The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group

Transcription

1 Salvage and Liquidation The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group Michael Warner. The problem for the Truman administration that fall of 1945 was that no one, including the President, knew just what he wanted, while each department and intelligence fully service knew what sorts of results it wanted to avoid. 9~ Michael Warner is on CIAs History Staff. Editors Note. This article is an expanded appeared fall version of one that under the same title in the 1995 edition of Studies in Intelligence. January 1996 marked the 50th anni of President Trumans versary appointment Central Intelligence (DCI) and the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), CIAs institutional predecessor. The office diary of the Presidents chief military adviser, FIt. of the first Director of Admr. William D. Leahy, records a rather unexpected event on 24 Janu ary 1946: At lunch today in the White House, with only members of the Staffpresent, RAdm. Sidney Souers and I were presented by President Truman] with black cloaks, black hats, and wooden daggers, and the President read an amusing directive to us outlin ing of some our duties in the Central Intelligence Agency sic], Cloak and Dagger Group of Snoopers. 1 With this whimsical ceremony, President Truman christened Admi ral Souers as the first DCI. The humor and symbolism of this inauguration would have been lost on many veterans of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the big intelligence and covert action agency that Truman had suddenly disman tled at the end of World War II, only four months earlier. CIG inevi tably suffered (and still suffers) from comparisons with OSS. The Group began its brief existence with a phony cape and a wooden dagger. It was a bureaucratic anomaly with no independent budget, no statutory mandate, and staffers assigned from the permanent departments of the government. Nevertheless, CIG grew rapidly and soon gained a fair measure of organizational auton omy. The Truman administration invested it with the two basic mis sions of strategic warning and coordination of clandestine activities abroad, although interdepartmental rivalries prevented the Group from performing either mission to the full est. Strategic warning and clandestine activities are the two basic missions of todays CIA. 2 Historical accounts of Trumans dis solution of OSS and creation of CIG have concentrated on assigning credit to certain actors and blame to their opponents and rivals. ~ The pas sage of time and the gradually expanding availability of sources, however, promise to foster more holistic approaches to this subject. The problem for the Truman admin istration that fall of 1945 was that no one, including the President, knew just what he wanted, while each department and intelligence service knew fully what sorts of results it wanted to avoid. With this context in mind, it is informative to view the formation of CIG with an eye toward the way administration offi cials preserved certain essential functions of OSS and brought them together again in centralized, a peace time foreign intelligence agency. Those decisions created a permanent structure that, while still intelligence incomplete, preserved some of the 111

2 most useful capabilities of the old OSS while resting on a firmer institu tional foundation. From War to Peace Before World War II, the US Government had not seen fit to cen tralize either strategic warning or clandestine activities, let alone com bine both missions in a single organization. The exigencies of glo bal conflict persuaded Washington to bui!d.a formidable intelligence apparatus in Maj. Gen. William J. Donovans Office of the Coordina tor of Information (renamed OSS in 1942), Americas first nondepartmen tal intelligence arm. As such, it encountered resentment from such established services as the FBI and the Military Intelligence the War Department (better known as the G-2). Division of General Staff General Donovan advocated the cre ation of a limited but permanent service after vic foreign intelligence tory, mentioning the idea at several points during the ~ war. President Roosevelt made no promises, how ever, and, after Roosevelts death in April 1945 and the German surren der that May, President Truman felt He no compulsion to keep OSS alive. disliked Donovan (perhaps fearing that Donovans proposed intelligence establishment might day one be used against Americans). ~ The President and his top military advisers also knew that Americas wartime intelli gence success had been built on cryptologic successes, in which OSS had played only a supporting role. Signals intelligence was the province of the Army and Navy, two jealous rivals that only barely cooperated; not even General Donovan contemplated Major-General William J. Donovan centralized, civilian control of this field. Truman could have tried to trans form OSS into a central intelligence service conducting clandestine collection, analysis, and operations opportunity and dismantled OSS abroad. He declined the instead. Within three years, however, Truman had overseen the creation of service conduct a central intelligence ing clandestine collection, analysis, and operations abroad. Several authors have concluded from the jux of these facts that Truman taposition dissolved OSS out of ignorance, haste, and pique, and that he tacitly admitted his mistake when he endorsed the reassembly of many OSS functions in the new CIA. Even Presidential aide Clark Clifford has complained that Truman prema turely, abruptly, and unwisely 6 disbanded the OSS. A look at the mood in Washington, however, places Trumans decision in a more favorable light. At the onset of the postwar era, the nation wanted demobiliza and Congress tionfast. OSS was already marked for huge reductions because so many of its personnel served with guerrilla, commando, and propaganda units considered extraneous in peacetime. Congress regarded OSS as a tempo rary war agency, one of many bureaucratic hybrids raised for the national emergency that would have to be weeded out after victory. ~ Indeed, early in 1945 Congress passed law requiring the White a House to seek a specific Congres sional appropriation for any new agency operating for longer than 12 months. 8 This obstacle impeded any Presidential wish to preserve OSS or to create a permanent peace time intelligence agency along the lines of General Donovans plana path made even slicker by innuendo, spread by Donovans rivals, that the General was urging the creation of an American Gestapo.9 Truman had barely moved into the Oval Office when he received a scath ing report on OSS. (Indeed, this well have been the same report might primary source for the abovemen tioned innuendo) A few months before he died, President Roosevelt had asked an aide, Col. Richard Park, Jr., to conduct an informal investigation of OSS and General Donovan. Colonel Park completed his report in March, but apparently Roosevelt never read it. The day after Roosevelts death, Park attended an Oval Office meeting with President Truman. Although no minutes of their discussion survived, Park proba bly summarized his findings for the new President; in any event, he sent Truman a copy of his report on OSS at about that time. That document castigated OSS for bumbling security, and complained vans proposed intelligence reform had all the earmarks of a Gestapo system. ing OSS, although and lax that Dono Park recommended abolish he conceded that 112

