I've reactivated the debate, now that my distinguished opponent, Nur-Ab-Sal is finished with his debate.

I've got a couple of simple rules, though I doubt they're very necessary:

1. No trolling
2. No overt insults (keep any contempt for the opponent's side limited to covert insinuations)
3. For the voters, in the event of a forfeiture by either party, no default votes (and no 'votebombing')

That much said, I'd like to welcome and wish well my opponent, and hope that this debate is enjoyable to both parties, and the audience.

I’d like to thank Torvald for his debate challenge. I’d also like to note that the burden of proof is on me, Con, to demonstrate that there is good reason to think God exists. Before I begin, I’ll define God as a divine Creator with the general Judeo-Christian attributes (i.e. omniscience, omnipotence, etc.) but not any specific deity with an exclusive religious affiliation.

Introduction

In my opening round, I’ll provide two arguments for God’s existence. The first argument, the kalām cosmological argument, seeks to prove a divine Creator of the cosmos, and the second, the modal ontological argument, adds to this Creator the general Judeo-Christian attributes while simultaneously explaining his existence through necessity.

Kalām Cosmological Argument

I’ll use the famous version of the KCA popularised by Dr. William Lane Craig. [1]

1. Everything which begins to exist has a cause

2. The Universe began to exist

3. The Universe has a cause

P1 is basically a corollary of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) attributed to Leibniz. The PSR explains that “for every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation for why x exists.” There are two possible explanations for any existing entity: it either exists in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. Thus we must distinguish between a necessary and contingent entity. Now recall that P1 states whatever begins to exist has a cause. For an entity to begin to exist, it is contingent, meaning it could have failed to exist – otherwise, if it could not have failed to exist, we’d label it as necessary. Thus because something beginning to exist is contingent, and because contingency requires an external cause, everything which begins to exist has a cause.

Now take a look at P2. A Universe which does not begin to exist implies a past-eternal Universe, meaning there are an actually infinite number of past events. The problem is that an actual infinity is impossible in nature. For instance, consider Hilbert’s Hotel. A hotel exists with an actually infinite number of rooms, and all of these rooms are occupied. Now suppose that a guest asks for a room. Although the entire hotel is occupied, the manager proceeds to move the guest in room 1 to room 2, room 2 to room 3,…, room n to room n+1, emptying a room for the guest. But whasn’t the hotel already fully occupied? [2] This situation is absurd, and shows that an actual infinity presents too many logical incoherencies to be possible in a Universe which operates on logic. Thus a past-eternal Universe is impossible, and thus the Universe had a finite beginning.

From P1 and P2, the conclusion follows. Let’s now analyze the necessary properties of such a cause. Because the cause transcends all of spacetime reality, it must be nonspatiotemporal. The only candidates that fit this critera are abstract mathematical entities, such as numbers, or an unembodied mind, as neither require spacetime to exist. Because numbers and sets don’t exert causal influence, we can deduce the cause must be a nonspatiotemporal mind. The mind must also have caused the Universe out of free-will, for if the mind necessarily caused the Universe in the same way freezing temperature water necessarily causes ice, then the Universe would once again be past-eternal – we’ve however seen that’s absurd. Thus, an unimaginably powerful transcendent mind willed the Universe into being. The next argument will extend the PSR to this Creator.

Modal Ontological Argument

I’ll use a condensed version of the modal ontological argument as put forth by Alvin Plantinga. [3]

1. If a maximally great being possibly exists, a maximally great being exists.

2. A maximally great being possibly exists.

3. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

This argument is easy to misinterpret, so it’s important an explanation is given of each of the premises. P1 is affirmed by considering how we define a “maximally great being” (MGB). An MGB is one who embodies all great-making properties (i.e., power, knowledge, love) and to their maximal extent (i.e., omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence). As stated earlier, there are two modes of possibility – contingency and necessity. Because necessity is greater than contingency (existing in all possible worlds rather than some possible worlds), an MGB must embody necessity. Thus, P1 is affirmed by an MGB’s property of necessity – if it possibly necessarily exists, it necessarily exists (axiom S5 of modal logic). If the MGB necessarily exists, it exists in our own world as well. This conditional statement is relatively uncontroversial among philosophers.

