These matters came
before the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board ("Board") upon certification
from the Third District Subcommittee, Section I, and were heard on December
13, 2002, by a duly convened panel consisting of Thaddeus T. Crump, Lay
Member, James L. Banks, Jr., Ann N. Kathan, Joseph R. Lassiter, Jr. and
John A. Dezio, Chair. The Respondent, James Kevin Clarke, (hereinafter "Mr.
Clarke" or "Respondent") was present with counsel, Craig S. Cooley and Barbara
Ann Williams, Bar Counsel, represented the Virginia State Bar (hereinafter
"the Bar").

The Chair polled the
panel members to determine whether any member had a personal or financial interest
in this matter that might affect or reasonably be perceived to affect his or
her ability to be impartial in this proceeding. Each member, including the chair,
verified that they had no conflicts.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
MISCONDUCT

The Board adopts the Stipulated
Allegations of Fact and Findings of Misconduct submitted by the Bar and
the Respondent, and finds as follows:

I. General Findings of
Fact

1. The respondent, James Kevin
Clarke, was admitted to the Virginia State Bar on May 3, 1994.

2. Mr. Clarke was an active member
of the Virginia State Bar, in good standing to practice law in the Commonwealth
of Virginia, at all times relevant to these proceedings.

3. Mr.
Clarke has no prior attorney disciplinary record.

II. VSB Docket No. 00-031-2428
(Stephen L. Brown)

4. On January 8, 1999, Mr. Clarke
conferred with Stephen L. Brown in the Petersburg jail about Mr. Brown's desire
to petition the Petersburg Circuit Court for a reduction of his felony sentence
for breaking and entering.

5. Following that meeting, Mr. Clarke
determined that an error had been made in calculating Mr. Brown's sentence,
concluded that the facts supported the conviction and conferred with the Assistant
Commonwealth's Attorney.

6. On January 15, 1999, Stephen
L. Brown retained Mr. Clarke to represent him and paid Mr. Clarke $500, after
executing an Information and Fee Agreement.

7. On March 5, 1999, after speaking
with several witnesses, Mr. Clarke visited Mr. Brown at the Petersburg jail
and provided him copies of a motion to reduce sentence and a motion to postpone
transfer into the Department of Corrections.

8. Mr. Clarke filed both motions
on March 8, 1999.

9. On July 1, 1999, Mr. Clarke wrote
Mr. Brown and advised him that the judge preferred to decide the issues in question
based solely upon the motions filed, but that he was still trying to set a hearing
date and would keep Mr. Brown informed of his progress.

10. On July 1, 1999, Mr. Clarke wrote
potential witnesses, requesting that they draft letters that could be submitted
to the court in lieu of testimony.

11. Mr. Clarke also wrote Mr. Brown's
probation officer, who had prepared the sentencing calculation, citing the alleged
errors therein.

12. By letter dated July 19, 1999,
the probation officer advised Mr. Clarke that there was indeed an error in scoring
but that error actually inured to Mr. Brown's benefit.

13. On August 6, 1999, Mr. Brown
wrote Mr. Clarke inquiring about the status of his case and threatening to file
a bar complaint.

14. By letter dated August 26, 1999,
Mr. Clarke told Mr. Brown what he had learned, and suggested that if Mr. Brown
retracted his request for a sentence reduction, Mr. Clarke would reimburse him
the retainer he had paid.

15. Meanwhile, Mr. Brown wrote Mr. Clarke
requesting him to acknowledge the representation and indicating that he had not
heard from Mr. Clarke since July 1, 1999.

16. On September 17, 1999, Mr. Brown
wrote Judge Oliver Pollard, Jr., inquiring about the status of sentence reduction
motion.

18. On October 6, 1999, Mr. Brown
wrote Mr. Clarke, advising him that he wished to retract his request to reduce
his sentence and that he wanted to be reimbursed for the retainer fee that he
paid Mr. Clarke.

