china's security analysts have been predicting u.s. decline for a long time.
In fact, the idea that U.S. strength is weakening and that its policies will no
longer be effective throughout the world is not new in the 1990s. Using internal
Chinese documents, Professor Robert S. Ross has shown it was alleged in the
early 1980s. For example, U.S. concessions in what formed the August 17, 1982,
Communique between the United States and China were explained as due to U.S.
"power decline." Another analyst at that time argued that U.S. "position of
strength is declining" and U.S. policy will "lead to failure everywhere." (188)

According to official Chinese Marxism, a "capitalist" United States cannot
avoid decline forever. Even in military strength and technology, including the
development of the revolution in military affairs (RMA), areas where the United
States currently is considered to hold the leading position, Chinese military
experts claim that there are several reasons the United States is destined to
fall behind other nations. This "inevitable" decline of the U.S. hegemon is a
decisive feature of China's assessment of the future. Without U.S. decline,
there will be no multipolar structure in which a rising power can seek
protection. Without the fading away of U.S. military alliances with Europe and
Japan, a rising power will have no new partners with which to align.
Additionally, without U.S. decline, Chinese Marxism would be proven false.

Since 1991, some Chinese military authors have described specific U.S.
military weaknesses and forecasted that after two decades the superpower status
of the United States will end. This chapter, which cites the views of 70
authors, divides its survey of U.S. decline into three subjects:

How and why the United States will fail to exploit the promise of a potential
RMA

People's Liberation Army (PLA) assessments of how U.S. logistics and
operational weaknesses in the Gulf War are indicators of American decline and
the problems it will face in future wars

How U.S. military weakness is one factor affecting overall U.S.
decline.

This is the first of several chapters to deal with Chinese writings about the
future implications of the RMA, which is also an important factor in the
chapters about Comprehensive National Power (CNP), Japan, Russia, and future
wars. PLA authors assert that the United States will do well in the RMA only in
its initial period of a decade or so, then other nations like Russia and Japan
will surpass America in developing future RMA-type forces. (189) Failure
with the RMA will affect victory in future war, because "Non-RMA troops will not
possess the qualifications for future high-technology warfare." (190)

The assessment of U.S. military decline is reinforced by Chinese civilian
authors. As mentioned in chapter one, authoritative civilian analysts forecast a
decline in America's diplomatic role in the 21st century, as multipolarity opens
up the potential for new alignments and "partnerships," and Japan and Europe
seek to improve their relations with China. According to the ancient statecraft
of the Warring States era, a too-powerful hegemon could easily destroy a rising
rival. However, a coalition or a series of "strategic partnerships" could save a
rising power from such destruction if the hegemon were declining. Chinese
authors claim, "Today the trend toward multipolarization in the world is
quickening, which prevents the United States from achieving world dominance. In
fact the United States is declining relatively in the world. The gap between
insufficient power and overly lofty goals fundamentally frustrates its scheme to
create a single-pole world." (191)

failure to implement the rma

Chinese authors define an RMA as they believe the United States does,
emphasizing the potential invention of radical new forms of warfare, enhanced
information warfare, networks of systems, and "digitized" combat forces. (192) However,
while Chinese analysts acknowledge America's current leading position in the
field, many also point to existing and future weaknesses, how they can be
exploited, and why other countries will surpass the United States. For example,
the scope of negative predictions about how the United States will implement an
RMA varies little among five books published by PLA authors at the Academy of
Military Science (AMS) in the last 4 years. (193) Their
critiques of the United States range from technology issues to the ways in which
U.S. military and government attitudes and philosophies will restrict and limit
creativity, development, and implementation of the RMA. Several of the authors
emphasize the greater potential of other countries, including China, in the area
of innovation. Gao Chunxiang writes that U.S. weaknesses

provide us with the train of thought in future information warfare on how to
stay clear of the enemy's main force and strike at his weak points, avoid his
strengths and attack his weaknesses, adopt his good points and avoid his
shortcomings, use the indigenous to create the foreign, seek the cause to
respond with a plan. . . . In future information warfare, if we only dare to
blaze new trails there will be no need to be afraid of anyone. (194)

Other authors point out how long it will take the United States to realize
fully the RMA. General Wang Pufeng estimates it will take until 2050 for all
U.S. forces to be "digitized" and part of a "system of systems," because of the
slow pace to date and U.S. interservice rivalry. (195)

According to Han Shengmin, the United States faces the following four major
obstacles in "establishing a digitized battlefield:" (196)

Interservice rivalry. The U.S. Air Force and Navy do not want to join the
U.S. Army's digital forces experiments and have a "negative-passive attitude."
Both houses of the U.S. Congress are also said to be obstacles, as indicated by
the statement, "Senate Armed Services Committee, Air-Land Forces Subcommittee
Chairman, John Warner, believes that 'troops still lack the technical skills to
use digitized equipment in combat.' " Another Senator is quoted as saying, "Army
troops are too reliant on digitized battlefields, and as soon as a digitized
network is destroyed, they would be unable to fulfill their combat missions." (197)

Insufficient funds. The U.S. defense budget has been decreasing for many
years, and recently even for digital forces.

The technology is too complex. "If you want to build a digitized battlefield,
you must resolve the following six technical issues: converting sensors
information into digitized coded form; processing digitized information; making
digitized connections; joining digitized systems of different combat platforms;
developing digital display equipment; and establishing digital links between
troops and platforms."
(198)

Information networks are easily damaged. "The control nodes of information
networks after being attacked are easily damaged, causing the entire system to
break down. . . . Local network systems' security is poor, and they are easily
subject to electronic attacks." (199)

Another important example of Chinese beliefs is America, Russia, and the
Revolution in Military Affairs, by two officers at the AMS, who argue that
the United States will at first be successfully innovative during the initial
decade of the RMA but later will be surpassed by one (or more) vigorous nations.
They explain that the United States will ultimately lose its status as a
military superpower because it will fail to exploit the RMA for several reasons,
including:

American military arrogance following the Gulf War will inhibit fundamental
innovation, especially in the area of new operational concepts which are crucial
for an RMA.

Information technology and other new military technologies will be
universally available through commercial enterprises and cannot be restricted by
the U.S. Government, so the United States will lose its current advantage.

Smaller defense budgets have historically produced more innovation than the
giant U.S. budgets.

New, innovative "measures of effectiveness" tend to drive innovation, and
nations other than the United States are experimenting more in this area, even
when they have to buy weapons from more advanced nations. (200)

Wang Zhenxi, a Senior Adviser at the China Institute of International
Strategic Studies (CIISS), provides additional insight into why, despite its
advanced technology, other countries may surpass the U.S. in exploiting the RMA.
He argues that not only could other nations put forward new technologies or
doctrines before the United States, but that military factors are not the only
ones affecting the outcome of the RMA. Instead, a variety of components, such as
the factors that make up a country's CNP, also contributes to a country's
ability to develop the RMA:

Counting on its technical superiority, the United States claims itself to be
the forerunner in the military revolution and that it even has such a great lead
of 30 to 50 years over other nations that no country can catch up and advance
shoulder to shoulder with it before 2020. We say that military technology is an
agent behind the military revolution, but not the only one.

Wang next employs the same definition of RMA used by Andrew W. Marshall and
other American proponents:

It depends on the combined action of social, political, economic and
scientific and technological factors for a military revolution to take place and
proceed smoothly. . . . And in the military field it hinges on the joint
innovation of the military technology, doctrines and organizational structure.

