Caught on tape: Cop assaults 15-year-old special needs student

UPDATE (at bottom): Cop who assaulted teen now in jail on rape charge; shot ex-wife’s new husband 24 times in ‘self defense’

For the offense of not having his shirt tucked in, 15-year-old special needs student Marshawn Pitts was slammed into a wall of lockers and pounded repeatedly in the face by a police officer who broke the boy’s nose and bloodied his mouth.

The Dolton, Illinois teen told a local CBS affiliate that the officer was cursing at him as he complied with the order to tuck in his shirt. Then, “it was just like, boom!” he said.

The assault, which took place in May, was recorded on a security camera at the Chicago suburb’s Academy for Learning.

“The academy is a high school for special-needs students who are emotionally disturbed or struggle with behavioral disorders,” noted Chicago Breaking News. “Marshawn was a student there because he suffered brain injuries when he was hit by a car years ago, [family attorney Edward] Manzke said.”

During the recording, the officer stoops down and places a cup of coffee on the floor, then threw the teen into the lockers before pummeling him and pinning him to the floor in a maneuver known as the “face-down take-down.”

“Zena Naiditch of Equip for Equality, a legal advocacy group that fights for the rights of people with disabilities, looked at the video and said the type of physical restraint used by the officer has killed students,” CBS News reported.

Naiditch added that the hold can be lethal because those trapped by it are left unable to breathe. CBS noted that seven states currently prohibit officers from using the “face-down take-down.”

The officer has not been identified, but due to the filmed evidence of the assault he has been terminated from the force.

Manzke told WBBM News Radio 780 that Marshawn has since transferred to a new school and the family is planning to file a lawsuit.

This video is from CBS 2 in Chicago, broadcast Oct. 7, 2009.

UPDATE: Cop who assaulted teen now in jail on rape charge; shot ex-wife’s new husband 24 times in ‘self defense’

The officer who brutally beat special needs student Marshawn Pitts has been identified as 38-year-old Christopher Lloyd, according to Chicago Breaking News, which spoke to Lloyd’s father.

The news agency reported that Lloyd is currently in jail after being charged with the rape of a woman he knew and is facing a 20-year sentence should he be convicted.

The Chicago Tribune-backed service adds: “A lawsuit filed by his ex-wife, Nicole McKinney, last summer alleges he gunned down her new husband Cornel McKinney in front of their children outside their home on the 6100 block of South Langley Avenue on Feb. 17, 2008.”

An autopsy revealed Lloyd shot the man 24 times, the agency found. He was not jailed at the time as Chicago police accepted his explanation that the killing was in self-defense.

Lloyd also reportedly told his father that the boy he was filmed assaulting had a history of behavioral problems and had cursed at him when told to tuck in his shirt.

If the Chicago authorities had not let this police officer get away with shooting somebody 24 times which was violent brutality and MURDER – the rest of the damage he has done, wouldn’t have been done.

And, since when does anything someone might say, excuse brutality, violence, physical assault or murder by police or anybody else. What kind of model of behavior is that? It is against the law by anyone’s standards and is nothing but sadistic and criminal behavior and the law should apply to police officers when they engage in criminal brutality against us.

When the police officers act no differently than the most evil and sadistic of criminals, they are no longer serving the public good.

The Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted a 2002 DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism. [1] Excerpts from that study, dated August 16, 2002, recommend the creation of a super-Intelligence Support Activity, an organization it dubs the Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG), to bring together CIA and military covert action, information warfare, intelligence and cover and deception.[2] For example, the Pentagon and CIA would work together to increase human intelligence (HUMINT), forward/operational presence and to deploy new clandestine technical capabilities.[3] Concerning the tactics P2OG would use,

Among other things, this body would launch secret operations aimed at stimulating reactions among terrorists and states possessing weapons of mass destruction—that is, for instance, prodding terrorist cells into action and exposing themselves to quick-response attacks by U.S. forces.

Such tactics would hold states/sub-state actors accountable and signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk , the briefing paper declares.[2]

See also

Operation Northwoods
References

1. ^ Defense Science Board, DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism, U.S. Department of Defense, Final Outbrief, August 16, 2002; 78 pages (in PowerPoint format). Text of the document in HTML format. Here is a 30-page excerpt from the foregoing (in PowerPoint format). This is the publicly published U.S. government document which proposes P2OG.
2. ^ a b William M. Arkin, The Secret War: Frustrated by intelligence failures, the Defense Department is dramatically expanding its ‘black world’ of covert operations, Los Angeles Times, October 27, 2002. Also available here.
3. ^ David Isenberg, ‘P2OG’ allows Pentagon to fight dirty, Asia Times, November 5, 2002.

External links

* Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Project on Government Secrecy, DOD Examines ‘Preemptive’ Intelligence Operations, Secrecy News, Vol. 2002, Issue No. 107, October 28, 2002.
* Chris Floyd, Into the Dark: The Pentagon Plan to Provoke Terrorist Attacks, CounterPunch, November 1, 2002. Also appeared in Moscow Times, November 1, 2002, pg. XXIV; St. Petersburg Times, November 5, 2002; and under the title Into the Dark: The Pentagon Plan to Foment Terrorism, Collected Writings: Past Articles by Chris Floyd, April 15, 2005. This article was chosen number four in Project Censored’s Censored 2004: The Top 25 Censored Media Stories of 2002-2003, (#4) Rumsfeld’s Plan to Provoke Terrorists.
* Seymour M. Hersh, The Coming Wars: What the Pentagon can now do in secret, The New Yorker, January 24, 2005 edition. Referenced by the below Chris Floyd article.
* Chris Floyd, Global Eye, Moscow Times, January 21, 2005, Issue 3089, pg. 112; also appeared as Darkness Visible: The Pentagon Plan to Foment Terrorism is Now in Operation, Collected Writings: Past Articles by Chris Floyd, April 15, 2005.

(They’ve been finding these WWI munitions, arsenic, lewisite and other chemical weapons components on Washington, D.C.’s American University campus and the surrounding neighborhood since 1993, including some Lewisite and buried lab contents recently in September and October of 2009. The area is still filled with arsenic from the WWI chemical weapons lab and test firing compound that were originally in the area. – my note)
Washington D.C. Chemical Munitions

EPA ID# DCD983971136

NPL Status: Not on NPL

50th and Massachusettes
Washington, DC 20015
District of Columbia
Contacts

Washington, D.C. Army Chemical Munitions (Spring Valley)
Current Site Information
EPA Region 3 (Mid-Atlantic)
Delaware
New Castle County
2 miles southwest of the City of New Castle
EPA ID# DCD983971136

1st Congressional District

Last Update: January 2009
Other Names
Spring Valley
Current Site Status

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provides minutes of the latest partnering, Remediation Advisory Board (RAB) and community meetings on their web site accessible on the website link below. The Army Corps also routinely updates this website with project progress reports and notifications of future meetings and events. The Restoration Advisory Board (the local community group) meetings are held on the second Tuesday of each month (except December and August) and are open to the public with public comment solicited at the end of each session.

The USACE completed excavation of a a munitions pit on a residential property adjacent to, and owned by the American University. USACE is completing test trenching and arsenic contaminated soil removal at this and the adjoining property. All work at these two properties is expected to be complete in the fall of 2009. USACE is planning for destruction of recovered chemical and conventional munitions.

The USACE has sampled approximately 1,500 for arsenic to date. Twenty seven additional properties were added to the site in 2006 based on a review of real estate records. Sampling of these properties and land owned by the District within the site is complete. EPA and the District Department of Environment are issuing comfort letters to property owners where sampling and any required remediation has been completed. USACE is attempting to gain access to all properties not previously sampled (approximately 10), and 5 properties where sampling revealed arsenic above 20ppm, the site cleanup goal.

In September of 2005 ATSDR issued a Health Consultation for the Spring Valley Site. ATSDR recommended additional sampling of soil, groundwater and air in specific locations within the Spring Valley Site. The DC Council approved funding for a health study and a contract was awarded to Johns Hopkins for that study, and a report was released in 2007. The report concludes that the health of Spring Valley residents is good; better than National averages and consistent with a reference community with similar demographics. Additional DC funding may be allocated for follow-on work in FY’2010.

In late 2003 perchlorate was discovered in groundwater at the site. A groundwater study is underway. Thirty nine monitoring wells have been installed near the Dalecarlia reservoir, adjacent to waste and munition disposal sites in the Spring Valley neighborhood and in other selected locations. Groundwater sampling data collected between 2005 and 2007 has identified two locations in the site where groundwater is contaminated with perchlorate, and one location where groundwater is contaminated with arsenic at elevated levels. The groundwater study continues in 2009 and 2010 with installation of additional monitoring wells including four deep wells and another round of well and surface water sampling.

District Of Columbia Council held a Public Roundtable in May 2009 to discuss issues at the site. EPA testified at the Roundtable. In June of 2009 the Congressional ‘COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service and the District of Columbia’ held a hearing on the site. Members of the public, Army, EPA, District Department of Environment, GAO, and American University provided testimony and answered questions.

RAB meetings over the past year have focused the arsenic clean-up; disposal of recovered munitions, chemical sampling other than arsenic, completing site work and pursuit of additional funding to accelerate the cleanup. For more detailed information and updates on RAB issues, public meetings, and background, please access USACE’s web site by clicking on the Spring Valley internet site below:

The Army maintains a Spring Valley internet site.
Site Description

Spring Valley is located in the Northwest section of the District of Columbia, including the American University. During WWI this area was known as the American University Experimental Station and Camp Leach, a 660-acre facility used as a research and test center for chemical weapons. The experimental station and chemical laboratories were located on American University property.
In January, 1993 a contractor who was digging a utility trench unearthed World War I munitions in the Spring Valley area of the District of Columbia. During further investigations, munitions were discovered in pits located on the Korean Ambassador property, adjacent to American University and additional pits were also found on the adjacent residential property. The pit excavation and other work at the Korean property has been completed. An additional pit on the adjacent residence found numerous additional munitions and the work has not been completed yet. That work began in 2007 and was completed in 2009.

Arsenic-contaminated soil has been removed from the Child Development Center play area on American University. Soil removal actions have been completed on several American University Lots and at approximately 90 residential properties. Approximately 50 residential properties still require soil removal. All soil removal at residential properties should be complete in 2009. Soil remediation at Federal and District owned property is scheduled for 2010.

The site-wide soil cleanup standard for arsenic has been finalized at 20 ppm by EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers and the DC Health Department. The Mayor’s Science Advisory Panel has approved this standard. The arsenic contamination is the result of chemical warfare research carried out at the American University Experimental Station during WWI.

The Army Corps of Engineers budget for this site is approximately $11 million dollars per year. Site work is expected to continue thru 2011.

The USACE has completed excavation of lab waste and debris in an area near the boundary of the American University known as Lot 18. Numerous empty (scrap) munition and several intact bottles were removed from the site. One of the bottles was found to contain a small amount of Lewisite, a blister agent used at the site; a second bottle was found to contain mustard gas. Other chemical agent degradation products have been found in sealed containers. The USACE began excavation of additional lab debris in an adjacent area of the American University in 2008 and will complete the action in 2009.

The USACE intends to destroy recovered munitions currently stored at the site in 2009.

Site Responsibility
USACE is the lead agency at this site.

NPL Listing History
Not listed on the NPL.
Threats and Contaminants
The primary threats at the site are buried munitions and elevated arsenic in site soils and threats posed by buried munitions and lab waste.

Contaminant descriptions and risk factors are available from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, an arm of the CDC.
Cleanup Progress
The pit excavation and other work at the Korean property has been completed. An additional pit on the adjacent residence is currently being addressed. Arsenic contaminated soil has been removed from the Child Development Center play area on American University. Soil removal actions on several American University Lots and at approximately 70 homes have been completed. The site-wide soil cleanup standard for arsenic has been finalized at 20 parts per million (ppm) by EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Washington DC Health Department. The Mayor’s Science Advisory Panel has approved this standard. The American University intramural fields have been returned to the University and are back in use and the University is preparing to reoccupy the Child Development Center. To date the Army Corps of Engineers has spent over $160 million on investigation and removal work. Also see the Spring Valley web address above.
Contacts
Contact Us
Administrative Record Locations

Kent Slowinski leads a tour of the Spring Valley World War I munitions site in Northwest Washington, which the Army Corps of Engineers has been working for years to clean up. (By Katherine Frey — The Washington Post)

A groundwater monitoring well registers high levels of perchlorate. (Katherine Frey – The Washington Post)

The manicured lawns and beautiful brick homes that line the streets of Spring Valley look like those in most affluent District neighborhoods.
This Story

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Hazardous Waste and History Mix On D.C. Tour
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SPRING VALLEY: Norton Tries to Reassure Residents Over Chemical Weapons Cleanup
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More Questions on Buried Munitions
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AMERICAN UNIVERSITY EXPERIMENT STATION: Vial Used for Chemical Agent Mustard Is Uncovered

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But the area looked much different during World War I, when the Army was using it as a testing ground for chemical weapons.

On Sunday, visitors on a tour of the neighborhood heard how, 90 years after scientists ended their experiments, the remnants of toxic munitions remain.

The purpose of the tour is to encourage more historical research, investigation and cleanup here, said Kent Slowinski, who led more than a dozen people on the walk. We want to raise awareness in both Spring Valley and nationwide.

He and Allen Hengst co-founded Environmental Health Group: Spring Valley, a group that advocates for more research into the locations and health effects of the chemicals.

The one-mile walk was part of more than 120 free WalkingTownDC tours, presented by Cultural Tourism DC, that took place across the District over the weekend.

During World War I, 661 acres of forested land around the American University campus were used for Army tests. The range became known as the American University Experiment Station.

In 1993, a construction crew’s discovery of an artillery round triggered an evacuation and cleanup of the area. Experts have since been scouring the neighborhood for buried munitions and chemicals. Workers have found several toxins, such as arsine, a vomiting agent called DA or Clark 1 and liquid mustard, a type of blistering agent.
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Slowinski, a landscape architect who grew up in Spring Valley, became interested in 1996 when a stonemason with whom he was working found munitions at a home in Spring Valley. For two hours Sunday, Slowinski, who has given several tours of the area, pointed to various campus buildings and houses where hundreds of chemical munitions might be buried. He began at the university’s Ohio McKinley Hall, the birthplace of the U.S. Chemical Warfare Service. He pointed to trees, football fields and green patches around the university and neighborhood where he believes munitions still lie.

Slowinski also talked about homeowners whose health problems might be linked to the neighborhood’s past.

It’s terrifying, said Chris Cottrell, 22, a senior at American University who took the tour. There are dangerous munitions buried on campus, and I don’t think most students even know about it. This is like the first thing the university should tell students about.

Aaron Lloyd, 38, grew up in Spring Valley. Less than a decade ago, his stepfather found munitions buried in the back yard of the home where Lloyd grew up and where his mother had kept a garden. It’s very disturbing, he said. Someone had to have known about these chemical weapons before 1993.

Nan Wells, an advisory neighborhood commissioner from Spring Valley, said she hopes that the tour will help engage the public. We need follow-up studies to know the health effects, she said during the tour. She also hopes that the Army Corps of Engineers, which along with the D.C. Department of the Environment is overseeing the cleanup and destruction of the munitions, will continue to fund the project.

For fiscal 2010, the corps has allotted $11 million to the cleanup effort. The number drops to $3 million in fiscal 2011 and $500,000 the following fiscal year.

Nazzarena Labo, 36, a epidemiologist, said more research needs to be done before health effects from the munitions can be determined. It’s very hard to go from anecdotal evidence to causation, she said. People shouldn’t be scared or anxious. But they should be concerned.

Slowinski ended the tour at 4825 Glenbrook Rd., a vacant house where cleanup workers found a laboratory vial last month that tested positive for the World War I blistering agent mustard. The home’s owner had a brain tumor and eventually moved away, Slowinski said.

American University has since bought the house, where cleanup continues.

Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.) said Thursday that she plans to host a community meeting next month at which residents of the District’s Spring Valley neighborhood can question ^ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Col. David E. Anderson about the latest discovery of buried World War I chemical munitions in the area.
This Story

*
Hazardous Waste and History Mix On D.C. Tour
*
SPRING VALLEY: Norton Tries to Reassure Residents Over Chemical Weapons Cleanup
*
More Questions on Buried Munitions
*
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY EXPERIMENT STATION: Vial Used for Chemical Agent Mustard Is Uncovered

On Aug.4, the engineer corps found a glass vial containing traces of the blistering agent mustard during ^ what was thought to be the closing stages of an excavation in the back yard of a vacant house on Glenbrook Road. The corps has been searching on and off for 16 years for munitions buried at what was once a military weapons test site and had been winding down ^ the part of the project the search at the house.
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The discovery of the mustard, two feet below the surface, has halted excavation and rekindled residents’ fears of what might still lie undiscovered. Norton said she would set a date for the meeting later, and plans to visit the site one day next week.

Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton toured World War I munitions burial sites in Northwest Washington on Wednesday and sought to reassure the public that the Army Corps of Engineers would continue its search for such materials for as long as it takes.
This Story

*
Hazardous Waste and History Mix On D.C. Tour
*
SPRING VALLEY: Norton Tries to Reassure Residents Over Chemical Weapons Cleanup
*
More Questions on Buried Munitions
*
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY EXPERIMENT STATION: Vial Used for Chemical Agent Mustard Is Uncovered

Norton (D-D.C.) was given a status report by the corps, which has been directing the $170 million, 16-year cleanup of the munitions that are buried in scattered sites in the District’s Spring Valley neighborhood.

This month, workers were surprised when they found a flask containing residue of the blistering agent mustard buried in the yard of a vacant house in the 4800 block of Glenbrook Road NW. Officials said they had thought cleanup at that site was almost finished.

Work there has been halted but will resume soon, Norton said as she stood across the street Wednesday morning.

Meanwhile, corps officials said they plan to search with metal detectors in the Dalecarlia woods, along Dalecarlia Parkway, in an area that was once a mortar firing range.
Norton said she has asked the corps to reveal all of the substances that have been found in the area, something the corps has not publicly done.

American University, in what was then a remote part of Washington, served as an experimental site for chemical warfare during World War I.

That was then, Norton said. Our concern now is not to rewrite history but to keep the corps digging until all concerned, including the Congress of the United States, is satisfied that it’s all done.

Our position is that the corps must remain until there is an objective all-clear here, she added. Nobody need move out of this beautiful neighborhood. It really isn’t fair to alarm people. . . . There is no indication that the neighborhood is unsafe.

There are 1,632 suspect properties in the area, she said. Ninety-eight percent of them have been sampled. About 140 have required cleanup of some kind.

Norton said she has been told that the air in the area is safe, and so is the water.

Some residents remain critical of the corps’ work. Give me a backhoe and ground-penetrating radar, and I guarantee I’ll find stuff that they missed, said Kent Slowinski, who said he grew up in the neighborhood.

Others said they are satisfied. I think that the Army corps has done a fairly comprehensive, conscientious job, said Jeff Stern, who has lived around the corner for 20 years. I’m pretty comfortable that they’re going to clean it up, and we’re all going to move on.

Last winter, on the slopes below the Point, a herd of deer, too many to be counted, was grazing, a remnant of the porous boundary between the city and the natural world that made the site so attractive to the founders of St. E’s in the 1850s. The campus was empty, its curving streets — which once invited patients to wander among the trees and grass — quiet. On Wednesday they were full of the usual talismans of the new security society: black Chevy Tahoes with tinted windows, large vans with no markings, men with earpieces and short cropped hair.

Even the promises of public access were beginning to morph slowly into the bland language of the bureaucratic wormhole. During the approval process, there had been talk of public access not just to the Point, but to a theater on the campus and an old Civil War cemetery. There was the sense that Hitchcock Hall, which still has the solid bones of a lovely public theater in it, might someday host community gatherings, public lectures, concerts and films. All with DHS approval, of course.

Norton spoke Wednesday as if that were all still true. She hailed a new day, the first time in memory that residents and visitors will be able to visit the Point, the most panoramic view of the city.

But GSA officials were already muddying up that clear vision. GSA has been working very closely with DHS and the community to ensure that the operational and security needs of DHS are maintained while allowing public access to the St. Elizabeths campus, read a GSA statement, released after officials were pressed on comments that seemed to contradict Norton’s sanguine view of wider public access.
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The most reasonable view of the plan for St. E’s is a mix of resignation, sadness, skepticism and anger. Resignation, because the pragmatists are probably right, especially in the current economy. Sadness, because the advocates for a better use are certainly right: This will be a fortress with forbidding walls, occupied by commuters who drive in and out and very likely never leave the compound during the work day. Skepticism because it’s impossible to know how seriously anyone pursued other options for the site.

And anger because early design drawings for the first big new building on the campus, a Coast Guard facility — 1.18 million square feet of bland boxiness that looks as if it was found on a World War II-era drafting board — are so desultory. It is supposed to be energy efficient, and it will stretch down the side of a hill on the edge of the campus, thus preserving some of the historic feel of the old landscape. But the design, by Will + Perkins, is ugly.

The best response to the project is vigilance. To be blunt, the promises of public access are probably hollow, perhaps even disingenuous. Even if they were made sincerely, all it will take is for someone in the bureaucracy to utter the magic words national security to deny access to the campus, at first on an occasional basis, and eventually forever. Within a few years, no one will even remember the Point, and St. E’s will sit high and impregnable on its hill, bristling with security and black cars and open to nobody but its employees.

Even the promise to rehabilitate the 52 historic structures must be watched very closely. Can we believe it? What will happen if it turns out to be even more expensive than anticipated to return them to life? Security has become the trump card that transcends all other values. We need to spend our money on more important things . . . .

St. E’s reached the point of Wednesday’s groundbreaking relatively quickly for a project of this size, and the process revealed the usual fault lines between idealists and the get-‘er-done crowd, between preservationists and local community leaders hungry for economic revitalization. Marion Barry probably didn’t mean to raise the specter of race, but perhaps that was involved too, in the usual subterranean fashion that it operates in Washington politics.

This is where an architectural obituary ends with a bland statement of it remains to be seen . . . But St. E’s deserves better than that. So here’s a test, to be taken 10 or 15 years from now.

Does anyone walk outside its gates to eat lunch? Have property values risen near the site? Do the same people live there? Did GSA in fact save and repair all 52 buildings as planned? Has there ever been an open performance in the old theater? Is the Civil War cemetery on anyone’s tourist map? Do people gather at sunset on the Point and watch the light fade over the city? If you say Ezra Pound to anyone leaving the central building, is there a glimmer of recognition?

Click a phrase to jump to the first occurrence, or return to the search results.

In 1903 a young priest working on his doctoral degree at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., was studying the reaction of the gas acetylene and arsenic trichloride in the presence of aluminum chloride. When these compounds were mixed, the flask turned black, and after the mixture was poured into water, a black, gummy mass formed that had a penetrating odor and caused the priest to become seriously ill. He was hospitalized for several days while recovering from the toxic effects of the compound and decided to postpone indefinitely any further investigations of it. However, the priest, Father Julius Arthur Nieuwland, described the reaction in his 1904 dissertation. The toxic substance later became known as lewisite, one of the most deadly poison gases developed until well after World War I. Produced by the United States during the latter part of that war, it had also been independently discovered, although not manufactured, in Germany. During World War II, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan produced lewisite. Since that time other countries have manufactured the compound, including Iraq, North Korea, and perhaps Libya.

In the early evening of April 22, 1915, the first lethal poison gas attack of World War I occurred at Ypres, Belgium. German troops discharged approximately 160 tons of chlorine gas that slowly crept toward the Allied trenches with the aid of a gentle wind. French and Algerian soldiers first noticed two strange yellow clouds approaching, and soon men began to choke, cough, suffocate, and retreat in horror. Smoke and fumes made their panic worse because they could not see around them. Some soldiers buried their faces in the dirt, hoping to protect themselves from the unknown killer. A few officers who were educated in chemistry realized the value of urinating on a cloth and breathing through it to crystallize and neutralize the chlorine, and they instructed others to do so.

The unprecedented attack killed more than 5,000 men and injured 15,000 others. There were between 880,000 and 1,297,000 gas casualties during World War I, and gas warfare may have caused more than 26,000 deaths. American casualties from poison gas totaled almost 72,000, and of these more than 1,200 died. The Central Powers and then the Allies attacked with the weapon even though two separate prewar international conferences had banned the use of weapons and projectiles intended to diffuse asphyxiating, deleterious, or poisonous gases.

The United States did not declare war on Germany until April 2, 1917, but by then it had already begun research into chemical gases. The Bureau of Mines first conducted chemical warfare research early in 1917, under the direction of Van H. Manning. Founded in 1910 to investigate poisonous and asphyxiating gases in mines, the bureau offered its services to the Military Committee of the National Research Council (NRC) on February 8, 1917. On April 3, the committee formed the Subcommittee on Noxious Gases, composed of army and navy officers and members of the Chemical Committee of the NRC, and Manning was appointed as its chairman. George A. Burrell, who worked for the Bureau of Mines, became the director of research on war gases on April 7 and immediately began working on a suitable gas mask for American soldiers.

The need for more chemists quickly arose, and in May the Bureau of Mines was authorized to accept help from laboratories at twenty-one universities, three companies, and three government agencies. Furthermore, in July 1917 a central laboratory was established at American University in Washington, D.C. The weapons development and testing facility would become known as the American University Experimental Station. The War Department began suggesting in September 1917 that the labs at American be militarized, and ten months later, in June 1918, President Woodrow Wilson agreed, transferring the extensive work at the university to a newly formed army subdivision, the Chemical Warfare Service. Eventually, more than 10 percent of all the chemists in the United States became directly involved with chemical warfare research during World War I.

One of them was Winford Lee Lewis, who left Northwestern University in 1918, where he was an associate professor of chemistry, to become the director of the Offensive Branch of the newly formed Chemical Warfare Service unit at Catholic University. This unit, called Organic Unit No. 3, was given the task of developing and producing novel gases, especially compounds containing arsenic. In April 1918, following the suggestion of the Rev. John Griffin, who had been Julius Nieuwland’s chemistry adviser at Catholic, Lewis reviewed the priest’s dissertation and read about his experiments with arsenic trichloride. He further investigated and perfected its reaction with acetylene, with aluminum trichloride acting as a catalyst.

Lewis wrote that the resulting compound ‘…took on a nauseating odor and [caused] marked irritation effect to the mucous surfaces. The headache resulting persists several hours and the material seems to be quite toxic.’ The perfected product was named after him, christened lewisite. The government eventually ordered Lewis to stop working on the compound at Catholic University, under the pretext that it was ineffective. They did this, however, in order to trick German spies into believing that Lewis’ work had not been productive. In truth, other researchers continued evaluating and perfecting lewisite at nearby American University.

Lewis believed in gas warfare and defended its use throughout his life, saying that it would make wars more humane because it would shorten them and innocent civilians would suffer less. He also believed that ‘Providence’ would intervene and give the most advanced people the best gas. Lewis furthermore characterized the horrors of gas warfare as exaggerations and insisted that chemical battles are the most efficient and economical of all fights.

Nieuwland, who became a renowned professor of chemistry at the University of Notre Dame, held similar beliefs. When questioned in 1936 about his discovery of lewisite, he asserted that poison gas rendered warfare more humane:

By the introduction of gas and other modern instruments of warfare, a progressively small percentage of combatants have been killed. In biblical times, thousands of men met in the middle of a plain and slashed one another until only a few were left standing. Today, the primary aim is not to kill but to incapacitate. And poison gas is an ideal method of achieving that aim. If a man goes to a hospital suffering from gas, he is as useless as if he were dead and to care for him, several other persons must be kept out of the battle lines. The chances are that ultimately the victim will recover.

Lewisite, the chemical formula of which is C2H2AsCl3, was given the code names ‘Methyl’ and ‘G-34? during World War I. Perhaps its most enduring pseudonym is ‘Dew of Death.’ General Amos Fries, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces’ Gas Service and later director of the Chemical Warfare Service, so named it because there were plans to spray lewisite over the enemy from airplanes, and the gas was thought to be so deadly that ten planes armed with it could eliminate every trace of life in Berlin.
After the war, many newspaper articles sensationalized lewisite, attaching properties to it that the poison gas did not have. The Cleveland Plain Dealer on June 15, 1919, reported that lewisite was seventy-two times more powerful than mustard gas, considered the king of war gases at that time, and that a single drop on the back of a hand was fatal. Also, on February 26, 1923, the San Francisco Journal stated that lewisite would sterilize the ground so that ‘nothing will grow upon it for at least two years and perhaps longer’ and that one drop of it on living flesh caused ‘mortification.’

Lewisite is primarily a vesicant (causing blisters). It secondarily irritates the lungs and is a systemic poison. Upon contact with the skin, it causes large, painful, fluid-filled blisters, especially on the extremities, back, and scrotum. It also acts as a toxic lung irritant by causing swelling, inflammation, and destruction of the lining of the airways. The lining may subsequently slough off and form an obstruction in the airway, making it difficult to breathe. It is a systemic poison because absorption of arsenic through the skin causes pulmonary swelling, diarrhea, restlessness, weakness, below-normal temperature, and low blood pressure. A victim feels its effects immediately.

Lewisite can be delivered as a vapor, an aerosol, or a liquid and is believed to be most damaging in low-temperature, low-humidity, and dry nonalkaline conditions. It can be fatal in as little as ten minutes when inhaled in high concentrations. Lewisite is also persistent, lasting up to six to eight hours in sunny weather and even longer in cold, dry climates. The poison vapor is about seven times heavier than air and will therefore hover along the ground and enter caves, trenches, and sewers.

Mustard gas, like lewisite, is a vesicant. The two chemicals have many of the same characteristics, but there are also important distinctions. Mustard agents can be composed of sulfur- or nitrogen-based compounds, whereas lewisite is composed of arsenic. Sulfur mustard was the compound used extensively during World War I, first by the Germans and later by the Allies. Similar to lewisite, it is effective as a liquid, vapor, or aerosol, but in contrast to lewisite, its effects are delayed for up to a few hours. They will both form large blisters on the skin, but mustard lesions take about two to three times as long to heal. Whereas lewisite has a lower freezing temperature than mustard agents, both compounds can persist for days, even months under certain conditions. Mustard gas accounted for almost 40 percent of the total gas casualties in World War I.

After lewisite’s transfer to the American University Experimental Station, Captain James Bryant Conant was ordered to find a method to manufacture it in large quantities. Formerly an instructor of chemistry at Harvard University, Conant directed the Organic Research Unit No. 1 of the Offense Research Section at American.
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Weaponry: Lewisite — America’s World War I Chemical Weapon

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The lewisite work at the Experimental Station was dangerous. A huge tub of soapsuds had to be readily available for soldiers to plunge into if gas from leaking pipes or vats of boiling chemicals contaminated them. Soldier-chemists tested human volunteers and animals to determine the effectiveness of the compound. George Temple, the head of the station’s motor maintenance department, repeatedly volunteered to be burned by poisonous gases. When a sample of lewisite was placed on his forearm, it caused redness, swelling, and huge silver-colored blisters that took eight weeks to heal.

One morning in August 1918 an explosion caused by a faulty timer on a bomb sent lewisite gas across a field and toward the homes of residents near the American University campus, including that of former senator Nathan B. Scott. Scott, his wife, and his sister-in-law were gassed while sitting on their porch. Not long after the accident, the lewisite work at the university ceased and the Chemical Warfare Service ordered production moved to a secret plant twenty miles east of Cleveland, in Willoughby, Ohio.

The Willoughby plant was located on the site of the former Ben-Hur Motor Company. Soldiers first arrived at the site at the end of July 1918 and found that, although the office building was mostly completed, the plant floor had never been graded. A plumbing system had been installed, but there were no working sewer or water lines in the facility. The pipes had frozen over the previous winter, so the system had to be removed and totally redone. The electrical wiring was only partially complete and had been installed haphazardly, so it had to be removed and reinstalled.

Finding contractors to remodel the plant was difficult. Most of the nearest ones were located in Cleveland, and transportation, food, and housing for construction workers had to be arranged. Further, the workmen wanted to be reimbursed for the cost and time of traveling. Fortunately, Willoughby contractors were eventually found and hired, but only after appealing to the town’s mayor. The workers took from July 28 to mid-August to remodel the factory. Security was tight. A barbed-wire fence was erected around the facility, and guards maintained a twenty-four-hour watch. Klaxon horns and an alarm system were also installed to warn of the presence of intruders. Eventually the site included four barracks to house the twenty-two officers and 542 soldiers working at the facility, a mess hall, and a forty-eight-bed hospital (neither of the two deaths that occurred at the plant was from the effects of lewisite).
The soldiers working there initially were not allowed to leave the grounds except for meals, and all their mail went through a post office box, No. 426, in Cleveland, without any mention of Willoughby. On August 10, Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert, director of the Chemical Warfare Service, visited the Willoughby plant and told the soldiers that as long as they maintained secrecy about the plant, the army would allow them to enter the town of Willoughby, but they were still not permitted to go to Cleveland due to the fear of espionage.

Each of the soldiers at the facility was issued a gas mask that had to be kept nearby or worn in the alert position at all times. Many of the men worked to the point of complete exhaustion, trying to make the plant operational as soon as possible because the government had ordered three thousand tons of lewisite to be ready for a planned spring 1919 offensive against the Germans.

In September 1918, the War Department realized that, in order to satisfy all its planned uses for lewisite, production had to be doubled. That entailed a large expansion at Willoughby. New equipment was ordered, and the plant layout changed to make room for it. Amazingly, by November, just five months after construction started, the plant had begun full production of ten tons of lewisite per day.

On November 11, however, the war suddenly ended. Early in December, the men began dismantling, inventorying, and disposing of the plant’s equipment and materials. By March 1919, all of the plant’s soldiers were gone.

From the time the soldiers had arrived in Willoughby until the day they left, the town’s government, Red Cross, and residents were all extremely helpful and friendly. They often hosted receptions and gatherings for the soldiers, provided pies for their Thanksgiving dinner, and even donated a grand piano to the boys. When townspeople asked the soldiers what they were doing at the Willoughby plant, the soldiers responded that they were working on a formula for rubber, which explained the strong odors that the plant emitted.

According to Nate A. Simpson, one of the soldiers assigned to the plant, the army did not reassign a single soldier from the top-secret facility until the war was over. The plant became known as the ‘mousetrap’ because once you were there, you knew you were not going to leave until the war was over.

There are different stories pertaining to what happened to the gas produced at Willoughby after the armistice was signed. Some say the plant never produced chemicals, but in 1957 workmen dug up several laboratory bottles containing lewisite on the grounds of the old facility. Others suggested that the army hauled between a few tons and 150 tons of lewisite to the Atlantic Ocean by train in big steel casks that were under guard. There the material was carefully transferred onto barges and dumped at sea. Another account suggests that 150 tons of lewisite was en route to Europe when the war ended, and the ship transporting it was subsequently sunk rather than be allowed to return the deadly chemical to the United States.

Two British scientists, Stanley Green and Thomas Price, published the formula for lewisite in The Journal of the Chemical Society in 1921. According to General Fries in his book Chemical Warfare, the formula’s publication was unfortunate because the highly secret compound became known throughout the world, perhaps allowing Japan and Germany to learn about it and develop manufacturing techniques.

Until 1943 lewisite was thought to be equal to or better than mustard gas. However, U.S. Army tests done during World War II on lewisite found that unless the human subjects were defenseless or unconscious, they immediately felt the pain of exposure and would leave the area and protect themselves. Because mustard does not cause immediate effects, soldiers were more likely to be exposed for longer periods. Army testers also found that it was very difficult to get effective concentrations of lewisite vapor. Furthermore, the development of British anti-lewisite, which can prevent burns caused by lewisite and reverse its systemic effects, was believed to reduce the combat effectiveness of the chemical weapon. For those reasons, the U.S. military has not considered lewisite an effective chemical agent since World War II.

Other countries apparently did not agree with this evaluation. For example, the Soviet Union produced huge quantities of the material, disposing of approximately twenty thousand tons of it in the Arctic Sea during the late 1940s and ’50s. More recently, a plant specifically designed to incinerate lewisite and mustard gas has become operational at Gorny, Russia.

Although chemical weapons were not used in major combat during World War II, the Japanese used lewisite and mustard gas in China during most of the war years. In one horrible experiment, prisoners were forced to drink ‘crude water,’ which was a liquid form of lewisite or mustard gas. In addition, more than thirty-five hundred Chinese died in October 1941 at Ichange in the Yangtze Valley after a suspected lewisite attack. Lewisite artillery shells were found on New Guinea, indicating that the Japanese had planned to use the agent against Allied forces. Germany also conducted lewisite experiments on concentration camp inmates.

From 1940 to ‘43, the United States produced lewisite at a small pilot plant at Edgewood Arsenal and then later at Huntsville, Pine Bluff, and Rocky Mountain arsenals. About twenty thousand tons of the agent had been produced before the plants were shut down. Along with disposing of the enemy stockpiles, the United States also dumped most of its own lewisite into the Atlantic and Pacific oceans after the war. One of the 1948 dumping operations was referred to as Operation Geranium because lewisite has a geraniumlike odor.

More recently, Iraq allegedly used lewisite and a mustard gas-lewisite mixture against Iran in the 1980s. The deadly chemical was detected in three separate 1991 instances during the Persian Gulf War, and at least one Iraqi prisoner of war claimed in February 1991 that Iraq had lewisite-filled munitions in its inventory.

A 1999 article in Environmental Health Perspectives reported that lewisite is still produced in very limited quantities in the United States (presumably just for military preparations) and the country’s remaining stockpile is stored at Desert Chemical Depot in Utah. And recently in Washington, D.C., lewisite and mustard agents, hastily buried and forgotten when the American University Experimental Station closed down, have been discovered in the ground, requiring a hazardous waste cleanup operation by the army’s Corps of Engineers.
Lewisite, the major American contribution to chemical weapons development during World War I, has had an amazing history, from its inadvertent discovery by a priest in 1903 to its presence a hundred years later in the arsenals of some countries. Most notably, North Korea has an estimated twenty-five hundred to five thousand tons stockpiled. Whether lewisite will eventually be used in combat situations or as a terrorist weapon — and, if so, how effective it would be — remains to be determined.

This article was written by Joel A. Vilensky and Pandy R. Sinish and originally published in the Spring 2005 edition of MHQ. Joel A. Vilensky and Pandy R. Sinish are the authors of Dew of Death: The Story of Lewisite, America’s World War I Weapon of Mass Destruction.

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WASHINGTON – The Sensor Fuzed Weapon is a marvel of military technology, says its maker, Textron Defense Systems. An advanced “cluster bomb,’’ it is designed to spray 40 individual projectiles of molten copper, destroying enemy tanks across a 30-acre swath of battlefield.

But the bomb – which is made at a Textron facility in the Boston suburb of Wilmington – violates terms of a landmark international treaty limiting cluster bombs to 10 bomblets or less. The pending treaty, signed by 98 nations last year in Oslo, has been sought for decades by human rights groups, which say that cluster bombs kill indiscriminately and leave behind duds that kill or maim unsuspecting civilians.

Now Textron, with the support of the Pentagon and the State Department, is mounting a campaign to derail the cluster-bomb treaty and write a new set of rules under the United Nations that would make it easier to sell its weapon around the world.

Textron’s primary argument for scrapping the treaty is that 99 percent of the bomblets released by the Sensor Fuzed Weapon will explode in combat, leaving only a tiny amount of unexploded ordinance that could be picked up by a child or hit by a farmer’s plow. Textron calls this capability “clean battlefield operation.’’

“It really is an extremely sophisticated weapon,’’ said Mark D. Rafferty, vice president of business development for Textron Defense Systems, which employs about 1,000 people at its Wilmington plant. Rafferty stood in front of a full-scale mock-up of the bomb, a 6-foot-long cylinder with tail fins, at an arms show in Washington, D.C., last week.

“Knowing that we are in no way, shape or form contributing to [civilian suffering] is really a very satisfying place to be,’’ he said.

The United States is among several major powers including Russia, China, and Israel that have refused to sign the Oslo treaty.

The US Air Force has purchased 4,600 of the new weapons, at a cost of several billion dollars. Textron has also sold them to Turkey, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. And it is in the final stages of reaching a deal with India for 510 of the weapons at an estimated cost of $375 million.

Textron wants the international community to rewrite the treaty to allow weapons with large numbers of bomblets, if they can be shown to avoid the potential for civilian casualties from unexploded components.

The initiative has outraged many arms control advocates, however, who secured signatures from Britain, France, and 96 other countries at last year’s Oslo negotiations. The treaty needs to be ratified by 30 countries to take effect; so far, 17 of them have done so.

“It’s a disgraceful attempt to throw mud at the most important achievement in humanitarian affairs and disarmament in the last decade,’’ said Thomas Nash, coordinator of the London-based Cluster Munition Coalition, a network of 400 nongovernmental organizations from about 90 countries.

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Textron Defense Systems is a division of the Providence-based conglomerate Textron Inc., which makes products as diverse as helicopters and passenger planes and defense and intelligence systems. It had annual revenue of more than $14 billion in 2008. The Wilmington facility makes a variety of air-launched munitions, as well as both air and ground surveillance systems.

As part of its public relations push, Textron has established a new website, dontbanthesolution.com, replete with expert testimony and computer-generated battle scenes to demonstrate its weapon’s pinpoint accuracy and fail-safe design. Textron Systems chief executive Frank Tempesta, has penned an oped in a leading international trade magazine contending that the proposed treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, will do more harm than good by leading militaries to use more powerful, and less accurate, weapons to achieve the same effect. And the company has dispatched officials to foreign capitals and the conference rooms of skeptical human rights groups to make their case.

Dropped from a high-flying aircraft, the Textron weapon releases 10 canisters that parachute downward, scanning for the enemy with a built-in sensor. When they reach an optimum altitude, the canisters, spinning at high speed, release four separate bomblets, or “skeets,’’ each with its own rocket motor and targeting system.

Each skeet has a 2.2-kilogram warhead, sufficient to pierce and disable a 70-ton tank, and weighs a little less than 4 kilograms including its motor and electronics.
Just two of the weapons, released from a B-52 bomber, destroyed 24 Iraqi tanks in 2003.

If they don’t find a target, the company says, the 40 bomblets are designed to self-destruct. For example, if the skeet reaches a height of 50 feet without homing in on the heat from a tank or armored vehicle, it will explode in midair. And once armed, the projectile is only capable of exploding for eight seconds before it disarms. As a third safety mechanism, any unexploded skeets lying on the ground will disarm after two minutes.

The Pentagon has certified in testing that the Sensor Fuzed Weapon leaves unexploded bomblets only 1 percent of the time or less. That is a standard that Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has stipulated all cluster munitions must meet by 2018.

Arms control advocates remain unconvinced, however.

“They think technology is the answer,’’ said Nash, the Cluster Munition Coalition coordinator. His group contends that Textron’s claims of accuracy and reliability have historically been overstated.

“It is not reasonable to base your policy on the continued failure of weapons manufacturers to make reliable weapons,’’ he said. “They make money from selling weapons, and I think that compromises to a certain extent the credibility of their humanitarian analysis.’’

Other experts, including supporters of the Oslo treaty, acknowledge that Textron has made significant breakthroughs to minimize harm to civilians. Ove Dullum, chief scientist at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, said in an interview that based on tests he considers the Sensor Fuzed Weapon a minimal risk to civilians.Continued…

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Still, he says that may not hold true under battle conditions.

Graphic
How an SFW works

“My experience . . . is that even if carefully conducted tests of ammunition show a very low dud rate, that will not represent the dud rate in war,’’ he said, citing the aging of munitions, environmental impact, and the handling of the weapons in a real war environment.

Moreover, even if the weapon can achieve the level of reliability advertised, it is still highly dangerous for civilians on the battlefield, said Jeff Abramson, deputy director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan Washington think tank. He said that, depending on how many are used in a future conflict, a 1 percent dud rate could still affect many innocent bystanders.

“If you have 1 percent of 10,000 submunitions, that is 100 left that could possibly explode in the future,’’ he said.

Textron and the US military say that, without the ability to use cluster bombs with 40 bomblets, military forces will inevitably use greater numbers of traditional bombs. That, Gates concluded in a policy memorandum last year, “could result, in some cases, in unacceptable collateral damage and explosive remnants of war.’’

Nations that do not sign the treaty could have trouble selling their weapons. Cluster bombs made by Diehl and Rheinmetall in Germany and by Bofors Defence and GIAT Industries in France meet the requirements of the treaty, with two bomblets contained in each. They would be expected to pick up market share at Textron’s expense if the treaty is ratified as written.

Also, nations that ratify the treaty may place restrictions on cooperating with any military that doesn’t abide by it.

UN negotiations to craft a new agreement are at a standstill. “There is still a wide divergence,’’ said a US defense official involved in the talks who declined to be identified because he was not authorized to do so. Another meeting is scheduled in Geneva in November.

But a State Department spokesman, Jason Greer, argued that a new treaty that takes into account the potential to reduce civilian casualties would be an improvement over the Oslo pact, which merely sets standards for bomblets and their size.

The US government also argues that the current treaty will have little effect if the holdouts – which have the largest militaries and explosive stockpiles – refuse to participate. A new treaty, said Greer, would probably include “more of the countries that actually produce cluster munitions.’’

LENOIR CITY, Tenn., Sept. 22 /PRNewswire/ — EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT), a global provider of professional support services to a broad range of Federal markets, was ranked as one of the most successful defense and government contractors by Government Executive Magazine in August of 2009.

Specializing in security, critical mission support, munitions response and stabilization and reconstruction operations, EODT ranked 86th on the list of the Top 100 Defense Contractors with more than $406M in business in 2008. Overall, EODT ranked 118th on the list of Top Government Contractors.

We’re pleased to be included on this list alongside other well-respected companies, said Matt Kaye, President and Chief Executive Officer of EODT. It’s a testament to the hard work of our employee-owners, leveraging our critical skills and technology, and our commitment to our customers’ mission success.

Government Executive Magazine is a biweekly business magazine serving senior executives and managers in the federal government’s various departments and agencies. It covers the business of the federal government while serving the individuals who manage those departments and agencies.

Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

September 1984

Leaveanworth Papers are published by the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not neccessarily those of the Department of Defnse or any element thereof. Leavenworth Papers are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

Leavenworth Papers US ISSN 0195 3451

FOREWORD

This Leavenworth Paper chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army’s tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front.

Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by suprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures.
In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question. General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction.

Over 50 percent of the Total Army’s Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. The Leavenworth Paper was prepared by the USAR Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of request from USAR Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. In fulfilling the needs of the USAR, this Leavenworth Paper also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed.

Contents
Illustrations
Tables
Introduction
1. The Introduction of Gas Warfare in World War I
2. The Europeans Face Chemicals on the Battlefield, 1915-1918
3. The U.S. Army’s Response to Chemical Warfare, 1915 – 1917
4. The AEF Organizes for Chemical Warfare
5. The Quick and the Dead : The AEF on the Chemical Battlefield
6. We Can Never Afford to Neglect the Question
Notes
Bibliography

Illustrations
Maps
1. The stabilized Western Front, 1915
2. Ypres sector in Belgium, 22 April-24 May 1915
3. Varicolored zones of German gas fired in support of a crossing of the Dvina River before Riga, Eastern Front, 1 September 1917 German gas shell bombardment of Armentières
4. German gas shell bombardment of Armentières on 9 April 1918
5. The German spring offensives of 1918 were heavily supported by a variety of gases

Tables
1. Summary of markings for chemical shell and properties of most common gases
2. Hospitalized casualties

Introduction

The combat experience of World War I provided the U.S. Army with its first significant exposure to chemical warfare. The purpose of this paper is to show how the Army prepared for this kind of warfare and how soldiers in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), from generals to doughboys, adapted or failed to adapt to fighting a war in which chemical weapons played a prominent role. Because no one AEF division experienced every facet of gas warfare, the study will examine information pertaining to many units in order to give a more complete picture of the phenomenon.

In World War I terms, chemical warfare included not only gas, but liquid flammable material, thermite, and smoke (all of which are relevant to the modern battlefield). This study will deal only with what participants referred to as chemicals … gases, or war gases. These included real gases such as phosgene and chlorine, and also weapons that, while referred to as gases, were in fact vaporized liquids (mustard gas, for example) or finely ground solids. In this study the terms chemical agent and gas will be used interchangeably. Smoke will be discussed, but only as a ruse for gas; liquid flame and thermite will not be covered. Because most of the U.S. experience was on the Western Front, that theater of the war will receive detailed treatment.

Despite technological advances in chemical warfare since 1918, many lessons learned on the battlefields of World War I are valid for study today, if only because America’s principal antagonist in world affairs, the Soviet Union, appears to be quite willing to employ chemical agents on today’s battlefield. During the decade of the 1970s persistent accounts of the use of chemical agents by the Russians and their clients caused the U.S. government to pay closer attention to the problem of chemical warfare. Soviet offensive equipment captured by the Israelis in the 1973 October War contained filtration systems for survival on a chemical or biological battlefield. Reports from Laos about Vietnamese using a chemical agent called Yellow Rain on mountain tribesmen prompted a policy review by U.S. government officials. In December, 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with subsequent reports from Afghan refugees that the invaders were using gas during combat operations, again forced the U.S. Army to reassess its chemical warfare doctrine.1

U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that the Russians have between 70,000 and 100,000 chemical warfare troops. Every Soviet line regiment has a Chemical Defense Company. Present Soviet chemical delivery systems include artillery, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, bombs, air spray, and land mines. The blood, blister, and nerve agents in the Russian chemical arsenal include mustard gas (a blister agent) and phosgene (a lung injurant) two of the most effective agents used in World War I.2

There is an abundance of material available for a study of gas warfare during World War 1. Sources include unit reports, the published and unpublished diaries of participants, books written by chemical officers during the interwar period, and a number of secondary historical works of more recent origin. Also, I conducted several interviews with veterans of the First World War to obtain as accurate a picture as possible of what it was like for an AEF doughboy to train for, and to live, work, and fight in, a chemical environment. During the war the newly created Chemical Warfare Service (CWS)* did its best to record its activities and report on the use of chemicals. I relied extensively on these records.

A number of agencies provided a great deal of assistance to me in the preparation of this paper, and I would like to acknowledge the staffs of the following institutions: the Technical Library, Chemical Systems Laboratory, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground;, U.S. Army Chemical Center and School, Fort McClellan, Alabama; National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and Combined Arms Research Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I especially want to thank members of the 1st Gas Regiment Association for graciously consenting to be interviewed, and Lt. Col. Charles M. Wurm, Chemical Corps, CACDA, Fort Leavenworth, for providing me with a great amount of technical information and advice.

Major(P) Charles Heller, USAR
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

*The forerunner of the CWS was the Gas Service, set up under AEF General Order 31, 3 September 1917. On 11 May 1918, when the CWS was established as a branch of the National Army, the Gas Service became the Overseas Division, CWS.

The Introduction of Gas
Warfare in World War I

Chapter 1

Of all the weapons employed in World War I, none stimulated public revulsion more than poison gas. The abhorrence of chemical warfare lingered long after the Armistice of 11 November 1918. Gas victims continually reminded the general public of the effect of chemical weapons, as illustrated by the often repeated story of a veteran’s coughing fit being explained by a tap on the chest and an apologetic, Gas you know.

The employment of chemical agents in war, however, did not begin with World War I. The earliest recorded incident occurred in the fifth century B.C. during one of a series of wars between Athens and Sparta.*1 Over the centuries that followed, combatants on several occasions engaged in rudimentary forms of chemical warfare on the battlefield. If by the end of the nineteenth century the use of poison gas was still by far the exception and not the rule in war, there were in all the great powers a number of men who foresaw its widespread use should a general conflagration engulf Europe.2

*Spartan forces besieging an Athenian city placed a lighted mixture of wood, pitch, and sulfur under the walls. The Spartans hoped the fumes would incapacitate the Athenians so that they would not be able to resist the assault that followed.

A concern with poison gas manifested itself at the Hague Conference of 1899. One of the agenda items dealt with prohibiting the use of shells filled with asphyxiating gas. The proposed ban** eventually passed with one dissenting vote, that of the American representative, Naval Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, who declared that it was illogical and not demonstrably humane to be tender about asphyxiating men with gas, when all were prepared to admit that it was allowable to blow the bottom out of an ironclad at midnight, throwing four or five hundred men into the sea, to be choked by water, with scarcely the remotest chance of escape. Secretary of State John Hay, in his instructions to Mahan, argued that the inventiveness of Americans should not be restricted in the development of new weapons. For Hay it made no sense for the United States to deprive itself of the ability to use, at some later date, a weapon that might prove to be more humane and effective than anything then present in the American arsenal. 3
**The declaration stated, The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gasses.

The Hague Conference declaration did not prevent some nations from discussing the use of chemical weapons, and at least one country, France, experimented publicly with gas. The French Army tested a grenade filled with ethyl bromoacetate, a nontoxic tear, or lachrymatory, agent developed for use in the suppression of small-arms fire from the concrete casements then prevalent in the permanent fortifications that dotted Western Europe. In 1912, French police used 26-mm grenades filled with this agent to capture a notorious gang of Parisian bank robbers. The Germans, unlike the French, did not experiment with chemical agents for military use as such, but at the outbreak of World War I, Germany’s highly advanced dye industry gave it a sophisticated technological base from which to develop weapons of this nature.4

When war erupted in August, 1914, everyone from private citizens to the leaders of the belligerent countries shared a common belief that the economies of the European nations would neither survive nor support a lengthy war. As a result, the war plans of two key protagonists, Germany and France, called for a quick, decisive offensive against one another. Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany assured his troops that they would be home before the leaves fall. It was not to be. By the end of 1914, the armies on the Western Front were locked in a deadly form of trench warfare (Map 1),* sustained by the very industrialized economies that, because of their complexity and interdependency, had been thought unable to withstand a long war.5

*One of the misconceptions surrounding World War I is that there existed a continuous, parallel belt of trenches stretching from the English Channel in the north to the Swiss border in the south. In fact, in some sectors along the 470-mile Western Front, soldiers occupied shell holes; in other areas, the terrain caused troops to be dispersed in fortified garrisons or strong points. Some trenches, as in the British sector of Flanders, were actually sandbagged parapets rising from marshy lands, where digging any deeper than a foot or two would have brought water to the surface. There was one factor, however, that was constant along the entire front. Whether in trenches, shell holes, or strongpoints, daily life offered little more than dull routine and boredom for the men of both sides as they waited for their respective high commands to decide their fate.

Unwilling to accept the indecisiveness of trench warfare, army staffs on both sides pondered ways to break the deadlock and return to open or maneuver warfare. Alternatives were proposed, some strategic, others tactical. The British, for example, sought a strategic solution by a seaborne assault against Turkey, an ally of Germany. This attack at Gallipoli in 1915 sought to open the Dardanelles as the first step toward linking up with. Russia and forcing Turkey out of the war. For a variety of reasons, the plan failed, and the deadlock on the Western Front continued.

As their attack at Gallipoli tottered to defeat, the British looked to the application of tactical innovation at Neuve-Chapelle to break the stalemate. On 10 March 1915 British artillery, instead of firing a lengthy bombardment prior to an attack, as doctrine dictated, let loose a brief but intense barrage on a relatively narrow German trench frontage. The fire was then shifted to the German rear in order to create a lethal steel curtain that would block reinforcements. To the surprise of everyone, the British infantry quickly overran the German forward positions. The attack failed, though, primarily because the high command, viewing it as an experiment, did not have sufficient reserves available to exploit a breakthrough.
To View: The stabilized Western Front, 1915

Germany also searched for ways to break the deadlock and decided on a solution involving gas. Early in the war the Germans kept a wary eye out for indications that the French were using their 26-mm gas grenades. Apparently, in August, 1914, France did use this chemical weapon, but in open areas where the gas quickly dispersed with no noticeable effect on the enemy. The French soon discarded the grenades as worthless. At this same time, stories were appearing in Allied newspapers about a new French liquid explosive, turpinite. While claiming that this substance gave off lethal fumes, the articles failed to explain that the gas reached a deadly concentration only in confined spaces. Still, the Germans were apprehensive and became alarmed by the deaths of a number of soldiers asphyxiated during a French bombardment, even though a medical team rushed to the scene concluded that the men died not from poison gas, but from inhaling carbon monoxide fumes while huddled in their dugout.6

In any event such newspaper stories and front-line experiences may have spurred the development of war gases by German scientists. Contributing to that effort, chemistry professor Walter Nernst suggested partially replacing the TNT in a 105-mm shrapnel shell with dianisidine chlorosulphonate, an agent known to cause irritation of the mucous membrane. The new filling would serve two purposes: it would conserve TNT and act as a chemical weapon. The German High Command accepted this new weapon, although it is uncertain which of the two purposes it initially considered more important. On 27 October 1914, 3,000 of these shells fell on British troops near Neuve-Chapelle. The soldiers suffered no ill effects and never suspected they were under chemical attack. The Germans continued to experiment with gas because they were convinced the idea had merit and because intelligence sources could not determine what effect the shells had had at Neuve-Chapelle. This lack of information on the effects of gas attacks was a common occurrence throughout the war.7

The Neuve-Chapelle experiment increased the German High Command’s interest in gas warfare. The German General Staff asked the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin to investigate the possibility of using a more effective agent. The only guideline provided by the military was that the Hague declaration of 1899, banning projectiles used exclusively for delivering poison gases, had to be circumvented. Adhering to the letter if not the spirit of the ban, the Germans devised a gas shell that also contained an explosive charge for producing a shrapnel effect. The Professor von Tappan who designed the shell also solved two technical problems related to emplacing chemicals in an artillery projectile. First, he stabilized the liquid within a shell casing in order to reduce its tumbling in flight, thereby increasing the shell’s accuracy and range. Second, to ensure that two extremely reactive chemical substances did not accidently combine in the shell casing, von Tappan developed a special shell, designated the T-shell by the German Army in his honor. The T-shell was a standard 15-cm howitzer round that contained seven pounds of xylyl bromide and a burster charge for a splinter effect. A lead lining prevented contact between the burster charge and the chemical payload.8

The German High Command decided to use the first T-shells on the Eastern Front. On 31 January 1915, over 18,000 shells were fired at Russian positions at Bolimov. German officers, confident that their new weapon would neutralize the enemy positions, were surprised when their attack was repulsed with severe casualties. The shelling had had little or no effect on the Russians because cold temperatures had prevented vaporization of the xylyl bromide.9

To find a more effective means of employing gas on the battlefield, the German High Command turned to an assistant of von Tappan, Professor Fritz Haber. Haber, a reservist, had shown marked enthusiasm for the potential value of chemicals as weapons. Believing that T-shells did not provide a high enough concentration of chemicals to produce enemy casualties, he suggested the use of large commercial gas cylinders as a delivery system. Cylinders could deliver large amounts of gas and, like the T-shell, did not technically violate the Hague ban on projectiles. Haber also recommended the use of chlorine as an agent because it was commercially produced and readily available in large quantities. Chlorine also satisfied the requirements for military application: it was lethal immediately effective, nonpersistent, and volatile. It was also dense enough to resist dilution in a moderate wind.10

Haber’s gas cylinder project received the approval of the Chief of the German General Staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn, who had the professor appointed Head of the Chemical Warfare Department in the Prussian Ministry of War. The high command selected the front of the Fourth Army facing the French salient at Ypres as the location for an experimental attack. Pioneer Regiment 35 was designated to conduct the gas attack. Haber, assigned as a chemico-technical advisor, assisted Colonel Peterson, the regimental commander, and instructed the troops on the emplacement and use of gas cylinders. By 10 March 1915 the Regiment, with the assistance of infantry labor, had emplaced 1,600 large and 4,130 small cylinders containing a total of 168 tons of chlorine. Then, for one month, the Pioneer troops sat and waited for the winds to shift westerly toward the enemy trenches in the Ypres salient. Only then could they safely unleash the chemicals by opening the cylinder valves.11

Late in the afternoon of 22 April 1915, a setting sun cast long shadows over the battle-scarred terrain around the medieval Belgium city of Ypres. In the distance the faint sound of large-caliber guns could be heard. Birds fluttered and swooped, seeking places to roost on the practically treeless landscape. Suddenly, at 1724, three flares rose from an observation balloon over the German lines and burst against the darkening eastern sky. German artillery commenced a fierce bombardment that landed to the rear of the French and British lines in the Ypres sector. Then, at 1800, an eerie silence fell over the area.
To View: German Pioneer troops opening cylinders for a gas attack, 1916.
Peering across the battlefield, men of two French divisions, the 87th Territorial and the 45th Algerian, saw blue-white wisps of haze rising from the German trenches. The haze swirled about, gathered in a cloud that slowly turned yellow-green and began to drift across the terrain at a height of up to six feet. As the cioud drifted, it settled into every depression in the landscape. Finally, the gentle north .northeasterly wind brought it spilling into the French trenches, silently enveloping the occupants in a misty, deadly embrace.

To the north and southwest of the now mist-enshruded French positions, British and Canadian troops looked into the haze and, to their amazement, saw soldiers, many without weapons, emerge from the cloud, running wildly, and in confusion toward positions to the rear. Terror-stricken Algerians ran by the startled Dominion troops, coughing And clutching their throats. Moments later French soldiers staggered by, blinded, coughing, chests heaving, faces an ugly purple color, lips speechless with agony. One by one, the guns of the French artillery batteries in the sector stoppedfiring, and the two French divisions collapsed. The Ypres front now had a gap over four-miles wide containing hundreds of men in a comatose or dying condition. After half an hour, German troops, equipped with cotton wadding tied over their faces-a primitive form of protective mask-cautiously advanced into the breech created by the discharge of chlorine gas.
To View: Ypres sector in Belgium, 22 April-24 May 1915

Following the initial shock and surprise, Allied commanders began to bring forward reserve troops and to move units from the left and right flank into the gap. The Germans advanced four and one-half miles – until they encountered the ragged edge of a hurriedly organized defensive line (Map 2). The First Canadian Division and assorted French troops manned the line in scattered, hastily prepared positions 1,000 to 3,000 yards apart. This improvised defense, together with the fact that the Germans had lost some of their combat edge during the month-long wait for favorable winds, finally slowed and then halted the attack. As for the German troops who reached their initial objective, they had only the most primitive protective equipment. When they saw the havoc their own gas had wrought, they had no wish to proceed any farther that night.

Two days later, during which time the British and French brought reinforcements into the area, the Germans discharged more gas. Although they did so again four more times throughout May, the element of surprise had been lost. The British and French troops were now equipped with their own primitive masks, and although the defenders suffered severe losses (over 5,900 casualties-nearly double the number of casualties for the attackers), the Germans could gain no more than a few hundred yards beyond the forward limit of their first attack. The German High Command, surprised as its opponents at the success of the new weapon, had no reserves to exploit a possible success. Thus, one of the war’s greatest tactical surprises was dissipated on what amounted to an experimental attack with limited objectives.12
To View: German medics, wearing an early mask, giving oxygen to gas victim, 1915. British, French, and Russian prototype masks were similar in design.

