Background

The Almaz S-300P/S-400 family
of Surface to Air Missile systems is without doubt the most capable SAM
system in widespread use in the Asia Pacific region. From its genesis
during the 1970s this former Soviet PVO system has continuously
evolved,
through a series of incremental and larger enhancements.

At this time the PLA is the largest single user of this family of
weapons, after the Russian Federation which inherited the considerable
inventory operated by the Voyska PVO.

While the S-300P/S-400 series is often labelled as 'Russia's Patriot',
the system in many key respects is more capable than the US Patriot
series, and in later variants offers mobility performance and thus
survivability much better than that of the Patriot. The introduction of
the 64N6 Big Bird series of phased array acquisition radars in later
variants provides them with many of the capabilities of the US SPY-1
Aegis system, in a highly mobile SAM system.

From an Australian perspective the deployment of large numbers of the
S-300P/S-400 family of missiles in Asia is of major concern. Rapidly
deployable, high survivable, and highly lethal, these weapons are
especially difficult to counter and require significant capabilities to
robustly defeat. The US Air Force currently envisages the F-22A Raptor
as the primary weapon used to defeat these capable systems.

It is important to note that no F/A-18 variant, nor the Joint Strike
Fighter, were designed to penetrate the coverage of the S-300P/S-400 systems. The survivability
of these aircraft will not be significantly better than that of legacy
combat aircraft.
With the penetration of the internet into Russia, significant volumes
of imagery and technical material covering this system have become
available in the public domain. This webpage concentrates some of this
material with the aim of providing a resource for military intelligence
and strategy professionals.

Strategic Context

Both the Almaz S-300P/S-400
(SA-10, SA-20) and Antey S-300V (SA-12) SAM systems grew out of
the disappointments of Vietnam and the Yom Kippur wars, where single
digit S-75/SA-2, S-125/SA-3 and 3M9/SA-6 series SAMs were soundly
defeated in combat by the US and Israelis respectively. Designed for
the
high density battlespace of late Cold War central Europe, the S-300P
and S-300V series of SAMs represent the pinnacle of Soviet Cold War era
SAM technology, with no effort spared to push the technological
envelope. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, both systems have
continued to evolve, benefitting immeasurably from large scale access
to
Western technology markets, and Western computational technology to
support further design effort. Against the current benchmark in Western
SAM technology, the Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 system, both the S-300P and
S-300V series remain highly competitive.

5V28E /
SA-5
Gammon

It should come as no surprise
that the US publicly expressed concerns about the possibility of Serbia
and Iraq acquiring these systems prior to the OAF and OIF air campaigns
- the presence of these systems could have dramatically changed the
nature of both air campaigns. With superb missile kinematics, high
power-aperture phased array radar capability, high jam resistance and
high mobility, the S-300P series and S-300V would have required
unusually intense defence suppression effort, changing the character
and
duration of both air campaigns. The political fracas surrounding the
Cypriot order for S-300PMU1, and the long standing intent of both North
Korea and Iran to purchase large numbers of late model S-300P
underscore this point.

In US terminology, the double
digit S-300P series and S-300V systems represent anti-access
capabilities - designed to make it unusually difficult if not
impossible to project air power into defended airspace. The B-2A and
F-22A were both developed with these threat systems in mind, and are
still considered to be the only US systems capable of robustly
defeating
these weapons. The technique for defeating them is a combination of
wideband all aspect stealth and highly sensitive radio-frequency ESM
receivers, combined with offboard sources of near-realtime Intelligence
Surveillance Reconaissance (ISR) data on system locations.

Aircraft with no stealth, reduced
RCS capabilities, or limited aspect stealth, such as the F-15E, F-16C,
F/A-18E/F, Eurofighter Typhoon and JSF are all presented with the
reality that high to medium altitude penetration incurs a very highly
risk of engagement by either of these weapon systems. It is perhaps
ironic that the only reliable defence for aircraft lacking top tier all
aspect stealth capability is high speed low altitude terrain masking
using Terrain Following Radar, supplemented by offboard near-realtime
ISR data, support jamming and standoff missiles. Australia's F-111s, if
used cleverly, were arguably much more survivable against this class of
technology than the vast majority of newer types in service - it should
come as no surprise that the Bundes-Luftwaffe in Germany developed the
terrain following Tornado ECR Wild Weasel precisely around this regime
of attack on the SA-10/20/12.

That the Canberra DoD leadership
opted in 2002 to wholly ignore the arrival of the
S-300P series SAMs in the Asia-Pacific region, in their long term force
structure planning,
is
nothing less than remarkable and raises some very serious questions
about how well the capabilities of these systems are actually
understood
in the halls of the Canberra Russell Offices. Despite repeated
proposals by a great
many parties, there are no plans to equip the RAAF with anti-radiation
missiles or support jamming aircraft, there was an ongoing drive for
early F-111 retirement, and the F-22A Raptor, the US solution to the
S-300P problem, is generally dismissed as being too good for
Australia.

