Chapter XVIIBack to Bataan

The Plans for Opening Manila Bay

Although the seizure of Manila had
gained important military advantages
for the Allies, the exploitation of those
advantages would be severely limited
until MacArthur's forces also secured
Manila Bay. It availed little to have
captured Manila's port, railhead, and
storage facilities if access to those facilities
could not be obtained by sea--even
repairs to port and transportation installations
would have to wait until Manila
Bay was safe for Allied shipping.

The necessity for developing Manila's
base facilities became more pressing
with each passing day. The Lingayen
Gulf beaches and the temporary subbase
established at Nasugbu Bay for the 11th
Airborne Division were strained to the
utmost to support Sixth Army. An extended
period of bad weather would
make it next to impossible to continue
moving supplies over the Lingayen
beaches and down the Central Plains,
and the rainy season was approaching.

During the battle for Manila XIV
Corps had cleared the eastern shore of
Manila Bay. To assure the security of
the rest of the bay, it would be necessary
to clear Bataan Peninsula, forming
the bay's western shore; Corregidor Island,
lying across the entrance to the
bay; smaller islands off the southwestern
shore; and, finally, the southwestern
shore itself from Cavite to Ternate, an
area the 11th Airborne Division had bypassed
during its drive on Manila from
the south.

On the eve of the entry into Manila,
General Krueger had asked General
MacArthur if GHQ SWPA had developed
any plans for opening Manila Bay.1
At that time it had appeared to Krueger
that the capture of Manila might not
take long and that XIV Corps would
soon be able to participate in operations
to clear the bay's shores. Moreover, XI
Corps had recently landed on the west
coast of Luzon northwest of Bataan. XI
Corps, it seemed, would soon establish
contact with XIV Corps in the Central
Plains and would then be ready to turn
its attention toward Bataan, securing
the bay's western shore.

General MacArthur informed Krueger
that GHQ SWPA plans called for the
earliest possible seizure of Bataan, to be
followed by the capture of Corregidor
and the clearing of the bay's south shore
to Ternate.2
It would be up to General
Krueger to formulate detailed plans for
the execution of these tasks. Now feeling
that XIV Corps might have its hands

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full for some time at Manila and subsequently
against the Shimbu Group in
the mountains east of the capital,
Krueger made that corps responsible
only for clearing the Cavite-Ternate
shore. To the XI Corps, in better position
for the tasks than the XIV, he assigned
responsibility for securing Bataan
and capturing Corregidor.3
Krueger expected
XI Corps to be ready to undertake
the Bataan and Corregidor operations by
mid-February,4
but first the corps had to
complete the missions assigned to it
when it had landed on Luzon on 29
January.

Maj. Gen. Charles P. Hall's XI Corps,
consisting of the 38th Infantry Division
and the 24th Division's 34th RCT, had
once been prepared to land at Vigan, on
Luzon's northwest coast a hundred miles
above Lingayen Gulf.5
GHQ SWPA
had canceled this operation on 11 January,
two days after Sixth Army's assault
at Lingayen Gulf. At that time, in the
light of the Japanese air reaction at the
gulf, planners at GHQ SWPA felt that
it would be too risky to send an assault
convoy closer to Formosa, where, MacArthur thought, many of the Japanese
counterattack aircraft were based. Also,
GHQ SWPA had learned that guerrillas
already controlled much of the coast in
the Vigan region; it was not conceivable
that the Japanese troops stationed there
posed a threat to Sixth Army's beachhead.
MacArthur thereupon directed
XI Corps to land on the Zambales coast
of Luzon northwest of Bataan.6

The locale selected for the new landing
was the San Antonio area of Zambales
Province, lying some forty miles west of
the southwest corner of the Central
Plains and twenty-five miles northwest
of the northwest corner of Bataan. The
coast is separated from the Central Plains
by the Cabusilan Mountains, which form
part of the great Zambales Chain stretching
northward from the tip of Bataan
to the Bolinao Peninsula on the west
side of Lingayen Gulf. Providing the
only military significant plains area along
the west coast, the San Antonio region
was the site of San Marcelino Airstrip,
about six miles inland via Route 7.
Route 7, which runs down the west coast
from the Bolinao Peninsula, leads south
from San Marcelino over gently rising
ground thirteen miles to the U.S. Navy
base at Olongapo, at the head of Subic
Bay and at the northwest corner of
Bataan. From Olongapo the highway
follows a twisting route eastward through
rough, jungled country across the base of
Bataan Peninsula fifteen miles to Dinalupihan.
The highway runs northeast
another twenty-five miles from Dinalupihan
to the junction with Route 3 at
San Fernando, which XIV Corps had
secured on 28 January.7

In 1942 the Japanese might well
have landed on the Zambales coast and
cut across Bataan before MacArthur's

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Fil-American forces had completed their
withdrawal into the peninsula, a contingency
that MacArthur had not then
overlooked.8
Recalling in 1945 the opportunity
that the Japanese had missed
three years earlier, MacArthur's decision
to land XI Corps at San Antonio bid
fair to lay to rest General Willoughby's
fears that the Japanese might conduct a
"historically repetitive delaying action"
on Bataan.9
Thus, XI Corps' primary
mission was to drive rapidly across the
base of Bataan in order to prevent any
substantial Japanese withdrawal into the
peninsula. Second, the corps would
seize and secure airfield sites in the San
Antonio-San Marcelino area so that the
Allied Air Forces could broaden the base
of its air deployment on Luzon and more
easily project air power over the South
China Sea. Finally, XI Corps was to fall
upon the Kembu Group's right rear if
that Japanese force was still holding up
the XIV Corps advance to Manila Bay by
the time General Hall's troops reached
the Central Plains from the west coast.10

Yamashita had no plans to retire into
Bataan for the purpose of denying
Manila Bay to the Allies--or for any
other purpose.11
Having decided that
the defense of Manila Bay was beyond
the capabilities of his forces, Yamashita
believed that if he concentrated his
troops in the cul-de-sac of Bataan they
would be cut to pieces more rapidly
(and by lesser Allied ground strength)
that they would in the three mountain
strongholds he had established. In
northern Luzon, where he concentrated
the bulk of his strength and most of his
best troops, he would have far greater
opportunity for maneuver and a considerably
greater chance to provide his
forces with the food requisite to a protracted
stand than he would on Bataan.
He considered he could longer delay the
reconquest of Luzon and, thereby, Allied
progress toward Japan, from the Shobu,
Kembu, and Shimbu positions than he
could from Bataan. As it was, Japanese
forces--acting against Yamashita's orders,
it is true--were able to deny Manila
Bay to the Allies for some two months
after Sixth Army's landing at Lingayen
Gulf.12
It seems self-evident that the
Luzon Campaign of 1945, taken as a
whole, would have been over far sooner
had Yamashita decided to concentrate
in the blind alley of Bataan.13

Allied intelligence agencies estimated
that the Japanese had nearly 13,000
troops in the Bataan-Zambales Province
area, 5,000 of them in the region immediately
north of Bataan and the rest on

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the peninsula.14
GHQ SWPA expected
that XI Corps would meet the first significant
resistance along Route 7 across
the base of Bataan Peninsula, and further
believed that operations to clear the
peninsula would probably follow the
pattern established by the Japanese in
1942.15

Actually, the Japanese had less than
4,000 troops in the XI Corps objective
area. The principal force was the 10th
Division's 39th Infantry (less 1st Battalion),
which Yamashita diverted to
Bataan late in December when he canceled
plans to ship the unit to Leyte.16
The regimental commander, Col. Sanenobu
Nagayoshi, also had under his
control two provisional infantry companies,
a platoon of light tanks, a reinforced
battery of mixed artillery, and
minor Army and Navy base defense and
service force detachments. The entire
force, including the 39th Infantry, was
designated the Nagayoshi Detachment,
which was nominally under General
Tsukada, Kembu Group commander.
Having once instructed the Nagayoshi
Detachment to block Route 7 in order
to protect the Kembu Group right rear,
Tsukada, when XIV Corps reached the
Clark Field area, directed Colonel
Nagayoshi to pull his troops out of the
Bataan-Zambales area into the main
Kembu positions. Before these orders
reached the Nagayoshi Detachment, that
Japanese force was under attack by XI
Corps, and all opportunity to make an
orderly withdrawal had vanished.

