Only Press News

Friday, 29 November 2013

Recent discussion in the wake of Saudi Arabia's refusal to accept a nonpermanent seat on the U.N. Security Council has prompted bewilderment – and renewed questions about the Kingdom’s foreign policy. Yet accusations of irresponsibility are inaccurate and misleading. Indeed, despite the criticisms leveled by commentators including Fareed Zakaria on these very pages, the fundamentals of Saudi foreign policy have not changed in decades, and are based on consistent and clear foundations.

As the “senior player” in the Arab world, as the Kingdom was recently described by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Saudi Arabia works to promote economic stability and political security via a moderating energy policy and careful strategic posture that is aimed at countering and neutralizing the upheaval that has been tearing the Muslim and Arab worlds apart.

This approach has been on display in recent Saudi actions.

When an insurgency sought to overthrow the Bahraini government in 2011, a Saudi-led Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) military contingent stepped in to secure the critical state infrastructure of this tiny nation. In addition, the Kingdom is also heavily engaged in attempting to stabilize Yemen, primarily through economic and security assistance based on the GCC plan that replaced former President Ali Abdullah Saleh with an interim government. This new leadership is now drawing up of a new constitution for elections next year. And in Egypt, Saudi Arabia has stepped in as a crucial player in pushing back against Muslim Brotherhood ideology, including through providing the financial resources needed to strengthen the more moderate but temporary government in Cairo.

All this is in keeping with Saudi Arabia’s role and responsibilities as the cradle of Islam. After all, the Kingdom has a unique standing vis-a-vis the more than 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide, a leadership role enhanced by the Kingdom's willingness to expend formidable financial and economic resources in assisting other nations in dire straits to maintain stability.

This approach has in turn generated a growing foreign policy assertiveness that is being transformed from primarily reactive to proactive. The fact is that the Kingdom also has global responsibilities, including trying to combat Islamic extremism. And despite the popular image in the United States that Saudi money is about funding terror, the Kingdom was actually a victim of al Qaeda-backed terrorism on its own soil several years before the tragic events of September 11, 2001. In 1995, for example, al Qaeda struck a National Guard training facility in Riyadh. This was followed by the Riyadh compound bombings in May 2003. The latter attack claimed dozens of lives and prompted the Saudis to launch a massive security upgrade to root out terrorists in their midst and overseas through hard (military and police) and soft (educative and financial) tactics.

But years before these changes, Saudi Arabia had already staked out its diplomatic position on the al Qaeda threat. Following the 1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, Saudi Arabia is said to have requested that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden. The former head of Saudi Arabian intelligence, Prince Turki al-Faisal, reportedly said back in 2001 that Taliban leader Mullah Omar had initially agreed to grant the request, but changed his mind and was “abusive” about the Kingdom.

Despite the failure to secure bin Laden, the Saudi counter-terrorism effort decimated al Qaeda’s infrastructure in the Kingdom, preventing attacks both at home and abroad in the process including a heavily Saudi-backed infiltration scheme that thwarted an alleged attempt to place bombs on two cargo planes in Yemen that had been destined for the United States.

But Saudi Arabia does not only have a responsibility to push for security from terrorism – as the world’s largest oil exporter, it also has a global responsibility to ensure the well-being of the world’s financial system. Serving as the undisputed leader of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Saudis have managed oil production in a consistent, sensible manner that has broadly kept global energy markets stable and supplied while minimizing the chance for the sudden supply disruptions seen with countries such as Iran, Iraq and Venezuela.

Despite the frustration in the West with the Kingdom, Saudi Arabia has been the most durable and unwavering ally of the United States in the Middle East since 1945, balancing its roles as a leading Muslim nation and a pivotal U.S. partner. Secretary Kerry made this very point when he said of the Kingdom that it has “the ability to be able to influence a lot of important things we also care about.”

