09ASTANA447, KAZAKHSTAN: AK ZHOL LEADER BAIMENOV SAYS PARTY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000447
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019
TAGS: PGOVPRELPHUMPINREFINKDEMKPAOKZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: AK ZHOL LEADER BAIMENOV SAYS PARTY
GOT INFUSION OF FUNDING, CRITICIZES BAIL-OUT PACKAGE
REF: A. STATE 19716
¶B. ASTANA 0250
¶C. ASTANA 0204
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b)/(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 5, Alikhan Baimenov, the leader of
opposition Ak Zhol party, alleged to us that until recently
his party was the target of an "information blockade" by both
pro-government and opposition media. The recent easing of
this blockade allowed Ak Zhol to re-emerge on the public
radar. Baimenov maintained that his party is a threat to the
ruling elite because its electorate overlaps with the
electorate of the ruling Nur Otan party. Ak Zhol got an
infusion of funding, he claimed, from formerly pro-government
businessmen. Baimenov railed against the government's
program to combat the economic crisis, alleging that the
bail-out package will benefit a select few well-placed
businessmen close to President Nazarbayev. Baimenov believes
that personal interests were behind the recent government
take-over of BTA bank. He was doubtful that the government
will call early elections in such tough economic times, and
he chose not to speculate extensively on which party would
become the second party in parliament should the elections be
held. Baimenov encouraged the United States to support the
development of a Russian-language media sources to counter
Russia's influence in the Kazakhstani media market. He
offered his insights regarding the influence of senior
figures in the Presidential Administration. END SUMMARY.
AK ZHOL'S SUDDEN PUBLIC ACTIVITY
¶2. (C) On March 5, we met with the leader of the Ak Zhol
party, Alikhan Baimenov. Baimenov, whose party is viewed by
the other opposition parties as the government's pocket
opposition, recently made several comments
uncharacteristically critical of the government, particularly
over its handling of the economic crisis. He also announced
his party's intention to hold protest rallies in the spring
unless the government reconsiders its anti-crisis program and
initiates further amendments to the laws on political
parties, elections, and the media. Baimenov claimed that his
party's sudden activity should not be viewed as something out
of the ordinary -- rather, Ak Zhol simply had to take some
time to regroup after the last parliamentary elections. He
claimed that his party was also the target of an "information
blockade" from both the pro-government media and the press
outlets associated with other opposition parties, notably the
newspaper "Svoboda Slova," which is closely linked with the
opposition party Azat. Baimenov believes that this
"blockade" has eased somewhat, allowing Ak Zhol to re-emerge
on the public's radar.
"WE PLAY ON THE PRESIDENT'S FIELD"
¶3. (C) Baimenov confided that Ak Zhol recently gained some
"members with funds," people he described as formerly
pro-government businessmen who "overcame their fears" to join
the opposition. Ak Zhol is a threat to the ruling elite
because its electorate overlaps with the electorate of the
ruling Nur Otan party, he claimed. While the opposition Azat
party, National Social Democratic Party (OSDP), and Communist
Party fight for the same group of opposition-oriented
followers, "we play on the President's field," he asserted.
The majority of Kazakhstanis "don't think about politics," so
Ak Zhol's strategy is to reach the population on "softer
issues," like culture, the Kazakh language, and nationality.
Asked to describe his party's platform, Baimenov said Ak
Zhol's goal is to "truly realize the government's Path to
Europe program." (NOTE: The Path to Europe is President
Nazarbayev's program to establish closer ties with Europe,
including through greater economic cooperation and
ASTANA 00000447 002 OF 003
harmonizing Kazakhstani laws with European legislation. END
NOTE.)
SHARP CRITICISM OF THE ANTI-CRISIS PROGRAM
¶4. (C) Baimenov did not mince words in criticizing the
government's program to combat the economic crisis, alleging
that only a select few well-placed business tycoons will see
its benefits. In his view, government funds to assist
KazakhMys, a copper giant, and the Eurasia Natural Resources
Corporation (ENRC) will "flow straight into the pockets" of
their respective major
shareholders, the pro-Nazarbayev
oligarchs Vladimir Kim and Aleksandr Mashkevich. He believes
the funds will go abroad to finance Kim's and Mashkevich's
overseas investment projects rather than be reinvested in
Kazakhstan. Baimenov railed against the lack of transparency
