BOOK THREE

I

HE who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of
governments must first of all determine 'What is a state?' At present this is a
disputed question. Some say that the state has done a certain act; others, no,
not the state, but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman
is concerned entirely with the state; a constitution or government being an
arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is composite, like any
other whole made up of many parts; these are the citizens, who compose it. It is
evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what
is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion.
He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy.
Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have
obtained the name of citizen any other accidental manner, we may say, first,
that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for
resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has no
legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed
under the provisions of a treaty. Nay, resident aliens in many places do not
possess even such rights completely, for they are obliged to have a patron, so
that they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them
citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who
are too young to be on the register, or to old men who have been relieved from
state duties. Of these we do not say quite simply that they are citizens, but
add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the other, that they are
past the age, or something of that sort; the precise expression is immaterial,
for our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned
may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles. But the
citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense,
against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is
that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. Now of offices
some are discontinuous, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice,
or can only hold them after a fixed interval; others have no limit of time --
for example, the office of a dicast or ecclesiast. It may, indeed, be argued
that these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no
share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have
the power do not govern. Let us not dwell further upon this, which is a purely
verbal question; what we want is a common term including both dicast and
ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it 'indefinite office,'
and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the
most comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are
generally so called.

But we must not forget that things of which the underlying principles differ
in kind, one of them being first, another second, another third, have, when
regarded in this relation, nothing, or hardly anything, worth mentioning in
common. Now we see that governments differ in kind, and that some of them are
prior and that others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted are
necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. (What we mean by perversion
will be hereafter explained.) The citizen then of necessity differs under each
form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a
democracy; but not necessarily to other states. For in some states the people
are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary
ones; and suits are distributed by sections among the magistrates. At
Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they
distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, and other
causes are decided by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at
Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes. We may, indeed, modify
our definition of the citizen so as to include these states. In them it is the
holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges,
and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of
deliberating or judging about some things or about all things. The conception of
the citizen now begins to clear up.

He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial
administration of any state is said by us to be a citizens of that state; and,
speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of
life.

II

But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are
citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or more
ancestors. This is a short and practical definition but there are some who raise
the further question: How this third or fourth ancestor came to be a citizen?
Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony,
said -- 'Mortars are what is made by the mortar-makers, and the citizens of
Larissa are those who are made by the magistrates; for it is their trade to make
Larissaeans.' Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the
definition just given they shared in the government, they were citizens. This is
a better definition than the other. For the words, 'born of a father or mother
who is a citizen,' cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of
a state.

There is a greater difficulty in the case of those who have been made
citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after the expulsion of
the tyrants, for he enrolled in tribes many metics, both strangers and slaves.
The doubt in these cases is, not who is, but whether he who is ought to be a
citizen; and there will still be a furthering the state, whether a certain act
is or is not an act of the state; for what ought not to be is what is false.
Now, there are some who hold office, and yet ought not to hold office, whom we
describe as ruling, but ruling unjustly. And the citizen was defined by the fact
of his holding some kind of rule or office -- he who holds a judicial or
legislative office fulfills our definition of a citizen. It is evident,
therefore, that the citizens about whom the doubt has arisen must be called
citizens.

III

Whether they ought to be so or not is a question which is bound up with the
previous inquiry. For a parallel question is raised respecting the state,
whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state; for example, in the
transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. In such cases persons
refuse to fulfill their contracts or any other obligations, on the ground that
the tyrant, and not the state, contracted them; they argue that some
constitutions are established by force, and not for the sake of the common good.
But this would apply equally to democracies, for they too may be founded on
violence, and then the acts of the democracy will be neither more nor less acts
of the state in question than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This
question runs up into another: on what principle shall we ever say that the
state is the same, or different? It would be a very superficial view which
considered only the place and the inhabitants (for the soil and the population
may be separated, and some of the inhabitants may live in one place and some in
another). This, however, is not a very serious difficulty; we need only remark
that the word 'state' is ambiguous.

It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be regarded
as a single city -- what is the limit? Certainly not the wall of the city, for
you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may say, is
Babylon, and every city that has the compass of a nation rather than a city;
Babylon, they say, had been taken for three days before some part of the
inhabitants became aware of the fact. This difficulty may, however, with
advantage be deferred to another occasion; the statesman has to consider the
size of the state, and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not.

Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as well as their
place of abode, remain the same, the city is also the same, although the
citizens are always dying and being born, as we call rivers and fountains the
same, although the water is always flowing away and coming again Or shall we say
that the generations of men, like the rivers, are the same, but that the state
changes? For, since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of citizens
in a constitution, when the form of government changes, and becomes different,
then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic
differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And
in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different
when the form of their composition alters; for example, a scale containing the
same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian
mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the
state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and it may be called
or not called by the same name, whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely
different. It is quite another question, whether a state ought or ought not to
fulfill engagements when the form of government changes.

IV

There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the virtue of a
good man and a good citizen is the same or not. But, before entering on this
discussion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion of the virtue of
the citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community. Now,
sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot,
and a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and
while the precise definition of each individual's virtue applies exclusively to
him, there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to them all. For
they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation. Similarly,
one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the
common business of them all. This community is the constitution; the virtue of
the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a
member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that there
is not one single virtue of the good citizen which is perfect virtue. But we say
that the good man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue. Hence
it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue
which makes a good man.