3 some of the Offices personnel and activities were worth preserving in other agencies. OSSs Research and Analysis Branch in particular could be salvaged and given Department. 10 to the State Donovan himself hardly helped his own cause. OSS was attached to the Executive Office of the President but technically drew its orders and pay from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Donovan refused to compromise on his proposals with JCS representa tives delegated to study postwar intelligence needs. He insisted that a permanent intelligence arm ought to answer directly to the President and not to his advisers. ~ The Joint Chiefs had already rescued Donovan once, when the G-2 had tried to sub sume OSS in This time the White House did not ask the Joint Chiefs opinion. The JCS stood aside and let the Office meet its fate. Taking the Initiative The White House evidently con cluded that the problem create a new peacetime intelligence organization was how to without Donovan and his Office. Many senior advisers in the Roosevelt and Truman administra tions believed that the nation needed some sort of permanent intelligence establishment. The Bureau of the Budget took up this issue shortly before President Roosevelts death, presenting itself to Roosevelt as a dis interested observer and creating a small team to study the governments intelligence requirements and recom mend possible reforms. Soon after he took office, Truman endorsed the 12 Budget Bureaus effort. Donald C. Stone, Bureau of the Budget In August, the Budget Bureau began drafting liquidation plans for OSS and other war agencies, but ini tially the Bureau assumed that liquidation could be stretched over a period of time sufficient to preserve OSSs most valuable assets while the Office liquidated functions and released personnel longer needed no in peacetime. On 27 or 28 August, however, the President or his princi pal reconversion advisersbudget Director Harold D. Smith, Special Counsel Samuel Rosenman, and Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion John W. Snydersud denly recommended dissolving OSS almost immediately. ~ Bureau staff ers had already conceived the idea of of OSS, the Research giving a part and Analysis Branch (R&A), to the con State Department as a going cern. The imminent dissolution of OSS meant that something had to be done fast about the rest of the Office; someone in the Budget Bureau (prob ably the Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Donald C. Stone) quickly War Department decided that the could receive the remainder of OSS for liquidation.4 salvage and Stone told frustrated OSS officers on 29 August that important functions of the Office might survive: Stone stated that he felt that the secret and counterintelligence activities of 055 should probably be continued at a fairly high level for probably another year. He said he would support such a program. 15 Snyder and Rosenman endorsed the Budget Bureaus general plan for intelligence reorganization and passed it to Truman on 4 September Donovan predictably exploded when he learned of the plan, but the President ignored Donovans protests, telling Harold Smith on 13 September to recom mend the dissolution of Donovans outfit even if Donovan did not like ~ Within a week, the Budget Bureau had the requisite papers ready for the Presidents signature. Execu tive Order 9621 on 20 September dissolved OSS as of 1 October 1945, sending R&A to State and everything else to the War Department. The Order also directed the Secretary of War to liquidate OSS activities whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest. i8 That same day, Truman sent a letter of appreciation (drafted by Donald Stone) to General Donovan. ~ The transfer of OSSs R&A Branch to the the President told State Department, Donovan, marked the beginning of the development of a coordinated system of foreign intelligence within the permanent framework of the Government. The President also implicitly repeated Stones assurances to OSS, informing earlier 113