As for P2, for an MGB to be possible, there must be no logical contradictions in its nature. We see that omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence, etc., present no logical inconsistencies; therefore, an MGB is at least possible.

The conclusion that a maximally great being exists follows logically from P1 and P2. Recall that the PSR requires an explanation for the existence any given entity, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. God is no exception to this rule – and we see that he satisfies the first possible explanation, necessity, through the modal ontological argument.

Conclusion

With the kalām cosmological argument, I demonstrated that anything which exists contingently requires an external cause through the PSR. Next, I demonstrated that the Universe began to exist; and thus could have failed to exist, meaning it was contingent. I concluded with an analysis of the external cause of the Universe, showing that it must have been a personal nonspatiotemporal mind. Next, with the modal ontological argument, I showed that this divine Creator has all great-making properties to their maximal extent, including necessity over contingency, and thus must exist in the actual world. These two arguments build a cumulative case for God’s existence – the first shows the necessity of a Creator given the Universe while the second not only reaffirms God’s existence but explains the Creator’s existence through the property of necessity.

The resolution has been affirmed. I won’t introduce any new arguments in the final round, but I may or may not introduce new arguments until then, especially to demonstrate the unlikelihood of atheism.

Kalam Cosmological ArgumentI've responded to the Kalam argument before. I will not argue with your first syllogism. That the universe had to have had a cause is completely logical, and is supported by M-Theory. That cause can be explained by logic and science, rather than the supernatural. I am not claiming that the universe has an infinite past. You raise a highly interesting field of logic in your next syllogism. However, I think it would do well if you could explain it in terms and progressions slightly less confusing (your explanation was somewhat cryptic and difficult to understand). It feels as if you're just talking for the sake of saying something, but not really getting much of anywhere. I'm sure, of course, that this is not the case, and that I'm simply not focusing hard enough, but please, humor me.

Logical AbsenceMy opponent has made his case, so I will now make one of my own, in my own words and my own logic. What I have to say is really quite brief, so I'll get right to it:

P1: Science has a rational explanation for the source of the universe.P2: Science can explain, with supporting evidence, this rational explanation, without the necessity of magic.P3: The concept of the divine cannot explain the source of the universe without magic and illogical, non-supported claims.C: Science is more probably accurate.

Modern science, while certainly not able to answer every question, has used the evidence and information available to try to explain the more difficult questions (rather than using the inexplicable to explain what is already known). The current school of thought, as you know, as to the origins of the universe is the Big Bang Theory. Contrary to popular belief resulting from religious propaganda, the Big Bang is not supposed to have been a random explosion, occurring in the presence of nothingness, that created the universe. The formation of a universe is, in fact, believed to be function of a larger body, called the 'multiverse,' which, hypothetically, is a large, potentially infinite collection of parallel universes, all existing within a matterless void. Such a thing is supposedly wrought with tiny 'bubbles,' called quantum microsingularities. Such singularities are everywhere, throughout everything. It has been hypothesized that the expansion of one to critical volume or mass, size, so to speak, would cause a hyperinflation, resulting in a massive release of energy, creating a universe. Of course, this is all hypothesis and conjecture, full of gaps and suppositions. However, it is no more illogical than the concept of a cosmic being that somehow inspired the universe to exist. I would think, if a scientific explanation of the origin of the universe can be devised, a supernatural one is simply illogical and unnecessary, especially given the lack of evidence supporting such a Creator (unless one takes the existence of the universe as said evidence).

As my opponent has said, the burden of proof is indeed on him. I therefore will elect to say little else, because A) It's polite, B) I like letting the opponent say more than I do, and C) I don't actually have anything else to say, at the moment. It must, of course, be understood that in such matters, no real conclusion may be reached, since it is a soft subject, with no definite proof for either side. This makes the entire debate rest on which school of logic argues more favorably. It seems to me that the very good structure of my opponent's argument calls for a tie at the least, if not a win on his part. Well played sir, and I now leave the floor to you.

