March 13, 2011 - The Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
the federal agency with primary responsibility for
securing the air cargo system.

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen
100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by
August 2010.

GAO reviewed TSA's progress in meeting the act's
screening mandate, and any related challenges it faces
for both domestic (cargo transported within and from the
United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for the
United States).

This
statement is based on prior reports and testimonies issued from
April 2007 through December 2010 addressing the security of the
air cargo transportation system and selected updates made in
February and March 2011. For the updates, GAO obtained
information on TSA's air cargo security programs and interviewed
TSA officials.

As of
August 2010, TSA reported that it met the mandate to screen 100
percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo, but as GAO
reported in June 2010, TSA lacked a mechanism to verify the
accuracy of the data used to make this determination.

TSA took
several actions in meeting this mandate for domestic cargo,
including creating a voluntary program to facilitate screening
throughout the air cargo supply chain; taking steps to test
technologies for screening air cargo; and expanding its
explosives detection canine program, among other things.
However, in June 2010 GAO reported that TSA did not have a
mechanism to verify screening data and recommended that TSA
establish such a mechanism.

TSA
partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that
verifying such data would be challenging. As GAO reported in
June 2010, data verification is important to provide reasonable
assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels.
As GAO further reported in June 2010, there is no technology
approved or qualified by TSA to screen cargo once it is loaded
onto a pallet or container--both of which are common means of
transporting domestic air cargo on passenger aircraft.

As a result,
questions remain about air carriers' ability to effectively screen air
cargo on such aircraft. TSA has also taken a number of steps to enhance
the security of inbound air cargo, but also faces challenges that could
hinder its ability to meet the screening mandate.

TSA moved its
deadline for meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as it applies to
inbound air cargo to the end of 2011, up 2 years from when the TSA
administrator previously reported the agency would meet this mandate.
According to TSA officials, the agency determined it was feasible to
accelerate the deadline as a result of trends in air carrier reported
screening data and discussions with air cargo industry leaders regarding
progress made by industry to secure cargo on passenger aircraft.

TSA also took
steps to enhance the security of inbound cargo following the October
2010 Yemen air cargo bomb attempt--such as requiring additional
screening of high-risk cargo prior to transport on an all-cargo
aircraft. However, TSA continues to face challenges GAO identified in
June 2010 that could impact TSA's ability to meet this screening mandate
as it applies to inbound air cargo. For example, GAO reported that TSA's
screening percentages were estimates and were not based on actual data
collected from air carriers or other entities, such as foreign
governments, and recommended that TSA establish a mechanism to verify
the accuracy of these data.

TSA partially
agreed, and required air carriers to report inbound cargo screening data
effective May 2010. However, TSA officials stated while current
screening percentages are based on actual data reported by air carriers,
verifying the accuracy of the screening data is difficult.

It is
important for TSA to have complete and accurate data to
verify that the agency can meet the screening mandate. GAO
will continue to monitor these issues as part of its ongoing
review of TSA's efforts to secure inbound air cargo, the
final results to be issued later this year.

GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen
air cargo screening. Although not fully concurring with
all recommendations, TSA has taken or has a number of
actions underway to address them. Continued attention is
needed to ensure some recommendations are addressed,
such as establishing a mechanism to verify screening
data. TSA provided technical comments on the information
in this statement, which GAO incorporated as
appropriate.