With the battle front at Ypres now stabilized, the British and French had to decide whether or not retaliate in kind. Faced with the Germans’ obvious technological advantage, the Allies at first hesitated to retaliate for fear of inviting the expansion of gas warfare. But when, the British Expeditionary Force commander reported that a lack of an offensive gas capability would seriously impair the morale of his troops, the British cabinet gave its approval to use chemical agents. The French government soon followed suit for basically the same reason.13

On 24 September 1915, at 0550 near Loos, Belgium, the British launched the Allies’ first attack supported by gas. It had taken them five frantic months to reach a point at which a large-scale gas attack was feasible. During that period, several Special Companies of Royal Engineers had been trained in the emplacement and discharge of gas cylinders. Unlike the Germans, the British decided to conduct their gas attack on a wide frontage. This necessitated the deployment of the cylinders clustered in batteries along the front rather than spaced far apart in one continuous line. To accomplish this, the British constructed galleries in front of the first-line trenches and positioned in them 5,500 cylinders containing 150 tons of chlorine.* The frontage was too wide to saturate all of it with gas, so the British decided to utilize smoke candles to simulate gas in those areas where the agent could not be used. By alternating the discharges of gas and smoke, the gas attack could be prolonged over forty minutes. This planned smoke screen was the first used during the war.

*This forward placement was made to protect the cylinders from German artillery, which was zeroed in on the first line of trenches to the rear of the galleries.

Fortune did not favor this first British gas attack. During the evening prior to the attack, the winds died. The following morning the British commander, Gen. Sir Douglas Haig, made a controversial decision to proceed with the attack despite uncertainty as to whether or not the slight breeze that rose in the morning would continue to blow toward the German lines. On the right flank, the gentle winds brought the gas and smoke mixture into the German trench system. There, the mild wind worked to the British advantage, for the cloud lingered and did not dissipate. On the left flank, however, not only did the winds fail, but in several positions the gas wafted back into the British trenches, engulfing the troops waiting to attack.

The Germans were taken by surprise. Their troops had little awareness of the danger posed by gas and were not sufficiently trained in defensive measures. The war diary of the German Sixth Army, the unit that bore the brunt of the attack, described the results. The gas in some instances caused little but momentary confusion, while in other cases entire units lost their ability to resist the follow-up British infantry attack. The German mask, which was essentially the same one used at Ypres, broke down as the gas lingered. The chlorine also caused rifles, machine guns, and even artillery breechblocks to jam. The most effective result of the gas was that it rendered German officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) incapable of shouting commands loud enough to be heard through their masks. The dense clouds of smoke and gas also shrouded positions and precluded officers and NCOs from leading by example.14

In spite of some British gains, the attack fell short of the desired results for three reasons. The first was the decision to proceed with the attack despite the unfavorable wind conditions. Second, the British artillery was hampered in providing support because it lacked sufficient shells. Third, there were no reserve divisions to exploit a breakthrough. In his report, the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French, acknowledged that, although the attack failed to penetrate the German lines, the gas attack met with marked success, and produced a demoralizing effect in some of its opposing units. More important, the major belligerents had accepted and expanded the use of chemicals as weapons of war.15

The ensuing chemical war proved to be one of experimentation with gases and with defensive add offensive equipment. As tactical doctrine and training evolved to reflect technological changes, the availability of gases and the imagination of commanders became the only limits to the employment of this new weapon.

The Europeans Face
Chemicals on the Battlefield,
1915-1918

Chapter 2

During World War I chemists on both sides investigated over 3,000 chemical substances for potential use as weapons. Of these, only thirty agents were used in combat, and only about a dozen achieved the desired military results (Table 1). Most armies grouped war gases according to their physiological effects, that is their effects on the human body.1

One category, lachrymators, was composed of tear gases such as xylyl bromide, an agent that primarily affected the eyes but in large concentrations could also damage the respiratory system. Asphyxiators, such as phosgene, chloropicrin, and chlorine, were in another category. These gases caused fluid to enter the lungs, thereby preventing oxygen from reaching the blood. Toxic gases, yet another category, passed through the lungs to the blood, preventing the circulation and release of oxygen throughout the body. Hydrogen cyanide ( Vincennite to the French) was one of the least effective toxic agents. Sternutators, such as diphenylchlorarsine, were a type of respiratory irritant composed of a very fine dust that caused sneezing, nausea, and vomiting. Some sternutators were systemic poisons that had a delayed toxic effect on the body. The final category held the greatest casualty producer-a vesicant or blister agent that, because of its peculiar odor, the British and later the Americans commonly referred to as mustard gas. *2

*The Germans referred to it as Yellow Cross because of the shell marking, and the French called it Yperite, in recognition of the location where it was first used.

In 1917 the Germans first used mustard against the Allies at Ypres. This was the only persistent agent used during World War I and had effects similar to those produced by a combination of lachrymatory, asphyxiator, and systemic poisons. Although called mustard gas, this chemical was not a gas, but rather a volatile liquid that, several hours after contact with the skin, would cause severe bums and blisters. The introduction of Yellow Cross caught the Allies completely by surprise. During the first attack, British infantry saw the gas shells explode, but were unable to see, smell or taste any agent, nor feel any immediate effects. The soldiers concluded that the Germans were trying to trick them and did not put on their masks. After several hours, to the consternation of officers and medics, the troops began to complain of pain in their eyes, throats, and lungs. Later, blisters appeared on the exposed skin of the British soldiers. The German use of Yellow Cross caused British gas casualties, which had been declining, to increase markedly. Because of its ability to produce large numbers of casualties, mustard was soon being referred to as the King of the war gases.3
TO VIEW: 1. Side view of gas cylinder emplacement

The major combatants realized that the employment of gas called for specially trained troops and, accordingly, formed offensive gas units. Because of the need to emplace gas cylinders, pioneer or engineer troops usually provided the cadre of these special units. The Germans converted two pioneer regiments, the 35th and 36th, into gas units consisting of three battalions each. The regiments would deploy by companies, according to the size of the front of the attack. In addition to these units, the Germans organized a gas mortar (Minenwerfen) battalion. The Austro-Hungarians followed the German model and created their own special gas units.4

As early as July, 1915, the French and British organized gas companies called Special by the British and Z for gaz (gas) by the French; both employed engineer troops as cadre. By 1917 the British had expanded their original four companies to twenty-one and had organized them as a Special Brigade. The French eventually created the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd gas battalions composed of three companies each. The Russians organized gas units and called them Gas Detachments of the Chemical Department, with one detachment assigned to each Russian Army, a total of thirteen.5

In addition to developing gas units and chemical agents, a constant search continued for efficient delivery systems. The cylinders used in the first gas attack at Ypres in 1915 were the major component of a cumbersome, immobile system, It usually took several days of intensive labor,* with infantry providing most of the muscle, to emplace the cylinders for a cloud attack (Figure 1). One can gain an indication of the difficulty of the task by noting that as many as 12,000 cylinders, each weighing over 100 pounds, were sometimes needed for a single operation. Once emplaced, the cylinders were dangerously exposed to enemy high explosive shells and easily damaged, Cylinder discharges always depended on favorable weather conditions.

*The time it took to install individual cylinders varied according to the terrain, weather, available manpower, and enemy harassing fire.
TO VIEW: 1. Summary of markings for chemical shell and properties of most common gases

Despite these problems, the British relied on cylinders as a delivery method until the end of the war. They normally used seven to eight cylinders in a section, six sections to a Special Brigade company. Sixteen companies could produce a gas wave or cloud that covered a 24,000-meter front. Several factors influenced the British decision to continue using cylinders. First, the prevailing winds favored Allied gas clouds. Second, the British suffered from a chronic shortage of shells and were reluctant to convert the production of high explosive shells to the production of gas shells. Third, British intelligence reports indicated a dense cloud attack was effective in producing mass casualties. On 26 October 1917, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Foulkes, Commander of the British Special Brigade, reviewed intelligence reports indicating that British cloud attacks created significant German casualties as far back as thirty kilometers from, the front-line trenchm Foulkes proposed that the Special Brigade use what he termed retired cylinder attacks, in which. a large number of cylinders would be emplaced behind British lines rather than in the front lines or forward of the trenches. Because the Special Brigade companies could assemble a greater number of cylinders in a relatively small area without the interference of enemy small arms or shell fire, this method allowed for a significantly greater concentration of gas released at one point.6

The British improved this tactic by conducting what they called beam attacks. These attacks called for placing numerous cylinders on narrowgauge tram cars that troops pushed forward to positions just behind the front trenches. After the cylinders were opened, the resulting gas concentration became so dense that friendly troops had to be evacuated from the path of the gas beam. On 24 May 1918 the British launched their first beam attack. This and similiar attacks, General Foulkes claimed, caused the Germans considerable anxiety, for they could not determine how and where the dense clouds originated. The beam attacks were especially deadly when launched from six or more separate railheads and when the individual clouds merged behind German lines. Prisoners taken from the German 9th Uhlan Regiment reported that one such attack caused 500 casualties in the neighboring 1st Landwehr Regiment, which, as a. result of the attack, had to be withdrawn from the line. According to the British, the effectiveness of the improved cloud attacks, with their increased density, continued to frustrate the German Army.7

The Germans, for their part, arranged their cylinders so that twenty formed a battery. Fifty such batteries were required to saturate one kilometer of front line with gas. The lack of favorable prevailing winds, however, soon forced the Germans to abandon the cloud attack. On 8 August 1916, they launched their last cylinder attack at Wieltje, near the scene of the first discharge at Ypres.8
To View: Narrow gauge tram gondola with gas cylinders.

Because the prevailing winds in Western Europe blew from west to east, the German Army began to place increasing reliance on gas-filled shells that detonated beyond Allied lines and whose contents could then drift back over enemy trenches. Gas shells could be fired. from standard artillery pieces with no extensive adaptation for gas employment. Although weather conditions still remained a factor, no longer did the Germans have to wait for the wind to change to a westerly direction. Now artillery could fire upward of the target, saturating it with gas and achieving the same effect as cylinders. Shells also offered an element of surprise not available with cloud attacks. Finally, gas shells proved more advantageous than high explosive rounds because the former did not have to score direct hits on a target to neutralize it. To avoid confusion and to aid artillerymen, the Germans developed a coded system of colored crosses to identify shells containing chemical agents.

The Germans were further encouraged to use gas shells by the results of an attack staged on the night of 22-23 June 1916. About 110,000 shells containing the lung irritant Green Cross fell on French forces near the fortress of Verdun. German batteries adjacent to this sector added thousands of rounds of a lachrymatory gas. The gas attack, according to French sources, had its greatest effect on French artillerymen and reserves in the rear areas, causing over 1,600 casualties. German staff officers, impressed with the results, talked of creating special gas batteries controlled by special gas staffs. In the interest of flexibility, however, the high command decided that all artillery units should fire gas shells. By the war’s end, gas shells comprised 50 percent of a German artillery battery’s basic.9

The British and,French also developed gas shells with unique color codes. The French Army used these shells almost as extensively as the Germans and fired the first phosgene-filled artillery shells on 22 February 1916 at Verdun. The French also experimented with an extremely small bursting charge in order to increase the gas payload. This French innovation allowed a stable, dense cloud to form. Although the French increased the chemical payload, they erred by adding comparatively harmless (smoke producers), such as stannic chloride, thus reducing the toxic capacity of their phosgene shells by 30 to 40 percent.10

The French committed another technical error in the gas war. The hydrocyanic acid (hydrogen cyanide) used in their Vincennite shell (named for the production location) was too volatile and filled only half of the shell’s capacity. Unless an extremely high concentration could be built up, there were no harmful effects. All the belligerents considered the Vincennite fill practically worthless. The French, for some reason, refused to accept this conclusion and manufactured over four million shells that, when fired, caused relatively few casualties.11
To View: British artillery firing and recieving gas shells, ca. 1916.

The British faced a constant artillery shell production shortage and supplemented their use of gas cylinders with the 4-inch Stokes mortar, introduced in July, 1916, at the Battle of the Somme, The weapon, designed specifically to fire gas and thermite shells, had a payload three times as large (six to nine pounds) as could be fired from the standard 3-inch mortar. A range of only 800 to 1,000 meters meant that effective delivery required emplacement in the front-line trenches. Members of the Special Brigade also experimented with a homemade contraption similar to a trench mortar.

To View: A 4-inch Stokes mortar used by British and American gas troops.

Early in 1917 Capt. William H. Livens, a British officer, developed a device made from ordinary steel containers. This makeshift mortar fired oil drums packed with oil-soaked cotton waste. Captain Livens also began to experiment with firing large gas-filled shells from his homemade trench mortar. This resulted in a new delivery system known as the Livens projector. In its final form the projector consisted of a drawn steel cylinder eight inches in diameter, one and one-fourth inch thick, that came in two sizes-two feet nine inches or four feet long. Rounded at one end, the cylinders had a base plate that looked like a Mexican sombrero. The projectors were buried in a trench cut at a forty-five degree angle for maximum range. Originally buried to the muzzle, this depth was later found to be unnecessary, and the projectors were thereafter emplaced only deep enough to steady them for firing. The shells used with the projectors carried a payload of thirty to forty pounds of chemical agent and had a range, depending on the length of the barrel, of either 1,200 or 1,900 meters. The British first used this delivery system for what they called gas shoots at Arras on 4 April 1917. The Germans reported that the density of the gas delivered by this method equaled that of a gas cloud. Captured German documents claimed that the Livens projector was a deadly weapon because it not only developed a dense concentration of gas similiar to the one created by cylinders, but like artillery, its impact came as a surprise. During the war the British fired ever 300 ga’s projector shoots. On 31 March 1918 the largest of these operations took place at Lens, with the firing of 3,728 of the devices.12

Increased casualties resulting from British gas projector attacks prompted the Germans to develop a similar weapon. Time constraints and the lack of industrial capacity for increased steel production forced them to retool their obsolete 18-cm heavy mortars. These tubes coul& fire a projectile containing three to four gallons of a chemical agent. In December, 1917, the Germans launched their first projector attack on the Western Front. In August, 1918, they introduced a rifled projector, 16-cm in diameter, that increased the range of the device to 3,500 meters. The shells contained thirteen pounds of chemical agent and five and one-half pounds of pumice. The pumice kept the chemical agent from. being flung into the air upon explosion. It also made the agent, usually phosgene, more persistent. In one instance, the gas reportedly lingered for one and one-half hours. Yet, impressive as were these results, the Germans, despite their efforts, continued to lag behind the British in the tactical use of this delivery system.13

Initially, the tactical employment of chemical weapons varied to some degree between the Allies and the Central Powers; however, these variations became less noticeable during the latter stages of the war. By November, 1918, the protagonists were using similiar delivery systems and chemical agents.
To View: Livens projector emplacement, 1918, used by British, French, and Americans.

From 1915 to 1918 the Germans held the initiative in most areas of gas warfare. They did this through the introduction of new agents that allowed them to direct more systematic thought to the question of how the employment of gas might alter a tactical situation. They were, for example, the first to use gas as an adjunct to maneuver in support of an infantry attack. The Allies struggled to keep up with such offensive doctrine, but they had to contend first with the development of effective defensive measures to counter German initiatives. Only after developing countermeasures could the Allies then plan their use of a new chemical agent or a new delivery system. This lag was evident in the case of the two most effective agents used in World War I, phosgene and mustard gas. The Germans introduced phosgene six months before the Allies were able to employ it and mustard a year ahead of their foe. The Allies had to adopt immediate defensive measures, such as effective mask filters and protective suits, before they could turn to the development of tactical doctrine. As far as the tactical employment of gas was concerned, wrote Lt. Col. Pascal Lucas, a French officer, it took us a long time to realize that the neutralization of personnel [by gas] could supplement the always incomplete destruction of defensive organizations by high explosives.14

British gas doctrine, when circumstances did permit its development, was driven in part by a shortage of artillery shells that prohibited the British Army from mounting an artillery gas attack until the summer of 1916. In the meantime, the British, as noted, convinced themselves that chemicals released from cylinders or projectors could most effectively be used to obtain the highest possible concentration of an agent in a specific area. The consequences of this doctrine were twofold: it prevented the British from employing gas to support mobile or open warfare, and it limited the. use of chemical agents primarily to the more restricted roles of attrition and harassment.

In the case of harassment, the British High Command, relying on intelligence reports, would indicate for one reason or another what German units it wished the Special Brigade to weaken or demoralize. German divisions recently transferred from the Eastern Front were prime targets because of their ignorance of defensive measures for gas warfare. The British sought out units that they expected to be transferred to the main battle fronts, i.e., Somme or Ypres, and tried to weaken them physically and psychologically before they deployed. On at least one occasion, a gas operation was postponed to await the arrival of a particular division. Once a German unit became a target for a gas attack, the Special Brigade made a point of following that unit around the front. The 1st Bavarian Regiment, for instance, was gassed fifteen times; the 1st Guards Regiment twelve times in six months; the 10th Bavarian Regiment ten times in five months, and the 9th Bavarian Regiment fourteen times from 28 June 1916 to 1 August 1917. The effects could be devastating to the morale of the gassed units and those units around them. A captured German diary recorded, We have again had many casualties through gas poisoning. I can’t think of anything worse; wherever one goes, one must take one’s gas mask with one, and it will soon be more necessary than a rifle. Things are dreadful here. 15

The British ultimately developed tactical doctrine for the use of gas shells. This doctrine set three methods for inflicting enemy gas casualties. The first and most favored method was by a surprise gas attack, in which British gunners attempted to establish the greatest concentration of gas in a target area by firing a lavish expenditure of ammunition at an extremely rapid rate. After one or two minutes of shelling, enemy soldiers who had not put on protective masks would be incapacitated by the dense gas; the remainder would be masked, rendering further bombardment uneconomical and unnecessary. The second method for using gas shells tried to exhaust the enemy by desultory fire over a period of many hours. In most instances, the British believed this attrition. method not worth the effort, because few casualties were produced. The third method was an attempt to penetrate the enemy’s gas masks with new agents such as chloropicrin, which when fired in a high concentration in a specific area, seeped into the masks and created intolerable eye irritation, coughing, vomiting, and inflammation of the respiratory tract. Enemy soldiers forced to remove their fouled masks were then subjected to a shelling with lethal phosgene.16

The Germans attempted to make the enemy trenches no less dreadful than their own. Having the technological advantage that gave them the ability to introduce new gases before the Allies, the Germans devoted much thought to the tactical employment of chemical weapons, and in this respect, they reached a high degree of sophistication. After abandoning cloud attacks, the Germans increased their use of gas shells. They discovered on the Eastern Front that tear gas was extremely effective in neutralizing Russian artillery. Even a few rounds would incapacitate a gun crew or, having forced it to mask, prevent it from delivering accurate fire. On the Western Front in 1916, the Germans fired some 2,000 tear gas shells at an extensive French trench system near Verdun. This massive surprise bombardment resulted in the capture of 2,400 Frenchmen who, after being temporarily blinded by the tear gas, were surrounded by German troops wearing goggles, but no masks.17

The Germans introduced other agents to the battlefield for specific tactical purposes. In May, 1916, they fired their Green Cross shell filled with diphosgene, a lung irritant. Later, as an indication of the increased sophistication of gas shells, they subdivided the Green Cross shell fill, first by a mix of 75 percent phosgene and 25 percent diphosgene, which was labled Green Cross 1. Then, in July, 1917, four different percentages of phosgene, diphosgene, and diphenylchlorosine called Green Cross 2, A, B, and C, respectively, were introduced. These were followed shortly by Blue Cross and Yellow Cross shells. The former shell was filled with an arsenic compound of finely separated dust. In field trials, this agent proved extremely effective in the penetration of all mask filters in existence. The need to encase the compound in a glass-lined shell, however, reduced its effectiveness, as the heat of the explosion failed to cause vaporization, and the force of the explosion caused only mechanical pulverization. The recipients, the French and British, considered Blue Cross a failure and not worth the effort. The introduction of Yellow Cross (mustard gas), however, again gave the Germans the initiative in chemical warfare, which they held to the end of the war. By increasing the explosive charge in the shell, the Germans further extended the area contaminated by this blister producing agent. This shell was marked by a double (Lorraine) cross.18

The Germans found gas persisted even longer when an agent and a small amount of high explosives were placed in one shell. The effect of the high explosive, when used in the proper amount, was to spread the agent over a wider area and keep it airborne longer. With this knowledge, the Germans changed their gas doctrine from attacking a, particular target to gassing large areas for extended periods of time. German staff officers began to plan operations that called for gas barriers and gas pockets.

German tactical doctrine for the use of artillery gas shells offered a variety of possibilities. For the offense, it called for surprise and the concentration of as much gas as possible through the sudden and rapid placement of shells on a target area. Cloud concentration tactics imitated surprise tactics, but with an increase in the number of shells and an expansion of the size of a target area. Another offensive tactic was the use of gas shells that contained a high explosive charge and shrapnel. These shells, used exclusively by the Germans, had an effect so devastating that the efficacy of a high explosive shrapnel [gas] shell bombardment was always increased. Once introduced, the Germans always added a percentage of these shells to any high explosive or shrapnel bombardment. The high explosive-gas shell was used extensively in German rolling barrages to support advancing infantry during the spring offenses of 1918. These shells were also used to neutralize known enemy artillery batteries and machine gun nests, thus allowing German infantry to bypass Allied strong points.19

The key figure in the expansion of German gas shell tactical doctrine was Lt. Col. Georg Bruchniffiler, known as Durchbruck (Breakthrough) and considered an artillery genius because of his success on the battlefield. While on the Eastern Front, Bruchmiiller, a great believer in the efficiency of gas shells, developed a highly sophisticated system of gas artillery fire. His tactical ideas were incorporated in the December, 1917, edition of the German manual for employment of gas shells.20 Bruchmiiller’s system created Gas Squares, which were areas known to hold enemy batteries or concentrations of enemy troops. These locations would be saturated by surprise gas shell fire, and the lethal concentration would be renewed by subsequent periodic fire. Bruchmiiler’s artillery tactics achieved surprise through a predicted-fire method that eliminated the usual ranging of the target by one gun of a battery. Bruchmiiller formulated advanced firing data and tables based on meteorological variables such as wind, air temperature, and barometric pressure.21

*Infantry troops seeking shelter from. the high explosive bombardment were often forced into locations such as shell holes, where the gas settled. Furthermore, the concussion often stripped a mask off a soldier’s face, exposing him to gas poisoning. More important, this tactic made Allied soldiers mask everytime they were subjected to artillery fire.
To View: British soldiers blinded by mustard gas at an advance aid station near Béthune during the German Lys spring offensives, 9 – 29 April 1918.

When Blue Cross and Yellow Cross shells became available, Bruchmiiller devised Buntkreuz (colored cross) tactics. One of the most successful uses of this new doctrine came on the Eastern Front, in the German crossing of the Dvina River before Riga (Map 3). On 1 September 1917 a two-hour preliminary bombardment of the Russian batteries created varicolored zones, as combinations of Blue Cross and Green Cross were used both during bombardment and then during three hours of firing for effect. For the preliminary gas fire, each German battery had a set of firing sequences every twelve minutes to counter Russian batteries, which first maintained a desultory fire and then fell silent. According to German estimates, more than 116,400 gas shells were fired, which caused at least a thousand Russian casualties, mainly because of the ineffectual respirators issued to Russian troops. The figure might have been higher had not the Russians fled. German infantry reached the opposite bank to find that the Russian artillery crews had abandoned their guns in great haste, resembling flight. The Russian infantry, which lacked effective personal protection against chemical agents, had followed suit.22

*Zones containing either Blue, Green, or Yellow Cross gas shells or combinations of all three.
TO VIEW: Varicolored zones of German gas fired in support of a crossing of the Dvina River before Riga, Eastern Front, 1 September 1917

Persistent agent fire was used tactically by the Germans on both the offense and the defense. Surprise, though desirable, was not necessary for persistent agents. Yellow Cross allowed an area to be cleared of, or rendered inaccessible to, the enemy. Fire continued for several hours, and the contamination could be renewed each day thereafter, if so desired. The areas gassed were called Yellow Zones of Defense. In April, 1918, the Germans shelled the city of Armentieres with mustard gas (Map 4). The bombardment was so heavy that witnesses claimed liquid mustard gas ran in the streets. Naturally, the British evacuated the locale; the contamination, however, prevented the Germans from entering the city for two weeks. In the spring offensives of 1918 (Map 5), the Germans created mustard gas zones to protect the flanks of advancing infantry, to neutralize enemy strong points, to deny the enemy key terrain, to block supply routes, and to render enemy artillery batteries ineffective. Even in open warfare, a German officer wrote, the troops soon were asking for gas supporting fire. 23
To View: Various types of gas masks used in World War I.

Mustard gas caused considerable consternation among the Allies. We were outdistanced … a French officer noted, the German lead on us in this respect … was a source of real inquietude, for the units that were exposed suffered considerably and the struggle against Yperite seemed most deceptive of solution. The Allies eventually responded in kind, but not until June, 1918, a full year after the Germans introduced the ultimate agent of World War I, did the French use Yperite, and it took the British until 26 September 1918 to retaliate with mustard. So desperate were the French to obtain the agent that British officers reported teams of French soldiers draining unexploded German Yellow Cross shells in order to reuse the gas.24
TO VIEW: 4. German gas shell bombardment of Armentières on 9 April 1918

TO VIEW: 5. The German spring offensives of 1918 were heavily supported by a variety of gases

Personal protection was always a problem, one neither side ever really solved in World War I. The German High Command, prior to the first attack at Ypres, made no effort to develop an efficient gas mask. Attacking German soldiers had small protective bags of mull or hemp that were soaked in a sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) solution and then tied over the mouth and nose. Not until the closing months of 1915 did the German army begin to issue a self-contained respirator. The mask had a treated leather facepiece (because of the shortage of rubber, only officer facepieces were constructed of this material, which was more efficient than leather and easier to maintain) and eyepieces of an outer glass lens and a celluloid inner lens. The first German mask had a significant drawback: the filter had to be screwed on to the facepiece each time the mask was used, which meant that more time was required to mask during a gas attack. Later, this problem was remedied by a single construction model with a replaceable filter element.25
To View: German artillerymen wearing the single-piece gas mask, early 1917.

The French, British, and Russians did not coordinate their research and development of gas defenses. Although they passed information and some equipment to each other, they worked independently for the most part on their own protective masks.* In England, shortly after the first gas attack in April, 1915, housewives were asked by the high command to produce what became popularly known as the Black Veil Respirator-black veiling held a pad of cotton waste soaked in a chemical solution over the nose and mouth. These makeshift masks reached the British trenches in early May. When, in the latter part of 1915, the Germans began to use tear gas, the British countered with a flour sack type mask made of flannel, called the Hypo or H-Helmet after the chemical in which it was soaked, calcium hypochlorite. This mask offered protection to the eyes as well as to the respiratory system. One British officer described it as a smoke helmet, a greasy grey-felt bag with a tale window certainly ineffective against gas. This H-Helmet contained two celluloid eyepieces, but no apparatus to expel the carbon dioxide that built up in the mask.26

*This go-it-alone attitude, created perhaps by national pride, prevailed for most of the war in many areas besides chemical warfare. In fact, it was not until the German spring 1918 offensives that a Supreme Command came into existence to direct and coordinate the operations of the Allied armies.
To View: British machine gun crew with PH-Helmets (note exhaust valve) firing during a German gas attack, Oise Sector, Marne, France, 1916.

In the fall of 1915 British intelligence learned of Germany’s intention to use a new gas, phosgene, a delayed-action choking agent, The Russians had also learned that the Germans intended to employ phosgene and advised the British that a solution of phenate-hexamine was effective in blocking the agent. As a result, the British soaked their H-Helmet in the Russian solution and added an outlet valve to reduce the carbon dioxide buildup inside the mask. The British Army called the new device the PH-Helmet. The troops called it a. goggle-eyed booger with a tit. 27
To View: French soldiers with M-2 masks advance through a gas cloud.

Although the PH-Helmet successfully blocked phosgene, it had serious drawbacks: it was hot, stuffy, and emitted an unpleasant odor; it also offered little protection against dense concentrations of lachrymatory agents. To counteract both phosgene and the lachrymating agents, the British in early 1916 took an entirely different approach to protective masks by developing a two-piece device called the Large Box or Tar Box Respirator. A canister worn on the back contained neutralizing chemicals and attached by a rubber hose to a facepiece covering the chin, mouth, and nose. The wearer endured an uncomfortable noseclip and a mouthpiece similar to an athlete’s rubber tooth protector. Goggles protected the eyes. The advantage of the mask rested in the use of a large filter. However, this also caused difficulties because the canister was too large and clumsy to be carried for extended distances over prolonged periods. This kind of mask reached its final stage of development with the introduction of the Small Box Respirator (SBR), which employed a smaller filter worn on the chest and a single construction facepiece. The details of the SBR became very familiar to men of the American Expeditionary Forces.28

The French wrote a different chapter to the development of the gas mask. After using the same primitive masks as the British, they set out to develop a mask that was both effective and comfortable to wear – two criteria that were, and still are, essential for the successful design of protective devices. The first significant French protective device, the M-2 mask, was similar in design to the British H-Helmet, except it did not cover the entire head, but took the form of a snout similar to a feedbag for a horse. Its filtration ability was limited, so French doctrine called for troops to be rotated after several hours of exposure to any gas.29 In 1917 the French introduced the ARS (Appareil Respiratoire Speécial) mask. In appearance it resembled German protective equipment. The rubber facepiece had a waxed or oiled linen lining. Inhaled air passed in front of the eyepieces to prevent clouding. A canister attached to the facepiece could not be removed.

In September, 1917, these French masks were followed by another, the Tissot, which became one of the most effective masks of the war. As one postwar American observer noted, the French deserve great credit for the introduction of this defensive piece of equipment. In design, the Tissot was similar to the British Small Box Respirator except that the former’s filter canister was carried on the soldier’s back, not chest. This meant that infantrymen could carry only the Tissot and no other equipment. It covered the entire face, but without the uncomfortable nose clip and mouthpiece. The design allowed air to enter the mouth across the eyepieces, thus removing the normal phenomenon of condensation. The circulation of fresh air also diluted any lachrymatory gases that might enter the mask. Finally, the entire facepiece was of thin rubber. The French thought the filter location, the same as for the Large Tar Box Respirator, clumsy and difficult to adjust and, therefore, judged it unsuitable for infantry. Troops, such as artillery gun crews and stretcher bearers, who were not loaded with personal equipment and who had to continue to fight or function during a gas attack, did receive the mask. These soldiers found, in addition to comfort, that one could breathe easier and that the filtration system was superior to the ARS and M-2 mask.30

Unlike the British and French, the Russians devoted few resources to the development of chemical protective equipment. Consequently, they suffered the greatest number of chemically inflicted casualties in World War I. On 2 May 1915, not quite a month after the second Battle of Ypres during which French Colonial and Territorial troops collapsed under the first German gas attack, the Russians were subjected to a similar experience. German pioneer troops directed by Fritz Haber released 263 tons of chlorine gas from 12,000 cylinders against Russian troops at Bolimov. The first cylinder attack on the Eastern Front killed 6,000 Russian soldiers. Two more gas cloud attacks were made on the same position, and upward of 25,000 Russian casualties resulted. According to German sources, in June, 1915, at Bzura, two Russian regiments, the 55th and 56th Siberian, suffered approximately 9,000 gas casualties, or about 90 percent of their total strength. On 7 September 1916 a German cloud attack killed 600 Russian officers and men. The following month Transbaikal Cossacks suffered 4,000 casualties. A gas attack in 1917 cost the Russians 12 officers, 1,089 men killed, and 53 officers, 7,738 men incapacitated. Despite these casualties, the Tzarist Army developed only one mask in addition to the basic chemical-soaked gauze respirator. The fabric facepiece of this mask covered the head and attached directly to a canister containing a charcoal filter. It looked similar to the bill on a duck. Although the mask had no noseclip or mouthpiece, soldiers still found it extremely uncomfortable because the weight of the filter placed a great strain on the muscles of the neck. To make matters worse, the filter of this mask was of questionable effectiveness. By 1917 different types of British and French masks were being sent to Russia and used, to some limited extent, by Russian troops.31

By the summer of 1917, when U.S. troops began to arrive at French ports, chemical warfare had become commonplace and, in practice, had reached a high degree of sophistication compared to the first significant gas attack at Ypres a little over two years earlier. By July the most effective chemical agent of the war, mustard or Yellow Cross, had made its appearance. Gas shells now might contain two or even three different agents. All of the delivery systems for chemical war were in operation and efforts were being made by the combatants to improve on these weapons. The British had, for example, devised electronically detonated cylinders on tram cars for beam attacks. Also, the British had finally begun to overcome their shell production problems and had used gas shells in large quantities at the Battle of Arras in April, 1917.

Tactical doctrine for chemical warfare had reached a high level of sophistication, especially in artillery employment. In this area, the Germans, thanks to Lt. Col. Georg Bruchmüller, led the way. German artillery firing instructions became increasingly complex in regard to the selection of the gas or combination of gases to be used in a variety of tactical situations.

Given the advantage of viewing the development of chemical warfare from afar, the United States Army, upon entering the war, should have been in a position to operate in a chemical environment without repeating the costly experiences of the French, British, and Germans. Unfortunately, this was not to be the case.

The U.S. Army’s Response
to Chemical Warfare,
1915-1917

Chapter 3

Most of the information Americans received concerning the war and chemical warfare in Europe came from the news media. Because the Royal Navy had cut the German trans-Atlantic cable early in the war, almost all news from the Continent flowed through British and French censors.

According to one author of a study on chemical warfare, Frederick Brown, Allied control of chemical warfare information to the United States can be divided into four distinct phases. During the first phase the Germans were portrayed as violators of the Hague Convention. Reports indicated that the German Army had introduced a barbaric and inhumane weapon. This line, of course, was geared to gaining,support and perhaps intervention by the United States on the side of the Allies in the European war. When the French and British decided to retaliate with gas, the message changed, with Allied releases indicating that the German’s first use of gas justified retaliation and the reluctant employment of similiar weapons by the Allies. A note of righteous indignation pervaded these reports, although the reports were toned down considerably when discussing the effects of gas. In the third stage, which occurred during the spring and summer of 1917, there was a total news blackout on information concerning the gas war. Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell speculated on the cause. He acknowledged an increased use of chemical agents on both sides and believed the Allies feared and perhaps with reason that a picture of gas warfare, if presented to the Americans, would result in a unreasonable dread of gases on the part of the American nation and its soldiers. The fourth and final phase, which came after U.S. entry into the war, was ushered in with a burst of information with virtually no censorship. The use of chemicals in this phase was depicted as a triumph of Allied technology, an example of good overcoming evil.1

Restricted Allied propaganda during the first three phases mentioned above impeded U.S. preparedness in chemical warfare in two ways. First, it gave U.S. officers the impression that the belligerents were making minimal use of gas and that chemical weapons, when employed, had little or no impact on the battlefield. Second, it created the perception among Army officers that chemical warfare, introduced by the barbaric Hun, was inhuman and somehow sullied the honor of the professional soldier.2

There were other reasons for the military’s lack of appreciation of this new weapon. President Wilson’s efforts to maintain strict neutrality during the first two years of the war hampered the Army’s planning for defense. When, at one point, Wilson discovered that the General Staffs War College Division had prepared contingency plans for a war with Germany, he reprimanded Secretary of War Lindley Garrison. When the Army did tackle the problem of preparedness, chemical warfare, because it was an unfamiliar subject to most planners, received little attention. Other matters seemed more pressing. There were, for example, significant shortages of all kinds of war materiel. In 1915, the U.S. Army had only twenty-one aircraft, as compared to Britain’s 250 and France’s 500. The United States had fewer than 700 3inch guns, while the French alone had 4,800 of a similar caliber prior to the outbreak of war. Based on Western Front usage, the U.S. Army had only a two-day supply of artillery shells. Similarly, four days of trench warfare would exhaust the U.S. inventory of small arms ammunition. In the assignment of priorities to overcome these and other deficiencies, chemical warfare came nowhere near the top of the list.3

During the summer of 1915, the U.S. Army War College published studies on the impact of the war on each belligerent’s industrial base. In this report, the implications of chemical weapons and gas warfare received no notice. In November, 1915, two months after the British retaliated with gas at the Battle of Loos, the War College published a supplement to the earlier studies. This report included a survey of developments in weapons, equipment, and force structuring, but interestingly, still did not mention gas warfare.

Even the preparedness movement and the passage of the 1916 National Defense Act did nothing to spur an American assessment of the chemical war being waged in Europe. In fact, during Congressional hearings over preparedness for national defense, poison gas was mentioned only once when Col. Charles G. Treat of the U.S. Army’s General Staff testified on the subject of changing artillery doctrine in Europe. Following a discussion of shrapnel shells, one Senator asked Treat, Are they still using the poisonous gas over there, Colonel? Treat replied, The papers say so, but we have not had any actual reports from our observers that they are using them. In November, 1916, the same month that Treat testified, the War Department’s Board of Ordnance and Fortifications noted that certain practices with poison gas in the European war made necessary the procurement of appropriate defensive equipment, such as gas masks for the Army. The board observed that no branch of the U.S. Army then handled anything remotely connected with chemical warfare.4

The board, in its final report, recommended that responsibility for the design, but not the supply, of gas masks be given to the Army’s Medical Department. In reviewing the records of the board, the Adjutant General sent extracts of the comments that pertained to gas defense equipment to the Surgeon General, who concurred with the board’s findings. The Chief of Staff also concurred, after which the Secretary of War gave the Surgeon General responsibility for the development and design of gas masks. No decision was made as to which branch of the Army would supply troops with protective gas equipment.5

The Surgeon General had detailed a number of medical officers to serve as observers with the French and British armies. Reports on the medical aspects of the European conflict, including the diagnosis and treatment of gas victims, were received by the Surgeon General from 1916 on. Unfortunately, for unexplained reasons, the Surgeon General took no action to initiate the development of protective gas devices. The Adjutant General, for his part, shelved the entire matter. Thus, on the eve of American intervention, the Army acted as if it had barely heard of chemical warfare.6

The Secretary of War’s Annual Report for 1917 reflected this neglect. The report pompously declared that the councils of prudence and forethought should prepare the Army to surprise the enemy rather than lag defensively behind the surprises which he prepares for us. The Secretary went on to acknowledge the tremendous impact of science on the war in Europe and referred specifically to the introduction of the airplane and the submarine. As for chemicals, he merely noted that there were other scientific novelties that had surfaced in the European conflict.7

In February, 1917, the question the scientific novelty called poison gas was finally raised by an anxious Quartermaster General who pointedly asked the Adjutant General exactly which bureau of the War Department would furnish the Army with gas masks if the need arose. The question prompted the Adjutant General to initiate correspondence with the’Chief of Ordnance, the Quartermaster General, and the Surgeon General to decide on the responsibility for gas mask production. At the time of the correspondence, the Surgeon General had yet to begin a program of gas mask development.8

That same month the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Mines took the first positive steps toward preparing the Army for chemical warfare. The director, Van H. Manning, displayed a great deal more vision and foresight than did his military colleagues in Washington. At a bureau meeting, Manning asked his department chiefs what they could do to be useful if the nation should become involved in the European war. Since its founding in 1908, the bureau had investigated poison gases found in mines, conducted research on breathing devices, and examined ways to treat miners who had succumbed to noxious fumes. Obviously, this work had a direct application to chemical warfare. The day following the meeting, the Secretary of the Interior authorized Manning to contact another civilian organization,. the Military Committee of the National Research Council. In a letter to C. D. Walcott, the chairman of the committee, Manning pointed out that the bureau could adapt for military application a self-contained breathing apparatus then in use for mine rescues. Also, the bureau had a test chamber at the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, experimental station that could be used to conduct tests on military gas masks then in use by the Europeans. The bureau hoped that the information obtained from this research could be given to the Army, allowing it to adopt the best gas mask, should the need arise.9

Upon receipt of this letter, Walcott arranged a meeting between representatives of the General Staffs War College Division and the Bureau of Mines. The meeting proved productive: at the end of February, 1917, the War Department accepted the bureau’s offer of assistance and agreed to furnish the support, exclusive of funding, necessary to move the work along. Still, no immediate action. was taken by either the Army or the Bureau of Mines to begin a defensive gas equipment research program.

On 6 April 1917, when the U.S. declared war on Germany, the Army not only lacked defensive equipment for chemical warfare, but also had no concrete plans to develop or manufacture gas masks or any other defensive equipment. Even if gas masks had been available, the Army would have had no idea how to conduct defensive gas training. Moreover, no one in the nation seemed to have any practical knowledge concerning offensive chemical warfare equipment or the doctrine then used by the Allies and the Germans for its employment.
Even after the declaration of war by Congress and the decision to ship an American division overseas, preparations for chemical warfare lacked a sense of urgency. The same day war was declared, the Council of National Defense formed a Committee on Noxious Gases. The group met in Washington and immediately adjourned to study British and French gas warfare literature. At later meetings the committee established definite guidelines for Bureau of Mines research to follow in the development of masks. Only then did the chemists at the bureau’s Pittsburgh experimental station begin in earnest to develop an American gas mask. The committee also recommended that gas mask production be kept separate and distinct from research.10

In May, 1917, the General Staff awoke to the fact that the division requested by the French and British as a token force might well be in combat in a matter of months without any defensive gas equipment L. P. Williamson, liaison officer between the Bureau of Mines and the War Department, received a directive from the General Staff telling him to seek the bureau’s assistance in the manufacture of 25,000 gas masks. George A. Burrell,* a civilian chemist in the bureau’s Research Laboratory, readily and willingly accepted the task, but not, as he later noted, fully appreciating all the conditions which a war mask had to encounter. Burrell should not have been so hard on himself. No one in the United States really understood or even knew much about the employment of chemical defensive equipment on the battlefield.11

*Burrell was made a colonel in the Corps of Engineers and later served in the Chemical Warfare Service Research Division.

Working day and night, employees of four different civilian companies fabricated 20,088 masks and filters, using a British Small Box Respirator (SBR) as a model. The masks were shipped overseas to be examined and tested by British experts. They were quickly rejected. The British cabled back that the masks were unacceptable for combat because the mouthpiece was too large and stiff. They also found the rubberized cloth facepiece did not filter out the agent chloropicrin, which was then being used by the Germans in increasing quantities. The filter, which was worn on the chest in a container, had soda-lime granules that were too soft. With repeated jolting, the granules would clog the canister and increase resistance to breathing.

While this was going on, the acting Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Tasker Bliss, after a lengthy round of memoranda initiated by the Adjutant General, informed the Surgeon General on 16 May 1917 that, in addition to research and development, the Medical Department would be responsible for supplying the U.S. Army with gas masks and other defensive equipment. During the next fiscal year the Medical Department would be responsible for supplying 1,000,000 gas masks, 8,500 decontamination sprayers for use in trench warfare, and 1,000 oxygen resuscitators for the treatment of chemical casualties. Unfortunately, neither the Chief of Staff nor the Surgeon General created an office to procure the equipment. The Surgeon General did, however, assign an officer to the National Research Council’s Committee on Noxious Gases.12

The Committee on Noxious Gases soon met with representatives from the Army and Navy and with members of a French scientific mission. After several sessions, the committee sent a memorandum to the Secretary of War on 2 July 1917, informing him that it had worked out a partial organization plan for a gas service. Unfortunately, the use of the term gas service was misleading, because what the committee recommended turned out to be a cumbersome decentralized system for preparing the Army for chemical warfare. The offensive aspects of gas warfare, the committee explained, should be handled by the Ordnance Department, the defensive measures by the Medical Department. The Bureau of Mines would continue to direct research, and the Corps of Engineers would receive responsibility for handling all chemical warfare material on the battlefield. The General Staff immediately put this decentralized system into effect.13

On 24 July 1917 the Chief of Staff ordered the Medical Department to provide nine officers as instructors for a Gas Defense School to be organized at the Infantry School of Musketry, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. As a result of this order, the Medical Department received the additional responsibility for the conduct of defensive gas training. Medical officers with absolutely no experience in gas warfare were now expected to train other medical officers for duty as instructors for an Army that would eventually be expanded to over three million men.14

After an interminable delay, the Surgeon General on 31 August 1917 finally created a Gas Defense Service composed of three sections: Field Supply, Overseas Repair, and Training. He placed a Medical Corps officer in command and filled his staff with members of the Medical Department’s Sanitary Corps.* The officers had no chemical warfare doctrine to guide them. Only two War Department publications existed in the United States to assist these gas officers: a hurriedly compiled Notes on Gas as a Weapon in Modern War and a Memorandum on Gas Poisoning in Warfare. Both publications appear to have borrowed extensively from French and British gas warfare doctrine, some of it outdated.15

*The Sanitary Corps is equivalent to today’s Medical Service Corps.
The creation of a Training Section, even with its limited expertise, came none too soon. In September, 1917, draftees, volunteers, and National Guardsmen began to arrive at the thirty-six training cantonments scattered across the country. Sanitary Corps and division medical officers, with only several thousand masks at their disposal (including the 20,088 rejected by the British), faced the overwhelming task of training hundreds of thousands of troops in gas warfare and gas defense. Shortages of equipment, manuals, and knowledge were not the only problems facing the new gas officers. Gas was such a new weapon that division commanders and their staff officers were unwilling to give up training time for chemical defense at the expense of more traditional military skills such as close order drill and marksmanship. It was a wonder that any defensive training in gas warfare took place. Many times it did not. Initially, there were at best one or two hours of gas defense lectures, sometimes accompanied by a demonstration of how to wear the gas mask.16

The lack of knowledge and experience with gas bred ignorance and superstition among recruits and veterans alike. Rumors swept through the camps that Germany had a gas that would make [soldiers’] eyes drop out of their sockets or their fingers and toes drop off. To the unsophisticated youths who filled the training camps, gas was mysterious enough, but add to it the word chemical, and it became hopelessly beyond … their conception. Gas was such an intangible thing, a division commander noted, that a level of understanding adequate to guard against the dangers it posed was difficult to reach. Reaching such a level continued to be a hopeless task because no coherent U.S. gas warfare doctrine existed. As a consequence, a majority of World War I doughboys found themselves in a chemical combat environment with only a minimal amount of defensive gas training and with no idea of what this training really meant. 17

Confronted with this unfortunate situation, the War College of the General Staff examined the evolving gas defense program in the fall of 1917. Defensive training in gas warfare – regardless of how rudimentary – had to be given to men going to Europe. Ypres had proved what chemical warfare could do to unprepared soldiers. Severe casualties and battlefield defeat might well occur if immediate steps were not taken to train men in the defensive aspects of chemical warfare. As a result, the War College requested and received a British gas officer and a gas NCO for each of the thirty-six training cantonments.

*The British Special Brigade of the Royal Engineers was an offensive gas unit. (See Chapter 2.)

In late October, 1917, the British gas experts arrived in the United States. Their activities were coordinated and directed by Maj. S.J.M. Auld, Special Brigade, Royal Engineers.* Auld quickly made his presence felt. Impressed by the British gas officer’s knowledge and practical experience, the War College and the Field Training Section asked him to prepare a working textbook on gas in order to fill the U.S. Army’s doctrinal void in chemical warfare. Working with Sanitary Corps Capt. James H. Walton, Auld wrote four pamphlets that were later combined as Adjutant General Document 705, Gas Warfare. They were initially published individually in the following order:

Part Three: Methods of Training in Defensive Methods
Part Two: Methods of Defense Against Attack
Part One: German Methods of Offense
Part Four: The Offensive in Gas Warfare -Cloud and Projector

*Later, in October, 1918, the Army Gas School was moved to Camp Kendrick, adjacent to Lakehurst, New Jersey, the proving ground for the new Chemical Warfare Service established on 11 May 1918.

Thus, British gas warfare doctrine edited by the War College Division of the General Staff became U.S. Army doctrine.18

Auld strongly influenced the organization of the U.S. Army for chemical warfare in one other way. When he and other British officers discovered that the General Staff had placed defensive training under the Medical Department, they were appalled. The British officers insisted that gas defense was purely a military affair ; in their opinion, proper defensive measures were largely a question of discipline. Based on the experience of the British Army, such procedures were so closely connected with the soldier’s fighting activities that preparation for chemical warfare could not be carried out by a noncombat branch of the’Army. The British were so emphatic that, in January, 1918, by order of the General Staff, the Field Training Section of the Sanitary Corps passed to the Corps of Engineers.19

Major Auld also suggested the establishment of a Central Army Gas School to train Divisional, Brigade and Regimental Gas officers and other personnel whom it might be desirable to educate in Gas Warfare. This idea was already under consideration by the General Staff. The result was the establishment of an Army Gas School at Camp A. A. Humphreys, Virginia,* where in May, 1918, two initial courses began. The first, a four-day course for officers and noncommissioned officers, provided general information on gas warfare. The second, a twelve-day course, was for Chief Gas Officers who would be assigned to division and higher echelon staffs. Although there were similarities between the two courses, the Chief Gas Officers’ instruction went into greater detail on most matters. The shortage of trained gas officers in the AEF prevented students from being held for longer periods of field training on subjects such as gas detection, construction of gas-proof dugouts, and the proper wearing of respirators.20

**In January, 1918, the General Staff placed the Sanitary Corps’ Field Training Section under the Corps of Engineers.
To View: Recruits undergoing a simulated gas attack at a National Army Camp, 1918.

Auld assisted in training the first U.S. gas officers, forty-five first lieutenants, all chemists, who were assigned to the Field Training Section of the Sanitary Corps.** The instruction took place at the American University in Washington, DC. In January, 1918, after three months of training in gas warfare and general military subjects, thirty-three of the forty-five officers, together with their British instructors, departed for duty at division training camps. The other twelve went directly to France. Unfortunately, by January, 1918, six of the thirty U.S. divisions destined to see combat in France had either left the States or had completed training. The men in these units had received no chemical warfare training before embarking for Europe. As for the divisions that did receive some training before shipping overseas, their division gas officers were afterwards assigned to the 473d Engineer Regiment, a stateside administrative holding unit. Thus, the first trained gas officers did not deploy with the men they had trained. Although necessary for the training of subsequent divisions, this decision had, in the words of one gas officer, a discouraging effect upon the men and upon gas training and discipline in general in the unit deployed overseas. The confidence of the embarking troops was hardly bolstered when the experts on chemical warfare stayed home.

As the war progressed, the training in the division camps improved. In January, 1918, the 29th Division’s gas training at Camp McClellan consisted of a brief lecture and gas mask drill for one hour daily, five days a week, under the close supervision of British instructors. This compared favorably to the weekly one-hour anti-gas instruction in October, 1917. As training became more sophisticated, men underwent tests at the end of their division’s training cycle. They masked and entered a chamber filled with chlorine gas. Next, they went through a chamber filled with a tear agent, where they unmasked. Although by the summer of 1918, recruits received standardized chemical warfare training, reports filed by division gas officers in Europe indicated the key to successful preparation had yet to be found. Still more training was needed, and it had to be integrated with other subjects.21

In the summer of 1918, with news reaching America of Germany’s increased use of gas, an Army regulation was promulgated, requiring every doughboy who left the country to have a certificate indicating he had completed gas training. No other military skill required such validation. Unfortunately, the requirement was usually ignored, and most men continued to arrive in France without the benefit of adequate instruction in gas defense. Gas officers realized that sufficient time for training in the camps did not exist. To make up for the deficiency, units attempted to use the time aboard transports for defensive gas training. The 80th Division, for example, ordered that shipboard activities would include physical training, manual of arms, guard duty, and anti-gas instruction. 22

Although the U.S. Army’s first efforts in chemical warfare were directed toward anti-gas or defensive measures, the development of the means to retaliate in kind soon followed. On 15 August 1917,, with the approval of the General Staff in Washington, AEF General Order 108 authorized the organization of special and technical engineer troops that would be assigned to each army as a Gas and Flame Regiment.* The War Department ordered recruits for the newly formed 30th Engineers to report to the American University campus in Washington, DC, where they were transformed into the 1st Gas Regiment. Unfortunately, with no one to instruct them in offensive or even defensive gas warfare, the only training the first companies of the gas regiment received in the United States involved close order drill. The unit underwent no special training in gas warfare. Beginning in December, 1917, the companies of the 1st Gas Regiment left the United States without gas masks.23

* Flame disappeared from the name and from use when GHQ, AEF, decided that the primitive flamethrowers used by the British and the French were more dangerous to the operator than to the enemy.
To View: Recruits at Camp Kearney, California, using British Ayrton or trench fans to clear gas, 1918.

The gas mask problem continued to plague the Army as a whole. An effective American mask was eventually developed using the British Small Box Respirator as a model. However, production of American gas masks peaked just one month prior to the end of the war. Late delivery and the initial small number of masks produced were offset only by the AEF’s decision to purchase several million British and French gas masks.24

The same unpreparedness and production lag applied to offensive chemical weapons. The Army attempted to contract out the production of war gases to a number of civilian chemical companies, but these firms objected immediately to the contracts because of the inherent dangers in the production of large quantities of war gases and because the demand for the product would not extend beyond the conflict. Besides that, the firms had already overcommitted their plants and personnel for the production of other war-related chemical products.25

The Army thus found itself with no alternative but to construct its own production facilities. In December, 1917, construction of plants to produce chemical agents began at Gunpowder Neck, Maryland. By the summer of 1918, the Edgewood Arsenal there had plants in operation producing phosgene, chloropicrin, mustard, chlorine, and sulfur trichloride. The arsenal also had a capability for filling artillery shells, although most of the agents produced were shipped overseas to the Allies in fifty-five gallon drums. Because of insufficient time, not one single gas shell manufactured at the arsenal ever reached an American artillery piece in France. When production of chemicals finally peaked one month prior to the Armistice, the plants had to stop production for lack of shell casings. artillery units and special gas troops fired American produced war gas, but in French and British shells.26

As the emphasis on chemical warfare increased, there arose a need to coordinate the various agencies assigned responsibility for gas warfare. Accordingly, on 28 June 1918 President Wilson, using the authority given to him by the Overman Act,* ordered the establishment of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) as a separate branch of the National Army. Immediately, all activities pertaining to chemical warfare were placed under Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert, formerly Commanding General of the First Infantry Division. The creation of a branch of the Army dedicated to chemical warfare was significant because it acknowledged, albeit belatedly, the tremendous impact the new weapon was having on the AEF The CWS, with the concurrence of the General Staff, established ten subordinate divisions:
Administration Proving
Research Medical
Gas Offense Training
Gas Offense
(Edgewood Arsenal) Overseas
(Gas Service, AEF)
Development 1st Gas Regiment

*The Overman Act of 20 May 1917 gave the president the authority to re organize executive agencies during the war emergency.

With the exception of the Overseas Division and the 1st Gas Regiment, the division chiefs were located in Washington, DC, and the operations of their divisions were scattered throughout the United States. The Administration Division facilitated routine matters and coordinated the activities of the other CWS divisions. A Research Division, as the name implied, handled all basic research, from the discovery of new chemicals to the development of protective masks and offensive equipment. Another division, Gas Defense, conducted research, but primarily administered the manufacturing, testing, and inspecting of gas masks for men and animals. This division also had the responsibility for manufacturing gas-proof dugout blankets, protective suits and gloves, antigas ointment, and gas warning signals. The Gas Defense Division administered Edgewood Arsenal. A Development Division experimented with charcoal suitable for gas mask filters, a manufacturing process for mustard, and a means of producing casings and adapters for 75-min shells of similar design to the French glass-lined gas projectiles. A Proving Division tested prototype gas shells before production and spottested shells prior to shipment overseas. The Medical Division coordinated work on the therapy, pharmacology, physiology, and pathology of war gases on the body. This division’s primary emphasis was on the prevention and treatment of casualties from mustard gas.28

The agency that had its most direct impact on the AEF was the Chemical Warfare Service’s Training Division. The division’s responsibilities included the organization and training of gas troops, the training of casual detachments for overseas duty, the maintenance of a Chemical Warfare Training Camp detachment, and the procurement and training of chemical officers for overseas duty. In recognition of the division’s importance, the Assistant Director of the Chemical Warfare Service, Brig. Gen. H. C. Newcomer, assumed operational command. This was the only division, other than Administration, headed by a general officer.

The structure of the CWS in the United States was determined by the personnel and equipment requirements of the AEF. Stateside training and preparations for chemical warfare had to be curtailed in order to rush American troops to France. Initially, expertise in chemical warfare was lacking. As a consequence, combat divisions deployed without proper training, equipment, and leadership. Until late 1917, there was no chemical warfare doctrine to rely upon. Nevertheless, American troops had to fight on a chemical battlefield against an opponent highly skilled in the use of chemicals in combat. Out of necessity it fell to the Overseas Division, CWS, to bear the brunt of the responsibility for preparing American soldiers for chemical warfare.

The majority of the thirty AEF divisions to see combat in World War I entered the line during and after the five German spring offensives of 1918. These offensives saw chemical warfare at the highest level since its introduction three years before. Regardless of the emphasis eventually placed on gas warfare by GHQ, AEF, and the Army General Staff, new doctrine’for gas weapons could not be fully absorbed or mastered by the inexperienced Americans. Prewar neglect of gas warfare equipment and accompanying doctrine had a significant impact on the ability of the AEF to defend against, and to successfully employ, chemical agents in World War I.

The AEF Organizes for
Chemical Warfare

Chapter 4

On 13 June 1917, while the General Staff in the United States struggled to organize, man, and equip an army, General John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), arrived in France with a staff of fifty-three officers and 146 enlisted men. After a continuous round of official visits and ceremonies, Pershing and his staff settled into temporary headquarters in Paris. Two weeks later the first American troops arrived in France. General Order 8, published on 5 July 1917, established the organization of the AEF General Headquarters (GHQ). This order also created on paper the GHQ position of Chief of the Gas Service, whose responsibilities included procurement of gas personnel and supplies, the conduct of the entire Gas and Flame Service both offense and defense, the supervision of training for gas officers and troops, and experimentation with new gases, delivery systems, and protective devices.1

Ordering the creation of a Gas Service was a simple matter. The actual organizing of a new branch of the Army, however, would take a tremendous amount of effort and time. Time was precious. By mid-July, over 12,000 doughboys were within thirty miles of the front, all without gas masks or training in chemical warfare. Yet, because of more pressing problems,* it was not until 17 August 1917 that General Pershing sent a cable to Washington requesting the organization of a Gas Service and the authority to appoint Lt. Col. Amos A. Fries, Corps of Engineers, as its chief.

Lieutenant Colonel Fries had arrived in France three days earlier. As an engineer officer he was assigned responsibility for organizing a road network to support the AEF Services of Supply (SOS). Several days later Col. Hugh A. Drum and Col. Alvin B. Barber of the GHQ, AEF, approached Fries. As Fries recalled after the war, the staff officers asked what I should think if my orders were changed so as to make me Chief of the newly proposed gas service. Given overnight to decide, Fries accepted. On 22 August 1917 he began to build an organization based on information Barber and Drum had compiled about the British Special Brigade and French Z units. In addition, the staff officers gave Fries a draft of a proposed General Order 31 that would establish a Gas Service.2

*In addition to commanding an army in a combat zone, Pershing was faced with the same problems that the General Staff in Washington had-the officering, billeting, feeding, equipping, and training of a vast army of raw recruits.

General Order 31 assigned the Gas Service responsibility for both offensive and defensive operations, including the organization of gas personnel, gas warfare supplies, and gas warfare training in the AEF. Appended to the order was a draft chart of the Gas Service Organization. In reviewing the chart with Fries, Pershing noted that the offensive arm included Stokes mortar companies. This prompted him to ask why existing trench mortar companies could not be utilized to fire gas rounds. Barber and Drum, who were also present, explained that gas operations were too technical and dangerous for untrained personnel to conduct and, therefore, required special troops. They also told Pershing that in the British Army the Special Brigade used 4-inch Stokes mortars.3

Acting on Pershing’s instructions, Fries, with Colonel Church and Captain Boothby of the Medical Department, visited the British Special Brigade headquarters at St.Omer. Church had served as an observer with the French Army for a year and a half and, during that time, had collected information on chemical warfare defense. Boothby did the same while observing British chemical warfare procedures and also took a course at the British defense school. At St. Omer the medical officers discussed British defensive gas doctrine, while Fries obtained information on the offensive aspects of chemical warfare. Fries elicited information on gases in use, special troops, chemical ammunition, and delivery systems. He also visited the large chemical material depot for the British Fifth Army.

After returning to AEF headquarters, the three officers reviewed both the draft General Order and the organizational chart. They modified the original proposals to provide general rather than specific guidelines, anticipating that only actual combat experience would glean the information necessary to build a truly effective organization. Fries criticized the British system that divided responsibility for offensive and defensive gas warfare. Paradoxically, the British liaison officer in the United States, Maj. S. M. J. Auld, warned the Americans against just such a practice. Thus, the AEF Gas Service made it the responsibility of all gas officers to be knowledgeable in both areas, a point driven home in subsequent general orders detailing the duties of army, corps, and division gas officers. On 3 September 1917, almost five months after the United States entered the war, the final version of General Order 31 was published (Figure 2).4

Not until 27 May 1918, as U.S. divisions were coming on-line in increasing numbers and experiencing heavy gas casualties, did GHQ, AEF, issue General Order 79 for the establishment of unit gas officers. Only then did Fries have the authority to appoint chief gas officers for armies and corps and gas officers and assistants for divisions. Until this time, division commanders had been appointing gas officers as they saw fit. Under the new arrangements, chief gas officers of armies and corps and division gas officers would be staff officers responsible to the commander. Parallel reporting procedures were established in order to ensure that accurate information reached the proper authorities. In addition to reports through official channels, the order authorized these officers to send required reports directly to the Chief of the Gas Service. The Chief, with GHQ approval, could also order these unit staff officers to attend meetings necessary for the coordination of defensive gas measures.
TO VIEW: 2. Organization of the Gas Service, AEF, 1917

The division and higher echelon gas officers had specific duties assigned. By direction of their commanding officers, they were to instruct and supervise the gas officers and NCOs within their command, supervise all defensive training and drill, collect enemy chemical warfare material for submission to AEF laboratories, inspect defensive measures, and advise the commander and staff regarding all aspects of chemical warfare. The division gas officer had the responsibility of reporting to the commander all gas casualties and actions taken to prevent recurrences. The division commander forwarded this report, together with a list of the actions he had taken to correct the deficiencies, to the Chief of the Gas Service.

Regimental and battalion commanders assigned duties to their gas officers. At this level, gas officer and gas NCO responsibilities were considered additional, not primary duties. A gas officer and NCO assistant were required for regiment, battalion, and separate units, and two NCOs were appointed for each company. Selected on the basis of undefined special qualifications, the men were trained at the AEF Gas Defense School or corps gas schools. Among their duties, they supervised training in the use of gas masks, gas proof shelters, alarm systems, and related defensive measures. When the division entered combat, the gas NCOs were required to inspect all defensive equipment and antigas procedures at least twice a week. They reported weather, terrain conditions, all new enemy gas tactics and material, and any noted deficiencies. This information was reported officially to the company commander and informally to the battalion commander.

