Sunni Tribal Forces

Local, Sunni tribal forces have been key to recapturing and holding ISIL-held areas. However, different mobilization and control patterns in Ninewa and Salah ad-Din have created different forms of Sunni forces, and may determine how much these Sunni forces contribute to stability or tension in the future.

This report is part of a larger study on local, hybrid and sub-state security forces in Iraq (LHSFs). Please see the main page for more findings, and research summaries about other field research sites.

Sunni participation has been viewed as a critical ingredient in the
fight against ISIL both because past Sunni marginalization and exclusion
directly fed ISIL recruits, and because Sunni tribal mobilization has
been crucial to containing Islamic extremist movements in the past,
notably Al Qaeda in Iraq. The fractured nature of the Sunni Arab
community1 and
their deep mistrust for the Iraqi government, Shi’a militias, and
Coalition forces did not make Sunni participation a foregone conclusion.
Nonetheless, Sunni Arab mobilization has been building since 2014. By
2017, approximately 30,000 to 45,000 Sunni Arab forces had been
mobilized in different forms under the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF,
or Hashd al-Shaabi)
banner. There are more Sunni tribal forces in Anbar and Ninewa, but
tribal units also exist in Salah ad-Din and other liberated areas.

Although all of these forces fall under the PMF, the mobilization and
support patterns and the relationships these Sunni forces have with
other PMF or Coalition actors differed starkly between Ninewa and Salah
ad-Din, the two governorates that this analysis will focus on. In
Ninewa, a US-sponsored initiative to mobilize tribal forces resulted in
much larger numbers overall, more consistent (if basic) training and
supply levels, and a stronger connection between these forces and ISF
and government actors. In Salah ad-Din, US-sponsored tribal mobilization
was not allowed by the Iraqi government and larger Shi’a PMF groups
stepped in to fill the void, supporting local affiliates in areas where
they operate. Whether and how these differing initial mobilization and
support patterns will affect the future longevity of these groups, and
whether the Sunni mobilization effort will actually contribute to
greater stability in the future are still open questions.

Background: the Sunni Awakening and Dismissal

As ISIL swept through Iraq, a critical enabling factor was the lack
of resistance and sometimes open support of the Sunni population. Sunni
populations in areas like Mosul and Tal Afar had for years suffered under the highly sectarian government of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government. In Tuz Khormatu
district in Salah ad-Din, ISIL fighters did not even arrive in the city
before locals, fed up with the Iraqi government’s treatment, flipped
their own cities to ISIL’s cause.

This was not the first time that sectarian rivalry and exclusive
security policies had bred radical extremist ideology and insecurity.
The rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups in 2005 and 2006
was also fed by Sunni marginalization – mass de-Baathification after
the US deposed Saddam Hussein created a reservoir of disempowered and
disenchanted Sunni forces, a welcome recruiting pool that fed the growth
of al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups. US forces were only able to
successfully contain al-Qaeda and tamp down violence by mobilizing local
Sunni tribal forces to their side, an initiative known as the Sons of Iraq, or the sahwa in Arabic (literally, the Sunni “Awakening”). By 2008, the US-backed sahwa
groups included some 30 tribes and an estimated 80,000 to 95,000
forces, predominantly across the Sunni tribal areas where al-Qaeda was
strongest – including in Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala.2

The counter-insurgency campaign was largely successful, and sahwa leaders
expected to be repaid by being integrated into Iraqi security forces,
and having a larger political voice, at least over their own Sunni Arab
areas if not in the government as a whole. There had been discussions
about integrating these groups into Iraqi forces, perhaps as a form of
national guard or other local policing or defense units.3 However, al-Maliki never trusted the sahwa leaders,
many of whom were former Saddam-era officials or former insurgents, and
he had little interest in re-empowering Sunni political leadership.4 The Maliki government effectively dissolved the sahwa forces
using the path of least resistance – the government did not appoint
them to positions or simply stopped paying them regularly.5 Instead
al-Maliki appointed sectarian-minded Shi’a leaders to key security
posts across predominantly Sunni areas. Their heavy-handed treatment and
sectarian-motivated abuses, often abetted by Shi’a militia forces,
increased the sense of Sunni disenfranchisement and resentment toward
the Iraqi government. Marginalized from security positions and left
unprotected, Sunni tribal leaders who had been part of the sahwa were directly targeted and assassinated by remnants of al-Qaeda and by the fore-runners of ISIL.6

