This painting had been formerly attributed to Willem van de Velde the Younger, but in 1973 it was re-attributed to Peter Monamy, a British painter (1681-1749). While there are some of the later van de Velde works portraying a similar ship, the re-attribution of this painting had been reaffirmed several times by M.S. Robinson, the late Curator of Paintings in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, who is a renowned researcher of the van de Veldes’ legacy and the author of two comprehensive catalogs of their works. One of the obvious reasons behind the re-attribution is the fact that the ship flies what appears to be a Hanoverian Standard of George I, who ascended the throne of Great Britain and Ireland in 1714, seven years after the younger van de Velde had died. The white running horse of Hanover is clearly visible in the lower left corner of the banner.

I have seen a very similar painting titled Stern View of the Royal William Firing a Salute, which is signed by Peter Monamy. The stern decorations of the three-decker (also flying a Hanover Standard) are nearly identical to the ship in the former painting. Despite that the ship cannot be identified as the Royal William with all certainty, because she was laid up during the period when the painting was commissioned.

Stern View of the Royal William Firing a Salute, by Peter Monamy

(in private collection)

(image 1400 x 1135 pixels, 1.05MB)

Sources: #ptrmnmy#, a catalog entry of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, NY

On August 291782 Royal George, a magnificent 100 gun three-decker, suddenly sunk in the calm waters of Spithead. The catastrophe took lives of Rear Admiral Richard Kempenfelt and around 900 of the ship’s crew. A thorough investigation had identified the cause of the tragedy – corrosion of iron fastenings in the coppered hull. A few years before a comprehensive program of coppering ships was introduced by Charles Middleton, Controller of the Navy, and it had been completed by the end of the American War. But by 1782 it became clear that something was terribly wrong with the method used to fix copper layers to the wooden hull. For instance a report submitted by Captain Lord Robert Manners after the battle of Chesapeake reads:

We felt severely the danger of keeping coppered line of battleships long out without looking at their bottoms, as the Terrible, one of the finest seventy-fours we had, by her exceeding bad state even before she left the West Indies, and by firing her own guns, and the enemy’s shot in the action, was found in so desperate a state that she was ordered to be scuttled and set on fire.

A number of ships sank suddenly a year or two after they had been coppered. The waterproof tarred paper seal placed between layers of copper and the hull was believed to prevent the rotting of timbers. But the iron fittings were the real cause of the corrosion due to the electrolytic effect. At a considerable cost the entire fleet had to be docked, and the iron fittings had been replaced with ones made out of hardened annealed copper.

The attempts of the Spanish Crown to strictly control the trade with its New World colonies had always been met with opposition by European maritime powers. In the beginning of the 18th century the British formed their South Sea Company to exploit a trading concession obtained from Spain after the peace of 1713. Strict conditions of the concession were largely ignored, which led to a semi-legal smuggling trade across the Spanish Caribbean. The Spanish government lacking proper funding could not impose customs control on its own and instead employed private parties as licensed guarda-costas. The latter, given the Caribbean long-time tradition of buccaneering, acted as peacetime privateers living off smugglers. Constant attacks of guarda-costas on the British merchants had been causing public outrage that had finally reached its pinnacle after an incident involving one Captain Robert Jenkins. Having suffered from a guarda-costa boarding party he appeared before the House of Commons driving the British public opinion to a violent agitation. His cause had proven convenient for the bellicose Tory opposition to force the Government to declare war on Spain, the conflict now known as the War of Jenkins’ Ear.

The British had a small mobile force in the Caribbean commanded by Vice-Admiral Edward Vernon who was appointed to Jamaica in July 1739. He had on many occasions publicly declared that he could take a Spanish strongpoint like Porto Bello with six ships, and that was exactly the size of his squadron that appeared before the fortress in November 1739. Porto Bello was a large settlement and a major Spanish naval base in the Spanish Main.

Vernon’s attack was carefully planned and brilliantly executed. Only one of two forts guarding the bay had artillery and of 32 guns only 9 were serviceable. After 24-hour siege the Spanish garrison surrendered. Unfortunately for the British no rich galleon had been found in the port. During a three-week occupation the British destroyed fortification, wrecked naval facilities and disrupted an annual fair, which was a cornerstone of the regulated Spanish commerce in the region.

This painting by George Chambers Senior was commissioned around 1836 by E.H. Locker, Secretary and Commissioner of Greenwich Hospital, who later donated it to the Naval Gallery of the Hospital. The painting shows an episode of the attack on Todo Fierro (Iron Fort) with Vernon’s 70-gun flagship Burford in the foreground. Further one can see the 60-gun Strafford and the 60-gun Worcester. Flying a red swallow-tail pennant 70-gun Hampton Court commanded by Commodore Brown is seen on their right.

