CHAPTER VII
The Advance on the Beachhead

The Japanese had again done the unexpected. Instead of holding Ioribaiwa
tenaciously as General MacArthur had assumed they would, they had thinned out
their lines and withdrawn after the opening encounter. Their withdrawal, if
unexpected, nevertheless enabled GHQ for the first time in the campaign to
issue a comprehensive plan on 1 October looking to the envelopment and
destruction of the enemy at the Buna-Gona beachhead. This plan and the more
detailed instructions of 11 October provided for the recapture of Goodenough
Island and stipulated that the troops available to the Commander, New Guinea
Force, would move on the beachhead along three axes of advance: along the
Kokoda Trail; via the Kapa Kapa-Jaure track or the Abau-Namudi-Jaure route; and
up the coast northwestward from Milne Bay. (Map 6) The advance would be in
two stages. The troops moving overland would, before any further advance,
secure the line of the Kumusi River from the Owalama

Map 6
Plan of 1 October 1942

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Divide (north of Jaure) to the crossing of the Buna-Kokoda track at Wairopi.
Those moving up from Milne Bay would first secure Goodenough Island and the
coastal area to the northward as far as Cape Nelson. When these areas were
secured, a concerted advance by all land forces upon the Buna-Gona area would
be ordered.1

The Approach To the Target

General MacArthur Explains the Plan

Because General MacArthur always had to consider the possibility that the
Japanese might succeed in retaking Guadalcanal, and that they would then throw
all their available forces into New Guinea, the plan had been so drawn that his
troops could be extricated should they be met by overwhelming force or should
their supply lines by sea or across the mountains fail. Emphasizing that the
situation in the Solomons had "a direct and vital bearing upon our operations,"
General MacArthur explained the basic reason for the provision in the Operation
Order of 1 October which required that the line of the Kumusi River be secured
in preparation for "an offensive against the north coast of New Guinea to be
executed upon order from General Headquarters."

. . . the successful employment, [he wrote] of any considerable number of
troops on the north shore of New Guinea is entirely dependent upon lines of
communication. The enemy has complete control of the sea lanes, and we are not
now, nor have any reasonable expectation of being in position to contest that
control. In consequence, although we shall employ shipping to the maximum
extent possible in the supply of our troops, our fundamental plans are limited by the fact
that the enemy can cut that line at will, even with so small a force as a few
torpedo boats. . . .

The general continued:

. . . It must be contemplated that any organization engaged on the north shore
of New Guinea must be ready and able to withdraw successfully across the
mountains with only such supplies as can be made available by air and by native
carriers. A local success attained at a time when the enemy is devoting his
attention to the Solomons, must not blind us to the fact that basic conditions
which have heretofore limited our action in New Guinea are unchanged, and that
in the absence of secure lines of communication on the north coast of New
Guinea we still are unable to maintain large forces there. In consequence, our
advance must be so planned that if supply lines fail, or if we are met by
overwhelming forces, we can withdraw to our previously occupied defensive
positions.

It was with an eye to such an eventuality that Colonel Sverdrup (who had
meanwhile reported adversely on the Abau-Jaure track) had again been sent to
New Guinea with instructions to discover and develop landing strips and
dropping grounds in the area beyond the mountains north of Abau.2

General MacArthur's purpose was clear. The risks of the advance would be
counterbalanced by a secure line of retreat. If the

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maneuver for whatever reason turned out badly, it would at least be possible to
extricate the forces and use them to fight again under more favorable
circumstances.

Logistic Preparations

As preparations for the offensive gathered momentum, a much-needed
consolidation of Australian and U.S. supply services in New Guinea was
effected. On 5 October General Headquarters established the Combined
Operational Service Command (COSC). The new command was to operate under New
Guinea Force and to control all Allied line of communications activities in
Australian New Guinea. Brig. Gen. Dwight F. Johns, U.S.A., Deputy Commander,
United States Army Services of Supply, was designated its commander, and Brig.
V. C. Secombe, Australian Staff Corps, became his deputy. All Australian and U.S. supply elements in the forward area were placed under General Johns's
command. In addition to carrying out routine service of supply functions, the
new command took over control of a pool of small boats or luggers which were
being assembled at Milne Bay for use in operations against Buna.3

Dock and port improvements at Milne Bay and Port Moresby were by this time well
advanced. The acute shortage of engineer troops in the combat zone was being
remedied by the transfer to New Guinea from Australia of all available engineer
troops, a process that in the case of the U.S. engineers had begun in earnest
in August. At Milne Bay, a permanent T-shape wharf to replace the previous
makeshift was finished in early October. At Port Moresby the half-mile causeway to Tatana
Island was completed by the end of the month. The benefit to Allied logistics
was very great. Several large ships could be unloaded simultaneously, where
previously it had been possible to unload only one. A small tropical anchorage,
capable initially of unloading and storing only 500 tons of cargo a day, had
been transformed into a busy port which already had several times that
capacity, and which ultimately would have a capacity nine times that figure. It
was a noteworthy achievement, and one of which General Casey could well be
proud.4

The airfield construction program was almost complete. With few exceptions, the
airfields at both Port Moresby and Milne Bay were either finished or due to be
completed shortly, and a 120-day supply level was being built up at both
points.5
A tremendous amount of construction still remained to be done in the
forward area, but it could be completed concurrently with the offensive.

The Recapture of Kokoda

To marshal the troops and bring them in concerted fashion before their
objective over the mountains and along the coast of a vast,

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undeveloped, jungle-covered island like New Guinea was to be no easy task. The
first drive, that along the Kokoda Trail, was already under way, with the
Australians under Maj. Gen. Arthur S. Allen, General Officer Commanding, 7th
Australian Infantry Division, in pursuit of the retreating Japanese. After
abandoning Ioribaiwa, the latter had withdrawn through the Gap, and by 8
October were at Templeton's Crossing. (Map IV) Entrenching themselves on high
ground on either side of the entrance to Eora Creek Gorge, the Japanese, now
principally troops of the 2d Battalion, 144th Infantry, held for a week and
then withdrew to Eora Creek. On orders of General Horii, who was then at
Kokoda, the main body of the 144th Infantry rejoined the 2d Battalion on 17
October at Eora Creek where a further stand was made.6

The Japanese had suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Australians and were
being relentlessly bombed and strafed from the air by the Fifth Air Force.
Their troops were suffering from beriberi, dysentery, lack of food, and some
had already begun to practice cannibalism.7
Yet they held to their positions
tenaciously and could be dislodged only by frontal attack and the same flanking
tactics that the Japanese themselves had used so effectively in the advance to
Ioribaiwa.

