by TAMMY LYNCH
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy

On 30 January, Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko
suffered a major blow when he was forced to accept the resignation of his
pro-western Foreign Minister and longtime ally Borys Tarsyuk. (1) The
resignation is the latest salvo in a political struggle that has left
Yushchenko isolated and under a continuous barrage not only from Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovych, but also from his former ally and former Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko. In the process, Yushchenko, largely through his own
actions, has lost most of the authority he won during the Orange
Revolution.

The political struggle also has caused confusion in
foreign capitals; it is unclear who is directing foreign policy, it is unclear
who speaks for Ukraine internationally, and it is unclear if either the
president or the prime minister has the ability to follow through on promises
made to potential international allies.

The Tarasyuk saga

Borys Tarasyuk had been in the middle of a tug of war
between the president and prime the minister for almost two months. On 1
December, at Prime Minister Yanukovych’s request, parliament voted to dismiss
Tarasyuk, who had been appointed by Yushchenko. The president strenuously
objected to the move and maintains that the vote was invalid. (2)
This dispute between the president and prime minister centered on Tarasyuk’s
unfailing pro-western orientation and his determination to pursue European
Union and NATO membership for his country. Yanukovych has rhetorically
supported Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation, but rejects NATO membership and
has stopped all concrete movement toward the EU.

Until his resignation, Tarasyuk continued to
represent Ukraine on foreign trips at Yushchenko’s behest, while at the same
time being barred by government security from entering his office or
participating in cabinet meetings. (3) However, possibly in
reaction to a decision by a Ukrainian district court to call Yushchenko to
testify during Tarasyuk’s appeal, the president backed down. The retreat
likely signals a major foreign policy shift, with only one Yushchenko ally
remaining in the government – Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko. Although
the constitution allows Yushchenko to appoint a new foreign minister, the
parliament must approve the nomination.

Law on cabinet shifts powers to Yanukovych

The domestic situation in Ukraine became
significantly more confusing on 12 January, when parliament extended its attack
to include not only Yushchenko’s foreign minister, but also Yushchenko’s most
basic influence on the government. The chamber voted to override
Yushchenko’s veto of a bill that drastically reduces his power. (4)
In particular, the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers allows the parliament
to appoint the prime minister without presidential approval, taking away
Yushchenko’s ability to influence the formation of the cabinet. The
bill also grants the prime minister the authority to appoint and dismiss the foreign
and defense ministers, removing this prerogative from Yushchenko’s
purview.

This latter provision directly contradicts the
country’s constitution and likely would be overturned in any constitutional
legal challenge.

Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine political bloc is
challenging the legality of the Law on the Cabinet override, based on what the
party says are differences in the wording of the bill originally vetoed by the
president and the bill sent to the president after the override vote. The
president received new wording of the bill, his press service said, and
therefore, parliament’s vote cannot be considered an override. (5) On 22
January, following an Our Ukraine complaint, the Mukacheva District Court
agreed with the president and issued an injunction against implementation of
the law, pending further review. (6)

Prime Minister Yanukovych and his ally, Parliamentary
Speaker Oleksandr Moroz, deny that the wording of the bill was changed and have
vowed to implement the law, despite the court order. On 30 January, Moroz
published “information about the official publication” of the law in the
government and parliament newspapers, but has refrained from publishing the
text. (7) One day earlier, he suggested that parliament may be ready
to support the president's amendments to the law. (8) The president
responded weakly by calling for a “roundtable” to search for “compromise.” (9)
Given the lack of success at past presidential roundtables, and his
retreat over Tarasyuk, it is doubtful that such a move would do much to ease
Yushchenko’s plight. It is clear, however, that Ukraine remains mired in
a legal and political morass.

Tymoshenko sends Yushchenko a message

The override removing many of Yushchenko’s powers
succeeded only because his former Orange Revolution ally Yulia Tymoshenko chose
to support the measure. With this vote, it became apparent that the
president no longer can expect the unilateral support of her bloc on any piece
of legislation – even a measure on which they were united previously. The
vote against the president seemed unexpected to members of Our Ukraine, who
marched out of the parliamentary chamber in protest. (10) Yushchenko can now
count on the support of only 80 out of 450 deputies for his proposals – on a
good day.

The move by Tymoshenko prompted cries of “betrayal”
from Our Ukraine, and suggestions that Tymoshenko and the 125 members of her
parliamentary bloc had turned away from the “orange ideals.” (11)

The vote also shocked many of those who had stood in
Ukraine’s Independence Square, watching their two leaders arm in arm, during
what would become known as the Orange Revolution. Although the two have
endured strained relations throughout most of their political careers, a vote
by Tymoshenko to remove significant powers from Yushchenko and turn them over
to revolution opponent Yanukovych seemed unimaginable. This is
particularly true since, in 2004, Tymoshenko fought vehemently against
constitutional reforms that granted the prime minister’s office greater powers
– reforms which Yushchenko ironically supported.

But much has changed in Ukraine. Since the Orange
Revolution, Yushchenko has seen a significant diminution in public support,
while both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko have seen their popularity ratings surpass
the president’s.

Some history

Instead of moving quickly to consolidate his power
directly after taking office, Viktor Yushchenko chose to separate himself from
his closest allies, while reaching out to his former opponents. In the
process, he alienated his revolution partner Tymoshenko and allowed Yanukovych
gradually to undermine his power.

Despite the current suggestion from Our Ukraine that
Tymoshenko has betrayed them with this latest vote, the first break in the
“Orange” team, as Yushchenko and Tymoshenko became known during the revolution,
actually occurred when Yushchenko dismissed Tymoshenko from the post of prime
minister in September 2005. The dismissal came during a purge of
several Yushchenko allies who had been accused of corrupt or inappropriate
activities (none were ever proven) in their positions.

