Coralie Delaume — What if Germany was the true winner of the Brexit?

FIGAROVOX/INTERVIEW:
For essayist Coralie Delaume, the Brexit is yet another revolt
against a blind Europe. But the UK, in breaking the myth of an
irreversible EU, may remain alone in its courage.

Coralie
Delaume is a journalist and essayist. She is author of Europe.
Les Etats désunis
(Michalon, 2014). Her cronicles are available on her bloghere

In
the UK, the Brexit has just had a victory. How would you analyse this
result? Is it a surprise?

It
is clearly a surprise because opinion polls, bookmakers and the City
all seemed to predict a "Remain" victory.

Nevertheless,
the City is, by nature, short sighted; its aim is not to produce
analysis, but maximum capital gain for investors. As for opinion
polls, in such subjects they should now be regarded as systematically
erroneous. For example, no more than one year ago, Greek opinion
poles predicted a clear "yes" victory in Alexis Tsipras'
referendum, but the "no" broke through with 61%, despite a
terror campaign led by the Greek and European press...

One
thing that lessens the surprise is that is that we are actually
starting to get used to this. Whichever the country and whatever the
question, every recent referendum about Europe has resulted in
rejection. The aforementioned Greek referendum in July 2015 aside,
there was the Danish referendum in December 2015, in which 53% voted
against further integration into the EU... as well as the Dutch
people's referendum last April with regard to free exchange between
the EU and Ukraine. Only 32% of the population voted, but of those
votes, the "no" had a clear win with 61%.

The
particularity of the British referendum is that has taken place in
one of the strongest EU countries. Also, the question demanded a
straight answer. It is the first time a population has had such a
blatant opportunity to choose between remaining in the EU or leaving.
But this time, those shouting; "this hasn't been well enough
explained" could neither claim that voters had not understood
the question, nor that the response was off the board because the
question too technical, nor that the votes were a mere opportunity to
sanction leadership. The British gave a clear reply to a simple
question.

In
such a dense and explosive Europe, it seems almost surreal. So yes,
obviously, also a little surprising.

Is
this a "no" to the Schengen agreement, or a "no"
to austerity?

It
is a multiple "no", as was the "no" of the French
referendum on the European constitution in 2005. We now know that,
with regard to the question of the EU, divisions do not follow
national political divide. In France in 2005, the "no" came
from both the right and the left.

There
is a simple explanation to this. The EU offers a framework. This
framework, along with the meta-laws that result from such a
supranational organisation, can be accepted or refused in spite of
profound disagreement on how to proceed should the framework be
abolished. To want sovereignty is to want full control over the
decisions that concern us, but that does not specify how to decide—
that is then done under national democratic debate.

What
the British do next is their business. For the moment they have done
nothing more that step outside the framework, and not all voters have
done so for the same reasons. Some, for example, want to reinstate a
completely sovereign state, as does Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, who
says, in a well-written editorial:
" With
sadness and tortured by doubts, I will cast my vote as an ordinary
citizen for withdrawal from the European Union.

Let
there be no illusion about the trauma of Brexit. Anybody who claims
that Britain can lightly disengage after 43 years enmeshed in EU
affairs is a charlatan or a dreamer (...) Stripped
of distractions, it comes down to an elemental choice: whether to
restore the full self-government of this nation, or to continue
living under a higher supranational regime (...) the Brexit vote is
about the supremacy of parliament and nothing else."

Among
those who chose to "Leave", some may well have done so for
reasons of immigration. It is a question that dominated the campaign
even though the UK is not only not part of the Schengen agreement,
but has also managed to delegate the surveillance of its borders to
France, by way of the Le Touquet Treaty in February 2003.

Others
where undoubtedly motivated by a climate of economic insecurity.
Along with Boris Johnson, those that lead the "Leave"
campaign are plainly liberal conservatives, but we cannot ignore that
there were also "Leave" voters among the working class
Left. The website Grey Britain,
that specialises in British political affairs explains, for example,
that one in three Labour voters opted for the Brexit. It then points
out that "The industrial districts of Wales have gone against
prediction by trusting an exit (...) In Sunderland, centre of the
Labour heartland, the Brexit had a 71% landslide. It is proof of how
many communities, particularly within the old industrial strongholds,
feel marginalised (...). Already, in September 2015, by choosing a
leader such as Corbyn, Labour voters sent out a message to other more
typical Labour leaders. By saying yes to the Brexit, one in three
Labour voters thus renewed that message."

Is
this result linked to fact that the UK has a history of not being
pro-European?

