A MUST -- THE WIRETAP ROOMS The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. Cities

THE SECRETS ARE hidden behind
fortified walls in cities across the United States, inside towering, windowless
skyscrapers and fortress-like concrete structures that were built to withstand
earthquakes and even nuclear attack. Thousands of people pass by the buildings
each day and rarely give them a second glance, because their function is not
publicly known. They are an integral part of one of the world’s largest
telecommunications networks – and they are also linked to a controversial
National Security Agency surveillance program.

Atlanta,
Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York City, San Francisco, Seattle, and
Washington, D.C. In each of these cities, The Intercept has identified an
AT&T facility containing networking equipment that transports large
quantities of internet traffic across the United States and the world. A body
of evidence – including classified NSA documents, public records, and
interviews with several former AT&T employees – indicates that the
buildings are central to an NSA spying initiative that has for years monitored
billions of emails, phone calls, and online chats passing across U.S.
territory.

The NSA
considers AT&T to be one of its most trusted partners and has lauded the
company’s “extreme willingness to help.” It is a collaboration that dates back
decades. Little known, however, is that its scope is not restricted to
AT&T’s customers. According to the NSA’s documents,
it values AT&T not only because it “has access to information that transits
the nation,” but also because it maintains unique relationships with other
phone and internet providers. The NSA exploits these relationships for
surveillance purposes, commandeering AT&T’s massive infrastructure and
using it as a platform to covertly tap into communications processed by other
companies.

Much has
previously been reported about the NSA’s surveillance programs. But few details
have been disclosed about the physical infrastructure that enables the spying.
Last year, The Intercept highlighted a
likely NSA facility in New York City’s Lower Manhattan. Now, we are revealing
for the first time a series of other buildings across the U.S. that appear to
serve a similar function, as critical parts of one of the world’s most powerful
electronic eavesdropping systems, hidden in plain sight.

“It’s
eye-opening and ominous the extent to which this is happening right here on
American soil,” said Elizabeth Goitein, co-director of the Liberty and National
Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice. “It puts a face on
surveillance that we could never think of before in terms of actual buildings
and actual facilities in our own cities, in our own backyards.”

There are
hundreds of AT&T-owned properties scattered across the U.S. The eight
identified by The Intercept serve a specific function, processing AT&T
customers’ data and also carrying large quantities of data from other internet
providers. They are known as “backbone” and “peering” facilities.

While
network operators would usually prefer to send data through their own networks,
often a more direct and cost-efficient path is provided by other providers’
infrastructure. If one network in a specific area of the country is overloaded
with data traffic, another operator with capacity to spare can sell or exchange
bandwidth, reducing the strain on the congested region. This exchange of traffic
is called “peering” and is an essential feature of the internet.

Because of
AT&T’s position as one of the U.S.’s leading telecommunications companies,
it has a large network that is frequently used by other providers to transport
their customers’ data. Companies that “peer” with AT&T include the American
telecommunications giants Sprint, Cogent Communications, and Level 3, as well
as foreign companies such as Sweden’s Telia, India’s Tata Communications,
Italy’s Telecom Italia, and Germany’s Deutsche Telekom.

AT&T
currently boasts 19,500 “points of presence” in 149 countries where
internet traffic is exchanged. But only eight of the company’s facilities in
the U.S. offer direct access to its “common backbone” – key data routes that
carry vast amounts of emails, internet chats, social media updates, and
internet browsing sessions. These eight locations are among the most important
in AT&T’s global network. They are also highly valued by the NSA, documents
indicate.

The data
exchange between AT&T and other networks initially takes place outside
AT&T’s control, sources said, at third-party data centers that are owned
and operated by companies such as California’s Equinix. But the data is then
routed – in whole or in part – through the eight AT&T buildings, where the
NSA taps into it. By monitoring what it calls the “peering circuits” at the
eight sites, the spy agency can collect “not only AT&T’s data, they get all
the data that’s interchanged between AT&T’s network and other companies,”
according to Mark Klein, a former AT&T technician who worked with the
company for 22 years. It is an efficient point to conduct internet
surveillance, Klein said, “because the peering links, by the nature of the
connections, are liable to carry everybody’s traffic at one point or another
during the day, or the week, or the year.”

