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C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 004030
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2026
TAGS: PGOVSOCIECONKPALIZJO
SUBJECT: PILLARS OF JORDAN,S HASHEMITE RULE: THE TRIBES
REF: A. 98 AMMAN 5579
¶B. 98 AMMAN 5619
¶C. 98 AMMAN 5677
¶D. 03 AMMAN 893
¶E. 03 AMMAN 967
¶F. 03 AMMAN 980
¶G. 03 AMMAN 1063
¶H. 06 AMMAN 2943
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (SBU) This is the first in a series of messages that will
assess the traditional pillars of Hashemite rule in Jordan.
¶2. (C) Introduction: The three traditional pillars of
Jordan's Hashemite rule - the East Bank tribes, the security
and military services, and the business elite - remain
solid. Barring unforeseeable developments, Jordan's
stability is not now a question. However, even among the
groups that make up the pillars, there are many critics of
the economic, political and social changes that King Abdullah
introduced after coming to the throne in 1999. These
changes, aimed at broadening the Jordanian system's base of
support, inevitably angered some who enjoyed privileges and
patronage under the previous way of doing things. Meanwhile,
many of Jordan's poor and disenfranchised, who stand to gain
most from reform in the long run, also sometimes join in the
criticism, chiefly because many have not yet noticed
improvements in their daily lives.
¶3. (C) Notwithstanding these complaints about change, most
ordinary Jordanians understand that King Abdullah has
navigated Jordan successfully through a very difficult period
in the region; others merely accept that in the short to
medium term, there is no good alternative to the Hashemite
family's leadership. Viewed in this context, the three
pillars system continues to function even as the King works
to introduce changes to it. However, many are complaining
about the changes.
The East Bank Tribes
--------------------
¶4. (C) Summary: Despite modernization's inevitable erosion
of tribal traditions, some East Bank tribes are still
politically potent, and some of their leaders openly express
to emboffs increasingly strident grievances with King
Abdullah's reforms of the Jordanian system. Most of these
tribes have always been, and remain, poorer than other
Jordanians, and less educated. There have always been
malcontents among them. But the sheikhs, complaints also
reflect the consequences of King Abdullah's conscious effort
to make Jordan's political system fairer and more
sustainable. At the same time, the grievances are in some
cases evidence of the Palace's mishandling of a key
constituency. At present, the tribal leaders still need the
Palace's favor and have nowhere to go politically, though
more of their tribal clients than in the past may support the
Islamists at the next elections. End summary.
Historical Role, and the Impact of Modernization
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶5. (C) The East Bank tribes, especially the tribes that were
still nomadic at the time of the founding of the Emirate of
Transjordan 90 years ago, remain a key pillar of Hashemite
rule. They have long traditions of loyalty to the
Hashemites, and many remain proud of this alliance. In
addition, a second traditional pillar - the military and the
security services (septel) - still draws most of its manpower
from both sedentary and bedouin tribes. During several
crises during Jordan's early history, bedouin tribal leaders
played an important role because of their potential to
mobilize followers to physically protect the regime (in the
early days as tribal irregulars, and later as reliable
elements of the regular security services.) For example,
military and police units dominated by Howeitat and Bani
Sakhr tribesmen played important roles in expelling the PLO
in 1970.
¶6. (SBU) As described in refs A through C, as the Jordanian
state and economy grew over the past 90 years, the tribes
lost some of their traditional social, legal and economic
functions. On the other hand, the polarization of Jordanian
society that followed the civil war of 1970 between East
Bankers and West Bankers revitalized the tribes, political
role among the East Bankers.
The Tribal System Today
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Today many East Bank Jordanians still identify
strongly with a tribe in ways that are politically important.
Some tribes exert considerable influence as voting blocs,
and through the still-strong tribal loyalties of many key
Jordanian politicians and security officials. Even among the
rising generation of Jordanians, tribal identity is key to
politics. For example, a candidate in the recent University
of Jordan student government elections told poloff that she
and other candidates were assessing their chances of success
based on their tribes, numbers among the student body.
