President Obama's attempt to do a deal with the allies of al-Qaeda has already
backfired

Barack Obama’s attempts to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban look to be dead in the water before they have even started. During the closing stages of the G8 summit the president made the surprise disclosure that officials were primed to engage in their first direct talks with the enemy since the bitter conflict erupted more than a decade ago.

But no sooner had Mr Obama announced the talks, than their prospects were immediately placed in jeopardy, thanks to the hissy fit thrown by Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president. The “Karzai factor” has been one of the less predictable plot lines in the seemingly interminable Afghan soap opera. One moment Mr Karzai is being hailed as the saviour of the West, the only Afghan leader who can be trusted to take the fight to the Taliban. The next he is being denounced as a corrupt and weak politician who is only interested in his own self-advancement.

On this occasion, however, Mr Karzai’s temper tantrum, and suspension of talks with the US within hours of Obama’s announcement, appears to be fully justified. As Afghanistan’s democratically elected president, Mr Karzai might at the very least expect to be involved in any discussions relating to his country’s future. He is also within his rights to object to the Taliban naming their office in Qatar, where the negotiations are due to take place, as the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”. The country Mr Karzai governs is no such thing, and his government has committed itself to a pluralist society, rather than one based on the narrow strictures of Sharia. The Taliban have even been allowed to fly their own flag over the building.

Such is Mr Obama’s desperation to reach a deal with the Taliban before the last American combat troops return home next year, that he is prepared to go to the most extraordinary lengths to tempt them to the negotiating table – even if it means alienating a key White House ally. Consequently, on the day after Nato formally handed over control for Afghan security to Mr Karzai, the Americans find themselves in the invidious position of having the Afghan president refuse to talk to them about their own future role in his country.

Indeed, coping with Mr Karzai’s disaffection is the least of Mr Obama’s worries as he embarks on a last-ditch effort to do a deal with the Taliban before the mission ends. In the past, Washington has insisted on two pre-conditions before it would countenance talks: a cessation of hostilities and, crucially, a firm commitment from the group to cut its ties with al-Qaeda.

This, you may recall, was the original casus belli for the West’s military intervention after 9/11, when the refusal by Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s spiritual leader, to surrender Osama bin Laden to stand trial led to the overthrow of his government.

Despite the setbacks of the past decade, Mullah Omar remains the Taliban’s most influential voice, and his reluctance, even now, to make a public declaration denouncing his support for al-Qaeda is a graphic illustration of the weakness of Mr Obama’s negotiating position. The only commitment the White House could evince from the militants in their official statement was a pledge that the “Islamic Emirate never wants to pose harm to other countries from its soil, nor will it allow anyone to cause a threat to the security of countries from the soil of Afghanistan”. As for its attitude towards a ceasefire, within hours of the statement four American soldiers had been killed by a Taliban attack on Bagram air base.

There will, of course, be those who argue that, after the 3,000 Nato fatalities (including 444 British dead and hundreds more wounded) we have suffered during the past decade, we should not be talking to people who have the blood of Western soldiers on their hands. But any chance we had of defeating them on the battlefield, and forcing them to submit to our terms, vanished the moment Mr Obama, with David Cameron’s active encouragement, opted for a policy of cut and run, thereby handing the advantage to the Taliban. Consequently, any deal made over the future of Afghanistan will be one that suits the Taliban’s interests, rather than those of the millions of Afghan civilians we have been fighting to protect. Indeed, there are many Obama advisers who have already reconciled themselves to the idea that the Taliban will seize large swathes of the country the moment Western forces leave.

But while Mr Obama, in his desperation to get a deal, might be prepared to make a number of painful concessions, even he must accept that there can be no lasting settlement so long as the organisation maintains a close alliance with al-Qaeda’s terror network.