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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the
Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, April 9, 2008:
Census 2010:
Census at Critical Juncture for Implementing Risk Reduction Strategies:
Statement of Mathew Scirč:
Director, Strategic Issues:
David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
GAO-08-659T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-659T, a testimony for Chairmen, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on Information
Policy, Census, and National Archives, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimated the 2010 Census
would cost $11.5 billion, including $3 billion on automation and
technology. At a March hearing, the Department of Commerce (Commerce)
stated that the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program was
likely to incur significant cost overruns and announced a redesign
effort. At that time, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census as high
risk, citing long-standing concerns in managing information technology
(IT) investments and uncertain costs and operations. This testimony is
based on past work and work nearing completion, including GAO’s
observation of the address canvassing dress rehearsal. For IT
acquisitions, GAO analyzed system documentation, including
deliverables, cost estimates, other acquisitions-related documents, and
interviewed Bureau officials and contractors. This testimony describes
the implications of redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and decennial
operations, (2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) Decennial Census
costs.
What GAO Found:
The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress
Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its
plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. Last week Commerce
announced significant changes to the FDCA program. It also announced
that it expected the cost of the decennial to be up to $3 billion
greater than previously estimated. The redesign will have fundamental
impacts on the dress rehearsal as well as 2010 Census operations.
Changes this late in the decade introduce additional risks, making more
important the steps the Bureau can take to manage those risks. The
content and timing of dress rehearsal operations must be altered to
accommodate the Bureau’s design. For example, Commerce has selected an
option that calls for the Bureau to drop the use of handheld computers
(HHCs) during the nonresponse follow-up operation, and the Bureau may
now be unable to fully rehearse a paper-based operation. Additionally,
reverting to a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation presents the
Bureau with a wide range of additional challenges, such as arranging
for the printing of enumerator forms and testing the systems that will
read the data from these forms once completed by enumerators.
Given the redesign effort, implementing GAO’s recommendations
associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever.
Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management
capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also
needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including
developing risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving
its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also
needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to
help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected.
According to the Bureau, the redesign and related revision of the FDCA
program is expected to result in significant increases to the life
cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census. Even without considering the
recent expected cost increases announced by the Bureau to accompany the
redesign of the FDCA program, the Bureau’s cost projections for the
2010 Census revealed an escalating trend from previous censuses.
Previously, GAO recommended that the Bureau develop an integrated and
comprehensive plan to manage operations. Specifically, to understand
and manage the assumptions that drive the cost of the decennial census,
GAO recommended, among other actions, that the Bureau annually update
the cost of the 2010 Census and conduct sensitivity analysis on the
$11.5 billion estimate. However, while the Bureau understands the
utility of sensitivity analysis, it has not conducted such an analysis.
What GAO Recommends:
In its reports, GAO has recommended that the Bureau improve acquisition
management capabilities, operational planning, cost estimation, and
performance measurement. The Bureau agreed with most of these
recommendations, but has not fully implemented them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-659T]. For more
information, contact Mathew Scirč at (202) 512-6806 or sciremj@gao.gov
or David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Committee and Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing. As you
know, we recently designated the 2010 Decennial Census as a high-risk
area, citing a number of long-standing and emerging challenges facing
the census.[Footnote 1] These include weaknesses in managing
information technology (IT), operational planning, and cost estimating,
as well as uncertainty over dress rehearsal plans and the ultimate cost
of the census.
For 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) planned to make greater use
of technology. Among other things, the Bureau planned to automate some
of its field data collection activities as a way to reduce costs and
improve data quality and operational efficiency. In fact, census
workers used new technology, handheld computers (HHCs), during last
spring's dress rehearsal operation. The Field Data Collection
Automation (FDCA) program is a key IT acquisition that includes
systems, equipment, and infrastructure for field staff to use in
collecting census data for the 2010 Census. Last year, the Bureau had
estimated this and other IT acquisitions would account for about $3
billion of the then-estimated $11.5 billion total cost of the census.
