As detailed throughout this report,
naturalization processing before CUSA already suffered from
systemic weaknesses. INS lacked standards for the consistent
evaluation of an applicant's "good moral
character" and other qualifications for citizenship.
INS had become reliant on the use of temporary files, thus
preventing adjudicators from learning as much as possible
about an applicant's background, including information
concerning possible grounds for disqualification. Applicant
criminal history checks were poorly administered.

With the advent of CUSA, INS imposed an
ambitious production goal on this vulnerable system, and
failed to consider the impact of attempting to reach this
goal on matters other than production. Under the pressure of
production goals and in the absence of adjudicative
standards, the evaluation of naturalization eligibility
became more perfunctory. Adjudicators were trained and
instructed to concentrate primarily on the minimal statutory
criteria. In addition, their inquiries were limited by the
frequent unavailability of the crucial tools of
naturalization processing: applicant criminal history checks
and permanent files. The procedures on which INS relied to
make these tools available to adjudicators, clerical and
automated processes, experienced even greater strain as
production expectations increased. As a result of all these
factors, naturalization processing integrity was compromised
during CUSA.

Although the large numbers of pending
naturalization applications and the long waiting periods
experienced by applicants in 1994 and 1995 clearly called
for a concerted backlog reduction effort, INS' willingness
to step-up naturalization production before repairing known
system weaknesses and its lack of guidance to the Field
concerning how to increase production without decreasing the
quality of adjudications served to make INS employees, the
public, and Members of Congress suspicious of the motives
for INS' aggressive production goals. The disproportionate
focus on production, and the solicitous but unstructured
approach INS adopted for its "partnerships" with
community-based organizations, combined with intervention by
officials from the National Performance Review, made INS
Headquarters vulnerable to allegations that its efforts were
not genuine attempts to reduce the backlog but rather were a
politically motivated attempt to swell the voter rolls in
time for the November 1996 election.

As detailed earlier in our report, we
found that CUSA was neither created nor executed for reasons
relating to increasing the number of persons who would be
eligible to vote in November 1996. However, the absence of
standards, the acceleration of production, and the many
resulting mistakes did raise the question in the public
mind—a public that was largely unaware of INS' widespread
pre-existing problems—of why a government agency would so
risk the quality of its work in the name of production
goals.

We found that INS was willing to take
these risks primarily because the agency had long tolerated
a degree of error in its processes. As we described earlier
in this report, INS managed the fingerprint check according
to an analysis that balanced flaws in the system against the
resources required to redress them, and thereby accepted a
certain level of error. In view of the use of this approach
in administering one of the most significant checks in the
naturalization system—the check against the possibility of
bestowing citizenship on someone with a disqualifying
criminal record—it was no surprise that a similarly
tolerant perspective informed INS' remaining safeguards,
particularly when the rate of processing was increased.

Thus, implicit in the idea of backlog
reduction was a general acceptance of the status quo in
naturalization processing. We found that it was not an
ignorance of the problems so much as an acceptance of them.
As Commissioner Meissner told the OIG when discussing why
INS moved forward with its plans for CUSA knowing of the
problems that then existed in making applicants' permanent
files available to naturalization adjudicators, "the
assumption was this: . . . we have been doing it this way
for years and years and years, and things need to improve.
But they are not going to—you know, we are not going to
create an entirely new system in a flash, and so we will do
the best we can with what we have."

Furthermore, before the implementation
of CUSA those vulnerabilities had not been the subject of
widespread public outcry, and thus there was no outside
stimulus for INS to mend its ways. What was of immediate
concern to the public and to Congress were the
unconscionable delays in processing naturalization
applications, and it was on those delays that INS
single—mindedly focused its attention.

In the wake of CUSA, INS has asserted
that it is less tolerant of error in the naturalization
process. As Commissioner Meissner told the Subcommittee on
Immigration of the Senate Judiciary Committee in May 1997,
INS undertook "comprehensive measures" to
specifically "address the integrity of the
naturalization process." These steps were in addition
to having abolished the presumptive policy for fingerprint
checks, as described in our chapter on criminal history
checking procedures. Accordingly, INS has changed many of
its naturalization practices and procedures since the end of
the CUSA program and has made some significant improvements.
Before offering our recommendations, we briefly outline the
efforts INS has made in the years since CUSA to bolster the
integrity of its naturalization adjudications.

We note at the outset that our
investigation was designed to answer allegations concerning
the CUSA program itself and did not include an investigation
or detailed assessment of the changes that INS has made
since the end of fiscal year 1996. We do not purport to
evaluate whether the articulated changes in policy and
procedures, described below, have in fact been effectively
implemented in the Field. Such an evaluation was outside the
scope of our review. However, we have reviewed INS' written
policy changes, including memoranda implementing new
procedures and the reports submitted by outside firms who
worked with INS on quality assurance audits and on
naturalization reengineering, and we evaluate the extent to
which the announced changes address the problems we have
identified in this report.

We found that INS has made obvious
improvements in its procedures for ensuring that applicants'
fingerprints are checked by the FBI and that the results of
those checks are available to adjudicators. It has also
markedly improved its procedures for ordering and
transferring applicant files so that they, too, are
available at interview. Finally, it has implemented
standardized checklists and other processing forms that
allow it to monitor whether cases are adjudicated in a
manner consistent with these new procedures.

However, of greatest concern is the
fact that INS has not made progress toward developing and
implementing adjudicative standards, including the standards
for English testing and the evaluation of good moral
character. INS recognized before CUSA that such standards
were missing and that their absence diminished the quality
of naturalization processing during CUSA. Despite efforts to
"reengineer" naturalization, those same standards
are still lacking. INS has made little progress toward
ensuring that adjudicators, once they have the requisite
tools—like the results of criminal history checks or the
applicant's file—know how to use them. In short, INS has
standardized its processing procedures but has not improved
the substantive aspect of the evaluation of an applicant's
eligibility for naturalization. Our recommendations thus
focus, overall, on steps to be taken to improve the quality
of the naturalization adjudication itself.

In addition to many troublesome errors
in the naturalization process, we also found that INS'
representations to Congress both during and in the wake of
CUSA were not completely accurate. Although we found no
intention to deliberately mislead Congress, INS officials
reassured Congress and then failed to follow through
concerning the efforts it would make, in one instance, to
safeguard against fraud in the naturalization process, and,
in another, to reduce the backlog in adjustment of status
processing. The testimony of some INS officials in the wake
of CUSA, and other information INS provided Congress when
CUSA was under review, was similarly unreliable. Therefore,
our last recommendations address improving the quality of
the information INS provides Congress.

