What exactly does it mean to be an “atheist”?

In recent years there has been a lot of debate regarding the proper definition of “atheist,” even on thisblog. Traditionally, atheism has been defined as the claim that God does not exist. In the mid-20th century, however, atheist philosopher Antony Flew attempted to redefine atheism. Noting that the Greek prefix “a” is a term of negation, Flew said the proper definition of a-theism is simply “not a theist.” Another popular way of cashing this out has been to define atheism as “one who lacks belief in God.”

What’s the difference between these definitions? The traditional definition is an ontological claim (God is not included among the entities that exist) while the new definition is a psychological description (“I have no belief regarding the existence or non-existence of God”). We might label these two ways of defining atheism as “ontological atheism” and “psychological atheism.”

Why does it matter how we define atheism? It matters because of the burden of proof. A principle of rational discourse is that he who makes a claim bears the burden to defend it. If someone claims that God does not exist (ontological atheism), he bears a burden to demonstrate how he knows this to be true. On the other hand, one who lacks any beliefs with respect to God’s existence (psychological atheism) bears no burden of proof because he is not making a claim to knowledge. He is merely describing the content of his beliefs – that his stock of beliefs does not include a belief regarding the existence or non-existence of God. Flew understood this. He purposely redefined atheism to make it a psychological description so as to absolve atheists from their burden to defend the claim that God does not exist.

Who is Right?

The $64,000 question, then, is which definition of atheism is the right definition? Is atheism “belief in no God” (ontological atheism) or “no belief in God?” (psychological atheism)[1] Historically, atheism has been defined as the belief that no god(s) exists. For example, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines atheism as “the negation of theism, the denial of the existence of God.” And there is good reason for this definition. There are only three possible positions one can take regarding any given truth claim: affirm it, deny it, or reserve judgment. In this context, the truth-claim in question is “God exists.” Theism is the affirmation that the proposition “God exists” is true, while atheism is the denial that the proposition “God exists” is true. If one does not know if the proposition is true or false, then they are an agnostic. It’s that simple!

While many atheists want to define their view as “one who lacks belief in God,” when you probe the content of their beliefs it becomes readily apparent that they do not lack a belief concerning the existence of God at all. They are not neutral with respect to the proposition “God exists.” They believe God does not, or probably does not exist, and thus regardless of how they wish to define atheism, they bear a burden to explain why God’s existence is more improbable than not.[2]

Assessing Flew’s Redefinition

It seems to me that even on Flew’s redefinition, the atheist cannot avoid a burden of proof given the definition of “theist.” A theist is someone who believes God exists. Someone who is “not a theist,” then, is someone who does not believe God exists. That’s the traditional definition of atheism! It is also a claim to knowledge, and thus comes with a burden of proof. Even if we excise the psychological notion of “belief” from the definition of theist, it fares no better. If theism is defined as the proposition that “God exists,” and the a prefix negates that proposition, then atheism is the proposition that “God does not exist.” Once again, this is in line with the traditional definition of atheism. Both definitions entail an ontological affirmation, and thus require the atheist to explain why he believes (or how he knows) God does not exist.

In addition to etymology, there are other reasons to reject this new definition of atheism. First, it invites unnecessary confusion. Words are labels, and labels are shorthand ways of referring to specific ideas or things without having to describe them each time. If I want to talk about a dog, I don’t have to say “one of those little furry creatures with four legs and a tail that has a proclivity for barking.” I simply say “dog” and everyone knows what I am referring to. But what if someone redefined “dog” to mean “any common household pet,” such that both cats and dogs would now both qualify as “dogs.” Surely it would invite confusion. Whenever someone said they own a dog, we would always have to ask, “What kind of dog do you own: a canine dog or a feline dog?” Whenever a single label is used to refer to more than one idea/thing, clarity becomes more difficult to achieve. If we expand the definition of atheism from “belief in no God” to include “no belief in God,” then it must always be asked of an atheist, “What kind of an atheist are you?” The purpose of labels is to clarify and make distinctions, not to obscure. Expanding the definition of atheism will only serve to diminish the label’s descriptive utility.

