Hi John Mikes
Since IMHO life has to be intelligent, being unlike inanimate bodies, and life
is self-controlled or autonomous, I define intelligence as the
ability to make choices or selctions completely on one's own.
Adding free will to the requirements, it rules out computers as
piossible of intlligence.

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Life, free will and autonomous choice are all nonphysical.
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: John Mikes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-04, 12:18:20
Subject: Re: How can intelligence be physical ?
Here is another one about intelligence:
My definition goes back to the original Latin words: to READ between - lines,
or words that is. To understand (reflect?) on the unspoken. A reason why I am
not enthusiastic about AI - a machine (not Lob's universal computer) does not
overstep the combinations of the added limitations. Intelligence is
anticipatory.
JohnM
On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
How can be " PHYSICAL" - 'physical'?
(and please, don't tell "because we THINK so")
John M
On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 4:44 PM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, February 2, 2013 6:05:53 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Roger,
I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of
physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're
surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human chess
player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock traders
that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on.
When you don't understand what you are doing, it it easy to do it very fast.
This writer gives a good explanation:
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-minds-are-not-like-computers
Many AI algorithms are intrinsically slow. Most of the examples I've given are
made possible by parallelising large amounts of computers. They will never
understand in the sense you mean unless they have a 1p, but I don't see how
that relates to speed or how speed is relevante here.
Also I'm not claiming that intelligence == mind.
Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people say "oh
right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be able to do
X". And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's just a bias we
have, a need to feel special.
Have you considered that it is a bias you have, to make you feel special, to be
able to say that you are above their bias?
I have and it might be true.
WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science.
An argument can be made that Leibniz is the inventor of computer science,
particularly AI. http://history-computer.com/Dreamers/Leibniz.html
I honestly had no idea and I'm impressed (and ashamed for not knowing).
Craig
On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi socr...@bezeqint.net and Craig, and all,
How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ?
How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ?
How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ?
IMHO You need to consider what is really going on:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/
One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is
inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In
imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think,
to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while
retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into
a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only
parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.
Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine,
that one must look for perception.
Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon entering
it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the relations
they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or consciousness,
can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter how complex the inner
workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals that what is being
observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. Hence, materialism must
be false, for there is no possible way that the purely mechanical principles of
materialism can account for the phenomena of consciousness.
In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of
perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of materialism
cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the New System of
Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle (1702), are revealing in this
regard:
Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which
corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in
artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may
be.
But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which
compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the
Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness
which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This
perception cannot be explained by figures and movements.
Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness
must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as one conscious being. An
aggregate of matter is not truly one and so cannot be regarded as a single I,
capable of being the subject of a unified mental life. This interpretation fits
nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of perception as “the
representation in the simple of the compound, or of that which is outside”
(Principles of Nature and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to
Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception
and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed
into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible
entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity.” If perception
(and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a representation of a variety
of content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may construct Leibniz's
argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that matter can
explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A perception is a
state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity. Thus,
whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is
divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter
cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical with, give
rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, give rise to)
perception, then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is false.
Leibniz rejected materialism on the grounds that it could not, in principle,
ever capture the “true unity” of perceptual consciousness, that characteristic
of the self which can simultaneously unify a manifoldness of perceptual
content. If this is Leibniz's argument, it is of some historical interest that
it bears striking resemblances to contemporary objections to certain
materialist theories of mind. Many contemporary philosophers have objected to
some versions of materialism on the basis of thought experiments like
Leibniz's: experiments designed to show that qualia and consciousness are bound
to elude certain materialist conceptions of the mind (cf. Searle 1980; Nagel
1974; McGinn 1989; Jackson 1982).
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: socra...@bezeqint.net
Receiver: Everything List
Time: 2013-02-02, 01:39:35
Subject: Re: Science is a religion by itself.
On Feb 1, 7:51?m, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Friday, February 1, 2013 12:26:43 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
> > ?i socr...@bezeqint.net <javascript:>
>
> > Feynman was wrong. ?ife isn't physics,
> > it's intelligence or consciousness, free will.
>
> If we understand that physics is actually experience, then life,
> intelligence, consciousness, free will, qualia, etc are all physics. How
> could it really be otherwise?
>
> Craig
======
In the name of reason and common sense:
How could it really be otherwise?
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