An address delivered by Dillon S. Myer,
Director of the War Relocation Authority,
before a luncheon meeting of the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California,
on August 6, 1943.

The removal of some 110,000 people of Japanese ancestry from the
Pacific Coast during the spring and summer of 1942 posed a problem for
the government of the United States unlike any it had ever faced
before. Some aspects of the problem by now have been solved, but there
are many others which still must be dealt with, not alone by the War
Relocation Authority, but by the American people as a whole. There are
many different courses which the War Relocation Authority might follow
in the treatment of the evacuees now in the relocation centers. On the
one extreme, we might adopt the policy of turning all evacuees loose
from the relocation centers at one time, to go wherever they like. At
the other extreme, we might follow a policy, advocated by some, of
keeping all the evacuees detained for the duration of the war. Our
present course is charted for good reason somewhere between these two
extremes.

For some time now -- but more particularly in recent weeks -- there
has been a tremendous amount of misinformation and some deliberate
deception about the way we are managing the relocation centers and the
way we are returning many of the evacuees to private life. So today
I want to tell you how we are conducting our program and why we have
adopted the policies we are now following.

But first let me review some of the background facts. You will remember
that when the evacuation was first announced -- in early March of 1942
-- the people of Japanese ancestry were told simply that they must move
out of the prescribed coastal zone. Nothing was said at that time about
detention in government centers. It was the hope of the War
Department that many of the Japanese and Japanese-Americans would move
out voluntarily and resettle inland on their own initiative.
Throughout most of March in 1942, there was no restriction on the
movements of a person of Japanese ancestry once he had left the
military area. Clearly, there was no charge or even implication that
all persons of Japanese descent were disloyal. The real point was
simply that their presence complicated the problems of defense in a
sensitive and threatened military zone. Remember that as soon as
war broke out, the intelligence agencies apprehended all the enemy
aliens they suspected of being dangerous to national security; so the
Japanese population had been cleared of that supposedly most dangerous
element.

During the first weeks of March, some 8,000 people of Japanese descent
closed out their business affairs, packed up their belongings, and
moved eastward. Some went to the eastern part of California, which was
then outside the area designated for evacuation, while others moved to
communities in Utah, Colorado, and other states of the inter-mountain
region. Within a few days after the War Relocation Authority was
established -- on March 18 -- events began to occur which indicated
plainly that voluntary relocation would not be a feasible policy.
The mass movement of such a large group of people in such a short time
would have caused trouble regardless of the racial antecedents of the
migratory group. But in this case, the problem was further
complicated by the fact that the evacuees were racially related to the
enemy nation and were being excluded from the Pacific Coast for reasons
which were not made entirely clear. So it's not surprising that
those who moved voluntarily ran into difficulties and by the last week
of March, the situation was such that further Federal action was
essential. On March 27, the Commanding General of the Western Defense
Command issued the so-called "freeze" order and two days later
voluntary migration came abruptly to an end. Plans were immediately
drawn up to carry out the evacuation from that point forward under Army
supervision in accordance with a systematic schedule.

About this same time the War Relocation Authority began to formulate
some of its first plans for relocation. Since the most likely area for
immediate relocation was the inter-mountain west, the Director of the
WRA asked the governors and other leading officials of ten western
states to attend a meeting in Salt Lake City on April 7. That meeting
proved to be an important turning point in the relocation program.
The War Relocation Authority had several possible plans for relocation
in mind, but the reaction of the assembled governors and other state
officials was sharply unfavorable to most of these proposals. Some
of those at the meeting refused to be responsible for the maintenance
of law and order unless evacuees brought into their states were kept
under constant military surveillance. And practically all were strongly
opposed to any type of unsupervised relocation. Following the meeting, the
only feasible plan left was the establishment of relocation centers
with sufficient capacity and facilities to handle the entire evacuee
population for a temporary period.

