Saddam the first of several challenges

Although North Korea and Iraq were would-be partners in crime, that does not constitute a smoking gun. But it does show why war was necessary, writes Tony Parkinson

.In December 1999, long before President George Bush spoke of any "axis of evil", Iraq and North Korea began secret high-level talks on a potential missile deal.

Documents found by weapons investigators in Iraq reveal Saddam Hussein was in the market for surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1300 kilometres, far beyond the 150-kilometre limit imposed on Iraq by the UN Security Council.

North Korean officials visited Baghdad the following year. In spite of the UN ban, according to the documents, they agreed to "co-operate with Iraq on the items it specified".

Although this episode carries strong hints of Pyongyang and Baghdad as partners in crime, it is not a smoking gun. The chief of the weapons investigations in Iraq, David Kay, says there is no evidence the trade of missiles actually proceeded.

But it is a saga that points yet again to why war in Iraq was necessary - and why we will see an intense international focus in the coming weeks on the behaviour of other delinquent weapons states, notably North Korea and Iran.

The international system is trapped in a desperate game of catch-up to prevent the trafficking of doomsday technology. Saddam's Iraq was but the first of a series of challenges.

Much of the debate about Kay's interim report to the US Congress will centre on the headline finding that pre-war intelligence from the US, Britain and Australia (and just about every other reputable intelligence agency in the world, for that matter) almost certainly exaggerated the scale and "imminence" of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

The international system is trapped in a desperate game of catch-up . . .

This has become an embarrassment for the Bush, Blair and Howard governments. That said, it is wrong to infer Kay's findings somehow "de-legitimise" the US-led war in Iraq. Far from it.

The report stresses Iraq was a threat as long as Saddam remained in power. According to Kay, this assertion is supported by the testimony of Iraqi scientists, who have told inspectors Saddam's regime maintained, at the very least, the database and expertise - "the breakout capability" - to kick-start its programs once inspectors were gone, and sanctions lifted.

This judgement conforms with the 12-year pattern of subterfuge and obfuscation that characterised Saddam's dealings with the UN. The question was not whether Saddam had WMD (that much is established history) but what did he do with them, and when did he do it? That his regime refused to the last to make a full disclosure on these questions, as demanded repeatedly by the UN, became the trigger for military action.

The war in Iraq has sent a blunt message to other nations known to play fast and loose with the protocols governing weapons proliferation.

But the coming weeks will be just as critical in signalling whether, and how, the international system can find ways other than direct military intervention to stop the spread of WMD.

North Korea is one of the big players in the black market. It is a reputation all the more alarming for its claims this week that it has reprocessed 8000 spent fuel rods, giving it enough plutonium to produce five or six nuclear bombs.

Likewise, Iran is under heavy suspicion over its nuclear ambitions. Last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency put Tehran on notice, after two separate episodes of weapons-grade uranium being detected at a nuclear plant Iran claims is for peaceful purposes.

Faced with these dangers, Washington has sought to persuade other major powers, including China and Russia, to share responsibility for the task of steering Iran and North Korea away from this dangerous course. Can they maintain a united front and, if so, will negotiations produce effective and enforceable outcomes? Given recent history, this proposition requires a leap of faith.

But, in truth, there are no good options.

The invasion of Iraq cannot be, and should not be, the template for all future action. Yet doing little or nothing, for fear of inflaming a crisis, also carries incalculable risks. The likes of Syria and Libya will be watching to see who blinks first.

If North Korea and Iran prevail in this stand-off, non-proliferation will be officially dead as an instrument of global security.