INS' efforts to improve naturalization
processing after CUSA

In her prepared statement for the March
5, 1997, joint hearing before the Subcommittee on National
Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House
Judiciary Committee, Commissioner Meissner offered an
overview of the improvements INS had made to the
naturalization process:

First, we have eliminated the
possibility of naturalization cases being completed without
verification of an FBI fingerprint check. That is to say,
the FBI is now responding to INS in 100 percent of the cases
by providing either a "yes" or "no"
verification of whether there is a criminal history record
for an applicant. Second, we have instituted a quality
assurance program to ensure that all procedures are being
followed. The program involves random monthly checks of a
sample of cases from every office in INS. Third, we have
contracted with the management consulting firm of KPMG Peat
Marwick to review the implementation of these procedures and
to conduct and oversee an audit of all cases of persons who
may have been wrongfully naturalized last year. In such
cases we will initiate proceedings to revoke citizenship.
Finally, we are [g]etting a contract for a complete redesign
of the citizenship process during the next 18 months to two
years.

Two months later, by the time of
Commissioner Meissner's testimony on May 1, 1997, before the
Subcommittee on Immigration of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, INS had augmented its plans. The contract for the
redesign of the citizenship process went to Coopers &
Lybrand (later PricewaterhouseCoopers or PwC), an
independent accounting and management consulting firm, and
they were charged with a "comprehensive reengineering
of the naturalization program." Commissioner Meissner
also noted that INS, "using a team of expert
adjudicators and supervisors," was updating the INS
"Examiner's Handbook," the guide "for field
personnel in processing naturalization applications."

The improvements announced by
Commissioner Meissner in 1997 have remained those pursued by
INS. The new naturalization procedures implemented by INS
were entitled "Naturalization Quality Procedures"
(NQP), and their first edition was issued on November 29,
1996. This edition was superceded by subsequent clarifying
memoranda and other editions. As of this writing, the fourth
edition of these procedures, NQP4, governs the adjudication
of naturalization applications filed after October 1, 1998.1
PwC issued its final report, "INS Naturalization
Reengineering Evaluation," on June 30, 1999. Finally,
the updated "Examiner's Handbook" referred to by
Commissioner Meissner is entitled the "Adjudicator's
Field Manual." INS had completed the manual's table of
contents in 1999 and it envisions 83 different chapters
concerning INS adjudications. According to the table of
contents, chapters 70 through 75 will address nationality
and naturalization. As of this writing, only chapters 2 and
17 of the substantive chapters have been completed.2 INS has
not published any of the chapters pertaining to
naturalization.

We briefly describe below each of these
three efforts to improve the naturalization process.

Naturalization Quality Procedures

When they were first disseminated in
November 1996, INS' Naturalization Quality Procedures
offered "seven key enhancements" to "enhance
and monitor the quality" of the naturalization process:

Since it was first issued, NQP's focus
on applicant criminal history checking procedures, on file
use, and on documenting the actions taken in any case has
not changed, although the specific subject areas have been
modified. NQP4 is subdivided into the following topics: file
transfer procedures, fingerprint check integrity, G-325
biographic information checks (bio-checks), the adjudication
process, supervisory review, "reverification," and
"quality assurance review." INS ended its outside
testing program on August 1, 1998, and thus NQP no longer
addresses the monitoring of those outside entities.

NQP4 offers specific procedural
instructions concerning, among other things, the steps INS
employees must take to request and transfer applicant files
(directions are set out in a separate nine-page appendix),
and the circumstances under which a temporary file may be
used.3 It details the procedures to be followed for
scheduling or "descheduling" a naturalization
interview for an applicant for whom INS has received a
relating "ident" from the FBI, and steps to take
when an applicant's fingerprint card has been returned as
unclassifiable or is rejected because of masthead errors. It
dictates the steps to take after the naturalization
interview in order to document that the applicant has met
the English-language proficiency, knowledge of history and
government, "good moral character," and
"attachment to the Constitution" requirements of
naturalization.

NQP4 also includes several procedures
concerning the review of the original adjudicator's work. It
specifies circumstances under which an adjudicator must
obtain supervisory review of a decision to grant an
application (when an applicant has a "potentially
disqualifying criminal history," when the adjudication
is done on the basis of a temporary file, and when an
applicant is found to be exempt from the testing
requirements because of a disability). It also describes the
"reverification process," a procedure by which the
original "Clerical, Adjudication, and, if applicable,
the Continuation Processing Worksheets" are reviewed
for completion by a "reverifier" (an SDAO, DAOs
with certain grade levels and training, or a quality
assurance (QA) analyst). Such reviews must be conducted for
every case eligible for oath ceremony before the oath is
administered. Finally, it describes the "quality
assurance review" process by which naturalization cases
in different stages of adjudication are periodically and
randomly selected for review. The QA officer (a person hired
for this purpose, although unfilled QA positions may be
filled by officers who do not otherwise work on
naturalization cases) reviews the files to determine whether
they show evidence of having complied with NQP4. The QA
reports are to be analyzed by the district and regional
offices, and by INS Office of Internal Audit.

The most recent Service-wide NQP audit
conducted by KPMG Peat Marwick revealed that 4 of 15 INS
offices were not in compliance with the requirements of
NQP4.4 Indeed, each of KPMG's four previous NQP audits also
showed varying degrees of compliance in the Field. However,
with each audit report INS has amended its procedures to
respond to the identified problems, and KPMG repeatedly
found that following the new procedures "increased
internal control and significantly reduced the risk of
incorrectly naturalizing an applicant."

Based on a plain reading of the
requirements of NQP, the OIG agrees that the implementation
of these procedures does improve INS' ability to have the
requisite tools for a proper adjudication available to the
adjudicator at the time of the interview. By spelling out
that certain file-ordering steps must be taken before an
interview can take place, for example, INS has increased the
likelihood that the permanent file will be available to the
adjudicator at the time of the interview. By requiring
supervisory review in cases with certain criminal histories
or where unusual exemptions are requested, INS has increased
its own oversight of adjudication quality. By requiring that
the efforts to obtain the requisite tools be documented in
processing worksheets, INS has also increased
accountability: NQP creates an audit trail should any
subsequent reviewer question the original action. All of
these steps are clearly improvements.