Unlike Sukhoi Su-27/30 fighters
which many expect will require a robust support infrastructure,
intensive training, good tactics and talented fighter pilots to
operate,
all taking time to mature into a viable capability, the S-300P/S-300V
series SAMs were designed for austere support environments, to be
operated and maintained largely by Soviet era conscripts. Therefore the
integration of these weapons into wider and nearer regional force
structures will not incur the delays and difficulties expected by some
observers with the Sukhois. A package of S-300P/S-300V batteries could
be operationally viable within months of deployment in the region, and
earlier if contract Russian or Ukrainian personnel are hired to bring
them online faster. The notion of fifteen years warning time looks a
little absurd, given that these systems can proliferate and
operationally mature as capabilities within one to two years.

With the first generation of
these SAMs deployed during the early 1980s, currently marketed variants
are third and fourth generation evolutions of the basic design, mature
systems built with characteristic Russian robustness and simplicity
where possible.

In recent years the accelerated
marketing tempo of the desperate Russian industry has seen a
surprisingly large amount of detailed technical material on these
weapons appear in the public domain, with publications like Military
Parade, Vestnik PVO, Missiles.ru and Russkaya Sila posting detailed
summaries and
data on Internet websites, albeit mostly accessible only to readers of
Russian. Other former Warpac nations have also been surprisingly open
in
sharing information on these weapons. Given the availability of this
data it is now possible to compile more comprehensive analyses of these
weapons, than of equivalent US products such as the Patriot. This
analysis is based largely upon Russian sources.

The arrival of S-300P and S-300V
missile systems in the region radically changes the strategic
environment, both from the perspective of the US and Australia. These
highly capable systems are not invincible, but require significant
investment into specialised capabilities to defeat them - prohibitive
losses in
aircraft and aircrew otherwise might occur. As they are less demanding
to operate than modern combat aircraft, operators across the broader
region will be able to achieve combat effective proficiency faster than
with the Su-27/30. In practical terms the S-300P/S-300V SAMs are a
viable deterrent against air forces without the technological and
especially intellectual capital to tackle them - and in many respects
better value
for money than the Su-27/30. Their failure to sell in larger numbers
reflects more than anything poor marketing by Russia's industry.

The US Air Force's approach to
defeating these SAMs is conceptually simple: the F-22A exploiting its
all aspect wideband stealth, supercruise, high altitude and sensitive
ESM warning capability will kill the engagement and acquisition radars
using guided weapons., primarily the GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb. High
power standoff support jamming was to have been provided by the
cancelled program for B-52H aircraft equipped with electronically
steerable high
power jamming pods, standoff ISR support will be provided by
systems
such as the RC-135V/W, E-8C and since cancelled E-10 MC2A. Standoff or
highly
stealthy ISR capabilities will be necessary - the current generation of
high altitude UAVs like the RQ-1B and RQ-4A /B are not survivable in
airspace covered by the S-300P/S-300V systems.

Conventional unstealthy, or
partially stealthy combat aircraft will have difficulty surviving
within
the coverage of the S-300P/S-300V systems - the high transmit power,
large radar and missile seeker apertures, low sidelobes, generous use
of monopulse angle tracking and extensive ECCM features make these
systems difficult to jam effectively. Self protection jammers will need
to produce relatively high X-band power output, and exploit monopulse
angle tracking deception techniques - Digital RF Memory techniques with
high signal fidelity are nearly essential. Even so the challenges in
defeating these systems with a self protection jammer are not trivial -
raw power-aperture does matter in this game.

In practical terms, low level
terrain masking to remain below the radar horizon of these systems,
combined with good standoff ISR, support jamming and a low radar
signature standoff missile, is the only reliable defence for an
aircraft
with anything greater than insect sized all aspect radar signature. For
instance the JSF's forward sector stealth is likely to be adequate, but
its aft and beam sector stealth performance will not be, especially
considering
the wavelengths of many of the radars in question - a JSF driver runs a
real risk of taking a 3,000 lb hypersonic SAM up his tailpipe if he
cannot kill the target SAM engagement radar in his first pass. For the
JSF, integration of a terrain following radar mode in its AESA radar is
not an unusual technical challenge, incurring only modest development
cost. The bigger bite will be in shortened airframe fatigue life
resulting from fast low level penetration with a modestly swept wing
design.

Of the current crop of
conventional fighters
in Western service, the most survivable are those with good TFRs - the
F-111, Tornado and F-15E if fitted with the LANTIRN TFR pod - all
requiring a high performance EW suite.

A weakness of both the
S-300P/S-300V systems is that they are severely radar horizon limited
in
a fully mobile configuration. The addition of mast mounted acquisition
radars to extend their low level footprint severely impairs the
mobility of the battery.