Given this background, by 2014, the last thing many Sunni tribal
leaders wanted was to join sides with, or serve at the behest of, the
Iraqi government and the Shi’a militia groups that dominated the
anti-ISIL coalition. However, given their local knowledge and past
success in helping to defeat Islamic extremists, Sunni tribal forces had
the potential to play an extremely valuable role in re-capturing
ISIL-controlled areas. In addition, many political leaders and
international stakeholders (the US prominently among them) emphasized
that Sunni participation would be important for the medium- to long-term
stabilization and reconciliation process. They feared that unless
Sunnis were given a role in the post-ISIL security landscape, the same
radical elements would rise to the fore again after ISIL’s ouster. Such
thinking led to the development of a US-backed tribal mobilization
program based on the Sunni Awakening model. However, the Iraqi
government only authorized the program to be established in Anbar and
Ninewa, not in Salah ad-Din. This created significant differences in the
nature and role of the Sunni tribal forces mobilized in the different
governorates, as will be illustrated in case studies of the forces in
Ninewa and Salah ad-Din below.

Ninewa

The key factor distinguishing Sunni mobilization in Ninewa from that
in Salah ad-Din was a US-backed program for mobilizing, training, and
equipping Sunni tribal leaders. The program was officially known within
US circles as the Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF), but all of the
tribal forces mobilized within the TMF fall under the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) program, the official umbrella organization for forces and
militias mobilized to support the anti-ISIL coalition since June 2014.
Tribal forces and locals often refer to Sunni tribal forces as Hashd al-Asha’iri (literally the tribal hashd or tribal PMF), to distinguish them from the rest of the PMF, which are predominantly Shi’a.

The TMF program is officially an Iraqi government program, with all
funding and support provided via the Iraqi government, but the US has
been the driving force not only behind the funding but also the design
and structure of the program. The TMF was modelled after the US
experience with the Sunni Awakening, and driven by the idea that local
tribal groups would be essential not only to counter ISIL forces, but
also to manage the stabilization process post-liberation. The idea was
that in the immediate campaign to recapture and hold areas, local forces
could act as an important gap-filler and source of local manpower,
freeing up ISF forces to move forward with offensive operations once
they had captured an area.

The fact that local forces would be the ones taking on local policing
and “holding” functions might also better address persistent security
threats (such as ISIS sleeper cells) since they knew the local area. It
also was thought to be more palatable to local Sunni communities than
outside forces. “The idea was to mobilize them and allow them to deal
with their own territory,” offered a representative at the US diplomatic
mission to Iraq in Erbil who worked with the program. “These are local
guys. They know who belongs there. It also tends to help with returns;
people are more likely to go back when they know who is securing it and
when they can settle their own grievances.” Finally, it was hoped that
some degree of Sunni tribal engagement in the local security
establishment might address the issues of political exclusion and
disenfranchisement that had fed previous cycles of Sunni extremism. As
the same US representative offered: “The idea was that this would be a
form of ‘grassroots reconciliation’ – reconciliation in the sense of
these [Sunni] groups not being disenfranchised and excluded from Iraqi
forces and government.”

As of May 2017, approximately 18,000 tribal forces were registered in Ninewa, up from an estimated 15,000 at the end of 2016.7 Although
Anbar was not a focus of the research, the TMF program also existed
there and by May 2017, approximately 16,000 TMF forces were active in
Anbar (10,000 on salary and 6,000 without pay), from a high of 20,000 to
25,000 at the end of 2016. Forces are expected to take regular leave,
and even beyond regular leave cycles, attendance for regular duty
assignments is not perfect. As a result, the effective force size at any
given time is estimated to be half of what these official allocations
suggest.

