On the Inspiration of
Scripture

[from The
Nineteenth Century, Vol. 15, No. 84, Feb. 1884.]

{185} 1. It has lately been asked what answer do
we Catholics give to the allegation urged against us by men of the
day, to the effect that we demand of our converts an assent to views
and interpretations of Scripture which modern science and historical
research have utterly discredited.

As this alleged obligation is confidently
maintained against us, and with an array of instances in support of
it, I think it should be either denied or defended; and the best mode
perhaps of doing whether the one or the other, will be, instead of
merely dealing with the particular instances adduced in proof, to
state what we really do hold as regards Holy Scripture, and what a
Catholic is bound to believe. This I propose now to do, and in doing
it, I beg it to be understood that my statements are simply my own,
and involve no responsibility of any one besides myself.

2. A recent work of M. Renan's is one of those
publications which have suggested or occasioned this adverse criticism
upon our intellectual position. The author's abandonment of
Catholicism seems, according to a late article in a journal of high
reputation, in no small measure to have come about by his study of the
Biblical text, especially that of the Old Testament. 'He explains,'
says the article, 'that the Roman Catholic Church admits no compromise
on questions of Biblical criticism and history' ... though 'the Book
of Judith is an historical impossibility. Hence the undoubted fact
that the Roman Catholic Church ... insists on its members believing
… a great deal more in pure criticism and pure history than the
strictest Protestants exact from their pupils or flocks.' Should,
then, a doubting {186} Anglican contemplate becoming Catholic by way
of attaining intellectual peace, 'if his doubts turn on history and
criticism, he will find the little finger of the Catholic Church
thicker than the loins of Protestantism.'

3. The serious question, then, which this article
calls on us to consider, is whether it is 'an undoubted fact,' as
therein stated, that the Catholic Church does 'insist' on her children's
acceptance of certain Scripture informations on matters of fact in
defiance of criticism and history. And my first duty on setting out is
to determine the meaning of that vague word 'insists,' which I shall
use in the only sense in which a Catholic can consent to use it.

I allow, then, that the Church, certainly, does
'insist,' when she speaks dogmatically, nay or rather she more than
insists, she obliges; she obliges us to an internal assent to that
which she proposes to us. So far I admit, or rather maintain. And I
admit that she obliges us in a most forcible and effective manner,
that is, by the penalty of forfeiting communion with her, if we refuse
our internal assent to her word. We cannot be real Catholics, if we do
not from our heart accept the matters which she puts forward as divine
and true. This is plain.

3. Next, to what does the Church oblige us? and
what is her warrant for doing so? I answer, The matters which she can
oblige us to accept with an internal assent are the matters contained
in that Revelation of Truth, written or unwritten, which came to the
world from our Lord and His Apostles; and this claim on our faith in
her decisions as to the matter of that Revelation rests on her being
the divinely appointed representative of the Apostles and the
expounder of their words; so that whatever she categorically delivers
about their formal acts or their writings or their teaching, is an
Apostolic deliverance. I repeat, the only sense in which the Church
'insists' on any statement, Biblical or other, the only reason of her
so insisting, is that that statement is part of the original
Revelation, and therefore must be unconditionally accepted,—else,
that Revelation is not, as a revelation, accepted at all.

The question then which I have to answer is,
What, in matter of fact, has the Church (or the Pope), as the
representative of God, said about Scripture, which, as being
Apostolic, unerring Truth, is obligatory on our faith, that is, de
fide?

5. Many truths may be predicated about Scripture
and its contents which are not obligatory on our faith, viz., such as
are private conclusions from premises, or are the dicta of
theologians. Such as about the author of the Book of Job, or the dates
of St. Paul's Epistles. These are not obligatory upon us, because they
are not the subjects of ex cathedrâ utterances of the Church.
Opinions of this sort may be true or not true, and lie open for
acceptance or rejection, since no divine utterance has ever been
granted to us about them, or {187} is likely to be granted. We are not
bound to believe what St. Jerome said or inferred about Scripture; nor
what St. Augustine, or St. Thomas, or Cardinal Caietan or Fr. Perrone
has said; but what the Church has enunciated, what the Councils, what
the Pope, has determined. We are not bound to accept with an absolute
faith what is not a dogma, or the equivalent of dogma (vide infra,
section 17), what is not de fide; such judgments, however high
their authority, we may without loss of communion doubt, we may refuse
to accept. This is what we must especially bear in mind, when we
handle such objections as M. Renan's. We must not confuse what is
indisputable as well as true, with what may indeed be true, yet is
disputable.

6. I must make one concession to him. In certain
cases there may be a duty of silence, when there is no obligation of
belief. Here no question of faith comes in. We will suppose that a
novel opinion about Scripture or its contents is well grounded, and a
received opinion open to doubt, in a case in which the Church has
hitherto decided nothing, so that a new question needs a new answer:
here to profess the new opinion may be abstractedly permissible, but
is not always permissible in practice. The novelty may be so startling
as to require a full certainty that it is true; it may be so strange
as to raise the question whether it will not unsettle ill-educated
minds, that is, though the statement is not an offence against faith,
still it may be an offence against charity. It need not be heretical,
yet at a particular time or place it may be so contrary to the
prevalent opinion in the Catholic body, as in Galileo's case, that
zeal for the supremacy of the Divine Word, deference to existing
authorities, charity towards the weak and ignorant, and distrust of
self, should keep a man from being impetuous or careless in
circulating what nevertheless he holds to be true, and what, if indeed
asked about, he cannot deny. The household of God has claims upon our
tenderness in such matters, which criticism and history have not.

7. For myself, I have no call or wish at all to
write in behalf of such persons as think it a love of truth to have no
'love of the brethren.' I am indeed desirous of investigating for its
own sake the limit of free thought consistently with the claims upon
us of Holy Scripture; still my especial interest in the inquiry is
from my desire to assist those religious sons of the Church who are
engaged in biblical criticism and its attendant studies, and have a
conscientious fear of transgressing the rule of faith; men who wish to
ascertain how far certain religion puts them under obligations and
restrictions in their reasonings and inferences on such subjects, what
conclusions may and what may not be held without interfering with that
internal assent which they are bound to give, if they would be
Catholics, to the written Word of God. I do but contemplate the inward
peace of religious Catholics in their own persons. Of course those who
begin without belief in the religious aspect of the universe, are not
{188} likely to be brought to such belief by studying it merely on its
secular side.

8. Now then, the main question before us being
what it is that a Catholic is free to hold about Scripture in general,
or about its separate portions or its statements, without compromising
his firm inward assent to the dogmas of the Church, that is, to the de
fide enunciations of Pope and Councils, we have first of all to
inquire how many and what those dogmas are.

I answer that there are two such dogmas; one
relates to the authority of Scripture, the other to its
interpretation. As to the authority of Scripture, we hold it to be, in
all matters of faith and morals, divinely inspired throughout; as to
its interpretation, we hold that the Church is, in faith and morals,
the one infallible expounder of that inspired text.

I begin with the question of its inspiration.

9. The books which constitute the canon of
Scripture, or the Canonical books, are enumerated by the Tridentine
Council, as we find them in the first page of our Catholic Bibles, and
are in that Ecumenical Council's decree spoken of by implication as
the work of inspired men. The Vatican Council speaks more distinctly,
saying that the entire books with all their parts, are divinely
inspired, and adding an anathema upon impugners of this definition.

There is another dogmatic phrase used by the
Councils of Florence and Trent to denote the inspiration of Scripture,
viz., 'Deus unus et idem utriusque Testamanti Auctor.' Since
this left room for holding that by the word 'Testamentum' was meant
'Dispensation,' as it seems to have meant in former Councils from the
date of Irenĉus, and as St. Paul uses the word, in his Epistle to the
Hebrews, the Vatican Council has expressly defined that the concrete libri
themselves of the Old and New Testament 'Deum habent Auctorem.'