and oversight over the government's bail-out package.
"Extractive industries should have a responsibility to
reinvest at home," he argued. In Baimenov's view, the state
should be investing in infrastructure rather than "dabbling
in state capitalism."
BTA TAKE-OVER: A CLASH OF PERSONALITIES?
¶5. (C) Asked for his thoughts on the government's recent
take-over of BTA bank (ref C), Baimenov turned reflective for
a moment and said that "the government can't afford to loose
people like Ablyazov," BTA's ousted chairman who is
apparently in self-imposed exile in London. He believes that
the take-over was primarily driven by a conflict of
personalities: "The government could have negotiated, but
personal feelings got in the way." (NOTE: Independent
political analyst Dosym Satpayev told the Ambassador recently
that while BTA's financial vulnerability was the major reason
for the government's take-over, the personal dislike between
Ablyazov and Prime Minister Masimov certainly played a role
(ref B). END NOTE.)
EARLY ELECTIONS UNLIKELY
¶6. (C) Baimenov does not believe the government will call
early elections during such tough economic times. He
qualified, however, that "everything depends on the
Presidential Administration" -- "They may do it just to show
that no other party can pass the seven percent threshold (for
representation in parliament)." He ventured that the
government would "risk" elections only after the bail-out
program reached small and medium enterprises, the mainstay of
the middle class. The economic slowdown is a natural benefit
for the opposition, but few of the opposition parties have
fully harnessed its potential, argued Baimenov. In his
assessment, only the unregistered party Alga has the
potential to mobilize broad swaths of the population.
AND THE RUNNER-UP IS...
¶7. (C) We asked Baimenov if there is any truth to the
speculations that Ak Zhol will be the second party in the
Mazhilis (the lower house of parliament) after the next
elections. (NOTE: The recently-passed amendments to the
election law stipulates that any party that gets the
second-highest number of votes automatically gets into the
parliament, even if it does not pass the seven percent
threshold. Many in opposition circles believe that
Baimenov's Ak Zhol has been "picked" by the government to be
the second party. END NOTE.) Baimenov demurred from
answering directly, saying that Ak Zhol, Azat, and OSDP all
have the potential to actually exceed the seven percent
barrier. Instead, he floated his own candidate for the
"runner-up" -- the pro-government Adilet (Justice) party.
Baimenov alleged that Adilet has been copying many of Ak
Zhol's statements and policies. "It's like they are our
ASTANA 00000447 003 OF 003
proxy," joked Baimenov, "except they get air time, and we do
not."
NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE MEDIA
¶8. (SBU) Baimenov said that that the United States should
seriously consider doing more to support the development of
an alternative Russian-language media in Kazakhstan -- i.e.,
an alternative to television from Russia, which continues to
be the dominant source of news for most Kazakshtanis. He
used the example of recent events in Georgia, Ukraine, and
the Baltics. The population was fed Russia's perspective,
highlighting "examples of what is wrong with democracy."
Baimenov suggested that providing technical help to domestic
Kazakhstahni news outlets that present alternative points of
view or encouraging Western news outlets to enter into
partnership with local ones could be some of the ways we
could level the media playing field.
MUSIN HAS THE PRESIDENT'S EAR
¶9. (C) In accordance with ref A, we asked for Baimenov's
assessment of the influence of senior figures in the
Presidential Administration. Baimenov believes the
Presidential Administration head Aslan Musin "to be very
important in decision-making." "Musin is from the old
guard," and there is a generational affinity between him and
Nazarbayev, unlike the case with his much younger
predecessor, Kairat Kelimbetov (who now heads the
Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund). Baimenov sees Musin as
even "tougher" than Adylbek Zhaksybekov (who preceded
Kelimbetov and is now ambassador to Russia). Baimenov also
believes that State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev is highly
influential. He is viewed as having done an excellent job as
ambassador to the United States and is close to Nazarbayev.
HOAGLAND

The information recorded on this site has been extracted from http://Wikileaks.org (Kazakhstan) database..

We wish to express our gratitude to Julian Assange and his team for making this data available as it is an important public record.

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