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A3:
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1971 • April 4, 1977
PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 9
Excerpts From Transcript 305
SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Statement by Under Secretary Habib 318
U.S. ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN EAST ASIA
Statement by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke 322
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE g [ < E 1 I N
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971
April 4, 1977
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
President Carter's News Conference of March 9
Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the opening statement and the
questions and answers of a news conference
held by President Carter on March 9. 1
I have long been concerned about our own
nation's stance in prohibiting American citi-
zens to travel to foreign countries. We also
are quite eagerly assessing our own nation's
policies that violate human rights as defined
by the Helsinki agreement. 2
Later on this year we'll go to Belgrade to
assess the component parts of the Helsinki
agreement. And I want to be sure that we
don't violate those rights. So I've instructed
the Secretary of State to remove any travel
restrictions on American citizens who want to
go to Vietnam, to North Korea, to Cuba, and
to Cambodia. And these restrictions will be
lifted as of the 18th day of March.
I would like to point out that we still don't
have diplomatic relationships with these coun-
tries. That's a doubtful prospect at this time.
So there will be some necessary precautions
that ought to be taken by citizens who go
there, since we don't have our own diplomats
in those countries to protect them if they
should have difficulty.
I'd be glad to answer any questions that you
might have.
Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, UPI]?
Q. Mr. President, an American delegate to the
U.N. Human Rights Commission has said
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p.
328.
2 For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.
that he believes and he hopes that his allega-
tions concerning terror, suffering in Chile to-
day, coincide with your human rights policy.
Do they?
The President: Well, I don't know which
delegate this is or what his concerns are. But
we are still concerned about deprivation of
human rights in many of the countries of the
world. I think Chile would be one of those
where concern has been expressed. And I
want to be sure that the American people un-
derstand that this is a very sensitive issue.
We've tried to be broad based in our ex-
pression of concern and also responsible. At
first, our policy was interpreted, I think im-
properly, to deal exclusively with the Soviet
Union. I've just pointed out how our own
country has been at fault in some instances.
Torture has been reported to us from some of
the nations of the world. We are presenting
these items to the Congress as required by
law. But throughout the entire world, in
Latin America, in our own country, in the
Communist nations in Eastern Europe, and in
the Soviet Union, we are very much aware of
the concern about human rights.
I think it's entirely appropriate for our own
country to take the leadership role and let the
world say that the focal point for the preser-
vation and protection of human rights is in the
United States of America. I'm proud of this.
And I intend to adhere to it with the deepest
possible personal commitment, and I believe I
speak accurately for the American people on
this subject.
Q. Well, then, does that mean, Mr. Presi-
dent, that you don't object to the remarks that
were made by our delegate?
The President: I think that the remarks
made by the delegate concerning our past in-
April4, 1977
305
volvement in Chilean political affairs was in-
appropriate. I didn't know about it ahead of
time. It was a personal expression of opinion
by that delegate.
I think that the Church committee in the
Senate has not found any evidence that the
United States was involved in the overthrow
of the Allende government in Chile. There
were some allegations made, I think perhaps
accurate, that we did have financial aid and
other — I think financial aid to be
restrictive — to political elements in Chile that
may have contributed to the change in gov-
ernment. But I don't think there has been any
proof of illegalities there. And the statements
made by our delegate were his own personal
statements, not representing our govern-
ment's.
Q. Mr. President, there has been a lot of
talk about defensible borders lately and what
that means in regard to the Middle East.
Could I ask you, sir, do you feel that it would
be appropriate in a Middle East peace settle-
ment for the Israelis to keep some of the oc-
cupied land they took during the 1967 war in
order to have secure borders?
The President: The "defensible border"
phrase, the "secure borders" phrase, ob-
viously are just semantics. I think it's a rela-
tively significant development in the descrip-
tion of possible settlement in the Middle East
to talk about these things as a distinction.
The recognized borders have to be mutual.
The Arab nations, the Israeli nation, have to
agree on permanent and recognized borders,
where sovereignty is legal as mutually
agreed. Defense lines may or may not conform
in the foreseeable future to those legal bor-
ders. There may be extensions of Israeli de-
fense capability beyond the permanent and
recognized borders.
I think this distinction is one that is now
recognized by Israeli leaders. The definition
of borders on a geographical basis is one that
remains to be determined. But I think that it
is important for the world to begin to see, and
for the interested parties to begin to see, that
there can be a distinction between the two:
the ability of Israel to defend herself by in-
ternational agreement or by the sometime
placement of Israeli forces themselves or by
monitoring stations, as has been the case in
the Sinai, beyond the actual sovereignty bor-
ders as mutually agreed by Israel and her
neighbors.
Q. Well, does that mean international zones
between the countries?
The President: International zones could
very well be part of an agreement. And I
think that I can see in a growing way, a step-
by-step process where there might be a
mutual agreement that the ultimate settle-
ment, even including the border delineations,
would be at a certain described point. In an
interim state, maybe two years, four years,
eight years or more, there would be a mutual
demonstration of friendship and an end to the
declaration or state of war.
I think that what Israel would like to have
is what we would like to have: a termination
of belligerence toward Israel by her
neighbors, a recognition of Israel's right to
exist, the right to exist in peace, the opening
up of borders with free trade, tourist travel,
cultural exchange between Israel and her
neighbors; in other words, a stabilization of
the situation in the Middle East without a
constant threat to Israel's existence by her
neighbors.
This would involve substantial withdrawal
of Israel's present control over territories.
Now, where that withdrawal might end, I
don't know. I would guess it would be some
minor adjustments in the 1967 borders. But
that still remains to be negotiated.
But I think this is going to be a long, tedi-
ous process. We're going to mount a major ef-
fort in our own government in 1977 to bring
the parties to Geneva. Obviously any agree-
ment has to be between the parties con-
cerned. We will act as an intermediary when
our good offices will serve well.
But I'm not trying to predispose our own
nation's attitudes toward what might be the
ultimate details of the agreement that can
mean so much to world peace.
Q. At the risk of oversimplification, sir, I
306
Department of State Bulletin
believe I understand during the campaign you
proposed a gradual withdrawal of American
troops from Korea.
The President: Yes.
Q. Yet, after your revised budget went to
Congress, the Army has gone to Congress and
asked in fiscal 1978, for a doubling of mili-
tary construction funds for Korea and in the
three ensuing years, for more than $110 mil-
lion for similar construction. How does that
square with your withdrawal plans?
The President: My commitment to with-
draw American ground troops from Korea has
not changed. I'll be meeting this afternoon
with the Foreign Minister of South Korea.
This will be one of the matters that I will dis-
cuss.
I've also talked to General Vessey [John W.
Vessey, Jr.], who is in charge of our armed
forces in South Korea. I think that the time
period as I described in the campaign months,
a four- or five-year time period, is appro-
priate. The schedule for withdrawal of Ameri-
can ground troops would have to be worked
out very carefully with the South Korean
Government. It would also have to be done
with the full understanding and, perhaps, par-
ticipation of Japan.
I would want to leave in place in South
Korea adequate ground forces owned by and
controlled by the South Korean Government
to protect themselves against any intrusion
from North Korea. I would envision a con-
tinuation of American air cover for South
Korea over a long period of time.
But these are the basic elements, and I'm
very determined that over a period of time, as
described just then, that our ground troops
would be withdrawn.
Q. Mr. President, Vd like to try to clarify
the Israeli situation, if I might. A moment
ago in answering the question, you spoke of
the possibility of substantial withdrawal of
Israeli control over territory and then, just a
few seconds later, spoke of the possibility of
minor territorial concessions by the Israelis.
What is it exactly that you have in mind here?
Are you really talking about some big with-
drawals, or are you talking only about minor
withdrawals?
The President: I don't think I would use the
word minor withdrawals. I think there might
be minor adjustments to the 1967 — pre-1967
borders. But that's a matter for Israel and her
neighbors to decide between themselves.
I believe that we will know by, I'd say, the
middle of May, much more clearly the posi-
tions of the interested parties. I've not yet
met nor talked to the leaders in Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan, Egypt — Saudi Arabia, to a
lesser direct-participation degree.
I will meet with all these leaders between
now and the middle of May. And I don't want
to try to define in any specific terms the exact
delineation of borders, but I think this is ob-
viously one of the most serious problems.
There are three basic elements: One is an
ultimate commitment to complete peace in the
Middle East; second, border determinations
which are highly controversial and have not
yet been defined by either side; and third,
dealing with the Palestinian question.
And I'm not trying to act as the one to lay
down an ultimate settlement. I don't know
what an ultimate settlement will be. But
these matters will be freely and openly de-
bated within our own country and within the
countries involved. And I think I've described
as best I can my own position.
Q. Mr. President, last week in an interview
you expressed concern about the disclosure of
confidential and classified information. Ad-
miral [Stansfield] Turner, your choice to
head the CIA, has said, I believe in tes-
timony, that he would favor criminal penal-
ties for disclosure by government officials of
that type of information, but Vice President
Mondale said he's opposed to it. I wonder, sir,
if you'd tell us where you stand on that issue
and what, other than restricting access to
classified information, you intend to do about
this problem?
The President: Well, my own interest would
be to minimize the use of any criminal penal-
ties for disclosure of information. There are
April 4, 1977
307
other penalties that can be used without crim-
inal charges, and I think that Vice President
Mondale drew that distinction.
I don't know yet what procedure we will fol-
low. My own hope would be that we could
prevent the disclosure of intelligence informa-
tion that might be damaging to our national
security, rather than trying to control that
problem by the imposition of legal criminal
penalties.
Q. Could you elaborate on how you might
prevent that, Mr. President?
The President: Well, I think, first of all, is a
tighter control over the number of people who
have access to material that's highly sensi-
tive, that might damage the relationship
between our own country and our friends and
allies. We've already initiated steps to that
degree and we'll be pursuing it.
As you know, Admiral Turner has only re-
cently been confirmed. He's just now getting
his presence felt in the defense communities.
I'll be going out to the CIA headquarters this
afternoon to see the oath of office adminis-
tered to him.
But we'll make sure that the public knows
what new policies we impose. But the one
that's easiest to describe, and also very dif-
ficult to do, is to make sure that we don't have
too many people knowing about matters that
they don't need to know and, also, that we can
protect the legitimate confidentiality of
agreements between ourselves and our allies.
Now, I would never permit anything that
was either illegal or improper. And we've got
a very good arrangement that was primarily
set up by President Ford to prevent abuses.
The Intelligence Oversight Board is made up
of three distinguished men appointed by Pres-
ident Ford, who have complete access to any
operation conducted by the intelligence
forces.
Senator Inouye's committee in the Senate
and, I think, six committees in the House also
have access to this information. Of course, I'm
monitoring it myself. And I think Admiral
Turner's integrity is also a guarantee that
there will be no future abuses.
But that doesn't mean that everything that
we do in gathering intelligence on which our
security might very well depend has to be re-
vealed to the public. And drawing of that dis-
tinction is one that's my responsibility, and I
think I can handle that.
Q. What effect in your mind, if any, is the
extent of debate in the Senate over Mr. [Paul
C] Warnke's qualifications to be the chief
SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]
negotiator going to have eventually on our
negotiating position?
The President: I don't believe that the
exact vote in the Senate on Mr. Warnke's con-
firmation will have a major effect on future
negotiations with the Soviet Union on SALT.
The obvious impression that concerns me is
a demonstration of lack of confidence of the
Senate in my own ability and attitudes as a
chief negotiator. Obviously, as President, any
decisions made with the Russians on reduc-
tion of atomic weapons would have to be ap-
proved by me.
I have promised the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who in the past perhaps have been bypassed
in the process, that they will always know
ahead of time what our position will be at the
negotiating table. I've not promised the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that they would have the right
to approve or disapprove every individual
item in negotiations.
But I hope that the Senate will give Mr.
Warnke a strong vote. I think many of the
people that oppose Mr. Warnke just do not
want to see any substantial reductions in
atomic weapons, even though they are agreed
to mutually by us and the Soviet Union or
even if they are designed to reduce the threat
of nuclear destruction of the world. I feel very
deeply that we ought to pursue with every
possible means, an agreement with the Soviet
Union for substantial reductions in atomic
weapons. I think Mr. Warnke agrees; most of
the Senators agree.
So, there are a wide range of reasons for
not voting for Mr. Warnke. I have complete
confidence in him. And I might say there is
one more very significant guard against any
error that I and Mr. Warnke and the Secre-
tary of State and others might make. The
Senate has to approve, by a two-thirds vote
after complete open debate, any agreements
308
Department of State Bulletin
signed with the Soviet Union. So, I think that
the attacks on Mr. Warnke are primarily by
those who don't want to see substantial reduc-
tions in nuclear weapons in the world.
Q. Mr. President, I'd like to go just a little
bit further in your discussion of the defensible
borders issue. If I understood you correctly,
you're talking about the possibility of some-
thing like an Israeli defense line along the
Jordan River and perhaps at some point on
the Sinai Desert and perhaps at some point on
the Golan Heights that would be defense
forces but not legal borders. Have I under-
stood that correctly, that your feeling is that
the Israelis are going to have to have some
kind of defense forces along the Jordan River
and in those other places?
The President: Well, you added a great deal
to what I said. In the first place, I didn't men-
tion any particular parts of the geography
around Israel. And I didn't confine the de-
fense capability to Israeli forces. These might
very well be international forces. It might
very well be a line that's fairly broad, say 20
kilometers or more, where demilitarization is
guaranteed on both sides. It might very well
consist of outposts, electronics or, perhaps,
personnel outposts as were established in the
Sinai region as a result of the Egypt and Is-
raeli agreement.
I'm not going to try to get more specific in
saying what will or will not be the case. But
that is a possibility that might lead to the al-
leviation of tension there, and it's one about
which I will be discussing this matter with the
representatives from the Arab countries when
they come.
Q. On several occasions, Mr. President,
you have spoken in terms of the United States
being ready to move to a quick SALT agree-
ment, omitting cruise missiles, "Backfire"
bombers, if necessary. I'm wondering, sir,
have you had any indication yet of Russian
intentions on this subject?
The President: The Soviet Union, so far as I
know, still would like to include the cruise
missile question in the present negotiations.
They don't want to discuss Backfire bomber at
all. And my hope has been and is that by the
exclusion of both those controversial items,
which will require long and tedious negotia-
tions, that we might move to a rapid agree-
ment at SALT Two and immediately begin to
discuss, for instance, the Backfire bombers,
the cruise missiles, in subsequent negotia-
tions.
But I do not have any indication yet that
the Soviets have changed their position on
that issue.
Q. Mr. President, what about nuclear re-
ductions ?
The President: Again, I think you have two
approaches to the question.
I have proposed both directly and indirectly
to the Soviet Union, publicly and privately,
that we try to identify those items on which
there is relatively close agreement — not com-
pletely yet, because details are very difficult
on occasion. But I have, for instance,
suggested that we forgo the opportunity to
arm satellite bodies and also to forgo the op-
portunity to destroy observation satellites.
We've also proposed that the Indian Ocean
be completely demilitarized, that a com-
prehensive test ban be put into effect, that
prior notification of test missile launchings be
exchanged. And I would like to see any of
these items on which the Soviets will agree
quickly be concluded and then get down to the
much more difficult negotiations on much
more drastic, overall commitments to atomic
weapons, leading ultimately to the complete
elimination of atomic weapons from the face of
the earth.
This is going to be a long, slow, tedious
process. But I think if we and the Soviets
could agree on the easier items — and none of
them are very easy — quickly, it would show
good faith. I think it would let the world know
that we are serious in stopping once and for
all what has been a continuous and rapid esca-
lation in atomic weapon capabilities since they
were first evolved.
The press: Thank you, Mr. President.
The President: Thank you very much.
April 4, 1977
309
Prime Minister Rabin of Israel
Visits Washington
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State
of Israel made an official visit to Washington
March 6-9, during which he met with Presi-
dent Carter and other government officials.
Following is an exchange of remarks between
President Carter and Prime Minister Rabin at
a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of
the White House on March 7. 1
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 14
PRESIDENT CARTER
I'd like to say first of all that I am very
deeply grateful to welcome back to our coun-
try an old friend of mine and a longtime friend
of the United States, Prime Minister Rabin
from Israel.
We've had two foreign visitors already.
This is a different kind of visit. This is going
to be a series of working sessions. Because of
the crucial nature of problems that face the
Middle East and the close historic ties be-
tween Israel and the United States, we've de-
cided to minimize the amount of time spent in
ceremony. We will have a meeting tonight at
a banquet, but it will be a working banquet.
And I believe that this is the kind of inter-
relationship that will demonstrate to the
world the seriousness with which we address
our problems in the Middle East, our com-
mitment to Israel, our longstanding friend-
ship, our sharing of democratic principles and
human liberty, and our constant search for
peace.
As many of you may know, in the six-day
war in Israel a number of years ago, the
strategist and the tactician and the com-
mander was Prime Minister Rabin. Later he
was Ambassador to our country.
And while I was Governor of Georgia, he
and his wife visited me in Atlanta. He had
political aspirations then, I imagine, in the
1 For an exchange of toasts between President Carter
and Prime Minister Rabin at a dinner at the White
House on Mar. 7, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 323.
back of his mind. His success in politics was
much more rapid than I have achieved. When
I went to Israel not too long ago, he came
back from Africa to meet with me and to ex-
plain to me in a two- or three-hour session in
my hotel room some of the inner workings and
hidden mechanism of the Israeli political
structure. I didn't realize then how well he
understood them, because shortly afterward
he became the Prime Minister of that great
country. Later, I've now become President of
our country.
But I think this longstanding relationship
with him and a personal knowledge of him and
his deep commitment to peace in a courageous
way will stand us in good stead as we explore
the future of our two countries.
Recently, Secretary of State Vance took a
trip to the Middle East, began his trip with a
long conversation with Prime Minister Rabin
and his Cabinet, members of the Knesset,
other leaders of Israel, and then subsequently
went to meet with the leaders of other coun-
tries in the Middle East to try to explore some
common ground for future permanent peace
there, so that Israel might have defensible
borders so that the peace commitments would
never be violated, and that could be a sense of
security about this young country in the fu-
ture.
I can't think of any two nations on Earth
that more narrowly focus deep commitments
on a common way for the principles of gov-
ernment based on mutual background, the
present considerations on a common basis,
and in the future a mutual commitment.
This is a time of great joy for me to have
Prime Minister Rabin and his wife, Leah,
come to visit us. And I believe that the next
two days of discussions between myself and
him, his leaders and ours, the Cabinet-level
officers and the leaders of Congress and the
private community, will be very fruitful.
Nineteen seventy-seven is a year that
might very well bring a major step forward
toward ultimate and permanent peace. And to
a great degree, the success of this year's
negotiations and hopes rest on the shoulders
of a man who in the past has demonstrated his
capability of dealing with complicated prob-
lems in a frank and courageous fashion and
310
Department of State Bulletin
who has a vision that is very closely compati-
ble with the visions of the people of the
United States.
So on behalf of our people, I welcome you
back to our country, Mr. Rabin, and would
like very much to express our complete com-
mitment to an even greater interrelationship
on a common basis with the courageous citi-
zens whom you represent in the great nation
of Israel.
Thank you for coming. You are welcome
here.
PRIME MINISTER RABIN
Mr. President, Mrs. Carter: My wife and I
deeply appreciate your personal welcome and
your kind, warm words.
May I say it is always a pleasure to me to be
back in Washington and to see around me so
many friends. I wish particularly to thank
you, Mr. President, for the kind invitation
that brings me here today.
Your hospitality enables me to convey in a
most personal manner the best wishes, the
friendship, and the esteem of the people and
the Government of Israel, to you, Mr. Presi-
dent, and to the great people you represent.
Democratic Israel stands with you in your
endeavor to foster peace and human rights
within the family of nations. From this plat-
form, let me say to you, Mr. President, that
Israel shall continue to work tirelessly for the
peace and welfare of our region, strengthened
and encouraged by the special relationship
that has long marked the ties between our
two peoples.
Let me emphasize to you, Mr. President,
that I have come from Jerusalem, the City of
Peace, with a sense of dedication to build a
structure of peace between Israel and our
neighbors. Peace is our highest aspiration. It
is toward this end that Israel commits all its
energies; for peace is the essence of the herit-
age we share and the goal of policy we pursue.
It is a heritage as old, as eternal, and as living
as the Bible.
Everything our people stand for, every-
thing we believe in derives from the Biblical
definition of what is right and good. In the
words of Solomon in the Book of Proverbs:
"Righteousness exalts a nation."
It has been the moral standing of America
that induces help among millions longing for a
better, a more decent, and a more peaceful
world. It is the understanding and support
which America has throughout displayed for
the security and welfare of my own nation
that moves me now to express to you and
through you to the American people our deep-
est gratitude.
Mr. President, I come knowing that our as-
pirations and goals are one. It is in this spirit
that I look forward to our forthcoming talks,
and it is in this very same spirit that I bring
to you from Jerusalem our sincere greetings
of Shalom.
British Prime Minister Callaghan
Visits Washington
Prime Minister James Callaghan of the
United Kingdom made an official visit to
Washington March 9-12, during which he met
with President Carter and other government
officials. Following is an exchange of re-
marks between President Carter and Prime
Minister Callaghan at a welcoming ceremony
on the South Lawn of the White House on
March 10. l
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 14
PRESIDENT CARTER
It is with a great deal of pleasure person-
ally, and on behalf of the American people,
that we welcome to our country and to our na-
tional capital our good friends from the
United Kingdom, Prime Minister Callaghan
and his wife, Audrey.
I think it is not an exaggeration to say, nor
is it any reflection on our other friends and
1 For an exchange of toasts between President Carter
and Prime Minister Callaghan at a dinner at the White
House on Mar. 10, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 342.
April 4, 1977
311
allies to say, that we enjoy a special relation-
ship with Great Britain, with the other coun-
tries of the United Kingdom. They are our
closest allies and friends. We share security
agreements with them, trade agreements
with them, that are not shared with any other
country. There has been an intimate relation-
ship for decades and generations with the
people of Great Britain that has carved out
between us an unshakable friendship and
mutual commitment.
We are honored today to have the Prime
Minister with us because of his superb lead-
ership capability, demonstrated in having
held the three highest positions in the Gov-
ernment of Great Britain, even before he be-
came Prime Minister.
He also comes here with a special honor
paid to him by the other nations of the Euro-
pean Community. He is the President of the
European Community, and in my own discus-
sions with him today and tomorrow and to-
night, we will be talking about matters that
are bilateral in nature, that involve our secu-
rity based on the NATO interrelationships;
and also he will represent the European
Community itself — nine nations — there.
We have just celebrated last year our 200th
birthday, and the people of the entire United
Kingdom participated in an extraordinary de-
gree in helping us reconfirm our commitments
to the essence of the American spirit.
This is a silver jubilee for Great Britain, for
the United Kingdom, and we will be honoring
the Queen, who has served so well over the
last 25 years.
There has not been a visit by an American
President to Great Britain since, I believe,
1970. But because of our own interest in
strengthening ties and because of the lead-
ership capabilities of Prime Minister Cal-
laghan, I and the leaders of several other na-
tions will assemble in London in May to talk
about matters of great mutual interest.
I look forward to going back to my own
mother country. Although we have people in
our nation from many, many nations, I think
that all of us recognize that, historically and
politically, Great Britain is still America's
mother country.
So I look forward to going to London in
May. I am very grateful to have Prime Minis-
ter Callaghan come here. I look forward to-
night to a banquet. I am going to ask the
Prime Minister and the Vice President to sing
a duet for us as they did when the Vice Presi-
dent visited London not too long ago.
And I think that this combination of very
serious security matters, very important eco-
nomic matters, a spirit of historical friendship
and also personal friendship, will exemplify
this visit of our most distinguished visitor.
Thank you very much.
PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN
Mr. President and Mrs. Carter: Thank you
very much indeed for your very warm welcome
this morning and for your very kindly words
and for the weather, if I may say so, too.
I am very grateful to you for what you said.
I am not sure it is all true about me, but it is
certainly true that I have held all the major
offices. But I feel a little like the French aris-
tocrat after the Revolution who was asked
what he did. And he said, "I survived." And I
have got a feeling that in politics, to survive is
probably the most you can hope for. You can
influence events a little, but that is about it.
At any rate, I always arrive here, Mr. Pres-
ident, as you well know, with a very keen
sense of anticipation for the discussions that
we have, and on this occasion it is especially
invigorating to be here at the beginning of
your new Administration.
Now, you know, sir, as I know, that the
friendship between our two countries em-
braces all parties and all administrations on
both sides of the Atlantic, whatever they may
be. But nevertheless, in renewing the bonds
of friendship — and I hope, sir, that you and I
will be able to strike up a personal
friendship — let me say that I do so with a par-
ticular sense of excitement, an excitement of
sharing your new hopes, your new aspira-
tions, your intentions, your new policies,
being here at the beginning of a new Adminis-
tration.
And Vice President Mondale, whose words
I found very valuable when he came to
London — I am not sure that his singing was
312
Department of State Bulletin
quite up to that standard — but certainly he
communicated to us some of the excitement of
being in at the start of this new Administra-
tion in the United States.
You bear much of the burdens of the free
world — military burdens, economic burdens,
aid burdens. But what is more, Mr. President,
what you can do and what you have already
begun to do is to influence the political tone of
the world in a very marked degree. And I
would like to thank you, sir, and indeed the
whole American people, that in the leadership
that you give to the world today, that you
carry your responsibilities with spirit and
with a marked constructive thinking, and
imaginative thinking, too.
You referred, sir, to the fact that for the
time being I am President of the European
Community. Let me hasten to disabuse our
friends who gather here — that has nothing to
do with my capacity; it is as we say in the
United Kingdom, "It just happened to be
Buggins' turn," and I am Buggins.
But what I can say on behalf of them all is
that every member of the Community is de-
sirous that there should be a close partnership
and a strengthening of relations between the
United States and Europe.
You and I, Mr. President, will be holding
our discussions in a world which has now ex-
perienced four years of recession, the deepest
since the 1930's. Of course, the free world can
and will emerge from this recession, but we
need concerted intergovernmental action if we
are to do so as speedily as possible.
No one group of nations and no one nation
can survive permanently as an island of pros-
perity if the remainder of the world is in re-
cession. And our task, sir, if I may be bold
enough to say so, is to see how we can help
poverty and unemployment among the world's
people in an era of rapid change that has been
caused by the unprecedented speed of techno-
logical development.
This is going to cause us many problems.
And I was heartened yesterday, sir, to see
you calling for a new program to help the
young people of the United States who need
training and who are unemployed and who
you wish to see trained and get back into
employment.
Sir, we shall also need to discuss the eternal
problem, the never-ending problem of how
best to maintain and enhance the liberty for
our own citizens and for people in all parts of
the world.
We shall have to consider how to
strengthen our work for peace and enhance
our own security, how we can live with the
different systems, political systems, from our
own, those that are not based on parliamen-
tary democracy, as ours is; for if we don't learn
how to live with them, then with the rapid
advance of nuclear technology we shall cer-
tainly die with them.
And so we have much to talk about, and I
look forward to our conversations on these
and many other matters.
We shall be able to carry the results of our
discussions with us into the international
gatherings to which we both belong and espe-
cially, sir, to the Downing Street summit in
London on May 7 and 8 to which you have
kindly accepted my invitation. I hope that we
shall be able to have prior discussions that
will lead to positive results from that particu-
lar conference.
You, sir, have referred to the relationship
between our countries. When I was young I
used to say what I would like to do is have six
months in the United Kingdom and six
months in the United States. Getting a bit old
now, but even so, it is a wonderful place to be.
You have got an invigorating country here.
You have problems, but your attitude is al-
ways how can we lick them? That is what I
like to see. That is why it is such a pleasure to
be back here with you, sir, at the beginning of
your Administration, to wish you every suc-
cess in the tasks that you are going to have
to carry through and which you will have our
great support in all that you endeavor to do,
because we know that as leaders of the free
world you will get plenty of criticism. But you
also need support and encouragement, too.
So I can assure you, Mr. President, in con-
clusion, you will receive a very warm wel-
come when you come to London. We are very
honored that you should do so on May 7 and 8.
And I thank you again for your most kindly
welcome, you and Mrs. Carter, here this
morning.
April 4, 1977
313
President Carter's Call-in Radio Program of March 5
Following are excerpts from the transcript
of President Carter's telephone call-in radio
program, "Ask the President," of March 5.
Walter Cronkite, of CBS News, was
moderator. 1
Joseph Willman, of Sterling Heights,
Mich.: First, of all, Vd like to say good after-
noon to President Carter and Mr. Cronkite.
My question right now is, according to the
UPI story in today's Detroit News, Idi Amin
has sent squads that have killed 7,000 Chris-
tians. With this and other happenings there,
how can we with good conscience trust a man
with such an ego [inaudible], and if the time
arises will we use force to get them out, even
though confrontation with this country is ex-
pected by Amin?
The President: Well, it's hard to know how
to answer that question about future events.
As you know, we had what was on the border
of a crisis last weekend. The attitude that we
took was constantly to monitor what is going
on in Uganda to deal directly with Amin in a
very forceful way, to let him know that we
were expecting American lives to be
protected.
We also got the help of several national
leaders who are quite close to Amin. Primar-
ily those are of the Moslem faith, and they
contacted him directly.
We also got the Federal Republic of
Germany — West Germany — who has diplomat-
ic leaders in Uganda, in Entebbe, Uganda, to
contact Amin.
And he was constantly giving me assurance
through cables that the Americans would not
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p.
289.
be hurt. As you know, the outcome of that
weekend's tension was that he eventually said
that the meeting with the Americans was
called off and that anyone who wanted to
leave or come into Uganda from our country
would be permitted to do so.
I think that it's obvious that we'll do what-
ever we can to protect American lives
throughout the world. We have in the past,
before I became President, informed the
American people in Uganda — and I might say
in several other countries around the world —
that there was a potentially dangerous cir-
cumstance for them and that if they were
primarily concerned with a peaceful life, they
ought to change countries.
We do know that most of the persons who
are Americans in Uganda are missionaries,
deeply committed to their own religious faith.
They've got an option to leave, and they've
decided to stay. So, I think at this time I feel
that the American lives there will be pro-
tected.
We did act, I think, forcefully and effec-
tively with Amin; we had a lot of help from
other nations. And I can't say what I will do
in the future except to try to handle the situa-
tion similarly to what I did last weekend.
Mark Fendrick, of Brooklyn, N.Y.: Good
afternoon, Mr. President. What Pd like to ask
is in relationship to the attempts for return-
ing to a normal relationship with Cuba. Now,
in the paper the last couple of days here in
New York there's been talk about the Yankees
baseball team going to Cuba.
Do you think that this is a possibility in the
near future, and do you think that normal re-
lations to Cuba are possible again within the
near future?
The President: Well, there are varying de-
314
Department of State Bulletin
grees of relationships with Cuba. As you
know, we have had some discussions with
them in the past; for instance, on the anti-
hijacking agreement which expires this
spring. And we now have no visitation rights
by American citizens to go to Vietnam, to
North Korea, to Cuba, and one or two other
nations.
We do have a procedure already in effect
whereby a limited number of Americans can go
into Cuba without using a passport because of
a prior agreement with the Cuban Govern-
ment.
I would like to do what I can to ease ten-
sions with Cuba. It's only 90 miles, as you
know, from the Florida coast. And I don't
know yet what we will do. Before any full
normalization of relationships can take place,
though, Cuba would have to make some fairly
substantial changes in their attitude. I would
like to insist, for instance, that they not inter-
fere in the internal affairs of countries in this
hemisphere and that they decrease their mili-
tary involvement in Africa and that they rein-
force a commitment to human rights by re-
leasing political prisoners that have been in
jail now in Cuba for 17 or 18 years, things of
that kind.
But I think before we can reach that point
we'll have to have discussions with them. And
I do intend to see discussions initiated with
Cuba quite early on reestablishing the anti-
hijacking agreement, arriving at a fishing
agreement between us and Cuba, since our
200-mile limits do overlap between Florida
and Cuba. And I would not be averse in the
future to seeing our visitation rights per-
mitted as well.
Mr. Fendrick. In relationship, though, to
the Yankees playing an exhibition game
there, I've noticed that Secretary Vance has
backed this idea. Do you think that that's a
possibility this season?
The President: It's a possibility, yes.
Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, may I ask, it
seemed that Secretary Vance indicated just
the last day or so that there would be no pre-
conditions in discussions with Cuba. Are you
now saying that there will be?
The President: No. The preconditions that I
describe would be prior to full normalization of
relationships, the establishment of embassies
in both our countries, the complete freedom of
trade between the two countries.
But you couldn't possibly arrive at a solu-
tion to some of those questions without dis-
cussions. So, we will begin discussions with
Cuba, if they approve the idea, fairly shortly
on the items that I have described — increased
visitation of Americans to and from Cuba, the
fishing-rights question that has to be resolved
for the protection of our own fishermen, and
also the antihijacking agreement which has
been in effect in the past but is about to
expire.
John Melfi, of Johnson City, N.Y.: I know
we have a foreign aid policy to help countries
in need, but why do we spend so much on this
when we have so much poverty, unemploy-
ment, et cetera, in our own country?
The President: Well, John, I am going to
take a position that's not very popular, politi-
cally speaking. We only spend about three-
tenths of 1 percent of our gross national prod-
uct on foreign aid, which is about half the
proportion that is allotted to this purpose by
other countries like France, Germany and so
forth.
I don't particularly want to increase this
greatly, but I would like for it to be predict-
able. Also, in the past, we've not had foreign
aid used in an effective way. As one of my
friends has said quite often, I'm not in favor of
taxing the poor people in our rich country and
sending the money to the rich people in poor
countries; and quite often that has been done
in the past.
We have also a need, in my opinion, to sup-
port the lending institutions, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank. They
give aid to other countries in the form of
loans, sometimes low-interest loans. But in-
stead of just handing gifts out that are kind of
bad, as a basic philosophy — and also that are
abused — I would favor contributing to the
capital stock of these international or regional
April 4, 1977
315
lending agencies. I believe we will get a lot
better return on our money.
And I might say that my own experience in
this first six weeks has been that the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, for instance, and the
World Bank are quite strict on a nation that
makes a loan. They make them work hard to-
ward balancing their budget. Quite often they
require them to clean up corruption. They
make them assess very carefully their trade
policies.
So, I believe that the lending procedure in
foreign aid is much better than the gift proce-
dure, and when direct grants are made, we
ought to do more than we have in the past to
get the grants to people who actually need it.
Within those changes, I think that our
present level of foreign aid is about right,
John.
Mr. Strickland: I am John Strickland from
Fayetteville, North Carolina, and I want to
thank you for this opportunity to talk with
you. And I would like to know what your sen-
timents are on the Panama Canal 190U
treaty, and changing it.
The President: Okay. It is good to hear
from you, Mr. Strickland. My sister lives in
Fayetteville, as you may know. I am glad to
answer your question.
We are now negotiating with Panama as ef-
fectively as we can. As you may or may not
know, the treaty signed when Theodore
Roosevelt was President gave Panama
sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone it-
self. It gave us control over the Panama Canal
Zone as though we had sovereignty. So we've
always had a legal sharing of responsibility
over the Panama Canal Zone.
As far as sovereignty is concerned, I don't
have any hangup about that. I would hope
that after that — and expect that after the
year 2000 that we would have an assured
capacity or capability of our country with
Panama guaranteeing that the Panama Canal
would be open and of use to our own nation
and to other countries.
So, the subject of the negotiation now — it
has been going on quite a while — is to phase
out our military operations in the Panama
Canal Zone, but to guarantee that even after
the year 2000 that we would still be able to
keep the Panama Canal open to the use of
American and other ships.
President Carter Interviewed
by Media Representatives
President Carter met with a group of 22
publishers, editors, and broadcasters from 20
states on March U- Following is an excerpt
from the transcript of the interview. 1
Q. You spoke of the arms procurement as
part of one of these bullet-biting operations.
There has been a good deal of controversy
about American arms sales abroad to other
nations. The argument has been made re-
peatedly by supporters of that, that it is
necessary to maintain the balance of pay-
ments and maintain our defense industry.
What kind of look are you taking at that $12
billion-a-year annual rate of sales?
The President: A hard look. Here again, I
think that if there is one person in the gov-
ernment that ultimately has the responsibility
to take a position and to make a decision and
then explain the consequences of that decision
to the American people, it's the President; not
just because it's me — somebody has got to do
it, and it has to be the President.
When Cy Vance visited all the Middle East-
ern countries early this month, there was one
unanimous statement made by every head of
state, and that was that we are spending too
much of our money on weapons.
Now, it's hard for one of those countries,
for instance — I'm singling out that part of the
world — unilaterally to stop buying weapons.
But every one of them unilaterally said they
would like to stop. And I think that this puts a
responsibility back on our country, the major
arms supplier of the world, to try to induce
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p.
311.
316
Department of State Bulletin
Iran and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Syria
and Israel and Jordan to cut down on the
quantity of arms they buy.
Now, I've also been in touch with the Soviet
leaders, with the French leaders, with the
German leaders, and with the British, to join
with us in an effort to cut down on the quan-
tity of arms sold throughout the world. And
they've responded favorably so far. We've not
reached any tangible agreement, and I
can't — I don't want to claim that we have. But
there is a general concern around the world
that the arms sales are excessive, and I think
that our country can take some unilateral ac-
tion. We can take a considerable amount of ac-
tion bilaterally, when we get the buyer or the
purchaser of arms to agree to cut down the
quantity of their orders, and on a multilateral
basis, it's going to be slower to come. But I
think we can get our own allies and our poten-
tial adversaries to minimize or to reduce their
previous arms sales rates.
So I feel very strongly about this. And I be-
lieve that in the long run, our own economy
and the world peace will be enhanced by shift-
ing production and expenditure of funds to
other services or goods.
I'll just add one other thing: When you look
at it on a job-cost ratio basis, how many jobs
do you get for a million dollars spent? One of
the most inefficient industries is the defense
weapons industry. And I think that we need
not continue with a supposition that in the
long run the expenditure of the limited
amount of financial resources of the whole
world and of our own country is going to be
increased or decreased. When you spend
money for defense, you don't spend it on edu-
cation or health or other services or goods.
And I think the shift away from weapons to-
ward peaceful goods and services in the long
run is favorable for world peace, and also you
get more jobs per dollar spent.
Q. Mr. President, I am from the Rio
Grande Valley in Texas. And there is a prob-
lem there that affects the people that live in
that area, but it also affects everybody else in
the country. And that's the drug problem. A
day doesn't pass when there are not arrests
made for the drug smuggling, usually across
the border of Mexico. Last week, nine tons of
marijuana was confiscated. In your recent
discussions with Mexican President Lopez
Portillo, did you discuss this problem?
The President: Yes. Yes, we did discuss it
at length. I would guess that 70 percent of our
heroin comes to our country now from Mexico.
And the only way we can reduce that particu-
lar influx of drugs to our country is to cooper-
ate with the nations where it is grown. We
can, by infrared photography, either we or
the Mexican Government, for instance, iden-
tify the fields where the heroin poppies are
grown. And by going to the farms, the Mexi-
can soldiers go into the farms, they can de-
stroy those poppyfields before the harvest is
complete. At the same time, many of those
farmers are small, poverty stricken, live in
remote areas of the mountains. I think you
have to be above 3,000 feet to grow heroin
poppies, and alternative crops need to be pro-
vided for them.
So we discussed this at length, President
Lopez Portillo and I did, and we agreed that
with subcabinet-level representatives that we
would explore this question further. A part of
it, obviously, is trying to stop drugs as they
cross the border. But that's a very, very inef-
ficient operation. The cost is enormous. And
as you know, a tiny volume of a very large
quantity of heroin makes concealment very,
very easy. And so, to stop the drugs where
they are being produced is by far the better
approach. Lopez Portillo is also deeply con-
cerned about this. He feels the same way I do.
I've appointed as my own representative,
here in the White House, Dr. Peter Bourne,
who is probably the world's foremost expert
on heroin, cocaine, and marijuana — even
alcohol — all the drugs that are bad. He's trav-
eled throughout the world at the invitation of
other countries. He goes into countries that
we can't even get into because we don't have
diplomatic relationships with them. But be-
cause of his knowledge about the subject,
they bring him in to help them with their
problems. And he is heading up our drug ef-
fort in this country. And I think that with him
and the equivalent leaders in the other na-
tions, particularly Mexico, we can help a great
deal in the future.
April 4, 1977
317
THE CONGRESS
Southern Africa in the Global Context
Statement by Philip C. Habib
Under Secretary for Political Affairs 1
I am pleased to be here today, Mr. Chair-
man, to speak to this committee on a critical
question: the importance for the world at
large of achieving just solutions to the prob-
lems of southern Africa and the role which the
United States can play in contributing to
those solutions. I believe that our time to-
gether can be most productively spent in an
exchange of ideas and will therefore keep my
prepared remarks to a minimum.
I particularly welcome the opportunity to
appear before you at a time when the whole
question of U.S. policy toward southern Af-
rica is under urgent and comprehensive re-
view within the Department of State and
other concerned executive agencies. The
views and concerns expressed by your com-
mittee here today can help us to clarify the
issues and to formulate policies to deal with
those issues forthrightly and positively.
I can tell you that the general thrust of our
policy review has been to find ways of
strengthening the commitment of the United
States to social justice and racial equality in
southern Africa and of demonstrating that
commitment in tangible and meaningful ways.
It is, regrettably, the case that our actions in
the past have sometimes led others, both here
in the United States and abroad, to question
the depth and sincerity of that commitment.
It is the Administration's earnest hope that
1 Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
House Committee on International Relations on Mar. 3.
The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
when the historical record is finally written,
there will be no shadow of a doubt as to where
the United States stood on one of the great
moral and political issues of our time.
Perhaps the most concrete demonstration
to date of that renewed sense of commitment
is the Administration's unequivocal support
for efforts to repeal the so-called Byrd
amendment, under which the United States
has since 1971 imported raw materials from
Southern Rhodesia in open violation of its in-
ternational obligations as spelled out in the
U.N. Charter. Secretary of State Vance, tes-
tifying before the Senate Subcommittee on
African Affairs on February 10, stressed the
importance which President Carter personally
attaches to the repeal of this measure.
I would like for a moment to focus on the
broader context within which our policies to-
ward southern Africa must be viewed. In con-
structing a policy to deal with the problems of
that region, we must have a sure understand-
ing of our own national interests and act ac-
cordingly.
What are those interests, and how do we
serve them best in relation to southern Af-
rica?
First, I believe that our foreign policy must
be true to our own ideals as a nation. Presi-
dent Carter has, on many occasions, stated
clearly and forcefully his own personal com-
mitment to human rights. That commitment
requires our firm and clear opposition to ra-
cial and social injustice wherever it exists. A
policy toward southern Africa that is not
firmly grounded on this principle would be in-
consistent with our national character and
318
Department of State Bulletin
therefore would not command the support of
the American people. Moreover, it would cast
doubt on our commitment to social justice
both here at home and elsewhere in the world.
Secondly, we believe firmly that the people
of Africa hold the key to the solution of Afri-
can problems. The United States will remain
fully committed to using its political and eco-
nomic influence and its diplomatic offices to
support racial and social progress on the Afri-
can Continent. But it is not for us, or for any
other external power, to attempt to impose its
own ideas and solutions. It is for this reason
that during his recent visit to Africa our Am-
bassador to the United Nations, Andrew
Young, stressed that U.S. policy toward
southern Africa, and Africa as a whole, would
be developed in the closest possible consulta-
tions with African leaders.
The other important reason for our prefer-
ence for African solutions to African problems
is to avoid situations which make Africa an
arena for great-power rivalry, as happened in
Angola. Prolonged violence in southern Af-
rica, born out of racial discrimination and so-
cial and political injustice, could create oppor-
tunities for foreign intervention and confron-
tation. We believe that our best defense
against this possibility is to support policies
that will limit the areas where potential con-
flict may arise.
The United States recognizes that other na-
tions, most notably the developed countries of
Europe and Asia, also have important inter-
ests in the southern African region. In many
instances, their interests and influence
greatly exceed our own. We are convinced
that our traditional friends are equally con-
cerned and anxious to find solutions to the dif-
ficult problems of the region. To the extent
that we can combine and coordinate our ef-
forts, the prospects for encouraging meaning-
ful social and political change will be greatly
enhanced. During his visit to Europe and Ja-
pan, Vice President Mondale stressed that the
United States intends to consult even more
closely in the future on ways to bring our col-
lective influence to bear in seeking solutions
to the problems of southern Africa.
From the standpoint of our own economic
and strategic interests, we maintain firmly
that the United States has no reason to fear
the necessary and inevitable achievement of
racial equality and social justice in southern
Africa. To hold any other view would be to
refute the history of the past three decades and
to deny the obvious fact that the United States
has been able to establish cooperative and
constructive relations with newly emergent
nations in Africa and elsewhere in the world.
Indeed, it is only where progress toward so-
cial, racial, and political justice is delayed or
frustrated that the United States has any
cause for concern that conditions may arise
that are inhospitable to our basic national
interests. It is for this reason as well that we
must remain fully committed to helping those
who seek rapid, peaceful, and orderly change
in southern Africa.
Finally, the United States has a stake in
what happens in southern Africa because of
our belief that political harmony can and must
be achieved in diverse societies like our own.
The world is afflicted with nations in which
men of good will have not yet convinced their
countrymen that ethnic, racial, and religious
differences do not constitute a cause for dis-
crimination and violence. Success in achieving
orderly transitions to democratic rule in
southern Africa, with protection of human
rights for all, regardless of race, will help
those everywhere who seek peaceful resolu-
tions to conflict arising from ethnic, racial, or
religious differences.
Having outlined the considerations upon
which we believe U.S. policy toward southern
Africa should rest, I would like to review
briefly the status of the Administration's ef-
forts to date to develop a policy consistent
with these general principles and goals.
U.S. Position on Rhodesia and Namibia
In early 1976 the United States, in consulta-
tion with the frontline Presidents, began its
active involvement in the search for settle-
ments to the unresolved problems of Namibia
and Rhodesia. As the committee is aware, the
previous Administration achieved a major
breakthrough when, after months of intensive
diplomatic effort, it persuaded Ian Smith to
announce publicly last September 24 his ac-
April4, 1977
319
ceptance in principle of majority rule in
Rhodesia within two years.
That announcement led to the convening of
a conference of the Rhodesian parties under
British chairmanship in Geneva last October.
Regrettably, that conference adjourned in
December without measurable progress being
achieved on the central issue of the establish-
ment of an interim government that would
guide the territory to majority rule and inde-
pendence.
A mission to southern Africa led by Ambas-
sador Ivor Richard, the British Chairman of
the Geneva conference, was unsuccessful in
bridging the gap between the Rhodesian au-
thorities and the nationalists. On January 24
Ian Smith publicly rejected proposals that en-
visioned a British presence in Rhodesia dur-
ing the transitional period. That presence was
designed to serve as a balancing force be-
tween whites and blacks, assuring the former
of a tranquil transition and the latter of an ir-
reversible process toward majority rule
within a short, fixed time frame.
This Administration's response to Smith's
rejection was categoric. We stated our firm
support for the British and our belief that the
proposals put forward by them offered a
sound basis for continued negotiations. We
warned Smith that his intention to seek an
internal solution from which leading
nationalists would be excluded would clearly
be unworkable and unacceptable. It remains
our firm conviction that an internal settle-
ment that excludes important nationalist
leaders will not bring an end to the war and,
on the contrary, could well fuel the fires of
civil strife.
On February 10 Secretary Vance repeated
before the Senate Subcommittee on African
Affairs our clear statement to Smith that
under no circumstances can the Rhodesian re-
gime count on any form of American assist-
ance in its effort to prevent majority rule. In
the same statement, the Secretary reaffirmed
the Administration's unequivocal support for
repeal of the Byrd amendment. He under-
scored the importance that repeal would have
in strengthening our own leverage in promot-
ing a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and in
disabusing Ian Smith and the present Rhode-
sian authorities of any hope they might still
have that the United States will assist them
in their efforts to prevent majority rule.
The Administration will not be content to
end its efforts here, however. We are con-
tinuing to seek other ways to bring our posi-
tive influence to bear in encouraging rapid,
peaceful, and orderly change in southern Af-
rica.
Despite Smith's rejection, neither the
British nor we have abandoned the search for
a negotiated settlement. During February we
have twice consulted with British officials
here in Washington, most recently last week,
to consider what new initiatives might be
necessary to get negotiations going again. On
those occasions we have reaffirmed our sup-
port for the leading role that Britain, as the
recognized constitutional authority in
Rhodesia, must continue to play.
We are urgently consulting with the African
parties most interested and concerned on pos-
sible next steps. Ambassador Young's recent
visit to Africa afforded the Administration an
early opportunity to establish contact at a
high level on this and other issues of impor-
tance to Africans and to stress our intention
to develop our policies in close consultation
with them.
So long as there is no significant progress
through peaceful means toward the achieve-
ment of Africa's legitimate aspirations for ra-
cial equality and social justice, Africa's com-
mitment to armed struggle to achieve these
ends will remain a real one. Nevertheless we
believe that the leaders of Africa would all
prefer a solution that prevents further
bloodshed and destruction. It is the task of
diplomacy, and particularly of British and
American diplomacy in this instance, to help
the parties involved find ways to make a
negotiated solution possible.
With respect to Namibia, the United States
has supported and will continue to support
U.N. resolutions calling for South Africa to
end its illegal occupation of the territory and
for free elections there under U.N. supervi-
sion. We believe that all of Namibia's authen-
tic political voices, including specifically
SWAPO [South West Africa People's Or-
ganization], must be given the opportunity to
320
Department of State Bulletin
express themselves on the country's political
future. Any attempted solution that excludes
important Namibian political groups or that
fails to win the acceptance of the international
community is no solution at all and will not
receive the endorsement of the United States.
During his visit to Africa, Ambassador
Young found widespread support for the con-
tinuation of American efforts to develop a
negotiating framework within which the prin-
cipal parties can establish the steps leading to
independence and majority rule in Namibia.
We have assured all of the interested parties
that our diplomatic good offices will remain
available and that our efforts to promote a
settlement acceptable to the United Nations
and the international community will con-
tinue.
South African Role
A key factor in the success of American dip-
lomatic efforts to date has been our ability to
speak directly and frankly with all of the in-
volved parties. By virtue of its proximity and
ties with Rhodesia and its occupation of
Namibia, South Africa's role in the resolution
of both problems cannot be ignored. With re-
spect to Rhodesia, we have recently received
indications that the South African Govern-
ment is still interested in a negotiated settle-
ment. With respect to Namibia, we are at-
tempting to ascertain whether South Africa is
genuinely interested in moving toward an in-
ternationally acceptable solution.
So long as we are assured of the South Afri-
can willingness to be helpful, the United
States will be prepared to continue its consul-
tations with South Africa's leaders on these
issues. It should be made clear to all, how-
ever, that the United States has no interest in
any proposed solutions that would com-
promise the legitimate interests of the people
involved and their desires for majority rule
with full sovereignty and independence.
Moreover, our willingness to consult with
South Africa on these issues should in no way
be construed as an acceptance of that coun-
try's domestic policies. The violence in So-
weto and elsewhere bears grim testimony to a
society that must change, and change radi-
cally, or face the sure calamity of racial vio-
lence and chaos.
We will not hesitate to speak out publicly,
as appropriate, on events in South Africa, and
we will continue to make known to the South
African authorities our views, urging peaceful
and fundamental change. In addition, we will
seek ways of persuading South Africa that
such change is in the best interest of all its
citizens, black and white alike.
We are looking at the extent to which the
United States and other nations can use their
influence to both encourage and facilitate
change. At the same time, however, we must
remain sensitive to the danger that the at-
titudes and reactions of the outside world to
events in South Africa could have the unfor-
tunate effect of engendering greater isolation
and resistance to change. We must take care
that our own actions nurture, rather than in-
hibit, the changes that we believe can and
must be made.
The challenge that confronts our diplomacy,
and that of other nations committed to the
cause of social justice and racial equality in
southern Africa, is to find ways of transcend-
ing the barriers of fear and suspicion and to
point the way to solutions that will allow all of
the people of the region to live in dignity and
peace. There can be no question but that the
path ahead will be fraught with extreme dif-
ficulties. But neither can there be any ques-
tion of our dedication to continuing the
search.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Markup of S. 1439: Export Reorganization Act of 1976.
Meeting before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy. August 26-September 14, 1976. 274 pp.
United States Contributions to International Organiza-
tions. Report to the Congress for fiscal year 1975. H.
Doc. 95-11. January 1977. 126 pp.
Messages from the President of the United States
transmitting governing international fishery agree-
ments. Agreement with the Republic of Korea; H.
Doc. 95-78; February 21, 1977; 10 pp. Agreement
with Japan; H. Doc. 95-79; February 21, 1977; 13 pp.
Agreement with the European Economic Community;
H. Doc. 95-80; February 21, 1977; 9 pp. Agreement
with Spain; H. Doc. 95-81; February 21, 1977; 12 pp.
April 4, 1977
321
U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs in East Asia
Following is a statement made before the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of
the House Committee on International Rela-
tions on March 10 by Richard C. Holbrooke,
then Assistant Secretary-designate for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, whose nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 23. l
I am pleased to have this opportunity to
testify today on our economic and security as-
sistance programs in East Asia and the
Pacific. I greatly look forward to establishing
a constructive, compatible relationship with
this subcommittee and to working closely with
its members.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the end of
U.S. involvement in Indochina signals a new
era in East Asia. While tensions persist, they
are confined in scope and there is no major
conflict in progress. It appears that all of the
major powers, at least for the present, favor a
continuation of this situation. For many East
Asian countries, economic prospects are bet-
ter than ever before.
There are, nevertheless, major uncertain-
ties in the area. For example: Relationships
among the three states of Indochina and be-
tween Indochina and neighboring Southeast
Asian countries are still ambivalent and could
turn for the worse as easily as go for the bet-
ter. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is
presently quiet, compared to the upsurge of
violence last year, but it, too, is unstable.
Many countries are trying to cope, internally,
with the unaccustomed absence of wartime
pressures and the distortions these pressures
tend to cause in both economic and political
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
life. In brief, East Asia is undergoing its own
transition from an unfortunate past to an un-
certain future, albeit with high hopes for what
the future will hold.
The changing circumstances in East Asia
and our attitude toward this region obviously
require us to take a fresh look at our present
policies. As you know, we are considering new
approaches to a number of issues, such as the
reduction of our ground forces in Korea, the
normalization of diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China, the renegotiation
of our use of military facilities in the Philip-
pines, and more effective ways to improve ob-
servance of human rights. While we will need
additional time to formulate fully detailed po-
sitions on these questions, several broad pol-
icy guidelines are already clear:
— The United States shall remain an
Asian-Pacific power.
— We shall preserve a balanced and flexible
military posture in the western Pacific.
— We shall maintain close ties to Japan.
— We shall make efforts to normalize diplo-
matic relations with the People's Republic of
China, with due regard for the security of the
people of Taiwan.
— We have already moved forward on the
normalization of diplomatic relations with
Vietnam, with the forthcoming departure of a
Presidential Commission to Hanoi.
— Our security and economic ties with our
allies in New Zealand and Australia remain
strong.
— We intend to phase out our ground forces
in Korea, while insuring that the security of
Korea is in no way threatened. Our troop
withdrawal will be carried out in close consul-
tation with the Republic of Korea and with
Japan.
322
Department of State Bulletin
— The United States continues to have an
interest in Southeast Asia and will play an
appropriate role there. We look forward, for
example, to successful negotiations with the
Philippines on the use of bases there.
— The United States is dedicated to improv-
ing the world economic structure and to this
end will work with both developed and de-
veloping countries in East Asia. At the same
time, we will promote mutually beneficial
bilateral trade and investment.
— We expect continued cooperation with the
individual countries of East Asia and eagerly
await the opening of economic consultations
with the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN), comprising Singapore,
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Philippines.
Purposes of Assistance Programs
I will now address the more specific ques-
tion of U.S. economic and security assistance
in East Asia. With regard to AID [Agency for
International Development], we have only
development programs in this region.
On March 2 Secretary Vance testified be-
fore the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
of the House Appropriations Committee on
our foreign assistance programs. I would like
to reiterate several of the comments the Sec-
retary made that are especially relevant to
East Asia.
First, he emphasized that the United
States' foreign economic assistance reflects
our nation's concern for the world's poor.
Second, he noted that our own economic
prosperity is intertwined with the fortunes of
other nations and that we must move swiftly,
in concert with developing countries, toward
expanding global supplies of food, energy, and
raw materials, toward coping with population
growth, and toward fostering economic de-
velopment.
Third, he pointed out that our selective
military assistance supports the security of
our friends and allies, thus providing them
with greater opportunities for social and eco-
nomic progress.
Finally, the Secretary set forth the De-
partment's views on human rights, giving
strong support to the observance of human
rights throughout the world and favoring ex-
pression of this principle in our foreign eco-
nomic assistance programs; however, no sim-
ple formula can be applied with regard to
human rights violations, since economic and
security goals must be taken into considera-
tion along with our great concern for each in-
dividual's case.
In recent years, there has been greater
economic growth in the East Asian region — an
important market as well as significant source
of such raw materials as petroleum, tin, rub-
ber, and coconut — than in any other part of
the world. Yet despite impressive progress in
certain economic sectors, the nations of
Southeast Asia still have far to go in their de-
velopment efforts, particularly in meeting the
needs of the rural and urban poor.
We feel our bilateral economic assistance ef-
forts are truly helping the most needy ele-
ments of the Asian population as well as fur-
thering our own policy objectives.
In our own economic assistance programs,
we have tried to enhance regional cohesion.
Cooperative organizations for which we pro-
vided the financial impetus several years ago
are now functioning on their own with the full
support of the Asians themselves. With this in
mind, we are looking forward optimistically to
economic consultations later this year with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
While we hope that these talks will emphasize
the desirability of fostering close and mutu-
ally beneficial trade and investment relations,
we wish to hear views on other ways the
United States can help ASEAN's regional
cooperation.
Of course, in addition to these bilateral pro-
grams we contribute substantially to multilat-
eral financial institutions, such as the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD) and the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). These institutions are particu-
larly important, and I urge the subcommittee
to support the Administration's request for
their full funding. As you know, our support
encourages other donors, thus multiplying the
effect of our contribution.
April 4, 1977
323
We propose six recipients for security as-
sistance in fiscal year 1978: the Republic of
China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand.
With regard to the Republic of China, we
are in the process of phasing out our security
assistance program and thus are proposing
this year only $25 million in credits and a
small sum for grant training. Korea and the
Philippines will be discussed separately. In
recent times Indonesia and Malaysia have
emphasized economic development and have
kept military spending to a minimum. How-
ever, since the Communist victories in In-
dochina, the Indonesians have become more
concerned about their security and are mak-
ing modest efforts to upgrade their own de-
fenses. We feel our security assistance is an
appropriate contribution to the preservation
of the independence of these countries and to
regional stability in the still-uncertain post-
Vietnam period.
Thailand is a country with obvious security
concerns — stemming from both hostile
neighbors and an active, externally supported
insurgency — and one with which we have had
a longstanding security relationship. Again,
we believe assistance to Thailand is an impor-
tant contribution under present circumstances
to regional security and an expression of con-
tinued U.S. interest in Southeast Asia.
Turning to our economic assistance pro-
grams, you will find them focused primarily
on the rural poor, on those people who have
not shared adequately in the relative prosper-
ity of much of the region. Our first long-term
objective is to attain a 3.5 percent growth
rate in annual production of food grains by
1985. Our second goal is to slow down the
population increases which often cancel out
increases in food production. Moreover, we
have important health and education pro-
grams which similarly are aimed at improving
the quality of rural life and furthering agricul-
tural development. I feel that this emphasis in
our program reflects the needs of the recip-
ient countries, as well as the concern for the
poor expressed by Congress in assistance
legislation.
Assistance to Republic of Korea
I understand you are especially interested
in our assistance programs for Korea and the
Philippines.
With regard to Korea, our policy decisions
should be made in the light of our primary ob-
jective: to maintain a deterrent that will in-
sure peace on the peninsula. Although North
Korea refuses to renew the dialogue with the
South which was initiated in 1972, remains in-
transigent on all the political issues which di-
vide Korea, and continues to pursue its goal of
reunification of the peninsula, we have deter-
mined that a phased withdrawal of American
ground forces can be undertaken while still
meeting our security goal. This withdrawal
will be carried out on a timetable yet to be
determined. In order to maintain the military
balance on the peninsula and deter renewed
North Korean aggression, we will maintain
our air capability in Korea and will continue to
assist in the strengthening of the armed
forces of the Republic of Korea through a pro-
gram of foreign military sales assistance. This
assistance is designed to concentrate on areas
where Korean capabilities need improvement.
The impressive economic development
achieved by the Republic of Korea has allowed
us to phase out our economic assistance, ex-
cept for a proposed title I Public Law 480
program in fiscal year 1978 of $109.3 million.
Similarly, Korean economic progress led to
the termination of grant military assistance in
fiscal year 1976, except for a small sum for the
costs of delivery of previously funded mate-
riel. The Republic of Korea has formulated its
own force improvement plan, which seems to
be both militarily and economically feasible.
This plan calls for expenditure of approxi-
mately $5 billion for the period 1976-81, of
which roughly $3.5 billion will be in foreign
exchange. Most of this foreign exchange will
be expended in the United States. We believe
the sum proposed for credit sales — $275 mil-
lion in fiscal year 1978 — is appropriate in view
of our mutual security interests and our de-
sire to strengthen Korean forces as we phase
out our ground troops.
As President Carter has made clear, we are
324
Department of State Bulletin
deeply concerned about human rights viola-
tions in Korea. We are particularly concerned
with restrictions on political activity which
have led to the arrest of many Korean citizens
voicing peaceful opposition to the present
government. We will continue to express our
concern in authoritative ways and to encour-
age a human rights situation consistent with
normally accepted international standards.
At the same time, we believe it would be a
serious mistake to cut back our longstanding
assistance to the South Korean armed forces
which helps these forces better cope with the
formidable task of protecting their country
against the threat from the north. Moreover,
most South Koreans, including domestic critics
of the government, strongly favor continuation
of U.S. -Korean security ties and assistance.
In brief, we will work for an improvement in
South Korea's defensive capability while press-
ing vigorously for an improvement in the
human rights situation.
Our Public Law 480 program in Korea is
tied to an understanding we have with the
Koreans on textiles. The United States has
benefited from this arrangement. Cuts in this
program would mostly affect agricultural de-
velopment and would not, I feel, be an appro-
priate or effective response to the human
rights issue.
Programs for the Philippines
Turning to the Philippines, it may be useful
to recall that the United States has strong
and unique historical ties with the Philippines
as well as an important military interest in
that country because of its strategic location.
Our security relationship is defined in three
major agreements: the 1947 Military Base
Agreement, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty,
and a Military Assistance Agreement, revised
in 1953. The base agreement is currently
under renegotiation. As you know, the Ad-
ministration is currently studying the status
of these negotiations with the Philippines.
Pending the outcome of this review, it is dif-
ficult to comment concerning these negotia-
tions; but it is clear that if agreement is
reached it will include an element of compen-
sation beyond the programs I am presenting
to you today.
Our security ties with the Philippines and
our military facilities there serve important
U.S. national interests today, just as they did
during World War II and during the war in
Vietnam. They contribute significantly to the
maintenance of stability in Southeast Asia and
to our ability to keep vital sealanes open in
the event of hostilities. Finally, our bases
contribute to our ability to meet our obliga-
tions under the bilateral mutual defense pact
with the Philippine Government concluded in
1951.
The Philippines views our security assist-
ance program as evidence of continued U.S.
interest in and commitment to the defense of
that country and as an important factor in our
contribution to the bilateral security relation-
ship. As its contribution to a mutual security
relationship, the Philippine Government
grants us the use of a number of military
facilities, the most important of which are
Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base.
Moreover, the Philippine Government is at-
tempting to increase, with our help, its ability
to meet its own defense needs.
The security assistance proposed for fiscal
year 1978 — $19.6 million in grant materiel,
$800,000 for training, and $20 million in credit
sales — represents a continuation of existing
programs. These programs are aimed at im-
proving the ability of the Philippine armed
forces to defend their own country.
The United States also has important eco-
nomic ties with the Philippines: over $1 billion
in investment, a flourishing trade relation-
ship, and a large resident American business
community. We are currently discussing with
the Philippine Government a new agreement
regarding economic and commercial relations
that will replace the expired Laurel-Langley
Agreement.
It is clear from our political, military, and
economic relationship with the Philippines
that we have a continuing interest in assisting
that country's economic development. In the
past, U.S. aid has not only contributed to
April 4, 1977
325
Philippine economic development but has also
provided important encouragement for other
foreign donors to continue and enlarge their
contributions. At present, U.S. bilateral aid
constitutes approximately 12 percent of the
$500 million total of external assistance to the
Philippines. The Japanese contribution is ap-
proximately the same, while multilateral
donors such as the ADB and IBRD supply al-
most all of the balance. Our total proposals for
fiscal year 1978 include loans of $51,190,000,
grants of $11,781,000, and Public Law 480
programs totaling $34,803,000, making a
grand total of $97,774,000.
We are obviously troubled by human rights
abuses in the Philippines. Since the institution
of martial law in 1972, there have been wide-
ranging arrests and detentions without trial, in
some cases for as long as four years. Recent
government actions have included deportation
of several foreign missionaries and newsmen,
the closing down of several church radio sta-
tions and publications, and arrests of church
social workers accused of improper political
activity. Our concern has been communicated
to the Philippine Government, along with our
strong view that there should be a marked
improvement in the situation.
However, we don't believe that security or
economic assistance should be reduced be-
cause of the human rights problem. As I have
noted, the Philippines has strategic impor-
tance, not only for our own country but also
for nations friendly to the United States in
the region, and thus we should continue our
support.
Our economic assistance programs are
clearly directed toward aiding the rural poor.
Termination of these programs would not lead
to an improvement in the human rights situa-
tion in the Philippines. Rather, it would most
probably increase financial pressures on the
government, raise doubts about our security
and political relationships, and put pressures
on the Philippine Government to take even
more forceful domestic security measures.
Given the importance of our bilateral political,
security, and economic relations, we believe
we will have more influence with the Philip-
pine Government with regard to the human
rights situation if we continue our assistance
rather than if we reduce or terminate our
programs.
We have gone through a traumatic experi-
ence in Asia in the last decade from which we
have finally emerged. While this part of the
world is, fortunately, less volatile and preoc-
cupying than during the Vietnam war, we still
have important interests there. The signifi-
cance of Japan, a key ally, is obvious. Im-
proved relations with the People's Republic of
China are crucial in both a global and bilateral
context. We are still interested in the inde-
pendence and development of our friends in
Southeast Asia.
I believe the Administration's economic and
security assistance proposals for fiscal year
1978 represent an appropriate contribution on
the part of our government to peace, stability,
and development in East Asia. Moreover, it is
essential that we maintain our own credibility
and sustain our old friends in the area as both
we and they develop new policies to fit a new
set of circumstances.
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Brazil Conclude
Shrimp Fishing Agreement
Press release 95 dated March 3
Brazil and the United States have success-
fully concluded negotiations on a new agree-
ment relating to shrimp fishing activities of
U.S. -flag vessels off the coast of Brazil. The
agreement, which sets forth the terms and
conditions under which U.S. vessels may con-
duct this fishery, was initialed by the chair-
men of the U.S. and Brazilian delegations at
Brasilia on March 1. It will come into force
upon the completion of internal procedures
and an exchange of notes between the two
governments.
Under the agreement, U.S. vessels may
326
Department of State Bulletin
continue to conduct shrimp fishing operations
during 1977 in a specified area off the coast of
Brazil north of the mouth of the Amazon
River. In addition to restricting the area
which may be fished, the agreement reduces
the number of U.S. vessels which may engage
in the fishery. It also establishes fees which
must be paid by U.S. vessels applying for
fishing authorizations. The agreement will
remain in force until December 31, 1977, dur-
ing which time discussions will be held regard-
ing new arrangements that could help Brazil-
ian fishing enterprises achieve full utilization
of the shrimp resources of the area.
Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., was
the chairman of the U.S. delegation, and
Counselor Paulo Dirceu Pinheiro was the
chairman of the Brazilian delegation.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome
June 13, 1976. '
Signatures: Korea, March 2, 1977; Panama, March 8,
1977.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7. 1944. Entered into force April 4,
1974. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Angola, March 11, 1977.
Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974.
TIAS 7868.
Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright conven-
tion, as revised, concerning the application of that
convention to works of stateless persons and refugees.
Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July
10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright conven-
tion, as revised, concerning the application of that
convention to the works of certain international
organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered
into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Poland, December 9, 1976.
Expositions
Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928,
relating to international expositions, with appendix
and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972. '
Ratification deposited: Finland, February 17, 1977.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13,
1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Bolivia, September 23, 1976.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into
force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Accession deposited: Bolivia, September 23, 1976.
World Meteorological Organization
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Angola, March 16, 1977.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Agreement modifying and extending the agreement of
March 14, 1975, as extended, concerning shrimp
(TIAS 8253). Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia
March 1, 1977. Entered into force March 1, 1977.
Bulgaria
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with agreed minutes and related letter.
Signed at Washington December 17, 1976.
Entered into force: February 28, 1977.
Canada
Procedures for mutual assistance in the administration
of justice in connection with the Boeing Company
matter. Signed at Washington March 15, 1977. En-
tered into force March 15, 1977.
Agreement relating to cooperation in reconstruction of
Canadian portions of the Alaska Highway. Effected by
exchange of notes at Ottawa January 11 and February
11, 1977. Entered into force February 11, 1977.
Republic of China
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with annexes and agreed minutes.
Signed at Washington September 15, 1976.
Entered into force: February 28, 1977.
Guatemala
Memorandum of understanding relating to cooperative
efforts to protect crops from pest damage and dis-
eases. Signed at Guatemala February 21, 1977.
Entered into force February 21, 1977.
Jordan
Grant agreement to support and promote the economic
stability of Jordan. Signed at Amman February 8,
1977. Entered into force February 8, 1977.
Korea
Agreement terminating the agreement of November 24,
1 Not in force.
April 4, 1977
327
1972, concerning cooperation in fisheries (TIAS 7517).
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
February 24 and March 3, 1977. Entered into force
March 3, 1977; effective March 1, 1977.
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at Wash-
ington January 4, 1977.
Entered into force: March 3, 1977.
Mexico
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Mexico during calendar year 1977. Effected by
exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco January 10
and February 10, 1977. Entered into force February
10, 1977.
Poland
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and
related letter. Signed at Washington August 2, 1976.
Entered into force: February 28, 1977.
Portugal
Agreement relating to the continuation of international
broadcast activities carried out in Portugal by
RARET. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon
February 15, 1977. Entered into force February 15,
1977.
Spain
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States. Signed at Washington February 16,
1977.
Entered into force: March 10, 1977.
Sudan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed
at Khartoum February 21, 1977. Enters into force
upon receipt by the U.S. Embassy of notification of
the completion of the constitutional procedures for
ratification required by Sudanese law.
Syria
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat-
ing to the agreement of November 20, 1974 (TIAS
8119). Signed at Damascus March 3, 1977. Entered
into force March 3, 1977.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Agreement concerning the translation and publication in
English of Soviet journals and articles, with annexes.
Signed at Washington February 14, 1977. Entered
into force February 14, 1977.
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with agreed minutes and related letter.
Signed at Washington November 26, 1976.
Entered into force: February 28, 1977.
Zaire
Project loan agreement relating to North Shaba rural
development. Signed at Kinshasa January 27, 1977.
Entered into force January 27, 1977.
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Correction
The editor of the Bulletin wishes to call at-
tention to the following errors which appear in
the March 14 issue:
p. 210, col. 2: The second line of the eighth
paragraph should read, "me to pass any judgment
about the American".
p. 2U0, col. 2, line 28: "it" should read "its".
328
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX April 4, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971
Arms Control and Disarmament
President Carter Interviewed by Media Repre-
sentatives (excerpt) 316
President Carter's News Conference of March 9
(excerpts) 305
Asia. U.S. Economic and Security Assistance
Programs in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322
Brazil. United States and Brazil Conclude Shrimp
Fishing Agreement 326
Chile. President Carter's News Conference of
March 9 (excerpts) 305
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 321
Southern Africa in the Global Context (Habib) . . 318
U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs
in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322
Cuba. President Carter's Call-in Radio Program
of March 5 (excerpts) 314
Fisheries. United States and Brazil Conclude
Shrimp Fishing Agreement 326
Foreign Aid
President Carter's Call-in Radio Program of
March 5 (excerpts) 314
U.S. Economic and Security -Assistance Programs
in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322
Human Rights
President Carter's News Conference of March 9
(excerpts) 305
U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs
in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322
Intelligence Operations. President Carter's
News Conference of March 9 (excerpts) 305
Israel
President Carter's News Conference of March 9
(excerpts) 305
Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington
(Carter, Rabin) 310
Korea
President Carter's News Conference of March 9
(excerpts) 305
U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs
in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322
Mexico. President Carter Interviewed by Media
Representatives (excerpt) 316
Middle East. President Carter's News" Confer-
ence of March 9 (excerpts) 305
Namibia. Southern Africa in the Global Context
(Habib) 318
Narcotics Control. President Carter Interviewed
by Media Representatives (excerpt) 316
Panama. President Carter's Call-in Radio Pro-
gram of March 5 (excerpts) 314
Philippines. U.S. Economic and Security Assist-
ance Programs in East Asia (Holbrooke) 322
Presidential Documents
British Prime Minister Callaghan Visits
Washington 311
President Carter Interviewed by Media Repre-
sentatives (excerpt) 316
President Carter's Call-in Radio Program of
March 5 (excerpts) 314
President Carter's News Conference of March 9
(excerpts) 305
Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington 310
Publications. GPO Sales Publications 328
South Africa. Southern Africa in the Global Con-
text (Habib) 318
Southern Rhodesia. Southern Africa in the
Global Context (Habib) 318
Treaty Information
Current Actions 327
United States and Brazil Conclude Shrimp Fish-
ing Agreement 326
Uganda. President Carter's Call-in Radio Pro-
gram of March 5 (excerpts) 314
U.S.S.R. President Carter's News Conference of
March 9 (excerpts) 305
United Kingdom. British Prime Minister Cal-
laghan Visits Washington (Callaghan, Carter) 311
Name Index
Callaghan, James 311
Carter, President 305, 310, 311, 314, 316
Habib, Philip C 318
Holbrooke, Richard C 322
Rabin, Yitzhak 310
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: March 14-20
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
*109 3/16
tllO 3/16
till 3/17
*112 3/18
*113 3/18
tll4 3/18
*115 3/18
*116 3/18
*117 3/18
*118 3/18
*119 3/18
*120 3/18
*121 3/18
*122 3/18
Vance: House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations.
U.S. -Yugoslav consultations on
CSCE, Mar. 15-16.
Vance, Irish Foreign Minister
FitzGerald: joint statement.
Program for official visit of Prime
Minister Fukuda of Japan.
Richard N. Gardner sworn in as Am-
bassador to Italy (biographic data).
Expiration of area passport restric-
tions.
U.S. and Malaysia amend bilateral
textile agreement, Feb. 9-25.
Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., sworn in as
Assistant Secretary for Congres-
sional Relations (biographic data).
Richard M. Moose sworn in as Deputy
Under Secretary for Management
(biographic data).
Australian Foreign Minister Peacock
to visit Washington, Mar. 23-26.
Study group 5 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Telegraph and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee (CCITT), Apr. 13.
Asian and Pacific student leaders to
study citizen organizations in U.S.
U.S. and Thailand amend bilateral
textile agreement, Nov. 24.
Study group 1 of the U.S. National
Committee for CCITT, Apr. 14.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
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A3:
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1972 • April 11, 1977
PEACE, ARMS CONTROL, WORLD ECONOMIC PROGRESS, HUMAN RIGHTS:
BASIC PRIORITIES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Address by President Carter at the United Nations 329
SECRETARY VANCE EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE
OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Statement by Secretary Vance 336
INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN AN ERA OF CHANGE
Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers 317
TREASURY SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL TESTIFIES
ON LEGISLATION ON ILLICIT PAYMENTS ABROAD 351
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside bad,
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE g (J f] \f\
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1972
April 11, 1977
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, Human Rights:
Basic Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy
Address by President Carter 1
Last night I was in Clinton, Massachusetts,
at a town hall meeting where people of that
small town decide their political and economic
future.
Tonight I speak to a similar meeting where
people representing nations all over the world
come here to decide their political and eco-
nomic future.
I am proud to be with you tonight in this
house where the shared hopes of the world
can find a voice.
I have come here to express my own sup-
port, and the continuing support of my coun-
try, for the ideals of the United Nations.
We are proud that for the 32 years since its
creation, the United Nations has met on
American soil. And we share with you the
commitments of freedom, self-government,
human dignity, mutual toleration, and the
peaceful resolution of disputes — which the
founding principles of the United Nations and
also Secretary General Kurt Waldheim so well
represent.
No one nation by itself can build a world
which reflects all these fine values. But the
United States, my own country, has a reser-
voir of strength: economic strength, which we
are willing to share; military strength, which
we hope never to use again; and the strength
of ideals, which are determined fully to main-
tain the backbone of our own foreign policy.
It is now eight weeks since I became Presi-
dent. I have brought to office a firm commit-
ment to a more open foreign policy. And I be-
1 Made to representatives to the United Nations in
the U.N. General Assembly Hall on Mar. 17 (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated
Mar. 21).
lieve that the American people expect me to
speak frankly about the policies that we in-
tend to pursue, and it is in that spirit that I
speak to you tonight about our own hopes for
the future.
I see a hopeful world, a world dominated by
increasing demands for basic freedoms, for
fundamental rights, for higher standards of
human existence. We are eager to take part in
the shaping of that world.
But in seeking such a better world, we are
not blind to the reality of disagreement nor to
the persisting dangers that confront us all.
Every headline reminds us of bitter divisions,
of national hostilities, of territorial conflicts,
of ideological competition. In the Middle East,
peace is a quarter of a century overdue. A
gathering racial conflict threatens southern
Africa; new tensions are rising in the Horn of
Africa. Disputes in the eastern Mediterranean
remain to be resolved.
Perhaps even more ominous is the stagger-
ing arms race. The Soviet Union and the
United States have accumulated thousands of
nuclear weapons. Our two nations now have
five times more missile warheads today than
we had just eight years ago. But we are not
five times more secure. On the contrary, the
arms race has only increased the risk of con-
flict.
We can only improve this world if we are
realistic about its complexities. The dis-
agreements that we face are deeply rooted,
and they often raise difficult philosophical as
well as territorial issues. They will not be
solved easily. They will not be solved quickly.
The arms race is now embedded in the very
fabric of international affairs and can only be
April 11, 1977
329
contained with the greatest difficulty. Pov-
erty and inequality are of such monumental
scope that it will take decades of deliberate
and determined effort even to improve the
situation substantially.
I stress these dangers and these difficulties
because I want all of us to dedicate ourselves
to a prolonged and persistent effort designed:
— First, to maintain peace and to reduce the
arms race;
— Second, to build a better and a more co-
operative international economic system; and
— Third, to work with potential adversaries
as well as our close friends to advance the
cause of human rights.
Working To Advance the Cause of Peace
In seeking these goals, I realize that the
United States cannot solve the problems of
the world. We can sometimes help others re-
solve their differences, but we cannot do so by
imposing our own particular solutions.
In the coming months, there is important
work for all of us in advancing international
cooperation and economic progress in the
cause of peace:
— Later this spring, the leaders of several
industrial nations of Europe, North America,
and Japan will confer at a summit meeting in
London on a broad range of issues. We must
promote the health of the industrial
economies. We must seek to restrain inflation
and bring ways of managing our own domestic
economies for the benefit of the global econ-
omy.
— We must move forward with multilateral
trade negotiations in Geneva.
— The United States will support the efforts
of our friends to strengthen the democratic
institutions in Europe, and particularly in
Portugal and Spain.
— We will work closely with our European
friends on the forthcoming Review Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
We want to make certain that the provisions
of the Helsinki agreement 2 are fully im-
plemented and that progress is made to fur-
ther East- West cooperation.
— In the Middle East we are doing our best
to clarify areas of disagreement, to surface
underlying consensus, and to help to develop
mutually acceptable principles that can form a
flexible framework for a just and a permanent
settlement.
— In southern Africa, we will work to help
attain majority rule through peaceful means.
We believe that such fundamental transfor-
mation can be achieved, to the advantage of
both the blacks and whites who live in that
region of the world. Anything less than that
may bring a protracted racial war, with dev-
astating consequences to all. This week the
Government of the United States took action
to bring our country into full compliance with
U.N. sanctions against the illegal regime in
Rhodesia. And I will sign that bill Friday in
Washington.
— We will put our relations with Latin
America on a more constructive footing, rec-
ognizing the global character of the region's
problems. We are also working to resolve in
amicable negotiations the future of the
Panama Canal.
— We will continue our efforts to develop
further our relationships with the People's
Republic of China. We recognize our parallel
strategic interests in maintaining stability in
Asia, and we will act in the spirit of the
Shanghai communique. 3
— In Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, we
will strengthen our association with our tradi-
tional friends, and we will seek to improve re-
lations with our former adversaries. We have
a mission now in Vietnam seeking peaceful
resolution of the differences that have sepa-
rated us for so long.
— Throughout the world, we are ready to
normalize our relationships and to seek recon-
ciliation with all states which are ready to
work with us in promoting global progress
and global peace.
Containing the Global Arms Race
Above all, the search for peace requires a
much more deliberate effort to contain the
global arms race. Let me speak in this context
first of the U.S. -Soviet Union relationship
and then of the wider need to contain the pro-
2 For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.
3 For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435.
330
Department of State Bulletin
liferation of arms throughout the global com-
munity.
I intend to pursue the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks (SALT) between the United
States and the Soviet Union with determina-
tion and with energy.
Our Secretary of State will visit Moscow in
just a few days.
SALT is extraordinarily complicated. But
the basic fact is that while the negotiations
remain deadlocked the arms race goes on; the
security of both countries and the entire
world is threatened.
My preference would be for strict controls
or even a freeze on new types and new gener-
ations of weaponry and with a deep reduction
in the strategic arms of both sides. Such a
major step toward not only arms limitation
but arms reduction would be welcomed by
mankind as a giant step toward peace.
Alternatively, and perhaps much more eas-
ily, we could conclude a limited agreement
based on those elements of the Vladivostok
accord 4 on which we can find complete con-
sensus and set aside for prompt consideration
and subsequent negotiations the more conten-
tious issues and also the deeper reductions in
nuclear weapons which I favor.
We will also explore the possibility of a
total cessation of nuclear testing. While our
ultimate goal is for all nuclear powers to end
testing, we do not regard this as a prereq-
uisite for the suspension of tests by the two
principal nuclear powers, the Soviet Union
and the United States. We should, however,
also pursue a broad permanent multilateral
agreement on this issue.
We will also seek to establish Soviet will-
ingness to reach agreement with us on mutual
military restraint in the Indian Ocean, as well
as on such matters as arms exports to the
troubled areas of the world.
In proposing such accommodations I remain
fully aware that American-Soviet relations
will continue to be highly competitive — but I
believe that our competition must be balanced
by cooperation in preserving peace and thus
our mutual survival. I will seek such coopera-
tion with the Soviet Union earnestly, con-
stantly, and sincerely.
For text, see Bulletin of Dee. 23, 1974, p. 879.
However, the effort to contain the arms
race is not a matter just for the United States
and Soviet Union alone. There must be a
wider effort to reduce the flow of weapons to
all the troubled spots of this globe. Accord-
ingly, we will try to reach broader agree-
ments among producer and consumer nations
to limit the export of conventional arms, and
we ourselves will take the initiative on our
own because the United States has become
one of the major arms suppliers of the world.
We are deeply committed to halting the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons. And we will
undertake a new effort to reach multilateral
agreements designed to provide legitimate
supplies of nuclear fuels for the production of
energy while controlling the poisonous and
dangerous atomic wastes.
Working with other nations represented
here, we hope to advance the cause of peace.
We will make a strong and a positive contri-
bution at the upcoming special session on dis-
armament, which I understand will commence
next year.
Molding Global Economic Prosperity
But the search for peace also means the
search for justice. One of the greatest chal-
lenges before us as a nation, and therefore
one of our greatest opportunities, is to par-
ticipate in molding a global economic system
which will bring greater prosperity to all the
people of all countries.
I come from a part of the United States
which is largely agrarian and which for many
years did not have the advantages of adequate
transportation or capital or management skills
or education— which were available in the in-
dustrial states of our country. So I can sym-
pathize with the leaders of the developing na-
tions, and I want them to know that we will
do our part.
To this end, the United States will be ad-
vancing proposals aimed at meeting the basic
human needs of the developing world and
helping them to increase their productive
capacity. I have asked Congress to provide
%1V2 billion of foreign assistance in the coming
year, and I will work to insure sustained
American assistance as the process of global
economic development continues. I am also
April 11, 1977
331
urging the Congress of our country to in-
crease our contributions to the United Na-
tions Development Program and meet in full
our pledges to multilateral lending institu-
tions, especially the International Develop-
ment Association of the World Bank.
We remain committed to an open interna-
tional trading system, one which does not ig-
nore domestic concerns in the United States.
We have extended duty-free treatment to
many products from the developing countries.
In the multilateral trade agreements
[negotiations] in Geneva we have offered sub-
stantial trade concessions on the goods of
primary interest to developing countries. And
in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration, 5
we are also examining ways to provide addi-
tional consideration for the special needs of
developing countries.
The United States is willing to consider
with a positive and open attitude the negotia-
tion on agreements to stabilize commodity
prices, including the establishment of a com-
mon funding arrangement for financing buffer
stocks where they are a part of individual
negotiated agreements.
I also believe that the developing countries
must acquire fuller participation in the global
economic decisionmaking process. Some prog-
ress has been already made in this regard by
expanding participation of developing coun-
tries in the International Monetary Fund.
We must use our collective natural re-
sources wisely and constructively. We have
not always done so. Today our oceans are
being plundered and defiled. With a renewed
spirit of cooperation and hope we join in the
conference of the law of the sea in order to
correct past mistakes of generations gone by
and to insure that all nations can share the
bounties of the eternal oceans in the fu-
ture.
We must also recognize that the world is
facing serious shortages of energy. This is
truly a global problem. For our part, we are
determined to reduce waste and to work with
others toward a fair and proper sharing of the
benefits and costs of energy resources.
For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.
Respect for Basic Human Rights
The search for peace and justice also means
respect for human dignity. All the signatories
of the United Nations Charter have pledged
themselves to observe and to respect basic
human rights. Thus, no member of the United
Nations can claim that mistreatment of its
citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no
member can avoid its responsibilities to re-
view and to speak when torture or unwar-
ranted deprivation occurs in any part of the
world.
The basic thrust of human affairs points to-
ward a more universal demand for fundamen-
tal human rights. The United States has a his-
torical birthright to be associated with this
process.
We in the United States accept this respon-
sibility in the fullest and the most construc-
tive sense. Ours is a commitment, and not just
a political posture. I know perhaps as well as
anyone that our own ideals in the area of
human rights have not always been attained
in the United States. But the American
people have an abiding commitment to the full
realization of these ideals. And we are deter-
mined, therefore, to deal with our deficiencies
quickly and openly. We have nothing to con-
ceal.
To demonstrate this commitment, I will
seek congressional approval and sign the
U.N. covenants on economic, social, and cul-
tural rights and the covenants on civil and
political rights. And I will work closely with
our own Congress in seeking to support the
ratification not only of these two instruments
but the United Nations Genocide Convention
and the Treaty for the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination as well. I have
just removed all restrictions on American
travel abroad, and we are moving now to
liberalize almost completely travel opportuni-
ties to America.
The United Nations is a global forum dedi-
cated to the peace and well-being of every
individual — no matter how weak, no matter
how poor. But we have allowed its human
rights machinery to be ignored and sometimes
politicized. There is much that can be done to
strengthen it.
332
Department of State Bulletin
The Human Rights Commission should be
prepared to meet more often. And all nations
should be prepared to offer its fullest coopera-
tion to the Human Rights Commission, to
welcome its investigations, to work with its
officials, and to act on its reports.
I would like to see the entire United Na-
tions Human Rights Division moved back here
to the central headquarters, where its ac-
tivities will be in the forefront of our attention
and where the attention of the press corps can
stimulate us to deal honestly with this sensi-
tive issue. The proposal made 12 years ago by
the Government of Costa Rica — to establish a
U.N. High Commissionfer] for Human
Rights — also deserves our renewed attention
and our support.
Strengthened international machinery will
help us to close the gap between promise and
performance in protecting human rights.
When gross or widespread violation takes
place — contrary to international commit-
ments — it is of concern to all. The solemn
commitments of the United Nations Charter,
of the United Nations Universal Declaration
for Human Rights, of the Helsinki accords, and
of many other international instruments must
be taken just as seriously as commercial or se-
curity agreements.
This issue is important in itself. It should
not block progress on other important matters
affecting the security and well-being of our
people and of world peace. It is obvious that
the reduction of tension, the control of nuclear
arms, the achievement of harmony in the
troubled areas of the world, and the provision
of food, good health, and education will inde-
pendently contribute to advancing the human
condition.
In our relationships with other countries,
these mutual concerns will be reflected in our
political, our cultural, and our economic at-
titudes.
These, then, are our basic priorities as we
work with other members to strengthen and
to improve the United Nations:
— First, we will strive for peace in the
troubled areas of the world;
— Second, we will aggressively seek to con-
trol the weaponry of war;
— Third, we will promote a new system of
international economic progress and coopera-
tion; and
— Fourth, we will be steadfast in our dedi-
cation to the dignity and well-being of people
throughout the world.
I believe that this is a foreign policy that is
consistent with my own nation's historic val-
ues and commitments. And I believe that it is
a foreign policy that is consonant with the
ideals of the United Nations.
President Signs Bill Restoring
Embargo on Rhodesian Chrome
Following is a statement by President, Car-
ter issued on March 18. 1
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 21
I have today signed H.R. 1746 [Public Law
95-12], which restores executive authority to
enforce sanctions against Rhodesian chrome.
This measure is a central element in our Af-
rican policy. Members of my Administration
have supported it with one voice. With it, we
are bringing the United States back in line
with the decisions of the Security Council and
with our obligations under the United Nations
Charter.
H.R. 1746 effectively reinstates an embargo
against the importation of Rhodesian chrome
and other minerals, as well as any steelmill
product containing Rhodesian chromium. As a
matter of equity, however, I am issuing an
Executive order [No. 11978] which authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury to exempt
shipments now in transit to the United
States.
Our country is committed to the concept of
rapid transition to majority rule in Rhodesia
under nonviolent conditions. I view this
measure today as an appropriate and positive
step toward that goal. We have consistently
stated our belief that a peaceful solution in
1 For President Carter's remarks at the signing
ceremony, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents dated Mar. 21, 1977, p. 402.
April 11, 1977
333
Rhodesia depends upon negotiations that in-
volve a full spectrum of opinion among its
leaders, both black and white. With the
enactment of this measure, there can be no
mistake about our support for that principle.
