From Mubarak to Sisi: the end of liberal autocracy

Unlike during the Mubarak era, the current regime lacks a reliable civilian ally to populate the legislative branch of the state.

Demotix/Hussein Tallal. All rights reserved.Ever since the coup of July 2013 and the election of President Abdel Fattah El Sisi in 2014, the Egyptian regime has become increasingly autocratic.

Parliamentary elections only finally took place over the past few weeks, more than a year after Sisi came to power. Both executive and legislative powers have been and still are in the
hands of the president, and laws are being issued by decree. This includes a
number of repressive laws that have generated much controversy, namely the anti-terrorism law, and the anti-protest law. The latter, even though issued before Sisi’s election, was
kept in place and Sisi has openly voiced his support for
it.

This has been accompanied by the repression
of civil society and the labour
movement, reversing all the gains made during the late Mubarak era and during
the post-revolutionary period. Resistance to labour repression has manifested
itself in the recent Mahalla
textile worker strikes, a traditional hotbed for labour militarism against low
wages and corruption.

Comparatively, during the late Mubarak era, the regime took more of a
liberalised hue. The most prominent examples of this are the constitutional
amendments of 2005 and 2007, which allowed
for multi-candidate presidential elections for the first time in the country’s
history—which have continued since—and a devolution of greater power to
parliament.

This is not to argue that the Mubarak regime was not repressive;
rather that the nature of the regime was different, namely that of a 'liberal
autocracy' and that it went to some lengths to give the appearance of a
functioning democratic system. By contrast, Sisi’s regime seems to be focused
on greater power consolidation in the hands of the military and presidency, as
reflected by his call
to amend the constitution to reduce the power of the Egyptian parliament;
moving the regime away from any liberal tendency to become an outright
autocracy.

This can be attributed to the increased marginalisation of Mubarak era
civilian elites, and the power struggle between the military and these elites,
also known as the "new National Democratic Party" (NDP) guard. These elites, of which the most notable
example is Ahmed Ezz the steel tycoon, came to dominate parliament, the NDP and government during the late Mubarak era. The
liberalising trend of more power being devolved to parliament led to the
empowerment of these civilian elites, which increased their influence within
and over the state.

This also involved an increased "tolerance" of civil society, which was coopted by the same elites in order to
increase their power base. For example, syndicates were dominated by members of
the NDP, which were then used to provide direct support to the Mubarak regime.
This decentralisation of power aimed at empowering a new class: the crony
capitalists whose goal was to eventually take full control of the state.

Their power reached its apex during the Nazif government, the last
government of the Mubarak era; it was overtly controlled by crony capitalist businessmen.
This was, in essence, part of the project for Gamal
Mubarak to succeed his father with the support of this new civilian elite against
opposition by the military
establishment. This involved disenfranchising the old military elites and
eliminating their political and economic power, making them subordinate to the
NDP.

The Mubarak regime was a 'liberal autocracy'. Sisi’s regime is becoming an outright autocracy.

One of the clearest examples of this was the neo-liberal economic
policy followed by late Mubarak era elites, which led to their massive
wealth accumulation chipping away at the military’s economic empire. This
intra-elite rivalry could plausibly be argued as one of the main factors that
pushed the military to side with the protestors in early 2011 and remove Mubarak from power.

This explains why the military has now embarked on a systematic campaign
of disenfranchising these civilian NDP elites, both politically and economically, and reversing this liberalising trend. Economically, the military has aggressively expanded its activities,
primarily driven by aid from Gulf States, and mega infrastructure projects. This economic
expansion has essentially ‘crowded out’ Mubarak era elites by subjecting them
to severe economic pressure. By contrast, during the Mubarak era, these same
elites received generous state support and subsidies, which allowed for rapid
wealth accumulation in exchange for political loyalty to Gamal Mubarak.

On the political side, Sisi’s regime has embarked on a policy of
smothering these elites. The most prominent example is Ahmed Ezz himself, who was arrested, then freed, but barred from running for
parliament.

