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Sunday, May 21, 2017

Russia seeks to use the establishment of “de-escalation zones” to
reset its operations and constrain U.S. policy options in Syria. Russia,
Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement
to establish four de-escalation zonesin
western Syria on May 4. The agreement intends to preempt the unilateral
establishment of “interim
zones of stability” by the U.S. in Syria. The de-escalation zone agreement has
provided Russia, Iran, and the Bashar al-Assad regime with a period of rest and
refit to refocus their efforts in Eastern Syria, particularly in areas where
the U.S. is leading operations with Syrian rebels. Russia pivoted its air
campaign to focus on ISIS-held terrain in Eastern Syria from May 1 - 18.Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime likely
intend to use the period of de-escalation to disrupt joint U.S.-rebel
operations to push north against ISIS in Homs and Deir ez Zour Provinces, while
bolstering pro-regime advances against ISIS in both central Homs and eastern
Aleppo. Pro-regime forces seized Jirrah Airbase from ISIS in eastern
Aleppo Province on May 13 with Russian air support. Pro-regime forces also
advanced towards a joint rebel-U.S. base at Tanaf in eastern Homs Province
amidst the period of de-escalation. The U.S. responded to the threat against
Tanaf by striking
pro-regime and Iranian-backed militia forces near the base on May 18,
however. Russia
has also used the de-escalation agreement to reshape its deployment
to Syria. Russia claimed to withdraw 30 aircraft from the Bassel al-Assad
International Airport in Latakia Province upon signing the de-escalation
agreement on May 4. The alleged withdrawal does not represent the degradation
of Russian capabilities in Syria, nor does it preclude Russia from conducting
airstrikes. Rather, Russia likely seeks to replace particular air assets with
alternate air frames and capabilities better suited for the next phase of pro-regime
operations in Syria, similar to previous Russian “withdrawals” throughout 2016.
Russia reportedly deployed at least
21 M-30 Howitzers and a new shipment of missiles for the advanced S-400
Surface-to-Air Missile System operated by Russia in Syria in early May. Russia also
deployed at least one A-50U
‘Mainstay’ Aerial Early Warning and Control Aircraft to Bassel al-Assad
International Airport on the Syrian Coast as of May 3. Russia deliberately drove fluctuations in the levels of violence in
rebel-held Syria in order to compel local and international actors to submit to
the Russian-Iranian-Turkish de-escalation zones. Russia escalated and
subsequently tapered its air campaign in Syria prior to the Astana Talks in
Kazakhstan from May 3 – 4, after which Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed the ‘de-escalation zone’agreement.
Prior to the agreement, Russia intensified its air campaign againstmainstream
elements ofthe
Syrian opposition, reliefproviders, and civilian
infrastructure such as hospitals in
Idlib and Hama Provinces from April 26 – 30. However, Russia subsequently halted its air campaign on the proposed de-escalation
zoneson May 1 and shifted its
focus toward ISIS-held terrain in eastern Syria from May 1 - 18. The de-escalation zones provided Russia and
its Iranian allies with a period of reset to recover following heavy losses in
clashes with opposition forces in northern Hama Province throughout April 2017.
Pro-regime forces have meanwhile begun to slowly escalate violence within the
de-escalation zones, repeatedly violating the agreement with artillerystrikes in Dera’a and Hama
Provinces. Russia’s continual use of violence to coerce local and international
actors to accept agreements that primarily serve Russia, Iran, and Syrian
President Bashar al Assad precludes any possibility of a legitimate,
Russian-backed ceasefire agreement in Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting.ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Iran-backed Shia militias set conditions to disrupt or deny U.S.-backed forces freedom of maneuver near the Iraq-Syria border. Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) forces began clearing territory in western Ninewa Province toward the Syrian border. Iran-backed PMU forces also conducted offensives against ISIS in northern Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces, and defended positions north of the Makhoul Mountains and southwest of Tuz Khurmatu from ISIS ground assaults. ISIS remains operational in eastern Iraq, particularly in Diyala Province, despite clearing operations led by the Badr Organization since late 2014. ISIS also launched attacks in and around Baghdad in the week prior to its annual Ramadan campaign, anticipated to begin on May 26.

