The New Middle East

Saturday, September 23, 2017

Iraqi Kurds celebrate the coming referendum for an independent Kurdish state

This coming September 25th, the Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) will hold a referendum asking Iraq’s Kurds whether
they want to leave the Republic of Iraq and form an independent nation-state. If
successful, and the KRG secedes from Iraq, will the referendum serve Kurdish desires
for national self-determination? Will it give Iraq’s Kurds greater control over
their political, cultural and economic destiny?

Or would secession from Iraq instead solidify
authoritarian rule in the KRG and harm the Kurds economic and strategic
interests? These questions require careful analysis given the referendum’s implications,
not only for Iraq’s Kurds, but for the stability of Iraq and the eastern MENA region.

Distribution of Kurdish populations in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

As they rightly argue, the Kurds are the largest ethnic
group in the world which lacks its own nation-state. Beginning with Declaration of Independence by
the United States in 1776, and further elaborated as the 19th
century progressed, the concept of national self-determination became a
cardinal principle of international law, to be later embodied in the 1945 United
Nations Charter.

Ballot urging a "Yes" vote on the
the September 25 referendum

Kurds argue that having a nation-state does not reflect
an abstract desire, but represents a question of self-preservation. The historical
record clearly demonstrates that the Kurds have been treated in a despicable
manner in all 4 countries of the MENA region in which they live.

Saddam Husayn’s notorious ANFAL campaign, including
the dropping of chemical weapons on Kurdish residents of the city of Halabja in
March 1988, led to the destruction of hundreds of Kurdish towns and villages,
the elimination of Kurdish agriculture, and the deaths of thousands of men,
between the ages of 15 and 55, not to speak of the inhabitants of Halabja.

Image from the town of Halabja after it was bombed at Saddam Husayn's
orders with chemical weapons in March 1988

The Turkish government has also suppressed Kurdish
rights, including prohibiting the use of the Kurdish language, referring to Kurds
as “mountain Turks,” and refusing to invest in Kurdish populated areas in
eastern Turkey. The refusal to invest state funds in Kurdish areas has deprived
Turkey’s Kurdish minority of economic development, schools and employment
opportunities.

Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad

Syria’s frequent seizure of Kurdish lands in the
country’s northeast was often accompanied by the withdrawal of Syrian
citizenship, and the arrest and torture of Kurds who protested the policies of
the Bacthist regime in Damascus. Syria’s Kurds were deprived of
government services and, like Kurds in neighboring Turkey, prevented from
engaging in cultural expression. In effect, they were not recognized as Syrian
citizens. (See my earlier post: "The Rojava Kurds: A Model for the Contemporary Middle East? https://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2017/06/the-rojava-kurds-model-for-contemporary.html).

Iran’s suppression of Kurdish rights began with the
destruction of the only Kurdish nation-state, the short-lived Mahabad Republic
(Kurdish: کۆماری
مەھاباد‎ Komara Mehabadê; Persian: جمهوری مهاباد‎‎) of May-June 1947. The leader of the fledgling state, Gazi
Muhammad, a respected member of a local clerical family, was arrested, tried
and hung.

The continued jailing and killing of Kurdish
activists, both under the Shah’s regime and the Islamic Republic, and the refusal
to invest state funds in Kurdish areas of the north-west, constitute a record
of Iranian state’s authoritarianism, economic and cultural marginalization, and
physical elimination towards its Kurdish citizens. Given this history, why wouldn’t Kurds want their
own nation-state?

However, will the September 25 referendum give Kurds
the right to self-determination? Will it
offer them a better life? The answer is
most likely not. First and foremost,
Kurds and the international community should be asking, why is the referendum
being held at this point in time? Did
the KRG leadership schedule it to help Iraq’s Kurds or are there other
motivations at work? Unfortunately, if
the referendum is successful and the KRG withdraws from Iraq, we can expect political
and economic conditions to worsen in the new Kurdish nation-state.

Democracy and political development
Would an independent Kurdish state create a more democratic political system
for Iraq’s Kurds? Unfortunately, the
answer is no. KRG President Masoud Barzani fits the all too prevalent model of
political rule in the MENA region: authoritarianism
mixed with rampant corruption and nepotism.

