I've always been fascinated by formal systems, which is why I guess I'm
comfortable with "higher maths". What interests me most, however, is
not admiring them as objects of beauty and mystery, but using and applying them
to everyday problems. A body of rules is a formal system just like mathematics,
and there are some important discoveries about mathematical systems that apply
to a body of rules. Close by the mathematicians are linguists, psychologists,
sociologists, computer scientists, and philosophers who are struggling with
problems to do with the meaning of words and the nature of knowledge and
understanding; their findings also apply to a body of rules. And finally we have
the engineers whose expertise, we hope, lies in making things which work. They
might have some insights into the problem of making rules that work.

So what do we have? It is quite a radical change from the way most people
think about things like rules. We're going to focus on the racing rules of
sailing (RRS), and also include the IOM class rules.

1 The nature of rules

Always incomplete & inconsistent

The first issue is about the completeness and consistency of any formal
system. It is in principle not possible to write a body of rules that are
complete, self-contained, and self-explanatory. This comes from Godel and his
famous "Incompleteness theorem". Paraphrased, it says that a formal
system, such as a set of rules, is always incomplete -- there are always
questions and issues that the rules cannot decide. Paraphrased again, it is
impossible to write a "perfect" rule. This is "impossible"
as in "impossible both in principle and in practice", not merely
"impossible in practice" which is what most people think. No amount of
careful thinking, no amount of agonising over the right word to use, no amount
of editing or re-arranging, no amount of consulting and consideration will yield
a "perfect" rule. What these things do is take a rule from being
"95% good" to being "99% good". They are, of course, worth
doing, because we get a better rule; but doing them cannot yield a "100%
perfect" rule.

Although a rule-maker could write at length about the why's and wherefore's
of his rules (look at all the RRS books we have), there will always still be
situations and issues that are unexpected and unanticipated (look at all
the arguments about the RRS). That is "always" as in
"always no matter how hard you try", not "always 'cos you didn't
try hard enough" which is again what most people think. The unanticipated
and the unexpected will always cause situations that are not covered by the
rules. Hence, the unanticipated and the unexpected will also cause situations
that fall outside the rules and their intentions. Because of the unexpected and
unanticipated, a body of rules is always evolving and always incomplete.

Always socially constructed

The second issue is about the meaning of words. The best place to start is
with a long but deep quotation from Shotter (Conversational Realities,
1993):

[We can no longer take it] for granted that we understand another person
[...] simply by grasping the inner ideas they have supposedly put into their
words. [...] Most of the time [...] we do not fully understand what the other
person says. Indeed, in practice, shared understandings occur only
occasionally [...]. [When shared understandings do occur] it is by people
testing and checking each other's talk, by them questioning and challenging
it, reformulating and elaborating it, and so on. For in practice, shared
understanding are developed or negotiated between participants over a period
of time, in the course of an ongoing conversation [...] But if people are not
simply putting their ideas into words, what are they doing [?] Primarily, it
seems, they are responding to each other [...] in an attempt to link their
practical activities with those around them. [...] [I]t is from within the
dynamic[s ...] of these actively constructed [conversations] that what is
talked about gets its meaning. (p. 1, 2)

Shotter is making a number of vital points.

The words are not the meaning

First, words, in themselves, are either squiggles of ink on paper, or
acoustic vibrations in the air. They have no intrinsic meaning. Think of trying
to read hieroglyphics if you are not an ancient Egyptian, or Chinese if you are
not Chinese. The "real" meaning of a word or rule is given by many
things, and it turns out that the particular shapes of the squiggles -- the
words themselves -- are the least of it:

the context in which the rule is invoked

the reader's general personal and cultural characteristics: their value
system, attitudes, beliefs, and "world view"

the reader's particular views on and understanding of the role and point
of these sorts of "rules" in general, and the intent and purpose
of the particular rule in question

the reader's ambitions, motivations, and purposes

the society, culture, group, and frame in which the reader finds and
defines himself

the way the reader understands others to have used and understood the
particular rule in question, and these sorts of rules in general

In general, there seems little to be gained by the view that the meaning of a
rule is given by the "plain" or "ordinary" (or any other
flavour of the) meaning of its words, not only because of the considerations
mentioned above, but because this does not help to induce consensus on what a
rule might "really" or "actually" mean.

Always "interpreted"

The "understanding" that someone has of a rule, the "real
meaning" that they attribute to a rule, is given by an act of
interpretation, either consciously or unconsciously. We are talking here not of
the "official interpretation" that might be given to a rule, but the
every-day "interpretation" that we all give to the words we see and
hear in order to make sense of them.