Friday, May 19, 2017

Russia, Iran, and Syria redeployed forces to constrain the activities of the U.S. in Eastern Syria. Pro-regime forces reportedly deployed hundreds of fighters along the Damascus - Baghdad Highway in Central Syria at the urging of Russia following several weeks of advances in the area by opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Jordan. The U.S. later conducted an airstrike against a pro-regime convoy advancing against opposition groups at Al-Tanaf on the Syrian-Iraqi Border on May 18. Pro-regime forces also seized the Jirah Airbase in Eastern Aleppo Province from ISIS on May 12. These movements suggest that pro-regime forces intend to insert themselves into the campaigns against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City and Deir ez-Zour Province - thereby preempting long-term expansion by the U.S. in Eastern Syria. ISW has previously recommended that the U.S. refocus the campaign against ISIS towards Deir ez-Zour Province as a long-term base for operations against both ISIS and the Russo-Iranian Coalition in Syria.

The U.S. and Turkey likely failed to overcome their strategic divide during a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on May 16. Trump reiterated his support for Turkey in the “fight against terror groups” including as ISIS and the PKK but did not address his recent decision to directly arm the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Erdogan condemned the decision as an “absolutely unacceptable” measure that presented a “clear and present danger” to Turkey. Erdogan also reiterated his calls for the U.S. to extradite exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen. The White House likely offered greater cooperation with Erdogan against the PKK in Turkey and Northern Iraq to mitigate the risk of an imminent rift with Turkey. These efforts nonetheless remain insufficient to reverse the growing strategic divergence between the U.S. and Turkey.

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of May 10, 2017.

Monday, May 15, 2017

Russia, Iran, and Turkey agreed at a new set of Astana Talks on May 3 - 4 to establish four large “de-escalation” zones over opposition-held regions of Western Syria. The deal allows for the three countries to deploy forces along the borders of the “de-escalation zones” to monitor a faltering nationwide ceasefire that excludes all opposition forces “associated” with Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria. Activists reported a general decrease in violence except along key frontlines such as Damascus and Northern Hama Province after the deal went into effect on May 6. Russia likely intends to leverage to “de-escalation zones” to subordinate the political process to its objectives, reset its military deployments, and block future unilateral action to implement so-called “zones of stabilization” by the U.S. in Syria. Pro-regime forces will likely also use the relative lull in Western Syria to refocus their military campaign towards Eastern Syria to preempt the U.S. from establishing a long-term foothold in regions formerly held by ISIS in Syria. Conditions on the ground remain unfit for a durable ceasefire or political settlement to end the Syrian Civil War.

The U.S. signaled its intent to move forward with an imminent offensive to seize Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS that includes the Syrian Kurdish YPG despite clear objections from Turkey. U.S. President Donald Trump signed an order on May 8 authorizing the U.S. Department of Defense to directly provide weapons, ammunition, and other equipment to the YPG “as necessary” in support of upcoming operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City. Pentagon Spokesperson Dana White stated that the weapons deliveries will be “limited, mission specific, and metered out incrementally” in order to prevent the transfer of weapons to the PKK in Turkey. The U.S. also floated plans to expand an intelligence fusion center based in Ankara targeting the PKK in Turkey. These efforts remain insufficient to address the security concerns of Turkey. The decision will likely fuel a further breakdown in relations between Turkey and the U.S. that could include new cross-border operations by Turkey against the YPG in Northern Syria. This strategic break will form a core area of disagreement during a face-to-face meeting between Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan in Washington D.C. on May 16.

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of April 3, 2017, and May 10, 2017, respectively.

Friday, May 12, 2017

Key Takeaway: Russia has continued its destabilization campaign in Ukraine using its proxy forces and other means of subversion. The Trump Administration has indicated it is willing to support Ukraine as the Eastern European country faces Russian aggression. President Trump must act to strengthen the U.S.-Ukraine partnership and increase pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin as part of a broader campaign to deter Russian aggression globally.

U.S. officials emphasized their support for Ukraine in a series of diplomatic meetings in May. U.S. President Donald Trump held separate meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin in Washington on May 10 during which he reportedly stressed “Russia’s responsibility to fully implement the Minsk agreements.” This rhetoric echoes previous statements by Trump administration officials. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the U.S. will maintain sanctions against Russia “until Moscow reverses the actions that triggered them.”