General Order 79 established an AEF Gas Defense School with a course of instruction adequate for the training in gas defense of gas officers and noncommissioned officers. The school director received specific instructions, to coordinate his activities with those of officers engaged in offensive gas instruction and with those at the AEF’s new chemical experimental station at Hanlon Field near Chaumont. Instructors at the Gas Defense School kept abreast of the latest changes in gas warfare by personally reviewing files of Allied and American gas officer reports and by reading translated copies of captured German and Austrian documents.

General Order 79 dealt primarily with the Gas Corps* and the training of its officers, but it also called the attention of all ranks to the increasing importance of gas warfare. Although the Gas Corps would do every thing that was possible to prepare individuals and units to avoid casualties from gas, the ultimate responsibility for defense against gas, the order concluded, devolves upon commanding officers who must provide for the training of their men and the maintenance of gas discipline. In order to maintain gas discipline and provide adequate training, the order urged commanders to cooperate with Gas Corps officers.5

*Gas Service and Gas Corps were terms used interchangeably in the AEF.

The extensive use of gas by the Germans in their spring 1918 offensives caused the AEF General Staff to expand the duties of gas officers. As of 2 July 1918, gas officers were to be consulted and their technical knowledge utilized in the preparation of all plans involving the extensive use of gas, whether by artillery or other means. Thus, the duties and responsibilities of gas officers grew with the increasing awareness of the impact chemical agents were having on the offensive and defensive capabilities of AEF units. Fries, however, faced a chronic problem of locating competent men to serve in a branch of service that lacked precedent and had an unknown future. was further complicated by an Armywide shortage of personnel. The Corps of Engineers, originally the primary source of gas officers, became reluctant, as its own demand for officers grew, to have men reassigned to another branch.6

The AEF Gas Service had other problems with which to contend. There was, for example, a severe shortage of gas warfare supplies. The lack of protective masks for members of the AEF caused the greatest concern. On 2 August 1917, GHQ, AEF decided to utilize the British Small Box Respirator (SBR) as its primary mask and the French M-2 mask* as an emergency protective device.7

The SBR consisted of a canister-type filter of absorbent charcoal with alternating layers of oxidized soda lime granules. A flexible rubber tube connected the canister to a rubberized facepiece that was held to the face by elastic bands in order to provide an airtight fit. Inside the facepiece was a rubber nose clip. A hard rubber mouthpiece that the wearer grasped by his teeth was connected to the flexible hose attached to the filtration canister. A soldier exhaled air through a rubber flutter valve at the front of the mask. The wearer viewed the world through two lenses made of celluloid or specially prepared glass. Each soldier had a tube of antidimming or defogging paste that could be used to prevent condensation from forming on the lenses. Lacking an American mask, the AEF placed an initial order for 600,000 SBRs and 100,000 French M-2 masks. Additional orders followed, as it would take the United States a year from its entry into the war to begin providing its troops in the field with an acceptable American-made version of the SBR.8

The shortage of respirators notwithstanding, no individual could enter the combat zone unless equipped with a mask. Commanders and staff officers went to considerable lengths to ensure that all members of their units had respirators. In late December, 1917, the newly arrived 42nd Rainbow Division was moved by rail to a training site in France. On the train were masks for the unit, which the division’s Chief of Staff planned to issue on its arrival. The 1st Division, however, was due to go on the line shortly and submitted an urgent request for respirators. The Chief of the Gas Service responded by ordering the 42nd’s Chief of Staff to transfer his masks to the 1st Division. To circumvent the order, the 42nd’s Chief of Staff immediately stopped the train and ordered the masks issued to his men. He then reported to Fries that it was impossible to comply with the order because the masks had already been issued.9

*Because of its poor filtration capability and flimsy construction, the M-2 mask was later banned for use in the alert zone for everyone except men with head wounds who could not wear the SBR, men who were unconscious and could not grasp the mouthpiece, and black soldiers who could not wear the nose clips of the SBR.

Several thousand men of the 1st Division lacked masks, and its 1st Brigade was scheduled to move to the front line in January.* Fries finally obtained a priority of shipment and detailed several gas officers to accompany the masks from Le Havre, the major British supply base, to ensure their safe delivery to the 1st Division. Despite these precautions, one carload of 4,000 masks disappeared in transit. Fries finally had to order the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division to turn in their SBRs. These were cleaned and reissued to the Division’s 1st Brigade. This episode was not an isolated one.10

Gas equipment and supplies in the United States and France were initially the responsibility of the nearest related branch of the Army. The AEF Gas Service found this procedure exceedingly embarrassing, cumbersome and inefficient. Despite initial resistance, the General Staff in Washington approved AEF requisition submitted on 10 September 1917 for 50,000 cylinders, 50,000 Livens projector shells, and a large quantity of Stokes mortars and ammunition. None of these weapons or ammunition reached the AEF in time to be used in combat. To avoid duplication of effort and to save time, Fries, in February, 1918, received permission to make direct purchases of equipment from the Allies. At that time almost all of the gas warfare material used by the AEF came from the British. Not until April, 1918, did any material manufactured in the United States begin to reach the AEF. As noted in the preceding chapter, a number of war gases were manufactured in the United States during the war, and more than 3,600 tons of these did reach the French and British.11

Because of a shortage of artillery pieces, artillery units of the AEF were equipped primarily with the French 75-mm light field gun, the 155-mm medium howitzer, and the 240-mm heavy howitzer, as well as with British 8-inch and 9.2-inch heavy howitzers. The U.S. Army also adopted, with minor modifications, the French gas shell. The AEF Services of Supply purchased French shells and painted them according to an American color code.**12

Originally, the SOS defensive gas equipment fell into Class I with clothing, leather goods, and optical instruments. In February, 1918, when the Gas Service was given authority to requisition its own supplies, all items of gas warfare equipment were placed into a new category, Class V. In September, 1918, the Army created four subclasses within the general Class V classification. Subclass A material included offensive gas supplies, such as gas shells and grenades, that were not used by gas troops but by the combat arms. Subclass B material included those gas supplies issued exclusively to gas troops. Subclass C supplies encompassed aviation, smoke, and incendiary material. Subclass D items included all defensive gas material. The Ordnance Corps transported and issued subclasses A and C, while the Gas Service did the same for B and D items. The Gas Service distributed all anti-gas supplies. Fries ordered a 10 percent reserve of all equipment at the division gas dumps, and each company or regiment maintained a 5 percent reserve supply. The division gas officer issued the required masks to the regimental supply officers, who distributed them to battalions. Gas officers also issued gas alarm devices, Strombo horns, Klaxon horns, and gongs directly to company commanders in each sector. Later, army and corps gas officers were given similar responsibility for the issue of gas supplies to corps artillerymen and all rear echelon troops.13

*Only one-half of the 1st Division was needed to relieve a French division (French divisions were one-half the size of the comparable American unit). The balance of the 1st Division remained in training.

**They were distinguished by a gray body lettered Special Gas. A strip colored either white or red or both circled the shell. Nonpersistent gas had only red, semipersistent gas combined red and white. The number of stripes indicated the relative persistency, the least persistent having fewer stripes.

Another branch heavily involved in chemical warfare was the Army’s Medical Department. The General Staff anticipated that medical officers would require some knowledge of the actual symptoms brought on by chemical agents and the various methods of treatment for gas poisoning. Consequently, in May, 1917, the War Department issued a Memorandum on Gas Poisoning in Warfare with Notes on Its Pathology and Treatment, based on British sources. Still, despite this assistance from Washington, most of the planning and organization for the treatment of gas casualties was done by the AEF in France.14

Maj. J. R. Church, Medical Department, was the first Medical Director of the Gas Service in France. While on the General Staff, he had assisted in the initial planning for an AEF Gas Service. As Medical Director he devoted most of his time to organizational matters. The increase in gas casualties, however, resulted in a personnel change in the position, with Lt. Col. Harry L. Gilchrist, M.D., the former commander of Number 9, General Hospital, replacing Church. Gilchrist prepared for his new assignment by attending the British Gas School at Rouen, France.15

When Gilchrist reported for duty as Medical Director, he found no records or guidelines detailing the responsibilities of his position. His first priority, and one agreed to by Fries, was to launch a gas instruction campaign directed specifically at AEF medical officers. On 9 February 1918, Gilchrist published a pamphlet, Symptomology, Pathology and General Treatment of Gas Cases, which provided medical officers basic information on the treatment of chemical casualties. Following this publication, the Medical Director’s office issued a constant stream of bulletins aimed at keeping AEF medical officers up-to-date on the latest medical developments in gas warfare. Gilchrist visited most AEF divisions and hospitals, where he lectured to officers and men on chemical warfare from a medical point of view, emphasizing prevention and treatment of gas casualties.16

As the chemical war escalated with the introduction of mustard gas, the Medical Director’s responsibilities and, indeed, his department’s tasks became increasingly crucial to the AER Gilchrist inspected troops at the front and visited medical personnel in hospitals, hospital trains, and other locations. He also served as the liaison officer between the Gas Service and the Medical Department, advising both the AEF’s Chief of the Gas Service and the Chief Surgeon on gas-related medical matters. In addition to these general duties, he collected all medical information relating to gas warfare and relayed it to the AEF’s Chief Surgeon. Gilchrist focused his attention on such matters as new treatment for gas casualties and combating-the effects of the enemy gases not only from a therapeutic, but also from a prophylactic point of view. To obtain information, he visited the sites of battles where large numbers of gas casualties had occurred.17

Because armies and corps of the AEF were formed after the arrival of a number of divisions, the medical structure to treat gas casualties evolved first within the division. On 1 March 1918, the 42nd Division became the second American division to occupy a sector on the Western Front. Although initially the division had few gas casualties, the medical officers prepared for a large influx of gas victims. All four of the division’s field hospitals were set up to accept gas victims, and orders were given that a total of 500 beds be put aside for such cases. On 20 March the Germans launched an artillery bombardment of mustard and high explosive shells that hit the 42nd Division’s 165th Infantry at 1730 hours. In the space of a few minutes, the mustard caused 270 casualties, including one death. The first-aid station through which the casualties passed also received a drenching with. gas, so medical personnel wore masks as they treated the patients.18

As a result of this attack and others that followed, the 42nd Division took several steps to improve the treatment of gas casualties. These later became standard for AEF divisions in the line. The first measure was to dedicate one of the four division field hospitals to gas cases. The position of division Gas Medical Officer was also created. Memorandum 148, HQ, 42nd Division, published on 23 April 1918, listed the duties of this officer as the instruction of medical personnel in gas defense; the supervision of gas protection of medical dugouts, aid stations, and field hospitals; the early diagnosis of symptoms; and the treatment of all types of gas casualties.19

The AEF adopted the 42nd Division’s practices when it instituted the position of division Gas Medical Officer in AEF General Order 144, dated 29 August 1918. GHQ took this measure in the face of mounting gas casualties and a high incident of gas malingering. As a consequence, in addition to the duties indicated in the 42nd Division’s memorandum, the AEF order added duties such as the instruction of all division personnel on the early symptoms and treatments of gas poisoning and the instruction of line officers in practical medical matters connected with gas warfare. The orders stated that any officers selected must be live, wide-awake, energetic men, and must show a keen appreciation of the work. By the first week in October, 1918, each AEF division had a Gas Medical Officer. These men were sent to the School of Pharmacy’s School of Gas (Ecole de Gaz) at the University of Paris for a four-day course to prepare them for their division duties.20

Beyond the division field hospitals, each army established its own gas hospitals.* The first such installation began operation on 29 August 1918. Army-level hospital personnel were casuals, or officers and men loaned from base or evacuation hospitals or anywhere else medical personnel could be found. To meet the demands of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the Chief Surgeon, AEF, in September, l918, established five gas hospitals with a total of 1,650 beds. Colonel Gilchrist suggested three mobile 1,500-bed gas hospitals be established, one for each U.S. corps. This plan, however, was never implemented because of insufficient personnel. Another plan called for the creation of two emergency gas teams to be assigned to each base hospital. Their mission was to relieve the strain that sudden gas attacks put on division field hospitals*. The GHQ, AEF, organized several emergency gas teams, each consisting of a medical officer, two nurses, and two orderlies. The Chief Surgeon of the 1st U.S. Army, Col. A. N. Stark, however, objected to these teams on the grounds that base hospitals were too far removed from the fighting. He also believed that the division field hospitals set aside forgassed soldiers were effective and needed no further assistance. HeedingStark’s objections, the Chief Surgeon disbanded the teams.21

Another problem with which Fries and his staff had to contend was training in gas defense. When the 1st Division arrived in France, Pershing thought it best to have the Americans train by serving with a French divi sion. This proved to be unsatisfactory because the training varied from unit to unit within the French division. When the Training Section of the AEF’s GHQ became operational, it prepared a standardized division training schedule. Initially, the period of time a division spent preparing to enter the line was supposed to be three months.** Only two days of the schedule were allocated to Gas Service instructors. Later, as the demand for combat units increased, the gas instruction decreased to a mere six hours. This was vigorously protested by the Gas Service. In the spring of 1918, when the German offensives required a shortening of the division training cycle to bring new units on line, gas instruction was cut further.22

Formal defensive training was supplemented by wearing the masks during other training activities. Pvt. Norman A. Dunham of the 40th Division remembered wearing the SBR and full pack during two and three hour marches. He thought the mask the worst thing a soldier has to contend with and the most torturous thing a person can wear. Lt. Edgar D. Gilman remarked that when he wore the mask he found that it was not only disagreeable, painful, and smothering, but also that his saliva flowed profusely from his mouth, through the flutter valves, and down the front of his shirt. Personal protection was survival on the battlefield,however, and command emphasis had to be placed on defensive gas training, to include the wearing of the mask.23

*Corps hospitals were not considered because a corps was organized exclusively for tactical purposes.
**The 1st Division was retrained at Gondrecourt and was the only AEF Division to complete the AEF’s three-month-long training schedule.

It became obvious to GHQ, AEF that many commanders were not supporting the training activities of their gas officers and NCOs. To remedy this problem, officers in brigades that were rotated off the line received a comprehensive lecture course on gas defensive measures. However, continued reports of over 25 percent gas casualties indicated to General Staff that, after basic training, comparatively little was to be gained by instructing individuals in units on the line. The consensus among gas officers was that training had to instill an interest and awareness of gas defensive measures throughout an entire unit to give the best results in combat. Gas officers also believed more realistic training was needed. One result of this conviction was that artillery batteries, when they trained, received a minimum of three surprise gas attacks as part of the training schedule. To test the alertness of sentries and to correct such carelessness as leaving masks out of reach, attacks were often scheduled at night, while the troops were sleeping at their position. Men firing on the ranges were subjected to simulated surprise gas attacks in order to familiarize them with laying artillery pieces during an attack and to acquaint them with the difficulty of transmitting firing data while masked. During night marches, men were subjected to gas attacks as a means of teaching them to overcome confusion.

During the first year of American participation in the war, men arriving as individual replacements had little or no formal instruction in defensive measures until they reached their units in the forward areas. In the summer of 1918, the Army acted to rectify this haphazard method. Training stations were established at the AEF debarkation ports of Brest and St. Nazaire. Each center had five Gas Service instructors: one officer and four NCOS. Three enlisted men acted as gas mask fitters and helpers. When troops arrived at the stations, they marched single file into a warehouse to be fitted and issued. masks. After an inspection, the troops moved to a large lecture hall where instructors did everything possible to impress on the men the importance of defensive gas measures. To complete the training, seventy-five to 100 men at a time entered a gas chamber filled with a tear agent for five to ten minutes. At peak times more than 2,000 men a day were put through this initiation into gas warfare.

In Army rear areas, depot divisions,* such as the one at La Querche, handled three categories of personnel: newly arrived line replacements, special units such as engineer troops, and casuals who were recently released from hospitals and scheduled to rejoin their units. During the normal three-week course, the replacements received a minimum of eighteen hours of gas defense training. Their training consisted of lectures, mask drills, games with the mask worn, and firing weapons while wearing the The troops also went through simulated tactical operations, with the instructors lighting smoke candles and throwing tear gas grenades to provide added realism.

*The AEF suffered so many casualties that some divisions were broken up, their men used as replacements, and their cadre used to train arriving personnel.

Special troops such as pioneer infantry, engineer, and medical service units first received basic infantry training and then were given three days’ intensive instruction in gas defense. During the three days, the men practiced their specialty while wearing masks. For example, medics with SBRs in place applied bandages and carried stretchers through woods and over rough terrain. Engineers constructed roads and pioneer troops dug ditches while wearing masks. After duty hours, trainees played baseball in their SBRs.
To View: Sanitary Detachmant, 121st Maching Gun BAttalion, wearing the SBR while playing baseball, 2 June 1918.

Hospital convalescents, the last category of men run through the divisions, numbered anywhere from a handful to 2,000 a day. These men were reequipped with masks, and those with prior gas training – Class A men – were excused from formal instruction until August, 1918, when the mounting number of mustard gas casualties compelled the Gas Service staff to give all personnel short classes on ways to avoid being contaminated by this persistent agent.

The increased German employment of chemical agents-especially mustard gas – for counterbattery fire forced American artillery training camps to place special emphasis on defensive gas instruction. During a gas attack, a poorly trained artillery man would be totally incapable of serving his weapon or delivering accurate fire. Initially, artillery officers and NCOs attended a week-long course of lectures, drills, and practical exercises. Later NCOs received an additional week of training. If the artillerymen failed to score 70 percent or better on the final examination, they had to repeat the course. Just before returning to the front, the graduates had to visit.a base hospital to see gas casualties. The experience, according to instructors, furnished a great stimulus to general gas training. Still, despite these efforts to train every doughboy arriving in France, many received no training in gas warfare because of the pressing need for troops,on the front lines.24

In conjunction with the emphasis on gas defensive training, the AEF paid increasing attention to the offensive gas capabilities of the American Army in France. On 10 January 1918 the first two companies of the 1st Gas Regiment (30th Engineers) arrived in France (Figure 3). The companies reported to the British Special Brigade training area at Helfaut, where Brigadier General Foulkes personally directed the training of the unit. Eventually, four of the six companies of the regiment passed through Helfaut.
TO VIEW: 3. U.S. Gas Regiment, company organization, 1917

The training of the 1st Gas Regiment in offensive gas operations began in February, 1918, and employed the delivery systems used by the British. The American troops spent five days learning to use Livens projectors, seven days for Stokes mortars, and two days for cylinder operations. The men first attended classes and then conducted practical field exercises in which they applied their newly acquired knowledge. Projector operations called for the emplacement of the guns at night and their detonation the following day. Stokes mortar drill required the men to conduct rapid fire with gas rounds, thermite, and smoke, both day and night. Officers of the regiment opened cylinders of chlorine, and the men walked through the gas cloud to instill confidence in their training and equipment. The American officers were then detailed to a sector of the British front and assigned to Special Brigade companies, where they observed projector, mortar, and cylinder operations. The overall result was that these men better understood offensive gas operations and could assist in training the other companies of the American Gas Regiment.25

On 6 June 1918 these trained officers and men held a practice shoot for the AEF General Staff at Hanlon Field, the home of the AEF’s Gas School and experimental station in France. Twelve Stokes mortars and 100 Livens projectors were fired. On 22 June, after several more exercises, companies of the 1st Gas Regiment moved to the U.S. sector to conduct offensive gas operations.

Artillery was the other branch of the Army capable of conducting offensive gas operations. In the first gas warfare manuals prepared by the U.S. Army War College, artillery employment was not included because of the continual changes in gas tactical doctrine* on the Western Front. Therefore, almost all artillery training in gas warfare was conducted in France, where the AEF adopted British and French doctrine for gas shell fire. The U.S. 1st Army, for example, published its own Provisional Instruction for Artillery Officers on the Use of Gas Shell, based on French field manuals. At artillery camps, gas officers lectured on the problems involved in the use of gas shells, but no evidence exists to indicate that gas shells were ever fired in training. Yet, by 1 November 1918, 20 percent of all shells delivered to the AEF were gas filled, and a 25 percent ratio was planned for 1919.26

No other preparations or plans were instituted in AEF rear areas to prepare and sustain the American armies in chemical warfare. The burden of the gas war fell to the combat divisions of the AEF. How well they fought and how well they adapted to this new experience is the subject of the next chapter.

*Firing with gas shells was such a new experience that the opposing armies changed their doctrine on a regular basis seeking the most effective means of employment.

The Quick and the Dead :
The AEF on the
Chemical Battlefield

Chapter 5

Between 18 and 21 January 1918, units of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division relieved the French 1st Moroccan Division manning the front lines in the Ansauville sector. In doing so, the Big Red One became the first American division to occupy a portion of the Western Front. The movement of American troops into the lines was uneventful except for one incident, As we take our positions in the trenches, Maj. Gen. Robert Bullard, the division commander, noted, from the French position on our right some two hundred gas casualties are evacuated-our first object lesson. 1

This grim object lesson reinforced French warnings that the Ansauville sector was a highly active gas front with both sides constantly employing large amounts of chemical agents. The German use of Yellow Cross especially concerned the French. The XXII Corps commander, prior to the arrival of the ist Division, had his troops post in every dugout instructions in English on the correct procedures to follow during and after a Yellow Cross attack. The French warning advised the Americans to mask when the first gas shell exploded and remain masked for four hours following a gas bombardment. The instructions also called for anyone in a gassed area to beat and shake his clothing prior to entering a dugout and to use soapy water to decontaminate skin exposed to mustard. Further instructions from the French corps commander followed, emphasizing the gas-proofing of dugouts and the maintenance of gas mask discipline.2

Based on the 1st Division’s experience over the previous months, these instructions should not have been necessary. Although the unit arrived overseas without the slightest bit of gas training, it received in France the most complete chemical warfare preparation of any AEF division during the war. Gas training pamphlets, directives, and orders were showered on the 1st Division by an anxious and apprehensive GHQ, AEF. The 1st Division became the only American division to undergo the complete GHQ, AEF, training schedule, which included defensive and offensive gas training.*

*Even with this extensive training, the mistakes made by the soldiers of this division during chemical warfare were the very same repeated over and over by other, less prepared AEF divisions. In the Ansauville and the Montdidier sectors, the Big Red One suffered more casualties from gas than from small arms or artillery shell fire.
To View: Big Nims, 366th Infantry, 92nd Division, inspecting his mask (note mouthpiece), 8 August 1918.

Instruction in chemical warfare began for the 1st Division in December with nine hours devoted to defensive training. Proper masking was a key element of this training. With troops in the practice trenches, instructors sounded gas alarms and lit smoke pots to simulate gas clouds, thereby increasing the troops’ skill in putting on and wearing the gas masks. During the drill, gas instructors reminded their students that in case of gas attack, there are only two classes of soldiers, the quick and the dead. 3

The British had decided for reasons now obscure that SBR masking should take no longer than six seconds, to be accomplished in five steps. In step one, the doughboy had to hold his breath,* knock off his headgear, grip his rifle between the legs, and reach into the case on his chest to grasp the mask by the breathing joint and nose clip. At step two, the soldier thrust his chin out, held the mask in front of the face with both thumbs inside and under the elastic headband. In step three, the chin was placed into the facepiece while the headband was pulled over the head to secure the mask. Next, at step four, the soldier grasped the mouthpiece with his teeth. The last step, five, required the soldier to reach through the facepiece to secure the nose clip and then run his hands around the mask to ensure a snug fit. Division gas officers complained that when it came to defensive gas training, many commanders were satisfied when their men simply achieved the six-second requirement. Proper adjustment, the gas officers believed., was more important than speed.4

*Officers realized that, when exposed to German gas in combat, men instinctively took a deep breath. In so doing, they unintentionally inhaled the poisonous air. Later, the AEF corrected the drill by instructing the doughboy to stop breathing when the gas alarm sounded.

When finally issued, each mask came with a small log book tied to the canvas case. Soldiers received instructions to record the length of time they wore the mask, both for drill and in combat. They were also required to identify each type of gas encountered. The purpose of this log was to ensure that the filter in the canister was replaced at the proper intervaL Filters for an SBR had a life of fifty to 100 hours of exposure, depending on the chemical agents. As might be expected, the log system did not work. As one gas officer remarked, any man who in the hell of battle can keep such a record completely should be at once awarded a Distinguished Service Medal. Gas officers in some divisions came up with an alternative: they painted the number of the month of issue on the case. If and when filters became available, the officers replaced them based on their own estimate of exposure time. There were three types of AEF filter canisters. Those painted black were for training only and offered no protection against smoke or gas. Canisters colored yellow protected against smoke, offered greater gas protection, and had a high resistance to breathing. The green canister offered protection against smoke, had sufficient gas protection, and had a low resistance to breathing.5
To View: Men of the 366th Infantry, 92nd Division, during an inspection of their American SBRs at Ainville, Vosges, France, 8 August 1918.

While the British SBR was initially worn by the 1st and other divisions, the American version was in ready supply by the late summer of 1918. The American mask had both advantages and disadvantages. Although its fuller facepiece permitted easy cleaning of the eyepieces, these eyepieces had a tendency to fall out; also, the larger facepiece with an increase in dead space made it more difficult to clear. The larger canister gave greater protection, but was heavier and clumsy.6
To View: Medics place an M-2 mask on a head-wound casualty, 137th Ambulance Company, 31 August 1918.

There is no question but that the SBR, whether British or American, was extremely uncomfortable. General Bullard admitted that he could never fulfill the qualification of a successful wearer because as much as he tried he could not wear the mask longer than three minutes without feeling smothered. Since the SBR was difficult to wear, division gas officers reported troops would change from the SBR to the more comfortable M-2 in the midst of a gas attack, in the process inhaling the poisonous air. The M-2 did not offer the filtration protection of the SBR. Its flimsy construction and susceptibility to water damage also reduced. its effectiveness, as did the fact that it did not block mustard gas. The widespread problem with the M-2 prompted AEF, GHQ General Order 78 on 25 May 1918. This order forbid anyone who entered the alert zone* to use the M-2. As noted previously it was retained and attached to stretchers for men with head wounds or for those unable to grasp the mouthpiece. Labor troops in rear areas were authorized to wear the M-2.7

A number of U.S. officers apparently procured, on their own, another French mask, the ARS (described earlier). This created morale problems since it gave American enlisted men the impression that our protective equipment is defective. A Gas Service report demanded that these officers be taught that only the material issued by the Gas Service was authorized for use, and that they had no authority to secure equipment from the French.8

Another mask, the Tissot, was officially procured from the French, although it was for issue only in small numbers to artillerymen, Signal Corps troops, and front-line medical units whose personnel had to be active during gas attacks. Not only did this mask’s filter offer less resistance to breathing and have the same quality filtration of the American SBR, but the problem of fogged vision associated with the SBR did not exist. The Tissot design allowed air to flow between the two lenses of each eyepiece, eliminating condensation. Most important, the Tissot design did away with a nose clip and mouthpiece, making it a comfortable yet safe mask.9 Unfortunately, as noted earlier, the filter location on the back, together with the flimsy rubber facepiece, made it unsuitable for infantry.

If soldiers wearing gas masks in defensive positions experienced a variety of problems, they encountered even more difficulties when they shifted to the offensive. The standard issue American or British SBR made normal breathing difficult, it made obtaining sufficient oxygen during heavy exertion, such as in infantry attacks across No Man’s Land, impossible. Additionally, exertion caused perspiration to form on the lens, limiting vision even more than what was normal.*

Standing Orders for Defense Against Gas published in November, 1911, stated that within two mile& of the front lines and within areas specially exposed to gas shelling, the gas mask case would be carried in the alert position, which was on the chest.
To View: Lt. William T. Powers, Pvt. Walter Miesley, Operator, and Pvt Tichard Pereyer, Recorder, wearing the Tissot mask while receiving instructions from a forward observer, 30 October 1918.

At Ville Savoye, for example, Pvt. Moses King, 305th Infantry, 77th Division, had difficulty seeing through his mask and received an order from his company commander – whose own vision was obscured – to remove his facepiece, but to keep the nose clip and mouthpiece in place. This pernicious habit, the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, AEF, noted in September 1918, has been the cause of many casualties ; the practice has been condemned at every opportunity. Despite the condemnation, the practice never ceased, and the increased use of mustard gas by the Germans resulted in a significant number of Allied casualties suffering from eye damage.10

As a consequence of these and other problems, standing orders did not call for troops to mask during the attack. Doughboys did, however, wear the mask on the chest in the alert position with the helmet chin strap on the tip of the chin, rather than under it, to facilitate quick placement of the mask if gas were encountered.11

* Anti-dimming (defogging) paste was issued with the mask, but according to soldiers who used it, it distorted the vision of the mask wearer.

In addition to the problems associated with gas masks, the persistency of chemical agents combined with the methods of AEF commanders to produce a significant number of gas casualties. Under normal attacking conditions, an area in which phosgene was used would clear in ten minutes. Diphosgene would take longer to dispel, perhaps fifteen to twenty minutes. Mustard gas would linger for several days. A problem arose, however, when AEF commanders intent on taking an objective regardless of the cost often launched an attack before a gassed area had cleared. The reason for this disregard lay in the fact that the AEF, from General Pershing down to division commanders, never hesitated to relieve an officer considered lacking in an aggressive spirit.

Of the chemical agents employed by the Germans against the Allies, mustard gas was responsible for 39 percent of AEF gas casualties. Once mustard gas made contact with the skin, it destroyed tissue as long as it remained, doing damage several hours before the first symptoms appeared. To combat this persistent blister agent, the Gas Service made available to line units an ointment called Sag paste* to protect exposed flesh. Sag paste came in a 3.5-cm by 16-cm collapsible tube and became a standard-issue item for the prevention and treatment of mustard burns. According to one veteran, it looked like and had the consistency of carbolated vaseline. Doughboys who entered a mustard-contaminated area or who anticipated a shelling of Yellow Cross smeared their bodies with the ointment. It proved very effective, a medic in the 35th Division noted, if used in time. However, it was uncomfortable because it caked when the men perspired and rubbed off on clothing when a soldier engaged in any physical activity. The paste also presented a danger: if not removed after exposure to gas it eventually absorbed the mustard agent without neutralizing it, which meant that the agent ultimately came into contact with the skin. There were other uses for the paste: medics, for example, found it to be effective in soothing mustard burns by blocking the oxygen to the contaminated area. Enterprising men in the trenches found it extremely effective in exterminating cooties, the doughboy slang for body lice.12

The Defense Division, CWS, sought other ways besides masks and Sag paste to protect troops from mustard gas. The division designed and had manufactured a protective suit for artillery gun crews, medics, and decontaminating teams. The suit consisted of cotton sheeting impregnated with linseed or vegetable drying oil. The coveralls had elastic ties at the ankles and wrists. A zipper down the center from neck to crotch provided an airtight fit. The hood was worn under the headgear. Mittens had been provided prior to the development of the suit and were highly valuable … but somewhat stiff and clumsy. ** Special boots were also provided to complete the uniform. Unfortunately, the suit trapped body heat and moisture so it could rarely be worn longer than fifteen to thirty minutes. A gas officer reported men tearing off the suit while working in an area reeking with mustard gas because they couldn’t stand the discomfort any longer. 13

Gloves were not available until the end of the war.
To View: Pvt. John Sloan, 6th Infantry Medical Attachment, in an Anti-Gas Suit, Croix de Charemont, France, 20 August 1918. This protective uniform was worn by medical personnel and artillery gun crews.

The effects of mustard gas could be lessened or even avoided by removing it with hot soapy water shortly after exposure. To this end, GHQ, AEF, on 29 August 1918, ordered the Medical Department to activate a number of mobile degassing units. Each division in the line of battle would have two such units attached, commanded by a Sanitary Corps captain or first lieutenant. To each eleven-man unit a specially trained medical gas officer would be detailed from the supported division, This individual’s duties included the supervision of the unit’s operation, instruction of the medical personnel on the treatment of gas casualties, and responsibility for the maintenance of the proper equipment for the treatment of gas casualties at the battalion advance aid station. The degassing units remained in the division rear. When a unit became contaminated and could be withdrawn from the line, the degassing station rushed to treat the men as close to the front as possible. The units equipment consisted of a five-ton tank truck with a 1,200 gallon capacity and an instantaneous heater mounted on the rear of the vehicle to provide hot water. The heated water flowed to portable shower baths similar to modern field showers. Another vehicle carried fuel, underwear, uniforms, and medical supplies. These supplies included bicarbonate of soda to Rush the patient’s eyes, ears, mouth, and nasal passages. Unfortunately for the thousands of mustard casualties, very few degassing units saw service, as evidenced by the late date of the order creating them.*14
To View: Degassing Station tank truck with heater mounted in the rear, Mobile Degassing Unit #1, Services of Supply, Tours, France, 21 July 1918.

*When the Armistice took effect, the few units that had reached the field were turned over to the Quartermaster Corps for delousing troops returning home.

While methods were being sought to degas men, efforts were also undertaken to decontaminate the ground they held in the static trench warfare. General orders created decontamination squads at regiment and battalion level. These units decontaminated shell holes with lime and new earth, buried gas shell duds, reported to gas officers the location of dud shells that could not be buried, and removed contaminated equipment and clothing in special oiled bags. Each man in the squad was issued a new SBR, a reserve M-2 mask, a suit of protective coveralls, and two pairs of oiled mittens. The decontamination equipment consisted of shovels, buckets, and long-handled tongs for handling dud mustard shells.
To View: A squad preparing to decontaminate a gas shell hole, 4 December 1918.

In the trenches, mustard gas and other agents were counteracted in a variety of ways. During a gas attack, standing orders called for as little moving about and talking as possible, because gas poisoning was sometimes intensified by exertion. Once an attack ceased, trenches were cleared of low lying gas. One method required the use of an Ayrton or trench fan. This device consisted of a two-foot-long handle attached to a rigid piece of canvas hinged to a fifteen-inch section that moved in one direction. In effect the fan was used like a shovel, with the moveable flap creating an upward air current, thus removing the gas. Americans adopted these fans as called for by British defensive gas doctrine. Unfortunately, the fans, according to British General Foulkes, were worse than worthless. Not only did they not remove the vapor, but the exertion of masked users led to exhaustion and increased susceptibility to gassing.* The fans were eventually discarded and burned to create an updraft, soon recognized as a better method of clearing trenches and dugouts of gas.15
To View: Men detailed to use Ayrton or British trench fans after gas attack, 1918.

Another method of decontamination used in the trenches consisted of placing boxes of chloride of lime outside of dugouts. Prior to entering, men stepped in the substance, neutralizing any mustard agent clinging to the shoes. The Vermoral sprayer, which was a hand-pumped fire extinguisher filled with a sodium thiosulfate solution, could neutralize chlorine, but little else. The sprayers were used, however, to moisten the blankets at the entrances of the gas-proof dugouts.16

The prolongation of German gas attacks, the increased quantity of chemical agents fired in an attack, the extensive use of the persistent agent mustard, plus the fact that 80 percent to 90 percent of all gas attacks experienced by the AEF took place during the hours of darkness, made the construction of gas-proof dugouts essential for survival in the trenches (Figure 4). Basically, the gas-proofing of dugouts required a wood frame entrance and a snug fitting blanket, usually soaked with glycerine and kept damp with a diluted solution of sodium thiosulfate. If space allowed, complete protection could, be obtained by hanging two blankets over the entrance in such a way as to leave an air space between the two. Such measures made it difficult for men in front-line trenches to get out of a dugout rapidly in the event of an infantry attack, and for this reason early U.S. manuals advised against protection of front-line dugouts. But this advice was generally ignored because of the need to have a gas-free environment in which to sleep and occasionally remove the SBR. The same Army manual stated that Medical aid-posts and advanced dressing stations; Company, Regiment, and Brigade Headquarters; at least one dugout per battery position; Signal Shelters and any other place where work has to be carried out during a gas attack should always be protected. 17

*Apparently the, British Army first rejected the fan, an, invention of Mrs. Ayrton, the wife of a distinguished physicist, but political pressure forced them to procure 100,000. The AEF Gas Service, unaware of the circumstances and not thinking to ask, ordered 50,000.
TO VIEW: 4. Entrance, gas-proof dugout

Oftentimes, casualties occurred when a gas shell or projector shell fell at the entrance of a dugout and the force of the explosion threw open the blankets and drove the gas inside. On 27 May 1918, at the beginning of one of the German 1918 spring offensives, a concentration of 983 phosgene projector bombs caught doughboys of the 168th Infantry, 42nd Division, asleep in dugouts on the side of a ravine. The Germans, in order to keep the U.S. troops pinned in the gassed position, shelled the area in the rear of the ravine for an hour with shrapnel and Yellow Cross. The division G-3 reported one soldier killed and six wounded by shrapnel, 236 gassed, and thirty-seven gas deaths resulting from the attack.18

It was the duty of the gas sentry to sound the warning of a gas attack to the other troops. Usually the sentry received general instructions to alert his unit as soon as he heard the hissing sound of gas leaving cylinders, saw a cloud moving along the ground, observed a distant flash, heard a muffled explosion of projectors, saw a shell burst with a small pop, or sniffed a suspicious odor. In addition to shouting, Gas he would, after masking, sound a mechanical alarm. Such alarms ranged from air horns, known as Strombos,* to metal shell casings, steel triangles, or even church bells. When, in the fall of 1918, the AEF went on the offensive, the Gas Service decided that Klaxon horns and European police rattles produced the most audible warning of gas to troops on the move.19
To View: Pvt. Demetry Melonisk, 315th Field Hospital, 304th Sanitary Train, 79th Division, carrying a chruch bell used to give gas alarms, 17 October 1918.

*Strombos horns carried for a great distance and were initially used for cloud attacks that occurred over a wide frontage. Later in the war, when attacks became more localized with projectiles and shells, the Strombos were phased out and replaced with alarms whose sound did not carry as far.

Whether on the move in open warfare or manning the trenches in static warfare, the most critical individuals in chemical combat were the unit gas officers. On 27 May 1918, AEF General Order 79 formalized and standardized defensive duties for gas officers, the positions having been created by individual divisions on their own initiative after arrival in France. Two months later, General Order 107 expanded the functions of gas officers: in addition to their previous duties, they would be advisers whose technical knowledge would be solicited in the preparations of all plans involving the extensive use of gas, whether by artillery or by other means. Despite the order, staff officers too often told gas officers that their advice for offensive planning was not required and that they should concern themselves only with defensive duties. The success of division gas officers in integrating plans for the use of gas in offensive operations eventually depended on, in the words of the Gas Service’s Chief, their ability to go out and sell gas to the army. Despite such promotional efforts, resistance by staff officers continued. During the Meuse-Argonne campaign in the fall of 1918, an unidentified division gas officer reportedly recommended to a division operations officer (G-3) that gas be used during a particular phase of the engagement. The staff officer replied that he would employ the artillery firing gas shells only if the gas officer stated in writing that the gas would not cause a single American casualty. This request was unrealistic in that a thorough staff planner in World War I usually included an allowance for casualties due to a friendly barrage. Another objection raised to the use of gas was that commanders feared its employment would subject their men to unnecessary retaliatory gas attacks.20

Even if a division commander and his staff were reluctant to employ chemicals, they could not afford to be careless about the protection of their troops from chemical agents. A unit’s effectiveness depended on proper gas defensive measures. GHQ, AEF, delegated significant responsibility for gas defense to division, regiment, battalion, and company gas officers and NCOs. These dedicated and harried men attempted to insure that their respective organizations could cope with gas attacks while sustaining minimal casualties. Once in the trenches, exposed to a chemical warfare environment, most commanders soon realized the need for competent gas officers. After selection and training, gas officers had to prove themselves to the commander, staff, and the troops in the trenches. The most effective way to gain the respect and confidence of the troops, one gas officer discovered, was to join a unit under an attack. This practice offered a number of advantages. First, the gas officer learned the immediate effects of a gas attack and what individuals endured during such an attack. He could suggest corrections and give guidance during the attack, as opposed to afterwards, when men were already casualties. The confidence of the men in the gas officer’s instruction grew when they observed him take what they did. Infantry officers proved more willing to accept the advice of such a gas officer because they knew he spoke from actual and not book knowledge.

*No figures for the AEF are available, but the French concluded that 75,000 or 1.5 percent of all their casualties were due to arnicicide (casualties caused by friendly fire).

This knowledge afforded the gas officer the credibility to obtain a hearing and accomplish results when he called to the attention of unit officers and staff both good results of proper gas discipline and the bad results of bad discipline. 21

While division gas officers worked with the staff, the regimental and battalion gas officers had the greatest impact on the doughboys, At these lower echelons, gas officers assumed a variety of responsibilities that ranged from instruction to inspection of defensive equipment and selection of alternate positions during an attack. It fell to these officers to assure that gas alarms were installed, gas sentries posted, gas alert signs displayed, and dugouts selected for gas-proofing, In addition these officers took wind readings twice a day.* When required, gas officers became bomb disposal experts who located and removed all unexploded enemy gas shells. As the Table of Organization for AEF units, did not include gas officers, General Order 79 of 27 May 1918, which ordered the appointment of gas officers down to battalion level, caused some grumbling in recently arrived divisions. Plagued by a shortage of line officers, commanders assigned men to gas duties grudgingly., When the need arose, the men chosen were subjected to double duty as infantry officers.22

With the absence of sophisticated detection and warning systems, one of the most important functions of a gas officer became the determination of when to give the order to mask and when to unmask. At gas schools, trainees were taught to taste gas, sniffing just enough air to identify a chemical agent by its own peculiar odor. They had to know the persistency and the properties of each gas and then be able to determine how soon after an attack the air would clear. Most of the officers became very proficient at identification. At times, though, some gas officers were too conscientious in tasting for gas and became casualties themselves.23

When night settled in, gas officers in the trenches slept fitfully, waiting for the cry of Gas One such officer described an evening that was shattered, after the troops had gone to sleep, by the sound of artillery followed by gas alarms. Everyone, he recalled, came out of their holes with masks in place, the fine fruit of constant training. The officer lifted his mask, sniffed, and determined the fumes to be from high explosive shells. After taking his mask off, the gas officer gave the all clear and the men unmasked. Toward dawn the men again awoke to the sound of gas alarms and cries of Gas This time the officer raised his mask and detected the mild pungent breath of a chemical agent. He masked and told the others to do the same. A gas shell exploded upwind with a light pop and puff of vapor. After the shells ceased dropping he checked up and down the line for casualties and found none. Several minutes passed, and he took another taste only to detect a lingering odor. Five minutes later a light wind drove the gas away, and the all-clear sounded.24

*Early in the American involvement, AEF and War Department manuals listed cloud attacks as the primary delivery system of the Germans; when the wind blew from the east, therefore, troops went on a gas alert.

The Americans were not always so fortunate in responding to gas attacks. On 26 February 1918, at 1330 in the Ansauville sector, men of the 1st Division received the first German projector attack directed against U.S. forces. The estimated 150 to 250 bombs contained phosgene and chloropicrin. Conditions were ideal for such an attack: the heavy evening air kept the gas low to the ground, and what wind there was soon became calm. The bombs fell over a 600-meter front, where heavy underbrush held the gas in place. Of the 225 men exposed, 33 percent (eighty-five men) became casualties. Two men died soon after the attack, and six soldiers succumbed after they reached the division field hospital.

Col. Campbell King, 1st Division Chief of Staff, believed that there were several causes for the casualties. The sudden attack caught men unprepared on sentry duty or in their dugouts; they did not have adequate warning to adjust their masks or lower the gas curtains. After the attack, men removed their masks on their own initLtive, or changed to the M-2, although the gas lingered in a dangerous concentration. Furthermore, the unmasked doughboys remained or worked in the dugouts and in low places in the woods, where gas stagnated. A captain who witnessed the attack amplified the Chief of Staffs observation. He reiterated that the premature removal of the mask, a breach of discipline, caused casualties and that the men failed to mask in time and to lower the gas-proof curtains. At the same time, the soldiers neglected to put out fires in the dugouts, thereby drawing gas from the trenches into the sealed shelters. Men who were only slightly gassed exerted themselves, contrary to standing orders, thus complicating their symptoms. The captain attributed the donning of the M-2 to the discomfort involved in wearing the SBR. A field hospital report mentioned that one man had had his mask disarranged in. an attempt to force a mask on a comrade who had gone berserk and torn off his own mask.25

In another commonplace incident, an entire platoon of infantry in the 28th Division became gas casualties before they reached the front. While moving forward one night toward Châuteau Thierry, the men stopped to rest in shallow shell holes near the road. A recent rain had diluted the usual smell of mustard, and no one advised the green troops that the holes were craters from Yellow Cross shells. Unwittingly, they slept through the night in fresh mustard contamination. The following morning the men awoke with backs and buttocks so badly burned that the skin appeared to be flayed. The battalion gas officer could only try to relieve their agony with generous applications of Sag paste. That same day the 28th Division’s gas officer noted his dwindling supplies of paste and masks. Since German gas seemed to be coming over in increasing quantities with the resulting casualties, he ordered. one of the battalion gas officers back to the SOS depot at Gievres on a foraging expedition to secure antigas supplies for the division.26

There were times when division, regimental, and battalion gas officers, in their more zealous attempts to prevent gas casualties, ran afoul of line officers. A battalion commander in the 23d Infantry, 2d Division, complained to his superior that the requests, orders, and reports required by the regimental gas officer were absurd, ludicrous, and, in many cases, impossible to carry out. For instance, the gas officer had ordered that all men within 1,200 yards of the front line must sleep in gas-proof dugouts with sentry posted over each. If this order were respected, the commander complained, no one in the unit would get any rest because the facilities for compliance did not exist. Another directive informed the infantry officer that men exposed to mustard should take a warm bath and change uniforms. To this he replied, with frustration, We don’t get enough water to wash regularly. The battalion commander closed his letter by explaining how tired he was of receiving directives doped out of a book. Staff officers, he believed, must become more aware of the conditions at the front.27
To View: Infantrymen of the 28th Division masking during a gas attack, 23 August 1918.

Likewise a division commander complained that new gas officers were almost hysterical in their attempts to educate the troops in gas defense. Knowledge and real efficient training, he observed, came after hard experience and the hysteria of gas officers passed. When the 1st Division suffered 800 gas casualties at Villers-Tournelle, General Bullard complained of a report filed by a GHQ gas officer who, he believed, spoke without knowledge or consideration in a tone of superior criticism that comes from abstract study. After Bullard complained, the officer’s superiors ordered all gas officers to abstain from such criticism. Fortunately, incidents such as these were the exception rather than the rule, and line officers eventually realized that the gas officers were there to help them, not to harass them.28

Still, the job of gas officer continued to be a demanding one, especially in regard to defensive training for replacements. The square World War I division had a Table of Organization strength of approximately 28,000 officers and men. In this war of attrition with high casualties (referred to as wastage ), these large square divisions had a constant flow of new men into the ranks. The 1st Division, for example, after 223 days in the line, received over 30,000 replacements, The 2nd Division’s statistics were even more striking: following 139 days in the trenches, it took in over 35,000 new men. Six other divisions received over half their strength in replacements, and another five received over a third. The rapid mobilization and rush to send men overseas led to a situation in which men had little overall training. The 42nd Division, after some time in the trenches, withdrew to train for the St. Mihiel offensive. During this time the division received replacements, cannon fodder if there ever was any. One, company obtained forty-three new men of whom one man had had but one week of training; four had had two weeks; twenty had had three weeks; six had had four weeks ; and the balance had had between one and three months. Gas officers were therefore faced with a continual personnel training problem, having to instill a proper respect for gas defense in green officers and men.29

Protecting officers and men of the AEF required more than training. Contamination of food, water, tobacco, and equipment by chemical agents emerged as a significant problem for gas officers. On an interim basis the Gas Service issued tar paper and oil cloth to cover food and tobacco. Water contamination was always a problem, because the scarcity of water often compelled men like a 79th Division doughboy at Montfaucon to risk drinking from a suspicious source. Driven by thirst, this American ignored the warning of French soldiers and drank stagnant water from a shell hole. He later suffered chest pains from the gas contaminated water. After being evacuated he eventually returned to his unit, but only after twenty-three days in a base hospital. No one ever devised an effective means to stop troops from drinking contaminated water. Late in the war, the Quartermaster Corps packaged foodstuffs destined for France in gas-proof, airtight trench ration containers.

As for equipment, the corrosive properties of most war gases created problems of contaminated artillery shells not being able to be chambered, breechblocks jamming, gun surfaces rusting, and contaminated small arms cartridges not chambering properly. AEF regulations required weapons and shells be cleaned with oil immediately after a gas attack, but the metal continued to corrode unless small arms were disassembled and boiled in a solution of sodium bicarbonate and water. The difficulty of applying decontamination method in the trenches, not to mention in No Man’s Land during a prolonged assatilt lasting several days, can be well imagined, Protection of animals was also a problem, and they, too, were fitted with protective masks.30

*The term square comes from the fact that the division had four infantry regiments.
To View: The use of chemical agents created problems not only for the combat arms but also for the Services of Supply, the logistical tail of the AEF. Here mules and men are masked for a drill, November, 1918.
When doughboys went over the top, they, their commanders, and their gas officers alike faced increased challenges and many difficulties not met with in trench warfare. At times, good gas discipline had little or no impact on casualties in the maelstrom of battle. The reports of gas officers constantly referred to gas casualties caused by men being knocked down, or shocked and stunned by German high explosive shell fire. The concussion of the exploding shells slowed the men’s reaction or worse, knocked them unconscious, and they never had a chance to put their mask on. Many times the blast tore off a mask or flying shrapnel cut the facepiece or damaged the hose from the filter to the mouthpiece. The extensive use of gas both at day and night often meant prolonged use of the mask. Lt. Robert A. Hall, for example, blamed a significant number of the 1st Division’s gas casualties at Villers-Toumelle on the fact that after seventeen to eighteen hours of good gas discipline wearing the SBR, perspiration impregnated with gas seeped under the elastic head band. Perspiration also caused the nose clip to slip, and as a result, men inhaled poisonous vapor or had their eyes affected and, as a consequence, became gas casualties.31

Troops caught in the open by enemy gunners often sought cover in shell holes, ravines, and patches of wood, the very places where gas lingered the longest. Even if men maintained strict gas discipline, casualties were inevitable when the enemy concentration of gas shells became too dense. From 0600, 12 October to 1600, 13 October 1918, the 114th Infantry, 29th Division, attacked German positions at Bois Ormout. The Germans fired an estimated 2,000 gas shells at the regiment in bursts of about 300. Yellow, Green, and Blue Cross 77-mm and 105-mm shells landed around the 1,500 men of the 114th Infantry while they deployed in ravines, shell holes, and wooded areas. As a consequence, 500 men became gas casualties, mostly with lung injuries. The commander requested permission to evacuate the contaminated area. The French 66th Regiment commander, who had operational control of the attack, told him to remain in place. The Frenchman believed the withdrawal of the regiment was not tactically sound, for the Germans would counterattack if they detected any sign of an Allied retreat. Maj. James H. Walton, the division gas officer, remarked that this incident, in which high gas casualties were inflicted despite good gas discipline, was one of the best examples of the deadly effects of gas shell he had seen in combat.32

Combat decisions that had little reference to gas warfare often resulted in incurring or aggravating gas casualties. For example, although AEF tactical doctrine called for the preselection of alternate positions, many requests to relocate infantry units during combat were denied even though the tactical situation and the enemy’s use of chemical agents called for relocation. In the determination to show the AEF’s battle prowess, many of its senior commanders were loath to give up an inch of occupied or captured ground. In one such case, on 15 July 1918, the commander of the 30th Infantry, 3d Division, filed a graphic report of the unit’s plight after repelling a German attempt to cross the Marne. His men, after being shelled with various chemicals for ten hours, were absolutely worn out. They had not had even a drink of water during that time. The shells landing in their sector contained mustard, chloropicrin, and chocolate (diphosgene has the odor of candy) gases. If the men remained in their contaminated uniforms, he noted, they were certain to become gas casualties, because the mustard gas would eventually reach their flesh. It was absolutely impossible to feed the regiment. because the rations had been contaminated by the gas. He reported to division that they are still there in the line and they will hold the line, but they ought to be relieved…. They were not.* Such decisions exhibited a crucial lack of understanding of the nature of gas warfare.33

Like the infantry, AEF artillerymen and animals suffered under the fury of German gas shell bombardments. While nonpersistent gas caused artillerymen problems in their attempt to deliver accurate fire, mustard yellow cross gas, remarked a cannoneer with the 91st Division, seems to be about the only Boche weapon of which the men are really afraid. Efforts were made to displace batteries subjected to counterbattery gas attacks, but this was difficult and time consuming. To assist the artillerymen who had to remain in a gassed area, the French Tissot mask was issued when available. As previously noted, not only did this mask’s filter offer less resistance to breathing, but the problem of fogged vision associated with the SBR did not exist. Most important, without a nose clip and mouthpiece it was a very comfortable mask to wear. In addition to the Tissot mask, gas gloves made of oil cloth were issued together with impervious clothing. However, because the antigas suits were not ventilated, men would tear them off in warm weather even while working in an area reeking with. mustard. As an alternative to the protective coveralls, artillerymen used Sag paste. Many artillerymen shaved off all their body hair prior to an application of the ointment. Every man in the firing battery, noted a gunner, is now denuded of hair on top of his poll, under his arm pits, between his legs, and his underwear is soldered to him with ‘sag paste.’ 34

*Gas casualties for the 30th Infantry during the period 14-20 July 1918 totaled 202 out of a total of 600 for the 3rd Division. (Spencer, Gas Attacks, Part 1, p. 123.)
To View: A horse and cannoneer masked during a gas attack, 1918.

The German use of chemical agents during World War I also placed a tremendous burden on a noncombat branch, the AEF Medical Department. Initially, no actions were taken at division level to provide medics with special expertise in the treatment of chemical casualties. As a result, division medical personnel were unprepared initially to handle the influx of gas victims. In the confusion of organizing and placing an American army in combat, it took GHQ, AEF, until October, 1918, to establish a uniform procedure to handle casualties.
To View: Battery A, 108th Field Artillery, receiving and firing gas counterbattery, 3 October 1918.

The 42d Division, the second most experienced American combat division of the AEF, appointed a gas medical officer a position that eventually all divisions of the AEF were ordered to establish. The 42d’s decision to appoint a gas medical officer came in the wake of several disastrous contacts with chemical agents in the division’s early combat. One such incident occurred on the evening of 20 March 1917, when approximately 400 German mustard rounds and 7,000 high explosive and shrapnel shells landed on a position manned by the division’s 165th Infantry. The weather conditions were excellent for the persistent mustard agent. It had rained earlier, and there was no breeze to dissipate the gas as it hung in the air. At midnight, men began to suffer the delayed effects of the gas. Company K lost two-thirds of its effectives. A week later Lt. Col. H. L. Gilchrist, Medical Director of the AEF, reported observing at a base hospital 417 gas casualties from the 165th Infantry.35

As the intensity of fighting increased, so did the number of men who claimed they were gassed, further burdening the Medical Department. Many shell-shocked soldiers or men who suffered from exhaustion and hunger believed themselves to be victims of gas poisoning. Others panicked after smelling shell fumes and reported themselves gassed. Then there were the shirkers who feigned being gassed. The symptomology of gas poisoning is so complex, observed Maj. William V. Sommervell, 3d Division Gas Officer, and at the same time so indefinite that anyone who claimed to be gassed was immediately sent to the rear.36
To View: Lts. Lautell Lugar and William A. Howell, Medical Corps, attending wounded to the rear of the first trench line during a gas attack, 27 October 1918.

As a consequence GHQ, AEF, expanded the number of medical personnel available to diagnose gas victims and weed out malingerers. At the hospital to the rear, division medical personnel devised several traps to detect suspected malingerers. One trap involved offering the gas casualty a large meal. Men on the front line were always hungry; they rarely had enough to eat. But a gas victim’s symptoms would include a loss of appetite, so anyone who devoured the food found himself promptly returned to the line. Medical personnel also offered suspected malingerers a cigarette laced with diphosgene. If the soldier gagged he was feigning gas poisoning. Some idea of the magnitude of the problem may be derived from one division field hospital commander’s establishment, of a board to review the 251 gas cases in his wards. The board’s report indicated that only ninety of the men actually suffered from gas poisoning. The problem, though, was never satisfactorily resolved in the AEF.37

The Medical Department processed gas casualties in combat divisions, using procedures similar to those used for sick and wounded. Medics at the battalion aid stations did what they could for the gas wounded. This consisted of plastering Sag paste on mustard burns, often having to cut a uniform open to expose the swollen flesh. A wet compress applied over the eyes eased the pain of those blinded. Men who inhaled mustard gas could only be comforted with. words, for no treatment could ease their pain. Medics could do nothing but try to put [the] mask back on and get them to a Field Hospital. From the battalion aid station, men moved to the Ambulance Head, the closest point to the line safely out of reach of German artillery fire. When possible, all gas casualties rode to avoid exertion. Men blinded by chemical agents were usually led to the ambulance head by comrades who could see, although in some instances, large numbers of blinded soldiers groped their way to the rear by holding on to a cord set up by the medics.38
To View: Gas casualties from the 2nd Battalion, 326th Infantry, 82nd Division, waiting for evacualtion, Argonne Forest, Ardennes, France, 11 October 1918.

When possible, division field hospitals were located in the same general area, with one hospital designated to handle gas victims. At this hospital the division medical officer supervised triage. Soldiers were placed into one of the following categories: fit for duty, immediate return to unit; fit for duty in twenty-four hours, return to unit; severely gassed, evacuate to an Army hospital. Exhausted men who complained of gas symptoms but who showed no outward signs of having been gassed were held in the division rear for rest, food, and observation. If medics verified their claims to gas poisoning, they too were evacuated.39
To View: Loading 89th Division gas patients at a field hospital north of Royaumeix (St. Mihiel Sector), 8 August 1918, for removal to a base hospital in Toul. Stretcher bearers wear makeshift burlap mittens to protect hands from gas-infected clothing of victims.

Division gas hospitals had to be located near a source of water because persistent and even nonpersistent agents clung to clothing, hair, and skin. After admission to a hospital, doughboys stripped off all their clothing and showered. Those casualties with serious symptoms were bathed while still on their stretchers. The bath house of the 2d Division gas hospital had a portable heater and six shower heads. When a doughboy left the showers, medics sprayed his eyes, nose, and throat with bicarbonate of soda. Depending on the diagnosis, the patient might be given a special treatment. of alkaline, oxygen, and, if necessary, venesection (bleeding) to counteract the effects of inhaled gas. For those soldiers who had eaten food or drunk water contaminated by gas, doctors prescribed olive or castor oil to coat the irritated stomach linings. When treatment failed to allow free breathing, or when the patient developed additional symptoms, medics immediately evacuated him to a base gas hospital. By November, 1918, the Medical. Department was well on its way to developing procedures to handle gas Victims.40

If American defensive doctrine and procedures for dealing with gas warfare were rudimentary or nonexistent to begin with and evolved during the war, the same was true of offensive gas doctrine and procedures. The American Army’s Artillery Corps had not determined its own doctrine for gas warfare prior to entering combat. Instead, U.S. artillerymen borrowed from both the French and British, as well as from the Germans. The first U.S. field manual for the use of chemical artillery shells was a translation of a current French manual. The AEF, emulating the French, classified chemical shell fire into two types of bombardment. The first type, destructive fire, consisted of two minutes of rapid fire with rounds landing in close proximity, so as to create a dense gas cloud that, given surprise, could inflict heavy casualties. The second type, a neutralizing bombardment, was fired over a longer period and was used to lower the enemy’s physical resistance and morale. It also interfered with the enemy’s activities by forcing him to wear a mask for extended periods of time. Mustard gas best accomplished neutralization according to the AEF field manuals.41

AEF manuals identified several kinds of missions that utilized surprise or neutralizing bombardment. For purpose of harassment, a neutralizing fire was used to exhaust and hinder the movement of enemy personnel. Interdiction fire was a kind of neutralizing fire that rendered positions untenable. Barrages in support of an infantry attack were to consist of 25 percent gas, or one gun per battery. The balance of high explosive fire disrupted enemy reinforcements and prevented counterattacks. AEF manuals duplicated German doctrine by ordering the inclusion of gas in all barrages; this would, it was hoped, deceive the enemy into believing a great concentration of gas was being fired at all times and cause him to mask frequently, thus wearing him down physically and mentally and limiting his ability to defend his position.42

Artillery counterbattery fire with gas came to be an extremely effective tactic. Before gas shells came into use, the attempt to neutralize enemy batteries on the Western Front required large amounts of high explosive shell. Regardless of the length of time or the number of rounds fired, complete destruction of the enemy’s batteries was never accomplished. Between 1914 and 1916 the average length of time required for artillery counterbattery fire to be effective was estimated at over six days. By 1917, gas made it possible to neutralize a known artillery battery in as little as fifteen minutes. Effective counterbattery fire over a wide front could neutralize enemy artillery in only two to four hours. By the spring of 1918, artillery commanders called for gas shells constantly, and the number of rounds fired was limited only by the availability of such shells.43

Of special demand was mustard, the agent that had become the king of the chemical war. The effect of mustard shells was so striking that there was a constant unfilled demand for them. One division commander remarked that when his cannoneers were at last issued the agent their morale soared. The arrival of mustard from French gas ammunition points in July, 1918, caused a great jubilee among AEF division artillerymen. That same month, on 2 July 1918, AEF General Order 107 allowed division gas officers to take an active role in the preparation of all plans involving the extensive use of gas by artillery and special gas troopS.44

AEF tactical employment of mustard and other chemical agents improved somewhat as artillerymen became more experienced. If, for instance, the exact location of an enemy battery in a wooded area was unknown, an AEF battery would shell the access roads with mustard, rather than waste limited gas shells by dowsing the entire woods. The artillerymen would then fire high explosive shells to damage the access roads and make it difficult for resupply trains trying to reach the battery to avoid contamination. The enemy battery would soon have to move. This tactic was also used to block reinforcements passing through defiles or over bridges. It proved to be an extremely efficient and economical method of counterbattery fire.45

Unfortunately, many senior U.S. Army officers remained oblivious to the potential use of chemicals by artillery or special gastroops in the offense. When it came time for the AEF to launch its first major offensives at St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne, the use of gas was minimal. In preparing for the Meuse-Argonne campaign, for example, the U.S. First Army Headquarters studied the spring offensives of 1918, where the Germans literally smothered the Allies with hundreds of thousands of gas shells in a relatively short space of time. To its credit, First Army HQ disseminated this information to its units and, in field orders during the campaign, urged subordinate corps and divisions to use gas. Gas was made available by the French to the Americans in a sufficient quantity to neutralize enemy batteries, strong points, and installations, and to produce casualties. The final decision to utilize gas, however, rested with the corps and division commanders. With little or no doctrine, training, or experience they were reluctant to employ gas. The offensive use of chemical weapons, according to one First Army general, does not seem to be understood. Army-level operational planning for the campaign included extensive use of gas, but its use by corps and divisions was halting. While the First Army’s divisions did gain some confidence in the use of gas towards the end of the campaign, they never really mastered its employment.46

After training with the British Special Brigade, the other gas offensive arm of the AEF, the 1st Gas Regiment, went into action on 22 May 1918. The Ist Battalion, 1st Gas Regiment, which consisted of Companies A and B, reported for duty attached to the 26th Division. On 18 June, Company B, temporarily attached to the XXXII French Corps, conducted the regiment’s first independent operation. At 2230, seven hundred 8-inch Livens projectors, emplaced the night before and loaded with sixty-pound drums of phosgene, were fired at two targets located 1,500 meters away. The first target was a company of infantry with one Minenwerfer (mortar) company and the second a reserve battalion of infantry. Artillery fired shrapnel and high explosive shells in conjunction with the projector attack. A month later prisoners revealed that this attack caused at least fifty casualties, including ten enemy deaths.47
The AEF tactical doctrine for the employment of special gas troops cited the advantages of using gas in terms of accuracy, the extended casualty producing area, and. lasting results. The doctrine noted the effectiveness of gas for the elimination of well-entrenched targets that high explosive fire could not destroy. The amount and type of chemical agent employed depended on the tactical situation, as well as wind and terrain features. Projectors, the primary weapon of U.S. gas troops, provided the means for producing casualties and demoralization second to none. When used aggressively, Livens projectors could keep enemy forces off balance; when employed on a quiet front, they could lessen considerably the likelihood of that front being used as a place to rest battle weary troops.48

In the offense, special gas troops could be utilized, according to AEF manuals, in five tactical situations. In the first, they would precede an offensive operation, keeping enemy positions in a gas environment until attacking troops arrived. This tactic would cause casualties and demoralize and reduce the fighting efficiency and morale of the enemy. Second, gas employed by special troops could eliminate machine gun nests just prior to an attack. AEF 4-inch Stokes mortars offered the best means of eliminating a machine gun position: two to ten Stokes mortars firing phosgene could form a localized concentration, either creating casualties or forcing the masking or the abandonment of the gun. Third, gas was ideal for sustained operations. Each night, gas could be placed on enemy machine gun nests, strongpoints, and troop concentrations, thereby weakening future resistance. Fourth, after friendly forces had taken an objective, reorganized, and consolidated their positions, gas employment acted as a temporary check or block to potential enemy counterattack formations. Fifth, the doctrine stipulated that in a stabilized situation frequent surprise fire with projectors could create the high concentrations of gas on suitable enemy targets from one end of the line to the other needed to harass enemy troops. In addition, local concentrations of gas, fired from Stokes mortars on machine gun nests, mortar positions, strongpoints, trench intersections, and other sensitive points further reduced enemy morale and strength.49

In the brief time it was deployed, the 1st Gas Regiment never matched the sophistication of the British Special Brigade. With the return to open warfare, the 1st Gas Regiment made superhuman efforts to meet AEF needs and moved their Stokes mortars with advancing infantry rather than remain in the trenches, as the British did. The regiment mortar men became very proficient in using thermite shells against machine gun positions and in covering advancing infantry with smoke. The regiment did not, however, employ gas during the attack as extensively as it did thermite and smoke. Gas was used, though, in conjunction with smoke, in order to cause enemy troops to expect gas whenever they received smoke. This tactic forced the enemy to mask, further limiting his vision.