19. On or about November 9, 1999,
Mr. Brown submitted a bar complaint against Mr. Clarke, alleging that Mr. Clarke
had abandoned his case after accepting a retainer for legal services.

20. Intake attempted to deal with
Mr. Brown's complaint proactively and granted Mr. Clarke's request for an extension
of time to respond to the complaint.

21. Although Mr. Clarke advised Intake
that he would refund Mr. Brown's retainer, Mr. Clarke never responded to the
bar complaint.

22. During the course of the bar's
investigation of Mr. Brown's complaint, Mr. Clarke did not respond to Bar Investigator
David Abrams' numerous requests for an interview.

The foregoing allegations give rise
to the following charges of misconduct under Rules of Professional Conduct:

DR 6-101. Competence and
Promptness.

(C) A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about matters in which the lawyer's services are being rendered.

RULE 8.1 Bar Admission And
Disciplinary Matters

[A] lawyer . . . in connection with
a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(d) obstruct a lawful investigation
by an admissions or disciplinary authority.

III. VSB Docket
No. 01-031-0039 (Rodney Webb)

23. On or about July 19, 1994, Rodney
Webb pled guilty in Petersburg Circuit Court to three felony charges of cocaine
distribution and one felony charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine; he received
a suspended sentence, which included 20 years of good behavior.

24. On January 25, 1998, by telephone,
Mr. Clarke discussed with Mr. Webb at great length charges pending against Mr.
Webb in Prince George County and obtained a list of possible witnesses.

25. On January 26, 1998, after Mr.
Clarke had reviewed the general district court file, Mr. Webb retained him to
represent him on charges of cocaine possession in Prince George County.

26. By February 6, 1998, Mr. Clarke
had met with the Commonwealth's Attorney and Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney,
contacted the arresting officer, spoke with a State Trooper involved in Mr.
Webb's prior arrest, obtained a copy of the certificate of analysis and researched
recent case law.

27. Mr. Clarke convinced the court to
order a psychological evaluation of Mr. Webb, and after he was found competent
to stand trial and not insane at the time of the offense, represented Mr. Webb
at a preliminary hearing on June 15, 1998, at which time the charge was certified
to circuit court.

28. Mr. Webb was released on bond
pending trial, but on August 6, 1998, was arrested in the City of Petersburg
for 18 felonies including grand larceny, forgery, uttering and related charges.

29. The Prince George County Circuit
Court revoked his bond and Mr. Webb was incarcerated; the Petersburg charges
were transferred from general district court to juvenile and domestic relations
district court because the victim was Mr. Webb's mother.

30. A September 1, 1998 trial date
in Prince George County was continued, after Mr. Clarke requested that the judge
recuse himself; the trial was reset for October 8, 1998.

31. Mr. Clarke filed a motion to
suppress the Commonwealth's evidence but withdrew that motion after Mr. Webb
pled guilty to cocaine possession on October 10, 1998.

32. On October 26, 1998, Mr. Clarke
successfully argued a motion to reduce Mr. Webb's bond from $20,000 with surety
to $10,000 with surety, but the bond was still to high for Mr. Webb to post,
and he remained in the Petersburg City Jail.

33. On December 8, 1998, the Prince
George County Circuit Court sentenced Mr. Webb to five years with all but 12
months suspended.

34. During his representation of
Mr. Webb on the cocaine possession charge in Prince George County, Mr. Clarke
expended an exceptional amount of time and energy, not only frequently meeting
with his client in jail and attempting to allay his anxieties, but also meeting
with his client's mother and various witnesses.

35. After the Prince George County
matter was resolved, Mr. Clarke focused on the Petersburg charges, and regularly
communicated with Mr. Webb, his father and mother, the prosecuting attorney,
and the clerk of court about the status of Mr. Webb's case.

36. At the preliminary hearing in
the Petersburg Juvenile and Domestic Relations General District Court on March
25, 1999, Mr. Clarke obtained a nolle prosequi from the Commonwealth
on all charges.

