Sunday, September 9, 2007

How the CIA defeated Apartheid & placed the ANC

Thursday 08-Mar-2007[This is the most important article I found on the web in my more than 5 years on the web. The original discovery was by a military friend of mine overseas. He found the book, and then later, I found this article.An alert reader in the UK found this. This article is the follow on by Dr Cummings to his book, "The Pied Piper" (1985). Dr Cummings was a CIA agent in the Middle East. This is an extremely important article and it explains what went on behind the scenes in this country. Jan]From International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence , Summer 1995:A Diamond Is Forever: Mandela Triumphs, Butheleziand de Klerk Survive, and ANC on the U.S. Payrollby Richard CummingsNelson Mandela is the president of South Africa, an event ofmonumental significance in world history. This great personaltriumph is for him a vindication of his struggle. But now that theSouth African elections are long past, the record must be setstraight about what really happened and why. The press hasconcealed as much as it reported; ideologues of all stripes haverushed around to rationalize their hypocrisies, and Americanpoliticians have been spreading around largesse as if the moneywere their own. That the results were so perfect, historically sosymmetrical, is rather remarkable.But, those with power, or who are connected to it, do not want thefacts about the funding of the election to be known because itwould reveal a pattern of deception and control, both to influencethe outcome and to moderate the African National Congress. Andthose on the radical left don't want it known that the ANC hascompromised itself by joining the list of organizations takingmoney from the United States, because they think it will hurt thecause of revolution. Everyone involved, across the ideologicalspectrum, has therefore joined in a kind of game to cloud the mindsof outside observers.Most hypocritical perhaps was the attempt to make a devil out ofChief Mangosuthu Buthelezi by characterizing him as the tool of theoppressors and an obstructionist in the transition to democracy.His anomalous situation in post-apartheid South Africa led tosuggestions that he was an enemy of democracy, and the cause ofdissension that led to violence in an attempt to disrupt theelectoral process that black South Africans struggled for decadesto achieve. Chairman of the Inkatha Freedom Party and chiefminister of KwaZulu, this prince and descendant of Shaka Zulu wasthen cast in the role of villain and reactionary. But it was notalways so.ANC and the CPThe triumph of Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress inSouth Africa was, for many years, viewed in certain circles as anextremely undesirable result. During the Cold War, the power of theSouth African Communist Party in the ANC made the ANC unacceptableas a holder of power in a post-apartheid South Africa. Yet, becauseapartheid and the white supremacist Nationalist Party were anathemato the rest of Africa, and because white racism fueled thesentiments for communism among the black majority in South Africa,a reliable black alternative to the ANC became essential. As HarryRositzke, the Central Intelligence Agency station chief in NewDelhi from 1957 to 1962, and coordinator of operations againstCommunist parties abroad from 1962 until his retirement from theCIA in 1970, wrote in 1977: "In Africa, an area ofprimitive, unstable states, Soviet influence is substantial inSomalia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Angola. The support of blackindependence movements against the Rhodesian and South Africangovernments may extend that influence. The training of fivethousand African students each year in the Soviet and East Europeanuniversities is a direct investment in the future leadership of alargely illiterate continent."1Noting the "Chinese competition the Soviets face in ... the SouthAfrica liberation movements," Rositzke argued candidly for covertaction in the Third World: "Do we try to make a deal withThe leftists -- covertly at least to start? Do we take any covertpolitical action to ensure the continued supply of chrome from ablack Rhodesia that threatens to boycott its sale to the UnitedStates if we do not withdraw our investments in South Africa?However unlikely these scenarios, we cannot forecast whatwill happen in the economic world to threaten ourprosperity." 2These concerns led to a policy that did not distinguish betweenanti-communism and opposition to apartheid. Indeed, they becamesynonymous in South Africa as that policy came to a head in theReagan administration. As Gregory Treverton has observed:"For the Reagan administration, the intended signal wasanti-communism. For it, there was nothing incompatible aboutsupporting anti-communism in Angola and anti-apartheid in SouthAfrica."3United States anti-apartheid policy was always primarily a tool ofits anti-communist policy. And that anti-communist policy wasdirectly related to the preservation of American "prosperity" andeconomic self-interest, as Rositzke explained. To this end, the CIAfunneled money into Africa Bureau, a London-based anti-apartheidgroup headed by the Rev. Michael Scott, an Anglican priestdedicated to ameliorating the harsh apartheid policies of SouthAfrica in South West Africa. Dan Schecter, Michael Ansara, andDavid Kolodney wrote in 1970, "The United States remains involvedin channeling money to various factions within southern-Africanliberation movements, hoping, of course, to mold them inpro-Western directions." 