To the surprise of Westerners, Wang differs from Americans and does not
expect the United States to be the world's leader in the RMA:

It is not necessarily the existing most technologically advanced country that
will eventually achieve the best results in the military revolution. And it can
not be ruled out that in the current military revolution certain countries may
advance new military thoughts or doctrines, thus pinning down the technological
supremacy the U.S. primarily expects to possess in the era of information. . . .
If the social, political, economic, scientific and technological, and military
thought factors are taken into account, then it is not absolutely limited to the
United States as the only country that can wage a military revolution. (201)

Chinese analysts also use the most recent public review of United States
defense strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as the
basis to suggest increasing military challenges the United States may not be
prepared to face. First, there is the issue of homeland defense. Lu Dehong from
the CIISS writes, "It is the first time since the end of the Cold War that the
United States emphasizes that the U.S. homeland is not free from external
threats." Second, Lu points out that the United States is making only a modest
effort to exploit the RMA: "How to balance investment in the present versus the
future was the fundamental contradiction facing the U.S. Department of Defense."
The QDR examined three different strategic paths to solve this tough problem:
the QDR chose a third path--to strike a balance between the present and the
future "that embraces the RMA in an evolutionary way. . . . Continuing to
exploit the RMA has been adopted as the general principle of U.S. military
development of the QDR." (202)

The Chinese criticize the U.S. Army for already "being trapped in the blind
alley of technology." A Liberation Army Daily article states, "The Army
which the U.S. Army is engaged in is no more than the use of a nation's
technology to transform the existing units as well as the
existing weaponry and equipment of the Army, and the U.S. Army is
already trapped in the blind alley of technology." The article warns, "If the
United States goes on with the present practice, the military revolution it is
engaged in will not be a thorough going one," and predicts "The United States
will not exploit the RMA very well." (203)

According to some Chinese military authors, the United States already knows
China can defeat it in 2020. General Pan Junfeng states that the United States
will not have formed a full information warfare force until the middle of the
21st century. He explains three ways that in future wars American computers can
be very vulnerable. "We can make the enemy's command centers not work by
changing their data system. We can cause the enemy's headquarters to make
incorrect judgments by sending disinformation. We can dominate the enemy's
banking system and even its entire social order." General Pan states that the
United States already realizes these three points and that on January 30, 1994,
Defense News reported that in war games between the Chinese military
and the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, at the U.S. Naval War College, the Chinese
forces defeated U.S. forces. General Pan puts forward five suggestions for ways
in which China can strengthen its development and implementation of the RMA:

Increase research on military doctrine

Establish operational theory

Train high-quality people in advanced degrees

Establish combat laboratories and learn from the six laboratories the United
States has created

Some Chinese authors have treated the question of America's future
extensively as they analyze the future security environment, so it is important
to know the baseline of how China assesses the United States today. In general,
Chinese authors assert the following points about current U.S. military
weakness:

The United States barely won the Gulf War.

Saddam could have won with a better strategy.

The United States today cannot "contain" Chinese power.

The United States is unable to execute its military strategy of two major
regional contingencies.

Chinese books on the U.S. military are plentiful and largely descriptive. (205) Some
Chinese military textbooks about the U.S. Armed Forces begin with a sentence
that declares U.S. military technology is the best in the world, (206) but this
apparent praise is misleading. The main point of all writings about U.S. forces
is to emphasize their weak points and their vulnerability to defeat by China.
Not one of the more than 200 books reviewed for this study admitted that the
United States could defeat China by force in any scenario--but many techniques
can supposedly defeat U.S. forces. (207) There are
frequent references to China's "defeat" of U.S. forces in both Korea and
Vietnam. The United States is said likely to fall behind others in the RMA. It
is said that even Japan is developing better military technology than the United
States in several areas and that the United States is "dependent" on Japan for
military technology.
(208)

The devaluing of U.S. military power is accompanied by frequent references in
military books and the prestigious journal, China Military Science, to
the importance of ancient Chinese statecraft, especially to the early centuries
of Chinese history, when several warring states adroitly manipulated a balance
of power until one state achieved primacy and assumed the name "China." Both the
challenge of new military technology and the need to use traditional Chinese
statecraft figure in this story of the founding of China; both are also often
mentioned when Chinese authors address the 21st century.

In general, most Chinese analysts since 1991 have acknowledged that the
United States is the "sole military superpower" and has the most technologically
advanced army, navy and air force in the world. Somewhat humorously, one analyst
writes, "In the last 20 years, people have turned pale at the mere mention of
U.S. military strength." (209) However,
they suggest that this characterization of narrow technological superiority
would mean very little in a U.S. conflict with China. Chinese authors repeatedly
emphasize that major, fatal weaknesses characterize the American Armed Forces.
Almost all universally cite Chairman Mao's requirement that the dialectical
aspect of Chinese military science requires assessment of weakness as well as
strength.

The Chinese view is that the United States suffers from fundamental logistics
weaknesses and several operational weaknesses. Chinese authors believe Saddam
Hussein, using Chinese-style strategy, could have exploited these weaknesses in
order to defeat the United States.

weaknesses in logistics

In order to denigrate the image of the United States as a superpower
colossus, a number of Chinese articles focus on American logistics
limitations.
(210) Many Chinese analysts cite statistics and examples from the Gulf
War in order to point out the problems the United States would face in a
potential war in Asia. Other authors examine the evolution of U.S. military
strategy, arguing that it illustrates the gradual weakening of U.S. power since
World War II.

The United States is described as a country that "must cross the Atlantic or
Pacific Oceans and go to Europe or Asia" before any serious war starts. From
1961 to 1968, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson incorporated a flexible response
strategy for fighting two-and-a-half wars simultaneously. Chinese military
authors refer to these as a war with the Soviet Union and Europe, a war with
China and Asia, and half a war with a regional power in an area such as the
Middle East. As America's overall national strength declined, however, from 1969
to 1980, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter realized that "strength fell short
of ambition" to fight two-and-a-half wars, so U.S. military strategy shifted to
fighting one-and-a-half wars. Chinese called this "fighting the big war either
in Europe or Asia, and at the same time a small war in some other region." (211)

The Chinese posit that American weakness can be seen from the U.S. definition
that the Gulf War should have been a "half war," but in fact it required almost
all America's conventional weapons, its reserves had to be called up, 6 months
were needed for the United States to complete the deployment of troops in the
Gulf, and it had to hire foreign ships to carry troops, equipment, and supplies.
Chinese analysts point out that nearly 50 percent of the weapons and equipment
for the Gulf War had to be carried by foreign ships and foreign aircraft because
the United States lacked strategic airlift and sealift. After detailing the
extent of U.S. dependency on foreign transportation, one author wrote, "Huge
inputs were in order to guarantee one battlefield's requirements; if it had to
simultaneously ensure the requirements of two battlefields, the current U.S.
transportation capabilities clearly are insufficient." (212) More
importantly, Chinese articles point out that in the Gulf War, oil, which
accounts for 50 percent of the materials consumed by the U.S. Armed Forces,
could basically be arranged in the region rather than having to rely on
vulnerable lines of supply. One author asks, "If it were a long, drawnout war,
with many casualties and losses, could the United States promptly replenish
troops, equipment, and materials and maintain the troops' fighting ability?" (213)

They cite other U.S. advantages in the Gulf War, not to be repeated again,
such as the cooperation of the 28 countries in the coalition and the role of 120
countries in imposing a blockade against Iraq. Chinese analysts also note that
America's "strong dependency on allies" is a potential vulnerability in future
multination joint combat operations because of problems inherent in alliances.
One author writes that during the Gulf War, "Due to differences among the
various allied countries' troops, in the areas of war interests, combat
ideology, weaponry, culture, and language, numerous difficulties inevitably
existed in command coordination. This could provide the opponent with a few
opportunities it could exploit, including dividing and disintegrating the
alliance politically, and destroying the countries militarily one by one." (214) In
addition, Chinese military specialists also point out that in spite of all the
advantages provided by the alliance, it took Iraq only several hours to capture
Kuwait, but the allied forces took more than 30 days to recover Kuwait.

One important assessment concludes that if it was so difficult for the United
States to win a "half war" against Iraq with so many advantages from its
coalition forces, the United States would not do well fighting alone against
China and Asia. A PLA author asserts that it would be "hard to predict the
result" of a United States war with China and Asia:

If we have to predict, then the chance of its winning is only 30 percent,
because the U.S. Forces have never fought a "whole" war overseas, while the
"half wars" they have fought ended sometimes in victory and sometimes in defeat.
The two sides fought to a draw in the Korean War; the Vietnam War was lost; and
the Gulf War was a victory, but fought by 28 countries. (215)

Even looking back on World War II, the Chinese assessment is that, although
the United States was in a "whole" war, it fought only "half of it" because of
its limited participation, which began with Pearl Harbor. According to the
Chinese assessment, "The relentless pressure of the Russians was driving the
Germans farther and farther back, and the defeat of Germany was almost a
certainty" before the United States opened the second front in Normandy. Even in
the European theater, the United States was joined by both the Soviet Union and
Britain, while in the Asian theater the United States enjoyed the combat
cooperation of "China, Britain, and the Soviet Union." (216)

north korea can defeat america

Chinese military authors also appear to devalue the effectiveness of U.S.
forces in a future Korean scenario. According to a colonel at AMS, several
factors ensure U.S. defeat "if in the next few years a Korean War erupted." His
main points are:

The United States will not have 6 months to deploy and train forces. Instead,
"the Korean People's Army will surprise attack South Korean air bases, ports and
communication lines."

