ARMY SIRIIVEILLNCE OF CIVILIANS: A 1)OCUMENTARY ANALYSIS
PnituAcE Member of the Subcommittee: computer print-outs and publications generated in the course of the

The following report by the Subcommittee staff analyzes certain

Army's domestic intelligence program. I asked the staff to prepare this i'en)rt so that moml)0ers of the Subcommittee might be saved- the laix)r of analyzing thousands of documents, many of which require painstaking ti'ansfation from the original "com puterese." In addition, it is sensib le for us to work from an expurgated version of reports on the )olitical and private lives of law-abiding citizens so that we would not to guilty of compounding the invasions of privacy which already have occurred. In most. instances where names of individuals or groups appear in this report, they are taken from examples presented at our hearings, or from news articles describing the various Army dossier collections. In Itfew cases, however, it has been necessary to mention some organize. tons l)y name in discussing data banks not previously known. Although' there is a danger tiat the unscrupulous might misuse them identi(icat ions, on balance it is preferable that they be mentioned in the report. Only in this way can it be graphically demonstrated how the Army mnischaracterized individuals and groups to their prejudice without foundation in fact, how arbitrary any judgments were, and how it. continually exhibited a lack of appreciation for the potential harm that comes Irom indiscriminately listing together organizations with widely different aims, aspirations, methods, and behavior. These listings also show how ill-defined the Army programs were, including as they (1, small and ad"ho groups, street gangs, local organizations--some of them arms of government-along with national organi. zations of more permanent existence and importance. As the report makes clear, these listings demonstrate how worthless and unsubstan. tintedltie •riny's characterizations often were, while at the same time how dangerous they were to individual and associational rights. The evi(lence over lelmingly demonstrates that the appearance of an indi* vidunl or organization ii!the Army's files signifies no indictment of the person or group. In my opinion, this report and the documents on which it is based demonstrate conclusively that the monitoring of individuals and orga. nizations by military intelligence was of no practical value to military commanders charged with quelling civil disorders and safeguarding military security. The overwhelming majority of the reports pertain to the peaceful activities of nonviolent citizens lawfully exercising their constitutional rights of speech, press, religion, association, and petition. For reasons of efficiency alone, the Defense Department was
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V

right to order the reports destroyed. As the Army General Counsel said of the files: "They were the most worthless damn things I had ever seen ill my life. It was a waste of paper. We said, 'Burn 'em.'" However, it is equally clear that the reports posed a. clear and present. danger to the privacy and freedom, of thousands of. Ameriuan. itinzeln•--Citizens whose only "offense" was to stand on their hind legs and exercise rights they thought the Constitution guaranteed to them.

These files (olnfirmn what we learned first from former intelligence

agents-that Army intelligence, in the name of preparedness and seciii'ity, had developed a massive system for monitoring virtually all political protest in the United States. In doing so, it was not cont(lit, with ol)serving at arms length; Army agents repeatedly inwas not confined to acts or plans -for violence, but included much private information about peoples' finances, psychiatric records, and sex lives. T•IN report further reveals the enormity of the data collection. Our hearings focused rather narrowly on the operations of the Intelligente Command and on one military intelligence detachment belonging to the Fifth Infantry Division. ]n contrast, the staff re port demonstrates that virtually every major stateside Army unit had its own set of files on civilian politis. Por example, ill resplonse to an inve~ntor~y ordered by ,A rmy officials in the spring of 1970, Fourth Army Ileadlquarters at Fort Sam Houston, T'1ex., repolrted the equiv. alent of 100,000 file cards on "personalities of interest." If that were not enough, ItI Corps at Fort llood, T'ex., reportedly a computer dlata file on civilian political groups within the same five-state area. Tme size of these and other data banks coonfirms that the Army's (lomestic intelligence operations did not begin with the Newark and D)etroit riots ofl/1967. The events of that stunmer only expanded activities whieh had been going on, in var mying degrees of intensity, since 1940, and which has its roots as far beck as World War I. 'le absence of cilsmon, control over this surveillance prior to 1970 has already been established. This report proves the absenee of central 1,lita)/ control as well. Each major dat',a bank developed ind,pendent of the others in a milieu which showed little concern for the values of privacy, freedom, efficiency, or economy. Trie documents also demonstrate that the surveillance. was not the result of any malevolent intent on the paity of military officers. They merely did what they thought was their joh in the manner in which ( they drew a false analogy between foreign counterintelligence and counterinsurgency operations and the Army's role in domestic tivil disturbances. The hypothesis that revolutionary groups might be h)Phind the civil rights and anti-war movements became a presumption which infected the entire operation. Demonstrators and rioters were not regarded as American citizens with possibly legitimate grievances, but as "dissident forces" deployed against the established order. Given this conception of dissent, it is not surprising that Army intell gence would collect information on the political and private lives of the dissenters. The military doctrines governing counterintelligence, counterinsurgency, and civil affairs operations demanded it. If these mis-perceptions of dissent in the United States account for the direction Army intelligence took in the late 1960s, they do not
filtrated civilian groups. Moreover, the iniformation they relported

VI

Explain the extraordinary growth of its operations. Responsibility heIre must lie with civiliani authorities in both the Executive Brancll and in Congress. Ill the midst of crisis, Pentagon civilians issued vague, mission-type orders which essentially gave intelligence otlicers it free hand in collecting whatever information they deemed necessary to the efficient conduct of civil disturbance operations. Sub. sequently, neither the Pentagon's civilian hierarchy nor the Congress had any routine means by which to review the appropriateness of those (h'eisionsi il former agents came forward and blew the whistle unt in 1970. Meanwhile, the surveillance grew, as most governmental programs grow, by the quiet processes of bureaucratic accretion. As the directives reproduced in the Appendix to the hearings graphically demonstrate, each subordinate element in the chain of command expanded on the or(lers it received from above, while the traditional secrecy we have, granted our intelligence agencies immunized each echeloin from effective review by its superiors. Since the Subcommittee began its investigation in January, 1970, Civilian officials in tile Departments of Army and Defense have'worked hard to reestablish civilian control. 'iho task has not been easy; bureauctacies in motion tend to stay in motion. Many of the records undoubtedly have been destroyed; many others undoubtedly have been hidden away. For the moment, however, it would appear that the systematic moni itoring has ceased. Trhe question this Subcommittee must decide is whether this cessation of operations is adequate for our purposes, or whether some other action. such as lehislattion modeled on the Defense D)epartment's recent directives, is needed to bar a recurrence. Chairman, Subcommittee on ConstitutionalRights.

Mr. Chainanand Member8 of the Subcomnmittee: The core of any intelligence operation is its files. The Army's files on civilian political activity were voluminous and far-reaching. Scores of local, regional, and national records centers kept track of individuals and organizations of all kinds, from Unitarian Church congregations to the Weathermen. Computers were used to store information and to index voluminous libraries of dossiers. Where computers were not used, card indexes opened the way to the information. Since the Subcommittee began its investigation of these files in January 10"0, many of these records have been destroyed. Before the destruction of records began, however a lawsuit was filed, Tatum v. Lah'd. which sought to enjoin the military's monitoring of civilian political activity. Part of the relief sought by the plaintiffs was supervised d(lstruction of the records. Although the District Court denied the plaintiffs request for an order requiring delivery of the r(,cords to the court, the defendants, represented by the Department of *Justice, promised to preserve one copy of each computer print-out and l)uilication destroyed for purposes of litigation. These files were turned over to Internal Security Division of tfle Department of Justice at various times in 1970 and 1901. In February and March 1971, the Subcommittee conducted hearings data collection programs as well as on other representative on the Army Gover'unment data programs. Witnesses at these hearings presented soine documentary evidence together with their testimony on Army surveillance operations and their subjects. Statements of correspondents who know of and who participated in Army surveillance activities are included in the appendix to the hearings. To facilitate the Subcommittee's analysis of the Army's domestic intelligence operations, the Chairman asked the Department of Justice on March 9, 1971,1 for permission to examine the files. The Justice Department, after consultation with the Departments of Defense and Army, granted the request and the following documents were delivered to the Subcommittee offices: 1. Five volvunes of a six-volume set of "mugbooks" Iublished by the Army Intelligence Command, and generally known as the F.ort Holabird "black list," and containing information on more than 1000 individuals. (Confidential) 2. A two-volume "Compendium" published by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence containing data on
1 Sep Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill of Rights Hearings before the Con. stitutional Rights Rubeommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 92d Cong. lst Sess. (1971) Part I, p. 022. (Hereinafter cited as Hearings).

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more than 100 organizations and approximately :150 individuals. (overall clnssifleation of Secret) 3. A print-out, from the "Bio ranphie Data File" of the Ft. ilolahird computer. consisting of, 379 paLges of a 40.-pane document with information on almost 4000 individuals. (Confidential) 4. Volumes 2 through 6 of a six-volume computer print-out, on Personalities from Ft. Monroe data bank of the Continental Army Command. (Confidential) 5. Briefing Repnors from CONARC:S Counterintelligence Reeords Information System dated from December 15, 1969, to .January 11, 1970, and from June 30 to July 106i). (Unclassified) Following examination of these materials, the Chairman addressed inquiries to the Department of Defense seeking additional information nl)out these materials. This letter of March 30, 1971, and the two replies. one to the Subcommittee Chief Counsel on June 9. and one to the Chairman on June 10, are reprinted in the Hearings.' On April 10, 1971. a commlter sl)ecialist from the Department of the Army met with the Stanff Counsel, but was unable to explain the eoding of the Fort liolabird computer. At that time the Subcommittee wns informed that the computer instruction books no longer existed. The inability of the Chairman and staff to obtain neither clear and detailed explanations for tjme data collection and storage operations of tim Army's domestic inttllfgence program nor the delivery to the Subcommittee. of documents kAown, to lhe, in the, Department's possession ultimnahtly caused the Chah'man to inform the Defense Department that. lie was conmsiderinfl, intmoducing a Resolution in the Senate whlih would have had the effect of authorizing the. Subcommittee, on behalf of the Senate, to sul)noena the necessary witnesses and documents to

make preparation of this. aimd the Subcommittee Report possible. In January, 1972. the Department of Defense delivered a second
set of materials to the Subcoommittee. These materials included: 1. The computer instruction books for the Fort TIolabird bio.

tional code listings. unclassifiedd) 2. A nine-page print-out, on five prominent personalities in the civil rights and antiwar movements extracted from the Fort lHolabird Tnuident Data File. (Confidential) 3. A set, of mieroflhn aperture cards containing all print-outs from the Fort Monroe Incident Data file from January 1, 1960, through February 28. 1070. (Unelassified) These print-outs substantially added to the CRIS briefing Reports received in the Spring ;f 1071. There are reports on well over 4,000 incidents during this period. 4. "An Alphalbetieal Roster by Iitials" representing the organizational data file from the Fort Hood computer of III Corps. The file contains information on approximately 2050 organizations and 800 individuals. (UTnelassifled) 5. One page from the P.S. Strike Command's computer printout entitled "Counterintelligence Personality File." (Secret) 6. A print-out published by the Directorate for Civil Disturbanee Planning and Operationi entitled "Civil Disturbance Antici'fHearings, Part ir, pp. 1228, 1228, and 1232.

graphic, data file and incident data file wiflh over 750 organiza-

3 Iateci Activities or Events," dated 15 October 1969, with coverage of 177 events. (Unclassified) 7. A copy of USAINTC Regulation 390-100 establishing standard operating procedures for the CONUS intelligence program. (Conl dential) 8. An inventory of noncomiputerized files maintained by the continental armlies, the Military District of Washington, and the U.S. At-my in Hawaii. (Parts Confidential; parts unclassified) These documents have expanded our knowledge of the Army's data keeping olperations considerably. However, they are far from coin. plete. 'orexample, the Departments of Army and Defense have been unable to supply us with : 1. Computer code books for the Fort, Monroe, Fort Hood, DCI)PO, and Strike Command data banks; 2. Fo•t Holahird's incident data files, (All we have received is it nine-page excerpt of spot reports relating to five pesonis) ; 3. Strike Comma'nd's full Counterintelligence Personality File, and its incident and organization files, if any; 4. DCDPO's full computer files on individuhals, organizations, 5. The computerized index to the domestic intelligence sections of the microfilm archives of the Counterintelligence Analysis Branch, (now Detachment) ; and 6. Documents (or persons) to describe this nature, scope, content, purposes, uses and capabilities of these data banks. The subcommittee also had a considerable amount of difficulty in obltaining the declassification of much of the materials delivered by the l)epartments of the Army? and Defense. For over a year, we were unable to obtain the declassiflcation of this report ' despite the fact that none of the information it contains affects national security, and despite the fact that it pertains to an illegal program now disavowed by the Pentagon. Yet even with the public admission that none of the information was of any value to any legitimate military function, the report was not cleared until late June 1972, following another letter from the Chairman concerning his proposed Senate Resolution. At this point, the declassitfcation proved surprisingly easy. A representative of the Department of Defense General Counsel read the report for 1%. hours and pronounced it declassified when he finished. What follows, then, is the picture of tie Army's surveillance of ('ivilians unaffiliated with the armed forces as disclosed by the files and printouts madee available to the subcommittee. LAWJ•ENCE M. BsIun,
0h CounRsel amd Sqtaff Dh-eetor. lef
A airing, Part II, pp. 12127. 122. . lie,

and incidents;

4 I.
FORT 1IOLABIRD

"tM[uo BooKs"

1W

The "mug books" consist of six volimes of photogrophs and poersonal data, classified "confidential" and entitled J'n(79duvald Aetire in Civil Di8tui-banees.The books were compiled by intelligence analysts at Fort, iolabird and published by the Intelligenee Command in Mfav und Oetober 1908. During the hearings they were frequently referred to as the "blacklist," •i name given to then by one of their editors. At other times they have been referred to as the Fort. T-Tolabird "identiflcation list." Tlie following information is based on an examination of flve of the six volumes issued by the Intelligence Command: Volume 1, for unknown reasons, was niot included in the materials preerved for thepT7tum ease. Slightly less than 1.000 individuals are profiled in these five volumes. Each page, with few exceptions, contains three entries. Each ent y consists of a photograph (on the left). and descriptive data, ineludin4 the individual's name., (ate of birth, address, occupation, arrest record, organizational affiliation, associations, and miscellaneous information. The geographical spread of addresses listed is broad, although persons from certain regions tend to bn grouped together. Volume 2, for Instance, lists persons in Atlanta. Georgia; Selnia. M1ontg.omery. Tuskegee. and Birmingham, Ala.: Washington, D.C.; Charlotte antid Durham, N.C.: JTackson, Miss.: Arlington, Va.; Cleveland, Ohio; Pine Bluff. Ark.: Dallas, Tex.; and New Orleans and Shreoveport, La. Volunme 4 includes residents of Brooklyn, New York: Wilmington. Dela. ware; Washington, D.C.: Chiieao, Ill.: and Cincinnati, Yellow Springs, Cleveland, Bowling Green, and Dayton, Ohio. A wide variety of occupations are listed. They include plumbers. post offlee clerks, printers, students, professors, teachers, a state legislatr', funeral directors. psychologists, priests, a professional com,,dian, delivery c-lerks, kitchen workers, a 1ar,.e number of field workers for the. Southern Christian Leaderslhip Conference and for the Conare.ss of llncial Equality, steel workers, physicians. photographers, mechanics' helpers. attorneys, surgeons, and TV servicemen. At least thirty of the persons aplppearin in the "mug books" are nationally known. A large number of fleld workers for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Congress of Rlacial Equality appear in Volume to note previous arrests is provided for each entry, although A place 3. no provision is made to indicate the disposition of the charg s. A very large number of persons are included in the five volumes with no in. dicnation of any arrest. For instance in Volume 2, of 223 entries, 52 have no record of any arrest and in Volume 0 63 of 167 entries have no record of any arrest, In addition, among those who do have an arrest record, a significant number have been arrested only one time and for violating iklocal breach of the peace or other similar ordinance in connection with participation in a civil rights demonstration, Typical of the entries are arrests for: unlawful assembly, paradin without

permit, disturbing the peace, trespassing, breach of peace, Jisobeying an officer and blocking a roadway, interfering with the free flow of traffic, provocation and resisting arrest, inciting to riot, teaching and advocating overthrow of the government, and using obscene language.

In the case of a small number of entries some serious arrests are refor larceny. corded. These include arrestsgrandkidnaping, burglary, grand auto aggravated assault, and theft, Exhibli 1 consists of excerpts from the Fort Holabird mug books, "sanitized" to safeguard the privacy of the individuals involved.
EXHMIT 1
FORT IIOLABIID
-l•
'p a "+l.

came f!rom both police booking files and street surveillance. Other pho-

As the above excerpts indicate the Army's photographs apparently

tographs in the mug books appear to have been taken from newspapers, magazines, or school yearbooks. The listing of full street addresses for persons without arrest records suggests that Army intellIgence was doing more than copying police files, while the listing of arrests in both California and Florida for a minister active in com. munity action work shows the reach of information swapping between police departments and the military. Most important, the entries clemonstrate the complete absence of care by the editors of the mug books to link the publication of a person's picture, name, address, and-associ. ations with the reasons for that publication. It thus appears that Army intelligence operated on the assumption that all forms of political dis.sent were within its jurisdiction to monitor.

I

Most persons listed are identified with some political or social action organization. There is an extraordinary diversity in the kinds of organizations mentioned, and no indication of the reason, purpose, or significance of listing these groups. These organizations include: SNCC; the Communist Party, U.S.A.; the Deacons for Defense and Justice; CORE0•; the Spring Mobilization Communittee To End the War in Vietnam; NAACP; the Socialist Workers Party; the States Rights Party; the Ahilerican Nazi Party; the Black Panthers.; Americans for 3 I)emocratie Action; the National Committee to Abolish the House I'n-American Activities C(ommittee; American Friends Service Committee; the W.E.B. I)uBois Clubs; the War Resisters League; the World Workers Par'ty ; tile Southern ('1hristialf IA'ader.lflp Conference; the P1rogressive, Labor Movement; the Presiyterian Interracial council l of ( 'hicago; tile Fair Play rot ('uba Committee; and thle D)allas ('ounty. Alahama, Voters League. Oj Short notati11io1s d1eril)e, alld somietililes adveIrsely liatI'aclteize, the individual's alleged political phlilosoply, activities, or associations. One person, for exailljple, is described Its ha11v'ing lnumflelro0115 pro-Comllmuist associates, another is alleged to be an avowed Marxist, and It ti1rd is described as ain active denloiistrator withi a Red background who is a radical. Tihe connectioll between these beliefs, actions, and associations, and the Army's eivil disturbance mission is nowhere
ilidicate(l.

In this ease, the cargo of sex perversion is demoiistlably false-in addition to being irrelevant to the Armny's iilforlfatiolli ntee(1s.

Many individuals' names and photos appear who, based on the in. formnation set forth in the folders, have none or only one arrest, few political associations, and very little other information to indicate why their inclusion in a file ot this nature would assist the Army or local law enforcement officials in preserving the peace. Typical of these entries are the following, taken from Volume 2: (1) Black female; date of birth; address; member of NAACP' no other information except that she is the wife of a named physician. (2) Wlite female' date of birth; physical description; no other information except that she is a member of SNCC.