Many commanders resisted the employment of special gas troops. The use of gas was new to American commanders, so it came as no surprise to officers of the Gas Regiment that trouble occasionally arose with the unit they were to support. The 1st Gas Regiment company commanders, lieutenants and captains attached to infantry divisions, tried as best they could to explain what results gas would achieve. During the Saint Mihiel operation in the fall of 1918, infantry officers quickly took advantage of the close support furnished by the Gas Regiment, whose mortar crews knocked out German machine gun nests with thermite and created smoke to screen the U.S. infantry. Still, the infantry appeared reluctant to use gas consistently. When the American First Army launched its first attack, the 1st Gas Regiment did not support the offensive with gas.

During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the 1st Gas Regiment did support Anierican troops with gas. Company E, 1st Gas Regiment, attached to the 28th Infantry Division, bombarded enemy hilltop positions with Stokes mortar rounds of smoke, thermite, and deceptive gas. Covered by this suppressive fire, doughboys executed a flanking movement and took the hill with very little difficulty. On 2 October 1918, Company F, while in support of the 33d Infantry Division, received authorization to fire fifty-six projectors loaded with phosgene bombs at German units near Bois La Ville. Results of the gas mission were unknown. Soon after, however, German artillery retaliated by firing a number of Yellow Cross rounds at the 33d Infantry Division. As a result, the infantry regiment being supported by the gas company refused to allow it to fire its scheduled second projector attack. The official history of the Gas Regiment indignantly reported that American troops near Bois La Ville constituted a normal mustard target for German gunners and that, irrespective of our gas operations, the locale normally experienced such attacks.50

Company F fired one of the largest American gas bombardments of the Meuse-Argonne campaign in support of the French XVII Corps. The men of Company F installed 230 Livens projectors in two nights. To assist in the operation, 100 French soldiers with forty-seven horses pulled narrowgauge rail cars containing projectors and shells to the front. At exactly 0330 on 16 October 1918, drums of phosgene, fired in a dense fog and rain, fell on a known enemy troop position. Corps artillery fired high explosive shells in conjunction with the attack.51

As the Meuse-Argonne operation continued infantry commanders gained confidence in the effectiveness of chemicals and increasingly called upon gas troops to exercise their skills. By the latter stages of the offensive, some division commanders actively sought out gas company commanders to support their operations. The 2d Division staff consulted the supporting gas company in planning an attack and, as a result, projectors were used for the first time preceding a significant American advance. The results confirmed the claims of the gas unit in that a large number of enemy troops became casualties; the gas cloud itself had a demoralizing effect on other German troops as the wind pushed it to the enemy rear.52

The initial hesitancy by the AEF to employ gas was judged understandable by an officer of the 1st Gas Regiment. The American Army was unprepared to engage in gas warfare when President Wilson committed it to battle. As a result, the use of chemical weapons and the defense against them became a deadly learning process for all branches of the Army under the stress of battle. Many commanders were simply unwilling to employ a weapon with which they had had no prior experience and which, if used, could invite German retaliation in kind. For those commanders who did allow the use of gas, some became enthusiastic supporters of offensive gas operations; some did not. The American experience with the offensive use of gas remained uneven to the end of the war.53

We Can Never Afford to
Neglect the Question

Chapter 6

General John J. Pershing, in his Final Report, made specific reference to three weapons introduced in World War I and the impact each had on the conduct of the war. The three weapons Pershing listed were the tank, aircraft, and poison gas. Only one, gas, caused him to reflect on its use in any future war. He declared, Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question. Pershing, with the experience of the war behind him, pointed out that gas was a significant weapon, but not as a producer of battle deaths.1

The AEF suffered 34,249 immediate deaths on the battlefield. Of these, an estimated 200 were caused by gas.* The number of men wounded and evacuated to medical facilities numbered 224,089. Medical Department reports indicate 70,552 of these hospital patients suffered from gas wounds. Of these gas victims, 1,221 died in AEF hospital wards. When, looking at the total figures, 27.3 percent of all AEF casualties, dead and wounded, were caused by gas. With respect to the burden gas casualties placed on medical facilities, not to mention the replacement system, a significant 31.4 percent of all AEF wounded were treated in hospitals for gas wounds (Table 2).2

Gas in World War I did not have to cause large numbers of casualties to be an effective and versatile weapon. Gas warfare placed additional strain on every aspect of combat. According to British Maj. Gen. Charles H. Foulkes, Commander of the Special Brigade, the appearance of gas on the battlefield … changed. the whole character of warfare. In World War I, gas was everywhere, in clothing, food, and water. It corroded human skin, internal organs, and even steel weapons. The smell of gas hung in the air, and the chemical environment became a reality of everyday life. Not only did men have to train constantly, but an entire logistical network had to be established for offensive and defensive gas equipment. A new branch of the U.S. Army came into existence, and new units, such as decontamination squads, mobile degassing units, and special gas troops, were created. These organizations, in turn, took manpower away from the combat arms, as combat arms officers became gas officers in divisions, regiments, and battalions. Also, the impact of gas on the Medical Department posed tremendous problems in the treatment of casualties. The number of gas wounded became so great that one field hospital out of four per division was dedicated to the treatment of gas victims.3

*This is a rough and perhaps low estimate. It was always difficult to determine the cause of death when shell-torn bodies were interred by Quartermaster troops.
TO VIEW: 2. Hospitalized casualties
Despite the pervasive impact of chemical agents on the battlefield, commanders and staffs had difficulty adjusting their thinking and planning in such a way as to make effective use of these new weapons – weapons totally different from anything they had ever been trained to use. Not only did commanders and staffs have difficulty determining how they would employ the new weapon to their tactical advantage, but they also had to consider the effects of enemy gas on their own troops. By entering the conflict without preparation for chemical warfare, AEF commanders never fully comprehended the potential of gas on the battlefield.

The experience of the United States Army before and during World War I suggests several shortcomings in the military’s preparation for, and later employment of, chemical warfare. Prior to American entry into the war, the War Department and General Staff virtually ignored the deployment of chemical weapons in Europe and did, little or nothing to prepare the Army to fight and survive in a chemical environment. This pervasive neglect had an adverse impact on the capability of the AEF to fight effectively on a chemical battlefield. American troops entering front-line trenches were usually poorly trained and ill equipped to engage in gas warfare.

Proper defensive equipment is a minimal requirement for the successful engagement of forces in chemical warfare. The indispensable item for the World War I doughboy was his protective mask. Besides the filtration of all harmful agents, the mask had to fulfill a number of other requirements to be efficient. It had to be comfortable and allow for freedom of movement, full vision, easy breathing, communication, and durability. The American failure to develop a mask that could meet these requirements limited the combat effectiveness of the soldiers of the AEF. The decision to purchase the British SBR and, later, to manufacture an American version of it rather than to adopt and modify the more efficient and comfortable French Tissot was a serious error in judgment brought about by a lack of foresight and preparation.

The prewar failure to develop and experiment with new gases was also a serious shortcoming. If attention had been paid to the rapidly changing technology of chemical warfare, the United States, with its untapped industrial capacity, might have been able to overcome the German advantage. American technology might have produced the king of war gases, the persistent mustard agent, in a timely fashion. Instead, the Germans introduced this agent a year before the Allies.

After entry into the conflict, the United States geared up for production of war gases currently in use. Eventually mustard and other agents were shipped from the United States, but only in fifty-five-gallon containers. Production of chemical shells, based on French designs, was belatedly undertaken, and not a single American gas shell ever left the muzzle of an AEF artillery piece in combat. The unfortunate shortage of gas shells restricted the AEF’s capability to retaliate in kind against the Germans; this, in turn, had a demoralizing effect on troops whose own positions had been liberally drenched with gas from German shells.

The AEF never found the key to effective education and training for the offensive and defensive aspects of chemical warfare. A significant advantage could have been obtained if both offensive and defensive training had been integrated into all aspects of instruction. Once a soldier understood the overall nature of gas warfare and acquired confidence in his equipment and gas officers, he more easily accepted and adjusted to chemicals in actual combat. Unfortunately, U.S. training in chemical warfare never reached the sophistication needed to achieve the desired results. Equipment shortages and the lack of trained, instructors hampered the AEF’s preparation to engage in chemical warfare. The Army suffered needless casualties as a consequence.

Good gas discipline was also essential to the conduct of chemical warfare. Very few soldiers reached the level of the 1st Infantry Division doughboy who, when asked by a staff officer if the gas alarm signified a drill, replied through his mask in muffled tones, Put on your mask, put on your mask, you damn fool and don’t ask questions. Here, said the division commander who learned of the incident, was the real thing in discipline. Discipline and training were required if men were to be expected to remain in a contaminated area. The soldier’s determination to fight on would certainly have been enhanced if he had had faith in his equipment and the knowledge that provisions had been made for the decontamination of himself and his gear.4

Had the U.S. Army’s leaders, prior to America’s entry into the war, prepared themselves intellectually by studying German gas doctrine or by reviewing observer reports, gas officers would not have had to overcome such strong resistance to the tactical employment of chemicals. Because the U.S. Army failed to develop gas warfare doctrine, the average AEF officer never really understood the potential value of chemicals. Nor could he put aside his preconceived, if perhaps erroneous notion, that chemicals were unusually inhumane weapons whose development should not be pursued. For America the real inhumanity of chemical warfare in World War I lay in the blindness of U.S. civilian and military leaders who, having ignored the real and present threat posed by gas, deployed the doughboys of the AEF to fight unprepared in a chemical environment. Ignorance, shortsightedness, and unpreparedness extracted a high toll at the front, a toll that the United States with its intellectual and technological resources should not have had to pay.

Notes

Introduction

1. Wayne Biddle, Restocking the Chemical Arsenal, New York Times Magazine, 24 May 1981:36.

6. Rudolf Hanslian, The German Gas Attack at Ypres on April 22, 1915 (Berlin: Verlag Gasschutz and Luftschutz, 1934), 6, translated by the Military Intelligence Division, U.S. Army War College; Charles H. Foulkes, Gas The Story of the Special Brigade (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1936), 24; Ulrich M61ler-Kiel, Die Chemische Waffe im, Weltkrieg and jetzt [The chemical weapon during the war and now] (Berlin: Verlag Chemie, 1932), 16, translated by the Military Intelligence Division, U.S. Army War College; H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), 63; Hogg, Gas, 19.

12. The description of the first gas attack is taken from the following sources: Hanslian, Ypres; Owen Spencer Watkins, unidentified article in The Methodist Recorder (Great Britain) quoted in The Literary Digest, 4 September 1915:483-86; and Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1930), 175-85.

13. Foulkes, Gas , 19-20.

14. The description of the British gas attack at Loos is taken from Ibid., 66-84; and Hart, The Real War, 186-98.

5. Great Britain, Army, Report on the Activities of the Special Brigade, with chart on Expansion of the Special Brigade, 19 December 1918, in possession of the author; France, Armée, Armées du Nord et du Nordest, Instruction relative a l’Organization et a emploi des Unités speciales, dites, Unités Z [Instruction relative to the organization and. use of special units, called Units Z], 23 January 1918, partial translation by Dr. Robert. M. Epstein, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command. and General Staff College, 1982; Hanslian, Chemische Krieg, 4. There were thirteen Russian field armies at the time that country left the war.
6. Foulkes, Gas , 242-43.

7. Samuel James Manson Auld, Chemical Warfare, Chemical Warfare, 15 March 1922:1224, reprint of a lecture published in the Royal Engineers Journal (Great Britain) of February 1922; Foulkes, Gas , 293.

8. Hanslian, Chemische Krieg, 4-5; Foulkes, Gas , 94-95, 305.

9. Hanslian, Chemische Krieg, 48-49.

10. Prentiss, Chemicals in War, 440-45.

11. Ibid.

12. Foulkes, Gas , 167, 169; Lefebure, Riddle, 62.

13. Hanslian, Chemische Krieg, 107.

14. Hogg, Gas, 48-49; Pascal Lucas, The Evolution of Tactical Ideas in France and Germany during the War of 1914-1918 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1923), 34, translated by P. V. Kieffer, U.S. Army, in 1925.

1. Frederick Brown, Chemical Warfare, A Study in Restraints (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 15-17, 1 confirmed Brown’s analysis of the propaganda war by examining prewar issues of the Army-Navy Journal,The Literary Digest, and the New York Times. I also looked at Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda in the World War (New York: Peter Smith, 1938), and Peterson, Propaganda for War. Frederick Palmer, an astute wartime observer, gives an excellent overview of the effect Allied propaganda had on Americans in Newton D. Baker, America at War, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1931), 1:36-39. See also Benedict Crowell, America’s Munitions, 1917-1918 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), 410.

2. Brown, Chemical Warfare, 40-41. Brown cites Chief of Staff Peyton C. March’s comments that the use of gas reduces civilization to savagery. From memoirs of World War I officers, especially those who served in the Chemical Warfare Service, it is apparent that this belief was widespread.

4. U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Preparedness for National Defense, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1916), 483; Wilder D. Bancroft,et al., Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, The Medical Department of the United StatesArmy in the World War, vol. 14 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1926), 27.

5. Bancroft, et al., Medical Aspects, 27.

6. Ibid. In Chemical Warfare, Brown cites two reports, but these were filed after the U.S. declaration of war.

18. E. W. Spencer, The History of Gas Attacks upon the American Expeditionary Forces During the World War, 4 pts (Bound typescript; Edgewood Arsenal, MD: Chemical Warfare Service, U.S. War Department, 15 February 1928), 3:403-4; J. W. Grissinger, Medical Field Service in France (Washington, DC: The Association of Military Surgeons, 1928), 28-29, reprinted from The Military Surgeon 61-63 (1927-1928).

23. Norman A. Dunham, The War As I Saw It, 3 vols., manuscript, World War I project, MHI, 1:166, 168; Gilman, Lectures, 14.

24. U.S. Army, Chemical Warfare Service, European Division, Training Activities of the Chemical Warfare Service (N.p., 1919). Unless otherwise indicated all of the information pertaining to defensive gas training is from this unnumbered publication.

5. Amos A. Fries, -Gas in Defense-, in -Gas in Attack- and -Gas in Defense- (Fort Leavenworth,KS: The General Service Schools Press, n.d.), 17-18, reprinted from the National Service Magazine, June-July 1919; Report … Defense Division, 12.

6. Report Defense Division, 14.

7. Bullard Personalities, 159; Report … Defense Division, 14.

8. U.S. Army, A.E.F., Office of the Chief of Gas Service, Semi-monthly Report to Director of Gas Service, U.S., on Activities and Needs of the Gas Service, A. E. F., 15 May 1918, 2, DTIC AD-498800.

21. U.S. Army, 26th Division, Gas Officer, Report of Growth, Organization and Accomplishments of the Division Gas Officer, With Suggested Duties of Officers, 25 November 1918, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washing-ton, DC.

1. John J. Pershing, Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920), 77.

2. In researching gas casualty statistics, I found minor discrepancies and a variety of reporting methods. The studies I examined included Albert G. Love, Statistics, pt. 2, Medical and Casualty Statistics, The Medical Departanent of the United States Army in the World Way, vol. 15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1925); Albert G. Love, War Casualties, Army Medical Bulletin no. 24 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Medical Field Service School, 1931); and Harry L. Gilchrist, A Comparative Study of World War Casualties From Gas and Other Weapons (Edgewood Arsenal, MD: Chemical Warfare School, 1928). I found that the latter had the clearest format and figures that were substantiated by the other studies. The figures do not include casualties in the Marine Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division.

3. Foulkes, Gas , 345.

4. Bullard, Personalities, 161.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Unpublished

Auld, Samuel James Manson. A General Record of the American Chemical Warfare Service and the Relations Therewith of the British Gas Mission. 5 sect. In the author’s possession.

Dunham, Norman A. The War as I Saw It. 3 vols. Manuscript. World War I project, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Fries, Amos A., Lt. Col., to Director of the Chemical Warfare Service, 19 March 1919, Subj: History of Chemical Warfare Service in France. Uncataloged manuscript. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Kachik, Andrew. Diary [of service with the 314th Regiment, 79th Infantry Division]. World War I project, U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

King, Moses. Diary of Moses King, Company I, 305th Infantry, U.S.N.A. N.d. World War I project, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Munchausen, Baron [pseud.]. History of the 318th Field Hospital. World War I project, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Newton, Willard. Over There for Uncle Sam: A Daily Diary of World War One. World War I project, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Spencer, E. W. The History of Gas Attacks upon the American Expeditionary Forces During the World War. 4 pts. Bound typescript. Edgewood Arsenal, MD: Chemical Warfare Service, U.S. War Department, 15 February 1928.

—–. Office of the Chief of Gas Service. Semi-monthly Report to Director of Gas Service, U.S., on Activities and Needs of the Gas Service, A. E. F. 15 May 1918. DTIC AD-498800.

U.S. Army. Chemical Warfare Service. History of the Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces. N.p., 1918.

—–. Defense Division. Report on the Operations of the Defense Division, Chemical Warfare Service. Submitted to the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service in accordance with S. O. 31, December 1918. DTIC AD-498438.

Graves, Robert. Goodbye to All That. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957, c1929.
Great Britain. Army. Report on the Activities of the Special Brigade. With chart on Expansion of the Special Brigade. 19 December 1918. In the author’s possession.

Grissinger, J. W. Medical Field Service in France. Washington, DC: The Association of Military Surgeons, 1928.

—–. The 1st Division at Cantigny, May 1918. U.S. Army Chemical Corps ,,Historical Studies: Gas Warfare in World War I, Study no. 11. Army Chemical Center, MD: Historical Office, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1958.

—–. The 42nd Division Before Landres-et-St. Georges, October 1918. U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Studies: Gas Warfare in World War I, Study no. 17. Army Chemical Center, MD: Historical Office, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1960.

—–. The Use of Gas in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, September – November 1918. U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Studies: Gas Warfare in World War I, Study no. 10. Army Chemical Center, MD: Historical Office, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1958.

Ganoe, William A. The History of the United States Army. Rev. ed. Ashton, MD: Eric Lundberg, 1964.

Gilchrist, Harry L., Col. A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons. Edgewood Arsenal, MD: Chemical Warfare School, 1928.

Love, Albert G., Maj. Statistics.Pt. 2. Medical and Casualty Statistics. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, vol. 15. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1925.
—–. War Casualties. Army Medical Bulletin no. 24. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Medical Field Service School, 1931.

Müller-Kiel, Ulrich. Die Chemische Waffe im Weltkrieg und Jetzt [The chemical weapon in the World. War and now]. Berlin: Verlag Chemie, 1932. Translated by the Military Intelligence Division, U.S. Army War College.

10. Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 1917-1918 by Major Charles E. Heller, USAR

STUDIES IN PROGRESS
Soviet Airborne Forces
*
Rapid Deployment Logistics, Lebanon, 1958
*
Special Units: Rangers in World War 11
*
Counterattack on the Naktong: Light Infantry Operations in Korea, 1950
*
Armored Combat in World War 11: Arracourt
*
Stand Fast: German Defensive Doctrine in World War il
*
Combined Arms Doctrine in the 20th Century
*
Operations of Large Formations: The Corps
*
Tactics and Doctrine in Imperial Russia
*
U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965

TO VIEW: MAJ (P) Charles E. Heller

Major(P) Charles E. Heller, USAR, is currently on an AGR tour at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College as the Combat Studies Institute’s USAR Staff Officer. He has served on active duty with the 8th Infantry Division and in a variety of USAR assignments, including a MOBDES position with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has an M.A. in history from the University of Massachusetts and has recently completed all his degree requirements for a Ph.D. at the same institution. He has published a number of articles on a variety of military history topics.

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Mission

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a separate, department level activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for the purpose of accomplishing the following missions:

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal and educational concerns of the Army and publish and distribute the results of such research in a variety of formats to the Active Army and Reserve components.

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at CGSC and assist other CGSC departments in integrating applicable military history materials into their instruction.

3. Serve as the TRADOC executive agent for the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.

The Army thus found itself with no alternative but to construct its own production facilities. In December, 1917, construction of plants to produce chemical agents began at Gunpowder Neck, Maryland. By the summer of 1918, the Edgewood Arsenal there had plants in operation producing phosgene, chloropicrin, mustard, chlorine, and sulfur trichloride. The arsenal also had a capability for filling artillery shells, although most of the agents produced were shipped overseas to the Allies in fifty-five gallon drums. Because of insufficient time, not one single gas shell manufactured at the arsenal ever reached an American artillery piece in France. When production of chemicals finally peaked one month prior to the Armistice, the plants had to stop production for lack of shell casings. artillery units and special gas troops fired American produced war gas, but in French and British shells.26

(From site above)

***

Chemical warfare
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For other uses, see Chemical warfare (disambiguation).
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It has been suggested that Timeline of chemical warfare be merged into this article or section. (Discuss)

Chemical warfare (CW) involves using the toxic properties of chemical substances as weapons to kill, injure, or incapacitate an enemy.

This type of warfare is distinct from the use of conventional weapons or nuclear weapons because the destructive effects of chemical weapons are not primarily due to their explosive force.

Chemical weapons are classified as weapons of mass destruction by the United Nations, and their production and stockpiling was outlawed by the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. The offensive use of living organisms or their toxic products is not considered chemical warfare but biological warfare.

Chemical warfare is different from the use of conventional weapons or nuclear weapons because the destructive effects of chemical weapons are not primarily due to any explosive force. The offensive use of living organisms (such as anthrax) is considered biological warfare rather than chemical warfare; however, the use of nonliving toxic products produced by living organisms (e.g. toxins such as botulinum toxin, ricin, and saxitoxin) is considered chemical warfare under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Under this Convention, any toxic chemical, regardless of its origin, is considered a chemical weapon unless it is used for purposes that are not prohibited (an important legal definition known as the General Purpose Criterion).[1]

About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th century. Chemical weapons are classified as weapons of mass destruction by the United Nations, and their production and stockpiling was outlawed by the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.

Under the Convention, chemicals that are toxic enough to be used as chemical weapons, or that may be used to manufacture such chemicals, are divided into three groups according to their purpose and treatment:

* Schedule 1 – Have few, if any, legitimate uses. These may only be produced or used for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes (i.e. testing of chemical weapons sensors and protective clothing). Examples include nerve agents, ricin, lewisite and mustard gas. Any production over 100 g must be notified to the OPCW and a country can have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of these chemicals.
* Schedule 2 – Have no large-scale industrial uses, but may have legitimate small-scale uses. Examples include dimethyl methylphosphonate, a precursor to sarin but which is also used as a flame retardant and Thiodiglycol which is a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of mustard gas but is also widely used as a solvent in inks.
* Schedule 3 – Have legitimate large-scale industrial uses. Examples include phosgene and chloropicrin. Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosgene is an important precursor in the manufacture of plastics and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant. The OPCW must be notified of, and may inspect, any plant producing more than 30 tonnes per year.

Although crude chemical warfare has been employed in many parts of the world for thousands of years,[2] modern chemical warfare began during World War I – see Poison gas in World War I.

Initially, only well-known commercially available chemicals and their variants were used. These included chlorine and phosgene gas. The methods used to disperse these agents during battle were relatively unrefined and inefficient. Even so, casualties could be heavy, due to the mainly static troop positions which were characteristic features of trench warfare.

Germany, the first side to employ chemical warfare on the battlefield,[3] simply opened canisters of chlorine upwind of the opposing side and let the prevailing winds do the dissemination. Soon after, the French modified artillery munitions to contain phosgene – a much more effective method that became the principal means of delivery.[4]

Since the development of modern chemical warfare in World War I, nations have pursued research and development on chemical weapons that falls into four major categories: new and more deadly agents; more efficient methods of delivering agents to the target (dissemination); more reliable means of defense against chemical weapons; and more sensitive and accurate means of detecting chemical agents.

Chemical warfare agents
See also: List of chemical warfare agents
A chemical used in warfare is called a chemical warfare agent (CWA). About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th century and the 21st century. These agents may be in liquid, gas or solid form. Liquid agents are generally designed to evaporate quickly; such liquids are said to be volatile or have a high vapor pressure. Many chemical agents are made volatile so they can be dispersed over a large region quickly.

The earliest target of chemical warfare agent research was not toxicity, but development of agents that can affect a target through the skin and clothing, rendering protective gas masks useless. In July 1917, the Germans employed mustard gas. Mustard gas easily penetrates leather and fabric to inflict painful burns on the skin.

Chemical warfare agents are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A substance is classified as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through nausea or visual problems. The distinction between lethal and incapacitating substances is not fixed, but relies on a statistical average called the LD50.

Persistency

One way to classify chemical warfare agents is according to their persistency, a measure of the length of time that a chemical agent remains effective after dissemination. Chemical agents are classified as persistent or nonpersistent.

Agents classified as nonpersistent lose effectiveness after only a few minutes or hours. Purely gaseous agents such as chlorine are nonpersistent, as are highly volatile agents such as sarin and most other nerve agents. Tactically, nonpersistent agents are very useful against targets that are to be taken over and controlled very quickly.

Apart from the agent used, the delivery mode is very important. To achieve a nonpersistent deployment, the agent is dispersed into very small droplets comparable with the mist produced by an aerosol can. In this form not only the gaseous part of the agent (around 50%) but also the fine aerosol can be inhaled or taken up by the skin.

Modern doctrine requires very high concentrations almost instantly in order to be effective (one breath should contain a lethal dose of the agent). To achieve this, the primary weapons used would be rocket artillery or bombs and large ballistic missiles with cluster warheads. The contamination in the target area is only low or not existent and after four hours sarin or similar agents are not detectable anymore.

By contrast, persistent agents tend to remain in the environment for as long as several weeks, complicating decontamination. Defense against persistent agents requires shielding for extended periods of time. Non-volatile liquid agents, such as blister agents and the oily VX nerve agent, do not easily evaporate into a gas, and therefore present primarily a contact hazard.

The droplet size used for persistent delivery goes up to 1 mm increasing the falling speed and therefore about 80% of the deployed agent reaches the ground, resulting in heavy contamination. This implies, that persistent deployment does not aim at annihilating the enemy but to constrain him.
Possible targets include enemy flank positions (averting possible counter attacks), artillery regiments, commando posts or supply lines. Possible weapons to be used are wide spread, because the fast delivery of high amounts is not a critical factor.

A special form of persistent agents are thickened agents. These comprise a common agent mixed with thickeners to provide gelatinous, sticky agents. Primary targets for this kind of use include airfields, due to the increased persistency and difficulty of decontaminating affected areas.

Classes

Chemical weapons are inert agents that come in four categories: choking, blister, blood and nerve.[5] The agents are organized into several categories according to the manner in which they affect the human body. The names and number of categories varies slightly from source to source, but in general, types of chemical warfare agents are as follows:

Similar mechanism to blister agents in that the compounds are acids or acid-forming, but action is more pronounced in respiratory system, flooding it and resulting in suffocation; survivors often suffer chronic breathing problems.

4-24 hours; see symptoms. Exposure by inhalation or injection causes more pronounced signs and symptoms than exposure by ingestion Slight; agents degrade quickly in environment

There are other chemicals used militarily that are not scheduled by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and thus are not controlled under the CWC treaties. These include:

* Defoliants that destroy vegetation, but are not immediately toxic to human beings. Some batches of Agent Orange, for instance, used by the United States in Vietnam, contained dioxins as manufacturing impurities. Dioxins, rather than Agent Orange itself, have long-term cancer effects and for causing genetic damage leading to serious birth deformities.
* Incendiary or explosive chemicals (such as napalm, extensively used by the United States in Vietnam, or dynamite) because their destructive effects are primarily due to fire or explosive force, and not direct chemical action.
* Viruses, bacteria, or other organisms. Their use is classified as biological warfare. Toxins produced by living organisms are considered chemical weapons, although the boundary is blurry. Toxins are covered by the Biological Weapons Convention.

Designations
For more details on this topic, see chemical weapon designation.

Most chemical weapons are assigned a one- to three-letter NATO weapon designation in addition to, or in place of, a common name. Binary munitions, in which precursors for chemical warfare agents are automatically mixed in shell to produce the agent just prior to its use, are indicated by a -2 following the agent’s designation (for example, GB-2 and VX-2).

Some examples are given below:
Blood agents: Vesicants:

* Cyanogen chloride: CK
* Hydrogen cyanide: AC

* Lewisite: L
* Sulfur mustard: H, HD, HS, HT

Pulmonary agents: Incapacitating agents:

* Phosgene: CG

* Quinuclidinyl benzilate: BZ

Lachrymatory agents: Nerve agents:

* Pepper spray: OC
* Tear gas: CN, CS, CR

* Sarin: GB
* VE, VG, VM, VX

Delivery

The most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of its delivery, or dissemination, to a target. The most common techniques include munitions (such as bombs, projectiles, warheads) that allow dissemination at a distance and spray tanks which disseminate from low-flying aircraft. Developments in the techniques of filling and storage of munitions have also been important.

Although there have been many advances in chemical weapon delivery since World War I, it is still difficult to achieve effective dispersion. The dissemination is highly dependent on atmospheric conditions because many chemical agents act in gaseous form. Thus, weather observations and forecasting are essential to optimize weapon delivery and reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces.

Dispersion
Dispersion of chlorine in World War I

Dispersion is placing the chemical agent upon or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemination, so that the material is most efficiently used. Dispersion is the simplest technique of delivering an agent to its target. The most common techniques are munitions, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks and warheads.

World War I saw the earliest implementation of this technique. The actual first chemical ammunition was the French 26 mm cartouche suffocante rifle grenade, fired from a flare carbine. It contained 35g of the tear-producer ethylbromacetate, and was used in autumn 1914 – with little effect on the Germans.
The Germans on the other hand tried to increase the effect of 10.5 cm shrapnel shells by adding an irritant – dianisidine chlorosulphonate. Its use went unnoticed by the British when it was used against them at Neuve Chapelle in October 1914. Hans Tappen, a chemist in the Heavy Artillery Department of the War Ministry, suggested to his brother, the Chief of the Operations Branch at German General Headquarters, the use of the tear-gases benzyl bromide or xylyl bromide.

Shells were tested successfully at the Wahn artillery range near Cologne on 9 January, 1915, and an order was placed for 15 cm howitzer shells, designated ‘T-shells’ after Tappen. A shortage of shells limited the first use against the Russians at Bolimów on 31 January, 1915; the liquid failed to vaporize in the cold weather, and again the experiment went unnoticed by the Allies.

The first effective use were when the German forces at the Second Battle of Ypres simply opened cylinders of chlorine and allowed the wind to carry the gas across enemy lines. While simple, this technique had numerous disadvantages. Moving large numbers of heavy gas cylinders to the front-line positions from where the gas would be released was a lengthy and difficult logistical task.

Stockpiles of cylinders had to be stored at the front line, posing a great risk if hit by artillery shells. Gas delivery depended greatly on wind speed and direction. If the wind was fickle, as at Loos, the gas could blow back, causing friendly casualties.

Gas clouds gave plenty of warning, allowing the enemy time to protect themselves, though many soldiers found the sight of a creeping gas cloud unnerving. This made the gas doubly effective, as, in addition to damaging the enemy physically, it also had a psychological effect on the intended victims.

Another disadvantage was that gas clouds had limited penetration, capable only of affecting the front-line trenches before dissipating. Although it produced limited results in World War I, this technique shows how simple chemical weapon dissemination can be.

Shortly after this open canister dissemination, French forces developed a technique for delivery of phosgene in a non-explosive artillery shell. This technique overcame many of the risks of dealing with gas in cylinders. First, gas shells were independent of the wind and increased the effective range of gas, making any target within reach of guns vulnerable. Second, gas shells could be delivered without warning, especially the clear, nearly odorless phosgene – there are numerous accounts of gas shells, landing with a plop rather than exploding, being initially dismissed as dud high explosive or shrapnel shells, giving the gas time to work before the soldiers were alerted and took precautions.

The major drawback of artillery delivery was the difficulty of achieving a killing concentration. Each shell had a small gas payload and an area would have to be subjected to saturation bombardment to produce a cloud to match cylinder delivery. A British solution to the problem was the Livens Projector. This was effectively a large-bore mortar, dug into the ground that used the gas cylinders themselves as projectiles – firing a 14 kg cylinder up to 1500 m. This combined the gas volume of cylinders with the range of artillery.

Over the years, there were some refinements in this technique. In the 1950s and early 1960s, chemical artillery rockets and cluster bombs contained a multitude of submunitions, so that a large number of small clouds of the chemical agent would form directly on the target.

Thermal dissemination
An American-made MC-1 gas bomb

Thermal dissemination is the use of explosives or pyrotechnics to deliver chemical agents. This technique, developed in the 1920s, was a major improvement over earlier dispersal techniques, in that it allowed significant quantities of an agent to be disseminated over a considerable distance. Thermal dissemination remains the principal method of disseminating chemical agents today.

Most thermal dissemination devices consist of a bomb or projectile shell that contains a chemical agent and a central burster charge; when the burster detonates, the agent is expelled laterally.

Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not particularly efficient. First, a percentage of the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Second, the sizes of the particles vary greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid droplets of variable and difficult to control sizes.

The efficacy of thermal detonation is greatly limited by the flammability of some agents. For flammable aerosols, the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the disseminating explosion in a phenomenon called flashing. Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third of the time. Despite a great deal of study, flashing is still not fully understood, and a solution to the problem would be a major technological advance.

Despite the limitations of central bursters, most nations use this method in the early stages of chemical weapon development, in part because standard munitions can be adapted to carry the agents.
Soviet chemical weapons canisters from a stockpile in Albania

Aerodynamic dissemination

Aerodynamic dissemination is the non-explosive delivery of a chemical agent from an aircraft, allowing aerodynamic stress to disseminate the agent. This technique is the most recent major development in chemical agent dissemination, originating in the mid-1960s.

This technique eliminates many of the limitations of thermal dissemination by eliminating the flashing effect and theoretically allowing precise control of particle size. In actuality, the altitude of dissemination, wind direction and velocity, and the direction and velocity of the aircraft greatly influence particle size. There are other drawbacks as well; ideal deployment requires precise knowledge of aerodynamics and fluid dynamics, and because the agent must usually be dispersed within the boundary layer (less than 200–300 ft above the ground), it puts pilots at risk.

Significant research is still being applied toward this technique. For example, by modifying the properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved, even at supersonic speed. Additionally, advances in fluid dynamics, computer modeling, and weather forecasting allow an ideal direction, speed, and altitude to be calculated, such that warfare agent of a predetermined particle size can predictably and reliably hit a target.

Protection against chemical warfare

Ideal protection begins with nonproliferation treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, and detecting, very early, the signatures of someone building a chemical weapons capability. These include a wide range of intelligence disciplines, such as economic analysis of exports of dual-use chemicals and equipment, human intelligence (HUMINT) such as diplomatic, refugee, and agent reports; photography from satellites, aircraft and drones (IMINT); examination of captured equipment (TECHINT); communications intercepts (COMINT); and detection of chemical manufacturing and chemical agents themselves (MASINT).

If all the preventive measures fail and there is a clear and present danger, then there is a need for detection of chemical attacks,[6] collective protection,[7][8][9] and decontamination. Since industrial accidents can cause dangerous chemical releases (e.g., the Bhopal disaster), these activities are things that civilian, as well as military, organizations must be prepared to carry out. In civilian situations in developed countries, these are duties of HAZMAT organizations, which most commonly are part of fire departments.

Detection has been referred to above, as a technical MASINT discipline; specific military procedures, which are usually the model for civilian procedures, depend on the equipment, expertise, and personnel available. When chemical agents are detected, an alarm needs to sound, with specific warnings over emergency broadcasts and the like. There may be a warning to expect an attack.

If, for example, the captain of a US Navy ship believes there is a serious threat of chemical, biological, or radiological attack, the crew may be ordered to set Circle William, which means closing all openings to outside air, running breathing air through filters, and possibly starting a system that continually washes down the exterior surfaces. Civilian authorities dealing with an attack or a toxic chemical accident will invoke the Incident Command System, or local equivalent, to coordinate defensive measures.[9]

Individual protection starts with a gas mask and, depending on the nature of the threat, through various levels of protective clothing up to a complete chemical-resistant suit with a self-contained air supply. The US military defines various levels of MOPP (mission-oriented protective posture) from mask to full chemical resistant suits; Hazmat suits are the civilian equivalent, but go farther to include a fully independent air supply, rather than the filters of a gas mask.

Collective protection allows continued functioning of groups of people in buildings or shelters, the latter which may be fixed, mobile, or improvised. With ordinary buildings, this may be as basic as plastic sheeting and tape, although if the protection needs to be continued for any appreciable length of time, there will need to be an air supply, typically a scaled-up version of a gas mask.[8][9]
Members of the Ukrainian Army’s 19th Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Battalion practice decontamination drill, at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

Decontamination

Decontamination varies with the particular chemical agent used. Some nonpersistent agents, such as most pulmonary agents such as chlorine and phosgene, blood gases, and nonpersistent nerve gases (e.g., GB) will dissipate from open areas, although powerful exhaust fans may be needed to clear out building where they have accumulated.

In some cases, it might be necessary to neutralize them chemically, as with ammonia as a neutralizer for hydrogen cyanide or chlorine. Riot control agents such as CS will dissipate in an open area, but things contaminated with CS powder need to be aired out, washed by people wearing protective gear, or safely discarded.

Mass decontamination is a less common requirement for people than equipment, since people may be immediately affected and treatment is the action required. It is a requirement when people have been contaminated with persistent agents. Treatment and decontamination may need to be simultaneous, with the medical personnel protecting themselves so they can function.[10]

There may need to be immediate intervention to prevent death, such as injection of atropine for nerve agents. Decontamination is especially important for people contaminated with persistent agents; many of the fatalities after the explosion of a WWII US ammunition ship carrying mustard gas, in the harbor of Bari, Italy, after a German bombing on 2 December 1943, came when rescue workers, not knowing of the contamination, bundled cold, wet seamen in tight-fitting blankets.

For decontaminating equipment and buildings exposed to persistent agents, such as blister agents, VX or other agents made persistent by mixing with a thickener, special equipment and materials might be needed. Some type of neutralizing agent will be needed; e.g. in the form of a spraying device with neutralizing agents such as Chlorine, Fichlor, strong alkaline solutions or enzymes . In other cases, a specific chemical decontaminant will be required.[9]

Sociopolitical climate
ARMIS BELLUM NON VENENIS GERITUR

War is fought with weapons, not with poisons

The study of chemicals and their military uses was widespread in China and India. The use of toxic materials has historically been viewed with mixed emotions and moral qualms in the West. The practical and ethical problems surrounding poison warfare appeared in ancient Greek myths about Hercules’ invention of poison arrows and Odysseus’s use of toxic projectiles. There are many instances of the use of chemical weapons in battles documented in Greek and Roman historical texts; the earliest example was the deliberate poisoning of Kirrha’s water supply with hellebore in the First Sacred War, Greece, about 590 BC.[11]

One of the earliest reactions to the use of chemical agents was from Rome. Struggling to defend themselves from the Roman legions, Germanic tribes poisoned the wells of their enemies, with Roman jurists having been recorded as declaring armis bella non venenis geri , meaning war is fought with weapons, not with poisons. Yet the Romans themselves resorted to poisoning wells of besieged cities in Anatolia in the second century BC.[12]

Before 1915 the use of poisonous chemicals in battle was typically the result of local initiative, and not the result of an active government chemical weapons program. There are many reports of the isolated use of chemical agents in individual battles or sieges, but there was no true tradition of their use outside of incendiaries and smoke. Despite this tendency, there have been several attempts to initiate large-scale implementation of poison gas in several wars, but with the notable exception of World War I, the responsible authorities generally rejected the proposals for ethical reasons.

For example, in 1854 Lyon Playfair, a British chemist, proposed using a cyanide-filled artillery shell against enemy ships during the Crimean War. The British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal as as bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy.

Efforts to eradicate chemical weapons
See also: List of chemical arms control agreements

Nation CW Possession Signed CWC Ratified CWC
Albania Known January 14, 1993 May 11, 1994
Burma (Myanmar) Possible January 13, 1993 No
the People’s Republic of China Probable January 13, 1993 April 4, 1997
Egypt Probable No No
France Probable January 13, 1993 March 2, 1995
India Known January 14, 1993 September 3, 1996
Iran Known January 13, 1993 November 3, 1997
Israel Probable January 13, 1993 No
Japan Probable January 13, 1993 September 15, 1995
Libya Known No January 6, 2004
(acceded)
North Korea Known No No
Pakistan Probable January 13, 1993 October 28, 1997
Russia Known January 13, 1993 November 5, 1997
Serbia
and Montenegro Probable No April 20, 2000
(acceded)
Sudan Possible No May 24, 1999
(acceded)
Syria Known No No
Taiwan Possible n/a n/a
United States Known January 13, 1993 April 25, 1997
Vietnam Probable January 13, 1993 September 30, 1998

* August 27, 1874: The Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War is signed, specifically forbidding the employment of poison or poisoned weapons.
* September 4, 1900: The Hague Conference, which includes a declaration banning the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases, enters into force.
* February 6, 1922: After World War I, the Washington Arms Conference Treaty prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. It was signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, but France objected to other provisions in the treaty and it never went into effect.
* September 7, 1929: The Geneva Protocol enters into force, prohibiting the use of poison gas.

Despite numerous efforts to reduce or eliminate them, some nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical warfare agents. To the right is a summary of the nations that have either declared weapon stockpiles or are suspected of secretly stockpiling or possessing CW research programs. Notable examples include United States and Russia.

US Vice President Dick Cheney opposed the signing ratification of a treaty banning the use chemical weapons, a recently unearthed letter shows. In a letter dated April 8, 1997, then Halliburton-CEO Cheney told Sen. Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that it would be a mistake for America to join the Convention. Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC, even if they do participate, reads the letter,[13] published by the Federation of American Scientists.

The CWC was ratified by the Senate that same month. Since then, Albania, Libya, Russia, the United States, and India have declared over 71,000 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles, and destroyed about a third of them. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and Russia are supposed to eliminate the rest of their supplies of chemical weapons by 2012. But that looks unlikely – the U.S. government estimates remaining stocks will be destroyed by 2017.

History
Warfare

Ramses II at Kadesh.jpgGustavus Adolphus at the Battle at Breitenfeld.jpgM1A1 abrams front.jpg

Chemical weapons have been used for millennia in the form of poisoned spears and arrows, but evidence can be found for the existence of more advanced forms of chemical weapons in ancient and classical times.

A good example of early chemical warfare was the late Stone Age (10 000 BC) hunter-gatherer societies in Southern Africa, known as the San. They used poisoned arrows, tipping the wood, bone and stone tips of their arrows with poisons obtained from their natural environment. These poisons were mainly derived from scorpion or snake venom, but it is believed that some poisonous plants were also utilized. The arrow was fired into the target of choice, usually an antelope (the favourite being an eland), with the hunter then tracking the doomed animal until the poison caused its collapse.

Ancient Greek myths about Hercules poisoning his arrows with the venom of the Hydra Monster are the earliest references to toxic weapons in western literature. Homer’s epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, allude to poisoned arrows used by both sides in the legendary Trojan War (Bronze Age Greece).[12]

Textual and Literary Evidence

Some of the earliest surviving references to toxic warfare are may appear in the Indian epics Ramayana and Mahabharata. [14]

The Laws of Manu, a Hindu treatise on statecraft (ca 400 BC) forbids the use of poison and fire arrows, but advises poisoning food and water. Kautilya’s Arthashastra, a statecraft manual of the same era, contains hundreds of recipes for creating poison weapons, toxic smokes, and other chemical weapons. Ancient Greek historians recount that Alexander the Great encountered poison arrows and fire incendiaries in what is now Pakistan in the fourth century BC.[12]

Sun Tzu’s Art of War (ca 500 BC) advises the use of fire weapons. In the 4th century BC, writings of the Mohist sect in China describe the use of bellows to pump smoke from burning balls of mustard and other toxic vegetables into tunnels being dug by a besieging army. Even older Chinese writings dating back to about 1000 BC contain hundreds of recipes for the production of poisonous or irritating smokes for use in war along with numerous accounts of their use. From these accounts we know of the arsenic-containing soul-hunting fog , and the use of finely divided lime dispersed into the air to suppress a peasant revolt in AD 178.

The earliest recorded use of gas warfare in the West dates back to the 5th century BC, during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Spartan forces besieging an Athenian city placed a lighted mixture of wood, pitch, and sulfur under the walls hoping that the noxious smoke would incapacitate the Athenians, so that they would not be able to resist the assault that followed. Sparta wasn’t alone in its use of unconventional tactics during these wars: Solon of Athens is said to have used hellebore roots to poison the water in an aqueduct leading from the Pleistrus River around 590 BC during the siege of Kirrha.[12]
Chemical weapons were known and used in ancient and medieval China. Polish chronicler Jan D?ugosz mentions usage of poisonous gas by the Mongol army in 1241 in the Battle of Legnica.

Historian and philosopher David Hume, in his history of England, recounts how during early in the reign of Henry III (r.1216 – 1272) the English Navy destroyed an invading French fleet, by blinding the enemy fleet with quicklime, the old name for calcium oxide. D’Albiney employed a stratagem against them, which is said to have contributed to the victory: Having gained the wind of the French, he came down upon them with violence; and throwing in their faces a great quantity of quicklime, which he purposely carried on board, he so blinded them, that they were disabled from defending themselves.[15]

Archaeological Evidence

There is archaeological evidence that the Sasanians deployed chemical weapons against the Roman army in 3rd century AD/CE. Research carried out on the collapsed tunnels at Dura-Europos in Syria suggests that the Iranians used bitumen and sulphur crystals to get it burning. When ignited, the materials gave off dense clouds of choking gases which killed 20 Roman soldiers in the matter of 2 minutes.[16]

Rediscovery

During the Renaissance, people again considered using chemical warfare. One of the earliest such references is from Leonardo da Vinci, who proposed a powder of sulfide of arsenic and verdigris in the 15th century:

throw poison in the form of powder upon galleys. Chalk, fine sulfide of arsenic, and powdered verdegris may be thrown among enemy ships by means of small mangonels, and all those who, as they breathe, inhale the powder into their lungs will become asphyxiated.

It is unknown whether this powder was ever actually used.

Earlier, in the 13th century, of Henry III the English Navy destroyed an invading French fleet, by blinding the enemy fleet with quicklime, the old name for calcium oxide. (See Calcium oxide#use as a weapon) In the 17th century during sieges, armies attempted to start fires by launching incendiary shells filled with sulphur, tallow, rosin, turpentine, saltpeter, and/or antimony. Even when fires were not started, the resulting smoke and fumes provided a considerable distraction. Although their primary function was never abandoned, a variety of fills for shells were developed to maximize the effects of the smoke.

In 1672, during his siege of the city of Groningen, Christoph Bernhard van Galen, the Bishop of Münster, employed several different explosive and incendiary devices, some of which had a fill that included belladonna, intended to produce toxic fumes. Just three years later, August 27, 1675, the French and the Germans concluded the Strasbourg Agreement, which included an article banning the use of perfidious and odious toxic devices.

In 1854, Lyon Playfair, a British chemist, proposed a cacodyl cyanide artillery shell for use against enemy ships as way to solve the stalemate during the siege of Sevastopol. The proposal was backed by Admiral Thomas Cochrane of the Royal Navy. It was considered by the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, but the British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal as as bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy. Playfair’s response was used to justify chemical warfare into the next century:

There was no sense in this objection. It is considered a legitimate mode of warfare to fill shells with molten metal which scatters among the enemy, and produced the most frightful modes of death. Why a poisonous vapor which would kill men without suffering is to be considered illegitimate warfare is incomprehensible. War is destruction, and the more destructive it can be made with the least suffering the sooner will be ended that barbarous method of protecting national rights. No doubt in time chemistry will be used to lessen the suffering of combatants, and even of criminals condemned to death.

Later, during the American Civil War, New York school teacher John Doughty proposed the offensive use of chlorine gas, delivered by filling a 10 inch (254 millimeter) artillery shell with 2 to 3 quarts (2 to 3 liters) of liquid chlorine, which could produce many cubic feet (a few cubic meters) of chlorine gas. Doughty’s plan was apparently never acted on, as it was probably presented to Brigadier General James Wolfe Ripley, Chief of Ordnance, who was described as being congenitally immune to new ideas.

A general concern over the use of poison gas manifested itself in 1899 at the Hague Conference with a proposal prohibiting shells filled with asphyxiating gas. The proposal was passed, despite a single dissenting vote from the United States. The American representative, Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, justified voting against the measure on the grounds that the inventiveness of Americans should not be restricted in the development of new weapons.

World War I
Aerial photograph of a German gas attack on Russian forces circa 1916
A Canadian soldier with mustard gas burns, ca. 1917–1918.
Main article: Poison gas in World War I

The Hague Declaration of 1899 and the Hague Convention of 1907 forbade the use of poison or poisonous weapons in warfare, yet more than 124,000 tons of gas were produced by the end of World War I. The French were the first to use chemical weapons during the First World War, using tear gas.
The German’s first use of chemical weapons were shells containing xylyl bromide that were fired at the Russians near the town of Bolimów, Poland in January 1915.[17] The first full-scale deployment of chemical warfare agents was during World War I, originating in the Second Battle of Ypres, April 22, 1915, when the Germans attacked French, Canadian and Algerian troops with chlorine gas. Deaths were light, though casualties relatively heavy.

A total 50,965 tons of pulmonary, lachrymatory, and vesicant agents were deployed by both sides of the conflict, including chlorine, phosgene and mustard gas. Official figures declare about 1,176,500 non-fatal casualties and 85,000 fatalities directly caused by chemical warfare agents during the course of the war.[18]

To this day unexploded WWI-era chemical ammunition is still frequently uncovered when the ground is dug in former battle or depot areas and continues to pose a threat to the civilian population in Belgium and France and less commonly in other countries. The French and Belgian governments have had to launch special programs for treating discovered ammunition.

After the war, most of the unused German chemical warfare agents were dumped into the Baltic Sea, a common disposal method among all the participants in several bodies of water. Over time, the salt water causes the shell casings to corrode, and mustard gas occasionally leaks from these containers and washes onto shore as a wax-like solid resembling ambergris. Even in this solidified form, the agent is active enough to cause severe contact burns to anybody coming into contact with it.[citation needed]

Interwar years

After World War I chemical agents were occasionally used to subdue populations and suppress rebellion.

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1917, the Ottoman government collapsed completely, and the former empire was divided amongst the victorious powers in the Treaty of Sèvres. The British occupied Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq) and established a colonial government.

In 1920, the Arab and Kurdish people of Mesopotamia revolted against the British occupation, which cost the British dearly. As the Mesopotamian resistance gained strength, the British resorted to increasingly repressive measures. Much speculation was made about aerial bombardment of major cities with gas in Mesopotamia, with Winston Churchill, then-Secretary of State at the British War Office, arguing in favor of it.[19] In the 1920s generals reported that poison had never won a battle. The soldiers said they hated it and hated the gas masks. Only the chemists spoke out to say it was a good weapon.

In 1925, sixteen of the world’s major nations signed the Geneva Protocol, thereby pledging never to use gas in warfare again. Notably, in the United States, the Protocol languished in the Senate until 1975, when it was finally ratified.

The Bolsheviks also employed poison gas in 1921 during the Tambov Rebellion. An order signed by military commanders Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko stipulated: The forests where the bandits are hiding are to be cleared by the use of poison gas. This must be carefully calculated, so that the layer of gas penetrates the forests and kills everyone hiding there. [20]

During the Rif War in Spanish Morocco in 1921–1927, combined Spanish and French forces dropped mustard gas bombs in an attempt to put down the Berber rebellion. (See also: Chemical weapons in the Rif War)

In 1935, Fascist Italy used mustard gas during the invasion of Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Ignoring the Geneva Protocol, which it signed seven years earlier, the Italian military dropped mustard gas in bombs, sprayed it from airplanes, and spread it in powdered form on the ground. 150,000 chemical casualties were reported, mostly from mustard gas.

World War II
The chemical structure of Sarin nerve gas, developed in Germany (1939)

Despite article 171 of the Versailles Peace Treaty, article V of the Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare [3] and a resolution adopted against Japan by the League of nations on 14 May 1938, the Imperial Japanese Army frequently used chemical weapons. Because of fear of retaliation however, those weapons were never used against Westerners, but against other Asians judged inferior by the imperial propaganda.

According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, the chemical weapons were authorized by specific orders given by Emperor Showa himself, transmitted by the chief of staff of the army. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the battle of Wuhan from August to October 1938.[21]

They were also profusely used during the invasion of Changde. Those orders were transmitted either by prince Kotohito Kan’in or general Hajime Sugiyama.[22]

The Imperial Japanese Army used mustard gas and the recently-developed blister agent Lewisite against Chinese troops and guerrillas. Experiments involving chemical weapons were conducted on live prisoners (Unit 731 and Unit 516). The Japanese also carried chemical weapons as they swept through Southeast Asia towards Australia.

Some of these items were captured and analyzed by the Allies. Greatly concerned, Australia covertly imported 1,000,000 chemical weapons from the United Kingdom from 1942 onwards[23] [4][24] [5][6].[25][26][27]

Shortly after the end of World War I, Germany’s General Staff enthusiastically pursued a recapture of their preeminent position in chemical warfare. In 1923, Hans von Seeckt pointed the way, by suggesting that German poison gas research move in the direction of delivery by aircraft in support of mobile warfare. Also in 1923, at the behest of the German army, poison gas expert Dr. Hugo Stolzenberg negotiated with the USSR to built a huge chemical weapons plant at Trotsk, on the Volga river.

Collaboration between Germany and the USSR in poison gas continued on and off through the 1920s. In 1924, German officers debated the use of poison gas versus non-lethal chemical weapons against civilians. Even before World War II, chemical warfare was revolutionized by Nazi Germany’s discovery of the nerve agents tabun (in 1937) and sarin (in 1939) by Gerhard Schrader, a chemist of IG Farben.

IG Farben was Germany’s premier poison gas manufacturer during World War I, so the weaponization of these agents can not be considered accidental.[28] Both were turned over to the German Army Weapons Office prior to the outbreak of the war.

The nerve agent soman was later discovered by Nobel Prize laureate Richard Kuhn and his collaborator Konrad Henkel at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research in Heidelberg in spring of 1944.[29][30] The Nazis developed and manufactured large quantities of several agents, but chemical warfare was not extensively used by either side. Chemical troops were set up (in Germany since 1934) and delivery technology was actively developed.

Recovered Nazi documents suggest that German intelligence incorrectly thought that the Allies also knew of these compounds, interpreting their lack of mention in the Allies’ scientific journals as evidence that information about them was being suppressed. Germany ultimately decided not to use the new nerve agents, fearing a potentially devastating Allied retaliatory nerve agent deployment. Fisk, Robert (December 30, 2000). Poison gas from Germany . Independent. http://www.zmag.org/hussein.htm.

William L. Shirer, in The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, writes that the British high command considered the use of chemical weapons as a last-ditch defensive measure in the event of a Nazi invasion of Britain.

On the night of December 2, 1943, German Ju 88 bombers attacked the port of Bari in Southern Italy, sinking several American ships – among them SS John Harvey, which was carrying mustard gas intended for use in retaliation by the Allies if German forces initiated gas warfare. The presence of the gas was highly classified, and authorities ashore had no knowledge of it – which increased the number of fatalities, since physicians, who had no idea that they were dealing with the effects of mustard gas, prescribed treatment improper for those suffering from exposure and immersion.

The whole affair was kept secret at the time and for many years after the war (in the opinion of some, there was a deliberate and systematic cover-up). According to the U.S. military account, Sixty-nine deaths were attributed in whole or in part to the mustard gas, most of them American merchant seamen [31] out of 628 mustard gas military casualties.[32] The large number of civilian casualties among the Italian population were not recorded. Part of the confusion and controversy derives from the fact that the German attack was highly destructive and lethal in itself, also apart from the accidental additional effects of the gas (it was nicknamed The Little Pearl Harbor ), and attribution of the causes of death between the gas and other causes is far from easy.[33][34]

Rick Atkinson, in his book The Day of Battle, describes the intelligence that prompted Allied leaders to deploy mustard gas to Italy. This included Italian intelligence that Adolf Hitler had threatened to use gas against Italy if the state changed sides, and prisoner of war interrogations suggesting that preparations were being made to use a new, egregiously potent gas if the war turned decisively against Germany. Atkinson concludes that No commander in 1943 could be cavalier about a manifest threat by Germany to use gas.

The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, the senior Islamic religious authority of the Palestinian Arabs and ally of Adolf Hitler was accused of sponsoring an unsuccessful chemical warfare assault on the Jewish community in Tel-Aviv during 1944 by The David S. Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies. Allegations suggest that five parachutists were supplied with maps of Tel Aviv, canisters of a German–manufactured fine white powder, and instructions from the Mufti to dump chemicals into the Tel Aviv water system. District police commander Fayiz Bey Idrissi later recalled, The laboratory report stated that each container held enough poison to kill 25,000 people, and there were at least ten containers. [35]

North Yemen Civil War

The first attack took place on June 8, 1963 against Kawma, a village of about 100 inhabitants in northern Yemen, killing about seven people and damaging the eyes and lungs of twenty-five others. This incident is considered to have been experimental, and the bombs were described as home-made, amateurish and relatively ineffective . The Egyptian authorities suggested that the reported incidents were probably caused by napalm, not gas. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, suggested in an interview that Nasser would not hesitate to use gas against Israel as well.

There were no reports of gas during 1964, and only a few were reported in 1965. The reports grew more frequent in late 1966. On December 11, 1966, fifteen gas bombs killed two people and injured thirty-five. On January 5, 1967, the biggest gas attack came against the village of Kitaf, causing 270 casualties, including 140 fatalities. The target may have been Prince Hassan bin Yahya, who had installed his headquarters nearby. The Egyptian government denied using poison gas, and alleged that Britain and the US were using the reports as psychological warfare against Egypt. On February 12, 1967, it said it would welcome a UN investigation. On March 1, U Thant said he was powerless to deal with the matter.

On May 10, the twin villages of Gahar and Gadafa in Wadi Hirran, where Prince Mohamed bin Mohsin was in command, were gas bombed, killing at least seventy-five. The Red Cross was alerted and on June 2, it issued a statement in Geneva expressing concern. The Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Berne made a statement, based on a Red Cross report, that the gas was likely to have been halogenous derivatives – phosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, chloride or cyanogen bromide.

The gas attacks stopped for three weeks after the Six-Day War of June, but resumed on July, against all parts of royalist Yemen. Casualty estimates vary, and an assumption, considered conservative, is that the mustard and phosgene-filled aerial bombs caused approximately 1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries.

Cold War

After World War II, the Allies recovered German artillery shells containing the three German nerve agents of the day (tabun, sarin, and soman), prompting further research into nerve agents by all of the former Allies. Although the threat of global thermonuclear war was foremost in the minds of most during the Cold War, both the Soviet and Western governments put enormous resources into developing chemical and biological weapons.
[edit] Developments by the Western governments

In 1952, researchers in Porton Down, England, invented the VX nerve agent but soon abandoned the project. In 1958 the British government traded their VX technology with the United States in exchange for information on thermonuclear weapons; by 1961 the U.S. was producing large amounts of VX and performing its own nerve agent research. This research produced at least three more agents; the four agents (VE, VG, VM, VX) are collectively known as the V-Series class of nerve agents.

Also in 1952 the U.S. Army patented a process for the Preparation of Toxic Ricin , publishing a method of producing this powerful toxin.