Under the FDCA program the Bureau planned to use HHCs during operations
such as address canvassing, nonresponse follow-up, and census coverage
measurement. Last year, during address canvassing dress rehearsal field
activities in California and North Carolina, both we and Bureau
officials observed a number of performance problems with the HHCs (such
as slow and inconsistent data transmissions).
At a March 2008 hearing, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the
Bureau stated that the FDCA program was likely to incur significant
cost overruns and said that a redesigning effort to get the Decennial
Census back on track was under way. The Secretary of Commerce outlined
several alternatives for redesigning this central technology
investment, including possibly dropping the HHCs from the nonresponse
follow-up operation. Last week, the Secretary chose to do just that.
Additionally, he decided that the Bureau would reduce deployment of
field technology infrastructure by the contractor, and have the
contractor provide HHCs for address canvassing and develop the
information system for controlling field operations.
As requested, our testimony today will call upon our past work,
including our observation of the use of the HHCs in the address
canvassing dress rehearsal, to provide a description of implications of
the redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and Decennial Census operations,
(2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) Decennial Census costs. Our
remarks today are based primarily on reports that we issued from 2002
through December 2007 on the planning and development of the 2010
Census, as well as the results of work nearing completion. We visited
census test sites in Queens, New York; several counties in rural south-
central Georgia; Austin, Texas; and the Cheyenne Indian Reservation in
South Dakota. During these visits we observed tests of the address
canvassing operation, and we observed tests of the nonresponse follow-
up operation. In May and June 2007, we observed address canvassing at
the 2008 Dress Rehearsal in sites located in North Carolina and
California. For IT acquisitions we analyzed system documentation,
including project plans, deliverables, cost estimates, earned value
management data, other acquisition-related documents, and we
interviewed Bureau officials and contractors.
This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
The redesign of the Decennial Census carries with it significant
implications for its key operations--address canvassing and nonresponse
follow-up. Among these are the need for putting in place a paper-based
nonresponse follow-up operation, devising approaches to manage workload
from late mail returns, and ensuring that the automation for address
canvassing works. This is not an exhaustive list of the numerous
challenges the Bureau faces going forward. While these challenges are
significant, it must be stressed that the Bureau could have faced
overwhelming challenges had it chosen not to redesign the Decennial
Census.
Given the redesign effort, implementing our recommendations associated
with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically,
the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities,
including finalizing FDCA requirements. The Bureau also needs to
strengthen its risk management activities, including developing risk
mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-
level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan
and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing to help ensure that
decennial systems perform as expected.
According to the Bureau, this redesign and subsequent revision of the
FDCA program is expected to result in significant increases to the life
cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census. Last week, the Secretary
testified that the Decennial Census could cost up to $3 billion more
than the existing $11.5 billion total life cycle cost estimate. Even
without considering the recent expected cost increases announced by the
Bureau that will accompany the streamlining of the FDCA program, the
Bureau's cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an escalating
trend compared to those from previous Censuses. In constant 2010
dollars, the estimated $11.8 billion cost of the 2010 Census, before
the FDCA program redesign, represented a more than tenfold increase
over the $1 billion spent on the 1970 Census. To manage the 2010 Census
and contain costs, we previously recommended that the Bureau develop a
comprehensive, integrated project plan for the 2010 Census that should
include itemized estimated costs of each component, including a
sensitivity analysis and an explanation of significant changes in the
assumptions on which these costs were based.[Footnote 2] In response,
the Bureau provided us with the 2010 Census Operations and Systems Plan
dated August 2007. This plan represented an important step forward at
the time. It included inputs and outputs and described linkages among
operations and systems. However, it did not include sensitivity
analysis, risk mitigation plans, a detailed 2010 Census timeline, or
itemized estimated costs of each component. With the redesign, this
plan will need to be updated.
Redesign Implications for Decennial Census Operations:
The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress
Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its
plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. The dress rehearsal
features a mock Census Day, now set for May 1, 2008. Last year at this
time, the Bureau carried out a major dress rehearsal operation--address
canvassing--in which the Bureau updated address lists and collected
global positioning coordinates for mapspots. The largest field
operation of the dress rehearsal was to have begun this month. In this
operation (nonresponse follow-up), field staff were to conduct face-to-
face interviews with households that did not mail back their
questionnaires.