So back to the U.N. Security Council – if Saudi Arabia wants to be a responsible player, why did it turn down a seat? The answer is that as part of its growing efforts to steer a more assertive and independent course, Saudi Arabia has found itself increasingly at odds with the U.S. and others over their handling of Syria. Just this week, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister urged the Security Council to act to “save” Syria, and it is this refusal to act that likely pushed a disillusioned Kingdom to shun the body.

If a more independent Saudi foreign policy is “irresponsible,” then Fareed Zakaria is right. But while he might be willing to pick the country for a Most Irresponsible Foreign Policy award, the facts of the Kingdom actually suggest this is a country whose foreign policy is more stable, secure and responsible than many realize.

China’s more assertive posture in regional territorial disputes took a new turn at the weekend with its decision to implement an Air Defense Identification Zone. At a time when tensions in the region are already high due to a lingering territorial dispute between China and Japan, China’s action has escalated tensions in the East China Sea. Now, with Beijing apparently demonstrating a fundamental misunderstanding of diplomacy with its neighbors, the region is forced to confront provocative and potentially destabilizing behavior.

On November 23, China’s defense ministry unilaterally announced the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. According to the new rules for conduct in this ADIZ, any aircraft flying into China’s ADIZ is required to submit flight plans to Chinese authorities, maintain two-way radio communication, and keep radar transponders turned on. Should a plane refuse to follow these instructions, China’s military will “adopt defensive measures.”

ADIZs are, by themselves, not controversial, acting as early-warning perimeters for self-defense. But while there are no international rules concerning their size or establishment, China’s action is provocative for two reasons. First, it may be attempting to set new rules for aircraft flying above waters considered a state’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Second, it chose to establish an ADIZ that overlaps considerably with those of both Japan and Taiwan as well as a sliver of South Korea’s. Provocatively, included in China’s ADIZ are territorial disputes it maintains with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese) and with South Korea over Ieodo (Suyan Rock in Chinese).

Under current U.S. and Japanese practice, ADIZ procedures are not applied to foreign aircraft if they do not intend to enter their territorial airspace. China’s move sets the stage for a dangerous situation, however, if a plane flies through a portion of its ADIZ (not intending to enter territorial airspace) and refuses to follow China’s unique protocols. This is particularly worrisome with respect to Japan – under China’s new rules, Chinese planes could be scrambled to confront Japanese planes flying in the overlapped portion of the ADIZ, which could result in an accidental collision. In the worst case scenario, a situation could arise where an order by either country is given to adopt defensive measures against what they see as intruding planes. Think of the 2001 EP-3 incident, when a Chinese fighter collided with a U.S. surveillance plane, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot. If that happened with a Japanese plane today, Beijing would be pressured to take aggressive action to placate the virulent Chinese nationalism that is sure to erupt.

Representatives from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan quickly expressed strong concern about China’s attempt to alter the status quo and destabilize the region. And, quick to demonstrate their refusal to be cowed by China, the United States and Japan continued scheduled exercises in the area of the Senkaku Islands. Indeed, to underscore its commitment to the status quo, the United States on Tuesday sent two B-52s directly through China’s ADIZ, refusing to follow China’s new rules.

China’s decision to establish the ADIZ demonstrates both recklessness and misunderstanding. It is reckless in that Beijing is attempting to unilaterally change the status quo via intimidation. Such behavior is escalatory and only increases tensions between neighbors and drastically reduces trust with the United States. At the same time, China’s behavior demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of both statesmanship and the commitment by the United States and its allies to uphold international norms.

China has a right to seek changes to existing rules that guide state behavior, but not through intimidation. The U.S. and China’s neighbors understand that China is rising and have worked to engage China through various dialogues that strengthen China’s voice in international affairs and benefit China’s global presence. Yet, China should not mistake their engagement for weakness. The United States and its allies stand resolute to defend the rules and norms that have underwritten peace and security for decades, upon which the prosperity of the region was built and continues to grow. Brute attempts at change will always be forcefully resisted.

