In their accounts of the historic February 1972 trip to China,
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger focus on the February 21 meeting
with Mao Zedong as well as the talks with Zhou Enlai on the Vietnam
War, Taiwan, and the Shanghai Communique. Both kept secret one
of the trip's more remarkable episodes -- Kissinger's top secret
intelligence briefing to the Chinese on Soviet military forces
arrayed against China. They also kept secret some of their talks
with Zhou; Kissinger later claimed that Zhou "spent very
little of our time on" Taiwan, but actually Nixon and Kissinger
went to some length to mollify his concerns about the possibility
of Taiwanese independence and prospective Japanese influence over
Taiwan. (Note 1) After years of declassification
requests and appeals, the National Security Archive publishes
here for the first time the intelligence briefing to the Chinese
and the complete texts of Nixon's conversations with Zhou, including
the assurances on Taiwan.

Richard Nixon's trip to China in February 1972 was a critically
important moment in the early history of the Sino-American rapprochement.
Keeping Secretary of State William Rogers out of the talks, Nixon
and Kissinger met privately with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai where
they confirmed understandings on sensitive issues such as Taiwan
and the normalization of diplomatic relations. Nearly ten years
ago, the National Security Archive filed a mandatory review request
with the National Archive's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff
for declassification review of the memoranda of conversations
(memcons) for the Nixon-Mao-Zhou Enlai meetings. While the Nixon-Mao
memcon had been declassified separately among State Department
records at the National Archives, the memcons of the Nixon-Zhou
talks were finally released in the spring of 1999. Three of them,
however, were released with a significant number of excisions.
(Note 2) The National Security Archive promptly
filed an appeal with the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, which
rejected it two years later on the grounds that declassification
would harm U.S. foreign relations and national security. The next
step, taken in June 2001, was an appeal to the Interagency Security
Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the "court of last resort" for
the mandatory review process. ISCAP enhanced its already remarkable
reputation by approving complete release of the memcons in the
fall of 2002. Possibly because of understaffing, the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff delayed releasing the documents until 14 November
2003.

While the newly released information in the Nixon-Zhou talks
is interesting, none of it was so sensitive that it could not
have been released years ago. Some of the excisions had to do
with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and the 1971 South Asia
War but most relate to two preoccupations of the Chinese leadership:
1) fear of renewed Japanese expansion, and 2) opposition to Taiwanese
independence. The late 1960s and early 1970s was a period when
Japan's export successes were catching attention throughout the
industrialized world, not least in the United States where some
industries were feeling the brunt of Japanese competition. As
orthodox Marxists, the Chinese leadership easily assumed that
economic expansion would develop into political and military expansion,
a revival of the Japanese imperialism that had caused so much
devastation in China only a few decades earlier. In keeping with
this, Zhou expressed concern about the possibility of Japanese
expansion into South Korea and Taiwan, with Nixon and Kissinger
assuring him that as long as the United States had a security
treaty with Japan, Washington would be in a position to check
any Japanese tendencies toward militarism and political expansionism.
With the U.S. committed to pulling its forces out of Taiwan, Zhou
expressed anxiety not only about the revival of Japanese influence
in its former colony, but also about the prospects for an independent
Taiwan. The forces pushing for independence were small, but Zhou
was nonetheless concerned and wanted assurances that Washington
would not support any movement that was inconsistent with the
concept of "one China." (Note 3)

Why security reviewers working with the Nixon Presidential Materials
Staff sought to block complete declassification of these memcons
is puzzling. Granting that some of the discussion remained sensitive
during the 1970s, by the time that the Nixon project made the
initial denials in 1999 and 2001, so much information had been
declassified relating to the touchier portions of these documents
that there could be no legitimate reasons to maintain their classification.
Indeed, details on Beijing's concerns about Japanese expansion,
possible Japanese influence in Taiwan and South Korea, and the
Taiwanese independence movement had already been declassified
in the Nixon National Security Files and State Department records
at the National Archives. (Note 4) Concerns about
harm to U.S. foreign policy were greatly exaggerated; its earlier
decisions on the withholdings are a telling example of the overclassification
problem in the U.S. government secrecy system. (Note
5)

The release of the Kissinger intelligence briefing to the Chinese
on 23 February 1972 shows much better judgment. After it initially
denied the Archive's mandatory review request in the spring of
2002, the Nixon Project released, in response to an appeal, the
memcon of the intelligence briefing. Kissinger's intelligence
briefings to the Chinese have long been a subject of discussion,
but this is the first one to be declassified. Perhaps the ISCAP
decision on the Nixon-Zhou talks made the Nixon Project and the
National Archives less hesitant to declassify once sensitive documents,
such as this one, that had long been overtaken by events. In light
of their pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union at the
same time, Nixon and Kissinger had understandable reasons for
assigning a high classification to secret briefings on Soviet
military forces arrayed against China. Now that so much information
has been released on triangular diplomacy, however, this document
was ripe for declassification, which the Nixon Project recognized,
after some hesitation.