The Nagayoshi Detachment's strongest
concentration--some 2,750 men--was
dug in athwart Route 7 along the base
of Bataan Peninsula. Here, Colonel
Nagayoshi stationed the 3d Battalion,
39th Infantry, his tanks, most of his artillery,
and his regimental troops. One
provisional infantry company garrisoned
Olongapo; a company of the 2d Battalion,
39th Infantry, was at San Marcelino
Airstrip; and the rest of the Nagayoshi
Detachment--about 1,000 troops--held
scattered outposts along the eastern,
western, and southern shores of Bataan.

Against Nagayoshi's 4,000, XI Corps
landed with nearly 40,000 troops, including
5,500 Allied Air Forces personnel
who were to prepare a fighter base at
San Marcelino Airstrip. Staged at Leyte
by Eighth Army, XI Corps sailed to
Luzon aboard vessels of Task Group
78.3, Admiral Struble commanding. A
small force of cruisers, destroyers, and
escort carriers was available to provide
gunfire and air support at the beachhead.
Fifth Air Force planes, responsible
for protecting the convoy on its way
from Leyte to Luzon, were to take over
air support tasks within a day or two
after XI Corps landed. Once XI Corps
had secured a beachhead and captured
San Marcelino Airstrip, it would pass
from Eighth to Sixth Army control.17

Already well along in its preparations
for the Vigan operation, XI Corps encountered
few difficulties in making
ready for its new assignment other than

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those involved in collecting and disseminating
terrain data. Sufficient information
was available for tactical plans to
be drawn up quickly, and only a few
minor changes had to be made in logistical
plans. Again, planning in the
Southwest Pacific Area proved remarkably
flexible. Loading and movement to
the objective area were accomplished
without untoward incident; at dawn on
29 January the ships of the assault convoy
were in position off San Antonio,
ready to begin landing operations.

Sealing Off Bataan: A Study in Command

Maneuvering Inland

Preassault bombardment of the XI
Corps beachhead was scheduled to begin
at 0730 on the 29th, but Admiral Struble
canceled it when Filipino guerrillas,
sailing out in small craft to greet the
American convoy, reported that there
were no Japanese in the landing area.18
XI Corps then proceeded to land with
four regiments abreast, the 34th Infantry
on the right (south) and each regiment
in column of battalions, across a
front extending almost six miles north
along the coast from San Antonio. The
first wave, reaching shore on schedule at
0830, was greeted by cheering Filipinos
who eagerly lent a hand at unloading.

The 149th Infantry, 38th Division,
dashed inland to take San Marcelino Airstrip,
but upon arrival found that guerrillas
under Capt. Ramon Magsaysay,
later President of the Republic of the
Philippines, had secured the field three
days earlier. The 24th Reconnaissance
Troop, attached to the 34th RCT, sped
on south along Route 7 to the north
shore of Subic Bay before dark. Nowhere
did XI Corps troops encounter
any opposition during the day, and the
only casualty of the assault seems to have
been an enlisted man of Company F,
151st Infantry, 38th Division, who was
gored by one of the notoriously ill-tempered
Filipino carabao.19
Tactical
surprise had been complete. Colonel
Nagayoshi did not even learn of the
landing until the next day, and then he
thought that XI Corps had come ashore
at Subic Bay.20

General Hall assumed command
ashore about 0800 on 30 January, and
simultaneously Eighth Army passed control
of XI Corps to Sixth Army. A few
hours later the reinforced 2d Battalion,
151st Infantry, seized Grande Island,
lying across the entrance to Subic Bay,
against no opposition, and after a sharp
skirmish at the outskirts of Olongapo
the 34th Infantry took the town.

With these two actions XI Corps-had
completed its initial tasks. Subic Bay
was secure for base development; the San
Marcelino Airstrip had been taken, and
work on the fighter field had already
started. The entire XI Corps was ashore,
and the only significant difficulty yet
encountered had resulted from poor
beach conditions, which had delayed discharge

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XI CORPS LANDING AREA ON WESTERN COAST OF LUZON, Zambales Mountains
in background.

of heavy equipment. All in all,
the operation had gone unexpectedly
well so far, and XI Corps was ready to
begin its next job--the drive across the
base of Bataan Peninsula to cut Japanese
routes of access and establish contact
with XIV Corps.

General Hall's plan called for the 38th
Division, less the 151st RCT in XI
Corps Reserve, to pass through the 34th
Infantry at Olongapo and drive rapidly
eastward. He directed Maj. Gen. Henry
L. C. Jones, the commander of the 38th
Division, to advance along Route 7 and
"routes north thereof," the advance to
be so conducted that the two columns,
moving along separate axes, could be
mutually supporting.21
General Jones,
in turn, decided to push the 152d Infantry
east along Route 7 while the 149th
Infantry, less 1st Battalion in division
reserve, was to strike eastward via a
rough trail that XI Corps headquarters
believed paralleled Route 7 on rising
ground about 1,200 yards north of the
highway. General Hall apparently expected
that the 149th Infantry, bypassing
whatever opposition might be found
along Route 7, would reach Dinalupihan
quickly. Then the regiment could, if
necessary, turn back west along the highway
to help the 152d Infantry reduce
any Japanese defenses that might still
be holding out. While he set no time
limit for the operation, subsequent
events indicate that General Hall felt
that the two regiments of the 38th Division
could clear Route 7 through to
Dinalupihan by evening on 5 February.22

Neither the XI Corps nor the 38th
Division as yet had much detailed information

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about Japanese strength and deployment
along Route 7.23
Lt. Col.
Gyles Merrill, commanding guerrillas in
Zambales and Bataan Provinces, estimated
that 2,000 to 5,000 Japanese,
armed with machine guns, artillery,
tanks, antitank guns, and mortars, were
well dug in along Route 7, but XI Corps
seems to have taken this estimate with a
grain of salt.24
As a matter of fact, the
152d Infantry began its drive across
Bataan with an estimate that it might
meet as few as 900 Japanese on Route 7
instead of the 2,750 or more that Colonel
Nagayoshi actually had stationed there.25

As had been the case for XIV Corps
troops in Manila, the XI Corps' advancing
infantry would not discover the main
body of the Japanese on Route 7 until
actually in contact at the principal defenses,
for Colonel Nagayoshi had established
only one relatively weak outpost
position between Olongapo and his
strongest concentrations. He deployed
his main strength in a series of mutually
supporting strongpoints along and on
both sides of Route 7 in an area that
began approximately three miles northeast
of Olongapo and extended eastward
another three miles through rough terrain
known as ZigZag Pass. The Japanese
defenses ran from northwest to southeast
across Route 7, which meant that the
left of the 152d Infantry would come
into contact with the Japanese right
before the 152d's right even approached
the Japanese left.