37. As a result of Mr. Webb's arrest
and conviction in Prince George County, he was brought before the Circuit Court
of the City of Petersburg to show cause why his previously suspended sentence
in that jurisdiction should not be revoked.

38. While he was serving time in
the Riverside Regional Jail on the Prince George drug conviction, Mr. Webb was
seriously injured in a fight with another inmate.

39. Due to the severity of Mr. Webb's
injuries, in April 1999, Mr. Clarke successfully moved to have the unserved
portion of Mr. Webb's sentence on the Prince George drug conviction suspended,
to have Mr. Webb released from jail and to delay the show cause hearing on whether
the suspended sentence handed down by the Petersburg Circuit Court should be
revoked.

40. Mr. Clarke drove Mr. Webb to
see his doctor on more than one occasion and provided the prosecuting attorney
with periodic updates on Mr. Webb's condition.

41. On December 20, 1999, the Petersburg
Circuit Court entered an order substituting Mr. Clarke as counsel for Mr. Webb
on the Petersburg drug charges, although Mr. Clarke had been assisting Mr. Webb
prior to that time.

42. On April 3, 2000, Mr. Webb sent
Mr. Clarke a certified letter complaining that he was unable to get in touch
with him; the letter was returned to Mr. Webb unclaimed.

43. By letter dated June 21, 2000,
in connection with the proposed revocation of Mr. Webb's suspended sentence
based upon the Petersburg drug conviction, the Petersburg Circuit Court notified
Mr. Webb and Mr. Clarke that "[d]ue to difficulty and delay in scheduling a
hearing date in this matter, the Court is requiring your appearance on July
19, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. in the Petersburg Circuit Court. Both
parties must be present" (emphasis in the original).

44. Mr. Clarke contends that he either
received the court's letter of June 21, 2000, after the court date had already
passed or did not open the letter until after the court date had passed and
therefore did not knowingly disobey the court's ruling.

45. On July 10, 2000, the Virginia
State Bar received a bar complaint from Mr. Webb, dated June 28, 2000, complaining
that Mr. Clarke had "disappeared."

46. When Mr. Clarke failed to appear
for the revocation hearing on July 19, 2000, the circuit court issued a Rule
to Show Cause requiring Mr. Clarke to appear before the court on August 14,
2000, and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to appear
on July 19.

47. At the hearing on August 14,
2000, the court held Mr. Clarke in contempt for his failure to appear, gave
him a suspended jail sentence, imposed a $50 fine and banned him from serving
as court-appointed counsel in the 11th Circuit, which to that point
had been a major part of his practice.

48. On September 15, 2000, Mr. Clarke
paid the $50 fine on the Rule to Show Cause.

49. Mr. Clarke did not submit a written
response to Mr. Webb's bar complaint.

50. During the course of the bar's
investigation of Mr. Webb's complaint, Mr. Clarke did not respond to Bar Investigator
David Abrams' numerous requests for an interview.

The foregoing allegations give rise
to the following charges of misconduct under Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.3 Diligence

(a) A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information.

RULE 8.1 Bar Admission And
Disciplinary Matters

[A] lawyer . . . in connection with
a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(d) obstruct a lawful investigation
by an admissions or disciplinary authority.

IV. VSB Docket No. 01-031-1085
(Mr. and Mrs. Robert T. Gunn)

51. On March 20, 2000 Derrick S.
Gunn, son of Mr. and Mrs. Robert T. Gunn, was convicted in the Circuit Court
of Powhatan County of one count of arson and sentenced to serve ten years in
jail, with nine years suspended.

52. A few days before July
18, 2000, Mr. Clarke spoke to Mr. Gunn by telephone and agreed that Mr. Clarke's
fee for representing Derrick on appeal would be $1,000, of which $500 was to
be a retainer

55. In Mr. Clarke's file is an unsigned
letter to Mr. Gunn dated September 6, 2000, reassuring Mr. Gunn that Mr. Clarke
was working on the appeal and promising to arrange a meeting to review what
he had prepared.