However, NQP is a dense series of
technical rules and NQP compliance is labor-intensive.
Although the NQP4 memorandum is addressed to "all
employees who process naturalization applications," it
is difficult to imagine that line adjudicators and clerical
staff can become easily conversant with its contents. (The
text of the procedures is 35 pages long, with an additional
37 pages of explanatory attachments.) INS has developed
training courses to help the Field understand how to use NQP,
and such training makes the new procedures more accessible.
Nevertheless, according to comments made to us by INS
employees during interviews about CUSA (and often
volunteered by them, because we did not specifically inquire
about NQP), NQP has not been whole-heartedly embraced in the
Field because it is a labor- and checklist-intensive process
that emphasizes the importance of form. Such resistance may
not bode well for NQP's ultimate ability to succeed at
overhauling the naturalization program.

More importantly, however, even if
widely accepted and appropriately implemented in the Field,
NQP4 alone is not enough. NQP4 does not purport to address
the substance of the naturalization adjudication. It is not
a guide concerning how to adjudicate cases; it is a guide
concerning how to get the documents adjudicators need in
order to adjudicate a case properly. As noted in the June
1999 PwC report,

Implementation of NQP is a major step
toward standardizing how naturalization cases are documented
from receipt through closing and has strengthened the
process integrity.

While the NQP has standardized how the
process is documented, it has not standardized the actual
interview content or decision-making process.

To address this problem, according to
the PwC report, INS will rely principally on the
Adjudicator's Field Manual, the guide for Field personnel
referred to in Commissioner Meissner's testimony of May
1997.

Naturalization reengineering evaluation

PwC's original mandate was to
"examine all aspects of the naturalization process,
from initial contact by an applicant, through case
adjudications and the swearing-in ceremony, to the
retirement of the case record." PwC worked with INS as
a "joint 'redesign team' to implement—or
realize—the redesigned [naturalization] process."
PwC's June 30, 1999, final report, by its own definition,
was an "assessment document" that provides
"information about accomplishments to date, steps
remaining to reach the ultimate redesigned state, and an
evaluation of the progress achieved." In other words,
the PwC report does not claim that the process has been
redesigned. It instead describes the goals for the ideally
redesigned naturalization process and tracks INS' progress
toward achieving those goals.

PwC's summary of INS' progress toward
achieving the goals of a redesigned process describes seven
"major redesign components," each of which
corresponds to some aspect of the naturalization application
process. These components are: information to applicants,
the telephone center (a "redesign feature" to
improve customer access to information), testing,
fingerprinting, service centers, interview and oath, and
technology. In all but two areas, testing and technology,
the PwC report noted that INS was "on track" to
realizing the redesigned process.

The OIG, given the nature of the
allegations we were assigned to investigate, did not
concentrate on the customer-service oriented subject matter
addressed by the PwC redesign plan. We note that the
improvements in this area, by better preparing prospective
naturalization applicants, will also improve the
adjudication process. For example, in December 1998 INS
published "A Guide to Naturalization," a written
source for information on naturalization for prospective
applicants and other interested persons. According to the
PwC report, the guide will be translated into "key
languages spoken by major customer groups."

As to the remaining components, the PwC
report is a useful summary of changes that have taken place
in naturalization testing, fingerprinting, practices
relating to interviews and oath ceremonies, and technology.
Like NQP, the PwC analysis does not include a discussion of
appropriate adjudicative standards or any other means of
ensuring accurate and consistent decision-making. It does,
however, point out the urgent need for the development of
such standards if a truly "reengineered"
naturalization process is to become a reality.

We offer below a brief summary of the
PwC redesign recommendations that deal directly with the
aspects of naturalization processing on which our report
concentrates. The summary does not address all of the topics
covered by the PwC report. The summary is of those aspects
of the PwC report that inform our own recommendations that
follow.

PwC's commentary on interviews

In regard to the topic of
naturalization interviews and oath, PwC declared that INS
was "on track" toward a redesigned process. As
discussed above, PwC lauded INS' NQP as a means of having
"greatly reduced the risk of incorrectly naturalizing
an applicant." However, PwC noted that NQP cannot and
does not address the problem of the inconsistent approaches
to interviewing adjudications, and does not provide
clarification of "areas that are too broad or
inconsistently applied." These would have to be
addressed by the anticipated Adjudicator's Field Manual,
although PwC noted that a manual alone would not be enough.
PwC called for adequate training, incentives to encourage
compliance, and penalties for non-compliance.

PwC commentary on the testing of
English and Civics

While PwC was working with INS, the
outside testing program for English and Civics was
abolished. According to the PwC report:

Limited INS oversight of testing
providers and allegations of fraud by testing providers cast
doubt on the integrity of the outside testing program. INS
could not reasonably validate that applicants holding
passing certificates had actually demonstrated the required
English proficiency and U.S. history and government
knowledge.

Accordingly, INS ended the outside
testing program on August 1, 1998, and stopped accepting
certificates from applicants as of July 31, 1999.

For the sake of both efficiency and
integrity, the PwC report recommends a testing redesign that
requires applicants who are not exempt from the testing
requirements to pass the citizenship tests before filing an
application for naturalization. Once standardized and
objective tests are developed, the redesign envisions that a
"professional testing organization" will
administer tests to applicants at testing centers overseen
by INS. To prevent fraud, the test results will be
transmitted electronically from the testing centers to INS.
Although not specifically stated in the PwC report, this
testing redesign recommendation appears to apply to the
testing of spoken and written English, and to the testing of
an applicant's knowledge of U.S. history and government. PwC
noted that "a fair and consistent process will perhaps
be the greatest customer benefit of the new testing
program."

Current law requires that an
applicant's verbal skills be evaluated "from the
applicant's answers to questions normally asked in the
course of the examination" or naturalization interview.
The PwC testing redesign envisions that the testing of
verbal English skills will be a pre-requisite to and thus
separate from the naturalization interview. Accordingly, in
addition to the selection of an appropriate professional
testing organization to administer the test and the
technological improvements required for the electronic
transmission of test results, the recommended redesign
requires a regulatory change to permit INS to test an
applicant's verbal skills before the interview.

PwC also noted that the redesign of
applicant testing was "delayed." Apart from the
abolition of the outside testing program, INS has made
little other progress toward implementing a new testing
program or improving the traditional testing that has always
been a part of naturalization interviews. The PwC report
noted that the testing process remained "basically
unchanged for both the applicant and INS," and that the
current process was "flawed." PwC found, as did
the Center for Applied Linguistics as early as 1995, and as
did the OIG as detailed in our current report, that
"testing methods varied from one office to another and
even among adjudicators in a single office," and that
"passing standards varied." PwC pointed out that
INS still had to answer the fundamental questions,
"what to test? How to test? Where to test? Who will
test?"

