Send an email to Colonel Lewis G. Irwin

Colonel Lewis G. Irwin

Lewis G. Irwin is a Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and an Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duquesne University, jointly appointed to the Department of Political Science and the Graduate Center for Social and Public Policy. In the Army Reserve, Colonel Irwin commands the 926th Engineer Brigade, and has served in a wide variety of assignments during more than 25 years of service in the U.S. Army. These assignments have included tours of duty in Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Germany, including service with the 101st Airborne Division, the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, West Point’s Department of Social Sciences, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command, among others. From August of 2007 until February of 2008, he served with the U.S. Army in Afghanistan as the leader of an ad hoc interagency team assigned the mission of designing and implementing a nation-wide reform of the Afghan National Police, then known as “Focused District Development.” That effort continues today. An Army Reserve Adjunct Professor for Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Colonel Irwin is the author of The Chill in the House (SUNY Press, 2002) and The Policy Analyst’s Handbook (M. E. Sharpe, 2003), in addition to numerous journal articles and other publications. Colonel Irwin holds a bachelor’s in civil engineering management from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, a master’s in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College, and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale University.

*The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI.

SSI books and monographs by Colonel Lewis G. Irwin

May 10, 2012

Authored by Colonel Lewis G. Irwin.
Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO’s irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. This book explores shortfalls in the U.S. Government’s strategic planning processes and the mechanisms for interagency coordination of effort that have contributed to this situation, as well as reforms needed to meet emerging 21st century national security challenges.