Prior to the redesigning effort, the Bureau had already changed its
plans for the dress rehearsal, in part, to focus greater attention on
the testing of technology. In a November 20, 2007, decision memo, the
Bureau announced that it would delay Census Day for the dress rehearsal
by 1 month, to May 1, 2008. The Bureau also listed a number of
operations it no longer planned to rehearse, including group quarters
enumeration and census coverage measurement. Also in February 2008, the
Bureau announced that it would remove from the scope of the FDCA
program contract the development of all systems and software associated
with the census coverage measurement operation.
The redesign approach selected by the Secretary will require that the
Bureau quickly develop and test a paper-based nonresponse follow-up
operation. Any paper-based option has its own set of unique issues,
such as setting up operations to support paper field data collection
centers and seeking printing solutions for enumerator forms. Among
other issues, decisions on a printing solution will need to be made
soon. Although the Bureau has carried out paper-based operations
before, in some cases they now involve new procedures and system
interfaces that as a result of their exclusion from the dress
rehearsal, will not be tested under census-like conditions. For
nonresponse follow-up in 2010 the Bureau will be using newly developed
systems for integrating responses and controlling workload. For
example, the Bureau will need to rely on a newly developed system
called the Decennial Response Integration System to identify households
that have not returned census forms and for collecting the results of
enumerators conducting nonresponse follow-up person interviews.
Dropping the use of the HHCs for nonresponse follow-up and reverting to
paper for that operation this late in the decade also precludes
nonresponse follow-up from being fully tested in the dress rehearsal.
Under the delayed dress rehearsal this operation was to begin next
month, soon after households in dress rehearsal locations were to
return their census forms. A paper operation requires different
training, maps, and other material to be prepared prior to the
operation. The Bureau has announced no specific plans for conducting
field testing of certain key operations, such as nonresponse follow-up.
Without sufficient testing, operational problems can go undiscovered
and the opportunity to improve operations will be lost.
The redesign's move from the use of HHCs to a paper-based nonresponse
follow-up operation may limit the Bureau's ability to reduce follow-up
with persons who are late in returning their census questionnaires. One
of the primary advantages the Bureau cited for using HHCs was the
ability, as late mail returns came in, to remove those addresses from
enumerators' assignments--preventing enumerators from doing unnecessary
work. According to the Bureau, in 2000 enumerators visited over 4
million households that had returned their census form late. In 2004,
the Bureau tested the capability of an earlier prototype of the HHC to
adjust workloads by identifying late mail returns. We reported in 2007
that based on these tests it appears that if the Bureau had possessed
this capability during the 2000 Census, it could have eliminated the
need to visit nearly 773,000 late-responding households and saved an
estimated $22 million (based on our estimate that a 1 percentage point
increase in workload could add at least $34 million in direct salary,
benefits, and travel costs to the price tag of nonresponse follow-
up[Footnote 3]). The Director of the Census Bureau stated that he
believes that the Bureau can still partially adjust enumerator workload
to recognize late mail returns without the use of HHCs. To achieve this
objective, the Bureau will need to specify the process it will use and
conduct appropriate tests.
The redesign will also affect the 2010 Census address canvassing
operation. The Secretary's decision to use the HHCs for the 2010
address canvassing operation means that certain performance issues with
the handheld technology must be addressed promptly. Field staff
experienced difficulties using the technology during the address
canvassing dress rehearsal. For example, workers reported problems with
HHCs when working in large assignment areas during address canvassing.
The devices could not accommodate more than 720 addresses--3 percent of
dress rehearsal assignment areas were larger than that. The amount of
data transmitted and used slowed down the HHCs significantly.
