This document identifies information pertaining to the
Uranium-Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) process that is
Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) as defined in Section
148 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, and provides guidance
for determining if documents, materials, or facilities contain such
UCNI.

Separate guidelines, issued by the DOE Office of Nuclear Materials
Production, will identify information pertaining to the Special Isotope
Separation and the Plutonium-AVLIS process that is UCNI. There is a
significant sharing of technology between Uranium-AVLIS and
Plutonium-AVLIS. Where the technology for one process is usable in the
other, or where there are common issues, the information controls
(classification, UCNI, et. al.) must be consistent. Information must
be protected based on the significance of what is revealed about either
process. Thus, there is information about Uranium-AVLIS that must be
protected as UCNI because of the significance of that information to the
Plutonium-AVLIS process.

The guidelines contained in this document are the basis for development
of internal guidelines specifying what information pertaining to the
issuing organization is UCNI.

DOE Order 5650.3, Identification of Unclassified Controlled
Nuclear Information (UCNI), establishes policies and procedures for
identifying UCNI and for reviewing and marking documents and materials
containing UCNI. The user of these guidelines must be familiar with DOE
Order 5650.3 and must be particularly cognizant of the criteria and
adverse effects test therein. In addition, users of these guidelines
are reminded that DOE Order 5635.4, Protection of Unclassified
Controlled Nuclear Information, provides directive guidance on policies
and procedures for protecting information determined to be UCNI or
documents or material marked as "May contain UCNI."

This document contains "Official Use Only" information and is not
to be publicly released. However, should this document be requested for
release under a statute (i.e., the Freedom of Information Act), the
cover, pages i through 6, 10, 12, 22 through 25, and the back cover may
be released as reasonably segregable information.

A number of topics in this document relate to information that is
addressed in classification guides and/or bulletins. Appropriate
classification guidance (e.g., CG-AIS-1, CG-NP-2, CG-SS-2, local
classification guides) should be utilized to determine that the
information being considered for control as UCNI is in fact
unclassified.

Any document or material that has been, is, or will be widely and
irretrievably disseminated into the public domain, as determined by a
Reviewing Official, and whose dissemination into the public domain was
not, is not, or will not be under control of the Government is exempt
from control under these guidelines even if the document or material
contains information that a Controlling Official has determined to be
UCNI. That same information in other documents or material can still be
controlled and protected as UCNI.

All authorized DOE and DOE contractor UCNI Reviewing Officials are
to base their UCNI determinations regarding documents or material
pertaining to the Uranium-AVLIS process on this guide. Determinations
regarding the SIS Program or the Plutonium-AVLIS process are to be based
on separate guidelines under the cognizance of the DOE Office of Nuclear
Materials Production.

A Denying Official (see DOE Order 1700.1 for designation and
specification of authority) with cognizance over information contained
in documents or material pertaining to AVLIS shall deny a request made
under a statute (e.g., the Freedom of Information Act) or Executive
Order for any portion of the document or material that the Denying
Official determines to contain UCNI. Such determinations regarding
documents or materials pertaining to the Advanced Isotope Separation
(AIS) Program or the Uranium-AVLIS process shall be based on this guide.

Persons other than Reviewing Officials and Denying Officials are to
use this guide to make preliminary review determinations that a document
or material pertaining to the Uranium-AVLIS process may contain UCNI if
that person:

Is the originator of a newly generated document or
material.

Has cognizance over any information in the document
or material.

When a preliminary determination has been made that a document or material
may
contain UCNI, that document or material must be marked with
the appropriate NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION stamp and forwarded to a
Reviewing Official for a review determination.

Any Reviewing Official may recommend to the Director for Office of
Advanced Technology Projects new subject areas, new topics, or revisions
to the UCNI topics in this guide. A determination by (1) the originator
of a document or material, or (2) a person having cognizance over
information in a document or material that a document or material may
contain UCNI is one source for such recommendations. The Director,
Office of Advanced Technology Projects shall review such recommendations
and, if appropriate, initiate the formal process to revise this guide.

The goal of the DOE Advanced Isotope Separation (AIS) Program is
to develop and demonstrate technology for the economical separation of
uranium for commercial reactor fuel. This program has been sponsored by
the DOE Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy since the mid-1970s. The
intent of the DOE is to be able to proceed with construction and
operation of a uranium-isotope separation plant, funded either by the
Government or by private sources, in a way that will allow the U.S.
Uranium Enrichment Enterprise to remain a strong competitive force in
the world uranium market and to ensure a continuing economical supply of
enriched uranium for domestic utilities. The Uranium-AVLIS process has
been selected by DOE as the advanced isotope separation technology for
further development and possible deployment in a uranium isotope
separation plant.

The AVLIS process exploits the small differences in the energy
levels of electrons in different isotopes in an atomic vapor. These
energy level differences cause the isotopes to absorb slightly different
wavelengths of light. Laser light can be tuned to the precise
wavelengths that are absorbed by only one isotope, causing that isotope
to lose an electron and become ionized. The other isotopes do not
absorb laser light at this wavelength and remain uncharged or neutral.
The ionized isotope can then be separated from the neutral isotopes by
an electric field. For uranium isotope separation, the laser light is
tuned to ionize 235U atoms and leave 238U atoms neutral. The
235U is then collected on negatively charged product collector
elements. The neutral 238U is unaffected by the electric field and
is collected on the roof of the separator pod from which the condensed
vapor can then be recovered separately. The AVLIS process uses dye
lasers to accomplish the atomic ionization in the vapor. The dye lasers
are frequency-tunable and generate the precise wavelength required to
ionize the 235U. The dye lasers are pumped by electrically driven
copper lasers.

