Wading in the Back Channels of Diplomacy

On Sunday, Pakistan and India’s foreign ministers reportedly met for 100 minutes on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York City. According to Reuters, it was “a fresh attempt” to improve bilateral ties between the two nations since the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. However, Pakistan’s Shah Mehmood Qureshi and India’s S.M. Krishna told reporters later that they “did not fix a date” for the resumption of full-fledged peace negotiations, otherwise known as composite talks.

Both sides insisted the meeting was “positive, frank and useful,” but Krishna noted that for a meaningful dialogue to continue, “it is essential to ensure an environment free of violence, terrorism and the threat to use violence.” He added to reporters, “We remain concerned about the threat which groups and individuals in Pakistan continue to pose to us.” And, although he acknowledged the legal action undertaken by Pakistan against suspects in the Mumbai attacks, “a crime of the magnitude that was committed in Mumbai could not have been done by seven or eight individuals.”

Dawn quoted Krishna, who also announced that India had rejected Pakistan’s proposal for back channel diplomacy, noting, “When we have front channel, there’s no need for back channel.” Given that Pakistan had already announced that former Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammed Khan would be appointed as special envoy in the back channel talks, Krishna’s announcement was slightly embarrassing. The development, however, does raise some interesting questions about back channel diplomacy and its advantages for Indo-Pak ties.

Back channel diplomacy refers to negotiations that take place in secret between parties in dispute or with a neutral third party present. In Pakistan, such talks occurred back in 2003, when a ceasefire pertaining to the Line of Control was negotiated, as well as during Musharraf‘s presidency in 2007. In the March 2, 2009 issue of The New Yorker, Steve Coll delved into the talks during Musharraf’s era, noting the top diplomats involved – Tariq Aziz from Pakistan and Satinder Lambah from India – were tasked with developing a “non paper” on Kashmir, “a text without names or signatures which can serve as a deniable but detailed basis for a deal.” Khurshid Kasuri, the then-foreign minister, noted the back channel talks were so advanced by 2007 that they’d “come to semicolons.” An Indian official told Coll, “It was huge – I think it would have changed the basic nature of the problem…You would have then had the freedom to remake Indo-Pakistani relations.”

The agreement, which was close to being signed [Coll noted that one quarrel over the Sir Creek waterway would be formally settled during a visit by PM Manmohan Singh to Pakistan] was shelved due to political turmoil in Pakistan, i.e. Musharraf’s firing of the Supreme Court justices and the subsequent declaration of the state of emergency. Coll wrote, “In New Delhi, the word in national security circles had been that ‘any day now we’re going to have an agreement on Kashmir…But Musharraf lost his constituencies.”

Since Zardari’s PPP government came to power, there has been talk of reviving the back channel talks of the past and concluding work on this reported “non paper.” From a U.S. standpoint, a breakthrough in Indo-Pak talks would be conducive to shifting Pakistan’s attention to its western border, not to mention that progress could potentially reduce rivalry between the two countries in Afghanistan, [see Myra MacDonald’s Reuters blog: Now or Never? for more]. Such an approach has been embraced by the current Pakistani administration, who advocate for front and back channels to “work in tandem.”

There are many advantages of back channel diplomacy. Shuja Nawaz, author of Crossed Swords and director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council, told me that back channel talks are “essential to get rid of the undergrowth and to build up vested interest groups of non-official actors. Track I [diplomacy] tends to be stuck in history and detail as the mandarins fight old battles over and over again.” Ultimately, in atmospheres that are as charged as India and Pakistan, this type of back channel diplomacy bypasses the need to toe party lines and spout rhetoric. Coll, in his New Yorker piece, even noted the aforementioned “non paper” was a factor in tempering India’s response after the Mumbai attacks.