Surprisingly, my opponent states that he “will not argue with [my] first syllogism.” My opponent states that the mandate for a cause is logical, and he declares that theoretical physics, such as M-theory, supports such a proposition. However, he then states that such a cause is “explained by logic and science, rather than the supernatural.” This rebuttal fails for multiple reasons.

First, when I say Universe, and perhaps I should have clarified this, I am referring to all of spacetime reality, meaning I’m also referring to any sort of oscillating multiverse that some theories posit. P2 would apply to any sort of theoretical multiverse model; and because P1 is a metaphysical truth, P3 follows for all of spacetime reality. The soundness of the KCA mandates a nonspatiotemporal cause. Any cause within spacetime merely misses the point and only moves the question to the cause of that cause. Thus, if my opponent is referring to a spatiotemporal entity that caused the Universe, he simply begs the question as to what caused that.

Second, given that my opponent agrees my syllogism to be true, it seems logical to assume my analysis of the conclusion to be true. I’ve already explained that I’m referring to all of spacetime reality (“nature”) when I discuss the Universe, so the cause of nature must necessarily be supernatural. I’ll repeat that my analysis revealed the cause of the Universe to be an uncaused, nonspatiotemporal, unimaginably powerful mind with free-will.

Modal Ontological Argument

As stated in the comments, my wording here was also confusing, and I sincerely apologize – my opponent states he “think[s] it would do well if [I] could explain it in terms and progressions slightly less confusing.” Consequently, I’ll clarify the premises behind the modal ontological argument.

First, let’s examine what modality is. In modal logic, some proposition can be either impossible or possible. Then, if that proposition is possible, it can be either contingent or necessary. Let’s examine contingency and necessity. For this explanation, I’ll use what’s called “possible world semantics,” which is a way of talking about modal logic that facilitates its comprehension. Here, a possible world doesn’t refer to a concrete physical entity, just a hypothetical situtation. In possible world semantics, a proposition is contingent if it is true in some possible worlds. For example, I am contingent as I could have possibily never existed, just as my microwave oven could have possibly never existed. Moreover, my microwave oven could be not as obnoxious in some possible world. A proposition is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. For example, mathematics and logic necessarily exist. 1 + 1 = 2 is true in all possible worlds. Thus we must make the distinction between contingency and necessity for any given propostion.

Let’s now discuss this within the context of the modal ontological argument. Within this argument, God is defined as a “maximally great being,” meaning He embodies all great-making properties to their maximal extent (i.e. omnipotence, omniscience), etc. This means that God, in His maximal excellence, embodies necessity over contingency, because being true in all possible worlds is greater than being true in some possible worlds. Thus God is necessary. If God is necessary, then he exists in all possible worlds. If God exists in all possible worlds, he exists in the actual world. This last bit follows logically from axiom S5 of modal logic: if possibly necessarily God exists, then necessarily God exists.

Now within the context of my larger argument, I used the MOA to apply to God the usual Judeo-Christian attributes because such a being must exist. I also used this argument to apply the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God, in that he is necessary in his own nature.

Logical Absence

Although not necessary, my opponent has made a case of his own. His argument roughly states that science rationally explains the beginning of the Universe without supernatural phenomena, and thus should be accepted over a supernatural explanation. This argument fails for multiple reasons: (1) it is not logically valid, (2) premise 1 and premise 2 are false, and (3) premise 3 is false. Basically, all of the premises are false; and, even if they were true, it would not follow logically to its conclusion.

Logical validity

First, my opponent’s argument is not logically valid. He derives that science is “probably more accurate” than a divine explanation. However, he pulls this probability out of thin air, as he does not mention probability anywhere in his premises or his explanation. Thus, the premises do not follow to their conclusion even if we assume his argument is inductive rather than deductive. Second, my opponent’s argument commits the false dichotomy fallacy, as he basically supposes that a divine explanation and a scientific explanation are mutually exclusive without substantiating this point. The truth of the matter is that science is constrained to spatiotemporal reality, and religious explanations are not. I’ll discuss this further in 2 and 3.