4Long before the Reagan administration, white liberals in the UnitedStates and South Africa understood the threat of communism in SouthAfrica and took action, in concert with the CIA, to undermine thatthreat, even if this delayed, by necessity, the end of apartheid.And ultimately, Buthelezi became a key figure in that effort.The leading American liberal politician to first become activelyinvolved in the anti-apartheid movement was then United StatesSenator Hubert Humphrey (D., Minnesota). In 1960, a press agency,International Features Service, was established, largely todisseminate the thoughts of Senator Humphrey to the people of theThird World, including Africa. International Features was quicklyreorganized as a not-for-profit organization, Peace for Freedom,liberally supported with CIA funds through the InternationalDevelopment Foundation and the Price Fund.5 Another organization launched with CIA assistance was the United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP) when the African-American Institute, a CIA conduit, agreed to add USSALEP to its existing projects.6 A key functional area of USSALEP was, and is, "flexible independent exchanges, providing opportunities for leaders in any variety of fields to confer with colleagues." 7 In 1983, HarrisWofford, later a U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, and then, as now,a member of the management committee of USSALEP, stated thatButhelezi deserved support because he had stayed in South Africa,unlike leaders of the ANC, and had not engaged in violence.8 Wofford made it very clear that he was speaking not only for himself, but for his organization.Wofford served as President Kennedy's special representative to Africafrom 1962 to 1964 before he became associate director of the PeaceCorps. The implication was clear: Buthelezi was with the West,but Mandela, who often espoused pro-South African Communist Partysentiments, was not. And a major non-governmental backer ofUSSALEP was AMAX, the American mining giant, on whose board haveserved former Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.The Lowenstein InterventionIn 1959, Allard Lowenstein, then a foreign policy aide to SenatorHumphrey, traveled to South Africa and South West Africa to gatherdata on the effects of apartheid in both territories. During thecourse of this trip, Lowenstein was approached by the CIA in SouthAfrica and requested to smuggle out of South Africa a "Capecolored" student, Hans Beukes, a member of the anti-SWAPO Hererotribe from Rehoboth, South West Africa.9 Beukes would later be accused of subverting SWAPO when it expelled him in 1976.10 Lowenstein would later writeBrutal Mandate, a book on his South African experience. A leadingAmerican liberal who had served as president of the National StudentsAssociation and civil rights activist, Lowenstein was recruited tothe CIA in 1962 as an expert on southernAfrica.11 From 1962 to 1967, Lowensteintraveled to that part of the continent and had contacts with varioussouthern African personalities, both in Africa and the UnitedStates, providing the agency with his assessment of their politicalleanings, and their reliability.The ANC had taken up armed struggle on 16 December 1961 with thefounding by Nelson Mandela of Umkhonot We Sizwe, "Spear of theNation," and with its Communist support, was becoming a threat.Mandela was a cult figure of the Left who had enormous appeal.Until his capture, his ability to elude the police had made him afolk hero. In the spring of 1962, Lowenstein was contacted by boththe American Committee on Africa and the CIA-supported AmericanSociety for African Culture, which were joining forces for ademonstration and protest march on behalf of Nelson Mandela, WalterSisulu, and the seven others who had been arrested by the SouthAfrican police when the ANC underground headquarters wasdiscovered. While the United States did not want Mandela in power,neither did it want him martyred. The arrested leaders were ontrial and faced the possibility of the death penalty, which inSouth Africa was administered by hanging. Because of the organizedpressure, Mandela and Sisulu were not executed but sentenced tolife in prison, with Mandela remaining on Robben Island as thepreeminent figure in the African National Congress. After the dayto day operations of the ANC passed to Mandela's far lesscharismatic law partner, Oliver Tambo, who had fled to Zambia, theANC was seemingly neutralized without the United States to blame.Other ChoicesThe CIA was looking for alternatives to the ANC. To the ANC's left,the CIA directed money to the ultra-black nationalist PanAfricanist Congress (PAC) which had organized the demonstration,from which the ANC abstained, that led to the Sharpeville massacrein the spring of 1960.12 As early as1961, Mandela had discounted the Pan Africanist Congress because,he asserted, "there is no doubt in my mind that they preached anextreme form of racialism."13Mandela believed the abandonment of non-violence and theintroduction of the use of force to be justified because, "[N]oleader is going out to say we want peaceful discussions because thegovernment is making that kind of talk senseless. Instead ofgetting a favorable response, the government is more arrogant. TheAfrican reaction can only be a show of force." Notes of the secretinterview given by Mandela to Patrick O'Donovan were provided toAllard Lowenstein in London by Mary Benson, an anti-apartheidactivist.14To rival Spear of the Nation, which had begun a campaign ofsabotage against "the symbols of apartheid" by staging rocketattacks against police stations, the PAC launched Poqo, a massmovement modeled on the Mau Mau in Kenya. Claiming a membership of150,000, it engaged in acts of terrorism. Although it neverachieved the strength of the ANC, it did come back to haunt SouthAfrican politics by initially refusing to take part in the firstone-person, one-vote non-racial elections in the country's history.Having become the CIA's Frankenstein' s monster, the Pan AfricanistCongress ceased to be an acceptable alternative to Mandela and theANC, but it continued to pose a sufficient threat to possiblydisrupt the electoral process.Throughout the 1960s, Lowenstein made considerable use of hisexpertise on revolutionary movements in southern Africa in waysthat would have an important impact on U.S. policy. From hisvantage point in the intelligence community, he argued for ananti-Communist alternative on the Left, becoming a key figure, inthe parlance of the agency, of the "good wing" of