PwC commentary on INS technology

The PwC report includes a component on
the technology used by INS. It describes, as we have, the
multiple computer systems on which current naturalization
processing depends. We summarize here aspects of PwC's
findings and recommendations concerning INS technology
because they have a direct bearing on INS' ability to
properly administer its A-file policies and procedures, one
of the substantive topics of our report.

Despite the development of revised
systems since the end of CUSA-like the Reengineered
Naturalization Automated Casework System (RNACS)—the
interfaces among INS' various systems, according to the PwC
report, continued to be complicated and often failed. The
PwC redesign thus recommended that INS develop centralized
information management and centralized records management.
To achieve these goals, INS planned to "develop and
deploy" the new CLAIMS 4, a centralized database that
consolidates the previous version of CLAIMS (CLAIMS 3) and
RNACS. INS also planned that completed applications would be
scanned into CLAIMS 4 at the service centers, so that the
information would later be available to adjudicators in an
automated format. This procedure would move INS away from
the use of its current paper application. INS also planned
to develop and deploy the National File Tracking System (NFTS),
a national system that will recognize multiple files in
various districts and will eliminate the need for local
tracking systems, including RAFACS.

In March 1999, INS had introduced a
"baseline version" of CLAIMS 4 which, according to
the PwC report, "provided basic functionality" for
naturalization. By June 1999, it had been implemented in all
service centers, three regional offices, and 23 field
offices. However, PwC noted that personnel at the sites
using the new system have complained that CLAIMS 4 is
"sluggish," that the interview time is lengthened
as adjudicators adjust to working with the system instead of
with the hard copy of the N-400, and that "system
efficiency is hampered by CLAIMS 4 dependency on multiple
systems with complicated interfaces." The NFTS, on the
other hand, has not yet been developed. According to the PwC
report, INS is not "on track" with the
"technology" component of its redesigned
naturalization process.

The Adjudicator's Field Manual

The last of the three major efforts by
INS to improve its naturalization processing is the
Adjudicator's Field Manual.

Apart from the technical, procedural
improvements like fingerprint processing and file transfers,
the remainder of the issues in naturalization adjudications
that have been the subject of our report are anticipated by
INS to be addressed in the Adjudicator's Manual. An effort
to create a revised manual was announced by Commissioner
Meissner in May 1997. According to the PwC report in June
1999, INS was then working on developing the naturalization
portions of the manual. As of this writing, INS has not
published any section of the manual concerning
naturalization processing.

Recommendations

Interviews and adjudications

The evaluation of "good moral
character"

In regard to the "good moral
character" evaluation, we found that adjudicators had
different understandings concerning when they were to
explore issues not directly raised by the questions on the
N-400, or when they should request corroborating
documentation. Because the adjudicative corps during CUSA
was made up mostly of new officers with only brief training,
they did not have years of experience to draw on in the
absence of formal guidance. As production expectations
increased, their questions were usually resolved in favor of
the choice that was the least time-consuming: if the inquiry
was not necessary to the adjudication, it was discouraged.
As a result, adjudications were weighted in favor of
approval, because adjudicators were not encouraged to take
the time required to explore and perhaps uncover grounds of
disqualification. Thus, the absence of standards made
naturalization adjudications more vulnerable to compromises
brought about by the application of production pressures.

Concerning the standard for evaluating
"good moral character," the PwC report notes only
that although NQP standardizes "how the process is
documented," it does not provide consistency to the
interview or the actual decision-making process.5 In
"recognition of this problem," according to PwC,
INS is working on the naturalization portions of the
Adjudicator's Field Manual. As noted above, because INS has
yet to publish the naturalization portions of its
Adjudicator's Manual, there has been no further guidance
available to the Field for the appropriate evaluation of an
applicant's good moral character.

The lack of progress in this area is of
great concern. Since before CUSA, INS has recognized that
adjudicators were in need of guidance in this area, and yet
none has been disseminated. It is the heart of the
naturalization inquiry, the aspect of the examination
process without which the standardization of file procedures
and checklists has little substantive value.

At the same time, the OIG recognizes
that the "good moral character" standard is one
that has been the subject of many varying legal
interpretations. However, to continue to ignore the need for
a standard simply because that standard is difficult to set
invites the type of problem that characterized CUSA: the
reduction of the evaluation of eligibility for citizenship
to the bare statutory minimums.

INS may choose instead to work toward
changing federal law to require that, to be eligible for
citizenship, an applicant need only demonstrate that he or
she is not statutorily disqualified, and thus bring federal
law into conformity with what has been, in many busy INS
offices, the de facto practice. However, unless and until
the legal requirements for citizenship are legally modified
to reflect these practices, INS must provide guidance to the
Field concerning how to adjudicate cases in a manner that is
consistent with applicable law.

Accordingly, we make the following
recommendations:

INS should prioritize its work on the
naturalization portions of the Adjudicator's Field Manual if
it is to be the controlling source for adjudicative
standards as described in the PwC report. INS should
disseminate the manual to all adjudicators, and provide
training in conjunction with its publication that will
permit adjudicators to become familiar with its contents.

In the drafting of the "good moral
character" subsection of the Adjudicator's Field Manual
and in adjudicator training, INS must provide guidance on
how to "evaluate claims of good moral character on a
case-by-case basis" as required by current law. This
guidance should include guidance on the following topics
within the broader category of the evaluation of "good
moral character," all of which we found to be a source
of confusion for adjudicators during CUSA:

guidance concerning when, if ever, it
is appropriate to ask an applicant questions other than
those listed on the N-400;

guidance concerning when, if ever, it
is appropriate to ask an applicant to provide additional
documentation (such as copies of income tax returns or proof
of having paid child support) to support his or her
demonstration of good moral character;

guidance concerning when, if ever, an
applicant who is not statutorily precluded from establishing
good moral character may nevertheless be found to lack good
moral character and thus not be eligible for citizenship;

guidance concerning the relevance to
the good moral character inquiry of certain common but
non-precluding crimes like driving under the influence of
alcohol or, in some states, spousal battery;6

guidance concerning how to evaluate the
effect of probation or parole on the good moral character
determination; and

guidance concerning the record that
must be created in order to legally support the
adjudicator's finding that the applicant lacks good moral
character so that the original finding may be upheld in the
face of subsequent legal challenge.

Testing

As Commissioner Meissner told the OIG,
INS had a long history of "arbitrary and untrained
testing procedures." Before CUSA, INS had recognized
the Field's need for guidance concerning the standards to be
used in evaluating an applicant's English proficiency and
knowledge of U.S. history and government. Because INS failed
to provide such guidance, inconsistent testing practices
continued throughout CUSA.

