Black History Month 2015 Day 6

Section 1.Neitherslaverynorinvoluntaryservitude,except as a punishmentforcrimewhereofthepartyshallhavebeendulyconvicted,shallexistwithintheUnitedStates, or anyplacesubject to theirjurisdiction.

Section 2.Congressshallhavepower to enforcethisarticle by appropriatelegislation.

TheThirteenth,Fourteenth,andFifteenthAmendments to theU.S.Constitutionwereapproved by Congressandratified by thestatesaftertheU.S. Civil War. Knowncollectively as theCivilWarAmendments,theyweredesigned to protectindividualrights.TheThirteenthAmendmentforbidsInvoluntary Servitude or Slavery, exceptwherethecondition is imposed on an individual as punishmentfor a crime.

Formanydecades,however,thegoals of theCivilWarAmendmentswerefrustrated.Dueperhaps to thewaningpublicsupportforpostwarReconstructionandthenation’slack of sensitivity to individualrights,theU.S.SupremeCourtseverelycurtailedtheapplication of theamendments.TheSupremeCourtthwartedtheamendments in twoways: by restrictivelyinterpretingthesubstantiveprovisions of theamendmentsand by rigidlyconfiningCongress’senforcementpower.

Congressenacted a number of statutes to enforcetheprovisions of theCivilWarAmendments,but by theend of thenineteenthcentury,most of thosestatuteshadbeenoverturned by thecourts,repealed, or nullified by subsequentlegislation.Forexample,Congressenactedthecivilrightsact of 1875(18Stat.336),whichprovidedthatallpersonsshouldhavefullandequalenjoyment of publicinns,parks,theaters,andotherplaces of amusement,regardless of race or color.Althoughsomefederalcourtsupheldtheconstitutionality of theact,manycourtsstruck it down.Thesedecisionswerethenappealedtogether to theU.S.SupremeCourtandbecameknown as theCivil Rights Cases, 109U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct.18, 27 L. Ed.835(1883).Thecasesinvolvedtheaters in NewYorkandCaliforniathatwouldnotseatAfricanAmericans, a hotel in Missouriand a restaurant in KansasthatwouldnotserveAfricanAmericans,and a train in Tennesseethatwouldnotallow an AfricanAmericanwoman in the“ladies”car.

TheSupremeCourtstruckdowntheCivilRightsAct of 1875 by an 8–1vote,holdingthatCongresshadexceededitsauthority to enforcetheThirteenthandFourteenthAmendments.TheCourtheldthatprivatediscriminationagainstAfricanAmericansdidnotviolatetheThirteenthAmendment’sban on slavery.Followingthisdecision,severalnorthernandwesternstatesbeganenactingtheirownbans on discrimination in publicplaces.Butmanyotherstatesdidtheopposite:theybegancodifyingracialSegregationanddiscrimination in lawsthatbecameknown as theJim Crow Laws.

In 1896,theU.S.SupremeCourtdecidedthecase of Plessy v. Ferguson,163U.S.537, 16 S. Ct.1138, 41 L. Ed.256, in which it upheldsegregation on railroadcars.De-segregationistshadhopedthattheSupremeCourtwouldacknowledgethatthefederalgovernment’spower to regulateinterstatecommerceallowed it to bansegregation on publictransportation.ButtheCourtavoidedthisissue,holdingthatthisparticularrailwaywas a purelylocalline. In addition,theCourtfoundthatthesegregationrulesdidnotviolatetheThirteenthAmendmentbecausetheydidnotestablish a state of involuntaryservitude,althoughtheydiddistinguishbetweenraces. In a lonedissent,JusticeJohn Marshall Harlanarguedthatthe“arbitraryseparation of citizens, on thebasis of race,whiletheyare on a publichighway, is a badge of servitudewhollyinconsistentwiththecivilfreedomandtheequalitybeforethelawestablished by theconstitution.”

Duringthenextsixdecades,theU.S.SupremeCourtcontinued to upholdsegregation of theraces in schools,publicaccommodations,publictransportation,andvariousotheraspects of publiclife, so long as thetreatment of theraceswasequal.TheCourtrefused to hearcasesarguingthattheThirteenthAmendmentwasviolated by privatecovenantsbetweenwhiteswhoagreednot to sell or leasetheirhomes to AfricanAmericans.Thus,thecovenantswereallowed to stand.Gradually,though,theSupremeCourt’snarrowview of theCivilWarAmendmentsexpanded,resulting in significantchanges in civilandCriminal Law. Thisexpansionbegan in 1954,whentheCourtoverturneditsdecision in Plessy v. Fergusonandoutlawedtheseparate-but-equaldoctrine (brown v. board of education of Topeka,Kansas,347U.S.483, 74 S. Ct.686, 98 L. Ed.873[1954]).

