I'm not sure which was the harder job last week – being the Prime Minister selling the carbon tax, or the Chairman of News Corporation defending the empire.

Perhaps the other hard job at present is trying to make sense and comment on all that has been announced and discussed in the last week on the carbon price.

After wading through the Clean Energy Future website to digest all of the details, there are perhaps some insights on page 131 of the Government's proposed program document – the "fiscal tables" in Appendix C.

Looking at the first full year of the program, 2013-14, it will raise somewhere in the order of $9.1 billion from permit sales, fuel tax credit reductions and other carbon price related revenues.

The program will also see some $9.4 billion spent in compensation and management costs, including household assistance, job support, carbon permit loans and governance – a small, net deficit to the government of around $300 million.

There are also the two primary direct action programs, being the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) and Land/Biodiversity measures that are an additional budget spend of just under $1 billion per annum.

Further, I understand there will be additional federal funds provided to close down and replace Hazelwood and Playford power stations to directly reduce those emissions, which may run into several billion dollars to complete, but let's say an average cost of $1 billion per year over the next five years.

So, roughly speaking, the carbon tax revenue and compensation to offset the effects of the tax are therefore effectively "revenue neutral" while the direct action programs result in a net deficit of around $2 billion a year.

Finally, there is the formation of the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) – a combining of existing programs and funding. While it is headlined as a further $3.6 billion spend on clean energy, it is really a re-announcement of previous programs and funding and is already accounted for in the budget projections.

It could be concluded from this analysis that the carbon tax revenue is washed out by the compensation programs while the tangible outcomes – CEFC, land/biodiversity and plant closures – will be required to be funded from budget as a net new cost.

The bet here, then, is that the carbon price actually changes individual and industry behaviours to materially reduce emissions in addition to the direct action programs that have been announced. This can be achieved, but there are a number of risks, perceived or real, to be overcome.

Risks related to the carbon price component of program that I have heard commentary on include:

Emitters with captive customers will simply pass on the cost of the tax to their customers, who in turn will pass these costs on along the supply chain. Further, most, if not all, of these emitters cannot vary the operation of their plants for minor changes in demand and will continue to emit at the same levels. There is a risk that these outcomes will not reduce actual emissions.

The carbon price quantum is insufficient to motivate a shift from coal to gas, rendering no change in the base-load generation portfolio. Coal would therefore retain its capacity share and there would be no reduction in emissions.

Consumers rely on the compensation programs to reimburse them for any increased costs and, as a result, do not modify demand behaviours to reduce emissions.

The compensation to households is insufficient compared to the increase in costs, placing further pressures on already strained "family budgets." This may force some reduction in demand, but will have other consequences if families cannot reduce demand any further.

Because of the way wholesale power generators are dispatched, a variable reduction in demand will reduce the power being generated from zero to low emitting variable generators, such as wind farms and gas fired plants. Reduction in demand is unlikely to reduce the use of large emitting coal fired plants, which provide the 24x7 "base-load" power.

While households may receive compensation, many businesses will not, and the increase in costs to businesses could affect their performance and viability if they are unable to reduce demand.

The administrative burden and compliance costs of the new tax become a further impost on business performance and productivity.

While the expected increase in costs of goods and services from the tax may be neutralised in the domestic market by virtue of the compensation package, our international competitiveness for both exports and inward investment may be harmed. This outcome may cause wider damage to our longer-term economy.

While there may be an increase in wholesale power prices, they are insufficient to provide sufficient revenues for clean/renewable power plants and the deployment of clean and renewable energy power generation facilities will not occur at the required levels or rate to meet emission reduction and portfolio targets.

I am sure the government is well aware of the above risks that are being discussed across the community and will no doubt address them in due course, but it is worth noting that the above matters relate to the carbon tax and compensation program components alone, and not to the direct action programs proposed. It may well be that the sorts of risks listed above are the primary root cause of angst and concern in the community with the overall announced program.

The tangible programs in what has been announced – including direct action on heavy emitters and providing finance to build out the renewable energy generation portfolio – do seem to have much broader community support and provide the opportunity to make a positive, lasting difference on our lives and future. From my own polling on these topics, the community would readily get behind the action-oriented programs if they were directly linked to getting projects executed to reduce emissions.

The only way to reduce emissions from plants like Hazelwood is to close some or all of it down. But, no one is going to build a new power station to replace Hazelwood unless it is absolutely confirmed that the plant will close. And, we cannot let Hazelwood close until we have a locked in project to build the replacement capacity. Chicken and egg. That is why the direct programs announced by the Government are the most crucial ones to deploy, whether it is to replace old, high emitting coal plants or build new renewable energy capacity.

And, these programs are not really funded by the carbon tax – these costs are incremental to the budget after the tax/compensation "wash out."

While there are many very important details to work through to ensure these action programs are well governed and executed, they are programs that could start today and be funded independently of the carbon tax.

So, regardless of whatever happens politically to the carbon tax and future trading schemes, it would be productive to lock in the tangible components of the Clean Energy Future program and move these forward sooner rather than later. With some suggested tweaks, these are:

Launch the Clean Energy Finance Corporation with an experienced, independent board and seasoned management. Ensure that its focus is on facilitating the deployment of large scale power generation plants – mirroring successful, analogous programs overseas, such as in the US, where a significant portfolio of projects are now being developed as a result of this type of intervention. Avoid fragmenting the funds into small increments that cannot yield the scale of projects we now require.

Continue with existing related programs, being ARENA, the Renewable Energy Target and the Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Institute, but consider consolidating or tight coordination with the CEFC to streamline programs and decision-making. If combined into a single body, it would be charged with developing and implementing the nation’s clean energy portfolio to achieve our 2020 targets and beyond.

Provide funding support to Victoria and South Australia to enable an orderly shutdown and replacement of Hazelwood and Playford. This is an enormously complex task and best handled by the state governments who will need to manage a wide range of stakeholder interests and ensure that if any supply is removed, it is replaced with new capacity ahead of time.

Complete, issue and maintain the national "Energy White Paper," which should provide the ongoing blueprint for our long-term, secure electricity supply portfolio.

Implement the land and biodiversity measures with appropriate external expertise and governance.

There is much to do in a short period of time. It is time to get moving with the direct action programs put forward by our government. Focusing our limited resources on implementing a very effective Clean Energy Finance Corporation and tackling the tricky, but doable, task of replacing our worst emitting power stations is a big step forward in the right direction.

Further, these actions, I sense, are ones that the community will get right behind. The ongoing noise and angst to the carbon tax, however, may overcome these very good initiatives, and put at risk achieving tangible outcomes to underscore our future.

Andrew Dyer has worked extensively in the energy and utilities industries in Europe, the US, Asia and Australia. He is now a Company Director.