Civitas Humanahttps://civitashumana.wordpress.com
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”
Tue, 05 Feb 2019 14:20:35 +0000 en
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Bayesian Analysis of Craig Keener, “Otho: A Targeted Comparison”https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/09/22/bayesian-analysis-of-craig-keener-otho-a-targeted-comparison/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/09/22/bayesian-analysis-of-craig-keener-otho-a-targeted-comparison/#respondFri, 22 Sep 2017 18:26:13 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/?p=1842[Recently I wrote a critical review of Christian scholar Craig Keener’s new volume Biographies and Jesus: What Does It Mean for the Gospels to Be Biographies?, with emphasis on chapter 6–“Otho: A Targeted Comparison of Suetonius’ Biography and Tacitus’ History, with Implications for the Gospels’ Historical Reliability”–which is written by Keener himself. Ancient historian Richard Carrier sent me some further analysis, which makes both a deductive and inductive critique of Keener’s arguments. Carrier’s feedback can be found below. -MWF]

Applying Bayes’ Theorem to your article’s point:

Keener says we can be sure Suetonius et al. worked from sources, because they say they worked from sources. Then he says we can assume the same of the Gospels, because the Gospels have other similarities to Suetonius et al., except for that one.

This is a straightforward fallacy of false generalization. “All X’s did Y, and all Y’s entail doing Z, therefore all X’s did Z” does not lead by any valid logical inference to “The Gospels are an X,” precisely because the Gospels did not do Y (so the first premise in the argument fails to obtain). So any other similarities there may be are analogically irrelevant to whether the Gospels did Z. Only doing Y can entail Z. He would need to find examples of texts that we can be certain did Z, without doing Y (Y being “naming and discussing sources”). Without arguing in a circle.

So for the deductive logic.

But an apologist will insist it’s inductive. But then Bayes’ Theorem enters.

Keener’s argument that “we can be sure Suetonius et al. worked from sources” has this form:

The probability that they would say Y and not have done Z is low; therefore, given Y, the probability they did Z is high. But Keener has no evidence this relation holds for anything other than Y.

Where Y is in e, as are all other similarities between Suetonius et al. and the Gospels, then:

P(Z|e) = P(Z)P(e|Z) / [ P(Z)P(e|Z) + P(~Z)P(e|~Z) ]

Suppose we break the evidence into just Y, and then X for all the other parallels.

For just Y:

P(Z|Y) = P(Z)P(Y|Z) / [ P(Z)P(Y|Z) + P(~Z)P(Y|~Z) ]

Assume we’re neutral on the prior (we might not be, but that depends on other arguments and we are just analyzing this one), so that P(Z) = P(~Z), then:

P(Z|Y) = P(Y|Z) / [ P(Y|Z) + P(Y|~Z) ]

Which –> 1 as P(Y|~Z) –> 0.

That’s Keener’s argument.

But when he turns to the Gospels, he falsely treats X as if it were Y. But that doesn’t work. His argument from X is:

P(Z|X) = P(Z)P(X|Z) / [ P(Z)P(X|Z) + P(~Z)P(X|~Z) ]

And with a neutral prior that’s:

P(Z|X) = P(X|Z) / [ P(X|Z) + P(X|~Z) ]

Keener presents no evidence that that –> 1 as P(X|~Z) –> 0, nor any evidence that P(X|Z) is even high.

What instead he does is argue:

P(Z|Y&X) = P(Y&X|Z) / [ P(Y&X|Z) + P(Y&X|~Z) ]

Which gets him the Y result, then he uses the same argument for the Gospels, but “forgets” the Gospels don’t have Y. He is thus conflating Y with X. To argue X correlates with Z in the absence of Y requires actual evidence that that is ever the case. He presents none. Presenting examples that correlate Z with Y&X simply does not constitute evidence that Z correlates with Y. That’s the generic Bayesian analysis of the fallacy of false analogy in a nutshell.

Conversely, you point out that the generic similarities in X are actually known or credible properties even of fiction, so that in fact the evidence there is actually argues *against* any distinct correlation between X and Z (it may be at best 0.5, such that P(Y&X|Z) = P(Y&X|~Z)), so it’s even worse than Keener having no evidence that X correlates with Z; the evidence actually is against there being any such correlation, at least in any reliable sense. That’s the “at best” 0.5 correlation; but it’s possibly worse, if the absence of Y is telltale of fiction, another argument of yours. And that need not be a correlation of 1, it could be, say, 0.8, allowing 20% of examples of no-Y still being Z texts. Look what happens when you are even that generous (and still using a neutral prior as if no other considerations mattered, which we know isn’t the case), assuming no correlation exists between no-Z texts containing X:

P(Z|X) = P(X|Z) / [ P(X|Z) + P(X|~Z) ] = 0.2 / (0.2) + (0.5) = 0.29.

If no-Z texts typically contained X, it’s even worse. Only if no-Z texts rarely contain X would it get better; but that would require the very evidence Keener doesn’t present: that X correlates with Z.

Introducing Y also changes the result, of course. But that’s precisely what the Gospels don’t do. Likewise any other generic factor that might up the odds of Z; which would need to be demonstrated as doing so in other texts (and without circular argument).

-Richard Carrier

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/09/22/bayesian-analysis-of-craig-keener-otho-a-targeted-comparison/feed/0adversusapologeticaUnderstanding the Spirit vs. the Letter of Probabilityhttps://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/understanding-the-spirit-vs-the-letter-of-probability/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/understanding-the-spirit-vs-the-letter-of-probability/#commentsWed, 05 Jul 2017 05:09:55 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/?p=1586My apologies for there being so little activity on Civitas Humana for a long while now. I have been insanely busy and stressed lately (both professionally and personally), and I have only recently been able to catch up with blogging.

I’ll begin pumping some fresh blood into Civ by discussing Bayes’ theorem, the resurrection of Jesus, and why I think that, even with a non-zero prior (which is still very, very low) for the resurrection event, Paul’s letters and the Gospels are far too weak of consequent evidence to offset more probable (naturalistic or mundane) explanations for the same data.

Over a decade ago (March 2006) secular New Testament scholar Bart D. Ehrman debated Christian philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig about the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus (the transcript of the debate can be read here). Overall, the debate left me with the impression that Ehrman made a better case for naturalistic or non-paranormal explanations being more probable than a veridical resurrection event, with regards to the origin of the resurrection belief among Jesus’ disciples and the first generation of Christians. But there was one area where I think Craig scored a technical, though relatively minor point against Ehrman (as will be discussed below), and this was with regards to how Ehrman was defining a miracle event and conflating prior probability with posterior probability.

Lowder begins by listing two published statements by Ehrman, which were quoted by Craig during the debate (bolding is my own):

(1) “Because historians can only establish what probably happened, and a miracle of this nature is highly improbable, the historian cannot say it probably occurred.”
(The Historical Jesus, part 2, page 50)

(2) “Since historians can establish only what probably happened in the past, they cannot show that miracles happened, since this would involve a contradiction — that the most improbable event is the most probable.”
(The New Testament: A Historical Introduction, page 229)

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In his response to these statements of Ehrman, Craig critiques his line of reasoning by arguing that Ehrman is conflating prior probability with posterior probability. The odds that a given individual may resurrect from the dead could, indeed, be very, very low. But if there is very, very good evidence that such a resurrection event has occurred, it may offset the low prior, and even outweigh alternative explanations, to degree such that Pr (R/B & E) > 0.5 (perhaps even by a wide margin, e.g., +0.9).

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Here is what Craig states in his own words (bolding is my own):

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“In other words, in calculating the probability of Jesus’ resurrection, the only factor he [Ehrman] considers is the intrinsic probability of the resurrection alone [Pr(R/B)]. He just ignores all of the other factors. And that’s just mathematically fallacious. The probability of the resurrection could still be very high even though the Pr(R/B) alone is terribly low.”

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Lowder likewise offers his own interpretation of Ehrman’s two quotations, and here is what he states regarding the first:

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“I am inclined to interpret (1) as the following claim: (1′) Pr(R/B) is so low that it is impossible, even in theory, for there to be sufficient evidence to confer a high final epistemic probability on R, i.e., Pr(R/B & E) > 0.5.”

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I would argue that to describe a miracle as an event that cannot be probable, even in theory, one would need to assign its prior probability a value of zero. And this is the same conclusion that Lowder reaches, when he states (bolding is my own):

“The only way to reconcile (1′) with BT would be to assign Pr(R/B) a value of zero. If Pr(R/B) = 0, then it follows from BT that Pr(R/B&E;)=0. So, on the basis of (1) alone, as Craig has quoted Ehrman, I think it is premature to assume that Ehrman ‘just ignores all of the other factors.’ Maybe he does do that, but the quotation provided in (1) doesn’t show that. What I can say is that either Ehrman ignores all of the other factors or Ehrman assumes that historians must assign Pr(R/B) a value of zero. If the latter, then I think that is false.”

With regards to Ehrman’s second quotation, Lowder briefly states:

“Turning to (2), I don’t have much to say, other than I think Craig is 100% correct when he says that Ehrman ‘Confuses Pr (R/B & E) with Pr (R/B).’”

My Thoughts on Ehrman’s Quotes

At the end of this essay, I will make some suggestions for improving Ehrman’s arguments (which in spirit I think are correct, even if they may be formally invalid at parts). That said, I agree with Lowder’s conclusions on both accounts, for at least three reasons:

The first is that, inductively speaking, virtually no event in the empirical world has a prior value of zero, beyond logical contradictions. There is even a slight prior probability, however small, that the sun may not rise tomorrow, or that fire may suddenly cease to burn and be safe to put your hand in, or that we are all living in a matrix designed by extraterrestrials. I would assign all of these types of events very, very low priors, but none are impossible, in theory. As stated, the only things I that would argue are theoretically impossible are logical contradictions. There cannot be things like square circles, pink gold, or one plus one equaling three.

2) Miracles Need Not Be “The Most Improbable Event,” Even Intrinsically

The second reason I disagree with Ehrman deals with his definition of miracles in the latter quotation — namely, that a “miracle” is “the most improbable event.” This is because one could imagine a number of possible worlds in which miracles happened quite frequently (or at least not on an unprecedented basis). We could live in a possible world such as described in the Book of Exodus, in which the Red Sea suddenly parted to allow a group of people to pass through, food rained down from the sky, rivers spontaneously turned into blood, and darkness covered the earth for a period of multiple days (without any solar explanation). If these events further happened within some sort of religious context — such as a prophet predicting their occurrence, or their development favoring a specific religious group of people — I think we could further extrapolate that they were miracles that were happening as part of some sort of purposeful design, perhaps as even pointing to the truth of one exclusive religious faith.

“An event (ultimately) caused by God that cannot be accounted for by the natural powers of natural substances alone. Conceived of this way, miracles don’t violate the laws of nature but rather involve the occurrence of events which cannot be explained by the powers of nature alone. When dead bodies come back to life it is a miracle because the molecules that make up the corpse lack the powers necessary to generate life.”

Usefully, this definition even discusses dead bodies miraculously returning to life, which pertains to the present discussion. I would add, however, that I think other supernatural agencies (or even teleologies), acting from outside of ordinary physical causation, could likewise cause miracles. One could certainly imagine a plurality of gods, or angels, or demons performing miracles. Furthermore, agents who are located within the physical world, such as a miracle worker (e.g., Jesus), could also hypothetically perform miracles, even if their miraculous effects depart from ordinary patterns of physical cause and effect. We’ll return to this definition later on as I offer input for how to strengthen some of Ehrman’s arguments against miracles.

3) Events with the Lowest Prior Can Still Have the Highest Posterior

But to return to both Craig’s and Lowder’s critiques of Ehrman’s arguments from probability, my third point is that I agree Ehrman appears to be conflating prior probability with posterior probability. This leap seems to occur when Ehrman argues that historians “cannot show that miracles [have] happened” since it would involve “the most improbable event” being “the most probable.” Now, since in the quotes provided Ehrman does not speak in terms of priors or posteriors, it’s a little difficult to ascertain which kind of probability he is referring to, so he may not be making this leap.

But I will say that, even if a miracle is the most intrinsically improbable event out of a set of explanations (prior probability), there may be enough evidence in favor of its occurrence (consequent probability), to outweigh more intrinsically probable alternative explanations (posterior probability).

The Most Improbable Prior Becoming the Most Probable Posterior

Consider the following example: Say that one day I am walking on an abandoned beach somewhere in California. The sand is largely undisturbed and smooth. Then, somewhere along my journey, I come across hoofprints that resemble those of a horse. I spot no animal in the near vicinity that may have caused the hoofprints. As such, I am left to probability when interpreting what caused the evidence of the hoofprints. Was it 1) a horse?, 2) a zebra?, or 3) a unicorn? Out of these three explanations I would certainly argue that the unicorn is intrinsically the “the most improbable event,” followed by the zebra, then the horse, so that:

Unicorn: Pr (H3/B) < Zebra: Pr (H2/B) < Horse: Pr (H1/B)

But now let’s say that I return home and turn on the news, and to my surprise, learn that a creature resembling a unicorn had been taken into captivity, on that very same beach. Zoologists had likewise done DNA tests on the animal and discovered that they did not match any known Equidae. Likewise, X-rays had revealed that the distinctive horn on its head was an authentic part of its skeleton, and not a fake. Eventually, a public showing of the creature was made available, and I saw it for myself. At the same time, there was no report or evidence of horses or zebras in the same area.

I may, after all of this, even still suspect the whole thing to be an elaborate hoax. I may still suspect that the hoofprints, which I had seen, to have been caused by an unknown horse in the same area. But evidence of this kind would nevertheless drastically increase the probability of Pr (H3/B & E), perhaps to the extent that it outweighed Pr (H1/B & E) + Pr (H2/B & E). My point is that even the most intrinsically improbable explanation, out of a set of explanations, can still be the most probable posterior explanation, when factoring in consequent probability and weighing it against alternative explanations of the same data.

The Analogy of Winning the Lottery

The example of the unicorn may be a tad extreme (though I still think it’s perfectly suitable for something as extreme as a resurrection event), but there are also more mundane examples in which the lowest prior explanation still turns out to be the highest posterior. Winning the lottery is often used as an example to illustrate this kind of scenario.

