The U.S. plan to deploy elements of its Ballistic Missile Defense System in Eastern Europe was bound to be controversial. Russia has long been wary of U.S. missile defense plans and skeptical of U.S. claims about the ballistic missile threat from the third countries that missile defense is supposed to counter. The choice of Eastern Europe as the site of the upcoming deployment has made the plan particularly contentious, linking it to the already controversial process of eastward expansion of NATO. As a result, many Russians believe that in reality the missile defense system is directed against Russia.

The controversy over the deployment of a missile defense system in Europe is mainly a political issue that is directly linked to the character of the relationships between the countries, the way they understand each other’s intentions, and the level of trust between them. The disagreement that surrounds the missile defense deployment is probably the best evidence that the relationships between Russia and the United States and its Eastern European allies are not in good shape. At the same time, it is usually the process of working together on resolving differences that presents an opportunity to improve relationships. The United States and Russia have made a number of promising steps in that direction recently, but, unfortunately, it is too early to say that they have already found a solution of the problem.

In dealing with issues of missile defense, attempts to find a political solution inevitably have to take into account technical realities, in particular the potential capabilities of missile defenses and their limitations. Unfortunately, neither in Russia nor in the United States are these realities part of the public discussion to the extent it is necessary. This, of course, directly affects the quality of the debate. This article is an attempt to consider the main facts related to the suggested deployment of the missile defense system in Eastern Europe and to present an assessment of the capabilities and limitations of this system. We hope that this analysis will help improve the understanding of the issues the United States and Russia are dealing with and will help in finding a mutually acceptable way out of the current situation.

The planned system and its capabilities

The core of the current U.S. plan is to deploy ten ballistic missile interceptors in Poland and a tracking and discrimination radar in the Czech Republic after 2011. The officially declared goal of the current stage of deployment is “an improved capability to defend the United States against ballistic missile attack from the Middle East” and “to extend defensive coverage to Europe” against some missile attacks from that region.

The interceptors that would be deployed in Poland are two-stage solid-propellant missiles with a launch weight of about 22 tonnes that carry a relatively small kinetic-kill vehicle. Even though the interceptor is smaller than an ICBM (for example, the launch weight of a Minuteman missile is about 36 tonnes and that of a Topol-M is about 47 tonnes), it can accelerate the kill vehicle to very high speed – about 9 km/s, which is higher than the speed achieved by intercontinental missiles.

The radar that is planned to be deployed in the Czech Republic would be moved there from its current location at the missile defense test site at Kwajalein Atoll, where it has been used during various missile defense tests. It is a phased-array radar with a 12 meter diameter antenna that can be rotated. The radar operates in the X-band (wavelength of several centimeters), which allows it to achieve fairly high resolution and accuracy. The hope of the developers of the system is that the radar would be able to find a warhead among simple decoys and then track it. The intercept is supposed to take place during the ballistic phase of the flight, at altitudes well above the atmosphere.

The capability of a missile defense system depends on a number of factors. At the very minimum, the interceptors of the system must have a high enough speed to be able to reach a target after it is detected by the system’s radars.

The United States insists that the only targets that the planned system could intercept would be ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East region, from Iran in particular. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) claims that interceptors deployed in Poland will not have even a theoretical capability to reach Russian ballistic missiles on their trajectories. Unfortunately, this claim is incorrect. An analysis of possible trajectories of ICBMs and interceptors shows that with support from the radar in Czech Republic, interceptors deployed in Poland could reach most Russian missiles launched from bases in the European part of Russia. This, of course, does not automatically mean that the interceptors would be able to actually destroy the missiles (more about this later), but it is clear that this kind of misleading claim undermines the credibility of U.S. statements.

Another claim often being made by the U.S. Administration is that the ten interceptors that would be deployed in Poland could not possibly counter the Russian strategic nuclear force. Although it is hard to disagree with this statement, it should be noted that U.S. documents that set the roadmap for missile defense development clearly state that missile defense deployment would not stop after today’s systems are deployed. The Presidential National Security Directive 23 (PNSD-23), signed by President Bush in December 2002, states that the United States would begin to deploy missile defenses in 2004 “as a starting point for fielding improved and expanded missile defenses later.” The missile defense system is being developed and deployed in a way that would allow the system to expand in the future, as new or additional components become available. So, it is understandable that the references to the limited scale of the current deployment do not look entirely convincing.

There is a clear disconnect between the views held on the possible future capabilities of the system by the United States and Russia. Ideally, these views would eventually be reconciled. But by deliberately downplaying the capability of its system, the United States makes this reconciliation more difficult.