There are signs of this struggle in the way that the regime has been
trying to intervene in parliamentary elections. For example, Sisi has called
for a unified list to run for parliament
in order to support the state in its struggle against terrorism, a call which
was not welcomed by many parties.
This was followed by the creation of an electoral list called “For The Love of
Egypt”, whose general coordinator is Sameh Seif El Yazal, an ex-republican
guard officer and a security expert who is known for his close ties to the
military, and whose list is running with the proclaimed goal of supporting the
“Egyptian state” and supporting Sisi. This list has
recently dominated the first round
of the parliamentary elections.

This can be construed as an attempt by the regime to vet and control candidates in an attempt to
create new civilian elites who can provide the mass base it needs to control parliament
i.e. a new but loyal version of the NDP. For example, one of the most prominent
members of the list is Naguib Sawiris, the Egyptian
billionaire, who is not considered to have been part of the Mubarak era
political elites.

Mubarak era elites are still attempting to return
to the political scene through these parliamentary elections, however. Ex-NDP members
have either overtly
entered the race, or covertly funded parties
and individuals to enter the race on their behalf.

These parliamentary elections are a struggle between the two strongest
forces within Egyptian polity, the military and Mubarak era elites. Their level
of success is very difficult to gauge due to the covert nature of their
participation.

Then there is the Muslim Brotherhood, who have a rather
complicated relationship with the military. During the Mubarak era, the Muslim
Brotherhood acted as an illiberal opposition, where they were allowed to
penetrate civil society and participate in parliamentary elections in exchange
for ‘crowding out’ other opposition movements. During the first transitional
period, the Muslim Brotherhood shifted its position to act as an ally of the
military, against the protest movement, thus placing
itself as a civilian ally of the military, and acting as a regime stabiliser
during a period of severe turbulence.

Currently, the Brotherhood has been subjected to a period of
sustained, un-paralleled, physical repression. Thousands of
its members have been arrested or killed in confrontations with security
forces, and its leadership has been sentenced to death for charges ranging from
treason and espionage to inciting violence.

This means that the military has also discarded another potential
ally, which acted to stabilise the regime in times of crisis. This could pose
serious difficulties in populating parliament with potential allies, or at
least an opposition that the military can control. This tactic has eliminated
two social forces that could have channeled mass discontent away from the
military and the presidency, acting as regime 'stabilisers'. It is worth noting
that during his recent visit to the UK, Sisi claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood
are part of the Egyptian people, and that it was up to the Egyptians to decide
their level of participation—a notable change in stance, which might stem
from his desire to appease European public opinion.

The other civilian mass movement that could have acted as an ally to
the military is the largest Salafi party in Egypt—El
Nour Party. However, this party faces significant difficulties in playing this
role.

First, among the broader Islamist audience, the party lost significant
support due to its backing of
the coup that removed the Muslim Brotherhood from power. This severely reduced
its appeal to the wider Islamist audience. Second, for the more secular
audience, the general animosity against the Salafist movement was compounded
with general animosity against political Islam as a whole, especially after the
removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power. This means that any alliance between
the military and the El Nour Party would negatively affect the legitimacy of
the regime, which partly justifies its repression as protection against
political Islam.

The El Nour Party, rather than acting as the civilian ally that could
populate parliament, is a liability for the regime, unable to gain
the support of either an Islamist or a secular audience. This has been reflected in
the abysmal
performance of the party in the first round of the parliamentary
elections, which resulted in the party winning eight seats only.

Placed within this context, the delay of the parliamentary elections
and the regime’s fear
of the parliament and its attempt to control the process, is understandable. The
struggle for power between the military and civilian elites might spill over into
parliament, transforming it into a real organ for opposition to the regime,
which the regime will have serious difficulties in repressing without
significant loss of legitimacy domestically and internationally.

Thus, the call Sisi made to amend the constitution and limit the
power of the parliament is another move in the regime’s attempts to
disenfranchise civilian elites. The main threat that the regime faces is the
non-existence of a reliable civilian ally it can trust to populate the
legislative branch of the state. This lack of allies forces the regime to
attempt to cultivate a new elite close to the military, however, its success in
doing so is dubious at best.

As such, the regime has no choice but to concentrate power in its
hands and push the Egyptian political system to become a fully-fledged
autocratic system.

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