Neither Tymoshenko nor anyone in her cabinet was
mentioned in these allegations, but the prime minister had used her position
successfully to increase her popularity and had bumped heads with Yushchenko's
aides on a number of issues. When the president dismissed his
tarnished aides, in one broad sweep, he dismissed Tymoshenko and her allies,
too. (12)

Shortly thereafter, Yushchenko signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with Viktor Yanukovych, resuscitating the political career of his
former presidential and revolution opponent. In return, Yanukovych agreed
to vote to confirm Yushchenko’s new choice for prime minister. (13)
The president was criticized heavily for the agreement, which included support
of an amnesty for electoral fraud and the introduction of immunity from
prosecution for local deputies. (14)

The voters took their first revenge during the March
2006 parliamentary elections, as Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc (14%) was beaten
soundly by The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT) (23%). Yanukovych, meanwhile,
placed first with 32%. But instead of actively supporting a reuniting of
the “orange coalition,” which would have controlled a parliamentary majority,
Yushchenko introduced Yanukovych’s name into parliament for confirmation as
prime minister. Our Ukraine joined an ill-fated coalition
government with Yanukovych, and Tymoshenko announced her “radical opposition”
to the government.

Reading the tea leaves

Given the history of the two since the Orange
Revolution, it is no surprise that Tymoshenko’s reflex reaction to support
Yushchenko was not in top form. Nevertheless, the vote by Tymoshenko is
more than a bit perplexing. As longtime Ukraine analyst Taras Kuzio wrote
in his recent BBC blog, “Those of us who have been following Soviet and
post-Soviet developments have become used to reading between the lines and
figuring out what is really going on behind the scenes. This ability is
now seriously stretched.” (15) Surely, there must be more of a reason for
the vote than irritation over Yushchenko’s past treatment of his former
ally.

Tymoshenko quickly suggested that this vote
"absolutely did not" represent any alliance with Yanukovych and named
several reasons for the action. First, in return for assisting in the
override of the President’s veto, the ruling coalition supported, in the first
reading, the Law on the Opposition. This bill, which guarantees the
political opposition a number of important rights, could be a major step
forward in Ukrainian politics. If passed into law in the second reading,
it would place Ukraine securely in the realm of Western European, pluralistic,
parliamentary republics. Tymoshenko said, “What you have seen is an
interim position in order to secure gains for Ukraine’s long-term
future.” (16) But even Tymoshenko admitted that passage of the Law
on Opposition in the second reading is not guaranteed.

BYUT's Law on Imperative Mandate for local councils
also was passed in the second reading. The law will make it virtually
impossible for a local deputy elected on a party list to oppose the wishes of
the party leadership, for fear of being expelled. This could be a major
improvement, eliminating the potential for bribery, extortion and coercion of
individual deputies. This will only be the case, however, if the
provision to expel members is not abused by party leadership.

Tymoshenko also suggested that the vote would “end
the constitutional crisis” between the president and the prime minister by
placing power securely in the hands of one, and that this vote is meant to set
the stage for a dismissal of parliament by the president. (17) In fact,
at a meeting congress of 3,000 BYUT local deputies, Tymoshenko announced that
she already had begun creating a new election list for a new election. (18)

It seems unlikely that this vote by BYUT will end the
constitutional crisis, since constitutional challenges are likely to ensue if
the law comes into force as passed. Moreover, it seems even less
likely that Yushchenko will embrace Tymoshenko’s idea to dismiss parliament,
which would necessitate working with Tymoshenko during and following any new
parliamentary election. In the past, Yushchenko has demonstrated an
almost pathological aversion to working with Tymoshenko, even to his own
detriment and to the detriment of his programs. This likely will increase
after the latest vote.

It may be possible that Tymoshenko doesn’t have any
real expectation that the president will dismiss parliament, especially given
the lack of any legal reason to do so. Instead, with the vote, Tymoshenko
forces Yushchenko into a choice—enter into further agreements and compromises
with Yanukovych or begin working in a collaborative manner again with her to
push forward his agenda.

The situation resembles that of September 2005, when
Tymoshenko refused to support Yushchenko’s choice to replace her as prime
minister. The president then chose to sign the soon-to-be-broken
Memorandum of Understanding with Yanukovych. This move drastically
undermined voter support for him and his party, and would not have been
necessary had Tymoshenko supported him. Tymoshenko used that
memorandum effectively in her parliamentary election campaign.

To this end, BYUT deputy head and foreign policy
advisor Hryhoriy Nemyria suggests that Tymoshenko was attempting to block any
possible new agreements between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, thus clarifying once
again the choice facing the president. (19)

Regardless, in Internet chat rooms and on the streets
of Kyiv, voters now are expressing not only irritation with Yushchenko, but
also with Tymoshenko, for voting “with” the man she has always fought, and
against the man she has always supported. She, no doubt, is trusting that
her oratory and political skills, which have served her in good stead in the
past, will help her explain her position and calm the criticism of this
vote. Should Tymoshenko quickly return to “radical” opposition tactics,
voters may overlook this “situational” alliance with Yanukovych—as they did
after the September 2005 prime minister vote. But there is no doubt that
the strategy is a risky one.

The next steps of both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko will
determine what effect this vote may or may not have on their popularity and on
the future direction of the country. While nothing is certain in
Ukraine, given the President’s past inability to outmaneuver opponents
politically, prospects for his political career seem bleak. And prospects
for Ukraine’s Western orientation also seem dim in the near future.

“Frankly speaking, we do not understand who
represents Ukraine,” said Poland’s Ambassador to Ukraine Jazec
Klyuchkovsk recently. (20) Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga was
even more blunt during the Davos World Economic Forum on 26 January. "The
Ukrainian people deserve much better than what they have,” she said. (21)