¶8. (C) Many tribal Jordanians now live in cities. However,
most continue to vote in their tribal areas, where
gerrymandering ensures that some tribes, political clout is
out of proportion to their actual numbers. In the more
cohesive tribes, the loyalty to their sheikhs of these
urbanized tribesmen is reinforced by interests in hereditary
landholdings in the tribal areas, and by sheikhly patronage.
One of the sheikhs of the Bani Sakhr, who control the land
into which Amman's eastern suburbs are expanding, recently
told polcouns that, even as his followers cash in on the real
estate boom, he ensured that urban families did not sell
their last bits of rural land so that this tie was not
broken. The Bani Sakhr are traditionally among the
Hashemites, closest supporters. Their paramount sheikh,
Faisal Al-Fayez, was Prime Minister from 2003 to 2004.
A New King and a New Strategy Trim Tribal Perks
--------------------------------------------- --
¶9. (SBU) The late King Hussein kept key tribes loyal with
tens of thousands of patronage jobs, with subsidies and
public works, and by means of honors and special attention
for tribal leaders. The pork-barrel aspects of this
patronage, however, eventually became an unsustainable burden
on the public finances. In addition to subsidies to the
tribes, the GOJ had to pay for overstaffed and inefficient
civil and security services packed with tribesmen, as well as
an infantry-heavy army that was at least as much a tribal
jobs program as it was a fighting force. This patronage
system could only work in a state-dominated economy, propped
up by foreign assistance, and it largely left out in the cold
the country's Palestinian-Jordanian majority.
¶10. (SBU) Upon his accession to the throne in 1999, King
Abdullah made a strategic decision to modernize. The King's
economic reforms have largely been a success, though the
benefits are spread unevenly among the population. In 2006,
real GDP growth is on track to exceed five percent for the
third year running. More Palestinian-Jordanians are being
drawn into the regime's business pillar, as a modern
entrepreneurial class that is beginning to succeed in the
global marketplace. But traditional tribal clients have lost
much in the course of these changes.
Tribal Grievances
-----------------
¶11. (C) Discontent has spread among some tribesmen and other
East Bankers who see their traditional privileges slipping
away. This was inevitable if Jordan was to rationalize its
public finances. Perhaps more avoidable, however, is the
sense among some tribal leaders that the Palace has also cut
back on the low-cost (but politically effective) honors and
senior attention once lavished on them by King Hussein.
Tribal figures have disappeared from King Abdullah's inner
circle following the dismissal of former GID director Saad
Kheir and former PM Faysal Al-Fayez in 2005. The sacking of
Amman Mayor Nidal Hadid in May, 2006, also bruised tribal
egos. Note: Kheir is from a sedentary Salt area clan; and
Hadid,s father is the senior sheikh of the Hadid tribe (para
27). End note. The touchier sheikhs have been further
provoked by the re-emergence close to the King of their bete
noir, the modernizing and Palestinian-Jordanian Bassem
Awadallah (ref H). Tribal griping about "foreign"
Palestinian-Jordanians sometimes morphs into complaints that
the Hashemites themselves are also interlopers, having come
to Jordan from the Hijaz "only" 90 years ago.
¶12. (C) These resentments, though not universal, seem to be
widespread and raw. For example, it is common for emboffs to
hear tribesmen and other East Bankers unfavorably compare
King Abdullah to his father, and criticize Abdullah for not
visiting tribal notables more often on their own turf. Some
backwoodsmen even assert (offering no evidence) that the King
avoids tribal visits because he fears for his personal safety.
