A
recently uncovered energy-policy report from April 2001
suggests that the Bush administration has been plotting
action against Iraq since well before 9/11and that
the motivation is oil

In
April 2001, we could pick up a newspaper and read about
race riots in Cincinnati, preparations for the controversial
World Economic Forum in Quebec City, or the diplomatic fallout
from the collision of U.S. and Chinese military planes over
the South China Sea. For lighter fare, there was the 20th
anniversary of E.T., the divorce of Tom Cruise and
Nicole Kidman, and the arrest of Sean “Puffy” Combs on a
weapons charge in Florida. The New York Yankees, meanwhile,
were preparing for the new season and a chance at their
fourth consecutive World Series title.

Spring
was in the air, and Americans could go about their business
blissfully unaware that five months later, on Sept. 11,
2001, the world as we knew it would change forever.

Americans also were blissfully unaware that deep within
the closed-door world of the Washington power elite, a blueprint
was being drawn up for a confrontation with Iraq—one that
eventually would be sold to the American public as a necessary
preemptive strike in the 9/11-inspired war on terrorism.

JAMES
BAKER

An
April 2001 blue-ribbon study by the Council for Foreign
Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public
Policy at Rice University, titled Strategic Energy Policy
Challenges for the 21st Century, has recently surfaced,
and it raises serious questions about President George W.
Bush’s explanation for his showdown with Iraq. The report,
commissioned by former Secretary of State James Baker and
submitted to Vice President Dick Cheney, warns of potentially
serious energy shortages within five years unless corrective
action is taken. With chilling disregard for international
law, it advises, among other things, that the United States
consider military intervention in Iraq to maintain the stability
of Persian Gulf oil supplies. Critics are calling this report,
which both the British and Australian press covered last
October but which has gone unnoticed in the mainstream American
media, the hidden blueprint to George W. Bush’s Iraq policy.
Moreover, the administration’s actions toward Iraq have
mirrored many of the report’s recommendations.

The sponsors and authors of the document are a who’s who
of hawks and oilmen: the Washington-based Council on Foreign
Relations includes Cheney, the former CEO of the oilfield
supply firm Halliburton; Baker, whose family has close ties
to Pennzoil; and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
also an adviser since 2001 to the China Offshore Oil Company.
Edward P. Djerejian, the director of Baker Institute since
1994, has been ambassador to both Israel and Syria, and
is currently a director at Occidental Petroleum. Among the
members of the task force who wrote the report are the chairmen
of Texaco, Shell Oil and Enron. George W. Bush, by the way,
was the founder and CEO of the Bush Exploration Oil and
Natural Gas Company from 1975 to 1986.

The 45-page paper, which is online at www.rice.edu/projects/baker/Pubs/work
ingpapers/cfrbipp_energy/energytf.htm, strives to take a
nonpartisan view of the causes of the looming crisis. It
criticizes what it calls the government’s failure over several
successive administrations to develop a comprehensive energy
policy, citing the lack of storage facilities for oil reserves,
increased demand for light trucks (pickups, sport utility
vehicles and minivans), failures to raise fuel efficiency
standards for motor vehicles—“an attainable option”—and
develop solar and wind power sources as factors.

Because of this shortsighted approach, the report says,
“the United States remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma.”
It states that the central problem for the administration
is that “the American people continue to demand plentiful
and cheap energy without sacrifice or inconvenience.” And
with “the energy sector in critical condition, a crisis
could erupt at any time [that] could have potentially enormous
impact on the U.S. . . . and would affect U.S. national
security and foreign policy in dramatic ways.”

The report goes on to say that “the consequences of not
having an energy policy that can satisfy our energy requirements
on a sustainable basis have revealed themselves in California,”
and warns that “there could be more Californias in America’s
future.” It calls on President Bush to tell “these agonizing
truths to the American people.”

