For Strategic Defense: A New Strategy For the New Global Situation

About the Author

Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security PolicyDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

Introduction

The Persian Gulf War has changed the political backdrop for
Congress's annual debate over funding of the Strategic Defense
Initiative -- or SDI. Live TV broadcasts and countless replays of
deadly Scud missiles screeching over the skies of Israel and Saudi
Arabia, and then Patriot missiles soaring up to destroy them,
brought home to Americans, for the first time perhaps, that America
needs effective defenses against possible missile attacks. No
congressman or senator now can afford to be seen as opposed to
missile defense. The central question of the SDI debate long had
been whether the technology worked and thus whether it was feasible
to deploy such defenses. This question now has been answered
resoundly in the affirmative.

The SDI debate now shifts to what kind of defenses are best and
when they will be built. This shift in debate itself is the most
significant victory for proponents of strategic defenses since
Ronald Reagan launched the SDI program on March 23, 1983. It now is
up to George Bush to take advantage of this opening to ensure that
America can defend itself from missile attack by the turn of the
century.

Changing Tactics Already SDI critics are changing their tactics in
preparation for the new debate over SDI. Some are masking their
opposition to SDI by expressing strong support for tactical missile
defenses like Patriot, which can defend only against short-range
missiles. Others are backing extremely limited strategic defense
deployments that conform to the terms of the increasingly outdated
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- a treaty specifically
designed to prevent the United States or Soviet Union from building
effective defenses.

SDI backers, for their part, will be faced with the task of
presenting the issue in as stark terms as possible. Neither
tactical defenses like Patriot nor the ABM Treaty-compliant systems
now championed by SDI critics can credibly defend American
territory against missile attacks. The question that SDI supporters
must press the program's detractors to answer is a straightforward,
unambiguous: "Yea or nay on effective missile defenses?"

The focus of the new SDI debate will be Bush's strategic defense
proposal known as G-PALS, for Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes. G-PALS pares back America's SDI plans to meet the fiscal
and military requirements of the 1990s. Unlike Reagan's SDI
program, designed to disrupt a massive Soviet surprise attack
involving thousands of incoming missiles, G-PALS will give America
-- and its allies -- a near-perfect defense against limited or
perhaps accidental attacks by up to 200 missile warheads. G-PALS
then cuts the proposed cost of SDI from $53 billion to $41 billion
over ten years. This puts SDI well within the cost-range of other
important defense programs -- less than the Air Force's B-2 Stealth
bomber and comparable to the mobile Midgetman missile system.

To push forward with G-PALS, Bush needs a strategy that frames
the missile defense debate in clear-cut terms: "For it or against
it." To advance his missile defense agenda, Bush should:

** Ask Congress for a straight up-or-down vote on deploying
strategic defenses in the 1990s. Absent a clear mandate to deploy
defenses against ballistic missiles, it is likely that opponents
will continue to limit missile defense programs strictly to
research and development.

** Fight attempts to split the SDI program. Congressional
critics of SDI have sought to derail the SDI program by dividing it
into different functions. Example: separating short-range, or
"theater," missile defenses from strategic defenses capable of
defending U.S. territory; and limiting funding for some of the most
critical, and promising, elements of an effective SDI system,
including Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptors. Bush should
stop these efforts to kill the SDI program piece by piece by
vetoing any legislation that divides the program.

** Set a two-year deadline to complete negotiations with the
Soviet Union to modify the ABM Treaty. The U.S. cannot deploy G-
PALS or any other effective anti-missile defenses until it modifies
or withdraws entirely from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
This nearly two-decade old accord, drafted in the chilliest of the
Cold War years, virtually bans long-range missile defense. If
Moscow does not agree within two years to modernize and update the
Treaty to allow the testing and deployment of credible SDI systems,
Bush should withdraw from the Treaty, as he is allowed to do under
the treaty if he gives six months' notice. Bush rightly could
explain that the treaty has become an anachronistic relic of the
Cold War.