4 Donovan that the War Department would maintain certain OSS compo nents providing services of a military nature the need for which will con tinue for some time.2 OSS was through, but what would survive the wreck? The President probably gave little thought necessary services of a military nature to those that would somehow con tinue under War Department auspices. Truman shared the wide spread feeling that the government needed better intelligence, although he provided little positive guidance on the matter and said even less about intelligence collection (as opposed to its collation). He commented to Budget Director Harold Smith in September 1945 that he had in mind a different kind of intelligence service from what this country has had in the past, a broad intelligence service attached to the Presidents office.21 Later remarks clarified these comments slightly. Speaking CIA employees in 1952, Truman reminisced that, when he first took office, there had been: to an audience of no concentration ofinforma tion for the benefit of the President. Each Department and each organization had its own information service, and that information service was walled offifrom every other service. 22 Trumans memoirs subsequently expanded on this point, explaining what was at stake: I have often thought that ~f there had -been something tion ofinformation like coordina in the.government it would have been more difficult, ~f not impossible, John J. McCloy. Asst. Secretary of War for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days 1941] the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew.23 These comments suggest that Truman viewed strategic warning as the pri mary mission of his new intelligence establishment, and as a function that had to be handled centrally. His remarks also suggest that he inno cently viewed intelligence analysis as largely a matter of collation; the facts would speak for themselves, if only they could only be gathered in one place. intelligence service to do. That is what he wanted his new The Budget Bureau itself had not proposed anything that looked much clearer than the Presidents vague notions. Bureau staffers wanted the State Department to serve as the Presidents principal staff agency in developing high-level intelligence, after taking the lead in establishing the integrated Government-wide 24 Program. At the same time, how ever, Budget Bureau officers wanted the departments to continue to conduct their own intelligence func tions, rather than relegating this duty to any single central agency. A small interagency group, under the leadership of the State Department, could coordinate de~artmental intel ligence operations.2 This proposed program rested on two assumptions that would soon be tested: that the State Department was ready to take the lead, and that the armed services were willing to follow. In the meantime, Donovan fumed about the Presidents decision yet again to Budget Bureau staffers who met with him on 22 September to arrange the details of the OSS~s in the draft dissolution. An oversight ing of EQ 9621 had left the originally proposed termination date of 1 October unchanged in the final signed version, and now Donovan had less than two weeks to dismantle his sprawling agency. One official of the Budget Bureau subsequently suggested to Donald Stone that the War Department might sition by keeping its portion of OSS functioning for the time being, perhaps even with Donovan in charge. Stone preferred someone other than Donovan for this job and promised to discuss the idea with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy on 24 September.26 ease the tran Two days later, McCloy stepped into the breach. He glimpsed an opportu nity to save OSS components as the nucleus of a peacetime intelligence service. A friend of Donovans, McCloy had long promoted an improved national intelligence capability.27 He interpreted the Presidents directive as broadly as possible by ordering OSSs Deputy Director for Intelligence, Brig. Gen. John Magruder; to preserve his 114

5 . is. that Central Intelligence Group Secret Intelligence (SI) and Counter espionage (X-2) Branches as a going operation in a new office that McCloy dubbed the Strategic Services Unit (SSU): This assignment of the OSS activ ities. a method. ofcar~ying out the desire of the President, as indicated by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget, that these facilities of OSS be exam ined over the next three months with a view to determining their Obvi appropriate disposition. ously, this will demand close liaison with the Bureau of the Budget, the State Department, and other agencies ofthe War Departments to insure that the facilities and assets of OSS are preserved/or any possible Jiaure use... The situation is one in which the facilities ofan organi z.ation, normally shrinking in size as a result of the end offight ing, must be preserved far so as potentially o~j~ture usefidness to the country. The following day, the new Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, con firmed this directive and implicitly endorsed McCloys interpretation, for mally ordering Magruder to preserve as a unit such of these functions and ficilities as are valuable for permanent peacetime purposes emphasis added] ~29 With this order, Patterson postponed indefinitely any assimilation of OSSs records and personnel into G-2. the War Departments General Magruder soon had to explain this unorthodox arrangement to sharp-eyed Congressmen and staff. Rep. Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Commit tee, asked the general on 2 October Brig. Gen. John ~ about the OSS contingents sent to the State and War Departments and the plans for disposing of OSSs unspent funds (roughly $4.5 million). Magruder explained that he did not quite know what State would do with R&A; when Cannon asked about the War Depart ments contingent, the general read aloud from the Secretary of Wars order to preserve OSSs more valu able functions as a unit. 30 Two weeks later, staffers from the House Military Affairs Committee asked why the War Department suddenly needed both SSU and the G-2: General Magruder explained that he had no orders to liquidate OSS (other than, those ofcourse, j~ nctions without any peacetime sign~f1cance) and that only the Assistant Secretary of War McCloy] could explain why OSS had been absorbed into the War Department on the basis indicated. He said he felt, ever,. the. objective how was to retain SSU intact until the Secre tary of State had surveyed the intelligence field and made rec ommendations to the President. Committee staff implicitly conceded that the arrangement made sense, but hinted that both SSU and the remnant of R&A in the State Depart ment ought to be considerably reduced in size.31 what was occu Reducing SSU is just pying the units new Executive Officer, Col. William W. Quinn: The orders that General Magruder received from the Secretary of War were very simple. He was charged with preserving the intelligence assets created and held by OSS during its existence and the disbandment ofparamilitary units, which included the 101 Detachment in Burma and Southeast Asia and otherforms ofintelligence units, like the Jedburgh teams, and morale operations, et cetera. My initial business was primarily liq uidation. The main problem was the discharge of literally thou sands ofpeople. Consequently, the intelligence collection effort more or less came to a standstill.. Magruder did his best to sustain morale in the Unit, keeping his deputies informed about high-level debates over the holy cause of central intelligence, as he jocularly dubbed it. He suggested optimistically that SSU would survive its current exile: In the meantime I can assure you there is a great deal of serious thinking in high places regarding the solution that will be made/or OSS SSU]. Ihope it will prove fruitjid. There is a very serious movement under way to recon struct some of the fortunate more ~ aspects of our work. 115

