This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-252
entitled 'Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Recent Testing Raises Issues
About the Potential Effectiveness of Advanced Radiation Detection
Portal Monitors' which was released on November 17, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
Science and Technology, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST:
Tuesday, November 17, 2009:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
Recent Testing Raises Issues About the Potential Effectiveness of
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors:
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-10-252T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-252T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Homeland Securityís (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear
smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in the
nationís defenses against such threats. DHS has sponsored testing to
develop new monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP)
monitors, to replace radiation detection equipment being used at ports
of entry. DNDO expects that ASPs may offer improvements over current-
generation portal monitors, particularly the potential to identify as
well as detect radioactive material and thereby to reduce both the risk
of missed threats and the rate of innocent alarms, which DNDO considers
to be key limitations of radiation detection equipment currently used
by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at U.S. ports of entry. However,
ASPs cost significantly more than current generation portal monitors.
Due to concerns about ASPsí cost and performance, Congress has required
that the Secretary of Homeland Security certify that ASPs provide a
significant increase in operational effectiveness before obligating
funds for full-scale ASP procurement. In May 2009, GAO issued a report
(GAO-09-655) on the status of the ongoing ASP testing round.
This testimony (1) discusses the principal findings and recommendations
from GAOís May report on ASP testing and (2) updates those findings
based on information from DNDO and CBP officials on the results of
testing conducted since the reportís issuance. DHS, DNDO, and CBPís
oral comments on GAOís new findings were included as appropriate.
What GAO Found:
GAOís May 2009 report on ASP testing found that DHS increased the rigor
in comparison with previous tests and thereby added credibility to the
test results. However, GAOís report also questioned whether the
benefits of the ASPs justify its high cost. In particular, the DHS
criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness
require only a marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons-
usable nuclear materials, which DNDO considers a key limitation of
current-generation portal monitors. The marginal improvement required
of ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not completed
efforts to fine-tune current-generation equipment to provide greater
sensitivity. Moreover, the test results showed that ASPs performed
better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of such
materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat
guidance for setting detection thresholds, but that differences in
sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or
above that level. Finally, DNDO had not yet updated its cost-benefit
analysis to take into account the results of ASP testing and did not
plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional
insight into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification
even though test delays have allowed more time to conduct the
simulations. DNDO officials believed the other tests were sufficient
for ASPs to demonstrate a significant increase in operational
effectiveness. GAO recommended that DHS assess ASPs against the full
potential of current-generation equipment and revise the program
schedule to allow time to conduct computer simulations and to uncover
and resolve problems with ASPs before full-scale deployment. DHS agreed
to a phased deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems
but disagreed with the other recommendations, which GAO believes remain
valid.
The results of DNDOís most recent round of field testing raise
continuing issues. In July 2009, DNDO resumed the field testing of ASPs
that it initiated in January 2009 but suspended because of serious
performance problems. However, the July tests also revealed critical
performance deficiencies. For example, the ASP had a high number of
false positive alarms for the detection of certain nuclear materials.
According to CBP, these false alarms are very disruptive in a port
environment because any alarm for this type of nuclear material causes
CBP to take enhanced security precautions. To address these false
alarms, DNDO plans to modify the ASP to make these monitors less
sensitive to these nuclear materials and thereby diminishing the ASPsí
capability. As GAO reported earlier this year, previous testing results
demonstrated that the ASPs represented a marginal improvement in
detecting these materials. By reducing the sensitivity to nuclear
materials even further, it is uncertain exactly what improvement in
detecting these materials the ASPs are providing or whether DNDO might
be able to achieve a similar level of performance as the modified ASPs
by improving the current-generation portal monitors that are already in
place. In addition, the July 2009 testing also identified a critical
equipment failure, including an alert malfunction, which DNDO is taking
steps to resolve for future testing.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-252T] or key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841
or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work on the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) testing of advanced spectroscopic portal
(ASP) radiation detection monitors. One mission of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), an agency within DHS, includes screening cargo
and vehicles coming into this country for smuggled nuclear or
radiological material that could be used in an improvised nuclear
device or radiological dispersal device (a "dirty bomb"). To screen
cargo at ports of entry, CBP conducts primary inspections with
radiation detection equipment called portal monitors--large stationary
detectors through which cargo containers and vehicles pass as they
enter the United States. When radiation is detected, CBP conducts
secondary inspections using a second portal monitor to confirm the
original alarm and a handheld radioactive isotope identification device
to identify the radiation's source and determine whether it constitutes
a threat.