Most of the time, our interpretations of words are completely unconscious,
and so it might seem strange to claim that, nevertheless, we are continuously
interpreting words people use. We just read and understand. In addition, it
seems that we have cognitive equipment which restricts our automatic,
unconscious interpretations to just one outcome from many possibilities, and so
we are not even aware that there were other possibilities, other
interpretations, in the first place. This has been well-studied in cognitive
psychology under the heading of visual illusions.

Their application always in a social context

"Interpretations" of rules and "determinations" of what
they "really" mean do not generally arise in isolation, but are
contextualised in time and place to the everyday business of using and applying
them, and arise from a consensus in the actions of a group of interested
parties. The point is that the "real" meaning of a rule is validly
revealed in the use that is made of it, and is thus not free of issues of
conformity, influence, power, and politics.

Example

This about describes the rules of sailing for me. I can't grasp them just by
reading them, and I don't fully understand them when I do. I get some
understanding by conversing with others (talking and writing, but sometimes
shouting on the pond-side!), by using them (making a protest, being a member of
a Protest Committee), and by checking, questioning, and challenging, all over a
period of time. The result is that both my understanding is shaped, and so is
the understanding of the others involved in our activities. We have jointly
constructed a (socially) agreed meaning to give to the words of the rules -- the
"real" meaning of the rules is not contained within their words.

One of my favourite rules is RRS 53:

Rule 53 Skin Friction

A boat shall not eject or release a substance, such as a polymer, or have
specially textured surfaces that could improve the character of the flow of
water inside the boundary layer.

I guess most skippers know that this, the current version of RRS 53, was put
into the rule book after Dennis Connor won the America's cup in 1986 with
riblets. As far as I know, protests under RRS 53 are unheard of, because
skippers "know" that the rule is "intended" to prevent just
two things -- polymer ejection and riblets -- and not any of the other things
that boat doctors do to their boats. Strictly speaking, all of the following
activities involve specially texturing the surface of a hull and are illegal by
RRS 53 -- "sanding" with 400 grit in a uniform, straight line from
stem to stern in order to induce parallel microscopic grooves in the surface;
"normal" sanding with 2000 grit wet and dry; polishing; waxing;
painting; simple cleaning....

It is an excellent example of a rule which, as written, is completely
unworkable, but when given a shared understanding of its intent, works just fine
in practice.

2 Improving the social construction of rules

What we actually mean by "improving the rules" is improving our
understanding of them, or improving our adherence to them. It should be clear
that attending to the wording of a rule is a relatively small part of
"improving" it. Remember that, as well as it being absolutely
impossible to construct a rule that is 100% unambiguous and 100% clear, it is
also absolutely impossible to cover every eventuality or anticipate every
possibility. Attention therefore needs to focus on the other matters identified
earlier. If you want to improve understanding of rules:

Give guidance on the intent and purpose of each of the rules in question.
The emphasis here is on the intent of the rule -- the sort of issue
it addresses, and the way it wishes to deal with that issue. In my opinion,
this is the single most important activity that would be expected to improve
understanding and adherence.

Give guidance on the role and purpose of these sorts of "rules"
in general, and the appropriate value system, attitudes, beliefs, and
"world view" involved in them. No body of rules is value-free; it
may be worth making the value system of the rules explicit. Keep in
mind the distinction between the "letter of the law" and the
"spirit of the law", and decide what sorts of rules these
are. It is unlikely that they would be the former. Our racing rules of
sailing are firmly based on the concept of sportsmanship, and the idea that,
if you've transgressed, not only do you not need an exactly-worded rule to
tell you to take your penalty, but you don't seek to evade your penalty by a
letter-of-the-law approach.

Give guidance on the way others use and understand the particular
rule in question, and these sorts of rules in general. Publish and discuss
cases. Discuss how the rule might be applied in a variety of "What
if..." scenarios.

3 Engineering good rules

If we think of rules as tools, as products which should help do a good job,
then we can introduce a whole set of concepts from systems engineering.

The Shewart cycle

The centre-piece of any engineering approach to the solution of a problem is
the Shewart cycle -- analyse the problem, design the solution, implement the
solution, evaluate the outcomes.

Systems analysis is concerned with "what" -- what topics do the
rules need to cover, what is the intended audience for the rules, what are the
intended outcomes of effective rule observance?

Systems design is concerned with "how", given an understanding of
"what" the rules should do -- how will the rules be engineered to
achieve the intended outcomes, how will all segments of the intended audience be
accommodated, how are the various rule topics to be treated?

System implementation is concerned with "doing it", given the
design developed earlier -- actually constructing the rules in line with the
design, ensuring that the design standards set are followed.

To complete the cycle, the implemented rules must be evaluated, tested, and
reviewed. If the cycle is not completed in this way, the whole engineering
exercise is likely to be ineffective.

For the RRS, this cycle is well understood and well implemented by the rule
makers. There are various standing committees and sub-committees of ISAF and
ISAF-RSD whose task is precisely to take this approach to engineering the rules
on a cyclic basis.