Secondly, the concept now being labeled as “atheism” (lack of belief in God; not a theist) has long been described as agnosticism. An agnostic is one who either believes that humans cannot possess warranted beliefs concerning the existence or non-existence of God, or one who simply lacks a belief concerning the existence or non-existence of God. In what way does this differ from the new definition of atheism? It appears to be a distinction without a difference. In the end, psychological atheism collapses into agnosticism. If the “agnostic” label captures the essence of this new form of so-called atheism, then it should continue to be described with this label.

Thirdly, to define atheism as “a lack of belief in God” turns atheism into a description of one’s psychological state, rather than a position. Since psychological states are neither true nor false, defined as a psychological description, atheism is neither true nor false. Only propositions have truth value.

Fourthly, to suggest that those who think the proposition “God does not exist” is false and those who lack beliefs with respect to God’s existence should both be called “atheists” makes as much sense as suggesting that those who think the proposition “God exists” is true and those who lack beliefs with respect to God should both be called theists! Indeed, it seems a bit strange to associate the absence of belief with either “atheism” or “theism” since both labels are used to describe beliefs about the truth or falsity of God’s existence.

Finally, the new definition spreads its net too wide. If an atheist is one who lacks belief with respect to the question of God’s existence (or is simply not a theist), then babies and dogs should also be classified at atheists.[3] This is absurd! There is a cognitive element to atheism that the new definition is clearly lacking, and thus not deserving of the atheism label.

Having Said That…

While I think there are good historical, logical, and practical reasons for rejecting the new definition of atheism, I acknowledge the fact that words are defined by usage. If the more expansive definition of atheism becomes generally accepted by English speakers, then one cannot deny that the new definition is a legitimate definition (even if we do not agree with the change in usage).[4] There is no principled reason for thinking the historic definition of atheism could not be changed or expanded to include other meanings.

Indeed, something similar happened with the word “agnostic.”[5] The term was coined by T. H. Huxley, which he defined as a method of knowledge encapsulated roughly by the principle ‘the certainty with which you believe X should be proportional to the evidence for X.’ As applied to the question of God’s existence, he did not think it was possible to know whether God exists. Over time, however, it also came to refer to one who makes no claim to personally know whether God exists, but considers it possible that the answer can be discovered. To distinguish between these different positions and to restore clarity in the public square, it became necessary to augment “agnostic” with other descriptors such as “soft” and “hard.” If the public comes to accept the new definition of atheism as legitimate, those who adopt the “atheist” label will required to provide similar augments to accurately identify their view. Personally, I think the simplest solution is to abandon the attempt to redefine or expand the definition of atheism, opt for a new label to describe their position, stick with “agnostic,” or forego a label altogether. In support of the last option, consider the fact that we do not regularly have labels to describe a lack of belief in something. For example, there is no label for those who lack a belief in aliens. So if truly and only lacks belief in God, perhaps they are not deserving of a label because they have nothing to contribute to the conversation.

In Conclusion

The move to redefine atheism has been motivated less by a desire for greater clarity, and more by a desire to avoid a burden of proof. While I think there are good reasons to reject this redefinition as invalid, unnecessary, and unhelpful, even if it comes to be accepted as legitimate, the “atheist” who adopts it still bears a burden of proof if he thinks the proposition “God exists” is false or probably false. In my experience, the vast majority of those who prefer to define atheism as “no belief in God,” “not a theist,” or “one who lacks belief in God” fit this description. They think God does not, or probably does not exist, and as such, they bear a burden of proof no matter what they call themselves or how they define their terms. While definitions are important, let’s not allow them to distract us from the main thing: What does the self-described atheist believe concerning the proposition “God exists”? If they have an opinion on the matter, then they also have a burden of proof.

