Networked tribes, system disruption and the emerging bazaar of violence. A blog about the future of conflict.

Saturday, 12 August 2006

AL QAEDA'S ACHILLES HEEL: RESIDUAL HIERARCHY

Early analysis of a rapidly unfolding operation, like the arrest/unravelling of the UK airplane liquid bomb plot, can easily be distorted by hype and erroneous information. Despite this potential minefield, here's my initial take on the event.

Here's the bad news. From all indications, it appears that the operation showed significant signs of open source warfare in both substance and structure. For example, the operation was characterized by: a self-organizing UK cell energized by al Qaeda's plausible promise, gathering of expertise/funding from al Qaeda in Pakistan, and innovative applications of technique/technology. Also, it appears that the operation wasn't directed at purely symbolic targets (using planes as guided missiles) but against the transportation infrastructure itself (like the successful attack on Madrid and last years attack on London). This slow shift reflects a growing realization, echoed by an increasing number of sources, that system disruption is more valuable in this war than the destruction of symbols.

Here's the good news. Al Qaeda's leadership provided too much centralized command and control of this operation after it connected with the UK cell. A great example of this, in microcosm, is a report that the suspects received a coded message from Pakistan that said, "attack now" just before the arrests. Operational control at this level is likely the cause of the factors that led to its failure. Here's why:

it increased the plans exposure due to extensive traffic/communication to/from/with cells in Pakistan (particularly coded traffic). This needlessly exposed the operation to state monitoring of cross border traffic and Pakistan's ISI (which has proven to be much better at counter-terrorism than western agencies).

it increased the size of the operation to ensure that it approached the scale of 9/11 (to counter the diminishing returns of terrorism). The result is that the greater the scale of the plot and the longer the length of the time line necessary to plan it, the greater potential of the plot's exposure.

it likely dictated the method and the target of the operation. The operation was focused on body counts, airplanes, and simultaneous detonation. It's very likely that a indigenous UK cell could have produced more innovation in method and target selection. In effect, any similarity to previous attacks increases the potential of detection.

Final thoughts. Al Qaeda's failures to decentralized command and control of this operation ultimately led to its failure. Despite this, the plot appears to have been close to fruition since there are signs that a significant amount of planning and intelligence gathering was accomplished before detection (which indicates that our ability to interdict these threats is still not much better than it was before 9/11, the only major difference between then and now is that we are aware that they can occur).

Unfortunately, given the strong trend lines towards further escalation of this epochal conflict, we can expect al Qaeda to recover from this failure quite quickly. The motivations necessary to activate groups are still running high and the tools/methods of this type of warfare are still readily available and applicable. However, as long as al Qaeda continues to exercise even a small modicum of centralized command and control: the spacing of attacks will be long, the targets will be within known groups, and the size of the plots will be large. The result is they will be relatively easier to detect than more sophisticated, innovative, and decentralized operations. Our problem really starts when they evolve to the next level and fully embrace open source warfare's decentralized approach (much as the problem we now face with Hezbollah, although their evolution reflects the different contextual requirements of their position on the spectrum of open source warfare).

Comments

AL QAEDA'S ACHILLES HEEL: RESIDUAL HIERARCHY

Early analysis of a rapidly unfolding operation, like the arrest/unravelling of the UK airplane liquid bomb plot, can easily be distorted by hype and erroneous information. Despite this potential minefield, here's my initial take on the event.

Here's the bad news. From all indications, it appears that the operation showed significant signs of open source warfare in both substance and structure. For example, the operation was characterized by: a self-organizing UK cell energized by al Qaeda's plausible promise, gathering of expertise/funding from al Qaeda in Pakistan, and innovative applications of technique/technology. Also, it appears that the operation wasn't directed at purely symbolic targets (using planes as guided missiles) but against the transportation infrastructure itself (like the successful attack on Madrid and last years attack on London). This slow shift reflects a growing realization, echoed by an increasing number of sources, that system disruption is more valuable in this war than the destruction of symbols.

Here's the good news. Al Qaeda's leadership provided too much centralized command and control of this operation after it connected with the UK cell. A great example of this, in microcosm, is a report that the suspects received a coded message from Pakistan that said, "attack now" just before the arrests. Operational control at this level is likely the cause of the factors that led to its failure. Here's why:

it increased the plans exposure due to extensive traffic/communication to/from/with cells in Pakistan (particularly coded traffic). This needlessly exposed the operation to state monitoring of cross border traffic and Pakistan's ISI (which has proven to be much better at counter-terrorism than western agencies).

it increased the size of the operation to ensure that it approached the scale of 9/11 (to counter the diminishing returns of terrorism). The result is that the greater the scale of the plot and the longer the length of the time line necessary to plan it, the greater potential of the plot's exposure.

it likely dictated the method and the target of the operation. The operation was focused on body counts, airplanes, and simultaneous detonation. It's very likely that a indigenous UK cell could have produced more innovation in method and target selection. In effect, any similarity to previous attacks increases the potential of detection.

Final thoughts. Al Qaeda's failures to decentralized command and control of this operation ultimately led to its failure. Despite this, the plot appears to have been close to fruition since there are signs that a significant amount of planning and intelligence gathering was accomplished before detection (which indicates that our ability to interdict these threats is still not much better than it was before 9/11, the only major difference between then and now is that we are aware that they can occur).

Unfortunately, given the strong trend lines towards further escalation of this epochal conflict, we can expect al Qaeda to recover from this failure quite quickly. The motivations necessary to activate groups are still running high and the tools/methods of this type of warfare are still readily available and applicable. However, as long as al Qaeda continues to exercise even a small modicum of centralized command and control: the spacing of attacks will be long, the targets will be within known groups, and the size of the plots will be large. The result is they will be relatively easier to detect than more sophisticated, innovative, and decentralized operations. Our problem really starts when they evolve to the next level and fully embrace open source warfare's decentralized approach (much as the problem we now face with Hezbollah, although their evolution reflects the different contextual requirements of their position on the spectrum of open source warfare).

On Brave New War

G. Gordon Liddy Show (radio)...this is a seminal book in the truest sense of the term.. way ahead of the curve... go out and buy it right now -- G. Gordon Liddy

City JournalRobb has written an important book that every policymaker should read -- Glenn Reynolds (Instapundit)

Small Wars JournalWithout reservation Brave New War is for professional students of irregular warfare and for any citizen who wants to understand emerging trends and the dark potential of 4GW -- Frank Hoffman

Scripps Howard News ServiceA brilliant new book published by terrorism expert John Robb, titled "Brave New War," hit stores last month with virtually no fanfare. It deserves both significant attention and vigorous debate... - Thomas P.M. Barnett

Chet Richards DNIJohn has produced an important book that should help jar the United States and other legacy states out of their Cold War mindset. You can read it in a couple of hours – so you should read it twice...

Washington Times / UPIRobb correctly finds the antidote to 4GW not in Soviet-style state structures such as the Department of Homeland Security, but in decentralization -- William Lind (the father of 4th generation warfare).

Robert PatersonHaving painted a crystal clear picture of how a war of networks is playing out, he comes to an astonishing conclusion that I hope he fills out in his next book.

The Daily DishJohn Robb of Global Guerrillas has written the most important book of the year, Brave New War. - Daily Dish (The Atlantic)

Simulated LaughterWell-written. Brave New War reads more like an action novel than a ponderous policy book. - Adam Elkus

FutureJackedGo buy a copy of this book. Now. If you are low on cash, skip a few lunches and save up the cash. It is worth it. - Michael Flagg

ZenPunditThe second audience is composed of everyone else. Brave New War is simply going to blow them away. - Mark Safranski

Haft of the SpearThere aren’t a lot of books that make me recall a 12-year-old self aching for the next issue of The Invincible Iron Man to hit the shelves. Well done.
- Michael Tanji

Ed ConeHis book posits an Army of Davids -- with the traditional nation state in the role of Goliath. - Ed Cone (Ziff Davis)

Shloky.comThis is the first real text on next generation warfare designed for the general population and it sets the bar high for following acts. It is smart, it is a short read, and it will change your thinking. - Shlok Vaidya

Politics in the ZerosI suggest this is something Lefties need to start thinking about now, as that decentralized world is coming. - Bob Morris