Nagayoshi had chosen his ground well.
While more rugged terrain than the ZigZag Pass area is to be found on Luzon,
few pieces of ground combine to the
same degree both roughness and dense
jungle. Route 7 twists violently through
the pass, following a line of least terrain
resistance that wild pigs must originally
have established. The jungle flora in the
region is so thick that one can step five
yards off the highway and not be able to
see the road. The Japanese had honeycombed
every hill and knoll at the ZigZag with foxholes linked by tunnels or
trenches; at particularly advantageous
points they had constructed strongpoints
centered on log and dirt pillboxes. All
the defenses were well camouflaged, for
rich, jungle foliage covered most positions,
indicating that many had been
prepared with great care and had been
constructed well before Nagayoshi's 39th
Infantry had reached the area in December.26
Few if any of the installations
dated back to 1942, when elements of
MacArthur's command that were deployed
in the ZigZag Pass area had withdrawn
into Bataan before constructing
many defenses and had left the Japanese
to occupy the pass against no opposition.27

Colonel Nagayoshi had plenty of food
and ammunition for a prolonged stand,

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VISIBILITY ZERO, ZIGZAG PASS

and he also possessed numerous mortars
and machine guns. His artillery, however,
was inadequate for the task at hand
and he lacked certain types of medical
supplies, especially malaria preventatives
and cures. Having left only one minor
outpost along Route 7 between Olongapo
and the ZigZag, he made no attempt to
cover that open, three-mile stretch of
road with fire. He had so scattered his
mortars and artillery in order to protect
them against American artillery and air
strikes that his troops would often have
difficulty massing their fires. Finally, his
defensive line was scarcely 2,000 yards
wide northwest to southeast, thus rendering
his whole position susceptible to
vigorous outflanking maneuvers. On
the other hand, he had good troops,
well-prepared positions, and excellent
defensive terrain.

Into Contact

On the morning of 31 January the
152d Infantry, leaving one battalion to
reduce the Japanese outpost a mile and
a half northeast of Olongapo, marched
on another mile and a half to the point
where Route 7 began climbing jungled

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hills into the ZigZag.28
Opposition so
far had been limited to scattered rifle
fire and a few bursts of long-range machine
gun fire, but as attacks against the
first Japanese strongpoints began the
next morning, 1 February, the 152d
Infantry ran into increasingly determined
resistance.29
On 1 February the problem
of the actual location of the various
American units arose to plague the 152d
Infantry, the 38th Division, and the XI
Corps. Route 7 twisted so violently and
the terrain through which it passed was
so densely jungled that the 152d had
considerable trouble orienting itself on
the map, which was none too accurate
to begin with. Secondly, the 38th Division
was employing a map code that
soon proved highly susceptible to garblings
and misunderstandings as one
echelon reported its supposed locations
to another.30
Finally, the 152d Infantry
often had trouble getting its radios to
work properly in the thick vegetation
of the ZigZag area.

Map 8
ZigZag Pass
1 February 1945

The 152d Infantry, during the morning
of 1 February, approached the western
entrance to an irregularly shaped
horseshoe curve on Route 7. (Map 8)
The horseshoe curve rounded, and partly
crossed, the nose of a northwest-southeast
ridge. Open on the north, the horseshoe
measured some 200 yards west to east
across its northern points; the western
leg was about 250 yards long, north to
south; the eastern leg 325 yards long;
and the southern leg, almost 275 yards
across, west to east. In the center, at its
broadest, the horseshoe measured nearly
300 yards. At 38th Division headquarters
on 1 February it was the consensus
that the 152d Infantry's leading battalion
had fought its way around the horseshoe
and by dusk was anywhere from 150
to 300 yards east along Route 7 beyond
the horseshoe's northeastern corner. According
to the regimental operations
officer, the leading battalion did not even
reach the horseshoe on 1 February.
Rather, the battalion, which faced strong
opposition all day, made only 500 yards
in an easterly direction and dug in for

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Map 9
ZigZag Pass
2 February 1945

the night of 1-2 February at a point almost
200 yards west of the horseshoe's
northwestern corner.31
A study of all
available regimental and battalion records
indicates that on 1 February at least
one company of the 152d's leading battalion
reached the southeastern corner
of the horseshoe but withdrew before
dark to rejoin the rest of the battalion
west of the horseshoe.32

Whatever its location, the 152d Infantry
had begun to fight its way into a
veritable hornet's nest of Japanese. The
leading battalion, the 1st, had rough
going all day, and had had to spend most
of its time trying to find and isolate
Japanese positions. During the following
night, the Japanese launched a number
of small-scale counterattacks against
the battalion and harassed it with mortar
and artillery fire, which inflicted some
casualties not only on the 1st Battalion
but also on the 2d and 3d, now about
1,500 yards to the west along Route 7.
By dawn on 2 February the regiment's
casualties since it had begun moving
through the 34th Infantry about noon
on 31 January totaled 17 men killed, 48
wounded, and 2 missing.

Plans for 2 February called for the 152d
to sweep rising ground along both sides
of Route 7, simultaneously smashing
through the ZigZag along the highway.
That day the 3d Battalion discovered
strong Japanese defenses along a northwest-southeast ridge north of the horseshoe.
(Map 9) Unable to locate the north
flank of these Japanese positions, the battalion
hit the defenses in the center but
gained nothing. Japanese pressure forced
the unit generally southeast along the
western slope of the ridge, and the battalion
sideslipped back to Route 7 near
the northwestern corner of the horseshoe.
The 2d Battalion, operating south
of the highway, more than kept abreast
of the 3d but, because of the southeastward
slant of the Japanese line, located
no strong defenses. Since there seemed
to be little point in holding ground no
Japanese occupied, and since the 3d
Battalion had made no progress against
the Japanese right north of Route 7, the
2d Battalion pulled back to the highway.
In the center, meanwhile, the 1st Battalion
had gained no new ground along
Route 7 through the horseshoe.

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The 152d's positions at dark on 2 February
were again a matter of some dispute.
General Jones now believed that
the 2d and 3d Battalions were on the
horseshoe's eastern leg near the northeastern
corner,33
and that the 1st Battalion
was well into the horseshoe. Other
reports indicate, however, that the entire
regiment reassembled for the night west
of the horseshoe. From subsequent developments,
it appears that elements of
the 152d had reached the northeastern
corner of the horseshoe on 2 February
but that the 2d and 3d Battalions actually
held for the night along the western
leg while the 1st Battalion occupied its
previous night's bivouac to the west.

Casualties on 2 February numbered 5
men killed, 26 wounded, and 1 missing,
for a total since noon on 31 January of
22 killed, 74 wounded, and 3 missing.
It is perhaps indicative of the nature of
the terrain in which the 152d Infantry
was fighting that the regiment claimed
to have killed only 12 Japanese from
noon on 31 January to dark on 2
February.

The attack of 2 February had developed
somewhat slowly, primarily because
the 1st and 3d Battalions had been
shaken up by the Japanese counterattacks
and artillery and mortar fire of the
previous night and, having lost some key
company officers and NCO's, faced serious
reorganization problems. At any
rate, when General Hall came up to the
front about noon, he found the 152d
Infantry barely under way. Dissatisfied
with the progress. Hall informed General
Jones that the exhibition of Jones's
division was the worst he had ever seen34--a rather severe indictment of an entire
division, only one regiment of which,
the 152d Infantry, had yet seen any real
action on Luzon. The 152d was a green
unit that had been in combat scarcely
forty-eight hours by noon on 2 February.
General Jones, in turn, was none too
happy about the conduct of the 152d and
had been especially displeased by the
performance of the 3d Battalion. Late
that day he relieved the regimental commander,
Col. Robert L. Stillwell. Lt.
Col. Jesse E. McIntosh, the regimental
executive officer, thereupon took over
the command. Not satisfied that this
change would produce the results he
desired, General Hall directed the 34th
Infantry to pass through the 152d and
continue the attack eastward. The 34th
would operate under the direct control
of Headquarters, XI Corps; the 152d
Infantry, remaining under Jones's command,
would follow the 34th through
the ZigZag to mop up bypassed pockets
of Japanese resistance.35
Dividing the
command at the point of contact, General
Hall in effect left General Jones in
command of only one regiment, the
152d Infantry. The 151st Infantry was
still in XI Corps reserve and the 149th,
while ostensibly under Jones's control,
was still off on the bypassing mission to
Dinalupihan that had been undertaken
at corps direction.