Christopher
Augustine, a spokesperson for the NSA, said in a statement that the agency
could “neither confirm nor deny its role in alleged classified intelligence
activities.” Augustine declined to answer questions about the AT&T
facilities, but said that the NSA “conducts its foreign signals intelligence
mission under the legal authorities established by Congress and is bound by
both policy and law to protect U.S. persons’ privacy and civil liberties.”

Jim Greer,
an AT&T spokesperson, said that AT&T was “required by law to provide
information to government and law enforcement entities by complying with court
orders, subpoenas, lawful discovery requests, and other legal requirements.” He
added that the company provides “voluntary assistance to law enforcement when a
person’s life is in danger and in other immediate, emergency situations. In all
cases, we ensure that requests for assistance are valid and that we act in
compliance with the law.”

Dave
Schaeffer, CEO of Cogent Communications, told The Intercept that he had no
knowledge of the surveillance at the eight AT&T buildings, but said he
believed “the core premise that the NSA or some other agency would like to look
at traffic … at an AT&T facility.” He said he suspected that the
surveillance is likely carried out on “a limited basis,” due to technical and
cost constraints. If the NSA were trying to “ubiquitously monitor” data passing
across AT&T’s networks, Schaeffer added, he would be “extremely concerned.”

Sprint,
Telia, Tata Communications, Telecom Italia, and Deutsche Telekom did not
respond to requests for comment. CenturyLink, which owns Level 3, said it would
not discuss “matters of national security.”

The maps
The Intercept used to identify the internet surveillance hubs.

Maps:
NSA/AT&T

THE EIGHT LOCATIONS are featured on a
top-secret NSA map, which depicts U.S. facilities that the agency relies upon
for one of its largest surveillance programs, code-named FAIRVIEW.
AT&T is the only company involved in FAIRVIEW, which was first established
in 1985, according to NSA documents, and involves tapping into international
telecommunications cables, routers, and switches.

In 2003,
the NSA launched new internet mass surveillance methods, which were pioneered
under the FAIRVIEW program. The methods were used by the agency to collect –
within a few months – some 400 billion records about people’s internet
communications and activity, the New York Times previously
reported. FAIRVIEW was also forwarding more than 1 million emails every day
to a “keyword selection system” at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters.

Central to
the internet spying are eight “peering link router complex” sites, which are
pinpointed on the top-secret NSA map. The locations of the sites mirror maps of
AT&T’s networks, obtained by The Intercept from public records, which show
“backbone node with peering” facilities in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Los
Angeles, New York City, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.

One of the
AT&T maps contains unique codes individually identifying the addresses of
the facilities in each of the cities.

Among the
pinpointed buildings, there is a nuclear blast-resistant, windowless facility
in New York City’s Hell’s Kitchen neighborhood; in Washington, D.C., a
fortress-like, concrete structure less than half a mile south of the U.S.
Capitol; in Chicago, an earthquake-resistant skyscraper in the West Loop Gate
area; in Atlanta, a 429-foot art deco structure in the heart of the city’s
downtown district; and in Dallas, a cube-like building with narrow windows and
large vents on its exterior, located in the Old East district.

Elsewhere,
on the west coast of the U.S., there are three more facilities: in downtown Los
Angeles, a striking concrete tower near the Walt Disney Concert Hall and the
Staples Center, two blocks from the most important internet exchange in the
region; in Seattle, a 15-story building with blacked-out windows and reinforced
concrete foundations, near the city’s waterfront; and in San Francisco’s South
of Market neighborhood, a building where it was previously claimed that the NSA
was monitoring internet traffic from a secure room on the sixth floor.

The peering
sites – otherwise known in AT&T parlance as “Service Node Routing
Complexes,” or SNRCs – were developed following the internet boom in the
mid- to late 1990s. By March 2009, the NSA’s documents say it was tapping into
“peering circuits at the eight SNRCs.”

The
facilities’ purpose was to bolster AT&T’s network, improving its
reliability and enabling future growth. They were developed under the
leadership of an Iranian-American innovator and engineer named Hossein
Eslambolchi, who was formerly AT&T’s chief technology officer and president
of AT&T Labs, a division of the company that focuses on research and
development.

Eslambolchi
told The Intercept that the project to set up the facilities began after
AT&T asked him to help create “the largest internet protocol network in the
world.” He obliged and began implementing his network design by placing large
Cisco routers inside former AT&T phone switching facilities across the U.S.
When planning the project, he said he divided AT&T’s network into different
regions, “and in every quadrant I will have what I will call an SNRC.”

