Emergency services repeated ALL occupants have been accounted for in response to media reports that two people have been killed and said, these reports are untrue. A number of people were taken to hospitals with injuries of varying degrees.

"In a second press conference Saturday evening (Jul 6th San Francisco local time) the fire chief reported, all passengers and crew have been accounted for, final numbers were 2 occupants killed, 10 in critical condition, 38 with serious injuries, 82 with minor injuries, 175 uninjured. The confusion about people being not accounted for was the result of survivors being taken to two different locations at the airport. The two fatalities were 16 year old Chinese girls travelling as part of a school outing."

This is correct.. and even more sad.. one of the girls had survived the crash, but may have been run over by emergency vehicles trying to get to the aircraft. Autopsy is still going on to determine that.

CNN reported voice recorders indicate the pilot was starting go around procedures 1.5 seconds before impact. That's sounds like a bad altimeter setting, I'm not familiar with the 777 but he couldn't have known how close he was to the ground.

Doubt it's an altimeter issue. NTSB reported that their approach speed was 137kts at a 7 mile final, with flaps at 30, but also indicated that the speed was significantly slower. Stick shakers started to go off at 1.5 seconds before impact, meaning that their speed was slow enough to cause a stall. Then they started to power up then impact. I'm thinking it's a speed issue at this point, but we'll wait to see what the FDR has to say. They simply didn't have the speed to land and hit the sea wall and PAPIs instead.

BL.

Agree not an altimeter issue. Was simply, IMHO, too low too slow. Why didn't the Captain trainer notice the below airspeed much earlier and correct? ILS had been out as well as PAPI lights for some time for 28L.Visually, the PIC should have been able to see he was too low and too slow even without PAPI in time to execute a successful GA.

Understand, I have never flown a 777. During the time I was flying, I was certified up to an Embraer 190. I was afforded the opportunity to fly a 767 sim several years ago. There is not that much difference in management of a visual approach glide slope and approach speed...even without PAPI My first private instructor called it "Poppy Lights"...if you see 4 red poppies on final you will be pushing up poppies from your grave. One just needs to know the approach plates. .recommended glide scope, approach speed, runway length, altimeter, BP, temp, wind, (weather) and the weight/balance of your ship. It seems this pilot in control, in training, was not well supervised by his trainer. Just MYHO. Fantastic response by responding firefighters, police, and passengers helping their fellow passengers. Kudos to all!

There had better be some explanation other than the usual over-reliance on cockpit technology and under-reliance upon basic airmanship skills and judgment. Thirty knots slow during a ham-and-cheese sandwich visual approach to a big runway in the middle of a CAVU day.... about the only two things you need to pay attention to below the glare shield are the gear indicators and the air speed. If it was a "die by wire" Airbus I could understand letting HAL fly you into the ground, but four seasoned (or at least "experienced", as their hours would suggest) pilots somehow being unaware of or ignoring the most important performance indication in all of fixed wing aviation demands a believable explanation... like a buxom, topless blond waving at them from the bow of a sailboat on short final.

@AntiguaJim for the record, the 28L PAPIs were not out of service during the approach of Asiana 214.

These are the 28L NOTAMs. The PAPI was damaged in the accident and was placed out of service then, and the runway will be held closed until NTSB releases it. The localizer/DME is out of service beginning on the 7th but was in service at the time of the accident.

PF was seated on the left, PNF on the right, and the PNF was in command. A relief FO in the jump seat could not see the runway.PF is a captain rated on 737, 747, A320, had been flying A320 most recently prior to the 777, and was an A320 sim instructor.PNF is a check captain and was flying as a check captain for the first time.Right-side flight director switch was found in the on position, left-side switch in the off position.Autothrottle switches were found in the armed position.Crew stated that approach clearance included speed 180 kts until 5 DME.PNF stated that at 4000 ft they put the flight director in vertical speed mode at 1500 fpm.Below 500 ft PNF said he assumed autothrottles were maintaining speed while crew worked to correct slight lateral and vertical deviation.At 200 ft PNF said he saw 4 red PAPIs and he recognised the autothrottles were not maintaining speed.PNF stated he established a go around attitude at that time, he also stated the PF had advanced the throttles to TOGA at that time.

"At 200 ft PNF said he saw 4 red PAPIs and he recognised the autothrottles were not maintaining speed."

That says it all right there... I don't know what the three of them were looking at during the time he descended from 4,000 to 200, but obviously it was neither the PAPI or the airspeed indicator, the most important things to be monitoring above and below the glare shield respectively.

I mean... what nonsense. He's "all red" and concludes it is the fault of the auto-throttles and not his failure to maintain the correct rate of descent which, by the way, could just have easily been due to diving below the glide path at 30 kts OVER the speed bug setting. These guys obviously have a "VatSim" approach toward flying... it's all just a technological game until the CVR transcript says "sound of impact". It's just like that Air France crew that sounded like a bunch of lawyers arguing a point before the judge in chambers, this law and that law, for so many painful and needless minutes as their A330 was falling through the darkness from cruising altitude to obliterating impact with the cruel sea.

No, it can't possibly be yet another example of seat of the keyboard flying prevailing over seat of the pants flying, it just can't be. I think it had to be the gal on the bow of that sailboat, or perhaps the flight attendant was all out of coffee or tea and offered up some "me".

After the crash there were quite a few diversions to the San Jose airport nearby. I was really impressed by the way the San Jose approach controller handled the increased traffic load.