AlthoughtheSupremeCourthaddeclaredinvalidtheCivilRightsAct of 1875, it hadnotinvalidated an earlieract,theCivilRightsAct of 1866(42U.S.C.A. § 1982).TheCivilRightsAct of 1866wasspecificallyenacted to enforcetheThirteenthAmendment’sban on slavery. By 1968,theU.S.SupremeCourtwasrelying on theact to prohibitindividualsfromdiscriminatingagainstracialminorities in thesale or lease of housing (Jones v. Alfred H. MayerCo., 392U.S.409, 88 S. Ct.2186, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1189[1968]).TheJonesdecisionwasissuedjustweeksafterCongressenactedthefirstfederalfairhousinglaws.

In reachingtheirdecisiontheSupremeCourtfirsthad to decidewhetherCongresshadthepower to enacttheCivilRightsAct of 1866.JusticePotter Stewart, writingforthemajority,turned to theThirteenthAmendmentandobservedthat it wasadopted to removethe“badges of slavery”andthat it gaveCongresspower to effectthatremoval.Stewartwrote:

CongresshasthepowerundertheThirteenthAmendmentrationally to determinewhatarethebadgesandtheincidents of slavery,andtheauthority to translatethatdeterminationintoeffectivelegislation….[W]henracialdiscriminationherdsmenintoghettosandmakestheirability to buypropertyturn on thecolor of theirskin,then it too is a relic of slavery.

TheSupremeCourtcontinues to addressissuesthatariseundertheThirteenthAmendment. In the1988case of UnitedStates v. Kozminski, 487U.S.931,108 S. Ct.2751,100 L. Ed. 2d 788,theCourtexploredthemeaning of theterminvoluntaryservitude.ThiscaseaddressedtheThirteenthAmendment as well as a federalcriminalstatute(18U.S.C.A. § 1584)thatforbidsinvoluntaryservitude. At issue in thecaseweretwomentallychallengedmen in poorhealthwhohadbeenkeptlaboring on a farm.Themenworkedsevendays a week, 17 hours a day,initiallyfor$15perweekandthenfor no pay at all.Theiremployersusedvariousforms of physicalandpsychologicalthreatsandforce to keepthemen on thefarm.TheCourtheldthat“involuntaryservitude”requiresmorethanmerepsychologicalcoercion; it alsorequiresphysical or legalcoercion.But,theCourtnoted,theThirteenthAmendmentwasdesignednotonly to abolishslavery of AfricanAmericans,butalso to preventotherforms of compulsorylaborakin to thatslavery.

Observingthatthedefinition of slaveryhasshiftedsincetheCivilWar,courtshaveheldthatinvoluntaryservitudedoesnotnecessarilyrequire a blackslaveand a whitemaster (Steirer v. BethlehemAreaSchoolDistrict, 789 F. Supp.1337[E.D.Pa.1992]).Thecourtshavefoundthatreligioussectsmay be guilty of subjecting an individual to involuntaryservitude if thesectknowinglyandwillfullyholds an individualagainstherwill (UnitedStates v. Lewis, 644 F. Supp.1391[W.D.Mich.],aff’d, 840F.2d1276(6thCir.1986). In addition,forcing a mentalpatient to performnontherapeuticlabormay be a form of involuntaryservitude (Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp.445[E.D.Wis.1974]).

A relatedstatute is theAnti-PeonageAct(42U.S.C.A. § 1994).Peonage is defined as compulsoryservicebasedupontheindebtedness of thepeon to themaster.ThecourtshaveheldthatneithertheThirteenthAmendmentnortheAnti-PeonageActprevents a convictedpersonfrombeingrequired to work on publicstreets as part of hissentence (Loeb v. Jennings, 67 S.E.101(Ga.1910),aff’d, 219U.S.582, 31 S. Ct.469, 55 L. Ed.345[1911]). In addition,neither of theselawspreventsthegovernmentfromgarnishingwages or usingthecourt’sContemptpower to collectoverduetaxes or Child Support (Beltran v. Cohen, 303 F. Supp.889[N.D.Cal.1969];Knight v. Knight, 996F.2d1225[9thCir.1993]).