Identification of these problems caused the contractor to create a task
team to examine the issues, and the team recommended improving the end-
to-end performance of the mobile solution by controlling the size of
assignment area data delivered to the HHC both for address canvassing
and nonresponse follow-up operations. One specific recommendation was
limiting the size of assignment areas to 200 total addresses. However,
the redesign effort took another approach that uses laptops and the
software application used for the American Community Survey to collect
information in large assignment areas. It is not yet clear how this
work-around will be carried out. Furthermore, the Bureau will need to
define specific and measurable performance requirements for the HHCs as
we recommended in January 2005.[Footnote 4]
Another operational issue is the ability of the contractor to accept
changes to its address files after it completes address canvassing
updates. This could preclude the Bureau from conducting "restart/redo"
operations for an area where the address file is discovered to be
incorrect. This function is critical in developing an accurate and
complete address list. Without the ability to update the mailing list
for "restart/redo" operations, the Bureau would consider not mailing
census questionnaires to addresses in that area and instead deliver
census forms by hand. This has the potential to significantly increase
costs.
Redesign Implications for IT Acquisitions:
The Bureau still needs to agree upon and finalize requirements for the
FDCA program. In March 2006, we reported that the FDCA project office
had not implemented the full set of acquisition management capabilities
(such as project and acquisition planning and requirements development
and management) that were needed to effectively manage the
program[Footnote 5]. For example, although the project office had
developed baseline functional requirements for the acquisition, the
Bureau had not yet validated and approved them. Subsequently, in
October 2007, we reported that changes to requirements had been a
contributing factor to both cost increases and schedule delays
experienced by the FDCA program.[Footnote 6] In June 2007, an
assessment by an independent contractor of the FDCA program reported on
requirements management problems--much like those we reported in March
2006. Similar to our recommendation, the independent assessors
recommended that the Bureau immediately stabilize requirements by
defining and refining them. The Bureau has recently made efforts to
further define requirements for the FDCA program, and it has estimated
that the revised requirements will result in significant cost
increases. On January 16, 2008, the Bureau provided the FDCA contractor
with a list of over 400 requirements for the FDCA program to reconcile.
Although some of these new requirements will be dropped based on the
Secretary's recent decision, many will still need to be addressed to
ensure that FDCA will perform as needed.
Commerce and Bureau officials need to address critical weaknesses in
risk management practices. In October 2007, we reported that the FDCA
project had weaknesses in identifying risks, establishing adequate
mitigation plans, and reporting risk status to executive-level
officials.[Footnote 7] For example, the FDCA project team had not
developed mitigation plans that were timely or complete nor did it
provide regular briefings on risks to senior executives. The FDCA
project team's failure to report a project's risks to executive-level
officials reduces the visibility of risks to executives who should be
playing a role in mitigating them.
As of October 2007, in response to the cost and schedule changes, the
Bureau decided to delay certain system functionality for FDCA. As a
result, the operational testing that was to occur during the dress
rehearsal period around May 1, 2008, would not include tests of the
full complement of Decennial Census systems and their functionality.
Operational testing helps verify that systems function as intended in
an operational environment. In late 2007, according to Bureau
officials, testing plans for IT systems were to be finalized in
February 2008. Therefore, we recommended that the Bureau plan and
conduct critical testing, including end-to-end testing of the Decennial
Census systems.[Footnote 8] As of March 2008, the Bureau still had not
developed these test plans. In the recent program redesign, the Bureau
included conducting end-to-end testing. The inability to perform
comprehensive operational testing of all interrelated systems increases
the risk that further cost overruns will occur, that decennial systems
will experience performance shortfalls, or both.
Given the redesigning effort, implementing our recommendations
associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever.
Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management
capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also
needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including
developing adequate risk mitigation plans for significant risks and
improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The
Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end
testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected.
Redesign Implications for Decennial Census Life Cycle Costs:
Even without considering the recent expected cost increases announced
by the Bureau to accommodate the redesign of the FDCA program, the
Bureau's cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an escalating
trend from the 1970 Census. As shown in figure 1, the estimated $11.8
billion cost (expressed in constant 2010 dollars) of the 2010 Census,
before the FDCA program redesign, represented a more than tenfold
increase over the $1 billion spent on the 1970 Census. The 1970 Census
was the first Census to rely on mailing census forms to households and
asking for a mail return--a major part of the data collection. Although
some of the cost increase could be expected because the number of
housing units--and hence the Bureau's workload--has gotten larger, the
cost growth has far exceeded the increase in the number of housing
units. The Bureau estimated that the number of housing units for the
2010 Census would increase by almost 14 percent over Census 2000
levels.
