Duplicity syndrome is not something new in the Sri Lankan political
arena. The epidemic has already devoured the country’s body-politics. The
endemic growth is endogenous in the midst of the ruling elites. Duplicity is
considered the surreal way to win the support of the Sinhalese voters. To
contain it, is highly an impossible task.

The syndrome lurked its ugly head in 1815, when the Sinhalese chiefs
of Kandy, betrayed the last King to bring the Kingdom under the British
suzerainty and drive the Tamils away. Ratwatte, the Dissave (chief) of Matale,
was one amongst those chiefs, who supported the British against his own
sovereign, to bring the last Kingdom under the British rule, as well to force
the Tamils out of the region. (Please read Anecdotes for further
details)

The Politics
of Duplicity:

The last episode, so far staged, was the doomed peace negotiation,
between the Sri Lankan Government led by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Recently, Dr. Anton Balasingham
undertook a belated attempt to show that, the Duplicitysyndrome
continues to rare its ugly head, unabatedly.

“The Politic of
Duplicity” – Re-visiting the Jaffna Talks, is a recently published book
on the rescinded peace talks is claimed to be the official version of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Geriatric Dr. Anton Balasingham, the author,
was a former journalist, but since 1983, has assumed an envious role, the
political advisor and theoretician of the Tamil Tiger movement.

Balasingham had critically examined the ill-fated peace talks held
between the Sri Lankan Government led by Chandrika Kumaratunge and the
Liberation Tigers, during 1994-95, in Jaffna. Further, it is claimed that,
Balasingham had explored the causes for the failure of the peace effort, with
the view to bring to light, the hidden motives and under-currents that
underline Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony. The study is said to have offered
fascinating insights into the complex minds of the protagonists involved in
this intractable ethnic conflict.

The author indicates that the LTTE adopted a “Two Track” strategy:

Existential – Issues which were urgent, immediate, day-to-day problems
caused by set of bans and restrictions, which required the utmost attention;

Political
problems – considered fundamental, relating to the rights and aspirations
of the Tamils – “Our People” – which required a thorough examination of
the causes to work out an acceptable solution.

When giving reasons for the collapse of the Peace Talks, Anton
Balasingham, the man behind the scene, gives the inside story as follows:

“The LTTE had justifiable reasons and complaints to withdraw from
the negotiating process. -

The
Government was not acting in good faith.

It had
failed to fulfill its pledges and promises.

The
talks were dragging on for more than six months without direction and
progress.

We did
not stipulate any impossible conditions, but rather sought relief to the
Tamil population suffering enormously, under the economic blockade and
other bans imposed by the governments.

Kumaratunge’s
regime was merciless and adopted an uncompromising attitude.

We did
not withdraw from the talks abruptly as the government construed. We gave
adequate advance notice extending to a period of three weeks, instead of
72 hours, as required by the truce agreement. (Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement).

We
urged the government to implement the pledges before the set deadline. But
the government failed to take the warning seriously.

In the
end, we were left with no other choice, but to make that painful decision.

This was the first time, the world officially hears about the
thinking behind the LTTE’s withdrawal from the peace talks. In the light of the
arguments given above, there is no shred of doubt that, LTTE’s withdrawal was
justifiable and an act to salvage the honor of the Tamil people.

International community has to bear in mind that, LTTE is not a
terrorist organization as propagated by the Sri Lankan government, but a
popularly recognized freedom movement, struggling for the freedom of the
Tamils. Velupillai Prabakaran- the
Tiger supremo, is considered - the soul and heart of the revolutionary
aspirations of the Tamils, not only for those living and languishing within Sri
Lanka, but to the Tamils living all over the world. As an independent minded
political commentator, journalist and writer, I have no hesitation in declaring
the above two statements boldly and publicly, to clarify any lingering doubts
about the LTTE and its legendary leader.

Chandrika’s constitutional authority to initiate negotiation.

The talks between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan Government
began earnestly, for the first time after the tenth parliamentary general
elections, held on 16 August 1994. It dragged on, until the final collapse on
19 April 1995, when the deadline set by the Tigers expired. I wish to go into
the initial stages of the peace negotiation, when Chandrika Kumaratunge was the
Prime Minister of the country.

After the tenth parliamentary general elections, President Dingri
Banda Wijetunge, according to the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka – 1978, Clause 30 (1) was the virtual Head of State, Head
of the Executive, Head of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. Under clause 43(2), the President shall be a member of the
cabinet of ministers and shall be the head of the cabinet of ministers, and
D.B. Wijetunge, undoubtedly, remained as the Head of State. He also retained
the Minister of Defence portfolio,-
Constitutional clause 44(2).