Premise 1 and 2

My opponent’s first premise is “science has a rational explanation for the source of the universe,” and his second is “science can explain, with supporting evidence, this rational explanation, without the necessity of magic.”

First, science has no explanation for the source of the Universe – if we’re discussing the Big Bang model for the beginning of our Universe, then it merely describes the inflation of an infinitely dense singularity into the cosmos. Science does not provide a sufficient reason for the existence of this singularity; indeed, the Universe could not possibly exist necessarily – it had a beginning, the fundamental particles are not necessary, no composite entity is necessary, and we can imagine the fundamental particles in a different arrangement with no apparent logical contradiction. [1] Thus, the Universe is not necessary, and requires an external cause which is beyond empirical constraints. If we’re discussing the multiverse, then as it too would require a beginning due to the absurdity of an actual infinity, then you can just move my entire explanation to this same realm. Science has no rational explanation for the source of the Universe, no matter if we’re discussing our Universe, the multiverse, or all of spacetime reality.

Second, if science did have an explanation that didn’t lead to an absurd infinite regress of causes, it would mandate an uncaused first cause. Since science can only empirically test nature, it would literally require whatever this is to appear out of nothing – which is literally “worse than magic,” as Dr. Craig is so fond of saying. Once again, science can only test nature, and because nature requires an explanation, science cannot explain the source of the Universe.

Premise 3

My opponent’s third premise states, “The concept of the divine cannot explain the source of the universe without magic and illogical, non-supported claims.”

I’ve already given very good reasons to believe in the divine. All of my premises have been supported, and each of my syllogisms follow to their conclusions. Thus, I have given good reasons to believe in a supernatural cause of the Universe. Similarly, science cannot explain the source of the Universe as it is by definition beyond the empirical limits of science.

Unless my opponent can define “magic,” this is just a loaded word. I’ve proven that a divine Creator fashioned the Universe ex nihilo, and if my opponent wants to call this magic, fine.

My opponent ends his round 2 response with “it seems to me that the very good structure of my opponent's argument calls for a tie at the least, if not a win on his part,” and because of his humility I must ask voters to give my opponent conduct.

Kalam Cosmological ArgumentWhen my opponent says 'Universe,' I apologize for misinterpreting his meaning. I feel obligated, however, to point out that, hypothetically speaking of course, time likely would not exist outside of a universe, in the void within the multiverse. It would be forceless space, and from the human perspective, very unreal.

I agree with most of my opponent's references to the Kalam Argument, however, I disagree on one issue: his conclusion about the Cause. He concludes that the lack of ultimate explanation (for, while there is a partial explanation for the existence of individual universes, the explanation for the multiverse is yet totally absent), the Cause must be supernatural. I would contest that this is due to our lack of information; in ancient times, similar debates were held about the shape of Earth, and the smooth win most frequently went to the view that Earth was flat. Such a conclusion was the result of lacking information. Science of the time simply could not answer the questions at hand, so the people devised alternate solutions (this is, in fact, the origination of religion). Numerous 'scientific' and philosophical fiascoes have ensued because of such conclusions, beliefs that rats and maggots grew from rotting meat and trash, that fire was caused by phlogiston, that Earth was flat, and encased by 'celestial spheres,' that stars were gods, etc. It was hasty at those times, for the great thinkers to turn to such extravagant and supernatural solutions to their musings, and I suggest that it is now as well.

Modal Ontological ArgumentThank you for the explanation. If my understanding is correct, it is much like the logic used in basic programming, with a progression of basic yeses and nos. If I further understand correctly, contingent refers to a state in question, and necessary refers to a control, or invariable asset. How am I doing so far?

