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Pakistan High
Commissioner Abdul Basit today said the peace process with India stood
“suspended”, and there were no talks scheduled between the two countries as of
now.

The statement is being seen as a setback for
bilateral ties as the word “suspended” had so far not been used by either
nation to define the delay in holding a dialogue.

Interacting with the
media here, Basit said, “There is no meeting scheduled as of now. I think at
present the peace process is suspended.”

Basit was also
non-committal on the visit by an NIA team to Pakistan: “It is not about
reciprocity, but cooperation between the two countries.”

He went on to state
that dialogue was not a favour by one country to another, and that if India was
not ready for talks, Pakistan could always wait.

New Delhi was quick
to hit back on both the issues. Ministry of External Affairs spokesman Vikas
Swarup cited today’s response of a Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson, who
said: “I will again state that negotiations are the best means to resolve the
issues. I have read the statement of the Indian Foreign Secretary you are
referring to and in that also, there was an indication that the talks would
take place.”

India, as such, has
questioned Basit’s statement on “suspension of talks”.

Swarup said on March
26, before the visit of the Pakistan JIT, the Indian High Commission had
formally conveyed to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry that “the terms of
reference had been broadly agreed upon with the proviso that these would be on
the basis of reciprocity and followed in accordance with extant legal
provisions”.

Basit also sought to
push the Jammu and Kashmir dispute back in the forefront. “It is the Jammu and
Kashmir dispute that is the root cause of mutual distrust and other bilateral
issues. Therefore, its fair and just resolution, as per the aspirations of the
people of Jammu and Kashmir, is imperative. Attempts to put it on the back
burner will be counterproductive,” he said.

The Pakistan envoy
also raised the recent arrest of alleged Indian spy Kulbhushan Yadav by
Pakistan security agencies, and said that it once again “irrefutably
corroborates what Pakistan has been saying all along — we all are well aware of
those who seem to create unrest and destabilise the country”.

On India’s request
for consular access to Yadav, Basit said, “The request is under consideration,
but can’t say when they would be given consular access.”

He also said that
Pakistan “subscribed to China’s viewpoint on
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Masood Azhar”.

India tried getting
the JuD chief designated as a terrorist at the United Nations recently but the
Indian move was stalled by the Chinese over a “technical hold”. China had
subsequently said that Azhar was not a terrorist.

People's
self-esteem, their need to gain approval or avoid humiliation are psychological
drivers that help fuel conflicts, and must be factored into attempts to bring
about peace, says an expert.

Like most
individuals, leaders of countries or armed groups may go to great lengths to
protect their self-esteem, and this can make them deaf to reason, said Paul
Randolph, a mediation expert at Regent's University London and author of a new
book on the issue.

He said fear of
humiliation has played a significant part in prolonging Syria's conflict, which
has entered its sixth year. A second
round of peace talks to end the war that has killed up to 4,70,000 people is
due to resume on Monday in Geneva.

Negotiators are
expected to tackle the issue of a political transition in Syria, including
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s future.

US Secretary of
State John Kerry, who is working with Russia to persuade Assad to step down,
said on Tuesday there was no way to end the Syrian war with Assad still at the
helm.

"It's a very,
very complex situation there. But why leaders of nations will not step down is
the same driver that prevents somebody from saying sorry... it is a shame for
them, and shame is painful," Randolph told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

Scientists have
found that an attack on a person's self-esteem activates the same parts of the
brain as physical pain, he said. "So when you're humiliated, your brain
interprets it as if you're putting your finger in the fire... our brain doesn't
like it and it won't allow us to do it," he said. That, combined with the
desire to make a mark on the world - another expression of self-esteem - makes
it hard for leaders to retreat.

What is needed in
Syria is a "golden bridge", a concept from ancient China, which
advises any wise conquering general to build a golden bridge on which his
defeated enemy can retreat, Randolph added.

Mediation works

"All disputes
are really very simple in the sense that it's about somebody wanting something
and somebody else not being prepared to give it," said Randolph.