According to clause 43 (3) of the Constitution, the President,
appointed Chandrika Kumaratunge, as the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance,
Planning, Ethnic affairs and National integration.The President used his discretionary authority vested on him
under the supreme law of the landto
appoint leading members of her People’s Alliance Party (PA) as ministers. It
must be borne in mind that, the constitution has not conferred, either any
extra-ordinary executive privileges, or powers to the prime minister. She was
just a minister, holding office at the pleasure of the President and nothing
more or less.

Unmindful of the limitation of powers enjoyed by the prime minister,
the ill-fated peace talks were initiated, whilst Chandrika Kumaratunge was only
a prime minister.

Earlier, Chandrika Kumaratunge’s People’s Alliance in its election
manifesto pledged under its political agenda a few proposals regarding the
resolution to the protracted ethnic conflict. Following are few of the cardinal
themes highlighted in the PA’s manifesto:

Peaceful
resolution of the war and the ethnic crisis by the recognition of group
rights and community rights.

Every
citizen right to a dignified and decent life with self-respect, without
fear and repression.

Formulation
and implementation of special welfare program for displaced people living
as refugees with the objective of giving them immediate relief, so that
their temporary refugee status should not deprive them of the basic rights
and equal opportunities available to other citizens.

The leader of the PA, after the parliamentary general elections, was
projected and hailed - the Apostle of Peace. Unfortunately, up to date, the PA
leadership has failed to translate into action, those cardinal themes, referred
above.

Enamored by the PA’s policy declaration and the cabinet decision
regarding the partial lifting of the economic embargo - virulently put in place
and practiced by the United National Party (UNP) government -Velupillai
Prabakaran the leader of the LTTE, issued a press statement on 2 September
1994, “welcoming Chandrika’s goodwill.” “In that statement, he announced his
decision to release ten police detainees as ‘a reciprocal gesture of goodwill’.
He urged Chandrika to lift the economic blockade totally, to create conditions
of normalcy in the Tamil homeland. The LTTE leader went a step ahead and
suggested for permanent ceasefire and unconditional talks.’

Chandrika’s entrenched views on the Ethnic issue:

Before delving into the rationale and compulsion behind such a
voluntary press statement, expressing satisfaction over Chandrika’s decision to
lift partially, the economic embargo, it is prudent to read the author’s
encounter with Chandrika Kumaratunge in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India, during the
early part of 1986, from where the Tamil Tiger organization earlier operated.
Detail description of the encounter is elaborately given in the first chapter,
“Chandrika’s Peace Initiative, “ just after the author’s introductory note.

“The lady (Chandrika Kumaratunge) paid a visit to the political
headquarters of the LTTE, at Indra Nagar, Adaiyar; Chennai, accompanied by her
husband, Vijaya Kumaratunge and Ossie Abeyagunasekera of the Sri Lanka Mahajana
Party.” To continue in the words of Balasingham –

“At that time of our encounter, Chandrika was not seriously involved
in Sri Lankan politics, but showed intense curiosity over the political aims
and objectives of the LTTE. For nearly an hour, I gave a thorough theoretical
exposition of the Tigers political project, arguing our case for political
independence and statehood, based on the right to self-determination of the
Tamil people. While her husband listened politely with patience, Chandrika was
argumentative.Presenting a pluralistic
model of Sri Lanka’s social formation, comprising of different ethnic
groupings, she rejected the conception of Tamil nation and homeland.
Chandrika’s thesis, in essence was that, the Tamil problem was a minority
issue, not a nationality question and that Tamils were not entitled to the
right to self-determination and statehood.”

Furthermore, “Chandrika objected by arguing that, the Tamils could
not exercise the right to secede within a unitary state. --- The lady was
obstinate and single minded. She operated with a different mind-set, from a
different ideological universe. I could notice an inherent resistance in her to
tolerate any alternative themes other than her well entrenched pluralist
conception of Sri Lankan society in which all ethnic minorities have to adjust
and associate with the majority.”

By painting a clear picture of the mindset of Chandrika Kumaratunge,
the author has failed to relate the necessity, the rationale behind, to take
her into confidence and the political party led by her.Furthermore, the wisdom and the rationale
for recollecting and recording the details about his encounter with Chandrika
Kumaratunge are very intriguing.The
book containing statement of this nature was published during the height of the
eleventh parliamentary general elections, become more egregious.