Relocation centers were never intended as concentration camps or
prisons. They were established primarily as an expedient -- to
provide communities where the evacuated people could live while
long-range relocation plans were being developed. After the Salt
Lake City meeting with the western governors, the intention of the War
Relocation Authority was to receive the entire evacuee population at
the relocation centers, develop individual records, and then work out a
relocation program on an individual basis. However, within a few weeks
after the meeting -- before the movement into relocation centers was
even well under way -- a strong demand for farm labor arose, especially
in the sugar beet producing areas of the West. By the middle of May,
the need for workers had become so acute that the War Relocation
Authority and the Western Defense Command jointly worked out a special
program for recruitment of evacuees in Army assembly centers and in the
few relocation centers which were then in operation. By the latter part
of June, approximately 1600 evacuees from the centers were at work in
sugar beet areas and other sections of the agricultural west. Before
the close of the harvest season in the fall, nearly 10,000 evacuees had
been recruited from the centers for seasonal work under this group
leave program.

Evacuees were permitted to work only in areas where state and local
officials had given written assurance that law and order would be
maintained. Each group of evacuees going out was assigned to work in a
specific area and the members of the group were not allowed to leave
this designated area without special permission from the Western
Defense Command. Even with these precautions, some of us in WRA
feared that serious difficulties might develop between the evacuee
workers and the people of nearby communities. Surprisingly enough,
however, the result of the program were generally good from every point
of view. In nearly all cases, the evacuees were accepted as valuable
workers and treated as such. Before the season ended, they had
harvested enough beets to provide a year's sugar ration for nearly
10,000,000 people.

While this movement into the agricultural fields was going forward, the
great bulk of the evacuated people were pouring into relocation
centers. By mid-summer, four of the centers were in operation and
nearly one-third of the evacuee population had been transferred to
these new communities. The program was still young, but already
evidence was beginning to accumulate that the relocation centers could
never be developed into normal communities, in the full sense of the
word. Signs of unrest were mounting and valuable skills were obviously
not being put to full productive use. On the other hand, the experience
in the sugar beet fields was encouraging. It showed that evacuees
could make a significant contribution to the solution of the manpower
problem. And so on the 20th of July, the War Relocation Authority
adopted a policy making it possible for American citizen evacuees who
had never lived or studied in Japan to leave the relocation centers
indefinitely, after investigation, in order that they might take
full-time jobs and establish residence in normal communities. Later on,
toward the end of September, that policy was broadened so that any
resident of a relocation center -- citizen or alien -- might apply for
indefinite leave outside of the evacuated areas.

In recent weeks, there has been a great deal of public discussion about
this leave program and about the adequacy of check made by the War
Relocation Authority prior to the granting of leave. The impression has
been created that we make practically no check at all, and the charge
even has been made that we are consciously turning spies and saboteurs
loose upon the Nation. I want to refute this charge with all possible
emphasis. As a matter of fact, we have been bending over backwards in
the precautions we have taken. The federal government has more
information concerning the people in relocation centers than it has on
any other group. Records on many of these people have been built up
over a period of years by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Office of Naval Intelligence, and other investigative agencies. In
addition, the War Relocation Authority has been accumulating
information on this entire group ever since they entered relocation
centers. In granting leave we make a very careful check of the records
which have been developed for each individual at the relocation center.
If there is any evidence from any source that the evacuee might
endanger the national safety or interfere with the war effort,
permission for indefinite leave is denied. As a further precaution, we
are acquiring from the Federal Bureau of Investigation all the
information available in its files and from other intelligence agencies
on all adult evacuees at centers. The names of nearly 90 percent of
the adult evacuees have now been checked through FBI and the job should
be completed in the next few weeks. I should add that in the great
majority of cases so far considered, there has been nothing in FBI
files or elsewhere to justify denial of leave.

Besides checking the record of the evacuee himself, we also try to
determine the attitude of the community where he is planning to
relocate. If popular opinion seems to run strongly against the
acceptance of any person of Japanese descent, the evacuee is so advised
and is urged not to relocate in that particular area. We also require
each evacuee going out on indefinite leave to inform us of any change
of job or change of address. And we are maintaining in our Washington
office a locator file so that individual evacuees may promptly be
located if the need arises. Some of you may be surprised to learn
that the evacuees, as a group, are not rushing forward to take
advantage of the leave procedure. In fact, our principal trouble
has been in the other direction. Ever since the present leave program
was adopted last September, we have been trying to convince the
evacuated people that relocation in normal communities is the best
course, both for themselves and for the nation as a whole. But the
evacuees read the same newspapers as the rest of us and listen to the
same radio programs. They hear themselves branded by a few public
officials and influential citizens as a group of potential saboteurs,
day after day and week after week. And so, naturally, many are
reluctant to leave the centers to face a public that seems
predominantly hostile.