While the goal of the AIS Program is to develop and demonstrate
technology for the separation of uranium for commercial reactor fuels,
the AVLIS process and technology can be adapted to the separation of
fissile isotopes for defense applications such as in nuclear weapons.
Uranium-AVLIS information therefore concerns atomic energy defense
programs and must be reviewed to determine if protection as UCNI is
required by the Atomic Energy Act.

The following types of unclassified information about
Uranium-AVLIS are UCNI:

1. Sensitive design or design-related operational information
concerning sensitive facilities that is essential to or could
significantly assist in designing, constructing, or operating facilities
or equipment for producing, processing, separating, or otherwise
utilizing nuclear materials for military applications or could
significantly increase the likelihood of the illegal production of a nuclear
weapon (UCNI GG No. 10).

Unclassified AVLIS information that is UCNI under this general
guideline includes certain information on copper and dye lasers with
related critical optics, power conditioning, electronics, and other key
ancillary components; separator design and electron beam gun technology
with related ancillary components. This may include certain information
about uranium processing technology and refractory materials technology.

To be UCNI, in addition to the criteria set forth in DOE Order
5650.3, the AVLIS information:

Must be specific to one or more sensitive facilities identified
in Section E where one or more sensitive functions
identified in
Section D are performed.

Must be sensitive to the extent that unauthorized dissemination
could significantly assist in designing, constructing, or operating a
facility for the production of special nuclear material (SNM) suitable
for the production of a nuclear weapon.

Generally, information about a technology applicable to AVLIS that is
being pursued for another application is not UCNI unless sensitive
design information pertinent to an AVLIS application for the production
of SNM is revealed. By definition, unclassified information or hardware
routinely available in the public domain is not UCNI. The association
of that information or hardware with an AVLIS application would be UCNI
only if it reveals sensitive design information essential to an AVLIS
application for the production of SNM.

2. Sensitive design and design-related operational information
concerning critical equipment or components of sensitive facilities
that, if sabotaged, could prevent operation or safe shutdown under
normal or abnormal conditions, or could be of significant assistance in
planning or executing an act of theft, diversion, or dispersion of
nuclear material (UCNI GG No. 11). Sensitive information concerning
security plans and procedures for production or utilization facilities,
nuclear materials contained in such facilities, or nuclear materials in
transit, provided this information cannot be obtained by casual
observations from uncontrolled areas (UCNI GG No. 15). Sensitive
information concerning security equipment for the protection of
production or utilization facilities, nuclear material contained in such
facilities, or nuclear material in transit (UCNI GG No. 16). Sensitive
information revealing capabilities, deficiencies, or vulnerabilities of
a specified security plan, procedure, or system (UCNI GG No. 17). And,
sensitive design information concerning a specified sensitive facility that is
not readily observable from a public area (UCNI GG No. 6).

Unclassified AVLIS information that is UCNI under these general
guidelines includes certain plant design information such as detailed
floor plans and schematics; specific information on critical or
sensitive equipment, and power and cooling systems; specific
descriptions of critical operations and procedures; nuclear materials
control and accountability systems and procedures; and sensitive
security information concerning facilities, equipment, plans,
procedures, capabilities, deficiencies, and operations concerning
Uranium-AVLIS. Generally for AVLIS research and development (R&D)
or demonstration facilities, such information would be UCNI only if it
could be of significant assistance to a malefactor in planning or
executing an act of theft, diversion, or dispersion of nuclear material,
or an act of sabotage that could only prevent safe shutdown under normal
or abnormal conditions. Information that could only assist a malefactor in
preventing operation of such facilities would not normally be UCNI.

3. Guidelines that concern information falling under this topical
guideline document must also reference the general guidelines
determination (s) (e.g., GG No. 10, GG No. 16, etc.) on which they are based.
See page I-3, paragraph H, UCNI General Guidelines (GG-2).

NOTE: The product of a Uranium-AVLIS Plant is special nuclear material
(SNM) because it is enriched in 235U. Since it contains less than 20%
235U, it is referred to as low enriched uranium (LEU).

For UCNI, a sensitive function is one that concerns atomic energy
defense programs and whose disruption could reasonably be expected to
have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public
or the common defense and security. The sensitive functions pertaining
to Uranium AVLIS fall in the following two categories and information
about these functions may be UCNI:

1. Nuclear Material Production.

a. AVLIS process research, development, and demonstration.

b. Design, construction, and activation of a
plant for the enrichment of uranium for domestic
and defense reactor fuel and/or for nuclear weapons
production.

c. Operation of that uranium enrichment plant.

2. Safeguards and Security

a. Protection of AVLIS technology and
Uranium-AVLIS facilities.

b. Safeguarding of special nuclear material
(feed, product, and by-product) in Uranium-AVLIS
facilities and in shipments to and from those
facilities. Information concerning shipments of material
containing or revealing UCNI, such as unclassified but sensitive
equipment or components may be UCNI. However, a product shipped
exclusively for civilian program uses or involving low-level radioactive
waste is exempt from control as UCNI.

A sensitive facility is one in which a sensitive function is
performed. For Uranium-AVLIS, the sensitive facilities are those being
used for experiments and process demonstration; examples of those
facilities are listed below. From time to time other facilities may be
used for Uranium-AVLIS experiments and process demonstration and may be
designated sensitive facilities. Certain unclassified design and design
related operational information, as described in
Section F, about these
facilities may be UCNI.

Facilities at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL) being used for Uranium-AVLIS experiments and process
demonstration, such as Building 490, the Laser and Separator
Development Facility.

Facilities being used for Uranium-AVLIS experiments and
process demonstration such as K-25 and X-10 in Oak Ridge, TN.

Facilities at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant being used
for Uranium-AVLIS experiments and process demonstration.

Uranium enrichment production facilities when such facilities
are constructed.