The
Balkan peninsula juts out from southeastern Europe into the Mediterranean
between the Adriatic and Black Seas. This position at the meeting place of
Europe, Asia and Africa has given it a transitional role in history, a role
associated with easy peripheral accessibility that has brought in a volatile
infusion of neighboring peoples, cultures and empires which have left marked
centrifugal influences on the peninsula. No less have internal forces tended
toward factionalism, imperialism and divism between political entities,
creating a legacy of conflicting territorial claims that make the Balkans
probably the leading area in the world of 'problem areas', meaning those
areas of a state claimed by another state.

These
internal territorial conflicts are based to a great degree on the ethnic
complexity of the Balkans, complexity born of different races, languages,
religions and customs. The erosive clash of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian
empires brought to the fore the necessity of specific identification of
ethnic groups for political purposes both within the empires and against the
empires. Thus the Balkans became, in a sense, a world laboratory for ethnic
group identification, just as territorially it is a classical model of
problem areas.

Because the long history of battle for national independence is so absorbing,
it becomes a temptation to view the Balkans as an area of static equilibrium
— a sort of museum piece of history, often enshrined in period pieces of
colorful musical comedy such as Franz Lehar's Merry Widow. Yet, in
truth, the same historical processes are in operation now as in the past and
are producing changes as strong and as fundamental as those in the past.

Although the end of World War I brought the emergence of the present Balkan
states and the end of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian

425

empires, the cultural imprint of these and earlier occupiers still remains on
the Balkan landscape, both physically and culturally. Yugoslavia is a
classical example of this as is evident in a transect from northwest to
southeast. Slovenia, in the northwest, with the adjacent portions of Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina was under Austrian administration. The cultural
heritage is still evident in architecture, cuisine, language, railroad
patterns and other cultural characteristics. Similarly the Hungarian imprint
was left on northeast Yugoslavia, and Turkish influences are clearly seen in
southeast Yugoslavia. Both Italian and Roman traces persist in Dalmatia and
Istria. In broader regional terms, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece all show
marked heritage from the Turkish period and Romania still carries within
itself areal vestiges of Hungarian, German and Russian occupation.

Since
World War II, the dominance of Communist regimes in Hungary, Romania,
Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria has created a new ideological empire which,
while technically not analogous to the previous empires, may still in time
again create a new historical impress on the landscape that will produce a
new contrast between those countries and the non-Communist states of Greece
and Turkey. One of the changes on the landscape that is already noticeable
is the consolidation of smaller land holdings into large collective farms in
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and in certain parts of Yugoslavia and
Albania. Urban influences are also discernible in 'socialist' architecture,
such as the State Printing House in Bucharest, and in the ubiquitous 'Park
of Rest and Culture' and 'Palace of Culture' that dot the cities of
Communist-ruled Eastern Europe, as well as the more ephemeral posters and
banners that have been so prominent a part of the Communist city.

Sharp
distinction must be made between the spread of Communist ideology as opposed
to Soviet political domination. Immediately after World War II it appeared
that the Soviet Union would gain hegemony of the whole Balkan peninsula
through successful Communist penetration of Greece, which would have given
the Soviet Union access to the Aegean Sea. [1] At the same
time political pressure was placed on Turkey through activity in the
Azerbaidjan in Iran. Had both sections of the pincer

1. Hugh Setton-Watson, The East European Revolution
(New York and Washington, D. C, Praeger 1956), 318-328. Also Robert Lee Wolff,
The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956),
264-265 and 317. For a vivid account of the Athens battle of 1944-1945 see
L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York : Holt. Rinchart
and Winston, 1958), 820-830.

426

movement worked, the Soviet Union would have gained probable control of the
Turkish Straits and thus easy entrance to the eastern Mediterranean which
would have put corresponding pressure on the British strategic control
points of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. This was plainly a power push for
Soviet control of the peninsula. But the Azerbaidjan effort was stopped and
so was the guerrilla effort in Greece, where aid was first given by the
British and then following 1947 by American military and economic aid under
the Truman doctrine. Thus in 1947, there seemed to be a clear confrontation
between the Soviet Union and the United States in terms of power politics.
Had this continued, it would have meant division of the peninsula into two
power blocs with Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania in the
Soviet sphere of influence and Greece and Turkey in the sphere of influence
of the United States.

