SHORT,
J.: Tache Franklin appeals his convictions for voluntary
manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime.
Franklin argues the trial court erred in admitting his statement into
evidence. We affirm.[1]

FACTS

Franklin
was charged with murder, first-degree burglary, and possession of a weapon
during the commission of certain crimes as a result of the investigation into
Stephen Raines's (Victim) death. Officer
James Shumpert of the Orangeburg County Sheriff's Office was the investigating
officer and took Franklin's statement at the police station.

At
trial, Franklin sought to suppress his statement. The trial court held a pre-trial Jackson v. Denno[2] hearing to determine the voluntariness of Franklin's statement. Shumpert
testified that at 11:39 a.m. at the police station on the day of the shooting,
he read Franklin his Miranda[3] rights from the Sheriff's Office's standard Miranda warning form. Franklin
initialed next to each Miranda right on the form, proceeded to sign,
then crossed out his signature and stated he did not want to talk. Franklin
testified at the hearing the reason he initially refused to give a statement
was because he wanted to speak to an attorney.[4]
Shumpert testified Franklin did not ask for an attorney. Franklin was taken to
a holding cell.

At
approximately 3:00 p.m., Victim died and Officer Shumpert again met with
Franklin to inform him of Victim's death. Franklin testified Officer Bamberg,
of the Orangeburg County Sheriff's Office, was present and told him he could
receive a life sentence. Franklin claimed Bamberg's threat of life
imprisonment made him panic, and he "figured [he] had to tell them
something." According to Shumpert, Franklin stated "I didn't kill no
one," and indicated he wanted to talk. Shumpert again read Franklin his
rights, and he signed the Miranda form. Franklin then gave Shumpert his
statement. When asked at the pre-trial hearing: "Did you freely and
voluntarily give a statement to them?" Franklin responded: "Yes, I
did." He admitted he was not forced or threatened or told he would spend
the rest of his life in prison if he did not talk to them.

In
the written portion of his statement, Franklin claimed he was at work when he
received a telephone call from Damien asking for a ride to Corona Drive
Apartments. Franklin called his friend, Anthony. Franklin, Damien, and
Anthony met at the Citgo station. Damien got into the car with a shotgun, and Franklin
dropped Anthony off "in the back" with his friend, Terrell. The men
then went to the Corona Apartments. In his statement, Franklin continued:

[T]hey
went upstairs to do business. I was downstairs. I heard tumbling. I was getting
ready to walk to the back with . . . Anthony and Terrell, then I heard a shot
go off. I left the apartment walking because Damien had my keys. Later on got
picked up by the police.

The latter portion of
Franklin's statement consisted of questions asked by Shumpert and answered by
Franklin.

The
trial court found Franklin was given his Miranda warnings; the second
interview was to advise him of a change in the case and that he was now faced
with a murder charge; and the statement was not coerced and was freely and voluntarily
made.

At
trial, Franklin testified he and Anthony went to Victim's house to buy an ounce
of cocaine for $600. Victim let him in the back door. Neither Franklin nor
Anthony was armed. Franklin went upstairs with Victim while Anthony stayed
downstairs. Victim told Franklin he needed $800. Franklin and Victim
exchanged words, Franklin started to leave, Victim pushed Franklin then grabbed
a rifle that was leaning against the wall. Franklin "rushed in,"
pushed Victim, and grabbed the gun. Franklin next tripped on a shoe and fell
into the closet. The two men tussled, and Victim snatched the gun from
Franklin. Franklin pulled the trigger. Franklin admitted there was no person
named "Damien" involved. He testified he lied in his statement to
the police because he felt he had no choice and was panicked.

The
trial court properly charged the jury it must first determine the voluntariness
of Franklin's statement before considering it. The jury found Franklin guilty of voluntary manslaughter and possession
of a weapon. The trial court sentenced Franklin to concurrent sentences of
twenty and five years' imprisonment, respectively. This appeal followed.