During his
employment with AT&T, Eslambolchi said he had to take a polygraph test, and
he obtained a government security clearance. “I was involved in very, very top,
heavy-duty projects for a few of these three-letter agencies,” he said, in an
apparent reference to U.S. intelligence agencies. “They all loved me.”

He would
not confirm or deny the exact locations of the eight peering sites identified
by The Intercept or discuss the classified work he carried out while with the
company. “You put a gun to my head,” he said, “I’m not going to tell you.”

Other
former AT&T employees, however, were more forthcoming.

A former
senior member of AT&T’s technical staff, who spoke on condition of
anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject, confirmed with “100 percent”
certainty the locations of six of the eight peering facilities identified by
The Intercept. The source, citing direct knowledge of the facilities and their
function, verified the addresses of the buildings in Atlanta, Dallas, Los
Angeles, New York City, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.

A second
former AT&T employee confirmed the locations of the remaining two sites, in
Chicago and San Francisco. “I worked with all of them,” said Philip Long, who
was employed by AT&T for more than two decades as a technician servicing
its networks. Long’s work with AT&T was carried out mostly in California,
but he said his job required him to be in contact with the company’s other
facilities across the U.S. In about 2005, Long recalled, he received orders to
move “every internet backbone circuit I had in northern California” through the
San Francisco AT&T building identified by The Intercept as one of the eight
NSA spy hubs. Long said that, at the time, he felt suspicious of the changes,
because they were unusual and unnecessary. “We thought we were routing our
circuits so that they could grab all the data,” he said. “We thought it was the
government listening.” He retired from his job with AT&T in 2014.

A third
former AT&T employee reviewed The Intercept’s research and said he believed
it accurately identified all eight of the facilities. “The site data certainly
seems correct,” said Thomas Saunders, who worked as a data networking
consultant for AT&T in New York City between 1995 and 2004. “Those nodes
aren’t going to move.”

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

AN ESTIMATED 99 PERCENT of the world’s intercontinental internet
traffic is transported through hundreds of giant fiber optic cables hidden
beneath the world’s oceans. A large portion of the data and communications that
pass across the cables is routed at one point through the U.S., partly because
of the country’s location – situated between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia
– and partly because of the pre-eminence of American internet companies, which
provide services to people globally.

The NSA
calls this predicament “home field advantage” – a kind of geographic good
fortune. “A target’s phone call, email, or chat will take the cheapest path,
not the physically most direct path,” one agency document explains.
“Your target’s communications could easily be flowing into and through the
U.S.”

Once the
internet traffic arrives on U.S. soil, it is processed by American companies.
And that is why, for the NSA, AT&T is so indispensable. The company claims
it has one of the world’s most powerful networks, the largest of its kind in
the U.S. AT&T routinely handles masses of emails, phone calls, and internet
chats. As of March 2018, some 197 petabytes of data – the equivalent of more
than 49 trillion pages of text, or 60 billion average-sized mp3 files –
traveled across its networks every business day.

The NSA
documents, which come from the trove provided to The Intercept by the
whistleblower Edward Snowden, describe AT&T as having been “aggressively
involved” in aiding the agency’s surveillance programs. One example of this
appears to have taken place at the eight facilities under a classified
initiative called SAGUARO.

As part of
SAGUARO, AT&T developed a strategy to help the NSA electronically eavesdrop
on internet data from the “peering circuits” at the eight sites, which were
said to connect to the “common backbone,” major data routes carrying internet
traffic.

The company
worked with the NSA to rank communications flowing through its networks on the
basis of intelligence value, prioritizing data depending on which country it
was derived from, according to a top-secret agency
document.

Graphic:
NSA

NSA diagrams reveal
that after it collects data from AT&T’s “access links” and “peering
partners,” it is sent to a “centralized processing facility”
code-named PINECONE, located somewhere in New Jersey. Inside the PINECONE
facility, there is a secure space in which there is both NSA-controlled and
AT&T-controlled equipment. Internet traffic passes through an AT&T
“distribution box” to two NSA systems. From there, the data is then transferred
about 200 miles southwest to its final destination: NSA headquarters at Fort
Meade in Maryland.