The troops of the 25th Brigade, forced to scale the heights where the enemy troops were entrenched, pushed them out of
one strong point after the other. The 16th Brigade, under Brig. John E. Boyd,
relieved the 25th Brigade on 20 October. Aided by the 25th Brigade's 2/31
Battalion, the fresh troops of the new brigade soon cleared the Japanese out of
the Eora Creek area and, shortly thereafter, forced them out of Alola. The
144th Infantry next fell back on Oivi where it was relieved on 29 October by a
fresh force from the beachhead under command of Colonel Yazawa. The new force,
a composite battalion of 41st Infantry troops strongly reinforced with
artillery and engineer elements, was ordered to dig itself in on the heights at
Oivi and to hold its positions as long as possible in order to cover the
movement of the 144th Infantry across the Kumusi River. The 41st Infantry
troops, who had brought all the food and ammunition with them that they and
hundreds of impressed Rabaul natives could carry, quickly dug themselves in on
the heights and prepared for a major stand.

After a short rest the 25th Brigade had again gone into action, and it occupied
Kokoda on 2 November. The Australian flag was raised there on that day by Maj.
Gen. George A. Vasey, who had taken over command of the 7th Division from
General Allen a few days before. With Kokoda airfield in Australian hands, and
the 25th and 16th Brigades converging on Oivi, the pursuit was virtually over.8
The troops along the first axis of advance had almost reached their objective.

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Securing the Coast

The problem still remained how to secure the coast from Milne Bay to Cape
Nelson. Since there were then no landing craft in the theater, General
MacArthur had issued orders in August that as many shallow-draft boats as
possible be assembled at Milne Bay to serve the purpose.9

Planning for the move had scarcely begun when the possibility arose that Marine
Corps troops would be made available for the task. The initiative had come from
Admiral King, who ordered Admiral Nimitz on 8 September to release a regiment
of trained amphibious troops to the Southwest Pacific Area. The 8th Marine
Regiment was chosen for the task. Notified four days later by General Marshall
that the regiment would be turned over to him by Admiral Ghormley on or about 1
October, General MacArthur began at once to plan for the use of the Marine unit
in the coastal infiltration.10

General MacArthur did not get the Marine regiment. Admirals Nimitz and Ghormley
had grave objections to releasing it and told Admiral King that this highly
trained amphibious unit should not be used to do a job that General MacArthur's
available troops in shallow-draft barges could probably do as well. Admiral
King apparently considered the point well taken. The offer of amphibious troops
was withdrawn, and General MacArthur was left with the task of securing the northeast coast of Papua as best he could from his own
resources.11

By this time, it had become clear that to send the troops up the coast by boat
would be both slow and dangerous. For one thing there were not nearly enough
shallow-draft boats in sight to do the job properly; for another the route
between Milne Bay and Cape Nelson and beyond Cape Nelson was strewn with
uncharted reefs. Finally, as General Blamey observed to General MacArthur, to
use the boats for the forward movement would not only delay the operation but
might also result in the troops' meeting the same fate that befell the Japanese
on Goodenough Island.

There was fortunately a better way. In July the local Australian authorities
had cleared off and barricaded an airstrip at Wanigela Mission on Collingwood
Bay, a point within easy marching distance of Cape Nelson. It became possible
therefore to get the troops forward by air, and to use the boats to supply them
from Milne Bay as soon as a clear channel could be charted through the reefs.
The air force, which by this time had the space, undertook to fly the troops
in, and a party of coastwatchers in the small motorship HMAS Paluma began
charting the required clear-water channel to Cape Nelson.12

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The 2/10 Battalion of the 18th Brigade and attached U.S. engineer and
antiaircraft troops were flown into Wanigela from Milne Bay on 5 and 6 October
by the 21st and 22d Transport Squadrons of the Fifth Air Force. The troops
immediately began securing the area and preparing it for the reception of more
troops. By that time the Paluma had completed the charting of the channel to
Cape Nelson, and the boats, laden with supplies, began moving forward to
Wanigela from Milne Bay.13

General Blamey had planned to follow the 2/10 Battalion with the rest of the
18th Brigade as soon as the 17th Brigade (which was to replace it at Milne
Bay) arrived there and the supply of the Wanigela area by sea was assured. To wait
for the arrival of the 17th Brigade would have meant a considerable delay
inasmuch as it was not due at Milne Bay until late October. General Blamey
decided therefore to use the 128th Infantry (then still at Port Moresby) to
reinforce the Wanigela garrison. By doing so, Blamey believed he would not only
save time but would also help out the air force, which was reluctant to use the
airfields at Milne Bay for troop movements because they were inferior to those
at Port Moresby.14

On 13 October the 2/6 Independent Company and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the
128th Infantry were ordered to Wanigela by air, the 3d Battalion, under Lt.
Col. Kelsie E. Miller, leading. The air movements began next morning with the initial flights originating at Laloki
airfield near Port Moresby. By 18 October, most of the regiment was at
Wanigela. The Band, the Antitank Company, the Service Company, and two
companies of the 1st Battalion had to be left temporarily at Port Moresby when
the field at Wanigela became unusable because of heavy rains.15

Preliminary reconnaissance had indicated that there were excellent trails in
the Wanigela-Cape Nelson area. It was therefore planned that the troops would
march from Wanigela to Pongani, a point on the western shore of Dyke Ackland
Bay, about thirty miles from Buna, which was known to be free of Japanese. The
men of the Australian Independent Company, who were specially trained in jungle
operations, were to go first, and the 3d, 2d, and 1st Battalions, 128th
Infantry, were to follow in that order. The trail, which lay diagonally across
the neck of the Cape Nelson Peninsula, was cut by the Musa River at Totore, a
day's march from Wanigela, and reputedly the only good river crossing in the
area.