¶13. (C) At the same time, a few tribal leaders such as Saoud
Al-Ka'abneh, a Bani Sakhr sheikh, tell poloffs that their
royal patronage continues unabated; Bani Sakhr remains
heavily represented in the security services and the
military. However, other important tribal figures are quite
open in expressing to emboffs their unhappiness with the
changes under King Abdullah. Recent conversations with these
sheikhs provide a snapshot of tribal gripes:
Bani Hassan - Background
-----------------------
¶14. (U) The Bani Hassan are the most numerous tribe in
Jordan, with about 300,000 members. (Bani Hassan are also
present in Iraq, south of Najaf and Karbala). Those in
Jordan remain fairly cohesive politically. They were
semi-nomadic at the time of Transjordan's foundation, and
their traditional lands are east of the northern Jordanian
town of Mafraq. About half live in the tribe's territory,
with the other half in Amman and other cities. The urbanized
Bani Hassan keep up strong ties with the tribal home folks.
Bani Hassan - Sheikh Nawaf
--------------------------
¶15. (C) Nawaf Al Eitan is the senior sheikh of the Bani
Hassan in Jordan, and is also the tribal leader most willing
to criticize the new order within emboffs, hearing. Nawaf
is both the uncle and brother-in-law of the chief of the
national police, Major General Muhammad Majid Al-Eitan.
During a meeting at Sheikh Nawaf's modest home outside Mafraq
in March, he complained to polcouns and pol FSN about the
influence on the King of "outsider" (i.e.,
Palestinian-Jordanian) reformers like Awadallah. He was no
less critical of East Bank advisors to King Abdullah, calling
PM Marouf Bakhit a "drunkard." While Sheikh Nawaf made the
obligatory protestations of his tribe's loyalty to the King,
he at the same time dismissed "all the King's relatives and
advisors" as "thieves." He characterized Queen Rania
(another Palestinian-Jordanian) in crude terms.
¶16. (C) At the heart of Sheikh Nawaf's discontent was his
claim that King Abdullah had reneged on the alliance between
the Hashemites and the tribes that "made Jordan." Tribesmen
could no longer look forward to as many low-paying but secure
jobs in the security forces or civil service as they once
did. Government subsidies for basic foods and fuel had been
cut. And ministers "no longer listen to me" or to other
tribal sheikhs. Nawaf was particularly upset over the
Palace's decision last Fall to pass him over for a seat in
the appointed Senate.
¶17. (C) Unemployment among Bani Hassan youth was "shocking,"
according to Nawaf. He thought that joblessness, cuts in
subsidies and the GOJ's association with U.S. policies in
Iraq and Palestine were driving both the Bani Hassan and
other poor people into the arms of the Islamists. Most Bani
Hassan had always practiced a brand of traditional folk
Islam, with no predilection for political Islam or the Muslim
Brotherhood, he said. But the Muslim Brotherhood would sweep
the next elections among his tribe if the balloting were
"fair," he predicted. Note: Elections for municipal
councils will probably take place in late 2006 or early 2007;
parliamentary polls are slated for 2007. End note. Because
of this, he added, it was "foolish" to pursue sincere
democratization in the current environment.
¶18. (C) Sheikh Nawaf claimed that the Bani Hassan and other
tribes felt alienated from the regime, and (perhaps still
thinking about the Senate seat that got away) "humiliated" by
the new way they were treated. He complained that the local
head of the General Intelligence Directorate pressured people
to put advertisements in newspapers praising the King, at a
cost of about USD 700 for each ad. "This could feed a family
for weeks. Instead of taking money from my people in this
way, the authorities should be giving them money." There was
"a limit to how much of this they could endure," he said,
without suggesting what options the tribes had if the limit
were exceeded.
Abu Zayd
--------
¶19. (U) The Abu Zayds are the predominant clan around the
town of Sahab, 20 miles east of Amman; they number about
13,000.
Abu Zayd - Sheikh Hamad
-----------------------
¶20. (C) Sheikh Hamad Abu Zayd was a Member of Parliament, but
lost his seat to the Islamic Action Front in 2003. At the
time he told emboffs that he had lost the election because
people perceived him as being too close to the Americans.