Nominees for Talks:

According to Balasingham’s assertion, “the press statement” led to
the establishment of the official communication between the LTTE and the
Government. Chandrika Kumaratunge, the prime minister who welcome the LTTE’s
desire for a cease-fire and their willingness for unconditional talks. She
suggested Prabakaran to nominate his representatives to begin negotiations with
(my) her representatives. Four representatives were nominated by the LTTE for
the proposed negotiations, followed by Chandrika nominating her own
representatives.

Now, it become compelling to point out that, about the negotiating
party, the Tamil Tigers has failed to take into consideration an important
aspect, the basic norms regarding negotiation. During the early period of the
negotiation, Chandrika Kumaratunge was merely a prime minister without any
overriding executive powers. Meanwhile, she was the leader of the PA; the
political party that established majority by one vote to topple UNP, but the
President who was the Head of State and of the Government was from the United
National Party.

When she requested either to name LTTE representatives for
negotiation or when she named her negotiators, as prime minister, she did not
forward a copy of the cabinet resolution to inform that the matter was
discussed in the cabinet of ministers meeting and approved. She in her personal
capacity, as the head of the political party, should have invited the LTTE for
negotiation and not on behalf of a Government, when she was not
constitutionally empowered to do so. Unfortunately, the invitation for the
initial negotiation was misconstrued. Chandrika Kumaratunge’s ploy worked and
the LTTE came forward to negotiate.

Without considering the legal standing of Chandrika Kumaratunge in
the government led by the Dingri Banda Wijetunge, the UNP executive President,
the LTTE wrote back to Chandrika Kumaratunge on 23 September, 2000, “we are
glad to inform you that your nominees are welcome in Jaffna, any time –.“When the Tiger Supremo informs that he was
glad to welcome Chandrika Kumaratunge’s representatives, then the matter ends
immediately. Why should some one wail over it all over again?

When Chandrika Kumaratunge wrote to Prabakaran on 21 September,
1994,”I give below the names of the government representatives: “ - the LTTE
has failed to request the Prime Minister to provide copies of the resolution
adopted in the meeting of the cabinet of ministers, authorizing her to
undertake such negotiation. In addition, the LTTE has failed to urge her to
send authenticated copy of the resolution approved by the cabinet of ministers,
nominating those negotiators to represent the government to negotiate with the
Tamil Tigers.

According to The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka Clause 43 (1) - “There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers charged
with the direction and control of the Government of the Republic, which shall
be collectively responsible and answerable to Parliament.”

Failing to demand for the copies of
the above mentioned cabinet resolutions authenticating Chandrika Kumaratunge’s
authority to negotiate on behalf of the government and that of the so-called
government negotiators authority to represent the government that was led by
Dingri Banda Wijetunge, President and Head of State, was a serious lapse.

Therefore, any amount of recriminatory rhetoric alleging Chandrika
Kumaratunge for dispatching low-keyed negotiation team amounts to a belated
wisdom. Earlier, when the same subject was brooked, Thamilselvan the leader of
the LTTE’s negotiation team in an interview with the “Sunday Leader” the
Internet edition, dated 6 September 1998, had already dealt about this subject.
Excerpts of the interview is given below:

“We have come to realize today that the President (later at the
Presidential election Chandrika Kumaratunge was elected as the President) did
not devote herself to peace with sincerity. Who formed her peace team? Her
personal accountant, her personal architect and her private secretary. Let us
for a moment assumes that, she picked them to be in her team of negotiators;
because of the confidence, she reposed on them. Where are they today? Her
personal accountant - Rajan Asirwatham and personal architect - Naveen
Gunaratne, now have been removed from service by her. Their removal means that,
she can no longer trust them. The very facts of her sending a group of persons,
whom she herself cannot trust to win our confidence, makes us think that her
peace endeavor was nothing more than a joke.”

Balasingham repeats those sale allegations.“We are deeply disappointed when we received
the list of government nominees for talks. The team consisted of a lawyer, a civil
servant, a bank manager and an architect.”

Future procedural norms – a compelling suggestion:

Belated allegations will not undo those wrongs. Now it is history.
LTTE is one of the best militant organizations in the world. No doubt about it,
but their exposure to real politics is limited. Diplomacy is something
different from negotiation. Diplomatic approach means skilful approach at a
negotiating table and handling the affairs without arousing hostility.It must be understood that, this type of
diplomatic negotiations demand tact and wisdom and not rhetorical flourishes.

Normally, in any bilateral negotiation, or conference, the
participants are expected to provide their bio-data. Those parties responsible
for arranging those talks normally provide curriculum vitae of the
participants. LTTE could have demanded for the same.

