Wednesday, March 16, 2016

SITREP | Algeria and The Mali Crisis

The attack against a Saharan strategic industrial plant by the Mokhtar Belmokhtar katiba (combat unit)13 on 16 January 2013, represented not only another strategic surprise but also a tipping point for the Algerian government, since it dragged Algeria straight into the Sahelian crisis.

Image Attribute: The attack against the Tiguentourine gas plant on Januaary 16. 2013

Algeria has
long positioned itself as a traditional mediator of conflicts in the Sahel, at
times in apparent competition with Gaddhafi. Algeria mediated peace processes
that brought a precarious end to previous Tuareg uprisings in Mali in 1991–1995
and 2006. Indeed, the Algerian treatment of the Tuareg issue was always
motivated by the fear of contagion among Algerian Tuaregs and by the desire to
contain Libya or any other neighboring state’s influence. Algeria knows what is
expected on it in this crisis, given its status as the regional military power,
its influence in the far northern part of Mali (Kidal), as intermediary in
previous crises in northern Mali, and as the original home of al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[1]

Algeria also
attempted to utilize this influential role to convince Tuaregs to fight against
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) groups in the Sahel. Many
former Malian Tuareg rebels offered their services and join the specialized
unit settled after the 2006 “Tamanrasset Accords” (Accords de Tamanrasset)
signed under the auspices of Algiers, which were supposed to maintain security
in northern Mali.

After
condemning the military coup in Bamako in March 2012, Algeria opted for a low
profile, and the government remained silent in the following months, issuing
occasional statements of concern about Mali’s growing instability. This
relative absence from the international policy response was first interpreted
as a cautious position related to the 2012 April abduction of seven Algerian
diplomats in the Malian city of Gao by the radical group Movement of Uniqueness
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Algiers’ wait-and-see attitude can also be
attributed to political internal preoccupation with domestic affairs and the
internal competition within the elite over the upcoming 2014 presidential
elections.[2] It would seem that Algeria has been waiting to see how the regional
situation plays out before making any decision and thus leaving the risks of
resolving the crisis to others.

Algiers’
opposition to participation in a regional intervention force is formally
expressed in a constitutional article which forbids its forces from taking part
in military action outside its own territory. Algeria has been continually
invoking this constitutional principle, thus justifying why its forces have not
crossed into Mali to eradicate AQIM, even when invited to do so by its Sahelian
neighbours, particularly by Niger. Yet the Algerialed CEMOC (Joint Military
Chief-of-staff Committee) was created in 2010 for precisely this purpose.
However, on 20 December 2011, a few weeks before the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) proclaimed the independence of Azawad, Algerian
army forces crossed into Mali. This move occurred exactly five days before Iyad
ag Ghaly announced the creation of a new jihadist group called Ansar al-Dine
(defenders of the faith) in Northern Mali. The question then is why Algeria had
some forces entered in Mali if Algeria is so keen not to intervene militarily
on foreign soil? It is not clear what kind of forces were sent, but according
to the official Algerian statements, Malian military elements were reported to
be training with Algerian military counterparts in Kidal Region. Algeria
withdrew its so-called military advisors from Mali and cut off military
assistance at the end of 2011 when the conflict was clearly about to begin
(Keenan 2012).

Map Attribute: MoroccoOnTheMove.com

In the summer
2012 context of entrenchment of radical groups in northern Mali with uncertain
implications, Algeria has first maintained contacts with a wide range of
actors, and seemed to be prioritizing access to information and influence over
a clearly formulated strategy. On the international front, the situation was
immensely embarrassing for Algeria who was accused of passivity and perceived
it had little choice, but to try and negotiate a deal with all Tuareg rebels in
order to calm down a potentially explosive situation.