10. There is a further question, which is still
left in some ambiguity, the meaning of the word 'Auctor.' 'Auctor' is
not identical with the English word 'Author.' Allowing that there are
instances to be found in classical Latin in which 'auctores' may be
translated 'authors,' instances in which it even seems to mean
'writers,' it more naturally means 'authorities.' Its proper sense is
'originator,' 'inventor,' 'founder,' 'primary cause;' (thus St. Paul
speaks of our Lord as 'Auctor salutis,' 'Auctor fidei;') on the other
hand, that it was the inspired penmen who were the 'writers' of their
works seems asserted by St. John and St. Luke and, I may say, in every
paragraph of St. Paul's Epistles. In St. John we read 'This is the
disciple who testifies of these things, and has written these
things,' and St. Luke says 'I have thought it good to write to
thee' &c. However, if any one prefers to construe 'auctor' as
'author,' or writer, let it be so—only, then there will be two
writers of the Scriptures, the divine and the human. {189}

11. And now comes the important question, in what
respect are the Canonical books inspired? It cannot be in every
respect, unless we are bound de fide to believe that 'terra in
ĉternum stat,' and that heaven is above us, and that there are no
antipodes. And it seems unworthy of Divine Greatness, that the
Almighty should in His revelation of Himself to us undertake mere
secular duties, and assume the office of a narrator, as such, or an
historian, or geographer, except so far as the secular matters bear
directly upon the revealed truth. The Councils of Trent and the
Vatican fulfil this anticipation; they tell us distinctly the object
and the promise of Scripture inspiration. They specify 'faith and
moral conduct' as the drift of that teaching which has the guarantee
of inspiration. What we need and what is given us is not how to
educate ourselves for this life; we have abundant natural gifts for
human society, and for the advantages which it secures; but our great
want is how to demean ourselves in thought and deed towards our Maker,
and how to gain reliable information on this urgent necessity.

12. Accordingly four times does the Tridentine
Council insist upon 'faith and morality,' as the scope of inspired
teaching. It declares that the 'Gospel' is 'the Fount of all saving
truth and all instruction in morals,' that in the written
books and in the unwritten traditions, the Holy Spirit dictating, this
truth and instruction are contained. Then it speaks of
the books and traditions, 'relating whether to faith or to morals,'
and afterwards of 'the confirmation of dogmas and establishment
of morals.' Lastly, it warns the Christian people, 'in matters
of faith and morals,' against distorting Scripture into
a sense of their own.

13 But while the Councils, as has been shown, lay
down so emphatically the inspiration of Scripture in respect to 'faith
and morals,' it is remarkable that they do not say a word directly as
to inspiration in matters of fact. Yet are we therefore to conclude
that the record of facts in Scripture does not come under the
guarantee of its inspiration? We are not so to conclude, and for this
plain reason:—the sacred narrative carried on through so many ages,
what is it but the very matter for our faith and rule of our
obedience? What but that narrative itself is the supernatural
teaching, in order to which inspiration is given? What is the whole
history, traced out in Scripture from Genesis to Esdras and thence on
to the end of the Acts of the Apostles, but a manifestation of Divine
Providence, on the one hand interpretative, on a large scale and with
{190} analogical applications, of universal history, and on the other
preparatory, typical and predictive, of the Evangelical Dispensation?
Its pages breathe of providence and grace, of our Lord, and of His
work and teaching, from beginning to end. It views facts in those
relations in which neither ancients, such as the Greek and Latin
classical historians, nor moderns, such as Niebuhr, Grote, Ewald, or
Michelet, can view them. In this point of view it has God for its
author, even though the finger of God traced no words but the
Decalogue. Such is the claim of Bible history in its substantial
fulness to be accepted de fide as true. In this point of view,
Scripture is inspired, not only in faith and morals, but in all its
parts which bear on faith, including matters of fact.

14. But what has been said leads to another
serious question. It is easy to imagine a Code of Laws inspired, or a
formal prophecy, or a Hymn, or a Creed, or a collection of proverbs.
Such works may be short, precise, and homogeneous; but inspiration on
the one hand, and on the other a document, multiform and copious in
its contents, as the Bible is, are at first sight incompatible ideas,
and destructive of each other. How are we practically to combine the
indubitable fact of a divine superintendence with the indubitable fact
of a collection of such various writings?

15. Surely, then, if the revelations and lessons
in Scripture are addressed to us personally and practically, the
presence among us of a formal judge and standing expositor of its
words, is imperative. It is antecedently unreasonable to suppose that
a book so complex, so systematic, in parts so obscure, the outcome of
so many minds, times, and places, should be given us from above
without the safeguard of some authority; as if it could possibly, from
the nature of the case, interpret itself. Its inspiration does but
guarantee its truth, not its interpretation. How are private readers
satisfactorily to distinguish what is didactic and what is historical,
what is fact and what is vision, what is allegorical and what is
literal, what is idiomatic and what is grammatical, what is enunciated
formally and what occurs obiter, what is only of temporary and
what is of lasting obligation? Such is our natural anticipation, and
it is only too exactly justified in the events of the last three
centuries, in the many countries where private judgment on the text of
Scripture has prevailed. The gift of inspiration requires as its
complement the gift of infallibility.

Where then is this gift lodged, which is so
necessary for the due use of the written word of God? Thus we are
introduced to the second dogma in respect to Holy Scripture taught by
the Catholic religion. The first is that Scripture is inspired, the
second that the Church is the infallible interpreter of that
inspiration.

16. That the Church, and therefore the Pope, is
that Interpreter is defined in the following words:— {191}

17. Since then there is in the Church an
authority, divinely appointed and plenary, for judgment and for appeal
in questions of Scripture interpretation, in matters of faith and
morals, therefore, by the very force of the words, there is one such
authority, and only one.

Again, it follows hence, that, when the
legitimate authority has spoken, to resist its interpretation is a sin
against the faith and an act of heresy.

And from this again it follows, that, till the
Infallible Authority formally interprets a passage of Scripture, there
is nothing heretical in advocating a contrary interpretation, provided
of course there is nothing in the act intrinsically inconsistent with
the faith, or the pietas fidei, nothing of contempt or
rebellion, nothing temerarious, nothing offensive or scandalous, in
the manner of acting or the circumstances of the case. I repeat, I am
all along inquiring what Scripture, by reason of its literal text,
obliges us to believe. An original view about Scripture or its parts
may be as little contrary to the mind of the Church about it, as it
need be an offence against its inspiration.

The proviso, however, or condition, which I have
just made, must carefully be kept in mind. Doubtless, a certain
interpretation of a doctrinal text may be so strongly supported by the
Fathers, so continuous and universal, and so cognate and connatural
with the Church's teaching, that it is virtually or practically as
dogmatic as if it were a formal judgment delivered on appeal by the
Holy See, and cannot be disputed except as the Church or Holy See
opens its wording or its conditions. Hence the Vatican Council says,
'Fide divinâ et Catholicâ ea omnia credenda sunt, quĉ in verbo Dei
scripto vel tradito continentur, vel ab Ecclesiâ sive solemni judicio,
sive ordinario et universali magisterio, tanquam
divinitus revelata, credenda proponuntur.' And I repeat, that, though
the Fathers were not inspired, yet their united testimony is of
supreme authority; at the same time, since no Canon or List has been
determined of the {192} Fathers, the practical rule of duty is
obedience to the voice of the Church.

18. Such then is the answer which I make to the
main question which has led to my writing. I asked what obligation of
duty lay upon the Catholic scholar or man of science as regards his
critical treatment of the text and the matter of Holy Scripture. And
now I say that it is his duty, first, never to forget that what he is
handling is the Word of God, which, by reason of the difficulty of
always drawing the line between what is human and what is divine,
cannot be put on the level of other books, as it is now the fashion to
do, but has the nature of a Sacrament, which is outward and inward,
and a channel of supernatural grace; and secondly, that, in what he
writes upon it or its separate books, he is bound to submit himself
internally, and to profess to submit himself, in all that relates to
faith and morals, to the definite teachings of Holy Church.