Suppose that I purchased a ticket in a 1/1,000,000 odds lottery from a state vendor. The lottery only has two options:

H1 = Winner

H2 = Loser

The prior probability that I will win the lottery is vastly lower than the prior probability that I will lose, so that:

Winner: Pr (H1/B) < Loser: Pr (H2/B)

Suppose that when the winning numbers are announced, however, the numbers on my ticket match them, and I win the lottery. The ticket further contains all of the marks and signs of a valid lottery ticket. I return to the vendor to collect my winnings. The vendor carefully inspects the ticket and finds no signs of tampering or forgery. We have all of the evidence we would expect if I had genuinely won the lottery, and none of the evidence we would expect if I lost the lottery:

Winner: Pr (E/H1 & B) > Loser: Pr (E/H2 & B)

The prior probability that I would win is 1/1,000,000, and the prior probability that I would lose is 999,999/1,000,000. But let’s say that the consequent probability that I have a genuine lottery ticket is 999,999,999/1,000,000,000, versus the consequent probability that I have managed to perfectly forge a winning ticket and cheat the system is 1/1,000,000,000. Our Bayes’ formula for the probability of me genuinely winning the would be:

In this example, despite a very low prior probability for winning the lottery, the expected evidence is so strong, and the alternative hypothesis of the same data is so weak, as to yield a posterior probability of 99.9% that I am a genuine winner. Accordingly, even though a lottery win was originally the most intrinsically improbable event, a posterior consideration of the evidence was still able to overturn this low prior and allow for this event to become the most probable outcome.

Now, I have used the analogy of a lottery win to show how intrinsically improbable events can still become the most probable interpretation of a set of data, even in the mundane world. But in truth, it is an absolutely terrible analogy for the resurrection of Jesus, despite Craig’s attempt to appeal to it in some of his other debates. The reason why is because a lottery win is only an unlikely particular proposition, whereas a resurrection from the dead is an unlikely general proposition.

Lottery wins are not unprecedented events, and are recorded to happen in the world all the time. In fact, if ten million people entered a 1/1,000,000 lottery, and then nobody won, I would be rather surprised. This is nothing like a person returning to life after three days of brain death (especially in the manner depicted in the Gospels, as will be discussed below). Such an event would have no precedent whatsoever documented by medicine, forensic science, or parapsychology. To propose that such an event has occurred, therefore, relies on unprecedented general assumptions about the world, as opposed to a particular case of an improbable lottery win. As such, the resurrection of Jesus is far more similar to the example of the unicorn above, which would likewise be an unprecedented general proposition, than it is to the example of an unlikely lottery win, which would still have a documented reference class of occurrences in the world.

With this appreciation for the unprecedented nature of Jesus’ resurrection, and how it makes general and not just particular claims about the world, we can now look towards some of the considerations for how to calculate its prior probability.

The Prior Probability of a Miraculous Resuscitation or Resurrection

To begin with, I will dispel with any notion that assigning a low prior probability to miraculous resurrection from the dead has to do with “presuppositions against miracles” or “biases of worldview.” That billions upon billions of people die and do not resurrect after three days of brain death is empirically observed. In fact, this would be true, even in a possible world in which God exists. Bayesian expert Robert Cavin (slide 108) shows how this can be demonstrated through little more than a simple statistical syllogism, such as:

99.999…999% of the dead are not supernaturally interfered with by God, and, thus, not raised by Him.

Jesus was dead.

Therefore, it is 99.999…999% probable that Jesus was not supernaturally interfered with by God, and, thus, not raised by Him.

As this syllogism shows, the prior probability for the resurrection of Jesus must be, at the very least, extremely low. And really, we aren’t out of the woods yet, because this same syllogism could be applied first to a miraculous resuscitation from the dead. Resuscitation only involves the more common process of a dead person returning to ordinary life (only to later die again). If Jesus had merely resuscitated from the dead, then such a process would entail that he had died at around age 30, returned to life, and then died again at around age 70 (allowing for a late lifespan in antiquity). Such an event could still be deemed “miraculous,” if it had happened on the third day after brain death (a medically unattested event), but it would still fall short of the teachings of orthodox Christian theology.

Orthodox Christian theology teaches that Jesus did not merely resuscitate from death, but that resurrected to immortal life. As Craig (Knowing the Truth about the Resurrection, pg. 15) explains about the nature of Jesus’ resurrection:

“Resurrection is not resuscitation. The mere restoration of life to a corpse is not a resurrection. A person who has resuscitated returns only to this earthly life and will die again.”

Instead, Craig (pg. 127) explains the actual transformation that is entailed by the Christian claim that Jesus resurrected from the dead:

“Jesus rose to eternal life in a radically transformed body that can be described as immortal, glorious, powerful, and supernatural. In this new mode of existence, he was not bound by the physical limitations of the universe, but possessed superhuman powers.”

The prior probability of this kind of event must, indeed, be even lower than Cavin’s statistical syllogism above. This is due to the fact that we are now not just discussing bodies that return to life after a period of death which exceeds the limits of resuscitation documented by medicine. We are now discussing further additional phenomena like “transformed bodies” that can exceed “the physical limitations of the universe” and possess “superhuman powers.” Such a body would be an unprecedented medical phenomena, even if it hadn’t previously returned to life on the third day after brain death.

If billions upon billions of people do not return to life on the third day after brain death (a miraculous resuscitation), and billions upon billions of people do not possess bodies with superhuman abilities exceeding physical limitations (transformed bodies), then surely the combination of both (a resurrection) would involve even more kinds of unprecedented phenomena than either alone. That which is unprecedented, particularly when we have a large pool of data to establish a precedent (in this case, billions upon billions of humans, whose bodies and deaths we can study), is almost by its very nature an event with a low prior probability.

Evidence that Could Render a Resurrection Event as Probable

Now, those points being made, I have nevertheless stated above that very strong evidence can still overturn a very low prior. With this in mind, let’s now turn to the evidence that Craig offers for the resurrection of Jesus:

Jesus’ burial

The discovery of his empty tomb

His post-mortem appearances

The origin of the disciples’ belief in his resurrection

Craig elaborates further on these points later in his opening statement (drawing primarily on information in Paul’s letters and the Gospels), but I think this preliminary sketch will serve well to discuss, abstractly, what kind of evidence could be offered to argue that a given person had resuscitated or resurrected from the dead.

To begin with, I think it will be helpful to discuss another individual, besides Jesus of Nazareth, whose death and (hypothetical) resuscitation or resurrection we could investigate in a similar manner. Another executed individual, whose death was personally witnessed by dozens of individuals and electronically witnessed by hundreds (whose testimony we could actually corroborate in modern times), is Oklahoma city bomber Timothy McVeigh. As The Guardian (“A Glance, a Nod, Silence, and Death”) explains about the witnesses for McVeigh’s death:

“The execution was watched by 10 journalists, McVeigh’s lawyers, government officials, 10 survivors and victims’ relatives in Terre Haute and another 232 in Oklahoma City, linked by satellite feed.”

We can even plot on a reliable timeline the precise seconds of McVeigh’s death. Now, the Gospels claim that Jesus’ execution started around “noon,” with the Synoptics adding a (historically uncorroborated) three-hour midday darkness (likely invented in imitation of OT verses like Jl. 2:1-2; Am. 5:18-20; Zp. 1:14-15), and the ripping of the curtain in the Jewish Temple (likely invented for theological reasons, discussed here). Those theological embellishments aside, we can certainly say that we have nothing like the evidence below for Jesus’ execution (even if understandably so):

Following his death, McVeigh was cremated at Mattox Ryan Funeral Home in Terre Haute, IN. Now, let’s imagine an alternate sequence of events:

Let’s imagine, following his placement in the incinerator, that following the 1-3 hours of cremation, those arriving to pick up the ashes suddenly found an angelic being standing in front of the furnace. This angelic being then opened the incinerator to reveal McVeigh perfectly alive and well. McVeigh then revealed himself to all present at the funeral home, and walked out, miraculously thrusting away any attempt to constrain him.

In the days and weeks following, McVeigh made many public appearances before whole crowds. Any police or military personal who attempted to re-arrest him found themselves constrained by invisible forcefields. When they fired guns at him, the bullets penetrated his body, and yet did not kill or injure him (a superhuman feat, indeed). Eventually, forensic scientists arrived who confirmed that McVeigh had the exact same DNA and finger prints as the individual who had been executed. Multiple journalists from multiple news networks documented his appearances, complete with live video broadcasting. McVeigh took up the “One Million Dollar Paranormal Challange” offered by the James Randi Educational Foundation, and demonstrated the ability to take a gunshot directly to the head, at point-blank range, and yet to walk away unscathed (demonstrating that his body was truly immortal). Eventually, McVeigh ascended into space in New York Central Park, before hundreds of thousands of people, filming on home video cameras, as well as multiple film networks.

Now, as I have stated above, the prior probability for a resurrection event is very low, indeed. But in an example such as above, I would argue that its posterior probability is very good. This is because in such a hypothetical example we are dealing with very extraordinary evidence. And future historians, I would think, could argue that this event probably took place, based on the evidence that I have discussed.

The Meaning of “Extraordinary” Evidence

Something should be said at this point about what is meant by the term “extraordinary.” As forensic expert Richard Packham (“The Man with No Heart: Miracles and Evidence”) explains, the term “extraordinary” does not mean that the type of evidence itself has to be remarkable. Video tapes, DNA and finger print testing, medical records, and so on are all part of ordinary life experience. What is meant by “extraordinary” in this case is that the evidence in question cannot be equally explained by a wide range of causes, but is only rendered probable under a very specific hypothesis.

Extraordinary evidence is especially necessary when dealing with events that have extremely low priors, since a higher consequent probability will be necessary, and a lower consequent probability for alternative hypotheses with higher priors, in order to offset the disparity between the priors of those alternative hypotheses. If the consequent probability is roughly equal for an event with a low prior, as it is for an event with a higher prior, then the event with the higher prior will have a greater posterior value, by virtue of its prior alone. This is especially relevant for the study of Jesus’ resurrection. As has been emphasized, the prior for such a resurrection event is very, very low.

It is also fair to say that alternative scenarios — such as Jesus’ body being obscurely buried or moved/stolen, and the disciples first conceiving of the resurrection through a combination of visionary experiences and theological rationalizations — very likely have higher priors. Phenomena like bodies being obscurely buried, or moved/stolen from their burial sites are documented occurrences (unlike immortal resurrections). Furthermore, especially in cases when a burial site is found empty, the prior probability for a body being moved or stolen would increase substantially.

Sometimes apologists try to argue that naturalistic accounts of the group appearances in Paul’s letters (such as to the 12 and the 500) necessitate things like mass hallucinations (a phenomenon to which they assign a very low prior). But this is based on a misconstrual of the evidence. To argue that 12 people, for example, had all seen and heard the same thing at the same time, we would need something like 12 independent accounts from different individuals all testifying to the same kind of appearance. In contrast, Paul’s testimony only provides a single account of an anonymous group of 12 people that Jesus (allegedly) “was seen” by, without providing the details of this appearance. For an in depth response to apologetic assertions of this sort, see my reply to Vincent Torley on the probability of Jesus’ resurrection. For a further response to the “mass hallucination” objection for the appearances in the Gospels, see Keith Parsons’ article “Kreeft and Tacelli on the Hallucination Theory.”

If the consequent evidence found in Paul’s letters and the Gospels is equally probable for such alternative scenarios (which I will argue is roughly the case), as they are for a veridical resurrection event, then these alternatives to the resurrection will have a greater posterior value, by virtue of their higher prior value alone. (I will also make some additional arguments at the end for why the consequent probability of these texts may even yield a higher value for naturalistic or non-paranormal explanations.)

In the case of the hypothetical example of McVeigh above, however, there are not too many alternative explanations that we can turn to (with higher priors), without resorting to ones that are likewise paranormal (which also have low priors). One could posit, for example, that the apparently resurrected individual was not actually the McVeigh who had died, but instead a clone with his same DNA and fingerprints, who had been implanted with extraordinary technology that allowed him to perform the feats described. But since such technology would exceed all known technology to have existed in the early 2000’s (or even today), it would still be an appeal to a highly paranormal explanation (which likewise had a very, very low prior).

I suppose the weakest link in the chain of events above is what happened to McVeigh’s corpse. One could, of course, appeal to the eyewitness testimony of those at the funeral home. But, at least as someone who has worked at a funeral home in the past (Evergreen Mortuary and Cemetery, Tucson, AZ, 2007-2008), I wasn’t aware of any video cameras or recording devices at the facility. It could be confirmed that McVeigh’s body was checked in (with a timestamp), and that certain eyewitnesses had seen it enter the cremation furnace and then come out alive. But I’m not sure much more could be offered (though, if anyone knows about the specifics of McVeigh’s situation, please provide me with the details). But even this would be more than can be offered with Jesus. We only have anonymous literature (the Gospels) for the specifics of Jesus’ burial, to state that Joseph of Arimathea buried Jesus (perhaps with Nicodemus) and that women (who vary in their role call) found the tomb empty (perhaps with Peter and an unnamed discipled). At least journalists could investigate those at McVeigh’s funeral home in ways that cannot be done with the Gospels.

Why the Evidence for Jesus’ Resurrection is Not Extraordinary

So, if the hypothetical resurrection event of McVeigh above could be enough to overturn a low prior, why do I think the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection is insufficient? Let’s turn now to the evidence that Craig presents. Using a variation of the “minimal facts” approach, Craig presents the following “facts” that supposedly must be explained by the historians, surrounding death and burial of Jesus:

After his crucifixion Jesus was buried by Joseph of Arimathea in a tomb.

On the Sunday after the crucifixion, Jesus’ tomb was found empty by a group of his women followers.

On different occasions and under various circumstances different individuals and groups of people experienced appearances of Jesus alive from the dead.

The original disciples suddenly and sincerely came to believe that Jesus was risen from the dead despite their having every predisposition to the contrary.

Craig describes these alleged circumstances as “facts” in order to treat them as non-negotiable, but the reality is that there is a wealth of NT scholars who do not accept all of them (nor how they are worded), or who are at least agnostic about whether they can be verified. Ehrman himself, for example, has recently cast doubt on Jesus’ burial by Joseph of Arimathea, which he elaborates on in his blog series “Did the Romans Allow Decent Burials?.” Likewise, Ehrman also doubts the discovery of the empty tomb by women, which he discusses in his blog “The Women and the Empty Tomb.” Below is an additional list of NT scholars who do not accept the “fact” of the empty tomb:

I’ve critiqued Craig’s variation of the minimal facts argument before in my essay “Knocking Out the Pillars of the “Minimal Facts” Apologetic,” in which I discuss some of the statistical problems with trying to gauge scholarly consensus for his alleged “facts” (the first two of which do not even have a consensus of scholarly support), so I won’t elaborate too much further here on the points that I have already made in that essay.