The popular idea of shooting
cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles or standoff missiles at the
S-300P/S-300V battery, assuming its location is known, is only viable
where such a weapon has a sufficiently low radar signature to penetrate
inside the minimum engagement range of the SAM before being detected -
anything less will see the inbound missile killed by a self defensive
SAM shot. The current Russian view of this is to sell Tor M2E/SA-15D
Gauntlet and Pantsir S1/S2 / SA-22 self-propelled point defence SAM
systems as a rapid reaction
close in defensive Counter-PGM system to protect the S-300P/S-300V
battery by
shooting down the incoming missile if it gets past the S-300P/S-300V
SAMs. Integration of the new Fakel 9M96 series point defence SAM would
provide an organic Counter-PGM defensive capability in the battery.

In summary, current RAAF force
structure plans do not provide for a robust long term capability to
defeat the S-300P/S-300V class of SAMs - weapons which are very likely
to be encountered during coalition operations, and most likely,
regional
operations over the coming two or more decades. If the RAAF wishes to
remain competitive in this developing regional environment, further
intellectual and material investment will be needed.

Almaz
S-300P/PT Volkhov-M6 / SA-10A Grumble A

Зенитный Ракетный
Комплекс
С-300П/ПT

The earliest origins of the
S-300P series lie in the mid 1960s, when the Soviet Voyska PVO and
Ministry of Military Production initiated its development. The aim was
to produce an area defence SAM system capable of replacing the largely
ineffective S-75/SA-2 Guideline and S-200/SA-5 Gammon systems, neither
of which performed well against low flying Wild Weasels, low RCS
targets
or US support jamming aircraft. The original intent was to design a
common SAM system for the Voyska-PVO (Air Defence Forces),
Voenno-Morskiy Flot (Navy) and the PVO-SV (Air Defence Corps of the Red
Army) but divergent service needs across these three users soon saw
commonality drop well below 50%. Ultimately the V-PVO's S-300P series
and PVO-SV's S-300V series diverged so completely to become largely
unique systems.

The design aims of the original
S-300P were to produce a strategic area defence SAM system, intended
to protect fixed targets such as government precincts, industrial
facilities, command posts and headquarters, military bases, strategic
and tactical airfields and nuclear sites. This weapon system was to
initially defeat SAC's SRAM firing FB-111As, B-52Hs and then
anticipated
B-1As, and later the Boeing AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile. The
deployment model of the first generation systems was based on the
existing S-75/SA-2, S-125/SA-3 and S-200/SA-5 systems, with a
semi-mobile package of towed trailer mounted radars and missile
Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL).

5P85-1
TEL
(Author)

The S-300P introduced some
important technological innovations. The first generation V-500/5V55
missile used a single stage solid rocket motor, and conceptually is
closest to the baseline US Army MIM-104 Patriot. The missile was
deployed and handled in a sealed cylindrical launch tube/canister, with
a cold start gas generator used to eject the missile vertically
before
its motor was initiated. The 5P85 TEL was a semi-trailer arrangement,
with the forward booms splayed when deployed as stabilisers. The four
launch tubes were mounted on a hydraulically elevated frame, retained
in later TEL designs. A typical battery would be equipped with three
5P85 TELs, each with four SAMs, or double the SAM complement of the
S-75/SA-2 it replaced and permitting 2 rounds per launch. The
designation of this TEL following a mid life block upgrade became
5P85-1.

5N63
Flap Lid
A Engagement Radar (радиолокатор подсвета и наведения)

The first generation of the
S-300P's 5N63 (later 30N6) Flap Lid A engagement/fire control radar was
also
innovative, and clearly influenced by the Raytheon MPQ-53 engagement
radar for the MIM-104 Patriot. The Flap Lid, like the MPQ-53, uses a
10,000 element transmissive passive shifter technology phased array,
with a space
(a.k.a. optical) feed into the rear plane of the antenna, using a
microwave lens feed and a complex monopulse horn arrangement. The Flap
Lid's antenna stows
flat on the roof of the radar cabin, which was initially deployed on a
trailer towed by a Ural-357, KrAZ-255 or KrAZ-260 6x6 tractor. The
whole
radar cabin is mounted on a turntable and used to slew the phased array
to cover a 60 degree sector of interest.

MPQ-53
Patriot

The 5N63 was a huge generational
leap in technology from the Fan Song, Low Blow and Square Pair
mechanically steered and scanned engagement radars on preceding V-PVO
SAMs. With electronic beam steering, very low sidelobes and a narrow
pencil beam mainlobe, the 30N6 phased array is more difficult to detect
and track by an aircraft's warning receiver when not directly painted
by
the radar, and vastly more difficult to jam. While it may have
detectable backlobes, these are likely to be hard to detect from the
forward sector of the radar. As most anti-radiation missiles rely on
sidelobes to home in, the choice of engagement geometry is critical in
attempting to kill a Flap Lid.

Unlike the Patriot's MPQ-53
engagement radar which has substantial autonomous search capability,
the 5N63 is primarily an engagement radar designed to track
targets
and guide missiles to impact using a command link channel. The absence
of dedicated directional antennas on this system indicates that the
commands are transmitted via a specialised waveform emitted by the main
array. The first generation of the 5V55K missile was command link
guided, following the design philosophy of the S-75/SA-2 and
S-125/SA-3,
with a cited range of 25 nautical miles and altitude limits between 80
ft and 80,000 ft.

