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A number of philosophers, from the medieval period on (some of whom were occasionalists), have argued that a central feature of causal relations is a necessary connection between cause and effect. But they have also concluded that no such necessary connections are ever to be found among things or events in nature. This chapter examines this argument in its epistemological and ontological versions in al-Ghazali, Nicolas of Autrecourt, Malebranche, and Hume.

A number of philosophers, from the medieval period on (some of whom were occasionalists), have argued that a central feature of causal relations is a necessary connection between cause and effect. But they have also concluded that no such necessary connections are ever to be found among things or events in nature. This chapter examines this argument in its epistemological and ontological versions in al-Ghazali, Nicolas of Autrecourt, Malebranche, and Hume.