A culture of respect for human rights would exist
when there was a widely-shared sense of entitlement to these rights,
of personal responsibility and of respect for the rights of others,
and when this influenced all our institutional policies and practices.
This would help create a more humane society, a more responsive
government and better public services, and could help to deepen
and widen democracy by increasing the sense amongst individual
men and women that they have a stake in the way in which they
are governed. For these and other reasons we believe a culture
of respect for human rights is a goal worth striving for. (Paragraph
9)

There is no vision, no administrative framework
and scant guidance reaching public authorities to tell them how
a culture of respect for human rights might look or how it can
be delivered. (Paragraph 61)

It is clear that, by and large, public authorities
do not consider mainstreaming respect for human rights in their
policies and practices a priority. We conclude that the Government's
enthusiasm to make the Human Rights Act come alive as a measure
which places positive duties on public authorities, and which
should promote a culture of respect for human rights in every
aspect of public life, needs to be forcefully promoted. (Paragraph
62)

The process of putting a culture of human rights
at the heart of the work of public authorities needs to be reinvigorated
if a consistent human rights message is to have a chance of reaching
public authorities. These agents of the state cannot be expected
to embrace a human rights culture that they do not know about.
(Paragraph 68)

The Case for a Human Rights Commission

The existence of the Joint Committee on Human
Rights is no substitute for the establishment of a human rights
commission. (Paragraph 74)

We believe a commission could reduce avoidable
litigation against public authorities rather than encourage it.
On simple grounds of economy, the Government should be prepared
to look positively at the idea of a commission. (Paragraph
78)

A Government should be able to look on a commission
as a partner (although an independent and when necessary critical
one) which can help it achieve some of its more fundamental goals,
bringing it solutions, not just problems. (Paragraph
79)

A commission could make a positive contribution
to achieving its vision of a new relationship between the citizen
and the statea relationship that could be to the benefit
of both parties. (Paragraph 80)

The decision to reorganise the institutional arrangements
for the promotion of equality has made it an urgent necessity
to consider the institutional arrangements for the promotion and
protection of human rights more generally. The Government's decision
in principle to establish a new equality commission, which will
have to consider human rights issues in the context of its own
work, makes it necessary for the Government to now resolve the
question of a human rights commission. (Paragraph
84)

Since the Government is serious about developing
a culture of respect for human rights it has a duty of leadership.
If it wills the end, it must also will the means. Precious time
has already passed. The question is whether the means to achieve
the ambition are in place. We do not believe they are. An independent
commission could provide those means. (Paragraph
88)

There is still a long way to go in establishing
the culture of respect for human rights, and the momentum from
the Human Rights Act is ebbing. If it is not revived, the loss
will detract from or adversely affect the conduct and performance
of public services, and consequently the well-being of those who
use them. (Paragraph 89)

There is an unmet need for citizens to be assisted
in understanding what their rights are, how these rights must
be balanced with those of others, and how to assert their rights
without necessarily having recourse to litigation. A commission
could meet those needs. (Paragraph 93)

We do not find evidence of the rapid development
of awareness of a culture of respect for human rights and its
implications throughout society, and what awareness there is often
appears partial or ill-informed. Indeed, we fear that the most
recent highwater mark of this culture was between the passing
of the Human Rights Act and its coming into effect in the
two years since the Act was brought into effect, the evidence
we have gathered suggests the culture may actually have been in
retreat. We conclude the resources devoted to this task within
Government are insufficient to achieve the goal that the Government
desires. We conclude that a commission would be both an effective
and an efficient way of developing public awareness. (Paragraph
94)

A commission would give human rights a focus,
resources and a degree of institutional stability not found recently
in central government. This would provide a base from which there
might be a realistic chance of devising and disseminating a more
credible culture of respect for human rights in public authorities.
(Paragraph 96)

A commission could undertake much of the dissemination
and monitoring of human rights with respect to public authorities
which is not happening, and shows no likelihood of happening,
under the existing arrangements within Government. We believe
this work needs to be done. We conclude that in the absence of
a human rights commission it will not be done well, or possibly
it will not be done at all. (Paragraph
98)

We are persuaded that sufficient unmet needs have
been identified for there to be work for a commission to do. The
development of a culture of respect for human rights in Great
Britain is in danger of stalling, and there is an urgent need
for the momentum to be revived and the project driven forward.
A culture of respect for human rights cannot be developed through
the courts alone and it cannot be developed solely by an agency
within Government. We believe an independent commission would
be the most effective way of achieving the shared aim of bringing
about a culture of respect for human rights. Our advice is that
such a commission should be established. (Paragraph
99)

Functions and Powers of the proposed Commission

We start from the position that the powers given
to any commission should flow directly from the functions it is
required to perform. Its powers should be sufficient for it to
do its work, but no more extensive than is necessary. As we have
also made clear, we do not envisage creating a body which is principally
adversarial and litigious in nature. (Paragraph
104)

A commission would have an important and valuable
role to play in improving the quality of understanding of human
rights issues in the voluntary and professional advice sectors.
It should be able to do this through funding education and research,
and funding the development and provision of advice services provided
in the voluntary sector rather than to undertake such advice functions
directly itself. (Paragraph 113)

Involvement in the reporting processes under the
various international human rights instruments would be a valuable
function of any human rights commission. We would hope that a
commission would also raise awareness of the international instruments
more generally, and use them in its work in developing a culture
of respect for human rights. (Paragraph
118)

The power to conduct public inquiries on its own
initiative would be an essential element of a human rights commission's
functions. (Paragraph 128)

We do not think it necessary to duplicate the
work of this Committee by imposing a duty on a commission to conduct
parallel scrutiny of legislation. (Paragraph
132)