In the early 1782 the French and the Spanish had planned a joint invasion of Jamaica. The French fleet consisting of 35 ships of the line commanded by Comte de Grasse sailed on April 8th from Martinique accompanied by a large troop convoy to meet the Spanish forces off Cap François. Admiral Sir George Rodney, commander of the English fleet of thirty-seven ships, followed at once. With a little wind the fleets have been maneuvering and skirmishing for four days. Hectic maneuvers resulted in a number of collisions in the French fleet that cost it ships and time. Finally in one of those collisions Zelé, commanded by Captain Gras-Previllé, was dismasted which brought on the main battle on April 12th.

The two fleets were passing in line on opposite course cowered in the thick smoke from the cannon. A sudden shift in the wind threw both lines into disorder with some of the British ships crossing the French line. This ‘breaking the line’ much praised later as a brilliant tactical maneuver was in fact unintentional and unfortunate. The British ships around the French flagship were cut and surrounded. The bulk of the French fleet, however, was trapped between the British and the shore and could not escape. In the melee that followed five French ships were taken including the flagship Ville de Paris with Comte De Grasse himself.

Admiral Hood, the second in command of the British fleet, insisted on pursuing of the remaining French ships but the exhausted Rodney who did not sleep for the last four days refused. Still Hood had managed to take two escapees later and the French plans of the invasion of Jamaica were thwarted.

In the middle of the painting the French flagship Ville de Paris, 104, is shown hauling down her colors with the Rodney’s flagship Formidable, 98, engaging her from the starboard. Beyond the Ville de Paris the British Barfleur, 98, is seen raking her from the bow. In the reality Ville de Paris surrendered to Admiral Hood, not to Rodney. The painting correctly shows the British ships flying red ensigns, despite the fact that Rodney was Admiral of the White (note the St. George flag on the main mast of the Formidable). This was the result of Rodney’s order to avoid confusion with the white Bourbon ensigns of the French.

This painting shows the Victory going to windward down the Channel. In the distance beyond the stern Rudyed’s eddystone lighthouse is visible. The ship is flying the flag of Lord Hood as Vice-Admiral of the Red. In 1793 she was bound to the Mediterranean to serve as the flagship at the siege of Toulon.

The Victory is shown as she was built in 1765. In 1780 her hull was covered in 3923 sheets of copper, totaling at least 14 tons of copper and fastenings.

Monamy Swaine was the son of the better-known Francis Swaine and grandson of the even more famous Peter Monamy, and may have been named after him. He was active from about 1769 to 1774 and, if this painting is by him into the 1790s. As an artist he specialized in still-life and genre, although he exhibited two marine pictures at the Free Society of Artists in 1771 and 1772.

This painting depicts the duel between the turkish flagship Real Mustafa (84 guns) and russian admiral Spiridov’s ship Svyatoy Evstafiy (68). During the boarding action the burning debris of the turkish ship set the russian flagship on fire and soon she blew up. The russian admiral escaped the explosion just minutes before. Ten minutes later Real Mustafa exploded too. The turkish squandron retreated to the Bay of Chesma only to be destroyed there in the next two days in what later to be called Battle of Chesma.

Russian painter Ivan Aivazovsky dedicated a number of his works to this battle. This one was painted in 1848.

AN ENGLISH SIXTH-RATE SHIP FIRING A SALUTE AS A BARGE LEAVES; A ROYAL YACHT NEARBY

by Willem van de Velde, the Younger, 1706

A variety of shipping is shown in a calm. In the foreground on the left a small boat with two figures on board is rowing towards the left. One figure works at the oars and the other is standing up in the boat and attends to a fishing net on the starboard side. To the right is an elaborately decorated sixth-rate ship in port-quarter view. She flies a Union flag at the main and a pendant at the mizzen, which is probably a signal. Her port anchor is visible and may indicate that she is about to anchor. She is flying a salute to starboard as a ship’s barge in the centre pulls away from her port quarter. A figure leans in a leisurely manner from the mizzen top, while other figures are occupied on the deck and in the rigging. In the left middle-distance beyond is a royal yacht, viewed from before the port beam with her mainsail, topsail, foresail and jib set. Other vessels can be seen in the left distance. It is has been suggested that the main vessel is the ‘Peregrine Galley’, which was a 20-gun ship built at Sheerness in 1700, since it resembles an annotated pen and ink drawing of this vessel with manuscript notes relating to her decoration.

The artist was the younger son of Willem van de Velde the Elder. Born in Leiden, he studied under Simon de Vlieger in Weesp and in 1652 moved back to Amsterdam. He worked in his father’s studio and developed the skill of carefully drawing ships in tranquil settings. He changed his subject matter, however, when he came with his father to England in 1672-73, by a greater concentration on royal yachts, men-of-war and storm scenes. From this time painting sea battles for Charles II and his brother (and Lord High Admiral) James, Duke of York, and other patrons, became a priority. Unlike his father’s works, however, they were not usually eyewitness accounts. After his father’s death in 1693 his continuing role as an official marine painter obliged him to be more frequently present at significant maritime events. The painting is signed ‘W.V.Velde J 1706′.