Standard
of Review

The trial court's factual
conclusions as to the voluntariness of a statement will not be disturbed on
appeal unless so manifestly erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion. State
v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). An appellate court
is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. Id. When reviewing a trial court's ruling concerning
voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its
own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether
the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence. State v. Saltz,
346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Franklin
argues the trial court erroneously admitted his statement because he invoked
his right to silence and the police initiated contact on the same charges.
Franklin maintains the admission of his statement was prejudicial error because
it damaged his credibility. In his statement, Franklin blamed the shooting on
a third person, but at trial he asserted self-defense. We affirm.

"A
statement obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible
unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda . . . ." State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 30, 538 S.E.2d 248, 253
(2000). If a suspect invokes his right to counsel, police interrogation must
cease unless the suspect initiates further communication with police. State
v. Wannamaker, 346 S.C. 495, 499, 552 S.E.2d 284, 286 (2001).

The
invocation of the right to remain silent, however, is not equivalent to the
invocation of the right to counsel and "is not a permanent bar to police
reinitiating contact with the suspect." State v. Benjamin, 345
S.C. 470, 476, 549 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2001) (citing Michigan v. Moseley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975)). If an accused invokes the right to remain silent, the
police may resume questioning as long as the original request to cease
questioning was "scrupulously honored." Id. (quoting Moseley,
423 U.S. at 102-04).

In Benjamin,
our supreme court opined:

Courts
interpreting Mosley have set forth five factors to analyze to ascertain
whether the defendant's right to cut off questioning was "scrupulously
honored": (1) whether the suspect was given Miranda warnings at the
first interrogation; (2) whether police immediately ceased the interrogation
when the suspect indicated he did not want to answer questions; (3) whether
police resumed questioning the suspect only after the passage of a significant
period of time; (4) whether police provided a fresh set of Miranda warnings before the second interrogation; and (5) whether the second
interrogation was restricted to a crime that had not been a subject of the
earlier interrogation.

Id.

The
defendant in Benjamin was arrested and taken to the sheriff's office. Id. at 475, 549 S.E.2d at 261. When asked by the officer if he wanted to talk,
Benjamin invoked his right to silence, but according to the officer, did not
request an attorney. Id. Approximately one hour later, a South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") officer investigating the
case arrived. Id. Benjamin agreed to talk to the SLED officer and gave
oral and written statements. Id. Finding the statements admissible,
the supreme court stated: "[T]he Mosley factors are not
exclusively controlling, nor do they establish a test which can be woodenly
applied. Rather, the factors provide a framework for determining whether,
under the circumstances, an accused's right to silence was scrupulously
honored." Id. at 477, 549 S.E.2d at 261 (citations omitted). The
court further concluded that a second interrogation is not unconstitutional
merely for involving the same subject matter discussed in the first interview. Id. at 477, 549 S.E.2d at 262.

The Benjamin court found "a subsequent interrogation concerning the same crime does
not, in and of itself, violate an accused's right to remain silent." Id. at 478, 549 S.E.2d at 262. Rather, "[w]hat is paramount is that police,
under the totality of the circumstances, 'scrupulously honor'" a suspect's
right to remain silent. Id. The court found Benjamin's right to remain
silent was "scrupulously honored" as he had the right to cut off
questioning at any time; the original officer immediately ceased questioning
Benjamin upon his invocation of his right to remain silent; at least one hour
passed before the SLED agent arrived; the SLED agent informed Benjamin of his Miranda rights; and Benjamin initialed and signed all the waivers. Id.

We likewise find,
under the totality of the circumstances, Franklin's right to remain silent was
"scrupulously honored." Franklin, after being advised of his Miranda rights, invoked his right to remain silent at approximately 11:39 a.m. on the
day of his arrest. According to Officer Shumpert, Franklin did not invoke his
right to counsel. More than three hours later, Officer Shumpert met with
Franklin a second time to inform him of Victim's death. Shumpert again read
Franklin his rights, and he signed the form. Although Officer Bamberg informed
Franklin he could receive a life sentence, Franklin testified at the Jackson
v. Denno hearing that he was not coerced or threatened, and he freely and
voluntarily made his statement. We find, under the totality of the circumstances
presented here, that the officers complied with the mandates of Moseley,
and the trial court properly admitted Franklin's statement.

For the foregoing
reasons, Franklin's convictions are

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS and LOCKEMY,
JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.