7. United States War Department,
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. in 128 parts (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1880-1901), series 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, p. 913. Hereafter
cited as OR, all references are from series I unless noted.

8. Ibid., p. 915.

9. Ibid.,

10. Ibid., p. 923.

11. Nesbitt, Saber and Scapegoat,
p.65.

12. Ibid., p. 67.

13. Richard D. Hooker, ed., Maneziver
TVarfare: An Antholog@, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993),
p. 42. Mission orders are those that define the objective, but leave the
means of obtaining it up to the dccision-makers on the scene. Since the
early 1980's, reformers among both the Army and Marine Corps have been
advocating exactly this kind of looser command style,, with some success.
It is a concept designed to give subordinates room to use their own initiative,
and encourage flexible tactical thinking at lower command echelons.

14. McClellan, I Rode TVith
JEB Sti4art, p. 3 15. McClellan makes it clear that the original plan
was likely Mosby's. as reported in an article Colonel Mosbv wrote in the
Philadelphia TVeekly Times, December 1 5, 1 877. Stuart's official
report doesn't mention Mosby, but circumstances indicate that he was likely
the original author.

1 5. The OR missives, quoted
in full above, speak to this-Lon-street explicitly states so in his cover
letter forwardin- Lee . s June 23rd correspondence.

16. McClellan, I Rode With JEB
Stuart, p. 318.These orders are quoted in full further on. See note
74 below.

54. Busey and Martin, Regimental
Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, p. 194. All the strengths given
here arc from the June 30th estimates, and represent what are likely the
best estimates of strength for the command. Cavalry operations were highly
fluid, and horses broke down often, meaning that actual "ready for duty,
equipped" strengths would fluctuate substantially from day-to-day in active
operations. If not exact, these figures certainly give the closest basis
for comparison we have.

55. OR, vol. 27, pt. 3,
p. 913. Technically, Stuart had command over Jones and Robertson from the
time of their arrival at Fleetwood in early June, and this order on the
22nd directed him to take charge of Jenkins. Imboden seems to have remained
technically independent, but this hardly mattered before July, given that
Imboden was operating on what amounts to an independent mission on the
western flank of Lee's army.

56. McClellan, I Rode With JEB
Stuart, p. 319.

57. OR, vol. 27, pt. 3, pp. 867-868.

58. TRADOC is the army acronym
for Training and Doctrine Command, that branch of the army responsible
for establishing common tactical procedures and setting baseline performance
standards for the various combat arms.59. Ibid., i). 927.

60. Wilbur Nye, Here Come
The Rebels (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Press, 1988, reprint of 1965
edition), pp. 129-134; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, pp 89-9.
Nye's book is a detailed history of the Confederate Second Corps
and its supporting units in the invasion. As such, it provides excellent
detail for some of these mostly-forgotton actions.

62. Douglas Craig Haines, "R. S.
Ewell's Command June 29-July 1, 1863," The Gettysburg Magazine, no.
9 (July 1993):20. In Jenkins' defense, the failure to get the orders to
retire was certainly more Ewell's fault and quite illustrative of the low
regard with which Ewell had come to hold his cavalry.

63. Shevchuk, "Albert Jenkins,"
P. 57

64, Ibid., p. 56.

65, Jenkins' actions on July Ist
seem to be a forgotten chapter in the Gettysburg story, and have
produced some wildly conflicting accounts. At odds with the above is Longacre's
account of the actions undertaken by Jenkins' command: Longacre has Jenkins
retiring leisurely to Petersburg, Pennsylvania-York Springs today-where
he and his command spent a quiet night on June 30th. They only discoved
that a battle was being fought on the afternoon of the I st after
a large lunch and some boastful conversation with a local gentleman. While
this anecdote seems to cast Jenkins in a worse light than even the Chambersburg
incident, the sole source for this story is Jacob Hoke's The Great Invasion,
reported by Nye and in turn by Longacre. Shevchuk's account is based
on better primary sources, and has a truer ring to it: Jenkins' men reached
Petersburg late on the night of the 30th, and were up again at dawn, riding
to join Ewell. Hermann Schuricht, a lieutenant with the 14th Virginia Cavalry,
report ed the latter in his diary. See Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg,
pp. 146-7; Shevchuk, "Albert Jenkins," pp. 56-7.

71. The destruction of the Baltimore
& Ohio railroad not only damaged the Union war effort, but likely interrupted
any plans to bring in reinforcements from West Virginia or points further
west.

72. OR, vol. 27. pt. 3. pp. 985-986.

73. Ibid., pp. 947-948.

74. A number of historians and
Stuart partisans have essentially blamed Robertson-as the senior of the
two-for failing to follow his @rders, or have blamed Lee for failing to
use these two brigades effectively. For a representative sample of this
criticism, see: John S. Mosby, "Confederate Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign.
Part I," in Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., Battles and
Leaders of the'Civil War, 4 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff. 1956,
reprint of 1888 edition), 3:252; Nesbitt, Saber and Scapegoat, pp.
68-70; Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, pp. 233-4; McClellan,
I Rode With JEB Stuart, pp. 3 18-19; Coddington, The Gettysburg
Campaign. pp. 1 83-4.

75. Crute, Units of the Confederate
States Army, pp. 240-242.

76. Blackford, War Years With
JEB Stuart, p. 229.

77. McClellan, I Rode With JEB
Stuart, p. 319.

78. OR, vol. 27, pt. 3, pp. 927-28.

79. Ibid., p. 916.

80. Coddington, The Gettysburg
Campaign, p. 184. As one of the comprehensive secondary sources for
the campaign, Coddington discusses the issue in some detail, and is representative
of the bulk of historical opinion here.

85. For a good look at Lee's concerns
about supplying his army in the spring of 1863, see OR, vol. 25, part 2,
pp. 597-8, 686-7,

697. The message from Lee to Brig.
Gen. William N. Pendelton, chief of artillery, is especially illuminating,
where Lee is instructing Pendelton not to bring up the horses needed to
fill out teams for the artillery, since those additional animals would
only starve in place, even given the reduced demand on the railroad with
the absence of Longstreet and two divisions.

95. McDonald, History of the
Laurel Brigade, p. 154. The Federal force here was the 6th U.S. Cavalry,
a large but inexperienced regiment detached by Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt
to verify rumors of a Confederate supply train. The Confederates ambushed
the 6th U.S. north of Fairfield, inflicted heavy losses, and secured Lee's
flank through what would become the Army of Northern Virginia's primary
retreat route after Gettysburg.