Wednesday, January 7, 2015

Musings On Iraq 2014 Year In Review

2014 was a traumatic year for Iraq. Open fighting started
once again at the beginning of the year culminating in the fall of most of
central Iraq to militants during the summer. The result was nearly 2 million
people being displaced and over 60,000 casualties. There was also a bitterly
disputed election that finally saw Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki deposed. His
replacement Haider Abadi was left with the daunting task of not only fighting
the insurgency, but also trying to repair the political damage done by his
predecessor as well as addressing the structural problems within the country. This
is a review of last year’s events, but is in no way comprehensive. It is just
some of the major stories covered by Musings On Iraq in 2014.

JANUARY

Last year got off to a bad start as Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki decided to use the death of the leadership of the Army’s 7th
Division to go after the Anbar protest movement. On December
21 the Islamic State (IS) launched an ambush in western Anbar, which led to
the deaths the commander of the 7th Division and most of his staff. The
government immediately announced a retaliatory operation against the
insurgents, which received widespread popular support across the country.
Instead of using this moment to bring the country together, the premier decided
to use it against his opponents. He went on national TV accusing
the protest movement of harboring Islamic State (IS) elements. The next day
Maliki ordered the arrest of parliamentarian Ahmed Alwani who had been an
organizer of the demonstrations, and who was known for his fiery and sectarian
speeches attacking Shiites. His detention led to a shootout in which his brother
and five of his guards were killed. Maliki then shut down the Ramadi protest
area. The province immediately exploded in violence
with clashes in cities like Ramadi, Garma and Hit, while Fallujah quickly fell
to insurgents. This was the start of open fighting the country, which continues
to this day. Protests had been going on for a year when the prime minister
decided to try to shut them down. They began after Maliki arrested
some of Finance Minister Rafi Issawi’s bodyguards on terrorism charges in
December 2012. Protests
quickly emerged in Fallujah, Tikrit, Baghdad, and other cities. These were
eventually organized
by the Mutahidun list and several Sunni clerics such as Sheikh Abdul Malik
al-Saadi. While the insurgency attempted to exploit the demonstrations for
their own means, and there were pro-militant factions at sites like Fallujah
and Hawija, the mainstream assemblies were more of an expression of Sunni anger
at the failure of the government and Prime Minister Maliki. This was a major
change from just a few years ago when in 2009 the majority of Sunnis and even
some insurgent factions decided to participate in provincial elections. The
next year Maliki came in second in parliamentary balloting, but used the courts
and played upon the divisions within his opponents to assure himself a second
term. This caused widespread resentment against the prime minister. The leaders
of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), which won the most seats in parliament,
but failed in its attempt to stop Maliki proved no better as the list’s leader
Iyad Allawi resorted to complaining and leaving the country to rally foreign support,
while ignoring Iraqis. Other INM members cut deals with the prime minister in
order to assure themselves ministries. This started the process of many Sunnis losing
faith in their politicians, which culminated in the protest movement. When
Maliki decided to shut down the Ramadi site in December 2013 it was the last
straw that made people give up on the system, and turn towards violence.
Maliki’s short sightedness at going after the demonstrators instead of focusing
upon the insurgents played into their hands, and they are still benefiting from
it to this day.

The fighting in Anbar had a ripple effect upon Iraqi society
by forcing out thousands of families. By the end of January
2014 the Red Crescent reported that over 34,000 families had fled the
province due to not only the fighting, but the indiscriminate shelling and air
strikes by the government forces. Many of these people went to Kurdistan or
Baghdad. Anbar was not the only place this movement of people was going on. In
other governorates with insurgent activity Iraqis began to flee due to the
violence. Starting in 2013 dozens of families were leaving areas of Diyala
as the Islamic State was attempting to scare and intimidate the local
population. This was occurring in Ninewa, and Babil as well. When the militants’
summer offensive began this crisis would turn into a tragedy as tens of
thousands were forced out of their homes for a total of around 2 million
displaced. To add to these problems the special committee set up to deal with
displacement and the Migration Ministry were both accused of massive
corruption, stealing most of the money set aside to help these people.

