This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-13-414T
entitled 'Border Security: DHS's Progress and Challenges in Securing
U.S. Borders' which was released on March 14, 2013.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Statement for the Record to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, March 14, 2013:
Border Security:
DHS's Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. Borders:
Statement for the Record by Rebecca Gambler, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
GAO-13-414T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-13-414T, a testimony before the record to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
At the end of fiscal year 2004, DHS had about 28,100 personnel
assigned to patrol U.S. land borders and inspect travelers at air,
land, and sea POEs, at a cost of about $5.9 billion. At the end of
fiscal year 2011, DHS had about 41,400 personnel assigned to air,
land, and sea POEs and along the border, at a cost of about $11.8
billion. DHS has reported that this stronger enforcement presence was
one of several reasons why fewer people were attempting to illegally
cross the border. However, challenges remain in securing the border.
In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS border security
programs and operations.
As requested, this statement addresses some of the key issues and
recommendations GAO has made in the following areas: (1) DHS’s efforts
to secure the border at and between POEs; (2) DHS interagency
coordination and oversight of border security information sharing and
enforcement efforts; and (3) DHS management of infrastructure,
technology, and other assets used to secure the border. This statement
is based on prior products GAO issued from January 2008 through
February 2013, along with selected updates conducted in February 2013.
For the selected updates, GAO reviewed information from DHS on actions
it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), has reported progress in stemming illegal
cross-border activity, but it could strengthen the assessment of its
efforts. For example, since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number
of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry (POE)
as an interim measure for border security. GAO reported in December
2012 that apprehensions decreased across the southwest border from
fiscal years 2006 to 2011, which generally mirrored a decrease in
estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. CBP
attributed this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and
increased resources for border security. Data reported by CBP’s Office
of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) show that total apprehensions across
the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011
to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012. It is too early to assess
whether this increase indicates a change in the trend. GAO reported in
December 2012 that the number of apprehensions provides information on
activity levels but does not inform program results or resource
allocation decisions. Border Patrol is in the process of developing
performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its
efforts to secure the border between POEs, but it has not identified
milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them, which
GAO recommended that it do. DHS agreed and said that it plans to set a
date for establishing such milestones and time frames by November 2013.
DHS law enforcement partners reported improvements in interagency
coordination and oversight of intelligence and enforcement operations,
but gaps remain. GAO reported in November 2010 that information
sharing and communication among federal law enforcement officials had
increased; however, gaps remained in ensuring law enforcement
officials had access to daily threat information. GAO recommended that
relevant federal agencies determine if more guidance is needed for
federal land closures and that they ensure interagency agreements for
coordinating information and integrating operations are further
implemented. These agencies agreed and in January 2011, CBP issued a
memorandum affirming the importance of federal partnerships to address
border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive
step, to fully satisfy the intent of GAO’s recommendation, DHS needs
to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the
existing interagency agreements.
Opportunities exist to improve DHS’s management of border security
assets. For example, DHS conceived the Secure Border Initiative
Network as a surveillance technology and deployed such systems along
53 miles of Arizona’s border. In January 2011, in response to
performance, cost, and schedule concerns, DHS canceled future
procurements, and developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology
Plan (Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. GAO reported in
November 2011 that in developing the new Plan, CBP conducted an
analysis of alternatives, but it had not documented the analysis
justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of
technologies proposed in the Plan, which GAO recommended that it do.
DHS concurred with this recommendation. GAO has ongoing work in this
area and expects to issue a report in fall 2013.
What GAO Recommends:
While this statement contains no new recommendations, GAO has
previously made recommendations to DHS to enhance border security. DHS
has generally concurred with these recommendations and has taken
actions, or has actions planned or under way, to address them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-414T]. For more
information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or
gamblerr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to submit this statement on the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) efforts to secure U.S. borders against threats of
terrorism; the smuggling of drugs, humans, and other contraband; and
illegal migration since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
At the end of fiscal year 2004, the first full year DHS existed as an
agency, it had about 10,500 agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land
borders and about 17,600 officers inspecting travelers at air, land,
and sea ports of entry (POE),[Footnote 1] and a total of about $5.9
billion allocated to secure the entire U.S. border.[Footnote 2] At the
end of fiscal year 2011, both the number of personnel and amount of
resources dedicated to border security had significantly increased,
with approximately 21,400 agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land
borders and more than 20,000 officers assigned to air, land, and sea
POEs,[Footnote 3] amounting to about $11.8 billion allocated to secure
the entire U.S. border.