During the 1960s, the U.S. explored the use of anticholinergic deleriant incapacitating agents. One of these agents, assigned the weapon designation BZ, was allegedly used experimentally in the Vietnam War. These allegations inspired the 1990 fictional film Jacob’s Ladder.

In 1961 and 62 the Kennedy administration authorized the use of chemicals to destroy vegetation and food crops in South Vietnam. Between 1961 and 1967 the US Air Force sprayed 12 million US gallons of concentrated herbicides, mainly Agent Orange (containing dioxin as an impurity in the manufacturing process) over 6 million acres (24,000 km²) of foliage and trees, affecting an estimated 13% of South Vietnam’s land. In 1965, 42% of all herbicides were sprayed over food crops. Besides destroying vegetation used as cover by the NLF and destroying food crops the herbicide was used to drive civilians into RVN-controlled areas.[36]

In 1997, an article published by the Wall Street Journal reported that up to half a million children were born with dioxin related deformities, and that the birth defects in South Vietnam were fourfold those in the North. The use of Agent Orange may have been contrary to international rules of war at the time. It is also of note that the most likely victims of such an assault would be small children. A 1967 study by the Agronomy Section of the Japanese Science Council concluded that 3.8 million acres (15,000 km²) of land had been destroyed, killing 1000 peasants and 13,000 livestock.

Between 1967 and 1968, the U.S. decided to dispose of obsolete chemical weapons in an operation called Operation CHASE, which stood for cut holes and sink ’em. Several shiploads of chemical and conventional weapons were put aboard old Liberty ships and sunk at sea.

In 1969, 23 U.S. servicemen and one U.S. civilian stationed in Okinawa, Japan, were exposed to low levels of the nerve agent sarin while repainting the depots’ buildings. The weapons had been kept secret from Japan, sparking a furor in that country and an international incident. These munitions were moved in 1971 to Johnston Atoll under Operation Red Hat.
George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signing the bilateral treaty on 1990-06-01

A UN working group began work on chemical disarmament in 1980. On April 4, 1984, U.S. President Ronald Reagan called for an international ban on chemical weapons. U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed a bilateral treaty on June 1, 1990, to end chemical weapon production and start destroying each of their nation’s stockpiles. The multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in 1993 and entered into force (EIF) in 1997.

In December, 2001, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, NIOSH, National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), along with the U.S. Army Research, Development Engineering Command Edgewood Chemical/Biological Center (ECBC), and the U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first of six technical performance standards and test procedures designed to evaluate and certify respirators intended for use by civilian emergency responders to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon release, detonation, or terrorism incident. To date NIOSH/NPPTL has published six new respirator performance standards based on a tiered approach that relies on traditional industrial respirator certification policy, next generation emergency response respirator performance requirements, and special live chemical warfare agent testing requirements of the classes of respirators identified to offer respiratory protection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agent inhalation hazards. These CBRN respirators are commonly known as open-circuit self-contained breathing apparatus (CBRN SCBA), air-purifying respirator (CBRN APR), air-purifying escape respirator (CBRN APER), self-contained escape respirator (CBRN SCER) and loose or tight fitting powered air-purifying respirators (CBRN PAPR). Current NIOSH-approved/certified CBRN respirator concept standards and test procedures can be found at the webpage: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/standardsdev/cbrn/

United States Senate Report

A 1994 United States Senate Report, entitled Is military research hazardous to veterans health? Lessons spanning a half century, [37] detailed the United States Department of Defense’s practice of experimenting on animal and human subjects, often without their knowledge or consent. This included:

* Approximately 60,000 [US] military personnel were used as human subjects in the 1940s to test the chemical agents mustard gas and lewisite. Mustard section,[37]
* Between the 1950s through the 1970s, at least 2,200 military personnel were subjected to various biological agents, referred to as Operation Whitecoat. Unlike most of the studies discussed in this report, Operation Whitecoat was truly voluntary. Seventh section,[37]
* Between 1951 and 1969, Dugway Proving Ground was the site of testing for various chemical and biological agents, including an open air aerodynamic dissemination test in 1968 that accidentally killed, on neighboring farms, approximately 6,400 sheep by an unspecified nerve agent. Dugway section,[37]

Developments by the Soviet government

Due to the secrecy of the Soviet Union’s government, very little information was available about the direction and progress of the Soviet chemical weapons until relatively recently. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian chemist Vil Mirzayanov published articles revealing illegal chemical weapons experimentation in Russia.

In 1993, Mirzayanov was imprisoned and fired from his job at the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, where he had worked for 26 years. In March 1994, after a major campaign by U.S. scientists on his behalf, Mirzayanov was released.[38]

Among the information related by Vil Mirzayanov was the direction of Soviet research into the development of even more toxic nerve agents, which saw most of its success during the mid-1980s. Several highly toxic agents were developed during this period; the only unclassified information regarding these agents is that they are known in the open literature only as Foliant agents (named after the program under which they were developed) and by various code designations, such as A-230 and A-232.[39]

According to Mirzayanov, the Soviets also developed weapons that were safer to handle, leading to the development of the binary weapons, in which precursors for the nerve agents are mixed in a munition to produce the agent just prior to its use. Because the precursors are generally significantly less hazardous than the agents themselves, this technique makes handling and transporting the munitions a great deal simpler.

Additionally, precursors to the agents are usually much easier to stabilize than the agents themselves, so this technique also made it possible to increase the shelf life of the agents a great deal. During the 1980s and 1990s, binary versions of several Soviet agents were developed and are designated as Novichok agents (after the Russian word for newcomer ).[40] Together with Lev Fedorov, he told the secret Novichok story exposed in the newspaper Moscow News.[41]

Iran–Iraq War
Victims of Iraq’s poison gas attack in civil area during Iran–Iraq War

Chemical weapons employed by Saddam Hussein killed and injured numerous Iranians, and even Iraqis. According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and China.[42]

The Iran–Iraq War began in 1980 when Iraq attacked Iran. Early in the conflict, Iraq began to employ mustard gas and tabun delivered by bombs dropped from airplanes; approximately 5% of all Iranian casualties are directly attributable to the use of these agents.[citation needed]

About 100,000 Iranian soldiers were victims of Iraq’s chemical attacks. Many were hit by mustard gas. The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans. Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 80,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions.[43][44][45]

Iraq also targeted Iranian civilians with chemical weapons. Many thousands were killed in attacks on populations in villages and towns, as well as front-line hospitals. Many still suffer from the severe effects.

Despite the removal of Saddam and his regime by Coalition forces, there is deep resentment and anger in Iran that it was Western companies based in the Netherlands, West Germany, France, and the U.S. that helped Iraq develop its chemical weapons arsenal in the first place, and that the world did nothing to punish Iraq for its use of chemical weapons throughout the war.[46]
Main article: Halabja poison gas attack

Shortly before war ended in 1988, the Iraqi Kurdish village of Halabja was exposed to multiple chemical agents, killing about 5,000 of the town’s 50,000 residents [47]. After the incident, traces of mustard gas and the nerve agents sarin, tabun and VX were discovered.

During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Coalition forces began a ground war in Iraq. Despite the fact that they did possess chemical weapons, Iraq did not use any chemical agents against coalition forces. The commander of the Allied Forces, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, suggested this may have been due to Iraqi fear of retaliation with nuclear weapons.[citation needed]

Falklands War

Technically, the reported employment of tear gas by Argentine forces during the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands constitutes chemical warfare.[48] However, the tear gas grenades were employed as nonlethal weapons to avoid British casualties. The British claim that more lethal, but legally-justifiable as they are not considered chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, white phosphorus grenades were used.[49] The barrack buildings the weapons were used on proved to be deserted in any case.

Terrorism

For many terrorist organizations, chemical weapons might be considered an ideal choice for a mode of attack, if they are available: they are cheap, relatively accessible, and easy to transport. A skilled chemist can readily synthesize most chemical agents if the precursors are available.

The earliest successful use of chemical agents in a non-combat setting was in 1946, motivated by a desire to obtain revenge on Germans for the Holocaust. Three members of a Jewish group calling themselves Dahm Y’Israel Nokeam ( Avenging Israel’s Blood ) hid in a bakery in the Stalag 13 prison camp near Nuremberg, Germany, where several thousand SS troops were being detained. The three applied an arsenic-containing mixture to loaves of bread, sickening more than 2,000 prisoners, of whom more than 200 required hospitalization.

In July 1974, a group calling themselves the Aliens of America successfully firebombed the houses of a judge, two police commissioners, and one of the commissioner’s cars, burned down two apartment buildings, and bombed the Pan Am Terminal at Los Angeles International Airport, killing three people and injuring eight. The organization, which turned out to be a single resident alien named Muharem Kurbegovic, claimed to have developed and possessed a supply of sarin, as well as 4 unique nerve agents named AA1, AA2, AA3, and AA4S. Although no agents were found at the time he was arrested in August 1974, he had reportedly acquired all but one of the ingredients required to produce a nerve agent. A search of his apartment turned up a variety of materials, including precursors for phosgene and a drum containing 25 pounds of sodium cyanide.[50]

The first successful use of chemical agents by terrorists against a general civilian population was on March 20, 1995. Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic group based in Japan that believed it necessary to destroy the planet, released sarin into the Tokyo subway system killing 12 and injuring over 5,000. The group had attempted biological and chemical attacks on at least 10 prior occasions, but managed to affect only cult members. The group did manage to successfully release sarin outside an apartment building in Matsumoto in June 1994; this use was directed at a few specific individuals living in the building and was not an attack on the general population.

On 29 December, 1999, four days after Russian forces began assault of Grozny, Chechen terrorists exploded two chlor tanks in town. Because of the wind conditions, no Russian soldiers were injured.[51]

In 2001, after carrying out the attacks in New York City on September 11, the organization Al Qaeda announced that they were attempting to acquire radiological, biological and chemical weapons. This threat was lent a great deal of credibility when a large archive of videotapes was obtained by the cable television network CNN in August 2002 showing, among other things, the killing of three dogs by an apparent nerve agent.[52]

On October 26, 2002, Russian special forces used a chemical agent (presumably KOLOKOL-1, an aerosolized fentanyl derivative), as a precursor to an assault on Chechen terrorists, ending the Moscow theater hostage crisis. All 42 of the terrorists and 120 of the hostages were killed during the raid; all but one hostage, who was killed, died from the effects of the agent.

In early 2007 multiple terrorist bombings have been reported in Iraq using chlorine gas. These attacks have wounded or sickened more than 350 people. Reportedly the bombers are affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq[53] and have used bombs of various sizes up to chlorine tanker trucks.[54] United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the attacks as, clearly intended to cause panic and instability in the country. [55]

* ATSDR Case Studies in Environmental Medicine: Cholinesterase Inhibitors, Including Insecticides and Chemical Warfare Nerve Agents U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
* Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons, about the danger posed by non-state weapons transfers
* Gaddum Papers at the Royal Society
* Chemical Weapons stored in the United States
* [7] The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW
* [8] Chemical Warfare in Australia
* Classes of Chemical Agents U.S. National Library of Medicine
* Chemical warfare agent potency, logistics, human damage, dispersal, protection and types of agents (bomb-shelter.net)
* ‘War of Nerves’: A History of Chemical Weapons (interview with Jonathan Tucker from National Public Radio Talk of the Nation program, May 8, 2006

MKULTRA redirects here. For other uses, see MKULTRA (disambiguation).
Declassified MKULTRA documents
Project MK-ULTRA, or MKULTRA, was the code name for a covert CIA mind-control and chemical interrogation research program, run by the Office of Scientific Intelligence. The program began in the early 1950s, continuing at least through the late 1960s, and it used United States citizens as its test subjects.[1][2][3] The published evidence indicates that Project MK-ULTRA involved the surreptitious use of many types of drugs, as well as other methods, to manipulate individual mental states and to alter brain function.

Project MK-ULTRA was first brought to wide public attention in 1975 by the U.S. Congress, through investigations by the Church Committee, and by a presidential commission known as the Rockefeller Commission. Investigative efforts were hampered by the fact that CIA Director Richard Helms ordered all MK-ULTRA files destroyed in 1973; the Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission investigations relied on the sworn testimony of direct participants and on the relatively small number of documents that survived Helms’ destruction order.[4]

Although the CIA insists that MK-ULTRA-type experiments have been abandoned, 14-year CIA veteran Victor Marchetti has stated in various interviews that the CIA routinely conducts disinformation campaigns and that CIA mind control research continued. In a 1977 interview, Marchetti specifically called the CIA claim that MK-ULTRA was abandoned a cover story. [5][6]

On the Senate floor in 1977, Senator Ted Kennedy said:

The Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over thirty universities and institutions were involved in an extensive testing and experimentation program which included covert drug tests on unwitting citizens at all social levels, high and low, native Americans and foreign. Several of these tests involved the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in social situations. At least one death, that of Dr. Olson, resulted from these activities. The Agency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific sense. The agents doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific observers.[7]

To this day most specific information regarding Project MKULTRA remains highly classified.

Title and origins
Dr. Sidney Gottlieb approved of an MKULTRA subproject on LSD in this June 9, 1953 letter.

The project’s intentionally oblique CIA cryptonym is made up of the digraph MK, meaning that the project was sponsored by the agency’s Technical Services Division, followed by the word ULTRA (which had previously been used to designate the most secret classification of World War II intelligence). Other related cryptonyms include MK-NAOMI and MK-DELTA.

A precursor of the MK-ULTRA program began in 1945 when the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency was established and given direct responsibility for Operation Paperclip. Operation Paperclip was a program to recruit former Nazi scientists. Some of these scientists studied torture and brainwashing, and several had just been identified and prosecuted as war criminals during the Nuremberg Trials.[8][9]

Several secret U.S. government projects grew out of Operation Paperclip. These projects included Project CHATTER (established 1947), and Project BLUEBIRD (established 1950), which was later renamed to Project ARTICHOKE in 1951. Their purpose was to study mind-control, interrogation, behavior modification and related topics.

Headed by Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the MK-ULTRA project was started on the order of CIA director Allen Dulles on April 13, 1953,[10] largely in response to Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean use of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea.[11] The CIA wanted to use similar methods on their own captives. The CIA was also interested in being able to manipulate foreign leaders with such techniques,[12] and would later invent several schemes to drug Fidel Castro.

Experiments were often conducted without the subjects’ knowledge or consent.[13] In some cases, academic researchers being funded through grants from CIA front organizations were unaware that their work was being used for these purposes.[14]

In 1964, the project was renamed MK-SEARCH. The project attempted to produce a perfect truth drug for use in interrogating suspected Soviet spies during the Cold War, and generally to explore any other possibilities of mind control.

Another MK-ULTRA effort, Subproject 54, was the Navy’s top secret Perfect Concussion program, which used sub-aural frequency blasts to erase memory.[15]

Because most MK-ULTRA records were deliberately destroyed in 1973 by order of then CIA Director Richard Helms, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for investigators to gain a complete understanding of the more than 150 individually funded research sub-projects sponsored by MK-ULTRA and related CIA programs.[16]

Goals

The Agency poured millions of dollars into studies probing dozens of methods of influencing and controlling the mind. One 1955 MK-ULTRA document gives an indication of the size and range of the effort; this document refers to the study of an assortment of mind-altering substances described as follows:[17]

1. Substances which will promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the point where the recipient would be discredited in public.
2. Substances which increase the efficiency of mentation and perception.
3. Materials which will prevent or counteract the intoxicating effect of alcohol.
4. Materials which will promote the intoxicating effect of alcohol.
5. Materials which will produce the signs and symptoms of recognized diseases in a reversible way so that they may be used for malingering, etc.
6. Materials which will render the induction of hypnosis easier or otherwise enhance its usefulness.
7. Substances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand privation, torture and coercion during interrogation and so-called brain-washing .
8. Materials and physical methods which will produce amnesia for events preceding and during their use.
9. Physical methods of producing shock and confusion over extended periods of time and capable of surreptitious use.
10. Substances which produce physical disablement such as paralysis of the legs, acute anemia, etc.
11. Substances which will produce pure euphoria with no subsequent let-down.
12. Substances which alter personality structure in such a way that the tendency of the recipient to become dependent upon another person is enhanced.
13. A material which will cause mental confusion of such a type that the individual under its influence will find it difficult to maintain a fabrication under questioning.
14. Substances which will lower the ambition and general working efficiency of men when administered in undetectable amounts.
15. Substances which promote weakness or distortion of the eyesight or hearing faculties, preferably without permanent effects.
16. A knockout pill which can surreptitiously be administered in drinks, food, cigarettes, as an aerosol, etc., which will be safe to use, provide a maximum of amnesia, and be suitable for use by agent types on an ad hoc basis.
17. A material which can be surreptitiously administered by the above routes and which in very small amounts will make it impossible for a man to perform any physical activity whatsoever.

Historians have asserted that creating a Manchurian Candidate subject through mind control techniques was a goal of MK-ULTRA and related CIA projects.[18]

Budget

A secretive arrangement granted the MK-ULTRA program a percentage of the CIA budget. The MK-ULTRA director was granted six percent of the CIA operating budget in 1953, without oversight or accounting.[19] An estimated US$10m or more was spent[20].

Experiments

CIA documents suggest that chemical, biological and radiological means were investigated for the purpose of mind control as part of MK-ULTRA.[21]

Drugs
LSD

Early efforts focused on LSD, which later came to dominate many of MK-ULTRA’s programs.
Experiments included administering LSD to CIA employees, military personnel, doctors, other government agents, prostitutes, mentally ill patients, and members of the general public in order to study their reactions. LSD and other drugs were usually administered without the subject’s knowledge or informed consent, a violation of the Nuremberg Code that the U.S. agreed to follow after World War II.

Efforts to recruit subjects were often illegal, even discounting the fact that drugs were being administered (though actual use of LSD, for example, was legal in the United States until October 6, 1966). In Operation Midnight Climax, the CIA set up several brothels to obtain a selection of men who would be too embarrassed to talk about the events. The men were dosed with LSD, the brothels were equipped with one-way mirrors, and the sessions were filmed for later viewing and study.[22]

Some subjects’ participation was consensual, and in many of these cases, the subjects appeared to be singled out for even more extreme experiments. In one case, volunteers were given LSD for 77 consecutive days.[23]

LSD was eventually dismissed by MK-ULTRA’s researchers as too unpredictable in its results.[1] Although useful information was sometimes obtained through questioning subjects on LSD, not uncommonly the most marked effect would be the subject’s absolute and utter certainty that they were able to withstand any form of interrogation attempt, even physical torture.

Other drugs

Another technique investigated was connecting a barbiturate IV into one arm and an amphetamine IV into the other.[24] The barbiturates were released into the subject first, and as soon as the subject began to fall asleep, the amphetamines were released. The subject would begin babbling incoherently at this point, and it was sometimes possible to ask questions and get useful answers.

The experiments were exported to Canada when the CIA recruited Scottish physician Donald Ewen Cameron, creator of the psychic driving concept, which the CIA found particularly interesting. Cameron had been hoping to correct schizophrenia by erasing existing memories and reprogramming the psyche. He commuted from Albany, New York to Montreal every week to work at the Allan Memorial Institute of McGill University and was paid $69,000 from 1957 to 1964 to carry out MKULTRA experiments there. In addition to LSD, Cameron also experimented with various paralytic drugs as well as electroconvulsive therapy at thirty to forty times the normal power. His driving experiments consisted of putting subjects into drug-induced coma for weeks at a time (up to three months in one case) while playing tape loops of noise or simple repetitive statements. His experiments were typically carried out on patients who had entered the institute for minor problems such as anxiety disorders and postpartum depression, many of whom suffered permanently from his actions.[27] His treatments resulted in victims’ incontinence, amnesia, forgetting how to talk, forgetting their parents, and thinking their interrogators were their parents.[28] His work was inspired and paralleled by the British psychiatrist Dr William Sargant at St Thomas’ Hospital, London, and Belmont Hospital, Surrey, who was also involved in the Intelligence Services and who experimented extensively on his patients without their consent, causing similar long-term damage.[29] Dr. Cameron and Dr. Sargant are the only two identified Canadian experimenters, but the MKULTRA file makes reference to many other unnamed physicians who were recruited by the CIA.[citation needed]

It was during this era that Cameron became known worldwide as the first chairman of the World Psychiatric Association as well as president of the American and Canadian psychiatric associations. Cameron had also been a member of the Nuremberg medical tribunal in 1946-47.[30]

Revelation

In 1973, CIA Director Richard Helms ordered all MK-ULTRA files destroyed. Pursuant to this order, most CIA documents regarding the project were destroyed, making a full investigation of MK-ULTRA impossible.

In December 1974, The New York Times reported that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s. That report prompted investigations by the U.S. Congress, in the form of the Church Committee, and by a presidential commission known as the Rockefeller Commission that looked into domestic activities of the CIA, the FBI, and intelligence-related agencies of the military.

In the summer of 1975, congressional Church Committee reports and the presidential Rockefeller Commission report revealed to the public for the first time that the CIA and the Department of Defense had conducted experiments on both unwitting and cognizant human subjects as part of an extensive program to influence and control human behavior through the use of psychoactive drugs such as LSD and mescaline and other chemical, biological, and psychological means. They also revealed that at least one subject had died after administration of LSD. Much of what the Church Committee and the Rockefeller Commission learned about MKULTRA was contained in a report, prepared by the Inspector General’s office in 1963, that had survived the destruction of records ordered in 1973.[31] However, it contained little detail.

The congressional committee investigating the CIA research, chaired by Senator Frank Church, concluded that [p]rior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects . The committee noted that the experiments sponsored by these researchers … call into question the decision by the agencies not to fix guidelines for experiments.

Following the recommendations of the Church Committee, President Gerald Ford in 1976 issued the first Executive Order on Intelligence Activities which, among other things, prohibited experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested party, of each such human subject and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission. Subsequent orders by Presidents Carter and Reagan expanded the directive to apply to any human experimentation.

On the heels of the revelations about CIA experiments, similar stories surfaced regarding U.S. Army experiments. In 1975 the Secretary of the Army instructed the Army Inspector General to conduct an investigation. Among the findings of the Inspector General was the existence of a 1953 memorandum penned by then Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson. Documents show that the CIA participated in at least two of Department of Defense committees during 1952. These committee findings led to the issuance of the Wilson Memo, which mandated—in accord with Nuremberg Code protocols—that only volunteers be used for experimental operations conducted in the U.S. armed forces. In response to the Inspector General’s investigation, the Wilson Memo was declassified in August 1975.

With regard to drug testing within the Army, the Inspector General found that the evidence clearly reflected that every possible medical consideration was observed by the professional investigators at the Medical Research Laboratories. However the Inspector General also found that the mandated requirements of Wilson’s 1953 memorandum had been only partially adhered to; he concluded that the volunteers were not fully informed, as required, prior to their participation; and the methods of procuring their services, in many cases, appeared not to have been in accord with the intent of Department of the Army policies governing use of volunteers in research.

Other branches of the U.S. armed forces, the Air Force for example, were found not to have adhered to Wilson Memo stipulations regarding voluntary drug testing.

In 1977, during a hearing held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to look further into MKULTRA, Admiral Stansfield Turner, then Director of Central Intelligence, revealed that the CIA had found a set of records, consisting of about 20,000 pages,[32] that had survived the 1973 destruction orders, due to having been stored at a records center not usually used for such documents.[31] These files dealt with the financing of MKULTRA projects, and as such contained few details of those projects, but much more was learned from them than from the Inspector General’s 1963 report.

In Canada, the issue took much longer to surface, becoming widely known in 1984 on a CBC news show, The Fifth Estate. It was learned that not only had the CIA funded Dr. Cameron’s efforts, but perhaps even more shockingly, the Canadian government was fully aware of this, and had later provided another $500,000 in funding to continue the experiments. This revelation largely derailed efforts by the victims to sue the CIA as their U.S. counterparts had, and the Canadian government eventually settled out of court for $100,000 to each of the 127 victims. None of Dr. Cameron’s personal records of his involvement with MKULTRA survive, since his family destroyed them after his death from a heart attack while mountain climbing in 1967.[33]

U.S. General Accounting Office Report

The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on September 28, 1994, which stated that between 1940 and 1974, DOD and other national security agencies studied thousands of human subjects in tests and experiments involving hazardous substances.

The quote from the study:

… Working with the CIA, the Department of Defense gave hallucinogenic drugs to thousands of volunteer soldiers in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In addition to LSD, the Army also tested quinuclidinyl benzilate, a hallucinogen code-named BZ. (Note 37) Many of these tests were conducted under the so-called MKULTRA program, established to counter perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing techniques. Between 1953 and 1964, the program consisted of 149 projects involving drug testing and other studies on unwitting human subjects…[34]

Deaths

Harold Blauer, a professional tennis player in New York City, died as a result of a secret Army experiment involving MDA.[35]

Frank Olson, a United States Army biochemist and biological weapons researcher, was given LSD without his knowledge or consent in 1953 as part of a CIA experiment, and died under suspicious circumstances (initially labeled suicide) a week later following a severe psychotic episode. A CIA doctor assigned to monitor Olson’s recovery claimed to be asleep in another bed in a New York City hotel room when Olson jumped through the window to fall ten stories to his death.[36]

Olson’s son disputes this version of events, and maintains that his father was murdered due to the belief that he was going to divulge his knowledge of the top-secret interrogation program code-named Project ARTICHOKE.[37] Frank Olson’s body was exhumed in 1994, and cranial injuries indicated Olson had been knocked unconscious before exiting the window.[38]

The CIA’s own internal investigation, by contrast, claimed Gottlieb had conducted the experiment with Olson’s prior knowledge, although neither Olson nor the other men taking part in the experiment were informed as to the exact nature of the drug until some 20 minutes after its ingestion. The report further suggested that Gottlieb was nonetheless due a reprimand, as he had failed to take into account Olsen’s already-diagnosed suicidal tendencies, which might well have been exacerbated by the LSD.[36]

Legal issues involving informed consent

The revelations about the CIA and the Army prompted a number of subjects or their survivors to file lawsuits against the federal government for conducting illegal experiments. Although the government aggressively, and sometimes successfully, sought to avoid legal liability, several plaintiffs did receive compensation through court order, out-of-court settlement, or acts of Congress. Frank Olson’s family received $750,000 by a special act of Congress, and both President Ford and CIA director William Colby met with Olson’s family to publicly apologize.

Previously, the CIA and the Army had actively and successfully sought to withhold incriminating information, even as they secretly provided compensation to the families. One subject of Army drug experimentation, James Stanley, an Army sergeant, brought an important, albeit unsuccessful, suit. The government argued that Stanley was barred from suing under a legal doctrine—known as the Feres doctrine, after a 1950 Supreme Court case, Feres v. United States—that prohibits members of the Armed Forces from suing the government for any harms that were inflicted incident to service.

In 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed this defense in a 5–4 decision that dismissed Stanley’s case.[39] The majority argued that a test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would call into question military discipline and decision making would itself require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters. In dissent, Justice William Brennan argued that the need to preserve military discipline should not protect the government from liability and punishment for serious violations of constitutional rights:

The medical trials at Nuremberg in 1947 deeply impressed upon the world that experimentation with unknowing human subjects is morally and legally unacceptable. The United States Military Tribunal established the Nuremberg Code as a standard against which to judge German scientists who experimented with human subjects… . [I]n defiance of this principle, military intelligence officials … began surreptitiously testing chemical and biological materials, including LSD.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing a separate dissent, stated:

No judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability the involuntary and unknowing human experimentation alleged to have occurred in this case. Indeed, as Justice Brennan observes, the United States played an instrumental role in the criminal prosecution of Nazi officials who experimented with human subjects during the Second World War, and the standards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed to judge the behavior of the defendants stated that the ‘voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential … to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts.’ If this principle is violated, the very least that society can do is to see that the victims are compensated, as best they can be, by the perpetrators.

This is the only Supreme Court case to address the application of the Nuremberg Code to experimentation sponsored by the U.S. government. And while the suit was unsuccessful, dissenting opinions put the Army—and by association the entire government—on notice that use of individuals without their consent is unacceptable. The limited application of the Nuremberg Code in U.S. courts does not detract from the power of the principles it espouses, especially in light of stories of failure to follow these principles that appeared in the media and professional literature during the 1960s and 1970s and the policies eventually adopted in the mid-1970s.

In another law suit, Wayne Ritchie, a former United States Marshall, alleged the CIA laced his food or drink with LSD at a 1957 Christmas party. While the government admitted it was, at that time, drugging people without their consent, U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel found Ritchie could not prove he was one of the victims of MKULTRA and dismissed the case in 2007.[40]

Extent of participation

Forty-four American colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like including Sandoz (currently Novartis) and Eli Lilly & Co., 12 hospitals or clinics (in addition to those associated with universities), and 3 prisons are known to have participated in MKULTRA.[41][42]

Notable subjects

A considerable amount of credible circumstantial evidence suggests that Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber, participated in CIA-sponsored MK-ULTRA experiments conducted at Harvard University from the fall of 1959 through the spring of 1962. During World War II, Henry Murray, the lead researcher in the Harvard experiments, served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was a forerunner of the CIA. Murray applied for a grant funded by the United States Navy, and his Harvard stress experiments strongly resembled those run by the OSS.[43] Beginning at the age of sixteen, Kaczynski participated along with twenty-one other undergraduate students in the Harvard experiments, which have been described as disturbing and ethically indefensible. [43][44]

Merry Prankster Ken Kesey, author of One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, volunteered for MK-ULTRA experiments while he was a student at Stanford University. Kesey’s ingestion of LSD during these experiments led directly to his widespread promotion of the drug and the subsequent development of hippie culture.[45]

Candy Jones, American fashion model and radio host, claimed to have been a victim of mind control in the ’60s.[46]

Infamous Irish mob boss James Whitey Bulger volunteered for testing while in prison.[47]

Conspiracy theories

MK-ULTRA plays a part in many conspiracy theories given its nature and the destruction of most records.
Lawrence Teeter, attorney for convicted assassin Sirhan Sirhan, believed Sirhan was under the influence of hypnosis when he fired his weapon at Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Teeter linked the CIA’s MKULTRA program to mind control techniques that he claimed were used to control Sirhan.[48]

Jonestown, the Guyana location of the Jim Jones cult and Peoples Temple mass suicide, was thought to be a test site for MKULTRA medical and mind control experiments after the official end of the program. Congressman Leo Ryan, a known critic of the CIA, was assassinated after he personally visited Jonestown to investigate various reported irregularities.[49]

Popular culture

* MKULTRA is referenced in the plots of The Ambler Warning by Robert Ludlum, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test by Tom Wolfe, Firestarter by Stephen King, Infinite Jest by David Foster Wallace, Just a Couple of Days by Tony Vigorito, The Manchurian Candidate by Richard Condon, The Telling of Lies by Timothy Findley; and The Watchmen by John Altman; the films The Bourne Ultimatum, Conspiracy Theory, The Good Shepherd, Jacob’s Ladder, and The Killing Room; the television series Angel, The West Wing. The Lone Gunmen, Numb3rs, Bones, Quincy M.E. and The X-Files; the games Conspiracy X and The Suffering: Prison is Hell; the character Deathstroke the Terminator in the Teen Titans by DC Comics.
* The bands mk Ultra, MK-ULTRA, and a side project of Frank Tovey took their names from these projects. MKULTRA is also referenced by such musical artists as Black Rebel Motorcycle Club, Canibus, Exit Clov, Fatboy Slim, Green Magnet School, Immortal Technique, Manic Street Preachers, Muse, The Orb, Sirius Isness, Lustmord side project Terror Against Terror, Tokyo Police Club, and Unwound.
* MKULTRA also provides a name for a move by professional wrestler Sterling James Keenan.

* Short documentary about MKULTRA and the Frank Olson incident
* The Most Dangerous Game Downloadable 8 minute documentary by independent filmmakers GNN
* GIF scans of declassified MKULTRA Project Documents
* Interview of Alfred McCoy on CIA mind control research
* U.S. Supreme Court CIA v. SIMS, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) 471 U.S. 159
* U.S. Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. STANLEY, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) 483 U.S. 669

v • d • e
United States chemical weapons program
Agents and chemicals
3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) A Chlorine A Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) A Phosgene A QL A Sarin (GB) A Sulfur mustard (HD) A VX
Weapons
Bigeye bomb A M1 chemical mine A M104 155mm Cartridge A M110 155mm Cartridge A M121/A1 155mm Cartridge A M125 bomblet A M134 bomblet A M138 bomblet A M139 bomblet A M2 mortar A M23 chemical mine A M34 cluster bomb A M360 105mm Cartridge A M426 8-inch shell A M43 BZ cluster bomb A M44 generator cluster A M55 rocket A M60 105mm Cartridge A M687 155mm Cartridge A XM-736 8-inch projectile A MC-1 bomb A M47 bomb A Weteye bomb
Operations and testing
Dugway sheep incident A Edgewood Arsenal experiments A MKULTRA A Operation CHASE A Operation Geranium A Operation LAC A Operation Red Hat A Operation Steel Box A Operation Ranch Hand A Operation Top Hat A Project 112 A Project SHAD
Facilities
Anniston Army Depot A Anniston Chemical Activity A Blue Grass Army Depot A Deseret Chemical Depot A Edgewood Chemical Activity A Hawthorne Army Depot A Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System A Newport Chemical Depot A Pine Bluff Chemical Activity A Pueblo Chemical Depot A Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility A Umatilla Chemical Depot
Units and formations
1st Gas Regiment A U.S. Army Chemical Corps A Chemical mortar battalion
Equipment
Chemical Agent Identification Set A M93 Fox A MOPP A People sniffer
Related topics
Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory A Chlorine bombings in Iraq A Herbicidal warfare A List of topics A Poison gas in World War I A Tyler poison gas plot
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_MKULTRA
Categories: Devices to alter consciousness | History of the United States government | Central Intelligence Agency operations | Psychedelic research | LSD | Medical research | Military history of the United States | Military psychiatry | Mind control | 1953 establishments | Secret government programs | Human experimentation in the United States | Investigations and hearings of the United States Congress | Code names

Operation Operation WASHTUB was a CIA-organized covert operation to plant a phony Soviet arms cache in Nicaragua to demonstrate Guatemalan ties to Moscow. It was part of the effort to overthrow the President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954.[1][2]

On February 19, 1954, the CIA planted a cache of Soviet-made arms on the Nicaraguan coast to be discovered weeks later by fishermen in the pay of Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza García. On May 7, 1954, President Somoza told reporters at a press conference that a Soviet submarine had been photographed, but that no prints or negatives were available. The story also involved Guatemalan assassination squads. The press and the public were skeptical and the story did not get much press. .[3]

The Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted a 2002 DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism. [1] Excerpts from that study, dated August 16, 2002, recommend the creation of a super-Intelligence Support Activity, an organization it dubs the Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG), to bring together CIA and military covert action, information warfare, intelligence and cover and deception.[2] For example, the Pentagon and CIA would work together to increase human intelligence (HUMINT), forward/operational presence and to deploy new clandestine technical capabilities.[3] Concerning the tactics P2OG would use,

Among other things, this body would launch secret operations aimed at stimulating reactions among terrorists and states possessing weapons of mass destruction—that is, for instance, prodding terrorist cells into action and exposing themselves to quick-response attacks by U.S. forces.

Such tactics would hold states/sub-state actors accountable and signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk , the briefing paper declares.[2]
[edit] See also

Operation Northwoods
[edit] References

1. ^ Defense Science Board, DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism, U.S. Department of Defense, Final Outbrief, August 16, 2002; 78 pages (in PowerPoint format). Text of the document in HTML format. Here is a 30-page excerpt from the foregoing (in PowerPoint format). This is the publicly published U.S. government document which proposes P2OG.
2. ^ a b William M. Arkin, The Secret War: Frustrated by intelligence failures, the Defense Department is dramatically expanding its ‘black world’ of covert operations, Los Angeles Times, October 27, 2002. Also available here.
3. ^ David Isenberg, ‘P2OG’ allows Pentagon to fight dirty, Asia Times, November 5, 2002.

[edit] External links

* Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Project on Government Secrecy, DOD Examines ‘Preemptive’ Intelligence Operations, Secrecy News, Vol. 2002, Issue No. 107, October 28, 2002.
* Chris Floyd, Into the Dark: The Pentagon Plan to Provoke Terrorist Attacks, CounterPunch, November 1, 2002. Also appeared in Moscow Times, November 1, 2002, pg. XXIV; St. Petersburg Times, November 5, 2002; and under the title Into the Dark: The Pentagon Plan to Foment Terrorism, Collected Writings: Past Articles by Chris Floyd, April 15, 2005. This article was chosen number four in Project Censored’s Censored 2004: The Top 25 Censored Media Stories of 2002-2003, (#4) Rumsfeld’s Plan to Provoke Terrorists.
* Seymour M. Hersh, The Coming Wars: What the Pentagon can now do in secret, The New Yorker, January 24, 2005 edition. Referenced by the below Chris Floyd article.
* Chris Floyd, Global Eye, Moscow Times, January 21, 2005, Issue 3089, pg. 112; also appeared as Darkness Visible: The Pentagon Plan to Foment Terrorism is Now in Operation, Collected Writings: Past Articles by Chris Floyd, April 15, 2005.

Gladio (Italian for Gladius, a type of Roman short sword) is a code name denoting the clandestine NATO stay-behind operation in Italy after World War II, intended to continue anti-communist resistance in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. Although Gladio specifically refers to the Italian branch of the NATO stay-behind organisations, Operation Gladio is used as an informal name for all stay-behind organisations, sometimes called Super NATO .[1]

Operating in many NATO and even some neutral countries,[2] Gladio was first coordinated by the Clandestine Committee of the Western Union (CCWU), founded in 1948. After the creation of NATO in 1949, the CCWU was integrated into the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC), founded in 1951 and overseen by the SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), transferred to Belgium after France’s official withdrawal from NATO’s Military Committee in 1966 — which was not followed by the dissolution of the French stay-behind paramilitary movements.

The role of the CIA in sponsoring Gladio and the extent of its activities during the Cold War era, and its relationship to terrorist attacks perpetrated in Italy during the Years of Lead and other similar clandestine operations is the subject of ongoing debate and investigation. Italy, Switzerland and Belgium have had parliamentary inquiries into the matter.[3]

The command structure of stay-behind forces, as suggested in Field Manual 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces.

After World War II, the UK and the US decided to create stay-behind paramilitary organizations, with the official aim of countering a possible Soviet invasion through sabotage and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. Arms caches were hidden, escape routes prepared, and loyal members recruited: i.e. mainly hardline anticommunists, including many ex-Nazis or former fascists, whether in Italy or in other European countries. In Germany, for example, Gladio had as a central focus the Gehlen Org — also involved in ODESSA ratlines — named after Reinhard Gehlen who would become West Germany’s first head of intelligence, while the predominantly Italian P2 masonic lodge was composed of many members of the neofascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), including Licio Gelli. Its clandestine cells were to stay behind (hence the name) in enemy controlled territory and to act as resistance movements, conducting sabotage, guerrilla warfare and assassinations.

] . . . [

In 1991, a report by Swiss magistrate Pierre Cornu was released by the Swiss defence ministry. It said that P26 was without political or legal legitimacy , and described the group’s collaboration with British secret services as intense . Unknown to the Swiss government, British officials signed agreements with the organisation, called P26, to provide training in combat, communications, and sabotage. The latest agreement was signed in 1987… P26 cadres participated regularly in training exercises in Britain… British advisers — possibly from the SAS — visited secret training establishments in Switzerland. P26 was led by Efrem Cattelan, known to British intelligence.[75]

In a 2005 conference presenting Daniele Ganser’s research on Gladio, Hans Senn, General Chief of Staff of the Swiss Army between 1977 and 1980, explained how he was informed of the existence of a secret organisation in the middle of his term of office. According to him, it already became clear in 1980 in the wake of the Schilling/Bachmann affair that there was also a secret group in Switzerland. But former MP, Helmut Hubacher, President of the Social Democratic Party from 1975 to 1990, declared that although it had been known that special services existed within the army, as a politician he never at any time could have known that the secret army P26 was behind this. Hubacher pointed out that the President of the parliamentary investigation into P26 (PUK-EMD), the right-wing politician from Appenzell and member of the Council of States for that Canton, Carlo Schmid, had suffered like a dog during the commission’s investigations. Carlo Schmid declared to the press: I was schocked that something like that is at all possible, and said to the press he was glad to leave the conspirational atmosphere which had weighted upon him like a black shadow during the investigations.[89] Hubacher found it especially disturbing that, apart from its official mandate of organizing resistance in case of a Soviet invasion, P26 had also a mandate to become active should the left succeed in achieving a parliamentary majority.[86]
[edit] The Order of the Solar Temple mystery

Psychiatrist Jean-Marie Abgrall has alleged[90] that the collective suicides allegedly committed by various Order of the Solar Temple (OST) members, in December 1995 in the Vercors region of France, were somehow related to Gladio. According to Jean-Marie Abgrall’s declarations to Le Point magazine and Nice Matin newspaper in February 2003, which he renewed in official justice documents, the Renewed Order of the Solar Temple cult ( Ordre Rénové du Temple – ORT[91]), ancestor of the OTS, had relations with Gladio networks. Abgrall also claimed that the AMORC, of which he had been a member, was also related to Foccart networks (Jacques Foccart was De Gaulle’s spindoctor for African affairs, and retained an important role long after him).

The theory of the mass suicide has been heavily contested by family of the victims Alain Vuarnet, René and Muguette Rostan, Willy and Giséla Schleimer and their lawyer, Alain Leclerc. According to a Reuters cable dated March 22, 2004 (19:03:46), the lawyer explained that he had two documents upholding the theory of a murder, the first one being Jean-Marie Abgrall’s juridical declaration above-mentioned. According to the lawyer, psychiatrist Jean-Marie Abgrall reveals… that the Order of the Solar Temple, as the AMORC and the ORT, were created and controlled by French and foreign secret services . Those information weren’t given at the time of investigations; the lawyer thus asked that Dr. Abgrall be heard by the judge, according to a Reuters cable.

One document was a copy of an April 21, 1997 letter addressed by a lawyer office to a bank, concerning the distribution of 17 million French Francs (about 2.5 millions Euros) between various personalities and political parties, the OST and the Rosicrucian Order AMORC (Ancient Mystical Order Rosae Crucis), an organization suspected of links with the OST. In his demand for more investigation, Dr. Leclerc wrote: If the document is true, it shows that the Order of the Solar Temple was in activity after the last March 22, 1997 massacre (the collective suicide of five adepts in Canada) and that the responsibles of this organization are still alive . However, the court refused further expertise: thus, it hasn’t been possible to verify the validity of this document.

A third document was sent by the French secret services (RG) to the judge, discrediting the family of the victims’ claims and demands for further investigations. If Jean-Marie Abgrall’s claims of relationship between the ORT (OST’s ancestor) and Gladio may seem far-fetched, Propaganda Due’s juridically proven involvement[citation needed] in Gladio’s strategy of tension inclines one to keep open various possibilities during investigations. Furthermore, connections between ORT founder Luc Jouret and far-right Belgian activist Jean Thiriart have been alleged by other sources; together, they had found in the 1970s a far-right party which was controlled by Belgium’s branch of Gladio. In any case, the mass suicides haven’t been clearly explained, let alone financial links concerning those various cults.[92][93][94]

FOIA requests and US State Department’s 2006 communiqué

Three Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests have been filed to the CIA, which has rejected them with the Glomar response: The CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence of records responsive to your request. One request was filed by the National Security Archive in 1991; another by the Italian Senate commission headed by Senator Giovanni Pellegrino in 1995 concerning Gladio and Aldo Moro’s murder; the last one in 1996, by Oliver Rathkolb, of Vienna university, for the Austrian government, concerning the secret stay-behind armies after a discovery of an arms-cache.[28]

Furthermore, the US State Department published a communiqué in January 2006 which, while confirming the existence of stay-behind armies, in general, and the presence of the Gladio stay-behind unit in Italy, in particular, with the purpose of aiding resistance in the event of Soviet aggression directed Westward, from the Warsaw Pact, dismissed claims of any United States ordered, supported, or authorized skullduggery by stay-behind units. In fact, it claims that, on the contrary, the accusations of US-sponsored false flag operations are rehashed former Soviet disinformation based on documents that the Soviets themselves forged; specifically the researchers are alleged to have been influenced by the Westmoreland Field Manual, whose forged nature was confirmed by former KGB operatives, following the end of the Cold War. The Soviet-authored forgery, disseminated in the 1970s, explicitly formulated the need for a strategy of tension involving violent attacks blamed on radical left-wing groups in order to convince allied governments of the need for counter-action. It also rejected a Communist Greek journalist’s allegations made in December 2005 (See above).[61]

Politicians on Gladio

Whilst the existence of a stay-behind organization such as Gladio was disputed, prior to its confirmation by Giulio Andreotti, with some skeptics describing it as a conspiracy theory, several high ranking politicians in NATO countries have made statements appearing to confirm the existence of something like what is described:

* Former Italian prime minister Giulio Andreotti ( Gladio had been necessary during the days of the Cold War but, that in view of the collapse of the East Bloc, Italy would suggest to NATO that the organisation was no longer necessary. )
* Former French minister of defense Jean-Pierre Chevènement ( a structure did exist, set up at the beginning of the 1950s, to enable communications with a government that might have fled abroad in the event of the country being occupied. ).
* Former Greek defence minister, Yannis Varvitsiotis ( local commandos and the CIA set up a branch of the network in 1955 to organise guerrilla resistance to any communist invader )

As noted above, the US has now acknowledged the existence of Operation Gladio.

Gladio in Fiction

A precise analogue of Operation Gladio was described in the 1949 fiction novel An Affair of State by Pat Frank.[95] In Frank’s version, U.S. State Dept officers recruit a stay-behind network in Hungary to fight an insurgency against the Soviet Union after the Soviet Union launches an attack on and captures Western Europe.
[edit] References

v • d • e
Cold War
Participants NATO A Non-Aligned Movement A SEATO A Warsaw Pact
1940s
Yalta Conference A Operation Unthinkable A Potsdam Conference A Gouzenko Affair A Iran crisis of 1946 A Greek Civil War A Restatement of Policy on Germany A First Indochina War A Truman Doctrine A Marshall Plan A Czechoslovak coup d’état of 1948 A Tito–Stalin split A Berlin Blockade A Western betrayal A Iron Curtain A Eastern Bloc A Chinese Civil War (Second round)
1950s
Korean War A 1953 Iranian coup d’état A Uprising of 1953 in East Germany A 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état A Partition of Vietnam A First Taiwan Strait Crisis A Geneva Summit (1955) A Poznan’ 1956 protests A Hungarian Revolution of 1956 A Suez Crisis A Sputnik crisis A Second Taiwan Strait Crisis A Cuban Revolution A Kitchen Debate A Asian-African Conference A Bricker Amendment A McCarthyism A Operation Gladio A Hallstein Doctrine
1960s
Congo Crisis A Sino-Soviet split A 1960 U-2 incident A Bay of Pigs Invasion A Cuban Missile Crisis A Berlin Wall A Vietnam War A 1964 Brazilian coup d’état A U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic A South African Border War A Transition to the New Order A Domino theory A ASEAN Declaration A Laotian Civil War A Greek military junta of 1967–1974 A Cultural Revolution A 1962 Sino-Indian War A Prague Spring A Goulash Communism A Sino-Soviet border conflict
1970s
Détente A Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty A Black September in Jordan A Cambodian Civil War A Ping Pong Diplomacy A Four Power Agreement on Berlin A 1972 Nixon visit to China A 1973 Chilean coup d’état A Yom Kippur War A Strategic Arms Limitation Talks A Angolan Civil War A Mozambican Civil War A Ogaden War A Cambodian-Vietnamese War A Sino-Vietnamese War A Iranian Revolution A Operation Condor A Bangladesh Liberation War A Korean Air Lines Flight 902
1980s
Soviet war in Afghanistan A Olympic boycotts A History of Solidarity A Contras A Central American Crisis A RYAN A Korean Air Lines Flight 007 A Able Archer 83 A Strategic Defense Initiative A Invasion of Grenada A Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 A Invasion of Panama A Fall of the Berlin Wall A Revolutions of 1989 A Glasnost A Perestroika
1990s
Breakup of Yugoslavia A Dissolution of the USSR A Dissolution of Czechoslovakia
See also
Soviet and Russian espionage in U.S. A Soviet Union–United States relations A NATO-Russia relations
Organizations
ASEAN A Central Intelligence Agency A Comecon A European Community A KGB A Stasi
Races
Arms race A Nuclear arms race A Space Race
Ideologies
Capitalism A Liberal democracy A Communism A Stalinism A Trotskyism A Maoism
Propaganda
Pravda A Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty A Red Scare A Voice of America A Voice of Russia
Foreign policy
Truman Doctrine A Marshall Plan A Containment A Eisenhower Doctrine A Domino theory A Kennedy Doctrine A Peaceful coexistence A Ostpolitik A Johnson Doctrine A Brezhnev Doctrine A Nixon Doctrine A Ulbricht Doctrine A Carter Doctrine A Reagan Doctrine A Rollback
Timeline of events A Portal A Category
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Gladio
Categories: Anti-communism | Central Intelligence Agency operations | Contemporary British history | Contemporary French history | Contemporary Italian history | History of modern Greece | History of Turkey | Operation Gladio | Military scandals | Military operations involving NATO | Stay-behind organizations | Warfare by type | Cold War

In 1990, Colonel Herbert Alboth, a former commander of the Swiss secret stay-behind army P26 declared in a confidential letter to the Defence Department that he was willing to reveal the whole truth . He was later found in his house, stabbed with his own military bayonet. The detailed parliamentary report on the Swiss secret army was presented to the public on November 17, 1990.[28] According to The Guardian, P26 was backed by P27, a private foreign intelligence agency funded partly by the government, and by a special unit of Swiss army intelligence which had built up files on nearly 8,000 suspect persons including leftists , bill stickers , Jehovah’s witnesses , people with abnormal tendencies and anti-nuclear demonstrators. On November 14, the Swiss government hurriedly dissolved P26 — the head of which, it emerged, had been paid £100,000 a year. [59]

Human Exposures Under Control [PDF 415.68 KB, 26 pp] has been verified.
Groundwater Contamination Under Control [PDF 814.28 KB, 20 pp] has been verified.
Site Description

The Knolls site is located at 2401 River Road in the Town of Niskayuna, Schenectady County, New York, on the south bank of the Mohawk River. Construction of the site began in 1948 and laboratory operations began in 1949. The site consists of 170 acres of land, extending 4,200 feet along the river. Most of the property is located on a bluff about 100 feet high with a steep slope dropping off to a low bench about 15 to 20 feet above the river.

The principal function of the site is research and development in the design and operation of naval nuclear propulsion engines. As a result of these activities, various types of hazardous and mixed wastes are generated. Mixed waste contains both hazardous waste and radioactive material. The majority of hazardous and mixed wastes are generated from laboratory operations and facility renovation activities.

Container storage areas are used for hazardous and mixed waste prior to shipment off-site to licensed/permitted treatment, storage or disposal facilities. The Knolls site may also accept mixed waste to consolidate wastes for shipment to out-of-state treatment facilities. There is no disposal of hazardous waste or mixed waste at the facility.

NYS Department of Environmental Conservation completed a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Assessment preliminary review and a visual site inspection of this facility, and determined that investigations will be required at 31 of the identified solid waste management units (SWMUs) and four areas of concern (AOCs). Conditions have been included in the NYS hazardous waste permit to require Knolls to submit investigation work plans for all SWMUs and AOCs that require further corrective action activities.
Site Responsibility and Legal Instrument

The State is responsible for corrective action through issuance of a NYS Part 373 operating permit for storage of hazardous and mixed waste.
Permit Status

The NYS Part 373 operating permit, issued July 20, 1998, allows for hazardous and mixed waste storage in four areas. These areas are:

* The Building Q1 complex with an authorized capacity of 6,600 gallons;
* Two prefabricated modular additions located in the Building E11 truck bay with an authorized capacity of 1,320 gallons;
* Four floor vaults (numbered 2, 3, 5 & 6) with an authorized capacity of 3,520 gallons each; and
* Building M10 with an authorized capacity of 36,800 gallons.

The types of containers used for storage of hazardous waste include bottles, cans, jugs, drums and large volume boxes.
Potential Threats and Contaminants

The four potential exposure pathways for this site are surface water, groundwater, sediment and soil. Some potential receptors in the area are:

* Mohawk River users (via recreation and drinking water),
* Terrestrial and aquatic biota, and
* On and off-site employees and residents in the area.

Current effluent discharges to the Mohawk River are regulated under a permit issued by NYS Department of Environmental Conservation.

Knolls is also monitoring on-site stream and Mohawk River water quality. This surface water monitoring shows that there have been only occasional water quality exceedences for two non-hazardous compounds, both of which are attributable to natural conditions. Knoll’s groundwater monitoring network consists of 56 wells, of which 33 are currently monitored for chemical constituents.

Within the monitoring well system there have been elevated levels of phenols, in an isolated area, and volatile organic compounds in three areas of the site. Sediment sampling has been done in the on-site streams, which flow toward the Mohawk River. Detectable concentrations of contaminants were found in all sediments, but no appreciable difference between upstream and downstream concentrations are clear, with one exception (manganese, a non-hazardous metal) at Mid-line Stream.

Localized soil contamination, which can be traced to specific sources, has been discovered. Soil contamination includes polychlorinated biphenyls in two areas (one area of which has been remediated), heavy metals in two areas (one area of which has been remediated), and volatile organic compounds in a fifth area.
Cleanup Approach and Progress

Based upon available data, no imminent danger to human health or the environment has been identified. However, implementation of corrective action programs is required to control certain potential risks. The goal of these programs is to seek complete characterizations of, and final solutions for, environmental contamination that has been, or may yet be, identified. The on-going routine monitoring programs undertaken by Knolls, in addition to the corrective action programs, are designed to alert Knolls and the NYS Department of Environmental Conservation of any health or environmental risks.

Knolls has been required by the NYS Department of Environmental Conservation to supplement previously conducted geophysical/soil gas surveys to determine the horizontal and vertical extent of suspected waste deposition in certain areas of the site, as well as supplementing existing groundwater monitoring data. These surveys will be used as a basis for site visits to determine whether contaminant releases to the soils within the boundaries of the suspected waste deposition areas have occurred.

In other areas, site visits have been or will be used to either discover whether contaminant releases have occurred, or to confirm the removal of contaminated materials from soils. In the remaining areas, Knolls will be required to conduct a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation to determine the extent and concentration of already confirmed contamination, or to perform phased evaluations of in-ground portions (industrial sewers) of systems as part of a required work plan.
Site Repository

Copies of supporting technical documents and correspondence cited in this site fact sheet are available for public review at:

EPA added the Radiation Technology, Inc. (RTI) site in Rockaway Township, New Jersey to the National Priorities List on September 1, 1984 because volatile organic compounds (VOCs), or potentially harmful chemicals that can easily evaporate into the air, were found in onsite water supply wells. The 263-acre Superfund site, located in Morris County, was used for testing and developing rocket engines and propellants. Onsite operations also included radiation sterilization, production of architectural products, and hardwood flooring production. RTI improperly stored and disposed of waste drums containing solvents and other chemicals.

The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) and the Rockaway Township Health Department closed onsite contaminated wells. During the first part of the cleanup, RTI installed wells to measure and monitor the ground water contamination, and also removed abandoned tanks and drums under NJDEP supervision. At New Jersey’s request, EPA took over the cleanup. EPA oversaw ground water investigation and removed material containing asbestos in a portion of the site. In early 2007, the U.S. Army Military Munitions Response Program notified EPA that a portion of the site fell within the boundaries of a historic practice projectile firing area, and could have contained unexploded materials. The U.S. Army conducted an investigation, and no dangerous materials were found or removed. As a precaution, EPA requested that safety procedures related to unexploded materials be included in the site’s work plans.

The 1978 discovery of toxic chemicals beneath the suburban infrastructure of Love Canal, in Niagara Falls, New York first illuminated the consequences of environmental neglect. For decades, many American businesses had disposed of hazardous waste improperly, contaminating tens of thousands of sites nationally, including nearly 250 within Region 2 alone. Accidents, spills, and leaks of hazardous materials resulted in land, water, and air that pose immediate and potential threats to public and environmental health.

Citizen reaction to these localized threats led Congress to establish the Superfund Program in 1980, an initiative designed to locate, investigate, and clean up the most hazardous sites nationwide. Superfund is officially called CERCLA, or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The EPA administers the Superfund Program in cooperation with individual states and tribal governments.

The national EPA office that oversees management of the program is the Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation (OSRTI). The sites dealt with under Superfund are listed on the NPL, or National Priorities List. Superfund constitutes a crucial environmental and economic precedent within American legislative history.

Pennwalt Lindane Dump
Alsco Community Park
Current Site Status
EPA completed the Second Five-Year Review of the Site in September 2008. The purpose of the Five-Year Review is to determine if the remedy at the Site is protective of human health and the environment. The remedy at the Site has been determined to be protective of human health and the environment in the short term. Exposure pathways that could result in unacceptable risks are being controlled, and institutional controls are preventing exposure to, or the ingestion of, contaminated wastes, soils, and ground water. Contaminated leachate and shallow ground water are being controlled by the successful operation of the leachate/shallow ground water collection and treatment system. The quality of the effluent from the treatment system achieves discharge standards. To ensure long term protectiveness, 1,4-dioxane will be added to the list of sampled contaminants and additional monitoring will be performed to assess potential downgradient plume migration. Long term protectiveness of the remedy is expected to be achieved through the continued operation and maintenance of the leachate/shallow ground water collection and treatment system and continued compliance with institutional controls. EPA continues to review quarterly monitoring reports and annual groundwater monitoring reports.
Site Description
The Lindane Dump site, located in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, consists of a recreational park about 14-acres in size and a 47 ½-acre lower project zone that includes a closed landfill area. About 400 tons of powdered lindane pesticide waste and other industrial waste were dumped at the site from 1900 to 1950. Industrial waste dumping continued after the sale of the property in 1965. In 1976, a portion of the site was donated by the owner to Harrison Township for use as a park area. There are approximately 13,000 people living within one-mile of the site. Residents near the site obtain water from a municipal system that draws water from the Allegheny River.

Site Responsibility
This site is being addressed through Federal, State, and potentially responsible parties (PRPs) actions.

NPL Listing History
Our country’s most serious, uncontrolled, or abandoned hazardous waste sites can be cleaned using federal money. To be eligible for federal cleanup money, a site must be put on the National Priorities List. This site was proposed to the list on September 30, 1982 and formally added to the list on September 8, 1983.

Threats and Contaminants

The ground water and soil are contaminated with pesticides. The site has been capped and an upgraded leachate collection and treatment system has been installed. These actions have significantly reduced the possibility that pesticide residues in the soil might leach into the ground water and surrounding soils. The cap and leachate collection and treatment system also prevent humans and wildlife from accidentally ingesting or coming into direct contact with contaminated ground water, soil, or leachate which may pose health risks.

A leachate treatment system has been installed and activated to control the spread of pesticide residues. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) and Pennwalt, a potentially responsible party have conducted an investigation into the nature and extent of contamination at the site. The investigation defined the contaminants and recommended alternatives for the final cleanup. In 1983, the State and Pennwalt, agreed to conduct a leachate treatability study to evaluate short- and long-term treatment and disposal alternatives. In 1992, EPA selected the remedy for cleanup of the site which includes capping the site and installing an upgraded leachate control system. In 1993, EPA and Elf-Atochem, a successor of Pennwalt, agreed to a Consent Decree, requiring Elf-Atochem to conduct the remedial design and construction activities for the site. The leachate treatment system has reduced the further spread of contaminated materials from the Lindane Dump. Construction of the cap began in the spring of 1998 and was completed in the spring of 1999. A baseball field and tennis courts were constructed on the upper portion of the site which is commonly known as the Alsco Community Park. Operation and maintenance activities will continue for at least 30 years.

My Note – there had been a chemical weapons lab somewhere near Cleveland, Ohio – in a small town. What happened to that area’s cleanup – has it ever been checked or did they simply build people’s houses on top of it as they did in Washington, DC and other places?

The Project Daedalus reference article from the English Wikipedia on 24-Jul-2004
(provided by Fixed Reference: snapshots of Wikipedia from wikipedia.org)
Project Daedalus

Project Daedalus was a study conducted between 1973 and 1978 by the British Interplanetary Society to design a plausible interstellar unmanned spacecraft. A dozen scientists and engineers led by Alan Bond worked on the project.

The design criteria were that the spacecraft had to use current or near-future technology and had to be able to reach its destination within a human lifetime (a flight time of 50 years was alotted). The target chosen was Barnard’s Star, 5.9 light years away, which at the time was believed to posses at least one planet (the evidence on which this belief was based has since been discredited). The design was required to be flexible enough that it could be sent to any of a number of other target stars, however.

Daedalus would be constructed in Earth orbit and have an initial mass of 54,000 tons, including 50,000 tons of fuel and 500 tons of scientific payload. Daedalus was to be a two-stage spacecraft. The first stage would operate for two years, taking the spacecraft to 7.1% of light speed, and then after it was jettisoned the second stage would fire for 1.8 years, bringing the spacecraft up to about 12% of light speed before being shut down for a 46-year cruise period.

This velocity was well beyond the capabilities of chemical rockets, so nuclear pulse propulsion was selected instead. Specifically, Daedalus would be propelled by a fusion rocket using pellets of deuterium/helium-3 mix that would be ignited in the reaction chamber by inertial confinement using electron beams. 250 pellets would be detonated per second, and the resulting plasma would be directed by a magnetic nozzle.

The second stage would have two 5-meter optical telescopes and two 20-meter radio telescopes. About 25 years after launch these telescopes would begin examining the area around Barnard’s Star to learn more about any accompanying planets. This information would be sent back to Earth, using the 40-meter diameter second stage engine bell was a communications dish, and targets of interest would be selected. Since the spacecraft would not decelerate upon reaching Barnard’s Star, Daedalus would carry 18 autonomous sub-probes that would be launched between 7.2 and 1.8 years before the main craft entered the target system. These sub-probes would be propelled by nuclear-powered ion drives and carry cameras, spectrometers, and other sensory equipment. They would fly past their targets, still travelling at 12% of the speed of light, and transmit their findings back to the Daedalus second stage mothership.

The ship’s payload bay containing its sub-probes, telescopes, and other equipment would be protected from the interstellar medium during transit by a 50-ton 7mm-thick beryllium disk. Larger obstacles that might be encountered while passing through the target system would be dispersed by an artificially-generated cloud of particles some 200 km ahead of the vehicle. The spacecraft would carry a number of robot wardens capable of autonomously repairing damage or malfunctions.

Operation Northwoods, or Northwoods, was a false-flag plan, proposed within the United States government in 1962. The plan called for CIA or other operatives to commit apparent acts of terrorism in U.S. cities to create public support for a war against Castro-led Cuba. One plan was to develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington .

This operation is especially notable in that it included plans for hijackings and bombings followed by the use of phony evidence that would blame the terrorist acts on a foreign government, namely Cuba.