Unfortunately, this problem will probably get worse before it improves. Although China’s ADIZ does not cover the South China Sea, where it is ensnarled in multiple territorial disputes, China’s Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said that China will establish additional zones after all necessary preparations are completed. This raises worries over new provocations. Should China decide to extend another expansive ADIZ in the South China Sea, backed by its threat to adopt defensive measures, this would overlap multiple ADIZs, thereby throwing down the gauntlet to all states on its periphery.

A paradox exists in that China’s behavior is both understandable and yet puzzling. China is in many ways blinded by a mixture of victimization and self-confidence that lead it to demand changes, believing its time has come after having suffered so long under the hand of foreign oppressors. At the same time, how it chooses to do so defies logic. At a time when U.S. leadership is working to build strategic trust with China, the Korean leadership is pursuing closer ties with China as part of a trustpolitk campaign and Taiwan’s leadership is maintaining a positive relationship with Beijing, China chooses to act in a way that in one broad stroke erases much of the goodwill that has been built. And at a time when Japanese leadership remains highly critical of China and is strengthening partnerships with countries similarly challenged by China, Beijing’s act further steels Tokyo’s opposition and sends a frightening message to others in the region.

China’s leadership appears to see its neighbors as conspiring to stop China’s rise. The U.S. rebalance to the region and Japan’s changing security policies are interpreted as provocative actions directed against Beijing. As such, China believes it must counterbalance these efforts. What Beijing fails to see is that efforts like those by the United States and Japan are in fact reactions against Chinese behavior. China’s more assertive posture in recent years has spooked the region, and its unilateral efforts to change international norms are viewed as part of this revanchism.

The reality is that China is not the victim, but very much part of the problem.

