"TL 900 and 905 were created by partition in 1945. TL 601, 900 and
905 are accessed by County Road 834 (Fire Road) and easements from that
road. Fire Road was created in 1918 by dedication of easements to the
county. The Fire Road right-of-way was subsequently improved to a point
located just inside the eastern border of TL 905, where it comes to an
apparent dead end. As dedicated, the Fire Road right-of-way continues
westward, bisecting TL 905; however, that portion of Fire Road was never
improved.

"In 1998 and 1999, a series of transactions occurred that radically
altered the 1990 configurations of TL 601, 900 and 905, as described
below.

"A. Adjustment between TL 900 and 905

"In March 1998, Mark Gorham and Joyce Gorham purchased TL 900
and 905. On April 30, 1998, the Gorhams recorded a property line
adjustment that left TL 900 entirely within the bounds of TL 905, and
reduced it in size to two acres, surrounding an existing dwelling formerly on
TL 905. See Figure 2. The property line adjustment increased TL 905 from
15.39 acres to 23.18 acres. TL 900 was then sold to a third party.

"B. Division of TL 905 into 905A and 905B

"In May 1998, intervenor Darin Gorham and his wife Nicki Gorham
purchased a half interest in TL 905. On June 1, 1998, the Gorhams
submitted an application to the county to rezone that parcel from RR-10 to
RR-5. On June 3, 1998, the county responded that the average parcel size
in the exception area was too large to support a zone change to RR-5
pursuant to RCP Goal 2, Policy 11. In the meantime, intervenor applied for
and received a legal lot verification for TL 905. Intervenor then applied for
a partition of TL 905 into two parcels, 11 and 12.18 acres in size. The
county gave tentative partition approval on September 28, 1998, with the
condition that the final plat be recorded by September 28, 2000.

"However, the final partition plat was not recorded. Intervenor
learned from the county surveyor's comments with respect to the partition
plat that the Fire Road right-of-way continued west across TL 905 from its
apparent dead end, and that the surveyor could find no evidence that the
unimproved portion of Fire Road had ever been vacated. Intervenor also
learned of an informal county policy of treating a parcel that is bisected by a
public right-of-way as two separate parcels. Rather than finalize the
partition plat, intervenor sought a legal lot verification determining that the
3.5-acre portion of TL 905 north of Fire Road was a separate parcel
(henceforth TL 905B). On April 21, 1999, the county issued a legal lot
verification to that effect. On December 8, 1999, the county issued a legal
lot verification for the 18-acre portion of TL 905 south of Fire Road
(henceforth TL 905A). See Figure 3, below.

"C. Adjustment between Lots 601 and 905B

"On April 22, 1999, Mark Gorham purchased TL 601, which
adjoined TL 905B to the north. TL 601 was 12.13 acres in size, and
contained an existing dwelling in its eastern portion. On June 15, 1999, the
Gorhams recorded a property line adjustment that reduced TL 601 to two
acres, including the existing dwelling. The result was to increase TL 905B
from 3.5 acres to 13.66 acres. TL 905B was then deeded to Mark Gorham.
The county issued legal lot verifications for TL 601 and TL 905B on July
22 and 23, 1999. On August 10, 1999, TL 601 was sold to third parties. On
November 26, 1999, Mark Gorham obtained county approval to site a
mobile home on TL 905B. The relevant parcels had now taken on their
current configuration. See Figure 4.

"On December 17, 1999, intervenor submitted a revised zone change
application for TL 905A and 905B, an area totaling 31.68 acres. A hearings
officer held a public hearing on January 27, 2000, and closed the
evidentiary record on February 7, 2000. On March 9, 2000, the hearings
officer issued a decision denying the rezone on the grounds that TL 905A
and 905B were not properly viewed as separate parcels and, without
viewing them as separate parcels, the average parcel density within the
entire exception area still exceeded 7.5 acres per parcel. Intervenor and the
county planning director both requested reconsideration. The hearings
office granted reconsideration and reopened the record until June 16, 2000.
On July 26, 2000, the hearings officer issued a decision approving the
requested rezone to RR-5, incorporating his March 9, 2000 decision except
as expressly modified or supplemented. Petitioner appealed the hearings
officer's decision to the board of commissioners. On September 13, 2000,
the board of commissioners issued an order declining to hold a new hearing
and affirming the hearings officer's decision. This appeal followed."
Maxwell v. Lane County, 39 Or LUBA at 557-61 (footnotes omitted;
boldface in original).

