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Platforma Obywatelska [PO, the Civic Platform] has been in power for 16 months.
It has avoided major blunders but also major successes. Perhaps it is for the
best: it is terrifying to think what might have happened if the government had
managed to push its election promises through Parliament during the months
following the election and if the global crisis had hit us at the early,
painful stages of reforms, and well before their benefits (if any) had been
felt.

In the course of these 16 months the
PO came up with a number of ideas, decisions and omissions that have managed to
antagonize, to varying degrees, a wide range of target groups: doctors and
nurses, customs officials, trade unionists, feminists, teachers, would-be early
retirees, parents of six-year olds, dockyard workers, scientists, the armaments
industry, market fundamentalists, Catholic traditionalists, the armed forces,
even some employers. Just like the previous right of centre AWS-UW government,
the PO-PSL [Polish People’s Party] coalition was quick to get into conflict
with the very groups that comprised its electoral backbone. None of these
conflicts may have been very heated, yet each of them involved a vital section
of the active electorate.

Common sense suggests that the
popularity of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the ruling coalition ought to
be waning rapidly, and that the opposition parties ought to be growing in
strength. Yet surveys show that no such thing is happening.

Apart from minor swings, opinion
polls carried out by various institutions show relatively solid support for the
PO. The opposition has attempted a variety of manoeuvres:
it has changed its image, hairstyles, faces, poetics, clothes, rhetoric,
programmes, alliances, target groups and travel routes around the country. The coalition
has argued and negotiated, announced a range of new projects, only to drop them
again, it has succeeded here and failed there, and in Olsztyn it has even been fighting with itself.
Something seems to be happening all the time, new fronts are being opened and
closed, every day someone wins and someone else loses but the balance of
political forces among the four main parties PO - PiS [Right and Justice] - SLD
[People’s Democratic Party] - PSL oscillates within a very narrow bandwidth.

However badly the opposition is
doing and however badly the coalition is doing, nothing seems to stick to the PO. For the PO’s wide
embrace includes a whole range of political attitudes, from the integrationist
Gowin to the libertarian Palikot, from the mildly liberal Boni to the market
fundamentalist Chlebowski, from the extremely exiguous Czuma to the always
moderate Komorowski….

By cleverly positioning itself at
the centre of the political scene and by building ingenious bridges between the
enormous spread of its branches, the PO has left little space and oxygen for any
of the other parties, particularly as they don’t seem to know what they are
about. The SLD cannot decide what it means to be left-wing today, while the PiS
has fallen into total, automatic opposition, throwing tantrums for the most
trivial of reasons and hysterically rejecting anything the PO says, even if it
means condemning their own ideas from 18 months earlier.

Anyone who was not an apparatchik
under the previous regime, is not a radical trade unionist, extreme
traditionalist or a xenophobe, and who wishes to support a party that has a
chance of getting into the Seym, will have great difficulty in finding their
positions represented outside of the PO. Real
opposition - coherent, sharply defined, with a consistent and transparent programme,
such as the LPR [the League of Polish Families] on the right and the SDPL [Social
Democratic Party of Poland] on the left - is either extra-parliamentary or stands
almost no chance of entering the next Parliament, or both. Moreover, there is
no indication that this situation is likely to change. One year ago the
Platform won the election because the electorate saw it as the main anti-PiS
party. These days the PO dominates the scene
because nobody has managed to offer a sensible alternative.

Anchored in the centre

However, even if the PiS or the SLD
should come up with alternative programmes and sensible visions for Poland, just
now it does not seem likely that Polish society would be convinced. For the Poles
the recent governments led by the PiS (2005-2007) and the SLD (2001-2005) are
still fresh in the memory. Too fresh to believe the dovelike smiles of the PiS Chairman
Kaczyński (who, nevertheless, stubbornly promotes [the hawkish] politician
Antoni Macierewicz and people supported by [the fundamentalist Catholic] Radio
Maryja or the left-wing statements by SLD Chairman Napieralski (who tried to
include [former SLD Prime Minister] Leszek Miller on the European Parliament
electoral list).

At the moment, there is apparently
no viable alternative to the Civic Platform as Poland’s ruling party. And we’re
not just talking about the current Parliament but rather the next one, perhaps
even the one after that. Yes, I know, this is what some commentators have already
said once before, especially following the SLD landslide victory in 2001, when
all the other parties were in a state of collapse. And, to a lesser degree, they
said so after the triumph of AWS [the Solidarity Election Action, a now defunct
right-wing party] in 1997. However, those were different situations. The SLD
did not manage the shift from the left to the centre although Leszek Miller did
try this manoeuvre by flirting with the neoliberals and neoconservatives. The AWS,
in its turn, not only did not manage to position itself in the centre (which
was occupied by Unia Wolności [The Freedom Union]) but was unable to create a
united right-wing front.

Unlike its predecessors, the
Platform, as ruling party, has anchored itself firmly in the centre while at
the same time retaining a strong position on the moderate right and
successfully spreading its tentacles left of the centre. If we were to look for
analogies, we would probably have to look at the experience of Britain where
the development of political PR and an erosion of the two-party system resulted
in long-term periods of domination by the Conservative Party (1979-1997)
followed by the Labour party (1997 till now). The situation was similar in Germany where
the Social Democrats held power continuously from 1969 until 1982.

