War is Peace, Occupation is Withdrawal, and Nation-Building is an Exit Strategy

Ross Douthat had this to say today about why we can’t leave Afghanistan:

Why? Because of three considerations. First, the memory of 9/11, which ensures that any American president will be loath to preside over the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul. Second, the continued presence of Al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan’s northwest frontier, which makes it difficult for any American president to contemplate giving up the base for counterterrorism operations that Afghanistan affords. Third, the larger region’s volatility: it’s the part of the world where the nightmare of nuclear-armed terrorists is most likely to become a reality, so no American president can afford to upset the balance of power by pulling out and leaving a security vacuum behind.

Note that Ross calls them “considerations” in favor of staying in Afghanistan. He evidently can’t bring himself to call them “reasons,” for they are anything but. Take the “memory of 9/11.” No doubt no president would want the Taliban to take Kabul on his watch. (The Taliban already control roughly half the country already, but Ross’s assumption that nobody will notice until they take over the few square kilometers where the media are concentrated is probably right.) According to departing General McChrystal, for example, Obama doesn’t really care about Afghanistan and probably sees the occupation as pointless. Still, he supports it because it keeps Afghanistan boring and therefore off the front page. Rather than order of withdrawal, in other words, Obama prefers to buy an option at $1 trillion [update: $70+ billion] a year that lets him pursue his domestic agenda without distraction. To put Ross’s point another way, no President would have the courage to make Afghanistan policy based on what’s actually best for America. The paramount concern is public relations.

As for Ross’s “consideration” number two — that Afghanistan is a useful “base for counterterrorism operations” — it is not even coherent. Leave aside that Afghanistan, one of the most remote places on earth, is a comically inconvenient place to run a counter-terrorism program. (As an alternative, may I suggest Washington, D.C., where the government that is supposed to protect us from terrorism is actually located?) A military base is where commands can be given and equipment and personnel stored. It exists to stage an army in order to control territory. An international terrorist organization such as al Qaeda, however, does not need to control terroritory. It can move in, move out, form and reform in any number of regions around the globe, including (indeed, perhaps especially) ones occupied by foreigners. To combat such an organization, defending a piece of territory is useless, possibly even counter-productive.

Lastly, Ross resorts to IR-theory concepts such as “balance of power” and “security vacuum” to suggest that the occupation is somehow preventing nuclear terrorism. Here he seems deeply confused. Nuclear weapons require vast sums, technical expertise and secure facilities to produce. Consequently, the only entity capable of making them so far is a state. The danger of nuclear terrorism is that one government or other will either (i) carelessly allow a weapon to be passed to a terrorist organization, or (ii) collapse with its nuclear material unaccounted for. It is unclear how the concept “balance of power,” which refers to a rivalry among multiple states, elucidates these dangers. Afghanistan in particular does not even have one state, let alone several. It has experienced civil war of one form another for decades; there is no “balance of power” there of which one can meaningfully speak. Doubtless, if the U.S. withdraws, Afghans will go on killing each other, as they have been doing for generations. Though lamentable, that does not increase the risk of nuclear terrorism. Clearly, Ross is alluding to some nightmare chain of events that U.S. withdrawal could trigger. His IR-theory jargon, however, only obscures what that chain of events might be.

In short, Ross does not come up with any intelligible rationale, other than executive branch PR, to continue nation-building in Afghanistan. We know, of course, what Ross is trying to do: He’s playing the Sage Establishment Moderate, able to incorporate the strengths of both competing positions. Thus, in his latest column, he concedes to doves that withdrawal is a worthy goal, but argues with the hawks that, to get out, we must continue COIN. In this case, his purported wisdom is unearned, for Ross comes with no actual reason that America has to be in Afghanistan in the first place.

I thought this blog was a rather tepid response to a weak article by Douthat. Douthat’s first argument based on 9/11 is absurd, and I highly doubt any man with competence would base a foreign policy purely off a memory (although we are still in Japan, so maybe memories count for something) (that was sarcasm).

Douthat’s strongest argument was the second of the article and this response to Douthat was, I thought, the weakest of this blog. You assume that a base is essentially for the imperial purposes alone of controlling territory. In this instance, your presuppositions have blinded you. Everyone knows that terrorists are mobile and move around frequently. That is every reason to have a base there, because it allows you to be more mobile around the world, rather than just being stationed in D.C., as you suggest. This allows us to go to where the terrorists actually are (however, our base in Kyrgyzstan can supply this just as well as Afghanistan can). Keep in mind those “commands given” at bases, often come down the chain of command fom Washington. Your assumption of the purposes of a base is rather narrow and made to fit your argument here rather than to fit reality.