6 Despite Magruders and Quinns efforts, the House of Representatives on 17 October lopped $2 million from the OSS terminal budget that SSU shared with the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS), its erstwhile sister branch now set in the Department of State. The cut directly threatened both SSU and IRIS. The Truman administration eventually convinced Congress to drop the Houses recision and even increase funding for both pieces of OSS, but not until after several anxious weeks in SSU and the War Department.34 Institutional enemies closer to hand also seemed to threaten SSUs inde pendence that fall. Just before Thanksgiving, McCloy warned Secre tary Patterson that only close supervision, could prevent the War Department bureaucracy from taking the course of least resistance by merely putting SSU] into what I think is a very unimaginative section of G-2 and thus osing] a very valuable and necessary military asset.35 General Magruder told his lieutenants that SSU was quietly winning friends in high places, but repeatedly reminded staffers of the need for discretion, noting that some people did not like SSU and the less said about the Unit] the better.36 Controversy and Compromise McCloy (with Stones help) had pre cipitated an inspired bureaucratic initiative that would eventually expand the Truman administrations options in creating a new intelligence establishment. Amid all the subse quent interagency debates over the new intelligence establishment that autumn, SSU preserved OSSs for eign intelligence assets for eventual President Truman and Sidney Souers transfer to whichever agency received this responsibility. The Truman administration waged a heated inter nal argument over which powers to be given to the new central intelli gence service. The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, who quickly agreed that they should oversee the proposed office, stood together against rival plans proposed by the Bureau of the Budget and the FBI. The Army and Navy, however, would not accept the State Depart ments insistence that the new offices director be selected by and account able to the Secretary of State. The armed services instead preferred a plan outlined by the JCS back in Sep tember, which proposed lifting the new intelligence agency outside the Cabinet departments by placing it under a proposed National Intelli gence Authority.37 This was the plan that would soon settle the question of where to place SSU. The JCS had been working on this plan for months, having been spurred to action by Donovans 1944 campaigning for a permanent peacetime intelligence agency. In September, JCS Chairman William Leahy had transmitted the plan (JCS 1181/5) to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, who sent it on to the State Department, where it languished for several weeks. The plan proposed, among other things, that a new Central Intelligence Agency should, among its duties, perform: such services ofcommon con cern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished by a common agency, including the direct procurement of intell~gence.38 This artful ambiguityservices of common concernmeant espionage and liaison with foreign intelligence services, the core of clandestine for eign intelligence. Everyone involved with the draft knew this, but no one 116

7 in the administration or the military wanted to say such thin,~,s out loud; hence, the obfuscation* In any case, here was another function that the drafters of the JCS plan performed, or at least coordinated, centrally. felt had to be In December 1945, an impatient President Truman asked to see both the State Department and the JCS proposals and decided that the latter looked simpler and more workable. This decision dashed the Budget Bureaus original hope that the State Department would lead the govern ments foreign intelligence program. Truman cre Early in the new year, ated the CIG, implementing what was in essence a modification of the JCS 1181/5 proposal. He persuaded Capt. (soon to be Rear Admiral) Sidney Souers, the Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence and a friend of Navy Secretary Forrestal (and Presi dential aide Clark Clifford) who had advised the White House on the intelligence debate, to serve for a few months as the first DCI. 40 The CIG formally came into being with the Presidents directive of 22 Janu ary Cribbing text from JCS 1181/5, the President authorized CIG to: perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services ofcommon concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more effi ciently accomplished centrally.4 Here was the loaded phrase services of common concern again, only this time the telltale clause including the direct procurement of intelligence had discreetly disappeared. (With minor editing, the phrase would appear yet again in the CIAs the National enabling legislation, Security Act of 1947.) Two days later, on 24 January, Tru man invited Admiral Souers to the White House to award him his black cape and wooden dagger. part to McCloys Thanks in order to preserve OSSs SI and X-2 Branches, the cloak and dagger capabilitythe services of common concern men tioned in the Presidents directive was waiting in the War Department for transfer to the new CIG. General Magruder quietly applauded Souerss appointment as DCI, explaining to his deputies that SSU might soon be moving: With respect to SSU, we and the War Department are thinking along the same lines: that at such time as the Director of Central Intelligence] is ready to start oper ating, this Unit, its activities, personnel, and facilities will become available to the Director, but as you know, the intent of the Presidents 22Januaty] directive was to avoid setting up an inde pendent agency. Therefore, the Central Intelligence Group, pur posely called the Group, will utilize the facilities of several Departments. This Unit will become something in the way of a contribution furnished by the War Department.42 Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had saved the foreign intelli core gence of OSS in the SSU; all that was required was for the National Intelligence Authority to approve a method for transferring it. This the NIA did at its third meeting, on 2 April 1946.~~ The actual trans fer of SSU personnel began almost as soon as CIG had acquired a new DCI, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, in June Vandenberg a month later was able to report matter of factly to the National Intelligence Authority that the tiny CIG had begun to take over all eign intelligence activities, meaning the much larger SSU. At that same clandestine for meeting, Admiral Leahy also reminded participants (in a different context) that it stood that CIG eventually would broaden its scope. was always under 14 From Small Beginnings An eminent historian once remarked that the crowning achievement of his torical research is to attain an understanding of how things do not happen. To put it simply, history rarely offers up tidy events and clear motivations. President Truman did not follow a neat plan in founding the CIG. He implicitly imposed two broad requirements on his advisers and departments in the fall of 1945: to create a structure that could col late the best intelligence held by the various departments, and to make that structure operate, at least ini tially, on funds derived from the established agencies. Indeed, the fric tion and waste in the process that resulted from this vague guidance prompted complaints that the Presi dent had acted rashly in dissolving OSS and ignoring the advice of intel ligence professionals like Donovan. In the fall of 1945, the President vaguely ized intelligence service, but his wanted a new kind of central Cabinet departments and existing 117