The polyvinyl toluene (PVT) portal monitors CBP currently uses for this
screening can detect radiation but cannot identify the type of material
causing an alarm. As a result, the monitors' radiation alarms can be
set off even by shipments of bananas, kitty litter, or granite tile
because these materials contain small amounts of benign, naturally
occurring radioactive material. To address the limitations of current-
generation portal monitors, DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) in 2005 began to develop and test ASPs, which are designed to
both detect radiation and identify the source.[Footnote 1] DNDO hopes
to use the new portal monitors to replace at least some PVTs currently
used for primary screening, as well as PVTs and handheld identification
devices currently used for secondary screening.
Since 2006, we have been reporting on issues associated with the cost
and performance of the ASPs and the lack of rigor in testing this
equipment. For example, we found that tests DNDO conducted in early
2007 used biased test methods that enhanced the apparent performance of
ASPs and did not use critical CBP operating procedures that are
fundamental to the performance of current handheld radiation detectors.
[Footnote 2] In addition, in 2008 we estimated the lifecycle cost of
each standard cargo version of the ASP (including deployment costs) to
be about $822,000, compared with about $308,000 for the PVT standard
cargo portal, and the total program cost for DNDO's latest plan for
deploying radiation portal monitors--which relies on a combination of
ASPs and PVTs and does not deploy radiation portal monitors at all
border crossings--to be about $2 billion.[Footnote 3]
Concerned about the performance and cost of the ASP monitors, Congress
required the Secretary of Homeland Security to certify that the
monitors will provide a "significant increase in operational
effectiveness" before DNDO obligates funds for full-scale ASP
procurement.[Footnote 4] In response, CBP, DNDO, and the DHS management
directorate jointly issued criteria for determining whether the new
technology provides a significant increase in operational
effectiveness. The primary screening criteria require that the new
portal monitors detect potential threats as well as or better than
PVTs, show improved performance in detection of highly enriched uranium
(HEU), and reduce by 80 percent the number of innocent alarms that are
sent to secondary inspection. To meet the secondary screening criteria,
the new portal monitors must reduce the probability of misidentifying
special nuclear material (e.g., HEU and plutonium) and the average time
to conduct secondary screenings.
DNDO designed and coordinated a new series of tests, originally
scheduled to run from April 2008 through September 2008, to determine
whether the new portal monitors meet the certification criteria and are
ready for deployment. Key phases of this round of testing include
concurrent testing led by DNDO of the new and current equipment's
ability to detect and identify threats and of ASPs' readiness to be
integrated into operations for both primary and secondary screening at
ports of entry; field validation testing led by CBP at four northern
and southern border crossings and two seaports; and an independent
evaluation, led by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate at one of
the seaports, of the new portal monitors' effectiveness and
suitability.
In May 2009, we reported on the results of the then-current round of
ASP testing.[Footnote 5] The findings from that report were based on
completed tests and preliminary results available at the time. Testing
on ASPs has continued since that report was issued. Today my testimony
will (1) discuss the principal findings and recommendations from our
May report and (2) update those findings based on the results of DNDO's
July 2009 ASP field validation testing. The findings we are presenting
today are based on our previous ASP reports and updated with
information collected during interviews with DNDO and CBP officials. We
also reviewed testing results in a report on the July 2009 tests from
the ASP Field Validation Advisory Panel, a panel made up of officials
from CBP, DNDO, and a national laboratory established to examine
testing results and provide recommendations. On November 12, 2009, we
briefed DHS, CBP, and DNDO officials on the findings of our updated
work. During the briefing, CBP and DNDO officials provided oral
comments and offered additional information and clarifications we
included in this testimony as appropriate. Both our prior work and our
updated work were conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to produce
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our statement today.