Each side usually
has both rational and psychological elements to them. So psychology has a huge
part to play in understanding and resolving disputes, and getting the parties
to shift their positions from a degree of intransigence to being collaborative,
he added.

Crucial to the
process is for disputing parties to feel heard, which boosts their self-esteem.

"One of the
extraordinary things about mediation is that if the parties feel heard, their
anger subsides," Randolph said. That is when logic and reason can begin,
and through negotiation the needs of both sides can be addressed. The aim is to
end up with no winner or loser, but with both sides gaining, he said. — Reuters

Maj. Gen. Bradley A.
Becker, commanding general, U.S. Army Military District of Washington and U.S.
Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Daniel B. Allyn hosted Gen. Dalbir Singh, Chief
of the Army Staff, Indian Army, during an Army Full Honor Wreath-Laying Ceremony
at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, Va., April
7, 2016.

This wreath-laying
ceremony is important for building strong relationships with Indian Army
counterparts, said Becker.

“We build trust and confidence
with each other the more we do the military to military training exercises,
visits to each other’s countries,” said Becker. “In this case, paying tribute
to our Soldiers and all of our service members at the Tomb of the Unknown
Soldier.”

The U.S. supports India's critical
role as a leader in maintaining regional stability, according the U.S. State
Department. Security ties are reflected in growing bilateral defense and
counterterrorism cooperation. The United States and India also are developing
their defense partnership through military sales and joint research,
co-production and co-development efforts.

After the wreath-laying
ceremony, Singh visited the Space Shuttle Challenger Memorial. U.S. Army Chief
of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley hosted an Army Full Honor Arrival Ceremony at Conmy
Hall on Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Va.

The technology
sourcing agreement with Lockheed is the latest in a string of partnership deals
from Ashok Leyland to step up its defence play and to reach a turnover of Rs
5,000 core over the next five years.

This, by any stretch
of imagination, is an ambitious target, given that its current revenue is a
little over Rs 600 core. However, it may not be entirely unachievable.

Since its inception
in 1998, Ashok Leyland's defence arm has relied heavily on strategic alliances
to win big contracts. Over the past decade, it has signed three deals with
overseas players to boost its technological know-how. It is now looking to do
the same with Lockheed.

Nitin Seth,
president (light commercial vehicle & defence), Ashok Leyland, says the
right technological support is critical to the success of a company trying to
make a mark in defence manufacturing, given the huge initial costs involved in
developing products.

"It is not that
we cannot develop our own technology, but considering the time it takes and the
money that is required (Rs 400-Rs 500 crore), it is better to source
(platforms) which are in service," says Seth.

The latest deal, for
instance, will allow Ashok Leyland to use Lockheed's platforms for its
light-specialist vehicles (LSV) and light-armoured multipurpose (LAM) vehicles.
In addition to giving it a foothold in the $1-billion armoured vehicle market
in India, the tie-up will significantly boost its overall capabilities in
providing mobility solutions for the army.

Defence mobility is
one area Ashok Leyland is betting on heavily. Already, it is the largest
supplier of medium- and-heavy vehicles to the army. Its warhorse, the Stallion,
was used to carry troops to the battlefield during the Kargil war, and from 400
Stallions in 1998, the army today has over 70,000 Stallions, accounting for
almost 80 per cent of its fleet of big vehicles.

Backed by Lockheed's
technological support, Ashok Leyland is looking to bid for LSV and LAM vehicle
programmes of the Indian Army. It believes the tie up will significantly shrink
the time taken to develop the vehicle and also help it keep the costs low, as
it won't have to start manufacturing from scratch.

Ashok Leyland sets
its sights high in defence

A shot in the arm

If Ashok Leyland
becomes a supplier of LSV and LAM vehicles, its revenue could straightaway get
a boost of Rs 5,000 crore. Then, there is also the scope for recurring demand
as the army doesn't change its models frequently. This means the business from
these programmes could be four or five times bigger than what is believed
today.

