This book connects two central problems encountered by the Federal Republic of Germany prior to reunification in 1990, both of them rooted in the Second World War. Domestically, the country had to ...
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This book connects two central problems encountered by the Federal Republic of Germany prior to reunification in 1990, both of them rooted in the Second World War. Domestically, the country had to integrate eight million expellees forced out of their homes in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the lost war. Externally, it had to reestablish relations with Eastern Europe, despite the burdens of the Nazi past, the expulsions, and the ongoing East–West struggle during the Cold War. This book shows how the long-term consequences of the expellee problem significantly hindered West German efforts to develop normal ties with the East European states. In particular, it emphasizes a point largely overlooked in the existing literature: the way in which the political integration of the expellees into the Federal Republic had unanticipated negative consequences for the country's Ostpolitik.Less

After the Expulsion : West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990

Pertti Ahonen

Published in print: 2003-11-06

This book connects two central problems encountered by the Federal Republic of Germany prior to reunification in 1990, both of them rooted in the Second World War. Domestically, the country had to integrate eight million expellees forced out of their homes in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the lost war. Externally, it had to reestablish relations with Eastern Europe, despite the burdens of the Nazi past, the expulsions, and the ongoing East–West struggle during the Cold War. This book shows how the long-term consequences of the expellee problem significantly hindered West German efforts to develop normal ties with the East European states. In particular, it emphasizes a point largely overlooked in the existing literature: the way in which the political integration of the expellees into the Federal Republic had unanticipated negative consequences for the country's Ostpolitik.

This introductory chapter demonstrates the centrality of the expellee problem for West Germany's political development. As a means to that end, it provides a long-term case study of a policy field in ...
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This introductory chapter demonstrates the centrality of the expellee problem for West Germany's political development. As a means to that end, it provides a long-term case study of a policy field in which the expellee issue's contribution was particularly significant: the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik — or policy toward Eastern Europe. The goal is to untangle a paradox that characterized West German Ostpolitik particularly until the early 1970s and, on a lesser scale, all the way to German reunification in 1990. The focus is on the complex interactions among expellee organizations, the main political parties, and Bonn's federal government. It examines the expellee lobby's efforts to pursue its revisionist agenda, highlighting the various channels through which the expellee activists exerted pressure on the country's political elites and the degree to which the latter responded to such pressure.Less

Introduction

PERTTI AHONEN

Published in print: 2003-11-06

This introductory chapter demonstrates the centrality of the expellee problem for West Germany's political development. As a means to that end, it provides a long-term case study of a policy field in which the expellee issue's contribution was particularly significant: the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik — or policy toward Eastern Europe. The goal is to untangle a paradox that characterized West German Ostpolitik particularly until the early 1970s and, on a lesser scale, all the way to German reunification in 1990. The focus is on the complex interactions among expellee organizations, the main political parties, and Bonn's federal government. It examines the expellee lobby's efforts to pursue its revisionist agenda, highlighting the various channels through which the expellee activists exerted pressure on the country's political elites and the degree to which the latter responded to such pressure.

This chapter analyses the emergence of an enduring pattern of Ostpolitik interaction among the expellee groups, Konrad Adenauer's government, and the main parties during the period preceding the ...
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This chapter analyses the emergence of an enduring pattern of Ostpolitik interaction among the expellee groups, Konrad Adenauer's government, and the main parties during the period preceding the Federal Republic's attainment of sovereignty in May 1955. The expellee organizations began to voice a variety of political demands immediately after their founding, with the most urgent calls centering on socioeconomic issues, which was not surprising considering the poverty and deprivation that afflicted most expellees in the early post-war years. Accordingly, the expellee groups soon began to promulgate a number of demands that remained standard features of their social policy agenda for years to come. As Bonn's political elites reacted to these demands, a complicated pattern of interaction between the expellee lobby, the government, and the main parties gradually took shape during the Federal Republic's formative years.Less