8 services knew fairly specifically what kinds of central intelligence they did not want. Between these two realities lay the gray area in which the GIG was founded and grew in Tru man always took credit for assigning GIG the task of providing timely stra tegic warning and guarding against another Pearl Harbor. GIG acquired its second missionthe conduct of clandestine activities abroadin large part through the foresight of Donald Stone and John J. McGloy. These two appointees ensured that trained OSS personnel stayed together as a unit ready to join the new peacetime intelligence service. Within months of its creation, GIG had become the nations primary agency for strategic warning and the of clandestine activities management abroad, and within two years the Group would bequeath both mis sions to its successor, the CIA. The relationshipand tension between the two missions (strategic warning and clandestine activities) formed the central dynamic in the unfolding early history of CIA. Many officials thought the two should be handled centrally, although not necessarily by a single agency. That they ultimately were combined under one organization (GIG and then CIA) was due largely to the efforts of McGloy and Magruder. Nevertheless, it is clear from the history of the SSU that high-level Truman administration officials acted with the tacit assent of the White House in preserving OSSs most valuable components to become the nucleus of the nations foreign intelligence capability. The Presidents actions do not deserve the charge of incompetence that has been leveled against them, but it does seem justified to conclude that Trumans military advisers deserve most of the credit for the creation of a GIG that could collect as well as collate foreign intelligence. NOTES 1. Diary of William D. Leahy, 24 January 1946, Library of Gongress. Admiral Leahy was simultaneously designated the Presidents represen tative to the new, four-member National Intelligence Authority (GIGs oversight body). The other members were the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. 2. A recent unclassified statement to CIA employees entitled Vision, Mission, and Values of the Central Intelligence Agency identified the basic missions: following as CIAs We support the President, the National Security Gouncil, and all who make and execute US national security policy by: Providing accurate, evidence-based comprehensive and timely foreign intelligence related to national security; and Gonducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the President. 3. Several authors describe the found ing and institutional arrangements of GIG. Three CIA officers had wide access to the relevant records in writing their accounts; see Arthur B. Darling, The Central Inteiz~ence Agency: An Instrument ofgovernment, to 1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wash ington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981); and Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence: October February 1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp See also Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: 055 and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, 1983). B. Nelson MacPherson offers thoughtful commentary in CIA Origins as Viewed from Within, Intelligence and National Securily, 10 April 1995, pp Donovans Memorandum for the President, 18 November 1944, is reprinted in Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp Richard Dunlop, Donovan: Americas Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), pp See also Troy, the CIA, p Donovan and 6. Glark Glifford, it bears noting, played little if any role in the disso lution of OSS; see Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991, p. 165). William R. Gorson calls the affair a sorry display of presidential bad manners and shortsightedness; The Armies ofignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New York: Dial Press, 1977), p The Bureau of the Budget had warned Donovan in September 1944 that OSS would be treated as a war agency to be liquidated after the end of hostilities. See Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp The legislation was titled the Independent OffIces App ropria non Act of 1945, Public Law 358, 78th Congress, Second Session. 9. For an indication of the mixed Congressional attitudes toward OSS, see Smith, The Shadow Warriors, pp