Despite these advantages, back channel talks can only be successful if trust exists between the two nations, and if both sides want to come to the table. Given the environment in India following the Mumbai attacks, there is a deep mistrust in New Delhi of Pakistan’s ability to control militancy within and outside its borders. And, despite Islamabad’s eagerness to enter into negotiations, the issue of Balochistan and India’s alleged involvement in the restive province also hinders the potential for successful peace talks. Moreover, Pakistan’s very publicized call for back channel diplomacy seems almost counter-intuitive, since the benefit of such talks is that they bypass constituency pressures.

Should Indo-Pak back channel talks resume? Given the current status quo in Indo-Pak relations, this alternate form of diplomacy could be instrumental in jump starting the peace process. But due to the above mentioned factors, the nature of the talks would be different from the ones that took place in 2007. A neutral third party would change the previous dynamic, but could help broker negotiations, acting as a bridge in bringing the two state actors to an even table.

“And because the United States has a stake in ensuring stability in Pakistan given increased investment in the form of the Kerry Lugar bill and additional troops to Afghanistan, perhaps special envoy Holbrooke, or another appointed official on behalf of Washington might serve to mediate initial attempts at back channel diplomacy.”

“According to Praveen Swami, a Kashmir expert at The Hindu, the Indian government has been holding secret talks over the summer with the main political separatist alliance in Kashmir, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, to try to agree an approach to bring peace to the region. ”Perhaps most important,” he said, “Pakistan is being asked to endorse the talks.”

Over on its side of the border, the Pakistan government has decided to grant limited autonomy to Gilgit and Baltistan. It had previously run the region directly from Islamabad, much to the irritation of local people who felt they had been deprived of their political rights to the kind of self-rule given to Pakistani provinces.”

All interesting addendums to the above piece that I didn’t work in for the sake of brevity.

excellent piece..i think it’s also a good piece because the general public doesn’t know what goes into backchannel diplomacy, what it means and what it’s ramifications or results can be. I learnt something through the post.

as you mentioned, backchannel diplomacy has its advantages, and I think the bypassing of constituency pressures and party lines being two of the biggest. you quoted the article the holbrooke idea as a possible mediator for this round of talks, but unfortunately the obama administration has shyed away or flat out refused so far to deal with the pak-india equation. the most disappointing policy decision concerning pak from the obama admin in my opinion so far. i suppose another official could go as holbrookes job description has refused it, but i think they would be unwilling and the indians would probably be just as unwilling. also, backchannel talks could secretly take place and the public wouldn’t know about a US mediator, but if that information becomes public in the aftermath it could spark a backlash against each respective government. Pakistanis already feel that the US is too involved, and while anti-americanism is not generally associated with India, it is in fact very anti-america when it comes to america’s policing of the world.

India has milked the mumbai attacks for everything it can. It reminds me of the way that Iran has cunningly shifted focus around its nuclear talks with the western powers. For instance, Iran has managed to divert the issue so much that Iran even coming to the negotiating table is being seen as a concession on their part. whereas the actual concession is supposed to be on uranium enrichment and the like. They have managed to buy themselves so much time through these tactics that even if sanctions are brought down against them it won’t be for another year. This shifting of focus from the actual issue (peace, kashmir in indias case-nukes in irans case) is the same thing india has managed to do through the mumbai attacks. They can outrightly be opposed to even sitting down and talking, in affect be opposed to peace, but have managed to shift the debate to “why should we even sit down and talk?” The mumbai attacks have enabled the world community to sympathize with India’s anti-peace stance. And on the other side of things, one can say Pakistan hasn’t done enough to satisfy the indians in the aftermath of the bombings. Most of the world has recognized pakistan fight against extremism during the general assembly session but India has refused to do so. They still want to see the leader of LeT (?) sorry I’m forgetting exactly who but I think the leader LeT is the one the way to see arrested. Pakistan has him under house arrest and say that they don’t want to arrest him as yet because if they do, his arrest won’t stand up in court based on lack of evidence. Fair enough point if they are sincere in this. If they take him to court now without the right evidence then they will lose him for awhile. And if they are being sincere then it is the right move on pakistan’s part to want more evidence so that they can get a conviction instead of a “show-arrest.”