This
would have been a classical pattern of division of the Balkan peninsula into
clearly delimited zones dominated by foreign powers, but, in fact, this did
not happen because in 1948 there was a political break between Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union, which broke Soviet domination although the supremacy
of the Communist structure has still remained in Yugoslavia.
[2]
This schism was extended by the subsequent shift in the late 1950's of Albania
from alliance with the Soviet Union to alliance with Communist China,
[3] and in the early 1960's by the assertion of greater
independence from the Soviet Union by Romania.

Thus
in short order the Balkan Peninsula changed from apparent polarized
East-West domination to an area of diverse political entities, which show
constantly greater independence and individuality. The extent of change in
relationships is exemplified by the signing of a treaty of friendship
between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1953[4]
which led to a short exchange of state visits with each other until the
deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

Hence
the Balkan Peninsula still demonstrates its transitional character for not
only is it a contact zone of East-West confrontation, it also reflects the
conflicts within the Communist group from orthodoxy to 'Titoism' and from
alliance with the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries of Eastern
Europe to alliance with Communist China.

Like
the rest of Eastern Europe, the Balkans has undergone drastic political,
social and economic changes since World War II. In addition to the separate
cultural factors of national identity, Communist ideology and Russification,
one must add the additional process of 'modernization', which is the impact
of modern technology as differentiated from a specific ideology. The end
result is that each country is undergoing differential development that
makes it increasingly difficult to make generalizations for 'the Balkans'.
In fact because of the changing regional relations in Europe as a whole it
becomes most pertinent to ask "What is the Balkans?"

Theoretically, the Balkan peninsula would be the land south of a line drawn
between the northern end of the Adriatic and Black Seas, yet this seemingly
ready line of identification does not conform to the political units nor to
the ethnic grouping that exist now or in the past. Therefore the precise
areal definition of what constitutes 'the Balkans' has been a subjective one
based upon different points of view in relation to existing geopolitical
situations. The problem is similar to that of the concept of 'Central
Europe' (Mitteleuropa or Zwischeneuropa) [5] which
has undergone considerable change over a period of time.

Some
authors continue to use 'the Balkans' as an area name, but others prefer the
term 'Southeast Europe'. [6] This manner of using
directional titles has created geographical confusion to the reader because
the list of such titles now includes the entire gamut from western, eastern
and southern Europe to central, southeast and even east-central Europe.
[7]
The ultimate value of these multiferous sub-divisions is debatable, but what
they do indicate is that Europe is a complex entity which can be studied
from different points of view and with different geographic orientations. It
is even possible to take an ideological point of view and use an area
designation of 'the people's democracies' of Europe focusing on the
Communist-dominated countries west of the Soviet Union. [8]

Not
only is there a question as to what name to use for the region, there is
also discrepancy as to what specific countries to include in the Balkans.
The narrowest definition would be to limit the Balkans to the three
countries of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. [9] Other
authors include Romania [10] and Greece [11]
as integral parts of the region. Some justification may also be made that
Hungary is in many ways a Balkan culture and that, since European Turkey is
part of the Balkan peninsula and since the history of the Balkans is so
closely linked to the Turkish empire, perhaps all of Turkey should also be
added.
[12] Thus the gamut of choice ranges from the smallest nucleus of
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, to the greater Balkans concept of Hungary,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and Turkey.

Without attempting to make a definitive area definition, it should be noted
that the use of the entire area as a general unit best shows the trends and
scale of significant political, economic and social changes that have
characterized the Balkans since World War II.

The
most significant demographic trend in the Balkans since World War II has
been the decrease in the birth rate with a corresponding decrease in the
annual increase in population. Prior to World War II, western Europe had
lower rates of birth than did eastern Europe, but in the postwar period, the
situation became reversed with the highest growth rates in western Europe
and smaller rates in the rest of Europe.

In
the 1960-1967 period, the average rate of population increase for Europe was
0.9 %, but that of western Europe was 1.1%, while southern Europe was 0.9%,
eastern Europe, 0.6% and northern Europe, 0.7 %. [13] In
this United Nations classification, some of the Balkan countries are

12. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, eds., The Balkans in
Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the
Eighteenth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1963), 451 pp.

grouped in the eastern Europe category, namely Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
while Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia are placed in southern Europe and
Turkey is listed under southwest Asia.