As pertinent here, in his appeal to LUBA, petitioner argued that the county
erroneously based its calculation regarding the average lot size within Exception Area
260B-1 on a total area size of 103.5 acres. He also argued that the county erred in
determining that petitioner could not challenge, or that the county could not consider, the
partition of tax lot 905 into tax lots 905A and 905B, the property line adjustment between
tax lot 900 and tax lot 905, and the property line adjustment between tax lot 905B and tax
lot 601. Finally, petitioner argued that the county's findings regarding sewage, water
supply, access, natural hazards, and effect on resource lands were not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.

In affirming the county's decision, LUBA first concluded that petitioner had
failed to raise the issue relating to the total size of Exception Area 260B-1 before the
close of the evidentiary hearing and that petitioner therefore had waived that issue.
Maxwell, 39 Or LUBA at 562-63. LUBA also determined, consistently with McKay
Creek Valley Assn. v. Washington County, 118 Or App 543, 848 P2d 624, rev den 317 Or
272 (1993), that where the applicable county ordinance relating to rezoning--the county's
Policy 11--"does not expressly require determination of the legal status of tax lots 905A
and 905B, that question need not be considered in connection with the county's
proceedings under Policy 11." Maxwell, 39Or LUBA at 565-69. LUBA determined that
petitioner's arguments regarding the property line adjustments between tax lot 900 and tax
lot 905 and between tax lot 905B and tax lot 601 did not provide any basis for reversal or
remand of the county's decision. LUBA so reasoned because petitioner had failed to
identify any manner in which those actions affected the total number of parcels factored
into the calculation of average parcel size within the exception area. Id. at 569-70.
Finally, LUBA determined that the county's findings regarding sewage and other
requirements were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 570-73.

As noted, McKay Creek is central to the parties' dispute and LUBA's
disposition. Thus, we begin by examining that and other cases addressing the so-called
"legal lot" issue.

In Yamhill County v. Ludwick, 294 Or 778, 663 P2d 398 (1983), property
within a 40-acre-minimum forest zone was subdivided or partitioned and sold to
individual owners. The county later granted permits and variances permitting the
construction of a single-family dwelling on a 4.7-acre parcel and on a 5-acre parcel.
Neighboring property owners appealed the county's decision granting the permits and
variances to LUBA, contending that the county had, in effect, rezoned the area without a
proper rezoning procedure. LUBA reversed the county's decision, on the ground that the
lots were not "existing legal lots of record" as provided in the applicable county zoning
ordinance. Yamhill County v. Ludwick, 3 Or LUBA 271 (1981). The county sought
judicial review, and we reversed, concluding that an "existing legal lot of record" meant
merely a legally recorded conveyance of a parcel. Yamhill County v. Ludwick, 57 Or App
764, 646 P2d 1349 (1982).

The Supreme Court reversed our decision. As pertinent here, the court
concluded that the original subdivision or partition of the land had occurred in violation
of ORS chapter 92 and that, consequently, the tracts were not "existing legal lots of
record" as required by the applicable zoning ordinance. Ludwick, 294 Or at 788. The
court reasoned that, although it did not know Yamhill County's "legislative intent" in
referring to "existing legal lots of record" in the ordinance, it "seem[ed] logical" that the
county intended to identify and avoid potential site-related problems prior to subdivision,
rather than having to address such problems at some later time when owners sought
permits and variances. Id. at 789. That conclusion was not dependent on whether the
sales of the tracts to the owners were void or voidable under contract law. Id. at 789-90.
Rather, the court was concerned "only with the legal status of the lots for the purpose of
land use planning." Id. at 790.

Ten years after Ludwick, we decided McKay Creek. There, Washington
County formerly, and erroneously, had interpreted its community development code and
ORS chapter 92 "to allow new parcels to be created by recording deeds or land sale
contracts separately conveying portions of an existing parcel that were separated by a
public road, without additional county review." McKay Creek, 118 Or App at 545. In
addition, a county zoning ordinance permitted a dwelling in conjunction with farm use in
an exclusive farm use (EFU) zone if the dwelling was located "on a lot or parcel" that was
operated for certain agricultural or forestry purposes. Id. The county approved a
dwelling under the ordinance. An association appealed to LUBA, arguing that the subject
property did not qualify as a "lot or parcel" for the purpose of the ordinance because it
had been unlawfully created under the erroneous prior county policy. Relying on
Ludwick, LUBA held that the circumstances in which the substantive correctness of prior
actions creating a lot or parcel could be collaterally attacked were quite limited: A
collateral attack in a subsequent land use proceeding involving the same parcel was
cognizable only when the applicable local ordinance at issue in the current proceeding
"specifically require[d] a determination that a lot or parcel was 'legally' created." McKay
Creek Valley Assn. v. Washington County, 24 Or LUBA 187 (1992). LUBA concluded
that the dwelling permit ordinance at issue did not require such a determination and that,
consequently, the association's collateral attack was not cognizable. Id.