The Mali
dossier (as well as the Western Sahara one) has always been led by the Algerian
intelligence services, the Département de la Sécurité et du Renseignement (DRS)
(Ammour 2013). Convinced that it should hold the monopoly of mediation with
regards to the northern Mali crisis, Algeria’s attitude was no longer
necessarily to wait and see: Algeria has expressed its preference for a
political solution in Mali.[3] ECOWAS and Mali transitional authorities were
wondering how Algiers could contribute to a negotiation process with the armed
groups, particularly Ansar al-Dine, whose head Iyad Ag Ghali is well known in
Algeria. He is among those leaders of the Tuareg rebellion working closely with
the DRS.[4]

He came to
prominence in 1988 when he founded a Tuareg secessionist movement in northern
Mali. Moreover, he was the main leader of the Tuareg rebellion that began in
1990 and ended with the peace ceremony at Timbuktu in 1996. During that period,
Iyad came under the eye of the DRS who were concerned that the rebellion might
spread into Algeria. His first involvement with the GSPC/AQIM was in 2003 when
he facilitated the liberation of the 14 out of 32 hostages abducted in the
Algerian Sahara by Abderrazak Lamari (a.k.a El Para), a former Algerian
parachutist to be said a DRS agent.[5] As a local notable, Iyad ag-Ghaly recycled
himself in the hostage liberation business, taking large percentages of the
ransoms, and playing all sides of the table.

That may
explain the off-the-record set of talks Algiers led along the 2012 summer. In
July, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika discretly received envoys from Ansar
al-Dine, MNLA, and even from MUJWA (the kidnapper of algerian diplomats in
Gao). Few days after, the MNLA publicly excluded the mediation of Algiers and
accused the algerian government of expelling the injured Tuaregs who are
seeking a shelter in southern Algeria, and of infiltrating the MNLA with agents
from the DRS. The Algerian authorities never officially acknowledged that
meeting took place. In October 2012, another secret delegation of Ansar al-Dine
visited Algiers. The same month the Algerian government sent a humanitarian
convoy and three military vehicles to Kidal, under the control of Ansar
al-Dine. Another Algerian convoy reached Gao under the control of MUJWA. In
both cases, Islamist organizations were in charge of distributing the food to
local populations. The same month, French intelligence services assessed that
Iyad Ag Ghali received a medical treatment in Aïn-Naadja military hospital in
Algiers, thus confirming that the Islamist leader is at home in Algeria.

It seemed then
more profitable for Algiers to portray the MNLA as a destabilizing force, but
one which was unable to found a State according the sacrosanct principle of
self-determination. Algiers had more interest in dealing and negotiating with a
familiar interlocutor, who would be easier to manage (to manipulate), whom
ideological principles fluctuate, and whose interests might be limited to a
consistent financial gain. Thanks to Algiers, Iyad ag-Ghaly was imposed as an
unavoidable interlocutor in the regional conflict exit strategy plan, to such
an extent that even the ECOWAS representative eventually held talks with him in
Ouagadougou in November 2012. But even if Iyad ag-Ghaly announced he had given
up implementing Sharia law throughout Mali (but in Kidal), some Malian and
Western observers would still have been suspicious of such sudden reversal.

The
longstanding ties between the DRS and some key-individuals of Ansar al-Dine,
the blood ties between Iyad ag Ghaly and Abdelkrim al-Targui who leads the
AQIMkatiba al-Ansar, and the presence of Ansar alDine men in southern Algeria’s
supply base and base camp, demonstrated that Algeria was apparently monitoring
the Mali crisis dossier through the use of personal contacts.[5] Keen to avoid
criticism related to this connection, Algiers would later on refuse the egalization
of a Salafi party in Algeria (the Front of the Free Awakening). Paradoxically,
however, Algiers still permitted a Malian Salafist to build up his credibility
among other protagonists of the peace process.

At first,
Algeria’s stance on the Mali crisis appeared to echo a greater number of
stakeholders: the UN Secretary General’s report dated 29 November 2012, for instance,
urged caution and dialogue. On the other hand, West African officials condemned
the UN for being “out of touch” over its lack of urgency in taking action in
Mali, and were pushing the Mali government to cut an autonomy deal with Tuaregs
in exchange for their joining the fight against al-Qaeda.

It seemed then
that Algeria succeeded in finding out an opportunity to regain its traditional
role as regional power-broker and mediator in any Tuareg conflict. By using
Ansar al-Dine as a proxy in northern Mali, Algeria could pretend to provide an
apparent peacemaker foreign policy, and retrieve a consistent leadership after
decades of diplomatic decline. However, further serious setbacks came to
contradict the Algerian strategy and prove that it was far from being wise in
dealing with such a complex interlacing context.