DHS has reported that this stronger enforcement presence was one of
several reasons, including changes in the U.S. economy, why fewer
people were attempting to illegally cross the border. However,
challenges remain in securing the border both at and between land
POEs. For example, DHS data have shown that several hundred thousand
persons have entered the country illegally through and between the
nation's POEs. Further, our analysis of DHS data indicated that across
southwest border sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband
increased 83 percent from fiscal years 2006 through 2011--from 10,321
to 18,898.[Footnote 4] In fiscal year 2012, DHS data indicate that
seizures decreased to 17,891 across the southwest border.
DHS's efforts to secure the border at and between the POEs are the
primary responsibility of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
(CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO)[Footnote 5] and Office of
Border Patrol,[Footnote 6] respectively. Other DHS components also
play a role in border security. CBP's Office of Air and Marine
operates a fleet of air and marine assets in support of federal border
security efforts. DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
is responsible for investigating cross-border illegal activity and
criminal organizations that transport persons and goods across the
border. In addition, other federal, state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies expend resources for border security. For
example, the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA)
have jurisdiction for law enforcement on federal borderlands
administered by their component agencies, including DOI's National
Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land
Management, and USDA's Forest Service.
Over the years, we have reported on a variety of DHS border security
programs and operations. As requested, my statement discusses progress
and challenges in the following areas:
(1) DHS's efforts to secure the border at and between POEs,
(2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security
information sharing and enforcement efforts, and:
(3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets
used to secure the border.
This statement is based on related reports and testimonies we issued
from January 2008 through February 2013 that examined DHS efforts to
secure the U.S. border (see Related GAO Products at the end of this
statement). It also includes selected updates we conducted in February
2013. Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we obtained
and analyzed from officials from various DHS components; the
Departments of Justice (DOJ), DOI, and USDA; and state and local law
enforcement agencies. More detailed information about our scope and
methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the
updates, we collected information from DHS on actions it has taken to
address recommendations made in prior reports on which this statement
is based. We also reviewed publicly available documents, such as CBP's
budget justification for fiscal year 2013. We conducted all of this
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
CBP Has Reported Progress in Stemming Illegal Cross-Border Activity,
but Could Strengthen Assessment of Its Efforts:
Border Patrol Has Reported Some Success in Reducing Illegal Migration,
but Challenges Remain in Assessing Efforts:
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of
apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim
measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance
reports. As we reported in December 2012, our data analysis showed
that apprehensions across the southwest border decreased 69 percent
from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.[Footnote 7] These data generally
mirrored a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each
southwest border sector. As we testified in February 2013, data
reported by Border Patrol following the issuance of our December 2012
report show that total apprehensions across the southwest border
increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in
fiscal year 2012.[Footnote 8] It is too early to assess whether this
increase indicates a change in the trend for Border Patrol
apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year 2011,
Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors in
part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic
objectives, and increased resources for border security.
In addition to collecting data on apprehensions, Border Patrol
collects other types of data that are used by sector management to
help inform assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the
threats of illegal migration and smuggling of drugs and other
contraband. These data show changes, for example, in the (1)
percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended,
(2) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended
more than once (repeat offenders), and (3) number of seizures of drugs
and other contraband.[Footnote 9] Our analysis of these data show that
the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended from
fiscal years 2006 through 2011 varied across southwest border sectors.
The percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the
border illegally declined by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 through
2011. Further, the number of seizures of drugs and other contraband
across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898
in fiscal year 2011.
