The Appearance and Cognition of Nonexistent Phenomena:Gelug and Non-Gelug Presentations in Alternating Order

The Tibetan explanations of the appearance and cognition of nonexistent phenomena fall broadly
into two camps: Gelug and non-Gelug (Sakya, Nyingma, and Kagyu).

Neither Gelug nor non-Gelug, however, presents a uniform explanation. Several masters within
each camp have explained specific points slightly differently in their commentaries. Here, as a
foundation for more advanced study, we shall present an overview of the two general positions
regarding the main points. For each point, we shall present the assertions shared in common and
then the two positions in an alternating fashion.

We shall use the explanations given primarily by the late eighteenth-century master Akya
Yongdzin (A-kya Yongs-‘dzin dByangs-can dga-ba’i blo-gros) to represent the Gelug position. This
explanation accords with the monastic textbook (yig-cha) tradition of the sixteenth-century master Jetsun Chokyi-gyeltsen (rJe-btsun Chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan), followed by Sera Jey (Se-ra Byes) and Ganden Jangtsey (dGa’-ldan Byang-rtse) Monasteries. To represent the non-Gelug position, we shall rely
primarily on the explanations given by the fifteenth-century Sakya master Gorampa (Go-ram bSod-nams seng-ge).

Existent phenomena (yod-pa) are those that can be validly cognized. They include both affirmation phenomena (sgrub-pa, affirmingly known phenomena), such as an orange, and negation phenomena (dgag-pa, negatingly known phenomena), such as not an orange.

Nonexistent phenomena (med-pa), such as unicorns and mirages, can be objects of cognition, but not objects of
valid cognition (tshad-ma). They are objects only of distorted cognition (log-shes).

Cognitive appearances of nonexistent objects may arise in both nonconceptual and conceptual
cognition. In distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition, we may see a hallucination of a unicorn in
an empty meadow. In distorted conceptual cognition, we may imagine a unicorn in a meadow. If the
nonexistent objects – unicorns – do not actually exist, then how can cognitive appearances of them
arise?

Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing a unicorn in a meadow:

The empty meadow is the focal object (dmigs-yul). The cognition of a unicorn there takes on a mental aspect (rnam-pa, mental semblance) that resembles a unicorn in the meadow. The mental aspect is
the appearing object (snang-yul) and cognitively taken object (gzung-yul).

According to the Prasangika tenets, the mental aspect that resembles a unicorn is an existent
phenomenon, although the unicorn is nonexistent. Moreover, the cognition of a hallucinated unicorn
as a hallucinated unicorn is accurate. The distortion lies in considering the hallucinated unicorn
to be an external, conventionally existent unicorn.

The fifteenth-century Gelug masters Gyeltsab (rGyal-tshab Dar-ma rin-chen) and the First Dalai Lama Gedundrub (dGe-‘dun grub) agree that the hallucination of a unicorn assumes a mental aspect that
resembles a unicorn and that this mental semblance appears (arises) in the cognition. However,
since they assert that distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition has neither an appearing object
nor a cognitively taken object, they do not identify the mental aspect with either of them.

A unicorn is the involved object (‘
jug-yul) of the distorted visual cognition. An external, conventionally existent unicorn,
acting as the focal object and focal condition (dmigs-rkyen) of the hallucination, does not cause the mental aspect that appears (the
mental semblance of a unicorn) to arise. This is because there is no such thing as an external
conventionally existent unicorn. The mental aspect arises because of internal physical or mental
causes for hallucination.

As a transparent mental semblance of a unicorn, the mental aspect that appears does not reveal
an actual unicorn through it. It does not reveal anything.

Consider the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition of seeing hallucinated patches of colored
shapes that are subsequently conceptualized as a unicorn in a meadow:

There is no focal object, focal condition, or cognitively taken object of the hallucination,
indirectly cognized (shugs-la rig) by the distorted cognition. This is because there are no external patches of
colored shapes that are subsequently being conceptualized as a unicorn. The distorted nonconceptual
cognition does not indirectly cognize anything,

The distorted cognition takes on a mental aspect that resembles external patches of colored
shapes that are subsequently conceptualized as a unicorn in a meadow. Although the opaque mental
aspect is directly cognized (dngos-su rig), the hallucination has no appearing object since nothing has cast its
impression on the consciousness. The mental aspect arises because of internal physical or mental
causes for hallucination.