Chandrika Kumaratunge, by being merely the prime minister, took the
Tigers, and the whole country for a ride, by assuming a preposterous position -
Head of State, to initiate talks, for and behalf of the Government of Sri
Lanka.

Chandrika Kumaratunge was not the first Sinhalese leader to have
circumvented the constitution to hoodwink the Tamils. Even earlier, when the
leaders of the Tamil Arasu Kadchchi (Federal Party) had discussions and
negotiations with D S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Dudley Senanayake, and Srimavo
Bandaranaike, they failed to demand copies of the resolutions adopted in the
Cabinet of Ministers’ meeting, before starting such negotiations. Presidents,
as well as the Prime Minister, are both creatures of the country’s
Constitution. Therefore, they are constitutionally bound to convince the
cabinet of ministers, receive their approval and authorization, before entering
into such negotiations.

Therefore, in any future invitation by the Sri Lankan government for
a proposed negotiations, the party or parties invited for such negotiations has
to consider demanding:

A copy
of the resolution adopted at the meeting of the cabinet of ministers
authorizing the Head of State to negotiate and the details of those
representatives approved to represent the Government.

Party
or parties invited for such negotiation might urge the Government to go
before the State National Assembly – the Parliament, and table a motion
with details of their proposals for such proposed negotiation. If by any
chance if the Government could muster the popular support in the floor of
the Parliament and then the Government has to clearly indicates that, they
are prepared to accommodate proposals put forward by the invitees to the
negotiation in the motion before the parliament.

Motion
of such nature tabled in the house should be adopted in the form of a
framework resolution for talks to follow.

At present, we hear of the on-going Norwegian initiative. We hear lot
of contradictory rhetoric. It is high time such documents mentioned above are
demanded. Above all tact and diplomacy has to be adopted.

An aggrieved party, should never in the future, come forward for
negotiation at the behest of any Head of State. This would be a futile
exercise. President, Prime Minister and Government leaders are all creatures of
the constitution under which they are empowered, or else they are mere mortals
alike any one of us. Therefore, party to any future invitation for negotiation,
has to urge that, such invitation has to be done according to the constitution
that the government follows and comply accordingly and not according to the
whims and fancies of an individual leader.

Gleanings from the Book:

Anton Balasingham, when describing about the modalities adopted
about the negotiations, describes: “Adopting peculiar modality hitherto unknown
in the discourse of conflict resolution, the Jaffna peace talks were held on
two levels. On the one level, there were direct negotiations between the
accredited representatives of the Sri Lanka government and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam.On the other
level, there was indirect dialogue between the leadership of the government and
the LTTE in the form of exchange of letters.

Balasingham displayed his former journalistic skill, when he
compiled on chronological order, the 70 odd letters exchanged between the
Government and the LTTE leadership, details of the negotiations and the
thinking of the LTTE, objectively, very earnestly and judiciously. With belated
comments, it has to be recorded that the brinkmanship approach adopted in the
book, reflects to an extent, the contradictory postures. It is highly
unfortunate that the book exposed author’s diplomatic ability, sagacity,
suavity and his political clairvoyance.

According to Balasingham, “ Since the Government was represented by
a low-key team, without any authority to make decisions, the direct engagement
produces no positive results and the correspondence between the leaderships became
significant and determinant. As the head of the Sri Lankan state, Chandrika
Kumaratunge corresponded with the LTTE leader, Mr. Velupillai Pirabakaran. In
the capacity of the Deputy Defence Minister, Col. Ratwatte also exchanged
letters with the LTTE leader, particularly on the matters of security and
cessation of hostilities. There were also letters of exchange between Mr.
Balapatabendi, the head of the Sri Lanka delegation and Mr. Tamilselvan, who
led the LTTE negotiating team.”

The author describes lucidly, the four round of talks, the LTTE had
with the Government representatives.

On 2nd
September 1994, Mr. Prabakaran issued a press statement welcomingChandrika’s gesture of goodwill.
He announced his decision to release ten police detainees, as a
‘reciprocal gesture of goodwill.’ He urged Chandrika to lift the economic
blockade totally, to create condition of normalcy in the Tamil homeland.
He also suggested a permanent cease-fire and unconditional talks.

The
very first letter written by Chandrika Kumaratunge, dated 9 September
1994, addressed to Prabkaran; was dispatched through the ICRC.

Prabakaran
responded positively to Chandrika Kumaratunge by his letter dated 12
September 1994.