It was soon discovered that the reconnaissance reports had been mistaken about
the condition of the trails in the Wanigela-Pongani area. The river was rising
rapidly and most of the trails in the area had been obliterated. Traveling with
little but their rifles, the Australian commandos who left on the 14th as
planned, managed to reach Pongani, but the heavily loaded 3d Battalion,

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only a day behind the Australians, was unable to get through. After
floundering in knee-deep swamps, the men reached Totore on the afternoon of 16
October, and went into camp near by at Guri Guri, called by Colonel Miller "the
most filthy, swampy, mosquito infested area" that he had ever seen in New
Guinea.

A crossing by log raft was attempted at a nearby native village. Reconnaissance
on the far side showed that a crossing there would put the battalion on the
wrong route, and the project was abandoned in favor of a crossing farther
upstream. On 18 October, 1,500 feet of cable was dropped from the air at Guri
Guri. No tools, tie wire, clamps, or bolts were dropped with the cable. Company
M, under Capt. Frank N. Williams, and a platoon of Company C, 114th Engineer
Battalion, carried the cable, strung out by hand, to the upstream site and
started establishing the crossing there.

Though still without tools, clamps, or tie wire, Captain Williams soon had a
makeshift crossing over the Musa. It too was abandoned when ANGAU passed on
the information that the trail leading out of the site was under seven feet of
water, and impassable to anything except small boats and native canoes.

On 23 October Company M and the engineer platoon rejoined the 3d Battalion,
which had been ordered from Guri Guri to Gobe, west of Porlock Harbor. The
battalion was to be shuttled from Gobe to Pongani in such of the boats coming
in with supplies from Milne Bay as could negotiate the treacherous waters
around Cape Nelson. The 2d Battalion, which had been just behind the 3d on the
Wanigela-Totore track, was ordered back to Wanigela, to be moved to Pongani by
sea as soon as shipping was available. The elements of the 1st
Battalion present at Wanigela were to follow immediately, and the rest of the
battalion was to be transferred to Pongani in the same fashion as soon as it
reached Wanigela.16

The 3d Battalion marched overland from Totore to Gobe in
two echelons, taking approximately four days for the move. Some of the men
picked up malaria in the mosquito-infested swamps along the Musa, and the
weakening effects of the march were apparent in the subsequent operations of
the battalion.17

The coastal shuttle had meanwhile gone into operation, despite the fact that
little was known at that time about the waters past Wanigela. The available
information was that boats of up to twelve-foot draft could safely negotiate
the coastal waters between Milne Bay and Wanigela, but that only small luggers
or trawlers would be able to get around Cape Nelson because of submerged reefs
in that area, some of them only a few feet from the surface. The plan for the
shuttle was worked out accordingly. Large fishing boats of between 100 and 120
tons, loaded so as to draw not more than twelve feet of water, would bring the
supplies forward from Milne Bay to Wanigela, and a flotilla of eight luggers
with an average

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displacement of about 20 tons, would carry them around Cape Nelson to
Pongani. The larger boats were to be under control of the Combined Operational
Service Command, while the luggers would come under command of Lt. Col.
Laurence A. McKenny, Quartermaster of the 32d Division.18

The first two luggers reached Wanigela on 17 October and were at once sent forward to Pongani with
men and supplies. Early the following morning, a Fifth Air Force B-25 mistook
them for the enemy and bombed the boats off Pongani. Two men were killed: Lt.
A. B. Fahnestock, in charge of small boat operations for the COSC, and Byron
Darnton, a veteran correspondent of The New York Times who had served with the
32d Division during World War I, and had looked forward to reporting its
operations in World War II. Several others were wounded, and one of the boats
suffered such severe damage that it had to be withdrawn from the run.19

Despite this initial error, and the fact that the luggers did not operate
during daylight to avoid being attacked by Japanese aircraft, the
Wanigela-Pongani shuttle continued in successful operation through the rest of
October. The few quartermaster troops under Colonel McKenny's command had a
difficult time of it. There were no piers or jetties in the area and no
lighters. To unload the luggers they had to pile the cargo on native outrigger
canoes, rowboats, or canvas-sided engineer boats. Then, aided wherever possible
by natives and tactical forces from the shore, they would take to the water
and, stark naked, push the tiny craft through the breakers, unload, and go back
again, making dozens of trips through the night without rest in order to be on
their way again before daylight.20

These small seaborne supply and troop movements had their effect. By 2
November, the day the Australians retook Kokoda, the 128th Infantry, less only
the elements still at Port Moresby, was at Pongani and Mendaropu and rapidly
growing supply dumps had been established at both points.21

The discovery by the Paluma in early November that the larger vessels operated by the COSC could
safely round Cape Nelson further increased the usefulness of the luggers. The
bigger boats from Milne Bay began discharging their cargo at Porlock

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COASTAL SHUTTLE OPERATIONS

--109--

Harbor, and the luggers, in turn, began shuttling between Porlock and
Pongani.22

The Recapture of Goodenough Island

GHQ had ordered that, in addition to securing the coast between Milne Bay and
Cape Nelson, the Commander, New Guinea Force, was to recapture Goodenough
Island, a flanking position which in enemy hands could imperil the advance
along the northeast coast of Papua. The task of taking the island went to the
2/12 Battalion of the 18th Brigade, then still at Milne Bay. The troops, in
two destroyers, were landed on both sides of the island's southern tip on the
night of 22-23 October and drove inland.23