All of the US support for TMF salaries and equipment is channeled
through the Iraqi government, via the Iraqi Train and Equip Funding
(ITEF). The Iraqi government also decides on the number of forces
authorized, and vets which forces can join the TMF, although the US and
Kurdish officials also apply their own vetting procedures.8 This
multi-layered approval process, with both Kurdish and Baghdad-based
officials eager to veto any tribal leader they mistrust is part of the
reason that the TMF grew so much more slowly in Ninewa than in Anbar.

Each of these forces is supposed to receive a brief, 10-day training,
which introduces the basics of maneuvering and weapons skills, how to
work as a unit, how to recognize and disarm IEDs, emergency first aid,
and the laws of war and human rights obligations. However, training has
been slow and challenging to organize; of the 18,000 forces authorized
for Ninewa in May 2017, only 6,000 had received training. TMF training
has been provided by Coalition forces, not only the US military but also
Spanish, Dutch, and British trainers, among others.

There has been no deliberate outreach and recruitment program – it
was not necessary, according to officials working with the program. Once
word of mouth spread that tribal leaders could get training, equipment,
and salaries for their forces, they began reaching out. The US official
engaged in the program noted that it tends to be a “self-selecting”
group. Most of these tribal leaders see that they cannot be seen sitting
out the fight to retake territory if they want to have a claim on
future control of their areas. Others are simply motivated by a desire
for revenge on tribal rivals who sided with ISIL or for at least some
influence on how these actors are dealt with.9

Most units have a political backer, usually a senior tribal figure
(sometimes also an official political representative), who proposes
establishing a unit. [Force mobilization is strongly connected to
political dynamics. For example, in Ninewa there are 47 tribal units, 26
of which either have an active politician as a sponsor or a politically
engaged sponsor. He often provides additional funding support to both
the registered forces and a number of not-yet-authorized (i.e.,
unofficial) members of the unit. The political sponsor is often not a
field commander, so most units effectively have a political or nominal
leader and then an actual, tactical commander.

Although 18,000 tribal fighters across Ninewa may sound significant,
they are carved up into 100-300 man battalion formations, which limits
the influence of any one group and of the Sunni tribal forces as a
whole. The limited unit size is intentional. Although Iraqi and Kurdish
officials were willing to tolerate some mobilization, neither group
wanted to deal with the potential political threat posed by a strong,
cohesive Sunni force in Ninewa. A larger and more cohesive force might
also arguably challenge the authority of the ISF and the Iraqi
government’s authority, which would undermine the underlying purpose in
mobilizing these forces – to contribute to stability and resumption of
government control.

The largest force has just over 600 fighters. It belongs to a
commander named Shaikh Nizzan Luhaybi, who uses his force to control the
local area of Hajj Ali, a poor, rural area in Qayyara
district on the border with Salah ad-Din. Nizzan earned this
distinction by being one of the first tribal forces and by demonstrating
a stronger ability to fight and hold areas than most other tribal
commanders. It is also helpful for the Coalition to have a strong tribal
force in Hajj Ali, which is a small backwater, far from population
centers, but in a sensitive area vulnerable to ISIL. There are pervasive
and signifi can't ISIL threats in the area, emanating from just across
the border in Shirqat,
which was still partially under ISIL control at the time of writing. In
addition, while 600 forces are enough for Nizzan to dominate Hajj Ali,
where there are no other real competitors, they are not enough for him
to exert a level of control over more significant areas to the north.

