LOCKEMY, J.: Ralph D. Ware (Husband) appeals the family court's order denying his motion to vacate
its divorce orders. Husband argues the family court erred in failing to vacate
its orders because Wife had a full and fair opportunity to challenge the
personal jurisdiction of the circuit court of Randolph County, Alabama (Alabama
Court), which also entered divorce orders. We affirm.

FACTS

Husband
and Margaret P. Ware (Wife) were married on September 24, 1986. Over the next
fourteen years, the parties lived, worked, and purchased a home in South
Carolina. In 2000, Husband joined the Military Sea Lift Command, which caused
him to be at sea for long periods of time, sporadically returning to the
marital home. Husband returned to the marital home for the last time in 2005.

On January 5, 2007,
Husband filed for divorce in Alabama where he lived. Wife was served with the
Alabama divorce action on January 13, 2007. A month later, Wife filed for
divorce in South Carolina. Four days after Wife filed for divorce in South
Carolina, Alabama attorney Kesa M. Johnson appeared on Wife's behalf before the
Alabama Court "on the limited basis and for the sole purpose of filing a
motion to dismiss" Husband's complaint. In her Limited Notice of
Appearance, Wife explicitly stated she was not submitting to the jurisdiction
of the Alabama Court.

Wife
argued the Alabama Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction over both parties. According to Wife, Husband did not satisfy
Alabama's residency requirement to initiate a divorce action.[1]
Wife attached a signed affidavit to her motion explaining she has been a
resident of South Carolina her entire life and has only been to Alabama twice
to visit Husband's family. Wife continued, "I have never resided there, I
have never been registered to vote there, I have never had a driver's license
from there, [and] I have never owned real or personal property there."

After
a hearing in April 2007, the Alabama Court denied Wife's motion and
specifically stated:

A
hearing was held on April 4, 2007, on [Wife's] Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
for Divorce for [Husband's] failure to plead and prove residence as required by
Alabama statu[t]e. At said hearing, [Husband] appeared and testified as to his
domicile in Alabama since 2001. Furthermore, [Husband] has filed amended
pleadings that denote the same domicile. While the Court notes that [Husband]
spends most of his time at sea due to his profession, residency is based on
more than w[h]ere he lays his head each night.

The
Alabama Court's order failed to state whether it had personal jurisdiction over
Wife, instead focusing on its jurisdiction over Husband based on his domicile
in Alabama. Wife filed a motion to reconsider, noting the Alabama Court
addressed personal jurisdiction over Husband but failed to address personal
jurisdiction over her or jurisdiction over the marital property. Wife
reiterated her argument that the Alabama Court lacked jurisdiction over her and
the marital property and requested the Alabama Court reconsider its ruling.

The
Alabama Court did not rule on Wife's motion to reconsider, and instead set a
trial date for August 2007. Wife filed a motion for a continuance based on the
Alabama Court's failure to rule on her motion to reconsider. Soon thereafter,
Johnson filed a motion to withdraw as Wife's counsel, which the Alabama Court
approved. Wife's motion for reconsideration remained pending until after the
Alabama Court issued its final divorce order.

Meanwhile, Wife's
divorce action continued in South Carolina. Wife attempted to serve Husband
through certified mail, return receipt requested, but all certified mail was
returned undelivered. Wife moved to serve Husband by publication, which the
family court granted after Wife submitted an affidavit of publication at trial,
manifesting service by publication in compliance with the South Carolina Code.
Husband never responded to Wife's attempts to serve process on him and was
never involved in the South Carolina divorce action.

After
a final hearing in June 2007, the family court issued a final divorce order and
a supplemental Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) dividing Husband's
military retirement. The family court specifically found it had both subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties. The family
court equitably divided the parties' property, awarded Wife $750 in monthly
alimony, and awarded Wife $2,867.91 in attorney's fees.

Two months later, the
Alabama Court issued a final judgment of divorce. The Alabama Court declared the
divorce decree and QDRO entered by the family court "null and void and of
no effect." Further, the Alabama Court found Wife was served with legal
notice of the divorce proceeding and was represented by counsel. Additionally,
the Alabama Court averred:

Judge
Jocelyn Cate was sent notice of this Court's Order May 13, 2007, and yet
refused to abstain from further proceedings and even refers to the notice in
her Final Order, dated July 13, 2007. Once this Court obtained jurisdiction of
this proceeding, no other Court could proceed on any issues regarding a divorce
between the parties and resolution of all issues of the divorce proceeding.
Further, [Husband] is full time employed as a member of the Merchant Marine
Service and is only home 30 days per year. [Wife] and her attorney in South
Carolina, William J. Clifford, have to know these facts and yet they do not
inform the South Carolina Court of these facts, as is reflected in the records,
and attempted to have him served by notice in the Randolph Leader.