** Reorganize the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
(SDIO) to ensure quick deployment of G-PALS. All research and
development programs associated with G-PALS, including Brilliant
Pebbles space-based interceptors, the Ground-Based Interceptor
(GBI), Arrow, and Patriot, should be consolidated into one office
within SDIO. Bush should instruct this office to manage its
programs with an eye toward the deployment of G-PALS by the end of
the decade.

The Changing Strategic Environment

Bush's new G-PALS proposal switches the focus of SDI from a
massive, calculated nuclear strike from the Soviet Union to missile
strikes that are smaller and potentially less destructive, but also
more likely. These new threats to America and its allies come from
the spread of missile technology to increasing numbers of Third
World countries including Libya, North Korea, and Syria, and the
possibility that spreading political turmoil in the Soviet Union
could lead to an unauthorized or accidental Soviet missile
launches.

Iraq's Scud missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia
during the Gulf War were America's first warning that the nature of
warfare, even in the Third World, is becoming ever more deadly. The
U.S. now projects that 24 Third World nations will have ballistic
missiles by the year 2000. (Department of Defense, "Briefing on the
Refocused Strategic Defense Initiative," February 12, 1991.) Given
the prospects for regional military conflicts from South Asia to
South America, the Gulf War may well be a frightening indication of
conflicts to come. America must be prepared to meet these
threats.

Demise of Deterrence? "Deterrence," or the
concept that missile strikes are best prevented through the threat
of retaliation rather than by defenses, is the bedrock argument of
those who oppose missile defense. Missile defenses, they argue,
only muddy the waters by giving a false confidence to those who
possess the defenses. The notion of deterrence of course has some
logic when applied to the actions of a rational leader in full
command of his forces. This may have been true of the U.S.S.R.
until recently. But the notion that deterrence can protect America
increasingly is divorced from the real world in which America must
survive. Iraq's Saddam Hussein fired his missiles at Israel and
Saudi Arabia in full knowledge that he was likely to suffer
retaliation in kind. Defense with Patriot missiles, not deterrence
via counterthreats, was the key to countering the Scud threat.

Similarly, political turmoil in the Soviet Union brings into
question the value of a strategy based solely on offensive nuclear
deterrence, rather than on a strategy that combines deterrence with
defenses. Even as the Soviet Union continues to modernize its
awesome strategic nuclear arsenal, daily it becomes less clear who
will control this force as turmoil spreads through Soviet society,
including the restive Soviet military. Soviet military leaders
recognize this potentially catastrophic development. Soviet Chief
of Staff General Mikhail Moiseyev tried to reassure the West last
September 27 that " ... in those areas [of the Soviet Union] where
the situation does not fully correspond to the concept of national
security, [nuclear] warheads have been put in a more secure place."
(Michael Dobbs, "Soviet Says Warheads Moved From Ethnic Sore
Spots," Washington Post, September 28, 1990, p. A-1.) Moiseyev's
statement confirms the problem. If, in fact, control over Moscow's
nuclear arsenal is in danger of fragmenting among various political
factions within the Soviet military, the risks of an accidental or
unauthorized launch of a nuclear-tipped missile rise
accordingly.

Neither deterrence nor defenses can prevent an accident or stop
a rogue commander operating outside central control. Defenses,
however, can prevent the accidental or desperate act from leading
to the destruction of an American city, and perhaps a wider nuclear
war.

What is G-PALS?

G-PALS is designed to provide the U.S. and its allies with near-
perfect protection against the smaller-scale strikes likely from a
Third World foe or a fragmented Soviet Union. It will be able to
rebuff missile strikes of up to 200 warheads aimed at the U.S. from
anywhere in the world with near 100 percent confidence.

This new mission requirement stands in contrast to the mission
assigned to the "Phase I" SDI system developed during the Reagan
Administration. That system was meant to break up a deliberate
attack on U.S. military targets by thousands of Soviet warheads.
Although the military requirements established for SDI in the
Reagan Administration are classified, it has been reported that the
system would have been able to shoot down 30 percent of all Soviet
warheads in a first strike and 50 percent of the warheads carried
on the SS-18 Satan missile, the most dangerous and accurate in the
Soviet arsenal. ( Steven A. Hildreth, "The Strategic Defense
Initiative: Issues for Phase I Deployment," CRS Issue Brief
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1990) p. 4.)