There are people here on the Pacific Coast and elsewhere who feel that
the War Relocation Authority is making a serious mistake in urging the
people of Japanese descent to leave the sanctuary of relocation
centers. Some of these people feel that it is not safe for the nation
to have any person of Japanese descent at large. Others argue that
confinement in relocation centers is necessary for protection of
evacuees themselves. I disagree strongly with both these points of view
and I would like to tell you why.

First, let us take a look at the argument that all people of
Japanese ancestry constitute a menace to the national security. At
the present time, there are almost 35,000 people of Japanese descent
outside relocation centers within the continental limits of the United
States. About half of these people have left the centers only in the
past few months, but some 20,000 of them lived outside the evacuated
area or have never been in relocation centers. Yet in all these months
of war, not one case of sabotage on the part of any person of Japanese
descent has been reported from any reliable source.

Contrary to the persistent rumors of sabotage by resident Japanese at
the time of Pearl Harbor, we have it from the very highest authorities
that no such actions have been committed either on December 7, 1941, or
at any time since. In view of that record, both in Hawaii and on the
mainland, I am frankly unable to see any factual basis for assuming
that every person with a Japanese face is automatically a threat to the
safety of the nation.

The argument that people of Japanese descent must be kept in
confinement for their own protection is remarkably similar to the
justification which the Nazi regime has sometimes advanced for its
treatment of the Jews. This argument is based on the assumption that
the law enforcement agencies of the nation have somehow broken down and
that they are no longer able to offer the protection which they
provided in time of peace. Essentially, the argument is a slander
against these agencies and against the basic good sense of the great
majority of our people. Despite all the racial emotions that have
been aroused, I refuse to believe we have proceeded so far in the
direction of anarchy that we find it necessary to lock up all persons
of Japanese descent in order to protect them from bodily harm.

So far I have been talking mainly about the leave program of the War
Relocation Authority because that is, and has been for several months,
the most important part of our total program. But we still have an
important job to do in managing the relocation centers. In considering
the manner in which the relocation centers are operated, it is
important to keep clearly in mind the status of the evacuees. They
are not living in the relocation centers as punishment for any
wrong-doing, or because they are suspected of being dangerous; they are
not prisoners of war; they are not internees. They are a dislocated
group of people removed from their homes and their means of livelihood
as a wartime emergency measure. As such they are entitled to treatment
according to American standards of decency. Ever since the summer of
1942, when most of the centers were still in the early stages of
construction, all sorts of unfounded rumors and inaccurate stories
have been circulated about the WRA management policies. Some of
these stories have been obviously fantastic -- like the one circulated
in Idaho over a year ago that all evacuees lived in snug little
bungalows with pink tile bathrooms. And more recently, there was the
story attributed to a member of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities that all evacuees are provided by the Government with five
gallons of whiskey. Unfortunately, most of the stories have not been so
plainly ridiculous. Although equally untrue, they have generally
carried more of an appearance of plausibility and consequently have
been widely accepted.

It is extremely significant, I think, that most of the stories about
pampering of evacuees have come from people who have never visited a
relocation center. In a number of cases, people who have actually
visited a center have taken pains to make a public denial of all
pampering charges. But such stories, of course, have not received as
much attention as the original allegations. The same thing is true of
the charges that have been made in recent weeks by investigators, and
spokesmen for the House Committee on Un-American Activities. We have
made a careful analysis of the more important of these charges and have
found that the great majority are inaccurate or misleading and that
many of the most startling ones are completely untrue. Yet the great
bulk of the Americans still remember the charges and have not yet
learned about the actual facts.

Perhaps the most widely criticized aspect of relocation center
administration is the policy under which evacuees are being fed.
Food is a delicate topic these days and it's not surprising that people
should be aroused when they hear the evacuees are enjoying a better
diet than the average civilian family. If these stories were true, I
will readily concede that there would be grounds for the most intense
kind of public resentment. But the stories are not true and I believe
that all of you sitting here today would be convinced of their falsity
if you could eat just one meal in a relocation center. The food served
at the centers is nourishing,
but could not be called luxurious by any
conceivable American standard. The cost of feeding over the past
several months has ranged from 34 to 42 cents per person per day. And
it is the established policy of the Authority that this cost shall not
exceed 45 cents per day in any case. All rationing restrictions
applicable to the civilian population are strictly followed. Two
meatless days are observed at each center every week. And in areas
where local milk supplies are short, milk is provided only to small
children, nursing or expectant mothers, and special dietary cases.
[PHOTO: Special formula of milk and of fruit juices are served to
children. (Manzanar, 04/02/1942)]

Ever since the relocation centers were first established, our policy
has been to produce as much food as possible on the project lands. We
expect a greatly increased production of vegetables, meats, dairy
products, and poultry products during the current year, probably up to
one-third of the total food requirements of the centers.