56. Mr. Gunn did not receive Mr.
Clarke's letter, and on or about October 3, 2000, Mr. and Mrs. Gunn filed a
bar complaint against Mr. Clarke, claiming that they had been unable to contact
Mr. Clarke.

57. After receiving two letters from
Intake Counsel attempting to deal with the Gunn's bar complaint in a proactive
manner, Mr. Clarke wrote Derrick on November 20, 2000, and sent him a copy of
the Petition for Appeal and a motion submitting himself as Derrick's counsel
on appeal.

58. Mr. Clarke failed to advise Derrick
or his parents that the Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Appeal on January
8, 2001, although Derrick is copied on a letter dated January 21, 2001, requesting
oral argument before a three-judge panel.

59. Mr. Clarke failed to advise Derrick
or his parents that on March 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
for appeal for the reasons stated in the order entered on January 8, 2001.

60. Mr. Clarke also failed to advise
Derrick or his parents that he could appeal the Court of Appeals' decision to
the Supreme Court of Virginia.

61. Mr. Clarke did not respond in
writing to the Gunn's complaint.

62. During the course of the bar's
investigation of the Gunn's complaint, Mr. Clarke did not respond to Bar Investigator
David Abrams' numerous requests for an interview.

The foregoing allegations give rise
to the following charges of misconduct under Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.

(c) A lawyer shall inform the client
of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications from another party that
may significantly affect settlement or resolution of the matter.

RULE 8.1 Bar Admission And
Disciplinary Matters

[A] lawyer . . . in connection with
a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(d) obstruct a lawful investigation
by an admissions or disciplinary authority.

V. VSB Docket No. 01-031-2626
(Kenneth Church)

63. On or about February 16, 1999,
Kenneth Church retained Mr. Clarke to represent him on breaking and entering,
grand larceny and bomb threat charges in the Colonial Heights General District
Court.

65. Even though the Colonial Heights
charges were serious and extensive, Mr. Clarke agreed to accept a fee of $1,500,
including a $500 retainer.

66. Mr. Clarke appeared on Mr. Church's
behalf on at least five occasions in general district court, not only for matters
directly associated with the charges, but also with respect to alleged violations
of Mr. Church's pre-trial release and probation, bond revocation, request for
bond reinstatement, and an additional, unrelated general district court matter.

67. In circuit court, Mr. Clarke
made many appearances on Mr. Church's behalf, and on December 21, 1999, Mr.
Church entered into a plea agreement, with sentencing set for April 10, 2000.

68. In March 2000, Mr. Church's pre-trial
case worker noted several alleged violations of the conditions of Mr. Church's
release and set them for hearing along with Mr. Church's sentencing.

69. Shortly before April 10, 2000,
Mr. Church fled the jurisdiction.

70. Although Mr. Clarke appeared
for the sentencing hearing, Mr. Church did not, and a capias was issued for
his arrest.

71. Mr. Church was captured and returned
to Virginia; his sentencing hearing was held on July 11, 2000.

72. Despite numerous violations of
the conditions of Mr. Church's pre-trial supervision and his flight from justice,
Mr. Clarke convinced the court not to deviate from the sentencing guidelines
and sentenced him at the midpoint of the guidelines.

73. Mr. Clarke's representation of
Mr. Church lasted 17 months, and involved an enormous amount of time and effort,
including almost weekly contact with Mr. Church's pre-trial case worker.

74. Nonetheless, Mr. Church paid
very little toward Mr. Clarke's fee and often failed to keep appointments with
his counsel.

75. After Mr. Church was convicted
and sentenced, he asked Mr. Clarke to file a sentence reduction motion; Mr.
Clarke advised Mr. Church that the would not file the motion unless Mr. Church
paid him the balance due for Mr. Clarke's prior fee, for which Mr. Church had
previously signed an Acknowledgment and Affirmation of Debt .

76. On December 15, 2000, Mr. Church
borrowed $250 from his former employer and paid Mr. Clarke that amount and indicated
that his brother would pay the remaining balance.