Ashok Leyland,
however, is not banking on armoured vehicles alone to reach the Rs 5,000 crore
target. It has also joined hands with Sweden's defence and security company
Saab and is looking for an alliance with Bharat Forge to produce vehicles to
carry guns and missiles. The idea, the company says, is to have a wide range of
products under one roof to meet all requirements of the army.

So far this strategy
has proved fruitful. Out of the 14 tenders to supply medium and heavy trucks
floated over the past year, Ashok Leyland claims to be in the final stages (L1
stage) of at least 12 of these. However, it has not disclosed the deal value
yet.

This means Ashok
Leyland is proving to be cost-competitive in India. One way, it has achieved
this is by localising production as much as possible. "In order to have a
viable business in defence, one should have at least over 80 per cent
localisation but for certain products we have achieved almost 100 per cent
localisation," says Seth.

Its strengths are
clearly reflected in its order book. It recently bagged a Rs 800-crore tender
to supply 450 artillery tractors and Stallions and 825 ambulances to the army.

Yet, its future is
not without challenges. Other major players, including Tata Advanced Systems,
Mahindra Defence Systems and Bharat Forge, are also keen on the LSV and LAM
programmes, increasing competition in the space.

This is the first
time the Indian army has called for bids for these vehicles (1,300 LSV and 700
LAMs). Equipped with sophisticated technology, including thermal imaging and
mounted machine guns, these vehicles are highly effective in combing and
patrolling operations, be it within the city or along the border.

While the vehicle is
popular worldwide, especially with the armies in the US, the UK and Iraq, it
cannot be imported because the specifications for speed, power and weight
differ based on local conditions.

Seth says while
Ashok Leyland has a head-start with the platform provided by Lockheed, it will
still have to make heavy investments in redesigning the product to acclimatise
it to Indian conditions. Currently, the prototype of the vehicle, along with
that of two other companies, is in the testing stage with the army. If Ashok
Leyland wins the commercial bid, it will be in a position to start
manufacturing by 2019.

However, because it
takes a long time for defence contracts to materialise and the outcome even
after the gestation period is unpredictable, the company is also looking at
exports to safeguard its interests.

Barack Obama’s comments on the nuclear threat
in the Indian subcontinent may have rankled New Delhi, but the US President is
right in hinting that India’s undefined defence posture compels its adversaries
to prepare for the worst

External Affairs
Ministry spokesman Vikas Swarup has raised an important issue concerning
India’s defence posture. Commenting on US President Barack Obama’s recent call
for India and Pakistan to reduce their nuclear arsenal, he said that the US
lacked an understanding of India’s defence posture. “India has a no-first use
policy and has never initiated military action against any neighbour”, he said.

For one, his remarks
are not entirely true; for another, it is unclear if he understood what
‘defence posture’ implies. What defence posture a nation should adopt against
adversaries is defined by the political leadership in close consultation with
the military leadership, based upon what political objectives are sought to be
met by war. To say that defence forces are meant to safeguard territorial
integrity is dangerous, since it leaves room for interpretations on the defence
posture. India — when it was most needed — has not articulated its defence
posture, since the May 1998 nuclear tests.

Consequent to the
Pakistan-supported terror attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001,
India initiated Operation Parakram, a 10-month military stand-off with
Pakistan. Throughout the crisis, India’s political and military leadership were
out of sync on the defence posture. For the Army, which was ordered to mobilise
its entire 12 lakh strength, the defence posture implied war. For the AB
Vajpayee Government, the defence posture was unclear — it intended to go to war
but developed cold feet. To save face, India’s National Security Advisor
Brajesh Mishra sought assistance from his American counterpart Condoleezza Rice
to avert an imminent war. However, the Parliament of India was later told that
the defence posture for Operation Parakram was coercive diplomacy, which the
Government claimed had succeeded. If it had, Pakistan, not India, would have
blinked first.