At the
Maryland compound, the communications collected from AT&T’s networks are
integrated into powerful systems called MAINWAY and MARINA,
which the NSA uses to analyze metadata – such as the “to” and “from” parts of
emails, and the times and dates they were sent. The communications obtained
from AT&T are also made accessible through a tool named XKEYSCORE,
which NSA employees use to search through the full contents of emails, instant
messenger chats, web-browsing histories, webcam photos, information about
downloads from online services, and Skype sessions.

THE NSA’S PRIMARY mission is to gather
foreign intelligence. The agency has broad legal powers to monitor emails,
phone calls, and other forms of correspondence as they are being transported
across the U.S., and it can compel companies such as AT&T to install
surveillance equipment within their networks.

Under a
Ronald Reagan-era presidential directive – Executive
Order 12333 – the NSA has what it calls “transit authority,” which it
says enables it to eavesdrop on “communications which originate and terminate
in foreign countries, but traverse U.S. territory.” That could include, for
example, an email sent by a person in France to a person in Mexico, which on
its way to its destination was routed through a server in California. According
to the NSA’s documents, it was using AT&T’s networks as of March 2013 to
gather some 60 million foreign-to-foreign emails every day, 1.8 billion per
month.

Without an
individualized court order, it is illegal for the NSA to spy on communications
that are wholly domestic, such as emails sent back and forth between two
Americans living in Texas. However, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the
agency began eavesdropping on Americans’ international calls and emails that
were passing between the U.S. and other countries. That practice was exposed
by the New York Times in 2005 and triggered what became known as the
“warrantless wiretapping” scandal.

Critics
argued that the surveillance of Americans’ international communications was
illegal, because the NSA had carried it out without obtaining warrants from a
judge and had instead acted on the orders of President George W. Bush. In 2008,
Congress weighed into the dispute and controversially authorized elements of
the warrantless wiretapping program by enacting Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence and Surveillance Act, or FISA. The new law allowed the NSA to
continue sweeping up Americans’ international communications without a warrant,
so long as it did so “incidentally” while it was targeting foreigners overseas
– for instance, if it was monitoring people in Pakistan, and they were talking
with Americans in the U.S. by phone, email, or through an internet chat
service.

Within
AT&T’s networks, there is filtering equipment designed to separate foreign
and domestic internet data before it is passed to the NSA, the agency’s
documents show. Filtering technology is often used by internet providers for
security reasons, enabling them to keep tabs on problems with their networks,
block out spam, or monitor hacking attacks. But the same tools can be used for
government surveillance.

“You can
essentially trick the routers into redirecting a small subset of traffic you
really care about, which you can monitor in more detail,” said Jennifer
Rexford, a computer scientist who worked for AT&T Labs between 1996 and
2005.

According
to the NSA’s documents,
it programs its surveillance systems to focus on particular IP addresses – a
set of numbers that identify a computer – associated with foreign countries. A
classified 2012 memo describes the agency’s efforts to use IP addresses to home
in on internet data passing between the U.S. and particular “regions of
interest,” including Iran, Afghanistan, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, Yemen,
Sudan, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. But this process is not an exact science, as
people can use privacy or anonymity tools to change or spoof their IP
addresses. A person in Israel could use privacy software to masquerade as if
they were accessing the internet in the U.S. Likewise, an internet user in the
U.S. could make it appear as if they were online in Israel. It is unclear how
effective the NSA’s systems are at detecting such anomalies.

In October
2011, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which approves the
surveillance operations carried out under Section 702 of FISA, found that there
were “technological limitations” with the agency’s internet eavesdropping
equipment. It was “generally incapable of distinguishing” between some kinds of
data, the court stated. As a consequence, Judge John D. Bates ruled,
the NSA had been intercepting the communications of “non-target United States
persons and persons in the United States,” violating Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The ruling, which was
declassified in August 2013, concluded that the agency had acquired some 13
million “internet transactions” during one six-month period, and had unlawfully
gathered “tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications” each year.

The root of
the issue was that the NSA’s technology was not only targeting communications
sent to and from specific surveillance targets. Instead, the agency was
sweeping up people’s emails if they had merely mentioned particular
information about surveillance targets.

A top-secret
NSA memo about the court’s ruling, which has not been disclosed
before, explained that the agency was collecting people’s messages en masse if
a single one were found to contain a “selector” – like an email address or
phone number – that featured on a target list.