The relief of the 152d Infantry and
its commander, and the insertion of the
34th Infantry at the horseshoe under
corps control, reflected primarily a combination

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Map 10
ZigZag Pass
3 February 1945

of Hall's expectation of a rapid
drive across Bataan and a misapprehension
on his part concerning the strength
and location of the Japanese defenses
along Route 7. Hall believed that the
152d Infantry had at most encountered
only an outpost line of resistance, that
the principal Japanese defenses lay a
mile or so east of the horseshoe, and
that the 152d Infantry had found "nothing
that an outfit ready to go forward
could not overcome quickly."36
The
38th Division and the 152d Infantry, on
the other hand, were convinced that the
152d was up against something "big"
and had reached the Japanese main line
of resistance. As events were to prove,
the 38th Division and the 152d Infantry
were more nearly correct as of evening
on 2 February than was XI Corps.

Frustration at the Horseshoe

The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,
encountered some harassing fire from
Japanese mortars and artillery on the
morning of 3 February as it passed
through the 152d Infantry and moved
deep into the horseshoe.37
(Map 10)
While one company struck north and
northeast from the horseshoe's northwestern
corner, the rest of the battalion
followed Route 7 around to the eastern
leg, retracing the 152d Infantry's path.
The 34th's company on the north, hitting
some of the same ridge line defenses
that the 3d Battalion, 152d Infantry, had
previously encountered, slid back southeast
just as had the 152d's battalion, and
dug in for the night not far east of the
horseshoe's northwestern corner. The
main body of the 1st Battalion, 34th
Infantry, was unable to move more than
halfway north along the eastern leg before
Japanese fire from high, dominating
terrain 200 yards east of that arm halted
it. Seeking to outflank this opposition,
Company A struck off to the southeast
from the horseshoe's southeastern corner.
The company reached a point on the
northern slopes of Familiar Peak about
700 yards southeast of its line of departure,
but was then pinned down and
surrounded. Meanwhile the 2d and 3d
Battalions, 152d Infantry, patrolling behind
the 34th Infantry's battalion, had
knocked out a few isolated Japanese
strongpoints and dug in for the night
both north and east along Route 7 from
the horseshoe's southwestern corner. The
1st Battalion, 152d, remained west of
the horseshoe.

If one thing was obvious by dusk on
3 February it was that the 34th Infantry

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had employed insufficient strength for
the task at hand--it had committed only
one battalion to do a job that three
battalions of the 152d had been unable
to accomplish. Accordingly, Col. William
W. Jenna, commanding the 34th,
decided to employ his entire regiment
in a three-pronged attack. His 1st Battalion
would concentrate against the
Japanese on the dominating ground east
of the horseshoe's eastern leg; the 2d
Battalion would clear the Japanese from
the northeastern corner area, undertaking
flanking maneuvers north of Route
7; and the 3d Battalion would clear the
highway to and beyond the northeastern
corner, initially following the 2d
Battalion.

On 4 February the 34th's attack went
well at first, but in the face of continued
strong opposition, including heavy mortar
and artillery fire, the regiment before
dusk had to give up much of the ground
it gained during the day. The 1st Battalion
dug in for the night farther south
along the horseshoe's eastern leg than
it had the previous night, although it
retained a hold on some terrain east of
that leg. The 2d Battalion had knocked
out some strongpoints along the southern
end of the Japanese right flank defenses
in the area north of Route 7, but
Japanese fire drove most of the unit back
to the road late in the afternoon. (Map
11) The 3d Battalion, because the 2d
had made no permanent progress, had
not gone into action.

Map 11
ZigZag Pass
4 February 1945

General Jones had meanwhile directed
the 152d Infantry to renew its attacks
against the Japanese right, north of
Route 7. The 1st Battalion, 152d, in
a wide envelopment from the west, at
first had considerable success, but late
in the afternoon, just when it seemed
that the battalion was about to overrun
the strongest positions along the ridge
line, a vicious Japanese mortar and artillery
barrage drove the unit back south
to Route 7. This was the fourth time
in three days that the Japanese had
thwarted American attempts to clear the
ridge north of the horseshoe.

The fighting at the horseshoe on 3
and 4 February cost the 34th Infantry
41 men killed, 131 wounded, and 6 missing
while on the same days the 152d
Infantry lost 4 men killed, 48 wounded,
and 1 missing. The 34th Infantry had
extended the front a little to the north
of the horseshoe and a bit east of the
eastern leg, but neither the 34th Infantry
nor the 152d Infantry had made any
substantial gains beyond the point the
152d had reached on 2 February. The
Japanese still held strong positions north
of the horseshoe and they still controlled
the northeastern corner and about half
the eastern leg. The 34th Infantry's
greatest contribution during the two

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days, perhaps, was to have helped convince
General Hall that the Japanese
had strong defenses throughout the ZigZag area and that the regiment had indeed
reached a Japanese main line of
resistance. It had not been until evening
on 3 February that the XI Corps' G-2
Section had been willing to concede that
the Japanese might have strong defenses
at the ZigZag, and it was not until the
next evening that General Hall was convinced
that the 34th and 152d Infantry
Regiments had encountered a well-defended
Japanese line.38

Apparently, Hall's conviction that his
troops had come up against a Japanese
main line of resistance led to a second
conviction that the fight at the horseshoe
would henceforth go better if he unified
the command there. At any rate, late
on the 4th, Hall attached the 34th Infantry
to the 38th Division and directed
Jones to attack eastward early on 5 February
with all the strength he could
bring to bear. Speed, General Hall went
on, was essential.39

General Jones planned to reduce the
Japanese strongpoints methodically with
a series of simultaneous, co-ordinated,
battalion-sized attacks. He expected the
152d Infantry to do most of the work
initially, while the 34th Infantry completely
cleared the horseshoe area and
then drove eastward on the south side
of Route 7. Foreseeing difficulties in
arranging artillery support, Jones limited
general artillery support fires to targets
east of the Santa Rita River, which
crossed Route 7 a mile east of the horseshoe,
and required that requests for
closer support be cleared through regimental
headquarters.40
Individual infantry
battalions under this arrangement
would be able to get close support only
after some delay. The plan also split
the 152d Infantry, placing two of its
battalions north of the 34th and the
third south. Colonel Jenna, commanding
the 34th Infantry, objected, suggesting
that control and co-ordination would
be easier if the 34th Infantry concentrated
its efforts south of Route 7 while
all the 152d remained north of the road.
Jones did not agree, and directed Jenna
to execute his attacks as scheduled.41

General Jones realized that his plan
left something to be desired and that
he was calling for a comparatively slow
course of action. Actually, he would
have liked to undertake an even slower
course by pulling the 34th Infantry back,
adjusting all his artillery and mortars
carefully, and then staging a co-ordinated,
two-regiment attack behind heavy
artillery and mortar concentrations. This
would have taken about two days, and
he knew that General Hall would brook
no such delay. He therefore felt that
his plan, which called for extensive outflanking

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maneuvers north of Route 7
by the 152d Infantry, was the only one
that promised success under the circumstances,
and he indicated to General
Hall that if the plan did not work out
he would change it. Jones premised his
plan on the belief that the 34th Infantry
would be able to carry its share of the
load in the new attack, but it appears
that he did not have a clear idea of the
regiment's situation and condition, probably
because the regiment had been operating under corps control for two
days.42