This being laid down, let me go on to consider
some of the critical distinctions and conclusions which are consistent
with a faithful observance of these obligations.

19. Are the books or are the writers inspired? I
answer, Both. The Council of Trent says the writers ('ab ipsis
Apostolis, Spiritu Sancto dictante); the Vatican says the books ('si
quis libros integros &c. divinitus inspiratos esse negaverit,
anathema sit'). Of course the Vatican decision is de fide, but
it cannot annul the Tridentine. Both decrees are dogmatic truths. The
Tridentine teaches us that the Divine Inspirer, inasmuch as he acted
on the writer, acted, not immediately on the books themselves, but
through the men who wrote them. The books are inspired, because the
writers were inspired to write them. They are not inspired books,
unless they came from inspired men.

There is one instance in Scripture of Divine
Inspiration without a human medium; the Decalogue was written by the
very finger of God. He wrote the law upon the stone tables Himself. It
has been thought the Urim anti Thummim was another instance of the
immediate inspiration of a material substance; but anyhow such
instances are exceptional; certainly, as regards Scripture, which
alone concerns us here, there always have been two minds in the
process of inspiration, a Divine Auctor, and a human Scriptor; and
various important consequences follow from this appointment.

20. If there be at once a divine and a human mind
co-operating in the formation of the sacred text, it is not surprising
if there often be a double sense in that text, and, with obvious
exceptions, never certain that there is not.

Thus Sara had her human and literal meaning in
her words, 'Cast out the bondwoman and her son,' &c.; but we know
from St. Paul that those words were inspired by the Holy Ghost to
convey a spiritual meaning. Abraham, too, on the Mount, when his son
asked {193} him whence was to come the victim for the sacrifice which
his father was about to offer, answered 'God will provide;' and he
showed his own sense of his words afterwards, when he took the ram
which was caught in the briers, and offered it as a holocaust. Yet
those words were a solemn prophecy.

And is it extravagant to say, that, even in the
case of men who have no pretension to be prophets on servants of God,
He may by their means give us great maxims and lessons, which the
speakers little thought they were delivering? as in the case of the
Architriclinus in the marriage feast, who spoke of the bridegroom as
having kept the good wine until now;' words which it was needless for
St. John to record, unless they had a mystical meaning.

Such instances raise the question whether the
Scripture saints and prophets always understood the higher and divine
sense of their words. As to Abraham, this will be answered in the
affirmative; but I do not see reason for thinking that Sara was
equally favoured. Nor is her case solitary; Caiphas, as high priest,
spoke a divine truth by virtue of his office, little thinking of it,
when he said that 'one man must die for the people;' and St. Peter at
Joppa at first did not see beyond a literal sense in his vision,
though he knew that there was a higher sense, which in God's good time
would be revealed to him.

And hence there is no difficulty in supposing
that the Prophet Osee, though inspired, only knew his own literal
sense of the words which he transmitted to posterity, 'I have called
my Son out of Egypt,' the further prophetic meaning of them being
declared by St. Matthew in his gospel. And such a divine sense would
be both concurrent with and confirmed by that antecedent belief which
prevailed among the Jews in St. Matthew's time, that their sacred
books were in great measure typical, with an evangelical bearing,
though as yet they might not know what those books contained in
prospect.

21. Nor is it de fide (for that alone with
a view to Catholic Biblicists I am considering) that inspired men, at
the time when they speak from inspiration, should always know that the
Divine Spirit is visiting them.

The Psalms are inspired; but, when David, in the
outpouring of his deep contrition, disburdened himself before hisGod
in the words of the Miserere, could he, possibly, while
uttering them, have been directly conscious that every word he uttered
was not simply his, but another's? Did he not think that he was
personally asking forgiveness and spiritual help?

Doubt again seems incompatible with a
consciousness of being inspired. But Father Patrizi, while reconciling
two Evangelists in a passage of their narratives, says, if I
understand him rightly (ii. p. 405), that though we admit that there
were some things about which inspired writers doubted, this does not
imply that inspiration allowed {194} them to state what is doubtful as
certain, but only it did not hinder them from stating things with a
doubt on their minds about them; but how can the All-knowing Spirit
doubt? or how can an inspired man doubt, if he is conscious of his
inspiration?

And again, how can a man whose hand is guided by
the Holy Spirit, and who knows it, make apologies for his style of
writing, as if deficient in literary exactness arid finish? If then
the writer of Ecclesiasticus, at the very time that he wrote his
Prologue, was not only inspired but conscious of his inspiration, how
could he have entreated his readers to 'come with benevolence,' and to
make excuse for his 'coming short in the composition of words'?
Surely, if at the very time he wrote he had known it, he would, like
other inspired men, have said, 'Thus saith the Lord,' or what was
equivalent to it.

The same remark applies to the writer of the
second book of Machabees, who ends his narrative by saying, 'If I have
done well, it is what I desired, but if not so perfectly, it must be
pardoned me.' What a contrast to St. Paul, who, speaking of his
inspiration (1 Cor. vii. 40) and of his 'weakness and fear' (ibid ii.
4), does so in order to boast that his 'speech was, not in the
persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the Spirit and
of power.' The historian of the Machabees, would have surely adopted a
like tone of 'glorying,' had he had at the time a like consciousness
of his divine gift.

22. Again, it follows from there being two
agencies, divine grace and human intelligence, co-operating in the
production of the Scriptures, that, whereas, if they were written, as
in the Decalogue, by the immediate finger of God, every word of them
must be His and His only, on the contrary, if they are man's writing,
informed and quickened by the presence of the Holy Ghost, they admit,
should it so happen, of being composed of outlying materials, which
have passed through the minds and from the fingers of inspired penmen,
and are known to be inspired on the ground that those who were the
immediate editors, as they may be called, were inspired.

For an example of this we are supplied by the
writer of the second book of Machabees, to which reference has already
been made. 'All such things,' says the writer, 'as have been comprised
in five books by Jason of Cyrene, we have attempted to abridge in one
book.' Here we have the human aspect of an inspired work. Jason need
not, the writer of the second book of Machabees must, have been
inspired.

Again; St. Luke's gospel is inspired, as having
gone through and come forth from an inspired mind; but the extrinsic
sources of his narrative were not necessarily all inspired any more
than was Jason of Cyrene; yet such sources there were, for, in
contrast with the testimony of the actual eye-witnesses of the events
which he records, he says of himself that he wrote after a careful
inquiry, 'according as {195} they delivered them to us, who from the
beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word;' as to
himself, he had but 'diligently attained to all things from the
beginning.' Here it was not the original statements, but his edition
of them, which needed to be inspired.

23. Hence we have no reason to be surprised, nor
is it against the faith to hold, that a canonical book may be
composed, not only from, but even of, pre-existing documents, it being
always borne in mind, as a necessary condition, that an inspired mind
has exercised a supreme and an ultimate judgment on the work,
determining what was to be selected and embodied in it, in order to
its truth in all 'matters of faith and morals pertaining to the
edification of Christian doctrine,' and its unadulterated truth.

Thus Moses may have incorporated in his
manuscript as much from foreign documents as is commonly maintained by
the critical school; yet the existing Pentateuch, with the miracles
which it contains, may still (from that personal inspiration which
belongs to a prophet) have flowed from his mind and hand on to his
composition. He new-made and authenticated what till then was no
matter of faith.

This being considered, it follows that a book may
be, and may be accepted as, inspired, though not a word of it is an
original document. Such is almost the case with the first book of
Esdras. A learned writer in a publication of the day [Note
1] says: 'It consists of the contemporary historical journals,
kept from time to time by the prophets or other authorized persons who
were eye-witnesses for the most part of what they record, and whose
several narratives were afterwards strung together, and either
abridged or added to, as the case required, by a later hand, of course
an inspired hand.'

And in like manner the Chaldee and Greek portions
of the book of Daniel; even though not written by Daniel, may be, and
we believe are, written by penmen inspired in matters of faith and
morals and so much, and nothing beyond, does the Church 'oblige' us to
believe.