The mental semblance of external patches of colored shapes is the involved object of the
distorted visual cognition.

An empty meadow is the focal object, as in the nonconceptual hallucination. The transparent
mental aspect that appears or arises is a mental representation (snang-ba) of a unicorn in the meadow and this is the involved object.

The appearing object is the semitransparent meaning/object category (don-spyi)
unicorn, based perhaps on a composite of the meaning/object categorieshorse and
cartoon horn.

The conceptually implied object (zhen-yul) – an actual conventionally existent unicorn corresponding to the meaning/object
categoryunicorn (the appearing object) – does not exist. Thus, an actual unicorn as the
conceptually implied object does not appear, even unclearly, through a transparent mental aspect
and semitransparent appearing object.

As in the distorted sensory nonconceptual cognition, there is no focal object, focal condition,
or cognitively taken object. The appearing object is an opaque mental aspect that seemingly
resembles a unicorn in a meadow. As in the Chittamatra presentation, the mental aspect (focal
aspect,
dmigs-rnam) and the consciousness of it come from a shared natal source (rdzas) – namely, the same karmic legacy (sa-bon, karmic seed, karmic tendency). This is the case, despite the mental aspect being a
nonstaticmetaphysical entity (spyi-mtshan).

The appearing object is confused with the meaning/object category of actual conventionally
existent unicorns, imputed on the opaque mental aspect. The meaning/object category is the involved
object.

The conceptually implied object being signified (zhen-pa’i brjod-bya) as a unicorn by the distorted conceptual cognition – external
objective patches of colored shapes that the conceptual cognition mentally synthesizes into and
signifies as a conventionally existent unicorn – does not exist.

Neither the conceptual cognition of a horse in a meadow nor of a unicorn in a meadow has an
external focal object. Nevertheless, the latter is a distorted invalid cognition, while the former
is a valid cognition. The conceptual cognition of the unicorn is invalid because it cannot serve as
a basis for further valid cognition of its involved object (a conventional unicorn). Namely, it
cannot act as a basis for valid sensory nonconceptual cognition of the conceptually implied object
being signified (external patches of colored shapes) that the conceptual cognition synthesizes into
and signifies as its involved object (a unicorn).

According to the Madhyamakatenet systems, nonconceptual and conceptual cognition each produce
cognitive appearances not only of the extent of what their involved objects are (ji-snyed-pa), but also of how their involved objects exist (ji-lta-ba).

Each validly knowable phenomenon holds its own individual essential nature (rang-gi ngo-bo ‘dzin-pa). “The extent of what something is” refers to the individual
essential nature that this something holds. That essential nature may be simply as an individual
validly knowable item, or it may be as a specific conventional commonsense object (‘
jig-rten-la grags-pa), such as an orange or a table.

“How something exists” refers to what establishes the existence of something.

In the context of Madhyamaka, the issue of what establishes the existence of something revolves
around whether or not an object has truly established existence (bden-par grub-pa, true existence).

“Truly established existence” is existence established by something on the side of an object,
independently of mental labeling (ming ‘dogs-pa, imputation). “Independently” means independently of being, in terms of
superficial truth (kun-rdzob bden-pa, relative truth, conventional truth), the referent object (btags-chos, imputed object) of a word, concept, or mental label, when validly imputed on a
basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi). In other words, truly established existence is existence established
independently of being what a word, concept, or mental label conventionally refers to. Nothing
exists in this impossible manner.

Imputation may be of the extent of what something is or of how something exists. The imputation
of truly established existence is an imputation of how something exists. It entails mental
fabrication (spros-pa) by conceptual cognition.

“Mental fabrication” is defined as the addition of an appearance of a manner of existence to an
object beyond what exists. Specifically, mental fabrication makes up and projects an appearance of
truly established existence. It occurs in both conceptual and nonconceptual cognition. Mental
fabrication automatically arises (lhan-skyes) in each moment of experience, due to the habits of grasping for true existence
(bden-‘dzin-gyi bag-chags).

Thus, although metaphysical (spyi-mtshan) and objective entities (rang-mtshan) both lack truly established existence, both appear to be truly existent.

Mental labeling (imputation) and mental fabrication are not equivalent terms.

