Since the Uzice Corps, like
the rest of the JNA, retreated from Bosnia-Herzegovina
within the deadline set by the so-called international
community, and that while deployed in its area o
responsibility it had not been engaged in military
operations, its role can be qualified solely as a
useful projection of force that, albeit temporarily,
stopped the wider inter-ethnic and inter-religious
conflicts in this area. Therefore the role of the Uzice
Corps in eastern Bosnia cannot be taken
against its commanding officer. More likely, unbiased
foreign observers would describe this role as
humanitarian.

Superior Authority

Paragraph
55 of the Indictment says: Slobodan MILOSEVIC
was elected President of the FRY on 15 July 1997, assumed
office on 23 July 1997, and remains President as of the
date of this indictment.

Paragraph
56 of the Indictment says: As President of the
FRY, Slobodan MILOSEVIC functions as President of the
Supreme Defence Council of the FRY. The Supreme Defence
Council consists of the President of the FRY and the
Presidents of the member republics, Serbia and Montenegro.
The Supreme Defence Council decides on the National
Defence Plan and issues decisions concerning the VJ. As
President of the FRY, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has the power to
order implementation of the National Defence Plan
and commands the VJ in war and peace in compliance with
decisions made by the Supreme Defence Council. Slobodan
MILOSEVIC, as Supreme Commander of the VJ, performs these
duties through commands, orders and decisions.

Paragraph
57 of the Indictment says: Under the FRY Act on
the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, as Supreme Commander of
the VJ, Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercises command
authority over republican and federal police units
subordinated to the VJ during a state of imminent threat
of war or a state of war. A declaration of imminent
threat of war was proclaimed on 23 March 1999,and
a state of war on 24 March 1999.

Paragraph
58 of the Indictment says: In addition to his de
jure powers, Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercises extensive de
facto control over numerous institutions essential
to, or involved in, the conduct of the offences alleged
herein. Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercises extensive de
facto control over federal institutions nominally
under the competence of the Assembly or the Government of
the FRY. Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercises de facto
control over functions and institutions nominally under
the competence of Serbia and its autonomous provinces,
including the Serbian police force. Slobodan MILOSEVIC
further exercises de facto control over numerous
aspects of the FRYs political and economic life,
particularly the media. Between 1986 and the early 1990s,
Slobodan MILOSEVIC progressively acquired de facto
control over these federal, republican, provincial and
other institutions. He continues to exercise this de
facto control to this day.

Paragraph 59 of the
Indictment says: Slobodan MILOSEVICs de
facto control overSerbian, SFRY, FRY and
other state organshas stemmed, in part, from his
leadership of the twoprincipal political parties
that have ruled in Serbia since 1986, and in the FRY
since 1992. From 1986 until 1990, he was Chairman of the
Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of
Communists in Serbia, then the ruling party in Serbia. In
1990, he was elected President of the Socialist Party of
Serbia, the successor party to the League of Communists
of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working
People of Serbia. The SPS has been the principal ruling
party in Serbia and the FRY ever since. Throughout the
period of his Presidency of Serbia, from 1990 to 1997,
and as the President of the FRY, from 1997 to the
present, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has also been the leader of
the SPS.

Paragraph 60 of the
Indictment says: Beginning no later than October
1988, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has exercised de facto
control over the ruling and governing institutions of
Serbia, including its police force. Beginning no later
than October 1988, he has exercised de facto control
over Serbias two autonomous provincesKosovo
and Vojvodinaand their representation in federal
organs of the SFRY and the FRY. From no later than
October 1988 until mid-1998, Slobodan MILOSEVIC also
exercised de facto control over the ruling and
governing institutions of the Montenegro, including its
representation in all federal organs of the SFRY and the
FRY.

COMMENT:
All six Paragraphs cited above (55-60) deal with
constitutional authority of Slobodan Milosevic as
president of the FRY and Chairman of the Supreme Defense
Council from July 15, 1997 to May 22, 1999, i.e. the date
of the indictment. When it literally cites constitutional
powers (e.g. order implementation of the National
Defence Plan through commands, orders and
decisions), the Indictment is accurate, and
deserves no comment.