¶21. (C) Polcouns met with Sheikh Hamad and his eldest sons in
their large Sahab home in April, just as Jordan was bracing
for cuts in fuel subsidies, which in the event came off
without the trouble that Hamad and others predicted. Hamad,
who in meetings with poloffs over the past three years had
had nothing but praise for the GOJ, said on this occasion
that conditions were becoming "unbearable" for some of his
people due to the cuts in subsidies and patronage jobs.
Tribal clients were coming to his door in unprecedented
numbers for help. "People are angry because they can give
their children nothing but bread to eat." The Sheikh,s son
offered to show polcouns nearby shacks where parents and
children slept on cardboard on the floor.
¶22. (C) "Most" young Abu Zayd men were unemployed, Hamad
said, because they can no longer get military and civil
service positions. He claimed "not a single Jordanian" was
working in the nearby Tajamouat Qualifying Industrial Zone
(QIZ). Note: In fact, about 25 percent of the laborers in
this QIZ are Jordanian, but few are from the Sahab area. End
note.
¶23. (C) Hamad, whose wealth is based on his nationwide bus
line, had boasted in 2004 to emboffs about the private school
he had founded in order to provide free education to 500
children from the Sahab area. When asked in April about the
school, Hamad sullenly replied that he was closing it; he
could not longer afford it due to hard times in his bus
business. He complained that despite numerous appeals to the
Palace, he never got "one dinar" of GOJ support for the
school.
¶24. (C) Hamad contended that the poor of his tribe "see no
benefit" from American aid. Saddam's oil grants were
understood and appreciated by the people, he claimed. People
believed that Saddam's aid stopped because of the U.S.
campaign in Iraq; Hamad argued the U.S. should subsidize
Jordanians, fuel consumption as Saddam had done, rather than
provide aid that "disappeared" because it went through
"corrupt men around the King."
¶25. (C) The Sheikh related that at a recent audience with
King Abdullah, he had pled for medical care for a number of
charity cases from his tribe. The King promised him the
Royal Court would look after them; according to Hamad Court
staffers took care "of some but not others." The Sheikh also
saw PM Bakhit to ask for medical aid, but claimed he got no
result.
¶26. (C) Sheikh Hamad also complained that after his defeat by
the IAF in 2003, he had launched his own political party at
the urging of the General Intelligence Directorate and with
promises of GID financial support. He had let his tribal
clients know they would all get some money for joining the
party. No money ever arrived, and the Sheikh had lost face
as a result.
Hadid - Background
------------------
¶27. (C) The Hadid tribe numbers about 20,000. Their home
turf is south Amman. The tribe's senior sheikh, Barjes
Al-Hadid, is a pro-government Member of Parliament. Jordan's
other tribal leaders recognize him as the country's
pre-eminent expert on tribal customary law, and some recently
asked him to mediate in a dispute among clans around Kerak.
Sheikh Barjes, son Nidal Hadid was mayor of Amman from 1998
until May, 2006. Saad Kheir, head of the General
Intelligence Directorate until 2005, is an in-law to Nidal
Hadid.
Hadid - Sheikh Barjes
--------------------
¶28. (C) Polcouns met with Sheikh Barjes at his run-down south
Amman villa in April. As many Jordanians do, Barjes combined
gracious hospitality with relentless criticism of U.S.
policies toward the Palestinians and in Iraq. Despite his
objections to these policies, he personally supported the
Jordan-U.S. "alliance" because he understood that Jordan was
weak and needed peace with Israel and help from the U.S. But
it was becoming more and more difficult to convince his
tribal clients of this. Barjes said his people viewed the
GOJ's ties to the United States as the reason for their
economic problems, because America had deposed their previous
benefactor, Saddam Hussein. Unemployment among his people
was extensive, he said. The impending fuel subsidy cuts
would cause even more hardship. Unless Jordan's Gulf and
American friends provided new help to "their Jordanian ally,"
the GOJ had no choice but to impose the cuts and "let the
people suffer."