Specifically, I listened to the "KSJC NORCAL Approach #1" feed from around 1840Z-1915Z. Everything was business as usual at San Jose, up until around 1840Z when the diverted aircraft began to arrive, many of them at min fuel.

@InterpreDemon not correct to say he was ignoring the PAPI, in fact part of the problem may have been that he was fixated on it. At 500 ft he saw 3 red 1 white and was concentrating on that, ignoring the airspeed. If that had continued for another 4 seconds the first warning of low airspeed would've been the stick shaker below 100 ft.

Why was the PNF/instructor not scanning airspeed? Did the psychology of his dual roles as PNF and instructor play a part? He said he assumed the autothrottles were maintaining speed. He said this was his first flight as an instructor. Should newly qualified instructors be supervised by a senior instructor for their first few flights? He seemed to say they advanced the throttles to TOGA at 200 ft. According to the FDR, 200 ft was 16 s before impact, and the throttles actually began to advance at 125 ft, 8 s before impact. So his memory is not perfect, understandable really.

What about the PF? He'd been an A320 pilot for the past seven or eight years. The A320 is typically not a long-haul aircraft, so he would've been flying mostly in East Asia. This was approximately his tenth flight in the 777. How many visual approaches had he performed in the 777 without glideslope guidance? What about in the 777 simulator? Or in the real A320?

How did the autothrottle disengage without either pilot being aware of it? Is there any automatic reengagement of an armed autothrottle if a low airspeed condition is detected? If they really did initiate TOGA 8 s before impact, does it really take that long for the engines to spool up and arrest their descent rate? Were both pilots in agreement at that time about the TOGA? How did they communicate during those seconds? And a lot has been made of the unusually short underrun area of this runway; how would the aircraft have behaved if the tail had struck tarmac or grass instead of a sea wall?

After the crash there were quite a few diversions to the San Jose airport nearby. I was really impressed by the way the San Jose approach controller handled the increased traffic load.

Specifically, I listened to the "KSJC NORCAL Approach #1" feed from around 1840Z-1915Z. Everything was business as usual at San Jose, up until around 1840Z when the diverted aircraft began to arrive, many of them at min fuel.

Oktalist, even at 500' I doubt he "suddenly" saw three red and that in the minutes prior to that point he had been stabilized on the GS. Why anybody would be flying on auto-throttle as late as short final escapes me since there are any number of things that can occur that would require an immediate response not possible with the autopilot (like discovering after you were gawking at the topless sailorette that you were far too low and slow) and yes, when the engines are at or close to flight idle that spool-up takes an eternity in an environment where seconds count. It ain't like cracking the throttle on that IO-540 in front of you and getting instant torque. That's why turbine pilots must always be well ahead of the equipment if they are to be able to stabilize the flight path, and generally flight energy decisions and adjustments have to be made at least ten seconds in advance.

You see, that's why I know this is all BS.... that plane was not stabilized on the glide path with everything hanging out because if it was the engines would have been already cranking at a good clip. No, the engines were probably at idle because he was porpoising the GS... indeed perhaps due to fixation on the PAPI ("chasing the needles") or maybe he was looking at something else. The two things he was definitely not looking at were airspeed and power. When the report is released the FDR and CVR will tell us "the rrrrrrrrrrrrest of the story", and it will not be pretty. I had to laugh when Asiana announced that they had grounded their 777 fleet for inspection, when they really should have grounded their pilot roster for re-examination.

Oktalist, even at 500' I doubt he "suddenly" saw three red and that in the minutes prior to that point he had been stabilized on the GS. Why anybody would be flying on auto-throttle as late as short final escapes me since there are any number of things that can occur that would require an immediate response not possible with the autopilot (like discovering after you were gawking at the topless sailorette that you were far too low and slow) and yes, when the engines are at or close to flight idle that spool-up takes an eternity in an environment where seconds count. It ain't like cracking the throttle on that IO-540 in front of you and getting instant torque. That's why turbine pilots must always be well ahead of the equipment if they are to be able to stabilize the flight path, and generally flight energy decisions and adjustments have to be made at least ten seconds in advance.

You see, that's why I know this is all BS.... that plane was not stabilized on the glide path with everything hanging out because if it was the engines would have been already cranking at a good clip. No, the engines were probably at idle because he was porpoising the GS... indeed perhaps due to fixation on the PAPI ("chasing the needles") or maybe he was looking at something else. The two things he was definitely not looking at were airspeed and power. When the report is released the FDR and CVR will tell us "the rrrrrrrrrrrrest of the story", and it will not be pretty. I had to laugh when Asiana announced that they had grounded their 777 fleet for inspection, when they really should have grounded their pilot roster for re-examination.

After the crash there were quite a few diversions to the San Jose airport nearby. I was really impressed by the way the San Jose approach controller handled the increased traffic load.

Specifically, I listened to the "KSJC NORCAL Approach #1" feed from around 1840Z-1915Z. Everything was business as usual at San Jose, up until around 1840Z when the diverted aircraft began to arrive, many of them at min fuel.

Great job by the KSJC controllers that day.

This I can attest to that I believe the areas are physically next to each other at the TRACON. From my tour there, the room is set up like a hub and spokes on a bicycle; each spoke is an area I can't remember which areas are which but I do remember seeing the areas for SFO, OAK, and SJC all being adjacent to eachother (read: backs to eachother), so they could turn around and yell out something if an incident happened. The ones that were on the far side comprised of the SMF, SCK, APA, and RNO areas.

Again, my memory is dodgy on this, as it was at least 5 years since that tour.