The Programmes and Strategies of the Expellee Organizations

PERTTI AHONEN

Published in print: 2003-11-06

This chapter analyses the emergence of an enduring pattern of Ostpolitik interaction among the expellee groups, Konrad Adenauer's government, and the main parties during the period preceding the Federal Republic's attainment of sovereignty in May 1955. The expellee organizations began to voice a variety of political demands immediately after their founding, with the most urgent calls centering on socioeconomic issues, which was not surprising considering the poverty and deprivation that afflicted most expellees in the early post-war years. Accordingly, the expellee groups soon began to promulgate a number of demands that remained standard features of their social policy agenda for years to come. As Bonn's political elites reacted to these demands, a complicated pattern of interaction between the expellee lobby, the government, and the main parties gradually took shape during the Federal Republic's formative years.

This chapter analyses West German politics from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's era from the late 1950s to the Bundestag election of 1965 and the last months of Ludwig Erhard's government in 1966, with ...
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This chapter analyses West German politics from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's era from the late 1950s to the Bundestag election of 1965 and the last months of Ludwig Erhard's government in 1966, with a special focus on the intensified scramble for expellee votes that took place in these years. The battle's immediate cause was the SPD's concentrated campaign to court this segment of the electorate, which, in turn, was part of the party's larger project of repositioning itself away from the traditional left towards the contemporary political centre. The resulting electoral tussle raised the stakes in expellee politics and seemingly brought the expellee lobby to new heights of political influence in the first half of the 1960s. However, these appearances were deceptive, for in reality the expellee organizations had by then entered a period of decline.Less

Ostpolitik Options and Expellee Influence, 1959–1966

PERTTI AHONEN

Published in print: 2003-11-06

This chapter analyses West German politics from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's era from the late 1950s to the Bundestag election of 1965 and the last months of Ludwig Erhard's government in 1966, with a special focus on the intensified scramble for expellee votes that took place in these years. The battle's immediate cause was the SPD's concentrated campaign to court this segment of the electorate, which, in turn, was part of the party's larger project of repositioning itself away from the traditional left towards the contemporary political centre. The resulting electoral tussle raised the stakes in expellee politics and seemingly brought the expellee lobby to new heights of political influence in the first half of the 1960s. However, these appearances were deceptive, for in reality the expellee organizations had by then entered a period of decline.

This chapter traces key moments in the interaction between the expellee groups and West German political elites from the start of the new Ostpolitik in 1970 to German reunification two decades later. ...
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This chapter traces key moments in the interaction between the expellee groups and West German political elites from the start of the new Ostpolitik in 1970 to German reunification two decades later. The period was characterized by the continued decline of the expellee lobby's power. The backward-looking organizations found themselves increasingly isolated in West German public life, with ever more tenuous links to most of the political elites, the media establishment, and the general public, including the majority of rank-and-file expellees. The end of the road for the expellee lobby came in 1990, when Helmut Kohl's government finally abandoned its tactical manoeuvring and accepted a long-awaited reunification settlement, as a part of which Germany formally gave up all territorial claims towards Eastern Europe.Less

From the New Ostpolitik to Reunification, 1969–1990

PERTTI AHONEN

Published in print: 2003-11-06

This chapter traces key moments in the interaction between the expellee groups and West German political elites from the start of the new Ostpolitik in 1970 to German reunification two decades later. The period was characterized by the continued decline of the expellee lobby's power. The backward-looking organizations found themselves increasingly isolated in West German public life, with ever more tenuous links to most of the political elites, the media establishment, and the general public, including the majority of rank-and-file expellees. The end of the road for the expellee lobby came in 1990, when Helmut Kohl's government finally abandoned its tactical manoeuvring and accepted a long-awaited reunification settlement, as a part of which Germany formally gave up all territorial claims towards Eastern Europe.

