Narrative:During a scheduled 07:45 departure from Little Rock to Minneapolis, an Indicating Crew Alerting System (ICAS) message stating "R 14th duct" occurred during take-off and the flight crew aborted the take-off and returned to the gate. Two mechanics replaced the 14th stage bleed air-sensing loop on the right engine and tested the system. At the end of the day the aircraft was to be repositioned to Minneapolis. The RegionalJet departed Little Rock at 21:21 and started climbing to FL410. At approximately 21:52, the flight crew acknowledged to Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) that they were at FL410. Then the stick shaker and stick pusher activated several times before the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall. Almost simultaneously, both engines shut down. The air-driven generator was automatically deployed and supplied the backup alternating current power to the airplane. At about 21:54, the flight crew asked for a lower altitude. and declared an emergency. At about 21:59 the flight crew requested an altitude of 13,000 feet. At 22:08, the flight crew stated that they had a double engine failure and that they wanted a direct route to any airport. Kansas City ARTCC directed the flight to Jefferson City Airport. At about 22:13, the flight crew stated that they had the runway approach end in sight. The airplane did not make it to the airport and crashed and broke up in a residential area. about two miles from the airport. A large fire erupted.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were (1) the pilots' unprofessional behavior, deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship, which resulted in an in-flight emergency from which they were unable to recover, in part because of the pilots' inadequate training; (2) the pilots' failure to prepare for an emergency landing in a timely manner, including communicating with air traffic controllers immediately after the emergency about the loss of both engines and the availability of landing sites; and (3) the pilots' failure to achieve and maintain the target airspeed in the double engine failure checklist, which caused the engine cores to stop rotating and resulted in the core lock engine condition. Contributing to this accident was 1) the engine core lock condition, which prevented at least one engine from being restarted, and 2) the airplane flight manuals that did not communicate to pilots the importance of maintaining a minimum airspeed to keep the engine cores rotating."

Work with members of the aviation industry to enhance the training syllabuses for pilots conducting high altitude operations in regional jet airplanes. The syllabuses should include methods to ensure that these pilots possess a thorough understanding of the airplanes’ performance capabilities, limitations, and high altitude aerodynamics.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-10

Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators establish Safety Management System programs.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-11

Strongly encourage and assist all regional air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 to implement an approved Aviation Safety Action Program and an approved Flight Operational Quality Assurance program.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-2

Determine whether the changes to be made to the high altitude training syllabuses for regional jet airplanes, as requested in Safety Recommendation A-07-1, would also enhance the high altitude training syllabuses for all other transport-category jet airplanes and, if so, require that these changes be incorporated into the syllabuses for those airplanes.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-3

Require that air carriers provide their pilots with opportunities to practice high altitude stall recovery techniques in the simulator during which time the pilots demonstrate their ability to identify and execute the appropriate recovery technique.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-4

Convene a multidisciplinary panel of operational, training, and human factors specialists to study and submit a report on methods to improve flight crew familiarity with and response to stickpusher systems and, if warranted, establish training requirements for stickpusher-equipped airplanes based on the findings of this panel.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-5

Verify that all Canadair regional jet operators incorporate guidance in their double engine failure checklist that clearly states the airspeeds required during the procedure and require the operators to provide pilots with simulator training on executing this checklist.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-6

Require regional air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 to provide specific guidance on expectations for professional conduct to pilots who operate nonrevenue flights.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-7

For those regional air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 that have the capability to review flight data recorder (FDR) data, require that the air carriers review FDR data from nonrevenue flights to verify that the flights are being conducted according to standard operating procedures.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-8

Work with pilot associations to develop a specific program of education for air carrier pilots that addresses professional standards and their role in ensuring safety of flight. The program should include associated guidance information and references to recent accidents involving pilots acting unprofessionally or not following standard operating procedures.

Issued: --

To: NTSB

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-07-9

Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators incorporate into their oversight programs periodic Line Operations Safety Audit observations and methods to address and correct findings resulting from these observations.