Russia nevertheless continued to fuel the war in Ukraine and destabilize the country politically while waging a disinformation campaign to portray Ukraine as the aggressor. Russian-backed separatist forces violated their obligations under the Minsk Ceasefire Agreement. They resumed attacks against Ukrainian forces near the strategic cities of Mariupol, Donetsk, and Popasna following a brief lull for the celebration of Orthodox Easter on April 16. Russia resisted efforts to deploy international peacekeepers in order to preserve its proxies’ freedom of action. Russia also continued to exploit social tensions in Ukraine. Pro-Russia hooligans clashed with pro-Ukrainian activists, nationalists, and law enforcement personnel across Ukraine during Victory Day Celebrations on May 9. These provocations failed to create widespread public discontent, but demonstrate the persistent Russian-backed campaign to destabilize Ukraine from within. Russia also likely continues to try and undermine Ukraine’s relationships with European nations. Unidentified assailants attacked Polish and Lithuanian diplomatic facilities in Lutsk on March 29 and Kyiv on April 24, respectively. Ukrainian and Polish officials previously accused Russia of using similar incidents to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its Eastern European partners.

Ukraine’s government made progress in combating corruption and creating a favorable business environment as it confronts a stagnant economy. President Petro Poroshenko expanded the critical e-declaration system on March 27, through which Ukrainian government officials must publicly reveal their assets. Ukraine also launched a number of corruption investigations into officials in the banking and government sectors. Ukraine’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announced that the GDP decreased from projected estimates due to the ongoing conflict. The financial burden from the war has contributed to slow economic growth, which increasingly undermining public confidence in the government.

The U.S. must not only support Ukraine in its economic and political reform efforts, but also take a strong stance against Russia’s aggression. Previous levels of Western pressure have failed to effect a significant change in the Kremlin’s policy toward Ukraine, including in the period since President Trump took office. Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely fuel the war and foment instability until he returns Ukraine under his sphere of influence or until the cost of continued aggression becomes unacceptable. The U.S and its allies must support Kyiv’s efforts to maintain a stable economy, advance political reforms, and strengthen the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or risk growing Russian aggression and subversion in a country and region vital to America’s national interests.

Key
Takeaway:The U.S. should start
to reorient its long-term relationship with Turkey during the upcoming meeting
between U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on May
16. The U.S. and Turkey suffer from a deep strategic divergence that goes far
beyond operational disagreements over the offensive against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa
City. The U.S. must instead prioritize its remaining leverage on efforts to halt
and reverse this mounting divide and reenlist Turkey as a legitimate NATO ally
against the threats posed by Salafi-Jihadist Groups and the Russo-Iranian
Coalition.

The
current friction between the U.S. and Turkey extends beyond operational
disagreements over the anti-ISIS operation in Ar-Raqqa City. Turkey’s strategic
objectives diverge from those of the U.S. in key ways. Turkish
President Recep Erdogan ultimately seeks to reassert Turkey’s status as a
regional power throughout the sphere of influence of the former Ottoman Empire.
Erdogan promotes the spread of Islamism across the Middle East and North Africa
as a means to create governments responsive to him and his Islamist Justice and
Development Party (AKP). His aspirations drive an independent regional policy
that eschews traditional partnerships with the U.S. and Europe. He also
leverages tools of the state to consolidate his increasingly authoritarian rule
at home. These objectives - and the manner in which he pursues them – undermine
the strategic goals of the U.S. in the Middle East and Europe. Erdogan’s
distinct brand of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ leads him to support Salafi-Jihadist Groups
such as Ahrar al-Sham that serve as a vector for al Qaeda. His embrace of
populist nationalism fuels an active conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK), which is waging an insurgency in Turkey. The PKK’s Syrian branch – the Syrian
Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) – is the primary anti-ISIS ground force
partner for the United States. Erdogan’s attempts to forge an independent
foreign policy prompt him to pursue superficial yet deepening ties with Russia
and Iran.

