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The Chinese ambassador’s recent remarks that Canada should keep human rights and national security concerns out of free trade negotiations don’t sit well with former cabinet minister Peter MacKay.

“It’s surprising that the Chinese envoy would even suggest such a thing,” said MacKay, a former minister of justice, defence, and foreign affairs in former prime minister Stephen Harper’s government, in a phone interview.

In the negotiations, we have to be cognizant of the fact that we are a democratic country, we place a high priority on human rights, we believe firmly in the rule of law.

— Peter MacKay, former cabinet minister

According to a March 24 Globe and Mail report, Lu Shaye, the Chinese ambassador to Canada, said China will regard as trade protectionism any attempt by Canada to block Chinese firms from taking over Canadian companies. Lu added that Beijing doesn’t want human rights to be used as a “bargaining chip” in the talks.

MacKay believes it is critically important for Canada to have human rights and national security issues on the table when discussing trade deals with China.

“I think that our trade pursuit and the protection of our national interests, our security interests, are inseparable,” he said.

“And I believe as well that in the negotiations, we have to be cognizant of the fact that we are a democratic country, we place a high priority on human rights, we believe firmly in the rule of law. … These are notable differences between Canada and China.”

MacKay noted that there is ample evidence of Chinese cyber attacks and intrusions against Canada, indicating that protection of our national interests needs to be foremost in the minds of anyone embarking on trade discussions with China.

In one well-publicized case in 2014, a Chinese state-sponsored cyberattack hacked into the computer systems of Canada’s National Research Council. According to a March 30 Globe report, federal documents show that the cyberattack cost Canada hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Liberal government sparked renewed concern last month when it approved a Chinese company’s takeover of Montreal high-tech firm ITF Technologies, a deal previously blocked by the Conservative government under Harper. The applications of the Canadian company’s laser technology products include making weapons.

“Without national security clearance, it opens up Canada and all of our interests—critical infrastructure, our national security, our banks, our institutions—it opens them up for certain risks, and it will also by the way cause serious concerns amongst our allies, the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand,” MacKay said.

History of Hostilities

Western intelligence agencies have often warned that China’s state-owned and private enterprises act in the interest of the Chinese Communist Party to the detriment of the West. Canada decided to block Chinese telecom giant Huawei from a government communications network project in 2012 due to security risks.

A U.S. congressional national security report released in 2012 concluded that risks associated with Huawei’s and Chinese telecom company ZTE’s “provision of equipment to U.S. critical infrastructure could undermine core U.S. national-security interests.”

In another case publicized in 2011, as previously reported by Epoch Times, Chinese hackers penetrated the computers of the finance, defence, and treasury departments in Canada.

Chinese officials have often taken a hostile stance against Canada’s allies. In a Chinese-language propaganda video released in 2015 to commemorate China’s World War II victory against Japan, Chinese military is shown destroying U.S. maritime forces and occupying the Japanese island of Okinawa.

A 2013 documentary film produced by two senior generals in the Chinese military labels the United States as China’s enemy.

‘Eyes Wide Open’ Beats Naiveté

Although an interview with a Global Affairs Canada spokesperson wasn’t possible, department spokesperson Natasha Nystrom said in an emailed statement that Canada is in the early stages of exploratory trade talks with China.

“We are also seeking Canadians’ views on whether and how to pursue a Canada-China FTA [free trade agreement]. The government’s approach is one that puts the interests of Canadians, including the opportunities that exist for the middle class and crucially, our values, front and centre,” Nystrom wrote.

John McCallum, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s former immigration minister and now Canada’s ambassador to China, said in an interview with the Toronto Star that he is eager to do “even more” than already suggested by Trudeau to improve relations with China. He insisted the Trudeau government will ensure that promoting and protecting human rights remains a priority, and any agreements with China will take these concerns into account.

Randy Hoback, a Conservative MP and vice-chair of the parliamentary committee on international trade, says Canadian administrators shouldn’t be naive when dealing with China.