9 10. The Park report resides in the Rose A. Conway Files at the Harry S. Truman Library, OSS/ Donovan folder; see especially 1-3 and Appendix III. Tho pp. mas F. Troy has pointed to strong similarities between the Park report and Walter Trohans Gestapo stories in the Chicago Tribune; see Donovan and the CIA, pp. 267, Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith, pp For more on Donovans refusal to compromise, see Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp George F. Schwarzwalder, Division of Administrative Man agement, Bureau of the Budget, project completion report, Intelli gence and Internal Security Program of the Government {Project 2171, 28 November 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Budget), Series 39.35, Progress Box 181, p. 5. Reports, 13. George Schwarzwalder recorded several years later that the Budget Bureau learned on 24 August that OSS would be dissolved; see his 1947 progress report on Project 217, cited above, p Donald C. Stone, Assistant Direc tor for Administrative Management, Bureau of the Bud get,. to Harold Smith, Director, Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Trans fer of its Activities to the State and War Departments, 27 August 1945, reproduced in C. Thomas Thorne, Jr. and David S. Patterson, editors Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, US Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States series DC: Government (Washington, Printing Office, 1996), pp Hereinafter cited as FRUS. 15. G.E. Ramsey, Jr., Bureau of the Budget, to Deputy Comptroller McCandless, Conference on OSS with Don Stone and OSS representatives, Aug. 29, 29 August 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Budget), Series 39.19, OSS Orga nization and Functions, Box Smith, Rosenman, and Snyder to Truman, Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Transfer of its Activities to the State and War Departments, 4 September 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Inde pendence, Missouri. 17. The quoted phrase comes from Harold Smiths office diary for 13 September 1945, in the Frank lin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York. 18. Executive Order 9621, 20 Sep tember 1945, FRUS pp is noted in 19. Stones authorship Corson, Armies ofignorance, p Harry S. Truman to William J. Donovan, 20 September 1945; Document 4 in Michael Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington, DC: CIA, 1994) p. 15. See also Troy, the CIA, pp Donovan and 21. Harold Smiths office diary entries for 13 and 20 September 1945, Roosevelt Library. 22. Trumans speech is reprinted as Document 81 in Warner, The CIA under Hary Truman, p Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol ume II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p Quoted phrases are in Snyder, Rosenman, and Smith to Tru man, 4 September Harold D. Smith to Harry S. Tru man, Transfer of Functions of the Office of Strategic Services, 18 September 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library. 26. G.E. Ramsey, Jr., Bureau of the Budget, to the Assistant Director for Estimates, Bureau of the Bud get, Disposition of OSS, 24 September 1945, FRUS, pp For McCloys advocacy of a cen tralized intelligence capability, see Kai Bird, The Chairman: JohnJ. McCloy, the Making oftheameri can Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp John J. McCloy to John Magruder, OSS, Transfer of OSS Personnel and Activities to the War Department and Creation of Strategic Services Unit, 26 Sep~ tember 1945, FRUS, pp Robert P. Patterson to John Magruder, 27 September 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 319 (Army Intelligence), Decimal File , 334 OSS, box 649, Strategic Services Unit folder. 30. US House of Representatives, House Appropriations Commit tee, First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Recision Bill, 1946, 79th Cong., First Sess., 1945, pp John R. Schoemer, Jr., Acting General Counsel, Strategic Ser vices Unit, memorandum for the record, Conference with repre sentatives of House Military Affairs Committee, 19 October 1945, CIA History Staff HS/CSG 1400, item 14, unclassified. 32. William W. Quinn, Buffalo Bill Remembers: Truth and Courage (Fowlerville, MI: Wilderness Adventure Books, 1991), p SSU Staff Meeting Minutes, 23 October 1945, National Archives and Records Administra tion, Record Group 226 (OSS), Entry 190, WASH-DIR-OP-266 (microfilm M1642), Roll 112, folder General Magruder 119

10 made his holy cause quip 29 November meeting. at the 34. SSU Staff Meeting Minutes for 19 October, 30 October, and 20 December Harry S. Truman to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 7 November 1945, reprinted in US House of Representatives, House Miscellaneous Documents II, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., serial set volume 10970, document 372, with attached letter from Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to President Tru man, dated 6 November First Supplemental Surplus Appro priation Recession Act, 1946, Public Law , Title 1, 60 Stat. 6, 7, (1946). 35. McCloy to Patterson, Central Intelligence Agency, 13 Novem ber 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 107 (War Department), Entry 180, Files of the Assistant Secretary of War, box 5, Intelli gence folder. also Clifford, Counsel to the President, p President Truman to the Secretar ies of State, War, and Navy, 22 January 1946; FRUS, pp SSU Staff Meeting Minutes, 29 January 1946; Magruder praised Souerss appointment at the 24 January meeting. 43. National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIAs third meet ing, 2 April 1946, CIA History Staff HS/HC-245, National Archives and Records Administra tion, Record Group 263 (CIA), History Staff Source Collection. 44. National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIAs ing, 17 July 1946; Document fourth meet 13 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, pp SSU Staff Meeting Minutes for 1 November, 6 November, and 29 November Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp , 315, JCS 1181/5 is attached to Will iam D. Leahy, memorandum for the Secretary of War and Secre tary of the Navy, Establishment of a central intelligence service upon liquidation of OSS, 19 September 1945; Document 2 in Warner, The CIA under Hany Truman, p The term services of common concern apparently originated with OSSs General Magruder and was adopted by a JCS study group; Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p Truman, Memoirs, pp See also William Henhoeffer and James Hanrahan, Notes on the Early DCIs, Studies in Intelligence (spring 1989), p. 29; 120

Espionage and Intelligence Debra A. Miller, Book Editor Intelligence... has always been used by the United States to support U.S. military operations, but much of what forms today s intelligence system

BGS Managing Director Michael Allen s Book, Blinking Red, is Reviewed By The Center for the Study of Intelligence Blinking Red Book Review March 2014 Reviewed by Roger Z. George The far-reaching intelligence