As we reported in December 2012, Border Patrol sectors and stations
track changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if
the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets are being
deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials
from Border Patrol headquarters.[Footnote 10] Border Patrol data
showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of the nine sectors on
the southwest border improved from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.
[Footnote 11] Border Patrol headquarters officials said that
differences in how sectors define, collect, and report turn back data
(entrants who illegally crossed the border but were not apprehended
because they crossed back into Mexico) and got away data (entrants who
illegally crossed the border and continued traveling into the U.S.
interior) used to calculate the overall effectiveness rate preclude
comparing performance results across sectors. Border Patrol
headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border Patrol
sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and got away
data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting the data
varied across sectors and stations based on differences in agent
experience and judgment, resources, and terrain. Border Patrol
headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012 to provide a
more consistent, standardized approach for the collection and
reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors.
Each sector is to be individually responsible for monitoring adherence
to the guidance. According to Border Patrol officials, it is expected
that once the guidance is implemented, data reliability will improve.
This new guidance may allow for comparison of sector performance and
inform decisions regarding resource deployment for securing the
southwest border.
Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and
measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the
border between ports of entry and for informing the identification and
allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but has not
identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing
them. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions
on the southwest border between ports of entry as an interim
performance goal and measure for border security as reported in its
annual performance report. Prior to this, DHS used operational control
as its goal and outcome measure for border security and to assess
resource needs to accomplish this goal.[Footnote 12] Operational
control--also referred to as effective control--was defined as the
number of border miles where Border Patrol had the capability to
detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. DHS
last reported its progress and status in achieving operational control
of the borders in fiscal year 2010. At that time, DHS reported
achieving operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles
across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders.[Footnote 13]
Along the southwest border, DHS reported achieving operational control
for 873 (44 percent) of the about 2,000 border miles.[Footnote 14] At
the beginning of fiscal year 2011, DHS transitioned from using
operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border
security. We testified in May 2012 that the interim goal and measure
of number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs
provides information on activity levels but does not inform program
results or resource identification and allocation decisions, and
therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and Congress
could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability.[Footnote
15] Further, studies commissioned by CBP have found that the number of
apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because
agency officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-
border illegal activity.[Footnote 16]
Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of
developing performance goals and measures, but has not identified
milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them.
According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time
frames for the development of performance goals and measures is
contingent on the development of key elements of its new strategic
plan, such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency's time frames for
implementing these key elements--targeted for fiscal years 2013 and
2014--are subject to change. We recommended that CBP establish
milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or
goals, for border security between ports of entry that defines how
border security is to be measured, and a performance measure, or
measures, for assessing progress made in securing the border between
ports of entry and informing resource identification and allocation
efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendations and stated that it
plans to set milestones and timeframes for developing goals and
measures by November 2013.
CBP Has Taken Action to Strengthen POE Inspection Programs and Officer
Training, and Has Additional Actions Planned or Underway:
As part of its homeland security and legacy customs missions, CBP
inspects travelers arriving at POEs to counter threats posed by
terrorists and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent
or altered travel documents and to prevent inadmissible aliens,
criminals, and inadmissible goods from entering the country. In fiscal
year 2012, CBP inspected about 352 million travelers and over 107
million cars, trucks, buses, trains, vessels, and aircraft at over 329
air, sea, and land POEs. We have previously identified vulnerabilities
in the traveler inspection program and made recommendations to DHS for
addressing these vulnerabilities, and DHS implemented these
recommendations. We reported in January 2008 on weaknesses in CBP's
inbound traveler inspection program,[Footnote 17] including challenges
in attaining budgeted staffing levels because of attrition and lack of
officer compliance with screening procedures, such as those used to
determine citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering the
country as required by law and CBP policy.[Footnote 18] Contributing
factors included a lack of focus, complacency, lack of supervisory
presence, and lack of training. We recommended that CBP enhance
internal controls in the inspection process, implement performance
measures for apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, and
establish measures for training provided to CBP officers and new
officer proficiency. DHS concurred with these recommendations and has
implemented them. Specifically, in January 2008, CBP reported, among
other things, that all land port directors are required to monitor and
assess compliance with eight different inspection activities using a
self-inspection worksheet that is provided to senior CBP management.