Although the regional trend in the Balkans is toward a decrease in annual
population increase, there is still considerable difference in the
individual country rates. In the 1963-1967 period, Hungary showed only a 0.3
% annual increase, one of the smallest in Europe. [14] The
extent of the decline in Hungary is highlighted by the fact that in the
1953-1959 period, it was 0.6%. [15] Three countries showed
an intermediate grouping: Romania at 0.6%, and Bulgaria and Greece both at
0.7%, still below the average for Europe. But Yugoslavia had a rate of 1.2%
and Turkey and Albania had the very high rates of 2.5 and 2.8%,
respectively.
[16]

These
rates are directly associated with the corresponding natural increases based
on the relationship of rates of birth and death. In 1967, Hungary had a
natural increase of 3.8 per thousand resulting from a crude birth rate of
14.5 and a high death rate, 10.7 per thousand. Bulgaria was next with 6.0,
based on crude birth of 15.0 and crude death rate of 9.0 per thousand.
Greece followed with a birth rate of 18.5 and death rate of 8.3 to create a
natural increase of 10.2 per thousand. Yugoslavia showed a somewhat higher
natural increase of 10.8 per thousand with a birth rate of 19.5 and death
rate of 8.7 per thousand. But Romania had a higher birth rate of 27.1 and a
death rate of 9.3 to produce a natural increase of 17.8 per thousand. In
contrast to all of these, in 1966 Albania had a birth rate of 34.0 per
thousand and a low death rate of 8.6 to make a natural increase of 25.4 per
thousand. And Turkey had the even higher birth rate of 43 per thousand with
a death rate of 16.0, thus having the highest natural rate of increase of 27
per thousand.
[17]

The
extent of the decline in both birth and death rates is best evidenced by
comparative statistics in previous periods. In 1881-1885 Hungary had a birth
rate of 45.0 per thousand and a death rate of 33.5. By the 1921-1925 period,
this had dropped to 29.4 and 19.9. In sharp contrast, this fell in 1962 to a
birth rate of 12.9 per thousand and a death rate of 10.8 to create the
phenomenally low natural increase of 2.1 per thousand. An even more
spectacular decline is shown in the deaths of infants less

than
a year old. In the 1901-1905 period the incidence was 217.8 per thousand; in
1967, only 37 per thousand. [18]

In
1890, Bulgaria had a birth rate of 34.9 per thousand and a death rate of
21.0. By 1920, this had increased to 39.9 and 21.4. By 1966, the birth rate
had dropped to a peace-time low of 14.9 with a death rate of 8.3 per
thousand.
[19]

Yugoslavia also reflects the decline in both rates with a rather even decline
since 1921 from a birth rate of 36.7 per thousand and a death rate of 20.9
to 18.9 and 8.6 respectively in 1968. [20]

Romania showed the same pattern of constant decline in both birth and death
rates until 1966. For example, in 1930 the birth rate was 34.1 per thousand
and the death rate, 19.3, which dropped in 1966 to 14.3 and 8.2. But in 1967
and 1968 the birth rate nearly doubled and the death rate also rose to 9.3
and 9.6. [21] Curiously enough, the same change is
reflected in the deaths of infants less than a year old. In 1930, this was
175.6 per thousand which by 1965 had dropped to 44.1. But in 1966 and 1967
this rose to 46.6 and jumped in 1968 to 59.5 per thousand.
[22]

Greece shows a
somewhat different pattern. In the immediate period after World War I, the
birth rate was about 21.0 per thousand, then by 1936 moved up to 30.0 and
stayed high until the end of World War II, when a decline set in, to a low
of 17.7 per thousand in 1965. [23] A great difference also
appears in the death rate, in that before World War II, the rate ranged
between 13.0 and 18.0 per thousand, but by the end of World War II had
dropped to nearly 8.0 per thousand and has stayed near the same level since
then.
[24] In the years 1963 and 1964, the combination of low
birth rate, low death rate and an increase in emigration produced the very
low population increases of only 0.37% and 0.36%, among the very lowest in
Europe.
[25]

that
the birth rate since World War II is higher than it was before World War II.
In 1938 it was 34.7 per thousand and dropped to 28.1 in 1941. In 1946 it was
at a low of 27.1 and rose to 43.8 in 1955, then slowly fell to 35.3, still a
very high figure for Europe. During the same period, the death rate
decreased from 17.8 in 1938 to a low of 8.4 per thousand in 1967. Thus
Albania has a high birth rate and a rather low death rate to produce a high
natural increase, which in 1967 was 26.9 per thousand. [26]
These raw statistics raise questions that are both intriguing and difficult
to answer. In the case of Hungary, the high death rate in the past decade is
clearly linked to the large exodus of young people during the 1956
revolution thereby leaving a larger proportion of older people in the
population structure. But it is more difficult to explain why Albania and
Greece have death rates that are only half as high as that of Turkey.