In the early hours of Sunday morning, in Geneva, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, and foreign ministers from Russia, China, and Europe signed a deal to suspend aspects of Iranian nuclear work in exchange for some sanctions relief. “With this first step, we have created the time and the space in order to be able to pursue a comprehensive agreement…to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon," Kerry told assembled diplomats and journalists.
President Barack Obama was triumphant. “Today, that diplomacy opened up a new path toward a world that is more secure – a future in which we can verify that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and that it cannot build a nuclear weapon.”
He should not be so certain. Rather than prevent Iran’s nuclear breakout, historians may mark the Geneva deal as the step that most legitimized Iran’s path to nuclear weapons capability.
Willing to deal is not synonymous with sincere desire to reach a comprehensive settlement. Key to successful reconciliation is truth, and there are many reasons to doubt Iranian intentions, none of which did the Geneva negotiators address. Iranian authorities say they seek nuclear technology to ensure domestic energy security, but as the Bipartisan Policy Center showed, Tehran could achieve that aim for a fraction of the cost and for decades, if not centuries, longer if it chose to invest instead in its pipeline and refinery infrastructure.
Neither Obama nor Kerry have demanded Tehran clarify past deception. If Iran’s nuclear program has always been peaceful as Tehran claims, then it would have had no need to hide enrichment plants and other facilities from inspectors. It is all well and good to compliment Iran on allowing inspections of key plants once discovered, but a sincere Tehran would not offer transparency only when intelligence services discover subterfuge.
Iran also walked away from previous offers – and even agreements – that would see it guaranteed reactor fuel should it agree that critical reprocessing might occur abroad. Unfortunately, the current deal rewards Iran for its past defiance and loosens what diplomats once considered the minimum safeguards.
Fear over Iranian intentions is genuine. While Iranian officials say that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has issued a fatwa banning nuclear weapons, the collection of his fatwas on his official websites does not include it. Iranian officials and diplomats citing it have been inconsistent as to its date of issue and contents. Meanwhile, various Iranian officials have threatened to use nuclear weapons, curious statements from a regime that claims they do not seek to develop them.
Indeed, on December 14, 2001, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the father of Iran’s post-revolutionary nuclear program, reportedly declared: “The use of an atomic bomb against Israel would totally destroy Israel, while the same against the Islamic world would only cause damage. Such a scenario is not inconceivable.” Just over three years later, Iran Emrooz quoted Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Kharrazi, secretary general of Iranian Hezbollah, as saying, “We are able to produce atomic bombs and we will do that. We shouldn't be afraid of anyone. The U.S. is not more than a barking dog." On May 29, 2005, Hojjat ol-Islam Gholam Reza Hasani, the Supreme Leader's personal representative in the West Azerbaijan province, reportedly declared possession of nuclear weapons to be one of Iran's top goals. “An atom bomb…must be produced as well,” he said. While some academics have suggested that Iranian leaders never said they hoped to “wipe Israel off the face of the earth,” official translations and banners suggest otherwise.
Past National Intelligence Estimates have further concluded that Iran has researched and experimented with nuclear weapons components, a charge that Iranian officials have always denied. While subsequent estimates suggested that Tehran stopped such work, an Islamic Republic sincere in putting past suspicions behind it would come clean.
More from GPS: Iran deal opponents' concerns misplaced?
True, the deal signed is better than that scuttled by French officials earlier this month. Diplomats have now placed restrictions on Iranian engineers using the pause to install new centrifuges. And negotiators have addressed concern regarding the potential of Iran extracting plutonium from the Arak heavy water plant.
Does it hurt to try with the current deal? Unfortunately, still, the answer is yes.
While Iran has agreed to suspend some enrichment, every concession Tehran has granted is reversible. The legitimacy of six unanimous or near unanimous U.N. Security Council Resolutions demanding Iran cease enrichment as a result of its non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards agreement can never be restored. The billions of dollars in sanctions relief Iran receives might very well pump new life into Tehran’s nuclear program. After all, when the European Union nearly tripled trade with Iran between 2000 and 2005, the Iranian government responded by spending the preponderance of its hard currency windfall on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Perhaps, diplomats hope that, with some pressure relieved, Iranian officials will now negotiate sincerely during the next six months to resolve its nuclear file permanently. If so, they will be disappointed. By rewarding Iran for decades of defiance, negotiators have now set a precedent by which, whenever Tehran needs cash, it can restart enrichment and then demand billions in payment for temporary suspensions. In effect, Iran has replicated North Korea’s strategy: blackmail for cash and technology.
Second term presidents always seek legacies. President Clinton pushed hard at Camp David II to end the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian chairman Yasser Arafat walked away, and violence increased exponentially. Likewise, President George W. Bush sought a comprehensive settlement with North Korea. His administration removed North Korea from its list of terror sponsors and lifted some sanctions. In response, Pyongyang redoubled its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and accelerated terrorism against South Korea.
Unfortunately, the Iranian nuclear deal appears to fall into the same pattern. Not every country must be met halfway, and not every compromise is wise. The difference between appeasement and compromise is often determined only in historical hindsight. When historians consider the Geneva deal, they likely will categorize it as the former.