First, on the
ground, the jihadist groups have strengthened their hold on the northern part
of Mali and were preparing themselves for the possible military confrontation
with the African forces. On November 28, 2012, AQIM announced the creation of a
6th brigade called “Youssef ben Tachfine”, made up mainly of Tuaregs residing
in northern Mali. It was headed by El Kairuani Abu Abdelhamid al-Kidali (“from
Kidal”), a local Tuareg member of the group’s al-Ansar brigade, whose leader is
Abdelkrim al-Targui, the cousin of Iyad ag-Ghaly. Such a new ethnic
distribution system was the result of growing resentment by non-Algerians after
they were denied leadership positions. It was also an alarming sign that
locally-rooted djihadist katibas had consolidated prior to the French military
intervention in January 2013. More over, at that time, concerns were raised
about the extension of jihadism in West Africa by Oumar Ould Hamaha, a former
associate of Mokhtar Belmoktar, then head of MUJWA in Gao, and future leader of
Ansar al-Sharia.[6] Hamaha declared: “We want to enlarge our zone of operation
throughout the entire Sahara, going from Niger through to Chad and Burkina
Faso” (Joscelyn 2013).

Second, Iyad
ag-Ghaly’s apparent negotiations’ agenda revealed other hidden political
ambitions, related to his coordinating projects with AQIM: just after the
signature of an agreement with the MNLA under Algiers’ auspices (21 December
2012), Iyad-ag-Ghaly broke off the accord at the end of December, and took the
lead of the Islamists offensive towards southern Mali cities (Konna and
Dyabali). The confidential letter from Abdelmalek Droukdel (head of the AQIM
northern Algeria katiba) to the islamists leaders in northern Mali found out in
Timbuktu in February 2013, proves that a real synchronisation between AQIM and
Ansar al-Dine did exist, and that the gathering of all the radical forces was
part of a long-term strategy of entrenchement in the Azawad region:

“We must not go too far or take risks in our
decisions or imagine that this project is a stable Islamic state. It is too
early for that, God knows. Instead, it is necessary to be cautious in the
matter and we must be more realistic and look at it from a broader and more
complete perspective to see a historic opportunity that must be exploited to
interact with the Azawad people, including all its sectors, with the aim of
uniting it and rallying it behind our Islamic project, by adopting its just
cause and achieving its legitimate goals, while giving it an authentic Islamist
tinge. … That demands of us to establish a new framework regulating the
organizational relationship with Ansar Dine and defining the nature of the
appropriate activities, in a way that combines the continuation of our global
jihadi project and the preserving of the Azawad Islamic project, while
developing it and avoiding its failure. …. As for internal activity, in this we
would be under the emirate of Ansar Dine. Our emir would follow their emir and
our opinion would follow their opinion. By internal activity, we mean all
activity connected to participating in bearing the responsibilities of the
liberated areas.”.[7]

Third, on 30
September 2012, the US Africa Command chief, General Carter F. Ham, clearly
aligned his view with the political solution route favored by the Algerian
government saying “One of the key aspects of seeking a resolution to the
security challenges in northern Mali will be to separate terrorist
organizations from non-terrorist organizations”. This US alignment with
Algerian stance is to be understood in the light of the strong partnership that
emerged after 9/11 when Algeria needed to be firmly integrated into the new
dynamic and the NorthSouth security system in order to retrieve a place on the
international scene after almost ten years of isolation due to the civil war.
By joining the “Global War on Terrorism” the Algerian government found the
opportunity to regain its international legitimacy and transform its foreign
policy into a new source of legitimacy for its domestic policy. The
strengthening of ties with Washington resulted in a flurry of visits to Algiers
by American officials and regular invitations to the White House for Algerian
ministers and President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. On the security level, there has
been an increase in the number of joint operations and initiatives. The FBI has
opened a field office in Algiers, Algerian officers have been trained in the
United States, and there has been a series of joint intelligence missions
between highranking DRS officers and their American counterparts. The two
countries have therefore established relations that are primarily focused on
the security issue, with Washing- ton formulating and determining the
principles, methods, and strategies.