On judicial review, we noted that the term "parcel" was defined in the
Washington County code; that the definition "paralleled" the equivalent definition in ORS
chapter 215; and that the county definition "specified the ways in which parcels may be
created and enumerates the sources of the approval criteria that apply to them." McKay
Creek, 118 Or App at 545. We concluded that, nevertheless, in the dwelling permit
proceeding at issue, the county was not required to determine the legality of the relevant
parcel. We reasoned:

"The problem here is not whether [the subject] property is a lawfully
created lot or parcel, but whether that question must be considered in
connection with this application [for a permit]. [The Yamhill County
ordinance at issue in Ludwick] expressly made the legality of the lots an
approval criterion for allowing the use on them that the applicants sought.
That is not the case here. We do not read the Ludwick principle as
applying in situations where applicable legislation does not make the
permissibility of the use subsequently applied for dependent on the
correctness of earlier decisions and actions affecting the status of the
property. In other words, our understanding of Ludwick is that it construes
a particular ordinance; it does not establish a general rule whereby every
application for a use of land would necessitate a redetermination of the
permissibility of every other use that has taken place on the land.

"For similar reasons, this case is unlike Woosley v. Marion County,
118 Or App 206, 846 P2d 1170 (1993), where LUBA and we affirmed the
county's denial of an application for a replacement dwelling on property
that, earlier, had been unlawfully partitioned. The basis for that decision
was county legislation that forbade land use approvals on property that was
in violation of any ordinance of the county. No argument is made that there
is corresponding legislation that bears on this application.

"LUBA drew a distinction here between prior government approvals
and the substantive correctness of those approvals, and indicated that the
existence of the former could be re-explored in connection with subsequent
applications, while the latter question could not be. The property in
question passes the test that LUBA deemed applicable. Therefore, it is
unnecessary for us to decide whether, in the absence of state or local
legislation that mandates it in connection with particular applications, even
the level of reexamination of earlier actions embodied in that test is
appropriate as a general rule. We hold that the legality of the status of
respondents' property as a lot or parcel did not have to be determined here
and, therefore, we reject petitioner's assignment."

Our most recent "legal lot" case was Marshall v. City of Yachats, 158 Or
App 151, 973 P2d 372, rev den 328 Or 594 (1999). There, the petitioners challenged the
city's approval of a dwelling permit, asserting, in part, that an earlier partitioning of the lot
had been unlawful. In rejecting that challenge, we emphasized that the petitioners had
"point[ed] to nothing in the city's legislation that require[d] a legal lot of record as a
prerequisite to the granting of a dwelling permit." 158 Or App at 157. We concluded
that, consistently with McKay Creek, "in the absence of such a requirement, both the
legality of the [prior] partitioning and the merits of [the] petitioners' collateral attack on it
are inconsequential to [the court's] review of the city's decision to issue the permit." Id.

Reduced to their essence, the described cases establish that a local
government entity must determine the legal status of a lot or parcel "in connection with" a
current proceeding involving the parcel if required to do so by "applicable legislation."
See McKay Creek, 118 Or App at 548. That much is clear, and we do not revisit that
basic holding. Nevertheless, we believe that the cases lack clarity as to two important
subsidiary principles. First, although the Supreme Court in Ludwick based its decision on
the fact that the ordinance in that case expressly required a legal lot, and we in McKay
Creek and Marshall pointed to the absence of an express requirement, Ludwick did not
hold that an inquiry into the legality of a lot can be triggered only by an express
requirement to that effect.

Second, and equally significantly, none of the described cases provides a
satisfactory answer to the question of what legislation properly is deemed "applicable."
Again, in Ludwick, the particular county ordinance governing the particular proceeding at
issue expressly required consideration of the parcel's legal status; accordingly, the court
was not called upon to look further afield. In McKay Creek, although other local
ordinances may have (and, for the dissent, did) shed light on the question, we apparently
based our analysis entirely on the ordinance governing dwelling permit proceedings. See
McKay Creek, 118 Or App at 545. In Marshall, relying on McKay Creek, we also
addressed only the ordinance governing the particular proceeding at issue. Marshall, 158
Or App at 153, 157.