First
Round of Talks was held on 13-14 October 1994, at the Political head
quarters of the LTTE, in Jaffna. Participants on behalf of the Sri Lankan
government- K.Balapatabendi – the leader of the delegation, who was the
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister and a lawyer by profession; Lionel
Fernando, Secretary, Ministry of Information, Tourism and Aviation,
R.Asirwatham, Chairman, Bank of Ceylon and N.L.Goonaratne, an Architect by
profession.

The
second Round of Talks scheduled for 24 October 1994, was suspended, when
on 23 October 1994, Gamini Dissanayake, the Presidential candidate and the
leader of the UNP, was killed by a suicide bomber at an election rally.

In the
Presidential elections held on 9 November 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunge
secured an overwhelming victory, obtaining over 62 percent of the votes.

Chandrika
Kumaratunge took oath as President, on 12 November 1994. As a gesture of
goodwill, to mark Chandrika Kumaratunge’s the assumption to power as the
new President, the LTTE declared cessation of hostilities for a week, from
12 November to 19 November 1994.

Second
Round of Talks was held on 2 January 1995, at the Political headquarters
of the LTTE, in Jaffna. Government delegation included senior army
officer, Brigadier A.S.Peris and a naval officer, Captain Prasanna
Rajaratne. Followed by the -

Declaration
of Cessation of Hostilities signed on 5 January 1995, by Prabakaran and
Chandrika Kumaratunge, and came into effect on 8 January 1995.

Third
Round of Talks was held on 14 January 1995, at the same venue, with the
participation of the same government delegates.

Prabakaran
by his letter dated 16 March 1995, addressed to Chandrika Kumaratunge,
detailing LTTE’s frustration, specified deadline for the termination of
talks by 28 March 1995. ”If a favourable response is not received from you
before 28th March 1995, we will be compelled to make a painful
decision as to whether to continue the peace process or not.”

Prabakaran
by his letter dated 6 April 1995, addressed to Chandrika Kumaratunge,
informed her that, the LTTE has extended the deadline for the abrogation
of the talks by 19th April 1995.

Fourth
Round of Talks was held on 10 April 1995, at the same venue in Jaffna.
Government delegation included, Rt. Rev. Bishop Kenneth Fernando, the
Anglican Bishop of Colombo, Dr. Jeyadeva Uyangoda, a university lecture,
Charles Abeyasekera, Chairman, Movement for inter-Racial Justice and
Equality (MIRJE), K.Balapatabendi, Secretary to the President, Brigadier
A. S. Pieris (Army), and Captain P.A.S. Rajaratne (Navy).

Prabakaran,
the Leader of the LTTE, by his letter dated 18 April 1995, addressed to
Chandrika Kumaratunge, conveyed their decision that, they would
discontinue with their participation in the negotiation process with the
government and from the cessation of hostilities, effective from 19 April
1995, as stated in their earlier communication.

On the
day of the deadline, 19 April 1995, the armed hostilities between the
parties in conflict resumed, when the Sea Tiger commandos attacked and
sank two Sri Lankan naval vessels inside Trincomalee harbor, in the Eastern
Province.

Beginning
of Eelam War Three.

Balasingham Should have avoided the following comments:

When Balasingham commenting about the letter dated 7 December
1994, written by Col. Anuraddha Ratwatte to Prabakaran –

Ratwatte’s letter was sarcastic and provocative. Mr.
Pirabakaran was annoyed. He wanted to send a strongly worded letter to
Ratwatte, accusing Sinhala political leaders, both dead and alive, of
genocide, of slaughtering sixty thousand innocent Tamils, a phenomenon
continuing under the cover of war and economic strangulation. I
advised Mr. Pirabakaran not to respond emotionally, but to deal with these
issues with political sagacity. He concurred. (Page45)

The sentence
highlighted with bold italic letters gives a bad taste in the mouth. The
reason for Balasingham to highlight Prabakaran’s thinking regarding
Ratwatte’s so called obnoxious letter is not clear. However, it gives room
for others to speculate that, the LTTE leader used to take all his
decisions based on emotions and not based on facts. It provides room for
others to conjure that to provide details confidential discussions was to
display one-upmanship. It is always appropriate to avoid writing comments
and the details regarding the discussion a leader has with various
advisors to get more feedbacks on a certain subject before arriving at a
concrete decision.

When commenting about the decision to
implement the deadline –

In view of the above factors, the LTTE was thrown into the
dilemma of making a difficult decision as to whether to terminate, or
continue to participate in the peace process. We knew that, the negative
decision would impair the image of the movement, internationally. However,
at the same time, a positive decision would plunge the movement into a
futile, meaningless exercise, with far reaching military consequences. Mr.
Pirabakaran was convinced that the Kumaratunga government was not genuine
and was buying time for a hidden agenda. I suggested another
extension of the deadline. Mr. Pirabakaran was not favorably disposed
to the idea, arguing that it would not serve any purpose, other than
endangering our position militarily. (Page - 141)

Another uncalled for comment. This sentence project persistence
of dissent in a well organized disciplined organization.