It is
also clear that, for the area as a whole, population losses during World War
II and the smaller birth rate during World War II are significant factors in
the general post-war decline. Similarly the recent availability of
contraceptive devices and the possibility of legal abortion also help
explain the general decline in birth rates but do not provide clear answers
as to why the differences between individual countries. Nor can one
attribute these differences primarily to political ideology, because
Hungary, a Communist country, and Greece, a non-Communist country, both have
low birth rates compared to Albania, a Communist country, and to Turkey, a
non-Communist country.

Perhaps what is needed is not to explain each deviation or change year by year
but rather to focus upon long range trends and to place them within a
conceptual framework that relates to the end result, rather than to focus on
individual population factors. Clearly, there are involuntary controls of
population such as war or any number of diseases that an individual cannot
himself choose to avoid. But just as clearly there are voluntary controls of
population that an individual may choose or not choose, such as
contraceptive devices and abortions. This voluntary element of deciding
whether to have children or not to have children might best be designated as
the 'family climate'.

In
the past it appears that circumstances in the Balkans were conducive to the
creation and maintenance of large families. Contraceptives were difficult to
obtain, if not completely non-existent. The high death rate of infants and
of still-births encouraged the birth of more children. Farm life itself
encouraged large families not only for labor but for companion-

able
family life. Large-scale emigration, especially at the turn of the century,
was another incentive for large families on the assumption that even if some
left, there would still be children in the 'old country'. Furthermore church
and state encouraged family-hood as did cultural traditions, because in much
of the Balkans, perhaps in all the Balkans, manhood was associated with
family virility — a man who had fathered many children deserved village
respect for that if for no other reason. Thus for centuries the 'family
climate' favored large families.

Yet
it must be also recognized that some of these same factors in certain
circumstances favored less childbirth. In Greece, for example, the long
history of emigration has been a negative factor because parents recognized
the probability that their children would emigrate permanently overseas.

But
over the past half century it appears that regional environmental factors
have tended to create a 'family climate' favoring small rather than large
families. Some of the countries, like Hungary for example, have not only
made it easy to obtain contraceptives but have also permitted legal
abortion. There also seems to be some correlation between rise in standard
of living and drop in family size. In Yugoslavia in 1968 the lowest
birthrates were in the Voivodina, 13.8 per thousand; Serbia Proper, 14.9;
Croatia, 15.2; and Slovenia, 17.4; compared to 23.1 in Bosnia-Hercegovina;
25.6 in Macedonia and 37.4 in the Kosovo. Conversely there are more divorces
in the areas of higher standard of living ranging, in 1968, from 179.4
divorces per thousand marriages in the Voivodina to only 26.3 per thousand
marriages in the Kosovo. If the marriage pattern conformed to this premise,
one could predicate a classical 'model' conducive to small families, but
actually the marriage rate is the opposite of what one might expect — the
highest being 9.0 per thousand inhabitants in both the Voivodina and in
Serbia Proper in comparison to only 7.3 in the Kosovo and 6.7 in Crna Gora.
[27] Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that many of the
divorced people remarry thus raising the marriage incidence.

Another factor that must be considered in population increase is the age of
marriage of the bride and groom. In Bulgaria in the past decade the largest
category of brides was under the age of 19, with almost an equal number
being married in the 20-24 year old category. The leading category for
grooms was the 20-24 year old bracket with the 25-29 year old unit next with
about half the number of marriages. [28] Rumania

shows
the same pattern of brides mainly below the age of 20 and grooms in the
20-24 category. [29] The same is true of Yugoslavia with
the brides generally marrying at a younger age than the men.
[30]

But
in Greece both men and women marry at a later age, similar to the situation
in Ireland. In 1967, the largest category for women was the 20-24 year group
totaling some 31,595 out of 81,706 marriages. The next largest category was
the 25-29 group, which was just slightly larger than the 15-19 group. For
men, the predominant group was 25-29 years of age totaling 26,705 out of the
81,706 marriages. The next group was 30-34, which was slightly larger than
the 20-24 group. [31] Thus, in Greece, clearly both men
and women marry some five to ten years later than in the other Balkan
countries.

