Here appear occasional jottings of my random musings. Profound or jejune, they reveal the contours of my mental universe, with world history, intellectual history, civilizations, philosophy, religion, society, knowledge, and books as some major themes.
Since May 2011, this blog has been exclusively focused on Singapore. All my other reflections are now posted in "Notes from Noosphere" (see link under "Miscellany" on the right margin).

It is heartening to learn that Dr Toh was the veneer of strength behind his
more illustrious colleague Mr Lee Kuan Yew; how he exuded intellectual
independence rarely seen in parliament these days and how he truly cared for the
people. He embodied all that Singaporeans want in our leaders: strong but not
bullying, intellectual rather than just scholarly but above all: truly
caring.

The reports referred to Dr Toh as one of Singapore’s founding fathers who
struggled for Singapore’s independence and who manoeuvred against the
‘communists’. Dr Toh’s struggle against supposed ‘communists’ wasn’t a struggle
for independence but a struggle for power instead. A struggle for independence
has to be against some foreign power whose rule we want to overthrow. We can
therefore either speak of independence struggle against British rule before 1963
or against Malaysian rule between 1963 and 1965. Dr Toh and his colleagues
didn’t struggle against British rule but used British might instead to wipe out
political foes and received power from the British. They also didn’t struggle
against Malaysian rule but actively courted Malaysian rule instead. Independence
fell onto our laps when we were kicked out of Malaysia by Tunku Abdul Rahman. Is
the act of founding one of merely receiving independence or one of fighting for
independence? To regard founding simply as receiving independence is to cheapen
what founding means. India’s founding for example is more closely associated
with Mohandas Ghandi, the leader of their independence movement than with Nehru,
their first prime minister. Our founding should similarly be more closely
associated with those who fought for our independence than those who merely
inherited independence. Several books regard anti-colonialism amongst the local
populace as the fundamental reason why Britain granted us self-rule:

To defuse hostile sentiments against colonial rule, the colonial government
had to accept constitution reformation in 1954 to grant Singapore greater
internal self-government [1].

The people’s vehement desire for self-government was why Britain had to
grant early self-government in order to gain the people’s acquiescence to govern
them [2].

The trade union movement bore Singapore out of colonialism and into
statehood [3].

There is little doubt that the exodus of British capital and activity due to
strikes and unrest hastened the relinquishing of control over internal affairs
[4].

It was thus the ordinary workers and students, the so-called ‘leftists’ or
‘pro-communists’ who fought for our independence through trade union and student
movements. There was nothing particularly communist about these movements which
were driven by genuine worker grievances [5] and discrimination against the
Chinese educated [6]. Throughout the world today, there are still people who
demonstrate against work place and social injustices such as the 2011 Batam
demonstrations for fair wage and the 2011 ethnic Indian demonstrations in
Malaysia.

At that time, many strikes began peacefully but turned violent only because
employers hired secret society members to break up strikes which led to scuffles
or they were triggered by the police using water cannons to disperse picketers
[3]. Even David Marshall didn’t think they were communists but Chinese
chauvinists instead [7]. The Malayan Communist Party itself admitted that they
had no control over the rioters and even criticised the rioters for being overly
militant [8]. The MCP had been outlawed in 1948 and their Singapore operation
had been badly crippled by the Special Branch in 1949 so that subsequent riots
weren’t communist led but arose out of the spontaneous boiling over of hatred
accumulated through years of suffering social injustice.

As we remember the 70th anniversary of the Fall of Singapore, let us not
forget that these so-called ‘leftists’ were the ones who resisted the Japanese
invasion and who fought a guerrilla warfare with the Japanese throughout the
years of Japanese Occupation. They were our true patriots who laid down their
lives for Singapore compared to some of the PAP ‘old guards’ who worked for the
Japanese instead. Should our founding fathers be those who fought the Japanese
or those who worked for the Japanese?

It is interesting to note that the so-called leftists included luminaries
like Tan Kah Kee and Tan Lark Sye who contributed much to Singapore education
and philanthropy. The former was branded as a communist, prevented from
returning to Singapore and forced to live out the rest of his life in China [9].
The latter was stripped of his citizenship and forced to live out his life in
Malaysia [10]. How to believe these were hard core communists all out to ruin
Singapore? They were businessmen who would have continued to contribute to
Singapore’s prosperity had they not been persecuted.

