Afghanistan: can the war be won?

In what was Nato’s worst week in months, the Taliban killed more than a dozen
troops, attacked vital supply convoys, ambushed an Afghan wedding, and
executed a seven-year-old for 'spying’. The former head of the British
Army reassesses our chances of success.

US numbers in Afghanistan are scheduled to peak later this year at about 98,000Photo: REUTERS

By General Sir Richard Dannatt

7:00AM BST 13 Jun 2010

On the face of it, this would seem to have been a bad week for Nato and the Pakistanis in the Afghan-Pakistan region: more than a dozen Nato troops killed; British military fatalities now not far off the three hundred mark; a bomb at a wedding in Kandahar that killed more than 40 family members and friends; a boy of seven apparently executed for being a government spy; and more than

50 Nato vehicles burned while pausing on one of their epic resupply journeys from Karachi to Kandahar.

All of this has happened in the early months of the US military surge, which is designed to transform the lives of the Afghan population – coincidentally, just in time for the US mid-term elections.

However, on the other side of the coin, we see: an international community that is more in harmony with the Afghan government than for a long time; the third most senior al-Qaeda leader killed just over the border in Pakistan; further significant areas of Helmand province now under government control; a major Nato operation in Kandahar province about to be launched, drawing on the lessons of the ongoing successful British-led Operation Moshtarak in Helmand; and a British Prime Minister prepared to spend the night with the Army in its forward base at Camp Bastion, and even having enough energy to go for a morning run around the camp in the Afghan heat before getting stuck into his duties. I find all that very encouraging, because this campaign is about leaders and people.

The Taliban leadership – under the influence of the fundamentally malign and negative al-Qaeda-backed Islamist agenda – is not concerned with Afghanistan as such, but with the enforced reimposition of the Islamic Caliphate for their own political ends.

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What do they have to offer their people, other than a diet of repression and fear? How can rational people want to support a movement that destroys schools simply because they include girls among their pupils, and that is prepared not only to execute people in public in a football stadium, but also to kill a seven-year-old because he is deemed a government spy?

Such behaviour is unacceptable. If it was only to the detriment of the Afghan population, we might be able to turn a blind eye. But it was among that mayhem, imposed by the Taliban, that al-Qaeda was able to establish itself in the late 1990s, wreak havoc and death in New York and Washington and, given the chance, would do so again.

This campaign is very much focused on people, and there are three specific dimensions to it.

First, the campaign is being conducted among the people – the Afghans are the environment within which our troops fight; in the way that river lines, hill tops, villages and towns were in the conventional wars of the past.

Second, it is a fight about the people. In this sense it is a classic counter-insurgency campaign in which the pro-government forces need to win the hearts and minds of the population under threat.

General Stan McChrystal’s military concept of operations is one of “Clear, Hold and Build” – to clear areas of Taliban, to then hold them securely with sufficient numbers of Allied and Afghan troops so that the inhabitants feel safe, and then offer them the opportunity for a better life built on a legal economy and a traditional society, free from fear.

But third, this campaign is not just being fought for the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the South Asia region under the immediate threat of Islamist terror. It is also being waged for the people of the West – North America, Europe and for this country, where it is especially important that we have a mutually beneficial relationship with our large British-Muslim population. (But not tolerate those who oppose and would seek to change our society through violence for their own political ends.)

So much for the people; but what about the leaders? David Cameron, as our new Prime Minister, has made a very impressive start, holding the inaugural meeting of his National Security Council on his first full day in office, receiving President Hamid Karzai as his first overseas visitor, and pledging unequivocal support to our Armed Forces.

Mr Cameron’s address on Friday morning to our troops was not just words, but a statement of intent – he wants to put the military back centre-stage in our national life.

From our soldiers’ point of view, the doubling of the Operational Allowance to close to £5,000 for a six-month operational tour in Afghanistan, or elsewhere, is excellent news, and the allocation of a further £67 million to tackle IEDs is absolutely right.

The former is a worthy recognition of the difficult and dangerous work on behalf of the nation carried out by the Armed Forces, while the latter is a carefully focused enhancement, necessary for the conduct of the campaign.

But those aspects of leadership, while welcome, could be thought to be more symbolic than substantive. The acid test for Barack Obama and David Cameron will come from the single-mindedness and clear focus that they exhibit in pursuing the real issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in the wider security interests of the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

So if Afghanistan is all about leadership and people, what is to be done?

Essentially, the future of the country must be in Afghan hands. We can advise and enable, but we should progressively reduce the international military presence as the Afghans take increasing responsibility for themselves.

Our exit strategy from the country itself is synonymous with the blueprint for the establishment of a sufficiently functional Afghan state. The Afghans must run their own security, which is why huge emphasis is being placed by Nato on building up the national army and police; the Afghan economy must be converted as quickly as possible from one based on the illegal opium trade, to one profiting from traditional cash crops, such as wheat, saffron and pomegranates.

From these two key developments will flow an increase in the rule of law, a reduction in corruption and the chance for a society largely based on traditional families and tribes to be sufficiently stable so that al-Qaeda will never be able to plan, train and prepare to bring violence to the shores of our country again.

Away from big media headlines, less dramatic developments in Afghanistan and elsewhere that rarely get reported bear witness to the progress being made. Sadly, opening a school, drilling a well, or even reducing the poppy harvest in Helmand by 25 per cent in 2009 go largely unrecorded.

As the campaign continues, the Army will hold its nerve as it does the right thing on behalf of our nation. Perhaps the real question is whether the nation will hold its own nerve in order to do the right thing for itself? This is a leadership challenge of huge proportions for our new Government, but one that it must get right. From what we have seen for far, I believe it will.

* General Sir Richard Dannatt is a former Chief of the General Staff of the British Army