There are a couple points that I will reiterate, however, the first of which pertains to Craig’s third “fact” about Jesus’ post-mortem appearances. Even if there are multiple post-mortem appearances of Jesus described in Paul’s letters and the Gospels, that doesn’t mean that every encounter has a historical basis, nor that, historically speaking, every person who thought that Jesus appeared to them saw the same thing. Even the Gospels/Acts describe Jesus’ appearance to Paul, for example, differently than how he appeared to the original disciples. On one occasion Jesus appears without being recognizable to his followers (Lk. 24:15-16). On another he walks through doors (Jn. 20:26). Jesus’ appearances in 1 Cor. 15:3-7 are entirely vague, and we cannot assume that what “was seen” by Peter, for example, was the same as what “was seen” by the 500. Neither can we assume that such appearances (especially in Paul’s letters) amounted to corporeal experiences. With regards to the group appearance to the 500, for example, scholar Stephen Patterson (The God of Jesus, pg. 236) points out:

“It is not inconceivable that an early Christian group might have interpreted an ecstatic worship experience as an appearance of the risen Jesus.”

We lack the ability to investigate any of these specifics, and Paul’s account itself is too vague. In such a circumstance, this allows for a wider range of causes to produce the same evidence. This is precisely the opposite of extraordinary evidence, since its consequent probability is roughly equally expected for alternative hypotheses to a corporeal experience (if not greater, as will be argued below).

My second point is that many scholars would take issue with the wording in Craig’s fourth “fact,” particularly with regards to the original disciples “suddenly” coming to believe he was risen, and “having every predisposition to the contrary” of forming such a belief. Both of these descriptions are vaguely worded and can be picked at to add more nuance.

To begin with, although Matthew, Luke, and John depict Jesus appearing to his original disciples quite shortly after his death (causing them them to believe in his resurrection), many scholars would argue that they may have formed the resurrection belief after a substantial gap of time later. Since the creed in 1 Cor. 15 is generally agreed to have been composed 2-5 years after Jesus’ death, they must have formed this belief within a few years after the crucifixion, but it can be debated whether this constitutes a “sudden” belief. It may have taken the original disciples months or even a year to form such a view. As Ehrman (How Jesus Became God, pg. 175) has recently argued:

“If it is true that the disciples fled from Jerusalem to Galilee when Jesus was arrested, and that it was there that some of them ‘saw’ him, they could not have seen him the Sunday morning after his death. If they fled on Friday, they would not have been able to travel on Saturday, the Sabbath; and since it was about 120 miles from Jerusalem to Capernaum, their former home base, it would have taken a week at least for them to get there on foot. Maybe some of them, or one of them, had a vision of Jesus in Galilee soon after he was crucified — possibly the following week? The week after that? The next month? We simply don’t have sources of information available that make this kind of judgement possible.”

And so I think many scholars would dispute whether it is a “fact” that the original disciples “suddenly” came to believe that Jesus was risen. But I think even more would dispute that they had “every predisposition to the contrary” of forming such a belief. I think that Ehrman scored a very solid substantive (not just technical) point against Craig, when he argued that this belief may not have been improbable at all, if the disciples were searching for a rationalization for how Jesus could have been crucified, and yet still be the Messiah. As Ehrman argued during the debate:

“The one thing we know about the Christians after the death of Jesus is that they turned to their scriptures to try and make sense of it. They had believed Jesus was the Messiah, but then he got crucified, and so he couldn’t be the Messiah. No Jew, prior to Christianity, thought that the Messiah was to be crucified. The Messiah was to be a great warrior or a great king or a great judge.He was to be a figure of grandeur and power, not somebody who’s squashed by the enemy like a mosquito. How could Jesus, the Messiah, have been killed as a common criminal? Christians turned to their scriptures to try and understand it, and they found passages that refer to the Righteous One of God’s suffering death. But in these passages, such as Isaiah 53 and Psalm 22 and Psalm 69, the one who is punished or who is killed is also vindicated by God.Christians came to believe their scriptures that Jesus was the Righteous One and that God must have vindicated him. And so Christians came to think of Jesus as one who, even though he had been crucified, came to be exalted to heaven, much as Elijah and Enoch had in the Hebrew scriptures. How can he be Jesus the Messiah though, if he’s been exalted to heaven? Well, Jesus must be coming back soon to establish the kingdom. He wasn’t an earthly Messiah; he’s a spiritual Messiah. That’s why the early Christians thought the end was coming right away in their own lifetime.”

And so, we can hardly say that the disciples had “every predisposition to the contrary” of forming the resurrection belief. If such a rationalization provided a doctrine that, in the face of grief, allowed them to hold on to their faith in Jesus as the Messiah, as well as his apocalyptic teachings, then such a development could not be improbable at all. It’s important to remember that most historians do not regard Jesus as a militaristic Messianic figure who was leading a resistance movement. Had he been one, perhaps his movement might have died out, following his death. But had Jesus already been preaching about an apocalyptic event in the near future, then his death (and expected return) could fit easily within such an eschatology. All it would take would be an additional rationalization that the Messiah had only temporarily suffered (as would his followers), but would soon return, to usher in the tribulation that he had predicted.

It should be noted that this belief in Jesus’ return could have very likely preceded the experiences of his post-mortem appearances. If the early Christians came to believe that Jesus was raised to heaven, and would soon return, then it may be this precise view that triggered them to have visions or experiences of him raised from the dead. In that case, Craig may have “facts” three and four backwards.

Craig is laying far too much emphasis on the post-mortem appearances and acting as if it would be impossible for them to be produced by human imagination (necessitating something like a veridical resurrection event). Craig wants to then use this as the launch pad for what formed the resurrection belief. But, it would certainly not be hard for human imagination to theologically rationalize that Jesus had been raised to heaven, and would soon return. And, once one had come to such a belief, having visions or experiences of Jesus in his risen state certainly seems less improbable. The Gospels, of course, depict the disciples as being surprised by the resurrection, but it’s important to remember that these are later sources (likely influenced by later storytelling, embellishment, and apologetic agendas). Paul’s testimony in 1 Cor. 15 emphasizes the resurrection before the appearances, and it should be noted that the vocabulary ἐγήγερται (“he rose”) can apply equally to ascension to heaven as it does to rising on earth. As Ehrman (How Jesus Became God, pgs. 205-206) interprets the earliest resurrection belief:

“They believed that Jesus had come back from the dead — but he was not still living among them as one of them. He was nowhere to be found. He did not resume his teaching activities in the hills of Galilee… The disciples, knowing that Jesus was raised that he was no longer among them, concluded that he had been exalted to heaven. When Jesus came back to life, it was not merely that his body had been reanimated. God had taken Jesus up to himself in the heavenly realm, to be with him … This is why the disciples told the stories of Jesus’ post-resurrection appearances the way they did. Jesus did not resume his earthly body. He had a heavenly body. When he appeared to his disciples, in the earliest traditions, he appeared from heaven.”

Either way, Paul’s testimony is too vague to furnish any narrative for a corporeal appearance of Jesus on earth. The vaguer the evidence, the more alternative hypotheses will have roughly equal consequent probability for explaining the same the same data. And if an alternative hypothesis with a higher prior value — such as an obscure burial of Jesus with no empty tomb, followed by the disciples coming to rationalize that Jesus had been raised to heaven (and would soon return) in the weeks and months following his death, triggering them to have post-mortem experiences, and culminating in the testimony found in 1 Cor. 15 — has equal consequent probability to a veridical resurrection event, then its posterior probability will be greater, by virtue of the prior alone.

Qualifiers that Often Go Ignored in Resurrection Debates

One thing that often irks me is that a number qualifiers often go unmentioned by apologists in debates when they discuss the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection. I’ll discuss a few below:

1) A Lone Enterprise

One is that, outside of the field of New Testament Studies, I am unaware of any ancient miracle claim in antiquity (analogous to something as remarkable as Jesus’ resurrection) that Classicists, scholars of Near Eastern Studies, or ancient historians argue can be proved using ancient texts. This circumstance needs to be stated at the beginning of any opening statement that Craig or any other apologist makes trying to prove Jesus’ resurrection using ancient texts like Paul’s letters and the Gospels. They are practically embarking on a lone enterprise. Such an enterprise becomes particularly suspicious when one looks into the universities that employ these apologists, and realizes that the vast majority come from faith-based institutions that dogmatically require adherence to Christian theological beliefs. There is no parallel for such institutions in either Classics or among atheists. I know of no institution of higher education that has a policy requiring faculty to sign doctrinal statements requiring adherence to Pagan theological beliefs, or of an atheist university requiring all faculty to be atheists. One has to question where and how an apologist like Craig fits anywhere into ordinary trends within secular academia, when has pretenses to holding “academic debates” about Jesus’ resurrection.

2) The Limitations of Ancient Literature

Second, I have repeatedly emphasized that the locus of evidence that we are dealing with, when discussing Jesus’ resurrection, is ancient texts. And really, since we aren’t dealing with documentary evidence (like inscriptions or papyri notes), it is better described as ancient literature. This kind of evidence needs to be contrasted heavily with the kinds of evidence that I discussed in the hypothetical cases of the unicorn and McVeigh above — medicine, forensic science, parapsychology, and journalism — precisely because the latter form of evidence is far better at furnishing evidence that can be considered “extraordinary.” Forensic science, for example, is designed to weed out alternative explanations for a piece of evidence (e.g., blood) beyond a very specific hypothesis, through things like DNA testing. Ancient literature, in contrast, is very bad at giving such specifics.

Ancient literature was produced in a context from which we are distanced by thousands of years (permitting us to interview no original witnesses). We do not possess the autograph manuscript for any ancient literary work, meaning that we must piece together every ancient text from copies of copies, passing through countless unknown hands. The standards for what constituted even historiography and historical biography in antiquity differed drastically from modern standards, meaning that even the best historians frequently did not identify their sources, explain how they interacted with them, or to what degree they were reliable. Frequently, whole speeches were reconstructed or even invented/imagined, by historians of the likes of Tacitus. Even historians like Polybius and Livy could contradict in the details of important events, such as Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps.

When we consider that the Gospels do not even meet the literary standards of the ancient historiography and historical biography of their period, that their authors are highly anonymous and do not identify their sources, and that they fashion their narratives in imitation of previous mythical literature, the reliability of these texts is called even further into question. This coupled with the vague nature of Paul’s testimony makes the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection (primarily restricted to this body of evidence) quite problematic. Craig tries to shortcut this issue by appealing to scholarly consensus. But as discussed above, the first two of Craig’s “facts” do not even have a consensus of scholarly support, and his framing of the latter two can be highly disputed.

The reality is that for most obscure claims in the ancient world (excluding highly general claims, e.g., Jerusalem was a real city), especially when we only have ancient literature to rely on, we are going to have far less certainty than for modern events, which we can investigate with more reliable methods. This reality pertains to the resurrection of Jesus, for which we have no archaeological or documentary evidence, but only ancient literature composed decades after his death [1]. Such evidence, by its very nature, will be less probative and more obscure in its origins. The more obscure the evidence is, the greater its consequent probability is for a wider range of explanations. In such a circumstance, such evidence is far less extraordinary.

Elaborating on this limitation of ancient literary evidence, even Christian scholar Dale Allison (Resurrecting Jesus, pp. 337-339) makes the following observation about appealing to the post-mortem appearances as “evidence” for Jesus’ resurrection:

“Most of the past – surely far more than 99 percent, if we could quantify it – is irretrievably lost; it cannot be recovered. This should instill some modesty in us. Consider the weeks following the crucifixion. We have only minuscule fragments of what actually transpired. What, for instance, do we really know about the resurrection experience of James? First Corinthians 15:7 saysthat he saw the risen Jesus. And that is it. What Jesus looked like, what he said, if anything, where the encounter took place, when precisely it happened, how James responded, what state of mind he was in, how the experience began, how it ended – all of this had failed to enter the record. Almost every question that we might ask goes unanswered … Yet they are the sorts of questions historians often ask of old texts. The fact that we cannot begin to answer them shows how emaciated historically – as opposed to theologically – the Gospel narratives really are. Even if we naively think them to be historically accurate down to the minutest detail, we are still left with precious little. The accounts of the resurrection, like the past in general, come to us as phantoms. Most of the reality is gone … Even if history served us much better than it does, it would still not take us to promised land of theological certainty.”

If far more than 99% of the circumstances behind Jesus’ resurrection are lost, then we are dealing with unknowns that leave open a lot of room for alternative hypotheses besides a veridical resurrection event. Such ambiguity of the evidence certainly diminishes Pr (R/B & E), particularly when it raises the consequent probability of those alternative hypotheses for explaining the same data. This is part of a broader point that is implied when Classicists, for example, say that we “know less” about the ancient world than today. We know less, because often times the evidence is too limited to yield a high posterior value for specific hypotheses, than what we can do for many modern events. It’s simply a reality of working with more limited evidence, to which Jesus’ resurrection belongs.

That said, I don’t wish to exclude ancient literary evidence entirely from the table. One could certainly imagine scenarios in which ancient literature furnished extraordinary evidence. Say, perhaps, that we had eleven independent accounts written by the original disciples (excluding Judas), in which they identified their names and discussed seeing Jesus in a corporeal setting. Say that even the original autograph manuscripts of these texts had been preserved, and that based on a variety of considerations — such as manuscript testing and early external quotations — we could reliably date these texts to only a few years after Jesus’ death. Say that Paul’s testimony was more extensive, and that he identified more of his sources and described Jesus’ appearances in a corporeal manner, which aligned with the other hypothetical texts described above. Say that Caiaphas, Pilate, and Tiberius Caesar had likewise written about Jesus’ resurrection in literary texts that were preserved. Say that early-1st century inscriptions were found in Jerusalem that described Jesus’ resurrection in detail. All of this combined evidence would certainly raise the probability of Pr (R/B & E) drastically.

