A blog to capture random thoughts, mainly dealing with politics and especially military matters.

Monday, August 17, 2015

Retiring Army Chief of Staff GEN Ray Odierno Suggests Embedding US Troops in Iraqi Combat Formations - Are Some Vietnam War Lessons Learned Applicable to the Present Iraq Situation?

With over four years serving at the
highest levels of command in Iraq,
it is arguable that GEN Odierno is the World's most savvy expert alive on the
subject of fighting in Iraq
so it isn't surprising that he spent much of his 12 August final Pentagon press
conference reflecting on Iraq.

“I believe that if we find in the
next several months we’re not making the progress … we should probably
absolutely consider embedding some soldiers with them, see if that would make a
difference,” GEN Odierno said. “That doesn’t mean they would be fighting, but maybe
embedding them and moving with them...."
This not something new as in the past GEN Odierno has said that
embedding US troops, who have been training and advising the Iraqis since last
year, “probably would make them more effective.”

GEN Odierno retired from the Army two
days later on 14 August after serving four years as the Army Chief of Staff. With almost 40 years of service including
well over four years in Iraq,
more than any other Military General Officer, he might know what he's talking
about. In addition to commanding all forces
in Iraq as the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (Sep 08 - Sep 10); he had
previously served in Iraq as Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (Dec 06 - Feb
08); Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mar 03 - Apr 04); and during Desert
Storm he had been the Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3rd Artillery
Regiment, 3rd Armored Division (Dec 90 - Jun 91). Hence, he might be on to something when he
suggests embedding US Troops in Iraqi combat formations. This would not be a new concept in that during
the Vietnam War we embedded US Advisor in all Republic of Viet Nam (RVN) combat
formations and it proved very effective.
Although the US
might have technically lost the War, it is indisputable that neither any US
Forces nor any of our RVN allies with embedded Advisors were ever defeated on
the battlefield.

Now this is a subject I do have a
little first hand knowledge about. As a
new Second Lieutenant (2LT) out of OCS but with some prior enlisted service, I
was sent to Vietnam
and, because I was fortunate enough (or unfortunate depending on your
perspective) to have passed the Vietnamese Language Test, I was assigned as an
Advisor embedded in an Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) Infantry
unit. During my extended tour I came to
admire the fighting spirit and bravery of the ARVN Soldier but their leadership
was unimpressive. Many of the officers
lacked initiative which might have been a result of the consequences of
failure. You couldn't fail if you didn't
act but what was worse than failing was for their Advisors to go up the
"advisory chain" complaining about their inaction to their
superiors. During my extended tour I
went from green 2LT to combat seasoned First Lieutenant (1LT) to experienced Captain
(CPT) where I was then the Senior US Soldier embedded in the unit.

I can't speak for all US Advisors
but I suspect my experience was representative of what many of us found. Although we did not command the ARVN units,
once we had proven our competence, when we spoke our ARVN counterparts accepted our "advice" like they had "heard it from a burning bush." Embedded US Troops provided the leadership
that the ARVN units needed to become an effective fighting force. Although I've been to Afghanistan, I've never served in Iraq so I don't
know if US Advisors would have the same effect on Iraqi combat formations but
it would certainly worth a try. I do
know that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was a battle hardened force with 40+
years of experience fighting on their home turf yet they never won a single
battle against a RVN Unit with embedded advisors. It wasn't until US Combat Forces which
included Advisors were withdrawing in 1971-73 that ARVN units started losing
engagements.

Operation Lam Son 719, a
limited-objective offensive campaign conducted February - March 1971 in the southeastern
portion of the Laos
by RVN Forces was the first major operation conducted without embedded US
Advisors and the results were devastating.
Although both the US and RVN Presidents "spun" the operation
as a roaring success and proof "Vietnamization" was working, it had
really exposed grave deficiencies in the South Vietnamese military's planning,
organization, leadership, motivation, and operational expertise -- expertise
that had previously been provided by US Advisors.

So why were
we accepted by the ARVN commanders?
Because when we got into some "bad shit," the American Advisor
or "cố vấn Mỹ" could call in a very accurate US Artillery fire
mission and adjust fire, could get US Attack Helicopter gun ships on station and on occasions
could even get fast movers (Air Force Close Air Support) to wreck havoc on the
enemy. We could even get US "Dustoff" Medivac helicopters to come in
to hot LZs, something ARVN pilots were reluctant to do. I found that over time the last thing my
counterpart wanted was for anything to happen to me -- which was very
comforting. Although initially accepted
for the support we could provide, any Advisor "worth his salt" soon
found himself "virtually" in command of the unit.

Embedding
US Advisors in Iraqi Combat Units is not without risks and Advisors do have to
participate in ground combat by virtue of where they must be physically located
in order to be effective and to be credible, an Advisor has to share in the risks which means leading from the front. Hence, US Advisors are “boots on the ground,”
especially Advisors embedded at the company and battalion levels. You can’t call in or adjust artillery from
the rear, you can’t coordinate air support from the rear and you certainly
can’t laze a target for a Fast Mover from the
rear. These are task that require the
advisor to SEE the target and to see the target you must be out front where the
danger is.

Like I said in the beginning, I don’t
know if GEN Odierno’s suggestion of embedding US Troops in Iraqi units will
work but what I DO know is that what we’re doing now is NOT working so we need
a change of tactics ASAP before it’s too late. I also know that embedding
Advisors in RVN units worked against one of the most experienced, dedicated and
battle hardened enemies we’ve ever faced.
And finally, I know that If conditions on the ground continue to
deteriorate, there will come a time when the only viable option remaining to salvage
the situation will be a major deployment of US Ground Forces, probably in the
range of 75,000 to 100,000 troops, which is something body wants to see happen. A modest deployment of 7500 to 10,000
Advisors now is certainly worth the gamble.