Why
then do Greek men and women marry at a later age? The question is easier to
ask than to answer, but some causes seem reasonably clear. The poverty of
the countryside is often quoted by peasants as a reason to delay marriage
and also the fact that the young men in great part either emigrate out of
Greece or go to the towns so that the villages suffer a dearth of eligible
young men. Another reason that is given is that a woman is expected to bring
a sizeable dowry to the marriage. Not only does it take time for a woman to
accumulate a large dowry, but an older man who is well established can
demand more than a younger man, hence the dowry system tends to perpetuate
older marriages.

Statistically, marriages in Greece were indicated in 1967 in three categories
: urban, semi-urban and rural. Out of a total of 80,765 in all Greece,
44,056 were urban, 8,841 semi-urban, and 27,868 rural. This would indicate
an urban predominance, but this is a very inconclusive generalization
because more than half of the urban marriages, 26,522, were in Athens. And
actually outside of Athens itself, rural marriages predominated over urban
marriages even in Macedonia, where Salonika with its large population had a
large number of marriages. [32] Since the age of marriage
in the cities is also comparatively older as it is in the countryside it is
probable that the low natural rate of increase in Greece will continue as it
is.

The
relationships of ethnic groups to population increase must also be raised.
This question is particularly pertinent to the Balkans where each country
has large numbers of minority groups. The large number

of
ethnic groups in the Balkans precludes detailed discussion here but because
the administrative divisions of Yugoslavia, the republics, are based on
ethnic grounds, they well illustrate ethnic differences, especially in terms
of natural increase. In the 1950-1954 period the natural increase per
thousand inhabitants by republics was as follows : Bosna-Hercegovina, 24.3;
Crna Gora, 22.1; Croatia, 11.5; Macedonia, 23.9; Slovenia, 11.9; and Serbia,
15.0, which was further divided into Serbia Proper, 14.8, the Voivodina,
10.9, and the Kosovo, 25.5. In 1968 they were: Bosna-Hercegonina, 16.5; Crna
Gora, 14.3; Croatia, 5.1; Macedonia, 17.6; Slovenia, 6.7; and Serbia, 9.3,
which was divided into Serbia Proper, 6.6, the Voivodina, 4.6, and the
Kosovo, 28.5.
[33] This shows that in all administrative units except one
there had been sizeable decreases in natural increase but that in that one,
the Kosovo populated mainly by Albanians, the natural increase had not only
not declined, it had been augmented so that it was some seven times as great
as the Voivodina and over five times as great as Croatia.

This
example highlights the problem of differential growth of ethnic groups
within Balkan countries. In general, the minority groups are growing faster
than the majority groups of individual countries. In the future this may
increase internal frictions in the countries that have large and well
identified minority groups, such as the Albanians in Yugoslavia and the
Hungarian and German minorities in Romania.

These
demographic trends of decreasing birth and death rates, higher divorce rates
and differential ethnic growth rates in the Balkans are all similar to
general demographic trends in the world at large. Yet the basic fact remains
that in the Balkans as in the world there is still an increase of population
each year, and, even at these reduced rates, there is growing population
pressure in all the Balkan countries. This is being expressed both by
increasing area densities and by internal migrations, mainly to urban areas.

All
of the Balkan countries show increasing density of population. Bulgaria had
a density of 48 persons per square kilometer in 1921; 60.9 in 1941 and 75.2
in 1967. [34] Yugoslavia had 49.0 in 1921, 56.8 in

1948 and 72.5 in
1961. [35]
In 1821 Greece had only 19.8 per square kilometer, 39.5 in 1920, 56.8 in 1940
and 63.6 in 1961. [36] Rumania had 60.1 in 1930, 66.8 in
1948 and 80.4 in 1966. [37] Hungary has had the highest
with 53.9 in 1869, 85.9 in 1920, 100.1 in 1941 and 107.1 in 1960.
[38] Albania showed the greatest post-war increase in density from 39 in
1945 to 68 in 1967. [39] Turkey has the lowest country
density of 42 persons per square kilometer but if a geographical division is
made of Turkey, a surprising contrast appears because Asiatic Turkey has
only 40 per square kilometer but the European portion has the very high
density of 118 persons per kilometer. [40]

