Ukraine and the West

Oranges are not the only fruit

A forceful response is required to Yulia Tymoshenko’s conviction

POLITICAL leaders, however grand or glamorous, should be held to account for their actions, even to the extent of being prosecuted. Yet the seven-year jail sentence meted out to Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister of Ukraine, for exceeding her powers in a gas deal with Russia, has all the hallmarks of a show trial. Ukraine's politicians are no saints, and Ms Tymoshenko is no exception. But her alleged crime dates from a Soviet-era law, the evidence against her was thin and the sentence appears designed to eliminate her as a political challenger to Ukraine's president, Viktor Yanukovych.

European and American leaders issued several clear warnings to Mr Yanukovych about the consequences if Ms Tymoshenko were convicted and kept from running in future elections. Ukraine's relations with the West, they insisted, would suffer and a trade and association agreement with the European Union under negotiation for four years would be junked. They should now carry out these threats.

Different camps make different arguments against a tough response. Mr Yanukovych's backers say the constitution bans him from interfering with an independent judiciary. Some doves in the West, meanwhile, say that a fierce reaction is unlikely to have any impact. Others maintain it may be counter-productive. If Ukraine is cold-shouldered, they say, it may turn to Russia instead—where Vladimir Putin is trying to seduce Ukraine into a “Eurasian union” with Belarus, Kazakhstan and other ex-Soviet countries.

These arguments do not wash. Ukraine's judiciary is hardly independent. Since Mr Yanukovych narrowly defeated Ms Tymoshenko for the presidency in February 2010, he has repeatedly acted to overturn all obstacles to his authoritarian rule, including through politically driven prosecutions. The idea that a strong reaction from the West will have no impact is also wrong. Mr Yanukovych is already talking of changing the law to decriminalise Ms Tymoshenko's alleged offence. During the “orange revolution” in 2004, outside pressure helped thwart his bid to steal the presidential election from Ms Tymoshenko's erstwhile ally, Viktor Yushchenko.

The least persuasive argument is the one that suggests a slighted Mr Yanukovych might fall into Russia's arms. Although he remains a thuggish autocrat whose power-base is mostly in Ukraine's Russian-speaking east, he has long since fallen out with Mr Putin, who has criticised Ms Tymoshenko's conviction and would surely have preferred her to win the presidency last year. Russia can offer Ukraine cheaper gas and other economic benefits, but at the price of undermining Ukraine's sovereignty. In the end a stronger link to the West is a far more enticing prize (see article).

The membership challenge

The West needs to do more to persuade Ukraine of that. Many of the hopes raised by the “orange revolution” were later dashed by the squabbles between Ms Tymoshenko and Mr Yushchenko. Little wonder that voters became so disillusioned that they turned to the revolutionaries' rival. But it is also true that the European Union was too cautious in encouraging Ukraine's democratic reforms. The future of Ukraine, which with 45m people is the most important former Soviet republic after Russia, is of vital concern to Brussels, as an energy corridor and as a potential agricultural and manufacturing power. The best option is to hold out the real prospect of eventual EU membership, which a revived trade and association deal should explicitly point towards. But it should be on offer only if Ms Tymoshenko is freed and Mr Yanukovych gives up his repressive use of the courts.