Based on the information that I have seen regarding WoSign, I believe that WoSign intentionally bent the rules in order to continue issuing SHA-1 SSL certs, when they knew full well that was no longer allowed. I also believe that the deception continued even after Mozilla directly asked WoSign about this. WoSign has lost my confidence in their ability and intention to follow Mozilla's policies.

所以打算採取與 CNNIC 類似的處分方法，但很不幸的由於規模不一樣，所以被迫採用另外的方式來處理：

Therefore, I think we should respond similarly to WoSign as we did to CNNIC [1][2]. Unfortunately, the number of certificates and the timescales involved are such that we prefer not to create a list of the domains for which previously-issued certs that chain up to the Affected Roots may continue to be trusted, so our approach will be a little different, as Gerv previously described[3].

1) Distrust certificates chaining up to Affected Roots with a notBefore date after October 21, 2016. If additional back-dating is discovered (by any means) to circumvent this control, then Mozilla will immediately and permanently revoke trust in the Affected Roots.-- This change will go into the Firefox 51 release train [4].-- The code will use the subject key id (hash of public key) to identify the Affected Roots, so that the control will also apply to cross-certs of the Affected Roots.

然後將之前簽出來的 SHA-1 憑證列入 OneCRL：

2) Add the previously identified backdated SHA-1 certs chaining up to the Affected Roots to OneCRL.

另外一個非常大的事情是，Mozilla 將永久不信任安永香港的稽核報告：

3) No longer accept audits carried out by Ernst & Young Hong Kong.

Gervase Markham 做了補充「永久」的部份：

To be clear, this is a permanent ban, applicable worldwide, but only to the Hong Kong branch of E&Y. (If further issues are found with E&Y audits elsewhere, then we might consider something with wider scope.)