On February
2013, the US State Department designated Iyad ag-Ghaly as a wanted terrorist
(US Department of State 2013). One month later, Ansar al-Dine, was designated a
foreign terrorist organization by the State Department, because of its close
cooperation with al-Qaeda’s affiliate in North Africa. This move not only shows
the contradictions and the incoherencies of the US administration policy, but
points out the difficulties Washington D. C. has had in understanding the
complexity of the Malian situation from the start.

The decision
to designate Iyad ag-Ghaly and its organization as terrorist may have been
interpreted as a move to distance itself from the Algerian government strategy
of compromise, and be seen as an implicit disavowal of Algiers’ short-term
vision. It remains to be seen if the Algerian authorities will draw the lessons
of their rapprochement with a Salafist organisation, even if it is a Tuareg
one.

[1] The Kidal
region (Adrar of Ifoghas mountains) where most of the leaders of the MNLA, the
MIA (Movement of Islamic Azawad, a splinter group from Ansar al-Dine created in
January 2013), and Ansar al-Dine come from, is locally renowned to be the
influence zone of Algeria where cross border trafficking of food, oil, and
various licit goods has been common practice since the 1960s. The Algerian
subsidised foodstuffs sold illicitly in north Mali have created a shadow
economy that allows the poor region of Kidal to maintain a degree of food
security. Even the Malian President Amadou Amani Touré admitted this to be the
case in 2009 by saying Northern Mali is Algeria’s 49th province. See Ammour
2012.

[2] Today
opacity within the regime has worsened after the President’s stroke and his
hospitalization in Paris in April. Despite promises to step down from power,
internal speculations over the future power struggles over an eventual fourth
term in the next presidential election have heightened concerns about the
stability of the country.

[4] After the
French military intervention in Mali, three leaders of Ansar al-Dine found
shelter in Tamanrasset after some negotiations with the DRS. (Boufatah 2013).
On the links between Iyad ag-Ghaly and the DRS see (Keenan 2013). See also
(Nossiter A, MacFarquhar N 2013).

[5] His real
name is Amari Saifi. He joined the armed Islamist movement in 1992 and later on
became the second-in-command of the GSPC. He came to prominence through the
kidnapping of 32 tourists in the Sahara. After the release of the hostages he
flew to northern Chad where he was captured by a rebel Chadian group. Today he
is believed to be imprisoned in Algeria. An investigation led by Salima Mellah
et Jean-Baptiste Rivoire asserts that Saifi was in fact a DRS agent. See their
article from 2005. See also Keenan 2009.

[6] Not only
Iyad ag-Ghaly, but also Ahmada Ag-Bibi, a.k.a. “the man of Algiers” who lives
in Tamanrasset and was in charge of the food supplying of Ansar al-Dine; Senda
Ould Bouamama, former right-hand of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who was the leader of
Ansar al-Dine in Timbuktu (in May 2013 he surrendered to the Mauritanian
authorities); Deity Ag-Sidamou, who was based in southern Algeria where he
managed the gas supplying for Ansar al-Dine through his own local illicit
networks; and finally Nabil Jazaïri (The Algerian), who previously served in
the Algerian army, and was chief of the Kidal area and in charge of the
training camps of Ansar al-Dine.

[5] He is known
as the man with the red beard. He was one of the most active founders of MUJWA
and was responsible for the kidnapping of three humanitarian workers in the
Rabouni-Tindouf Sahrawi refugees camp (Algeria) in 2011. Early December 2012,
he created a new armed movement, Ansar al-Sharia, mainly composed of Azawad
Arabs and Berabish (like him) from Timbuktu. He is also the brother in law of
Mokhtar Belmokhtar. He is said to have been killed in March 2013 by Arabs of
the Kunta tribe in the Gao region.

[7] This letter
has been translated in English by the Associated Press. Only three out of six
chapters are readable. The other chapters are missing. It has been written
after a meeting on 18 March 2012 between A. Droukdel and five Sahelian
commanders. See Associated Press 2013. Another 79 page-document written by
Abdelmalek Droukdel, entitled “Roadmap relating to Islamic Jihad in Azawad” was
discovered in a television station in Timbuktu by a French journalist of
Libération. It has not yet been translated.

This article is an excerpt from a research paper, titled "Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis" published at International Journal of Security & Development under Creative Commons License 3.0