Your last argument is the strongest you make (although a state does not have to be careless to supply terrorists with weapons, I think your presuppositions blinded you there again). I agree with you that our presence there does not necessarily deter terrorists from getting nuclear weapons, and so I think is a rather weak argument from Douthat, especially the balance of power jargon. It would be nice though to see a stronger hand in Pakistan(and by stronger hand, I mean someone like Musharaff rather than an unstable democracy) that would prevent their nukes from falling into the hands of radicals. That is the country to be more concerned about, rather than Afghanistan.

I’m amending my earlier statement about Kyrgyzstan. I wish I could say it was a joke, but it was a bad argument on my part. Kyrgyzstan has been falling apart as of late, although they have allowed us to keep our base up and running for now. I completely understand if someone wants to post a response criticizing that point, but be aware you will be committing a red hering, ad hominem, straw man, or some other logical fallacy without actually addressing the argument. So please be logical in your responses. Thank you.

trbraton – thanks for the correction. That was an editing mistake related to total vs. annual dollars spent.

djeskey – I disagree that a military “base” is a place from which to stage counter-terrorism operations. It’s important to distinguish between fighting the Taliban, which does require a base in Afghanistan, from countering al Qaeda attacks on U.S. soil, which does not.

“I disagree that a military “base” is a place from which to stage counter-terrorism operations. It’s important to distinguish between fighting the Taliban, which does require a base in Afghanistan, from countering al Qaeda attacks on U.S. soil, which does not.”

This assumes a change in counter-terrorism strategy from offensive to defensive. At this point I might agree to such a strategy change because al-Qaida seems to have become greatly decentralized, and they have proliferated to many points around the globe. Then you would be right, and there would be no point to a base in Afghanistan. However, should one want to maintain an offensive strategy to counter al-Qaida before they reach U.S. soil, then that would require maintaining a base of some sort, in order to launch operations to attack the terrorists.

djeskey – I agree that an “offensive” strategy of sending in personnel to hunt out and disrupt terrorist networks often requires a staging area of some sort. However, it does not require a whole military base. Indeed, it would seem that less conspicuous operations would be more effective.

Yes, but it would still by definition be a base, regardless of how much you may find the term repugnant. Hence, the definition of the term being: “a fortified or more or less protected area or place from which the operations of an army or an air force proceed.” Although a base can be large, it does not have to be. In fact, the C.I.A. uses the term for their installations. You may be right about the size, but a base is still a base, and I suggest arguing with neocons about war strategy on a much more solid ground than not needing bases to conduct an offensive war against terrorist networks. You seem to have made the mistake of accepting the premise of Douthat’s argument for an offensive war, rather than switching to a new strategy. Rather than arguing on Douthat’s ground, you should have reframed the argument giving you the advantage. You could then have had a much stronger argument rather than the one you presented above.

I’m certainly not going to disagree with your idea of an “offensive” strategy for fighting terrorism requiring a base. My problem is the ENTIRE idea of an “offensive” strategy to combat terrorism. An offensive strategy, while it sounds good, is still simply the killing of people from other countries. I would go so far as to say that any pre-emptive military act is, in and of itself, an act of terrorism. When you make the distinction between fighting the Taliban and fighting Al-Queda, what you’re really saying is killing “afghans” or killing “pakistanis”. Either way, the policy is wrong-headed.

My critique had nothing to do with what strategy should be used. My statements were purely to counter the faulty logic in the article above. As far as I’m concerned a defensive strategy may very well be more effective.

I make the distinction between Taliban and Al-Qaida, because there is a fundamental distinction to be made. The Taliban are a group trying to retake control of the Afghan government. Al-Qaida is an international group, made up of multiple nationalities, that uses terror tactics to scare people into conforming to their strict, political interpretation of Islam.

“I would go so far as to say that any pre-emptive military act is, in and of itself, an act of terrorism.”