the CIA. As a CIAoperative once described this element in the agency to HarrisWofford, "If you only knew what we're really doing, the liberalsand the leftists, the democratic leftists, what we're supportingaround the world, you'd see that we represented the 'good wing' inthe CIA."15 And in his pursuit of ananti-Communist left alternative in South Africa, while heacknowledged that the blacks had ample reason to resort toviolence, Lowenstein faulted the ANC, as did the agency, on thegrounds that it was engaging in armed struggle with support fromthe Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, not to mentionits alliance with the South African CommunistParty.16 In his 1966 swing throughsouthern Africa, Lowenstein conferred with representatives of theANC in Dar es Salaam, whose headquarters in which they met featureda large portrait of Mao Zedong. When Lowenstein asked them how hecould be of help, the black South Africans told him that what theyneeded was money for arms. They were engaged in armed struggle andwanted weapons, not the limited support Lowenstein had provided inthe past, and which China had eclipsed. At this point, Lowensteinconcluded that the ANC was unreliable and uncontrollable andtherefore totally unacceptable. 17But as the entire Cold War liberal structure began to come apartduring the Vietnam war, Lowenstein turned his efforts to gettingrid of President Lyndon Johnson and to replacing him with SenatorRobert F. Kennedy (D., New York) and to his own political career,winning election to Congress as a Democrat from New York in 1968.He would not return to the South African scene until the late1970s, when, following a stint as one of President Carter'sambassadors to the United Nations, he traveled extensively insouthern Africa at the behest of the CIA and Harry Oppenheimer,scion of the South African DeBeers and Anglo-American gold miningand diamond empire. In the interim, the fruitless search for analternative political group to the ANC continued as violenceescalated in South Africa, and it become increasingly threatened bythe possibility of a revolution led by the South African CommunistParty and the ANC.Zulu RisingDuring this period the fortunes of Buthelezi began to rise.Although in the pay of the South African government as chiefminister of the KwaZulu government, Buthelezi steadfastly refusedto permit KwaZulu to be turned into a "homeland." To do so wouldhave constituted an acceptance of the government's apartheidpolicies. This posture of at least nominal independence, as well ashis identification with the mythic Zulu people led Buthelezi to beable to play both sides with consummate skill. He was never asycophant to the National Party, which had formalized a system oftotal racial segregation, and which had controlled South Africasince 1948, when the old United Party of Jan Smuts had beendefeated. Buthelezi appealed to those who never had any use forwhite liberals like Helen Suzman, whose Liberal party had beenoutlawed, and who maintained a life of luxury in the midst of asystem she purported to detest. As the cast of "Wait A Minim," theSouth African musical comedy mocked, "the only thing the liberalshate more than apartheid is the blacks."Buthelezi, highly intelligent and articulate, played the role ofthe radical conservative, to the increasing attention of the UnitedStates. Capable of appearing fiercely traditional in tribal dressone minute, and handsome and immaculate in a Saville Row suit thenext, Buthelezi began to capture the imagination of the powerbrokers. He not only spoke all the languages of South Africa, heseemed to speak to the economic and political needs of the country,with its astonishing diversity, as well. There was a vacuum and heappeared to be the only player capable of filling it. WithButhelezi and his ideas for a federal republic of South Africa,investment would be safe, and whites and blacks could be placated.Even his appeal to royalty, his professed loyalty to the King ofthe Zulus, Goodwill Zwelethini (also his nephew), impressed whiteswho sought modest change in the context of stability, and blacks,for whom royalty had always held a certain attraction as adimension of African pride. If a black African leader for SouthAfrica could have been created by the Reagan administration, itwould have been Buthelezi. With Ronald Reagan in the White Houseand William Casey at CIA, the "good wing" would be out and the hardline in. There was no such thing as a Left alternative to communismin this ideology, only a Right alternative that was indeed "right."Under Reagan, Buthelezi would fit the mold, as Jonas Savimbi did inAngola, where South Africa and the CIA together aided his effortsagainst the leftist government, with its pro-Soviet sympathies.Indeed, conservatives worldwide began to support Buthelezi, withparticular support coming, according to a former U.S. "Africahand," from Germany through such conservative semi-politicalfoundations as the Adenauer Schiftung and the Ebert Schiftung, muchin the manner that DCI Casey was able to get other countries suchas Saudi Arabia to aid the contras inNicaragua.18 According to thissource, Buthelezi had been promised a "Greater Natal" by hard-lineapartheid Prime Minister P.W. Botha, who offered him thepossibility of having white areas such as Durban in his power base.With such an increase in his domain, were an election to happen, hewould be able to command at least the five percent that wasultimately established as a basis for a seat in the cabinet. Alongwith white representation in the cabinet, he would be a sufficientforce to moderate the polices of a leftist government underMandela, and block either nationalizations or confiscatory taxpolicies.19 But before this scenariobegan to take hold, the liberals gave it one more shot to find analternative to Mandela and the ANC who would not be so conservativeas to alienate the majority of blacks, who might still turn to thefar left. At this point in the 1970s, Allard Lowenstein once againentered the scene, with Buthelezi playing to both liberal