In arguing that plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden to prove but-for
causation in this case, defendants emphasize that it is undisputed that plaintiff was aware
that there were no steps at the front door and that she even testified that she did not
consider that circumstance to be a hazard, because she did not use the front door to enter
and leave the manufactured home. Further, defendants point out that plaintiff testified
that she did not know why she fell and that, in fact, she failed to testify that the presence
of steps or a hand rail would have prevented her from falling. In the absence of such
testimony, defendants contend, it is pure speculation as to what might have happened had
the door been secured shut or had steps and a handrail been in place.

Plaintiff contends that such direct evidence is not required. According to
plaintiff, it is sufficient for her to provide evidence from which a factfinder could make
inferences sufficient to establish but-for causation. In this case, she insists, there is such
evidence. Among other things, she contends, there is evidence that defendants knew that
the condition of the site was not safe, that their usual practice was to provide temporary
steps, and that an eyewitness saw the wind catch the door as plaintiff held on to it, pulling
her out of the door. Plaintiff contends that, from that evidence, along with a measure of
common sense, a reasonable inference could be drawn that steps and hand rails would
have prevented her fall or, at the very least, that securing the door in the first place would
have prevented the accident from occurring.

We agree with plaintiff. In doing so, we emphasize the narrowness of the
question before us, namely, whether there is evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to but-for causation. In our view, the evidence is sufficient to create
such a genuine issue of material fact as to that issue. A jury could infer from the
eyewitness testimony about what happened, from the fact that defendants' usual practice
was to provide temporary steps, and from common sense that it was reasonably probable
that defendants' failure to secure the door or to have steps in place caused plaintiff's
injuries.

Contrary to defendants' contention, it is not necessary for plaintiff to present
direct evidence that she fell because the door was not sealed shut or because there were
no steps or a hand rail; nor did she need to put on direct evidence that she would not have
fallen if the door had been sealed shut or if there had been steps in place. See West v. Allied Signal, Inc., 200 Or App 182, 192, 113 P3d 983 (2005) (the jury is permitted to
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence). As Prosser and Keeton's treatise on torts
explains,

"Circumstantial evidence, expert testimony, or common knowledge
may provide a basis from which the causal sequence may be inferred. Thus
it is every day experience that unlighted stairs create a danger that someone
will fall. Such a condition 'greatly multiplies the chances of accident, and is
of a character naturally leading to its occurrence.' When a * * * person
tumbles down the steps, it is a reasonable conclusion that it is more likely
than not that the fall would not have occurred but for the bad lighting.
When a child is drowned in a swimming pool, no one can say with certainty
that a lifeguard would have saved the child; but the experience of the
community permits the conclusion that the absence of the guard played a
significant part in the drowning. Such questions are peculiarly for the jury;
and whether proper construction of a building would have withstood an
earthquake, or whether reasonable police precautions would have prevented
a boy from shooting the plaintiff in the eye with an airgun, are questions on
which a court can seldom rule as a matter of law."

Defendants contend that, even if the evidence was sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to causation, the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment given that they had no duty to protect plaintiff from a risk of injury on her own
property in the absence of a contractual obligation to install temporary steps, especially in
light of plaintiff's knowledge of the hazard. Plaintiff's claim, however, is not based on a
breach of contract, and the existence of a contract between the parties does not
necessarily insulate defendants from liability for negligent conduct not governed by the
terms of the contract. See Georgetown Realty v. The Home Ins. Co., 313 Or 97, 106, 831
P2d 7 (1992).

In the alternative, defendants contend that, even if there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to causation, summary judgment properly was granted because the
circumstances of plaintiff's injury were not reasonably foreseeable, as a matter of law.
According to defendants, the absence of steps was an obvious hazard and a deterrent to
use of the front door, as evidenced by testimony that plaintiff and her husband did not use
the front door for ingress or egress.

We reject defendants' contentions. The issue of foreseeability is ordinarily
one for the jury, except in the extreme case in which no reasonable factfinder could find a
foreseeable risk. McPherson v. Oregon Dept. of Corrections, 210 Or App 602, 614, 152
P3d 918 (2007). To establish foreseeability, plaintiff is not required to present evidence
that defendants knew or should have known that plaintiff would fall. The concept of
foreseeability refers to "generalized risks of the type of incidents and injuries that
occurred rather than predictability of the actual sequence of events." Fazzolari v.
Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or 1, 21, 734 P2d 1326 (1987).

In this case, there is evidence that defendants were aware of the risk of
falling posed by the door's height above the ground and the absence of steps; their
practice, in fact, was to provide temporary stairs, although they did not do so in this case.
Further, plaintiff was one of the general class of persons threatened by defendants' alleged
negligence, and the harm that plaintiff suffered was the type of harm that was within the
scope of the risk created by defendants' alleged negligence. McPherson, 210 Or App at
614. The fact that plaintiff was also aware that there were no steps at the front door may
indeed bear on defendants' ultimate liability, because of plaintiff's possible comparative
fault or some other reason. But the evidence of plaintiff's knowledge does not, by itself,
render the injury that she suffered unforeseeable as a matter of law. See Bailey v. Lewis Farm, Inc., 343 Or 276, 287-89, 171 P3d 336 (2007); Fazzolari, 303 Or at 16 (discussing
limits of negligence liability).

We conclude that the record reflects genuine issues of material fact as to
defendant's liability in negligence for plaintiff's injury and that, as a result, the trial court
erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Reversed and remanded.

1. In Joshi, the Oregon Supreme Court observed that "[t]his court has repeatedly
looked to Prosser and Keeton for explication of tort law." 342 Or at 161 n 1.