ROSENDO R. CORALES v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 186613 , August 27, 2013 , PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor ofNagcarlan, Laguna for three (3) consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998,2001 and 2004 elections. In his first term as local chief executive,petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the positionof Municipal Administrator, whose appointment was unanimouslyapproved by the Sangguniang Bayan in a resolution. During hissecond and third terms as municipal mayor, petitioner Coralesrenewed the appointment of petitioner Dr. Angeles. But, on thesetimes, the Sangguniang Bayan in different resolutions,disapproved petitioner Dr. Angeles appointment on the ground ofnepotism, as well as the latters purported unfitness andunsatisfactory performance. Even so, petitioner Dr. Angelescontinued to discharge the functions and duties of a MunicipalAdministrator.Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal(Andal), the Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an AuditObservation Memorandum (AOM) addressed to petitioner Coraleswho was asked to comment/reply. Instead of submitting hiscomment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together withpetitioner Dr. Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition andMandamus against Andal and the then members of theSangguniang Bayan before the RTC Laguna. Petitioners sought, byway of prohibition, to require the Office of the Provincial Auditor,through Andal, to recall its AOM and to eventually desist fromcollecting reimbursement from petitioner Corales for the salariespaid to and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles for the lattersservices as Municipal Administrator. Petitioners similarly sought,by way of mandamus, to compel the then members of theSangguniang Bayan, as a collegial body, to recall its Resolutions

denying confirmation to petitioner Dr. Angeles appointment as

Municipal Administrator and in their stead to confirm the validityand legitimacy of such appointment.In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andalsbehalf, who was impleaded in his official capacity, filed a Motionto Dismiss petitioners Petition for Prohibition and Mandamusgrounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. The trial court denied thesaid Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely anominal party. The subsequent motion for its reconsideration wasalso denied.Respondent Republic, as represented by COA, as represented byAndal, consequently filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court ofAppeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court as it unjustlydenied respondents right to actively prosecute the case througha mere declaration that it was a nominal party despite a clearshowing that the Petition for Prohibition referred to therespondent as a real party in interest.The Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision grantingrespondents Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and settingaside the RTC Orders and, accordingly, dismissing petitionersPetition for Prohibition with the court a quo. Disgruntled,petitioners moved for its reconsideration but it was denied forlack of merit. Hence, this petition.ISSUE:Whether or not the prohibition by RTC is premature?HELD:YES. Viewed in this light, this Court can hardly see any actual caseor controversy to warrant the exercise of its power of judicialreview. Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the powerof judicial review, the following must be extant: (1) there must bean actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) thequestion must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person

challenging must have the standing. An actual case or

controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion ofopposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution asdistinguished from a mere hypothetical or abstract difference ordispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can beinterpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law andjurisprudence. Closely related thereto is that the question must beripe for adjudication. A question is considered ripe for adjudicationwhen the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect onthe individual challenging it.The requisites of actual case and ripeness are absent in thepresent case. The AOM issued by Andal merely requestedpetitioner Corales to comment/reply thereto. Truly, the AOMalready contained a recommendation to issue a Notice ofDisallowance; however, no Notice of Disallowance was yet issued.More so, there was no evidence to show that Andal had alreadyenforced against petitioner Corales the contents of the AOM.Similarly, there was no clear showing that petitioners, particularlypetitioner Corales, would sustain actual or imminent injury byreason of the issuance of the AOM. The action taken by thepetitioners to assail the AOM was, indeed, premature and basedentirely on surmises, conjectures and speculations that petitionerCorales would eventually be compelled to reimburse petitioner Dr.Angeles salaries, should the audit investigation confirm theirregularity of such disbursements. Further, as correctly pointedout by respondent Republic in its Memorandum, what petitionersactually assail is Andals authority to request them to file thedesired comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the scope ofthe action for prohibition, as such request is neither an actionablewrong nor constitutive of an act perceived to be illegal. Andal,being the Provincial State Auditor, is clothed with the authority toaudit petitioners disbursements, conduct an investigationthereon and render a final finding and recommendationthereafter. Hence, it is beyond question that in relation to hisaudit investigation function, Andal can validly and legally requirepetitioners to submit comment/reply to the AOM, which the lattercannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking judicial intervention, like

filing

an

action

for

prohibition.

Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment

ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with thecommission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resortedto when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Clearly,petitioners have all the remedies available to them at theadministrative level but they failed to exhaust the same andinstead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwisestated, the auditing process has just begun but the petitionersalready thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition forProhibition.