24. I have said that the Chaldee, as well as the
Hebrew portion of Daniel requires, in order to its inspiration, not
that it should be Daniel's writing, but that its writer, whoever he
was, should be inspired. This leads me to the question whether
inspiration requires and implies that the book inspired should in its
form and matter be homogeneous, and all its parts belong to each
other. Certainly not. The Book of Psalms is the obvious instance
destructive of any such idea. What it really requires is an inspired
Editor [Note 2]; that is, an {196}
inspired mind, authoritative in faith and morals, from whose fingers
the sacred text passed. I believe it is allowed generally, that at the
date of the captivity and under the persecution of Antiochus, the
books of Scripture and the sacred text suffered much loss and injury.
Originally the Psalms seem to have consisted of five books; of which
only a portion, perhaps the first and second, were David's. That
arrangement is now broken up, and the Council of Trent was so
impressed with the difficulty of their authorship, that, in its formal
decree respecting the Canon, instead of calling the collection 'David's
Psalms,' as was usual, they called it the 'Psalterium Davidicum,'
thereby meaning to imply, that although canonical and inspired and in
spiritual fellowship and relationship with those of 'the choice
Psalmist of Israel,' the whole collection is not therefore necessarily
the writing of David.

And as the name of David, though not really
applicable to every Psalm, nevertheless protected and sanctioned them
all, so the appendices which conclude the book of Daniel, Susanna and
Bel, though not belonging to the main history, come under the shadow
of that Divine Presence, which primarily rests on what goes before.

And so again, whether or not the last verses of
St. Mark's, and two portions of St. John's Gospel, belong to those
Evangelists respectively, matters not as regards their inspiration;
for the Church has recognised them as portions of that sacred
narrative which precedes or embraces them.

Nor does it matter whether one or two Isaiahs
wrote the book which bears that Prophet's name; the Church, without
settling this point, pronounces it inspired in respect of faith and
morals, both Isaiahs being inspired; and, if this be assured to us,
all other questions are irrelevant and unnecessary.

Nor do the Councils forbid our holding that there
are interpolations or additions in the sacred text, say, the last
chapter of the Pentateuch, provided they are held to come from an
inspired penman, such as Esdras, and are thereby authoritative in
faith and morals.

25. From what has been last said it follows, that
the titles of the Canonical books, and their ascription to different
authors, either do not come under their inspiration, or need not be
accepted literally.

For instance the Epistle to the Hebrews is said
in our Bibles to be the writing of St. Paul, and so virtually it is,
and to deny that it is so in any sense might be temerarious; but its
authorship is not a matter of faith as its inspiration is, but an
acceptance of received opinion, and because to no other writer can it
be so well assigned.

Again, the 89th Psalm has for its title 'A Prayer
of Moses,' yet {197} that has not hindered a succession of Catholic
writers, from Athanasius to Bellarmine, from denying it to be his.

Again, the Book of Wisdom professes (e.g.,
chs. vii. and ix.) to be written by Solomon; yet our Bibles say, 'It
is written in the person of Solomon,' and 'it is uncertain who
was the writer;' and St. Augustine, whose authority had so much
influence in the settlement of the Canon, speaking of Wisdom and
Ecclesiasticus, says: 'The two books by reason of a certain similarity
of style are usually called Solomon's, though the more learned have no
doubt they do not belong to him.' (Martin. Pref. to Wisdom and Eccl.;
Aug. Opp. t. iii. p. 733.)

If these instances hold, they are precedents for
saying that it is no sin against the faith (for of such I have all
along been speaking), nor indeed, if done conscientiously and on
reasonable grounds, any sin, to hold that Ecclesiastes is not the
writing of Solomon, in spite of its opening with a profession of being
his; and that first, because that profession is a heading, not a
portion of the book; secondly, because, even though it be part of the
book, a like profession is made in the Book of Wisdom, without its
being a proof that 'Wisdom' is Solomon's; and thirdly, because such a
profession may well be considered a prosopopœia not so difficult to
understand as that of the Angel Raphael, when he called himself 'the
Son of the great Ananias.'

On this subject Melchior Canus says: 'It does not
much matter to the Catholic Faith, that a book was written by this or
that writer, so long as the Spirit of God is believed to be the author
of it; which Gregory delivers and explains, in his Preface to Job, "It matters not with what pen the King has written his letter, if it
be true that He has written it."' (Loc. Th. p. 44.)

I say then of the Book of Ecclesiastes, its
authorship is one of those questions which still lie in the hands of
the Church. If the Church formally declared that it was written by
Solomon, I consider that, in accordance with its heading (and, as
implied in what follows, as in 'Wisdom,') we should be bound,
recollecting that she has the gift of judging 'de vero sensu et
interpretatione Scripturarum Sanctarum,' to accept such a decree as a
matter of faith; and in like manner, in spite of its heading, we
should be bound to accept a contrary decree, if made to the effect
that the book was not Solomon's. At present as the Church (or Pope)
has not pronounced on one side or on the other, I conceive that, till
a decision comes from Rome, either opinion is open to the Catholic
without any impeachment of his faith.

26. And here I am led on to inquire whether obiter
dicta are conceivable in an inspired document. We know that they
are held to exist and even required in treating of the dogmatic
utterances of Popes, but are they compatible with inspiration? The
common {198} opinion is that they are not. Professor Lamy thus writes
about them, in the form of an objection: 'Many minute matters occur in
the sacred writers which have regard only to human feebleness and the
natural necessities of life, and by no means require inspiration,
since they can otherwise be perfectly well known, and seem scarcely
worthy of the Holy Spirit, as for instance what is said of the dog of
Tobias, St. Paul's penula, and the salutations at the end of
the Epistles.' Neither he nor Fr. Patrizi allow of these exceptions;
but Fr. Patrizi, as Lamy quotes him, 'damnare non audet eos qui hĉc
tenerent,' viz., exceptions, and he himself, by keeping silence, seems
unable to condemn them either.

By obiter dicta in Scripture I also mean
such statements as we find in the Book of Judith, that Nabuchodonosor
was king of Nineve. Now it is in favour of there being such
unauthoritative obiter dicta, that unlike those which occur in
dogmatic utterances of Popes and Councils, they are, in Scripture, not
doctrinal, but mere unimportant statements of fact; whereas those of
Popes and Councils may relate to faith and morals, and are said to be
uttered obiter, because they are not contained within the scope
of the formal definition, and imply no intention of binding the
consciences of the faithful. There does not then seem any serious
difficulty in admitting their existence in Scripture. Let it be
observed, its miracles are doctrinal facts, and in no sense of the
phrase can be considered obiter dicta.

27. It may be questioned, too, whether the
absence of chronological sequence might not be represented as an
infringement of plenary inspiration, more serious than the obiter
dicta of which I have been speaking. Yet St. Matthew is admitted
by approved commentators to be unsolicitous as to order of time. So
says Fr. Patrizi (De Evang. lib. ii. p. 1), viz., 'Matthĉum de
observando temporis ordine minime sollicitum esse.' He gives
instances, and then repeats 'Matthew did not observe order of time.'
If such absence of order is compatible with inspiration in St.
Matthew, as it is, it might be consistent with inspiration in parts of
the Old Testament, supposing they are open to rearrangement in
chronology. Does not this teach us to fall back upon the decision of
the Councils that 'faith and morals pertaining to the edification of
Christian doctrine' are the scope, the true scope, of inspiration? And
is not the Holy See the judge given us for determining what is for
edification and what is not?