This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of the New Ostpolitik and its initial result, the Moscow Treaty. It argues that the change in West German Ostpolitik resulted from various ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of the New Ostpolitik and its initial result, the Moscow Treaty. It argues that the change in West German Ostpolitik resulted from various interrelated factors, and can be accounted for only when both the specific German domestic structure and the global East-West environment with its intra-alliance dynamics are taken into account. Thus, this chapter shows, the book is based on the fairly innovative approach of integrating different levels of analysis, the political system, society, and international environment, into one model. This is followed by a discussion of scholarship on Ostpolitik. The book's contribution to Ostpolitik scholarship is then presented. The book's aim is to provide the first systematic analysis of the formulation and making of New Ostpolitik based on primary sources.Less

Introduction

Julia von Dannenberg

Published in print: 2008-01-10

This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of the New Ostpolitik and its initial result, the Moscow Treaty. It argues that the change in West German Ostpolitik resulted from various interrelated factors, and can be accounted for only when both the specific German domestic structure and the global East-West environment with its intra-alliance dynamics are taken into account. Thus, this chapter shows, the book is based on the fairly innovative approach of integrating different levels of analysis, the political system, society, and international environment, into one model. This is followed by a discussion of scholarship on Ostpolitik. The book's contribution to Ostpolitik scholarship is then presented. The book's aim is to provide the first systematic analysis of the formulation and making of New Ostpolitik based on primary sources.

This chapter presents the idea that the New Ostpolitik was both an integral part of and an independent force in German approach to Western détente policy. It could develop only in the context of the ...
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This chapter presents the idea that the New Ostpolitik was both an integral part of and an independent force in German approach to Western détente policy. It could develop only in the context of the international trend towards détente, but at the same time proved to be an independent policy of an economically and politically strengthened Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that pursued German interests. This chapter discusses both the development from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ Ostpolitik and its relation to international détente policy to provide a better understanding of the making of the Moscow Treaty as the start of New Ostpolitik.Less

Setting the Stage: From Confrontation to Détente

Julia von Dannenberg

Published in print: 2008-01-10

This chapter presents the idea that the New Ostpolitik was both an integral part of and an independent force in German approach to Western détente policy. It could develop only in the context of the international trend towards détente, but at the same time proved to be an independent policy of an economically and politically strengthened Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that pursued German interests. This chapter discusses both the development from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ Ostpolitik and its relation to international détente policy to provide a better understanding of the making of the Moscow Treaty as the start of New Ostpolitik.

The renunciation-of-force policy for which the Foreign Ministry prepared under Brandt's lead was implemented, and a treaty with Moscow concluded, only nine months after the formation of the new ...
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The renunciation-of-force policy for which the Foreign Ministry prepared under Brandt's lead was implemented, and a treaty with Moscow concluded, only nine months after the formation of the new government. Whatever the quality of the prior preparations, implementing this new ‘ostpolitical’ programme was still a very different matter from merely planning it behind the closed doors of the Foreign Ministry. This chapter addresses the policy-making processes within the domestic and international context. Specifically, it addresses the following questions: Given that the Ostpolitik that Brandt announced was so hotly contested, how could it be put into action so successfully and swiftly? Which actors, interests, and factors, within the government as well as outside it, played a role in the making of the Moscow Treaty? What were the goals and motives of the Brandt government in the policy under consideration?Less

‘Unpacking the Box’: The Making of the Moscow Treaty in the Domestic and International Contexts

Julia von Dannenberg

Published in print: 2008-01-10

The renunciation-of-force policy for which the Foreign Ministry prepared under Brandt's lead was implemented, and a treaty with Moscow concluded, only nine months after the formation of the new government. Whatever the quality of the prior preparations, implementing this new ‘ostpolitical’ programme was still a very different matter from merely planning it behind the closed doors of the Foreign Ministry. This chapter addresses the policy-making processes within the domestic and international context. Specifically, it addresses the following questions: Given that the Ostpolitik that Brandt announced was so hotly contested, how could it be put into action so successfully and swiftly? Which actors, interests, and factors, within the government as well as outside it, played a role in the making of the Moscow Treaty? What were the goals and motives of the Brandt government in the policy under consideration?

