Measuring mayhem: The challenge of assessing violence and insecurity in Mexico

As a presidential candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) claimed he would bring a new strategy to the country’s struggle with organized crime — one that de-emphasized the targeting of drug kingpins and focused on reducing homicides, extortion cases and kidnappings.

One year into the presidency, Peña Nieto’s administration claims that the homicide rate has dropped by 18 percent; on the other hand, government stats point to a 35 percent increase in kidnappings. After the arrest of two major Zeta and Gulf Cartel leaders earlier this year, Peña Nieto’s strategy shift appears to be more rhetorical than real. Many scholars, analysts and civil society leaders have taken issue with the claim that drug-related violence has declined. Recognizing the importance of understanding drug-related violence in Mexico, Baker Institute Viewpoints invited five scholars to respond to the question, “Has drug violence in Mexico declined?”

Brutal murders, beheadings, and assaults on police and the media punctuate news reports from Mexico on a near daily basis — that is, the reports that make it to the U.S. While the common perception is that insecurity is high, official accounts downplay the extent and impact of the violence. Indeed, many media outlets still quote a death toll of 60,000 to 70,000 since the drug war began in 2006. This is both inaccurate and disingenuous. Researcher Molly Molloy suggests that a more realistic estimate is more than 130,000 deaths. As a result, she calls the murder victims who have disappeared from the official government tallies the “Mexican Undead.” In 2012, the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) reported that the Mexican murder rate tripled during Calderón’s term. The government’s response was to stop reporting drug violence statistics.

When Peña Nieto came to power the silence expanded to all things drug-related — except, of course, spectacular government successes. While violence under the Peña Nieto administration is reportedly down, the public perception is that insecurity is on the rise. The Mexican drug war’s death toll is now out of sight, but not necessarily out of mind. In August 2013, a poll by El Universal found that nearly half (49 percent) of Mexicans think that drug violence is worse than when Peña Nieto first took office. What is known is that 72.5 percent of reported murders occurred in just 10 Mexican states: Guerrero, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Jalisco, Tamaulipas, Estado Mexico, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Michoacán and Veracruz. While there is no reliable count of the drug war’s death toll, violence — like real estate — is local.

Shifting hotspots

Cartel violence ebbs and flows as cartels gain control of various plazas and transshipment routes. Furthermore, the hotspots shift. In 2012, murder rates started to drop in some areas, while rising in others. According to INEGI, Mexico’s statistical agency, Chihuahua and Guerrero were tied in 2012 for the highest murder rate with 77 murders per 100,000 residents. For Chihuahua this meant a downward trend from 182 per 100,000 in 2010; for Guerrero it represented a surge — up from 45 per 100,000 in 2010. Sinaloa and Durango followed with 48 murders per 100,000 in 2012, while Tamaulipas was close behind with 46 per 100,000. In July 2013, murders in Tamaulipas (the battleground between the Zetas and Gulf Cartel) were up 90 percent from the year prior. The hotspots are bloodiest when the contest for control rages. Calmer areas can be explained as firmly under the control of one cartel.

Drug violence in Mexico’s cities

For a time, Ciudad Juárez was the bloodiest city in the world — then the violence dropped. Tijuana was similarly under the gun for a time, and then it stabilized. Both cities have seen sporadic spikes in violence as dynamics shift. Currently, Tijuana is experiencing an increase in violence. The Tijuana weekly reports that murders are up 25 percent in the battle to control street-level drug sales. As part of that dynamic, police have been warned not to interfere with cartel business. In Juárez, attacks against police continue, as do sporadic massacres. The most violent Mexican cities since the start of the Peña Nieto administration are Acapulco, Torreón, Gómez Palacio, Culiacán, Monterey, Ciudad Juárez, Ciudad Victoria, Tijuana, Chihuahua and Zapopan.

While violence ebbs and flows due to the state of conflict between the cartels, it is also influenced by state security surges and the co-option of municipal officials. Recent reports show that 40 percent of Mexico’s mayors are threatened by cartels. Gangsters extort “taxes” from the mayors in exchange for safety. The mayors who refuse are likely to be killed. During the past six years, 45 mayors have been assassinated and 30 kidnapped. The areas viewed as the most dangerous for municipal officials were Michoacán, Guerrero, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas and Durango. Police are also at risk. In Michoacán, for example, 15 high-ranking police officials have been killed since 2010.

Since violence is difficult to measure due to underreporting, media silence, and efforts by political actors to shape public perception, it is important to look at other indicators of insecurity. Kidnappings are one measure; they are high and also underreported. In 2012, 105,628 kidnappings were counted, but only 1,317 were reported to police. Of 4,007 forced disappearances during the same time period, only 718 were reported to police.

Impunity is perhaps the best indicator of both security and government solvency (that is, capacity and legitimacy). Impunity also provides insight into corruption. Mexico’s impunity rates for murder are dismal. On average they are estimated at about 80 percent, but in contested or dominated areas such as Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero and Sinaloa, they average 90 percent.

Another important measure of insecurity is the number of attacks on journalists. From January to September 2013, Artículo 19 reports that there were 225 attacks against journalists, making this one of the most violent years for the Mexican press since the start of the drug war. By comparison, there were 207 in 2012, and 172 the year prior.

Despite the government’s efforts, the violence continues to spread. In 2006, Calderón launched an offensive to contain La Familia Michoacana (LFM). By late 2008, LFM’s reach had extended to nearly 60 percent of Michoacán and beyond. In May 2013, Mexican troops once again returned to the contested state to pacify the Knights Templar, an LFM splinter group.

Essentially, we are trying to measure the outcome of multiple, interlocking “criminal insurgencies.” And as in the case of traditional insurgency, body counts — either in terms of victims or criminals arrested — don’t tell the whole story. The drug war has yet to wane. Success will not be measured in numbers, but in sustained stability and a functioning state where the corruption that fuels impunity is contained. The road toward that end is one on which Mexico is still progressing.

Guest author John P. Sullivan is a lieutenant in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. He is also a senior fellow at the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute at Louisiana State University and a senior fellow at Small Wars Journal — El Centro. His current research focuses on the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and other countries. Baker Institute drug policy postdoctoral fellow Nathan Jones congratulates John Sullivan on the successful defense of his doctoral thesis with Spain’s Universitat Oberta de Catalunya.