8 (3) Name of black male; no other information except the notation, "Active in State of Texas." (4) Young, black male: date of birth; physical description; address; no other information except his arrest in 1962 for interfering with the free flow of traffic. (5) White female; date of birth; physical description; address; described as "housewife"; no other information except, "Demonstrator, Civil Rights." In Volume 3. of 237 entries, 94 were young, black citizens with no other information except the notation of one arrest for either (1) parading without a permit in Lee County, Alabama, on September 1, 1965, or (2) an unidentifiable crime (apparently a violation of a town ordinance) in Tuscahlosa, Alabama. In Volume'5, of 189 entries, 27 individuals idontifled as members of the Black Panther Party had no arrest record at all. Their entries included name, date of biirth, address, physical description, and membership in the Black Panther Party. The source of the information included in the profiles is not indicated, although Volumes 2 and 31 may have been adapted from a similar publication by the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Thus it is not possible for the user to appraise the accuracy of any item, except insofar as it confirm. what he has learned from other sources. No date is printed in any of the volumes examined: therefore users could not have known within any certainty when to consider the information out of date. Nor do the looks indicate how many editions were issued or to whom they were sent. Former agents, however, recall seeing copies in MI field offices. From the distribution of intelligence summaries and other publications, it seems likely that copies went to all group, region, and field offices of the Intelligence Command, all G-2s of CONARC troop units, the FBI, the Provost Marshall General, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and the Adjutant Generals of all 50 States. What purpose these books served has never been explained by the Army. Captain Pyle testified that he had been told by one of the editors that the muig books were a "blacklist" of "persons who might cause trouble for the Army." The inclusion of photographs and street addresses supports this interpretation. Whatever their original purpose, the Army General Counsel conceded that the books were not necessary to the Army's mission and would be destroyed. 4 The order to destroy the mug books was issued on February 18,1970, but as of August 26, 1970, less than half had been reported destroyed. The absence of detailed records requiring personal accountability for books (as is required for documents classic fled Secret and Top Secret) made efforts to guarantee destruction difficult. To maximize destruction the Assistant ChiLf of Staff directed the Commanding General of the Intelligence Command t6 withdraw copies from the field and supervise their destruction. Subsequently, however, field units were directed to take charge of the destruction themselves and simply forward certificates of destruction. Thus,. while certificates were received for 46 percent of the volumes issued, it is unlikely that 46 percent of the volumes actually went into the incinerators.

A Hearings, Part II, p. 1049.

9 II. TiiE CIAB CoMPENDIuM The second important domestic intelligence compilation examined by the Subcommittee staff is a set of two yellow, vinyl-covered, looseleaf binders popularly known as the "Coipendium." Both volumes which were eassified "ISECRET," are entitled C;vii Di.ttrbanecsand by the Counterintelligence Analysis Brinch (CIAB) and bear the imprtint of "Headquarters, Departinent of the Army; Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence." Each opens with an acknowledgment that the basic information on organizations and individuals contained therein was provided primarily by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Compendium employed a, loose-leaf format to facilitate the continual updating of information. Standardized formats were prescribed to assure uniformity in the presentation of significant data. New information was to be inserted in the form of replacement pages. Users were encouraged to forward any information in their possession which could fill existing gaps or adid substantive knowledge to the present treatment of any city, organization, or personality covered. Suich information, as well as comments and suggestions pertaining to continued publications and utilization of the Compendium were to be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. The actual writing and editing was done by analysts in the domestic intelligence section of the Counterintelligence Analysis Branch (CIAB).
A. CITIES

Dissmidenee. Volume 1 is subtitled Citie.q and Organizatloa. of Interest. Volume. 2 is sub-titled Personamities of Interest. Both were prepared

Part I of Volume I classifies cities according to the amount of force that probably would be required to restore order in the event of massive rioting. This categorization was not intended as a prediction of which cities are most likely to experience disorder, but as an estimate of the maximum intensity racial violence was likely to attain and the amount of force that would be required,to quell thai violence. Urban areas which probably would require federal troops in the event of major civil disorder are classified as Category I cities. They include Baltimore, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. The, total number of cities in this category, which also includes such joint urban centers as San Francisco-Oakland, is 22. Category IT cities, which would probably require no more than National Guard assistance, include Atlanta, Boston, Dayton, Miami and Nashville. There are 61 cities and urban centers in this4 category. Category ITT cities (requiring joint state and municipal police forces) and Category IV cities (within the control of municipal police departments) are not discussed in the Compendium. The following (riteria, taken from the Summary of Factors Considered, were used to assign particular cities to particular categories. A. The population of the urban area, and the percentage of Negroes among the population. B. The population of the "core city" of each metropolitan area and the percentage and distribution of Negro population elements.
70-911-72-2

10 C. Tile presence of large "blue-collar" neighborhoods, as rereflected by the relative size of the industrial playroll and indus1). The presence of poor economic and sociological conditions, and their reflection ill the crime rate. E. The unemployment rate in the area, and metropolitan districts of concentrated unemployment. F. The presence and degree of activity of'mnilitant racial, leftist (anti-war and anti-draft), and extreme riglt-wing groups, and afl assessmen, t of the capabilities of these groups to stir up1) emot~ions or provoke a (civil disturbance. G. The history of civil disturbances in tile area. If. The assessment of known and probably future demonstrations. I. The existence of a. wide-spread sense of injustice, and real or inma,,ined lack of ineansof redress. J. The (aching of arms or explosives, or any other preparation for rioting. These. factors are identical to those set forth in the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan of May 2, 1968. The section entitled ('U/y AS'mmary (70,he reveals that the summaries of the ,ities afre, no more than condensations of the most salient statistics and activil ies bearing on civil disturbanlces. Much of the data trial concentrations.

is based on information provided by tile Bureau of the Budget in
its repoits on Standard Metropolitan 'Statistical Areas. The following

afrt Source'.s used in the compilation of such data:

1. "The Statistieal Abstract of the United States," 88th Edition (1MO;), Bureau of the Census, department of Commerce. '2.. "U'niform Crime Rel)orts for the United States-l1966." releas(•(l Aigust 1967, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice. 3. "Area Trends in Employment and Unemployment," February 1968. l)Dem tment of Labor. 4. Civil 1)istirhaimce Planning Packets prepared by CONARC. I0.Replorts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Part T'"lBasic I)ata." 'Includes pl)opulation (and ethnic composition. if significant), unemployment, crime rate (major crimes), potential trouble areas (part of data. received from counterintelligence reports), and a brief history of civil disturbances in that area. Part II, "Significant, Organizational Activity," is a summary of the organizations whose activities have the greatest bearing on futiuro civil disturbances. Tile eitNy sunUnaries are quite brief, averaging approximately one typewritten page each. Population, unemployment, and crime rate statistics are, based on government figures. The percentage of nonwhites is always noted. Comments on"Potential Trouble Areas" ap-

11 pear to be somewhat arbitrary and deal almost, exclusively witflh ie Negro population. For example, Baltimore's trouble spots are simply designated as the southwestern wards, where the majority of the city's Negro population live. The lower east side areft of I)etroit is said to be occupied "almost exclusively by Negroes, many of whom have little respect foi, police, law, or the comminunity in general." Tihe summary "Histories of Civil I)ist-1it'banees" are more detailed, but brevity limits their content to the most significant previolls disorders and a few facts descrilbing their context. T'1he date of the.disturlbanep, the ium1ber of persons arrested, the amount of damage.. the number of injuries, and the "'atise" of the disturbance are usually included. So fal' as they go, the "histories" appear to be accurate,

but they offer little insight into the catustes of disorder. Thus, a.typical entry says only that in Jersvey City, New Jersey., on .July 17', 1967, Negro youths broke windows' of a' lu1ncheonette and stole guln find ,andy. The somtres of tile information are not cited. 'l'h1e last factor considered ill the eity summaries is "Signifieant ()Irgallizational Activity." lBec-ause the mnajoritv of the organizations are .(hiracterized politically, this section contains some of the, most ,.oist.jtttionallv offensive datia. nhese hiiaraeterizations are inl ealsiile form,ifild (0o reveal whv pa rt ieula r organ izat ions are labeled "Comnot inluist,', "anti-white." ori "radical." T1he ma jority of tile organizations represent' Negroes; the National Assoeiatioin fore the Advancement of Colored People, the Congress of Racial FEquality, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Student son-violent, Coordinating committee e appear frequently. Predominately white organ izations frequently 'Iai'eterized include Students for a I)emocratic Society, the Southern Students organizingng Committee, branches of the ELu Klux Klan. and the Ameriean Nazi Pa'ty. The information contained in the organization summaries general enough to have been obtained almost entirely through the public media. Many of the organizations listed have no history of violence. In Baltimore the NAACP is characterized simply as being active in protnoting Negro civil rights by peaceful methods. LL referring to a black group in Cincinnati, on the other hand, the summary says that it has changed from nonviolence to militant Black Power. Such organizations are listed because they are supposed to be "significant." However, nowhere ill tile Coinpendium are there any criteria which night reveal how this determination was made.
It. OIlOANIZATIONS

Part I1 of Volume I discusses "Organizations of Tnterest." These are broken down into four categories: political, racial, anti-war/antidraft, and international. The preface to Part II states that a few of the organizations listed are entirely legitimate and legal in their aims and
aspirations. Two examples of such groups are the NAACP and the Urban League.5
" One example of the Inconsistency of the Army's characterizations, and one which Illustratet; uiglln the lack of any substantiation for their concluslonary statements. is shown in hoth the D)epartment of tihe Army, and the USAINTC collection plans which label the NAACP as an organnizntion that attempts "to create, prolong, or amgravate racial tensions." It would appear that the authors of the plans did not rely on the Compendium for their
"Intelligence."

12 Topics covered in the organizational summaries include: objectives, ideology, history (since 1962), significant activities, influence, leadership (personalities), finances and "final comments." Over 100 organizations are characterized in statements which average between one and two pages. On the whole, these summaries are expanded discussions of the same organizations mentioned in the City Summary Guide. However, the focus here is on national organizations. Although there is no evidence to indicate that the. riots of the late 1960s were the product of any organized effort, the Compendium reveals that Army intelligence kept watch over allegedly subversive groups. As the various collection plans directed, the editors of the Compendium l)aid close attention to the possibility that Communists and others with revolutionary designs might infiltrate civil rights and anti-war organizations. For example, the summary describing the American Friends Service Committee states that there is no evidence of infiltration or influence by a subversive element. On the other hand, one black organization is reported to be influenced and infiltrated by members of Communist front groups. No documentation is given to support this charge and no proof is offered to indicate that the organization was responsible for any recent civil disorders. Allegations of possible subversive influence appear frequently, usually without referonce to the source of the charge, the evidence on which it is based, or any explanation of what constitutes a "subversive" group or "communist front." As in the descriptions of organizations included in the City Summary Guide, most of the information presented in Part II could have beeni abstracted from publicly available sources. The main purpose of the summaries appears to have been to provide an assessment of the particular organization's potential or capability for violence, based on its past actions, its goals, and its leadership;. However, unevaluated information and undocumented conclusions often are intermixed. The summary of an urban racial gang, for example, reveals the names of its leadership-seemingly factual information. Yet in the section "Significant Activities," the gr'ou p's president is said to have hired 14 and 15-year-old gang member. to shoot three men on September 12, 1967. The final comment is that members of the gang are known to have access to weapons. Such apparently unsubstantiated data and observations are typical of the organization summaries, and Volume I of the Compendium as a whole. Thirteen political, 49 racial. 16 anti-war/anti-draft, and 27 international organizations are listed. As the following examples show, the Army indiscriminately lumped together organizations of unquestioned legItimacy and legality (even in the eyes of the. Army) together with those. few. groups plopularly regarded as having employed unlawful methods in pursuit of their ends. In no case, however, was there proof that even these latter groups had violated the law, let alone that they constituted any threat to national security. The groups include: A. Political American Nazi Party. Communist Party, USA. John Birch Society. Minutemen. National States Rights Party. National Renaissance Party. Progressive Labor Party. Socialist Workers Party.

Resisters TInside the Army. Scots Against War. Socialist German Students League.

South Vietnamese Peop)le's Cohmmittee for' Solidarity with the Amer. icanlPeople.
Stop It Committee.

Student Union for Peace Action. The Refusal. US Campaign. Vietnam Information Group. War Res.isters International. Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The following entries, are typical of the organizational descriptions which appear in the Compendium.
,XIHIIIT :1

CIAB Co,%iPr.Nwvft
SECTION B-BLAcK UXITEI)
I. SUMMARY

FitONT (BUF)

BUF Is a loose coalition of moderate and militant Negro groups In the WashIngton, D.('. area. It Is a relatively new organization embodying the concept of Negro unity, and involves key Negro personallties.

15
I. OBJECTIVES AND IDEOLOGY According to its stated objectives, the BUF was organized to improve communication between all Negroes in Washington, D.C., in order to gain a "proportionate" share In the "decision making councils" and economic institutions of the District of Columbia. There has been little variation by the 1117F from Its stated purpose. IllI. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION The BUiF was formed on 9 January 1968, during a conference of Washington, D.C.'s Negro leaders at the New School for Afro-American Thought (NSAAT), locatedtat 2208 14th Street NW, Washington, I).C. Stokely Carnichael was responlsibh for calling these leaders together. Since, its formation, the group has be'n the subject of much controversy and speculation concerning its program and future activity. Several press conferences have not clarified these( issues. At present, the organization seems to b(- stressing only unity among the disparate organizations represented. IV. SIGNIFICA.NT ACTIvIrTIs None. V. STRENG{II, FOLLOWING, AND INFLUENCE As a coalition of moderate and militant groups, the B1FUhas no individual members. The( most prominent groups currently involved in tihe BUF are tihte Washington, D.C. chapters of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the National Urban League (NUL), an1d tile Southern Christian ILadershl) ('onference ( SCLC). The total number of lpartlelimting groups is between 15 and 20. Organizational affillation with tile BI'F is theoretically olxn to any group with a minilnumn of IMper ('emit Negro membership and an interest in the Negro community. The Influence of the B1IF in the Washington area is currently of concern In assessing the possible colntrilution of the organization to Dr. Martin Luther King's Washington Spring Project (WSHI). As of mid-March 1968. the IH'T indicated that It would "suilport the ahis" of the, W.I'. but would not actively participate in the denmonstration as a group, although member organizations would be permitted to do so. The imlaet of the BITF as' a nation wide force cannot be evaluated at this thne. It is known that Stokely Carmichael made trips to Dayton, Ohio, and Boston to aftt('npt to spread the BT1F concept, and it is reported that Ills Boston efforts met with little success. An unidentified BUP spokesman has stated that the organizatMon has had It quirles on its activities from interested persons or groups In 37 cities. VI. LEADERSIIIP titles are known for the three principal leaders in B1IT, who No leadershim are: Stokley ( rrmichael (SNCC) ; Sterling Tucker (NUL) ; Walter Fauntroy (SCLC). VII. FINANCES No Information Is currently available concerning BUF finances, and it is not felt that the organization actually has control of any of time financial resources or dealings of its member organizations. VIII. COMMENTS Time term "united front" Is a very meaiiingful one in a discussion of possible communist affiliation with racial organizations in the U.S. The history of collmunist movements world-wide is replete with examl)leh of tile use of the "front" concept, such as, the Front Populaire, active in France during the 1930's, and the current National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. Carmichael called the initial BUF meeting and first used the term publicly less than a month after his return from his much publicized tour of communist capitals. No conclusions can be made at this time as to the BUF organizations being pMrt of a communist front group. but participation of any group in a "united front" organization offers indications of possible communist dominance or influence.

16
The entry for BUF illustrates the scope and detail of the information gathered on many of the organizations in the Compendium. The entry is notable for the neutral narrative of parts I through VII. More typical, however, of the other entries in tile Compendium is part VIII, Comments. Although the comment appears to be straightforward and factual about the history of the term "unitedfront," it does contain unverified and prejudicial statements suggesting a communist connection or influence. While the report disclalins knowledge of any facts establishing a link between the BUF and communist influence and while it cautions against misimpressions--"conclusions"--on this account, tile report leaves the reader with the very same misimpressions warned against. This kind of "guilt by disclaimed innuendo" is not uncommon throughout the files.
SECTION, A-ABC PARTY (ABC)

I. SUMMARY ABC Party (ABC) is a small, extreme right-wing political organization of negligible Influence. It has the goal of establishing In the United States a strong,
c(mtralized "Racial Nationalist State." The AB1C is a local organization iII the

New York City area.
11. OBJECTIVES AND IDEOLOGY

Thie stPted nid apparently true objectives of the ABC, as paraphrased are: A. Enant and rigidly enforce legislation to restrict the benefits of American citizenship to mentally and genetically so-, nd members of the Caucasian race. B. Enact legislation to prohlilit intermarriage between whites and non-whites. C. The Jewish race. which constitutes the motivating financial and intellectual ba.klione of the left-wing revolutionary activity In the United States, as manifested In the so-called Negro civil rights movement, shall be deprived of their Anwriean citizenship by suitable legislation and shall henceforth be prolithited from holding any profe.,.slonal, political, or educational posts with the RItial Nationalist State. The Jew constitutes an alien virus In the national bloodsti'ualn and, as such, must be purged from our cultural, ecoiomnmle, and political life.

D. Enact legislation to hasten the repatriation of American Negroes to the newly independent black nations of the African continent under the auspices and guidance of black nationalist leadership in the United States. E. The establishment of a selective immigration policy of which the primary purpose iq to nttract the best European racial stock to the North American Continent in order to utilize their vast energy and talent in the task of crreating a dynamih, expanding White Empire capable of withstanding encroachments of tile primitive colored world led by the Oriental colossus of Red China.
11I. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION

The ABC was founded in 1049 by in New York City. It has always been actively anti-Negro, anti-Semitic. and anti-communist. Its infrequent rallies have shown that its membership and power have neither grown nor matured. The headquarters of the ABC is located at - West -th Street, New York City, New York. There are no organized chapters of tile ABC.
IV. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1940-1068: The ABC attempted to hold numerous rallies, but none has had any appreciable results. 1940-1903: The ABC published several pamphlets and bimonthly newsletters. It reduced the number of its publications due to lack of funds. October 21, 1907: Tile ABC attempted to take part in a counter-demonstration at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., but the ABC group was unable to arrive
on time due to an illness of a member. V. STRENGTH, FOLLOWING, AND INFLUENCE

The total membership of the ABC is about 20 people, all from the New York City area. The extent of ABC sympathetic following is estimated at no more than 50, but it is difficult to ascertain the size of this group since ABC meetings usually attract numbers of police, Journalists, and the curious. The ABC has a negligible amount of Influence due to the lack of members, money, and ideas
with popular appeal. The party has in the past attempted to coordinate a few

17
activities with the American Nazi Party (ANP), but It has been unable to exert any Influence on the ANP. It has not had any Influence In government or official circles.
VI. LEADERSHIP

National Director: National Secretary:
VII. FINANCES

The Iprinhry sources of funds for the ABC are

an ABC mem-

ber from Middletown, New York, and other occasional, individual financial contributions. ABC members contribute at meetings and obtains some money from the sale of books which le recommends for reading. There is also some profit from bulk orders of reprints of pamplhlets and leaflets distributed by the ABC. The exact financial status of the ABC is unknown, but they may be badly in need of monetary aid.
VIII. COMMENTS

Lack of popular and financial support may cause the demise of the ABC In the near future.

