Qatar

Qatar -- Foreign Relations

The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the
resulting
threat to other small gulf states forced Qatar to alter
significantly its defense and foreign policy priorities.
For
example, whereas Qatar had supported Iraq financially in
its
1980-88 war against Iran, Qatar quickly joined the
anti-Iraq
coalition after the invasion. Formerly a political and
economic
supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
Qatar
bitterly condemned the alliance between the PLO and many
Palestinians on the one hand and Saddam Husayn on the
other hand.
Moreover, Qatar's previous opposition to superpower naval
presence in the gulf turned into an open willingness to
permit
the air forces of the United States, Canada, and France to
operate from its territory.

The GCC, which for years had been aimed, in part, at
dealing
with a perceived Iranian threat (both external and, in the
cases
of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, internal), became a
forum
for condemnation of Iraq and a venue for building a
concerted
defense against further Iraqi advances. After the Iraqi
defeat,
Qatar and other GCC members focused their energies on
improving
cooperation and coordination on mutual defense issues
while also
continuing to work together in social, cultural,
political, and
economic spheres. Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, has been
historically
sensitive to outside military intervention in the gulf and
was
eager to bolster regional security measures.

The war also drew Qatar and other GCC members closer to
Egypt
and Syria, the two strongest Arab members of the anti-Iraq
coalition. The Qatari-Egyptian rapprochement began in 1987
when
the two countries resumed diplomatic relations after the
League
of Arab States (Arab League) summit that adopted the
resolution
allowing members to reestablish diplomatic links at their
discretion. After the war, Egypt and Syria received large
sums
from the gulf states in appreciation for their roles.
Qatar and
Syria signed an agreement on trade and economic and
technical
cooperation in January 1991.

Even before August 1990, Qatar historically had close
relations with its larger and more powerful neighbor,
Saudi
Arabia. Because of geopolitical realities and the
religious
affinity of the two ruling families (both adhere to the
conservative Wahhabi interpretation of Islam), Qatar
followed the
Saudi lead in many regional and global issues. Qatar was
one of
the few Arab countries that observed the full forty-day
mourning
period after the assassination of Saudi Arabia's King
Faisal ibn
Abd al Aziz Al Saud in March 1975 and the death of King
Khalid
ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud in 1982. The two countries signed
a
bilateral defense agreement in 1982, and on several
occasions
Saudi Arabia acted as mediator in territorial disputes
between
Qatar and Bahrain.

Qatar also has had cordial relations with Iran, despite
Qatar's support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. In 1991
Shaykh
Hamad ibn Khalifa welcomed Iranian participation in gulf
security
arrangements. Iran was one of the first countries to
recognize
Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad in 1972. Relations were based
partially
on proximity (important trade links exist between the two
countries, including a ferry service between Doha and
Bushehr)
and partly on mutual interests. Plans were being
formulated in
1992 to pipe water from the Karun River in Iran to Qatar.
The
Iranian community in Qatar, although large, is well
integrated
and has not posed a threat to the regime. Iran's claim in
May
1989 that one-third of Qatar's North Field gas reservoir
lay
under Iranian waters apparently was resolved by an
agreement to
exploit the field jointly.

Relations with Bahrain continue to fluctuate between
correct
and strained, with tensions rising regularly over
territorial
disputes dating back for decades. Most of the friction
involves
Hawar and the adjacent islands, which both countries
claim.
Tensions rose most recently in July 1991 when, according
to
reports, Qatari naval vessels violated Bahraini waters,
and
Bahraini jet fighters flew into Qatari airspace. The issue
was
referred in August to the International Court of Justice
in The
Hague to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the
dispute.
Other disputes have involved the abandoned town of Az
Zubarah, on
the northwest coast of Qatar. The most serious crisis took
place
in April-June 1986, when Qatari forces raided Fasht ad
Dibal, a
coral reef in the gulf north of Al Muharraq in Bahrain
that had
been artificially built up into a small island. They took
into
custody twenty-nine workers who were sent by Bahrain to
build a
coast guard station. The workers were released in May, and
installations on the island were destroyed. Qatar
submitted the
dispute to the International Court of Justice at The
Hague, but
Bahrain refused the jurisdiction of the court in June
1992. The
dispute was ongoing as of early 1993
(see Foreign Relations
, ch.
3).