I hope that the present Rhodesian au-
thorities, as well as the black African
nationalist leaders, will accurately assess the
vote of the Congress and this Administra-
tion's stand on Rhodesia. The solution rests in
their hands, not ours. Further delay in
negotiations will invite more violence and in-
crease the prospect of outside intervention —
an outcome which every person of good will
wishes to avoid.
With the cooperation of the Congress, we
have taken a step of great importance in our
southern African policy. I want to thank the
leadership of both Houses for their initiative
in bringing about this encouraging
development.
President Carter's Remarks
at Clinton, Mass., Town Meeting
Following are excerpts from President
Carter's opening remarks and a question-and-
answer session at the Clinton, Mass., Town
Hall on March 16. 1
In the field of foreign affairs — and this is
the last thing I want to talk about — I've done
a lot of studying. I trust the American people.
I've been criticized by some in the news media
in the last eight weeks about telling the
American people too much.
I've removed the restrictions on American
travel overseas. I believe that an American
citizen ought to be able to go wherever that
person wants to go without the government
telling him.
We're going to try to open up our borders
for a change so visitors can come to our coun-
try. They may not be popular people, but I
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 21, 1977, p.
358.
think our system of government is strong
enough to have someone come into our nation
and make a speech at Yale, or Harvard or
here in your own town, with whom you may
not agree.
I want to see our country set a standard of
morality. I feel very deeply that when people
are put in prison without trials, and tortured
and deprived of basic human rights, that the
President of the United States ought to have
a right to express displeasure and to do some-
thing about it. I want our country to be the
focal point for deep concern about human
beings all over the world.
I am trying to search with the Soviet Union
for a way to reduce the horrible arms race,
where we've spent billions and billions and bil-
lions of dollars on atomic weapons. We are no
more secure now than we were 8 years ago or
12 years ago or 16 years ago. We're much
more deeply threatened by more and more
advanced weapons. So, we are dealing with
the Soviet Union, quietly and diplomatically,
and I hope effectively, to search out a way to
reduce dependence on weapons without
damaging at all our nation's own security.
We have problem areas around the world,
as you know, in the Middle East, in southern
Africa, in the Horn of Africa, in the eastern
Mediterranean around Cyprus. We're not try-
ing to impose our will on other people. But
when we can add our good offices and the
strength of our country to bring potential
warring nations together, we'll do this.
And I think the American people have
enough intelligence and enough judgment to
be told what's going on. In the past we've had
too much of top government officials going off
in a closed, locked room and evolving a
foreign policy for our country and negotiating
in secret and then letting the American people
know about it when it's all over. I want you to
know about it ahead of time, and you can de-
pend on that when I tell you.
Q. My name is Reverend Richard Harding,
and, President Carter, it's a pleasure to wel-
come you to the number-one everytown,
USA— Clinton, Massachusetts.
I would like to ask you, Mr. President — it
334
Department of State Bulletin
seems that world peace hinges greatly on the
Middle East.
The President: Yes.
Q. What do you personally feel must be
done to establish a meaningful and a lasting
peace in that area of the world? Thank you.
The President: I think all of you know that
there has been either war or potential war in
the Middle East for the last 29 years, ever
since Israel became a nation. I think one of
the finest acts of the world nations that's ever
occurred was to establish the State of Israel.
So the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is
the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Is-
rael's right to exist, Israel's right to exist
permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace.
That means that over a period of months or
years that the borders between Israel and
Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan,
Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel,
to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so
that no matter who the leaders might be in
those countries, the people themselves will
have formed a mutual understanding and
comprehension and a sense of a common pur-
pose to avoid the repetitious wars and death
that have afflicted that region so long. That's
the first prerequisite of peace.
The second one is very important and very,
very difficult; and that is the establishment of
permanent borders for Israel. The Arab coun-
tries say that Israel must withdraw to the
pre-1967 borderlines. Israel says that they
must adjust those lines to some degree to in-
sure their own security. That is a matter to be
negotiated between the Arab countries on the
one side and Israel on the other. But borders
are still a matter of great trouble and a mat-
ter of great difficulty, and there are strong
differences of opinion now.
And the third ultimate requirement for
peace is to deal with the Palestinian problem.
The Palestinians claim up till this moment
that Israel has no right to be there, that the
land belongs to the Palestinians, and they've
never yet given up their publicly professed
commitment to destroy Israel. That has to be
overcome.
There has to be a homeland provided for the
Palestinian refugees who have suffered for
many, many years. And the exact way to
solve the Palestinian problem is one that first
of all addresses itself right now to the Arab
countries and then, secondly, to the Arab
countries negotiating with Israel.
Those three major elements have got to be
solved before a Middle Eastern solution can
be prescribed.
I want to emphasize one more time, we
offer our good offices. I think it's accurate to
say that of all the nations in the world, we are
the one that's most trusted, not completely,
but most trusted by the Arab countries and
also Israel. I guess both sides have some
doubt about us. But we'll have to act kind of
as a catalyst to bring about their ability to
negotiate successfully with one another.
We hope that later on this year, in the lat-
ter part of this year, that we might get all of
these parties to agree to come together at
Geneva, to start talking to one another. They
haven't done that yet. And I believe if we can
get them to sit down and start talking and
negotiating that we have an excellent chance
to achieve peace. I can't guarantee that. It's a
hope.
I hope that we will all pray that that will
come to pass, because what happens in the
Middle East in the future might very well
cause a major war there which would quickly
spread to all the other nations of the world;
very possibly it could do that.
Many countries depend completely on oil
from the Middle East for their life. We don't.
If all oil was cut off to us from the Middle
East, we could survive; but Japan imports
more than 98 percent of all its energy, and
other countries, like in Europe — Germany,
Italy, France — are also heavily dependent on
oil from the Middle East.
So, this is such a crucial area of the world
that I will be devoting a major part of my own
time on foreign policy between now and next
fall trying to provide for a forum within which
they can discuss their problems and, hope-
fully, let them seek out among themselves
some permanent solution.
Just maybe as briefly as I could, that's the
best answer I can give you to that question.
April 11, 1977
335
Secretary Vance Emphasizes Importance
of Foreign Assistance Programs
Statement by Secretary Vance 1
This is the fourth time in the short period
since this Administration took office that I
have come before committees of the Congress
to describe and support our foreign assistance
requests. That is a measure of the importance
we give to these programs in the larger
scheme of our foreign policy.
In their diversity, our foreign assistance ef-
forts meet a variety of American foreign pol-
icy objectives. But a unity and common pur-
pose binds them together. The components of
the program amount to a humanitarian in-
vestment in the social, economic, and techno-
logical development of poor countries. The re-
sult will be an expanding world economy with
benefits for people of all countries, our own
included.
It should be clear to us all that the way
American workers and consumers live, our
standards of living, depends in large part on
supplies of food, energy, and raw materials
from the developing world — from countries
we are helping to move ahead on their own
courses of economic development. Fur-
thermore, the expansion of our own economy
is linked to the growth of demand abroad.
Foreign buyers take some 40 percent of our
grains; they take an eighth of everything we
produce. The developing countries are in-
1 Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assist-
ance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
Mar. 23 (text from press release 127). The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superinten-
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
creasingly vital markets for our industries
and firms. Over a third of our trade is with
these countries; that amounts to more than
our trade with the European Community. Our
raw materials come more and more from for-
eign sources, especially from those developing
countries we are now encouraging.
We are investing in the cause of peace, as
well, when our aid becomes part of an effort
to resolve old, and potential, regional dis-
putes. Our selective military and related se-
curity assistance programs can enable our
friends and allies to expend less of their na-
tional energies on insuring their own security
and to concentrate instead on their own eco-
nomic and social development.
We are investing through all aspects of our
programs — bilateral assistance, multilateral
assistance, security assistance — in a world
that offers hope of decent lives and worthy
goals to people whose common lot is privation
and hunger. The danger of failing to address
the legitimate aspirations of the developing
world would be frustration in the poorer coun-
tries that could take violent forms. Terrorism
and confrontational economic demands are
symptoms of such malaise.
Support for economic development has be-
• come particularly necessary in the face of es-
calating energy costs and the effects of world
recession. In 1974 the effect of quadrupled
energy prices more than offset all assistance
the developing countries received; and in 1975
their exports fell by almost $5 billion, the
biggest drop in the postwar period.
336
Department of State Bulletin
At the same time, what is called the
North-South dialogue offers unprecedented
opportunities for cooperation between the
rich and poor regions of the world. Dedication
of our joint efforts now to an effective eco-
nomic development strategy is essential to its
progress. We must keep in mind the impor-
tance of the political as well as economic
stakes in achieving this progress. This is ob-
vious in terms of our bilateral relations. Addi-
tionally, the developing nations are more
likely to cooperate with us in addressing such
longer term, global issues as halting the
spread of nuclear weapons or protecting the
environment if they are confident of our coop-
eration in addressing their economic difficul-
ties.
This may be a pivotal year. Particularly
great opportunities bring with them greater
demands on both our resources and the wis-
dom of our diplomacy.
The International Development Association
now faces its fifth capital replenishment — a
call to both the industrialized countries and
the newly rich oil producers to address jointly
the problems faced by the poorest countries.
This is also the initial year of a multilateral
long-term program to help develop the Sahel-
ian region of Africa, which has been devas-
tated by drought but which now shows prom-
ise of recovery.
Private banks have helped the developing
countries bridge their financial gaps during
recent economic hard times, but at higher cost
than most of these countries can sustain. A
substantial increase in governmental and mul-
tilateral financing is necessary to sustain their
development efforts and their access to pri-
vate credit.
As this committee was early to see, the best
way to judge our assistance efforts is by their
effectiveness in meeting basic human needs.
You were instrumental in charting "new di-
rections" in bilateral foreign assistance. The
Carter Administration concurs with them
wholeheartedly. "New directions" call for
greater emphasis on delivering aid directly to
the poor people of the world. Similarly, we
are called upon to concern ourselves with the
status of human rights in the countries we
aid.
We seek to meet both of these goals, fully
mindful of the problems of implementation.
How, for instance, are we to proceed in a case
where our commitment to development and
economic human rights may come into conflict
with our commitment to principles of indi-
vidual justice? No pat formula can resolve
such a dilemma. We believe we can best deal
with these questions on a case-by-case,
country-by-country basis, always applying the
same set of general criteria.
We hope that our example may influence
other donors to multilateral aid organizations
to adopt the pragmatic principles of "new di-
rections." Meanwhile, we can and will strive
for the most effective day-to-day administra-
tion of our assistance programs. We will judge
our programs by their results, and not just in
terms of this year's or next year's funding
levels.
To do our part in responding to the needs of
the world's poor and to meet new opportuni-
ties for development, we propose for fiscal
year 1978 a total foreign assistance package of
$7,271,000,000, an increase of $1,670,000,000
over 1977.
The bulk of that increase — a billion dollars,
in fact — results from a procedural change. At
the request of the Congress, we are in fiscal
year 1978 seeking appropriations for the call-
able capital of the international financial in-
stitutions, which in the immediate past was
authorized but not appropriated. But as you
know, none of the callable capital has ever
been called, and the appropriations will prob-
ably never be spent. The remaining $670 mil-
lion represents:
— First, restoration of reductions made by
the previous Administration in its request for
security supporting assistance for the Middle
East;
— Second, substantial increases in our con-
tributions to multilateral institutions; and
— Third, moderate increases in our bilateral
development assistance program.
I submit a table for the record which out-
lines our budget request. 2 We will be happy
to provide more detail later if you wish. Now
'For table, see Bulletin of Mar. 14, 1977, p. 238.
April 11, 1977
337
let me explain how the pieces of our aid pro-
posals fit together and why we believe each of
them is important.
Bilateral Development Assistance
While proposed increases in our bilateral
development assistance programs are not so
large as those for multilateral institutions, we
believe that our bilateral programs are no less
important an element in our general aid
strategy.
These bilateral programs are designed to
address the basic human problems of food and
agriculture, population and health, and educa-
tion and human resources development in the
world's poor countries. These programs are
the most direct way to put American skills
and resources to work improving the human
condition around the world and spurring eco-
nomic development. In concert with the recip-
ient countries, we are seeking to promote
growth with equity, and sound development
policies. This is the core of the "new direc-
tions" approach. This effort is complemented
by our bilateral food aid programs, which also
are aimed primarily at poor countries.
Multilateral Assistance
Our multilateral assistance programs
through the international financial institutions
complement the bilateral programs and serve
the same broad purpose: to promote economic
and social progress in the developing world.
These institutions are mechanisms for shar-
ing the aid burden. Donors contribute accord-
ing to their ability to provide aid; the share of
the United States has actually declined over
the years. For instance, our share of the ini-
tial subscription in the International De-
velopment Association was almost 42 percent.
In the proposed fifth replenishment, it will be
less than 32 percent. Thus, other nations are
providing a steadily increasing share of the
capital requirements of these banks.
These institutions also reinforce the concept
of mutual responsibilities on the part of both
developed and developing countries. When
developing countries borrow from the interna-
tional financial institutions, they are expected
to adopt sound economic policies, to provide
significant amounts of their own resources
toward the common goal, and to accept the
discipline imposed by obligations to repay
their loans.
The financial structure of these institutions
serves the purpose of development well. They
borrow funds in capital markets to finance
their "hard" lending operations at commercial
rates. This capital is an important source of
growth for middle-income developing coun-
tries that can service debt on commercial
terms. These countries receive little U.S. cap-
ital assistance. The capital funds borrowed far
exceed the capital contributed by donor mem-
bers and are secured by pledges of callable
capital. This year, as stated, we are for the
first time seeking appropriations for this call-
able capital; these appropriations are unlikely
to result in any budget outlays. For their
soft-loan operations to the poorest countries
unable to borrow at commercial rates, these
institutions rely on donor contributions.
Our leadership and influence in these in-
stitutions come as a result of our sizable con-
tributions and the system of weighted voting
linked to those contributions. Although our
measure of control over the policies of the in-
ternational financial institutions is less than
over our own bilateral programs, this diminu-
tion of control is more than offset by the
burden-sharing advantages that come with
the participation of other major donors in
these multilateral programs.
We will remain vigilant in encouraging
these institutions to maintain their own finan-
cial soundness and to invest their resources
well.
We also want to expand our support of the
United Nations Development Program and of
the assistance given by the U.N. specialized
agencies.
Security Supporting Assistance
Our security supporting assistance is a vit-
ally important part of our diplomatic efforts to
achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East and to provide the means to support a
peaceful settlement in southern Africa.
Our security supporting assistance request
for Africa of $135 million includes these ele-
ments:
— $100 million for a U.S. contribution to an
338
Department of State Bulletin
international Zimbabwe Development Fund
to promote Zimbabwe's peaceful transition to
majority rule. The Fund's purposes would be
rapid restructuring of the economy and of
government services to provide more train-
ing, education, and economic opportunities for
blacks and the maintenance of confidence
among skilled whites to encourage them not to
abandon their jobs and homes. Our goal is to
prevent a collapse of the Zimbabwe economy.
As part of our planning, we have consulted
extensively with the British. We have solicited
the views and support of 18 other potential
donors. Initial responses have been encourag-
ing.
Congressional support for this multilateral
effort to promote economic development bene-
fiting all segments of the Zimbabwe popula-
tion could be a crucial factor in encouraging a
negotiated political settlement. Its presence
in this budget would be helpful in persuading
other donors to contribute. We would of
course consult closely with you as the outlines
of the programs to be supported by this fund
take shape, prior to any commitment of spe-
cific amounts.
— We also seek $35 million for current de-
velopment programs in Botswana, Lesotho,
Swaziland, and Zaire. These countries figure
significantly in the political evolution under-
way in southern Africa. For this reason, these
programs have been included under security
supporting assistance.
The United States has played a major role
in efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to
majority rule in southern Africa. It is criti-
cally important that this effort be reinforced
by economic actions to promote political and
economic stability and to demonstrate that
the United States can be counted upon to
cooperate in a constructive manner. This aid
program therefore is directly linked to our
broader foreign policy objectives.
Military Assistance
Our military security assistance programs
enable friendly and allied countries to meet
their basic security requirements, and thus
add to our own security as well. We consider
the funds we are requesting essential to
reassure our friends and allies of our re-
liability and consistency in their support.
In his address to the United Nations on
March 17, President Carter spoke of the need
for "a wider effort to reduce the flow of
weapons to all the troubled spots of the
globe." He promised American initiatives to
limit the exports of conventional arms. The
Administration has in fact embarked upon a
thorough reexamination of our arms transfer
policies.
We have already begun to make important
changes in both our security assistance pro-
grams and our sales activities:
— In support of the President's initiative,
we have indicated to other supplier nations
our intention to exercise restraint in exports
and our hope that they will do so as well. We
have also made clear to prospective buyers
our hope that they will exercise their own re-
straint in turn.
— We are taking steps to require arms
manufacturers to seek State Department ap-
proval before they approach foreign govern-
ments about prospective sales. It is not our
intention to restrict legitimate business activ-
ity. But we do have a responsibility to insure
that the sales promotion activities of private
American firms in the sensitive area of arms
and instruments of war do not conflict with
our national security interests and foreign pol-
icy objectives.
— Finally, we will provide the Congress
with a statement justifying every foreign
military sales proposal. These justifications
will provide you with the basis for the Admin-
istration's decision to approve the sale. We
are now completing our review of pending
sales cases.
It may well be that the review of arms
transfer policies which we are conducting and
our consultations with you will reveal the
need for changes in existing legislation. In the
meantime, I believe it would be imprudent to
try to change parts of our evolving military
assistance effort and thus to threaten disrup-
tive changes which could put heavy and unex-
pected burdens on our friends and allies.
I have welcomed this opportunity to pre-
sent our foreign assistance programs. We be-
lieve they are coherent in concept and repre-
sent a justifiable level of effort.
April 11, 1977
339
President Carter Outlines Goals
of Foreign Assistance Program
Message to the Congress 1
To the Congress of the United States:
In the years since World War II, the
United States has encouraged economic de-
velopment throughout the world through a
variety of economic assistance programs.
Most of our efforts have succeeded. Some
have failed. Now we have the opportunity, as
with many of our domestic programs, to
learn from our experience, and to improve
our policies in the future.
Members of my Administration are now
testifying in support of our approach to
foreign assistance. I am sending you this
message to explain some of the principles be-
hind our program — especially to outline the
lessons we have learned about foreign
assistance and the goals we now hope to
achieve.
The future of the United States will be
affected by the ability of developing nations
to overcome poverty, achieve healthy growth
and provide more secure lives for their
people. We wish to join with other nations in
combining our efforts, knowledge, and re-
sources to help poorer countries overcome
the problems of hunger, disease, and illiter-
acy. We are seeking important improvements
in our program, some of which reflect
changes in emphasis and approach:
— We will ensure that lending agencies at-
tach adequate self-help conditions to their
loans so that borrowing nations will make ef-
fective use of the funds they receive.
— We will make certain that the Congress
is able to exercise its legitimate responsibil-
ity to monitor the effectiveness of our aid
programs.
— We will encourage other wealthy nations
to contribute a greater share to the multilat-
eral aid effort, and we will reduce our own
share where it has been too high.
— In close cooperation with the Congress
'Transmitted on Mar. 17 (text from White House
press release dated Mar. 18).
we have made sure that our concessional aid
goes to those who need it most; we will con-
tinue this approach.
— We are now reforming the policies which
have, on occasion, awarded liberal grants and
loans to repressive regimes which violate
human rights.
— We will root out mismanagement and in-
efficiency where they exist in our foreign as-
sistance programs in order to guarantee that
benefits will always be delivered to those for
whom the programs were designed.
— We recognize that salaries and living styles
of some employees have been too lavish, and
we will insist that the international programs
we support do more to control their
administrative overhead.
— I will work closely with the Congress to
see that our aid efforts are more closely
correlated to international economic and
political circumstances and talk frankly to
American citizens about the economic,
political, and security benefits we receive
from our foreign assistance programs.
Close cooperation and support from the
Congress is essential to the effectiveness of
our efforts. In a few areas the program I
have submitted requires a significant
increase in funding — but I have asked for
this only where I am sure that the increase
will be worthwhile.
To achieve our goals of helping the people
of the world toward economic self-
sufficiency, relieving the victims of
disasters, investing in a healthy world econ-
omy, and supporting the security of friendly
nations, I ask your favorable consideration
for the following:
— Multilateral Development Assistance.
International financial institutions such as
the World Bank group — in particular the In-
ternational Development Association — and
the Inter-American and Asian Development
Banks are major sources of assistance loans
to the world's poor nations. These institu-
tions have been highly professional in their
work. They help remove political consid-
erations from development efforts, and they
encourage developing countries to pursue
sound domestic policies. They enable many
340
Department of State Bulletin
donors to pool their efforts — including some
of the oil-exporting nations. An initial,
modest U.S. contribution to the African De-
velopment Bank will provide our encourage-
ment to this promising regional effort.
We are asking $540 million in supplemental
appropriations for fiscal year 1977 to fulfill
past pledges to the international financial
institutions, and $2.7 billion in new appro-
priations for fiscal year 1978. This is an in-
crease (of approximately one-third) for an
effort which has proved to be very effective.
The largest single expenditure is for U.S.
participation in the 5th replenishment of the
International Development Association,
which makes loans on favorable terms to the
world's poorest nations.
The United Nations Development Pro-
gram, which provides important technical as-
sistance to the developing world, has also
proven its effectiveness and worth. We are
seeking an appropriation of $130 million for
fiscal year 1978, a 30% increase over last
year.
— Bilateral Development Assistance. Con-
gress has played a major role in developing
our bilateral programs, which provide direct
American support for development programs
in the poorer countries. Through these
programs we have shared our expertise and
our resources with other countries. Our
bilateral programs are directed at the
poorest people in these countries' popula-
tions; they emphasize food and nutrition,
population and health, education and human
resource development, and science and tech-
nology, including energy development.
We have certain expectations of the
countries which we help. We have no inten-
tion of running their governments or their
economies, but we expect them to mobilize
their own resources in the effort to develop,
to ensure that the poor share in the benefits,
and to respect basic human rights.
I am asking the Congress to provide $1.3
billion for the bilateral development assist-
ance program for fiscal year 1978. This is a
20% increase over the amount provided for
fiscal year 1977, which I believe is clearly
worthwhile.
Last year, the Congress, on its own initia-
tive, appropriated $5 million to help develop
a comprehensive long-term recovery plan for
the Sahel region, which had undergone a dis-
astrous drought. As the first major U.S. con-
tribution to this program, I am requesting
$50 million for fiscal year 1978. We will coop-
erate with other interested nations in making
further contributions to the Sahel
development effort in the future.
— The PL-i80 Program. The enormous vi-
tality of U.S agricultural production permits
us to share a portion of our bounty in the
form of food aid. Our PL-480 programs
should not only help the poorer countries
improve the quantity and quality of their nu-
trition, but also encourage self-help pro-
grams that will improve their capacity to
feed their people in the future. And these
programs let us offer relief from famine and
privation in the wake of natural and
man-made disasters. In fiscal year 1978, our
food aid programs will distribute $1.4 billion
in agricultural commodities.
— Security Assistance Program. Only
where peace and security are assured can
free nations devote their full energies to
development. Our security assistance pro-
grams are keyed to these goals, and to ad-
vancing the security interests of the United
States in cooperation with our friends and al-
lies. Nearly two-thirds of the funds re-
quested for security assistance will be for
economic supporting programs. I have in-
creased the amounts proposed by the pre-
vious Administration for the Middle East;
this will strengthen the economic underpin-
nings so essential to achievement of our goal
of peace and stability in this vital region.
For FY-1978 the major elements of my
program on security assistance are:
• Grant military aid — $284.6 million to
eight countries, in most of which we also
have U.S. military facilities essential to our
global interests. This includes $224 million in
programs plus $60.6 million in general and
administrative costs, most of which will be
reimbursed from other sources.
• Grant military education — $35.7 million
to train future military leaders.
• Financing for foreign military
April 11, 1977
341
sales— $708 million, which will finance $2.2
billion in loans to help foreign governments
eventually to meet their essential security
needs by themselves, instead of depending
on U.S. handouts.
• Security supporting assistance — $1.9
billion to finance programs for countries
whose economic condition is a factor in our
efforts to assure international security. The
two areas where most of these funds will be
used — Middle East, and depending on
events, Southern Africa — testify to the
significance of these programs.
These proposals are fully consistent with
my wish to limit budget increases to
essentials. My assistance program is part of
an effort to combine support of our country's
economic interests and security with
compassion for the impoverished millions of
fellow human beings who share the world
with us.
I hope that the economic assistance program
now before you will receive your careful,
prompt, and sympathetic attention. It
represents a vital step toward partnership in
a peaceful and equitable world order.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, March 17, 1977.
U.S. Assistance Programs
in Southeast Asia
Following is a statement by Robert B. Oak-
ley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Sub-
committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of
the House Committee on International Rela-
tions on March 17. l
I am pleased to have this opportunity to
testify on the Administration's economic and
security assistance programs in East Asia for
fiscal year 1978. Since Mr. Holbrooke dis-
cussed last week our general position on as-
sistance to East Asia, I would like today to
pay special attention to Southeast Asia — the
area to which most of our assistance is di-
rected. 2
While the non-Communist nations of South-
east Asia have in recent years become in-
creasingly prosperous and independent, these
countries face continuing problems of de-
velopment and major uncertainties concerning
their relationships with the Communist gov-
ernments in Indochina. Still fearful of the
regional intentions of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia, they see a continuation of U.S.
developmental, humanitarian, and military
assistance as essential if they are to adapt to
the new situation in Southeast Asia — to the
demands of greater self-reliance.
Our bilateral economic assistance goes to
three nations in Southeast Asia: Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand, while our secu-
rity assistance covers these three as well as
Malaysia. Since Mr. Holbrooke discussed the
Philippines in his prepared statement, I will
comment only on Indonesia and Thailand.
For Indonesia in fiscal year 1978, we are
proposing $57.2 million in economic assistance
and $90.7 million in Public Law 480 programs,
in addition to security assistance of $15 mil-
lion in grant materiel, $3.1 million in training,
and $40 million in FMS [foreign military sales]
financing.
Indonesia's position as an important oil ex-
porter should not obscure the fact that she
remains one of the very poorest countries in
the world. Her needs in critical fields such as
developmental capital, technical assistance,
and manpower training are vast and, accord-
ing to the World Bank, can be met only with
substantial external aid.
The present government, which took power
in 1966 following an attempted seizure of
power by Communists, is led by the military
but includes many civilians, particularly
American-trained economists. Prior to the
Communist victories in Indochina, it held
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
2 For a statement before the subcommittee on Mar.
10 by Richard C. Holbrooke, then Assistant Sec-
retary-designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, see
Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1977, p. 322.
342
Department of State Bulletin
military spending to a minimum in order to
devote its maximum resources to economic
development. But recently it has felt a need
to pay somewhat more attention to improving
its own security, particularly its mobility and
surveillance capabilities. This need is re-
flected in our proposed increase in FMS
financing from $23.1 million in fiscal year 1977
to $40 million in fiscal year 1978 and the ex-
ceptional request to continue grant assistance
for this next year.
We feel it is in the U.S. interest to continue
assistance to Indonesia, not only because it is
a strategically located country which has
maintained close and friendly ties with the
United States during the last decade, but also
because our economic assistance programs
there directly benefit some of the poorest
people in the world. The requested Indone-
sian assistance program is, in our view, ap-
propriate.
For Thailand, we are proposing an economic
assistance program for fiscal year 1978 of
$4,405,000 and military assistance of $8 mil-
lion in grant materiel, $1 million in training,
and $29.5 million in credit sales.
Thailand is obviously the nation most di-
rectly concerned by developments in In-
dochina, and its stability and independence
are important to the maintenance and
strengthening of peace in the region. The
Thai face real security problems along the
borders with their Communist neighbors as
well as an active, externally supported in-
surgency. However, in view of the increasing
ability of Thailand to provide for its security
and its economic progress, we have been
steadily reducing economic assistance and
phasing out grant security aid. The fiscal year
1978 requests are well below those of the fis-
cal year 1977 program and are in line with this
trend. We feel the requested fiscal year 1978
levels are an appropriate U.S. contribution to
regional stability, as well as to the Thai Gov-
ernment's own effort in specific key fields.
In Southeast Asia, the human rights situa-
tion varies from country to country. Mr. Hol-
brooke's prepared statement last week de-
scribed our concerns in the Philippines.
In Indonesia, the human rights problem is a
legacy of the attempt by Communists to seize
power in 1965. At present, about 30,000 indi-
viduals are still detained. The Government of
Indonesia fears that mass release of these
people will rekindle subversion and public
disorders. In this connection, it is worth re-
calling that in 1965 the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI) was the world's largest Com-
munist party outside of the U.S.S.R. and
China and that it has made three attempts to
seize power by violence. This background con-
tributes to Indonesian Government worries
about the possible future intentions of the
PKI's cadres.
While the U.S. Government understands
the background, this does not diminish our
strong concern over the abuse of human rights
and individual liberties. Our views have been
made known to the Indonesian Government.
In December 1976 the Government of In-
donesia released 2,500 prisoners and an-
nounced a three-year phased release of the
remainder. We believe our efforts have been
helpful and intend to continue them. We also
believe that continued U.S. security and eco-
nomic assistance at the requested levels
enhances stability and furthers economic
progress, thereby creating a more favorable
climate for the observance of human rights.
Concerning recent press reports on civilian
casualties in East Timor, our information on
the situation is limited, but we believe the
casualty figures cited by the press are greatly
exaggerated. These figures apparently relate
to the casualties which occurred in late 1975
and early 1976 and are not substantiated by
any reliable observers of whom we have
knowledge.
In Thailand we understand that all but 143
of the several thousand persons who were ar-
rested following the violence that immediately
preceded the October 6 coup d'etat have been
or will be soon released. Under the provisions
of martial law some 2,000 other people remain
in detention. The vast majority fall into
categories of common criminals. No members
of the previous democratically elected gov-
ernment have been arrested or detained.
Although this hearing primarily concerns
our economic and security programs in coun-
April 11, 1977
343
tries that have been and continue to be close
friends of the United States, we are at the
same time attempting to normalize relations
with our former adversaries in Vietnam. The
Presidential Commission is in Hanoi at this
moment, trying to achieve a satisfactory ac-
counting of our MIA's in Southeast Asia so
that we can move toward the normalization of
relations. The Commission will also visit Laos
to discuss the MIA issue. We hope for an
eventual easing of tension and promotion of
stability for the entire region, making it pos-
sible for all nations to devote more of their
own resources and of the assistance they re-
ceive from abroad to the economic well-being
of their peoples and to relax the restraints
which today are in varying degree imposed
upon individual liberties throughout the re-
gion.
Department Discusses South Asia
and U.S. Assistance Programs
Following is a statement by Adolph Dubs,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East-
ern and South Asian Affairs, before the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the House Committee on International Re-
lations on March 22. l
I am pleased to testify today in support of
AID's [Agency for International Develop-
ment] proposed fiscal year 1978 development
assistance programs in Bangladesh, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and the Public Law
480 commodity sales to those four countries
and India. Since Mr. Adler [Michael H. B.
Adler, Acting Assistant Administrator for
Asia, AID] is concentrating on the details
and specifics of our economic assistance pro-
posals, I would like to present a brief over-
view of recent political and economic
developments in the region and how these
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
developments relate to U.S. policies, goals,
and concerns.
Mr. Chairman, the programs we are con-
sidering today will affect countries with a
combined population of over 800 million
people, more than one-fifth of the inhabitants
of the world. Most of the people in these
countries are, by any standard, among the
poorest individuals we are attempting to as-
sist anywhere.
South Asia is marked by its diversity. The
vast majority of its inhabitants belong to
three great religions: Hinduism, Buddhism,
and Islam. The political systems are not
uniform in structure. The area's economies
range from subsistence farming to high-
technology industries. Despite this diversity,
the nations of South Asia share many things.
In particular, they share common acute and
pressing problems: They all confront the
problems associated with rising populations,
declining land-man ratios, low industrializa-
tion, rapid urbanization, and severe
problems in the fields of education and
health.
Two successive good crop years, and the
absence of manmade or natural disasters,
have reduced temporarily the acuteness of
the basic challenges facing South Asia.
Nevertheless, the overall system remains
exceedingly fragile. The economies of all the
states are heavily influenced by the vagaries
of weather, and the region repeatedly has
been confronted by cyclical food shortages
which have threatened the lives of millions.
Our goal is providing development assist-
ance and food aid to help South Asia address
these challenges. We recognize the limits of
our ability to influence developments, par-
ticularly in view of the massive difficulties
faced, but we feel that we have an obligation
to assist these countries in their developmen-
tal efforts. Certainly, despite its many prob-
lems the area has the potential to develop, to
become self-sufficient in food production, and
to satisfy the basic needs of its peoples.
During the past year, South Asian states
generally have improved their bilateral rela-
tions. Efforts to do so have required political
courage and foresight and have demonstrated
a degree of flexibility on the part of the re-
344
Department of State Bulletin
gion's leaders. We welcome these efforts.
South Asian nations, for the first time since
1962, all enjoy full and normal diplomatic rela-
tions. And outside the immediate region, India
has made progress toward normalizing its rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China,
while Pakistan has done the same with Af-
ghanistan. If the regional tensions which have
characterized relations among South Asian
countries continue to decrease, we hope that
these countries will shift increasing resources
to developmental purposes.
India and Pakistan have made important
strides in implementing the process of nor-
malization under the Simla agreement, while
India and Bangladesh have met on several
occasions to discuss their dispute over the
division of the Ganges' waters. Political prob-
lems continue to exist, but these are being
addressed by the nations of the region di-
rectly, without outside intervention. This in
itself is a most welcome development.
The United States, Mr. Chairman, has
only a limited ability to influence this process
of regional accomodation, but we encourage
it and have supported it where possible. Di-
rect U.S. security interests in South Asia are
limited. We have no military bases on the
subcontinent, and we seek no bases. We have
been following a policy of restraint on the
sale of military equipment. We believe that
this policy has served our interests well.
Aside from modest military training pro-
grams, we offer no grant military aid in
South Asia.
This is not to say that our political inter-
ests in the region are insignificant, but
compared with other areas of the world, our
direct involvement is modest and our inter-
ests can best be served by encouraging the
evolution of a stable regional system, free of
outside domination, in which the individual
countries are able to devote increasing
resources to their own development.
Additionally, our political interest is en-
hanced by the fact that South Asia has
become increasingly important in interna-
tional forums, where many of the more basic
economic issues confronting the world are
being addressed. The regional states partici-
pate actively in the Group of 77, the
Nonaligned Conference, the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation, the
North-South dialogue, and in many other in-
ternational forums. Within these groupings,
South Asia counts for a great deal: India has
long been an important spokesman for the
Third World; Pakistan has been in the
forefront on international economic issues;
and Sri Lanka currently chairs the
nonaligned group of nations. On the whole,
South Asia has adopted a constructive and
noncontroversial approach, seeking to pro-
mote a genuine dialogue with the developed
world.
Our goals in South Asia continue to be:
— Improving regional stability and
enhancing the ability of the regional states to
resolve their bilateral problems without out-
side interference;
— Strengthening the independence of
South Asian nations and supporting their de-
termination to avoid domination by any
external power;
— Providing economic assistance and hu-
manitarian aid, when this is required,
assisting the nations of the area in their ef-
forts to attack poverty;
— Encouraging these nations to adopt
constructive policies on major world eco-
nomic and political issues;
— Limiting regional conventional arms
acquisitions and preventing nuclear prolifer-
ation in South Asia;
— Fostering, so far as we are able, the
promotion of human rights and the democratic
process; and
— Controlling the production of narcotics
and their supply to the world's illicit market.
Fortunately, trends in recent years within
South Asia have shown substantial progress
toward these goals, although the problems
ahead remain formidable. Nuclear prolifera-
tion, Mr. Chairman, is one such issue.
As you are aware, India exploded a nuclear
device in 1974, and Pakistan has contracted
to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant
from France. It is in our basic interest that
both countries behave responsibly in this
field. We have repeatedly stressed our
opposition to the transfer of sensitive nuclear
April 11, 1977
345
technology. We are discussing this problem
with the Pakistan Government in diplomatic
channels. Prime Minister Bhutto recently
stated that he would be prepared to discuss
this matter with us, and we hope that it will
be possible to reach a mutually satisfactory
conclusion.
Narcotics, as you are well aware, Mr.
Chairman, is another significant issue con-
fronting U.S. policy in South Asia. Two of
the regional states, India and Pakistan, are
large producers of opium. So far as we are
aware, no South Asian opium or opium prod-
ucts have yet reached the United States, but
as the suppression programs in Mexico and
Burma bear fruit, international traffickers
may turn their attention to South Asia.
Mr. Chairman, recent internal political de-
velopments in South Asia have received a
considerable amount of press attention, and I
would like to address myself to these de-
velopments briefly. India and Pakistan have
just completed general elections; Sri Lanka
is scheduled to do so before the end of the
year; and Bangladesh has had nationwide
local elections. In the first two instances,
there were broad-ranging, extremely free
debates on the domestic issues confronting
these countries, as well as on their basic
political structures and leadership. With re-
gard to Sri Lanka, the campaign in that
country promises to afford the voters an op-
portunity to openly examine the nation's
priorities, goals, and direction, as has been
the case in previous elections.
Mr. Chairman, our proposed AID program
is supportive of our political interests in
South Asia. It is aimed at the most critical
problems of the area: increasing food produc-
tion and reducing population growth. A
solution to these problems is crucial to im-
proving the lives of the poor in this region.
The challenge also has worldwide
significance in our interdependent world. I
know you will have specific questions on
these proposals, as well as on the general
situation in the region, which I will be happy
to answer as fully and frankly as possible.
Expiration of Area Restrictions
on Use of Passports
Press release 114 dated March 18
On March 18 the restrictions against the use
of the U.S. passport for travel to, in or
through Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and
Cambodia expire. Therefore there will no
longer be any bar to the use of the passport in
those countries.
It is important for would-be travelers to
bear in mind, however, that the ability of the
U.S. Government to extend the traditional
protection to its citizens is very limited in
those countries with which the United States
maintains no diplomatic or consular relations.
That is the case with the four aforementioned
countries. Although it is possible for Ameri-
can travelers to seek very limited assistance
from the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which
protects U.S. interests in Cuba, there is no
protecting power in any of the other countries
mentioned above. This and other inherent
risks for Americans in traveling to these
countries are described in greater detail in
travel advisory notices which will be made
available by the Passport Office and Foreign
Service posts abroad to would-be travelers to
those countries.
Revisions of the Department of the Treas-
ury licensing procedures affecting the expen-
diture of funds in the aforementioned coun-
tries are in preparation. Information may be
secured from the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Department of the Treasury.
346
Department of State Bulletin
Inter-American Relations in an Era of Change
Statement by William H. Luers
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 1
On behalf of the Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, I welcome this series of hearings. I
hope they can contribute to an illumination
and to a better appreciation of the profound
changes that have taken place in our hemi-
spheric relations over the past generation.
In this opening statement, I plan to de-
scribe briefly:
— How our perceptions of the hemisphere
have lagged behind reality;
— How differently we and the other nations
of this hemisphere perceive our mutual inter-
ests;
— How strikingly different our perceptions
are from the Latin Americans' on the proper
emphasis on rights; and
— How we are setting out in this environ-
ment to improve hemispheric cooperation.
America's appreciation of and attitudes to-
ward Latin America and the Caribbean have
not kept pace with the dramatic changes that
have taken place in this hemisphere since the
early days of the Alliance for Progress. Symp-
tomatic of this lag is the fact that a major
U.S. newspaper carried an editorial on Brazil
only last month and referred to its capital as
Rio.
Today the nations of Latin America and the
Caribbean are more diverse, confident, inde-
1 Made before the Subcommittee on Inter-American
Affairs of the House International Relations Committee
on Mar. 24 at a hearing on fiscal year 1978 foreign eco-
nomic assistance for Latin America. The complete tran-
script of the hearings will be published by the commit-
tee and will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402.
pendent, and self-aware than any regional
grouping in the Third World. But they also
have a crushing burden of foreign debt, an
alarming population growth, and a dizzy rate
of urbanization. As change has transformed
these societies, inequities have become
exaggerated — stark poverty exists alongside
prosperity.
Most of the nations of the hemisphere have
given up one-man rule for more in-
stitutionalized forms of government. But the
dominant institution is the military. Democ-
racy, never strongly rooted in Latin America,
is less prevalent today than at any time since
World War II. Yet, while there are repressive
governments, many democratic freedoms
coexist — paradoxically — with serious abuses
of human rights.
Latin America and the Caribbean present
most dramatically the importance of the
North-South issues to the people of this coun-
try. From no other part of the world does
foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our
society or create such an implicit obligation to
help:
— As our living standards outstrip theirs,
we become the illegal but logical haven for
workers escaping the despair of poverty.
— Regional proximity sharpens our human-
itarian perceptions that poverty is a global
rather than a national problem.
— As our market for illicit drugs expands,
our corruption and crime extends itself into
the poor agricultural areas where the prod-
ucts of the poppy and the coca plant become
valued commodities.
— As our interchanges of finance, trade, and
April 11, 1977
347
tourism grow, they impact deeply on citizens
of this country.
— And as citizens from our neighborhood
enter the United States, our society is en-
riched and our labor force expanded.
The peoples of this hemisphere are no
longer in awe of us. They respect our vitality,
success, technology, and prosperity. But they
charge that we have an insatiable thirst for
the world's resources, that we are unwilling
to share our expanding wealth, and that we
have used our enormous power arbitrarily in
the past.
If Latin Americans are still described in
cliches by us, so we, likewise, are little un-
derstood by them.
Differing Perceptions of Interests
Let me turn now to discuss briefly how our
interests in the nations of Latin America and
the Caribbean contrast with their interests in
us.
The United States:
— Hopes that this hemisphere remains free
from military conflict, from arms races, and
from the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
— Depends on the expansion of two-way
trade with a rapidly growing and industrializ-
ing market;
— Looks to the leaders of this hemisphere to
play a mature and moderating role in the in-
ternational councils now exploring the reor-
dering of the world's economic institutions
and procedures;
— Desires to see the end to torture, perse-
cution, arbitrary arrest, and violence from the
left and the right; and
— Hopes that economic development will be
accompanied by the development of demo-
cratic institutions which provide the most cer-
tain guarantee of human rights.
What the nations of Latin America and the
Caribbean seek from us is quite different.
From each nation of the hemisphere comes a
different set of requests, reflecting the diver-
sity of the region. You will be examining this
diversity with my colleagues. There are com-
mon threads, however:
— Trade and resource flows are at the cen-
ter of their concerns. They want expanded
and preferred access to our markets and
guarantees of stabilized earnings from their
exports. They want financial backing for their
heavy debt burdens.
— They insist that we not intervene in their
internal affairs. Their obsession with U.S. in-
terventionism has a long history. By interven-
tionism they often mean not only military in-
tervention and subversion but also the
ubiquitous U.S. products and television pro-
grams.
— They also want our respect and our ap-
preciation of their dignity, independence, and
sovereignty. They want our understanding
and our attention.
Interdependence requires that we respond
to these hemispheric interests. Otherwise we
cannot expect responsiveness to ours.
Differing Perspectives on Human Rights
I would like here, Mr. Chairman, to make a
comment on the differing perspectives that
we and many Latin American nations have on
human rights.
Some governments see our urging respect
for human rights as a new type of U.S. inter-
ventionism. They are annoyed because they
believe that our comments and program re-
strictions reflect a failure to understand their
particular domestic problems and security
threats. We do not pretend to measure or
judge the domestic threat. It is the type and
severity of the response that concerns the
American people. As President Carter said
[at the United Nations on March 17], no sig-
natory of the U.N. Charter "can avoid its re-
sponsibilities to review and to speak when
torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in
any part of the world."
And let it be said that other hemispheric
governments and many people in this hemi-
sphere welcome and are heartened by our re-
newed attention to values that still form a
unique part of this New World. In our in-
creased interest in human rights, we are not
imposing our political preferences on any na-
tion. But we are summoning governments to
respect the principles to which they have sub-
scribed in numerous U.N. and OAS docu-
ments.
348
Department of State Bulletin
There is a second aspect of the rights ques-
tion, the perception of which separates us
from many governments, leaders, intellectu-
als, and ordinary citizens in this hemisphere.
We stress as fundamental the rights of liberty
and freedoms from physical and mental perse-
cution. Yet many in this hemisphere see the
rights to food, shelter, work, and survival as
fundamental. If the right to be free from tor-
ture and persecution is vital to man's dignity,
so are the economic and social rights. We
must be alert to the charge that we justify our
decision not to share our wealth on the
grounds that others violate human rights. Our
conscience thus eased, some charge, we con-
tinue to devour a third of the world's re-
sources.
I should like to quote here again from Pres-
ident Carter's address to the United Nations.
The human rights issue, he said:
... is important in itself. It should not block prog-
ress on other important matters affecting the security
and well-being of our people and of world peace. It is
obvious that the reduction of tension, the control of nu-
clear arms, the achievement of harmony in the troubled
areas of the world, and the provision of food, good
health, and education will independently contribute to
advancing the human condition.
In our relationships with other countries, these
mutual concerns will be reflected in our political, our
cultural, and our economic attitudes.
Mr. Chairman, if we are prepared to match
our morality with our generosity, if compas-
sion for the poor is equal to our passion for
freedom, and if we pay as much attention to
egalitarian as we do to libertarian issues, our
message will be heard and understood.
Toward Improved Hemispheric Cooperation
Mr. Chairman, I am optimistic about our
capacity to shape a more cooperative relation-
ship with the other nations of this hemi-
sphere.
First, we have with our neighbors a long
experience in shaping economic change and
growth. The global North-South debate, in a
real sense, began in this hemisphere. The
leaders of Latin America are advanced in
their ideas on how the United States might
become a better partner in their economic de-
velopment. We must address simultaneously
global, regional, subregional, and bilateral is-
sues. Our approach to many economic issues
will depend on solutions developed in a global
framework. Other issues we can best work
out through a strengthened inter-American
system with the Organization of American
States at its center. Still others we can best
approach cooperatively through existing sub-
regional organizations. Finally, there will be a
number of questions we can resolve most ef-
fectively only on a bilateral basis.
Second, this is a hemisphere whose nations
are at peace with each other. Although there
are repressive governments, there is no seri-
ous threat of war. The nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean spend less on ar-
maments than any region in the world. And
while violence is too often turned inward in
the Americas, the governments have the
interest and capacity to improve the lot of
their people. Most people throughout the
Americas respond instinctively to fundamen-
tal humanitarian values. Even authoritarian
governments accept these ideals and explain
departures from them in terms of priorities
rather than preference. Without war, gov-
ernments and societies can devote their ener-
gies to people.
Third, we must make clear that the long era
of U.S. interventionism has passed. Govern-
ments will remain skeptical of our assurances.
We must be open in our relations and abstain
from our historic compulsion to design the fu-
ture of our neighbors. We can convince them
now only by our performance, not rhetoric.
Fourth, there is a new sense of cooperation
between the U.S. private sector and the gov-
ernments of this hemisphere. Governments
have better defined the terms under which
foreign capital is wanted. U.S. companies, for
their part, are demonstrating a new sensitiv-
ity to the national pride and sovereign rights
of their hosts. Improved cooperation with the
private sector is critical to capital and tech-
nology transfers.
Fifth, the increasing role of Hispanic
Americans and people from the Caribbean in
our society is beginning to raise the American
consciousness about our neighborhood. We
must develop together with the Congress and
the media new ways and new programs for
April 11, 1977
349
expanding our understanding of this hemi-
sphere and its peoples. It is likewise essential
that the nations of this hemisphere make
greater efforts to understand us.
Finally, President Carter has shown an
unprecedented interest in Latin America:
— His first Presidential visitor was, by no
coincidence, from Mexico. We have already
set an energetic and cooperative course with
the Government of Mexico to manage the
complex problems we share.
— A first priority of this Administration
after the inauguration was to give urgent at-
tention to negotiating a new treaty with
Panama for the canal. This is an issue of im-
portance not just between us and Panama but
for our relations with the entire hemisphere.
— Several foreign ministers have visited
Washington as a first step to rebuilding our
relations with traditional friends.
— We have indicated a readiness to talk to
the Cuban Government without preconditions
on a range of issues that divide us.
— We are committed to continued strong
support for international and regional finan-
cial institutions and to sustaining significant
bilateral assistance programs which are criti-
cal to the development needs of the region. In
this endeavor we shall need the support of the
Congress.
— And although we know it will be difficult
to move rapidly on the many economic issues
critical to this hemisphere, this Administra-
tion is committed to engage the issues
seriously.
Mr. Chairman, we have an opportunity and
obligation to cooperate constructively with
this new hemisphere. We must do so without
sentimentality but with a sense of strong tra-
dition, without paternalism but with respect
for the sovereignty, independence, and dig-
nity of each nation to find its own future.
Pan American Day and
Pan American Week, 1977
A PROCLAMATION 1
The people of the Western Hemisphere share a com-
mon past and a common future. As friends and
neighbors we have an obligation to help one another, in
order to promote our common good and to solve the
problems of each nation, and advance our mutual inter-
est in global solutions to problems that confront all of
humankind. The Organization of American States, the
world's oldest regional organization, is one symbol of
these shared aspirations.
Since Pan American Day was first proclaimed in 1889,
the nations of this hemisphere have undergone dramatic
changes internally and in relationship to each other.
The challenge for all of us in the coming year is to find
ways to adapt our relationships to take into account
these changes. At the same time, we should rededicate
ourselves to the ideals of peace, cooperation, and social
justice which continue to unite and inspire our peoples.
It is appropriate that we set aside a special period to
honor the heritage that unites us, to reaffirm our
mutual desire for peace and international harmony, and
to dedicate ourselves to shaping a relationship which
looks to the future for inspiration.
Now, Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, President of
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
Thursday, April 14, 1977, as Pan American Day, and
the week beginning April 10, 1977, as Pan American
Week. I call upon the Governors of the States and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Mayor of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and appropriate officials of all other
areas subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to
issue similar proclamations.
I urge the communications media, educators, indi-
viduals, and organizations to join together during this
week to celebrate our friendship and to recognize the
need for a continuing commitment to peaceful and pro-
ductive relationships with our neighbors in this Hemi-
sphere as a special part of our effort to forge equitable
global frameworks for relations among nations.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
this twenty-first day of March, in the year of our Lord
nineteen hundred seventy-seven, and of the Independ-
ence of the United States of America the two hundred
and first.
Jimmy Carter.
1 No. 4491; 42 Fed. Reg. 15677.
350
Department of State Bulletin
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal Testifies on Legislation
on Illicit Payments Abroad
Following is a statement by Secretary of the
Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal made be-
fore the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs on March 16. 1
Department of the Treasury press release dated March 16
I would like to say at the outset that the
Administration supports the aims of S. 305.
The Carter Administration believes that it is
damaging both to our country and to a healthy
world economic system for American corpora-
tions to bribe foreign officials. The United
States should impose specific criminal penal-
ties for such acts. The effective enforcement
of U.S. criminal penalties for corrupt pay-
ments abroad is a difficult matter and will re-
quire close international cooperation. I will
discuss these enforcement aspects later in my
testimony.
The problem of corrupt payments is one
that is a cause of great concern to this Admin-
istration. Paying bribes — apart from being
morally repugnant and illegal in most
countries — is simply not necessary for the
successful conduct of business here or over-
seas. I believe that the responsible elements
of the business community agree, and it had
been my hope that the business community it-
self would formulate and implement a code of
business ethics that would set high standards.
Unfortunately, there has been little move-
ment to date in the private sector. The Carter
Administration has decided that strong gov-
ernment action in the form of further legisla-
tion is needed.
In its assessment of legislative alternatives,
the Carter Administration is reviewing care-
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
fully the record of recent regulatory action.
We are finding this record a very useful guide
against which new initiatives can be
examined. I believe therefore that it would be
worthwhile to review with you the consider-
able regulatory action that has taken place
during the past few years.
1. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion has been impressively successful in ob-
taining disclosure from issuers of registered
securities who have engaged in these im-
proper practices. It is already clear that these
disclosures have compelled many firms to im-
pose strict internal controls against these
practices. I need not describe further the
SEC's action, as I am sure that Chairman
[Roderick M.] Hills will give you a thorough
description in his testimony today.
2. In June 1976 the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice issued 11 questions to which corporate of-
ficers and outside auditors are required to re-
spond in affidavit form. These questions are
designed to discover whether corporations
have been illegally deducting bribes. As of
December 31, 1976, the 11 questions had been
asked in approximately 800 large case exam-
inations. Indications of slush funds or illegal
activity have been found in over 270 such
cases. Most of these cases are still under ac-
tive consideration, and over 50 criminal inves-
tigations have been started.
Also in the tax area, the Tax Reform Act of
1976 eliminated the tax benefits (deferrals
and deductions) associated with illegal pay-
ments made by majority-owned subsidiaries
and domestic international sales corporations.
This new prohibition parallels longstanding
prohibitions against deductions of illegal pay-
ments made in the United States.
I believe that this increased audit activity
and new legislation will have an increasingly
salutary effect.
April 11, 1977
351
3. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976
now requires reports of payments (including
political contributions and agents' fees) that
are made or offered to secure the sale of de-
fense items abroad. The data reported by
U.S. firms is made available to Congress and
to Federal agencies responsible for enforcing
laws on this subject. The Department of State
has issued detailed regulations to implement
this requirement.
Furthermore, 1976 amendments to the
Foreign Military Sales Act require disclosure
to purchasing governments and to the De-
partment of Defense of any agents' fees in-
cluded in contracts covered by the act. Fees
determined to be questionable by the Defense
Department or unacceptable by foreign gov-
ernments will not be allowed costs under such
contracts.
4. Last year, the International Chamber of
Commerce organized an international panel to
formulate a code of ethics for businessmen.
The panel is scheduled to present a code of
ethics to the ICC Executive Board on March
23. Subject to approval by the national cham-
bers of commerce, the code could be adopted
by the ICC council at its June 1977 meeting.
5. The United States is actively pursuing in
the United Nations a treaty on corrupt pay-
ments in international transactions. The
United States has formally proposed that the
treaty be based on three concepts: (1) en-
forcement of host-country criminal laws; (2)
international cooperation on exchange of
information and judicial assistance in en-
forcement; and (3) uniform provisions for dis-
closure of payments to foreign officials and
agents made to influence official acts.
The U.N. working group for this initiative
has met twice and will meet again to begin
drafting March 28-April 8. It has been di-
rected to report by this summer on a possible
treaty on illicit payments for consideration by
the United Nations Economic and Social
Council and possible action by the General
Assembly.
A number of other governments have ex-
pressed interest in international action, but
there is much work still to be done. This
treaty may be an essential complement to ef-
fective enforcement of domestic legislation,
such as S. 305. President Carter is giving this
effort his fullest support.
6. The Department of Justice, in coopera-
tion with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the Bureau of Customs, has
reviewed the foreign activities of approxi-
mately 50 domestic corporations. This review
has resulted in the opening of active criminal
investigations on eight multinational corpo-
rations. Several of these investigations are
now in the grand jury stage.
The United States is also continuing to
cooperate through bilateral agreements in the
law enforcement efforts of other govern-
ments. Thirteen agreements on specific
corporate groups have been signed, and dis-
cussions are underway with other countries.
Enforcement Problems
The initiatives described above are collec-
tively impressive. They add up to a significant
deterrent to corrupt payments by American
firms, both in the United States and abroad.
Of equal importance, Mr. Chairman, is the
change in the climate of public opinion in the
United States. I am certain that any U.S.
corporate executive faced with a choice of
whether to make a corrupt payment in 1977
will be much more reluctant than he would
have been three years ago.
However, the Administration believes that
the recent initiatives must be complemented
by new legislation. The Administration sup-
ports the criminalization of corrupt payments
made to foreign officials.
But before turning to the criminalization
aspects of S. 305, I would like to assure the
committee that the Administration agrees
with section 102 of title I concerning account-
ing records and dealings with accountants.
We note that the SEC has recently offered for
comment proposed regulations which closely
parallel section 102. We suggest that the
committee consider comments received by the
SEC concerning the proposed regulations
when it marks up this section.
Now turning to the central aspect of S.
305 — the criminalization of corrupt payments
made to foreign officials — as I said, we sup-
port it. At the same time, the Administration
352
Department of State Bulletin
recognizes that great care must be taken with
an approach which makes certain types of ex-
traterritorial conduct subject to our country's
criminal laws. Moreover, a law which pro-
vides criminal penalties must describe the
persons and acts covered with a high degree
of specificity in order to be enforceable, to
provide fair warning to American busi-
nessmen. Mr. Chairman, I am seriously con-
cerned about the enforcement problems aris-
ing from the broad and sometimes vague
reach of S. 305 as it is presently drafted. The
Administration believes that the bill can and
must be improved in a number of respects to
insure that it will be fairly and effectively en-
forced and, in its implementation, will not
give undue offense to foreign countries whose
officials would be implicated in cases brought
under the U.S. criminal law.
Aspects of the bill which we believe require
improvement include the following elements:
— The definition of a "domestic concern"
should specify the degree of control which will
bring a foreign corporation controlled by in-
dividuals who are citizens or nationals of the
United States within the purview of the law.
— The definition of the term "domestic con-
cern" should also make it clear when a foreign
corporation which is owned directly or indi-
rectly by a U.S. corporation is covered.
— Foreign issuers of registered securities
should not be subject to the criminalization
penalties.
— Requiring the SEC to take primary re-
sponsibility for enforcing a criminalization
program would be a dubious diversion from its
primary mission of securing adequate disclo-
sure to protect investors of registered securi-
ties.
— The term "interstate commerce" should
be more precisely defined to provide more
specifically the certainty and the extent of
contacts with the United States constitution-
ally required in a criminal statute.
I want to emphasize that our reservations
do not represent an intent to weaken the
thrust of the bill or to delay its passage.
Rather, we want to work with your commit-
tee to insure that legislation in this area is
workable and fair. We have established an
interagency group to recommend language
which will satisfy our concerns. We will get
that language to you as soon as possible.
Further, the Administration believes that
prompt disclosure of corrupt foreign pay-
ments also may provide a highly effective de-
terrent. We do not foreclose the possibility
that disclosure provisions will be considered
in our further review of the enforcement as-
pects of this subject.
Moreover, once the bill is enacted into law,
the Administration plans to continue to seek a
multilateral treaty and additional bilateral
agreements on illicit payments. Such agree-
ments will increase the enforceability of
domestic legislation and will help to minimize
any adverse effects of this law on our foreign
relations. Our intent is to propose that a mul-
tilateral treaty include an undertaking by
each country to adopt the approach of S.
305 — in other words, to apply a criminal pro-
hibition against foreign corporate bribery.
Disclosure of Shareholder Identity
Let me turn now to a brief discussion of
title II. First, I support its concept —
increased disclosure where it will help inves-
tors and serve public policy. In general, I
believe that the benefits of increased disclo-
sure outweigh its burdens. The trend in re-
cent years toward both increased corporate
disclosure and increased disclosure of share-
holders themselves has benefited investors,
and I have favored it.
Concerning title II, however, it seems to us
that the present reporting requirement,
coupled with recent SEC actions, may be al-
ready achieving its intended goal. Specifical-
ly, we think that these regulations already
disclose shareholders in positions of potential
control. We particularly think that recent
SEC administrative actions have helped im-
prove disclosure of the identity of large
shareholders.
Let me provide some specifics concerning
our reservations over title II. First, the ap-
parent intention of this legislation is to dis-
close the ownership interests of persons with
potential influence over corporate manage-
ments. Presumably, the sponsors believe that
April 11, 1977
353
shareholders and the general public could be
affected by these people and thus have a right
to know their identity. I agree — disclosure of
those who truly could exercise such control
makes sense.
The issue, however, is one of whether the
present disclosure requirements already ac-
complish this. It seems to me that the present
requirement — that beneficial owners of 5 per-
cent or more disclose their identities — already
is effective.
My own experience and observations in
business have been that owners of less than 5
percent rarely have potential control of man-
agements. An ownership position of that size
rarely threatens a management with being
overruled or overthrown. I realize that the 5
percent requirement doesn't reveal a large
absolute number of owners in any given cor-
poration, but nevertheless it seems to reveal
those with potential control.
Indeed, the area of greater abuse has been
that of managements abusing shareholder
rights — pursuing policies which aren't dis-
closed to them and which may be contrary to
shareholders' best interests. In contrast,
there have been almost no examples of less-
than-5-percent shareholders harmfully
dominating managements.
Second, I have some concerns over the ef-
fects of this lowered reporting level on foreign
portfolio investment in the United States. Our
equity market benefits considerably from
foreign transactions in U.S. securities. Any
actions which might reduce the inflow of
foreign capital or divert transactions offshore
should be studied carefully. In particular, the
amount of new equity capital available to
American business in the past three years has
been too small, and if this bill would reduce it
further, I would be concerned. One reason for
this concern is that the 1976 Treasury report
to the Congress entitled "Foreign Portfolio
Investment in the United States" concluded
that disclosure requirements deterred foreign
investors from our equity market.
I also question the possible effects of title II
on this Administration's objective of an open
environment for international investment and
removing existing obstacles to it. Freer in-
ternational investment would benefit all na-
tions, and especially the United States with
our strengthening economy. Imposing a lower
reporting requirement, however, is inconsist-
ent with this goal of facilitating such invest-
ment. Our report on foreign portfolio invest-
ment noted that many foreign investors often
fear filing ownership reports with the U.S.
Government, since it might lead to reporting
their ownership interests to their home gov-
ernments. Disclosure of this information to
home governments could have, and in some
instances has had, serious consequences for
foreign investors, including forced repatria-
tion and confiscation of assets.
As you know, portfolio investment ebbs and
flows rapidly, and this tightened disclosure
requirement might impede these flows. It
seems to me that this impact of this legislation
on overall portfolio investment should be
evaluated more carefully.
My third reservation, Mr. Chairman, re-
flects this Administration's concern with
costly reporting requirements imposed on
American business by government. We be-
lieve that before new regulations requiring
more documentation are imposed, the need
should be proven and the costs of compliance
understood. I already have indicated uncer-
tainty over the need; moreover, I don't be-
lieve that any estimate has been made of the
increased costs which title II would require.
Ultimately, these costs probably will be borne
by investors, since the financial inter-
mediaries which must report will pass them
through. Indeed, they may be borne particu-
larly by individual investors, since securities
firms recently have had difficulty in passing
through costs to institutional investors.
In summary, we don't think that there is
sufficient evidence that the objectives of this
legislation aren't already being met. We par-
ticularly think that recent SEC initiatives
may be making the 5 percent requirement
more effective.
Concerning the SEC, its recent broadening
of the definition of beneficial ownership will
produce more disclosure, and we should as-
sess its effects. Furthermore, recent legisla-
tion directed the SEC to require financial in-
354
Department of State Bulletin
stitutions to report their equity holdings. This
may accomplish much of the purpose of title
II. We will consult with the SEC on these de-
velopments to assess their effect on overall
disclosure. Afterwards, we would be willing
to report back to the committee in writing
concerning our findings.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
Alan Boyd Named To Negotiate
U.S.-U.K. Air Services Agreement
Press release 88 dated February 28
Alan Boyd has been designated by Presi-
dent Carter as special U.S. representative to
negotiate a new U.S.-U.K. air services
agreement. Mr. Boyd will have the personal
rank of Ambassador.
The United Kingdom announced on June 22,
1976, its intention to terminate effective June
22, 1977, the current U.S.-U.K. air services
agreement (the "Bermuda agreement"). Al-
though the United States expressed its con-
tinuing satisfaction with the Bermuda agree-
ment, it accepted a British invitation to enter
into negotiations. In the first phase of the
negotiations, which took place during the fall
of 1976, aviation officials of both governments
exchanged data and views. The United States
strongly defended the principles of competi-
tion embodied in the Bermuda agreement and
succeeded in laying the groundwork for what
we are confident will be a productive second
phase of negotiations, which began in London
February 28.
The United Kingdom has informed us that
beginning with the second phase of the
negotiations it also intends to be represented
by an official of greater seniority and status.
Ambassador Boyd is a former Secretary of
Transportation and Chairman of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB). Until December
31, 1976, he was vice chairman of Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad. In his new capacity he will be
supported by the Office of Aviation of the De-
partment of State and will work closely with
the Departments of Transportation and Com-
merce and the CAB.
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
13, 1976. '
Signature: Philippines, January 5, 1977.
Customs
Customs convention regarding E.C.S. (Echantillons
Commerciaux-Commercial Samples) carnets for com-
mercial samples, with annex and protocol of signa-
ture. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into
force October 3, 1957; for the United States March 3,
1969. TIAS 6632.
Notification uf denunciation: Norway, January 31,
1977; effective April 30, 1977.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. '
Acceptance deposited: Austria, March 1, 1977.
Meteorology
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization,
with related protocol. Done at Washington October
11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS
2052.
Ceases to be separate member: St. Pierre and
Miquelon, effective September 28, 1977. 2
Oil Pollution
Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oc-
tober 21, 1969. Enters into force January 20, 1978.
TIAS 8505.
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, March 1, 1977.
Postal
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and
convention with final protocol and regulations of
1 Not in force.
2 Meteorological service being incorporated in that of
France as of September 28, 1977.
April 11, 1977
355
execution. Done at Vienna January 10, 1964. Entered
into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Accession deposited: Angola, February 23, 1977, ef-
fective March 3, 1977.
Second additional protocol to the constitution of the
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general reg-
ulations with final protocol and annex, and the uni-
versal postal convention with final protocol and de-
tailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974.
Entered into force January 1, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Iraq, November 29, 1976.
Accession deposited: Angola, February 23, 1977, ef-
fective March 3, 1977.
Safety at Sea
International regulations for preventing collisions at
sea. Approved by the International Conference on
Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to
June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965.
TIAS 5813.
Acceptance deposited: Libya, February 16, 1977.
Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc-
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Finland, February 16, 1977.
Accession deposited: Zaire, February 10, 1977.
Telecommunications
Telephone regulations, with appendices and final pro-
tocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into
force September 1, 1974; for the United States April
21, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: March 16, 1977. 3
Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annexes, and
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered
into force September 1, 1974; for the United States
April 21, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: March 16, 1977. 3
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959,
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to es-
tablish a new frequency allotment plan for high-
frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes
and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. En-
tered into force January 1, 1976; for the United States
April 21, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: March 18, 1977. 4
Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14,
1973. Entered into force February 20, 1977.
Accession deposited: Malawi, March 14, 1977.
Proclaimed by the President: March 18, 1977.
BILATERAL
German Democratic Republic
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and re-
lated letter. Signed at Washington October 5, 1976.
Entered into force: March 4, 1977.
Indonesia
Loan agreement relating to a family planning oral con-
traceptive project. Signed at Jakarta January 24,
1977. Entered into force January 24, 1977.
Loan agreement relating to the Surakarta potable
water project. Signed at Jakarta January 24, 1977.
Entered into force January 24, 1977.
Japan
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at Wash-
ington March 18, 1977. Enters into force on a date to
be mutually agreed.
Mexico
Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange-
ments to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected
by exchange of letters at Mexico March 8, 1977. En-
tered into force March 8, 1977.
Philippines
Agreement amending the loan agreement of August 6,
1976, relating to improvement of local waterworks
systems. Signed at Manila February 7, 1977. Entered
into force February 7, 1977.
Singapore
Agreement relating to the establishment of a U.S. Air
Force management training assistance team in Singa-
pore, with appendices. Effected by exchange of let-
ters at Singapore February 23 and 24, 1977. Entered
into force February 24, 1977.
Thailand
Agreement relating to the deposit by Korea of 10 per-
cent of the value of grant military assistance and ex-
cess defense articles furnished by the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul May 12, 1972.
Entered into force May 12, 1972, effective February
7, 1972. TIAS 7351.
Terminated: February 19, 1977.
J With declarations
4 With reservation.
356
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX April 11, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1972
Arms Control and Disarmament
Peace. Arms Control, World Economic Progress,
Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S.
Foreign Policy (Carter) 329
President Carter's Remarks at Clinton, Mass.,
Town Meeting (excerpts) 334
Asia. U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast
Asia (Oakley) 342
Aviation. Alan Boyd Named To Negotiate
U.S. -U.K. Air Services Agreement 355
Bangladesh. Department Discusses South Asia
and U.S. Assistance Programs (Dubs) 344
Cambodia. Expiration of Area Restrictions on
Use of Passports 346
Congress
Department Discusses South Asia and U.S. As-
sistance Programs (Dubs) 344
Inter-American Relations in an Era of Change
(Luers) 347
President Carter Outlines Goals of Foreign As-
sistance Program (message to the Congress) . . 340
President Signs Bill Restoring Embargo on
Rhodesian Cnrome (Carter) 333
Secretary Vance Emphasizes Importance of
Foreign Assistance Programs 336
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal Testifies on
Legislation on Illicit Payments Abroad (Blu-
menthal) 351
U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast Asia
(Oakley) 342
Cuba. Expiration of Area Restrictions on Use of
Passports 346
Economic Affairs
Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress,
Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S.
Foreign Policy (Carter) 329
President Signs Bill Restoring Embargo on
Rhodesian Chrome (Carter) 333
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal Testifies on
Legislation on Illicit Payments Abroad (Blu-
menthal) 351
Foreign Aid
Department Discusses South Asia and U.S. As-
sistance Programs (Dubs) 344
President Carter Outlines Goals of Foreign As-
sistance Program (message to the Congress) . . 340
Secretary Vance Emphasizes Importance of
Foreign Assistance Programs 336
U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast Asia
(Oakley) 342
Human Rights
Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress,
Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S.
Foreign Policy (Carter) 329
President Carter's Remarks at Clinton, Mass.,
Town Meeting (excerpts) 334
U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast Asia
(Oakley) 342
India. Department Discusses South Asia and
U.S. Assistance Programs (Dubs) 344
Indonesia. U.S. Assistance Programs in South-
east Asia (Oakley) 342
Korea. Expiration of Area Restrictions on Use
of Passports 346
Latin America
Inter-American Relations in an Era of Change
(Luers) 347
Pan American Day and Pan American Week,
1977 (proclamation) 350
Middle East. President Carter's Remarks at
Clinton, Mass., Town Meeting (excerpts) 334
Pakistan. Department Discusses South Asia and
U.S. Assistance Programs (Dubs) 344
Passports. Expiration of Area Restrictions on
Use of Passports 346
Presidential Documents
Pan American Dav and Pan American Week,
1977 (proclamation) 350
Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress,
Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S.
Foreign Policy 329
President Carter Outlines Goals of Foreign As-
sistance Program 340
President Carter's Remarks at Clinton, Mass.,
Town Meeting (excerpts) 334
President Signs Bill Restoring Embargo on
Rhodesian Cnrome 333
Southern Rhodesia. President Signs Bill Re-
storing Embargo on Rhodesian Cnrome (Car-
ter) 333
Sri Lanka. Department Discusses South Asia
and U.S. Assistance Programs (Dubs) 344
Thailand. U.S. Assistance Programs in South-
east Asia (Oakley) 342
Treaty Information. Current Actions 355
United Kingdom. Alan Boyd Named To
Negotiate U.S. -U.K. Air Services Agree-
ment 355
Vietnam. Expiration of Area Restrictions on
Use of Passports 346
Name Index
Blumenthal, W. Michael 351
Carter, President 329, 333, 334, 340, 350
Dubs, Adolph 344
Luers, William H 347
Oakley, Robert B 342
Vance, Secretary 336
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: March 20-27
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
*123 3/21 Public hearings to be held on continu-
ation or termination of advisory
committees.
*124 3/21 Shipping Coordinating Committee
(SCO. Subcommittee on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working
group on radiocommunications,
Apr. 26 (rescheduled).
*125 3/21 SCC, SOLAS, working group on ship
design and equipment, Apr. 14.
*126 3/21 Government Advisory Committee on
International Book and Library
Programs, Apr. 21.
127 3/23 Vance: Subcommittee on Foreign As-
sistance, Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.
*Not printed.
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/?73
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI
No. 1973 • April 18, 1977
PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 24
Excerpts From Transcript 357
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION VISITS VIETNAM AND LAOS
TO SEEK INFORMATION ON MISSING AMERICANS
Remarks by President Carter, Mr. Woodcock, and Senator Mansfield
and Text of Com/mission's Report 363
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION
Statement by Under Secretary Cooper 378
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
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April 18, 1977
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The BULLETIN includes selected
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Publications of the Department of
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international relations are also listed.
President Carter's News Conference of March 24
Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on March 21*. 1
I have a brief opening statement to make
about the function of the Presidency and
about the Secretary of State's upcoming
visit to the Soviet Union.
I think one of the most impressive obser-
vations that I have understood so far about
the Presidency and what it stands for is the
need to derive its strength directly from the
people. There have been some expressions
of concern about my bringing on these news
conferences and in other ways issues that af-
fect foreign policy directly to the people of
our country.
I think it is very important that the
strength of the Presidency itself be
recognized as deriving from the people of
this nation, and I think it is good for us,
even in very complex matters when the
outcome of negotiations might still be in
doubt, to let the Members of Congress and
the people of this country know what is
going on and some of the options to be pur-
sued, some of the consequences of success,
some of the consequences of failure.
I think in many areas of the world now we
are trying to invest a great deal of time and
attention and the good offices of our country
to bring about a resolution of differences
and to prevent potential conflict.
Tomorrow, the Secretary of State will
depart for the Soviet Union. We have spent
weeks in detailed study about the agenda
that has been prepared. This agenda is one
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 28, 1977, p.
439.
that's been derived by the Soviet Union and
by our own country. I would say the central
focal point will be arms limitations and
actual reductions for a change.
I have had long discussions with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and with other members of
my own Cabinet to derive our potential pro-
posals, which Cy Vance will put forward to
Mr. Brezhnev and the Russian leaders.
We will be talking about the limitation on
arms sales. We are now the number-one ex-
porter or salesman of arms of all kinds. We
have been working with our own allies to
cut down this traffic, and we hope to get the
Soviet Union to agree with us on constraint.
We'll be dealing with mutual and balanced
force reductions in the NATO area, and on
this trip Cy Vance will make a report on the
attitude of the Soviet Union leaders concern-
ing the European theater.
We'll be trying to control the testing of
nuclear devices, both weapons and peaceful
nuclear devices, and we would like to elimi-
nate these tests altogether if the Soviets
will agree.
We are going to try to move toward de-
militarizing the Indian Ocean, and here
again we'll be consulting closely with our al-
lies and friends. And we are going to ex-
press our concern about the future of Africa
and ask the Soviet Union to join with us in
removing from that troubled continent out-
side interference which might contribute to
warfare in the countries involved. And we
will start laying the groundwork for cooper-
ation with the Soviet Union at the Geneva
conference, which we hope will take place,
concerning the Middle East.
These matters are extremely complex. We
don't know whether or not we will be suc-
April 18, 1977
357
cessful at all, but we go in good faith with
high hopes. The Soviets have been very
cooperative up to this point, and we are
pleased with their attitude. And I know that
the prayers of the American people will go
with Cy Vance, our Secretary of State, to
the Soviet Union, in hopes that this trip
might result in the alleviation of tension and
the further guaranteeing of peace for our
world in the future.
Q. Mr. President, in terms*of bringing the
American people in on the dialogue, you
spoke of arms reduction. Does that mean
that Vance will take a new set. of proposals
on SALT?
And. two, you spoke of the cooperative
attitude of the Soviets. Does that mean that
you don't think that any of Brezhnev's
statements in the past week will have any
bearing, in terms of your human rights
stand, on the SALT negotiations?
The President: Well, I think the first
question is easily answered. Yes, we will
take new proposals to the Soviet Union. We
are not abandoning the agreements made in
the Vladivostok agreement. As you know,
all previous SALT agreements have been, in
effect, limitations that were so high that
they were, in effect, just ground rules for
intensified competition and a continued mas-
sive arms growth in nuclear weapons.
We hope to bring not only limitations
for — to continue in the past — but also actual
substantial reduction that the Soviets will
agree. That will be our first proposal. I
spelled this out briefly in my U.N. speech.
And the second fallback position will be,
in effect, to ratify Vladivostok and to wait
until later to solve some of the most difficult
and contentious issues. We hope that the
Soviets will agree to the substantial reduc-
tion.
The other part of your question was what,
Helen [Helen Thomas, UPI]?
Q. It was in the question of this new — this
cooperative attitude.
The President : About Brezhnev's at-
titude?
Q. Right.
The President : Well, I study Mr.
Brezhnev's speeches in their entirety. And I
think the speech made this past week to
their general trade union conference and one
made previously at Tula — I consider them to
be very constructive.
There was a delineation in his speech be-
tween human rights, which he equates with
intrusion into their own internal
affairs — and I don't agree with that
assessment — that has been divided in his
speeches from the subject of peace and arms
limitation, including nuclear arms. So I have
nothing that I have heard directly or indi-
rectly from Mr. Brezhnev that would
indicate that he is not very eager to see
substantial progress made in arms lim-
itations.
Q. Mr. President, in your opening state-
ment you said you thought it was a good
thing for you to speak out on negotiation
details, but you didn't say why. As I under-
stand the criticism, sir, it is that it impedes
negotiations when you put out on the table,
just in a range of thought, things that the
parties haven't privately been able to work
out. Why do you think it does not impede
negotiations?
The President : Well, I think if anyone
would analyze the details of the statements
that I have made so far, they are not so nar-
rowly defined or specific that they would
prevent both parties to a dispute from
negotiating in good faith with a fairly clean
slate ahead of them. The Middle East is one
example.
I think, in many instances, the proposi-
tions that I have promulgated publicly are
generally conceded to be very important and
legitimate, but the public expression of
those matters has not been made to the
American people over a period of years.
The exact means of defining borders in
the Middle East, the exact resolution of the
Palestinian problem, the definition of
permanent peace — all these things obviously
358
Department of State Bulletin
have to be decided between the Arab coun-
tries and Israel. But to point out that they
are matters in dispute and that we hope
they will be solved this year I think is con-
structive.
We have not intruded ourselves against
the wishes of the interested nations in the
eastern Mediterranean. Both Turkey and
Greece welcomed our emissary, and I think
we can be a good mediator to the extent
that both parties trust us to act in good
faith.
The same thing applies in southern Africa
and the same thing applies to the MIA
mission to Vietnam and Laos.
And I believe that it is very important for
the American people to know the framework
within which discussions might take place
and to give me, through their own approval,
strength, as a party to some of the
resolutions of disputes and also to make sure
that when I do speak I don't speak with a
hollow voice but that the rest of the world
knows that on my stand, for instance, on
human rights that I am not just speaking as
a lonely voice but that I am strongly
supported by the Congress and the people of
the country.
This week the Congress passed almost
unanimously — I think with only two dissent-
ing votes in both Houses — a strong confir-
mation that my own stand expressed on
human rights is indeed the stand of the
American people. It's an unswerving com-
mitment. It's one that will not be changing
in the future. And I think for the rest of the
world to know this and for the American
people to participate in that expression of
concern about human rights is a very con-
structive thing.
Q. Mr. President, you said that when you
received the report from the Woodcock
Commission that every hope you had for
their mission had been realized.
The President: Yes, that is true.
Q. That report suggested that the best way
to get an actual accounting of those still
missing in Southeast Asia is for the nor-
malization of relations; yet your position in
the past has been that there must be an
accounting first before relations can be
normalized. Hart- you changed your posi-
tion, and what hope does that give for the
families?
The President: No, I haven't changed my
position. I have always taken the position
that when I am convinced that the Viet-
namese have done their best to account for
the service personnel who are missing in
action, at that point I would favor normali-
zation, the admission of Vietnam into the
United Nations, and the resumption of trade
and other relationships with the Viet-
namese.
I believe that the response of the
Vietnamese leaders to the Woodcock Com-
mission was very favorable. They not only
gave us the bodies of 11 American
servicemen, but they also promised to set up
a Vietnamese bureaucracy to receive the in-
formation that we have had about the date
and the place that we think service people
were lost and to pursue those investigations.
I think this is about all they can do. I
don't have any way to prove that they have
accounted for all those about whom they
have information. But I think, so far as I
can discern, they have acted in good faith.
They have also suggested, and we have
agreed, that we go to Paris to negotiate
further without any preconditions. In the
past, the Vietnamese have said that they
would not negotiate with us nor give us
additional information about the MIA's until
we had agreed to pay reparations. They did
not bring this up, which I thought was an
act of reticence on their part.
They had claimed previously that Presi-
dent Nixon had agreed to pay large sums of
money to Vietnam because of damage done
to their country. Our position had been,
whether or not that agreement had been
made, that the Vietnamese had violated that
agreement by intruding beyond the de-
militarized zone during the war.
But they told Mr. Woodcock and sent
word to me: We are not going to pursue past
agreements and past disagreements. We are
eager to look to the future.
April 18, 1977
359
And I am also eager to look to the future.
If we are convinced, as a result of the
Paris negotiations and other actions on the
part of the Vietnamese, that they are acting
in good faith, that they are trying to help us
account for our MIA's, then I would aggres-
sively move to admit Vietnam to the United
Nations and also to normalize relationships
with them.
Q. As to the second part of my question,
what about the families of the 2,500 people
who have still not been accounted for, or
remains have not been returned?
The President : I have nothing but
sympathy for the families involved, and I
can assure them through this news confer-
ence presentation that we will never cease
attempting to account for those 2,500
American servicemen who were lost.
I might point out that at the conclusion of
the Korean war and the Second World War,
of those that were lost in action, we only ac-
counted for — I think we still did not account
for 22 percent. At the conclusion of the
Vietnam war, my understanding is that we
had accounted for all except about 4
percent.
I can't certify that we have all the infor-
mation available, and we are never going to
rest until we pursue information about those
who are missing in action to the final conclu-
sion. But I will do the best I can. But I
don't want to mislead anybody by giving
hope about discovery of some additional in-
formation when I don't believe that the hope
is justified.
Q. Mr. President , on the subject of
Vietnam, if you feel the United States is not
obligated to uphold the terms of the Paris
peace accords because of the North
Vietnamese offensive that overthrew the
South Vietnamese Government, do you feel,
on the other hand, any moral obligation to
help rebuild that country?
The President: I can't say what my posi-
tion would be now on future economic
relationships with Vietnam. I think that
could only be concluded after we continue
with negotiations to see what their attitude
might be toward us.
My own natural inclination is to have
normal diplomatic relationships with all
countries in the world. Sometimes there are
obstacles. I believe there are now 14 nations
with whom we do not have diplomatic
relationships.
I don't know what the motivations of the
Vietnamese might be. I think part of the
motivation might be to be treated along with
other nations in economic assistance from
our country and in trade and development of
their fairly substantial natural resources, in-
cluding oil.
Other considerations might be political in
nature. They might very well want to bal-
ance their friendship with us with their
friendship with the Soviet Union and not be
completely dependent upon the Soviet
Union. That is just a guess on my part. But
I am willing to negotiate in good faith. But
as far as describing what our economic rela-
tionship might be with Vietnam in the fu-
ture after the relationships are established,
I just couldn't do that now.
Q. Mr. President, with that understand-
ing and your hesitancy to disclose a
position before negotiations are started —
The President: I don't have a position.
Q. Beyond that, do you still feel that if
that information on those American serv-
icemen who are missing in action is forth-
coming from the Vietnamese, that then this
country has a moral obligation to help re-
build that country, if that information is
forthcoming ?
The President: Well, the destruction was
mutual. You know, we went to Vietnam
without any desire to capture territory or to
impose American will on other people. We
went there to defend the freedom of the
South Vietnamese. And I don't feel that we
ought to apologize or to castigate ourselves
or to assume the status of culpability.
Now, I am willing to face the future
without reference to the past. And that is
what the Vietnamese leaders have proposed.
And if, in normalization of relationships,
360
Department of State Bulletin
there evolves trade, normal aid processes,
then I would respond well. But I don't feel
that we owe a debt nor that we should be
forced to pay reparations at all.
Q. Mr. President, yesterday several Con-
gressmen accused your economic policies as
being dictated by New York banks. Now,
your plans for bailing out New York
through using the IMF [I nternational
Monetary Fund] with a hyperinflationary
process indeed does sound like a recent
speech that David Rockefeller made in
which he called for hyperinflating the ad-
vanced sector and imposing so-called de-
mand economies on the Third World, which
means massive austerity.
Now, at the same time, over recent weeks
a number of our NATO allies —
The President: What is your question?
Q. My question is, over recent weeks a
number of our NATO allies have indicated
that they would rather see the problem of
Third World debt resolved through a debt
moratorium. And I am just wondering if
there is any chance that you'd go along with
our allies in that direction, or if you would
insist on this kind of hyperinflationary
bailing out.
The President: Well, I have had no en-
treaties from David Rockefeller concerning
the New York problem, nor have I had any
of our allies that have called on me to join
them in a debt moratorium. I am not in
favor of a debt moratorium.
Q. Mr. President, would you mind telling
us what our commitments are in Zaire and
what the ramifications of those commit-
ments might be to us?
The President: We have no outstanding
commitments in Zaire. Over a period of
years, President Mobutu has been a friend
of ours. We've enjoyed good relationships
with Zaire. We have substantial commercial
investments in that country.
After the recent, very disruptive conflict
within Zaire when the country was finally
formed — a number of years ago — it has been
fairly stable since then. Zaire was involved,
I think at least indirectly, in the Angolan
conflict, and there are some remaining hard
feelings between Angola and Zaire on that
part. Some of the Katangans who lived in
the southern part of Zaire are now involved
in trying to go back into the area where
they formerly lived.
We have no hard evidence, or any evi-
dence as far as that goes, that the Cubans
or Angolan troops have crossed the border
into Zaire. We look on them as a friendly
nation, and we have no obligations to them
as far as military aid goes. But we have
been cooperating in exchanging information
with the Belgian Government, the French
Government, and others, just to try to
stabilize the situation and to lessen the
chance of expanding the conflict.
Q. Mr. President, I don't ask this ques-
tion in a churlish way or an argumentative
way—
The President : I'm sure you don't.
[Laughter.]
Q. But taking — recalling the un-
willingness of the United States to inter-
vene at the time of the Hungarian uprising
or at the time of Dubcek's ouster in
Czechoslovakia, what do you really think
that you can accomplish for political dissi-
dents in the Soviet Union, not in other parts
of the world, but in the Soviet Union? And I
have a followup I would like to ask.
The President: Why don't you ask your
followup now and I will try to answer.
Q. My followup is this: You are saying
that all of the evidence that you have from
Mr. Brezhnev is that he is willing to go for-
ward or he is receptive to SALT Two negoti-
ations.
Mr. Brezhnev said before the labor con-
gress that normal relations would be
impossible — unthinkable was his word — if
your human rights campaign continued.
You have referred to private communica-
tions with Mr. Brezhnev, and I would, like
to know, in the followup question, whether he
has given you any assurances in those pri-
vate communications that he is indeed
willing to go forward on SALT Two.
April 18, 1977
361
The President: Well, it is not just a mat-
ter of private conversations. We are not
trying to overthrow the Soviet Government
nor to intrude ourselves into their affairs in
a military way.
I think it has been a well-recognized in-
ternational political principle that interfer-
ence in a government is not a verbal thing.
There is an ideological struggle that has
been in progress for decades between the
Communist nations on the one hand and the
democratic nations on the other.
Mr. Brezhnev and his predecessors have
never refrained from expressing their view
when they disagreed with some aspect of so-
cial or political life in the free world. And I
think we have a right to speak out openly
when we have a concern about human rights
wherever those abuses occur.
I think that Mr. Brezhnev has not said
that he is concerned about my campaign on
human rights. What he said is that he ob-
jects to any intrusion into the internal
affairs of the Soviet Union.
Now, I have tried to be reticent about it.
I have tried to let my own position be clear
in the speech at the United Nations and in
my other actions. I have tried to make sure
that the world knows that we are not
singling out the Soviet Union for abuse or
criticism.
We are trying to move in our own country
to open travel opportunities and to correct
civil rights abuses and other abuses in our
country. So I don't think this is a matter
that is connected with the search for peace
through the SALT negotiations, for in-
stance.
The very fact that Mr. Brezhnev and his
associates have welcomed Secretary Vance
to the Soviet Union and have helped us
prepare a very comprehensive agenda is
adequate proof that he has not broken off re-
lationships in any way and that he has hopes
that the talks will be productive. My belief
is that he is acting in good faith. We are not
going to negotiate in such a way that we
leave ourselves vulnerable. But if the Soviet
Union is willing to meet us halfway in
searching for peace and disarmament, we
will meet them halfway.
I think that this is a good indication that
they are acting in good faith. If we are
disappointed, which is a possibility, then
we'll try to modify our stance.
Letters of Credence
Austria
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Austria, Karl Herbert Schober,
presented his credentials to President Car-
ter on March 23. 1
Chile
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Chile, Jorge Cauas, presented
his credentials to President Carter on March
23. »
Guinea
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Guinea, Daouda Kourouma, pre-
sented his credentials to President Carter
on March 23. 1
Kenya
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Kenya, John Peter Mbogua,
presented his credentials to President Car-
ter on March 23. l
Swaziland
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Kingdom of Swaziland, Musa Simon Kunene,
presented his credentials to President
Carter on March 23. '
1 For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release dated Mar. 23.
362
Department of State Bulletin
Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and Laos
To Seek Information on Missing Americans
The five-member Presidential Commis-
sion on Americans Missing and Unac-
counted For in Southeast Asia visited
Vietnam and Laos March 16-20. Following
are remarks to the press by President Carter
and the transcript of a news conference by
Leonard Woodcock and former Senator Mike
Mansfield after the Commission's meeting
with President Carter on March 23, together
with the te.rt of the Commission's report,
which was released by the White House that
day.
REMARKS AND NEWS CONFERENCE
White House press release dated March 23
President Carter
I would like to make a brief report on
what I consider to be a superb mission to
Vietnam and Laos on the part of Leonard
Woodcock and Senator Mike Mansfield, Mar-
ian Edelman, Ambassador Yost, and
Congressman Montgomery to inquire about
the accounting for American service people
who were missing in action and also to lay
the groundwork for future normalization of
diplomatic relationships with those two
countries.
Every hope that we had for the mission
has been realized. The Commission members
and the staff were received with great
friendship. The Vietnamese delivered to the
Commission 12 bodies. Eleven of them have
been identified as American servicemen.
One body is not an American serviceman
and will be returned. We have notified the
Vietnamese Government about the error,
and it was an honest mistake.
Positive identification procedures are con-
tinuing in Hawaii. We feel that without
delay — this is a very careful and meticulous
process — that we can notify the families
when positive identification is assured.
The other 11 bodies are American service
people, and we think we know who they are,
but before the families are notified we want
to be absolutely certain. The one body that
was in error, the family is being notified
about that error.
The Vietnamese have not tied together
economic allocations of American funds with
the MIA question. We believe that they
have acted in good faith. They have prom-
ised to set up a permanent study mechanism
by which the U.S. Government can provide
information that we have about the potential
whereabouts or identity of servicemen who
were lost, and the Vietnamese have
promised to cooperate in pursuing the evi-
dence that we might present to them in the
future.
They have also suggested that we reini-
tiate diplomatic discussions in Paris without
delay to resolve other issues that might be
an obstacle to peace between our two coun-
tries and friendship between our two coun-
tries and normalization of relationships
between our two countries.