Although these country densities offer some comparisons in terms of population
growth, the reality is that there is geographical concentration of people
into a relatively small portion of each country. This is highlighted by
Greece where it is estimated that more than a third of the population live
on less than 5 % of the land and about a half live on less than 15% of the
total territory. [41]

This
increasing concentration of population is best indicated by the changes in
the ratio of urban to rural population. But these ratios must also be used
with caution because each country makes its own definition of what
constitutes urban and rural classification. Not only do these definitions
often change with different censuses, but some of the countries have added a
third classification, semi-urban, which is hard to combine with either urban
or rural.

As
might be expected, Albania is still predominantly rural. In 1923 the ratio
was 84.1 % rural and 15.9% urban. By 1967, this had become 66.7% rural and
33.3 % urban. [42] Bulgaria in 1920 had an urban ratio of
19.9 %
[43] but by 1965 nearly half the country was classed as
urban, 46.4 %. [44]

In
the census of 1961, Greece introduced a three-category classification,
wherein 'urban' was defined as municipalities and communes in which the
largest center had a population of 10,000 or more inhabitants. The

'semi-urban' category was for those municipalities with a largest population
center between 2,000 and 9,999 inhabitants, and the 'rural' category was for
those in which the largest center had less than 2,000 inhabitants. Because
semi-urban is a statistical rather than functional division, it makes it
difficult to include this in either the strictly urban or strictly rural
category. Using the 1961 classification, in 1928 the urban percentage was
31.1; semi-urban, 14.5%; and rural, 54.4%. Corresponding figures for 1961
were 43.3% urban; 12.9%, semi-urban; and 43.8%, rural. [45]
This shows the increase in urban population and the decrease of both the
semi-urban and rural categories.

For Romania the
proportion in 1930 was 21.4% urban and 78.6% rural population. By 1956 this
had changed to 31.3% urban and 68.7% rural and in 1966 to 38.2% urban and
61.8% rural. [46]

But
for Yugoslavia the urban ratio is still surprisingly small. According to the
censuses of 1948 and 1953, it was only 16.2 and 18.5 %. [47]
By the 1961 census, this had increased to only 28.0 %. [48]
Even Turkey had a higher ratio of urbanization, which rose from 24.2% in 1927
[49] to 32.2% in 1960 and 34.4% in 1965. [50]

Again
these raw statistics must be viewed with caution. Actually the process of
urbanization is not quite the same as one imagines in western Europe and the
United States. Instead, in the Balkans there is a marked functional
difference between the city as represented by a small agricultural segment
of population and the large rural agglomeration which is primarily
agricultural in function but statistically is large enough to surpass the
usual urban definition of any settlement of more than two thousand
inhabitants.

Therefore some Balkan 'cities' are, in reality, large agricultural villages.
It is clear that all the Balkan countries are undergoing complex internal
migrations, of which one product is urbanization. But, most unfortunately,
there is a dearth of factual data available on the specific details of
individual migration. While it is possible statistically to see the end
results of migration, it is difficult, if not actually impossible, to see
the processes of movement involved. There is a multiplicity of
cross-migrations not only from village to village and village to city, but
also

from
city to city and from city back to the village. Distinctions must also be
made as to area migrations both within regions and between regions.

The
extent of such migration is evidenced by studies of the 1961 census in
Yugoslavia which indicate that only 7% of the 340 towns had at least
two-thirds of the inhabitants born in the town, that some 60% of the towns
had between one-third and two-thirds of the population native-born, and that
33 % of the towns had a native-born population of less than one-third.
Stated conversely, nearly one-third of all the towns in Yugoslavia had
two-thirds of their inhabitants born elsewhere. [51]

Not
only are towns growing by migration from the countryside, there is some
indication that birth rates in the towns have not decreased as fast as in
the countryside, so that in fact there is somewhat of a greater natural
increase in the cities, thus accentuating the growth of cities. In
Yugoslavia, for example, there was a 14.0 per thousand inhabitants increase
in total population between the 1948 and 1953 censuses, but the urban
increase was 38.2 per thousand. There was an even greater increase from the
1953 census to the 1961 census where the total population increase was 10.9
per thousand but the urban increase was 43.5 per thousand.
[52]