The plan stated:

The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

Operation Northwoods was drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and signed by then-Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer, and sent to the Secretary of Defense.

Several other proposals were listed, including the real or simulated actions against various U.S military and civilian targets. Operation Northwoods was part of the U.S. government’s Cuban Project (Operation Mongoose) anti-Castro initiative. It was never officially accepted or executed.
Contents

The main proposal was presented in a document entitled Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS), a collection of draft memoranda written by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative to the Caribbean Survey Group.[1] (The parenthetical TS in the title of the document is an initialism for Top Secret. ) The document was presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13 as a preliminary submission for planning purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that both the covert and overt aspects of any such operation be assigned to them.

The previously secret document was originally made public on November 18, 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board,[2] a U.S. federal agency overseeing the release of government records related to John F. Kennedy’s assassination.[3][4][5][6][7] A total 1521 pages of once-secret military records covering 1962 to 1964 were concomitantly declassified by said Review Board.

Appendix to Enclosure A and Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A of the Northwoods document were first published online by the National Security Archive on November 6, 1998 in a joint venture with CNN as part of CNN’s 1998 Cold War television documentary series[8][9]—specifically, as a documentation supplement to Episode 10: Cuba, which aired on November 29, 1998.[10][11] Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A is the section of the document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.

The Northwoods document was published online in a more complete form (i.e., including cover memoranda) by the National Security Archive on April 30, 2001.[12]

Content

In response to a request for pretexts for military intervention by the Chief of Operations of the Cuba Project, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the document lists methods (with, in some cases, outlined plans) the authors believed would garner public and international support for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. These are staged attacks purporting to be of Cuban origin.

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):
1. Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
2. Land friendly Cubans in uniform over-the-fence to stage attack on base.
3. Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
4. Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).[13]
5. Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
6. Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
7. Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.
8. Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
9. Capture militia group which storms the base.
10. Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires—napthalene.
11. Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be in lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A Remember the Maine incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to evacuate remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.[14]
The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A Cuban-based, Castro-supported filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. Cuban B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with Cuban messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and Cuban shipments of arm which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.[15]
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a MAY DAY message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio[16] stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to sell the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent Intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down, a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.[17]

James Bamford summary

Journalist James Bamford summarized Operation Northwoods in his April 24, 2001 book Body of Secrets:

Operation Northwoods, which had the written approval of the Chairman and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for innocent people to be shot on American streets; for boats carrying refugees fleeing Cuba to be sunk on the high seas; for a wave of violent terrorism to be launched in Washington, D.C., Miami, and elsewhere. People would be framed for bombings they did not commit; planes would be hijacked. Using phony evidence, all of it would be blamed on Castro, thus giving Lemnitzer and his cabal the excuse, as well as the public and international backing, they needed to launch their war.[18]

Related Operation Mongoose proposals

In addition to Operation Northwoods, under the Operation Mongoose program the U.S. Department of Defense had a number of similar proposals to be taken against the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro.

Twelve of these proposals come from a February 2, 1962 memorandum entitled Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass or Disrupt Cuba, written by Brig. Gen. William H. Craig and submitted to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the commander of the Operation Mongoose project.[5][6][7][19]

The memorandum outlines Operation Bingo, a plan to, in its words, create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing an excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.

It also includes Operation Dirty Trick, a plot to blame Castro if the 1962 Mercury manned space flight carrying John Glenn crashed, saying: The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al. Cuba [sic]. It continues, This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.

Even after General Lemnitzer lost his job as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still planned false-flag pretext operations at least into 1963. A different U.S. Department of Defense policy paper created in 1963 discussed a plan to make it appear that Cuba had attacked a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) so that the United States could retaliate. The U.S. Department of Defense document says of one of the scenarios, A contrived ‘Cuban’ attack on an OAS member could be set up, and the attacked state could be urged to take measures of self-defense and request assistance from the U.S. and OAS.

The plan expresses confidence that by this action, the U.S. could almost certainly obtain the necessary two-thirds support among OAS members for collective action against Cuba. [18][20]

Included in the nations the Joint Chiefs suggested as targets for covert attacks were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Since both were members of the British Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs hoped that by secretly attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United States could incite the people of the United Kingdom into supporting a war against Castro.[18] As the U.S. Department of Defense report noted:

Any of the contrived situations described above are inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system in which security can be maintained, after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision should be made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation by U.S. personnel is limited only to the most highly trusted covert personnel. This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units for any aspect of the contrived situation. [18]

The U.S. Department of Defense report even suggested covertly paying a person in the Castro government to attack the United States: The only area remaining for consideration then would be to bribe one of Castro’s subordinate commanders to initiate an attack on [the U.S. Navy base at] Guantanamo. [18]Reaction

President John F. Kennedy personally rejected the Northwoods proposal. A JCS/Pentagon document (Ed Lansdale memo) dated March 16, 1962 titled MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 16 MARCH 1962 reads: General Lemnitzer commented that the military had contingency plans for US intervention. Also it had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force, with the pretext either attacks on US aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we could retaliate. The President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of military force, that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere that he couldn’t use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba. [21] The proposal was sent for approval to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, but was not implemented.

Kennedy removed Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly afterward, although he became Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in January 1963.

The continuing push against the Cuban government by internal elements of the U.S. military and intelligence community (the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Cuban Project, etc.) prompted Kennedy to attempt to rein in burgeoning hardline anti-Communist sentiment that was intent on proactive, aggressive action against communist movements around the globe. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy fired then CIA director Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director Charles P. Cabell, and Deputy Director Richard Bissell, and turned his attention towards Vietnam.

Kennedy also took steps to bring discipline to the CIA’s Cold War and paramilitary operations by drafting a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) which called for the shift of Cold War operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Department of Defense as well as a major change in the role of the CIA to exclusively deal in intelligence gathering. Kennedy was notably unpopular with the military, a rift that came to a head during Kennedy’s disagreements with the military over the Cuban Missile Crisis, shortly before the presentation of Northwoods. Personally, Kennedy expressed concern and anger to many of his associates about the CIA’s growing influence on civilians and government inside America.

On August 3, 2001, the National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba (the main legislative body of the Republic of Cuba) issued a statement referring to Operation Northwoods and Operation Mongoose wherein it condemned such U.S. government plans.[22]
See also
Cuba portal

* Jon Elliston, editor, Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda (Melbourne, Australia and New York: Ocean Press, 1999), ISBN 1-876175-09-5.
* James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, first edition, April 24, 2001), ISBN 0-385-49907-8. Here is an excerpt from Chapter 4: Fists of this book.

References

1. ^ a b U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS), U.S. Department of Defense, March 13, 1962. The Operation Northwoods document in PDF format on the website of the independent, non-governmental research institute the National Security Archive at the George Washington University Gelman Library, Washington, D.C. Direct PDF links: here and here.
2. ^ The Records of the Assassination Records Review Board, National Archives and Records Administration.
3. ^ Media Advisory: National Archives Releases Additional Materials Reviewed by the Assassination Records Review Board, Assassination Records Review Board (a division of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration), November 17, 1997. A U.S. government press-release announcing the declassification of some 1500 pages of U.S. government documents from 1962-64 relating to U.S. policy towards Cuba, among which declassified documents included the Operation Northwoods document.
4. ^ Jim Wolf, Pentagon Planned 1960s Cuban ‘Terror Campaign’, Reuters, November 18, 1997.
5. ^ a b Mike Feinsilber, At a tense time, plots abounded to humiliate Castro, Associated Press (AP), November 18, 1997; also available here.
6. ^ a b Tim Weiner, Documents Show Pentagon’s Anti-Castro Plots During Kennedy Years, New York Times, November 19, 1997; appeared on the same date and by the same author in the New York Times itself as Declassified Papers Show Anti-Castro Ideas Proposed to Kennedy, late edition—final, section A, pg. 25, column 1.
7. ^ a b Jon Elliston, Operation Mongoose: The PSYOP Papers, ParaScope, Inc., 1998.
8. ^ National Security Archive: COLD WAR: Documents, National Security Archive, September 27, 1998-January 24, 1999.
9. ^ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Appendix to Enclosure A: Memorandum for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project and Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, U.S. Department of Defense, circa March 1962. First published online by the National Security Archive on November 6, 1998, as part of CNN’s Cold War documentary series. Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A is the section of the Operation Northwoods document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.
10. ^ Episode 10: Cuba; Cuba: 1959-1968, CNN (Cable News Network LP, LLLP).
11. ^ Cold War Teacher Materials: Episodes, and Educator Guide to CNN’s COLD WAR Episode 10: Cuba, Turner Learning (Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.).
12. ^ Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuba Invasion in 1962, National Security Archive, April 30, 2001.
13. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p7, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
14. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p8, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
15. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p9, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
16. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p10, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
17. ^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p11, media.nara.gov, accessed 9/3/09
18. ^ a b c d e James Bamford, Chapter 4: Fists of Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, first edition, April 24, 2001), ISBN 0-385-49907-8. Here is an excerpt from Chapter 4: Fists of this book.
19. ^ Memo from Brig. Gen. William Craig to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass, or Disrupt Cuba, U.S. Department of Defense, February 2, 1962. The following are photoscans of this document in JPEG format: Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4. (Note: the foregoing links to Brig. Gen. Craig’s memo are at this time offline. The following are backup links: text in HTML; JPEG photoscans: Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4.)
20. ^ Mike Feinsilber, Records Show Plan To Provoke Castro, Associated Press (AP), January 29, 1998.
21. ^ Lansdale Memo of 16 Mar 1962. This memo records a high-level meeting in the White House 3 days after McNamara was presented with Operation Northwoods. [1]
22. ^ Statement by the National Assembly of People’s Power of the Republic of Cuba, National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, August 3, 2001; also available here.

External links

See the above References section for documents cited in the body of this article.

* The Full Operation Northwoods document in both JPEG and fully searchable HTML format.
* High resolution scans from the National Archives, main pages: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
* Scott Shane and Tom Bowman with contribution from Laura Sullivan, New book on NSA sheds light on secrets: U.S. terror plan was Cuba invasion pretext, Baltimore Sun, April 24, 2001.
* Ron Kampeas, Memo: U.S. Mulled Fake Cuba Pretext, Associated Press (AP), April 25, 2001.
* Bruce Schneier, ‘Body of Secrets’ by James Bamford: The author of a pioneering work on the NSA delivers a new book of revelations about the mysterious agency’s coverups, eavesdropping and secret missions, Salon.com, April 25, 2001.
* David Ruppe, U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba; Book: U.S. Military Drafted Plans to Terrorize U.S. Cities to Provoke War With Cuba, ABC News, May 1, 2001.
* TV interview with James Bamford regarding Operation Northwoods
* The Truth Is Out There—1962 memo from National Security Agency, Harper’s Magazine, July 2001.
* Chris Floyd, Head Cases, Moscow Times, December 21, 2001, pg. VIII; also appeared in St. Petersburg Times, Issue 733 (100), December 25, 2001.
* Operation Northwoods, SourceWatch.

* Thierry Meyssan, Operation Northwoods: The Terrorist Attacks Planned by the American Joint Chief of Staff against its Population, Voltaire Network, November 5, 2001.
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Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northwoods
Categories: Canceled military operations involving the United States | United States intelligence operations | False flag operations | Cuba – United States relations | Opposition to Fidel Castro | Official documents of the United States | Terrorism in Cuba | 1962 works | Secret government programs

The second USS Thresher (SSN-593) was the lead ship of her class of nuclear-powered attack submarines in the United States Navy. Her loss at sea during deep-diving tests in 1963 is often considered a watershed event in the implementation of the rigorous submarine safety program SUBSAFE.

The contract to build Thresher was awarded to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on 15 January 1958, and her keel was laid on 28 May 1958. She was launched on 9 July 1960, was sponsored by Mrs. Frederick B. Warder (wife of the famous Pacific War skipper), and was commissioned on 3 August 1961, with Commander Dean L. Axene in command.
Content

Thresher conducted lengthy sea trials in the western Atlantic and Caribbean Sea areas in 1961 and 1962. These tests provided a thorough evaluation of her many new and complex technological features and weapons. Following these trials, she took part in Nuclear Submarine Exercise (NUSUBEX) 3-61 off the northeastern coast of the United States from 18 September to 24 September 1961.

On 18 October Thresher headed south along the East Coast. While in port at San Juan, Puerto Rico on 2 November 1961, her reactor was shut down and the diesel generator was used to carry the hotel electrical loads. Several hours later the generator broke down, and the electrical load was then carried by the battery. The generator could not be quickly repaired, so the captain ordered the reactor restarted. However, the battery charge was depleted before the reactor went critical. With no electrical power for ventilation, temperatures in the machinery spaces reached 60 °C (140 °F), and the boat was partially evacuated. Cavalla (SS-244) arrived the next morning and provided power from her diesels, enabling Thresher to restart her reactor.[1]

Thresher conducted further trials and fired test torpedoes before returning to Portsmouth on 29 November. The boat remained in port through the end of the year, and spent the first two months of 1962 evaluating her sonar and Submarine Rocket (SUBROC) systems. In March, the submarine participated in NUSUBEX 2-62 (an exercise designed to improve the tactical capabilities of nuclear submarines) and in antisubmarine warfare training with Task Group ALPHA.

Off Charleston, SC, Thresher undertook operations observed by the Naval Antisubmarine Warfare Council before she returned briefly to New England waters, after which she proceeded to Florida for more SUBROC tests. However, while moored at Port Canaveral, Florida, the submarine was accidentally struck by a tug which damaged one of her ballast tanks. After repairs at Groton, Connecticut, by the Electric Boat Company, Thresher went south for more tests and trials off Key West, Florida, then returned northward and remained in dockyard for refurbishment through the early spring of 1963.
Sinking

On 9 April 1963, after the completion of this work, Thresher, now commanded by Lieutenant Commander John Wesley Harvey, began post-overhaul trials. Accompanied by the submarine rescue ship USS Skylark (ASR-20), she sailed to an area some 350 kilometers (220 statute miles or 190 nautical miles) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and on the morning of 10 April started deep-diving tests. As Thresher neared her test depth, Skylark received garbled communications over underwater telephone indicating … minor difficulties, have positive up-angle, attempting to blow. [2][3][4] When Skylark received no further communication, surface observers gradually realized Thresher had sunk. Publicly it took some days to announce that all 129 officers, crewmen, and military and civilian technicians aboard were presumed dead.

After an extensive underwater search using the bathyscaphe Trieste, oceanographic ship Mizar and other ships, Thresher’s remains were located on the sea floor, some 8,400 feet (2,600 m) below the surface, in six major sections.[5] The majority of the debris had spread over an area of about 134,000 square metres (160,000 sq yd). The major sections were the sail, sonar dome, bow section, engineering spaces section, operations spaces section, and the stern planes.

Deep sea photography, recovered artifacts, and an evaluation of her design and operational history permitted a Court of Inquiry to conclude Thresher had probably suffered the failure of a joint in a salt water piping system, which relied heavily on silver brazing instead of welding; earlier tests using ultrasound equipment found potential problems with about 14% of the tested brazed joints, most of which were determined not to pose a risk significant enough to require a repair. High-pressure water spraying from a broken pipe joint may have shorted out one of the many electrical panels, which in turn caused a shutdown ( scram ) of the reactor, with a subsequent loss of propulsion. The inability to blow the ballast tanks was later attributed to excessive moisture in the ship’s high-pressure air flasks, which froze and plugged the flasks’ flowpaths while passing through the valves. This was later simulated in dock-side tests on Thresher’s sister ship, USS Tinosa (SSN-606). During a test to simulate blowing ballast at or near test depth, ice formed on strainers installed in valves; the flow of air lasted only a few seconds. Air driers were later retrofitted to the high pressure air compressors, beginning with Tinosa, to permit the emergency blow system to operate properly.

Unlike diesel submarines, nuclear subs rely on speed and deck angle rather than deballasting to surface; they are driven at an angle towards the surface. Ballast tanks were almost never blown at depth, and to do so could cause the ship to rocket to the surface out of control. Normal procedure was to drive the ship to periscope depth, raise the periscope to verify the area was clear, then blow the tanks and surface the ship.

At the time, reactor-plant operating procedures precluded a rapid reactor restart following a scram, or even the ability to use steam remaining in the secondary system to drive the ship to the surface. After a scram, standard procedure was to isolate the main steam system, cutting off the flow of steam to the turbines providing propulsion and electricity. This was done to prevent an over-rapid cool-down of the reactor. Thresher’s Reactor Control Officer, Lieutenant Raymond McCoole, was not at his station in the maneuvering room, or indeed on the ship, during the fatal dive. McCoole was at home caring for his wife who had been injured in a household accident — he had been all but ordered ashore by a sympathetic Commander Harvey. McCoole’s trainee, Jim Henry, fresh from nuclear power school, probably followed standard operating procedures and gave the order to isolate the steam system after the scram, even though Thresher was at or slightly below her maximum depth and was taking on water. Once closed, the large steam system isolation valves could not be reopened quickly. Reflecting on the situation in later life, McCoole was sure he would have delayed shutting the valves, thus allowing the ship to answer bells and drive herself to the surface, despite the flooding in the engineering spaces. Admiral Rickover later changed the procedure, allowing steam to be withdrawn from the secondary system in limited quantities for several minutes following a scram.

There was much (covert) criticism of Rickover’s training after Thresher went down,[citation needed] the argument being his nukes were so well conditioned to protect the nuclear plant they would have shut the main steam stop valves by rote — depriving the ship of needed propulsion — even at great depths and with the ship clearly in jeopardy.[citation needed] Nothing enraged Rickover more than this argument. Common sense, he argued, would prove this to be untrue.[citation needed]

It’s more likely that the engine room crew was simply overwhelmed by the flooding casualty, or took too long to contain it.[citation needed] In a dockside simulation of flooding in the engine room, held before Thresher sailed, it took the watch in charge 20 minutes to isolate a simulated leak in the auxiliary seawater system. At test depth, taking on water, and with the reactor shut down, Thresher would not have had anything like 20 minutes to recover. Even after isolating a short-circuit in the reactor controls it would have taken nearly 10 minutes to restart the plant.

The Thresher probably imploded at a depth somewhere between 1,300 and 2,000 feet (400 and 600m).

Over the next several years, the Navy implemented the SUBSAFE program to correct design and construction problems on all submarines (nuclear and diesel-electric) in service, under construction, and in planning. During the formal inquiry, it was discovered record-keeping at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was far from adequate.[citation needed] For example, no one could determine the whereabouts of hull weld X-rays made of Thresher’s sister ship Tinosa, nearing completion at Portsmouth, or, indeed, whether they had been made at all. It was also determined that the engine room layout was awkward, in fact dangerous, as there were no centrally-located isolation valves for the main and auxiliary seawater systems. Most subs were subsequently equipped or retrofitted with flood control levers, which allowed the Engineer Officer of the Watch in the maneuvering room to remotely close isolation valves in the seawater systems from a central panel, a task necessarily performed by hand on Thresher. Hand-power valves might not even have been accessible during a flooding casualty: at such depths, the blast of water from even a small leak (a water spike ) can dent metal cabinets, rip insulation from cables, and even cut a man in half. (Water pressure at 1,000 feet (300 m)] is about 450 psi (3,100 kPa)].)
SUBSAFE would prove itself to be a crucial part of the Navy’s safe operation of nuclear submarines, but was disregarded just a few years later in a rush to get another nuclear sub, Scorpion, ready for service as part of yet another program meant to increase nuclear submarine availability. The subsequent loss of Scorpion reaffirmed the need for SUBSAFE, and apart from Scorpion, the U.S. Navy has suffered no further losses of nuclear submarines.

The Navy has periodically monitored the environmental conditions of the site since the sinking and has reported the results in an annual public report on environmental monitoring for U.S. Naval nuclear-powered ships. These reports provide specifics on the environmental sampling of sediment, water, and marine life which were taken to ascertain whether Thresher’s nuclear reactor has had a significant effect on the deep ocean environment. The reports also explain the methodology for conducting deep sea monitoring from both surface vessels and submersibles. The monitoring data confirms that there has been no significant effect on the environment. Nuclear fuel in the submarine remains intact.

According to newly declassified information, the Navy sent Commander (Dr.) Robert Bob Ballard, the oceanographer credited for the successful search for the wreck of RMS Titanic, on a secret mission to map and collect visual data on both the Thresher and the Scorpion wrecks.[citation needed] The Navy used Ballard’s search for the Titanic as a screen to hide the mission. Ballard approached the Navy in 1982 for funding to find the Titanic with his new deep-diving robot submersible. The Navy saw the opportunity and granted him the money on the condition he first inspect the two submarine wrecks. Ballard’s robotic survey discovered that the Thresher had sunk so deep it imploded, turning into thousands of pieces. His 1985 search for the Scorpion, which was thought to be a victim of a Soviet attack, revealed such a large debris field that it looked as though it had been put through a shredding machine. The survey data revealed the most likely cause of the loss of the Scorpion was one of its own torpedoes exploding inside the torpedo room. Once the two wrecks had been visited, and the radioactive threat from both was established as small, Ballard was able to search for Titanic. Due to dwindling funds, he had just twelve days to do so, but he used the same debris-field search techniques he had used for the two subs, which worked, and the Titanic was found.[6]

U.S. submarine classes are generally known by the hull number of the lead ship of the class – for instance, Los Angeles-class boats are called 688s because the hull number of USS Los Angeles was SSN-688. The Thresher-class boats should thus be called 593s, but since Thresher’s sinking they have been referred to as 594s (Permit class).

Details of the disaster
Time-accelerated sequence of events during the disaster

The following is from the 1975 book The Thresher Disaster by John Bentley.[7] Times are in 24-hour notation.

* 07:47: Thresher begins its descent to the test depth of 1,300 feet (400 m).
* 07:52: Thresher levels off at 400 feet (120 m), contacts the surface, and the crew inspects the ship for leaks. None are found.
* 08:09: Commander Harvey reports reaching half the test depth.
* 08:25: Thresher reaches 1,000 feet (300 m).
* 09:02: Thresher is cruising at just a few knots (subs normally moved slowly and cautiously at great depths, lest a sudden jam of the diving planes send the ship below test depth in a matter of seconds.) The boat is descending in slow circles, and announces to Skylark she is turning to Corpen [course] 090. At this point, transmission quality from the Thresher begins to noticeably degrade, possibly as a result of thermoclines.
* 09:09: It is believed a brazed pipe-joint ruptures in the engine room. The crew would have attempted to stop the leak; at the same time, the engine room would be filling with a cloud of mist. Under the circumstances, Commander Harvey’s likely decision would have been to order full speed, full rise on the sail planes, and blowing main ballast in order to surface. Due to Joule-Thomson effect, the pressurized air rapidly expanding in the pipes cools down, condensing moisture and depositing it on strainers installed in the system to protect the moving parts of the valves; in only a few seconds the moisture freezes, clogging the strainers and blocking the air flow, halting the effort to blow ballast. Water leaking from the broken pipe most likely causes short circuits leading to an automatic shutdown of the ship’s reactor, causing a loss of propulsion. The logical action at this point would have been for Harvey to order propulsion shifted to a battery-powered backup system. As soon as the flooding was contained, the engine room crew would have begun to restart the reactor, an operation that would be expected to take at least 7 minutes.
* 09:12: Skylark pages Thresher on the underwater telephone: Gertrude check, K [over]. With no immediate response (although Skylark is still unaware of the conditions aboard Thresher), the signal K is repeated twice.
* 09:13: Harvey reports status via underwater telephone. The transmission is garbled, though some words are recognizable: [We are] experiencing minor difficulty, have positive up-angle, attempting to blow. The submarine, growing heavier from water flooding the engine room, continues its descent, probably tail-first. Another attempt to empty the ballast tanks is performed, again failing due to the formation of ice. Officers on the Skylark could hear the hiss of compressed air over the loudspeaker at this point.
* 09:14: Skylark acknowledges with a brisk, Roger, out, awaiting further updates from the SSN. A follow-up message, No contacts in area, is sent to reassure Thresher she can surface quickly, without fear of collision, if required.
* 09:15: Skylark queries Thresher about her intentions: My course 270 degrees. Interrogative range and bearing from you. There is no response, and Skylark’s captain, Lieutenant Commander Hecker, sends his own gertrude message to the submarine, Are you in control?
* 09:16: Skylark picks up a garbled transmission from Thresher, transcribed in the ship’s log as 900 N. [The meaning of this message is unclear, and was not discussed at the enquiry; it may have indicated the submarine’s depth and course, or it may have referred to a Navy event number (1000 indicating loss of submarine), with the N signifying a negative response to the query from Skylark, Are you in control? ]
* 09:17: A second transmission is received, with the partially recognizable phrase exceeding test depth…. The leak from the broken pipe grows with increased pressure.
* 09:18: Skylark detects a high-energy low-frequency noise with characteristics of an implosion.
* 09:20: Skylark continues to page Thresher, repeatedly calling for a radio check, a smoke bomb, or some other indication of the boat’s condition.
* 11:04: Skylark attempts to transmit a message to COMSUBLANT (Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet): Unable to communicate with Thresher since 0917R. Have been calling by UQC voice and CW, QHB, CW every minute. Explosive signals every 10 minutes with no success. Last transmission received was garbled. Indicated Thresher was approaching test depth…. Conducting expanding search. Radio problems meant that COMSUBLANT did not receive and respond to this message until 12:45. Hecker initiated Event SUBMISS [loss of a submarine] procedures at 11:21, and continued to repeatedly hail the Thresher until after 17:00.

On 11 April, at a news conference at 10:30, the Navy officially declared the ship as lost.

* Just outside the main gate of the Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, California, a Thresher-Scorpion Memorial honors the crews of the two submarines.[8]
* In Carpentersville, IL the Dundee Township Park District named a swimming facility in honor of Thresher.[citation needed]
* In Portsmouth, New Hampshire, there is a stone memorial with a plaque honoring all who were lost on the Thresher. It is located outside the USS Albacore museum.[9]
* A Joint Resolution was introduced in 2001 calling for the erection of a memorial in Arlington National Cemetery, but this proposal has yet to be adopted.[10]
* On 12 April 1963, President John Kennedy issued an Executive Order (No. 11104) paying tribute to the crew of Thresher by flying flags at half-staff.[11]
* The musician Phil Ochs composed a song detailing the vessel’s demise. This song appears on his debut album, All the News That’s Fit to Sing. Pete Seeger also composed a song inspired by the vessel.[citation needed]
* The Thresher’s hull number, 593, can be seen on the sailfin of the fictional USS Wayne in the movie The Spy Who Loved Me.[citation needed]
* In Eureka, Missouri, there is a marble stone at the post office on Thresher Drive honoring the officers and crew of the USS Thresher, Lost 10 April 1963 [12]

See also

* Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle
* USS Scorpion (SSN-589), the only other American nuclear-powered submarine to be lost at sea, sunk under mysterious circumstances in 1968
* John Craven USN Key individual in the search for Thresher

Thresher A Permit A Plunger A Barb A Pollack A Haddo A Jack A Tinosa A Dace A Guardfish A Flasher A Greenling A Gato A Haddock
List of submarines of the United States Navy A List of submarine classes of the United States Navy

Coordinates: 41°46?N 65°03?W? / ?41.767°N 65.05°W? / 41.767; -65.05

Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_(SSN-593)
Categories: United States submarine accidents | Permit class submarines | Lost submarines of the United States | Lost nuclear submarines | Nuclear-powered ships | United States Navy nuclear ships | Maritime incidents in 1963 | Shipwrecks in the Atlantic Ocean | Ships built in Maine | 1960 ships

Lyman Louis Lemnitzer
August 29, 1899(1899-08-29) – November 12, 1988 (aged 89)
Lyman L. Lemnitzer.jpg
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, US Army (Ret.)
Place of birth Honesdale, Pennsylvania
Allegiance United States of America
Service/branch United States Army
Years of service {USAMA 1916-1920} 1920-1969
Rank US-O10 insignia.svg General
Commands held Chief of Staff of the United States Army
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Supreme Allied Commander, NATO
Battles/wars World War II
Korean War
Awards Army Distinguished Service Medal (3)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal

Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star
British Order of the British Empire
French Legion of Merit (Officer)
German Bundeswehr Cross of Honour in Gold
Other work Rockefeller Commission

Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 – November 12, 1988) was an American Army General, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962. He then served Supreme Allied Commander, NATO from 1963 to 1969.
Contents

Lemnitzer was born on August 29, 1899 in Honesdale, Pennsylvania. He graduated from West Point in 1920 and was assigned at his request to a Coast Artillery unit. Lemnitzer served in the Philippines but soon began receiving the staff assignments that marked his military career.

Lemnitzer was promoted to Brigadier General in June 1942 and assigned to General Eisenhower’s staff shortly thereafter. He helped form the plans for the invasions of North Africa and Sicily and was promoted to Major General in November 1944. Lemnitzer was one of the senior officers sent to negotiate the Italian surrender during the secret Operation Sunrise and the German surrender in 1945.

Following the end of World War II, Lemnitzer was assigned to the Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was later named Deputy Commandant of the National War College. In 1950, at the age of 51, he took parachute training and was subsequently placed in command of the 11th Airborne Division. He was assigned to Korea in command of the 7th Infantry Division in November 1951 and was promoted to Lieutenant General in August 1952.

Lemnitzer was promoted to the rank of General and named Commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East and of the 8th Army in March 1955. He was named Chief of Staff of the Army in July 1957 and appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1960. As Chairman, Lemnitzer weathered the Bay of Pigs crisis and the early years of American involvement in Vietnam. He was also required to testify before the United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee about his knowledge of the activities of Major General Edwin Walker, who had been dismissed from the Army over alleged attempts to promote his political beliefs in the military.

Lemnitzer approved the plans known as Operation Northwoods in 1962, a proposed plan to discredit the Castro regime and create support for military action against Cuba by staging false flag and develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington . Lemnitzer presented the plans to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13, 1962. It is unclear how McNamara reacted, but three days later President Kennedy told the general that there was no chance that America would take military action against Cuba. Within a few months, after the denial of Operation Northwoods, Lemnitzer was denied another term as JCS chairman.[1]
In November 1962, Lemnitzer was appointed as Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, and as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO (the US European Command is the crown jewel of regional commands) in January 1963.[2] This period encompassed the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 and the withdrawal of NATO forces from France in 1966.
Major-General Arsa Jovanovic’, Major-General Fitzroy MacLean, Field Marshal Harold Alexander & Major-General Lyman Lemnitzer in Belgrade, February 1945.

Lemnitzer retired from the military in July 1969. In 1975, President Ford appointed Lemnitzer to the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (aka the Rockefeller Commission) to investigate whether the Central Intelligence Agency had committed acts that violated American laws and allegations that E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis (of Watergate fame) were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Lemnitzer died on November 12, 1988 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. His wife, Katherine Tryon Lemnitzer (1901-1994), is buried with him.

Lemnitzer was played by John Seitz in the 1991 Oliver Stone film, ‘JFK.
[edit] Awards and decorations

Lemnitzer was awarded numerous military awards and decorations[3] including but not limited to:
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Service Medal ribbon.svg
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with three oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service ribbon.svg Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service ribbon.svg Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star ribbon.svg Silver Star
Legion of Merit ribbon.svg Legion of Merit (Officer) and (Legionnaire) degrees
PresFree.gif Presidential Medal of Freedom (Awarded by President Reagan, June 23, 1987)
American Defense Service ribbon.svg American Defense Service Medal
Bronze service star
Bronze service star
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign ribbon.svg
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal (with two campaign stars)
American Campaign Medal ribbon.svg American Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal ribbon.svg World War II Victory Medal
Army of Occupation ribbon.svg Army of Occupation Medal
National Defense Service Medal ribbon.svg National Defense Service Medal
Bronze service star
Bronze service star
KSMRib.svg
Korean Service Medal (with two service stars)

* Parachutist Badge

Foreign decorations

* Honorary Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (Great Britain)
* Honorary Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (Great Britain)
* Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic (Italy)
* Grand Cross of the Order of the Crown (Italy)
* Military Order of Merit (Italy)
* Grand Cross of the Légion d’honneur (France)
* Médaille militaire (France)
* Croix de guerre with Palm (France)
* Bundeswehr Cross of Honour in Gold (Germany)
* Grand Officer of the Order of Boyaca (Columbia)
* Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun (Japan)
* Medalha de Guerra (Brazil)
* Grand Official of the Order of Military Merit (Brazil)
* Order of Military Merit Teaguk (Korea)
* Order of Military Merit Teaguk with Gold Star (Korea)
* Gold Cross of Merit with Swords (Poland)
* Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant (Thailand)
* Medal for Military Merit, First Class (Czechoslovakia)
* Royal Order of the White Eagle, Class II (Yugoslavia)
* Grand Star of Military Merit (Chile)
* Order of Melnik (Ethiopia)
* United Nations Korea Medal
* Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation

See also
World War II portal
United States Army portal

References

1. ^ ABC News: U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba
2. ^ Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General, United States Army . arlingtoncemetery.net. http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lemnitz.htm.
3. ^ Richard Nixon: Remarks on Presenting the Distinguished Service Medals of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. – July 11th, 1969

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U.S. Nuclear Accidents
Article: US Nuclear Accidents. … over the coast of Spain, killing eight of the eleven crew members and igniting the KC-135’s 40000 gallons of jet fuel. … www.lutins.org/nukes.html
#
US Dropped Four H-Bombs On Spain In 1966
PALOMARES, Spain — Almost 40 years have passed since the U.S. Air Force … fifth nuclear bomb from the Palomares accident was never recovered and remains … www.rense.com/general45/drop.htm
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Calendar of Nuclear Accidents
17-1984: Fire on board the US-nuclear submarine Guitarro 18-1968: Accident during launch of US satellite, radioactive materials fall into ocean near …
archive.greenpeace.org/comms/nukes/chernob/rep02.html
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Nuclear weapons and nonproliferation: a reference book – Google Books Result
by Sarah J. Diehl, James Clay Moltz – 2002 – History – 375 pages
The United States submits a draft nuclear nonprolifera- tion treaty in August to the … midair accident and drops four nuclear weapons on Palomares, Spain. …
books.google.com/books?isbn=1576073610… –
#
Broken Arrows: Nuclear Weapons Accidents | atomicarchive.com
Since 1950, there have been 32 nuclear weapon accidents, known as Broken Arrows. … with a KC-135 during refueling operations and crashed near Palomares, Spain. … The U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Gato reportedly collided with a … www.atomicarchive.com/Almanac/Brokenarrows_static.shtml
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1966 Palomares B-52 crash – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Retrieved 2008-02-16. ^ a b c Megara, John. Dropping Nuclear Bombs on Spain, The Palomares Accident of 1966 and the U.S. Airborne Alert (PDF). …
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Palomares_B-52_crash

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N-BASE – Submarine accident list
The threat of a serious nuclear weapons accident has not disappeared with the … a KC-135 tanker aircraft while over the village of Palomares in southern Spain. … 9 April 1981: The U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USS …http://www.n-base.org.uk/public/report…/air_sea_accidents.html – Cached – Similar –

***

John R. Bolton
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

John Bolton

25th United States Ambassador to the United Nations
In office
August 1, 2005 – December 9, 2006
President George W. Bush
Preceded by John Danforth

Zalmay Khalilzad (May 2007 to Jan 2009)
Born November 20, 1948 ( 1948-11-20) (age 60)
Baltimore, Maryland
Political party Republican
Spouse(s) Gretchen Bolton
Children Jennifer Sarah Bolton
Profession Lawyer, diplomat
Military service
Service/branch United States Army National Guard
Unit Maryland

John Robert Bolton (born November 20, 1948), is an American conservative political figure who has been employed in several Republican presidential administrations. He worked as the interim Permanent US Representative to the UN from August 2005 until December 2006 on a recess appointment[1], and resigned in December 2006 when his recess appointment would have ended[2] [3] and he was unable to gain confirmation from the Senate.[4][5]

Bolton is currently a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and of counsel to the law firm Kirkland & Ellis, in their Washington D.C. office.[6] He is also involved with a broad assortment of other conservative think tanks and policy institutes, including the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Project for the New American Century (PNAC), Institute of East-West Dynamics, National Rifle Association, US Commission on International Religious Freedom, and the Council for National Policy (CNP). Bolton is often described as a neoconservative,[7][8][9] though he personally rejects the term.[10]
Contents

Bolton was born in Baltimore, Maryland. The son of a fireman[11], he grew up in the working-class neighborhood of Yale Heights and won a scholarship to the McDonogh School in Owings Mills, Maryland, graduating in 1966. He also ran the school’s Students For Goldwater campaign in 1964. He then attended Yale University, where he shared classes with his friend Clarence Thomas, and was a contemporary of Bill and Hillary Clinton at Yale Law School.[12]. He was a member of the Yale Political Union, and he ultimately earned a B.A. summa cum laude in 1970 and a J.D. in 1974. Though Bolton supported the Vietnam War, he enlisted in the Maryland Army National Guard, but did not serve in Vietnam. He wrote in his Yale 25th reunion book I confess I had no desire to die in a Southeast Asian rice paddy. I considered the war in Vietnam already lost. [13] In an interview, Bolton discussed his comment in the reunion book, explaining that he decided to avoid service in Vietnam because by the time I was about to graduate in 1970, it was clear to me that opponents of the Vietnam War had made it certain we could not prevail, and that I had no great interest in going there to have Teddy Kennedy give it back to the people I might die to take it away from. [14][15]

Personal life

He is married to Gretchen Smith Bolton. She has degrees from Wellesley College and New York University. The couple’s home is currently in Bethesda, Maryland.[16]. They have one daughter, Jennifer Sarah, who graduated from the Holton-Arms School and, in May 2008, graduated from Yale in the same residential college as her father did, Calhoun College. She is the former Chairman of the Tory Party of the Yale Political Union, an organization her father was also involved in. John Bolton is a member of the Lutheran Church.[17]

Legal career

From 1974 to 1981, Bolton was an associate at the Washington office of Covington & Burling; he returned to the firm again from 1983 to 1985. Bolton was also a partner in the law firm of Lerner, Reed, Bolton & McManus, from 1993–1999.[18][19]

Public policy career

Between 1997 and 2000, Bolton worked pro bono as an assistant to James Baker in Baker’s capacity as Kofi Annan’s personal envoy to the Western Sahara.[20] Before joining the George W. Bush administration, Bolton was Senior Vice President for Public Policy Research at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank.

During the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, he worked in several positions within the State Department, the Justice Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

His Justice Department position required him to advance Reagan administration positions, including opposition[citation needed] to financial reparations to Japanese-Americans held in World War II-era internment camps; the insistence of Reagan’s executive privilege during William Rehnquist’s chief justice confirmation hearings, when Congress asked for memos written by Rehnquist as a Nixon Justice Department official; the framing of a bill to control illegal immigration as an essential drug war measure; and, issues related to the investigation of the Iran-Contra affair.

Bolton’s government service included such positions as:

* Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs at the Department of State (1989–1993), where he led in the successful effort to rescind the UN resolution from the 1970s that had equated Zionism with racism, and also played a major role in obtaining UN resolutions endorsing the use of force to fight Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait;
* Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (1985–1989);
* Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, USAID (1982–1983); and
* General Counsel, USAID (1981–1982).[18][19]

Bolton is also the former executive director of the Committee on Resolutions in the Republican National Committee.[18]

During the George W. Bush administration, Bolton has been the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (2001-2005) and U.S. Ambassador to the UN (2005-2006).

Bolton has been a prominent participant in some neoconservative groups such as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), and the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf (CPSG). But Bolton disputes the label neo-conservative attached to him[7],pointing out that he was a conservative since high school, when he worked on the 1964 Goldwater campaign[21].

Bolton was formerly involved with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Federalist Society, National Policy Forum, National Advisory Board, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, New Atlantic Initiative, Project on Transitional Democracies).

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
John Bolton
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
In office
2001 – 2005
Preceded by new position
Succeeded by Robert Joseph

Bolton worked as the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, sworn in to this position on May 11, 2001. In this role, a key area of his responsibility was the prevention of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Bolton also led the Bush administration’s opposition on constitutional grounds[22] to the International Criminal Court, negotiating with many countries to sign agreements, called Article 98 agreements, with the U.S. to exempt Americans from prosecution by the Court, which is not recognized by the U.S.; more than 100 countries have signed such agreements so far. Bolton said the decision to pull out of the ICC was the happiest moment of his political career so far.[23]

Weapons of mass destruction

Bolton was instrumental in derailing a 2001 biological weapons conference in Geneva convened to endorse a UN proposal to enforce the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. U.S. officials, led by Bolton, argued that the plan would have put U.S. national security at risk by allowing spot inspections of suspected U.S. weapons sites, despite the fact that the U.S. claims not to have carried out any research for offensive purposes since 1969. [24]

Also in 2002, Bolton is said to have flown to Europe to demand the resignation of Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and to have orchestrated his removal at a special session of the organization.[citation needed] The United Nations’ highest administrative tribunal later condemned the action as an unacceptable violation of principles protecting international civil servants. Bustani had been unanimously re-elected for a four-year term — with strong U.S. support — in May 2000, and in 2001 was praised for his leadership by Colin Powell.[25]

He also pushed for reduced funding for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to halt the proliferation of nuclear materials.[26] At the same time, he was involved in the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, working with a number of countries to intercept the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and in materials for use in building nuclear weapons.[citation needed]

Diplomacy

According to an article in the The New Republic, Bolton was highly successful in pushing his agenda, but his bluntness has won him many enemies. Iran’s Foreign Ministry has called Bolton ‘rude’ and ‘undiplomatic’ .[27] In response to critics, Bolton states that his record demonstrates clear support for effective multilateral diplomacy. Bush administration officials have stated that his past statements would allow him to negotiate from a powerful position. It’s like the Palestinians having to negotiate with [Israeli Prime Minister] Ariel Sharon. If you have a deal, you know you have a deal, an anonymous official told CNN.[28] He also won widespread praise for his work establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative,[29] a voluntary agreement supported by 60 countries .[30]

He was part of the State Department’s delegation to six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear program in 2003. He was removed from the delegation after describing Kim Jong-il as a tyrannical dictator and saying that, for North Koreans under Kim’s rule, life is a hellish nightmare. [31] In response, a North Korean spokesman said such human scum and bloodsucker is not entitled to take part in the talks. [32] Congressional Democrats argued that Bolton’s words at the time were undiplomatic and endangered the talks. Critics argued that Bolton’s record of allegedly politicizing intelligence would harm U.S. credibility with the United Nations[33] President Bush said he wanted John Bolton because he can get the job done at the United Nations. [34]. Bolton recalls that his ‘happiest moment at State was personally ‘unsigning’ the Rome Statute,’ which had set up the International Criminal Court.[35]

Criticism

Critics allege Bolton tried to spin intelligence to support his views and political objectives on a number of occasions. Greg Thielmann, of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), was assigned as the daily intelligence liaison to Bolton. Thielmann stated to Seymour Hersh that, Bolton seemed troubled because INR was not telling him what he wanted to hear … I was intercepted at the door of his office and told, ‘The Undersecretary doesn’t need you to attend this meeting anymore.’ According to former coworkers, Bolton withheld information that ran counter to his goals from Secretary of State Colin Powell on multiple occasions, and from Powell’s successor Condoleezza Rice on at least one occasion.[36]

In 2002, Bolton accused Cuba of transfers of biological weapons technology to rogue states and called on it to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. [37] According to a Scripps Howard News Service article, Bolton wanted to say that Cuba had a biological weapons capacity and that it was exporting it to other nations. The intelligence analysts seemed to want to limit the assessment to a declaration that Cuba ‘could’ develop such weapons. [38] According to AlterNet, a progressive/liberal activist news service, Bolton attempted to have the chief bioweapons analyst in the State Department’s bureau of intelligence and research and the CIA’s national intelligence officer for Latin America reassigned. Under oath at his Senate hearings for confirmation as Ambassador, he denied trying to have the men fired, but seven intelligence officials contradicted him.[26] Ultimately, intelligence officials refused to allow Bolton to make the harsh criticism of Cuba he sought to deliver, [38] and were able to keep their positions. Bolton claims that the issue was procedural rather than related to the content of his speech and that the officers, who did not work under him, behaved unprofessionally.

Bolton is alleged by Democratic Congressman Henry Waxman to have played a role in encouraging the inclusion of statement that British Intelligence had determined Iraq attempted to procure yellowcake uranium from Niger in Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address.[39] These statements were claimed by critics of the President to be partly based on documents later found to be forged.[40] Waxman’s allegations have no visible means of support as they are based on classified documents.[39]

Bolton is alleged by the Knight Ridder news agency to have been scheduled to tell the House of Representatives International Relations subcommittee that Syria’s development of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that they posed a threat to stability in the region. Knight Ridder reported that Bolton’s appearance was cancelled after CIA and other intelligence agencies said that assessment was exaggerated.

Bolton claimed that Iran and Syria were threatening the world with weapons of mass destruction, an allegation that was denied by the CIA. Bolton has also made threats against Iran. In a 2006 speech to AIPAC, Bolton threatened Iran with painful consequences if that country did not yield to Washington demands that it shut down all its nuclear programs. Bolton’s actions at the United Nations Security Council were controversial. During and after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006, he consistently blocked efforts to adopt a ceasefire. He rejected criticism of Israel’s bombing of Lebanon and claimed that there is no moral equivalence between Lebanese civilians killed accidentally by Israel retaliation attacks and Israelis killed by malicious terrorist acts .

Bolton stated in June 2004 congressional testimony Iran was lying about enriched uranium contamination: Another unmistakable indicator of Iran’s intentions is the pattern of repeatedly lying to … the IAEA, … when evidence of uranium enriched to 36 percent was found, it attributed this to contamination from imported centrifuge parts. However, later isotope analysis supported Iran’s explanation of foreign contamination for most of the observed enriched uranium.[41] At their August 2005 meeting the IAEA’s Board of Governors concluded: Based on the information currently available to the Agency, the results of that analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran’s statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. [42]. Bolton has authored a new book titled Surrender Is Not an Option. In his book Bolton criticizes the Bush administration for changing its foreign policy objectives during the start of the administration’s second term.[43]

On May 28, 2008, the British activist George Monbiot attempted to make a citizen’s arrest of Bolton, for his role as an architect of the Iraq War at the Hay Festival of Literature & Arts in Hay-on-Wye, Wales. The attempt was unsuccessful, and Monbiot was ejected by security personnel.[44]

Permanent Representative to the UN
President George W. Bush announces the nomination of Bolton as the U.S. Ambassador to UN as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice looks on.

On March 7, 2005 Bolton was nominated to the post of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations by President George W. Bush. As a result of a Democratic filibuster, he was never confirmed by the Senate and thus never obtained the official title of Ambassador. Bolton’s nomination received strong support from Republicans but faced heavy opposition from Democrats due initially to concerns about his strongly expressed views on the United Nations.

Holding a 10-8 majority in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (tasked with vetting ambassadorial nominees), the Republican leadership hoped to send Bolton’s nomination to the full Senate with a positive recommendation. Concern among some Republicans on the committee, however, prompted the leadership to avoid losing such a motion and instead to send the nomination forward with no recommendation. In the full Senate, Republican support for the nomination remained uncertain, with the most vocal Republican critic, Ohio Senator George V. Voinovich, circulating a letter urging his Republican colleagues to oppose the nomination.[45] Democrats insisted that a vote on the nomination was premature, given the resistance of the White House to share classified documents related to Bolton’s alleged actions. The Republican leadership moved on two occasions to end debate, but because a supermajority of 60 votes is needed to end debate, the leadership was unable to muster the required votes with only a 55-44 majority in the body. An earlier agreement between moderates in both parties to prevent filibustering of nominees was interpreted by the Democrats to relate only to judicial nominees,[46] not ambassadorships, although the leader of the effort, Sen. John McCain, said the spirit of the agreement was to include all nominees.

On November 9, 2006, Bush, only days after losing both houses to a Democratic majority, sent the nomination[47] for John Robert Bolton to continue as representative for the United States at the UN.[48] He said: I believe that the leaders of both political parties must try to work through our differences. And I believe we will be able to work through differences. I reassured the House and Senate leaders that I intend to work with the new Congress in a bipartisan way to address issues confronting this country.

Views on the United Nations

Bolton has been a strong critic of the United Nations for much of his career. In a 1994 Global Structures Convocation hosted by the World Federalist Association (now Citizens for Global Solutions), he stated,
“ There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is only the international community, which can only be led by the only remaining superpower, which is the United States. [49] He also stated that The Secretariat Building in New York has 38 stories. If you lost ten stories today, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference. [50] ”

Both Bolton’s opponents[51] and his supporters[52] have used the same video of his remarks at the 1994 event in support of their points of view.

When pressed on the statement during the confirmation process, he responded, There’s not a bureaucracy in the world that couldn’t be made leaner. [53] In a paper on U.S. participation in the UN, Bolton stated the United Nations can be a useful instrument in the conduct of American foreign policy. [54]

A member of the Project for the New American Century, Bolton was also one of the signers of the January 26, 1998 PNAC letter sent to President Bill Clinton urging him to remove Saddam Hussein from power using U.S. diplomatic, political and military power. The letter also stated American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.

The November 15, 2005 Washington Times article Can the U.S. find a substitute for the U.N.? noted that Bolton advocates a revolution of reform at the UN. Specifically, he called for:

* The five permanent members of the UN Security Council to work more closely to craft powerful resolutions and make sure they are enforced, and to address the underlying causes of conflicts, rather than turning them over to the Secretariat and special envoys;
* A focus on administrative skills in choosing the next secretary-general; and
* A more credible and responsible Human Rights Commission.

Bolton noted that the U.S. had the option of relying on regional or other international organizations to advance its goals if the U.N. proves inadequate.[55]

2005 nomination, Senate confirmation hearings
Day 1

On April 11, 2005, The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reviewed Bolton’s qualifications. Bolton said that he and his colleagues view the U.N. as an important component of our diplomacy and will work to solve its problems and enhance its strengths.[citation needed]

Republican committee chairman Richard Lugar of Indiana criticized Bolton for ignoring the policy consequences of his statements, saying diplomatic speech should never be undertaken simply to score international debating points to appeal to segments of the U.S. public opinion or to validate a personal point of view. [56] The committee’s top Democrat, Joe Biden of Delaware, compared sending Bolton to the UN to sending a bull into a china shop, and expressed grave concern about Bolton’s diplomatic temperament and his record: In my judgment, your judgment about how to deal with the emerging threats have not been particularly useful, Biden said.

Republican Senator George Allen of Virginia said that Bolton had the experience, knowledge, background, and the right principles to come into the United Nations at this time, calling him the absolute perfect person for the job.

Russ Feingold, a Democrat on the committee from Wisconsin, asked Bolton about what he would have done had the Rwandan genocide occurred while he was ambassador to the United Nations, and criticized his answer – which focused on logistics – as amazingly passive.

According to Newsday, Lincoln Chafee, a Republican from Rhode Island, may be pivotal for Bolton’s nomination. [57] His initial remarks were cautiously favorable: You said all the right things in your opening statement. Chafee stated that he would probably support Bolton unless something surprising shows up.

According to an Associated Press story on the hearing, [T]hree protesters briefly interrupted the proceedings, standing up in succession with pink T-shirts and banners, one reading: ‘Diplomat for hire. No bully please.’ These protesters were part of a group advocating representation in the Senate for residents of the District of Columbia that is known for such demonstrations at a variety of hearings.

Day 2

On April 12, 2005, the Senate panel focused on allegations discussed above that Bolton pressured intelligence analysts. I’ve never seen anybody quite like Secretary Bolton. … I don’t have a second, third or fourth in terms of the way that he abuses his power and authority with little people, former State Department intelligence chief Carl W. Ford Jr., said, calling Bolton a serial abuser. Ford contradicted Bolton’s earlier testimony, saying: I had been asked for the first time to fire an intelligence analyst for what he had said and done. Ford also characterized Bolton as a kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy , implying that he was always ready to please whoever had authority over him, while having very little regard for people working under him[58].

Lugar, who criticized Bolton at his April 11 hearing, said that the paramount issue was supporting Bush’s nominee. He conceded that [b]luntness may be required, even though it is not very good diplomacy.

Chafee, the key member for Bolton’s approval, said that the bar is very high for rejecting the president’s nominees, suggesting that Bolton would make it to the Senate.

Erosion of Republican support
Search Wikinews Wikinews has related news: U.S. Senator Voinovich allows Bolton nomination to pass to full Senate vote

On April 19, Democrats, with support from Voinovich, forced Lugar to delay the committee vote on Bolton’s nomination until May. The debate concerning his nomination raged in the Senate prior to the Memorial Day recess. Two other Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee, Chafee and Chuck Hagel, also expressed serious concerns about the Bolton nomination.

Asked on April 20 if he was now less inclined to support the nomination, Chafee said, That would be accurate. He further elaborated that Bolton’s prospects were hard to predict but said he expected that the administration is really going to put some pressure on Senator Voinovich. Then it comes to the rest of us that have had some reservations.

On April 20, it emerged that Melody Townsel, a former US AID contractor, had reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Bolton had used inflammatory language and thrown objects in the course of her work activities in Moscow. Townsel’s encounter with Bolton occurred when she served as a whistleblower against a poorly performing minority contractor for US AID, IBTCI. Townsel told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff that Bolton had made derogatory remarks about her sexual orientation and weight, among other workplace improprieties. In an official interview with Senate Foreign Relation Committee staff, Townsel detailed her accusations against Bolton, which were confirmed by Canadian designer Uno Ramat, who had served as an IBTCI employee and one of Townsel’s AID colleagues. Time Magazine, among other publications, verified Townsel’s accusations and Ramat’s supporting testimony, and Townsel’s story was transcribed and entered into the official Senate committee record. Townsel, who was an employee of Young & Rubicam at the time of her encounter with Bolton, continued working for the company on a variety of other US AID projects.

On April 22 the New York Times and other media alleged that Bolton’s former boss, Colin Powell, was personally opposed to the nomination and had been in personal contact with Chafee and Hagel. The same day, Reuters reported that a spokesman for Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) said that the Senator felt the committee did the right thing delaying the vote on Bolton in light of the recent information presented to the committee. [59]

On April 28, The Guardian reported that Powell was conducting a campaign against Bolton because of the acrimonious battles they had had while working together, which among other things had resulted in Powell cutting Bolton out of talks with Iran and Libya after complaints about Bolton’s involvement from the British. It added that The foreign relations committee has discovered that Bolton made a highly unusual request and gained access to 10 intercepts by the National Security Agency… Staff members on the committee believe that Bolton was probably spying on Powell, his senior advisers and other officials reporting to him on diplomatic initiatives that Bolton opposed. [60] However, Rich Lowry pointed out that During the same four-year period, other State Department officials made roughly 400 similar requests. [61]

Also on May 11, Newsweek reported allegations that the American position at the 7th Review Conference in May 2005[62] of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty had been undercut by Bolton’s absence without leave during the nomination fight, quoting anonymous sources close to the negotiations .[63]

The Democrats’ filibuster

On May 26, 2005, Senate Democrats postponed the vote on Bolton’s UN nomination. The Republican leadership failed to gain enough Republican or Democratic support to pass a cloture motion on the floor debate over Bolton, and minority leader Harry Reid conceded the move signaled the first filibuster of the year. The Democrats claimed that key documents regarding Bolton and his career at the Department of State were being withheld by the Bush administration. Scott McClellan, White House press secretary, responded by saying, Just 72 hours after all the good will and bipartisanship (over a deal on judicial nominees), it’s disappointing to see the Democratic leadership resort back to such a partisan approach. [64]

The failure of the Senate to end debate on Bolton’s nomination provided one surprise for some: Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) voted against cloture for procedural reasons, so that he could bring up a cloture vote in the future.[65] (Although Voinovich once spoke against confirming Bolton, he voted for cloture.) Senator John Thune (R-SD) voted to end debate but announced that he would vote against Bolton in the up-or-down vote as a protest against the government’s plans to close a military base (Ellsworth) in his home state.

On June 20, 2005 the Senate voted again on cloture. The vote failed 54-38, six votes short of ending debate. That marked an increase of two no votes, including the defection of Voinovich, who switched his previous yes vote and urged President Bush to pick another nominee (Democrats Mark Pryor, Mary Landrieu and Ben Nelson voted to end debate both times). On June 21, Frist expressed his view that attempting another vote would be pointless, but later that day, following a lunch at the White House, changed his position, saying that he would continue to push for an up-or-down vote.[66] Voinovich later recanted his opposition and stated that if Bolton were renominated he would have supported the nomination.[67]

Accusations of false statement

On July 28, 2005 it was revealed that a statement made by Bolton on forms submitted to the Senate was false. Bolton indicated that in the prior five years he had not been questioned in any investigation, but in fact he had been interviewed by the State Department’s Inspector General as part of an investigation into the sources of pre-war claims of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After insisting for weeks that Bolton had testified truthfully on the form, the State Department reversed itself, stating that Bolton had simply forgotten about the investigation.[68]

Recess appointment
Search Wikinews Wikinews has related news:

* Bush likely to appoint Bolton during congressional recess
* Bush appoints John Bolton United States’ ambassador to the United Nations

On August 1, 2005, Bush officially made a recess appointment of Bolton, installing him as Permanent US Representative to the UN. A recess appointment lasts until the next session of Congress ends or until the individual is renominated and confirmed by the Senate. During the announcement, Bush said, This post is too important to leave vacant any longer, especially during a war and a vital debate about U.N. reform. [69] Democrats criticized the appointment, and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said Bolton would lack credibility in the U.N. because he lacked Senate confirmation.[70] U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomed Mr. Bolton, but told reporters that the new ambassador should consult with others as the administration continued to press for changes at the United Nations.[71]

Term at the UN

The Economist called Bolton the most controversial Ambassador ever sent by America to the United Nations. Some colleagues in the UN appreciated the goals Bolton was trying to achieve, but not his abrasive style.[72][73] The New York Times, in its editorial The Shame of the United Nations, praised Bolton’s stance on reforming the disgraceful United Nations Human Rights Commission ,[74] saying John Bolton, is right; Secretary-General Kofi Annan is wrong. The Times also said that the commission at that time was composed of some of the world’s most abusive regimes who used their membership as cover to continue their abusiveness.

Bolton also opposed the proposed replacement for the Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council, as not going far enough for reform, saying: “We want a butterfly. We don’t intend to put lipstick on a caterpillar and call it a success.”[75]

2006 nomination

Bush announced his intention to renominate Bolton for confirmation as U.N. ambassador at the beginning of 2006, and a new confirmation hearing was held on July 27, 2006, in the hope of completing the process before the expiration of Bolton’s recess appointment at the end of the 109th Congress.[76] Voinovich, who had previously stood in opposition to Bolton, had amended his views and determined that Bolton was doing a good job as UN Ambassador; in February 2006, he said I spend a lot of time with John on the phone. I think he is really working very constructively to move forward. [77]

Over the summer and during the fall election campaign, no action was taken on the nomination because Chafee, who was in a difficult re-election campaign, blocked a Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote.[citation needed] Without his concurrence, the SFRC would have been deadlocked 9-9, and the nomination could not have gone to the Senate floor for a full vote. Bush formally resubmitted the nomination on November 9, 2006, immediately following a midterm election that would give control of the 110th Congress to the Democratic party.[78] Chafee, who had just lost his re-election bid, issued a statement saying he would vote against recommending Bolton for a Senate vote, citing what he considered to be a mandate from the recent election results: On Tuesday, the American people sent a clear message of dissatisfaction with the foreign policy approach of the Bush administration. To confirm Mr. Bolton to the position of U.N. ambassador would fly in the face of the clear consensus of the country that a new direction is called for. [79]

On December 4, 2006, Bolton announced that he would terminate his work as U.S. Representative to the UN at the end of the recess appointment and would not continue to seek confirmation.[80] His letter of resignation from the Bush administration was accepted on December 4, 2006, effective when his recess appointment ended December 9 at the formal adjournment of the 109th Congress.

The announcement was characterized as Bolton’s resignation by the Associated Press,[81] United Press International,[82] ABC News,[83] and other news sources, as well as a White House press release[3] and President Bush himself.[84] The White House, however, later objected to the use of this language. Deputy Press Secretary Dana Perino told CBS News it is not a resignation. [85] The actual language of the President’s written acceptance was: It is with deep regret that I accept John Bolton’s decision to end his service in the Administration as Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations when his commission expires. However, at press conference, the president said, I received the resignation of Ambassador John Bolton. I accept it. I’m not happy about it. I think he deserved to be confirmed. [84] Some news organizations subsequently altered their language to phrases such as to step down, to leave, or to exit. [citation needed]

Support for Bolton

During his confirmation hearings in 2005, letters with signatures of more than 100 co-workers and professional colleagues were sent to Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in praise of Bolton and contradicting other criticisms and allegations concerning his diplomatic style and his treatment of colleagues and staff. In late 2006, when his nomination was again before the Committee, another letter signed by more than 56 professional colleagues supporting the renomination was sent to Senator Lugar.[86] A Wall Street Journal op ed by Claudia Rossett on December 5, 2006, said in part, Bolton has been valiant in his efforts to clean up UN corruption and malfeasance, and follow UN procedure in dealing with such threats as a nuclear North Korea, a Hezbollah bid to take over Lebanon, and the nuclearization of Hezbollah’s terror-masters in Iran. But it has been like watching one man trying to move a tsunami of mud.

American Enterprise Institute

In Bolton’s time at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, he spoke against the policy of rewarding North Korea for ending its nuclear weapons program.[87] He said the policy would encourage others to violate nuclear non-proliferation rules so that they could then be rewarded for following the rules they’d already agreed to.[87]

On three episodes of Fox News in May and June 2008, Bolton suggested that Israel may attack Iran after US elections in November.

In January 2009, Bolton proposed a three state solution to the Arab Israeli conflict in which Gaza is returned to Egyptian control and the West Bank in some configuration reverts to Jordanian sovereignty. [88]

On July 27, 2009, John Bolton was appointed to the board of directors for EMS Technologies, Inc. (ELMG), a Georgia based tech company that subcontracts for many DOD contractors.

