Share this

Read more!

Get our weekly email

Enter your email address

Kotor, Montenegro. Wikimedia commons. Some rights reserved.Montenegro is the only country which is
currently negotiating the terms of its EU membership with the administrations
in Buseles. During the last two years 16 out of 35 chapters have been open. Because
of significant problems Montenegro has with corruption and organized crime as
well as with an inefficient judiciary, which is also the subject of a
considerable political influence by the ruleing elite, the EU had opted for a
new approach: the negotiations opened with chapters 23 and 24 (judiciary and
the rule of law) and will conclude with those same chapters.

Moreover the bilateral agrement Montenegro
signed gives the EU administration the power to invoke the 'overall balance
clause' and effectively freeze the ascension process if progress made in the
negotiation of chapters 23 and 24 has been deemed unsatisfactory. It is worth
noting the lack of measurable outcomes in the past two years of negotiations.

Despite
the demonstrable lack of progress on the road to EU membership, as noted in the
EC Yearly Progress Reports for 2013
and 2014, the prime minister of Montenegro likes to point out that his country
is a ‘regional leader’ in EU and NATO integrations. Aside from constituting a
misrepresentation of facts, such boasting by the Montenegrin top government
official indicates the significant problems facing other regional candidates
for the EU membership: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and FYR of
Macedonia.

As someone who playes an active role in the political life in Montenegro, I
could say that my country indeed exists and functions on that proverbial
political, geographic and security border country between East and West.

Within the borders of my homeland whose
economy is barely functioning, we live a Balkan variant of a facade democracy
which does not allow for the existence of independent and functional
institutions. According to local as well as European observers and analysts,
Montenegro's rulling elite as well as our judiciary and law enforcement agencies are
utterly corrupt. Analysts also warn about the strong ties between law
enforcement and organized crime. Last year’s scandalous leaks of classified
audio material, known as the Snimak affair,
clearly documented the government and ruling party officials in concerted
efforts to commit electoral fraud, intimidate and bribe voters, and rig
election results. This scandal demonstrated that the election process in
Montenegro has been controlled by the ruling party and thus rendered meaningless.
It is because of irregularities and election fraud, among other reasons, that
Montenegro is yet to witness a peaceful and democratic transition of power.

This could
have been just another sad tale of ‘transitional pains and challenges’ had it not
been for a worrying security element. Namely, the emerging and gradual
strengthening of the ‘politically influential’ Montenegrin mafia (observation
in the EC Yearly Progress Report)
with ties to Russian criminal networks and specifically with the so-called
‘Russian cocaine’ cartel (as noted by the American DEA and Italy’s DIA
investigations into Šarić, Dudić-Fric, and Keljmendi cases).

In
terms of geo-politics, Montenegro’s position is not an enviable one. It shares
border with the EU (Croatia) and also with authoritarian Balkan states (Serbia,
Kosovo, FYR of Macedonia). While some of our neighbours side with the West and
impose economic sanctions against Russia, others stage a massive military
parade to mark the state visit by Vladimir Putin.

Furthermore, according to the findings by
Western intelligence agencies, many criminal organizations from Montenegro have developed extensive
networks of regional contacts, and are often contracted out by neighboring
autocratic regimes. This is a textbook example of so-called “hybrid” security
threats in the Western Balkans. This
created a regional criminal network whose financial capabilities have long surpassed those
of individual states. Such networks often act as
both a creditor and a strategic partner of individual states. What we have in
Montenegro is mafia acquiring the right to full citizenship and exercising
significant influence in policy development. In addition to controlling
substantial financial assets such criminal network has its own media outlets as
well as a firm foothold in state intelligence services whose main task is to
slender, keep under surveilance, and intimidate opposition leaders while
praising and promoting the ruling elite.

When it comes to economy, the situation is
equaly troubling. Over the past two decades the government of Montenegro had
sold almost the entire proverbial family silverware. Virtually the entire
industy had been privatised in a rather questionable manner. In addition to
selling off and privatizing everyhting the government had borrowed in excess of
45% of the country's GDP, while the unemployment rate continued to grow
steadily. Montenegro's foreign debt is currently sitting on over 60% of the GDP,
and the amount of uncollected taxes paired with the internal debt exceeds 30%
of the annual revenues. If we add to this the most recent capital project
agreed on with Chinese partners– the building of a highway in Montenegro – and
the ongoing legal proceedings related to request for compensation by a former
strategic partner and the former owner of the largest aluminum plant in
Montenegro, Oleg Deripaska, the economic future looks even beleaker. Every
international financial institution that was asked to comment on the
Montenegro's plan to build the highway with Chinese partners had warned against
proceeding with it. As for Deripaska's request, Montenegro is in real danger of
losing the arbitration process and having to pay the Russian oligarch a
compensation of upwards of 20% of the country's GDP.

Even though it may sound strange to say it, I
believe that the aforementioned problems are not the greatest obstacle to
implementing reforms in Montenegro. I would argue that rapidly deteriorating
geo-political situation in the region as well as in the Mediratteanina basin
and Eastern Europe constitutes the gravest threat.