There is another practical exception to the ideal
continuity of Scripture inspiration in mere matters of fact, and that
is the multitude of various manuscript readings which surround the
sacred text. Unless we have the text as inspired men wrote it, we have
not the divine gift in its fulness, and as far as we have no certainty
which out of many is the true reading, so far, wherever the sense is
affected, we are in the same difficulty as may be the consequence of
an obiter {199} dictum. Yet, in spite of this danger,
even cautious theologians do not hesitate to apply the gratuitous
hypothesis of errors in transcription as a means of accounting for
such statements of fact as they feel to need an explanation. Thus, Fr.
Patrizi, not favouring the order of our Lord's three temptations in
the desert, as given by St. Luke, attributes it to the mistake of the
transcribers. 'I have no doubt at all,' he says, 'that it is to be
attributed, not to Luke himself, but to his transcribers' (ibid.
p. 5); and again, he says that it is owing 'vitio librariorum' (p.
394). If I recollect rightly, Melchior Canus has recourse to the
'fault of transcribers' also. Indeed it is commonly urged in
controversy (vide Lamy, i. p. 31).

28. I do not here go on to treat of the special
instance urged against us by M. Renan, drawn from the Book of Judith,
because I have wished to lay down principles, and next because his
charge can neither be proved nor refuted just now, while the strange
discoveries are in progress about Assyrian and Persian history by
means of the cuneiform inscriptions. When the need comes, the Church,
or the Holy See, will interpret the sacred book for us.

I conclude by reminding the reader that in these
remarks I have been concerned only with the question—what have
Catholics to hold and profess de fide about Scripture? that is,
what it is the Church 'insists' on their holding; and next, by
unreservedly submitting what I have written to the judgment of the
Holy See, being more desirous that the question should be
satisfactorily answered, than that my own answer should prove to be in
every respect the right one.

Notes

2.
This representation must not be confused with either of the two views
of canonicity which are pronounced insufficient by the Vatican
Council—viz. 1, that in order to be sacred and canonical, it is
enough for a book to be a work of mere human industry, provided it be
afterwards approved by the authorities of the Church; and 2, that it
is enough if it contains revealed teaching without error. Neither of
these views supposes the presence of inspiration, whether in the
writer or the writing; what is contemplated above is an inspired
writer in the exercise of his inspiration, and a work inspired from
first to last under the action of that inspiration.Return to text

Essay II. Further
Illustrations

§ 30. Prefatory Notice

{39} IN
the February Number of the Nineteenth Century, an article of
mine appeared, which has elicited a criticism from a Catholic
Professor of name. As I acquiesce neither in his statements nor in his
reasonings, I have been led to put on paper Remarks in answer to him;
and that without availing myself of the offer made to me by the Editor
of the Review to re-publish, together with these Remarks, my Article
itself: an indulgence beyond its rules, which I feel I have no right
to accept, unless the Article shall be expressly called for by the
public.

At present, in order to make these Remarks
intelligible to those who have not seen my original Article, it is
sufficient, I conceive, to say that they aim, as that Article did, at
answering the question proposed in my title-page [Note]:
"What is of obligation {40} for a Catholic to believe concerning the
Inspiration of the Canonical Scriptures?" This being the sole
question, I observed, that, since two Ecumenical Councils have spoken
upon Inspiration, it is obvious to have recourse to them, if we would
learn what is de fide, or obligatory on our faith in the
matter. To this, of course, must be added any teaching which comes to
us incidentally from the ordinary magisterium of the Church, or
from the joint testimony of the Fathers; but the two Councils, the
Tridentine and the Vatican, give us by far the most distinct and
definite information.

These two Councils decide that the Scriptures are
inspired, and inspired throughout, but they do not add to their
decision that they are inspired by an immediately divine act, but they
say that they are inspired through the instrumentality of inspired
men; that they are inspired in all matters of faith and morals,
meaning thereby, not only theological doctrine, but also the
historical and prophetical narratives which they contain, from Genesis
to the Acts of the Apostles; and lastly, that, being inspired because
written by inspired men, they have a human side, which manifests
itself in language, style, tone of thought, character, intellectual
peculiarities, and such infirmities, not sinful, as belong to our
nature, and which in unimportant matters may issue in what in
doctrinal definitions is called an obiter dictum. At the same
time, the gift of inspiration being divine, a Catholic must never
forget that {41} what he is handling is in a true sense the Word of
God, which, as I said in my Article, " by reason of the difficulty of
always drawing the line between what is human and what is divine,
cannot be put on the level of other books, as it is now the fashion to
do, but has the nature of a Sacrament, which is outward and inward,
and a channel of supernatural grace."

This is why the second great definition of the
Councils, on which I proceeded in my Article to insist, is so
important, viz., that the authoritative interpretation of Scripture
rests with the Church."

So much on the view of Scripture which offends
the Professor in question, to whose criticisms in the March Number of
the Irish Ecclesiastical Record I now make my answer.

§ 31. Prefatory Notice (continued)

A not over-courteous, nor over-exact writer, in
his criticisms on my Essay on Inspiration, gives it as his judgment
upon it, that "its startling character" must be evident to "the merest
tyro in the schools of Catholic Theology." ‘Tis a pity he did not
take more than a short month for reading, pondering, writing, and
printing. Had he not been in a hurry to publish, he would have made a
better Article. I took above a twelve-month for mine. Thus I {42}
account for some of the Professor's unnecessary remarks.

If I understand him, his main thesis is
this—that, virtually or actually, Scripture is inspired, not only in
matters of faith and morals, as is declared in the Councils of Trent
and of the Vatican, but in all respects, and for all purposes, and on
all subjects; so that no clause all through the Bible is liable to
criticism of any kind, and that no good Catholic can think otherwise.
If this is his position, it is plain that I approach the question on
quite a distinct side from him; but I do not see that personally and
practically I have very much to differ from him in, except in his
faulty logic, and his misrepresentations of what I have written.

§ 32. Divine Inspiration of Scripture in
all matters of Faith and Morals

This proposition must be accepted as de fide,
or of obligatory faith, by every Catholic, as having been so defined
by the Councils of Trent and of the Vatican.

Now I say first, that the inspiration of
religious and moral truth, of which these Councils speak, is a divine
gift, in the first instance given to divine ministers, and from them
carried on, as into their oral teachings, so also into such of their
writings {43} as the Church has declared to be sacred and canonical.

And next: divine gifts, as we read of them in the
history of Revelation, did not extend in every case to all departments
of ministration, but had in each instance a particular service and
application. These various favours were ordinarily but partial, given
for precise and definite purposes; so that it is but in harmony with
the rule of Providence in parallel cases, if there should be found, in
respect to Biblical Inspiration, a distribution and a limitation in
the bestowal of it. St. Paul's account of the gratiĉ gratis datĉ,
may be taken to illustrate this principle, without my meaning at all
thereby to imply that the inspiration of an Evangelist was not in its
intensity, refinement, abundance, and manifoldness, far superior to
the gifts spoken of by the Apostle in the chapter to which I refer. I
refer to that chapter in order to draw attention to what was the rule
of Providence at the first in the disposal and direction of the gratiĉ
gratis datĉ, viz., that they had a special scope and character,
and, in consequence, as is intimated in the parable of the Five and
Ten Talents, were limited in their range of operation. I am not here
affirming or denying that Scripture is inspired in matters of
astronomy and chronology, as well as in faith and morals; but I
certainly do not see that because Inspiration is given for the latter
subjects, therefore it extends to the former. {44}

The Apostle tells us that, whereas there are "diversities
of grace," there is "the same Spirit"; and that "the manifestation of
the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; that is, the
gift is given according to the measure of the need. Then he says, "To
one by the Spirit is given the Word of Wisdom, to another the Word of
Knowledge according to the same Spirit." To both of them there was
given "the Word" of God; but one was the minister of the Word as far
as Wisdom went, and the other as far as Knowledge went; and, though
the same man might indeed have both gifts, we could not logically
argue that he had wisdom on the mere ground of his having knowledge.

It may be observed too that it was by information
from those who thus had "the Word" of God that St. Luke wrote his
Gospel; for he says expressly that the things which he recorded "were
delivered to us" by those "who from the beginning were eye-witnesses,
and servants of the Word"; that is, those who saw, or who were
inspired to know, what the Evangelist reported from them: a statement
which would imply that their particular gift was that of bearing
faithful witness, or otherwise being endowed with the gift of
knowledge. As another instance of the limitation of a gift, I may
refer to the history of Jonas. "The Word of the Lord" came to him to
denounce judgment against Nineve; but he did not know that the divine
menace was conditional. Again, Eliseus says to Giezi, "Was {45} not my
heart present when the man turned back to meet thee?" yet, when
the Sunamitess had "caught hold on his feet," he had said, "Her soul
is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me and hath not told me."