But when we are only dealing with vague testimony in Paul and anonymous literature (composed decades later) in the case of the Gospels, the case becomes weaker. It becomes further weaker, when we consider that the Synoptics show heavy inter-dependence, and that John shows inter-dependence (either through Markan-dependence or a common Passion narrative) with the story of the empty tomb (one of the most crucial pieces of evidence). Where the Gospels are not textually dependent, such as the post-mortem appearances, they substantially diverge (with Matthew placing Jesus’ appearance to his disciples in Galilee, but Luke and John placing it in Jerusalem, with highly different details in the latter two cases). When agreement can only be reached through collusion, and discrepancies abound when there is a lack of collusion, this is precisely the opposite of strong evidence. Then there is the fact that, when the evidence is lined up diachronically (Paul -> Mark -> Matthew -> Luke -> John), it grows in the telling, exactly the sort of thing you would expect with embellishment and legendary development.

Such evidence can hardly be described as “extraordinary.” It’s consequent probability fits nicely into legendary development, perhaps even more nicely than into a veridical resurrection event, as will be discussed further below.

3) Where Is Jesus Today?

A final qualifier that I think often gets ignored in debates about the resurrection is an additional “minimal fact” that I think we can almost all agree upon: Jesus is not on earth today. In Luke/Acts (as well as what I think is the correct interpretation of Paul), this circumstance is explained by Jesus’ ascension to heaven. Given our current understanding of cosmology, it’s a little difficult to understand how flying into the sky would do little more than take Jesus into space. But I suppose one could conjecture that Jesus perhaps teleported into another dimension of reality after he was hidden up in the clouds somewhere. (Or maybe he is out somewhere beyond Voyager?)

Now, this additional fact (which is an actual minimal fact) requires that Bill Craig will need to appeal to more than just the resurrection to explain all the data. Simply rising from the dead doesn’t explain Jesus’ absence from earth today. He needs to give an explanation for how Jesus could rise to immortal life, and yet disappear entirely from earth. (Such evidence, in fact, would be unexpected for the resurrection hypothesis, without appealing to further explanations of the data.) Suggesting that Jesus is now in another plane of existence (or in outer space), however, would require him to appeal to even more generalassumptions than the resurrection hypothesis. And such general assumptions would plunge his case into even further depths of a lower prior probability.

But here, naturalistic or non-paranormal hypotheses have complete explanatory ease. They can appeal to a very easy explanation: Jesus is dead. Such an explanation requires that we make no general assumptions, and it would have a very, very high prior probability. In fact, it’s literally what happened to everyone else from the ancient world. The evidence of Jesus’ absence is likewise completely expected on this hypothesis. Considering that Craig has to distort his appeal to scholarly consensus to marshal his other alleged “facts,” I’m surprised that he seems to never bring this one up. It certainly comes off as sweeping the elephant under the rug, while doing one’s best to turn the molehills into mountains.

Considerations that May Lower Pr (E/R & B)

Above I have taken the approach of arguing that the consequent probability of the resurrection hypothesis is roughly equal for alternative explanations, whereas those explanations have a much higher prior probability than the resurrection. As such, alternative explanations to the resurrection will inevitably have a greater posterior probability to the resurrection. I have also argued that assigning the resurrection a low prior probability has nothing to do with “naturalist presuppositions” or “worldview bias.” That billions upon billions of people die, and do not supernaturally resurrect in the manner described with Jesus, is an observed medical fact. But I don’t wish to leave this debate a hostage to prior probability. As such, I will further make a couple additional arguments for why a veridical resurrection event does not even have an equal consequent probability to alternative hypotheses, but in fact a value that is lower.

1) A Story that Grew in the Telling

The first argument touches on a point that is already noted above about how the story of the resurrection grew in the telling. This kind of trend renders a high consequent probability for legendary development, but it fits awkwardly with the resurrection hypothesis.

We can start with the earliest testimony in Paul’s letters, particularly 1 Corinthians. First off, unlike the Gospels, Paul makes no mention of an empty burial place being discovered after Jesus’ death, the first mention of which appears in Mark. It’s also an odd detail in Mark that the women who discover the empty tomb run away and tell no one. Many scholars suggest that this detail bears traces of the author of Mark inventing the story. As James Crossley (“Against the Historical Plausibility of the Empty Tomb Story and the Bodily Resurrection of Jesus,” pg. 186) argues:

“The earliest empty tomb story we have (Mk 16.1-8) suspiciously makes it clear that the only witnesses to the empty tomb told no one (16.8). All the other Gospel narratives make good sense in the context of creative storytelling, including the grounding of present beliefs in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.”

Paul’s silence on the empty tomb, if he had actually heard of such a thing from Peter, or anyone else, is likewise an awkward fit of the evidence. As G.W.H. Lampe (The Resurrection, pg. 43) points out:

“In this case I think that the argument from silence has unusual force. For the situation in which Paul wrote 1 Corinthians 15 was that some of the Corinthians were denying there is a resurrection of the dead (1 Cor. 15:12). In answer to them Paul marshals every possible argument…If Jesus’ resurrection is denied, he says, the bottom drops out of the Christian gospel. And the evidence that he was raised consists in the appearances to himself and to others. Had he known a tomb was found empty it seems inconceivable that he should not have adduced this here as a telling piece of objective evidence.”

But what is even further noteworthy is that Paul not only describes the appearance to Peter and the other early Christians in this passage, but also Jesus’ appearance to himself. In Acts, however, Paul does not have a corporeal experience with Jesus, but rather a celestial vision. What is strange, however, if Jesus had actually appeared to Peter or the other Christians in a corporeal manner, is that Paul in 1 Cor. 15 describes his own celestial appearance with the same vocabulary. As even Christian scholar Raymond Brown (An Introduction to the New Testament, pg. 534) points out:

“The concluding reference to himself is extremely important since Paul is the only NT writer who claims personally to have witnessed an appearance of the risen Jesus … Paul places the appearance to himself, even if it was last, on the same level as the appearance to all the other listed witnesses.”

And so, we get an odd reading of the earliest testimony, if we are to interpret it as Jesus appearing to Peter and the other Christians in a corporeal manner, but to Paul in a different manner. Instead, Crossley (pg. 186) argues:

“The list of eyewitnesses in 1 Cor. 15.5-8 gives no evidence pointing in the direction of the bodily resurrection as an historical event, except in the sense of a visionary experience.”

Decades after Paul, however, the Gospels depict Jesus’ resurrection in an increasingly bodily (and embellished) manner, with it growing between each Gospel. Diachronically, the evidence can be lined up as follows:

Paul (c. 50’s CE), the earliest source, has no empty tomb and just vague “appearances” of Jesus (likely interpreted as visionary experiences).

Mark (c. 70’s CE), half a century after Jesus’ death, then has an empty tomb.

Matthew (c. 80’s CE), after Mark, then has Jesus appear to his disciples in Galilee.

Luke (c. 90’s CE), even later, instead has Jesus appear to his disciple in Jerusalem (a different story than Matthew’s), and likewise this Jesus can teleport and is not at first recognizable to his followers.

Finally, John (c. 90-100’s CE) has Thomas be able to touch Jesus’ wounds.

If you go even later into the Gospel of Peter (2nd century CE), Jesus emerges as a giant from the tomb with giant angels accompanying him (verses 39-40).

This sequence of event reads somewhat oddly, under the hypothesis that its origin started with a veridical resurrection event. Why wouldn’t Paul and the Gospel of Mark explain things more clearly and with more detail in the earliest accounts? Why do we only see the more corporeal elements in later accounts, building on earlier texts, from which they are absent?

Under the hypothesis of legendary development (beginning with visionary experiences and theological rationalization), however, they fit quite nicely. Under this interpretation, though, the consequent probability is actually greater for an alternative hypothesis to the resurrection event. And so, it’s not just that the resurrection has a low prior, but also that the evidence is not even the most expected under this hypothesis.

2) A World with Pre-Jesus Models for Resurrection Fabulation

My second argument deals with the broader Mediterranean context in which the resurrection belief emerged. If we were dealing with a world in which no one was ever thought to resurrect from the dead, and the belief in Jesus’ resurrection had just come out of nowhere, then this might be evidence that rendered the consequent probability quite high for the resurrection hypothesis. But recent scholarship is finding this more and more to be the exact opposite case.

Richard Miller in his monograph Resurrection and Reception in Early Christianity, for example, has recently performed an exhaustive thematic and historical study of how Jesus fits into the divine translation of other ancient resurrected figures, such as Hercules, Romulus, Julius Caesar, and Augustus.

Interacting with the testimony of Justin Martyr (the earliest exegete of the Gospels), Miller concludes in the monograph: “[T]he earliest Christians would not have considered the New Testament accounts of Jesus’ resurrection to be literal or historical, but instead would have recognized this narrative as an instance of the trope of divine translation, common within the Hellenistic and Roman mythic traditions.” In that case, the consequent probability for a veridical resurrection event is lowered substantially, since the earliest textual evidence does not even point in that direction.

Then there is the circumstance that much of the mythology surrounding Jesus (including his resurrection, ascension, and attribution of a divine name) fits well into previous Mediterranean concepts of divinity. If the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection and deification fits into a cultural cookie-cutter shape, one has to question whether it is better explained by an unprecedented veridical resurrection, or whether the evidence is more expected by such cultural fashioning.

M. David Litwa has recently argued in Iesus Deus(pg. 4), through a synchronic analysis of the mythology about Jesus’ life — pertaining to his divine conception (ch. 1), his childhood zeal for honor (ch. 2), his miraculous benefactions (ch. 3), his epiphanic transfiguration (ch. 4), his immortalizing resurrection (ch. 5), and his reception of a divine name after his ascension (ch. 6) — that the early Christian depiction of Jesus fits quite nicely into common Mediterranean tropes of godhood and divinity. In that case, the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, ascension, and deification may have a greater consequent probability under the hypothesis of culturally (re)fashioning his image, than it does for a veridical resurrection event.

Considerations like those noted above show that the case against Jesus’ resurrection need not hinge solely on factors of prior probability alone (something that apologists will often try to chalk up to “worldview bias,” despite the counter-points I’ve already mentioned). Even with issues of prior probability laid aside (so that all hypotheses are on equal footing), the evidence can still be read as rendering a higher consequent probability for alternative hypotheses. And in that case, the posterior probability would still yield a higher value for alternatives to the resurrection. And it need hardly be pointed out that, if both the prior and the consequent is lower for the resurrection than for alternative hypotheses, then its posterior doesn’t have a chance.

Suggestions for Strengthening Ehrman’s Case

In his debate with Craig, Ehrman noted many of the other alternative explanations that I have discussed above — such as the body being moved/stolen, the original disciples having only visions of Jesus, the resurrection belief being formed out of theological rationalization, etc. As I have said, I think that Ehrman overall made a stronger case that these alternative hypotheses are more probable than the resurrection. For this reason, I think that the “spirit” of Ehrman’s probability argument was correct.

But if I can identify a weak point in Ehrman’s presentation, I don’t think he clearly explained the formal validity of why. That does not entail that he made a weaker case. Someone can argue a case, which has a few invalid points, that nevertheless is the stronger position. To contend otherwise is to commit the fallacy fallacy. But Ehrman never made a response to Craig’s Bayesian critique. Instead he remarked:

“Thank you, Bill, for that impressive refutation! I do have to tell you that if you think I’m going to change my mind because you have mathematical proof for the existence of God, I’m sorry, but it ain’t gonna happen!”

Jokes aside, though, this is not what Craig was arguing. Craig was not providing a mathematical proof of God, but a critique of Ehrman’s probabilistic argument against miracles. Later on his blog, Ehrman (“Carrier, Bayes Theorem, and Jesus’ Existence“) did remark:

“After that debate I got a bunch of emails from mathematicians and statisticians who also thought Craig’s argument was outrageously funny — not to say outrageous — and explained to me mathematically why Craig had absolutely botched the ‘proof.'”

I’m not aware of anywhere online, however, where Ehrman has made those emails public or discussed the substance of their content. As such, I’ve written this (rather lengthy) essay for what I think is the correct way to respond to Craig’s argument. I think that Craig presented the weaker case, but that he also did score a technical point on this issue. To add further strength to Ehrman’s case, therefore, I shall make the following suggestions:

1) Revising Ehrman’s Definition of a Miracle Event

I don’t think that Ehrman presents the strongest case against miracles (including the resurrection) when he defines them, from the get go, as “the most improbable event.” This kind of definition is too question-begging and it opens the door to the stock “naturalist presupposition” apologetic slogan. The reason we are looking at stuff like the texts that discuss Jesus’ resurrection is precisely to see whether such a miracle could ever be probable.

As I stated at the beginning of this essay, in certain possible worlds miracles may not even be intrinsically improbable. One could imagine a possible world in which miracles happened quite frequently, if we define them as departures from ordinary patterns of physical cause and effect, which are brought about by miracle-working agents. What matters most is that such events would be empirically observable. If someone has changed water into wine, or risen from brain death into an immortal body, then this is a demonstrable and observable effect. And science could hypothetically study such a change, which could even be documented in peer-reviewed literature. I am just aware of no such peer-reviewed literature in the fields of medicine, forensic science, or parapsychology in the actual world that we live in.

But to discuss the resurrection of Jesus, I don’t think that one even needs to mention the word “miracle.” All that needs to be done is to define “resurrection” as Craig has previously in his own published literature. Then, the next step is to point out that billion upon billions of people have been recorded to die, without there being any documentation for such an event in medical literature. That’s all it takes to assign a very, very low prior probability to the resurrection hypothesis.

2) Noting that Pr (R/B) is Non-Zero, But So Low as to Only Be Rescued by Extraordinary Evidence

I’ve noted at the top of this essay that no event in the empirical world (aside from logical contradictions), strictly speaking, has an inductive prior of zero. I think Ehrman should make this simple qualification, in order to be fair in his treatment of Craig. But some events, such as the resurrection, have an extremely low prior (based on documented empirical observation) for the reasons that I have discussed. Ehrman only needs to note this, in order to demand some very extraordinary evidence from Craig.

I’ve also discussed how “extraordinary” evidence should be defined as that which renders a high consequent probability only for a specific hypothesis, and not for other hypotheses. Extraordinary evidence is necessary for events with low priors, particularly when they are weighed against alternatives with substantially higher priors, precisely for the reason that a high consequent will be necessary to offset the higher priors of those alternative hypotheses. Short of this, if the consequent is roughly equal for those alternatives (or even less than the relative disparity between the priors), then it won’t be enough to offset their priors, and the alternatives will still yield a higher value for their posterior probability.