However,
in paragraphs 58, 59, 60 and 62 the authors stray from
legal logic and introduce into their interpretation of
constitutional and legal powers of the Yugoslav president
a division between de jure and de facto powers,
the latter being, in their regard, primary. According to
their interpretation, de facto powers enabled
Slobodan Milosevic to exert extensive control over
numerous institutions essential to, or involved in, the
conduct of the offences alleged herein, as well as
control over functions and institutions nominally
under the competence of Serbia and its autonomous
provinces, including the Serbian police force;
control over numerous aspects of the FRYs
political and economic life, particularly the media;
having, between 1986 and the early 1990s progressively
acquired de facto control over these federal,
republican, provincial and other institutions. He
continues to exercise this de facto control to
this day, including the governing
institutions of Montenegro, its representation in
all federal organs of the SFRY and the FRY. Given
all these "de facto" powers, the
implication is that Slobodan Milosevic would be
responsible for acts of his subordinates in the Yugoslav
Army and all the police forces, federal and Serbian,
which allegedly committed crimes in the province of
Kosovo-Metohija since 1998.

In other
words, despite all the marking of multi-party democracy
instituted in Serbia in 1990 and the FRY from the
beginning, their elected and re-elected president has
been a dictator who held de facto power over
all aspects of life and all government institutions. This
is the message behind this description of the supposed de
jure and de facto powers that Slobodan
Milosevic had as president of Serbia and the FRY.

Authors of the Indictment even
bothered to divine the origins of this de
facto absolute power and control: Milosevics
leadership of the twoprincipal political
parties that have ruled in Serbia since 1986, and in the
FRY since 1992 (Serbian League of Communists and
the Socialist Party of Serbia), as Paragraph 59 indicates.

Reality, however, is markedly
different from the social and political landscape of the
1990s FRY painted by the Indictment.

1. When the Socialist Party of
Serbia appeared on the political scene in 1990, it was
not the successor party to the League of Communists
of Serbia, but just one of some twenty other
political parties and movements (Serbian Renewal Movement
[SPO], Serbian Radical Party [SRS], Democratic Party, New
Democracy, Serbian Democratic Party, Communist Party of
Yugoslavia, New Communist Movement, etc.). The direct
successor to the League of Communists, both
in the financial and ideological sense, was the League of
Communists  Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ), which
later fragmented. Many former members of the Serbian
League of Communists joined the new Socialist Party of
Serbia, but their number among the total membership soon
became a minority.

2. Until the fall 2000
elections, the SPS has indeed been a leading political
party, winning most elections but not all. In the last
decade of the 20th century it did not have an absolute
parliamentary majority, in Serbia or Yugoslavia, so it
formed coalitions and power-sharing arrangements with
other parties (SPO, SRS, New Democracy). The balance of
power between coalition parties in the Parliament and the
government precluded any politician, including the
President of the FRY Slobodan Milosevic, from
establishing de facto control over federal,
republican, provincial and other institutions.

3. All the important decisions
regarding the national interest were made through
referenda, the Federal and the Serbian Parliament, and
the Supreme Defense Council; every time, leaders of the
opposition parties in the Parliament were consulted. This
prevented any individuals de facto
control. We cite only some of the more important
decisions:

a) rejection of the so-called
international mediation to resolve the Kosovo-Metohija
crisis in April 1998, was the result of a referendum by
the citizens; b) decisions to involve the Yugoslav Army
against the terrorist and separatist movement of Kosovo
Albanians and oppose any form of foreign
intervention were reached unanimously by the
Supreme Defense Council of the FRY; c) the SDC also
discussed (on October 4, 1998) the talks with U.S.
Ambassador R. Holbrooke, in which Serbian President
Milutinovic took part, as well as the agreement that the
talks produced; the platform for the talks was adopted by
the FRY Parliament on October 5, 1998; d) the Serbian
Parliament adopted the 10 Principles of the Contact Group
as a platform for the Rambouillet talks, and e) decisions
to declare imminent danger of war on March 23, and to
declare a state of war at the outbreak of NATOs
aggression on March 24, 1999, were made by the FRY
government based on its constitutional authority.

4. The Indictments
imputation that Slobodan Milosevic exercised de facto control
over governing institutions in Montenegro between 1988
and 1998. Before his election to the FRY presidency (July
1997) Slobodan Milosevic did not have, nor could have,
any influence on political and other developments in
Montenegro, since he had neither de jure nor
de facto authority in this republic. When he
was elected President of the FRY, the SFRY had already
been destroyed; separatist movements raging throughout
its former territory had not bypassed Montenegro,
weakening the federal influence on this republic 
and with it the influence of Slobodan Milosevic as the
federal President. Since the schism in the ruling
Socialist Party of Montenegro, this republics
governing institutions have openly advocated
secession and de facto acted as a separate,
sovereign nation. Under these circumstances, powers of
the FRY President have been reduced only to his de
jure authority, and even that has been usurped by the
Montenegrin authorities. Slobodan Milosevics
influence in this member of the federation was virtually
nil.