At that time, CBP also established performance measures related to the
effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. Additionally, in June 2011,
CBP began conducting additional classroom and on-the-job training,
which incorporated ongoing testing and evaluation of officer
proficiency.
In December 2011, we reported that CBP had revised its training
program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own
training development standards.[Footnote 19] Consistent with these
standards, CBP convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify
and rank the tasks that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a
result, the new curriculum was designed to produce a professional law
enforcement officer capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist,
criminal, biological, and agricultural threats.
We also reported that CBP took some steps to identify and address the
training needs of its incumbent CBP officers but could do more to
ensure that these officers were fully trained. For example, we
examined CBP's results of covert tests of document fraud detection at
POEs conducted over more than 2 years and found weaknesses in the CBP
inspection process at the POEs that were tested. In response to these
tests, CBP developed a "Back to Basics" course in March 2010 for
incumbent officers, but had no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of
the training. Additionally, CBP had not conducted an analysis of all
the possible causes or systemic issues that may have contributed to
the test results. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP evaluate
the "Back to Basics" training course and analyze covert tests, and DHS
concurred with these recommendations. In April 2012, CBP officials
notified GAO that it had completed its evaluation of the "Back to
Basics" training course and implemented an updated, subsequent
training course. In November 2012, CBP officials stated they had
analyzed the results of covert tests prior to and since the
implementation of the subsequent course. GAO is currently reviewing
CBP's analysis of the covert test results and other documentation CBP
has provided to determine the extent to which CBP has addressed this
recommendation. Further, in July 2012 CBP completed a comprehensive
analysis of the results of its document fraud covert tests from fiscal
years 2009 to 2011. In addition, we reported that CBP had not
conducted a needs assessment that would identify any gaps between
identified critical skills and incumbent officers' current skills and
competencies. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP conduct a
training needs assessment. DHS concurred with this recommendation. In
January 2013, CBP notified GAO it had developed a survey of incumbent
officers to seek feedback on possible gaps in training. CBP is
currently analyzing the survey results and preparing a report, which
will recommend a path forward to address training needs. According to
CBP, if an additional training need is identified and funding is
available, CBP will develop or revise the current training program. In
February 2013, CBP officials stated it plans to complete this process
by April 15, 2013.
DHS Law Enforcement Partners Reported Improved Results for Interagency
Coordination and Oversight of Intelligence and Enforcement Operations,
but Gaps Remain:
DOI and USDA Reported Improved DHS Coordination to Secure Federal
Borderlands, but Critical Gaps Remained in Sharing Intelligence and
Communications for Daily Operations:
Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal
lands protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the
southwest and northern borders and can cause damage to natural,
historic, and cultural resources, and put agency personnel and the
visiting public at risk. We reported in November 2010 that information
sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement
officials had increased in recent years.[Footnote 20] For example,
interagency forums were used to exchange information about border
issues, and interagency liaisons facilitated exchange of operational
statistics. However, gaps remained in implementing interagency
agreements to ensure law enforcement officials had access to daily
threat information to better ensure officer safety and an efficient
law enforcement response to illegal activity. For example, in Border
Patrol's Spokane sector on the northern border, coordination of
intelligence information was particularly important because of sparse
law enforcement presence and technical challenges that precluded
Border Patrol's ability to fully assess cross-border threats, such as
air smuggling of high-potency marijuana.
We recommended DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and accountability
as needed to further implement interagency agreements for coordinating
information and integrating operations. These agencies agreed with our
recommendations, and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum to all
Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol agents emphasizing the
importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security
threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully
satisfy the intent of our recommendation, DHS would need to take
further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing
interagency agreements to enhance border security on federal lands.