The intended purpose of these TMF – as local holding forces – largely
plays out in practice. A general trend in Ninewa has been for ISF
forces, notably the Iraqi Army, Special Forces, and Federal Police, to
lead in recapturing an area and briefly hold it for a couple weeks. They
then leave behind a contingent of the Federal Police and other forces
supported by TMF to hold the area, while the main fighting forces
advance further. In this “holding” role, tribal forces are assigned
basic guard duties, such as manning checkpoints or guarding government
facilities.

As intended, local forces have primarily been deployed in their local
areas only. However, in some cases and largely due to shortages of
forces in certain areas, tribal hashd have
been deployed outside their local areas to hold other territories
within Ninewa. For example, Sunni TMF forces that were largely drawn
from other parts of Ninewa played a role in securing both east and west Mosul
after liberation. Coalition tracking (shared with researchers)
suggested that after the liberation of east Mosul, in February 2017, 11
TMF units (approximately 2,700 forces) were helping with holding
operations in east Mosul.10 While
some of these TMF forces were drawn from east Mosul communities, others
were deployed from other areas of Ninewa, such as Qayyara.
The same pattern of deploying TMF from other areas of Ninewa also
appeared to be emerging in West Mosul just after liberation, with 10 TMF
units assigned to liberated areas of West Mosul in mid-June 2017.11 Those
working with the program noted it was harder to mobilize tribal
fighters from urban Mosul than it was in other, more rural and tribally
dominated areas, like Qayyara. Due to the shortage of forces to maintain
control in East Mosul, some TMF forces had to be called in from other
areas when other units moved on to operations in West Mosul.12

While the TMF program is dominant in Ninewa, there have been other
Sunni mobilization efforts. The largest of these initiatives is a
3,000-strong force organized by former Governor Ateel Nujaifi in July
2014, which is now known as the Ninewa Guard Force and was previously
called the Hashd al-Watani.
Nujaifi originally mobilized his forces, with Turkish support, to be
self-standing, which was viewed as a challenge to Baghdad’s authority
and illegal (the Iraqi Constitution states that any group organized
outside the Iraqi government is illegal). As of February 2017, they
continued to receive training from Turkish forces. The majority of other
reporting confirms that they also receive weapons and financial support
from Turkey but both Turkey and Nujaifi deny this.

In an interview for this study, Nujaifi said he never considered
mobilizing his forces under the TMF program because the limits on force
numbers, equipment, and resources made it “no real fighting force.” The
contrast between the level of training, weaponry, and equipment provided
to Sunni TMF fighters and those provided to many Shi’a PMF forces
(albeit largely by Iran) was evidence, in his view, that the decision to
support a Sunni TMF “was a political decision by Baghdad to keep Sunni
forces weak.”

While Nujaifi’s forces were initially independent, in late 2016,
after the PMF law legalized the PMF structure as equivalent to Iraqi
military forces, the Ninewa Guard Force officially joined the PMF.
Referring to the PMF law, Nujaifi argued, “I believe it was a mistake,
but we have to respect the law. I would prefer to place my force under
the Iraqi army, but the PMF law is the law. And so, we had to join the
PMF.”

Completely separate from Nujaifi’s forces, other Arab units under
individual tribal leaders have joined the two larger forces in Ninewa
(outside the ISF): the Peshmerga or the PMF. The KDP-Peshmerga has
established a 2,000-strong tribal force known as the Jazeera Brigade in
the Rabi’a, Zummar,
and Ayyadhiya sub-districts of Tal Afar. The Jazeera Brigade includes
two Sunni Arab battalions of 1,000 fighters each and one former TMF
unit, which calls itself the Ninewa Lions. The commander of the unit
says he switched over because the Iraqi government limited the number of
fighters he could have as part of his TMF unit and because he felt
Sunni forces received less equipment and pay than other forces did.