KRG President Masoud Barzani
standing next to Iraq & KRG flags

An independent Kurdish state in Iraq would only
strengthen Barzani’s rule in the KRG Parliament and he has already flouted KRG
laws by remaining as president, despite his term having expired 2 years ago. The
Referendum will do nothing to address the demands of young Kurds, expressed for
example in the formation of the Gorran (Change) Party, which demand that the
KRG become more transparent in its political and economic decision-making.

Relations between the KDP and PUK
As is already clear, the declaration of an independent Kurdish state will not
solve the ongoing tension between the two dominant political parties in the
KRG, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), controlled by the Barzani family and its
extended clan, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled by the
Talabani family. Both parties still have
separate militias (Pesh Merga units) and control their own economic and legal
institutions.

Because an independent Kurdistan would create new
power vacuums, there is a high probability that a successful referendum would
foster internal Kurdish divisions, as well as conflict with ethnic groups
living under Kurdish rule. As an example, the governor of Kirkuk, Najmaldin
Karim, who is nominally a member of the PUK, is supporting the referendum which
will be of greater benefit to Masoud Barzani and the KDP than the PDK. After having initially promoted reconciliation
between Kirkuk’s multiple ethnic groups – Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians,
Karim has ruling in an increasingly sectarian, asserting the rights of the
city’s Kurdish population over other ethnic groups.

Domestic political and economic impact
One of the most important consequences of the KRG referendum if it leads to an
independent state has received little attention. The current president of the Republic of Iraq
is a Kurd, Fuad Masum, who was overwhelming elected by the Chamber of Deputies
(national parliament) in 2014 to succeed Iraq’s previous president, Jalal
Talabani, also a Kurd.

Former Iraqi Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari

Kurds have consistently occupied positions of power
in the Federal Government in Baghdad since the overthrow of Saddam Husayn and
the Bacth Party regime in 2003.
Other Kurds, such as Hoshayr Zebari, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and Barham Salih who served as a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning,
have wielded significant influence in the Federal Government in Baghdad.

Former Iraq Deputy Prime Minister &
KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih

A Kurd, General Babakir Shawkat Zebari, was appointed
Chief of Staff of Iraq’s Armed Forces, serving in that position from 2003-2015.
Many Kurdish delegates serve in the
Chamber of Deputies (national parliament) and Federal Government Ministries.

Iraq's Chief-of-Staff, Babakir Zebari ,meets General Maritn Dempsey

Declaring independence will rupture these positions
of influence in Baghdad and weaken lines of communications between the central
government and Arbil. The new Kurdish
state would be unable to benefit from oil revenues generated throughout Iraq,
only in the more limited areas under its control. Because it is highly doubtful that it could forcibly
integrate the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into the new state, it would lose those
oil revenues as well. Further, it would
face problems transporting oil through pipelines which crossed the territory of
Iraq.

With the serious economic problems which continue to
face the KRG, most importantly the decline in global oil prices and extensive
political corruption, the new Kurdish state would have less access to
international; lenders and credit markets than if it remained within the
Federal Republic of Iraq. With no
appreciable agrarian sector, a result of Saddam’s genocidal ANFAL campaign, the
new Kurdish state will be very much dependent on food imports.

Human resources
With Arab Iraq, Turkey and Iran having made clear their strong opposition to
the upcoming independence referendum, the new Kurdish state will not only be
landlocked, but it’s likely that its neighbors would prevent their citizens
from accepting employment there. This would present a special problem in light
of the KRG’s need for a wide variety professional expertise, ranging from civil
engineers, and computer scientists, to economists and management specialists,
to oil industry professionals.

The KRG’s universities, which all too frequently
give preference to applicants with ties to the KDP and PUK rather than students
with strong academic records, are not producing the level of professional and
technical expertise which is needed to develop the Kurdish economy,
infrastructure, government institutions, and generate meaningful economic
growth. While Western personnel might fill (at a much higher cost) this
deficiency, the new Kurdish state would be cutting itself off from access to
critically needed human resources.