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The Nixon Project made several withholdings from this memcon,
during which Nixon and Zhou reviewed the Taiwan issue, the U.S.
military posture, Sino-American relations during the 1940s, and
the Vietnam War negotiations. Key statements in the conversation
(see page 5) were those in which Nixon provided the basis for
what has been U.S. policy on Taiwan ever since. While Nixon said
that the United States would not support "any" Taiwanese
independence movement and asserted that Taiwan was "part
of China," he also stated that Washington supported a "peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issues." These statements were in
private; no president publicly declared non-support for Taiwanese
independence until President Bill Clinton visited China in 1998.
(Note 6) The government's excisions from this
document set the tone for the other Nixon-Zhou memcons: With his
concerns about Japanese expansion and Taiwan, Zhou worried that
Japan would "move into" Taiwan or at least foment Taiwanese
independence. Nixon assured that he would work against such an
outcome. Recognizing China's long-standing opposition to the US-Japan
security treaty, Nixon argued that Beijing should accept the treaty
because it gave U.S. influence over Tokyo on such matters as Taiwan
policy. Other passages that were excised include Nixon's statement
on the U.S. hard anti-Soviet line during the South Asian war and
the arrangements for Kissinger to give an intelligence briefing
on Soviet forces threatening China (see document
four).

In this conversation, Nixon, Zhou, and Kissinger discussed the
1962 Indo-Chinese war, South Asian conflicts, U.S. politics and
Sino-American normalization, the Korean peninsula, U.S.-Soviet
detente, and Sino-Soviet tensions and their background. Some of
the details initially withheld from this document also relate
to Japan, with Nixon assuring Zhou that Washington would discourage
any Japanese "military intervention" in South Korea.
Nixon restated the point that close US-Japan relations were necessary
to give the US leverage on Japan's policy toward Korea or Taiwan.
Again, to mollify Zhou's concerns over Japanese expansion, Nixon
made a general commitment that the U.S. would "restrain the
Japanese from going from economic expansion to military expansion."
Also withheld from the document was a brief exchange on Soviet
"subversion" in Yugoslavia and the sailing of Soviets
nuclear submarines through the Suvarov Straits during the South
Asian war.

During the talks with Zhou, Nixon also made what amounted to
a general security guarantee for China. Noting that during the
South Asian crisis he had been ready to "warn the Soviet
Union against undertaking an attack on China," Nixon went
even further, declaring that the "US would oppose any attempt
by the Soviet Union to engage in aggressive action against China."
That Nixon and Kissinger had no idea what the United States could
do to support the Chinese in a confrontation with the Soviets
was necessarily unstated. Kissinger's NSC staff had once looked
into the issue and only came up with a proposal for a UN resolution;
the U.S. was not likely to go to war with the Soviets over China.
(Note 7) Nevertheless, Nixon brought the issue
up again, this time, during a toast at a banquet in Shanghai,
Nixon declared that the "American people" were dedicated
to the "principle" that "never again shall foreign
domination, foreign occupation, be visited upon this city or any
part of China or any independent country in this world."
(Note 8)

In this conversation, Nixon, Zhou, and Kissinger discussed the
Shanghai communiqué, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam negotiations,
the Korean War POW issue, Cambodia and the Vietnam War, South
Asian conflicts, and the Middle East. Apart from a critical comment
about India's ingratitude about U.S. aid, most of the newly released
portions concern Japan and Taiwanese issues, ranging from the
leak of a State Department memo on Taiwan to the Japanese to Kissinger's
scorn over the "unreliability" of Japanese journalists.
On Japanese foreign policy, Nixon again pledged to "restrain"
any Japanese tendencies toward expansionism in the "interest
of peace in the Pacific." When Zhou expressed concern about
a possible Japanese military role in South Korea, Nixon assured
him that Washington would use its "influence" to "discourage"
Japanese intervention there. During one of the exchanges on Taiwan,
Nixon commented that without having forces in Japan, the U.S.
would have no influence over Tokyo's Taiwan policy -- the Japanese
would not "pay attention." While he was trying to encourage
Zhou to take a more positive view of the U.S.-Japan security relationship,
the latter continued to hold by the goal of a "peaceful,
independent, and neutral Japan." To the extent that Japan's
successful economic expansion had become a worrisome problem,
Zhou later suggested, it was an American responsibility: the United
States had let Japan "fatten herself," now Japan is
developing "too rapidly" and has become a "heavy
burden on you" (a likely reference to U.S. trade deficits).