andconservative factions.According to South Africa expert Professor William Foltz of YaleUniversity, Buthelezi was being "courted by South African bigbusiness and some American corporations" during the1970s.20 He mentioned AMAX, the mininggiant with extensive South African holdings that was also a USSALEPbacker through its AMAX Foundation, as one of these. The effort toapproach Buthelezi, Foltz explains, was led not by Americanbusiness interests, but by the liberal part of South Africanindustry, particularly Harry Oppenheimer, whose Ernest OppenheimerMemorial Trust, the charitable arm of Anglo-American, was alsobacking USSALEP; Helen Suzman; and Clive Menell, chair of AnglovaalHoldings, Ltd., a mining giant. Menell lives across the street fromOppenheimer in South Africa, and entertained Buthelezi in his homein the presence of Professor Foltz. Foltz explains that Buthelezi'srefusal to let KwaZulu be a homeland made him attractive to theOppenheimer crowd, as he could not be seen as a tool of apartheid.Although highly ambitious and sensitive to slights, real orapparent, Buthelezi was regarded by his advocates as a "reasonableand interesting alternative, at least a serious player." So Woffordwas right. USSALEP, launched with the CIA's help and passed alongto power South African and American corporate interests, couldproclaim by 1980 that it "receives no funding, direct or indirect,from the United States, South Africa, or any other government," wasnow behind Buthelezi, seeing nowhere else to go.Lowenstein ReduxBy the mid 1970s, the exploitation of uranium in South West Africahad made South Africa's role there a major international issue. Thelarge block of nonwhite Third World countries pressed for SouthWest Africa's independence. In April 1975, Allard Lowensteinattended a key symposium on "The Outlook for Southern Africa,"which was backed by the Johnson Foundation. Funded by USSALEP andthe Johnson and Johnson pharmaceutical company, the meeting washeld at the Johnson Wingspread conference facility in Wisconsin.The symposium explored ways to prevent the worst from happeningfrom the point of view of the American, South Africa, and Britishcompanies that invested heavily there. South Africa was describedas "the Saudi Arabia of minerals," and South West Africa had onceagain become vitally important to the West because of Britain'sdependence upon it for uranium.21Rio Tinto Zinc, a multinational mining company based in Britain,was exploiting the Rossing mine, the world's largest single sourceof uranium.Lowenstein's presentation at the Wingspread symposium was aclassic "good wing" analysis. Will we identify with the oppressedpeople, including those of South Africa? Because Africans werefinding that the only way to produce change was through violence,this was playing "into the hands of the Soviet Union and China,"who were providing money and training which were, in fact,producing results. Lowenstein asked the rhetorical question andtried to answer it: "Can we influence Africans toaccommodate their demands in less violent ways? Only if we pressurefor the necessary reforms at an acceptable pace. This means findingways for South Africa to get out of Namibia and Rhodesia, to permitBlack regimes to develop in both states. Instead of 'buffer states'there might emerge on the border of South Africa the appearance ofprivileged sanctuaries so that the pressure for change within SouthAfrica would be stepped up. As the international dimensionsproceed, they are the priority; the domestic ones should follow.Eventually, changes within South Africa will have to occur. If theydo not come nonviolently and in a rapid, evolutionary way, theywill be forced with sabotage, violence andwarfare."22At the United Nations, he clashed with U.S. Ambassador Andrew Youngover U.S. policy in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. Lowenstein was stronglyopposed to Robert Mugabe and wanted a role for white liberals. Healso visited South Africa where he held lengthy meetings with youngAfrikaner Nationalists. After his U.N. service, Lowenstein cameback in from the cold. His involvement with the powerful whiteliberals of South Africa and his relationship with Frank Carlucci,appointed deputy director of the CIA by President Carter (and whohad been stationed in South Africa when Lowenstein traveled therein 1959), enabled him to continue his work in southern Africa inthe summer of 1979.This vitally important trip was financed by Anglo-American, whichpaid Lowenstein $7,000 for his services, $1,000 to his aide, MarkChildress, and $1,000 to Lowenstein' s secretary. Provided for thesummer's expedition were a comfortable house in Johannesburg, withrecreational facilities and domestic servants, and fulltransportation, including return air fares on the Concorde forLowenstein, Lowenstein's three children and Childress. All of thiswas arranged by Hank Slack, the American Director of Anglo-Americanand the former son-in-law of HarryOppenheimer. 23 Lowenstein wasworking closely with Deputy CIA Director Carlucci, who statedcategorically that "Lowenstein would report tome."24 And there was much to report.Lowenstein first consulted with Theo-Ben Gurirab of SWAPO, at SWAPOheadquarters in New York City, then departed for South Africa.There he held meetings with Buthelezi, Harry Oppenheimer, HelenSuzman, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, and P.W. Botha,the South African Prime Minister. He also met with Mandela, stillincarcerated on Robben Island.25Richard Moose, Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for Africa,told Sam Adams, formerly of CIA, that Lowenstein was talking to "alot of opposition groups."26 WhatLowenstein was doing was laying the groundwork for a flexibleAmerican policy in South Africa, in alliance with the wealthy SouthAfrican white liberals and the "verlicht" Afrikaner Nationalists,to dismantle the structure of apartheid without Marxistrevolution. Lowenstein's role in this venture was cut short when hewas shot to death in 1980 by Dennis Sweeney, a former recruit inthe civil rights movement