The housing at relocation centers is certainly no more than
adequate by any ordinary standards. Evacuee residents live in plain
barracks of frame construction which are partitioned off into
family-size apartments. A family of six or seven people will ordinarily
occupy a room about 20 by 25 feet. In the barracks there is no running
water, no cooking facilities, and no baths or toilets. However, each
block of 12 or 14 barracks -- accommodations between 250 and 300 people
-- is provided with a messhall and a bath and laundry building.

Education is provided for the evacuee children through the
high school level. At all centers, we have developed our school
curriculum and selected our teachers in conformity with the standards
of the state where the center is located.

All evacuees at relocation centers have been provided with medical
care and hospitalization when needed and these services are
supplied largely by evacuee doctors and nurses.

In operating the centers, we have always made maximum use of
evacuee manpower. Evacuees are employed in clerical and
stenographic positions, on construction activities and land development
work, in food production, and -- to some extent -- in manufacturing.
Most of those who work are paid at the rate of $16 per month;
apprentices and others requiring close supervision receive $12, while
professional workers, such as doctors, are paid $19. In addition, each
evacuee working at the center receives small clothing allowances for
himself and his dependents. These allowances range from $2 a month for
small children in the southerly centers to $3.75 for adults in centers
where the winters are severe. At the present time, about 30 percent
of the able-bodied evacuees at the centers are engaged in some line of
work.

The policy of the War Relocation Authority provides that evacuees at
all centers are to have an active voice in the management of
their own affairs, but maintenance of law and order within the center
is a responsibility of the WRA project director. To assist him in this
function, the project director has a small staff of non-Japanese
internal security officers and a sizable crew of evacuee policement.
The exterior boundaries of each project area are guarded by a
detachment of military police who are available for service within the
center in cases of emergency.

I won't go into further details on the conditions that prevail in the
relocation centers. But I believe I have said enough to indicate that life
in the centers is not exactly a bed of roses. When the evacuees
first arrived at each of the centers last summer and fall, construction
work was still in progress and it continued at most places until well
after the arrival of the last evacuee contingent. Under the
circumstances, a great amount of turmoil and confusion was inevitable.
Evacuee families from all sections of the Pacific Coast and all walks
of life suddenly found themselves crowded together in a strange new
environment. They found themselves cut off from all normal intercourse
with the larger American community and deprived of all ordinary
economic opportunities. Practically all the social controls that
ordinarily make for family and community solidarity were thrown out of
gear and the problem of juvenile delinquency began to assume serious
proportions.

It is significant, I think, that we have had our most serious problems
at the four oldest centers. These centers were all established during
the spring and early summer of 1942 before the War Relocation Authority
had really worked out many of its most fundamental policies. It must
be remembered that we were operating in an almost entirely new field of
governmental action virtually without precedents or guideposts.
Under the circumstances, some confusion of administration was
inevitable. At the Poston center in Western Arizona, last November, the
residents of one of the three communities there staged a strike and
protest meeting that lasted the better part of a week. However, the
trouble was settled peaceably without any violence or any destruction
of government property despite all rumors and reports to the contrary.
At Manzanar, we had a more serious disturbance which happened to occur
just before the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. In this case,
the military police were called in to restore order. And in the fracas,
two evacuees were killed and ten others wounded.

Some of the accounts gave the impression that both of these incidents
were manifestations of pro-Axis feeling on the part of the evacuees.
And the Manzanar incident has also been described as a celebration of
the Pearl Harbor anniversary. These explanations are dramatic,
exciting, and easy to accept. But they do not square with the facts.
Actually, both of the incidents were extremely complicated in their
origin.