"U.S. casualties will not be as low as in the Gulf War. . . . On the Korean
peninsula, the population is dense, with river networks and mountains, roads are
few, unsuitable to armor . . . casualties will be extremely high."

"North Korea's mountains are wrapped in clouds and mist; it will be difficult
for the U.S. Air Force and high-technology weaponry to give full play to their
vast superiority."

U.S. forces lack numerical strength. During the Korean War, U.S. troops
reached over 400,000, but the result was not victory. In the 1960s and 1970s, in
the Vietnam War American forces were 663,000 and had great technical
superiority, but the result also was defeat. U.S. forces in year 2000 will be 70
percent of today.
(217)

weaknesses in the gulf war

The Chinese perception of American strategic weakness based on logistics is
further compounded by the assertions of many Chinese military authors that
American operational weaknesses could one day make U.S. forces extremely
vulnerable to a Chinese-style strategy. An overall assessment of the war comes
from the Vice President of AMS, Li Jijun, who writes that during the Gulf
War,

U.S. Armed Forces revealed many weak points. For example, the combat
consumption was too great, and it could not last long. There was great reliance
on the allied countries. The high-tech equipment was intensive and its key links
were rather weak; once they were damaged, combat effectiveness was greatly
reduced. Also if the adversary of the United States was not Iraq, if the battle
was not fought on the flat desert, if the Iraq Armed Forces struck first during
the phase when U.S. Armed Forces were still assembling, or if Iraq Armed Forces
withdrew suddenly before the U.S. Armed Forces struck, then the outcome of the
war might have been quite different. (218)

Several books published in the mid-1990s purport to analyze U.S. military
weaknesses in detail. One published in May 1996 by Major General Li Zhiyun,
Foreign Military Studies Director at the National Defense University, contains
articles by 75 PLA authors who describe in detail an extended list of joint
warfare weaknesses of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force: (219)

Interservice rivalries limit coordination.

Intelligence does not reach operators rapidly.

Space satellites are vulnerable to direct attack.

Command control nodes are exposed to attack.

Ports and airfields are vulnerable in initial deployment.

Each high-tech weapon has its own weakness.

Aircraft carriers depend on E6 Prowlers.

U.S. forces are optimized for deserts, not mountains.

These represent a common theme in PLA views of future warfare--America is
proclaimed to be a declining power with but two or three decades of primacy
left. U.S. military forces, while dangerous at present, are vulnerable and can
be defeated by China with the right strategy. That strategy is "defeating the
superior with the inferior" (yiruo shengqiang). Part of the recommended
approach in some of this PLA writing is the requirement for "the inferior" to
pre-emptively strike the "superior" in order to paralyze his nerve centers and
block his logistics. Chinese military books and articles on U.S. weaknesses date
back at least to the Gulf War in 1991 and continue to appear, drawing on
analysis of that conflict. Ten strategies that could have been employed to
exploit U.S. operational weaknesses during the Gulf War were cited by Chinese
military analysts.

Fortify positions. One representative analyst states, "Nothing can
better reflect an Army's fighting ability than combat involving attacks on
fortified positions." The Chinese explain American success in attacking Iraqi
fortifications as due to the terrain in Kuwait and Southern Iraq, which is "a
flat desert" where it is "difficult to build long-term solid fortifications"
because the sand layer is so thin. Even with this advantage of Iraqi weakness,
"The United States took a long time to tackle them . . . in 38 days
they flew 10,000 sorties, and eliminated only 40 percent of the Iraqi forces."
To the Chinese, the important point about American weakness is that U.S. forces
could not overcome the following defenses: cities and mountains deep in the
hinterland, the underground command post, garrisoned tunnels, underground
warehouses, and aircraft and strategic missile bunkers that, according to the
Chinese analysis, were "relatively safe." Only a few civilian bunkers and "some
hangars which were not solid enough" were destroyed. U.S. conventional munitions
cannot destroy fortifications with walls greater than 10 meters thick or deep
underground facilities, especially in mountainous areas. The Chinese analyst
concludes, "If the Iraqi forces could have relied on mountainous areas and built
tunnels with layers more than 10 meters or even dozens of meters thick, then
even if the U.S. forces could have cut several meters away from the peak, they
could not have hurt the Iraqi forces one little bit."

Using this measure of effectiveness, Chinese analysts belittle American
capabilities to "penetrate or blow up a protective layer several meters thick"
or the battleship Wisconsin's 1-ton shells that can destroy "a
reinforced concrete protective layer as thick as 4 meters." (220) Chinese
underground bunkers are portrayed as invulnerable to American attacks. If press
reports are accurate, China has a series of underground tunnels in the
mountainous area west of Beijing that protect a national underground command
center. Chinese use of tunneling and mountainous areas for command centers and
protection of army, navy, and air force equipment dates back to the Korean War
and is often described with pride in Chinese historical accounts. It is
therefore likely that Chinese military leaders take comfort in this American
operational weakness.

Exploit weaknesses. Several Chinese articles criticized the Iraqi
military commanders for not exploiting well-known American weaknesses. (221) The
Vietcong and North Vietnamese knew how to play on American weaknesses, but the
Iraqis did not learn from those lessons. For example, the Iraqis did not conduct
harassment attacks behind American lines at bases in Saudi Arabia, unlike the
Vietcong's extensive operations. The Iraqi officer corps was not sufficiently
trained in technology to master the advanced equipment that it had purchased. (222)

One way to defeat U.S. Air Force and Naval air power is to strike at
American-controlled airbases, according to former Chief of Staff of the PLA,
General Su Yu: "However strong a combat capability, an Army unit does not have
any combat capability before entering its position." According to past examples
of local wars, the Israeli Air Force succeeded in launching surprise attacks in
several wars because of its "strict training and meticulous planning and
preparations" and because "the other party slackened their efforts, lowered
their guard, had insufficient training, and issued inappropriate combat
commands."
(223) Another crucial area where Chinese analysts criticized Iraq for
not making surprise attacks was pointed out by Gao Chunxiang. When discussing
the complexities of logistics safeguards, he stated, "If the Iraqi military had
made a surprise attack on the rear of the U.S. military and multination troops,
then the end of the war could have been rewritten." (224)

Prevent specialized training. According to the Chinese, the Iraqis
allowed the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct special training for several months
before the war and to remain on a high state of alert. "This undoubtedly helped
to win superiority and take the initiative." According to Chinese analysts, "Air
power's relative strength is complicated. It includes the quality and quantity
of weapons, the training level and fighting will of personnel, the logistics
support capabilities, and combat operational concepts." These are referred to as
"a balance of static forces" which Chinese analysts do not believe is as useful
a measure of effectiveness as the "balance of dynamic forces." The dynamic
balance "has a great deal to do with how both parties actually employ their
power."
(225)

Use special measures. A particular example of how one side in combat
can greatly strengthen its superiority in a "balance of dynamic strength" is to
adopt "special measures." Although the U.S.-led coalition had static balance
superiority in terms of air power, if the Iraqis had followed a North Vietnamese
example, during the Gulf War they could have released "smoke screens
supplemented by the spray of water." The Vietnamese used these "screens" to
"make it impossible for the laser-guided bombs dropped by the U.S. Air Force to
hit the Hanoi electric power station." Some Iraqi special measures were
effective, however. Quoting a U.S. Government source, Chinese analysts state,
"Only a dozen or so of the 700 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed in the first 2 days
of air raids," because of the effectiveness of air defense self-protective
measures, camouflage, and "air defense exercises in cities." In the long run,
Chinese analysts trust the use of protracted and guerilla warfare to wear down
the invader. Harassing attacks can create confusion, cause losses, and damage
the morale of the political system. (226)

Study high-tech weapon vulnerability. A series of Chinese articles
describes how individual U.S. high-tech weapons systems each have their own
particular weaknesses and flaws that must be studied and exploited. Even the
U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile can be shot down by Chinese surface-to-air guided
missiles. Chinese missiles have "on several occasions downed U.S.-made U-2
high-altitude reconnaissance planes, causing a great shock to the United
States." The HQ-2 surface-to-air guided missile made by China is acclaimed to
have a "killing probability" of "no less than 90 percent" when three missiles
are launched simultaneously within the effective range of about 30 kilometers. (227)