The strength of the LTTE, as perceived by
the international community, as well as by the Sri Lankan Government, is its
clearly developed strategy of keeping the whole world guessing - a tacit
conjectural posture. When recording about dissents and other matters, it might
tend to erode the strength so far the organization maintained in the diplomatic
and military arena.

Despite few minor irritable lapses, the
book was an endevour to maintain in record the doomed negotiation, the LTTE had
with the Sri Lankan Government, led by Chandrika Kumaratunge. The book had
succeeded in placing in record, the unbelievable nature of the Sinhalese
leadership. This was a minor episode in the major tragic drama – the ethnic
conflict and Tamils’ struggle for their own cherished homeland.

Though one could ignore some of the
undiplomatic comments found in the book as minor irritants, the book would
serve as a written record. Though generations to come might be dumbfounded with
disbelief at the diplomatic debacle, but would always stand in good stead to
learn, how not to negotiate undiplomatically. International students of the
Ethnic conflict, if they wished to be acquainted with the thinking of LTTE and
its leader, then this book would serve to enlighten them. I urge that, every
Tamil should buy and own a copy for posterity.

Tragic and heart rendering episodes:Anecdote – 01.

“—Don
William Adrian Dias Bandaranike, who happened to be present at the dramatic
moment in the island’s history, when Kandy’s last king was taken prisoner, by
his own nobles, in 1815, and handed over to a British army of invasion. John
D’Oyly, an officer of considerable diplomatic skill, has masterminded the
British advance into the hills. Bandaranaike had come up from the British
settlements, in order to assist the officers of the invading army, as their
interpreter. King Sri Vikrama Rajasingha of Kandy, was reported to be in
Dumara, and the British forces (writes my uncle Sir Paul Pieris in his book Tri
Sinhala: The last phase, 1796-1815) were so deployed as to cut off
all chance of escape from there. A Kandyan chief named Eknelligoda approached
the house at the head of his men, and Sir Paul cites Bandaranaike’s lively
account of the events that followed:

The doors were
closed and an Appuhami of the Stepena ge or Bed Chamber was on guard
outside, spear in hand. He challenged Eknelligoda, whom he recognized, and
followed the challenge with a spear-thrust aimed with such force, that as
Eknelligoda avoided the blow, the weapon shivered to fragments against a stone.
The Appuhamy was immediately seized and hustled away and Eknelligoda walking up
to the door called on the King with whom were two of the Queens, to open it;
this he would not do … nor did he produce the Golden Sword, the emblem of the
Kingship, though a demand was made for it. The door was therefore battered down
and the men rushed in and a disgusting scene followed as the golden ornaments
and the very clothes were torn off the persons of the royal captives.’

It was at this
juncture, the Bandaranaike, who was outside the Royal Bed Chamber, exercised
his diplomatic skills. He called to the Queens to come out, speaking to them in
their native Tamil, and addressing them by respectful term of Ammaayarum.
The unfortunate young women emerged, writes Sir Paul:

Reeling pitifully from side to side –
like fowls whose necks had been twisted, was Dais’s graphic description – and
clung to him on either side in an agony of terror, crying out ‘Oh protect us.’
Blood was streaming from the lobes of their ears, which had been lacerated in
tearing away their earrings, and crushing some medical leaves, he stanched the
bleeding. In the meanwhile, Eknelligoda was reviling the King in the coarsest
terms and ordering his men to fetch some wild creepers with which to bind him
out. Dias could not restrain his indignation.

‘You people,’ he hotly protested, ‘up to this hour, worshipped the
King as father and god, but mine have long been under foreign governments and
are not expected to show him same reverence. All that is needed is his safe
custody, why then insult, injure and bind him?’ at the same time offering his
own shawl if it was considered necessary to secure his limbs. Eknelligoda
angrily retorted that his advice was not wanted; on his orders, the King was
rightly bound, and as he was unable to walk, he was dragged and pushed along
and thrown on the ground. - Pages 11-12– Relative Merits by Yasmine
Goonaratne – a member of the Late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s clan.