Of course, one truth the report ignores is that many of
its authors, as prominent members of the oil industry, have
profited handsomely from the very lack of a comprehensive
energy policy the report decries. The United States will
never be energy independent, and it’s too reliant on other
countries for its oil and natural gas needs, the report
contends. And even though the United States gets 75 percent
of its oil from outside the Middle East, the principal cause
of a future crisis, it claims, would be “Middle East tension.”

“Chances
are greater than at any point in the last two decades of
an oil supply disruption,” the report says. “Gulf allies
are finding their domestic and foreign policy interests
increasingly at odds with U.S. strategic considerations,
especially as Arab-Israeli tensions flare. . . . They have
become less inclined to lower oil prices. . . . A trend
towards anti-Americanism could affect regional leaders’
ability to co-operate with the U.S. in the energy area.
The resulting tight markets have increased U.S. vulnerability
to disruption and provided adversaries undue political influence
over the price of oil.’’

The Baker report calls for a “reassessment of the role of
energy in foreign policy,” with stable oil supplies repeatedly
mentioned as a “security imperative.”

SADDAM
HUSSEIN

After
presenting its bland version of how we’ve gotten into this
mess, the paper singles out Saddam Hussein as the principal
threat to stable Middle East oil supplies. What really addles
the oil barons is Iraq’s ability to exert leverage over
the petroleum markets. Moreover, if Saddam feels like holding
back oil, only the Saudis, and to a lesser extent the United
Arabs Emirates, have the spare production capacity to bail
us out. “Over the past year, Iraq has effectively become
a swing producer, turning its taps on and off when it has
felt such action was in its strategic interest to do so,”
the report says. “Saudi Arabia has proven willing to provide
replacement supplies to the market when Iraqi exports have
been reduced. This role has been extremely important in
avoiding greater market volatility and in countering Iraq’s
efforts to take advantage of the oil market’s structure.”

But the report’s authors also note that “there is domestic
pressure on the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) leaders to
reject cooperation to cool oil markets during times of a
shortfall in Iraqi oil production. These populations are
dissatisfied with the “no-fly zone” bombing and the sanctions
regime against Iraq, perceived U.S. bias in the Arab-Israeli
peace process, and lack of domestic economic pressures.”
(Aside from the dangers of energy shortages, there are purely
political reasons to keep petroleum supplies, and hence
the price of oil, stable: The last three times oil rose
above $30 a barrel, recessions followed. Getting reelected
to the presidency, as George H.W. Bush learned, can be tough
during hard economic times).

In recommending what to do about Saddam, the report turns
menacing as it discusses war. “Iraq remains a destabilizing
influence to U.S. allies in the Middle East, as well as
to regional and global order, and to the flow of oil to
international markets from the Middle East. Saddam Hussein
has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the
oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate
oil markets. This would display his personal power, enhance
his image as a ‘Pan Arab’ leader supporting the Palestinians
against Israel, and pressure others for a lifting of economic
sanctions against his regime. The United States should conduct
an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military,
energy, economic, and political/diplomatic assessments.
The United States should then develop an integrated strategy
with key allies in Europe and Asia, and with key countries
in the Middle East, to restate goals with respect to Iraqi
policy and to restore a cohesive coalition of key allies.”

And while the report mulls containment strategies, it expresses
the concern that if you try working with Saddam, you end
up feeding his power and making matters worse. In order
to alleviate an energy shortage, then, the United States
may need to resort to “military intervention.”

There are signs beyond the Baker report that the U.S. will
do whatever it takes to keep oil barrels rolling in. Writing
for the Sydney Morning Herald on Dec. 26, Ritt Goldstein
reports, “As far back as 1975, Henry Kissinger, then secretary
of state, said America was prepared to wage war over oil.
Separate plans advocating U.S. conquest of Saudi oilfields
were published in the ’70s. So it should come as little
surprise that in May last year (2001)—four months before
the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York—a battle
plan for Afghanistan was already being reviewed by the U.S.
Command that would carry it out after Sept. 11. Military
strategists were highlighting the energy wealth of the Caspian
Sea and Central Asia and its importance to America’s ‘security.’
The Indian media and Jane’s Intelligence Review reported
that the U.S. was fighting covert battles against the Taliban,
months before the ‘war on terrorism’ was declared.”