Northern Border Partners Reported Interagency Forums Improved
Coordination, but DHS Oversight Was Needed to Resolve Interagency
Conflict in Roles and Responsibilities:
DHS has stated that partnerships with other federal, state, local,
tribal, and Canadian law enforcement agencies are critical to the
success of northern border security efforts. We reported in December
2010 that DHS efforts to coordinate with these partners through
interagency forums and joint operations were considered successful,
according to a majority of these partners we interviewed.[Footnote 21]
In addition, DHS component officials reported that federal agency
coordination to secure the northern border was improved. However, DHS
did not provide oversight for the number and location of forums
established by its components, and numerous federal, state, local, and
Canadian partners cited challenges related to the inability to
resource the increasing number of forums, raising concerns that some
efforts may be overlapping. In addition, federal law enforcement
partners in all four locations we visited as part of our work cited
ongoing challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, Border Patrol and
Forest Service, and ICE and DOJ's Drug Enforcement Administration in
sharing information and resources that compromised daily border
security related to operations and investigations. DHS had established
and updated interagency agreements to address ongoing coordination
challenges; however, oversight by management at the component and
local levels has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of
these agreements.
We also reported in December 2010 that while Border Patrol's border
security measures reflected that there was a high reliance on law
enforcement support from outside the border zones, the extent of
partner law enforcement resources that could be leveraged to fill
Border Patrol resource gaps, target coordination efforts, and make
more efficient resource decisions was not reflected in Border Patrol's
processes for assessing border security and resource requirements. We
recommended that DHS provide guidance and oversight for interagency
forums and for component compliance with interagency agreements, and
develop policy and guidance necessary to integrate partner resources
in border security assessments and resource planning documents. DHS
agreed with our recommendations and has reported taking action to
address them. For example, in June 2012, DHS released a northern
border strategy, and in August 2012, DHS notified us of other cross-
border law enforcement and security efforts taking place with Canada.
However, in order to fully satisfy the intention of our
recommendation, DHS would need to develop an implementation plan that
specifies the resources and time frames needed to achieve the goals
set forth in the strategy.
Opportunities Exist to Improve DHS's Management of Border Security
Assets:
DHS Has Deployed Assets to Secure the Borders, but Needs to Provide
More Information on Plans, Metrics, and Costs:
In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a
multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders
and reducing illegal immigration. Through this initiative, DHS planned
to develop a comprehensive border protection system using technology,
known as the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), and tactical
infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lighting. Under this program, CBP
increased the number of southwest border miles with pedestrian and
vehicle fencing from 120 miles in fiscal year 2005 to about 650 miles
presently.[Footnote 22] We reported in May 2010 that CBP had not
accounted for the impact of its investment in border fencing and
infrastructure on border security.[Footnote 23] Specifically, CBP had
reported an increase in control of southwest border miles, but could
not account separately for the impact of the border fencing and other
infrastructure. In September 2009, we recommended that CBP determine
the contribution of border fencing and other infrastructure to border
security.[Footnote 24] DHS concurred with our recommendation and, in
response, CBP contracted with the Homeland Security Studies and
Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of the impact of tactical
infrastructure on border security. CBP reported in February 2012 that
preliminary results from this analysis indicate that an additional 3
to 5 years are needed to ensure a credible assessment.
Since the launch of SBI in 2005, we have identified a range of
challenges related to schedule delays and performance problems with
SBInet. SBInet was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a
"virtual fence" along the border, and after spending nearly $1
billion, DHS deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona's
border that represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January
2011, in response to concerns regarding SBInet's performance, cost,
and schedule, DHS canceled future procurements. CBP developed the
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the
remainder of the Arizona border.
In November 2011, we reported that CBP does not have the information
needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.[Footnote 25] In
developing the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives and
outreach to potential vendors. However, CBP did not document the
analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment
locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan.
Specifically, according to CBP officials, CBP used a two-step process
to develop the Plan. First, CBP engaged the Homeland Security Studies
and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of alternatives
beginning with ones for Arizona. Second, following the completion of
the analysis of alternatives, the Border Patrol conducted its
operational assessment, which included a comparison of alternative
border surveillance technologies and an analysis of operational
judgments to consider both effectiveness and cost. While the first
step in CBP's process to develop the Plan--the analysis of
alternatives--was well documented, the second step--Border Patrol's
operational assessment--was not transparent because of the lack of
documentation. As we reported in November 2011, without documentation
of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and
deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in
the Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed,
identify how the analysis of alternatives was used, assess the
validity of the decisions made, or justify the funding requested. We
also reported that CBP officials have not yet defined the mission
benefits expected from implementing the new Plan, and defining the
expected benefit could help improve CBP's ability to assess the
effectiveness of the Plan as it is implemented.