in Mississippi, but the legacy of hisinvolvement remained a potent one. Carlucci, who admired Lowensteinand was greatly influenced by him, shared Lowenstein's assessmentthat the problems of South Africa could be "workedout."27 And Buthelezi had goodreason to believe that he was, at the very least, part of thesolution and not the problem.U.S. AidWith the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980,United States and South African intelligence (BOSS, the SouthAfrican CIA) increased cooperation on behalf of Jonas Savimbi inAngola. The CIA authorized $15 million for Savimbi'sUNITA.28 In South Africa, withGerman money coming to him, Buthelezi was fast becoming the darlingof American conservatives, including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan'sAmbassador to the United Nations, as a "sound anti-Communistalternative. "29 The Washington Timesand the Wall Street Journal took up his cause. But, according toProfessor Foltz, there was a significant split in the Reaganadministration. Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for Africa,Chester Crocker, was "opposed to Buthelezi" and "playing a muchmore complicated game."30 Foltzexplains that Crocker thought it wise "not to see any single personas the answer."31 Foltz also creditsthe British Ambassador to South Africa at that time, Sir RobinRenwick, as being "highly skillful" in his efforts to preventviolence and bring about a peaceful solution in South Africa.(Renwick is generally acknowledged with having obtained Mandela'srelease from prison, a task made easier by the fact that hisgovernment had not imposed sanctions on South Africa, therebygiving it some leverage with the white regime in Pretoria.) But heargues that the "whole situation was sliding rapidly" and that the"logic" of the Reagan administration' s policy was "comingapart."32The support of American industrial interests for Buthelezi began todiminish when it appeared that he might not be able to deliver inthe face of enormous public support for Mandela. The final push,Foltz explains, was the 1986 U.S. sanctions legislation, whichaltered the situation irrevocably. Now a legend among Americanblacks as a symbol of the triumph through struggle over apartheid,Nelson Mandela could no longer be shunted aside. The ANC had becomethe ultimate force in South Africa, and Buthelezi, with his baselimited to the Zulus, was without a national organization capableof overcoming it. But, with financial support still coming to himfrom Germany, Buthelezi was, according to Foltz, able to retain theservices of the powerful Washington public relations firm, Black,Manafort. Buthelezi and his people continued to use the rhetoricof the Cold War, "not about the ANC but the ANC and theCommunists." 33 But the miningcompanies were no longer interested and Buthelezi's support waslimited to "the fast buck people inNatal."34 And while Buthelezi might,at one point, have been able to get the 5 percent needed for acabinet position, the "old Africa hand" argued (incorrectly, itturned out) that Buthelezi would be "hard pressed" to carry theZulu vote. Because the young Zulus are now more urban than rural,and identify increasingly with the ANC, he maintained, Buthelezi' spower base was substantially eroded, notwithstanding continuedGerman support and support from private American conservativegroups.35 Foltz puts it moreforcefully: "He [Buthelezi] is playing a destructive andscandalous role now."36 But who wasactually paying for that role and, in effect, funding the bloodbaththat lasted until Inkatha reentered the elections?Reenter the United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program(USSALEP), by now no longer stating that it does not receive fundsfrom any government directly or indirectly, but indicating overtlythat it is funded, in part, by the United States Agency forInternational Development (AID) and the National Endowment forDemocracy (NED). In its 1992 Program Update, in a short noteentitled "Transition to Democracy Project," USSALEP proclaims:The $8,000,000 cooperative agreement, under which subgrants of $4.8million for the African National Congress (ANC) and $2.6 millionfor the Inkatha Freedom Party was to be disbursed by September 30,1992, was extended for an additional 15 months in order to utilizethe full amount obligated by USAID. The purpose of the project isto build administration capacity within the ANC and the IFPorganizations to enable them to participate more effectively in thenegotiations leading to a new constitution and democraticgovernment. Due to the very stringent disbursement conditions(which, for example, eliminated the category of salaries as apermissible expenditure category under the original budgets),coupled with administrative/ absorptive capacity limitations of thesub-grantees, only approximately 45 percent of the $7.4 millioncould be expended during the originally scheduled, 13-month projectlife.The monies disbursed to date have been used to: (i)acquire or rent office space to house central and regional staff,(ii) purchase and install computer hardware and software and trainpersonnel needed to establish effective management informationsystems, and (iii) pay for sundry travel, consulting and workshopexpenses relating to the above and to the formulation of policyoptions and negotiation positions.USAID and USSALEP are presently in discussion with the subgranteesto identify new areas of expenditure not previously included intheir budget proposals. Among those being considered is thecritical one encompassing peace initiatives. 