Ehrman only needs to demonstrate 1) that alternative hypotheses have a higher prior than the resurrection, and 2) that their consequent is roughly equal (or, if less, still not by a ratio greater than the disparity between the priors). If Ehrman can further demonstrate that alternative hypotheses even have a greater consequent probability than the resurrection (which I think he can), then that is gravy.

3) Emphasizing that such Ancient Literature is Not Extraordinary Evidence

I would recommend to anyone who argues contrary to Craig’s variation of the “minimal facts” apologetic to promptly point out that his “facts” are not facts. His first two don’t even have scholarly consensus, and he’s framed the latter two in misleading ways. But I think it’s perhaps even more important to bring people’s attention back to the actual evidence under consideration.

In framing the debate as a discussion of “facts,” I think Craig wants to make the audience imagine that they are staring at Jesus’ burial, the empty tomb, and Jesus appearing to his disciples as the “evidence.” But that’s hardly the case. What we are actually looking at is ancient texts, particularly Paul’s letters and the Gospels. It should further be pointed out that nowhere in Classics, Near Eastern Studies, or ancient history is there a precedent for scholars using such ancient texts to prove a kind of event as unprecedented as Jesus’ resurrection. Craig is embarking on a lone venture, one that suspiciously aligns with his religious and apologetic interests.

Once focus is correctly brought back to the ancient literature that is our actual evidence, the next step is to emphasize that this is a very weak kind of evidence, when compared to other methods of inquiry. We are not talking about medical evidence, forensic science, parapsychology, or even journalism. We are dealing with literature, the origins of which we are distanced from by thousands of years. We can speak to none of the original witnesses, nor directly investigate any of the original circumstances. Even if this is an understandable circumstance, it still means that we are very, very limited in what we can know. In situations that involve more unknowns, the consequent probability of the same evidence will very likely rise for a broader range of explanations. This is particularly bad for the posterior probability of events with extremely low priors, such as the resurrection.

Once all of this context has been laid out, Ehrman can then lay out the wide range of alternative explanations. I think it is particularly helpful to discuss diachronically how the story of the resurrection grew over time, exactly as you would expect for legendary development. It’s also helpful to lay out all of the pre-Jesus models of resurrection, ascension, and divinization in the ancient Mediterranean world. It’s not like the idea of Jesus’ resurrection came out of nowhere, and the fact that it fits so well into cultural cookie-cutter models makes a good case for how the same evidence can be equally explained (or explained better) by non-resurrection hypotheses. Those factors coupled with the observations that Ehrman already made for why the disciples would have sought theological rationalizations to justify Jesus’ crucifixion, and expected his return (a context in which his resurrection to heaven makes perfect sense), wraps up the case against the resurrection hypothesis quite nicely.

I don’t think in making these suggestions that I have changed the spirit of Ehrman’s case too much, but I do think that I have tightened the formal validity of his arguments from probability, and I think that this helps in responding to the technical point that he missed in his debate against Craig.

-Matthew Ferguson

[1] For a discussion on the issue of archaeological evidence and the resurrection, including the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, you can read a comment thread that I engaged in on the matter, which started here.

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/understanding-the-spirit-vs-the-letter-of-probability/feed/25adversusapologeticaPic 3The fish gets biggerMillerA Brief Status Update for the Summerhttps://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/06/02/a-brief-status-update-for-the-summer/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/06/02/a-brief-status-update-for-the-summer/#respondFri, 02 Jun 2017 18:13:38 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/06/02/a-brief-status-update-for-the-summer/Κέλσος: I have been super busy with both academic and personal work lately, and so I just want to give a brief status update about my (apparent) absence from the blog. First off, if you don’t see new posts from me, that doesn’t mean that I am not adding new content. I regularly…]]>

I know it’s been a long time since Francis Adams or I have added new content to Civ, but we will be active again soon. We have both been very busy lately, and so I want to share this announcement that I just wrote on Κέλσος about what we’ve been up to. I hope everyone is having a good summer, and expect new content at some point in the near future.

I have been super busy with both academic and personal work lately, and so I just want to give a brief status update about my (apparent) absence from the blog.

First off, if you don’t see new posts from me, that doesn’t mean that I am not adding new content. I regularly add footnotes and new material to old essays (as well as answering comments), and so this is a heavily tailored blog. I tend to write long essays on specific topics, rather than short blog posts, and to beef them up over time.

Most of my page views come from Google searches and not new posts, and so the blog is still getting a lot of new material out there. I want to clarify this, especially since I have some people supporting me on Patreon, and I don’t want to give the impression that I’m not active on the…

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2017/06/02/a-brief-status-update-for-the-summer/feed/0adversusapologeticaJeff Lowder, “The VICTIMs of Christian Apologetics”https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/10/31/jeff-lowder-the-victims-of-christian-apologetics/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/10/31/jeff-lowder-the-victims-of-christian-apologetics/#respondMon, 31 Oct 2016 21:36:37 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/?p=1570I’ve been taking a break from blogging lately, in order to focus on my dissertation work, but a recent counter-apologetics video was posted that is worth mention. I have been co-authoring a critical review of apologists Norman Geisler and Frank Turek’s I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, with Jeff Lowder, founder of the Internet Infidels and blogger at the Secular Outpost.

Both Geisler and Turek repeat the slogan “the atheist must borrow X from theism” (e.g., logic, morality, agency, mathematics, etc.) in a dozen of variations, all making assertions about metaphysical issues that allegedly cannot be explained under the hypothesis of naturalism, and require the existence of God. Of course, actual naturalist philosophers, such as Jack Ritche in Understanding Naturalism, have also thought about such things, and written philosophical resources extensively discussing issues of physicalism, logic, and value. But what is nice is that Lowder provides a detailed, point-by-point refutation against arguments of this sort in a two and half hour video, based on slides he used to prepare for a public debate with Turek.

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/10/31/jeff-lowder-the-victims-of-christian-apologetics/feed/0adversusapologeticaThomas Aquinas on Divine Simplicity and Richard Dawkins’ Ultimate Boeing 747 Gambithttps://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/04/20/thomas-aquinas-on-divine-simplicity-and-richard-dawkins-ultimate-boeing-747-gambit/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/04/20/thomas-aquinas-on-divine-simplicity-and-richard-dawkins-ultimate-boeing-747-gambit/#commentsThu, 21 Apr 2016 01:42:37 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/?p=1373I have been discussing the theology of Thomas Aquinas in recent posts on this blog, including an extensive rebuttal to Aquinas’ Five Ways of proving God’s existence in this previous essay. The Five Ways belong to question 2 of the first part of Summa Theologica, and in this post I am going to discuss the content under question 3. In question 3, Aquinas writes about the theological attribute of divine simplicity. The discussion there is relevant to an argument that atheist Richard Dawkins made about a decade ago in TheGod Delusion, termed the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit.

Dawkins’ argument is a play on the notion of a “tornado sweeping through a junkyard to assemble a Boeing 747,” which is used by creationists to mischaracterize the probability of abiogenesis and evolution. Allegedly, the odds of complex life emerging by chance should be as rare as a tornado passing through a junkyard and assembling a Boeing 747. Dawkins’ response, however, is to turn this argument on its head. If life is too complex to have emerged by chance, then what are the odds that a complex deity, with all of the intelligence needed to design life, would just happen to exist by chance as the uncaused creator of the universe, in order to create life? Dawkins argues that the unexplained complexity of this designer poses a greater question than the problem that it seeks to solve. Rather, God is the Ultimate Boeing 747, in that the odds of such a being just happening to exist is much improbable than the more simple explanations of abiogenesis and evolution.

This argument did not jive well with many theologians, however, and both Alvin Plantinga (response here) and William Lane Craig (response here) wrote a rebuttal to it. In their responses both Plantinga and Craig appeal to Aquinas’ conception of divine simplicity to argue that Dawkins does not have a correct understanding of theology. Below is my response to their counter-arguments, and why I do not think that they have correctly characterized the complexity described by the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit.

In Summa Theologicapart 1, question 3, Aquinas lays out the following aspects of God’s simplicity:

God does not have a body.

God is not composed of matter and form.

God is the same as his essence or nature.

God is his own existence.

God does not belong to a genus.

There are no accidents in God.

God is not a composition of parts.

God does not enter into composition with other things.

Notice how Aquinas argues that God is “simple,” primarily because he lacks physical parts and composition. This is different from saying that God is complex because he possesses the intelligence and capability of designing extremely complex objects, such as biological structures. This distinction is important to bear in mind when looking at the actual argument that Dawkins lays forth in the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit. In TheGod Delusion (pp. 187-189), Dawkins presents that argument as follows:

One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect, over the centuries, has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.

The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself. In the case of a man-made artefact such as a watch, the designer really was an intelligent engineer. It is tempting to apply the same logic to an eye or a wing, a spider or a person.

The temptation is a false one, because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer. The whole problem we started out with was the problem of explaining statistical improbability. It is obviously no solution to postulate something even more improbable. We need a “crane”, not a “skyhook”; for only a crane can do the business of working up gradually and plausibly from simplicity to otherwise improbable complexity.

The most ingenious and powerful crane so far discovered is Darwinian evolution by natural selection. Darwin and his successors have shown how living creatures, with their spectacular statistical improbability and appearance of design, have evolved by slow, gradual degrees from simple beginnings. We can now safely say that the illusion of design in living creatures is just that – an illusion.

We don’t yet have an equivalent crane for physics. Some kind of multiverse theory could in principle do for physics the same explanatory work as Darwinism does for biology. This kind of explanation is superficially less satisfying than the biological version of Darwinism, because it makes heavier demands on luck. But the anthropic principle entitles us to postulate far more luck than our limited human intuition is comfortable with.

We should not give up hope of a better crane arising in physics, something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology. But even in the absence of a strongly satisfying crane to match the biological one, the relatively weak cranes we have at present are, when abetted by the anthropic principle, self-evidently better than the self-defeating skyhook hypothesis of an intelligent designer.

I have bolded the words “design” and “intelligent” above, because I think that they are at the heart of the argument that Dawkins is making here. Dawkins is not saying that God is complex because he is composed of physical parts, but instead that God is complex because of his intelligence. For complex biological organisms to be explained as the creation of an intelligent designer, we first have to assume a more complex intelligence capable of designing such complexity. As such, Dawkins is arguing that God is teleologically complex, not that he is physically complex.

Behavioral. Activities undertaken for the sake of something, which may be either a state or further action.

Artifactual. Activities undertaken for the sake of producing an object of a certain sort (artificial).

…Agent-specific teleology (I) is purposive, rational, and intentional, and represents external evaluation. The goal is the object of an agent’s desire or choice…”

What Dawkins is arguing is that God is complex because he exhibits the kind of behavioral and artifactual teleology that is implied by intelligent design. God is behavioral, in that he is designing biological structures or the physical constants in our universe for the sake of some purpose; he is intelligently creating the universe for the purpose of life. God is also artifactual, in that he is designing these things in specific ways, and not in other ways, in order to suit the purpose of his design. God has the ability to decide and execute a plan, which reflects agency-centered teleology.

The alternative to this hypothesis is that there is no intelligence or agency-centered teleology behind our universe and the life within it. Rather, these things have arisen as the result of blind and unintentional causes. Evolution instead explains how complexity has emerged as the result of mutation and natural selection, which do not exhibit agency-centered teleology [1]. This can create the illusion of design, but is actually the result of non-intelligent causes. This alternative theory also matches the definition of metaphysical naturalism, which I offer in this previous essay.

Now, consider the responses to Dawkins’ argument, and why I think that they miss the mark. Here is what Alvin Plantinga writes in response to Dawkins:

“More remarkable, perhaps, is that according to Dawkins’s own definition of complexity, God is not complex. According to his definition (set out in The Blind Watchmaker), something is complex if it is has parts that are ‘arranged in a way that is unlikely to have arisen by chance alone.’ But of course God isn’t a material object at all and hence has no parts. God is a spirit, an immaterial spiritual being, and therefore has no parts at all.”

Note that Plantinga is quoting a different book (The Blind Watchmaker) than TheGod Delusion, which I don’t think offers the same definition of complexity that Dawkins is implying in the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit. Regardless of whether Dawkins says elsewhere that complexity entails an improbable arrangement of parts to have arisen by chance, what he clearly means in the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit is the teleological complexity implied by intelligent design. William Craig makes the same mischaracterization when he responds to Dawkins:

“[A]s a mind without a body, God is amazingly simple. Being immaterial, He has no physical parts.”

Both of these responses miss the mark. At no point in laying out his argument above does Dawkins state that God is a complex arrangement of physical parts. Both Plantinga and Craig are conflating two different understandings of “complexity,” in order to straw man Dawkins’ argument. Their appeal to the kind of divine simplicity discussed by Thomas Aquinas, therefore, is irrelevant.

Plantinga appears to foresee this problem, when he offers an alternative meaning of complexity, by suggesting that God is complex because of his omniscience and what he knows:

“So it is far from obvious that God is complex. But suppose we concede, at least for purposes of argument, that God is complex. Perhaps we think the more a being knows, the more complex it is – God, being omniscient, would then be highly complex … [I]f Dawkins proposes that God’s existence is improbable, he owes us an argument for the conclusion that there is no necessary being with the attributes of God…”

Plantinga states that omniscience is one of the attributes of God, and in the same article he also writes:

“God has created us in his image, and an important part of our image bearing is our resembling him in being able to form true beliefs and achieve knowledge.”

And so, we are right back to God possessing intelligence in terms of his knowledge. Now, here is the thing: Plantinga argues that God was not created, but is a necessary being that exists in all possible worlds. This is the standard theistic rebuttal to the question, “If God created the universe, then who created God?” The answer is that nobody created God. God simply exists as an ontologically primitive entity.

As philosopher Graham Oppy (The Best Argument Against God, pp. 12) explains, an ontologically primitive entity is something that is not “not susceptible to further explanations.” God’s existence is not explained by anything else; he simply exists inherently. Why is this hypothesis more complex than the alternative hypothesis that the origins of our universe and the life within it are blind? Because a basic tenet of explanatory simplicity is that the more simple hypothesis is one that postulates fewer and less complex primitive entities. The less things that you merely assume on the ontological bedrock, the less conjectures you need to make a priori. As Oppy (pg. 13) explains:

“If everything is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities.”