* Profile: John R. Bolton, RightWeb
* John R. Bolton, Notable Names Database
* The Creation, Fall, Rise, and Fall of the United Nations John Bolton’s chapter from the Cato Institute book, Delusions of Grandeur: The United Nations and Global Intervention
* John Bolton interviewed by Jon Stewart on The Daily Show from March 20, 2007
* John Bolton interview by Neal Conan on Talk of the Nation, May 1, 2007
* Audio interview with National Review Online

Government offices
Preceded by
John D. Holum Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
2001 – 2005 Succeeded by
Robert Joseph
Diplomatic posts
Preceded by
Anne W. Patterson (acting) United States Ambassador to the United Nations
2005 – 2006 Succeeded by
Alejandro Daniel Wolff (acting)

v • d • e
United States Ambassadors to the United Nations
Edward Stettinius, Jr. A Warren Austin A Henry C. Lodge, Jr. A James J. Wadsworth A Adlai Stevenson A Arthur Goldberg A George Ball A James R. Wiggins A Charles W. Yost A George H. W. Bush A John A. Scali A Daniel P. Moynihan A William Scranton A Andrew Young A Donald McHenry A Jeane Kirkpatrick A Vernon A. Walters A Thomas R. Pickering A Edward J. Perkins A Madeleine Albright A Bill Richardson A Richard Holbrooke A John Negroponte A John Danforth A John R. Bolton A Zalmay Khalilzad A Susan Rice
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_R._Bolton
Categories: 1948 births | Assistant Attorneys General of the United States | Living people | American Lutherans | People from Baltimore, Maryland | United States Department of State officials | Permanent Representatives of the United States to the United Nations | People from Bethesda, Maryland | Yale University alumni | Yale Law School alumni | Recess Appointments during the George W. Bush administration | Reagan Administration personnel | American Enterprise Institute | Presidents of the United Nations Security Council

Since 1950, there have been 32 nuclear weapon accidents, known as Broken Arrows. A Broken Arrow is defined as an unexpected event involving nuclear weapons that result in the accidental launching, firing, detonating, theft or loss of the weapon. To date, six nuclear weapons have been lost and never recovered.
1950s

Date: November 10, 1950
Location: Quebec, Canada
A B-50 jettisoned a Mark 4 bomb over the St. Lawrence River near Riviere-du-Loup, about 300 miles northeast of Montreal. The weapon’s HE [high explosive] detonated on impact. Although lacking its essential plutonium core, the explosion did scatter nearly 100 pounds (45 kg) of uranium. The plane later landed safely at a U.S. Air Force base in Maine.

Date: March 10, 1956
Location: Exact Location Unknown
Carrying two nuclear capsules on a nonstop flight from MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, Florida to an overseas base, a B-47 was reported missing. It failed to make contact with a tanker over the Mediterranean for a second refueling. No trace was ever found of the plane.

Date: July 27, 1956
Location: Great Britain
A B-47 bomber crashed into a nuclear weapons storage facility at the Lakenheath Air Base in Suffolk, England, during a training exercise. The nuclear weapons storage facility, known as an igloo, contained three Mark 6 bombs. Preliminary exams by bomb disposal officers said it was a miracle that one Mark 6 with exposed detonators sheared didn’t explode. The B-47’s crew was killed.

Date: February 5, 1958
Location: Off Georgia, United States
In a simulated combat mission, a B-47 collided with an F-86 near Savannah, Georgia. After attempting to land at Hunter Air Force Base with the nuclear weapon onboard, the weapon was jettisoned over water. The plane later landed safely. A nuclear detonation was not possible since the nuclear capsule was not on board the aircraft. Subsequent searches failed to locate the weapon.

Date: February 28, 1958
Location: Great Britain
A B-47 based at the U.S. air base at Greenham Common, England, reportedly loaded with a nuclear weapon, caught fire and completely burned. In 1960, signs of high-level radioactive contamination were detected around the base by a group of scientists working at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE). The U.S. government has never confirmed whether the accident involved a nuclear warhead.
1960s

Date: January 24, 1961
Location: North Carolina, United States
While on airborne alert, a B-52 suffered structural failure of its right wing, resulting in the release of two nuclear weapons. One weapon landed safely with little damage. The second fell free and broke apart near the town of Goldsboro, North Carolina. Some of the uranium from that weapon could not be recovered. No radiological contamination was detectable in the area.

Date: July 4, 1961
Location: North Sea
A cooling system failed, contaminating crew members, missiles and some parts of a K-19 Hotel -class Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine off Norway. One of the sub’s two reactors soared to 800 degrees Celsius and threatened to melt down the reactor’s fuel rods. Several fatalities were reported.

Date: December 5, 1965
Location: Pacific Ocean
An A-4E Skyhawk attack aircraft loaded with one B43 nuclear weapon rolled off the deck of the USS Ticonderoga. Pilot, plane and weapon were never found.

Date: Mid-1960s (Date undetermined)
Location: Kara Sea
Soviet nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin was forced to dump its reactors in the Kara Sea. Some accounts said the Lenin experienced a reactor meltdown.

Date: January 17, 1966
Location: Palomares, Spain
A B-52 carrying four nuclear weapons collided with a KC-135 during refueling operations and crashed near Palomares, Spain. One weapon was safely recovered on the ground and another from the sea, after extensive search and recovery efforts. The other two weapons hit land, resulting in detonation of their high explosives and the subsequent release of radioactive materials. Over 1,400 tons of soil was sent to an approved storage site.

Date: April 11, 1968
Location: Pacific Ocean
A Soviet diesel-powered Golf -class ballistic missile submarine sank about 750 miles northwest of the island of Oahu, Hawaii. Reports say the submarine was carrying three nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, as well as several nuclear torpedoes. Part of the submarine was reportedly raised using the CIA’s specially constructed Glomar Explorer deep-water salvage ship.

Date: November 1969
Location: White Sea
The U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Gato reportedly collided with a Soviet submarine on November 14 or 15, 1969, near the entrance of the White Sea.
1970s

Date: April 12, 1970
Location: Atlantic Ocean
A Soviet November -class nuclear-powered attack submarine experienced an apparent nuclear propulsion problem in the Atlantic Ocean about 300 miles northwest of Spain. Although an attempt to attach a tow line from a Soviet bloc merchant ship; the submarine apparently sank, killing 52.

Date: November 22, 1975
Location: Off Sicily, Italy
The aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy and the cruiser USS Belknap collided in rough seas at night during exercises. Although it was declared as a possible nuclear weapons accident, no subsequent nuclear contamination was discovered during the fire and rescue operations.
1980s

Date: October 3, 1986
Location: Atlantic Ocean
A Soviet Yankee I -class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine suffered an explosion and fire in one of its missile tubes 480 miles east of Bermuda. The submarine sank while under tow on October 6 in 18,000 feet of water. Two nuclear reactors and approximately 34 nuclear weapons were on board.

Date: April 7, 1989
Location: Atlantic Ocean
About 300 miles north of the Norwegian coast, the Komsomolets, a Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine, caught fire and sank. The vessel’s nuclear reactor, two nuclear-armed torpedoes, and 42 of the 69 crew members were lost.

Date: August 10, 1985
Location: Near Vladivostok, Russia
While at the Chazhma Bay repair facility, about 35 miles from Vladivostok, an Echo -class Soviet nuclear-powered submarine suffered a reactor explosion. The explosion released a cloud of radioactivity toward Vladivostok but did not reach the city. Ten officers were killed in the explosion.
1990s

Date: February 11, 1992
Location: Barents Sea
A collision between a CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Sierra -class nuclear-powered attack submarine with the U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarine Baton Rouge. Both vessels reportedly suffered only minor damage. There is a dispute over the location of the incident in or outside Russian territorial waters.
2000s

Date: August 12, 2000
Location: Barents Sea
The CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Oscar II class submarine, Kursk, sinks after a massive onboard explosion. Attempts to resuce the 118 men fail. It is thought that a torpedo failure caused the accident. Radiation levels are normal and the submarine had no nuclear weapons on board.

Sources:
U.S. Defense Department
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
National Security Archive
Greenpeace
Joshua Handler, Princeton University
United Press International
The Associated Press
Blind Man’s Bluff : The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage

Edwin Anderson Walker
November 10, 1909(1909-11-10) – October 31, 1993 (aged 83)
ColEAWalker.jpg
Colonel Edwin A. Walker
Place of birth Center Point, Texas
Allegiance United States of America
Service/branch United States Army
Rank Major General
Commands held 24th Infantry Division
Battles/wars World War II
Korean War

Major General Edwin Anderson Walker (November 10, 1909 – October 31, 1993) of the U.S. Army was known for his conservative political views and for being an attempted assassination target of Lee Harvey Oswald.
Contents
[hide]

Edwin Ted Walker was born in Center Point, Texas and graduated from the New Mexico Military Institute in 1927. He then attended the United States Military Academy, where he graduated in 1931.[1] During World War II, Walker commanded a subunit of the Canadian-American First Special Service Force in the invasion of Anzio, Italy in January 1944. In August 1944, Walker succeeded Robert T. Frederick as the unit’s commanding officer. The FSSF landed on the Hyeres Islands off of the French Riviera, taking out a strong German garrison.

Walker again saw combat in the Korean War, commanding the Third Infantry Division’s Seventh Infantry and was senior advisor to the First Korean Corps. He next became the commander of the Arkansas Military district in Little Rock, Arkansas. During his years in Arkansas, he implemented an order from President Eisenhower in 1957 to quell civil disturbances during the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock.

In 1959, General Walker was sent to Germany to command the 24th Infantry Division. In 1961, however, he became involved in controversy. Walker initiated an anti-communist indoctrination program for troops called Pro Blue (due to Free World troops being coloured blue on maps)[2] and was accused of distributing right-wing literature from the John Birch Society to the soldiers of his division. He was also quoted by a newspaper, the Overseas Weekly, as saying that Harry S. Truman, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Dean Acheson were definitely pink. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara relieved Walker of his command, while an inquiry was conducted, and in October Walker was reassigned to Hawaii to become assistant chief of staff for training and operations in the Pacific. Instead, Walker resigned from the Army on November 2, 1961. Said Walker: It will be my purpose now, as a civilian, to attempt to do what I have found it no longer possible to do in uniform. [3]
In February 1962, Walker entered the race for Governor of Texas, but finished last among six candidates in a Democratic primary election in May that was won by John Connally.[4]

Walker organized protests in September 1962 against the use of federal troops to enforce the enrollment of African-American James Meredith at the racially segregated University of Mississippi. His public statement on September 29:

This is Edwin A. Walker. I am in Mississippi beside Gov. Ross Barnett. I call for a national protest against the conspiracy from within. Rally to the cause of freedom in righteous indignation, violent vocal protest, and bitter silence under the flag of Mississippi at the use of Federal troops. This today is a disgrace to the nation in ‘dire peril,’ a disgrace beyond the capacity of anyone except its enemies. This is the conspiracy of the crucifixion by anti-Christ conspirators of the Supreme Court in their denial of prayer and their betrayal of a nation.[5]

After a violent, 15-hour riot broke out on the campus, on September 30, in which two people were killed and six federal marshals were shot, Walker was arrested on four federal charges, including insurrection against the United States. Walker posted bond and returned home to Dallas, where he was greeted by a crowd of 200 supporters.[6] After a federal grand jury adjourned in January 1963 without indicting him, the charges were dropped. Because the dismissal of the charges was without prejudice, the charges could have been reinstated within five years.[7]

Assassination attempt

It was around this time that Walker got Lee Harvey Oswald’s attention. Oswald, a self-proclaimed Marxist,[8] considered Walker a fascist and the leader of a fascist organization.[9]

A front page story on Walker in the October 7, 1962, issue of the Worker, a Communist Party newspaper to which Oswald subscribed, warned the Kennedy administration and the American people of the need for action against [Walker] and his allies. On October 8, Oswald quit his job and moved to Dallas, with no explanation. Five days after the front page news on January 22, 1963 that Walker’s federal charges had been dropped,[10] Oswald ordered a revolver by mail, using the alias A.J. Hidell. [11]

In February 1963, Walker was making news by joining forces with evangelist Billy James Hargis in an anti-communist tour called Operation Midnight Ride .[12] In a speech Walker made on March 5, reported in the Dallas Times Herald, he called on the United States military to liquidate the scourge that has descended upon the island of Cuba. [13] Seven days later, Oswald ordered by mail a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, using the alias A. Hidell. [14]

Oswald began to put Walker under surveillance, taking pictures of Walker’s Dallas home on the weekend of March 9–10.[15] He planned the assassination for April 10, ten days after he was fired from the photography firm where he worked. He told his wife later that he chose a Wednesday evening because the neighborhood would be relatively crowded because of services in a church adjacent to Walker’s home; he would not stand out and could mingle with the crowds if necessary to make his escape. He left a note in Russian for his wife Marina with instructions should he be caught.[16] Walker was sitting at a desk in his dining room when Oswald fired at him from less than a hundred feet (30 m) away. Walker survived only because the bullet struck the wooden frame of the window, which deflected its path. However, he was injured in the forearm by fragments.

At the time, authorities had no idea who attempted to kill Walker. A police detective, D.E. McElroy, commented that Whoever shot at the general was playing for keeps. The sniper wasn’t trying to scare him. He was shooting to kill.

Marina Oswald stated later that she had seen Oswald burn most of his plans in the bathtub, though she hid the note he left her in a cookbook, with the intention of bringing it to the police should Oswald again attempt to kill Walker or anyone else. Marina later quoted her husband as saying, Well, what would you say if somebody got rid of Hitler at the right time? So if you don’t know about General Walker, how can you speak up on his behalf? [17] Oswald’s involvement in the attempt on Walker’s life was suspected within hours of his arrest on November 22, 1963, following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.[18] But police had no evidence of Oswald’s involvement in the Walker attempt until early December 1963, when the note and some of the photos were found by authorities. The bullet was too badly damaged to run conclusive ballistics tests, but neutron activation tests later determined that it was extremely likely the bullet was a Mannlicher-Carcano bullet manufactured by the Western Cartridge Company, the same ammunition used in the Kennedy assassination.[19]

Oswald later wrote to Arnold Johnson of the Communist Party, U.S.A., that on the evening of October 23, 1963 he had attended an ultra right meeting headed by Gen. Edwin A. Walker.[20]

Associated Press v. Walker

Angered by negative publicity he was receiving for his conservative political views, Walker began to file libel lawsuits against various media outlets. One of these suits was in response to coverage of his participation in the University of Mississippi riot, specifically that he had led a charge of students against federal marshals and that he had assumed command of the crowd. [21] A Texas trial court in 1964 found the statements false and defamatory.[22] The decision was appealed, as Associated Press v. Walker, all the way to the United States Supreme Court,[23] but the Court ruled against Walker and found that although the statements may have been false, the Associated Press was not guilty of reckless disregard in their reporting about Walker. The Court, which had previously said that public officials could not recover damages unless they could prove actual malice, extended this to public figures as well.

Later life

By resigning instead of retiring, Walker was unable to draw a pension from the Army. He made statements at the time to the Dallas Morning News that he had refused to take his pension. The Army restored his pension rights in 1982. He had made several previous requests for his pension dating back to 1973.[24]

Walker, then 66, was arrested on June 23, 1976 for public lewdness in a restroom at a Dallas park and accused of fondling an undercover policeman.[25][26][27] He was arrested again in Dallas for public lewdness on March 16, 1977.[28][29] He pled no contest to one of the two misdemeanor charges, was given a suspended, 30-day jail sentence, and fined $1,000.[30]

He died of lung cancer at his home in Dallas in 1993.[31]

Culture

* Walker was cited as inspiration for the Air Force General James Mattoon Scott character in the film Seven Days in May, although Walker himself is mentioned by name in the film.

Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwin_Walker
Categories: American military personnel of the Korean War | American military personnel of World War II | Cancer deaths in Texas | Deaths from lung cancer | John Birch Society | John F. Kennedy assassination | People from Kerr County, Texas | Recipients of the Combat Infantryman Badge | United States Army generals | United States Military Academy alumni | American anti-communists | 1909 births | 1993 deaths

United States President’s Commission on CIA activities within the United States

The U.S. President’s Commission on CIA activities within the United States was set up under President Gerald Ford in 1975 to investigate the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies within the United States. The commission was led by the Vice President, Nelson Rockefeller, and is sometimes referred to as the Rockefeller Commission.

The commission was created in response to a December 1974 report in The New York Times that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s. The commission issued a single report in 1975, touching upon certain CIA abuses including mail opening and surveillance of domestic dissident groups. It publicized Project MKULTRA, a CIA mind control study. It also studied issues relating to the John F. Kennedy assassination, specifically the head snap as seen in the Zapruder film (first shown on television in 1975), and the possible presence of E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis in Dallas, Texas.[1]

A larger investigation, the Church Committee, was set up on 27 January 1975 by the U.S. Senate. The Nedzi Committee was created in the U.S. Congress on 19 February 1975. It was replaced by the Pike Committee five months later.

Project MK-ULTRA, or MKULTRA, was the code name for a covert CIA mind-control and chemical interrogation research program, run by the Office of Scientific Intelligence. The program began in the early 1950s, continuing at least through the late 1960s, and it used United States citizens as its test subjects.[1][2][3] The published evidence indicates that Project MK-ULTRA involved the surreptitious use of many types of drugs, as well as other methods, to manipulate individual mental states and to alter brain function.

Project MK-ULTRA was first brought to wide public attention in 1975 by the U.S. Congress, through investigations by the Church Committee, and by a presidential commission known as the Rockefeller Commission. Investigative efforts were hampered by the fact that CIA Director Richard Helms ordered all MK-ULTRA files destroyed in 1973; the Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission investigations relied on the sworn testimony of direct participants and on the relatively small number of documents that survived Helms’ destruction order.[4]

Although the CIA insists that MK-ULTRA-type experiments have been abandoned, 14-year CIA veteran Victor Marchetti has stated in various interviews that the CIA routinely conducts disinformation campaigns and that CIA mind control research continued. In a 1977 interview, Marchetti specifically called the CIA claim that MK-ULTRA was abandoned a cover story. [5][6]

On the Senate floor in 1977, Senator Ted Kennedy said:

The Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over thirty universities and institutions were involved in an extensive testing and experimentation program which included covert drug tests on unwitting citizens at all social levels, high and low, native Americans and foreign. Several of these tests involved the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in social situations. At least one death, that of Dr. Olson, resulted from these activities. The Agency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific sense. The agents doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific observers.[7]

[edit] Title and origins
Dr. Sidney Gottlieb approved of an MKULTRA subproject on LSD in this June 9, 1953 letter.

The project’s intentionally oblique CIA cryptonym is made up of the digraph MK, meaning that the project was sponsored by the agency’s Technical Services Division, followed by the word ULTRA (which had previously been used to designate the most secret classification of World War II intelligence). Other related cryptonyms include MK-NAOMI and MK-DELTA.

A precursor of the MK-ULTRA program began in 1945 when the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency was established and given direct responsibility for Operation Paperclip. Operation Paperclip was a program to recruit former Nazi scientists. Some of these scientists studied torture and brainwashing, and several had just been identified and prosecuted as war criminals during the Nuremberg Trials.[8][9]

Several secret U.S. government projects grew out of Operation Paperclip. These projects included Project CHATTER (established 1947), and Project BLUEBIRD (established 1950), which was later renamed to Project ARTICHOKE in 1951. Their purpose was to study mind-control, interrogation, behavior modification and related topics.

Headed by Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the MK-ULTRA project was started on the order of CIA director Allen Dulles on April 13, 1953,[10] largely in response to Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean use of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea.[11] The CIA wanted to use similar methods on their own captives. The CIA was also interested in being able to manipulate foreign leaders with such techniques,[12] and would later invent several schemes to drug Fidel Castro.

Experiments were often conducted without the subjects’ knowledge or consent.[13] In some cases, academic researchers being funded through grants from CIA front organizations were unaware that their work was being used for these purposes.[14]

In 1964, the project was renamed MK-SEARCH. The project attempted to produce a perfect truth drug for use in interrogating suspected Soviet spies during the Cold War, and generally to explore any other possibilities of mind control.

Another MK-ULTRA effort, Subproject 54, was the Navy’s top secret Perfect Concussion program, which used sub-aural frequency blasts to erase memory.[15]

Because most MK-ULTRA records were deliberately destroyed in 1973 by order of then CIA Director Richard Helms, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for investigators to gain a complete understanding of the more than 150 individually funded research sub-projects sponsored by MK-ULTRA and related CIA programs.[16]
[edit] Goals

The Agency poured millions of dollars into studies probing dozens of methods of influencing and controlling the mind. One 1955 MK-ULTRA document gives an indication of the size and range of the effort; this document refers to the study of an assortment of mind-altering substances described as follows:[17]

1. Substances which will promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the point where the recipient would be discredited in public.
2. Substances which increase the efficiency of mentation and perception.
3. Materials which will prevent or counteract the intoxicating effect of alcohol.
4. Materials which will promote the intoxicating effect of alcohol.
5. Materials which will produce the signs and symptoms of recognized diseases in a reversible way so that they may be used for malingering, etc.
6. Materials which will render the induction of hypnosis easier or otherwise enhance its usefulness.
7. Substances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand privation, torture and coercion during interrogation and so-called brain-washing .
8. Materials and physical methods which will produce amnesia for events preceding and during their use.
9. Physical methods of producing shock and confusion over extended periods of time and capable of surreptitious use.
10. Substances which produce physical disablement such as paralysis of the legs, acute anemia, etc.
11. Substances which will produce pure euphoria with no subsequent let-down.
12. Substances which alter personality structure in such a way that the tendency of the recipient to become dependent upon another person is enhanced.
13. A material which will cause mental confusion of such a type that the individual under its influence will find it difficult to maintain a fabrication under questioning.
14. Substances which will lower the ambition and general working efficiency of men when administered in undetectable amounts.
15. Substances which promote weakness or distortion of the eyesight or hearing faculties, preferably without permanent effects.
16. A knockout pill which can surreptitiously be administered in drinks, food, cigarettes, as an aerosol, etc., which will be safe to use, provide a maximum of amnesia, and be suitable for use by agent types on an ad hoc basis.
17. A material which can be surreptitiously administered by the above routes and which in very small amounts will make it impossible for a man to perform any physical activity whatsoever.

Historians have asserted that creating a Manchurian Candidate subject through mind control techniques was a goal of MK-ULTRA and related CIA projects.[18]

Budget

A secretive arrangement granted the MK-ULTRA program a percentage of the CIA budget. The MK-ULTRA director was granted six percent of the CIA operating budget in 1953, without oversight or accounting.[19] An estimated US$10m or more was spent[20].

Experiments

CIA documents suggest that chemical, biological and radiological means were investigated for the purpose of mind control as part of MK-ULTRA.[21]
Drugs
LSD
Early efforts focused on LSD, which later came to dominate many of MK-ULTRA’s programs.

Experiments included administering LSD to CIA employees, military personnel, doctors, other government agents, prostitutes, mentally ill patients, and members of the general public in order to study their reactions. LSD and other drugs were usually administered without the subject’s knowledge or informed consent, a violation of the Nuremberg Code that the U.S. agreed to follow after World War II.

Efforts to recruit subjects were often illegal, even discounting the fact that drugs were being administered (though actual use of LSD, for example, was legal in the United States until October 6, 1966). In Operation Midnight Climax, the CIA set up several brothels to obtain a selection of men who would be too embarrassed to talk about the events. The men were dosed with LSD, the brothels were equipped with one-way mirrors, and the sessions were filmed for later viewing and study.[22]

Some subjects’ participation was consensual, and in many of these cases, the subjects appeared to be singled out for even more extreme experiments. In one case, volunteers were given LSD for 77 consecutive days.[23]

LSD was eventually dismissed by MK-ULTRA’s researchers as too unpredictable in its results.[1] Although useful information was sometimes obtained through questioning subjects on LSD, not uncommonly the most marked effect would be the subject’s absolute and utter certainty that they were able to withstand any form of interrogation attempt, even physical torture.

Other drugs

Another technique investigated was connecting a barbiturate IV into one arm and an amphetamine IV into the other.[24] The barbiturates were released into the subject first, and as soon as the subject began to fall asleep, the amphetamines were released. The subject would begin babbling incoherently at this point, and it was sometimes possible to ask questions and get useful answers.

The experiments were exported to Canada when the CIA recruited Scottish physician Donald Ewen Cameron, creator of the psychic driving concept, which the CIA found particularly interesting. Cameron had been hoping to correct schizophrenia by erasing existing memories and reprogramming the psyche. He commuted from Albany, New York to Montreal every week to work at the Allan Memorial Institute of McGill University and was paid $69,000 from 1957 to 1964 to carry out MKULTRA experiments there. In addition to LSD, Cameron also experimented with various paralytic drugs as well as electroconvulsive therapy at thirty to forty times the normal power. His driving experiments consisted of putting subjects into drug-induced coma for weeks at a time (up to three months in one case) while playing tape loops of noise or simple repetitive statements. His experiments were typically carried out on patients who had entered the institute for minor problems such as anxiety disorders and postpartum depression, many of whom suffered permanently from his actions.[27] His treatments resulted in victims’ incontinence, amnesia, forgetting how to talk, forgetting their parents, and thinking their interrogators were their parents.[28] His work was inspired and paralleled by the British psychiatrist Dr William Sargant at St Thomas’ Hospital, London, and Belmont Hospital, Surrey, who was also involved in the Intelligence Services and who experimented extensively on his patients without their consent, causing similar long-term damage.[29] Dr. Cameron and Dr. Sargant are the only two identified Canadian experimenters, but the MKULTRA file makes reference to many other unnamed physicians who were recruited by the CIA.[citation needed]

It was during this era that Cameron became known worldwide as the first chairman of the World Psychiatric Association as well as president of the American and Canadian psychiatric associations. Cameron had also been a member of the Nuremberg medical tribunal in 1946-47.[30]

Revelation

In 1973, CIA Director Richard Helms ordered all MK-ULTRA files destroyed. Pursuant to this order, most CIA documents regarding the project were destroyed, making a full investigation of MK-ULTRA impossible.

In December 1974, The New York Times reported that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s. That report prompted investigations by the U.S. Congress, in the form of the Church Committee, and by a presidential commission known as the Rockefeller Commission that looked into domestic activities of the CIA, the FBI, and intelligence-related agencies of the military.

In the summer of 1975, congressional Church Committee reports and the presidential Rockefeller Commission report revealed to the public for the first time that the CIA and the Department of Defense had conducted experiments on both unwitting and cognizant human subjects as part of an extensive program to influence and control human behavior through the use of psychoactive drugs such as LSD and mescaline and other chemical, biological, and psychological means. They also revealed that at least one subject had died after administration of LSD. Much of what the Church Committee and the Rockefeller Commission learned about MKULTRA was contained in a report, prepared by the Inspector General’s office in 1963, that had survived the destruction of records ordered in 1973.[31] However, it contained little detail.

The congressional committee investigating the CIA research, chaired by Senator Frank Church, concluded that [p]rior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects . The committee noted that the experiments sponsored by these researchers … call into question the decision by the agencies not to fix guidelines for experiments.

Following the recommendations of the Church Committee, President Gerald Ford in 1976 issued the first Executive Order on Intelligence Activities which, among other things, prohibited experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested party, of each such human subject and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission. Subsequent orders by Presidents Carter and Reagan expanded the directive to apply to any human experimentation.

On the heels of the revelations about CIA experiments, similar stories surfaced regarding U.S. Army experiments. In 1975 the Secretary of the Army instructed the Army Inspector General to conduct an investigation. Among the findings of the Inspector General was the existence of a 1953 memorandum penned by then Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson. Documents show that the CIA participated in at least two of Department of Defense committees during 1952. These committee findings led to the issuance of the Wilson Memo, which mandated—in accord with Nuremberg Code protocols—that only volunteers be used for experimental operations conducted in the U.S. armed forces. In response to the Inspector General’s investigation, the Wilson Memo was declassified in August 1975.

With regard to drug testing within the Army, the Inspector General found that the evidence clearly reflected that every possible medical consideration was observed by the professional investigators at the Medical Research Laboratories. However the Inspector General also found that the mandated requirements of Wilson’s 1953 memorandum had been only partially adhered to; he concluded that the volunteers were not fully informed, as required, prior to their participation; and the methods of procuring their services, in many cases, appeared not to have been in accord with the intent of Department of the Army policies governing use of volunteers in research.

Other branches of the U.S. armed forces, the Air Force for example, were found not to have adhered to Wilson Memo stipulations regarding voluntary drug testing.

In 1977, during a hearing held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to look further into MKULTRA, Admiral Stansfield Turner, then Director of Central Intelligence, revealed that the CIA had found a set of records, consisting of about 20,000 pages,[32] that had survived the 1973 destruction orders, due to having been stored at a records center not usually used for such documents.[31] These files dealt with the financing of MKULTRA projects, and as such contained few details of those projects, but much more was learned from them than from the Inspector General’s 1963 report.

In Canada, the issue took much longer to surface, becoming widely known in 1984 on a CBC news show, The Fifth Estate. It was learned that not only had the CIA funded Dr. Cameron’s efforts, but perhaps even more shockingly, the Canadian government was fully aware of this, and had later provided another $500,000 in funding to continue the experiments. This revelation largely derailed efforts by the victims to sue the CIA as their U.S. counterparts had, and the Canadian government eventually settled out of court for $100,000 to each of the 127 victims. None of Dr. Cameron’s personal records of his involvement with MKULTRA survive, since his family destroyed them after his death from a heart attack while mountain climbing in 1967.[33]

U.S. General Accounting Office Report

The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on September 28, 1994, which stated that between 1940 and 1974, DOD and other national security agencies studied thousands of human subjects in tests and experiments involving hazardous substances.

The quote from the study:

… Working with the CIA, the Department of Defense gave hallucinogenic drugs to thousands of volunteer soldiers in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In addition to LSD, the Army also tested quinuclidinyl benzilate, a hallucinogen code-named BZ. (Note 37) Many of these tests were conducted under the so-called MKULTRA program, established to counter perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing techniques. Between 1953 and 1964, the program consisted of 149 projects involving drug testing and other studies on unwitting human subjects…[34]

Deaths

Harold Blauer, a professional tennis player in New York City, died as a result of a secret Army experiment involving MDA.[35]

Frank Olson, a United States Army biochemist and biological weapons researcher, was given LSD without his knowledge or consent in 1953 as part of a CIA experiment, and died under suspicious circumstances (initially labeled suicide) a week later following a severe psychotic episode. A CIA doctor assigned to monitor Olson’s recovery claimed to be asleep in another bed in a New York City hotel room when Olson jumped through the window to fall ten stories to his death.[36]

Olson’s son disputes this version of events, and maintains that his father was murdered due to the belief that he was going to divulge his knowledge of the top-secret interrogation program code-named Project ARTICHOKE.[37] Frank Olson’s body was exhumed in 1994, and cranial injuries indicated Olson had been knocked unconscious before exiting the window.[38]

The CIA’s own internal investigation, by contrast, claimed Gottlieb had conducted the experiment with Olson’s prior knowledge, although neither Olson nor the other men taking part in the experiment were informed as to the exact nature of the drug until some 20 minutes after its ingestion. The report further suggested that Gottlieb was nonetheless due a reprimand, as he had failed to take into account Olsen’s already-diagnosed suicidal tendencies, which might well have been exacerbated by the LSD.[36]

Legal issues involving informed consent

The revelations about the CIA and the Army prompted a number of subjects or their survivors to file lawsuits against the federal government for conducting illegal experiments. Although the government aggressively, and sometimes successfully, sought to avoid legal liability, several plaintiffs did receive compensation through court order, out-of-court settlement, or acts of Congress. Frank Olson’s family received $750,000 by a special act of Congress, and both President Ford and CIA director William Colby met with Olson’s family to publicly apologize.

Previously, the CIA and the Army had actively and successfully sought to withhold incriminating information, even as they secretly provided compensation to the families. One subject of Army drug experimentation, James Stanley, an Army sergeant, brought an important, albeit unsuccessful, suit. The government argued that Stanley was barred from suing under a legal doctrine—known as the Feres doctrine, after a 1950 Supreme Court case, Feres v. United States—that prohibits members of the Armed Forces from suing the government for any harms that were inflicted incident to service.

In 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed this defense in a 5–4 decision that dismissed Stanley’s case.[39] The majority argued that a test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would call into question military discipline and decision making would itself require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters. In dissent, Justice William Brennan argued that the need to preserve military discipline should not protect the government from liability and punishment for serious violations of constitutional rights:

The medical trials at Nuremberg in 1947 deeply impressed upon the world that experimentation with unknowing human subjects is morally and legally unacceptable. The United States Military Tribunal established the Nuremberg Code as a standard against which to judge German scientists who experimented with human subjects… . [I]n defiance of this principle, military intelligence officials … began surreptitiously testing chemical and biological materials, including LSD.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing a separate dissent, stated:

No judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability the involuntary and unknowing human experimentation alleged to have occurred in this case. Indeed, as Justice Brennan observes, the United States played an instrumental role in the criminal prosecution of Nazi officials who experimented with human subjects during the Second World War, and the standards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed to judge the behavior of the defendants stated that the ‘voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential … to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts.’ If this principle is violated, the very least that society can do is to see that the victims are compensated, as best they can be, by the perpetrators.

This is the only Supreme Court case to address the application of the Nuremberg Code to experimentation sponsored by the U.S. government. And while the suit was unsuccessful, dissenting opinions put the Army—and by association the entire government—on notice that use of individuals without their consent is unacceptable. The limited application of the Nuremberg Code in U.S. courts does not detract from the power of the principles it espouses, especially in light of stories of failure to follow these principles that appeared in the media and professional literature during the 1960s and 1970s and the policies eventually adopted in the mid-1970s.

In another law suit, Wayne Ritchie, a former United States Marshall, alleged the CIA laced his food or drink with LSD at a 1957 Christmas party. While the government admitted it was, at that time, drugging people without their consent, U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel found Ritchie could not prove he was one of the victims of MKULTRA and dismissed the case in 2007.[40]

Extent of participation

Forty-four American colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like including Sandoz (currently Novartis) and Eli Lilly & Co., 12 hospitals or clinics (in addition to those associated with universities), and 3 prisons are known to have participated in MKULTRA.[41][42]

Notable subjects

A considerable amount of credible circumstantial evidence suggests that Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber, participated in CIA-sponsored MK-ULTRA experiments conducted at Harvard University from the fall of 1959 through the spring of 1962. During World War II, Henry Murray, the lead researcher in the Harvard experiments, served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was a forerunner of the CIA. Murray applied for a grant funded by the United States Navy, and his Harvard stress experiments strongly resembled those run by the OSS.[43] Beginning at the age of sixteen, Kaczynski participated along with twenty-one other undergraduate students in the Harvard experiments, which have been described as disturbing and ethically indefensible. [43][44]

Merry Prankster Ken Kesey, author of One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, volunteered for MK-ULTRA experiments while he was a student at Stanford University. Kesey’s ingestion of LSD during these experiments led directly to his widespread promotion of the drug and the subsequent development of hippie culture.[45]

Candy Jones, American fashion model and radio host, claimed to have been a victim of mind control in the ’60s.[46]

Infamous Irish mob boss James Whitey Bulger volunteered for testing while in prison.[47]

Conspiracy theories

MK-ULTRA plays a part in many conspiracy theories given its nature and the destruction of most records.

Lawrence Teeter, attorney for convicted assassin Sirhan Sirhan, believed Sirhan was under the influence of hypnosis when he fired his weapon at Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Teeter linked the CIA’s MKULTRA program to mind control techniques that he claimed were used to control Sirhan.[48]
Jonestown, the Guyana location of the Jim Jones cult and Peoples Temple mass suicide, was thought to be a test site for MKULTRA medical and mind control experiments after the official end of the program. Congressman Leo Ryan, a known critic of the CIA, was assassinated after he personally visited Jonestown to investigate various reported irregularities.[49]

Popular culture

* MKULTRA is referenced in the plots of The Ambler Warning by Robert Ludlum, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test by Tom Wolfe, Firestarter by Stephen King, Infinite Jest by David Foster Wallace, Just a Couple of Days by Tony Vigorito, The Manchurian Candidate by Richard Condon, The Telling of Lies by Timothy Findley; and The Watchmen by John Altman; the films The Bourne Ultimatum, Conspiracy Theory, The Good Shepherd, Jacob’s Ladder, and The Killing Room; the television series Angel, The West Wing. The Lone Gunmen, Numb3rs, Bones, Quincy M.E. and The X-Files; the games Conspiracy X and The Suffering: Prison is Hell; the character Deathstroke the Terminator in the Teen Titans by DC Comics.
* The bands mk Ultra, MK-ULTRA, and a side project of Frank Tovey took their names from these projects. MKULTRA is also referenced by such musical artists as Black Rebel Motorcycle Club, Canibus, Exit Clov, Fatboy Slim, Green Magnet School, Immortal Technique, Manic Street Preachers, Muse, The Orb, Sirius Isness, Lustmord side project Terror Against Terror, Tokyo Police Club, and Unwound.
* MKULTRA also provides a name for a move by professional wrestler Sterling James Keenan.

* Short documentary about MKULTRA and the Frank Olson incident
* The Most Dangerous Game Downloadable 8 minute documentary by independent filmmakers GNN
* GIF scans of declassified MKULTRA Project Documents
* Interview of Alfred McCoy on CIA mind control research
* U.S. Supreme Court CIA v. SIMS, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) 471 U.S. 159
* U.S. Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. STANLEY, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) 483 U.S. 669

v • d • e
United States chemical weapons program
Agents and chemicals
3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) A Chlorine A Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) A Phosgene A QL A Sarin (GB) A Sulfur mustard (HD) A VX
Weapons
Bigeye bomb A M1 chemical mine A M104 155mm Cartridge A M110 155mm Cartridge A M121/A1 155mm Cartridge A M125 bomblet A M134 bomblet A M138 bomblet A M139 bomblet A M2 mortar A M23 chemical mine A M34 cluster bomb A M360 105mm Cartridge A M426 8-inch shell A M43 BZ cluster bomb A M44 generator cluster A M55 rocket A M60 105mm Cartridge A M687 155mm Cartridge A XM-736 8-inch projectile A MC-1 bomb A M47 bomb A Weteye bomb
Operations and testing
Dugway sheep incident A Edgewood Arsenal experiments A MKULTRA A Operation CHASE A Operation Geranium A Operation LAC A Operation Red Hat A Operation Steel Box A Operation Ranch Hand A Operation Top Hat A Project 112 A Project SHAD
Facilities
Anniston Army Depot A Anniston Chemical Activity A Blue Grass Army Depot A Deseret Chemical Depot A Edgewood Chemical Activity A Hawthorne Army Depot A Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System A Newport Chemical Depot A Pine Bluff Chemical Activity A Pueblo Chemical Depot A Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility A Umatilla Chemical Depot
Units and formations
1st Gas Regiment A U.S. Army Chemical Corps A Chemical mortar battalion
Equipment
Chemical Agent Identification Set A M93 Fox A MOPP A People sniffer
Related topics
Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory A Chlorine bombings in Iraq A Herbicidal warfare A List of topics A Poison gas in World War I A Tyler poison gas plot
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_MKULTRA
Categories: Devices to alter consciousness | History of the United States government | Central Intelligence Agency operations | Psychedelic research | LSD | Medical research | Military history of the United States | Military psychiatry | Mind control | 1953 establishments | Secret government programs | Human experimentation in the United States | Investigations and hearings of the United States Congress | Code names

The Pond (intelligence organization)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Pond was a small, secret organization formed by the government of the United States of America which operated between 1942 and 1955.[1] It engaged in espionage. Its existence has only recently been acknowledged.

In the spring of 1942, Brigadier General Hayes Kroner, the head of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Service, was given the go-ahead to set up an espionage organization separate from William Wild Bill Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services.[1] He selected U.S. Army Captain John or Jean Grombach to head it.[1] Grombach, the son of the French consul in New Orleans, had obtained American citizenship and graduated from West Point before World War II.[1]

In 1955, The Pond was disbanded by the American government because of post-war centralization of intelligence gathering and questions about the organization’s effectiveness.

On April 27, 2008, the Associated Press reported that the Central Intelligence Agency planned to release a stash of Pond-related papers accidentally discovered in a Virginia barn in 2001 and hand them over to the National Archives at College Park, Maryland.[2]

President’s Surveillance Program
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cover of the 10 July 2009 Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program

The President’s Surveillance Program (PSP) is a collection of secret intelligence activities authorized by then President of the United States George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks in 2001 as part of the War on Terrorism. The Terrorist Surveillance Program, which authorized warrantless wiretapping of international communications where one party to the communication was believed to be affiliated with al-Qa’ida, is the only part of the President’s program that has been publicly disclosed. The other intelligence activities covered under the same Presidential authorizations remain classified information, although the Attorney General publicly acknowledged the existence of such activities in 2007.[1] The other activities have reportedly included data mining of e-mail messages[2] and telephone call detail records in the NSA call database.[3]

The President’s Surveillance Program activities were periodically reauthorized by the President, and were later transitioned to authority granted in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008. The act required the Inspectors General of all intelligence agencies involved in the program to complete a comprehensive review of the activities through January 17, 2007, and produce an unclassified report within one year after enactment. The report published on July 10, 2009 concluded that the President’s program involved unprecedented collection activities, that went far beyond the scope of the Terrorist Surveillance Program.[1] The report raised questions over the legal underpinnings of the authorizations, a lack of oversight, excessive secrecy, and the effectiveness of the program.[4][5] The report concluded that the program was built on a factually flawed legal analysis.[6]

Public disclosure of the Terrorist Surveillance Program in 2005 ignited the NSA warrantless surveillance controversy. The other classified aspects of the program had also raised serious concerns within the Department of Justice over the program’s legal status and its potential effect on future criminal prosecutions. This caused conflicts with the White House that resulted in a dramatic confrontation in 2004 at the hospital bedside of the ailing Attorney General, and nearly lead to mass resignations of top Justice officials in protest when they were overruled.[7] The report on the program was also released during a period of intense negotiations over proposed language in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that would amend the National Security Act of 1947, increasing the requirements for briefing Congress on some classified intelligence programs like this one—President Barack Obama has threatened to veto the bill over that issue.[8]
Contents
[hide]

In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President of the United States authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct a classified program to detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. As part of the NSA’s classified program, several different intelligence activities were authorized in Presidential authorizations, and the details of these activities changed over time. The program was reauthorized by the President approximately every 45 days, with certain modifications. Collectively, the activities carried out under these authorizations are referred to as the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP).[1]

One of the activities authorized as part of the PSP was the interception of the content of communications into and out of the United States where there was a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al-Qa’ida, affiliated with al-Qa’ida, or a member of an organization affiliated with al-Qa’ida. After a series of articles published in The New York Times revealed classified details on this aspect of the PSP, they were publicly acknowledged and described by the President, the Attorney General, and other Administration officials beginning in December 2005, including a Presidential radio address on December 17, 2005. The President and other Administration officials labeled the publicly disclosed interception of the content of certain international communications by the NSA as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). The Attorney General subsequently publicly acknowledged the fact that other intelligence activities were also authorized under the same Presidential authorization, but the details of those activities remain classified.[1]

Several different agencies had roles in the PSP. At the request of the White House, the NSA was involved in providing the technical expertise necessary to create the program. The NSA also was responsible for conducting the actual collection of information under the PSP and disseminating intelligence reports to other agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for analysis and possible investigation. With the exception of the NSA, the Department of Defense (DoD) had limited involvement in the PSP.[1]

Components of the Department of Justice (DOJ) other than the FBI also were involved in the program. Most significantly, DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided advice to the White House and the Attorney General on the overall legality of the PSP. In addition, DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (now called the Office of Intelligence in DOJ’s National Security Division) worked with the FBI and the NSA to address the impact PSP-derived information had on proceedings under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). DOJ’s National Security Division also handled potential discovery issues that may have involved PSP-related information in international terrorism prosecutions.[1]

The CIA, in addition to receiving intelligence reports as PSP consumers, requested information from the program and used this information in its intelligence analyses. The CIA also initially prepared threat assessment memoranda that were used to support the periodic Presidential authorizations. Beginning in 2005, the newly created ODNI assumed responsibility for preparing these threat assessment memoranda. In addition, NCTC analysts received program information for possible use in analytical products prepared for the President, senior policymakers, and other Intelligence Community (IC) analysts and officers.[1]

PSP IG Group report
The Inspectors General (IGs) of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Justice (DOJ), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) – collectively the PSP IG Group – conducted the review required under the FISA Amendments Act. The 32 page unclassified report, dated July 10, 2009, summarized the portions of the collective results of the IG reviews that could be released in unclassified form. A separate classified report summarized the classified results of the individual IG reviews.[1] The classified report is reportedly several hundred pages long. The unclassified report revealed new details of internal deliberations over the programs, but few new details on the scope of the surveillance.[5]

The PSP IG Group collectively interviewed approximately 200 government and private sector personnel as part of this review. Among the interviewees were former and current senior government officials, including Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte, NSA and CIA Director and Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) Michael Hayden, White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The IGs did not have the power to compell testimony,[9] and Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Attorney General John Ashcroft, DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, and former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet declined the opportunity to be interviewed for the review.[1]

Origin of the program

In the days immediately after September 11, 2001, the NSA used its existing authorities to gather intelligence information in response to the terrorist attacks. When Director of Central Intelligence Tenet, on behalf of the White House, asked NSA Director Hayden whether the NSA could do more against terrorism, Hayden replied that nothing more could be done within existing authorities. When asked what he might do with more authority, Hayden said he put together information on what was operationally useful and technologically feasible. This information formed the basis of the PSP. Shortly thereafter, the President authorized the NSA to undertake a number of new, highly classified intelligence activities.[1]

The specific intelligence activities that were permitted by the Presidential Authorizations were highly classified. Former White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that it was the President’s decision to keep the program a close hold. Gonzales stated that the President made the decision on all requests to read in any non-operational persons, including DOJ officials. Attorney General Ashcroft approved the first Presidential Authorization for the PSP as to form and legality on the same day that he was read into the program in October 2001.[1]

The CIA initially prepared the threat assessment memoranda that were used to support the Presidential Authorization and periodic reauthorizations of the PSP. The memoranda documented intelligence assessments of the terrorist threats to the United States and to U.S. interests abroad from al-Qa’ida and affiliated terrorist organizations. Initially, the analysts who prepared the threat assessments were not read into the PSP and did not know how the threat assessments would be used.[1]
DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo was responsible for drafting the first series of legal memoranda supporting the program. Yoo was the only OLC official read into the PSP from the program’s inception in October 2001. Jay Bybee was OLC Assistant Attorney General at the time, and Yoo’s supervisor. However, Bybee stated he was never read into the PSP and could shed no further light on how Yoo came to draft the OLC opinions on the program. The first OLC opinion directly supporting the legality of the PSP was dated November 2, 2001, and was drafted by Yoo.[1]

NSA Director Hayden consulted with NSA senior technical experts and experienced attorneys from the NSA’s Office of General Counsel, but only Hayden knew about and participated in the development of the Presidential Authorization by serving as a technical advisor. After the Authorization was signed, NSA attorneys supported the lawfulness of the resulting program. After Hayden received the first Authorization, he assembled 80 to 90 people in a conference room and explained what the President had authorized. Hayden said: We’re going to do exactly what he said and not one photon or electron more. According to Hayden, the program was designed to provide the NSA with the operational agility to cover terrorism-related targets.[1]

Legal underpinnings
Initial justification

John Yoo was the sole OLC attorney who advised Attorney General Ashcroft and White House officials on the PSP from the program’s inception in October 2001 through Yoo’s resignation from DOJ in May 2003. Upon Yoo’s departure, another DOJ official, Patrick Philbin, was selected by the White House to be read into the PSP to assume Yoo’s role as advisor to the Attorney General concerning the program. In addition, Jack Goldsmith replaced Jay Bybee as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC on October 6,2003. Even though Bybee had never been read into the PSI, Philbin persuaded Counsel to the Vice President David Addington to read in Goldsmith, Bybee’s replacement. After being read into the PSP, Goldsmith and Philbin became concerned about the factual and legal basis for Yoo’s legal memoranda supporting the program.[1]

Goldsmith and Philbin began developing an analysis to more fully address the FISA statute with respect to the PSP. Beginning in August 2003, Philbin and later Goldsmith brought their concerns about the OLC legal opinions to Attorney General Ashcroft. In December 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Counsel to the Vice President Addington and White House Counsel Gonzales at the White House to express their growing concerns about the legal underpinnings of the program. In late January 2004, at Goldsmith’s request, the White House agreed to allow Deputy Attorney General James Comey to be read into the PSP following Comey’s confirmation as the Deputy Attorney General in December 2003. After being briefed, Comey agreed that the concerns about Yoo’s legal analysis were well-founded. Comey told the DOJ OIG that of particular concern to him and Goldsmith was the notion that Yoo’s legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full congressional notification.[1]

The DOJ OIG later concluded that it was extraordinary and inappropriate that a single DOJ attorney, John Yoo, was relied upon to conduct the initial legal assessment of the PSP, and that the lack of oversight and review of Yoo’s work, as customarily is the practice of OLC, contributed to a legal analysis of the PSP that at a minimum was factually flawed. Deficiencies in the legal memoranda became apparent once additional DOJ attorneys were read into the program in 2003 and when those attorneys sought a greater understanding of the PSP’s operation. The DOJ OIG concluded that the White House’s strict controls over DOJ access to the PSP undermined DOJ’s ability to perform its critical legal function during the PSP’s early phase of operation.[1]

Conflicts between DOJ and the White house

Comey told the DOJ OIG that he met with Attorney General Ashcroft on March 4, 2004, to discuss the PSP and that Ashcroft agreed with Comey and the other DOJ officials’ assessment of the potential legal problems with the PSP. Later that day, Ashcroft was struck with severe gallstone pancreatitis and was admitted to the George Washington University Hospital in Washington, D.C. Because of Ashcroft’s disability, Comey took over as Acting Attorney General.[1]

Later on March 5, Gonzales called Goldsmith to request a letter from OLC stating that Yoo’s prior OLC opinions covered the program, meaning the PSP. Goldsmith, Philbin, and Comey re-examined Yoo’s memoranda and concluded that Yoo’s memoranda did not accurately describe some of the Other Intelligence Activities that were being conducted under the Presidential Authorizations implementing the PSP, and that the memoranda therefore did not provide a basis for finding that these activities were legal. On Saturday, March 6, Goldsmith and Philbin, with Comey’s concurrence, met with Addington and Gonzales at the White House to convey their conclusions that certain activities in the PSP should cease.[1]

After a series of follow-up meetings between DOJ and White House officials, the President instructed Vice President Cheney on the morning of Wednesday, March 10, to call a meeting with congressional leaders to advise them of the impasse with DOJ. A meeting with the Top administration officials, and the congressional leaders known as the Gang of Eight, but without DOJ personnel, was convened in the White House Situation Room later that day. According to Gonzales’s notes of the meeting, the consensus of the congressional leaders was that the program should continue. However, after Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 24, 2007, Representative Nancy Pelosi, Senator Jay Rockefeller, and Senator Tom Daschle issued statements sharply disputing Gonzales’s characterization of their statements at the March 10, 2004 meeting, stating that there was no consensus at the meeting that the program should proceed.[1]

Ashcroft hospital bedside meeting

Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that following the meeting with the congressional leaders on March 10, President Bush instructed him and Card to go to the George Washington University Hospital to speak to Ashcroft, who was in the intensive care unit recovering from surgery. At approximately 7:00 p.m. that day, Comey learned that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital to see Ashcroft. He relayed this information to FBI Director Mueller, and told him that Ashcroft was in no condition to receive guests, much less make a decision about whether to recertify the PSP. Philbin said he was leaving work that evening when he received a call from Comey, who told Philbin that he needed to get to the hospital right away and to call Goldsmith and tell him what was happening.[1]

Comey recalled that he ran up the stairs with his security detail to Ashcroft’s floor, and he entered Ashcroft’s room, which he described as darkened, and found Ashcroft lying in bed and his wife standing by his side. Comey said he began speaking to Ashcroft, and that it was not clear that Ashcroft could focus and that he seemed pretty bad off. Goldsmith and Philbin arrived at the hospital within a few minutes of each other, and met with Comey in an adjacent room. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin later entered Ashcroft’s room and, according to Goldsmith’s notes, Comey and the others advised Ashcroft not to sign anything. [1]

When Gonzales and Card arrived, they entered Ashcroft’s hospital room and stood across from Mrs. Ashcroft at the head of the bed, with Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin behind them. Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that he carried with him in a manila envelope the March 11, 2004, Presidential authorization for Ashcroft to sign. According to Philbin, Gonzales first asked Ashcroft how he was feeling and Ashcroft replied, Not well. Gonzales then said words to the effect, You know, there’s a reauthorization that has to be renewed …. [1]

Comey testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee that at this point Ashcroft told Gonzales and Card in very strong terms about his legal concerns with the PSP, which Comey testified Ashcroft drew from his meeting with Comey about the program a week earlier. Comey testified that Ashcroft next stated: ‘But that doesn’t matter, because I’m not the Attorney General. There is the Attorney General,’ and he pointed to me – I was just to his left. The two men [Gonzales and Card] did not acknowledge me; they turned and walked from the room. [1]

Gonzales, subsequently summoned Comey to the White House, and he brought United States Solicitor General Theodore Olson with him as a witness. Andy Card was also present for this meeting which took place later that evening. Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that little more was achieved at this meeting other than a general acknowledgment that a situation continued to exist because of the disagreement between DOJ and the White House regarding legal authorization for the program.[1]

White House Counsel reauthorization

On the morning of March 11, 2004, with the Presidential Authorization set to expire, President Bush signed a new Authorization for the PSP. In a departure from the past practice of having the Attorney General certify the Authorization as to form and legality, the March 11 Authorization was certified by White House Counsel Gonzales. At noon on March 11, Director Mueller met with Card at the White House. According to Mueller’s notes, Card told Mueller that if no legislative fix could be found by May 6, 2004, when the March 11 Authorization was set to expire, the program would be discontinued. Mueller wrote that he told Card that the failure to have DOJ representation at the congressional briefing and the attempt to have Ashcroft certify the Authorization without going through Corney gave the strong perception that the [White House] was trying to do an end run around the Acting [Attorney General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portions of the program. [1]

Several senior DOJ and FBI officials considered resigning after the Presidential Authorization was signed without DOJ’s concurrence. Corney told the DOJ OIG that he drafted a letter of resignation because he believed it was impossible for him to remain with DOJ if the President would do something DOJ said was not legally supportable. Corney also testified that Ashcroft’s Chief of Staff David Ayres believed Ashcroft also was likely to resign and thus Ayres urged Corney to wait until Ashcroft was well enough to resign with him. Goldsmith told the DOJ OIG he drafted a resignation letter at around the same time as Corney. According to his contemporaneous notes, Goldsmith cited the shoddiness of the prior OLC legal review, the over-secrecy of the PSP, and the shameful incident at the hospital as among his grievances.[1]

At approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 12, 2004, FBI Director Mueller drafted by hand a letter to withdraw the FBI from participation in the program. Mueller told the DOJ OIG that he planned on having the letter typed and then tendering it, but that based on subsequent events his resignation was not necessary. Later that morning, the President met with Mueller. According to Mueller’s notes, Mueller told the President of his concerns regarding the FBI’s continued participation in the program, and that he was considering resigning if the FBI were directed to continue to participate without the concurrence of the Attorney General. Mueller wrote that he explained to the President that he had an independent obligation to the FBI and to DOJ to assure the legality of actions we undertook, and that a presidential order alone could not do that. According to Mueller’s notes, the President then directed Mueller to. meet with Corney and other PSP principals to address the legal concerns so that the FBI could continue participating in the program as appropriate under the law. [1]

On March 17, 2004 the President decided to modify certain PSP intelligence-gathering activities and to discontinue certain Other Intelligence Activities that DOJ believed were legally unsupported. The President’s directive was expressed in two modifications to the March 11, 2004 Presidential Authorization. On May 6,2004 Goldsmith and Philbin completed an OLC legal memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP as it was operating at that time. The OLC memorandum stated that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001 gave the President authority to use both domestically and abroad all necessary and appropriate force, including signals intelligence capabilities, to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States.[1]

Transfer to FISA

Certain activities that were originally authorized as part of the PSP have subsequently been authorized under orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). The activities transitioned in this manner included the interception of certain international communications that the President publicly described as the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Further details regarding this transition are classified. As a result of this transition, the President decided not to reauthorize these activities and the final Presidential Authorization expired on February 1, 2007. The Protect America Act of 2007, passed in August of that year, amended FISA to address the government’s ability to conduct electronic surveillance in the United States of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. This legislation expired in early 2008, and in July 2008 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 was enacted.[1]

The DOJ OIG review concluded that several considerations favored initiating the process of transitioning the PSP to FISA authority earlier than had been done, especially as the program became less a temporary response to the September 11 terrorist attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool. These considerations included the PSP’s effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons, the instability of the legal reasoning on which the program rested for several years, and the substantial restrictions placed on FBI agents’ access to and use of program-derived information due to the highly classified status of the PSP.[1]

Briefings

Each Presidential Authorization also included a requirement to maintain the secrecy of the activities carried out under the program. The President also noted his intention to inform appropriate members of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the program as soon as I judge that it can be done consistently with national defense needs. According to the NSA, between October 25,2001, and January 17,2007, Hayden and current NSA Director Keith B. Alexander, sometimes supported by other NSA personnel, conducted approximately 49 briefings to members of Congress and their staff, 17 of which took place before the December 2005 media reports regarding what was called the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Hayden told the IGs that during the many PSP briefings to members of Congress no one ever suggested that NSA should stop the program.[1]

From January 2002 to January 2006, only Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Presiding Judge Royce C. Lamberth, followed by Presiding Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, were read into the PSP. The circumstances under which the Presiding Judge was notified of the existence of the PSP and read into the program, and the measures subsequently taken to address the effect of the PSP on the government’s relationship with the FISC are only revealed in the classified report.[1]

Discovery issues

DOJ was aware as early as 2002 that information collected under the PSP could have implications for DOJ’s litigation responsibilities under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 and Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Analysis of this discovery issue was first assigned to OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo in 2003. However, no DOJ attorneys with terrorism prosecution responsibilities were read into the PSP until mid-2004, and as a result DOJ continued to lack the advice of attorneys who were best equipped to identify and examine the discovery issues in connection with the PSP. The steps taken since then to address discovery issues with respect to the PSP are discussed only in the classified report. The DOJ may need to re-examine past cases to see whether potentially discoverable but undisclosed Rule 16 or Brady material was collected under the PSP, to ensure that it has complied with its discovery obligations in such cases.[1]

Effectiveness

The IGs also examined the impact of PSP information on counterterrorism efforts. Many senior IC officials believe that the PSP filled a gap in intelligence collection thought to exist under the FISA statute shortly after the al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks against the United States. Others within the IC, including FBI agents, CIA analysts and officers, and other officials had difficulty evaluating the precise contribution of the PSP to counterterrorism efforts because it was most often viewed as one source among many available analytic and intelligence-gathering tools in these efforts. The IG reports describe several examples of how PSP-derived information factored into specific investigations and operations.[1]

During the May 2006 Senate hearing on his nomination to be CIA Director, Hayden said that, had the PSP been in place before the September 2001 attacks, hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi almost certainly would have been identified and located. In May 2009, Hayden told NSA OIG that the value of the Program was in knowing that NSA signals intelligence activities under the PSP covered an important quadrant of terrorist communications. NSA’s Deputy Director echoed Hayden’s comment when he said that the value of the PSP was in the confidence it provided that someone was looking at the seam between the foreign and domestic intelligence domains.[1]

The DOJ OIG found that the exceptionally compartmented nature of the program created some frustration for FBI personnel. Some agents and analysts criticized the PSP-derived information they received for providing insufficient details, and the agents who managed counterterrorism programs at the FBI field offices the DOJ OIG visited said the FBI’s process for disseminating PSP-derived information failed to adequately prioritize the information for investigation. In sum, the DOJ OIG found it difficult to assess or quantify the overall effectiveness of the PSP program as it relates to the FBI’s counterterrorism activities. However, based on the interviews conducted and documents reviewed, the DOJ OIG concluded that although PSP-derived information had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in the FBI’s overall counterterrorism efforts.[1]

The CIA OIG determined that several factors hindered the CIA in making full use of the product of the PSP. Many CIA officials stated that too few CIA personnel at the working level were read into the PSP. The CIA OIG determined that the CIA did not implement procedures to assess the usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether particular PSP reporting had contributed to successful counterterrorism operations. In a May 2006 briefing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a senior CIA official said that PSP reporting was rarely the sole basis for an intelligence success, but that it frequently played a supporting role.[1]

Reaction

Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), issued a statement on the day the report was released saying, no president should be able to operate outside the law. She was responding specifically to a statement in the report attributed to former Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey that,[6] Yoo’s legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full congressional notification. [1] Pelosi further stated that, the House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees will closely examine the findings and recommendations of the classified and unclassified reports, and will conduct appropriate oversight of electronic surveillance activities. [6]

John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.), House Judiciary Committee Chairman, made the following comments in an official statement on the day the report was released: This report, mandated by Congress last year, documents what many of us in Congress concluded long ago: President Bush’s warrantless surveillance program was illegal from the beginning, and of questionable value. It clearly violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which regulates domestic surveillance for intelligence purposes, and was based on legal analysis that was ‘factually flawed’…. The refusal of key Bush administration officials such as David Addington and John Yoo to cooperate with the IGs’ review underscores the need for an independent commission with subpoena power to further review these issues, as I have called for. [10][11]

Conyers’ counterpart on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), issued a statement on the report saying its conclusions should highlight rule-of-law issues ignored by the previous administration. Leahy said, This report underscores why we should move forward with a nonpartisan commission of inquiry. Without a thorough, independent review of decisions that run counter to our laws and treaties, we cannot ensure that these same mistakes are not repeated. Such a commission must have bipartisan support to be able to truly get to the bottom of these issues with objectivity and credibility. [12]

Shortly after the report was released, former NSA Director Michael Hayden, who designed and implemented the program in 2001, told the Associated Press that he personally briefed key members of congress on the program. He maintained that the members were kept well-informed, and was distressed by suggestions that they were not. Hayden said key members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of both parties were briefed about four times a year, but admitted that the number of lawmakers informed was intentionally limited as the program was highly classified.[13]
Timeline

