But, despite the progress, those who settle for nothing short of a war with
Iran have still been expressing pessimism, and have been trying to scuttle the
negotiations. Israel, in particular, has been trying to "prove" that
Iran is not trustworthy and has not changed its policies. In its latest effort,
Israel
has claimed that its navy has intercepted a shipment of Iranian weapons
in international waters near a Sudanese port that had been intended for the
Palestinian group Hamas in Gaza. The distance between Gaza and the Sudanese
port is at least 1000 miles, and the road between the two passes through Egypt.
The rockets that were
displayed by Israel last Monday, allegedly sent by Iran, are 6-7 meter long
and weigh close to a ton. How can they pass through Egypt, whose military dictatorship
is an ardent foe of Iran, without being caught? How can they pass through the
Sinai Desert without attracting any attention from Israelis? Unless we believe
that Iran can successfully bribe a huge number of Egyptians, the allegations
and the plan for getting the weapons to Gaza simply defy logic.

In another baseless report, Fredrik Dahl and Louis Charbonneau of Reuters
claimed
on February 27 that, "The U.N. nuclear watchdog planned a major report
on Iran that might have revealed more of its suspected atomic bomb research,
but held off as Tehran’s relations with the outside world thawed, sources familiar
with the matter said." The source was, as usual, anonymous, and the report
did not make it clear what sort of "evidence" the IAEA had obtained
other than claiming that the source suggested that the evidence was "more
recent material concerned extra detail about alleged research and experiments
that were covered in the November
2011 report. A new report would probably have included ‘updated information
on PMD [possible military dimension (of Iran’s nuclear program)]’ which could
have ‘reinforced the concern’ about Iran." That report was criticized widely,
and completely
deconstructed.

Even if some raw evidence did exist, Dahl and Charbonneau did not even consider
the possibility that the IAEA did not report it because the evidence was not
credible. Of course, Israel
quickly demanded that the IAEA release the report. In fact, the IAEA
denied the Reuters report.

In order to justify their pessimism on the possibility that an agreement with
Iran can be reached, some of the hawks point to what the Iranian hardliners
have been saying. For example, between the signing of the Geneva Accord and
the beginning of the new round of negotiations in Vienna in February, Iran’s
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei expressed his lack of hope for the negotiations
to succeed. In particular, on February 17 Khamenei said that although he supports
the nuclear negotiations, he does not believe that the negotiations with the
US"will
go anywhere." The mainstream media in the US, the hawks and the Israel
lobby that are looking for any excuse to scuttle the diplomatic process, quickly
interpreted Khamenei’s speech as indicating his unwillingness to compromise.
But, is Khamenei really interested in resolving the dispute diplomatically,
and what is an acceptable compromise, anyway?

First of all, as far back as 21 March 2013, when Khamenei signaled a change
in his position regarding negotiations with the United States, he has consistently
said the same thing and, thus, there was nothing new in his last month’s declaration.
But, he has always meant the negotiations about reestablishing diplomatic relations
between the two nations, not the nuclear negotiations. This was
recently confirmed by Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Majles, the Iranian
parliament, who is very close to Khamenei.

Second, former Defense Minister Mohammad
Forouzandehwas reported
saying several weeks ago that the nezaam – the state, as is called
in Iran – has decided to "close the nuclear file" by reaching an agreement
with the West. Forouzandeh, an appointee of Khamenei, heads the Foundation of
the Oppressed and Disabled, the second-largest commercial enterprise in Iran.
He is also an appointee of Khamenei to the Expediency Discernment Council, a
constitutional body that arbitrates dispute between the Majles and the
powerful Guardian Council that must approve all the laws passed by the Majles
and also provides Khamenei advice on important national issues, and is very
close to the Supreme Leader. Forouzandeh likened the decision to the decision
in July 1988 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic,
to accept Resolution
598 of the UNSC that had called for ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, and
end the bloody eight-year war.

But, why does Khamenei even make such statements? The reason is twofold. One
is that his hardline supporters oppose the negotiations. Some do so for ideological
reasons. They do not trust the United States, and are afraid that President
Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif will make too many
concessions. Others oppose the negotiations because they gained their political
and economic power as a result of the hostility between the two nations, and
are afraid that if the negotiations succeed, they will lose everything. Thus,
in order to control such hardliners, Khamenei must appear resolute at home.
The second reason is that Khamenei is trying to create a political cover for
himself and his authority, in case the negotiations fail, because he wants to
be able to declare then that "I told you so." Thus, his negative view
of the negotiations with the US is mostly for his domestic audience, as well
as his own authority.