Following the balkanisation of Ukraine, which
was done following the earlier Bosnian scenario, the West once again views the
Balkans through a crisis management lense. The most recent statements made by
the U.S. officlas were a cause for concern. The U.S. Secretary of State, John
Kerry, went so far to suggest that both Montenegro and Serbia are 'in the line
of fire' in the ongoing confrontation with Russia. Experience teaches us that
such statements by high-ranking Western officials mean a shift in their
priorities from issues of democractization and reforms to those of security.
That is why I believe the current geo-political dynamics in the region is the
greatest obstacle to reforming Montenegrin society.

The
reform-oriented rhetoric notwithstanding, the Montenegrin governing elite has
never been truly interested in EU integrations; it rather viewed the process as
an inconvenient but necessary political manoeuver. The structural reforms it
espouses – strengthening the rule of law, establishing state institutions
independent of partisan influence, fighting against corruption and organized
crime – have been identified by the Montenegrin regime as threat to its own
safety and remaining in power. That is why the Montenegrin government appointed
its former chief of secret police to oversee the process of EU integration. The
political opposition is concerned that the absence of measurable results in
investigating and prosecuting cases of high-level corruption and alleged mafia
bosses as well as election fraud and mishandling of public funds could
seriously jeopardize, if not altogether halt, Montenegro’s EU accession.

The
issue of NATO membership, on the other hand, has been treated very differently
by the Montenegrin government and the ruling coalition. For them the benefit of
NATO membership is threefold: it secures the benevolent treatment by the U.S.
and forces the EU to grudgingly tolerate a reform-averse regime, while it also
serves as a powerful weapon in discrediting their political opponents who are
calling for reforms by misrepresenting their actions as anti-Western,
anti-American, and pro-Russian. That is why the government in Podgorica had
decided its troops should join the NATO mission in Afghanistan even though
Montenegro is not a member of the North Atlantic military alliance. Over 20% of
Montenegro’s rather small standing army served as part of the ISAF mission.

This
balancing act by the Montenegrin government could be termed ‘with NATO, against
reforms’. It went on without a glitch until the issue of formally joining this
organization became part of the official agenda. It was then that troubling
links between Montenegrin intelligence services, structures of organized crime,
and Russian intelligence agencies as well as the influence organized crime has
on policy-making came to the fore. Those problems had been noted by both NATO
and EU officials over the past two years but the government in Podgorica chose
to ignore subtle messages couched in a diplomatic language. I believe that is
why Montenegro was not invited to join NATO during its summit in Wales. I also
believe the Alliance is aware that for the Montenegrin ruling elite to reform
its security agencies and intelligence sector would equal the cutting off of a
branch these former communist functionaries have been sitting on for the past
25 years.

All being said, not everthing in
Montenegro is beyond the pale. There are models of political action which
deserve atention and support. Moreover, the situation seems to favour
reform-oriented political forces. The EU is clearly nervous over the lack of
reforms and the sluggishness of the government in Podgorica in implementing
them. The U.S. seems unsure about where the loyalties of Montenegro's security
and intelligence aparatus lie. Furthermore, over the last year or so, a
powerful coalition of opposition parties ready to implement the necessary
reforms along the lines indicated by both Brussels and Washington has emerged
in Montenegro.

While this new opposition coalition
was forming, the crisis in Ukraine erupted. It came as a political 'manna from
heaven' to the Montenegrin rulling elite because it altered the geo-political
dynamics and shifted the focus of the West from the issue of domestic reforms
to those of regional security and stability. Moreover, because of its
long-standing friedly relations with Russia, the government in Podgorica was
able to once again bargain with the West and effectively secure its further
non-compliance with requests for reforms.

Djukanović's government has also revived the
old false dillema - NATO or Reforms – and managed to again polarize the
domestic political scene. Many had argued that the aim was to incentivise the
international community to turn the blind eye to yet another electoral fraud in
Montenegro. Furthermore, it offered to the citizens a choice that, in fact, is anything
but: choose between those who are siding with Vladimir Putin, and the current
model of governing which could be approriately termed Montenegrin putinism. I
could not emphasize the falsity of this dilemma strongly enough. I am convinced
that the goal of becoming a member of NATO while reforming Montenegro is indeed
achievable.

It is, thereforee, of paramount importance
that our international partners refocus their attention back on to the issue of
reforms in Montenegro. To say that, with balanced approach and the implementing
of much needed reforms, a small Montenegrin economy could recover quickly would
be stating the obvious. Within a few years of it being sworn in and in
cooperation with our colleagues from Brussels, a new reform-oriented government
could sucessfully address the problems of corruption within the judiciary,
strengthen institutions, and meet the European standards in the sphere of the
rule of law. It is true that the fight against organized crime would be long
and difficult, but it is also true that one needs to start such a fight in
order to win it.

There is a political force in Montenegro that
is able and ready to work towards meeting the abovementioned goals. That is a
powerful opposition coalition whose support is constantly on the rise and is
currently commanding 30% of the electorate. It is a political coalition whose
program is anchored in western democratic values and whose devotion to reforms
is beyond reproach.

Regardless of the current and worrisome
geo-political dynamic, it would be wise of our Western partners to pay closer
attention to this reformist political coalition. By doing that, they would clealry
recognize corrupt, criminalized, and anti-reform power structure as the
significant creator of problems that contribute to further destabilizing the
entire region.

To read more about the challenges facing specific EU candidate countries, click here.

If you enjoyed this article then please consider liking Can Europe Make it? on Facebook and following us on Twitter @oD_Europe

Related

This article is published under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. If you have any
queries about republishing please
contact us.
Please check individual images for licensing details.