In overseeing the promotion of a culture of human
rights, a commission would have to be able to work effectively
through regulatory and representative bodies for different sectors
of public activity. (Paragraph 135)

The commission we propose should have any adjudicative
function in relation to complaints of violation of rights. In
respect of Convention rights, these must remain a matter for the
courts to determine. In respect of other rights not directly enforceable
in law, it would in our view be inappropriate to hand a quasi-judicial
function in this way to a body which is not a court, a legislative
body or a branch of the Executive. (Paragraph
140)

The commission should have the power to apply
to the court for permission to intervene as a friend of the court
in order to give advice in proceedings initiated by other parties
that involve or are concerned with human rights. As the independent
public authority created as a guardian of human rights, it is
appropriate for the commission to be able to assist the court
in this way. (Paragraph 151)

Since we have no agreed view about the desirability
of a power to provide direct legal advice and assistance in strategic
cases, we wish to consult more widely on this issue. (Paragraph
154)

The following powers and functions are essential
for the human rights commission we propose

to promote understanding and awareness of
human rights (including not only the Convention rights but also
rights embodied in international human rights instruments binding
on the UK );

to conduct and commission research and provide
financial or other assistance for educational activities in connection
with promoting understanding and awareness of human rights;

to conduct inquiries into matters of public
policy and practice relating to human rights (with the power to
have access to information needed for an effective inquiry);

to give guidance to, and promote best practice
in, public authorities in relation to human rights;

to offer guidance and advice to Ministers
and to Parliament in connection with human rights;

to be able to publish reports on any of the
above matters;

to assist in the provision of advice and assistance
to members of the public on ways to find help to protect or vindicate
their rights;

to be able to support and promote access to
alternatives to litigation in disputes relating to the protection
of human rights;

to be able to apply to the courts for permission
to appear as amicus curiae in proceedings that
involve or are concerned with human rights; and

to be able to intervene as a third party in
legal proceedings relating to questions of principle involving
human rights.

We intend to consider further whether the following
powers and functions are desirable for a commission

to provide assistance to individuals to take
cases relating to human rights questions;

to be able to take cases in its own name;

to be able to seek judicial review in its
own name.

We do not believe that the commission we propose
should have any power to adjudicate on individual complaints of
violations of rights. We consider it is unnecessary for a commission
to have the duty of scrutinising proposed legislation for compliance
with human rights. (Paragraph 166)

Equality and Human Rights

This report constitutes our formal input into
the Government's consultation on the structure of a single equality
body for Great Britain. (Paragraph 173)

The human rights dimension is an unavoidable element
of the debate on the single equality body. The question now is
not whether there should be arrangements for
the promotion and protection of human rights sitting alongside
those for the promotion of equality, but how those arrangements
should be designed. (Paragraph 188)

A powerful argument for bringing all strands of
the human rights agenda into a single body is that this would
strengthen the ability to promote a culture that respects the
dignity, worth and human rights of everyone. Provided that this
were done in a way that did not blunt the cutting edge of the
specialised compliance work in tackling unjustifiable discrimination
by means of monitoring and law enforcement, we consider that,
on balance a single body would be the more desirable of the two
options. However, the option of creating two separate bodies that
has been used both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of
Ireland, would be a viable alternative, provided that they were
closely linked in their work. (Paragraph
203)

Devolution

We do not intend to look behind the Belfast Agreement
and reopen the question of the establishment and structure of
the institutional arrangements for the promotion and protection
of human rights and equality in Northern Ireland. (Paragraph
208)

Unless the next elections to the Scottish Parliament
produce an unpredictable political upheaval, there is going to
be a Scottish human rights commission. That is the settled view
of the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Parliament and we take
that decision into account in the structures we propose for the
rest of the UK. (Paragraph 211)

There are special circumstances in Wales, as there
are in the different regions of England. But, at least for the
foreseeable future, there are not to be separate jurisdictions
between Wales and England, and there are no current plans to establish
a human rights commission in Wales. We will therefore consider
arrangements for the protection and promotion of human rights
jointly in England and Wales. (Paragraph
213)

The argument for establishing locally-sensitive
but UK-wide arrangements (with respect to the complex inter-relationships
between reserved and devolved responsibilities) applies equally
to arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights
and to arrangements for the promotion of equality. This is a further
argument for making decisions in principle about both at the same
time. (Paragraph 217)

The Government should establish, on a non-statutory
basis, a UK Human Rights Advisory Council. (Paragraph
219)

The principal function of the Advisory Council
we propose should be to provide a "light-touch" co-ordination
of arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights
(including equality) throughout the UK and, in its first phase,
helping prepare the way for the institutional changes which are
in view. (Paragraph 220)

Independence and Accountability

On the whole we would tend to favour a form which
requires a duty to consult Parliament on the appointment of commissioners
as a guarantee of independence and democratic accountability,
so long as this was a statutory duty. (Paragraph
223)

We would not favour any statutory obligation to
require the commission's membership to be "representative
of all sections of the community"but we would expect
this to be a consideration in making appointments, as it should
be for all public bodies. (Paragraph 224)

The main factor which will influence the quality
of the people who seek to become commissioners is the perception
that the commission is a body with the potential to exercise real
influence, and which is to be resourced adequately to do the job
it has been set. As a guarantee of independence, Parliament should
be directly involved in the setting of any commission's budget.
(Paragraph 225)

We do not consider that the standard model of
NDPB accountability is a sufficiently outward and visible guarantee
of independence from the Government to be appropriate to a national
human rights commission (or indeed the proposed single equality
body, whether or not integrated with a human rights commission).
(Paragraph 230)