In addition, we reported that CBP's 10-year life cycle cost estimate
for the Plan of $1.5 billion was based on an approximate order-of-
magnitude analysis, and agency officials were unable to determine a
level of confidence in their estimate, as best practices suggest.
Specifically, we found that the estimate reflected substantial
features of best practices, being both comprehensive and accurate, but
it did not sufficiently meet other characteristics of a high-quality
cost estimate, such as credibility, because it did not identify a
level of confidence or quantify the impact of risks. GAO and OMB
guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are important for
program approval and continued receipt of annual funding. In addition,
because CBP was unable to determine a level of confidence in its
estimate, we reported that it would be difficult for CBP to determine
what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks
associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining
Arizona border.
We recommended in November 2011 that, among other things, CBP document
the analysis justifying the technologies proposed in the Plan,
determine its mission benefits, and determine a more robust life cycle
cost estimate for the Plan. DHS concurred with these recommendations,
and has reported taking action to address some of the recommendations.
For example, in October 2012, CBP officials reported that, through the
operation of two surveillance systems under SBInet's initial
deployment in high-priority regions of the Arizona border, CBP has
identified examples of mission benefits that could result from
implementing technologies under the Plan. Additionally, CBP initiated
action to update its cost estimate for the Plan by providing revised
cost estimates in February and March 2012 for the Integrated Fixed
Towers and Remote Video Surveillance System, the Plan's two largest
projects. We currently have ongoing work for congressional requesters
to assess CBP's progress in this area and expect to issue a report
with our final results in the fall of 2013.
In March 2012, we reported that the CBP Office of Air and Marine
(OAM)--which provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of
its customers, primarily Border Patrol--had not documented significant
events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement
across locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate
that its decisions to allocate resources were the most effective ones
in fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats.[Footnote 26] OAM
issued various plans that included strategic goals, mission
responsibilities, and threat information. However, we could not
identify the underlying analyses used to link these factors to the mix
and placement of resources across locations. OAM did not have
documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan
to mission needs or threats. For example, while the southwest border
was Border Patrol's highest priority for resources in fiscal year
2010, it did not receive a higher rate of air support than the
northern border. Similarly, OAM did not document analyses supporting
the current mix and placement of marine assets across locations. OAM
officials said that while they generally documented final decisions
affecting the mix and placement of resources, they did not have the
resources to document assessments and analyses to support these
decisions. However, we reported that such documentation of significant
events could help the office improve the transparency of its resource
allocation decisions to help demonstrate the effectiveness of these
resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs and addressing
threats. We recommended in March 2012 that CBP document analyses,
including mission requirements and threats, that support decisions on
the mix and placement of OAM's air and marine resources. DHS concurred
with our recommendation and stated that it plans to provide additional
documentation of its analyses supporting decisions on the mix and
placement of air and marine resources by 2014.