, 165 Or App 246, 250, 997 P2d
226 (2000) (explaining that, under PGE, both text and context are pertinent to the first
level of analysis; examining the context of a county code provision before examining its
text, because the context "provide[d] perspective on the text"). Given PGE, it is
unremarkable that, in determining whether a local government must consider the legal
status of a parcel "in connection with" a current proceeding involving the parcel, the local
government must consider not only the particular ordinance that governs the current
proceeding, but also must identify and construe the ordinance in light of any other
relevant, applicable legislative enactment. Also consistently with PGE, even if the text of
a local ordinance does not explicitly and unambiguously require the local government to
consider the parcel's legal status, such a requirement may, if sufficiently supported, be
derived from the "text in context."

We turn to the legislation at issue here. Again, the particular enactments
relating to zoning and rezoning include the county's RCP Goal 2, Policy 11, and its
implementing Order 88-2-10-14. Goal 2, Policy 11, provides:

"Land use designations and densities appropriate for developed and
committed [i.e., exception] areas shall be determined through compliance
with other plan policies and the following criteria:

"a. A Rural Residential designation shall be applied to lands which
are devoted to rural housing uses as evaluated by the following criteria:

"i. existing development pattern and density;

"ii. on-site sewage disposal suitability, or community sewerage;

"iii. domestic water supply availability;

"iv. access;

"v. public services;

"vi. lack of natural hazards;

"vii. effect on resource lands.

"Densities of 1, 2, 5 or 10 acres shall be applied to represent existing
development patterns and to limit problems resulting from a negative
evaluation of any of the above criteria."

By its terms, Goal 2, Policy 11, neither expressly refers to nor sets out any
express requirements relating to "lots" or "parcels." It does, however, expressly provide
in part, that "[l]and use designations and densities appropriate for developed and
committed areas shall be determined through compliance with other plan policies" and
with "existing development pattern[s] and density," among other criteria. Moreover,
nothing in Goal 2, Policy 11, limits the extent of, or sets out any exceptions to, the
required compliance with those policies and criteria or otherwise expressly exempts
parcels subject to zoning or rezoning from other applicable legislation. Goal 2, Policy 11,
therefore suggests that, at a minimum, zoning decisions must be made in a manner that is
consistent with the requirements of other local land use legislation.

Next, Order 88-2-10-14 sets out three "policy interpretations" applicable to
Goal 2, Policy 11. Policy Interpretation #1 defines the term "existing development
patterns" as used in that policy and explains how those patterns should be determined in
evaluating a rezoning request for a residential area, including "identification" of the
"average parcel size or parcel density" of the existing development. Policy Interpretation
#2 provides that, in determining whether a "proposed residential density is consistent with
the Goal 2 Policy 11 requirements that the proposed density 'shall be applied to represent
existing development patterns,'" the county shall perform a "mathematical computation"
to determine "the existing, average residential parcel size[]." In explaining the
computation, the "policy interpretation" explains:

Policy Interpretation #3 discusses ways in which the county determines whether a
proposed residential density "limit[s] problems resulting from a negative impact" of the
criteria listed in the Goal, including identification of potential "compatibility problems"
and possible "mitigation measures."

By its terms, each of the described policy interpretations expressly provides
that the determination whether an exception area should be rezoned shall be made on the
basis of a computation involving "parcels." Thus, the relevant unit of land for purposes
of a rezoning proceeding is a "parcel," not a "lot" or a "legal lot." However, none of the
policy interpretations set out in Order 88-2-10-14 defines the term "parcels," establishes
any requirements relating to parcels, or incorporates the definition of, or requirements
relating to, parcels found in any other source of law. Nevertheless, it is significant that
the second policy interpretation expressly recognizes the role that "division" of parcels
can have on future rezoning decisions. On balance, Order 88-2-10-14, considered
together with Goal 2, Policy 11, suggests that zoning and rezoning decisions must be
made in a manner that is consistent with other requirements of local land use legislation
pertaining to "parcels," including legislation relating to the "division" of parcels.

