There is very interesting sutta in SN 22.55 that would explain the Buddha's reluctance to deal with Vacchagotta's question on post-mortem non-existence, on the ground that it is too closely allied to the nihilists' position if He had replied in the affirmative to the question.

According to SN 22.81, the nihilists take the position -

He may not regard form as self … or hold such an (eternalist) view, but he holds such a view as this: ‘I might not be, and it might not be for me; I will not be, (and) it will not be for me.’ That annihilationist view is a construction….

On the other hand, the Buddha takes the nihilist thesis and makes a subtle, but significant switch in SN 22.55 as follows -

No c’assa no ca me siyā , na bhavissati na me bhavissati

“‘It might not be, and it might not be for me; it will not be, (and) there will not be for me

According to SN 22.55, resolving in such a manner leads to the abandoning of the lower fetters. So how is the ariyan conception different from the nihilistic one?

The nihilistic position is premised on the verb bhavissāmi actually having a self-referent, since it is in the 1st person singular. This leads to the translation "I will not be". On the other hand, the ariyan version uses the verb bhavissati, which is in the 3rd person singular. In such usage, it takes on an abstract/process oriented conception shorn of self-view, leading to the translation "It will not be".

The concern that the ariyan version could be easily mistaken for the nihilist version is suggested in SN 22.55 -

Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling becomes frightened over an unfrightening matter. For this is frightening to the uninstructed worldling: ‘If there were not, there would not be for me; there will not be, (so) there will not be for me.’

BB has a fulsome discussion on this sutta. I follow BB is using the Ceylonese variant reading and not using the Burmese reading of SN 22.55 as its "no cassaṃ, no ca me siyā, nābhavissa, na me bhavissatī" appears to have suffered a textual loss.

The nihilistic position is premised on the verb bhavissāmi actually having a self-referent, since it is in the 1st person singular. This leads to the translation "I will not be". On the other hand, the ariyan version uses the verb bhavissati, which is in the 3rd person singular. In such usage, it takes on an abstract/process oriented conception shorn of self-view, leading to the translation "It will not be".

On the subject of "self" as memory, I think this is an oversimplification. The khandha/cetasika perception or sanna, according to abhidhamma, is what is resposible for memory and is only one component of the functional construction of "self-notion." From Cetasikas by Nina van Gorkon:

Perception has the characteristic of perceiving by on act of general inclusion, and the function of making marks as a condition for repeated perception (for recognizing or remembering) (I am using the translation of the ven. Nyanaponika, Abhidhamma Studies, page 69, BPS, Kandy, 1976), as when woodcutters 'perceive' logs and so forth. Its manifestation is the action of interpreting by means of the sign as apprehended.

Sanna is not the same as citta which is the 'leader' in cognizing an object. As we have seen, sanna recognizes the object and it 'marks' it so that it can be recognized again. This is explained by way of a simile: carpenters put tags or signs on logs so that they can recognize them at once by means of these marks. This simile can help us to understand the complex process of recognizing or remembering. What we in conventional language call "remembering" consists of many different moments of citta and each of these moments of citta is accompanied by sanna which connects past experiences with the present one and conditions again recognition in the future. This connecting function is represented by the words 'recognition' and 'marking' (1 See Abhidhamma Studies, by the Ven. Nyanaponika, 1976, page 70, where it is explained that the making of marks and remembering is included in every act of perception.)

As the Ven . Dr. Walpole Rahula explains in What the Buddha taught, "self" is a functional creation of the khandhas so the khandas operate together. Otherwise it would be like five horses attempting to pull a cart in five different directions.

So defining "self" as memory would be the same as defining it as a function of sanna, which I think would be incomplete and unsupported by sutta or abhidhamma.

BB

Author of Redneck Buddhism: or Will You Reincarnate as Your Own Cousin?

BubbaBuddhist wrote:On the subject of "self" as memory, I think this is an oversimplification. The khandha/cetasika perception or sanna, according to abhidhamma, is what is resposible for memory and is only one component of the functional construction of "self-notion." From Cetasikas by Nina van Gorkon:

Perception has the characteristic of perceiving by on act of general inclusion, and the function of making marks as a condition for repeated perception (for recognizing or remembering) (I am using the translation of the ven. Nyanaponika, Abhidhamma Studies, page 69, BPS, Kandy, 1976), as when woodcutters 'perceive' logs and so forth. Its manifestation is the action of interpreting by means of the sign as apprehended.

Sanna is not the same as citta which is the 'leader' in cognizing an object. As we have seen, sanna recognizes the object and it 'marks' it so that it can be recognized again. This is explained by way of a simile: carpenters put tags or signs on logs so that they can recognize them at once by means of these marks. This simile can help us to understand the complex process of recognizing or remembering. What we in conventional language call "remembering" consists of many different moments of citta and each of these moments of citta is accompanied by sanna which connects past experiences with the present one and conditions again recognition in the future. This connecting function is represented by the words 'recognition' and 'marking' (1 See Abhidhamma Studies, by the Ven. Nyanaponika, 1976, page 70, where it is explained that the making of marks and remembering is included in every act of perception.)

As the Ven . Dr. Walpole Rahula explains in What the Buddha taught, "self" is a functional creation of the khandhas so the khandas operate together. Otherwise it would be like five horses attempting to pull a cart in five different directions.

So defining "self" as memory would be the same as defining it as a function of sanna, which I think would be incomplete and unsupported by sutta or abhidhamma.