Camouflage tanks. Another measure of effectiveness showing American
military weakness involves Iraqi tanks and American efforts to destroy them.
According to Zhai Zhigang, a military Research Fellow, in order to attack Iraqi
troops successfully, U.S. troops would have had to achieve a three-to-one
superiority in order to "insure a quick battle to force a quick decision." Zhai
then listed the obstacles to American success. First, Iraqis had built antitank
ditches filled with gasoline and with mines laid densely around them; thus,
"even if the 2,200 U.S. tanks break through the many Iraqi tank positions and
gallop to northern Kuwait, they will fight an engagement with nearly 1,000 T-72
tanks from five of the best Presidential Republican Guard divisions." According
to Zhai, "A tank in a defilade can usually cope with two to three offensive
tanks with similar capabilities." There were 4,000 Iraqi tanks in Kuwait that
had been concealed in "solid defilades." Therefore, Zhai estimated, only 40
percent of a tank in a defilade was exposed, and camouflaging made it hard to
discover or hit directly. (228)

What is the significance of these military calculations? Zhai's comments
confirm the use of operations research by Chinese analysts. Trading off one tank
vs. two to three tanks when the defending tank is in defilade is a good example.
The suggestion that the 2,200 U.S. tanks that penetrated Northern Kuwait would
not be able to successfully destroy 1,000 T-72 tanks contains a number of
miscalculations, including the determination that a U.S.-crewed M-1 tank is
roughly equivalent to an Iraqi-crewed, 20-year-old, Soviet-made T-72 tank and
that even a 2.2-to-1 superiority is inadequate.

Destroy the nonlinear. U.S. combat theory for high-tech local wars
was criticized by one Chinese analyst, who believes that the nonlinear form of
combat, where "fairly large gaps can emerge between the flank and rear of one's
own troops," means there is the potential for "annihilation." Li Qingshan
writes, "During the Gulf War, the U.S. military frontal attack from the coast of
the Persian Gulf . . . was approximately 300 kilometers. In this
150,000-square-kilometer combat area, the U.S. military deployed 17 divisions,
and the average interval between each division was 94 kilometers. It is thus
clear that the gaps exposed by the nonlinear form of combat can provide
opportunities for the one side to be carved up, surrounded, and even destroyed
by the other."
(229)

Establish sound economic structure. A Chinese military Research
Fellow, Han Ren, pointed out that Iraq had an important economic-based weakness.
"Iraq's economic structure is irrational, and 80 percent of its food, 60 percent
of its medicines, and the majority of its modern weapons are imported." Han
described Iraq's overall military disadvantage by comparing the static totals.
His comparisons are particularly interesting because Iraq's quantitative
military indicators approach those of China. Han said that Iraq had 1.1 million
troops, 5,500 tanks, 780 combat planes, and 40 to 50 naval vessels. U.S. and
coalition forces counted 700,000 troops, 3,100 tanks, 2,200 planes, and some 200
naval vessels superior in quality and capability to Iraq. (230)

Establish a nuclear deterrent. The Chinese media (and interviews by
the author) stress that Iraq did not have a nuclear deterrent and that the
United States needed to make nuclear threats in order to achieve victory over
Iraq. According to the Chinese, Saddam treated seriously a comment to the
British Broadcasting Corporation by Vice President Dan Quayle, on February 1,
1991, that he "would not rule out using nuclear weapons in the war against
Iraq." This assertion seems to suggest that the conventional forces alone of the
U.S.-led coalition could not have defeated Iraq without a nuclear threat, which
presumably would not be so successful in deterring China.

Assess air power. Chinese assessments of American air power also
include specific measures of effectiveness and imply the use of operations
research. U.S. airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) have "raised by more
than 30 percent the probability of attacking aircraft hitting their targets."
This would be effective even for old aircraft models. Chinese assessments of the
Falklands War emphasized that "even though Argentina did not enjoy advanced air
power, it achieved the glorious distinction of downing 18 British ships and won
widespread notice in the international community." (231) Sun
Hongwei points out that "even in the Gulf War, in which the largest amount of
new weaponry was used, aircraft dating from the 1960s made up the biggest
proportion of the total used by coalition forces." The point seems to be that by
combining new and a majority of old fighter aircraft with the force multiplier
of AWACS and others listed in the article (electronic jamming aircraft sometimes
made up as much as 25 percent of each formation), superiority can be achieved.

This misperception allows an obsolete 30-year-old fighter aircraft (the
majority of China's Air Force) to become effective by adding a few AWACS
aircraft and electronic jamming aircraft, which China is in the process of
acquiring. This is not a proper approach to assessing the balance of air power
and could lead to a major miscalculation. If Chinese military leaders actually
use such concepts, they would greatly underestimate the damage that advanced
fighter aircraft can do to a nation defended by obsolete fighters.

u.s. aircraft carrier vulnerabilities

The aircraft carrier battle group still is the "epitome" of combat forces and
is second to none on the ocean, writes Ying Nan. But according to his analysis
of how the weak can defeat the strong, aircraft carrier battle groups have
numerous "weaknesses." A weaker opponent can still achieve the result of "the
mouse will rule the elephant" (laoshu zhi daxiang). His main points
are: (232)

The entire aircraft carrier battle group has numerous radar reflections and
infrared and electromagnetic signatures, so it is very difficult to effectively
conceal them.

Aircraft carrier battle group capabilities drop following the deterioration
of natural conditions (such as weather), and the nighttime flying capability of
pilots of carrier-based planes is only about 50 percent of their daytime
ability.

Aircraft carrier battle group flexibility is limited by numerous islands and
reefs, or when water is shallow and when close to the coast.

While getting supplies at sea, their defense capability clearly drops. For
example, U.S. aircraft carriers generally use MKC-13-1 steam launchers, and each
launch requires 1.5 to 2 tons of fresh water; after every 500 launches,
specialized technical personnel ground the aircraft and overhaul it at sea for
1-2 days; after every 2,500 launches, the plane is returned to the aircraft
carrier port for 3 to 6 weeks of repairs.

Aircraft carriers need 1 to 4 special supply ships that frequently are the
target of an enemy's attack.

The antisubmarine and antimine capability of an aircraft carrier battle group
is relatively poor. During World War II, nine aircraft carriers--36 percent of
the total number of aircraft carriers that sank--were bombarded and sunk by
submarines.

Since the 1980s, new high technology in submarines has caused the threat of
submarines to aircraft carriers to increase.

Although it is difficult for mines to directly sink and destroy an entire
aircraft carrier, the damage and deterrent role created by mines still make the
navies of all countries uneasy.

Elevators, catapult launchers, and arresting devices all are extremely
vulnerable. The elevators move planes to the deck, so if they are damaged, the
aircraft carrier is unable to do anything.

The U.S. Navy has reduced the number of S-3 aircraft and escort ships
accompanying aircraft carriers.

AWACS aircraft operating from a carrier will be the priority targets of other
navies wishing to attack aircraft carriers.

Unmanned planes can repeatedly launch attacks against the aircraft carrier
battle group, forcing the ship's catapult launcher to continuously launch
fighters for take off, causing it to lose large amounts of power and fresh
water.

Aircraft carriers are vulnerable to electronic equipment aboard medium and
small ships, on offshore islands and reefs, and on air balloons, which can
continuously create confusion in the electromagnetic environment.

overall u.s. decline

The effect of U.S. military decline will reinforce the trend toward
multipolarity and the end of America's superpower status, because, according to
Chinese assessments, U.S. military weaknesses are just one part of the overall
fall in U.S. CNP. In fact, Chinese analysts see U.S. decline in virtually any
arena. For example, in a discussion about how the newest and highest skyscrapers
in the world are all being built in Asia, and many in China, one author writes,
"As the 20th century fades, the United States seems to be ceding skyscraper
supremacy to the East. Does that imply that the coming century and the coming
millennium will belong to the Orient?" (233) However,
as was true of the debates on the period of transition to a multipolar world,
Chinese authors do differ in their views on the extent and rate of U.S. decline.
Some analysts focus on the concrete, specific aspects of American weaknesses,
while others examine overall U.S. power and compare it with that of other
nations.
(234)

One of the authors of a major study on the changing world structure by the
Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) asserts that U.S. decline is
relative. He explains, "Position of strength is a relative concept; whether a
country's position of strength is high or low, strong or weak, can be shown only
through a comparison with other countries. In general, the relative decline of
America's position of strength is the contrast between the power of the United
States and that of other major nations." The author goes on to state that at
present, no country will increase its strength quickly enough to surpass the
United States before the early 21st century. The rise of Japan, Germany, and
other major European and Asian countries "subjected America's position of
strength to new challenges, but they still do not constitute a major threat to
America's superpower status. This situation will be maintained at least until
the beginning of the next century." (235) The
former president of SIIS, Chen Qimao, points out that U.S. power can be
declining compared to other countries even though its economy and science and
technology are strong. "Overall, the U.S. position of strength will continue its
relative decline, but in recent years, the U.S. economy has picked up, its
economic structure has been adjusted, and, in areas such as the science and
technology revolution that takes information as its core, it is at the forefront
of the Western nations; therefore, the process of its relative decline will be
convoluted, not direct."

