Abstract

Dissecting and analysing the new deprivation of citizenship provision contained in s40(4A) of the British Nationality Act 1981, inserted by the Immigration Act 2014, this thesis demonstrates that existing difficulties in this area will be exacerbated and that the new power will raise fresh, challenging and complex issues which have not troubled the courts before. This is achieved by applying the principles of human rights law, both international and European, and public international law to detect and predict legal problems that may arise in the course of its operation.
The findings of this research indicate the following conclusions. The closed material procedure used during deprivation appeals violates Article 6(1) ECHR and exposes the weaknesses of the admissibility regime of that Article. It is demonstrated that the determination of the ability of an individual to gain a new nationality will be a complex task for the courts and the ‘able to become’ test will rarely be satisfied. The analysis shows that the UK may potentially be in breach of its obligations under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and further risks breaching international law by depriving individuals whilst they are abroad and refusing to accept the return of its stateless former nationals. Further, the focus of s40(4A) solely on naturalised citizens is potentially in breach of Article 14 ECHR and this distinction cannot be legitimately justified.
On the basis of these findings, it is submitted that the myriad legal and extra-legal problems with the new deprivation power, combined with the risk of statelessness, make it an extremely undesirable development in British citizenship law. The choice for Parliament is to either repeal s40(4A) and accept the limitations of the existing law or engage in a serious and inclusive exercise aimed at reforming citizenship law into a coherent modern form.