Many Singaporeans are grateful to the PAP ‘old guards’ and regard them as our
founding fathers because they believe the ‘old guards’ took us from Third World
to First. The following books suggest that Singapore wasn’t Third World when PAP
took over in 1959:

In 1960, Singapore’s per capita GDP was $1,330, which gave the country a
middle-income status [11].

Post-war Singapore was never a backward fishing village waiting to be
transformed by Lee Kuan Yew into a modern economy. The King of Thailand wouldn’t
have sent 20 of his sons to a fishing village for education in the late
nineteenth century. A fishing village could not have staged a manned air flight
as early as 1911. Singapore was credited with the finest airport in the British
Empire in the 1930s. In Aug 1967, speaking to American businessmen in Chicago,
Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged that we were already a metropolis [12].

Unemployment in 1960 was estimated to be 4.9% [13]

The following book suggests that our progress was simply a matter of
continuing our colonial tradition of free market adaptation:

Development through multinationals required no more than what Singapore had
always done historically – respond to changes in the international economy and
in foreigner requirements. Accepting foreign enterprise is a continuation of a
long tradition of adaptability (since colonial times) [14].

The following books suggest that resourcefulness of people, favourable global
conditions and luck played a part too:

According to the Winsemius Mission: resourcefulness of her people, active
industrial promotion by government and close cooperation between employers and
labour will allow Singapore to successfully carry out its proposed programme
[15].

Until 1973, growth was made possible by an expanding world economy
unfettered by trade and investment restrictions, supported by trade
liberalisation in developed countries that was sparked off by the Kennedy Round
of multilateral trade negotiations in the Sixties. Singapore was also given
access to industrialised markets under the Generalised System of Preferences
[16].

Some of Singapore’s economic success must be attributed to luck. For
example, it benefited from the oil exploration boom in the region in the early
1970s. Singapore’s leaders were guided by the counsel of the eminent Dutch
economist, Dr Albert Winsemius who was struck by the often informally acquired
skills of Singapore labourers whom he watched undertaking effective repair jobs
with simple tools [17].

The following books suggest the indispensability of Dr Winsemius to
Singapore’s development:

Dr Winsemius and I.F. Tang made extraordinary contributions to the economic
development of Singapore as leader and secretary of the first UN
Industrialisation Survey Team in 1961 [18].

With Singapore’s secession in 1965, the United Nations Proposed
Industrialization Programme for the State of Singapore became the basis for
Singapore’s industrialisation strategy [19].

The 1960-61 United Nations mission led by Albert Winsemius helped develop a
blueprint for Singapore’s industrialisation and development plan and recommended
the establishment of EDB [20].

The following books suggest that the PAP ‘old guards’ foolishly chose import
substitution first but were forced to switch to export industrialisation only
when we were kicked out of Malaysia:

Singapore at first adopted the industrialisation policy of import
substitution, followed after 1966 by the export of labour intensive manufactured
goods [21].

Singapore’s industrialisation strategy was originally dependent on policies
of import substitution within the Malaysian common market, but the attainment of
political independence in 1965 led to export industrialisation [22].

Import substitution was adopted in the early 1960s in anticipation of the
Malayan common market. However, Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965
dashing the hopes of the common market, hence an export strategy was promoted
instead [23].

Thus, our development was in accordance to Dr Winsemius and his team’s plans,
we avoided the mistake of import substitution only because we were kicked out of
Malaysia, we had resourceful people, favourable global conditions, good luck and
were merely continuing the good, old colonial tradition of free market
adaptation. Thus, many factors contributed to our progress; the notion of the
PAP ‘old guards’ singularly dragging us from Third World to First is false.

Finally, we must also consider the deplorable manner with which the PAP dealt
with its political opponents and ask ourselves if these are what we expect of
our founding fathers. When PAP detained Barisan leaders during Operation Cold
Store for alleged connection to the Brunei anti-Malaysia revolt, the British
Commissioner Lord Selkirk and his deputy Philip Moore believed the Barisan had
intended to work within constitutional means. Subsequent British investigations
found little evidence of the allegation for which Barisan leaders had been
detained. Yet, by the time the Barisan leaders were released, the election was
over [24]. The operation thus appears politically motivated and lacking in
scruple. When David Marshall tried to visit the detainees, he found appalling
conditions worse than that experienced by those who were detained in Malaysia
and worse than anything ever experienced under the colonial government [25]. How
can we associate such cruel methods with our founding fathers?