This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions from the preceding chapters. It argues that the New Ostpolitik was the realization of Brandt's, and not Kiesinger's ‘ostpolitical’ agenda ...
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This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions from the preceding chapters. It argues that the New Ostpolitik was the realization of Brandt's, and not Kiesinger's ‘ostpolitical’ agenda as devised during the Grand Coalition government. Ostpolitik was the work of only a handful of authors: Brandt, Bahr, and some other key advisers. The departments and actors formally in charge of foreign policy, most notably the Foreign Ministry, had little or no say in the execution of the new Eastern policy.Less

Conclusion

Julia von Dannenberg

Published in print: 2008-01-10

This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions from the preceding chapters. It argues that the New Ostpolitik was the realization of Brandt's, and not Kiesinger's ‘ostpolitical’ agenda as devised during the Grand Coalition government. Ostpolitik was the work of only a handful of authors: Brandt, Bahr, and some other key advisers. The departments and actors formally in charge of foreign policy, most notably the Foreign Ministry, had little or no say in the execution of the new Eastern policy.

This chapter follows, through the Cold War up to the present day, the continuing and evolving German relationship with Eastern Europe. The different orientations of the Federal Republic of Germany ...
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This chapter follows, through the Cold War up to the present day, the continuing and evolving German relationship with Eastern Europe. The different orientations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are analyzed through their foreign policies, the building of the Berlin Wall, Ostpolitik, and the curious competition to appropriate Prussia's disputed historical legacy. The chapter concludes by taking stock of the state of the German myth of the East today, examining complexities of reunification and the persistent ‘wall in the minds’, especially in mutual antagonistic stereotypes of ‘Wessis’ and ‘Ossis’, so-called ‘Ostalgie’ (nostalgia for a lost eastern German state and society), and the paradoxical belated rise of a distinct East German national identity. The chapter ends with an assessment of the future of German relations with Eastern Europe, marked by issues like the challenges of the European Union's expansion and relations with the new Russia.Less

From the Cold War to the Present

Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius

Published in print: 2009-08-27

This chapter follows, through the Cold War up to the present day, the continuing and evolving German relationship with Eastern Europe. The different orientations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are analyzed through their foreign policies, the building of the Berlin Wall, Ostpolitik, and the curious competition to appropriate Prussia's disputed historical legacy. The chapter concludes by taking stock of the state of the German myth of the East today, examining complexities of reunification and the persistent ‘wall in the minds’, especially in mutual antagonistic stereotypes of ‘Wessis’ and ‘Ossis’, so-called ‘Ostalgie’ (nostalgia for a lost eastern German state and society), and the paradoxical belated rise of a distinct East German national identity. The chapter ends with an assessment of the future of German relations with Eastern Europe, marked by issues like the challenges of the European Union's expansion and relations with the new Russia.

Uses petitions to the Security section of the East German communist party to monitor the Wanderlust of East Germans seeking to take advantage of the travel reforms enacted in the wake of Ostpolitik ...
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Uses petitions to the Security section of the East German communist party to monitor the Wanderlust of East Germans seeking to take advantage of the travel reforms enacted in the wake of Ostpolitik in the early 1970s. The fact that only East Germans with western relatives could partake of these exceptions created a two‐tier mentality in the GDR, undermining egalitarian claims. The Stasi's involvement in vetting travellers is considered, and the paradox that ‘regime‐carriers' such as soldiers and teachers were least likely to be granted travel to the West, generating resentments against punishment for loyalty. The chapter then proceeds to the more serious step of applications to leave the country once and for all, and the Stasi's attempts to stifle what became a nascent civil rights movement in the 1980s. It concludes by considering the tensions which arose between emigration seekers and reformers who wanted to stay in the GDR to work from within—rifts which have left their mark in the historiography of East German dissidence.Less