The above claim
regarding the arrest of the last King of Kandy, was confirmed by the Ceylon
Government Gazette Extraordinary, published on Wednesday 22 February 1815, as
follows:

Bulletin of Intelligence

Devout thanks are due to the supreme disposer of events who enabled His
Majesty’s Forces in this Colony in the short space of forty days without loss
of a single individual, to overturn a Tyrannical Government, which for several
generations has oppressed the people of the Interior Provinces in the Island of
Ceylon. (Sri Lanka)

A dispatch has just reached His Excellency the Governor and Commander
of the Forces from

Mr. D’Oyly, communicating the important and pleasing Intelligence, that
the King of Kandy with two of His Wives was yesterday surrounded by the
people of Dombara in conjunction with some armed Kandyans, sent by the Adigar
Eyhelapola, in the precincts of the village of Medde Maha Nuwera, in the
Province of Dombara and taken prisoner. His mother and two remaining wives
were at Hanweylle (a short distance from the same place) and had been sent for
with conveyances and an escort.

Further particulars are not mentioned nor will His Excellency defer for
their arrival this publick (sic) expression of congratulation towards His
Sovereign His Royal Highness the Prince Regent and the British nation on an
event so auspicious to the cause of humanity, justice and good Government, so
honourable to the British arms and so promising of increasing prosperity to
this Colony in an accession of Territory population produce, trade and
resources on the spontaneous invitation and willing And contended people.

In gratitude to
the Almighty, for so speedy and happy an issue of an undertaking which in many
views appeared in no slight degree arduous, and in humble anticipation of those
sentiments of humane consideration which would not fail on an occasion of
general rejoicing to occupy the Breast of His Royal Highness in favour of poor
individuals suffering the deprivation of liberty for petty offences, it is His
Excellency’s immediate intention that all persons who on this day to remain
detained in the Goals of the Colony on account of Fines not exceeding 100 Rix
Dollars, with forthwith receive a full and free remission of such fines. Also
that all persons under sentence or commitment of any provincial judge or
Sitting Magistrate for the purpose of finding surety of good behaviors, or to
keep peace, shall be discharged of such Sentence or commitment, unless it shall
appear by the Oaths of two credible witnesses that the release of any such
person or persons would be dangerous to the public, which prisoners must on
such proof be excepted and remain detained for His Excellency’s further orders
on a full consideration of their respective cases.

British Head
Quarters’

Kandy 19th
February 1815.

By His
Excellency’s Command.

(Signed)
J.Sutherland

Dep. Sec. To
Govt.

Anecdote No: - 02.

In 1815, when the Sinhalese chieftains entered into an agreement with
the British after the capture of Kandy. They deviously plotted and entered a
clause into the agreement, debarring the Tamils from entering the Kandyan
province:

Ceylon Government
Gazette Extraordinary – Monday 6th March 1815

Official
Bulletin

British Head Quarters

Kandy 2nd March 1815.

This day a solemn conference
was held in the Audience Hall of the Palace of Kandy, between His Excellency
the Governor and Commander of the Forces on behalf of his Majesty and of His
Royal Highness the Prince Regent on the one part, and the Adikars, Dissaves,
and other principal chiefs of the Kandyan Provinces on the other part, on
behalf of the people, and in presence of the Mohotolahs, Coraals, Vidans and
other subordinate Headmen from the different provinces and great concourse of
inhabitants.

A Public Instrument of Treaty, prepared in conformity to conditions
previously agreed on, for establishing His Majesty’s Government in the Kandyan
Provinces, was produced and publickly (sic) read in English and Cingalese and
unanimously presented to.

PROCLAMATION:

At a convention held on the second day of March in the year of Christ
1815, and the Cingalese year 1736, at the Palace in the City of Kandy, between
His Excellency and Lieutenant-General Robert Brownrigg, Governor and
Commander in Chief in and over the British Settlements and Territories in the
Island of Ceylon, acting in the name and on behalf of His Majesty George the
Third King, And His Royal Highness George Prince of Wales Regent, of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on the one part, and the Adigars,
Dessaves and other principal Chiefs of the Kandyan Provinces on behalf of the
Inhabitants, and in presence of the Mahattales, Corals Vidahns and other
subordinate Headmen from the several Provinces and of the people then and there
assembled on, the other part, it is agreed and established as follows:

(There were 12 clauses in the Kandyan Proclamation and Clause No: 3 deal
with the exclusion of the Tamils from the Kandyan provinces, urging for their
expulsion from the Provinces, as follows)

3. That all male persons,
being or pretending to be relations of the late Raja Sri Wickerma Raja Singhe,
either by affinity or by blood and whether in ascending, descending or
collateral line, are hereby declared enemies to the government of the Kandyan
provinces, and excluded and prohibited from entering those provinces on any
pretence whatever, without a written permission for that purpose by the
authority of the British Government, under the pains and penalties of martial
law, which is hereby declared to be in force for that purpose; and all male
persons of the Malabarcaste, now
expelled from the penalties, prohibited from returning, except with the
permission before mentioned.