"Purpose. Pursuant to ORS chs 92, 197, and 215, any person desiring to
partition * * * land within any part of Lane County outside of incorporated
cities shall submit preliminary plans and final plats for such partitions * * *
to the Director [of the Planning Division] for review."

LC 13.050 provides, in part:

"General Requirements and Standards of Design and Development for
Preliminary Plans. The following are the requirements to which the
preliminary plan of a * * * partition must conform:

"(1) Conformity with the Comprehensive Plan. All divisions shall
conform with the Comprehensive Plan for Lane County * * *.

"* * * * *

"(2) Conformity with the Zoning. All divisions shall comply with all
specifications of the applicable zoning requirements in Lane Code,
including uses of land, area and dimension requirements, * * * and other
requirements as may be set forth."

LC 13.100 provides, in part:

"Application Requirements for Preliminary Partition Plans.

"(1) An application for preliminary partition approval shall be filed
with the Department * * *."

LC 13.120 provides, in part:

"Criteria for Approval of Preliminary Plans. A decision of the preliminary
plan shall be subject to Director approval * * *."

Also as pertinent here, LC 13.300 sets out application requirements for final partition
plats; LC 13.310 sets our criteria for approval of final partition plans; LC 13.320 sets out
final partition map requirements; and LC 13.400 provides for amendments to preliminary
plans. Finally, "[i]n addition to, and not in lieu of any other enforcement mechanism
authorized by Lane Code," LC 13.700(1), LC 13.700 provides for enforcement of LC
chapter 13 by means of civil penalties, equitable relief, and, "[w]henever the Director
determines that property has been partitioned * * * in a manner contrary to any of the
provisions of this chapter," the preparation and recording of a report to that effect,
including "a statement that no building permits will be issued for the described
property[.]" LC 13.700(3).

In summary, under LC chapter 13 and the incorporated "constructions"
provided in LC 16.090, a "parcel" is a tract of land created by "partitioning" or in
compliance with "all applicable planning, zoning, and partitioning ordinances and
regulations." In turn, "partitioning" of land is an expressly defined process involving
specified requirements for the creation of "parcels," one of which is that preliminary
partition plats comply with zoning ordinances.

By their terms, and considered as context to Goal 2, Policy 11, and Order
88-2-10-14, those provisions not only inform us of the precise legal meaning of the term
"parcel" for the purpose of LC chapter 13--namely, a tract of land created according to the
procedural and substantive requirements of that chapter. They also suggest that that
meaning is applicable in the context of zoning and other land use proceedings as well.
Stated another way, where each of the cited and quoted enactments recognizes and gives
effect to related enactments and the requirements established therein, it is logical to
conclude that the terms used have the same meaning throughout those related enactments.
Cf. PGE, 317 Or at 611 (where the legislature uses the same term in related statutes,
court infers that the term has same meaning); Kahn v. Pony Express Courier Corp., 173
Or App 127, 141, 20 P3d 837, rev den 332 Or 518 (2001) (same).

Accordingly, we conclude that, although neither Goal 2, Policy 11, nor
Order 88-2-10-14 expressly defines the term "parcel" or sets out any requirements relating
to parcels, nevertheless, the definition of "parcel" provided in LC 16.090 and
incorporated in LC chapter 13, and the requirements pertaining to the creation of parcels
set out in LC chapter 13, are applicable in the context of a rezoning proceeding under
Goal 2, Policy 11, and Order 88-2-10-14. Thus, a computation of "average existing
parcel size" or "parcel density" for the purpose of deciding an application for rezoning
must be conducted using "parcels" that conform to the meaning of, and requirements
relating to, that term in LC chapter 13. The county and LUBA erred in concluding
otherwise.

Applicant also argues that Order 88-2-10-14 constitutes a local
interpretation of the county's Goal 2, Policy 11, to which LUBA and this court must defer
under ORS 197.829(1) and Clark. As pertinent here, under ORS 197.829(1)(a)-(c),
LUBA is required to affirm a local governing body's interpretation of its land use
regulation unless LUBA determines that the interpretation is inconsistent with the express
language of the regulation or its underlying purpose or policy. Similarly, under Clark, in
reviewing a county's land use decision, the reviewing tribunal must affirm the county's
interpretation of its own ordinance unless it determines that the county's interpretation is
inconsistent with the express language of the ordinance, its context, or its apparent
purpose or policy. 313 Or at 514-15.