Nothing in these stimmarie., o0.in seorls of othet's )llblished in the Compendium, indicates that the, groups described pose a. threat to civil order or military security. Compared to some othe' oflllcial publications of the same period, the Compendium is a model of professional analysis. While its descriptions, with exceptions, generally stick to publicly available evidence, there are some unsubstantiated allegations of criminal or subversive intent, and a number of examples where damaging inferences are easily made.
c. EnsO•NALTIES

sketches on 345 "personalities of interest." The volume is divided into two sections: the domestic section, which includes 243 personality sketches, and the foreign section, which contains 102 sketches. Again the FBI is acknowledged as the primary source of information. From the information contained in the personality sketches, it appears that the material was collected from police arrest records, military. files (including psychiatric records), local draft board reeords, private institutions, credit companies, and records of organizations to which the "personalities of interest" belong. Other sources appear to have included newspapers, magazines, and other generally available publications. Occasionally the source of a particular item of information is acknowledged in the sketch. For example, the sketch of a leader of a right-wing extremist group cites Army medical records as the source of its unfavorable characterization of his mental condition. None of the biographical sketches indicates when the information was collected or compiled. Some information concerning political activities dates back to the early 1920s, but most of the data pertains to activities and events which took place during the 1960s. All sketches in the edition examined by the Subcommittee staff were prepared prior to the elections of November 1968. Occasionally there are slightly different sketches of the same individual and not every sketch has a page number at the bottom of the sheet.. The Compendium was upated as late as November 1969, but these revisions were not made available to the Subcommittee. Information in each personality sketch is presented according to the following forrpat:

The second volume of the Compendium contains biographical

18 I. Personal Dita: C. Date and place of birth. 1). Current resident (or usual location). I1. Background. III. Political/Organizational Affiliation and Activity. IV. Individual oir Non-Organizaltional Activities. V. Other Information. Most of these biographical sketches are less than a page long, amd most of the information in them is set, forth in category II-"Political/Organizational Affiliation atid Activity." Pe'rsons of Interest" include the leaders of all major minority groups and anti-war organizations, political extremist groul)s, the Communist Party USA, and the civil rights till(] peace movements. A few of the sketches note that the individual was not directly aligned with any known racial or
A. True name. 1. Alias/nicknames.

organizations described il Volume I as Communist fronts active in
political organization of counterintelligence interest. In these instances, tle individuals usually have ina(le outspoken remarks on ra(ial or' aliti-war issues. Advocates of civil rights and peace causes are not the only persons

profiled in the Compendium. Leaders of groups described as "white racist., such as the White Party of America, thef National States Rights I afty. and the Ku Klux Klan, are listed alongside "black power militants" from the lRevoltitiona ry Action Movement, DIeacons for l)hense and Justice, and the Black Panther Party for Self D)efense. In many instances the fact that the individual is a leader of an organization of interest is the only fact itoted about him. For example, svIe persons are listed siml)ly as members of the bIoard of a southern students organizing committee,. The same holds true for officers of the American Nazi lParty an1d other organizations which have been in
existence for a great many years. Surplrisingly, the authors of the Compendium were unable to supply anything more in these instances

Sketches vary from brief rundowns of organizational roles to elaborate, descriptions of the individual's mental condition, family situa-

other than the fact, of membership).

tion, schooling, occupation, financial condition, criminal record, political associations, speeches given and statements made. Beliefs, association.s and private conversations also are reported. For example:
Following n medical examination in February 1961, -was diagnosed fromn depre(s'lon and exeessive worry due to personal problems. It Is not known who conducted the examination. A lwych(llatric examination on 15 April 1955, revealed that Is sub. ject to feelings of uncontrollable hostility In times of stress and that he has a laranold personality.
11a "schizoild personality, chronic, mioderate." He was described as suffering it

(college) for three weeks: and where he obtained a B.A. degree with honors in political science in 1063 and an M.A. degree In political science In

attended

-

-

City College from 1058 to 1961;

19M4.

completed the third grade of formal education. From 1948 to 1940 lie attended the Institute, Texas, but did not graduate because of failure to comply with a school policy involving female students. engineer with the Is the Chairman of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

has an elementary school education and has been employed as an Central Railroad since 1947. has associated with known communists.

19
He was an unsuccessful senatorial candidate in where he ran on a peace platform. A leading anti-war spokesman is quoted as stating that "his purpose is to develop '. . . an anti-imperiallstic consciousness among the American peoulep.' He wants 'a supervised armistice' in Vietnam. He said that he would have 'backed LBJ if he would have come to the aid of Israel in their war with the Arab nations.'" In a closed PTA and staff meeting called in connection with the disturbances, said, "I am*not talking about facts; I am talking about what I want you to do and what I have the power to make you do." In mid-1967 addressed a Black Nationalist group for two hours. During the course of his address lie said, "All whites are expendable for the cause of Black Power... liberals should be employed for suicide squads."

-

conduct in 1946 while picketing the United Nations. The same person also was reported as present at a 1966 demonstration in Times Sqpare in New York City. A faculty member at the Free School of New IY ork, who also edits a'magazine, is cited for his extensive particil)ation in protests against U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam, and a memIem' of the American Nazi Party is noted as having attended the funeral of Party leader George Lincoln Rockwell in Alulust 1967. Much of the Information published in the Personalities section of the Compendium appears to be petty, private, and unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest. For example, it is difficult to comprehend whify Army commanders would need to know that a prominent civil rights leader in a particular locality has four brothers, five sisters, and a widowed mother. Similarly useless reports state that a well known entertainer has a wife and six children, that the divorced wife of a minority group leader seeks no support from her former husband because she shares his championship of the poor and that sexual maladjustment, flat feet, and torn ligaments were tile reasons why two individuals were granted 1-Y classifications by the Selective The source of financial support for persons known to have incited riots might well he a valid item of intelligence interest. Less clear is the reason whv the Army reported that the combined lfonthly salary of a civil rights activist and his wife was $775, or that another civil rights leader left his job in private industry because a civil rights organization offered him a salary of $12,500 a year. It is even more difficult to perceive why the Compnendium should go into the financial status of an outspoken individual with "no direct organizational affiliations." This was done, however, even to the. extent of noting that he had unpaid bills and had had his credit. card privileges revoked. While at least 60 of the 243 personalities of interes.tare well known public figures. there are many curious omissions and inclusions. Thus only one of eight defendants in a nationally publicized conspiracy prosecution is listed. Similarly, many persons active at a local level but unknown nationally are, included. For example, the chairman and vicechairman of a southwestern community's Committee To End the War in Vietnam are given a page each altholuih all that appears to have been known about them was that they were officers of the committee. Arrests are often reported, but less frequently is anything said about the disposition of the charges.

The authors of the Compendium appear to have been especially interested in persons who participate in demonstrations. The descriptioti of one anti-war figure notes that he was arrested for disorderly

Sera'ice.

20
Coverage of individuals b occupation is very broad. Included are clergymen, teachers, journalists, editors, attorneys, industrialists, a laborer, a construction worker, railroad engineers, a postal clerk, a taxi driver, a chiropractor a nationally-known doctor, a chemist, an economist, an historian, a playwright, an accountant, an entertainer, professors, a former radio announcer, an athlete, a civilian working for the Department of the Army, a Congressman, executives, and authors. Most of the persons of interest are involved in race-related activities. Some civil rights activists also oppose the war in Vietnam, but of 243 persons in the domestic section of the Compendium, 193 were said to support or oppose expanded rights for Negroes. All but a few of the rest were involved in the anti-war movement. The Foreword to Volume I states that the purpose of the Compendium was to provide a reference base for all OACSI publications concerned with dissidence and civil disturbances. According to former analysts at CIAB, the concept originated with William L. Parkinson, Deputy Chief of the Branch, who proposed it during the fall as a device to relieve his analysts ota flood of petty inquiries. of 1967 The two-volume encyclopedia was designed for both staff and operational use, and was distributed widely. 346 copies of Volume I and 348 copies of Volume II were authorized for distribution to 108 Defense agencies, commands, schools, intelligence groups, other governmental organizations such as the FBI, the CIA, NASA, Secret Service, and the Sthtte Department, and eight defense attach6s in foreign countries, including the Soviet Union. The Compendium's existence was first disclosed publicly on February 26, 1970, by the Ohicago Sun-Tinmes. The disclosure apparently

W

came as a surprise to some of the Army's civilian superiors, and they subsequently ordered it destroyed. In his letter of March 20, 1970, Under Secretary of the Army Thaddeus Beal assured the Chairman that theo Compendium was out-of-date and would be withdrawnw" from the field and destroyed. For some reason, however, field units were instructed to carry out the destruction themselves and to submit certificates of destruction instead. At the Counterintelligence Analysis Division this directive was interpreted to permit microfilming of the Compendium before destruction of the office copy was carried out. Thus, as Secretary Frophlke testified, "The destruction of all copies has not yet been assured." 6
*Hearings, Part I, p. 804. As of August 28, 1070 five months after the orders to destroy the Compendium had been issued, it was reported [bat Certificates of Destruction had not been received for 50 of 851 copies.

21

III.

FILES OF TilE ARmY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

W

The most extensive files maintained by the Army on civilian political activity were kept by the U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) at Fort Holabird, Md. Created in 1965 by the unification of a number qf military inteligence groups formerly assigned to the Continental Armies, the Intelligence Command coordinated the domestic intelligence operations of some 1200 intelligence agents working out of some 300 offices coast to coast. Its chief mission was the conduct of security clearance investigations. It also maintained the Army's Central Records Facility, 'now called the Investigative Records Repository, and the Defense Department's Central Index of Investigations. These activities were (and remain) housed in a huge sheet metal warehouse at Fort Holabird.7 The central core of the Intelligence Command's files is the Investigative Records Repository which c6ntains approximately eight million security clearance, criminal, and counterintelligence dossiers. Around this core, a number of files have been developed specifically to keep track of civilian political activities unrelated, or only indirectly related, to the investigation of persons being considered for security clearances. These satellite files included: (1) A search file on suspected subversive groups and individuals (sometimes called the "departmental file"), (2) Cabinets filled with reports on incidents of domestic political activity thought to represent an "incipient" threat to civil order or to military security, (3) A computerized file of incident reports relating to civil disturbances, demonstrations, meetings, speeches, etc., (4) A biographic data file, also computerized, on persons believed to pose a threat to military security or civil order, (5) A library of domestic intelligence publications, videotapes of demonstrations, photographs of demonstrators, and similar items.
A. TME SUBVERSIVES FILE

The oldest of the satellite files is a collection of dossiers on "persons, whierever located, [who are] considered to constitute a threat to the "subversive and other organizations of intelligence interest to the Army, wherever located, and of whatever sponsorship, [which are] considered to constitute a threat to national security." 8 This file is maintained primarily as a search file to facilitate the investigation of persons being considered for security clearances. However, it also has been used to prepare reports on persons suspected of espionage, sabotage, incitement to riot, and subversion of military discipline. The term "subversives file" is something of a misnomer, as the dossiers primarily relate to individuals and organizations who could not
I The new Defense Investigative Service (DIS) Is in the process of taking over many of thesp activities. A description of the Investigative Records Repository was Included in Secretary FroehIke's testimony (Hearings, Part I, pp. 401-404). s Hearings, Part I, p. 402.

security and defense of the Government of the United States," and

22 fairly be accused of seeking to change the Constitution of the United States by unconstitutional means. Some of the groups included, together with their dossier numbers, are: Organization and dos8ier number American Friends Service Committee, ZB-00-02-00. Amnericans for Democratic Action, ZA-00-17-81. Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, ZB-50-05-27. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, ZA00-04-02. National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, ZA-00-90-26. National States Rights Party, ZA-00-90-97. Southern Christian Leadership Conference, ZB-00-87-94. Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam, ZA-02-17-2170. Veterans for Peace in Vietnam, ZB-02-18-03. Women Strike for Peace, ZB-01-86-95. These and additional organizations included in these files are listed at pages 1736-37 of Part IT of the Siolnmilittee's hearings, and are ta ken from a news release. Individuals described in these files have, at least until ,Januarv of 1971, included some public officials, including Congressnien and Oovernors. These are the files to which Secretary Froehlke referred when he testified that "There are dossiers within the Arny Investigative Records Repository which contain FBI reports and other material which do not meet current Army criteria for retention." 1 .elroited that their files conOn December 31, 1970. the Repository tained the following number of (lossiels.'
Organization flhss: -----------------------------------------1. Paper, copy 2. Paper. copy (former CIC) ------------------------------------------.. 3. Paper, copy 771st MI group 4. Paper. copy USARP ------------------------------------------------------------------------------5. Microfilm Total -------------------------------------------35, 600 60, 150 3, (00 7, 981) 97, 904 211, 243 3,424 41,307 80, 731

Although these dossiers are not specifically identified in the inventory as part of the subversives file, it would seem that the bulk of them are. To determine how many of them relate to civilian lpolitical groups like those listed above, it would be necessary first to subtract all those files relating to groups and individuals in other countries whose activities were or are considered to pose a threat to national security. A second discount would have to be made for various fronts for foreign intelligence agencies, and a third for those domestic organizations which actually seek to change our form of government by unconstitutional means.
*Hearings, Part It,p. 404. 0 1 Hearings, Part p. 402.

23 Tile reports filed in the dlossiers originated with a variety of intelligence agencies, including Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and state and municipal police intellizenee units. The chief contributor', however, has always been the FBI. Since 1939, when President Roosevelt first ordered the Bureau to exchange internal security inforIlation with the armed forces, military intelligence agencies at all levels of goverinent have been thie recipients of reports from other agencies. Where reports were transferred only at. tile local level, copies usually found their way up through the chain of command. rhi unfi ation o,' the 300 stateside offices of the Army's MI groups under a single Intelligence Command in 1965 undoubtedly facilitated the expansion of such files attall levels, but particularly at Fort Ilolibird. The key policy questions raised by tlhe continued existence of these files onl "su;ibverslve andl other dissidents" concerns security clearance investigations. *UnderExecutive Order 104150 the Army is charged with investigating the backgrounds of persons being considered for access to military secrets. This has entailed the scrutiny of organizational affilinations for leads to evidence of disloyalty. Thus the investigators have amassed files on certain domestic political groups. There is a serious question, however, as to how much information Army investigators need on a particular group in order to determine that further investigation of one of its members is warranted. Thus Pentagon officials have recently asked whether the Tntelligence Command really needs 124 linear feet ot dossiers of raw intelligence on the Communist Party U.S.A. in order to carry out its investigations of persons being considered for clearances. They questions whether a brief characterization prepared by Justice Department lawyers on the basis of FBI files would not be sufficient. Similarly, other, have questioned the number of groups the Army has kept files on. Should its files be limited to those groups with demzonstrable ties to foreign go 'ernmnents, or should they include-as they now do-virtually every activist l)(;litical group in America? Finally, how many federal agencies should maintain raw intelligence files on domestic political activir;y which esýentially duplicate the files of the FBI? These are just some of the problems raised by the Fort Holabird subversives file.
B. NON-COMPUTEITIZED INCIDENT FILES

Military intelligence procedures called for the filing of two kinds of reports describing incidents of interest. "Spot reports," which followedi a brief six or 14 paragraph format, were intended to provide little more tbhn the essentials of Who? What? When? Where?, and perhaps How? "Agent reports" were the longer, narrative descriptions of an incident, operation, investigation, or debriefing. Both forms were used by agents of the Intelligence Command to report incipent civil disturbances, incidents which might threaten military security, or incidents involving servicemen. In the civil disturbance area, a premium was placed on speed of reporting and Brig. Gen. William H. Blakefield frequently urged his men to "beat the A.P."

24 Spot reports of demonstrations, meetings, marches, vigils, and other forms of political protest were often telephoned to local MI group offices, drafted into the proper six or 14 paragraph form by duty agents, and then reported up the chain of command via teletype to Fort H[olabird. At each level, a copy would be kept for the files. The reports all funneled into the CONUS Intelligence Branch, Operations IV, a section of the Intelligence Command-headquarters which was located in a room adjacent to the Investigative Records Repository." At Ops IV, as it was called, intelligence analysts would sort the reports for retransmission to interested agencies and make summaries of the important ones which would later be copied onto key-punch cards for computer storage. Then the reports would be filed chronologically mi file cabinets. Two untypical, but authentic, spot reports are set forth below."
SHORT FORM SPOT REPORT

LC 116th HQ P 281515Z JUN 68 To: USAINTC Info: MOW BT Unclass 1. 116-8189-643. 2. It has been learned that 28 Jun 68 will supposedly be a day of violent action against Yugoslav installations in the US. Today is known as the day of St. Lazar. Serbian men are supposed to show tmeir manhood today. No further information is known. 3. TPO, FBI. 4. 9-3. 5. None. 6. None. By AIC 116th HQ.
LONG FORM SPOT REPORT

USAINTC Sr No. 911 1. IHQ, 108th MI GP. 2. 108-9058-146. 4. None. 5. 1330 EST, I Mar 69, Bellevue Hospital, 467 1st Ave, NYC, and the Staten Island Ferry. 6. None. 7. A group known as "The Crazies", composed of persons in the Youth international Party and another group called "Up Against the Wall," plan to announce their formal "birth" by engaging in the following activities on 1 Mar 69: A. First The Crazies plan to enter Bellevue Hospital, located at 467 1st Ave., NYC, with toy guns and steal one of the patients " This office was eliminated in 1970 and its functions transferred to other elements in thp oMee of the Director of Investigations. USAINTC. IsHearings, Part I, pp. 241-2.

3. The Crazies.

25
out of the hospital. The Crazies plan to put a straight jacket on one of their own members, sneak him into Bellevue and then other Crazies with the toy guns plan to enter and steal the patient. B. After they leave Bellevue, The Crazies plan to travel to the Staten Island Ferry and board the boat which travels between lower NYC and Staten Island. They plan to enter the boat peacefullv, i.e., paying their way and not jumping over the rail, and whe'n they get on board they plan to threaten the boat's captain by demanding that he take them to Cuba. When the captain obviously refuses to do so, they plan to rush -to one side and threaten 'to "tip the boat over." 8. Military personnel traveling to NYC often use the Staten Island Ferry F.ey.150 EST, 27 Feb. 69. 10. Continue liaison with local agencies. 11. NY FBI. 12. B-6. 13. 1510 EST 27 Feb 69-D.A. Berrien, RGON , 108th MI GP. 14. Additional information concerning this matter will be reported when received. In addition to spot reports and agent reports, Army intelligence agents also prepared "summaries of Information" on particular subjects, such as anti-military activity on college campuses, the Students

military police. It describes anti-war activities prior to the CouniterInaugiral demonstrations in Washington, I).C. on #January 20, 1909.
assigned to this operation).13
CID TPMOWASH

for• l)emoeratic Society: and incidents of bombing. On a daily and weeklv hasis. speot relorts also were summarized and transmitted via teletype to user agencies around the world. Two of these intelligence summaries are set forth below. The flist is a daily intelligence summary taken from the Intelligence Command teletype and rehpublished verbatim by the Army Provost Marshal (General's office for use by the

A close reading will reveal that Army intelligence had at least one undercover agent Inside a commune on DuPont Circle. (Former agents have since revealed that the 116th AI Group actually had two agents
DAItY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Washington. D.C.: Between 0100 and 0130 hrs on 18 Janudry, the selective Service National Headquarters Building was firebombed, causing major damage to the first floor. San Francisco, Calif.: On 17 January the United California Committee for an Academic Environment (OAE), supported by the Silent Majority Against Revolutionary Tactics (SMART), sponsored a rally to show support for Dr. Hayakawa, president of San Francisco State College, Governor Reagan and Mayor Alloto In their stand against the student strike and the teachers strike.