However, the PO
is in a more comfortable position because, by expanding equally to the left and
right of centre, it has forced its rivals to choose between meaningless
moderation and an obviously marginal radicalism. Having been pushed out of the
centre that is occupied by the PO, its rivals
have little room for manoeuvre and each of them has to watch their flank. On
the right flank, the PiS is bogged down in a continuous war with Roman
Giertych, Marek Jurek and Father Rydzyk [of Radio Maryja]. The SLD meanwhile
cannot afford to allow the creation of a strong, sharply defined left that is trying
to emerge somewhere between the growing “Krytyka Polityczna” [Political
Critique] and SDPL.

As a result, the domination by the
PO seems to be permanently entrenched. This
certainly applies to the parliamentary election cycle. Its rivals are
increasingly aware of this, as are the Platform’s politicians. And this, in
turn, has started to profoundly change the fabric of Polish politics.

This situation puts Donald Tusk -
party leader, Prime Minister and candidate in the forthcoming presidential
elections - in a very comfortable position, at least in the short term. Above
all, the Prime Minister can feel certain that no member of his crew will jump
overboard. For there is nothing on the far side of the deck. The PO is like a boat anchored in dry docks. Anyone wishing
to escape will perish, smashed up on the hard concrete surface of the political
system. There is little danger of the M.P. Jarosław Gowin taking offence and
leaving the party, should the parliamentary club reject his bioethical
projects, or of Jacek Saryusz-Wolski slamming the party door if Danuta Hübner were
offered a prestigious place on the electoral list in his stead and Jerzy Buzek landed
a prestigious post in Brussels.
And [the enfant terrible of Polish politics] Janusz Palikot is also more likely
to suffer further reprimands humbly and promise to behave, even if he has no
intention of doing so.

This unchallenged domination
enables Tusk to control the situation in the rival parties as well. He has just
lured away from the SLD two key candidates in the forthcoming presidential
elections. He has bought Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz by supporting his candidacy
for the post of Secretary of the Council of Europe. He acquired Danuta Hübner in
exchange for a place on the European Parliament list. Tusk does not have to
worry that his numerous voters and friends will not like it. What can they do
apart from frowning quietly? And Hübner and Cimoszewicz are booty worth a
sin. There are no other personalities around, so the Prime Minister can be sure
that the Left will put up at least two candidates. And that will mean that the
only real challenger will be Lech Kaczyński - who no longer stands a chance of
winning, and thus Donald Tusk may win in the first round.

In the same way, the PO can afford to allow public debate of controversial issues
such as euthanasia, in vitro fertilization and abortion. Even if Tusk’s
contribution to the debate is somewhat bland and does not satisfy anyone, those
who are dissatisfied cannot drop his party because they have nowhere else to
go. This applies not only to politicians but also to voters. So what if the band
of those disappointed in the Prime Minister, the government and the Platform keeps
growing? They are not likely to switch to the PiS. And they are equally
unlikely to start supporting Napieralski’s SLD. They might grumble, they might
even be angry with the PO for nominating Anna Fotyga [Foreign Minister under
the PiS government] as Poland’s Ambassador to the UN, they might fume about the
government’s anti-crisis policies and all its other blunders but - as [commentator]
Seweryn Blumsztajn said on his radio show - they keep repeating that as long as
the PiS is still strong heavy-handed criticism of the government is not
advisable, even if particular actions by individual PO politicians can be
criticized.

Weakness in diversity?

With the PiS lurking around the
corner Tusk’s Platform feels like a column of settlers surrounded by
bloodthirsty Indians. Everyone knows that if they let themselves be split up
they can say goodbye to their scalps. However, this does not mean that the
Poles do not have any de facto political options. However, the genuine
alternatives, the arguments that can have real influence on life, the credible,
substantive political differences are to be found within the ruling Platform
rather than between it and its rivals. And this, too, has created a new
situation, as yet unfamiliar on the Polish political scene.

An essential aspect of this new
situation is a growing awareness among all interest groups (from the feminists
and pro-life activists, trade unions, employers, professional and ideological
lobbies to shady wheeler-dealers) that the only way to get anything out of this
government, to influence legislation, policies, state economic policies, is to
find someone within the ruling party who will represent their interests. The
wide spread of the Platform would seem to be ideally suited to this. However,
with increasing tensions caused by disparate interests, the broad
representation which currently enables the party to maintain widespread support
will become the source of growing pressure, scandals and internal rifts that could
drive it to the point of disintegration.

In the short run, it might be
possible to contain, for example, the controversy over bio-ethical issues
within the Platform so that practically every position is represented within
the ruling party. Similarly, the debate on fighting the crisis may one day
follow the monetary logic of Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski, and the next day
the more interventionist sympathies of Secretary of State Michał Boni. It is
possible to announce budget cuts one day, and tax increases the next. It is
possible to feed the left in the morning and the right in the evening, or the
other way around. However, sooner or later some decisions will have to be
taken.