Regional opposition
The strident rhetoric emanating from Turkey and Iran do not bode well for the
Iraqi Kurds declaring an independent state.
Both Turkey and Iran fear the “halo effect” of the Kurds in Iraq declaring
an independent state. Kurds in both Turkey and Iran are restive in the face of
central governments who have done nothing to offer them a place in Turkish or
Iranian political life and society.

Tanks of the Turkish Army on manuevers along Iraq-KRG border this past week

Indeed, this past week, Turkey has been conducting
extensive military maneuvers along the Turkish-KRG (Iraq) border. Meanwhile, clashes between PKK militants
along the Turkish KRG border, and those between PJAK forces and the Iranian
Army along the KRG-Iran border, could escalate if the declaration of
independence moves forward.

International opposition Certainly, the KRG should be concerned that
its main allies, the United States and the European Union, have both come out
against the referendum. Long time US diplomat
in Iraq and Trump administration point man on
Iraq, Brett McGurk, called the referendum, “a very risky process,” with,
“no prospect for international legitimacy,” https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/world/middleeast/iraqi-kurds-independence-vote.html?_r=0
. United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, likewise
opposes the referendum, saying that it will undermine the joint effort to
defeat the so-called Islamic State.

Out-migration of the Kurdish educated
classes While supportive of the idea of a Kurdish
nation-state, large numbers of educated Kurds argue that the KRG has yet to
develop the democratic infrastructure which would allow the referendum to be a
meaningful exercise.

This point assumes greater salience if we consider
the expectations which the referendum has raised among many Kurds, especially
those who are educated. If corruption is not addressed and the economy doesn’t
improve (and I know university faculty who haven’t received their salaries for
going on 2 years), highly educated and skilled Kurdish youth will leave the new
state for other parts of the MENA region, Europe, North America, Australia and
East Asia. As of now, there is no reason
to believe that an independent Kurdish state in Iraq would become truly
democratic or offer meaningful economic opportunities.

Fighting the Dacish There is every reason to believe that the
referendum will undermine the struggle against terrorism, particularly the Dacish
or so-called Islamic State. The
suspicion which already exists between KRG Pesh Merga and the Iraqi Army will
be amplified and cooperation in the struggle to defeat the Dacish will be
compromised.

Possible solutions I have no doubt that there will be a Kurdish
state in the future. And it is highly probable that it will stretch across an
area larger than the current KRG. If
establishing a Kurdish state in Iraq is not a wise idea at the moment, are
there alternative solutions to the current situation, even if temporary?

I would suggest that Kurds might begin by looking at
the reconciliation which was achieved between French and English speaking
Canadians. Ever since the defeat of the
French in North America during the French and Indian War (1754-63), tensions have
existed between the two communities. Concentrated in the east-central province
of Quebec, the Quebecois have bristled at what they consider English speaking
Canada’s cultural condescension and failure to assist them in benefiting from
the country’s economic progress.

The Parti Québécois has advocated for an independent
Quebec for many years and referenda were held in 1980 and 1985. Each was defeated, although the 1985
referendum only by a narrow margin. In
2006, the Canadian parliament - 265 to 16 - declared that the Québécois were “a nation within
a united Canada.” Today, the province’s official language is French.

"Made in Quybec"

Unlike the Kurdish economy, Quebec’s economy is highly diversified.
Economic reasons were one reason the Québécois chose not to secede from Canada
as many saw secession as delivering a serious blow to the province’s economy. Quebec’s
economy has thrived through remaining part of the Canadian Federation.

At the same time, the Federal Government in Ottawa has taken Quebec’s
culture seriously. Considerable funds are spent protecting and preserving its
French heritage. All official signs
throughout Canada, and not just in French speaking areas, are in English and
French. French speaking university students, who study outside Quebec, can submit
examinations and research papers to be evaluated in French.

If the Federal Government in Iraq would demonstrate the same type of
respect for Kurdish culture, would that be sufficient to begin a dialogue, one
which, after 2003, has yet to begin? Could
a cultural dialogue which would involve a serious effort at national reconciliation?
As an example, most Kurds speak Arabic and many can read and write the
language. However, few Arab Iraqis have studied
and learned Kurdish, even though both are designated as official languages in
the Republic of Iraq.