5. Paragraph 58 cites a claim of
Slobodan Milosevics de facto control
over numerous aspects of the FRYs political and
economic life, particularly the media, which is
also far from the truth. Since the introduction of multi-party
politics in Serbia and Yugoslavia, i.e. since the
appearance of political parties and movements, numerous
media  newspapers, magazines, radio and TV 
have come into existence. All major opposition papers
have their newspapers and magazines. Only the SPS had no
such paper until it lost power. Several dailies that have
styled themselves independent have been hostile towards
the SPS from the start. Without a doubt, foreign
donations (for example, a donation from the CIA Balkans
Institute in January 1999, within the so-called program
for promotion of democracy in Yugoslavia) have played a
significant role in the appearance and survival of these
media. Slobodan Milosevic could not have had any
influence over such actions, let alone de facto
control.

Therefore,
the division of presidential authority into de jure
and de facto is really an attempt to present
Yugoslavia as a dictatorship. Such a presentation has no
basis in reality, and should hence be relegated to the
category of low-brow propaganda that certainly does not
belong in documents of an international legal
institution, which the ICTY claims to be.

Paragraph
61 of the Indictment says: In significant
international negotiations, meetings and conferences
since 1989, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has been the primary
interlocutor with whom the international community has
negotiated. He has negotiated international agreements
that have subsequently been implemented within Serbia,
the SFRY, the FRY, and elsewhere on the territory of the
former SFRY. Among the conferences and international
negotiations at which Slobodan MILOSEVIC has been the
primary representative of the SFRY and FRY are: The Hague
Conference in 1991; the Paris negotiations of March 1993;
the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in
January 1993; the Vance-Owen peace plan negotiations
between January and May 1993; the Geneva peace talks in
the summer of 1993; the Contact Group meeting in June
1994; the negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 9-14 September 1995; the negotiations to end
the NATO bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-20
September 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in
November 1995.

COMMENT: Paragraph 61 cites, not
very accurately, the main foreign policy involvements of
Slobodan Milosevic in dealing with crises in the former
SFRY from 1991 to 1995. Citing 1989 as the starting year
for such engagements is inaccurate, since Yugoslavias
foreign policy at the time was formulated by the federal
Presidium, Parliament and Executive Council. Given the
well-known, constructive and peaceful role of Slobodan
Milosevic in all these negotiations, from the 1991 Hague
Conference to the 1995 Dayton talks there is nothing
incriminating in this paragraph. Quite to the contrary,
in all the negotiations cited in the Indictment Slobodan
Milosevic was a desirable and notable negotiator (though
some thought he played hardball), and this
was publicly admitted by many of his negotiating
partners, either immediately or later on. We will mention
several examples that confirm Slobodan Milosevics
constructive and peaceful engagement in international
conferences, talks and negotiations regarding the
Yugoslav crisis, from 1991 to 1995:

a. The
1991 Hague Conference, where Slobodan Milosevic
represented only Serbia, was intended to decide upon the
dissolution of Yugoslavia as a federation, according to
the Badinter plan and with agreement of all six
presidents of federal republics. Only Slobodan Milosevic
opposed this intent. Soon it was shown that this plan was
to provide a basis for the premature recognition
of seceded republics as independent states (Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia). Multiple
bodies of the so-called international community have
since agreed that this had been a mistake, as well as one
of the causes of the long civil and ethno-religious war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, certainly one of the most horrible
wars ever waged in this region.

b. from the beginning to the end
of the ethno-religious war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Slobodan Milosevic on many occasions took active part in
talks and negotiations, consistently supporting a
cessation of hostilities and search for a peaceful
solution to the crisis (through supporting the Vance-Owen
plan, visiting Pale with the then-President of the FRY
Dobrica Cosic and the Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis,
etc.). It is well known that Lord David Owen blamed the U.S.
government, not Slobodan Milosevic, for lengthening the
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The crowning achievement of Mr.
Milosevics efforts to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina
is the Dayton Agreement, even though many of its
provisions were not favorable to the Serbs.