[1]Not all atheists would argue that these two definitions are mutually exclusive. Many would acknowledge that “atheist” has been historically defined as the belief that no God exists, but argue that this is but one legitimate way of defining the word. They object to those who wish to exclude the new definition as illegitimate, or automatically assume that anyone who adopts the atheist label must believe God does not exist.[2]An atheist might object, “While I tend to think God does not exist, I am not certain of this and thus bear no burden of proof.” What he fails to understand is that certainty is not a prerequisite for belief, and hence is not a prerequisite for a burden of proof. Most of our beliefs are held with a level of justification that falls sort of certainty. Indeed, most theists would probably admit that they are not certain God exists. How would the atheist respond if the theist said, “Since I am not certain that God exists, I bear no burden of proof”? Surely the atheist would object to this, and rightly so. One need not be certain of the truth of some X to believe X,and if they believe X is true they have the burden to demonstrate how they know X is true.

Certainty is not a prerequisite for labeling oneself an atheist either. See “Dawkins is an agnostic? Why certainty is irrelevant to defining atheism.”[3]William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 156.[4]Consider the fact that the early Christians were called “atheists” by their pagan neighbors because Christians did not believe in the Roman gods.[5]“Agnostic” comes from the Greek word gnosis,meaning “knowledge.” The a prefix negates this meaning, hence “lack of knowledge.”

Let’s be clear here. I’m not saying that if I don’t have reasons to show you wrong, that I must conclude you are right. I can simply remain agnostic on the issue until more evidence arises pro or con. But if I am going to say that your X does not exist, then I am also making an ontological claim just like you are, and hence I have a burden to back up my claim with evidence.

Seems to me the door swings both ways on this one, and if so, it might take some time to prepare for the ramifications of that fact.

For example:

If there is a difference between ontological and psychological atheism, so, too, then is there a difference between ontological and psychological theism.

And since ontological theism is a claim to knowledge, and as you wrote, a claim to knowledge requires a burden of proof to be proven true, then a theist must provide evidence for God’s existence, which has been the war-cry of pretty much every atheist.

In either case, neither group, ontologically speaking, can provide any real evidence (or at least not sufficiently to prove their claim to the opposing side).

And as a matter of fact, most theists, who make an ontological claim, are really making only a psychological claim, in that they believe what they believe, not on any ontological knowledge, but on faith (coupled, perhaps with reason) which is/are not enough to fulfill the burden of proof placed upon them when they simply claim God exists.

Jason wrote:

“Whenever a single label is used to refer to more than one idea/thing, clarity becomes more difficult to achieve.”

Kind of like the label “theist”. Theist means many things to many people, and isn’t sufficiently detailed in it’s meaning to allow for the categories necessitated by the label, e.g. Christians, Muslims, Brahmans, and Ba’hai-ians are all theists, but do not necessarily, and probably don’t all believe in the same Theos, or God. I know someone who believes the norse gods are real. By default, this makes him a theist. But who would actually think of him as a theist, since theist implies belief in God, capital “G”?

So, do we think of theism as a bad term? One that should be redefined backward into a simpler context? Should we add “soft” or “hard” or something else to specify a more accurate word label, as if to ask “What kind of theist are you?”?

Finally,

“Thirdly, to define atheism as “a lack of belief in God” turns atheism into a description of one’s psychological state, rather than a position. Since psychological states are neither true nor false, defined as a psychological description, atheism is neither true nor false. Only propositions have truth value.”

This can easily be reworded, as follows:

…to define theism as “a belief in God” turns theism into a description of one’s psychological state, rather than a position. Since psychological states are neither true nor false, defined as a psychological description, theism is neither true nor false. Only propositions have truth value.

Whoa!

And that’s what theism is: a belief in the existence of God/a god/or gods. Theism hinges on belief as much as any thing else. But, as you’ve pointed out, atheism does not automatically hinge on unbelief. There is an ontological claim.

So what’s left? If I am speaking with a confirmed atheist and I want to change his or her position, making an ontological claim “God exists” is pretty much useless. I can point to almost anything (the universe, creation, etc.) and any such points can be refused (not necessarily refuted). Even if I appeal to reason (cosmological arguments, no infinite regression, etc.) I still haven’t proven anything. Those get rejected and argued about academically all the time, with no convincing end in sight.