Public Law 101-576 November 15, 1990 Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 One Hundred First Congress of the United States of America AT THE SECOND SESSION Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

SECTION 1 The President s Job Description President Ronald Reagan talks to U.S. troops in South Korea in 1983. Guiding Question What are the roles and qualifications of the office of the President? Use

FDR AND PEARL HARBOR Almost as soon as the attacks occurred, conspiracy theorists began claiming that President Roosevelt had prior knowledge of the assault on Pearl Harbor. Others have claimed he tricked

African Americans in Aviation: The 1940s A Decade of Change PRACTICING HISTORY WITH PRIMARY SOURCES ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This poster is made possible by the generous support of the Gertrude E. Skelly Charitable

Welcoming Remarks Financial Interdependence in the World s Post-Crisis Capital Markets Presented by GIC in partnership with the Philadelphia Council for Business Economics, the CFA Society of Philadelphia,

Alexander Hamilton Background Information: Alexander Hamilton was born in the British West Indies in 1755, the son of James Hamilton and Rachel Lavine, who were not yet married. Hamilton s father abandoned

Chapter 23 America and the Great War, 1914 1920 Chapter Summary Chapter 23 introduces the student to the American role in World War I. Among the topics covered in this chapter are the complexity of the

CHAP TER1 EDUCATING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRACTITIONERS: PREPARING TO FACE THE DEMANDS OF THE 21st CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT James M. Smith In 1984 Theodore J. Crackel wrote, in an insightful

Note: This compilation of the National Security Act of 1947 reflects amendments enacted into law through Public Law 110 53 (August 3, 2007). These materials are not official evidence of the laws set forth

The National Security Act of 1947 July 26, 1947 Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758. AN ACT To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National

GAO United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees April 2012 MILITARY EDUCATION Improved Oversight and Management Needed for DOD s Fellowship and Training-with-Industry

VIP CODE OFFICIAL VIP CODE 1 1 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 HEADS OF STATE/REIGNING ROYALTY VIP CODE 2 (FOUR STAR EQUIVALENT) 3 VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 4 GOVERNORS IN OWN STATE (SEE#44)

TESTIMONY OF ZOË BAIRD, PRESIDENT, MARKLE FOUNDATION CHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE Select Committee on Homeland Security U.S. House of Representatives "Information Sharing

V: RECOMMENDATIONS TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI Recommendation: The Executive Branch should provide for a central planning and coordination mechanism (likely within an existing entity)

Order Code 98-249 GOV Updated March 18, 2008 Former Presidents: Federal Pension and Retirement Benefits Summary Stephanie Smith Analyst in American National Government Government and Finance Division Congress

A Guide To The UNITED STATES MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5008 The following article has been re-printed with the permission of the United States Military Institute.

United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees April 2016 CIVIL SUPPORT DOD Needs to Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities for Defense Support of Civil Authorities during

Statement of Dick Thornburgh Counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP and Former Attorney General of the United States Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission Public Meeting Regarding Chapter

Women in the Military Women have served in military conflicts since the American Revolution, but World War II was the first time that women served in the United States military in an official capacity.

Articles Was the Constitution Illegally Adopted? Michael P. Farris1* Abstract: This article analyzes the claim that the Constitution was illegally ratified in 1788. This claim is founded on the premise

GAO United States General Accounting Office Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate For Release on Delivery Expected

WikiLeaks Document Release February 2, 2009 Congressional Research Service Report 95-753 Presidential Emergency Powers: The So-Called War Powers Act of 1933 David M. Ackerman, American Law Division Updated

Status of the Director of Central Intelligence Under the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 At the time the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 takes effect, the then-current

GAO United States Government Accountability Office Report to November 2010 HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DOD Needs to Provide More Information on Risks to Improve Its Program Management GAO-11-148 November

Written Testimony of Sonia Ellis Submitted to the Special Committee on Aging United States Senate Hearing on the Jamaican Lottery Scam March 13, 2013 I would like to thank Chairman Nelson, Ranking member

PUBLIC LAW 113 283 DEC. 18, 2014 128 STAT. 3073 Public Law 113 283 113th Congress An Act To amend chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, to provide for reform to Federal information security. Be it

0.75 the interpretation of Executive Order 10501 of November 5, 1953, as amended, and of regulations issued thereunder in accordance with section 11 of that order; and the interpretation of Executive Order

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. BUSINESS BY Steven M. Shaker Director of Business Intelligence Global Associates, Ltd. George Kardulias Deputy Director of Business Intelligence Global Associates, Ltd. Presented

The Take Charge Approach to Leadership Edward J. Tomey, Professor Emeritus Antioch Unviersity New England Department of Organization & Management Note: This article is based on Ed Tomey s book manuscript

The President s Desk: Campaign Button Module The Road to the White House Topic: Presidential campaigns and elections Grades: 4-6 Time Required: 1-2 class periods Goals/Rationale: By exploring the primary

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTING OF ACCOUNTS PAYABLE FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATION ON THE "OTHER DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS" PORTION OF THE FY 1996 FINANCIAL STATE1\1ENTS