If I understand your explanation properly, you have just made an absolutely sublime case, which I cannot possibly refute. I would be wasting both of our time, and that of the audience, were I to flounder around in an attempt to dispute what you have said.

Logical AbsenceI will not argue that the picture of the universe and its origins which science offers is far from complete. That the universe is not necessary is another point which cannot be argued. That science's explanation is incomplete does not make it irrational.

Choice of the LikelierAt this point, we have gotten to more or less an impass: science reaches a point of incompletion that dissolves into speculation and guesswork, short even of hypothesis, which is the very quality that gives the argument of the divine an unlikely consideration. Neither side can do more than trade tit for tat now, and that would be an abominable regression from civilization. I posit, therefore, that the choice between the reality or unreality of 'God' is solely up to personal preference and opinion, which can hardly be disputed with reason. I further suggest that I am not qualified to continue this debate on the level to which my opponent, Nur-Ab-Sal, has taken it, whether the topic might hold its own in another's hands or not. That much said, I have only two further things to say:

A. While it seems to be no significant inconvenience to me, I feel I should protest the Con's 'phone-a-friend' approach to aspects with which he is not well-versed; I have tried to carry out my part of the debate solely on my own merit, and I think the bequest of advice or assistance should be avoided, though, since it was not addressed in the rules, it is acceptable.

B. A lovely debate it certainly has been, though I fear there are rapidly fewer points for my opponent to bring up that I can competently address, and rapidly fewer points that I could bring up that my opponent could not defenestrate. I thus turn the floor over to the Con, be it as of the steps of his victory.

I’d like to thank Torvald once again for his contribution. I’d also like to state that I received help before Torvald even posted his response to my argument, and it was completely unrelated to the debate. I just wanted to give him credit for teaching me relevant material. That said, Torvald and I have resolved the issue in a PM.

Kalām Cosmological Argument

My opponent states that “time likely would not exist outside of a universe, in the void within the multiverse.” My opponent fails to provide a source for this claim. Besides, the term “multiverse” is so ambiguous it could mean a host of things, such as the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, or the oscillatory model of the “Big Crunch.” Both, I might add, require time to operate. Even if my opponent’s statement was true, and time is not needed in the multiverse, one still needs to apply the PSR to this multiverse, and ask for an explanation of its existence. I’ve already explained it could not be necessary, and therefore requires an external cause. Whether or not the multiverse is temporal or atemporal is trivial.

My opponent next states that I’ve concluded the cause must be supernatural because of the lack of ultimate explanation. On the contrary, even in my round 1 response, I logically analyzed the properties such a cause must have in order to create all of spacetime reality. I’ll repeat that because the cause transcends time, it must be nonspatiotemporal, which, by ruling abstract mathematical entities out, could only be an unembodied mind. Unless my opponent can dispute my analysis, this explanation for the external cause of the Universe stands.

I’ve nowhere argued that simply because science lacks an ultimate explanation, we must resort to the divine. I’ve argued that the cause of the Universe (“nature” in this sense of the word) must necessarily be supernatural. Science can only empirically study nature, so if there were a cause of nature, as my opponent seemingly does not dispute, science could not even begin to discuss it. Once again: science can only test nature, and since the cause of nature is necessarily beyond nature, science cannot test it. What follows is a discussion of primitive belief systems and the characteristic of early science to resort to the divine, most of which is an exercise of the genetic fallacy: why we hold a belief does nothing to show that belief is wrong. [1]

Modal Ontological Argument

My opponent concedes this point, and thus implicitly concedes the existence of a maximally great being. This alone, nevermind dispute over the KCA, should prove my case. My opponent at the very least recognises this. I hope by the end of this debate I have caused him to rethink his views on theism.

(We’ll discuss logic further in a PM).

Logical Absence

My opponent states, “that science's explanation is incomplete does not make it irrational,” and I completely agree. I’ve nowhere stated that science is irrational. In fact, science’s incomplete view of the Universe is irrelevant to my case: the cause of the Universe is necessarily outside the scope of science’s study.