S-300PT
5P85-1
TEL

This variant was designated the
S-300PT (P - PVO, T -Transportiruyemiy) and incrementally upgraded
models the S-300PT-1, it entered service in 1978. NATO labelled it the
SA-10A Grumble.

36D6/ST-68UM/5N59
Tin
Shield
(РАДИОЛОКАЦИОННАЯ
СТАНЦИЯ)

Two search and acquisition radars
were introduced to support the S-300PT, both with 360 degree coverage.
The 3D 36D6/ST-68UM/5N59 Tin Shield was used for high and medium
altitude targets, and the 2D 76N6 Clam Shell for low altitude low RCS
targets.

36D6
Tin
Shield

The 36D6 Tin Shield is semimobile
and towed by a KrAZ-255 or -260 tractor, it can be deployed or stowed
in
one hour, or two with the mast. The design uses a large paraboloid
cylindrical section primary reflector and a linear element array
deployed on a pair of booms to provide electronic beam steering in
elevation from -20 to +30 degrees, the antenna can perform a full 360
degree sweep in 5 to 10 seconds. With a transmitter peak power rating
cited between 1.23 MegaWatts and 350 kiloWatts, the manufacturer claims
the ability to detect a 0.1 square metre RCS target at 300 ft AGL out
to
24.8 nautical miles, and at medium to high altitudes to 94.5 nautical
miles. Clutter rejection is claimed to exceed 48 dB, and the system can
track 100 targets. An IFF system is integrated in the radar.

LEMZ
5N66/5N66M/76N6 Clam Shell (низковысотный
обнаружитель)

Its sibling, the 5N66/5N66M/76N6
Clam Shell
low level early warning radar, is an unconventional frequency modulated
continuous wave design, using a split antenna arrangement with a large
beak to prevent spillover from the transmitter. Quoted performance
figures include the detection of targets with an RCS as low as 0.02
square metres, at speeds of up to 1,400 kt, with a bearing resolution
of
1 degree, velocity resolution of 9.3 kt and range resolution of 2.15
NM. Quoted RMS tracking errors are 0.3 degree in bearing, 4.7 kt in
velocity and 1 NM in range. Chaff rejection performance is quoted at
better than 100 dB, detection range is stated to be 50 NM for targets
at
1,500 ft altitude, and 65 NM for 3,000 ft altitude. The transmitter
delivers 1.4 kW of CW power at an unspecified carrier frequency, system
MTBF is quoted at 100 hr with an MTTR of 0.5 hr.

An important feature of the
S-300PT was the introduction of the semi-mobile 40V6, 40V6M and 40V6MD
masts, towed by a MAZ-543 derived tractor, in turn based on the 1966
Scud launcher vehicle. The 23.8 metre tall 40V6, 40V6M could be used to
elevate the Clam Shell, Tin Shield and Flap Lid radars to extend their
radar horizon and improve clearance in uneven terrain. The double
height 37.8 metre tall 40V6MD has been used with the Flap Lid, Clam
Shell, and its recent 96L6 replacement. The masts take 1 to 2
hours to erect. The unique 40V6 series masts permit static or
semimobile S-300P series SAM systems extended low level coverage not
available in any competing Western designs, and were clearly introduced
to defeat SAC's low level FB-111A, B-52G/H and B-1B force - and the
AGM-86B cruise missile. These masts continue to be marketed as an
accessory for the latest production variants of S-300P radars.

The Tin Shield / Clam Shell /
Flap Lid combo provided the V-PVO with the first all altitude
acquisition and engagement package on a semi-mobile SAM system and was
a
key factor driving the development of the F-117A and B-2A bombers. Had
the balloon gone up in 1984, the F-117A would have tasked first and
foremost with obliterating the V-PVO's S-300P radar systems.

54K6 Mobile
Command Post

The two radars were integrated
with a 5N63S mobile command post, carried on an 8x8 MAZ-7910 chassis.

54K6E
Command
Post

Almaz
S-300PS / SA-10B Grumble B

Самоходный Зенитный
Ракетный Комплекс
С-300ПС

Growing US electronic combat and
SEAD capabilities, in the EF-111A
Raven and F-4G Weasel forces were clearly considered a serious threat
and this spurred the further evolution of the S-300PT system. In 1982
the V-PVO introduced a fully mobile variant of the system, designated
the S-300PS (P- PVO, S - Samochodnyy/Self-propelled), labelled by NATO
the SA-10B.

