Consider
this data presented by Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr. in a recent post.

(http://www.usfleetforces.blogspot.com/)

Unfortunately, like PONCE, most of the Commanding Officers (COs) detached for cause on my watch
were for personal misconduct. In every case, each Commanding Officer, whether through personal misconduct, negligence, or
exceptionally poor judgment, lost the trust of their subordinates or their superiors and without that fundamental building
block in place - trust - they no longer had the ability to command. Here's a summary of the ten Commanding Officer reliefs
that occurred in 2010 and 2011 in U.S. Fleet Forces.·USS THE SULLIVANS- Multiple operational incidents culminating with a buoy collision that damaged the port screw
while deployed.·USS JOHN L HALL - Collision
with a pier while deployed·USS TRUXTUN
- Inappropriate relationship with a junior member of the wardroom.·NCTS Bahrain - Inappropriate relationships with several members of the command.·USS GUNSTON HALL - Sexual harassment, maltreatment of subordinates, assault, drunk and disorderly
conduct. Command Master Chief (CMC) also relieved for failure to take appropriate action for inappropriate/unprofessional
behavior.·USS MEMPHIS - Cheating ring
involving exams.·NMCB 21 - Failure to address
inappropriate/unprofessional behavior by subordinates. CMC also relieved for failure to take appropriate action for fraternization
and unduly familiar relationships.·USS ENTERPRISE - Exceptional lack of judgment while XO of ENTERPRISE.·USS STOUT - Failure to take action to deter unprofessional behavior in overseas ports, hostile command climate.
CMC also relieved for failure to correct a pervasive pattern of unprofessional behavior by the ship's crew.·USS PONCE - Dereliction of duty, unprofessional conduct, favoritism,
hostile command climate. Executive Officer (XO also relieved for being complicit by action and inaction in creating a hostile,
unprofessional and unsafe environment onboard PONCE.

For those of you who are in the command pipeline or still contemplating a career that culminates
in command, I think it is important that you understand the following significant lessons from these incidents:

(1)Loyalty to the Institution. The responsibility of a CO for his/her command is absolute and COs are provided with tremendous authority to
execute their responsibilities (Navy Regulations). When a CO is negligent, demonstrates personal misconduct, or routinely
exhibits poor judgment that places the command at risk, the XO and CMC are faced with a hard decision - loyalty to the individual
or loyalty to the institution. Although the answer is easy - loyalty to the institution - the decisions that will be required
to maintain good order and discipline at the command, which includes addressing CO issues, will be hard but must be made.
Problems do not fix themselves and only grow worse with time.

(2) Command Leadership Team. Commanding Officers
must have the forceful backup of their XO and CMC to succeed in command. Conversely, the XO and CMC cannot cede their shared
responsibility for good order and discipline to the CO. You simply cannot be a strong "Yes Man" and a good XO or
CMC at the same time. Correcting the improper orders or behavior of our seniors (forceful backup) is critical to mission success
and good order and discipline. Forceful backup means just that - forceful backup. The XO and CMC must have the courage to
address CO issues with the CO until they are resolved. There is often no clear line of demarcation on what must be
addressed - it's the ultimate gut check call based on your beliefs and your core values. I personally believe the greatest
act of loyalty to a CO by any subordinate is keeping him/her from making a serious mistake. On PONCE, VADM Harris also determined
that the XO failed to provide the forceful backup to the CO necessary for her to succeed. Had he done his job and provided
forceful backup despite the CO's overpowering nature, there was a chance that this whole matter could have been avoided. Contrast
this situation with STOUT. There, with a popular and well-liked but very hands-off CO, the CMC was the weak link and kept
command issues from the CO - issues that ultimately caused his downfall. In both cases, the Command Leadership Team failed
the Navy and the CO was held accountable, along with the relevant other corner of the triad.

(3) Risk Taking.
Effective operations in a rapidly changing battlespace are absolutely dependent on intelligent initiative which means intelligent
risk-taking. With any risk-taking, there will inevitably be mistakes. There is a big difference between mistakes in judgment
that are well-intentioned, recoverable, and result from inexperience and those actions resulting from willful negligence or
fatal flaws, personal or professional. I think it is clear that all of the reliefs summarized above were a result of the latter
and not the former.

Command at sea is still the best job in the Navy and the highlight of any naval career. Most
of our COs succeed every day in tough circumstances and successfully complete their command tours. Although CO failures are
rare, they are traumatic to our Navy and to our units, which is why they garner so much attention (as they should). We must
learn from these failures and move on. But the fundamental fact remains, the vast majority of our COs succeed in command.All the best, JCHjr----------------------And today another commander was
reported to be relieved: This time from the USS MOMSEN.

Not only do these incidents weigh on those the commanders leave behind- they hit at
the very foundation of the honor, courage, commitment we expect from all who serve.

Command at sea is tough- and if one loses perspective, then “all Hell”
can break loose!What can
be done to stem the tide?Admiral Harvey’s is on a personal
mission to inculcate a new sense of mission and restore honor to all those who command.

These pages are dedicated
to those who have never faltered and we salute you- and it is really for those who may have, and need a way out.Without being too preachy, learning how to get over a misplaced sense of self will be part of the battle.