Although operations on 5 February
started out in a promising manner, the
situation in the horseshoe area soon
turned into a shambles. The 2d Battalion,
34th Infantry, which had been harassed
by Japanese mortar fire throughout
the night of 4-5 February, started off on
the 5th trying to reduce a Japanese
strongpoint near the northeastern corner
of the horseshoe. Maneuvering to outflank
the strongpoint, the battalion
moved well north of Route 7, upsetting
plans for close artillery support of the
152d Infantry's battalions. (Map 12)
About the time that the 2d Battalion,
34th Infantry, felt it was making good
progress, Japanese artillery fire pinned
it down. Around 1130, having received
a number of casualties, the battalion requested
permission to withdraw. Jenna
assenting, the battalion began moving
back to the west side of the horseshoe.
About the same time, increasingly concerned
over the casualties his regiment
was taking from Japanese mortar and
artillery fire, Jenna radioed Jones:

Map 12
ZigZag Pass
5 February 1945

I am convinced that the entire Japanese
position opposing XI Corps cannot be
cracked unless there is a withdrawal to a
point where entire Corps Artillery and all
available air work it over with every possible
means for at least 48 hours. My 1st and
2nd [Battalions] have suffered terrific casualties
and it is becoming questionable how
long they can hold up under this pounding.
. . . 43

Jenna's thinking was obviously in line
with that of General Jones, but the 38th
Division commander, mindful of Hall's
insistence upon speed, did not act upon
Jenna's recommendation and sent no
immediate reply to the regimental
commander.

Shortly after 1200, when his 1st Battalion,
on the horseshoe's eastern leg,
began reporting heavy casualties from
Japanese artillery, Colonel Jenna decided
to withdraw that unit west of the
horseshoe. His reserve battalion, the 3d,
had moved up to the northwestern
corner of the horseshoe and had started

--323--

to probe across its open end, over the
ridge line, in preparation for its share
in the attack. When the 1st and 2d Battalions
began withdrawing, the 3d had
to hold to cover. The 1st Battalion, during
its withdrawal in the afternoon, was
harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar
fire, which also hit forward elements
of the 3d. By 1740 on the 5th the entire
34th Infantry was again west of the
horseshoe--the regiment was, indeed,
behind its line of departure of the
morning of 3 February.

Having received information that the
152d Infantry's attacks were going well,
Jenna apparently felt that his withdrawal
could not redound to the advantage
of the Japanese. He was, however,
primarily concerned with the welfare of
his regiment, which had lost another
20 men killed and 60 wounded during
the previous twenty-four hours. The
34th Infantry had suffered a total of 325
battle casualties and 25 psychoneurosis
cases since coming ashore on 29 January,
almost all of them during the period
3-5 February. In its three days at the
ZigZag the regiment had lost nearly half
as many men as it had during 78 days
of combat on Leyte.44
Many of the casualties
at the ZigZag had been among
key personnel and included the regimental
executive officer, 1 battalion commander,
4 company commanders, and
3 first sergeants. The 34th was no longer
an effective combat unit, and about
1900 on 5 February General Hall directed
General Jones to replace it with
the 38th Division's 151st Infantry, which
so far had seen practically no fighting.45

The 152d Infantry's operations on 5
February met with limited success. The
2d Battalion relieved Company A, 34th
Infantry, at the latter's isolated perimeter
some 700 yards off the horseshoes's southeastern
corner with little difficulty, the
Japanese who had surrounded the company
having disappeared during the
night. The 2d Battalion remained in
the area for the rest of the day and that
night, finding only abandoned Japanese
positions. North of the horseshoe the
1st Battalion, 152d Infantry, resumed its
attacks against the Japanese ridge line
defenses, again moving in from the west.
The battalion made good gains during
the morning and cleared much of the
northern and central portions of the
ridge. The attack slowed during the
afternoon, however, as Japanese opposition
stiffened.46
By now the battalion
was nearing the southern end of the
Japanese-held ridge and was located
about 600 yards north-northwest of the
horseshoe's northwestern corner. The
unit began setting up night defenses in
apparently abandoned Japanese positions
when suddenly, from a maze of
previously undiscovered foxholes, tunnels,
and trenches within and without
the perimeter Japanese riflemen and
machine gunners started pouring out
point-blank fire. The 1st Battalion could
not employ artillery or mortar support
to disperse the Japanese and the battalion's
men found it virtually impossible
to return the Japanese rifle fire without
hitting each other. The best thing to

--324--

do seemed to be to escape from the Japanese
ambush and the battalion started
withdrawing, apparently in a rather disorganized
fashion. About dark the first
troops began reaching the perimeter of
the 3d Battalion of the 34th Infantry,
which was in reserve near the northwestern
corner of the horseshoe, but it
was noon the next day before all the
1st Battalion, 152d, had completely reassembled
and reorganized. The battalion's
losses for 5 February numbered 9
men killed and 33 wounded, including
many key NCO's and company-grade
officers. For example, Company C had
no officers left and Company B had
only one.

Thus, by evening on 5 February, the
attack at the ZigZag had ended in failure.
Except for the terrain held by the
2d Battalion, 152d Infantry, southeast
of the horseshoe, the 152d and 34th Infantry
Regiments were no farther forward
than the 152d had been on the
evening of 2 February. The fighting at
the ZigZag had cost the 34th Infantry
roughly 70 men killed and 200 wounded,
and many of the men left in its three
infantry battalions could not be counted
as combat effectives. The 152d Infantry,
with casualties of about 40 men killed
and 155 wounded, was actually little
better off, for it had lost an even greater
proportion of junior officers and senior
NCO's. The 1st Battalion, for instance,
had only 15 officers and 660 enlisted
combat effectives, and the entire regiment
faced serious reorganization problems.
Yet 5 February had not been
entirely void of good news. The 38th
Division's 149th Infantry, which had
taken the "high road" eastward, had
reached Dinalupihan and had made
contact with XIV Corps troops there.

149th Infantry Mix-up

At dusk on 31 January the 149th
Infantry had assembled at a branching
of the Santa Rita River three and a half
miles northeast of Olongapo and about
a mile and a quarter northwest of the
152d Infantry's forward elements on
Route 7 half a mile west of the horseshoe.47
On 1 February Col. Winfred G.
Skelton, the regimental commander, intended
to march eastward along the trail
XI Corps had designated as far as a
north-south line through Bulate, a tiny
barrio on Route 7 at the eastern exit
of the ZigZag and some four miles east
of the horseshoe. Once on this line, the
regiment would halt pending new orders.
The march started on 1 February with
guerrillas and local Negritos guiding.
About 1300 Skelton reported to General
Jones that the 149th would reach its
objective line within three hours, and
also that he was on the XI Corps' trail
at a point nearly two miles east of the
horseshoe and roughly 1,200 yards north
of Route 7. Jones, mindful of XI Corps'
admonition to keep the 149th and 152d
Infantry Regiments within supporting
distance of each other, now felt that the
149th was getting too far east of the 152d,
and directed Colonel Skelton to halt
approximately 2,500 yards west of the
original objective line. Well before dark,
Skelton reported that his leading battalion
was at General Jones's new objective
and was digging in along the XI Corps'
trail at a point about 750 yards north of

--325--

Route 7 at barrio Balsic, a mile west
of Bulate.

At this juncture General Jones began
receiving reports from 38th Division
Artillery liaison planes that the 149th
Infantry was no place near the locations
Colonel Skelton had reported for it.
Jones believed that the 149th's leading
elements were about three miles northwest
of their reported location.48
Colonel
Skelton, on the other hand, insisted that
his troops were in the position he had
reported, while an XI Corps Artillery
liaison plane placed the regiment a mile
and a third northwest of Skelton's claim
and over a mile and a half southeast of
the area in which Jones believed the
regiment was located. General Hall evidently
chose to believe the report of the
XI Corps Artillery aircraft.