Let’s say President Obama received intelligence that China was going to strike the West Coast, let’s say Los Angeles, with an ICBM. We know that strike ie imminent, say tomorrow, or even in a few hours. We then take action, and take out their weapons capabilities so they can’t nuke us. You’re statement implies that this act of self-defense would be an act of terror. Now, you can argue that you let the Chinese know that you have been informed of their plans, and try to thwart it diplomatically. However, if they still won’t relent, or if you know that they will strike in a few minutes, then you attack first. That is self-defense, you are NOT being the aggressor. And so what if it is an act of terrorism? Terrorism means “the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, esp. for political purposes.” I would hope that after we pre-empt, the Chinese, or anyone who would attack us, would be intimidated and coerced into not attacking. I would hope they were terrified.

well what’s the measuring stick of imminent threat? You can’t say that the people of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan are a threat to American security. Your scenario envisions an actual threat. You know, a belligerent enemy, threatening you with real violence, that actually has the MEANS TO DO SO. Is Al-Queda really a threat to American citizens? Let me put it this way. Is Al-Queda more of a threat to American citizens than the American military is to Iraqi or Afghan citizens? The answer is absolutely no. The perpetrators of 9/11 were trained and armed by wealthy Saudi elites. Not poor tribesmen in the mountains of Pakistan.

I disagree with all the arguments for and/or against military
bases in any country outside the U S. America seems to think we know what’s best for the rest of the world and we go
about forcing our beliefs on the rest of the world. All I’ll say
about America’s public justification for war is it is supposedly
to bing peace. If you cannot see what an oxymoron that is
then you need to educate yourself a bit more. The real reason
for all these so called “peace is our goal” wars of America is simply to have first dibs on the natural resources in any given
area. In other words we do it to supply our consumption. Don’t
want to get into some senseless argument over that it’s just
a fact. period.

Now if you really want to keep America safe from terrorist’s
you simply close all the foreign military bases, bring all the
troops home, station them at ALL strategic ports of entry and
within the U S interior in and around large and medium utility
service plants. Spend all the saved trillions of dollars on R&D
for security apparatus, software & alternative energy sources
and technology plus new ways to grow and harvest food
supply/sources. As advances are made take a little of the
funds and start the restoration and modernizing of our national
roads and electrical grids.

This is a very simple, doable, logical and intelligent plan that
has no holes or intelligent arguments against it. If you wanna
start shootin’ holes in it then I would say your probably one of
those people who when a person says the sky is blue you say
no not really it’s red and I can prove it. What a waste that is

I have a question “djeskey” how do you know when something
is an “actual threat” ????

Is it when Israel tells you Yazacrenski terrorists attacked the
U S Liberty and you strike the Yazacrenski’s???

or is it when the NSA or CIA or FBI or BFE tells you a mad
scientist named Mr Mild And No-threat has dumped anthrax
into Detroit’s water supply and you arrest him and torture
him til he dies while you try to get him to confess

or is it when Dick Cheney or Rahm Emanuel swear on a
stack of bibles that they personally believe the intelligence
reports that say your grandmother has now or used to have
weapons of mass destruction hidden in her basement and
you send ATF agents to burn her out if she doesn’t come
quietly

Debunking a war hawk’s ‘reasons’ for staying in Afghanistan is an exercise in futility similar to debunking creationists ‘reasons’ for their stated disbelief in scientific principles, like evolution. Both groups dishonestly hide their true motivations behind arguments that, once debunked, are dropped in favor of new ‘reasons.’ Creationists come up with new ‘problems’ in scientific theory when their old arguments are shown to be nonsense, the same as the war hawks do. One group is trying to collect Air Miles To Heaven, the other has dreams of Global Empire, but neither is honest enough to admit where they’re coming from.

I notice that Ross Douhat is only 40 years old. The U.S. Army allows volunteers up to age 42. Having never served in the military, now is the time for him to act on his opinions, up close and personal, in Afghanistan.

I don’t disagree with you about the difficulty of determining what an “actual threat” is. Clearly, Iraq was not one when we invaded, and the Taliban are not now. My problem was with the absolute statement that “Colin Cambell” made that any pre-emptive strike is wrong. There are scenarios where a pre-emptive strike is defensive in nature, much like killing a robber in your house before he kills you or anyone in your family. If you can determine the “actual threat”, then I am all for a pre-emptive strike. The trick is determining whether or not the potential threat is an actual threat. However, when the determination is made, it only reasons that one must make the strike, not for love of war, but for the safety and security of the citizenry. Otherwise, your enemy strikes first, and you go to war anyway.