The same question may also be approached by another road, from a
consideration of the best constitution. If the state cannot be entirely composed
of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well, and
must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike,
the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the
virtue of the good citizen -- thus, and thus only, can the state be perfect; but
they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the good
state all the citizens must be good.

Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the living
being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and
body, as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of
husband and wife, property of master and slave, so of all these, as well as
other dissimilar elements, the state is composed; and, therefore, the virtue of
all the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excellence of
the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands by his
side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be
absolutely and always the same.

But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen and
the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the good ruler is a
good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man. And
some persons say that even the education of the ruler should be of a special
kind; for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and military
exercises? As Euripides says:

"No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires."

As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. If then the
virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we assume further
that the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the virtue of the good
citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be absolutely the same, although
in some cases they may; for the virtue of a ruler differs from that of a
citizen. It was the sense of this difference which made Jason say that 'he felt
hungry when he was not a tyrant,' meaning that he could not endure to live in a
private station. But, on the other hand, it may be argued that men are praised
for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a citizen of
approved virtue who is able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a good
man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and
obeying, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of praise. Since, then,
it is sometimes thought that the ruler and the ruled must learn different things
and not the same, but that the citizen must know and share in them both, the
inference is obvious. There is, indeed, the rule of a master, which is concerned
with menial offices -- the master need not know how to perform these, but may
employ others in the execution of them: the other would be degrading; and by the
other I mean the power actually to do menial duties, which vary much in
character and are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as
handicraftsmen, who, as their name signifies, live by the labor of their hands:
under these the mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some
nations, the working classes had no share in the government -- a privilege which
they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and the
statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except
for their own occasional use; if they habitually practice them, there will cease
to be a distinction between master and slave.

This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but there is a rule of
another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth -- a
constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as he would learn
the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a general of
cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders of a
general of infantry, and by having had the command of a regiment and of a
company. It has been well said that 'he who has never learned to obey cannot be
a good commander.' The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be
capable of both; he should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey
like a freeman -- these are the virtues of a citizen. And, although the
temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the
virtue of a good man will include both; for the virtue of the good man who is
free and also a subject, e.g., his justice, will not be one but will comprise
distinct kinds, the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing
as the temperance and courage of men and women differ. For a man would be
thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman
would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation
than the good man; and indeed their part in the management of the household is
different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve.
Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all
other virtues must equally belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the
subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to
the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the
flute.

From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question,
whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, or
different, and how far the same, and how far different.

V

There still remains one more question about the citizen: Is he only a true
citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic to be included? If they
who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this
virtue of ruling and obeying; for this man is a citizen And if none of the lower
class are citizens, in which part of the state are they to be placed? For they
are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners. May we not reply, that as
far as this objection goes there is no more absurdity in excluding them than in
excluding slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It must
be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary
to the existence of the state; for example, children are not citizen equally
with grown-up men, who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being grown
up, are only citizens on a certain assumption. Nay, in ancient times, and among
some nations the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the
majority of them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them to
citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of a
citizen will not apply to every citizen nor to every free man as such, but only
to those who are freed from necessary services. The necessary people are either
slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and laborers who
are the servants of the community. These reflections carried a little further
will explain their position; and indeed what has been said already is of itself,
when understood, explanation enough.

Since there are many forms of government there must be many varieties of
citizen and especially of citizens who are subjects; so that under some
governments the mechanic and the laborer will be citizens, but not in others,
as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called government of the best (if
there be such an one), in which honors are given according to virtue and merit;
for no man can practice virtue who is living the life of a mechanic or laborer.
In oligarchies the qualification for office is high, and therefore no laborer
can ever be a citizen; but a mechanic may, for an actual majority of them are
rich. At Thebes there was a law that no man could hold office who had not
retired from business for ten years. But in many states the law goes to the
length of admitting aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citizen though
his mother only be a citizen; and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate
children; the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But when the
number of citizens increases, first the children of a male or a female slave are
excluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of
citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.

Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens; and he is a
citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honors of the state. Compare
Homer's words, 'like some dishonored stranger'; he who is excluded from the
honors of the state is no better than an alien. But when his exclusion is
concealed, then the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow
inhabitants.

As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of
the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in some states
the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When
they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the
statesman and those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others,
the conduct of public affairs.

VI

Having determined these questions, we have next to consider whether there is
only one form of government or many, and if many, what they are, and how many,
and what are the differences between them.

A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state, especially of
the highest of all. The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the
constitution is in fact the government. For example, in democracies the people
are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two
forms of government also are different: and so in other cases.

First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how many forms of
government there are by which human society is regulated. We have already said,
in the first part of this treatise, when discussing household management and the
rule of a master, that man is by nature a political animal. And therefore, men,
even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together; not
but that they are also brought together by their common interests in proportion
as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the
chief end, both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life
(in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the evils of existence
do not greatly overbalance the good) mankind meet together and maintain the
political community. And we all see that men cling to life even at the cost of
enduring great misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness and
happiness.