More than anything else. they were the culmination of community
anxieties and resentments that had been building up over a period of
months. Evacuees at both of these centers had been through the
experiences I have just mentioned. Many of them -- citizen and alien
alike -- had suffered substantial losses of property at the time of the
evacuation. Most of them looked forward to the future with misgiving
and uncertainty. A few had even reached the point of abandoning all
hope that they would ever make a successful adjustment to life in the
United States. In such a highly charged atmosphere people were easy
prey for the agitators and the slightest spark of trouble was bound to
cause an explosion. And in time the spark was introduced.

Following the Manzanar incident, we took steps to strengthen our
internal security system at the centers and established a special isolation
center for persistent and incorrigible troublemakers. This center
was temporarily established in January at an abandoned CCC camp near
Moab, Utah, and is now located on the grounds of an Indian Service
boarding school at Leupp, Arizona. At the present time about 70
evacuees -- all American citizens -- are being quartered at
this center. Alien evacuees who incite trouble at the relocation
centers are certified to the Department of Justice and transferred to internment
camps.

Now let me return to the subject of clearing evacuees for leave. It has
taken time to develop individual records on all the evacuees at the
centers, but as we are now in a position where we can make a reasonable
determination of loyalties on every adult individual. The task of
gathering these records was started several months ago is now just
about completed. On January 28 of this year, the Secretary of War
announced the formation of a special combat team unit in the United
States Army to be composed entirely of American citizens of Japanese
descent. During February and early March a recruitment program was
carried out by the Army in the Hawaiian Islands and among
Japanese-Americans on the mainland both in and out of relocation
centers. I might add parenthetically that nearly 1200 young men of
Japanese ancestry at the centers volunteered from behind barbed wire
and the greater part of them are now in training at Camp Shelby,
Mississippi. But the main point is that while this recruitment was
going on, the War Relocation Authority, with Army collaboration,
carried out a vast registration program involving all evacuees at the
centers 17 years of age or over. The purpose of the registration
was to acquire information on the evacuees that could be used in
connection with the granting of leave. Each adult evacuee was
required to fill out a form that would provide extensive data on his
background, attitudes, and organizational affiliations. One question on
that form that has come in for widespread public attention is the
so-called "loyalty question", No. 28. At first, through an
oversight, all evacuees -- both citizen and aliens -- were asked to
swear allegiance to the United States and forswear obedience to any
foreign power, including the Emperor of Japan. After the forms had been
printed and distributed, it was realized that since alien Japanese are
not eligible for naturalization, they could not answer this question in
the affirmative without becoming "men without a country". So the
question was changed for aliens in such a way that they were asked to
swear that they would abide by the laws of the United States and would
not interfere with the war effort. But throughout the entire
registration, citizen evacuees were asked to make a definite
declaration of loyalty.

Partially because of the confusion in the wording of question 28 for
aliens, a great many premature and inaccurate reports have been
circulated about the number of evacuees who failed to answer "yes" on
this question. So many varying percentages have been tossed around
publicly that I find it hard to keep up with them myself. But here are
the facts. 88 percent of those who registered answered "yes" to
question 28 without qualification. 74 percent of the citizen males
who registered answered "yes" as did 85 percent of the citizen
females who registered, and 97 percent of the aliens who
registered. Approximately 11 percent answered "no" or qualified
their answers and a little over one percent refused to answer
this particular question. In addition, there were about 3,000
evacuees at the centers who failed to register. If all evacuees
were as untrustworthy as they have frequently been depicted, we most
certainly would not have had a single negative answer to question 28.

Using these same questionnaires as basic information, we are now about
to begin a program of segregation. We are going to separate
these evacuees who have indicated -- either by expressed statement or
by persistent action -- that their loyalty lies with Japan in the
current hostilities and we are going to maintain them in a center by
themselves. The first group to be segregated will be those who have
requested repatriation or expatriation to Japan and who have not
withdrawn their applications prior to July 1, 1943. These people will
be segregated as a group rather than on an individual basis. All others
to be segregated, however, will be given individual hearings. Aside
from the repatriate-expatriate group, candidates for segregation will
be drawn chiefly from those who have unfavorable records with
intelligence agencies and those who are denied leave clearance by the
War Relocation Authority because of other information indicating
loyalty to Japan. Tule Lake in northern California has been
selected as the segregation center. Present residents of Tule Lake
who are eligible for indefinite leave will be given a choice of
relocating immediately or of transferring to another center. Persons at
the other centers who are designated for segregation will be
transferred to Tule Lake. Actual movements will begin as soon as
preliminary arrangements are completed and transportation becomes
available -- probably soon after September 1.