The Pentagon officially still retains the military requirement
for a full Phase I SDI system as a long-term goal for U.S.
ballistic missile defenses. (General Colin L. Powell, "Statement of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives," February 7, 1991,
p. 9.) If necessary, G-PALS later could be expanded through the
deployment of additional interceptors to meet Phase I requirements.
And G-PALS too will deploy systems, like Patriot, to defend
America's allies and American troops in the field against attacks
by short-range missiles, technically known as "tactical" or
"theater" ballistic missiles. (The Heritage Foundation was briefed
by Administration officials on G-PALS on February 11 and February
21, 1991. For further information on G-PALS see: Department of
Defense, "Briefing on the Refocused Strategic Defense Initiative,"
February 12, 1991.)

G-PALS will consist of anti-missile systems now being developed
by the SDI program, but G-PALS generally will need fewer of them.
The number of space-based interceptor missiles will be reduced from
over 4,000 in the Phase I plan to 1,000 in the G-PALS plan. The
number of ground-based interceptors will be halved from 1,600 to
800.

While the precise design or architecture of G-PALS still is
under discussion, a deployed G-PALS system probably would
include:

1,000 Brilliant Pebbles interceptors.

Brilliant Pebbles interceptors are tiny satellites designed to
track, attack and destroy an enemy missile as it rises through the
atmosphere, or in what is known as its boost phase. Each Brilliant
Pebble is autonomous. Each has its own on-board sensors to identify
targets, a computer system for processing information, and a
propulsion system to speed it toward a target. (For a detailed
description of the Brilliant Pebbles system see: Baker Spring,
"Brilliant Pebbles: The Revolutionary Idea for Strategic Defense,"
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 748, January 25, 1990.)

Brilliant Pebbles destroy their targets by "kinetic energy,"
that is, by smashing into them at high speed. If deployed in the
proper orbit, Brilliant Pebbles can counter ballistic missiles with
ranges anywhere from about 300 miles to intercontinental distances.
Missiles with ranges below 300 miles do not climb above 62 miles
and thus do not reach altitudes high enough to become vulnerable to
space- based Brilliant Pebbles interceptors. During the Persian
Gulf War, Iraq's al-Hussein and al-Abbas missiles, with ranges of
375 and 550 miles, would have been vulnerable to Brilliant
Pebbles.

To provide a similar level of protection absent space-based
weapons, the U.S. would have to deploy tens of thousands of ground-
based anti-missile weapons on the territory of its allies. This
would be extraordinarily expensive since each Patriot, for example,
can defend an area of only about 40 square miles. (Charles Bennett,
"SDI Is No Patriot," The Washington Post, February 5, 1991, p.
A-19.) There, of course, also may be times when the deployment of
ground- based anti-missile weapons in a foreign country may be
politically sensitive or impossible. Space-based weapons by
contrast, provide protection while being "politically
invisible."

Another reason that space-based weapons remain essential to any
SDI system is that space-based interceptors are far more effective
than ground-based interceptors against missiles with multiple
warheads, like most Soviet intercontinental missiles. Only a space-
based weapon can destroy an enemy missile during its ascent before
it releases its multiple warheads and decoys. Ground-based
interceptors, therefore, must discriminate between warheads and
decoys and then attack each of the warheads individually in space
or as they re-enter the earth's atmosphere closing in on their
targets. Brilliant Pebbles need not do this because it destroys the
one missile carrying the warheads and decoys.