37Hired as project manager of the Transition to Democracy Project wasStanley Kahn, a South African sociology professor on the faculty ofboth the universities of Witwatersrand and Cape Town. Kahn hadserved as executive director of the Funda Centre in Diepkloof,Soweto and was the recipient of a USSALEP Alan Pifer Fellowship tovisit the United States to "survey the contribution of communitycolleges to adult education."38 Kahnwas later promoted to Director of USSALEP South Africa.Kahn may be a fine fellow, but it still sounds a lot like "walkingaround money." And if salaries were being paid to ANC and Inkatha,who was getting the money? Mandela? Buthelezi? And if these groupswere getting the money, who decided that more than twice as muchshould go to the ANC as to Inkatha? Notably, Harris Woffordcontinued to serve on the Board and Council of USSALEP, whichdispensed the funds from the AID budget that Wofford voted for as asenator. His past legal practice has involved major clients inAfrica. Apart from this seeming conflict of interest, Americantaxpayers should be concerned that their money was being used toinfluence the outcome of an election in a foreign country, howeverovert this funding might now be. Most of the old players are stillthere: Harry Oppenheimer, who funds USSALEP through theAnglo-American & DeBeers Chairman's Fund; Clive Menell, chairman ofAnglovaal Holdings, Ltd. (contributor and Board and Councilmember), and an old Buthelezi backer; and Hank Slack, now presidentand CEO of MINORCO in London (contributor and Board and Councilmember), as well as all the major industrial concerns, American,international and South African, that control the vast mining'interests of South Africa and the rest of its economy. The resultof all of this funding of the competing parties? R.W. Johnson, anative of South Africa and a fellow in politics at MagdalenCollege, Oxford, on leave from Oxford to write about current SouthAfrica and also to serve as national co-director of the LaunchingDemocracy project, a public information service for all SouthAfrican political parties, sponsored by the Institute forMulti-Party Democracy (one wonders about the source of itsfunding), observed:Some of the killing is political: currently the largest setof victims are Inkatha officials killed by the ANC, though the mostpublicized recent killing was that of Chris Hani, the SACP(Communist) leader, by the white Right. The Azanian People'sLiberation Army, the armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress,carries out anti-white atrocities from time to time, and, ofcourse, Inkatha takes its vengeance on the ANC with fairregularity.39As the whites were panicking, a state of emergency was declared inKwaZulu because of the inability of Mandela, Buthelezi, KingGoodwill Zwelethini, and de Klerk to come to an agreement on how toresolve the impasse and get Inkatha back into the electionprocess.40 Buthelezi denounced whathe described as "a lengthy Machiavellian manipulation commenced,right at the start of our negotiations, with attempts tomarginalize our Inkatha FreedomParty."41 If he was referring to theinequitable distribution of the U.S. AID money between the ANC andInkatha, he certainly made up the difference from the Germans. Andhow effective giving money to the ANC will be in wooing it from itsSouth African Communist Party ally remains to be seen. Mandelainsists the ANC is not Communist, but that it remains loyal to itsoldest ally and friend.42 Moreover,the relisting as a USSALEP sponsor of the African AmericanInstitute, a CIA conduit in the past that helped launch USSALEP,also means that CIA money still, in all probability, flows covertlyto certain organizations in South Africa. The most likely candidatefor U.S. assistance was the CIA's old client, the Pan AfricanistCongress (whose overt support the ANC would never accept), to keepit in the electoral process and then accept the results. But theamount of money given to the Pan Africanist Congress has surelybeen miniscule, given its lack of a function at this point ofhistory. The purpose was not to get it votes, but to keep it quiet.Educating VotersAfter the supposed failure of former Secretary of State Henry A.Kissinger (now an international business consultant) and formerBritish Foreign Minister Lord Carrington (who has served on theboard of Rio Tinto Zinc, which controls the Rossing uranium mine inNamibia) to bring Buthelezi into the elections, all seemed to belost.43 But an amazing last minutereprieve was finally achieved, and the elections went forward inthe midst of bombings by white extremists. Helping the IndependentElection Commission to supervise them to make sure they were "fair"was the South African Fair Elections Fund (SAFE), funded largely byAmerican interests and headed up by the liberal Kennedy loyalist,Theodore Sorensen, who had $7 million at his disposal for "votereducation." According to Ian Williams of the New York Observer,"many of those involved in SAFE haven't concealed their hopes foran ANC landslide."44 And whileWilliams reported AID's funding of both the ANC and Inkatha, heneglected to mention USSALEP, the éminence grise of the wholesordid business. But even with AID funding much of the election,and SAFE providing additional assistance to assure the right kindof acceptable "left" victory, Ronald Brown, President BillClinton's man at the Department of Commerce, announced $140 millionin aid to South Africa.A good portion of this will find its way into the pockets of NorthCarolina academics and their institutions, Duke, Chapel Hill, andNorth Carolina State. They are participating in the $350 millionSouth African research and manufacturing center to be built inMuizenberg, a suburb of Cape Town. The project has the backing ofthe ANC.45 This may help explain whyconservative, anti-Communist Senator Jesse Helms (Rep., NorthCarolina) has failed to denounce the U.S. AID funding of theCommunist-backed ANC -- he makes an unlikely pair with HarrisWofford. Actually, the only institution that should cry fraud isNorth Carolina's predominantly black university, Northern CarolinaA&T, Jesse Jackson's alma mater, which has mysteriously beenexcluded from the AID boondoggle.The ANC and Buthelezi both shouted "fraud" as the election came toa close. The one party that began to pick up surprising support inthe election's final hours was the old bastion of white supremacy,the National Party. It appealed to the "colored" vote, those ofmixed race who tend to be better educated and own property, and toconservative blacks. F.W. de Klerk, holding