Despite INS' own repeated
identification, since late 1995, of the development of
testing standards as a priority, still none exists. INS'
creation of the outside testing program—which had, in
part, been intended as a strategy for
standardization—resulted in failure as INS did not
adequately monitor the outside testing entities or timely
respond to evidence of fraud in test administration. The
abolition of the outside testing program in August 1998
makes moot our concerns of inadequate monitoring in that
program, but the problem of inconsistent, unfair, and
untrained testing practices remains unresolved.7

According to the PwC report, INS has
convened a policy working group that is "drafting a
procurement package for a test development contract and is
working with INS testing experts and the Department of
Education." According to William Yates, now the Acting
Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for the Immigration
Services Division, as of June 2000 the working group has
made no additional progress since the publication of the PwC
report.

As a result of our investigation and in
view of the steps INS has taken since CUSA, we make the
following recommendations in regard to naturalization
testing:

With or without the services of an
outside consultant, INS should immediately develop a
standard by which to evaluate an applicant's "ability
to read, write and speak words in ordinary usage in the
English language" as required by current law.
Appropriate standards are overdue and will be required
regardless of whether INS otherwise adopts the testing
recommendations in the PwC report. Therefore, the
development of the standard for English-language testing
should not be postponed pending the development of other
testing strategies that may not be implemented for many
months to come.

As long as current law continues to
require that an applicant's verbal skills be evaluated
"from the applicant's answers to questions normally
asked in the course of the examination," INS should
provide guidance concerning which questions normally asked
at interview are appropriate indicators of the requisite
level of language proficiency, and how those questions
should be posed.

INS should ensure that the
"Service authorized Federal Textbooks on
Citizenship," excerpts from which are required by
current law to be used for the testing of applicants'
reading and writing skills and for their knowledge of U.S.
history and government, are up-to-date, accurately reflect
by example the nature of the tests administered, and are
available to adjudicators.

INS should provide guidance and
training concerning the nature and number of questions to be
used for the testing of an applicant's knowledge of U.S.
history and government, including the range of questions
from which an officer may choose and how the officer should
tailor the test to the individual applicant as required by
current law. According to the edition of "A Guide to
Naturalization" available as of this writing, INS
continues to publish the list of 100 questions, although
modified in small ways, that was used during the
Legalization (Amnesty) program of the 1980s and during CUSA.
If this is the list from which adjudicators continue to draw
their questions, INS must provide guidance concerning the
discretion an officer has to choose questions from the list,
including the number of questions offered the applicants and
whether there is any required passing percentage.

Having been lawfully admitted to the
United States is a prerequisite to naturalization. Providing
false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit during the
statutory period necessarily prevents an applicant from
establishing good moral character. The evaluation of both
requires the adjudicator to review the applicant's
immigration and residency history.

We found that during CUSA in four of
five Key City Districts INS interpreted the confidentiality
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) too broadly and thus prevented adjudicators from
exploring suspicions that applicants who became residents
under the provisions of IRCA may have obtained residency
through fraud. Although opinions issued by the General
Counsel made clear that an adjudicator could review an
applicant's entire file in conjunction with the
naturalization adjudication—even that portion of the file
segregated from the rest of the information by a red sheet,
indicating that the file contained information subject to
the confidentiality provisions of IRCA—local
interpretations contradicted that advice and adjudicators
were often instructed that they could not conduct such a
review.

We also found that INS conducted a
large scale investigation into a particular scheme involving
fraudulent adjustment of status applications under the
Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) provisions of IRCA, and
yet failed to timely provide adjudicators information about
the fraud, and thus failed to prevent many applicants
suspected of SAW fraud from naturalizing.

Accordingly, we make the following
recommendations:

INS should reiterate to all
adjudicators that it is appropriate to conduct a review of
the entire applicant file in conjunction with the
naturalization adjudication.

INS should provide guidance concerning
how to detect previous fraud by applicants for
naturalization, and how to confirm or dispel during the
naturalization interview such suspicions of fraud.

INS should provide guidance concerning
any other information available in an applicant's file that
may have a bearing on the adjudicator's evaluation of the
applicant's eligibility for citizenship.

INS should improve the coordination
between its investigative and adjudicative efforts so that
information concerning fraudulent activity detected by INS
investigators is timely available to and appropriately acted
on by those who may be asked to adjudicate related benefits
applications.

Streamlining adjudication processes

We found that INS' efforts to
streamline the adjudication process during CUSA resulted in
compromises to system safeguards designed to prevent the
ineligible from naturalizing. They also gave adjudicators
and, subsequently, Members of Congress, the impression that
INS was willing to modify procedures in order to appease
community groups or those with political interests in
disregard for eligibility standards. In the event that INS
considers future streamlining strategies or continues to
conduct "off-site processing," we make the
following recommendations:

In conducting "off-site" or
"outreach" processing, INS should provide guidance
to the Field for the fair and consistent administration of
such programs, including procedures for determining which
outside organizations are entitled to participate and how to
ensure that additional pressures to approve applications are
not brought to bear on participating adjudicators.

In implementing any
"streamlining" procedure, INS must first validate
the procedure to ensure that no sacrifice is made to
naturalization processing integrity in the name of the
streamlining innovation.

A-file policy and practice

We found that by fiscal year 1996, INS'
records infrastructure and file policies were in disrepair.
In the largest Key City District, Los Angeles, INS had
become inured to the idea that permanent files would not be
reviewed in conjunction with the applicant's naturalization
interview. Other districts also often used temporary files
to conduct naturalization adjudications. As production
increased under CUSA, reliance on temporary files increased.
As a result, adjudicators made eligibility determinations
based on incomplete information. Also, the creation of
hundreds of thousands of temporary files increased INS'
records burden. INS had lost control over its own records,
and consequently, in at least two instances investigated by
the OIG, was unable to produce information requested by
national auditors (for the KPMG-supervised Criminal History
Case Review) or by Congress (for the Committee on House
Oversight investigating the election contested by Robert
Dornan) because it was unable to locate the relevant files.

Since the end of CUSA, INS has made an
effort to shore up its file policy and practices. NQP4
plainly states that "the review of an applicant's
A-file is critical to confirming that the applicant is
eligible for naturalization." As discussed above, NPQ4
sets out detailed file transfer procedures that must be
followed, including procedures to use when previous
procedures have failed to result in the successful transfer
of a file. It also requires that "error reports"
generated by the computer systems be resolved and not
ignored. All of these procedures make successful file
transfers and thus file availability more likely. In those
instances when the permanent file is not located and
available at the interview and a temporary file must be
used, NQP4 requires supervisory review of an adjudicator's
decision to grant the application.