The S-300PS saw the 5N63 Flap Lid
engagement radar and 5P85 TEL transplanted on to the high mobility 8x8
MAZ-7910 vehicle derived from the MAZ-543. The rehosted radar became
the 5N63S Flap Lid B (Samochodnyy/Self-propelled). This permitted the
engagement
radar and TELs to set up for firing in 5 minutes, and rapidly scoot
away after a missile shot to evade US Air Force Weasels. Two improved
variants of the 5V55 missile were introduced. The 50 nautical mile
extended range 5V55KD was supplemented with the 5V55R, the latter using
a Track Via Missile (TVM) semi-active seeker similar in concept to the
MIM-104 Patriot seeker. The TVM system relays to the ground station
radar data produced by the missile seeker, and offers better jam
resistance and accuracy against a pure command link guidance package,
especially as the missile nears the target. Later variants of the Flap
Lid are designated as Radiolokator Podsvieta i Navedeniya (RPN -
Illumination and Guidance Radar).

The improved 5N63S Flap Lid B
radar had the capability to concurrently engage six targets, and guide
two missiles against each target. The phased array beam steering
angular range was extended to permit instantaneous coverage of a 90
degree sector, comparable to the SPY-1 Aegis radar.

Improvements were not confined to
the radar and missiles. Two variants of the MAZ-7910 based TEL were
introduced. The 5P85S with the characteristic large accessory cabin and
the supplementary 5P85D TEL/Transloader, were both equipped with
5S18/19 series autonomous electrical power generators. A fully mobile
54K6 command post was introduced, also carried by a MAZ-7910. A typical
battery 5P85SD TEL group would include one 5P85S TEL, two 5P85D
TEL/Transloaders and one
mobile 5N63S Flap Lid B radar. The 5P85S was a "smart" TEL equipped
with the control logic and datalink hardware for the whole 5P85SD TEL
group, the 5P85D being a "dumb" TEL under the control of the 5P85S (the
mnemonic is accidental).

The S-300PS/SA-10B was a close
technological equivalent to the MIM-104 in many respects, but was
significantly more mobile, and offered a better low altitude footprint
due to the semimobile mast mounted Tin Shield and Clam Shell systems.

Almaz
S-300PMU / SA-10B/C Grumble B/C

Самоходный Зенитный Ракетный
Комплекс
С-300ПМУ

The first export variant of the
S-300P series was the S-300PMU/SA-10C,
which was in most respects identical to the Soviet S-300PS/SA-10B and
made available in 1989. The system may be labelled in Western
literature either as an export SA-10B or SA-10C.

5P85TE
TEL
Deployed

The S-300PMU was also supplied
with variants of the S-300PS MAZ-7910 based TELs, these being
designated 5P85SU/DU respectively. A battery was equipped with up to
four 83P6 fire units, comprising in total twelve (4 x 1 + 2)
5P85S/5P85D (SU/DU export variant)
TELs, each with four 5V55 rounds.

Almaz S-300PM/PMU1 /
SA-20A Gargoyle A

Самоходный Зенитный
Ракетный Комплекс
С-300ПМ/ПМУ1

The next big evolutionary step in
the S-300P system was the introduction of the enhanced S-300PM and its
export variant the S-300PMU1/SA-10D, in 1993. The SA-10D, later
redesignated SA-20 Gargoyle, was subjected
to what Russian sources describe as a deep modernisation with design
changes to most key components of the system. The aim was to improve
its
basic capabilities as a SAM, extend radar and engagement footprints,
increase the level of automation in the system, and introduce an
anti-ballistic missile capability against ballistic missiles with
re-entry speeds of up to 2.8 km/sec. It is intended to engage combat
aircraft at all altitudes, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic
missiles, making it an equivalent to the PAC-1 and PAC-2 Patriot
variants.

Incremental changes were made to
the Flap Lid, yielding the 30N6/30N6-1 Tomb Stone variant, designated
30N6E1 for export, capable of
guiding the new
48N6 missile, the manufacturer claims an ability to engage targets with
an RCS as low as 0.02 square metres at an unspecified range, and an
autonomous search capability. The 30N6E1 retains the capability to
deploy on the 40V6M mast. An improved 54K6E1 mobile command post was
introduced, the 76N6 Clam Shell was retained. While the 36D6 Tin Shield
remained available, the S-300PMU1 introduced the new highly mobile
NIIIP 5N64S (64N6E export designation) Big Bird 3D search and
acquisition radar, carried on a 8x8
MAZ-7910 series vehicle, the MAZ-74106-9988. The radar can be deployed
or stowed in 5
minutes - the booms stow against the array, the outer panels of the
array swing inward and the whole antenna stows forward to lie flat on
top of the trailer.

The S-300PM/PMU1 saw the
introduction of a third
TEL variant, the semitrailer based 5P85T series usually towed by a 6x6
KrAZ-260 tractor. Unlike the earlier road mobile
5P85 TEL, the 5P85T was designed for 'shoot and scoot' rapid erection
and launch preparation, and was equipped with an integral electrical
power generator and a radio datalink package for autonomous operation.
The key distinction is that the 5P85T is a road mobile TEL rather than
off-road mobile TEL, quite unlike the semimobile 5P85 TEL.