So basically, taking all of the above into consideration I think backchannel diplomacy is the only option for now as sitting around twiddling thumbs is ridiculous. All that is happening now is a back and forth of rhetoric, which in all honesty nobody cares to hear. Everyone’s heard it before and it’s always the same lip service provided to invigorate nationalist sentiments. the only problem i see with backchannel talks is that even if they talk and come to agreements, the media and the public is not aware of what is happening to hold governments accountable for their actions. And sometimes agreements take place, as you mentioned above, but since its behind the scenes it is very easily scrapped when minds or circumstances change and neither party is really beholden to their word. At times it doesn’t require concrete commitments from concerned parties, but nonetheless in this situation I think concrete commitments are a ways away. So backchannel it is.

Thanks for the comment, Sheri. Has the US flat-out refused to deal with the Pak-India relationship? I was under the impression that it has come up numerous times, particularly as the Obama admin has shifted its attention to Afghanistan and realize that stability there is linked to the Indo-Pak relationship. That being said, I agree with you, the U.S. may be a feasible third party in back channel talks, but the ramifications of their involvement may outweigh the benefits it may bring.

First, India isn’t too happy with the Obama administration due to the U.S. shift towards China. Second, in past history, India-Pak relations have always competed for U.S. attention. I wonder if the back channel talks could really be informal and sincere if ulterior ambitions are involved. Finally, as you mentioned, the anti-U.S. sentiment in Pakistan will undoubtedly complicate U.S. involvement as a third party – even though back channel talks essentially occur to bypass constituency pressures, the final product still needs to withstand public opinion.

Maybe a third party could be a Scandinavian country – since countries like Norway have been intrinsically linked to peace processes throughout the world, including in Sri Lanka. They might be viewed with less suspicion.

After listening to pleas from Islamabad for dialog and Indian arrogant behavior for a long time, I really believe that Pakistan; Zardari & Cronies should stop begging India for dialog. India does not want dialog on any real issues and keep making excuses on other stuff. Pakistani leadership should show some self respect and stop begging.

India and Pakistan must do whatever it takes to resolve their problems which are linked and mutual. Assumptions on the Indian side that they do not need a Pakistan are silly as without Pakistan and a stable one the Taliban would be knocking on Delhi’s doorstep soon.

If this govt can solve this problem, much of its misdeed can be forgiven, i hope it happens for our children’s sake.

[…] deals more with the Pakistani experience, CHUP! gives more of an analysis on hard news. Here is a great article on the sideline discussions officials of Pakistan and India had on during the UN General Assembly […]

First of all my heartfelt congratulations on CHUP.
Second I am sorry to say this but I do not agree with the name CHUP! Why CHUP – if one needs to be heard and raise concerns pertinent to one’s country, then CHUP will not do. It has to be something which conveys the meaning of CHanging Up Pakistan and at the same time means “listen”, “Act” – something like that – I am sorry my urdu fails me but I hope you get the point. Chup rah kar badlaav nahi la sakte.
Third, I am also subscribing to this blog because I would like to understand what the young of Pakistan thinks – I know what the young of India think – I am one of them and in many ways I guess we are biased against Pakistan just as I am sure that would be the case across the border.
And finally, no amount of back door diplomacy will ever bring any result for the betterment of ties between the two countries – there is so much mistrust, one-upmanship and history that back door diplomacy will not work. There has to be some extremely drastic, out of the box ideas that need to be worked upon and implemented if India and Pakistan want to live together happily ever after.
I have an idea but for that I’ll have to wait till I find myself sitting in the PM’s chair!

Thanks for your comment. It’s ok if you don’t agree with the naming of this website, but let me provide the reasoning behind the name, since many people may not understand it at first. At the time I created this website, (and still today) the voice of Pakistan that was represented in the news media were the militants, extremists, and fundamentalists. CHUP there represents an attempt to “Chup” those voices, so that a different voice of Pakistan can be represented, via news analysis, interviews, and contributions by young Pakistanis.