77. The balance was never paid.

78. Mr. Clarke did not respond in
writing to Mr. Church's complaint.

79. During the course of the bar's
investigation of Mr. Church's complaint, Mr. Clarke did not respond to Bar Investigator
David Abrams' numerous requests for an interview.

The foregoing allegations give rise
to the following charges of misconduct under Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.

RULE 8.1 Bar Admission And
Disciplinary Matters

[A] lawyer . . . in connection with
a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(d) obstruct a lawful investigation
by an admissions or disciplinary authority.

VI. VSB Docket No. 01-031-3163
(Hassan Shabazz)

80. Hassan Shabazz was found guilty
in the Circuit Court of Nottoway County of three counts of robbery and three
counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery; he was sentenced
on December 22, 1999, to serve 20 years with 113 years suspended .

81. On or about January 20, 2000,
the Circuit Court of Nottoway County appointed Mr. Clarke to represent Hassan
Shabazz on the appeal of his criminal conviction.

82. Mr. Clarke filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Court of Appeals on Mr. Shabazz's behalf on January 21, 2000.

83. Mr. Shabazz learned that Mr.
Clarke had been appointed to represent him when Mr. Clarke visited him at the
Piedmont Regional Jail on February 4, 2000.

84. Mr. Shabazz did not hear anything
from Mr. Clarke since February 4, 2000, although Mr. Shabazz and members of
his family attempted to contact Mr. Clarke.

85. Mr. Shabazz learned that the
Court of Appeals had denied his appeal on June 21, 2000, after he wrote the
court.

86. By the time Mr. Shabazz learned
his appeal had been denied, the deadline for appealing to the Supreme Court
of Virginia had passed.

The foregoing allegations give rise
to the following charges of misconduct under Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.3 Diligence

(a) A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.

VII. VSB Docket No. 02-031-1723
(Costella L. Forney)

88. In 1999, Mr. Clarke was appointed
to represent Costella L. Forney on armed robbery charges pending in the Richmond
Circuit Court.

89. On or about December 18, 2001,
Ms. Forney filed a bar complaint against Mr. Clarke, alleging that he had failed
to provide her a copy of her file despite her repeated requests.

90. The Virginia State Bar tried
to deal with the complaint proactively by requesting Mr. Clarke to either provide
Ms. Forney a copy of her file or explain to her why he could not.

91. Mr. Clarke did not respond to
the Virginia State Bar's efforts to resolve the complaint outside the disciplinary
process or respond to the bar complaint after a disciplinary file was opened.

92. During the course of the bar's
investigation of Ms. Forney's complaint, Mr. Clarke did not respond to Bar Investigator
David Abrams' numerous requests for an interview.

The foregoing allegations give rise
to the following charges of misconduct under Rules of Professional Conduct:

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information.

RULE 1.16 Declining Or Terminating
Representation

(e) All original, client-furnished documents
and any originals of legal instruments or official documents which are in the
lawyer's possession (wills, corporate minutes, etc.) are the property of the client
and shall be returned to the client upon request, whether or not the client has
paid the fees and costs owed the lawyer. If the lawyer wants to keep a copy of
such original documents, the lawyer must incur the cost of duplication. Upon request,
the client must also be provided copies of the following documents from the lawyer's
file, whether or not the client has paid the fees and costs owed the lawyer: lawyer/client
and lawyer/third-party communications; the lawyer's copies of client-furnished
documents (unless the originals have been returned to the client pursuant to this
paragraph); pleadings and discovery responses; working and final drafts of legal
instruments, official documents, investigative reports, legal memoranda, and other
attorney work product documents prepared for the client in the course of the representation;
research materials; and bills previously submitted to the client. Although the
lawyer may bill and seek to collect from the client the costs associated with
making a copy of these materials, the lawyer may not use the client's refusal
to pay for such materials as a basis to refuse the client's request. The lawyer,
however, is not required under this Rule to provide the client copies of billing
records and documents intended only for internal use, such as memoranda prepared
by the lawyer discussing conflicts of interest, staffing considerations, or difficulties
arising from the lawyer/client relationship.

