I have selected as my
subject on this occasion the campaigns of Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest, who
was my immediate commander during the last year and a half of the war, and who, if not the
greatest military genius, was certainly the greatest revolutionary leader on our side. He
was restrained by no knowledge of law or constitution. He was embarrassed by no
preconceived ideas of military science. His favorite maxim was, "War means fighting,
and fighting means killing." Without the slightest knowledge of them, he seemed by
instinct to adopt the tactics of the great masters of the military art, if there be any
such art.
Hamley says, "Nothing is more common than
to find in writings on military matters reference to 'the rules of war,' and assertions
such as some general 'owed his success to knowing when to dispense with the rules of war.'
It would be difficult to say what these rules are or in what code they are embodied."
Colonel T.W. White, a clear headed officer of my command, expressing the same idea more
quaintly, said: "It all consists in two words -- luck and pluck." Forrest
possessed both of these in an eminent degree; and his successes, many of which were
achieved with men who had never been drilled one hour together, illustrated what might
have been accomplished by untrained Southern soldiers.

His Life Before The War.

In February, 1841, when I was but
ten years of age, I remember well a small company of volunteers who marched out of the
town of Holly Springs, Mississippi, for the relief of Texas, then threatened by invasion
from Mexico. In that little band stood Bedford Forrest, a tall, black haired, gray eyed,
athletic youth, scarce twenty years of age, who then gave the first evidence of the
military ardor he possessed. The company saw no fighting, for the danger was over before
it arrived, and the men received no pay. Finding himself in a strange country without
friends or money, Forrest, with the characteristic energy which distinguished him in after
life, split rails at fifty cents per hundred and made the money necessary to bring him
back to his family and home. Without tracing him through the steps by which he accumulated
a fortune, it is enough to say that at sixteen years of age he was left fatherless, with a
mother and large family to support on a small leased farm, and at forty years of age he
was the owner of a large cotton plantation and slaves, making about one thousand bales of
cotton per annum, and engaged in a prosperous business in Memphis, Tennessee, the largest
city of his native State. His personal courage had been severely tested on several
occasions; notably at Hernando, Mississippi, where he was assaulted in the streets by
three Matlock brothers and their overseer Bean. Pistols and bowie knives were freely used,
and after a terrible fight, in which thirteen shots were fired, the three Matlocks and
Forrest all wounded, his assailants fled and left him master of the field.

Lieutenant Colonel Of A Cavalry
Battalion.

On the 14th of June, 1861, Nathan
Bedford Forrest was enrolled as a private in a Confederate cavalry company, and went into
camp near Randolph, Tennessee. About the 10th of July, 1861, Hon. Isham G. Harris, the
great war Governor of Tennessee, knowing Forrest well and having a high regard for the
man, telegraphed him to come to Memphis, and there, through the aid of General Polk,
procured authority for him to raise a regiment of cavalry for Confederate service. This
was somewhat difficult authority to obtain at that time, for in the beginning of the war
neither side regarded cavalry as of much value for fighting purposes; and it is, perhaps,
more due to Forrest than to any other man, that the cavalry was subsequently so largely
increased and played such an important part on both sides. But Forrest's men were not
properly called cavalry -- they more nearly resembled the dragoons of the sixteenth
century, who are described as "mounted foot soldiers." Jackson's corps were
called "web footed cavalry," and Forrest's troopers might well be called
"winged infantry."
On the 20th of July, Forrest mustered his first
company into service, and about the same time smuggled out of Louisville, Kentucky, though
closely watched, pistols and saddles to equip them. During the second week of October,
1861, he organized a battalion of eight companies, of which he was elected Lieutenant
Colonel, and the day after its organization moved for Fort Donelson, and commenced his
active and brilliant career, which knew no cessation until the armies of the South were
surrendered. I shall not in this address undertake to follow in detail his successful and
marvelous career, nor shall I indulge in any flowers of rhetoric to adorn my story. I will
attempt by a plain and simple recital of his most prominent deeds, to raise up the
monument he hewed out for himself, and leave to other hands to polish its surface and
crown it with appropriate wreaths of beauty.

His First Battle.

After having seen some service in
marching and scouting, but with little time or inclination for drill, on the 28th of
December, 1861, Forrest, with three hundred men, met the enemy for the first time, about
four hundred and fifty strong, near Sacramento, Kentucky. This fight deserves especial
notice, not only because of its success and the confidence inspired in the raw Confederate
cavalry, but because it displayed at once the characteristics and natural tactics which
were subsequently more fully developed and made Forrest famous as a cavalry leader. He had
marched his command twenty miles that day, when he found a fresh trail where the enemy's
cavalry had passed. Putting his command at a gallop, he traveled ten miles further before
he struck the rear guard. His own command was badly scattered, not half up with him; but
without halting, he rushed head long at them, leading the charge himself. When he had
driven the rear guard on to the main body, and they turned on him with superior force, he
quickly dismounted his men and held the enemy in check until his command came up, and
ordered them to attack in flank and rear. This movement was successful, and the retreat of
the Federals soon began. Quickly mounting his men, he commenced one of his terrible
pursuits, fighting hand to hand with pistol and sword -- killing one and wounding two
himself continuing the chase for many miles, and leaving the road dotted with wounded and
dead.
His Major, a celebrated preacher and
subsequently an equally celebrated Confederate Colonel, D.C. Kelly, saw him then for the
first time under fire, and thus vividly describes the wonderful change that always took
place in his appearance in a fight: "His face flushed till it bore a striking
resemblance to a painted Indian warrior's, and his eyes, usually so mild in their
expression, blazed with the intense glare of a panther's about to spring on his prey. In
fact, he looks as little like the Forrest of our mess table as the storm of December
resembles the quiet of June."
Those who saw him when his brother Jeffrey
fell, who was born after the death of his father, and who was educated and almost idolized
by his brother, say that the blaze of his face and the glare of his eyes were fearful to
behold, and that he rushed like a madman on the foe, dealing out death with pistol and
sword to all around him -- like Hector fighting over the body of Patroclus:

"Yet, fearless in his strength, now rushing on
He dashed amid the fray; now shouting loud,
Stood firm; but backward not a step retired."

This first fight, as I have said,
illustrated the military characteristics of the man, and justified the remark of General
Dick Taylor, that "he employed the tactics of Frederick at Leuthen and Zorndorf,
without even having heard these names." First, his reckless courage in making the
attack -- a rule which he invariably followed and which tended always to intimidate his
adversary. Second, his quick dismounting of his men to fight, showing that he regarded
horses mainly as a rapid means of transportation for his troops. Third, his intuitive
adoption of the flank attack, so successfully used by Alexander, Hannibal and Tamerlane --
so demoralizing to an enemy even in an open field, and so much more so when made, as
Forrest often did, under cover of woods which concealed the weakness of the attacking
party. Fourth, his fierce and untiring pursuit, which so often changes retreat into rout
and makes victory complete. If our Confederate leaders had pursued their victory at
Manassas, Shiloh and Chickamauga as Forrest pursued this his first victory; as he pursued
Streight in the mountains of Alabama; as he pursued Sooy Smith from West Point; as he
pursued Sturgis from Tishomingo creek; as he pursued every advantage obtained over an
enemy -- the cause that we lost might perhaps have been won. Fifth, following, without
knowing it, Napier's precept of the art of war, he was always in front, making personal
observations and sending back orders for moving his troops, "while his keen eye
watched the whole fight and guided him to the weak spot." As Scott said of Wellington
--

"Greeting the mandate which, sent out
Their bravest and their best to dare
A fate their leader shunned to share.
He his country's sword and shield
Still in the battle front revealed
And where danger fiercest swept the field
There came like a beam of lights"

This practice brought him into many
personal conflicts; and General Dick Taylor has well said: "I doubt if any commander,
since the days of lion hearted Richard, has killed as many enemies with his own hand as
Forrest." This exposed him also to constant danger, and he had twenty seven horses
killed and wounded under him in battle and was twice severely wounded himself. This
practice led to imitation by his general officers; and at Hurt's crossroads, the day
before the battle of Franklin, I witnessed what I will venture to say was never seen on
any other battlefield during the war, Forrest with two division and three brigade
commanders all on the skirmish line in the fight.

Fort Donelson And Shiloh.

At Fort Donelson his regiment bore a
conspicuous part in the fight, covered General Pillow's flank in the most important sortie
that was made on our side, captured a battery of six guns, and retreated in safety, when
the garrison surrendered. At Shiloh, without taking any part in the main battle, he
rendered signal and efficient service. Our army had been withdrawn early Sunday evening,
and when officers and men were sleeping, fondly dreaming that their victory was complete,
Forrest, without any orders from any superior officer, had pressed his scouts to the river
and discovered that reinforcements of the enemy were arriving. I was then in command of an
infantry brigade, which, by some oversight, had not received the order to retire, and
having continued the fight until dark, slept on the ground where Prentiss surrendered.
About midnight, Forrest awoke me, inquiring for Generals Beauregard, Bragg and Hardee, and
when I could not tell him the headquarters of either, he said, in profane but prophetic
language, "If the enemy come on us in the morning, we will be whipped like
hell." With promptness he carried the information to headquarters, and with military
genius, suggested a renewal at once of our attack, but the unlettered Colonel was ordered
back to his regiment "to keep up a vigilant and strong picket line," which he
did, and gave timely notice of the Monday's attack. On the day after Shiloh, General
Sherman was attempting to press our army in retreat, and the advance guard of his division
was composed as he tells us, of two regiments, the Seventy seventh Ohio infantry and
Dickey's Fourth Illinois cavalry. Forrest, with three hundred cavalry, was watching them.
Just as they were attempting to cross a small ravine and were in some confusion, he made a
charge so fierce and sudden that infantry and cavalry were all driven back together.
Forrest, charging in among them with pistol and sabre, pursued to within one hundred and
fifty yards of the division in line of battle, while cries of "kill him,"
"knock him off his horse," were heard all around him. The enemy lost fifteen
killed and twenty five prisoners, while Forrest was severely and his horse mortally
wounded.
General Sherman, in his report of it, says:
"The enemy's cavalry came down boldly at a charge led by General Forrest in person,
breaking through our lines of skirmishers, when the infantry, without cause, threw away
their muskets and fled. The ground was admirably adapted to a defence of infantry against
cavalry, being miry and covered with fallen timber. As the regiment of infantry broke,
Dickey's cavalry began to discharge their carbines and fell into disorder. I instantly
sent orders to the rear for the brigade to form in line of battle, which was promptly
executed." The success and result of this attack can be best estimated by considering
this further extract from General Sherman's report: "The check sustained by us at the
fallen timbers delayed our advance, so that night came on us before the wounded were
provided for and the dead buried; and our troops being fagged out by three days' hard
fighting" (it will be remembered that this was the only fighting they had on the
third day), "exposure and privation, I ordered them back to their camps where they
now are."