A typical S-300PM/PMU1 battery
comprises a 30N6E1 engagement radar, a 76N6 (76N6E export) low level
early warning / acquisition radar and up to a maximum of eight
5P85S/5P85T (SE/TE export variant) TELs, each with four 48N6 rounds. A
PVO battalion then combines up to six batteries, using a shared 64N6E
acquisition radar, supported by a 54K6E command post. Both the TEL
variants departed from earlier subtypes in that all TELs qualify as
"smart" and can be independently addressed by the 30N6E1 battery radar
via datalinks. The more compact electronics package saw the removal of
the large cabin used with the S-300PS/PMU 5P85S/SU TEL.

A
1T12
site
survey
vehicle
used to support an S-300PMU1 battery.

48N6 Missile Launch

5N64S/64N6 Big
Bird
Acquisition Radar (радиолокатор обнаружения)

The 5N64S/64N6E Big Bird is the
key to
much of the improved engagement capability, and ballistic missile
intercept capability in the later S-300P variants. This system operates
in the 2 GHz band and is a phased array with a 30% larger aperture than
the US Navy SPY-1 Aegis radar, even accounting for its slightly larger
wavelength it amounts to a mobile land based Aegis class package. It
has
no direct equivalent in the West.

Like other components of the
system, the 64N6E has a number of unique and lateral design features.
The radar antenna is mounted on a cabin, in turn mounted on a turntable
permitting 360 degree rotation. Unlike Western phased arrays in this
class, the 64N6 uses a transmissive phased array with a front face horn
feed, the horn placed at the end of the long boom which protects the
waveguides to the transmitters and receivers in the cabin. The beam
steering electronics are embedded inside the antenna array, which has
around 3400 phase elements on either face. This Janus faced
arrangement permits the Big Bird to concurrently search two 90 degree
sectors, in opposite directions, using mechanical rotation to position
the antenna and electronic beam steering in azimuth and elevation. This
design technique permits incremental growth in output power as the only
components of the system which have to handle high microwave power
levels are the waveguide and feed horn.

The radar includes a fixed sector
search mode, in which rotation is stopped, the antenna tilted back and
electronic beamsteering employed to search a fixed angular extent in
elevation and azimuth, centred on the antenna boresight. This mode is
employed for targets requiring high tracking update rates, such as
ballistic missiles, or fast aircraft.

The 64N6E is a frequency hopper,
and incorporates additional auxiliary antenna/receiver channels for
suppression of sidelobe jammers - NIIP claim the ability to measure
accurate bearing to jamming sources. The back end processing is Moving
Target Indicator (MTI), and like the Aegis the system software can
partition the instantaneous sector being covered into smaller zones for
specific searches. To enhance MTI performance the system can make use
of
stored clutter returns from multiple preceding sweeps. Detection ranges
for small fighter targets are of the order of 140 to 150 nautical miles
for early variants. Per 12 second sweep 200 targets can be detected,
and either six or twelve can be individually tracked for engagements.

Early
production
5N64S
Big
Bird
A configuration - deployed.

64N6E1/E2
deployed
on
display.

64N6E
deployed
in
the
field.

64N6E
stowed
and
on
the
move.

While the Big Bird provides an
excellent acquisition capability against aerial and ballistic missile
targets, the 5V55 missile was inadequate. The S-300PM/PMU1 introduced
the 48N6 which has much better kinematics - cited range against aerial
targets is 81 nautical miles, ballistic missile targets 21.5 nautical
miles, with a minimum engagement range of 1.6 to 2.7 nautical miles.
Low altitude engagement capabilities were improved - down to 20 - 30 ft
AGL. The missile speed peaks at 2,100 metres/sec or cca Mach 6. The
missiles can be fired at 3 second intervals, and Russian sources claim
a single shot kill probability of 80% to 93% for aerial targets, 40% to
85% for cruise missiles and 50% to 77% for TBMs.

The PRC has to date been the
principal export client for the system, acquiring between 4 and 6
batteries of the S-300PMU between 1991 and 1994, and supplementing
these
with further buys. The PLA's systems include both fully mobile
5P85SU/DU and road mobile 5P85T series TELs. The total PLA inventory
has
not been disclosed publicly. The most recent buy has been of two
S-300F/SA-N-6 navalised systems for the PLA-N. The principal impediment
to export sales numbers has remained cost - a well equipped battery is
typically cited at around US$100 million.

In 2008 Iran was to have taken
initial
deliveries of its package of S-300PMU1 systems. Details on quantities,
configuration, and supporting radars remain to be disclosed. The
delivery was delayed and later cancelled following a resolution by the
UN Security Council, in 2010.

96L6
Acquisition Radar
(радиолокатор обнаружения)

An option for the S-300PS/PMU,
S-300PM/PMU1 and follow-on S-300PMU2 cited by two Russian
manufacturers is the new LEMZ 96L6 early warning and
acquisition radar,
a planar array design with electronic beam steering in elevation and
mechanical steering in azimuth. It is intended as a replacement for the
Tin Shield and Clam Shell. The 96L6/96L6E is available in semi-mobile
towed versions, a semi-mobile mast mounted version using variants of
the
40V6M/MD, and a fully mobile version on an 8x8 MZKT-7930 vehicle, based
on the MAZ-543M chassis. LEMZ claim a detection range of 160 nautical
miles, and the ability to track up to 100 targets, an IFF array is
colocated with the antenna. The system has an interface for digital
data transmission directly to a 30N6E/E1/E2 Flap Lid, using cabled
links to the S-300PMU/PMU1 and optical fibre cables or microwave links
to the S-300PMU2. Deployment and stow time is 5 minutes for the mobile
variant, and 30 to 120 minutes for the semi-mobile and mast mounted
variants respectively.