4 Improving the engineering of good rules

With a good cycle in place for the development of rules, there are two areas
which might help with improving this development: systems theory, and principles
from quality assurance.

Systems theory

General systems theory is a branch of theoretical engineering which is
concerned with the structure and functioning of whole systems. It focuses on the
big picture. In particular, it looks at the "soft" side of the system
-- the people -- as well as the "hard" side -- inputs, processes,
outputs.

Amongst a number of matters, systems theory draws attention to two aspects of
a functioning system which are of interest to us here: the control sub-system
embedded within the system, and the attitudes and expectations of the people who
both run the system and are impacted by the system.

Control sub-system

The effective control of any system requires four components: that we monitor
the outputs of the system, that we know what these outputs should be, that we
compare the actual outputs with the required outputs, and that we take
corrective actions to change the way the system operates to bring the outputs
into line with what is required. If any one of these components is missing, the
system cannot be controlled or managed.

If we look at a rules "system", we can immediately ask a number of
questions.

Do we know what the outcomes of the system actually are? That is, are we
measuring or sampling the results of applying the rules? Can we say with
confidence, for example, what proportion of penalizable racing incidents
actually result in penalties taken?

Can we say what the outcomes should be? That is, do we know what
measurements represent a "well-functioning" system of rules? Can
we say, for example, that the rules "should" result in penalties
being taken for 100% of penalizable incidents? 90%? 50%? 20%?

Does anyone anywhere compare actual outcome against required
outcome? That is, do the rule makers monitor the system operation and
compare what happens with what should happen? For example, do race
committees report to organising authorities, and do organising authorities
report to the rule-makers, that while 90% of start-line incidents resulted
in penalties being taken, this only happened in 40% of mark-rounding
incidents?

Are there any mechanisms in place which allow the system to be tweaked or
changed so as to bring actual outcomes into line with requirements? That is,
are there effective mechanisms in place which change the system in good time
and in the right way? For example, do race committees have the freedom and
the authority to modify a rule in the light of their experiences, and if so,
do they know how to do that within the rules system as whole? Another
"for example", do the rule makers prioritise their updates of the
rules according to the facts they have about penalties being taken (or not)
for penalizable incidents? According to whether a certain class of
competitor is being victimised by the rules system, not advantaged?

The idea of the control sub-system is to say that, beside the
"normal" system which operates "normally", we need a
sub-system which can effectively manage the "normal" system. There are
some hints here that we need to attend to system measurements in order to assist
with effective management. This idea is developed below.

The people: those operating the system, and those impacted by the system

Systems theory is concerned to have us look carefully at the attitudes,
opinions, beliefs, and expectations of the people involved in the system. It is
also careful to say that we must think, not only about those people who run the
system, but about those affected by the system -- its beneficiaries, and its
victims.

The point here is that the best-intended (and the best, technically) systems
can fail utterly if the people operating the system have different ideas about
the system from those of the designers; and if the people impacted by the system
have negative instead of positive experiences of the system outcomes. These
fundamental issues can be overlooked where there are time pressures on the
development of the system, for example, or where the focus is on "technical
excellence" instead of "effectiveness" or "usefulness".

For example, do Protest Committee members have adequate training in the
intent and purpose of the rules? In the operation and procedures of a protest?
In the appropriate attitudes to display while a member of a protest committee?
For example, do protesters and protestees have adequate protection against
flawed decisions of a protest committee?

Quality assurance

The recent "quality" movement has led to a number of insights into
quality and what makes a product or service of high quality. For our purposes we
can look at recent ideas on the quality management of a production or
development process. There are two aspects of significance here. One is a focus
upon the process of working, and the other is on the measurement of what we are
doing.

Improving the development process

If we take an engineering process such as our rules development process
(analyse what rules are needed, design the rules required, implement the rules,
evaluate the results), we find that we can achieve reasonable quality in the end
product (the rules), but that this quality reaches a plateau. Time and again, we
expend the same sort of effort in the same sort of places, getting the product
(the rules) to the same sort of quality. What has happened is that we have
attended exclusively to the quality of the end result, and have not equally
attended to the quality of the process which brings about the end result.
In order to achieve quantum improvements in product (rule) quality, we must
additionally focus on the processes we use in engineering and developing those
products (rules). This is a subtle and significant addition to our view of
improving the quality of our rules.

The implication is that we must think about our rule development processes.
For example, we assume that the rule makers should exclusively be international
experts; but why? There is substantial evidence that "ordinary"
skippers are excellent at spotting problems that an "expert" may well
fail to see.

Measuring and metrics

We know we need to attend to system measurements in order to assist with
effective management of the system. We also should know that we need to be very
careful about what we do measure, because these measurements will come to define
the system and how well it operates.