There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority;
they have been often defined already in discussions outside the school. The rule
of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in
reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to
the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the
slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other hand, the
government of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called
household management, is exercised in the first instance for the good of the
governed or for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the good of
the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in
general, which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists
themselves. For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practice
gymnastics, and the helmsman is always one of the crew. The trainer or the
helmsman considers the good of those committed to his care. But, when he is one
of the persons taken care of, he accidentally participates in the advantage, for
the helmsman is also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training.
And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and
likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns. Formerly,
as is natural, every one would take his turn of service; and then again,
somebody else would look after his interest, just as he, while in office, had
looked after theirs. But nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be
gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in
office. One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in
health while they continued in office; in that case we may be sure that they
would be hunting after places. The conclusion is evident: that governments which
have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict
principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which regard only
the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for they are
despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen.

VII

Having determined these points, we have next to consider how many forms of
government there are, and what they are; and in the first place what are the
true forms, for when they are determined the perversions of them will at once be
apparent. The words constitution and government have the same meaning, and the
government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of
one, or of a few, or of the many. The true forms of government, therefore, are
those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the
common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest,
whether of the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions. For the
members of a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in its
advantages. Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which
regards the common interests, kingship or royalty; that in which more than one,
but not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is so called, either because the rulers
are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state
and of the citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the state for the
common interest, the government is called by the generic name -- a constitution.
And there is a reason for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in
virtue; but as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain
perfection in every kind of virtue, though they may in military virtue, for this
is found in the masses. Hence in a constitutional government the fighting-men
have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.

Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows: of royalty,
tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For
tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch
only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the
needy: none of them the common good of all.

VIII

But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it will
therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the nature of each of
them. For he who would make a philosophical study of the various sciences, and
does not regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything, but to
set forth the truth in every particular. Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy
exercising the rule of a master over the political society; oligarchy is when
men of property have the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite,
when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers. And here arises
the first of our difficulties, and it relates to the distinction drawn. For
democracy is said to be the government of the many. But what if the many are men
of property and have the power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said
to be the government of the few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich,
and have the power in their hands because they are stronger? In these cases the
distinction which we have drawn between these different forms of government
would no longer hold good.

Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many,
and name the governments accordingly -- an oligarchy is said to be that in which
the few and the wealthy, and a democracy that in which the many and the poor are
the rulers -- there will still be a difficulty. For, if the only forms of
government are the ones already mentioned, how shall we describe those other
governments also just mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous
and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their respective states?

The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in democracies,
the number of the governing body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy,
or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that
the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, there is a
misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them. For the real
difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men
rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an
oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich
are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by
an, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and
democratical parties respectively claim power in the state.

IX

Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and
democracy, and what is justice oligarchical and democratical. For all men cling
to justice of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and they do not
express the whole idea. For example, justice is thought by them to be, and is,
equality, not. however, for however, for but only for equals. And inequality is
thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but only for unequals.
When the persons are omitted, then men judge erroneously. The reason is that
they are passing judgment on themselves, and most people are bad judges in their
own case. And whereas justice implies a relation to persons as well as to
things, and a just distribution, as I have already said in the Ethics, implies
the same ratio between the persons and between the things, they agree about the
equality of the things, but dispute about the equality of the persons, chiefly
for the reason which I have just given -- because they are bad judges in their
own affairs; and secondly, because both the parties to the argument are speaking
of a limited and partial justice, but imagine themselves to be speaking of
absolute justice. For the one party, if they are unequal in one respect, for
example wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all; and the other party,
if they are equal in one respect, for example free birth, consider themselves to
be equal in all. But they leave out the capital point. For if men met and
associated out of regard to wealth only, their share in the state would be
proportioned to their property, and the oligarchical doctrine would then seem to
carry the day. It would not be just that he who paid one mina should have the
same share of a hundred minae, whether of the principal or of the profits, as he
who paid the remaining ninety-nine. But a state exists for the sake of a good
life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves
and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in
happiness or in a life of free choice. Nor does a state exist for the sake of
alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for the sake of exchange and
mutual intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who
have commercial treaties with one another, would be the citizens of one state.
True, they have agreements about imports, and engagements that they will do no
wrong to one another, and written articles of alliance. But there are no
magistrates common to the contracting parties who will enforce their
engagements; different states have each their own magistracies. Nor does one
state take care that the citizens of the other are such as they ought to be, nor
see that those who come under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness
at an, but only that they do no injustice to one another. Whereas, those who
care for good government take into consideration virtue and vice in states.
Whence it may be further inferred that virtue must be the care of a state which
is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name: for without this end the
community becomes a mere alliance which differs only in place from alliances of
which the members live apart; and law is only a convention, 'a surety to one
another of justice,' as the sophist Lycophron says, and has no real power to
make the citizens

This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as Corinth and Megara, to
be brought together so that their walls touched, still they would not be one
city, not even if the citizens had the right to intermarry, which is one of the
rights peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, if men dwelt at a distance
from one another, but not so far off as to have no intercourse, and there were
laws among them that they should not wrong each other in their exchanges,
neither would this be a state. Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter,
another a husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is
ten thousand: nevertheless, if they have nothing in common but exchange,
alliance, and the like, that would not constitute a state. Why is this? Surely
not because they are at a distance from one another: for even supposing that
such a community were to meet in one place, but that each man had a house of his
own, which was in a manner his state, and that they made alliance with one
another, but only against evil-doers; still an accurate thinker would not deem
this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another was of the same
character after as before their union. It is clear then that a state is not a
mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual
crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state
cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a
community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake
of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established
among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities
family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men
together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is
friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means
towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and
self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life.

Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble
actions, and not of mere companionship. Hence they who contribute most to such a
society have a greater share in it than those who have the same or a greater
freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political virtue; or
than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.

From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the partisans of
different forms of government speak of a part of justice only.

X

There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state: Is
it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant?
Any of these alternatives seems to involve disagreeable consequences. If the
poor, for example, because they are more in number, divide among themselves the
property of the rich -- is not this unjust? No, by heaven (will be the reply),
for the supreme authority justly willed it. But if this is not injustice, pray
what is? Again, when in the first division all has been taken, and the majority
divide anew the property of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on,
that they will ruin the state? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those who
possess her, nor is justice destructive of a state; and therefore this law of
confiscation clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must
of necessity be just; for he only coerces other men by superior power, just as
the multitude coerce the rich. But is it just then that the few and the wealthy
should be the rulers? And what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the
people -- is this just? if so, the other case will likewise be just. But there
can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.

Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in that case
everybody else, being excluded from power, will be dishonored. For the offices
of a state are posts of honor; and if one set of men always holds them, the rest
must be deprived of them. Then will it be well that the one best man should
rule? Nay, that is still more oligarchical, for the number of those who are
dishonored is thereby increased. Some one may say that it is bad in any case for
a man, subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion, to have the
supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the law itself be democratical
or oligarchical, how will that help us out of our difficulties? Not at all; the
same consequences will follow.

XI

Most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion. The principle
that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is one that is
maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an
element of truth. For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary
person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if
regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many
contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each
individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet
together, they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and
senses; that is a figure of their mind and disposition. Hence the many are
better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one
part, and some another, and among them they understand the whole. There is a
similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of
the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful,
and works of art from realities, because in them the scattered elements are
combined, although, if taken separately, the eye of one person or some other
feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture. Whether this
principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear.
Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of application; for the
argument would equally hold about brutes; and wherein, it will be asked, do some
men differ from brutes? But there may be bodies of men about whom our statement
is nevertheless true. And if so, the difficulty which has been already raised,
and also another which is akin to it -- viz., what power should be assigned to
the mass of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and have no personal merit --
are both solved. There is still a danger in aflowing them to share the great
offices of state, for their folly will lead them into error, and their
dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also in not letting them share, for
a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full
of enemies. The only way of escape is to assign to them some deliberative and
judicial functions. For this reason Solon and certain other legislators give
them the power of electing to offices, and of calling the magistrates to
account, but they do not allow them to hold office singly. When they meet
together their perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the better
class they are useful to the state (just as impure food when mixed with what is
pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the
pure would be), but each individual, left to himself, forms an imperfect
judgment. On the other hand, the popular form of government involves certain
difficulties. In the first place, it might be objected that he who can judge of
the healing of a sick man would be one who could himself heal his disease, and
make him whole -- that is, in other words, the physician; and so in all
professions and arts. As, then, the physician ought to be called to account by
physicians, so ought men in general to be called to account by their peers. But
physicians are of three kinds: there is the ordinary practitioner, and there is
the physician of the higher class, and thirdly the intelligent man who has
studied the art: in all arts there is such a class; and we attribute the power
of judging to them quite as much as to professors of the art. Secondly, does not
the same principle apply to elections? For a right election can only be made by
those who have knowledge; those who know geometry, for example, will choose a
geometrician rightly, and those who know how to steer, a pilot; and, even if
there be some occupations and arts in which private persons share in the ability
to choose, they certainly cannot choose better than those who know. So that,
according to this argument, neither the election of magistrates, nor the calling
of them to account, should be entrusted to the many. Yet possibly these
objections are to a great extent met by our old answer, that if the people are
not utterly degraded, although individually they may be worse judges than those
who have special knowledge -- as a body they are as good or better. Moreover,
there are some arts whose products are not judged of solely, or best, by the
artists themselves, namely those arts whose products are recognized even by
those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge of the house is not
limited to the builder only; the user, or, in other words, the master, of the
house will be even a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge
better of a rudder than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a
feast than the cook.

This difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered, but there is another
akin to it. That inferior persons should have authority in greater matters than
the good would appear to be a strange thing, yet the election and calling to
account of the magistrates is the greatest of all. And these, as I was saying,
are functions which in some states are assigned to the people, for the assembly
is supreme in all such matters. Yet persons of any age, and having but a small
property qualification, sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge, although
for the great officers of state, such as treasurers and generals, a high
qualification is required. This difficulty may be solved in the same manner as
the preceding, and the present practice of democracies may be really defensible.
For the power does not reside in the dicast, or senator, or ecclesiast, but in
the court, and the senate, and the assembly, of which individual senators, or
ecclesiasts, or dicasts, are only parts or members. And for this reason the many
may claim to have a higher authority than the few; for the people, and the
senate, and the courts consist of many persons, and their property collectively
is greater than the property of one or of a few individuals holding great
offices. But enough of this.

The discussion of the first question shows nothing so clearly as that laws,
when good, should be supreme; and that the magistrate or magistrates should
regulate those matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with precision
owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing all particulars. But
what are good laws has not yet been clearly explained; the old difficulty
remains. The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws varies of
necessity with the constitutions of states. This, however, is clear, that the
laws must be adapted to the constitutions. But if so, true forms of government
will of necessity have just laws, and perverted forms of government will have
unjust laws.