In the end, it appears, nobody was
right. First, the trail that the XI Corps
thought paralleled Route 7 simply did
not exist. Instead, almost two miles east
the Santa Rita River branching the trail
swung off to the northeast. Second, the
area through which the 149th Infantry
was moving was not only densely wooded
but was also unmapped--the 1:50,000
maps the troops were using showed only
white for a large area beginning some
2,000 yards north of Route 7--and the
liaison planes' reports could at best only
be guesses. Third, the guides that Skelton
had taken with him had proved unreliable
and he had sent them back to
camp. Finally, a study of all relevant
sources of information indicates that,
when it halted, Skelton's leading battalion
was almost two miles due north of
the position he thought it had reached.

There then ensued a complete breakdown
of communications between 38th
Division headquarters and the 149th
Infantry that created more confusion.
About 2100 on the 1st of February General
Jones radioed Skelton to return to
Santa Rita and start over. The 149th
Infantry never received the message. On
the other hand, three times by 1130 on
the 2d, Skelton radioed Jones for new
orders. Before receiving an answer,
Skelton had learned that he had incorrectly
reported his previous positions,
but guerrillas informed him that he need
only follow the trail he was already on
to swing back southeast to Route 7 near
Dinalupihan. Though he relayed this
information to General Jones by radio,
division headquarters never received the
message.

By now, mutual misunderstanding
was leading from confusion to chaos.
Believing that the 149th Infantry was
already on its way back to Santa Rita,
Jones had seen no necessity for replying
to Skelton's first two requests for new
orders. Skelton's third request, which
division received about 1115, finally
brought forth instructions from Jones
for Skelton to move the whole regiment
back to the Santa Rita fork at once.
Jones apparently had decided to employ
the 149th along Route 7, for he informed
Skelton that his regiment could be used
"to better advantage here."49
Skelton
received this message about noon, and
immediately started back over the trail,
followed by his regiment.

--326--

Colonel Skelton reached the 38th
Division's command post a mile northeast
of Olongapo about 1930 on 2 February,
and explained the situation to
General Jones. Despite Jones's apparent
desire to employ the 149th on Route 7,
XI Corps wanted the regiment to try
again to reach Dinalupihan on the bypass
trail, and now General Hall lifted
his previous restriction that the 149th
Infantry keep within supporting distance
of units on Route 7. At 2330, accordingly,
Jones directed Skelton to start
back over the trail at 0700 on the 3d.
Jones ordered Skelton to try to follow
the line of the trail XI Corps had mapped
out, but felt that it would not make
much difference which trail the 149th followed
as long as it reached Dinalupihan
quickly.50

Taking off as directed on the 3d, the
149th Infantry followed the trail that
arcked to the northeast, swung back southeast
at a point about two and a quarter
miles north of Balsic, and about 0245
on 5 February made contact near Dinalupihan
with patrols of the 40th Division,
XIV Corps, which had already
reached the town. The march back over
the trail had gone without incident, but
the bypass maneuver to Dinalupihan
had taken five days rather than the two
it would have consumed had XI Corps'
original orders been less restrictive and
had communications been better. Nevertheless,
the 149th Infantry had completed
one of XI Corps' most important
missions, that of denying the Japanese
access to Bataan from the Central Plains.
The real credit for this accomplishment,
however, had to be given to XIV Corps,
for its troops, already in Manila by 5
February, had had the Japanese cut off
from Bataan for at least three days.51

A Change in Command

Although troops of XI Corps had
reached Dinalupihan, the corps had not
yet cleared Route 7 across the base of
Bataan Peninsula, and until that job was
substantially complete the corps could
not move to secure the rest of Bataan
and undertake its share of operations
to clear Manila Bay. General Hall, who
had apparently expected that his work
in northern Bataan would be over by
5 February, was far from pleased with
the course of events so far, and he laid
the blame for the failure of his forces
to break through the ZigZag on the
shoulders of General Jones, the commander
of the 38th Division. Hall had,
indeed, been thoroughly dissatisfied with
the 38th Division's performance for some
days, and had already informed General
Jones in considerable detail what he
thought was wrong with the division.52
The climax of General Hall's dissatisfaction
came on 6 February.

As of the morning of the 6th General
Jones had under his command in the
vicinity of the horseshoe only the 152d
Infantry. XI Corps had released the
151st Infantry to him from XI Corps
Reserve, but the first elements of that
regiment, the 1st Battalion, would not
reach the forward area until after 0900,
and the rest of the regiment not until
morning of the 7th. General Hall had

--327--

Map 13
ZigZag Pass
6 February 1945

pulled the 34th Infantry out of the fight
and had sent it back to the rear for rest
and recuperation. He had also taken
the 149th Infantry away from General
Jones and had directed that regiment to
start an attack westward from Dinalupihan
on the morning of 7 February.53

General Jones felt that he probably
could not break through with only the
one battalion of the 151st Infantry and
the two battalions of the 152d that were
available to him (the 1st Battalion, 152d
Infantry, was not fit for combat on the
6th). Jones had also decided to move
the 2d Battalion, 152d Infantry, back
from its isolated position southeast of
the horseshoe in order to concentrate
his forces. The time required to reorganize
and redeploy his units for a new
attack, together with the relatively slow
arrival of the echelons of the 151st Infantry
at the front, gave General Jones
what he considered a heaven-sent opportunity
to adjust artillery and undertake
concentrated bombardments before
pushing his infantry back into the ZigZag. Jones (and Jenna of the 34th
Infantry, as well) had previously recommended
that one or two days of aerial
and artillery bombardment be thrown
against the Japanese, but until the morning
of the 6th Jones had had no opportunity
to even start employing his
artillery in such a manner.

The scheduled artillery concentrations
were delayed while the 38th Division
waited for an air strike that was late in
coming. Shortly after the artillery finally
began firing late in the morning General
Hall arrived in the forward area.
Incensed when he found the infantry
was not attacking, Hall asked Jones how
long the artillery fire was to last. When
Jones replied that he expected to take
all day to make sure the artillery carefully
registered on all known and suspected
targets, Hall told the 38th Division
commander "to cut out such precise
stuff" and get the attack under way again.
Reluctantly, Jones started the 152d Infantry
forward.54
The artillery registration
that Jones had been able to execute
apparently did some good, for the 3d
Battalion, 152d Infantry, behind close
artillery support, reduced the last Japanese
defenses at the northeast corner of
the horseshoe during the day and spent
the following night along Route 7 just
east of that corner. (Map 13) Neither
the rest of the 152d Infantry nor the
1st Battalion, 151st Infantry, gained new
ground on the 6th, and the 2d Battalion,

--328--

152d Infantry, gave up terrain as it
withdrew to Route 7 from its position
southeast of the horseshoe.

About noon on the 6th, while on his
way back to XI Corps' command post,
General Hall decided that the fight at
the ZigZag would go better under a new
commander, and he took the step that
he had apparently been contemplating
as early as evening on 2 February. He
relieved General Jones and placed Brig.
Gen. Roy W. Easley, the assistant division
commander, in temporary control.55
The next day, 7 February, General
Chase, who had led the advance elements
of the 1st Cavalry Division into Manila
and who was in line for a promotion,
arrived to take permanent command of
the 38th Division.56

General Hall, whose action had not
surprised General Jones,57
gave as his
reasons for the relief of Jones:

. . . lack of aggressiveness on the part of
his division, unsatisfactory tactical planning
and execution and inadequate reconnaissance
measures. He failed to produce the
results with his division which might be
reasonably expected.58

The Reduction of the ZigZag

Just what General Hall expected to
result from the change of command at
the 38th Division is not clear, although
it appears that he anticipated that the
division might be able to clear the ZigZag by evening on 7 February.59
If so,
Hall was again to be disappointed.

Operations at the ZigZag after 6 February
varied little in nature from those
before that date.60
Complicated maneuvers
through dense jungle and over
rough, broken ground characterized
each day's action. Again there was considerable
backing and filling as some
ground gained had to be given up in the
face of Japanese artillery and mortar
fire and local counterattacks. For example,
on 8 February elements of the 151st
Infantry, making a bypassing movement
south of Route 7, reached the Santa Rita
River crossing over a mile east of the
horseshoe, but returned to the horseshoe
on the 10th.

