A full report is available at the end of this piece.

The revolutionary wave of uprisings that has erupted in the Middle East since 17 December 2010 has radically altered the geopolitical makeup of the region. Political systems, national interests, alliances and rivalries have been reassessed. In this new political landscape, Iran, much like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel, seeks to fill the vast power vacuum created and advance its regional influence.

Initially, the Iranian regime viewed the Arab uprisings with enthusiasm. Finally pro-Western dictatorships which the Islamic Republic had denounced since its creation were overthrown. The 1979 revolution appeared to have been successfully exported. The rise of Islamist parties could provide Iran’s theocracy a unique opportunity to exert regional hegemony, one of the regime’s long-standing strategic objectives.

A year later, Iran’s enthusiasm has withered into concern and uncertainty. Far from advancing its regional influence, Iran is losing out from the Arab uprisings. Specifically, Iran is losing its ability to exert soft power in the region and stands to lose a key regional ally if the Syrian regime is overthrown. Crucially, I believe this decline was not inevitable; Iran has made a series of mistakes both in its exercise of soft power and its policy towards Syria that have weakened its regional influence considerably.

Soft Power: “Irrelevant Iran”

Firstly, in an effort to render itself relevant to regional developments, Iran has wrongly depicted the Arab uprisings as an Islamic one. According to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, “Islam has become the guiding principle of [the] popular movements.” Worse, Iran claims the protests are rooted in the 1979 revolution as if to assume responsibility for their rise and development: “this Islamic awakening,” said Khamenei last February, “was created by the victory of the great Revolution of the Iranian nation.” Not only are these depictions false but they are insulting to the Arab masses – of all religions – protesting socioeconomic and political hardships unrelated to Iran. Such pronouncements do nothing for Iran’s popularity on the Arab street.

Not only has Iran gone out of its way to disassociate the Arab uprisings from developments in Syria, it has aided the crackdown on Syrian protestors. Iran’s simultaneous criticism of Saudi Arabia for its “interventionist policies” and “Western meddling in Syrian affairs” illustrates the extent of Iranian double standards.

If Assad’s regime collapses, not only does Iran risk losing its key strategic ally Syria, but also its ability to counter Israel through the millions of dollars in economic aid and supplies channelled to Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

While Iran pursues a realpolitik strategy towards Syria, desperate not to lose its key regional ally, it is rapidly losing any appeal it had gained over the past thirty years as an anti-Western, anti-Israeli nation that overthrew the Shah’s autocratic regime. The more Iran supports the brutality of the Syrian government, the more unpopular Iran appears to the Arab street.

At some point, Iran will have to reassess its support for Assad. If and when Tehran feels his regime is doomed, Iran will change its stance to influence post-Assad Syria from the best position possible. Given the extent of support it has provided Assad so far, such a shift will most likely prove ineffective; it will be too little too late. If Iran goes on to lose its strongest Arab ally, it will mark a substantial loss in the regional influence and security Iran had enjoyed over the past 30 years.

As for Iran’s soft power status, it is unlikely that this will be regained any time soon. Undoubtedly, Arab public opinion may not play as big a role as some envision following the Arab Awakening. The futures of new regimes in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya remain unclear. Nevertheless, given the centrality of soft power in Iran’s perpetual bid for regional hegemony, the Iranian regime should be concerned that the speeches, statements and responses it makes throughout the Arab uprising are having a negative impact on its image in the region and beyond.

Mona Moussavi graduated from LSE with degrees in History and International Relations. To contact her, email d.c.akkad@lse.ac.uk. Click here to read her full report, written in Washington, D.C. in December 2011:Iran and the Arab Awakening

Share this:

Related

One Comment

“While Iran pursues a realpolitik strategy towards Syria, desperate not to lose its key regional ally, it is rapidly losing any appeal it had gained over the past thirty years as an anti-Western, anti-Israeli nation that overthrew the Shah’s autocratic regime. The more Iran supports the brutality of the Syrian government, the more unpopular Iran appears to the Arab street.”
I think is a fair assessment… A further element to take into account is the fact that also Hamas has eventually abandoned its Syrian protector as a result of the uprising. This is a momentous regional shift reinforcing the idea of an increasingly isolated Iran the soft-power of which is progressively loosing grip. Have other allies of the Syrian regime (read Hezbollah) considered how their support for Asad’s regime will squander their political capital in the region?