A Brigadier General Capture Of
Murfreesboro'.

On the 10th of June, 1862, before he
had recovered from his wound, at the earnest solicitation of prominent citizens of North
Alabama, he was ordered to Chattanooga to take command of four regiments of cavalry, which
had seen but little if any service. He arrived on the 19th of June, and began at once to
have his horses shod and his men made ready for a move. He was then but a Lieutenant
Colonel, though assigned to this command as a Brigadier General, to which rank he had been
recommended for promotion, and the appointment was subsequently made on the 21st of July.
After some delay and trouble with his Colonels, growing out of the question of rank, he
moved from Chattanooga on the 8th of July, with about two thousand cavalry rank and file.
In five days he had crossed the mountains, fought a severe battle at Murfreesboro', and
with his two thousand cavalry, by hard fighting and a successful bluff, captured General
Crittenden, with seventeen hundred infantry, four pieces of artillery, six hundred horses,
forty wagons, twelve hundred stands of arms and ammunition, and a large quantity of
clothing and supplies. A Union writer estimated their loss at one million dollars. In five
days more he had driven the Union cavalry from Lebanon, captured three picket posts around
Nashville with one hundred and forty three prisoners, burned four important bridges near
the city, a railroad station and a large supply of railroad wood, and made his escape from
General Nelson, who was pursuing him with a largely superior force.
On the 21st July, 1862, the day his commission
as Brigadier General bears date, while he was tearing up railroad track, burning bridges
and doing much damage, he was so completely surrounded that his escape seemed impossible,
and a telegram was actually sent to General Buell that he had been captured, with eight
hundred men; but when the mountain passes were all guarded, and the enemy moving on him on
every road, he coolly and quietly led his men out of the trap set for him, by taking the
dry bed of a creek, with steep banks, that concealed him from view, running parallel with
the McMinnville road, and passing almost under the troops drawn up in line of battle on
this road to intercept him.
On the 23d he joined Bragg at Sparta, where he
was for the first time furnished with a section of artillery, and as our army moved into
Kentucky, was ordered to assist in protecting its left flank, which he did.

Organizes A New Command In Middle
Tennessee.

But Forrest was best suited to
independent action; and, at his own request, turned over his brigade in Bragg's army on
the 27th of September, 1862, at Bardstown, Kentucky, and in five days had marched one
hundred and sixty five miles and was at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, to organize a new
command.
By the first November, 1862, he had organized a
new brigade, thirty five hundred strong, and being anxious to retake the capital of his
State, had persuaded General Breckinridge, then in command, to permit him, with his own
force and three thousand infantry under General Roger Hanson, to attempt it. The movement
was made; but just when the attack was about to begin, and when Forrest felt confident of
success, an order came to retire.

His First Raid Into West
Tennessee.

On the 10th of December, 1862,
Forrest was ordered to move with his new brigade of raw cavalry, armed only with shot guns
and such weapons as they picked up in the country, across the Tennessee river to destroy
the railroad communication between Louisville and Memphis. He called attention to the
almost unarmed condition of his command; but, in reply, was ordered by General Bragg to
move at once. Sending an agent forward to smuggle percussion caps out of Memphis, he
started. By the 15th he had crossed the Tennessee river at Clifton, swimming his horses
and ferrying over his men, artillery and train, with a leaky old ferryboat, in a cold,
pelting rain, that destroyed most of his small supply of percussion caps. Fortunately, his
agent arrived that night with a fresh supply, and he began his arduous task on the 16th,
after sinking and concealing his ferryboat to make safe his return. In two weeks' time,
with about three thousand raw and almost unarmed cavalry, in a small district of country,
surrounded on three sides by the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers, and on the fourth by
the Memphis and Charleston railroad, thronged with Union soldiers, marching an average of
twenty miles a day, he fought three heavy battles, had almost daily skirmishing, burned
fifty railroad bridges, destroyed so much of its trestle work as to render the Mobile and
Ohio railroad useless there the rest of the war, captured eighteen stockades, with two
thousand five hundred prisoners, took and disabled ten pieces of field artillery, carried
off fifty wagons and ambulances, with their teams, captured ten thousand stands of arms
and one million rounds of ammunition, and then crossing the Tennessee river, seven hundred
yards wide, in a few skiffs and one ferryboat, navigated by poles, his horses swimming,
while an enemy ten thousand strong was attempting to cut off his retreat, he returned to
his camp on the 1st of January, 1863, with a command stronger in numbers than when he
started, thoroughly equipped with blankets and oil cloths, their shot guns replaced with
Enfield rifles, and with a surplus of five hundred rifles and eighteen hundred blankets
and knapsacks. While the army of Virginia can justly boast of its unsurpassed infantry
under Jackson, the West is equally proud of the matchless achievements of Forrest and his
cavalry. He had scarcely returned from this expedition, when he was ordered to assist
Wheeler in his attack on Dover. Returning from this, he was constantly engaged in the
battles and skirmishes around Spring Hill and Thompson station; and on the 24th of March,
1863, with his own command, captured Brentwood, with seven hundred and fifty nine
prisoners, and destroyed a railroad bridge and blockhouse in a short distance of
Nashville.

Captures Streight.

On the 23d of April, 1863, he was
ordered to the relief of General Roddy, who was threatened with a heavy force at
Tuscumbia. Starting from Spring Hill, Tennessee, and moving with his extraordinary
celerity, he crossed the Tennessee river on the 27th and on the 28th joined Roddy, who was
holding the enemy in check at Town creek. Before him was General Dodge, with about eight
thousand infantry; and just as Forrest opened an artillery fire on him, a scout reported
Colonel Streight, with two thousand two hundred cavalry, moving through Newburg towards
Moulton, and before him lay unprotected the iron works of Montevallo, the workshops at
Selma, and all the railroads of Alabama and Georgia; where he would strike, no one could
tell. Forrest saw at once that the movement of Dodge was a feint, to cover the operations
of Streight; and leaving a few regiments to keep up a show of resistance, he fell back
that night toward Courtland, to prepare for the pursuit of Streight, which he commenced
early on the morning of the 29th March, 1863. The story of that celebrated pursuit, which
lasted four days and nights, almost without cessation; the constant skirmishing, amounting
often to heavy battles; the flanking of the bridge over Black creek, through the aid of
Miss Emma Sanson, who, mounting behind him on his horse; piloted him to an old ford; the
courage and simplicity of that same country girl, spreading out her skirts and telling him
to get behind her when they dismounted at the ford under fire of the enemy; the fierce
fighting at Sand mountain at dusk, where men fought by the flash of their guns, and where
Forrest had one horse killed and two wounded under him; the weird midnight attack when he
rolled his guns silently by hand to within one hundred and fifty yards of his unconscious
foe, and awoke the slumbering echoes of the mountain with the thunder of his artillery;
the sharp crack of the rifle and the Rebel yell, before which the enemy fled; and the
final stratagem by which seventeen hundred Federals were captured by six hundred
Confederates -- has been so often and so vividly told, that it needs no repetition, until
some Southern Waverly shall perpetuate it in romance, or some Southern Homer
shall embalm it in undying verse.

The Battle Of Chickamauga.

From this time to the battle of
Chickamauga he was constantly engaged and rendered effective service, both in Middle and
East Tennessee. In the battle of Chickamauga, his men, dismounted, fought with the
infantry until the retreat began, when, mounting his men, he pursued to within three miles
of Chattanooga. He captured a Federal officer in a tall tree that had been conveniently
arranged for an observatory; mounting to his place, he could see the enemy retreating
along the roads and in the town of Chattanooga in great confusion and chaos. He
communicated these facts to headquarters, and urged an immediate advance of the
Confederate army upon them. Had his example or his advice been followed, Sherman's march
to the sea might never have been made.

He Leaves Bragg's Army.

On the 3d of October, 1863, he was
ordered by General Bragg to turn over his command, except Dibrell's brigade, to General
Wheeler for an expedition into Tennessee. Regarding this as derogatory to him, he resigned
his commission. General Bragg was my first brigade commander, and I was more attached to
him than any General under whom I served. I knew him to be a pure and unselfish patriot,
and in the fall of 1861 bore from him to President Davis the strikingly unselfish
proposition to turn over to General A.S. Johnston, for active service in Kentucky, his
well drilled army at Pensacola, and to receive raw recruits in its place, if he could not
be taken with his men; and I would say nothing now even to wound his memory: But the
promotion of Wheeler over Forrest, which he, in an honest desire to promote the good of
the service, recommended, was unfortunate.
Wheeler, a brave, generous, unselfish and
educated soldier, did not desire it, and suffered in public estimation when it was thrust
on him. Forrest, though a great strategist, trusted largely for tactics and many military
details to officers under him; and if Wheeler had remained second to Forrest, as he was
perfectly willing to do, a more splendid combination for cavalry operations could scarcely
have been made. Thus ended Forrest's career in Bragg's army; but before we turn from this
Department, I must recall an anecdote strikingly illustrative of the estimation in which
Forrest was held by the people, and which he always told on himself with great delight.
When Bragg was retreating from Tennessee, Forrest was among the last of the rear guard,
and an old lady ran out of her house to the gate, as he was passing, and urged him to turn
back and fight. As he rode on without stopping, she shook her fist at him in great rage
and said: "Oh! you great, big, cowardly rascal, I only wish old Forrest was here;
he'd make you fight!"