During the period to 6 February,
General Jones had had only one regiment

--329--

under his command at the ZigZag
most of the time. By contrast, General
Chase was able to employ three regiments,
less one infantry battalion, from
the time he assumed command on 7
February.61
The 151st and 152d Infantry
Regiments attacked from the west
side of the ZigZag while the 149th Infantry,
less one battalion, struck from the
east beginning on the 7th. General
Chase had another advantage that Jones
had not enjoyed. On 6 February Fifth
Air Force P-47's started operating from
the San Marcelino Airstrip, making
close air support readily available. That
day the planes began an intensive bombing
and strafing program, and simultaneously
started giving the ZigZag a good
going over with napalm. At the same
time, corps and division artillery were
able to step up the pace of their support
firing.62
Nevertheless, the Japanese continued
to hang on doggedly, and almost
foot-by-foot progress, attained in a series
of small unit actions, marked the 38th
Division's operations for nearly a week
following General Jones's relief. In fact,
the only difference troops on the ground
could see in the fighting after 6 February
was that daily gains could usually--but
not always--be measured.

The 151st and 152d Infantry Regiments
reduced the last important defenses
in the vicinity of the horseshoe
by evening on 8 February, and by dusk
on the 11th the two units had made
sufficient progress east of the horseshoe
to permit the relief of the 151st Infantry
for operations elsewhere on Bataan Peninsula.
(Map 14) It was not until afternoon
of 13 February that the 149th and
152d Infantry were able to make their
first fleeting contact from their respective
sides of the ZigZag. The 149th
Infantry overran the last organized Japanese
strongpoint on the 14th and on the
following day that regiment and the
152d completed mopping-up operations.

Through 15 February, the 38th Division
and attached units, including the
34th Infantry, had killed nearly 2,400
Japanese in the ZigZag region and had
taken 25 prisoner. The 300-odd men
remaining alive from the original Japanese
garrison on the highway retreated
south into Bataan with Colonel Nagayoshi.63
The 38th Division and the 34th
Infantry had suffered about 1,400 combat
casualties, including 250 men killed,
during the process of destroying the
Nagayoshi Detachment.

By 15 February, then, XI Corps had
completed the task at the ZigZag and
had secured positions from which to
launch subsequent operations aimed
more directly at securing Manila Bay,
operations that had, indeed, begun before
the ZigZag Pass fight was quite over.
The "campaign" from San Antonio to
Dinalupihan had not gone as General
Hall had expected, and the corps commander
had been bitterly disappointed
with the turn of events at the ZigZag.
Not every operation can go according to
plan and expectation--too many imponderables
are involved. XI Corps' attack

--330--

Map 14
Clearing ZigZag Pass
38th Division
7-14 February 1945

across Bataan strikingly illustrated the
degree to which some of the imponderables
could and did affect the outcome
of the operation.

Clearing Bataan Peninsula

The Situation and the Plans

General Krueger's plan for XI Corps
operations to clear Bataan Peninsula
south of Route 7 called for one RCT to
drive down the east coast while another
seized Mariveles, at the southern tip of
the peninsula, by an amphibious assault
from Subic Bay. Krueger initially set
D-day for the two attacks as 12 February,
but as planning progressed it became
evident that XI Corps was much too
involved at the ZigZag to meet that target
date or to release from the ZigZag
all the forces required. Accordingly,
Krueger rescheduled D-day for 15 February
and, to make up General Hall's
troop shortages, sent south the 6th Division's
1st Infantry, which had recently
completed its part in I Corps operations
to seize San Jose.64

Hall divided his Bataan Peninsula
forces into two groups. East Force and
South Force. East Force--the reinforced
1st RCT, 6th Division--would operate
under the control of Brig. Gen. William
Spence, commander of 38th Division
Artillery. It would push south along
Bataan's east coast road, the same road
the Japanese had followed in 1942, starting
its drive south on 14 February in
order to divert Japanese attention from
the Mariveles landing, which Hall set
for the 15th. South Force--the 38th
Division's 151st RCT--would operate
directly under General Chase's command.
After landing at Mariveles, South
Force would establish control over southern
Bataan and then strike up the east

The amphibious phases of the operation
were directed by Admiral Struble,
commander of Task Group 78.3, which
was supported by cruisers and destroyers
of Task Group 77.3 under Admiral
Berkey. In addition to landing South
Force, Task Group 78.3 would also sweep
mines from the waters across the entrance
to Manila Bay, paying especial
attention to the area between Mariveles
and Corregidor and the channel between
Corregidor and Caballo Island, a mile to
the south. Fifth Air Force planes from
Mindoro and Luzon would provide necessary
preliminary bombardment for the
landing at Mariveles and would support
subsequent ground operations on
Bataan.66

Sixth Army and XI Corps estimated
that 6,000 Japanese were still on Bataan
south of the ZigZag. One concentration,
believed to include a battalion of the
39th Infantry, was thought to be holding
the Pilar-Bagac road, running east to
west across the center of the peninsula;
the remaining Japanese presumably garrisoned
the Mariveles area.67
Actually,
Nagayoshi probably had less than 1,400
troops, including remnants of his ZigZag
Pass force, on Bataan south of Route 7.
Of these, around 1,000 held positions
in the Bagac area on the west coast or
along the Pilar-Bagac road. About 300
Japanese, scattered in various small detachments,
were located in southern
Bataan, but few were near Mariveles.
Nagayoshi must have expected attack
from the west, for the few formal defenses
he had along the Pilar-Bagac road
were oriented in that direction. He was
also able to incorporate into his defenses
on the road some positions that
MacArthur's Fil-American forces had
originally constructed in 1942.68

Bataan Secured

The 38th Division's 151st RCT loaded
at Olongapo on 14 February, and the
ships of Task Group 78.3 sortied the
same day.69
The 6th Division's 1st RCT
started out of Dinalupihan on the afternoon
of 12 February, planning to be
seven miles to the southeast, at Orani,
by morning of the 14th. (Map 15) Mine
sweeping and preliminary bombardment
began on the 13th. During that day and
the next Task Group 78.3 swept about
140 mines from the bay, 28 of them left
over from the days of the American defense
in 1942. Mines at the entrance to
Mariveles Harbor damaged two destroyers
of Task Group 77.3, but sweeping
continued without other incident except
for some fire from Japanese guns on
Corregidor.

Task Group 78.3 completed a final

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Map 15
Clearing Bataan
12-21 February 1945

sweep of Mariveles Harbor at 0900 on
15 February as destroyers moved in for
close support fire and Fifth Air Force
B-24's bombed the landing beaches.
The 151st Infantry started ashore in
LCVP's at 1000, opposed by a little machine
gun and rifle fire. A near miss
from a Japanese gun on Corregidor
wounded 17 infantrymen as they boarded
an LCPR at the side of an APD
(Transport, High Speed), while somewhat
later an LSM carrying the 24th
Reconnaissance Troop shoreward struck
a mine and caught fire, with resultant
casualties and the loss of most of the
unit's equipment. Poor beach conditions
slowed all discharge, but at 1400 General
Chase, who had accompanied South
Force, assumed command ashore.

The 151st Infantry found no Japanese
before sunset, but during the night 75-100 Japanese attacked the perimeter of
the 3d Battalion about three miles northeast
of Mariveles. The battalion beat off

--333--

the attack after killing 60 or more Japanese.
South Force's casualties during the
day were 3 killed, 43 wounded, and 14
missing, all incurred in the course of the
landing. The 151st Infantry spent the
next few days securing the Mariveles
area, simultaneously dispatching patrols
northward along both sides of Bataan
Peninsula. On 18 February a patrol established
contact with East Force at
Limay, a third of the way up the east
coast.