Wanderlust: Travel, Emigration and the Movement

Patrick Major

Published in print: 2009-11-05

Uses petitions to the Security section of the East German communist party to monitor the Wanderlust of East Germans seeking to take advantage of the travel reforms enacted in the wake of Ostpolitik in the early 1970s. The fact that only East Germans with western relatives could partake of these exceptions created a two‐tier mentality in the GDR, undermining egalitarian claims. The Stasi's involvement in vetting travellers is considered, and the paradox that ‘regime‐carriers' such as soldiers and teachers were least likely to be granted travel to the West, generating resentments against punishment for loyalty. The chapter then proceeds to the more serious step of applications to leave the country once and for all, and the Stasi's attempts to stifle what became a nascent civil rights movement in the 1980s. It concludes by considering the tensions which arose between emigration seekers and reformers who wanted to stay in the GDR to work from within—rifts which have left their mark in the historiography of East German dissidence.

This study explores the emerging politics of peace, both as an ideal and as a pragmatic aspect of international relations during the early Cold War. By tracing the myriad ways in which a broad ...
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This study explores the emerging politics of peace, both as an ideal and as a pragmatic aspect of international relations during the early Cold War. By tracing the myriad ways in which a broad spectrum of people involved in and affected by the Cold War used, altered, and fought over this seemingly universal concept, it deconstructs the assumed binary between realist and idealist foreign policy approaches generally accepted among contemporary policymakers. It argues that a politics of peace emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of a gradual convergence between idealism and realism. A transnational politics of peace succeeded only when idealist objectives met the needs of realist political ambition. It maps three dynamic arenas that together shaped the global discourse on peace: Cold War states, peace advocacy groups, and anticolonial liberationists. The thematic focus on peace moves transnationally where transnational discourses on peace emerged. It reveals the transnational networks that challenged and eventually undermined the Cold War order. It deterritorializes the Cold War by revealing the multiple divides that emerged within each Cold War camp, as peace activists challenged their own governments over the right path toward global peace, and also challenged each other over the best strategy. The Politics of Peace assumes a global perspective once peace advocates confronted the violence of national liberation movements in the Third World. It thus demonstrates that the Cold War was both more ubiquitous and less territorial than previously assumed.Less

The Politics of Peace : A Global Cold War History

Petra Goedde

Published in print: 2019-04-25

This study explores the emerging politics of peace, both as an ideal and as a pragmatic aspect of international relations during the early Cold War. By tracing the myriad ways in which a broad spectrum of people involved in and affected by the Cold War used, altered, and fought over this seemingly universal concept, it deconstructs the assumed binary between realist and idealist foreign policy approaches generally accepted among contemporary policymakers. It argues that a politics of peace emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of a gradual convergence between idealism and realism. A transnational politics of peace succeeded only when idealist objectives met the needs of realist political ambition. It maps three dynamic arenas that together shaped the global discourse on peace: Cold War states, peace advocacy groups, and anticolonial liberationists. The thematic focus on peace moves transnationally where transnational discourses on peace emerged. It reveals the transnational networks that challenged and eventually undermined the Cold War order. It deterritorializes the Cold War by revealing the multiple divides that emerged within each Cold War camp, as peace activists challenged their own governments over the right path toward global peace, and also challenged each other over the best strategy. The Politics of Peace assumes a global perspective once peace advocates confronted the violence of national liberation movements in the Third World. It thus demonstrates that the Cold War was both more ubiquitous and less territorial than previously assumed.

This chapter deals with the Harmel report and the involvement during 1967 of Britain and Germany in the reappraisal of NATO and its future tasks, proposed by Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign ...
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This chapter deals with the Harmel report and the involvement during 1967 of Britain and Germany in the reappraisal of NATO and its future tasks, proposed by Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign Minister. That such a reappraisal was both necessary and urgent was evident after the French withdrawal from the military organization of NATO and in the light of questioning by public opinion in NATO countries of the utility of the organisation. For Germany, the exercise was regarded as an important opportunity to reinforce its own Ostpolitik and to ensure that the German problem was deemed by members of the Alliance as an essential ingredient of a settlement in Europe. An important consideration, in terms of Anglo-German relations, was that Britain and Germany co-operated closely as co-rapporteurs for one of the Harmel study working groups.Less