“They were going to allow the approval of the telecom company out of Montreal, where our security people are saying ‘no way, you cannot let this happen.’ This should be a very dangerous precedent,” says Hoback.

“You have to go into this type of situation with your eyes wide open, and I think they’re being really naive and really don’t necessarily understand who they’re dealing with.”

Espionage, in Hollywood terms, involves agents in tuxedos who brandish high tech surveillance gear and weaponry. For the Chinese Communist Party, however, espionage is conducted in plainer, but more nefarious ways.

On July 28, the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology, a nonprofit cybersecurity think tank., held an event in Washington D.C. to explain findings on Chinese espionage detailed in its recent report, “China’s Espionage Dynasty: Economic Death by a Thousand Cuts.” Joshua Philipp, who covers national security for Epoch Times, presented on the overt structure and operations of the Chinese regime’s systems for intelligence gathering and control in the United States and abroad.

Drawing on his earlier reporting and interviews, as well as other news reports and literature, Philipp showed how the Chinese regime exploits the open system of the United States to advance their espionage, which chiefly involves infiltrating overseas Chinese communities or underground groups, then bringing these organizations in line with an overarching “united front.”

Philips said that two key Communist Party organs, the United Front Department and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, facilitate the Chinese regime’s efforts to govern ethnic Chinese living abroad. “The Chinese Communist Party regards Chinese expats, Chinese immigrants in other countries, and even second and third generation Chinese as part of the Chinese system,” said Philipp.

Thus, Chinese students have been recruited as special agents, and Chinese newspapers that are partial to the regime receive financial support through advertisements from companies in mainland China, Philipp said, citing documents leaked to Epoch Times by Chinese defector and former diplomat Chen Yonglin.

The Chinese regime has also attempted to infiltrate the tongs—the Chinese community groups established by early immigrants to provide support their countrymen of the same clan or province. Today, these tongs have “extremely large memberships,” according to Philipp.

“If you want to expand the influence of the Chinese Communist Party in foreign countries, this is the easiest way to do it,” Philipp said. “You go to the people who already govern these communities, and give them incentive to act as pseudo communist officials overseas.”

Through the tongs, the Chinese regime then influences foreign politics. Philipp noted that two aides of former New York City Comptroller John Liu, who ran for mayor in 2008, were linked with powerful local tongs, and even Beijing.

A Chinese state-run news outlets, Global Times, published a response on May 29 to rumors that China would begin sending nuclear-armed submarines for patrols in the Pacific Ocean. While it notes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made no official announcements on the patrols, it states that it’s time for the People Liberation Army to send “nuclear submarines into the depth of the Pacific Ocean for regular patrols.”
The report argues that the CCP has a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons, and because of this, its nuclear ambitions are benign. The problem is that China’s “no first use” policy is little more than a widely-parroted lie.
“With regard to ‘no first use,’ a careful look at the Chinese wording of China’s ‘no first use’ policy reveals that it commits them to nothing,” stated Mark Schneider, a senior analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, during a congressional hearing in March 2012.
While the CCP’s policy suggests it would not use nuclear weapons unless another country used them first, its actual policy is that it could use nuclear weapons to counter regular military attacks as well.
Schneider noted a report from Kyodo News Agency, which obtained classified Chinese military documents stating China “will adjust the nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile-possessing country carries out a series of air strikes against key strategic targets in our country with absolutely superior conventional weapons …”
Read MoreBeware the ‘Little White Rabbit’ of China’s Military
He also notes that in 2000, the CCP “adopted a nuclear doctrine which allowed for ‘a preemptive strike strategy,’” which allows it to use “its tactical nuclear weapons in regional wars if necessary.”
The use of pre-emptive strikes is still a key element in Chinese military writings, and as Michael Pillsbury notes in his book, “The Hundred-Year Marathon,” this concept is at the heart of its “Assassin’s Mace” strategy, which the CCP has designed to defeat technologically superior opponents such as the United States. The strategy includes the use of high altitude EMP (HEMP) attacks, which would leverage the EMP field generated by nuclear weapons to destroy communication and control systems of a targeted country.