XII

In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in the
highest degree a good in the most authoritative of all -- this is the political
science of which the good is justice, in other words, the common interest. All
men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a certain extent they agree
in the philosophical distinctions which have been laid down by us about Ethics.
For they admit that justice is a thing and has a relation to persons, and that
equals ought to have equality. But there still remains a question: equality or
inequality of what? Here is a difficulty which calls for political speculation.
For very likely some persons will say that offices of state ought to be
unequally distributed according to superior excellence, in whatever respect, of
the citizen, although there is no other difference between him and the rest of
the community; for that those who differ in any one respect have different
rights and claims. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of a
man, or any other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a greater share
of political rights. The error here lies upon the surface, and may be
illustrated from the other arts and sciences. When a number of flute players are
equal in their art, there is no reason why those of them who are better born
should have better flutes given to them; for they will not play any better on
the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the
superior artist. If what I am saying is still obscure, it will be made clearer
as we proceed. For if there were a superior flute-player who was far inferior in
birth and beauty, although either of these may be a greater good than the art of
flute-playing, and may excel flute-playing in a greater ratio than he excels the
others in his art, still he ought to have the best flutes given to him, unless
the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence in flute-playing,
which they do not. Moreover, upon this principle any good may be compared with
any other. For if a given height may be measured wealth and against freedom,
height in general may be so measured. Thus if A excels in height more than B in
virtue, even if virtue in general excels height still more, all goods will be
commensurable; for if a certain amount is better than some other, it is clear
that some other will be equal. But since no such comparison can be made, it is
evident that there is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim
to office on every sort of inequality any more than in the arts. For if some be
slow, and others swift, that is no reason why the one should have little and the
others much; it is in gymnastics contests that such excellence is rewarded.
Whereas the rival claims of candidates for office can only be based on the
possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state. And
therefore the noble, or free-born, or rich, may with good reason claim office;
for holders of offices must be freemen and taxpayers: a state can be no more
composed entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if wealth and freedom
are necessary elements, justice and valor are equally so; for without the former
qualities a state cannot exist at all, without the latter not well.

XIII

If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it would seem
that all, or some at least, of these claims are just; but, if we take into
account a good life, then, as I have already said, education and virtue have
superior claims. As, however, those who are equal in one thing ought not to have
an equal share in all, nor those who are unequal in one thing to have an unequal
share in all, it is certain that all forms of government which rest on either of
these principles are perversions. All men have a claim in a certain sense, as I
have already admitted, but all have not an absolute claim. The rich claim
because they have a greater share in the land, and land is the common element of
the state; also they are generally more trustworthy in contracts. The free claim
under the same tide as the noble; for they are nearly akin. For the noble are
citizens in a truer sense than the ignoble, and good birth is always valued in a
man's own home and country. Another reason is, that those who are sprung from
better ancestors are likely to be better men, for nobility is excellence of
race. Virtue, too, may be truly said to have a claim, for justice has been
acknowledged by us to be a social virtue, and it implies all others. Again, the
many may urge their claim against the few; for, when taken collectively, and
compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and better. But, what if the
good, the rich, the noble, and the other classes who make up a state, are all
living together in the same city, Will there, or will there not, be any doubt
who shall rule? No doubt at all in determining who ought to rule in each of the
above-mentioned forms of government. For states are characterized by differences
in their governing bodies-one of them has a government of the rich, another of
the virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all these elements
co-exist. How are we to decide? Suppose the virtuous to be very few in number:
may we consider their numbers in relation to their duties, and ask whether they
are enough to administer the state, or so many as will make up a state?
Objections may be urged against all the aspirants to political power. For those
who found their claims on wealth or family might be thought to have no basis of
justice; on this principle, if any one person were richer than all the rest, it
is clear that he ought to be ruler of them. In like manner he who is very
distinguished by his birth ought to have the superiority over all those who
claim on the ground that they are freeborn. In an aristocracy, or government of
the best, a like difficulty occurs about virtue; for if one citizen be better
than the other members of the government, however good they may be, he too, upon
the same principle of justice, should rule over them. And if the people are to
be supreme because they are stronger than the few, then if one man, or more than
one, but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule, and not
the many.

All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which
men claim to rule and to hold all other men in subjection to them are strictly
right. To those who claim to be masters of the government on the ground of their
virtue or their wealth, the many might fairly answer that they themselves are
often better and richer than the few -- I do not say individually, but
collectively. And another ingenious objection which is sometimes put forward may
be met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator who
desires to make the justest laws ought to legislate with a view to the good of
the higher classes or of the many, when the case which we have mentioned occurs.
Now what is just or right is to be interpreted in the sense of 'what is equal';
and that which is right in the sense of being equal is to be considered with
reference to the advantage of the state, and the common good of the citizens.
And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed. He differs
under different forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able
and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue.