Britain, Germany and the Harmel report

Terry Macintyre

Published in print: 2007-12-01

This chapter deals with the Harmel report and the involvement during 1967 of Britain and Germany in the reappraisal of NATO and its future tasks, proposed by Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign Minister. That such a reappraisal was both necessary and urgent was evident after the French withdrawal from the military organization of NATO and in the light of questioning by public opinion in NATO countries of the utility of the organisation. For Germany, the exercise was regarded as an important opportunity to reinforce its own Ostpolitik and to ensure that the German problem was deemed by members of the Alliance as an essential ingredient of a settlement in Europe. An important consideration, in terms of Anglo-German relations, was that Britain and Germany co-operated closely as co-rapporteurs for one of the Harmel study working groups.

This chapter centres on German Ostpolitik in its three phases and the reaction to it by the British government. Britain was a firm advocate of moves designed to improve East-West relations, and ...
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This chapter centres on German Ostpolitik in its three phases and the reaction to it by the British government. Britain was a firm advocate of moves designed to improve East-West relations, and encouraged Germany away from the Hallstein doctrine, towards a position that was based on an improved détente with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries as the best means of achieving a settlement in Europe. The discussion includes detail of a seemingly little-known British Ostpolitik initiative launched in 1966, which proposed a ‘Declaration on Europe’. Like the British reaction to the Peace Note, the Germans were lukewarm about the Declaration, but it was an indication of the state of relations at the time that neither country was prepared to express outright opposition.Less

Détente, Ostpolitik and Anglo-German relations

Terry Macintyre

Published in print: 2007-12-01

This chapter centres on German Ostpolitik in its three phases and the reaction to it by the British government. Britain was a firm advocate of moves designed to improve East-West relations, and encouraged Germany away from the Hallstein doctrine, towards a position that was based on an improved détente with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries as the best means of achieving a settlement in Europe. The discussion includes detail of a seemingly little-known British Ostpolitik initiative launched in 1966, which proposed a ‘Declaration on Europe’. Like the British reaction to the Peace Note, the Germans were lukewarm about the Declaration, but it was an indication of the state of relations at the time that neither country was prepared to express outright opposition.

Looking at East Germany (or the German Democratic Republic, GDR), Oliver Bange points out how intelligence gathering and analysis under dictatorship is hindered by mirror-imaging the adversary’s ...
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Looking at East Germany (or the German Democratic Republic, GDR), Oliver Bange points out how intelligence gathering and analysis under dictatorship is hindered by mirror-imaging the adversary’s intentions, and thereby misdirecting an expensive intelligence effort to futile ends, while consuming precious, limited material and human means. Namely, the GDR, convinced that it had built a truly socialist society whose only threat lay in external states, led the ruling decision-makers to chronically underestimate the possibility of dissent within their own society. As a result, intelligence efforts were expended on collecting information about “counterrevolution” initiatives from the West—a misguided anxiety, as détente-minded politicians on the other side of the Iron Curtain had long deserted the cause of liberating those under Communist rule. The East German regime, here as elsewhere, undermined its own security through a lack of self-questioning and subordination to doctrine.Less

The Stasi Confronts Western Strategies for Transformation, 1966–1975

Oliver Bange

Published in print: 2013-12-18

Looking at East Germany (or the German Democratic Republic, GDR), Oliver Bange points out how intelligence gathering and analysis under dictatorship is hindered by mirror-imaging the adversary’s intentions, and thereby misdirecting an expensive intelligence effort to futile ends, while consuming precious, limited material and human means. Namely, the GDR, convinced that it had built a truly socialist society whose only threat lay in external states, led the ruling decision-makers to chronically underestimate the possibility of dissent within their own society. As a result, intelligence efforts were expended on collecting information about “counterrevolution” initiatives from the West—a misguided anxiety, as détente-minded politicians on the other side of the Iron Curtain had long deserted the cause of liberating those under Communist rule. The East German regime, here as elsewhere, undermined its own security through a lack of self-questioning and subordination to doctrine.