And here is why theism is more complex than atheism: To assume that an intelligent God, exhibiting agency-centered teleology, simply exists, without any further explanation, is far more complex than proposing non-intelligent causes for the things that God is used to explain. We don’t have to start on the ontological bedrock with a highly complex intelligence, especially of the sort exhibiting the bizarrely personal and emotive aspects of the Christian God, as something that is primitive and cannot be explained by anything else. Instead under atheism, non-intelligence gives rise to intelligent beings, such as humans, through blind selective forces. That at least starts us with something simpler and less complex than the human intelligence that we are seeking to explain.

And so, I find it very hard to believe that God is “simple” under the definition of “complexity” that Dawkins is describing. God is extremely complex, in terms of his agency-centered teleology and intelligence, not because he is composed of physical parts. At least if our universe had blind origins, without such complex intelligence, we don’t have to assume something that complicated as ontologically primitive. A blind start postulates fewer and less complex primitive entities.

-Matthew Ferguson

[1] Funny enough, Plantinga argues that even if biological complexity has emerged through evolution, that still does not mean that God could not have guided such evolution. In his response to Dawkins, Plantinga states:

“Suppose the evidence of evolution suggests that all living creatures have evolved from some elementary form of life: how does that show that the universe is without design? … After all, couldn’t it be that God has directed and overseen the process of evolution? What makes Dawkins think evolution is unguided?”

But when one stops to think about the actual forms of life that emerge from evolution, including those that cause suffering and pain, we must consider what kind of evolution God is guiding. Why would God guide evolution to create diseases and genetic defects, for example? In Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism (pg. 59), Plantinga offers the following answer:

“Satan and his minions … may have been permitted a role in the evolution of life on Earth, steering it in the direction of predation, waste, and pain…”

Once more, I have to wonder if it is really a more simple explanation to say that “Satan and his minions” have created diseases and genetic defects, or to propose that blind and unguided evolution sometimes accidentally creates forms of life that cause suffering and pain. I leave it to the reader to decide which explanation is simpler.

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/04/20/thomas-aquinas-on-divine-simplicity-and-richard-dawkins-ultimate-boeing-747-gambit/feed/2adversusapologeticaBoeing 747A Minimalist Definition of Naturalismhttps://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/a-minimalist-definition-of-naturalism/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/a-minimalist-definition-of-naturalism/#commentsThu, 07 Apr 2016 01:12:06 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/?p=1379(This blog essay no long represents my current views. I will post a new essay on the subject, at some point in the future. -MWF 2/5/19)

I am going to start posting again here on Civ by beginning with a relatively short discussion of my definition of metaphysical naturalism. I have discussed some of the conceptual and ontological ways of defining both the “natural” and the “supernatural” in a couple of my previous essays on this blog (see here and here). In those essays I discuss criteria such as physicalism, reductionism, uniformity, and teleology. I think that all of these criteria are useful for articulating some of the ways that we differentiate the natural from the supernatural, but recently I have started to think that an even more minimal definition of naturalism is sufficient to deny one particular supernatural concept, namely the existence of God.

One of the major issues that I have discussed in defining naturalism is the relationship between mental states and physical states. Our brains are physical objects, but many philosophers have posed conceptual issues for how our minds (a pattern of the brain) relate to physics. Hard reductionistsargue that all mental states are reducible to and identical with physical states, but there have also been proponents of supervenience, who argue that, while mental states are not directly identifiable with physical states, they still supervene upon physical states. Epiphenomenalists argue that mental states are a byproduct of physical states, but play no causal role in behavior. Discussing each of these theories can become complicated, and it often bogs down the definition of naturalism, so that it becomes difficult to use the term in ordinary discussion.

While I think it is worthwhile to explore these conceptual and ontological issues, I do not think that they are necessary to form a minimalist definition of naturalism that posits a basic relationship between mental and physical states. Rather, I will offer this more simple definition that is compatible with all of them: Metaphysical naturalism is the ontological view that all mental states are dependent upon antecedent physical states, in the sense that mental state X cannot exist, unless there is antecedent physical state Y. Notice how I have not specified whether mental states reduce to physical states or supervene upon physical states. What I have basically argued is that all minds must be dependent upon physical brains, regardless of whether they ontologically reduce to physical states in the brain or supervene upon those physical states.

This definition is useful, because it denies the existence of a number of supernatural concepts. Ghosts and souls, for example, are usually conceived of as minds that are not dependent upon physical brains, and under my definition, minds of this kind would not exist. Even physical objects inhabited by mental forces, however, would still fall under this definition. A golem, for example, is a physical object that is inhabited by a mental force. But the mental force within the golem cannot be explained by any physical state or structure within the golem itself, such as a brain. Likewise, this definition denies more abstract intentionalities that are conceived of as non-physical forces influencing the world. Karma, for example, cannot exist under this definition, unless it is defined as an ordinary cause and effect pattern within social contexts, in which reciprocal outcomes occur as a result of decisions and actions that ultimately depend on antecedent physical states.

Now, how is this useful for denying the existence of God? For the simple reason that theologians have classically defined God as lacking physical parts. The medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas (whom I have discussed previously on this blog, here), for example, argues in Summa Theologica (I, 3, ii) that God is not composed of matter and form. Likewise, God is generally understood as a conscious, aware, and even omniscient. In the words of the Shvetashvatara Upanishad (VI.2), God is “pure consciousness, omnipresent, omniscient, the creator of time.” Generally understood, even across the theologies of multiple religions, therefore, God is mental and not non-mental. But, likewise, God is not a physical being.

We could, of course, envision an omnipotent and omniscient being that was still composed of physical parts, but I have offered the theological definitions above to point out that classical theology generally denies that God is a physical being, despite his mental and conscious attributes. This relates, then, to my definition of metaphysical naturalism. Under my definition of naturalism, all mental states are dependent upon antecedent physical states, regardless of whether they reduce to or supervene upon them. Under this definition, therefore, the classical theological conception of God would not exist. My metaphysical naturalism, therefore, entails an atheistic reality.

Now, the great thing is, however, that my definition is perfectly compatible with human minds, even with all the peculiarities of our conscious existence. So long as our minds are dependent upon antecedent physical states, they are compatible with my definition of metaphysical naturalism. And what we know about the human mind, through neuroscience, demonstrates that it is, indeed, dependent upon antecedent physical states in the brain. As naturalist philosopher Richard Carrier (Sense & Goodness Without God, pp. 156-157) explains:

“The evidence seems clear: our mind, hence our very existence, depends entirely on the brain. As a mechanism, the brain must be kept healthy and active, so it can remain a system of coherent perception and thought, and we can remain ‘conscious’ and experience life itself. But stop the brain from functioning, and we can experience nothing. Our ‘consciousness’ ceases to exist.”

“The positive evidence for mind-brain physicalism also presents an almost insurmountable challenge for opponents. For example, scientists have confirmed that we only perceive things after our brains do, not the other way around. When we see a face, our brains already show activity in the area that recognizes faces a fraction of a second before we are aware of seeing a face at all. Likewise, when we make a decision, say to move our arm, we know our brain has already sent the signal to move the arm (and thus has already decided to move it) a fraction of a second before we become aware of making such a decision. This is very hard to explain unless physicalism is true. For only then would perception be a process occurring in a physical organ, one that takes time (a fraction of a second) to complete itself, and only then would self-awareness itself be such a process of perception.”

“Consider a different problem. There are many people who suffer from a condition called synesthesia, where their brain fails to physically separate sensory processing, so they ‘see’ sounds or ‘hear’ colors, and so on. If this is what happens when the brain’s wires get crossed, how can a disembodied soul experience distinct sensations? After all, the soul has no physical wires to keep such sensations separate, and clearly can’t keep them separate in synesthetes. Yet every out-of-body experience has been reported without synesthesia.”

“I could list a dozen other similar problems that opponents of mind-brain physicalism have a hard time answering, but that neurophysiologists can answer easily, often with hard evidence to back them up.”

Philosophers can still challenge in what way our consciousness relates to physical states in the brain, and whether it can truly be said to be identical with those physical states. But regardless, the evidence is clear that our consciousness depends upon antecedent physical states, so much so that we can even observe those states in the brain before we become aware of them. Humans are natural, therefore, whereas God is not.

A final point that I will raise is that we also have a very good explanation for why humans have created the concept of God, as well as other non-physical consciousnesses, such as ghosts and souls, if we live in a universe where no such minds exist that are not dependent upon antecedent physical states. The reason why is that the human mind is programed for agent over-detection. As Stewart Guthrie explains in Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion, human beings have a tendency to impute our own consciousness and agency onto non-conscious and non-mental things. Seeing the Virgin Mary’s face in a piece of toast is a simple example, but likewise, even the very concept of God involves imputing a conscious intentionality onto the origins of our universe.

As I explain in my essay “Cosmology and Time in Metaphysical Naturalism,” even if our universe had a “beginning,” in the sense that it is past finite, and even if there was a “cause” at t=0 that entailed t–>nonzero, we would still have little reason to believe that such a cause was conscious or mental. The reason why is that such a cause could have been something non-conscious and non-mental. With all of our tendencies toward agent over-detection, however, human beings have projected a conscious agency, such as God, onto the origins of our universe. But, this is a simple case of human fabrication. The current evidence that we have for every mind that exists, whether it be human or animal, is that such minds depend upon antecedent physical states, such as those in the brain. We have no evidence to the contrary. This fact, combined with our tendency to impute agency, provides a strong inference to the conclusion that God, as defined by classical theologians, probably does not exist, but is rather a human creation. In contrast, the state of the evidence for how our brains and minds work is compatible with my minimalist definition of metaphysical naturalism, spelled out above.

Admittedly, this minimalist definition of naturalism does not predict much else that is specific about our universe (such as galaxies, stars, or even biological evolution), but I am fine with that. There can be multiple possible worlds of naturalism that are conceivable, but all of them will have no mental states or minds without antecedent physical states such as brains.

-Matthew Ferguson

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/a-minimalist-definition-of-naturalism/feed/2adversusapologeticaGodbrain-leftBig History: An Introductionhttps://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/12/20/big-history-an-introduction/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/12/20/big-history-an-introduction/#respondSun, 20 Dec 2015 23:08:49 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/?p=1347What is big history? This emergent and interdisciplinary field, enriched and pioneered by Dr. David Christian of Macquarie University, encourages a more holistic understanding of human events than does the traditional study of history. While historians are concerned with understanding the past in context, and considering cause and effect in human terms, big historians are concerned with understanding the past not only in its immediate human historical setting, but in the context of scientific and physical laws of nature as well. If history is written by the victor, then big history is written in the stars themselves.

Dr. Christian, bolstered by the support of philanthropist Bill Gates, first injected big history into the public sector with a 2011 TED Talk, providing an 18 minute overview of world history. In this sensational talk, which has garnered more than 5 million views since its publication, Dr. Christian identifies the basic principles of big history, including the concept of Goldilocks conditions and the various “thresholds” of complexity that we observe in the universe. At various moments in the cosmic past, Christian states, certain Goldilocks conditions have come about, in which “not too little, and not too much” of certain components — usually energy or mass — have allowed the universe to reach states of increasing complexity.

Starting at the Big Bang and the first moment of time itself, Christian traces the cause-and-effect of each moment and identifies these thresholds. He highlights the six universal thresholds of complexity as follows:

The Big Bang represents the first level of complexity, in which the universe emerges into existence, roiling and rapidly expanding.

The formation of stars, the first complex object in the universe, represent the second threshold.

The emergence of complex atomic structures, wrought by nuclear fusion in solar cores and spread out into the universe by supernovae, are the third level of complexity.

The creation of our solar system, including our watery world in a Goldilocks orbit around our Sun, is the fourth threshold.

The emergence of life on Earth is the fifth threshold of complexity. Like the creation of the solar system, this threshold was reached when Goldilocks conditions on the young Earth allowed for early complex structures to encode and replicate DNA, the information source of life.

The appearance of humans and human language is the final threshold Christian identifies in this talk. He argues that the appearance of our species constitutes a threshold because, for the first time, information is able to transcend rote biology and, through human speech and writing, become passed down through the generations.

Big history argues that the exponential combination of these thresholds, each one made possible and propelled forward by the one before it, is responsible for the exquisite complexity of the universe that we observe today. While humans are the drivers of traditional history, big history is a tale spun by the more ancient and fundamental forces of nature long before human activity comes into play.

So what does the study of big history mean for secular humanism? As Christian notes during the closure of his talk, things that appear to us to be very complex are also, by their nature, very fragile. The interconnected modern world that has resulted from eons of increasingly-complex transformations is immensely delicate. It balances now in a sort of Goldilocks condition of its own, propped up by the pillars of its less-complex predecessors and preparing even now for whatever threshold lies beyond this present one. Even so, there are certain aspects which threaten this delicate balance, many of them human made. Christian identifies two — namely, nuclear war and climate change — which threaten to degrade the present complexity we enjoy. However, it can be extrapolated that many acts of violence or ignorance — from the terrorism of recent months and years to the oppressions of corrupt governmental, economic, or religious systems — could spell doom for human life and advancement on Earth.

The study of big history is bolstered by a secular humanist ideology, which turns its logical awareness of the possibility of destruction into an injunction away from our baser urges and towards a sustainable, conscientious, and equitable management of the complex planet and information ecosystems we find ourselves a part of. While big history empirically provides for how we might encounter insurmountable challenges to our complexity, it is secular humanism that provides an imperative to preserve and encourage our present and shared intricacy. This is a fact not lost on Dr. Christian, who, in a recent interview, stated that one dimension of big history is that it provides for modern humans a new story of our origin. He states of his studies in big history:

“In modern science, and I include the humanities here, science in a German sense of science—rigorous scholarship across all domains—in modern science we’ve gotten used to the idea that science doesn’t offer meaning in the way that institutional religions did in the past. I’m increasingly thinking that this idea that modernity puts us in a world without meaning—philosophers have banged on about this for a century-and-a-half—may be completely wrong. We may be living in an intellectual building site, where a new story is being constructed. It’s vastly more powerful than the previous stories because it’s the first one that is global. It’s not anchored in a particular culture or a particular society. This is an origin story that works for humans in Beijing as well as in Buenos Aires.”

If Dr. Christian is right to say that we are “living in an intellectual building site, where a new story is being constructed,” then it is not unreasonable to expect that, as humanity becomes more and more unified under a common narrative, that secular humanism will be an important component of the global origin story being told.

The video of Dr. Christian’s TED Talk can be viewed below:

To learn more about big history, you can visit the Big History Project, an online educational outreach program started by Christian and Gates that is open to the public and available for use in secondary schools.