I return to St. Paul: he continues, "To another,
Faith in the same Spirit; to another, the grace of healing in one
Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy."
and so on. He ends a long chapter on the subject by enumerating the
offices which needed and determined the gifts—"Apostles, Prophets,
Doctors," and the rest; and by intimating that, as not all are
Apostles or Prophets, so the gifts, necessary to these, were not given
to others. This is from 1 Cor. xii. The 4th Chapter of his epistle to
the Ephesians is on the same subject.

I should infer from this, that those who were
chosen by the Spirit to minister between God and man, such as Moses,
Samuel, Elias, Isaias, the Apostles and Evangelists, would be invested
with the high gifts necessary for their work, and not necessarily with
other gifts.

I do not, then, feel it any difficulty when I am
told by the infallible voice of more than one Ecumenical Council, that
the writers of Scripture, whether under the New Covenant or the Old,
ethical and religious writers as they were, have had assigned to them
a gift and promise in teaching which is in keeping with this
antecedent idea which we form of the work of Evangelists and Prophets.
If they {46} are to teach us our duty to God and man, it is natural
that inspiration should be promised them in matters of faith and
morals; and if such is the actual promise, it is natural that Councils
should insist upon its being such;—but how otherwise are we to
account for the remarkable stress laid on the inspiration of Scripture
in matters of faith and morals, both in the Vatican and at Trent, if
after all faith and morals, in view of inspiration, are only parts of
a larger gift? Why was it not simply said once for all that in all
matters of faith or fact, not only in all its parts, but on every
subject whatever, Scripture was inspired? If nothing short of the
highest and exact truth on all subjects must be contemplated as the
gift conveyed to the inspired writers, what is gained by singling out
faith and morals as the legitimate province of Inspiration, and
thereby throwing the wider and more complete view of Scripture truth
into the shade? Why, on the contrary, does the Vatican Council so
carefully repeat the very wording of the Tridentine in its statements
about inspiration in faith and morals, putting no other subject matter
on a level with them? It may perhaps be said that it is a rule with
Councils, that the later repeat the very words of the earlier; true,
the Holy Trinity, the Creation, the Incarnation, the Blessed Virgin's
prerogatives, are often expressed in language carrying on a tradition
of terms as well as truths; but this is done because the truths or
words are {47} important. It is a paradox to say that the Vatican
declarations about Scripture are in their wording so much of a fac
simile of the Tridentine, only because they mean so very little.
Even when a phrase is not easy to translate, the identity is
preserved; for instance, the clause "in rebus fidei et morum, ad ĉdificationem
doctrinĉ Christianĉ pertinentium," not "pertinentibus," is found in
both Councils.

This is the obvious aspect under which I first
view the inspiration of Scripture, as determined by the Councils.

§ 33. Inspiration in matters of Historical
Fact

Here we are brought to a second and most
important question. When I say that the writers of Scripture were
divinely inspired in all matters of faith and morals, what matters are
included in the range of such inspiration? Are historical statements
of fact included? It makes me smile to think that any one could fancy
me so absurd as to exclude them, especially since in a long passage in
my Essay I have expressly included them; but the Professor has done
his best so to manage my text, as to make his readers believe that the
Bible, as far as it is historical, does not in my view proceed from
inspired writers. Professing to quote me, he omits just the very
passage in which I have distinctly avowed the {48} inspiration of the
whole of its history. This is so strange, so anomalous a proceeding,
as to make it difficult to believe that the same person who had the
good feeling to write the first page of the Review wrote those which
follow.

I am obliged to take notice of this great
impropriety in pure self-defence; for if I am not able to show that
the writer has ill-treated me, he will have an argument against me
stronger than any which by fair means he is able to produce. On the
other hand, if I show that he has been guilty of an indefensible act,
third parties will not be so ready to think him a safe guide in other
judgments which he makes to my discredit.

To begin, then: in § 13 of my Essay, pp. 5, 6, I
write thus: "While the Councils, as has been shown, lay down so
emphatically the inspiration of Scripture in respect to faith and
morals, it is remarkable that they do not say a word directly as to
its inspiration in matters of fact. Yet are we therefore to conclude
that the record of facts in Scripture does not come under the
guarantee of its inspiration? we are not so to conclude."

These are my words, as they stand; but he quotes
them thus: "[The Cardinal] asserts that, while the Councils, as has
been shown, lay down so emphatically the inspiration of Scripture in
respect to faith and morals, it is remarkable that they do not say a
word directly as to its inspiration in matters of fact," p. 139; and
there he stops: he quotes neither {49} my question nor my answer
which follow, my question being,

Qu: "Are we therefore to conclude that the
record of facts in Scripture does not come under the guarantee of its
inspiration?"

and my answer being,

Answ.: "We are not so to conclude, and for
this plain reason," &c., &c.

With such notions of a critic's duty, much less
does the Professor think it necessary to quote, or, I suppose, even to
read, the twenty lines on behalf of the inspiration of the Bible
history which follow thus:

"For this plain reason—the sacred narrative,
carried on through so many ages, what is it but the very matter for
our faith and rule of our obedience? What but that narrative itself is
the supernatural teaching, in order to which inspiration is given?
What is the whole history, traced out in Scripture from Genesis to
Esdras, and thence on to the end of the Acts of the Apostles, but a
manifestation of Divine Providence, on the one hand interpretative, on
a large scale and with analogical applications, of universal history,
and on the other preparatory, typical and predictive, of the
Evangelical Dispensation? Its pages breathe of providence and grace,
of our Lord, and of His work and teaching, from beginning to end. It
views facts in those relations in which neither ancients, such as the
Greek and Latin classical historians, nor moderns, such as {50}
Niebuhr, Grote, Ewald, or Michelet, can view them. In this point of
view it has God for its Author, even though the finger of God traced
no words but the Decalogue. Such is the claim of Bible history in its
substantial fulness to be accepted de fide as true. In this
point of view, Scripture is inspired, not only in faith and morals,
but in all its parts which bear on faith, including matters of fact."

All this he leaves out.

If a finish was wanting to this specimen of, what
I must call, sharp practice, he has taken care to supply it. For,
after cutting off my own statement at its third line, as I have shown,
he substitutes, as if mine, a statement of his own, which he
attributes to me, about obiter dicta, adding the words, "Hence
he [the Cardinal] raises the question," which I do not raise till
eight pages later, and not "hence" even then. And next, whereas obiter
dicta are according to him in their very nature exceptions to a
rule, viz., the rule that Scripture statements of fact are inspired,
he is obliged for the moment to imply that I do maintain the rule, in
order that he may be able to impute to me, in cases of obiter dicta,
a breach of it.

§ 34. Obiter Dicta viewed relatively to
Inspiration

The subject which naturally comes next to be
considered is that of the possible presence of obiter {51} dicta
in inspired Scripture: by obiter dicta being meant phrases,
clauses, or sentences in Scripture about matters of mere fact, which,
as not relating to faith and morals, may without violence be referred
to the human element in its composition.

Here, however, I observe with satisfaction that
the Professor so far does me justice as to allow that what I have
conceded, or have proposed to concede, to the scientific or literary
inquirer, is not inconsistent with what the Church pronounces to be
obligatory de fide on the Catholic. He says, "while the Church
is silent, we of course do not dare to censure these views, but
neither do we dare to hold them." This being the case, I shall, in the
interest of the untheological student, under correction of the Church,
continue as I have begun, to treat my subject as a question open to
argument.