Is Hearings, Part I. p. 240.
79-911-72-3

Ted Terreus (Phonetic) and Jim Strain ('Phonetic) of the CAE addr(essed a crowd of approximately 500 persons who carried signs to show their support. During the rally a group of 50 counter-demonstrators carried signs to show their support. for the studeljts and the teachers. Trouble ensued when one of the counter-denionstrators hit a rally supporter over the head with his sign. Police

arrestedl the assailant and no further trouble occurred. Santa Barbara, Calif.: The 8D8 Chapter at the University of California at Santa Barbara has announced that they will call for a general student, strike If James Johnson, an alleged student, is arrested because of speech he recently gave on obscenity. In the text of his speech Johnson allegedly used several four letter words. There Is no further information at this time.
SECTION It: FUTURE EVENTS

(Sunday, 10 January-.Monday, 20 January 1069) Washington, D.C.: A. Information has beepi received that NM3IC olnlelals and (11's will lead the 19 January parade down Pennsylvania Ave. to tile Capitol

building. U1pon reaching the steps of the Capitol women participants will burn w'oter-registrrt ton cards. Draft cards reportedly will also be burnetl. Various students will hold a rally at the statue of Gen. Sherman and then join the
livrade. Upon conclusion of tile parade the marchers are invited to attenda counter-inaugural ball, located in a tent, which is to last all night. Omi 20 January, small groups of demonstrators will leave tile tent and proceed along tile inanugurnl route to a position in front of the stands just opposite the north tilde of Pennsylvonla Ave. Tile demonstrators will attempt to stand five or six deep so as to conceal various Individuals carrying signs. Thle inaliti objective of tile demonstrators Is reported to be to get tile maximumnltnumblr of signs in view of the main TV cameras located at 15th Street and Pennsylvania Ave. On the arrival of Nixon, tile protesters will begin to chant and show their signs. B. Out-of-town dissidents currently in Washington are heing hmuse4d in a "coimnulne" at 1827 S Street NW along with "pigasus" and several dogs, who ore permitted to move among the persons sleeping on thie floor but are not permltted to leave tile building for fear of being seen. Four or live unidentified "hippies" announced plans to leave Washington for fear that it will bie another

Chicago and many of the dissidents have expressed their alplrehenslon about

police intervention in their demonstrations. Much dissention exists among the dissidents because they are unable to agree on plans for demonstrations. And

efforts to secure a united action between SDS and NMC have been fruitless to

date. The second summary is a,weekly intelligence summary for the week of March 11-18, 1908. It beam( the basis for the ca.se of L>rd v. Tatum.
[USAINTC Weekly Intelligence Suinmmary No. 65-12, Mar. 19. 11ii.S

27
C0, 82nd Abn Div (Thru XVIII Abn Corps) ; CG, 5th Inf Div (Thru DCSI Fifth Army): 1P110, USA; CU, USAHtHAW (Thru 710th MI Det); C0, Ft. 1)evens (Thru 108th MI Up)); CO, if)2td MI Up (Thru 116th 311 Up); CO, 108th MI Gp; CO, 109th MI Up; CO 111th 311 0p; CU, 112th M11 Up; CO, 113th MI Up; CO, 115th 311 Up; CO, 110th MI Up; CO, 710th MI Det; Director ANM1CC (Pass to DIA element--) ; USAINTC LINO, Pentagon. Subject: USAINTC weekly Intelligence summary number 68-12. The following summary contains Items of Intelligence interest for the period 00I) hirs, 3.onday 11 March 68 to 0000 hrs, Monday 18 March 68 and informiation concerning signllicant future events: SEUTION I: TIHE PART WEEK Monday, 11 Maroh 1968: Hlartford, Conn. : Approximately 20 persons picketed outside the U.S. Federal Building. The protesters carried placards denouncing tUe war in Vietnam and the payment of IlncomeO tax. The demonstration was spoInmired by the Voluntown, Coln., Chapter of the New Enlgland Counilttle for Non-Violent Action. Tuskegee, Alabama: Stokely Carnulchahel spoke to a group of about 2000 'Tuskegee Ihistitiute (TI) students concerning the bilitck power philosophy. Ilh indicated that Negroes should arni themselves for protection against "Whitey," anld that thly should fight hi theUnited St ates andtlint In Vietna1. His spe'ch was followed by a question and answer isrlo(l. .%t the end of the session, the crowd dispersed quietly and without Inhldenit. Tuitsda~l, 12 March J968: liostoli, hass. : An estinnnt.'d S5 dtlein..strators r'eires(lnIhing tihte New England Resistance gathered ait the gates of lhe Bostoin Arnmy Base to protest the Inutllltion of Pethr Crews. Thi-res was one seulilh bietweeI pro(leslors uanud a counter protester. As a result, extra police were, called to the scene. The demonstratIon teirminateIl without fuirtlhr incident. Thie demonstrators paraded to the, Tnl. viorsity of Massachusetts in Boston, where another brief demonstration wias held. There were no Inheld•tits at teIn lal ter dlentonstrntion. Ihiffalo, N.Y. : I•eimuonstrators were observed pick,,ting In front of lhe Buffalo Afees Station for the second consecutive day. On I1 Mar. there were only 12 pheki'Is, but on 12 Mar. alpproxinately 25-30 demonstrators were observed. These, Individuals w~ere believed to lie members of tihe SIM from State University of Nivw York ait Buffalo. Wednesday, 13 March 1968: Brooklyn. N.Y. : About 35 persons partlclpatel in a demonstration * * * schedtiled Induction oi' Peter Bh-hr. hlany or the, irotestor.l distributed leale-ts and flowers to persons entering the iFort. Tlw, dtlenionslration lasted appwoximately one and one half hours and etded without Inhldent. Columbla, S.C.: Approximately 200 Negrios from Allen University and Benedlit collegee in Columbiai joined at group of about I0O studlents front South Carolain State College (SCSC) and Clafllin (ollege, Orangeburg, S.C., in a denionstratlin at the, State Capitol Building. This protest was a continuance of the demon.tha-ion held by SCSR students at Capitol on 7 Mar 68 (reference I'SAINTFC Weekly Summary Number (1-l. About 20 South Carolina state patrolmen equllpped with batons, 44istols, gas masks and steel helmets were on hand to prevent any violence. Following an unsuccessful attempt by approxiinately 30 Negro demonstrators to enter the State Capitol, the Orangeburg protesters reboarded thirteen chartered buses and returned to their respective schools. During the d(emonstration about fifteen Negroes, Including James Weston, Sociology Professor at SCC0, were admitted to the governor'ss office for a brief conference. There are no details about what took place Irn his office. Minneapolis, Minn.: Approximately 25 persons from Ean Claire, Wisconsin demonstrated in front of the Washington Avenue AFEFS, after protesting the Selective Service System In general and specifically the pre-induction pcessIng of Steve Smith from Eau Claire. There was no violefice. While undergoing processing, Smith took several pictures of AFEES personnel and some rooms In the building. He was also seen taking notes on the induction process.

28
Maicistom. \\'iseonsli: Alpproximately rao Inemilrs of the Community Actilon Party staged it dteaollftratioln at Bascom Hail on tile University of Wisconsin ('n1a1iije. They were I•l'ketlng a team of re.rulters fromn Boeing Aircraft Conilmy i rtf'e-rncýe USA ISNT Weekly SHinlnmary Numnher (."-11 ). The entire d1illDom, Atigelhs. Calif.: Approximate-ly 100 ntle(ltbers of the resistance staged a Oarraway Angeles AFl"e,. in support of 11111 in-ace'ful deii,4I ration ait tie MLos wSrhetdllled for inlductio. No Incidents were reported, and the demonwho wit.. st rai tte•4rM 1111 ersel IM'acefullly. San .lose, 'lif.: An Antl.Im'he ('hetil ('olupnny demonstrtiofn was hehl in frout of the Admnilslstration Buildingh at Soon Joose State college e (8.1lC). A crowd of ilmiut 4(141-51) lromloS were pres(eit, but approxinately 90% of these were Sieettolte! Elr clirhlls onlookers. At 12:40 hrs. tile demonstrators moved to tOw Morris li)aly Adlitorlum where tll.y were refused Jiirulssi)ln to tohld a rally. $1SJ(' otfli'hils, however pIerinitted fth protectors to u1se' the niinsle building for lilt ofl('rll11lI rally. The rally received very little support and attendance was light.
Tholurshtlon. I i .lMarc'h MINW: Mlenillis, 'iDl'lte.Aftler m',verati (lilys (if peaceful imntrehes aind meetings, melil: i.lrs ort tite sanitfation v'nlon iIttlle illvolv('Il il 1tteillpt to hlo(k trash remiioval by Imii-millloil workers referencee tUS IN'r(' Weekly Sumtmary (I,--l).The' Iirluleiit r.,,ulled Iiit,tlea rre,4t of about :3I pefrsi) Oil eloncarges of disorderly (oil.

attemllstllg tIo dIfhlay tIhe dehlplrtilre of garbage irlcks fronlt tile department of sit uitlation pIarkilng lot. To date, there are no Indications that an early settlement lit t1wgi.ilttiol strike will be reached. Fridayl. M) iarehl If968:

Ihilladelphlia. l'P. : A. 'rlu' l'hiladelphla Clapter of tile Women's Strike for Ilheai. slolOtim4-'41d DInl atlli-lramft meeting at the First Unitnrlan Church whlch alttratclA tii mtuldienee of about 200 persons. Vonrad Lynn. atn author of draft evilsiOn literature. rephimitil Yhle (haplhain Willnim Sloan ('oltin as the prlinellal spitiewr olf til, iimeetiig. Fohlowlmig question Iald answer period Robert Edenhattii of the V'entral ('Conimiittte, for Conselentious Objectors stated that mnny Philladelih!i lawyers were acceptlng draft evasion cam-s. The meeting ended without Inlcldelit. IB.Hiowv. Albert Clhige. Jr., the founder of thie Black ChristIan Nationallst Movenlint hi Detroit,. sioke to ain esthiiafited 100 persons at the 0minannlel Mttl0bodit Church. ('leage spoke on tile topic of black unity and the problems of the ghetto. The wnieting was peneefll amnd poilee reported no ineldents. Washington, l).C.: David Delllnger of tie 'ntlonal Committee to end the war In A'Whtniml joined two other antiwar si'eakvrs In an aplprance before a group of about 55 itrsmons who had gathered iln Judvtiar.y square to demon.trate their oplu.sltloln to tile' war Ili Vietnam. The group subsequently marched on the offices of the Inmternal Revenume Service (IRS) and picketed outside while a delegation spoke with IRS officials. A spokesman for the delegation indicated that they would refuse to pay that portion of their in(,ome tax which went to finance the Vietnam war. After the delegation returned from the peaceful confrontation, tiw entire grnoutj (limstermd wiltlhout Incident. l)etrolt. Mheh.: A group of about 100 persons gathered In front of the Fort Wayle IellledUtiol Celmter to protest the scheduled Induction of Tom Nixon. a leader of the Detroit Draft Resistance Committee (DRC). The protesters displayed anti-draft/Vietnam placards and passed out anti-draft literature which had been printed by the socialist workers party. Nixon arrived at the Induction center but refused to begin processing and a federal marshal arrested him. There were no further Incidents and the demonstrators dispersed quietly. ChIcago. Ill.: Approximately 30 members of the Chicago Area Draft Resistors (CADRE) participated in a peaceful demonstration In front of the Van Buren Street APFES. The protesters were apparently demonstrating In support of Robert Freestom, an active CADRE member who was scheduled for induction. The demonstrators dispersed without Incident and police made no arrests.

69
Providence, R.T.: Vice President Hubert Humphrey arrived nt the Sheraton Blltmore and entered the hotel without incident although approximately 75 students and faculty members from Brown University (BUT) Rhode Island School of Design and Pembroke ColUge marched from the BU campus to a park aross front the hotel. A petition bearing names of those who would refuse to we drafted was taken Into the hotel by a delegation from the group. Of the 537 names reportedly on the petition, about 340 belonged to women students at Pembroke College. At 1625 hrs. the Vice lPresident deported tite lintel without Incident. A few of the demonstrators remained in the area overnight, but there were no Incidents and police made no arrests. Riverside, Calif.: During the 50th Anniversary Celebration Parade at March Air Force Base, a group of about 30 protesters began a parallel march to protest the war in Vietnam. The protesters wore black arm bands and carried antiwar placards. The anti-war group made no attempt to Interfere with the parade and olmlie made no arrests.
81u11d11y, 17 March 1968: miento Im'uriretlonnl It- Heml.cuprocion l4,voliwlontiirlin 0 l1lti0 I'trli,.tiijted In a peaceful demonstration at the White House. The demonstrators carried pin,"4:dN which r(,llct(ld their Sl1port for .Merlcan policy lit Vietntam. INote: dhijimistrattirm were pilcketing the entrai(ce. At 1515 lbrs. it group of aouit 10MN) Sautturday, 16 March 1968:

Washington, D.C.: A. About 21 memniers of an organization known ns Movi-

This group was previously reported as the Movemnent Insurrectional Reeooperatlon-.MI,. reference LU'AINTC Weekly Hunmaory Number (8-11. B. Stokley Carmichael of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee I.14('(' slinki ait the (Chiureh of the l(tMdae1,r iI W34shila0t4o1t. D . to an unknown m. ).( rmlnmber of lieople onl bhick power lind the Black United Front. urging all blIack peotse to come together. Carnilchael ended the speech with words from RIp Brown, "We shall conquer without a doubt". lie indicate( that March 20 would lie International Rap Brown Day (see Wednesday, 20 March 1968). T'heire wits no violence and no arrests were made. ('til'tmm Ill. o Aiproxunitely :100 meinnlelrs of •'eterans for Pece, anlld Women for Peace held a peaceful demonstration at tile Musmem of Sclence aind Industry protesting an exhibit by the U.S. Army. Several demonstrators entered tile building In spite of warnings, by museum officials and 6 were arrested on charges of disorderly condmct, resisting arrest and criminal trespassing. Five of those arrested were Juveniles. Los Angeles, Calif.: Approxintately 2W0-300 Negroes staged n mock trial for a Los Angeles police officer. The incident resulted from tile shooting of a Los Si\m.i'teiw by the officer. Tile demonstration was sponsored by thp l.os Angeles Negro Student non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the Black Panthers and "PR". Speakers Included Reverend Clayton D. Russell, Head of People's Independent ('hurch, Los Angeles: Ben Wnytt, Los Angeles Negro attorney: and Franklin Ahlxinder. Southern Callfornia Distrlet Repre.spntatlve. ('ommImnitlIlst Party, USA. The demonstrators passed out "Wanted" posters of the officer, and found litll "guilty of first (legree murder." 'ni demonstration was In'f( l. Section II: Forecast of Future Events

Mimimi. Fla. : A spokesninmn for tiPe Southern Students Orgatizilt. ('Conlllttee announced plans for a demonstration to be held on the campus of thp Teniversity of Miami (luring the morning. According to the spokesman, a group of anti-war/ droft supporters will participated in the demonstration. Baltimore, Md.: Members of the Baltimore Inter-Faith Peace Mlssoln Intend to demonstrmite at the Baltimore U.S. Post Office to support the four Indlividunls on trial for pouring blood into the records of the Selective Service Board nil 2T Oct. 1917.
Philadelphia, Pa.: Members of the Vietnam Week Committee, composed largely of professors and students of the University of Pennsylvania, will conduct a "sleep-in" to protest the scheduled appearance of Dow Chemclanl Company recruiters on campus. The next day, 19 March, the same organization will sponsor a protest rally on campus.
Monday. 18 March-Tfesday, 19 March 1968:

Monday. 18 March 1968:

30
Tuesday!, 19 Mlareh-W1'cdnse.raly, 20 March 19JI: Sacramento. Calif: On 19 Mar. a draft resistance rally has been sehleithled on

flhe campus of Sacramento State College for the purrfuse of attracting support for 5 who plan wersons to refuse induction on the following day. The rally will b, SlNsnsoredl by the Sacramento Draft Resistance Uni-n. On 20 Mar. the demon. st rators will allegedly attempt to disrupt the induction processing of the 5 Indivludals at the Selective Service Buildi•g. At the present time, there are no Indications as to the number of persons who will participate in either denmoistration.
Wc11Mcsdall, #20Mar'ch 1908: New Orleans, La: A spokesman for SNCC has proclaimed that 20 March will

le officially designated as "I'. Rap Brown Day". According to the spokesman, sympathy demonstrations are scheduled for the following cities: Washington, D.C.: Detroit, Michigan; and, Atlanta, Georgia. At tihte present time. sppclflc details concerning the number of participants and the exact locations of the

demons!trations are unknown. T'l rsiay, 28 March 1968:

Knoxville. Tenn: An un(ihartered chapter of the Vietnam Education Committee at tile University of Tennesee lihas scheduled an anti-war demonstration in protest of the appearance of General Lewis Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System. This cotniiand will publish periodic special Intest-st sumnmaries to addresses In addition to the regular weekly summary whenever upcoming events of unusual Importance develop within Conus. Dougherty for Blakefleld.

It should be noted that none of the foregoing reports bears a security classification. Sometime in 196I the decision was made to computerize the spot reports inl 9) separate categories to facilitate attempts at predicting civil disturbances and plotting trends. (This computerized incident file will be discussed below.) In addition, civil disturbance reports were filed in the dossiers of persons who were being or who had been considered for security clearances. Thus flies which were supposed to be based on the results of careful investigation were contaminated with frequently inaccurate and misleading information. How many security clearances were unjustly denied as a result of this practice is not, known, but the potential for injustice clearly was there. On March 9, 1970, an order was issued to destroy all spot reports 60 days after their initiation. On June 9,1970, field units were directed not to submit spot reports on civil disorders until directed to do so by the Director of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations (now the Director of Military Support). In July of 1970, a series of inspections was undertaken to determine the extent of compliance. Disobedience was found to be so great that the Army General Counsel ordered an Inspector General's investigation of the Intelligence Command. As of December 1970, however, spot reports at the Intelligence Command's headquarters still had not been destroyed.
C. COMPUTERIZED INCIDENT FILE

The core of the Intelligence Command's data bank of civil disturbance information was a computerized listing of spot reports. Given

the volume of spot reports received (1200 a month in 1969), this file must have constituted one of the most extraordinary chronicles of

31 domestic political activity ever compiled. Apparently, however, neither Army's assurance that one copy of each data bank would be kept for possible use in the 7aturt case. Fortunately, a glimpse of the incident file can be obtained from the Coln j)telr instruction book which guided its programmers. 4 The book, which is undated, begins with the comment that the incident data bank is designed to permit periodic summaries and reports and to aid Operations officers in their analysis of given projects. •In addition to tie Ol, Stil shtlland categories s8,t forth in the May 2, 1968," Civil Disturbance Infornmation Collection Plan, there are also categories and code numbers for the strength of local police departments, sheriff's offices, and state police, arrests, strikes, boycotts, and conventions. The organizational list is the same as that whicii appears in the Biographic Instruction Book (see next section), but there are handwrltten adlditions for the Atlanta Workshop in Non-Violence, the American Serv'icemen's Union, and Accidental Assemblies of Cosmic Dust. Another glimpse of the Incident Data File may be obtained from flye short print-outs made available to the Subcommittee early in 1972. These are listings of spot reports on five well-known personalities active in the civil rights and the anti-war movements. The listings were requested by Army General Counsel Jordan and Under Secretary Beal during their trip to Fort Holabird on February 9, 1970 after they had been repeatedly assured that a biographic data file did not exist. (The biographic file was accidentally discovered by Pentagonl officials oni Februan'ry 17, 11)70, when a courier-briefer brought the "wrong" print-outs to them for examination). T'he contents of these extracts can best be understood by examining a "sanitized" version of one of them:
"Two instruction books, one for the biographic data bank and one for the Incident file, were included in the second hatch of materials received from the Justice Department. As rvee.naithys itinnts. i1tI. the Department of Defense had told the Subcommittee that these books noionger existed. 1'3'rhso caTeorles include, among others, disaffection, marches/parades, meetings/ gatherings, puillications (leaflets, postures, papers), strikes and boycotts and conventions.

the computer tapes nor tde print-outs have been preserved, despite the

32
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As can be seen, each entry follows a standard format: An identifying number (which apparently keys to the original report),
a category number (which corresponds to the 96 basic categories of civil disturbance information listed in the May 2, 1968

collection plan, An organization number (e.g. for the subject's civil rights group ,
An a variety of other numbers identifyinT the source of the

report, the area it came from, the day, month, and year it was information, and the time of the report. Each entry also contains a description of the incident (summarized from longer reports), a list of persons involved in the incident coded by their organization, and a list of organizations involved, accompanied by their code numbers. Cryptic descriptions like "various plans and activities of the Committee were reported on in detail" indicate that the computerized incident file was intended as an index to more extensive records as well as a source of thumbnail sketches of political activity. In all likelihood it was intended as a means of reentering the hard copy files of spot reports, agent reports, and reports from other agencies.
produced the city and state to which it pertained, and evaluation of the reliability of the source and the credibility of the

34
The reports in these five short print-outs are estimates of the probal)ility of violence, tile number of persons at a church meeting, the time, flight number, airline, and destination of the individual, the hotel in which he was staying, and the location and number of people at a rall.)y or meeting. The print-outs demonstrate that the Army had the ability to reconstruct the record of an individual's public activities throughout the country, including dates, times, places, other .persons involved, along with details of the activities themselves. T'he five print-outs produced for the Army General Counsel were probably assembled by directing the computer to produce all spot reports containing a nine-digit "biographic identity" number. Whet her this number was intended to be the same as the nine-digit Social Security number (contained in some spot reports on civilians), the eight-digit military service number then being phased out, or some other number is not clear. Whatever the coding scheme, however, the existence of this number meant that the Incident Data File could be used as a source of biographic data independent of the Biographic Data File which shared use of the same computer. The coding of individuals as individuals and as members of organizations also made it possible for the Intelligence Command to produce lists of members of particular organizations, lists of organizations to which particular individuals belonged, and lists of organizations with overlapping memberships. In addition the coding of "dossier" numbers gave Fort Holabird's analysts a ready cross-reierence to their subversives file. Why the Intelligence Command thought it needed these capabilities has never been explained. Orders to destroy the file were issued on February 19, 1970. On July 10, 1970, it was discovered that the entire data bank could be reconstituted. Later an "inactive tape" wvas discovered and ordered destroyed on October 17, 1970. As with the mug books and the Compendium, destruction has not been assured.
I). THE COMPUTERIZED BIOGRAPHIC DATA FILE

Intelligence analysts at Fort Holabird stood astride the flow of civil disturbance and military security incident reports and took from it items of interest pertaining to individuals and organizations. Some of these items were sent offto other intelligence units, such as the Counterintelligence Analysis Branch and the FBI. Others were used to write special reports like the Intelligence Command's massive report and membership catalogue on the Students for a Democratic Society. Still other items were entered in the subversives file or filed in the dossiers of prospective, current, and former security clearance holders.