200 Brilliant Eyes sensors

Brilliant Eyes, derived from Brilliant Pebbles technology,
detect and track ballistic missiles in flight. Brilliant Eyes have
light- and heat-sensitive sensors to pick up the bright plumes
emitted by missiles in their boost phase. Brilliant Eyes help
direct space- based and ground-based interceptors against incoming
ballistic missiles. Brilliant Eyes are smaller and lighter than
existing satellites that detect and track missile launches and are
better able to withstand enemy attack, in part because they will be
deployed in large numbers. Only space-based sensors can provide the
early warning capability and targeting information needed for
missile defense. This was demonstrated during the Gulf War when
America's early warning satellites alerted the Patriot of Iraqi
Scud launches.

800 ground-based interceptors

Warheads that slip through the Brilliant Pebbles net in space to
threaten American territory will be intercepted by ground-based
interceptors. Two ground-based systems are under consideration. The
first is known simply as the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI). The
second is the Exoatmospheric/Endoatmospheric Interceptor (or E2I,
pronounced "e-squared-eye," for short). Either one may be deployed,
or both could be deployed in tandem.

GBI is based on technology developed through the Exoatmospheric
Reentry vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS) test program. A test
version of ERIS intercepted and destroyed a U.S. Minuteman I dummy
warhead in space this January 28. The targeted Minuteman I was
launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, while the
test version of ERIS was launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the
Pacific Ocean. GBI, like ERIS, would attack enemy missile warheads
in space before they re-enter the earth's atmosphere.

The technical challenge facing the GBI system is to discriminate
between real warheads and decoys. Dummy warheads, similar to
balloons, travel through space mimicking real warheads. The
vulnerability of the decoy warhead is its weight. Because it is so
light, it is stripped away by the atmosphere as it begins the
"terminal" or reentry phase of flight. Only real warheads survive
the terminal phase. Because GBI will intercept enemy missile
warheads in space, it must be able to discriminate between warheads
and decoys. This is a difficult technical challenge, but progress
on it is being made. The January 28 ERIS test successfully
discriminated a dummy Minuteman I warhead from two decoys. If,
however, GBI proves incapable of discriminating between warheads
and decoys with a high degree of confidence, it is likely that E2I,
rather than GBI, will be deployed as the ground-based leg of the
G-PALS system.

E2I is based on technology developed through the High
Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI) program. Since E2I is
designed mainly to intercept and destroy enemy warheads after they
reenter the atmosphere, it generally will attack only after the
earth's atmosphere has stripped away the decoys. The main technical
challenge facing E2I is ensuring that its on-board sensor will find
the target warhead and direct the interceptor against it. This is
tougher to do inside the atmosphere than above it, since the speed
of the incoming missile creates friction with the atmosphere that
then creates extremely high heat. This heat distorts the view seen
by E2I's sensor as it "looks" through its sapphire crystal window.
Preliminary tests indicate, however, that the window can be kept
cool by covering it with a shroud for the early part of the
interceptor's flight and using a liquid nitrogen coolant to coat
the window after the shroud has been jettisoned. This was
demonstrated during the first flight test of a HEDI missile at
White Sands, New Mexico, on January 26, 1990.

Ground-based sensors

G-PALS will depend on ground-based as well as space-based
sensors to track ballistic missiles in flight. The ground-based
sensors will relay essential targeting information to the
interceptor missiles so that they can locate and destroy enemy
warheads. Two ground-based sensor systems are likely to be included
in the G-PALS system.

The first is the Ground-Based Radar (GBR), which will track
missile warheads in the latter stage of their flight in space and
inside the atmosphere as they close on their targets. GBR will be
particularly useful in tracking missiles that have shorter times of
flight, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) since
it has the ability to process radar information quickly and provide
it to commanders. GBR is designed to be mobile and probably will be
based on railcars to make it less vulnerable to enemy strikes.

G-PALS second ground-based sensor system is apt to be the
Ground-based Surveillance and Tracking Systems (GSTS). This is a
heat- sensitive sensor mounted on a rocket. Upon early warning of a
missile strike, the sensor will be launched into space to scan for
incoming warheads beyond the range of the ground-based radar. The
system will play an important role in distinguishing between real
warheads and decoys.