Course Principles of GPA Unit III Implementation of the Three Branches of Government Essential Question What are the structure and functions of the executive branch of the government, including the constitutional

14 Improving the Complaints Process Our systemic review demonstrated that the complaints mechanisms in place to address public concerns about the work of pathologists providing forensic pathology services

Pros and Cons Evenly Matched on Constitutional Revision From the Attitude Survey on the Constitution of Japan 1 January 2016 ARAMAKI Hiroshi MASAKI Miki Public Opinion Research Division NHK Broadcasting

Three Branches of Government The Executive Branch The President of the United States is the leader of the executive branch. The President s duties are to: Enforce federal laws and recommend new ones Serve

Council for Higher Education Accreditation THE Fundamentals of ACCREDITATION WHAT DO YOU NEED TO KNOW? September 2002 The Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) is a private, nonprofit national

Social Education 69(7), pg 385 391 2005 National Council for the Social Studies Part Documents Can Help Reinforce Behaviors (The Role that an Individual Plays in a Democracy) II Documents and Civic Duties

Order Code RS22121 Updated November 23, 2007 The Interagency Security Committee and Security Standards for Federal Buildings Summary Stephanie Smith Analyst in American National Government Government and

Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5545.04 April 7, 2011 USD(P&R) SUBJECT: Policy on the Congressional Reporting Process for Military Educational Institutions Seeking to Establish, Modify, or Redesignate

Order Code RS22992 November 26, 2008 The President-Elect: Succession and Disability Issues During the Transition Period Summary Thomas H. Neale Specialist in American National Government Government and

The Need to Share: The U.S. Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement A White Paper prepared by the AFCEA Intelligence Committee April 2007 Serving Intelligence Professionals and their Community The Need

NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ACT 39 OF 1994 [ASSENTED TO 23 NOVEMBER 1994] [DATE OF COMMENCEMENT: 1 JANUARY 1995] (English text signed by the President) as amended by National Strategic Intelligence

Injured on the Job Your Rights under FELA Quick Facts: What To Do If Injured 1. Consult your own doctor for treatment. Give your doctor a complete history of how your injury happened. Make sure that the

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Office of Inspector General United States Patent and Trademark Office USPTO Needs Strong Office of Human Resources Management Capable of Addressing Current and Future Challenges

The Social Security Act of 1935: A Result of Roosevelt s Leadership Carrie Temm (MLA Style) Temm 2 Abstract President Franklin D. Roosevelt played the key leadership role in getting the Social Security

Assignment of Army Lawyers to the Department of Justice The Department of Justice may appoint Army attorneys as special attorneys or Special Assistant United States Attorneys enabling them to perform litigation

U.S. Support of the War at Home and Abroad The Main Idea As the United States sent increasing numbers of troops to defend South Vietnam, some Americans began to question the war. Content Statement/Learning

Lincoln s Daughter? By Matthew Pinsker Lately the Lincoln world has been quietly buzzing about the discovery of new letters. There s the presidential note scribbled hastily after the Battle of Gettysburg

H. R. 2458 48 (1) maximize the degree to which unclassified geographic information from various sources can be made electronically compatible and accessible; and (2) promote the development of interoperable

Civics EOC Exam Preparation Welcome! Sit in groups of four at each table. Presenter Mr. Hough Do not doodle on the dry erase boards. Topic The Three Branches of Government as Established in the U.S. Constitution

Preface to Making Failure Feasible: How Bankruptcy Reform Can End Too Big To Fail John B. Taylor May 2012 Motivated by the backlash over the bailouts during the global financial crisis and concerns that

ATTORNEYS, MANAGERS AND THE ASSOCIATION 5235617 Attorneys, Managers and the Association Serving and Surviving In A Unique Relationship By Matthew Perlstein, Esq. (Reprinted with Permission) INTRODUCTION

TIME MANAGEMENT FOR PROJECT MANAGERS Effective time management is one of the most difficult chores facing even the most experienced managers. For a manager who manages well-planned repetitive tasks, effective

PRACTICAL ADVICE ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO SETTLE YOUR CASE WITH THE GOVERNMENT This article is collaboration between the panel moderator Brian J. Alexander and panel participants, Richard Saltsman,

Less than ten years ago, educational admin istrators were talking about Management by Ob jectives (MBO) and Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems (PPBS). These management techniques, developed for use

Free Report: How To Repair Your Credit The following techniques will help correct your credit and should be done with all Credit Bureaus. In this section you will learn the ways of removing negative items

The History of Veterans Employment Services THE HISTORY OF VETERAN'S EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING The history of the Veteran's Employment Service (VES) closely parallels that of our free public employment system

western cape office of the consumer protector What you should know about contracts The purpose of this guide is to give ordinary South African consumers a very basic guide to contracts and what they mean

TESTIMONY OF STEVE COOPER DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

FDR Birth Announcement. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was born on January 30, 1882 to James Roosevelt and Sara Delano Roosevelt at their home in Hyde Park, New York. This whimsical birth announcement was found