35 Many items were coded for computer storage. In his first article, Mr. Pyle described a computer card lhe had seen in the course of a briefing he had received at Fort Ilolablrd.lo It bore the name of Arlo Tatum, executive secretary of the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, and contained a single notation-that Mr. Tatum had once delivered a speech at the University of Oklahoma on the legal rights of conscientious objectors. Where this card went is not, and probably never will be, knowý,n.has former analyst from the Intelligence Command's headquarters A informed the Subcommittee staff that following publication of Mr. Pyle's fi-st article he was ordered by his superiors to remove all items mentioned in the article from the files. It would have beeen logical, however, for the Tatum card to have gone into the incident data file, for the "Biographic Data File" examined by the Subcommittee staff appears to have been primarily an index to other files. The print-out examined by the Subcommittee is dated February 9, 1970, and contains 408 pages. Pages 1-28 are missing--apparently torn off for examination by civilian officials in the Pentagon and lost. There tire ten entries to each page but the last, so that the total number of persons listed may be estimated at close to 4,078. The names are listed in alphabetical order. As with the other materials, the persons listed include both the great an(d the ol)scure. Included among them are priests, lawyers, singers, comedians, and politicians. There are also relatives of federal officials, including a member of the family of a U.S. Senator. Many Negroes, including state legislators, former federal officials, Urban League and NAACP leaders, and members of the Black Panthers and the Black Muslims also are listed. Other personalities of interest include a Variety of anti-war leaders, ranging from members of Senator MeCartlh"s campaign team to Weathermen. There are Communist leaders and •linutemlen. Some p)er.ons listed are national figures; others are loeal workers. Groups represented include CORE, SNCC, SCLC, (Ihicanos, OEO workers and the American Civil Liberties Union. According to Army officials, one of the missing pages of the print-out included an entry for an airborne general who sul.scribed to rhe Bond, an "underground" newspaper critical of the military. The format of each entry can be seen in Exhibit 5 wlich is a collection of excerpts f rom the IMiographic Data File, "sanitized" to'protect the privacy of the persons described.
16 "CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics." Washington IMonthly, January 1970, p. 4.

38 While, some of the categories in the print-out are obvious, others are not. The following analysis makes use of the computer code book and (t letter from the IDepartment of Defense dated June 10, 1971. (Hearings. Part. II, pp. 1237-39). Item 1--Report Number-designates the reporting unit, the Julian date of the report, and a control number. Reporting units assigned two-digit designators included MI groups (by regional offices), the FBI, the Office of Naval Investigations (now Naval Investigative Service), thie Office of Special Investigations (Air Force), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and CIAB. The spaces for name, street address, and zip code need no explanation, although from a constitutional and policy perspective it should be asked what the Army was doing keeping track of politically active citizens by their addresses. Of course, once the decision has been made to identify individuals, their names and addresses are the first items sought. Following each name there also is a space for a numerical ideintifier designating that name. Whether Social Security numbers, military service numbers, or some special numbers were used here is not known. In many cases addresses and zip codes are not present, and in a number of instanens the zip code numbers do not correspond to those set forth in the Zip Code Directory. The di.crepancies, according to the Defense Department. are due io clerical errors. If so, then the incidence of clerical mistakes in this print-out is relatively high. The "dossier" designation is only rarely completed. In a sample of 500, only 32o (6%) had a dossier number. In nine cases, there was derogatory information noted as well. The number used here also is a nine-digit code. It refers to another file system of Army dossiers and the number was included when available. This may be thie number used in the 8 million dossier collection of the Investigative Records Repository at Fort Holabird, or it may be one assigned to the subversives file. The "atr-a of report" number is a five-digit number, and in most cases it is the normal zip code number. In some cases alphabetic designations are used either for special cases or when the zip code was unknown. T•he "primnary area" number is a modified zip code to indicate the primary geographic area of operations of the subject. The "date" is the (late of the report. For the most part these were 196,8 and 1969 reports, but a number dated back to 1966 and 1967. The earliest entry is aYebruary 1966 report. It is probable that when the system came into operation, rel)orts which had been gathered earlier were put into the computer. In a few cases, more than one entry appears for a single name, but not very often. It is not possible to tell
whether this computer gave a key to every spot report mentioning a) person, or only to the first one.

39 Filipino, Hawaiian, Eskimo, Aleutian, Caucasian and Negro. Types of train-ring include aircraft, airms, language, cultural, Communist party, radio, sabotage, vessels, weapons, and 22 others. The organizational codes are the most extensive. There are 770 of them, coveringnn almost everywere not. As the list below demonstrates, many that. organization remotely connected with public affairs there is ai amazing diversity of organizations. They are large and small, national and local, private and governmental, union, street gang academic, legal, and civic action, establishment and anti, estatldishment, involved in public issues and not, controversial and staid, known and unknown. nhe scope of the Army's interest is truly extraordinarv, but even more surprising is the fact that this is a list created before thle lolalird system. wacs. computerized and presumably before the operators had collected any information about such groups aid their alleged connection with civil disturbance. Yet all these organizations were given specific codes in apparent anticipation of their ap eating regularly in civil disturbance. intelligence reports from tile liel d. The mere lisdtng of these organizations b)y itself connotes no judgment about them. but the fact that they were singled out and giwvn special identification as part of a civil'disturbance intelligence program taints each of them with suspicion. The joining of such disparate groups can only serve to infect even the most. innocent with the sins, real or presumed. of the most questionable. Following ar. a :ehvetion of the organizations listed in the code book: American Civil Liberties Union, American Friends Service Committee, American Nazi Party, American Security Council, American Society of Friends, American Veterans Committee, Americans for Constitutional Action, Americans for Democratic Action. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Archie Brown for Supervisor Coinmittee: Baltimore Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Bay Area Festivwl Coninmittee, Blackstone Rangers, Bognlusa Voters League; California Democratic Council, Catholic Peace Fellowship, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Chicago Commission on Human Relatioins, Chicago Committee of One Hundred, Chicago Jewish War Veterans. Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties: Clergymen's Committee for Vietnam, Communist Party of China, Council of Federated Organizations, Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, Captive Nations, Chicago Based Anti-Open Housing Group: Double Sex Kings, Foreign Policy Association, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Fund for Republic, Inc., Governor's Commission on Human Rights, God's Children Motorcycle Gang, Hell's Angels of California (National), High School Students for Social Justice; International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers; John Birch Society, League of Women Voters of the U.S.A., Liberal Party of New York, Liberty Lobby, Life Line Foundation, Inc., Let Freedom Ring Society; Manion Forum, Mattachine Society, Inc., Minutemen, Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, Moral Re-Armament, N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., National Association for the Ad-

40 vancement of Colored People, National Association for the Advancement of 1White People. National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., National Civil Liberties Clearing House, National Committee for a Salne Nuclear Policy (SANE), National Conference for New Politics, National Council of Churches, National Lawyers Guild. National Review; National States Rights Party, National Student Association, National Urban Leaigue, National Socialist White Peoples Party, National I)emocratic Women's League. Oakland Committee, for Community Improvement, Pneifica Foundation. Philadelphia Committee for a.Six I[our Day with Eight Hours Pay, "Peace Corps"; Ramparts. Religious Society of Friends, Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Student 'Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. Stite Human Rights Commissions, Twin Cities Draft Comnseling Center; United Electrical. Radio. and Machine Workers of America, United World Federalists. Inc., riban League, US (Ron Karenga's Orgnization). Value Creation Study Society; White Citizens improvement West. Baton RougeCouncil, Women Internationnl Strike for Peace, associao, Younig A,inericis for Freedom, Young democrats, Young Democrats from the University of Milwaukee. The coding system for these organizations is different from that used in the subversive file. The following comparison illustrates the difference.
Organization American Friends Service Committee .. .................................... Americans for Democratic Action ............................................. Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam .................................. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People .................... National Committee for aSane Nuclear Policy ................................... National States Rights Party .................................................. Dossier number ZB ZA ZB ZA ZA ZA 00 00 50 00 00 00 02 00 17 81 05 27 04 02 90 26 90 97 Computer number A024 Ai335 CM94 N006 NoIl N030

Thus the Intelligence Command had not developed one universal numbering system for its files by the time the computerized holdings were ordered destroyed. There are six designations for positions in the group-chairman, treasurer, secretary, steering committee, worker and meml)er. The "target interest" can lbe one of 97 categories including: abduction; arms, theft: arms, traffic, blacklist; defection; civil disturbances, general; demonstrations, peaceful: AFEES, civilian, anti-draft. antiVietnam; demonstrations, violent; same categories, espionage; leaders: militant, nonviolent, pacifist; organizations: militant, nonviolent, pacifist; picketing; publications: leaflets, posters, pal)e.•s (to include distributing); riots; rumors; subversive activities; and sniping. There are 13 categories of ideology: anti-U.S., Communist party member, Communist inclined, leftist, moderate pro-Castro, proChicom, pro-Soviet; pro-U.S., rightist, ultra-nationalistic, violent action inclined, violent action member. On the right hand margin of the print-out there is a category entitled "Derogatory Information." The purpose of this section is not to reveal what the derogatory information is, but whether it is "on file," "not on file," or "unknown." Most of the entries say "unknown," but a large number say "on file." Except where descriptive comments else-

41 where in the l)rint-out give a clue, it, is impossible to determine what the derogatory information might have beIncn. For every person whose, name began •:ithi H for whom an arrest is note(l, there is a correspon(ling notation that derogatory information is on file. However, within the same group of people, notations of desertion or absence without leave (AWOL) are not accompanied by "derogatory information on file." In many instances, derogatory information is noted where there is 1 iinarrative comment at all. The space following "alias" serves triple duty. In a few cases, it lists an a.vsuined name, and in fewer still, an address. In most instanr.es, however, it contains a four or five word comment stating why the in(livi(lual is of interest to military intelligence. Out of 3,398 entries in the portion of the print-out examined by the Subcommittee staff, only 943 (28%•) included a descriptive comment. The most common notations are to the effect that the individual subscribed to The Bond (an underground newspaper critical of the military), had been arrested at the Pentagon, or had been arrested for disorderly conduct. The figures for these entries are as follows:
Number Subscribes to Bond ............................................. Disorderly conduct ................................ ............................. Arrested at Pentagon, Nov. 13, (1969?)................. Arrested at Pentagon, October 1967 . .................................... 252 122 96 56 Pefcent 27 13 10 6

Other common entries note associations with anti-war coffeehouses, participation in anti-war demonstrations, or membership in a servicemen's anti-war association. Possession of allegedly "subversive literature," distribution of anti-war literature, or the signing of a petition sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union also appear to have been activities which brought individuals within the scope of the Biographic Data File. In a majority of the 943 instances where a comment appear's, the activities (lescribed related either to the anti-war activities of military l)ersonnel or the anti-war/anti-military activities of civilians. In the 2,455 entries (72% of all entries) where no comment appears at. all, it is impossible to determine why the individual was listed. In a few instances a military address suggests that the individual was a serviceman, but in most instances the address section is empty or offers no clue. Where those listed are women without military addresses, it seems highly likely that they were civilians. If the entries in which comments appear truly constitute a representative sample of all entries, then it would seem that the Biographic Data File served in part as a device to monitor "disaffection" and resistance in the Army (RITA). The inclusion of a large number of civilians, however, demonstrates a concern about civil disturbance activity. According to a letter dated September 29, 1967, which is referred to in the preface of the instruction book for the Biographic Data File, the only purpose of the file was to fill a void which had existed during earlier civil disturbance operations. Since this letter pr'edated the M!arch on the Pentagon (October 21, 1967), the "void" may refer to a lack of information about suspected black agitators. 'this apparent contradiction, combined with the complete absence of any entries for well-known civil rights, white supremacist, black
79-911-72----4

42 power, or anti-war figures (including Arlo Tatum, the conscientious objector), suggests that the biographic file might have been heavily edited before It was delivered to the Pentagon. This suspicion is encouraged by the following circumstantial evidence: 1. General Blakefield, the commanding general of the Intelligence Command, repeatedly denied the existence of the Biographic Data File and the mug books Nvhen asked about them by Army General Counsel Jordan at a Pentagon meeting on Januari 16,1970.

Counsel's inquiries. 3. Col. Arthur J. Halligan, Director of Investigations and head of the CONUS intelligence program under General Blakefleld, is reported as having flatly denied the existence of the Biographic Data File to the, Army General Counsel and to Under Secretary of the Army Beal during their visit to Fort Holabird on February 9, 1970. It was the Intelligence Command's persistent denials that led Robert Jordan. the General Counsel, to direct the production of listings of spot reports on five, well-known personalities. 4. On two subsequent occasions it was learned that the Intelligence Command had failed to carry out orders to destroy its computerized files on civilians unaffiliated with the armed forces. Whatever its original purpose, the Bioqraphie Data File clearly had the potential to serve four purposes. First, it could provide exfnesive summnry information about an individual's political beliefs, associations, andi activities, as well as his occupation, training, race. and ethnic origin. Second. it could serve as means of producing lists of dissenters by name, address, organization, position within the organization, and ideology. Third, it could be used as an index to more extensive computerized and non-computerized files on individualq and organizations active in civilian politics. Fourth, it. could he used to determine who should, and should not receive security elearanees' on the basis of frequently inaccurate, unverified, and highly suspect reports originally filed in haste for civil disturbance early warning purposes only.
E. fRMTONNAL AND LOCAL FLEYS

directed the concealment of information about the CONUS intelligence operation in January 1970 in anticipatiop of the Army General

Branch, Operations IV, has described to the staff how his superiors

2.\n intelligence analyst assigned to the CONUS Intelligence

The forefgoing files constitute only part, of the Intelligence Command's holdings on the political and private lives of American citizens. In addition, more than 300 group, region, fleld and residence offices maintained their own files. Most, of these undoubtedly were copies of reports forwarded to Fort Holabird. Others, however, such as the 113th MI Group's files on Senator AdlMi E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) and Representative Abner J. Mikva (D-Ill.), appear to have remained at the local level. Defense Department officials have repeatedly stressed that less than five percent of the energies of the Army Intelhience Command was devoted to the CONUS intelligence program. This figure, however, does not. account for the fact that each MI group maintained its own CONUS Intelligence Section of full-time domestic intelligence agents. In Washington, D.C., for example, this section was assigned more

43
than 20 full-time agents, or over 15 percent of the entire group's investigative force. "Ihese units, staffed and led by officers and civilians with overseas experience in covert operations, appear to have gone at their work with considerable zeal. The following description of one set of files is taken from a letter received by Congressman Cornelius Gallagher (D-N.J.) in March 1970:
o At the present time, the files of the 116th M.i. Group consist of a 5 x 7 card tile on several thousand persons In the Washington area. On these cards are a picture of each person, his name and address, occupation, background, a record of political groups with which lie has been affiliated, notes on political meetings, rallies. and dehmnonstrations which lie hios attended, and sumnmarles of his views
on political issues.

The Subcommittee also has obtained unclassified portions of the tiles of the 1130th MI Group's Rlegion V Office in Minneapolis, Minnesota. These include a card file on individuals active in the Twin Cities area in the spring of 1968 and a munber of photographs taken by_ plainclothes Army agents of local anti-war demonstrat ions. In add ition, there are pictures in this file which )ear tile stamp of the University The order to destroy these files went out in late June 1970. Throughout the summer and fall numerous inspections were conducted to enlcollrage compliance. Yet as late as November 1970 the National Guard in Minnesota was still listing the 113th MI Group as a source of (Iomesti, intelligence inforimation.'7 In his testimony before the Subcommittee. Mr. Pyle illustrated the problem:
Although my information is limited, I am confident that since February 1970 there has been a substantial effort to cut this prograin back. The effort has been most Intense during the last three months following disclosures that the Army was watching elected officials. The Army General Counsel, the Assistant Chief (ifStaff for Intelligence. and their staffs have worked especially hard. But despite
their efforts-despite the Inspections they have made in the field-they have not been successful In some locations.

(of Minnesota Department of Police.

For example. during the sunlnmer of 1070 a lieutenant at Region V of the 113th Military Intelligence Group In Minneapolls received a large number of files from field and residence offices on pers.'walities and organizations. These files were supposed to 1w (Iestroyed. but he believed in the program and decided to conceal many of the personality -reports. so lie hid them In the bottom of a security container.

Only after the activities of the 113th MI Group in Minneapolis became the subject of a nationwide television documentary, did the lieutenant decide to destroy them. At the time of destruction, Mr. Pyle said, the files weighed about 50 pounds. He added: (t)he same lieutenant... went to two residence offices within his region and instructed the residence office commanders that personality files could be hidden inside of organization files. Personalities on whom they were not permitted to keep records, he said, might be described as members of organizations on which they could keep records." Is Accordingly, despite the. efforts of the Army's higher officials, the complete destruction of the regional and local Atles ofthe Intelligence Command cannot be assumed.
14llearings,

. iionarinrs, Part 1, P. 162. Part I, p. 1i6.

44

IV. FiiFs

OF THTE COINTINEN14TAL An31Y COMMAND

Like the Intelligence Colnmnand, the Continental Army Command (COXARC) maintained a nationwide net workc of compulterized and non-computerized files oti civilians 1Ifassoeiated with the armend forces. The existence of the computer was first revealed by Morton Kondracke of he ( '/i; ;.o ',,- ;Oct.x o01Febrin',1 *v27, 1970.11 On March 10. 1970, m the plaintiffs in tlh, T'atum ease, filed a illotiol) in Distriet Court which described CONARCs files in even greater detail. Yet. in over nine nionthis of correspondence with the Chairman of the Subcommittee, officials of the Departmrents of Defense and Army made no mention of these records. Indeed, in his letter to the Chairman dated March 20, 1970. Under Secretary Beal reported that no other intelligence files 2 existed besides those at Fort. Hlol aird and at CI.B.- o It. was not until November i27. 1970. thathe finally admitted that "In addition to the data bank at Foit 1-lolahird, data'banks have been destroyed at Headquarters. Continental Army and at headquarters, III'Corps, Fort IFood.' 21 1ls letter, however, nmde no mention of their origins, content.. •sope. purposes, or Use. Similarly. U-nder Secretarv of Defense Froehike shed no light on ('ONAJRC's files in his appearance before the Subcommittee. His entire remarks on that agency s operations consisted of a vague reference to one (possibly two) tactical intelligence units whose "methods of collvt ion .. . were less constrained" than those of the Intelligence d.2-2
(Commnrn

Research by the Sublommittee staff has determined that. the' Continental A iny- commandd , its subordinate continental armies, and(their constituent elements have been amassing files on the political activities of civilians and soldiers forl decades. Th'ie bulk of these files have been stored in the conventional manner: dostsiers for organizations and(1 some of the more active individuals: card files for the rest. At, CONARC's lieadquartmer the practice, tit least. until mnid-1970, was to make out a card on virtually every p)eron mentioned in the domestic intelligence reports of tile FBI. Some of these were kept. in manual files: others were transferred to a computer. To conserve space, CONARC also microfilmed portions of its files. The basie. non-computerized file at CONARC(s headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia, was similar to the stllhersives file at. Fort Ilolahird. Its primary purpose was to check o01 "loyalty" of orgathe nization, and individuals find to monitor "disaflection" within stateside

Army units. A secondary purpose for thp file. however, was to expand

the Command's understanding of domestic disturbances. The commanding general of the Continental Army Command actually wears two hats. one as COXARC's chief and the other as head of tie U.S. Army Forces Strike Command (ARSTRIKE). The CONARC job is laIgely that of superintending tile administrative problems of iihe

21 flearIngm,. Part 1i, p. 1106. 2' Jlnrings. Part I. p. 389. Nor was there any mention of the computers maintained by the Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations or by the U.S. Strike Command.