This chapter explores Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s disdain for hegemony and search for primacy as they sought to refurbish America’s tarnished reputation. Through their pursuit of détente ...
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This chapter explores Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s disdain for hegemony and search for primacy as they sought to refurbish America’s tarnished reputation. Through their pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union and China, their resort to the Nixon Doctrine (to exit as gracefully as possible from Indochina), and the meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in December 1971 to restore America’s global economic stature, they attempted to achieve U.S. primacy in world affairs. Their efforts to implement the novel grand strategy of strategic globalism fell short, as seen in the difficulty of extricating the United States from Vietnam, Nixon’s Watergate imbroglio, and the presence of competing visions of world order among allies, most notably in West Germany’s pursuit of Ostpolitik.Less

Attaining Primacy

William O. WalkerIII

Published in print: 2018-10-15

This chapter explores Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s disdain for hegemony and search for primacy as they sought to refurbish America’s tarnished reputation. Through their pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union and China, their resort to the Nixon Doctrine (to exit as gracefully as possible from Indochina), and the meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in December 1971 to restore America’s global economic stature, they attempted to achieve U.S. primacy in world affairs. Their efforts to implement the novel grand strategy of strategic globalism fell short, as seen in the difficulty of extricating the United States from Vietnam, Nixon’s Watergate imbroglio, and the presence of competing visions of world order among allies, most notably in West Germany’s pursuit of Ostpolitik.

In this chapter, Olick outlines the general political trends of the postwar period in West Germany. He begins by tracing the successes of the Social Democrats’ Ostpolitik in the 1970s and the turn ...
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In this chapter, Olick outlines the general political trends of the postwar period in West Germany. He begins by tracing the successes of the Social Democrats’ Ostpolitik in the 1970s and the turn toward neoconservatism in the Seventies and Eighties. Olick then examines Helmut Schmidt’s pragmatic claims that the Federal Republic was a “normal” state, facing the same problems in the same ways as other states, and how Schmidt’s government ultimately gave way to Kohl’s conservative government in the context of the Euromissile debates. Olick asserts that Schmidt’s tenure and the subsequent election of Karl Carstens as president mark a first state of the “normal nation”, and he identifies Kohl’s emphasis on importance of tradition and sense of German history as important to this transition. According to Olick, the Nazi past grew to be viewed as a distant historical past rather than a pressing issue. He concludes with a discussion of the idea of normalization, which Olick argues failed in some ways but aided the Federal Republic in others.Less

The Normal Nation

Jeffrey K. Olick

Published in print: 2016-11-24

In this chapter, Olick outlines the general political trends of the postwar period in West Germany. He begins by tracing the successes of the Social Democrats’ Ostpolitik in the 1970s and the turn toward neoconservatism in the Seventies and Eighties. Olick then examines Helmut Schmidt’s pragmatic claims that the Federal Republic was a “normal” state, facing the same problems in the same ways as other states, and how Schmidt’s government ultimately gave way to Kohl’s conservative government in the context of the Euromissile debates. Olick asserts that Schmidt’s tenure and the subsequent election of Karl Carstens as president mark a first state of the “normal nation”, and he identifies Kohl’s emphasis on importance of tradition and sense of German history as important to this transition. According to Olick, the Nazi past grew to be viewed as a distant historical past rather than a pressing issue. He concludes with a discussion of the idea of normalization, which Olick argues failed in some ways but aided the Federal Republic in others.

This chapter is primarily concerned with the evolution of Vatican policies in response to the systematic persecution of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, China, and parts of South-East Asia, ...
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This chapter is primarily concerned with the evolution of Vatican policies in response to the systematic persecution of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, China, and parts of South-East Asia, culminating in the excommunication of Communists in 1949, against the background of the development of the Cold War between East and West after 1945. It also examines the papacy’s relationships in this period with the countries of Western Europe, especially the reviving democracies in France, Germany, and Italy, but also the Iberian dictatorships, and explores the attitude of Pius XII towards the Atlantic Alliance and the emerging processes of European integration. It focuses attention upon the Americas, North and South, and upon the Vatican’s response to the processes of decolonization, especially in Palestine. It concludes with an examination of claims that the later years of Pius XII’s pontificate constituted a sort of preparation for the Ostpolitik of his successors.Less