BB

Yes, self is not just memory, but memory is the "rupa" of self. Ego is made of memory and leaded by memory, conditioned by memory and die with memory. What is conditon to this memory (consciosness, body etc), is an another question, but self-rupa, is memory.

I cant find "my self" out of my memory, and i cant concider consciosness like part of "my self".

Imagine, you have a party, you drunk a lot , you wake up , and you friend tel you see that, it's you who does it . You tell that it's not you, you dont remember that you does it. So you have not memory about it, but if we return in the time, at the moment when that accident was done, you have all, consciosness, citta, sanna every you want, but this information is not a part of your memory, it's gone, so you cant say that it was you, this accident is not a part of your "I".

So if the memory is the "self"? - yes.If this definition of self must be completed to work with it? - No. Perharps some one have to know much more details about "self-nature" to stop concider himself like a self, to stop apropriate this "self", and finaly be liberated from it, but i think is not the essential information to be freed from "self-view".

PS: ""self" is a functional creation of the khandhas so the khandas operate together." - it's sounds to complicate, i dont understant it. Dhamma is simple, dry and dirrect, can be seen right now, and actualy, with all respect to the Ven . Dr. Walpole Rahula, i cant see what he said. If some one can traduse it in sample language i will be gentil.

robertk wrote:It is ironic that Thanissaro's outright attack on Orthodox theravada is now being held up as some type of New Orthodox position.

1. Even if this were true, how would it qualify as ironic? "Attack" is overstating it; "outright attack" is completely inappropriate.2. "Orthodoxy" is just a fancy way of talking about opinions. So, you're criticizing Thanissaro for having an opinion about a compilation of opinions?3. The way you've phrased it is ambiguous, and suggests you think Thanissaro should be kicked out of the club. Theravada is a living, dynamic tradition, not a static or unchangeable monolith with Country Club requirements. Thanissaro is a living part of Theravada, a living tradition, and that alone is all he (or any Theravadin) needs to justify challenging the tradition's staleness.4. It might be more accurate to contextualize your criticisms in terms of orthopraxy instead of orthodoxy.

mikenz66 wrote:Hi Daniel, Since Ven Thanissaro is quite clear that he disgrees with other interpretations in a number of areas, it is no surprise that a number of other interpreters disagree with him....Ven Thanissaro makes some interesting points regarding how to make use the the "not-self" teachings. Some possible objections to his interpretation have been discussed in the threads.... Robert and others have given some thought to the matter recently in [this NO self] thread...:

12. "Though certain recluses and brahmans claim to propound the full understanding of all kinds of clinging... they describe the full understanding of clinging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, and clinging to rules and observances without describing the full understanding of clinging to a doctrine of self. They do not understand one instance... therefore they describe only the full understanding of clinging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, and clinging to rules and observances without describing the full understanding of clinging to a doctrine of self.

Mike

...What Thanissaro teaches about anatta is irrelevant (I don't study Thanissaro much anymore and this latest book is just a compilation of scattered teachings I've already digested or got indigestion from.). Whether or not Thanissaro actually told Dhammanando he believes in an eternal self is irrelevant. Whether the Buddha meant NO self or NOT self by anatta is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the Buddha never came out and plainly said the self does not exist, and the one time (we know of) someone asked him if the self exists he refused to answer. What is relevant is that the texts are full of locutions (personal pronouns, etc...) where the existence of the self is taken for granted.

It makes very little difference if one believes and acts as if one has no self or if one acts and believes that the aggregates are not self because in the context of the whole Buddha Dhamma either view has path utility.

Here Buddha seems to speak about self.He dont refute "Manyness" = Self, he dont refute "Oneness" = Anatta, he tell just that is not the way that he teach Dhamma. It mean that dhammas exist on relative point of view and dont exist on absolute point of view, that they are self, on relative point of view, and anatta on absolute point of view, but it's not the way that he teach The Dhamma of liberation from suffering, he teach it by depending origination. "If there IS this, so that IS"

What do you think?

SN 12.48 Lokayatika Sutta: The Cosmologist

Staying at Savatthi. Then a brahman cosmologist [1] went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there, he said to the Blessed One, "Now, then, Master Gotama, does everything [2] exist?"

"'Everything exists' is the senior form of cosmology, brahman."

"Then, Master Gotama, does everything not exist?"

"'Everything does not exist' is the second form of cosmology, brahman."

"Then is everything a Oneness?"

"'Everything is a Oneness' is the third form of cosmology, brahman."

"Then is everything a Manyness?"

"'Everything is a Manyness' is the fourth form of cosmology, brahman. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle: From ignorance as a requisite condition come fabrications. From fabrications as a requisite condition comes consciousness. From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form. From name-&-form as a requisite condition come the six sense media. From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering.

What the recognition of anatta negates is a permanent, unchanging Self. This recognition doesn't preclude the use of pronouns as expedient conventional expressions.

Yes, I' made this point above. This is a further point. The contexts of these passages do not indicate that the Buddha was instructing these bhikkhus in any kind of expedient-conventional-expression way. These are formal instructions.

danieLion wrote:Maybe it's just me, but I don't see any way of having a sense of self and a healthy ego if I believe the Buddha taught "NO self."

Anatta has been misrepresented both in the direction of over-negation and in the opposite direction of under-negation. Again, anatta negates a permanent, unchanging Self, not the impermanent, changeable, developmental self-structure that is a necessary part of healthy psychological development. No aspect of this latter developmental structure is a permanent unchanging Self. Therefore, no part of it should be grasped at or clung to as a means of salvation.