45 is a hohli(g company. The ARSTRIKE job entails providing ready troop units for immediate deployment at home, as well as abroad, through the joint Army-Air Force Strike Command (USSTRICOM). While the job of providing early warning intelligence on potential riots for A STRI KE umits was assigned to the Intelligence Command. tie Continental Army Command also ran a collection operation of its own. The agents useCl in this operation came from the Counterintelligence Sections of Military Intelligence Detachments assigned to the G--2 (intelligence) staffs of stateside troop divisions. With'little to do but handle unit securitv and train for possNible combat assignments. these agents had consid'eralble time to devote to domestic intelligence activities. The result was an extraordinary collection of non-computerized data banks on political activity in the G-2 offices of most, stateside units and installations. At Fort Hood, Texas, and at CONAIRC headquarters at Fort Monroe. Virginia, large portions of these files were computerized.
A. FORi' MO.MHOE DTI'A BANK

ThIe Fort Monroe (lata hank, known as the lioun te lligence Records Information Svstem (CRIS), was established in .amui'arv 19)69 and copuiputeriz'/ed il May INR. It conntained three basic categories of infoma-ltion with a cross-reference capability amongr them. The
(antgories were incidents, personalities, alnd organizations. The information itself was stored on mnintic discs, with a hackow file on mani gnetic tape. Information for alV/three, files was Ireceived from the five continental armies and the Military D)istrict of Washinsrton (CONUS.AMDW), the Intelligence Com'mand, and the FBI. Each of thesp three collection systems, in turn. gathered information from state and municipal police departments and tile news media. Regular recipients of weekly CRIS reports included the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, CONARC: the Depputy Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence, CONUS armies anld the MDI)W: the Intelligence ('ommand: the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence; and tile Commander, Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service. No civilian authorizationi was ever granted for the establishment of this data bank. The Subcommittee staff has had the opportunity to examine both the incident and Personality files maintained within the Counterintelligence Records Information System. No organizationtal file has been p)reserved for the Tatun, case, possibly because it had not been. pro-

grained before the order to destroy all coml)uterized records was issued
on March 6, 1970. I. TIlE COUrUTERUIZ.D INCIDENT FILE

The following analysis of the Fort Monroe incident file is hIsed on (omlmter print-outs covering the period from January 19(69 through Februar'v 1970. These print-outs appear on a set of microfilm nuerture cairds lonmed to the Suhconmmittee by the Department of Defense. Whlat has happened to the priint-otits for the period May though De(.emilher 1968 is not known. Nor are any of the computer instruction

46
books available. Most of the print-outs are marked "For Official Use

Only," and hence are unclassified. (Where tile classification "Coifidential" appears on cover sheets and it few aperture cards, it seems to have been an afterthought, for itheinside sheets clearly state that the reports themselves are unilassi fled). The CONARC incident file is essentiallv a collection of weelylv or hi-weekly intelligence summaries known as "CRIS Reports." The hasic element of these summaries is the spot report. organized in a format similar to that prescribed b)y the Fort, I olabird incident data file instruction book. Each entry gives tile location, report number, time, and source of the report, along with an evaluation of reliability of source and content, a characterization ot the nature of the incident, a list of the organizations and individuals involved, andia description of what happened. Exhibit 6 sets forth some typlical CRIS Reports. ExiiimT' 6
CRIS INCIDENT REPORTS, NOVEMBR 1969

47
The scope of these reports is extremely broad. Reports are included from all over the country and describe such events as bombings, television interviews, civil rights marches, anti-war demonstrations, and military courts-martial. For example, the CRIS Report for the week of June 30-July 6,1969, included reports describing: A lawsuit filed by the Emergency Civil Liberties Union against the New Jersey State police, taken from press reports. The suit is categorized ltinder "subversive activities." A second report. from an unnamed agency of the New Jersey State government, gives names of the plaintiffs and their attorneys and provides a detailed summary of the ease. A demonstration in LAs Angeles protesting the reduction of funds for a New York City OEO neighborhood youth project. The group was composed mostly of young Mexican Americans, but included some Negroes and Caucasians. The source is "agent observation," which probably means that plainclothes agents from the 116th MI Group in Los Angeles were on the scene. The cancellation of a curfew by the mayor of Waterbury, Con__necticut following a meeting withi local Negro leaders. The report ........ la~ll-t• 7ti--li-riee- X-6 ,-if-1e6a-c -•iiPWgfe a-M-istu~l ft-yrtmwrof'-the-• peace. Source: local police: subject: "arrests." The appearance of six Negro males at a Baltimore, Mfaryland police headquarters to protest the biting of a young girl by a police dog. The group's demand for an explanation for the use of police dogs is reported, along with a notation that scheduled meeting between the protesters and police officials was cancelled when the protestei-s failed to appear on time. The report is listed as "meetings/gatherings" and the source is the local police. A protest by 200 adults and children at City Hall in New Haven, Connecticut, demanding $300,000 for summer help projects. The subject is "meetingsgatherings" and the source is the FBI. The firebombing of the Wilmington, Delaware home of a Negro employee of the DuPont Corporation. Damage was assessed at $200. Subject: "Firebombs;" source: local police. Violence in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,' precipitated when a Negro security guard attempted to arrest a Negro woman for shoplifting at a supermarket. The police were called in, rocks were thrown, two policemen were injured, and many persons were arrested. Subject: "civil disturbances, general; ' source: local police. A boycott in Waycross, Georgia, organized by the Southern Christian Leadershfp Conference. A rather lengthy report describes the group's demands, meetings that were held, and the name of the group's leader. The subject is "demonstration, government building;" sources include the FBI, military intelligence, and local police. All together, thirty-five incidents in various pails of the United States were reported 'in this one weekly report. So far as the staff has been able to determine, these CRIS reports largely duplicated the weekly intelligence summaries issued by the Intelligence Command.

48 At the end of each weekly or bi-weekly print-out, there is a statistical breakdown of reports by region and type of incident (e.g. antiwar, anti-military, anti-draft, racial, and miscellaneous). These types of incidents in turn are subdivided into the categories of "violent" and "'ion-violent."Exhibit 7 is an example of one of these breakdowns.
EXITIBIT

The difference in the, number of reports from summary appears is computed and labeled "trend." Accordingly, the the previous week to be u crude attempt to construct a barometer of political activity throughout the nation. What good this would do in predicting the likelih-ood of a riot in a particular city is not clear. The predictive value of this kind of analysis also is brought, into question by the fact that the report uses a week-to-week time lrame,and assumes that figures on the freuency of arrests on clashes with police can be conve.•edintgpedmto Yof widespread rioting. It. would appear that military inte hgence put great froth in the Mathering of large amounts of info-rmation but did little, to develop theories concernmffig its use. It appears to have been data rich and theory poor.

4zý

49 From the beginning of January 1969 through the end of February 1970, analysts in the Office of the Deputy, Chief of Staff for Intelligence at the Continental Army Command selected 4,398 incident reports for computer storage. The sources of these reports were:
Source of reports Number of reports Percentage of reports

M0 Puhlic. appearances by cabinet members, generals, mayors, and state officials also are reported. In most instances, the officials are mentioned only to describe a meeting or a demonstration. Thus a report on the Subc'ommittee Chairman mentions that he gave a speech at Statesville, North Carolina in 1970 at which twenty persons picketed without incident. In a few instances

what the official said also was reported, but the overall pattern shows no l)paticular interest in the political positions of public figures. In some instances, however. personal identity numbers were assigned to public officials. F4tw example, a United States Senator was coded 000004890; a U.S. Congressman, 000004595; and a state governor, 000003976. Normally, such numbers were reserved for radical students, militant black power advocates, or civil rights leaders. Nothing in the reports on these officials or in their political reputations suggests why they should have been singled out for special treatment. However, the fact that they were given identity numbers while others. were not does not indicate that. the reports mentioning other officials could not be recalled. Computers today can be instructed to recall all reports containing a, given name or word. Thus reports which mention someone

only incidentally could be recovered if that person were later to become a personality of interest." According to Defense Department General Counsel J. Fred Buzharldt.23 the.Fort Monroe incident data bank:
which might result in the deployment or commitment of federal troops. The actual use in civil disturbances in accordance with the Army Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot).

. . . was designed to retrieve civil disturbance information rapidly and generate data and statistics to assist CONARC in the prediction of civil disturbances
attempt to predict possible civil disturbances or incidents related directly to the requirements placed on CONARC to provide Task Forces for deployment and for

The print-out, however, shows that in practice tle collection of civil disturbance information was largely indiscriminate and the reports kept for future reference related more to the activities of individuals and organizations than to the practical reconnaissance needs of Task Force commanders. By and large, the CONARC incident file duplicated the Intelligence Command system. As for destruction, the Defense Department General Counsel has 'reported: 24
The civil disturbance information in CRIS was stored on four magnetic tapes and discs. They were all destroyed on April 12, 1970, by degaussing, i.e., the information was removed from the discs and tapes by passing them through a magnetic field. No other discs or tapes contained the information which was in the Fort Monroe program. Supporting files consisted of boxes of IBM cards, existing printouts, and the user manuals. These related files were destroyed on April 22, 1970.
lHearings, Part 1I1 p. 1233. 21Hearings, Part II: p. 1233.

51
C. TIHE COMPUTERIZED PERSONALITIES FILE

o

The Subcommittee staff has also examined Volumes 2 through 6 of the "Personalities Edition" of the Counterintelligence Records Information System dated January 26,1970. (Volume 1 was not included in the print-outs loaned to us by thbejustice Department). These five volumes contain 2,269 pages of detailed summaries of the political beliefs and activities of nearly 5,500 persons, in addition to a 99-page index to persons listed. Exhibit 8 is a series of excerpts from this print-out, "sanitized" to protect the privacy of those mentioned.

-COOOGL8:.. ACTS ON OFFICIALENCOUNTERED THE NAVY AND ALTHOUGH HE "BLE Bi THAT TSTPIOITE M WAR. HKIN MANY PEOPLE FIND IN MILITARY. ORGANIZATION .. WAS NOT 04W So HE MAO) O SENSE OF BEING PITTED AGAINST A SYSTEMS HE " AR tCALC9EERSTVpiS.E M__LE.
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S--_IC_SATV.A.. -....... . . .. PICTURE -401p NOT PRE SENT........ OCCeuPATION ... "CO M+ISCELLANEOUS OCCtPATIlN4S .NA.PRATIYE-ATTENOED THE BANKS COU94TY WORLD PEACE FAIR OEL- THE HUGH AT ..... .; . CARCELLA COMMUNITY CENTER P-IRkLiSS "ILLS PEWN HSEWAS ONE CF THE -. - ......... SPDE.AKRERSHA0 ......AEp JAT..T__S OEA rM T.P.EO!E._14 VIETNA1M WRE.A....... .. .. :. ,. ,.-.. : . IN CONTACT WITH THE WELL-TO-O0 AND T14E COCKTAIL SET ANO WERE . ." kOT IN CONTACT. WITH THE PEOPLE IN VIETNAM4 HE SAID THAT THE . ... MILITARY OF THAT COUNTRY DID NOT REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM HE FURTHER QUESTION IMW PEOPLE OFWAR FOREIGN CIVIL WAR ADHE ....... ".- - •-..."RAISED THE SAID TIAT THE VIETNAM A 4AS A €OtJMTRY-TH4E US .

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0 AND BATTERY OISMISSED NO 6S FOR UILOING CODE VIOLATION FINED S..ANC TSVRYATIVf IN PEACE T__-DRL T AND ANTI-VIFTNAM ACTIVITIES SINCE EARLY 196OS. RUSSIlAN VISITING Cc-..% . . WITIL SO? EAJT UGILTWAS .GU ITN HER HOME IN MA 6S.GOIi LEADER OF r-c4• COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNhAt.

64
Each of the more than 7,000 entries in this data file follows the same format. Reading from left to right across the print-out, it calls for: "Name and Address/PLINK #/Date of Birth/Employment/Data Source." "PLINK" is computer shorthand for "personait link" and is expressed by a numerical identifier. According to the Defense Del)artlnent, it served as a cross-reference to organizational and incident flies.25 Beneath this line are 17 categories for information, grouped as follows: Ethnic Group Race Religion Income Per Year Ieader of Effectiveness Sex Marital Status Alias 'Arrest History Service Status Citizenship Employment Type Education Character Picture Occupation Most of these categories are self-explanatory; those that are not appear to have been used for some non-obvious purposes. The Defense Department explained: 26
Under the entry of "character," codes indicated such characteristics as militancy or lack of militancy and degree of support rendered to the organization. The codes for the "leader of" indicated the economic and social characteristics for a variety of groups. Codes under the data element "effectiveness" Indicated the degree of effectiveness of the leadership of the individual being described. The entries under the field "picture" merely indicated whether a picture was available in the source file (or document). There are no records existing to indicate how the various categories were assigned to the above elements. It is known that the categorizations were made by the Army elements designing the system.

This explanation is interesting for several reasons. First, it indicates that the Continental Army Command was using a set of highly subjective criteria to characterize individuals and organizations. Second, it suggests that no documents existed to explain the criteria to the intelligence analysts responsible. for making the characterizations. Third, it suggests that the officials who drafted the explanation were unable to find anyone who could explain in any detail just how the analysts went about their job of classifying American citizens according to their "effectiveness" in exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights. In none of the entries examined were all of these categories completed. This was true even in the case of well-known public figures. Below the 17 categories, there are lines for "Organizational membership," and "Influence therein." Whenever these are completed, they are preceded by "Entry No. "1 and "001', respectively, no matter how many organizations are listed. Whenever an organization is listed, it is accompanied by a seven-digit designator which Army representatives have, said is a code number for organizations. It may also identify the individual's role or activity in the organization. The second space in each designator is always a letter which corresponds
T Rearings. Part II. p. 1235. "Hearings, Part II. p. 1236.

65 to the first initial of the group's name. To the far left of each organizational notation is one of two phrases: "Office holder" or "Worker." Rarely is a person listed as a worker. Below the list of organizations with which the individual is associated is a space for "Narrative" or, in some cases, "Analyst comment." These statements run the gamut from quotations from newspapers to informant's reports. Persons described in the data bank range from members of clearly peaceful "establishment" groups such as the Unitarian-Universalists, Quakers, American Friends Service Committee, the Society for Ethical Culture, and SANE, to individuals alleged to be connected with the Communist Party, and personnel from Isvestia and the KGB (Soviet Intelligence). Convicted Soviet spies join Nobel prize winners and entries from Who's Who. Activities described vary from peaceful expressions of views to espionage. In most cases, however, the individuals were included solely because they chose to exercise constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. Some are cited for handing out pamphlets, making speeches, attending rallies, subscribing to periodicals, signing political advertisements, advocating voter registration, calling for the reform of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, signing an election petition, and speaking unfavorably of the Army, an officer, or the President. Others are included for opposing the war in Vietnam, participating in sit-ins, sleep-ins, and demonstrations, picketing (in one case of a shoe shop), and writing letters of support to Hanoi. In a large number of cases, an arrest is noted. Many are for offenses often associated with public protests, such as parading without a permit, loitering, littering, and disorderly conduct. Only a few arrests are for serious offenses, such as drug smuggling, carrying concealed weapons, and the like. Rarely do the summaries note what came of the arrest. Many entries associate the individual with groups considered by the Army to be Communist Party fronts. In the majority of these cases, there is no evidence that the individual was or is a knowing member activeoe working to overthrow the government of the United States. On the. otler hand, volumes 2 and 3 contain a sprinkling of cases in which the individual appears to have been involved in espionage. Typically these are convicted or deported agents whose names are easily recognizable to the informed laymen. A number of individuals are identified as members of the Communist Party, USA. However, there is usually no way to ascertain the credibility of the charge-libelous in some states--because no source is given, or because the allegation was made by an unnamed informant. In manv cases no reason is given for including the individual in CONARC's data bank. Some entries list only a name and address. Others contain internal contradictions, or suggest a good reason why the individual should not be of interest to Army intelligence. In a great many instances, spouses are listed for no apparent reason other

W

66 than their choice of marital partner-or former partner. Relatives listed include brothers, sisters, mother, fathers, children (some very young), and in one case a girl friend. In most cases, it is not possible to determine the original source of the information. However, in about 80 percent of the entries the FBI is cited as the "Data Source." 27 Some of the information appears to have been furnished by confidential informants. In a few instances an FBI file code is cited, but for the most part it is impossible to determnine to what extent CONARC developed its own covert sources. Other entries su ggest direct agent observation, but do not reveal whose agents did the observing. Only a few of the entries can be attributed to newspaper articles. Some, of these date back to the early 1960s. Entries pertaining to a number of prominent persons are taken from "Who's Who, while arrest information appears to come mainly from police records. One notation reports a building code violation. Other entries cite no source whatever. This is often true where the reports connect the activities of U.S. citizens with foreign countries such as the Soviet Union, France, Switzerland, and Canada. One anonymous report discloses that the subject wrote to the Soviet Emnbassv to request information for a school paper. Another notes that a young student exchanged pen-pal correspondence with a teacher in the Soviet Union. Many of the anonymous reports appear to have been gleaned from interviews with employers, employees, friends, or associates. Others seem to have been taken from passport applications, immigration files, and "statements of personal history" filled out by persons applying for security clearances. Under what authority and for what purpose private sources were approached and the records of other federal agencies made available to CONARC is not known. Finally, at the right-hand margin of almost every line on which there is an entry, a five-digit number appears. In'most cases, the number is "69221." Occasionally it is "69328," and in a few cases still another number appears. According to the Defense Department, these numbers indicate the area of operations from which the particular report originated.
b In some instances the data source Is indicated by a seven-digit code number followed by "USC," "CON," or "MIC." The seven-digit number identifies the original document; the abbreviations represent the reporting agency.

-

67 What purposes this file was intended to serve have not been disclosed, but on its face the print-out does not seem intended to facilitate the civil disturbance mission. It is difficult to imagine how records of an individual's religion, annual income, and marital status would be of use to a 'task force commander trying to quell a riot or contain a violent demonstration. Perhaps CONARO's analysts hoped through the statistical analysis of seemingly irrelevant data to produce new insights into the nature and causes of civil disorders. The details sought suggest the intent to speed the retrieval of characterizationss" of all "persons of interest" to CONARC but the incompleteness of most entries indicate that the computer was far from replacing the manual files. However, the data base was sufficiently complete that it could have been used to correlate political activists with their organizations and home towns. Without the computer instruction books and the assistance of persons familiar with the programming of the various files within the CONARC data system, no comprehensive appraisal can be made of. these files. However, a few -tentative conclusions are possible. First, to our surprise, CONARC's computerization of personality duta appears to have gone beyond that of the Intelligence Command, both in numbers of persons monitored and the variety of information recorded. This indicates that CONARC's surveillance of civilians was far more extensive than direct evidence of it would suggest. Second, the categories of information sought and the actual information recorded show that CONARC's data collection far outstripped either Annex B or the DA Civil Disturbance Information Plan. This finding raises the question: Did CONARC expand its surveillance on its own initiative, or were there still other Army-wide directives which have not been made known to us? Third, most of the information contained in the "Personalities Edition of January 26, 1970" bears no reasonable relationship to the Army's missions, but could be used for such unauthorized purposes as libel, slander or blackmail. We have no reason to believe that CONARC's commanders intended to misuse their files, but they clearly had files which were open to unauthorized abuse.