He goes on to claim that "Certain far-sighted intelligent U.S. personages
have already clearly pointed out that in the new century the U.S. will be
transformed from a superpower to a common power (putong daguo)." (236) He Fang,
at the State Council International Studies Center, also believes that the United
States will be a common power in the future; however, he provides a possible
exemption for U.S. military power. He writes, "The transition period will be
America's evolution process from a superpower to a common power; its military
force perhaps will not be included, but its military role is declining." (237)

Social issues are frequently cited by Chinese analysts as an area where the
United States has serious troubles. Particularly when compared to other
countries, the United States is depicted as leading the world in social
problems.
(238) For example, one author referred to America as the "Drug
Superpower."
(240) A book entitled American Social Diseases conveys the
impression that pure economic decline would be the least of the problems
Americans will face in the future. The author forecasts American weakness based
on:

"Crisis of political confidence (lack of trust in the government and
congress, disappointment and dissatisfaction with both parties, 'lost faith' in
the current political mechanism)." (241)

The author concludes that U.S. decline is both relative and actual:

America's international position and influence continue to relatively weaken
. . . due to the quickening development of the world's multipolar trend, so that
internationally, the U.S. is subject to greater challenges and restrictions; on
the other hand. . . . America's own deep social problems and crises are becoming
more and more revealed to the world, so that U.S. international influence is
naturally declining.
(242)

loss of allies

What are the long-term consequences of the United States declining while
others rise? Chinese authors assert that as Japan and Western European nations
gain more and more power, they will seek influence in international affairs
commensurate with their strength and demand equality in their relationships with
the United States. In keeping with the world's transition toward multipolarity,
the decreasing gap between the U.S. CNP and that of Japan and Europe means
America's allies will be asserting themselves as poles, unwilling to remain the
subordinate partners of the United States and submit to its "Unipolar World
Strategy."
(243)

An article by four analysts at the China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) states, "As a result of their economic growth,
more and more countries now dare to say 'no' to the United States. Gone are the
days when one or two powers could sit upon high and dominate." (244) Yuan
Peng, also of CICIR, agrees, "It is proved in practice that, although the
absolute strength of the United States has almost peaked, its international
influences and its capability of dominating global affairs have not
synchronously increased. On the contrary, they are noticeably not as good as in
the past. The multipolar system proposed by China, Russia, France, and other
countries has posed a direct challenge to the unipolar strategy of the United
States. . . . Of more concern to the United States is the fact that its
traditional European allies, Japan, etc., are also gradually drifting away and
are hardly of one heart and one mind with the United States on major issues." (245)

For its part, the United States, with its "global domination mentality," is
expected to fight to hold on to its position of world leadership and supremacy,
leading to direct conflicts and struggles with Japan and Europe. (246) Although
America will be able to maintain its alliances in the short term, Chinese
analysts foresee that in the long run:

The United States will lose its global prominence.

The United States will gradually lose its powerful alliances with Europe and
Japan as the three powers descend into fierce economic and political rivalries.

As their conflicts with the United States increase, Japan and Europe will
work to improve their relations with China.

Jin Dexiang, a senior analyst at CICIR, believes, "Changes in the relative
economic status of the United States, Japan, and Germany have exerted a
far-reaching impact not only on their external and internal policies but also on
world economics, world politics, and international relations." (247) Jin
argues that while the U.S. economic growth rate and share of world trade
declined greatly from its post-World War II levels, in large part to its arms
race with the Soviet Union, the economies of Japan and Germany grew.
Subsequently, Japan and Germany were no longer satisfied with economic power but
desired influence in other realms as well. "Bulging money bags have whetted the
appetite of both Tokyo and Bonn for a larger global role in the political
arena." According to Jin, Japan therefore is "beefing up its military muscle"
and "filling up the vacuum left behind by U.S.-Soviet military retrenchment" in
the Asia-Pacific region. Germany, too, is seeking a major political role through
several tactics. It is striving for a Bonn-centered European Economic Zone while
"trying its best to overtake Japan and catch up with the United States in the
21st century." Jin believes, "The scramble for the political leading role
already exists among America, Europe, and Japan," concluding that "rivalry and
contention among the three economic power centers of America, Europe, and Japan
promise to replace U.S.-Soviet contention and the arms race as an all-important
world issue."
(248)

While Jin argues that simply the economic power of Germany has provided it
with the foundation to assert itself on the world stage, other authors point to
the fact that the joint economic strength of the EU is even greater than that of
the United States according to some indicators. When discussing the economic
contention and friction that exist between the EU and United States, for
example, Yang Dazhou of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) writes,
"Europe already possesses the economic strength to contend with the United
States; the GNP of the European Union nations already exceeds America's." (249)

In addition to economic considerations, another major factor cited by many
authors that has contributed to the increasing rivalry between the United States
and Japan and Europe is the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. To quote
Jin Dexiang, the end of the Cold War resulted in the "removal of the glue
cementing Western unity." (250) Sa
Benwang, a Senior Researcher at the China Institute of International Studies
(CIIS), agrees. He believes "the demise of the 'common threat' and 'common
enemy,' and the subsequent demise of the 'common target' of the
U.S.-European-Japanese 'Cold War alliance'," reduced the possibility of
coordination and compromise, so that "'west-west' contradictions between the
United States and Europe and Japan will be on the rise." (251) Three
CICIR analysts claim that the combination of "eroded alliance cohesion" and the
growth of the EU means

a transformation process has been underway to turn the transatlantic partners
into strategic rivals. . . . This results in transatlantic bickering and
quarrels in political, security, economic and trade fields. Bilateral tensions
grew over Bosnia, NATO, trade and other issues with never-ending disputes. Thus
the demise of a common strategic goal had put the alliance built up in the Cold
War in jeopardy and pushed it close to the verge of collapse. (252)

Several analysts at CICIR argue that the United States realizes its
"leadership capacity and cohesive force" are weakening and therefore it has to
"cotton up" to its allies by supporting Germany and Japan to become permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council, allowing Europe to build a certain amount
of self-defense strength and encouraging Japan to play a greater role in Asia.
They explain that the United States does this "to achieve 'soft control' over
these countries."
(253) Most authors, however, believe that the United States will be
more active in its efforts to maintain power. For example, Yang Shuheng at the
Center for Peace and Development, argues that the United States intends to
establish its dominant position. (254) According
to Qi Deguang of CICIR, the United States "purposefully took an attitude of
aloofness" toward the Bosnia crisis to "wait to see the fun when they failed." (255) After the
European effort to reduce the crisis failed, the United States started to
proclaim that it must play the leading role and bombed the Bosnian-Serb position
to show that the United States was seizing overall control.

Another analyst suggests that a key factor causing the United States to
enlarge NATO is that "the United States finds its national power weakened, . . .
[and] it seeks to rely on NATO to continue its leading role in the world." (256) According
to Chinese analysts, America's goal through the NATO eastward expansion is both
to weaken and encircle Russia, and to provide itself with a means of
consolidating and furthering its leadership position in Europe. Zhang Liangneng,
an analyst at CICIR, states "NATO eastward expansion is a vital strategic step
for the United States to control Europe and contain Russia." However, Zhang
asserts that the United States may not be able to realize its aspirations where
Europe is concerned, because

The Western European countries, particularly France and Germany, have already
realized that the era when they had to rely purely on the United States to
maintain regional security in Europe is gone. Only by promoting economic and
political integration, enhancing military and defense cooperation, establishing
united defense institutions and military forces and forging a solid "European
pillar," can Europe's security and stability, as well as other interests, be
truly protected.
(257)

