Before last month’s crash of a flight that began in Ethiopia, Boeing Co. said in a legal document that large, upgraded 737s “cannot be used at what are referred to as ‘high/hot’ airports." (www.latimes.com) Mais...

This the kind of crap that gets non aviation readers upset? The simple truth is that all aircraft are W.A.T. limited (weight/altitude/temperature), and there are charts (old school) and FMS calculations (new school) available to determine aircraft performance. What’s not taught sufficiently during training (sim) is how degraded performance affects particular aircraft aerodynamics. It’s easy to stop or go after an engine comes apart before or after V1, but whether at Mexico City, Quito, Ecuador or Miami, aircraft performance (or lack of) generally surprises the heck out of the crews when in the real world!

Some planes are worse than others , the 737-900s especially use a lot of runway. The 737-700s do ok, my opinion is the airplane should have been elevated with a taller gear, similar to the Airbus series or 757. Probably will see the 757/767s around for a while is my guess

Pardon my ignorance but it seemed to me that he didn't sit on his brakes and allow the noisemakers to fully wind up before rolling. I am under the impression that those (appear to be older) low-bypass engines needed several seconds to spool-up before you started to roll. Or am I wrong on this ? Also I didn't notice a windsock, maybe there was no headwind, it was Australia so the OAT have been very high and, since it was Australia, a long way from anywhere else, he might have had very full tanks.

Don't shoot the messenger. If Boeing hadn't made that claim in their complaint against Bombardier, there would be nothing to report. What was reported by Bloomberg is correct and is not sensationalistic. It's also yet another way Boeing's foolish attempt to stifle competition will bite itself in the ass. The "existential threat" to the 737 is not the C Series (now the A220), it was Boeing itself.

Having spent 40 years as a flight simulation guru, I can assure you that all atmospheric conditions encountered in the real world can be duplicated in simulators of aircraft type. It is up to what the particular user wants to include in their training syllabus that makes the difference.

Simulators have come a very long way since my first encounter with one in the late 70’s right up the B777. Trouble is the instructors are told not to give multiple failures and there is far too much time spent on V1 cuts, unnwanted reverser activation and a rush through the three stall series. It’s a great tool but there is not enough understanding of theory of flight and very little spent on performance. Not that it would have helped in the two Max accidents, but simple knowledge of power setting with attitude and configuration should tell the pilot approx.what the airspeed is. To leave the engines at a high thrust setting while fighting aerodynamic loading in manual flight and listening the deafening roar that accompanies a 400+ Kt. IAS is not taught. I wonder what the standby instruments were indicating. You are correct about the training syllabus, usually low cost airlines and start - ups use contractors at first until they can get their own people into the right seat (read 250 hrs.) and drive the costs down.

Usually theory of flight and flight experience was already learned prior to being hired by an airline due to the 4 - 5000hr minimum requirements. That's not an option today so here we are with what we've got!

Having just done the 737 type rating at my (Major) Airline, I can only applaud them for covering way more than the minimum required by the authorities. I have a little experience already (4500h) but the same comprehensive training is given to ab-initios; including multiple failures, performance scenarios and manual flight. In fact, the first module of 12 hours (out of 64h) was all emphasised on raw data, manual handling. I can only wish that the ultra-low cost carriers and the Regionals would start doing this. good simulator training is invaluable!

Agreed Highflyer. Three are more and more drivers and operators out there moving into commercial cockpits as true pilots and aviators retire. It has become a downward spiral as manufacturers and operators try to make up for this.

Sorry not aviation related but why does this text become almost unreadable as threads get more responses. I am using an iPhone XS. I have told FlightAware but no response. Anyone else see this formatting problem?

Yes, on small screen devices such as iphones. It is not really total responses. It is the indenting of responses that cause the problem. Rotating your phone to landscape view will help but first make sure rotation lock is not on.

Doesn’t the tire issue come into play here too? I know the physics of getting off the ground in a “fixed” distance when high/hot is where this discussion is going, but tire temp is a key limiter too. Longer take-off runs make for higher v speeds and hot runways make for high taxi-way surface temps too. I’m not an ATP pilot, but not one of you mentioned this part of the safety equation at places like PHX. Just sayin’.

Well, I guess one of us ATP's will finally get around to addressing your valid question. If the OAT was a major factor for tire failure you would see it with SWA at LAX, PHX, DEN. They do the fastest turns in the industry and that affects residual tire temps. for long taxi time airports and high/hot ops. The most pertinent issue for tire life is proper inflation pressure, period. Tire manufacturers specifically address under inflation parameters and operation outside of which requires the tire to be scrapped due to sidewall degradation issues. If you are operating at or above the tires rotational speed limit, you are already outside the box somewhere else! Just sayin.

might restate your premise about PHX "has to shut down the whole airport for a few days every summer due to heat". The airport does not close to operations, however, the respective commercial operators, 121, 135, 91 subpart K must have performance charts that meet or exceed the surface temp. at the proposed departure time. I flew a Falcon 20 in and out of PHX on that infamous 1990 day and it was 122 when we departed. The Dassault performance charts for the aircraft went to 125 and the airport was not "closed". We did, however, use a bit of runway!