Mental labeling entails applying a word or concept to signify the extent of what something is.
In other words, mental labeling applies the name of the commonsense object that something
conventionally is. Mental labeling is merely an imputation on a basis for labeling, such as a
collection of parts, and does not make up anything beyond what conventionally is the case.

Mental fabrication entails making up and projecting how something deceptively appears to exist (‘
khrul-snang), which goes beyond what is actually the case.

Existence in terms of mental labeling means existing conventionally as “this” and “not that,”
dependently on being the referent object of the mental labels “this” and “not that,” when those
mental labels are validly imputed on a basis for labeling.

Although the actual process of mental labeling occurs only in conceptual cognition;
nevertheless, everything exists in terms of mental labeling, whether conceptually or
nonconceptually cognized.

Mental fabrication is the addition of an appearance – an inseparable combination of both
what something is and how it exists – to an object, beyond what is the case. The mental fabrication
consists of the mental synthesis of objective entities (rang-mtshan, specifically characterized phenomena) into metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan, generally characterized phenomena), with appearances of truly established
(unimputed) existence. Mental fabrication occurs only in conceptual cognition.

Objective entities are individual items (bye-brag) and include moments of sensibilia and moments of sound. They are the exclusive
involved objects cognized by valid nonconceptual cognition.

The metaphysical entities into which objective entities are mentally fabricated are combinations
of

a collection synthesis (tshogs-spyi) as a commonsense object,

a category of phenomena that the commonsense object is an instance of, such as “an orange.”

Although commonsense objects appear to be truly existent entities (unimputed, not mentally
fabricated) and “truly existently” to fit into certain categories, they are devoid of this
fabricated manner of existence. This is because the metaphysical entities themselves are mentally
fabricated. In other words, although metaphysical entities (commonsense objects) are decisively and
accurately apprehended (rtogs-pa) as “this” and “not that” conventional object; nevertheless, there is nothing on
the side of the commonsense object that makes it “this” and “not that” by its own power.

Objective entities (moments of sensibilia or moments of sound), which appear only in
nonconceptual cognition, do not appear to be truly existent, conventional commonsense objects,
which “truly existently” fit into the conceptual categories “this” and “not that.” This is because
nonconceptual cognition does not decisively determine (nges-pa, ascertain) its object as “ this” and “not that.” In technical terms,
nonconceptual cognition is nondetermining cognition of what appears (snang-la ma-nges-pa, inattentive perception).

Objective entities are what can be synthesized and labeled conceptually as commonsense objects,
but they themselves are not commonsense objects. Thus, objective entities lack truly established
existence, in the sense that they do not exist unimputedly (truly) as conventional commonsense
objects
“this” and
“not that.” They can only be synthesized into commonsense objects
“this” and
“not that,” imputedly, by conceptual cognition.

Commonsense objects, such as oranges, as static metaphysical entities, are incapable of
performing functions (don-byed nus-pa). This is the case although commonsense objects deceptively appear to
perform functions, such as a commonsense orange appearing to make our hands sticky when we hold
one. Only objective entities (sensibilia), such as moments of tactile sensations, perform
functions.

Here, a moment of a nonsticky tactile sensation – the conceptually implied object being
signified by the conceptual cognition of feeling a commonsense orange held in our hand – is
followed by a moment of a sticky tactile sensation.

The inference (rjes-dpag) that the moment of the nonsticky sensation performed the function of producing
the moment of the sticky sensation as its effect is a valid inferential cognition. This is the case
despite the inference being a conceptual cognition. The inference is valid because it leads to
valid cognitions of moments of sticky sensations following moments of nonsticky sensations whenever
validly conceptually cognizing the feeling of a commonsense orange in our hand.

Sensibilia have parts, since they are collections of molecules (‘
dus-pa’i rdul-phran). Moreover, their molecules are collections of particles (rdzas-kyi rdul-phran), and even particles have directional parts. Further, moments of
sensibilia or of sound also have temporal parts. Neither sensibilia nor moments of them or of sound
exist independently of their parts.

Nevertheless, sensibilia and their moments do not have truly established existence even as “
sensibilia
this and
not that” or as “moment
this and
not that,” unless such a conventional identity is mentally fabricated conceptually. The
conventional identity is mentally fabricated by synthesizing it from the collection of parts on
which the conventional identity can be labeled.

