Wednesday, February 17, 2016

Is Reconciliation Possible In Iraq?

Reconciliation is often discussed in Iraq, but rarely ever
accomplished. The Prime Minister has talked about it, there have been joint Sunni-Shiite
prayers and tribal meetings, but nothing ever comes of them. The National
Democratic Institute recently released a report “Iraq’s Road to
Reconciliation” about this topic based upon interviews with religious,
tribal, community and protest leaders. One of the major difficulties was that
people often don’t agree upon what reconciliation means and who should be
included. The biggest problem however was that the country’s political elite who
are expected to lead Iraq in this process, have no desire to do so because they
live off of division to stay in power.

All of those included in the National Democratic Institute
survey agreed that Iraq’s politicians were barriers to reconciliation. That was
because the country’s leaders advocated sectarianism and division to maintain
their positions. At the same time, the elite were believed to be the only ones
capable of pushing the process forward. Reconciliation between the political
class was also important because their differences were a major reason why the
country remained deadlocked on so many important issues. That history and the
political benefits garnered from sectarianism were why none were willing to
seriously deal with rapprochement. The people in the survey thought that it was
up to the public therefore to pressure the government towards change. The
problem with that approach is that the ruling parties are not beholden to the
public, but instead the people are reliant upon them. For example, there have
been years of protests in Iraq, and there are ones going on right now, but all
they have garnered is lip service from politicians. That’s because Iraq’s oil
based economy means that the government does not need taxes from the public for
funds, but rather uses its natural wealth to become the largest employer and
provider in the country. This is a common practice in petroleum dependent
countries. Without that connection it’s unlikely that any demonstrations can
make Iraq’s rulers move towards reconciliation unless they themselves want to,
which does not look like it will happen any time soon.

Even if that process were to begin there are major barriers
to it being successful in Iraq. First, no one seemed to agree on the terms and
players that should be involved. Each group looked at the issue different. For
example should it be Shiites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds, Baathists and
everyone else, Iraq and foreign countries, should insurgents be involved, etc.
There was also the issue of whether it should just focus upon present wrongs or
historical ones. The National Democratic Institute brought up amnesty as a
perfect example of this dilemma. Many said they supported the idea as a
concept, but when they got into the specifics there was no agreement. For
example, not many thought that people that had killed should be included. Given
all the differences in Iraq there was probably no consensus on what even that
meant. Would that just be members of the former regime, insurgents, militias,
etc. That led few to believe that amnesty could be implemented in practice. Another
issue was that few had any trust in the judiciary, which would be intimately
involved in any amnesty program. The courts were considered corrupt and under
political control, and thus easily manipulated. Finally, many Kurds had lost
trust in Baghdad, and did not want to work on many of these issues because they
had decided on independence instead. What everyone could agree upon was that
any rapprochement had to be based upon Iraqi identity instead of sect or
ethnicity. Again, all of these differences pointed to how far away Iraq was
from even opening the door to reconciliation because so few could agree on even
basic terms.

The third factor brought up was that sectarianism within
society needed to be addressed, not just with the political parties. In polls,
Iraqis say that they do not think in ethnosectarian terms, but when they were
questioned on specific issue they often did. This was especially true today as
the Islamic State has played upon the divisions within the country and
increased tensions between communities. The violence of the insurgents has also
created a deep seated desire for revenge amongst many groups that will take
years to overcome.

The National Democratic Institute finished with six steps
Iraq should take to move forward with reconciliation. The first was judicial
reform. The courts play a crucial role in this process. They would oversee the
release of prisoners, enforcement of due process, impartial prosecutions, etc. Making
judges independent, and not beholden to political parties would be an important
move to ensure that Iraq would start moving towards those goals. Second was a
more equitable distribution of resources. Many of those interviewed thought
that politicians and their cronies got all the benefits from the country. This
was an especially important issue for the Kurds who believe Baghdad has cut
them off. There was also a push for great transparency over the budget and
decentralization of power to the provinces. The third was disarming groups. The
Hashd, tribes, and others need to be demobilized after the war with the Islamic
State. This would be easier said then done as many foreign powers back armed
groups and would not agree to having them give up their weapons. Four was
ending the quota system in government that determines the top positions in
government. Many believe that the quotas are at the heart of the ethnosectarian
political system that rules the country, and therefore ending it would be a
blow to it. Five was holding reconciliation conferences, which was
self-explanatory. Last was countering foreign influence in Iraq. Outside powers
were seen as supporting the political divisions within the country to maintain
their influence. Pushing Iraqi nationalism over ethnosectarianism was seen as a
possible way to lesson this interference. These were all good suggestions, but
the likelihood of them happening was little to none. As the study already noted
Iraq’s politicians have no stomach for any real reform, especially if it
threatens their hold on power. All of these proposals would do that. Prime
Minister Abadi for example, brought up judicial reform at the end of 2015. When
it came to it however, he left it up to the judges to change themselves, which
never happened. That in a nutshell is the problem with reconciliation in Iraq.
The public wants it, and even some politicians, but as long as the majority of
elite do not, nothing will happen. The country’s leadership simply has too much
to lose in such a process, and therefore will continue to stand in the way.

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com