I have nothing to rebut in his next paragraph, as he explicitly acknowledges the superiority of my argument over his. I’d like to remind my opponent that I’m not arguing that because science has an incomplete view of the Universe, we must resort to a supernatural explanation. I am saying that because science can only test nature, as science can only test what is empirically testable, and because we are discussing the Universe’s explanation, science cannot even hypothetically address the issue. Once again, what caused nature is supernatural, and science cannot test the supernatural. So if one concedes nature has an external cause, one concedes it’s beyond the testability of the sciences.

I’d like to once again thank my opponent for his contribution to the debate. I have plenty of room left, but as you can see we are shortening our responses with every round. That said, I’d ask my opponent to stick with the debate, as this could be a learning experience if he encounters these arguments in the future.

I know that this will be a sore disappointment to anyone watching or participating, and I offer my humblest apologies to Nur-Ab-Sal, but I do not think I will be able to participate further in the debate. I find myself greatly outmatched. I am simply no match for the Con. I concede the debate.

BigKids 12:24--Simply dismissing the probability of a god by saying "I dont believe anything I cant see", is as inadequete and lazy of a response as the ever popular "god did it", simply because you cant see sub atomic particles, they are right in front of your face until the day you pass on. Science cannot prove or disprove the reason for everything is a slave supporting sexist who rested on the 7th day, or flying horses called unicorns and leprechauns with a pot of gold at the end of rainbows, these are what science call statistical improbabilities :)

GAMEOVER 10:26--The Theory of Evolution is just like the Theory of Gravity, testable, repeatable, falsifiable, and fits known empirical evidence. Advocating intellectual honesty, is the single most corrosive thing for religious dogma :)

DevientGenie 11:56--Lets look at some basic differences. Cristian Leaders Institute-- "We use the term home discipleship to accent the point that when the home is strong and supported in walking with god, the church prospers". Science-- We use the term empirical to accent the point that when evidence is strong, and supported by years of testing, mankind prospers :)

QUESTIONS 7:6--Why is it that people who think Elvis or Tupac are alive, we consider delusional, yet people who think that the reason for everything can convict you of thought crimes, those people somehow posess moral excellence? :)

CaptainObvious 2:3--Science cannot prove or disprove a slave supporting sexist who is admittingly jealous and can convict you of thought crimes, anymore than science can prove leprechauns at the end of rainbows. Those things seems a bit far fetched for a thinking person and are therefore called statistical improbabilities amongst not only the most brilliant minds of today, but a growing number of people everywhere :)

LOVE 8:14--What does a stalker do, that the main character in the holy binky does?....They put you on a pedestal, but then once they're rejected, its anger, and rage

Thus far, you've provided a thought experiment that proves a correlation between the mind and brain. You haven't even begun to show that they're ontologically identical. Please explain how qualia are material.

dude im saying that the brain and mind are the same thing the mind is not a seperate entity which is why such changes happen not because there is a correltion but because they are the same thing. the brain is still not fully understood just because they have not yet found how it works doesnt mean somthign else is influencing our personalities

Because as I have said multiple times that physical effects of the brain on the mind show a CORRELATION between the two. It would be ridiculous to state that the brain has no relationship to the mind" this does not, however, prove that the brain and mind are ontologically equivalent, nor does it prove that the mind can be reduced to matter. Qualia and such are immaterial.

When some people get parasites their entire personality changes but again your still saying that the mind is not the brain but if its not tell me how does having a parasite change ones personality if the mind is not the same as the brain?

Reasons for voting decision: conduct to Con because Pro conceded at end.
S&G Tie.
Arguments to Con because Pro conceded at end.
Sources to Con for having slightly better sources for a internet debate (I like using stuff from just a real book on my own shelf too, but you got to give something a voter can actually click on I think)

Reasons for voting decision: Sources to Con because he had better sources. Arguments because Pro conceded. Edit: Shifted Conduct to Pro, who deserves it for honorable behavior. At the time I originally voted, I was annoyed at all the noobs giving him equal points.