There were some 290 Japanese on the island, sixty of the 353 troops of the
Sasebo 5th SNLF who had been stranded there on 26 August having been evacuated
to Buna by submarine before the Australians landed.24
The submarine had brought
in food and ammunition, and the remaining Japanese, well dug in, resisted
tenaciously during the daylight hours of the 23d, but only to gain time. That
night, the submarine came in again. Shuttling back and forth through the night, it deposited 250 Japanese troops on nearby Fergusson
Island, where they were picked up by a cruiser and taken to Rabaul. The few
stragglers left behind on Goodenough were quickly mopped up by the Australians
who at once took appropriate measures for the island's security.25

The March to Jaure

On the Kapa Kapa trail, meanwhile, Captain Boice and a small party were
advancing toward Jaure and Major Baetcke, in command at "Kalamazoo," was
building a forward supply base at Arapara, about thirty miles away by trail.
Though the road was still unfinished, it was possible by this time for jeeps to
travel over it as far as Nepeana, a distance of about fourteen miles. Over the
remaining sixteen miles the track was so steep and so rough that native
carriers had to be used to do the job. Supervised by ANGAU officers the natives
were hard at work moving the supplies forward on their backs.26

The results of Captain Boice's reconnaissance were soon in. After being delayed
at Laruni, about fifty miles out, because he had run out of rations and an
airdrop that he had asked for had not materialized in time, Boice had finally
reached Jaure on 4 October. Next day he reported by radio that the trail
although taxing was practicable for marching. General Harding, who had moved
the divisional CP to Kalamazoo,

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KAPA KAPA TRAIL, SEPTEMBER 1942

at once secured permission from New Guinea Force to send forward an advance
echelon of the 126th Infantry. Except for Company E, at Nepeana, the regiment
was then encamped at Bootless Inlet near Port Moresby. The advance unit was to
be composed of the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, supported by troops of the
regimental Antitank and Cannon Companies operating as riflemen, who were to go
first.

The Antitank and Cannon Companies and a small medical detachment, all under the
command of Captain Medendorp, left Kalikodobu for Nepeana en route to Jaure on
6 October. At Nepeana, Medendorp was to use forty-five men from Company E--a
five-man communications detachment under 1st Lt. James G. Downer and a forty-man
rifle platoon under 1st Lt. Harold B. Chandler, Jr.--as his advance guard. The
force as it left Kalikodobu numbered 250, with 100 natives attached.
Medendorp's orders were to establish dropping grounds at Laruni and Jaure and
to build up stocks of food and supplies there for the use of the main force
when it began moving. By arrangement with the air force, the Band, Service, and
Casual Companies were to load the planes and do the actual dropping.

Because the troops were fresh to the jungle, too heavily burdened, and not in
top condition, the first day's march to Nepeana (where Company E was
encamped) did not go well. Hearing that the troops had fared

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badly, General Harding, who reached Nepeana by jeep early the next morning to
see the men off, gave orders that their packs be lightened and their ammunition
cut down. In addition, he ordered the forty-five men detailed as advance guard
to push ahead for Jaure "without regard to the progress of the other two
companies. . . ." Lieutenants Downer and Chandler--Downer going first--were to
come under command of Captain Boice upon their arrival at Jaure, where they
were ultimately to be reunited with their company.27

The second day's march, through comparatively easy country, went off without
difficulty. The next day when the foothills of the range were reached told a
different story, especially for the troops of the Antitank and Cannon
Companies. These men were in much poorer condition than the men of the advance
guard, who had been longer in the area and had had a chance to toughen up while
helping the engineers build the road to Nepeana.

As Medendorp recalls the situation:

The troops had no trail discipline. The hills were steeper. Footing was
insecure. Leeches and insects began to be a nuisance. The trail was strewn with
cast-off articles. Leather toilet sets, soap, socks, and extra underwear told a
tale of exhaustion and misery. Upon reaching streams, the men would rush to
them and drink, regardless of the fact that upstream some soldier might be
washing his feet. The trail was filled with struggling individuals, many lying
on one side panting for breath. The medical officer bringing up the rear,
reached the bivouac that night with a platoon of limping and dazed men. There
were no stragglers however, for it was feared all through the march that
stragglers might be killed by a Jap patrol.28

On the fourth day the troops reached Arapara, halfway to Laruni, and the last
point which could be supplied from Kalamazoo.29
The next day most of the native
carriers deserted, and the weary troops were left to carry their rations and
heavy supplies themselves.

After a hard uphill climb the Medendorp force reached Laruni, which was on a
mountain top, on 13 October. The advance guard, traveling light and moving
fast, was a day ahead. On 14 October, just as the Medendorp force began
establishing a dropping ground at Laruni, the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry,
under the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Henry A. Geerds, began leaving
Kalikodobu for Jaure. Attached was the 19th Portable Hospital and a platoon of
the 114th Engineer Battalion. The force was almost 900 strong and had several
hundred native carriers accompanying it. The companies were following each
other at a day's interval, with Company E,

--112--

under Captain Schultz, leading, and Company F, under Lt. Erwin Nummer,
immediately behind.

After leaving a forty-two-man detachment at Laruni to take care of the dropping
ground, Medendorp pushed on to Jaure and reached it on 20 October, four days
after Downer and Chandler got there. The next day, on orders of New Guinea
Force, he sent a fifty-man detachment of the Cannon Company northeastward into
the Kumusi River Valley. These men were to be joined immediately by the rest of
the troops of the Antitank and Cannon Companies, in order to prevent a possible
Japanese attack on Jaure from the Wairopi area.

The march was much more difficult for the 2d Battalion than for the troops with
Boice and Medendorp because, while it had rained spasmodically during the first
two weeks of October, the heaviest rains fell just as the battalion began
leaving Kalikadobu. Beginning 15 October, a steady downpour gave the men no
respite through five days and five nights. Even after the elements abated a
little, heavy rains during the afternoon and at night left the troops drenched
and miserable.

The Owen Stanley divide at Mount Suwemalla (or, as the troops called it, "Ghost
Mountain"), was a dank, eerie place a few days out of Laruni. It rose 2,000
feet higher than the Gap, and the terrain was, without qualification, rougher
and more precipitous than that over which the Australians and Japanese were
struggling further to the northwest. Captain Schultz reported that the trail
was so narrow that "even a jack rabbit couldn't leave it." The troops had to
march in single file, and there was usually no place on either side of the
trail for a bivouac. In the jungle the men stumbled over vines and roots with every step as they made their way through the muck
and slime. The ever-present mud was sometimes so deep that the men sank into it
up to their knees and had to have help in extricating themselves. The swollen
mountain streams through which the men had to wade had currents of up to twenty
miles per hour--sufficient to knock a man down during some of the crossings.

To follow the stream beds gave no relief. Not only were they cluttered with
immense boulders but the streams became roaring torrents at a moment's notice,
and the men had no choice but to take to the trail again.

Immense ridges, or "razorbacks," followed each other in succession like the
teeth of a saw. As a rule, the only way the troops could get up these ridges,
which were steeper than along the Kokoda Trail, was either on hands and knees,
or by cutting steps into them with ax and machete. To rest, the men simply
leaned forward, holding on to vines and roots in order to keep themselves from
slipping down the mountainside.

Plunging down the face of one such ridge, the troops would find themselves
faced with the towering slope of another only a stone's throw away. Four or
five ridges--only a few miles as the crow flies--meant a day's march. The same
troops that, in one instance, stumbled, slipped, or fell more than 2,000 feet
in forty minutes on a downward slope took almost eight hours, most of it on
hands and knees, to cover the last 2,000 feet of the 9,000-foot divide.

Profiting from the experience of Boice and Medendorp, the battalion had
stripped for the march. Gas masks, helmets, mess kits, and heavy weapons had
been left behind, and the ammunition load had been cut down. But so rough was
the trail and so

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arduous the march that even the lightened packs proved too heavy. Piece by
piece, the men discarded toilet articles, raincoats, shelter-halves, mosquito
nets, and even blankets. As a result the troops, who were constantly at the
mercy of chiggers, mites, mosquitoes, and leeches, spent their nights being
cold as well as wet.30

The men had been poorly fed. They were, for the most part, on the Australian
ration--hardtack, bully beef, and tea, supplemented by a little rice. Because
the unceasing wet had made it virtually impossible for them either to heat the
ration or to boil water for tea, most ate the food cold and threw away the tea.
The bully beef (corned, preserved beef of Australian manufacture) came in
large, four- or five-pound tins. It was not only unappetizing, it often had a
revolting fish-oil taste that caused some of the troops to retch when they
tried eating it. Many of the tins had become contaminated: some had been
contused or sprung when they were dropped from the air; others had been left
out in the open without cover and had rusted. This contamination, together with
the impossibility of sterilizing the few eating utensils the troops had with
them, and the tendency of the oversize cans of beef to spoil before they were
completely consumed, had its effect. Acute diarrhea and dysentery gripped most
of the battalion, and many of the men had to cut holes in the seats of their trousers, so completely had
they lost control of their bowel movements.31

The medical officers marching at the rear of the column did what they could for
those who because of exhaustion, dysentery, and other ailments could not keep
up. It was a great deal, and in the opinion of one who made the march, many
members of the battalion owed their lives to these doctors who picked them up
and cared for them when they were so sick and weak that "they were ready to
call it 'quits' and die."32

The 1st Sergeant of Company E, Paul R. Lutjens,
recalls the march in these words:

It was one green hell to Jaure. We went up and down continuously; the company
would be stretched over two or three miles. We'd start at six every morning by
cooking rice or trying to. Two guys would work together. If they could start a
fire which was hard because the wood was wet even when you cut deep into the
center of the log, They'd mix a little bully beef into a canteen cup with rice,
to get the starchy taste out of it. Sometimes we'd take turns blowing on sparks
trying to start a fire, and keep it up for two hours without success. I could
hardly describe the country. It would take five or six hours to go a mile,
edging along cliff walls, hanging on to vines, up and down, up and down. The
men got weaker; guys began to lag back. . . . An officer stayed at the end of
the line to keep driving the stragglers. There wasn't any way of evacuating
to the rear. Men with sprained ankles hobbled along as well as they could,
driven on by fear of being left behind. . . ."33

--114--

As the march continued, the suffering of the men increased, and Sergeant
Lutjens wrote in his diary: ". . . Our strength is about gone. Most of us have
dysentery. Boys are falling out and dropping back with fever. Continual
downpour of rain. It's hard to cook our rice and tea. Bully beef makes us sick.
We seem to climb straight up for hours, then down again. God, will it never
end?"34

After plunging through gorges, wading neck-deep streams, scaling
cliffs, and slogging over muddy trails, the men of Schultz's company reached
Jaure on 25 October exhausted, their clothing in tatters and their shoes moldy
and worn out. The march had been too much for Colonel Geerds. He suffered a
heart attack on the trail and had to be evacuated to Port Moresby. Ordered
forward from Kalikadobu, Maj. Herbert M. Smith, previously supply liaison
officer for the regiment, took over as battalion commander.35

By 28 October, the other companies had reached Jaure and the main body of the
battalion began leaving Jaure for Natunga and Bofu, points in the steep
foothills of the range northeast of Jaure leading to the Buna area. Companies E
and F, the first to arrive, had gone on ahead to prepare dropping grounds at
Natunga and Bofu. Already in place to the west, where they were guarding the
battalion's flank and rear, were the Antitank and Cannon Companies under
Captain Medendorp. The Medendorp force, now known as the W or Wairopi Patrol,
had elements operating on the east bank of the Kumusi in the shadow of Mount Lamington. With a base camp
and dropping ground at Kovio and, two days away, an advance post at Barumbila,
ten miles south of Wairopi, it was actively patrolling the area forward of
Barumbila.36

Completing the Deployment

The Discovery of the Airfields

The 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, with attached regimental and divisional
troops, was the only American force to march over the Owen Stanleys since a
better way had been found to get the troops forward. Acting on his own
volition, Cecil Abel, a missionary and long-time resident of the Abau district,
came to Port Moresby with the information that there was an excellent airfield
site near Fasari, in the upper valley of the Musa River. General MacNider and
Colonel Bradley, recognizing the importance of the information, rushed Abel to
Kalamazoo to see General Harding. Having realized the difficulty of getting any
sizable body of troops across the Owen Stanleys by marching, Harding welcomed
the news. He saw in the field of which Abel spoke a way of getting his
remaining troops across the mountains swiftly, and without dulling their
physical edge. He was convinced

--115--

of the feasibility of the idea when Abel assured him that a trail on
high ground, suitable for marching, led from the site of the airfield to
Pongani, forty-five miles away. Returning to Port Moresby the next day, Harding
enlisted the aid of General Whitehead, who was also much taken with the idea.
Abel returned at once to Fasari and, with the aid of native labor and hand
tools dropped from the air by the Fifth Air Force, soon had a field there
suitable for the use of transports. Thus, when Colonel Sverdrup reached the
upper Musa on 19 October, after toiling laboriously over the mountainous Abau
track, he found C-47's already using the field, the first plane having landed
there that day.37

Within days of the completion of the strip, which was fittingly given the name
Abel's Field, three other promising sites were found in the same general area.
The first, suitable only for emergency landings, was at Embessa, a few miles
north of Abel's Field; the second, a much better site, was at Kinjaki Barige,
about twenty-five miles farther and northwest from Embessa; the third, also an
excellent site, was at Pongani itself.38
As had been the case at Abel's Field,
little more was required to convert these sites into acceptable landing fields
than cutting over and burning tall grass and small trees. By early November
Colonel Sverdrup had finished the job, using native labor at Embessa and
Kinjaki Barige, and members of Company C, 114th Engineer Battalion, at Pongani.39

General Blamey's Proposal

The question as to whether the Kapa Kapa-Jaure track would be used for further
troop movements was not easily dismissed. On 19 October, the day that he
received word that Abel's field was ready for use, General Harding asked
permission from New Guinea Force to fly in the 1st and 3d Battalions, 126th
Infantry, to the field. From there the two units would march to Pongani.
General Herring had been in favor of the plan, but General Blamey had turned it
down on the ground that, except for Abel's word, there was no proof that a
practicable trail to Pongani existed. On 30 October Harding proposed that the
1st and 3d Battalions be flown across the mountains to Pongani and Kinjaki
Barige. This time, Blamey approved the plan, and at once asked General
MacArthur's concurrence for the transfer by air to Pongani of the two
battalions, and for the immediate landing of supplies for their support at
Abel's field and Kinjaki Barige.40

--116--

Because of events in the Solomons, General MacArthur did not immediately give
his concurrence. The situation in the South Pacific (where Vice Adm. William F.
Halsey had succeeded Admiral Ghormley as Commander, South Pacific Area, on 18
October) had become critical. After successfully landing troops on Guadalcanal,
the Japanese on 23 October had launched a fierce attack on the airfield. The
land attack was co-ordinated with a move southward from Rabaul of heavy
Japanese naval forces, including carriers. On 26-27 October the attacks, both
by land and by sea, were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. The
situation, however, continued grave, for the American fleet, after losing one
of its two carriers and suffering heavy damage to the other, had been forced to
withdraw, leaving the Japanese free to continue with the reinforcement of their
expeditionary force on Guadalcanal.41

General MacArthur had already prepared a
plan for withdrawal from the north coast and, if necessary, from New Guinea,
should the Japanese take Guadalcanal and then turn their full strength on New
Guinea.42
He therefore answered General Blamey that as long as the situation in
the Solomons remained indecisive, and the enemy had afloat large bodies of
troops which could be easily turned against New Guinea, it was unsafe to
concentrate as large a force as two regiments, less one battalion, in the
Pongani area--at least before the line of the Kumusi River was secured. General
MacArthur added that the original plan to combine the advance along the Kokoda
Trail with an envelopment from Jaure was still safest line of action, since it
could be by a movement on Buna in conjunction with envelopments from both Jaure
and Pongani.43

General Blamey assured General MacArthur that he had never
intended to concentrate the remaining units of the 126th Infantry at Pongani.
His intention had been rather to consolidate the regiment (less the 250 men in
the Kumusi Valley) at Bofu. The troops would be flown to the Pongani area only because the airfields were
there, and there was nowhere else to land them.
Immediately upon disembarking, they would leave the coastal area and march inland to Bofu
and join the 2d Battalion. The march from Pongani to Bofu would be by a route south of, and protected by,
Hydrographer's Range. For additional protection, the 2/6 Independent Company,
at Pongani, would be assigned to patrol the trails north of the range. The 250-man
force in the Kumusi Valley would remain there to harass enemy communications
and would come under 7th Division command when the Australians crossed the
Kumusi River.

Having clarified his proposal, General Blamey asked General MacArthur to give
further consideration to the request that the remaining units of the 126th
Infantry be flown to the north shore. Lines of withdrawal Blamey added, were
available both from Pongani and Bofu and, while not easy to use, were believed
to be no more difficult than those over the Kokoda Trail.44

--117--

CROSSING A BRANCH OF ERORO CREEK, elements of the 32d Division make their way to Embogo, 5 November 1942.

After reconsidering the matter, General MacArthur told General Blamey that he
was very much in favor of an early attack and would be in complete accord with
such a proposal if sufficient supplies could be provided by air in time to
assure its success. This meant, he stipulated, that at least ten days' rations
and appropriate amounts of ammunition and medical supplies would have to be in
place behind each of the three columns before an advance was ordered. What was
more, the air supply movements to Kokoda, Bofu, and Pongani would have to be
completed before the movement of the 126th Infantry from Port Moresby began.
Since these movements would place a tremendous strain upon the air force,
Blamey was told to make sure that the attack was logistically feasible before
the troops were ordered forward.45

That same day, 2 November, General MacArthur
picked 15 November as the tentative date of attack. The following day,

--118--

CHOW LINE ALONG THE MUDDY TRAIL. 128th Infantrymen en route to Oro Bay from Pongani.

New Guinea Force ordered the 32d Division to patrol up to, but to make no move
beyond, the Oro Bay-Bofu-Wairopi line until so ordered. On 6 November an
advance echelon of General Headquarters opened at Port Moresby, and General
MacArthur arrived there the same day to direct the operations.46

Drawing the Noose Tight

Oivi and Gorari

Progress on the main axis of advance accelerated when Kokoda was recaptured.
The airfield was quickly reconditioned and lengthened to accommodate C-47's,
and the Fifth Air Force at once began using it to fly in food, guns, and
ammunition in support of the Australian advance. Vehicles, bridging equipment,
and other paraphernalia followed. The supply nightmare that had beset the
Australians in the Owen

--119--

Stanleys was over. What 2,000 natives and dropping from the air could not do in
days, it was now possible to accomplish by plane in minutes. With Kokoda
airfield as their rearward base, the Australians could advance on the beachhead
with confidence.47

Colonel Yazawa's troops, having come in from the beachhead,
were well dug in when the 16th Brigade, advancing over the Abuari-Missima-Fila
cutoff, attacked toward Oivi on 4 November. The Japanese had artillery emplaced
on the heights and, as both Colonel Yazawa and General Horii hoped, enough food
and ammunition for at least a week's stand, followed by an orderly withdrawal.
The 3d Battalion, 144th Infantry, with attached engineer troops was at Gorari,
a few miles to the east, where it had been sent the day before by General Horii
to prevent an Australian break-through on Colonel Yazawa's left rear. The rest
of the 144th Infantry and attached divisional and regimental units were in
bivouac at Ilimo. They were resting and recovering their strength preparatory
to crossing the Kumusi River. Since Colonel Kusunose had been evacuated to
Rabaul in late October because of sickness and wounds, Colonel Tsukamoto,
commander of the 1st Battalion, 144th Infantry, who had led the initial attack
on Kokoda, was temporarily in command of the regiment.48

The 16th Brigade met stiff resistance when it attacked toward Oivi. Reinforced by the 3d Australian Infantry Battalion, a militia unit, the brigade began flanking on right and left. By 8 November elements of the 2/1 Battalion, moving
around the Japanese south (left) flank, were in contact with the enemy
southeast of Gorari. On 9 November the 25th Brigade joined the 2/1 Battalion,
and the Australians pounced on the Japanese at Gorari.

With the Australians in front and rear, Colonel Yazawa realized it was time to
pull out. That night he evacuated Oivi unobserved with what was left of his
force--900 men. With him were General Horii and several members of the Shitai
staff, who had apparently been inspecting Yazawa's position when the
Australians cut between it and Gorari. Abandoning guns and ammunition, and
indeed everything that would impede their flight, the Japanese took the only
remaining route of escape left to them--the rugged jungle country northeast of
Oivi. Since the mouth of the Kumusi was only about twenty miles north of Gona,
Yazawa planned to follow the river bank to the sea and then move to Gona by way
of the coast.

After circling through the jungle, the troops of the Yazawa Force came out on
the left bank of the Kumusi, well north of the Australians. Shaking off all
attempts of the latter to overtake them, they struck off toward the river's
mouth--their ultimate destination, Gona.

Gorari was completely overrun by 12 November. More than 500 Japanese were
killed there; guns, small arms, and ammunition were captured; and some 200
Rabaul natives were liberated. The Japanese suffered heavily at Gorari, but the
much larger body of Japanese at Ilimo, as well as a remnant of the Gorari
force, got away. Japanese sick and wounded began crossing

--120--

the Kumusi on 10 November, and the main body crossed on the night of 12-13
November, covered by a small rear guard which dug itself in at Ilimo. With the
sick and wounded, some 1,200 men crossed the river, mostly on rafts. The
incoming troops reached Giruwa several days later, hungry and mostly
weaponless, having lost most of their equipment, stores, and ammunition either
before or during the crossing.49

The Japanese had taken heavy losses at Oivi and Gorari, and their forces had
been scattered. Colonel Yazawa had held at Oivi almost as long as he had
intended, but the orderly withdrawal that General Horii had planned for had
become a rout.

On 13 November the 25th Brigade wiped out the enemy rear guard which had been
covering the crossing. A temporary bridge was completed at Wairopi that night.
The next morning, while the air force dropped bridging equipment for a more
permanent structure, the leading element of the brigade began crossing the
river.50

The Americans Reach the Front

By this time the movement of the American forces into the concentration areas
was almost complete. The 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, which had started
leaving Jaure on 28 October, closed into the Natunga area on 2 November, after a comparatively easy march from Jaure. After
spending more than a week in the area drawing rations, helmets, boots, and
other equipment at the Natunga dropping ground, the battalion pushed on to Gora
and Bofu, reaching the latter point on 12 November.

Captain Boice had been unable to find even one good dropping ground between
Jaure and Natunga. As a result, most of the rations dropped from the air
between those two points had been lost, and the troops (who were reduced to
eating bananas and papayas or whatever else they could find) had gone hungry.
Colonel Quinn had made it his business to fly with the airdropping planes in
the hope of working out dropping techniques which would get food to his troops.
He was killed on 5 November while in a plane dropping supplies to the troops at
Natunga. A cargo parachute that caught in the plane's tail assembly sent the
plane out of control, and everyone aboard died in the crash.

Colonel Quinn's loss was a blow to the division. General Harding, in a letter
to General Eichelberger, described Quinn as "my best regimental commander, and
that by a wide margin." Harding chose Lt. Col. Clarence M. Tomlinson,
commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, to command the regiment, and Tomlinson
was promoted to colonel in short order. Maj. George Bond took command of the 3d
Battalion.51

The air movement from Port Moresby of regimental headquarters and
of the 1st and 3d Battalions began on 8 November, the 1st Battalion going
first. Because heavy

--121--

TAKING A BREAK. Troops from the 3d Battalion and regimental headquarters of the 126th Infantry rest along a trail between Boreo and Dobodura.

rains had made the airfield at Pongani temporarily unsafe for the landing of
troops, 590 men of the 1st Battalion--Battalion Headquarters, Company A,
Company B, two platoons of Company C, and a squad of Company D--under the
battalion commander, Lt. Col. Edmund J. Carrier, were flown instead to Abel's
Field. Upon arrival there, they began marching to Pongani.52

Work on a new all-weather airfield had been proceeding at Pongani. The field, on a
well-drained site and covered with gravel from a nearby pit, was finished on 9 November, the day after the movement to
Abel's Field began. The air force, previously under the impression that only
Abel's Field was open, tested the new field, found it acceptable, and at once
began flying in the rest of the 126th Infantry to Pongani.53

Within hours of Colonel Carrier's arrival at Abel's Field, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 218
men--Company D, less one squad, and Company C, less two platoons--under Maj.

