Challenges Facing Iraqi-Gulf Relations and How to Overcome Them

Dr. Jensen is Associate Professor of Security Studies at the National Defense College in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

The views in this article reflect the personal views of the authors and not those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Ninth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), July 31-August 3 2018, which was organized by the Gulf Research Center Cambridge at the University of Cambridge.

Iraqi and Arab Gulf relations noticeably improved after the election of Iraq Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in September 2014 and his government's ability to stop the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, further rapprochement is constrained by historical, social and geo-political factors. Iraq-Gulf relations are dynamic, complex and multifaceted. The three main political components in Iraq — Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds — all have different positions regarding the Arab Gulf states. The same can be said for the Arab Gulf states (members of the Gulf Cooperation Council), with each having a different interest and approach to deepening ties with Iraq. This paper discusses the historical factors shaping the current Iraq-Gulf rapprochement, then analyzes the challenges and opportunities to its development.

RELATIONS SINCE 1981

Iraq was the battleground to stop expansion of the 1979 Iranian Revolution into Arab Gulf states. While Saddam Hussein initiated the war on September 22, 1980, it became apparent to Arab Gulf states by 1981 that Saddam Hussein could not win without their support, especially after Iranian forces occupied Iraqi territory and there was a fear that Iranian forces could move into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Starting in 1981, Arab Gulf states in the newly established Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began providing Iraq various forms of financial assistance and logistical and political support and this continued until the war ended in 1988. But GCC states provided financial and logistical support to Iraq for different purposes that differed in magnitude and impact. For example, Saudi Arabia, offered grants that were not expected to be fully repaid and allowed its territory to be used for equipment and weapons shipments. Saudi Arabia also built a pipeline to let Iraqi oil reach the Red Sea, bypassing the pipeline closed by the Syrian government. Kuwait also provided low interest loans and credit to finance the war and opened its borders and ports to Iraq as a logistical hub. Countries like the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait assisted the Iraqi Air Force with radar, for example. This significantly helped Iraq conduct and finance the war.

During the war, Iraq needed Gulf logistical and financial assistance, while Gulf states needed Iraqi military might and man power to confront Iranian expansion. By the end of the war, Gulf governments had provided more than $50 billion in support to Iraq, not including the diplomatic, religious and moral support they provided. However, after the parades and celebrations had ended, Gulf states did not invite Iraq to be a full member of the GCC. Following the war, Iraq went through a recession and did not receive the financial, diplomatic or moral support it felt it deserved for helping secure the Arab Gulf. Gulf reluctance to support Iraq, especially Kuwait's insistence that Iraq fully repay its loans or an Iraqi perception that Kuwait was increasing its oil exports at a time of declining oil prices, enabled the conditions for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Iraq-Gulf relations have not recovered from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This tragic mistake by Saddam Hussein came with many unintended consequences, perhaps the most severe, that almost 30 years later, Iraq still feels rejected by the Arab Gulf. Part of this could be due to the rise of sectarianism in the region and the fact after 2003 the Iraqi government became Shiite-led by Iraqi exiles aligned with Iran. Notwithstanding, the long shadow of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has loomed largest over the Iraq-Gulf relationship.

Iraq's aggression against Kuwait in 1990 was reciprocated in 2003 when the US-led coalition invaded Iraq with the diplomatic and logistical support of the GCC. While publically Arab Gulf states remained impartial to the invasion and encouraged a diplomatic solution, US troops invaded Iraq from bases in GCC countries, most notably from Kuwait. In fact, in December 2003 at the 24th session of the GCC Supreme Council in Kuwait, the council expressed its satisfaction with a new policy of the US administration towards Iraq, planning to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis, which implicitly recognized and supported the role of the US occupation. However, as an old adage says "be careful what you wish for," because the new Iraqi government, which GCC countries helped precipitate through its pressure on the US to hand over authority to, was unacceptable to the Gulf states because of its clear ties to Iran.

Arab Gulf states then faced a critical juncture when the US agreed to withdraw its forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. On December 18, 2011 a GCC Supreme Council summit was held in Riyadh, in which its final statement expressed a GCC fear of a security vacuum in the region due to the full withdrawal of US troops in Iraq. The final communique, though, did nothing more than call on Iraqi political parties to work towards a unified, secure and prosperous Iraq and hoped that Iraq would consider the fraternal ties between it and GCC states during the Arab Spring, when Iraq expressed solidarity with Bahraini protesters. The GCC states' strategy in Iraq after 2003 was based on a hope that someone else (the US and the UN) would fix the country to their liking, without having to make firm commitments to the new Iraq. On the other hand, Arab Gulf states' rivals Iran and Turkey seized the opportunity to invest political capital in the new Iraqi government and shape it to fit their interests.

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