On the other hand, overestimating the capabilities of the system, which is often done in the Russian debate, does not help to resolve the issue either. It should be noted that any missile defense system that is supposed to intercept targets outside of the atmosphere would be extremely vulnerable to simple countermeasures. Even if an interceptor was able to catch up with a target missile and reach it in time, the system would still have to solve the problem of finding the warhead in a cloud of decoys. This task would be complicated by the employment of a range of other penetration aids. Systems that are supposed to counter missile defenses – decoys and other penetration aids – have been an integral part of development of ballistic missile forces, both in the United States and Soviet Union since at least 1960s, and all modern Russian missiles carry them. Given the experience that is available in this area, we can state with certainty that the current or future missile defense system will not be able to counter the ballistic missiles that Russia has in its arsenal today. (It is also likely that the missile defense could not successfully counter a missile threat from Iran, should this threat ever materialize.)

Even if the United States expands the system, say, by increasing the number of interceptors, it would not be able to neutralize the retaliatory capability of the Russian missile force. This, of course, does not mean that Russia should completely ignore the possibility of the system’s expansion. But if Russia is concerned about this possibility, it should concentrate on this point and not pretend that the U.S. system in its current configuration could pose any threat.

Similarly, the concerns about the possibility of using the interceptors in Poland for offensive mission are hardly justified. Even though interceptors are ballistic missiles of a sort, neither their payload nor guidance make them suitable for attacking ground targets. Using the interceptors themselves or the infrastructure that is created for them for offensive missions would be absolutely impractical and therefore can be completely ruled out.

Another set of issues is related to the deployment of a radar in Czech Republic. The capabilities of this radar also need to be assessed very carefully. This is a dedicated radar that is suitable for a narrow range of missions and that is quite limited in its ability to be employed for other missions.

First of all, the location of the radar in Czech Republic would not allow it to see missiles launched from any of the Russian test sites used for launches of sea-based or land-based ballistic missiles. The curvature of the Earth completely prevents this. Thus the radar cannot be used to gather intelligence on Russian missiles.

As for its missile defense mission, the main reason the system will employ a centimeter-range (X-band) radar is that it can provide high resolution that could help distinguish a warhead among decoys. At the same time, at these wavelengths a warhead has a fairly small reflective cross-section, which limits the range at which the radar can detect a target. This means that the Czech radar would not be able to track a large number of warheads simultaneously. Its early-warning capability would be limited as well, so it would have to rely on an external support – in the current deployment plan, the search will be done by another radar (known as the forward-based radar), which would be relocatable and could be deployed in the vicinity of the expected ballistic missile launch area.

Theoretically, the X-band radar could be upgraded to boost its power and increase its range and the number of targets it can handle. This modernization would require almost complete rebuilding of the antenna and therefore can be detected far in advance. This capability may be distant, but it certainly needs to be taken into account and could be a reason for concern.

Overall, the European system in the configuration that is proposed by the United States today cannot present a significant direct threat to the Russian strategic force. At the same time, it is not difficult to see how Russia may have questions about the eventual goal of the missile defense buildup and about the circumstances that accompany its deployment. For example, for a system that is claimed to provide a defense of Europe, it does not seem to be well configured for this mission. The claims that interceptors would not be able to reach Russian missiles, despite the evidence to the contrary undermine credibility of other U.S. statements. Overall, the current situation does not help build trust and understanding between Russia and the United States.

Opportunities for cooperation

A truly viable solution to the current problem would mostly likely be possible only if Russia and the United States build a partnership that does not depend on the balance between their strategic forces. The controversy that surrounds the missile defense deployment in Europe clearly demonstrates that this goal has not yet been achieved. Moreover, this controversy prevents such a new relationship from emerging, instead returning us back to a Cold War logic and mentality. Neither Russia nor the United States should be interested in this kind of deterioration of their relationship.

Even though the disagreement seems to be very serious, the current situation presents an opportunity for finding mutually acceptable solutions to the current problem. The most important proposal so far is the Russian one to offer its early-warning radars in Gabala or Armavir for use in the defense. The United States should very seriously consider this proposal. These Russian radars were developed as dedicated early-warning radars and can provide serious surveillance support to the U.S. radar, which is designed primarily for target tracking and discrimination. Even though the Gabala radar is fairly old, it is perfectly adequate for the supporting role that Russia suggested. Integration of Russian and U.S. radars should not be technically difficult. Russia could also consider offering a site on its territory for the deployment of the U.S. forward-based radar. In any of these scenarios, cooperation between Russia and the United Stated on a range of issues related to missile defense, even if limited at first, would greatly help them build mutual trust and understanding that is clearly necessary today.