Improved Testing Rigor Discussed in Our May 2009 Report Demonstrates
Limitations of ASPs:
Our May 2009 report on the then-current round of ASP testing found that
DHS increased the rigor of ASP testing over that of previous tests, and
that a particular area of improvement was in the performance testing at
the Nevada Test Site, where DNDO compared the capability of ASP and
current-generation equipment to detect and identify nuclear and
radiological materials. For example, unlike in prior tests, the plan
for the 2008 performance test stipulated that the contractors who
developed the equipment would not be involved in test execution. This
improvement addressed concerns we previously raised about the potential
for bias and provided increased credibility to the results.
Nevertheless, based on the following factors, in our report we
questioned whether the benefits of the new portal monitors justify the
high cost:
* The DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational
effectiveness. Our chief concern with the criteria is that they require
only a marginal improvement over current-generation portal monitors in
the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials during
primary screening. DNDO considers detection of such materials to be a
key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. The marginal
improvement required of ASPs to meet the DHS criteria is problematic
because the detection threshold for the current-generation portal
monitors does not specify a level of radiation shielding that smugglers
could realistically use. Officials from the Department of Energy (DOE),
which designed the threat guidance DHS used to set the detection
threshold, and national laboratory officials told us that the current
threshold is based not on an analysis of the capabilities of potential
smugglers to take effective shielding measures but rather on the
limited sensitivity of PVTs to detect anything more than certain
lightly shielded nuclear materials. DNDO officials acknowledge that
both the new and current-generation portal monitors are capable of
detecting certain nuclear materials only when unshielded or lightly
shielded. The marginal improvement in detection of such materials
required of ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not
completed efforts to fine-tune PVTs' software using a technique called
"energy windowing" that could improve the PVTs' sensitivity to nuclear
materials. DNDO officials expect they can achieve small improvements in
sensitivity through energy windowing, but DNDO has not yet completed
efforts to fine-tune the PVTs' software. In contrast to the marginal
improvement required in detection of certain nuclear materials, the
primary screening requirement to reduce the rate of innocent alarms by
80 percent could result in hundreds of fewer secondary screenings per
day, thereby reducing CBP's workload. In addition, the secondary
screening criteria, which require ASPs to reduce the probability of
misidentifying special nuclear material by one-half, address the
limitations of relatively small handheld devices in consistently
locating and identifying potential threats in large cargo containers.
* Results of performance testing and field validation. The results of
performance tests that DNDO presented to us were mixed, particularly in
the ASPs' capability to detect certain shielded nuclear materials
during primary screening. The results of performance testing at the
Nevada Test Site showed that the new portal monitors detected certain
nuclear materials better than PVTs when shielding approximated DOE
threat guidance, which is based on light shielding. In contrast,
differences in system performance were less notable when shielding was
slightly increased or decreased: both the PVTs and ASPs were frequently
able to detect certain nuclear materials when shielding was below
threat guidance, and both systems had difficulty detecting such
materials when shielding was somewhat greater than threat guidance.
With regard to secondary screening, ASPs performed better than handheld
devices in identification of threats when masked by naturally occurring
radioactive material. However, the differences in the ability to
identify certain shielded nuclear materials depended on the level of
shielding, with increasing levels appearing to reduce any ASP
advantages over the handheld identification devices. Other phases of
testing uncovered multiple problems in meeting requirements for
successfully integrating the new technology into operations at ports of
entry. Of the two ASP contractors participating in the current round of
testing, one has fallen behind due to severe problems encountered
during testing of ASPs' readiness to be integrated into operations at
ports of entry ("integration testing"); the problems may require that
the vendor redo previous test phases to be considered for
certification. The other vendor's system completed integration testing,
but CBP suspended field validation testing in January 2009 after 2
weeks because of serious performance problems resulting in an overall
increase in the number of referrals for secondary screening compared
with existing equipment.