Onward and upward,

Francis Adams

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/12/20/big-history-an-introduction/feed/0francisadams42Screenshot 2015-12-20 at 1.39.32 PMGood News!https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/12/10/good-news/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/12/10/good-news/#respondThu, 10 Dec 2015 21:05:14 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/12/10/good-news/Κέλσος: I have received news that I have unanimously passed the Greek qualifying exam in my PhD program! This exam was the last of 11 qualifying exams that I have had to take in my graduate studies (5 in my MA program, and 6 in my PhD program). The Greek exam is, by far, the…]]>

I have had less time to write on Civ than I would have liked this year, due to my language studies in Greek, so I thought that I would share this major milestone. I still have more graduate projects to work on, but I also have much more material planned for Civ, when I get around to it. At least I am making progress towards my PhD!

I have received news that I have unanimously passed the Greek qualifying exam in my PhD program! This exam was the last of 11 qualifying exams that I have had to take in my graduate studies (5 in my MA program, and 6 in my PhD program). The Greek exam is, by far, the most difficult (the second most difficult is the Latin qualifying exam, but I consider Latin to be a much easier language than Ancient Greek, and that’s saying something!).

There has been a long journey to get to this point. I began studying Greek six years ago (the year before I entered my Classics MA program at the University of Arizona). During my time there I not only studied Greek every semester, but even took an independent study in Greek prose composition in which I completed all of North and Hillard’s Greek Prose Composition. In addition to…

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/12/10/good-news/feed/0adversusapologeticaCan There Be Empirical Evidence of God’s Existence? Thoughts on Summa Theologica I, 1, vii, Aquinas’ Five Ways (I, 2, iii), and Miracleshttps://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/09/28/can-there-be-empirical-evidence-of-gods-existence-thoughts-on-summa-theologica-i-1-vii-aquinas-five-ways-and-miracles/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/09/28/can-there-be-empirical-evidence-of-gods-existence-thoughts-on-summa-theologica-i-1-vii-aquinas-five-ways-and-miracles/#respondMon, 28 Sep 2015 16:00:29 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/?p=1211Recently I’ve been reading a new commentary on St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, written by Brian Davies–Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary (2014). I’ve also decided to blog some of my thoughts and notes along the way, in order to discuss a few of the differences between Christian theology and metaphysical naturalism. In this post, I will be discussing some of the implications of Aquinas’ theology for the possibility of there being empirical evidence of God’s existence, particularly with regard to how Aquinas describes God as the object of the study of his sacred science (part I, question 1, article 7), and Aquinas’ Five Ways of demonstrating God’s existence (part 1, question 2, article 3).

I am frequently asked by Christian theists and apologists what evidence or arguments I would find persuasive for God’s existence. One of the pet peeves that I have with many theological arguments, however, is the unfalsifiability of their core premises. Take the apologetic moral argument, for example. This argument can take a variety of forms, but consider the rather simple formulation of it advanced by theologian William Lane Craig:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.

2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.

3. Therefore, God exists.

Now, even skipping over the meta-ethical question of how one defines “objective moral values and duties,” as well as the rather controversial fact claim being made in p2, I see little reason for an argument like this to be persuasive. The reason why is that I see no way of testing or falsifying p1. Whether objective moral values and duties can or cannot exist without God is a question of how we define and conceptualize morality. It is not a premise that can be tested against empirical data and observation.

All an apologist needs to do, therefore, to grant this argument apparent soundness, is to define moral ontology as requiring God’s existence, and then to deduce that the existence of objective moral values and duties (a premise that I am only granting for the sake of argument) thus proves God. But such arguments reduce to little more than armchair speculation. They start with arbitrary definitions of morality and then deduce conclusions, rather than inferring conclusions from demonstrable evidence. Because of this, it is very easy to use an argument like this to create specious “evidence” for God’s existence, when all one is really doing is cooking up arbitrary premises that are then inserted into a formally valid syllogism. But, even if valid, such a syllogism is not sound, if one does not accept the premises, and I see no reason to accept p1, particularly because I see no way of testing or falsifying it.

Empirical Evidence and Falsifiability

What is great about empiricism as an epistemology, however, is its ability to falsify certain kinds of predictions and claims based on demonstrable evidence. Empirical evidence is based on sensory experience and observation, and there are many kinds of religious predictions that can be tested by our senses.

Take, for example, the apocalyptic claim that Jesus would return on May 27, 2012 in order to usher in the end times of scripture. What is great about a claim like this is that it is empirically testable. All you have to do is wait until May 27, 2012, look outside, and if the world is still doing fine with no signs of apocalyptic cataclysm, then the claim has been falsified. It’s that simple.

(Note also that, if such an apocalyptic prediction proved to be true, and the world really did come to an end, this kind of empirical evidence would be far more powerful proof of God’s involvement than mere ontological arguments, which simply define God into existence with arbitrary and untestable premises.)

In fact, one of the reasons that I doubt the truth of Christianity, as a religion, is because many NT scholars agree that both the historical Jesus and the apostle Paul predicted an impending end of the world within a generation of their own lifetimes (for a basic summary of this conclusion, see John Loftus’ “At Best Jesus Was a Failed Apocalyptic Prophet”). And yet, the 1st and 2nd centuries CE have come and gone, without any sign of Jesus’ return or the apocalypse. The first generations of Christians, therefore, including Jesus and Paul, must have been mistaken.

Can God Be Empirically Observed?

When it comes to empirically testing God’s existence, however, many theologians and apologists retort that God is not an object within space-time that can be empirically observed. For example, theologian David Bentley Hart (The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss, pg. 30) argues:

“[God] is not a ‘being,’ at least not in the way that a tree, a shoemaker, or a god is a being; he is not one more object in the inventory of things that are, or any sort of discrete object at all. Rather, all things that exist receive their being continuously from him, who is the the infinite wellspring of all that is.”

What Hart is getting at is that “God” is not just an object within the universe, but is instead the immanent source of being, upon which all contingent things are dependent. Thus, to argue that God’s existence could be falsified through empirical observation within space-time, theologians maintain, is to misunderstand the theology of God’s existence.

When it comes to Judeo-Christian religious traditions, there is some scriptural support for this idea. For example, John 1:18 states, “No one has ever seen God, but the one and only Son, who is himself God and is in closest relationship with the Father, has made him known.” And 1 Corinthians 2:9 (alluding to Isaiah 64:4) claims that the things revealed by the spirit are, “What no eye has seen, what no ear has heard, and what no human mind has conceived—the things God has prepared for those who love him.” Then again, Genesis 32:30 states that Jacob saw God “face to face,” but perhaps this is just an anthropomorphized metaphor for God. Regardless, for the purposes of this discussion, I will assume Hart’s description that God is not discrete object, which is observable within space-time, and is thus beyond direct empirical observation.

Is “Nonoverlapping Magisteria” a Good Argument?

If God cannot be empirically observed, does that mean that the existence of God is beyond the realm of empirical evidence?

On the one hand, I think there are many theists (and even certain agnostics) who would like this to be the case, because it would safely gerrymander the question of God’s existence (or religious questions more broadly) into a category that could never be empirically falsified. Take, for example, agnostic Stephen Jay Gould, who was famous for espousing the view that science and religion belong to “nonoverlapping magisteria.” In other words, Gould argued that religion deals with questions that science cannot answer, and vice versa. For example, Gould (“Nonoverlapping Magisteria”) states:

“The lack of conflict between science and religion arises from a lack of overlap between their respective domains of professional expertise—science in the empirical constitution of the universe, and religion in the search for proper ethical values and the spiritual meaning of our lives. The attainment of wisdom in a full life requires extensive attention to both domains…”

Well, how awfully convenient! If religion deals with questions like “ethical value,” which, as discussed above (as well as in my essay “Are All Norms Moral Norms?”), are normative questions that are notoriously difficult for empirical science to answer, then it looks like religion is off the hook for having to provide empirical evidence. Moreover, no amount of empirical evidence could ever falsify religion. How mightily convenient for theists, especially when they are trying wiggle out of giving demonstrable evidence for God!

For a critique of the view that science and religion simply “answer different questions,” I recommend philosopher Stephen Law’s “Has Science Buried God?.” Here is what Law argues regarding whether empirical science can validate religious claims:

“It takes only a moment’s reflection to realise that the unobservable is not off-limits to science. Science has a well-established track record of confirming and refuting beliefs about things that can’t be observed.

Take electrons, for example. We can’t observe electrons themselves. But we can observe their effects. The theory that electrons exist has observable consequences. If the theory about electrons is true, then we should expect to observe certain things – such as these bubbles in a bubble chamber – that are unlikely to be observed otherwise. If these effects are observed, then the theory is strongly confirmed. The key to understanding how claims about unobservables can be observationally confirmed or refuted is to realise that unobervables can have observable effects.”

Here, I agree strongly with Law. Even if God cannot be empirically observed directly, there can still be empirical proof of God’s existence through his effects.

Thomas Aquinas on Knowing God through God’s Effects

Here is also where Thomas Aquinas and Summa Theologica enter the equation. It turns out that Aquinas makes a very similar argument to the one that Law makes above, when describing the methods of his sacred science. In part I, question 1, article 7, Aquinas argues:

“Although we cannot know in what consists the essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.”

In other words, even if you cannot see God, you can still see effects of which you can logically infer God is the cause. Inferring a cause through its effect is, after all, something we do regularly, as Law discusses above.

“An event (ultimately) caused by God that cannot be accounted for by the natural powers of natural substances alone. Conceived of this way, miracles don’t violate the laws of nature but rather involve the occurrence of events which cannot be explained by the powers of nature alone. When dead bodies come back to life it is a miracle because the molecules that make up the corpse lack the powers necessary to generate life.”

Here is why miracles are a great form of evidence: they are empirically demonstrable. If the Red Sea were to suddenly part, in order to allow a group of people to pass through it, then this would be phenomenon that we could empirically observe. Turning water into wine involves demonstrable empirical change. People’s whose physical illnesses were suddenly healed, after a miracle worker placed his or her hands upon them, would provide empirical evidence for medical miracles, and so on.

I should note, too, that miracles would not be the only kind of empirical effect that God could use to provide evidence of his existence. Prophecies made under controlled conditions (in order to eliminate ex eventu prophecies), which had successful results, would also be empirical evidence of divine involvement. Likewise, successful prayer studies could provide empirical evidence of God’s existence. As Law continues to explain:

“What about the belief that there’s a God who answers our prayers? Is that scientifically testable? Yes, it is. There have been two huge multi-million dollar, double-blind scientific experiments involving prayers for heart patients, both of which found the prayers had no medical effects. One study was run by a scientist who believes in both God and the power of prayer and who was clearly disappointed by the results, so you can’t dismiss these studies on the grounds of bias.

What these large-scale studies revealed was not just an absence of evidenceof the power of prayer to produce such medical results. They also revealed evidence of the absence of any such power. That’s scientific data strongly supporting the view that prayer doesn’t have that sort of medical effect.”

And so, I do not think it is true at all that there can be no empirical evidence of God’s existence. Miracles, prophecy, and answered prayers would all provide excellent empirical evidence of divine involvement. It just so happens that none of these phenomena have been verified by a successful study. Instead, we only hear of such things through hearsay, or ancient religious texts, which are notoriously unreliable forms of evidence. But that does not mean that such empirical evidence could never be provided, in principle.

However, I also want to discuss Aquinas’ Five Ways to assess the kinds of empirical evidence that he offers, and why I find his arguments to be unpersuasive.

Defining the Hypothesis of “God”

First, I will lay down a minimal attribute of God that I consider essential to any successful argument for his existence: agency. God is not an impersonal, non-mental, or non-rational concept, but instead one that implies that there is a willful intelligence behind our universe. God’s miracles, for example, are purposeful events, which are directed towards achieving certain ends. This kind of intentionality reflects the actions of an agent making conscious decisions.

For this reason, I agree with theologian Randal Rauser’s definition of the ‘minimal’ conception of God:

“Theism is minimally the position that the ultimate cause of everything that contingently exists is an agent cause. Thus, God is minimally the ultimate agent cause of everything that contingently exists. So if you believe that God exists as defined then you are a theist. If you believe no God exists as defined then you are an atheist.”

A key aspect of agency is that it involves what philosophers call teleology, or goal-orientated behavior. Not all forms of teleology, however, reflect the actions of an agent.

Platonic vs. Aristotelian Teleology

To specify the kind of teleology that I am looking for–for proof of God’s existence as an intelligent agency– I will use a helpful distinction drawn by philosopher André Ariew in “Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments.” Ariew distinguishes between two types of teleology, and their relevance to theological arguments for God’s existence: “Platonic teleology” and “Aristotelian teleology”. As Ariew (pg. 8) explains:

“Insofar as Aristotle’s teleology pertains to explanations of natural items, it is misleading to cast off Aristotle’s teleology as reading purposive behavior into natural events. This perception of Aristotle’s teleology is the result of conflating Aristotle’s naturalistic teleology with Plato’s … Plato’s natural teleology is and Aristotle’s is not creationist, anthropomorphic, and externally evaluative … Aristotle’s natural teleology is and Plato’s is not naturalistic, immanent, and functional.”

Ariew (pgs. 8-9) goes on to identify two distinct types of teleology in Aristotle’s writings:

“Teleological explanation in Aristotle pertains broadly to goal-directed actions or behavior. Aristotle invokes teleology when an event or action pertains to goals … [W]e can distinguish two distinct conceptions of teleology in Aristotle’s writings and at least two sub-categories:

I. Agency-centered teleology:i. Behavioral. Activities undertaken for the sake of something, which may be either a state or further action.ii. Artifactual. Activities undertaken for the sake of producing an object of a certain sort (artificial).

II. Teleology pertaining to natural organisms.i. Formal. Biological developmental processes that occur for the sake of self-preservation or preservation of the species (form).ii. Functional. Parts of organisms that are present for the sake of the organism possessing them.

I and II are distinct notions of teleology … Agent-specific teleology (I) is purposive, rational, and intentional, and represents external evaluation. The goal is the object of an agent’s desire or choice … Teleology pertaining to natural organisms is distinct: non-purposive (though seemingly so), non-rational, non-intentional, and immanent — that is, an inner principle of change. The goal is not an object of any agent’s desire.”

