Top positive review

First of all, ignore the ignorant one-star reviews of this book, which have not bothered to try and engage with its contents. They are sounding off about something else. This is not a hatchet job by a couple of liberal academics against people they do not like. It is rigorous and judicious assessment of both UKIP as a party and what sort of people support it and why they think the way they do. It is seeking to explain, not condemn. The book is based on solid demographic research and by talking to key UKIP figures and makes three key findings.

First, UKIP has involved from a single-issue pressure group into a fully-fledged political party with an underlying ideology. Despite its missteps, it is a far more professional and sophisticated outfit than it once was. It has built up a political machine. On this point however, I am not altogether convinced. Post-referendum, UKIP will struggle to define its purpose and I am not too sure if UKIP has laid solid institutional foundations to allow it to develop a profile based on a set of ideas that transcend personalities and don't need the showmanship of its former leader, Farage, to sustain them. The rise of Theresa May as the Tories' leader, and her brand of back-to-the-50s suburban Tory values, probably offers something more to the liking of many of its key activists than Cameron did. Co-option and assimilation by the Tories are real hazards for the party over the coming years.

Second, much of its support is based on former Labour voters - white, older and working-class voters, especially. When this observation was made, just a few years ago, this was going against the conventional wisdom of much of the commentariat which tended to write off UKIP supporters as a combination of disaffected Tory voters and the dross of the far right. Since then, the data provided by the General Election of 2015 and the 2016 EU Referendum has been conclusive: UKIP has made significant inroads in traditional English and Welsh Labour heartlands. On this point, the authors have been more than vindicated.

Explaining the basis of this support is hard to answer. In theory, UKIP's free market policies should put working class voters off (why it does not needs more explanation) but many of these voters seem to look past this and warm to its appeal to 'traditional' British values. At the heart of this is a form of class conflict, but one defined as much by values as economics. Middle-class, metropolitan Labour supporters subscribe to a different set of values to many traditional Labour supporters. We have scarcely begun to digest the implications of this, not just for Labour's electoral prospects, but for the wider implications about a divided country, with opposing definitions of identity and belonging.

That brings us to the third finding. Ideologically the party rejects the blood and soil nationalism of the British National Party and purports to be a civic nationalist party - that is, it is open to members of any race and creed, provided they accept core 'British values.' That said, It has struggled to win over BME voters and the young - and there is no doubt that some of its support has been creamed off the now defunct BNP. It is certainly opposed to the middle-class cosmopolitanism shared by all three mainstream party leaders at the time the book was written, Cameron, Clegg and Miliband. This does not merit the designation 'fascist' but it is proper to situate the party to the right of the mainstream, in its cultural values. This explains much of its appeal - many of its supporters feel alienated by mainstream middle-class values and this party speaks to them.

The barriers to UKIP's wider breakthrough are the nature of the first-past-the-post system and the diffusion of its support geographically. it is wide but not deep enough anywhere for it to deliver clusters of seats in parliament. This has been the bane of all would be third parties in the UK. It has not shown thus far that it can surmount these barriers. Those are not the sum of its problems, as we discussed above. Still, whether it is destined to rise or fall over the coming years, none of the underlying issues that the rise of the party have highlighted are going to vanish anytime soon. Even if UKIP were to disappear tomorrow, this book would still be relevant and topical and will carry on being so for many years to come, because it deals with the underlying cultural and values conflict that will persist, for a very long time.

Top critical review

2.0 out of 5 starsThere is no quality analysis. Rushed out to before the election to get themselves BBC air-time.

28 January 2015

This book falls down on its analysis. For example, their question 'Look at the age of UKIP voters' is left as just that! Instead, a proper analysis might relate this to the number of Labour governments a blue collar voter have lived through.

The authors who wrote this book out just just in time for the EU election and, I felt wrote it specifically for the BBC, in the same way that Shakespeare would write for the Tudor audience. I personally felt that they were a couple of chancers buying themselves BBC time and a doorway into journalism.

On the plus side, it contains a guide on how to get elected and the UKIP history is certainly entertaining (although, I personally doubted its veracity).

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First of all, ignore the ignorant one-star reviews of this book, which have not bothered to try and engage with its contents. They are sounding off about something else. This is not a hatchet job by a couple of liberal academics against people they do not like. It is rigorous and judicious assessment of both UKIP as a party and what sort of people support it and why they think the way they do. It is seeking to explain, not condemn. The book is based on solid demographic research and by talking to key UKIP figures and makes three key findings.

First, UKIP has involved from a single-issue pressure group into a fully-fledged political party with an underlying ideology. Despite its missteps, it is a far more professional and sophisticated outfit than it once was. It has built up a political machine. On this point however, I am not altogether convinced. Post-referendum, UKIP will struggle to define its purpose and I am not too sure if UKIP has laid solid institutional foundations to allow it to develop a profile based on a set of ideas that transcend personalities and don't need the showmanship of its former leader, Farage, to sustain them. The rise of Theresa May as the Tories' leader, and her brand of back-to-the-50s suburban Tory values, probably offers something more to the liking of many of its key activists than Cameron did. Co-option and assimilation by the Tories are real hazards for the party over the coming years.