The Alabama Court
granted Husband's request for a divorce and titled his retirement, 2005 Ford
F-150, old uniforms, clothing and personal belongings into his name. Additionally,
the Alabama Court titled Wife's retirement and disability, 2006 Jeep Liberty,
household furnishings, and home in Charleston in her name. The order did not
mention alimony, attorney's fees, or life insurance.

After
issuing its final divorce order, the Alabama Court denied Wife's motion to
reconsider, finding "jurisdiction was proper [in Alabama] and that [Wife]
was properly served in this matter and failed to appear." Additionally,
the court noted, "this case was filed and [Wife] served prior to [Wife's]
commencement of the divorce action in South Carolina."

After both the
Alabama Court and the family court entered divorce orders, Husband requested
the family court vacate its orders pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3)-(5), SCRCP.[2]
In his motion, Husband argued jurisdiction attached in Alabama before Wife
filed for divorce in South Carolina; thus, South Carolina never had
jurisdiction.

The
family court denied Husband's motion to vacate based on Rule 60(b)(3) and
(b)(5), finding no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party, or evidence demonstrating any judgment was satisfied. The
family court then addressed Husband's Rule 60(b)(4) argument at length. The
family court found the Alabama Court had personal jurisdiction over Husband and
his marital status. However, the family court concluded the Alabama Court lacked
personal jurisdiction over Wife or in rem jurisdiction over the marital
property in South Carolina which would have prevented the family court from
exercising jurisdiction. The family court also found the Alabama Court's order
denying Wife's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was
not entitled to full faith and credit because it was not a final ruling on the
issue and Wife did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Alabama Court. Ultimately,
the family court denied Husband's motion to vacate and awarded Wife $2,425 in
attorney's fees that she requested. This appeal followed.

Issue
on Appeal

Did
the family court err in denying Husband's motion for relief from the final divorce
orders pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The
decision to grant or deny a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b), SCRCP, is within the sound discretion of the family court and can be
reversed only if the family court abused its discretion. Gainey v. Gainey,
382 S.C. 414, 423, 675 S.E.2d 792, 796-97 (Ct. App. 2009). "An abuse
of discretion occurs when the [family court's] order [is] controlled by an
error of law or the order is based on factual conclusions that are without
evidentiary support." Id. at 423, 675 S.E.2d at 797.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Husband
argues the family court erred in denying his motion to vacate the final divorce
orders. Specifically, Husband contends the family court erred in determining
its final divorce orders were not void because Wife had an opportunity to fully
litigate the issue of personal jurisdiction before the Alabama Court. Thus,
Husband contends the Alabama Court's determination it had jurisdiction over
Wife is entitled to full faith and credit. We disagree.

Initially,
we note neither party disputes the validity of the other party's divorce.
Accordingly, that the parties are divorced is the law of the case. SeeLucas v. Rawl Family Ltd. P'ship, 359 S.C. 505, 511, 598
S.E.2d 712, 715 (2004) (finding an unappealed ruling, right or wrong is the law
of the case). The principal issue before
this court is whether the division of the marital property ordered by the
Alabama Court is entitled to full faith and credit.

Pursuant
to article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution, "Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to . . . judicial [p]roceedings of
every other State." Thus, every state is required to give a judgment at
least the res judicata effect it would be afforded in the state where it was
rendered. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963); Hospitality
Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 356 S.C. 644, 653, 591 S.E.2d 611,
616 (2004) (citing Durfee, 375 U.S. at 109). "'A judgment of
a court without jurisdiction of the person or of the subject matter is not
entitled to recognition or enforcement in another state, or to the full faith
and credit provided for in the federal Constitution.'" Fin. Fed. Credit Inc. v. Brown, 384 S.C. 555, 562-63, 683 S.E.2d 486,
490 (2009) (quoting 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 986 (1997)); see alsoDurfee, 375 U.S. at 110 ("[A] judgment of a court in one State is
conclusive upon the merits in a court in another State only if the court in the
first State had power to pass on the merits—had jurisdiction, that is, to
render the judgment."). However, when the issue of jurisdiction has been fully
and fairly litigated and finally decided, further inquiry into the jurisdiction
of the issuing court is precluded. Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111; see alsoMarshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 297 (2006) (noting "Durfee stands only for the proposition that a state court's final judgment determining its own jurisdiction ordinarily qualifies for full faith and credit, so
long as the jurisdictional issue was fully and fairly litigated in the court
that rendered the judgment"). If the issue was not fully litigated, a
court "may inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's
decree." Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident
& Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 705 (1982).
Consequently, "[i]f that court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the relevant parties, full faith and credit need not be given." Id.