There are many other examples of efforts by conflicting
groups finding solutions to the problems divide them. Should the Iraqi Kurds “bet the farm” on
Masoud Barzani and the corrupt political elite which continues to exploit the
KRG’s oil wealth? Does the Barzani clan deserve their support?

Or should they attempt to work with progressive
Iraqis in the Federal Government in Baghdad like Prime Minister Hayder al-Abadi
(a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Manchester in the UK), highly respected Iraqi technocrats, and the members of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s office in al-Najaf to
find economic, political and cultural paths to national reconciliation? I would suggest the latter course which would create more synergy and bring greater benefits to all concerned parties than the forthcoming referendum.

The Iraqi Association for Political Psychology is a civil society organization concerned with promoting reforms in Iraqi society through enhancing social psychological knowledge. The association believes that scientific psychological knowledge can be employed
to transcend political, religious, ethnic, class, and/or geographical
cleavages, with the goal of reforming Iraq's psycho-political structure. This
organization devotes all the possibilities of thoughts and practice to achieve
its adopted vision:

«To create a humanitarian political culture
which promotes the dignity of society and the rationality of the state.»

Working methods and procedures

· The IAPP will conduct
surveys and theoretical studies to diagnose psycho-social phenomena which
result from the interactive relationship between society and politics, such as
the performance of voters and candidates in national asnd provincial elections, the dynamics of
socio-political protest, the drivers and motivations fostering social and political violence, the formation of
political attitudes, and the means of enhancing social awareness of democracy
and the principles of citizenship.

·The association will hold,
and participate in, conferences, seminars, workshops, courses and lectures at
the local and international levels.

·The IAPP will cooperate
and coordinate with scientific societies and entities inside and outside
Iraq, in order to promote the theoretical and practical skills of the
specialists working in the field of political psychology.

·The association will implement
non-profit projects with state institutions, civil society organizations, scientific
centers, and academic departments in relevant universities, conduct
workshops and studies, and provide consultations on phenomena related to the
interaction of psychological and political factors.

·The IAPP will issue
documentary periodicals, and participating in the print, audio and visual
media, with the goal of strengthening the understanding of the social and psychological dimensions of political
behavior.

·The IAPP will establish
academic units (schools, research institutes, faculties, universities) specialized in
political psychology and its cognitive approaches.

Wednesday, August 16, 2017

Why does the Middle East continue to suffer from
sectarianism?Is it, as Orientalists
have argued, an integral part of Middle East culture and the region’s dominant
religion, Islam?Or are there more
complex processes at work?What are the
causes of sectarianism and where is it leading the Middle East?

The short answer to these questions is that sectarianism is
a function of the collapse of politics in the Middle East.It is charitable to refer to the MENA region
as being comprised of political “systems.” However, almost no polity offers its
citizenry effective political institutions, a civic political culture and the
rule of law.

Without democratic political
leadership, functional political institutions, a vibrant civil society and an
independent judiciary to provide checks and balances on executive and
legislative power, all else vanishes into thin air.There can be no effective social services, no
high quality education, no civic pride and inspiration, no independent associational
behavior, or economic development as long as sectarian politics dominate a
country’s landscape.Sectarianism
represents the antithesis of a political culture of trust.

Why has politics in the Middle East collapsed?The long road of the 20th century
was filled with countless political potholes.Crisis after
crisis struck the region.Colonial
powers – Britain and France - combined with rapacious elites in the region to
thwart progressive social and political change.Post-WWII military coups, which sought to address problems of rising political
unrest based in socioeconomic inequality, only “spread the poverty,” to quote a
biting Egyptian comment.

Wars – including
the destructive conflict with Israel, especially in 1967 – undermined the legitimacy
of the one party states which came to power after WWII, whether based onNasirism in Egypt, Bacthism in
Syria and Iraq, the National Liberation Front in Algeria, or Qaddafi’s transformation of Libya into a “People’s Jamahiriya.”