Figure 1: Decennial Census Costs from 1970 through 2010 (Projected) in
Constant 2010 Dollars:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Decennial Census Costs from 1970 through 2010 (Projected) in Constant
2010 Dollars:
Census year: 1970;
Cost: $1.0 billion.
Census year: 1980;
Cost: $2.6 billion.
Census year: 1990;
Cost: $4.1 billion.
Census year: 2000;
Cost: $8.2 billion.
Census year: 2010 (projected);
Cost: $11.8 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau figures.
[End of figure]
As figure 2 shows, before the FDCA program redesign, the Bureau
estimated that the average cost per housing unit for the 2010 Census
was expected to increase by approximately 26 percent over 2000 levels,
from $69.79 per housing unit to $88.19 per housing unit in constant
2010 dollars. When the projected cost increase that accompanies the
FDCA program redesign is considered, the average cost per housing unit
will increase by an even greater percentage.
Figure 2: Decennial Census Average Cost per Housing Unit from 1970
through 2010 (Projected) in Constant 2010 Dollars:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Decennial Census Average Cost per Housing Unit from 1970 through 2010
(Projected) in Constant 2010 Dollars:
Census year: 1970;
Cost: $14.39.
Census year: 1980;
Cost: $29.05.
Census year: 1990;
Cost: $39.61.
Census year: 2000;
Cost: $69.79.
Census year: 2010 (projected);
Cost: $88.19.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau figures.
[End of figure]
Given the projected increase in spending, it will be imperative that
the Bureau effectively manage the 2010 Census, as the risk exists that
the actual, final cost of the census could be considerably higher than
anticipated. Indeed, this was the case for the 2000 Census, when the
Bureau's initial cost projections proved to be too low because of such
factors as unforeseen operational problems and changes to the
fundamental design. The Bureau estimated that the 2000 Census would
cost around $5 billion. However, the final price tag for the 2000
Census was more than $6.5 billion, a 30 percent increase in cost. Large
federal deficits and other fiscal challenges underscore the importance
of managing the cost of the census, while promoting an accurate, timely
census.
We have repeatedly reported that the Bureau would be challenged to
control the cost of the 2010 Census. In January 2004, we reported that
under the Bureau's approach for reengineering the 2010 Census, the
Bureau might find it difficult to reduce operational risk because
reengineering introduces new risks.[Footnote 9] To manage the 2010
Census and contain costs, we recommended that the Bureau develop a
comprehensive, integrated project plan for the 2010 Census that should
include the itemized estimated costs of each component, including a
sensitivity analysis and an explanation of significant changes in the
assumptions on which these costs were based. In response, the Bureau
provided us with the 2010 Census Operations and Systems Plan, dated
August 2007. This plan represented an important step forward at the
time. It included inputs and outputs and described linkages among
operations and systems. However, it did not yet include sensitivity
analysis, risk mitigation plans, a detailed 2010 Census timeline, or
itemized estimated costs of each component. Going forward, it will be
important for the Bureau to update its operations plan.
The assumptions in the fiscal year 2009 President's Budget life cycle
cost estimate of $11.5 billion may not have included recent
productivity data from last year's address canvassing dress rehearsal.
According to the Bureau, initially, the cost model assumed productivity
for address canvassing to be 25.6 addresses per hour for urban/suburban
areas. However, results from the address canvassing dress rehearsal
showed productivity of 13.4 addresses per hour for urban/suburban
areas. While the life cycle cost estimate increased slightly to $11.5
billion in the fiscal year 2009 President's Budget, these increases
were attributed to other factors and not to lower-than-expected
canvassing productivity. Best practices call for cost model assumptions
to be updated as new information becomes available. We previously
reported that the life cycle cost estimate has not been updated to
reflect changes in assumptions. In July 2006, we testified that the
estimate had not been updated to reflect the results of testing
conducted in 2004.[Footnote 10] As the Bureau updates its estimate of
the life cycle cost annually and as part of the redesigning effort, it
will be important that it reflect changing assumptions for productivity
and hours worked.