There have also been reports of TMF units switching programs and
allying themselves with Shi’a PMF forces in exchange for more money and
more advanced weapons and equipment than the US-backed program would
offer them. Local Sunni groups are engaged in an “arms race,” said one
US official at the US diplomatic mission to Iraq in Erbil, and each is
seeking more advanced weaponry, more fighters, and more funding than
their rivals (or potential future rivals). As this arms race ratchets
up, the US policy will not keep pace with the much better equipped and
less restricted Iranian-backed PMF forces. As the US official reflected,
“This is why the US has trouble competing with the Iranians – they give
more stuff, pay better, and do it quicker.”

There were some reports of Shi’a PMF recruiting Sunni tribal forces
in Ninewa. For example, Badr Organization reports that local Sunni
groups have joined their ranks in Ninewa. The RISE Foundation also
reported that a Sunni tribal unit drawn from locals in Mosul, the “Mosul Hashd,”
was stood up by the Badr Organization and Kata’ib Hizb Allah in
Mosul.39 However, it was not possible to confirm how frequently this
happens. Coalition tracking on TMF units is challenging because
coalition and US partners cannot physically visit TMF units but keep
touch remotely, by phone calls. In the very fluid situation in Ninewa,
with a plethora of different armed actors, often not clearly
identifiable, it is difficult to keep track of what any one force is
doing, or whom they are affiliated with.

Salah ad-Din

The Iraqi government did not allow a similar TMF program to be
developed in Salah ad-Din, despite requests from tribal leaders,
according to a US official. Instead, tribal forces wishing to fight ISIL
have still joined the overall PMF umbrella group, but have largely done
so in affiliation with one of the larger Shi’a PMF. The result has been
a much smaller, more fractured, and politically fraught mobilization in
Salah ad-Din.

Mobilization and recruitment of tribal forces in Salah ad-Din has
generally followed two patterns. In some cases, large Shi’a PMF groups,
primarily Badr and AAH, directly recruited local tribal forces in Salah
ad-Din as they entered or cleared areas.13 The Shammari Brigade in Dour
was initially mobilized around the time of liberation by both Badr and
AAH. More recently, there are reports that in the late spring of 2017, a
new group of Sunni PMF in Dour mobilized
to support the Khorasani Brigades in the region. In these cases, Shi’a
PMF often provide direct training to the Sunni forces mobilizing under
their leadership (a pattern that has been mirrored in the Shi’a PMF
mobilization of other local minority groups in Kirkuk).14

In other cases, tribal
leaders used personal contacts in Baghdad to request that their forces
be registered. To do so, though, they often had to go through one of the
major Shi’a PMF groups or, once registered, were assigned to one of
these groups for administrative management. Khalid al-Gibara, a former
leader of al-Alam’s local Sunni tribal PMF force, called the Sons of
al-Alam, illustrated some of these trends when he described how his
forces formed. He said that when ISIL captured al-Alam, he and many of
his tribal family members fled to Samarra, beyond the line of ISIL
control. Through informal contacts and personal connections, via a
person affiliated with AAH, al-Gibara expressed his intention to offer
his al-Alam tribal forces as part of the PMF. In addition to making his
initial connection through AAH, he said that the financial payments and
other supporting weaponry and supplies they get from Baghdad are
irregular. In order to effectively support his forces, al-Gibara decided
that they would have to affiliate with a larger PMF force – in this
case, AAH.

Although al-Gibara’s tribal unit was initially known as an AAH
affiliate, he said they later gained more independence and moved away
from the powerful Shi’a force because they did not like AAH’s behavior
and conduct toward locals. Their motivation in mobilizing was to defend
their local area, al-Gibara said, which was not necessarily AAH’s agenda
in Salah ad-Din. Other interviewees also suggested that some of the
al-Alam and Dour Sunni PMFs have been able to act more independently of
their Shi’a PMF sponsors in 2017 because the situation has become more
stable and Shi’a PMF forces’ direct control and influence in the Tikrit
area have waned vis-à-vis government forces. Nonetheless, there is still
some degree of affiliation and influence.

