Danny Escobedo's
brother-in-law was killed on January 19, 1960. At about 2:30 in the
morning, Escobedo was arrested without a warrant and taken to the Chicago
police headquarters for questioning. Escobedo made no statement to the
police and was released at approximately 5:00 that afternoon, after his lawyer
obtained a writ of habeascorpus.

Ten days later,
on January 30, Escobedo was again arrested, handcuffed, and driven to the
police station. On the way to the sta tion, the police allegedly informed
Escobedo that a man named Benedict DiGerlando had said it was Escobedo who
had fired the shots that killed his brother-in-law. The police also
allegedly told Escobedo that the case against him was pretty secure and he
might as well "come clean" and admit to the killing. At that
point, Escobedo asked to have his lawyer present before answering any questions.

The police questioned
Escobedo for several hours, during which he continued to ask for his attorney.
He was told that he could do so after the police concluded their interrogation.
Escobedo's attorney, who was at the police station on another matter, discovered
that Escobedo was in custody. He asked repeatedly to speak to his client
but got the same answer: He could see Escobedo after the questioning.

While interrogating
Escobedo, the police told him that they had DiGerlando in custody. They asked
Escobedo if he would like to call DiGerlando a liar to his face. Escobedo
said he would, and when the two men met, Escobedo said to DiGerlando: "I
didn't shoot Manuel-yo4 did." This statement placed Escobedo at the crime
scene for the first time or, at the least, showed that he had knowledge of
the crime. As the questioning continued, Escobedo gave other information
that incriminated himself, his sister, and DiGerlando in the murder
of his brother-in-law.

Before his trial,
and on appeal, Escobedo asked the court to suppress all information
gathered during the interrogation without his attorney. The motion was
denied, and Escobedo was convicted of the murder of his brother-in-law.

In February 1963,
the Illinois Supreme Court heard Escobedo's appeal, ruled that the information
should not have been allowed as evidence, and reversed the decision of the
lower court. However, the state appealed for a rehearing. Saying
that Escobedo had given the information voluntarily, the state asked the court
to rule in favor of the prosecution and admit the evidence. The court
agreed.

Escobedo then
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the case. The issue
before the Court: Was the refusal by police to honor Escobedo's request to
consult with his lawyer a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights?

The U. S.
Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, said that Escobedo's rights had been
violated. Overturning the ruling of the state supreme court, it declared
that the information was not admissible as evidence because it had been unlawfully
obtained.

Writing for the
Court, Justice Arthur Goldberg explained the point at which a police procedure
became "accusatory" instead of 'investigatory:"

... [when]
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular subject, ... the police carry out
a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to
consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been
denied 'the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment
.... [N]o statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may
be used against him at a criminal trial.

The dissenting
justices expressed their serious concerns that this decision would make it
much more difficult for the police to obtain information and for prosecutors
to gain convictions.

Writing in dissent,
Justice John Marshall Harlan stated:

I would affirm
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois.... I think the rule announced
today is most ill-conceived and that it seriously and unjustly fetters perfectly
legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.

Justice Byron
White wrote the dissenting opinion for himself and Justices Clark and Stewart:

I do not suggest
for a moment that law enforcement will be destroyed by the rule announced
today. The need for peace and order is too insistent for that.
But it will be crippled and its task made a great deal more difficult, for/unsound,
unstated reasons which can find no home in any of the provisions of the
Constitution.

The significance
of the Escobedo case was its broadened interpretation of the Constitution
concerning the Sixth Amendment protections for those accused of crimes.
It extended the time frame during which suspects were entitled to have a lawyer
present beyond the trial itself to the time of the interrogation. The
decision was widely criticized by police officers who depended on confessions
for evidence. It also raised many questions: it seemed to imply that
suspects should be-told of their right to remain silent and to have an attorney.

Vocabulary

(writ of)
habeas corpus Court order requiring that a person in custody be brought
before a court so a judge can determine the legality of keeping him or her
in jail.

incriminate
To involve in or charge with a crime or other illegal act.