Thus, when temporary files are used,
the risk that such use will result in an improper decision
is reduced by supervisory review.

However, these improved
file-transferring procedures are highly dependent on INS'
automated systems, systems that—as our investigation
revealed—historically have not been designed or maintained
in a manner that allows them to live up to the extensive
expectations placed on them. INS' efforts with CLAIMS 4 and
NFTS are responsive to the problems we identify in this
report. As noted at the outset, we have not evaluated
whether the implementation of these innovations has been
successful to date. However, we offer certain cautionary
recommendations as INS continues its efforts with
automation.

The task of consolidating into one
automated system all of the information on which a
naturalization adjudicator depends—the information from
the applicant's file, the information from the N-400, any
enforcement action that may have been taken against the
applicant—is enormous. Ideal file-transferring and the
availability of an applicant's immigration history is
dependent on these automated systems. They, in turn, are
highly dependent on adequate financial resources to be spent
on design, technological infrastructure, and user education.
Successful implementation depends on knowledgeable and
capable management of the system and its users. Assuming all
of these necessary resources will be available to INS, the
goal still cannot realistically be achieved for many years
to come.

Our concern lies more with the
immediate future. In both its records management and its
administration of criminal history checks, INS historically
failed to shore up its contemporary practices because it was
waiting for the reengineered processes of the future to take
over and make its paper-based processes obsolete. In the
meantime, the paper-based processes were poorly
administered. If this history is repeated, hundreds of
thousands of naturalization adjudications are at risk as INS
continues its work in the years until that automated future
arrives. Accordingly, we make the following recommendations:

INS should validate its
file-transferring procedures under NQP4 to determine the
extent to which they have been successful at getting the
applicant's permanent file to the adjudicator in time for
the naturalization interview; if temporary file use exceeds
some small percentage of naturalization adjudications,
reexamine the transferring procedures to determine what
additional efforts can be made to make permanent files
available.

INS should continue to prioritize the
importance of file transfers and of file availability to the
adjudicator, and, as noted in our section on adjudicative
guidance, above, should train and remind INS staff on the
relevance of the permanent file to the naturalization
adjudication.

INS should continue to search for
applicant permanent files even after a temporary file has
been used for the naturalization, and should review the
permanent files to ensure that the decision made without the
permanent file was proper; the results of such reviews (or
"post-audits") should be used to determine whether
the temporary file procedures promulgated under NQP are
sufficient to keep the risk of error occasioned by temporary
file use to a minimum.

We also found that INS' loss of control
over its records, and thus its loss of control over
information pertaining to naturalization applicants, was not
attributable solely to its poor file practices. INS' failure
to properly update and maintain its data systems was another
significant contributing factor. Because INS did not timely
"close out" cases and update databases, we found
that INS could not rely on querying those databases to
confirm an applicant's naturalization status. The combined
problem of poor file practices and inaccurate database
information allowed the Los Angeles District to provide
incorrect answers to Congress when Congress sought
information on the naturalization status of certain voters.
The failure to "close out" files and to update the
database also appears to have caused a fundamental flaw in
the data INS provided to the KPMG-supervised review, thus
rendering incomplete (by 71,000 cases) the universe of cases
on which these important and costly studies were based.

Accordingly, we also make the following
recommendations:

INS should ensure that the Field timely
closes out naturalization cases and updates the relevant
naturalization database(s).

As INS depends more on automated
systems in naturalization processing, the accuracy of the
information in those systems is paramount. Accordingly, INS
should periodically test or audit the information in the
naturalization database to determine its accuracy; when
inaccuracies are revealed they should be quickly corrected.

The administration of INS' A-files and
automated data and the implementation of the recommendations
listed above depend for their success on the quality of INS'
clerical staff. We found that many of the processing
problems we identified in our report—problems of
file-ordering, document interfiling, case close-outs—were
attributable in part to shortages of clerical staff,
deficiencies in the instructions given to clerical staff
(including contractor employees), and insufficient emphasis
on the importance of the clerical aspects of naturalization
processing. Accordingly,

INS should monitor its clerical
staffing and training to ensure that its application
processing is supported by a sufficient number of clerical
employees who are properly trained to carry out their
important processing functions.

Criminal history checking procedures

Of all of the processing flaws that
came to light in the wake of CUSA, those in INS' criminal
history checking procedures were the ones of greatest
concern to Members of Congress. In addition to the policy
that permitted adjudicators to presume the absence of a
criminal record simply because there was no rap sheet in the
file used at adjudication (the presumptive policy), INS
failed to ensure that fingerprint cards rejected by the FBI
were replaced with suitable cards, and failed to ensure that
those rap sheets that did result from criminal history
checks were available for review by adjudicators at
interview. Because of these flaws, INS naturalized persons
with disqualifying criminal histories8 and failed to conduct
a complete criminal history check for 18 percent of the
total population naturalized. In addition, INS'
"bio-check" procedures, by which INS would learn
information about an applicant who was the subject of an
investigation by the FBI or other government agencies, were
negligently administered.

It has been in this area of greatest
weakness that INS has clearly made the greatest
improvements. The presumptive policy was abolished in
November 1996. INS also abandoned its Designated
Fingerprinting Services program and now exercises control
over how fingerprints are taken. Current automated systems
are designed to keep a case on "hold"—prevent it
from being scheduled for interview—unless the FBI
affirmatively reports that the applicant has no criminal
history. The hold must be manually removed and must only be
lifted after the rap sheet has been interfiled and is thus
available to the adjudicator. Automated systems thus will
not schedule a case if there has been no response from the
FBI, as would be the case if, for example, a fingerprint
card has been rejected for masthead errors. Finally, NQP4
requires that records from the disposition of criminal cases
be in the file before an adjudication is completed—that
is, before the applicant is approved for naturalization,
thus prohibiting a practice like the vulnerable one that
existed in the Los Angeles District during CUSA of reviewing
rap sheets after applicants had been approved.9 All of these
changes represent significant improvements and will increase
INS' ability to prevent applicants with disqualifying
criminal histories from being naturalized.

INS has also improved its procedures in
regard to "bio-checks." NQP4 provides instructions
that if the service center advises the local office that a
"third agency has information" about an applicant,
"third party responses" must be obtained.10

However, vulnerabilities remain in INS'
criminal history checking procedures. In regard to
fingerprint checks, INS still has not completely embraced
the notion that completed criminal history checks are
absolutely necessary in every case, as explained below.