The necessity of linking themselves with Shi’a PMF, both as an
initial mobilization and registration route and for continuing resource
support, has led to a much smaller number of overall forces in Salah
ad-Din. Many Sunni tribal leaders deeply mistrust Shi’a PMF and even
those who later joined Shi’a PMF expressed mistrust for their motives in
Salah ad-Din. Thus, the fact that tribal groups could only effectively
join the PMF as an affiliate of these groups would have been a
significant deterrent. As a result, fewer Sunni tribal forces have
mobilized against ISIL in Salah ad-Din than in Ninewa. Although precise
numbers are hard to track down, interviews with tribal leaders suggested
that only 2,000-3,000 forces have been mobilized in all of Salah
ad-Din, in contrast with the 18,000 registered in Ninewa. There is also a
relatively higher number of forces from Dour, al-Alam, and Shirqat than
in other areas.

The degree of PMF control or direction over tribal forces in Salah
ad-Din depends in part on the role played by Sunni PMF in a given area.
The earliest and most operational Sunni PMF group in Dour is known as
the Shammari Brigade. It was formed in 2015, roughly concurrent with the
liberation of Dour, and initially worked with both Badr and AAH. At the
time of writing, it was closely affiliated with the Badr Organization’s
9th Brigade because the Shammari Brigade was assigned to help hold the
frontline along the Jilliam Desert in Dour,
an operation led by Badr’s 9th Brigade. Given this close tactical and
operational role, Badr not only administered the Shammari Brigade’s
salaries but also provided more regular, tactical direction. The
Shammari Brigade also coordinated with the Khorasani Brigade, which was
operating out of the nearby Hamreen mountains, although they did not
report directly to them.

In other cases, the Shi’a PMF may be able to use their administrative
control to ask for specific support from Sunni PMF but do not directly
control day-to-day activities. In Shirqat,
there is a tribal brigade known as the 51st Brigade, which is under the
direction of Yassin J’bouri, one of the most prominent political actors
in Salah ad-Din. The 51st Brigade reportedly has stronger independent
fighting abilities and has been operative for longer. Moreover, due to
its link with Yassin J’bouri and his political weight, this force has
been able to operate with some degree of autonomy, both in terms of
taking on particular operations and being less accountable to other
security or political actors in Salah ad-Din. However, according to
locals, the 51st Brigade still reports administratively to Shi’a PMF in
the area, which offers a degree of leverage. Shi’a PMF are not primarily
in Shirqat city, but they are posted along the main highway that is to
the west of the city. Shi’a PMF periodically conduct what they describe
as “inspection tours” in the Shirqat city area, or alternatively ask the
51st Brigade to conduct inspection tours and house searches on their
behalf and to report back to them on what is found.

The relationship between Sunni and Shi’a PMF is not necessarily a
one-way street and offers Sunni PMF advantages beyond financial support.
An affiliation with these larger Shi’a PMF offers a degree of
protection and autonomy. Members of the 51st Brigade have reportedly
engaged in illegal activities outside Shirqat, most notably the
extensive looting that happened in Tikrit immediately
after liberation. This looting and destruction was quite targeted
against rival tribes whom the Sunni PMF forces accused of supporting
ISIL and, in many cases, of directly perpetrating acts of destruction or
killing their family members when ISIL was in control. One local
analyst framed it as a quid pro quo between the Shi’a PMF and the Sunni
tribal forces affiliated with them at the time. During the recapture of
Tikrit, Shi’a PMF were supposed to stay out of the area (following an
agreement to withdraw that enabled US airstrike participation), and it
was relatively easy for them to do so because they could leave much of
the looting and revenge attacks to Sunni tribal forces. For their part,
the Sunni PMF forces were happy to exact revenge on local tribal rivals
who had supported ISIL and attacked their families only months before.
The general absence of rule of law and protections offered by the more
powerful Shi’a PMF were enabling factors that allowed the Sunni tribal
PMF to carry out their revenge.