This
trend is also illustrated by Bulgaria. Until 1948 the natural increase in
the countryside was higher than in the cities. In 1939 the rural increase
was 9.0 per thousand population compared to the urban rate of 4.7 per
thousand. By 1948 this difference had narrowed to 12.2 for the rural areas
and 11.6 for cities. In 1949 this reversed to 13.2 urban and 12.8 rural and
the difference has grown progressively to 8.9 urban and 3.3 rural in 1967.
[53]

This
trend can also be expressed by the specific growth of individual cities in
Bulgaria. In the period 1946 to 1965, the population increase in Bulgaria
was 15.2 %. But the population of the city of Sofia increased by 69 %, nine
cities increased over 200 % and 36 cities increased between 100 and 200%. By
contrast, only three cities decreased in population. [54]

Urbanization is, then, one of the striking demographic trends in the Balkans.
But the different countries show quite different areal patterns of
urbanization.

The
towns of the Balkans are not new. Most of them date back not only to
medieval times but to the classical period as well. Thus history has helped
mold urban characteristics over a long period of time. Secondly, ethnic
groups have occupied their present territories over a considerable span so
that ethnic influences are related to urban structure. Thirdly, most of the
Balkan countries have existed for some time, and even though Yugoslavia and
Albania date back only to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, certain territorial
units had administrative continuity, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina over
centuries, so that there has been sufficient time for a political imprint to
be implanted on the urban scene. Therefore the general areal pattern of
towns today represent a historical selection and development not only in
terms of political, social, economic and military factors but of the
attractions or limitations of natural conditions as well. Therefore although
it must be recognized that each country has its own mosaic of areal
distribution of cities, three distinct patterns are recognizeable.

Greece constitutes one type in which a prime city dominates the country.
According to the census of 1961, Athens alone had 52% of the urban
population of Greece and 22% of the total population of the whole country.
[55] The second largest city is Salonika, which in 1961 had only some 20%
of the population of Athens. In addition to these two, there is only one
other city with a population of over 100,000 people. That is Patras, whose
conurbation included some 102,000 compared to the 1,853,709 of Athens and
the 378,444 of Greater Salonika. [56] Athens is a
classical example of the powers of attraction of a capital city, where all
factors, political, economic, social, military, historical, physical, and
even its location in the geographical center of the state of Greece, favor
constant aggrandizement of the populace. It is difficult to see how regional
planning to aid the other cities can hope to cope with the magical allure of
the very name of Athens.

Sofia
in Bulgaria is also a dominant capital city, but, in 1965 its population of
801,000 represented only 21 % of the urban population and 9.7% of the total
population of the country. There were four other Bulgarian cities that had
populations of more than 100,000 inhabitants — Plovdiv, Varna, Ruse and
Burgas. But there were 27 cities in the category of 25,000 to 99,999
inhabitants and 34 in the 10,000 to 24,999 class, which

shows
the dispersed pattern of cities outside of Sofia. [57]
This is the second urban type where there is a prime city but also a number
of secondary centers which show a regional influence. Albania with the city
of Tirana, Turkey with Istanbul, Romania with Bucharest, and Hungary with
Budapest all represent this second urban type.

But
in Yugoslavia there is no single dominant city. To be sure Belgrade, the
capital, is the largest city, but its population of 585,234 in 1961 formed
less than 4 % of the total population. And the second city, Zagreb, was only
about 25% smaller with its population of 430,802. In addition there were
five other cities with a population larger than 100,000 inhabitants, namely
Ljubljana, Novi Sad, Rijeka, Sarajevo and Skopje. [58]
This lesser urban concentration may be expressed in another fashion by
indicating that of the 348 towns listed in the 1961 census, only 14 had more
than 50,000 inhabitants and they included only 41.4 % of the urban
population. This means that the majority of Yugoslav towns are relatively
small, actually more than two thirds of them have less than 10,000
inhabitants. [59]

In a
sense the urban pattern of Yugoslavia is a decentralized one in that many
geographical regions contain large local centers. The capital cities of the
individual republics highlight this decentralization. They represent
location and growth under different administrative situations, but their
strength has been their usefulness as local urban centers for different
ethnic groups. The creation of the administrative system of republics in
postwar Yugoslavia has given them renewed growth and vigor as ethnic
capitals.

This
concentration of population in the republic capitals is shown by the fact
that the eight administrative capitals of Yugoslavia in 1961 contained only
8.8% of the total population but included 31.3 of the total urban
population. The respective figures for the republic capitals are: Sarajevo
in Bosna-Hercegovina, 4.4 and 22.4; Titograd in Crna Gora, 6.2 and 28.6;
Zagreb in Croatia, 10.4 and 33.6; Skopje in Macedonia, 11.8 and 33.8;
Ljubljana in Slovenia, 8.4 and 30.8; Belgrade in Serbia Proper, 12.4 and
43.3; Pristina in the Kosovo-Metohija, 4.0 and 20.2; and Novi Sad in the
Voivodina, 5.5 and 14.2 %. [60]

show
differential densities of both population and settlement. These rural areas
may have extremely high density of population and sometimes are located near
and associated with major cities. This is the situation near Zagreb, where
the nearby Zagorje has the highest density of rural population in
Yugoslavia.

In
some of the Balkan countries certain areas show such a decided concentration
of population, both rural and urban, that they constitute population
'heartlands' on the basis of their demographic, political, economic and
social significance.

Greece in particular shows such territorial demographic concentration.
Although there is a surprisingly even distribution of peoples and
settlements throughout peninsular and insular Greece, on the bases of
density of population and on a higher rate of population increase, a zone,
sometimes called the 'fertile crescent', extends from the Attic plain of
Athens to the plains of Macedonia with the city of Salonika, and projects
northeastward into western Thrace. [61] This zone poses
the whole question of planned development because the inexorable growth of
Athens raises the issue as to whether the government should foster economic
development in the poorer regions. The likelihood is that even if the growth
of Athens is limited in some form, it is still this 'heartland' zone that
will show the greatest growth.

Yugoslavia also has a territorial 'heartland'. This extends in a
crescent-shaped arc from the northern Adriatic coast through eastern
Slovenia into the Drava and Sava lowlands of the Voivodina and southward
through western Serbia into the Kosovo. [62] This is a
long area which does not have a consistently high density throughout its
span, but this qualitative designation does show the area of increasing
population concentration in the past half century. Therefore, it too is the
probable zone of greatest future growth.

In
Romania, the basic pattern of population is most directly associated with
the Transylvanian Mountains, which constitute a zone of low density of
population. In contrast the Transylvanian Basin, the Hungarian lowland to
the west, the Moldavian plains to the east and the Wallachian plains to the
south all contain large urban and rural popula-

tions.
But the greatest zone of concentration is in the central Wallachian plain
west of the cities of Bucharest and Ploeşti. [63]

Hungary which consists mainly of plains areas forms a great contrast to the
other countries because of the high density of population throughout almost
all of the regions of the country. But Budapest does act as the nucleus of a
major area of concentration along the upper Danube. In addition there is a
secondary center in the lower Tisza river valley northeast of Szeged.
[64]

In
Bulgaria the situation is quite the opposite from Hungary because the
mountains divide the country into a series of isolated regional centers. The
two largest of these are the Sofia basin and the upper Maritsa valley with
the city of Plovdiv. [65] Although these are separated by
mountains, they do form a population axis which will probably continue to
grow at a faster rate than the other parts of the country.

In
Albania the settlement pattern is much simpler than in the other Balkan
countries. The coastal plain on the west stretching from the town of Shkodër
to Vlorë is heavily populated with the greatest density between the coastal
port of Durrës and the capital, Tiranë. [66]

In
the period since the end of World War II, new demographic trends are
changing markedly the structure and growth of population in the Balkans. New
political regimes, changing technology and decreasing isolation all play
roles in higher standards of living and generally decreasing birth and death
rates. Although there are differential rates of population growth in the
different countries, all are experiencing growing urbanization and an
increasing concentration of people into population 'heartlands', which are
experiencing higher rates of growth than other national regions. These
Balkan 'heartlands' appear to offer the most attractive conditions for
increased settlement, therefore they constitute the pattern of the future
wherein there will be increased concentration in these same regions rather
than the creation of new 'heartlands'.