The largest excised section, focusing on the Peng Meng-min affair,
reflects Beijing's concern about the Taiwanese independence movement.
Bitterly opposed to the Nationalist regime imposed by mainlanders
led by Chiang Kai-shek, native-born Taiwanese had created an underground
pro-independence movement, which elicited sympathetic reactions
in the United States. Peng, an international relations professor
at National Taiwan University and a former diplomat, had turned
into an opponent of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship and a supporter
of independence. During the mid-1960s, Peng was arrested on sedition
charges and sentenced to eight years in prison, but international
protest led to the commutation of his sentence after he had served
seven months. Peng remained under close surveillance but secretly
fled to Sweden in early 1970, with the help of local supporters
and the Swedish chapter of Amnesty International. While in Sweden,
Peng applied for a U.S. visa so he could hold a research position
at the University of Michigan's Chinese Studies program. The Nixon
White House had been none too happy about Peng's visa application
-- and Vice President Agnew opposed it altogether -- but Kissinger
and the State Department decided that it was better to approve
the visa than face "congressional and public criticism which
would prove harmful to U.S. policy" toward Taiwan. Peng's
status as a former participant in Kissinger's international seminar
at Harvard may have softened Kissinger's attitude in this instance.
The State Department granted the visa in September 1970. (Note
9)

Plainly, Peng's status grated on Zhou: he had already brought
it up with Kissinger during the secret trip suggesting that the
CIA was behind the escape. (Note 10) Zhou brought
up the issue of possible U.S. complicity again during the talks
with Nixon, but Kissinger denied it and observed that left-wing
groups had helped Peng escape. In any event, both Nixon and Kissinger
assured Zhou that they would not support Taiwanese independence,
although they were careful to note that that they could not use
force to halt it if it came to pass. As Zhou suggested, Chiang
kai-shek could repress pro-independence forces because the idea
of an independent Taiwan was as anathema to him as it was to Zhou.
Peng remained a thorn in Beijing's side; after political conditions
on Taiwan had improved, he returned and ran as the presidential
candidate of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.
While Peng had little chance of winning, the campaign elicited
a large Chinese naval demonstration and missile shots over Taiwan,
one of the major episodes in the 1995-96 crisis over Taiwan. (Note
11)

The shared antagonism toward the Soviet Union was a crucially
important dimension of the Sino-American rapprochement, and to
enhance Beijing's confidence in American power as well as to bring
the two governments closer together, Kissinger wanted the Chinese
to have the best intelligence information available on Soviet
military forces. Kissinger's first disclosure of intelligence
information to Beijing may have occurred in November 1971, during
the Indo-Pakistan War. When meeting with UN Ambassador Huang Hua,
he provided details on Indian forces arrayed against Pakistan
and later offered him a more general briefing on the "disposition
of Soviet forces." (Note 12) Huang did
not take up that offer but General Alexander Haig, Kissinger's
deputy, restated it when he met with Zhou in January 1972. Haig
offered "unilaterally and without any reciprocity" on
China's part "our assessment of the Soviet threat which exists
against the People's Republic." He also told Zhou that when
Nixon and Kissinger arrived in February, the latter would be "ready
to to discuss the modalities of furnishing this information."
(Note 13) The manner in which Haig made the
offer relieved Zhou of having to reply on the spot, much less
to say anything suggesting that Beijing wanted or needed such
information.