To be sure, there was impressive cultural production during
the 20th century which was inherently anti-sectarian.Taha Husayn’s literary criticism, Iraq’s
“Free Poetry” movement in (al-shicr
al-hurr), Umm Kalthum’s incredibly creative music, the novels of Najib
Mahfuz and Orhan Pamuk, the films of Muhammad Makalbaf and Salah Yasin, Jawad
Salim’s architecture, the political treatises of Muhammad cAbid al-Jabari,
Husayn al-Muruwwa’, Sadiq al- cAzm, and cAbdallah al-cUrwa
(Laroui), and the critique of Islamic thought by Muhammad Arkoun and
Ali Shariati all sought to promote critical thinking and the betterment of
society.However, these intellectual
efforts to promote tolerance and inclusivity could do little to overcome the
forces which led to the rise of the authoritarian regimes.

Perhaps nothing did more to promote sectarian identities in
the MENA region than the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79.The revolution which subsequently established
the Islamic Republic of Iran signaled the death knell of secular nationalist ideologies,
especially Pan-Arab nationalism, and led to two of the most destructive wars of
the 20th century, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, and the 1991 Gulf War.Under the slogan, The State of the Supreme Jurisprudent (waliyat al-faqih/vilayet e
faqih), the revolution was appropriated by a sectarian version of Shiism
which paraded as religion

Iranian sectarian entrepreneur - Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei

Even though it initially attracted the support of many Sunni
Muslims, Ayatollah Khomeini’s religious dictatorship, which replaced the
secular dictatorship of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, set the stage for the rise
of sectarian tensions and ultimately a Saudi-Iranian “Cold War.” Iran's effort to export its revolution and creates links with Syria and Hizballah in Lebanon elicited a frightened response from regimes with Sunni Muslim majority populations. This fear was best verbalized by Jordan's King cAbdallah who spoke of Iran's effort to create a "Shica Crescent" which would stretch from Teheran through Iraq, Syria and into southern Lebanon.

The perceived threat which republican regimes posed to monarchical rule, especially the Nasir regime in Egypt, provoked a vigorous Saudi reaction. The Saudi monarchy used its oil wealth to
disseminate a poisonous distortion of Islam to the far corners of
the world (including the United States) in the form of Wahhabism – a vicious
ideology which, in the name of Islam, promoted violence, intolerance, misogyny
and the destruction of critical thinking.

Saudi sectarian entrepreneur
Prince Muhammad Salman

Wahhabism was even more pernicious than Khomeini's transformation of Shiism in Iran into a political ideology. Following the defeat of Egypt and Syria in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Saudis began to provide foreign aid to Egypt after the closing of the Suez Canal cost the Nasir regime large sources of revenues and added costs to support Egyptians who had been forced to move to leave cities along the canal for other cities to the West. The Saudis exploited Egypt's post-1967 economic travails to sponsor radical Islamists in Egypt.

These developments might lead some to ask – isn't Islam in fact at
fault? Before arriving at this
conclusion, we need remember why a revolution occurred in Iran in 1978-1979 (and,
for the majority of its supporters, a revolution which did not seek to replace a secular
tyrant with a “religious” one).Very
rarely do analysts choose to recall that it was the United States which
supported the Shah of Iran from the time it reinstated him to the Peacock Throne
in 1953 until his overthrow in late 1978. His extremely repressive rule, which included massive imprisonment and torture, made the Shah one of the most hated rulers in the Middle East .

Had the United States used its influence to force the Shah to enact political and
social reforms during these 25 years – certainly not unreasonable policy option
given that his military weaponry and the training of his intelligence services
were all gifts of American taxpayers - we probably would not have to have faced the enmity of the Islamic Republic, its efforts to destabilize the eastern Middle East, or be confronting a potential nuclear arms race in the region.

Nor did the US use its influence to prevent Saudi oil wealth
from being used to support terrorism. The US never went public in denouncing the dissemination of Wahhabism around the world
to establish mosques where Wahhabi “preachers” spread their virulent propaganda
which inspired countless terrorists to action.Their Friday “sermons” and media pronouncements castigated “Crusaders,”
Shica, Jews, and Christians, while promoting the suppression of
women, democratic values, humanist education and freedom of artistic
expression.As long as Saudi oil flowed
to the West, the US and its allies said nothing.