After the crisis,
the Indian Army chief, General S Padmanabhan, publicly said, “Whenever there is
a situation calling for the Army’s help, the latter’s role should be clearly
defined to avoid confusion.” If there was confusion about defence posture
within the Indian Army, think what the Pakistan Army would have done: It braced
itself for the worst. India’s declaratory nuclear no-first-use policy became
meaningless for Pakistan and the world during this crisis.

After Operation
Parakram, while the Indian political leadership maintained stoic silence on the
defence posture, the Indian Army sent confusing signals. On the one hand, it
fenced the military-held Line of Control suggesting a strategic defence
posture. On the other, it announced the Cold Start doctrine on the border
implying an offensive posture.

Catering to the
worst case scenario, the Pakistan Army acquired tactical nuclear weapons and
declared a ‘full spectrum deterrence’ defence posture to plug operational gaps
of the Cold Start. It also explained that while strategic nukes cater to the
strategic and operational levels of war, the tactical level or the immediate
battlefields had become vulnerable to India’s Cold Start. To fill this gap, the
TNWs had been inducted into the inventory.

While the world was
grappling with the fall-out of Cold Start and TNWs given the history of wars
between India and Pakistan, the Indian military added more confusion to its
defence posture. Declaring the need to protect borders from an aggressive China
and a belligerent Pakistan, the Indian Army, in 2009, announced the need to
prepare and fight a two-front war. It declared an offensive defence posture
against China by raising the 17 Mountain Strike Corps. A naïve media fed stories
of how the Indian Army would fight a war, if needed, in Tibet on Chinese soil.

Not to be left
behind, the Indian Air Force, claiming to be the only Service providing
dissuasive deterrence, raised its combat strength need from 39.5 squadrons to
42 squadrons for the two-front war scenario. Never mind that the Government has
not told the Army and the IAF what it desires to achieve in war on two-fronts;
the Army and the IAF do not have a combined assessment of the two-front threat;
the two Services do not have a common doctrine to combat the two-front
scenario; and most importantly, the two have not officially accepted that
fighting a two-front war will be a disaster of unimaginable proportions.

Putting it squarely,
the Army and IAF represent two domains of war. Even if the IAF were to get 42
combat squadrons there is little it can do. China today has mind-boggling
capabilities regarding unmanned combat aircraft and ballistic and cruise
missiles, and in the other four domains of war, namely, space, electromagnetic,
cyber, and sea. What India needs is a defence posture against all six domains
of war against China.

Pakistan, once again
catering for the worst case scenario, sought interoperability with the Chinese
military in 2009, which today far exceeds that of the US and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation forces at the height of the Cold War. Interoperability is
the ability of two Armed Forces to operate together in combat environment with
ease as one whole. This helps strengthen deterrence, manage crisis, shape
battlefields and win wars. The invigorated Pakistan military which will be
supported by the Peoples’ Liberation Army in all conventional war domains
(land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic and cyber), without showing its hand,
is the new military threat facing India. India’s defence posture of a two-front
war is no longer relevant.

Given the
strengthened defence posture acquired by Pakistan, shouldn’t India re-assess
the need to build capabilities for a two-front threat? Instead of questioning
the Services on their bizarre defence posture, the Parliament’s Standing
Committee on Defence recently lambasted the Ministry of Defence for failing to
provide war withal. This is putting the cart before the horse. Why must the nation
spend finances on defence without a debate on defence posture? This is what all
major powers routinely do.

The problem is that
the Government has convinced itself and sounded the defence Services that it
will not initiate war. Generals of the Army’s Northern Command have been
telling the media that there will be no war. What they have not catered for is
the worst case scenario. What if Pakistan, frustrated by India’s determination
not to discuss the Kashmir resolution, decides to go to war?

More than war
preparedness, what will let India down is its undecided defence posture during
peacetime. Since war has its own dynamics such situations lead to disasters
irrespective of the peacetime intentions of a nation. And this is what
President Obama was referring to by calling on India and Pakistan to reduce
their nuclear arsenals. Since that depends on the conventional arsenal of the
two, the start point could be to discuss issues under the memorandum of
understanding of the 1999 Lahore Declaration.