One major section is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has historically been rooted in the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, the natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, despite simultaneously professing its desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:

formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

internal unrest on Taiwan;

Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and

foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.

One major section (beginning on page 86) is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

There have been no signs that China’s military posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly. The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, the natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits.

In preparation for their participation in the 2015 Paris Air Show, Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology released promotional videos to feature alongside the hardware that they will be exhibiting at the show. The aim is to “promote Taiwan’s achievements in defense technology and other areas,” and “exploring opportunities to introduce locally produced key weapon modules into international supply chains.”

The Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship missile (HF III “Brave Wind”)The Tien Kung III surface-to-air missile (TK III “Sky Bow”)The Cardinal II unmanned aircraft system
The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST) is Taiwan’s main weapons research and development center. The organization, previously known only as CSIST, was spun off from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) in April of 2014.

One major section (beginning on page 56) is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

Security in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interactions between and among mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. China’s strategy toward Taiwan has been influenced by what it sees as positive developments in Taiwan’s political situation and approach to engagement with China. However, China’s overall strategy continues to incorporate elements of persuasion and coercion to deter or repress the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence.

China and Taiwan have made progress in expanding cross-Strait trade/economic links and people-to-people contacts. Alongside positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in China following the re-election of President Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, there have been no signs that China’s military posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly.

The PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

Admiral Chen Yeong-kang became Taiwan’s new Deputy Minister of National Defense (Policy) on Tuesday, March 3, 2015. Chen replaced Andrew Hsia, who stepped down to became Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council in January of 2015.

Chen’s former posts in the military include serving as Navy Commander, as head of the Republic of China Defense Mission in the United States, and as President of the National Defense University.

Chen, a long-time naval officer who has studied at the U.S. Naval Command College, is familiar with foreign affairs, foreign military weapons procurement, armed forces development and military education. While serving as Navy Commander, Chen was a driving force for Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program and was keen to push for the Navy’s modernization.

Admiral Kao Kuang-chi became Taiwan’s new Minister of National Defense on Friday, January 30, 2015. Kao replaced Yen Ming, who had held the post since August of 2013.

Kao, a former Navy commander and chief of the General Staff, will use his expertise to help carry out an indigenous submarine program and downsize the country’s troops as the military continues its efforts to build a small but elite force.

The procurement of F-16 C/D fighter jets from the United States is still an option to beef up Taiwan’s defense capabilities, the Ministry of National Defense said Monday, dismissing a report that the military has decided not to purchase the aircraft.

There was speculation among US-based China experts this week that the White House was growing increasingly frustrated with China and could change policies and move closer to Taiwan, even agreeing to sell it new weapon systems. However, sources close to the administration of US President Barack Obama told the Taipei Times that it was not considering a change in policy.