If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, although not enough
to make up the full complement of a state, whose virtue is so pre-eminent that
the virtues or the political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison
with his or theirs, he or they can be no longer regarded as part of a state; for
justice will not be done to the superior, if he is reckoned only as the equal of
those who are so far inferior to him in virtue and in political capacity. Such
an one may truly be deemed a God among men. Hence we see that legislation is
necessarily concerned only with those who are equal in birth and in capacity;
and that for men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law -- they are themselves a
law. Any would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them: they would
probably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions said to the hares,
when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and claiming
equality for all. And for this reason democratic states have instituted
ostracism; equality is above all things their aim, and therefore they ostracized
and banished from the city for a time those who seemed to predominate too much
through their wealth, or the number of their friends, or through any other
political influence. Mythology tells us that the Argonauts left Heracles behind
for a similar reason; the ship Argo would not take him because she feared that
he would have been too much for the rest of the crew. Wherefore those who
denounce tyranny and blame the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus
cannot be held altogether just in their censure. The story is that Periander,
when the herald was sent to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off
the tallest ears of corn till he had brought the field to a level. The herald
did not know the meaning of the action, but came and reported what he had seen
to Thrasybulus, who understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the
state; and this is a policy not only expedient for tyrants or in practice
confined to them, but equally necessary in oligarchies and democracies.
Ostracism is a measure of the same kind, which acts by disabling and banishing
the most prominent citizens. Great powers do the same to whole cities and
nations, as the Athenians did to the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians; no sooner
had they obtained a firm grasp of the empire, than they humbled their allies
contrary to treaty; and the Persian king has repeatedly crushed the Medes,
Babylonians, and other nations, when their spirit has been stirred by the
recollection of their former greatness.

The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns all forms of
government, true as well as false; for, although perverted forms with a view to
their own interests may adopt this policy, those which seek the common interest
do so likewise. The same thing may be observed in the arts and sciences; for the
painter will not allow the figure to have a foot which, however beautiful, is
not in proportion, nor will the shipbuilder allow the stem or any other part of
the vessel to be unduly large, any more than the chorus-master will allow any
one who sings louder or better than all the rest to sing in the choir. Monarchs,
too, may practice compulsion and still live in harmony with their cities, if
their own government is for the interest of the state. Hence where there is an
acknowledged superiority the argument in favor of ostracism is based upon a kind
of political justice. It would certainly be better that the legislator should
from the first so order his state as to have no need of such a remedy. But if
the need arises, the next best thing is that he should endeavor to correct the
evil by this or some similar measure. The principle, however, has not been
fairly applied in states; for, instead of looking to the good of their own
constitution, they have used ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that
under perverted forms of government, and from their special point of view, such
a measure is just and expedient, but it is also clear that it is not absolutely
just. In the perfect state there would be great doubts about the use of it, not
when applied to excess in strength, wealth, popularity, or the like, but when
used against some one who is pre-eminent in virtue -- what is to be done with
him? Mankind will not say that such an one is to be expelled and exiled; on the
other hand, he ought not to be a subject -- that would be as if mankind should
claim to rule over Zeus, dividing his offices among them. The only alternative
is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to be the
order of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state for life.

XIV

The preceding discussion, by a natural transition, leads to the
consideration of royalty, which we admit to be one of the true forms of
government. Let us see whether in order to be well governed a state or country
should be under the rule of a king or under some other form of government; and
whether monarchy, although good for some, may not be bad for others. But first
we must determine whether there is one species of royalty or many. It is easy to
see that there are many, and that the manner of government is not the same in
all of them.

Of royalties according to law, (1) the Lacedaemonian is thought to answer
best to the true pattern; but there the royal power is not absolute, except when
the kings go on an expedition, and then they take the command. Matters of
religion are likewise committed to them. The kingly office is in truth a kind of
generalship, irresponsible and perpetual. The king has not the power of life and
death, except in a specified case, as for instance, in ancient times, he had it
when upon a campaign, by right of force. This custom is described in Homer. For
Agamemnon is patient when he is attacked in the assembly, but when the army goes
out to battle he has the power even of life and death. Does he not say -- 'When
I find a man skulking apart from the battle, nothing shall save him from the
dogs and vultures, for in my hands is death'?

This, then, is one form of royalty -- a generalship for life: and of such
royalties some are hereditary and others elective.

(2) There is another sort of monarchy not uncommon among the barbarians,
which nearly resembles tyranny. But this is both legal and hereditary. For
barbarians, being more servile in character than Hellenes, and Asiadics than
Europeans, do not rebel against a despotic government. Such royalties have the
nature of tyrannies because the people are by nature slaves; but there is no
danger of their being overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal. Wherefore
also their guards are such as a king and not such as a tyrant would employ, that
is to say, they are composed of citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are
mercenaries. For kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but
tyrants over involuntary; and the one are guarded by their fellow-citizens the
others are guarded against them.

These are two forms of monarchy, and there was a third (3) which existed in
ancient Hellas, called an Aesymnetia or dictatorship. This may be defined
generally as an elective tyranny, which, like the barbarian monarchy, is legal,
but differs from it in not being hereditary. Sometimes the office was held for
life, sometimes for a term of years, or until certain duties had been performed.
For example, the Mytilenaeans elected Pittacus leader against the exiles, who
were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet. And Alcaeus himself shows in
one of his banquet odes that they chose Pittacus tyrant, for he reproaches his
fellow-citizens for 'having made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless
and ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises.'

These forms of government have always had the character of tyrannies,
because they possess despotic power; but inasmuch as they are elective and
acquiesced in by their subjects, they are kingly.