Tensions will grow even if they
are not reflected in opinion polls for some time to come. Increasingly, they
will paralyse decision-making processes (for example, those relating to the
current economic crisis), impose dysfunctional, rotten compromises (as in the
case of the missile shield) and push the government into seeking absurd quid
pro quo solutions (nominating Fotyga to the UN Ambassadorship to please some, and
Cimoszewicz to the Council of Europe to appease others).

Spread-eagled across much of the
political scene, PO will thus increasingly
come to resemble the single party rule of the previous regime, when factions
used to play the role of pluralist representation of diverse points of view,
factional wars replaced political debate and political decisions depended on
who happened to have better access to the leader’s ear. Such a situation is not
conducive to rational politics.

The fate of the Prime Minister

Pleasant as it may be for the
government to be treated with generosity or calculated tolerance by the greater
part of the political milieu, it could also be dangerous. A government can be
lulled into a sense of false security, which can even deprive it of its instinct
of self-preservation The recent defeat of the PO’s candidate in the Olsztyn mayoral
elections demonstrates that this process is already under way. Convinced that
victory was in its pocket, the overconfident Platform put up a candidate who
had little local support, thus engineering its own defeat.

Another danger for the government
lurks in the inevitable attracting of parasites, which are drawn to all governments
but especially to long-enduring ones. The Platform has not been and will not be
an exception. If Donald Tusk is not careful in this matter, he will end up just
like his predecessor Leszek Miller.

A sense of security also induces
the kind of tactical thinking that is dangerous in the long run. Since we face no
immediate threats, sometimes we can ease up for the sake of some peace and
quiet. We don’t have to try particularly hard. We think we can get away with
the odd mistake. After all, nobody will switch allegiance to the PiS just
because, for example, the Prime Minister played football instead of voting in
the Seym, or went skiing instead of developing plans to combat the financial
crisis, or even because he brutally fired a good justice minister in an
emotional fit and brought in someone as objectionable as Andrzej Czuma.

However, impunity is an illusion.
Even if the PO government’s mistakes and its MPs’
excesses have not yet cost it any votes, someone will have to pay for them. And
opinion polls already show who it is. While support for the Platform remains
steady, the same cannot be said for its leader. Donald Tusk’s political
position is weakening not only in absolute terms but also in comparison with
other PO leaders.

During his year in office Donald
Tusk not only stopped being the most popular member of his government (being
overtaken by Radosław Sikorski in January) but was also the only PO leader
whose net popularity (i.e. the difference between those who trust him and those
who don’t) decreased over the past year – by a third. In the same period other PO leaders’ popularity increased substantially. In this
respect, too, the situation is reminiscent of the previous regime. When it is
impossible or difficult to change the ruling party, it is the leader who
attracts most blame. Under communism the Polish authorities coined the slogan
“Socialism yes - distortion no”; its equivalent under a democratic system of a
dominant single party would be the slogan “Party yes - leader no”. It is
therefore not out of the question that Donald Tusk will share the fate of
Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, Willy Brandt and many other leaders of dominant
parties who had to depart the scene even though their parties did not lose
public support and power.

If a single party stays in power
for too long the country may benefit more than the party itself, since one
parliamentary term is usually not enough to carry out coherent and consistent
reforms. Parties that hand over power after four years usually leave office having
completed at most half of their projects. And their successors usually do not
complete it either. We experienced this most painfully when Buzek’s and
Balcerowicz’s government was forced out before it had a chance to complete four
major reforms. The imperative of their completion still haunts us in the form
of the disasters hanging over Poland
in the area of social security, health system, education and local government.
It is, however, impossible to tell if these reforms were any good because
nobody knows what their effect would have been had they been completed.

The fate of the party

In this respect a long-term
dominant position puts the Platform under the obligation of treading
particularly firmly. If the Platform hands over power in seven or eleven years
it won’t be able to blame anything on lack of time, useless coalition partners,
a malicious president or obstruction by opposition parties. Everything that
will happen in Poland at
that time will be the PO’s credit or fault.

The experience of the British
Conservatives and German Social Democrats demonstrates that the longer the
system of one dominant party survives the more painful is its eventual decline.
However, as painful declines go, it was the centrist Christian Democratic Party
in Italy
that experienced the worst. After dominating the country for nearly half a
century it dissolved itself in 1993 as a result of massive scandals. When the
system broke down the party leaders’ careers ended in court or in political
retirement. Only very few managed to pass unscathed through the sieve of the
uncompromising judge di Pietro.

In democracy a dominant single
party can rule for a long time - but not forever. That much is obvious.
However, it is less obvious what it will leave behind. The Italian case
demonstrates that it is not so much the rule by a dominant party that poses the
greatest threat but rather the subsequent rise to power of its marginalized,
fragmented successors who grow increasingly radicalized and who have lost all
sense of responsibility. In this respect the PO,
as the dominant party, bears a particular responsibility, not only in relation
to what it does or does not do but also as to how its policies will affect the
evolution of the political scene. Its lasting legacy will depend on what happens
to their decisions when someone else takes power in Poland - sooner or later.