The History of the Peloponnesian War

Page: 75

"But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with me—who,
if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves—in spite of the
enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be certain that
he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands; and although
besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon us—the only
point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. It is this, I
know, that has had a large share in making me more unpopular than I should
otherwise have been—quite undeservedly, unless you are also prepared
to give me the credit of any success with which chance may present you.
Besides, the hand of heaven must be borne with resignation, that of the
enemy with fortitude; this was the old way at Athens, and do not you
prevent it being so still. Remember, too, that if your country has the
greatest name in all the world, it is because she never bent before
disaster; because she has expended more life and effort in war than any
other city, and has won for herself a power greater than any hitherto
known, the memory of which will descend to the latest posterity; even if
now, in obedience to the general law of decay, we should ever be forced to
yield, still it will be remembered that we held rule over more Hellenes
than any other Hellenic state, that we sustained the greatest wars against
their united or separate powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any
other in resources or magnitude. These glories may incur the censure of
the slow and unambitious; but in the breast of energy they will awake
emulation, and in those who must remain without them an envious regret.
Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who
have aspired to rule others; but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom
incurs it for the highest objects. Hatred also is short-lived; but that
which makes the splendour of the present and the glory of the future
remains for ever unforgotten. Make your decision, therefore, for glory
then and honour now, and attain both objects by instant and zealous
effort: do not send heralds to Lacedaemon, and do not betray any sign of
being oppressed by your present sufferings, since they whose minds are
least sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it,
are the greatest men and the greatest communities."

Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians of
their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their immediate
afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing them; they not only
gave up all idea of sending to Lacedaemon, but applied themselves with
increased energy to the war; still as private individuals they could not
help smarting under their sufferings, the common people having been
deprived of the little that they were possessed, while the higher orders
had lost fine properties with costly establishments and buildings in the
country, and, worst of all, had war instead of peace. In fact, the public
feeling against him did not subside until he had been fined. Not long
afterwards, however, according to the way of the multitude, they again
elected him general and committed all their affairs to his hands, having
now become less sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and
understanding that he was the best man of all for the public necessities.
For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he
pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness
was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have
rightly gauged the power of his country. He outlived its commencement two
years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it
became better known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay
attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the
city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a
favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private
ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to
the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their
allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honour and
advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster
on the country in the war. The causes of this are not far to seek.
Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to
exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead
them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by
improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the
contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them
by contradiction. Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated,
he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell
victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short,
what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first
citizen. With his successors it was different. More on a level with one
another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the
conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might
have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of
blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not
so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was
sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures
afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy
themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which
they not only paralysed operations in the field, but also first introduced
civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other
forces in Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the city, they
could still for three years make head against their original adversaries,
joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all
in revolt, and at last by the King's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds
for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell
the victims of their own intestine disorders. So superfluously abundant
were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy
triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.