The U.S.’s myopic focus on the campaign against ISIS in
Ar-Raqqa City has ignored – and often exacerbated - the growing strategic divergence
with Turkey. U.S. President Donald Trump has
doubled-down on his predecessor’s preference for an offensive against Ar-Raqqa
City led by the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The president
authorized the U.S. Department of Defense on May 8 to provide direct material
support, including weapons and ammunition, to the YPG despite the long-standing
objections of Turkey. This decision subordinates long-term regional stability
to short-term military expediency. It increases the risk that the U.S. will
fail to secure its objectives because any near-term gains against ISIS in
Ar-Raqqa City will likely prove ephemeral. The YPG-led SDF will ultimately
struggle to provide a political alternative acceptable to a Sunni Arab majority
population that will not submit to the YPG’s vision even when it is implemented
by other Sunni Arabs. This outcome will create an environment permissive for Salafi-Jihadist
groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda. The decision also increases the risk that
Turkey will launch cross-border operations targeting the YPG in Northern Syria,
particularly against the town of Tel
Abyad in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province. The U.S. may attempt to prevent
this move - including with new military deployments along the border as well as
expanded intelligence sharing against the PKK – but such responses will fail to
address Turkey’s fundamental concerns. These efforts also risk expending
sources of available leverage that the U.S. could instead use to drive a
strategic realignment with Turkey on key issues such as the threats of al
Qaeda, the
Russo-Iranian coalition, and the wider Turkish-Kurdish War.

The U.S. should act to prevent Turkey from being drawn
further into the Russo-Iranian orbit in Syria. Turkey’s
cooperation with Russia and Iran is transactional and contingent upon Erdogan’s
perceived foreign policy gains. Turkey circumvents the European Union-regulated
Southern Gas Corridor through Russian-backed TurkStream in order to transport gas supplies
to southern Europe. Turkey also signaled its intent to purchase the S-400 air
defense system from Russia as an allegedly more affordable option to NATO
member states’ defense systems. Turkey participates in the Russian-led Astana
talks as a guarantor in order to legitimize itself as a key actor in the Syrian
theater. The December 2016 “cessation of hostilities” deal and the recent
announcement of “de-escalation zones” support this effort by reinforcing Turkey’s
de facto zones of control in Idlib Province and territorial control seized in Turkey’s
Operation Euphrates Shield.

The U.S. needs to sever the link between Turkey and
Salafi-Jihadist groups. Turkey channels its support for anti-regime operations
through al Qaeda-aligned opposition groups. Turkey notably supported the “Jaysh
al Fatah Operations Room” led by al Qaeda in Syria to seizethe city of Idlib in 2015. Turkey
included Ahrar al Sham – a Salafi-Jihadist group allied with al Qaeda – in its Operation
Euphrates Shield. Turkey also tolerated ISIS’s territorial control along its
southern border as an acceptable YPG deterrent. This outreach empowered
irreconcilable actors on the ground at the expensive of acceptable opposition
groups, blocking any prospect of a legitimate negotiated settlement to the
Syrian Civil War. This empowerment also ensures continued safe haven for ISIS,
al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups that threaten the U.S. and Europe.
The U.S. thus cannot allow Turkey to unilaterally shape governance in Ar-Raqqa
City or Northern Syria. The U.S. must over time persuade Turkish leaders that
backing al Qaeda linked groups actually threatens Turkey’s interest. Turkey’s backing
of al Qaeda-aligned groups exacerbates the risk of domestic terrorism in
Turkey, elevates the terror threat to NATO member countries, and even competes
with Erdogan’s own quasi-imperial vision of the Middle East.

The U.S. should seek to capitalize
on points of short-term cooperation and set conditions to shape a long-term
strategic convergence with Turkey against Russia, Iran, and Salafi-Jihadist
groups. The U.S. and Turkey still share fundamental strategic
objectives and short-term interests. The announced de-escalation zones in Syria
benefit the Bashar al-Assad regime and the Russo-Iranian coalition more than advance
Turkey’s interests. Both the U.S. and Turkey need to block the expansion of
Russian and Iranian military presence in Syria. This deal will enable pro-Assad
regime forces to regroup and reset for offensive operations in central and
southern Syria, far from Turkey’s area of interest. Turkey is not likely to
cede areas of opposition control to fully implement the agreement. The U.S. and
Turkey can also cooperate on counter-terrorism operations inside Turkey.

