Under ORS 30.866(1)(c), a stalking protective order shouldn’t have been issued when a respondent drives through a petitioner’s neighborhood three times and only makes contact with members of petitioner’s household as a response, despite respondent’s history of infrequent incidents of anger and aggression towards others.

Halvorson appealed the issuance of a stalking protective order (SPO) on grounds that it was not supported by sufficient evidence. K.E.A. and Halvorson were divorced in 2009 and K.E.A. filed for an SPO in 2012 after three unwanted encounters during which the Halvorson was driving around K.E.A .’s neighborhood. The third encounter escalated into a verbal confrontation between K.E.A.’s current husband and Halvorson, resulting in a police response. Based on those contacts, the trial court entered the SPO against Halvorson. On appeal, the Court addressed only one of Halvorson’s many arguments that the record did not support the issuance of an SPO: that K.E.A.’s “apprehension” due to Halvorson’s contact was not objectively reasonable under ORS 30.866(1)(c). The Court determined that, based on the evidence in the record, Halvorson’s actions were not objectively threatening. Despite the fact that during the marriage, Halvorson had pushed K.E.A. onto the sidewalk, verbally abused K.E.A. during divorce proceedings, and exhibited anger and aggression toward others, the recent incidents were not so violent or intimidating to objectively cause an apprehension for petitioner’s personal safety or the safety of her household as required by ORS 30.866(1)(c). Reversed.