“One
example of this is when a user of a webmail service accesses her inbox; if the
inbox contains one email message that contains an NSA tasked selector, NSA will
acquire a copy of the entire inbox, not just the individual email message that
contains the tasked selector,” the memo stated.

The court’s
ruling left the agency with two options: shut down the spying based on mentions
of targets completely, or ensure that protections were put in place to stop the
unlawfully collected communications from being reviewed. The NSA chose the
latter option, and created a “cautionary banner” that warned its analysts not
to read particular messages unless they could confirm that they had been
lawfully obtained.

But the
cautionary banner did not solve the problem. The NSA’s analysts continued to
access the same data repositories to search, unlawfully, for information on
Americans. In April 2017, the agency publicly
acknowledged these violations, which it described as “inadvertent
compliance incidents.” It said that it would no longer use surveillance
programs authorized under Section 702 of FISA to harvest messages that
mentioned its targets, citing “technological constraints, United States person
privacy interests, and certain difficulties in implementation.”

The
messages that the NSA had unlawfully collected were swept up using a method of
surveillance known as “upstream,” which the agency still deploys for other
surveillance programs authorized under both Section 702 of FISA and Executive
Order 12333. The upstream method involves tapping into communications as they
are passing across internet networks – precisely the kind of electronic
eavesdropping that appears to have taken place at the eight locations
identified by The Intercept.

Photo:
Frank Heath

Atlanta 51 Peachtree
Center Avenue

The
AT&T building in Atlanta was originally constructed in the 1920s as the
main telephone exchange for the city’s downtown area. The art deco structure,
made of limestone, was designed to be the largest in the city at the time at 25
stories tall. However, due to the Great Depression, plans were scaled back and
at first, it only had six stories. Between 1947 and 1963, the building was
upgraded to host 14 stories, and a large brown microwave tower – visible for
miles – was also added. A profile of the building on the History
Atlanta website notes that it contains “operations, phone exchanges
and other communications equipment for AT&T.”

Photo:
Frank Heath

NSA and
AT&T maps point to the Atlanta facility as being one of eight “peering”
hubs that process internet traffic as part of the NSA surveillance program
code-named FAIRVIEW. One former AT&T employee – who spoke on condition
of anonymity – confirmed that the site was one of eight primary AT&T “Service
Node Routing Complexes,” or SNRCs, in the U.S. NSA documents explicitly
describe tapping into flows of data at all eight of these sites.

Information
provided by a second former AT&T employee adds to the evidence linking the
Atlanta building to NSA surveillance. Mark Klein, a former AT&T technician,
alleged in 2006 that the company had allowed the NSA to install surveillance
equipment in some of its network hubs. An AT&T facility in Atlanta was one
of the spy sites, according to documents Klein presented in a court case over
the alleged spying. The Atlanta facility was equipped with “splitter”
equipment, which was used to make copies of internet traffic as AT&T’s
networks processed it. The copied data would then be diverted to “SG3” equipment
– a reference to “Study Group 3” – which was a code name AT&T used for
activities related to NSA surveillance, according to evidence in the Klein
case.

The Atlanta
facility is likely of strategic importance for the NSA. The site is the closest
major AT&T internet routing center to Miami, according to the NSA and
AT&T maps. From undersea cables that come aground at Miami, huge flows of
data pass between the U.S. and South America. It is probable that much of that
data is routed through the Atlanta facility as it is being sent to and from the
U.S. In recent years, the NSA has extensively targeted several Latin American
countries – such as Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela – for surveillance.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

Chicago 10 South Canal
Street

Like many
other major telecommunications hubs built during the late 1960s and early
1970s, the Chicago AT&T building was designed amid the Cold War to
withstand a nuclear attack. The 538-foot skyscraper, located in the West Loop
Gate area of the city, was completed in 1971. There are windows at both the top
and bottom of the vast concrete structure, but 18 of its 28 floors are
windowless.

According
to the Chicago Sun-Times, the facility handles much of the city’s phone and
internet traffic and is equipped with banks of routers, servers, and switching
systems. “This building touches every single resident of the city,” Jim Wilson,
an AT&T area manager, told the
newspaper in 2016.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

One of the
building’s architects, John Augur Holabird, said in
a 1998 interview that it housed “a big switchboard.” He added: “In case the
atomic bomb hits Milwaukee, you’ll be happy to know your telephone line will
still go through even though the rest of us are wiped out. And that’s what that
building was for.”