I will respond immediately to Premier
Pham Van Dong that we accept their
invitation and that these discussions will
commence. There are no preconditions re-
quested and there will certainly be no
preconditions on our part for these talks in
Paris.
I would like to express on behalf of the
American people my sincere thanks to
Chairman Leonard Woodcock and to the
April 18, 1977
363
Commission members. They met with almost
every conceivable interested group before
they departed from the United States, in-
cluding representatives of the families of
servicemen who are missing in action, con-
gressional leaders, and others. And they
formed a team which worked in remarkable
concert and performed their assignment in
an absolutely superlative way.
At this time I would like to introduce to
the group Chairman Leonard Woodcock,
who will be available to answer your ques-
tions about the trip. Later on this afternoon,
a complete written report by the Commis-
sion to me will be made public.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Woodcock and Senator Mansfield
Q. Can you tell us what body it was that
was returned? Was that a Vietnamese?
Mr. Woodcock: The indication is it is a
person who is approximately 50 years old
and a Vietnamese. I might emphasize, as far
as all the members of the Commission are
concerned, we are absolutely convinced that
this was a human error and simply
underscores the enormity of the task of re-
covering those missing in action.
I think it is in the public domain that
those lost in World War II and in the Ko-
rean war — 22 percent were finally not ac-
counted for. In this war, the number is less
than 4V2 percent.
Of course, you have substantial land
areas. In the case of Laos, it is a huge land
area with a very small population, no more
than 3V2 million; and the difficulties are con-
siderable. We hope we have — I think we
have placed on track the solution to this
question.
Q. Have you submitted the 12th name on
our list to tell the Vietnamese that that par-
ticular individual has not been returned?
You have 11 that are accounted for from the
list of those missing in action.
Mr. Woodcock: That is correct.
Q. Have you told them that the 12th
name —
Mr. Woodcock: When we were acquainted
with this by the Central Identification
Laboratory in Honolulu, a message was im-
mediately sent from the Commission
through our normal procedures through
Paris to the Vietnamese, yes.
Q. Are you and the Commission satisfied,
convinced, that the Government of Vietnam
has done its best, or reasonably done its
best, to account for all of the MIA's?
Mr. Woodcock: At this point?
Q. Yes.
Mr. Woodcock: We are satisfied that what
has been done to date, particularly within
the last few days, plus their assurance that
there will be renewed efforts, which is still
in the future — we are satisfied with the
agreement to set up the process.
We have recommended, among other
things, that they be invited, for example, to
send representatives to our Central Identifi-
cation Laboratory in Honolulu because they
do really quite extraordinary things with
regard to identification on evidence that at
first blush would seem to me to be very lit-
tle.
Q. Let me try from the other way. Do you
believe that they are holding back either in-
formation or American men ?
Mr. Woodcock: It is quite obvious, with
regard, for example, to the 24th body, that
they have known about that for some time.
And on the last evening, late in the last
evening, when they informed us that Mr.
Gouglemann died in the South last June and
they also said they would turn over that set
of remains — it is quite obvious that had been
held back.
We believe from this point, particularly if
we can have an ongoing relationship, that
that will be ended.
Q. Mr. Woodcock, did you bring back any
information on any GI's who might have
chosen to stay there?
Mr. Woodcock: They were queried about
the possibility of deserters who had joined
the Vietnamese community. They said they
364
Department of State Bulletin
were not aware of any. They did say that all
Americans who had registered with them
had been allowed to leave.
Q. Do you come away then with the view
to the central question that the MIA's really
arc all dead?
Mr. Woodcock: That is the general conclu-
sion of the Commission.
Q. Mr. Woodcock, yesterday you refused
to characterize your mission as a success.
Today the President calls it a great success.
Hare you changed your mind, by any
chance?
Mr. Woodcock: I think it is a success in
the terms of what we established for
ourselves. I said on behalf of the Commis-
sion when we left we were seeking a key to
the solution of the MIA problem and
through that hoping to build a bridgehead
toward normalization.
We think that has been done. But
obviously what will happen from now on will
depend upon future events — not unilateral
future events, but bilateral future events.
Q. The question is, what ivas uppermost
in the minds of this government in sending
you to get an accounting of the MIA's or to
get started on the road toward normaliza-
tion ?
Mr. Woodcock : I don't think you can
separate the one from the other. Obviously,
there has to be a solution to the one to make
the other possible. It is my own personal
conclusion it is in the national interest of
this country to have a stable Southeast
Asia. You cannot have a stable Southeast
Asia without having stability with regard to
our relationship with the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam.
Q. When you said you believed the general
conclusion is the MIA's are all dead, how
many does that include besides the 11 that
were brought back?
Mr. Woodcock: The total number that
were unaccounted for, including civilians, at
the point when we went there was 2,546.
Q. You believe that, all of these are dead?
Mr. Woodcock: We do not think that there
are any Americans left alive in either Viet-
nam or Laos who are being held against
their will.
Q. Why can't their graves be found?
Mr. Woodcock: That process we have
underway.
When you consider the thick foliage of
jungle over so much of the land area, when
that total number includes those lost at sea,
we start with a number of which based upon
ordinary evidence there could be no hope of
finding.
Q. When did the question of sending
negotiators back to Paris come up, and in
what context was it — ivhat kind of problem?
Would that be sort of a start of diplomatic
relations? What are the major questions?
The aid question?
Mr. Woodcock: With regard to the discus-
sions in Paris, that has never been stopped.
There was a discussion last November which
was not continued. Then there were pre-
paratory discussions leading to the visit of
this Commission. So that continuing
negotiations or discussions in Paris is not
new. That is something that has been done
sporadically now over several years.
Q. When you said you established a
bridgehead toward normalization of rela-
tions, does that apply to Laos as well as
Vietnam?
Mr. Woodcock: With regard to Laos, we
had a relatively brief formal discussion in
which they laid down the position they had
been holding. Our informal relationships and
discussions were very frank. They indicated
to us that they would set up an agency for
the purpose of seeing what could be done
relative to the recovery of those missing in
action. Then they confirmed that in an offi-
cial broadcast on the day after we had left.
We came away with some hope, which we
think has been confirmed, but all of that lies
in the future.
Q. I would like to ask Senator Mansfield
April 18, 1977
365
something. Senator, did you find any ex-
traordinary amount of bitterness on the part
of government officials with whom you
talked, or do you think if we established
normal relations we can have a very
friendly relationship with Vietnam!'
Senator Mansfield: Less bitterness than I
thought would be noticeable. And the answer
to the second part of your question: Yes.
Q. Senator Mansfield, what do you think
personally of the United States giving fi-
nancial or economic aid to Vietnam?
Senator Mansfield: It depends what chan-
nels you want to use. I think the present
channel through international agencies is the
correct one. What will come out later will be
determined by what will happen in the
meantime.
The press: Thank you.
TEXT OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT 1
Presidential Commission on Americans Missing
and Unaccounted For in Southeast Asia
Report on Trip to Vietnam and Laos March 16-20, 1977
I. Mandate of the Commission
On February 25, 1977, the State Department an-
nounced that the President was sending a Presidential
Commission of distinguished Americans to Southeast
Asia to help him obtain an accounting about missing
Americans in that region. Mr. Leonard Woodcock,
President of the United Auto Workers, was chosen by
the President to head the five-member Commission.
Other members were: Former Senator Mike Mansfield,
former Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Congressman
G. V. Montgomery, and Ms. Marian Wright Edelman,
Director of the Children's Defense Fund.
The Commission was charged with traveling to Viet-
nam and Laos to meet with representatives of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Lao People's
Democratic Republic to seek information on our mis-
sing personnel, including the return of recoverable
remains. The Commission was also instructed to
receive from these governments their views on mat-
ters affecting our mutual relations. The Commission was
requested by the President to report its findings
directly to him on their return.
The Commission was not a diplomatic mission in the
usual sense, in that it was not empowered to negotiate
on behalf of the U.S. Government on matters involving
relations between the U.S. and the two countries
which it was to visit. However, the Commission was
given authority to reach agreement with the Viet-
namese and Lao authorities on matters pertaining to
the question of our missing personnel in order to
obtain information and recoverable remains.
Both White House and State Department announce-
ments made clear that the U.S. Government remained
concerned about all Americans lost in Southeast Asia,
those still listed as missing as well as the larger
number who have been presumed dead with no
accounting being provided. The fact that a man has
been declared dead for legal purposes did not affect
the U.S. Government's determination to seek
information about him and to arrange for the return of
his remains if they could be recovered.
The announcements also stated that the naming of
the Commission and its trip to Indochina was a further,
measured step which the U.S. Government was taking
to put the recent conflict behind us and to establish
more normal relations between ourselves and the coun-
tries of that area.
II. Preparations for the Trip
After receiving the Presidential mandate for its mis-
sion, the Commission immediately initiated a series of
actions designed to insure careful preparation for its
trip.
The Departments of State and Defense provided
briefing material on the background and history of the
MIA issue, including details on missing individuals and
on past efforts to obtain information on them, as well
as a review of U.S. relations with the countries of
Indochina.
On Monday, March 7th, the Commission held its first
formal meeting and briefing session at the Department
of State. This briefing included discussions of previous
dealings with the Vietnamese and Lao, in particular
the Vietnamese position of linking their action on
MIA's under Article 8b of the Paris Agreement to
what they claim was the remaining U.S. obligation to
help heal the wounds of war to Vietnam by providing
aid as stipulated by Article 21 of the same accord. 2
The Commission concluded that it would be better to
approach the Vietnamese in a humanitarian spirit of
mutual cooperation, looking to the future, rather than
to engage in sterile, legalistic debate of the past which
focused on the war. Dr. Henry Kenny, former staff
member of the House Select Committee on Missing
Persons in Southeast Asia, described that Committee's
1975 trip to Hanoi and Vientiane to obtain the return
of three American pilots and to discuss the MIA prob-
lem with leaders of both countries.
In cooperation with the Commission, the Depart-
1 Released on Mar. 23 (text from White House press
release).
2 For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of Feb.
12, 1973, p. 169.
366
Department of State Bulletin
merit of State arranged for U.S. representatives to
meet with Vietnamese representatives in Paris to
prepare further for the Commission's visit to Hanoi.
Mr. James D. Rosenthal. Director of Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia Affairs, and chief of the Commission's
staff for its visit to Southeast Asia, attended this
meeting and reported back to the Commission in Wash-
ington prior to its departure.
The Commission also met with non-governmental or-
ganizations and individuals who were concerned with
the MIA problem and other matters pertinent to its
mission. On March 7th, the Commission met with rep-
resentatives of the National League of Families of
American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.
The League said that they recognized an accounting
for all the missing was impossible but that some men
still missing were known to be alive at one time and
the American people are entitled to know what hap-
pended to them. They urged the Commission to seek
all possible information on these men. Chairman
Woodcock and the Commission members assured the
League representatives that this was the primary pur-
pose of the trip and the Commission would do the best
it could.
A meeting was also held on March 11th with repre-
sentatives of the American Friends Service Commit-
tee, who briefed the Commission on their recent visit
to Vietnam and urged it to consider humanitarian aid
to that country. Mr. Richard Dudman of the St. Louis
Post Dispatch, who had been captured and released
during the war in Cambodia, urged the Commission to
approach Cambodia on the MIA issue, particularly in
regard to the 25 international journalists missing in
that country, four of whom are Americans. The Com-
mission agreed to contact the Cambodians to try to ar-
range a meeting with Cambodian representatives
during its trip.
Commission members also met or talked individually
with persons and groups with a specific interest in
their mission, such as MIA family members.
The Commission was fortunate to have the recently
published final report of the House Select Committee
on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, which
documented in detail past military and diplomatic ef-
forts to obtain a resolution of the MIA problem and
which included recommendations for future action. All
Commission members read this report thoroughly and
were told later in Vietnam by SRV Deputy Foreign
Minister Phan Hien that he had also read it.
On Saturday, March 12th, the Commission met with
President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.
The President expressed his deep concern about ob-
taining a satisfactory MIA accounting and his hope for
eventual normalization of relations with Vietnam and
Laos. The Commission was directed not to apologize
for past relations, but to emphasize the President's de-
sire for a new beginning with these governments on
the basis of equality and mutual respect. It was in-
structed to seek all MIA information and to obtain all
recoverable remains from the Vietnamese and Lao and
to listen carefully to the concerns of these govern-
ments on other matters of mutual interest. The Presi-
dent asked Mr. Woodcock to deliver personal letters
from him to Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van
Dong and to Lao President Souphanouvong.
On March 13th the Commission departed Washington
for Hawaii, where it received briefings by the De-
partment of Defense, the Joint Casualty Resolution
Center (JCRC) and the Central Identification
Laboratory (CIL). The DOD briefer indicated there
were 2,546 Americans w-ho did not return from the war
in Indochina, of whom 758 are still listed as MIA or
POW. "We have no evidence," he said, "to indicate
that any American servicemen are being held as pris-
oners in Southeast Asia, but whether a man is alive or
dead does not relieve us of the responsibility to seek
an accounting for him." The briefings described the
many efforts made to obtain information and recover
remains, since the end of U.S. involvement in the In-
dochina War and the Paris Agreement of January
1973. The Commission was impressed by data showing
that the number unaccounted for in Indochina is about
4% of those killed in that conflict. As indicated in the
House Select Committee Report, this contrasts with
the 22% unresolved cases in World War II and Korea.
This impressed upon the Commission the need to be
realistic in its expectations for a further Indochina
accounting. The Commission also visited the CIL where
it reviewed procedures for identifying recovered re-
mains. The Commission was impressed by the CIL's
capability of identifying even partial remains and
noted that CIL expertise is one reason why there is
not yet an unknown soldier from the Vietnam War.
The Commission departed Hawaii on March 13th for
the Philippines, where it remained overnight to rest
and prepare further for its visit to Hanoi and
Vientiane. U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines William
H. Sullivan met with the Commission and provided it
with the benefit of his many years of experience in
negotiating with the Vietnamese.
III. Visit to Vietnam
Program in Hanoi
The Commission arrived in Hanoi at 2:45 p.m.,
March 16, 1977 aboard a U.S. Air Force C-141 from
Clark Air Base and departed at approximately 10:00
a.m. March 19, 1977 aboard the same aircraft for Vien-
tiane.
Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien greeted the
Commission at Gia Lam Airport upon arrival. The
Commission and staff were housed in the official Gov-
ernment Guest House as guests of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam.
The Commission was received by SRV Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh two
hours after arrival. There were formal meetings on
March 17 and 18 between the Commission and the
Vietnamese delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister
Phan Hien, a meeting with Prime Minister Pham Van
Dong in the afternoon of March 17, and a separate
meeting between technical experts concerned with the
April 18, 1977
367
development of MIA information and recovery of re-
mains. Representative Montgomery was the only
Commission member who attended the latter meeting.
In addition. Minister Trinh hosted a formal dinner
and cultural performance for the Commission on March
17 and attended a dinner given in turn by the Commis-
sion on the next night. Other Commission activities in-
cluded: a visit to the Hanoi City cemetery, located in
Ha Dong Province roughly 20 kilometers from Hanoi,
to see the remains of the 12 pilots which the Viet-
namese agreed to turn over to the Commission; and a
dignified ceremony upon reception of the remains at
Gia Lam Airport on March 19 just prior to departure.
Members of the Commission also undertook
individual activities. The Chairman had two private
meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien,
and Ms. Edelman visited a kindergarten and had a
meeting with Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, Minister of
Education.
Atmosphere in Hanoi
A significant aspect of the Commission's visit to
Vietnam was the cordial atmosphere which prevailed
throughout its stay. The Vietnamese Government
appeared to have made a major effort to ensure that
the Commission's stay was both pleasant and produc-
tive and that the Commission was treated with respect
and dignity. This point is of importance because in
Asia the form of a visit and the level of attention given
to a delegation often conveys an essential political
message. Using this standard, the Commission con-
cludes that the Vietnamese leadership was indicating
by this treatment the importance it attached to the
Commission's visit, and its genuine desire for a new
and improved relationship with the United States.
This did not, of course, mean that the Vietnamese
were ready to concede on substantive issues, but it
was — and is — an encouraging beginning to serious dis-
cussions on them.
The spirit of cordiality carried over into meetings as
well. Phan Hien spoke in a spirit of conciliation during
both of the formal meetings. There was a conspicuous
absence of polemics or harsh rhetoric on either side.
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong also received the
Commission for a special meeting at which the
President's personal letter was delivered to him. The
talks with him were candid; he expressed his govern-
ment's policy firmly but without rancor or harshness
despite the recent bitter past. He expressed particular
appreciation for the President's message and later
asked the Commission to convey back to the President
a letter from him in reply.
There were sporadic attempts to restrict individual
movement around Hanoi, but in general Commission
members and staff were permitted to go where they
wished. This was usually — but not always — under es-
cort. Protocol officers explained that this was for
security reasons, citing possible hostile acts by the
populace which still remembers the "destruction
caused by U.S. bombing." These restrictions eased as
the visit progressed. This point is important because it
reminded the Commission that, despite all the good
will and cordiality which marked the visit, there will
for quite a while be an element of reserve toward us
because of the long period when we and the Viet-
namese were adversaries.
Substance of Talks in Hanoi
Missi)ig i)t Action
The highlight of the Commission's talks in Hanoi was
the SRV's formal undertaking to give the U.S. all
available information on our missing men as it is found
and to return remains as they are recovered and
exhumed. This new commitment was contained in
statements by top SRV officials and was further re-
fined in the Technical Sub-Commission meeting with
officials of the Vietnamese agency responsible for seek-
ing information on the missing and recovering remains.
The key elements in the Vietnamese statements
were as follows;
a) The remains of the 12 U.S. airmen announced last
September as killed in action would be returned to the
U.S. and could be taken back by the Commission if de-
sired.
b) All living U.S. military POW's have been
returned.
c) All U.S. civilians remaining in South Vietnam
after April 30, 1975 who registered with the
Vietnamese authorities have left the country.
d) The SRV has established a specialized office to
seek information on missing Americans and to recover
remains. Although terrain and the tropical conditions
of Vietnam have hindered search efforts, this office is
actively seeking information and the remains of
missing Americans.
e) The SRV will give the U.S. "as soon as possible"
all available information and remains as they are
discovered.
f) The Vietnamese would welcome U.S. assistance
for this work in the form of information and
documents, as well as material means helpful to the
search efforts.
Although the MIA undertaking was stated in
unqualified terms, the Vietnamese made clear that
they still considered this subject and other aspects of
U.S. -SRV relations to be "interrelated." They stated
that their actions on MIA's were in conformance with
Article 8b of the Paris Accord, for example, and cited
the need for comparable U.S. fulfillment of its alleged
obligation under Article 21 to "heal the wounds of
war" and provide reconstruction aid. They also raised
the issue of normalization of relations in this context.
They were careful to say that none of these three
points (i.e., MIA's, normalization, and aid) should be
considered as preconditions to the other two and it was
not the SRV's intention to raise the question this way.
But they did note that they were closely related to
each other and that both sides should take them in an
overall context and apply their position in a flexible
way. This appeared to go farther than previous SRV
368
Department of State Bulletin
statements in reducing' the specific linkage between
Vietnamese action on MIA's and U.S. agreement to
provide aid. But it still suggests that actual Viet-
namese performance on MIA's will probably be subject
to our willingness to move concretely to implement the
spirit of good will displayed by the Commission's visit.
The Technical Sub-Commission meeting was
requested by the U.S. side and agreed on by the Viet-
namese for the morning of March 18, prior to the sec-
ond formal session with Phan Hien. Representative
Montgomery attended for the Commission with staff
support by Mr. [Frank A.] Sieverts, Dr. [Roger]
Shields, Dr. Kenny, and the JCRC representatives.
Leading for the Vietnamese was Vu Hoang, Director
of the Consular Department of the Vietnamese Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, and Director of the office
responsible for seeking information on the missing and
the recovery of remains. He was supported by two
specialists.
The Vietnamese described their MIA office as or-
ganized from central to provincial levels and said it re-
lies on local citizen groups for much of its information.
They noted that the forested and mountainous terrain
of Vietnam hindered searches, and that even where a
plane had been seen coming down it was often hard to
find it. Pilots who bailed out might come down many
miles from the downed aircraft and were often lost, un-
less they landed in populated areas. Other
impediments to successful searches noted by Mr.
Hoang were the lack of specialized tools and transpor-
tation, the "attitude of the people" reluctant to help
with U.S. MIA's when so many of their own relatives
had been lost, and the fact that in the South the search
had only recently been organized.
The Vietnamese noted that they had substantially
increased their budget for this work and confirmed
that they would be pleased to receive materials to aid
the search process, including case folders, anthropologi-
cal books, tools, medical supplies and antiseptics, and
transportation equipment. They also said they would
look into the possibility of providing items such as dog
tags, aircraft numbers, and personal effects, as well as
remains of Americans lost in the South.
Mr. Hoang proposed that information and other ma-
terials be exchanged directly with him at his address
in the Foreign Ministry. He asked with whom he could
correspond and was given Mr. Sieverts' name at the
State Department as a point of contact.
The Sub-Commission also worked out procedures for
the return of the 12 remains. The full Commission
later visited the cemetery where the remains were
being kept following their exhumation.
In a brief meeting following the final dinner, the
Commission was told that American citizen Tucker
Gouglemann had died in Saigon in June 1976, and that
his remains would be returned as soon as they could be
hygienically exhumed. The Commission had asked in
its initial meeting about Mr. Gouglemann, the last
known American remaining in Vietnam following the
communist takeover who wished to leave. The Com-
mission was also told at this final meeting that the
Vietnamese believed another American may be buried
in the Hanoi cemetery and promised to return his re-
mains as well. Although they almost certainly have al
least some additional MIA information available, they
did not provide it to the Commission during its visit .
Normalization of Relations
Vietnamese officials expressed a strong desire to
move toward normal relations with the U.S. and stated
that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is prepared to
establish diplomatic relations with us. At the same
time they noted that obstacles still exist on the road to
normalizing relations, although expressing hope that
with good will they could all be removed. They said
Vietnam is prepared to normalize on the basis of
sovereignty, mutual respect, noninterference in each
other's affairs and peaceful coexistence. Regarding
diplomatic relations, they indicated Vietnam is pre-
pared to establish them, but then added that this will
depend on the attitude of the United States and
"whether it will give up its erroneous policy of the
past." They stated that the Vietnamese view is that
actions such as the U.S. economic blockade and the
veto of Vietnam's entry into the UN stem from this
erroneous policy. Finally, they said that there are
three key areas of discussion between us: the MIA's,
normalization, and aid. They stated we should not con-
sider any one as a precondition to the other two, but
noted that they clearly are interrelated.
The Vietnamese proposed negotiations between dip-
lomatic representatives of the U.S. and SRV to discuss
the elements and process of normalization. They
suggested talks in Paris. The Commission said it would
convey this proposal to the President for his
consideration.
Vietnamese leaders expressed clearly to the Com-
mission their government's foreign policy, in
particular regarding their neighbors in Southeast Asia.
They presented to the Commission Foreign Minister
Trinh's "Four Points" as the basis for their policy:
"1. Respect for each other's independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression,
non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. .
2. Not to allow any foreign country to use one's ter-
ritory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and
intervention against the other country and other coun-
tries in the region.
3. Establishment of friendly and good-neighborly
relations, economic cooperation and cultural exchanges
on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Settlement
of disputes among the countries in the region through
negotiations in a spirit of equality, mutual understand-
ing and respect.
4. Development of cooperation among the countries
in the region for the building of prosperity in keeping
with each country's specific conditions, and for the
sake of genuine independence, peace and neutrality in
Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to peace in the
world."
April 18, 1977
369
The Vietnamese complained about the negative
attitude of the new Thai authorities toward Vietnam
and advised the U.S., as friends of Thailand, to urge
the Thais to better their relations with the SRV by
living up to the Thai-Vietnamese joint communique of
last August <i. The Commission expressed the new
U.S. Administration's desire for a stable, peaceful, and
prosperous Southeast Asia.
Economic anil Humanitarian Assistance
In the Commission's meetings with them, the
Vietnamese emphasized their strong interest in receiv-
ing aid from the United States. This was expressed as
an American "responsibility" and "obligation," and aid
was generally categorized as something the United
States "should" do.
In their presentations, they cited three ways of
looking at the U.S. "responsibility" to contribute to
postwar reconstruction: legal, humanitarian, and on
the basis of reciprocity. They said they were ready to
be flexible in discussing the modalities of how we
might provide aid to them, though they continued to
cite Article 21 of the Paris Accord.
Aside from the legal basis for our providing assist-
ance, the Vietnamese discussed a humanitarian basis
for aid. Suggesting they were performing a
humanitarian act in working to alleviate the suffering
of the MIA families, they stated that in fairness we
should be willing to act humanely to repair some of the
destruction caused during the war. They indicated that
Vietnam has a pressing immediate need for food aid,
fertilizer, farm machinery, building materials for
schools and hospitals, raw materials for its factories,
and medicines.
In the third aspect — reciprocity — the Vietnamese
made the point that actions cannot come from just one
side. Obliquely referring to their accounting for the
MIA's and providing aid, they indicated that each side
must take steps which address the concerns of the
other. As noted earlier, they did not specifically link
the two issues, although they noted that aid, in MIA
accounting, and normalization are "interrelated."
At other times, the Vietnamese referred to our pro-
viding aid to them as a matter of conscience or as a
moral obligation. They said aid is an "obligation you
should fulfill — an obligation to be fulfilled with all your
conscience and all your sense of responsibility." They
added that, "In brief, we have obligations which are
related to each other. So we should start from this po-
sition."
The Vietnamese also indicated their government's
willingness to be flexible regarding the form aid might
take. While not specifically stating which they might
prefer, they referred to discussions with previous U.S.
administrations in which various forms of aid were
mentioned, including concessional, bilateral, and
multilateral.
Refugees and Family Ramification
The Vietnamese said they would be "generous" with
regard to their citizens wishing to join relatives in the
U.S., and to those wanting to return to Vietnam from
abroad, providing they follow proper procedures. The
Commission welcomed this statement and suggested
continued efforts to resolve this problem through the
Red Cross and UNHCR [United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees].
Social Problems
In response to her request the Vietnamese arranged
for Ms. Edelman to visit a kindergarten-child care
center, and to meet with the Minister of Education,
Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh (formerly Foreign Minister of
the PRO [Provisional Revolutionary Government]). In
discussions with Ms. Edelman the Vietnamese de-
scribed their efforts to care for orphans (who they said
numbered 500,000 including those with one parent) and
to rehabilitate "street children" in South Vietnam. The
Vietnamese said nutrition was their main child care
problem, reflecting their overall concern about their
current food shortages.
With Ms. Edelman and in discussions with the Com-
mission, the Vietnamese referred to their continuing
efforts to rehabilitate up to 400,000 former prostitutes,
100,000 drug addicts, and to treat venereal disease.
They also noted that over 4 million of their population
remained unemployed, mainly in South Vietnam.
IV. Visit to Laos
Some 550 Americans are listed as missing or dead in
Laos. The President therefore asked the Commission
to visit that country as well to seek the cooperation of
the Lao authorities in resolving these cases. Secretary
of State Vance addressed a letter to Phoune Sipaseuth,
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the
Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), on
February 24, 1977 asking that the Commission be re-
ceived in Laos. Minister Phoune replied on March 12
accepting the Secretary's proposal.
Program in Vientiane
The Commission went from Hanoi to Vientiane, capi-
tal of Laos, early March 19 by U.S. military aircraft
and remained until late afternoon March 20. The
Commission met for two hours in formal talks with the
LPDR delegation headed by Nouphan Sidphasay,
Secretary of State (Deputy Foreign Minister) on
March 19. The next day the Commission was received
in separate meetings by Foreign Minister Phoune and
by LPDR President Souphanouvong, to whom Chair-
man Woodcock delivered a personal letter from Presi-
dent Carter. The Commission was honored at a dinner
given by the Lao Government March 19 and returned
the hospitality with a luncheon March 20 attended by
Minister Phoune and other high-level Lao officials.
Atmosphere in Vientiane
Although the U.S. maintains a small Embassy in
Vientiane ably led by Charge d'Affaires Thomas J.
370
Department of State Bulletin
Corcoran, Lao-American relations have been cool since
events in the spring of 1975 and the subsequent estab-
lishment of the LPDR in December of that year.
However, working in cooperation with our Embassy,
the Lao arranged a warm reception for the Commis-
sion and made it evident throughout the visit that the
Commission was welcome. The Commission was
greeted at the airport by Deputy Foreign Minister
Nouphan and escorted to accommodations provided by
the Lao Government in Vientiane's largest hotel. In
the Commission's meetings with President
Souphanouvong and Foreign Minister Phoune, both
expressed the view that the Commission's visit was
evidence of a new American attitude toward their
country, and a demonstration of the President's desire
to improve relations with Laos.
As in Vietnam, the tone and atmosphere of the
Commission's visit to Laos was important. Chairman
Woodcock made the point that the Commission had
come not to replace the work of our Embassy but to
underscore the President's desire to improve relations
with Laos on the basis of mutual respect and benefit.
He relayed the President's desire to help remove the
obstacles to improved relations, such as the MIA
question. This new spirit was apparently understood
and accepted by the Lao, whose leaders responded in a
similar vein.
Substance of Talks in Vientiane
The Commission made clear to the Lao authorities
the great importance the President and the American
people attach to obtaining the best accounting possible
for the Americans listed as missing or dead in Laos.
The Chairman stated that the Commission would
welcome any definite information or remains the Lao
may have on these men, and indicated U.S. willingness
to cooperate fully with the Lao in casualty resolution.
He expressed the hope that the two parties could
agree, during the Commission's visit, on an orderly-
procedure to resolve the issue. He noted to all the Lao
leaders that progress on this issue would be a signifi-
cant step toward improvement of U.S. -Lao relations.
The Lao expressed to the Commission their
sympathy with the MIA families and their wish to re-
lieve the latter's suffering. They noted the great diffi-
culty of finding MIA information and remains in the
rugged terrain of Laos, particularly given the coun-
try's small population and lack of material means. The
Lao did assure the Commission that there are no
Americans who have been captured and are alive in
Laos, and that all Americans captured during the war
had been returned to the U.S. They stated that the
Lao Government had ordered before, and will now
order again, the people of Laos to seek information
and remains. But they regretted that they had no such
information or remains now to provide the Commis-
sion.
In both formal and informal meetings, responsible
Lao officials agreed to receive further MIA case files,
as well as other material that we could provide to as-
sist their search. Commission members stressed that
we understood the difficulties involved in Laos and
were realistic in our expectations of what information
could be developed. The Commission nevertheless
emphasized the importance of all information, such as
aircraft tail numbers, ID cards, dog tags, and even par-
tial remains, as being helpful to the United States.
The Lao made clear to the Commission that they
connected the MIA problem with that of U.S. assist-
ance to "heal the wounds of war" and rebuild their
country. They expressed the belief that the two prob-
lems should be resolved together, since both resulted
from the war. They noted that if one speaks of
humanitarian concern for the MIA's, one must also
think of the damage Laos suffered at U.S. hands dur-
ing the war. They said the Lao people could be
expected to search for MIA information only when
they see that the U.S. Government is interested in
healing this damage and helping reconstruct the coun-
try. In more general terms, they indicated that the
MIA problem can be resolved when there is a new
relationship between the two countries and when U.S.
policy has changed from hostility to friendship.
The Commission was informed during its visit of the
problem of unexploded ordnance in Laos. One observer
in Vientiane, who recently visited the Plain of Jars,
reported that 15 persons had been killed during the
past year in one village of 3400 people by such
unexploded war material. The Commission believes the
U.S. could provide advice and technical assistance on
how to defuse such ordnance, and that the American
people would understand and support such an effort.
In this regard the Lao, in the formal talks, laid
great emphasis on difficulties caused by what they
termed "reactionaries" engaged in hostile activities
against their government. They expressed particular
concern at what they claimed was Thai hostility
toward them and Thai support for anti-LPDR elements
both within Laos and in Thailand. They noted that the
previous U.S. administration had been hostile toward
Laos, and charged that it had supported some of the*'
elements. They said that in any case, the U.S. Gov-
ernment has provided aid to the Thai, thus enabling
the latter to support such elements. They expressed
the belief that the U.S. should resolve this problem in
order to provide a new atmosphere for relations
between Laos and the U.S.
The Commission assured the Lao that the U.S. has
no hostile intentions toward them and does not support
elements hostile to the LPDR either within Laos or
outside the country. Senator Mansfield made a particu-
larly forceful rebuttal of the Lao charges, based on his
experience and previous visits to Laos. The Lao took
careful note of these assurances, and they later wel-
comed them as an indication of a new attitude on the
part of the U.S. Government toward their country.
The Commission concludes from its visit to Laos that
the Lao probably have considerably less information on
MIA's than the Vietnamese, and are less able to de-
velop additional information or locate remains. They
probably could produce some, however, and could
April 18, 1977
371
gather more if they so desired. For example, there are
a very few MIA's who were known to be in Lao hands
in the 1960's and there are recent reports of scattered
aircraft parts in the countryside which may resolve a
few more cast-.--.
The Commission feels that this will most likely
happen in the context of a general improvement of re-
lations with Laos. The Commission's visit helped con-
siderably in this regard, not only as a demonstration of
the new Administration's interest, but also as a means
of assuring the Lao that we have no hostile intent to-
ward them. The Commission took note of the formal
LPDR statement that no Americans are alive and pris-
oner in Laos, which though tragic seems true in light
of all the evidence available. The Commission finds
encouraging the Lao expression of willingness to ac-
cept further case files and other materials from us, and
to cooperate more closely with us through our
Embassy on the MIA problem.
Thus, while disappointed that it was not able to ob-
tain further information and remains from the Lao
during its visit, the Commission feels the trip was
worthwhile in that it set a new tone for U.S. -Lao rela-
tions, emphasized to the Lao the importance we
continue to attach to the MIA issue, and helped estab-
lish procedures for obtaining further information. One
press report after the Commissioner's departure
indicated that the Lao were setting up a committee to
search for information, though this could not be con-
firmed at time of writing.
V. Cambodia
Due to the current lack of communication between
the U.S. and the Cambodian Government and the
apparent unsettled situation in Phnom Penh, the
Commission decided it was best not to try to go to the
Cambodian capital. Instead, it was decided to attempt
to arrange a contact with an Ambassador of Democrat-
ic Cambodia at a location in Southeast Asia. It was
hoped that should such a meeting be possible, it would
be a significant first step toward opening a dialogue
with this new government, thus possibly improving
our chances of obtaining information on those missing
or killed in Cambodia, including the 25 journalists of
various nationalities (four of whom are Americans). A
representative of our Liaison Office in Peking
delivered a formal request for such a meeting to the
Democratic Cambodia Embassy in Peking.
On March 19 Radio Phnom Penh carried the text of a
press communique issued by the Cambodian Foreign
Ministry refusing our request and hurling harsh invec-
tive at the U.S. (the text is attached). 3 The
Commission therefore was unable to meet with any
representatives of the Cambodian government and was
unable to provide any information about our people
missing or killed there.
Not printed here.
VI. Press
American media viewed the Commission's trip as a
major news event. The MIA issue was still generating
widespread interest, the prospects for normalization
reflected a significant foreign affairs initiative, and a
visit to Hanoi, the first by American newsmen in five
years, offered obvious human interest angles.
At the Commission's request, the State Department
called Vietnamese attention to our media's strong
interest in the visit and sought approval for their
entry. Despite our effort to increase the number, the
Vietnamese approved only five, who were selected by
the State Department Correspondents' Association.
NBC's John Hart served as pool reporter for American
television and radio networks: CBS's Willis Brown was
the pool TV cameraman. Time Magazine's Strobe
Talbott represented the American news-magazines.
AP's Peter Arnett and UPI's Richard Growald served
their own companies.
Because the Vietnamese insisted that our press ac-
company the Commission, the trip proved unusual.
Aboard the plane throughout the 24,000-mile journey,
the press, the Commission, and the staff mixed freely.
Both in Hanoi and Vientiane, the press was considered
part of the delegation, was housed and ate with the
Commission and staff, and attended all events except
the talks themselves. The accessibility and frankness
of the Commission with the press comported with the
American public's great interest in the mission, and
reflected the openness which characterizes the Admin-
istration's approach to public affairs.
American media coverage for the Commission was
extensive, both in print and broadcasts. The Commis-
sion believes the public has received a fair and full
account of its activities which should aid in developing
the public support necessary for future Administration
actions. A continuation of this openness is
recommended as we move ahead.
The Vietnamese developed a fine appreciation of the
importance of the American media during the war and
afforded our accompanying press unusual cooperation.
Special interviews were provided to them by the Viet-
namese Prime Minister and the Deputy Foreign
Minister for Press and Information.
In their meeting with the latter, the newsmen re-
quested approval to remain in Vietnam to cover
developments in greater detail. They were told that
adequate facilities were not available at this time, but
the Deputy Foreign Minister also pointed out that
while over the years there had been about a dozen
American newsmen in Hanoi, no Vietnamese jour-
nalists had ever been to the United States. The
American newsmen offered to initiate an invitation.
Should the Vietnamese seek visas as a result of this
invitation, it will present the Administration with an
opportunity to make a meaningful positive gesture by
permitting them entry into the U.S. Although the
Vietnamese media obviously reflect the constraints of
a communist society, reciprocal visits would be in the
interests of the normalization process generally.
372
Department of State Bulletin
While in Hanoi the American newsmen were usually
free to walk around the immediate downtown area. At
first, this had to be done in the company of English-
speaking guides, but this gradually eased and
enterprising newsmen found themselves able to
explore their own interests on their own, when they
chose to do so — within the obvious limits of language
and lack of familiarity with the local scene.
VII. Military Support for the Commission
Military support for the Commission was excellent.
In addition to arranging briefings in Washington and
Honolulu, the Defense Department and military serv-
ices provided excellent transportation and billeting
arrangements. Both the VC-135 which carried the
Commission to the Philippines and the C-141 for the
trip to Indochina were well equipped for the extensive
work which was done on board. Arrangements at
CINCPAC and Clark Air Base were also fully satisfac-
tory.
VIII. Commission's Conclusions
Missing in Action
Although the Commission was able to obtain only
the 12 remains as well as information on Tucker
Gougelmann and a promise to deliver another set of
remains during its brief stay, the Commission's visit
did appear to create a new and favorable climate for
improved relations with both Vietnam and Laos. In the
Commission's view, the best hope for obtaining a
proper accounting for our MIA's lies in the context of
such improved relations. The Commission believes that
the creation of this new spirit is the most significant
contribution to the accomplishment of the mission as-
signed it by the President.
The Commission also believes it impressed upon the
Vietnamese and Lao our realistic attitude on the MIA
issue and our intention to resolve it on a reasonable
basis in order to remove it as an obstacle to
normalization. The Commission believes this approach
is more likely to elicit further information and remains
than continuing past policies of confronting the
Vietnamese and Lao on the issue.
On the basis of its talks with Vietnamese and Laos
officials at the highest level, and on other information
available to it, the Commission specifically concludes:
1. There is no evidence to indicate that any Ameri-
can POW's from the Indochina conflict remain alive.
2. Americans who stayed in Vietnam after April 30,
1975, who registered with the Foreign Ministry and
wished to leave have probably all been allowed to
depart the country.
3. Although there continue to be occasional rumors
of deserters or defectors still living in Indochina, the
Commission found no evidence to support this conjec-
ture.
4. The Vietnamese have not given us all the
information they probably have, in part because of
their concentration on the return of remains. The
Commission believes it succeeded in making clear to
the Vietnamese the importance we attach to receiving
all kinds of information, however slight or fragmentary
it may be.
5. The Vietnamese gave a clear formal assurance
that they would look for MIA information and remains
and that they would provide such information and
remains to the U.S. They did not make this specifically
contingent on our provision of aid, but they do see ac-
tion on MIA's as related to resolution of other issues of
concern to them.
6. For reasons of terrain, climate, circumstances of
loss, and passage of time, it is probable that no
accounting will ever be possible for most of the Ameri-
cans lost in Indochina. Even where information may
once have been available, it may no longer be
recoverable due to the ravages of time and physical
changes.
7. A new procedure has been established for the
continuing exchange of MIA information between the
U.S. and the SRV. The U.S. will use this mechanism
to furnish additional information and materials to
assist MIA searches.
8. The Lao authorities called attention to the diffi-
culty of MIA search efforts in view of the difficult
terrain in their country, but undertook to provide in-
formation and remains as they were found.
9. The Commission was unable to meet with
representatives of the Cambodian Government. That
government has repeatedly denied that it holds any
foreign prisoners, and the Commission considers it
unlikely that additional MIA information will be forth-
coming from that country.
Normalization of Relations
1. Both the Vietnamese and Lao leaders are clearly
interested in establishing a new and friendlier rela-
tionship with the United States.
2. They indicate that they are willing to look to the
future rather than the past in such a relationship, al-
though they consider that the U.S. has remaining
obligation to repair the damage caused by the war in
their countries. This is likely to continue to be an im-
portant factor in working out new or improved
relations with these two countries.
3. Both Vietnam and Laos have a clear interest in
such a new relationship. Vietnam in particular
apparently looks forward to benefits in such matters as
trade and other long-term economic arrangements.
4. The Vietnamese are willing to enter into
immediate high-level diplomatic discussions with the
U.S. on normalization. They made clear their interest
in establishing formal diplomatic relations as quickly
as possible. They indicated their desire to see past
"erroneous" U.S. policies on such matters as UN
membership and the trade embargo changed.
5. Both the Vietnamese and Lao leaders appear to
April 18, 1977
373
view the present U.S. intentions toward them as more
positive than in the past. They have a positive attitude
themselves toward the new U.S. administration. They
were pleased to understand that the U.S. is prepared
to deal with them on the basis of equality and mutual
respect, and that the U.S. has an interest in the stabil-
ity and prosperity of Southeast Asia.
6. The Lao appreciated the Commission's assurances
that the U.S. Government has no hostile intentions
toward their regime and is not supporting elements
trying to overthrow it, but they are likely to remain
sensitive and suspicious as long as indigenous insur-
gent activity continues to give them significant prob-
lems.
Economic and Humanitarian Assistance
1. The Vietnamese clearly expect a significant U.S.
contribution to their postwar economic reconstruction.
2. At the same time they indicated flexibility about
the form this aid might take and the basis on which it
could be given. They listed concessional aid, bilateral
aid, multilateral aid and long-term loans as forms of
aid which have been discussed in the past, although
they did not specify which of these they preferred or
whether any one form alone would be acceptable.
3. The Vietnamese seem prepared to deemphasize
references to this aid as coming from U.S. obligations
under the Paris Agreement. This remains clearly their
own position, but they appear willing to discuss aid in-
stead in humanitarian and moral terms. They indicated
that they understand our domestic political constraints
on this issue.
4. While not specifically linking provisions of U.S.
aid to either an MIA accounting or normalization, the
Vietnamese stated that these three issues are "interre-
lated" and indicated that they would expect both sides
to take actions regarding the other's concerns. They
did state that none of these three issues was a precon-
dition to the other two. Nonetheless, it remains to be
seen how forthcoming the Vietnamese may be in ac-
counting for the MIA's if the U.S. does not take some
steps on aid.
IX. Recommendations
1. The Commission believes that resumption of talks
in Paris between representatives of the U.S. and
Vietnamese Governments would be a most useful way
of continuing the dialogue begun during its mission to
Hanoi.
2. The Commission believes that normalization of re-
lations affords the best prospect for obtaining a fuller
accounting for our missing personnel and recommends
that the normalization process be pursued vigorously
for this as well as other reasons.
3. The Commission believes it most important to
continue the technical exchanges with the Vietnamese
agency on accounting for MIA's which were initiated in
Hanoi.
4. In addition to talks in Paris, consideration should
be given to proposing that a U.S. representative per-
sonally bring such information to Hanoi, and to
inviting Vietnamese representatives to visit the U.S.
Central Identification Laboratory in Honolulu.
5. In view of the Vietnamese statements that they
would be glad to receive material assistance to aid their
search for U.S. remains, the Commission recommends
that this subject be considered promptly within the
U.S. Government with a view to quickly providing
whatever assistance is appropriate.
6. Consideration should also be given to offering
technical advice and assistance on defusing unexploded
ordnance, which the Commission understands con-
tinues to be a serious problem in some areas. An
international agency such as UNHCR could be helpful
in arrangements for providing such information.
7. Another possible action would be to encourage
private American groups to increase humanitarian aid
programs for Indochina, in such areas as food and med-
ical supplies, including prosthetic equipment.
United States and Yugoslavia
Hold Consultations on CSCE
Press release 110 dated March 16
U.S. and Yugoslav representatives met
March 15-16 in Washington for consultations
and discussions on the Belgrade followup
meeting to the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in
1975. The preparatory session for the Belgrade
meeting will begin June 15, and the date for
the main, substantive meeting, also to be held
in Belgrade, will be set at that time.
Ambassador Milorad Pesic, who is responsi-
ble in the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for
Foreign Affairs for the preparations for the
Belgrade conference, led the Yugoslav delega-
tion. Ambassador to the United States Dimce
Belovski also participated on the Yugoslav
side. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Arthur A. Hartman led the U.S. delegation.
Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher received Ambassadors Pesic and
Belovski on March 15.
In addition to discussions in the Department
of State, Ambassador Pesic met with members
of the CSCE Commission, including Chairman
Dante Fascell.
The discussions and consultations were use-
ful and timely and took place in a constructive
and cordial atmosphere.
374
Department of State Bulletin
Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan
Visits Washington
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of Japan
made an official visit to Washington March
20-23, during which he met with President
Carter and other government officials. Fol-
lowing is the text of a joint communique is-
sued March 22. 1
White Hovi.se press release dated March 22
President Carter and Prime Minister
Fukuda met in Washington March 21 and 22
for a comprehensive and fruitful exchange of
views on matters of mutual interest.
They expressed satisfaction that through
the meetings, a relationship of free and candid
dialogue and mutual trust was established be-
tween the new leaders of the governments of
the United States and Japan. They agreed
that the two Governments would maintain
close contact and consultation on all matters
of common concern.
The President and the Prime Minister ex-
pressed their determination that the two
countries, recognizing their respective re-
sponsibilities as industrialized democracies,
endeavor to bring about a more peaceful and
prosperous international community. To this
end, they agreed that it is essential for the
industrialized democracies to develop har-
monized positions toward major economic is-
sues through close consultation. They agreed
further that it is important to sustain and de-
velop dialogue and cooperation with countries
whose political systems differ and which are
in varying stages of economic development.
The President and the Prime Minister noted
with satisfaction that the friendly and cooper-
ative relations between the United States and
Japan have continued to expand throughout
diverse areas in the lives of the two
peoples — not only in economic and political in-
terchange, but in such varied fields as science
1 For an exchange of remarks between President
Carter and Prime Minister Fukuda at a welcoming
ceremony at the White House on Mar. 21 and their ex-
change of toasts at a dinner at the White House that
evening, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments dated Mar. 28, 1977, pp. 415 and 420.
and technology, medicine, education and cul-
ture. They looked forward to further collab-
oration on both private and governmental
levels in all these areas. The President and
the Prime Minister confirmed their common
determination to further strengthen the
partnership between their two countries,
based on shared democratic values and a deep
respect for individual freedom and fundamen-
tal human rights.
The President and the Prime Minister con-
firmed their common recognition that the
interdependence of nations requires that the
industrial countries manage their economies
with due consideration for global economic
needs, including those of the developing na-
tions. They agreed that economic recovery of
the industrialized democracies is indispensa-
ble to the stable growth of the international
economy, and that nations with large-scale
economies, including the United States and
Japan, while seeking to avoid recrudescent in-
flation, should contribute to the stimulation of
the world economy in a manner commensurate
with their respective situations. They agreed
that both Governments would continue to con-
sult closely to this end.
They agreed that a liberal world trading sys-
tem is essential for the sound development of
the world economy, and in this connection ex-
pressed their determination to seek signifi-
cant early progress in the Tokyo Round of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and to bring
those negotiations to a successful conclusion
as soon as possible.
They reconfirmed the need for the nations
concerned, including the United States and
Japan, to address constructively the issues
posed in the North-South relationship. They
noted the continuing seriousness of the global
energy problem and reconfirmed the impor-
tance of taking further steps to conserve
energy and to develop new and alternative
energy sources. They agreed on the necessity
of intensified consumer country cooperation in
the International Energy Agency and of con-
tinued promotion of cooperation between the
oil-importing and oil-producing countries.
They agreed that both Governments would
continue their efforts to identify and promote
positive solutions to these issues, and would
April 18, 1977
375
endeavor to bring the Ministerial Meeting of
the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation to a successful conclusion.
The President and the Prime Minister wel-
comed the convening in London in May of the
summit conference of the major industrial
countries. They expressed their expectation
that the conference, in a spirit of cooperation
and solidarity, would serve as a forum for a
constructive and creative exchange of views
on problems confronting the world economy.
The President and the Prime Minister re-
viewed the current international situation,
and reaffirmed their recognition that the
maintenance of a durable peace in the Asian-
Pacific region is necessary for world peace
and security.
They agreed that the close cooperative rela-
tionship between the United States and Ja-
pan, joined by bonds of friendship and trust,
is indispensable to a stable international polit-
ical structure in the Asian-Pacific region.
They noted that the Treaty of Mutual Cooper-
ation and Security between the United States
and Japan has greatly contributed to the
maintenance of peace and security in the Far
East, and expressed their conviction that the
firm maintenance of the Treaty serves the
long-term interests of both countries.
The President reaffirmed that the United
States as a Pacific nation, maintains a strong
interest in the Asian-Pacific region, and will
continue to play an active and constructive
role there. He added that the United States
will honor its security commitments and in-
tends to retain a balanced and flexible mili-
tary presence in the Western Pacific. The
Prime Minister welcomed this affirmation by
the United States and expressed his intention
that Japan would further contribute to the sta-
bility and development of that region in vari-
ous fields, including economic development.
Noting the activities of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, the President and
the Prime Minister valued highly the efforts
of its member countries to strengthen their
self-reliance and the resilience of the region.
They also reaffirmed that the two countries
are prepared to continue cooperation and as-
sistance in support of the efforts of the
ASEAN countries toward regional cohesion
and development.
Taking note of the situation in Indochina,
they expressed the view that the peaceful and
stable development of this area would be de-
sirable for the future of Southeast Asia as a
whole.
The President and the Prime Minister noted
the continuing importance of the maintenance
of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
for the security of Japan and East Asia as a
whole. They agreed on the desirability of con-
tinued efforts to reduce tension on the Korean
Peninsula and strongly hoped for an early re-
sumption of the dialogue between the South
and the North. In connection with the in-
tended withdrawal of United States ground
forces in the Republic of Korea, the President
stated that the United States, after consulta-
tion with the Republic of Korea and also with
Japan, would proceed in ways which would
not endanger the peace on the Peninsula. He
affirmed that the United States remains
committed to the defense of the Republic of
Korea.
The President and the Prime Minister em-
phasized that, as a first step toward the most
urgent task of nuclear disarmament, nuclear-
testing in all environments should be banned
promptly. With respect to the international
transfer of conventional weapons, they em-
phasized that measures to restrain such trans-
fers should be considered by the international
community as a matter of priority. In connec-
tion with the prevention of nuclear prolifera-
tion, the President welcomed the ratification
by Japan last year of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The President and the Prime Minister, rec-
ognizing the important role the United Na-
tions is playing in the contemporary world,
agreed that Japan and the United States
should cooperate for the strengthening of that
organization. In this connection, the Presi-
dent expressed his belief that Japan is fully
qualified to become a permanent member of
the Security Council of the United Nations,
and stated American support for that objec-
tive. The Prime Minister expressed his ap-
preciation for the President's statement.
376
Department of State Bulletin
The President and the Prime Minister reaf-
firmed that the use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes should not lead to nuclear
proliferation. In this connection, the Presi-
dent expressed his determination to develop
United States policies which would support a
more effective non-proliferation regime. The
Prime Minister stated that for Japan, a party
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a highly
industrialized state heavily dependent on im-
ported energy resources, it is essential to
progress toward implementation of its pro-
gram for the development and utilization of
nuclear energy. The President agreed to give
full consideration to Japan's position regard-
ing its energy needs in connection with the
formulation of a new nuclear policy by the
United States. The President and the Prime
Minister agreed on the necessity for close
cooperation between the United States and
Japan in developing a workable policy which
will meet Japan's concerns and contribute to a
more effective non-proliferation regime.
The President and the Prime Minister dis-
cussed matters concerning bilateral trade,
fisheries and civil aviation. They agreed on
the importance of continued close consultation
and cooperation between the two Govern-
ments to attain mutually acceptable and
equitable solutions to problems pending be-
tween the United States and Japan.
The Prime Minister conveyed an invitation
from the Government of Japan to President
and Mrs. Carter to visit Japan. The President
accepted this invitation with deep apprecia-
tion and stated that he looked forward to vis-
iting Japan at a mutually convenient time.
Secretary Vance Meets With
Irish Foreign Minister
Following is a joint statement, issued on
March 17 following a meeting between Secre-
tary Vance and Irish Foreign Minister Garret
FitzGerald.
Press release 111 dated March IT
1. The Secretary of State and the Irish
Minister for Foreign Affairs discussed the
situation in Northern Ireland and expressed
concern about the continued violence there.
2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs ex-
pressed appreciation to the Secretary of State
for the continued efforts of the U.S.
Administration to limit support for violence in
Northern Ireland by persons mistakenly moti-
vated in the United States, and for its wish to
insure that legitimate concern for human
rights is not misused by those who support vio-
lence as a means to political ends in Ireland.
3. The Secretary of State reaffirmed the
longstanding U.S. Government policy of
noninvolvement in the issue of Northern
Ireland.
4. Both the Secretary of State and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed their
commitment to the statement of President
Carter made on October 28, 1976, which op-
posed violence as part of a solution to the Irish
question and expressed support for negotia-
tions and peaceful means for finding a just so-
lution involving the two communities of
Northern Ireland and which would protect
human rights.
April 18, 1977
377
The International Economic Situation
Following is a statement made before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy
of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on March 18 by Richard N.
Cooper, then Under Secretary-designate for
Economic Affairs, whose nomination was
continued by the Senate on April 6. 1
It is my pleasure to be here today to
present an overview of the international
economic situation. As the first
Administration witness to testify in this
series of hearings, let me reiterate Presi-
dent Carter's conviction that a coherent and
effective foreign economic policy, supported
by the American people, requires sustained
cooperation between the Administration and
Congress. It is in this spirit that I view the
opportunity to appear before this key sub-
committee today.
In this opening statement I would like to
cover several areas:
— Events leading to our present situation;
— The current state of the international
economy;
— Foreign policy considerations; and
— Our overall foreign economic strategy.
I shall keep my oral presentation brief and
look forward to your questions for an
opportunity to more fully explain our
policies.
A quick review of the recent past is help-
ful in understanding the current environ-
ment. Two developments are of particular
significance.
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
In the early 1970's the Western industrial
economies began to experience a relatively
synchronized economic expansion, the cul-
mination of exceptionally rapid world
growth during the previous decade. In
1972-73 the growth rate of the OECD [Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] area exceeded 6 percent,
approaching the limits of productive capac-
ity in that area and outstripping the ability
of many producers to expand supplies. By
1973, in reaction to rising inflation, several
countries were already pursuing contraction-
ary policies to cool their overheated
economies, accepting the prospect of a slow-
down in growth.
Then came the oil embargo and
quadrupling of the price of oil in the winter
of 1973-74. This was the largest single
global economic shock in modern history.
Because of the suddenness and magnitude of
the impact, the increased price for oil acted
as a major drain on purchasing power in the
oil-consuming world. Coming on top of the
mild slowdown already in progress, the oil
price rise plunged the industrial economies
into full recession.
Individual countries reacted differently.
The United States, Germany, and Japan
accepted the recession and permitted aggre-
gate demand to contract. Others, particu-
larly the weaker European economies and
several semi-industrialized developing na-
tions, delayed domestic adjustment. They
financed their balance-of-payments deficits
with borrowings, gambling that the reces-
sion would be short and that resumed eco-
nomic growth would enable them to bring
payments back into balance. The bet was
understandable, even rational, but it turned
out to be wrong; the recession was longer
378
Department of State Bulletin
and deeper than originally expected, large
oil deficits added to the problem, and those
attempting to ride it out by financing these
deficits saw their indebtedness continue to
mount.
The Current Situation
Today the world is slowly emerging from
the worst recession of the last 40 years. Re-
covery, which had begun in the latter half of
1975, picked up steam in the first half of last
year but then began to slow in many coun-
tries. This pause, combined with pressures
in foreign exchange markets associated with
external payments strains in a number of
countries, created renewed uncertainty. The
fear that simultaneous recovery in the
OECD area would overheat the world econ-
omy was replaced in the second half of the
year with the concern that a flattening of
the recovery might lead to insufficient
growth.
As 1977 began, however, the outlook ap-
peared more positive. The recovery began to
pick up in many of the OECD countries.
However, because of the different underly-
ing conditions in various countries before
the recession and the different ways they
reacted to the recession, individual coun-
tries are now emerging in widely different
positions of strength.
Several factors characterize the present
state of recovery:
Moderate But Sustained Growth
First, we can expect moderate but sus-
tained growth throughout the rest of this
year:
— Real growth rates in the industrial
countries are projected to average about 4
percent in 1977, somewhat lower than the 5
percent attained in 1976. The stronger
economies— the United States, Germany,
and Japan — are well into the cyclical
upswing. This year we may see a growth
rate somewhat below last year's average for
the group, which was above 6 percent. In
several other major economies, such as the
United Kingdom, France, and Italy, stabili-
zation measures will lead to slower growth
than the 1976 average growth rate of about
4 percent.
— Real growth in the oil-importing
developing countries is likely to be some-
what below the estimated 5.4 percent of
1976. Brazil, India, and Korea were among
the major countries helping to pull the LDC
[less developed country] average up in 1976.
This year, adjustment and slower growth in
several larger countries will slightly reduce
the overall average.
— Aggregate inflation rates in the OECD
area will remain disturbingly high, although
less than the 8 percent rate of 1976. At the
upper end of the OECD spectrum, consumer
prices are likely to rise about 20 percent this
year in some countries. At the opposite ex-
treme, price increases in the order of 2-4
percent might be expected.
— Unemployment will remain a major
problem as approximately 15 million men
and women are out of work in the OECD
area, half in the United States.
Problem Areas
Second, there are areas of the recovery
that need to be strengthened:
—Sluggish investment in the OECD area
is perhaps the most important weakness in
the recovery. The severity of the recession
led to reduced real investment and a
consequent lower growth in productive
capacity. New capacity requirements in sev-
eral key industries, the need to replace a
portion of existing capital stock made obso-
lete by high-cost energy, and special future
requirements in energy and pollution-con-
trol facilities require substantial new
investment.
— Additional oil price increases, coming on
top of the already high price levels, could
also upset the current growth pattern. U.S.
Government analysis in advance of the last
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] price decision in December indi-
cated that each 5 percent increase in the
cost of crude oil would cost oil-consuming
countries approximately $6 billion in higher
oil import bills, with the United States
April 18, 1977
379
paying about $1.7 billion of that total. Ab-
sent compensating domestic policy actions,
each 5 percent increase costs the seven
largest industrial countries an average of 0.3
percent of GNP [gross national product]
growth and adds roughly 0.3 percent to
consumer prices.
Payments Imbalances and External Debts
Third, OPEC members can be expected to
amass annual current account surpluses in
excess of $30 billion for at least the next few
years, and the accumulation of financial
assets by several Arab oil exporters to-
gether could easily surpass $300 billion by
the end of 1980. The total oil import bill,
which was $35 billion in 1973, will be on the
order of $140 billion in 1977. The large
chronic OPEC surplus is matched by
aggregate deficits in both developed and de-
veloping oil-importing countries, which can
be reduced but not eliminated in the medium
term. Only the distribution of the deficit
among importers can change.
Borrowings to finance balance-
of-payments deficits each year have meant
an increase in the external indebtedness of
many nations in the OECD, the developing
world, and the Eastern European nonmar-
ket countries.
The debt issue is complex. As an
illustration of the situation, we can look at
the developing countries. Those with access
to private capital markets borrowed heavily
to finance deficits, in preference to making
difficult domestic adjustments, which, if un-
dertaken, would have aggravated the world
recession.
While in many cases the rate of inflation
has reduced the burden of past debts,
debt-service payments of the non-oil-
producing LDC's are now in excess of $21
billion in 1976, or an increase of about 75
percent over the 1973 level. Over 80 percent
relates to payments on private and official
commercial debt. In 1976 these payments
consumed about 20 percent of their income
from merchandise exports as compared to 17
percent in 1973. These large debt-service
payments will cause several countries to
continue the search for new financing at the
same time that they make necessary internal
adjustments. Collectively, debts must be ac-
cumulated beyond present levels because of
the OPEC surpluses. Absent sufficient
financing, several countries would be forced
to take the 1974-75 recession in 1977 and
1978.
This could threaten the process of recov-
ery itself, particularly in Europe, where de-
pendence on external markets is
considerably larger than is that of the
United States. But the American economy
would also be affected adversely by a major
slump in export markets brought about by
deflation and import restrictions.
Danger of Protectionism
Fourth, the danger of protectionism is
growing and remains a constant threat to
the recovery. The OPEC surpluses will lead
to unaccustomed deficits. At the same time
unemployment will exert pressure for ex-
pansion, which, unless coordinated, will
worsen deficits. Import restrictions would
seem to be the way out, especially since im-
ports are a natural scapegoat for what is
basically deficient total demand. Import re-
strictions, however, will never work
collectively — unemployment will only be
exported.
Thus far, governments have generally fol-
lowed prudent trade policies, but the
possibility of protectionism is real. Trade
restrictions would spread in the current en-
vironment, and it could easily take another
decade to get back to where we are today.
The Less Developed Countries
Fifth, recession and weak export markets,
inflation and higher cost imports, and high
energy prices, have adversely affected many
LDC's. Our own economic welfare is
increasingly intertwined with trade with and
investment in the developing world. Many of
these critical issues are under discussion in
the North-South dialogue, where a failure to
maintain a constructive atmosphere could
undermine global economic cooperation.
This, then, is where we are in the recov-
ery: modest growth ahead, which must be
380
Department of State Bulletin
reinforced by reduced inflation, increased
employment, expanded investment,
strengthened energy policies, adequate
financing for payments imbalances and
adjustment, turning back protectionism, and
the improvement of global economic cooper-
ation among all countries.
Foreign Policy Considerations
The current economic situation has major
foreign policy implications. Two general
considerations are paramount:
— The growing interaction of national
economies means that problems in some
countries can easily become contagious and
that they can be effectively addressed only
by nations working closely together. Among
the market economies the United States is
relatively less dependent on the world econ-
omy, but our economic welfare and security
cannot be divorced from the economic health
of other nations and are becoming increas-
ingly intertwined with it.
— Economic concerns preoccupy govern-
ments everywhere. They require economic
stability and progress to maintain the
confidence of their electorates. Economic
problems can generate political and social
instability and undermine the network of
international cooperative arrangements
which have been painstakingly erected in
the last 30 years.
In the last few years the fabric of interna-
tional cooperation has held together ex-
traordinarily well despite severe economic
strains. Indeed, we have made some major
advances, including the first comprehensive
reform of the international monetary system
since Bretton Woods; an agreement by the
industrial democracies to avoid unilateral
trade restrictions despite the pressures of
the recession; the conclusion of the OECD
investment declaration, strengthening the
framework for private investment among
the Western democracies; and the provision
of additional sources of finance to developing
countries from the IMF [International
Monetary Fund] Trust Fund and a greatly
expanded IMF compensatory financing
facility.
The general foreign policy challenge be-
fore us is not only to preserve this coopera-
tive framework but to strengthen and
extend it to insure global economic growth.
I turn now to the specific issues we face and
our strategy for dealing with them.
Foreign Economic Strategy
Let me discuss our overall strategy in the
context of our broad macroeconomic
objective: a strong recovery characterized
by steady, sustained, noninflationary growth
and expanding job opportunities in the
OECD area and the developing world. The
key elements of our approach are the coor-
dinated stimulation of the stronger
economies, adequate international financing
conditioned on timely adjustment, reduced
dependence on foreign energy sources,
continued trade liberalization, and progress
in the North-South dialogue.
Coordinated Stimulatio n
First, coordinated stimulation: We should
look first at President Carter's recovery
program, which is designed to strengthen
the domestic economic performance and
create jobs without triggering inflation. The
program should not be seen only in domestic
terms but as part of an overall plan in which
those countries in a strong financial position
expand as rapidly as they can consistent
with sustained growth and the control of in-
flation, thereby absorbing a greater portion
of the aggregate deficit of the oil-importing
countries and stimulating growth in the
weaker economies.
The Administration has formulated its
program with both domestic and interna-
tional considerations in mind. It contains tax
features to provide quick injections of pur-
chasing power into the economy as well as
encouragement for increased private
investment, and it includes programs to in-
crease employment directly. The program
will extend over two years and is adjustable
as conditions warrant.
We have been encouraging other strong
economies to follow our lead in stimulating
their economies. Thus far the degree of
April 18, 1977
381
stimulation varies widely among these coun-
tries, and we will be paying close attention
to the evolution of their policies.
Financing and Adjustment
Second, financing and adjustment: In
some individual cases, countries which chose
to rely heavily on external finance to cover
their deficits over the past few years must
take domestic adjustment measures to
strengthen their payments position and
avoid the risk of impairing their
creditworthiness. As noted before, however,
we must accept the need to sustain consid-
erable increases in aggregate debt for the
near future.
Individual requirements vary consider-
ably, but for many countries the economic
adjustment process will take years and re-
quire difficult economic decisions. For some,
there is an immediate requirement to
channel new funds away from financing con-
sumption to expenditures which increase fu-
ture production through investment. Over
the last few years, ad hoc responses to the
major international shocks resulted in large
amounts of private borrowing being used to
finance imports for consumption without
adequate sums being directed to increase
productive capacity. In addition, in some
countries budget deficits must be severely
reduced as government expenditures have
exploded without comparable tax collections.
Unless there is international growth,
countries cannot make necessary adjust-
ments without painful and severe
dislocations. Adjustment and recovery thus
go hand in hand. It is also imperative that
those initiating adjustments are able to find
external financial support for responsible
stabilization programs.
The necessary financing will have to be
rechanneled one way or another from OPEC
countries in surplus. In the past, private
commercial institutions have been the
principal mechanism for this intermediation.
We will continue to rely primarily on the
private sector to perform this function. But
we are also examining new ways to insure
adequate amounts of financing from interna-
tional institutions and the proper mix of
official and private financing in individual
cases. The International Monetary Fund in
particular is skilled at facilitating necessary
domestic stabilization as a condition for fi-
nancial support, which is the type of lending
that will be most appropriate for many
countries.
Energy
Third, energy: The events of the past four
years have clearly demonstrated the
vulnerability of the United States and its
major allies to OPEC decisions to raise
prices and to the threatened or actual use of
an oil embargo by some oil-exporting coun-
tries as an instrument of national policy. As
already noted, uncertainty over the course
of future OPEC price policy hangs over the
recovery and prospects for global economic
growth and stability. And for the longer
term, there is more to the energy question
than OPEC's actions. A profound shift in
global supply-and-demand patterns has
taken place. Oil is a depletable asset. We
must not only reduce our short-term vul-
nerability, but we must begin preparing for
the post-oil age.
The key element of U.S. energy strategy
is the development of a comprehensive
domestic energy policy. The full plan is
evolving in close cooperation with Congress
and our partners in the International
Energy Agency and will be detailed by April
20. Clearly one major thrust will be to re-
duce dependence on imported oil.
Internationally, we will be supporting
several important efforts. The United States
has made the International Energy Agency
the principal vehicle for energy cooperation
with the other industrialized countries; and
we will continue our policies there to
develop coordinated national programs for
conservation, development, and reduced de-
pendence. We shall continue our efforts to
integrate key OPEC countries into the
world economic structure so that decisions
affecting international economic welfare and
stability can be made cooperatively. And we
shall focus attention and resources on assist-
ing the non-oil LDC's to improve their
energy positions.
382
Department of State Bulletin
Trade Policy
Fourth, trade policy: I have already
described the impact that renewed protec-
tionism would have on the recovery. In ad-
dition, we would undoubtedly pay the price
of any resurgence of protectionism in other
areas of international cooperation.
In the next several weeks the
Administration will face difficult decisions
concerning trade policy toward such sensi-
tive imports as shoes and color TV sets. Our
own actions will have a major influence on
the trade policy of other countries. We are
also examining our trade strategy in the
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva,
where we expect to make significant prog-
ress before the authority of the Trade Act of
1974 expires.
North-South Dialogue
Fifth, we plan to redouble our efforts in
the North-South dialogue in order to
strengthen global cooperation generally.
Economic developments of the past four
years have caused the developing nations to
accelerate their search for international
policies which increase resource transfers to
them and enhance their role in international
decisionmaking. They have called for in-
creased levels of foreign assistance,
permanent trade preferences, technology
transfer on more favorable terms,
commodity-price stabilization, and debt
forgiveness.
The Carter Administration is still review-
ing its overall North-South policies, but
several elements of our general approach
are already clear:
—The interests of all countries are best
served in an open and buoyant world econ-
omy.
— We have many mutual interests with
the developing world and will emphasize
those issues where all countries can derive
benefit, as opposed to those where some
countries' gain is others' loss.
— The dialogue must be a two-way street.
All countries must accept obligations to the
world system. We shall approach problems
of the developing world with a desire to as-
sist in any reasonable way possible. But we
shall also expect that within their
capabilities they maximize their own re-
sources for development, adhere to
standards of basic human rights, and respect
our interests.
This coming year commodities and official
debt will be particularly important to the
overall discussions.
Over the next several months we will be
engaged in a series of meetings on ways to
strengthen individual commodity markets
and on the possibility of common funding for
individual commodity stockpiles.
A number of serious problems in the
commodities area must be addressed
cooperatively by producers and consumers.
For a large number of developing countries,
earnings from commodities are critical to
economic development. At the same time, all
countries have a major interest in assuring
that our goal of a stable, expanding world
economy is not threatened either by exces-
sive fluctuations of commodity prices and
export earnings or by an inadequacy of
resources.
Within this framework of mutual interest
we are prepared to act on commodities is-
sues. The problems faced in the commodities
area require an integrated approach, ad-
dressing price stabilization, trade, the im-
provement of market structures, the stabili-
zation of export earnings, resource de-
velopment, and investment. The new Ad-
ministration is currently formulating policies
toward all these issues. We are prepared to
deal with them constructively in the coming
months in a number of meetings including
the work now underway in UNCTAD
[United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development] and elsewhere on a number of
individual commodities.
We believe the existing international in-
stitutions can play a very helpful role here.
The IMF compensatory financing facility,
which lends for shortfalls in LDC export
proceeds, has been a particularly key
element; and we will be open to possible fu-
ture improvements. In addition, the World
Bank might usefully facilitate resource
development.
April 18, 1977
383
A second major issue will be the demands
for general debt relief for official debt of the
low-income countries. The issue should not
be confused with the indebtedness issue dis-
cussed before, which involves mainly
commercial borrowings of the higher income
LDC's, none of whom have advocated any
type of general debt relief.
The developing countries have made for-
giveness of official debt a principal demand in
the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation in Paris, which is due to wind up
late this spring. The United States and other
industrialized democracies have remained firm
that this would be a mistaken policy.
In general, official debt burdens can be
serviced and are not major impediments to
development. In addition, generalized debt
relief would provide indiscriminate benefits
to those countries which had not pursued
effective domestic policies and would be un-
related to currently appropriate burden
sharing among the aid-giving countries.
Finally, since individual country situations
differ so widely, debt relief can be meaning-
fully considered only on a case-by-case
basis.
As one examines demands for debt relief,
however, it is clear that the developing
countries' objective is to increase resource
transfers. Looked at this way, the United
States, in conjunction with other donor
countries, can make a major contribution to
development via higher levels of foreign as-
sistance, both multilateral and bilateral.
The Administration is convinced that
larger resource transfers to the Third World
are required in order to meet legitimate
development requirements. Furthermore,
we believe that foreign assistance is the
most direct and effective way to do this, and
that an improved economic assistance per-
formance by the United States not only ad-
vances global economic development but is a
sensible alternative to LDC proposals for
general debt relief, as well as other resource
transfer schemes which we believe to be
poorly conceived. However, we will want to
insure that our foreign assistance resource
transfers are efficiently used and actually
reach the people who need them.
In recent weeks Secretary Vance and
other Administration officials have testified
in support of a larger bilateral U.S. foreign
assistance program and prompt U.S. par-
ticipation in the capital replenishment of
international development banks, particu-
larly the International Development Associ-
ation, the soft-loan window of the World
Bank. The 1978 budget calls for budget au-
thority of $1.35 billion for bilateral de-
velopment assistance, $2.6 billion for the
World Bank Group (of which $1 billion is
callable capital), $130 million for the United
Nations Development Program, and $1.9
billion for security supporting assistance.
The support of this subcommittee and your
colleagues in Congress will be essential to
fulfillment of the President's objective in
this area.
Reinforcing Structure of Cooperation
Mr. Chairman, the economic situation will
present a major challenge to our foreign
economic policy in the coming years. We will
have to deal with the complex interrelation-
ships among the pace of economic expansion,
the distribution of large trade deficits, the
system of international financing, energy
policy, the degree of protectionism, and the
strengthening of cooperative relationships
among all countries. If the deep strains in
the international economy force each coun-
try to go its own w T ay, everyone will be the
loser.
To date the structure of international
cooperation has worked well, thus justifying
the continuing effort we and other countries
have devoted to building it over the last
quarter century. In the face of difficulty we
must now preserve and reinforce this struc-
ture. This will require the willingness of the
United States and others to adapt to new
circumstances. As in the past others will be
looking to us to lead the way in fashioning
effective policies. The Administration looks
forward to working closely with the Con-
gress in meeting this challenge.
384
Department of State Bulletin
Department Discusses Approach
to Environmental Issues
Following is a statement by Patsy T.
Mink, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on
Arms Control, Oceans, and International
Environment of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on March 31. 1
Thank you for the opportunity to testify
on S. Res. 49, which urges the United
States to seek agreement of other
governments to a treaty requiring prepara-
tion of an international environmental im-
pact statement for any major project,
action, or continuing activity which could
reasonably be expected to have an adverse
effect on the environment of another nation
or a global commons area.
The Department is in full agreement with
the basic purpose of S. Res. 49, which I see
as seeking responsible assessment by na-
tions of the environmental effects of their
actions upon other nations.
We are embarked on a number of ac-
tivities internationally to gain the support of
other countries for implementation of this
concept. Our efforts are meeting with some
success; we also have encountered some
basic resistance.
For example, the United States has
played a leading role in the development of
the principles concerning transfrontier
pollution which have been adopted by the
Council of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
These principles, which are intended as
guides to member states, call for provision
of information to, and consultation with,
other countries before activities are under-
taken which may have transfrontier pollu-
tion implications; provision is also made
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
for monitoring, research, and dispute
settlement.
I think our country can be justifiably
proud of the arrangements we have de-
veloped over the years with Canada and
Mexico to identify and resolve transfrontier
pollution issues. With Canada, we have the
International Joint Commission, created in
1909. With Mexico, we have the
International Boundary and Water Commis-
sion. Each of these is unique in its particular
structure, but both of them have been
invaluable in addressing environmental
problems with our two close neighbors. I
think one point to be learned from those
experiences is that we should not be rigid as
to the kinds of tools we develop. The impor-
tant thing is to address the problem.
We have also encouraged the European
Communities (Common Market) in their ef-
forts to develop Community-wide environ-
mental assessment procedures.
Another case in point is the United Na-
tions Law of the Sea Conference. The
United States has proposed and achieved
consensus on a treaty article calling upon
states to prepare environmental assessments
of their activities which might adversely af-
fect the marine environment. Such reports
are to be published or provided to the
competent international organizations to be
made available to all states.
And with respect to the possible
development of Antarctic resources, we are
actively engaged in cooperative environmen-
tal studies w r ith our Antarctic Treaty
partners. This includes expanded studies
that could form the basis for effective en-
vironmental measures related to marine
living resources, as well as studies on the
environmental implications of any mineral
resource activities that may occur in
Antarctica.
The United States has been working
within the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) on draft principles of con-
duct for guidance of states in the conserva-
tion and harmonious exploitation of shared
natural resources. Included are provisions
on notification, consultation, and environ-
April 18, 1977
385
mental assessment. These guidelines,
specifically at U.S. initiative, would provide
that:
States should make environmental assessments
before engaging in any activity with respect to a
shared natural resource which may create a risk of
significantly affecting the environment of another
State or States sharing that resource.
In addition, within the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe we are
supporting a project to develop common in-
ternational methodologies for analyzing en-
vironmental implications of economic
activities. A concrete example we hope to
use is the problem of long-range atmos-
pheric transport of pollutants and the
resultant phenomenon of "acid rain." If we
can develop a workable and internationally
accepted means of designing and assessing
the specific environmental impact of related
factors such as power generation, the next
step would be consultations between
countries leading to introduction of remedial
measures to diminish these environmental
impacts.
Such consultations are already called for
under the OECD transfrontier pollution
principles, but the problem is how to
convert abstract principle into practice. We
believe that our step-by-step approach is
producing a strengthened international
consensus on the importance of systematic
environmental assessment; it is also increas-
ing agreement among nations on how to go
about this process.
I have described a rather gradualistic ap-
proach. It serves the purpose of developing
an international consensus which we hope
will encourage nations to be willing to adopt
binding international obligations of the kind
set forth in S. Res. 49. The reluctance of
states to accept real or perceived restraints
on their sovereignty is reflected in the
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Envi-
ronment, which sets forth the sovereign
right of nations to conduct their own
environmental policies.
The issue goes right to the heart of na-
tional economic survival. In Europe, the
most dramatic current case of transfrontier
pollution probably is that of acid rain. Acid
rain in turn results from the production of
energy from conventional fossil fuels. The
states of Europe would be understandably
reluctant to adopt any broad obligations
which could affect their right to continue the
production of energy.
The proposed treaty could be read to
require that if any activity of a state or its
nationals or persons subject to its jurisdic-
tion were to be challenged by another state
or by UNEP as potentially having signifi-
cant adverse effect upon the other state's
physical environment or environmental
interests or upon the global commons, such
a challenge could halt the activity in ques-
tion pending the outcome of a mandatory
consultation, the preparation of an environ-
mental impact statement for external review
by the affected state and by UNEP, and
submission of any related dispute to compul-
sory international settlement. I do not be-
lieve that other states would accept a
binding obligation of this nature; moreover,
we believe it would be difficult even for the
United States to accept an obligation which
might allow another state to halt, perhaps
indefinitely, a domestic activity undertaken
in accordance with U.S. laws.
The issue that I am addressing is one of
degree only. Unfortunately, we do not have
the shared international perception of the
importance of this issue to enable us to
move yet toward such binding commitments.
If you will accept the reservations I have
expressed as to the specific details of the
treaty text described in S. Res. 49, I am
pleased to say that the concept has the
support of the Department of State.
We do believe that this is the direction in
which we should be moving. I understand
the injunction in the resolution to "seek the
agreement of other governments to a
treaty" to express a conceptual goal rather
than a specific charter.
I hope that the emphasis upon interna-
tional environmental impact statements does
not rule out the flexibility to pursue other
means of achieving the purpose, such as the
use of joint commissions like those we now
have with Canada and Mexico. Moreover, I
expect that the elaboration of cooperative
procedures for assessing environmental
impacts will be more palatable to foreign na-
386
Department of State Bulletin
tions than a proposal that countries do uni-
lateral environmental impact statements on
the effects of their actions in other coun-
tries. For one thing, a nation is likely to
want to do its own analysis of the impact
within its jurisdiction. For another, it may
believe that an analysis by the nation which
is responsible for the potential damage
would be less balanced than a cooperative
analysis.
I hope that you will accept the likelihood
that we may be able to develop international
machinery for exchange of information and
consultation long before nations will
be willing to accept compulsory dispute
settlement.
Finally, I am sure that you recognize that
the development of any international con-
vention on so important a subject will be
a sustained process of give-and-take and
that the final product will reflect other
countries' views as well as the draft which
we initially put forward.
With these clarifications, may I again
reiterate that the Department agrees with
the goal of the resolution and wishes to
compliment Senator Pell for having re-
minded us all of the importance of the goal.
Current Treaty Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome
June 13, 1976. '
Signatures: Belgium, March 16, 1977; Bangladesh,
March 17, 1977; El Salvador, Sudan, March 21, 1977;
Romania, March 22, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, March 23, 1977.
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as
amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956.
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284,
7668.
Acceptance deposited: Nicaragua, March 25, 1977.
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19,
1967; for the United States December 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.
Notification of succession: Bahamas, March 17,
1977.
Optional protocol, to the Vienna convention on con-
sular relations, concerning the compulsory
settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24,
1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the
United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, March 17, 1977.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964; for the United States December 13, 1972.
TIAS 7502.
Notification of succession: Bahamas, March 17,
1977.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development formulated at the
Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Done at
Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force
December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Guinea-Bissau, March 24,
1977.
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference
July 1-22, 1944. Done at Washington December 27,
1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS
1501.
Signature and acceptance: Guinea-Bissau, March 24,
1977.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. '
Acceptance deposited: Bahamas, January 31, 1977.
Organization of American States — Charter
Charter of the Organization of American States.
Signed at Bogota April 30, 1948. Entered into force
December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.
Signature: Surinam, February 22, 1977.
United Nations — Privileges and Immunities
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the
United Nations. Done at New York February 13,
1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the
United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.
Notification of succession: Bahamas, March 17,
1977.
Accession deposited: Sudan, March 21, 1977.
BILATERAL
Federal Republic of Germany
Agreement relating to the security of information on
the JT-10D aircraft engine. Effected by exchange of
Not in force.
April 18, 1977
387
notes at Washington February 24 and March 18,
1977. Entered into force March 18, 1977.
Guatemala
Agreement relating to the deposit by Guatemala of 10
percent of the value of grant military assistance and
excess defense articles furnished by the United
States. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala
May 16 and July 19, 1972. Entered into force April
26, 1973. TIAS7625.
Terminated. March 2, 1977.
Jordan
Agreement amending the nonscheduled air service
agreement of September 21. 1974 (TIAS 7954), and
relating to scheduled air service. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington March 14 and 16,
1977. Entered into force March 16, 1977.
Spain
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States. Signed at Washington February 16,
1977.
Entered into force: March 10, 1977.
Syria
Agreement amending and implementing the air
transport agreement of April 28, 1947, as amended
(TIAS 3285, 3818). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington March 14 and 16, 1977. Entered into
force March 16, 1977.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Program of exchanges for 1977-79 and conditions
governing exchanges. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington October 22, 1976. Entered into force
October 22, 1976.
Chec
klist
of Department of State
No.
Date
Subject
Press Releases: March 28 -April 3
*145
3/31
Richard C. Holbrooke sworn in as As-
sistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs (biographic data).
Press releases mav be obtained from the Office of
*146
3/31
Vance: departure, Moscow.
Press
Relations, Department of State, Washington,
*147
3/31
Foreign Minister Genscher, Vance: ar-
rival, Bonn.
D.C.
20520
*148
3/31
SCC, SOLAS, working group on fire
protection, Apr. 26.
No.
Date
Subject
*149
3/31
Advisory Committee on the Law of the
128
3/28
Vance: arrival, Brussels, Mar. 26.
Sea, rescheduled, Apr. 25-26.
-129
3/28
Vance: remarks following special ses-
sion of North Atlantic Council, Mar.
26.
*150
3/31
SCC, SOLAS, working group on sub-
division and stability's panel on bulk
cargoes, New York, Apr. 28.
*130
3/28
Vance: press briefing on board aircraft,
Mar. 26.
*151
3/31
Study groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for the Interna-
*131
3/28
Vance: arrival, Moscow, Mar. 26.
tional Radio Consultative Committee
tl32
3/28
Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar.
(CCIR), Apr. 28.
27.
*152
3/31
Hodding Carter III sworn in as Assist-
*133
3/28
Shipping Coordinating Committee
(SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group
ant Secretary for Public Affairs and
Department spokesman. Mar. 25
(biographic data).
on life-saving appliances, Apr. 27.
i:,:i
3/31
Chancellor Schmidt, Vance: news con-
*134
3/28
SCC, SOLAS, working group on inter-
ference, Bonn.
national multimodal transport and
154
3/31
Vance: arrival, London.
containers, Apr. 27.
*155
4/1
Vance: remarks, London.
*135
3/28
U.S. Advisory Commission on Interna-
tional Educational and Cultural Af-
fairs, Apr. 25.
156
4/1
Lucy Wilson Benson sworn in as Under
Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science and Technology, Mar. 28
+ 136
3/29
Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar.
(biographic data).
28.
*157
4/1
Program for visit of President Sadat of
*137
3/29
Patsy T. Mink sworn in as Assistant
Egypt, Apr. 3-6.
Secretary for Oceans and Interna-
*158
4/1
Phase 2 of Caribbean-American work-
tional Environmental and Scientific
shop seminar begins Mar. 26.
Affairs, Mar. 28 (biographic data).
*159
4/1
Terence A. Todman sworn in as Assist-
+ 139
3/30
Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar.
29.
ant Secretary for Inter-American Af-
fairs (biographic data).
+ 140
3/30
U.S. -Cuba joint communique, Mar. 29.
*160
4/1
Vance: arrival, Paris.
141
3/30
Vance, Foreign Minister Gromyko:
toasts, Moscow.
+ 161
4/2
Vance: news conference on London-
Paris flight, Apr. 1.
+ 142
3/30
Vance: news conference, Moscow.
+ 162
4/2
Vance, Carter: arrival, Andrews AFB.
*143
3/30
Gale W. McGee sworn in as U.S. Per-
manent Representative to the OAS
(biographic data).
*Not printed.
+ 144
3/30
U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint communique.
+ Held for
a later issue of the Bulletin.
388
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX April 18, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1973
Arms Control and Disarmament. President Car-
ter's News Conference of March 21 (ex-
cerpts) 357
Austria. Letters of Credence (Schober) 362
Chile. Letters of Credence (Cauas) 362
Commodities. The Internationa] Economic s^
tion (Cooper) 378
Congress
Department Discusses Approach to Environmen-
tal Issues (Mink) 385
The Internationa] Economic Situation (Cooper) . . . -ITS
Developing Countries. The International Eco-
nomic Situation (Cooper) 378
Economic Affairs
The Intel-national Economic Situation (Cooper) . . .
President Carter's News Conference of March 24
(excerpts ) 357
Energy. The International Economic Situation
i ( '< ioper) 378
Environment. Department Discusses Appn
to Environmental Issues (Mink) 385
Europe. United States and Yugoslavia Hold i
sultations on CSCE 374
Guinea. Letters of Credence (Kourouma) 362
Human Rights. President Carter's News Confer-
ence of March 24 (excerpts ) 357
Ireland. Secretary Vance Meets With Irish
Foreign Minister (joint statement) 377
Japan. Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan Visits
Washington (joint communique) 375
Kenya. Letters of Credence (Mbogua) 362
Laos. Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and
Laos To Seek Information on Missing Americans
(Carter, Mansfield. Woodcock. Commission re-
port) 363
Presidential Documents
President Caller's News Conference of March 24
cerpts) 357
Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and Laos
To Seek Information on Missing Americans .... 363
Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan Visits Washington
(joint communique) 375
Swaziland. Letters of Credence (Kunene) 362
Trade. The International Economic Situation
(Cooper) 378
Treaty Information. Current Treaty Actions 387
U.S.S.R. President Carter's News Conference of
March 24 (excerpts ) 357
Vietnam
President Carter's News Conference of March 24
(excerpts) 357
Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and Laos
To Seek Information on Missing Americans (Car-
lei-, Mansfield, Woodcock, Commission report) . 363
Yugoslavia. United States and Yugoslavia Hold
( 'onsultations on CSCE 374
Zaire. President Carter's News Conference of
March 24 (excerpts ) 357
Name Index
, 1 'resident 357, 363
( 'anas, Jorge 362
( neper, Richard N 378
Kourouma, Daouda 362
Kunene, Musa Simon 362
Mansfield, Mike 363
Mbogua, John Peter 362
Mink, Patsy T 385
Schober, Karl Herbert 362
Woodcock. Leonard 363
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1974 • April 25, 1977
SECRETARY VANCE VISITS MOSCOW AND WESTERN EUROPE
News Conference* and Text of Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communique 389
PRESIDENT CARTER DISCUSSES STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION PROPOSALS
Remarks to the Press and Questions and Answers 409
DR. B-RZEZINSKTS NEWS CONFERENCE OF APRIL 1 4U
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
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Note: Contents of this publication are nut
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re-
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1974
April 25, 1977
The Department of State BILLET1S,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested ayencies of the yovernment
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreiyn relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreiyn Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreiyn policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerniny treaties and inter-
national ayreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Secretary Vance Visits Moscow and Western Europe
Secretary Venice visited Moscow March
26-31. En route to Moscow, he met with the
North Atlantic Council at Brussels on
March 26. Following his visit to Moscow, he
met with Federal German, British, and
French officials at Bonn, London, and
Paris March 31 -April 2.
Following are transcripts of news confer-
ences held by Secretary Vance at Moscow
March 27-30, the text of a joint
communique of the Government of the
United States and the Government of the
Soviet Union issued on March 30, a news
conference held by Secretary Vance on April
1 aboard the aircraft en route from London
to Paris, and remarks by Secretary Vance
and President Carter upon the Secretary's
arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on April
2. 1
NEWS CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, MARCH 27
Press release 132 dated March 28
Secretary Vance: We have been working
today on fine-tuning our preparations for
our discussions which start tomorrow.
Really that is about all new that has hap-
pened since we arrived here last night.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Pravda has an editorial
today in which it says that the finalized ion
of Vladivostok is not our fault — not ours,
the Russians' fault — and that the United
States has let this drag on for an unpardon-
ably long time. Would you comment on
that, sir?
Secretary Vance: Well, whatever may
have been the circumstances in the past that
led to the fact that we do not yet have a
SALT Two agreement, I consider that
something of the past, and I am looking
forward to the future and I hope that we can
begin to make it move again and get a SALT
Two agreement and get it promptly.
Q. Could I follow up, sir? The editorial as
well indicts the Carter Administration as
well as the Ford Administration, saying
there had been no deeds by the Democratic
Administration to demonstrate its readiness
to move forward.
Secretary Vance: I think that we have
been working diligently to get ourselves
prepared for these talks. It has taken us not
an unreasonable amount of time to get ready
for the talks. We have only been in office
some two months, and we are now here and
prepared for serious discussion.
Q. Would you — there has been a good deal
of discussion, of confusion, over your
statement made on the plane that the essen-
tials of your comprehensive package about
[inaudible]. 2 Could you clarify what you
meant by that? I think you said that mi-
nor details are negotiable, but not the
essentials.
Secretary Vance: Of course in any negoti-
ations obviously you listen to whatever the
other side has to say. We think that the
proposals which we are making are sound
proposals; and I hope and believe that they
will be the basis for an agreement, that they
should serve as the framework for the
negotiations which will have to take place to
lead to the final agreement.