68
V. FILES OF
THE

CONUS ARmtiES

As the foregoing summaries indicate, redundancy was a key feature of the Army's domestic intelligence data banks. The armies belonging to the Continental Army Command were no exception. Because little has been said about them, the following fragments of information drawn from a CONARC inventory are included in this report.28 A.
FIRST ARMY

The domestic intelligence operations of the First U.S. Army focused on New England, the Middle Atlantic states, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio. Accordingly, its records largely duplicated those maintained by the 108th and 109th MI Groups of the Intelligence Command. The central data bank, located at Fort George Meade, Md., reported the following quantity of records on military and civilian dissenters: Organizations cards (5 x 8 inches) : 18 linear feet, Personality folders: 12 linear feet, Organization cards (5 x 8 inches) : 18 linear feet, Personality cards (5 x 8 inches) : 52 linear feet. By our count, one loosely-packed inch of 5 x 8 file cards contains about 100 separate cards. (A compressed inch will contain 125 or more.) In other words, the First Army reported keeping at least 21,600 cards on organizations (100 x 12 x 18), and 62,400 cards on individuals (100 x 12 x 52). Undoubtedly, more than one card was used to describe some individuals and groups, while some cards were holdovers from earlier decades. Even so, the size of these files is staggering, and would be difflcult to believe were it not, for the fact that other CONUS armies have reported similarly large holdings. In addition, First Army headquarters reported approximately 24 linear feet, of domestic intelligence publications. These included not only USAINTC's mug books and CIAB's Compendium, but also: .M[onthly CONJTS intelligence summftries published in booklet form by all CONUS armies and the Military District of Washington. Air Force (Office of Special Investigations) Counterintelligence Briefs. Naval Investigative Service counterintelligence reports. FBI reports collected by the 108th and 109th MI Groups. Approximately 75 percent of the data recorded in the card files on individuals and *organizations was extracted from FBI reports. The remaining 25 percent. according to the First Army, was taken from the news media. and "miscellaneous sources." Presumably these ranged from the Intelligence Command's wire srvice to the First Armv's own undercover agents. About 60 percent of-the information in the personality and organization folders reportedly came from the FBI and other governmental agencies.
SR This inventory, like the foregoing analyses of computer files, contradicts Secretary Froplilke's testimony: "Stich fles, as you know, were ordered desatroyed In the spring of 1970. Therefore. It Is imossible to examine sitch flies to determine to what particular Individuals And organi1t71tilonx the, related or the sipecific contents of the files. All the evidence strongly Indicates that the files were comprised pialyof voluminous newspaper clippings. They also continued a number of reports fr~omm thilrd agencies, both Vederal state and local. To a lesser degree, they also contained the products of direct agenL observation reports." Hearings, Part I, p. 389.

69
B. TIlIRD ARMY 29

The Third U.S. Army kept track of military and civilian dissenters in the Southeastern United States. Its headquarters at Fort McPherson, Ga., reported a card file (5 x 8 cards and microfilm cards) on 4,672 persons, 2,220 organizations, and 382 publications. The report omitted any mention of dossiers or publications, but did furnish eight criteria by which the Third Army determined which individuals and organizations merited space in its files. 1. Subjects who aim to, or whose current activities are prejudicial to the best interests of the Army and/or adversely affect military operations. 2. Organizations and individuals who engage in, or lend support of RITA activities to include provision of lnnds, advice, publications, and legal support. 3. Leaders of anti-ROTC activities at colleges and universities having ROTC programs, to include organizations involved and current activities. 4. Leaders of leftist organizations that conduct dissident activities at/or on military installations, such as distribution of literature and sponsorship of demonstrations. 5. Leaders of organizations whose activities are predicted to interrupt, or adversely affect, Army operations in the event of a civil disturbance which involves military personnel and/ or materiel, to include organizations involved and modus operandl. 6. Writers of threatening or "crackpot" letters. 7. Some foreign agencies that have been designated by ACSI, DA, as collectors of intelligence information in the U.S. 8. Organizations that have been cited as subversive by Federal and state investigative bodies. Given such a broad list, it is easier to understand how Third Army headquarters could find so many individuals and organizations to keep track of in the Southeast. Similar, but less extensive files, were reported to exist at Fort McClellan, Ala., Fort Jackson, S.C., and Fort Bragg, N.C.
C. FOURTHI ARMY

Although few regions of the country have been less troubled by civil disorders than the Southwest, the Fourth Army maintained the most extensive data banks on political dissenters within CONARC. The headquarters file at Fort Sam Houston, for example, reported 90 linear feet of dossiers and 100 linear feet of 3 x 5 inch "locator cards" or organizations and individuals. Since 100 linear feet of 3 x 5 cards equals approximately 120,000 separate cards (100 x 1'2 x 100), this headquarters file probably qualifies as the largest of its kind in the entire Army. The purpose of these cards, according to the Fourth Army, was to provide information to command and staff elements of this headquarters and Class I installations concerning

0 The Second U.S. Army no longer exists.

70
(a) Individuals and organizations whose activities/statements or affiliations with subversive groups indicate an actual or possible potential for violent confrontation; (b) Or who have indicated support, financial or otherwise, for such groups and individuals. (c) Individuals and organizations which have indicated a desire to or have made actual contact with active duty members of the military for the apparent purpose of influencing such individuals toward dissident activity or disaffection. Fort Sam Houston, however, was not the only repository of CONUS intelligence files in Texas. Fort Hood, home of three civil disturbance task force headquarters and six ARSTRIKE brigades, maintained both computerized and non-computerized listings of civilian groups and their leaders on both the national and local level. (See section VI,

infra.)

1). r.'Tri AM•NY

The Fifth U.S. Army, which has responsibility for much of the Great Plains and Mid-West (minus Ohio), reported approximately 93.6 linear feet of dossiers and approximately 5,000 5 x 8 inch cards on individuals and organizations at its headquarters at Fort Sheridan, Ill. Its inventory did not reveal what files, if any, were maintained by subordinate units but one example was supplied by Mr. Laurence Lane who testified that the G-2 of the Fifth Mechanized Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colo. maintained a complex filing system:
Card cross-files were maintained on individuals, cities, and organizations. Each card indicated where source material was stored, I.e., spot reports, newspaper clippings, agent reports, etc. Clippings and teletype reports normally were categorized chronologically, whereas agent reports, dossiers, and other developed Information were filed by subject.$

During the fall of 1969, he added, this system became too burdensome, and was replaced by a tabloid journal in which items of information were logged chronologically as they were received.
E. SIXTI1 ARMY

For the West Coast and Rocky Mountain states, the Sixth Army reported a headquarters file of only 35 linear feet of dossiers-the equivalent of four-and-a-half four-drawer file cabinets. Its inventory made no mention of the files of its subordinate commands, but included the following justification: "Should troops be deployed to restore stability and order, lack of the information contained in these files would commit the troop commander to a strange area with no knowledge of his opponents or their plans, tactics, strengths, weaknesses, organization or capabilities. This could lead to unnecessary over-reaction due to a lack of knowledge of the situation." F.
MILITARY DISTRICr OF WASIINGTON

The Military District of Washington (MDW) admitted to 90 manila folders on "dissident personalities and 112 folders on "dissident or' Hearings, Part I, p. 826.

71 ganizations." The files were needed, it said, "to advise the commander, MDW, and contingency units of individuals and organizations which could cause disorders beyond the capability of civil authorities to control. This can be accomplished only through the maintenance of timely and accurate information on prominent dissident individuals and groups.". On the basis of this incomplete inventory, it is possible to draw at least six conclusions. First, each CONUS army and many subordinate installations and units maintained its own distinctive files on dissident and subversive activity. Second, in some instances these files were incredibly large, indicating that a vigorous collection effort had existed over a long period of time. Third, much of the information in these files appears to have been drawn from FBI reports. Fourth the files of each Army headquarters duplicated to a large extent similar records maintained by MI group headquarters located on the same post. Fifth, at least one subordinate unit, III Corps at Fort Hood, went so far as to computerize its files on national and local dissenters. The existence of this data bank was not uncovered until April 1970 when responses were received to an inventory ordered by the Secretary of the Army.

-'

72
VI. FORT HOOD COMPUTER

The surprise disclosure of the previously unknown CONARC computer by Chicago Sun-Time8 reporter Morton Kondracke caused the Secretary of the Army to order an Army-wide search to find all computer data banks dealing with the political activities of persons unaffiliated with the Department of the Army. One result of this inventory was the disclosure that III Corps, in conjunction with theý G-2 Office at Fort Hood, Texas, had also developed a computerized strage systemr for civil disturbance intelligence. A copy of Fort Hood's "Alphabetical Roster by Initials (of Organizations)" was sent to the Pentagon sometime in the late spring of 1970, misplaced, and rediscovered in the spring of 1971. It was then sent to the Department of Justice for preservation in connection with the Tatum case. In January, 1972, a copy of this print-out was delivered to the Subcommittee for analysis. Whether there was a computerized incident file and a computerized personality file in addition to the roster of organizations is not known. However, it is known that the computer files, whatever they contained, were supplemented by 3 1manual search file of approximately 1,000 5 x 8 a inch cards of some sort. The organizational roster stored information on civilian political activity by the group's initial, its ideology or type of activity, the names of its leaders, chapters and members, its address (including street addresses), membership size, associated organizations, date of formation, and "card code." The roster carries no security classification and is marked "For Official Use Only." An excerpt from this organizational file follows:

3The

source of this report Is the Fourth Army inventory of non-computerized holdings.

76
In all, 247 organizations and 337 individuals are listed, which makes the roster of organizations appear modest beside the non-computerized file of over 100,000 index cards on individuals maintained at Fort. Sam Houston. All of these organizations appear to be located within the six states to which riot units within III Corps could be deployed ini case of civil disorder. The states are Texas, Illinois, California, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Tennessee. Addresses for the most part refer only to the city and state in which the organization or individual is located. However, in many instances, street addresses or post office boxes are entered for individuals as well as groups, giving III Corps the capability of producing computerized lists of dissenters by ideology and organizations in six states. Organizations are broken down into 12 categories and assigned code letters from A to L denoting the nature of their ideology and activity. Organizations listed in the roster are set forth below by their respective categories. The abbreviations used are taken from column four of the print-out, as are the labels describing the organizations. As is so often the case in these Army files, who decided which groups were "right-wing" or "poverty-agitation" or whatever can not be established. What basis in fact there was for the label also is unknown. But there is evidence, illustrated by the testimony by Ralph Stein quoted on page 83, for example, that. the labels were carelessly and arbitrarily assigned. And there can be no question that here, as so often the case, the arbitrary characterization of a group, or the unsubstantiated identification as a person as a member of a "suspect" organization, could be. the occasion for serious and unjustified injury to his
reputation and livelihood.

L. Legal Deen8e AM CIVIL LIBERTY U MOVEMENT LEGAL SERV COM AID DEF R WILLUM A "sequence code" of one letter and four digits apparently keys each entry to some other records system. Without the computer codie books, which were not delivered to tihe Subcommittee, it is not possible to determine to wJhat each sequence code number refers. IPossibly on the supposition that "dissident civilians are analogous to the "enemny" in wartime, 3 2 III Corps attempted to estinmate the size of the various group within ita.are•L•perat~i %.ThIcsoding~s~ch.ine was as follows:
Code No.: Number of per80118 In group

Tihe Fort Hood data bank on or-ganizations apparently was instituted sometime after III Corps troops were prepositionled outside of Chicago during the 1968 Democratic National Convention. Neither the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence nor the Continental Army Conmmand's intelligence staff were aware of its existence until they conducted the inventory ordered by Secretary of tile Armny Resor. On April 25, 1970, Fouith Army reported to CONARC that III Corps and Fort Hood maintained computer tape listing of a limited number of civilian organizations and their leaders at both national and local level. The computerized data, it explained, was maintained to insure the availability of pertinent situational intelligence information, primarily regarding areas of responsibility under "Garden Plot.," the civil disturbance contingency plan. It ýrgued that the maintenance of such data was essential to lhe effective intelligence support of three civil disturbance task force headquarters andisix civil distulrbance brigades located at Fort Hood. If the data. were available only upon deployment of one or more of the riot units., Fou.th Army contended, proper assimilation of tile information by commanders at all echelons would be precluded. How the riot unit commanders could lawfully make use of the information on civilian organizations, their leaders and members, was not explained. Fourth Army's justification of the data bank went on to argue that the information pertaining to the Oleo Sltrut Coffee House in Killen, Tex., was essential because the coffee house supported anti-military activities and had been the scene of numerous rallies and meetings which were not in the best interests of the Army. In addition, the management of the coffee house was alleged to have rendered financial assistance to two "underground" newspapers located in the area. What constitutional or statutory authority Fort Hood intelligence had to investigate the finance of newspapers in Killen was not explained.
"This Is a theme that runs through tie collection plans which authorized the monitoring. See Appendix.

80 Compared to the national data banks maintained by the Intelligence Command and CONARC, the Fort Hood operation seems modest. Nonetheless, the independent development of this data bank-particularly in light of the huge files already existing at Fourth Army headquarters-again demonstrates how easy it was for domestic intelligence activities to be initiated without authority from the Department of the Army and without consideration for efficiency or economy. As with the Fort Holabird files, Army civilians had difficulty assuring the destruction of the Fort Hood data bank. According to DOD 3 General Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt,8
were no ltihe data bank and computer program on magnetic tape (there -1....... ... ... ý ... destroyed on A ugust 15, 1970. discs) w ere previously destroyed.
also been It was thought that the printout provided to ACSI, DA. ... had destruction deto had never been any written record of the stroyed. Although there confirm this, several prior searches had failed to discover the document in questionn. However, on May 11, 1971, the last remaining printout from Fort Hood was discovered by accident among some files in the Office of the Assistant Chief of retained for litigation purposes.
.' Hearings, Part It, p. 1234.

. . . [Tihe printout . . . sent to the 4th Army was

Staff for Intelligence,

...

The Justice Delmrtment has advised that it should be

81

VII. FILEs oF- THlE COUNTErINTELLIOEXCE

A.NALYSIS BRANCH, OACSL

PW

The task of the two major collection agencies (CONARC and USAINTC) was to report and store as much data as they could. Speed and volume were the criteria by which their performances were evaluated. Thus, where they could afford it, they turned to computers. The Counterintelligence Analysis Branch (CIAB) (now Detachment) in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI) was a different kind of agency. Its main mission was to produce analyses of matters of counterintelligence interest occurring anywhere in the world. These analyses took the form of threat estiiiates, organizational studies, briefings, talking papers, fact sheets, officials. CIAB's briefers kept the Under Secretary of the Army, the Ar~my General Counsel, and the Chief of Staff informed of the course of civil disturbances. To facilitate their research and writing, CIAB's analysts maintained a large microfilm archive called the "Counterintelligence Reference File System." lDuring the fall of 1967 consultants from the Research Analysis Corporation recommended that CIAB undertake an ambitious computer operation which they contended would predict when and how many troops would be needed to put down riots in various cities. The proposal was rejected. Former analysts attribute the rejection to two factors: (1) An unwillingness to accept the information loss that occurs when lengthy. reports are compressed and translated into keypunchable categories, and (2) The existence of the microfilm archive which had proven adequate to the task of storing counterintelligence information from overseas. Knowledge that computerization was going on elsewhere, and the realization that CIAB could not afford to duplicate the efforts of others, also may have influenced the decision. However CIAB did computerize its index to the microfilm archive, which had been enlarged as early as 1964 to include domestic intelligence records. By early 1970 the archive contained approximately 117,500 documents, of which half or more related to civilian political activity. The index to these documents contained approximately 189,000 entries identifying types of activities and references to 113,250 organizational and 152,000 personality entries. There also were 5,800 index entries which identified reports as being associated with specific toptlMIl- ents, such as riots, coup d'etats, elections, or similar happenings. What percentage of these index entries related to domestic political activities is not known, but former analysts recall that the domestic portion of the computerized index was approximately a foot and a half thick. While many entries undoubtedly pertained to the same subject, it is difficult to accept Under Secretary Beal's assurance of March 20, 1970, that CIAB did "not collate information on a broad basis and only has information needed to answer specific questions of concern to the Department of the Army." 84
84 Hearings, Part II, p. 1053.

82

.~~~......-Thoi-inadex-wasfassorbled-by-flieo alphiabetical~order.inga-of-koy-.puneh .... cards on individuals and organizations. These cards contained a number of descriptive categories, some of which are listed below:

Membership. Plans. Finances. Literature. Tactics. Affiliations with other groups. Beside each item of information on the print-out was a citation to the roll and frame of microfilm on which the original report was reproduced. For example, a typical entry might read in part: "DELLINGER, DAVID, ... CYIICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL 845/ correct tray of microfilm, select reel 845, put 'it in the microfilm reader/printer, and crank to frame .332. To get a permanent copy, he would press a button and the machine would make a wet copy of the report. The coding of the reports was facilitated by the use of a specially abridged version of a standard Intelligence Subj'ect Code. Letter todes were used to sort individuals and organizations by location; numerical codes sorted them'by status and beliefs. For example, "HUSX" Would indicate "Western hemisphere, United States." "IHUSANY" would represent a soldier in New York state. Additional codes sorted individuals by their profession, military service, rank, and political affiliation. For example, the prefix "134"' meant "non-Communist," while "135" meant "Communist." The suffix 295 indicated a person, 799 an anti-war group. 134.799, therefore, would denote a nlon-Communist anti-war group. By the use of such numbers, CIAB produced concise characterizations of the beliefs and affiliations of many individuals and organizations.
332 .
. . ."

To view the original report the analyst would go to the

83 No effort-was made-to keep.records.on Jaw-abiding citiz.eos. eptqrate from those on foreign spies. "Dissidents" and "subversives" were mixed' together indiscriminately, and the analysts were given broad discretion to decide who belone-ed in what catevorv. Mr. Stein testified:35
... While no problem ever existed with a self-proclaimed communist, the Individual analyst would have to choose a designation arbitrarily in many doubtful cases or where identifying Information was lacking. The result? Many persons who are not communists have been so listed in CIAB's data bank.

were students who merely participated in a meeting or rally sponsored by, an organization under surveillance.

At the time of my departure from CIAB .. . manyy of the individuals listed

To illustrate the kinds of reports stored in CIAB's archive, Mr. ... .Steicitedseral hundred FBI background investigations of young people arrested for misdemeino6si ur'ingtheT• hfober 19}7Mtiehft the Pentagon. "These reports not only listed the details of the offense but also revealed the individual's background, education, schooling, membership in groups, associations, travels, and often contained in-

Workers World Party Communist Party, USA Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist Socialist Workers*Party Progressive Labor Party Students for a Democratic Society Southern Students Ot'ganizing Committee Spartacist League Young Socialist Alliance National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Student Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam
SANE

Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Bughiess Executives Move to End the War in Vietnam Clergy and Laymen Concerned About the War National Lawyers Guild Emergency Civil Liberties Committee The Resistance The Revolutionary Contingent Yiddisher Kultur Farband National Conference for New Politics Women's Strike for Peace Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Peace and Freedom Party Urban League Youth International Party Racial Congress of Racial Equality National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee Revolutionary Action Movement Southern Christian Leadership Conference Mr. Stein testified that "A few of the groups did sponsor activities designed to hamper the Army in the accomplishment of its lawful mission.. ." But "most of the information collected... was not of any
value in determining the possibility of civil disturbances
... ,"

31He

emphasized that "the Army collected and received information on many purely local groups Avhich engaged entirely in constitutionally protected activity. Examples include black groups devoted solely to securing better housing, vigil groups in New England which met regularly to light candles and pray for peace, and student organizations interested in increasing the relevancy of their education." 40 Financial information, sexual activities (especially illicit or unconventional), personal beliefs and associations were all reported in great detail." 1 00 Hearings, Part i, P. 265. 40 Hearings, Part 1, p. 265.
4t

Hearings, Part I, p. 265.

85

----

ligence Community. .