* DNDO's plans for computer simulations. As of May 2009, DNDO did not
plan to complete injection studies--computer simulations for testing
the response of ASPs and PVTs to simulated threat objects concealed in
cargo containers--prior to the Secretary of Homeland Security's
decision on certification even though delays to the ASP test schedule
have allowed more time to conduct the studies. According to DNDO
officials, injection studies address the inability of performance
testing to replicate the wide variety of cargo coming into the United
States and the inability to place special nuclear material and other
threat objects in cargo during field validation. DNDO had earlier
indicated that injection studies could provide information comparing
the performance of the two systems as part of the certification process
for both primary and secondary screening. However, DNDO subsequently
decided that performance testing would provide sufficient information
to support a decision on ASP certification. DNDO officials said they
would instead use injection studies to support effective deployment of
the new portal monitors.
* Lack of an updated cost-benefit analysis. DNDO had not updated its
cost-benefit analysis to take into account the results of ASP testing.
An updated analysis that takes into account the testing results,
including injection studies, might show that DNDO's plan to replace
existing equipment with ASPs is not justified, particularly given the
marginal improvement in detection of certain nuclear materials required
of ASPs and the potential to improve the current-generation portal
monitors' sensitivity to nuclear materials, most likely at a lower
cost. DNDO officials said they were updating the ASP cost-benefit
analysis and planned to complete it prior to a decision on
certification by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Our May report recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct DNDO to (1) assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for a
significant increase in operational effectiveness based on a valid
comparison with PVTs' full performance potential and (2) revise the
schedule for ASP testing and certification to allow sufficient time for
review and analysis of results from the final phases of testing and
completion of all tests, including injection studies. We further
recommended that, if ASPs are certified, the Secretary direct DNDO to
develop an initial deployment plan that allows CBP to uncover and
resolve any additional problems not identified through testing before
proceeding to full-scale deployment. DHS agreed to a phased deployment
that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with GAO's
other recommendations, which we continue to believe remain valid.
Results from July 2009 Testing Raise Continuing Issues:
The results of DNDO's most recent round of field validation testing,
which it undertook in July 2009, after our May report was released,
raise new issues. In July 2009, DNDO resumed the field testing of ASPs
at four CBP ports of entry that it initiated in January 2009 but
suspended because of serious performance problems. However, the July
tests also revealed ASP performance problems, including two critical
performance deficiencies. First, the ASP monitors had an unacceptably
high number of false positive alarms for the detection of certain high-
risk nuclear materials. According to CBP officials, these false alarms
are very disruptive in a port environment in that any alarm for this
type of nuclear material would cause CBP to take enhanced security
precautions because such materials (1) could be used in producing an
improvised nuclear device and (2) are rarely part of legitimate or
routine cargo. Furthermore, once receiving an alarm for this type of
nuclear material, CBP officers are required to conduct a thorough
secondary inspection to assure themselves that no nuclear materials are
present before permitting the cargo to enter the country. Repeated
false alarms for nuclear materials are also causes for concern because
such alarms could eventually have the effect of causing CBP officers to
doubt the reliability of the ASP and be skeptical about the credibility
of future alarms.
Secondly, during the July testing the ASP experienced a "critical
failure," which stemmed from a problem with a key component of the ASP
and caused the ASP to shut down. Importantly, during this critical
failure, the ASP did not alert the CBP officer that it had shut down
and was no longer scanning cargo. As a result, were this not in a
controlled testing environment, the CBP officer would have permitted
the cargo to enter the country thinking the cargo had been scanned,
when it had not. According to CBP officials, resolving this issue is
important in order to assure the stability and security of the ASP.
In addition to these key performance problems, the ASP was not able to
reduce referrals to secondary inspection by 80 percent as required by
the DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational
effectiveness. According to the report from the ASP Field Validation
Advisory Panel, a panel made up of officials from CBP, DNDO, and a
national laboratory, the ASP was able to reduce referrals to secondary
inspection by about 69 percent rather than the 80 percent as required
by the DHS criteria.