The
country, certainly, has always held a special position within the EU,
and as early as 1984 it began opposing its laws. At the Fontainebleau
summit, Margaret Thatcher threatened to leave in order to gain
"rebates" on the UK's financial contribuations, because she
felt that the British quota was set too high with regard to the
scantiness of the agricultural grants the nation received. Ever
since, the UK has claimed EU specificity on every possible occasion.
The nation refused to adopt the Euro, did not enter into the Schengen
agreement, obtained an opt-out (waiver) protocol on the charter of
fundemental rights and refused to sign the European fiscal compact
(officially know as the TSCG, or the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union) that
introduced a golden rule within the domain of public finances...

In
truth, the UK has managed, as much as possible, to preserve its
sovereignty and has acted, above all, in its best interests — which
is absolutely normal, and so do nations worldwide, as long as they
meet no obstacle in doing so. In the heart of the EU, Germany also
proceeds in the same way. The powerful (Federal) Constitutional Court
of Karlsruhe watches jealously over the country's best interests. It
is within this framework, in 2005, when publicly announcing its
position on the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, that Germany
notably demanded "the extending and strengthening of Bundestag
and Bundesrat rights in the matter of the European Union"
(Lisbon Treaty, June 2009).

The
difference between the two countries is that British "sovereignty"
has always presented itself as defiant of Europeen integration
whereas German Sovereignty made a sort of Tender Offer on European
institutions. Today, the interests of the EU and those of Germany are
intrinsically linked, notably with the existance of the Euro. This
currency, being under-valued for Germany economy, allows the country
to be super-competitive and to reap huge extra commercial benefits.
What's more, it allows almost zero-interest lending. The fragiliity
of "peripheral" countries has transformed German debt into
a safe-haven, and interest rates for repayments are historically low.
This mid-June, the German 10-year interest rate for borrowing even
went negative...

But
again, why would an EU member-state renounce being listened to when
it always gets what it wants? German proponderance owes a lot to the
quiet submission of France. In a different way, the special
treatement of Britain within the EU was always due to its implicit
message that it would be ready to exit if it had to. It is something
that Alexis Tsipras's Greece never did, which also explains the
dramatic failing of the Syriza party. Within the EU, positions of
power between nations have not been eradicated, on the contrary, and
as a result, the nations that survive best are those that realise
this and meddle through, without expecting any hypothetical "Europeen
solidarity", which, even if it sounds good, is yet to happen.

On
a wider scale, does the Brexit victory symbolise a people's revolt
against Europe?

Against
today's Europe, yes, most clearly. Europe today is above all that of
the Single European Act of 1986, which freed up financial movement.
It is that of the Euro, that created a ferocious hierarchy between
lending and indebted countries, and put its member-states into
perpetual pursuit of wage moderation. It is the Europe of rivalry
between workers. Despite "free movement", named as such to
sound good, the Commission nevertheless issued a formal notice to
France and Germany, ordering them to stop applying a minimum wage on
the employment of foreign lorry drivers, and thus the "European
dream" began to seem a nightmare. And above all, today's Europe
is the humiliating monopoly of EC laws above national laws that
undermines democracy. Furthermore, it could soon become that of the
TTIP, the TISA,
and other international commercial treaties that are currently being
negociated, and that promises little good.

It is against all these
things that the people are revolting. They are searching and
grappling for a solution, and are trying to expel the older political
parties, such has been the scale of grotesque pantomimic alternation
between the left and the right practically all over Europe. Thus, in
Italy, the Five Star Movement (M5S) recently gained great success in
local elections. In Spain, it may be that Unidos Podemos (alliance
between Podemos and the United Left) becomes, as from this Sunday
(original article published 24/06/16), the nation's first formal
opposition party. All these experiences will not necessarily be
fruitful — already, in Greece, the Syriza defeat bled the country —
but these movements do show a clear thirst for radical change, and a
citizen desire to regain a grip on one's own destiny.

What
will happen now? What do the European texts state? What are the
different stages of disengagement?

It
is hard to say because the Brexit is the first exit Europe has
experienced. We will probably know a bit more after the summit this
28/29 June. Whatever the situation, we do know that EU membership is
not irreversable... at least not for a country that knew how to
distance itself from the federal mirage of the Euro.

As
for the UK, undoubtably, it has some difficult times ahead. A
whirlwind-come-snowball effect is already in motion. And one mustn't
forget that Northern Island and Scotland voted "Remain" at
56% and 62% respectively. As for France and the southern Europeen
countries, they now find themselves in a Europe that is even more
Germanic than it was just last week, which is not necessarily good
news for them.