The end product of this segregation program will be one center
composed entirely of evacuees who have indicated in effect that they
want to be Japanese. They will receive fair, decent treatment; they
will be adequately guarded, and will not be generally eligible for
leave. Then there will be nine other centers composed entirely of
evacuees whose records and statements indicate that they want to be
Americans -- and all of these people will be eligible for leave from
the centers outside of designated military areas.

A great deal has been said, especially in recent weeks, regarding the
extent of Americanization that has taken place among the citizens of
Japanese descent who were born and raised in this country. My own
experience with these people over the past 14 months, together with all
the information I have been able to obtain from authoritative sources,
convince me
that the great bulk of the Nisei or second-generation
group are wholeheartedly American in all their fundamental attitudes
and loyalties. Approximately 72 percent of them have never even
visited Japan and only about 15 percent have ever studied there for any
extended period. The overwhelming majority of those youngsters have
been brought up in this country, have attended American public schools,
and have absorbed Americanism almost as naturally as they breathe.
[PHOTO: "Mrs. Mildred Howell, teacher. The girls of Grade 12-A in Home
Economics class." (Rohwer, 11/25/1942)]

To claim otherwise is equivalent to asserting that American
institutions exercise a less potent influence over the youthful mind
than the transplanted institutions of the Orient. I deny that
assertion. I have faith in the strength of American institutions and I
believe that few human minds can be exposed to them during the
formative years without absorbing the rich heritage of American life.
The most eloquent testimony of this is being provided almost every day
at relocation centers -- in the community newspapers, in the
classrooms, and in activities of such thoroughly American organizations
as the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, YMCA, YWCA and National Red Cross.
Residents of the relocation center have given evidence in many ways
that they wish to become part of the fiber of this country. They have
bought thousands of dollars worth of war bonds and stamps. They have
contributed to the Red Cross -- at many centers well in excess of their
quotas. They have volunteered for service in the Army. And large
numbers have expressed an eagerness to play an active part in war work.

Americanism is stressed at all centers in the schools, in adult
education courses, in discussion forums, and in almost every aspect of
community activities. However, Americanization can never be wholly
effective within the confines of relocation centers. We have felt from
the beginning that the only effective way to carry on the
Americanization process among the evacuees would be to restore those
with good records to normal American communities at the earliest
possible date. That is one of the basic reasons why we have
developed a leave program and why we are now concentrating our energies
mainly on relocation outside the centers.

Ever since the time of the evacuation, we in WRA have been acutely
conscious of the grave implications of our program. We have been aware
that our progress is being watched by the Japanese government and
that it might provide a pattern for the treatment of American nationals
-- both soldiers and civilians -- in Japanese hands. We have also
born in mind the reactions in other parts of the Orient -- in China,
India, and other countries whose collaboration we need in the fight
against the Tokyo end of the Axis.

We recognize that the WRA program is a proper subject for public
inquiry. We welcome investigation by committees of the Congress or any
other group. We welcome constructive criticism of the manner in which
we are discharging our responsibility. We heartily endorse the
fundamental American right of a healthy difference of opinion. But, in
view of the serious issues at stake, we do ask that investigations of
our program be conducted in a truly fact-finding spirit and that
criticism of our administrative actions be based on truth rather than
on rumor or manufactured allegations.

In carrying the program forward, we have also kept constantly in mind a
number of basic assumptions. In the first place, we have
assumed that the foremost task before the American people is to win the
war and we have felt that this means concentrating our energies on
fighting the enemy rather than fighting among ourselves. Secondly, we
have assumed that the great majority of the people of Japanese ancestry
now in this country will remain here after the war and continue to be
good citizens or law-abiding aliens. Thirdly, we believe that it is
possible to distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal people of
Japanese ancestry to a degree that will safeguard the national
security. Techniques for determining loyalty, which have been
employed by the intelligence agencies over a period of years, have
amply demonstrated their effectiveness, and we feel that these same
techniques can be used in determining eligibility for leave.
Finally, we believe that loyalty grows and sustains itself only when it
is given a chance. It cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
discrimination.