black babies, managedto remind South Africans of every color that "majority rule" on theAfrican continent can be less than paradise. Rwanda, Somalia,Angola, Zaire, and the Sudan are shattering reminders of the chaosso often associated with post-colonial "liberation. " He managed todo the impossible: prevent the ANC from getting the twothirds seats in parliament it needed to ram through an economicagenda that is supported by the South African Communist Party. Infour years, de Klerk's party will be in a position to form acoalition with Inkatha, not unlike the Democratic TurnhalleAlliance in Namibia (formed with Allard Lowenstein's support andassistance), which also managed to prevent the prevailingrevolutionary group, SWAPO, from getting the two thirds it neededto nationalize the mineral wealth.Once again, white American liberals have failed to appreciate theinnate conservatism of some black Africans, and their willingnessto work with whites, even their former oppressors, out of fear thatthey might lose their property to a "revolutionary" regime, evenone financed by the U.S. government and supported by Jesse Helmsand Harris Wofford, the "Odd Couple" of American politics. If apost-Mandela ANC splits apart, as some South Africans havepredicted, and with the South African Communist Party marginalized,a National/Inkatha Party could well become a real force in SouthAfrica. There is a certain logic to this; the Boers and the Zulushave always had a common enemy: the British and theirEnglish-speaking South African allies in the mining industries.But the Boers and Zulus, both pro-business, pose no threat to thegreat companies and families that have controlled the South Africaneconomy since the Boer war.Mandela's Democratic MovesMeanwhile, Nelson Mandela has made all the right noises, from thepoint of view of his American supporters. He pledged not toconfiscate the property of whites and not to tax in a way that willdiscourage foreign investment and profit. He also made it clearthat he will not tolerate disorder; after the election he urgedeveryone to go back to work and back to school. Mandela did notspend all those years in prison to preside over a country in chaosand anarchy. Like Buthelezi, who is actually a close friend of his,Mandela is a descendant of African royalty. If the ANC and Inkathahave accepted U.S. dollars, as they have, from the Americans whocaused the perpetuation of apartheid for Cold War reasons, there ismore than enough irony in this to justify their actions. Mandelahas started to resemble his predecessor in African liberation, JomoKenyatta. Kenyatta had been jailed for a very long time on chargesof being a Mau Mau terrorist, and then was released in time to stopa violent revolution. Kenyatta suppressed his opposition andallowed the whites to keep control over the Kenyan economy. ButAlec Erwin, a white Communist ANC candidate, declared that there"was nothing sacrosanct" about limiting the budget deficit to 6percent of the GNP, as the IMF had required the ANC to pledge priorto granting a loan. If the ANC could stop mentioning this IMFrequirement as part of the ANC's program, clearly more wasnecessary to make sure the worst did nothappen.46The Voters' ChoiceThe election results, which all the parties long ago accepted as"free and fair," produced some surprises, with the ANC polling 62.5percent, less than the 67 percent required for control over theconstitution, but more than enough to control patronage and 12cabinet seats. De Klerk and the National Party (NP), which woncontrol of the Western Cape, got over 20 percent, enough votes toallow de Klerk to be one of the two executive vice presidents andto gain four cabinet seats. The NP probably got a higher percentageof the black vote than did the Pan Africanist Congress, a relic ofCold War history, which received scant support in the election.Also disappearing into oblivion was the Democratic Party (DP),which was nothing more than the reconstituted old Liberal Partythat Allard Lowenstein had backed. Once banned by the primitivewhite racist South African government, and later reinvented as theProgressive Party with the help of Harry Oppenheimer, the DP wasbasically the personal vehicle of Helen Suzman, who spent as mucheffort fighting the ANC as she did apartheid.Mandela indicated that he would consider offering cabinet posts torepresentatives of parties which polled less than the required 5percent, a carrot to the Pan Africanist Congress if they agreed tobehave themselves. Inkatha received over 10 percent, enough to putButhelezi in the cabinet and give Inkatha a total of four cabinetseats -- a result his critics said was impossible. His total wasaugmented, and de Klerk's reduced, by the fact that some whiteAfrikaners voted for Buthelezi on the national level and the NP onthe provincial level to bolster black opposition to the ANC. Thewhite separatist Freedom Front ended up with about 3 percent,indicating that the white racist call for a boycott of theelections was only marginally successful. Together, these threeprovided an opposition bloc of over one-third of the voters, notcounting those who boycotted theelection.47 Buthelezi, whose Inkathaalso carried KwaZulu/Natal, which his critics claimed he wouldnever be able to do, summed up: "I'm grateful that up tonow, in spite of all the skullduggery and the cheating, so far ithas not flared up into any conflict orviolence."48And it is not likely to. Buthelezi is now the Home Minister, whichputs him in charge of internal affairs and makes him the boss ofSidney Mufamadi, the black chief of police who is also a member ofthe central committee of the South African Communist Party. Thelate Joe Slovo, South African Communist Party chairman, was head ofHousing and Welfare before his death. Joe Modise, the blackcommander of Spear of the Nation, is Minister of Defense (albeitassisted by the existing chief of staff, General Georg Meyring, awhite Afrikaner, who remained in his post); after the change ingovernment Derek Keyes, de Klerk's white Afrikaner Minister ofFinance continued to