Moving out of Orani on the 14th, East
Force had reached Pilar before dark and
on the next day probed south to Orion,
four miles beyond Pilar. There had been
little opposition and the only hindrance
to faster progress had been the too-thorough
job guerrillas had done in
destroying the many bridges carrying
the coastal road over tidal streams. During
the night of 15-16 February an estimated
300 Japanese attacked the 1st
Infantry's perimeter near Orion, but the
U.S. regiment, losing 11 killed and 15
wounded, beat off the Japanese and
killed 80 of them in a melee of confused,
sometimes hand-to-hand fighting. The
incident marked the end of organized
Japanese resistance in southern Bataan.

The next day General MacArthur had
a narrow escape from injury if not
death. Visiting East Force's zone, the
theater commander proceeded south
along the coastal road to a point nearly
five miles beyond the 1st Infantry's
front lines. His party encountered no
Japanese, but patrolling Fifth Air Force
P-38's, observing the movement, assumed
that they had discovered a Japanese
motor column and requested
permission to bomb and strafe. Before
granting permission General Chase directed
a further investigation, an investigation
that disclosed that the small
group of vehicles contained Americans
only. MacArthur and his party returned
northward safely.

During the period 17-20 February
East Force, augmented by the 149th Infantry
and other elements of the 38th
Division, drove across Bataan to Bagac,
finding only abandoned defensive positions
and a few Japanese stragglers. On
21 February troops of the 1st Infantry
made contact with patrols of the 151st
Infantry south of Bagac, while the 149th
Infantry started patrolling north up the
west coast from Bagac.

The contact south of Bagac marked
the end of the tactically significant portions
of the Bataan campaign of 1945.
XI Corps had not met the resistance General
Hall had expected--the corps' casualties
were about 50 men killed and 100
wounded, while known Japanese casualties
numbered 200 killed. Nagayoshi's
remaining troops, about 1,000 in all,
holed up north of the Pilar-Bagac road
along the jungled slopes of Mt. Natib,
where elements of the 38th Division, of
the 6th Division, and Filipino guerrillas
successively hunted them down. These
Japanese presented no threat to Allied
control of Bataan, and most of them
died of starvation and disease before
American and Filipino troops could find
and kill them.

With the clearing of Bataan, XI
Corps had executed the first step of the
GHQ SWPA-Sixth Army plan for opening
Manila Bay. And as XI Corps troops,
on 16 February, broke the last organized
Japanese resistance on the peninsula,
operations to secure Corregidor Island
began.

12. Actually, so great were the clearing and repair
problems that it was well into April before the Allies
were able to make much use of Manila Bay and
Manila's port facilities.

13. For an opposite point of view, see Morton, Fall
of the Philippines,p. 163. Japanese officers who reviewed
The Fall of the Philippines in manuscript
disagreed with Morton and put forth interpretations
similar to those of the present volume. See Morton,
op. cit., n. 9, p. 163.

26. If no work had been undertaken earlier, which
seems impossible, it certainly started immediately
upon the arrival of the 39th Infantry. See Diary, 2d
Lt. Saburo Kitano, 6th Company, 2d Provisional
Infantry Battalion, XI Corps G-2 Periodic Report
No. 13, 10 February 1945. There are some indications
that many of the defenses at the ZigZag had originally
been constructed by Japanese naval troops who,
previously stationed at Olongapo, had moved to the
main Kembu defenses in January.

30. The basic trick of the map code was to measure
co-ordinates on the 1:50,000 map the troops were
using by means of the yard scale from a 1:20,000 map.

31. Interv, Falk with Wilson, 22 Aug 52. Wilson
stated that he was often surprised to find where 38th
Division G-2 and G-3 reports placed the regiment
and stated that division locations were often at
variance with locations he had sent to division
headquarters. The present author found many amazing
disagreements, especially during the first week of
the action, among locations recorded in regimental
division G-2, division G-3, and division artillery
reports. XI Corps reports sometimes disagreed with
all four!

32. General Jones believed that the entire battalion
had reached "a point a little beyond the horseshoe."
Jones Comments, 20 Dec 56.

33. Note that General Jones no longer believed the
152d was beyond the horseshoe. Either he was in
error the previous night or the 152d had lost ground
on 2 February.

39. Rad, XI Corps to 38th Div, 2040 4 Feb 45, Entry
50, in 38th Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Feb 45; Ltr, Hall to
Krueger, 4 Feb 45. General Jones felt that the transfer
of the 34th Infantry to his control was an attempt
by General Hall "to push the blame on me for the
failure of the 34th Infantry." Jones Comments, 20
Dec 56.

40. This crossing of the Santa Rita is in accordance
with the AMS S712, 1:50,000 map of 1944 the troops
were using at the time. According to the AMS S711
1:50,000 map of 1952, Edition 2, the proper name for
the stream is the Jadjad River.

46. General Jones believed the stiffening opposition
marked redeployment of Japanese after the withdrawal
of the 34th Infantry. Jones Comments, 20
Dec 56. The author has been unable to find any
evidence of such redeployments in either Japanese
or American records.

48. Jones Comments, 20 Dec 56. General Jones states
that he had three reports from Division Artillery
planes that the 149th was about three miles northwest
of Skelton's reported position. The author
could find only one report of such a nature in 38th
Division Artillery and other division records, and
this report placed the regiment four miles northwest
of the location Skelton had reported.

50. Msg, 38th Div to 149th Inf, 2330 2 Feb 45, Entry
70, 38th Div G-3 Jnl, 2 Feb 45; Jones Comments,
20 Dec 56. Jones felt that since XI Corps had directed
the 149th Infantry to undertake the march along the
trail, the regiment was now under XI Corps control.
General Jones, however, issued the actual march
orders to the regiment.

55. Ltr, Hall to Krueger, 6 Feb 45; Ltr, Hall to
author, 15 Mar 52; Interv, Falk with Elmore, 3 Apr
52; Jones Comments, 20 Dec 56; 38th Div G-1 Jnl,
5 and 6 Feb 45. Strangely, at 1640 on 5 February, the
Chief of Staff, 38th Division, informed the Division
G-1 that Jones was about to be relieved, and late that
night the G-1 Section prepared orders for Easley's
assumption of command. Neither Hall nor Elmore
(the XI Corps chief of staff) could offer any explanation
of this action, and Hall insisted that he did not
make up his mind to relieve Jones until noon on the
6th. Jones did not comment on the strange circumstances.
It is probable that the 38th Division staff
sensed what was obviously about to happen and
prepared itself accordingly, or it may be that Jones,
feeling that his relief was imminent, alerted his
chief of staff.

57. Jones Comments, 20 Dec 56 and 26 Jan 57. It
was Jones's opinion that General Hall had expected
that the 34th Infantry, operating under XI Corps
control, would have broken through the ZigZag in
a day or two, thus giving Hall an excuse to relieve
Jones. Then, Jones continued, when the 34th Infantry
failed to produce, Hall placed it under Jones's
command so that Hall could blame Jones for the
34th Infantry's failure. The attempted adjustment of
the artillery on 6 February was, in Jones's opinion,
simply the incident that Hall was waiting for to
precipitate Jones's relief. There was, in Jones's
opinion, "nothing that I could have done to keep my
command." Jones Comments, 26 Jan 57.

61. On the 5th, it is true, both the 152d and 34th
Infantry Regiments were under Jones's command,
but the 34th had to be withdrawn that day. On the
6th, Jones had the 152d plus a battalion of the 151st,
but on that day one battalion of the 152d had to
spend its time reorganizing. During most of the
final stages for the fight for the ZigZag, one battalion
of the 149th Infantry held and patrolled in the
Dinalupihan area and did not enter the fight.