Goldstein adds, “Virtually concurrent with the report’s
release on April 10 last year, Tommy Franks, commander of
U.S. forces responsible for the Persian Gulf/South Asia
area, added his voice. An April 13 report on his congressional
testimony defined General Franks’ command’s key mission
as ‘access to [the region’s] energy resources.’ ”

Whose fault is it that our soldiers may have to die so that
the oil industry may live? According to the report’s authors,
no one in particular is responsible, least of all George
W. Bush. “That Americans face long-term situations such
as frequent sporadic shortages of energy, energy price volatility,
and higher energy prices is not the fault of President Bush,”
it says. “That Americans face long-term energy delivery
challenges and volatile energy prices is the failure of
both Democrats and Republicans to fashion a workable energy
policy. Energy policy was allowed to drift by both political
parties despite its centrality to America’s domestic economy
and to our nation’s security.”

There is good reason to doubt this, especially considering
the Republican cast of the report’s sponsors and authors.
Speaking on Feb. 28 before the Commonwealth Club, a California-based
public policy forum, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., senior attorney
for the Natural Resources Defense Council, blasted the Bush
administration’s handling of the energy problem. “The Bush-Cheney
energy plan is a $34 billion subsidy to the oil industry,
the nuke industry and the coal industry,” Kennedy charges.
“There is language in the plan that expresses a strong love
and favor for conservation, and there are 11 conservation
and renewable programs, but none of them are funded. There’s
no money in the budget or the bill; it’s all going to big
oil, big coal and big nuke, which don’t need the money.
These are industries that gave $60 million to Republican
congressional candidates during the last cycle—more than
any other industry—and Bush is the largest beneficiary.
They’re getting $34 billion in return, and it’s a disastrous
policy for our country.

“The
plan says we should study Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(C.A.F.E.) standards. We don’t need to; we know they work.
If we raise Corporate Average Fuel Economy by one mile per
gallon, we get more oil than there is in two Arctic National
Wildlife Refuges. If we raise oil efficiency by 2.7 miles
per gallon in our cars, we eliminate 100 percent of Gulf
imports into this country.” The odds of that happening seem
remote—early last year, Congress, acting under pressure
from Detroit, defeated the latest proposal to raise fuel
efficiency standards.

Kennedy went on to detail the partisan origins of the predicament,
adding that “President Carter passed C.A.F.E. standards
in response to the second oil crisis in 1979. Those standards
were directed toward getting our country up from 20 to 40
miles per gallon by 1990. Within six years, we had raised
average fuel economy by seven and a half miles per gallon.
That efficiency caused an oil glut in this country, collapsing
the price of gasoline to the lowest levels in decades. Oil
companies went to the Reagan administration and persuaded
them to roll back C.A.F.E. standards.

“The
Gingrich Congress subsequently made it illegal for the government
to pass them. In 1986 we doubled imports from the Persian
Gulf, and they’ve been going up ever since. If Reagan hadn’t
done that, we would not have imported one drop of Gulf oil
into this country after 1986. We almost certainly wouldn’t
have had a Gulf War, and if you can follow the logic from
there, we probably wouldn’t be involved in Afghanistan today
and the World Trade Center might still be standing.”

Most significant, the Baker report raises fundamental questions
about the Bush administration’s honesty with the public
in claiming that war with Saddam Hussein will be waged to
disarm him. Reached for comment by e-mail, Noam Chomsky,
professor of linguistics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
wrote that he had not read the report, but commented that
“there can be no serious doubt that regaining control of
the 2nd largest energy reserves in the Middle East, with
military bases right at the heart of the world’s major energy
resources, is a long-term goal of U.S. strategic planning.”