In the early hours of Sunday morning, in Geneva, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, and foreign ministers from Russia, China, and Europe signed a deal to suspend aspects of Iranian nuclear work in exchange for some sanctions relief. “With this first step, we have created the time and the space in order to be able to pursue a comprehensive agreement…to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon," Kerry told assembled diplomats and journalists.
President Barack Obama was triumphant. “Today, that diplomacy opened up a new path toward a world that is more secure – a future in which we can verify that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and that it cannot build a nuclear weapon.”
He should not be so certain. Rather than prevent Iran’s nuclear breakout, historians may mark the Geneva deal as the step that most legitimized Iran’s path to nuclear weapons capability.
Willing to deal is not synonymous with sincere desire to reach a comprehensive settlement. Key to successful reconciliation is truth, and there are many reasons to doubt Iranian intentions, none of which did the Geneva negotiators address. Iranian authorities say they seek nuclear technology to ensure domestic energy security, but as the Bipartisan Policy Center showed, Tehran could achieve that aim for a fraction of the cost and for decades, if not centuries, longer if it chose to invest instead in its pipeline and refinery infrastructure.
Neither Obama nor Kerry have demanded Tehran clarify past deception. If Iran’s nuclear program has always been peaceful as Tehran claims, then it would have had no need to hide enrichment plants and other facilities from inspectors. It is all well and good to compliment Iran on allowing inspections of key plants once discovered, but a sincere Tehran would not offer transparency only when intelligence services discover subterfuge.
Iran also walked away from previous offers – and even agreements – that would see it guaranteed reactor fuel should it agree that critical reprocessing might occur abroad. Unfortunately, the current deal rewards Iran for its past defiance and loosens what diplomats once considered the minimum safeguards.
Fear over Iranian intentions is genuine. While Iranian officials say that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has issued a fatwa banning nuclear weapons, the collection of his fatwas on his official websites does not include it. Iranian officials and diplomats citing it have been inconsistent as to its date of issue and contents. Meanwhile, various Iranian officials have threatened to use nuclear weapons, curious statements from a regime that claims they do not seek to develop them.
Indeed, on December 14, 2001, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the father of Iran’s post-revolutionary nuclear program, reportedly declared: “The use of an atomic bomb against Israel would totally destroy Israel, while the same against the Islamic world would only cause damage. Such a scenario is not inconceivable.” Just over three years later, Iran Emrooz quoted Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Kharrazi, secretary general of Iranian Hezbollah, as saying, “We are able to produce atomic bombs and we will do that. We shouldn't be afraid of anyone. The U.S. is not more than a barking dog." On May 29, 2005, Hojjat ol-Islam Gholam Reza Hasani, the Supreme Leader's personal representative in the West Azerbaijan province, reportedly declared possession of nuclear weapons to be one of Iran's top goals. “An atom bomb…must be produced as well,” he said. While some academics have suggested that Iranian leaders never said they hoped to “wipe Israel off the face of the earth,” official translations and banners suggest otherwise.
Past National Intelligence Estimates have further concluded that Iran has researched and experimented with nuclear weapons components, a charge that Iranian officials have always denied. While subsequent estimates suggested that Tehran stopped such work, an Islamic Republic sincere in putting past suspicions behind it would come clean.
More from GPS: Iran deal opponents' concerns misplaced?
True, the deal signed is better than that scuttled by French officials earlier this month. Diplomats have now placed restrictions on Iranian engineers using the pause to install new centrifuges. And negotiators have addressed concern regarding the potential of Iran extracting plutonium from the Arak heavy water plant.
Does it hurt to try with the current deal? Unfortunately, still, the answer is yes.
While Iran has agreed to suspend some enrichment, every concession Tehran has granted is reversible. The legitimacy of six unanimous or near unanimous U.N. Security Council Resolutions demanding Iran cease enrichment as a result of its non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards agreement can never be restored. The billions of dollars in sanctions relief Iran receives might very well pump new life into Tehran’s nuclear program. After all, when the European Union nearly tripled trade with Iran between 2000 and 2005, the Iranian government responded by spending the preponderance of its hard currency windfall on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Perhaps, diplomats hope that, with some pressure relieved, Iranian officials will now negotiate sincerely during the next six months to resolve its nuclear file permanently. If so, they will be disappointed. By rewarding Iran for decades of defiance, negotiators have now set a precedent by which, whenever Tehran needs cash, it can restart enrichment and then demand billions in payment for temporary suspensions. In effect, Iran has replicated North Korea’s strategy: blackmail for cash and technology.
Second term presidents always seek legacies. President Clinton pushed hard at Camp David II to end the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian chairman Yasser Arafat walked away, and violence increased exponentially. Likewise, President George W. Bush sought a comprehensive settlement with North Korea. His administration removed North Korea from its list of terror sponsors and lifted some sanctions. In response, Pyongyang redoubled its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and accelerated terrorism against South Korea.
Unfortunately, the Iranian nuclear deal appears to fall into the same pattern. Not every country must be met halfway, and not every compromise is wise. The difference between appeasement and compromise is often determined only in historical hindsight. When historians consider the Geneva deal, they likely will categorize it as the former.