Pius XII : Communism and the Cold War

John Pollard

Published in print: 2014-10-30

This chapter is primarily concerned with the evolution of Vatican policies in response to the systematic persecution of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, China, and parts of South-East Asia, culminating in the excommunication of Communists in 1949, against the background of the development of the Cold War between East and West after 1945. It also examines the papacy’s relationships in this period with the countries of Western Europe, especially the reviving democracies in France, Germany, and Italy, but also the Iberian dictatorships, and explores the attitude of Pius XII towards the Atlantic Alliance and the emerging processes of European integration. It focuses attention upon the Americas, North and South, and upon the Vatican’s response to the processes of decolonization, especially in Palestine. It concludes with an examination of claims that the later years of Pius XII’s pontificate constituted a sort of preparation for the Ostpolitik of his successors.

The final chapter examines the development of German division and the inter-German border from the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two German governments until the collapse of the border in 1989. It ...
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The final chapter examines the development of German division and the inter-German border from the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two German governments until the collapse of the border in 1989. It analyses the work of the joint Border Committee, which marked the border between East and West and institutionalized cross-border interactions by 1978. The chapter shows that this process allowed East German forces to turn the border into an almost impenetrable divide for the first time. But the East–West compromise also sowed the seeds of division’s undoing. The chapter documents the growing distance between the experiences of East and West Germans and the disappearance of local- and regional-level administrative contact. The chapter argues that the GDR regime’s failure to contain the pressure for greater mobility spelled its demise during the second half of the 1980s. The regional drama of unification in the Eichsfeld completes the story which began with the drama of division.Less

Divide and Rule : The Openly Negotiated Border and Its Demise

Sagi Schaefer

Published in print: 2014-10-09

The final chapter examines the development of German division and the inter-German border from the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two German governments until the collapse of the border in 1989. It analyses the work of the joint Border Committee, which marked the border between East and West and institutionalized cross-border interactions by 1978. The chapter shows that this process allowed East German forces to turn the border into an almost impenetrable divide for the first time. But the East–West compromise also sowed the seeds of division’s undoing. The chapter documents the growing distance between the experiences of East and West Germans and the disappearance of local- and regional-level administrative contact. The chapter argues that the GDR regime’s failure to contain the pressure for greater mobility spelled its demise during the second half of the 1980s. The regional drama of unification in the Eichsfeld completes the story which began with the drama of division.

This chapter discusses the two distinct currents of West German foreign policy—Westbindung and Ostpolitik. The main arguments in West German foreign policy centered on Germany and its relationship to ...
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This chapter discusses the two distinct currents of West German foreign policy—Westbindung and Ostpolitik. The main arguments in West German foreign policy centered on Germany and its relationship to the West. Westbindung sought to deepen the ties of Germany with the U.S., even at the cost of dividing up East Germany from West Germany. Ostpolitik emphasized the unity of Germany, therefore rejecting the Westbindung arguing that it would cause a division between the two. These opposing foreign policies resulted in a political rift between the Christian Democrats who wanted to integrate West Germany into the U.S., and the Social Democrats who challenged this approach, and kept open the possibility of German reunification.Less

Idealism and Realism

Hans Kundnani

Published in print: 2015-01-14

This chapter discusses the two distinct currents of West German foreign policy—Westbindung and Ostpolitik. The main arguments in West German foreign policy centered on Germany and its relationship to the West. Westbindung sought to deepen the ties of Germany with the U.S., even at the cost of dividing up East Germany from West Germany. Ostpolitik emphasized the unity of Germany, therefore rejecting the Westbindung arguing that it would cause a division between the two. These opposing foreign policies resulted in a political rift between the Christian Democrats who wanted to integrate West Germany into the U.S., and the Social Democrats who challenged this approach, and kept open the possibility of German reunification.