(4) There is a fourth species of kingly rule -- that of the heroic times --
which was hereditary and legal, and was exercised over willing subjects. For the
first chiefs were benefactors of the people in arts or arms; they either
gathered them into a community, or procured land for them; and thus they became
kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was inherited by their descendants.
They took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices, except those
which required a priest. They also decided causes either with or without an
oath; and when they swore, the form of the oath was the stretching out of their
sceptre. In ancient times their power extended continuously to all things
whatsoever, in city and country, as well as in foreign parts; but at a later
date they relinquished several of these privileges, and others the people took
from them, until in some states nothing was left to them but the sacrifices; and
where they retained more of the reality they had only the right of leadership in
war beyond the border.

These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the monarchy of the heroic
ages; this was exercised over voluntary subjects, but limited to certain
functions; the king was a general and a judge, and had the control of religion
The second is that of the barbarians, which is a hereditary despotic government
in accordance with law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesynmete or
Dictator; this is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which is
in fact a generalship, hereditary and perpetual. These four forms differ from
one another in the manner which I have described.

(5) There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the disposal of
all, just as each nation or each state has the disposal of public matters; this
form corresponds to the control of a household. For as household management is
the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management of a
city, or of a nation, or of many nations.

XV

Of these forms we need only consider two, the Lacedaemonian and the absolute
royalty; for most of the others he in a region between them, having less power
than the last, and more than the first. Thus the inquiry is reduced to two
points: first, is it advantageous to the state that there should be a perpetual
general, and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or open to the
citizens in turn? Secondly, is it well that a single man should have the supreme
power in all things? The first question falls under the head of laws rather than
of constitutions; for perpetual generalship might equally exist under any form
of government, so that this matter may be dismissed for the present. The other
kind of royalty is a sort of constitution; this we have now to consider, and
briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it. We will begin by inquiring
whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws.

The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in general terms,
and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any science to abide by
written rules is absurd. In Egypt the physician is allowed to alter his
treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes the risk. Hence it is
clear that a government acting according to written laws is plainly not the
best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general principle which
exists in law; and this is a better ruler which is free from passion than that
in which it is innate. Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway
the heart of man. Yes, it may be replied, but then on the other hand an
individual will be better able to deliberate in particular cases.

The best man, then, must legislate, and laws must be passed, but these laws
will have no authority when they miss the mark, though in all other cases
retaining their authority. But when the law cannot determine a point at all, or
not well, should the one best man or should all decide? According to our present
practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate, and decide, and their
judgments an relate to individual cases. Now any member of the assembly, taken
separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of
many individuals. And as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better
than a banquet furnished by a single man, so a multitude is a better judge of
many things than any individual.

Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are like the
greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little. The
individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then
his judgment is necessarily perverted; but it is hardly to be supposed that a
great number of persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same
moment. Let us assume that they are the freemen, and that they never act in
violation of the law, but fill up the gaps which the law is obliged to leave.
Or, if such virtue is scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only suppose
that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask which will be the more
incorruptible, the one good ruler, or the many who are all good? Will not the
many? But, you will say, there may be parties among them, whereas the one man is
not divided against himself. To which we may answer that their character is as
good as his. If we call the rule of many men, who are all of them good,
aristocracy, and the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better
for states than royalty, whether the government is supported by force or not,
provided only that a number of men equal in virtue can be found.

The first governments were kingships, probably for this reason, because of
old, when cities were small, men of eminent virtue were few. Further, they were
made kings because they were benefactors, and benefits can only be bestowed by
good men. But when many persons equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the
pre-eminence of one, they desired to have a commonwealth, and set up a
constitution. The ruling class soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of
the public treasury; riches became the path to honor, and so oligarchies
naturally grew up. These passed into tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies;
for love of gain in the ruling classes was always tending to diminish their
number, and so to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their masters
and established democracies. Since cities have increased in size, no other form
of government appears to be any longer even easy to establish.

Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power is the best
thing for states, how about the family of the king? Are his children to succeed
him? If they are no better than anybody else, that will be mischievous. But,
says the lover of royalty, the king, though he might, will not hand on his power
to his children. That, however, is hardly to be expected, and is too much to ask
of human nature. There is also a difficulty about the force which he is to
employ; should a king have guards about him by whose aid he may be able to
coerce the refractory? If not, how will he administer his kingdom? Even if he be
the lawful sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, still he
must have some force wherewith to maintain the law. In the case of a limited
monarchy there is not much difficulty in answering this question; the king must
have such force as will be more than a match for one or more individuals, but
not so great as that of the people. The ancients observe this principle when
they have guards to any one whom they appointed dictator or tyrant. Thus, when
Dionysius asked the Syracusans to allow him guards, somebody advised that they
should give him only such a number.