1 Other press releases relating to Secretary Vance's
trip are Nos 128-131 dated Mar. 28; 141 dated Mar.
30; 146, 147,*153, and 154 dated Mar. 31; 155 and 160
dated Apr. 1; and 163 and 164 dated Apr. 4.
2 For Secretary Vance's news conference held aboard
the aircraft on Mar. 26, see press release 130 dated
Mar. 28.
April 25, 1977
389
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the ques-
tion of human rights to come up either from
the other side or would you bring it up
yourself?
Secretary Vance: I think that it may come
up; if it does come up, of course we will be
prepared to discuss it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you and the Carter
Administration have frequently talked about
deep cuts in the comprehensive package. I
would like to ask you how deep is deep?
Secretary Vance: I said yesterday I am
not going to get into numbers. That is a
thing which should be taken care of in the
face-to-face discussions with the Soviets,
and therefore I am going to stay away from
numbers.
Q. Is 2,000 in the ballpark? [Laughter.]
Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday you talked
about what you might expect in the way of
atmospherics. Now that you have arrived
and you spent a little bit of time last night
with Foreign Minister Gromyko, could you
expand a little bit and tell us a little bit
about, perhaps characterize, your reception
and give us a little idea about what the
Foreign Minister had to say?
Secretary Vance: Sure. Let me repeat
what I said yesterday — that I hope that
the atmosphere would be cordial and
businesslike.
The reception which we received last night
was very cordial. We had a very good discus-
sion, cordial discussion, with the Foreign
Minister coming in and I am terribly happy
with the reception which we received.
Q. What is the schedule, Mr. Secretary?
Are you going to see Mr. Brezhnev in the
morning? Will you see him at every session,
or will you be meeting with Mr. Gromyko?
Secretary Vance: We will be meeting to-
morrow morning in the Kremlin. As to who
the participants will be, I think we will leave
that until tomorrow.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you going to bring
up the question of microwaves and radiation,
the problem in the Embassy?
Seo-etary Vance: That may come up as one
of the topics.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify a bit,
sir, at this stage before the talks begin to-
morrow as to why the United States believes
it is necessary at this particular stage to
make what amounts to a quantum jump in
moving forward very rapidly into substantial
reductions in the nuclear armed forces level?
Secretary Vance: We look at the objective
that both sides are trying to achieve. That
objective is to make real progress in the field
of arms control. It seems to us that the time
has come to see if we cannot make some real
progress. Obviously, progress has been made
in SALT One and in the Vladivostok agree-
ment, but we hope that we could see more
rapid progress; because it is, as I said to you
yesterday, not only in the interest of both
ourselves and the Soviet Union but the world
in general that we move these discussions
more rapidly toward really true arms control
and only by getting into deeper cuts are we
making that kind of progress.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect your first
meeting tomorrow to put forward the
American SALT proposals and to thereby
permit the Soviets a couple of days before
giving you a reply, or do you expect some
kind of a reply from the Soviets if these
proposals have already been privately
proposed?
Secretary Vance: In our discussions tomor-
row, I will put forward our proposals on
SALT; and I would be prepared to go into
detailed discussions, I and my colleagues,
should the Soviets choose to do so, should
they desire to defer till the next day,
Tuesday, or even till Wednesday, to continue
the detailed discussions or take up detailed
discussion — that is all right with me. We are
prepared to take whatever time that is re-
quired to carry out these discussions, be-
cause as I said, I do not know of anything we
are doing which is more important.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any general
sort of outline on what you are proposing to
do in the first session? •
390
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Vance: I think from reading the
newspapers you would have a pretty good
idea of the general outlines of the proposal.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think you can
expect to achieve a comprehensive agreement,
the kind you would really like, by the Oc-
tober deadline, or does that involve poten-
tially extending SALT One until you
complete the comprehensive SALT Two?
Secretary Vance: I think it is possible to
have a comprehensive one by October. It
would mean that everybody would have to
work very hard and that we would have to
bend efforts on both sides to accomplish it.
But I think it is possible.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what good do you think
it does to speak out on behalf of human
rights in the Soviet Union? What specific
good does it do?
Secretary Vance: Let me say on behalf of
the question of human rights on the whole,
that we have spoken out on the issue of
human rights across the board, not solely
with respect to the Soviet Union. We have
indicated, as the President did in his speech
at the United Nations, that this was
something that transcended individual coun-
tries or even regions. We have no intent to
single out any country, and whenever we
have spoken out it should not be interpreted
as such.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect it to
do? What good do you expect it to accom-
plish?
Secretary Vance: We hope that it will over
a period of time sensitize the international
community to the problems of human rights
and as a result of that we will see actual
tangible progress being made.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can I ask you this? In a
reply to an earlier question on human rights,
you said that you think it may come up, if it
does you will be prepared to discuss it. My
question to you, sir, is whether you plan on
your own behalf to raise the issue of human
rights.
Secretary Vance: I do not plan in my
opening statement to touch on it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will yon be talking about
southern Africa at all in the course of your
discussions?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I am sure the ques-
tion of southern Africa will come up during
the course of our discussions. I would assume
it would come up later on during the week
and not in any depth this first day, because
the central focus, I believe from the
standpoint of both sides, is going to be on the
strategic arms question.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what members of the
delegation will actually sit in on the SALT
talks? In connection with that will you do the
vast bulk of the talking on the American
side, or will some of the others —
Secretary Vance: The answer is, yes, I
will do the bulk of the talking on our side.
We will have really a small group, probably
four or five at most, including a notetaker. I
do not think more than four or five.
Q. Could you tell who they will be, sir?
Secretary Vance: I will leave that until
tomorrow.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I do not believe you have
had an opportunity to meet with General
Secretary Brezhnev before.
Secretary Vance: No, I have not.
Q. Do you know whether you will be
having private talks with him, sir?
Secretary Vance: No, I do not know at this
point whether I will or not.
Q. Will you be seeing any human rights
activists while you are here?
Secretary Vance: No, I will not.
Q. Mr. Carter laid out the agenda at his
March 2i press conference. Do you feel that
success of progress on the non-SALT parts of
the agenda depends on having progress in the
SALT talks? In other words, with no prog-
ress in SALT, can there be progress on any
other part of that agenda?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I think so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said you were not
going to raise the human rights issue. Can
you tell me if you are going to raise the issue
April 25, 1977
391
of family reunification like the Ray
McClellan cane?
Secretary Vance: I believe that the ques-
tion of family reunification could be one of
the subjects for discussion.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on that issue, in
followup, there are reports that you got a
a list of 700 names.
Secretary Vance: I am not going to com-
ment on details or anything like that.
Q. What are the subjects yon will raise in
the opening statement? Yon mentioned
SALT.
Secretary Vance: I will touch briefly on
each of the items in the agenda which we
agreed upon with the Soviets; and as you
know, that includes a number of items — the
strategic arms items, the items dealing with
other arms limitations, matters of trade, and
a number of international issues, and in addi-
tion to that, some bilateral questions.
Q. On the subject of trade, do you see any
movement or desire within the Congress to
rescind the Jackson-Van ik amendment in
favor of more trade with the Soviet Union
and better relations?
Secretary Vance: I think there are mixed
views in Congress on this at this point in
time. And we will just have to wait and see
what happens.
Q. On the whole, wouldn't you agree that
there is not much desin in the Congress to
do anything about that?
Secretary Vance: I think that at this point
it would be difficult to get it reversed in
Congress.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on subjects aside from
SALT, would you bring forth any specific
proposals, say on the Middle East, southern
Africa, a)id the subject of arms trade?
Secretary Vance: I think on the Middle
East I would expect we would just merely
have a general review of the situation that
exists in the Middle East and a discussion of
what has been said by the various leaders on
both sides up to this point in time. I am of
course prepared to discuss any matters relat-
ing to it that may come up, but I would ex-
pect it to be sort of a general overview as far
as that is concerned.
On southern Africa, I think we might very
well discuss specific items having to do
particularly with the questions of Rhodesia
and Namibia.
Q. Mr. Secretary , are there any
possibilities of a summit Carter-Brezhnev
meeting before formal agreement on a new
SALT agreement , or is such a summit
specifically tied to an agreement and would
come after agreement?
Secretary Vance: I do not think it is
necessarily tied to that, but there has been
no discussion yet between the parties with
respect to any specific date when such a
meeting would be held.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what have you thought
of the Izvestia article of several weeks ago
which accused several Jewish activists of
being spies for CIA men working under Em-
bassy cover?
Secretary Vance: I did not read the article
itself. I am familiar with the article. I am not
familiar with the specific facts relating to the
particular cases where the allegations were
made.
Q. Mr. Secretary, were you and the
Administration encouraged by Secretary
Brezhnev's comments on the Soviet plan for a
Middle East peace settlement?
Secretary Vance: I would like to explore
that in further depth before giving you an
answer on that. There are certain parts of it
that appear on further reading to have some-
thing new in it, and I would like to specif-
ically ask whether there was indeed
something new intended.
Q. What parts struck you as new? You
said there were some parts that appeared to
be new. Which were those?
Secretary Vance: The parts dealing with
the question of boundaries appear to be new.
Q. I am sorry, sir. May I go back to this?
The Izvestia article accused Melvyn
Levitsky, who is in the State Department
right now, of specifically being a spy, one of
your State Department officials, and im-
plied —
392
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Vance: As far as that is con-
cerned, that is certainly not true.
Q. Certainly not true?
Secretary Vance: Yes, certainly not true.
Q. Mr. Secretary, a specific technical
point. The cruise missile — is it now the
American feeling, is it your feeling, the test-
ing and development of the cruise missile is
verifiable?
Secretary Vance: The verification is ex-
tremely difficult in the whole cruise missile
field. That's one of the real problems of the
cruise missile. At this point there are no
methods of verification which provide the
kind of verification I think both of us, both
sides, would like to have. That has been one
of the problems of the cruise missile all
along. You can have some verification, but it
is extremely difficult.
Q. Are those remarks subject to deploy-
ment or development, or both?
Secretary Vance: Both.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviets have said
that they think the human rights question
will complicate these negotiations. Do you
think the human rights question will compli-
cate them?
Secretary Vance: I hope they would not
complicate them. The subject of SALT is so
important that I think that it can and should
stand on its own two feet, and I hope very
much that will be the case.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your ride yesterday
back from the airport to town with Mr.
Gromyko, was it mostly small talk, or did
you discuss [laughter] anything of a more
substantive nature?
Secretary Vance: Mostly small talk except
we discussed how we were going to proceed
in terms of an agenda, et cetera, for the com-
ing week and that we were going to go to the
ballet tonight.
Q. And you felt that Mr. Gromyko
radiated a certain warmth? [Laughter.]
Secretary Vance: He did.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have any Soviet dissi-
dents or Jewish activists asked for a meeting
with you?
Secretary Vance: I believe some did, and
my reply was that I was going to devote all
of my time during the period that I was here
to working on the matters which I came to
discuss. That will keep me fully busy.
Q. Mr. Secretary, hare you talked with
President Carter since you have beoi here?
Secretary Vance: No.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviets are very
disturbed about the gross imbalance in trade
with the United States. Have you got any
comfort that you can offer them while you
are here to redress their [inaudible]?
Secretary Vance: No immediate comfort,
but the subject of trade will be a subject
which will be on the agenda.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if the subject of human
rights does come up, will you or have you
already expressed to the Soviets that the Ad-
ministration may run into some difficulties
with Congress in ratifying the SALT
agreement should the Soviets' crackdown on
dissidents continue?
Secretary Vance: I have not yet expressed
that view to the Soviet Union in answer to
your specific question. When and if the ques-
tion comes up tomorrow, I will respond at
that time.
Q. Is there an Administration fear that
that may happen?
Secretary Vance: I would prefer not to
comment on that at this point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of
speculation in American magazines and
newspapers on the ambassadorship to this
country. Have you been able to tell Mr.
[Malcolm] Toon, or in front of us —
Secretary Vance: I have not discussed
publicly the question of ambassadorships
with anybody. I am not going to do that.
When and until we, as a government, make
the statements with respect to that issue, I
am going to adhere to that. That properly
comes from the President rather than from
me, and when that time comes, we will let
the public know.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the
Soviets will make specific proposals on
April 25, 1977
393
SALT, or will they simply respond to
yours?
Secretary Vance: No, I think they will
undoubtedly want to know what we have to
suggest, and I would not rule out — indeed, I
would expect — that they would probably
have some proposals to make.
Q. I would like to revert to the review
piece in Pravda again, in which they said
more than two mouths later concrete steps
were still not visible on the part of the
Administration on arms reduction. Do you
think this overlooks some of the statements
and proposals that the President put
forward, and if so, why do you think that
Pravda might have taken this position?
Secretary Vance: I do not know why any
particular words were chosen by Pravda. I
think that President Carter has made in
general terms some concrete and very
helpful proposals, and I think that when we
flesh those out they will be seen to be very
constructive proposals, and I hope that the
Soviets will feel so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if you were asked why
the Carter Administration decided to double
the funds for Radio Free Europe, what will
you be answering?
Secretary Vance: Well, even after we
have doubled the funds, we will be spending
less in this area than many other countries,
I believe including the Soviet Union, for
that purpose.
A couple of more questions and then we
will —
Q. But they are spending more to broad-
cast to America than we are spending to
broadcast to them?
Secretary Vance: No, I was talking in the
general field of —
Q. Of radio propaganda?
Secretary Vance: Yes, that is right. In-
formation, I would call it. [Laughter.]
One more question.
Q. Have you talked to Mr. Gromyko on
the trip in, did you mention the possibility
of extending your talks for an additional
day, and if so, what was his reply?
Secretary Vance: I said I would be happy
to stay here as long as was necessary in
order to make progress and if we were mak-
ing progress that I would be delighted to
stay on for another day or two, three,
whatever is required.
Q. And his response?
Secretary Vance: As to the exact words, I
think he ought to make it. I was encouraged
by his response.
Thanks very much.
[Following the news conference, the Secretary an-
swered additional questions in the Embassy courtyard.]
Q. [Inaudible.]
Secretary Vance: I want to put the past
behind and talk about the future. I hope
very much that we will be able to start some
real progress now that we are here. I know
that the editorial referred to the fact that
the Carter Administration itself had al-
legedly been slovenly. I cannot believe we
have. This is quite a serious subject. It has
taken us a period of time within the gov-
ernment to review our position. We have
done so. I think we are coming up with some
very constructive and concrete proposals,
and I really do not believe that we have
been unduly long in getting ready for these
talks.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the two proposals that you
will make — one a comprehensive settlement
and the other one a deferral — seem both to
have been rejected, in one form or another
at least, by the Soviets. What reason do you
have to believe that they will find them con-
structive at this time?
Secretary Vance: Well, I hope that when
we have a chance to sit down and discuss in
detail the concrete proposals with respect to
the comprehensive package, they will see
that it really is a very constructive proposal
which deals with substance, and that as we
have a chance to discuss it in its full detail,
they may see the merit of it.
Q. What kind of an atmosphere are you
anticipating now? You had a chance to talk
briefly with Mr. Gromyko.
Secretary Vance: I have been very
394
Department of State Bulletin
pleased with the cordial atmosphere which
we have seen during our brief time here and
the very cordial welcome when we came
yesterday evening, and Gromyko was very
kind and cordial on our ride in from the air-
port. We are going to go to the ballet to-
gether this evening, and I hope and expect
that we will continue to be cordial and
businesslike.
NEWS CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, MARCH 28
Press release 136 dated March 29
Secretary Vance: We've had two meetings
today. The first meeting was about two and
a half hours in length, I believe. That was a
meeting attended by General Secretary
Brezhnev and the Foreign Minister. This
afternoon the General Secretary did not at-
tend; it was attended by the Foreign Secre-
tary, the Deputy Minister.
This morning we discussed the assessment
of both sides with respect to U.S. -Soviet re-
lations in the future. This was an exchange
of views and then a dialogue back and forth
with respect to various items which have
been raised in what amounted to sort of the
opening statements on the part of the Gen-
eral Secretary and myself. This afternoon
we devoted the whole afternoon to SALT.
During the course of our discussions I put
forward the two proposals which you are all
familiar with. The Soviets, on their side,
made certain suggestions. We discussed the
various matters at considerable length.
I don't think it's appropriate to go into the
details of our discussion. There will come a
time later on when we will be able to talk to
you more about the details of the plans and
the discussion; but I just don't think it is
appropriate at this juncture to get into any
of that kind of detail, because we are going
to be resuming again tomorrow morning at
11:00 to continue our discussions.
Q. Can you characterize in general at all
the Soviet response to the comprehensive
proposal?
Secretary Vance: I think it would be
inappropriate to do so. Let me just say that
the general atmosphere was businesslike. It
was not rejected out of hand.
Q. Without going into details, sir, could
you tell us whether the Soviets offered a
proposal?
Secretary Vance: Well, they did offer a
proposal. It is a proposal that we are famil-
iar with. In essence they have suggested
this proposal before. There were some vari-
ations on it, but I don't want to go into details.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Brezhnev raise
the question of human rights this morning?
Secretary Vance: He did.
Q. hi what way?
Secretary Vance: He made a statement
with respect to the question of human
rights. I responded to that, and again I
really don't think it's appropriate to go into
detail as to what was said.
Q. Was his statement what you expected,
or was it stronger than you expected? Did it
take you off guard?
Secretary Vance: It did not take me off
guard.
Q. If we could turn to the public record
for the moment: We were told that Foreign
Minister Gromyko in his toast [at a lunch-
eon on Mar. 28], in the part about
Palestinian representation at Geneva, said,
"Can't we decide on participation at the con-
ference itself?" which would seem to imply
that the Soviets were ready to attend Geneva
without having as a prerequisite Palestinian
representation. Is that your understanding
of what he said? If so, do you feel that
breaks with —
Secretary Vance: He said something along
those lines. What he meant by that I am not
sure. We will be discussing the Middle East
question later on during our talks, and
during that portion of the talks I do intend
to find out exactly what he did mean to say.
Q. You don't want to talk about your
response on the human rights issue; yet the
Soviet press agency made public in some de-
tail allegedly what Brezhnev said to you. I
think it's only fair for our readers that we
have some idea of your response to him.
April 25, 1977
395
Secretary Vance: I haven't seen what they
said. I'll read what they said, and then I'll
comment tomorrow.
Q. Would you like us to read you what
they said right now? The Soviets come on
quite strong, Mr. Secretary.
Secretai-y Vance: What did they say?
Q. I've got it right here, if you'll wait just
a moment. The key part went like this:
TASS began by saying that Brezhnev made
his statement, a)id then it went on to say:
"At the sa))ie time an appropriate appraisal
was given of those moments in U.S. policy
which do not square with the principle of
equality, non-interference in the internal af-
fairs of each other, and mutual benefit,
without the observance of which the con-
structive development of relations between
tin two countries is impossible."
Secretary Vance: Let me simply say this:
that I made reference to the fact that our
human rights position springs out of
fundamental values which we hold; that we
are different societies, we have different
values; that we do not intend to single out
the Soviet Union in what we say about
human rights; that our concerns are univer-
sal in nature; and that we will continue to do
what we believe is appropriate in the overall
question of human rights. That, in essence,
is what I said.
Q. Do you feel that you cleared the air or
that you are going to have more discussion
about human rights?
Seo'etary Vance: No, I think the air is
pretty clear now.
Q. Mr. Vance, is it your impression that
as a result of this exchange that the subject
is over with or is it going to play a part?
Secretary Vance: No, I would expect it is
over with for these discussions.
Q. Mr. Vance, on SALT, when you said
the Soviets made a position we're all
familiar with —
Secretary Vance: What I said was we all
are familiar with.
Q. So that there's no misunderstanding on
our part, my assumption is that they pro-
posed keeping the 2,400 limit and including
the cruise missile in it. Is that a fair as-
sumption?
Secretary Vance: Yes, it is, including the
cruise missile.
Q. Do you regard it significant, sir, that
Brezhnev did not show up this afternoon?
Secretary Vance: No, not at all.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you explain at
all — you said you laid out both proposals.
Does that mean that you mentioned first the
comprehensive proposal and then you went
immediately to raise the second proposal as
well? Could you tell us a little bit about
this?
Secretary Vance: They were both raised
side by side.
Q. Simultaneously?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. Did they ask you — without you telling
us the answer — but did they ask you what
type of, how far the deep reduction could go
approximately?
Secretary Vance: I gave it to them in
approximation.
Q. Do you hope or have any reason to be-
lieve that you might get a Soviet response
before you leave Moscow?
Seo-etary Vance: Yes. They indicated
they would give us a response.
Q. Will you discuss that tomorrow
morning? Will this go on with SALT or
move to other issues?
Secretary Vance: I believe we'll start with
SALT tomorrow.
Q. Then your general appraisal is that it
is an optimistic —
Secretary Vance: I am not going to
characterize it as optimistic or pessimistic. I
will say that we had a businesslike
discussion which will continue tomorrow.
Q. Are they making progress on SALT
dependent upon any actio?) by us on human
rights?
Secretary Vance: No.
Q. Sir, Mr. Secretary, do you see any
396
Department of State Bulletin
progress as a result of one day's talk toward
this framework which you've been talking
about?
Secretary Vance: Well, I think the fact
that we're talking about it and serious ques-
tions are being asked back and forth on it is
some progress. But I don't want to blow it
up as any great thing.
Q . Do you think, sir, that yon' 1 1 be
lea ring Thursday morning on schedule?
Secretary Vance: As I've said all along, if
we're making progress and there's a purpose
in continuing on through Thursday, I'm pre-
pared to stay through Thursday, Friday, or
however long it takes.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East and
Gromyko's comments on that — did you feel
that the Soviet position has become more
flexible?
Secretary Vance: I couldn't really tell;
there wasn't that much of it in the toast to
draw any conclusions. We are going to have
to have a full discussion to really get an idea
of what's involved.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on SALT, will the pri-
mary issue be trying to unravel with the in-
hibitions that are on you — / assume from
what you said we can safely assume that the
Soviet position will be what must be very
much as what it was at the end of January
of 1976 and February 1976.
Secretary Vance: That's a fair assumption.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in Mr. Gromyko's toast
he repeated their standard support of the
Vladivostok agreement. Then he said, as we
got it, "A constructive approach from the
U.S. side will always be met with under-
standing from the U.S.S.R." Did you regard
that as an encouraging sign that they would
be ready to consider something more than
just a simple ratification of the Vladivostok
agreement?
Secretary Vance: I listened to that part
with great interest. But I really don't know
how to characterize it.
Q. Well, was there anything in the talks
that will give you the information to help
you characterize it?
Secretary Vance: No. It is too early in the
talks to draw any conclusions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us whether
tin Soviet representatives raised the basic
question which we have heard — that they ob-
ject to a new administration coming in with
a fundamentally different approach?
Secretary Vance: Yes, that question was
raised as one of the items. We discussed at
some length as to whether or not the — well,
I'm getting into too much detail.
Q. Did Mr. Grornyko do most of the
talking on the Soviet side i)i the afternoon?
Secretary Vance: Yes, he did.
NEWS CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, MARCH 29
Press release 1 'Ml dated March :lll
Secretary Vance: Let me give you a brief
fill-in on what we covered today. We had two
meetings; one in the morning, and we met
again this afternoon starting at 4:30 and just
finished a few moments ago. In the morning
we covered two areas — mutual balanced force
reductions discussions, which have been
going on in Vienna, and the Middle East. In
the afternoon session, we covered a number
of items — the comprehensive test ban, de-
militarization of the Indian Ocean, nonprolif-
eration, conventional arms transfers, the
proposal of the Soviets with respect to
weapons of mass destruction — and touched
just very, very briefly at the end on southern
Africa.
As you can see, it was a full day with many
subjects before us for discussion. We agreed
in a number of these areas to set up follow-on
working groups to continue the discussions
that we started today. I won't try and give
you a list of the various issues today, but be-
fore the end of the mission I will indicate
which are the areas in which we are going to
have the follow-on working groups.
Q. Mr. Secretary, were you disappointed
by the fact that SALT did not become the
centerpiece of today's discussion?
Secretary Vance: No, I was not. Indeed, I
was glad that it didn't come up today,
because it indicates to me that serious con-
April 25, 1977
397
sideration is being given to the question of
SALT and to the proposals which have been
tabled. I am not trying to be optimistic about
that, but I do think it indicates that serious
consideration is being given to it.
Q. Is there an indication that the Politburo
perhaps is meeting on the SALT proposal?
Secretary Vance: I don't know.
Q. On the Middle East, Mr. Secretary, did
yon get the feeling, in general, that the
Soviets were being helpful or constructive in
any way, and particularly did you get any
enlightenment on Mr. Gromyko's remark in
his toast yesterday?
Secretary Vance: I had the feeling that
they were being constructive, that they
wished to play a constructive and active role
as Cochairman [of the Middle East Peace
Conference at Geneva]. We welcome that
fact. We think we both have a responsibility
in this area to try and see that progress is
made toward a Middle East settlement, and
therefore I welcome that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does the statement yes-
terday mean what it seems to mean?
Secretary Vance: Which one are you
talking about?
Q. On the Middle East — specifically, that
the Soviet position currently is that the
question of PLO [Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization] participation can await discus-
sion inside the conference.
Secretary Vance: You had better let them
speak to that. I do not want to — we both
agreed that we will not comment on what the
other side said and let them speak for them-
selves.
Q. Let me just ask you generally on that
point — are you somewhat more interested in
the proposa I than without examining it fur-
ther?
Secretary Vance: Well, all I want to say on
the Middle East today is that I found the dis-
cussion useful. We reviewed all of the issues,
both procedural and substantive. I think I
have a fuller and more complete understand-
ing now of the Soviet position, and I will let
it go at that today.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how close do you think
you are to a compreheyisive test ban?
Secretary Vance: We had a good discussion
on that today. There are some obvious issues
in that area that have to be further explored,
but I thought that the talks in that area were
useful and constructive, as I did particularly
in the area of nonproliferation.
Q. Did anyone in the Soviet delegation in-
dicate to you that they are now giving serious
study to the proposal on SALT?
Secretary Vance: I did not ask about it.
Q. There are no other problems here?
Secretary Vance: No other problems here.
Q. Was there any allusion at all today to
human rights?
Secretary Vance: No allusion to human
rights today.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past the Russians
have not ever seriously considered or
responded to us when we have suggested a
conventional arms reduction to areas such as
the Middle East. Was that a subject of
discussion today? Did you get the feeling
that they would consider such an approach?
Secretary Vance: Yes, it was a subject of
discussion again today. As I indicated to you
earlier, we have in the past discussed the
question of conventional arms transfers in
the Middle East. And as I have indicated
previously, the problem there remains the
unresolved political issue and my judgment is
that it is going to be difficult to achieve any
substantial reduction in arms transfers there
until the political differences among the
parties are resolved.
Q. On the issue of southern Africa, did you
discuss President Podgorny's recent
statements in southern Africa at all?
Secretary Vance: No, we just touched
very, very briefly on it, and we really did not
spend much time on it.
Q. [Inaudible] conventional arms trans-
fers, did you discuss it in reference to Africa
as well?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. Could you expand on that at all?
398
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Vance: I really do not want to
expand on it at this point other than to say
that we touched both Middle East, Africa
and the general problems of Africa.
Q. On the Vienna talks, Mr. Secretary, is
there any hope that you see now that the ice
will be thawed?
Secretary Vance: Well, I think we both
agreed that we felt it was important to try to
get that out of the doldrums. It is something
that, in my judgment, should be done. It
would be very much in the interests of all of
us to make that kind of movement. I do not
want to make any predictions, however, on
the basis of our discussions today that
something is about to happen.
Q. Mr. Secretary, we are getting down now
to the last two sessions. Could you give us
some idea of your sense of when you expect
the Soviets to respond, particularly to the
American priority of a comprehensive
package?
Secretary Vance: I cannot give you a pre-
cise answer on that, Mr. Kalb [Bernard Kalb,
CBS News]. I wish I could. My best guess is
that the subject will come up tomorrow.
Q. Mr. Vance, the United Press was
informed today by the Foreign Ministry that
the Foreign Ministry will not grant a visa
to one of our prospective Moscow
correspondents. Two questions: Do you see
any political significance in that, and sec-
ondly, do you recall the Helsinki agreement
clearly enough to be able to help me find out
whether they are obliged under that agree-
ment to give an answer for this rejection?
They gave no explanation.
Secretary Vance: The answer is I do not
recall those provisions of the Helsinki
agreement sufficiently to give you an answer,
and secondly, I am not familiar with the inci-
dent to which you refer.
Q. How would you describe the atmos-
phere, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Vance: Again, it was
businesslike.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any clear
ideas at this point as to whether you might
stay over another day or two?
Secretary Vance: Let me say I am still
prepared to stay over if this will be useful,
and I would think I would probably know by
the end of the meeting tomorrow morning.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how does it feel for a full
day to go by without you getting any indica-
tion from the Russians on the central ques-
tion to which you have come to Moscow?
Secretary Vance: As I indicated, I think
that that is not only expectable but in a way
I am pleased by that, because it leads me to
guess, at least, that serious consideration is
being given to the proposals which we have
put forward. As I say, I do not want to be
optimistic about it, but at least I think that
one can draw the kind of conclusions that I
did from that.
Q. There were no followup questions by the
Russians on the proposal today?
Secretary Vance: No. I think the proposal
is really quite clear. Maybe there will be
some questions tomorrow.
Q. Can you tell us the numbers tonight,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Vance: [Laughs.] Not tonight.
[Laughter.]
Q. Do you expect to meet with Mr.
Brezhnev tomorrow? Do you expect that he
will be there? Have you been given an
indication?
Secretary Vance: I have not been given an
indication.
Q. Sir, do you expect to see him again be-
fore you leave — Mr. Brezhnev?
Secretary Vance: I do not know for sure,
but I think probably I will.
Q. In assessing these two days, Mr. Secre-
tary, would you say you are making more
progress than you expected, less, or about
what you expected?
Secretary Vance: I would answer by saying
I found the discussions today to be useful and
helpful.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are these working groups
you talk about — are these working groups
that would be set up for the future or just
to7tiorrow?
April 25, 1977
399
Secretary Vance: For the future.
Q. Where would they meet? Here or Wash-
ington or —
Set-return Vance: Either place. Could meet
in Geneva. That depends on what subject
they deal with.
Q. Is this our idea, the working groups?
Secreta>-i) Vance: We both agreed to it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, couldn't you be more
precise on what areas they are going to work
on and how many they are, because it makes
it very difficult to write about?
Secretary Vance: I realize that. Let me
just say at this point there will be several. I
do not want to announce, unilaterally
announce, these. We will do it bilaterally
when we do it.
NEWS CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, MARCH 30
I'i-i ■ release 1-12 dated March SO
Secretary Vance: Good evening. Let me
fill you in on our meeting of this afternoon.
We met this afternoon with General
Secretary Brezhnev and Foreign Minister
Gromyko and other officials. At that meet-
ing the Soviets told us that they had
examined our two proposals and did not find
either acceptable. They proposed nothing
new on their side.
Let me give you a brief outline, as I prom-
ised I would when we reached this point, on
the nature of the two proposals which we
put forward.
The first proposed what we had called our
deferral proposal. Under this proposal we
suggested the deferral of consideration of
the cruise missile and the "Backfire" bomber
issues and that we resolve all other
remaining issues under the Vladivostok ac-
cord and sign a new treaty. The proposal is
only consistent with the agreement reached
at Vladivostok, as you know, and there was
no agreement reached at Vladivostok with
respect to either cruise missiles or the
Backfire bomber and therefore they have
been and are open issues. So, in essence,
our proposal was: Let's sign up what has
been agreed at Vladivostok and put aside
the cruise missile and get on with SALT
Three.
As an alternative, and what we have re-
ferred to as the comprehensive proposal, the
one that we preferred and urged that they
give serious consideration to, was a proposal
which would have really made substantive
progress toward true arms control. It had in
it four elements — or has in it four elements.
Let me run through them briefly with you.
The first deals with aggregates. We
proposed that there be a substantial reduc-
tion in the overall aggregate of strategic de-
livery vehicles.
Second, we proposed that there be a re-
duction in the number of what are called
modern large ballistic missile launchers.
Third, we proposed that there be a reduc-
tion in the MIRV launcher aggregate.
And fourth, we proposed that there be a
limit on the launchers of ICBM's equipped
with MIRV's. In other words, we proposed
a sublimit in that area.
Going on to ICBM restrictions, we pro-
posed that there continue to be a ban on
construction of new ICBM launchers. We
proposed in addition a ban on modification of
existing ICBM's. In addition to that, we
proposed a limit on the number of flight
tests for existing ICBM's. We proposed in
addition a ban on the development, the test-
ing, and deployment of new ICBM's. In
addition to that, we proposed a ban on the
development, testing, and deployment of
mobile ICBM launchers.
With respect to the cruise missiles, we
proposed a ban on the development, testing,
and deployment of all cruise missiles,
whether nuclear armed or conventionally
armed, of intercontinental range. In other
words, we set a limit. I'm not going to give
you that precise number, but there was a
specific number over which they would be
banned, and that limit was the limit between
intercontinental and nonintercontinental.
Finally, with respect to the Backfire
bomber, we indicated that we want them to
provide us with a list of measures to assure
that the Backfire bomber would not be used
as a strategic bomber.
That, in essence, is the comprehensive
package which we put forward.
400
Department of State Bulletin
We agreed to continue discussions in the
future. Foreign Minister Gromyko and I will
be meeting in May to discuss the Middle
East and other items, including strategic
arms limitation.
In addition to that, we have agreed to set
up a number of working groups in various
areas to follow up on the discussions which
we have had here in Moscow.
Let me give you a list of the areas in
which we will have these follow-on working
groups. They include the area of comprehen-
sive test bans; the area of chemical weapons;
the area of prior notification of missile test-
firing; the area of antisatellite weapons; the
area of civil defense; the area of possible
military limitations in the Indian Ocean; the
area of radiological weapons; the area of
conventional weapons; and we agreed to set
up a regular schedule of meetings to deal
with the whole question of proliferation.
That is the summary of where we are at
this point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat effect do you think
the outcome of these negotiations will have
on U.S. -Soviet relations?
Secretary Vance: I think we made prog-
ress in these negotiations and they were
useful. I think that U.S. -Soviet relations
will continue to be good. I hope in the future
we can strengthen those relations.
Needless to say, I am disappointed that
we have failed to make progress in what I
consider to be the most essential of all these
areas, namely, the area of strategic nuclear
arms. But I think that our relationships will
continue. We will certainly do everything
we can to continue to try and strengthen
relations.
Q. It must be very evident, sir, that
without the specifics of the proposal that the
United States presented, it will be impos-
sible for any rational person to draw a
conclusion as to whether the U.S. proposal
was plausible or not as a proposal made be-
tween adversary nations. Is there nothing
that you can do, sir, to give us the specifics
which would tell the American public
whether the proposal made by the United
States was a plausible proposal?
Secretary Vance: I cannot give you, at
this point, any specific numbers. I think that
you have enough in terms of the outline of
the proposal to answer the question which
we put, Mr. Marder [Murrey Marder,
Washington Post].
Q. I would defer with due respect, sir.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Soviet side give
you any reason to hope that there may be
some further negotiation on your proposal
and on their proposal so that you might find
a bridge between the two?
Secretary Vance: Yes. We agreed that we
would continue discussions. That is all.
Q. To what extent do you think the issue
of human rights might have played a role in
the failure of these discussions?
Secretary Vance: Well, human rights did
not come up after the first day. We never
discussed it again.
Q. You don't think it in any way affected
their thinking on your proposals?
Secretary Vance: I do not believe it did.
No, I think it stood on its own feet, but you
will have to ask them.
Q. I'm not clear what happens next. Is
one side supposed to come up with a new
proposal, or where do we go from here?
Specifically?
Secretary Vance: Where we go from here
is that I am hoping that they would consider
the proposals which we have made. We
think that they provide a reasonable basis
for further discussions.
We will be meeting again. I hope by that
time there will be something to put on the
table which will permit us to make progress.
Q. Did they give you some indication that
they think this is a basis, that your propos-
als are a basis, for further negotiations?
Secretary Vance: All they gave us today
was that they said they did not find it ac-
ceptable.
Q. Did they expand on that, sir, at all, or
just say they did not find it acceptable?
Secretary Vance: They said they did not
find it acceptable because that did not coin-
April 25, 1977
401
cide with their view of what they thought
was an equitable deal.
Q. Is it still possible, sir, to think to re-
place SALT One by October, when it
expires ?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I think it is still
possible. I would come back to the point
that the deferral proposal is a proposal
which is based upon what was agreed to at
Vladivostok and simply puts aside the very
difficult issues of Backfire and the cruise
missile and one could sign that and move
immediately on to the more complex prob-
lems which are contained in the
comprehensive proposal in SALT Two.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did they then give you
an indication that the deferral proposal
might be a better basis for further talks than
the comprehensive proposal? Did they make
a distinction between the two rejected
proposals?
Secretary Vance: They did not make a dis-
tinction between the two.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will you be issuing a
communique on other areas, such as the
Middle East, southern Africa —
Secretary Vance: We probably will be is-
suing a communique, yes.
Q. Are your meetings continuing tonight
to start the communique?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. Where will the meetings be between you
and Mr. Gromyko?
Secretary Vance: We have not finally
agreed. It will be somewhere in Europe.
Q. Could you amplify, sir, on the meet-
ings that are continuing tonight?
Secretary Vance: The only meeting is on
the draft of the communique.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will you leave Moscow
without having achieved that general
framework ?
Secretary Vance: That is correct. We will
leave without having achieved that general
framework. I am very disappointed that we
were unable to do so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you told us two days
ago that the Soviets had put on the table a
slightly modified version of the January
1976 proposal. Is that still on the table —
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. We have two American proposals and a
Soviet proposal?
Secretary Vance: That is right.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that
agreement on some strategic arms proposals
now still remains a prerequisite, or a condi-
tion, for a summit meeting between Presi-
dent Carter and Leonid Brezhnev?
Secretary Vance: I do not want to express
an opinion on that now. I think that I should
leave that for the future.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that to-
day's failure will result in the acceleration
of the arms race on the part of both
countries?
Secretary Vance: I would certainly hope
not. I think that it would be a tragedy if
there would be an acceleration of the arms
race. This would be in the interest of
neither side, nor in the interest of peace.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did we express an opin-
ion as to their proposal on the table, and if
not, what is the state of play? Is it for us to
come up with a new proposal, or for them, to
amend their proposal, or —
Secretary Vance: Yes, we have discussed
the proposal.
Q. That was discussed today?
Secretary Vance: Not today, but we have
had a discussion.
Q. Mr. Vance, you were saying that our
relations were nevertheless good, despite
your inability to reach an agreement on
SALT. I must say it seems to strain cred-
ibility, that statement. It would seem to, I
think, most of us that the main topic here
was a collapse in the SALT negotiations.
There seems to be no possible compromise
on this, and I would think that relations
were worse than any time in recent years.
Where is the relationship good, given the
402
Department of State Bulletin
fact on the central question that there is ab-
solutely no agreement! 1
Secretary Vance: Well, I think, Mr.
Gwertzman [Bernard Gwertzman, New York
Times], that we have made, as I indicated
earlier, progress in a number of other areas
that I outlined to you. The nature of the
talks was at no time acrimonious or unbusi-
nesslike. I think that the task remains
before us to try and find a way to reach
agreement in the strategic area, and we
both should bend our efforts to that end.
Q. What progress do you mean? Are yon
referring to the working groups or the sub-
ject area of the Middle East —
Secretary Vance: Yes, to these various
other matters which we discussed.
Q. Can you give me specifics on that? Did
you find out what Gromyko meant the other
day?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I did. He did not
mean what has been written in the papers.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what did he mean?
Secretary Vance: He did mean that he felt
that the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization] should be included in any talks.
Q. He did or did not?
Secretary Vance: He did mean that they
should be.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did you make any
progress on reunification of divided
families? And what was the answer?
Secretary Vance: They are taking it under
consideration.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have you reported to the
President already tonight on the results of
the talks?
Secretary Vance: I have sent a message to
him indicating that the proposals we put
forward have been unacceptable.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you help, sir, on
some physical things?
Secretary Vance: Yes, sure.
Q. How long did the meeting last?
Secretary Vance: You mean this
afternoon? I think about an hour.
Q. Did Mr. Brezhnev — was he present all
the time?
Secretary Vance: Yes, he was.
Q. Did he participate much in the discus-
sions?
Secretary Vance: Yes, he did. He did all
the talking.
Q. Could you tell us anything more,
physically, about —
Secretary Vance: Well, it was similar to
the other meetings which we have had. On
the Soviet side Mr. Brezhnev did the talk-
ing, and on our side I did the talking for our
group.
Q. Was there any noticeable difference in
mood between Monday's discussion by Mr.
Brezhnev and today's discussion by him?
Secretary Vance: No, I don't think there
was any major difference.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what was the central
reason — perhaps you answered it somewhere
in this discussion — that the Soviets gave you
for their rejection for both proposals that the
United States put forth?
Secretary Vance: It was their view that
the deferral proposal did not accord with
Vladivostok. It is our very clear view that it
does accord with Vladivostok because
Backfire and cruise missiles were not
included in the Vladivostok accord and they
remained unsettled issues — so that there is
a difference of view between the Soviets and
ourselves on that matter.
Q. Was there a central dispute, sir, on the
difference between the two aide memoires
out of Vladivostok, the one on ballistic mis-
siles, and the American version mentioning
ballistic missiles and the Soviet version
mentioning just missiles?
Secretary Vance: There was discussion of
the aide memoire, yes.
Q. Could you tell us, sir, what their rea-
son was for rejecting the comprehensive
package, sir?
Secretary Vance: They really should speak
on this themselves, but I will tell you that
April 25, 1977
403
their indication is that they do not feel that,
as they put it, that it is an equitable pack-
age. We believe that it is equitable and it
does attack the central questions which are
involved in seeking a real arms control
agreement.
Q. Is that proposal still on the table and
negotiable?
Secretary Vance: It is. All proposals are
still on the table.
Q. It is in your view negotiable? Or did
they reject it in the basic form as presented?
Secretary Vance: I would hope as they
reflect on it that they will find merit in it
and we will find a way to get back together
again and start talking pretty soon.
Q. Sir, with respect, is that [inaudible] the
reason yon feel we can still get an agree-
ment by October? Is there anything more
specific as to why you feel the October dead-
line is still manageable?
Secretary Vance: No, I think the reason
that I feel it is still manageable is that if the
parties get together and really put the polit-
ical will behind it, an agreement can be
achieved by October.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you get the statis-
tics that we've been asking you for for the
past three days? How deep is deep?
Secretary Vance: I really don't think I can
give this to you. I will try and give it to you
at some point later if I can, but I just can't
do it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did you formally tell
the Soviets that we also found their proposal
unacceptable? And could you tell us why we
do find their proposal unacceptable?
Secretary Vance: The reason that we have
found their proposal unacceptable is that it
does not deal properly with the cruise
missile issue.
Q. Did you discuss the possibility of ex-
tending the SALT One agreement beyond the
end of October?
Secretary Vance: We did not discuss that,
no.
Q. Any indication that they would settle
for a reduction that was less deep than the
one you proposed? A smaller reduction?
Secretary Vance: As I say, no counter-
proposals were made by them today.
Q. Mr. Secretary, was it suggested at all
that at any time between now and the next
several months that you would return to
Moscow to continue negotiating on the
subject?
Secretary Vance: No, but as I indicated,
Mr. Gromyko and I are going to meet in
May, and one of the subjects which will
come up at that time will be the subject of
deep arms limitations.
JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. COMMUNIQUE,
MARCH 30
Press release 1-14 dated March 30
On March 28-30, 1977, General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, L.I. Brezhnev and member of the Polit-
buro of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.S.R., A. A. Gromyko, held talks with the
Secretary of State of the United States of America,
Cyrus R. Vance, who was in Moscow on an official
visit.
In the course of the talks there was a general
discussion of American-Soviet relations, as well as cer-
tain international problems of mutual interest for the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
Consideration of questions relevant to the comple-
tion of the new agreement on the limitation of
strategic offensive arms occupied the central place in
the talks. The sides have agreed to continue the con-
sideration of these issues.
An exchange of views also took place on a number of
other questions concerning the limitation of armaments
and disarmament. It was agreed that bilateral con-
tacts, including meetings of experts, would be held to
discuss these matters.
The discussion of international issues included the
Belgrade preparatory conference, and the situation in
Cyprus and southern Africa. They reaffirmed the im-
portance of the Quadripartite Agreement of September
1971. Special attention was given to the situation in
the Middle East. The sides have agreed that coopera-
tion between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as co-
chairmen of the Geneva conference is essential in
bringing about a just and lasting peace in the area. An
understanding was reached to hold, in the first half of
May, 1977 in Geneva, a meeting between the Secretary
of State of the U.S. and the Minister of Foreign Af-
404
Department of State Bulletin
fairs of the U.S.S.R. for a thorough exchange of views
on the Middle East problem, including the question of
resuming the work of the Geneva conference. Some of
the other issues discussed in the talks in Moscow will
be reviewed at that time.
The consideration of practical questions of bilateral
relations produced several specific understandings.
NEWS CONFERENCE ABOARD AIRCRAFT
EN ROUTE LONDON-PARIS, APRIL 1
Press release l(il dated April 2
Q. Do you mind if I start out by asking
you the same question we started off with
yesterday? Now that Mr. Gromyko has told
us why he thinks the package is inequitable;
namely, that it preserves the America>i lead
in some areas and requires the Russians to
cut down the area where they might
expand — how do you answer that?
Secretary Vance: I would answer it by
saying that I think that you can take a look
at the overall package; it is balanced and
fair.
Let us start off in the ICBM field. In the
ICBM field it requires both of us to reduce,
and to reduce to the same number.
Secondly, it is true that it requires the
Soviets to reduce in the area of large ballis-
tic missiles. That, however, is important
because it increases the stability that would
result as a result of consummation of the
package. If you take a look at the totals that
would result from the package you would
see the Soviet Union ending up with a sub-
stantial advantage in throw- weight
still — but a reduced advantage in throw-
weight — and it would show the United
States ending up with a slight advantage in
the warhead area. But both would have re-
duced the numbers of weapons they have
and accordingly have produced a more stable
situation.
Insofar as freezes are concerned, the
freezes would for the first time begin to get
a handle on the qualitative improvement
problem, which none of the previous agree-
ments have touched. And I think this is a
terribly important step forward.
Insofar as the cruise missile is concerned,
the United States in its proposal agreed to
limitation on the cruise missile; insofar as
"Backfire" is concerned, it made a move-
ment or concession toward the Soviet
position.
And thus I think when you take a look at
the whole package you can say it is a fair
and evenly balanced package.
Q. On the way over you said that on this
particular package — you were prepared to
discuss some minor aspects of it, and the
essentials were fundamental and basically
nonnegotiable. Is that still the case, or will
there be some kind of modified proposal to
make in Geneva?
Secretary Vance: No. I would hope that
the Soviets would study our proposals and
come back with — and if they see specific as-
pects of it, then that they would come back
with specific counterproposals, which we of
course would take under consideration. But
as I said, it seems to me to be fair and
equitable, and if there are specifics about it
which they think are not, let them put them
on the table and we will consider them.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that look-
ing back on it now, looking especially at the
trade union speech and some of the
comments by the Soviets leading up to your
meeting with Mr. Brezhnev, that perhaps the
American side may have misinterpreted the
seriousness with ivhich the Soviets held their
contention that the United. States was inter-
fering in its internal affairs and that there
was linkage between atmosphere and SALT?
Secretary Vance: I indicated to you, I be-
lieve, on the way over, that they would
make their fundamental determination on
the basis of the proposal itself, not upon the
question of their views with respect to the
human rights issues. I think Mr. Gromyko
confirmed that.
I indicated previously that I thought that
their view with respect to human rights
could affect the general atmosphere but
would not affect their ultimate decision on
the military questions involved in the pack-
age. I still think that is correct.
Q. Mr. Vance, do you think it's possible
or likely that the Russians may have been
put on the defensive by the publicity given
April 25, 1977
405
our approach before the United States ever
got to Moscow? Is it possible that in an ef-
fort to be sort of more open to the American
people the President might have, in effect,
given the wrong signal to the Russians and
they may have interpreted that as a political
gimmick or something?
Secretary Vance: No, I do not really think
so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you
think the Soviets rejected the package on
Wednesday for military reasons, and to
what extent did they reject it to test the Car-
ter Administration's resolve?
Secretary Vance: I would make just a
guess. At this point I have no idea.
Q. You have no conception —
Secretary Vance: No. It would be a total
guess. No, as I indicated to you, he said
that insofar as the comprehensive package
was concerned that they considered it
inequitable and one-sided and therefore re-
jected it. Insofar as the other package was
concerned they said that that was
unacceptable because they did not believe it
comported with Vladivostok.
I told you on Wednesday night that I did
not — we did not agree to either of those
statements by the General Secretary; that
we felt that the package was equitable and
fair and we felt the second package com-
ported fully with Vladivostok.
Q. What do you think, in general, of the
Gromyko news conference [inaudible]?
Secretary Vance: Obviously he felt it
necessary to hold a press conference to state
their views. We felt that we owed it to the
people to explain what it is that had been
rejected, and therefore I outlined in general
terms what our proposal was. And in light
of that I think he felt it necessary to come
out and express what the Soviet views
were. I do not see any harm coming from it,
no.
I think the people are entitled to know.
This is a very important issue for the
American people and for the Soviet people
and for the people of the world, and I think
they are entitled to know what kind of pack-
age it was we put on the table.
Q. Did he violate any agreement?
Secretary Vance: No, he did not.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you indicated Wednes-
day night that our approach to the cruise
missiles was to put restrictions based on the
range of the missiles. How would this work,
in view of the fact that the air-launched and
sea-launched missiles, for example, could be
carried much closer to the Soviet borders by
ship or by plane [inaudible]?
Secretary Vance: Well, I am not sure I
understand your question.
Q. You put a restriction simply on the
United States deploying a missile for a
range of say 1,500 or 1,600 miles, for
example. What would be the significance of
that when an air-launched missile can be
put on an airplane and carried by B-l, or
by 71f7 even, to within 300 miles of the
Soviet border? Or a sea-launched can be put
on a ship and taken into the Baltic and
fired?
Secretary Vance: Well, then you have to
get into the whole question of what targets
can be hit at what ranges, and it gets into a
very complicated kind of equation.
Q. It is the delivery system that matters
more — the range of that — than the range of
the missile itself, in terms of restriction.
Secretary Vance: No, no more than the
fact that an IRBM [intermediate-range bal-
listic missile], which is not included, or an
MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile],
which the Soviets have, are not considered
as intercontinental weapons. It is the same
kind of a thing.
Q. Mr. Secretary , after the first day of
talks you said that you thought the air was
cleared on the human rights issue. To get at
that point of stability were the Soviets given
some kind of assurance that there would not
in the future be a direct approach in defense
of one or another Soviet dissident by the
President of the United States?
Secretary Vance: No, no such assurance
was given.
Q. Well, why were they satisfied?
Secretary Vance: I didn't say that they
406
Department of State Bulletin
were satisfied. They just didn't bring the
subject up again.
Q. But you said that you felt that after the
first day that they would not bring it up
again.
Secretary Vance: I said that I felt that the
air was clear because they had made their
statement. I didn't say they were satisfied.
Q. But you said that they merely were
going to be satisfied by making a strong
statement —
Secretary Vance: You're using the word
"satisfied." I never used the word "satis-
fied." Next question.
Q. Mr. Secretary , Mr. Gromyko's
statement in Moscow seemed to be insisting
that a neiv SALT agreement lead to the
liquidation of some of our bases in
Europe — Britain, NATO bases. Was the
question raised with you, and are they going
to start setting some new conditions before
they start negotiating?
Secretary Vance: If they should pursue
that idea, then it would change the whole
basis of SALT. In the past, as you know,
the question of forward-based systems and
the Soviet equivalent — namely, the IRBM's
and the MRBM's — have not been included.
And therefore, if this was to be interjected
into the SALT talks, it would be a total
change from the past.
Q. Did he bring it up with you?
Secretary Vance: As I said, yes he did, he
brought it up on the last day. He made his
statement, and I indicated to him exactly
what I have told you.
Q. Let's do the numbers now today.
Gromyko said "1,800 to 2,000" and 1,100 on
MIRV's. Since it's out, perhaps we can talk
about it. The American people are entitled
to know —
Secretary Vance: What about it?
Q. Are the numbers right?
Secretary Vance: I'm not going to give
you specific numbers. They are in the
ballpark.
Q. Well, what does the 1 ,800-to-2,000
range mean?
Secretary Vance: It isn't a range. The
1,800 to 2,000 as he describes it was the
area of reduction — to a number in that area.
Q. Is that a negotiable range?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. What about the MIRV numbers?
Secretary Vance: Same thing.
Q. [Inaudible].
Secretary Vance: I said I wasn't going to
give you any specifics. It's still in the
ballpark.
Q. The President said 550. Can you
explain that to us? The President said 550
on ICBM'x.
Secretary Vance: The answer is, Yes,
there is such a number in the package.
Q. Is that MIRV's ICBM—MIRV ICBM
launchers?
Secretary Vance: That's all I'm going to
say about numbers.
Q. Mr. Secretary, am I right in believing
that the Soviets gave you no reason to be
hopeful on the reunification of divided
families?
Secretary Vance: I told you, on reunifica-
tion of divided families, that I discussed the
subject with them and they said they would
take it under consideration.
Q. That's basically like saying we are not
going to do anything about it?
Secretary Vance: No, it's not. I wouldn't
draw that conclusion. I think that really
that's all that one can say on that subject in
the interests of the divided families.
Q. Are you reticent that in speaking out
you could queer a deal?
Secretary Vance: I have said really all I
want to say on that.
Q. Is it possible that there was some kind
of blunder in the American psychological
approach to these negotiations — that is, you
presented a firm proposal hoping that the
Russians might negotiate; instead, they
fownd it so outrageous that they rejected it
out of hand and have really sort of taken
your breath away?
April 25, 1977
407
Secretary Vance: They haven't taken my
breath away.
Q. You know what I wean, was there a
blunder —
Secretary Vance: I don't think so.
Q. Do yon see any problem at all to the
Administration's credibility the way that the
situation stands at present? The
Administration is saying from all depart-
ments, so are congressional leaders, that the
Administration was not surprised that the
proposals were rejected by the Russians.
Frankly, i)i logic, that means that your
mission went with real probability that it
was going to be rejected. It sets up a whole
syndrome that the United States at least — it
sets up a premise that this mission was
doomed to failure from the start. Could you
comment on that?
Secretary Vance: I indicated that I was
disappointed that we didn't make progress
and establish a framework. That directly re-
flects my views.
Q. I recognize you said you were disap-
pointed, sir. But others are saying — the rest
of the Administration is saying something
considerably different. They are sayitig that
they were not surprised. If that holds true
that >neaus in logic that they expected this
mission to fail.
Secretary Vance: I don't think it necessar-
ily means that. What it probably means is
that anything is possible in the negotiations
and the fact that we were not successful
didn't surprise them. And that's simply
what —
Q. Will we have an opportunity with some
of the other officials — frankly, there are
basic inconsistencies in the rationalization
as it now appears for many of the American
proposals; they appear to be inconsistent.
I'm sure there must be an explanation for
them. Well, I want to give you a small
example. The United States calls for a ban
on all new nuclear weapons. The cruise
missile is a new nuclear weapon.
Secretary Vance: It was dealt with
specifically. What the proposal called for
was with respect to ICBM's, not all new
systems.
Q. But you see, we have not seen the lan-
guage of the proposal as the President has
stated —
Secretary Vance: That answers your ques-
tion.
Q. No, it doesn't, sir. The President said
o>i Wednesday, or Tuesday, that his pro-
posal calls for a ban on all new nuclear
weapons systeyns.
Secretary Vance: The accurate thing is
that it called for a ban on the deployment of
any new ICBM's. O.K.?
ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AFB, APRIL 2
Press release 162 dated April 2
Secretary Vance
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It's
very good to be home, and I want to express
my deep appreciation to the President and
Mrs. Carter for coming out to meet us.
I might just say a word about our recent
trip. Arms control is an ongoing process. It
has been going on for a long time; it will
continue for a long time in the future. It is
not for the short-winded. We did make some
progress in a number of other arms control
areas if not in the strategic area. We will
have a number of working groups which will
begin to work shortly in areas running from
comprehensive test bans, to looking at the
Indian Ocean and demilitarization, to a host
of other areas. Our next meeting with the
Soviets will be in May when I will meet with
Mr. Gromyko to resume further discussions
in the area of strategic arms.
As I say, it is good to be home. Thank you
for being here, Mr. President.
President Carter
Well, I am very glad to have the
Secretary of State and Paul Warnke back
home. We have put forward for the first
time a comprehensive proposal to limit and
then drastically reduce the atomic weaponry
of the world. We look on this as a necessary
first step. We are absolutely determined
408
Department of State Bulletin
without ceasing to work harmoniously with
the Soviet leaders to reduce dependence
upon atomic weapons. We will do everything
we can to strengthen the ties of friendship
and mutual trust with the Soviet leaders.
I want to express my thanks for the good
trip and the good negotiating position and
the success of the trip that the Secretary of
State has taken. And I want to express my
thanks to Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko
and others in the Soviet Union for the very
productive negotiations on many items that
we raised.
As the Secretary of State has said,
negotiation for drastic elimination of atomic
weapons after all these years — a quarter (if
a century — is a very difficult undertaking
but it is one that we will pursue with
determination, with persistence, and with
hope for success. Our whole Administration
will be devoting a great effort to preparing
for the continuation of the talks that will
proceed in Geneva the first part of May.
And I believe that the Soviets will
ultimately agree with us that it is to the ad-
vantage of the Soviet people, the American
people, and the rest of the world to reduce
our dependence upon this destructive
weapon.
Thank you very much.
President Carter Discusses Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals
Following is the transcript of remarks by
President Carter and questions and answers
with Jiews correspondents in the briefing room
at the White House on March 30.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 4
The President: Good afternoon.
This has been an afternoon devoted to re-
ceiving dispatches from Moscow, and I'd like
to make a report to the American people
about what has occurred.
We have proposed to the Soviet leaders in
the last two days a comprehensive package
of agreements which, if concluded, will lay a
permanent groundwork for a more peaceful
world, an alleviation of the great threat of
atomic weapons, that will retain the political
and strategic weapon capability and balance
between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
One of our proposals on this nuclear
weapons talks was very brief, and it was our
second option. It was, in effect, to ratify the
Vladivostok agreement that had already
been reached.
The difference between us and the Soviet
Union on this point is that the Soviets claim
that Secretary Kissinger and my predeces-
sors in the White House — Presidents Ford
and, earlier, Nixon — did agree to forgo the
deployment of cruise missiles. Our position
is that we have never agreed to any such
thing. But we asked the Soviet Union to
accept an agreement on all other matters
and postpone the cruise missile and the Rus-
sians' new bomber, the "Backfire" bomber,
until continuing later discussions. They re-
jected that proposal.
The other one was much more
far-reaching and has profound consequences
that are beneficial, I think, to our own na-
tion and to the rest of the world. It was to
have substantial reductions in the level of
deployment of missile launchers and the
MIRV'ed missiles below the 2,400 level and
the 1,320 level that were established under
the Vladivostok agreements — substantial
reductions; secondly, to stop the
development and deployment of any new
weapons systems. A third point was to
freeze at the present level about 550
intercontinental ballistic missiles, our Min-
uteman and their missiles known as the
SS-17, 18, and 19.
Another was to ban the deployment of all
mobile missiles, their SS-16 and others, or
ours— that is under the development stage,
the MX.
Another one is to have a strict limit on
the deployment of the Backfire bomber and a
April 25, 1977
409
strict limit on the range that would be per-
mitted on cruise missiles.
Another element of the proposal was to
limit the number of test-firings of missiles to
six firings per year of the intercontinental-
range and also of the medium-range missiles
and to ask the Soviet Union to give us some
assured mechanism by which we could dis-
tinguish between their intercontinental
mobile missile, the SS-16, and their
limited-range mobile missile, the SS-20.
The sum total of all this proposal was a
fair, balanced, substantial reduction in the
arms race which would have guaranteed, I
believe, a permanent lessening of tension
and a mutual benefit to both our countries.
The Soviets, at least at this point, have not
accepted this proposal either.
Both parties — which will be promulgated
in a joint communique tomorrow — have
agreed to continue the discussions the first
half of May in Geneva.
You might be interested in knowing that a
few other points that we proposed were to
have adequate verification, an end of con-
cealment, and the establishment of a so-
called data base by which we would tell the-
Soviet Union the level of our own arma-
ments at this point and they would tell us
their level of armaments at this point so
that we would have an assured mutually
agreed level of weapon capability.
I might cover just a few more things. In
addition to discussing the SALT agreements
in Geneva early in May, we have agreed to
discuss other matters — south Africa, the
upcoming possible Middle Eastern talks.
And we've agreed to set up eight study
groups; one to develop an agreement where
we might forgo the development of a capa-
bility of destroying satellite observation ve-
hicles so that we can have an assured way
to watch the Soviets, they can have an as-
sured way of watching us from satellites.
The second is to discuss the terms of a
possible comprehensive test ban so that we
don't test in the future any more nuclear
weapons. And we've also asked the Soviets
to join with us in a prohibition against the
testing of peaceful nuclear devices.
Another study group that has been
mutually agreed to be established is to dis-
cuss the terms by which we might de-
militarize or reduce the military effort in the
Indian Ocean.
Another group will be set up of experts to
discuss the terms by which we can agree on
advanced notice on all missile test-firings so
that, perhaps 24 hours ahead of time, we
would notify the Soviets when we were
going to test-fire one of our missiles, they
would do the same for us.
Another group will be studying a way to
initiate comprehensive arms control in con-
ventional weapons and also the sale of
weapons to third countries, particularly the
developing nations of the world.
Another is to discuss how we might con-
tribute mutually toward nonproliferation of
nuclear weapon capability. Nations do need
a way to produce atomic power for electric-
ity, but we hope that the Soviets will join
with us and our allies and friends in cutting
down the capability of nations to use spent
nuclear fuels to develop explosives.
Another item that we agreed to discuss,
at the Soviets' request, was the termination
in the capability of waging radiological or
chemical warfare.
And the eighth study group that we
agreed to establish is to study the means by
which we could mutually agree on forgoing
major efforts in civil defense. We feel that
the Soviets have done a great deal on civil
defense capability. We've done a less
amount, but we would like for both of us to
agree not to expend large sums of money on
this effort.
So the sum total of the discussions has
been to lay out a firm proposal which the
Soviets have not yet responded to on drastic
reductions in nuclear capability in the
future — these discussions will continue early
in May — and to set up study groups to con-
tinue with the analysis of the other eight
items that I described to you.
I'd be glad to answer just a few questions.
Q. Mr. President, pardon me if I doti't
stand, but I will block the camera there.
Do you still believe that the Soviets in no
way linked your human rights crusade with
arms control negotiations?
The President: I can't certify to you that
410
Department of State Bulletin
there is no linkage in the Soviets' minds be-
tween the human rights effort and the
SALT limitations. We have no evidence that
this was the case.
Secretary Vance thought it was quite
significant, for instance, that when General
Secretary Brezhnev presented a prepared
statement on the human rights issue that it
was done in a different meeting entirely
from the meeting in which the SALT negoti-
ations occurred.
So our assessment is that there was no
linkage, but I can't certify that there is no
linkage in the Soviets' minds.
Q. Mr. President, you've said that the
Soviets contend that Secretary Kissinger
and your predecessors had promised that we
would not deploy, I believe, the cruise mis-
sile.
The President: Yes.
Q. Just where and how do they contend
that this promise was given, and have you
checked with them to see if in fact it was?
The President: Yes. Both President Ford
and Secretary Kissinger have maintained
publicly and to me privately that there was
never any agreement on the part of the
United States to contain or to prohibit the
deployment or development of cruise
missiles.
The language that was used in the early
Vladivostok agreement, which, as you know,
has not yet been ratified, was a prohibition
against air-launched missiles.
Secretary Kissinger's position has
been — and he is much better able to speak
than I am to speak for him — that that meant
ballistic missiles, which was a subject of the
Vladivostok talks.
Two and a half years ago or so, when
these talks took place, the cruise missile
capability was not well understood and there
was no detailed discussion at all of the
cruise missile. The Soviets claim that when
they did discuss air-launched missiles that
they were talking about cruise missiles.
Secretary Kissinger said that he was not
talking about cruise missiles.
Q. Sir, the point, just to follow, they are
not contending that there was any secret
understanding or discussion or anything?
The President: No.
Q. They're talking about the language that
iriix in the Vladivostok agreement?
The President: Exactly.
Q. Did the Russians hare a
counterproposal on SALT that they offered
us, or were they content simply to listen to
our proposals?
The President: They listened to our two
proposals. Of course, their proposal has
been to ratify their understanding of the
Vladivostok agreement, which includes their
capability of developing the Backfire bomber
and our incapability of developing cruise
missiles. That's an agreement that we never
understood to be part of the Vladivostok
agreement.
Q. Mr. Carter, if necessary to achieve any
progress, are you willing to modify your
human rights statemeiits —
The President: No.
Q. — or will you continue to speak out?
The President: No. I will not modify my
human rights statements. My human rights
statements are compatible with the con-
sciousness of this country. I think that there
has been repeated recognition in interna-
tional law that verbal statements or any sort
of public expression of a nation's beliefs is
not an intrusion in other nations' affairs.
The Soviets have in effect ratified the
rights of human beings when they adopted
the United Nations Charter. The Helsinki
agreement, which will be assessed at Bel-
grade later on this year, also includes
references to human rights themselves.
So I don't intend to modify my position. It
is a position that I think accurately
represents the attitude of this country.
I don't think that it's accurate to link the
human rights concept with the SALT
negotiations. I think that's an incorrect
linkage. The SALT negotiations, I hope, will
be successful as we pursue in laborious
detail those discussions the rest of this year.
They will be successful only if the Soviets
are convinced that it's to their advantage to
April 25, 1977
411
forgo a continued commitment, and a very
expensive commitment and a very threaten-
ing commitment, to the arms race — and only
if our own people believe that we derive the
same advantage. That's what we hope for.
Q. Mr. President, how would you
characterize what happened today? How
serious a setback is this? Did we expect that
the Soviets might he more receptive to our
positions?
The President: We had no indications
either in direct or indirect communications
with Brezhnev that they were ready to ac-
cept our positions. We carefully prepared
over a period of five or six weeks what we
thought was a balanced and what we still
think is a balanced proposal with drastic re-
ductions.
I might say that there is a unanimous
agreement among the key Members of Con-
gress, the State Department, my own staff,
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs,
that this is a good and fair proposal. I have
hopes that the substance of our proposal will
be accepted by the Soviet Union in the fu-
ture, because it's to their advantage and
ours to do so.
But I'm not discouraged at all. Cy Vance
sent back the word that he was disappointed
that we didn't reach immediate agreement
but that he was not discouraged. And I
think the fact that a joint communique has
been prepared and will be released
tomorrow morning spelling out the fact that
our nations will continue without interrup-
tion these discussions is very encouraging.
Q. Mr. President, would it be fair to say
that the talks broke down because the United
States is now not prepared to accept
restrictions on cruise missiles?
The President: No.
Q. Isn't that the heart of it?
The President: That is not the heart of it
at all. We are prepared to accept restric-
tions on the cruise missile if it's part of an
overall and balanced package. We are not
prepared to accept a unilateral prohibition
against the development or deployment of
the cruise missile absent some equivalent
response from the Soviet Union including
the Backfire bomber. But we put together a
package which was fair and balanced. But
we are not prepared unilaterally to forgo an
opportunity unless it's equivalent to a Soviet
response.
Q. Yes, sir, I didn't mean unilaterally,
but on the January 1976 trip by Secretary
Kissinger to the Soviet Union there was ac-
tive negotiation regarding a balanced reduc-
tion involving some limitations on cruise
missiles.
So when you say, sir, that the Soviets say
we agreed to restrict cruise missiles, aren't
they referring to 1976 and not to Vladivo-
stok, when indeed the cruise missile was on
the drawing board and not a real thing?
The President: I don't believe that — I
don't want to get myself into the position of
speaking for Secretary Kissinger — I don't
think there has ever been any insinuation of
an American agreement that the Soviets
could build and deploy the Backfire bomber
without limitation while we limited cruise
missiles. And that's the position that the
Soviets adopted as the Vladivostok
agreement.
Q. Mr. President, have the Russians ex-
plained why they were turning down the
comprehensive proposal? Was it because
they did not want such drastic reductions as
you proposed, or was it because they felt the
limitations on cruise were not adequate?
Did they give any reasons?
The President: I do not know yet. I've not
received a definitive analysis from Secretary
Vance. He a few minutes ago was in the
American Embassy in Moscow preparing for
me a detailed report on what has occurred.
So far as I know at this point, there were
not any specific reasons given for the
Soviets turning down of our proposal.
My guess is that this proposal is so sub-
stantive and such a radical departure in
putting strict limits and reductions on exist-
ing missiles and a prohibition against the
development or deployment of new missiles
in the future that the Soviets simply need
more time to consider it. Whether they'll ac-
cept it or not, at the May meetings in
Geneva or subsequently, I don't have any
way to know yet.
412
Department of State Bulletin
Q. To follow that up — the Man meetings,
are they to be between Mr. Gromyko and
Mr. Vance?
The President: That's correct.
Q. Mr. President. Senator Baker, just
outside a few moments ago, said that during
your briefing of the congressional leadership
you said you intended to "hang tough." Did
you say that, and what did you mean by
that?
The President: Yes. I do. I think that it's
important for us to take advantage of an op-
portunity this year to negotiate not just a
superficial ratification of rules by which we
can continue the arms race, but to have a
freeze on deployment and development of
new missiles and an actual reduction in
launchers and MIRV'ed missiles below what
was agreed to previously. And on those
items I intend to remain very strong in my
position.
I don't think it's to our nation's advantage
to put forward in piecemeal fashion addi-
tional proposals. Our experience in the past
has been that the Soviet Union extracts
from those comprehensive proposals those
items that are favorable to them and want
to continue to negotiate the other parts of
the proposals that might not be so favorable
to them.
So I do intend to continue strong
negotiations to let the leaders of our country
know what we are proposing. And I'm not in
any hurry; it's important enough to proceed
methodically and carefully. But I hope that
the Soviets will agree with us to drastic re-
ductions and strict limitations in the future
which have never been part of previous
agreements.
Q. Mr. President, could I follow that?
The President: Please.
Q. When you say you intend to continue
negotiations, is there a chance that you
might go to Geneva in May since you will
already be in Europe in the early part of
May anyway?
The President: As a matter of fact, I'm al-
ready scheduled to go to Europe not just to
meet with the allies in London but to meet
with President Asad of Syria. And where
that meeting will be taking place I don't
know. But I have no intentions at this time
to meet with any Soviet leaders on that trip.
Q. Mr. President, how will this data bast
work? Will that include all conventional
armaments as well?
The President: That would be a separate
matter of discussion. The data base has been
for a long period of time a matter of dispute
in the mutual and balanced force reductions
talks taking place in Vienna, where we've
asked the Soviets to give us an inventory of
their arsenal among the Warsaw Pact na-
tions. These are conventional weapons
primarily.
But the data base to which I was referring
this afternoon is an inventory of nuclear
weapons that have been included in the
SALT talks — the strategic nuclear weapons.
So far we have a fairly good way on both
sides of inventorying weapons that are ac-
tually deployed. But we would like to have a
free and accurate exchange with the Soviet
Union about how many weapons they have
and how many we have, so that we can
monitor much more closely any deviations
from those figures in the future.
Q. If I could follow, would that include
any kind of verification?
The President: Yes. We would like to
have the subject of verification opened up
dramatically. For instance, in a
comprehensive test ban we would like to
have onsite inspection. The Soviets have
never agreed to this principle, but they have
mentioned it a couple of times in the discus-
sions. Foreign Minister Gromyko last year
filed a statement at the United Nations that
mentioned the possibility of onsite inspec-
tions. But we feel that verification is a very
crucial element in a comprehensive arms
limitation agreement. Verification obviously
includes an absence of concealment, and ver-
ification, to a lesser degree, also includes
the data base to which I just referred.
One more question.
Q. May I ask, please? Has the breakdown
of these talks in any way influenced your
thinking on development of future U.S.
weaponry; that is, ivill you be now more
April 25, 1977
413
inclined to go for full production of the B-l
or any other advanced weapon systems?
The President: Obviously, if we feel at the
conclusion of next month's discussions that
the Soviets are not acting in good faith with
us and that an agreement is unlikely, then I
would be forced to consider a much more
deep commitment to the development and
deployment of additional weapons. But I
would like to forgo that decision until I am
convinced the Soviets are not acting in good
faith. I hope they will.
Let me answer one question from Wes.
[Wes Pippert, United Press International].
Q. I was going to offer the "thank you."
The President: Okay; fine.
Q. Mr. President, one question about the
deep cuts. Because the Soviets seem to have
more delivery systems today than we do, is
there objection that they would have to de-
stroy more weapons than we would have to
if you did get those deep cuts'?
The President: Deep cuts would affect
both of us about the same. Shallow cuts,
say, from 2,400 down to 2,200, on launchers
would affect the Soviets much more ad-
versely than it would us. Part of our
package involved the very heavy missiles,
the SS-9, and SS-18, which now stand at a
308 level. We included in our package a sub-
stantial reduction below that figure.
I think that the details of our proposal
would probably best be revealed later. I am
a little constrained about the details because
Secretary Vance and Mr. Gromyko still have
agreements among themselves about revela-
tions of the negotiations with which I am not
yet familiar. But I think later on those exact
figures can be made available.
Presidential Assistant Brzezinski's News Conference of April 1
Following is the transcript of a news con-
ference held on April 1 by Zbigniew
Brzezinski , Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
White House press release dated April 1
Dr. Brzezinski: What I would like to do is
essentially give you as much information as
I legitimately can on the proposal that we
made in Moscow. In so doing, I don't pro-
pose to engage in any recrimination but
would merely like to lay out for you the kind
of proposal we made and the thinking that
went into that proposal, for I believe that
the thinking that the proposal reflected is
almost as important as the proposal itself.
What we were trying to accomplish and
what we intend to accomplish is to move
forward to genuine disarmament; that is to
say, to obtain a significant reduction in the
level of the strategic confrontation.
We believe that SALT agreements should
not only set the framework for continued
competition but that they should indeed
limit that competition, reduce its scope, in-
troduce greater stability into our relation-
ship.
Our proposals were thus designed to ac-
complish two basic purposes: to give both
sides the political and the strategic parity to
which each of them is entitled, and this
means that there should be no self-evident
advantage in the agreement which would be
either of a strategic character or which
would be susceptible to political perceptions
as an advantage; and secondly, it was our
basic purpose to seek an agreement which
would provide to both sides again political
and strategic stability. Parity in the first
instance; stability in the second instance.
By this, I mean a proposal which would
take into account the fact that if you only
have certain kinds of limits but do not an-
ticipate technological dynamics, what may
seem stable in 1977 or 1978 could become
very unstable in 1980 or 1985. It was there-
414
Department of State Bulletin
fore felt that genuine strategic arms
limitations — indeed, a genuine strategic
arms reductions agreement — ought to take
both of these elements into account.
The proposal that we made was therefore
very finely crafted. We attempted very de-
liberately to forgo those elements in our
strategic posture which threaten the Soviets
the most, and we made proposals to them
that they forgo those elements in their
strategic posture which threaten us the
most. We felt particularly by concentrating
on the land-based ICBM's that are MIRV'ed
we would take into account the greatest
sources of insecurity on both sides.
I truly believe that this proposal, if ac-
cepted, or when accepted, could serve as a
driving wedge, as a historical driving
wedge, for a more stable and eventually
more cooperative American and Soviet
relationship. It is thus a proposal which is
not only strategic but political in its charac-
ter; and Secretary Vance, in his remarks in
Moscow, placed a great deal of emphasis on
the political significance of this proposal.
It was a proposal which had strategic as
well as political intentions very much in
mind. Because of that, it was also a proposal
which was accompanied by a series of other
proposals designed to place the American-
Soviet relationship not only on a more stable
basis but to make the cooperative elements
in that relationship more comprehensive.
This is why we have deliberately matched
or accompanied the SALT proposals with
initiatives in regard to such matters as the
Indian Ocean and the desirability of achiev-
ing mutual restraint in regard to our
respective military presence in that part of
the world. This is why we proposed that we
hold further discussions on conventional
arms transfers to third parties. This is why
we suggested that it would be in our mutual
interest as a stability-producing initiative to
talk and discuss our respective civil defense
programs. This is why we suggested that we
talk about a comprehensive test ban. This is
why we suggested that there be controls on
antisatellite capabilities and on prior notifi-
cation of missile" test-flights.
All of that cumulatively was designed to
produce greater mutual stability, to widen
areas of cooperation, to indeed offset the
competitive elements in our relationship by
a widening pattern of cooperation. And we
are encouraged by the fact that eight
working groups were set up on the basis of
these proposals, as well as some that the
Soviets made, in order to move forward on
these issues.
I should have added, incidentally, and I
failed to do so, that we also proposed
meetings on nonprolife ration. That was part
of our proposal.
It is in this context that we proposed a
comprehensive package with negotiating
flexibility inherent in it in order to structure
a rather different and more stable and more
equitable U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship.
That package has two key elements in it.
First of all, it called for reductions which
were of a greater scope than just symbolic.
And the second, equally important, part of
the package involved a proposal for a freeze,
for a halt on the modernization of ICBM's;
and I will talk about that in more detail.
You can well see how these two key
fundamental elements are interrelated. We
proposed the reduction so as to lower the
level of the competition, and we proposed a
freeze in order to halt it qualitatively and
quantitatively. Thus, it is in many respects
the first truly, genuinely disarmament-
oriented proposal introduced into the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
We proposed more specifically that the
present strategic aggregates, which were
set at the high level of 2,400 for each side,
be reduced to a range between 1,800 and
2,000; and here again is a demonstration of
the inherent flexibility of the package, be-
cause this is something which we were
prepared to discuss.
We proposed, moreover, that within that
framework the present level of MIRV's,
which is set at 1,320, be reduced to some-
thing between 1,100 and 1,200. And we also
suggested that in that context it would be
desirable that the total number of the so-
called Soviet modern large ballistic missiles,
particularly the SS-9 and SS-18, be
reduced; because within the framework of
lowered aggregates these large missiles
with their potential for numerous
April 25, 1977
415
MIRV'ing— indeed the SS-18 can be
MIRV'ed up to 8 to 10 warheads — becomes
increasingly significant and introduces an
asymmetrical aspect into the relationship.
On that basis we proposed that both sides
freeze the deployment of all of their ICBM's
and ban modifications on existing ICBM's
and indeed limit the number of annual flight
tests for ICBM's, thereby reducing the
likelihood of significant modifications, and
also ban the development, testing, and de-
ployment of new types of ICBM's and
particularly ban the deployment, testing,
and development of mobile ICBM's — a fac-
tor, again, which if not checked, could
introduce very major uncertainty into the
U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship.
This more specifically meant that on the
U.S. side we were prepared to freeze our
Minuteman III deployment — that is to say,
the MIRV'ed ICBM— at 550, which is where
it is currently. And we would forgo further
improvements in all U.S. ICBM's, and we
would abandon the MX program, both for
silo and mobile basing. And we would forgo
any plans for any other ICBM's.
On the Soviet side we proposed that the
Soviets freeze the number of their strategic
ICBM's, the SS-17's, 18's, and 19's at a
number not in excess of 550, which actually
means that they could still go up because
they are below that number, and these
would be the Soviet MIRV'ed missiles.
Given the size of some of them, this is an
important point to bear in mind, for it raises
the issue of equity; given the size of some of
them, their total number of warheads even-
tually could be greater than our land-based
ICBM's would provide. And we would
expect that the MLBM, or the modern large
ballistic missile, component within the con-
text of the 550 would not be greater than
150. This is important because this would
provide for a reduction.
Q. Could you repeat that?
Dr. Brzezinski: We also proposed that the
total number of the modern large ballistic
missiles, which we would expect would be
the SS-18's because they are the most mod-
ern Soviet ballistic missiles that are large,
would not be greater than 150. And that
would be a reduction from the present total,
but that will be an important element of
stability because that large number of the
modern large ballistic missiles introduces
the destabilizing potential inherent in large
throw-weight and many, many warheads.
Q. Do they currently have 320?
Dr. Brzezinski: Three hundred and eight.
We would also expect the Soviets to
abandon the development and deployment of
the SS-16, which is their mobile ICBM, just
as we would abandon the MX.
Q. How about the SS-20; would that also
be abandoned?
Dr. Brzezinski: The SS-20 in its precise
configuration is not a strategic weapon; and
we would want, in the course of the agree-
ment, to develop arrangements which would
permit us to have the needed assurance that
the SS-20 is not being upgraded into the
equivalent of the SS-16 because, as some of
you clearly know, the SS-20, with a third
stage, could be in effect the equivalent of
the SS-16. We would therefore want to have
some arrangements whereby we could
clearly differentiate between the two.
Finally, we would propose to make an
arrangement with regard to the Backfire
which would give us some assurances that it
would not be used as a strategic weapon by
the Soviet Union, and this is something that
would be negotiated more fully within this
framework; and we would propose to ban all
strategic cruise missiles, and that, again, is
something which would be negotiated. In
that context, though, it is to be noted that
the Soviet side has insisted that the
Backfire is not a strategic weapon, though it
has a radius of over 2,000 miles. We would
presumably define the cruise missile as
being strategic at a level lower than that in
the context of our negotiations.
I would say that if one analyzes this pro-
posal in detail I think one is justified within
the limits of human reason, within the
confines of one's own background, tradition,
and concerns which necessarily confine our
ability to be absolutely certain about our
judgments, that this was a genuine effort at
an equitable arrangement.
416
Department of State Bulletin
We would constrain those aspects of our
strategic programs which are threatening to
the Soviets. We would want the Soviets to
adjust similarly in those regards which are
most threatening to us.
We would cap the arms race; we would
impose a limit on the numbers through a
reduction, significant reduction; and we
would impose restraints of a qualitative type
on offensive systems. Thus, we would both
take a giant step forward. I see a certain
analogy between the situation in which we
find ourselves today and the late 1960's. At
that time, some of you might recall, we pro-
posed to the Soviets that ABM's be banned
because ABM's introduce an inherent
element of instability into the relationship.
The first Soviet reaction to that proposal
by Prime Minister Kosygin was very
negative, given their backgrounds, their
traditions, their ways of looking at the
strategic relationship. Yet, over time,
through a continuing discourse, the Soviet
side came to recognize the fact that indeed
in the age of highly advanced strategic
systems the introduction of the ABM ele-
ment into the equation was truly destabi-
lizing. And the most important
accomplishment of SALT One was precisely
that which the Soviets earlier had so indig-
nantly rejected; namely, a ban on the ABM
systems. We are thus in the first phase of
an ambitious and far-reaching search for a
significant American-Soviet accommodation.
We believe in some respects we are in the
earlier, educational part of the process in
which both sides have to think through the
implications both of an unchecked arms race
and of the benefits of reductions and a
freeze.
We are going to continue these talks with
the Soviets. You know that they will be con-
tinued on a top-level basis in May by
Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister
Gromyko, and we expect to have contacts
and exchanges prior to that date. We are
hopeful that the search for something truly
significant will bear fruit.
I don't think anyone in this house or in
this city engaged in this process expected
the Soviet Union simply to accept these
proposals instantly.
We went to them in order to present to
them our views regarding what might con-
stitute a truly creative and historically novel
framework for our strategic relations. We
will persist in that effort, and we are hope-
ful, on the basis of prior experience and
given the overriding interest that both sides
have in stability and accommodation, with
patience and with persistence, and with
good will on both sides, there will be signifi-
cant progress made toward what could be a
very significant turn in the American-Soviet
relationship.
Q. Would you please clarify two points?
Your definition of — the American definition
of the strategic cruise and would you go over
again, please, I guess I just didn't hear it
well, the MIRV idea? Were you talking
simply about MIRV equivalency, or was
this—
Dr. Brzezinski: In regard to the cruise
missile, our position is that a cruise missile
which is not capable of employment either in
a transcontinental operation, or which
doesn't have a range in excess of weapons
systems that are typically considered to be
strategic, is nonstrategic. And since there
has been an ongoing discussion with the
Soviets as to what is and is not a strategic
weapon, we would want to reach a more
precise definition of that in the course of the
negotiations, banning those cruise missiles
which have as themselves a strategic range,
and retain for both sides flexibility for those
that are not.
Specifically talking about the MIRV's, our
proposal is to freeze the land-based ICBM's
that can be MIRV'ed at 550 and to reduce
particularly the number of those very large
Soviet ICBM's which can be MIRV'ed into
very numerous warheads, given their
throw-weight, because that in the long run
could introduce an element of instability for
both sides.
We would, at the same time, in that
context, forgo those systems which are par-
ticularly threatening to the Soviet land-
based ICBM force. It is to be remembered
in this context that, at least for the time be-
ing, the Soviet strategic forces are heavily
dependent on their land-based ICBM's.
April 25, 1977
417
Those American systems which could
threaten these land-based ICBM's are natu-
rally and understandably particularly
threatening to the Soviets.
So we try to take that concern of theirs
into account while registering with them
what we consider to be a legitimate concern
of ours, namely, that we don't want them to
acquire a capability to very significantly
threaten our land-based systems.
Q. Doctor, you didn't talk about the so-
called data base, and I have a question
about it. The President, at his press confer-
ence here in this room, spoke of some form
of verification of the data-base material,
once it was submitted by either side to the
other side, I guess. Can you elaborate on
what verification we are talking about?
Dr. Brzezinski: I don't want to go into too
many specifics, because I would really like
to confine myself to the broad package, to
the broad framework within which we would
negotiate. But specifically, with regard to
the data base, let me limit myself to this
observation.
We would hope and we would expect that
in the context of this increasingly more
stable and more accommodating relationship
that we feel ought to develop between us
and them in the strategic realm, the Soviet
Union would become increasingly more
forthcoming with regard to data base.
Many of you know about this SALT
relationship as much and I am sure, in quite
a few cases, much more than I do; and
therefore you will remember that
throughout much of SALT One the data base
on which these negotiations was based was
largely American-provided and the pattern
of the negotiations typically involved a situ-
ation in which we would provide information
about our systems, numbers, dimensions,
characteristics, and then we would say to
the Soviets, "And with regard to your sys-
tems, which we estimate at being at so
many and to possess the following dimen-
sions and to have the following characteris-
tics, we would propose the following."
And the Soviets would respond and say,
"With regard to the strategic information
which you have provided us about yourself,
418
our position is as follows. And with regard
to the information that you have given
us — the alleged information you have given
us — about our systems, our position is as fol-
lows." And they would comment on it, but
without a truly equitable data base.
I would hope and we would expect that in
a symmetrical strategic relationship, which
it has now become, the Soviet Union would
provide us with all of the necessary data,
just as we provided them with the necessary
data, and we would each have and retain the
needed means for verifying the accuracy of
that data.
Q. How?
Dr. Brzezinski: For one thing, through
satellites, which are very important sources
of information. But beyond that, with
regard to the cruise missile, we would have
to perhaps explore some additional ways of
verification; and I don't want to be too
specific, because that is something which
again would have to be negotiated, but let
me merely note the difficulty with which,
again, many of you are familiar.
It is very difficult to differentiate between
the cruise missiles which are strategic and
nonstrategic; their sizes, dimensions are the
same. It is very difficult to differentiate be-
tween a cruise missile which has a nuclear
warhead and those which do not. So we
would have to have some additional, more
comprehensive arrangements to give both
sides the assurance that they need to have
on this issue.
Q. I am really not asking for details, but
is this an onsite-inspection proposal,
basically?
Dr. Brzeziyiski: I don't think we have yet
reached the stage in which direct onsite
examination of all weapons systems is feasi-
ble; but certainly, if the Soviet side were
prepared to accept some onsite verification,
it would be a giant step toward mutual con-
fidence, and we would certainly welcome
onsite Soviet inspection of some of our
weapons systems — so that this in itself would
be something which would be a great contri-
bution to mutual stability. And I would hope
that as Soviet confidence grows, as Soviet
Department of State Bulletin
preoccupation with secrecy declines, that
they will find this idea less and less
abhorrent.
Q. You talked about the Soviet concern for
their land-based weapons, and there has al-
ways been a lack of symmetry between then-
perception of their defense needs and the
U.S., which is why they came up with a
freedom of choice within their weapons sys-
tems.
Your proposal, the American proposal —
according to what you say— would appear to
take away a lot of their freedom of choice;
and at the same time, it doesn't say any-
thing about sea-based missiles, which also
are a threat — or the Soviets perceive as a
threat — to their land-based systems.
Therefore, can you explain why, in your
perception, this is equivalent, a third thing
that they have to cut back from 308 to 150 in
their superlaunch missiles and we don't
have to cut back any land-based?
Dr. Brzezinski: First of all, as far as the
freedom to mix is concerned, that would still
be retained by both sides, though there
would be upper limits set on what you can
do, particularly in regard to land-based
ICBM's. That limit indeed would be set at
550. But each side, or one of the sides, could
decide that it prefers to have fewer of these
and more sea-based. So, in that sense, there
is some freedom to mix, no doubt about it.
As far as the Soviet throw-weight or large
ballistic missiles are concerned, their
reduction is a necessary concomitant of
mutual stability, because if they are not re-
duced in numbers, then by MIRV'ing them
the Soviet Union would gain, particularly
within these lower aggregates, a very signif-
icant advantage.
I think one has to recognize the fact that
if you have fewer total numbers then any
asymmetry becomes increasingly significant,
and the Soviets do have that asymmetry to
their advantage in the possession of the
large ballistic missiles which can be
MIRV'ed up to 8 or 10 warheads.
In addition to that, there is this other
problem, which I don't want to exaggerate,
but which has to be taken into account when
we think of equity at the lower aggregates;
namely, the Backfire. We were prepared to
consider special arrangements for the
Backfire; but again, the Backfire, however
one defines it, whether it is a strategic or
nonstrategic weapon, becomes more signifi-
cant if you have lowered aggregates than if
you have higher aggregates.
If these aggregates are high, then you can
say, well, it is more marginal; but if you go
down to 1,800, then the introduction of the
Backfire, at some number which is in excess
of 100, becomes a factor. And yet we are
prepared to accommodate on that, too.
I am not going to argue that — it would be
silly — that this was an infallible package
which has to be taken in toto. All I am going
to say is that we made the damnedest effort
to produce a package which, within the lim-
its of our own intelligence — and by
intelligence, I not only mean information, I
also mean what is in our heads — we could
say was reasonably equitable for both sides.
We did our best to define it that way and
will be glad to discuss it, and we intend to
discuss it. We would like to find out what
aspects of this are particularly troubling to
the Soviets, because that is what negotia-
tions are about, and conceivably if the case
is persuasive, this or that adjustment could
be made in return for this or that adjust-
ment.