Organizes A New Command In West
Tennessee And North Mississippi.

Mr. Davis refused to accept his
resignation, but promoted him to the rank of Major General, and assigned him to the
command of North Mississippi and West Tennessee, and gave him permission to take with him
his old battalion, now known as McDonald's, and Morton's battery, which he had organized,
and whose guns he had captured -- the whole force amounting to three hundred men and four
guns. He reached Mississippi with this force on the 15th of November, 1863, and after
reporting to General Joseph E. Johnston, and receiving the assistance of Major General
S.D. Lee to pass the enemy's line on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, he reached
Jackson, Tennessee, on the 6th day of December, 1863, and for the fourth time during the
war began to organize a new command. At this time West Tennessee was full of little
companies of from ten to thirty men willing to fight, but unwilling to go far from home or
into the infantry service. The arrival of Forrest was the signal for all these men to
rally around him, and by the 23d of December he had collected a force of about three
thousand men, all unarmed except about two hundred. In the meantime, General Hurlbut was
not idle, and General Sherman who was determined to capture Forrest, if possible, was
directing the movements against him.
The rains had been heavy and the streams were
all full. The Tennessee was behind him and on his left, the Mississippi on his right, and
before him were the Forked Deer, Hatchie and Wolf rivers, and General Hurlbut at Memphis,
with twenty thousand troops, watching every probable crossing place of these rivers, while
troops were moving from Union City, Fort Pillow and Paducah, on his flank and rear. Loaded
down as he was with three thousand unarmed men and a heavy train of supplies, escape would
have seemed impossible to a less daring and less wary man. But one of the greatest secrets
of Forrest's success was his perfect system of scouts. He kept able and reliable scouts
all around him and at great distances, and always knew where his enemy was, what he had,
what he was doing, and very often for days in advance what he was about to do. While the
enemy were watching for him at Purdy and Bolivar, he unexpectedly crossed the Hatchie at
Estenaula -- not, however, without some sharp fighting before he got away. And when they
were expecting him to cross the Wolf near its headwaters, he made a bold dash for Memphis
and crossed one regiment, having only two armed companies over Wolf river bridge, in nine
miles of that city. By skillful handling of his five hundred armed men, and the occasional
display of his large number unarmed, he fought several successful skirmishes, captured the
bridge over Wolf river near LaFayette station, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and
held the enemy in check at Collierville until he passed into Mississippi, with thirty five
hundred men, forty wagons loaded with subsistence, two hundred beef cattle and three
hundred hogs. The correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial, writing from Memphis,
January 12, 1864, says: "Forrest, with less than four thousand men, has moved right
through the Sixteenth army corps, has passed within nine miles of Memphis, carried off one
hundred wagons, two hundred beef cattle, three thousand conscripts and innumerable stores,
torn up railroad track, cut telegraph wire, burned and sacked towns, run over pickets with
a single derringer pistol, and all, too, in the face of ten thousand men."
General Forrest was met near Lafayette by
General Chalmers, with twelve hundred men, who covered his further march into Mississippi,
and who from then, until the close of the war, was his second in command.
The next month he was occupied in obtaining
arms for his recruits and reorganizing his command into four brigades. When this took
place, many officers who had been commanding little squads as companies were thrown out of
office. This occasioned great dissatisfaction, and about one third of the recruits
deserted and went back to West Tennessee. Before this organization was completed, General
Sherman commenced his movements in Mississippi.

The Defeat Of General W. Sooy
Smith.

On the 3d of February, 1864, General
Sherman began his movement from Vicksburg to Meridian, Mississippi, and at the same time
sent a force up by Yazoo City, to take Forrest in rear at Grenada, and ordered General W. Sooy Smith to "move from Collierville on Pontotoc and Okolona," &c., and to
meet him at Meridian, Mississippi, as near the 10th of February as he could.
General Sherman says "General Polk seemed
to have no suspicion of our intention to disturb him." If this were true, he
certainly could not say the same thing of Forrest. He knew that Smith's cavalry was
preparing to move some time before it did move. On the 8th two infantry columns moved - -
one on Panola and the other on Wyatt -- and on the 9th, one day before the cavalry
started, Forrest, then at Oxford, telegraphed Chalmers, at Panola, to skirmish with the
infantry, but that this was a feint, and he must be ready to intercept the cavalry, which
he predicted would strike for Columbus and the prairie country of east Mississippi, where
we had government works and a large quantity of corn. McCulloch's and Richardson's
brigades were then stretched out from Panola to Abbeville, watching the crossings of the
Tallahatchie river, while Jeff. Forrest's brigade was at Grenada watching the forces at
Yazoo City, and Bell, at Oxford, organizing. On the 1Oth Smith started from Collierville.
On the 11th McCulloch moved to Oxford on converging lines with him. By the 14th it was
manifest that Smith was moving for the prairie, and Forrest ordered a concentration of his
command near West Point to intercept him, and this was accomplished by the 18th -- Jeff.
Forrest reaching there on the 17th. His brigade was thrown forward towards Aberdeen, and
continued skirmishing with the enemy until the 20th. On the 20th Bell's brigade was sent
to keep on the flank of the enemy and cover Columbus, and McCulloch and Richardson moved
up to support Jeff. Forrest, and all fell back, slowly skirmishing to West Point. A
telegram received here announced that General S.D. Lee, with three brigades, would be with
us early on the 22d, and Forrest retired behind Suquatoncha creek, of steep banks and miry
bottom, and over which there were but few bridges, easily defended. This was a perfectly
safe position, where he could easily hold the enemy in check until Lee could arrive. Smith
was in a complete cul- de- sac, formed by the Suquatoncha on his right, the Tibbee before
him, and the Tombigbee on his left; and Lee and Forrest united could have crossed the
Suquatoncha behind him and captured his command. Early on the morning of the 21st, a heavy
fire was opened on our pickets, composed of two regiments, dismounted and thrown out in
front of the bridge, four miles west of West Point. Forrest soon came up to where I was
standing on the causeway leading to the bridge, and as it was the first time I had been
with him in a fight, I watched him closely. His manner was nervous, impatient and
imperious. He asked me what the enemy were doing, and when I gave him the report just
received from Colonel Duff, in command of the pickets, he said, sharply: "I will go
and see myself," and started across the bridge, which was about thirty yards long,
and then being raked by the enemy's fire. This struck me at the time as a needless and
somewhat braggadocio exposure of himself, and I followed him to see what he would do. When
we reached the other bank, the fire of the enemy was very heavy, and our men were falling
back -- one running without hat or gun. In an instant Forrest seized and threw him on the
ground, and while the bullets were whistling thick around him, administered a severe
thrashing with a brush of wood. A short time afterward I saw this scene illustrated in
Harper's Weekly, as Forrest breaking in a conscript. He stood a few minutes, and when the
fire slackened a little, ordered up his escort and McCulloch's brigade; and they soon
came. Leaving McCulloch in position, he mounted with his escort, a splendid company of
seventy five young men, who each seemed inspired with the reckless courage of their
leader, and dashed off through the woods to the flank and rear of the enemy. He soon
discovered that the attacking force was small; and at once suspecting it to be the attack
of a rear guard to cover a retreat, he ordered the first division forward, and the enemy
fell back rapidly before him until they reached a wood four miles north of West Point,
where they made a stand in force. After a heavy fight, in which he lost eighty killed and
wounded, and the enemy as many, and where he took seventy five prisoners, he drove them
back again, and continued the pursuit until dark, when he bivouacked on ground prepared by
the enemy, and where he found forage and camp fires all ready for his use. Continuing the
pursuit early on the morning of the 22d, he overtook the main body of the Federals drawn
up in line of battle at Okolona, a town situated in an open prairie. Up to this time he
had with him only his first division, not exceeding two thousand men. Before him, in an
open prairie, where all the movements of each side could be seen, was Sooy Smith, with
seven thousand picked Federal cavalry, selected especially, it is said, to crush the
Confederate leader. If Sooy Smith had fallen back from his dangerous position at West
Point to draw Forrest from a junction with Lee, he had acted with wisdom and skill; and
now the long looked for opportunity seemed to have arrived, when, with a superior force of
well drilled and splendidly armed cavalry, in an open prairie peculiarly fitted for
cavalry operations, the cherished object of General Sherman could be accomplished. A less
impetuous man than Forrest might have paused before such a situation; but he never
hesitated a moment. His two brigades of the first division had been ordered forward on two
different roads, converging at Okolona, and on they came at a run; and at this moment
Bell's brigade, which had been watching the flank of the enemy, came in from an opposite
direction. Forrest, putting himself at the head of one regiment of this brigade, mounted,
made his favorite flank attack, while his three brigades quickly dismounted, attacked in
front; and, after a short fight, the enemy, as if paralyzed with fear, fled almost without
a struggle, leaving a small battery of artillery and about thirty killed and wounded. Sooy
Smith, in his report, accounts for his defeat thus: "After the Fourth regulars had
driven one entire Rebel brigade out of town three times, a portion of McCrillis' brigade,
sent to the support of the Fourth, stampeded at the yells of our own men charging, and
galloped back through and over everything, spreading confusion wherever they went and
driving Perkins' battery of six small mountain howitzers off the road into a ditch."
Forrest pursued with his accustomed vigor; and twice after this the enemy seemed to have
regained their courage, and making bold stands, fought for a time with stubbornness and
skill. In their first stand Colonel Jeff. Forrest was killed, and in the last, which
occurred about sundown, General Forrest and three hundred men, some distance in advance of
his main body, was repulsed, and only escaped capture by taking shelter, dismounted, in a
ravine, which he held by hard fighting, until rescued by gallant old Bob McCulloch,
Colonel of the Second Missouri cavalry, who never failed to come when needed, but never
received the promotion he deserved.

Sherman's March To Meridian.

General Sherman, in the meantime,
had marched to Meridian, and says: "We staid in Meridian five days, expecting every
hour to hear of General Sooy Smith, but could get no tidings of him whatever."
As this was an important movement, and as its
main object was as we believe, defeated by Forrest, we must pause to consider the
situation at that time. General Sherman expresses it in these words: "The Rebels
still maintained a considerable force of infantry and cavalry in the State of Mississippi,
threatening the river, whose navigation had become to us so delicate and important a
matter. Satisfied that I could check this by one or two quick moves inland and thereby set
free a considerable body of men held as local garrisons, I went up to Nashville and
represented the case to General Grant." General Sherman further says: "A chief
part of the enterprise was to destroy the Rebel cavalry commanded by General Forrest, who
were a constant threat to our railway communications in Middle Tennessee, and I committed
this task to Brigadier General W. Sooy Smith. General Hurlbut had in his command about
seven thousand five hundred cavalry, scattered from Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth,
Mississippi, and we proposed to make up an aggregate cavalry force of about seven thousand
'effective,' out of these and the twenty five hundred which General Smith had brought with
him from Middle Tennessee. With this force General Smith was ordered to move from Memphis,
straight for Meridian, Mississippi, and to start by February 1st. I explained to him
personally the nature of Forrest as a man and of his peculiar force; told him that in his
route he was sure to encounter Forrest, who always attacked with a vehemence for which he
must be prepared, and that after he had repelled the first attack, he must in turn assume
the most determined offensive, overwhelm and utterly destroy his whole force. I knew that
Forrest could not have more than four thousand cavalry, and my own movement would give
employment to every other man of the Rebel army not immediately present with him, so that
he (General Smith) might act on the hypothesis I have stated." Again, referring to
the same subject, General Sherman, in his Memoirs says: "The object of the Meridian
expedition was to strike the roads inland, so to paralyze the Rebel forces that we could
take from the defence of the Mississippi river the equivalent of a corps of twenty
thousand men, to be used in the next Georgia campaign, and this was actually done. At the
same time, I wanted to destroy General Forrest, who, with an irregular force of cavalry
was constantly threatening Memphis and the river above, as well as our routes of supply in
Middle Tennessee. In this we utterly failed, because General W. Sooy Smith did not fulfill
his orders which were clear and specific, as contained in my letter of instruction to him
of January 27th, at Memphis, and my personal explanations to him at the same time."
As this letter is very important in this Connection, and has never been published, I give
it in full:

Headquarters Department of the Tennessee,
Memphis July 27th, 1864.

Brigadier General William Sooy Smith, Commanding Cavalry, &c.:

Dear General--By an order
issued this day, I have placed all the cavalry of this department subject to your command.
I estimate you can make a force of full seven thousand men, which I believe to be superior
and better in all respects than the combined cavalry which the enemy has in all the State
of Mississippi.
I will, in person, start for Vicksburg today,
and with four divisions of infantry, artillery and cavalry, move out for Jackson, Brandon
and Meridian, aiming to reach the latter place by February 10th. General Banks will feign
on Pascagonia, and General Logan on Rome.
I want you, with your cavalry, to move from
Collierville on Pontotoc and Okolona, thence sweeping down near the Mobile and Ohio
railroad, disable that road as much as possible, consume or destroy the resources of the
enemy along that road, break up the connection with Columbus, Mississippi, and finally
reach me at or near Meridian, as near the date I have mentioned as possible.
This will call for great energy of action on
your part; but I believe you are equal to it, and you have the best and most experienced
troops in the service, and they will do anything that is possible. General Grierson is
with you and is familiar with the whole country. I will send up from Hains Bluff an
expedition of gunboats and transports combined to feel up the Yazoo, as the present stage
of water will permit. This will disconcert the enemy. My movement on Jackson will also
divide the enemy, so that by no combination can he reach you with but a part of his force.
I wish you to attack any force of cavalry you meet, and follow them southward, but in no
event be drawn into the forks of the streams that make up the Yazoo nor over into Alabama.
Don't let the enemy draw you into minor
affairs, but look solely to the greater object to destroy his communication from Okolona
to Meridian, and then eastward to Selma. From Okolona south you will find abundance of
forage collected along the railroad, and the farms have standing corn in the fields. Take
liberally of all these, as well as horses, mules, cattle, &c. As a rule respect
dwellings and families as something too sacred to be disturbed by soldiers; but mills,
barns, sheds, stables and such like things use for the benefit and convenience of your
command.
If convenient, send into Columbus and destroy
all the machinery there, and the bridge across Tombigbee, which enables the enemy to draw
the resources of the east side of the Valley, but this is not of sufficient importance to
delay your movement.
Try and communicate with me by scouts and spies
from the time you reach Pontotoc, avoid any large force of infantry, leaving them to me.
We have talked over this matter so much that the above covers all points not provided for
in my published orders of today.

I am, yours, &c.,
W. T. Sherman, Major General Commanding.

While General Sherman admits the
defeat of General W. Sooy Smith and censures him severely, he claims that his own movement
was a complete success, and said, in general orders dated Meridian, Mississippi, February
18th, 1864: "Having fulfilled and well all the objects of the expedition, the troops
will return to the Mississippi river.
Now we know that the whole North expected Selma
to be destroyed or Mobile taken by him, and were sadly disappointed when he returned,
after tearing up a few miles of railroad track, which were soon replaced or repaired.
General Boynton, who took issue with General
Sherman, says: "This impression" (that Mobile or Selma was to be taken)
"was current at General Grant's headquarters and at Washington, and General Grant
himself had written to Halleck, under the date of January 15th, 1864, in the same letter
which unfolded the spring campaign, as follows: 'I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to
move out to Meridian with his spare force -- the cavalry coming from Corinth and
destroying the railroad east and south of there so effectually that the enemy will not
attempt to rebuild them during the rebellion. He will then return unless the opportunity
of going into Mobile appears perfectly plain.' Again, writing to General Thomas at
Chattanooga, January l9th, General Grant said: He (Sherman) will proceed eastward as far
as Meridian at least, and will thoroughly destroy the roads east and south of there, and
if possible will throw troops as far east as Selma, or if he finds Mobile so far unguarded
as to make his troops sufficient for the enterprise, will go there.' It will be observed
in General Sherman's letter of instructions to General Smith, he mentions as objects of
attack Columbus and Selma, where we had important government works, but gives no
instructions to attack Forrest; on the contrary, intimates that an attack will come from
him, and the movement seemed to me intended to elude and not attack Forrest. That General
Smith so understood his instructions is evident from his reports. In his report February
26th, 1864, by letter to General Sherman in person, he says: 'I moved the infantry brigade
temporarily assigned to my command, first on Panola and then on Wyatt, and drew Forrest's
forces and attention to those points, while I threw my whole force to New Albany, where I
crossed the Tallahatchie river without opposition. Forrest then fell back to Grenada, and
I moved on by way of Pontotoc.' In his more formal report of his operations made March
4th, he repeats the same thing more in detail, and seems to take credit to himself for
having deceived and eluded Forrest. General Sherman says that Smith might safely have
acted on the hypothesis I have stated, that 'my movements would give employment to every
other man of the Rebel army not immediately present with him ' (Forrest); and yet, when
Sooy Smith turned back from West Point, S.D. Lee was in one day's march of a junction with
Forrest. If General Sherman accomplished all he intended, why was Smith ordered to
Meridian, and why did he wait there five days for him? If the chief part of the enterprise
was to destroy Forrest, why was Smith ordered to 'move straight for Meridian,
Mississippi,' when Forrest was not there and not expected there? Why order Smith to move
through East Mississippi when Forrest was in West Mississippi? Why send infantry to make a
feint on Panola and Wyatt, when Smith was moving for Pontotoc one hundred miles east of
Panola? And lastly, if Smith was sent out especially to destroy Forrest, why does Sherman
say, 'I told him that in his route he was sure to encounter Forrest?'
I have no desire to take part in the
controversy between Smith and his friend Boynton with General Sherman. Smith may have
violated the verbal instructions given him by General Sherman, and he undoubtedly deserved
the censure he received for being outgeneraled and whipped by an inferior force. But we
cannot consent to this achievement of Forrest's being underrated, by admitting that
Sherman's march to Meridian accomplished all that was intended.
Thus ended Sherman's effort to crush Forrest
and set free the large number of men required to hold him in check. Mississippi, with its
immense stores of corn and beef, was still held, and the railroads soon repaired to feed
our army in Georgia. But the student of military operations will be puzzled to understand
how Sherman, with four divisions of infantry and a small force of cavalry, crossed such
streams as the Big Black and Pearl rivers and passed through the centre of Mississippi, in
the face of two divisions of infantry and four splendid brigades of well equipped and well
drilled cavalry under West Point officers, almost without firing a shot, while a man who
could not drill a company, with three thousand cavalry, one half raw troops, saved the
State by defeating General Grant's Chief of Cavalry with seven thousand picked troops.
It reminds us of what Macauley says of
Cromwell: "It is a remarkable circumstance that the officers who had studied tactics
in what were considered as the best schools, under Vere, in the Netherlands, and Gustavus
Adolphus, in Germany, displayed far less skill than those commanders who had been born to
peaceful employments, and never saw even a skirmish until the civil war broke out.
Cromwell never fought a battle without gaining a victory; he never gained a victory
without annihilating the force opposed to him." . . . "In what respect does
Cromwell, who never drew a sword till upwards of forty, yield to any of these famous
commanders? And how immeasurably superior to them all is he as an improver of
victory?" I would not by this disparage military education. I would not, if I could,
disturb a single leaf in the laurel crowns which decorate so justly the heads of those
whom nature and education have combined to make great generals. I do not concur in the
sentiment so often expressed, that "the Confederacy died of West Point"; but I
do believe that many a brilliant citizen soldier was neglected, and his usefulness
paralyzed, if not destroyed, by the West Point influence which barred the doors to
promotion. General Joseph E. Johnston, considered by many the first of Confederate
generals, has said, "if Forrest had been an educated soldier no other Confederate
general would have been heard of," and yet the treatment of Forrest furnishes a
striking example of what I have said.

The Third Raid Into West
Tennessee.