The Russian proposal is especially important since it would also allow establishing reliable joint monitoring of missile threats in the Middle East region by providing the capability to detect test launches from countries under scrutiny, such as from Iran. This, in turn, would allow developing a better response to this threat, which should not be limited to missile defense only.

Russia, in turn, would have to make a difficult decision regarding its strong opposition to the planned deployment of the radar in the Czech Republic and the interceptors in Poland. It is true that this deployment could present a political problem, but it should be taken into account that the capability of the system is very limited and it could not pose any significant threat to the Russian strategic missile force. Nor could the radar in Czech Republic even be used for intelligence-gathering.

Overall, Russia and the United States could achieve much more progress toward their respective goals by choosing dialog and cooperation over confrontation. Russia has already considerably changed the tone of the discussion on missile defenses by proposing the use of its radars. It is likely that by remaining open to cooperation and discussion and by demonstrating flexibility when necessary, Russia could further change the character of the discussion in the United States and in Europe. It should take into account that although missile defense enjoys wide political support in the United States, there are doubts, in Congress in particular, about the viability of the plan proposed by the current administration. There are also concerns about potential adverse effect that the current proposal may have on the U.S.-Russian relations. Russia’s openness to a dialogue could help strengthen those who seek effective and non-confrontational solutions of the problems related to proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. Maintaining a dialogue between Russia and the United States may prove difficult, but such a strategy will eventually prove more productive and will better serve the interests of both countries than the alternative.

The paradox of the situation is that the current disagreements provide unique opportunities for bringing the U.S.-Russian relationship to a new level of strategic partnership and for moving away from the current relationship based on mutual nuclear deterrence to a relationship that would make any serious confrontation impossible.

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Comments

"Thus the radar cannot be used to gather intelligence on Russian missiles."

Are you sure? Sergey Lavrov
said this last week.
"Russia's foreign minister suggested in an interview broadcast Friday that the United States wants to install an anti-missile system in Eastern Europe to spy on Russia"

Theodore Postol’s work has always confused me. The actual science is beyond my understanding but his general conclusion that on one hand missile defense won’t work; will never work and the opposite conclusion this system is so accurate it proves a risk to Russian-American relations. I think this article helped frame the discussion in a way I better understand the issues.

By the way, in the animation posted in an earlier article, it shows the intercept of a Russian ICBM by the GBI in Poland. Postol stated this is a real scenario and the MDA rebuttal was this intercept was impossible and Ted Postol had no clue regarding the GBI capabilities and such. Was this “kill” against the ICBM itself or against a deployed warhead? If the interceptor struck the ICBM in flight, I assume no decoys or penetrating aids would come into play. If the interceptor struck the RV before deploying its payload, I would draw the same conclusions. Any ideas what Ted Postol’s assumptions were in this scenario?

Theoretically, boot phase intercept of liquid ICBM are possible. Look here: http://programtree.com/pro.gif
You can see trajectory to Miami, to Minneapolis, to Seattle. All boot phases for Koselsk inside GBI range.
Case: GBI version is OBV. Launch GBI is 45 sec later SS19.

As I understand it, the main issue with boost phase intercept is that the missile trajectory is not as predictable as during ballistic flight. It is probably not impossible, but may require a heavier and more maneuverable KKV.

Frank: Yes, there is this issue of what an interceptor would be able to do if it "catches" a Russian missile. This will be well above the atmosphere, so it would have to deal with decoys etc., which eventually make an intercept pretty much impossible. But that's not MDA's claim - had they made it they would have to admit that the system won't work against Iranian missiles as well.

In fairness, MDA claims “great strides” have been made in decoy identification over the last five years and the US system is predicted to be “very” effective in parsing the decoys and penaids to strike the warhead itself. This is just the “company line” and I have no opinion if this is realistic in the least. Of course, an ICBM has never been used in combat either.

So in Ted’s animation, the GBI was striking a warhead that had been released from a RV.

If you read the verbiage from MDA, the general conclusion is not that the US GBI based in Poland could not “reach” a Russian ICBM in theory but that in a combat situation, there would not be enough time to detect a Russian launch by satellite, alert the National Command Authority, alert the European GBI system, cue the intercept and launch an interceptor to hit a, say, SS-27 minutes in flight. That too is the “company line”.

Most of the information regarding Russian, or previous Soviet, ICBM testing at Kamchatka (Kura) originates from Misawa in Japan. I would assume most of the US intelligence gathering regarding such activities is based in Japan.