Zhang's argument is supported by another CICIR analyst, who believes that
European nations not only intend to create a more unified military force
independent of the United States, but also plan to utilize NATO to do so:
"Although both the United States and Western Europe advocate NATO eastward
expansion, they are not entirely the same in regard to the concrete objective,
style and pace of the extension. While the United States attempts to make use of
the NATO move to maintain its own leading position in European affairs, West
Europe wants to build up its own 'defense pillar' through NATO expansion so as
to get rid of American control." (258) A Senior
Research Fellow at CIISS, Wang Naicheng, expects that this "U.S.-European
contradiction of control and counter-control" will become more and more acute,
because each side will intensify its efforts to establish its position. "Europe
is striving to change its role during the Cold War period as the little partner
utterly controlled by and dependent upon America. It is demanding that power be
shared in order to establish an equal, true partnership with the United States,
but the United States refuses to concede and instead is becoming even more
domineering, trying vigorously to consolidate its position as the overlord in
NATO."
(259)

Europe is not the only place where Chinese authors predict a U.S.-EU struggle
for leadership; they also foresee conflicts between the two Cold War allies
around the globe as Europe moves to expand its influence. Asia in particular is
pointed to by Chinese as an area where European nations are striving to
establish closer ties. An article by three CICIR analysts states,

Euro-American contention will be even more fierce in areas beyond the
transatlantic region, especially in the Asia-Pacific. The European Union has
initiated an omnidirectional strategy for expanding its foreign relations
through thrusting southward to the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa, advancing
eastward to Eastern and Central Europe and Russia, and designating Asia as the
key area for contention with the United States. (260)

The first Asia-Europe Summit Conference in Thailand (March 1996) was
considered by the authors to be a symbol of greater closeness between the two
regions, presaging further decline in U.S. global influence. They write that in
addition to seeking "stability and equilibrium in world political and economic
order," one of the main goals of the summit was to "further weaken U.S.
dominance in the global economy and international relations and frustrate U.S.
attempts to seek post-Cold War global hegemony." (261) Chen
Feng, a Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, pointed out that the Asia-Europe summit
meant that "for the first time the United States, as the only superpower in the
world, was unable to take part in this significant international conference." (262)

As the desire to be independent poles grows among European nations and in
Japan, Chinese analysts predict that they will work to improve their relations
with China. Three CICIR analysts conclude that the result of the power struggles
among the Cold War allies will be that America, Western Europe, and Japan will
"attach more importance to the China factor in their foreign strategies" because
of the "enhancement of China's Comprehensive National Power and the extension of
China's international influence." (263) Li
Zhongcheng, also at CICIR, agrees that China will become a new focus in
international relations because of its increased strength, but argues that
China's growing importance may actually be one of the factors that comes between
the allies. "With the improvement of its political big power status, Japan will
gain more independence in dealing with regional and international affairs.
Therefore, even though more stress has been laid on keeping vigilance over China
within the U.S.-Japanese alliance, it will be very difficult for Japan and the
United States to act synchronously and speak in one voice on their China policy.
Worse still, they could even become major rivals to each other in vying for
economic dominance in the Asia-Pacific." (264) Gao Heng
of CASS asserts that Japan is not only working on its relations with China, but
is also focusing on Russia. "Under pressure from the United States, Japan
accepted the new policy of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. However, for its own
interests (to serve as a world level power), Japan could not but try its best to
improve its relations with Russia and China." (265)

According to Gao, Germany is also focusing on improving its relations with
Russia in order to expand its influence, even though it is "America's 'leading
partner' in Europe."
(266) Gao, like other authors, mentions the developing closeness in
German-French-Russian relations and the recent creation of a large triangular
relationship among the three. Wu Guoqing of CASS explains that "political
triangles" such as the German-French-Russian one "constitute new geopolitical
centers" that alter Europe's geopolitical structure. (267) Hu Ning
of the Center for Peace and Development argues that Germany, France, and other
Western European nations are seeking to improve relations with Russia at the
same time that NATO is pursuing its eastward expansion, because Russia can serve
as a counter to the United States. Europe "needs to draw support from Russia's
power to oppose the U.S. domination of European security affairs, with the aim
of building a U.S.-Russian-Western European 'multipolar restrict and balance'
situation."
(268) Chinese authors quote Yeltsin as stating that if he had to
choose, he would side with Europe over the United States: "President Yeltsin . .
. said during the Denver Summit, 'If conflicts occur somewhere between Europe
and the United States, Russia will favor the position of Europe, sharing weal
and woe together.' "
(269)

Despite the extensive writing by Chinese analysts about the trends of growing
rivalries and conflicts between America and Japan and Europe, most expect the
alliances to endure in the short term. Regarding the United States and Europe,
for example, Wang Naicheng of CIISS writes that, although "their contradiction
has intensified," he believes that "in the foreseeable future . . . coordination
and cooperation will remain the central point in their relations." Because of
Russia's existence as a common potential threat and Europe's continued, though
decreasing, dependence on the United States in security affairs and economic
interdependence, "it is difficult to change in a short time the feature of the
relationship where the United States is the principal and Europe is the
subordinate. . . . Nevertheless, the cohesive force linking America and Europe
in NATO from the beginning of the post-Cold War era has weakened with each
passing day, and the contradiction, quite intense at times, has been developing
continuously." He believes that as EU integration continues, the pattern of the
U.S.-EU relationship will change. "With the progress in EU political, economic
and defense cooperation, certainly Western European countries will pose even
graver challenges to U.S. hegemony." (270)

Wang's views are shared by Sa Benwang of CIIS, who sees the weakening of the
alliances between America and Japan and Europe as inevitable but believes that
they will not abruptly end: "The centrifugal trend of Europe and Japan away from
the United States as head of the alliance will further increase, and the
tendency of the alliance to weaken will be hard to stop. Of course, this will
also be a tortuous and complex process; it is expected that alliance relations
will be maintained up to 2015." (271) Views
similar to those held by the above two analysts are presented more strongly by
three CICIR analysts who predict that major U.S.-EU confrontations only await
the growth of EU unified CNP:

There simply does not exist any room for fundamentally harmonizing such
mutually contradictory strategic goals. This divergence can be covered up at a
time when Europe still falls short of U.S. strength. However, once Western
Europe succeeds in catching up in strength with the United States, serious
conflicts will flare up between the two sides over their strategic goals. (272)

self-prophecy of decline

Chinese analysts quote American authors out of context to suggest that
distinguished Americans agree with China's assessment. It is true that American
authors frequently predict drastic decline for their country, but these warnings
are always linked to a set of recommendations that, if followed, will save the
day and avert the fall. Chinese authors omit these linked recommendations,
thereby giving their readers the impression that many sage Americans predict
their nations's own inevitable weakening. (273)

Henry Kissinger has been quoted as stating that America will now be only a
"beggar policeman," because the United States sought coalition funding for the
Gulf War. A glowing review of a book by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of
Control, in China's most prestigious military journal subtly distorted a
key point of the book. Brzezinski suggests that the United States will risk
losing its global leadership role if it does not improve its materialistic
values and present a more attractive model civilization than it does at present.
According to Colonel Pan Jiabin of the Academy of Military Science, the book "is
certainly representative of Western thought, especially that of high-level U.S.
Government views." Pan then misquotes Brzezinski: "The U.S. position as a global
power is in imminent danger." (274) Pan omits
Brzezinski's recommendations, which, if followed, would assure America's
superpower status. Colonel Zhang Zhaohong, of NDU, cites Samuel Huntington on
American weaknesses. He writes, "This U.S. leadership group lacks the ability to
sit in a tent and devise successful strategies. Huntington's latest book,
The Lonely Superpower, includes some views with which I rather agree.
The book points out that when the power of the sole superpower reaches a
considerable degree, it has too much trust in its own strength, does not take a
broad view of anything, and is prone to make many mistaken policy decisions." (275)

Paul Kennedy's book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, is
another example of American writing frequently cited by Chinese analysts.
Kennedy argues that high military spending leads to the weakening of the U.S.
and the Soviet Union, while low military spending allowed Germany and Japan to
rise. CICIR analyst Jin Dexiang, quotes Kennedy on the link between large
defense budgets and the decline of a country's economy and overall national
power. "If . . . too large a proportion of the state's resources is diverted
from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes, then that is
likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer term. In the
same way if a state overextends itself strategically . . . it runs the risk that
the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great
expense of it all--a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has
entered a period of relative economic decline." Jin then puts forward his own
belief that the United States is already entrapped in the danger zone predicted
by Kennedy. "As a matter of fact," he writes, "Washington today does not merely
'run the risk' of weakening national power, it is actually bogged down in the
quagmire of relative decline. Relentless expansion of war industry has entailed
. . . disastrous consequences on the long-term development of the U.S.
economy."
(276)

lord of the earth

Chinese authors have repeatedly pointed out that one important cause of
America's future decline is its conscious choice of a mistaken foreign policy.
After the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the depiction of America's
foreign policy in the official Communist Party newspaper became particularly
vivid. For example, the United States was likened to Nazi Germany in eight
specific ways in a long article that concluded that the pursuit of such
Nazi-like policies would end in "complete failure." (277)

In lieu of excerpting many other articles that also describe U.S. foreign
policy as a search for world domination, this one will be quoted in sufficient
detail to reveal the Chinese assessment of American goals clearly. It begins by
responding to the rhetorical question of how the United States today and Nazi
Germany are alike:

"First, their self-centeredness and ambition to seek hegemony are exactly the
same. In his notorious book, Mein Kampf, Hitler advocated 'ethnic
superiority' and 'living space,' maintaining that human society was one that
observed the law of the jungle, and that ethnic Germans should expand and become
the 'lord of the earth.' If we ask which country in the world wants to be the
'lord of the earth' like Nazi Germany did in the past, there is only one answer,
namely the United States, which upholds hegemonism."

