The question presented by these cases is whether, consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to
undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provides
to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.

Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted immigration
into this country. Unsanctioned entry into the United States is a crime
and those who have entered unlawfully are subject to deportation. But despite
the existence of these legal restrictions, a substantial number of persons
have succeeded in unlawfully entering the United States, and now live within
various States, including the State of Texas.

In May 1975, the Texas Legislature revised its education laws to withhold
from local school districts any state funds for the education of children
who were not "legally admitted" into the United States. The 1975 revision
also authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in their public
schools to children not "legally admitted" to the country. Tex. Educ.
These cases involve constitutional challenges to those provisions.

Plyler v. Doe

This is a class action, filed in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas in September 1977, on behalf of certain school-age
children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County, Tex., who could not
establish that they had been legally admitted into the United States. The
action complained of the exclusion of plaintiff children from the public
schools of the Tyler Independent School District. The Superintendent
and members of the Board of Trustees of the School District were named
as defendants; the State of Texas intervened as a party-defendant....

In considering this motion, the District Court made extensive findings
of fact. The court found that neither § 21.031 nor the School District
policy implementing it had "either the purpose or effect of keeping illegal
aliens out of the State of Texas." Respecting defendants' further
claim that § 21.031 was simply a financial measure designed to avoid
a drain on the State's fisc, the court recognized that the increases in
population resulting from the immigration of Mexican nationals into the
United States had created problems for the public schools of the State,
and that these problems were exacerbated by the special educational needs
of immigrant Mexican children. The court noted, however, that the increase
in school enrollment was primarily attributable to the admission of children
who were legal residents. It also found that while the "exclusion
of all undocumented children from the public schools in Texas would eventually
result in economies at some level," funding from both the State and Federal
Governments was based primarily on the number of children enrolled. In
net effect then, barring undocumented children from the schools would save
money, but it would "not necessarily" improve "the quality of education."
The court further observed that the impact of § 21.031 was borne primarily
by a very small subclass of illegal aliens, "entire families who have migrated
illegally and -- for all practical purposes -- permanently to the United
States." Finally, the court noted that under current laws and practices
"the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien of tomorrow,"
and that without an education, these undocumented children, "[already]
disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability,
and undeniable racial prejudices, . . . will become permanently locked
into the lowest socio-economic class."

The District Court held that illegal aliens were entitled to the protection
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that §
21.031 violated that Clause. Suggesting that "the state's exclusion of
undocumented children from its public schools . . . may well be the type
of invidiously motivated state action for which the suspect classification
doctrine was designed," the court held that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the statute would survive a "strict scrutiny" analysis because,
in any event, the discrimination embodied in the statute was not supported
by a rational basis.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the District Court's
injunction. We noted probable jurisdiction.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[no] State shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." Appellants argue at the outset that undocumented aliens,
because of their immigration status, are not "persons within the jurisdiction"
of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no right to the equal
protection of Texas law. We reject this argument. Whatever his status under
the immigration laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense
of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful,
have long been recognized as "persons" guaranteed due process of law by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

"The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the
protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race,
of color, or of nationality; and the protection of the laws is a pledge
of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo....

Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases
may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection only begins the inquiry. The more difficult question is whether
the Equal Protection Clause has been violated by the refusal of the State
of Texas to reimburse local school boards for the education of children
who cannot demonstrate that their presence within the United States is
lawful, or by the imposition by those school boards of the burden of tuition
on those children. It is to this question that we now turn.

The Equal Protection Clause directs that "all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike." But so too, "[the] Constitution does not
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same." The initial discretion to determine
what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the legislatures
of the States. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish
classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived,
that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account
for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill.
In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action,
we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears
some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose. But we would not
be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if
we applied so deferential a standard to every classification. The Equal
Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action
inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises. Thus we have treated
as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect
class," or that impinge upon the exercise of a "fundamental
right." With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to
enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate
that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. We turn to a consideration of the standard
appropriate for the evaluation of § 21.031.

Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into
this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to
the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of
a substantial "shadow population" of illegal migrants -- numbering in the
millions -- within our borders. This situation raises the specter
of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged
by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied
the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents.
The existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for
a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under
law.

The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of
this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may
withhold its beneficience from those whose very presence within the United
States is the product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do
not apply with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities
on the minor children of such illegal entrants. At the least, those
who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law
should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited
to, deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably
situated. Their "parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal
norms," and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State's
jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Even if the
State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against
their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct
against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.

"[Visiting] . . . condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical
and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the . . . child is an
ineffectual -- as well as unjust -- way of deterring the parent."

Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative
goal. Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable characteristic
since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action. But §
21.031 is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden
on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little
control. It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for
penalizing these children for their presence within the United States.
Yet that appears to be precisely the effect of § 21.031.

Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 35 (1973). But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable
from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of
education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact
of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction. The
"American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance." We have recognized "the
public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of
a democratic system of government," and as the primary vehicle for
transmitting "the values on which our society rests." In addition,
education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically
productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means
to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests. In addition
to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural
heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses
an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition
of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement
on the basis of individual merit. Paradoxically, by depriving the children
of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which
that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority.
But more directly, "education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and
self-sufficient participants in society." Illiteracy is an enduring
disability. The inability to read and write will handicap the individual
deprived of a basic education each and every day of his life. The inestimable
toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological
well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement,
make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based
denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the
Equal Protection Clause.

These well-settled principles allow us to determine the proper level
of deference to be afforded § 21.031. Undocumented aliens cannot be
treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation
of federal law is not a "constitutional irrelevancy." Nor is education
a fundamental right; a State need not justify by compelling necessity every
variation in the manner in which education is provided to its population.
But more is involved in these cases than the abstract question whether
§ 21.031 discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education
is a fundamental right. Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship on a
discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status.
The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By
denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic
possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress
of our Nation. In determining the rationality of §
21.031, we may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation
and to the innocent children who are its victims. In light of these countervailing
costs, the discrimination contained in § 21.031 can hardly be considered
rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State [emphasis
added].

It is the State's principal argument, and apparently the view of the
dissenting Justices, that the undocumented status of these children vel
non establishes a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits
that a State might choose to afford other residents. Indeed, in the
State's view, Congress' apparent disapproval of the presence of these children
within the United States, and the evasion of the federal regulatory program
that is the mark of undocumented status, provides authority for its decision
to impose upon them special disabilities. Faced with an equal protection
challenge respecting the treatment of aliens, we agree that the courts
must be attentive to congressional policy; the exercise of congressional
power might well affect the State's prerogatives to afford differential
treatment to a particular class of aliens. But we are unable to find in
the congressional immigration scheme any statement of policy that might
weigh significantly in arriving at an equal protection balance concerning
the State's authority to deprive these children of an education....

Appellants argue that the classification at issue furthers an interest
in the "preservation of the state's limited resources for the education
of its lawful residents." Of course, a concern for the preservation
of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used
in allocating those resources. The State must do more than justify
its classification with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate.
Apart from the asserted state prerogative to act against undocumented children
solely on the basis of their undocumented status -- an asserted prerogative
that carries only minimal force in the circumstances of these cases --
we discern three colorable state interests that might support § 21.031.

First, appellants appear to suggest that the State may seek to protect
itself from an influx of illegal immigrants. While a State might have an
interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic effects of sudden
shifts in population, § 21.031 hardly offers an effective method
of dealing with an urgent demographic or economic problem. There is no
evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant
burden on the State's economy. To the contrary, the available evidence
suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing
their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.
The dominant incentive for illegal entry into the State of Texas is the
availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this
country, or presumably to the State of Texas, in order to avail themselves
of a free education. Thus, even making the doubtful assumption that
the net impact of illegal aliens on the economy of the State is negative,
we think it clear that "[charging] tuition to undocumented children constitutes
a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration,"
at least when compared with the alternative of prohibiting the employment
of illegal aliens.

Second, while it is apparent that a State may "not . . . reduce expenditures
for education by barring [some arbitrarily chosen class of] children from
its schools," appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately
singled out for exclusion because of the special burdens they impose on
the State's ability to provide high-quality public education. But the record
in no way supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is
likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State.The State
failed to offer any "credible supporting evidence that a proportionately
small diminution of the funds spent on each child [which might result from
devoting some state funds to the education of the excluded group] will
have a grave impact on the quality of education." In terms of educational
cost and need, however, undocumented children are "basically indistinguishable"
from legally resident alien children.

Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately
singled out because their unlawful presence within the United States renders
them less likely than other children to remain within the boundaries of
the State, and to put their education to productive social or political
use within the State. Even assuming that such an interest is legitimate,
it is an interest that is most difficult to quantify. The State has no
assurance that any child, citizen or not, will employ the education provided
by the State within the confines of the State's borders. In any event,
the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by
this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that
some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States. It
is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by
promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within
our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment,
welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved
by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in
light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.

If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free
public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders,
that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial
state interest. No such showing was made here. Accordingly, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals in each of these cases is Affirmed.

JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.

While I join the Court opinion, I do so without in any way retreating
from my opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (dissenting opinion). I continue to believe that an individual's
interest in education is fundamental, and that this view is amply supported
"by the unique status accorded public education by our society, and by
the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional
values." Furthermore, I believe that the facts of these cases demonstrate
the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis,
and of employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny
depending upon "the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which
the particular classification is drawn....."

Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree
without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive
any children -- including illegal aliens -- of an elementary education.
I fully agree that it would be folly -- and wrong -- to tolerate creation
of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a limited
or no command of our language. However, the Constitution does not constitute
us as "Platonic Guardians" nor does it vest in this Court the authority
to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable
social policy, "wisdom," or "common sense." We trespass on the assigned
function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated
powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today....

In a sense, the Court's opinion rests on such a unique confluence of
theories and rationales that it will likely stand for little beyond the
results in these particular cases. Yet the extent to which the Court departs
from principled constitutional adjudication is nonetheless disturbing.

I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal
entry into this country, are indeed physically "within the jurisdiction"
of a state. However, as the Court concedes, this "only begins the inquiry."
The Equal Protection Clause does not mandate identical treatment of different
categories of persons.

The dispositive issue in these cases, simply put, is whether, for purposes
of allocating its finite resources, a state has a legitimate reason to
differentiate between persons who are lawfully within the state and those
who are unlawfully there. The distinction the State of Texas has drawn
-- based not only upon its own legitimate interests but on classifications
established by the Federal Government in its immigration laws and policies
-- is not unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledges that, except in those cases when state classifications
disadvantage a "suspect class" or impinge upon a "fundamental right," the
Equal Protection Clause permits a state "substantial latitude" in distinguishing
between different groups of persons. Moreover, the Court expressly
-- and correctly -- rejects any suggestion that illegal aliens are a suspect
class, or that education is a fundamental right. Yet by patching together
bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights
analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of
these cases.

In the end, we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny
employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children
are deprived of a public education. If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly
result-oriented approach, this case is a prime example.

The Court first suggests that these illegal alien children, although
not a suspect class, are entitled to special solicitude under the Equal
Protection Clause because they lack "control" over or "responsibility"
for their unlawful entry into this country. Similarly, the Court
appears to take the position that § 21.031 is presumptively "irrational"
because it has the effect of imposing "penalties" on "innocent" children.
However, the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude legislators from
classifying among persons on the basis of factors and characteristics over
which individuals may be said to lack "control." Indeed, in some circumstances
persons generally, and children in particular, may have little control
over or responsibility for such things as their ill health, need for public
assistance, or place of residence. Yet a state legislature is not barred
from considering, for example, relevant differences between the mentally
healthy and the mentally ill, or between the residents of different counties,
simply because these may be factors unrelated to individual choice or to
any "wrongdoing." The Equal Protection Clause protects against arbitrary
and irrational classifications, and against invidious discrimination stemming
from prejudice and hostility; it is not an all-encompassing "equalizer"
designed to eradicate every distinction for which persons are not "responsible."

The second strand of the Court's analysis rests on the premise that,
although public education is not a constitutionally guaranteed right, "neither
is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms
of social welfare legislation." Whatever meaning or relevance this
opaque observation might have in some other context, it simply has no
bearing on the issues at hand.

The importance of education is beyond dispute. Yet we have held repeatedly
that the importance of a governmental service does not elevate it to the
status of a "fundamental right" for purposes of equal protection analysis.
Moreover, the Court points to no meaningful way to distinguish between
education and other governmental benefits in this context. Is the Court
suggesting that education is more "fundamental" than food, shelter, or
medical care?

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees similar treatment of similarly
situated persons, but it does not mandate a constitutional hierarchy of
governmental services. JUSTICE POWELL, speaking for the Court in San
Antonio Independent School Dist., put it well in stating that to the
extent this Court raises or lowers the degree of "judicial scrutiny" in
equal protection cases according to a transient Court majority's view of
the societal importance of the interest affected, we "[assume] a legislative
role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence."
Yet that is precisely what the Court does today.

The central question in these cases, as in every equal protection case
not involving truly fundamental rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution," is whether there is some legitimate basis for a legislative
distinction between different classes of persons. The fact that the distinction
is drawn in legislation affecting access to public education -- as opposed
to legislation allocating other important governmental benefits, such as
public assistance, health care, or housing -- cannot make a difference
in the level of scrutiny applied.

Once it is conceded -- as the Court does -- that illegal aliens are
not a suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental right, our
inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the legislative classification
at issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.

Without laboring what will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it simply
is not "irrational" for a state to conclude that it does not have the same
responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose very presence in the
state and this country is illegal as it does to provide for persons lawfully
present. By definition, illegal aliens have no right whatever to be here,
and the state may reasonably, and constitutionally, elect not to provide
them with governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully
in the state....

Denying a free education to illegal alien children is not a choice I
would make were I a legislator. Apart from compassionate considerations,
the long-range costs of excluding any children from the public schools
may well outweigh the costs of educating them. But that is not the issue;
the fact that there are sound policy arguments against the Texas
Legislature's choice does not render that choice an unconstitutional one.....