Thecourtshavealsoheldthatstateworkfareprogramsthatrequire or encouragecitizens to obtaingainfulemployment in order to participate in thestate’spublicassistanceprograms do notconstituteinvoluntaryservitude or peonage (Brogan v. SanMateoCounty, 901F.2d762[9thCir.1990]). In anotherinterestingapplication of theselaws, a federalcourtheldthat a highschoolprogramthatrequiredallstudents to complete 60 hours of communityservice in order to graduatedidnotconstituteinvoluntaryservitude or peonage (Steirer v. BethlehemAreaSchoolDistrict, 789 F. Supp.1337[E.D.Pa.1992]).

TheFourteenthAmendment to the U. S. Constitutionreads:

Section 1.Allpersonsborn or naturalized in theUnitedStates,andsubject to thejurisdictionthereof,arecitizens of theUnitedStatesand of theStatewhereintheyreside. No Stateshallmake or enforceanylawwhichshallabridgetheprivileges or immunities of citizens of theUnitedStates;norshallanyStatedepriveanyperson of life,liberty, or property,withoutdueprocess of law;nordeny to anypersonwithinitsjurisdictiontheequalprotection of thelaws.”

Section 2.Representativesshall be apportionedamongtheseveralStatesaccording to theirrespectivenumbers,countingthewholenumber of persons in eachState,excludingIndiansnottaxed.Butwhentheright to vote at anyelectionforthechoice of electorsforPresidentandVicePresident of theUnitedStates,Representatives in Congress,theExecutiveandJudicialofficers of a State, or themembers of theLegislaturethereof, is denied to any of themaleinhabitants of suchState,beingtwenty-oneyears of age,andcitizens of theUnitedStates, or in anywayabridged,exceptforparticipation in rebellion, or othercrime,thebasis of representationthereinshall be reduced in theproportionwhichthenumber of suchmalecitizensshallbear to thewholenumber of malecitizenstwenty-oneyears of age in suchState.”

Section 3. No personshall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of PresidentandVicePresident, or holdanyoffice,civil or military,undertheUnitedStates, or underanyState,who,havingpreviouslytaken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of theUnitedStates, or as a member of anyStatelegislature, or as an executive or judicialofficer of anyState, to supporttheConstitution of theUnitedStates,shallhaveengaged in insurrection or rebellionagainstthesame, or givenaid or comfort to theenemiesthereof.ButCongressmay by a vote of two-thirds of eachHouse,removesuchdisability.”

Section 4.Thevalidity of thepublicdebt of theUnitedStates,authorized by law,includingdebtsincurredforpayment of pensionsandbountiesforservices in suppressinginsurrection or rebellion,shallnot be questioned.ButneithertheUnitedStatesnoranyStateshallassume or payanydebt or obligationincurred in aid of insurrection or rebellionagainsttheUnitedStates, or anyclaimfortheloss or emancipation of anyslave;butallsuchdebts,obligationsandclaimsshall be heldillegalandvoid.”

Section 5.TheCongressshallhavepower to enforce, by appropriatelegislation,theprovisions of thisarticle.”

TheFourteenthAmendment,ratified in 1868,hasgeneratedmorelawsuitsthananyotherprovision of theU.S.Constitution.Section 1 of theamendmenthasbeenthecenterpiece of most of thislitigation. It makes“Allpersonsborn or naturalized in theUnitedStates” citizens of theUnitedStatesandcitizens of thestate in whichtheyreside.Thissectionalsoprohibitsstategovernmentsfromdenyingpersonswithintheirjurisdictiontheprivileges or immunities of U.S.citizenship,andguarantees to everysuchpersondueprocessandequalprotection of thelaws. TheSupremeCourthasruledthatanystatelawthatabridgesFreedom of Speech, freedom of religion,theright to trial by jury,theRight to Counsel, therightagainstSelf-Incrimination, therightagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures, or therightagainstcruelandunusualpunishmentswill be invalidatedundersection 1 of theFourteenthAmendment.Thisholding is calledtheIncorporation Doctrine.