Howeitat - Background
---------------------
¶29. (U) The Howeitat number 30,000 and are predominant in
southern Jordan; they are nowadays not very cohesive
politically. (There are also a few Howeitat in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia.) The film "Lawrence of Arabia" made them
internationally famous, with Anthony Quinn, playing Sheikh
Odeh Abu Tayeh of the Howeitat, helping the Hashemites
overcome their First World War foes.
¶30. (C) Leadership of the tribe has since shifted to the
Al-Jazi clan. The current Al-Jazi sheikh, Sultan bin Feisal,
is widely viewed as ineffective. Two GID men appeared at his
last meeting with emboffs, and the clearly uncomfortable
sheikh was unwilling to engage in substantive conversation.
The tribe's most active political leader is Sultan,s cousin,
Member of Parliament Dr. Abdullah al-Jazi, and most Howeitat
go to him when they need something from the government.
Howeitat - Dr. Abdullah Al-Jazi
-------------------------------
¶31. (C) Al-Jazi is a close Embassy contact who has never
directly criticized the King in meetings with emboffs, and he
is proud that his eldest son has recently joined the Royal
Court's new policy unit. Over the past two years, however,
he has expressed increasing frustration with the King's inner
circle of advisors, some of whom he criticizes as being
"totally out of touch with the people." While admitting that
his tribal constituents have unrealistic expectations when it
comes to patronage jobs and government handouts - during one
meeting with poloff Al-Jazi took a phone call from a tribal
figure demanding that his high school drop-out son be put in
charge of Jordan's only railroad - at the same time he has
gently chided the Palace for distancing itself from its
tribal support base. "The King is getting some bad advice -
he should listen more to those of us who know what the
Jordanian people need and want," he told poloff. Al-Jazi
contends that his tribal clients continue to back the
Hashemites, but acknowledges that Islamists, appeal is
increasing for young Howeitat men who are bitter that they do
not enjoy the same entitlements their fathers did.
Conclusion
----------
¶32. (C) These tribal leaders, views provide insight into the
challenges King Abdullah faces as he tries to advance reforms
and continue his strong support for U.S. policy in the
region. While there is likely some hyperbole to their
complaints, their increased volume and stridency in recent
years is a significant development.
¶33. (C) The Palace might marginally reduce sheikhly
complaining if it devoted more time to ego-soothing meetings
and other recognition. But most of the tribes, discontent
is, in the end, a resource issue, and is unavoidable unless
the King were to reverse his reform program, or come into
unexpected new levels of aid from the Gulf or USG. Neither
development is likely.
¶34. (C) Does it matter? Could dissatisfied tribes or their
malcontent leaders credibly threaten to withhold their
allegiance from King Abdullah or from the whole Hashemite
family? In post's view, this is unlikely in the near term,
not least because government handouts, while reduced, are
still essential for most of the tribes. Though more
tribesmen than in the past may vote for Islamists at the next
municipal elections in late 2006, in that poll urban
Palestinian-Jordanians will be decisive in any gains the
Islamists make; tribal candidates will probably still prevail
in traditional tribal areas. However, tribal voters might be
more likely to swing to the Islamists if economic conditions
deteriorate for low-income Jordanians, or if the situations
in the Palestinian territories or Iraq get significantly
worse.
¶35. (C) Looming even larger over the political scene are the
national parliamentary elections scheduled for 2007, and the
King's push for electoral reform before then. Possible
shifts in tribal voting loyalties will be among the
considerations underlying debate in the cabinet and
parliament over the expected electoral reform bill, and over
any attempts to adjust the current electoral district
boundaries, which favor traditionally pro-government tribal
voters.
¶36. (C) The tribal pillar of the regime remains solid, though
cracks are beginning to show, and they bear watching.
HALE