"Second, the United States has outdone Nazi Germany with respect to
increasing military budgets and expanding its armament. Although the United
States has yet to launch a new world war, the size of its armament expansion and
the frequency of its use of military strength overseas have far exceeded those
of Nazi Germany in the past."

"Third. . . . When Hitler came to power, he made anti-Communism both his
strategic goal and tactical means for realizing his ambitions of engaging in
arms expansion and war preparations and of contending for world hegemony. . . .
It was also precisely under the guise of possessing 'common values' that the
United States and Japan have reinforced their military alliance, so that the
latter will play the role of the 'NATO of the Far East.' What substantive
differences are there between this kind of expansionist tactic and the Nazism of
the past?"

"Fourth, the trend toward replacing global international organizations with
military alliances is not without precedent. After World War I, on the proposal
of then-U.S. President Wilson, 44 countries formed the League of Nations in
1920. . . . Germany was a permanent member of the league's executive council. It
withdrew from the league in October 1933 due to restrictions on its program of
arms expansion and war preparations. . . . Of course, the United States and its
allies will not withdraw from the United Nations. But is not the way they have
repeatedly bypassed the United Nations and wantonly intervened in other
countries through their military alliance or bloc very similar to the Fascist
way of Germany?"

"Fifth, the strategic priorities and directions of global expansion are
basically similar. Hitler made Europe a strategic priority. . . . Today, Europe
is also the U.S. global strategic priority . . . the United States has
reinforced its military alliance with Japan in Asia, making Japan an important
accomplice in its armed intervention against other Asian countries. This is also
an attempt to gain control of the European and Asian continents from the Western
and Eastern fronts, with the ultimate goal of fulfilling its strategy of
dominating the world."

"Sixth, the methods they employed in dismembering other countries'
territories and encroaching upon their sovereignty through exploiting their
ethnic contradictions were very similar. Hitler, to secure the passageway for
taking over the Balkans, plotted in June 1937 the 'Green Project' of annexing
Czechoslovakia by employing its ethnic issues. Czechoslovakia was a multiethnic
country and its Sudetenland was inhabited by some Germans. Gorpel [name as
transliterated] clamored that 3.5 million Germans in Sudetenland were 'tortured'
and Germany could not afford to 'watch as an onlooker'. . . . In less than five
months, Nazi Germany took over the entire Czechoslovakia. Today, the U.S.-led
NATO is attempting to dismember and control the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
by taking advantage of its ethnic problems. . . . Is it not exceedingly clear
from what the United States and NATO did during the Kosovo crisis who was acting
like Nazi Germany?"

"Seventh, utilization of advanced technology to slaughter peaceful citizens
is by no means less barbaric. . . . Hitler not only used in war what were
considered to be the most advanced weapons of the time, such as airplanes,
tanks, and long-range artillery, to massacre peaceful citizens in anti-Fascist
countries, but also built concentration camps in Auschwitz and in other areas to
slaughter Jews and prisoners of war with 'advanced' technology. Executioners
drove hundreds and thousands of people into gas chambers and poured cyanide
through air holes in the roof, killing them all. Today, the U.S. hegemonists
used high-tech weapons to attack FRY civilian facilities several hundred miles
away from the battlefield, or, with laser and global position systems several
thousand meters above the sky, treated innocent and peaceful citizens as live
targets. The flagrant use of missiles by the U.S.-led NATO to attack the Chinese
embassy in Yugoslavia was a barbaric atrocity that the then-Nazi Germany had not
dared to commit."

"Eighth, there is no difference between brazen undermining of international
law and aggressive acts. What is the difference between the modern-day
hegemonists who willfully undermine international law and the erstwhile Nazi
Germany?"

"When we read world history, we know that many empires that had dominated for
some time finally ended in decline. Particularly in this century, the worldwide
colonial system that the Western powers built for several hundreds of years has
collapsed. They employ the wishful thinking that fortune is now on their side
and that it seems to be the turn of the United States--the sole superpower in
the world--to dominate the world and to become 'the master of the globe'. . . .
Even though they may run rampant for a while, they will eventually end in
complete failure."

Although this article is harsher in tone and more intemperate than others, it
does not deviate much in substance from Chinese authors who also condemn the
"hegemonic" goals of the United States. Some authors seem to hold out hope that
Washington will someday change its foreign policy goals, but this debate is
muted at present.

findings

Differing only in their views of exactly how fast and in what ways America's
powers will decline, Chinese analysts agree in asserting that the U.S. is losing
economic, political, and military influence around the world, and therein, its
status as a superpower. As evidence, they cite its failure to invest fully in
the RMA, as well as what they term weak strategies and logistics as military
vulnerabilities; they note its intractable domestic problems; and they point to
its frequent inability to prevail diplomatically. Their main criticisms of U.S.
weaknesses are outlined below. Chinese authors emphasize several problem areas
that America faces in implementing the RMA and maintaining its leading
position:

Interservice rivalry

A decreasing defense budget

Complex technology

The universal availability of technology through commercial enterprises after
its development

Easily damaged information networks

The greater potential of other countries in the area of innovation.

Several Chinese analysts suggest that China can exploit the above U.S.
weaknesses and improve its own development of the RMA. Chinese military analysts
also use examples from the Gulf War to illustrate U.S. weaknesses. Many state
that the outcome of the Gulf War could have been different if Iraq had employed
different tactics and exploited the following U.S. weaknesses:

The United States had insufficient means of transportation.

U.S. munitions cannot damage deep underground bunkers.

Various U.S. weapons systems have their own specific weaknesses.

The United States did not have superiority in its efforts to destroy Iraqi
tanks.

The U.S. nonlinear form of combat makes it vulnerable to being surrounded and
divided by the other side.

In addition to Iraq's economic weakness and its lack of a nuclear deterrent,
Chinese analysts criticize Iraq for:

Not making surprise attacks on U.S. airbases and the U.S. rear

Permitting the United States time to build up its logistics and conduct
special training for several months before the war

Not employing "special measures," such as harassing attacks.

It should be noted, however, that Chinese assessments do not treat the United
States as "weak" in any absolute sense at the present time. They characterize
the United States as a true hegemon in every way today. For example, a series of
books on the U.S. Armed Forces asserts U.S. technological superiority in
practically every field, despite U.S. reductions since 1991. (278)
Nevertheless, they assert that the United States will fall behind in military
innovation after 2010.

U.S. military vulnerabilities are only one contributing factor in the overall
process of U.S. decline depicted by Chinese analysts. While some authors focus
on specific areas where America is weakening, such as in military affairs or
domestic social problems, other analysts argue that the country's decline is
relative, that it is only declining compared to other nations whose power is
increasing. One predicted outgrowth of this trend of falling national strength
is that the U.S. is expected to lose its allies. As the power of Europe and
Japan increases, and they no longer must depend upon America either militarily
or economically, they are expected to come into greater conflict with the U.S.
Consequently, rivalries and struggles are expected to gradually cause the
alliances to weaken and fade. Moreover, at the same time that their
relationships are deteriorating with the U.S., Chinese analysts predict that
Japan and Europe will be striving to improve their ties to China.

After the Kosovo conflict, a number of Chinese authors debated the length of
time that the United States would be able to sustain its "unipolar" hegemonic
domination and hold back the global trend toward multipolarity. However,
agreement about the central trend was not reversed. The debate was only about
the length of time it will take for these tendencies and trends to unfold.