In contemporary Iraq, political forces which seek to promote
democracy and tolerance are faced with a political elite which is increasingly
subservient to Iran.How did that
happen?There is a very simple answer:
the US installed a sectarian elite after its 2003 invasion which included
political forces loyal to Iran, namely SCIRI (the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraqwhich later changed
its name to the more benign, Supreme Iraq Islamic Council) and the Islamic Call
Party (al-Dacwa al-Islamiya).

Iraqi sectarain etrepreneur
Nuri al-Maliki

As the regime of Islamic Call Party member, Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki, stepped up its sectarian policies after the US helped the Iraqi
leader cement a second term in 2010, the US increasingly withdrew from Iraqi
affairs.The most serious outcome of
this shortsighted policy was the fall of Mosul to the nefarious “Islamic State”
(Dacish) which caused more
Iraqi blood to be shed as well as waste more US taxpayer dollars on top of the
trillion dollar plus cost of the Iraq war and US occupation from 2003 to 2011.

In Egypt, we find an ironic situation where the Coptic
community supports the rule of
President cAbd al-Fattah al-Sisi because he removed former president Muhammad
Mursi, a Muslim Brother.Nevertheless, restrictions
on the building and repairs of Christian churches in Egypt still remain. The
failure to allow Coptic and other Christians their religious freedoms,
guaranteed under the Egyptian Constitution, sends a message to sectarian Islamists
that attacks in the print and visual media on Christians are
acceptable.

Perhaps the most infamous act of sectarian politics was Bashar al-Asad's release of radical Islamists from Syrian jails after the beginning of the Arab uprising. Through this cynical act, Asad sought to transform the political narrative from peaceful demonstrators seeking to bring a multi-ethnic and multi-sect democracy to Syria, to one that portrayed the conflict as "order and stability" against radical terrorists.

As political institutions have degenerated in the MENA
region, they have been replaced with patronage systems based on the personalization
of individual leadership.The al-Asad
family in Syria, Libya’s Mucammar al-Qaddafi, Yemen’s cAli cAbdallah
Salih, Saddam Husayn in Iraq all promoted a cult of personality. Political institutions, namely parliaments
and judiciaries, existed in name only.These
and other authoritarian leaders have promoted vertical identities which have
enabled them to eliminate civil society institutions built according to horizontal
identities.

With the effective end of civil society, and its replacement
with vertical identities based in patronage systems in the Middle East, corruption and nepotism
have flourished. As ever larger social
groups become tied to the dictator du
jour, these groups' interest in promoting sectarianism is likewise tied to a strong
material incentive, namely access to state wages, to soliciting bribes and finding jobs for
members of their extended families.

Framing the current political crisis facing the MENA region
in terms of “Islam” tells us very little about the region or its future. Without a doubt, sectarianism is often
expressed using a religious discourse or idiom.Often this discourse is embedded in coded language, e.g., referring to the Shica "rejectionists" (al-rawafid), or al-nasrani (Nazerenes or Christians).Nevertheless, the terms are
almost always used in a political context where the effort is meant to enhance the
solidarity of groups organized according to vertical identities by demeaning a hated Other.

If most of the problems of the MENA region can be explained
by economic and political decay, why has this discontent not been expressed
through other categories, especially social class?The short answer is that social class is
in fact embedded in sectarian discourse. Sectarianism builds on socioeconomic fears and resentments, but frames these feelings in cultural terms based in ethnicity and religion. Sectarianism fails to address social, political and economic
inequality. Instead, it instills the types of fears in marginal groups designed to prevent them from thinking
in social class terms, namely horizontal identities.

The corporatist world view promoted by both Pan-Arab
nationalism (we are all Arabs and any dissent threatens to disrupt Arab unity
and hence is treasonous) and radical Islamism (we are all Muslims and any
effort to disrupt the unity of the Islamic umma
is treasonous) suppresses the idea of the individual and her/his ability to engage in critical thinking.Lacking educational
systems which discuss concepts and categories, such as civic responsibilities, citizenship and democracy,
civil society organizations and labor unions, the peoples of the MENA region
have been cut off from thinking of society in terms of socioeconomic hierarchies.