Sections 2 to 5 havebeenthesubject of farfewerlawsuits.Some of thesesectionsseemanachronistictodaybecausetheyreflecttheimmediateconcerns of theUnion’spoliticalleadershipfollowingtheNorth’svictoryovertheSouth in theCivilWar(1861–65).Section 2, forexample,penalizedanystatethatattempted to abridgethevotingrights of itsblackmaleresidents by reducingthestate’srepresentation in Congress(nofemaleresident of anyracewasaffordedtheconstitutionalright to vote in theUnitedStatesuntil1920).Section 3 prohibitedfromholdingstate or federalofficeanypersonwhoengaged in “insurrection or rebellion” or otherwisegave“aid or comfort to theenemies”duringtheCivilWar.Section 4 reaffirmedtheUnitedStates’commitment to payitsCivilWardebt,whiledeclaringalldebtsandobligationsincurred by theConfederategovernment“illegalandvoid.”Section 5 enabled,andcontinues to enable,Congress to pass“appropriatelegislation” to enforcetheprovisions of theFourteenthAmendment.

TheFourteenthAmendmentwasdrafted to alleviateseveralconcernsharbored by manyU.S.citizensprior to itsratification.Themostobviousconcernrelated to thestatus of therecentlyfreedslaves.Fiveyearsbeforehostilitiescommenced in theCivilWar,theSupremeCourtdeclaredthatpeople of Africandescentliving in theUnitedStateswerenot“citizens” of theUnitedStates,butmerelymembers of a “subordinateandinferiorclass of humanbeings”deserving no constitutionalprotectionwhatsoever (DredScott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.[19How.]393, 15 L. Ed.691[1856]).TheFourteenthAmendmentvitiatedtheSupremeCourt’sholding in DredScott by makingallblacks“born or naturalized in theUnitedStates”full-fledgedcitizensentitled to thesameconstitutionalrightsprovidedforeveryotherU.S.citizen.

Theracistattitudesexpressed in DredScottalsomanifestedthemselvesaftertheCivilWar. In 1865,thesouthernstatesbeganenactingtheBlack Codes, whichdeprivedAfricanAmericans of manybasicrightsafforded to whiteAmericans,includingtheright to travel,beararms,ownproperty,makecontracts,peaceablyassemble,andtestify in court.TheBlackCodesalsoauthorizedmoreseverepunishmentsforAfricanAmericansthanwould be imposed on whitepersonsforcommittingthesamecriminaloffense.TheFourteenthAmendmentoffered an antidote to thesediscriminatorylaws by guaranteeing to members of allraces“dueprocess of law,”whichrequiresthelegalsystem to providefundamentallyfairtrialprocedures,and“equalprotection of thelaws,”whichrequiresthegovernment to treatallpersonswithequalconcernandrespect.

DredScottwasnottheonlySupremeCourtdecisionthatinfluencedtheframers of theFourteenthAmendment.Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)243, 8 L. Ed.672(1833),alsoplayed a significantrole.Thiscaseinvolved a Marylandwharfownerwhobrought a lawsuitagainstthecity of BaltimoreforviolatingtheFifthAmendment’seminentdomainclause, whichprohibitsthegovernmentfromtakingprivatepropertywithout“justcompensation.”Baltimoredefendedagainstthewharfowner’slawsuit by arguingthattheFifth Amendmentonlyprovidesreliefagainstactiontaken by thefederalgovernmentandoffers no protectionagainststategovernments or theirpoliticalsubdivisions.TheSupremeCourtagreedwithBaltimore.

WritingfortheCourt,ChiefJusticeJohn MarshallassertedthattheConstitutioncreatedthefederalgovernment,andtheprovisions of theConstitutionweredesigned to regulatetheactivity of thefederalgovernment.Thepeople of eachstateenactedtheirownconstitution,Marshallcontended, to regulatetheactivities of theirstateandlocalgovernments.Thus,MarshallreasonedthattheU.S.Constitutionoperatesonly as a limitation on thepowers of thefederalgovernment,unlessone of itsprovisionsexpresslyrestrictsthepowers of stategovernments, as doesArticle I, Section10.

Article I, Section10,providesthat“[n]oStateshallenterintoanyTreaty,Alliance, or Confederation,” or “passanyBill of Attainder, ex postfactolaw, or LawimpairingtheObligation of Contracts.”Thiswording,Marshallmaintained,demonstratesthattheFramersunderstoodthetype of clearandunequivocallanguagethatmust be used to make a provision of thefederalConstitutionbinding on thestates.Becausethefirsteightamendments to theConstitution do notcontainlanguagethatrestrictsthepowers of stategovernments,MarshallconcludedthattheBill of Rightswasinapplicable to thestates.