Ground-based and sea-based tactical missile
defenses

G-PALS is designed to link systems for protecting the U.S. from
attack by intercontinental-range missiles with interceptors
deployed abroad to protect allies or U.S. troops in the field from
attacks by shorter-range ballistic missiles like Iraq's Scuds.
Prior to G-PALS, theater missile defense and strategic missile
defense (or protecting U.S. territory) were not integrated into a
common design. By combining these two missions in G-PALS, America
will be able to deploy a defensive system capable of defending
against ballistic missiles of all ranges. Systems that previously
have been thought of as tactical or theater systems and are now
being brought under the SDI umbrella through G-PALS include:

Arrow Now under development by America and Israel, Arrow will
be able to protect hundreds of square miles against tactical
missiles, and ensure protection against missiles armed with
chemical warheads by destroying them at higher altitudes and more
completely than does Patriot. Arrow was tested in Israel on August
9, 1990, and March 25, 1991. Each test was considered largely
successful despite the loss of some electronic data. The final two
tests slated for later this year will demonstrate the ability of
Arrow to destroy a mock missile warhead in flight.

ERINT The U.S. Army, under SDIO supervision, has been
developing its own tactical ballistic missile system called the
Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT). It includes an on-board radar
to guide it toward enemy missiles in the terminal phase of flight
and a specially designed "fragmentation" warhead designed to throw
a cloud of shrapnel in front of an incoming missile. ERINT will fit
in existing Patriot missile canisters. A forerunner to the ERINT
system, called the Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiment
(FLAGE), was tested successfully against a U.S. Lance short-range
missile at the White Sands test range in New Mexico in 1987.

Patriot Developed originally by the Army Missile Command, Patriot
now has been turned over to SDIO, which will supervise efforts to
upgrade its range and accuracy.

THAAD This Theater High Altitude Area Defense system is being
designed by SDIO and the Army to defend wider areas than Patriot.
Of all the ground-based tactical missile defense systems under
development, only THAADs will be able to intercept missiles outside
the atmosphere. According to SDIO Director Henry Cooper, the THAAD
system also may be deployed on U.S. warships to offer defenses
against theater ballistic missiles around the world. The Navy is
participating in studies supervised by SDIO on theater missile
defenses.

It is likely that several of these tactical missile defense
programs -- Arrow, ERINT, Patriot, and THAAD -- will be
consolidated because their missions and capabilities overlap.

G-PALS Answers SDI Critics

Because it is a more limited system than that proposed for a
full Phase I defense, G-PALS addresses squarely some of the main
charges leveled against SDI by its critics. The charges have been:
1) that anti-missile defenses are too expensive; 2) that SDI will
undermine strategic stability; 3) that missile defense technology
is not feasible; and 4) that the deployment of SDI will block
improved relations with the Soviet Union.

The answers:

1) Cost. G-PALS reduces SDI deployment costs by $12 billion,
from $53 billion to $41 billion over ten years. ( 1988 dollars are
used to compare SDI deployment costs because the first deployment
plan was proposed in fiscal 1988.) It also ensures that no more
than $6 billion will be spent on SDI in any one year and less in
most years. Funding requirements will decline after 1998.

2) Strategic stability. SDI critics worry that anti-missile
defenses, particularly those capable of intercepting and destroying
long-range missiles, will undermine what is known as "strategic
stability." They argue that defenses, by reducing the vulnerability
of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to ballistic missile attack, may
tempt one side or the other to launch a first strike in the hope of
gaining an advantage. G-PALS, however, is not designed to defend
against a purposeful Soviet missile strike. G-PALS' 1,800
interceptors would be overwhelmed by the thousands of Soviet
warheads that could be directed against the U.S. in a purposeful
first strike. Even with G-PALS, the U.S. and the Soviet Union will
be vulnerable to a purposeful first strike. Offensive deterrence,
or the threat of retaliation, will remain the major means of
preventing all-out nuclear war. While the long-term SDI objective
still is to replace the precarious stability of the nuclear balance
of terror with the secure stability of effective defenses, G-PALS
gives no cause to upset the critics on this account.

