Truth and Knowledge

Truth and Knowledge: Preface

On-line since: 22nd December, 2000

PREFACE

PRESENT-DAY
philosophy suffers from an unhealthy faith in Kant.
[ 27 ]
This essay is intended to be a contribution toward overcoming this. It
would be wrong to belittle this man's lasting contributions toward the
development of German philosophy and science. But the time has come to
recognize that the foundation for a truly satisfying view of the world
and of life can be laid only by adopting a position which contrasts
strongly with Kant's. What did he achieve? He showed that the
foundation of things lying beyond the world of our senses and our
reason, and which his predecessors sought to find by means of
stereotyped concepts, is inaccessible to our faculty of knowledge.
From this he concluded that our scientific efforts must be limited to
what is within reach of experience, and that we cannot attain
knowledge of the supersensible foundation, of the “thing-in-itself.”
But suppose the “thing-in-itself” and a transcendental ultimate
foundation of things are nothing but illusions! It is easy to see that
this is the case. It is an instinctive urge, inseparable from human
nature, to search for the fundamental nature of things and their
ultimate principles. This is the basis of all scientific activity.

There is, however, not the slightest reason for seeking the foundation
of things outside the given physical and spiritual world, as long as a
comprehensive investigation of this world does not lead to the
discovery of elements within it that clearly point to an influence
coming from beyond it.

The aim of this essay is to show that everything necessary to explain
and account for the world is within the reach of our thinking. The
assumption that there are principles which belong to our world, but
lying outside it, is revealed as the prejudice of an out-dated
philosophy living in vain and illusory dogmas. Kant himself would have
come to this conclusion had he really investigated the powers inherent
in our thinking. Instead of this, he shows in the most complicated way
that we cannot reach the ultimate principles existing beyond our
direct experience, because of the way our faculty of knowledge
functions. There is, however, no reason for transferring these
principles into another world. Kant did indeed refute “dogmatic”
philosophy, but he put nothing in its place. This is why Kant was
opposed by the German philosophy which followed.
Fichte,
[ 13 ]
Schelling
[ 20 ]
and
Hegel
[ 7 ]
did not worry in the least about the limits to cognition erected
by Kant, but sought the ultimate principles within the world
accessible to human reason. Even Schopenhauer, though he maintained
that the conclusions of Kant's criticism of reason were eternal and
irrefutable truths, found himself compelled to search for the ultimate
cause along paths very different from those of Kant. The mistake of
these thinkers was that they sought knowledge of the highest truths
without having first laid a foundation by investigating the nature of
knowledge itself. This is why the imposing edifice of thought erected
by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel stands there, so to speak, without
foundations. This had a bad effect on the direction taken by the
thought of these philosophers. Because they did not understand the
significance of the sphere of pure ideas and its relationship to the
realm of sense-perceptions, they added mistake to mistake,
one-sidedness to one-sidedness. It is no wonder that their all too
daring systems could not withstand the fierce opposition of an epoch
so ill-disposed toward philosophy; consequently, along with the errors
much of real value in their thought was mercilessly swept away.

The aim of the following inquiry is to remedy the lack described
above. Unlike Kant, the purpose here is not to show what our faculty
of knowledge cannot do, but rather to show what it is really able to
achieve.

The outcome of what follows is that truth is not, as is usually
assumed, an ideal reflection of something real, but is a product of
the human spirit, created by an activity which is free; this product
would exist nowhere if we did not create it ourselves. The object of
knowledge is not to repeat in conceptual form something which already
exists, but rather to create a completely new sphere, which when
combined with the world given to our senses constitutes complete
reality. Thus man's highest activity, his spiritual creativeness, is
an organic part of the universal world-process. The world-process
should not be considered a complete, enclosed totality without this
activity. Man is not a passive onlooker in relation to evolution,
merely repeating in mental pictures cosmic events taking place without
his participation; he is the active co-creator of the world-process,
and cognition is the most perfect link in the organism of the
universe.

This insight has the most significant consequences for the laws that
underlie our deeds, that is, our moral ideals; these, too, are to be
considered not as copies of something existing outside us, but as
being present solely within us. This also means rejecting the
“categorical imperative,” an external power whose commandments
we have to accept as moral laws, comparable to a voice from the Beyond that
tells us what to do or leave undone. Our moral ideals are our own free
creations. We have to fulfill only what we ourselves lay down as our
standard of conduct. Thus the insight that truth is the outcome of a
free deed also establishes a philosophy of morality, the foundation of
which is the completely free personality.

This, of course, is valid only when our power of thinking penetrates
— with complete insight — into the motivating impulses of our
deeds. As long as we are not clear about the reasons — either natural or
conceptual — for our conduct, we shall experience our motives as
something compelling us from outside, even though someone on a higher
level of spiritual development could recognize the extent to which our
motives originated within our own individuality. Every time we succeed
in penetrating a motive with clear understanding, we win a victory in
the realm of freedom.

The reader will come to see how this view — especially in its
epistemological aspects — is related to that of the most significant
philosophical work of our time, the world-view of Eduard von Hartmann.
[ 4 ]

Clearly, the ultimate goal of all knowledge is to enhance the value of
human existence. He who does not consider this to be his ultimate goal,
only works as he learned from those who taught him; he
“investigates” because that happens to be what he has learned
to do. He can never be called “an independent thinker.”

The true value of learning lies in the philosophical demonstration of
the significance of its results for humanity. It is my aim to
contribute to this. But perhaps modern science does not ask for
justification! If so, two things are certain. first, that I shall have
written a superfluous work; second, that modern scholars are striving
in vain, and do not know their own aims.

In concluding this preface, I cannot omit a personal remark. Until
now, I have always presented my philosophical views in connection with
Goethe's world-view. I was first introduced to this by my revered
teacher, Karl Julius Schroer
[ 68 ]
who, in my view, reached such heights as
a scholar of Goethe's work because he always looked beyond the
particular to the Idea.

In this work, however, I hope to have shown that the edifice of my
thought is a whole that rests upon its own foundation, and need not be
derived from Goethe's world-view. My thoughts, as here set forth, and
as they will be further amplified in
The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity,
have been developed over many years. And it is with a
feeling of deep gratitude that I here acknowledge how the friendliness
of the Specht family in Vienna, while I was engaged in the education
of their children,
[ 69 ]
provided me with an ideal environment for
developing these ideas; to this should be added that I owe the final
shape of many thoughts now to be found in my
“Philosophy of Spiritual Activity”
to the stimulating talks with my deeply appreciated friend,
Rosa Mayreder
[ 70 ]
in Vienna; her own literary works, which spring from a
sensitive, noble, artistic nature, presumably will soon be published.