10 South
Canal Street originally contained a million-gallon oil tank, turbine
generators, and a water well, so that it could continue to function for more
than two weeks without electricity or water from the city, according to
Illinois broadcaster WBEZ. The building is “anchored in bedrock, which helps
support the weight of the equipment inside, and gives it extra resistance to
bomb blasts or earthquakes,” WBEZ reported.

Today, the
facility contains six large V-16 yellow Caterpillar generators that can provide
backup electricity in the event of a power failure, according to
the Chicago Sun Times. Inside the skyscraper, AT&T stores some 200,000
gallons of diesel fuel, enough to run the generators for 40 days.

NSA and
AT&T maps point to the Chicago facility as being one of the “peering” hubs,
which process internet traffic as part of the NSA surveillance program
code-named FAIRVIEW. Philip Long, who was employed by AT&T for more
than two decades as a technician servicing its networks, confirmed that the
Chicago site was one of eight primary AT&T “Service Node Routing
Complexes,” or SNRCs, in the U.S. NSA documents explicitly describe
tapping into flows of data at all eight of these sites.

Photo: Mike
Osborne

Dallas 4211 Bryan Street

This
AT&T building is a fortified, cube-like structure, located in the Old East
area of Dallas, not far from Baylor University Medical Center. Built in 1961,
it is a light yellow-brown color with a granite foundation. Large vents are
visible on the exterior of the building, as are several narrow windows, many of
which appear to have been blacked out or covered in a reflective privacy glass.

The 4211
Bryan Street facility is located next to other AT&T-owned buildings,
including a towering telephone routing complex that was first built in 1904.
A piece about
the telephone hub in the Dallas Observer described it as “an imposing, creepy
building” that is “known in some circles as The Great Wall of Beige.”

Photo: Mike
Osborne

According
to the Central Office website,
which profiles telecommunications buildings across the U.S., the Dallas
telephone hub is “the main regional tandem and AT&T for long distance and
toll services in the Dallas Texas region.” Today, the building also has “major
fiber connections to Plano, Irving, Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Ft. Worth, Abilene,
Houston and Austin,” the website adds.

NSA and
AT&T maps point to the 4211 Bryan Street facility as being one of the
“peering” hubs, which process internet traffic as part of the NSA surveillance
program code-named FAIRVIEW. A former AT&T employee confirmed that the
site was one of eight primary AT&T “Service Node Routing
Complexes,” or SNRCs, in the U.S. NSA documents explicitly describe tapping
into flows of data at all eight of these sites.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

Los Angeles 420 South
Grand Avenue

At the time
of its construction in 1961, the AT&T building known as the Madison Complex
was the tallest building in downtown Los Angeles. It has since been dwarfed by
a number of corporate office skyscrapers in the surrounding Financial District.

Located
between Chinatown and the Staples Center, the fortress-like structure is one of
the largest telephone central offices in the U.S. “The theoretical number of
telephone lines that can be served from this office are 1.3 million and this
office also serves as a foreign exchange carrier to neighboring area codes,”
according to the Central
Office, a website that profiles U.S. telecommunications hubs.

“Untitled,
or Bell Communications Around the Globe”. Mural by Anthony Heinsbergen (1961)
on the West side of 420 South Grand Ave, La.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

The 448-foot,
17-story building is beige, rectangular, and mostly windowless. On its roof,
there is a large microwave tower, which was originally used to transmit phone
calls across a network of antennae. The tower’s technology became obsolete in
the early 1990s, and it ceased to operate. It remains in place today as a sort
of monument to outdated methods of communication and stands in contrast to the
more modern buildings in the vicinity, many of them owned by banks.

The Madison
Complex is located just two blocks from One Wilshire, which houses what is
reportedly the most important internet exchange on the U.S. west coast.
“Billions of phone calls, emails and internet pages pass through One Wilshire
every week,” the Los Angeles Times reported in
2013, “because it is the primary terminus for major fiber-optic cable routes
between Asia and North America.”

Due to the
close proximity of the Madison Complex and One Wilshire, and their shared role
as telecommunications hubs, it is likely that the buildings process some of the
same data as it is being routed across U.S. networks.

NSA and
AT&T maps point to the Madison Complex facility as being one of the
“peering” hubs, which process internet traffic as part of the NSA surveillance
program code-named FAIRVIEW. A former AT&T employee confirmed that the
site was one of eight primary AT&T “Service Node Routing
Complexes,” or SNRCs, in the U.S. NSA documents explicitly describe
tapping into flows of data at all eight of these sites.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

New York City 811 10th
Avenue

It was
built in 1964 as New York City’s first major telecommunications fortress. The
striking concrete and granite AT&T building – located in the Hell’s Kitchen
area about a 15-minute walk from Central Park – is 134 meters tall, with 21
floors, each one of them windowless and built to resist a nuclear blast.

A New York
Times article published
in 1975 noted that 811 10th Avenue was “the first of several windowless
equipment buildings to be constructed” in the city, and added that its design
initially “caused considerable controversy.”

According
to AT&T records,
the building is a “hardened telco data center” and was upgraded in 2000 to
become an internet data center. Thomas Saunders, a former AT&T engineer,
told The Intercept that, in the 1970s, the building was considered to be “the
biggest hub for transmission [of communications] in the country.” Saunders also
claimed that, had Bush been in Manhattan during the 9/11 attacks, the Secret
Service would have taken him to safety inside the AT&T facility. “It’s the
strongest building in town,” he said.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

NSA and
AT&T maps indicate that the 10th Avenue facility is one of eight “peering”
hubs that process internet traffic as part of the NSA surveillance program
code-named FAIRVIEW. Two former AT&T employees confirmed that the site
was one of eight primary AT&T “Service Node Routing
Complexes,” or SNRCs, in the U.S. NSA documents explicitly describe
tapping into flows of data at all eight of these sites.

The design
of the building bears some resemblance to another windowless building in New
York City – AT&T’s towering skyscraper at 33 Thomas Street in lower
Manhattan. As The Intercept reported in
2016, 33 Thomas Street is a major hub for routing international phone calls and
appears to contain a secure NSA surveillance room – code-named TITANPOINTE –
that has been used to tap into faxes and phone calls.

NSA and
AT&T documents indicate that 10th Avenue building serves as the NSA’s
internet equivalent of 33 Thomas Street. While the NSA’s surveillance at 33
Thomas Street mainly targets phone calls that pass through the building’s
international switching points, at the 10th Avenue site the agency appears to primarily
collect emails, online chats, and data from internet browsing sessions.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

San Francisco 611 Folsom
Street

This San
Francisco AT&T building has been described as the city’s telecommunications
“nerve center.” It is about 256 feet tall, has nine floors, and its exterior is
covered in silver-colored panels; there are a series of vents that can be seen
at street level, but there are few windows.

NSA and
AT&T maps obtained by The Intercept indicate that 611 Folsom Street is one
of the eight “peering” hubs in the U.S. that process internet traffic as part
of the NSA surveillance program code-named FAIRVIEW. Philip Long, who was
employed by AT&T for more than two decades as a technician servicing its
networks, confirmed that the San Francisco site is one of eight primary
AT&T “Service Node Routing Complexes,” or SNRCs, in the U.S. NSA
documents explicitly describe tapping into flows of data at all eight of these
sites.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

Long
recalled that, in the early 2000s, he “moved every internet backbone circuit I
had in northern California” through the Folsom Street office. At the time, he
said, he and his colleagues found it strange that they were asked to suddenly
reroute all of the traffic, because “there was nothing wrong with the services,
no facility problems.”

“We were
getting orders to move backbones … and it just grabbed me,” said Long. “We
thought it was government stuff and that they were being intrusive. We thought
we were routing our circuits so that they could grab all the data.”

It is not
the first time the building has been implicated in revelations about electronic
eavesdropping. In 2006, an AT&T technician named Mark Klein alleged in a
sworn court declaration that the NSA was tapping into internet traffic from a
secure room on the sixth floor of the facility.

Klein, who
worked at 611 Folsom Street between October 2003 and May 2004, stated that
employees from the agency had visited the building and recruited one of
AT&T’s management level technicians to carry out a “special job.” The job
involved installing a “splitter cabinet” that copied internet data as it was
flowing into the building, before diverting it into the secure room.

The room at
AT&T’s Folsom St. facility that allegedly contained NSA surveillance
equipment.