US officials have also been trying to appear tough, in order for President
Obama to control his critics at home. Wendy Sherman, in particular, appears
to go out of her way to upset and insult Iranian officials and people. After
saying last October that "deception
is part of the Iranian leadership DNA," she also told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on February 4 that "We know that Iran does
not need to have an underground, fortified enrichment facility like Fordow …
[or] a heavy-water reactor at Arak to have a peaceful nuclear program."
Even if this were true, should this not be agreed upon as a result of the negotiations?
After all, the Fordow site and the incomplete reactor in Arak are Iran’s two
winning aces, which it will not give up, if ever, without extracting major concessions.
As expected, Sherman’s remark angered Zarif who
quickly rejected her assertions. But, such remarks also gave an excuse to
Iranian hardliners to once again stage fierce attacks on the Rouhani administration.
Secretary of State John Kerry has
also threatened that if Iran breaches its obligations, "the military
option is still on the table." Former Foreign Minister and current senior
foreign policy adviser to Khamenei, Ali Akbar Velayati, called
the threat "a bluff."

Thus, all indications are that Iran is ready and willing to compromise. Regarding
the Arak heavy-water research reactor that is to replace the aging Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR) and, when operational, it will produce plutonium that can be used
for making nuclear weapons, former Foreign Minister and current head of the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, said
on February 6 that Iran is to "modify the Arak reactor" in order
to allay the Western concerns. A reliable source told the author that Salehi’s
remark means a smaller and better safeguarded reactor that would produce much
less plutonium and will take much longer to do so. After all, for the purpose
of nuclear research and production of medical isotopes for Iranian patients,
the 40 MW Arak reactor is somewhat large – the TRR is
only a 5 MW reactor. In addition, Iran may be willing to negotiate an arrangement
similar to what it has for its 1000 MW light-water reactor in Bushehr, namely,
shipping out the spent fuel (Russia takes the delivery of the Bushehr’s spent
fuel). Its design may be modified to strengthen nonproliferation and, hence,
maximize its potential for producing medical isotopes. In return, Iran may also
agree to allow permanently-stationed IAEA inspectors at the site.

But, there is no realistic possibility that Iran will give up the Arak reactor
altogether after investing heavily in Iran, not to mention the fact that it
considers the reactor a
cause for national pride, as every aspect of its design and work has been
done by Iranian experts. But, this has also generated concerns regarding its
safety. Thus, as an incentive, Iran should be offered expert help, modern equipment
and instruments, and fuel for the reactor (natural uranium), in return for the
reactor’s strict safeguard by the IAEA.

As for Fordow enrichment site,
there is little, if any chance that Iran will be willing to dismantle it. The
site was
built under a mountain at the height of military threats against Iran’s
nuclear infrastructure as an "insurance policy" that would protect
Iran’s ability to enrichment uranium, in case the more vulnerable Natanz facility
is destroyed by bombardment. It is considered almost a "sacred
site." But, here too, Iran has indicated its willingness to compromise.
It has stopped enriching uranium at 19.75 percent at the site, and although
it has transferred there all the 2976 centrifuges that it intends to use at
Fordow, only
744 of them are operational. Thus, Iran may agree to reduce greatly the
number of centrifuges operating there, and couple that with intrusive inspections
by the IAEA, which should be plenty enough to allay any concern that the US
and its allies have.

As a result of the Sa’dabad
Declaration of October 2003 and the Paris
Agreement of November 2004, Iran agreed, in addition to suspending its nuclear
program, to sign the Additional
Protocol of its Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA and implement its provisions on a volunteer basis,
until the Majles ratified its signing. It did
so until February 2006, but because the
European Union reneged on its promises to Iran in return for its great concessions,
Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol. The agreement between Iran
and the IAEA that was signed
last November means that Iran is effectively carrying out most, if not all,
the provisions of the Protocol: more inspections, more transparency, and more
data and information about the past activities.

Iran will not, however, agree to officially ratify the Protocol before the
sanctions are lifted permanently. In other words, Iran is willing to
make important, but reversible, concessions, but will make them permanent
only if the US also takes irreversible steps toward ending its economic
sanctions permanently. Thus,
for example, President Obama cannot offer Iran temporary waiver of the sanctions,
but expect permanent and irreversible concessions from Iran.

Talk
of dismantling a major part of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, espoused by
the neocons and Israel and Saudi Arabia lobby in the United States will also
not go anywhere. Iran
will not agree to it, but time and again it has demonstrated its willingness
to make major concessions and to follow a prudent approach, only to be rebuffed
by the United States and its allies. Khamenei will not support President Rouhani’s
nuclear negotiations indefinitely. These
negotiations must bear fruits for Iran: recognition of its nuclear right,
preservation of most, if not all of its nuclear infrastructure and gradual lifting
of the sanctions. Asking Iran to give up a major part of its nuclear infrastructure
is tantamount to demanding that Iran surrender. It will not happen.

As the author has emphasized repeatedly – here,
here,
here,
and here
– if Washington is interested in the diplomatic resolution of the dispute with
Iran, which in turn will have a tremendously positive effect on peace and stability
in the Middle East, it should recognize the Rouhani administration’s domestic
constraints, and offer compromises that President Rouhani can take home and
demonstrate to his nation, including the hardliners, that diplomacy with the
US can work.