3) Feasibility. Critics of SDI in Congress long have contended
that it is not feasible to deploy defenses against ballistic
missiles. Some argued that intercepting even a few missiles was
impossible outside the test range. Proven wrong by the success of
Patriot in the Persian Gulf War, the critics have switched their
argument and claim that it is not possible to counter a large
number of missiles, particularly if they include multiple warheads
and decoys to confuse the defense. ( Harold Brown, "Yes on Patriot,
No on SDI," The Washington Post, March 27, 1991, p. A-23.) While
the jury still is out on this question until further testing is
completed, the issue is moot as far as G-PALS is concerned. G-PALS
is designed to provide protection against missile strikes of
limited size, only up to 200 warheads.

4) Relations with the Soviet Union. Some critics fear SDI will
undermine attempts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. But
the threat of Third World missile strikes and of accidental or
unauthorized missile launches are threats shared by the U.S. and
the Soviet Union. At a September 27, 1990, meeting in his Kremlin
office, Soviet Presidential advisor Yevgeny Primakov told Heritage
Foundation officials that there is a basis for U.S.-Soviet
cooperation in countering the Third World missile threat. Other
Soviet officials echo Primakov. (For further discussions of the
possibility of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the area of ballistic
missile defense, see: Baker Spring, "In Moscow, Hints of Support
for Strategic Defense," The Heritage Foundation, Executive
Memorandum No. 296, February 13, 1991 and Baker Spring, "The
Defense and Space Talks: The Prospects for a Breakthrough," The
Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Lectures No. 275, 1990.) Given
changing attitudes in the Soviet Union, SDI can become a source of
growing U.S.-Soviet cooperation, not confrontation.

Conflicting Signals from Congress on SDI

From the inception of the SDI program in 1983, Congress has
sought to derail Pentagon plans for anti-missile defenses. The
result has been sharp annual reductions in SDI funding,
restrictions on the testing of SDI components, and last year the
division of SDI funding into separate accounts, with the most
promising technologies receiving the lowest funding. Now, however,
the success of Patriot interceptors in the Persian Gulf War is
making House and Senate SDI opponents nervous. As a result, they
have been sending confusing and contradictory proposals. The common
thread in these is to divide further the SDI program so that these
opponents of strategic defense can support some aspects, such as
tactical missile defenses, including Patriot, while continuing to
oppose the key programs and technologies needed to defend American
territory against missile attacks. (Recent articles seeking to
separate Patriot's success from the issue of strategic defense
include: Charles Bennett, "SDI Is No Patriot," The Washington Post,
February 5, 1991, p. A-19; Harold Brown, "Yes on Patriot, No on
SDI," The Washington Post, March 27, 1991, p. A-23; and Leslie H.
Gelb, "Right-Wing Myths," The New York Times, January 27, 1991, p.
E-17.)

One anti-SDI effort being pushed by House leaders is a bill
introduced on March 14 by Timothy Penny, a Minnesota Democrat.
(Congressional Record, March 14, 1991, pp. H 1774, E 965.) His
proposal, H.R. 1446, would strip tactical missile defense programs
-- presumably including Arrow and Patriot, although his bill does
not specify -- from SDIO and establish a separate Theater Missile
Defense office within the Pentagon. Were the Penny bill to become
law, tactical as well as strategic defense programs would be
undermined. Many of the technologies under development for SDI are
"dual-use," that is, they are effective for tactical or strategic
defense. Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptors, for example,
could be used to counter tactical or intercontinental-range
strategic missiles. THAAD interceptors likely will be able to
counter some types of strategic missiles, as well as short-range
missiles. Ground-based and space-based sensors can be used for both
missions.

Flawed Plans Some members of Congress, including Senator Howell
Heflin, the Alabama Democrat, call for proceeding with the
development and deployment of anti-missile systems that comply with
the 1972 ABM Treaty. While Heflin's February 6 Senate floor
statement is a good faith effort to try to build a political
consensus for SDI, his plan for deploying missile defenses within
the confines of the ABM Treaty is flawed. (Congressional Record,
February 6, 1991, pp. S 1654-5.) He implies that the U.S. can
achieve a credible continental defense within ABM Treaty
limits.

