Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be
considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-204

AUGUST TERM, 2003

In re A.L., Juvenile

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APPEALED FROM:

Addison Family
Court

DOCKET NO.12-03-01 Anjv

Trial Judge: Helen M. Toor

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Mother appeals from a family court judgment terminating her
residual parental rights to the minor, A.L. Mother contends the court improperly
focused on her non-compliance with the conditions for reunification rather than
the adequacy of her parenting skills. We affirm.

The Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services first
became involved with mother in 1999 based on substantiated reports of neglect of
A.L., then one year old, and her two-month old sibling. During the next two
years, SRS received numerous additional reports of serious physical and medical
neglect by mother of A.L. and her two younger brothers, including reports from
the Health Department and the child= s
pediatrician, the Parent Child Center, and others detailing mother=
s failure to attend medical appointments, failure to maintain benefits for the
children= s basic needs, filthy home
conditions, and multiple instances of leaving the children unattended for long
periods. In March 2001, SRS took custody of the children, each of whom has a
different father. Five months later, mother had a fourth child by still another
father. This fourth child has been placed in his father=
s custody. A.L.= s father lives out of
state and has voluntarily relinquished his parental rights

A.L. was adjudicated CHINS after a contested merits hearing
in April 2001. Between the time A.L. was taken into custody in March and the
initial disposition report in June, mother missed twelve of twenty scheduled
visits with A.L. The case plan adopted by the court in June called for
reunification based on a number of requirements, including weekly counseling,
maintaining part-time employment, meetings with a parent educator, and attending
visits with the children. The disposition report indicated that if reunification
efforts were not successful by August the Department would seek termination of
parental rights.

SRS filed a termination petition in January 2002, based on
mother= s non-compliance with the plan
despite the extra five months of services. In May, following a hearing, the
court approved an agreement in which mother voluntarily relinquished her
parental rights to two of A.L= s
younger siblings, and agreed to continue to work toward reunification with A.L.
for the next six months by working with a parent educator, maintaining
employment, engaging in counseling, cooperating with A.L.=
s foster parent, and fulfilling certain other requirements. In October, SRS
re-filed the termination petition. Following a four day hearing in December, the
court issued a written decision granting the petition. This appeal followed.

Mother= s sole
contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly focused on her level of
compliance with the conditions for reunification rather than the adequacy of her
parenting skills. The court= s
findings do, indeed, describe in detail mother=
s history of general non-compliance with the case plan requirements, and mother
has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying these findings.
The court acknowledged that there were areas where mother had made some
progress, and that some of the foster mother=
s expectations were unrealistic. Nevertheless, the court=
s extensive findings B supported by
the overwhelming evidence B indicate a
consistent overall pattern of non-compliance. Furthermore, the court properly
focused on mother= s non-compliance
with the case plan to establish a change of circumstances
B or stagnation
B as the first step in determining the
merits of the petition. See In re D.B., 161 Vt. 217, 219-20 (1993) (court
may terminate parental rights if it finds a substantial change of circumstances
and that termination is in child= s
best interests; failure to meet expectations of case plan may be basis for
finding stagnation).

Although mother claims that the court was
A preoccupied@
with compliance issues to the exclusion of explaining what impact her
non-compliance actually had on her parenting skills, the decision does not
support the claim. Having found stagnation, the court went on to examine whether
termination was in the child= s best
interests under the statutory criteria set forth in 33 V.S.A.
' 5540. The court found that mother=
s consistent failure to keep visitation, medical, and other appointments
reflected negatively on her interaction with the child and her role in the child=
s life, and created constant stress in the relationship. See id.
' 5540(1) & (4) (best interests
analysis includes A the interaction
and interrelationship of the child with his natural parents@
and A [w]hether the natural parent has
played and continues to play a constructive role@
). As to the critical question of mother=
s ability to resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable period of
time, id. ' 5540 (3), the court
noted that despite two years of intensive services, mother had not been able to
complete her counseling and educational obligations under the case plan or
regularly keep appointments in the child=
s interest, indicating that she remained unable to focus on the child=
s needs and place them ahead of her own. The court thus concluded that mother
remained unable to responsibly parent the minor, now or in the foreseeable
future. Finally, the court found that A.L. had established an extremely strong
bond with her foster parents and foster siblings, and was thriving in her new
school and community. Id. '
5540(2).

We thus discern no basis to conclude that the trial court
failed to address the proper factors in its decision, which was amply supported
by the evidence and findings.