Photo: Mark
Klein

He said
equipment in the secure room included a “semantic traffic analyzer” – a tool
that can be used to search large quantities of data for particular words or
phrases contained in emails or online chats. Notably, Klein discovered that the
NSA appeared to be specifically targeting internet “peering links,” which is
corroborated by the NSA and AT&T documents obtained by The Intercept.

“By cutting
into the peering links, they get not only AT&T’s data, they get all the data
that’s interchanged between AT&T’s network and other companies,” Klein told
The Intercept in a recent interview.

According
to documents provided by Klein, AT&T’s network at Folsom Street “peered”
with other companies like Sprint, Cable & Wireless, and Qwest. It was also
linked, he said, to an internet exchange named MAE West, a major data hub in
San Jose, California, where other companies connect their networks together.

Sprint did
not respond to a request for comment. A spokesperson for Cable & Wireless
said the company only discloses data “when legally required to do so as a
result of a valid warrant or other legal process.” In 2011, CenturyLink
acquired Qwest as part of a $12.2 billion merger deal. A CenturyLink
spokesperson said he could not discuss “matters of national security.”

Photo:
Jovelle Tamayo for The Intercept

Seattle 1122 3rd Avenue

The Seattle
facility is located in the city’s downtown area, not far from the waterfront.
The gray building is 15 stories tall, with a dozen rows of narrow, blacked-out
windows and vents that rise to its peak. According to public records, it was first
constructed in 1955 and has reinforced concrete foundations and exterior walls
that are supported by a steel frame.

Historically,
the facility was an important communications switching point in the northwest
of the U.S., routing calls between places like Bellingham, Spokane, Yakima, and
north to Canada and Alaska. Today, the building appears to be primarily ownedby
the Qwest Corporation – a subsidiary of CenturyLink – but AT&T has a
presence within it. AT&T’s logo is emblazoned on a plaque outside the building’s
entrance.

Twenty-five
miles north of Seattle, there is a major intercontinental undersea cable called
Pacific Crossing-1, which routes communications between the U.S. and Japan; it
is possible that the Seattle building processes some of these communications
and others that pass between the U.S. west coast and Asia.

Photo:
Jovelle Tamayo for The Intercept

NSA and
AT&T maps point to the Seattle facility as being of eight “peering” hubs
that process internet traffic as part of the NSA surveillance program
code-named FAIRVIEW. A former AT&T employee confirmed that the site
was one of eight primary AT&T “Service Node Routing
Complexes,” or SNRCs, in the U.S. NSA documents explicitly describe
tapping into flows of data at all eight of these sites.

Photo:
Henrik Moltke

Washington, D.C. 30 E
Street Southwest

The
building is a large, concrete, rectangular-shaped facility with few windows,
located less than a mile south of the U.S. Capitol. Property tax records show
that Verizon owns the majority of the property (worth $26 million), while
AT&T owns a smaller part (worth $8.8 million). Plans of the building’s
internal layout show that AT&T has space on the fourth, fifth, and sixth
floors.

Central
Office Buildings, a website that
profiles telecommunications hubs in North America, describes the 30 E Street
South West facility as “the granddaddy HQ of Verizon landline in Washington,
DC.” It adds that the building contains a “a slew of switches of various
types,” including AT&T equipment for routing long distance phone calls
across networks.

Photo: Mike
Osborne

Capitol
Police has an office located opposite the telecommunications hub, and a large
number of police vehicles are usually located around the site. When The
Intercept visited the facility to take photographs earlier this year, within a
few minutes, several armed police officers arrived on the scene with dogs. They
questioned our reporter, searched his car, and said that the building was considered
critical infrastructure.

NSA and
AT&T maps point to the Washington, D.C. facility as being one of eight
“peering” hubs that process internet traffic as part of the NSA surveillance
program code-named FAIRVIEW. A former AT&T employee confirmed that the
site was one of eight primary AT&T “Service Node Routing
Complexes,” or SNRCs, in the U.S. NSA documents explicitly describe
tapping into flows of data at all eight of these sites.

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assange

At midday on Friday 5 February, 2016 Julian Assange, John Jones QC, Melinda Taylor, Jennifer Robinson and Baltasar Garzon will be speaking at a press conference at the Frontline Club on the decision made by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on the Assange case.