Paragraph 62 of the
Indictment says: As the President of the FRY, the
Supreme Commander of the VJ, and the President of the
Supreme Defence Council, and pursuant to his de facto
authority, Slobodan MILOSEVIC is responsible for the
actions of his subordinates within the VJ and any police
forces, both federal and republican, who have committed
the crimes alleged in this indictment since January 1999
in the province of Kosovo.

COMMENT: As President of the
FRY, and the President of the Supreme Defence Council,
Slobodan Milosevic has been the supreme commander of VJ
in both war- and peacetime, not de facto,
but de jure, based on his constitutional powers.
As the supreme commander, he is responsible for the
actions of the military, but not the police. As we said
earlier, federal police took no part in counter-terrorist
operations in Kosovo-Metohija, or defending this province
from NATO aggression. Forces of the Serbian MUP are
responsible to their superiors in the Serbian government.
Police forces in Montenegro are also responsible to the
government of their republic. Although the Defense Law
gives an option of subordinating the police units to
operational VJ commands in case of war or imminent danger
of war, police refusal prevented this course of action.

In January 1999, the OSCE
Verification mission deployed throughout Kosovo-Metohija
while VJ units withdrew to their garrisons. In the latter
half of February 1999, until and throughout the NATO
aggression against the FRY, VJ forces and the Serbian MUP
conducted counter-terrorist operations. However, as it
was already proven in responses to previous paragraphs of
the Indictment, the VJ did not commit any war crimes,
anytime, anywhere, nor did it act in any way against the
international laws of war. Therefore, its supreme
commander bears no criminal command responsibility, and
this accusation is groundless.

Paragraph 63 of the
Indictment says: Milan MILUTINOVIC was elected
President of Serbia on 21 December 1997, and remains
President as of the date of this indictment. As President
of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC is the head of State. He
represents Serbia and conducts its relations with foreign
states and international organisations. He organises
preparations for the defence of Serbia.

Paragraph 64 of the
Indictment says: As President of Serbia, Milan
MILUTINOVIC is a member of the Supreme Defence Council of
the FRY and participates in decisions regarding the use
of the VJ.

Paragraph 65 of the
Indictment says: As President of Serbia, Milan
MILUTINOVIC, in conjunction with the Assembly, has the
authority to request reports both from the Government of
Serbia, concerning matters under its jurisdiction, and
from the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, concerning its
activities and the security situation in Serbia. As
President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC has the authority
to dissolve the Assembly, and with it the Government,
subject to the proposal of the Government on
justified grounds, although this power obtains only
in peacetime.

Paragraph
66 of the Indictment says: During a declared
state of war or state of imminent threat of war, Milan
MILUTINOVIC, as President of Serbia, may enact measures
normally under the competence of the Assembly, including
the passage of laws; these measures may include the
reorganisation of the Government and its ministries, as
well as the restriction of certain rights and freedoms.

Paragraph 67 of the
Indictment says: In addition to his de iure
powers, Milan MILUTINOVIC exercises extensive de facto
influence or control over numerous institutions essential
to, or involved in, the conduct of the crimes alleged
herein. Milan MILUTINOVIC exercises de facto
influence or control over functions and institutions
nominally under the competence of the Government and
Assembly of Serbia and its autonomous provinces,
including but not limited to the Serbian police force.

Paragraph
68 of the Indictment says: In significant
international negotiations, meetings and conferences
since 1995, Milan MILUTINOVIC has been a principal
interlocutor with whom the international community has
negotiated. Among the conferences and international
negotiations at which Milan MILUTINOVIC has been a
primary representative of the FRY are: preliminary
negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
15-21 August 1995; the Geneva meetings regarding the
Bosnian cease fire, 7 September 1995; further
negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
9-14 September 1995; the negotiations to end the NATO
bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-20 September 1995;
the meeting of Balkan foreign ministers in New York, 26
September 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in
November 1995. Milan MILUTINOVIC was also present at the
negotiations at Rambouillet in February 1999.

Paragraph 69 of the
Indictment says: As the President of Serbia, and a
member of the Supreme Defence Council, and pursuant to
his de facto authority, Milan MILUTINOVIC is
responsible for the actions of any of his subordinates
within the VJ and within any police forces who have
committed the crimes alleged in this indictment since
January 1999 within the province of Kosovo.

COMMENT: We have no comment
regarding the largely accurate biographical information
and the list of functions performed in Serbia and the FRY
from August 1995 to January 1999. However, several
inaccuracies in the above-cited paragraphs do need to be
addressed: