The President began the meeting by asking General Wheeler to summarize
the military picture.

General Wheeler described Israeli
and UAR forces as follows:

Israeli forces are 55–65% mobilized with 160,000 now in the ground
forces. Israel has not yet called to duty the support forces that would
be necessary for a long campaign. The Air Force and Navy are fully
mobilized. The UAR has moved some 50,000
troops into Sinai and established them along two defensive lines, one
behind the other. They have moved a number of fighter aircraft into the
Sinai. In addition, they have established a small Naval force and 12
MIGs at Hurghada, across the Red Sea
from Sharm al-Sheikh where there are a 3000-man parachute battalion and
4 coastal defense guns.

He described the military situation as of the moment as basically static.
Although there have been two overflight incidents, neither side looks as
if it is readying for attack. The UAR's
dispositions are defensive and do not look as if they are preparatory to
an invasion of Israel. The UAR has
gained some military advantage by moving into Sharm al-Sheikh and by
advancing its forces into the Sinai. He concluded, however, that Israel
should be able to resist or undertake aggression and that in the long
term Israel would prevail.

In response to the President's question, he believed that Israel could
maintain the present level of mobilization for two months without
causing serious economic trouble. Full mobilization, however, would cut
into the economy. We believe Israel's full war stocks are designed to
carry three or four weeks. To continue beyond that would require
resupply. He thought the UAR could
continue for at least a month.

The President asked General Wheeler to confirm whether anything indicates that
either side will attack. General Wheeler answered that there were no
indications that the Egyptians would attack. If the UAR moved, it would give up its defensive
positions in the Sinai for little advantage.

He believed that the Israelis would win air superiority. The UAR would lose a lot of aircraft. Israel's
military philosophy is to gain tactical surprise by striking airfields
first but he believes this is not absolutely essential to Israel's
gaining air supremacy.

He concluded by noting that on the Israeli side the greatest danger is
the state of mind. The Israelis believed that if the situation jells, it
jells in favor of the Arabs.

The President asked whether there was any military reason why we should
make any declaration or any military moves now. General Wheeler said he saw none.

In response to the President's request, Secretary Rusk summarized the situation. Israeli
Foreign Minister Eban had come in the previous afternoon with a flash
message from Eshkol that the Israeli government expected an Arab attack
imminently. Eshkol requested that we put our Mediterranean forces in
touch with the Israeli Defense Force to coordinate action in the event
of such an attack.

Secretary Rusk had told Eban that our intelligence does not
support the view that Israel is threatened with imminent attack. He
noted that U Thant said that
everything he had heard in Cairo tends to exclude that likelihood also.
He explained to Eban the
President's problems with Congress and strong Congressional feeling that
the US must not act unilaterally. He cautioned against a preemptive
Israeli attack and said that we could not be responsible if Israel goes
off on its own.

Secretary Rusk felt that Eban the following morning had pulled
away somewhat from the message of Thursday evening. He indicated to the
Secretary on the phone that he would not have sent that message had he
been in Jerusalem. However, he did cite the “apocalyptic” mood in Israel
and the heavy pressure for a strike. Eban expected to return to Jerusalem for a Sunday
Cabinet meeting which might be “the most important to be held in the
history of Israel.”

Secretary McNamara had reported
that he had met with Eban from
10:30 to 11:20 a.m. He said Eban
was back on the tack of the night before—that a surprise Arab attack was imminent.
Eban said Israel by itself had
two alternatives—surrender or a preemptive strike. He had come to
explore a third—what the US might do to open the Gulf of Aqaba. He
stressed US commitments and expressed concern that so far he had had no
indication that the US was ready to use force. During the meeting
Eban received a message
stating that the prediction of attack was no longer just an appraisal
but was solid information. However, he was vague on the source of this
information.

Secretary McNamara had said that
the Israelis would stand alone if they initiated an attack. He cited the
importance of our gaining Congressional support and working through the
UN. Eban had questioned the efficacy of the UN. He predicted nothing would happen there
and asked why Israel should not act now.

Secretary Rusk stated that
Eban and Secretary Dulles had
jointly drafted the paragraphs that Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir had agreed [included?] in her
statement to the UN on 1 March 1957.5See footnote 3, Document
69. This in effect said that interference of
shipping by armed force would constitute an imposition on Israeli rights that would justify
exercise of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Mr. Eugene Rostow interjected that
it was important to settle in our own minds the doctrine of “first
strike.” It was important to decide whether the UAR by proclaiming a blockade of the Straits, had already
made a first strike.

The President then asked Mr. Battle to describe the Arab situation and Mr. Sisco to
describe the Israeli position.

Mr. Battle noted a vigorous Soviet
effort to turn this crisis into a US-Arab confrontation. He suggested
that Syria had been ahead of Nasser for a while but would now follow his
lead. He suggested that Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon will probably
be weakened in the current crisis. The closer we get to Israel, the more
difficult it will be for the moderate Arabs to stay at arms length from
Nasser. He was sure Hussein and Faisal must be having nightmares over
being drawn into this conflict, but they could not stay out of a holy
war against Israel. The rest of the Arab world would not be important,
except that Kuwait will probably be pressed to bail the UAR out financially and Libya may be under
pressure to abrogate our base rights at Wheelus.

Mr. Battle summarized by saying:
(1) whatever we do we are in trouble. If we fail to stand by Israel, the
radical Arabs will paint us as a paper tiger. If we stand by Israel, we
will damage ourselves seriously with all the Arabs. (2) We must remember
that the Arabs never stick together for long. We know that eventually
strains will reappear.

Mr. Sisco described access to the
Gulf of Aqaba as the “gut issue” for Israel. Backing down would amount
to surrender and maybe even the beginnings of dissolution of the State
of Israel. On the economic side, Israel depends on this route for most
of its oil imports and for many exports to the markets of Africa and
Asia it is trying to develop. Legally, Israel has the same interest as
we do in keeping the Straits open as a matter of principle. Israel has
made it clear that if the choice is surrender or action on any of these
fronts, it will choose action. Mr. Sisco pointed out that Israel has no faith in the UN. The UN
Security Council proved itself unable to deal with the problem of cross
border terrorism after the Syrian incidents last October. Nor does
Israel have faith in the ability of UN
Truce Supervisory Organization to in any way limit these incidents. It
has no faith in the General Assembly as now constituted. The composition
of the General Assembly of today is quite different from the Assembly
which after Suez established the UNEF.
Mr. Sisco predicted that any
General Assembly action today would be anti-Israeli. To top off their
lack of faith in the UN, they feel
U Thant is biased against
them. He rushed to pull out the UNEF,
and his slowness in getting out his report played into the UAR's hands. Then he went to Cairo and not to Tel Aviv. They feel
he will not come up with anything more than some “gimmick proposals” to
rationalize the status quo.

In summary, the Israelis are deeply concerned that with the passage of
time and with the double standard in New York, they can hope for little
more than gradual quiet acquiescence in the status quo. The Israelis
believe that they have a special relationship with us. They are willing
to exhaust the UN avenue if it does not
take too much time, but they want assurance that at the end of that road
the Straits will remain open. Mr. Sisco thought that cooperation among the maritime states
perhaps with the support of a Naval escort to keep the Straits open
would be the kind of concrete proposal the Israelis might be willing to
accept.

The President asked what kind of force might be available. Mr. Sisco believed it would be impossible
for the UN to approve any such UN force. However, we are working on a force
involving at first the US–UK and maybe
Canada—and then the Dutch, other Commonwealth nations, the Japanese and
maybe the Argentines.

The President interjected that the Canadians had not promised anything
but he felt from his conversation with Prime Minister Pearson that they
would probably go along.

Secretary McNamara questioned
whether the UK proposal brought here by Minister of State George Thomson had full UK military approval. This is something we
will have to work out. In any case, we would not want to launch any
Naval probe of the Straits until the UN
has played itself out and until Congress has endorsed our proposal.

In response to the President's further question, General Wheeler
described briefly the Naval forces now in the vicinity of the Red
Sea—two U.S. destroyers (the Fisk and the Kennedy) and the flagship of
COMIDEASTFOR (the Valcour).
The UK has several frigates and
minesweepers in the immediate area and the Hermes, a commando carrier,
is somewhere not far from Aden. In the Mediterranean there is a
substantial US force, and we hope we might persuade the Italians and
even the Greeks to join. However, what is in the Mediterranean may not
be useful in the Red Sea.

Mr. Eugene Rostow briefly
described Eban's purpose in coming
to Washington. He stated his belief that on Tuesday, May 23, we had held
the Israelis off from striking. At that time he had authorized
Ambassador Barbour to describe to
the Israelis the proposal that George
Thomson had brought to Washington. Eban now described that as Israel's
first ray of hope and said that he had come to Washington to find out
how serious that proposal was. Israel would regard the closing of the
Straits as justifying self-defense under Article 51, but Eban is disposed to recommend that his
government go along with us in an effort to unite the maritime nations behind a plan to keep the
Straits open by collective action. He felt that if there were some hope
that an international group would keep the Straits open, this would be
sufficient to stay Israel's hand. Eban had said he also was disposed to go along with this
plan if the President were behind it. Mr. Rostow said that this was the
specific question the President could expect Eban to put to him when
they met.

Secretary Rusk added that Eban needs to take home something that
he and his government can use to contain the “apocalyptic pressures”
they face. He said he recognized that that was the Israeli government's
problem. He assured the President that Eban understands the nature of
our public relations problems.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the
sensitive issue is whether Israel will insist on the right of passage
for Israeli flag vessels. As a practical matter, the UAR might allow the
continued passage of non-Israeli ships, but Israel may not be willing to
settle for that. In any case though we should concentrate on the
Straits, we won't get too far until U
Thant reports.

Secretary McNamara said he saw no
“perishability” in the situation as it stands except for the fact that
Israel probably can not sustain its mobilization for too long without
economic cost. He asked the President whether getting support for a
probe would be politically harder two to three weeks from now. The
President asked whether a probe could actually be made.

Secretary Rusk said he had told
Eban what he had said to
Gromyko in the Berlin crisis of 1961–62. He had said then that the
USSR could have war in five minutes but a peaceful
answer would take more time to work out. The Secretary said he had told
Eban that Israel has a tremendous stake in the world's view of its
actions, particularly who is responsible for a shooting war if one
starts. He had told Eban that
Israel would not be alone unless it chose to go alone. He had emphasized
that the US can not be drawn into war by the unilateral action of
others. Because of US public opinion and the views of Congress we must
exhaust all other avenues first. The Israelis must give our efforts a
chance.

The President asked General Wheeler to comment on the efficacy of an effort by the
maritime powers to keep the Straits open. He suggested that he could
tell Eban that we would work
through the UN even though we have our
doubts what that course will produce. Then we could put our eggs in a
multilateral basket by the maritime powers provided the military
situation does not deteriorate in the meantime.

General Wheeler said that if the
President decides to force the Straits the best way is by a series of
steps. First, we might send a non-Israeli flag cargo vessel into the
Straits. Then a cargo vessel with military escort (he noted apparent UAR
instructions not to accost any vessel with a military escort). If these
vessels were attacked, the least we could do would be to strike the air
and naval bases from which the attack was launched. This would be a more
limited operation than what the Israelis would have to mount. They would
probably have to destroy all the Sinai airfields as part of any air
attack on Sharm al-Sheikh or Hurghada.

In summary, General Wheeler expressed the view that the UAR would back down if the maritime powers
were able to muster an impressive enough force. He felt that this would
be the most precise military response we could mount; a show of force by
the Sixth Fleet near the UAR's coast
line might encourage the Israelis to attack or trigger an attack by
Nasser as a last desperate
act.

The President asked whether the UK has
enough interest to “stand up with us like men.” General Wheeler cited the UK's substantial oil interests and opined
that the UK could not tolerate Nasser as the dominant force in the
Middle East. The President asked, “If you were in Eban's place and we
told you we were relying on the UN and a
group of maritime powers, would that be enough to satisfy you?” General
Wheeler answered that he
would drive a harder bargain. He would agree to go along provided that
the US guarantee to back Israel if these efforts failed. He said he
might gamble that the US would have to back Israel anyway but would try
to get some more formal assurance. The President turned to the rest of
the group around the table and asked two questions: (1) Are there other
elements of the situation we have overlooked? (2) What do you recommend?
“Dean has to fly off to Iowa
for a speech; the Vice President has a birthday party; and along about
sundown I have to bell this cat. I need to know what I am going to
say.”

The Vice President summarized his view by focusing on the Gulf of Aqaba
as the central issue and expressed his doubt that the UAR would attack. He felt the UAR would understand that we have a great
stake in the freedom of the seas. He noted that this is a matter of life
or death for Israel and we could not expect Israel to trust Nasser's word.

The Vice President then asked what about the UAR's capability to endure a high degree of mobilization
over any period given its economic weakness. He wondered whether Nasser
wasn't trying to blackmail us. He felt the UN would not do much. At the end of the road, we have a
large stake in keeping the Straits open. Unless Israel thinks we are
going to back them, it will attack.

The Vice President suggested that the President tell Eban that we have a stake in the freedom
of the seas but that we also have a stake in peace in the Middle East.
The Israelis have to have faith and we will use everything we can to
achieve our ends.

The President asked whether he could go that far, and Secretary McNamara said he didn't think so.

Mr. Clifford pointed out that all
we are acting from at the moment is a UAR announcement that it would close the Straits. As far as
we know—since the UAR had been talking
about our Battle Act—the UAR might allow
even oil tankers to go through the Straits.

The President asked whether we expected a test soon and Mr. Vance and Mr. Eugene Rostow noted that there are
conflicting reports. The Israelis say that one tanker has already been
stopped in the Red Sea but we have no confirmation.

Mr. Clifford went on to say that
regardless of the legal points involved, in world opinion the UAR has not yet moved. So far we have had
only an oral threat. He felt it exceedingly important that Israel not
take the first overt step. If it does, we will bear the brunt of the
world's reaction.

Nevertheless, Mr. Clifford felt
that Israel's life was indeed at stake and that we must assure access to
the Gulf. If Nasser succeeds in
closing the Gulf, he will have won a major victory.

He felt that we have an excellent issue in the freedom of the seas and
that we must call Nasser's bluff.
We must put him in a position where he either takes an overt act against
free shipping or backs down. Mr. Clifford made a major point of the fact that our
ultimate objective is to put an Israeli ship through the Straits and on
into its port.

He concluded that there is no obligation to say all of this to Eban later in the day. He felt it would
be enough to say that we sympathize, that we are studying this but have
no commitment to make yet. The President asked whether Eban would not misjudge this as a cold
shoulder and go home to advise his Cabinet that it could not count on
the US. Mr. Clifford felt that
our expression of sympathy would be enough. Secretary Rusk asked whether this would not sound
as if we are diluting our commitment. Mr. Clifford said we need not volunteer any statement on
what we would do in the Straits, but the President laughingly said he
was sure he would have a chance to discuss that subject.

The President asked whether this would be enough for Eban to take home to keep the Israeli
Cabinet from deciding to strike. Secretary McNamara said he thought a little more was necessary. He
said that in his conversation with Eban that morning Eban had in a sense asked whether we were not walking
away from the commitments of our predecessors. Secretary McNamara would stop short of endorsing
all previously made commitments because “there is some pretty bad
language in them.” He suggested writing a new statement of our
position.

Mr. Ball suggested that two
problems should be separated: (1) the principle of free passage in
international waterways has been covered in the 1958 Convention of the
Seas; (2) the question of belligerent rights is a separate one.