XVI

At this place in the discussion there impends the inquiry respecting the
king who acts solely according to his own will he has now to be considered. The
so-called limited monarchy, or kingship according to law, as I have already
remarked, is not a distinct form of government, for under all governments, as,
for example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there may be a general holding
office for life, and one person is often made supreme over the administration of
a state. A magistracy of this kind exists at Epidamnus, and also at Opus, but in
the latter city has a more limited power. Now, absolute monarchy, or the
arbitrary rule of a sovereign over an the citizens, in a city which consists of
equals, is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature; it is argued that
those who are by nature equals must have the same natural right and worth, and
that for unequals to have an equal share, or for equals to have an uneven share,
in the offices of state, is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to have
the same food and clothing. Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals
every one be ruled as well as rule, and therefore that an should have their
turn. We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession implies law. And the
rule of the law, it is argued, is preferable to that of any individual. On the
same principle, even if it be better for certain individuals to govern, they
should be made only guardians and ministers of the law. For magistrates there
must be -- this is admitted; but then men say that to give authority to any one
man when all are equal is unjust. Nay, there may indeed be cases which the law
seems unable to determine, but in such cases can a man? Nay, it will be replied,
the law trains officers for this express purpose, and appoints them to determine
matters which are left undecided by it, to the best of their judgment. Further,
it permits them to make any amendment of the existing laws which experience
suggests. Therefore he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason
alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is
a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the
best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire. We are told that a patient
should call in a physician; he will not get better if he is doctored out of a
book. But the parallel of the arts is clearly not in point; for the physician
does nothing contrary to rule from motives of friendship; he only cures a
patient and takes a fee; whereas magistrates do many things from spite and
partiality. And, indeed, if a man suspected the physician of being in league
with his enemies to destroy him for a bribe, he would rather have recourse to
the book. But certainly physicians, when they are sick, call in other
physicians, and training-masters, when they are in training, other
training-masters, as if they could not judge judge truly about their own case
and might be influenced by their feelings. Hence it is evident that in seeking
for justice men seek for the mean or neutral, for the law is the mean. Again,
customary laws have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than
written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer
than the customary law.

Again, it is by no means easy for one man to superintend many things; he
will have to appoint a number of subordinates, and what difference does it make
whether these subordinates always existed or were appointed by him because he
needed theme If, as I said before, the good man has a right to rule because he
is better, still two good men are better than one: this is the old saying, two
going together, and the prayer of Agamemnon,

"Would that I had ten such councillors!"

And at this day there are magistrates, for example judges, who have
authority to decide some matters which the law is unable to determine, since no
one doubts that the law would command and decide in the best manner whatever it
could. But some things can, and other things cannot, be comprehended under the
law, and this is the origin of the nexted question whether the best law or the
best man should rule. For matters of detail about which men deliberate cannot be
included in legislation. Nor does any one deny that the decision of such matters
must be left to man, but it is argued that there should be many judges, and not
one only. For every ruler who has been trained by the law judges well; and it
would surely seem strange that a person should see better with two eyes, or hear
better with two ears, or act better with two hands or feet, than many with many;
indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make to themselves many eyes and
ears and hands and feet. For they make colleagues of those who are the friends
of themselves and their governments. They must be friends of the monarch and of
his government; if not his friends, they will not do what he wants; but
friendship implies likeness and equality; and, therefore, if he thinks that his
friends ought to rule, he must think that those who are equal to himself and
like himself ought to rule equally with himself. These are the principal
controversies relating to monarchy.

XVII

But may not all this be true in some cases and not in others? for there is
by nature both a justice and an advantage appropriate to the rule of a master,
another to kingly rule, another to constitutional rule; but there is none
naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any other perverted form of government;
for these come into being contrary to nature. Now, to judge at least from what
has been said, it is manifest that, where men are alike and equal, it is neither
expedient nor just that one man should be lord of all, whether there are laws,
or whether there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law. Neither
should a good man be lord over good men, nor a bad man over bad; nor, even if he
excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular case,
at which I have already hinted, and to which I will once more recur. But first
of all, I must determine what natures are suited for government by a king, and
what for an aristocracy, and what for a constitutional government.

A people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior in the
virtue needed for political rule are fitted for kingly government; and a people
submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtue renders them capable of
political command are adapted for an aristocracy; while the people who are
suited for constitutional freedom are those among whom there naturally exists a
warlike multitude able to rule and to obey in turn by a law which gives office
to the well-to-do according to their desert. But when a whole family or some
individual, happens to be so pre-eminent in virtue as to surpass all others,
then it is just that they should be the royal family and supreme over all, or
that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation. For, as I said before,
to give them authority is not only agreeable to that ground of right which the
founders of all states, whether aristocratical, or oligarchical, or again
democratical, are accustomed to put forward (for these all recognize the claim
of excellence, although not the same excellence), but accords with the principle
already laid down. For surely it would not be right to kill, or ostracize, or
exile such a person, or require that he should take his turn in being governed.
The whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who has this pre-eminence is
in the relation of a whole to a part. But if so, the only alternative is that he
should have the supreme power, and that mankind should obey him, not in turn,
but always. These are the conclusions at which we arrive respecting royalty and
its various forms, and this is the answer to the question, whether it is or is
not advantageous to states, and to which, and how.

XVIII

We maintain that the true forms of government are three, and that the best
must be that which is administered by the best, and in which there is one man,
or a whole family, or many persons, excelling all the others together in virtue,
and both rulers and subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be
ruled, in such a manner as to attain the most eligible life. We showed at the
commencement of our inquiry that the virtue of the good man is necessarily the
same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state. Clearly then in the same
manner, and by the same means through which a man becomes truly good, he will
frame a state that is to be ruled by an aristocracy or by a king, and the same
education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to
be a statesman or a king.

Having arrived at these conclusions, we must proceed to speak of the perfect
state, and describe how it comes into being and is established.