This is not so. The ABM Treaty allows the U.S. to deploy only
100 interceptors, all of which must be in fixed positions at Grand
Forks, North Dakota. A mere 100 interceptors are not enough to
defend America credibly against even the lightest missile attack.
Example: only ten Soviet SS-18 missiles, each of which is armed
with ten warheads, would saturate the entire system. Ground-based
interceptor missiles based in North Dakota, moreover, would not be
able to shoot down submarine launched missiles aimed at America's
coasts. Further, some areas of America would be left entirely
undefended against any sort of missile launch, including Alaska,
Hawaii, and likely even Heflin's home state of Alabama.

Despite conflicting signals coming from Congress, the Persian
Gulf success of anti-missile weapons gives Bush a tremendous
opportunity to mobilize support for development and deployment of
anti-missile defenses. Americans have seen gripping telecasts, live
from Israel and Saudi Arabia, of the lives and property ballistic
missile defenses can protect. Many Americans are asking their
senators and congressmen why America can protect its allies but not
America against ballistic missiles. If Bush poses the question as
starkly, SDI opponents will not find an answer.

Recommendations

G-PALS is the right program at the right time. By coordinating
the defense of American allies and American troops in the field
with the defense of American territory, and by including
ground-based and space-based systems, G-PALS contains all the
elements for a streamlined, efficient, and effective SDI program.
Still, G-PALS needs strong political backing from Bush. If he is to
succeed, he needs a strategy to put SDI critics on the defensive by
pressing them at every opportunity to express a clear "yea" or
"nay" on missile defense.

As part of this strategy, Bush should:

** Ask Congress for a straight up-or-down vote on deploying
strategic defenses in the 1990s. On August 3, 1988, in Chicago,
Bush pledged to decide on the final, precise architecture of an SDI
system during his first term. But in 1989, Congress cut funding for
the SDI program by $1.1 billion from the Administration's $4.9
billion request. Last year an additional $1.7 billion was cut, and
severe restrictions were imposed on how remaining funds could be
spent. These actions by Congress make it impossible for Bush to
fulfill his pledge because it will be impossible to complete the
necessary tests in time. While Congress is responsible for this
failure, Bush also bears blame for the outcome. In 1990, when
Congress challenged his pledge, Bush scarcely took notice. He could
have vetoed the Defense Authorization Bill and taken his case to
the American people; he chose instead to sign the bill.

G-PALS gives Bush a second chance to put SDI back on track. G-
PALS' limited military goals should permit an earlier deployment
decision than the more ambitious Phase I proposal. In fact, since
the Patriot interceptor already is in the field, one component of
G-PALS already is deployed. Bush easily could establish a timetable
for the deployment of additional components during the decade. He
then should ask Congress for the authority to field these systems
as they are ready. This will press Congress to come out openly
either in favor or against deployment of anti-missile defenses.
This too will give Bush the mandate he needs to keep SDI moving
steadily toward deployment, rather than getting bogged down, as SDI
opponents have tried to ensure, in endless years of research and
development.

** Fight attempts to split the SDI program. Congressional
opponents of anti-missile defenses are considering ways of dividing
the SDI program to kill it piecemeal. They apparently see this as a
means of their avoiding an open, clear-cut vote on SDI.
Representative Penny's H.R. 1446 is the most recent example of
efforts by SDI opponents to slice up the program and demolish it
bit by bit. The Penny bill attempts to strip SDI of programs
designed to defend against tactical or theater missiles. It
therefore cuts the heart out of G-PALS. Penny's bill would result
in further delays in deploying missile defenses for America's
allies, and virtually end any opportunity for the U.S. to defend
American territory against missile attack anytime soon. Bush should
veto any bill that seeks to split SDI.