That is due to the city giving developers the go ahead to build right up to fence lines of airports. The city of Va. Beach is now spending millions to buy back land around NAS Oceana to give it some space and to rein in encroachment.

Sorry not aviation related but why does this text become almost unreadable as threads get more responses. I am using an iPhone XS. I have told FlightAware but no response. Anyone else see this formatting problem?

It's mostly because the manuals don't go that high. Similar thing has happened in Alaska with very high atmospheric pressure, the altimeter setting knob can't go that high so the planes can't legally fly.

Just to add some extra info, quite a few years ago, there was an article by Joe Bill Dryden, then the chief test pilot for General Dynamics at Fort Worth, in the company's "Code One" magazine about limits on aircraft. These included weights, speeds, altitudes, and many others. His main point was that the testing for all of them are limited by customer needs and budgets. For example, the USAF was only interested in crosswind landings by F-16s up to a certain amount. Dryden said he was absolutely certain that the Dash 1 limit could have been higher, but the customer didn't fund testing beyond a certain value and that's where the testing stopped. Not all legal limits on an aircraft are due to physical and technical limitations. Some are because "we don't need it" and/or "we won't pay for it".

I think I said the "performance charts" didn't go that high and the knob will go wherever you want to put it, but the numbers in the Kollsman window have an upper limit that I once encountered going into a lower 48 destination in a Lear 25 back in the 80's.

It is not only the WAT factors to take into consideration, it is what they call "Escape Routes" which deals with what kind of terrain lies right ahead of an airport if a twin engine aircraft at MTOW has one engine failure right after V2. For instance the new Quito, Ecuador airport has severe escape route limitations specially when taking off from runway 36. Bogotá ditto when taking off from runway 13 (an 340-300 had a dicey take off in 2017 which prompted the BEA to consider it a very serious incident; they are flying now 787-9 from that airport; Iberia is all 340-600 to Bogotá; LH switched from -300 to -600 shortly thereafter). Now La Paz, Bolivia has a dubious "square situation": 13,000 ft. altitude and 13,000 ft. long runway and still can not sustain flights longer than 5-6 hours

The only way the airlines could cheat the 2.4/2.7 or 3% climb gradient for Two/Three or Four engine aircraft was to do a VMC departure so that in the event of a engine failure they could see and avoid rising terrain and return to the airport. If everything worked out ok they then had the fuel required for the planned trip. I never liked that idea especially on the A340-300 which required over 10,000’ of runway at GTOW at Sea Level let alone high elevation airports.

The 340-300 was always considered to be underpowered whereas the -600 version with the RR engines is considered somewhat overpowered for take offs at sea level but very well suited for high altitude airports.

Great comment chalet about long haul departures out of Bogota on Rwy 13. The implication being that the B787-9 has a better climb gradient on one engine than the A340-300 is able to manage on three engines. That is unless the Airbus had suffered some kind of double engine failure???

Boeing make a huge error in using the 1962 airplane, the 737-100 and kept trying to make larger and larger, the 737-900 is an example that is was time to stop, they take lots of runways, cruise at 320 feet and are uncomfortable. The should have worked of the 757/767 or went ahead and built the 797. I hate to fly any of the 737 series above the737-700 or the 737-800. This will be studied in the business schools as a mistake similar to the new COKE. Boeing use to be about quality and know the build junk, I not sure Airbus in any better. Profits over safety.

That's part of what I'm asking. Have any other incidents been reported? I'm not trying to defend Boeing here, just trying to make sense of it. Two incidents out of how many hundreds of flights? And no reports of problems by other pilots?

It's at least to some extent an issue with pilot training and the level of pilot experience. I think that to put it into some kind of perspective, in the case of Lion Air in Indonesia, the Captain of the accident aircraft the previous afternoon, flying from Bali across to Jakarta, was able to effectively manage the situation by following procedures. Next morning, same aircraft, same issue, but a different Captain with possibly a lot less experience.

Also Lou, whenever you see any references to the MCAS (Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System) being described as an "Anti Stall" system, this is not accurate, as Boeing are now striving to point out. Every B737 ever delivered (since 1967) is equipped with a stick shaker/stick pusher which is required by FAA Certification rules to warn that the Angle of Attack (AOA) of the wings is approaching the stalling AOA...

I was just looking at the picture heading this article which shows clearly another fault of the Max. What do you think will happen to the wing behind the engines following a catastrophic failure. There is a reason for all the other airplanes in the world to have their engines below and clear of the wing.

Please, somebody. Help me out here. Before they were all grounded how many 737 Max 8s were flying? If they all have that "software," why have only two crashed? Shouldn't they all be falling from the sky? And how many pilots flying this aircraft have reported problems on takeoff related to this problem? I'm obviously not a pilot, just trying to get a handle on this. Thanks.