Sectarian discourse deploys a number of tools to enhance its
oppressive politics.One of those tools is
based in a rigid patriarchy which attacks women’s rights and ability of women
to negotiate the public sphere and become active citizens.Another is the effort to create a sharp
binary pitting the “West,” against the authenticity of the "true
Islam.”

While the true Islam is left undefined, the message that you had better obey those who claim to be its guardians or
face serious consequences is not.To
challenge any of the outer trappings of sectarian identities could lead to
fines, jail or worse. If you are a Saudi woman, don’t attempt to drive an
automobile.If you’re an Iranian woman,
don’t pull your hijab too far back from your forehead and don’t hold hands in
public with a male who isn’t a member of your immediate family.

Syrian sectarian entrepreneur
President Bashar al-Asad

Despite the power of sectarian identities in the politics of
the Middle East, it offers no solutions to the region’s problems.Indeed, we need to consider the ideology of sectarianism a politically passive “place
holder,” which ignores the problems it purports to address, as they continue to intensify.The outcome for the MENA region is more civil
strife and political instability, with the potential for more failed states
like Syria and Yemen, and the fragmentation of existing nation-states into a
multiplicity of small fiefdoms such as we see happening in Syria and Somalia.

Is there anything that can be done to address the curse of sectarian
identities?The United Nations and
supportive states, including the United States and European Union, could convene a highly publicized
summit meeting to bring the problem into the open.At the very least, such a conference would be educational for the
peoples of the region – especially youth – if it were disseminated through social
media platforms.It would also put “sectarian
entrepreneurs” on the defensive.

Further, external powers, including the US, EU, Japan and
even China, could make their foreign assistance, both funding and technical support,
contingent on states who receive it reducing the scale of sectarian politics.Why would powers outside the Middle East want to follow such a
policy?The answer is simple: there is
an inverse relationship between sectarian politics, and the instability it causes, thus undermining economic opportunity for
foreign investors in the MENA region.

Foreign aid should likewise be correlated with the freedom
of citizens to form civil society organizations.Efforts to criminalize civil society organizations
which receive legitimate funding from foreign sources, whether the US
government, the UN or private foundations, should be roundly condemned.More funds should be allocated to train youth
leaders in the MENA region in the importance of civil society and to give them the
tools to form new, civic associations.These training efforts should be publicized in the Middle East, especially
in social media platforms used by youth.

A global fund to promote “Tolerance in Religion” should be funded
by the UN and the Organization for the Islamic States to train more Muslim clerics
in how to more effectively combat radicalism among youth.Fighting extremism not only benefits the
West,but even more so the Middle East, where terrorism has killed far more people than
anywhere else in the world.Once again,
the publicizing of this effort would send an important message to the large
youth demographic in the MENA region (in many countries 70% of the population under
30).

The struggle against sectarianism and its purveyors in the Middle East is not an easy task. However, the stakes for the Middle East, and for those nation-states, IGOs and NGOs with strong interests in the region, are too high for the continuation of a policy of "benign neglect."

Friday, July 28, 2017

We offer the discussion by Dr. Faris Kamal Nadhmi, Professor of Psychology, Salahiddin University, Arbil, KRG, Iraq, and President, the Iraqi Association for Political Psychology with al-Quds newspaper in Jerusalem: "The Iraqi Political System has lost its Legitimacy"

About Me

Eric Davis is Executive Director, MA Program in Political Science - Concentration in United Nations and Global Policy Studies, Professor of Political Science and the former director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA. He is author of CHALLENGING COLONIALISM: BANK MISR AND EGYPTIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1920-1941 (Princeton University Press, 1983; Institute for Arab Development, Beirut, 1986, and Dar al-Sharook, Cairo, 2009); STATECRAFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OIL, HISTORICAL MEMORY AND POPULAR CULTURE (University Presses of Florida, 1993); MEMORIES OF STATE: POLITICS, HISTORY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN MODERN IRAQ (University of California Press, 2005; Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 2008; and the forthcoming, TAKING DEMOCRACY SERIOUSLY IN IRAQ (Cambridge University Press). Currently, he is writing a book on the Islamic State and the changing modalities of terrorism in the Middle East. He can be contacted at davis@polisci.rutgers.edu and @NewMidEast