Finally, the more ad hoc nature of Sunni tribal mobilization has
created meant that the role played by Salah ad-Din’s tribal forces
varies much more than those in Ninewa. Most tribal forces in Salah
ad-Din were established as needed or desired by Shi’a PMF, and the role
they play tends to vary according to the support functions the latter
need. In some areas, Sunni PMF simply act as local checkpoint guards or
take on other community-policing functions. In other areas, though, they
appear to be directly augmenting existing fighting forces – as has been
true with the Shirqat PMFs and likely will be true with the new
Khorasani Brigades – or helping to hold the frontline, as with the
Badr-affiliated Shammari Brigades in Dour. By
contrast, while some tribal forces in Ninewa have been closer to the
frontline, the creation of these forces under the auspices of the TMF
program (including its limitations on numbers, equipment, and local
deployment patterns) has largely kept them in a holding and
stabilization role.

Conclusion

The jury is still out on the medium- to long-term future for these
groups, which were mobilized without a specific off-ramp or
demobilization plan in mind. The cementing of the PMF’s status in the
PMF law, the ongoing security threats in both Salah ad-Din and Ninewa,
and the fact that Iraqi forces still do not have the manpower to deal
with such threats suggest that there will not be any immediate plans to
demobilize soon. As it is, new groups are being mobilized and added to
the official roster every month.

If and when demobilization processes do begin, do the differing
mobilization patterns and roles played by tribal forces in Ninewa versus
Salah ad-Din affect the likely future role of these forces, whether
they would be de-mobilized, and if not what role they would play? The
relatively stronger affiliation of the Ninewa TMF forces with the Iraqi
government, and their integration into regular, junior security roles on
a consistent basis might augur for longer staying power for Ninewa’s
tribal forces. They are already taking on basic security functions under
the auspices of Federal Police and local police forces in a way that
might naturally transition toward a local guard or constabulary force.
They also have much higher numbers as a whole (18,000 versus a couple
thousand in Salah ad-Din). Sudden demobilization or disbandment of the
TMF forces would create an influx of unemployed local fighters at a
scale not as present in Salah ad-Din.

On the other hand, the decision to keep each tribal unit small and
distinct in Ninewa means that they ultimately have very little political
power or independent influence. This is not to overstate the autonomy
and strength of tribal forces in Salah ad-Din. Salah ad-Din Sunni
forces’ subsidiary role to larger Shi’a PMF and their overall small
numbers also make them a very minor and for the most part insignificant
political actor in Salah ad-Din. However, some tribal forces operating
in Salah ad-Din have been able to build up substantial and independent
fighting capabilities and a greater degree of influence than the Ninewa
TMF. In short, there are no Yassin J’bouri type brigades among the TMF
in Ninewa. The one outlier, both in terms of fighting strength and
degree of political autonomy, is Ateel Nujaifi’s Ninewa Guards Force,
but it is not, as noted, part of the TMF. Even though the number of TMF
forces overall is very high, their fractured nature and limited
independent tactical and operational means would make them very easy to
co-opt, disband, or marginalize in the future.

Another factor that is relevant to consider is tribal forces’
relationship with larger Shi’a PMF forces, which have significant
staying power and political influence, and would be the last of any
group to de-mobilize (if ever). In Ninewa, the US resourcing of the
program via the Iraqi government has – at least until now – limited the
number of Ninewa TMF seeking other support through the Shi’a PMF. It has
also resulted in an overall stronger connection between the tribal
forces and Iraqi federal authorities than in Salah ad-Din (albeit most
prominently with the Federal Police, which have been so intermixed with Shi’a militia forces
in the past that they can appear interchangeable in some ways). But
there are already signs that this is changing, as TMF seek more generous
and less constrained backers via Shi’a PMF. The US support for the TMF
program is also not likely to be indefinite and may already be on the
wane.