If these assumptions are accepted, it becomes extremely difficult
to justify the wholesale detention of all persons of Japanese descent
in relocation centers. In fact, I fail to see how such an action
could possibly be squared with the basic principles on which our
country has been developed and which we are now fighting to defend. But
there are many other -- more immediately practical -- reasons why we
decided many months ago that a large leave program was the only logical
step.

We realized that the skills and energies of the evacuees could never be
put to full use in the relocation centers; that manpower was going to
waste at a time when the nation needed every ounce of manpower.

We are aware, too, that operating the relocation centers is
draining money from the taxpayers and from the war effort. We hope
that outside relocation will reduce the population of the centers so
some of them can be closed and turned over to the Army for whatever use
they can make of them. Ideally, I hope all the people who are not
segregated can be relocated -- and we can work ourselves out of a job
before the close of the war.

Another reason for adopting the leave program lies in the constitutional
and legal principles involved. Lawyers generally are doubtful of
the legality of detaining American citizens, against whom no charge has
been placed. In fact, a Federal district court in California recently
rendered a decision denying an evacuee's petition for the writ of
habeas corpus only because WRA has established a leave program and the
evacuee had failed to apply for indefinite leave.

There is one important point about the leave program which I believe is
being overlooked in much of the discussion that has taken place here on
the Pacific Coast. I'm thinking about the Little Tokyos and
concentrations of people of Japanese ancestry which existed before
evacuation. I have found no one who thought that these
concentrations of population were desirable even in peacetime, let
alone in time of war. Most of the people who comprised them are now in
the relocation centers, and some people are insisting that they be kept
there for the duration. Suppose that were to be done. In that case,
what will happen when the war is over? One alternative that has been
suggested by some is to send all of them to Japan, regardless of
citizenship and regardless of loyalty. I cannot conceive of either the
American conscience or the Constitution permitting such an act. The
thing which most likely would happen would be for the evacuated people
to return to the place they called home -- and the Little Tokyos
would probably spring up again, with all their undesirable features.

But if the leave program is successful, a large number of the evacuees
will re-establish themselves in other parts of the country, where they
can be absorbed readily. It is hoped that the bulk of the relocated
people will stay where they strike root. It is hard to understand why
residents or officials of California or other west coast states would
oppose rather than support a program of relocation and dispersion
which provides the only sensible answer to one of the most pressing
social problems which the West Coast and the Nation has faced.

To my mind, the most serious aspect of the whole relocation program
is the fact that we are dealing exclusively with a racial minority.
The Nazis of Germany and the warlords of Tokyo have made it clear that
they consider themselves the master races of the earth and regard all
other peoples as inferior. This is a doctrine which most of us
instinctively detest -- a doctrine that runs counter to all our
cherished traditions and principles. Yet there are mounting signs that
a similar attitude is gaining ground in this country.

In recent weeks I have seen resolutions passed by
organizations all over California and other states reflecting the same
type of racial thinking that prevails in Tokyo and Berlin. I
realize, of course, that war always breeds strong emotions. And this
war has been especially trying on all of us. The scope of the combat,
the magnitude of the issues at stake, and the stern necessity for
constant unstinting effort have tried our tempers, frayed our nerves,
and warped our judgments. But this is all the more reason why we should
exercise restraint and hold fast to the principles we have always
cherished. Now, more than ever before, the United States is being
regarded from all quarters of the globe as an outstanding example of
democracy in action. If we give in to racial feeling, if we practice
the theories of the Nazis and the militarists, we are weakening our
position on every battle front in the world. If we repress or persecute
tens of thousands of our own citizens, solely on the grounds of race,
the other Nations of the world may well ask whether we have a moral
right to assume a leading role at the peace table, or to ask for
cooperation in waging the war.

But despite all resolutions that have been passed, despite all the
intemperate statements by some public officials, and despite the
strongly worded mail that has been coming in to my desk in recent
weeks, I still have confidence in the basic good sense of the American
people. I believe that much of current agitation is based on
misinformation rather than fundamental conviction. And I feel sure that
once the facts are known, the conscience of America will reassert
itself. Our treatment of the people of Japanese descent in our
midst will certainly go down as one of the most significant chapters in
the history of the current war. That chapter can be a shameful blot on
our national record or it can be to our everlasting credit. In the last
analysis -- the choice is really up to the American people.