Completely agree, Shemya Island is a tracking station all the way going back to SALT days. In fact by 1993, Pentagon budgetary constraints forced discontinuation of all but the primary mission of intelligence data collection at Shemya and its support for “NORAD early warning” was basically dropped.

Wow. Can we say "agenda" here? So basically the MDA/US is a bunch of lying SOBs because theoretically if you launched a GBI at virtually the same time as a Russian ICBM (which wouldn't happen) it could have a chance of missing RVs that it can't intercept? Am I the only one that thinks Postol is trying to have his cake and eat it too? I appoligize if I sound rude but this whole rigamarole is getting to be a sad joke. We're talking about TEN missiles here people. T-E-N. Sure, the US has talked about possibly expanding it- in the US not Poland. Does anybody here honestly believe Russia wouldn't see silo #11 being built and raise a ruckus? Postol seems to be living in a place where reality and fantasy are one and the same and "objectivity" doesn't appear in the dictionary.

As for ten or eleven missiles, it's not the issue. Let me quote the relevant paragraph here:

Even if the United States expands the system, say, by increasing the number of interceptors, it would not be able to neutralize the retaliatory capability of the Russian missile force. This, of course, does not mean that Russia should completely ignore the possibility of the system’s expansion. But if Russia is concerned about this possibility, it should concentrate on this point and not pretend that the U.S. system in its current configuration could pose any threat.

I would really encourage everyone to read posted stuff before starting an argument.

As for Postol does he have a site where he posts his assumptions that go into his calculations? ISPs, burn times, vehicle weights, acceleration curves, etc? And his sources as well (anybody can pull numbers out of the air).

Personally it wouldn't surprise me completely if a GBI could "technically" catch a Russian ICBM but practically speaking the decision loop (particularly involving a RUSSIAN missile) isn't going to be short enough to pull it off. As for effectivness I don't understand what Postol is so bothered about. Does he think we'd have a better chance shooting down an Iranian ICBM with NOTHING? Surely even a 50% solution is better than a 0% one.

Scott, why do you think that any decision to launch a GBI would need to be so long? The missile is without a warhead, it would intersept above NATO territory... So, if there is a warning for a launch in Russia, the reaction could be almost instatanious, even less than 45 seconds if the processing of the sattelite data is fast enough and directly linked to the ABM site.
Also, imagine a US first strike, no matter how impossible it could seem. Well if you are launching your nukes, you won't be taking long decisions whether or not to down a Russian ICBM.

It seems to me that an interception of, say, a Topol-M in the boost phase would be highly likely with 9km/sec interceptors launched from Poland, nullifying the use of decoys and more importantly maneuverable warheads. This is compounded by the fact that with only a total of around 120 Topol-M's planned for deployment, that's nearly 10% of the force, and that is assuming that the number of interceptors is capped at 10. The concept of defending Europe against a missile launch from Iran is absurd. Russia ought to either prevent the system from being deployed by diplomatic means or develop a system to counter it, whether that be some form of "anti-GBI" interceptor or targeting by "high acceleration/performance" IRBM's. This is clearly a move against Russia in my view, and has nothing to do with any possible "Iranian missile threat".

The Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) system now deployed in Alaska and California and perhaps in the future in Poland isn’t capable of striking an ICBM in boost phase. The technology is designed to place a “kill vehicle” in the orbital path of an ICBM and destroy the nuclear payload by kinetic strike.

Why is “the concept of defending Europe against a missile launch from Iran twenty years from now absurd”? That is about how long it will take to build an Iranian ICBM and the US to complete all the satellite systems necessary to cue and control such an ABM system.

I also predict in twenty years Russia will be a member of NATO and all these discussions will be mute.

Frank,
I may be completely wrong, but wouldn't a boost phase intercept be a lot easier than a terminal phase? The ICBM would be travelling much slower and would present a target many orders of magnitude larger than a re-entry vehicle, both in radar cross section and heat signature.
On the second issue, my thought is that the only country Iran would ever consider launching a nuke at would be the US. However, I don't believe that any state, Iran included, would be willing to risk certain retaliatory nuclear annihilation. Terrorists, yes; but never with an ICBM or IRBM. Besides, it's pretty hypocritical for the US or any other nuclear power to demand that Iran cease development of nuclear weapons, especially when the only reason for such a demand is to maintain the current world power structure in their favor. However, if there MUST be an ABM system in Poland, it should be an all-Russian system, Period. Otherwise it would be like Russia putting an ABM system in Canada or Mexico to protect the US from Cuban missiles. I think most people here would consider that an insult and provocation at best.