Q. What was the Soviet reaction to the
package in the general sense? Did they re-
ject it out of hand or say that certain things
were difficult?
Dr. Brzezinski: To say that the Soviets
rejected it out of hand gives it a dramatic
and categorical quality which I really do not
think the circumstances justify.
The sequence was essentially as follows:
Prior to the Vance mission, we did indicate
to the Soviets that we would be making pro-
posals for significant reductions. We did
that deliberately because we wanted the
Politburo to think about these issues.
As you know, the Soviets do not have an
arms control agency. The Soviets do not
have influential groups in their society that
are concerned with arms control. Arms
control proposals are assessed in the Soviet
Defense Ministry, which has certain in-
April25, 1977
419
teresting implications; and we felt it would
not be particularly constructive to send in a
detailed proposal which then is staffed out in
the Soviet Defense Ministry and goes up to
the Soviet Politburo with a categorical
critique. We wanted the top Soviet leaders
to focus on this issue.
Therefore we drew their attention to the
fact that we will be making proposals that
call for reductions, that we think would have
a significant impact on the broader nature of
our relationship; and then Secretary Vance
presented that and, as I said earlier, not
only in its strategic setting but also in its
political context when he made his opening
statement to the Soviets.
The Soviet leadership then expressed a
preference for the discussion of other issues,
during which time it presumably was
undertaking at least its preliminary assess-
ment of this proposal; and then in the final
or the pre-final session, I forget which,
General Secretary Brezhnev then informed
Secretary Vance that this proposal was not
acceptable to the Soviet Union, but he
coupled it, at the same time, with a clear-
cut indication that it is the Soviet expecta-
tion, which is matched by us, that these
talks, including the SALT aspects, will con-
tinue and that, indeed, the Gromyko-Vance
meeting will be resumed directly in Geneva
in May.
So, it is in this context that I think one
ought to assess where we are — and again, I
would like to draw your attention to the
analogy that I made before; namely, to the
initial reaction by Prime Minister Kosygin
when, for the first time, he was confronted
at the top level and not through bureaucrat-
ic channels with the arguments why an
ABM is mutually destabilizing. This was a
new argument for him. It was not a convinc-
ing argument initially, even though it was
made very persuasively when he met in
Glassboro with President Johnson and Sec-
retary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara
and then subsequently it became clear that
such an arrangement was indeed in the
mutual interest.
Q. Dr. Brzezinski, in Mr. Vance's news
conference in Moscoiv, he alluded to a Soviet
counterproposal based on the 1976
discussions with Dr. Kissinger. I am in-
terested in why that counterproposal was
not negotiable. What were its constituents,
and win/ was it )iot negotiable?
Dr. Brzezinski: I don't want to engage
here in a critique of the Soviet position,
because as I said at the beginning of my re-
marks, I am really not going to engage in
recriminations or a kind of side dialogue on
their proposals versus our proposals, but
really to try to explain the rationale and the
content of ours.
Let me limit myself, therefore, to one
comment. It is our broad feeling that 27
years after the beginning of the nuclear race
the time is right in our relations for doing
something more than just creating
frameworks for continued competition. It is
our feeling that the framework defined by
Vladivostok is so high in its numbers, so
open-ended in its consequences, so
susceptible to quantitative as well as qual-
itative improvements that in some respects
it comes close to a misstatement to call any
such arrangement arms limitations. All it is,
really, is an arrangement for continued arms
competition, and we have gone to the
Soviets with a proposal which we crafted as
best we could in order to convince them that
maybe the time is right to take a significant
step toward reductions.
We gave them ranges so they could pick
either the more ambitious or the less
ambitious part of it, depending on their es-
timate of the strategic consequences of cuts.
They have very good analysts. They should
be able, and I am sure they are able, to as-
sess whether 2,000 is better for them or
1,800, whether 1,200 MIRV's is better for
them or 1,100, and so forth. So we weren't
very categorical about it.
Q. Dr. Brzezinski , you placed heavy
stress at the beginning on the political as-
pect of this, as well as this strategic aspect
of the proposal. You said that no one
expected them to accept it out of hand, but
neither was there widespread, expectation of
the kind of fierce reaction from the
Russians, including the press conference
yesterday by Mr. Gromyko.
420
Department of State Bulletin
Politically speaking, do you feel that the
reception of the proposal and what has hap-
pened has set back Soviet-American rela-
tions, or were you surprised at what
happened, and if yon weren't, teas this a
miscalculation?
Dr. Brzezinski : If I wasn't, then it
couldn't be a miscalculation. It would be a
miscalculation if I was. We did not expect
the Soviets to accept this total framework
on the basis of three days' talks. We ex-
pected them to consider it. Our judgment —
and I have talked by telephone with
Secretary Vance when he was still in Mos-
cow, I talked to some of the other members
of the delegation since — was that the
discussions were generally conducted in
businesslike fashion, that the Soviet side,
through little gestures, went out of its way
to indicate that this is an ongoing relation-
ship. They did not hide the fact that they
took a negative view of this proposal, and
they were quite explicit on it; but there
were no nasty polemics in the meeting.
You are absolutely right in saying that
some of the statements, maybe even some of
the gestures, that were made in the press
conference by the Soviet Minister were of a
more assertive type. But I would describe
that perhaps as a reaction to the political
perception that indeed the United States
has come up with a proposal which, if ac-
cepted, would have a significant contribution
to disarmament.
The Soviets over the years have prided
themselves on being in the forefront of the
disarmament proposals and perhaps there
was just a tiny touch of defensiveness,
therefore, in some of these gestures and
some of these comments. I don't think that
these gestures and these comments are
really that important. What is important is
that the relationship involves continued
negotiations, that agreements were made in
Moscow to develop working groups on a
large number of highly sensitive issues — and
I read you the list, and indeed, there was a
further element in it, namely, radiological
weapons, which is what the Soviets
proposed— and that therefore the negotiat-
ing process continues. And in the negotiat-
ing process you expect to be turned down,
to be pressed, to be asked to make accom-
modations and concessions, but that is part
of the game.
Q. Doctor, what did we offer to forgo that
they would hare found most threatening to
their land-based missiles? I am not clear mi
that.
Dr. Brzezinski: Particularly the MX,
which in its consequences, given its accuracy
and so forth, by the early eighties, could be
extremely, extremely threatening to them.
And in that sense, I think that in itself
would be a source of considerable assurance
to them.
Beyond that, if we were to limit the cruise
missiles merely to tactical cruise missiles,
this, too, in the longer run, would be a sig-
nificant assurance to them.
Beyond that, we would have to make some
accommodations, given the total numbers in
Minutemen I and II, and in the Poseidons.
Basically, what it would give them is the
sense of security that the United States is
forgoing, as a basic strategic option, the
acquisition of first-strike capability against
their land-based systems.
United States and Cuba Open Talks
on Fisheries, Maritime Boundaries
Joint Communique 1
Negotiations between representatives of
the Government of Cuba and the Govern-
ment of the United States of America were
held from the 24th to the 29th of March on
matters concerning fisheries and maritime
boundaries which arise from the laws passed
by both parties on these subjects. In con-
cluding today the first stage of these negoti-
ations, it was agreed to continue them in the
near future. The delegations of both Gov-
ernments hope as a result of the progress of
the negotiations to reach a satisfactory
resolution of these issues.
1 Issued at New York, N.Y., on Mar. 29 (text from
press release 140 dated Mar. 30).
April 25, 1977
421
THE CONGRESS
President Announces Measures
To Control Marine Oil Pollution
Message to the Congress l
To the Congress of the United States;
The recent series of oil tanker accidents in
and near American waters is a grave reminder
of the risks associated with marine transpor-
tation of oil. Though we can never entirely
eliminate these risks, we can reduce them.
Today I am announcing a diverse but interre-
lated group of measures designed to do so.
These measures are both international and
domestic. Pollution of the oceans by oil is a
global problem requiring global solutions. I
intend to communicate directly with the
leaders of a number of major maritime na-
tions to solicit their support for international
action. Oil pollution is also a serious domestic
problem requiring prompt and effective ac-
tion by the federal government to reduce the
danger to American lives, the American
economy, and American beaches and
shorelines, and the steps I am taking will do
this.
The following measures are designed to
achieve three objectives: First, to reduce oil
pollution caused by tanker accidents and by
routine operational discharges from all ves-
sels; Second, to improve our ability to deal
swiftly and effectively with oil spills when
they do occur; and Third, to provide full and
dependable compensation to victims of oil
pollution damage.
These are the measures I recommend:
• Ratification of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships. I am transmitting this far-
reaching and comprehensive treaty to the
Senate for its advice and consent. This Con-
1 Transmitted on Mar. 17 (text from White House
press release dated Mar. 18).
vention, by imposing segregated ballast re-
quirements for new large oil tankers and
placing stringent controls on all oil dis-
charges from ships, represents an important
multilateral step toward reducing the risk of
marine oil pollution. In the near future, I will
submit implementing legislation to the Con-
gress.
• Reform of ship construction and equip-
ment standards. I am instructing the Secre-
tary of Transportation to develop new rules
for oil tanker standards within 60 days.
These regulations will apply to all oil tankers
over 20,000 deadweight tons, U.S. and
foreign, which call at American ports. These
regulations will include:
— Double bottoms on all new tankers;
— Segregated ballast on all tankers;
— Inert gas systems on all tankers; .
— Backup radar systems, including
collision avoidance equipment, on all tankers;
and
— Improved emergency steering standards
for all tankers.
These requirements will be fully effective
within five years. Where technological
improvements and alternatives can be shown
to achieve the same degree of protection
against pollution, the rules will allow their
use.
Experience has shown that ship construc-
tion and equipment standards are effective
only if backed by a strong enforcement pro-
gram. Because the quality of inspections by
some nations falls short of U.S. practice, I
have instructed the Department of State and
the Coast Guard to begin diplomatic efforts
to improve the present international system
of inspection and certification. In addition, I
recommend the immediate scheduling of a
special international conference for late 1977
to consider these construction and inspection
measures.
• Improvement of crew standards and
training. I am instructing the Secretary of
Transportation to take immediate steps to
raise the licensing and qualification
standards for American crews.
The international requirements for crew
qualifications, which are far from strict, will
422
Department of State Bulletin
be dealt with by a major international con-
ference we will participate in next year. I am
instructing the Secretary of Transportation
to identify additional requirements which
should be discussed, and if not included, may
be imposed by the United States after 1978
on the crews of all ships calling at American
ports.
• Development of Tanker Boarding
Program and U.S. Marine Safety Informa-
tion System. Starting immediately, the Coast
Guard will board and examine each foreign
flag tanker calling at American ports at least
once a year and more often if necessary. This
examination will insure that the ship meets
all safety and environmental protection regu-
lations. Those ships which fail to do so may
be denied access to U.S. ports or, in some
cases, denied the right to leave until the de-
ficiencies have been corrected. The informa-
tion gathered by this boarding program will
permit the Coast Guard to identify individual
tankers having histories of poor mainte-
nance, accidents, and pollution violations.
We will also require that the names of tanker
owners, major stockholders, and changes in
vessel names be disclosed and included in
this Marine Safety Information System.
• Approval of Comprehensive Oil Pollu-
tion Liability and Compensation Legislation.
I am transmitting appropriate legislation to
establish a single, national standard of strict
liability for oil spills. This legislation is
designed to replace the present fragmented,
overlapping systems of federal and state lia-
bility laws and compensation funds. It will
also create a $200 million fund to clean up oil
spills and compensate victims for oil pollution
damages.
• Improvement of federal ability to respond
to oil pollution emergencies. I have directed
the appropriate federal agencies, particularly
the Coast Guard and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, in cooperation with state and
local governments to improve our ability to
contain and minimize the damaging effects of
oil spills. The goal is an ability to respond
within six hours to a spill of 100,000 tons.
Oil pollution of the oceans is a serious prob-
lem that calls for concentrated, energetic,
and prompt attention. I believe these
measures constitute an effective program to
control it. My Administration pledges its
best efforts, in cooperation with the
international community, the Congress, and
the public, to preserve the earth's oceans and
their resources.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, March 17, 1977.
International Broadcasting Report
Transmitted to the Congress
Message From President Carter 1
To the Congress of the United States:
In my letters to the Speaker and to the
President of the Senate of January 31, I
stated that my advisers were reviewing a
report on international broadcasting in
compliance with Section 403 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
1977. That review is now finished.
This Administration firmly supports U.S.
international broadcasting as part of our
commitment to the freer flow of information
and ideas. Among the most valuable instru-
ments we have for this purpose are our in-
ternational radios — the Voice of America
(VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib-
erty (RFE/RL) — which for many years have
been a vital part of the lives of the peoples
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
My review of the U.S. international broad-
casting effort has led me to the following
conclusions, which are reflected in the at-
tached report:
(1) Present U.S. international broadcast
transmission facilities are inadequate; 16
additional 250 Kilowatt transmitters for
broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe are needed by VOA and RFE/RL
and can be installed in a period of three to
five years;
1 Transmitted on Mar. 22 (text from White House
press release, which includes the text of the report);
also printed as H. Doc. 95-107.
April 25, 1977
423
(2) There is no significant unused trans-
mitter capacity available for sharing among
U.S. broadcasters or between U.S. and
other Western broadcasters;
(3) A comprehensive outline of U.S.
worldwide broadcasting needs indicates a
requirement for 12 additional VOA trans-
mitters for broadcast to Asia and Africa,
beyond those required for European
broadcasts;
(4) Extending Board for International
Broadcasting-type transmissions to other
nations where access to information is re-
stricted would be highly impractical for a
variety of reasons.
This report is transmitted pursuant to the
requirements of P.L. 94-350, and I believe
that implementation of its recommendations
can assure the United States of effective
broadcasting programs in the years ahead.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, March 22, 1977.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Abuses of Corporate Power. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Gov-
ernment of the Joint Economic Committee. January
14-March 5, 1976. 199 pp.
South Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on South Africa — U.S. Policy and the Role
of U.S. Corporations. September 8-30, 1976. 792 pp.
U.S. Arms Sales Policy. Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and its
Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on proposed
sales of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. September
16-24, 1976. 155 pp.
International Finance. Annual Report of the National
Advisory Council on International Monetary and Fi-
nancial Policies, July 1, 1975^June 30, 1976* H. Doc.
95-67. January 31, 1977. 309 pp.
Rhodesian Sanctions. Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on S. 174, a bill to amend the
United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to halt the
importation of Rhodesian chrome; February 9-10,
1977; 81 pp. Hearing before the Subcommittees on
Africa and International Organizations of the House
Committee on International Relations on H.R. 1746;
February 24, 1977; 68 pp. Report to accompany S. 174;
S. Rept."95-37; March 3, 1977; 14 pp. Report, together
with additional, supplemental, minority, and dissent-
ing views, to accompany H.R. 1746; H. Rept. 95-59;
March 7, 1977; 19 pp.
Annual Report of the Subcommittee To Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and
Other Internal Security Laws to the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary. S. Rept. 95-20. February 17,
1977. 55 pp.
Legislative Activities Report of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, January 14, 1975-October 1,
1976. S. Rept. 95-21. February 21, 1977. 147 pp.
Disapproval of the Presidential Determination To Deny
Import Relief to the U.S. Honey Industry. Adverse
report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to
accompany H. Con. Res. 80. H. Rept. 95-25. February
22, 1977. 4 pp.
Subcommittee on Refugees. Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. Report on the subcommittee. S. Rept.
95-27. February 22, 1977. 9 pp.
The United States Response to the New International
Economic Order; The Economic Implications for
Latin America and the United States. A study
prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Economic Relationships of the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee. February 23, 1977. 32 pp.
Human Rights Reports Prepared by the Department of
State in Accordance With Section 502(B) of the
Foreign Assistance Act, as Amended. Submitted to
the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 1977.
143 pp.
U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Issues: The United
Kingdom, France, and West Germany. A staff report
prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Foreign
Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. March 1977. 32 pp.
U.S. Information and Cultural Programs: Focus on
Latin America, 1976. Report of a staff survey team to
the House Committee on International Relations.
March 1977. 46 pp.
Fishery Conservation Zone Transition Act Amend-
ments. Report of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries to accompany H.R. 3753. H.
Rept. 95-31. March 1, 1977. 9 pp.
Summary of Testimony and Findings and Conclusions
Resulting From Oversight Hearings on Narcotic
Abuse and Control. Interim report of the House Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, together
with additional views. H. Rept. 95-32. March 1, 1977.
87 pp.
Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement With Canada. Message
from the President transmitting a proposed
agreement. H. Doc. 95-90. March 1, 1977. 7 pp.
Expulsion of George A. Krimsky From the Soviet Union.
Report to accompany S. Res. 81. S. Rept. 95-35.
March 3, 1977. 2 pp. '
Supplemental Military Assistance to Portugal. Report of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to
accompany S. 489. S. Rept. 95-43. March 9, 1977. 6 pp.
Denial of Import Relief for Mushrooms. Message from
the President transmitting his determination that
import relief for the U.S. canned mushroom industry
is not in the national economic interest, pursuant to
section 203 (b) (2) of the Trade Act of 1974. H. Doc.
95-96. March 10, 1977. 2 pp.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization.
Communication from the President of the United
States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation.
H. Doc. 95-98. March 14, 1977. 4 pp.
424
Department of State Bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate
Message From President Carter '
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and
consent to ratification, the Agreement be-
tween the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Canada
Concerning Transit Pipelines signed at
Washington on January 28, 1977. I also
transmit, for the information of the Senate,
the report of the Department of State with
respect to the Agreement, including copies
of letters exchanged at the time the draft
text of the Treaty was initialed.
The Agreement was negotiated in re-
sponse to a request made by the Congress in
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
(P.L. 93-153) that the President determine
the willingness of the Government of Canada
to permit the construction of pipelines
across Canada to carry oil and gas from
Alaska's North Slope to markets in the
lower 48 states, the terms and conditions
which might apply to the operation of such
pipelines and the need for inter-
governmental agreements for this purpose.
The Agreement negotiated in response to
this request provides reciprocal protection
against interruption in the flow of hy-
drocarbons in transit, and against dis-
criminatory taxation. The Agreement is
applicable both to existing and future
pipelines transiting the United States and to
future pipelines transiting Canada.
It became clear early in the negotiations
that the Government of Canada was not
prepared to conclude an arrangement which
1 Transmitted on Mar. 30 (text from White House
press release); also printed as S. Ex. F, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., which includes the texts of the agreement,
an exchange of letters, and the report of the Depart-
ment of State.
granted advance approval to a specific
pipeline project. Consequently, the Agree-
ment was drafted without reference to the
specific proposals which have been made for
the construction of pipelines to transport
gas from Alaska's North Slope to the lower
48 states. Its provisions would be applicable
to both existing and future transit pipelines.
The Agreement does not constitute
Canadian approval of construction of a
transit pipeline across its territory. Upon
completion of studies currently in progress,
the Government of Canada will announce
whether or not it is willing to permit con-
struction of a transit pipeline for Alaskan
gas.
The Transit Pipeline Agreement provides
a formal basis for United States-Canadian
cooperation on hydrocarbon transportation
systems, should both governments decide
cooperation is advantageous. I urge the
Senate to act favorably on this Agreement
at an early date by giving its advice and
consent to ratification.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, March 30, 1977.
United States and Canada Amend
Fraser River Salmon Convention
Press release 82 dated February 25
Representatives of the Governments of the
United States and Canada signed on February
25 in Washington a protocol amending the
U.S. -Canada Fraser River Salmon Conven-
tion of 1930. Russell McKinney, Minister in
the Canadian Embassy in Washington, signed
for Canada, and Ambassador Frederick Irving
signed for the United States.
The Convention, which established a Com-
mission to regulate the salmon fishery of the
Fraser River system, also provided for an
Advisory Committee to the Commission con-
sisting of representatives from the various
branches of the salmon industry. The protocol
increases the number of members from each
country on that committee from six to seven.
April 25, 1977
425
U.S. and U.K. Reach Agreement
on Air Charter Arrangements
Following is a joint U.S. -U.K. press re-
lease issued at Washington and London on
April 7.
Press release 16S Haled April 7
The United Kingdom and the United
States have reached agreement on charter
arrangements for the next months.
The agreement covers all types of char-
ters currently approved in both countries
and includes for the first time the
U.S. -originating Advance Booking Charters
which were approved by the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board in September 1976. It brings
closer together the charter types on both
sides of the Atlantic.
The two governments hope that this
agreement will lead to an increase in charter
traffic between their two countries without
diverting traffic from the scheduled
services.
Some of the provisions of this agreement
are regarded as experimental. The results
will therefore be reviewed this autumn with
a view to determining whether any changes
would be desirable next year.
United States and Hungary Sign
Exchanges Agreement
Press release 167 dated April 6
The United States and the Hungarian
People's Republic signed on April 6 at
Budapest an intergovernmental Agreement
on Cooperation in Culture, Education, Sci-
ence and Technology. This is the first inter-
governmental exchanges agreement which
the United States has signed with Hungary.
The agreement provides the formal
framework for increased contacts and
exchanges between individuals and institu-
tions of the two countries in the areas of
culture, education, technology, and science
and provides a vehicle for the further im-
plementation of many provisions of the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs Arthur A.
Hartman signed for the U.S. side; Rudolf
Ronai, President of the Institute of Cultural
Relations, signed for the Hungarian side.
The purposes of this agreement include
the promotion of cooperation between in-
stitutions of higher learning of the two coun-
tries, the exchange of scholars and artists,
and the translation, publication, and presen-
tation of artistic works of each country in
the other. It will also facilitate visits by
scientists and researchers and the joint de-
velopment and implementation of scientific
programs and projects.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
13, 1976. 1
Signatures: Jamaica, March 24, 1977; Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, March 29, 1977; Australia, Kenya,
March 30, 1977; Austria, Ecuador, April 1, 1977*
Ratification deposited: India, March 28, 1977.
Atomic Energy
Protocol prolonging the agreement of December 9, 1970
(TIAS 7010), for the application of safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral
agreement between the United States and Colombia
of April 9, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5330, 6493), for
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy.
Done at Vienna March 28, 1977. Entered into force
March 28, 1977.
Signatures: Colombia, International Atomic Energy
Agency, United States.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force
provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Austria, March 31, 1977;
Cyprus, March 28, 1977; Israel, March 29, 1977.
Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered
'Not in force.
426
Department of State Bulletin
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done
at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force Jul v
1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Ratification deposited: Paraguay, November 15,
1976.
Accession deposited: Seychelles. February 8, 1977.
Customs
Customs convention on the A.T.A. carnet for the tem-
porary admission of goods, with annex. Done at Brus-
sels December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30,
1963; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS
6631.
Accession deposited: Cyprus, October 25, 1977.
Health
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 17, 1976. '
Acceptance deposited: Australia, March 30, 1977.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. '
Acceptances deposited: Saudi Arabia, March 23,
1977; Syria, March 25, 1977.
Ocean Dumping
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes.
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washing-
ton December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30,
1975. TIAS 8165.
Accession deposited: Libya, November 22, 1976.
Space
Convention on international liability for damage caused
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep-
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9,
1973. TIAS 7762.
Ratification deposited: Denmark, April 1, 1977. 2
Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. En-
tered into force September 15, 1976. TIAS 8480.
Ratification deposited: Denmark, April 1, 1977.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975;
for the United States April 7, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Greece, 3 Poland, 3 January
13, 1977; Cuba, January 14, 1977; 3 Argentina, 3
Ghana, January 19, 1977; Senegal, January 21,
1977; Burundi, January 25, 1977; Morocco, January
28, 1977; Chile, January 31, 1977; 3 Afghanistan,
Iran, February 3, 1977; Mauritania, February 4,
1977; Kuwait, February 7, 1977; 3 Romania, Feb-
ruary 8, 1977. 3
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959,
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to
establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-
frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with an-
nexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8,
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the
United States April 21, 1976.
Notification of approval: Sweden, January 26, 1977. 3
Tin
Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provi-
sionally July 1, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Zaire, April 1, 1977.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Military assistance agreement. Signed at Rio de Janeiro
March 15, 1952. Entered into force May 19, 1953.
TIAS 2776.
Notification of termination: March 11, 1977, by
Brazil, effective March 11, 1978, except that the
provisions of article I, pars. 2 and 4, and agree-
ments made pursuant to the provisions of article I,
pars. 3, 5, and 6, and of article III shall remain in
force unless otherwise agreed by the two govern-
ments.
Japan
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast of the
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington February 10, 1977.
Entered into force: March 3, 1977.
Jordan
Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles
and services to Jordan. Effected by exchange of notes
at Amman October 20, 1976, and February 23, 1977.
Entered into force February 23, 1977.
Kenya
Agreement concerning U.S. participation on a limited
voluntary basis in the National Social Security Fund
of Kenya. Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi
January 31 and March 21, 1977. Entered into force
March 25, 1977.
Malaysia
Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military as-
sistance and training pursuant to the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur
February 11 and March 14, 1977. Entered into force
March 14, 1977.
Saudi Arabia
Agreement relating to a U.S. military training mission
to Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of notes at
Jidda February 8 and 27, 1977. Entered into force
February 27, 1977.
Agreement providing for a military assistance advisory
group. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda June
1 Not in force.
2 With declaration.
3 Confirmed statements contained in final protocol.
April 25, 1977
427
27, 1953. Entered into force June 27, 1953. TIAS
2S12.
Terminated: February 27, 1977, with the exception of
par. 7, which shall remain in force and shall con-
tinue to apply in respect to activities under agree-
ment of February 8 and 27, 1977. until such time as
modified or replaced.
Thailand
Memorandum of agreement relating to the storage of
ammunition in Thailand. Signed at Bangkok March
22, 1977. Entered into force March 22, 1977.
PUBLICATIONS
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordert d by catalog or stock numbt r
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, B.C. Wi02. A 25-
percent discount is Hindi- on orders for 100 Or more
copies oj any ont publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittanct . payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Piices shown be-
loic. which include postage, are subject to change.
Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which de-
scribe the people, history, government, economy, and
foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a
list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic
and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set
of all Background Notes currently in stock — at least
140 — $21.80: 1-year subscription service for approxi-
mately 77 updated or new Notes — $23.10: plastic
binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are
available at 350 each.
Cvprus Cat.
Pub.
Malta Cat.
Pub.
Mauritania Cat.
Pub.
Nepal Cat.
Pub.
Paraguay Cat.
Pub.
Philippines Cat.
Pub.
Qatar Cat.
Pub.
Tanzania Cat.
Pub.
Western Samoa Cat.
Pub.
Yemen, People's Cat.
Democratic Republic of Pub.
No. SI.
7932
No. SI.
8220
No. SI.
8169
No. SI.
7904
No. SI.
8098
No. SI.
7750
No. SI.
7906
No. SI.
8097
No. SI.
8345
No. SI.
8368
123:C99/2
7pp.
123:M29/6
4 pp.
123:M44/2
6 pp.
123:N35
6pp.
123:P21
4 pp.
123:P53
8 pp.
123:Q1
4 pp.
123:T15
7 pp.
123:W52S
4 pp.
123-.508Y/
4 pp.
Inter- American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplo-
macy. This book deals with the beginnings of the U.S.
Government's effort to foster and strengthen coopera-
tive relations with the Latin American countries
through long-term, two-way, person-to-person com-
munication. The volume highlights the first years of the
program of educational and cultural exchange, the
pioneering period from 1936 to 1948. Pub. 8854. Inter-
national Information and Cultural Series 110. 381 pp.
$6.20. (Cat. No. Si. 67:8854).
Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft
Products and Components. Agreement with Brazil.
TIAS 8384. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8384).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Afghani-
stan. TIAS 8390. 13 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8390).
Remote Sensing for Earth Resources. Agreements
with Brazil extending the agreement of April 6, 1973.
TIAS 8391. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8391).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS
8392. 10 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8392).
Remote Sensing for Earth Resources. Agreement
with Brazil. TIAS 8393. 8 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8393).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Costa Rica.
TIAS 8394. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8394).
Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles
and Textile Products. Agreement with Haiti amending
the agreement of March 22 and 23, 1976. TIAS 8395. 3
pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8395).
Weather Stations. Agreement with Mexico extending
the agreement of July 31, 1970, as amended and ex-
tended. TIAS 8397. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8397).
Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation
Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in
Iceland. Agreement with other governments amending
the agreements done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as
amended. TIAS 8398. 2 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8398).
Whaling — International Observer Scheme. Agree-
ment with Japan extending the agreement of May 2,
1975. TIAS 8399. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8399).
Space Cooperation — Remote Manipulator System.
Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8400. 19 pp. 350. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:8400).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Pakistan
amending the agreement of August 7, 1975, as
amended. TIAS 8401. 11 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8401).
Transportation — Cooperation on Development of
High Speed Ground Systems. Memorandum of under-
standing with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS
8402. 10 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8402).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Zaire.
TIAS 8403. 25 pp. 450. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8403).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with In-
donesia amending the agreement of April 19, 1976, as
amended. TIAS 8404. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8404).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Chile.
TIAS 8405. 6 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8405).
428
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX April 25, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971,
Arms Control and Disarmament
ident ('alter Discusses Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Proposals (remarks, questions and an-
swers) 109
Presidential Assistant Brzezinski's News Confer-
ence of April 1 414
tary Vance Visits Moscow and Western
Europe (Carter, Vance, U.S.-U.S.S.R. com-
munique) 389
Aviation. U.S. and U.K. Reach Agreement on Air
Charter Arrangements (joint press release) . . . 426
Canada
United States and Canada Amend Fraser River
Salmon Convention 425
Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Trans-
mitted to the Senate (Carter) 125
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy -124
International Broadcasting Report Transmitted
to the Congress (Carter) 423
President Announces Measures To Control Marine
< hi Pollution (message to Congress) 422
U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Trans-
mitted to the Senate (Carter) 425
Cuba. United States and Cuba Open Talks on
Fisheries, Maritime Boundaries (joint com-
munique) 421
Educational and Cultural Affairs. United States
and Hungary Sign Exchanges Agreement 42(i
Energy. U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate (Carter) 425
Environment. President Announces Measures To
Control Marine Oil Pollution (message to Con-
gress) -122
Fisheries
United States and Canada Amend Fraser River
Salmon Convention 425
United States and Cuba Open Talks on Fisheries,
Maritime Boundaries (joint communique) 421
Human Rights. Secretary Vance Visits Moscow
and Western Europe (Carter, Vance, U.S.-
U.S.S.R. communique) 389
Hungary. United States and Hungary Sign Ex-
changes Agreement 426
Information Policy. International Broadcasting
Report Transmitted to the Congress
(Carter) 423
Maritime Affairs. President Announces Meas-
ures To Control Marine Oil Pollution (message
to Congress) 422
Middle East. Secretary Vance Visits Moscow and
tern Europe (Carter. Vance, U.S.-
U.S.S.R. communique) 389
Presidential Documents
International Broadcasting Report Transmitted
to the Congress 423
President Announces Measures To Control Marine
Oil Pollution 422
President Carter Discusses Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Proposals 409
etary Vance Visits Moscow and Western
Europe 389
U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Trans-
mitted to the Senate -125
Publications. GPO Sales Publications 428
Treaty Information
( lurrent Actions 426
1 States and Canada Amend Fraser River
Salmon < invention 425
United States and Hungary Sign Exchanges
Agreement (26
U.S. and U.K. Reach Agreement on Air Charter
Arrangements (joint pressrelease) 42ii
U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Trans-
mitted to the Senate (Carter) 425
U.S.S.R.
President Carter Discusses Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Proposals (remarks, questions and an-
swers) 109
Presidential Assistant Brzezinski's News Confer-
ence of April 1 414
Secretary Vance Visits Moscow and Western
Europe (Carter. Vance, U.S.-U.S.S.R. com-
munique) 389
United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Reach Agree-
ment on Air Charter Arrangements (joint press
release) 42(i
Name Index
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 114
Carter, President 389. 4(19. 422. 423, 425
Vance, Secretary 389
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: April 4—10
Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations. Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 2052(1.
No. Date Subject
"163 4/4 Vance, Foreign Minister Guiringaud:
remarks following meeting with
President Giscard d'Estaing,
Paris, Apr. 2.
! 1(>4 4/4 Vance, Guiringaud: remarks follow-
ing meeting, Apr. 2.
165 4/4 U.S. -Canada discussions on St. Law-
rence Seaway tolls. Apr. 1.
tl66 4/5 "Foreign Relations," 1949. vol. VII,
part 2. "The Far East and Aus-
tralasia," released.
167 4/(i U.S. and Hungary sign exchanges
agreement.
Ki.s 4/7 U.S. -U.K. air charter agreement.
*169 4/8 Government Advisory Committee on
International P.ook and Library
Programs: cancellation of Apr. 21
meeting.
17n 1/8 U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cultural
Affairs: revision of agenda for
Apr. 25 meeting.
*171 4/8 Matthew Nimetz sworn in as Coun-
selor of the Department (bio-
graphic data).
*172 4/8 Herbert J. Hansell sworn in as Legal
Adviser (biographic data).
17". 4/8 Joseph I). Duffey sworn in as As-
sistant Secretary for Educational
and Cultural Affairs (biographic
data)
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76,
/?7f
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1975 • May 2, 1977
PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES DECISIONS ON NUCLEAR POWER POLICY 429
U.S. URGES GLOBAL VIEW OF WATER RESOURCE PROBLEMS
Statement by Charles Hugh Warren in the U.N. Water Conference 437
DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES DEBT SITUATIONS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND THE ROLE OF PRIVATE BANKS
Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Boeker 441
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
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May 2, 1977
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interested agencies of the government I
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President Carter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy
Following is a statement by President
Carter issued on April 7, together with ex-
cerpts from the transcript of his remarks and
questions and answers with news corre-
spondents at the White House that day.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER
White House press release dated April 7
There is no dilemma today more difficult
to resolve than that connected with the use
of nuclear power. Many countries see nu-
clear power as the only real opportunity, at
least in this century, to reduce the depend-
ence of their economic well-being on foreign
oil — an energy source of uncertain availabil-
ity, growing price, and ultimate exhaustion.
The United States, by contrast, has a major
domestic energy source — coal — but its use is
not without penalties, and our plans also call
for the use of nuclear power as a share in
our energy production.
The benefits of nuclear power are thus
very real and practical. But a serious risk
accompanies worldwide use of nuclear
power — the risk that components of the nu-
clear power process will be turned to provid-
ing atomic weapons.
We took an important step in reducing the
risk of expanding possession of atomic
weapons through the Nonproliferation
Treaty, whereby more than 100 nations have
agreed not to develop such explosives. But
we must go further. The United States is
deeply concerned about the consequences for
all nations of a further spread of nuclear
weapons or explosive capabilities. We
believe that these risks would be vastly in-
creased by the further spread of sensitive
technologies which entail direct access to
plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or
other weapons-usable material. The question
I have had under review from my first day
in office is how can that be accomplished
without forgoing the tangible benefits of
nuclear power.
We are now completing an extremely
thorough review of all the issues that bear
on the use of nuclear power. We have
concluded that the serious consequences of
proliferation and direct implications for
peace and security, as well as strong scien-
tific and economic evidence, require:
— A major change in U.S. domestic nu-
clear energy policies and programs; and
— A concerted effort among all nations to
find better answers to the problems and
risks accompanying the increased use of nu-
clear power.
I am announcing today some of my deci-
sions resulting from that review:
First, we will defer indefinitely the com-
mercial reprocessing and recycling of the
plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear
power programs. From our own experience
we have concluded that a viable and eco-
nomic nuclear power program can be sus-
tained without such reprocessing and re-
cycling. The plant at Barnwell, South
Carolina, will receive neither Federal en-
couragement nor funding for its completion
as a reprocessing facility.
Second, we will restructure the U.S.
breeder reactor program to give greater
priority to alternative designs of the
breeder and to defer the date when breeder
reactors would be put into commercial use.
Third, we will redirect funding of U.S.
nuclear research and development programs
to accelerate our research into alternative
nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve
May 2, 1977
429
direct access to materials usable in nuclear
weapons.
Fourth, we will increase U.S. production
capacity for enriched uranium to provide
adequate and timely supply of nuclear fuels
for domestic and foreign needs.
Fifth, we will propose the necessary legis-
lative steps to permit the United States to
offer nuclear fuel supply contracts and
guarantee delivery of such nuclear fuel to
other countries.
Sixth, we will continue to embargo the
export of equipment or technology that
would permit uranium enrichment and chem-
ical reprocessing.
Seventh, we will continue discussions with
supplying and recipient countries alike of a
wide range of international approaches and
frameworks that will permit all nations to
achieve their energy objectives while
reducing the spread of nuclear explosive ca-
pability. Among other things, we will
explore the establishment of an international
nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program aimed
at developing alternative fuel cycles and a
variety of international and U.S. measures
to assure access to nuclear fuel supplies and
spent fuel storage for nations sharing
common nonproliferation objectives.
We will continue to consult very closely
with a number of governments regarding
the most desirable multilateral and bilateral
arrangements for assuring that nuclear
energy is creatively harnessed for peaceful
economic purposes. Our intent is to develop
wider international cooperation in regard to
this vital issue through systematic and thor-
ough international consultations.
EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT CARTER'S
REMARKS AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS '
The second point I'd like to make before I
answer questions is concerning our nation's
efforts to control the spread of nuclear
explosive capability.
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Apr! 11 1977
p. 502.
As far back as 30 years ago, our govern-
ment made a proposal to the United Nations
that there be tight international controls
over nuclear fuels and particularly those
that might be made into explosives.
Last year during the Presidential cam-
paign, both I and President Ford called for
strict controls over fuels to prevent the
proliferation — further proliferation of nu-
clear explosive capability.
There is no dilemma today more difficult
to address than that connected with the use
of atomic power. Many countries see atomic
power as their only real opportunity to deal
with the dwindling supplies of oil, the
increasing price of oil, and the ultimate
exhaustion of both oil and natural gas. Our
country is in a little better position. We
have oil supplies of our own, and we have
very large reserves of coal. But even coal
has its limitations. So we will ourselves con-
tinue to use atomic power as a share of our
total energy production.
The benefits of nuclear power, particu-
larly to some foreign countries that don't
have oil and coal of their own, are very
practical and critical. But a serious risk is
involved in the handling of nuclear fuels —
the risk that component parts of this power
process will be turned to providing explo-
sives or atomic weapons.
We took an important step in reducing
this risk a number of years ago by the im-
plementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty,
which has now been signed by approx-
imately a hundred nations. But we must go
further.
We have seen recently India evolve an
explosive device derived from a peaceful
nuclear power plant, and we now feel that
several other nations are on the verge of be-
coming nuclear explosive powers.
The United States is deeply concerned
about the consequences of the uncontrolled
spread of this nuclear weapon capability. We
can't arrest it immediately and unilaterally.
We have no authority over other countries.
But we believe that these risks would be
vastly increased by the further spread of
reprocessing capabilities of the spent nu-
clear fuel from which explosives can be
derived. Plutonium is especially poisonous,
430
Department of State Bulletin
and of course, enriched uranium, thorium,
and other chemicals or metals can be used as
well.
We are now completing an extremely
thorough review of our own nuclear power
program. We have concluded that serious
consequences can be derived from our own
laxity in the handling of these materials and
the spread of their use by other countries.
And we believe that there is strong scien-
tific and economic evidence that a time for a
change has come.
Therefore we will make a major change in
the U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies
and programs, which I am announcing
today. We will make a concerted effort
among all other countries to find better an-
swers to the problems and risks of nuclear
proliferation. And I would like to outline a
few things now that we will do specifically:
First of all, we will defer indefinitely the
commercial reprocessing and recycling of the
plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power
programs. From my own experience, we
have concluded that a viable and adequate
economic nuclear program can be maintained
without such reprocessing and recycling of
plutonium. The plant at Barnwell, South
Carolina, for instance, will receive neither
Federal encouragement nor funding from us
for its completion as a reprocessing facility.
Second, we will restructure our own U.S.
breeder program to give greater priority to
alternative designs of the breeder other
than plutonium and to defer the date when
breeder reactors would be put into commer-
cial use. We will continue research and de-
velopment, try to shift away from
plutonium, defer dependence on the breeder
reactor for commercial use.
Third, we will direct funding of U.S. nu-
clear research and development programs to
accelerate our research into alternative
nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve di-
rect access to materials that can be used for
nuclear weapons.
Fourth, we will increase the U.S. capacity
to produce nuclear fuels, enriched uranium
in particular, to provide adequate and timely
supplies of nuclear fuels to countries that
need them so that they will not be required
or encouraged to reprocess their own mate-
rials.
Fifth, we will propose to the Congress the
necessary legislative steps to permit us to
sign these supply contracts and remove the
pressure for the reprocessing of nuclear
fuels by other countries that do not now
have this capability.
Sixth, we will continue to embargo the
export of either equipment or technology
that could permit uranium enrichment and
chemical reprocessing.
And seventh, we will continue discussions
with supplying countries and recipient coun-
tries, as well, of a wide range of international
approaches and frameworks that will permit
all countries to achieve their own energy
needs while at the same time reducing the
spread of the capability for nuclear explo-
sive development. Among other things — and
we have discussed this with 15 or 20 na-
tional leaders already — we will explore the
establishment of an international nuclear
fuel cycle evaluation program so that we can
share with countries that have to reprocess
nuclear fuel the responsibility for curtailing
the ability for the development of explo-
sives.
One other point that ought to be made in
the international negotiation field is that we
have to help provide some means for the
storage of spent nuclear fuel materials which
are highly explosive, highly radioactive in
nature.
I have been working very closely with and
personally with some of the foreign leaders
who are quite deeply involved in the deci-
sions that we make. We are not trying to
impose our will on those nations like Japan
and France and Britain and Germany which
already have reprocessing plants in opera-
tion. They have a special need that we don't
have in that their supplies of petroleum
products are not available. But we hope that
they will join with us — and I believe that
they will — in trying to have some worldwide
understanding of the extreme threat of the
further proliferation of nuclear explosive
capability.
Q. Mr. P)'esident, in the last Administra-
tion there was some proposal to haw re-
May 2, 1977
431
gional reprocessing centers, which seem to
some people to put the emphasis on the
wrong thing. Does this mean that you are
going to not favor regional reprocessing cen-
ters? And secondly, would you be prepared
to cut off supplies of any kind of nuclear
material to countries that go nuclear?
The President: Well, I can't answer either
one of those questions yet. I have had
detailed discussions with Prime Minister
Fukuda, with Chancellor Schmidt, and also
with Prime Minister Callaghan, for instance,
just in recent days about a joint approach to
these kinds of problems.
Obviously, the smaller nations, the ones
that now have established atomic power
plants, have to have someplace either to
store their spent fuel or to have it reproc-
essed. And I think that we would very likely
see a continuation of reprocessing
capabilities within those nations that I have
named and perhaps others.
We in our own country don't have this re-
quirement. It's an option that we might
have to explore many, many years in the
future.
But I hope that by this unilateral action
we can set a standard and that those coun-
tries that don't now have reprocessing
capability will not acquire that capability in
the future. Regional plants under tight in-
ternational control obviously is one option
that we would explore. No decision has been
made about that.
If we felt that the provision of atomic fuel
was being delivered to a nation that did not
share with us our commitment to non-
proliferation, we would not supply that fuel.
Q. Mr. President, this carries an assur-
ance, which you had said earlier, for an
assured and adequate supply of enriched
uranium to replace the need for plutonium.
Do you foresee any kind of price guarantees
also for underdeveloped and poorer
countries so that the supply would not only
be assured but at a reasonable price in case
lack of reprocessing drove prices up?
The President: I don't know what the
future prices of uranium might be. At the
present time, of the enriched uranium that
we produce, about roughly a third of it is
exported, roughly a third of it is used for
our domestic needs, and about a third of it is
put in storage.
There has been an attenuation in recent
years of the projected atomic power plant
construction in our own country. Other na-
tions, though, are moving more and more
toward atomic power plants. But I can't tell
you at this point that we will guarantee a
price for uranium fuel that's less than our
own cost of production; and that would be a
matter of negotiation, perhaps even on an
individual national basis.
I think that a standard price would proba-
bly be preferable, but then we might very
well give a particular nation that was desti-
tute or a very close friend of ours or who
cooperated with us in this matter some sort
of financial aid to help them with the pur-
chase.
Q. You also said last year a couple of
times that you hoped to call a world energy
conference to discuss this as well as a lot of
other things. Do you foresee that happening
any tune in the near future?
The President: The item of nuclear power
plants and the handling of spent nuclear
fuels and the curtailment of the possibility
of new nations joining us in their capability
for explosives will be on the agenda in the
discussions in London early in May. And
this will be a continuing process for us.
I might add that Secretary Vance also
discussed this question with the Soviet au-
thorities on his recent visit to Moscow and
asked them to join in with us in enhancing
the nonproliferation concept. Their response
was favorable. But it will entail a great deal
of negotiation, and I can't anticipate what
the results of those negotiations might be.
We obviously hope for it to apply to all the
nations in the world.
Q. Mr. President, does your change in the
domestic program mean that you will not
authorize building the Clinch River breeder
reactor in Tennessee?
The President: The Clinch River breeder
reactor will not be terminated as such. In
432
Department of State Bulletin
my own budget recommendations to the
Congress, we cut back — I can't remember
the exact figure — about $250 million out of
the plutonium breeder reactor, the liquid
metal fast breeder reactor program.
I think that we would continue with the
breeder reactor program on an experimental
basis, research and development, but not
move nearly so rapidly toward any sort of
commercial use.
We also, obviously, are concerned about
the adverse economic impact of these
changes. And in the areas that would lose
employment that was presently extant, as
we increase our capacity for producing nu-
clear fuels, even using new techniques,
other than gaseous diffusion, like centrifuge
and laser beam use, then we would try to lo-
cate those facilities over a period of time —
it's a very slow-moving process — in areas
like Clinch River where they might be
adversely affected.
Q. Mr. President, does this mean that
Canada selling nuclear power equipment to
France and others, and France selling to
others — does this mean that we will supply
those other countries so that they won't
make more power?
The President: Well, I might say that the
two countries that most nearly share our
commitment and even moved ahead of us in
this field have been Canada — perhaps be-
cause of their unfortunate experience with
India — and Australia. Both those countries,
along with us, have substantial supplies of
nuclear fuel themselves.
I would hope that we could develop an
interrelationship with other countries to re-
move the competitive aspect of reprocessing
itself. There is obviously going to be con-
tinued competition among our own nation,
Canada, France, Germany, England, in the
selling of atomic power plants themselves. It
ought to be a clearly drawn distinction be-
tween the legitimate and necessary use of
uranium and other enriched fuels to produce
electricity, on the one hand, and a prohibi-
tion against the use of those fuels for explo-
sives.
It would be impossible, counterproduc-
tive, and ill advised for us to try to prevent
other countries that need it from having the
capability to produce electricity from atomic
power. But I would hope that we and the
other countries could form an alliance that
might be fairly uniform in this respect. I
know that all the other countries share with
us this hope.
The one difference that has been very
sensitive, as it relates to, say, Germany, Ja-
pan, and others, is that they fear that our
unilateral action in renouncing the reproc-
essing of spent fuels to produce plutonium
might imply that we prohibit them or
criticize them severely because of their own
need for reprocessing. This is not the case.
They have a perfect right to go ahead and
continue with their own reprocessing ef-
forts. But we hope they'll join with us in
eliminating in the future additional countries
that might have had this capability evolve.
Q. Mr. President, is it your assessment,
sir, that some of the smaller nations that
are now seeking reprocessing technology are
doing so in order to attain nuclear weapon
capability as well as or in addition to meet-
ing their legitimate energy needs?
The President: Well, without going into
specifics — I wouldn't want to start naming
names — I think it's obvious that some of the
countries about whom we are concerned
have used their domestic nuclear power
plants to develop explosive capability. There
is no doubt about it.
India, which is basically a peaceful nation,
at least as far as worldwide connotations are
concerned, did evolve an explosive capabil-
ity from supplies that were given to them by
the Canadians and by us. And we feel that
there are other nations that have potential
capacity already for the evolution of explo-
sives.
But we are trying to make sure that from
this point on that the increasing number of
nations that might have joined the nuclear
nations is attenuated drastically. We can't
undo immediately the mistakes that have
been made in the past. But I believe that
this is a step in the right direction.
May 2, 1977
433
President Sadat of Egypt
Visits Washington
President Anwar al-Sadat of the Arab
Republic of Egypt made an official visit to
Washington April 3-6, during which he met
with President Carter and other government
officials. Following is an exchange of re-
marks between President Carter and Presi-
dent Sadat at a welcoming ceremony in the
East Room of the White House on April J,. !
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 11
PRESIDENT CARTER
First of all, let me say that the weather is
not at all indicative of the warmth that we
feel in our own hearts and minds for the
visit of President and Mrs. Sadat. He said
that he's very glad to see the rain, that in
Egypt they don't get quite as much as we
have here. And this is kind of a treat for
him. I am looking forward to an opportunity
to go to his great country.
One of the most exciting experiences that
I have had was to visit recently the
tremendous exhibit of just a few of the pre-
cious items from the tomb of King Tut-
ankhamen, or King Tut as most of us refer to
it. My wife and I and our family went to the
National Gallery. And we were over-
whelmed at its beauty and the ancient herit-
age that belongs to Egypt. I believe that the
sending of this exhibit to our country — and
it is now moving from one great city to
another — has been a good omen for the rela-
tionship that is going to continue to improve
between the people of Egypt and the people
of the United States.
President Sadat, people stood in line all
night long, waiting to go in to see the
exhibit. And I think I can truthfully say
that of the almost one million Americans
who visited this exhibit in Washington, none
of them were disappointed and they thought
1 For an exchange of toasts between President Car-
ter and President Sadat at a dinner at the White
House on Apr. 4, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents dated Apr. 11, 1977, p. 490.
that the wait in line was well worth it when
they saw these treasures.
I am very grateful that I have been lucky
enough to be President during this year, a
year when President Sadat and other
leaders in the Middle East have established
a very special goal of major achievements in
bringing peace to that troubled region of the
world.
There are no easy answers. There have
now been about 29 years of search for ac-
commodation among the nations who inhabit
that precious area of ground. And I think
it's fair to say that with President Sadat's
close relationship with his own people, their
trust in him as a leader, his superb demon-
stration of courage to make statements of
hope and determination that 1977 will be a
fruitful year for negotiations, that he has
been an inspiration to us all. He under-
stands the complexities of the issues there.
But he also sees very clearly, as I am be-
ginning to learn, the tremendous benefits
that can be derived if leaders like him and
others can meet with a common purpose to
establish peace on a permanent basis in the
eastern part of the Mediterranean and
among those nations who share a common
heritage, a common history, common
ancestors, the opportunities for improved
trade, economic benefits for citizens there,
an end to the military arms race, and an op-
portunity to live in harmony, one with
another.
I'd also like to say that I have been looking
forward to a chance to establish a close and
personal friendship with President Sadat. I
have never talked to an American leader in
this Administration or the past Administra-
tions in the executive branch of government
or in the Congress who had met him who
didn't come away impressed with his sen-
sitivity, his intelligence, his vision, and his
courage. I hope to learn a lot from him and
to share with him, as best we can, the
prospects for the interested parties this
year to search out a common basis for a
peaceful and permanent solution to that
troubled region of the world.
Our own country will offer its good of-
fices, when called upon to do so, to share
434
Department of State Bulletin
with nations located there to find this peace-
ful resolution. We understand the common
ground on which that peace might be
brought. And I personally am willing to de-
vote a great deal of my own time and the
time of the American Government to
cooperation in this worthwhile pursuit to-
ward a great goal which might bring stabil-
ity to the entire world.
So, I would like to say in closing that
President Sadat is received here in our own
country with a warm welcome, appreciation
for his great achievements in the past, and a
hope that with his leadership and that of
others in the Mideast region, that the
achievements might be even greater this
year.
Thank you for coming to see us. I look
forward to detailed discussions about many
items that are on our agenda. And Mrs.
Sadat, we are very grateful that you could
come and be with us also. President Sadat,
welcome.
PRESIDENT SADAT
Mr. President: It is with great pleasure
that I revisit your country and meet with
such a statesman who is the personification
of the new spirit that is emerging in
America today.
For so long we have been told that politics
is amoral and that international relations are
not the domain of idealism or spirituality, but
one of expediency and the pursuit of selfish
interests. But the unfortunate turn of
events in the past decades and the suffering
that has been inflicted upon many of our fel-
low men have shaken the foundations of
these premises and confronted us with a
new challenge.
We had to reexamine the postulates which
we have taken for granted or acquiesced to
for centuries. A process of soul-searching
became inevitable for the salvation of man-
kind. Only leaders with vision and exceptional
wisdom were able to grasp the magnitude of
the problem and recognize the pressing need
for a bold change without delay.
It is quite evident, Mr. President, that
you were among those farsighted and
perceptive leaders. On the first day you as-
sumed the awesome responsibility of your
office, you took pride in the fact that your
society was the first one to define itself in
terms of both spirituality and human liberty.
You pledged to spare no effort to help shape
a just and peaceful world that is truly
humane.
It is in this spirit that I come to your
great country with an open mind and an
open heart in order to work with you for
strengthening the structure of peace and
promoting the revival of idealism in interna-
tional relations.
I am certain that you know, Mr. Presi-
dent, that Egypt ever since its emergence
as a state more than 7,000 years ago has
been a land of ideals and principles. From
time immemorial, the Egyptian has re-
mained faithful to higher values and ideals
which render human life more rewarding
and fulfilling. His belief in the divine truth,
the afterlife, and the day of judgment — all
this has instilled in him an extraordinary
sense of justice and a genuine conviction of
the universal brotherhood of man.
It is not a mere coincidence, therefore,
that we share with you the belief that the
only way to improve the quality of our life is
to reinstall the long-neglected idealism and
spirituality which enrich our existence indi-
vidually and collectively.
Mr. President, a few w T eeks ago, you
pledged to devote a major part of your time
this year to efforts toward a lasting peace in
the Middle East. Undoubtedly, this genuine
determination stemmed out of thoughtful
realization on your part of the possibility as
well as the necessity to establish peace in
the area after 29 years of devastating wars
and stifling tension.
This also demonstrates your enlightened
awareness that your country has a certain
mission to fulfill and a major responsibility
to contribute positively to the process of
peace in the Middle East. More important,
you registered your willingness and even
enthusiasm to fully assume this
responsibility.
In your speech at the United Nations on
May 2, 1977
435
March 17, you reiterated that your country
has the strength of ideals and that you are
determined to maintain these ideals as the
backbone of your policy. I endorse this
statement and hope to see it implemented in
practice. Such ideals certainly coincide with
the norms of legitimacy and legality in in-
ternational behavior.
Thus, you cannot support foreign occupa-
tion of one's land or tolerate territorial
expansionism. We know that attachment to
one's land is a value which is deeply rooted
in the fabric of the American society. It is
the central force that made the realization of
the American dream possible.
Mr. President, I am sure that you concur
with me that it would be a grave mistake to
waste this golden opportunity to put an end
to a state of affairs that has plagued our
area for decades.
There is every indication that you are
aware of the centrality of the Palestinian
cause to the entire dispute. It is the core
and crux of the issue. No progress what-
soever can be achieved so long as this prob-
lem remains unsolved.
In your public pronouncements in recent
weeks, you came very close to the proper
remedy. What is needed is the establish-
ment of a political entity where the
Palestinians can, at long last, be a commu-
nity of citizens, not a group of refugees. The
humanitarian dimension of their plight is
merely one of the aspects of the problem.
Their yearning to exercise their normal
rights remains the heart of the issue.
Mr. President, the Arab nation, with its
long history of tolerance and cooperation
with other nations, is eager to contribute
further to the welfare and prosperity of
mankind. It harbors no ill-feeling toward
any people, nor has it ever experienced
prejudice or hatred against any creed or
peoples. We remain committed to peace in
our area and in the world at large.
Mr. President, over the past few years, I
worked with your predecessors to develop
ties of cooperation and mutual understand-
ing between our two peoples. I am glad to
say that we are satisfied with the
development of our bilateral relations and
are looking forward for an era of an ever-
increasing exchange and interaction during
your Presidency. In this respect, I must
express my people's gratitude and mine, Mr.
President, for the gallant action from your
side, helping us in our economic problems
lately. Really, it has shown the valiant
American spirit after you have helped us in
many ways in the last few years, especially
in preparing the Suez Canal for the naviga-
tion and for the prosperity of the whole
world.
Mr. President, I am carrying to every
American a message of friendship and amity
from 40 million Egyptians. We wish you all
the success and gratification of fulfillment
you are aspiring to. Let us pray to God Al-
mighty so that the days ahead may witness
a happy American family under every roof
and a state of peace and solidarity in every
community. Let us also pray that God
grants us the strength to establish a better
world for the generations to come.
Hi
436
Department of State Bulletin
I.S. Urges Global View of Water Resource Problems
The United Nations Water Conference met
at Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 14 -25.
Following is the principal U.S. statement
on world water problems, made in plenary
session of the conference on March 15 by
Charles Hugh Warren, Chairman of the
Council on Environmental Quality, who
headed the U.S. delegation.
President Carter has asked our delegation
to extend his greetings and express his per-
sonal interest in the results of this confer-
ence. He hopes, as do we, that our
deliberations here will lead not only to the
customary report but to an actual improve-
ment in the lives of all people. Our subject
here, of course, is water — its quality, its
availability, and its use. Now, as in histori-
cal times, it shapes the very framework of
our lives.
During the rule of Caesar Augustus, the
population density of Italy was only 24 per-
sons per square kilometer; and that of
Greece, only 11 persons. By contrast, Egypt
was able to support 280 persons per square
kilometer. Later, in medieval times, Cor-
doba, the capital of Moorish Spain, is esti-
mated to have had a million inhabitants,
while north of the Alps the most populous
city was London — which had only 35,000.
The greatest single factor in these re-
gional population differences appears not to
have been migration, the effects of war, or
culture as we commonly define it; that factor
was water. The northern regions practiced
what is known as "rainfall farming"; the in-
habitants watered their crops with what the
skies offered. The southern regions, on the
other hand, practiced "hydraulic agricul-
ture"; they erected dams, dug canals, and
built irrigation ditches to convey water into
fields for intensive, continuous cultivation.
Today the techniques of hydraulic
agriculture — and indeed, of hydraulic life —
have spread to virtually every nation. In
this respect, the nations of the north have
benefited from a technology pioneered by
the nations of the south. We all know how to
impound water; how to collect it in lakes and
reservoirs; how to move it from one place to
another through canals and pumps and irri-
gation channels; how to probe deeper into
the earth for it; how to drain it from places
where it is plentiful and divert it to drylands
for food or livestock.
Yet the apparent success of our technol-
ogy has seduced many of us into thinking
that we have entirely tamed water and that
its abundance is limited only by human in-
genuity and technology.
Events of the last few years, however,
have made it clear that this is not so. A pro-
longed drought in the Sahel took a terrible
toll of human lives and rendered vast areas
of land incapable of sustaining plant and
animal life. In the western regions of the
United States lack of rainfall and snow has
prolonged drought conditions and reduced
already short water supplies. Also in the
United States, as in other parts of the
world, shortsighted forest practices and
overgrazing by livestock are destroying the
capacity of land to absorb water, filter it,
and recharge ground supplies.
The basic lessons to be derived from these
and other of man's misadventures with
water are these:
— First, despite our ingenuity in convert-
ing natural resources to our own use and
convenience, we still experience major fluc-
tuations in the supply of water;
— Second, though water seems inexhaus-
tible, it is, in fact, limited; and
May 2, 1977
437
— Third, water is not entirely a passive
resource to be extracted and d Q, ' o1 nppd as
we see fit. The hydrologic cycle that
supplies us with water has an integrity of its
own, pursuing its way from the skies, across
the land, and back to the sea in courses that
were ancient before man emerged on the
globe. Human activities can benefit from
this cycle, but we should recognize that
when we allow our activities to disrupt the
cycle itself we do so at our peril.
Today we more fully appreciate that the
earth's processes of supply cannot indefi-
nitely accommodate man's accelerating
demand for water nor can they cleanse the
pollutants and poisons which human ac-
tivities cause to be discharged into surface
and underground water bodies.
In my country, a series of water short-
ages, water problems, and indeed, water dis-
asters is forcing us to reconsider policies
heretofore considered farsighted and
advanced. We are beginning to reduce our
emphasis on water development and to give
more thought to water management. We are
beginning to distinguish human needs for
water from human desires for water. In
short, we are beginning to employ an en-
vironmental perspective in evaluating water
projects and water use, recognizing that the
supply and quality of water are affected by a
host of factors that have nothing to do with
hydraulic engineering.
Foremost among such other factors is
population. We all know global population
will double in the next 35 years. Our de-
mand for water, however, will double in far
less time, due to the increased need for
water to support intensive agriculture and
industrial expansion.
The location of people is another factor.
Instead of settling in places where safe
water is abundant, people have been en-
couraged to settle where they must rely
upon complex systems to bring water to
them. Sometimes such systems violate
natural laws which set certain limits for the
carrying capacity of the land and the water
potential of underground aquifers.
In addition, other human activities
threaten the quality of our water. As rain
falls, it picks up pollution in the air. After
falling on the land it picks up fertilizer, pes-
ticides, and silt from farms; it picks up acid
from mine wastes and oil from highways and
streets; it picks up a great diversity of
chemicals from industrial and municipal
establishments — especially human wastes.
These pollutants and poisons find their way
through the earth's water cycle.
In pointing out that we have begun to
move from water development to water
management, I do not mean to suggest that
the dimensions of the transition are the
same for all countries. However, despite dif-
ferences in population, geographic-
advantage, and state of development, I do
believe most nations share, in varying de-
grees, water problems and experiences simi-
lar to our own.
At issue, then, is how the earth's fixed
supply of water can be managed to meet fu-
ture demands imposed by the worldwide
growth of population, agriculture, and
industry. Specifically, we need to identify
our most likely water needs and problems
and consider how best to avert a global
water crisis. The United States takes this
issue and this conference most seriously. We
expect to learn more of and from your local
and regional experience and assessments.
The information we gather here, coupled
with the formal findings of the conference,
will be given by me directly to President
Carter.
We know that many topics will be
discussed in our report to him. However, at
this time I want to discuss but three vital
issues of interest to us all: community water
and health; water for food and fiber; and
disaster assistance.
First, community water and health. In
many regions, population growth and shifts
in population distribution resulting from
intensive urbanization have led to abuses in
consumption patterns and water shortages.
We would hope, therefore, that countries
with less than abundant water supplies or
with high population growth in areas of
marginal water availability would emphasize
policies to reduce rates of population
growth, encourage resource-oriented
438
Department of State Bulletin
settlements, stimulate reclamation and con-
servation, and finally, adopt development
technologies appropriate to specific water
needs.
In addition to supply, water must be of
such quality as to enhance health. The
United States has supported community
water supply and sanitation programs. Our
support program for water and sanitation
purposes to date totals $860 million. The
United States intends to increase its em-
phasis on and commitment to such
programs, which have as their purpose the
fulfillment of basic human needs.
Benefits from non-health-oriented water
development programs are, however,
frequently diminished by the increased
transmission of water-related diseases. As
we all know, schistosomiasis, which is en-
couraged by construction of dams and
irrigation ditches, now infects between 100
and 200 million people around the globe.
Only by recognizing the relationships be-
tween water and disease, and by supporting
preventive management strategies, can we
increase the well-being of people.
It is essential that we explicitly consider
the health impacts of each water resource
project as part of our environmental review
and that such review be as carefully consid-
ered and measured as our cost-benefit
analyses. As an example, the United States
is currently funding the environmental anal-
ysis of the Senegal River Basin and in sub-
Sahelian Africa is supporting projects de-
signed to assess the public health impacts of
water resource development. Moreover, we
will assist countries in training project man-
agers to assess the environmental health
consequences of their own development
proposals.
Second, water for food and fiber. Our
analysis of crop yields, farming conditions,
and water utilization around the world
indicates that the overriding focus should
not be on the amount of new land and water
that might be developed for agriculture but,
rather, on improving the effectiveness with
which water and other production aids are
applied and managed on land already under
cultivation. Of course some countries will
have to irrigate additional land in order to
meet their food and fiber needs. However,
because of the high cost of development and
the danger of long-term environmental de-
gradation, new irrigation projects should be
planned carefully and thoroughly.
In the United States we are emphasizing
better water management of both irrigated
and rain-fed lands. We are beginning to
realize the need to protect our remaining
prime agricultural lands from urban en-
croachment. We do so in recognition of the
need to increase the production of food and
fiber. For the same purpose, the United
States believes that the highest priority
should be given to improving the utilization
of water in existing irrigation projects and
in projects under development. Efficiency of
water use on these projects is generally re-
markably low. Improvement will require
that countries and regional and international
organizations give increased attention to
better irrigation practices on the farm, dis-
tribution systems to fields, and provision of
drainage.
Third, disaster assistance. Despite our
best efforts toward comprehensive planning
and management of water resources, we
continue to suffer from droughts and floods.
Solutions to these and other natural disas-
ters will not readily be found — but we
should continue to seek ways to expand our
cooperative efforts around the globe to
predict and then to mitigate such disasters.
When disasters occur, the United States
pledges to continue its commitment to aid
and assist stricken peoples everywhere,
should that assistance be desired.
If the world community is to avert water
crises of local, national, or global dimen-
sions, we must have accurate, pertinent,
and timely water data and information at
each of those levels. We should improve and
share methods for collecting, storing, and
exchanging data on ground and surface
water quantity and quality and on current
and projected water uses. We should use
this information to inform our decisionmak-
ers and their constituencies about the
necessity for long-term management of lim-
ited water resources.
The United States is prepared to provide
May 2, 1977
439
technical aid and assistance to other nations
interested in designing information systems
to upgrade their own assessments of water
resource needs.
But water resource data and technology
will be of little use without trained people.
Because water resource management re-
quires familiarity with the specific region
and its resources, the training should be
done in and by the countries concerned.
Such training programs can, however, draw
on the collective knowledge and expertise of
many other countries whenever it is not
readily available locally. The United States
has had a strong commitment to such train-
ing efforts in the past and we are prepared
to continue and expand this commitment in
the future.
These comments also apply to the related
question of technology transfer. Technical
knowledge exists which can help solve many
of the problems of concern to us all. Its use,
however, must be appropriate to the human
need.
President Carter has asked me to express
his conviction that, if this conference is to
succeed in its aims, we must follow up our
deliberations with action. Consequently, the
U.S. delegation fully endorses Secretary
General Mageed's [Yahia Abdel Mageed, of
Sudan, Secretary General of the conference]
desire to fix responsibility for acting on the
specific recommendations of this conference.
Our delegation will report back to Presi-
dent Carter on the results of our efforts dur-
ing the next several days. In addition, our
government is planning a major national
conference on water this May. We will make
sure that the recommendations of the
United Nations Water Conference are
brought to the attention of our national
conference.
Mr. President, it is in this spirit of com-
mitment to the broad purposes of this con-
ference, within the framework outlined, that
we approach the work of the next several
days.
We hope and trust that our collective ef-
fort will result in new perceptions for all of
us, in a new global view of the water re-
source field, and in a consensus on the ur-
gent problems ahead, which we —
mankind — must face and solve together.
World Trade Week, 1 977
A PROCLAMATION 1
We live in a world where all of us must depend on
each other — a world divided by nationality and
philosophy, but drawn together by common problems
and common hopes. We share with all people a concern
about unemployment, inequality, poverty, inflation,
and the danger of war. And we share with all people
the hope of a life free of hunger, disease, and repres-
sion, and a determination to overcome international
differences with mutual trust, respect and cooperation.
Our desire for justice, stability, and peace finds
practical expression in world trade. Trade generates
forces of friendship and understanding, which in turn
bring us closer to the kind of world we want.
The United States is the unsurpassed leader in
international commerce. Because our total trade is
greater than that of any other nation, we can, by in-
creasing our trade activities, make an enormous con-
tribution to the health of the international economy, to
the job market at home and abroad, to progressive re-
lationships between rich and poor nations and, finally,
to the cause of peace on our globe.
Now, Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, President of
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the
week beginning May 22, 1977, as World Trade Week. I
urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, profes-
sional and civic groups, the communications media, and
all concerned Americans, to observe World Trade
Week with meetings, discussions, exhibits, cere-
monies, and other appropriate activities that promote
continuing awareness of the importance of world trade
to our Nation and to our relations with other nations.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
this eighth day of April, in the year of our Lord nine-
teen hundred seventy-seven, and of the Independence
of the United States of America the two hundred and
first.
Jimmy Carter.
No. 4496; 42 Fed. Reg. 18855.
440
Department of State Bulletin
Department Discusses Debt Situations of Developing Countries
and the Role of Private Banks
Statement by Paul H. Boeker
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs x
I would like to speak briefly about the na-
ture of the current international financing
problem and then provide my assessment of
developing-country debt situations and the
role being played in that situation by inter-
national lending on the part of private
banks.
Since the winter of 1973-74, the
oil-importing countries have been forced to
share a collective deficit on current account
which corresponds to the surplus of the oil-
exporting countries. 2 This pattern has
clearly made the international economy a
more sensitive system and one requiring
greater attention to its management by all
countries and by the international financial
institutions. The magnitude of the collective
deficit and the suddenness with which it de-
veloped meant that while international pay-
ments adjustment was certainly in order,
adequate adjustment could be achieved only
at a gradual pace and over a number of
years. The size of the disequilibrium also
meant that the financing requirements of
deficit countries during the adjustment
period would be exceptionally large.
1 Made on Apr. 5 before the Subcommittee on Finan-
cial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs. The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be avail-
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
2 The current account balance is defined as the total
of sales and purchases by a country of currently pro-
duced goods and services, plus unilateral transfers,
gifts, and donations, both public and private.
Ultimate adjustment will depend upon the
world reducing its energy dependence on the
oil-exporting nations. Conservation and de-
velopment of alternate energy resources by
the major nations, particularly the United
States, will be critical.
Individual country problems will persist,
especially where there are social and politi-
cal constraints that curb the speed of
balance-of-payments adjustment. Some of
the industrial democracies, for example,
have faced difficult adjustment needs. Such
countries in particular will need the assur-
ance that sufficient external financing will
be available on reasonable terms to allow
them to move with the speed which their so-
cial and political conditions permit.
The buildup of foreign debt has been the
inevitable counterpart of the current ac-
count surpluses generated by the oil-
producing nations. Countries have wanted to
maintain reasonable rates of economic
growth during this period, thus avoiding
overly harsh deflation and resulting pres-
sures for protectionist trade policies that
would spread deflation internationally.
We have averted a crisis situation because
countries' external financing needs have
been met on adequate terms. Future crises
can be avoided, we feel, so long as adequate
financing continues and the system encour-
ages adjustment by oil-importing nations. It
is important in this regard that official
financing should be accompanied by
appropriate conditionality on the borrowers'
own economic policies.
May 2, 1977
441
On the whole, the international financial
system has held up well under the sudden
strains that were imposed upon it. The
share of the oil-importing developing coun-
tries in the global account deficit has so far
not been excessive, in my view. Some
countries have, in fact, experienced consid-
erable progress in their adjustment process.
At the same time there have been numerous
instances where balance-of-payments
positions have weakened.
Diversity of Debt Situations
Since 1973, balance-of-payments manage-
ment for most non-oil-exporting developing
countries has become very difficult. In order
to preserve development momentum, while
in most cases attempting internal adjust-
ment to the new situation, these countries
have been financing their deficits by exter-
nal borrowings on an unprecedented scale.
It is estimated that the medium- and long-
term foreign indebtedness of the
non-oil-exporting developing countries rose
from about $90 billion in 1974 to about $145
billion in 1976. Debt-service payments in
1976 were about $21 billion, an increase of
about 75 percent since 1973.
While the level of indebtedness has risen
rapidly, this does not by itself pose a threat
of acute debt-servicing difficulties. The
nominal increases are, in fact, far less
dramatic when one allows for, in this case,
the favorable effect on debt service of infla-
tion and for the growth of output and trade
over the period.
Nongovernment credits have played a sig-
nificant role in the buildup of debt. In 1975
and 1976, private markets are estimated to
have supplied roughly one-half of the credit
flows to the non-oil developing countries. As
a result, an estimated 40 percent of the out-
standing debt of these nations is now
attributable to commercial banks.
Aggregate debt statistics can be mislead-
ing, however, in that they fail to reflect the
wide diversity which exists in the situations
of developing countries. A more meaningful
picture of the debt situation is obtained by
distinguishing three broad groups of
developing-country debtors: the higher
income, semi-industrial countries; second,
the low-income developing countries; and
third, a middle category of transitional
countries.
The first category includes perhaps a
dozen rapidly growing countries, with rela-
tively high per capita income for developing
countries, which depend largely on private
markets for external capital. This dozen or
so countries, of which Brazil and Mexico are
the most important, have productive and di-
versified economies which have been capable
of generating adequate export earnings to
service debt. However, these countries will
face a substantial increase in debt-service
obligations over the next few years, and
their ability to attract new capital will be
contingent upon domestic measures to keep
their economies efficient and competitive.
Since exports bear the brunt of financing
debt service, access to and demand from
industrial-country markets will also play a
critical factor in their ability to meet their
financial obligations over the coming years.
At the other extreme of the developing-
country spectrum is a second category, low-
income countries. This is a group that has
been particularly hard hit by recent
economic events and confronts serious re-
source problems. They are looking primarily
to the developed world for concessional
transfers of resources and increased foreign
assistance to help them improve the invest-
ment situation within their own economies.
However, since they continue to benefit
from such lending and have had little
opportunity to attract significant amounts of
commercial debt, very few, if any, of these
countries have a significant debt problem as
such.
In the middle is a third category which in-
cludes a number of developing countries
with moderate per capita income which are
in transition in that they have begun
blending traditional aid-type financing with
commercial borrowing. Many of these coun-
tries are still largely dependent upon the
export of a few- commodities with highly
cyclical prices and have, therefore, external
payment situations which can be quite vari-
442
Department of State Bulletin
able. Some of these countries have so far
failed to take adequate domestic adjustment
measures and to pursue fully efficient man-
agement of their external debt. Total com-
mercial bank exposure to this category of
borrowers, however, is relatively small, and
only one of these countries has thus far
asked for a rescheduling of its official and
private debt.
Lending by Private Banks
The shocks which confronted the world's
economy in 1973 and 1974 gave many of the
oil-importing developing countries two broad
options. They could abruptly curb their
development objectives by deflating their
economies and imposing tight import restric-
tions, a course of action which would entail
significant political risk and have profound
adverse consequences on the world economy
as a whole. Alternatively, they could seek
an increased level of external finance which
would allow a more orderly adjustment
process over a longer period of years. The
latter course was clearly the option pre-
ferred by most developing countries.
Despite increased availabilities of official
financing, the extent of developing-country
financing requirements turned many of them
toward the private market. This remark-
able, although not entirely unexpected,
expansion of private lending has generated
concern regarding the position of banks and
the prospects for loan repayment. These
concerns are reinforced by an assumption
that developing countries may face some
kind of a general debt crisis.
Careful reading of the situation, I feel,
shows that despite some problems, the
lending standards of international banks
have been quite high and that general debt
difficulties for developing countries are not
likely. The selectivity of private lenders is
clearly evidenced by the concentration of
their lending to those developing countries
whose diversified economies and strong ex-
port performance provide the most
promising growth prospects.
As a result of generally prudent lending
policies, losses on bank loans to developing
countries have been small, with servicing
problems confined to relatively few coun-
tries. One of the characteristics of develop-
ing countries active in private markets has,
in fact, been their awareness that the
creditworthiness which they are so anxious
to sustain is inextricably conditioned by
their own governments' economic policies.
I believe that, on the whole, banks have
acted prudently. I also believe that private
lending, employing adequate lending stand-
ards, should continue to have a significant
role in assuring adequate capital flows to
developing countries. We should not, how-
ever, expect private creditors to maintain
indefinitely the current or an increased level
of lending to developing countries. In this
context, I believe that a better mix between
official and private lending is desirable,
given the longer term maturity of official
lending and its greater ability to facilitate
economic policy changes within the borrow-
ing countries.
Outlook and Implications
Although the 1977 payments deficit of the
non-oil-exporting developing countries will
approximate that of 1976, external borrow-
ing requirements should be somewhat
less — especially if, as expected, the
exceptionally high rate of increase in re-
serves that occurred in the past year is
slowed. Given the expected impact of
industrial-country growth on loan demand, it
would appear that private financing for de-
veloping countries will still be available at a
level commensurate with the aggregate
financing requirements they will have for
this type of borrowing. Private lenders
have, however, become increasingly cautious
about their exposure in some individual de-
veloping countries. The linkage of new
lending to borrowing countries' action to
manage efficiently their payments deficit
should receive even more emphasis than in
the past.
The increasingly selective nature of pri-
vate lending means that individual countries
encountering unexpected difficulties or de-
lays in their adjustment process could find
May 2, 1977
443
their accustomed access to private markets
weakened. Such financing problems could
become acute, especially in the event of any
slackening in the export performance of
developing countries, which means in turn
slackening in the rate of growth in the in-
dustrial countries and the world economy
generally. Import restrictions by the major
industrial-country markets on which de-
veloping countries depend could be particu-
larly significant in aggravating any financial
difficulties of this group of countries.
There are certainly grounds for caution,
since the large surpluses accruing to oil-
exporting countries will continue for several
more years. The problem of economic
adjustment to that deficit will be a continu-
ing one, and developing countries should for
several more years continue to have a
balance-of-payments deficit roughly of the
current magnitude.
In this situation, several major conclu-
sions emerge:
1. Economic growth in the poorer
developing countries will require a substan-
tial rise in concessional lending. Their ex-
ternal financial situation does not depend on
private markets.
2. In order to maintain creditworthiness
in private capital markets, the middle and
higher income developing countries must be
prepared to improve their debt management
and to make the adjustments necessary in
their own economies, even in some cases at
the cost of reducing recent growth.
3. The growth of the exports of these
countries and their access to industrial-
country markets will be critical to their
long-term process of adjustment.
4. The linkage of new lending to
performance criteria is increasingly impor-
tant for all lenders.
5. Close attention must be given to insure
that the international financial mechanisms,
such as the International Monetary Fund,
have adequate resources to respond effi-
ciently to the financing needs of developing
and other countries facing temporary
financing difficulties.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
U.S. Security Assistance Policy
for Latin America
Following is a statement by Terence A.
Todman, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, before the Subcommittee
oh Inter-American Affairs of the House
Committee on International Relations on
April 5. *
I am pleased to appear before this sub-
committee to discuss our security assistance
programs for Latin America.
The United States for many years has
maintained close working ties with the Latin
American military, both in purely military-
to-military terms and in dealing with indi-
vidual military leaders in their capacity as
presidents and ministers of the various gov-
ernments in the region.
This long association has developed an
arms relationship with the Latin American
countries that has helped us maintain access
to their military establishments, a matter of
some importance since 15 Latin American
and Caribbean nations today are governed
by or under the aegis of the armed forces.
Security assistance to these governments
thus is a political tool that provides us an
opportunity to exert some influence on their
attitudes and actions. It is, in short, a
means for protecting or advancing our inter-
ests, which are many and varied.
Among those interests in sharpest relief
today is our commitment to the defense of
human rights. President Carter has made
that commitment a priority consideration
that will help shape our foreign relations in
the years ahead. His Administration is ad-
justing the attitudes of the executive branch
to conform to the demands of the country,
which are reflected in this Congress, for a
foreign policy that is based on values the
United States prizes most highly.
Another is his interest in limiting the role
of the United States as arms supplier to the
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
444
Department of State Bulletin
world and changing the thrust of our policies
to the promotion of disarmament.
In the region for which I have responsibil-
ity for U.S. foreign relations, this means the
United States will strongly support local ini-
tiatives seeking to lessen the burden of ar-
maments. We would hope that flowing from
such initiatives will come a reduction of
tensions and the strengthening of stability
which has allowed the countries of Latin
America to pursue their affairs at peace
with one another. A specific case is our
support for the Declaration of Ayacucho,
signed in December 1974 by the Andean
states plus Argentina and Panama. The in-
tent of the signatories is to arrive at
arrangements that restrict the acquisition of
offensive weapons.
We have more traditional interests in the
region that engage our diplomatic energies.
None could be classed as strategic concerns
that are vital to the safety and well-being of
the United States. Yet there are latent se-
curity interests which must be attended
with some care, among them the Panama
Canal and its approaches, our lines of com-
munication in the Caribbean, and the
maintenance of important sealanes in the
region.
There is, finally, the range of economic
interests we have in maintaining access to
Latin American and Caribbean raw
materials, our position in the foreign trade
of the region, and the promotion and protec-
tion of extensive investments of the Ameri-
can private sector.
In this brief review of our political-
military relations in the hemisphere, I would
like to take this opportunity to put our secu-
rity assistance programs into some
perspective.
Ten or fifteen years ago, the United
States was the principal source of arma-
ments for the countries of the region. From
the middle to the late 1960's, however, that
relationship began to change radically, so
that today we rank fourth or even fifth as
the area's arms supplier. In fiscal year 1975,
for example, new orders under our FMS
[foreign military sales] program for Latin
America totaled $174.9 million. In fiscal
year 1976, a five-quarter year, they were
under $100 million. We do not have figures
for the current fiscal year, of course. The
Carter Administration's request for new
FMS credit financing for fiscal year 1978 is
$140.5 million for the region as a whole. I
would expect actual new orders to fall far
short of this in fiscal year 1978.
The U.S. share of the total Latin
American market for the past two years has
been under 15 percent. Of what we did sell
in that period, only about 25 percent went
for major items such as aircraft, ships,
weapons, ammunition, and the like. The bal-
ance is for spare parts, supporting noncom-
bat equipment, and supporting services in-
cluding training.
A number of factors have contributed to
this tailing-off in our arms transfers to the
region in recent years. One that is impor-
tant, but which is frequently overlooked, is
our restrictive transfer policy of limiting the
sophistication and quantities of armaments
that we will permit to be sold in Latin
America, particularly to the smaller and
poorer countries.
However, even for the larger and richer
countries, we refuse to sell aircraft more
advanced than the F-5 and A-4 level of
sophistication. We also deny the sale of cer-
tain advanced-technology weapons — smart
bombs, laser-guided missiles — uncon-
ventional munitions like napalm and flame-
throwers, and major combatant naval ves-
sels. Other munitions not prohibited by
regional policy are still denied in some cases;
these include certain short-range tactical
missiles.
Imposing limits of this kind often is
widely seen in Latin America as arbitrary
and patronizing, particularly with the larger
countries which today have significant
arms-manufacturing capabilities of their
own. In any case, most governments in the
area have developed important arms
relationships with Western Europe, Israel,
and the Soviet Union. In a real sense, our
restrictive policies have been an incentive
for the Latin American military to turn to
these suppliers, even though in many cases
May 2, 1977
445
we know they would have preferred to deal
with American suppliers.
Recent actions by five governments
rejecting fiscal year 1978 security assistance
underscore the independence of Latin
America in this and other fields. Their sharp
reaction to our surveys of human rights
practices in their countries, stipulated by
section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act,
reflected their deep attachment to the prin-
ciples of sovereignty and noninterference in
internal affairs.
Quite apart from the requirements of the
law for future security assistance programs.
President Carter, as I said at the outset,
has made it clear he believes that human
rights considerations are a matter of proper
international concern. The governments of
Latin America know this.
As we look at the wide scope of our inter-
ests and concerns in the region, we face an
important question: How do we, working to-
gether with these governments, find ways of
achieving improvements in the way the
people of this hemisphere are treated? It is
not a black-or-white proposition but, rather,
a complex question which must be
approached with great sensitivity.
We submit that wholesale elimination or
even substantial reduction of our security
assistance programs in Latin America would
be inadvisable. Such an abrupt approach
now, after maintaining political-military re-
lationships with these governments dating
back to and beyond the Second World War,
would produce widespread resentment and
alienation. We cannot predict the results of
such an approach — whether it might produce
improvements in the human rights situation
in these countries or, paradoxically, bring
about even worse conditions.
We hope therefore that the executive
branch will be allowed leeway to work with
the military in Latin America, using the
traditional tools of a relatively modest secu-
rity assistance program to take advantage of
whatever opportunities we might have to
advance the cause of human rights and our
other real interests in the hemisphere. That
remains the central issue.
Fifth-Year Review of Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement Begins
Joint U.S. -Canadian Statement
Press release 177 dated April 1-1
Senior Canadian and United States offi-
cials met in Washington on April 13 to begin
the joint review of progress made since 1972
under the terms of the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement. The Agreement was de-
signed to enable the two countries to under-
take a coordinated effort to clean up and
preserve the Great Lakes. Article IX of the
Agreement stipulates that the two countries
jointly review the effectiveness of programs
carried out under terms of the accord during
the first five years of its operation. The
Canadian delegation consisted of represen-
tatives of the Federal Government and the
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec.
Since 1972 substantial progress has been
made under the Agreement. Many of the
remedial programs are working well, but
much remains to be done. The review will
entail an indepth assessment of all of the
measures undertaken by the two countries
to restore the lakes and keep them healthy.
It is anticipated that the review will be
completed before the end of the year.
Over the next several months, meetings
with the public in Great Lakes communities
will be held on both sides of the border.
Those meetings, the results of the
comprehensive review by the Governments
and the work already undertaken by the In-
ternational Joint Commission, will enable
the two countries to determine how they
may reaffirm their continuing commitment
to the objectives of the Agreement and re-
spond to various proposals to strengthen the
Agreement to meet new water quality
issues.
President Carter and Prime Minister
Trudeau, in their meeting last February,
emphasized the importance they attach to
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment.
446
Department of State Bulletin
Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid Program
Following is a statement by John A.
Ferch, Director of the Office of Food Policy
and Program*, submitted to the Subcommit-
tee on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutri-
tion, and Forestry on April 5. 1
I would like to speak about the future of
the Public Law 480 program. I believe we
can be proud of the past. The food aid ac-
tivities of the United States since World
War II, I believe, have been a major contri-
bution to the welfare of all mankind. We
must now, however, look to the future. Will
there be a need for P.L. 480 over the next
10 years, and if so, how should we structure
its provisions? I believe there will be such a
need. Our ultimate objective, to be sure, is
a world in which U.S. food assistance is no
longer necessary. However, we are still far
from that situation. The food deficits of
many developing countries are large and
growing worse. P.L. 480 is more vital to
them than ever.
I therefore believe that the P.L. 480 pro-
gram should be continued and strengthened.
The latter objective can be furthered in
several ways:
— First, by gradually increasing the por-
tion of food aid which we give for humanitar-
ian purposes under title II.
— Second, by improving the development
focus of our P.L. 480 programs.
— Third, by continuing the market de-
velopment and foreign policy uses of P.L.
480 which have served our country so well
in the past.
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
I leave it to representatives from the De-
partment of Agriculture to speak to the role
of P.L. 480 in furthering domestic agricul-
tural and market development purposes. I
will address myself to its international as-
pects, which can be divided into
humanitarian, developmental, and foreign
policy considerations. I also will offer a few
remarks about P.L. 480 legislation and at-
tempt to relate P.L. 480 to our emerging
North-South policy.
The title II humanitarian food aid pro-
gram reflects the desire of the American
people to see hunger, malnutrition, and
suffering alleviated throughout the world.
The program, which should be continued and
strengthened in the years ahead, serves
several important purposes. Title II food
aid, through our management control sys-
tem, can be targeted to the highest priority
and neediest groups in recipient countries.
Title II is the major U.S. emergency food
aid response for victims of natural and
manmade disasters. It also is our principal
source of supply for world food projects op-
erated by the World Food Program,
UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund],
and other U.N. bodies. We look to the
United Nations to continue to guide this as-
pect of multilateral assistance, and we
ourselves will maintain a generous contribu-
tion.
As title II programs evolve in the years
ahead, I believe we should emphasize
projects with a maximum development link-
age. While helping to feed hungry and needy
individuals, U.S. food programs also should
help them to grow food and better provide
for themselves.
This brings me to the broader issue of
food aid and its contribution to development.
American food assistance over the past 20
May 2, 1977
447
years has contributed significantly to the
well-being and development of many Third
World countries by combating hunger and
maintaining minimum health levels.
Productivity and income levels have been
raised. In addition, provision of P.L. 480
products has eased balance-of-payments con-
straints. Their sale in the local market has
supplemented limited budgets and thereby
permitted many governments to direct a
greater portion of their scarce resources to-
ward development activities.
Notwithstanding such achievements,
donor governments have been under attack
in recent years for failing to establish a
more direct relationship between their food
aid and recipient countries' economic and so-
cial needs. It has been alleged that food aid
has, on occasion, actually hindered develop-
ment by depressing local food prices and
thereby serving as a disincentive to local
food production. Also, some argue that it
has permitted recipient governments to
postpone policy reform necessary to
stimulate agricultural development.
Although I believe that the evidence of
actual situations in which P.L. 480 has had
an adverse development impact is quite
slim, I recognize the theoretical basis of the
argument. Accordingly, the Administration
supports without reservation efforts to make
the P.L. 480 program contribute more
directly to the economic development of re-
cipient countries. Food aid is a particularly
versatile means of supporting development
programs since either it can be made
available in kind to those sectors of the
population engaged in the programs, or
through sale in the commercial markets of
the country, it can provide the financing
necessary to sustain more sophisticated as-
pects of the development plan.
Importance of Multi-Year Commitments
If we are to more strongly support
long-term development objectives with our
P.L. 480 programs, we need to be able to
negotiate long-term multi-year food aid
commitments. Several proposals have been
made along these lines, which we wish to
review carefully. Long-term commitments
can help us assure that P.L. 480 programs
foster and contribute to agricultural
production and do not act as a disincentive.
Stable and assured U.S. food aid supplies
over a period of several years would facili-
tate development planning and would enable
countries to undertake more far-reaching
agricultural reform programs. P.L. 480
commodities provided in support of a de-
velopment plan also can be more readily
directed toward the poorest sectors of soci-
ety.
In the past, P.L. 480 often has been
treated as a variable by the United States.
That is, commodities are made available for
the program only when the Secretary of Ag-
riculture determines that domestic require-
ments, carryover, and commercial export
needs have been met. These are valid con-
cerns, but the Secretary should be given
some flexibility to assure that P.L. 480
commodities can be continued for multi-year
commitments or for emergency situations.
Inclusion of new authority along these lines
in new P.L. 480 legislation, as proposed by
Secretary of Agriculture [Bob S.] Bergland,
would help to insure that the sharp cutbacks
in volume which occurred in our P.L. 480
programs in 1973 and 1974 during years of
tight supply would not be repeated.
In this connection, I believe it would be
useful to examine the desirability of a small
P.L. 480 reserve which could provide fur-
ther assurance that multi-year commitments
could be met and would help to stabilize
P.L. 480 programing levels during years of
short domestic supply.
The question of how much P.L. 480 should
be directed to multi-year developmental
programs at this time is difficult to assess.
Unfortunately, few Third World govern-
ments today are undertaking the
comprehensive agricultural development
programs of the type I describe above. We
estimate that the amount currently made
available for "grant back" will more than
adequately accommodate our needs for
multi-year development programing in the
years immediately ahead.
448
Department of State Bulletin
Foreign Policy Aspects
Turning now to my third point, I recog-
nize that the foreign policy aspect of P.L.