The PAP also cracked down on unions for union fund misuse when the funds were
used to support families of striking workers and detained union leaders but
weren’t properly documented due to poor accounting practices then. One example
is Jamit Singh who was charged with misappropriating funds in 1962, jailed and
then banished to Malaya. Jamit protested by saying that helping people is a
matter of heart, not keeping records. Deputy public prosecutor, Francis Seow
subsequently admitted that the trial was intended to reduce Singh’s capacity for
‘political mischief’ [26]. Again, how can we associate such cruel methods with
our founding fathers?

Worst of all are the experiences of Chia Thye Poh and Lim Hock Siew who were
locked away / confined for 32 and 18 years respectively. To say that Dr Toh’s
service to the nation is at great sacrifice to his career and prospects is to
trivialise the sacrifices of those whose best years were taken away from them
without ever being tried or convicted.

In conclusion, there is hardly any good reason to regard the PAP ‘old guards’
as our founding fathers. They inherited rather than fought for our independence
and were followers too albeit of Dr Winsemius’ plans. Above all, they were
guilty of perpetuating injustices unbefitting of founding fathers.

Thank you

.

Ng Kok Lim

[1] Derek Heng, Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, Singapore in Global History,
Page 220
[2] Karl Hack, Defence and decolonisation in Southeast Asia, page
224
[3] Michael Fernandez and Loh Kah Seng, Paths not taken – political
pluralism in post-war Singapore, Chapter 11
[4] Chris J Dixon, South East
Asia in the world economy, Page 144
[5] Michael Fernandez and Loh Kah Seng,
Paths not taken – political pluralism in post-war Singapore, Chapter 11
At
that time, workers worked 12 to 14 hours a day with only two days leave during
Chinese New Year. Of the 1955 strikes, half were sympathy strikes while
subsequent ones were mostly economic in nature. The strikes brought about an
increase in pay, sick pay and two weeks’ annual leave for workers. Various
ordnances between 1955 and 1957 gave workers eight-hour work day and Sunday off,
something we take for granted today. The unions sought to address genuine
workers’ grievances and to restore their rights and dignity.
[6]
http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1202_2006-07-28.html
The National Service
ruling angered Chinese Middle School students because they were compelled to
defend the same British order that had discriminated against them and in which
they saw no future. Largely, the Chinese who felt that they were not treated as
equals by the British did not feel obliged to serve the colonial
government.
[7] Carl A. Trocki, Paths not taken – political pluralism in
post-war Singapore, Page 127
[8] C C Chin, Paths not taken – political
pluralism in post-war Singapore, Chapter 3
[9] Robin Ramcharan, Forging a
Singaporean statehood, 1965-1995: the contribution of Japan, Page 111
[10]
Edwin Lee, Singapore: the unexpected nation, Page 296
[11] Carl A. Trocki,
Singapore: wealth, power and the culture of control, Page 166
[12] Peter
Wilson / Gavin Peebles, Economic growth and development in Singapore: past and
future, Page 26
[13] Philip Nalliah Pillai, State enterprise in Singapore:
legal importation and development, Page 29
[14] W. G. Huff, The Economic
Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century, Page
36
[15] R. P. Le Blanc, Singapore. the Socio-Economic Development of a
City-State: 1960-1980, Page 14
[16] R. P. Le Blanc, Singapore. the
Socio-Economic Development of a City-State: 1960-1980, Page 22
[17] Diane K.
Mauzy / Robert Stephen Milne, Singapore politics under the People’s Action
Party, Page 66
[18] Ngiam Tong Dow / Simon Tay, A Mandarin and the making of
public policy: reflections, Page 66
[19] Philip Nalliah Pillai, State
enterprise in Singapore: legal importation and development, Page 30
[20]
Danny M Leipziger, Lessons from East Asia, Page 240
[21] Jacques Charmes,
In-service training: five Asian experiences, Bernard Salomé, Page 21
[22]
Robert Fitzgerald, The Competitive advantages of Far Eastern business, Page
55
[23] Eddie C. Y. Kuo / Chee Meng Loh / K. S. Raman, Information technology
and Singapore society, Page 87
[24] Michael Fernandez and Loh Kah Seng, Paths
not taken – political pluralism in post-war Singapore, Page 218
[25] Carl A.
Trocki, Paths not taken – political pluralism in post-war Singapore, Page
121
[26] Michael Fernandez and Loh Kah Seng, Paths not taken – political
pluralism in post-war Singapore, Page 218-219