** Set a two-year deadline to complete negotiations with the
Soviet Union to modify the ABM Treaty. G-PALS is designed to
provide protection against missile strikes from Third World
countries, or accidental or unauthorized strikes from any country.
It cannot protect America against a major, purposeful Soviet
missile strike. The lesser threats against which G-PALS defends are
threats shared by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Soviet territory
is particularly vulnerable to Third World missile strikes because
many of the countries acquiring ballistic missiles are near the
Soviet border, including China, Iran, Iraq, Israel and Syria. Thus,
the Soviet Union has incentives to deploy a system similar to
G-PALS. This system is barred, however, by the 1972 ABM Treaty,
which limits the U.S. and the Soviet Union to 100 ground-based
interceptors. Under these limitations, neither side can legally
field a credible defense of its territory. The U.S. and the Soviet
Union have been negotiating since 1985 over SDI and the ABM Treaty
at the Defense and Space Talks (DST) in Geneva. Bush should seek
from Moscow a commitment to allow the deployment of anti-missile
defenses on both sides. He should also tell Soviet negotiators that
if an agreement cannot be reached within two years, the U.S. will
invoke Article XV of the ABM Treaty. This permits withdrawal on six
months' notice. America then, Bush should tell Moscow, will deploy
G-PALS. This will provide Bush with an extra measure of negotiating
leverage as well as strengthening the prospects for deploying
G-PALS.

** Reorganize the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
(SDIO) to ensure quick deployment of G-PALS. All of the programs
associated with the G-PALS proposal should be supervised by a
unified office within SDIO. One of the shortcomings of the SDI
program has been an overemphasis on research and an underemphasis
on deployment. This stems from the 1983 commission, headed by
former NASA Administrator James Fletcher, which recommended that
SDI be established as a research and development program to provide
a future president with the means for making an informed judgment
about the feasibility of deploying anti-missile defenses. The
future is now here. Getting SDIO onto a deployment track will
require, first, that Bush set a firm timetable for deploying at
least some G-PALS components. Second, Bush should consolidate
G-PALS management into a single office that is separate from
long-term research programs, and put G-PALS programs on a fast
track for deployment.

Managers in the consolidated G-PALS office within SDIO should be
instructed to direct the program with an eye toward rapidly
acquiring deployable systems that meet basic performance
requirements. Managers should focus on getting their systems
fielded in contrast to what typically happens, which is to try to
push each new technology to its limits. Example: SDIO has set
criteria for a Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) of under 20 pounds.
The first 1984 test version weighed over 2,500 pounds. The latest
version weighs about 500 pounds. How much delay and how many
dollars will be needed to bring the weight down further? Perhaps
the existing 500-pound interceptor is adequate for GBI's limited
defense mission. G-PALS managers should address these kinds of
questions. They will do so if they are rewarded with promotions for
moving their programs toward deployment, rather than setting
ever-receding performance goals.

Conclusion

George Bush has taken an important step toward defending
American and allied territory against ballistic missiles by
proposing a new SDI system known as Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes, or G-PALS. The dramatic success of the Patriot
missile in the Persian Gulf War demonstrates unequivocally that
America can down ballistic missiles in flight. Building on the
success of Patriot, and the growing political momentum in favor of
missile defenses, G-PALS can be the foundation for a political
consensus to deploy SDI. G-PALS answers the SDI critics. It reduces
costs, enhances strategic stability, it is technologically
feasible, and may be acceptable to Moscow.

Still, if G-PALS is to succeed, it will require strong backing
and a coherent political strategy, by the White House. Bush must
present the SDI issue in stark terms. He must ask senators and
representatives: "Are you for it or against it? Yea or nay?"

Ensuring Rapid Progress Therefore a strategy to get America moving toward
deploying missile defenses requires that Bush: request Congress to
vote, straight up or down, on the authority to deploy missile
defenses; veto any bill that would split up the SDI program; set a
two-year deadline for reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union
to modify the ABM Treaty; and consolidate the management of G- PALS
programs within SDIO to ensure rapid progress toward deployment.
Without such a strategy, G-PALS will be picked apart by SDI
opponents before it gets off the drawing boards. With strong
backing from the White House, however, 1991 could be the year
America at last can begin to defend herself against the threat of
ballistic missile attacks.