Meaning of the term “Malabar”
- The Portuguese were the first Europeans to use the term Malabar to mean
all Tamils. The Dutch took up the tale and carried forward the use of the term
Malabar as synonymous with Tamil. (Page 210, JaffnaTamils by:
Dr. D.M.Rasanagaiam)]

The third clause in the Kandyan Convention clearly shows that the
Sinhalese Chiefs demanded from their newly found British Colonial masters for
the expulsion of the Tamils from the Kandyan Provinces. One of the signatories
to the Convention was Dissave Ratwatte of Matale, the descendant of Chandrika
Bandaranaike Kumaratunge – the President of Sri Lanka.

Anecdote No: - 03.

A few days later, in February 1958, a large group of saffron-robed
Buddhist monks occupied the lawn of the Prime Minister’s residence at Rosemead
Place, in Colombo and demanded that the B-C Pact (Bandaranaike – Chelvanayagam
Pact) is torn up. The Prime Minister, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike appeared and, after
parleying with them, announced that he was abrogating the Pact since the
Federal Party has committed a breach of it by launching the anti-SRI campaign
against the Government. It was so simple as all that. But it was no surprise.

Whatever its shortcomings might have been, the B-C Pact was in the
nature of an international treaty between the Sinhalese and the Tamil nations.
For, what is an international treaty if it is not an arrangement by which two
or more peoples solemnly agree to terms and conditions under which they settle
their disputes, avoid future friction, and continue their separate lives in
peace and mutual friendship? The aim of the B-C Pact was just that. – Page
135 - The Fall and Rise of the Tamil Nation – by V.Navaratnam –
former member of Parliament, and a member who participated in the negotiation
of the B – C Pact, on behalf of the Federal party.

Later, under late Srimavo Bandaranaike – the mother of the present
President –the agreement between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party S.L.F.P – Ilankai
Tamil Arasu Kadchchi in 1960, to be crowned in 1994-1995 by Chandrika
Bandaranaike Kumaratunge.

Anecdote No: 04

The SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) promised to implement the B_C Pact
if the Federal Party would help to defeat the UNP (United National Party)
minority Government and enable Srimavo Bandaranaike to be appointed Prime
Minister. The Federal Party agreed and Dudley Senananyake was defeated when he
faced the new House. However, contrary to what the Party expected on the
assurances of its Colombo advisers, Mrs. Bandaranaike was not called to form a
new Government. Instead, Dudley Senanayake had Parliament dissolved and forced
another General Election.

The fresh General Election was held in July 1960, the second in the
course of one year, at which Srimavo Bandaranaike was returned to Parliament
with an absolute majority for her party, the SLFP. She became Prime Minister in
her own right and needed nobody has to help to rule the country as she pleased
for the next five years.

From the very outset of its term in office, the Government of Srimavo
Bandaranaike made it clear that the SLFP had not changed one whit from its well-known
stance of Sinhalese nationalism. It had put on a veneer of accommodation of the
Tamils only to inveigle the Federal Party into an agreement to suit its own
policy strategy to defeat its rival, the UNP. Once again, it proved the
honouring the solemn pledge given to an important sector of the nation was
still not its way of handling national affairs. The Federal Party made several
attempts, in series of meetings and discussion with the Prime Minister and some
of her colleagues to get them to implement the B_C Pact as promised, but they
could not be persuaded to keep their word. The government appeared to make the
leaders and their Colombo advisers understand that it was now under no
political compulsion to make peace with Federal Party and that promises were
given and broken according to the exigencies of politics.– Page
155- 156 - The Fall and Rise of the
Tamil Nation – by V.Navaratnam

Chelvanayagam issued a statement which
read, ‘This is another fraud perpetuated on the Tamil-speaking people by the
present government. At the time of passing of the Sinhala Only Act, the late
Prime Minister (SWRD Bandaranaike) as well as the Minister of Finance gave the
assurance that the implementation of the Act would be effected in a manner so
as not to cause any hardship to those public servants who were recruited
through a medium other than Sinhala. Those assurances given both in and out of
parliament. The delegation from our party which met the Prime Minister (Srimavo
Bandaranaike) and some of the ministers recently pointed out those assurances
and urged the government to honour them. But this Government has, on its own
admission, gone back on the assurances given by the late Prime Minister. Page- 112 – The Murder of a Moderate by
T.Sabaratnam.