[Due to a silly error of mine, Geoffrey Rockwell's earlier note on theory
went unwittingly into the ether. I have retrieved it from a copy I kept and
here include it as [2]. His reply to my reply to [2] follows as [3]. Sorry
for the discursive labyrinth. --WM]

I very much like what Willard said this morning about personification. I
think his example theory suggests two things:

1. Theories are about something underlying, something not clearly
visible in the 'phenomenology' (a freighted word). Often this is
something that causes or or is a contribing cause of what we observe but
not always. It can also be something distinctive to that phenomenology
in other ways.

2. The crucial practical role, certainly a crucial practical role, of a
theory is to allow us to make predictions, i.e., to know in advance
under what circumstances we will and will not encounter the target
phenomenon.

I went to see a performance last night of "Judy or What it Like To Be A
Robot" by Tom Sgouros. This is a performance around questions of artificial
intelligence, consciousness and scripting machines or performances.
(http://www.sgouros.com/)

Today I asked one of my philosophy colleagues if that performance was
itself a work of philosophy to which he replied that it was not. He said it
was "philosophically informed" the way a movie like the Matrix is.

When pushed on this he asserted that the performance did not make
assertions that could be assessed the way philosophical assertions can. In
other words it did not present a theory, where a theory would be a coherent
set of general assertions about some subject. Instead the actors (Tom and
Judy) performed characters who made assertions (among other things.)

I then pointed out that the word "theory" comes from the Greek to "view"
and shares a common root with "theatre" which suggests that theories are
works that stand-back in some fashion in order to present a particular type
of view on the subject theorized.

To this he replied that etymology isn't definition - it doesn't mean that
is how we use the word today. This raised the question of whether a
philosophical dialogue is a "work of philosophy" capable of presenting
theory or whether philosophers like Wittgenstein can be said to present
theories when they appear to be resisting theorizing (or trying to cure us
of the temptation).

The relevance of this story is that we need to expand the question to look
not only at theory but the practices associated with theory. What does it
mean to theorize? How do we do it? How do we exchange theories? Is all
theory performed, even if the performance is a reading?

Humanities computing brings a new set of practices to the mix. Developing a
computer model of a subject of inquiry is a form of applied theorizing. It
is a method or practice that humanities computing is introducing into the
humanities whereby we try to formally describe in code a subject so that
the computer can perform the theory as a way of testing it. Again, this is
a stepping-back-to-view akin to stepping back from writing theory.

The question I ask myself is whether there are inherent constraints to
theories modeled as code for automata that limit what can be theorized
through computing? We should ask Judy.

>What I think Geoffrey is talking about is the practice of modelling, i.e.
>constructing and interatively perfecting a partial and manipulable
>representation of something for the purpose of studying it. From this it
>follows that a model is what results from applying a theory to a specific
>set of circumstances in order to see if the theory works under those
>circumstances and what it can tell us about them. This definition of
>"theory" accords with some current philosophy of science, esp the so-called
>"semantic view", for which see Ronald N. Giere among others.

Willard is to kind to ascribe a coherent position to me when I was reacting
to a performance. One of the directions I was headed was to assert that a
computer model could be a theory the way we could say that a work of
philosophy is a theory.

This raises the question of what is the incarnation of a theory. Is a
theory in the mind while a written work is a "statement in writing" of the
theory? Where is Plato's theory of forms now? Is it in a "text", the
_Republic_, which is different from a particular instance of that abstract
text - namely the object on my shelf? Is it in the minds of those
philosophers who have read Plato? Or is it a form to which the physical
artefacts (and states of mind) are approximations? (This should remind us
of the debate at the UVA ACH/ALLC about "what is a text".

If we decide that certain objects called texts are theories, then I will
assert that other objects like programs are also capable of being a theory.
So, if I point to the _Republic_ as a theory of forms, I should be able to
point to Willard's system as a theory of personification.

Which brings me back to theorizing or the practice of developing theories.
The second point I want to make is that we don't always build programs
(code theories) based on ideas (mental theories). Sometimes we develop the
theory by iteratively playing with what is at hand, be it a lump of wax,
words on paper, code on a machine, or diagrams on napkins. The theory
emerges in the artefact and in our minds simultaneously - or in dialogue.
The artefact is interpreted during theorizing as a theory. For someone else
the artefact could be a database - to Willard it is an encoded theory. This
would answer respondents who point out that the artefact is just a machine
not a theory. It is only a theory when treated that way, which is the most
we can say about anything, including our mental states.

Regarding performance and philosophy, I put the question to Tom Sgouros,
the performer. His response was,

"That is, in a general sense, I agree with you and don't find an
important distinction between performance and philosophy, but "Judy"
(as opposed to Judy) doesn't really present a consistent viewpoint on
the important subjects."

He continues to say that a performance could be a work of philosophy, but
his show was not intended to present a consistent view and therefore he
would not claim it is such a work. Likewise we might say that certain
humanities computing works are philosophy (or theory) because they are
intended to present a consistent view, while others are not. In playing
with a model on a computer it would become a theory when the model was
consistent and not just an aggregation.