After Kissinger arrived in Beijing on 21 February, he held a
private talk with Zhou (after the Nixon-Mao meeting) where he
offered to share "some information on dangers we confront
in the military field." The next day, speaking with deputy
foreign minister Qiao Guanhua, Kissinger observed that when meeting
the next morning he would, in accordance with Nixon's wishes,
provide "some information of a more sensitive nature."
He further suggested that it would be "more beneficial"
if someone with military expertise were at the meeting. As the
Chinese had never asked for such a briefing, Qiao simply stated,
"we will study that." When Kissinger observed that,
"We will do that so that in any future crisis we both know
militarily what the problem is," Qiao was more positive,
saying "Good." As noted earlier, during the afternoon
meeting with Zhou on 22 February, Nixon briefly mentioned the
arrangements for a briefing that he had approved. (Note
14)

When Kissinger met with Qiao the next morning, in attendance
was the influential Marshal Ye Jianying whom Kissinger had first
met at the Beijing airport in July 1971. (Note 15)
After some discussion of the Shanghai Communiqué and the
importance of secrecy for the briefing, Kissinger gave a run-down
of Soviet forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet border, including
ground forces, tactical aircraft and missiles, strategic air defenses,
and strategic attack forces. The briefing was detailed, with specific
numbers of on Soviet divisions, aircraft, missiles, etc. Kissinger
gave special attention to nuclear forces, providing considerable
detail on four types of tactical missiles, including the explosive
yield of their nuclear warheads. After Kissinger discussed the
FROG, he admitted unfamiliarity with the names of the other two
tactical missiles and did not bother to give them to the Chinese.
The second missile was most likely the now well-known SCUD (or
SS-1B) while the third unnamed system was probably the SCALEBOARD
(or SS-12). The fourth, a naval cruise missile with a range of
300 nautical miles, was probably one version or the other of the
SHADDOCK (or SS-N-3). Perhaps Kissinger did not know (or did not
remember) that NATO military experts devised the often strange
nomenclature for Soviet weapons systems. (Note 16)

When Kissinger concluded his presentation, he emphasized that
except for Nixon and those Americans present, "nobody in
our government" knew about it, even the "intelligence
people" who had prepared the information. While Kissinger,
through Nixon's approval, had the authority to disclose the information
to the Chinese, undoubtedly Deputy of Central Intelligence Richard
Helms would have wanted to vet the briefing in the name of protecting
sources and methods. (Note 17) In any event,
Marshall Ye expressed his gratitude to Kissinger, saying that
not only was the information "very useful" but that
it also was an "important indication" of the U.S.'s
"willingness to improve our relations." This would not
be the last of such presentations; they were regular features
of Kissinger's visits to China until October 1975, when relations
had soured and the Chinese rejected his offer of a "special
briefing." (Note 18)

After the intelligence briefing, Kissinger reviewed U.S.-Soviet
negotiations then in play on a number of issues, such as the European
Security Conference (later known as the Conference on European
Security and Cooperation), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions,
SALT, and economic agreements, among others. This was part of
the Nixon-Kissinger confidence-building effort so that the Chinese
would not feel that Moscow and Washington were in "collusion"
against China but also had an opportunity to comment on the negotiations.
When the Nixon Project originally released this material (pp.
14-23), it withheld the opening pages containing the intelligence
presentation.

Notes

1. Richard Nixon, RN The Memoirs of Richard
Nixon (New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 559-580;
Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown,
1979). Kissinger also minimized the importance of the Taiwan issue
in his talks with Zhou Enlai during his July 1971 secret trip
to China. See Elaine Sciolino, "Records Dispute Kissinger
On His '71 Visit to China," New York Times, 28 February
2002, and National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book,
"The Beijing-Washington Back Channel and Henry Kissinger's
Secret Trip to China," at <http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66>.

3. For a thoughtful and important study of the
Taiwan issue since the early rapprochement, see Alan D. Romberg,
Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward
Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, D.C., Henry L.
Stimson Center, 2003).

6. Romberg, Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice,
p. 183, where he quotes President Clinton's June 1998 statement
that the United States "does not support independence for
Taiwan or one China, one Taiwan or Taiwan's membership in organizations
that require statehood." Clinton also stated emphasized the
great importance of a peaceful resolution of the "issue between
China and Taiwan."

8. "Toasts of the President and Chairman
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao at a Banquet in Shanghai," 27 February
1972, Public Papers of the President of the United States,
Richard Nixon, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements
of the President, 1972 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing
Office, 1973), p. 380.

15. For Kissinger's arrival at the airport,
see Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, pp. 55-56. Ye was a
member of the group of four marshals who had written a report
to the leadership recommending a new approach to the United States;
see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 245 and 248.