Without US support, the new, overall politically weak, non-Shi’a PMF
are likely to be the first to be de-mobilized, or at least the first to
stop being paid. This would tend to increase the need for tribal forces
to seek other backers, such as the larger Shi’a PMF groups. As a result,
one of the more likely short- to mid-term possibilities is that in both
Ninewa and Salah ad-Din the only Sunni tribal forces that would
continue to be supported would be those who were useful local affiliates
of Shi’a PMF. While there is some evidence that Shi’a PMF groups like
Badr have tried to act with greater sensitivity in Sunni-dominant areas,
and have even brokered some local peace deals
and mitigated tribal conflict, the overall vision of Sunni tribal
forces existing only at the behest of Shi’a PMF does not appear to
likely to lead to long-term stability. At a minimum, it does not seem
likely to further the original rationale for mobilizing these forces –
the idea that empowering and integrating Sunni forces at an equal level
to Shi’a forces would reduce some of the drivers of Sunni
radicalization.

References

2 Estimates of the number of sahwa forces varies: the Miriam Benraad estimates 94,000 sahwa members as of November 2008, while the Guardian has an estimate of 80,000 sahwa
forces in March 2008, and Ariel Ahram provides a range of “an estimated
75,000 to 100,00 men, almost all Sunnis” by the end of 2007. Myriam
Benraad, “Iraq's Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 1 (March 2011) 121-131, http://www.mepc.org/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-its-rise-and-fall; Maggie O'Kane and Ian Black, “Sunni militia strike could derail US strategy against al-Qaida,” The Guardian, March 21, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/21/iraq.alqaida; Ariel Ahram, Proxy Warriors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 90.

5 By the time of US withdrawal in December 2011, only two-thirds of Sahwa
members had been integrated into the ISF, and many were in temporary or
lower-level positions. Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt,
and Todd C. Helmus, “Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local
Defense for Afghanistan and Beyond” Rand, 2012, 160, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1232.pdf.

7 The Anbar program has always had a two-tier approach:
one group of forces receive an official salary allocation ($500 per
month), a food stipend, and a death benefit, and an equal or slightly
smaller number (the ratio varies over time) of forces are part of what
is called a “Shield Force.” These fighters serve without pay but with
death benefits. An additional number of forces participate in activities
with other tribal members on a de facto basis but fall into neither
category. So at the high point of an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 forces
at the end of 2016, many were not paid, or were not an official part of
the program. In Ninewa, the program has always been more tightly
controlled because of greater political sensitivities surrounding Sunni
forces in Ninewa (from both the Kurdish and Iraqi sides). As a result, a
greater number of tribal forces has always been “on budget,” with
official salary allocations.

9 The US official affiliated with the TMF coined this
“revenge management.” He noted that for tribal leaders to have a role in
deciding which other tribal leaders or groups in formerly
ISIL-controlled areas are either killed, saved, or exiled, they need to
arrive in the liberated areas first, with enough armed men to impose
their will and decide what happens to whom.

10 This figure is based on tracking conducted by the US
Diplomatic Mission to Iraq and was shared with the members of the
research study.

11 This information is based on tracking conducted by the
US Diplomatic Mission to Iraq, and shared with the members of the
research study.

12 Not many TMF units were operating at a level where they
could be deployed to other areas, according to those involved with
them, but some of the older units had this capacity.

13 Even when groups are mobilized by Shi’a PMF, the tribal
leader will still go through Baghdad to complete the formal
registration process. This might happen before or after Shi’a PMF arrive
in an area. For example, there are reports of prominent tribal leaders
in an area being called to Baghdad to register their forces as the first
step in the process.

14 For example, Turkmen forces stood up in Kirkuk
governorate were provided training at the local PMF base at Taza
Khurmatu, with some training provided by Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah
instructors. A Badr Organization spokesman also noted in an interview
for this study that they had provided training to Sunni PMF forces at
the Taza camp, at the request of the Iraqi government. A small number of
local Sunni forces drawn from Tikrit exist, but it is also possible
that Sunni forces from neighboring Salah ad-Din are trained at the Taza
camp.