According to a fact sheet prepared in early 1970, CIAB received I 'ithin the U.S._Intel-

u.doouwets.rouiio.approxuiniatel:yf!!tyiagcn

0

have no interest." 42 Another major source of reports was the Intelligence Command. "It often seemed to us," he recalled, "... that virtually every public protest meeting was monitored by Army agents, with the results being for.4 warded to Washington through Baltimore." ...- i.-Mairclh 1970, Iep~artmcnt of. the.Army officials defended the approl)riateness of CIAB's files on civilian activity. I vie.. Under Secretary Beal wrote to the Chairman, "the activities of the Counterintelligence Analysis Division do not involve an invasion of pri vacy or constitute an improper activity for the Army to perform."" Nine months later, however, a team of five CIAD analysts were directed to go through the microfilm archive frame-by-frame and mark inappropriate documents for excision. Then special duty personnel, working in shifts around the clock for 2 weeks, cut out the offending documents. Unfortunately, no report of this purge has been rendered to the Subcommittee, so it is impossible to say how thorough the editors were.
42Heari, gs, Part 1, p. 267. 43Iiia ir gs, Part I, p. 1053. 44 l Hearings, Part I, p. 1053.

FBI. )uring my period of service, the FBI obviously made no attempt to screen reports for relevance to the Army mission and so CIAB daily received a veritable flood of information, the major part of which related to totally civilian political activities in which the Army should

Force commands also maintained domestic intelligence files. The commands were the U.S. Strike Command and the Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations. The United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was established in 1961 to furnish rapidly deployable, combat-ready forces in an emergency situation anywhere within the United States or overseas. A two-service command (Army and Air Force), USSTRICOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., and is commanded by an Army general. Its two major components, the U.S. Army Forces Strike Command (ARSTRIKE) and the U.S. Air Force Strike Command (AFSTRIKE), are headquartered in close proxinity: ARSTRIKE at Fort Monroe, Va., and AFSTRIKE at adjacent Langley Air Force Base. ARSTRIKE supplies the troops; AFSTRIKE, the planes. ARSTRIKE's troops come primarily from three units in CONARC's strategic reserve: III Corps at Fort Hood, Tex., XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C., and the Fifth Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colo.45 To facilitate Arm cooperation in emergencies, the commanding general of CONARgis also in charge of ARSTRIKE. UISSTRICOM 's day-in, day-out emphasis is on welding its Army and Air Force components into quick reaction force. During the late 1960's, this mission included stepped-up efforts to assure rapid deployment of riot trained soldiers in times of civil disorder. To facilitate this effort and to insure military security, IYSSTRICOM's Director of Intelligence undertook to develop his own computerized files on civilian political activity. As was the case at Fort Hood*Fort Monroe, and Fort Holabird, the MaciDll computer operation was undertaken in late 1967 and early 1968 without civilian authorization of any kind. The unit in charge of the operation was the Counterintelligence and Security Division, Directorate of Intelligence, J-2, USSTRICOM. The primary sources of its information were the U.S. Army Area Monthly Intelligence Summaries, OSI Significant Counterintelligence Briefs, and FBI publications. At least two computer files were developed: a Counterintelligence Personality File and a Counterintelligence/Publication File. Whether ITSSTRICOM also maintained an incident data file in addition to its library of Monthly Intelligence Summaries is not known. Copies of these two print-outs were sent. to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIACI-4) and the Counterintelligence Analysis Branch in Washington as early as April 26, 1968. However, the only portion of these two files made available to the Subcommittee for analysis is a one-page excerpt from the Personality File. The following is a "sanitized" version of a page from the April 9, 19C8, Counterintelligence Personality File of the U.S. Strike Command.
5 Ill Corps, It will be recalled,! developed the Fort Hood computer. The Fifth Infantry Division through the Fifth MI lbetachment. was responsible for the unauthorized monitorlug of civilian political activities in Colorado Springs, Colo. See Hearings, Part I, pp. 305 ff.

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88 From the face of this print-out it would appear that the Strike Command's computer was being used simply to list items of interest to the Command. The absence of special code numbers suggests that it puterized files. However, it is also possible that the print-out represents an early format and that Strike Command's data bank became more sophisticated as time went by. The content of the foregoing entries would appear to be largely outside the Army's legitimate informational needs. For example, it is difficult to see how military security or riot operations would be enhanced by knowledge that a particular person is a member of the board of the American Civil Liberties Union or that a college dean I opposes the war. The sources of these reports also are interesting. "'ITVX 1st USA" indicates that the reporting unit was the office of the Deputy Chief -6f-S~tff'-f&P -Tfftllt~fr&, First Army headquarters, Fort-George.. Meade, Maryland. "TWX" indicates that the report was received by teletype. It thus would appear that Strike Command headquarters was linked with each of the continental armies by a teletype network not unlike the wire service that hooked components of the Army Intelligence Comma.nd together in one nationwide grid. If this is true, then it would seem that the Army operated not one, but two internal security wire services in the late 19 60s. Other sources listed on this print-out include the Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force (OSI), a Fourth Army Monthly Intelligence Summary (4AMIS), and a CONARC report. The dates on the entries indicate that the Strike Command computer may have been one of the earliest to go into operation. Reports cited date back to early 1967, and thus predate even the riots of the summer of 1967 when the CONUS intelligence program received its greatest impetus. On the other hand, reports from early 1967 might have been filed in the computer at a later date. The date of the print-out itself, however, indicates that the computer was in operation before the first vague mission-type order (DoD Directive 3025.12, dated June 8, 1968) was issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze.

89 IX. CoMruTEIzED FILES OF TIIE Dnwc'roun.A
PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

Fo Civm DISTURBANCE

d--A-no-time-during-the-firstý-yearof-the-Subcomrnitteeos.investigation----did either the Army or the Department of Defense admit that a computer on civilian political activity existed within the Pentagon•s domestic war room. Although copies of its print-outs were distributed regularly to the Under Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the S "Assistance Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Air Force, Navy, and Marines, the first disclosure was not made until July 4, 1971, when the New York Time8 published a story about its inaccuracies.45 The Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations (qDCDPO, now Directorate of Military Support) was created in april 1968 when the Army anticipated that it might have to deploy 10,000 troops in each of 25 cities simultaneously. Accordingly, a 180.. . manunit was-created to-command- Army operations on the--home front. To relieve overcrowding in the Army Operations Center, a new headquarters was carved out of a basement storeroom under the Pentagon s north mall. Completed in July 1969, at a cost of $2.7 million, this domestic war room was equipped with extensive teletype networks to MI group emergency operations centers throughout the country, situation maps, closed circuit television, hot lines, an illuminated switchboard, and a computerized data processing center. From an unclassified print-out furnished to the Subcommittee by the Department of Defense in January, 1972, it is clear that the Intelligence Branch of the Operations vision of the DCDPO published a computerized survey of recent and expected political protests. The survey included: (a) The specific location of the activity or event. (b) The sponsors (organization and leaders) and number of participants, if known. (c) Narrative remarks describing what transpired (or was expected to transpire). (d) Date of report, source, and (sometimes) an evaluation code. The cover title of this computerized report was "Civil Disturbance Anticipated Activities or Events." The issue of October 15, 1969, was 31 pages long. As the following excerpts show, no demonstration
was too peaceful or legal to be included.
.Wfitlhgs, Part II, 1p. 1730.

92 ThA format of this report is largely self-explanatory. Each "summary brief" is divided to answer four simple questions: A. Where? 1. Who ? C. What.? D. Source? (including date of report and an evaluation of source and information) Most of the source numbers indicate that the reporting unit was a unit of the Intelligence Command: e.g. the 118th MI Group in Colo-

rado or the 108th MI Group inConnecticut. Nothing in this rprint-out suggests that the DCDPO also maintained flies Oi past incidents or the activities of individuals and orglanizations. However, among the "essential elements of information" listed by the Directorate as necessary to its effective operation early in 1969 were the following:"4
distuiqances?

(1) What are the plans, operations, deployment, tactics, techniques, and capnbilitles of individuals, groups, or organizations whose efforts are to create civil (3) What are the reactions of minority groups and dissident elements to the effects of changes In Fe~ieral, state, or municipal laws, court decisions, referendunms, amendments, executive orders, or other directives? (4) What is the composition of the dissident force, e.g. youth, adult, mixed, unemployed laborers, minority group? (5) What primary organizations are connected with the disturbance in support, sympathy, or participation roles? (6) Who are the disturbance leaders of national/local influence and to what degree are they involved in planning, publicizing, organizing or directing? (R) Where are the dissident forces billeted and assembled? (9) What are the targets and objectives of the dissident forces? (11) What weapons/explosives does the dissident force have? Is there an organized sniper element? (12) What communications equipment does the opposing force have?

The language of this list-and the conception of civil disorders underlying it--would seem to make the amassing of personality and organizational data on "minority groups and dissident elements" imperative. Future demonstrators, according to the DCDPO, are not likely to be loyr.l Americans exercising constitutional rights, but "dissident forces" that "billet" and "assemble," carry "weapons" and "explosives," contain "an organized sniper element," and coordinate their assaults on "targets and objectives" with communications equipment." Civil disturbance operations thus will be similar to counterinsurgency warfare (or counterinsurgency war games) 48 in which military units
' "DCDPO Essential Elements of Information (1El)," ca. :anuary 1989, Xerox copy In Subcommittee Yarborough files. '4An Opneral Is said to have instructed his intelligence staff at the start of the Detroit riots:*"men, get out your eounterinsurgency mnanu~is. We have an insurgpecy on our hands." 11earinpo. Part 1, p. 104. Situation maps In the DCDPO used war game colors: blue crayon for, 'friendly forces," red for Negro neighborhoods.'

93
will be the "friendly forces" 49 and demonstrators the "opposhig forces." If this list accurately reflects the thinking of DCDPO personneland there is ever reason to believe that it did-then it would seem reatsonable to conclude that the men who ran the domestic war room kept records not unlike those maintained by their counterparts in the computerized war rooms in Saigon. The •ubcornmittee staff has receive(l no reports that any files at the DCDPO (now DOMS) were destroyed.
Annex 1 (Intelligence) to the DA Civil Disturbance Plan dated Feburary 1008 lists military units as the only "friendly forces" In it civil disturbance situation. Hearings, Part 11, 1).1121.

is

94
X. COMPARISON OF THE DATA BANxKS ANDI) Tim QUESTION, OF CONTROL

In addition to studying the contents of each data bank, we have attempted to compare then to each other in the hope of shedding some light on the question of control. The absence of effective civilian control has been established. By their own admissions, the responsible appointees of the Johnson and Nixon administrations were unaware ot the data banks until after January 1970.10 However, both General Counsel Jordan and Under Secretary Beal have asserted the existence of close military supervision of the Intelligence Command and CIAB by the A.-:;istant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. If so, this supervision should manifest itself in the forni~ of substantial similarities among the data banks. On the other hand, if no central authority effectively coordinated the Army's domestic intelligence operations, that lackc of coordination should be reflected by the existence of substantial dissimilarities among the data hanks. Most of the evidence received hb the Subcommittee on this question indicates the existence of substantial autonomy for units at the lower echelons of Army intelligence. Accordingly, for this study we have chosen to compare the holdings of the nationwide data banks maintained by ClAB3 ITSAINTC. and CONATRC. Because the Army has not made the CIAB index available to us (or to the Justice Dep artment) we have chosen to assume that the contents of the Compendium are indicative of whom CIAB considered sufficiently significant to warrant a place in its archive. To begin the comparison we went through the Permonalities section of the Compendium and selected the names of 60 individuals well-known to the public because of the widespread piblieity given to their activities. We then examined the Fort Tiolabird and Fort Monroe print-outs to see how many of these names appeared thore, and how the information on each compared. The results truly surmised us. Only 84 of the famous 60 app'enared in the Fort -Tolabird nrint-t,ut. Only §7 appeared in the Fort Monroe print-out. Just to double cheek we selected the names of 100 wellkcnown Americans from the CNAIRC computer and searched for them in the Fort,Holabird print-out. We found only 22. Similarly. the CONARO print-out provides space for detailed information on the persons it lists. Yet, for some reason-perhaps it was lack of mnnpower-most of the entries for the 100 prominent persons are surprisingly incomplete. Where the CONARG print-out does contain specific data. such as dates of foreign travel, military service status. or participation in parades. conferences. dr organizations, these focts infrequently appear in either the Compendium or the Fort Tfnlnbird print-ouit. Thus it would soem that each data bank grew independently, with no "close supervision" from a central authority on what to store or not store. Moreover. it appears that nonn of the agencies. paid any attention to the publications or holdings of the others in deciding who or what should be data-banked.
MEg.. stee Ulnrings, Part 1, pp. 202, 206-211. and 462.

95 CONCIUsIoN The foregoing analysis represents but a partial view of the Army's files on civilian political activity. As we have taken care to note throughout the report, our analysis has been limited by the fragmentary nature of our information and by the fact that the Departments of the Army and Defense apparently have not preserved one complete copy of each computer file and publication as promised in the Tatum W case. In addition, the unwillingness of the Defense Department to permit certain intelligence officers to testify has forced us to rely on necessarily vague actually was explanations and descriptions of what Army intelligence second-hand doing. At the same time, the civilian officials with whom we have dealt over the past two years have encountered great difficulty with their own investigations. Often it appeared that our sources knew more about the data banks than theirs did. In some instances they appear to have been lied to; in other instances they appear to have been victims of the art of "plausible denial"--a technique by which intelligence agencies (and others) admit just enough of thle truth to mask an essential falsehood. For example, domestic intelligence specialists in the Office of the. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence denied any knowledge of the Fort Ilolabird biographic data file when its existence was first disclosed in January 1970. Later they "discovered" the CONARC computer after its existence had been revealed in the press. Still later they uncovered computers at III Corps,. USSTRICOM, and the D(IDPO. Yet the documents clearly establish copies of the MacDill and CONARC print-outs ha i been transmitted to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence as early as 1908. Similarly, the "task group" of intelligence analysts assigned by the ACSI to answer civilian and Congressional inquiries worked in the very room which floused the DCDPO's computer. The secrecy which surrounds all military intelligence operations also hampered both Executive Branch and Congressional inquiries. The time it has taken to comprehend the structure and nwdu* operandi of' the Army's intelligence units has cut into our capacity to uncover and examine various files. Similarly, much time has been lost in discusIsions with Defense Department officials concerning what items may and may not be declassfied. Nothing in the Army's own security regulations would appear to Justify the classification of any of the documents we have examined, and nothing the Defense Delpartment has said in correspondence with the Chairman in any way can change the plain meaning of those regulations. The key problem here, as with the surveillance in general, is not security, but privacy. In their concern for protecting the privacy of the government, Defense Department officials have continued to classify documents which inder the regulations are inherently unclassiflable. Fortunately, it has been possible, through heavy editing and careful paraphrasing, to produce substitutes for the original documents that both preserve their signifieance and protect the privacy of individuals. In addition, the lack of time and resources has prevented us from making the same kinds of inquiries of the Navy and Air Force that we have of the Army. There is no question that ONI (now NIS) anc'

96
OSI reports were also stored in data banks substantially similar to those maintained by the Army, but it is unlikely that we will ever see their contents. Most important, unless additional former agents come forward to tell what they know, it is unlikely that we wil1 ever know the extent to which the monitoring and the data banks have been cut back. Shortly after our investigation began key files were classified and short-term agents replaced with career personnel. Personnel regulations were changed to exclude two and three-year volunteers from ser'i-ce as special agents, and current agents were threatened with prosecution ii they talked. As a result, military intelligence has become more of a closed society than at any time in its history. Despite these limitations, however, it, is possible to draw a number of conclusions about the nature and scope of the Army's data 0ollection. First, the files establish that, the monitoring was far more extensive than we had imagined. In all, the Army appears to have had over 850 sej)arIate records centers containing substantial files on civilian political activity. But more striking than the number of offices with records was the size of some of the records centers, Fourth Army headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., for example, reported the equivalent of over 120,000 file cards on "personalities of interest." It seems likely that the subversives file at Fort Holabird contained even more. CIAB in Washington reported that the computerized index to its microfilm archive contained 113,250 references to organizations and 152,000 references to individuals. Making estimates on the basis of such fragmentary evidence is always hazardous. Undoubtedly extensive duplication existed and thousands of files were maintained on dead men. Discounting for these factors, however, one can guess that Army intelligence had reasonably current files on the political activities of at least 100,000 civilians unaffiliated with the armed forces. In addition, of course, the Army could draw upon the security clearance and investigative dossiers of all federal agencies for whatever political and private information they might contain on persons who were, or had once been, affiliated within the federal government. As of December 31, 1970, the Defense Central Index of Investigations alone reported 25 million index cards representing files on individuals and 760,000 cards representing files on organizations and incidents. What separates military intelligence in the United States from its counterparts in totalitarian states. then, is not its capabilities, but its inten-

tions. This is a significant distinction but one which may not wholly reassure many Amerie.ans who rely oni a government of laws and not of the inte.ntions of men, no matter how honorable. A second lesson learned from examination of these flies is that Army intelligence was not just reconnoitering cities for bivouac sites, approach routes and Black Panther arsenals. It was collecting, disseminating, and storing amounts of data on the private and personal affairs of law-abiding citizens. Comments about the financial affairs, sex lives, and psychiatry, histories of persons unaffiliated with the armed i forces appear throughout the various records systems.

about politicaqly active groups and individuals. As Secretary Froehlke

intelligence was using a variety of covert, means to gather information

Third, the files confirm the testimony of former agents that Army

97 noted in his testimony before the Subcommittee, much of the infbrmation called for in the collection plans could not be collected in any other way. I ourth, at least two of the Army's data banks, those of Intelligence Command and- of CONARC, had the capacity for cross-reference among organizational, incident and personality files. Without documentation, we cannot know the purpose of such capabilities, or even! whether the programmers were simply providing for an unknownfuture contingency. Whatever the intention of Intelligence Command' or of CONA C, their system had the technical capacity to produce. correlations among persons, organizations and activities on the basis: of frequently incomplete or inaccurate information, Fifth, the size of the files confirms other reports that the swuroillance dates back not to the Newark and Detroit riots of 1007, but to the reestablishment of Arny counterintelligence on the eve of the Second World War. These other reports include letters from persons who served in military intelligence in the 1950's, an internal Army history of domestic intelligence activities from 1917 to the present, ahd an inventory of the Van Deman files supplied to the Subcommittee by a former intelligence analyst. Sixth, the files examiMed by the staff confirm the view, advanced by Defense and Army officials at the hearings and in correspondence, that the surveillance was substantially beyond the Army's civil disturbance or military security missions' 'Tho files, with few exceptions, bear no demonstrable relationship to real military needs. From the point of view of efficiency and economy alone, there was no reason for their existence. Finally, the major impression from our long study of these files is their utter uselessness. The collection of this information, and its attendant infringement on the constitutional rights and privacy of American citizens, has sometimes been justified on the grounds of necessity,

chiefly that of public safety. Yet, it appears that the vacuum-cleaner approach of collecting all possible information resulted in great masses of dhttat on individuals which was valuable for no legitimate (or even illegitimate) military purpose. These vast collections of fragmentary, incorrect, and irrelevant information-composed of vague conclusions and judgments and of overly detailed descriptions of insignificant facts--could not be consi(lered "intelligence" by any sense of the word. Thlev reflect an unfortunate tendency within the government to react to the prol~lem of civil disturbances by conducting widespread and

indiscriminate and duplicative sumrveillance. The result is a reat col-

hamlpers the ability of responsible officials to make intelligent decisions.

lection of information which gives the illusion of knowledge, Fut, which

I'lnfortlunltelv, it appears that the Army intelligence, uncertain of its stateside mis.ion. took refuge in surveillance and do05ier-building, and thereby deluded itself into thinking it was "doing something." In fact, it. was merely wasting time, money and manpower, and infringing on scope of the Army's domestic intelligence operations can be controlled so as to guarantee that such unnecessary and wasteful data gathering which endangers civilian control of the military, individual rights and personal privacy will not reoceur when the present concern over military surveillane subsides.

the rights of the citizens it was supposed to he safeguarding. The practical question which remains to be considered is how the

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