The City of Eureka
must disclose police video of an arrest that led to a claim that excessive
force was used against a juvenile, the First District Court of Appeal has
ruled.

Div.
Five held late Tuesday that the video captured by a patrol car’s dashboard
camera was not a confidential “personnel record,” and that Humboldt Superior
Court Judge Christopher G. Wilson, who ordered the disclosure, did not have to
follow statutory requirements governing discovery of police personnel files.

The
dispute grew out of the Dec. 6, 2012 arrest of a 14-year-old suspect in Eureka.
The district attorney declined to file charges against the suspect, and a
citizen claimed the police used excessive force.

Following
an internal affairs investigation, police Sgt. Adam Laird was charged with two
misdemeanors, abuse of authority and filing a false report. The charges were
dropped after prosecution and defense experts examined the video and concluded
that excessive force was not used.

The
North Coast Journal reported that Laird brought a claim against the city, but
agreed to a settlement that included his retirement, and that he now works as a
private investigator.

Journalist’s
Request

Thad
Greenhouse, a local journalist and now the editor of the North Coast Journal,
requested release of the video under the California Public Records Act and
Welfare and Institutions Code §827, which authorizes limited disclosure of
juvenile court records. Greenson argued that the video was of public interest
given the dismissal of the charges against Laird, and the sergeant’s claims
that he was prosecuted in retaliation for public statements, including those
supporting a controversial ex-police chief, and that his employer withheld
information that might have convinced prosecutors not to charge him in the first
place.

The
county objected on the ground that the juvenile’s privacy would be invaded,
while the city argued that Greenson was trying to circumvent
1974’s Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 531 and related
statutes.

Under
those provisions, the party seeking discovery of police personnel records must
establish good cause for the disclosure through affidavits. If the showing is
sufficient, the trial judge must order that the requested documents be produced
for in camera examination, and if the judge then finds the documents
discoverable, they are turned over to the moving party’s counsel, subject to an
appropriate protective order so as to balance the officer’s privacy and due
process interests against the interests to be served by disclosure.

Trial Court Hearing

Wilson
held a hearing last year, at which the minor waived his right to
confidentiality. The county and city continued to oppose disclosure, with the
city arguing that the video was confidential because it was reviewed as part of
the internal investigation into the incident, and that it was therefore not
discoverable under Pitchess in the absence of pending litigation.

The
trial judge, however, said that the video was not a personnel record, that
Pitchess thus did not apply, and that the public interest warranted disclosure,
subject to a protective order requiring measures to protect the juvenile’s
identity.

Presiding
Justice Barbara J.R. Jones said the trial judge was correct. If the city’s
argument were sustained, she said, virtually all body camera and dashboard
camera recordings of police activity would be considered personnel records.

She
cited Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (2014) 59 Cal.4th
59, which held that identities of police officers involved in shootings are not
categorically exempt from disclosure under the CPRA.

Cases Compared

Jones
compared the two cases:

“Here
as in LBPOA, the City has not demonstrated the arrest video was ‘generated in
connection’ with Sergeant Laird’s appraisal or discipline. The video is
simply a visual record of the minor’s arrest….We conclude the arrest video is
akin to ‘information contained in the initial incident reports’ of an arrest,
which ‘are typically not ‘personnel records’’ as that term is defined in . . .
[Penal Code] section 832.8.”

The
mere possibility that an officer might face discipline as a result of what the
video camera captures, Jones elaborated, “does not transmute arrest videos into
disciplinary documentation or confidential personnel information.”

She
also rejected the city’s claim that because the department used the video as
“the backbone” of its internal investigation, it fell under Penal Code
§832.8(e), which subjects “complaints, or investigations of complaints” to the
Pitchess requirements.

The
argument is unsupported by the evidence the city submitted, Jones said. And
even if the city did rely on the video in its probe, the video does not come
under the statute because it was generated independently and in advance of any
investigation or administrative proceeding, the presiding justice declared.

The
case is City of Eureka v. Superior Court (Greenson). 16 S.O.S. 3651.