1. Now I observe, first, that any statement about
the inspiration of Scripture is far too serious a matter in its
bearings to be treated carelessly; and consequently the Professor
explains, while he complains of, my "raising the question" of obiter
dicta "and not answering it." Of course; I do not go further in my
Essay than saying, "There does not seem any serious difficulty in
admitting" that they are to be found in Scripture. Why is not that
enough for a cautious man to say? The decision of the point does not
rest with me; but still I may have an opinion as long as there is no
decision. {52}

2. And next, why does he always associate an obiter
dictum with the notion of error or moral infirmity, or, even as he
sometimes expresses himself, with "falsehood"? At least what right has
he to attribute such an association to me? I have implied no such
thing. I very much doubt whether I have even once used the word "error"
in connection with the phrase "obiter dictum," though (as I shall show
directly) no harm follows if I have. I have given my own sense of the
word when I parallel it to such instances of it as occur in a question
of dogma. Does the Professor mean to say that such a dictum is
necessarily false when it occurs in a dogmatic document? No—it is
merely unauthoritative. Mind, I am not arguing that such an
unauthoritative dictum is possible in a matter of inspired
Scripture on the ground that it is possible in a matter of dogma; but
I am showing by a parallel case what my own meaning of the word is.

Obiter dictum means, as I understand it, a
phrase or sentence which, whether a statement of literal fact or not,
is not from the circumstances binding on our faith. The force of the "obiter"
is negative, not positive. To say, "I do not accept a statement as a
literal fact," is not all one with saying that it is not a
fact; I can not hold without holding not. The very
comfort of an obiter dictum to the Catholic, whether in its
relation to infallibility or to inspiration, whether in dogma or in
Scripture, is, that it enables him in controversy to pass by a
difficulty, {53} which else may be pressed on him without his having
the learning perhaps, or the knowledge, or the talent, to answer it;
that it enables him to profess neither Yes nor No in questions which
are beyond him, and on which nothing depends. In difficult questions
it leaves the Catholic student in peace. And, if my Critic asks, as I
understand him to do, who shall decide what is important and what is
not, I answer at once, the Church, which, though he seems to forget
it, claims the supreme interpretation of Scripture according to the
force of that second dogma about the written Word which was defined
both at Trent and the Vatican.

It is plain then, as an obiter dictum, in
my understanding of it, does not oblige us to affirm or to deny the
literal sense, neither does it prohibit us from passing over the
literal sense altogether, and, if we prefer, from taking some second,
third, or fourth interpretation of the many which are possible,
(provided the Church does not forbid,) as I shall show from St. Thomas
presently.

3. And now take one of the instances with which
Scripture may be said to provide us. St. Paul speaks of "the cloak
which he left at Troas with Carpus." Would St. Timothy, to whom he
wrote, think this an infallible utterance? And supposing it had been
discovered, on most plausible evidence, that the Apostle left his
cloak with Eutychus, not with Carpus, would Timothy, would Catholics
now, make themselves unhappy, because St. Paul had committed {54} what
the Professor calls "a falsehood"? Would Christians declare that they
had no longer any confidence in Paul after he had so clearly shown
that he "had" not "the Spirit of God"? Would they feel that he
had put the whole Apostolic system into confusion, and by mistaking
Eutychus for Carpus he had deprived them henceforth of reading with
any comfort his Epistle to the Romans or to the Ephesians?

I fear seeming to use light words on a sacred
subject; but I must ask, is St. Paul's request to Timothy about his penula,
a portion of "the Word"? is it more than an apparent exception, in the
text of his Epistle, to the continuity of the Divine Inspiration? And
was not that continuity still without any break at all in St. Paul, if
we consider Inspiration as a supernatural habit? May I ask an urgent,
important question without profaneness? Could St. Paul say, "Thus
saith the Lord, Send the penula," &c., &c.? I do not deny,
however, that in a certain case he could so speak; but are we driven
to that hypothesis here?

Theology has its prerogatives and rights; but its
very perfection as a science causes theologians to be somewhat wanting
in tenderness to concrete humanity, to those lay Catholics who in
their grasp of religious truth do not go much beyond the catechism,
and who, without entering into the expedients which system demands,
wish to preserve their obedience to Holy Church. {55}

4. Let us see, however, whether St. Thomas, the
greatest of theologians, will not accompany at least my first step in
this question.

In his Summa, i, qu. 102, he takes for granted
the Inspiration of Scripture, and its truthfulness as the consequence
of that inspiration; for where truth is not an effect, inspiration is
not a cause. And he inquires what statements of fact in Scripture are
to be taken as true literally, and what are not and, in answer to the
question, he lays down, as a rule or test, decisive of the point, this
circumstance, viz., whether the manner or bearing of the
sacred writer is historical or not. This being kept in mind, let us
consider his words:—

"In omnibus quĉ sic [per modum
narrationis historicĉ] Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda
veritas historiĉ"; that is, "In all matters which Scripture delivers
after the manner of historical narrative, we must hold, as a
fundamental fact, the truth of the history."

Now observe what follows from this. In giving a rule
or test of the truth of historical statements, he surely
implies that there are, or at least that there may be, statements
which do not embody, which do not profess to embody, historical
truth. If, in a military gathering or review, I were told, "You may
know the English by their red coats," would not this imply that there
were troops on the ground who were not English and not
in red? And in like manner, when St. Thomas says that the test of
historical truth is {56} the inspired penman's writing in the
historical style, he certainly implies that there are, or might be,
statements of fact, which in their literal sense come short of the
historic style and of historic truth, or are what I should call obiter
dicta. I repeat, obiter dicta are but "unhistoric
statements." So far I consider I speak with the sanction of St.
Thomas; now let me go on to say what I hold without (as I fear) his
sanction.

5. I feel very diffident of my ability to speak
with ever so much restraint of the words of St. Thomas; but, if I am
forced to speak, certainly he scorns to me not only to hold as literal
truth that "Paradisus est locus corporeus," which is the matter before
him, but to see little difficulty, supposing (which of course he does
not grant) that the literal sense was not historic, or was doubtful,
in interpreting the whole account spiritually or even figuratively.
Therefore, if the case occurred of small inaccuracies of fact in
Scripture history, instead of countenancing me in saying that, in
matters which did not infringe upon faith and morals, such apparent
error was of no serious consequence, I grant that he would have
preferred, (and with St. Augustine,) to interpret a passage, so
characterised, in a spiritual sense, or according to some other
secondary sense, which he thinks it possible to give to Scripture.
Here it is, I grant, that I should not have his countenance; he would
not indeed forbid me to say that a statement was literally
inaccurate, but he would rather wish me to find some {57}
interpretation for it which would give it an edifying sense. Thus St.
Augustine, when questioned as to Jacob's conduct towards his father
and brother, appeals from that grave question to its typical and
evangelical meaning: "Non est mendacium, sed mysterium."

§ 35. Restrictions upon Inspiration

St. Augustine and St. Thomas are such great names
in the Church that he must be a bold Catholic, who, knowing what they
are, should contradict them. But they cannot rightly be taken instead
of her Voice. There are numbers of good Catholics who never heard of
them, and many of these learned and accomplished in their respective
ways and callings, and earnestly desirous to remain in the faith and
fear of Holy Church. And, as I would not dare to treat the
above-mentioned {58} Fathers with disrespect, much less should I dare
to speak against the teaching of the Church herself; and when the
Church has distinctly taught us in two Ecumenical Councils, once and
again, at the interval of three hundred years, and in very different
conditions of human society, that the divine inspiration of Scripture
is to be assigned especially rebus fidei et morum, it shocks me
to find a Catholic Professor asserting that such a dogmatic decision
is what he calls a restriction; a charge as inconsistent with
good logic as with tenderness towards a decision of the Church. Of
course I have no intention of complaining of his adding to the Church's
decision the conclusions of theology or the anticipations of devotion,
but her person (if I may so speak of the Church) is sacred; and she
has reasons for all she does, and all she does not do. We should never
forget who is minister and who is Lord.

So much for (what I fear I must call) the
impropriety of the word restriction "when applied to a literal
quotation of mine from the definitions of two Ecumenical Councils. Now
for its failure in logic.