RULE 8.1 Bar Admission And
Disciplinary Matters

[A] lawyer . . . in connection with
a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(d) obstruct a lawful investigation
by an admissions or disciplinary authority.

PUBLIC REPRIMAND WITH
TERMS

The Board, having considered all
evidence before it and having considered the nature of the Respondent's actions,
the lack of a prior disciplinary record, Respondent's mitigating factors, and
based upon the Proposed Disposition signed and agreed to by both Bar
Counsel and Respondent's Counsel, hereby imposes upon the Respondent, effective
upon entry of this Order, a Public Reprimand with Term and such terms are as
follows:

1. By
December 31, 2002, Mr. Clarke shall make arrangements to be seen and evaluated
by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist approved by Bar Counsel and Lawyers Helping
Lawyers.

2. The purpose of the evaluation
shall be to determine if Mr. Clarke has a condition that currently impairs his
fitness to practice law.

3. Mr. Clarke shall execute whatever
medical releases are necessary for the psychologist, psychiatrist and any other
therapists, counselors or medical providers with whom he has consulted or been
treated by, to upon request produce his records and communicate with the Virginia
State Bar and Lawyers Helping Lawyers.

4. The evaluation shall be completed
no later than January 31, 2003, and the provider who sees and evaluates Mr.
Clarke shall submit a written report of his or her findings to Bar Counsel and
Lawyers Helping Lawyers within one week of the evaluation.

5. If it is determined that Mr. Clarke
has a condition that currently impairs his fitness to practice law, he shall
follow the course of treatment recommended by the provider, and no later than
February 14, 2003, enter into a Monitoring Agreement with Lawyers Helping Lawyers.

6. Mr. Clarke shall comply fully
with the terms of the Monitoring Agreement, and Lawyers Helping Lawyers shall
provide the Virginia State Bar quarterly reports on his progress through December
31, 2004.

7. If the provider determines that
Mr. Clarke has a condition that materially impairs his fitness to practice law,
a Suspensionfor Disability shall be imposed
until such time as Mr. Clarke proves that the Disability no longer exists pursuant
to Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 13.I.5.e.(2) of the Rules of Court.

Upon satisfactory proof that
all terms and conditions have been met, these matters shall be closed. Mr. Clarke's
failure to comply with any one or more of the agreed terms and conditions will
result in the imposition of the alternative sanction ofa Two
Year Suspension. The imposition of the alternative sanction shall not
require any hearing on the underlying charges of Misconduct, if the Virginia
State Bar discovers that Mr. Clarke has failed to comply with any of the agreed
terms or conditions. In that event, the Virginia State Bar shall issue and serve
upon Mr. Clarke a Notice of Hearing to Show Cause why the alternative sanction
of a two year suspension should not be imposed. The sole factual issue will
be whether the Mr. Clarke has violated one or more of the terms of the Public
Reprimand without legal justification or excuse. The imposition of the alternative
sanction shall be in addition to any other sanction imposed for misconduct during
the probationary period.

It is ORDERED that pursuant to Rules
of Court, Paragraph 13.B.8.c., the Clerk of the Disciplinary System shall assess
costs.

It is further ORDERED that a copy
teste of this Order shall be mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested,
to the Respondent at his last address of record with the Virginia State Bar,
1325 Greycourt Avenue, Richmond, VA 23227, to Respondent's counsel, Craig S.
Cooley, 3000 Idlewood Avenue, P. O. Box 7268, Richmond, VA 23221-0268, and hand
delivered to Barbara Ann Williams, Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar, 707 East
Main Street, Suite 1500, Richmond, Virginia 23219.

Terry Griffith, Chandler and Halasz,
Inc., P.O. Box 9349, Richmond, Virginia 23227, 804/730-1222, was the reporter
for the hearing and transcribed the proceedings.