I think hitting a streaking ICBM in boost launch is VERY difficult from the distance we’re talking about here. In the case of a SS-27, with its extremely fast launch speed, perhaps impossible. (I think it is impossible) If you’re sitting in an AEGIS cruiser off the coast of North Korea, in international waters, only a couple hundred miles away from the launch, the odds improve dramatically. In the future, space based laser technology may play a role in boost phase defense but that’s a big step into the future.

I completely agree it is totally hypocritical for the US to expect Iran not to develop nuclear weapons. Hypocrisy aside, if Iran goes down this road it will only spread the technology around the Near East with grave and uncertain results. How long before Somalia gets “the bomb”? Chechnya? Once we go down this path, the future becomes far more different for Russia and the United States to “manage”. Someone asked me the other day, what nuclear power I feared the most. My answer was simple, Pakistan.

If Iran had nuclear weapons and an ICBM delivery system would she use this technology to attack the US and face a devastating reply? I don’t think so. GBI in Europe is more of a political statement than anything else. I do think maintaining a smaller nuclear inventory and developing these defensive systems has a certain merit. American’s only other choice is to retain a much larger inventory of nuclear weapons to “target” these new emerging threats. For example, it is to Russia’s advantage that the Pentagon has decided to eliminate both the Peacekeeper missile and the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) and pursue the GBI system.

"Does anybody here honestly believe Russia wouldn't see silo #11 being built and raise a ruckus?"

Why would Russia "honestly believe" them "raising a ruckus" at that point would change anything at all? As Mr. Podvig has remarked, past experience with assurances given by the US provides every reason for Russia to conclude that all their leverage on the USA is lost if they cannot prevent unilateral deployment of the Eastern European interceptors. It is worth mentioning that the USA are not even legally bound to any of their questionable (in Russian opinion) reassurances in the absence of a follow-on agreement to the ABM Treaty.

"Hypocrisy aside, if Iran goes down this road it will only spread the technology around the Near East with grave and uncertain results. How long before Somalia gets “the bomb”? Chechnya?"

Which would inevitably render even the most theoretical protection offered by an Eastern European ABM site moot. I think this one of the points that people rightly criticize about the system, a 50% chance is no doubt better than 0%, but that is based on the assumption that an ABM site is even capable of providing said 50%.

Frank, what does Iran have to gain from sharing nuclear weapon technology with anyone?

BTW, I wonder how difficult it would be to replace kinetic interceptor warhead with an explosive one - conventional or even nuclear. We know this has been done in Soviet ABM. So why doesn't US do that to increase interception efficiency? Or maybe the're just taking their time for political reasons?

Iran has nothing more to gain from the spread of such technology than, say, Pakistan. Yet, such technology is expanding across the Near East; note the recent “issue” between Israel and Syria. What we have learned is that once these government-to-government and organization-to-organization relationships are developed, technology transfers occur and are unpredictable. Stopping Iran today is about the future 20 years from now. In fact the entire ABM system in Europe is about the future 20 years from now.

I don’t really think the payload for the GBI interceptor is politically driven with the exception of using a nuclear warhead. I think the KI warhead is the best technical solution to the problem today. I do think all this is an interim solution that will transition to space-based assets in the distant future.

Frank, can you please explain why you think that Iran is going to treat its hypothetical nuclear weapon techlogy like Pakistan (ie, share it), and not like about every other nuclear state (that is, protect it)?

I draw this conclusion from the fact that Iran’s nuclear program has already benefited from international support from both national governments like Russia, North Korea and Pakistan and also from non-governmental organizations such as the Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan network. How much of the Iranian nuclear program is actually “Iranian” is unclear at this point. Such international support always comes at a price. I honestly think Russia only wants commercial business opportunities with Tehran such as the joint Russian-Iranian nuclear power plant project but nuclear technology transfers are always apart of such arrangements.
I honest believe that China’s support for the Pakistan nuclear program in the 1980’s were as a counter point to India. Yet, look where the decision by China to mentor Pakistan have led us today. The last thing China wants is nuclear proliferation on her borders but that’s the reality. Just my opinion.

Selling missile defence while really taking aim at another problem?
Could an airforce pilot of any country pull the trigger on a hyjacked commercial airliner on a suicide mission against any country? Let's take out the human factor and let a missile defence system do the real dirty job. Isn't this what Bush is really on a mission to promote, while explaining to the world population that it's really just for intercepting missiles from rouge states? Wanna still fly commercial? Even a rouge state would know that any attempt to attack another nuclear country would spell anniliation for themselves. This just isn't a likely threat. But another 9-11 is.