DHS US-VISIT Program Technology Provides an Opportunity to Identify
Illegal Migration through Overstays:
DHS took action in 2004 to better monitor and control the entry and
exit of foreign visitors to the United States by establishing the U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program,
which tracks foreign visitors using biometric information (such as
fingerprints) and biographic information. DHS has incrementally
delivered US-VISIT capabilities to track foreign entries, and a
biometrically enabled entry capability has been fully operational at
about 300 air, sea, and land POEs since December 2006.[Footnote 27]
Since 2004, however, we have identified a range of DHS management
challenges to fully deploying a biometric exit capability intended, in
part, to track foreigners who had overstayed their visas and remained
illegally in the United States. For example, in November 2009, we
reported that DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to
scheduling, executing, and tracking the work needed to deliver a
comprehensive exit solution.[Footnote 28] In August 2010, we reported
that the DHS pilot programs to track the exit of foreign visitors at
air POEs had limitations curtailing the ability to inform a decision
for a long-term exit solution at these POEs.[Footnote 29]
In the absence of a biometric entry and exit system, DHS uses various
methods for identifying overstays, primarily biographic data, and
sharing of overstay information.[Footnote 30] US-VISIT identifies
overstays by analyzing biographic data maintained in the Arrival and
Departure Information System--a database that contains information on
aliens' entry, exit, and change of status--and electronically and
manually comparing Arrival and Departure Information System records
with information in other databases to find matches that demonstrate
that a nonimmigrant may have, for instance, departed the country or
filed an application to change status and thus is not an overstay.
Additionally, DHS shares overstay information among its components
through various mechanisms, such as alerts that can inform a CBP
primary inspection officer at a POE of a nonimmigrant's history as an
overstay violator, at which point the officer can refer the
nonimmigrant to secondary inspection for a more in-depth review of the
alien's record and admissibility. Furthermore, ICE's Counterterrorism
and Criminal Exploitation Unit uses data provided by US-VISIT and
various databases to identify leads for overstay cases, take steps to
verify the accuracy of the leads, prioritize leads to focus on those
identified as most likely to pose a threat to national security or
public safety, and conduct field investigations on priority, high-risk
leads. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting a
relatively constant percent of its total field office investigative
hours to Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit overstay
investigations, ranging from 3.1 to 3.4 percent.
We reported in April 2011 that DHS was creating electronic alerts for
certain categories of overstays, such as those who overstay by more
than 90 days, but was not creating alerts for those who overstay by
less than 90 days to focus efforts on more egregious overstay
violators, as identified by CBP. We recommended in April 2011 that DHS
assess the costs and benefits of creating additional alerts, and DHS
concurred with this recommendation. DHS has since reported that it
would begin creating additional alerts, which could improve the chance
that these individuals are identified as overstays during subsequent
encounters with federal officials. We have additional work ongoing for
congressional requesters in this area regarding DHS's identification
of and enforcement actions against overstays and expect to issue a
report with our final results in the summer of 2013.
This concludes my statement for the record.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact Rebecca
Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making
key contributions to this statement included Kathryn Bernet, Lacinda
Ayers, and Jeanette Espinola, Assistant Directors; as well as Frances
A. Cook, Alana Finley, Barbara Guffy, Lara Miklozek, and Ashley D.
Vaughan.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border
Security Status and Resource Needs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-330T]. Washington, D.C.: February
26, 2013.
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to
Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-25]. Washington, D.C.: December 10,
2012.
Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and
Assessment Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-688T]. Washington, D.C.: May 8,
2012.
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of
DHS's Air and Marine Assets. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-518]. Washington, D.C.: March 30,
2012.
Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers are Fully
Trained. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-269].
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2011.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and
Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-22]. Washington, D.C.: November 4,
2011.
Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing,
and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts but Would Have Costs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411]. Washington, D.C.:
April 15, 2011.
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures
for the Southwest Border. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T]. Washington, D.C.: February
15, 2011.
Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency
Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97]. Washington, D.C.: December 17,
2010.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a
Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177]. Washington, D.C.:
November 18, 2010.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited
Understanding of Air Exit Options. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860]. Washington, D.C.: August 10,
2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T]. Washington, D.C.: May 4,
2010.
Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of
Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13]. Washington, D.C.: November 19,
2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896]. Washington, D.C.: September
9, 2009.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-329T]. Washington, D.C.: January 3,
2008.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] POEs are the facilities that provide for the controlled entry into
or departure from the United States for persons and materials.
Specifically, a POE is any officially designated location (seaport,
airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are
assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and
enforce customs laws.
[2] The number of border agents includes those assigned to northern
and southwest border sectors. The number of officers assigned to POEs
does not include those performing trade or agricultural inspections.
The $5.9 billion includes all funds appropriated to DHS for border
security in fiscal year 2004.