480 often is spoken of as a misuse of the
food aid program. I do not agree. I believe
the authors of Public Law 480 were wise
when they wrote into its preamble that
among other things the program should be
used "to promote in other ways the foreign
policy of the United States." Most often
people criticize using P.L. 480 assistance for
foreign policy purposes when they disagree
with the particular foreign policy goal being
pursued. It is certainly valid to discuss the
desirability of our various policies or even
the efficacy of using P.L. 480 to help to
achieve them, but it is not very realistic to
suggest that P.L. 480 is somehow tainted by
such use. If by use of the P.L. 480 program
we can make some contribution to the pros-
pect for peace in the Middle East, help to
resolve the situation in southern Africa, as-
sist Portugal's evolution into a prosperous
European democratic nation, or make some
other contribution to our overall foreign
policy, we should do so.
In a sense, of course, division of the in-
ternational aspects of P.L. 480 into separate
categories is misleading. Almost every
program has aspects of all three —
humanitarian, developmental, and
political — intertwined in it. Which is the
major motivation or result in any particular
program could be, and often is, argued. In
any case, though we should be sure that any
program is justified on economic and human-
itarian grounds, we should not regard those
inspired mainly by foreign policy consid-
erations as in any way undesirable. In terms
of priority, I believe we should continue to
give first emphasis to those programs
predicated mainly on humanitarian and de-
velopmental considerations. This is funda-
mental to the philosophy which inspires our
food aid programs.
In discussing the foreign policy aspects of
P.L. 480, I believe it would be appropriate
to refer briefly to the question of human
rights. It is not necessary for me to
emphasize to you the Administration's con-
cern for human rights throughout the world.
President Carter and Secretary Vance, by
their actions and words, have done so
already. The Administration already has
made plain that human rights considerations
will be taken into account in all aspects of
our foreign affairs. I can assure you that
they also will be considered fully in the ad-
ministration of the P.L. 480 program.
Both Congress and the executive have
made a distinction in the application of
human rights criteria to various forms of in-
ternational assistance between those forms
of aid which are of direct benefit to the
people and those which mainly assist the
government apparatus and only indirectly
affect the people. P.L. 480, both title I and
title II, is in almost every instance of direct
benefit to the people of a country. Either
they receive food free, or the supply of food
which they can purchase is expanded. I
think this is an important consideration.
Extension and Amendment of the Legislation
Let me turn now to P.L. 480 legislation
and make a few comments which I believe
are important.
Secretary Bergland indicated in his
testimony that the Administration supports
a four-year extension of the law and I want
to explain the rationale for that request. A
four-year extension is necessary if we are
going to begin to negotiate the type of
multi-year development-oriented food aid
programs I have discussed above. It would
help to integrate food aid into our emerging
North-South strategy and would signal both
recipient developing countries and other
food aid donors that the United States in-
tends to work seriously toward the food aid
goals agreed to at the World Food Confer-
ence of 1974. I believe a four-year extension
would be consistent with Congress' own de-
sire to make our food aid both more
supportive of long-term development efforts
in food-deficit countries and responsive to
their immediate and growing food needs.
Finally, it would permit the United States
to participate in renegotiation of the Food
Aid Convention, which expires in June 1978.
May 2, 1977
449
Our failure to participate would lead to the
collapse of the convention, thereby
undermining progress made at, and since,
the World Food Conference to (1) make food
aid a more universal responsibility and (2)
rationalize the allocation of food aid.
I also strongly support the Administra-
tion's proposed amendment of section 111 of
the law, which provides that at least 75 per-
cent of title I programs be directed to
countries with per capita GNP [gross na-
tional product] under $300. We propose to
use the IDA [International Development
Association] poverty criterion — currently
$520 per capita — to replace the $300 per
capita GNP figure because the latter has
caused programing difficulties this year
which will become worse in 1978.
Let me explain in more detail what I
mean.
In fiscal year 1977, the food aid require-
ments of a number of countries in the Indian
Subcontinent will be less than anticipated in
the initial allocations table which the Admin-
istration sent to Congress in September
1976. Our first priority has been to use this
shortfall to increase programs for other
countries in the 75 percent category. We
have had some success in doing this, but
there are limits to the number of countries
in the under-$300 category which might be
suitable candidates for title I food assist-
ance.
Meanwhile, we have received a number of
food aid requests from countries in the 25
percent category. Our general policy has
been to keep these requests under review
until we can more accurately assess the
future food aid requirements this year of
countries in the 75 percent category. If we
cannot effectively reprogram food aid to
countries in the 75 percent category, we will
then begin to act on new and expanded pro-
grams for countries in the 25 percent cate-
gory. The Administration is likely to make a
judgment on this in the spring. Congress
will be informed.
Next year our programing situation will
become even more complicated under the
75/25 provision. One of largest food aid
recipients, Egypt, is expected to cross the
$300 per capita line, and other food aid re-
cipients, or potential food aid recipients,
may do so also. To maintain a large program
for Egypt and still meet the 75/25 require-
ments in these circumstances would require
substantial reprograming to other countries
in the 75 percent category and a very sharp
cutback in the already limited food resources
available for the 25 percent countries. In
fact, the cutback to the 25 percent countries
would be so sharp that we would have little
or no food aid left for programing to other
countries. Clearly this situation would be
highly undesirable.
Relations With the Developing Countries
Before concluding, I would like to under-
score the importance of P.L. 480 in the
broader context of our relations with the
developing countries. As you are all aware,
the developing countries as a group criticize
the structure of their relations with the de-
veloped countries and demand change. Food
aid has not been exempt from such criticism.
While much of it has been emotional and ill
founded, on certain points we must accept
the merits of the argument. This is espe-
cially true with regard to our previous
inability to commit food aid to multi-year
programs.
The food problems of many developing
countries in the years immediately ahead
are projected to reach very significant mag-
nitudes for many reasons. P.L. 480 alone
cannot meet those projected food needs. For
this reason, our policy has been patterned
on the conclusions of the World Food Con-
ference of 1974. That is, food production in
Third World food-deficit countries must be
increased and world food trade liberalized in
order to maximize world production, and
world food security should be enhanced
through an international system of nation-
ally held grain reserves. We address the
first point through the AID [Agency for In-
ternational Development] program, the sec-
ond through our stance in the trade negotia-
tions in Geneva, and the third through our
proposals at the International Wheat Council.
At this time I would like to stress the
complementarity of food aid and interna-
tional grain reserves. Under normal
450
Department of State Bulletin
circumstances even food-deficit countries
can afford to meet a portion of their food
needs through commercial imports. How-
ever, in 1973 and 1974 many Third World
purchasers were forced to devote a signifi-
cant portion of their earnings to food im-
ports when grain prices increased sharply.
An international system of grain reserves
would moderate the price increases and
would make available additional grain for
commercial sales during low production
years. Such a system thus would hold the
need for food aid to a minimum. It also
would have positive budgetary implications
for both developed and developing countries.
For an international system of reserves to
function smoothly, however, it must treat
the world market for grains as a whole and
not attempt to deal directly with the food
needs of the Third World market. Only in
this way can reserves dampen the price cy-
cle. With your support, the Administration
intends to continue both to press for the
adoption of an international system of grain
reserves and to increase the funding of its
food aid programs.
In summary, I strongly support the ex-
tension of the P.L. 480 Act. P.L. 480 has
been one of the real successes among the
programs begun by this nation in the wake
of the Second World War. It can be im-
proved, however, and I am confident that an
even better law will emerge from Congress
this year.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome
June 13, 1976.'
Signatures: United Kingdom, January 7, 1977;
Uruguay, April 5, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Philippines, April 4, 1977.
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of
December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo
June 20, 1975. '
Notification of approval: United States, April 8,
1977, for recommendations VII 1—3, VIIU4, and
VIII-6 through VIII-14; VIII-1, VIII-2, and
Y 1 1 1-5 accepted as interim guidelines.
Atomic Energy
Protocol prolonging the agreement of April 4, 1975
(TIAS 8051), for the application of safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral
agreement between the United States and Israel of
July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507,
5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for cooperation con-
cerning civil uses of atomic anergy. Signed at Vienna
April 7, 1977. Entered into force April 7, 1977.
Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency,
Israel, United States.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into
force October 1, 1976, provisionally.
Ratification deposited: Tanzania, April 4, 1977.
Gas
Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of as-
phyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bac-
teriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva
June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928:
for the United States April 10, 1975. TIAS 8061.
Accession deposited: Jordan, January 20, 1977. 2
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. 1
Acceptance deposited: Guinea, April 1, 1977.
Phonograms
Convention for the protection of producers of phono-
grams against unauthorized duplication of their
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971.
Filtered into force April 18, 1973; for the United
States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Ratification deposited: Holy See, April 4, 1977.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement relating to the establishment of an experi-
mental Loran-C power chain in the vicinity of the
St. Marys River, Michigan-Ontario, with annex.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March
29, 1977. Entered into force March 29, 1977, effec-
tive August 1, 1975.
Colombia
Agreement continuing in effect safeguards and guaran-
tee provisions of the agreement of April 9, 1962, as
1 Not in force.
2 With reservation.
May 2, 1977
451
amended (TIAS 5330, 6943), for civil uses of atomic
energy. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota
March 28, 1977. Entered into force March 28, 1977.
Israel
Agreement continuing in effect safeguards and guaran-
tee provisions of the agreement of July 12, 1955, as
amended, including associated understandings (TIAS
3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for
civil uses of atomic energy. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington April 7 and 8, 1977. Entered
into force April 8, 1977.
Portugal
Loan agreement relating to housing for low-income
families, with annex. Signed at Lisbon March 4,
1977. Entered into force March 4, 1977.
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amending the agreement of February 18, 1976, as
amended. TIAS 8380. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8380).
Inter-American Development Bank. Amendments to
the agreement of April 8, 1959, as amended,
Washington, June 1, 1976. TIAS 8383. 155 pp. $2.20.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8383).
Oil Pollution. Agreement with Bermuda. TIAS 8396.
4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8396).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Egypt.
TIAS 8406. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8406).
Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft
Products. Agreement with the Polish People's Repub-
lic. TIAS 8407. 10 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8407).
Collecting and Conserving Water Supplies From
Surface Runoff. Agreement with Abu Dhabi. TIAS
8408. 26 pp. 450. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8408).
Conservation of Polar Bears. Agreement with other
governments. TIAS 8409. 15 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8409).
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with El Salvador
terminating the agreement of April 19, 1972, as
amended. TIAS 8410. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8410).
Narcotic Drugs — Additional Equipment, Material
and Technical Support to Curb Illegal Traffic.
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8411. 7 pp. 350. (Cat.
No. S9.10:8411).
Frequency Modulation Broadcasting. Agreement
with Mexico amending the agreement of November 9,
1972, as amended. TIAS 8412. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9.10:8412).
Organization of American States Convention on Ter-
rorism. Convention with other governments. TIAS
8413. 34 pp. 450. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8413).
Telecommunications — Facilities of Radio Ceylon.
Agreement with Sri Lanka extending the agreement of
Mav 12 and 14, 1951, as amended and extended. TIAS
8414. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8414).
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with the
Philippines. TIAS 8415. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9.10:8415).
Earthquake Assistance. Agreement with Italy. TIAS
8416. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8416).
Claims — Marcona Mining Company. Agreement with
Peru. TIAS 8417. 6 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8417).
Military Assistance — Eligibility Requirements Pur-
suant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976. Agreement with Greece. TIAS
8418. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8418).
Military Assistance — Eligibility Requirements Pur-
suant to the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Agreement with In-
donesia. TIAS 8419. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8419).
Military Assistance — Eligibility Requirements Pur-
suant to the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Agreement with
Ecuador. TIAS 8420. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8420).
452
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX May 2. 197: Vol. LXXVI, No. 19'i
Arms Control and Disarmament. I Car-
ter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Pol-
icy (statement, excerpts from remarks and
questions and answers) 129
Canada. Fifth-Year Review of Great Lai
Water Quality Agreement Begins (joint U.S.-
Canadian statement) 446
Congress
Department Discusses Debt Situations of Develop-
ing Countries and the Role of Private Banks
ken Ill
[Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid Pro-
>ch) 447
Security Assistance Policy for Latin
America (Todman) ill
Developing Countries
rtment Discusses Debt Situations of De-
iping Countries and the Role of Private
'i 441
Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid Pro-
gram ( Fercn ) 447
Economic Affairs
Department Discusses Debt Situations of De-
veloping Countries and the Role of Prix
Ranks (Boeker) 441
U.S. Urges Global View of Water Resource Prob-
lems (Warren) 437
Egypt. President Sadat of Egypt Visits Washing-
ton (Cartel', Sadat ) 134
Environment
Fifth-Year Review of Great Lakes Water Qu.
Agreement Begins (joint L'.S. -Canadian state-
ment ) 446
U.S. Urges Global View of Water Ri Prob-
lems (Warren I 137
Food. Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food
Aid Program (Fei'ch) 447
Foreign Aid
Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid I
gram I Fercn I 147
U.S. Security Assistance Policy for Latin
America (Todman) 444
Human Rights. U.S. Security Assistance Policy
for Latin America (Todman ) 444
Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S. Security
Assistance Policy for Latin America (Todman). . 444
Nuclear Energy. President Carter Announces
Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy (statement,
excerpts from remarks and questions and
answers ) 429
Presidential Documents
President Caller Announces Decisions on Nuclear
Power Policy 429
President Sadat of Egypt Visits Washington 434
World Trade Week, 1977 (proclamation) 440
Publications. GPO Sales Publications
Trade. World Trade Week, 1977 (proclamation) .. 440
Treaty Information. Current Actions 151
United Nations. U.S. Urges Global View of
Water Resource Problems (Warren) 437
Name /,.
Boeker, Paul H 441
Carter, President 42!). 434, 440
h John A 447
Sadat . Anwar al- '. 434
Todman. Terence A 444
Warren. ( lharles Hugh 137
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: April 11-17
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations. Department of State. Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
*174 4/11 Shipping Coordinating Committee
(SCC), Subcommittee on Sab
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working
group on bulk chemicals, Mav 18.
175 4/13 SCC, SOLAS, working group on ship
design and equipment, May 10.
17(1 4/13 Barbara M. Watson sworn in as Ad-
ministrator of the Bureau of Secu-
rity and Consular Affairs (bio-
177 4/14 Fifth-year review of Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement begins.
*178 4/14 Charles William Maynes sworn in as
Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Organization Affairs (bio-
| hie data).
14 .James F. Leonard sworn in as Dep-
uty Representative to the United
Nations (biographic data).
180 4/14 Donald F. McHenry sworn in as Dep-
uty Representative in the l T .N. Se-
curity Council (biographic data).
181 4/15 International social workers prog
begins Apr. 25.
s Not printed.
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington. dc. 20402
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3:
7
&.
/?7C
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1976 • May 9, 1977
PRESIDENT CARTER'S PAN AMERICAN DAY ADDRESS 453
UNITED STATES RELATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Address by Assistant Secretary Schaufele 464
ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTS INCREASED U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
Statements by Ambassador Young and Deputy Assistant Secretary Bolen 471
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back core.
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE g \j , L E T I N
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1976
May 9, 1977
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U.S. Government Printing Office
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
President Carter's Pan American Day Address 1
Hace tres arios, tuve el honor y placer de
hablar ante la Asamblea General de la OEA
celebrada en mi estado de Georgia. Igual
que en Atlanta, hoy seguire el consejo de
mis comparieros, que opinan — para el be-
neficio de buenas relaciones — seria mejor
que no hablara en espahol hoy.
[Three years ago I had the honor and
pleasure of speaking before the General As-
sembly of the OAS held in my State of
Georgia. As I did then in Atlanta, I will
today follow the advice of my friends, who
have the opinion that — in the interest of
good relations — it would be better for me
not to speak in Spanish today.]
Since I can also speak English, I will shift
to that language.
That day in Atlanta three years ago, I
shared with you some of the thoughts that
my wife and I had brought back from our
visits to several of the American states. I
spoke particularly for the need for constant
cooperation, consultation, and harmony
among the nations of this hemisphere. I be-
lieve that just as strongly today as Presi-
dent of the United States as I did three
years ago as Governor of Georgia.
I am delighted to be with you in this
beautiful House of the Americas. For nearly
three decades the OAS has stood for mutual
respect among sovereign nations for peace
and the rule of law in this hemisphere. The
OAS Charter pledges us to individual liberty
and social justice. I come here now to re-
state our own commitment to these goals.
The challenge before us today, however,
is not just to reaffirm those principles but to
1 Made before the Permanent Council of the Organi-
zation of American States at the Pan American Union
at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 14 (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18).
find ways to make them a reality. To do
this, we must take account of the changes in
our relationships that have taken place over
the last 10 years, and we must candidly ac-
knowledge the differences that exist among
us. We must adapt our current policies and
institutions to those changes so that we can
pursue our goals more effectively.
As nations of the New World, we once be-
lieved that we would prosper in isolation
from the Old World. But since the Second
World War in particular, all of us have
taken such vital roles in the world commu-
nity that isolation would now be harmful to
our own best interests and to other coun-
tries. Our joining in the International Mone-
tary Fund, the World Bank, and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are all
signs that we understand this. So is the
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, which Raul Prebisch of
Argentina made into an important forum of
the developing world. Venezuela is now
cochairing the Paris Conference on Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation. The United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America is a source of many creative ideas
on development throughout the world. The
leaders of many Latin American nations
have been the driving force behind
improving North-South negotiations.
In all these ways, the nations of Latin
America were among the first in our chang-
ing world to see the importance of adapting
global institutions to the new realities of our
day.
The problems and the promises of our re-
gion have become as diverse as the world
itself. The economies of most Latin Ameri-
can nations have been developing rapidly,
although of course at different rates. Some
May 9, 1977
453
have an impressive rate of growth. Some, a
few, are among the poorest in the develop-
ing world. Some have abundant energy re-
sources; others are desperately short of
energy. Some of our countries export
primary products only. Some have become
major exporters of advanced manufactured
goods, while others export little at all. Your
problems of market access, technology
transfer, and debt management sometimes
defy regional solutions.
In addition to economic diversity, we have
all developed widely varied forms and
philosophies of government. This diversity
has brought national pride and national
strength. And as you've played more inde-
pendent and important roles in world
politics, we have all begun to construct more
normal and more balanced and more equal
relationships.
Basic Elements of New Approach
In the light of these changes, a single
U.S. policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean makes little sense. What we need
is a wider and a more flexible approach,
worked out in close consultation with you.
Together, we will develop policies more
suited to each nation's variety and potential.
In this process, I will be particularly
concerned that we not seek to divide the na-
tions of Latin America one from another or
to set Latin America apart from the rest of
the world. Our own goal is to address
problems in a way which will lead to produc-
tive solutions — globally, regionally, and
bilaterally.
Our new approach will be based on three
basic elements:
First of all is a high regard for the indi-
viduality and the sovereignty of each Latin
American and Caribbean nation. We will not
act abroad in ways that we would not toler-
ate at home in our own country.
Second is our respect for human rights, a
respect which is also so much a part of your
own tradition. Our values and yours require
us to combat abuses of individual freedom,
including those caused by political, social,
and economic injustice. Our own concern for
these values will naturally influence our re-
lations with the countries of this hemisphere
and throughout the world. You will find this
country, the United States of America,
eager to stand beside those nations which
respect human rights and which promote
democratic ideals.
Third is our desire to press forward on
the great issues which affect the relations
between the developed and the developing na-
tions. Your economic problems are also
global in character and cannot be dealt with
solely on regional terms.
However, some of our own global policies
are of particular interest to other American
states. When major decisions are made in
these areas, we will consult with you.
— The United States will take a positive
and an open attitude toward the negotiation
of agreements to stabilize commodity prices,
including the establishment of a common
funding arrangement for financing buffer
stocks where they are a part of individual
and negotiated agreements.
— We will actively pursue the multilateral
trade negotiations with your governments in
Geneva, Switzerland. We are committed to
minimize trade restrictions and to take into
account the specific trade problems of de-
veloping countries and to provide special
and more favorable treatment where feasi-
ble and appropriate. We believe that this is
in our mutual interest and that it will create
important new opportunities for Latin
American trade.
— Our own science and technology can be
useful to many of your countries. For in-
stance, we are ready to train your techni-
cians to use more information gathered by
our own satellites, so that you can make
better judgments on management of your
resources and your environment. Space
communications technology can also be a
creative tool in helping your national
television systems to promote your educa-
tional and cultural objectives.
— I have asked Congress to meet in full
our pledges to the Inter-American
Development Bank and the other multilat-
eral lending institutions which loan a high
454
Department of State Bulletin
proportion of their capital to the relatively
advanced developing countries of Latin
America.
— And finally, we are directing more and
more of our bilateral economic assistance to
the poorer countries. We are also prepared
to explore with other nations new ways of
being helpful on a wide range of institu-
tional, human development, and technolog-
ical approaches which might enable them to
deal more effectively with the problems of
the needy. All of us have a special responsi-
bility to help the poorest countries in the
world as well as the poorest people in each
of our countries.
I would like to add a word about private
investment. Your governments are under-
standably interested in setting rules that
will encourage private investors to play an
important role in your development. We
support your efforts and recognize that a
new flexibility and adaptability are required
today for foreign investment to be most use-
ful in combining technology, capital man-
agement, and market experience to meet
your development needs. We will do our
part in this field to avoid differences and
misunderstandings between your govern-
ments and ours.
Global and Regional Challenges
One of the most significant political trends
of our time is the relationship between the
developing nations of the world and the in-
dustrialized countries. We benefit from your
advice and counsel, and we count on you to
contribute your constructive leadership and
help guide us in this North-South dialogue.
We also hope to work with all nations to
halt the spread of nuclear explosive
capabilities. The states of Latin America
took the initiative 10 years ago when you set
up the first nuclear-free zone in any
populated area of the world. The Treaty of
Tlatelolco is a model worthy of our own ad-
miration. For our part the United States
will sign, and I will ask the Senate to ratify,
protocol I of the treaty prohibiting the
placement of nuclear weapons in Latin
America.
However, banning the spread of nuclear
explosives does not require giving up the
benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. We
mean to work closely with all of you on new
technologies to use the atom for peaceful
purposes.
To slow the costly buildup of conventional
arms, we are seeking global policies of re-
straint. We are showing restraint in our own
policies around the world, and we will be
talking to supplier nations and to prospec-
tive buyers about ways to work out a com-
mon approach. We also believe that regional
agreements among producers and pur-
chasers of arms can further such a global ef-
fort.
I spent most of this morning working on a
new U.S. policy to reduce the sale of conven-
tional arms around the world. Again, you in
Latin America have taken the lead. The pledge
of eight South American nations to limit the
acquisition of offensive arms in their region is a
striking example. If the eight nations can im-
plement their pledge, their own people will not
be the only ones to benefit. They will have
set a standard for others throughout the world
to follow.
These are challenges that face us in the
future. There are also problems that plague
us from the past. And we must work
together to solve them.
One that addresses itself to us is the
Panama Canal. In the first days of my own
Administration, just a few weeks ago, I
directed a new approach to our negotiations
with Panama on a new canal treaty. In the
light of the changes which I discussed be-
fore, the treaty of 1903, which combines
[defines] our relationship with Panama on
the canal, is no longer appropriate or effec-
tive.
I am firmly committed to negotiating in as
timely a fashion as possible a new treaty
which will take into account Panama's
legitimate needs as a sovereign nation and
our own interests and yours in the efficient
operation of a neutral canal open on a non-
discriminatory basis to all users.
Another problem which we must in a way
address together is that of Cuba. We believe
that normal conduct of international affairs
May 9, 1 977
455
and particularly the negotiation of differ-
ences require communication with all coun-
tries in the world. To these ends, we are
seeking to determine whether relations with
Cuba can be improved on a measured and a
reciprocal basis.
I am dedicated to freedom of movement
between nations. I have removed restric-
tions on U.S. citizens who want to travel
abroad. Today there are no restrictions im-
posed by our country. Today I have also
removed similar travel restrictions on resi-
dent aliens in the United States.
We seek to encourage international travel,
and we must take greater account of
problems that transcend national borders.
Drugs and international crime, including
terrorism, challenge traditional concepts of
diplomacy. For the well-being of our
peoples, we must cooperate on these issues.
With each passing year they will occupy a
more and more central place in our delibera-
tions.
Constructive Role of the OAS
I have a longstanding interest in the OAS,
and I very much want to see it play an in-
creasingly constructive role.
The General Assembly of the OAS has
been an important forum for the direct ex-
change of views among our governments.
Such ministerial consultations are extremely
useful. They allow us to apply our own col-
lective strength to political and economic
problems.
The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has performed valuable serv-
ices. It deserves increased support from all
our governments. We believe deeply in the
preservation and the enhancement of human
rights, and the United States will work to-
ward coordinated and multilateral action in
this field. The United States will sign, and I
will seek Senate approval of, the American
Convention on Human Rights negotiated
several years ago in Costa Rica. And we will
support, in cooperation with international
agencies, broadened programs for aiding
political refugees. I urge this organization
and all its member states to take a more ac-
tive role in the care, protection, and the re-
settlement of political refugees.
The peacekeeping function is firmly em-
bedded in the OAS Charter. I want to en-
courage the Secretary General of the OAS
to continue his active and effective
involvement in the search for peaceable so-
lutions to several longstanding disputes in
this hemisphere. The United States will
support his efforts and initiatives.
The OAS, of course, is not the only in-
strument of cooperation among the nations
of the Americas. The Inter-American De-
velopment Bank is among the most
important multilateral mechanisms for
promoting development of the world today.
By bringing in nations outside the Western
Hemisphere, the IDB bears testimony to
Latin America's growing involvement with the
rest of the world.
Within this hemisphere, many of you are
working toward regional and subregional
integration efforts, including those in the
Caribbean, in the Central American Com-
mon Market, and the Andean Pact; and we
favor such efforts. They are the first steps
toward Bolivar's vision of a hemisphere
united.
Let me conclude by bringing up a mat-
ter that is particularly close to me because
of my long interest in inter-American af-
fairs. My wife and I have traveled and made
many friends in Mexico and Brazil, the two
largest and most rapidly changing countries
in Latin America. And we have traveled
elsewhere and made many friends in Central
and South America. My wife is presently
studying Spanish, along with the wife of the
Secretary of State, and I have tried to keep
up with my own Spanish that I learned at
school. I have seen clearly how greatly our
country has been blessed and enriched by
the people and cultures of the Caribbean and
Latin America. And we are bound
together — and I see it very clearly — in cul-
ture, history, and by common purposes and
ideals.
The United States actually has the fourth
largest Spanish-speaking population in the
456
Department of State Bulletin
■ world. I tried to meet many of them during
,- my campaign the last two years. And they
gave me their support and their encourage-
ment and their advice. The novels we read,
/the music we hear, the sports that we
I play — all reflect a growing consciousness of
■ each other.
These intellectual, social, cultural, and
(■educational exchanges will continue, either
I with or without government help. But there
• are steps that governments can take to
speed up and enhance this process. In the
I months ahead, therefore, we plan to explore
(with your governments — individually and
here in the OAS — new people-to-people pro-
grams, an increase in professional and scien-
|tific exchanges, and other ways of
strengthening the ties that already link us.
The challenge we face is to awake our in-
stitutions to a changing world. We must
focus our attention on the problems which
face our countries and tailor each solution to
its problem.
As you know, I am a new President. I've
got a lot to learn. My heart and my interest
to a major degree is in Latin America. I
welcome every opportunity to strengthen
the ties of friendship and a sense of common
purpose and close consultation with the
nations and the peoples of the Caribbean
and Latin America.
Many of you are leaders representing your
own governments. I ask for your advice and
your counsel and your support as we face
problems together in the future. This means
a lot to our country, and it means a lot to us
also to have intimate bilateral and direct
relationships with you.
We look on the OAS, headquartered
thankfully here in Washington, as a -channel
through which we might learn more and
receive advice and make plans for the fu-
ture.
Simon Bolivar believed that we would
reach our goals only with our peoples free
and our governments working in harmony. I
hope that the steps that I have outlined
today and the commitments that I have
made will move us toward those goals of
peace and freedom.
President Carter's News Conference
of April 15
Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on April 15. 1
Q. Mr. President , in view of the Soviet
reaction and your own reassessment so far,
do you see any reason to change your SALT
proposals? Also, do you see any validity in
meeting with Secretary Brezhnev from time
to time, starting this year?
The President: I think that the Soviet re-
sponse has been predictable. I've been
somewhat concerned lately that they've de-
cided to go public as much as they have. But
I have to say that there is a very important
distinction that ought to be drawn between
private and determined and continuing
negotiations, which are being pursued on
the one hand, and the education of the pub-
lic, the presentation of issues to people in
our own country, which has always been the
case since I've been in office. And it's very
encouraging to know that now Mr. Brezhnev
and his other leaders, through Pravda, are
explaining the Soviet position to the people
of Russia.
So I see nothing wrong with the Soviet
leadership giving their arguments and their
excuses for not agreeing immediately to our
drastic cut proposals to the Soviet people,
but I do feel encouraged about it.
As far as the — the other part of your
question?
Q. I asked, did you see any reason to
change your proposals and also, do you
plan a summit meeting with Brezhnev, and
will you be having them from time to time?
The President: I see no reason to change
our proposals. We had two, as you re-
member. One is to ratify the basic
agreements of the Vladivostok discussions,
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18, 1977, p.
540.
May 9, 1977
457
and the other one is a much more drastic re-
duction in overall weapon capability. I see
no reason to change those proposals.
I would welcome a chance to meet with
General Secretary Brezhnev on a continuing
basis, annually at least, and I hope that
later on this year that he and I might meet
in our own country. I think it's good,
though, not to predicate each meeting with
the belief that some dramatic conclusion
might be reached or some dramatic
agreement might be reached.
I hesitate and am reluctant to work under
the pressure of having to come up with an
agreement each time. I think it makes too
much of an inclination for us to agree to
things that might be counterproductive for
our own nation's benefit, just in order to
have some publicity derived from the
agreement itself.
Q. Mr. President, another question on
strategic arms limitations. At least on the
public record, which is growing daily, there
seems to be a total impasse between the
United States and the Soviet Union on the
solution to the problem.
Now, do you believe that a meeting be-
tween you and Mr. Brezhnev could help
overcome that impasse? And, more gener-
ally, you've been meeting with a lot of lead-
ers. Do you feel that in meeting with foreign
leaders you can help change their perception
of what is actually in their national inter-
ests?
The President: I wouldn't ever expect to
change a foreign leader's opinion if he
thought it was contrary to his own national
interests, no. I have found, though, in my
meetings with a number of foreign leaders
already to be very helpful to me in
understanding their particular perspective
in trying to find some common ground on
which agreements can be reached.
The Middle East is one of the more
notable examples of this. And by the end of
May, I intend to have met with all the
foreign leaders who will be involved in the
Middle Eastern settlement, which we hope
to see make progress this year.
I don't consider the SALT talks at this
point to have reached an impasse. There are
continual discussions going on through
normal diplomatic channels. I think that
when we reconvene the Secretary-of-State-
level discussions in Geneva in just a few
weeks, we will have made some basic
progress. The 8 or 10 discussion groups that
were agreed to jointly by Mr. Brezhnev and
Mr. Vance will be put into effect within the
next two or three weeks, and a wide range
of discussion of strategic arms limitations,
the comprehensive test ban, commitment
not to destroy one another's satellite obser-
vation posts, demilitarization of the Indian
Ocean, and so forth, are going to proceed, I
hope, with a moderate degree of hope for
success. No one can guarantee success, but
I'll be doing the best I can, and I'm sure Mr.
Brezhnev will also, to find that common
ground that will leave our national interest
and the Soviet's national interest intact.
Q. Mr. President, the House, as you
know, just recently passed the Hark in
amendment to the International Lending
Institutions Act of 1977 —
The President: Yes, I know.
Q. — which stipulates that the U.S. repre-
sentative must vote ">io" to countries who
violate — loans to countries who violate
human rights. Did the Administration ac-
tively support — or why didn't the Adminis-
tration actively support this amendment?
The President: I think the Harkin
amendment is a mistake. The Reuss amend-
ment and the Senator Humphrey amend-
ment, which are the same, provide me with
an adequate authority to deal with the
question of human rights as it relates to in-
ternational and regional lending institutions.
To have a frozen mandatory prohibition
against our nation voting for any loan simply
removes my ability to bargain with a foreign
leader whom we think might be willing to
ease off on the deprivation of human rights.
But when the requirement is frozen into
law, there is simply no reason for a foreign
leader to try to comply.
458
Department of State Bulletin
I think we need to have the flexibility that
we proposed. My heart is with the Harkin
amendment because I want to do everything
I can to assure a maximum amount of human
rights commitment around the world. But I
think that to give us the authority within
the lending institutions to use our best
judgment and to negotiate for an easing off
of human rights restraints before a loan is
made is the best approach to it.
Interview With President Carter
by Media Representatives April 1 5
Following is an excerpt from the tran-
script of an interview with President Carter
on April 15 by 27 editors, publishers, and
broadcasters from 21 states. 1
Q. Mr. President, I a)n Vince Sanders
from the National Black Network, and I
would like to know if your Administration
has got to the point where it has developed a
policy toward Africa that gives you a course
of action rather than reaction to trouble
spots like Zaire and Rhodesia. Do you have
a definitive policy toward Africa as of yet?
The President: We are evolving one. I
have spent an awful lot of time on the Afri-
can question. I don't think I have announced
this previously is the reason I am hesitating,
but I have asked the Vice President particu-
larly to concentrate on the African question.
He has been doing a lot of detailed analysis
of each country, its history, background,
leadership, and how it relates to its
neighbors and so forth. I meet with him fre-
quently. We had a meeting just before lunch
on Africa.
I think that we do have a good policy
evolving. We have deliberately decided as
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 25, 1977,
p. 551.
part of that policy, though, to let the British
Government retain the leadership role for
the time being.
On David Owen's present trip, the
Foreign Minister of Britain, we authorized
him to say that we backed his proposals and
that we were prepared to participate for the
first time in a Geneva conference, if one
could be called.
There are three interrelated items, as you
know. One is what to do with Rhodesia. We
think the Smith government should step
down very shortly and permit majority rule
in Rhodesia. My own preference is that the
people of that country have a right to vote
on who their leader should be.
Obviously, the only country outside
Rhodesia which has a major influence on the
Smith government is South Africa. And we
are maintaining communications with the
South African leadership.
The second question, that's related, is
what to do about Namibia, or South West
Africa. Here we again favor majority rule in
Namibia. The United Nations has a major
role to play here as do the British in
Rhodesia. We have encouraged the South
African Government to move expeditiously
in releasing that country to its own
leadership.
Of course, in South Africa, which has a
legally constituted government, what we
need there of course is to pursue our own
commitment of the ending of apartheid and
move eventually toward majority rule.
The difficult question is, you know, how
much to push the South African Government
and drive them into a corner and to alienate
them from us, because to a major degree the
South African Government is a stabilizing
influence in the southern part of that
continent and they have a major role to play
in the peaceful resolution of Rhodesia and
Namibia.
So I think we do have an evolving policy
toward south Africa. David Owen will be
back from his tour, having met with many of
the African leaders, both black and white.
On the 18th of this month, which I think is
Monday, he will make his report to the
British Cabinet and then make his report to
May 9, 1977
459
us as well. We get daily communiques from
Foreign Minister Owen on this trip.
Q. The Kissinger plan, it makes provi-
sions for the whites who are there in
Rhodesia. And my feeling is that Ian
Smith, with the kind of control that he is
retaining now, he could more or less im-
plement a peaceful transition that will also
provide some reparations for the blacks who
are going to be displaced.
I think my question is, Will the Kissinger
plan be figured in a new conference that the
United States will sponsor?
The President: Certain component parts of
it. As you know, one of the major questions
is who is going to control the army or the
military force that exists in Rhodesia. I
think that in the past when a so-called
reserve fund was set up to compensate
white families and others who decided to
leave, the reserve funds have not been
used — in Kenya and some other countries.
These kinds of reserves have been voluntar-
ily contributed by nations. They have never
been used, because in the history of those
countries — it may be completely different in
Rhodesia, of course — the land was simply
transferred through routine, open market
means.
So the fact that Kissinger did agree, I
think with substantial congressional ap-
proval, to contribute to a fund to compen-
sate white landowners and others, doesn't
mean that we are putting that much money
out for good. It just means we agreed back
then to contribute our part to a fund that
may or may not be used. It is obviously ex-
tremely complicated, and we could talk for
hours about it.
Q. On the same subject of Africa, do you
agree with Andy Young that the Cuba>t ex-
peditionary force is a stabilizing influence 1 ?
The President: I have called publicly for
the Cuban expeditionary force to be with-
drawn from Africa. I read the whole text, of
course, of Andy's statement, and what he
said, I do agree with it. It obviously
stabilized the situation. And I think the
present Angolan Government under Neto is
likely to stay in power. The Cubans ought to
withdraw their forces from Africa.
Q. Would this be a precondition in the
present talks of normalizing relations with
Cuba?
The President: I wouldn't say that it
would be a precondition to the talks. We are
talking to Cuba now for the first time in a
number of years.
Q. Precondition of normalizing relations?
The President: I would rather not say that
before we ever had normal relations with
Cuba they would have to withdraw every
Cuban from other nations on earth. We
don't do it. I think we have got probably
1,200 different places around the world
where we have some American troops. But
the withdrawal of Cuban troops is a domi-
nant factor in Angola and other places
around Africa. They have troops in a lot of
other countries besides — people, rather, I
don't know about troops — in a lot of other
countries.
I just rather would not be pinned down so
specifically on it. But the attitude of Cuba to
withdraw its unwarranted intrusion into the
affairs of Africa and other nations would be
a prerequisite for normalization, yes.
Q. Do you maintain contact with the
Chinese on SALT or the Korean with-
drawal?
The President: Yes, we do. I have met
with the Chinese special representative
here, who, as you know, is an Ambassador,
for an extended conversation once. Cy
Vance talks to him on a routine basis, in-
cluding one substantial conversation since
Vance came back from Moscow. We try to
keep the Chinese informed about our own
attitudes, and although we don't have dip-
lomatic relations with them directly, with
exchange of Ambassadors, we do have a
friendly relationship with them.
There have been numerous congressional
delegations going to China. There is one
over there now. I thought it would be good
to let a member of my family go. So I asked
my middle son, Chip, to accompany the con-
gressional leaders when they went over.
460
Department of State Bulletin
We exchange ideas with the Chinese on
SALT. We try not to violate confidences. If
the Soviets tell us something in a negotiat-
ing session which we consider to be of a
confidential nature, we certainly don't tell
the Chinese about it. But we tell them our
basic position. I think we have as good a re-
lationship as one could have with China
short of full diplomatic relations.
President Carter's Remarks
at Dobbins Air Force Base, Ga.
Following are excerpts from President
Carter's questions and answers with news
correspondents upon his arrival at Dobbins
Air Force Base, Ga., on April 8. 1
Q. Mr. President, do you think that the
resignation of Prime Minister Rabin may
throw off your timetable for the Geneva
talks and a settlement in the Middle East?
The President: No, I don't. Obviously, the
Israeli Labor Party will now be searching
for a replacement candidate for Prime
Minister Rabin in May. And I believe that
the outcome of the election might very well
be affected; nobody can anticipate how.
But there is a great realization among the
Israeli leaders that 1977 is an important
year. There is almost a unanimous commit-
ment, I think, among all the Mideastern
countries that if we don't succeed this year
in some major step toward peace that it will
be a long time before we can mount such a
mammoth multinational effort again.
So it may be affected — the chances for
peace — but no one can predict how. And I
believe the Israelis will push forward with
their own strong desire to have a permanent
and lasting peace with the Arab neighbors,
to have borders that they can defend, and
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18.
1H77. p. 515.
that the Palestinian question be resolved. I
don't think the identity of one particular
political figure, even the Prime Minister,
will affect that adversely.
Q. Mr. President, when you were meeting
with President Sadat and you were talking
about this Palestinian question, did you get
any impression that there is a way to get the
Palestinians to Geneva as part of some
delegation? And if so, can you give us some
of your thinking on that?
The President: Well, as you know, Presi-
dent Sadat earlier had been the Arab leader
that was courageous enough to espouse the
idea that the Palestinians might be part of
the Jordanian delegation. Whether or not
that will evolve, I don't have any way to
anticipate.
But I have good hope that we can resolve
the question of Palestinian participation in
some fashion or another. At this point,
which is quite early in the year's efforts, I
believe that it's primarily a responsibility of
the Arab countries and the Palestinians.
And for me to spell out what I think is a
most likely prospect, I think would be coun-
terproductive at this point.
Q. Mr. President, do you think they
should be represented?
The President: Well, obviously, one of the
three crucial decisions to be made in the
Middle East concerns the Palestinian people.
And there will have to be a spokesman for
their viewpoint during the conference itself.
Whether that would be done by a surrogate
or by them directly is something that hasn't
been evolved.
The other two questions, obviously, are
the definition of permanent peace and the
assurance of it, and the border delineations.
But I certainly think that in some fashion
that the Palestinian people must be repre-
sented.
Q. Mr. President, President Sadat used
the word "entity" when he came to Washing-
ton, instead of Palesti)iian nation or Pales-
tinian state.
The President: Yes.
May 9, 1977
461
Q. Did you get any impression from him
that he is moving toward, or more willing
now to accept a Jordanian-Palestinian
nation; that is, a homeland that would be
under the control of Jordan?
The President: That's a question I
wouldn't want to answer for President
Sadat. I'll let him make his own statements
publicly, and I don't intend to repeat what
he tells me privately.
But I think that it's obvious that that's
one avenue of success. It's one that I have
espoused even during the campaign
months — that perhaps some confederation or
some relationship between the Palestinians
and Jordan might be advisable.
As you know, there are approximately a
million Palestinians who are part of the Jor-
danian society now, in very high positions in
the government, and I think this is a natural
possibility. Whether or not it will be the ul-
timate decision, I can't say.
Mr. President, what significance should
be placed on Ambassador Dobrynin's visit to
the State Department [inaudible] SALT
talks? Does this indicate any softening i>i
your mind on the part of the Russians?
The President: It confirms my own un-
wavering opinion that the Soviets want a
successful resolution of nuclear arms
control, the same as we do.
It's always inevitable that in a political
campaign or a SALT negotiation or a debate
between myself and Congress, that the
degree of combat and dispute and differ-
ences is the part that is emphasized. It's the
most newsworthy part, and it's the part
that's easier to understand.
There was a great deal of progress made
in the recent Moscow talks. As you know,
study committees were set up to explore
new ideas that had never been put on the
SALT negotiating table.
I believe that Mr. Dobrynin's conversation
with Mr. Vance — and of course I've had a
complete report on it — was encouraging.
There is about a month between now and
when the SALT negotiations will proceed in
Geneva between Mr. Gromyko and Secre-
tary Vance.
And during that period of time, we'll be
reassessing some of the objections that the
Soviets have raised to see if there is some
alternative that would be equally fair to
both sides, and we are now making projec-
tions of our own level of nuclear armaments
in the number of missiles, the number of
warheads, the throw- weight and the
diversity of nuclear capability that would be
in existence in 1985 if our proposal was ac-
cepted.
If during this reanalysis we show that
there is any inequity there, we would be
very eager to change it. My own opinion so
far — and I've done a good bit of work on it,
even since the Moscow talks — is that our
proposal was fair and was equitable. And if
the Soviets can give us some explanation
about which we were not aware concerning
their own capabilities or plans, I would
certainly take that into consideration.
But I believe that Dobrynin's visit to
Vance is encouraging. I think if one reads
Gromyko's entire text in his press
conference, it was encouraging. And the
private messages that I have had from Mr.
Brezhnev have also been encouraging.
I am not discouraged. And I'm determined
that we'll succeed in having not only a ratifi-
cation of the Vladivostok agreements but
substantive commitments on both sides to
actually reduce nuclear weapons below what
they have been in the past.
Q. Have you heard from Brezhnev lately,
Mr. President?
The President: No. I think that I've
already said that was the last question. Let
me say in closing that I'm very grateful to
be home. Thank you for coming out here.
There is a continual means by which I can
communicate with Mr. Brezhnev, either
through normal diplomatic sources or
otherwise. It's a routine sort of exchange,
nothing dramatic or startling, no new
concepts that have been proposed, but just
an assurance that the Soviet leadership is as
determined as I am to continue with the
efforts.
462
Department of State Bulletin
President Announces Measures
To Assist U.S. Shoe Industry
statement by President Carter 1
I am very reluctant to restrict interna-
tional trade in any way. For 40 years the
United States has worked for the reduction
of trade barriers around the world, and we
are continuing to pursue this goal because
this is the surest long-range way to create
jobs here and abroad. Only problems as
extreme as those faced by the American
shoe industry could force me to seek even
modest mandatory limits on imports. I have
seen those special problems firsthand during
visits to many shoe plants throughout the
country.
The number of firms in the shoe industry
dropped from 600 in 1968 to 380 today— a 40
percent decline. Employment in that same
period fell by 30 percent, which represents a
loss of 70,000 jobs. Imports from our two
major overseas suppliers have increased by
more than 100 percent in the last two years
and seem to be increasing even more rapidly
in recent months.
I have decided to reject the restrictive
tariff rate quota recommended by the Inter-
national Trade Commission, because that
•Issued on Apr. 1 (text from White House press
release). For the President's memorandums of Apr. 1
for the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
and for heads of certain departments and agencies, see
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated
Apr. 4, 1977, p. 479; for his message to the Congress
of Apr. 1 transmitting a report on the actions, see H.
Doc. 95-117, Apr. 4, 1977.
recommendation did not fairly balance our
concerns for domestic jobs and production,
inflationary pressures, and expanded world
trade.
But I have also decided to grant import
relief to our domestic shoe industry and
have therefore instructed Special Trade
Representative Robert Strauss to negotiate
orderly marketing agreements with the
appropriate foreign suppliers of shoes.
Over the long haul, the solution to dif-
ficulties in the shoe industry lies not in the
restriction of imports, but elsewhere — in
innovation and modernization of our own
production facilities and the financing to
make these possible.
The American shoe industry needs an
expanded and more effective program of as-
sistance to help it meet foreign competition.
I have directed the Secretary of Commerce
to work directly with the Secretary of Labor
and Ambassador Strauss in developing such
a program. Toward this end, these officials
will see that existing assistance programs
work better.
In addition, I will recommend to Congress
within 90 days any legislation which may be
needed to provide:
— Technological aid to increase production
efficiency and develop new production
methods.
— Data and market research to pinpoint
new marketing opportunities.
— Assistance for affected communities and
workers.
— Help with promotion and marketing
services.
— Financial assistance to support these
initiatives.
May 9, 1977
463
United States Relations in Southern Africa
Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 1
A few years ago I would not have chosen
this subject to provoke discussion among a
distinguished group of academic scholars.
The African Continent in general, and the
southern part of it in particular, excited sus-
tained attention and debate only among a
small band of specialists in academia, busi-
ness circles, and the government, except in
time of crisis. This has all changed radically,
and there are times when I look back with
some nostalgia to a more tranquil life before
I became so intimately acquainted with
African airline schedules and charters last
year.
Probably never in the history of American
diplomacy has the governmental and public-
interest, even absorption, in one relatively
small and remote area of the world in-
creased at such a rapid pace, from quasi-
academic to substantial.
Our concern about southern Africa is quite
unlike the basis for our interest in other
parts of the world important to the United
States, such as Europe, the Far East, and
the Middle East. Our interest is not
strategic. We have consistently made clear
that the United States does not wish to play
a military role anywhere in Africa. It is also
not based on economic interests, although
we do want to see that Western Europe as
well as the United States retains access to
the mineral wealth of southern Africa.
Under the proper political circumstances I
can visualize a very substantial growth in
two-way trade with that part of the conti-
1 Made before the American Academy of Political
and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 16.
nent. Our recent actions with respect to the
Byrd amendment should make clear that we
are fully capable of subordinating our eco-
nomic interests to other, more vital con-
cerns.
U.S. policies in southern Africa are essen-
tially founded on political interests. A signif-
icant ingredient of that interest is our con-
cern for human rights and human dignity.
Our policy toward southern Africa is guided
by our ideals of liberty and equality and by
our commitment to oppose racial and social
injustice. We believe that the minority
governments of Rhodesia, South Africa, and
Namibia violate fundamental human rights
as spelled out in the U.N. Declaration of
Human Rights. We have spoken out on this
subject forcefully and repeatedly so that
there can be no mistaking our position. In
conformity with our own fundamental prin-
ciples as a nation, we have based our
policies on the belief that the peaceful trans-
fer of power to the black majority is not
only necessary and desirable but also possi-
ble.
The foreign policy of the United States, if
it is to be successful, must be firmly
grounded in our own fundamental beliefs.
Lacking this vital element, it would not
obtain the requisite backing from our
people. It is self-evident, therefore, that the
United States must be engaged in southern
Africa if we want to remain true to
ourselves. Given the dangers involved, we
cannot remain an idle spectator while the
decolonization process takes place in
Rhodesia and Namibia.
Similarly, I believe that our history dic-
464
Department of State Bulletin
tates that we have a role to play with re-
spect to the system of apartheid in South
Africa. It has been a long and frequently
painful process for the black and white ele-
ments of our population to work out their re-
lationship based on the ideals of the Found-
ing Fathers. Very substantial progress has
been made in recent years in this respect,
and more needs still to be done. But at least
there is now hope where there once was
only despair, and we are on the right road.
Having come through this experience, we
can, I believe, without resort to the zealotry
of the converted, also contribute to the res-
olution of the apartheid issue. Our history as
a people of many races, able to live together
more or less in harmony, can be, within lim-
its, a guide and inspiration to others.
Apartheid, of course, simply means
"apartness." It enshrines the concept of
separateness, without even the leavening
thought of equality. The system of apartheid
currently being practiced in South Africa is
therefore still a considerable distance from
the slightly more progressive concept finally
struck down by our Supreme Court a quar-
ter century ago. It is a measure of the
distance South Africa must travel to over-
come the burden of its racial heritage.
The rapid changes in Portugal brought
about the decolonization of the Portuguese
empire in Africa. This development of the
last few years has, in turn, hastened the
demise of the remaining two vestiges of the
era of empire, Rhodesia and Namibia.
The policy of this Administration, and
that of its predecessor, has been to try to
insure that the changes which we consider
inevitable for both Rhodesia and Namibia
take place in a peaceful manner. There are
those who believe that the transition to
majority rule can come about only by force
of arms. These advocates of violence believe
that Ian Smith's record of procrastination in
Rhodesia and South Africa's continuing im-
portant role in Namibia preclude a peaceful
settlement. I strongly disagree with that
view. Progress has already been made,
perhaps more than we had reason to hope
for only a year ago. Ian Smith has agreed to
the principle of turning over power to the
black majority within two years. Although
negotiations broke down in Geneva over the
complex questions surrounding the mo-
dalities of the transition to majority rule,
I hope that talks can again be started. I am
convinced there is a reasonable chance for
success.
The Question of Rhodesia
We believe that the United Kingdom
should continue to take the lead on the
Rhodesian question since it is the sovereign
power in Rhodesia. We have worked closely
and well with them in the past; during Feb-
ruary we had several intensive meetings
with them in Washington to concert our
policies. And Foreign Secretary [David]
Owen is currently in southern Africa to as-
sess further the situation, on a trip planned
in agreement with the United States.
It is also not an insignificant
accomplishment that, in the course of work-
ing toward a peaceful settlement of southern
African issues, we have strengthened our
ties with the frontline states of Zambia,
Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique. Am-
bassador [Andrew] Young, on his trip to Af-
rica during the early days of the Carter
Administration, received valuable new
insights into the thinking of the African
leaders on those issues of mutual concern. I
want to emphasize that the frontline states
continue to support the view that a peaceful
solution is desirable in Rhodesia and
Namibia even as armed struggle goes on.
We are working closely with them to that
end.
The advantages of a peaceful transition to
majority rule should be manifest to all of us.
The transfer of power is going to be difficult
under any circumstances, and some
disruption of the economic processes may be
inevitable. But both Rhodesia and Namibia
are potentially prosperous countries with
existing structures upon which further
sustained economic growth can be built.
How much more desirable it would be for
the black majority to inherit a country with
a running economy than one so severely
damaged or destroyed by prolonged strife
that the immediate fruits of independence
may be meager indeed.
May 9, 1977
465
Given the strength, on the one hand, of
the Zimbabwe liberation forces, many of
which are now in training camps in Mozam-
bique and Tanzania, and the strength of the
Rhodesian security forces on the other, we
believe that a "solution" by combat of arms
would inevitably be protracted. There would
not be a quick knockout by either side.
Therefore such a "solution" would be bloody
and involve untold human suffering and mis-
ery, which we want to avoid if at all possi-
ble.
Prolonged violence would create a climate,
moreover, conducive to intervention by
forces from outside the African Continent.
The frontline states have thus far success-
fully resisted the counsel of those
contending that only armed struggle can
produce success in Zimbabwe and Namibia.
We cannot be sure, however, that they will
always see the situation this way.
We firmly believe that African problems
should be solved by the Africans them-
selves. Our policy has been guided by the
principle that the big powers or their
surrogates should not play a military role on
the continent. We have seen how long it
takes an outside power, once engaged in an
African conflict, to withdraw its forces, and
we have seen the many undesirable con-
sequences such involvement brings in its
train in terms of African stability and
unity.
Following rejection of the latest British
proposals in January, Ian Smith has appar-
ently decided to attempt what he euphemis-
tically calls an "internal solution." This in-
volves negotiations with certain black
groups and individuals, some of whom were
already members of the Smith regime, to
bring about majority rule. We do not believe
this will lead to a solution. It ignores not
only the desires of the Zimbabwe guerrilla
forces and important nationalist elements
but also those of the frontline states. In our
view this "internal solution" cannot last; to
attempt it would inevitably lead to increased
bloodshed and violence.
Finally, we believe that a peaceful solu-
tion in Rhodesia and Namibia would provide
a useful stimulus to orderly change in South
Africa itself. Conversely, the escalation of
violence in the adjoining territories could
well polarize opinion in South Africa and
make more difficult the achievement of any
progress in the direction of racial justice in
that country.
We recognize, of course, that our dedica-
tion to a peaceful, rapid, and orderly transi-
tion to majority rule needs to be backed up
with concrete measures. We worked hard
for the repeal of the Byrd amendment by
the Congress, accomplished by a decisive
margin in both Houses, placing the United
States in observance with pertinent U.N.
resolutions. Repeal should convince Prime
Minister Smith, if he still had doubts, that
he cannot count on the United States to bail
him out when his policies fail. We hope now
that he will give real negotiations another
chance.
We intend to insure that the sanctions
against Rhodesia are strictly enforced. We
will be consulting with other nations to see
what can be done about tightening com-
pliance with sanctions. We are looking into
additional measures that our government
might undertake to place additional pressure
on Rhodesia and to convince it of the gravity
of the situation.
We have provided economic assistance to
the Governments of Zambia and Mozam-
bique, in recognition of the economic losses
suffered by these two countries owing to the
closure of their borders with Rhodesia and
the interruption of the hitherto profitable
transit traffic in Rhodesian goods.
I would like to make it clear that we have
no solution that we wish to impose on the
various elements of the Zimbabwean politi-
cal scene. We have no favorites whom we
support. We will not take sides, since we
believe that the Africans want to work out
African solutions to African problems. We
will continue to counsel maximum flexibility
and readiness to compromise, maximum
unity among all of the nationalist liberation
forces, and a maximum effort to create the
kind of atmosphere that will allow the
negotiations to succeed. Both sides should
come to the conclusion that their objectives
can be achieved more surely and effectively
by negotiation rather than by resort to
arms.
466
Department of State Bulletin
The Namibian Issue
While the contentious issue of Rhodesia
tends to dominate the headlines, we have
not been unmindful of the need for rapid
progress on the Namibian issue as well. Our
policy with respect to that territory has
been consistent and clear. In 1966 we voted
to terminate South Africa's mandate. We
have supported the finding of the
International Court of Justice that South
Africa's occupation was illegal. We remain
committed to U.N. Security Council Res-
olution 385 calling for free elections under
U.N. auspices, South African withdrawal of
its illegal administration, and the release of
all Namibian political prisoners.
As in the case of Zimbabwe, we have
cause for at least some optimism that the
Namibian problem can be peacefully re-
solved. Some progress has been achieved. A
target date of December 1978 has been set
for independence, and the South Africans
have fully endorsed the concept that
Namibia should become independent on that
date.
A major difficulty, as we see it, has been
that the present efforts to establish an
interim government for Namibia have
excluded the South West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO), which is recognized
by the OAU [Organization of African Unity]
and the United Nations as the sole
Namibian nationalist movement. These ef-
forts have centered on a meeting of Nami-
bian groups in Windhoek seeking to estab-
lish an interim government to lead the
country to independence. For its part,
SWAPO has not wished to participate and
has insisted that independence could come
about only as a result of direct negotiations
between itself and the South African Gov-
ernment. On this issue, also, we urge a
spirit of compromise on both sides in the be-
lief that what may be achievable in a
peaceful manner would almost certainly be
preferable to anything that can be won
through the force of arms alone.
In the case of Namibia, too, it seems to us
that while the positions of some of the princi-
pal contenders are far apart, good will on
both sides can produce agreement. We be-
lieve that all political groups in Namibia,
specifically including SWAPO, have a role to
play in the process leading to independence.
We consider that the United Nations should
have a role to play in giving birth to an
independent nation from a territory which
the community of nations accepts as being
under U.N. authority, at least in theory. We
have proposed that an international
conference on a Namibian settlement take
place under U.N. aegis at a neutral site with
all the concerned parties.
In support of our policy, the United
States has since 1970 officially discouraged
American investment in Namibia. The
facilities of the Export-Import Bank are no
longer available for trade with the territory.
No future U.S. investments there, made on
the basis of rights acquired from the South
African Government following termination of
the mandate, would receive U.S.
Government protection against the claims of
a future legitimate government in Namibia.
We have urged American firms doing busi-
ness in Namibia to assure that their
employment practices are in conformity with
the principles of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
Policy Toward South Africa
Our policy toward South Africa is neces-
sarily different from our policy toward
Rhodesia and Namibia.
We have had diplomatic relations with
South Africa since that country became in-
dependent. In addition to our Embassy in
Pretoria, we have three consulates general
which keep us informed about what is going
on in that country.
South Africa is not a colonial remnant.
Even the leaders of black Africa do not chal-
lenge the right of the white minority to live
in South Africa. The white settlers began to
cultivate the lands of South Africa 300 years
ago. They are also Africans, and they have
no other place to go. The problems of South
Africa should therefore be solved in South
Africa — not by outside powers.
Our maintenance of diplomatic relations
with South Africa is by no means an
indication that we accept that country's in-
May 9, 1977
467
stitution of apartheid. We have not minced
our words in stating our unalterable opposi-
tion to apartheid and shall not do so in the
future. This system is a clear violation of
fundamental human rights. Last summer the
United States joined a consensus in the
U.N. Security Council resolution "strongly
condemning" the South African Government
for its role in the Soweto violence. On that
occasion, the acting U.S. representative
called on South Africa to "take these events
as a warning" and "to abandon a system
which is clearly not acceptable under any
standard of human rights." 2
As elsewhere in southern Africa we are
dedicated to the proposition that peaceful
change must succeed, if only because the al-
ternative is so unacceptable. We have
watched with dismay the escalation of
violence in South Africa, beginning with the
Soweto riots last year. We are deeply con-
cerned that unless the spiral of violence can
be arrested and reversed, there will be such
a polarization of forces within South Africa
that peaceful change will become immeasur-
ably more difficult than it is already. We
shall employ all reasonable channels to get
this message across to the South Africans
and to facilitate this change to the maximum
possible extent.
It is appropriate, however, to insert here
a cautionary word. Of all people, we Ameri-
cans should probably be chary about provid-
ing excessive and unsolicited advice to
others about how they should solve their
racial problems. True, we have made im-
pressive progress within our own country in
removing the stain of injustice and discrimi-
nation based solely on race. But we must
also admit that we have a considerable way
to go before our achievements approach the
ideals set forth in our Declaration of Inde-
pendence and our Constitution.
But perhaps more important, our recent
history provides testimony to the fact that
change in the racial sphere came about
— gradually, unevenly, perhaps even
2 For U.S. statements and text of Security Council
Resolution 392, adopted by consensus on June 19,
1976, see Bulletin of July 12, 1976, p. 59.
grudgingly — not because outsiders or
foreigners told us what was right, but be-
cause the realization finally dawned on our
people that the status quo was wrong and
had to be changed for our own good. This
self-realization must be given an opportunity
to do its creative work in South Africa also,
although I will readily agree that the time
for results is limited.
It is in no one's interest if the South Afri-
cans move into an isolationist shell, closed
against outside influences, there to defend
themselves from all enemies foreign and
domestic. Such a development would have
an effect opposite from the one we wish to
achieve.
Our diplomacy toward South Africa must
therefore be carried out with a good deal of
finesse and skill. We shall have to weigh
carefully the relative merits of speaking out
and of restraint.
In the circumstances I have described, the
United States is necessarily pursuing a
nuanced policy vis-a-vis South Africa,
without compromising our principles. As I
have already indicated, we have repeatedly
made clear our opposition to a system under
which an 18 percent minority limits the
black majority economically, discriminates
socially, and deprives the blacks of political
rights.
As a corollary to this policy, the United
States has opposed the South African Gov-
ernment's policy of creating a series of "ban-
tustans," or "homelands." The Transkei was
the first of these homelands to become
"independent," but others are expected to
be given that status by South Africa. The
United States has not recognized the Trans-
kei, and aside from South Africa, neither
have other members of the United Nations.
We have no intention of recognizing any of
the other homelands that will be declared
"independent."
In fact, the creation of these so-called
states is an extension of the apartheid pol-
icy. Stripped of all euphemisms and
rationalizations the concept of the
homelands is unfair to the black majority.
The effect of their creation is to deprive
substantial elements of the black urban
468
Department of State Bulletin
work force of their civil rights in South
Africa and to force many urban blacks to
take on citizenship of a "homeland" they
have never known. The homelands were es-
tablished without consulting the blacks.
They are generally conglomerations of the
remnants of tribal lands without contiguous
borders, without the basis for economic via-
bility, and without any basis for true
political independence from South Africa.
It is worth noting that there have been
some encouraging signs on the South Afri-
can scene. Events of the past year have not
been without their effect on the white com-
munity of South Africa. Many signs point to
considerable soul-searching, even on the
part of the Afrikaner community, which
forms the primary political base of the rul-
ing party. A number of leading Afrikaner in-
tellectuals have urged that the government
reconsider important elements of its policy,
such as present plans for the homelands, the
denial of all political rights to Africans out-
side the homelands, and various forms of
economic discrimination.
South African businessmen, too, have
begun to urge steps to improve the daily life
of Africans in such areas as housing and
training. In certain areas of activity which
are not directly under government sponsor-
ship, such as athletic and religious organiza-
tions, we detect some breakdown in pre-
viously rigid racial barriers. We have been
encouraged by the actions of the Catholic
Church to permit some integration of its
schools and by the tolerance of this decision
displayed by the South African Government.
In terms of the daily life of an African in
South Africa, these are small steps. But we
believe they reflect that the faith of many
South African whites in the possibility of
maintaining indefinitely racial separation
and white supremacy is being fundamentally
reexamined.
The United States has adopted certain
policies to demonstrate our opposition to the
apartheid policy of South Africa. Since 1962
we have maintained a voluntary embargo on
the sale of military equipment to South
Africa. U.S. naval vessels do not call at
South African ports (except for emergen-
cies), although they regularly make courtesy
calls in some black African ports.
We have redoubled our efforts to intensify
our contacts with blacks in the South Afri-
can population. President Carter recently
invited Gathsha Buthelezi, a prominent
black moderate, to the White House, under-
lining the Administration's interest in es-
tablishing better ties with black leadership in
South Africa.
Along these same lines, we have inten-
sified the informational activities of the U.S.
Information Service in South Africa, espe-
cially among the black population. We have
also expanded our exchange program, under
which a cross section of the South African
population, mostly blacks, visits the United
States for monthlong visits. Our diplomatic
and consular officers, including black
Foreign Service officers, cultivate a wide
range of contacts in South Africa.
Steps by U.S. Business Community
The United States has also encouraged
American firms doing business in South Af-
rica to improve working conditions for their
black employees. We believe this could be a
significant American contribution to the
principle of social justice and provide a ve-
hicle for promoting economic and social
progress. We have been encouraged by the
progress that many American firms have
demonstrated in working toward the princi-
ple of equal pay for equal work, adequate
pensions, improved medical and insurance
benefits, and expanded opportunities for ad-
vancement based entirely on merit, rather
than on the basis of race. Although there is
clearly room for improvement in the
performance of their labor practices, South
African-based American companies have
shown considerable sensitivity in dealing
with their black employees. By their
example they have already set in motion
some of the kinds of changes that are so
desperately needed.
A recent step in the right direction was
the March 1, 1977, announcement by 12
major U.S. corporations with business
interests in South Africa expressing support
May 9, 1977
469
for a set of principles designed to promote
equal employment rights for blacks and
nonwhite minority groups. These principles
call for the nonsegregation of races in all
dining facilities and places of work and the
concept of equal pay for all employees doing
equal and comparable work. We hope that
these constructive steps will be emulated
and expanded by other U.S. firms engaged
in business in South Africa and perhaps
even be adopted by the South African busi-
ness community itself.
We fully recognize that American
corporations genuinely desirous of wishing
to institute social changes in their labor
practices may fear contravening South Afri-
can laws and traditional practices which
discourage evolutionary changes. Moreover,
many of the white unions are resistant to
change. They will not countenance having a
black supervisor over a white worker, and
they restrict the movement of black workers
into the ranks of the skilled workers despite
the fact that South African industry desper-
ately needs more skilled workers.
There is no reason why American firms
cannot enter into collective bargaining
agreements with black unions. Unlike the
white unions, these are not officially
registered. However, they are not illegal,
and companies can deal with them. Several
weeks ago the second largest supermarket
chain in South Africa announced that it
would recognize and negotiate with a black
trade union. We hope this will encourage
American corporations to follow suit where
the existence of a black union makes this
feasible.
There are those, of course, who argue
that American corporations in effect have no
business being in South Africa in the first
place, that they are either an impediment to
social change or have no real effect on
change, and that their net result is to but-
tress the status quo elements that want
apartheid to go on.
Others have come forth with opposing ar-
guments. They claim that U.S. investment
assists the economic development of South
Africa, which sets in motion certain power-
ful currents of change that will be too pow-
erful to withstand. Increased investment,
the argument goes, helps create more jobs
for blacks, inevitably some upgrading of
their job skills, and this process has already
resulted in new and different perceptions and
attitudes that have made themselves felt on
the South African political scene.
The South African blacks seem to be di-
vided in their views on this issue. Some
favor foreign, including U.S., investment
while others have opposed it. There is cer-
tainly no clear consensus on the question.
As a government we have stayed neutral
on this issue so far. We have neither
encouraged nor discouraged American in-
vestment in South Africa. This is one of
many facets of our policy toward southern
Africa that is currently under review.
Potential American investors have been
free to decide the issue on their own, al-
though if asked we provide them with all the
information we have available. We make
certain they are aware of the controversy
about such investment, explain our official
neutrality, note the moral and social as well
as economic and political problems of
working in an apartheid society, and urge
that if they do invest they give priority at-
tention to the matter of fair employment
practices.
We have, however, placed some restric-
tions on our bilateral economic relationship.
For example, we restrict the Export-Import
Bank facilities in South Africa.
Export-Import Bank direct loans to South
African importers of U.S. products are pro-
hibited. However, the Bank does guarantee
privately financed loans as a service to U.S.
exporters.
As I indicated at the outset of my re-
marks, there are a number of positive ele-
ments on the southern African scene.
Perhaps the most promising aspect is the
fact that unlike a number of African coun-
tries, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa
itself have strong economic assets. Southern
Africa is richly endowed with a generally
favorable climate and with natural resources
that the world needs. We have already an-
nounced that we stand ready to assist
Zimbabwe and Namibia with training pro-
470
Department of State Bulletin
grams to promote further economic de-
velopment when majority rule comes.
The rest of the African Continent has, in a
relatively short time, made tremendous
progress from the colonial period to inde-
pendence to collectively playing a major role
on the world scene. The record has
inevitably been an uneven one, but there are
a number of African countries where Afri-
cans and Europeans cooperate in harmony
for the betterment of all. I would not suggest
that the situation in southern Africa is analo-
gous. But I do suggest that there are examples
on the African Continent which give hope that
political leaders can creatively build a future in
which blacks and whites can coexist and pros-
per in peace rather than have the future im-
posed on them.
For the sake of Africa, and for our sake, I
hope that the leadership in southern Africa
will choose wisely. For our part we wish
them well, and we will remain committed to
doing everything in our power to insure that
the outcome will be a happy one.
THE CONGRESS
Administration Supports Increased U.S. Contributions
to the African Development Fund
Following are statements by Andrew
Young, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, and David B. Bolen, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for African Affairs, before
the Subcomm ittee on Africa of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on April
18. l
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG
I very much appreciate this opportunity to
appear before your subcommittee today. I
must also commend this subcommittee for
its past lead on examining issues that affect
U.S. policy in Africa and for the forum it
provides today to discuss future U.S. par-
ticipation in the African Development Fund.
Africa's problems are not new.
Twenty-two of the 33 U.N. -designated
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
"most seriously affected countries," 13 of
the world's 18 landlocked developing coun-
tries, and more than half of the 29 least
developed countries in the world are in Af-
rica. These problems have been severely ag-
gravated by the current energy and inflation
problems. Millions of acres of arable African
land remain unused because of physical inac-
cessibility or lack of adequate roads, techni-
cal knowledge deficiencies, and irrigation
inadequacies.
Current foreign policy dictates a clear
need for addressing these problems by con-
tributing to the economic, social, and tech-
nological advancement of these countries
through international organizations. To this
end, the African Development Fund has al-
located 33 percent of its credits to the ag-
riculture sector during the last year, 27
percent to public utilities, 14 percent to
health, and 19 percent to transportation.
In examining the African nations, the
United States should recognize the
significant roles these nations play in the
May 9, 1977
471
United Nations and in other world contexts
rather than limiting itself to bilateral
policies. Our exports to Africa in 1976,
showing a clear trend toward greatly in-
creased interests in the area by American
business, reflect growing U.S. concern. This
concern should be furthered by sharing U.S.
technological advancements in transporta-
tion, communication, and agriculture to as-
sist the less developed countries in utilizing
their increasingly valuable natural
resources. The African nations are working
toward a new economic order and are look-
ing for assistance in this area from the de-
veloped countries, particularly the United
States, whose role in the past has not been
commensurate with its ability to assist these
countries on various levels.
The African Development Fund was begun
in 1973 as the concessional facility as-
sociated with the African Development
Bank. The Fund directs its loan resources
toward economic and social development. It
is able to loan to the neediest of the coun-
tries because it has a 0.75 percent service
charge with a 50-year repayment clause. At
this time, the African Development Fund is
unique in addressing the needs of the Afri-
can countries; certainly this invaluable in-
stitution deserves our cooperation and sup-
port.
In conjunction with this Administration's
policy, we must demonstrate through in-
creased participation in the Fund our con-
cern for the development and prosperity of
these countries. Repeal of the Byrd amend-
ment recently indicates the Administration's
good will and commitment to accept a more
positive role toward African growth,
prosperity, and independence.
To date, the United States has contrib-
uted only $15 million to the African De-
velopment Fund although we have pledged a
total of $25 million, thereby giving us less
than 3 percent of the voting power in the
Fund. If the United States is ever to obtain
a significant voice in the Fund, it is
essential that we contribute an amount that
truly represents our commitment. I urge
this subcommittee therefore to closely
examine this matter and vote to authorize
funding which will augment our role in the
Fund and will enable our delegation to
Mauritius [the 1977 meeting of the Boards of
Governors of the African Development Bank
and Fund, May 2-7] to speak from a position
of strength and visible commitment. It is
also my hope that appropriations would be
forthcoming in fiscal year 1979 which would
further demonstrate our commitment.
I would also urge this subcommittee to
overwhelmingly oppose the Wylie language
adopted during the House debate on this bill
which directs the Secretary of the Treasury
to seek, in his discussions with other na-
tions, a voting structure weighted to reflect
the contributions made by donor countries.
As a country which has the potential to con-
tribute so much and yet contributes so little,
we are hardly in a position to attempt to
amend the current structure in a way which
would greatly offend the members of the Af-
rican Development Bank.
Again, thank you for allowing me this op-
portunity to share my thoughts on this very
important matter with you.
STATEMENT BY MR. BOLEN
I welcome this opportunity to testify be-
fore this committee on U.S. contributions to
the African Development Fund, the conces-
sional loan affiliate of the African Develop-
ment Bank.
U.S. contributions to the African
Development Fund are of major importance
to the Administration's Africa policy. They
respond directly to the fundamental foreign
policy objectives of the economic assistance
efforts of the Carter Administration. Secre-
tary of State Vance enunciated the following
objectives for our foreign assistance before
the Senate Appropriations Committee:
— To demonstrate America's compassion
for the poor and dispossessed around the
world — those who, through no fault of their
own, are exposed to daily suffering and
humiliation and are struggling to survive;
— To make our fair contribution to the
472
Department of State Bulletin
enormous task of the social, economic, and
technological development of poor countries,
an investment which in this interdependent
world can pay us handsome dividends;
— To foster a climate of constructive coop-
eration, dialogue, and reciprocal benefit in
our North-South diplomacy.
As you know, 18 of the world's 29 least
developed countries are in Africa. Also,
many African countries have experienced a
deterioration in economic conditions over
the past 15 years. I know members of this
committee will agree that a world of pov-
erty, illiteracy, and disease cannot be safe
for this or future generations.
If we wish to demonstrate America's com-
passion for the world's poor, clearly we
must be prepared to act in Africa. If we
wish to make a fair contribution to the
enormous task of development of poor coun-
tries, clearly we must be prepared to pro-
vide our fair share in Africa.
Nowhere in the world is the task so enor-
mous, and nowhere is it more essential.
Compared to other parts of the developing
world, Africa is the least well endowed with
the basic economic and social infrastructure
essential to development generally. Only
concessional finance can deal effectively
with this situation. This was the underlying
reason for the creation of the African De-
velopment Fund in the first place. This is
why Fund loans have been directed to the
poorest African countries by common
consent of its African members.
I have no doubt that U.S. investment in
our growing economic interdependence with
Africa can pay us handsome dividends. For
four years, our imports from Africa have
been growing at a considerably faster pace
than global U.S. imports — largely because of
crude oil imports, particularly from Nigeria.
Africa now accounts for over 38 percent of
our crude oil imports. We are already de-
pendent on Africa for other essential
minerals — antimony, bauxite, chrome,
cobalt, copper, manganese, and platinum.
This dependence is likely to increase in
years to come, as the continent possesses a
substantial portion of the world's known
reserves of the 53 most important minerals
used in the industrial process today.
During 1974 and 1975 our exports to Af-
rica increased faster than the average rate
of increase of global U.S. exports. Now that
prices for many commodities exported by
Africa have strengthened, we expect this
favorable trend in our exports to Africa to
resume, thus creating more jobs and eco-
nomic opportunities for Americans.
U.S. direct investment in Africa has also
grown rapidly, expanding from an estimated
. $600 million in 1960 to $3.4 billion in 1975.
Additional contributions to the African
Development Fund are consistent with the
national interest in building cooperative
economic relations with African countries.
They are consistent with our efforts to fash-
ion a more constructive and cooperative
North-South dialogue. We need concrete
actions to demonstrate to these countries
that we are concerned with assisting them in
achieving a better life and a greater role in
an international economic order based on
market forces.
If we wish as a matter of humanitarian
compassion and economic self-interest to
make a fair contribution to the enormous
task of African development, we must seek
an appropriate role for the United States in
the African Development Fund. The African
Development Bank and Fund are the
preferred development finance institutions
of the Africans. They are the only pan-
African development finance institutions and
have proven themselves to have a unique
and effective role in the economic develop-
ment of the continent. The Africans view
the degree of donor support for the African
Development Fund to be an important
measure of donor commitment to African
development generally.
However, present U.S. contributions to
the African Development Fund total only
$15 million, about 4.4 percent of total con-
tributions to date. We are now eighth in
donor rank — after Canada, Japan, West
Germany, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands,
and Denmark. If the Administration's
May 9, 1977
473
$10 million fiscal year 1978 appropriation
request for the Fund is approved by the
Congress, our subscription would rise to $25
million, or about 5 percent of total pledged
and projected Fund contributions through
July 1, 1978. We would then be about sixth
in donor rank.
We know that both the Africans and other
donors consider this situation to constitute
an inadequate role for the United States in
the African Development Fund. The United
States plays a leading role in all the interna-
tional financial institutions except the Afri-
can Development Fund. We hold executive-
directorships in all these institutions except
the African Development Fund. The political
benefits we have already gained from mem-
bership in the Fund will be undercut if we
are unable to obtain an appropriate role
within a reasonable length of time. We
would also have no assurance of election to
an executive-directorship in the Fund with-
out increasing our relative voting power.
We therefore request the committee to in-
corporate in the legislation pending before
you language already passed by the House
which would authorize additional
contributions to the African Development
Fund. Negotiations for the Fund's second
replenishment exercise are expected to
begin at the end of this calendar year. We
will seek to expedite those negotiations. If
they are not completed prior to submission
of the fiscal year 1979 budget, we would
propose to seek an appropriation in fiscal
year 1979. This would permit us to move
toward an appropriate role in the Fund and
significantly increase the prospects for U.S.
election to an executive-directorship.
Conversely, the Administration strongly
opposes the amendment to the House ver-
sion of the authorization bill which directs
the Secretary of the Treasury to seek other
donor support for the purpose of changing
the voting structure within the Fund to re-
flect actual contributions by Fund members.
Relative donor-country voting power in
the Fund already reflects actual donor-
country contributions. Any U.S. attempt to
modify the Fund's articles of agreement to
reduce the African Development Bank's
share of the voting power would be politi-
cally unacceptable to the Africans and as
such almost certainly would be rejected by
the other donors.
Since the United States helped negotiate
the Fund's articles of agreement in the first
place and just ratified them last November,
we believe it to be inappropriate to be
forced by legislation to seek their modifica-
tion. The Fund's articles require approval of
all transactions by 75 percent of the total
votes and fully protect donor interests. We
hope the committee will seek elimination of
this amendment.
Funding for Earthquake Relief
to Romania Urged
Following is a statement made before the
House Committee on International Rela-
tions on April J, by Matthew Nimetz, then
Counselor-designate of the Department, who
was sworn in on April 8. '
I am grateful for this opportunity to ex-
press the views of the Administration on the
question of humanitarian and relief assist-
ance to Romania and on H.R. 5717, which
would provide funds for such assistance. Let
me also express my appreciation for the
cooperation which members of this commit-
tee have demonstrated in working with the
Administration as we attempt to formulate a
specific program of assistance which reflects
traditional American responsiveness to in-
ternational disasters and at the same time
fits harmoniously into the overall recon-
struction effort underway in Romania.
I am sure that the committee is aware of
the magnitude of the damage suffered by
the Romanian people in the March 4 earth-
quake: over 1,500 dead, 11,000 injured,
32,000 buildings destroyed, and 34,000
families homeless. In Bucharest alone,
where the quake caused the greatest loss of
life and property, nine hospitals were se-
verely damaged. The Romanian Government
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
474
Department of State Bulletin
has estimated that losses to the economy
exceed $1 billion.
In the immediate aftermath of this disas-
ter, the U.S. Government reacted promptly
and generously — as it has in the past in
countries such as Yugoslavia, Italy,
Guatemala, and Turkey — by providing
emergency assistance in the form of medical
supplies, 300 tons of dry milk, and the
dispatch of a team of seismic experts to as-
sist in on-the-spot evaluation of structural
damage. This initial package of disaster re-
lief assistance, which was funded out of the
Foreign Assistance Act and Public Law 480
title II, came to approximately $625,000. (In
addition, private American voluntary agen-
cies have contributed over $400,000 to assist
in post-earthquake relief efforts.) Other
governments have also responded gener-
ously in providing assistance to Romania for
both emergency relief and for longer term
reconstruction.
The Administration believes that the addi-
tional assistance envisioned by H.R. 5717
would provide an extremely important and
timely followup to the emergency relief
which this government has already supplied.
The Romanians face a monumental task in
restoring housing, medical facilities, and
communal services to normal levels. The
present bill would give the Administration
the vehicle for putting together a package of
rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance
which we would plan to administer according
to the following set of priorities:
(1) Hospital, medical and similar equip-
ment, and commodities with a humanitarian
purpose;
(2) Equipment, commodities, and technical
services required for clearing damaged
buildings and the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of damaged housing, schools,
and hospitals; and
(3) Equipment and commodities required
for rehabilitation, reconstruction, and
replacement in other sectors.
It goes without saying that we would ex-
pect to work closely with this committee and
with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in working out a suitable pro-
gram that corresponds both to the intent of
the Congress and to the needs of the Roma-
nian people.
I must add in all candor, however, that we
are concerned with the action taken by the
Senate on April 1 in cutting by one-half the
supplementary appropriation for S. 1124 for
Romanian earthquake relief and rehabilita-
tion. The Administration, in coordination
with our Ambassador in Bucharest, has
carefully considered the possible levels of
funding needed to implement a meaningful
program of assistance, within the very clear
budgetary constraints, and we have deter-
mined that $20 million should be allocated
for this purpose. I wish to stress that this
determination was made in consultation with
the Office of Management and Budget and
has the support of the highest levels within
the Administration — including the Presi-
dent. I also might add that the figure of $20
million in grant aid is consistent with U.S.
assistance provided to other countries which
have suffered devastating earthquakes. We
would therefore hope that the House and
Senate can promptly work out the necessary
authorizing and appropriating legislation
which would permit the Administration to
move forward with a $20 million package of
aid.
Although the committee's present concern
is the proposal for relief and rehabilitation
assistance within the framework of H.R.
5717, the Administration is also looking at
the possibility of providing other forms of
assistance to Romania to help in the recov-
ery from the enormous losses sustained. We
are reviewing, for example, the appro-
priateness of low-interest credits to help
finance Romanian purchases of U.S. equip-
ment to repair or replace items damaged in
the earthquake. We will consult with this
committee after the Administration has had
an opportunity to study this matter further.
I think a word about Romania's relations
with the United States would be appropriate
here. Although Romania is a member of
both the Warsaw Pact and the Communist
economic group, the Council of Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance, Romania has forcefully
pursued a policy of seeking friendly and
constructive relations with the countries of
the West, a policy which has distanced it
May 9, 1977
475
from the Soviet Union and the other mem-
bers of the Warsaw Pact. Romania continues
to pursue an independent line on a number
of international issues of major concern to us
and has consistently emphasized to this gov-
ernment its interest in establishing even
closer economic and political ties with the
United States. This improvement in rela-
tions has been underscored by the ex-
changes of visits by heads of state that have
taken place in 1969, 1973, and 1975. The pro-
posed grant of assistance to Romania in the
wake of the March 4 earthquake would be an
extremely significant gesture of support for
the efforts which Romania has been making
to map out its future independently of out-
side direction.
In this regard, I believe it is also
important to point out that the considerable
economic toll which Romania suffered as a
result of the earthquake may create pres-
sures on the Romanian Government to
modify this relatively independent stance.
Substantive evidence of our readiness to as-
sist would help the Romanians to maintain
their present course.
I am also aware of this committee's strong
and commendable concerns with the prog-
ress of human rights in countries to which
the United States supplies assistance. I
think that all of the members of this com-
mittee are equally aware of the commitment
of this Administration to keep this concern
in the forefront in our dealings with other
countries. The Administration is convinced
that the proposal to provide relief and re-
habilitation assistance to Romania is in no
way inconsistent with our concerns over
human rights. On the contrary, I can think
of no better way to underscore our human-
itarian concern with the conditions of human
existence in other countries.
In closing, I wish to express the Adminis-
tration's gratitude to the sponsors of H.R.
5717 for their initiative in proposing this
package of assistance and to the committee
for promptly taking up this urgent measure.
I respectfully urge you to move just as
quickly in translating it into law.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome
June 13, 1976. "
Ratification deposited: Jamaica, April 13, 1977.
Signatures: Argentina, April 14, 1977; Denmark,
January 12, 1977; Sweden, January 11, 1977.
Astronauts
Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into
outer space. Done at Washington, London, and Mos-
cow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3,
1968. TIAS 6599.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, April 15, 1977.
BILATERAL
Czechoslovakia
Agreement providing for consultations should textile
or apparel exports from Czechoslovakia cause mar-
ket disruptions in the United States. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Prague March 22 and 28, 1977.
Entered into force March 28, 1977.
Egypt
Loan agreement relating to a commodity import pro-
gram. Signed at Cairo March 6, 1977. Entered into
force March 6, 1977.
Project grant agreement for applied science and tech-
nology research, with annexes. Signed at Cairo
March 29, 1977. Entered into force March 29, 1977.
Nigeria
Memorandum of understanding relating to technical
cooperation in geological, water resources, land-use,
and related studies for the Capital Territory of
Nigeria. Dated February 4, 1977. Entered into force
February 4, 1977.
United Kingdom
Second protocol amending the convention of December
31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double
taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re-
spect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at
London March 31, 1977. Enters into force 30 days
after the date on which instruments of ratification
are exchanged.
Not in force.
476
Department of State Bulletin
NDEX May 9, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1976
Lfrica
Ldministration Supports Increased U.S. Contri-
butions to the African Development Fund (Bo-
len, Young) 471
nterview With President Carter by Media Rep-
resentatives April 1.3 (excerpt) 459
Lrms Control and Disarmament
'resident Carter's Pan American Day Address . . 453
'resident Carter's Remarks at Dobbins Air Force
Base. Ga. (excerpts) 401
hina. Interview With President Carter by Media
Representatives April 15 (excerpt) 459
'ongress
Administration Supports Increased U.S. Contri-
butions to the African Development Fund (Bo-
len, Young) 471
Ending for Earthquake Relief to Romania Urged
(Nimetz) 474
]uba. Interview With President Carter by Media
Representatives April 15 (excerpt) 459
Developing Countries. President Carter's Pan
American Day Address 453
Sconomic Affairs
'resident Announces Measures To Assist U.S.
Industry (statement) 463
'resident Carter's Pan American Day Address . . 453
foreign Aid
Administration Supports Increased U.S. Contri-
butions to the African Development Fund (Bo-
len, Young) 471
uruling for Earthquake Relief to Romania Urged
(Nimetz) 474
'resident Carter's News Conference of April 15
(excerpts) 457
iuman Rights
'resident Carter's News Conference of April 15
(excerpts ) 457
^resident Carter's Pan American Day Address . . 453
atin America and the Caribbean. President
Carter's Pan American Day Address 453
Middle East. President Carter's Remarks at
Dobbins Air Force Base, Ga. (excerpts) 4(il
Vamibia. United States Relations in Southern
Africa (Schaufele) 40 1
Organization of American States. President
Carter's Pan American Day Address 453
Presidential Documents
Intel-view With President Carter by Media Rep-
resentatives April 15 (excerpt ) • ■ 450
President Announces Measures To Assist U.S.
Shoe Industry 463
President Carter's News Conference of April 15
(excerpts ) 457
President Carter's Pan American Day Address . .
President Carter's Remarks at Dobbins Air Force
Base, Ga. (excerpts) 461
Romania. Funding for Earthquake Relief to
Romania Urged (Nimetz) 474
South Africa. United States Relations in South-
ern Africa (Schaufele) 464
Southern Rhodesia. United States Relations in
Southern Africa (Schaufele) 464
Treaty Information. Current Actions 476
U.S.S.R.
President Carter's News Conference of April 15
(excerpts) 457
President Carter's Remarks at Dobbins Air Force
Base, Ga. (excerpts) 461
Name Index
Bolen, David B 471
Carter, President 453, 457, 450. 461. 4a;
Nimetz, Matthew 474
Schaufele, William E., Jr 464
Young, Andrew 471
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: April 18-24
Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
*182 4/19 International Joint Commission au-
thorized to establish Great Lakes
Water Level Advisory Board.
*183 4/121 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
May 12.
"184 4/21 Program for visit of King Hussein I
of Jordan.
*185 4/22 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at
Sea, working group on radiocom-
munications, May 19.
*Not printed.
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington. dc. 20402
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1977 • May 16, 1977
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY ACT OF 1977
TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS
Message Front President Carter and White House Fact Sheet J,77
DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Statement by Undo- Secretary Benson ^85
THE CHALLENGE TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL:
ADVANCING THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS
Statement by Ambassador Young 494
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside hack coi-er
2 5 W
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E 1 N
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1977
May 16, 1977
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The Secretary of State has determined that the pub-
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re-
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN as the source will he appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
The Department or State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S, foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1977
Transmitted to the Congress
Following is the text of a message from
President Carter to the Congress dated
April 27, together with a fact sheet issued by
the White House that day.
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER
White House press release dated April 27
To the Congress of the United States:
The need to halt nuclear proliferation is
one of mankind's most pressing challenges.
Members of my Administration are now
engaged in international discussions to find
ways of controlling the spread of nuclear
explosive capability without depriving any
nation of the means to satisfy its energy
needs. The domestic nuclear policies which I
have already put forward will place our na-
tion in a leadership position, setting a posi-
tive example for other nuclear suppliers as
well as demonstrating the strength of our
concern here at home for the hazards of a
plutonium economy. Today I am submitting
to the Congress a bill which would establish
for the United States a strong and effective
non-proliferation policy.
This bill relies heavily upon work which
the Congress has already done, and I
commend the Congress for these valuable
initiatives. I look forward to working with
the Congress to establish a strong, respon-
sible legislative framework from which we
can continue strengthened efforts to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Among our shared goals are: an increase
in the effectiveness of international
safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear
activities to prevent further proliferation of
nuclear explosive devices, the establishment
of common international sanctions to
prevent such proliferation, an effort to en-
courage nations which have not ratified the
Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so at the ear-
liest possible date, and adoption of programs
to enhance the reliability of the United
States as a supplier of nuclear fuel.
This bill differs from pending proposals,
however, in several respects:
1. It defines the immediate nuclear export
conditions which we can reasonably ask
other nations to meet while we negotiate
stricter arrangements. The proposals
currently before Congress would impose
criteria that could force an immediate
moratorium on our nuclear exports, ad-
versely affecting certain allies whose
cooperation is needed if we are to achieve
our ultimate objective of non-proliferation.
2. It defines additional nuclear export
conditions which will be required in new
agreements for civil nuclear cooperation. In
particular, we will require as a continuing
condition of U.S. supply that recipients have
all their nuclear activities under IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency]
safeguards. I view this as an interim meas-
ure and shall make it clear to all potential
recipients and to other nuclear suppliers
that our first preference, and continuing ob-
jective, is universal adherence to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
3. For the near future, it attempts to
tighten the conditions for U.S. nuclear coop-
eration through renegotiation of existing
agreements to meet the same standards as
those we will require in new agreements. I
believe that this approach will better meet
our non-proliferation objectives than will the
unilateral imposition of new export licensing
conditions.