TheSupremeCourt’sdecision in Barronweighedheavily on themind of JohnBingham, theRepublicanrepresentativefromOhiowhowastheprimaryarchitect of Section 1 of theFourteenthAmendment.Binghamsaid he “noted … certainwords in theopinion of Marshall”when he was“reexaminingthatcase of Barron.” Thechiefjustice,Binghamstressed,deniedthewharfowner’sclaimbecausetheFramers of theBill of Rights,unliketheFramers of Article I, Section10,hadnotchosenthetype of explicitlanguagethatwouldclearlymaketheBill of Rightsapplicable to stategovernments.“Actingupon”Marshall’s“suggestion” in Barron, Binghamsaid, he “imitated” theFramers of Article I, Section10:”As[theseFramershadwritten]‘nostateshall … passanyBill of Attainder …’ I preparedtheprovision of thefirstsection of thefourteenthamendment.”

Bingham’sremarksshedlight on theSupremeCourt’sdecision to makemost of theprovisionscontained in theBill of Rightsapplicable to stategovernmentsthroughthedoctrine of incorporation.Underthisdoctrine,theSupremeCourthasruledthateveryprotectioncontained in theBill of Rights—exceptfortheright to beararms,theright to indictment by Grand Jury, theright to trial by jury in civilcases,andtherightagainstquarteringsoldiers—must be protected by stategovernmentsundertheEqualProtectionandDueProcessClauses of theFourteenthAmendment.

TheSupremeCourthasexplainedthateach of theseincorporatedrights is “deeplyrooted in thenation’shistory”and“fundamental” to theconcept of “orderedliberty”represented by theDueProcessClause (Palko v. Connecticut, 302U.S.319, 58 S. Ct.149, 82 L. Ed.288[1937]).Anystatethatdeniesone of theserights is violatingitsduty to providethe“equalprotection of thelaws”guaranteed to theresidents of everystate by theFourteenthAmendment.

Although a statemayprovidemoreconstitutionalprotection to itsresidentsthan is conferred by theBill of Rights,theFourteenthAmendmentprohibitsanystatefromprovidinglessprotection.Forexample,theSupremeCourtupheldtheconstitutionality of sobrietycheckpoints,whichauthorizepoliceofficers to stopmotorvehicles to determine if thedriverhasbeenconsumingalcohol,regardless of whetherthestopwasbased on Probable Cause or madepursuant to a Search Warrant as required by theFourth Amendment (Michigan v. Sitz, 496U.S.444,110 S. Ct.2481,110 L. Ed. 2d 412[1990]).TheMinnesotaSupremeCourtreachedtheoppositeconclusion,invalidatingarrestsmadeduringtrafficstops at sobrietycheckpointsbecausetheydidnotcomportwiththestate’sconstitutionalprovisionsprohibitingunreasonablesearchesandseizures (Ascher v. Commissioner of PublicSafety, 519N.W.2d183[Minn.1993]).

WhereastheDueProcessandEqualProtectionClauseshavegivenrise to a panorama of legalclaimssuch as thesobrietycheckpointcases,theprivilegesandimmunitiesclausehasproducedonly a fewlawsuitssincetheend of the1800s.Likemostotherlegalterms in theBill of Rights,thephraseprivileges or immunities is notdefined in theConstitution.Nordoesthephrasepossess a meaningthat is self-evident.However,someinsightintothemeaning of thePrivilegesandImmunitiesClausemay be gleanedfromstatementsmade by themanwhodraftedit,CongressmanBingham.

Binghamsaidthe“privilegesandimmunities of citizens of theUnitedStates … arechieflydefined in thefirsteightamendments to theConstitution of theUnitedStates… . Theseeight articles … neverwerelimitationsuponthepower of thestatesuntilmade so by theFourteenthAmendment”(quoted in Adamson v. California, 332U.S.46, 67 S. Ct.1672, 91 L. Ed.1903[1947][Murphy,J.,dissenting]).SenatorJacobHowardechoedthesethoughts,statingthat“theseprivilegesandimmunities,whatevertheymaybe—fortheyarenotandcannot be fullydefined in theirentireextentandprecisenature—[include] … personalrights … such as thefreedom of speechand of thepress,[and]theright of thepeople to peaceablyassembleandpetitionthegovernmentforredress of grievances.”Similarly,RepresentativeJames Wilsonmade it clearthatthe“privilegesandimmunities of thecitizens of theUnitedStates”include“[f]reedom of religiousopinion”and“freedom of speechandpress.”