Under
Alabama law, Wife's special appearance before the Alabama Court to contest the
court's jurisdiction did not subject her to the jurisdiction of the Alabama
Court. SeeCity of Albany v. Spragins, 93 So. 803,
805 (Ala. 1922) (finding a limited appearance to contest personal
jurisdiction is not a waiver of the jurisdiction issue and does not submit the
defendant to the jurisdiction of the court). Further, in Alabama the denial of
a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a final ruling on
the issue. Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)
("A denial of a . . . motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction
is interlocutory and preliminary only."). The avenues of answer, summary
judgment, and trial were still available for Wife to challenge the personal
jurisdiction of the Alabama Court. Id. ("After such a denial, the
continuation of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who appropriately
persists in challenging it in the defendant's answer to the complaint and by
motion for summary judgment or at trial depends on the introduction of
substantial evidence to prove the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations in the plaintiff's complaint."). In fact, in his brief, Husband admits the
denial of Wife's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was interlocutory.[3]
Accordingly, we conclude the family court properly determined the issue of the
Alabama Court's personal jurisdiction over Wife was not fully and fairly
litigated and finally decided.

Because
we find the issue of the Alabama Court's personal jurisdiction over Wife was
not fully litigated, we examine whether the Alabama Court had personal jurisdiction
over Wife in order to determine whether the Alabama Court's marital property
division was entitled to full faith and credit. SeeUnderwriters
Nat'l Assurance, 455 U.S. at 705 (noting that if the court issuing the
order lacked jurisdiction over one of the parties, the order need not be afforded
full faith and credit); Roy T. Stuckey, Marital Litigation in South Carolina
82-83 (Timothy L. Brown et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2001) ("When multiple states
issue judgments in divorce cases, full faith and credit should be given to the
orders of the first court to act after establishing personal jurisdiction
over both parties.") (emphasis added). This determination requires us
to examine Alabama law.

The
record before us contains no evidence of contacts by Wife sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over her. Other than visiting Husband's family
twice, Wife had no contacts with Alabama. Thus, we find the family court
properly determined the Alabama Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Wife. Furthermore,
we note because the Alabama Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Wife, its
division of the marital property outside Alabama is void under Alabama Law. Wannamaker
v. Wannamaker, 976 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (holding a default
judgment purporting to adjudicate marital property was void because the court that
issued the judgment lacked personal jurisdiction over wife); Burke v. Burke,
816 So. 2d 498, 501 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (holding "[b]ecause [the
Alabama court] did not have in personam jurisdiction over the wife, that
portion of the order dealing with the division of property is declared void").
Accordingly, we find the Alabama Court's division of the parties' marital
property is not entitled to full faith and credit.[4]

Conclusion

For
the foregoing reasons, we hold the family court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Husband's motion to vacate its divorce orders pursuant to Rule
60(b)(4). Accordingly, the decision of the family court is

Affirmed.

Konduros and
Geathers,
JJ., concur.

[1] Section 30-2-5 of the Alabama Code provides,
"When the defendant is a nonresident, the other party to the marriage must
have been a bona fide resident of this state for six months next [sic] before
the filing of the complaint, which must be alleged in the complaint and
proved."

On
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:

. . .

(3)
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.

[3] Husband argues the interlocutory nature of the
Alabama Court's ruling is inconsequential because Wife failed to appeal after
her motion to reconsider was denied. However, Husband's argument is unavailing
and merely highlights that the issue of personal jurisdiction was not fully
litigated.

[4] In so finding, we give the Alabama Court's division
of marital property only the res judicata effect it would have in Alabama. Durfee,
375 U.S. at 109 (explaining the Full Faith and Credit Clause "requires
every State to give to a judgment at least the res judicata effect which the
judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it").