May 16, 1977
477
4. It increases the flexibility we need to
deal with an extremely complex subject. For
example, instead of requiring countries that
want our nuclear exports to foreswear fuel
enrichment and reprocessing for all time, it
allows us to draft new agreements using in-
centives to encourage countries not to ac-
quire such facilities. It also permits me to
grant exceptions when doing so would fur-
ther our basic aim of non-proliferation. All
new cooperation agreements would, of
course, be subject to Congressional review.
This bill is intended to reassure other na-
tions that the United States will be a reli-
able supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment
for those who genuinely share our desire for
non-proliferation. It will insure that when
all statutory standards have been met, ex-
port licenses will be issued — or, if the judg-
ment of the Executive Branch and the
independent Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion should differ, that a workable
mechanism exists for resolving the dispute.
Since I intend personally to oversee
Executive Branch actions affecting non-
proliferation, I do not think a substantial
reorganization of the responsibility for nu-
clear exports within the Executive Branch is
necessary. This conclusion is shared by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The need for prompt action is great. Until
domestic legislation is enacted, other coun-
tries will be reluctant to renegotiate their
agreements with us, because they will fear
that new legislation might suddenly change
the terms of cooperation. If the incentives
we offer them to renegotiate with us are not
attractive enough, the United States could
lose important existing safeguards and
controls. And if our policy is too weak, we
could find ourselves powerless to restrain a
deadly world-wide expansion of nuclear ex-
plosive capability. I believe the legislation
now submitted to you strikes the necessary
balance.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, April 27, 1977.
478
WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET
White House press release (later! Apl
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act
of 1977, the domestic nuclear policies an-
nounced by the President on April 7, and
the additional policy decisions included in
this fact sheet are key components of the
Administration's nuclear nonproliferation
policy. The President's policy decisions
include:
— New conditions we will require for the
granting of nuclear export licenses.
— Additional new conditions we will re-
quire in new U.S. agreements for
cooperation. These agreements are the for-
mal bilateral undertakings which form the
basis for civil nuclear interactions with
other nations.
— Policies the executive branch will follow
in making recommendations to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission on the export of
sensitive items such as plutonium and highly
enriched uranium (the weapons-usable form
of uranium, known as HEU).
— Policies the executive branch will follow
in deciding whether to approve a request by
another nation to retransfer U.S. -supplied
fuel to a third nation for reprocessing.
— Policies to improve U.S. reliability as a
nuclear fuel supplier by introducing greater
clarity and predictability into the export li-
censing process.
Together, all these policies will place the
United States in a leadership position among
nuclear suppliers, and will establish a strong
and effective nonproliferation policy. These
policies have been developed, and must be
evaluated, as a complete package. They are
intended as a delicately balanced blend of:
— Denials: for those items, such as re-
processing plants, which we believe create
such a large risk that their export should be
avoided whenever possible;
— Controls: over those items and technol-
ogies, required by ongoing programs, where
improved safeguards and conditions for
physical security will substantially reduce
Department of State Bulletin
k the risk. These controls will be backed up by
I stiff sanctions which would be imposed on
I violators.
— Incentives: The United States fully rec-
ti ognizes that there is no such thing as an ef-
fective unilateral nonproliferation policy. We
■ must gain the support of other
1 nations — both suppliers and recipients — if
I we are to reach our common goal of limiting
I the spread of nuclear weapons. Hence the
■ Administration's program includes
I substantial elements of incentives, particu-
i larly in the areas of: uranium resource as-
I sessment; guaranteed access to nonsensi-
I tive, low enriched uranium (LEU) nuclear
| fuel; and spent fuel storage.
The following are key features of the Nu-
I clear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977
| and related Administration policies:
1. The bill establishes for the first time a
statutory requirement forbidding the inde-
pendent Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) from granting a license to export
nuclear materials or facilities until it has
been notified by the executive branch of its
judgment that the issuance of a license "will
not be inimicable to the common defense and
security." This judgment will be reached by
the Departments of State, Defense, Com-
merce, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, and the Energy Research and
Development Administration.
In arriving at these judgments, the execu-
tive branch will adhere to the following
policies not detailed in the act:
— Continue to embargo the export of en-
richment and reprocessing plants.
— Avoid new commitments to export sig-
nificant amounts of separated plutonium
except for gram quantities for research and
analytical uses.
— Avoid new commitments to export sig-
nificant quantities of highly enriched
uranium except when the project is of ex-
ceptional merit and the use of low enriched
fuel or some other less weapons-usable ma-
terial is clearly shown to be technically
infeasible.
— Require direct Presidential approval for
any supply of HEU greater than 15 kilo-
grams (the approximate amount needed for
a bomb).
— Undertake efforts to identify projects
and facilities which might be converted to
the use of LEU instead of HEU.
— Take steps to minimize inventories of
weapons-usable uranium abroad.
2. The bill defines the immediate nuclear
export conditions which we can reasonably
expect other nations to meet while we
negotiate stricter agreements for coopera-
tion. These conditions include:
— A requirement for International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all
exported items and on any other plutonium
or enriched uranium that might be used in
the exported facility or produced through its
use.
— A requirement that no U.S. export be
used for research or production of any nu-
clear explosive device.
— A requirement that no U.S. export be
retransferred by a recipient nation to any
other nation without the prior approval of
the United States.
— A requirement that no fuel exported
from the United States be reprocessed with-
out the prior approval of the United States.
These criteria differ from proposals
currently before Congress which include
criteria that could force an immediate
moratorium on U.S. nuclear exports. Such a
moratorium would seriously damage U.S.
relations with certain allies whose coopera-
tion is essential if we are to achieve our
nonproliferation objectives.
3. The bill defines additional nuclear
export conditions which will be required in
new agreements for cooperation. These
include:
— A requirement, in the case of
non-nuclear-weapons states, that IAEA
safeguards cover all nuclear materials and
equipment regardless of whether these have
been supplied by the United States.
Fulfillment of this requirement will be a
May 16, 1977
479
condition of continuing U.S. nuclear supply.
The President has also directed that this
requirement be viewed only as an interim
measure and that the United States' first
preference, and continuing objective, is uni-
versal adherence to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
— The stipulation that U.S. cooperation
under the agreement shall cease if the recip-
ient detonates a nuclear device or materially
violates IAEA safeguards or any guarantee
it has given under the agreement.
— A requirement for IAEA safeguards on
all U.S. -supplied material and equipment for
indefinite duration, whether or not the
agreement for cooperation remains in force.
— The U.S. right of approval on retrans-
fers extended to all special nuclear material
produced through the use of U.S.
equipment.
— The U.S. right of approval on reprocess-
ing extended to all special nuclear material
produced through use of U.S. equipment.
4. For the near future, the bill proposes
to tighten the conditions for U.S. nuclear
cooperation through the renegotiation of
existing agreements to meet the same
standards as those we will require for new
agreements (as specified in 3 above). This
approach will better meet U.S. nonprolifera-
tion objectives than would an attempt to
impose unilaterally new export-licensing
conditions.
5. The bill provides the flexibility needed
to deal with the many different situations
and nations involved. For example, it makes
the necessary exceptions for licenses under
existing multilateral agreements. It also es-
tablishes an efficient mechanism for the
President and Congress to review cases
where the executive branch and the inde-
pendent NRC differ on the granting of a
proposed export license. And it permits the
President to grant exceptions from the stiff
new conditions required for new agreements
for cooperation, if he considers that this is
in our overall nonproliferation interest.
6. The bill creates sanctions against the
violation of nuclear agreements by providing
that no nuclear export shall be granted to
any non-nuclear-weapons state that, after
enactment of this legislation:
— Detonates a nuclear explosive device.
— Terminates or abrogates IAEA
safeguards.
— Is found by the President to have mate-
rially violated an IAEA agreement or any
other guarantee it has given under an
agreement for cooperation with the United
States;
unless the President determines that such a
cutoff would hinder the achievement of U.S.
non-proliferation objectives or would jeop-
ardize the common defense and security.
7. The legislation proposes the establish-
ment of an international Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation Program, aimed at furthering
the development of alternative nuclear fuel
cycles which do not provide access to
weapons-usable material, as announced by
the President in his April 7 statement.
8. As an essential element of the
international evaluation program, the legis-
lation proposes a number of policies to as-
sure that adequate nuclear fuel supply will
be available to all nations as a non-
proliferation incentive. These include:
— A policy to assure adequate U.S.
uranium enrichment capacity.
— A policy assuring that nuclear exports
will be licensed on a timely basis once
statutory requirements are met.
— U.S. initiatives to promote international
consultations to develop multilateral means
for meeting worldwide nuclear fuel needs.
The bill further requires the President to
report to the Congress on the progress of
these discussions and to propose any
legislation he may consider necessary to
promote these objectives.
9. The bill commits the United States to
work with other nations to strengthen the
International Atomic Energy Agency
through: contribution of technical resources,
support, and funding; improving the IAEA
safeguards system; and by assuring that
that IAEA receives the data needed for it to
administer an effective comprehensive in-
ternational safeguards program.
480
Department of State Bulletin
President Carter's News Conference
of April 22
Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on April 22. 1
Q. Mr. President, are we going to transfer
American battle tanks to Zaire? And if so,
why?
The President: No. No decision has been
made about that. The news stories that have
come out recently about the possible sale of
tanks to Zaire are a result of a study that
was done a year or so ago before I became
President.
This question has never come to my atten-
tion since I have been in office until this
morning. I have made no decision about
sending tanks to Zaire. And I think it's
highly unlikely that I would advocate such a
sale.
Q. But to take up another foreign policy
question, your son Chip was on a trip to
China, has come back. I think you sent a
message with him and may have gotten a
message back. I wonder if you could tell us
about that communication, and specifically,
are you planning a trip to China or are they
planning, any of their leaders, to come here
in the near future?
The President: The nature of the message
is one just of friendship and good will and a
mutual agreement that it's in the best
interests of the world and our own countries
to increase communication, trade, and ulti-
mately, through compliance with the Shang-
hai agreement, to normalize relationships
with China.
I don't anticipate any trips outside the
country this year except my trip early next
month to London. And I'll go to Geneva to
meet with President Asad of Syria.
The Chinese Government have always
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 25, 1977, p.
588.
taken the position that their leaders coming
to our country would not be appropriate so
long as there is an Ambassador here which
represents the Republic of China on Taiwan.
So, I think even from the first visits there
of President Nixon and Kissinger, this has
been the Chinese position. I would certainly
welcome the Chinese leaders to come to
Washington to meet with me, as I would
other leaders of nations, but I think I have
described the situation now as best I can.
Q. Mr. President, you have had your at-
tention taken away from one of the alterna-
tives that you have been working on, the
Middle East peace, recently. But I wonder if
there has been any progress, movement, or
additional flow going on privately during
this time, if you could tell us about it.
The President: Well, yes. I've continued
my own study of the Middle Eastern ques-
tion. As you know, I have met now with the
Prime Minister of Israel and also with
President Sadat of Egypt. Today I'll be
meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria. And
early next month I'll meet with President
Asad from Syria on a brief trip to Geneva.
King Hussein [of Jordan] will be here Sun-
day and Monday to meet with me.
And I'm trying to learn as best I can the
attitudes of the different nations that are
involved in the Middle Eastern dispute and
to try to at least observe and analyze some
common ground on which a permanent
settlement might be reached.
I think it's best until I meet with all these
leaders to minimize my own statements on
this subject. I have outlined as best I could
some of the options concerning borders;
Palestine, the Palestinian people; the defini-
tion of permanent peace — those are the
three major issues. But now that the foreign
leaders know my own suggestions, I am try-
ing to get responses from them before I
make further comments about it.
Q. Mr. President, you described — Senator
Clark has described Zaire as a military dic-
tatorship. How can you regard this as a de-
fender of human rights?
May 16, 1977
481
The President: I have never defined Zaire
as a defender of human rights. I know that
there are some problems in Zaire with
human rights, as there are here and in many
other countries. But our friendship and aid
historically for Zaire has not been predi-
cated on their perfection in dealing with
human rights. I think, as you know, our
military aid for Zaire has been very modest.
We have observed some stabilizing of the
situation in the southern part of Zaire
lately, and I think our policy even in spite of
the invasion from Angola by the Katangans
has been compatible with our past policies.
Q. Are you sure there are no Cubans in
that group, Mr. President?
The President: I am sorry?
Q. Cubans. We hear reports from King
Hassan [of Morocco] and General Mobutu
[President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire] that
there are Cubans there.
The President: Let me — I can't certify to
this, because we don't have observers all
over the Shaba region. Our best information
is that the Katangans have been trained
within Angola by the Cubans. We have no
direct evidence at all that there are Cubans
within Zaire.
Q. What will you seek to accomplish, Mr.
President, when you go to London, in the
energy field, and to what extent is coopera-
tion among the major industrial countries
in the West an important factor in the suc-
cess of your own energy plan?
The President: I think it's accurate to say
that we've now taken the leadership in
moving toward a comprehensive energy pol-
icy for our nation. I would hope that the
other nations around the world would do a
similar thing.
There are other aspects of the energy
question, though, that must be addressed.
One is atomic energy, reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuels, a move toward non-
proliferation of atomic explosive capabil-
ity. So there will be a very complicated in-
terrelationship involving trade.
I think to the extent that we do conserve
in our own country it would make it easier
for our European allies and for Japan to
meet their own energy needs. We now sap
so much extra oil from the international
supplies that it makes it more difficult for
them.
I think this will, over a period of time, re-
duce the intense competition that's
inevitable for dwindling supplies of oil in the
face of increasing demand.
Western Summation of 1 1th Round
of MBFR Talks
The 11th round of negotiations on mutual
and balanced force reductions in Central
Europe was held at Vienna February
S-April 15. Following is a statement made
on behalf of the Western allies by Baron W.
J. de Vos van Steenwyk, Netherlands Rep-
resentative, at a news conference at Vienna
on April 15.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 77-4
During the past round, we have dealt with
a number of general topics and with the
problems of the discrepancy between East-
ern and Western figures on Warsaw Pact
military manpower.
One of the general topics Western partici-
pants have concentrated on during the round
is the need for the East to move away from
its basic conceptual approach to these
negotiations; namely, that all 11 direct par-
ticipants in these negotiations must submit
to an identical reduction formula as though
they were identical in all relevant respects,
that is, identical in military importance,
identical in their geographic situation, and
identically affected by the consequences of
reductions and limitations of their forces.
Obviously, this approach is not a logical or
realistic one if one looks at the important
differences which actually exist among the
different participants. Because of these dif-
ferences, the East's insistence that all direct
participants should be treated identically
482
Department of State Bulletin
would result in gross inequities and diminish
Western security.
What are these differences? They are,
first of all, the enormous differences in the
military strength of participants. The
participants in these talks include the
world's largest military powers, the United
States and U.S.S.R., as well as countries
with much less military potential. Both the
United States and U.S.S.R. possess a large
and varied strategic nuclear capability.
None of the other participants possesses
anything remotely comparable. Clearly, it is
not realistic to expect participants to over-
look this basic fact of these negotiations.
Second, there are important differences
between the different participants as to
geographical situation. The Soviet Union,
which is the largest power on the Eastern
side, is situated in direct proximity to the
area of reductions. The United States, on
the other hand, which is the comparable
Western power, is located at a distance of
5,000 kilometers on the other side of the At-
lantic Ocean.
Another important difference is that some
of the participants have substantially all
their forces in the area; substantially all of
their forces will therefore be affected under
any limitation. But other participants have
only a portion of their forces in the area,
and it is only this portion of their forces that
would in any way be limited under an
agreement. The Soviet Union and the
United States both fall in this second cate-
gory, of course. But in the case of the Soviet
Union, we are talking about the presence,
on territory directly adjacent to the reduc-
tion area, of extremely large forces with an
imposing array of the most modern equip-
ment.
Finally, there is the important difference
between East and West with regard to the
overall numerical levels of their forces in the
area. The East possesses sizable numerical
advantages in ground forces manpower and
in overall military manpower in the area. It
also has superiority in numbers of most
types of major armaments.
These are important realities which define
the negotiating situation we are addressing
in these talks. However, the East continues
to press an approach which deliberately
disregards these realities. In defiance of the
facts, it has insisted that the reduction for-
mula should be identical for all participants.
The East continues to envisage
equal-percentage across-the-board reduc-
tions of all types of military personnel and
armaments which would establish in treaty
form a right for the East to maintain its
considerable advantages in military man-
power and armaments.
This outcome would be inequitable and
would seriously diminish Western security.
Moreover, the East's contractualized numer-
ical advantages inside the reduction area
would be enhanced by the East's geographic
advantages; inside the area the East would
have more manpower and more armaments
than the West, and adjoining the area of re-
ductions is the Soviet Union, one of the
most powerful countries in the world. Soviet
forces in the U.S.S.R. are far larger than
Western forces in the reduction area and
would be subject to no numerical limitations
under an agreement.
Western participants would in addition
have to accept national ceilings. This would
seriously hamper the operation of NATO's
integrated defense structure and could
prejudice the future organization of Western
European defense. National ceilings could
limit the Western ability to maintain the
overall number of their military manpower
at an agreed level. It is evident that this
Eastern approach would diminish Western
security.
We are determined to do everything we
can to bring about an agreement. However,
the East will have to realize that any
agreement must be based on the realities of
the situation and not on an artificial
approach which insists on treating all 11 di-
rect participants as though they were iden-
tical.
In its proposals of December 1975, the
West made significant additions to the re-
ductions and limitations it has previously
proposed. These proposals offered a reason-
May 16, 1977
483
able and equitable basis for agreement
based on approximate parity in ground
forces, including a collective common ceiling
on both ground forces manpower and overall
military manpower. We still consider that
they deserve a positive and serious Eastern
response.
However, so far the East has given us no
such response. In its February 1976
proposal, which is not such a response, the
East continued to insist on the same equal-
percentage approach, with no change in the
outcome which would result from its
implementation. The only change was a
change in the sequence of reductions.
A major topic of our discussions during
this round has been the data issue.
Last June, 2Vfe years after the West tabled
data in November 1973, the East put down
figures on its forces in the area. There was a
considerable discrepancy between Eastern
and Western figures on Eastern forces in
the area. Our discussions during this round
have sought to clarify the underlying rea-
sons for this discrepancy. These discussions
have been carried on in a businesslike way.
However, the sources of the discrepancy
have not yet been identified. These discus-
sions will have to be continued in view of
the need for understanding on force levels,
for solution of the size of the reductions to
be taken by each side, and for resulting lim-
itations.
To sum up, we are disappointed that there
has not been more progress in the past
round. However, we continue to believe that
a basis for progress exists if the East moves
to a more realistic approach which does take
account of the real and important differences
among the direct participants in these
negotiations. The Western approach does
this.
U.S. and Cuba Reach Agreement
on Fisheries, Maritime Boundary
Following is a joint U.S. -Cuba statement
issued at Havana on April 27 and at Wash-
ington on April 28.
As a result of the negotiations held in
New York City [March 24-28] and sub-
sequently in the City of Havana [April 25-
27], between representatives of the Gov-
ernments of the United States of America
and the Republic of Cuba, a governing in-
ternational fisheries agreement on Cuba's
participation in fisheries within the 200-mile
zone of the United States and another
agreement on a preliminary boundary be-
tween the 200-mile zones arising from the
laws passed by both parties were concluded.
The delegations of the Governments of the
United States of America and the Republic
of Cuba were headed by Assistant Secretary
of State Terence Todman and Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs Pelegrin Torras.
The text of both agreements will be pub-
lished at a later date.
City of Havana, April 27, 1977.
484
Department of State Bulletin
THE CONGRESS
Department Discusses Security Assistance Programs
Statement by Lucy Wilson Benson
Under Secretary for Security Assistance Science and Technology
I had the pleasure of appearing before this
Committee in February with Secretary
Vance and Governor Gilligan [John J. Gilli-
gan, Administrator, Agency for In-
ternational Development] as you began your
consideration of the Administration's re-
quests for foreign assistance program
authorizations.
Since that time President Carter has sent
forward our specific legislative proposals for
security assistance. He emphasized in his
message that these programs are essential
to the attainment of important foreign policy
goals throughout the world and will reassure
our friends and allies of the constancy of our
support. He noted that adjustment had been
made to reflect the importance which we at-
tach to human rights considerations, and he
committed this Administration to taking
human rights considerations fully into
account in determining the scope and nature
of our security assistance programs. In view
of the ongoing arms transfer policy review,
the President also noted that he was
requesting only minimal changes in the gov-
erning legislation.
I now would like to provide this commit-
tee on behalf of the Administration a fuller
justification of our requests. First I want to
1 Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assist-
ance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
Apr. 21. The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
acknowledge the debt which we owe to this
committee for the leadership which you
exercised last year leading the way toward a
policy of genuine restraint on arms transfers
and toward the enunciation of a clear and
forthright U.S. policy on human rights, dis-
crimination, and other matters of principle.
The Administration is deeply committed to
the goals articulated in the International Se-
curity Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976. We intend to proceed toward
those goals purposefully and steadily, with
the careful planning which changes in such
important policies both demand and deserve.
In this context, our present proposals
represent a transitional program. As the
President stated, in the time available we
were able to make only minimal changes in
the budget prepared by the previous
Administration, where it was necessary to
bring the request into line with the basic
principles of the new Administration and to
indicate as fully as possible the new
directions in which we intend to move. We
need the programs and the funds requested
to provide us the means to proceed toward
our international goals, deliberately and in
full consultation with the responsible com-
mittees of the Congress.
Mr. Nimetz, Counselor of the Department
of State, is with me today to answer any
questions you may have about the Adminis-
tration's proposals for Greece and Turkey.
Secretary Vance has just transmitted these
proposals to the committee as a supplement
May 16, 1977
485
to the Administration bill sent to you last
month by the President.
General Fish [Lt. Gen. Howard Fish, Di-
rector, Defense Security Assistance Agency,
and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Security Assistance] also has accom-
panied me today to discuss the military se-
curity assistance programs, for which the
Department of Defense has administrative
responsibility. I regret that I shall not be
able to be with you tomorrow when Gover-
nor Gilligan appears to answer your detailed
questions about the administration by the
Agency for International Development of
the security supporting assistance
programs.
As you know, my subject today is military
assistance, which we provide under the aus-
pices of three programs: foreign military
sales (FMS), the military assistance
program (MAP), and the international mili-
tary education and training (IMET) pro-
gram. These programs comprise
$2,537,800,000 in program terms and
$972,750,000 in new obligational authority.
This represents, respectively, 57 percent
and 34 percent of the total security assist-
ance request.
Military Assistance Program
The law requires that grant military as-
sistance programs must be terminated at the
end of this fiscal year except as authorized
by Congress to specified countries in speci-
fied amounts. We are asking such authoriza-
tion for eight countries in fiscal 1978 for a
total MAP program of $284.6 million
including general costs. Five of these
(Spain, Turkey, Greece, Philippines, and
Portugal) are countries where we have ac-
cess to important base facilities and with
which we have reached or are anticipating
new agreements spelling out the terms for
our continued access. We will submit each
such defense cooperation agreement to the
Congress for formal approval.
In addition, we are proposing grant as-
sistance for Jordan, a key moderating influ-
ence among the Arab confrontation states.
Our grant aid request for Jordan continues
the effort of the U.S. Government to use se-
curity assistance as an effective means of
advancing the cause of peace in the Middle
East.
The other two proposed MAP recipients,
Indonesia and Thailand, are strategically
placed friends in Southeast Asia. These
countries are acutely aware of the increased
threats to their security following the U.S.
withdrawal from Indochina. We expect the
transition from grant aid to credit and cash
sales for these two friendly nations will be
completed by the end of fiscal year 1978.
As we terminate MAP programs, there
remains a backlog of grant materiel in the
pipeline awaiting delivery. The Congress
recognized this in the current law, which an-
ticipates the need to provide for the pay-
ment of such shipping costs. For 1978 we
have estimated specific supply operations
costs totaling $5,450,000 for eight countries
where we have ended grant MAP.
The largest single portion of the MAP
request is for general costs, totaling
$60,550,000. Fifty-two million dollars of this
amount is for administrative expenses, in-
cluding $38,295,000 for overseas man-
agement of the program. The committee will
recall that, effective July 1, 1976, all costs
of overseas programs management are to be
authorized under the MAP account,
including costs which had been borne pre-
viously by the military departments under
the Department of Defense budget. We are
anticipating continuing this arrangement,
and the general-cost figure is therefore
higher than it has been in past years, al-
though the number of overseas personnel
has been reduced. However, I hasten to
point out that we expect almost 80 percent
of these costs to be reimbursed, leaving a
net charge to the U.S. taxpayer of
$7,877,000 for the 966 U.S. military and 177
U.S. civilian personnel for which we are ask-
ing authority in fiscal 1978.
Overseas Program Management
Last year the Congress determined that
Military Assistance Advisory Groups
(MAAG's) and similar groups could continue
to operate abroad after fiscal year 1977 only
as specifically authorized by the Congress.
486
Department of State Bulletin
We are requesting such specific authority
for the assignment of military personnel to
25 foreign countries. These are countries
where we continue to have sizable military
security assistance or military supply rela-
tionships or, in a few cases, where the im-
portance of our overall security relations ar-
gues for the maintenance of this form of
military representation. However, these
personnel will not be conducting MAAG
business as usual under the proposed new
title of Defense Field Office. As General
Fish will explain at greater length, the em-
phasis will be on management, to insure that
our performance and that of the civilian con-
tractors supporting the program fulfills the
requirements of law and the contractual
commitments of the U.S. Government.
We are also asking for two other signifi-
cant amendments to last year's provisions
regarding overseas program management.
First, we are requesting authority to as-
sign up to six military personnel, instead of
three, to carry out security assistance
functions under the Ambassador, in cases
where the job cannot be done adequately
with three military persons.
Second, we are proposing that the
Congress allow the President to exercise his
discretion in determining where Defense At-
taches may perform security assistance
functions. In some cases, it has been most
efficient for the security assistance functions
to be handled by the Defense Attache's of-
fice. Barring them from performing such
functions could require the assignment of
additional military personnel to the mission.
Our proposed amendment would require
that the President's determinations be re-
ported to the chairman of this committee,
with details regarding the number of person-
nel involved and the reasons for the
decision.
I believe that these proposals are
consistent with the intent of the legislation.
We are reducing the number and size of
military units assigned to security assist-
ance program management overseas. But it
is in our interest to insure that these pro-
grams are managed efficiently, in accord-
ance with U.S. law, and in support of our
foreign policy objectives.
Military Education and Training Program
The international military education and
training program is nine months old. This is
the first budget year in which it stands
alone. I am persuaded that this program has
advanced our interests by contributing to
greater communication and understanding
between the United States and those
countries with which we have security
relationships.
Presently, the program is in transition
toward greater emphasis on the professional
education and training of present and future
foreign military leaders. In the past the
program was heavily weighted toward tech-
nical training in the operation and
maintenance of U.S. military equipment
provided under grant programs. For fiscal
year 1978 we are asking for a program of
$35.7 million. This will provide training
opportunities for an estimated 5,267 stu-
dents from 46 foreign countries.
Foreign Military Sales Program
The foreign military sales financing
program totals $2,217,500,000 for fiscal year
1978. One billion dollars, or 45 percent of
the program, is intended for Israel. As you
know, current law provides that Israel will
be relieved of its obligation to repay one-
half of the amount provided under the FMS
financing program.
We are proposing FMS programs for 32
countries. These programs range in size
from $500,000, with which we plan to pro-
vide the Government of Liberia the means
to purchase a patrol boat, to $275 million in
loans for the Republic of Korea, to enhance
the capability of that country to deter ag-
gression from its Communist neighbor to the
north and to facilitate the reduction of U.S.
ground troops.
In recent years, military credits provided
under this program have supplanted grant
assistance as the cornerstone of our
worldwide security assistance effort.
Over $10 billion in FMS credits have been
provided to foreign governments under the
FMS financing program over the years.
There has never been an instance in which a
foreign government has failed to repay or to
May 16, 1977
487
make acceptable arrangements to repay both
principal and interest in U.S. dollars. Inci-
dents of arrearages have also been remarka-
bly few and have been satisfactorily re-
solved.
Security Supporting Assistance
Security supporting assistance is the final
major element of the security assistance
programs for which I have responsibility
within the Department of State. You will
have the opportunity to examine this pro-
gram at greater length tomorrow with Gov-
ernor Gilligan. I will only note that this eco-
nomic aid program — which represents over
42 percent of our entire security assistance
request — is money spent not for arms or
military support but for specific programs of
assistance to friendly governments to
promote economic or political stability.
Again this year the largest portion of
these moneys is intended for Israel and
selected states in the Middle East, where
security supporting assistance is designed
to provide a foundation for the search for
regional peace and stability. In addition the
Administration is seeking authority for the
provision of security supporting assistance
to southern Africa, an area of potential con-
flict between black majorities and white
minorities, and for Jamaica, a friendly
neighbor facing extraordinary economic dis-
location which threatens its stability.
Programs for Greece and Turkey
Turning now from general comments on
our overall security assistance proposals, I
would like to call your particular attention
to our important programs for Greece and
Turkey.
In early March, Clark Clifford reported to
the full committee on his mission to the
eastern Mediterranean. He gave you his
recommendations for achieving progress
toward a Cyprus settlement and for
rebuilding our relations with Greece and
Turkey. U.S. security assistance is an im-
portant element in this process.
It is our view that given the history of
U.S. defense relations with Greece and
Turkey, defense cooperation agreements are
the best way to structure our future secu-
rity relationship with both countries. The
agreement with Turkey, concluded in March
1976, and the one currently under negotia-
tion with Greece do not mark major depar-
tures from U.S. security policy. Rather,
these agreements build on the past and
embody our commitment to mutual security
cooperation in the NATO context. The
agreements will improve and strengthen our
ties with both Greece and Turkey and will
help foster stability in the area.
The Administration is therefore prepared
to endorse in principle the U.S. -Turkish De-
fense Cooperation Agreement. The
Administration will also support and work to
conclude a similar agreement with Greece.
Though the Administration will defer for the
present seeking congressional approval of
either agreement, it is our considered opin-
ion that interim measures are needed for
both Greece and Turkey.
For Greece, the Administration is
requesting security assistance totaling $175
million, of which $35 million is grant assist-
ance and the remainder FMS credits and
guarantees.
For Turkey the Administration is request-
ing that Congress authorize $175 million in
foreign military sales financing for fiscal
year 1978 by FMS-guaranteed loans. We
also ask that the ceiling on cash foreign mili-
tary sales to Turkey be adjusted so that we
can maintain on a government-to-
government basis an ongoing Turkish
procurement of 40 NATO-committed air-
craft. These aircraft are already in produc-
tion, and Congress previously has been
notified of the FMS contracts involved. We
are not requesting any additional U.S. fund-
ing for this sale. We have also in our legisla-
tive proposal retained all of the conditions
regarding sales to Turkey imposed under
section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance
Act.
We think this is a balanced, moderate
program — one designed to begin the process
of restoring stability in the eastern Mediter-
ranean, moving toward a Cyprus solution,
488
Department of State Bulletin
and resolving the many problems which cur-
rently exist between Greece and Turkey.
The Counselor of the Department, Mr.
Nimetz, is prepared to go into further de-
tails with respect to our program recom-
mendations in this area.
Proposed Changes in Legislation
Finally, I would like to draw your attention
to several changes we are proposing in security
assistance legislation.
We are requesting an increase in the ceiling
on war reserve stockpiles for allied countries
outside NATO from $125 million for the cur-
rent year to $270 million for fiscal year 1978.
The stockpiles for which the authorization is
sought support Korean forces. This effort re-
lates to the President's announced intention to
withdraw American ground forces from the
Korean Peninsula over the next five years. No
funds are being sought under this ceiling for
the procurement of defense articles and serv-
ices. I understand that in large part the ceiling
will be used to accommodate the book transfer
of ammunition stockpiles situated in Korea and
previously maintained for U.S. troops, which
will henceforth be earmarked as war reserves
for the Republic of Korea troops which have
taken over the batteries as U.S. troops are
withdrawn.
We are asking for relaxation of the third-
country transfer provisions to exempt transfers
of maintenance and repair services and spare
parts and NATO cross-servicing arrangements.
It is frequently advantageous to pool repair
and maintenance facilities; regional cooperation
along these lines promotes closer security
cooperation. Requiring 30 days' advance notice
to the Congress before we authorize the fur-
nishing of services or the use of spare parts
would tend to frustrate such cooperation or
give rise to unintentional violations.
As for NATO cross-servicing, we have in-
formed the committee of the problems which
arose under the NATO Sea Sparrow project,
and the committee has accepted our advance
notification of future transfers of Sea Sparrow
parts and service among all NATO partners.
Although this precedent provides a means for
handling this sort of problem within NATO, we
would prefer that the law clarify this exception
so that our allies will be reassured that such
cross-servicing arrangements for U.S. weapons
are feasible.
We are also seeking to expand the exception
from the limitation of $25 million on commer-
cial sales of major defense equipment by in-
cluding not only NATO countries as presently
but also Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.
We have security and military supply relations
with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand simi-
lar in character to our relations with members
of NATO. These three countries are all demo-
cratic and industrialized states which have
demonstrated their commitment to world peace
and regional stability. They have also in the
past procured their defense requirements in
part through substantial commercial purchases
without U.S. Government participation, and
they could well feel unjustly discriminated
against by the present provisions of law ex-
cepting only the NATO allies from the lim-
itation on licenses for commercial export.
We are requesting as well an exception to
the $25 million limitation for exports under
coproduction agreements duly approved and
reported in advance to this committee and to
the Speaker of the House. The issuance of ex-
port licenses for the shipment of components
and related equipment or services provides
adequate U.S. oversight over the progress of
the coproduction arrangements between the
American manufacturer and the foreign pro-
ducer. This procedure also avoids the kind of
direct participation of U.S. agencies in pro-
curement and delivery which would result from
maintaining a requirement that purchases over
$25 million of major defense equipment be
handled under the foreign military sales sys-
tem. We believe that an early amendment of
this provision is consistent with the intent of
the act and the responsibility of the executive
branch for the regulation of exports of military
items.
In summary, gentlemen, the programs be-
fore you have the wholehearted support of this
Administration. We have made every effort to
insure that they provide all that is required,
but no more, to meet our foreign policy and
national security goals. I urge you to approve
them in full.
May 16, 1977
489
Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills
Transmitted to the Congress
Following are texts of identical letters
dated March 28 from President Carter to
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the
House, and Walter F. Mondale, President
of the Senate, transmitting legislation to au-
thorize foreign assistance programs for fis-
cal gears 1978 and 1979. '
LETTER ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
White House press release dated March 2<<
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Presi-
dent:) I am transmitting today a bill to au-
thorize foreign development assistance pro-
grams for the fiscal years 1978 and 1979.
Enactment of this legislation will enable
the United States to carry out an efficient
and effective bilateral development assist-
ance program which our international
position and objectives require. This bill
also authorizes appropriation of voluntary
contributions to International Organizations
whose programs are focused on the
developing world.
The bill provides that development assist-
ance shall be made available to the poorest
countries on a grant basis to the maximum
extent that is consistent with the attainment
of our development objectives. This proposal
is consistent with the United States position
at the UNCTAD IV Conference [United
Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment], which urged aid donor nations to
provide the relatively least developed coun-
tries on the UNCTAD list with assistance
on a grant rather than a loan basis. The bill
creates separate authorizations for popula-
tion planning and health programs, and a
requirement that all development assistance
programs be reviewed to assure that proper
attention is paid to the relationship of these
programs to worldwide population growth.
The bill also contains an authorization of
$200 million for a long-term multidonor de-
velopment plan for the Sahel. U.S. contribu-
tions to this program will be based on equi-
table burden-sharing with other donor
countries.
Enactment of this legislation will be an
important step in demonstrating our concern
for the economic problems of the developing
world. I urge its early passage.
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter.
LETTER ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
White House press release dated March 2S
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Presi-
dent:) I am transmitting today a bill to au-
thorize security assistance programs for the
fiscal years 1978 and 1979. I consider these
programs essential to the attainment of im-
portant United States foreign policy goals
throughout the world, and to reassure our
friends and allies of the constancy of our
support.
The programs authorized by this legisla-
tion include both military and economic
forms of security assistance, with
approximately two-thirds of the funds re-
quested intended for nonmilitary programs.
In addition, the bill provides for the con-
tinuation of our important international
narcotics control efforts.
The authorizations I am proposing reflect
downward adjustments this Administration
has made in several programs in light of the
human rights situations in the countries con-
cerned. We are committed to a continuing
effort to ensure that human rights consid-
erations are taken fully into account in
determining whether our security assistance
programs serve our national security and
foreign policy objectives.
I am not at this time proposing major
changes in the authorities and statutory
procedures which now govern security as-
sistance and arms export controls. I have
made clear on several occasions my deep
1 For texts of the bills transmitted, see H. Docs. 112
and 113, 95th Cong., 1st sess.
490
Department of State Bulletin
concern over the burgeoning international
traffic in arms. I am firmly resolved to bring
greater coherence, restraint and control to
our arms transfer policies and practices. To
this end, I have ordered a comprehensive
review of our policies and practices regard-
ing both governmental and commercial arms
exports.
We have already begun to discuss our pre-
liminary ideas with members of the Con-
gress, and will increase our consultations as
we proceed with our policy review. When
concluded, our review will provide the basis
for the reports to the Congress mandated by
sections 202 and 218 of the International Se-
curity Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976.
Our goal is to develop, in close consulta-
tion with the Congress, policies which re-
spect our commitments to the security and
independence of friends and allies, which re-
flect fully our common concern for the pro-
motion of basic human rights, and which
give substance to our commitment to
restrain the world arms trade.
The completion of this process within the
next few months will give both the Execu-
tive Branch and the Legislative Branch a
sound foundation on which they can base a
thoughtful reexamination of existing law and
fashion needed legislative revisions which
will complement our common policy
objectives, ensure appropriate participation
and oversight by the Congress, and provide
clear authority for the efficient conduct of
approved programs.
In the meantime, I urge the Congress to
avoid legislative initiatives which could dis-
rupt important programs or would hinder a
future cooperative effort based on a
thorough evaluation of the facts and policy
considerations. In this spirit, I have re-
quested only minimal changes in statutory
authority and have amended my
predecessor's budget only where necessary
to bring the request into line with basic
principles of this Administration. I urge the
early passage of the enclosed legislation and
look forward to joining in a productive effort
with the Congress later this year to achieve
constructive reform of the security assist-
ance and arms export control laws.
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter.
President Carter's Second Report
on Cyprus Submitted to Congress
Message to the Congress 1
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by Public Law 94-104, this
report describes progress which has been
achieved during the last sixty days toward
settlement of the Cyprus problem and the
efforts the Administration has made to con-
tribute to its resolution.
In my first report, dated February 11, I
emphasized the high priority we place on
this effort and reaffirmed our intention to
work closely with the Congress in deciding
on our future course. I promised that my
Special Representative, Mr. Clark Clifford,
would consult with you both before and after
his trip to the area. He has done so. Before
his departure, Mr. Clifford discussed the
Cyprus question, and other pertinent mat-
ters, with a number of interested Senators
and Congressmen. Leaving Washington
February 15, he spent some two weeks
visiting the eastern Mediterranean area to
confer with leaders in Ankara, Athens and
Nicosia. He also met with United Nations
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, under
whose leadership the Cyprus intercommunal
negotiations were subsequently reconvened.
Returning from this series of intensive con-
versations, Mr. Clifford stopped in London
to share his impressions with leaders of the
British Government which, as current in-
cumbent of the European Community Presi-
dency as well as former administrator of
1 Transmitted on Apr. 15 (text from White House
press release).
May 16, 1977
491
Cyprus, maintains a special interest in find-
ing a just and speedy Cyprus solution.
Upon his return, Mr. Clifford reported to
me that the leaders of Greece, Turkey and
Cyprus correctly saw his mission as a signal
of the deep interest this Administration
takes in the problems of the eastern
Mediterranean. He came away convinced of
their clear understanding that the United
States is firmly committed to the search for
a fair and lasting Cyprus settlement as well
as to the improvement of relations with our
two important and valued NATO allies,
Greece and Turkey, and to the creation of a
more stable atmosphere in the eastern
Mediterranean.
The tasks I gave Mr. Clifford were to
make a first-hand assessment of current
problems and attitudes in the three coun-
tries so that we might better judge what
contribution the United States might make
toward encouraging progress in the long-
festering Cyprus dispute; to identify ways in
which the United States could improve its
bilateral relationships with Greece and Tur-
key; and to gain a better insight into the
sources of the tensions that exist between
these two NATO allies.
In his visits to Ankara and Athens, Mr.
Clifford held detailed discussions on a range
of bilateral issues, as well as the subject of
Cyprus. These talks were useful in creating
a better understanding of the problems
which have complicated our relations with
Greece and Turkey. I was pleased to hear
from Mr. Clifford that the leaders in Ankara
and Athens support a serious attempt to
negotiate a fair settlement of the Cyprus
problem in 1977.
On Cyprus, Mr. Clifford had lengthy
meetings with Archbishop Makarios and
with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf
Denktash. These talks were frank and forth-
right. Both leaders recognized that what
would be needed to move the Vienna talks
forward were specific discussions of the two
central issues of the Cyprus problem: future
territorial arrangements and the division of
responsibility between the central and re-
gional governments. Mr. Clifford found a
new willingness to face the difficult deci-
sions which both sides must now make if a
settlement is to be reached.
One indication of that willingness is the
negotiations between the Turkish and Greek
Cypriot representatives which took place in
Vienna from March 31 through April 7.
These meetings — the first such intercom-
munal negotiations in more than a year —
were chaired for the first several days by
U.N. Secretary General Waldheim and fol-
lowing his scheduled departure on April 4,
the concluding sessions were held under the
chairmanship of the Secretary General's
Special Representative for Cyprus, Ambas-
sador [Javier] Perez de Cuellar.
We had not expected any dramatic break-
throughs at these meetings; and none
occurred. The two sides are still far apart in
their views. But the meetings did move for-
ward the process of probing and clarification
of each side's position by the other. Most
important, in my view, is the fact that for
the first time since 1974 concrete, detailed
proposals were put forward by each side
covering the two central issues. And finally
the momentum achieved in these meetings
has been preserved by the agreement of
both sides to meet again in Nicosia about
the middle of May to prepare for another
round in Vienna and thus continue the proc-
ess toward a peaceful Cyprus solution.
In my first report I promised that the
United States will do all that it can to help
achieve a negotiated settlement for Cyprus.
I believe that the United States should con-
tinue to take a part in supporting the
negotiating process revitalized by Secretary
General Waldheim last month in Vienna. I
believe that it is essential that we continue
to work with the parties to encourage and
insure a sustained and serious negotiating
process and equally important that we work
with our Greek and Turkish allies to
strengthen the ties of friendship and cooper-
ation between our countries. Working in
close liaison with the Congress, we will de-
vote whatever efforts may be required to
bring about a truly just and lasting peace in
the eastern Mediterranean.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, April 15, 1977.
492
Department of State Bulletin
U.S. -Canada Treaty on Execution
of Penal Sentences Sent to Senate
Message From President Carter 1
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I
transmit herewith the Treaty between the
United States of America and Canada on the
Execution of Penal Sentences which was
signed at Washington on March 2, 1977.
I transmit also, for the information of the
Senate, the report of the Department of
State with respect to the Treaty.
The Treaty would permit citizens of either
nation who had been convicted in the courts
of the other country to serve their sentences
in their home country; in each case the con-
sent of the offender as well as the approval
of the authorities of the two Governments
would be required.
This Treaty is significant because it rep-
resents an attempt to resolve a situation
which has inflicted substantial hardships on
a number of citizens of each country and has
caused concern to both Governments. I rec-
1 Transmitted on Apr. 18 (text from White House
press release); also printed as S. Ex. H, 95th Cong.,
1st sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and
the report of the Department of State.
ommend that the Senate give favorable
consideration to this Treaty together with
the similar treaty with the United Mexican
States which I have already transmitted.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, April is, 1977.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Duty-Free Treatment for Aircraft Engines Imported
as Temporary Replacements for Certain Aircraft
Engines Undergoing Overhaul. Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
422. H. Rept. 95-77. March 15, 1977. 3 pp.
Continuation of Temporary Duty Suspension on
Importation of Certain Horses. Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
3259. H. Rept. 95-79. March 15, 1977. 4 pp.
Duty-Free Entry of Carillon Bells for Smith College,
Northampton, Mass. Report of the House Committee
on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 1404. H.
Rept. 95-80. March 15, 1977. 2 pp.
Supplemental Military Assistance for Portugal for
Fiscal Year 1977. Report of the House Committee on
International Relations to accompany H.K. 3976. H.
Rept. 95-81. March 15, 1977. 6 pp.
Authorizing Additional Appropriations for the
Department of State for Fiscal Year 1977. Report of
the House Committee on International Relations to
accompany H.R. 5040. H. Rept. 95-84. March 16,
1977. 13 pp.
Amending the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock
Piling Act, and for Other Purposes. Report of the
House Committee on Armed Services to accompany
H.R. 4895. H. Rept. 95-104. March 22, 1977. 12 pp.
May 16, 1977
493
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
The Challenge to the Economic and Social Council:
Advancing the Quality of Life in All Its Aspects
Statement by Andrew Young
U.S. Representative to the United Nations '
The fundamental importance of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council is obvious. The
most critical task we confront, both as indi-
vidual nations and collectively, is the
advancement of the quality of life of human-
kind in all its aspects. That is the business
of this Council, and the peoples of the world
are rightly looking to us for initiative and
leadership in their quest for social justice.
The question is whether we can, and will,
respond to this challenge. I need not remind
anyone in this room of the magnitude of the
task; a brief glance at the program of work
of ECOSOC for this year is sufficient evi-
dence of the number, complexity, and inter-
relatedness of the issues we confront. If we
are to be successful, it will require a
genuine, sustained effort by all of us:
— To establish a common agenda based
upon conscious priorities. Such an agenda
and priorities should be directed against the
basic human misery which is well within our
capacity to eliminate.
— To focus on the common enemies of
humankind rather than on denunciation and
polemics against each other.
— To focus on problem solving rather than
ideological arguments.
— To work toward building an effective
consensus founded on those basic commit-
ments we have already undertaken in the
1 Made before the United Nations Economic and So-
cial Council (ECOSOC) at New York on Apr. 19 (text
from USUN press release 23).
Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
other major international instruments.
It is because my government and people
are so concerned with these problems, as
are all governments and peoples of the
United Nations, that I feel compelled to
warn against what I sense is an impatience
on the part of my people with international
development programs, or what we call
foreign aid programs.
It is not that the American people, or the
people of any nation, are basically opposed
to helping other people or even making sac-
rifices to aid other nations in their struggle
against oppression and poverty. It is that
too often the American people, and the
peoples of other nations, have been disap-
pointed that their efforts have not resulted
in any appreciable help for the poor of the
world nor the liberation of the oppressed.
No one can doubt the idealism and generos-
ity of the American people; for example, in
the 10 years 1969-78 the United States will
deliver more than 10 billion dollars' worth of
food under our Public Law 480. But it is
often asked why the poor of a rich nation
should be taxed in order to aid the rich of a
poor nation. A significant part of the
dissatisfaction of the people of the United
States with the programs of international
development is that so much of this nation's
efforts have been directed to giving military
rather than economic and social aid and to
bolstering repressive regimes.
494
Department of State Bulletin
If we are to maintain the commitment of
our people, and if you are to maintain the
commitment of your peoples, to the eco-
nomic and social programs of development
and to the human rights programs, we must
be able to demonstrate that these programs
really work, that they really affect in a real
and positive way the lives of the hungry, the
poor, the oppressed, the tortured, and the
homeless.
It is exactly against these timeless and
basic enemies of all people that we, repre-
sentatives of our various peoples, can meet
and find an exciting and action-producing
consensus. It is in the spirit of searching for
this consensus that I would like to make
some general comments as well as some spe-
cific suggestions for the work of this
session.
The Inseparable Nature of Human Freedoms
Some truths can never be repeated too of-
ten. They must always be before us. The
most fundamental truth of all is this: Man is
born to be free, and all that we do must be
devoted to the well-being of human
beings — every type of human being, of
whatever race or religion, of whatever sex,
and in all societies, new and old, rich and
poor. This truth, this great objective, be-
longs equally to everyone — every nation
represented in this chamber, every country
in the United Nations, and those not in the
United Nations. We are talking about an
idea which is inherent in the human
condition. It is humankind's nature to strive
for dignity, to struggle for justice, to
hunger for freedom, and to seek to live in
community.
There is yet another truth flowing from
this reality which is equally compelling. It is
the duty of public officials, and especially
the governing elite, of every nation, to do
their utmost to realize these common goals
of humankind. All of us in official service
must be constantly reminded, and must do
our best constantly to remember, that the
responsiveness of the governing elites to the
popular will for justice, for peace, for dig-
nity, and for freedom is the test by which
we should be measured.
This point has very recently been made by
a man who has worked for justice and
human dignity all his life. I refer to the new
Prime Minister of India, Prime Minister
Desai. Speaking on April 7 before a meeting
of nonaligned nations in New Delhi, he said
that:
We have learned from Gandhi that there is no nobler
quest than to work for' justice and a better life for
one's fellow brethren. He taught us, too, that dedica-
tion to the service of one's people must not be a con-
cealed lust for power. What the people need today is a
happy contented life fully utilizing the aids which sci-
ence has placed and will continually place at the dis-
posal of mankind. Life cannot be merely mechanized if
the end is to be happiness and contentment. There has
to be a moral and spiritual base for development along
with its materialistic content. Freedom from want and
freedom from fear have to be secured to make that
base. We have dedicated ourselves to the task of
achieving these freedoms along with the right to lib-
erty.
It is hard to match the eloquence of this
great Indian statesman. But let me try to
say in a few simple words of my own what
this means — and what it doesn't mean. It
obviously doesn't mean that we and all our
societies have to be perfect. Obviously we
can't. No matter how hard we try, there is
going to be a lot of room for improvement
elsewhere. No system within societies, no
amount of wealth, will create perfect jus-
tice.
At the same time, there are some things
which simply must never be accepted — the
governing elites not doing their best to meet
basic human needs, to avoid starvation and
malnutrition — or utilizing the power of
government to coerce and destroy people, or
tolerating barbaric cruelties inflicted by
lower level officials.
The Western democracies have often been
accused of giving the highest priority to
political rights — as we see them — and paying
insufficient attention to fundamental eco-
nomic and social rights. I propose to you
that this is not so. I would recall the very
important document in the history of my
country, President Roosevelt's 1941 message
to Congress in which he described the world
founded upon four essential freedoms. These
included freedom of speech and expression,
freedom of worship, and freedom from fear.
May 16, 1977
495
But there was one additional freedom:
freedom from want for all inhabitants of
every nation of the world. The present Ad-
ministration confirms our country's commit-
ment to all four, a commitment manifested
over the past 30 years by our cooperation in
a series of economic development programs.
The inseparable nature of these human
freedoms will always be borne in mind by
policymakers in the United States. The very
name of this Council clearly implies that the
same should be done here.
We have long since come to realize that
development cannot be measured in terms of
gross national product. The shine of steel
from a new mill is quickly dulled if its work-
ers or their brothers and sisters still in the
countryside must live in fear, be it fear of
political repression or fear of not being able
to feed themselves and their children.
I would like to speak to three basic fears
today — the fear of hunger, the fear of tor-
ture, and the fear of racism — and suggest
that these three are basic problems that we
could attack with near-unanimity and high
expectations of significant success if we
agreed to focus on them as our priorities.
Combating World Hunger and Famine
Hunger and famine are perhaps the
problems that affect directly and most dras-
tically the greatest number of human be-
ings. Today as many as 400 million
people — 15 percent of the world's
population — are starving. Hundreds of mil-
lions more receive only minimal food re-
quirements. Perhaps 100 million children
suffer chronic malnutrition. There are
virtually no countries in the world where all
the people have a healthy diet all the time.
These problems are not simply the legacy
of international manipulations and
maneuverings, as some would have it. In-
stead, they often reflect mistaken percep-
tions of growth. We have all been guilty of
ignoring our rural populations in pursuit of
machines and methods to propel us along the
path of industrialization.
In our country we turned our back on the
sturdy small farmer and skilled craftsman
whom our President Thomas Jefferson
acclaimed as the strength of our nation.
Today millions of Americans have left the
farms of rural America to seek their
fortunes in our cities. There, crowded to-
gether, depersonalized and hungry, too
many have failed to find what they had
sought.
If developing countries can learn some
things from our mistakes, they will be able
to adjust productive systems to meet their
own special conditions of climate,
geography, and human resources.
The international community can and
should do much to help. Food-surplus coun-
tries can provide food aid. We in the United
States hope to rework our own legislation so
that our food assistance can help foster
long-term development. Through the Inter-
national Fund for Agricultural Development,
we and other countries with the financial
means are supporting efforts, and helping
farmers, particularly small farmers in the
poorer countries, to increase production.
All food-producing countries can help by
working to fulfill the goal we set at the
seventh special session [of the U.N. General
Assembly] to reduce by half the food now
wasted because of poor storage and
handling — food enough to feed the 400 mil-
lion people who are starving.
In the field of food grains we also need to
establish a system of nationally held re-
serves to provide basic food security. The
United States is urgently reviewing this
question to see how we might be able to
help get negotiations moving.
We need also to work harder to find tech-
nologies and systems which take account of
the relationships among food production,
available resources, and environmental
stresses on the land. We need new ideas and
new systems which do not rely too heavily
on products which have become very
expensive. We must be better able to deal
with natural disasters, which can strike
with devastating and heartrending conse-
quences. In this context, the creative
initiative of France in establishing a Club
des Amis du Sahel provides a good example.
Without the freedom from want that these
496
Department of State Bulletin
efforts are aimed at securing, our words on
economic development or on human rights
will have little meaning to the great major-
ity of the world's people. But the reverse is
also true: We cannot attack the problems of
hunger and famine without remembering
justice as the goal of human society. Efforts
at increasing food production will not be
successful unless all nations face up to the
problems of poor distribution of land owner-
ship and income and inequity between tradi-
tional groups. For without justice, there can
be no true stability, and there cannot be
true social stability until everyone has
enough to eat. As long as there is hunger
anywhere it will affect people everywhere.
Hunger and famine are realities that
threaten the work of men and women
everywhere who seek for a better world.
Hunger and famine are not ancient pesti-
lences, but very modern plagues, stark
possibilities that can arise almost any year
and sweep away tens of thousands of inno-
cent men, women, and children. The evident
growing gap between the affluent minority
in every nation and the sometimes great
majority of poor in most nations only high-
lights the problem: While poverty spreads
and famine is a real possibility, small groups
in almost every nation live lives of luxury
and waste.
We dare to say these things here because
the silent poor majority of the world is not
also deaf and blind; though they do not, out
of fear and a sense of hopelessness, re-
monstrate against the gross inequity in the
distribution of the goods of the world, they
see and they hear and they understand.
They will not, and should not, be forever ig-
nored, Mr. Chairman.
Every country, including mine, has, at
least sometimes, some hungry people; and
every nation has some problem with waste
of vital resources that could be used to feed
the hungry. We are all on Spaceship Earth
together, Mr. Chairman, and we are all
neighbors in a Global Village. Surely our
common humanity calls upon us in the Coun-
cil meeting to find some new and effective
means to combat world hunger and famine.
So again I turn to the fact that economic
and social development cannot be separated.
We have two largely separate sections of
ECOSOC dealing with these matters, two
separate committees of the General Assem-
bly, and in most countries two professional
groups dealing with these problems. These
are separations merely of natural conven-
ience, and I do not propose to change them.
But we must think of every possible way to
increase the interface between the two
approaches — in our national planning, in our
bilateral cooperation for development, and
in our work of the United Nations, most
particularly in this Council.
At this session we have before us a res-
olution of the Commission for Social De-
velopment which recommends that we invite
the Secretary General to set up a small
working group to recommend how we can
better integrate social development efforts
into the work of the U.N. system. 1 would
like to reiterate my government's strong
support for this resolution. We cannot seek
a more just international economic order, a
better system of economic progress and
cooperation, without reference to man's
basic needs and what we have come to call
social considerations.
The Problem of Torture
I would like next to turn to the problem of
torture. There's an obvious connection with
the problem of fighting hunger. In each case
the central focus is the same — the dignity
and the worth of the human personality. If
we are to mean what we say about promot-
ing human rights, we should be concerned
whenever a human being suffers, whenever
his physical or spiritual existence is
threatened, either through lack of food or
through abuse of his body.
To put it bluntly, it's nothing less than de-
plorable that in our supposedly enlightened
time some of the gravest offenses to the
human person known throughout human
history are still being committed. We know
that torture exists in many parts of the
world today. Not only is it practiced in its
most debased and horrible forms; but sci-
ence and technology have been perverted by
May 16, 1977
497
sick minds to invent unbelievably cruel, if
highly sophisticated, modern methods. For
example, advances in new kinds of drugs
have brought with them advances in new
kinds of mental torture.
The struggle to eliminate torture is, in my
opinion, of basic importance, Mr. Chairman,
even though relatively few people are ac-
tually tortured in comparison to those who
suffer and sometimes die from hunger. Tor-
ture is not used today primarily as a means
of extracting information from a few hard-
core-opposition militants, but, rather, is
increasingly used as a means of intimidating
masses of poor and oppressed people. Tor-
ture is used as the leading edge of the whole
system of intimidation, and such a system
exists in almost every society in some form.
And while we can dream of someday in
the future being able to dismantle this whole
system of terror — subtle and other-
wise — that keeps people from being
free to express their legitimate aspirations
and complaints, at this moment in history
we must attack the ugliest head of this
hydra-headed monster: We must attack tor-
ture. In so doing we will make it possible,
perhaps, for the poor and oppressed to find
more spokesmen so they can be more fully
represented at the tables of deliberation of
the world.
I want to make it clear that we in the
United States understand that our own soci-
ety still has subtle but very strong systems
of intimidation at work that inhibit the
possibilities of our poor, our discriminated
against, and our dissidents from speaking
fully to redress themselves. The bright but
poor young man from our ghettos is much
more likely to go to jail and find himself
abused there; for those few from affluent
families who get in trouble with the law,
lawyers are readily available, while for the
majority of the poor, minimal legal assist-
ance is very difficult indeed.
One thing else needs to be mentioned, Mr.
Chairman. The outcry against torture that
has arisen in the last few years has, unfor-
tunately, produced new and subtler ways of
intimidating the spokesmen of the poor and
the oppressed and of driving the
dispossessed into even greater despair and
passivity. In particular, it is now increas-
ingly common to just murder a dissident or
to illegally kidnap the dissident and quickly
murder him. In such cases, the security
forces of a nation often disclaim any knowl-
edge of the act, and there is no tortured
person left to later tell the sad story of
suffering inflicted by other human beings.
So when we speak about torture, we mean
three things: physical torture, the general
problem of "missing persons," and the
problem of political assassinations.
"Torture" is a word that is repugnant to
all our ears, Mr. Chairman. There are some
things we don't like to talk about in
supposedly polite society. But do we not
deny our own humanity, Mr. Chairman and
my fellow delegates, as well as abandon
others to lives of degradation and suffering,
when we refuse to name that which is im-
portant and significant and has a name?
Perhaps our "politeness" is something of a
mask for cowardice or for our basic
unwillingness to do our duty as human be-
ings as well as representatives of our
peoples and governments. Can we allow "po-
liteness" and protocol to stand in the way of
a search for answers and solutions to this
problem of torture? Its essence is
barbarism — today increasingly associated
with modern technology, unfortunately.
In order to focus our attention firmly on
the nature of the problem, a problem that I
firmly believe we can help solve if we but
have the will, let me mention some of the
kinds of torture of which I have recently
heard, from various parts of the world.
In some cases, the prisoner is hung by his
or her knees, with the mouth taped tightly
shut. Then a piece of cotton is stuffed in the
nostrils — then the head hanging down
perhaps held tightly in place by the hair.
And then water is dripped from an
eyedropper on the cotton, until the prisoner
nearly drowns with only a few drops of
water applied. The terror — not to mention
the great potential for permanent physical
damage — is hardly imaginable to us.
498
Department of State Bulletin
We have all heard the stones of how elec-
tric shocks are used to torment prisoners — a
sad application of modern technology! Of
how leather or canvas hoods are placed on
the prisoners' heads. Of the sexual viola-
tions of especially young female prisoners,
that even has gone so far as the raping of
people of religious orders before groups of
security personnel.
And then there are the more "subtle"
kinds of torture, using drugs or enforced
dehydration. I know of one case where a
peasant leader was hung for over two days
in a refrigerated room with a group of corp-
ses, also suspended, but by meat hooks, and
constantly bombarded by a loudspeaker de-
nouncing him and telling him that if he
didn't denounce his fellow peasant leaders he
would be allowed to stay there until he,
also, died. I know of a case today where
Protestant pastors are imprisoned in a dark-
ened cell, with one meal per day and no
human contact allowed, apparently in the
expectation that they will finally go mad.
Such stories — there are many of them — I
only mention them here to remind us that
we are dealing with flesh-and-blood
problems — problems we can help solve,
problems of the greatest urgency and poig-
nancy.
Strengthening the Effort To End Torture
For the past several years, the General
Assembly has taken a number of unanimous
decisions reiterating its total rejection of
torture and endorsing measures to combat
it. We now have a Declaration on the Pro-
tection of All Persons From Being Subjected
to Torture, unanimously adopted by the 30th
Assembly. But in spite of these ringing
pronouncements taken with unanimous sup-
port, we have reports that torture still con-
tinues.
There is something gone wrong, I am
convinced, in those societies in which tor-
ture has taken hold, to whatever degree. No
government which claims respect from the
world community can endorse torture. I am
sure that in most cases the practices that do
occur are the result of the actions of dis-
turbed or misguided individuals perverting
governmental authority. Admittedly, in a
few extreme instances the prevalence and
persistence of torture suggests that it has
been practiced as a deliberate weapon of
governments' intimidation.
But whatever the reasons for torture, our
concern must be to do everything we can to
see that this practice is brought to an end.
We must find a way to make better use of
the institutions that we have, because up to
now what we have done has obviously not
been enough. We have before us a challenge
to find more effective ways to attack this
problem and to bring help to many people
who still suffer from torture.
In saying this I do not for the moment den-
igrate what has already been done. It was
all to the good for us to proclaim the decla-
ration against torture. It has been useful to
strengthen the Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners. We support as
well the effort to draft a body of principles
for the protection of all persons under any
form of detention or imprisonment which is
now before the Subcommission on
Discrimination and Minorities.
Every modest step taken to strengthen
the fabric of law as it applies to persons
under any form of detention is to be
encouraged. Support for these legal ad-
vances by all governments can be significant
in strengthening the national barriers
against mistreatment of persons, in making
less likely the abuse of prisoners by low r er
level officials.
We have not yet fully exploited what is
universally acknowledged to be the ultimate
remedy at our disposal: publicity and public
condemnation. Isn't this problem of torture
of such gravity that we should seriously
consider taking additional steps? I have in
mind steps that w r ould help us to expose
where torture has been a part of a consist-
ent pattern of gross violation of human
rights and to learn from the experience of
some governments which have in-
stitutionalized legal norms for the protection
of dissidents.
May 16, 1977
499
This second element occurs to me because
I think it gets us to the heart of the prob-
lem. In some countries, governments have
felt themselves threatened by subversive or
terrorist forces, and that situation has led
these governments to be less stringent than
they might otherwise have been in control-
ling the spread of torture. Several things
need to be said about this aspect of the
problem:
— First, no conditions which may threaten
the existence of a government, however
weak or insecure it may feel, are such as to
justify resort to torture. This proposition is
recognized by the United Nations Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which abso-
lutely forbids derogation from the
prohibition against torture, even in times of
public emergency threatening the life of a
nation.
— Second, as a practical matter, infliction
of torture as a means to maintain order is
ultimately self-defeating. This reaction of
revulsion and the renewed determination to
bring down regimes which grind down their
populations almost always creates even
greater problems of public order.
— And third, looking at historical experi-
ence, it has been true that many new and
weak governments have taken hold and have
survived without resort to such methods.
These are some of the reasons we feel it
would be worthwhile to consider how we
might establish a group which would inves-
tigate under U.N. mandate the problem of
torture on a worldwide basis — to tell us
where it exists and persists, to identify the
most flagrant instances, and to inform us
about cases in which governments have suc-
cessfully resisted or curbed resort to tor-
ture. It might be appropriate for the United
Nations to establish a panel of distinguished
nonpartisan experts. Such a special ad hoc
body would be best able to carry out the
sort of mandate I have in mind. An
authoritative, comprehensive report from
such a group would motivate us all, I am
sure, in the direction of a new and more ef-
fective effort to eliminate this evil.
I want to mention another important area
of work. I referred earlier to the perver-
sions of science and technology which have
led to new forms of assaults on the physical
and intellectual integrity of human beings.
The Subcommission of the Human Rights
Commission has recently been asked to for-
mulate guidelines for the protection of those
detained on the grounds of mental ill health.
This timely and humane initiative of the
United Kingdom deserves our full support.
U.N. Human Rights Machinery
The problem of torture and the measures
we take in the United Nations to combat it
are part of a bigger problem; namely, the
U.N.'s role in promoting human rights and
the development of machinery to carry out
that role. We attach great importance to
strengthening the U.N.'s human rights
machinery. My colleagues will recall the
remarks of President Carter on this subject
in his address on March 17.
It has been more than 30 years now since
this machinery first began to function
through meetings of the Human Rights
Commission. In this relatively short time,
much valuable groundwork has been laid in
an area which 30 years ago was unexplored.
We are at a stage when we must persist in
exploiting the advances which have been
made and in strengthening the somewhat
fragile structure of the newer procedural
devices, like those provided for in ECOSOC
Resolution 1503. 2
Each member of the United Nations is
now under a mandate from the Assembly to
develop and propose new ideas for improv-
ing the effective enjoyment of human rights
through the United Nations. We take this
assignment very seriously and will be
proposing initiatives in the future. As the
President indicated, we think there is much
to be said for the idea of establishing a
United Nations High Commissioner for
2 ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII), entitled "Pro-
cedure for dealing with communications relating to
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms,"
was adopted by the Council on May 27, 1970.
500
Department of State Bulletin
Human Rights. In addition, we want to find
ways to make the Commission on Human
Rights a more effective body. We think the
key lies in more complete cooperation with
the Commission on the part of all nations.
That will go a long way to make the United
Nations much more effective in protecting
the basic rights of all peoples.
Racism and Racial Discrimination
One of the most serious problems con-
fronting humankind today is the problem of
racism and racial discrimination. In this area
the people of the United States have a pecu-
liar responsibility: as a nation long afflicted
with the problems of racism and racial dis-
crimination, we feel a responsibility to
contribute to the world struggle to eliminate
all forms of racism and racial discrimination,
and our President recently called upon the
American people to move toward ratification
of the convention of this name. Fur-
thermore, we have been engaged in the
United States for more than a century in a
serious nationwide struggle, in many
respects a successful struggle, against rac-
ism. Our ongoing struggle, which is not
completed by a long shot and which con-
tinues, has been conducted in general in an
open and problem-solving way which
minimized violence to persons.
The experience of the United States of-
fers, we believe, many examples from which
the rest of the world might selectively prof-
it. We are still struggling to appreciate the
richness of diversity and to purge ourselves
of the curse of believing in conformity and
uniformity in this country; nevertheless,
perhaps no nation has made as much prog-
ress in its struggle against racism as the
United States.
That this transformation took place over a
relatively short time in the face of a problem
many thought was insoluble is not only a
source of pride for Americans but grounds
for faith that fundamental changes can take
place when people of good will, everywhere
in the world, show determination to work
for them.
Without this faith, I would not have come
here today. I believe that the United Na-
tions provides all of us a very special
opportunity — to help each other. It won't
always be easy. There will sometimes be
contentions and embarrassment.
But all of us must know, as government
officials and as individuals, that we will not
be true to ourselves as human beings unless
we make the most persistent, creative, and
concerted attack possible on the problem of
advancing the human dignity of the indi-
vidual and social justice for all. As dele-
gates, we have the responsibility to see that
our world organization plays a central role
in the process. I have suggested some
priorities which I hope can unite us in a new
consensus — a consensus that will enable us
to move forward in the long struggle to
realize the dream of a world of justice and
freedom for all. It is a consensus that unites
us in a struggle against evils which afflict us
all — not a potential and polemic struggle
against each other.
The Economic and Social Council is one of
the principal places where this consensus
can be formulated, strengthened, and put
into practice. Indeed, this is our mandate
under the charter, and the people of the
world — especially the hungry, the perse-
cuted, and the tortured — expect no less from
us. And it is, Mr. Chairman, exactly in
these areas that real progress can be made.
These are not areas in which the age-old,
and sometimes new, political rivalries and
conflicts make consensus impossible. These
are not areas in which nationalism and racist
ideologies can forever repel the great desire
of the peoples of the world for justice.
Political confrontation may be a fact of the
life of the world, and the correct balancing
of powers perhaps is a necessary prereq-
uisite to the struggle for world justice and
peace. But the struggle for justice and peace
is also a necessary prerequisite to the build-
ing of any real world order: Where there is
no justice, order is tyranny. So political
confrontation in ECOSOC is unnecessary
and unhelpful. We must be able to unite
against the common enemies of humankind
May 16, 1977
501
in the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations.
Perhaps in the past we have been too
timid, perhaps we have asked too little of
ourselves, of our nation, of the United
Nations. Before the massive problems of rac-
ism, torture, and famine, we dare not be
timid. We must try to measure ourselves
against the challenge of the problems which
confront us.
United States Joins Consensus
on U.N. Resolution on Benin
Following is a statement made in the
U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa-
tive Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on April Ik, to-
gether with the text of a resolution adopted
by the Council that day.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER
any person to recruit an American citizen in
the United States for service as a soldier in
foreign armed forces or for any American
citizen to enlist in the United States for
such service. In the event that there is evi-
dence of such activity taking place in the
United States, my government will move
vigorously to investigate and, where suffi-
cient evidence is available, to prosecute. We
are opposed to the use of mercenaries to
intervene in the internal affairs of other
countries and are committed to the enforce-
ment of our laws concerning the recruitment
of American citizens as mercenaries.
While a literal reading of paragraphs 4
and 5 of the resolution would inevitably pose
problems for any government in terms of ef-
fectively controlling activities of its citizens
outside its territorial jurisdiction, the
United States will make every effort to in-
sure that its laws on the subject are com-
plied with strictly so as to discourage
American citizens from becoming involved in
any type of unlawful mercenary activity.
USUN press release 21 dated April 14
The United States was able to join in the
resolution before the Council because of its
concern at the armed attack on Benin and
the loss of life and damage of property
suffered by the people and Government of
Benin. We want to extend our sympathy to
the people of Benin through their distin-
guished Ambassador to the United Nations,
Thomas Boya.
The United States also wishes to express
its concern at the apparent violation of the
territorial integrity of Benin. As members of
this Council know very well, threats to the
territorial integrity of African states have
become a serious problem, whether by mer-
cenaries or any other type of armed
intervention. More than mere lipservice —
and selective concern — must be paid to the
principle of territorial integrity if interna-
tional peace and security are to be
maintained.
I would also like to express briefly the
views of my government on the question of
mercenaries and comment on operative
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft resolution.
Under U.S. law it is a criminal offense for
TEXT OF RESOLUTION »
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Security Coun-
cil Special Mission to the People's Republic of Benin
established under resolution 404 (1977) (S/12294 and
Add.l),
Gravely concerned at the violation of the territorial
integrity, independence and sovereignty of the State
of Benin,
Deeply grieved at the loss of life and substantial
damage to property caused by the invading force dur-
ing its attack on Cotonou on 16 January 1977,
1. Takes note of the report of the Special Mission
and expresses its appreciation for the work
accomplished;
2. Strongly condemns the act of armed aggression
perpetrated against the People*s Republic of Benin on
16 January 1977;
3. Reaffirms its resolution 239 (1967) which, inter
alia, condemns any State which persists in permitting
or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries and the
provision of facilities to them, with the objective of
overthrowing the Governments of States Members of
the United Nations;
4. Calls upon all States to exercise the utmost vigi-
lance against the danger posed by international
mercenaries and to ensure that their territory and
1 U.N. doc. S/RES/405 (1977); adopted by the Coun-
cil by consensus on Apr. 14.
502
Department of State Bulletin
other territories under their control, as well as their
nationals, are not used for the planning of subversion
and recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries
designed to overthrow the Government of any Member
State of the United Nations;
5. F u ft her calls upon all States to consider taking
necessary measures to prohibit, under their respective
domestic laws, the recruitment, training and transit of
mercenaries on their territory and other territories
under their control;
6. Condemns all forms of external interference in
the internal affairs of Member States, including the
use of international mercenaries to destabilize States
and/or to violate the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence of States;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide ap-
propriate technical assistance to help the Government
of Benin in assessing and evaluating the damage re-
sulting from the act of armed aggression committed in
Cotonou on 16 January 1977;
8. Appeals to all States to provide material assist-
ance to the People's Republic of Benin in order to ena-
ble it to repair the damage and losses inflicted during
the attack;
9. Notes that the Government of Benin has re-
served its right with respect to any eventual claims for
compensation which it may wish to assert;
10. Calls upon all States to provide the Security
Council with any information they might have in con-
nexion with the events in Cotonou on 16 January 1977
likely to throw further light on those events;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely
the implementation of the present resolution;
12. Decides to remain seized of this question.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome
June 13, 1976. l
Signatures: Brazil, April 13, 1977; Thailand, April
19, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Panama, April 13, 1977.
Accession deposited: Libya, April 15, 1977.
Aviation
Convention for the unification of certain rules relating
to international transportation by air. Done at War-
saw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February
13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49
Stat. 3000.
Accession deposited: Oman, August 6, 1976.
Additional protocol no. 3 to amend the convention for
the unification of certain rules relating to interna-
tional carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October
12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocols
done at The Hague on September 28, 1955, and at
Guatemala City on March 8, 1971. Done at Montreal
September 25, 1975. »
Signature: Denmark, December 1, 1976.
Montreal protocol no. 4 to amend the convention for
the unification of certain rules relating to interna-
tional carriage bv air signed at Warsaw on October
12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol
done at The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at
Montreal September 25, 1975. l
Signatures: Denmark, December 1, 1976; Senegal,
August 18, 1976.
Narcotic Drugs
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.
Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, November 23, 1976.
Oil Pollution
Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted'at London Oc-
tober 15, 1971. '
Acceptance deposited: Bahamas, March 28, 1977.
Safety at Sea
Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc-
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.
Extended by United States to: Puerto Rico, Guam,
Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Midway,
Wake, Johnston Islands, Palmyra Island, Kingman
Reef, Howland Island, Baker Island, Jarvis Is-
land, and Navassa Island, April 1, 1977.
International convention for the safety of life at sea,
1974, with annex. Done at London November 1,
1974. '
Acceptance deposited: Mexico, March 28, 1977.
Space
Convention on international liability for damage caused
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep-
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9,
1973. TIAS 7762.
Ratification deposited: Greece, April 27, 1977.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with an-
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1,
1975; for the United States April 7, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Somalia, February 11, 1977;
Libya, February 22, 1977; Oman, February 24,
1977. 2
Accession deposited: San Marino, March 25, 1977.
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959,
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to
establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-
1 Not in force.
2 Confirmed statements contained in final protocol.
May 16, 1977
503
frequency radiotelephone coastal stations, with an-
nexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8,
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the
United States April 21, 1976.
Notification of approval: Hungary. February 16,
1977.
PUBLICATIONS
BILATERAL
Bangladesh
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.
Signed at Dacca April 1, 1977. Entered into force
April 1, 1977.
Cuba
Convention for the conservation of shrimp. Signed at
Havana August 15, 1958. Entered into force Sep-
tember 4, 1959. TIAS 4321.
Notice of termination: April 27, 1977; effective April
27, 1978.
Agreement on the hijacking of aircraft and vessels and
other offenses. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington and Havana February 15, 1973. Entered
into force February 15, 1973.
Terminated: April 15, 1977.
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at
Havana April 27, 1977. Enters into force on a date to
be mutually agreed by an exchange of notes.
Modus vivendi concerning a maritime boundary. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Havana April 27,
1977. Entered into force April 27, 1977.
Guatemala
Agreement relating to a cooperative program for the
prevention of foot and mouth disease, rinderpest,
and other exotic diseases in Guatemala. Signed at
Guatemala March 3, 1977. Entered into force March
3, 1977.
Haiti
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of November 30, 1976. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince April
13, 1977. Entered into force April 13, 1977.
Mexico
Agreement extending the air transport agreement of
August 15, 1960, as amended and extended (TIAS
4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of notes at
Mexico and Tlatelolco March 11 and 18, 1977. En-
tered into force March 18, 1977.
Tanzania
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat-
ing to the agreement of June 15, 1976 (TIAS 8310).
Signed at Dar es Salaam March 19, 1977. Entered
into force March 19, 1977.
United Kingdom
Agreement renewing and amending the memorandum
of understanding of April 28, 1976 (TIAS 8303), re-
lating to passenger charter air services, with related
letter. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
April 11, 1977. Entered into force April 11, 1977; ef-
fective April 1, 1977.
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
iiiou her from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be-
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.
American Women Today & Tomorrow. This report is
an analysis of a survey conducted by Market Opinion
Research for the National Commission on the Observ-
ance of International Women's Year. The survey
assessed women's attitudes and opinions, recorded
their current activities, looked at the patterns of their
lives, and asked about their views of the future. 79 pp.
$1.25. Stock No. 052-003-00249-3.
Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation
Services in Iceland and in Greenland and the Faroe
Islands. Agreement with other governments amending
the agreements done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as
amended. TIAS 8421. 2 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10:8421).
Whaling — Amendments to the Schedule to the Inter-
national Whaling Convention of 1946. Adopted at the
twenty-eighth meeting of the International Whaling
Commission. TIAS 8422. 5 pp. 35(2. (Cat. No.
S9.10:8422).
Debt Consolidation and Rescheduling. Agreement
with Bangladesh. TIAS 8423. 11 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8423).
Use of Veterans Memorial Hospital — Grants-in-Aid
for Medical Care and Treatment of Veterans and Re-
habilitation of the Hospital Plant. Agreement with
the Philippines amending the agreement of April 4,
1974. TIAS 8424. 3 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. S9.10:8424).
United States Naval Medical Research Unit. Agree-
ment with the Philippines. TIAS 8425. 4 pp. 350. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:8425).
Nutrition Development. Agreement with Chile. TIAS
8426. 42 pp. 550. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8426).
Industrial and Agricultural Production. Agreement
with Egypt. TIAS 8427. 14 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9.10:8427).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia
amending the agreement of April 19, 1976, as
amended. TIAS 8428. 2 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8428).
Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgium
amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27,
1950. TIAS 8430. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8430).
504
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX May 16, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1977
Arms Control and Disarmament
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of L977
Transmitted to the Congress (message fi
President Carter, fact sheet I 477
-rii Summation of l It h Round of Ml
Talks (news conference statement by Net!
lands Representative) 482
Benin. United States .loins Consensus on U.N.
Resolution on Benin (Sherer, text of resolu
tion) 502
Canada. U.S. -Canada Treaty on Execution of
Penal Sentences Sent to Senate (message from
President Carter) 493
China. President Carter's News Conference of
April 22 (excerpts) 481
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 493
rtment Discusses Security Assistance Pro-
grams ( Benson ) 485
Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills Transmitted to
the Congress (letters from President Carter) . . 490
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1977
Transmitted to the Congress (message from
President Carter, fact sheet) 477
President Carter's Second Report on Cyprus
Submitted to Congress (message) 491
Cuba. U.S. and Cuba Reach Agreement on
Fisheries, Maritime Boundary (joint si
ment) 484
Cyprus. President Carter's Second Report on
Cyprus Submitted to Congress (message) 401
Energy. President Carter's News Conference of
April 22 (excerpts) 481
Europe. Western Summation of 11th Round of
MBFR Talks (news conference statement
Netherlands Representative) 482
Fisheries. U.S. and Cuba Reach Agreement on
Fisheries, Maritime Boundary (joint state-
ment ) 4S4
Food. The Challenge to the Economic and Social
Council: Advancing the Quality of Life in All
Its Aspects (Young) 494
Foreign Aid
Department Discusses Security Assistance
Programs (Benson) 485
Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills Transmitted to
the Congress (letters from President Carter i . . 490
Human Rights. The Challenge to the Economic
and Social Council: Advancing the Quality of
Life in All Its Aspects (Young) 494
Middle East. President Carter's News Confer-
ence of April 22 (excerpts) 481
Military Affairs. Department Discusses Secu-
rity Assistance Programs I Benson) 485
Nuclear Energy. Nuclear Nonproliferation Pol-
icy Act of 1977 Transmitted to the Congress
(message from President Carter, fact sheet). . . 477
Presidential Documents
Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills Transmitted to
the Congress 490
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1077
Transmitted to the Congress
President Carter's News Conference of April 22
(excerpts)
President iort on Cyprus
Submitted to Congress
U.S. -Can y on Execution of Penal Sen-
t ernes Sent to Senate
Publications. GPO Sales Publications
Treaty Information
Current Actions
U.S. -Canada Treaty on Execution of Penal
Sentences Sent to Senate (message from Pres-
nt Carter)
United Nations
The Challenge to the Economic and 'oun-
cil; Advancing the Quality of Life in All Its
Aspects (Young)
United States Joins Consensus on U.N.
Resolution on Benin (Sherer, text of resolu-
tion)
Zaire. President Carter's News Conference of
April 22 (excerpts)
477
481
401
193
504
503
40)!
494
502
INI
Name In,
in, Lucy Wilson 485
Carter. President 477, 481, 49(1, 401, 403
Sherer, Albert W., Jr 502
Young, Andrew 404
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: April 25-May 1
Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Date
Subject
186 4/2G Fine Arts Committee, May 26.
1ST 4/27 Meeting to report on Apr. 1 talks
with repri es of Committee
on Harmonization, Conference of
European Posts and Telecommuni-
cation Admiii! May 1".
ISO 4/2N Program for working visit to Wash-
ington of Prime Minister Suarez of
Spain, Apr. 2S-29.
4/28 Shipping Coordinating Commi
U.S. National Committee for the
mention of Marine Pollution,
win-king' group on segregated bal-
last in existing tankers, May 26.
tl91 4/28 German-U.S. cultural talks, Apr.
20-27: communique.
102 4/29 U.S. and Czechoslovakia terminate
textile agreement. Mar. 22-2S.
193 4/20 W. Tapley Bennett, .Jr., sworn in as
1 ,S. Ambassador to NATO (bio-
graphic data).
+ 104 4/30 Vance: University of Georgia,
Athens, Ga.
*Not printed.
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V.J:
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1978 • May 23, 1977
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY
Address by Secretary Venice 505
SECRETARY VANCE'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MAY 4 513
ADMINISTRATION GIVES VIEWS ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION
ON DEEP SEABED MINING
Statement by Ambassador at Large Richardson 524
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
Fo>- index see inside back
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Vol. LXXVI, No. 1978
May 23, 1977
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
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ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President afid
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
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L nited States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Human Rights and Foreign Policy
Address by Secretary Vance
I speak today about the resolve of this
Administration to make the advancement of
human rights a central part of our foreign
policy.
Many here today have long been advo-
cates of human rights within our own soci-
ety. And throughout our nation that struggle
for civil rights continues.
In the early years of our civil rights
movement, many Americans treated the
issue as a "Southern" problem. They were
wrong. It was and is a problem for all of us.
Now, as a nation, we must not make a
comparable mistake. Protection of human
rights is a challenge for all countries, not
just for a few.
Our human rights policy must be under-
stood in order to be effective. So today I
want to set forth the substance of that pol-
icy and the results we hope to achieve.
Our concern for human rights is built upon
ancient values. It looks with hope to a world
in which liberty is not just a great cause,
but the common condition. In the past, it
may have seemed sufficient to put our name
to international documents that spoke loftily
of human rights. That is not enough. We
will go to work, alongside other people and
governments, to protect and enhance the
dignity of the individual.
Let me define what we mean by "human
rights."
First, there is the right to be free from
governmental violation of the integrity of
1 Made at Law Day ceremonies at the University of
Georgia School of Law at Athens, Ga., on Apr. 30
(text from press release 194).
the person. Such violations include torture;
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; and arbitrary arrest or impris-
onment. And they include denial of fair pub-
lic trial and invasion of the home.
Second, there is the right to the
fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shel-
ter, health care, and education. We recog-
nize that the fulfillment of this right will de-
pend, in part, upon the stage of a nation's
economic development. But we also know
that this right can be violated by a govern-
ment's action or inaction — for example,
through corrupt official processes which
divert resources to an elite at the expense of
the needy or through indifference to the
plight of the poor.
Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and
political liberties: freedom of thought, of re-
ligion, of assembly; freedom of speech; free-
dom of the press; freedom of movement both
within and outside one's own country;
freedom to take part in government.
Our policy is to promote all these rights.
They are all recognized in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, a basic
document which the United States helped
fashion and which the United Nations ap-
proved in 1948. There may be disagreement
on the priorities these rights deserve. But I
believe that, with work, all of these rights
can become complementary and mutually
reinforcing.
The philosophy of our human rights policy
is revolutionary in the intellectual sense, re-
flecting our nation's origin and progressive
values. As Archibald MacLeish wrote during
our Bicentennial a year ago: ". . . the cause
May 23, 1977
505
of human liberty is now the one great rev-
olutionary cause. ..."
President Carter put it this way in his
speech before the United Nations:
All the signatories of the United Nations Charter
have pledged themselves to observe and to respect
basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United
Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is
solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid
its responsibilities to review and to speak when tor-
ture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of
the world.
Since 1945, international practice has con-
firmed that a nation's obligation to respect
human rights is a matter of concern in in-
ternational law.
Our obligation under the United Nations
Charter is written into our own legislation.
For example, our Foreign Assistance Act
now reads: "... a principal goal of the
foreign policy of the United States is to
promote the increased observance of inter-
nationally recognized human rights by all
countries."
In these ways, our policy is in keeping
with our tradition, our international obliga-
tions, and our laws.
In pursuing a human rights policy, we
must always keep in mind the limits of our
power and of our wisdom. A sure formula
for defeat of our goals would be a rigid,
hubristic attempt to impose our values on
others. A doctrinaire plan of action would be
as damaging as indifference.
We must be realistic. Our country can
only achieve our objectives if we shape what
we do to the case at hand. In each instance,
we will consider these questions as we de-
termine whether and how to act:
1. First, we will ask ourselves, what is
the nature of the case that confronts us? For
example:
What kinds of violations or deprivations
are there? What is their extent?
Is there a pattern to the violations? If so,
is the trend toward concern for human
rights or away from it?
What is the degree of control and
responsibility of the government involved?
And finally, is the government willing to
permit independent outside investigation?
2. A second set of questions concerns the
prospects for effective action:
Will our action be useful in promoting the
overall cause of human rights?
Will it actually improve the specific
conditions at hand? Or will it be likely to
make things worse instead?
Is the country involved receptive to our
interest and efforts?
Will others work with us, including official
and private international organizations dedi-
cated to furthering human rights?
Finally, does our sense of values and
decency demand that we speak out or take
action anyway, even though there is only a
remote chance of making our influence felt?
3. We will ask a third set of questions in
order to maintain a sense of perspective:
Have we steered away from the self-
righteous and strident, remembering that
our own record is not unblemished?
Have we been sensitive to genuine
security interests, realizing that outbreak of
armed conflict or terrorism could in itself
pose a serious threat to human rights?
Have we considered all the rights at
stake? If, for instance, we reduce aid to a
government which violates the political
rights of its citizens, do we not risk penaliz-
ing the hungry and poor, who bear no respon-
sibility for the abuses of their government?
If we are determined to act, the means
available range from quiet diplomacy in its
many forms, through public pronounce-
ments, to withholding of assistance. When-
ever possible, we will use positive steps of
encouragement and inducement. Our strong
support will go to countries that are work-
ing to improve the human condition. We will
always try to act in concert with other coun-
tries, through international bodies.
In the end, a decision whether and how to
act in the cause of human rights is a matter
for informed and careful judgment. No
mechanistic formula produces an automatic
answer.
It is not our purpose to intervene in the
internal affairs of other countries, but as the
President has emphasized, no member of the
506
Department of State Bulletin
United Nations can claim that violation of
internationally protected human rights is
solely its own affair. It is our purpose to
shape our policies in accord with our beliefs
and to state them without stridency or apol-
ogy when we think it is desirable to do so.
Our policy is to be applied within our own
society as well as abroad. We welcome
constructive criticism at the same time as
we offer it.
No one should suppose that we are work-
ing in a vacuum. We place great weight on
joining with others in the cause of human
rights.
The U.N. system is central to this cooper-
ative endeavor. That is why the President
stressed the pursuit of human rights in his
speech before the General Assembly last
month. That is why he is calling for U.S.
ratification of four important human rights
covenants and conventions and why we are
trying to strengthen the human rights
machinery within the United Nations.
And that is an important reason why we
have moved to comply with U.N. sanctions
against Rhodesia. In one of our first acts,
this Administration sought and achieved re-
peal of the Byrd amendment, which had
placed us in violation of these sanctions and
thus in violation of international law. We are
supporting other diplomatic efforts within
the United Nations to promote basic civil
and political rights in Namibia and through-
out southern Africa.
Regional organizations also play a central
role in promoting human rights. The
President has announced that the United
States will sign and seek Senate approval of
the American Convention on Human Rights.
We will continue to work to strengthen the
machinery of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights. This will include ef-
forts to schedule regular visits to all mem-
bers of the Organization of American States,
annual debates on human rights conditions,
and the expansion of the inter-American
educational program on human rights.
The United States is seeking increased
consultation with other nations for joint
programs on economic assistance and more
general efforts to promote human rights. We
are working to assure that our efforts reach
out to all, with particular sensitivity to the
problems of women.
We will meet in Belgrade later this year
to review implementation of the Final Act of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe — the so-called Helsinki confer-
ence. We will take this occasion to work for
progress there on important human issues:
family reunification, binational marriages,
travel for personal and professional reasons,
and freer access to information.
The United States looks to use of
economic assistance — whether bilateral or
through international financial institu-
tions — as a means to foster basic human
rights.
— We have proposed a 20 percent increase
in U.S. foreign economic assistance for fiscal
year 1978.
— We are expanding the program of the
Agency for International Development for
"New Initiatives in Human Rights" as a
complement to present efforts to get the
benefits of our aid to those most in need
abroad.
— The programs of the United States In-
formation Agency and the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs stress support for law in society, a
free press, freedom of communication, an
open educational system, and respect for
ethnic diversity.
This Administration's human rights policy
has been framed in collaboration and consul-
tation with Congress and private organiza-
tions. We have taken steps to assure
firsthand contact, consultation, and observa-
tion when Members of Congress travel
abroad to review human rights conditions.
We are implementing current laws that
bring human rights considerations directly
into our decisions in several international fi-
nancial institutions. At the same time, we
are working with the Congress to find the
most effective way to fulfill our parallel
commitment to international cooperation in
economic development.
