Andy Xie, the Chinese version of Nouriel Roubini, the “Dr Doom" of global forecasters, will have further spooked panicky iron ore exporters with his prediction this week that prices were headed down to $50 a tonne – and would stay there.

Xie, an independent Shanghai-based analyst and former Morgan Stanley chief economist in Asia, concluded that a combination of a build-up of steel inventories and doubts about China’s long-term growth prospects will depress iron ore prices for the next period, however long that lasts.

He may well prove right, in which case an extremely painful adjustment awaits mid-tier miners dependent on China and a minimum price of around $100.

Australian iron ore exporters who had believed they had supply contracts in place are learning the hard way what has been a truism of doing business in China since it began opening to the outside world in 1978. It’s often the case negotiations begin when a contract has been signed!

Leaving aside the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-educated Xie’s tendency to make provocative calls – he got the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s right – it is clear we have entered a moment of increasing uncertainty about China’s growth trajectory, its demand for commodities, and its ability to manage a slowing economy. What is surprising in all of this is that iron ore exporters themselves have been tardy in coming to terms with the implications of a slackening Chinese economy, no less than China analysts who have remained upbeat in the face of growing evidence that a transformation from an export-led to consumer-driven economy is stuttering.

On top of this, political uncertainty is weighing as one generation of leaders gives way to another and, in the nature of things in China, an abundance of caution prevails during these transitional moments. China’s timidity, or put another way, hesitancy to stimulate its economy in the face of a more rapid deceleration than anticipated – 7.6 per cent growth in the second quarter and slowing – might be explained by political uncertainties. We do not know.

Analysts could be excused for sticking to their fairly upbeat forecasts of the Chinese ability to marshal an economy in transition on the basis that China has a good record of managing its ups and downs following the hard landing of the mid 1990s when implications of a slowdown barely caused a ripple outside the country.

However, stakes are vastly different now with China on the verge of becoming the world’s biggest economy in 2016 on a purchasing power parity basis, according to the International Monetary Fund.

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As we’ve noticed this week, disruptions to the market for iron ore – Australia’s biggest export to China – exact a severe penalty on the vulnerable. We have not seen the end of this shakeout.

All this puts a premium on the quality of information about what is actually happening in China separate from what the Chinese choose to tell us.

In this regard, Jane Golley of the Australian Centre on China and the World at the Australian National University has done us a favour in her chapter – Uncertain Numbers, Uncertain Outcomes – in the China Story Yearbook 2012 published by the centre. Golley focuses significantly on demographics in a contribution that makes it clear Chinese authorities “round out the figures" on matters like fertility rates, but it was her reference to a contribution from Heritage Foundation economist Derek Scissors that caught my attention.

Scissors noted that in 2010 Li Keqiang, who is set to become Premier in place of Wen Jiabao, had described China’s GDP figures as “for reference only". One wonders what other statistical information is “for reference only", including steel production and iron ore stockpiles.

What this tells you is that China remains an opaque environment in which to operate, significantly less so than it was, but capable of surprising nevertheless, as some high-profile mining identities are discovering.

So, how concerned should we be about a China slowdown and consequent pain being inflicted on iron ore exporters primarily, and the Australian economy more generally? The short answer is that China retains an enormous capacity to stimulate its economy if necessary, but in this latest instance leaders may well have decided to avoid past mistakes, including excessive investment in infrastructure and housing.

China’s economic managers have worked hard to wring from the economy the bad effects from post-global financial crisis stimulus spending – including inflationary pressures. Short of a sudden increase in unemployment they will be reluctant to return to the well unless it’s necessary.

In the meantime, you can be sure China’s leaders will not be losing sleep over the predicament of a coterie of Australian miners who have overextended themselves.