Recently, INS has proposed a revision
to NQP4 that would permit a naturalization adjudication to
proceed when an applicant has had two fingerprint card
submissions to the FBI returned to INS as
"unclassifiable." Under current NPQ4 guidelines,
such applicants are required to obtain police clearances
from all jurisdictions in which they resided during the
previous five years.11 According to the proposed revision to
NQP4, INS has now determined that

The Service's current control over the
fingerprinting process, the significantly diminished
unclassifiable reject rate, and the FBI criminal history
checks performed for classifiable and unclassifiable
fingerprints alleviates the need for local police
clearances.

This proposed policy does not apply to
those persons who are unable to submit classifiable
fingerprints—those applicants receive a fingerprint waiver
and must obtain a police clearance. It applies instead to
applicants who are not unable to submit classifiable prints,
but who have had two submissions rejected as unclassifiable
by the FBI. Such a proposed policy reveals that INS remains
willing to gamble—given the relatively small number of
cases to which such a policy will apply—that in some
instances it is simply not necessary to insist on a full
fingerprint check or, in its stead, a thorough police
clearance.12

There is little reason to support this
change in policy. Either an applicant is unable to submit
classifiable prints because of some physical condition, and
thus should obtain a fingerprint waiver, or classifiable
prints should be obtained. This is especially true now that
INS, and not outside entities, has control over the process
of taking and submitting the fingerprint cards and thus
bears the responsibility for the quality of the fingerprint
impressions taken. Except for processing expediency, there
is no substantive reason for foregoing a full fingerprint
check provided that the applicant's fingerprints can be
"taken." The fact that INS considered foregoing
the criminal history check—and not substitute it with a
police clearance—in those cases where two tries have been
unsuccessful suggests that former attitudes of weighing the
costs against the remote risk of detecting a disqualifying
criminal history—attitudes that prevailed during CUSA and
in earlier years—remain. To the extent that such attitudes
continue to inform criminal history checking policies, they
threaten the integrity of the naturalization process.13

In regard to "bio-checks,"
there is no explanation in NQP4, or otherwise available to
adjudicators, of what these checks are or how to obtain the
third-party responses. There is no instruction concerning
how to interpret or what to do with derogatory information
received, or how to proceed when alerted that there is a
"possible hit" concerning the naturalization
applicant.

We also note that in regard to
bio-checks, INS continues to use a "presumptive
policy." Because the number of "hits"
resulting from bio-checks is comparatively small, they are
more easily and accurately processed by INS, and are
processed through a central location in Washington, D.C.

Accordingly, the presumptive policy in
regard to bio-checks does not pose as great a risk as it did
in regard to fingerprint check responses. However, we note
that there is and has been automated data available from the
FBI to alert INS when an applicant has "cleared"
the bio-check process, and such data might be used to advise
the Field of the status of each applicant's bio-check. We
also note that although the risk is small, the consequences
of inadvertently naturalizing an applicant who has a
significant "bio-check" hit could be very serious:
INS could confer citizenship on someone that another federal
agency regards as a threat to the United States.

Accordingly, we offer the following
recommendations in regard to INS' criminal history checking
procedures:

Except for those applicants exempt
because of their age, INS should require a full fingerprint
check in every case unless the applicant is unable because
of physical condition to submit classifiable prints.

INS should provide guidance to local
offices concerning the nature of the bio-check, how to
obtain any "third party" responses, procedures
when notified of a "possible hit," and how to
evaluate any information received.

INS should review with appropriate
officials from other agencies and with Members of Congress
whether the "presumptive policy" in regard to
bio-checks should be abolished in favor of a policy of
definitive responses.

INS processing of adjustment of status
applications

Our report only briefly touched on INS'
administration of a benefit arguably even more valuable than
citizenship—the right to live in the United States
permanently. This benefit—symbolized by issuance of the
"green card"—requires of INS adjudicators many
of the same judgments using like information and documents
as for a naturalization adjudication. All the foregoing
recommendations to strengthen naturalization decision-making
should also be evaluated and, if appropriate, implemented
with respect to adjustments of status.

Reliability in representations made to
Congress

We found that INS failed to
follow-through on two important agreements it entered into
with Congress during CUSA. First, despite having represented
to Congress that it would take steps not to naturalize those
persons who obtained their permanent residency through
fraud—an obligation already imposed by the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA)—INS failed to provide its
adjudicators with guidance on how to detect such fraud and,
once detected, how to respond. By failing to ensure that
adjudicators had access to applicant permanent files during
CUSA, INS failed to provide adjudicators with the essential
tool they would need to detect such fraud. Finally, in four
of five Key Cities INS instructed adjudicators not to review
the immigration history of applicants who obtained their
residency under the Legalization program, thus precluding
the review of those previous applications—applications for
residency under the SAW program—about which Congress had
been most concerned.

Second, INS failed to comply with the
January 1996 reprogramming agreement it entered into with
Congress that it would use the reprogrammed funds to achieve
currency in both naturalization and adjustment of status
processing during fiscal year 1996. It is unknown whether
the agreement was in fact too ambitious in that both
programs were badly backlogged, but it is clear that while
INS Headquarters poured resources into and focused
extraordinary attention on naturalization, it made almost no
effort to similarly improve its adjustment of status work.
As a result, it failed to make sufficient efforts to comply
with this important aspect of its January 1996 reprogramming
agreement.

We also found that, beginning with the
September 1996 hearings into CUSA, INS repeatedly gave
Congress inaccurate assurances about the extent of the
processing errors made during CUSA. We did not find any
deliberate intention by any INS official to mislead
Congress, but we did find that the inaccuracies were often
the product of insufficient care in gathering the requested
information and the desire to project the agency's work in a
most favorable light.

For example, in testifying about the
errors in criminal history checking procedures, Associate
Commissioner Crocetti assured Congress that the confirmed
number of late-arriving, disqualifying criminal history
reports was very small nationwide, even though INS
Headquarters was then aware that the number of reports
arriving late—reports that had not yet been reviewed as
disqualifying or not—was much higher and that a serious
analysis of the data had barely begun. Later, when
Commissioner Meissner advised the Congress that the Field
had confirmed only 415 late—arriving, disqualifying
criminal history reports between July and October 1996, the
number was based on an inaccurate survey of the Field that
grossly understated the extent of the problem. Although the
desire to defend and protect the work of INS is not
criticized here, in the aftermath of CUSA it prevented INS
from providing Congress with accurate information about the
nature and extent of the many errors that had been made.

