JUSTICE
KITTREDGE: We granted Holman’s petition to review an order denying
post-conviction relief (PCR) and now reverse, finding trial counsel deficient
for failing to object to the introduction of wholly irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence. Accordingly, we grant PCR relief in the form of a new trial.

Petitioner
was charged with multiple offenses arising from a shooting incident at Voorhees College in Bamberg County, South Carolina, on the evening of January 21, 2000, which
spilled over into the early morning hours of the following day. Petitioner was
alleged to be the shooter. Because Petitioner was seventeen at the time, he
was further charged with possession of a pistol under the age of twenty-one. A
week following the January 21st shooting incident, a search of Petitioner’s
residence yielded a pistol. The handgun seized from Petitioner’s residence was
in no manner connected to the shooting incident at Voorhees College. Moreover, Petitioner was not charged with underage possession of the pistol seized
from his residence. We are troubled by the State’s effort to admit the
unrelated firearm in evidence. More troubling is Petitioner’s trial counsel’s
failure to object to the admission of the unrelated pistol.

We
hold that the failure to object to this clearly inadmissible evidence was
ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject the suggestion that the failure
to object to the unrelated pistol can be justified as a valid trial strategy. Whitehead
v. State, 308 S.C. 119, 122, 417 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992) (“Courts must be wary
of second-guessing counsel’s trial tactics; and where counsel articulates a
valid reason for employing certain strategy, such conduct will not be deemed
ineffective assistance of counsel.”). Substantial, and easily avoidable,
prejudice resulted from Petitioner’s failure to challenge the admission of the
firearm unconnected to the charged offenses. State v. McConnell, 290
S.C. 278, 280, 350 S.E.2d 179, 180 (1986) (holding the admission of bullets and
a pistol unconnected to the crime was erroneous and prejudicial).

The
admission of this irrelevant and prejudicial evidence undermines confidence in
the outcome of the trial. Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331, 642 S.E.2d
590, 596 (2007) (“[The prejudice prong is satisfied when] there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.”) (internal citations
omitted); Von Dohlen v. State, 360 S.C. 598, 603, 602 S.E.2d 738, 740-41
(2004) (“In order to prove counsel was ineffective, the applicant must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome of the trial.”). As both the deficient performance and prejudice
prongs are satisfied, we hold trial counsel was ineffective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Therefore, we reverse the denial of PCR and
grant the requested relief of a new trial.