So what should I do? I have to make a different appeal. I have to make a psychological appeal based on my own experience with God and, if counted trustworthy, rational, and morally decent by my audience, my testimony (and pretty much nothing else) becomes my greatest chance of converting the atheist, no matter their ontological claim of knowledge to the contrary.

You wrote, “In either case, neither group, ontologically speaking, can provide any real evidence (or at least not sufficiently to prove their claim to the opposing side).” I disagree. Perhaps you and I have different definitions of “evidence,” but theists have provided many arguments on behalf of theism, and atheists have offered many arguments against theism.

You wrote, “And as a matter of fact, most theists, who make an ontological claim, are really making only a psychological claim, in that they believe what they believe, not on any ontological knowledge, but on faith.” I don’t understand this. When someone says “I believe God exists,” they are making a statement about both ontology and psychology. They are saying that God is part of reality, and that psychologically speaking they believe this.

Theist is actually intended to be a generic term that refers to the generic God of the philosophers. But that God has specific properties – properties that would allow Jews and Muslims to call themselves theists, but not someone who believes in the Norse gods since those gods have different properties.

You wrote, “to define theism as “a belief in God” turns theism into a description of one’s psychological state, rather than a position. Since psychological states are neither true nor false, defined as a psychological description, theism is neither true nor false. Only propositions have truth value.” But I wouldn’t define theism as a belief in God. Theism is the position that the proposition “God exists” is true. Obviously one has to believe that in order to be a theist, but the term theist is not about one’s psychological state so much as it is about their ontological commitments.

We may have different definitions of evidence insomuch as what I might require as evidence of God’s existence versus what an atheist might require as evidence.

Personally, I don’t take rational arguments left to the intangible realm as good evidence. I’m not saying they never prove anything, but nor am I overly dogmatic about it. Maybe I shouldn’t say good, here, though. Maybe I should say convincing?

“When someone says “I believe God exists,” they are making a statement about both ontology and psychology. They are saying that God is part of reality, and that psychologically speaking they believe this.”

Seems to me “God exists” and “I believe God exists” are two vastly different statements with vastly different implications.

“Theist is actually intended to be a generic term that refers to the generic God of the philosophers. But that God has specific properties – properties that would allow Jews and Muslims to call themselves theists, but not someone who believes in the Norse gods since those gods have different properties.”

Just goes to show we can wrangle definitions to suit our etymological needs, too. 🙂

“But I wouldn’t define theism as a belief in God. Theism is the position that the proposition “God exists” is true. Obviously one has to believe that in order to be a theist, but the term theist is not about one’s psychological state so much as it is about their ontological commitments.”

Then how does adding that pesky little a- in front of theism not allow for the same argument? What changes?

You made it clear that for atheists and atheism, there is a difference between an ontological claim (no God exists) and a psychological claim (I believe no God exists). So why do theists get to use their term “theist” and the phrase “I believe…” in order to make an ontological statement about their personal commitments (as opposed to it being a psychological claim only), but an atheist cannot be make a statement about their ontological commitments when he or she says says essentially the same thing, but using the negative?

I don’t think that when an atheist says “I don’t believe God exists” that they are merely making a psychological claim. They are making both a psychological and ontological claim.

You wrote, “Seems to me ‘God exists’ and ‘I believe God exists’ are two vastly different statements with vastly different implications.” I don’t see how. How could one make the statement “God exists” without believing that the statement is true? I think both statements make the same point, with the one just being more explicit about the “belief factor” than the other. Remember, knowledge is justified true belief. One cannot make any claim to knowledge without first believing that claim is true.

I wrote, “But I wouldn’t define theism as a belief in God. Theism is the position that the proposition ‘God exists’ is true. Obviously one has to believe that in order to be a theist, but the term theist is not about one’s psychological state so much as it is about their ontological commitments” to which you responded, “Then how does adding that pesky little a- in front of theism not allow for the same argument? What changes?” I don’t think it changes a bit. I could rewrite that paragraph as: “Atheism is the position that the proposition ‘God exists’ is false. Obviously one has to believe that in order to be an atheist, but the term atheist is not about one’s psychological state so much as it is about their ontological commitments.” I’m not sure where you see the problem.