Before the report came out, containment of Iraq was the
accepted policy, even by hawks like Jim Baker himself. Speaking
in Washington, D.C., on May 4, 1998, Baker agreed with President
Clinton’s handling of the situation, saying, “I don’t buy
the argument that containment of Iraq is a failure. Look
what has happened to the nuclear weapons program there.
Look what’s happened to the chemical weapons program there.
Look what has happened to the missile delivery capability
program there—a lot. These sanctions have enabled the international
community to get a serious handle on the development of
all of these programs. So I don’t buy the argument that
containment is unsuccessful.”

By 2002, something had obviously changed. The United Nations
pulled its weapons inspectors out of Iraq in 1998, leaving
Saddam free to rearm, but that didn’t merit an immediate
military response in the government’s mind at the time.
The reasons behind George W. Bush’s Iraq policy clearly
lie somewhere else.

If you consider the Baker report as a possible basis for
Bush’s Iraq policy, it suggests a different scenario for
how events unfolded. Saddam had incurred the displeasure
of the U.S. government in 1999 when he got uppity and lowered
oil production. After Vice President Cheney received the
report in April 2001, the president’s inner circle began
plans for a regime change in Iraq. For political reasons,
a cover story would have to be created (you just can’t go
around overthrowing governments), so the Bush team settled
on a ploy of pressuring Iraq over its weapons of mass destruction
and scaring the public into thinking they might be used
against the United States.

After Sept. 11 and the war in Afghanistan, the White House
returned its attention to Iraq, and Bush ratcheted up the
rhetoric against Saddam. Hussein was a global menace who
was going to give chemical or biological weapons to Osama
bin Laden, the president contended. When the CIA irritated
the administration with its opinion that there was no Iraq-al
Qaeda connection, the Pentagon acted to bolster the charade
by announcing plans to set up its own internal intelligence
shop, which might come to different conclusions regarding
such a link. By then the national press was starting to
ask the question: Why all this talk of war now? Containment
had been working, and it was widely feared that removing
Saddam could create an unstable situation in Northern Iraq
and parts of Turkey if the region’s Kurds took advantage
of a power vacuum to demand their own autonomous state.
Veteran political commentators were baffled at the administration’s
new bellicosity.

Led by Cheney, the White House hawks pressed for an invasion
of Iraq. But after Russia and our European allies objected
to a U.S. military strike without U.N. approval, Secretary
of State Colin Powell prevailed over the go-it-alone camp
and successfully obtained U.N. Resolution 1441, which calls
for a full declaration and disarmament of its weapons of
mass destruction programs and authorizes the use of force
if Iraq was found in “material breach” of the resolution.
But administration made it clear that it reserved the right
to attack with or without a green light from the United
Nations. When U.N. inspectors detected discrepancies in
the Iraqi declaration of its weapons of mass destruction,
the administration had the pretext it needed to strike.

Which brings us to the present. With polls showing a majority
of Americans feeling that the United States does not have
good enough reason to go to war now, a vacationing President
Bush said last week at his ranch in Crawford, Texas, that
he hasn’t decided whether to take military action against
Iraq. But the administration may already be eyeing the prizes
of a coming war. On Dec. 29, Colin Powell said that the
United States was “positioning . . . military forces for
whatever might be required” in Iraq. In the event of a war,
he said, the country’s “oil fields are the property of the
Iraqi people. . . . If a coalition force goes into those
oil fields, we want to protect those fields and make sure
they’re used to benefit the people of Iraq, not destroyed
or damaged by the failing regime on the way out the door.”
If the administration has intended to invade Iraq all along,
this is exactly what you would be hearing.

In fairness, the charge that the president is systematically
deceiving the public over Iraq still can’t be proven. The
Baker report, though, provides a plausible explanation for
the White House’s actions, and the fact that it stayed buried
for so long is suspicious all by itself. The tragedy is
that if the government had maintained President Carter’s
fuel efficiency standards until now, there would no reason,
legitimate or not, to send young Americans and Iraqis into
a deadly confrontation. The country may have to pay a high
price in blood for failing to escape the quicksand of Persian
Gulf oil when we had the chance.