In summary, a local government entity must determine the legal status of a
unit of land in connection with a current proceeding involving that unit of land if required
to do so by applicable legislation. Applicable legislation includes not only the local
enactment governing the particular proceeding at issue, but also other related enactments.
In addition, the requirement that the local government determine the legal status of a unit
of land in connection with a particular proceeding need not be expressly stated in the
relevant enactment, but may be derived from its text in context or by consideration of its
purpose or policy. To the extent that McKay Creek holds otherwise, we now disavow it.

It follows that LUBA erred in concluding that, under McKay Creek,
because Goal 2, Policy 11, did not itself expressly require determination of the legal
status of applicant's tax lots 905A and 905B, the county was not required to consider that
question in connection with his application for rezoning. Because we conclude that
LUBA erred as asserted in petitioner's first assignment of error, we need not consider
petitioner's other assignments.

Reversed and remanded to LUBA with instructions to remand to the county
for further proceedings on applicant's application for rezoning, including consideration of
the legal status of the relevant parcels.

1. As discussed in LUBA's statement of facts, the owners of the property
included Darin Gorham ("applicant"), his wife Nicki Gorham, and his parents, Mark and
Joyce Gorham.

3. Petitioner relies in part on Higgins v. Marion County, 142 Or App 418, 921
P2d 413, rev den 324 Or 229 (1996). There, the county granted a lot line adjustment as
between two lots that ostensibly had been earlier partitioned from a 96-acre "parent
parcel" and granted a permit for primary dwelling on one of the resulting parcels. LUBA
reversed, concluding, "apparently as a matter of law," that the 96-acre parcel "had never
been lawfully partitioned." Id. at 420. We originally affirmed without opinion. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration, asserting that the proper disposition was for LUBA
to remand to the county for further findings as to the partitioning of the parcel. We
declined to do so, reasoning that the proceeding before us was not a partitioning
proceeding and that nothing in the record contradicted either LUBA's conclusion that an
"antecedent partition was a condition precedent" to the granting of the lot line adjustment
and dwelling permit, or its conclusion that such partition had not occurred. Id.

4. We note that, in a letter dated June 3, 1998, an associate planner in the Land
Management Division of the Lane County Public Works Department advised applicant's
agent that "legal lot verification" be completed in regard to tax lot 905, because "proof of
legal lot status is needed before a rezoning application can be considered * * *."

5. Judge Durham dissented. As had the majority, he noted that, although the
applicable Washington County ordinance did not expressly use the word "legal," it
defined the terms "lots" and "parcels" and those definitions referred to other ordinances
specifying requirements for the creation of lots and parcels. He reasoned that, "given that
context," the ordinance at issue therefore must be construed to mean lawfully created lots
or parcels. Id. at 549 (Durham, J., dissenting).

7. As discussed below, definitions of terms in Lane County Code 16.090
provide part of the context of Order 88-2-10-14. LC 16.090 does not define the term
"divide" or the term "division." We understand it to refer to either "partitioning" or
"subdividing" of land, each of which is discussed below.

8. After oral argument in this case, we requested that the parties submit
supplemental briefing on applicable related local legislation, if any, and that they provide
us with copies of such legislation. After receiving the parties' supplemental briefs,
including a copy of LC chapter 16, we separately requested that Lane County provide us
with LC chapter 13, of which we now take judicial notice.

9. By contrast, a "lot" is a "unit of land that is created by a subdivision of
land"; to subdivide land is to "divide an area or tract of land into four or more lots within
a calendar year." LC 16.090.

11. We also note that, even assuming that Lane County's interpretation of the
term "parcel" in Order 88-2-10-14 was inferrable from the manner in which it applied the
order in this rezoning proceeding and therefore was adequate for review under the
deferential standard of review set out in Clark, see Alliance for Responsible Land Use,
149 Or App at 266-67 (so determining in regard to the ordinance at issue in that case), it
nevertheless is questionable whether the county's interpretation was consistent with the
express language of the ordinance in its context--particularly, as discussed above, the
meaning of the term "parcel" in LC chapters 13 and 16.

12. As to the latter point, we note that, to the extent applicant and the county
characterize petitioner's challenge in this case as a "collateral attack" on the legality of the
parcels at issue, we do not understand petitioner to be challenging the creation or
existence of tax lots 905A and 905B for all purposes; rather, he challenges only their
legality as "parcels" for the purpose of the current rezoning proceeding. Thus, we
question whether it is proper or useful to regard his challenge as a collateral attack that
necessarily unsettles the result of a previous action or proceeding.