Almaz S-300PMU2 Favorit / SA-20B Gargoyle

Самоходный
Зенитный Ракетный Комплекс С-300ПМУ2 'Фаворит'

Further evolution of the S-300P design took place between 1995 and
1997, yielding the S-300PMU2/SA-10E Favorit system, later
redesignated SA-20B Gargoyle, intended to
compete directly against the Antey S-300V and Patriot PAC-2/3 systems
as an Anti-Ballistic Missile system. The Favorit incorporates
incrementally upgraded 30N6E2 Tomb Stone, 64N6E2 Big Bird radars and a
54K6E2
command post,
and the 96L6E as its early warning and primary acquisition system.
While the system retains compatibility with earlier 48N6 missiles, a
new extended 108 nautical mile range 46N6E2 missile was added.

The Favorit's new command post has the capability to control S-300PMU /
SA-10B/C,
S-300PMU1 / SA-20A batteries, and also S-200VE/SA-5 Gammon batteries,
relaying
coordinates and commands to the 5N62VE Square Pair guidance and
illumination radar. While the Favorit superficially appears like the
SA-20A, it has a wide range of incremental improvements internally, and
a range of optimisations to improve performance in the Anti-Ballistic
Missile role. Almaz, the system integrators, and Fakel, the missile
designers, claim to have repeatedly caused Scud target vehicle warheads
to detonate during test intercepts at the Kapustin Yar range in 1995.

Almaz-Antey S-400
Triumf / SA-21

Самоходный
Зенитный Ракетный Комплекс С-400 'Триумф'

The Almaz S-400 Triumf or SA-21
'Growler'
system is the subsequent evolution of the S-300PMU2, trialled in 1999.
The label S-400 is essentially marketing, since the system was
previously reported under the speculative label of S-300PMU3. At least
one report claims that funding for the development of the Triumf was
provided in part by the PLA.

The principal distinctions
between the S-400 and its predecessor lie in further refinements to the
radar and software, and the addition of four new missile types in
addition to the legacy 48N6E/48N6E2 used in the S-300PMU2 Favorit. As a
result an S-400 battery could be
armed with arbitrary mixes of these weapons to optimise its capability
for a specific threat environment. The 30N6E2 further evolved into the
more capable 92N2E Grave
Stone, carried by a new 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 vehicle. The additional range
required a significantly uprated transmitter tube to provide the higher
power-aperture performance needed, in additional to an improved exciter
and automatic frequency hopping capability. The 96L6 is offered as an
'all altitude' battery acquisition radar, also carried
by a 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 vehicle. A new 3D phased array acquisition radar
is
employed, the 91N6E derived from the 64N6E2, and the 40V6M/MD mast is
an available option. The 55K6E command post is
employed, carried by a new Russian built 8 x 8 Ural 532301 truck.

A 2008 diagram published by Almaz-Antey
showing the composition of an S-400 battery. Notable points include the
integration of external low band NNIIRT Protivnik GE and VNIIRT Gamma
DE L-band radars, and a range of passive emitter locating systems. All
have the angular accuracy to provide midcourse guidance updates for
missile shots.

Optional acquisition radars cited for the S-400 include the 59N6
Protivnik GE and 67N6 Gamma DE
in the L-band, but also the 1L119
Nebo SVU in the VHF band.
The Nebo SVU has a claimed capability against stealth aircraft. In
addition to further acquisition radar types, the S-400 has been
trialled
with the Topaz Kolchuga M,
KRTP-91 Tamara / Trash Can, and 85V6 Orion / Vega emitter locating
systems, the aim being to engage emitting targets without
emitting from the acquisition radars, or if the acquisition radars have
been jammed. In June, 2008, the manufacturer diclosed the integration
of the 1RL220VE, 1L222 and 86V6 Orion emitter locating
systems with the S-400.

The new 91N6E is a
derivative
of the 64N6E Big Bird series. It is readily identified against the
64N6E by the use of the new build MZKT-7930 tractor. It retains the
general configuration of its predecessors (Almaz-Antey).

Common S-300PMU2/S-400 transloader based on the 8 x 8 Ural
532301
chassis (Ural).

48N6E3
SAM
Cutaway.
Note the
TVC vanes in the exhaust nozzle. The seeker is labelled as 'semi-active
radar' (Almaz-Antey)

S-400 48N6E2/E3 SAM specifications.

TEL options include the 5P85TE2
semitrailer, towed by a 6 x 6 BAZ-64022
and an improved 8 x 8 TEL, which has yet to be published.
Demonstrators used the baseline 5P85SE on a MAZ-7910.