Mr. Ball indicated on the basis of
his conversation with Mr. Shoaib of the World Bank that Muslim world
opinion is coalescing against Israel. Shoaib felt that even the Iranians
would have to line up against Israel eventually. Therefore, the Israelis
would be “out of their minds” to attack. Their rights will be as clear
two weeks from now as now. We should live up to past commitments but we
should not underestimate the possibility of a grave oil crisis if we end
up on the Israeli side of a fight. US companies would be under serious
attack and would probably be nationalized.

Mr. Fortas described the problem as how to keep the Israelis from
striking. We will open the Straits over the long run but the critical
time is Israel's Cabinet Meeting Sunday. Mr. Fortas did not feel that
Mr. Clifford's suggestion went far enough. He felt we
would have to assure Eban that one
of these days we will assure that an Israeli flagship will get into the
Gulf. Mr. Fortas felt that Eban understands our problems but needs a
package he can sell to the Cabinet in Jerusalem.

The President asked whether Mr. Fortas meant we would enforce the passage
of an Israeli vessel with our men and ships. Mr. Fortas answered that we
would use whatever force necessary. The President said he did not
believe he was in a position now to say that.

The President indicated that Eban
would not get all he wants. The big question was whether we will regret
on Monday not having given him more. Nevertheless, we have the unanimous
pressure of the Congress to try the UN
and multilateral machinery.

The Vice President reiterated his point that we should tell Eban we have as big a stake in freedom
of the seas as Israel does and that Israel should have faith that we
will do what we can to protect that principle.

The President left the meeting at this point and suggested that the other
participants might want to stay on and draft a statement for him to use
with Eban later.

In the subsequent conversation, Secretary McNamara suggested four elements as part of what the
President might tell Eban: If
Israel initiates an attack, it will stand alone. If the UN fails and subject to Congressional
approval, the President would work with other nations to insure keeping
the Gulf open.

Mr. Fortas warned that we would not have a realistic choice between
participating and not participating even if Israel provokes hostilities.
He did not feel we could say that Israel will be alone.

Secretary Rusk stated that if
Israel strikes first, it would have to forget the U.S. The Vice
President countered that hostilities would face the President with the
most serious politics imaginable. We will not be able to play with
legalisms.

Secretary Rusk then tabled for the
group's consideration a possible statement for the President to use in
talking with Eban. That draft and
a copy of the statement as the President amended it and finally used it
are attached.9Not attached but see Document 74. The President rejoined
the meeting long enough to make those changes.

Meeting adjourned.

H.S.

1Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Middle East Crisis, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. Drafted on
May 27. Filed with a covering memorandum from Saunders to George
Christian stating that he had dictated this draft from his notes and
Christian could make additions or revisions before putting it in the
President's records. A few handwritten corrections by Saunders
appear on the source text and on a copy that Saunders sent to
Walt Rostow. (Ibid., Vol.
II) No copy with further revisions has been found. The agenda for
the meeting, prepared by Rostow, is ibid. The meeting, held in the
Cabinet Room, began at 1:33 p.m. The President left the meeting at
3:10 p.m. and returned at 3:51 p.m.; the meeting ended at 4:05 p.m.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

3The aide-mémoire of February 11,
1957, as made public on February 17, 1957, and Lodge's statement
before the General Assembly on March 1, 1957, stated that the United
States believed that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehended international
waters. See footnote 6, Document 36, and
footnote 6, Document 32. President
Eisenhower reiterated this position in an address of February 20,
1957. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp.
147–156)

4At his news conference
on February 19, 1957, Dulles said, “The President has inherent power
to use the forces of the United States to protect American ships and
their rights all over the world. But he has no power, in my opinion,
to use the forces of the United States on behalf of the vessels of
another flag unless he is given that authority by some congressional
resolution or by a treaty.” (Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1957, 115 p. 404) The complete record
of the news conference is ibid., pp. 400–406.

6The Secretary-General so
stated in his report to the Security Council on May 26. For the
text, see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General
of the United Nations, Vol. VII, U Thant, 1965–1967, pp. 438–443.