Thus, both metaphysical and objective entities are devoid of truly established existence.

The conceptually implied object is a truly existent commonsense orange. What the conceptually
implied object appears to be – a commonsense orange – conventionally exists as the superficial
truth about the object. It can be validly imputed on appropriate sensibilia. The appearance of a
commonsense orange arises in the conceptual cognition through a fully transparent mental aspect
that resembles a commonsense orange.

How the conceptually implied object appears to exist – with truly established existence – does
not exist. The commonsense orange is devoid of true existence.

Although the transparent mental aspect assumed by the conceptual cognition is a mental semblance
of true existence, the aspect does not reveal actual truly established existence through it. The
deceptive appearance of this mode of existence is distorted, because it is an appearance of
something nonexistent, as in imagining a unicorn.

In imagining a unicorn in a meadow:

The focal object is a meadow (which does exist) and the involved object is a unicorn there
(which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however, as the focal condition casting its
reflection on the consciousness.

The mental aspect (which does exist) resembling a unicorn appears (arises) simply because of
external and internal causes for distortion.

The appearing object is a meaning/object category (which does exist) of
unicorn, imputed on the mental aspect.

Similarly, in imagining a commonsense orange as truly existent,

the focal object is the commonsense orange (which does exist) and the involved object is truly
established existence (which does not exist). There is no actual true existence as the focal
condition casting its reflection on the consciousness.

The mental aspect (which does exist) resembling truly established existence appears (arises)
simply because of an internal cause for distortion – namely, the habit of grasping for true
existence.

The appearing object is a meaning/object category (which does exist) of
truly established existence, imputed on the mental aspect.

Thus, the conceptually implied object, as a conventionally existent commonsense object, is
devoid of existing in the manner of the conceptually implied manner of existence. This absence of
an impossible mode of existence is the voidness (stong-nyid, emptiness) of the conceptually implied commonsense object.

The conceptually implied object being mentally synthesized into and signified as “a commonsense
orange” by the conceptual cognition of a conventional commonsense orange is a non-truly existent
moment of non-truly existent sensibilia – for instance, a moment of a spherical patch of orange
color. The conceptually implied object being signified as an orange does not appear in the
conceptual cognition.

The appearing object is an opaque mental aspect that resembles a truly existent commonsense
orange. The involved object that arises (appears) is the mental synthesis (meaning/object category)commonsense orange. This mentally synthesized “commonsense orange,” which is merely a
conceptual representation (snang-ba) of a commonsense orange, is imputed on the mental aspect that is a mental
derivative (gzugs-brnyan) of the mental synthesis and which resembles the synthesis.

What the appearing object appears to be is a conventional commonsense object.

The manner of existence with which the appearing object appears to exist is truly established
existence. In other words, the mental semblance of a commonsense orange appears truly existently to
be a commonsense orange from its own side, independently of it being imputed (labeled) as such with
the meaning/object category (mental synthesis)
commonsense orange.

What the appearing object appears to be and how it appears to exist are both distorted. Actual
commonsense objects casting their reflections on consciousness do not exist. In sensory
nonconceptual cognition, only moments of sensibilia and of sound cast their reflections on
consciousness, not conventional commonsense objects. In the conceptual cognition of a commonsense
orange, only a meaning/object category, the mental synthesis
commonsense orange, is the object actually signified (dngos-kyi brjod-bya) by the mental aspect (the appearing object) in terms of what this
mental aspect appears to be.

Similarly, actual true existence casting its reflection on consciousness does not exist. In
sensory nonconceptual cognition, only non-true existence casts its reflection on consciousness, not
truly established existence. In the conceptual cognition of truly established existence, only a
meaning/object category (the mental synthesis)
truly established existence is the object actually signified by the mental aspect (the
appearing object) in terms of how this mental aspect appears to exist.

A commonsense orange – as what can be mentally fabricated (imputed) on the basis of the
conceptually implied object being signified as an orange (external objective sensibilia) –
conventionally exists as a superficially true object. A commonsense orange can be validly imputed
on sensibilia. The manner of existence (true existence) that is automatically fabricated as an
integral aspect of fabricating a conventional commonsense orange on the basis of the conceptually
implied object being signified does not exist in deepest truth (don-dam bden-pa). It is only a superficial appearance. Thus, conventional commonsense
objects are totally conceptional phenomena (kun-brtags).