In the first week of March, 1864, a
small brigade of Kentucky infantry, seven hundred effective, under General Buford, was
turned over to Forrest to be mounted, and General Buford assigned to command of his Second
division. Forrest, ever anxious to be moving, determined at once to move into West
Tennessee and Kentucky, to annoy the enemy and recruit his command, especially his new
Kentucky brigade. In ten days he mounted his new brigade, and on the 15th of March
commenced his movement, which resulted in the capture of Union City, with four hundred and
seventy five prisoners, with their arms, ammunition and three hundred horses; the attack
on Paducah, where a large quantity of supplies were obtained, and his Kentucky brigade
increased to seventeen hundred fighting men; the route of a Federal regiment at Bolivar,
and the capture of Fort Pillow. This last fight, for political purposes, has been, by
false testimony, and I believe willful perjury, represented as a bloody massacre. The
willful and malicious assaults of a partisan press, who have recently revived these
slanders for partisan ends, has called forth from Dr. Fitch, of Iowa, who was the Union
surgeon at Fort Pillow, a complete vindication of the Confederates, which has been
published in your Monthly Papers, and as I have recently published a statement on this
subject, I will not detain you now with its repetition. You will pardon me, however, for
saying that I regarded one of my highest duties in life well performed when, as a
representative in Congress, I placed on the records of the country a refutation of this
infamous slander on Forrest and his cavalry. It was said that Forrest's demand for a
surrender at Paducah, coupled with an implied threat that he would not be responsible for
the consequences if compelled to take the place by assault, showed a predetermination to
cold blooded murder. This was the form of his first demand for surrender made at
Murfreesboro', and he practiced it afterwards just as he practiced his flank attack, and
for the same purpose, and with the same effect, to intimidate his adversary. Again he
gathered up a large quantity of supplies and recruits, and again General Sherman attempted
to have him captured, as will be seen from the following telegrams, taken from the
Congressional report on the conduct of the war:

Nashville, Tennessee, April 2, 1864.

General McPherson, Huntsville:

I would not give orders about
Forrest, who is in your command, only the matter involves Kentucky also. As soon as he is
disposed of, I will leave all matters in your Department to you. Veatch is posted near
Purdy to cut off his escape by the headwater of the Natchez. Hurlbut, with infantry and
cavalry, will move towards Bolivar with a view to catch Forrest in flank as he attempts to
escape. Brayman will stop a few veteran regiments returning, and will use them as far out
as Union City.

W. T. Sherman, Major General.

-----

Nashville, April 11, 1864.

To General McPherson, Huntsville:

If you have at Cairo anything
that could go up the Tennessee, and move inland on Jackson or Paris even, it would disturb
Forrest more than anything Hurlbut will do from Memphis.

W. T. Sherman, &c.

-----

Nashville, April 18, 1864.

To General McPherson, Huntsville; General Brayman, Cairo; General
Hurlbut, Memphis; and General Slocum, Vicksburg:

General Grant has made the
following orders.. General Sturgis has started this morning, to assume command of all the
cavalry at or near Memphis, with which be will sally out and attack Forrest wherever he
may be. General Grierson may seize all the horses and mules in Memphis to mount his men
and be ready for the arrival of General Sturgis, and Buckland's brigade of infantry should
be ready to move out with the cavalry.

W. T. Sherman, Major General Commanding.

To further show the great danger
apprehended from Forrest at this time and the number of troops held to watch him, I cite
the following dispatch from General Sherman:

Nashville, April 19, 1864.

To General Rawlins, Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.:

At Memphis are Buckland's
brigade of splendid troops (two thousand), three other white regiments, one black
artillery at Fort Pickering, twelve hundred strong; about one thousand men floating, who
are camped in the fort; near four thousand black troops; three thousand enrolled and armed
militia, and all Grierson's cavalry, ten thousand nine hundred and eighty three, according
to my last returns, of which surely not over three thousand are on furlough. Out of this a
force of about twenty five hundred cavalry and four thousand infantry could have been made
up and by moving to Bolivar could have made Forrest come there to fight or get out. I have
sent Sturgis down to whip Forrest, and, if necessary, to mount enough men to seize any and
all the horses of Memphis and wherever he may go.

W. T. Sherman, Major General Commanding.

And again, writing to General
Thomas, at Chattanooga, from Nashville, April 25, he says: "The only danger I
apprehend is from resident guerrillas and Forrest coming from the direction of Florence. I
did want A.J. Smith about Florence to guard against that danger." While the enemy's
coils were being prepared for him, Forrest was quietly gathering recruits and supplies.
His first division had left him on the 15th, under orders of General Polk, to guard
against a threatened raid from North Alabama on Columbus, Mississippi. General Veatch had
been posted at Purdy, with ten thousand infantry, to guard the headwaters of the Hatchie,
and was ordered away, to General Sherman's intense disgust, as shown in his dispatches. As
soon as Veatch left Purdy, Buford, with a heavy subsistence train, drawn by oxen, moved
out by the Purdy road, while Forrest, with his escort and the remnant of his old battalion
-- in all about three hundred men -- moved so as to protect Buford's flank from a heavy
force moving from Memphis under Sturgis, and evidently intended, as Sherman had suggested,
to capture the Confederates while crossing the Hatchie river at Bolivar. Forrest reached
Bolivar first, and posting his three hundred chosen veterans in the fortifications, well
constructed by the Federals when they held this place, he coolly received the attack of
not less than two thousand cavalry, repulsed them with serious loss, and they retired
evidently believing Forrest's whole command present. He then moved on, having suffered no
serious loss, save the wounding of his gallant Adjutant, Major Strange. Hurlbut was
severely censured, removed from his command at Memphis, and General C.C. Washburn put in
his place. When, a short time after this, Forrest came into Memphis and captured
Washburn's uniform from the room in which he slept, it is said that Hurlbut curtly
remarked: "They removed me because I couldn't keep Forrest out of West Tennessee, but
Washburn couldn't keep him out of his bedroom."

The Defeat Of Sturgis.

Forrest reached Tupelo, Mississippi,
on the 5th of May, 1864, and was busily engaged in reorganizing his command, now
considerably increased by recruits and the addition of General Gholson's brigade, recently
converted from State into Confederate troops. On the 26th, by order of General S.D. Lee,
Department Commander, Chalmers, with McCulloch's and Neely's brigades was ordered to
Montevallo, Alabama, to protect the iron works of that region. On the 31st Forrest started
with Buford's division for Tuscumbia to assist Roddy in meeting a movement in that
quarter, and had reached Russellville, Alabama, when he received information that Sturgis,
with eight thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry and six batteries, was moving from
Memphis into Mississippi, parallel with the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Forrest began
at once to concentrate his scattered command.
Rucker, from Oxford, with three small
regiments, was thrown across the Tallahatchie at New Albany, and commenced to retard the
enemy's advance. This little brigade, under Rucker, who was second only to Forrest as a
fearless fighter -- composed of three regiments, under three dashing young Colonels, Duff,
Bill Taylor and Alex. Chalmers was highly complimented by Forrest for gallantry in
performing this duty. On the 9th Forrest took position with two brigades of Buford's
division, Johnson's brigade of Roddy's division and Rucker's brigade of Chalmers'
division, east of the Hatchie, near Rienzi, to dispute the passage of Sturgis over that
river, supposing he was moving to reinforce Sherman in Georgia. The scouts now reported
Sturgis moving south towards Forrest's camp at Tupelo. Chalmers, with two brigades, was
then at Montevallo, Alabama; Roddy, with one brigade, near Tuscumbia; Gholson, with one
brigade, near Jackson, Mississippi. General S.D. Lee, now in command, determined to fall
back toward Okalona until he could concentrate his forces, and left that night by rail,
after ordering Forrest to get in front of Sturgis and retard his advance. Forrest moved
before day to take position at Bryce's crossroads, on a dividing ridge where the waters of
the Hatchie rise and run north and of the Tallahatchie rise and run south, and when in
four miles of that place he learned that the enemy had already occupied it and were now
between him and his headquarters at Tupelo.
He had with him there his three smallest
brigades, the effective strength of which at that time he reported as follows: Lyons',
eight hundred; Rucker's, seven hundred, and Johnson's, five hundred; while Buford, with
Bell's brigade, about fifteen hundred strong, and two batteries of artillery, were some
distance in the rear. Ordering them to move instantly up, which they did, coming eight
miles in a gallop, he moved forward with the men he had and opened the fight, and at the
same time ordered Buford to send one regiment across the country to attack the enemy in
rear. The battle raged fiercely for some hours with doubtful success, and eight hundred
Federals and six hundred and forty Confederates fell dead and wounded around Bryce's
house. One peculiarity of Forrest's fighting was his almost reckless use of artillery, and
on this occasion he had eight pieces of artillery that were boldly handled by Captain
Morton, a beardless youth, with the face of a woman and the courage of a lion. The
Federals made several splendid charges, that were repulsed at short range by the
artillery, double shotted with cannister. The Confederates insist that both the Federal
infantry and cavalry were in this fight. The Federal cavalry officers who censured
Sturgis, say they had cavalry alone, and that instead of falling back with his cavalry on
to his infantry, prepared in line, he undertook to hold the position with his cavalry, and
bring up his infantry five or more miles at double quick, and that they arrived broken
down and unformed just as the cavalry were driven back on them, and all went pell mell
together. Be this as it may, when Forrest captured Bryce's house, the enemy's infantry in
column were in full view coming up. He turned loose on them his own eight pieces of
artillery and six more just captured, and about that time Barteau's regiment struck them
in rear, and the flight commenced.
A more terrific pursuit was never seen. The
negroes had been sworn on their knees in line before starting from Memphis to show no
quarter to Forrest s men, and on their shirts and banners was inscribed, "Remember
Fort Pillow." This had a double effect: it made the Federals afraid to surrender, and
infuriated Forrest's men -- and it is said that nineteen hundred were killed in this
pursuit, which was continued sixty miles. The exact truth as to this fight will, perhaps,
never be known; but taking either the Federal or Confederate accounts of it, it was the
most brilliant victory of the war on either side. Forrest reports his force as thirty two
hundred cavalry and eight pieces of artillery. The Federal report places Sturgis' force at
thirty three hundred cavalry, fifty four hundred infantry and seventeen pieces of
artillery. With a superior force of cavalry, he might well have expected to hold, with
them alone, his position, well selected at Bryce's crossroads, until his infantry could
come up. Sturgis was as much astonished at his defeat as any one, and was so terribly
mortified that when A.J. Smith moved out after Forrest, a confidential spy from Memphis
reported that Sturgis was sitting in a hotel soliloquizing, "It can't be done,
sir!" and when asked what could not be done, he said, "They c-a-n-'t whip old
Forrest!"
In this battle, two thousand prisoners were
taken, all the artillery (seventeen pieces), the whole ordnance train, well supplied with
ammunition and many articles of value to us; the ambulance and wagon train, filled with
most acceptable supplies, especially coffee, which the hungry Confederates had not tasted
for many days.
General Sherman, in a cipher dispatch, dated
June 20th, 1864, says: "He whipped Sturgis fair and square, and now I will put him
against A.J. Smith and Mower, and let them try their hand." By this victory Forrest
not only saved Columbus and the rich prairie region of Mississippi again, but he saved
Mobile also by the withdrawal of A.J. Smith's division, which had been ordered to its
attack.
Roemer, speaking of the battle of Arbela, says:
"From that great day when in person Alexander led the Macedonian horse, he ranks the
first of cavalry generals of all times, and the tactics there displayed were in every
respect the same which now receive the sanction of modern science -- sudden deployment and
bold attack, outflanking the enemy's wings, dividing the enemy's forces rallying,
attacking the rear, supporting the menaced point, and, to crown all, a pursuit of six
hundred stadia (seventy five miles) in twenty four hours. Never was there a greater
achievement in ancient or modern warfare."
When a new edition of Roemer's work on cavalry
is written, it is to be hoped that the battle of "Tishomingo Creek," or
"Bryce's Crossroads," as the Federals call it, will not be forgotten, where the
battle was fought and a pursuit of sixty miles made all in thirty hours.

The First Invasion Of A. J. Smith
Into Mississippi.

That you may appreciate the immense
work Forrest was now doing, besides keeping about thirty thousand men constantly engaged
to watch him, I call attention to the following telegrams from General Sherman. His
telegram from Nashville, dated April 4, 1864, to General Rawlings, shows that General Corse was sent up Red river to bring A.J. Smith "with all dispatch to Vicksburg and
up the Yazoo river and rapidly occupy Grenada. His appearance there, with ten thousand
men, will be a big bombshell in Forrest's camp, should he, as I fear he will, elude
General Hurlbut. At Grenada, Smith will do all the mischief he can, and then strike boldly
across the country by Aberdeen to Russellville and Decatur." This movement was
defeated by the victory over Sooy Smith and the advance into Middle Tennessee and
Kentucky. A little later A.J. Smith was ordered to assist in taking Mobile; and this was
broken up by the defeat of Sturgis, as shown by the following telegram from General
Sherman to Honorable E.M. Stanton, Secretary of War, dated Big Shanty, June 14, 1864:
"I have just received news of the defeat of our party sent out from Memphis, whose
chief object was to hold Forrest there and keep him off our road. I have ordered A.J.
Smith not to go to Mobile, but to go out from Memphis and defeat Forrest at all
costs." Again, as early as June 6, General Sherman telegraphed General Thomas to
prepare a cavalry raid for Opelika, Alabama; but when it was ready to move he was afraid
to let it stark and telegraphed to General Rousseau, at Nashville, June 20th, . .
"wait and see what Forrest will do." And on the 29th June to the same officer:
"Do not start until we know something definite of General A.J. Smith." To the
same officer on the 30th June: "The movement I want you to study and be prepared for
is contingent on the fact that General A.J. Smith defeats Forrest or holds him well in
check." And July 6th to the same officer: "That cavalry expedition must be off
now. . . . I have official information that General A.J. Smith is out from Memphis, with
force enough to give Forrest full occupation."
On the 24th June (General Sherman telegraphs,
through his aid, L.M. Dayton, to General Thomas: "General A.J. Smith moves from
Memphis via Corinth to engage Forrest. . . . Smith has nine thousand infantry and three
thousand cavalry." General Smith moved slowly and cautiously; Generals S.D. Lee and
Forrest were concentrating forces and fortifying at Okalona to meet him. The first
division was thrown forward above Pontotoc, to watch Smith, with orders to skirmish with
him slightly, but let him come on. Smith reached Pontotoc on the 11th of June and halted
until the 13th, as if hesitating what to do. On the 13th Smith turned east and moved
rapidly towards Tupelo, as if alarmed, but repulsed, with promptness and severe loss to
us, two flank attacks made on him during the day. During the night Smith entrenched
himself at Harrisburg, the site of an old town on the hill above Tupelo, with nine
thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry and twenty pieces of artillery. Major General
S.D. Lee, now in command of the Confederate forces, had seven thousand cavalry, twenty one
hundred dismounted cavalrymen acting as infantry and twenty pieces of artillery. The enemy
had greatly the advantage in force and position. General Smith, with a splendid corps of
infantry, hardened by long and active service, was in an entrenched position on a hill
covered with timber. General Lee, with dismounted cavalry, was in an open field where
every man he had and every movement he made could be plainly seen. The enemy would not
come out of his entrenchments. General Maury from Mobile was telegraphing for help against
a threatened assault, and General Lee determined to attack the enemy in position. Brave
men never marched more fearlessly to death than did Forrest's cavalry on that occasion, as
the terrible slaughter testified, including among the killed and wounded three brigade
commanders and almost every regimental commander engaged. We were badly defeated, and in a
very short time, but the enemy never moved from his entrenchments to improve his victory,
and on the next day moved off rapidly again as if in retreat. General Forrest dashed after
the rear guard in his usual style of pursuit, when just under the hill beyond the little
prairie, above Town creek (where it is said De Soto fought the Indians, and where old
bayonets and musket balls were found in the earth, mingled with Indian arrow heads),
Forrest suddenly came upon the enemy's infantry drawn up in line to receive him. He
attacked at once, and was driven back with heavy loss, and severely wounded himself. Thus
ended two sharp defeats in two successive days, for which General Lee has been somewhat
censured, as he was in immediate command. General Jordan, the biographer of Forrest, who
wrote under his supervision (and to whose valuable book I am greatly indebted for many
details used in preparing this address), leaves the impression that General Lee made the
fight from supposed necessity and without the concurrence of Forrest. I know that this is
not the true statement of the case. Lee, Forrest, Buford and I were riding to the front
when the battle was about to begin. Buford said to Lee and Forrest, who had spent the
night and morning together in consultation: "Gentlemen, you have not asked my opinion
about this fight; but I tell you, we are going to be badly whipped." Forrest replied,
sharply "You don't know what you are talking about; we'll whip 'em in five
minutes." Buford replied: "I hope you may be right, but I don't believe
it." Forrest was a great general; but he never rose to that greatness and dignity of
soul which enabled Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg to assume the responsibility of a failure.

The Second Invasion Of A. J.
Smith.

On the 19th of July, 1864, General
Grant telegraphed from City Point, Virginia, to General Sherman: "I see by Richmond
papers of yesterday that Smith has left Tupelo. Although they call it a retreat, I judge
from S.D. Lee's dispatch that Forrest has been badly whipped. Smith, however, ought to be
instructed to keep a close watch on Forrest and not permit him to gather strength and move
into Middle Tennessee." General Sherman gave the order, but he no longer talks so
flippantly about whipping Forrest as he had done. He telegraphs General Washburn, July
26th: "It was by General Grant's special order General Smith was required after his
fight to pursue and continue to follow Forrest. General Smith must keep well after
Forrest, and rather watch him closely, than attempt to pursue him; but when he does fight,
he should keep the advantage." General Washburn replies, Memphis, August 4th, 1864:
"Forrest is below Okalona; I am moving in that direction, while Smith is after him
with five thousand cavalry and ten thousand infantry." On the 11th Washburn further
telegraphed: "In addition to his own proper force, ten thousand strong, he has three
thousand colored troops from Memphis, three Minnesota regiments sent me from Saint Louis,
and four thousand cavalry." On the 4th of August General Sherman telegraphed General
Grant: "General Washburn is moving from Holly Springs on Columbus, Mississippi. He
thinks that Forrest is dead, from the wound he received in his battle with General
Smith." If this movement of General Washburn was not a myth, as he was never heard of
in the field, he must have suddenly returned when he learned that Forrest was not dead.
The only time he was ever known to be in the neighborhood of Forrest, was when he ran out
of his bedroom in Memphis, in light marching order, leaving his uniform behind, which
Forrest captured and afterward restored to him. Washburn, in return, sent to Forrest some
gray cloth, gold lace and trimmings to make him a Confederate uniform.
General Smith moved slowly, repairing the
railroad from Grand Junction to Abbeville as he came On the 8th of August Forrest again
took the field in a buggy though still suffering severely from his wound. On the 18th the
enemy had completed the railroad to Abbeville, thrown a pontoon bridge across the
Tallahatchie river at that place, and commenced his movement on Oxford. Feeling unable to
contend with A.F. Smith, with his largely superior command, he determined to make a
counter movement on Memphis with one half of his command, leaving the other half under his
first division commander -- the whole force not then exceeding four thousand effective. He
conceived this idea on the morning of the 18th of August, 1864, and sending out men to cut
the telegraph wires in rear of Smith, promptly at 5 P.M. of the same day he started,
saying to his second in command, "If you can hold them back two days, I will be in
Memphis." Believing it the best method of delaying the enemy, the officer left in
command determined to threaten an attack. Early on the morning of the 19th, taking his
escort and Colonel Burrows' regiment, two hundred and fifty strong, having placed his
command in a strong position behind Hurricane creek to receive any return attack that
might follow, he moved on Abbeville, captured forty pickets on the Oxford road, and
charged into town. As the Confederates came in, a large force of Federal cavalry went
rushing out. Colonel Burrows, a dashing preacher, who fought as well as he prayed, wanted
to charge after them; but the officer in command ordered a halt until he galloped to the
top of the hill and saw a heavy force drawn up behind it, evidently to receive a pursuing
charge, and withdrew. The return attack came, and was severely repulsed, and the enemy
were held back more than two days without discovering the absence of Forrest. This affair
at Abbeville and the affair at Town creek, where Forrest's command was so quickly cut to
pieces and himself severely wounded in a similar trap, led me to believe that A.J. Smith
had studied Forrest more closely than any other Federal general who met him. The movement
on Memphis had the desired effect to draw Smith back. A similar movement by Van Dorn on
Holly Springs drew Grant from Oxford; and it is believed that a similar movement, made
when our army lay at Canton, Mississippi, twenty thousand strong, while Memphis was
lightly garrisoned, would have drawn Grant from before Vicksburg. The railroad could have
put them in Panola in two days - - three days' marching would have put them in Memphis;
and, with the Mississippi river in our possession at Memphis and Port Hudson, Grant would
have starved sooner than Pemberton.

In Sheridan's Rear In Middle
Tennessee.

This campaign ended on the 23d of
August, and Forrest, without any time to rest, was ordered to the defence of Mobile. On
his way to Mobile, he was met by his new Department commander, General Dick Taylor, and I
give their interview and its results in the graphic language of the latter.
"General Maury was informed by telegraph
of my presence, that I assumed command of the Department, and would arrest Forrest's
movement. An hour later, a train from the north, bringing Forrest in advance of his
troops, reached Meridian, and was stopped, and the General, whom I had never seen, came to
report. He was a tall, stalwart man, with grayish hair, mild countenance, slow and homely
of speech. In a few words he was informed that I considered Mobile safe for the present,
and that all our energies must be directed to the relief of Hood's army, then west of
Atlanta. The only way to accomplish this was to worry Sherman's communications north of
the Tennessee river, and he must move his cavalry in that direction at the earliest
moment. To my surprise, Forrest suggested many difficulties and asked numerous questions:
how he was to get over the Tennessee? how he was to get back if pressed by the enemy? how
he was to be supplied? what should be his line of retreat in certain contingencies? what
he was to do with his prisoners, if any were taken? etc. I began to think he had no
stomach for the work, but at last, having isolated the chances of success from cause of
failure, with the care of a chemist experimenting in his laboratory, he rose and asked for
Fleming, the superintendent of the railway, who was on the train by which he had come.
Fleming appeared a little man on crutches (he had recently broken a leg), but with the
energy of a giant -- and at once stated what he could do in the way of moving supplies on
his line, which had been repaired up to the Tennessee boundary. Forrest's whole manner was
now changed. In a dozen sharp sentences he told his wants; said he would leave a staff
officer to bring up his supplies; asked for an engine to take him back twenty miles north
to meet his troops; informed me he would march with the dawn, and hoped to give an account
of himself in Tennessee. Moving with great rapidity, he crossed the Tennessee, captured
stockades, with their garrisons, burned bridges, destroyed railways, reached the
Cumberland below Nashville, drove away gunboats, captured and destroyed several
transports, with immense stores, and spread alarm over a wide region. The enemy
concentrated on him from all directions, but he eluded or defeated their several columns,
recrossed the Tennessee river, and brought off fifteen hundred prisoners and much spoil.
Like Clive, nature made him a great soldier; and he was without the former's advantages.
Limited as was Clive's education, he was a Borson of erudition compared with
Forrest." Such was the quick resolves, the prompt execution and the brilliant result
of the first short meeting between these two remarkable men. One, small in statue, but
keen in intellect and polished by education -- the other, rough and powerful in body and
mind. It was Richard, with a battle axe, that could cleave the bar of iron, meeting
Saladan, whose keen sycmeter could cut the pillow of silk. Forrest admitted that he was
more awed by Dick Taylor's power of will than any man he had ever met, or, as he expressed
it, "I lost my charm when I met Dick Taylor."
The consternation of the enemy at his movements
can best be appreciated from their telegrams to each other at the time.
Grant telegraphed to Sherman from City Point,
Virginia, September 12th, 1864: "It will be better to drive Forrest from Middle
Tennessee as a first step." Same day General Sherman telegraphs General Webster at
Nashville: "Call forward from Kentucky any troops that can be spared there, and hold
all that come from the rear until Forrest is disposed of."
On the 28th he telegraphs General Webster:
"I will send up the road tonight another division, and want you to call forward from
the rear all you can get."
On the same day General Sherman telegraphs
General Grant: "I send back to Stevenson and Decherd General Thomas to look to
Tennessee, and have ordered a brigade of the Army of Tennessee to Eastport, and the
cavalry across to that place from Memphis."
Forrest has got into Middle Tennessee, and
will, I feel certain, get on my main road tonight."
General Thomas telegraphs to General Sherman
from Nashville, October 3d, l864: "Rousseau will continue after Forrest. Major
General Washburn is coming up the Tennessee river with ten thousand cavalry and fifteen
hundred infantry, and will move toward Athens for the purpose of striking Forrest's flank,
or cutting off his communication with Bainbridge. General Morgan, as I telegraphed you
last night, is moving from Athens on Bainbridge. So it seems to me there is a fair chance
of hemming Forrest in and destroying his command. The river is not fordable, and if we
seize his means of crossing at Bainbridge, he will be unable to cross anywhere else, and,
I think, Rousseau ought certainly to destroy him." And it appears from the report of
General Thomas, that Rousseau had four thousand cavalry.

At Johnsonville.

With all these efforts made to
capture him, Forrest again made his escape. As soon as he reached the south side of the
Tennessee river in safety, he turned on his pursuers, laid an ambuscade of about three
hundred men, under Colonel Kelly, for the enemy attempting to land at Eastport, captured
seventy five prisoners, three pieces of rifled field artillery, sixty horses; sunk one gun
and two caissons in the river, and drove a large number of the enemy into the river, many
of whom were killed or drowned. And then striking boldly for Johnsonville, Sherman's chief
depot of supplies on the Tennessee river, captured one gunboat, two transports and one
barge, heavily laden with supplies; destroyed three gunboats, thirteen transports,
eighteen barges and buildings, quartermaster and commissary stores, to the value of eight
million dollars, as estimated by Federal officers. General Sherman, whose soul had been
greatly vexed by Forrest, writing to General Grant, November 6th, 1864, about the
movements of Hood, says: "And that devil Forrest was down about Johnsonville making
havoc among the gunboats and transports." Forrest's reputation was now world wide;
and in reading recently a description of the great Tamerlane, I was struck with the
wonderful resemblance between their military careers. The author of "Soldiers and
their Science" says of Tamerlane -- "Born to comparatively humble fortunes,
irresistible obstacles seemed to lie across the path of his ambition, and yet one by one
he overcame them. . . . His plans were deeply meditated; before embarking in an enterprise
he examined the avenues of retreat, and he himself tells us that the principles of his
tactics were uniform. It was his maxim that success came not from the greatness of armies,
but from skillful and judicious measures: Shepherds and hunters, mounted on light hardy
horses, and wielding the javelin and the bow, followed the standard of Timour; he covered
them neither with defensive armor nor unfamiliar weapons. He respected and even drew
advantage from that untamed and adventurous spirit, which, regarding close restraint as
insupportable, gave so large a scope to daring intelligence and prowess. . . . He relied
much on rapidity of movement, and often disconcerted his enemies by falling on them
unawares, and cutting them up in detail -- in his own words, he charged quick and hot on
the foe, and never let the plain of battle cool. He at least had made, if not announced
the discovery, since attributed to Marshall Saxe, "that the secret of an army's
success is in its legs." . . . . On all occasions his march was preceded by clouds of
flying scouts, who, piercing the country in every direction, kept him constantly informed
as to its varied resources and the dispositions of the enemy." With change of name a
better description of Forrest could scarce be written.

Hood's Nashville Campaign.

The day after Johnsonville was
destroyed, Forrest received orders to join General Hood in his march on Nashville. His
movements in this campaign were marked by his usual energy, judgment and success, but were
mostly of that ordinary character that marks cavalry acting as a part of an army of mixed
forces.

Schofield Halted At Spring Hill.

There were two movements, however,
that deserve especial notice When Hood was ready to advance from Columbia. Forrest crossed
Duck river about night in three places, and early the next morning whipped the Federal
cavalry at Hurt's cross roads and drove the most of it towards Nashville, and then turned
on the infantry and held them in check at Spring Hill until Hood's infantry came up The
head of the column reached Spring Hill some time before night and our army went into camp,
while the enemy marched along by them and, as General French expressed it, "lit their
pipes by our camp fires." This movement marks a new era in the use of cavalry to
arrest and capture retreating infantry, which deserves the especial study of military men.
It was subsequently copied by Sheridan in the capture of General Lee; and if it had been
practiced by Wilson on Hood as he retreated from Nashville, the Confederate army would
have been captured. I think I risk nothing in saying if Forrest had been in command of our
army, General Schofield would never have marched by Spring Hill, and the disastrous battle
of Franklin, where the gallant Cleburne and so many brave men fell, would never have been
fought.
Poor Cleburne! he was a noble specimen of the
Irish gentleman. I knew him as a promising young lawyer, and watched with interest his
brilliant career in arms. He supplied my division with ammunition on the morning of
Franklin, and we parted to meet no more. I shall never forget the solemn scene that
occurred when his body passed through Memphis, after the surrender, to its final resting
place in his adopted State of Arkansas. Like the burial of Sir John Moore, it was a sad
and silent scene as we laid him down on the steamer's deck. Around him stood Jefferson
Davis, Isham G. Harris, and the few Confederate generals then in Memphis. Respect for the
prejudices of our recent captors prevented a greater demonstration. An Irishman
approached, and in humble accents asked permission to kiss the coffin of his dead
commander. Mr. Davis nodded a silent assent. Kneeling and making the sign of the cross on
his breast, the humble soldier lingered a moment in prayer, and then pressed his lips with
fervor on the head of the coffin. Not a word was said; but each hat was involuntarily
lifted from the head and silent tears stole down the manly cheeks of those who were
present.

The Retreat From Columbia.

Another incident of this disastrous
campaign deserves especial mention, as illustrative of the character and service of
General Forrest. When Hood's army had been defeated at Nashville and driven back in almost
utter despair to Columbia, where it stood broken and sullen on the south bank of Duck
river, General Forrest, who had been operating around Murfreesboro', came in on the 18th
of December. The inspiring effect of his presence was felt by all, and was thus described
by my Adjutant, Captain W.A. Goodman, a man of brilliant intellect, cool in battle and
untiring in his devotion to the cause and the discharge of his duty: At no time in his
whole career was the fortitude of General Forrest in adversity and his power of infusing
his own cheerfulness into those under his command, more strikingly exhibited than at this
crisis. Broken and defeated, as we were, there were not wanting many others as determined
as he to do their duty to the last, and who stood out faithfully to the end; but their
conversation was that of men who, though determined, were without hope, and who felt that
they must gather strength from despair; but he alone, whatever he may have felt (and he
was not blind to the danger of our position), spoke in his usual cheerful and defiant
tone, and talked of meeting the enemy with as much assurance of success as he did when
driving them before him a month before. Such a spirit is sympathetic; and not a man was
brought in contact with him who did not feel strengthened and invigorated, as if he had
heard of a reinforcement coming to our relief." General Forrest was by unanimous
consent selected to cover the retreat from Columbia, and to assist his cavalry, now
reduced to three thousand, he was assigned a division of selected infantry, numbering only
fifteen hundred, but composed of as brave men and gallant officers as ever lived -- not
the least of whom was that gallant Mississippian, General Featherstone, whose subsequent
conduct at Sugar creek deserves to be long remembered. The advance of the enemy crossed
Duck river on the night of the 21st December, and on the 22d Forrest fell back slowly
until he reached a gorge between two hills, three miles from Columbia. Here he had slight
skirmishing, but held his position easily for the night. On the 24th Wilson's cavalry
corps, ten thousand strong, and Wood's division of infantry, crossed, and the pursuit
began in earnest. There was heavy fighting during the day, in which both infantry and
cavalry were engaged, and at night he camped at Pulaski. On the morning of the 25th he
fell back to a strong position on Anthony's hill, seven miles beyond Pulaski. The
situation now seemed desperate. It was only forty miles to the Tennessee river, where Hood
was crossing, and the infantry had not all reached there, while the trains were some
distance behind. Wilson, with ten thousand cavalry, and Wood's division of infantry, were
close on him, while A.J. Smith and Schofield were moving on from Columbia. Forrest, with
his forty five hundred, as undaunted as Zenophon with his celebrated ten thousand, calmly
awaited their approach, and his men gathered courage from their leader Wilson came on,
and, as General Thomas says, "Wood kept well closed up on the cavalry"; and I
give the result in the language of General Thomas' report: "During the afternoon
Harrison's brigade found the enemy strongly entrenched at the head of a heavily wooded and
deep ravine, through which ran the road and into which Colonel Harrison drove the enemy's
skirmishers. He then waited for the remainder of the cavalry to close up before attacking;
but before this could be accomplished the enemy, with something of his former boldness,
sallied from his breastworks and drove back Harrison's skirmishers." In this fight,
which General Thomas treats as a mere skirmish, the Confederates captured fifty prisoners,
three hundred cavalry horses, one gun of Company I, Fourth United States artillery, with
eight horses, and the killed and wounded were estimated at one hundred and fifty, while
the brilliancy and vim of the Confederate charge astonished the Federals so much that they
attacked no more that day. Forrest then retired to Sugar creek and halted for another
fight. Having selected an excellent position for his infantry and artillery, and thrown up
temporary breastworks of rails, he ordered Colonel Dillon, with the Second Mississippi
cavalry, to cross the creek above mounted ready for a flank attack, and again quietly
waited their coming. About daylight oil the 26th they were heard crossing the creek in a
dense fog. Nothing could be seen, but the commands to halt and dismount could be
distinctly heard. Hood's ordnance train had just left Sugar creek, and orders from the
river came to hold the enemy back if possible; and every Confederate felt the importance
of the crisis. On came the enemy in the fog to within thirty yards of Featherstone's
breastworks, when a deadly fire was opened on them, the long pent up Rebel yell burst
forth, and the Federals fled in dismay through the creek, with the Confederates after
them, while Dillon, charging in the rear, completed the rout. The enemy were severely
punished, but more frightened than hurt, and left behind them one hundred and fifty horses
and many overcoats, that were of great value to shivering men; but the grand result was
that the pursuit was permanently checked and the. enemy came no more. General Wilson, who
ignores this fight, says he was out of rations; could not bring Forrest to a fight, and
heard the main body of Rebels had already crossed the Tennessee, and therefore halted. The
truth is the infantry had not all reached the river, and the ordnance train left Sugar
creek that morning. General Thomas, speaking of Hood's army, says: "With the
exception of his rear guard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble. .
. The rear guard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the
last." Forrest was now admitted by all to be a Military Genius which
a distinguished military writer thus describes:

There is no art that requires greater natural gifts than the art of war: mind
and body must here cooperate and both must be sound and vigorous. The talent to seize, as
it were, with a glance, the advantages and disadvantages which may arise from the
situation of ground or troops and to single them out from all other objects -- this
characterizes the man born to become a general. This coup d'oiel, namely, the
comprehensive -- one, which, in unexpected results and in the most violent changes of
fortune and calculations, enables the general to discern quickly and to judge correctly of
his situation, and then, with firm determination to extort, as it were, from fortune that
which she will not freely give; or prudent and judicious, to extricate himself from a
dangerous position; this is not to be acquired; this can be reduced to no general formula,
nor be delineated upon plans and blackboards; but is, in the strictest sense of the word,
military genius.

Fall Of Selma.

General Forrest was now promoted to
Lieutenant General, and his command largely increased and reorganized. The First division,
commanded by Chalmers, was composed of all the Mississippi cavalry, reorganized into three
brigades, under Armstrong, Wirt Adams and Starke.
The Second division, commanded by Buford, was
composed of the Kentucky brigade and the Alabama cavalry.
The Third division, commanded by W.H. Jackson,
was composed of all the Tennessee cavalry in two brigades, under Bell and Campbell -- a
force of not less than ten thousand effective men if they could have been concentrated.
At the same time -- Major General James Wilson
was reorganizing his cavalry just north of the Tennessee river, at points favorable for
the passage of that stream, either to invade Mississippi or Alabama; and on the 18th of
March he crossed near Chickasaw station, Alabama, with seventeen thousand men, five
thousand of whom were dismounted, according to Andrews' history of the Mobile campaign.
On the 16th of March, 1865, General Dick Taylor
held a council of war in West Point, Mississippi, at which were present Forrest, Chalmers,
Buford and Jackson, and it was then determined that the object of Wilson's movements was
the destruction of the iron works at Montevallo and the shops at Selma, and it was decided
that all our forces should move by the shortest lines to Selma, and engineer officers were
sent at once to construct pontoon bridges over the Black Warrior at Cahawba. On the 24th
of March, Wilson started from Chickasaw station. On the 25th two brigades of the First
division started from Pickensville, Alabama, and Jackson from West Point, Mississippi. The
bridge across the Warrior had not been completed when Armstrong s brigade reached it, and
it was detained here one day. On the 30th they reached Marion, Alabama and finding that
nothing had been done towards bridging the Cahawba, a staff officer was sent by railroad
to Selma for pontoon boats, and the division commander was preparing to move on, when an
order came from General Forrest, telling him of the enemy's movement on Tuscaloosa, and
ordering him to halt and await orders. This caused a delay of one day, when General
Taylor, at Selma, hearing of it, telegraphed orders for the First division to move to
Plantersville. Before the division could reach Plantersville, orders came from General
Forrest to move to Randolph, about twenty miles further north. Before the division could
reach Randolph, Forrest had been driven from there, and it turned to Plantersville again.
The Ochmulgee swamp had now to be crossed, and Armstrong's brigade was five hours in going
one mile across it. When this brigade had gone over, it was utterly impassable to the
artillery and Starke's brigade; and these, under the direction of a neighborhood guide,
were moved to a crossing five miles above, and after working all night, got over about
daylight the next morning, and moving rapidly reached Selma just in time to see it burn.
Forrest, moving with Jackson's division, heard
of Croxton's movement on Tuscaloosa, and changed the march of this division by that place.
Jackson gallantly met and defeated Croxton, but by this movement was thrown so far out of
his line of march that it was impossible for him to reach Selma in time to assist in its
defence, and it fell. The fall of Richmond soon followed the fall of Selma, and the
Confederate flag went down to rise no more forever.

His Farewell Address.

It has been said that Forrest was
uneducated, and this is true; but his ideas, when properly clothed in correct language,
were pointed and strong, and he was exceedingly tenacious that his own ideas, and not
those of the writer, should be expressed by those who wrote for him. His strong and
touching final address to his troops, though shaped by another, was his own creation, and
he felt all that the language imported when he said: "Civil war, such as you have
just passed through, naturally engenders feelings of animosity, hatred and revenge. It is
our duty to divest ourselves of all such feelings, and as far as in our power to do so, to
cultivate friendly feelings towards those with whom we have so long contended and
heretofore so widely differed. Neighborhood feuds, personal animosities and private
differences should be blotted out, and when you return home a manly, straightforward
course of conduct will secure the respect even of your enemies. Whatever your
responsibilities may be to government, to society, or to individuals meet them like men. .
. . I have never on the field of battle sent you where I was unwilling to go myself, nor
would I now advise you to a course which I felt myself unwilling to pursue. You have been
good soldiers; you can be good citizens. Obey the laws, preserve your honor, and the
government to which you have surrendered can afford to be and will be magnanimous."
Like the cause he loved, he is dead. In coming years, when the bitterness of strife has
passed away, when that mystic harp, whose chords connect the graves of the dead with the
hearts of the living, shall vibrate the music of a restored Union, and some blind old bard
shall sing the praises of American heroes, while eager children listen to their deeds of
valor, the story of none will awaken loftier feelings of emulation than --