Accordingly, we make the following
recommendations:

When INS assures Congress that it will
undertake a particular course of action, INS should assign
an appropriate senior official with responsibility for
ensuring follow-through on the agreement or notification to
Congress of the inability to do so.

"Priorities" or other
internal agency goals should be drafted with congressional
commitments in mind so that the Field is sufficiently
informed of, and thus more likely to meet, congressional
expectations.

INS must more carefully review for
accuracy the data it provides to Congress, whether that data
is offered in writing or in testimony by INS officials.

INS should state clearly any
limitations or qualifications that may apply to and affect
the accuracy of the information furnished.

NQP4 also applies to those applications
that may have been filed before October 1 but for which
initial interviews took place on or after November 1, 1998.

INS published the NQP4 memorandum of
June 5, 1998, as an appendix to the Adjudicator's Field
Manual. INS has also published subsections of chapters other
than the chapter on naturalization, including two
subsections concerning adjustments of status.

NQP4 spells out A-file transfer
procedures in detail. It describes how to make initial
requests for A-files, how to interpret "mismatch"
reports concerning the CLAIMS/CIS computer interface that is
used to order A-files, and how to "resolve" those
reports. The procedures are labor-intensive. For example, if
a service center already "owns" or is in
possession of an A-file that had been requested through the
CLAIMS/CIS interface, the file number will appear in the
"mismatch report." (In other words, it cannot be
ordered by the inter-office file-ordering computer system
because the computer system shows that it is already located
at the file control office that is ordering the file.) NQP
instructs the service center employee to request the A-file
through RAFACS (the intra-office file-ordering system) and
note the request on a clerical processing sheet (presumably
attached to a temporary file). If the file is not received
within 30 days, a second request must be sent to the party
shown in RAFACS to be "holding" the file and a
second note must be entered on the processing sheet. If the
file is not received within 30 days of the second request, a
third request must be sent. On this occasion, a screen
printout of the third RAFACS request must be forwarded to
the person shown in RAFACS as the "responsible
party" then in possession of the file. The Clerical
Processing worksheet must be initialed to reflect that the
third request has been made.

As Commissioner Meissner had testified
in May 1997, the Department of Justice engaged KPMG Peat
Marwick to "validate if the new NQP . . . were
correctly implemented." KPMG reviewed NQP
implementation at some INS offices in February and March
1997 and issued a report on that review in April 1997. KPMG
reviewed the implementation of NQP3 in other offices in
August 1997 and issued a report in September 1997. KPMG
followed this review with an audit at 24 INS field sites,
including the four service centers, 11 district offices, and
9 CUSA offices. KPMG issued the audit report in December
1997. KPMG conducted another audit, and issued subsequent
reports, in the summer of 1998 and the spring of 1999.

Because INS has not developed standards
in this area, it cannot provide applicants much guidance
concerning the evaluation they will undergo. The
"Eligibility Worksheet" published with INS'
"A Guide to Naturalization" directs the
prospective applicant through a series of statements, and if
the applicant indicates "not true" in response to
any statement, the worksheet directs the applicant to
"stop," and notes, "you are not eligible to
apply for naturalization." Statement number nine is,
"I am a person of good moral character."

The Guide, like federal statutory law,
does not define "good moral character." It lists
examples of the types of things that "might show a lack
of good moral character," but clearly is not
exhaustive.

Whether the crime of spousal battery
may preclude the applicant from naturalizing depends on how
the crime is defined under state law. In California, for
example, the crime is defined as "willful infliction of
traumatic injury on a spouse," and, because of the
"willfulness" element, has been found to be a
crime of moral turpitude. A person is ineligible for
naturalization if he or she has been convicted of a crime of
moral turpitude within the statutory period, although an
exception is made if the applicant only committed one such
crime and it was a misdemeanor for which the applicant's
jail sentence was less than six months.

We note that NQP4 dictates that an
officer "must not [emphasis in original] conduct the
interview in the applicant's native language as a means of
completing the interview unless the English requirement is
waived." This is more restrictive than current law
which, under the provisions concerning "History and
Government examination," permits the examination to be
conducted in the applicant's native language if the
applicant "has satisfied the English literacy
requirement . . . but the officer conducting the examination
determines that an inaccurate or incomplete record of the
examination would result if the examination on technical or
complex issues were conducted in English."

We also note that instructions for Form
N-400 currently in use, like the one used during CUSA,
continues to misstate the legal requirements for eligibility
for a waiver of the English-language requirements and should
be corrected.

INS naturalized 369 persons with
disqualifying criminal histories during CUSA according to
KPMG's review of the 1,049,867 naturalized cases then
identified by INS.

The requirement that disposition
records be in the file before adjudication does not speak to
the importance of the thorough review of those disposition
records, or to the possible need to ask the applicant
questions concerning information the records reveal. We
presume that INS intends by such a requirement that the
disposition records will be reviewed by adjudicators who are
trained to recognize issues that require further
exploration, and who have the discretion to reschedule the
applicant for a supplemental interview if necessary.
However, without specific guidance in this regard,
adjudicators could comply with the letter of this rule
without conducting any meaningful review.

Applicants with positive
"bio-check" responses may be scheduled for
interview but not for ceremony unless the third agency
information, or documentation of its unavailability, is
obtained and in the file. An officer must verify that such
applicants have established "good moral character"
despite the information available as a result of the
bio-check.

The exact nature of a "police
clearance" is not defined in NQP4 or in INS' Policy
Memorandum No. 60 concerning the requirement of a police
clearance for applicants who failed to submit legible
prints. We infer that it is some confirmation by the
appropriate law enforcement agency that the applicant does
not have a disqualifying criminal history record.

INS' proposed policy change also
reflects the lingering misunderstanding at INS about the
nature of the "check" a rejected, unclassifiable
fingerprint card has undergone. As we noted in our chapter
on criminal history checking procedures, when the FBI
returns an unclassifiable fingerprint card to INS with the
notation "no record based on name-check," this
does not mean that the applicant has no criminal record. It
means instead that the fingerprints on the submitted card
were of insufficient quality to allow definitive comparison
to the fingerprint cards on file at the FBI. The applicant
whose fingerprint card is returned as unclassifiable may
have several potential "hits" as the result of the
name-check process, but no criminal history report will be
generated and sent to INS unless the FBI can confirm that
the fingerprints on the submitted card match the
fingerprints on the card on file.

INS submitted this proposed policy
change to the OIG for review before implementation. We noted
our objections as described here. As a result, INS has not
implemented the proposed policy.