In short, the superficially true manner of existence of commonsense objects is that they appear
to be truly existent, but in fact they are not truly existent. They are imputedly existent on
moments of sensibilia and of sounds.

The superficially true manner of existence of moments of sensibilia and of sound is that they
appear to be non-truly existent, but in fact their deepest manner of existence is beyond this
conceptualized manner of existence.

Compare the conceptual cognition of non-true existence with that of true existence. As in the
case of the difference between the conceptual cognition of a horse and a unicorn, the conceptual
cognitions of both true and non-true existence are distorted. However, the latter can act as a
basis for further valid cognition of its involved object; the former cannot.

The involved object of the conceptual cognition of non-true existence is the meaning/object
category
non-true existence. This conceptual cognition can act as a basis for valid sensory
nonconceptual cognition of the conceptually implied object being signified (the non-true existence
of moments of external sensibilia) that the conceptual cognition synthesizes into its involved
object.

The involved object of the conceptual cognition of true existence is the meaning/object categorytrue existence. This conceptual cognition cannot act as a basis for valid sensory
nonconceptual cognition of the conceptually implied object being signified (the true existence of
moments of external sensibilia) that the conceptual cognition synthesizes into its involved object.
Moments of external sensibilia are devoid of true existence.

The mental label is the audio category
orange and, usually in addition, a meaning/object category
orange – both being metaphysical entities.

The basis for labeling may be a spherical shape of orange color – an objective entity.

The referent object is a commonsense orange – a nonstatic collection synthesis (tshogs-spyi) as an objective entity.

It is important not to identify the referent object with either the basis for labeling or the
mental label itself.

The referent object is not the same as the basis for labeling. The colored shapes that appear
when seeing or thinking of a commonsense orange are not the actual orange. We do not eat a colored
shape when we eat an orange.

The referent object is not the same as the mental label. An actual orange is not the word or
concept
orange, nor is it a conceptual category.

An actual orange is what the audio category
orange and meaning/object category
orange refers to when labeled on the basis of appropriate colored shapes.

In terms of the conceptual cognition:

The appearing objects are not simply the audio and meaning/object categories
orange, but rather the audio and meaning/object categories
truly existent orange.

The conceptually implied object (object existing as cognitively taken) is a truly existent
orange. This is what the conceptual category (the concept) of “an orange” implies (zhen, clings to) and corresponds to.

Thus,

what the conceptual category of “an orange”
refers to (non-truly existent commonsense oranges, as objective entities) is not the same
as what the conceptual category of an orange
corresponds to (truly existent oranges, which do not exist at all).

In other words, the referent object of a conceptual cognition is not the same as its
conceptually implied object.

In short:

We see a non-truly existent commonsense orange, which nevertheless appears to be truly
existent.

We then conceptualize it as a truly existent commonsense orange.

In conceptual cognition, we mentally fabricate the conceptually implied object (a truly existent
orange) and project it onto the referent object (a non-truly existent orange as an objective entity
that we can see).

The mental label is the object that is the actual signifier (dngos-kyi brjod-byed). This is the audio category
orange – a metaphysical entity.

The basis for labeling is a mental aspect (mental semblance) resembling a truly existent
conventional orange. This too is a metaphysical entity.

The referent object (object actually signified) is the mental synthesis (meaning/object
category)
commonsense orange (a collection synthesis) – equivalent to a truly existent commonsense
orange, as a metaphysical entity. A commonsense orange being truly existent, however, is merely the
superficial truth about it – namely, its appearance to a conceptual mind.

It is important not to identify the referent object with either the basis for labeling or the
mental label itself.

The referent object is not the same as the basis for labeling. The mental semblance of a truly
existent orange that is the appearing object when thinking of an orange is not an orange. We do not
eat a mental semblance when we eat an orange.

The referent object is not the same as the label. A conventional commonsense orange is not the
word or audio category
orange.

A commonsense orange is what the audio category or word
orange refers to when labeled on the basis of an appropriate mental aspect. Namely, a
commonsense orange is the mental synthesis (meaning/object category)
commonsense orange and this is merely a mental representation of commonsense oranges.