While the performance of the ASP during the July field validation
testing raises issues about its potential readiness for deployment,
DNDO's proposed solutions to address these performance problems raise
additional questions about whether this equipment will provide any
meaningful increase in the ability to detect certain nuclear materials.
Specifically, to address the problem of false positive alarms
indicating the presence of certain nuclear materials, according to DNDO
officials, DNDO has modified the ASP to make this equipment less
sensitive to these nuclear materials. While this may address the issue
of false positive alarms, it will also diminish the ASP capability of
detecting a key high-risk nuclear material. Since the ASP modification,
DNDO conducted computer simulations using a vendor-provided system
called a "replay tool" to examine the effect of the modification on the
ASP's performance. According to DNDO officials, the replay tool
demonstrated that the modified ASP will still be able to detect certain
nuclear materials better than the PVT. However, at this point, DNDO
does not plan to retest the ASP at the Nevada Test Site where it can
examine the effects of these modifications using actual nuclear
materials. As we reported earlier this year, the results of the testing
at the Nevada Test Site demonstrated that the ASPs represented a
marginal improvement in detecting certain nuclear materials. By
reducing the sensitivity to these materials and not retesting the
modified ASPs against actual nuclear materials, it is uncertain exactly
what improvement in detecting certain nuclear materials these costly
portal monitors are providing.
While DNDO is reducing the sensitivity of ASPs to certain nuclear
materials, it has yet to complete efforts to improve the PVT's ability
to detect these same materials through energy windowing. For several
years, CBP officials have repeatedly urged DNDO officials to complete
this research. However, it was not apparent from our discussions with
DNDO officials if this effort is making meaningful progress with the
development of energy windowing or when it will be completed.
Furthermore, CBP officials stated that, depending on the outcome of
this research, energy windowing could be the more cost effective way to
improve detection of certain nuclear materials. In our view, ASPs being
modified to diminish their capabilities to detect certain nuclear
materials raises questions about whether energy windowing might be able
to achieve a similar level of performance against these same materials
from the PVTs that are already in place.
Beyond reducing the sensitivity of ASPs to certain nuclear materials,
DNDO also plans to address the issue of critical failures by, among
other things, installing an indicator light on the ASP that will alert
CBP officers that the ASP has experienced a mission-critical failure
and is no longer scanning cargo. While this should address the issue of
CBP officers not knowing that the ASP has suffered a critical failure,
CBP officials stressed to us the need for the ASP to be stable and
secure enough to avoid these shutdowns.
In closing, the issues raised by the results of the July 2009 field
validation tests provide even greater reason for DNDO to address
recommendations from our May 2009 report. In particular, we reiterate
the importance of our prior recommendation for DNDO to assess whether
ASPs meet the criteria for a significant increase in operational
effectiveness based on a valid comparison with PVTs' full performance
potential, given that the ASPs will no longer be as effective in
detecting certain nuclear materials.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Dr. Timothy Persons (Chief
Scientist), Ned Woodward (Assistant Director), Joseph Cook, and Kevin
Tarmann made key contributions to this testimony. Kendall Childers,
Karen Keegan, Carol Kolarik, Jonathan Kucskar, Omari Norman, Alison
O'Neill, and Rebecca Shea also made important contributions.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DNDO was established within DHS in 2005; its mission includes
developing, testing, acquiring, and supporting the deployment of
radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry. CBP began
deploying portal monitors in 2002, prior to DNDO's creation, under the
radiation portal monitor project.
[2] Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure
Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T], (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007).
[3] Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and Deploy
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the
Department's Previous Cost Estimates. G[hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/AO-08-1108R], (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2008).
[4] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121
Stat. 1844, 2069 (2007); Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance,
and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 121 Stat.
3574, 3679 (2008); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2167 (2009).
[5] Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show
Limits of the New Technology, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-655] (Washington, D.C.: May 21,
2009).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAOís actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAOís Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: