Here is a selection of case/reference citations regarding
judicial immunity when personally suing a Judge for money damages,
from the collection of former Phoenix, AZ Attorney Robert A.
Hirschfeld, JD. (Warning: Study and shepardize the cited case for
consistency with your situation, before citing it in your own
brief. Links to tools on shepardizing a case are on The Pro se Way)

In Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980) the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed an Arizona District Court dismissal based upon
absolute judicial immunity, finding that both necessary immunity
prongs were absent; later, in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072
(1986), the Ninth Circuit, en banc , criticized the "judicial
nature" analysis it had published in Rankin as unnecessarily
restrictive. But Rankin's ultimate result was not changed, because
Judge Howard had been independently divested of absolute judicial
immunity by his complete lack of jurisdiction.

Some Defendants urge that any act "of a judicial nature"
entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a
jurisdictional vacuum, (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the
second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing.
Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349.

"Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for
discretion is incident to jurisdiction." Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray
120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646
(1872)

A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject
matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for
his acts. Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)

Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts within
or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts have been
done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception being for acts
done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Gregory v. Thompson,
500 F2d 59 (C.A. Ariz. 1974)

There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts
wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a
civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign. Cooper
v. O'Conner, 99 F.2d 133

When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or
without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held
civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a
decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction. State use of
Little v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64 So.
2d 697.

"... the particular phraseology of the constitution of the
United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to
be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to
the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument." Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803).

"No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any
lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it
beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence."
Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859).

"The courts are not bound by an officer's interpretation of the
law under which he presumes to act." Hoffsomer v. Hayes, 92 Okla
32, 227 F 417.

Justice Field in Bradley v. Fisher. (13 Wall) 353 (1871) stated:
"...judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not
liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such
acts are in excess of their jurisdiction."

"The doctrine of judicial immunity originated in early
seventeenth-century England in the jurisprudence of Sir Edward
Coke. In two decisions, Floyd & Barker and the Case of the
Marshalsea, Lord Coke laid the foundation for the doctrine of
judicial immunity." Floyd & Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1607; The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (1612) were both
cases right out of the Star Chamber.

Coke's reasoning for judicial immunity was presented in four
public policy grounds:
1. Finality of judgment;
2. Maintenance of judicial independence;
3. Freedom from continual calumniations; and,
4. Respect and confidence in the judiciary.

The Marshalsea presents a case where Coke denied a judge
immunity for presiding over a case in assumpsit. Assumpsit is a
common-law action for recovery of damages for breach of contract.
Coke then explained the operation of jurisdiction requirement for
immunity:

. "[W]hen a Court has
(a) jurisdiction of the cause, and
proceeds iverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or
the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or
process of the Court, no action lies against them. But
(b) when the
Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding
is [before a person who is not a judge], and actions will lie
against them without any regard of the precept or process..."

Although narrowing the availability of judicial immunity,
especially in courts of limited jurisdiction, Coke suggested that
there was a presumption of jurisdiction and that the judge must
have been aware that jurisdiction was lacking.

Thus, questions of personam, rem and res jurisdiction are always
a proper issue before the court to obviate the defense that the
court had no way to know they lacked jurisdiction.

"Stump v Sparkman Revisited" continues to show it was Chief
Justice Kent (circa 1810) that was instrumental in establishing the
"doctrine" of JI in America, in Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns 282.
Thereafter Justice incorporated the "doctrine" in two cases:
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, and Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Both Yates and Randall dealt with
officers of the court.

"The belief that Bradley narrowed the scope of the doctrine
represents a serious misunderstanding of the decision. First,
Bradley provides no authority for the belief that a judge of
general jurisdiction may be liable for acts taken in absence of
subject matter jurisdiction. The distinction between excess of
jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction in the opinion is simply
explanatory. Because a court of general jurisdiction has
jurisdiction over all causes of action, a judge of such a court
will always be immune for his judicial acts, even if he exceeds his
authority. See Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351-52."

A Superior Court Judge is broadly vested with "general
jurisdiction." Evidently, this means that even if a case involving
a particular attorney is not assigned to him, he may reach out into
the hallway, having his deputy use "excessive force" to haul the
attorney into the courtroom for chastisement or even incarceration.
Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 at 288 (1991). Arguably, anything
goes, in a Superior Court Judge's exercise of his "general
jurisdiction", with the judge enjoying "absolute judicial immunity"
against tort consequences provided he is not divested of all
jurisdiction.

It is said that absolute judicial immunity is favored as public
policy, so that judges may fearlessly, and safe from retribution,
adjudicate matters before them. True. But equally important, is the
public expectation that judicial authority will only be wielded by
those lawfully vested with such authority.

The history of Arizona's admission to the Union reveals at least
one reason why historic public policy in Arizona would favor ARCP Rule 42(f)(1)'s complete and expeditious divestiture of
jurisdiction, and its concurrent divestiture of absolute judicial
immunity in the event a renegade judge persists in wielding the
tools of his office after having been affirmatively stripped of
them. Arizona Rule 42(f)(1) states:

Change as a Matter of Right - Nature of Proceedings. In any action pending in superior court, except an action pending in the Arizona Tax Court, each
side is entitled as a matter of right to a change of one judge and of one court commissioner. Each action, whether single or
consolidated, shall be treated as having only two sides. Whenever two or more parties on a side have adverse or hostile interests,
the presiding judge or that judge's designee may allow additional changes of judge as a matter of right but each side shall
have the right to the same number of such changes.

A party wishing to exercise that party's right to change of judge shall file
a "Notice of Change of Judge." The notice may be signed by an attorney; it shall state the name of the judge to be changed;
and it shall neither specify grounds nor be accompanied by an affidavit, such as required by subsection (f)(2) of this rule, but
it shall contain a certification by the party filing the notice or by the attorney that (i) the notice is timely, (ii) the party has not
waived the right under subsection (f)(1)(D) of the rule, and (iii) the party has not previously been granted a change of judge as
a matter of right in the case.

A judge may honor an informal request for change of judge. When a judge does so, the judge
shall enter upon the record the date of the request and the name of the party requesting change of judge. Such action shall
constitute an exercise of the requesting party's right to change of judge.

In 1912, the U.S. Congress refused to admit Arizona to the Union
for the stated reason that Arizona's proposed Constitution provided
the public with a mechanism for removing sitting judges from
office. Joint Res. No. 8, 8/21/11, 37 U.S. Stat. 39, cited in Vol.
1, Ariz. Rev. Stats., p.130. To facilitate admission to the Union,
the judge-removal mechanism was excised from the State
Constitution, allowing Arizona to become a State on 2/14/12. Soon
afterward, on 11/5/12, Arizona voters restored the mechanism by
amendment. Ariz. Constitution, Art. VIII "Removal from Office",
section 1; A.R.S. Vol. 1, p. 178. So strong was the citizens'
distrust of sitting State Court Judges in Arizona, that after
Arizona copied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it added the
present Rule 42(f)(1) to provide a mechanism for a litigant to
permanently remove the assigned judge from the case.

The difference between selectively disabling a judge in various
aspects of adjudication (such as during the appellate period) and
the permanent extinguishment of his jurisdiction in a given case,
has a logical relevance to a Judge's expectation of enjoying
absolute judicial immunity in that case.

In examining entitlement to immunity, the U.S. Supreme Court
focused upon the nature of the act: is it an act ordinarily
performed by a Judge? Unfortunately, judges sometimes exceed their
jurisdiction in a particular case. But an act done in complete
absence of all jurisdiction cannot be a judicial act. Piper v.
Pearson, id., 2 Gray 120. It is no more than the act of a private
citizen, pretending to have judicial power which does not exist at
all. In such circumstances, to grant absolute judicial immunity is
contrary to the public policy expectation that there shall be a
Rule of Law.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

Many times the reason or purpose for events in our life initially escapes us,but I am certain we can find reason and/or purpose in everything that happens!

It takes a short time to learn to exercise power, but a lifetime to learn how to avoid abusing it.

We are no longer a country of laws, we are a country where laws are "creatively interpreted."