FEBRUARY

Moqtada al-Sadr proved to be a mercurial leader once again
when he suddenly announced that he was retiring
from politics in February. Several politicians from his political bloc, Ahrar
followed suit and said they were resigning as well, while the head of his list
in parliament was replaced, and a new board of trustees created to run his
movement. Sadr was attempting to clean house of some politicians that he was
unhappy with as well as rallying the base before the provincial elections as
later in the month the Ahrar bloc said that it was still
running. Sadr made a similar move in August 2013 only to come back again.
While these might have been calculated moves it didn’t seem like anyone but
Sadr knew what the plan was as each time he said he was stepping down there was
widespread confusion within his movement. This was just the latest example of
what a difficult personality Sadr was.

MARCH

March saw a new and short-lived series of protests emerge
against the privileges of Iraq’s political elite. At the start of the month
people marched
in Baghdad, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Najaf, Basra, Karbala, Kirkuk, Muthanna, Babil,
and Qadisiyah against a new pension law passed in February. There were similar
demonstrations in August 2013. The law gave a new round of benefits to Iraqi
politicians who were already considered corrupt and incompetent. This was a
sign that the public was tired of business as usual with parliament giving
itself things like raises, while neglecting governing and developing the
country. Unfortunately these demonstrations only lasted a short while and then
disappeared meaning they applied no real pressure upon the government.

Iraq’s oil industry took
a hit in March. The Kirkuk pipeline had been a favorite target of
insurgents because it threatened the countries revenues, and was easy to attack
since it travelled through provinces where militants were active. On March 2
the line was blown up in Ninewa, and then again a week later. What was
different about this last incident was that the insurgents stayed to prevent
repairs. The North Oil Company said that the line would be up and running again
by April, but that never happened as repair crews with armed escorts were
driven off. The Kirkuk pipeline has been out of service ever since costing Iraq
millions of dollars in revenue. This was a major victory for the insurgents and
another sign that they had been able to rebuild their cadres.

Maliki showed his political machinations
once more by going after the provincial governments in Diyala, Wasit and Basra.
In Diyala, State of Law was shut out of the government so it got an arrest
warrant issued against the governor on corruption charges and went to court
over how the ruling coalition was formed without it. The court ruled in State
of Law’s favor leading to two rival governments being formed in the province.
In Wasit the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISC) cooperated
to keep State of Law out of the government there as well, and Maliki went to
court over that process too. Finally, in Basra State of Law got the head of the
provincial council, but wanted the governorship as well, so it went to court again.
The situation got so bad that Iran had to mediate
between Maliki and ISCI. These were all perfect examples of how Maliki
considered everyone who was not with him as a potential enemy. The courts were
under his influence and the justice system was often used to issue arrest
warrants against the prime minister’s opponents. These moves were another
example of how Maliki did not respect the political process. He’d gone to the
courts to win a second term in 2010, and now used them again to try to overturn
the outcomes of the 2013 provincial elections. This was also a warning of what
might happen in April’s national vote.

APRIL

At the end of April Iraq held another round of parliamentary
elections. The conventional
wisdom was that Maliki would win a third term as his opponents were once
again divided. The country’s elections however, rarely
turn out the way people expect. In 2009 the ruling parties in the
governorates were largely thrown out of office for failing to develop the
country. In 2010 Maliki came in second when he was expecting a sweeping victory,
and then in 2013, his State of Law faced a major defeat as it too was penalized
for being the incumbents in the provinces. 2014 would prove to be the same,
because Maliki found it beyond his means to return for a third term, although
that was still several months away.

MAY

In May the results
for the April elections were announced with the State of Law increasing its
share of seats in parliament. In 2010 State of Law won 89 seats, and in 2014
that went up to 95. The Sadrists came in second, but were only able to come
away with one third of the number of seats, 34, as State of Law. ISCI finished
third with 31 seats. That gave Maliki a decided advantage as the prime minister
would come from one of these major Shiite parties and together the Sadrists and
Supreme Council did not come close to State of Law. To add to that advantage
the Sadrists and ISCI spent their time attempting to make their list the National
Alliance a formal organization that would represent the Shiite parties and
have the power to name the premier. Maliki believed he could ignore these moves
and wait the two parties out until they would eventually agree to his
re-election. Little did he know that the real threat would come from within his
own list.

JUNE

June was the month the insurgents launched their summer
offensive. It began with the storming of Samarra in Salahaddin on June
5, followed by an assault upon the counter-terrorism bureau in Baquba,
Diyala the next
day, and then the seizure of the Anbar University campus in Ramadi on June
7. June
6 was also the start of the battle of Mosul, which fell a few days later.
The Iraqi Security Forces collapsed and the route continued as the insurgents
headed south taking Tikrit on June 10, along with sections of Kirkuk. Similar
success was made in Anbar as the security forces suddenly withdrew from the
Syrian border fleeing Rawa, Ana and Qaim on June
14 giving IS control of almost all of western Anbar. The insurgents had
largely rebuilt their networks by 2013 after being devastated by the U.S. and
Iraqi forces during the Surge. The result was attacks had been ramping up for
that entire year culminating in the seizure of several cities in Anbar in December
2013 and January 2014 after Maliki’s misstep of closing down the protest
movement. Violence continued to increase in the first half of 2014 pointing to
a big push coming during the summer.

The Islamic State was in the forefront of this offensive,
but that was in cooperation with other insurgent groups like the Baathist
Naqshibandi and friendly tribes. IS had made deals with these other groups to jointly
launch attacks starting in June. It seems like the militants were caught by
surprise by their own success. They were likely just planning raids like what
happened in Samarra, Baquba, and Ramadi, and instead ending up seizing around
one quarter of the country. This was an overstretch as there was no way the
insurgents were going to hold such a large section of territory, especially
when the west decided to become involved.

In response to the fall of Mosul Iraq’s militias began to mobilize.
Many of these groups had joined in the fight against the insurgents in 2013
as Maliki was unhappy with the Iraqi Security Forces, and called upon their
help. Groups like Asaib
Ahl al-Haq, Kataib
Hezbollah and the Badr Organization were seen fighting in Anbar and the
Baghdad belts throughout early 2014. The June offensive brought in the Sadrists
and the Supreme Council as there was widespread fear that Samarra would fall
along with its Askari shrine and Baghdad would be next. Iraqi militias from
Syria like the Abu
Fadhl Al-Abbas Brigade and the Khorasani
Brigade also sent their men to fight in Iraq. Their ranks were swollen
after Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa
calling on Iraqis to protect the nation. Sistani meant for people to join the
security forces, but many went to the militias as well. Since their deployment
in 2013 these militias have been accused of a series of sectarian attacks, and
the driving out of Sunni civilians from their homes in an attempt to deprive
the insurgents of their support base and redraw the demographics of parts of
the country. This repeats tactics they used during the civil war years of
2005-2008, and has added to the displacement crisis.

These militias were supported by Iran
who sponsored many of them. Iran sent in hundreds of advisers, began providing
military aid to Baghdad under an agreement signed with Maliki, and eventually delivered
Su-25 fighter bombers, pilots, and air
strikes by the Iranian Air Force as well. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Corps Quds Force and its leader General Qasim Suleimani led these efforts, and
followed the same strategy
Tehran used in Syria. Iran lacked confidence in the security forces in both
countries, and decided to employ its militia allies to defend the two
governments. The Badr Organization was put in charge of both efforts as it had
the longest relationship with Iran. That can be seen in Badr head Hadi Ameri
leading many of the recent operations rather than Iraqi generals. Iran was just
as threatened by the insurgents’ sudden advance in June. In coming to Iraq’s
aid it also became the dominant power in the country with its allies in the
forefront of the fighting, its advisers in the thick of the fighting, and its
men drawing up most of the plans for the defense of the country. This is a
position that it will be hard pressed to give up once the insurgency subsides.

JULY

As the Islamic State settled into governing its newly won
territories in northern Iraq it was immediately apparent what their rule would
mean. Throughout July
there were reports of destroyed homes, mass kidnappings, and executions
throughout central and northern Iraq as IS attempted to intimidate local
populations to control them, and retaliate against those that opposed it. For
example, on July 8 IS killed 50 villagers after it was driven out of Ziwiya,
Salahaddin. When it was eventually taken the next day, 15 people were executed
and almost the entire town was leveled with over 300 homes blown up. IS
considers itself a state, and much has been written about the vast assets it
controls to finance its operations, but its actions in Iraq showed that it was
still about destroying Iraq as much as trying to run sections of it.

AUGUST

In August
IS turned its attention northwards and seized Jalawla and Sadiya in
northeastern Diyala as well as the Sinjar area of western Ninewa. The Kurdish
peshmerga fled
in the face of the assaults. In Ninewa it was largely due to Syrian and Turkish
Kurdish fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the People’s
Protection Units (YPG) of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the
intervention of Iran that stopped the militants from moving into Kurdistan
itself. The Yazidis of Sinjar were not as lucky as IS began massacring
them and taking their women and girls for slaves. On August
3 for example, approximately 250 Yazidis were killed in Sinjar, Solagh,
Qiniyah, and Wahtanya. This led to the intervention of the United States, which
began launching air strikes in the area. IS had long considered Yazidis devil
worshippers and had repeatedly attacked the community in previous years. Now
that it controlled the main territory in which this group resided it went all
out to destroy it.

SEPTEMBER

September 8 the new government of Prime Minister Haider
Abadi was sworn in. Rather than being defeated by his opponents, Maliki was
forced out due to a split within his own State of Law list. Abadi was a long
time Dawa member having joined in 1967, but his background was much different
from the previous two prime ministers, Ibrahim Jaafari and Maliki. Abadi was a
technocrat and considered a problem solver, while Jaafari was known as a
philosopher and Maliki an autocrat. Abadi’s impact was immediately felt as he
formed a smaller government than Maliki’s 2010 one. He also proposed
a National Guard, which would include local forces recruited to fight the
insurgency and be under the control of the provinces, he promised to end
government shelling of civilian areas, said he would have no problem if Sunni
governorates wanted to form federal regions, and retired
General Abboud Qanbar the deputy chief of staff of operations and General Ali Ghidan
the ground forces commander, both of which were known as Maliki loyalists, and
were blamed for the fall of Mosul. Iraq is beset by a number of structural
problems and deep divisions. Abadi knew that without addressing these issues
Iraq would never be put right. These early moves were attempts to reach out to
the country’s Sunnis, and get rid of some of the politicized and incompetent security
leaders. This immediately set Abadi apart from his predecessors who would often
talk about reform, and then do nothing substantive about it. The replacement of
Maliki might have been the biggest story of 2014, even more so than the
fall of Mosul, because it opened hope that Iraq’s long standing problems might
finally be addressed, starting with the end of Maliki’s destructive politics.

OCTOBER

By October
the economic effects of the insurgency were beginning to emerge. Foreign
investors were pulling out of the country, the real estate and car markets
collapsed, hundreds of acres of farmland were now under militant control, and
imports were down 60-70% with many of the trade routes to Jordan, Syria and
Turkey having been cut off. 2 million people were also displaced and out of work,
and putting major burdens on the provinces that they now resided in. Iraq was
also facing a financial crisis as the 2014 budget was never passed due to
Maliki using it against his opponents during the elections. The prime minister
had also used money from the general budget and Development Fund for Iraq to
pay for the war and the running of the government depriving the country of much
of its ready cash. The economic costs of the war were likely the least reported
story of 2014. Iraq was one of the fast growing economies in the Middle East
after the civil war ended in 2008. Now that was all threatened.

The Islamic State made another big surge in Anbar from
September to October. At the end of September it took Camp
Saqlawiya, and then proceeded to take most of the center of the province
the following
month. This was being led by IS commander Abu
Omar al-Shishani, who is a Chechen, and who excelled at insurgent tactics. In
response the United States sent advisers
to Al Taqadum base outside of Habaniya and Al-Assad base in Baghdadi. The
Americans were hoping to train a new tribal force in the governorate to oppose
the insurgents much like it did with the Awakening previously. Premier Abadi
said he supported this idea, but was unwilling to commit any real assets to the
province’s defense. The governor, the local council, and sheikhs have
consistently complained
that their pleas for assistance have been ignored by Baghdad, and that has
resulted in 85% of Anbar falling to the Islamic State. The government is more
concerned with Salahaddin, which plays a central role in the insurgency
throughout central Iraq, and has largely written off Anbar for now.

In Salahaddin’s eastern Tuz Kharmato district the Islamic
State was forced out by a combined ISF, militia and peshmerga offensive. This
opened the door to a new set of problems as the Kurds and militias began confronting
each other for control of the area. This was later repeated in Jalawla and
Sadiya in Diyala after they were freed in November. All of these areas are part
of the disputed territories the Kurdistan Regional Government lays claim to.
The militias not only want them to remain under central control, but are being
used by Iran to push the Kurds not to think that they can annex them and then
declare independence. Tehran has warned Kurdistan that it opposes the break up
of Iraq at this time.

NOVEMBER

Prime Minister Abadi took another stab at reforming the
security forces when he forced
out another 200 officers. This included several top commanders who were in
charge of the regional operations commands. He also replaced deputy Interior
Minister Adnan Asadi who was known as a Maliki man. The premier showed once again
that he was committed to addressing the politicization of and corruption within
the security forces. Many of these officers such as General Rasheed Flayh
formerly of the Anbar Operations Command were known for stealing supplies from
their men. These were the first moves in a long process to root out these
elements and make the ISF a professional force.

DECEMBER

Abadi’s final move of 2014 was to demand
that due process be carried out within Iraq’s Justice System. He ordered that
all arrests be recorded, that suspects go to trial within the assigned time,
and that anyone acquitted or held without charges be released. Iraq’s prisons
and courts have not worked for decades dating back to the Saddam era. The
system is also notorious for abuse as confessions are the basis of cases and
they are often beaten out of people. The prime minister was again attempting to
tackle the nation’s structural problems, which were long overdue.

On the security front, the year ended with the government
forces going on the offensive. Starting at the end of the summer the siege of
Amerli in Salahaddin was ended, followed by the re-taking of the Tuz Kharmato
district. The longtime IS base in northeastern Babil’s Jurf al-Sakhr was
cleared out disrupting the group’s southern networks leading to no car bombings
there for the last two months of the year. In Salahaddin the Baiji Refinery was
relieved, while the southern Balad district was cleared. The Kurds also helped
free Diyala’s Sadiya and Jalawla, while re-entering the Sinjar area. On the
other hand, militants were still on the offensive in Anbar trying to take the
provincial capital of Ramadi and other towns in the center of the province.
Despite its setbacks in Salahaddin, IS was able to move back into Baiji, and
continued attacks throughout the governorate. Most importantly it had been able
to co-opt many smaller insurgent groups like Ansar
al-Islam, while pushing out others such as the Baathist Naqshibandi.
When the summer offensive began in June IS was the largest of the insurgent
groups and made local deals with other factions to carry out joint operations
against the government. By the end of 2014, it dominated the insurgency like
never before. This poses a risk to the group however as its new recruits’
loyalty is largely based upon the success it has had in Syria and Iraq. If it
faces more setbacks, especially if it were to lose a large city such as Tikrit,
which will be the focus of the ISF and militias this year, IS could start
facing desertions. There are already reports of it executing members who have
left their posts. It still controls huge swaths of the country however. More importantly, the loss of territory in no way means the end of the insurgency. In 2004 militants launched a huge summer offensive in several cities. They were turned back, but that simply dispersed the fighters over a larger swath of territory, and the fighting went on. Until the government finds a way to turn Sunnis away from violence, something that was actually achieved from 2008-2009, but thrown away in 2010, the insurgency will continue.

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com