There are no such things as objective commonsense oranges. Nevertheless, it is a valid
inferential cognition based on renown (grags-pa’i rjes-dpag) – in other words, based on convention – that when we nonconceptually
cognize a certain taste and texture in our mouths when we chew and then swallow something, we label
what we have experienced as “eating an orange.”

The conceptually implied object being signified as a commonsense orange is a moment of an
external spherical patch of orange color – an objective entity.

Thus:

What the conceptual category of a commonsense orange
refers to (a mental representation of a truly existent commonsense orange as metaphysical
entity) is not the same as what the conceptual category of an orange
corresponds to (a moment of spherical patch of orange color, as a non-truly existent
objective entity).

In other words, the referent object of a conceptual cognition is not the same as its
conceptually implied object being signified.

In short:

We see a moment of a non-truly existent spherical patch of orange color, an objective entity
that appears to be non-truly existent as a “this” and “not that.” In other words, it does not
appear to be either a truly existent or a non-truly existent commonsense orange.

We mentally fabricate the referent object (a truly existent commonsense orange, as a
metaphysical entity) from the conceptually implied object being signified (a moment of a non-truly
existent spherical patch of orange color).

We conceptually cognize a mental semblance of a truly existent commonsense orange, which we take
as the basis for labeling “a commonsense orange.”

Not only conceptual cognition, but also sensory nonconceptual cognition produces cognitive
appearances (mental aspects) resembling truly established existence. Thus, visual cognition of a
commonsense orange produces appearances of both a commonsense orange and its true existence.

Visual cognition does not have a conceptually implied object. It does have, however, an involved
object, which is also its object existing as cognitively taken.

In reference to what the mental semblance appears to be – an orange – a commonsense orange (the
object existing as cognitively taken) is an existent phenomenon.

In reference to how the mental semblance appears to exist – with truly established existence –
true existence (the object existing as cognitively taken) is a nonexistent phenomenon.

Since how the involved object appears to exist – with truly established existence – does not
exist, sensory cognition of the deceptive appearance of this mode of existence is distorted. This
is because it is sensory cognition of an appearance of something nonexistent, as in a hallucination
of a unicorn.

In the hallucination of a unicorn in a meadow, the focal object is a meadow (which does exist)
and the involved object is a unicorn (which does not exist). There is no actual unicorn, however,
as the focal condition casting its reflection on the consciousness. The mental semblance (which
does exist) of a unicorn arises simply because of external and internal causes for
hallucination.

Similarly, in the hallucination of the true existence of a commonsense orange, the focal object
is the commonsense orange (which does exist) and the involved object is truly established existence
(which does not exist). There is no actual true existence as the focal condition casting its
reflection on the consciousness. The mental semblance (which does exist) of truly established
existence arises simply because of an internal cause for distortion – namely, the habit of grasping
for true existence.

Sensory nonconceptual cognition does not produce appearances of true existence. It produces
appearances of non-true existence. In other words, its involved objects (moments of sensibilia) do
not appear as “this” and “not that” and are not definitely determined (ascertained) as “this” and “
not that.”

Appearances of truly established existence occur only in conceptual cognition.

When conceptual cognition definitely determines an appearance as “this” and “not that,” it
ascertains it as truly existently “this” and “not that.”

The term
appearances of non-true existence (med-snang) is used in the Nyingma school. The mainstream Sakya and the Karma Kagyu schools
use the equivalent term
appearances of dependently arising existence (rten-‘brel snang-ba).

In this context, dependently arising means arising dependently on parts, according to the
mainstream Sakya usage.

In Karma Kagyu, the term means arising dependently from unawareness (ignorance), as in the
twelve links of dependent arising.

For the sake of simplicity, we shall use the Nyingma term here.

Both appearances of true existence and appearances of non-true existence are mental
fabrications.

As one of the four categories
true existence,
non-true existence,
both, or
neither, an object can be ascertained as non-truly existent only by a conceptual cognition
of its voidness of true existence. That voidness is a denumerable ultimate phenomenon (rnam-grangs-kyi don-dam).

The nondenumerable ultimate phenomenon is actually inseparable voidness and appearance, with
both voidness and appearance being beyond words and concepts. Such a phenomenon cannot be an object
of conceptual cognition or of sensory or mental nonconceptual cognition.