Fakel 48N6E3
and
40N6
Surface
to
Air
Missiles

The first missile added to the
system is the 48N6E3/48N6DM (Dal'naya - long range), an incrementally
improved 48N6E2 variant with a range cited at 130 nautical miles.

The second
missile added to the S-400 is the new 40N6, a long range
ballistic trajectory weapon with a
cited range of 215 - 240 nautical miles, intended to kill AWACS, JSTARS
and
other high value assets, such as EA-6B/EA-18G support jammers. Further
details of this weapon remain to be
disclosed, although the Russian media reported successful completion of
state trials in 2010. The significant range improvement to around twice
that of the 48N6E2
suggests a two stage weapon, or a much larger motor casing with a
larger propellant load.

Extended range missile shots
typically involve ballistic flight profiles with apogees in excess of
40 km. The protracted development of the 40N6 suggests that directional
control through the upper portions of the flight profile may have
presented difficulties. One advantage of such flight profiles is that
the missile converts potential energy into kinetic energy during the
terminal phase of its flight, accelerating as it dives on its target.
This provides higher endgame G capability in comparison with flatter
climb-cruise-home profiles used in legacy designs.

Fakel
9M96E
and 9M96E2 Surface to Air Missiles

The third and fourth new S-400
missiles are
in
effect equivalents to the ERINT/PAC-3 interceptor missile recently
introduced to supplement the MIM-104 in Patriot batteries. These are
the 9M96E and 9M96E2, largely identical with the latter version fitted
with a larger booster. Fakel claim the 96M6E has a range of 21.6
nautical miles, and the 9M96E2 64.8 nautical miles, with altitude
capabilities from 15 ft AGL up to 66 kft and 100 kft respectively.

9M96E
and
9M96E2
(Almaz-Antey).

The 9M96 missiles are hittiles
designed for direct impact, and use canards and thrust vectoring to
achieve extremely high G and angular rate capability - they are not
unlike a scaled up R-73/AA-11 Archer dogfight missile in concept,
although their design heritage owes more to the 9K330/9K331/9K332 Tor
M/M1/M2 / SA-15 Gauntlet airframe design. An
inertial package is used with a datalink from the 30N6E radar for
midcourse guidance, with an active radar homing seeker of an
undisclosed type.
The small 53 lb (24 kg) blast fragmentation warhead is designed to
produce an controlled fragment pattern, using multiple initiators to
shape the detonation wave through the explosive. A smart radio fuse is
used to control the warhead timing and pattern. It is in effect a
steerable shaped charge.

The smaller size of these
weapons permits four to be loaded into the volume of a single
48N6E/5V55K/R launch tube container - a form fit four tube launcher
container was to have been used, although recent Russian reports
suggest a modified full sized tube with four internal chambers will be
used. A single 5P85S/T TEL can thus deploy up to 16 of
these missiles, or mixes of 3 x 48N6 / 4 x 9M96E/E2, 2 x 48N6 / 8 x
9M96E/E2 or 1 x 48N6 / 12 x 9M96E/E2. The stated aim of this approach
was to permit repeated launches against saturation attacks with
precision guided munitions - in effect trading 9M96 rounds for incoming
guided weapons. Fakel claim a single shot kill probability of 70%
against a Harpoon class missile, and 90% against a manned aircraft.

The addition of the 9M96E/E2 missiles, which amount to a combined ABM
and point defence weapon designs, is part of a broader Russian strategy
of deploying air defence weapons capable of defeating PGM attacks,
including the AGM-88 HARM family, and follow-on defence suppression
weapons, the latter types intended to disable the S-400 battery
acquisition and engagement radars. The advantage in using the 9M96E/E2
for this purpose is that it avoids the additional technical and
operational complexity of directing other "counter-PGM" point defence
weapons such as the Tor M1/M2,
Tunguska M and Pantsir S/S1 series.

Basic characteristics of the
9M96E and 9M96E2 missiles (Fakel in Milparade.ru)

Some sources have credited the 9M96E/9M96E2 missiles to the S-300PMU1
and S-300PMU2 Favorit, the latter of which appears to have been the
demonstration
platform for prototypes of these missiles. Integration of these
missiles on either of these systems will not present any challenges. To
date there have been no disclosures on domestic volume production or
export
sales of the 9M96 series.

Some sources also credit the S-400 with the capability first
demonstrated in the S-300PMU2 Favorit, of controlling S-200 / SA-5
batteries and directing the 5N62VE
Square
Pair
FMCW guidance and
illumination radar. Given that the Russian S-200 inventory and missile
warstock has been decommissioned and exported, if this capability is
retained, it is for export clientele.

Acknowledgments:

Special
thanks to Miroslav Gyűrösi for his helpful advice on early model
designations and battery compositions, and imagery of early variants,
Yevgeniy Yerokhin of Missiles.ru and Said Aminov of Vestnik PVO for the
respective use of their high quality imagery.