--122--

TAKING A BREAK. Lt. Col. Alexander MacNab (right), Executive Officer of the 128th Infantry, pauses with two of his men for a cigarette on the trail.

Richard D. Boerem, executive officer of the battalion, had landed at Pongani
and at once began marching to Natunga. Colonel Tomlinson and regimental
headquarters reached Pongani by air on 11 November, as did the 3d Battalion,
all elements moving out to Natunga immediately on arrival. By 14 November Major
Boerem's detachment was approaching Natunga, and regimental headquarters and
the 3d Battalion were moving forward rapidly behind it. Almost all of Major
Smith's 2d Battalion was at Bofu, and the remaining troops of the 1st
Battalion, under Colonel Carrier, after having struggled through swampy terrain
since 9 November, were approaching Pongani.54

On the coastal flank, General MacNider's command, the 128th Infantry and the 2/6 Independent Company, known
by this time as Warren Task Force, was consolidating in the Oro Bay-Embogo-Embi
area. Its

--123--

patrols were operating inland as far as Borio and up the coast as far as Cape
Sudest. The last two companies of the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, had been
flown to Wanigela from Port Moresby on 8 November and brought forward
immediately by boat. Except for Company A, which had been left at Pongani to
guard the supply dumps there, the battalion was now at Embogo under Lt. Col.
Robert C. McCoy. The 2d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Herbert A. Smith, was at
Eroro Mission, and the 3d Battalion, under Colonel Miller, was near Embi. The
Australian Independent Company, under Maj. Harry G. Harcourt, was at Pongani
preparing to move forward after its extensive patrols of the trails north of
Hydrographer's Range and of the Natunga-Pongani track. There was a forward dump
at Embogo, and Colonel McKenny was planning an even more advanced dump at
Hariko. General MacNider, in turn, planned to move his headquarters to Hariko
as soon as there were boats available for the movement.55

Artillery was to be Australian. A two-gun section of 3.7-inch mountain
artillery was at Embogo, and four 25-pounders had reached Oro Bay. The crews
were under 32d Division command. Reinforcements, consisting of the 127th
Regimental Combat Team, less artillery, had at last begun loading at Brisbane
for Port Moresby on 14 November.56

The Americans were now finally in position
for the forthcoming attack and the Australians soon would be. Up to this time
the campaign had cost the latter 2,127 casualties,57
but the enemy was back at
the beachhead on which he had landed in July. His back was to the sea, and the
noose around him was being drawn tight.

7. Diary, Actg Comdr, No. 2 MG Co. 2d Bn, 144th Inf. This Japanese officer,then at Eora Creek, noted in his diary on 17 October, that his troops had been
reduced to eating roots and grass, and, two days later, wrote that "because of
the food shortage, some companies have been eating human flesh [Australian
soldiers]."

19. Ltr, Lt Col Laurence A. McKenny, QMC, to Gen MacNider, n. d., sub: Report of attack by unidentified bomber at Pongani, New Guinea, 18 Oct 42, copy in OCMH
files; Allied Air Force Opns Rpt, 2400, 18 Oct 42. In a letter to General
Sutherland, General Harding had this to say of the blunder, "Everyone
hereabouts is distressed over the death of Darnton and Fahnestock. I knew
Darnton quite well . . . and considered him one damn good correspondent and
swell guy. He was hot to be on the spot for the first contact of American Army
ground troops with the Japs. I told him that this would probably be it and gave
him permission to go." Ltr, Gen Harding to Gen Sutherland, 20 Oct 42, copy in
OCMH files.

24. AMF, Interr Gen Adachi et al.; Naval Account Japanese Invasion Eastern New Guinea. An enemy diary captured at Buna recounts that since the Japanese troops
stranded on Goodenough Island "were without provisions and communications
facilities, three messengers were sent [to Buna] for help. Before departure,
these three men burned their skin to look like natives. They accomplished their
mission after covering more than 100 rautical miles in a canoe." Diary, member
15th Naval Pioneer Unit, in ATIS CT 14, No. 176.

28. Maj Medendorp, The March and Operations of the Antitank and Cannon
Companies, 126th Infantry, 4 Oct-28 Nov 42.

29. Just as the troops were settling themselves for the night, thirty-five men
of the 21st Brigade, whom the Japanese had cut off on the Kokoda Trail almost a
month before, staggered into camp. The Australians, starving, exhausted, and
nursing old untreated wounds, were in a pitiful state. After they had been
given food, and Capt. Lester Segal, the medical officer, had taken care of
their wounds, they were directed to Kalamazoo, where, Colonel Baetcke recalls,
twenty of the thirty-five had to be hospitalized immediately upon arrival. Ltr,
Capt Medendorp to Col Quinn (by hand via Maj Baetcke), 9 Oct 42, sub: Daily
Report, in 2d Bn, 126th Inf, Trail Opns Jnl; Interv with Col Baetcke, 17 Nov
50.

57. Australian casualty figures for the period 22 July 1942 to 16 November 1942, for ground troops only, are as follows: 709 killed in action; 132 died of
wounds and other causes, 1,286 wounded in action. Ltr, Balfour to author, 15
Feb 50; Sig, Australian Army Headquarters, Melbourne to Australian Military
Mission, Washington, No. MW-179, 22 June 50, copy in OCMH files.

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Jerry Holden for the HyperWar Foundation