[3] In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, appropriations acts provided that
Border Patrol was to maintain an active duty presence of no fewer than
21,370 agents protecting the border of the United States. Department
of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, div. B,
tit. VI, § 1608, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2012, div. D, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125
Stat. 786, 945-46 (2011).
[4] Drugs accounted for the vast majority of all contraband seizures;
contraband seizures other than drugs include firearms, ammunition, and
money.
[5] OFO is responsible for processing the flow of people and goods
that enter the country through air, land, and sea POEs where CBP
officers inspect travelers and goods to determine whether they may be
legally admitted into the country.
[6] Border Patrol works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and
contraband into the United States between POEs by using intelligence
information to inform risk relative to threats of cross-border
terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across locations;
integrating border security operations with other law enforcement
partners to address threats; and developing rapid response
capabilities to deploy the resources appropriate to changes in threat.
[7] GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in
Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-25] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10,
2012).
[8] GAO, Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform
Border Security Status and Resource Needs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-330T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26,
2013).
[9] Border Patrol's estimate of known illegal entries includes
illegal, deportable entrants who were apprehended, in addition to the
number of entrants who illegally crossed the border but were not
apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico (referred to as turn
backs) or continued traveling into the U.S. interior (referred to as
got aways). We defined these illegal entries as estimated "known"
illegal entries to clarify that the estimates do not include illegal
entrants for which Border Patrol does not have reasonable indications
of cross-border illegal activity. These data are collectively referred
to as known illegal entries because Border Patrol officials have what
they deem to be a reasonable indication that the cross-border activity
occurred. Indications of illegal crossings are obtained through
various sources such as direct agent observation, referrals from
credible sources (such as residents), camera monitoring, and detection
of physical evidence left on the environment from animal or human
crossings.
[10] Border Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate using a
formula in which it adds the number of apprehensions and turn backs in
a specific sector and divides this total by the total estimated known
illegal entries--determined by adding the number of apprehensions,
turn backs, and got aways for the sector. Border Patrol views its
border security efforts as increasing in effectiveness if the number
of turn backs as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries has
increased and the number of got aways as a percentage of estimated
known illegal entries has decreased.
[11] The exception was the Big Bend sector, which showed a decrease in
the overall effectiveness rate from 86 percent in fiscal year 2006 to
68 percent in fiscal year 2011.
[12] Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles under
operational control using factors such as operational statistics,
third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, resource
deployments, and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents.
[13] GAO, Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in
Implementation and Assessment Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-688T] (Washington, D.C.: May 8,
2012).
[14] GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control
Measures for the Southwest Border, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2011)
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-688T].
[16] For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the
Effect of the Arizona Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct.
18, 2005).
[17] GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-329T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3,
2008).
[18] The Immigration and Nationality Act, implementing regulations,
and CBP policies and procedures for traveler inspection at all POEs
require officers to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of
individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country. See 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a); 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a), (b), (f)(1).
[19] GAO, Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers
are Fully Trained, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-269]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2011).
[20] GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure
a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 18, 2010).
[21] GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of
Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 17, 2010).
[22] The length of the border with Mexico is defined by the U.S.
International Boundary and Water Commission at 1,954 miles. The length
of the land border is 675 miles, while the length of the border along
the Colorado River and Rio Grande River is 1,279 miles.
[23] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T] (Washington, D.C.: May 4,
2010).
[24] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2009).
[25] GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on
Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-22] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4,
2011).
[26] GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More
Effective Use of DHS's Air and Marine Assets, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-518] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30,
2012).
[27] GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages
of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 19, 2009).
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13].
[29] GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited
Understanding of Air Exit Options, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10,
2010).
[30] GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting,
Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts but Would
Have Costs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411]
(Washington, D.C. Apr. 15, 2011).
[End of section]
GAO’s Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the
performance and accountability of the federal government for the
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations,
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy,
and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and
reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO’s website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports,
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select
“E-mail Updates.”
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
Connect with GAO:
Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm];
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov;
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470.
Congressional Relations:
Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, DC 20548.
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, DC 20548.
[End of document]