The U.S. still retains multiple sources of leverage over
Turkey outside of Syria. The coordinated use of these levers can support a
strategy to bring Turkeyback
into alignment with the United States. The U.S. can
begin to roll back Turkey’s support for Salafi-Jihadist groups by addressing
Turkey’s concerns over the YPG’s growing influence in northern Syria and taking
tangible steps to pressure the Assad regime. The
U.S. can assuage Turkish fears of PKK expansion by supporting operations to
remove the PKK from Sinjar, Iraq.
Expanding economic aid could supplement Turkey's capacity to rebuild
northern Syria. Enhanced U.S. military
and intelligence cooperation through NATO can bolster the weakened, post-restructuring
Turkish Armed Forces that face a growing Russian-Iranian military
footprint, provided that Erdogan curbs his
post-coup authoritarian crackdown. The U.S. also has a range of
counter-terrorism sanctions measures it can use to address the threat posed by
al Qaeda-linked networks in Turkey. The U.S. can also pressure Turkey over
human rights violations during Erdogan’s
crackdown on domestic dissent.

The U.S. needs a broader strategic
outlook on cooperation with Turkey. Turkey is an ally rapidly drifting away
from the U.S. and Europe. Focusing exclusively or primarily on near-term
anti-ISIS gains in Syria will put long-term U.S. strategic interests at grave
risk. The Trump Administration must reframe the terms of engagement with
Erdogan or risk losing an important NATO partner in Turkey. A Turkey that acts
like a NATO ally can be an effective part of a U.S. strategy to destroy
Salafi-Jihadist groups and roll back the influence of the Russo-Iranian
coalition.

Thursday, May 11, 2017

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) surged in northwest Mosulin a bid to clear the city prior to Ramadan, anticipated to begin on
May 26. Emergency Response Division (ERD) and Federal Police (FP) units joined 9th and 15th Iraqi Army Division
units in northwest Mosul on April 28. The combined forces recaptured the neighborhoods of Mushairfa and 30 Tamouz, and are fighting to
seize the denser neighborhoods of Harmat, 17 Tamouz, and Hawi Kanisa as of
publication. Meanwhile, Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS) recapturedthree neighborhoods in western Mosul. ISF
are unlikely to clear the city prior to Ramadan. ISIS
claimedto launch attacks
to retake two Old City gates, Bab al-Jadid and Bab al-Toub. ISIS will also
continue to defend the Old City by conducting suicide attacks and attempting to draw fire on civilian gatherings. ISIS will
concentrate its defenses around al-Nuri Great Mosque, where ISIS leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared publicly in 2014.

Wednesday, May 10, 2017

U.S.-backed forces continue to advance on the major ISIS-held urban
centers of Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have
encircled ISIS in Mosul’s Old City. The U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) captured Tabqa, a city adjacent to Raqqa that contains
Syria’s largest dam. ISIS also lost terrain in southern Syria, as various
factions of the Syrian opposition, including some with U.S. backing, cleared
ISIS from positions in Suweida and the Qalamoun mountains. ISIS will attempt to
offset these losses during its annual Ramadan offensive campaign, anticipated
to begin around May 27. ISIS’s campaign in 2017 increasingly resembles its 2013
insurgent campaign; ISIS’s Ramadan plan will likely focus on synchronizing
spectacular attacks across different locations for combined effect. Potential targets
include religious sites, security forces, and oil infrastructure. ISIS may also
conduct ground attacks in Salah ad Din, Anbar, and central Syria where ISIS
retains latent combat capability.

Friday, May 5, 2017

ISIS is setting
conditions for its annual Ramadan campaign, anticipated to begin on May 26 with
intent to exploit security vulnerabilities across the country. ISIS tested
security in and around Baghdad by conducting a successful Suicide Vehicle-Borne
IED (SVBIED) attack in central Baghdad and attempting additional attacks in
Balad, Tarmiyah, and Jurf al-Sakhr. ISIS strained Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
resources by increasing the tempo of attacks in Ramadi and far west Anbar
Province. ISIS attempted numerous attacks in Salah al-Din province, which the
ISF foiled. The attacks indicate ISIS's continued attack capabilities in this
zone. ISIS attacked Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) near Mosul in a
potential bid to incite sectarian violence and detract from Mosul operations.
Security forces must complete the campaign for Mosul while protecting Baghdad
and repelling ISIS attacks across Anbar, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Ninewa
Provinces. ISF resources are further strained in Maysan and Basra Provinces,
which mobilized two operations commands to address tribal violence. ISIS will
continue to create and exploit weaknesses in Iraqi security prior to its
Ramadan offensive.