The bodies of 18 people have been found near the Iraqi capital Baghdad, hours after they were abducted from their homes, police say.

The corpses - with gunshots in the head - were found near the town of Tarmiya. At least one army officer was among those killed.

Execution-style killings have been on the rise in Iraq, correspondents say, alongside a wave of bomb attacks.

Sectarian violence has surged across the country in recent months.

At least one tribal chief and a police officer were also among those killed on Friday.

The UN says 979 people - including 158 police and 127 military personnel - were killed in violent attacks in October. More than 6,500 civilians have died since January, the highest annual toll since 2008.

The United Nations has called on Iraq's political leaders to co-operate to end the bloodshed, which has escalated since an army raid on a Sunni Arab anti-government protest camp in April 2013.

The protesters had called for the resignation of Shia Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, who they accused of targeting the minority Sunni community.

Iraq has also seen a spill-over of violence from the conflict in Syria, where jihadist rebels linked to the Islamic State of Iraq, a Sunni militant umbrella group that includes al-Qaeda, have risen to prominence.

She told the BBC the situation in Thailand was not calm enough for polls.

She also said she would not authorise the use of force against protesters occupying government ministries.

She was speaking after demonstrators forced their way into the army headquarters in Bangkok and held a demonstration there.

Ms Yingluck has been prime minister since 2011, when her Pheu Thai party won a general election.

PM Yingluck Shinawatra: "We need to protect democracy"
In an interview with the BBC's Jonathan Head on Friday, she said that if she called a new election, she was not sure the protesters would be satisfied.

"I love this country. I devote myself to this country. I need only one thing for the country: we need to protect democracy," she said.

She said the situation in Thailand was "very sensitive" and repeated her call for negotiations to resolve the crisis.

On Thursday, Ms Yingluck called for an end to the demonstrations after surviving a no-confidence vote.

However protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban has rejected her appeal.

"We will not let them work anymore," the former senior opposition lawmaker said in a speech late on Thursday.

Anti-government protesters with Thai national flags sit at the Royal Thai Army compound in Bangkok, Thailand, 29 November 2013
Protesters went inside the army HQ compound, sitting on the lawn
Anti-government protesters give roses, through razor wire, to the security personnel guarding the Defence Ministry as protesters gather outside it in Bangkok on 28 November 2013
In the last week protesters have marched on different government buildings
An anti-government protester sleeps among others sitting on the road outside the national police headquarters where they are protesting in Bangkok on 28 November 2013
On Thursday, they protested at the national police headquarters, shutting it down
Anti-government protesters gather in front of the Democracy Monument during a rally in Bangkok, Thailand, 29 November 2013
The government has asked the protesters to hold talks - but has been rejected
On Friday at least 1,000 protesters forced their way into the army headquarters compound, but did not enter any buildings.

The BBC's Jonah Fisher, who was at the scene, said protesters were massed on a lawn listening to speeches from leaders on a stage they had erected.

They urged the army to come out in support of the demonstrators. "We want to know which side the army stands on," Reuters news agency quoted one protester as saying.

Our correspondent described the atmosphere as good natured and said the authorities appeared keen to avoid confrontation. The protesters later left peacefully.

SWAT teams had been scrambled to the university, while students received a text message saying: "Confirmed report of person with gun on/near Old Campus. Shelter in place. This is not a test."
Police got an anonymous phone call from a phone booth at around 10am local time reporting a person on campus with a gun.

Streets close to the campus have been blockaded, and the FBI is looking at footage of the area around the phone booth to identify the caller.