* 2001-09-11: September 11 Attacks kill approximately 3000 people in the U.S.
* 2001-10-25: First Congressional briefing on the surveillance program[1]
* 2001-11-02: Date of first OLC opinion directly supporting the legality of the PSP (drafted by John Yoo)[1]
* 2002-12-11: Yoo drafted another opinion concerning the PSP using the same basic analysis contained in his November 2, 2001 memo[1]
* 2003-03: Yoo’s supervisor Jay Bybee resigns as the Assistant Attorney General for the OLC,[1] to become a U.S. Court of Appeals judge
* 2003-05: Yoo resigns from DOJ[1]
* 2003-10-06: Jack Goldsmith replaced Jay Bybee as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC[1]
* 2003-12: Goldsmith and Patrick Philbin met with David Addington, and Alberto Gonzales to express their concerns[1]
* 2004-01: Goldsmith’s request for the new Deputy AG James Comey to be read into the PSP is granted[1] by Addington[14]
* 2004-02-19: Mike Hayden and Vito Potenza from NSA meet with Comey to read him in to the program in the Justice Department’s SCIF[14]
* 2004-02-19: Hayden tells Comey, I’m so glad you’re getting read in, because now I won’t be alone at the [witness] table when John Kerry is elected president [14]
* 2004-03-01: Comey discussed DOJ’s concerns about the legality of the program with FBI Director Robert Mueller[1]
* 2004-03-04: Comey met with Attorney General John Ashcroft to discuss his concerns on the legality of the PSP [1]
* 2004-03-04: Attorney General Ashcroft is hospitalized that evening[1]
* 2004-03-05: Comey takes over as Acting Attorney General[1]
* 2004-03-05: Gonzales calls Goldsmith to request letter reaffirming Yoo’s prior OLC opinions[1]
* 2004-03-06: Goldsmith and Philbin met with Addington and Gonzales at the White House to tell them that certain activities in the PSP should cease.[1]
* 2004-03-07: Goldsmith and Philbin met again with Addington and Gonzales at the White House.[1]
* 2004-03-09: Gonzales called Goldsmith to the White House in an effort to persuade him that his criticisms of Yoo’s memoranda were incorrect[1]
* 2004-03-09: Another meeting at the White House was held with Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin present[1]
* 2004-03-10: Comey learns his old friend, then Deputy National Security Advisor Frances Townsend, is not read in, so he cannot consult her.[14]
* 2004-03-10: Goldsmith, Philbin, and Comey met to discuss the meeting at the White House the day before and how DOJ should proceed[1]
* 2004-03-10: Vice President Dick Cheney decides to get personally involved in the reauthorization[14]
* 2004-03-10: Gonzales, Cheney, Card, Hayden, and others, convened an emergency meeting with the Gang of Eight in the White House Situation Room[1]
* 2004-03-10: Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin rush to the hospital to tell Ashcroft not to sign anything[1]
* 2004-03-10: Gonzales and Card entered Ashcroft’s hospital room with the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization for Ashcroft to sign[1]
* 2004-03-10: Ashcroft told Gonzales and Card in very strong terms about his legal concerns with the PSP and referred them to Comey[1]
* 2004-03-10: Gonzales and Card left the hospital and then summoned Comey to the White House before he had left[1]
* 2004-03-10: Goldsmith called his deputy at OLC M. Edward Whelan III and told him to go to the office to draft a resignation letter for him, without explanation[15]
* 2004-03-10: After calling Comey, Card learns that top Justice staff are planning to resign[15]
* 2004-03-10: Comey brings Ted Olson to the White House at about 11:00 p.m. to witness the meeting with Gonzales and Card[1]
* 2004-03-10: Card confronts Comey over the resignation rumor, and learns that Comey is planning to resign [15]
* 2004-03-11: Addington re-types the code-word-classified Presidential authorization, replacing the signature line for Ashcroft with Gonzales[15]
* 2004-03-11: President George W. Bush signed a new Authorization for the PSP certified by White House Counsel Gonzales instead of the Attorney General[1]
* 2004-03-11: After learning the PSP was reauthorized, Comey types a resignation letter, but holds it at the request of Ashcroft’s Chief of Staff David Ayers
* 2004-03-12: Mueller drafts a resignation letter[1]
* 2004-03-12: National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice suggests that President Bush talk directly to Comey to “hear him out”[15]
* 2004-03-12: At the end of his daily briefing, Bush calls Comey aside, and asked him wait another 45 days, but Comey declines[15]
* 2004-03-12: After learning from Comey that Mueller planned to resign, Bush met with him privately and tells Mueller to tell Comey to do what “needs to be done.”[15]
* 2004-03-16: Comey drafted a memorandum to White House Counsel Gonzales setting out his advice to the President. Gonzales sent a dismissive reply[1]
* 2004-03-17: Bush modifies some PSP intelligence-gathering activities and discontinues others that DOJ believed not were legally supported[1]
* 2004-03-31: Ashcroft is cleared by his doctors to resume his duties as Attorney General[1]
* 2004-05-06: Goldsmith and Philbin completed an OLC legal memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP as it was operating at that time[1]
* 2004-05-06: The March 11 Authorization was set to expire[1]
* 2004-11-02: George W. Bush is re-elected President of the United States
* 2005-12-16: The New York Times publishes the first article describing NSA warrantless wiretaps[16]
* 2005-12-17: President Bush describes the TSP in a radio address[1]
* 2005-12-19: Gonzales & Hayden discuss legal issues around the TSP in a joint press conference[17]
* 2006-07-18: Gonzales testifies before the Senate Judiciary Committee[1]
* 2007-02-01: The President decided not to reauthorize these activities and the final Presidential Authorization expired[1]
* 2007-07-24: Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about the March 10, 2004, Gang of Eight briefing[1]
* 2007-08-05: The Protect America Act was enacted, amending FISA to address the government’s ability to conduct domestic electronic surveillance[1]
* 2008-02-17: The Protect America Act expired[1]
* 2008-07-10: The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 was enacted, providing broader authority than the acknowledged TSP scope[1]
* 2009-07-10: Inspectors General report required under FISA Amendments Act released[1]

1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz Inspectors General of the DoD, DOJ, CIA, NSA, and ODN (2009-07-10) Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program. Report. Retrieved on 2009-07-11. “Finally, the collection activities pursued under the PSP, and under FISA following the PSP’s transition to that authority, involved unprecedented collection activities. We believe the retention and use by IC organizations of information collected under the PSP and FISA should be carefully monitored.”
2. ^ U.S. Wiretapping of Limited Value, Officials Report . The New York Times. 2009-07-12. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11/us/11nsa.html?_r=1. Retrieved 2009-07-12. The report states that at the same time Mr. Bush authorized the warrantless wiretapping operation, he also signed off on other surveillance programs that the government has never publicly acknowledged. While the report does not identify them, current and former officials say that those programs included data mining of e-mail messages of Americans.
3. ^ Cauley, Leslie (2006-05-11). NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone calls . USA Today. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm. Retrieved 2009-07-12. The National Security Agency has been secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth, people with direct knowledge of the arrangement told USA TODAY.
4. ^ Hess, Pamela (2009-07-11). Report: Too few officials knew of surveillance . Google News. The Associated Press. http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hEr2O_sANlmWwPWdPygTxCbq1_bQD99C4KI00. Retrieved 2009-07-11. Not enough relevant officials were aware of the size and depth of an unprecedented surveillance program started under President George W. Bush, let alone signed off on it, a team of federal inspectors general found. The Bush White House pulled in a great quantity of information far beyond the warrantless wiretapping previously acknowledged, the IGs reported. They questioned the legal basis for the effort but shielded almost all details on grounds they’re still too secret to reveal.
5. ^ a b Taylor, Marisa (2009-07-11). Report: Effectiveness of Bush wiretap program disputed . Miami Herald. McClatchy News Service. http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/1136936.html. Retrieved 2009-07-11. A declassified intelligence report faults the Bush administration’s secrecy about its warrantless wiretap program. Despite the Bush administration’s insistence that its warrantless eavesdropping program was necessary to protect the country from another terrorist attack, FBI agents, CIA analysts and other officials had difficulty evaluating its effectiveness, according to an unclassified government report made public Friday.
6. ^ a b c Bush-era wiretap program had limited results, report finds . CNN.com date=2009-07-12. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/12/bush.wiretap/. Retrieved 2009-07-12. Former Deputy Attorney General James Comey, who took part in that face-off, told investigators that the program’s original authorization ‘involved ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full congressional notification.’ That line drew the ire of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who issued a statement Friday declaring that ‘no president should be able to operate outside the law.’
7. ^ Johnson, Carrie; Nakashima, Ellen (2009-07-12). Report: Wiretaps risked a crisis . Philadelphia Inquirer. The Washington Post. http://www.philly.com/inquirer/front_page/20090711_Report__Wiretaps_risked_a_crisis.html. Retrieved 2009-07-12. The Bush White House so strictly controlled access to its warrantless-eavesdropping program that only three Justice Department lawyers were aware of the plan, which nearly ignited mass resignations and a constitutional crisis when a wider circle of administration officials began to question its legality, according to a watchdog report released yesterday.
8. ^ Shane, Scott (2009-07-12). Cheney Is Linked to Concealment of C.I.A. Project . The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/politics/12intel.html?hp. Retrieved 2009-07-12. Democrats in Congress, who contend that the Bush administration improperly limited Congressional briefings on intelligence, are seeking to change the National Security Act to permit the full intelligence committees to be briefed on more matters. President Obama, however, has threatened to veto the intelligence authorization bill if the changes go too far, and the proposal is now being negotiated by the White House and the intelligence committees.
9. ^ Johnson, Carrie; Nakashima, Ellen (2009-07-11). Inspectors General Report Faults Secrecy of Surveillance Program . The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/10/AR2009071002536.html?wprss=rss_print/asection. Retrieved 2009-07-11. ‘Extraordinary and inappropriate’ secrecy about a warrantless eavesdropping program undermined its effectiveness as a terrorism-fighting tool, government watchdogs have concluded in the first examination of one of the most contentious episodes of the Bush administration.
10. ^ Conyers: IG Report Shows Bush Broke the Law, Personally Authorizing the Warrantless Surveillance Program . House Committee on the Judiciary. http://judiciary.house.gov/news/090710.html.
11. ^ Stern, Christopher (2009-07-10). Bush Wiretapping Program Lacked Proper Legal Review (Update1) . Bloomberg.com. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ai0sdApeGhds. Retrieved 2009-07-12. ‘President Bush’s warrantless surveillance program was illegal from the beginning and of questionable value,’ said House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers, a Michigan Democrat, in an e-mailed statement.
12. ^ AFP: US govt review questions effectiveness of wiretaps . Google News. 2009-07-11. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gbmJ61GItjVdbI6rLlbNlq-8wneA. Retrieved 2009-07-12. Democrat Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said in a statement that the conclusions of this review should help shed more light on these rule-of-law issues that the previous administration avoided for a long time.
13. ^ Hess, Pamela (2009-07-12). AP Interview: Hayden denies Congress not informed . Google News. Associated Press. http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iwJhPuY4ndVAdfJgwbiS3uh7uIGgD99CJOBO0. Retrieved 2009-07-12. Former CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden angrily struck back Saturday at assertions the Bush administration’s post-9/11 surveillance program was more far-reaching than imagined and was largely concealed from congressional overseers. In an interview with The Associated Press, Hayden maintained that top members of Congress were kept well-informed all along the way, notwithstanding protests from some that they were kept in the dark.
14. ^ a b c d e Gellman, Barton (2008-09-14). Conflict Over Spying Led White House to Brink . The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/13/AR2008091302284.html?sid=ST2008091302818. Retrieved 2009-07-13. This is the first of two stories adapted from Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, to be published Tuesday by Penguin Press.
15. ^ a b c d e f g Gellman, Barton (2008-09-15). Cheney Shielded Bush From Crisis – washingtonpost.com . The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/14/AR2008091401974.html. Retrieved 2009-07-13. This is the second of two stories adapted from Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, to be published Tuesday by Penguin Press.
16. ^ Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts . NYT’s Risen & Lichtblau’s December 16, 2005 Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts . http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1216-01.htm. Retrieved February 18 2006. via commondreams.org
17. ^ The White House (December 19, 2005). Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence . Press release. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html.

External links

* Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program on Wikisource.

PD-icon.svg This article incorporates public domain material from the United States Government document Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program, 10 July 2009 .
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Categories: Anti-terrorism policy of the United States | Counter-terrorism | George W. Bush administration controversies | National Security Agency | Secret government programs | Surveillance | War on Terrorism | Intelligence operations

The Nuclear fallout reference article from the English Wikipedia on 24-Jul-2004
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Nuclear fallout
For people who check facts

Fallout is radioactive dust created when a nuclear weapon explodes. A nuclear explosion vaporizes any material within the fireball, including the ground if it is nearby. In water, the minerals (including sodium in ocean water) are made radioactive by neutrons from the bomb core. Fallout from seawater is unusually dangerous because it is difficult to remove by washing.

When this material condenses in the cloud, it forms dust and light sandy material that resembles ground pumice. In the case of seawater, it forms a heavy fog from the base of the mushroom cloud (the base surge ). This highly irradiated material then falls to earth. The fallout behaves much like thousands of tiny x-ray machines, emitting gamma rays in all directions. A fallout shelter is designed to shield its occupants from this radiation. However, some radioactive contamination will probably remain when the inhabitants eventually emerge.

The closer to ground an atomic bomb is detonated, the more dust and debris is thrown into the air, resulting in greater amounts of fallout. From a tactical standpoint, this has the disadvantage of hindering any occupation efforts until the fallout clears, but more directly, the impact with the ground severely limits the destructive force of the bomb. For these reasons, ground bursts are not usually considered tactically advantageous, with the exception of hardened underground targets such as missile silos or command centers such as Cheyenne Mountain. Salting enemy territory with a fallout-heavy atomic burst could be used to deny enemy access to a contaminated area but such use is generally not considered an ethical military action.

The fallout residue can be used to analyze the source and nature of the weapon used. Materials used in the weapon will have distinct signature, which with proper analysis could reveal where or by whom the weapon was made.

Table of contents [showhide]
1 Effects of fallout
1.1 See also
2 Nuclear fallout
2.2 See also
3 References

Effects of fallout

Initial radiation from fallout can exceed 300 gray per hour (Gy/h) immediately downwind of a ground burst. A cumulative dose of 4.5 Gy is fatal to half of a population of humans. There have been no documented cases of survival beyond 6 Gy. Most people become ill after an exposure to 1 Gy or more. The fetuses of pregnant women are vulnerable and may miscarry, especially in the first trimester. Human biology resists mutation from large radiation exposure: grossly mutated fetuses usually miscarry. Civilian dose rates in peace-time range from 0.1 to 0.03 mGy/year.

Fallout radiation falls off (‘decays’) exponentially (quickly) with time. Most areas become safe for travel and decontamination after three to five weeks.

The ground track of fallout from an explosion is a long, thin fuzzy ellipse downwind of the explosion. It may be hundreds of km long, and up to 50 km (30mi) wide from a single explosion. Rain can cause fallout to settle more quickly. This means that a rainstorm can significantly increase the hazards to those just downwind of a nuclear war.

The most dangerous emissions from fallout are gamma rays, which travel in straight lines, like ordinary light. The fallout particles emit the invisible, deadly gamma rays in the same way that a light bulb emits light. Gamma rays are invisible, and cannot be seen, smelt, or felt, even at very dangerous intensities. Special equipment is required to detect and measure gamma rays.

Gamma rays do not contaminate people or objects. Fallout particles contaminate people or objects, and since they resemble sand, they can be brushed off, or washed off. The radioactive fog from seawater is a notable exception, being very difficult to wash off. The particles should be removed from the shelter, or shielded. Emergency drinking water can be adequately cleaned by filtering contaminated water through more than 25cm (10 in) of dirt. Food in sealed packages is not poisoned by fallout. Stored grain and exposed fruit can be cleaned and peeled. Vehicles are usually washed down with fire-hoses, into drains with removable filters, or deep trenches. Ground is usually decontaminated by bulldozing the fallout into deep, narrow trenches, and then back-filling the trenches.

The residual radiation hazard from a nuclear explosion is in the form of radioactive fallout and neutron-induced activity. Residual ionizing radiation arises from:

* Fission Products. These are intermediate weight isotopes which are formed when a heavy uranium or plutonium nucleus is split in a fission reaction. There are over 300 different fission products that may result from a fission reaction. Many of these are radioactive with widely differing half-lives. Some are very short, i.e., fractions of a second, while a few are long enough that the materials can be a hazard for months or years. Their principal mode of decay is by the emission of beta and gamma radiation. Approximately 60 grams of fission products are formed per kiloton of yield. The estimated activity of this quantity of fission products 1 minute after detonation is equal to that of 1.1 x 1021 Bq (30 million kg of radium) in equilibrium with its decay products.
* Unfissioned Nuclear Material. Nuclear weapons are relatively inefficient in their use of fissionable material, and much of the uranium and plutonium is dispersed by the explosion without undergoing fission. Such unfissioned nuclear material decays by the emission of alpha particles and is of relatively minor importance.
* Neutron-Induced Activity. If atomic nuclei capture neutrons when exposed to a flux of neutron radiation, they will, as a rule, become radioactive (neutron-induced activity) and then decay by emission of beta and gamma radiation over an extended period of time. Neutrons emitted as part of the initial nuclear radiation will cause activation of the weapon residues. In addition, atoms of environmental material, such as soil, air, and water, may be activated, depending on their composition and distance from the burst. For example, a small area around ground zero may become hazardous as a result of exposure of the minerals in the soil to initial neutron radiation. This is due principally to neutron capture by sodium (Na), manganese, aluminum, and silicon in the soil. This is a negligible hazard because of the limited area involved.

Worldwide Fallout: After an air burst the fission products, unfissioned nuclear material, and weapon residues which have been vaporized by the heat of the fireball will condense into a fine suspension of very small particles 0.01 to 20 micrometers in diameter. These particles may be quickly drawn up into the stratosphere, particularly if the explosive yield exceeds 10 kt. They will then be dispersed by atmospheric winds and will gradually settle to the earth’s surface after weeks, months, and even years as worldwide fallout.

The radiobiological hazard of worldwide fallout is essentially a long-term one due to the potential accumulation of long-lived radioisotopes, such as strontium-90 and caesium-137, in the body as a result of ingestion of foods incorporating these radioactive materials. This hazard is much less serious than those which are associated with local fallout and, therefore, is not discussed at length in this publication. Local fallout is of much greater immediate operational concern.

This type of fallout is featured in the book On the Beach by British author Nevil Shute.

Local fallout: In a land or water surface burst, large amounts of earth or water will be vaporized by the heat of the fireball and drawn up into the radioactive cloud. This material will become radioactive when it condenses, with fission products and other radiocontaminants that have become neutron-activated.

There will be large amounts of particles of less than 0.1 micrometer to several millimeters in diameter generated in a surface burst in addition to the very fine particles which contribute to worldwide fallout.

The larger particles will not rise into the stratosphere and consequently will settle to earth within about 24 hours as local fallout.
Severe local fallout contamination can extend far beyond the blast and thermal effects, particularly in the case of high yield surface detonations.

Whenever individuals remain in a radiologically contaminated area, such contamination will lead to an immediate external radiation exposure as well as a possible later internal hazard due to inhalation and ingestion of radiocontaminants.

In severe cases of fallout contamination, lethal doses of external radiation may be incurred if protective or evasive measures are not undertaken.

In cases of water surface (and shallow underwater) bursts, the particles tend to be rather lighter and smaller and so produce less local fallout but will extend over a greater area. The particles contain mostly sea salts with some water; these can have a cloud seeding affect causing local rainout and areas of high local fallout.

For subsurface bursts, there is an additional phenomenon present called base surge. The base surge is a cloud that rolls outward from the bottom of the column produced by a subsurface explosion. For underwater bursts the visible surge is, in effect, a cloud of liquid (water) droplets with the property of flowing almost as if it were a homogeneous fluid. After the water evaporates, an invisible base surge of small radioactive particles may persist.

For subsurface land bursts, the surge is made up of small solid particles, but it still behaves like a fluid. A soil earth medium favors base surge formation in an underground burst.

Meteorological Effects: Meteorological conditions will greatly influence fallout, particularly local fallout. Atmospheric winds are able to distribute fallout over large areas. For example, as a result of a surface burst of a 15 Mt thermonuclear device at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954, a roughly cigar-shaped area of the Pacific extending over 500 km downwind and varying in width to a maximum of 100 km was severely contaminated.

Snow and rain, especially if they come from considerable heights, will accelerate local fallout. Under special meteorological conditions, such as a local rain shower that originates above the radioactive cloud, limited areas of heavy contamination may be formed.

Blast and thermal injuries in many cases will far outnumber radiation injuries. However, radiation effects are considerably more complex and varied than are blast or thermal effects and are subject to considerable misunderstanding. A wide range of biological changes may follow the irradiation of animals, ranging from rapid death following high doses of penetrating whole-body radiation to essentially normal lives for a variable period of time until the development of delayed radiation effects, in a portion of the exposed population, following low dose exposures.

Median Lethal Dose (LD50): When comparing the effects of various types or circumstances, that dose which is lethal to 50% of a given population is a very useful parameter. The term is usually defined for a specific time, being limited, generally, to studies of acute lethality. The common time periods used are 30 days or less for most small laboratory animals and to 60 days for large animals and humans. It should be understood that the LD50 assumes that the individuals did not receive other injuries or medical treatment.

For yields of 5-10 kt (or less), initial nuclear radiation is the dominant casualty producer on the battlefield. Military personnel receiving an acute incapacitation dose (30 Gray) will become performance degraded almost immediately and combat ineffective within several hours. However, they will not die until 5-6 days after exposure if they do not receive any other injuries which make them more susceptible to the radiation dose. Soldiers receiving less than a total of 150 cGray will remain combat effective. Between those two extremes, military personnel receiving doses greater than 150 cGray will become degraded; some will eventually die. A dose of 530-830 cGray is considered lethal but not immediately incapacitating. Personnel exposed to this amount of radiation will become performance degraded within 2-3 hours, depending on how physically demanding the tasks they must perform are, and will remain in this degraded state at least 2 days. However, at that point they will experience a recovery period and be effective at performing nondemanding tasks for about 6 days, after which they will relapse into a degraded state of performance and remain so for about 4 weeks. At this time they will begin exhibiting radiation symptoms of sufficient severity to render them totally ineffective. Death follows at approximately 6 weeks after exposure.

Late or delayed effects of radiation occur following a wide range of doses and dose rates. Delayed effects may appear months to years after irradiation and include a wide variety of effects involving almost all tissues or organs. Some of the possible delayed consequences of radiation injury are life shortening, carcinogenesis, cataract formation, chronic radiodermatitis, decreased fertility, and genetic mutations.

For videos and more on the effects of a thermonuclear device check [1]

Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, plutonium, and uranium enriched in the isotopes U-233 or U-235. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—known as weapons usable material-are considered to pose the greatest proliferation risk because they are used to produce nuclear weapons. In 1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Sixty-nine countries, or about one-half of IAEA’s member states, currently participate in the database. As of December 31, 2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons-usable material. According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the information has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact from the reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, 17 involved either HEU or plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents involving weapons-usable material occurred during 1993-95. The remaining cases occurred during 1999-2001.

Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U-235 is considered weapons-usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or the weight of a paperclip.

Tanzanian police arrested one individual last week and seized a container of radioactive cesium.
9 March

Romanian police announced on 8 March that they are holding two individuals for attempting to sell stolen radioactive material, according to press reports. A po lice spokesman announced that two had in their possession 82 kg of radioactive material including low enriched uranium. Officials also found reportedly secret documents stolen from the Research and Design Center for Radioactive Metals.
4 March

UPDATE (12 February): According to press reports, Lithuanian officials have determined that the 100 kg of radioactive material seized last month from an armed gang is uranium-238. This material was stolen from a company responsible for maintenance at the nearby Ignalina nuclear power plant.
23 February

According to press reports, the Belarus Committee for State Security (KGB) seized five kilograms of cesium-133. The radioactive metal reportedly was sealed in glass containers. Belarus authorities are investigating the incident, according to press.
12 February

Lithuanian authorities announced that they had arrested seven people and seized nearly 100 kg of radioactive material, according to press reports. The mate rial, believed to be uranium, will undergo further tests to ascertain its makeup and origin. It was emitting 14,000 microroentgens per hour. Some reports stated that the material was a component of a nuclear fuel assemply which has been missing from the n early Ignalina nuclear power plant for several years. The Ignalina plant manager claims that the seized material is not nuclear fuel or equipment used at his facility.
1 February

Swiss federal prosecutors announced on 1 February the arrest of a Swiss citizen of Turkish descent for attempting to sell a sample of slightly-enriche d uranium in Switzerland, according to press. Swiss authorities stated that the individual claimed the sample was part of a larger cache still in Turkey. Turkish police using information from their Swiss counterparts, then arrested eight people and seized 1.128 kg of similar material. Press reports indicate that the uranium was similar to that used in nuclear power plant fuel rods. Swiss authorities reportedly are conducting tests to determine the uranium’s country of origin.
25 January

According to press reports, German authorities have charged a merchant and his lawyer with crimes stemming from their attempt to sell radioactive cesium to another merchant who was a police informant. The cesium reportedly was transported to Germany from Zaire on board a commercial airliner.
21 January

UPDATE (7 November 95): The German parliamentary commission investigating the 1994 plutonium smuggling incident, reportedly has uncovered German gove rnment documents indicating that the three smugglers offered to supply 11 kilograms of Russian-origin, weapons-grade plutonium, which they claimed was enough to build three nuclear weapons, according to press reports.
18 January

According to press reports, German authorities have charged a merchant and his lawyer with crimes stemming from their attempt to sell radioactive cesium-137 smuggled from Zaire to another merchant who was a police informant. The cesium reportedly was transported to Germany from Zaire on board a commercial airliner.
17 January

A Palestinian in Dubai, UAE has offered to sell three kilograms of reportedly Russian-origin red mercury to a Lebanese-American businessman, according to US diplomatic reporting.

———- 1995 ———-

28 December

According to press reports, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested nine members of a criminal organization in Novosibirsk and seized a quantit y of radioactive material. The material was identified in press reports as enriched uranium-235. The material had been transported to Novosibirsk by middlemen, possibly from Kazakstan. The ultimate destination may have been South Korea, accord ing to press reports.

2 December

UPDATE (9 Nov 95): According to Italian press reports, Italian prosecutors have arrested an individual, Roger D’Onofrio, with reported links to the U S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Italian-American mafia as part of their investigation of smuggling radioactive materials, money-laundering and arms trafficking. D’Onofrio, 72, reportedly has dual Italian and U.S. citizenship and retired from t he CIA only two years ago. The ring he is alleged to have been part of is said to have been active from the early 1990s up to this year. Italian investigators reportedly suspect that D’Onofrio is the mastermind behind an international ring which laundered dirty money and smuggled gold, weapons, and radioactive material. His name also appears in another investigation into an arms smuggling operation between Italy and the Middle East, according to press reports. D’Onofrio was taken into preventive custody o n charges of money laundering and acting as a broker in illegal currency dealing. According to press, the prosecutors had so far ascertained money laundering for over 2.5 billion dollars on behalf of secret service and organised crime sources in complicit y with diplomats, the ruling families in Kuwait, Morocco and Zambia, bankers, prelates and others.

1 December

UPDATE (23 November ): According to US diplomats in Moscow, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) delivered an official statement to US official s regarding the radioactive material discovered in Izmailov park on 23 November. The container, which held cesium-137, posed no public health threat. Radiation levels of the cesium were between 10 to more than 50 millicurrie. The radioactive material may have been used as an instrument calibration source used in flaw detection equipment.

30 November

A former Greenpeace president revealed that the organization had been offered a nuclear warhead by a disgruntled former Soviet officer keen to highlight la x security, according to press accounts. The former Greenpeace official stated in a recently published book that a Soviet officer with access to nuclear weapons offered Greenpeace an 800 kg nuclear Scud warhead for public display in Berlin. The offer was made shortly before 7 September 1991.

29 November

Russian security officials have recovered four containers with radioactive cesium, stolen from an industrial plant in the Urals and arrested the thieves, a ccording to press reports. Federal Security Service (FSB) officers found the 90-kilogram (198-pound) containers in a shaft of an old mine, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. One of the alleged thieves, the Bakal mining plant’s electrical engineer, had in itially kept them at his vegetable garden but moved them to a safer place after the theft had been discovered, claimed security officials. Two officials of a local penitentiary were his accomplices, they further alleged. Each container held a capsule with cesium 137, a radioactiveisotope used in geological research, as well as in medicine. The containers were similar to the one allegedly planted by Chechen rebels in a Moscow park.

23 November

Acting on a tip from Chechen separatist leader Basayev, Russian television reporters discovered a 32 kg container–reportedly holding cesium-137–in a Mosc ow park. The container was reportedly removed and turned over to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). FSB officials stated that an official investigation was underway and that no further comments would be made until the inquiry was completed, accor ding to press reports. Television reports quote a highly-placed FSB officer as stating unofficially that the object was a piece of a hospital x-ray machine. Basayev claimed earlier this month that several containers of radioactive material attached to exp losive devices had been planted in Russia. In a television interview aired on 15 October, Russian Interior minister Kulikov stated that Chechen separatist leader Basayev might have radioactive waste or radioisotopes taken from the Budyonnovsk hospi tal seized by Chechen rebels last spring.

23 November

UPDATE (7 Nov 95): A German court sentenced Adolph Jaekle, a German businessman, to 51/2 years in prison for smuggling weapons grade plutonium into the country, according to press reports. Investigators made the first in a series of contraband plutonium seizures in Germany when they raided Jaekle’s home, in the southern town of Tengen in May, 1994, and found a lead cylinder containing 6.15 grams ofpl utonium 239. Jaekle had pleaded not guilty to the plutonium charge, arguing that he did not know what the substance was.

11 November

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officials arrested two Lithuanian citizens in Smolensk for smuggling 10 kgs of uranium-238 into Russia, according to Russian television rep orts. Three Russians also were arrested for attempting to sell the uranium. Both the Lithuanians and the Russians claimed that poverty had induced them to attempt to traffic in smuggled nuclear materials. According to press accounts, Russian authorities s tressed that the material was not weapons grade and had no commercial or industrial uses.

9 November

Italian prosecutors reportedly have asked Spanish authorities for permission to question the Archbishop of Barcelona about his role in an international criminal syndicate involved in smuggli ng radioactive materials, according to Italian press accounts. Accusations against the Archbishop arose after Italian officials tapped a telephone conversation in which the Archbishop was named as playing a leading role in the criminal enterprise. Both th e Archbishop and the Vatican have vehemently denied the accusations. The Spanish Justice ministry has characterized the Italian request as not very well thought out. The Italian investigation grew out on an earlier probe into money laundering operations which reportedly uncovered information that a criminal enterprise involving a self-professed Italian intelligence official, was attempting to sell 7.5 kg osmium for $63,000 per gram, according to Italian press accounts.

7 November

During a search of a car at the Polish-Czech border, Polish Border Guards discovered 11 cigarette pack-size containers filled with strontium-90, according to press accounts. This incident is the first case in 1995 involving smuggling radioactive material through Poland.

7 November

UPDATE (10 Aug 94): Adolf Jaekle, accused of smuggling Russian-origin plutonium following a May 1994 raid on his home, denied any involvement in nuclear smu ggling, according to press reports. Jaekle insisted that the container of plutonium was planted at his home and that the container was not the same one he took from a Swiss associate for metal reprocessing.

7 November

Iranian press reports indicate the Iranian law enforcement authorities have arrested five Iranians and seized nine packets of uranium in tehran and two other cities. No details were released regarding amount of material or whether it was enriched or not.

25 October

The cleaning staff at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo 2 airport found a small lead container packed with radioactive substances in the men’s restrooms, according to p ress reports. Experts reportedly are attempting to determine the exact composition of the three sources of ionizing radiation found in the container. The speculation, in the Russian press, was that a nuclear smuggler lost his nerve and abandoned the mater ial during an aborted smuggling attempt.

19 October

UPDATE (10 Aug 94): According to a 19 October article in Der Stern, nuclear weapons smugglers involved in smuggling Russian-origin plutonium into Ger many in August 1994 have stored eight to ten kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium in Berlin. The article also implicates highly placed Russians in the smuggling activity.

14 October

Russian mafia figures reportedly were behind the 1993 theft of radioactive beryllium from a Russian nuclear laboratory and the failed attempt to sell the ma terial in the West, according to press reports. The theft, which was widely reported in 1993, was seized by police in Lithuania and remains today in the bank vault where it was first discovered. According to press, the smugglers were preparing to sell the beryllium to an Austrian middleman who in turn had a mystery buyer who reportedly was willing to pay as much as $24 million for the material. The buyer, although never identified, was said to be Korean. Beryllium, which is used in missile guidance system s, is a highly efficent neutron reflector, according to public statements by nuclear scientists.

10 October

Russian authorities claim that there have been no identified incidents in which weapons-grade radioactive material has been smuggled out of Russia, accordin g to press reports. In a press conference, Russian General Terekhov of the Interior Ministry, stated that of the 16 cases involving theft of radioactive materials, none could have been used to make nuclear weapons. He also ruled out any involvement by Rus sian organized criminal organizations in the thefts. The general claimed that the thefts were spontaneous actions by individuals working at nuclear facilities. The Russian officials concluded the press conference by stating that there is no black market i n nuclear materials.

1 September

According to press reports, Bulgarian police had broken an international nuclear smuggling ring composed of Russians and Ukrainians. Police spokesmen, decl ining to disclose details only said that the materials seized were of strategic value and included rare metals. The arrests were the culmination of a year-long undercover operation. Senior policie officials comented that they were still investigating the final destination of the materials, some of which were radioactive.

15 June

Press reports indicate that so far in 1995 Romanian authorities have seized 24 kgs of uranium powder and tablets and 1994 they arrested 24 people for involveme nt in nuclear smuggling and seized 10.35 kgs of uranium powder and tablets. From 1989 to 1993, the Romanians reportedly broke up five gangs, arrested 50 people, and seized 230 kgs of nuclear material.

13 April

Slovak police culminated a long investigation with the discovery of 18.39kg of nuclear material, 17.5 kg of which apparently is U-238, in a car stopped near P oprad in eastern Slovakia. Altogether, three Hungarians, four Slovaks, and two Ukrainians were arrested. This gang was connected to three other nuclear material smuggling incidents.

5 April

Four brass containers weighing 2 kilos each containing radioactive americium-241 and cesium-137 were stolen from a storeroom of isotopes in Wroclaw, Poland.

4 April

Press reports that 6 kg of U-235, U-238, radium, and palladium were found in a Kiev apartment. Occupants were ex-army, a lieutenant colonel and a warrant offic er, and material reportedly came from Russia.

2 April

Documents recovered by Japanese police in the investigation of Aum Shinrikyo involvement in the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack reportedly indicated that the ter rorists were collecting information on uranium enrichment and laser beam technologies. A spokesman for Russia’s prestigious nuclear physics laboratory, Kurchatov Institute, acknowledged that at least one Aum Shinrikyo follower was working at the institute .

14 March

Polish police in Bielska-Biala province arrested a man for possession of uranium .

8 March

Italian police arrested one Nicola Todesco for murder in a plutonium smuggling case gone awry when the murder victim did not have the money to pay for a quanti ty of plutonium smuggled out of Bulgaria. Todesco claimed he threw 5g of plutonium into the Adige river, but no trace of it was found after an extensive search. (Comment: Although an official Italian spokesman believed the plutonium was enriched for military use, it had not been analyzed and may be another scam involving ‘plutonium screws’ from smoke detectors.

25 January

According to Talinn news broadcasts, Lithuanian border police, using U.S.-supplied stationary radiation detectors, seized two tons of radioactive wolfram hi dden in a secret compartment in a truck trailer. (The wolfram is tungsten, which has a short half-life, and probably was infected by a radioactive contaminant.) The incident occurred at the Lithuanian-Belorus border, and the truck’ s owner and two other men were arrested. A similar incident occurred a week earlier at another border post but no details are available.

———- 1994 ———-

14 December

Czech police seized 2.72 kg of material–later identified as 87.7 percent enriched U-235–in Prague; this is the largest recorded seizure of such material. Police arrested a Czech nuclear physicist and two c itizens of the Former Soviet Union. The uranium apparently came from the FSU and was to be smuggled to Western Europe.

10 December

Press reporting indicates Hungarian border guards seized 1.7 kg of uranium and arrested four Slovak citizens. The material (depleted uranium and reactor fu el grade) reportedly was concealed in a fruit jar and was to be smuggled into Austria.

6 December

In a long article in Pravda, it was reported that three staffers of the Institute of Nuclear Physics were convicted of stealing 4.5 kg of uranium.

10 November

Press reporting indicates Hungarian police discovered 26 kg of radioactive material in the trunk of a car. Three suspects were subsequently arrested.

November

Press reporting indicates German police seized 1 milligram of cesium-137 in early November and arrested two suspects.

Press reporting indicates Russian authorities seized 27 kg of U-238, an unknown quantity of U-235 and detained 12 members of a criminal gang.

October

Press reporting indicates that in mid-October, four Indian villagers were arrested attempting to sell 2.5 kg of yellowcake, i.e. uranium extracted from ore.

13
October

Press reporting indicates Bulgarian officials seized four lead capsules suspected of containing radioactive material. The capsules were found on a bus enrou te to Turkey and police detained the two bus drivers.

10
October

Press reporting indicates Romanian authorities arrested seven people and seized 7 kg of uranium and an unidentified quantity of strontium or cesium.

01
October

Press reporting indicates Romanian police arrested four people trying to sell over 4 kg of U-235 and U-238.

October

Press reporting dated 26 October indicates Russian authorities arrested three men trying to pass 67 kg of U-238 to unidentified individuals in the city of Psko v.

28 September

Press reporting indicates that a container with radioactive substances was found on a street in Tallinn.

28 September

Romanian authorities arrested several indivduals who were attempting to sell 4.55 kg of uranium tetrachloride (61.9 percent uranium) for $25 thousand per kg, according to press reports

28 September

Press reporting indicates Slovak officials arrested four Slovaks trying to smuggle almost 1 kg of U-235 (judged not to be weapons-grade) into Hungary.

26 September

Press reporting indicates the discovery of a glass flask containing unspecified weak radioactive material at the Wetzlar railroad station in G ermany.

September

A Pole tried to sell 1 kg of U-235/238 in Germany. A German court subsequently sentenced him to two and a half years in prison for trading in radioactive ura nium.

11 September

Press reports indicate German police arrested a Zairian national attempting to smuggle 850 g of uraninite into Germany.

According to 6 June press reporting, Russian security official announces the arrest of three Russians in St. Petersburg who allegedly tried to sell 3.5 kg of HEU.

June

According to an 8 July press report, Russian authorities arrested three officers from the Northern Fleet accused of having stolen 4.5 kg of U-238 from their base in Nov 93.
June

According to a 2 November press report, police in Pitesti, Romania, arrested three Romanians trying to sell 3 kg of uranium tablets.

May

According to 30 July press reporting, 56 g of material, including 6 g of plutonium 239, were seized and Adolf Jaekle, a German citizen, was arrested in G ermany in May.

———- 1993 ———-

November

In a case stemming from an incident in November 1993 in which a Russian naval officer stole 4 kg of 20 percent enriched U 235 nuclear fuel rods from a p oorly guarded area at Severomorsk, a Russian court found the officer guilty but gave him a suspended sentence because he admitted the act. Two accomplices were sentenced to three years at a labor camp.

There were 103 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials in 2005, newly released statistics from the Agencýs Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) show.

The ITDB covers a broad range of cases from illegal possession, attempted sale and smuggling, to unauthorized disposal of materials and discoveries of lost radiological sources.

Another 57 incidents from previous years were reported. They involved illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and had occurred earlier, mainly in 2004.

Two reported cases in 2005 involved small quantities of high-enriched uranium (HEU) which is a fissile material. In New Jersey, USA, a package containing 3.3 grams of HEU was reported inadvertently disposed of. The second incident occurred in Fukui, Japan, when a neutron flux detector containing 0.0017 grams was lost at a nuclear power plant.

From the terrorism threat standpoint, these cases are of little concern but they show security vulnerabilities at facilities handling HEU, the latest report from the ITDB said. Indeed the majority of cases reported in 2005 showed no evidence of criminal activity.

The ITDB facilitates the exchange of authoritative information on incidents of trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. There are 91 countries that report to the IAEÁs database. See Story Resources for the full report, which covers the past 13 years.

The Past 13 Years: 1993 – 2005

Nuclear Materials
During the thirteen year period, there were 16 confirmed incidents that involved trafficking in HEU and plutonium – which are fissile materials needed to make a nuclear weapon. A few of these incidents involved seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material, but most involved very small quantities.

The majority of confirmed cases with nuclear materials involved low-grade nuclear materials, i.e. low enriched uranium (LEU) mostly in the form of reactor fuel pellets, and natural uranium, depleted uranium, and thorium. Where information on motives is available, it indicates that profit seeking is the principal motive behind such events, the ITDB report said.

Other Radioactive Materials
During 1993-2005, just over 60 incidents involved high-risk dangerous radioactive sources, which present considerable radiological danger if used in a malicious act. In the hands of terrorists or other criminals, some radioactive sources could be used for malicious purposes, e.g. in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or ́dirty bomb́, the ITDB said. The overwhelming majority of incidents concerning dangerous sources were reported over the last six years. The majority of all incidents involved the radioisotope Caesium 137.

Observed data from confirmed smuggling incidents and associated seizures and arrests are not necessarily representative of the wider universe of black market nuclear deals, including sophisticated schemes that escape scrutiny. As with other illegal commodities—
drugs for instance—what is captured probably represents just a fraction of what is available in the international marketplace. For example, the small (usually multi-gram) quantities of HEU and plutonium intercepted by authorities suggests that traders planned to show prospective customers samples of what could be larger inventories of privately-held material. Even kilogram-sized lots appearing in the black market may represent the tip of the proverbial iceberg. For instance, according to a Czech police investigation of a 1994 seizure in Prague of 2.7 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU, smugglers claimed they could deliver to buyers an additional 40 kilograms of HEU in the short term and 5 kilos each month over the next 12 months.2 Where this vagabond material, if it really existed, is now anyone’s guess.

Furthermore, the basic preconditions of a true market—would-be sellers and interested buyers—appear to be present. In Russia, the post-cold
war loss of government orders for nuclear goods, weakened security controls, and the economic desperation faced by the Russian workforce, set the stage for a dangerous proliferation dynamic. As then-senator Sam Nunn told a Senate hearing in 1995, the former Soviet Union was a ‘‘vast potential supermarket for nuclear weapons, weapons grade uranium and plutonium and equally deadly chemical and biological weapons.’’ 3

The literally hundreds of attempted thefts of nuclear and radiological materials at post-Soviet nuclear enterprises, especially in the 1990s, is ample evidence of proliferation pressures on the supply side. In one revealing 1998 incident, suggestive of a highly unstable security
climate, Russian security officials reportedly foiled a plot by ‘‘staff members’’ of a Chelyabinsk nuclear facility to steal 18.5 kilograms of HEU which, depending on the level of enrichment, could be almost enough for an atomic bomb.4

Among sub-national groups, Al Qaeda and (in the 1990s) the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult have most consistently demonstrated an interest in acquiring a nuclear capability, including a complete nuclear weapon via black market channels. Osama bin Laden, in an oft quoted statement, called the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the defense of Muslims a ‘‘religious duty,’’ leaving little doubt of his WMD intentions.6

Finally, the ostensible lack of clear market relationships in observed
nuclear smuggling activity may be unrepresentative of the true state of affairs. That is, purveyors of strategic nuclear wares may be converging with customers in ways not readily apparent to western intelligence or security officials.

The prime example of such a ‘‘shadow market’’ in the nuclear realm was the notorious marketing network for nuclear weapons technology set up by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. The network, which sold centrifuges, centrifuge components, uranium hexafluoride gas, and nuclear weapons designs to various adversary nations, operated for about 15 years (from the late 1980s to early 2004) before being shut down by a joint U.S.-U.K. intelligence effort.7

For example, in June 2003 an Armenian smuggler was captured at the border with Georgia carrying 170 grams of HEU. The material was enriched to 89 percent U-235, close to the standard used for nuclear weapons (above 90 percent). In early 2006, a Russian (North Ossetian) trafficker was apprehended in a sting operation in Georgia with 100 g of HEU also enriched to 89 percent. Whether the two shipments were part of the same cache is not known. The smuggler told Georgian authorities that he had access to an additional two to three kilograms of the same material, but this claim was not verified.
A New York Times account of the incident observed that ‘‘the case has alarmed officials, because they had thought that new security precautions had tamped down the nuclear black market that developed in the 1990s . . .’’ However, in both of the above cases, there is a strong likelihood that the material leaked out years earlier, before the safeguards were fully in place, and then stashed while the perpetrators looked for a buyer.12

The cases of Iran and Al Qaeda—adversaries of greatest current
concern—suggest a plausible link between smuggling and proliferation, even
if no definitive evidence exists that either has obtained a weapon or the means
to make one through smuggling channels.
The link is especially obvious in the case of Al Qaeda, since for nonstate
actors smuggling is practically the sole pathway to a nuclear capability.
The group is believed to have sought HEU (apparently unsuccessfully) in
various venues—Africa, Western Europe, and the former Soviet Union—since
the early 1990s. The group appears to have been victimized by scam artists
offering low-grade reactor fuel and radioactive trash, useless for making fission
weapons, Possibly of greater import are its efforts to acquire a complete
nuclear weapon. Stories circulated in 1998 that bin Laden offered a Kazakh
arms dealer two million pounds for a weapon, and that Al Qaeda actually
bought 20 tactical nuclear warheads from the ‘‘Chechen mafia’’ for $20 million
and two tons of opium.13 Also, former CIA director George Tenet recounts in
his book, At the Center of the Storm, that the agency in 2001 had received ‘‘a
stream of reliable reporting’’ that senior Al Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia had
been negotiating for the sale of three Russian tactical nuclear devices.14

Al Qaeda’s leaders have not been shy about claiming success in its
nuclear ventures. Bin Laden announced in a late 2001 interview that ‘‘we have
chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent’’ and his deputy Ayman al
Zawahiri told the same correspondent in 2004 that the group had succeeded in
purchasing some ‘‘suitcase’’ nuclear weapons, and that such items were widely
available on the ‘‘black market’’ in Central Asia.15 Most observers are skeptical
of such claims, citing the group’s technical inexperience, its pariah status, the
failure to detonate such a weapon and other factors. Importantly, an extensive
search of government buildings, military compounds, terrorist camps, safe
houses and the like in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom found no
trace of fissile materials or a weapon.16 Predictable denials have come from
Russia: then Russian president Vladimir Putin stated in a 2002 interview that he
was ‘‘absolutely confident’’ that terrorists in Afghanistan do not possess Soviet
or Russian weapons of mass destruction.17 Nevertheless, Al Qaeda’s evident
Nuclear Smuggling
13 Riyad Alam al-Din et al., ‘‘Report Links Bin Laden, Nuclear Weapons,’’ Al-Watan al-Arabi,
November 13, 1998, p. 20-21, Marie Colvin, ‘‘Holy Warrior with U.S. on His Sights—Focus—
Bomb—Profile—Osama bin Laden,’’ The Sunday Times, August 16, 1998. global.factiva.com/
en/arch/display.asp.
14 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, (New York: HarperCollins 2007), p. 272.
15 Sara Daly et. al. Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three
Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism. (Santa Monica RAND 2005), pp. 26-27.
16 Thom Shanker, ‘‘U.S. Analysts Find No Sign bin Laden Had Nuclear Arms,’’ February 21
2002, p.1. CNN.com., ‘‘Was al Qaeda Working on a Super Bomb?’’ January 24, 2002. http://www.isis.-
online.org/publications/terrorism/transcript.html.
17 RAND Aum, p. 45.
Summer 2008 | 439

determination to acquire a nuclear weapon and the possibility that some such
weapons are unaccounted for or at least not under Russian control are
disconcerting, to say the least.
For a nation-state, smuggling is one pathway, if not the preferred one,
to a nuclear bomb. Unlike terrorists, states have various legitimate options for
engaging a supplier country including official diplomatic ties, open contacts
with officials, scientists and so on. In the case of Iran, a cozy nuclear
relationship with Russia, epitomized by, but not limited to, the construction
of a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant at Busehr is a continuing source of
proliferation concern. Some U.S. officials believe that Iran could leverage
the relationship to expand contacts with Russia’s nuclear entities and to
acquire information and materials directly applicable to a nuclear weapons
program. For Iran, the chances of pulling off a clandestine procurement effort
for nuclear wares seem much higher than for an internationally proscribed
group such as Al Qaeda.
Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities are very much matters of
conjecture. The new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran is an
awkward document, one subject to widely divergent interpretations, but
providing a more benign assessment of Iran’s nuclear capabilities than
probably is warranted. It judges with moderate to high confidence that Iran
does not now have a nuclear weapon or sufficient fissile material to make one.
However, it won’t rule out that it could have acquired a weapon or the
necessary explosive ingredients from abroad. According to the estimate, Iran
halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but just what activities are
subsumed under the term ‘‘program’’ is unclear.18 For example, available
intelligence might indicate that Iran suspended efforts to retrofit long-range
rockets for nuclear warheads, but fail to detect continued clandestine procurement
activities for fissile materials and other bomb components.
Moreover, the NIE judges that Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program
faces major technical challenges and probably won’t yield enough highly
enriched uranium (HEU) until 2010–2015 timeframe. This strengthens the case
for diplomatic approaches to Iran (as opposed to tougher sanctions and
military strikes). Yet what lethal nuclear items Iran may already possess cannot
be inferred from the performance of its uranium conversion and enrichment
facilities nor from the spotty intelligence that apparently shaped the NIE.
Indeed, Iran’s highly publicized nuclear energy program could serve as a
convenient cover for a parallel small scale – but potentially dangerous –
weapons-building effort that relies extensively on black market operations to
obtain strategic nuclear wares.
Iran’s black market dealings are shrouded in mystery, but its procurement
networks for nuclear bomb ingredients have most likely focused
LEE
18 ‘‘Key Judgments from a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Activity,’’ New
York Times, December 4, 2007.

on the former Soviet Union.19 As a 2001 Department of Energy report noted,
‘‘Iran, among others, has tried to exploit Russia’s nuclear security problems
by attempting to acquire fissile materials’’20 Iran reportedly maintains an
active network of front companies and espionage agents inside Russia to
facilitate its WMD procurement objectives. Furthermore, Iranian legal
nuclear cooperation with Russia could mask and facilitate a variety of
illegal transfers, and also give Iran plausibility regarding its motives and
actions.
In addition, Iran, like other aspiring nuclear actors, may seek weapons
components by means of smuggling chains that they either patronize or
control. For instance, in mid-2007 British authorities reported disrupting an
alleged plot by a British company to smuggle Russian-origin HEU to Iran by
way of Sudan. According to an account in the London Observer, ‘‘A group of
Britons was tracked as they obtained weapons-grade uranium from the black
market in Russia. Investigators believe that it was intended for export to Sudan
and on to Iran.’’ The investigators reportedly had evidence that the material
was destined for Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The incident may represent
a sample of a wider proliferation problem. As a British parliamentarian who
monitors export control matters observed, ‘‘If one company is involved, how
many others might be out there?’’21
Russia, of course, has long been notorious for its leaky nuclear
stockpiles. Whether or not Iran (or other sinister actors) has been able to
exploit gaps in Russian nuclear security to procure the ingredients for a
bomb is an open question. Russian officials share Western skepticism about
Iran’s near-term ability to develop a nuclear weapon but some less publicized
signals from Russia should be cause for concern. In a post 9/11
conversation reported by former CIA director George Tenet, then Russian
president Vladimir Putin told Bush that he could not account for the
security of nuclear materials during his predecessor’s administration.22
(The well-publicized problems of the Yeltsin era – a near-bankrupt economy,
disarray within the nuclear complex, and a rising tide of criminality
and corruption – certainly provided a window for consequential proliferation
episodes.)
Then, at a press conference in June 2002, General Yury Baluyevsky,
outgoing chief of the Russian general staff, made the startling announcement
that ‘‘Iran does have nuclear weapons. Of course these are nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. I mean they are not ICBMs with a range of more
than 5,500 kilometers.’’ Baluyevsky did not elaborate on how Iran acquired
Nuclear Smuggling
19 As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran would have every incentive to
keep such dealings secret.
20 Department of Energy MPC&A Program: Strategic Plan, Washington, July 2001, p. 2.
21 Mark Townsend, ‘‘MI-6 Probes UK Link to Nuclear Trade with Iran,’’ The Observer, June 10,
2007.
22 George Tenet, In the Center of the Storm, (New York: HarperCollins 2007), p. 272.
Summer 2008 | 441

the weapons or the wherewithal to manufacture them.23 In a later statement,
the general maintained that Iran would not be able ‘‘to develop
nuclear weapons either in the near or in the distant future,’’ but the context
of the remarks indicated that he was referring to Iran’s indigenous enrichment
program, which would explain the contradiction.24 Baluyevsky’s
assertion is not incompatible with the NIE’s judgment that Iran stopped
its nuclear weapons program in 2003, conceivably having gotten much of
what it wanted by then.
Of course, it is hard to distinguish fact from fiction (or disinformation)
in deciphering commentary on proliferation issues. Yet given Russia’s
history of leaky nuclear stockpiles, the warnings about Iran have the ring
of plausibility. While Western experts debate the sophistication and spin
speed of Tehran’s centrifuges, Iran already could have obtained a nuclear
weapons capability of sorts through clandestine transfers from the former
USSR. The NIE’s conclusions substantially weaken the case for war with
Iran (and rightly so, in this writer’s opinion), however, possibly for the
wrong reasons. Consider that even a small number of ‘‘non-strategic’’ or
defensive nuclear warheads in Iran’s possession could be delivered with
devastating effect to Western targets via Iran-linked terrorist groups such
as Hezbollah or Hamas. There is no hard evidence of such a capability,
but the signs are disturbing enough to warrant caution in dealing with
Tehran. Indeed, Washington eventually may have to acknowledge that, as
former chief of U.S. Central Command John Abizaid puts it, ‘‘there are
ways of living with a nuclear-armed Iran,’’ however unpalatable the
prospect.25
To some, the threat of a nuclear Iran or (especially) a nuclear Al Qaeda
may seem greatly overblown. Yet it cannot be dismissed entirely. Certainly, it’s
conceivable that, in the 16 years since the Soviet collapse, given Iran’s multifaceted
nuclear relationship with Russia, and the distressing economic circumstances
that afflicted Russia’s nuclear complex in the 1990s, that Iran could
have managed to acquire enough fissile material for at least one bomb.
Moreover, despite official Russian assurances, it requires a leap of faith to
believe that all tactical nuclear warheads and small atomic munitions are safely
locked down and accounted for in Russia. Conditions for a black market in
weapons and other nuclear assets, thus, could have materialized in the
confused post Soviet years, even if adversaries’ ability to exploit this opportunity
was problematic.
LEE
23 Safa Haeri, ‘‘Iran Has Nuclear Bomb, Says Top Russian General,’’ Iran Press Service, June 6,
2002.
24 Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, ‘‘Iran Has No Chance of Producing Nukes on its Own—
Russian Chief of Staff,’’ The Analyst, April 15, 2004.
25 Peter Baker, ‘‘Bush’s War Rhetoric Reveals the Anxiety that Iran Commands,’’ Washington
Post, October 19, 2007, p. 5.
442 |

More than 20 attempts at smuggling nuclear materials have been confirmed this year, according to Jane’s Information Group Foreign Report. The incidents this year, in addition to more than 370 which have occurred in the last seven years — including 15 incidents involving plutonium or weapon-grade uranium — have prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency to step up its programs to improve the physical security of nuclear materials.

A collaborative law enforcement program under IAEA leadership was started earlier this year to help with the smuggling problem. In conjunction with the World Customs Organization, Interpol and the FBI, the IAEA program will seek better information exchanges between law enforcement agencies as well as training programs for police and customs organizations (Foreign Report, Oct. 4).

Even more IAEA action is needed to prevent nuclear materials from falling into terrorist hands, according to two nonproliferation specialists writing in Arms Control Today. George Bunn and Fritz Steinhausler write that adoption of stronger physical protection standards against these threats is essential, and the sooner the better.

The two supported a recent decision by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to convene a meeting of experts to draft a new amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which currently only applies to nuclear materials in transit.

The new amendment should add some sort of verification or reporting requirement, Bunn and Steinhausler said, adding that the convention should apply to domestic facilities and include measures on preventing sabotage (Bunn/Steinhausler, Arms Control Today, Oct. 2001).

The EPA’s Superfund program was established in 1980 to locate, investigate, and clean up hazardous waste sites throughout the United States. Nationally, EPA’s Superfund program has located, analyzed and worked to clean up thousands of hazardous waste sites since 1980.

In New England, the Superfund program has carried out or is currently involved in the clean up of close to 500 such sites since the law went into effect.

Today, the six New England states have 115 toxic and hazardous waste sites on the Superfund National Priority List (NPL).

The 1978 discovery of toxic chemicals beneath the suburban infrastructure of Love Canal, in Niagara Falls, New York first illuminated the consequences of environmental neglect. For decades, many American businesses had disposed of hazardous waste improperly, contaminating tens of thousands of sites nationally, including nearly 250 within Region 2 alone. Accidents, spills, and leaks of hazardous materials resulted in land, water, and air that pose immediate and potential threats to public and environmental health.

Citizen reaction to these localized threats led Congress to establish the Superfund Program in 1980, an initiative designed to locate, investigate, and clean up the most hazardous sites nationwide. Superfund is officially called CERCLA, or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The EPA administers the Superfund Program in cooperation with individual states and tribal governments.

The national EPA office that oversees management of the program is the Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation (OSRTI). The sites dealt with under Superfund are listed on the NPL, or National Priorities List. Superfund constitutes a crucial environmental and economic precedent within American legislative history.

Threat and Contaminants
Before the site was remediated, on-site soils, sludges, sediments, and surface water were contaminated with phenolics,
heavy metals, volatile organic compounds, and PCBs. The ground water, which is contaminated, is not used by area
residents for drinking water. Wetlands and wildlife inhabiting the wetlands near the site were threatened by contaminants.

York Oil Company
New York
EPA ID#: NYD000511733
EPA REGION 2
Congressional District(s): 24
Franklin
Next to the Town Hall and the Moira Town Highway Garage
NPL LISTING HISTORY
Proposed Date: 7/1/1982
Final Date: 9/1/1983
Site Description
The York Oil Company recycled waste oil at this 17-acre site, 1 mile northwest of Moira, from 1962 until 1975. The
facility’s operators collected crankcase and industrial oils, some containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), from
sources throughout New England and New York. They stored or processed the oils at the site in eight aboveground
storage tanks, three earthen-dammed settling lagoons, and at least one underground storage tank. The recycled
PCB-contaminated oil either was sold as No. 2 fuel oil or was used in dust control for the unpaved roads in the vicinity of
the site. During heavy rains and spring thaws, the oil-water mixture from the lagoons often would overflow onto
surrounding lands and into adjacent wetlands, which the company purchased in 1964. Contamination at the site first was
reported by a state road crew in 1979. In 1982, the County assumed title because of unpaid property taxes.
Approximately 1,700 people live within a 3-mile radius of the site; 400 live within a mile. Residents rely on private wells
for drinking water; 13 wells exist within 1/2 mile of the site. Recent sampling of well water in the area has revealed no
site-related contaminants.
Site Responsibility: This site is being addressed through federal, state, and potentially responsible parties’ actions.

0201202c.pdf

The actions that have been performed at the site, to date, have resulted in the removal of approximately
27,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated oil/water and 230 drums of PCB-contaminated debris from the site. In addition,
15,000 tons of steel from waste oil storage tanks was decontaminated, cut up, and disposed of off-site.
Approximately 21,000 tons of contaminated soils and sediments from the Site Proper were excavated and treated and
approximately 18,000 tons of contaminated sediments from the Contamination Pathways were excavated and treated. All
of the treated material was placed under a cap on the Site Proper.

Off-Site Contamination: The first stage of the long-term cleanup dealt, primarily, with the source control. The second
phase studied the Contamination Pathways, particularly the lead- and PCB-contaminated wetlands. The State began an
intensive study of the problem in 1986, which was continued by EPA in September 1988. In September 1998, EPA
selected a remedy for the Contamination Pathways. It features the excavation of contaminated sediments, followed by
solidification/stabilization and on-site disposal, natural attenuation of the ground water contamination, institutional
controls to prevent the installation and use of ground water wells, and long-term ground water monitoring. The remedial
design was completed in September 1999; construction commenced in September 1999 and was completed in
September 2002.

The site is being addressed in three stages: emergency actions and two long-term remedial phases focusing on source
control and contamination pathways.
Response Action Status
Emergency Actions: In 1980, EPA began emergency cleanup activities at the site. It secured the site to limit access and
to reduce the threat of direct contact with hazardous substances and removed oil and contaminated water from the
lagoons, which then were filled with a concrete by-product and sand. The top 3 feet of oil-soaked soil were excavated
from the neighboring wetlands. Contaminated oil was transferred to aboveground storage tanks, and contaminated soil
was contained on-site. Contaminated water from one of the lagoons was treated and discharged into the wetlands. An
interceptor trench was dug to alter the flow of surface water and ground water. In 1983, EPA conducted additional
emergency actions including the collection of oil seeping into drainage ditches, the installation of a new filter fence
system, and the posting of warning signs. EPA developed a schedule for collecting oily leachate and replacing sorbent
pads and began monitoring the site. In August 1992, EPA stabilized leaking tanks and drums. In December 1994, EPA
removed PCB-contaminated oil and drums of PCB-contaminated debris from the site, and decontaminated, cut up, and
disposed of off-site several waste oil storage tanks. In December 1995, EPA installed another interceptor trench to
collect oil seeping into the wetlands.
Source Control: Upon completion of a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) conducted to determine the
nature and extent of contamination at the site and to evaluate remedial alternatives in 1988, EPA selected a remedy for
controlling the source of the contamination. It featured: (1) excavating approximately 22,000 cubic yards of contaminated
soils and 8,000 cubic yards of contaminated sediments and solidifying this material on-site; (2) installing deep ground
water draw-down wells at the edges of the site to collect the sinking contaminated plume; (3) installing shallow

dewatering wells to collect contaminated ground water and oil during excavation; (4) treating these liquids and
discharging the clean ground water in accordance with state environmental requirements; (5) removing about 25,000
gallons of contaminated tank oils, as well as other oils collected at the site, to an EPA-approved facility to be incinerated;
(6) cleaning and demolishing the empty storage tanks; (7) backfilling the solidified soil into the excavated areas; and (8)
inspecting the site every five years to assure that human health and the environment continue to be protected.

Human Exposures Under Control [PDF 2.65 MB, 13 pp] has been verified.
Groundwater Contamination Under Control [PDF 1.72 MB, 9 pp] has been verified.
Site Description

The plant is located on 401 North Middletown Road in the village of Pearl River on a 580-acre site that lies within Clarkstown and Orangetown in Rockland County, New York. The facility is located about 1.5 miles north of the New Jersey State border and 20 miles northwest of New York City. It is bounded by Middletown Road on the East, Crooked Hill Road to the south, and forested and residential areas to the west and north respectively.

The facility produces pharmaceutical products, generating hazardous wastes (e.g., spent solvents, toxic and mixed wastes) and large quantities of nonhazardous solid waste (e.g., incineration ash, composting and wastewater sludge) in the process. Hazardous wastes are stored in 250 55-gallon containers on-site. Releases of contaminants have occurred from the leachate generated at landfills, the burning of solvents in an open pit, leaks of industrial wastewater from underground sewers, and chemical spills.

There are four landfills at this site (1, 2, 2A, and 3A). Landfills 1, 2, and 2A received a mix of waste including incinerator ash, glass, debris, plant trash and rubbish, vitamins, wastewater treatment plant sludge, fermentation cake, animal remains, and small quantities of laboratory chemicals. These