Second, much of its support is based on former Labour voters - white, older and working-class voters, especially. When this observation was made, just a few years ago, this was going against the conventional wisdom of much of the commentariat which tended to write off UKIP supporters as a combination of disaffected Tory voters and the dross of the far right. Since then, the data provided by the General Election of 2015 and the 2016 EU Referendum has been conclusive: UKIP has made significant inroads in traditional English and Welsh Labour heartlands. On this point, the authors have been more than vindicated.

Explaining the basis of this support is hard to answer. In theory, UKIP's free market policies should put working class voters off (why it does not needs more explanation) but many of these voters seem to look past this and warm to its appeal to 'traditional' British values. At the heart of this is a form of class conflict, but one defined as much by values as economics. Middle-class, metropolitan Labour supporters subscribe to a different set of values to many traditional Labour supporters. We have scarcely begun to digest the implications of this, not just for Labour's electoral prospects, but for the wider implications about a divided country, with opposing definitions of identity and belonging.

That brings us to the third finding. Ideologically the party rejects the blood and soil nationalism of the British National Party and purports to be a civic nationalist party - that is, it is open to members of any race and creed, provided they accept core 'British values.' That said, It has struggled to win over BME voters and the young - and there is no doubt that some of its support has been creamed off the now defunct BNP. It is certainly opposed to the middle-class cosmopolitanism shared by all three mainstream party leaders at the time the book was written, Cameron, Clegg and Miliband. This does not merit the designation 'fascist' but it is proper to situate the party to the right of the mainstream, in its cultural values. This explains much of its appeal - many of its supporters feel alienated by mainstream middle-class values and this party speaks to them.

The barriers to UKIP's wider breakthrough are the nature of the first-past-the-post system and the diffusion of its support geographically. it is wide but not deep enough anywhere for it to deliver clusters of seats in parliament. This has been the bane of all would be third parties in the UK. It has not shown thus far that it can surmount these barriers. Those are not the sum of its problems, as we discussed above. Still, whether it is destined to rise or fall over the coming years, none of the underlying issues that the rise of the party have highlighted are going to vanish anytime soon. Even if UKIP were to disappear tomorrow, this book would still be relevant and topical and will carry on being so for many years to come, because it deals with the underlying cultural and values conflict that will persist, for a very long time.

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Good insight into the party's early days and its efforts to distance itself from the extreme right wing parties, despite media insistence that "UKIP was just the same". It is anything BUT "the same". It is a radical alternative to the three main Establishment parties.

This book brought home to me the difference between ethnic and civic nationalism. The latter is what distinguishes UKIP from all other parties who argue for a managed immigration policy for the UK. Don't stop immigration, because we desperately need it, but control it.

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Excellent book by Ford and Goodwin, thoroughly recommended, read this along with the followup book "UKIP: Inside the Campaign to Redraw the Map of British Politics", to understand a deep, insightful analysis of the rise of UKIP and it's transformation from a single-issue (leave-EU) protest group to a populist party with at least 3 issues (anti-EU, anti-immigration and anti-politicians):-). The core insight is that the transformation of the UK's economy and society over the last 40-50 years has left behind a significant minority of disadvantaged and disconnected older, white, less educated, financially struggling, working class people (mainly men) - as many Old Labour as traditional Tories - who UKIP has successfully connected with. Post-Brexit, this is an important part of the explanation for why the UK has chosen Brexit.

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It is rare to find an academic book that is based on data and sound research with lots of footnotes and credits and still a good read. I enjoyed this book and would recommend it to anybody who likes reading about politics - or wants to find out more about what is really driving the rise of UKIP. It also sets in context the internal rows the party is having now in 2016 and 2017 and shows that this has happened before and, unfortunately in my opinion, they may grow yet stronger. It also shows why Labour need to be afraid - very afraid in their former heartlands.

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This is a book for anyone who is wondering just what the hell is going on out there in the murky world of politics, and needs it explaining in plain English. The highs and the lows are all part of the narrative, from the early days of UKIP right up to, though not including, the last council and European elections. I found it a good read and certainly feel more educated with regards to the changes in voter preferences.

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Excellent book. A fair and balanced view. One could hardly expect anyone to have any sympathy for the B.N.P. The only negative is if you want analysis of U.K.I.P's meteoric rise which began in 2014 with the European Elections then you will need to find out if there will be an updated edition. The most detailed (for the non enthusiast, non academic, most tedious ) analysis is quarantined in the back 20 pages of Appendices. Well written and supported by much data. A sympathetic view of what progress U.K.I.P. were making. In the light of subsequent events showing a good deal of foresight of their potential for success. An author's rating between the book and the by election of Clacton as being the U.K.I.P. perfect storm proved well founded with their subsequent 60 % to the Conservatives 25%.The research conclusions in the book appear well founded.