Notwithstandingthestatementsmade by thesecongressmen,theSupremeCourthaslimitedtheapplication of theFourteenthAmendment’sPrivilegesandImmunitiesClause to provideonlynegligibleprotectionagainstthestateandfederalgovernments. In theSlaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.(16Wall.)16, 21 L. Ed.268(1873), a group of NewOrleansbutchersbrought a lawsuit to invalidate a Louisianalawthatgranted a Monopoly to a localslaughterhouse.Thebutchersallegedthatthestate-charteredmonopolyviolatedtheir“privilegesandimmunities” to pursuegainfulemploymentfreefromunlawfulrestraints.

In an extremelynarrowreading of theFourteenthAmendment,theSupremeCourtrejectedthebutchers’argument.TheCourtheldthatthePrivilegesandImmunitiesClauseprotectsonlyrightsderivedfromU.S.citizenship,such as theright to Habeas Corpusandinterstatetravelandnotrightsderivedfromstatelaw,such as thecommon-lawrights of tortandpropertyasserted by theNewOrleansbutchers.TheSupremeCourthasneitheroverruleditsdecision in theSlaughter-Housecasesnorexpandeditsnarrowinterpretation of thePrivilegesandImmunitiesClause.Mostconstitutionalscholarshavesincepronouncedthisclause a deadletter.

If theSupremeCourthasprovided a moreconservativeinterpretation of thePrivilegesandImmunitiesClausethanenvisioned by theFramers of theFourteenthAmendment, it hasprovided a moreliberalinterpretation of theEqualProtectionClause. In brown v. board of education,347U.S.483, 74 S. Ct.686, 98 L. Ed.873(1954),theSupremeCourtruledthatthedoctrine of “separatebutequal,” in whichtheblackandwhiteracesweresegregated in publicschoolsandotherplaces of publicaccommodation,was“inherentlyunequal”anddeniedAfricanAmericans“equalprotection of thelaws.”Theambit of theEqualProtectionClausewaslaterenlarged by theSupremeCourtbeyondracialSegregation to cover an assortment of genderdiscriminationclaimsasserted by women.

TheCourtmadetheserulings in spite of evidencethatracialsegregationwasprevalent at thetimetheFourteenthAmendmentwasadoptedandthatwomenweretreatedlikesecond-classcitizensduringmost of thenineteenthcentury. In 1868,forexample,racialsegregation of publicschoolswaspermittedthroughouttheSouthand in eightnorthernstates.Thegallery of theU.S.Senatewasitselfsegregated by raceduringthedebate of theEqualProtectionClause.Duringthefirsthalf of thenineteenthcentury,everystateproscribedmarriedwomenfromdevising a will,owning or inheritingproperty,enteringinto a contract, or exercisingalmostanyotherbasiccivilrightafforded to women in themodernUnitedStates.Indeed,theCommon Lawrecognized no existenceformarriedwomenindependentfromtheirhusbands. By marriage,theHusband and Wifebecameoneperson in law,andthatpersonwasthehusband.

TheSupremeCourthasextendedthereach of theFourteenthAmendment to privateactorswhentheybecome so entwinedwithstate or localgovernmentthattheybecome, in effect,stateactors. In BrentwoodAcademy v. TennesseeSecondarySchoolAthleticAssociation, 531U.S.288,121S.Ct.924,148L.Ed.2d807(2001),theCourtheldthat a stateathleticassociationwas so closelyconnectedwiththepublicschools as to become a stateactor.Theassociationsought to curtailtheallegedfootballrecruitingabuses of BrentwoodAcademy, a privateschoolwith a verysuccessfulfootballprogram.

BrentwoodAcademysuedtheassociationandallegedthat it hadviolatedtheFourteenthAmendment.Theassociationwasnot a part of stategovernment,buttheSupremeCourtheldthatthestatehaddelegatedauthority to regulateschoolathleticprograms to theorganization.TheCourtappliedthegeneralprinciplewherethere is such a “closenexusbetweentheStateandthechallengedaction,”seeminglyprivatebehavior“may be fairlytreated as that of theStateitself.”

TheFifteenthAmendment to theU.S.Constitutionreads:

Section 1. Theright of citizens of theUnitedStates to voteshallnot be denied or abridged by theUnitedStates or by anyState on account of race,color, or previouscondition of servitude.

TheFifteenthAmendmentwasratified by thestates in 1870andalsogaveCongressthepower to enforcesuchrightsagainstgovernmentsthatsought to underminethisguaranteethroughtheenactment of appropriatelegislation.Enforcementwas,however,difficult as statesemployedgrandfatherclausesandothereligibilityrequirements to maintainracialdiscrimination in theelectoralprocess.