The Professor affirms, speaking (as I understand
him) of what he seems to consider in this case not more than an
hypothesis, namely, the "clause" in rebus fidei et morum, that
it is "a restricting clause," and that "the Catholic dogma is
adequately and accurately expressed only by eliminating that
clause." Eliminating! He cannot be using so great a word {59} with
reference to any mere statement of mine; it fits on to nothing short
of the dogmatic utterances of the two Ecumenical Councils. He has said
nothing in order to guard against this natural conclusion, and as if
to make it the clearer, he contrasts it with my own words, to the
effect that "sacred Scripture is inspired throughout."

But I would observe, that, easy as it is to speak
against "restrictions" being placed on the gift of inspiration, those
who would impute the blame, whether to the Church or to me, are also
incurring it themselves. For instance, if Scripture is the Word of God
(as in a true sense it is), and inspiration is (in the Professor's
sense) throughout it, it cannot but be verbally
inspired; but the prevalent opinion now is that this is not the case.
How is thus not putting a restriction upon inspiration? How is it thorough,
if the language of Scripture is not included in it? Yet the
Professor, who is so disturbed at my appealing to the dogmatic force
of "fides et mores," has no scruple whatever in depriving inspiration
of its action upon the language of the writers of Scripture. He
ventures to say, in spite of the dissent of great Fathers, that "God
in most cases did leave the choice of the words to the writer";
and he speaks of the opinion, that the Holy Spirit dictated the sacred
books word for word, as having been "held by a few, and now generally
and justly rejected." Thus he speaks. It seems that he may say without
Ecumenical Councils what another may not say with them. {60}

Nor is this the only "restriction" which he
allows upon the inspiration of Scripture. He does not quite commit
himself to it as an opinion, but he does not quarrel with those who
hold it, viz., that inspiration goes as far as, but not further than,
the "res et sententias" of Scripture, beyond which, it seems,
the inspiration does not reach; he calls for no "eliminating" process
here.

But something more has to be said still on the
Professor's mode of arguing. Nothing is more difficult in controversy
than the skilful use of metaphors. A metaphor has a dozen aspects,
and, unless we look sharp, we shall be slain by the rebound of one or
other of our deductions from them. Now if there be an idea intimately
connected or present to us when in theology we speak of a "word,"
it is that of a personal agent, from whom the word proceeds. It is an
effect which does not exist without a cause. It must have a speaker or
writer, and but one such. In this case one effect cannot have two
causes. If two are ascribed to it, one or other must be ascribed
metaphorically. We cannot refer it to each of two causes at one time
in its full sense. But the Professor takes it in its highest sense, as
the Word of God, when he would prove that Scripture had no
imperfection in it; yet when he would relieve himself of the
difficulties, and account for defects, of language, then it is the
word of man. Of course the inspiration of Scripture is from above; but
what I want to be told is, are we {61} to consider a book of
Scripture, whether written or spoken, literally the Word of God or
literally the word of man?

§ 36. Plenary as well as Present
Inspiration

But it may be objected, in answer to what I have
been saying in explanation of "restriction," that the Council of the
Vatican, treating of inspiration, has added to the dogma of Trent a
clause which destroys the distinction which I have been making as to
the special object with reference to which the sacred writers were
endowed with the gift. For the Vatican Council has dogmatically
determined the books of holy Scripture, "libros integros cum
omnibus suis partibus, inspiratos esse"; and if the whole of
Scripture in all its parts is inspired, how can inspiration be
restricted to the matters of faith and morals? Yet I conceive this
difficulty admits of an easy reply.

Certainly I have no wish to explain away the
words of the Council; but is there no distinction between a gift
itself, and the purpose for which it was made, and the use to which it
is to be applied? We meet with this distinction every day. Might not a
benefactor leave a legacy to the whole of a large family of children,
one and all, yet under the condition that it was expended solely on
their {62} education? And so Scripture is in its length and breadth,
and is brought into the compass of one volume by virtue of this
supernatural bond; whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever written, it
is all inspired: still we may ask the question, In what respect, and
for what purpose?

When we speak of the Bible in its length and
breadth, we speak of it quantitatively; but this does not interfere
with our viewing it in relation to the character, or what may be
called the quality, of the inspiration. According to the two Councils,
Scripture is inspired as being the work of inspired men, the subject
of faith and morals being the occupation or mission assigned to them
and their writings, and inspiration being the efficient cause of their
teaching.

Each of these truths is independent of, is
consistent with, each. The plenary extent of inspiration, and the
definite object of it, neither of these can interfere, neither can be
confused, with the other. Because a cup is full, that does not enable
us to determine what is the nature and the effects of the liquor with
which it is filled; whether, for instance, it is nutritive or
medicinal or merely restorative; and so, though Scripture be plenarily
inspired, it is a question still, for what purposes, and in what way.

In a word, Inspiration of Scripture in omnibus suis
partibus is one thing; in omnibus rebus is another.

It may be asked how inspiration could be given
{63} to the Sacred Writers for faith and morals, whereas they were not
always writing, and when they did write, needed not be writing on
religious and ethical subjects. Thus St. Paul, when he wrote about his
penula, was he not in possession of a divine gift which on that
occasion he could not use? But we see instances of this every day. A
man may be strong without opportunity of using his strength, and a man
may have a good memory or be a good linguist though he exercises his
gift only now and then; and so a passage of Scripture may have
spiritual meanings, as St. Thomas would hold, and may avail for
edification with a force which an uninspired writing has not, though
the literal sense may refer to matters purely secular and human, as
the passage in John ii, 10, which I have quoted in my Article.

§ 37. Inspiration as Co-ordinate with Error

There is one subject more, on which it may be
expedient to dwell for a few minutes.

The Professor insists on its being a conclusion
theologically certain that everything that is to be found in the
Sacred Writers is literally the Word of God; and in consequence he
would imply that I, by questioning whether some words in Scripture may
not come from the writers themselves mainly, {64} have committed the
serious act of rejecting a theological truth. Now, of course it is
indisputable that a proposition, which is the immediate consequence of
a truth of Revelation, is itself a certain truth. Certainly; but it is
a further question whether this or that conclusion is an instance of
such a real demonstration. This indeed I say frankly, that, if my
certainties depended on the Professor's syllogisms, I should have
small chance of making a decent show of theological certainties.

For instance, in the present question, he has
proved just the contrary to what he meant to prove, as can easily be
shown. He has to prove that it is theologically certain that the whole
of Scripture, whatever is contained in it, is the Word of God, and
this is how he does it. He says, "It is as absurd to say that a man
could commit sin under the impulse of the Holy Ghost, as to say
that the Sacred Writers could write error under the inspiration of the
Holy Ghost." Why does he change "impulse" into "inspiration" in the
second clause of his sentence? Who ever fancied that the impulse
of the Holy Spirit might cause error? Who will deny that the impulse
of the Holy Spirit would certainly be accorded to an Apostle or
Prophet to hinder, even in a statement of fact, any serious error? If
the Holy Spirit does not hinder varieties and errors in transcribers
of Scripture which damage the perfection of His work, why should He
hinder small errors (on the hypothesis that such there are) {65} of
the original writers? Is not He, with the Church co-operating,
sufficient for a Guardian?

But this is not all. He says that error cannot
co-exist with inspiration, more than sin with grace; but grace can
co-exist with sin. His parallel just turns against him. Good
Christians are each "the Temple of God," "partakers of the Divine
Nature," nay "gods," and they are said "portare Deum in corpore suo";
and priests, I consider, have not less holiness than others; yet every
priest in his daily Mass asks pardon "pro innumerabilibus peccatis et
offensionibus et negligentiis meis." Grace brings a soul nearer to God
than inspiration, for Balaam and Caiphas were inspired; yet the
Professor tells us that, though sin is possible in spite of grace,
error is impossible because of inspiration.

Thus I answer the special remarks made by my
Critic on my February Article; should other objections be urged
against it, I trust they would be found to admit of as direct an
explanation.