Chinese national security specialists have been describing America's role in
the future security environment in the same way for a decade: dangerous but
declining. In the picturesque terms of ancient Chinese statecraft, America is a
decaying hegemon whose leaders are as yet unaware that their fate is
unavoidable, so the U.S. leadership is pursuing several dangerous but doomed
strategies, such as:

Attempting to limit Russia's recovery and access to resources

Practicing limited containment of China's rising influence

Fomenting conflict between China and Japan

Investing (too slowly) in a potential RMA

Using the Bosnia conflict to maintain domination of Europe

Falsely spreading the China Threat Theory in ASEAN

Seeking military bases and new NATO allies in Central Asia

Aiding separatist movements in Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang.

China's authors propose a number of countermeasures to these alleged American
maneuvers. Deng Xiaoping's public proclamations were to "remain coolheaded" and
to "taoguang-yanghui"--bide our time and build our capability--to avoid
conflict with the United States during the decades it suffers inevitable
decline. Other authors sound more stringent warnings. The Vice President of AMS
urges vigilance, because the declining United States will attempt "strategic
deception" of other major powers, including China, as it did the Soviet Union
with the phony "Star Wars" threat, and as it did when it tricked Iraq into
invading Kuwait so the United States could dismantle Iraq's growing power. The
Director of the Foreign Policy Center at China's largest security research
institute warns that the United States may form a coalition to "strangle" China
if the proponents of the China Threat Theory become strong in the United States.

Other proposals are more defensive. For example, China's forecasted energy
needs will be enormous in 2020, which could make China vulnerable to the United
States. Therefore, one author urges that China's energy must be sought through
pipelines to Russia and Central Asia, because China's relative military
superiority in ground forces can better protect these energy assets, rather than
through oil purchases from the Persian Gulf, which rely on sea lanes that
America (and Japan) could threaten in the future. Perhaps the most aggressive
advice about how China should deal with the declining American hegemon has been
couched in specific analogies to ancient statecraft. A well-connected scholar
proposes China help to form a global anti-U.S. coalition with any and all
nations opposed to the United States. His colleagues criticize him for such
alarmist proposals. Several analysts have written that it is already "too late"
for the United States to contain China.

204. General Pan Junfeng, "Dui xin junshi de jidian kanfa"
(Several views on new military affairs), Zhongguo junshi kexue (China
Military Science) 35, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 111. General Pan is Director of the
Foreign Military Studies Department of AMS in Beijing. Similar proposals for how
China can exploit U.S. weaknesses and improve its position in the RMA are
offered in Gao Chunxiang, Xin junshi geming lun, 199-202, and Wang
Pufeng, Xinxi zhanzheng yu junshi geming, 201-203.

206. See the 10-book Modern U.S. Military Studies Series
(Xiandai Meijun yanjiu congshu) published by authors from China's
National Defense University in 1995. Hu Siyuan and Dai Jinyu, Xiandai Meiguo
kongjun (The modern U.S. Air Force)(Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe,
1995), 1, state, "The U.S. Air Force is the most modern Air Force in the world
today." Similarly, Wang Zhongchun, Zhao Ziyu, and Zhou Bailin, Xiandai
Meiguo lujun (The modern U.S. Army) (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe,
1995), write, "The U.S. Army is the army with the highest level of modernized
equipment in the world today." Yin Gu, Li Jie, and Lei Xiangping, Xiandai
Meiguo haijun (The modern U.S. Navy)(Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe,
1995), 1, state, "The United States is currently the world's only maritime
superpower." Finally, Wang Baofu, Meiguo tezhong zuozhan budui yu tezhong
zuozhan (U.S. Special forces and special warfare)(Beijing: Guofang daxue
chubanshe, 1995), 1, states, "The U.S. Special Combat Units have the best
equipment and the largest scope of any special combat force in the world."

207. In January 1998, a weekly column entitled "Future
Warfare" began to appear in the Liberation Army Daily that included
advice on how an "inferior" national force can defeat a "superior" force.

208. "Riben: Junshi jishu lingxian Meiguo" (Japan: leading
the U.S. in military technology), Junshi wenchai (Military Digest) 4,
no. 2 (1996): 18. This article asserts that Japan has modified its fighter
aircraft to exceed the turn rate of U.S. fighters; that F-117 exteriors and 95
per cent of U.S. military electronics depend on Japan and that Japan could shift
the Russian-American balance of power in missile accuracy if it sold the same
electronics to Russia that it does to the United States.

234. For a discussion on how the Kosovo crisis and the
NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in spring 1999 led to a
re-evaluation of previous assessments of the pace of the U.S. decline, see
chapter one, the section titled "Post-Kosovo Debate."

235. Ding Xinghao, "Shijie geju zhuanxing qi zhong de
Meiguo" (The United States during the transformation of the world structure), in
Kua shiji de shijie geju da zhuanhuan (Major changes in the world
structure at the turn of the century), ed. Chen Qimao (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu
chubanshe, 1996), 118.

238. A comparison of how the United States stands up to
the European Union (EU) in social issues, economics, science and technology, and
military affairs comes from an SIIS study: "In the future world structure,
Europe and Japan are the only forces that have the qualifications to struggle
with the United States for the leading world position, as will be compared
below. Europe has more advantageous conditions than Japan; Japan's weak points
are Europe's strong points. . . . The population of the EU is more than half
that of the United States, its GNP [gross national product] surpasses Japan's
and is comparable to America's. The EU share of world trade has already exceeded
America's. The European savings rate is equal to that of Japan and long ago
greatly outstripped that of the United States. Europe's science and technology
have very strong competitive power, based on Japanese statistics; in the world's
110 important technology areas, Europe is in the leading position in 34.
Europe's reliance on the world is not as great as Japan's, it has comparatively
vast territory, the trade among the countries of Europe is very vigorous, and
natural resources can be obtained through many channels. . . . In Europe, on the
basis of sovereign nations, each country already has suitable military force; if
in the future after they establish a common military structure, if they further
engage in arms expansion, it will not, like Japan, give rise to contrary
political consequences. When comparing internal conditions, Europe surpasses the
United States in numerous areas. The standard of living of the people in Western
and Northern Europe is not poorer than in the United States and there are far
fewer city evils than in the United States. There are not as many racial and
national problems as in the United States. The slums often seen in the United
States almost cannot be found in Western and Northern Europe. According to
statistics, of American children, 22 percent live in poverty, but in Germany it
is only 5 percent. The quality of Europe's middle and elementary school
education is higher than America's, and the crime rate and number of drug users
are less than in the United States. Western and Northern Europe, in the social
welfare areas of medical insurance, old-age pensions and unemployment subsidies
also are better than the United States." See, (239)

245. Yuan Peng, "An Arrogant and Lonely Superpower--The
Tradition and History of Hegemony," Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, May 26,
1999, 3, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0609, June 10, 1999. Yuan is at CICIR.

246. Yan Tao, "U.S. Determination on Use of Force and Its
'Global Domination' Mentality," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, February 15,
1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-046, February 20, 1998.

247. Jin Dexiang, "America vs. Japan and Germany: Why are
There Growth Imbalances? What is Next?," Contemporary International
Relations 2, no. 5 (May 1992): 8; other quotes in this paragraph are from
10-12. When he wrote this article Jin was Vice President of CICIR.

253. Xu Zhixian, Zhang Minqian, and Hong Jianjun, "On the
Foreign Strategy and Trends of China Policy of the U.S., Western Europe and
Japan at the Turn of the Century," Contemporary International Relations
8, no. 3 (March 1998): 12-14.

264. Li Zhongcheng, "The Role of an Emerging China in
World Politics," Contemporary International Relations 8, no. 2
(February 1998): 13. Li is a Research Professor in the Division for China and
World Studies.

273. Chinese analysts do this for other countries, as well
as for Taiwan. See Tai Baolin, Taiwan shehui qiwen daguan (The unheard
of magnificent spectacle of Taiwan society)(Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1992).

275. Ma Ling, "The Attempt Behind the 'Bombing in
Error'--Interview with Renowned Military Commentator Zhang Zhaozhong," Ta
Kung Pao (Hong Kong), May 17, 1999, A4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-1518, May 19,
1999. Zhang is Director of the Science and Technology Teaching and Research
Section of NDU.

277. Observer, "We Urge Hegemonism Today To Take a Look at
the Mirror of History," People's Daily, June 22, 1999, in
FBIS-CHI-1999-0622.

278. The United States has cut defense personnel by 40
percent, to the smallest level since 1950. Weapon purchases have declined nearly
70 percent. The 1999 defense budget will be about 40 percent below its 1985
level in real terms, with only 3.1 percent of gross domestic product for
defense, the smallest share since 1940.