In 1775 the 13 British colonies in North America rebelled against British rule and formally proclaimed their independence as the United States of America. What started as a war for America soon became a war for global maritime predominance. It differed in a number of significant factors from the Seven Years War, however. Firstly, Spain allied with France in 1779 and their combined navies were larger than that of the British. Secondly, the maritime war was conducted in Americas, thousands miles away from any quality dockyard resources. The Royal Navy’s successes in the Western Approaches in the Seven Years War had been largely achieved through easy access to the high-quality dockyards of the south and southwest coast of Britain. Crucially these had dry docks where the ships’ bottoms could be maintained and cleaned. In the coming war, however, that advantage was lost. Moreover, the War of American Independence came after nearly a decade of peace. In peacetime the ships had been laid up and the sailors and officers laid off, but to practise naval warfare at a high level required constant practice. Efficient sail handling and gunnery required crews to be drilled regularly; maneuvering the fleet required months of practice of each captain was to be able to regulate his position in relation to others be eye; and the repair pf damage caused by enemy fire or the weather was another skill that could be learned in dock. With no explicit and detailed policy to maintain operational effectiveness, rustiness had grown in Britain as quickly as complacency. The French and Spanish, meanwhile, had been steadily growing and modernizing their navies. In the coming war the Royal Navy was to receive a terrible shock.

THE OCCUPATION OF NEWPORT, 9 DECEMBER 1776. (Fragment)

When the war came, the Royal Navy used its experience in successful amphibious assaults of the previous war, among others, Québec and Havana to attack the rebels in their heartland. New York was a rebel stronghold and the most important commercial center in North America. To provide and alternative naval base to New York, Newport, Rhode Island, was also targeted, and the landing is shown in this image. The artist, Robert Cleveley, was an eyewitness to the assault, serving as captain’s clerk aboard the Asia. Both the attacks on New York and Rhode Island were great successes. The ships in the background can be seen laying down a covering bombardment while the boats pull for the beach. The boats in this image were specially designed landing craft known as ‘flatboats’. They could be stacked on board troopships, and once assembled and launched they could carry two rows of troops facing inward down the center, or artillery as is shown in the foreground to the right.

The hostilities of the Seven Years War were ended in 1763 by the Treaty of Paris. This involved a complex series of land exchanges but it was quite clear that Britain had won an astounding victory through her successful use of sea power: Canada and India were now British colonies. Much had been learned by both sides during the war about the difficulties of maintaining and operating fleets of fighting ships and, crucially, about the defense of the British Isles from invasion. By 1763 invasion was a significant part of French strategy for almost 20 years. Although the English Channel is at its narrowest point only 21 miles wide, significant logistical factors worked against the French. To start with, there were no major French ports anywhere along the Channel. The nearest port that could hold an invasion fleet and the necessary warships to protect it was at Brest, facing the Atlantic on the western coast of Brittany. To launch an invasion across the Channel, the cumbersome and unarmed invasion craft would either have to make the journey alone, unprotected from strong British forces awaiting them on sea and land, or would have to wait for fleet of warships to escort them across. It was, however, exceptionally dangerous for a fleet of French warships to enter the Channel. Not only there were no French ports safe from the weather or from English attack, but escape from the Channel back towards Brest could not be guaranteed in the face of prevailing westerly winds.

For that reason a British squadron watching the Western Approaches to the Channel could protect Britain from invasion and, in the same time, both protect her own trade and attack that of the French. Thus was born the Western Squadron which was to prove highly effective in maintaining a permanent and close blockade of the French coast. The relentlessness of that blockade was made possible by significant administrative and logistical developments; not least the revictualling of the fleet at sea which allowed ships to stay on station, with healthy crews, indefinitely. This close blockade of the French ports not only countered the invasion threat but also squeezed the life out of the French navy and of the entire French war effort. Sailors were denied sea time; the port was denied stores; and the French war machine in turn was denied money as the private financiers who kept the French economy afloat were crippled by British success against French trade.

Maintaining the blockade forged a generation of officers and men who had learned their trade in the unforgiving conditions of the Bay of Biscay and in the harsh reality of combat. Moreover, the execution of Admiral Byng for failing to do his duty at the Battle of Minorca in 1756 strengthened the professional resolve of naval officers so that, at the Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759, Hawke was able to demonstrate what was possible if healthy, dedicated and skilled sailors were well led.

Great technological breakthroughs had also been made. Of these the most significant was the emergence of the 74-gun ship as the backbone of every nation’s fleet. The 74 was large enough and had a significant weight of broadside to lie in the line of the battle alongside 100-gun ships of three decks, but she was also quick and maneuverable; a perfect compromise between the handiness of a frigate and the strength of a line of battle ship. Little progress was made regarding fleet tactics, however. Quiberon Bay had been a resounding success but the battle had been a chaotic melee, fought in a chase, and the French had not expected or desired battle. A number of actions had been fought in India in which both fleets had sought battle, but they again had proved indecisive affairs with both fleets fighting in parallel line ahead. The line of battle, like trench warfare, was far stronger in defense than attack and as yet no fleet was prepared to take the risks necessary to break it.