In accordance with human rights
provisions of legislation governing our secu-
May 23, 1977
507
rity assistance programs, we recently an-
nounced cuts in military aid to several coun-
tries.
Outside the government, there is much
that can be done. We welcome the efforts of
individual American citizens and private
organizations — such as religious, hu-
manitarian, and professional groups — to work
for human rights with commitments of time,
money, and compassion.
All these initiatives to further human
rights abroad would have a hollow ring if we
were not prepared to improve our own per-
formance at home. So we have removed all
restrictions on our citizens' travel abroad
and are proceeding with plans to liberalize
our visa policies.
We support legislation and administrative
action to expand our refugee and asylum
policies and to permit more victims of re-
pressive regimes to enter the United States.
During this last year, the United States
spent some $475 million on assistance to
refugees around the world, and we accepted
31,000 refugees for permanent resettlement
in this country.
What results can we expect from all these
efforts?
We may justifiably seek a rapid end to
such gross violations as those cited in our
law: "torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, (or)
prolonged detention without charges. ..."
Just last week our Ambassador at the
United Nations, Andrew Young, suggested
a series of new ways to confront the practice
of torture around the world.
The promotion of other human rights is a
broader challenge. The results may be
slower in coming but are no less worth pur-
suing. And we intend to let other countries
know where we stand.
We recognize that many nations of the
world are organized on authoritarian rather
than democratic principles — some large and
powerful, others struggling to raise the lives
of their people above bare subsistence
levels. We can nourish no illusions that a
call to the banner of human rights will bring-
sudden transformations in authoritarian
societies.
We are embarked on a long journey. But
our faith in the dignity of the individual en-
courages us to believe that people in every
society, according to their own traditions,
will in time give their own expression to this
fundamental aspiration.
Our belief is strengthened by the way the
Helsinki principles and the U.N. Declaration
of Human Rights have found resonance in
the hearts of people of many countries. Our
task is to sustain this faith by our example
and our encouragement.
In his inaugural address three months
ago, President Carter said, "Because we are
free we can never be indifferent to the fate
of freedom elsewhere." Again, at a meeting
of the Organization of American States two
weeks ago, he said, "You will find this coun-
try . . . eager to stand beside those nations
which respect human rights and which
promote democratic ideals."
We seek these goals because they are
right — and because we, too, will benefit.
Our own well-being, and even our security,
are enhanced in a world that shares common
freedoms and in which prosperity and eco-
nomic justice create the conditions for
peace. And let us remember that we always
risk paying a serious price when we become
identified with repression.
Nations, like individuals, limit their po-
tential when they limit their goals. The
American people understand this. I am con-
fident they will support foreign policies that
reflect our traditional values. To offer less is
to define America in ways we should not
accept.
America fought for freedom in 1776 and in
two World Wars. We have offered haven to
the oppressed. Millions have come to our
shores in times of trouble. In time of devas-
tation abroad, we have shared our re-
sources.
Our encouragement and inspiration to
other nations and other peoples have never
been limited to the power of our military or
the bounty of our economy. They have been
lifted up by the message of our Revolution,
the message of individual human freedom.
That message has been our great national
asset in times past. So it should be again.
508
Department of State Bulletin
Questions and Answers Following Secretary Vance's Address
at the University of Georgia School of Law
Pl'eas release 194A dated May :-i
Q. Secretary Venice, if I may digress from
your speech a little bit, you were quoted in
the New Yorker magazine last August as
saying that if our efforts to encourage pro
bono work by lawyers voluntarily were un-
successful, it might be necessary to impose
a mandatory system on all private lawyers
to do a certain amount of pro bono work.
Would you comment on that, please, sir?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I would be de-
lighted to comment on that.
I think that lawyers have a special
responsibility to the communities in which
they live and to the peoples of those com-
munities. In New York, where I practiced
law, I came to the reluctant conclusion that
the lawyers were not discharging their re-
sponsibilities in terms of public service and
meeting the needs of the poor and those who
could not afford proper legal services. And I
therefore urged that the lawyers in our
community increase their efforts both in
terms of time committed to pro bono ac-
tivities and in terms of contributions to help
support those activities. And I went on to
say that if this voluntary response — which is
what I pray would be the answer to this —
does not succeed, then I think it may be
necessary for the bar, the organized bar, to
set down prescriptions with respect to con-
tributions of time or other efforts to make
possible the rendering of these services to
those in the community who are not getting
them. I do not think we can, in this great de-
mocracy, have a situation where the courts
and the processes of the law are not freely
available to all.
Q. Secretary Vance, I'd like to ask you a
somewhat more general question and ask
you to speculate, just a bit, if you will.
First of all, do you think that in the
course of this Administration there is a real
possibility for significant and meaningful
arms limitation, particularly in light of
your recent conversations with the Soviets?
And then in a more long-range vein, I'd
like to ask you simply: Do you think that
any of us will live to see a day when nuclear
arms will in fact no longer exist?
Secretary Vance: On the first question, I
think it is possible during President Carter's
Administration to see significant arms con-
trol; but, I would caution, arms control is a
process which takes time and a great deal of
patience. It's not something for the
short-winded or the faint of heart.
These are extremely difficult problems
that have to be dealt with, that in terms of
the nations involved affect their very
national security. And therefore it is inevi-
table that they become a very time-
consuming process. All we have to do is look
back over the history of the past to see the
facts that underlie that statement.
But having said that, arms control —
particularly nuclear arms control — is one of
the major objectives of President Carter's
Administration. It is, along with a few other
items, at the very top of the list; and we will
continue to put our full efforts behind seek-
ing a fair and just settlement. And I think in
time that settlement can be achieved.
Now, your second question dealt with — I
believe the question: Can, in your lifetime,
we see the total elimination of nuclear
weapons?
I pray that that can happen. I'm not sure
it can. But I think that all of us have got to
bend our efforts in my generation and your
generation, and the generation that will be
May 23, 1977
509
following on after that, to inexorably move
us along the path to that time when we will
be able to achieve that goal.
Q. Secretary Ventre, 200 years ago the
U.S. military came into being to protect the
citizens of the United States of America.
Two weeks before Abraham Lincoln was
shot in 1865, he said that the worst aspect of
the Civil War was that it enabled a handful
of corporations to take over the economy of
the United States and that if this trend
wasn't stopped, the Republic would be de-
stroyed.
Now, 112 years later, after Lincoln said
that, a handful of American corpora-
tions — mainly multinational oil corpora-
tions — around the world are protected by
U.S. military forces which outnumber any
forces in the days of the Roman Empire.
What is going to be done about our foreign
policy of maintenance of empire? How are
we going to return this country once again
to being the democratic republic which it
was founded as?
Thomas Jefferson said that a standing
army in peacetime is the greatest threat to
the civil liberties of the people.
We are officially i>i peacetime, and yet we
have a big standing army which is going to
equip divisions in Russian uniforms with
captured Russian weapons. What use is a
policy of human rights if we are going to
press our policy of empire until we have a
third world war with the Russians and
everyone is obliterated in nuclear atoms?
What I'm asking you is: Isn't it time to
stop the multinational corporations from
dictating governmental policy? Isn't it time
to set up a public solar energy corporation
of the people, by the people, and for the
people, to break the power of the multina-
tional oil monopolies which have risen to
power since Lincoln's assassination and
have turned our nation from a democratic
republic into a military worldwide empire?
Secretary Vance: Well, you've made a
number of assumptions and asked a goodly
number of questions. Let me say that I do
not agree with a number of the assumptions
which you have made, but you have asked
some serious questions and I will try to an-
swer them.
I do not believe that it is fair or accurate
to state that the multinational corporations
control the policy of the United States. They
do not.
With respect to the development of
foreign policy, this is developed within the
government, without interference by corpo-
rate action from without. That policy is
being developed on the basis of the funda-
mental values which have undergirded the
founding of this country and its development
through the years since then.
Insofar as military forces are concerned,
the military forces at this juncture are less
than they have been in many years. They
stand ready as a defensive organization to
protect our country and our allies should the
need arise. But there is no aggressive
purpose on the part of the United States to
use those forces, and that should be crystal
clear.
We are bending our efforts in the military
area to find ways to reduce the likelihood of
conflict through arms negotiations. In the
area of the spread of nuclear weapons, the
United States has taken the leadership in
moving to try and get a control on the
spread of weapons through the policies
which have been announced with respect to
plutonium, the transfer of sensitive
technology relating to reprocessing and en-
richment, and the seeking of international
mechanisms to control this.
Let me just speak once more. And finally,
with respect to the problems of the develop-
ing world, I think that you will see in this
Administration, in the years ahead, an in-
creasingly important attention directed to
trying to work with the developing countries
to try and find ways to solve the common
problems which we have and the needs and
concerns which they have.
Q. Secretary Vance, as Professor [Dean]
Rusk has often explained to us, one of your
hardest jobs is often to justify — and some-
times even defend — our foreign policy to the
people here at home.
One of the areas that is always touchiest
is foreign aid; and that's something that the
510
Department of State Bulletin
press and the public are always ready to
criticize the Administration for, in light of
the problems we have in this country, as far
as sending money out of the country. When
the Administration announces a 20 percent
increase next year in owr foreign aid bill,
what answer will the Administration, as I'm
sure it's thought, have to the press and to
the American public for justifying that
move?
Secretary Vance: I believe that it is of
fundamental importance that we increase
our assistance through foreign aid. The
problems which face the developing world
are immense in terms of the social and eco-
nomic turmoil that have been caused over
the last several years.
Insofar as the developing world was con-
cerned, these problems were intensified by
the action taken by the OPEC countries
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] a couple of years ago, which
came on top of a recession and which
exacerbated the situation insofar as their
economies were concerned.
Also, as the world grows more tightly
knit, the economic problems of countries —
wherever they may be located — tend to af-
fect those in other countries. One of the
ways that we have of dealing with this is by
increasing, in a sensible and measured way,
the resources available to these developing
countries.
In my own judgment, the best way of
doing this is through the international finan-
cial institutions — which is the area in which
the greatest increase has been suggested in
our budget. The international financial in-
stitutions are, in my judgment, better able
to impose the kind of fiscal controls and con-
straints to make sure that the money is
properly spent than can be done on a bilat-
eral basis. Also, for every dollar that we put
in, we get matching money from others, so
that increases the funds available to meet
these problems.
There are always situations where we can
help on a bilateral basis — help the poor and
the needy in other parts of the world. And
there I think that we can and should do this
on a bilateral basis.
May 23, 1977
In the long run I think this does two
things:
First, I think it fills a world need for
which we have a responsibility along with
other nations.
And secondly, we are so interrelated
these days that in the end it helps us. We
depend in great measure on these nations
for commodities. If we're going to deal with
the global problems — we're dealing with
them now in international fora — we can't do
this alone. We have to be working with
other nations. And to the extent that we
begin to know them and work with them, I
think we strengthen our chances of dealing
with them satisfactorily.
Q. With Mr. Carter in the White House
and Andy Young in the United Nations
there will be a lot of changes in American
policy toward Africa, but there have been
charges by some African political analysts
that the only people who can solve African
problems are the African people, who refuse
to get identified as Communist or
capitalist — white or black.
Within the last few months there have
been some changes in some of the African
nations— that African nations traded Com-
munist friends for capitalist friends.
Another nation may, next to that, trade,
you know, capitalist friends for Coymnunist
friends. In light of some of the developments
since independence of some African nations,
you see people here who will be represented
by a bunch of other people that are not
elected by African people and there have
been changes that have been brought about
either by their Comynunist friends or
capitalist friends from outside of Africa,
with the result that people keep killing
each — one side keeps killing the other side,
then somebody else comes to power and
changes policy to the other side.
Do you really think that if Africa will de-
velop and grow in a peaceful environment
that this Communist-capitalist influence
can really help the nations in Africa? And,
if you don't, do you see a time when the
people of the capitalist and Comynunist
world can walk together with other people
instead of trying to tear each other apart
511
solely on the basis of ideological differ-
ences?
Secretary Vance: I believe that the future
of Africa must be determined by the African
nations.
Self-determination on their part is the an-
swer, in my judgment, to their future. That
does not mean that we should be indifferent.
If we can help to move the process of self-
determination in a constructive and peaceful
way, then I think it's appropriate that we do
so — as we are trying to do in the situation
that afflicts Rhodesia and Namibia at this
time. They themselves — the African
nations — are asking that assistance be given
in terms of trying to move the political
process to a solution of the differences with-
out having to resort to violence as a way of
achieving that. And I think it's appropriate
that the United States and the other nations
of the world should assist in trying to bring
about such a peaceful transition.
Q. Mr. Secretary , in light of the
Administration's recent mission to Hanoi
and in light of the innovative negotiations
which have been occurring with Hanoi, what
do you foresee or predict to be the future of
U.S. -Vietnamese relations with regard to
rebuilding in that country or whatever?
Secretary Vance: We have said to the
North Vietnamese — both President Carter
and I have said on many occasions — that we
believe a return toward normalization of the
relationships between Vietnam and the
United States is in the interests of both our
countries.
The first step was taken in the mission to
Hanoi which was led by Mr. [Leonard]
Woodcock and out of which came real
progress in the field of dealing with the
missing-in-action problem, which had been a
major separating influence.
We are meeting again, as you know, next
week with the Vietnamese in Paris to dis-
cuss the question of possible recognition of
each other. I think that this would be a good
second step along the way.
There are other problems that separate
our two countries. They will have to be dis-
cussed over a period of time. And through
those discussions I hope we will be able to
find solutions which are commonly satisfac-
tory to our two nations.
Specifically with respect to the question of
aid, as you know, we are prohibited from
giving aid, other than a small amount of
humanitarian aid, by virtue of the laws of
the United States.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
To Resume at Geneva
Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Statement '
The United States and the U.S.S.R. have
agreed that their delegations will resume
negotiations on strategic arms limitations in
Geneva beginning May 11, 1977. The discus-
sions will consider questions related to the
text of a SALT agreement which were con-
sidered but not settled in previous Geneva
negotiations.
In addition to the Geneva negotiations,
the two sides have agreed to continue to ex-
change views at other levels in an effort to
conclude a SALT agreement.
1 Read to news correspondents on Apr. 26 by De-
partment spokesman Hodding Carter III; also released
that day at Moscow.
512
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4
Press release -"- ilateil May 4
Q. Good morning, Mr. Secretary. How do
we stand on our negotiations with the
Soviets in SALT? Has the United States
modified the packages that were presented at
Moscow in the subsequent talks through Mr.
Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet
Ambassador to the U.S.]? And will there be,
can there be, a summit meeting with Mr.
Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Sec-
retary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union]
sometime this year without an agreement on
SALT?
Secretary Vance: First, let me give you a
rundown on where we stand since we had
our meetings in Moscow.
I have had several conversations with the
Soviets here in Washington since we re-
turned from Moscow. In those conversa-
tions, we have discussed two matters.
The first has been to set up the proce-
dures and dates for the working groups
which, you know, we agreed to establish as
a result of the Moscow meetings. We have
set up dates for almost all of the working
groups now. The meetings will be held in
three different places. One meeting will be
held in Washington, one meeting will be
held in Moscow, and several meetings will
be held in Geneva, for the various working
groups. I believe there are three working
groups for which we still have not been able
to set up a date because we have to ex-
change further papers in preparation for
those meetings.
Secondly, we have reviewed the two
proposals which we put on the table in Mos-
cow and the longstanding Soviet proposal
with respect to SALT which existed before
we went to Moscow. We have put no new
proposals on the table, nor have they.
We have merely reviewed the existing
proposals.
We will be discussing SALT with the
Soviets when I go to Moscow to meet with
the Foreign Minister. I do not want to pre-
dict at this time what may come out of those
discussions. We will just have to wait and
see what happens at the time.
Q. You said when you would go to Mos-
cow, you meant Geneva?
Secretary Vance: Excuse me, yes.
Q. And the second part of my original
question, can there be or will there be a
summit with Mr. Brezhnev in case there is
no SALT agreement this year?
Secretary Vance: I simply don't know the
answer to that. That is up to the Soviets,
and that has not been specifically discussed
with them.
Q. Five years have passed since the Shang-
hai communique was signed. Is there any
reason to believe that a solution to the
Taiwan problem will be any less
troublesome over the next five years than it
has been since '72?
Secretary Vance: First, let me say that
since this Administration came into office,
we have made clear that we are going to
conduct our bilateral relations with the
People's Republic of China in accordance
with the principles of the Shanghai
communique.
We have had a few discussions with the
liaison officer for the People's Republic of
China here in Washington.
I hope that later in this year we will be
able to set up a date for a trip when I will
go to Peking to have discussions where we
could explore in depth some of the issues
May 23, 1977
513
which need to be discussed between our two
countries.
It is indeed a difficult problem to move
toward normalization. As you all know,
normalization as an ultimate goal is a princi-
ple stated in the Shanghai communique, and
a principle behind which we place our ac-
ceptance. How one proceeds in terms of
time and the modalities is a very difficult
question and one which we will have to take
time to discuss with them; and this can only
be done through face-to-face discussions.
Q. If I might follow up on the question
about the SALT negotiations, do you believe
that limits on the cruise missile could or
should be included within the Vladivostok
framework?
Secretary Vance: That is a question of the
details of negotiations that I really don't
want to get into now. As I said, we have
discussed all three proposals which have
been put forward. What you are asking is: Is
there some combination of the various pro-
posals that might be put together? I don't
want to speculate on that at this time.
Q. If I may make it more general, do you
have any more hope today that you are
closer to establishing a framework for
resuming the negotiations?
Secretary Vance: I guess when you put
things in terms of hope, one tends to some-
times create expectations and get oneself
into problems.
Let me say that this will be a subject of
discussion, and I don't want to characterize
it in terms of hope or lack of hope.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when do you plan to re-
turn to the Mideast, and do you expect the
new Israeli Prime Minister to come here for
talks?
Secretary Vayice: I expect to go back to
the Middle East after the Israelis have put
together a new government. As to exactly
when that will be, it is a matter of
speculation. The numbers that I have heard
are that it could take anywhere from three
weeks to a couple of months for that to hap-
pen. It would not make sense for me to go
back to the Middle East until after there is a
new Israeli government in place.
On your second question, I think it would
be useful, once there is a new Israeli Prime
Minister, for us to meet with the new Prime
Minister before I go back to the Middle
East, because by that time the new Prime
Minister will be in a position where he will
be able to speak with authority with respect
to the Israeli position and what it may be
and what flexibility there may be in that po-
sition. To go back prior to that time, it
seems to me, would not make sense.
Q. You seem to imply that the United
States does not plan to change its negotiat-
ing position on SALT before the return to
Geneva. Is that a correct assumption? And
if so, why go, given the rapid communica-
tions and the intimate communications with
the Soviet Union? Do you have any reason
to believe you are going to be able to achieve
anything concrete?
Secretary Vance: We are going to be
doing several things while I am in Geneva.
We will be signing the Environmental Mod-
ification Treaty. In addition to that, we will
be discussing the Middle East.
I think it will be useful and constructive
for the Foreign Minister [Andrei A.
Gromyko] and me, at that level, to pick up
the discussions with respect to SALT, as
was indicated when I left Moscow. And I
think that any time the parties sit down and
start talking to each other, there is always a
possibility that something constructive can
come out of it, and therefore I am very
much in favor of it.
Range of Missiles Carried by Aircraft
Q. Can you explain what modifications, if
any, were made in the American proposal
while the delegation was in Moscow, specif-
ically referring to this question of nonheavy
bombers carrying cruise missiles?
Secretary Vance: I would be glad to talk
to that.
This relates to the question of whether or
not there should be a limitation on the range
of missiles that could be carried by tactical
aircraft.
One of the elements of the proposal which
we made to the Soviets in Moscow was that
514
Department of State Bulletin
any missile, air-launched cruise missile, with
a range over 600 — in other words, between
600 kilometers and 2,500 kilometers — could
only be carried on heavy bombers.
The reason for that was to meet the
problem created by the "Backfire" bomber,
which the Soviets maintain is an inter-
mediate bomber. But if one were to be able
to hang long-range missiles on it, it could, as
you can obviously see, change the charac-
teristics of that bomber.
Now, coming to the specifics of how that
provision came into being, the provision
with respect to tactical aircraft not being-
able to carry air-launched cruise missiles
with ranges over 600 kilometers was first
developed in 1975.
When this Administration came into of-
fice, we reviewed those studies. In the dis-
cussions in the NSC [National Security
Council] subsequently, one of the options
which was considered was that option. The
reason for its consideration is as I have indi-
cated. It is a very important aspect of limit-
ing or constraining the Backfire so that it
cannot become an intercontinental bomber.
And it was determined in the NSC and ap-
proved by the President that this would be a
provision.
That provision was not contained specif-
ically in the very brief general instructions
which I took with me to Moscow. But when
we got to Moscow and put down on paper
the specific proposal in all its detail, it was
clear that that had to be spelled out so that
there would be no ambiguity in dealing with
the Soviet Union, and it was therefore
included in the specific proposal which was
put before the Soviets.
Discussions With Vietnam and Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary, how close is the United
States to normalizing relations with Viet-
nam and Cuba, and what purpose does it
serve? What is in it for the American
people?
Secretary Vance: Let me bring you up to
date on the Vietnamese situation.
We have just completed two days of talks
with the Vietnamese in Paris. The meetings
have been adjourned. The parties will meet
again in two weeks in Paris. The meetings
were useful. There were differences
between us.
We made clear to the Vietnamese that we
will not pay any reparations. We indicated
to the Vietnamese that we are prepared not
to oppose their admission to the United Na-
tions. In turn, we are pleased with the
progress which is being made in the
missing-in-action area.
The ultimate goal of the parties is to see
whether or not we can find a basis for nor-
malization of relations between our two
countries.
I have previously stated, as has the Pres-
ident, that we believe that is in the interests
of our two countries, and we will continue to
see whether or not we can achieve that
objective.
Q. Excuse me, I tucked Cuba intv that,
too, trying to get two questions for the price
of one. How close are we on Cuba?
Secretary Vance: On Cuba, we have had
several meetings, but those meetings have
really dealt with the fisheries question.
As you know, on the recent meeting that
Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American Af-
fairs Terence] Todman had in Havana with
the Cubans, we reached agreement with re-
spect to a fisheries treaty.
There were other subjects which were
touched upon at the end of the meeting on
fisheries.
Since that time, there have been follow-on
technical meetings, and indeed I think one is
going on today in New York, on technical
fisheries questions.
There remain a number of issues between
our two countries, and I would expect that
these issues will become the subject of dis-
cussion at subsequent meetings.
Q. Mr. Secretary, this is another question
on the Middle East. Does the Administra-
tion consider as an option at the end of the
round of talks of presenting an American
peace plan to the parties, a comprehensive
American peace plan, without the element of
compulsion or enforcement, just for discus-
sion?
Secretary Vance: As the President has
May 23, 1977
515
indicated, we are going to go ahead and
complete the round of discussions which we
are having with the leaders of the various
countries concerned.
We will complete these discussions by the
end of May with respect to all countries ex-
cept the new leaders in Israel. And as I
have said, we cannot consider that until we
have seen who the new leaders will be and
when we could meet with them.
Following that, however, we will then
complete our work, and we will be prepared
to make suggestions to the parties with re-
spect to what we believe would be a fair and
equitable manner of dealing with the Middle
East problems. We will then go and discuss
these suggestions with the parties in an ef-
fort to see how much common ground we can
find among the parties.
The ultimate decision, however, on a
Middle East settlement, as we have said
many times, must be made by the parties
themselves.
Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to your last
question about Vietnam, you spoke of dif-
ferences between the United States and
Vietnam and also said that the United
States will not pay reparations to Vietnam.
Are the Vietnamese insisting on economic
aid of some kind as a precondition to nor-
malization at this time?
Secretary Vance: They have talked about
their view that there is a need for assistance
to, quote, "heal the wounds of war." That is,
in the terms of the language which was used
before, essentially a repetition of a request
for reparations. And so there is a difference of
opinion between us on that, because we have
said we will not pay reparations.
Q. As a precondition to normalization are
they insisting on this aid? Does that mean it
would hare to be committed before?
Secretary Vance: As a precondition to
normalization, I think the answer is yes. If
your question is, as a precondition to a dip-
lomatic recognition on either side, I don't
know the answer to that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on the
Middle East: One, did you mean to say that
the suggestions you are talking about will in
effect be a comprehensive American plan
and then you will see how much agreement
there is among the parties? And two, you
and the President seemed earlier this year
determined that the Geneva peace conference
be reconvened by the end of this year, dur-
ing the second half of the year. That deter-
mination seemed to lessen somewhat after
King Hussein' s visit, if I read the
President's remarks correctly. Where do you
stand on that?
Secretary Vance: Let me take the latter
question first.
We have said right from the outset that it
is terribly important that the proper base be
laid before going to a Geneva conference so
that one doesn't come to Geneva and then
just start thrashing around because nobody
has thought out how you are going to pro-
ceed and how the issues will be dealt with
and what the degree of commonality is with
respect to the views on the core issues.
Insofar as the timing is concerned, we still
believe that it is very important to have a
meeting before the end of 1977, indeed, in
the fall of 1977.
So our views remain unchanged on that.
But I stress the fact that we feel that it is
essential that adequate preparation be made
and that we have some idea of what will
come out of Geneva rather than just going
to Geneva to be in Geneva.
Now, I think you asked a second question?
Q. When you answered the previous ques-
tion you talked about American sugges-
tions. Is that in the frameivork of a com-
prehensive American plan?
Secretary Vance: I would think we would
have suggestions on the core issues.
Whether you want to call it a comprehensive
plan or not is a question that gets into
semantics. But I think we will have sugges-
tions on all the core issues.
Q. What kind of persuasive power does the
United States have when it runs into
resistance on these suggestions? In other
words, are we going to see another reas-
sessment on Israel, will the United States
review the question of aid to Egypt and so
forth, to accelerate compliance or voluntary
516
Department of State Bulletin
compliance on the part of the pen-tics to the
core suggestions?
Secretary Vance: I would think that the
first thing which one would have to do in
moving between the parties is to try and put
before the various parties the logic behind
the position, why it appears to be fair, and
have a dialogue with each of the individual
countries with respect to whatever sugges-
tions we may make in terms of why we be-
lieve them to be fair and equitable. But again
I stress that ultimately the decision for set-
tlement has to be made by the parties. It can't
be made by the United States.
Prospects for New Initiative on Rhodesia
Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your assess-
ment so far of the prospects for a joint
Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia, and
can you say will you be seeing African
leaders in London while you are there and,
if so, which ones?
Secretary Vance: We are working very
closely, as we have all through the last sev-
eral months, with the British on the south-
ern Africa questions and specifically with
regard to Rhodesia. We have been in close
touch with David Owen [British Foreign
Secretary] and the members of his staff in
developing ideas for a new initiative in
Rhodesia.
We have had a group from the State De-
partment which has been over there re-
cently for several days working with Mr.
Owen and the members of his staff. I have
reviewed the results of that along with the
Vice President.
I will be going back to London, as you
know, on Thursday, and on Friday I will be
meeting with the Foreign Secretary and his
staff to discuss the decisions which remain
before us on how we are next going to pro-
ceed in this area. I think we will reach those
decisions in the near future. By the near fu-
ture I would say about the middle of May,
perhaps even a little earlier than that.
Was there another part to your question?
Q. Will you be seeing African leaders in
London and, if so, which ones?
Secretary Vance: I will be seeing Mr.
Nkomo [Joshua Nkomo, President of the
Zimbabwe African People's Union and Pres-
ident of the African National Council-
Zimbabwe] on Friday afternoon. Let me in-
dicate I have already seen Bishop Muzorewa
[Abel Muzorewa, Chairman of the United
African National Council] when he was here
in the United States.
Q. Mr. Secretary, your comments about
SALT suggest there is a deadlock; is that
correct?
Secretary Vance: Nobody has moved from
their position at this point, but the parties
are talking to each other. So you can draw
your own conclusions, use whatever words
you want. We are talking to each other, and
I hope out of this process we will be able to
make some progress.
Q. Well, do you find at this point as a re-
sult of these talks that there has been any
"give" in the positions of either side to
suggest a compromise?
Secretary Vance: I don't want to get into
the details of our conversations at this
point, and I am just going to leave it there.
Expanding the Definition of Human Rights
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech at the
University of Georgia on Saturday you
suggested a number of questions that the
United States should be asking itself about
human rights.
Is it the implication of those questions
that in the future we will be hearing fewer
Presidential statements and Department of
State statements on human rights, or is that
a false conclusion to draw from this?
Secretary Vance: It doesn't necessarily
follow.
What I tried to do in the speech which I
gave at the University of Georgia was to
define what we meant by human rights; and
as you will notice, in the speech that I gave
I expanded the definition of human rights in
terms of the various subcomponents that are
included within human rights.
I secondly tried to set out the consid-
erations that we would have to take into ac-
May 23, 1977
517
count in deciding how we were going to
proceed in given cases on a country-by-
country basis, which I have said all along is
the way I believe that you are going to have
to deal with the problem except when you
are dealing in the international fora.
I stressed also the importance of using the
international and regional fora to have dis-
cussions on these human rights questions.
There is no lessening at all in terms of our
conviction that this is absolutely essential to
our foreign policy and that it must be car-
ried forward. I did believe it was useful to
define with greater precision than we have
in the past both what we meant by human
rights and how we intended to apply our-
selves to dealing with those questions.
U.S. Policy Toward South Africa
Q. Since the Vice President will be meet-
ing with the Prime Minister of South Af-
rica, could you define for us what this
government's policy now is toward South
Africa and particularly toward how rapidly
we believe there should be moves toward
majority government including all people in
South Africa?
Secretary Vance: Our policy with respect
to South Africa is and remains that we are
inalterably opposed to apartheid.
We feel it would be constructive, how-
ever, to meet with the Prime Minister, Mr.
Vorster, to talk with him about the ques-
tions of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South
Africa and how they plan to move within
South Africa in making progress in moving
away from apartheid and in dealing with the
problems of minorities within their country.
That is a subject which will be discussed by
the Vice President with Mr. Vorster when
he meets with him shortly.
Q. Sir, when you say there is no deadline
on SALT, did you have in your mind that
the interim agreement lapses in October?
Isn't that a deadline of sorts?
Secretary Vance: It is a fact that the
interim agreement expires in October, but if
we reach October and we have not had an
agreement, we have two choices. We can
518
either extend the agreement if the Soviets
are willing to do so, or we can continue to
proceed without an agreement but on the
assumption that we will continue as if there
were a continuing agreement. And I am not
saying that we won't reach agreement or
that we will reach agreement by October.
But I don't feel we are fighting any deadline
that is going to cause us to take actions that
are not wise and prudent.
Q. I am interested in the Policy Review
Memorandum that the Administration is
currently preparing on arms limitations.
I understand that when you appeared be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee last week you suggested that the United
States should severely cut back its coproduc-
tion agreements with other countries and
you specifically limited future coproduction
agreements to NATO, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand.
Now, my specific question is, why won't
you want to consider Israel as a partner in
future coproduction agreements, and related
to that, what is the specific status of Israel's
request for coproduction for the F-16?
Secretary Vance: Let me set aside the lat-
ter question and talk about the discussions
which I had with the Congress.
I met last week in two sessions, one with
the leadership on the House side and a sec-
ond meeting with the leadership on the
Senate side, to talk about a proposed direc-
tive which would be issued by the President
to govern our actions in the future in the
area of arms transfers. That document is
still in a draft stage. We are taking into ac-
count the suggestions which have been made
by the Members of the Congress.
Incidentally, they were very helpful
suggestions, and I think out of the process
of meeting with them and discussing this
paper we have improved substantially the
end product which will be coming out of it.
The President has not yet had a chance
because of preparations for the summit to
reach his final decisions with respect to that
memorandum, and I don't want to go into
detail until he has made his decisions.
I will comment, however, that one of the
items does deal with coproduction and that
Department of State Bulletin
this was a matter which was discussed at
some length with members of both the Sen-
ate and of the House. And we have their
views and they have been taken into account
and will be discussed with the President as
he makes up his mind concerning the ulti-
mate form of that memorandum.
Developments in Zaire
Q. Can you tell us ivhat are your views
now on the present developments in Zaire
and with the past and present involvement
of France, Egypt, Morocco, and others in
this conflict?
Secretary Vance: The situation in Zaire
has changed somewhat since we last met.
There has been an active mediation effort
led by the Nigerians, which we have been
very strongly supporting since the outset. I
discussed this a number of weeks ago with
[Nigerian] Foreign Minister Garba when he
came to the United States before it was
decided to launch that effort.
I believe that the solution will have to ul-
timately be found by the Africans in a politi-
cal solution, and therefore I very strongly
support and welcome this effort which is
being carried forward.
On the military side, as all of you know as
well as I do, the situation has somewhat
changed in the last several weeks. As a re-
sult of additional support which has been
given to the Government of the Republic of
Zaire, the military situation has appeared to
change on the ground, and it has resulted in
a movement back from the area nearest to
the copperbelt closer down toward the bor-
der where the fighting appears to be going
on now.
A number of nations, both African and
non-African, have made contributions to the
Republic of Zaire in terms of both nonlethal,
nonmilitary equipment and assistance; and
some of the other nations have made contri-
butions of both soldiers and lethal equip-
ment.
We will continue to follow the situation
with great care and work with the parties in
trying to bring about an ultimate resolution,
which again I say I believe must be worked
out by the Africans themselves.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will you make any ef-
fort, when you meet Mr. Gromyko in
Geneva, to revitalize the MBFR [mutual
and balanced force reduction] talks; and
does that have a very high priority or not in
the Administration's foreign policy?
Secretary Vance: Yes, it does have a high
priority. You know, I discussed the MBFR
situation with the Soviets when we were in
Moscow. And I subsequently have discussed
it with a number of the heads of state whom
I visited on my trip back from Moscow.
In addition, there are discussions going on
with respect to MBFR in the NATO con-
text, which is the negotiating context,
insofar as the West is concerned, for MBFR.
Any decisions that have to be taken there
must be alliance decisions taken among the
NATO alliance members. There are subjects
under discussion at this point, and we would
continue in the United States to press to see
that progress is made in this area, because
we believe this whole question of the central
balance — or the balance in the central part
of Europe — is of great importance and one
where we have to make progress.
Situation in Horn of Africa
Q. What is your assessment of U.S. rela-
tions in eastern Africa, and are you con-
cerned about the Communist influence
there, particularly in the Horn?
Secretary Vance: We have been following
the situation in the Horn with great care.
We have done a study and have completed
our study within the government on the
problems of the Horn of Africa. Recently,
the situation has become more tense as a re-
sult of a number of activities.
As you all know, the Ethiopians have
asked us to withdraw a number of our
people and from a number of facilities,
which we have done. We had previously in-
dicated to the Ethiopians that we had
already decided that we were going to close
down our communications facility in As-
mara and, at the same time, to reduce our
military assistance mission in Ethiopia.
We have kept in close touch with others in
the area, including the other countries in the
Horn of Africa, and with others who are in-
May 23, 1977
519
terested in the situation which is developing
in the Horn of Africa.
Everybody, of course, will be watching to
see what happens in the elections which will
be taking place in the Territory of Afars and
Issas, which is coming up very soon — that's
Djibouti — and we are prepared to send a
consul general there immediately after the
elections are held, should the decision be
that it's going to become independent at
that time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could we talk a little bit
about the European summit? We haven't
mentioned it yet. This is the first summit,
after all, of this Administration. What are
the expectations generally? And
specifically, do you feel that you will be able
to smooth over some of the differences that
have developed, particularly with West
Germany?
Secretary Vance: I think one of the main
benefits that we hope will come out of the
summit will be the opportunity for the heads
of state to establish a close working
relationship, a close personal working rela-
tionship, between each other; and this will
be possible not only in the full discussions
but in bilateral discussions that the heads of
state will be able to have between them.
Insofar as the substantive items are con-
cerned, as you know, the objective is to see
whether or not we can develop a common
perspective on the global economic situation
so that the individual countries can better
develop their domestic economic plans and
policies within the framework of a generally
agreed analysis, an evaluation, of the overall
global economic situation as we see it during
the next year or two.
Secondly, we would hope that there would
come out of it support for an augmentation
of the resources of the IMF [International
Monetary Fund].
Thirdly, we would hope that we would get
agreement with respect to a joint intent
among the parties to resist protectionist
pressures and to expand trade.
We would hope also that there would be a
general agreement with respect to the steps
which should be taken by all of us to im-
prove the global balance between energy
supply and demand, and we hope also that
we can reach agreement with respect to set-
ting up a follow-on study to evaluate the
fuel cycle. And this would permit one then
to see what the alternatives for the long run
may be in terms of the fuel cycle and how
one might proceed to try out these alterna-
tives, while at the same time assuring a
supply of fuel through international means
to all of the countries concerned.
And finally, we hope to reach agreement
on a common approach to the upcoming dis-
cussions which will take place in Paris at the
end of May — the North-South dialogue — and
as a result of that to more effectively help
the developing countries.
King Hussein of Jordan
Visits Washington
His Majesty King Hussein I of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an of-
ficial visit to Washington April 24-27, dur-
ing which he met with President Carter and
other government officials. Following is an
exchange of toasts between President Carter
and King Hussein at a dinner at the White
House on April 25, together with President
Carter's remarks to reporters following his
meeting with King Hussein at the White
House o)i April 26. '
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 2
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, APRIL 25
President Carter
The first thing I want to do tonight is to
welcome all of you to the White House to
join with me in expressing our appreciation
to a courageous man who's come to visit our
country again.
This is his silver jubilee year. He's been
in office now 25 years. And as I said this
1 For an exchange of remarks between President
Carter and King Hussein at a welcoming ceremony at
the White House on Apr. 25, see Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated May 2, 1977, p. 598.
520
Department of State Bulletin
morning when we had the welcoming-
ceremony, he has been here to visit fre-
quently; the first time, I believe, 18 years
ago.
On this trip he is going to be traveling
around the country. He is going down to one
of the better parts of our nation, Atlanta,
and then further south, a little too far south,
perhaps, to Orlando. He's going to bring his
young children over to join him and enjoy
our beautiful country.
For a number of years we've enjoyed his
friendship, and the close interrelationship
that has existed between Jordan and the
United States has been a great stabilizing
force in the Middle East. In spite of the dis-
harmonies that have existed there now for
29 years, there never has been a threat to
the close cooperation and communication and
friendship between Jordan and our country.
And we are very delighted to have tonight
the leader of that country come to see us.
We had a very fruitful discussion today
about past history — which I have just de-
scribed briefly — and the future. We
recognize the difficulty of resolving the his-
torical animosities that have existed in the
Middle Eastern region. But I think there is
almost a unanimous belief among the leaders
with whom I've discussed this subject that
1977 can be a propitious year for major
strides toward permanent peace.
We are blessed with a deep awareness of
the devastation of previous wars. There is a
widespread sense of waste and frustration in
spending so much of a country's resources
on weapons when economic progress and
better health care and education needs cry
out to be met. And when Secretary Vance
visited all the leaders in the Middle Eastern
region, a unanimous statement was: "We
wish that we could stop spending so much on
the weapons of war."
I think there is also a sense of hope in the
character of the leaders this year. We are
blessed with a sense of moderation and an
inclination toward peace.
And I think the last thing I'd like to men-
tion is that all of us feel that because of
these circumstances that an extraordinary
effort is worthwhile during 1977. And unless
we make some substantive progress toward
resolving the historical differences, it may
be a long time in the future before we can
mount such an effort again.
By the end of May, I will have met with
all the leaders of the countries involved and
will have listened to their thoughts, their
hopes, and their dreams and their plans for
peace.
I think there is a general sense that the
countries there trust our nation, at least
more than any other nation is trusted. And
it puts a tremendous responsibility on me
and the Vice President, the Secretary of
State, and others not to betray that trust,
to be fair and open and honest in our own
discussions with the leaders who have hon-
ored us by coming to our nation to visit.
I don't know whether or not we will be
successful this year. That's a very difficult
thing to predict. But I believe that one of
the great potential benefits that we can
observe and use is the courage and sound
judgment and experience and the seniority
and a sensitivity and, I think I can say accu-
rately, the unselfishness of King Hussein of
Jordan.
He's a natural leader. He's quiet-spoken
but firm. He's honest and courageous. He's
our friend, and he's a good adviser and
instructor for me, a new President, as I join
with many of you around this table in
searching for some opportunities to resolve
differences that have divided peace-loving
people too long.
So I'd like to propose a toast now to a
courageous King, to the people of Jordan, to
King Hussein. Welcome to our country, sir.
King Hussein
Mr. President, my dear friends: It's a
privilege and an honor for me to be here, to
have this wonderfulopportunity to meet
with you, sir, and to meet with friends once
again, to bring you the sincerest wishes of
the people of Jordan for every success not
only in leading the people of this great
nation, but in fulfilling the aspirations and
hopes of so many throughout the world.
I thank you, Mr. President, for the op-
portunity you gave me today to speak to you
frankly and to hear your views on many of
May 23, 1977
521
the problems that beset the part of the
world from which I come.
I can only say that despite the feeling that I
have had which has caused me to be cau-
tious in regard to the possibilities of real,
genuine progress toward a solution to the
Middle East problems, I have, as a result of
meeting you, sir, and our friends today, felt
more encouraged and more hopeful than I
have for a very long time.
To me, sir, humility is one of the most
important qualities in this world and in life
and one of the greatest signs of greatness.
Your humility, your genuine interests in
problems of others, your courage and your
vision, your desire to know the truth, are all
most encouraging to me and to those who
have come with me from Jordan.
I am sure this feeling is shared by others
who have had the privilege of meeting you,
and I am sure that many others will share
with us these feelings.
Twenty-five years have been short and
long at the same time. Whatever remains,
God willing, I will dedicate to one and one
objective only: to do all I can that the future
generations enjoy a better life than that
which they would have had to live.
My greatest hope and dream is to feel that
in some way I may, in what remains of life,
contribute toward a just, a lasting peace,
one which would enable all the people in our
area to divert their energies and resources
to build and attain a brighter future with
stability that is their right. I pledge to you,
sir, that I will do all that I can to work very
closely with you toward that end.
Our faith in you is great, our pride and
our friendship, and the pride in the fact that
the same ideals are upheld by us, the same
objectives are dear to us, and we share the
same hopes for a better future.
I wish you every success. I will pray for
you, and you can rest assured of our genuine
desire to do all we can for us to arrive at
our common objectives.
I thank you for your courtesy and your
kindness and the warmth of your feelings. I
treasure our friendship.
Gentlemen, I'd like you to join me in
drinking a toast to the President of the
United States.
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CARTER, APRIL 26
Q. How did it go, Mr. President?
The President: Just fine. It was one of the
most productive and enjoyable visits we
have had.
Q. Mr. President, could you clarify a
point? On the participation of the
Palestinians and the possible participation
in a Jordanian delegation, do you mean
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]
representatives or Palestinians who are not
part of the PLO?
The President: Well, it's too early to start
spelling out specifics about that. The one
thing I might add, on which all the leaders
seem to agree, is that the more agreement
that we can reach before going to Geneva,
the less argument there is going to be about
the form of the Palestinian representation.
And I think unless we see some strong
possibility for substantial achievements be-
fore a Geneva conference can be convened,
unless we see that prospect, then I think it
would be better not to have the Geneva con-
ference at all.
So far, though, I have been encouraged. I
think it would be a mistake to expect too
much. The differences are very wide and
longstanding and deep. But I found a strong
desire among all the leaders with whom I
met so far to marshal extraordinary efforts
during this year because of the moderate
leadership that exists in the Middle East
and because of the experiences that have
been so devastating in the past. So we
are all determined to do the best we can
in 77.
I think that the exact composition of the
delegations, involving the Palestinians, of
course, and the interrelationships that exist
among the Arab nations — whether part of
the discussions would be done as a group
and part of them on a bilateral basis, those
kinds of things have to be worked out.
After I've finished meeting all the leaders
in May, a strong likelihood is that we would
consolidate our own analysis of the remain-
ing problems and possible answers to
questions, and then Secretary Vance would
go back to the Middle East for another com-
522
Department of State Bulletin
plete round of talks with the leaders in-
volved.
Those are our present plans, and so far
the leaders in the Middle East have agreed
with that.
Q. May I follow that up, Mr. President!'
The President: I think that is probably
about all I need to say.
Q. But you do see)» more pessimistic than
before Hussein came.
The President: No, I am not more pes-
simistic. I think it would just be a mistake
for us to be overly optimistic. To raise ex-
pectations too high would be — I think would
be potentially very damaging. I think after
May, though, we'll have a much clearer con-
cept of what can be done.
Q. Did you learn anything new from
Hussein?
The President: Yes, I did. He is a very
good instructor, and I am a very eager stu-
dent.
U.S., France Hold Annual Meeting
of Cooperative Science Program
Joint Statement
Press release 203 dated May 5
The Annual Review Meeting of the U.S.-
France Cooperative Science Program was
held in Washington, D.C., May 2, 1977. The
purpose of the meeting was to underline the
accomplishments of the ongoing bilateral
programs in science and technology as well
as to explore possibilities for expansion of
the program in areas of mutual interest to
both countries.
Dr. Edward E. David, former Presidential
Science Adviser, and U.S. Coordinator of
the U.S. -France Cooperative Science
Program, headed the U.S. delegation. The
French Coordinators, Professor Bernard
Gregory, Director of the General Delegation
for Scientific and Technological Research
(DGRST), and Xavier de Nazelle, Director
for Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, led the French delegation. They
were accompanied by Charles Maisonnier,
Counselor for Foreign Affairs, Science
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and
Philippe Peltier, Director, Division of
Foreign Relations, DGRST.
As a part of the review, reports on the
status of cooperative activities were given
by representatives from the Department of
Agriculture, the National Bureau of
Standards, National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, Energy Research
and Development Administration, Health,
Education and Welfare, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, National Science
Foundation, and the Department of Transpor-
tation.
In addition, meetings were held with Dr.
Frank Press, Presidential Science Adviser,
and Mrs. Patsy Mink, Assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans and International En-
vironmental and Scientific Affairs. Visits
were also made to the National Science
Foundation, National Bureau of Standards,
Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration, and the House of Representatives.
The delegations agreed to work toward
furthering cooperation between the two
countries in the fields of alternative energy
sources, energy conservation, toxicol-
ogy, and agricultural research and food
production.
The U.S. -France Program was established
in 1969 by agreement between the French
Minister for Industrial and Scientific De-
velopment and the President's Science Ad-
viser. Collaborative programs in such fields
as agriculture, oceanography, space,
environment, transportation, basic and
applied sciences, and health involve over 15
agencies of the United States Government.
May 23, 1977
523
THE CONGRESS
Administration Gives Views on Proposed Legislation
on Deep Seabed Mining
Following is a statement by Ambassador
at Large Elliot L. Richardson, Special Rep-
resentative of the President for the Lair of
the Sea Conference, made before the
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries o« April 27. i
Mr. Chairman [Representative John B.
Breaux]: I am very pleased to have this op-
portunity once again to address this commit-
tee. I welcome your interest and concern
regarding the Law of the Sea Conference,
the purpose of which is to insure the orderly
use and development of the oceans, which
contribute so much to our security and eco-
nomic, scientific, and environmental
well-being. An internationally agreed
framework which would accommodate the
many different national interests in the
oceans would, as this committee has many
times acknowledged, be of great benefit. It
is the purpose of the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, to which I head the U.S. delegation,
to achieve such an agreement.
At the same time, I recognize your con-
cern over the slow pace with which the
negotiations in the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence have progressed with regard to
providing a framework for mining of the
deep seabed which lies beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. In particular, I can
understand your concern, as evidenced in
H.R. 3350, that U.S. nationals who have
pioneered development of deep seabed tech-
nology may be held up in moving forward to
1 The complete transcript (if the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 2(1402.
prove the technology and then, hopefully, to
provide the world with additional sources of
the minerals concerned. Our job, the Con-
gress and the Administration together, is to
find a way in which this can best be done.
Since the question of legislation, and
therefore H.R. 3350, about which I will
comment in a moment, is intimately tied to
progress at the Law of the Sea Conference,
I would like first to outline briefly where I
think we are. I will not, before this knowl-
edgeable subcommittee, go into a lengthy
history of the negotiations but will comment
only on developments since the summer of
1976 session.
As you know, that session did not go well,
with the seabed proving to be the major
sticking point. Since the Carter Administra-
tion took office and I was privileged to be
named as the President's Special Represent-
ative for Law of the Sea, we have
undertaken an intensive review of our posi-
tions and the problems facing the confer-
ence. We have also conducted an extensive
series of bilateral and multilateral
consultations. These include the interses-
sional consultations under Minister Evensen
[Jens Evensen, of Norway, a Vice Chairman
of the Law of the Sea Conference] which
you, Mr. Chairman, attended and with re-
spect to which I briefed the full committee
March 17.
In addition, I have made an extensive trip
to the Far East, talking to leaders in Japan,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Austra-
lia. I have also visited Mexico and Canada
and will this evening depart for a series of
discussions in France, Saudi Arabia, India,
the U.S.S.R., Norway, and the United
Kingdom. Richard Darman and J. T. Smith,
524
Department of State Bulletin
my deputies, have also traveled widely,
going first to Africa, where they visited
Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, Kenya,
and Egypt, and Latin America, where they
visited Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and
Brazil.
I will not tell you that as a result we "see
light at the end of the tunnel." But I can say
that we believe we can see the outline of a
solution which could accommodate the di-
verse interests of conference participants.
Whether or not we can strike a bargain
along these or other lines is impossible now
to predict and will depend in large measure
on factors over which we have no control
and limited influence. Paramount among
these will be group dynamics within the
Group of 77, which, as you know, is the
developing-country caucus at the confer-
ence.
But I am encouraged, Mr. Chairman, by
what I have seen to date, and I hope to be
able to return to this subcommittee and
other congressional bodies and announce
substantial progress toward a com-
prehensive treaty covering the whole
range of outstanding oceans issues. Such a
treaty — establishing an ordered, agreed re-
gime for 70 percent of the surface of the
globe — would be a truly historic accom-
plishment. It would prove by its very exist-
ence that the nations of the world could in
fact come together and in a spirit of mutual
accommodation overcome their differences
for the benefit of mankind.
Mr. Chairman, the United States seeks a
number of important objectives at the Law
of the Sea Conference. We seek to:
— Provide a framework of law within
which competing oceans uses can be accom-
modated;
— Preserve high seas freedoms, including
navigation and similar uses, in the 200-mile
economic zone;
— Insure unimpeded passage through and
over straits;
— Maintain maximum freedom of scientific-
research;
— Provide a framework for protecting the
marine environment;
— Establish a comprehensive dispute-
settlement mechanism; and
— Establish a regime for mining the deep
seabed.
Mr. Chairman, it is because of the impor-
tance of all of these objectives, particularly
our security and international objectives,
that we reaffirm our intention to seek
agreement on a comprehensive treaty which
protects our interests. As I have indicated,
I believe this is a realistic objective. We do
not, therefore, support legislation now. Pas-
sage of legislation now, or indeed even Ad-
ministration support for legislation, could
disrupt the May-July conference session and
jeopardize the prospect for progress at that
session. We will be reviewing the overall
question of our position on the enactment of
legislation once again after that session.
On the other hand, we must recognize
that international agreement may not be ob-
tained in the near future, in which event the
United States must consider legislation. It
is in that spirit that I offer the Administra-
tion's preliminary views on the substantive
provisions of H.R. 3350.
H.R. 3350 or any other legislation must be
judged with respect to its probable effect on
the conference as well as its intrinsic merits
as a vehicle to permit U.S. companies and
U.S. -led consortia to mine the seabed. I
believe Secretary [of Commerce Juanita M.]
Kreps and others will be testifying in detail
on the substance of seabed legislation, so I
shall confine myself to a brief summary at
this point.
We believe there are certain basic ele-
ments which should be provided for in any
legislation. Many of these elements are
present in H.R. 3350:
— It is interim; that is, it would be super-
seded by a comprehensive treaty;
— Implicitly, it reaffirms our legal position
that mining the deep seabed beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction is a high seas
freedom;
— It provides that U.S. operators must
pay reasonable regard to other marine ac-
tivities;
May 23, 1977
525
— It provides for environmental and safety
protection;
— It provides for duty-free entry of hard
minerals recovered from the deep seabed;
and
— It provides for harmonizing these
requirements with those of other nations
enacting similar legislation.
The Administration also agrees with the
concept embodied in H.R. 3350 that
legislation, when enacted, should cover both
prototype and commercial mining opera-
tions. It appears that in the next year or
two the mining consortia will be committing
major sums to pilot programs in anticipation
of commercial operations. In order to make
these commitments, the companies must
know, at least generally, what legal frame-
work will govern their future operations.
We believe, however, that authorizing the
administering agency to issue at the outset
the necessary rules and regulations to per-
mit the companies to proceed with exploita-
tion, as opposed to exploration, is prema-
ture. Industry will not need to move
forward with actual exploitation until the
early eighties. This approach will provide
regulations for exploration and a degree of
certainty to permit companies to move
forward toward exploitation without forcing
the administering agency to promulgate
exploitation regulations without an adequate
data base. We thus believe it would be
preferable to defer issuance of exploitation
regulations.
H.R. 3350 provides that any license shall
be exclusive as against any person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States or of
any reciprocating state within a specified
block. We believe there is an alternative ap-
proach which would better serve our foreign
policy, economic, and national security
interests and still give the sort of assurance
required by the miners and their banks.
Permits to mine could be issued without
regard to any specific mining site or block.
But the legislation could provide that in
regulating deep seabed mining the adminis-
tering agency would set out specific criteria
under which authorization to mine would be
issued in accordance with sound resource-
management and environmental principles.
Under such an approach, prior to
receiving a permit to mine — which would not
be tied to a particular area — the applicant
would be required to submit a plan of work
which would include a description of the
area to be mined. The permit, when issued,
would limit the applicant's activities to the
plan of work. Thus the legislation would not
grant exclusive rights; yet it would at the
same time be likely that the administering
agency would, in applying sound resource-
management and environmental principles,
avoid conflicting mining operations, should
the problem arise. Thus we believe that this
system would reasonably accommodate the
needs of the miners and their creditors and
avoid the appearance of carving up the
common heritage of mankind.
On another issue, Mr. Chairman, the Ad-
ministration shares with you and the other
drafters of H.R. 3350 the desire to protect
companies which begin mining operations
prior to the entry into force of a comprehen-
sive law of the sea treaty against any ad-
verse effects of such a treaty. We would
approach the problem somewhat differently,
however.
H.R. 3350 provides for compensation by
the U.S. Government for any loss suffered
in commercial operations as a result of the
entry into force of a treaty. We believe this
provision is unnecessary, potentially expen-
sive (up to $2 billion in 1975 dollars), and
potentially harmful to the negotiations. I be-
lieve, in the interest of obtaining a treaty
that protects our varied interests, our
negotiators must have the flexibility to
choose among a wide number of approaches
that would, in different ways, protect our
interests. Legislation providing for a U.S.
Government obligation to compensate for
any losses caused by a treaty could force our
negotiators to assure that the treaty would
conform to U.S. legislation.
The alternative favored by the
Administration would be to reaffirm that
U.S. miners now have the right to mine the
deep seabed under high seas principles and
526
Department of State Bulletin
therefore reaffirm our intention to seek
provisions in the treaty which will insure
that the integrity of prior investments in
commercial mining operations will be pro-
tected. Specifically, we will seek special
grandfather protection for investments al-
ready made. While difficult, I believe this is
reasonable and can be done if we stress that
it is investment and preparation for mining
an area — rather than a specific claim — for
which protection is sought.
Mr. Chairman, the Administration also
shares your concern that the benefits of
deep seabed mining accrue to the United
States to the maximum extent possible.
However, H.R. 3350 approaches this prob-
lem by providing that licenses will only be
issued if the minerals recovered, to the ex-
tent of the proportionate interest therein of
all U.S. entities, are processed in the
United States. The Administration considers
this provision unnecessary since, initially at
least, it is likely that our share, and proba-
bly more, of the processing will take place in
the United States anyway. More
importantly, however, we consider such a
provision to be potentially harmful since it
will certainly irritate foreign countries
whose nationals are participating in U.S. -led
mining consortia. We believe, therefore,
that the provision should simply be dropped.
We are still studying the question of
whether a requirement should be provided
regarding use of U.S. -flag and/or U.S. -built
vessels.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to in-
dicate the Administration's interest in
having U.S. legislation provide for benefits
for the international community. Such provi-
sions would emphasize by our action, not
only our words, that we are fully committed
to the concept of the common heritage of
mankind. It would also anticipate any future
treaty, which will surely provide for certain
international benefits. Such provisions could
help mitigate any adverse international con-
sequences by providing some inducement to
developing countries to agree to a treaty.
Benefits to the international community
could take a variety of forms. An escrow ar-
rangement could be established for collect-
ing moneys for the benefit of developing
countries. Mine sites, or portions of sites,
could be reserved for the future use of the
world community, or there could be provi-
sions for the training of nationals of develop-
ing countries. It is not necessary to decide
now just what form such benefits should
take. As the time for enactment of legisla-
tion draws nearer, there will be time to
work out specific proposals. But I believe it
would be useful to agree to the principle
from the outset.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by
emphasizing the importance I attach to the
closest cooperation between our negotiators
and the Congress. Since I became the Presi-
dent's Special Representative two months
ago I have appeared five times before
congressional committees and have had in-
numerable private contacts. Members of my
staff are in virtually daily contact with the
staffs of various Members of Congress.
Some of you and members of your staff par-
ticipated in the deliberations of the Adviso-
ry Committee earlier today and yesterday.
You, Mr. Chairman, took the time to come
to our meeting in Geneva and will, I trust,
with others of your colleagues, be with us in
New York.
I consider this ongoing exchange
absolutely essential to the success of my
mandate — to negotiate a comprehensive
treaty on the law of the sea which will protect
and further not only our own interests but the
interests of all mankind. For, while there are
some interests in conflict at the conference, all
participants share a common interest in pro-
viding a rational regime for all uses of the
oceans.
A phrase President Kennedy was fond of
using is particularly apt here: "A rising tide
lifts all the boats." Our task, that of the
Administration and the Congress, working
together and with the leadership of the rest
of the world, is to provide a framework to
insure that the oceans will be managed to
provide an ever-rising tide — hopefully, un-
disturbed by conflicts — of benefits for all our
people.
Moy 23, 1977
527
Department Discusses Proposal
for Zimbabwe Development Fund
Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '
I am delighted to testify today before the
Senate Subcommittees on African Affairs
and on Foreign Assistance in support of the
President's request for funds to support the
search for a peaceful resolution to the
Rhodesian problem.
This is a momentous occasion, one which
is underlined by the gravity of the situation
in Rhodesia. Today the balance is delicately
poised between the forces of violence and
those seeking to demonstrate that mankind
has the capacity to bind up its wounds and
to live together in peace and harmony. Only
too rarely do we have the opportunity to
move the forces of history into paths that
demonstrate that men of all races and
political persuasions can share common goals
of human growth and friendly association.
This occasion and this opportunity exists to-
day.
Gentlemen, I do not wish to minimize the
complexities of the Rhodesian problem. Nor
do I intend to minimize the many forces and
difficult obstacles that must be overcome if
we are to produce the type of multiracial so-
lution that will bring peace to southern Af-
rica. As one who has been intimately in-
volved in the search for peace for the past
year or more, I can testify amply to that.
However, I also must point out the conse-
quences that will follow if the United States
proves unwilling to make its resources
available to the processes of peaceful change
and economic growth in Rhodesia.
This Administration has made clear that it
strongly supports the protection and
1 Made before the Subcommittees on African Affairs
and Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on Apr. 28. The complete transcript
of the hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402.
enhancement of basic human rights through-
out the world. We are convinced that this
principle must find expression in our foreign
policy, including our foreign assistance, as
current legislation indeed requires. We have
already announced reductions, related to
human rights, in assistance to three coun-
tries. It behooves us, I firmly believe, to
provide economic assistance where such as-
sistance can tilt the balance in favor of
human rights. Such is the case in Rhodesia,
and much of Africa is watching to see if we
have the capacity and the will to promote
peaceful change in what could become one of
the most turbulent regions of the world.
With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I
will review the current status of the Rhode-
sian crisis. As the Senators know, violence
has been spreading in that territory since its
white minority declared, illegally, its
independence from British rule in 1965. This
action earned the Smith government the
condemnation of the international communi-
ty, and the United Nations, for its part,
called for sanctions against this illegal re-
gime. Three successive Administrations
have endorsed actions taken by the interna-
tional community to end the illegal status of
the breakaway regime. In April 1976, with
bipartisan support from the Congress, we
visited southern Africa and launched a cam-
paign to bring the principals involved in the
Rhodesian dispute to the conference table.
Despite the setback at Geneva, we remain
committed to the search for a peaceful set-
tlement. We will redouble our efforts
toward that goal. We are prepared to bring
to bear the influence and prestige of the
United States in an attempt to foster a suc-
cessful outcome of a second Rhodesia
conference which the British Government
has suggested convening. We are, if called
upon to do so by the principal participants,
willing to cosponsor the conference and
act as an honest broker during its delibera-
tions.
We are aware that the price of failure to
negotiate a settlement will continue to be
paid by the people of Rhodesia and its
neighboring states in the currency of human
528
Department of State Bulletin
suffering. Further, continued violence will
| spread instability and promote the possibil-
ity of foreign intervention in the region.
Such a denouement would throw into doubt
prospects for accommodation between
peoples of different races in Africa and could
compromise efforts to establish confidence in
relations between our government and that
of the Soviet Union.
We are consulting closely with British
Foreign Secretary David Owen, who has
recently returned from his mission to south-
ern Africa. The Foreign Secretary reports
that he was encouraged in his efforts to rec-
oncile competing and conflicting forces in
Rhodesia. His starting point has been the
acceptance by Prime Minister Smith, in Sep-
tember 1976, of the goal of majority rule for
Africans within two years. Mr. Owen's
principal objectives at this point are to es-
tablish agreement that majority rule will
come in 1978 and, through the proposed con-
ference, to prepare a constitution which
protects basic human rights and defines a
democratic process for the transition to in-
dependence. We hope that an independent
Zimbabwe will be multiracial, will reflect a
commitment to political and economic
growth, and will demonstrate that modera-
tion offers greater hope for the future than
the forces of division and violence.
In order to insure that the journey of
Rhodesia to political stability and independ-
ence has a reasonable prospect of success,
the United States, in concert with the
United Kingdom, has agreed to establish a
special economic consortium — the Zimbabwe
Development Fund. I cannot stress too
strongly the essential element of trust which
is embodied in the Fund. It represents an
unprecedented international economic com-
mitment in support of a Rhodesian settle-
ment.
I wish to assure you at this juncture that
the Fund is not a buy-out for whites who
wish to leave Rhodesia. The central focus on
the Fund is on economic and social
development. Congressional support for the
Fund would demonstrate to Africans and po-
tential donors that the United States can be
counted on to cooperate in a constructive
manner in working for peaceful change in
southern Africa. The Fund would encourage
blacks and whites to work together for the
future development of Zimbabwe and thus
demonstrate that multiracialism is a viable
option in southern Africa. I have no doubt
that the Fund may well be an important fac-
tor in the negotiating process and will
contribute to promoting peace and progress
in southern Africa.
As to the nature of the Fund itself, our
expectation is that we would be in a position
to utilize it to insure a constructive transi-
tion during the initial period of majority
rule. The Fund would respond to requests
from the Zimbabwe Government to support
specific development projects and programs.
We envisage, for example, substantial as-
sistance requirements in agricultural and
land reform, education and training, social
and economic infrastructure. In brief, the
Fund would represent an investment in
Zimbabwe's human resources and a contri-
bution to its future development.
I recognize that you would like to have
full particulars on the nature and scope of
specific projects to be financed by the Fund.
At present, we can only provide the broad
outlines of the kind of projects which may be
proposed by the new government. We know
that the rural sector will require greatly ex-
panded agricultural extension services for
Africans, road construction, land reform,
and resettlement for large numbers of Afri-
cans. Large investments will also have to be
made in training Africans to assume
positions as managers, educators, planners,
and directors of the many activities which
independence bestows upon a hard-pressed
people. In the fields of trade, finance, and
development, large-scale support also will
be required. Beyond these generalized
guidelines, we will have to learn as we pro-
ceed. However, I can assure you that we
plan to keep the Congress fully apprised of
the projects and programs supported by the
Fund.
The anatomy and financial underpinnings
of the Fund are not as difficult to define.
May 23, 1977
529
Last December, the U.S. Government and
the United Kingdom approached 18 nations
to support a Zimbabwe economic program.
Support is to be provided along the follow-
ing lines:
— Initial contributions of a minimum on
the order of $1 billion and, at a maximum,
approximately $U/2 billion.
— The United States would contribute 40
percent, or up to a maximum of $520 million.
— It is envisaged that contributions to the
Fund would be over a five-year period.
— Flows of bilateral concessional aid could
be counted as part of each nation's contribu-
tion, but for the five-year period we assume
that the majority of each contributor's as-
sistance would be a direct contribution to
the Fund.
Thus far, initial responses to our appeal
for support have been encouraging. If
adequate progress is made in the political
sphere, we would plan to organize a donors'
conference. The purposes of such a
conference would be to formalize pledges
and to draft articles of agreement for the
Fund.
I wish to point out, gentlemen, that our
own position has been put forth subject to
the approval of Congress. Accordingly,
favorable action by the Senate and the
House of Representatives will make it
possible to proceed with our plans for the
Fund.
Clearly, failure on the part of Congress to
extend its support would be a serious
setback to the Administration's efforts to
work for a peaceful settlement of the
Rhodesian problem. I firmly believe that we
are at a critical turning point in our effort to
restart the negotiating process and that a
strong signal from the Congress is essential
now. Without rapid progress toward settle-
ment, we confront the prospect of chaos in
southern Africa. Soviet President Podgor-
ny's recent visit to the region and his
pledges of arms aid are ample testimony to
his government's commitment to a violent
outcome. We now require a constructive
alternative — one which the Congress of the
United States can make credible in the test-
ing weeks and months ahead.
Gentlemen, we urge and welcome your
support as we pursue the path of peace in
southern Africa. With it we can accomplish
much; without it, constructive action would
be difficult, if not impossible.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Multinational Oil Companies and OPEC: Implications
for U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Energy of the Joint Economic Committee. June
2-8, 1976. 337 pp.
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion From Ships, With Annexes and Protocols. Mes-
sage from the President of the United States trans-
mitting the convention. S. Ex. E. March 22, 1977.
108 pp.
United States Military Installations and Objectives in
the Mediterranean. Report prepared for the Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Committee on International Relations by the
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
March 27, 1977. 95 pp.
Urging the Canadian Government To Reassess Its Pol-
icy of Permitting the Killing of Newborn Baby Harp
Seals. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations to accompany H. Con. Res. 142. S. Rept.
95-71. March 29, 1977. 10 pp.
NATO Standardization: Political, Economic, and Mili-
tary Issues for Congress. Report to the House
Committee on International Relations by the
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
March 29, 1977. 58 pp.
Protocol With Canada To Amend the Convention for
the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the
Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River
System, as Amended. Message from the President of
the United States transmitting the protocol, signed
at Washington on February 24, 1977. S. Ex. G.
March 31, 1977. 4 pp.
International Financial Institutions. Report of the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, together with minority, supplemental, addi-
tional, and separate views, to accompany H.R. 5262.
H. Rept. 95-154. March 31, 1977. 67 pp.'
Report on the Activities of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 94th Congress, First and Second
Sessions. S. Rept. 95-85. April 5, 1977. 77 pp.
Export Administration Amendments of 1977. Report of
the House Committee on International Relations, to-
gether with additional views, to accompany H.R.
5840. H. Rept. 95-190. April 6, 1977. 58 pp.
530
Department of State Bulletin
United States-Canadian Reciprocal Fisheries Agree-
ment. Report of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, together with dissenting
views, to accompany H.R. 5638. H. Rept. 95-193.
April 7, 1977. 26 pp.
Supplemental State Department Authorization for Fis-
cal Year 1977. Report of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations to accompany H.R. 5040. S. Rept.
95-99. April 21, 1977. 13 pp.
Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of
1977. Report of the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations to accompany H.R. 6179. H. Rept.
95-219. April 25, 1977. 17 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (1FAD). Done at Rome
June 13, 1976. '
Signatures: Iran, April 27, 1977: Ireland, Israel,
April 28, 1977.
Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10,
1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United
States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Extended by the United Kingdom to: Hong Kong, ef-
fective April 21, 1977.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April
4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Seychelles, April 25, 1977.
Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the
convention on international civil aviation, Chicago,
1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires
September 24, 1968. Entered into force October 24,
1968. TIAS 6605.
Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, May 3, 1977.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3. 1975. Entered into
force provisionally October 1, 1976.
Extended by the United Kingdom to: Bailiwick of
Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey, January
21, 1977."
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19,
1967; for the United States December 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Tanzania, April IN, 1977.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 62X5, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.
Enters n/to force: April 1, 197s.
Narcotic Drugs
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. En-
tered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Accession deposited: Mexico, April 27, 1977.
War
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condi-
tion of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the
field;
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condi-
tion of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members
of armed forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prison-
ers of war;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.
Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2,
1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, December 10, 1976.
Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17,
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect
to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect
to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, May 3, 1977.
BILATERAL
Cuba
Convention for the prevention of smuggling intoxicat-
ing liquors into the United States, and exchange of
notes. Signed at Havana March 4, 1926. Entered into
force June 18, 1926. 44 Stat. 2395.
On April 27, 1977, the parties agreed that the con-
vention had lapsed.
Japan
Agreement extending the agreement of May 2, 1975,
as extended (TIAS 8088, 8399), concerning an inter-
national observer scheme for whaling operations
from land stations in the North Pacific Ocean. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 27, 1977.
Entered into force April 27, 1977.
Not in force.
May 23, 1977
531
PUBLICATIONS
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stork number
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. A 25-
percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more
iiipiis of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent oj
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be-
low, which include domestic postage, <ice subject to
change.
Long Range Aid to Navigation (Loran) Station at
Keflavik, Iceland. Arrangement with Iceland. TIAS
8429. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8429).
Mutual Defense Assistance — Cash Contribution by
Japan. Agreement with Japan relating to the agree-
ment of March 8, 1954. TIAS 8431. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8431).
Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with the
World Meteorological Organization. TIAS 8437. 3 pp.
350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8437).
Air Transport Services. Agreement with Venezuela
amending the agreement of August 14, 1953, as
amended.' TIAS 8433. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8433).
Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation
Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
Agreement with Other Governments amending the
agreement done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as
amended. TIAS 8434. 1 p. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8434).
Trade, Investment and Financial Matters. Joint
communique with Brazil. TIAS 8435. 4 pp. 350. (Cat.
No. S9.10:8435).
Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment. TIAS 8436. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8436).
Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with
the Universal Postal Union. TIAS 8438. 2 pp. 350.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8438).
Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with
the World Intellectual Property Organization. TIAS
8439. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8439).
Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Civil
Glider Aircraft. Agreement with the Socialist Repub-
lic of Romania. TIAS 8440. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8440).
Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Socialist
Republic of Romania extending the agreement of De-
cember 4, 1973. TIAS 8441. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8441).
Trade — Specialty Steel Imports. Agreement with
Japan. TIAS 8442*. 28 pp. 450. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8442).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel
amending the agreement of September 30, 1976, as
amended. TIAS 8443. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8443).
Claims of United States Nationals. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 8446. 17 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8446).
Visas for Correspondents. Agreement with the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8448. 3 pp. 350.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8448).
Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Aircraft to Curb Il-
legal Production and Traffic. Agreement with
Mexico. TIAS 8449. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8449).
Narcotic Drugs — Additional Cooperative Arrange-
ments to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agreement with
Mexico amending the agreements of August 9, 1976
and February 4, 1976, as amended. TIAS 8451. 6 pp.
350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8451).
Social Security. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8452.
5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8452).
532
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX May 23, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1978
Africa. Questions and Answers Following Secre-
tary Vance's Address at the University of Geor-
gia School of Law (Vance) 509
Arms Control and Disarmament
Questions and Answers Following Secretary
Vance's Address at the University of Georgia
School of Law (Vance ) .' 509
Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4 ... 513
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks To Resume at
Geneva (joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement) 512
China. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
May 4 513
Congress
Administration Gives Views on Proposed Legisla-
tion on Deep Seabed Mining (Richardson i 524
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Pol-
icy 530
rtment Discusses Proposal for Zimbabwe De-
velopment Fund (Schaufele) 528
Culm. Secretary Vance'- News Conference
May 4 513
Ethiopia. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
May 4 513
Europe. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
May 4 '.
Foreign Aid
Department Discusses Proposal for Zimbabwe De-
velopment Fund (Schaufele) 52!S
Questions and Answers Following Secrel
Vance's Address at the University of Georgia
School of Law (Vance ) .' 509
France. U.S., France Hold Annual Meeting of Co-
operative Science Program (joint statement) . . . 523
Human Rights
Human Rights and Foreign Policy (Vance) 505
Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4 ... 513
Jordan. King Hussein of ..Ionian Visits Washington
(Carter, Hussein) 520
Law of the Sea. Administration Gives Views on
Proposed Legislation on Deep Seabed Mining
(Richardson i 524
Middle East. Secretary Vance's News Conference
of May 4 .' 513
Presidential Documents. King Hussein of Jordan
Visits Washington 520
Publications. GPO Sales Publications 532
Science and Technology. U.S., France Hold An-
nual Meeting of Cooperative Science Program
(joint statement) 523
South Africa. Secretary Vance's News Confer-
ence of May 4 .' 513
Southern Rhodesia
Department Discusses Proposal for Zimbabwe De-
velopment Fund (Schaufele) 528
Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4 ... 513
Treaty Information. Current Actions 531
U.S.S.R.
tary Vance's News Conference of May 4 ...
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks To Resume at
Geneva (joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement) 512
Vietnam
Questions and Answers Following Secretary
Vance's Address at the University of Georgia
School of Law (Vance) 509
Secretary Vance's News Conference of May I ... 513
Zaire. Secretary Vance's News C
May I 513
Name In
Carter, President 520
King Hussein I 520
Richardson, Elliot L
Schaufele, William E., Jr 528
Vance, Secretary 505, 500, 513
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: May 2-8
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State. Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
194A 5/3 Vance: questions and answers follow-
ing address at University of Geor-
gia, Apr. 30.
105 5/2 Overseas Schools Advisory Council,
New York, June 1.
MOO 5/2 Advisory Committee on International
Intellectual Property, June 1.
*197 5/2 Samuel W. Lewis sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Israel (biographic data).
ION 5/3 Robert F. Goheen sworn in as Ambas-
sador to India (biographic data).
5/4 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
U.S. National Committee for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution,
June 14.
200 5/4 Six foreign officials begin 30-day
study of local government and
community leadership in U.S.
+ 201 5/4 Vance: House Ad Hoc Committee on
Energy.
202 5/4 Vance: news conference.
203 5/5 Meeting of U.S. -France Cooperative
Science Program, May 2.
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
us. government printing office
washington, dc. 20402
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\ 3
76,
/?7?
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1979 • May 30, 1977
INTERVIEWS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER
European Newspaper Journalists 533
European Television Journalists 540
DEPARTMENT TESTIFIES ON NONPROLIFERATION
AND NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES
Statement by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 558
A NEW UNITY AND A NEW HOPE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE:
ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH SOCIAL JUSTICE
Statement by Ambassador Young 567
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1979
May 30, 1977
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President Carter Interviewed by European Newspaper Journalists
Following is the transcript of an interview
with President Carter by Fred Emery of the
Times, London, Henri Pierre of Le Monde,
Paris, H or st- Alexander Siebert of Die Welt,
Bonn, and Vittorio Zucconi of La Stampa,
Turin, held in the White House on April 25.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 9
Mr. Emery: We tried to have a European
unity parley here to get organized with ques-
tions and order of sitting. It has proved im-
possible. We are not going to unite.
[Laughter.}
The President: We will make it informal. I
am glad to have you here. I am looking for-
ward to meeting with the leaders of your
own countries when we go to Europe. I will
defer to your questions.
Mr. Emery: As I say, we have tried to
prepare some things. Mr. President, you
know that quite a few people in Europe are
puzzled and some are refreshed by the way
you are going about governing . How do you
describe your first hundred days in office?
The President: I have been pleased so far
at the response of the American people to
our Administration. I think we have at-
tempted to address some very difficult
questions which in the past have been either
ignored or delayed.
Last week I spent presenting our energy
proposals to the American people. We have
evolved and laid before the Soviet Govern-
ment a comprehensive reduction proposal in
nuclear armaments. We have begun to re-
duce the effort to sell conventional arms
around the world. We have spelled out a
strong position, which has not been unani-
mously accepted well, on nonproliferation of
nuclear explosive capability.
I have, I think, accurately mirrored the
American people's beliefs on public espousal
of human rights. We have begun to reor-
ganize our own nation's government and to
commence proposals which will ultimately
transform our welfare system and our in-
come tax structure. I have made some —
sometimes controversial — decisions to
prevent the raising of trade barriers and
have had an almost unprecedented stream of
distinguished visitors here from other coun-
tries. This past week, four foreign leaders
came to see me.
So in all of these areas I think we have
been fairly successful, either in beginning
efforts or in some few accomplishments at
this early time. The relationship between
myself and the American people is very
good now.
Mr. Emery: May I interrupt to say —
The President: Please.
Mr. Emery: How about your relations
with Congress —
The President: That was the other clause
in my sentence.
Mr. Emery: — the business community
and the unions?
The President: I think the relationship
with Congress has been steadily improving
as we have gotten to know one another. The
first time I was ever in the House of Repre-
sentatives was Wednesday night when I
made my speech. I had never visited there
before. But I believe that within the Demo-
cratic leadership now, there is a growing
sense of mutual understanding and trust and
consultation that has gotten to be a habit —
and a good one.
I think the business community has begun
to recognize that my own background as a
businessman will help to color the decisions
May 30, 1977
533
that I make about economics, and I think
that I have a fairly good relationship with
labor, as well.
So in general, as a completely unbiased
observer, I have been pleased. [Laughter.]
We have got a long way to go. I have a lot
to learn. And we are studying how to
restore normal relationships with govern-
ments where those relations have been
strained in the past. We are exploring some
possibilities for the resolution of the historic
conflict in the Middle East. We are trying to
work closely with Great Britain's leaders in
describing a proper role for us in southern
Africa. And I think we have got a possibility
at the meetings in London to more strongly
establish my personal friendship and under-
standing with the European leaders as well.
So I feel good about the Administration so
far.
Mr. Pierre: Ca7i I ask you a general ques-
tion about Europe? Since you took office, we
have the feeling in Europe that the
relationship between the United States and
Europe are now getting the same priority as
the American-Soviet relationship. What is
your general approach regarding Europe
and, more precisely, regarding the Euro-
pean Community? Some of your predeces-
sors, we feel, seemed to fear that a united
Europe, if it comes to be, might be a
competitor, might be going against the polit-
ical and economic American interests. Do
you share those fears?
The President: No. I think within 100
hours of my becoming President, the Vice
President had begun consultations with the
leaders of many nations in Europe. I have
already met with Prime Minister Callaghan
[James Callaghan, of the United Kingdom],
with the leaders of Portugal, with the Euro-
pean Community, NATO. I will meet with
the other leaders within the next two
weeks. And this will likely be the only trip I
shall take outside our country this year. I
have no other plans at this time.
I think all these items describe my deep
concern about good relationships with
Europe. I see no way that we can have a
successful resolution of East-West problems
without the full comprehension, un-
derstanding, participation with our allies
and friends in Europe.
We have, in addition to that, demon-
strated, I think, in my own budget proposals
to the Congress, an increasing emphasis on
military capability within NATO. And I in-
tend to stay over after the conference with
the heads of state, to meet with the NATO
leaders as well.
The people of our country, regardless of
who happens to be President, have a natural
sense that our historical ties and our future
are intimately related with the European
countries.
The other part of your question is that I
strongly favor, perhaps more than my
predecessors, a close interrelationship
among the nations of Europe, the European
Community, in particular.
We have a legitimate reticence about
trying to interfere, but I will do everything
I can within the bounds of propriety to
strengthen those natural ties — economically,
politically, militarily — that do exist now
among the countries of Europe and to
strengthen them in the future. And when
the nations involved consider it appropriate,
I would certainly welcome the absorption
within the European Community of Portugal
and Spain.
So I think that already I have both come
to realize and also have begun to act on the
premise of a strong Europe as essential to
our own good future and have recognized
the importance of the bilateral relationships
with the nations involved.
Mr. Zucconi: Mr. President, about
NATO, do you think that NATO is still a
viable alliance as it is now after 30 years of
existence, and do you foresee or wish any
change? Do you think the Europeans should
do more in their own defense? You might
share your thoughts on NATO with us.
The President: Yes. I think the NATO
military alliance is a cornerstone of our own
national security. I think the degree of
cooperation that has evolved from NATO
since its inception has helped to tie our
nations together in political and economic
534
Department of State Bulletin
and social ways. So the military alliance has
been a core around which our good progress
has been enhanced.
I have been concerned about the need for
a more fair sharing of military supplies and
weapons among the countries involved. It
ought to be a two-way street, and to the
extent that we can have common under-
standings about standardizing weapons sys-
tems, I believe that we will increase the
portion that does come from the European
suppliers.
I would hope that within the next 12
months, that the other leaders and I could
acquire a renewed commitment to NATO
principles and improvements on a multilat-
eral basis. I am quite reluctant to move
unilaterally in this field because I am so new.
I have a lot to learn from the leaders of
France and Germany and Great Britain and
other countries where they have been in-
volved so long.
The last point is that the differences that
we have had among us, I think, can only be
resolved among the heads of state. And with
the Leopard tank and the AWACS system
[airborne warning and control
system] — these matters are of tactical im-
portance, but they don't endanger the total
commitment of our countries to share in our
future security. And although France is not
a complete partner in the process as far as
mutual defense is concerned, that is not a
matter of great concern to us.
We have among the American people an
almost unanimous belief that NATO is a
very beneficial commitment to us. So I see
no danger of a deterioration in the NATO al-
liance.
Mr. Zucconi: That leads inevitably to the
question of the political situation, certainly,
in the European countries, among which
Italy and France — how do you react to the
growth of the Marxist left, so-called Euro-
Communists in those countries? How would
you react to the possibility of coalition gov-
ernments in a member's country, with a role
for the Communists in it?
The President: I think the first premise on
which we function is that the European citi-
zens are perfectly capable of making their
own decisions about political matters
through the free election process.
Within my own memory, this is the first
time that all the NATO countries have been
democracies. And I think this is a very good
evolution that we have already witnessed.
Secondly, we prefer that the governments
involved continue to be democratic and that
no totalitarian elements become either in-
fluential or dominant. And I would hope that
the democratic parties would prevail during
the coming years in the struggle for political
authority.
I believe that the best way we can pre-
vent the enhancement of Communist politi-
cal strength in Europe is to show that
democratically controlled governments can
function effectively and openly and with
humaneness and a genuine and continuing
comprehension of what people need and
expect from government.
To the extent that we fail as democracies,
as democratic leaders, to live up to the
ideals that exemplify our own commitments,
to that extent we open the opportunity for
Communist parties to be more successful.
So to summarize, I think each country has
to make its own decisions in the electoral
process. I am pleased at the enhanced de-
gree of commitment to the democratic gov-
ernments. We certainly prefer that the
democratic parties prevail in the future.
And we can encourage that process not by
interfering in electoral procedures within
countries themselves, but making the sys-
tem work ourselves.
Mr. Siebert: Mr. President, the economic
summit is only a couple of days away. The
meeting of the heads of state shows clearly
how interdependent the economies are and
that this interdependence is rapidly grow-
ing. How much sovereignty is the United
States willing to give up in the decisionmak-
ing process?
The President: None. [Laughter.]
Mr. Siebert: None?
The President: Not to give up
sovereignty. I think within the bounds of
May 30, 1977
535
sovereignty to be maintained by all the na-
tions, though, cooperation is very impor-
tant.
As I search for a proper way to exemplify
the sovereignty and independence of our
own nation, I want to make the right deci-
sions that are best for our own people. I
don't think there is any doubt that our own
people are best served when we do cooper-
ate with our allies, when we have open and
free trade, when we have a proper concern
about the less developed nations, when we
do have military security, when we have in-
ternational lending institutions like the
World Bank that can function effectively,
when we have a proper and multilateral
approach to solving the chronic and rapidly
deteriorating energy circumstances — all
those things that are multilateral in nature
and require cooperation and unselfishness
can enhance, I believe, the legitimate
sovereignty of nations and the protection by
leaders of the sovereignty.
So with the exception of your use of the
word "sovereignty," I think that we need to
be sure that our actions are unselfish and
predicated on proper consultation and a
sharing of both opportunity and the
resolution of problems.
Mr. Siebert: The American economic
growth has accelerated and you, Mr. Presi-
dent, recommended a sharply reduced
stimulus, fiscal stimulus, for 1977.
The President: Yes.
Mr. Siebert: Has the focus of the summit
altered? Will you still press for higher-
internal deficits and lower external
surpluses by Germany and Japan?
The President: We have left intact an eco-
nomic stimulus package for the 1977-1978
years, the 18-month period, of a little more
than $20 billion, which we consider to be
adequate.
It still is a substantial amount of stimulus
effort, and I would hope that the countries
that are relatively affluent and economically
strong might provide some stimulus for the
rest of the free world economy.
There is an element of trade which is of
concern. The OPEC [Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries] nations have a
positive trade balance of about $40 billion.
All the other nations in the world who are
their trading partners have to have a deficit
of about $40 billion. To the extent that the
strong nations like ourselves, Japan,
Germany, and others, can absorb part of
that deficit, it takes that requirement away
from the much weaker nations who have to
share it with us.
So to that extent, I am willing for our
country to experience some controllable in-
ternational trade deficits for a while. And
we have cut our own national budget deficit
down from about $65 billion to $47 billion or
$48 billion this year. Next year it is going to
go up some.
But I think that it is a matter of each
nation deciding on its own what is best for
its citizens but, at the same time, recogniz-
ing that when we are selfish and try to have
large trade surpluses and a very tight
restraint on the international economy, that
we make the weaker nations suffer too
much.
Mr. Siebert: Mr. President, are you
carrying major proposals to London, and
what kind?
The President: I think those specific
agenda items would best be reserved until
we get there. You are perfectly at liberty to
talk to the people in the offices of the Secre-
tary of State and the Secretary of the
Treasury. But as far as my own comments
as President, I think I would rather wait
until later to talk about that.
Mr. Emery: Can I bring you back to
energy? We are very struck by the fact that at
the same time as you can mention an item
like "unselfishness" on American commit-
ments to help allies with their petroleum de-
ficiencies in times of crisis, through this
conference in Paris, at the same time energy
always seems to be the biggest source of dis-
content and discord between us. Look at the
results of the Middle East war and the
energy crisis that followed.
Now, your own nuclear energy policy,
which, while many leaders give lipservice
to, they seem to be in some concern over,
536
Department of State Bulletin
ahead with their nuclear deals?
The President: I think you would have to
go back, to save time, and read the minutes
of my press conference when I described our
own reprocessing policy. I made it clear that
I was not trying to tell Germany and
France, Great Britain, Japan, what to do
within their own countries. We have ac-
tually built and attempted to operate two
reprocessing plants unsuccessfully.
We are blessed with moderate quantities
of uranium ore and large quantities of coal
and reasonable quantities of natural gas and
oil. I don't believe that within the next 20
years we will need to move to commercial
use of the breeder reactor, which is the ini-
tiation of the plutonium society. I cannot
speak for other countries.
I am very much aware that the waste
products from our own light water reactors,
using enriched uranium, are being held in-
tact. They are not being destroyed or
wasted. If we should need in the future,
they will be there.
The third point is that I am deeply con-
cerned if nations who presently do not have
the capability of building nuclear explosives
should have them. And we are going to do
what we can in the trade of nuclear fuels
and nuclear power plants to reduce that
number of nations who have the ability to
build nuclear explosives.
And the process has to start somewhere,
and in our own nation's history, it happened
to have started with me. It was a campaign
commitment of mine, shared, by the way,
with my opponent. President Ford, and I
have no reticence about imposing it.
This is a matter of contention. We would
prefer that reprocessing plants not be sold
to other nations of the world, particularly
those who have not signed the
Nonproliferation Treaty. But some of the
trades or contracts had already been ini-
tiated or consummated.
May 30, 1977
We have let our views be known, but we
recognize the autonomy of nations to deal as
they see fit.
So I think that the present competition
and some degree of disharmony among
nations on energy might very well be
exacerbated badly unless we all try to con-
serve energy as much as possible.
And I am not criticizing other nations
when 1 say that I am very glad that we have
finally moved, after being wasteful to the
extreme degree for so long, toward a new
policy that will be built around conservation
of all kinds of energy supplies. And I would
guess that our own action, as a very power-
ful, influential nation, might induce other
countries to join with us in a mutual
commitment to both inventory energy
supplies, assure a more fair distribution in
the future, and reduce the waste of them.
Mr. Siebert: Mr. President, you spoke
already about foreign trade, about the pro-
tectionist pressure in the United States
growing. Do you think you can resist the
demands of the unions and some industries?
What is your philosophy on international
trade, and what are your objectives?
The President: Yes. I can't guarantee it,
but I believe and I hope that I can resist
pressures of this kind. Among all the na-
tions who will be participating in the eco-
nomic summit, I would guess that our un-
employment rate is the highest. It is
running in excess of 7 percent. And with the
high unemployment rate comes extraordi-
nary pressure to get one's own workers
reemployed.
My position on trade restraints was spelled
out very clearly during the long cam-
paign that I conducted. And it is based
around the hope that whenever American
jobs are excessively in danger, that we can
best resolve this question by bilateral and
voluntary agreements on the importation of
overly competitive goods.
I think this is the case in shoes from
Taiwan and South Korea. I think it will be
the case with color television sets from Ja-
pan. And I would hope that this would be an
adequate pattern.
537
The Congress of the United States has the
authority under the law to override my deci-
sions if they are not considered to be
adequate. But I believe that I can prevail.
Mr. Siebert: The industrialized world must
find answers to the demands of the developing
nations, or the North-South conflict will be-
come more serious. What is your position on
commodity arrangements, common funds,
and the debt situation? Let's put it this way:
What can we offer them?
The President: Again, I think that specific
question can best be answered at a later
time. I have my own ideas about it, but they
will be much more firmly developed when I
get to the London conference.
And as we approach the CIEC [Confer-
ence on International Economic
Cooperation] meeting which will follow
immediately thereafter, I would hope that
the advanced industrial nations could pro-
vide a more uniform, comprehensive, and
compatible approach to the very serious
question. I just don't feel that I am qualified
at this point —
Mr. Siebert: At this point, perhaps, you
can take this. How do you look at the future
role of the international organizations like
the World Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund? Do you think those roles should
be broad and they should get —
The President: I think they should be
broadened and strengthened. I believe that
this is very important.
Mr. Siebert: Thank you.
The President: In the multinational trade
agreements and GATT [General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade] and OECD [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment] and the International Energy
Agency and the World Bank, regional
banks — I believe that is a proper place for
continuing multilateral interrelationships.
An