Issued: 20-NOV-2006

To: FAA

A-06-070

For airplanes equipped with CF34-1 or CF34-3 engines, require manufacturers to perform high power, high altitude sudden engine shutdowns; determine the minimum airspeed required to maintain sufficient core rotation; and demonstrate that all methods of in-flight restart can be accomplished when this airspeed is maintained. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 20-NOV-2006

To: FAA

A-06-071

Ensure that airplane flight manuals of airplanes equipped with CF34-1 or CF34-3 engines clearly state the minimum airspeed required for engine core rotation and that, if this airspeed is not maintained after a high power, high altitude sudden engine shutdown, a loss of in-flight restart capability as a result of core lock may occur. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 20-NOV-2006

To: FAA

A-06-072

Require that operators of CRJ-100, -200, and -440 airplanes include in airplane flight manuals the significant performance penalties, such as loss of glide distance and increased descent rate, that can be incurred from maintaining the minimum airspeed required for core rotation and windmill restart attempts. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 20-NOV-2006

To: FAA

A-06-073

Review the design of turbine-powered engines (other than the CF34-1 and CF34-3, which are addressed in Safety Recommendation A-06-70) to determine whether they are susceptible to core lock and, for those engines so identified, require manufacturers of airplanes equipped with these engines to perform high power, high altitude sudden engine shutdowns and determine the minimum airspeed to maintain sufficient core rotation so that all methods of in-flight restart can be accomplished. (Open - Acceptable Response)

Issued: 20-NOV-2006

To: FAA

A-06-074

For those airplanes with engines that are found to be susceptible to core lock (other than the CF34-1 and CF34-3, which are addressed in Safety Recommendation A-06-71), require airplane manufacturers to incorporate information into airplane flight manuals that clearly states the potential for core lock; the procedures, including the minimum airspeed required, to prevent this condition from occurring after a sudden engine shutdown; and the resulting loss of in-flight restart capability if this condition were to occur. (Open - Acceptable Response)

Issued: 20-NOV-2006

To: FAA

A-06-075

Require manufacturers to determine, as part of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 certification tests, if restart capability exists from a core rotation speed of 0 indicated rpm after high power, high altitude sudden engine shutdowns. For those airplanes determined to be susceptible to core lock, mitigate the hazard by providing design or operational means to ensure restart capability. (Open Acceptable Alternate Response)

Issued: 20-NOV-2006

To: FAA

A-06-076

Establish certification requirements that would place upper limits on the value of the minimum airspeed required and the amount of altitude loss permitted for windmill restarts. (Open - Acceptable Response)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-001

Work with members of the aviation industry to enhance the training syllabuses for pilots conducting high altitude operations in regional jet airplanes. The syllabuses should include methods to ensure that these pilots possess a thorough understanding of the airplanes’ performance capabilities, limitations, and high altitude aerodynamics. (Open - Acceptable Response)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-002

Determine whether the changes to be made to the high altitude training syllabuses for regional jet airplanes, as requested in Safety Recommendation A-07-1, would also enhance the high altitude training syllabuses for all other transport-category jet airplanes and, if so, require that these changes be incorporated into the syllabuses for those airplanes. (Open - Acceptable Response)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-003

Require that air carriers provide their pilots with opportunities to practice high altitude stall recovery techniques in the simulator during which time the pilots demonstrate their ability to identify and execute the appropriate recovery technique. (Open - Acceptable Response)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-004

Convene a multidisciplinary panel of operational, training, and human factors specialists to study and submit a report on methods to improve flight crew familiarity with and response to stick pusher systems and, if warranted, establish training requirements for stick pusher-equipped airplanes based on the findings of this panel. (Superseded by A-10-23) (Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-005

Verify that all Canadair regional jet operators incorporate guidance in their double engine failure checklist that clearly states the airspeeds required during the procedure and require the operators to provide pilots with simulator training on executing this checklist. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-006

Require regional air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 to provide specific guidance on expectations for professional conduct to pilots who operate nonrevenue flights. (Open Acceptable Alternate Response)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-007

For those regional air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 that have the capability to review flight data recorder (FDR) data, require that the air carriers review FDR data from nonrevenue flights to verify that the flights are being conducted according to standard operating procedures. (Open Acceptable Alternate Response)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-008

Work with pilot associations to develop a specific program of education for air carrier pilots that addresses professional standards and their role in ensuring safety of flight. The program should include associated guidance information and references to recent accidents involving pilots acting unprofessionally or not following standard operating procedures. (Superseded by A-10-15) (Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded)

Issued: 23-JAN-2007

To: FAA

A-07-009

Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators incorporate into their oversight programs periodic Line Operations Safety Audit observations and methods to address and correct findings resulting from these observations. (Open - Acceptable Response)

This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path. Distance from Little Rock National Airport, AR to Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, MN as the crow flies is 1125 km (703 miles).