It is very difficult to make rational decisions about a system if we do not
have relevant measurements of that system's operation. For example, we know that
there are difficulties with the current definition of windward and leeward. In
order to devote significant effort into resolving these difficulties, we really
do need to know things like what proportion of incidents involve
windward-leeward issues, what proportion of protest committee decisions would be
reversed if the windward-leeward definition were changed, and so on.

The point here is that we need to develop some thoughtful, useful metrics of
how our rules work, so we can make informed management decisions about rule
changes, and about process changes to the rule change procedures.

5 Dealing with disagreement

Disagreement about the meaning or use of a rule cannot be avoided. Because
the "real" meaning of a rule is revealed by acts of social
construction and individual interpretation (conscious or otherwise), a formal
system of social construction and individual interpretation is required to
resolve disagreements. Such a formal system in other contexts is called a
"court of law". What kind of court do we require: decision by an
"expert" authority, or decision by a jury of peers? Does our choice
tie in with the choices we made earlier about developing the rules?

We must be as concerned about the quality of court decisions on disputed rule
observance as we are about the quality of the rules themselves. Our
well-intentioned and well-engineered set of rules is of little use if they
cannot be confidently policed and prosecuted. As current political theory would
have it, the issues to do with legislation (setting the rules) are completely
separate from the issues to do with enforcement (policing, prosecuting, judging,
sentencing, appealing). Do we want to have the legislative and judicial
functions in our rules carried out by effectively the same people and the same
bodies?

Appreciating the extent and limitations of our judicial procedures mirrors
exactly our appreciation of our rules -- our judicial procedures are always
incomplete, always inconsistent, always socially constructed, their significance
less in the way they are worded than in the way they are used, their
significance and "meaning" lying in their intent and purpose, their
success lying in ensuring justice is done rather than the rules merely being
applied.

If we want to improve our judicial procedures, all of the comments made
earlier on improving our rule making apply -- we must attend to our judicial
system, and its control sub-system in particular; we must attend to the
engineering of our judicial procedures; we must attend to measuring the way our
judicial procedures work; we must look at improving the quality of the judicial
procedures; and so on.

From the point of view of the social construction of the judicial procedures,
we must give guidance to race committees and protest committees on:

The intent and purpose of the disagreements and disciplinary procedures

The motivations and attitudes which are appropriate for members of these
committees

The contexts in which disagreements are judged and penalties imposed

The way others have used and understood the particular judicial procedures

The way others have used and understood these sorts of procedures in
general

Although the judicial procedures are also "rules", they are very
different sorts of rules from those rules we were discussing earlier, the racing
rules or the class rules or whatever. There is a very strong case to separate
the judicial procedures from "the rules", and deal with them
differently, perhaps calling them the "Judicial rules of sailing", or
JRS.

Some explicit ideas on interpreting rules are given
in a separate Web page. That page shows, in various ways, that
interpreting a rule involves identifying and then giving effect to the intention
of the rule-maker, or (what is the same thing) identifying and then giving
effect to the purpose of the rule. This is quite contrary to what most
people think. It is usually held that the "real" meaning of a
rule can be found by considering the rule on its own, and by giving the words of
the rule their ordinary meaning. As we have seen, both of these notions
have serious difficulties.

6 Conclusions

Our incomplete body of rules is incomplete both in principle and in practice,
and hence is always flawed and subject to a measure of doubt; always subject to
debate and challenge; and always subject to a degree of conflict. And when we
have doubt, challenge, and conflict, we have (sigh!) issues of politics,
influence, control, authority, negotiation, and power which involve issues of
interpretation, intent, and application.

A rule, any rule, requires "interpretation" (consciously or
unconsciously) for its understanding. Understanding a rule requires more than
just the words of the rule, it requires an understanding of the intent of
the rule, and arriving at any understanding involves values, context, and
background. We can suggest that notes or commentary should be provided
with the rules on their intention and purpose, and similarly for official
interpretations. Then, the application of a rule is a political
act, involving motivation and purpose, power and influence.
Official interpretations are made by a power-group whose views, while
generally accepted, are nevertheless legitimately subject to challenge and
test. Finally, the rule-makers and protest committee members themselves
are fallible, and that the idea that they must necessarily know better is
therefore always rather wide of the mark.

In developing our rules, and in developing our judicial procedures for the
rules, we need to attend to the engineering of appropriate development
processes, to the attitudes and beliefs of those people both
operating the processes and impacted by them, to the measurement of outcomes,
and to the improvement of the quality of both the outcomes of rule and
judicial procedure development and the processes by which these rules and
judicial procedures are developed.

Is there a conclusion? Perhaps the "obvious" -- that the making and
use of rules is an intensely social and political activity in which we are all,
one way or another, involved, and it is not simply a "technical"
activity with "rights" and "wrongs".