For an intelligent agent–such as God–the first type of (I) “agency-centered teleology” is the kind of evidence that I am looking for. This type of teleology is akin to William Paley’s teleological argument for God, which maintains that the universe reflects a willful process of design that points to an intelligent creator–particularly in the complexity of biological structures. However, Paley’s argument has long been refuted by the discovery of evolution by natural selection, which instead proves that complex biological structures are merely formal and functional, and are actually the result of (II) “teleology pertaining to natural organisms.” As such, complex biological structures do not point to the teleology of any rational agent.

Aquinas’ Five Ways

Now let’s take a look at Thomas Aquinas’ Five Ways, to see if any of them point towards (I) agency-centered teleology. Out of the five, Aquinas’ 5th way would seem to be the most likely candidate. In Summa Theologica, part 1, question 2, article 3, Aquinas argues:

“The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”

“Though some readers of it seem to have thought otherwise, however, the Fifth way is not an “argument from design” in Paley’s sense. It does not appeal to vast cosmic evidence of design not produced by any human being while produced by a nonhuman designer. Nor is it saying that the world is a single, huge designed object. Rather it is noting that some, and only some, things in the world “act for the sake of an end.” Aquinas is saying that, forgetting about anything we might know about human behavior, there are some things in the world that can be thought of as goal-directed in their activity, and his argument is that the goal-directed activity of these things has to be due to a directing (nonhuman) intelligence of some kind.”

The kind of teleology that Aquinas describes above is elaborated upon by Christian philosopher Edward Feser. In Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide, Feser states:

“A struck match generates fire and heat rather than frost and cold; an acorn grows into an oak rather than a rosebush or a dog; the moon goes around the earth in a smooth elliptical orbit rather than zigzagging erratically; the heart pumps blood continuously and doesn’t stop and start several times a day; condensation results in precipitation which results in collection which results in evaporation which in turn results in condensation and so forth. In each of these cases and in countless others we have regularities that point to ends or goals usually totally unconscious, which are built into nature and can be known through observation to be there whether or not it ever occurs to anyone to ask how they got there. In particular, one can know that there are these ends, goals, purposes in nature whether or not it ever occurs to anyone to consider the purposes, or even the existence, of a designer of nature.”

However, I do not find Aquinas’ 5th way to be a very persuasive argument for God’s existence. While Aquinas may be correct that there are uniform patterns in nature, it does not follow that these patterns are similar to how “the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer.” That kind of teleology reflects the design of a rational agent. The natural patterns that Feser described above, however, are not the same.

“Aquinas exemplifies the melding of two teleologies whereby regularity of pattern is offered as evidence of design. As Ron Amundson so aptly puts it, “In Aquinas’ time it was easy to move from always acts for an end, and thence to achieves the best result” (Amundson 1996: 16). The distinguishing Aristotelian feature is the move from ‘always acts the same’ to ‘acts for an end’. The extra inference is Platonic and explains why the end ‘achieves the best result’.”

As Ariew explains, the kind of teleology that Aquinas provides in the 5th way only points towards (II) “teleology pertaining to natural organisms,” and does not provide the (I) “agency-centered teleology” that would point towards a rational agent–such as God. As such, I do not find Aquinas’ 5th way to be a very persuasive argument for God’s existence.

The first three of Aquinas’ Five Ways do not fare much better. For the 1st way, Aquinas states:

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another … But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.”

However, even if Aquinas were correct that an infinite regress is impossible, and that there must be a first mover, this is not a persuasive argument for God’s existence. The reason why is that such a first mover does not need to be a rational agency. If something impersonal and non-rational was the first mover of motion in the universe, I think it would very strange to call such a thing “God.” I need evidence of (I) “agency-teleology” to believe in God, and Aquinas’ 1st way provides for it even less than his 5th way.

For the 2nd way, Aquinas states:

“The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.”

As an initial observation, I think that Aquinas’ argument that nothing can be the efficient cause of itself may be a case of special pleading, since Aquinas does not seem to have a problem with God as the “first efficient cause,” which apparently has no other efficient cause then itself. I suppose you could say that God is “uncaused,” but why is there nothing else that could be the same? Seems a bit like a double-standard to me…

“The most obvious difficulty with this argument is that it is invalid. The strongest conclusion that could be drawn … is that there are first causes, that is, that there are causes of existence that are not themselves caused to exist. There is nothing in the premise that justifies drawing the conclusion that there is exactly one first cause.”

Regardless, though, Aquinas’ 2nd way has the same problem as the 1st. Even if we buy his argument about a “first efficient cause,” it does not follow that this would be an agent cause. What we need is evidence of a rational agent, not merely that there might be a first efficient cause. If the first efficient cause is impersonal and non-rational, then I see no reason to call it “God.”

For the 3rd way, Aquinas states:

“The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.”

This argument is a bit more complex, but what Aquinas is getting at is the idea of contingency. To simplify and explain Aquinas’ argument, I will quote Graham Oppy’s summary in Arguing About Gods (pp. 103-104):

“The core of the Third Way appears to have much the same kind of structure as the first two ways. However, there is an interesting–and much discussed–supporting argument for the claim that there are necessarily existent beings that is not paralleled by supporting arguments for the claim that there are things in a process of change, or things whose existence has an efficient cause. According to standard translations, the argument of the Third way is something like this:

1. There are contingent things.

2. If an existent thing is contingent, then there was a time when it did not exist.

3. (Therefore) If everything is contingent, then there was a time when nothing existed.

4. Something that does not exist can be brought into existence only be something that already exists.

5. (Therefore) If there was a time when nothing existed, then nothing exists now.

6. Something exists now.

7. (Therefore) Not every existent being is contingent.

8. A necessary being may or may not owe its necessity to something else.

9. The series of necessary beings that owe their necessity to something else does not regress to infinity.

10. (Therefore) There is a necessary being that does not owe its necessity to something else.”

All of that is quite a mouthful, but it still provides no persuasive evidence for God’s existence. Even if there must be a “necessary being,” which owes its necessity to nothing else, it does not follow that such a thing would be a personal, rational agent. As such, Aquinas’ 3rd way still provides no evidence for (I) “agency-centered teleology.”

What I will say about the first three of Aquinas’ Five Ways, along with the 5th way, is that they are based on empirical evidence. Motion, causation, contingency, and uniformity are things that we can generally infer from the empirical observation of our universe. However, they do not reflect the kind of behavioral and artifactual goal-orientation that is characteristic of a rational agent.

We can identify such rational goal-orientation in miracles, however. For example, if a limb were to regrow after someone prayed to a specific god (and only that god), we could infer that the action was behavioral and undertaken for the sake of some rational purpose. If the Red Sea were to part, specifically to allow a group of people to pass through, we could infer that the action was artifactual, in that the it achieves a very precise effect and not other effects. If a man turned water into excellent wine for a wedding, we could infer both that the action was behavioral and done for a certain purpose, and we could even link the miracle to a specific agent–the man performing the miracle.

The same is true of prayer studies. If a successful study were conducted showing that praying to a specific god cured illnesses–and only praying to that specific god, with other religions having no such effect–that would be excellent empirical evidence for some sort of rational, intelligent intervention. It would reflect the activity of an intentional agent specifically answering only certain kinds of prayers. However, as philosopher Stephen Law pointed out above, no such successful studies exist. It is not that such evidence couldn’t exist, in principle, but we simply live in a universe that reflects no such divine intervention from a rational agent.

We only have Aquinas’ 4th way left to discuss, and, strangely, I think that it might carry more weight as an argument for the existence of God. For the 4th way, Aquinas argues:

“The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being … Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.”

This argument appeals to the gradation of normative properties–such as something being “good” vs. “better” vs. “best.” Aquinas argues that, since the maximum of any genus is the cause of all in that genus, then God–the maximum of goodness–must be the cause of goodness in things.

Now, why do I think that this may be a stronger argument? The reason why is that I do tend to view normative properties–such as “good” and “bad”–as reflecting the preferences and desires of rational agents. As I argue in my earlier essay “Normative Ethical Subjectivism,” for example, I think that all such normative properties are dependent upon the preferences of judgemental subjects. When I say that something is “good” or “bad,” therefore, what I really mean is that it is preferable or non-preferable according to the standards of some arbitrative observer. Likewise, as I argue “Teleological Vs. Deontological ‘Oughts’,” I think that the only kind of normative imperatives that can be valid are those that refer to teleological goals. I also recently discussed these kinds of “hypothetical imperatives” in my essay “Are All Norms Moral Norms?”

The problem with Aquinas’ argument, however, is that I do not buy his premise that “goodness” is an objective quality of an object that we can “observe” apart from an arbitrative subject. There is no such thing as as something that is “good”–in essence–in my metaphysics. As Brian Davies (Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary,pp. 43-44) points out:

“The observational premise of the Fourth Way might strike some readers as not being any such thing. For do we observe that some things are more or less good, true, noble, and so on? … To understand the Fourth Way one needs to realize that Aquinas regularly takes being, truth, and goodness to be related in a serious way. For him, something that has being is always to some extent good.”

And here I simply disagree with Aquinas. I do not think that “being” is always to some extent “good.” Instead, I think that things are only “good” if they serve the preferences of some arbitrative subject. And, I see no such normative values in nature apart from what humans assign them.

Regardless, we are back to how we define and conceptualize normative properties–like morality–just as I discussed at the beginning of this essay. And, as I explained above, I do not find theological arguments that rest on these kinds of issues to be persuasive, because they are not empirically testable. Instead, these arguments boil down to how define certain kinds of ontological properties. I do not take it as a valid premise that we “observe” goodness in nature, like Aquinas, apart from human preferences, because of how I define normative value. There is no way to resolve this dispute, but to offer new definitions, and that is not the kind of empirical evidence that I am looking for with God.

As such, I do not see the gradations of “goodness” in being as something that needs to be explained by God, or anything else, to begin with, leaving the 4th way as another ineffective proof of God’s existence.

Conclusion

We saw above that there is good reason to think, theologically-speaking, that there could be empirical evidence of God’s existence. Even if God cannot be empirically observed directly, theologians like St. Thomas Aquinas have agreed that we can still study a cause through its effects. This kind of logic has likewise been used by atheists for years, such as philosopher Stephen Law. If I were to see empirical evidence of God’s effects, then I would be far more inclined to believe in God’s existence.

However, to discern the existence of a rational agency as a cause–such as God–there needs to be evidence of (I) “agency-centered teleology.” This kind of teleology is behavioral and artifactual, rather than the formal and functional features of (II) “teleology pertaining to natural organisms.” As I also argued above, the teleological argument that Aquinas makes in his 5th way is an unpersuasive argument for God’s existence, since Aquinas conflates the (II) Aristotelian teleology seen in the uniformity of natural processes with the arbitrative and agency-centered characteristics of (I) Platonic teleology.

Aquinas’ 1st, 2nd, and 3rd ways are not persuasive, because they do not provide evidence of (I) Platonic teleology, either. Simply because there must be a first mover to put things in motion, or a first efficient cause to start other efficient causes, or a necessary being upon which contingent things are dependent, does not prove that any of these “first movers” or “first causes” or “necessary beings” are rational agents.

Aquinas’ 4th way depends on an ontological understanding of normative properties, such as “goodness,” that I simply do not agree with. Such a dispute, however, cannot be solved empirically, but solely through how we define normative properties. And, as I explained above, any argument for God that boils down to how we define ontological attributes like this will not persuade me. If you want to convince me that God exists, you will have to show me empirical evidence.

Such empirical evidence could exist and be provided. I have argued that miracles would be a perfect example. However, I have also argued in my essay “History, Probability, and Miracles” that we currently have no succesful study for such phenomena. Philosopher Stephen Law has pointed out the same about prayer studies above. Empricial evidence for such rational agency simply does not exist, and instead we only observe a universe governed by impersonal, non-rational, and non-mental forces, just as metaphysical naturalism predicts. But, if such empirical evidence did exist, I would be far more inclined to believe in the existence of God.

But, at the very least, let’s stop pretending–as many religious apologists do–that there could be no evidence that would ever persuade an atheist of God’s existence. Let’s also stop claiming that religion answers “different questions” that science cannot. There are many kinds of religious claims that could be empirically verified–miracles, prophecy, and answered prayers are just a few.

The arguments of theologians like Thomas Aquinas, however, simply do not provide such empirical evidence, because they do point towards any rational agency–like God. But that doesn’t mean that there is no evidence that could ever persuade me of the existence of such a rational agency, in principle [1].

-Matthew Ferguson

[1] Other theological arguments–beyond appeals to the evidence of miracles, prophecy, and answered prayers–that I think would provide logically valid evidence for God’s existence (which is not to say that I think they are sound) include:

Irreducible complexity in biological structures: Although evolution explains quite nicely the apparent design of biological structures (as I explain here), if there were genuine irreducible complexity in biological structures, I think that this would provide evidence for intelligent design. Such evidence would suggest the artifactual intentionality of Platonic teleology, which would go much further towards suggesting the existence of God as a rational agency than the mere Aristotelian teleology appealed to in Aquinas’ 5th way.

Cosmic fine-tuning: If it could be demonstrated not only that the universe had an “unmoved mover” or “first efficient cause,” but further that this initial force had designed the universe in a specific way, then I think that this evidence would suggest the artifactual intentionality of Platonic teleology. There is no evidence of such fine-tuning, however, that cannot be explained as illusory by current cosmological models (as I explain here). As it stands, simply arguing that there is an “unmoved mover” or “first efficient cause” (if such a thing exists at all) does nothing to suggest that this initial force would be a rational agency, like God. I have also discussed the arguments of philosopher André Ariew (“Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments”) above, who explains that Aristotelian teleology alone does not demonstrate that our cosmos was intelligently designed.

]]>https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/09/28/can-there-be-empirical-evidence-of-gods-existence-thoughts-on-summa-theologica-i-1-vii-aquinas-five-ways-and-miracles/feed/0adversusapologeticaaquinasNew Pages on Civitas Humana!https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/07/07/new-pages-on-civitas-humana-2/
https://civitashumana.wordpress.com/2015/07/07/new-pages-on-civitas-humana-2/#respondWed, 08 Jul 2015 00:12:04 +0000http://civitashumana.wordpress.com/?p=1193It’s been a while now that the ‘Recommended Resources‘ page on the toolbar has merely stated “coming soon!”. Sorry that it didn’t come sooner, but now a number of books on topics of secular humanism, naturalism, materialism, cosmology, ethics, and more have been added as recommended readings. This list will no doubt also be expanded with time.