Britain's historical role in the gulf has guaranteed a
special relationship with its former protectorates.
Qatari-
British relations are tempered by a complex blend of
suspicion
and cordiality. On the one hand, Qataris are wary of the
former
colonial power because they remember instances when they
were
ill-served by their "protector," especially regarding the
exploitation of oil. On the other hand, the long-term
British
presence in the gulf has fostered many fruitful political,
economic, and cultural ties between the two countries. The
British Embassy in Doha, for example, is the only foreign
mission
that owns its land outright. In addition, many Britons
advise or
work for the Qatari government at high levels. British
banks and
other businesses are well represented in Doha. Many
Qataris
attend university in Britain, own homes there, and visit
regularly.

Relations with the United States have been generally
proper
but took a sudden turn for the worse in March 1988 when
United
States-made Stinger missiles (obtained through
unsanctioned
channels) were observed at a military parade in Doha. When
the
Qatari government refused to relinquish the weapons to the
United
States or to allow an inspection, the United States
instituted a
policy of withholding military and economic cooperation.
The
Stinger issue was settled when Qatar destroyed the
missiles in
question in 1990. Furthermore, both sides acknowledged the
need
to cooperate militarily in the face of Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait.
Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm greatly
improved Qatar's image of the United States as a desirable
security partner and resulted in changed bilateral
military
relations. On June 23, 1992, Qatar and the United States
signed a
bilateral defense cooperation agreement that provided for
United
States access to Qatari bases, pre-positioning of United
States
matériel, and future combined military exercises.

Following Saudi Arabia's lead, Qatar refused for many
years
to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This
changed
in the summer of 1988, when Qatar announced the opening of
relations at the ambassadorial level with the Soviet Union
and
with China. In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in
1991, Qatar established relations with the newly
independent
Russian Federation.

Qatar became a member of the United Nations in
September
1971, soon after it proclaimed independence. It was a
member of
several of its specialized agencies, including the
International
Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the International Labour Organisation, the
World
Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and the
United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization.

* * *

A number of books on Qatar appeared in the 1980s. The
most
useful, particularly in its interpretation of history and
politics, based largely on British Foreign Office records,
is
Jill Crystal's Oil and Politics in the Gulf. Less
analytical but still helpful, especially for understanding
the
disputes concerning Az Zubarah and Hawar and the adjacent
islands, is Rosemarie Said Zahlan's The Creation of
Qatar.
Information on the oil industry is presented uncritically
in
Qatar: Energy and Development by Ragaei El Mallakh.
Zuhair
Ahmed Nafi gives a similarly sanguine appraisal in
Economic
and Social Development in Qatar. Somewhat more
enlightening
is Sheikha Al-Misnad's The Development of Modern
Education in
the Gulf, which contains a wealth of statistical
information.
Naser Al-Othman's With Their Bare Hands gives a
Qatari's
proud view of his own history and includes several
fascinating
interviews with Qataris who worked in the first years of
oil
exploration. Abeer Abu Saud gives a personal view in
Qatari
Women: Past and Present.

For an encompassing overview of the country, the
"Qatar"
section in The Middle East and North Africa
constitutes an
informative annual reference. An excellent source of
statistics
is the "Qatar" section in another annual, the
Britannica Book
of the Year. P.T.H. Unwin compiled the Qatar
volume of
the World Bibliographical Series and wrote a helpful
historical
introduction. Up-to-date information on business and
economic
matters appears in the indispensable Middle East
Economic
Digest. (For further information and complete
citations,
see
Bibliography.)