Concluding Observations:
Given its size and complexity, carrying out the Decennial Census
presents significant challenges under any circumstances. Late changes
in census plans and operations, long-standing weaknesses in IT
acquisition and contract management, limited capacity for undertaking
these critical management functions, scaling back of dress rehearsal
activities, and uncertainty as to the ultimate cost of the 2010 Census
puts the success of this effort in jeopardy. Managing these risks is
critical to the timely completion of a reliable and cost-effective
census. Implementing our recommendations would help the Bureau
effectively manage the myriad of interrelated operations needed to
ensure an accurate and complete count in 2010 (Bureau officials have
agreed with many of our recommendations, but have not fully implemented
them).
The dress rehearsal represents a critical stage in preparing for the
2010 Census. This is the time when the Congress and others should have
the information they need to know how well the design for 2010 is
likely to work, what risks remain, and how those risks will be
mitigated. We have highlighted some of the risks today. Going forward,
it will be important for the Bureau to specify how it will ensure that
planned dress rehearsal operations will be successfully carried out,
and how it will provide assurance that the largest operation--
nonresponse follow-up--will be tested in the absence of a full dress
rehearsal. Likewise, the Bureau will need to establish plans for
working around limitations in the technology to be used in address
canvassing operations. It is critical that the Bureau ensure that the
technology for conducting address canvassing is a success.
The Bureau should implement prior recommendations in moving forward.
Contractor-developed IT systems and deliverables need to be closely
monitored to ensure that contractors are performing within budget. As
we have stressed throughout this testimony and in our prior
recommendations, the Bureau needs to practice aggressive project
management and governance over both the IT and non-IT components.
Further, it is essential that the Bureau implement our recommendations
related to information technology. The Bureau must solidify the FDCA
program requirements, strengthen risk management activities, and plan
and conduct critical testing of the Decennial Census systems.
Mr. Chairmen, Census Day is less than 2 years away and address
canvassing is 1 year away. The challenges we highlighted today call for
effective risk mitigation by the U.S. Census Bureau, and careful
monitoring and oversight by the Department of Commerce, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Congress, GAO, and other key stakeholders.
As in the past, we look forward to supporting the committee and
subcommittee's oversight efforts to promote an accurate and cost-
effective census.
Mr. Chairmen, this concludes our statement. We would be glad to answer
any questions you and the committee and subcommittee members may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,
please contact Mathew Scirč at (202) 512-6806 or sciremj@gao.gov or
David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this testimony. Other key contributors to
this testimony include Signora May, Assistant Director; Mathew Bader;
Thomas Beall; Jeffrey DeMarco; Elizabeth Hosler; Richard Hung; Anne
Inserra; Andrea Levine; Lisa Pearson; Sonya Phillips; Cynthia Scott;
Niti Tandon; Jonathan Ticehurst; Timothy Wexler; and Katherine Wulff.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Information Technology: Significant Problems of Critical
Automation Program Contribute to Risks Facing 2010 Census, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-550T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
5, 2008).
[2] GAO, 2010 Census: Redesigned Approach Holds Promise, but Census
Bureau Needs to Annually Develop and Provide a Comprehensive Project
Plan to Monitor Costs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgiin/getrpt?GAO-
06-1009T] (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006).
[3] GAO, 2000 Census: Contingency Planning Needed to Address Risk That
Pose a Threat to a Successful Census, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-00-6] (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
14, 1999).
[4] GAO, 2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining
Challenges Need Prompt Resolution, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-05-9] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2005).
[5] GAO, Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management
of Key 2010 Decennial Acquisitions Remain to be Done, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-444T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
1, 2006).
[6] GAO, Information Technology: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its
Risk Management of Decennial Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-79] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5,
2007).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-79].
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-79].
[9] GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed Soon,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-37] (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1009T].
[End of section]
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