The Canadian consulate in Hong Kong allegedly rejected the immigration requests of two Huawei employees, citing “reasonable grounds” that they may be spies.
The reasons for the rejections were outlined in two letters, obtained by the South China Morning Post.
A letter from Canada’s Hong Kong consulate in March states the immigration application was rejected on ground the individual falls under section 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The section refers to people employed by organizations involved in subversion, terrorism, or espionage.
The second rejection letter, sent in April, cited the same concerns over an individual’s spouse.
South China Morning Post did not release names of the alleged spies, but the piece is slanted in their defense. The Hong Kong-based news outlet has for years been growing closer to the Chinese regime, but came under more direct influence after its purchase by Alibaba CEO Jack Ma in December 2015.
The Canadian consulate in Hong Kong did not immediately respond to an email inquiring about the claims.
Huawei is a Chinese telecommunications company which has been accused of spying on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. The U.S. House Intelligence Committee listed the company in 2012 as a national security threat, and it has since been accused of launching cyberattacks and placing backdoors in its products.
MORE:Faced With Barrage of Chinese Spies, US Expands Rules for National Security Cases
Australia blocked Huawei from bidding on its national broadband plan in 2012, and the United States also banned it from bidding on government contracts.
Despite the concerns, Huawei was able to find a market in Canada, according to Bloomberg in 2014, where it supplies 3G and 4G network equipment to two of the country’s largest cellular operators, Bell Canada and Telus.
Its relationship with Canada has been lined with caution, however. Vice obtained two memos in 2014 from Canada’s Department of Public Safety, stating concerns it could threaten the country’s telecommunications infrastructure and networks.

A Chinese citizen claiming to work on China’s missile programs was arrested in New York on April 13 for his alleged part in a scheme to obtain sensitive carbon fiber and sell it to the Chinese military.
This marks the second Chinese espionage case in the United States in the past week—following the case of a U.S. Navy officer accused of spying on the U.S. military for China.
The latest alleged spy is Fuyi “Frank” Sun, 52, who “allegedly attempted to procure high grade carbon fiber for a source he repeatedly identified as the Chinese military,” said Assistant Attorney General John P. Carlin, in an April 14 press release.
Sun allegedly claimed to have worked personally in the Chinese regime’s missile program and “asserted that he maintained a close relationship with the Chinese military,” according to the release.
Sun also claimed to have a “sophisticated understanding of the Chinese military’s need for carbon fiber,” and “suggested” he would supply the material to the Chinese military or “institutions closely associated with it.”
Carlin said the carbon fiber has many uses in aerospace and defense, and is strictly controlled from export.
Sun has allegedly attempted for years to acquire the high-grade carbon fiber and illegally export it to China, said U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara, in the press release
Early on the week of his arrest Sun traveled from China to New York to finalize a deal to obtain the sensitive materials, Bharara said, but the men he met with turned out to be undercover U.S. agents.
“Sun allegedly told undercover agents that the carbon fiber he sought was headed for the Chinese military, and then paid tens of thousands of dollars in cash to purchase two cases of it,” Bharara said.
Sun also allegedly told the undercover agents to ship the material in unmarked boxes and to falsify the shipping documents so the shipment would slip past law enforcement.
The press release says that Sun had been trying to get his hands on sensitive carbon fiber since around 2011.
MORE:Navy Officer Who Allegedly Spied for China Had Nuclear Training
It states that he met with undercover agents around April 11 and 12, and “repeatedly suggested that the Chinese military was the ultimate end-user for the M60 Carbon Fiber he sought to acquire.”
The carbon fiber would fall under the category of “new materials,” which the Chinese Communist Party has identified as a priority to steal from other nations under its Project 863 program.
Sun faces up to 20 years in prison for attempting to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and conspiracy to violate it. He also faces up to 10 years in prison for trying to smuggle goods from the United States.