run the economy from the same position.Mandela's selection of the ANC's Thabo Mbeki as the other executivevice president left the able Cyril Ramaphosa out of the cabinet andthe government entirely, although he remains as the chairman of theANC, in which capacity he is in charge of drafting the newconstitution. Mandela's incredible balancing act made it possible,overall, for there to be something for almost everyone, at whichthe CIA probably heaved a considerable sigh ofrelief.49 With the Cold War over,the view seems to be who cares if a couple of Communists clankaround in the South African government as long as things arebasically under control?A Carat a Day...The Goldsmith Commission, which had investigated the role of thepolice in the violence prior to the elections, subsequently lookedahead to 1999, when the "real" elections will take place. Therewill be a need for new leaders who comprehend the serious economicproblems of the country, as perceived by the International MonetaryFund. USSALEP no doubt stands ready to provide these leaders. Theonly question is whether the United States government will continueto finance their campaigns.But while the pundits debate the first year of the Mandela era,DeBeers continues to control 80 percent of the world's diamond trade,"with 50 percent of these diamonds by value coming from thecompany's own mines in South Africa, Botswana, andNamibia."50 Jonathan M.E.Oppenheimer, Harry Oppenheimer' s grandson, the son of Nicholas F.Oppenheimer of Johannesburg, deputy chairman of the great mininggiants, the Anglo-American Group and DeBeers Consolidated Mines,Ltd., the latter founded by Cecil Rhodes with the backing of theRothschilds, represents the next generation of Oppenheimers as hecontinues his work as a management trainee at N.M. Rothschild &Sons in London.51 Politicians maycome and go, but as the DeBeers ad claims on television, "adiamond is forever."Funny Peculiar PostscriptSubsequently, reports came of widespread election fraud in KwaZuluNatal where Inkatha won its "victory." In some areas, more voteswere counted than the census recorded people living there.Nevertheless, the ANC did not seriously challenge the results. KeyANC candidates who were not elected on the national or provinciallevels were rewarded with big jobs in either Mandela's governmentin Pretoria or in the Inkatha-dominated government ofKwaZulu/Natal. Reporting for Newsday from South Africa in May 1994,Dele Olojede wrote:[T]he great South African political settlement is fait accompli.Mandela is in Pretoria, where Buthelezi will serve as his homeaffairs minister in charge of federal relations with provinces. Inthe Natal provincial capital of Pietermaritzburg Friday night,Inkatha Chairman Frank Mdlalose was duly sworn in as premier at theinaugural session of the provincial legislature. His candidacy wasunopposed. The ANC accepted three of 10 positions in Mdlalose'sCabinet. And when Zulu King Goodwill Zwelethini swept into thechambers, the ANC bench jumped up along with everyone else toshout, in salute, "Wena ndlovu!" ("You're the elephant.")Or the donkey.Richard Daley, the legendary major of Chicago, would have approvedtotally. That AID money wasn't wasted at all. King Goodwillexpressed confidence that, now, peace would surely reign in "mykingdom."52References1. Rositzke, Harry, The CIA's SecretOperations -- Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Action(New York, Readers Digest Press), 1977, p. 254.2. Rositzke, supra, at 256, 266.3. Treverton, Gregory F., Covert Action: TheLimits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York, BasicBooks), 1987, p. 220.4. Schecter, Dan., Ansara, Michael, and Kolodney,David, (African Research Group), "The CIA as an Equal OpportunityEmployer," in Dirty Work 2, The CIA in Africa, Ellen Ray,William Schaap, Karl Van Meter, Louis Wolf., eds. (Secaucus, NJ, LyleStuart, 2nd printing, 1980), p. 51; first published in Rampartsin 1970 and referring to The Politics of Unity by I. Wallerstein.5. Schecter, Ansara, and Kolodney, supra.6. Schecter, Ansara, and Kolodney, supra.7. "The USSALEP Story 1958-1980."8. Interview with Harris Wofford, 18 May 1983.9. My sources for this were: Tom Gervasi, whoserved as a counterintelligence officer assigned to the ArmySecurity Agency and the author of Arsenal of Democracy I (New York,Grove, 1978), and Arsenal of Democracy II (New York, Grove, 1981),and who was writing a history of the CIA at the time of his death,allegedly from lead poisoning from handling toy soldiers hecollected; Sam Adams, who served with the CIA in the SouthernAfrica Branch, DDI, at the time Allard Lowenstein worked for it,and then switched to the Southeast Asia Branch, and who was writinga history of the role of the CIA in Vietnam at the time of hisuntimely death from an alleged heart attack. Gervasi's book wasnever published, while Adams's unfinished manuscript was finallypublished in 1994, years after his death denied him the opportunityto both complete it and defend it against his critics. The book hasso far attracted little attention, but it was reviewed in thisjournal by Richard R. Valcourt: see "Vietnam's CuriousNumbers," International Journal of Intelligence andCounterintelligence , Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer, 1994, pp. 235-240.Adams was at my house in Bridgehampton for dinner not long beforehis death. He was in excellent health. See Sam Adams, War ofNumbers (Steerforth Press, South Royalton, VT, 1994). See alsoWilliam Chafe, Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and theStruggle to Save American Liberalism (New York, Basic Books, 1993),note 13, p. 494: "It is noteworthy that the NSA'sinternational vice-president, who was working for the CIA, onceagain asked Lowenstein to do some student government chores whilein South Africa." Chafe does not elaborate further, but becauseLowenstein attended the Congress of the National Union of SouthAfrican Students while in South Africa during the trip and had keptup his ties to the CIA-backed U.S. National Student Association,the smuggling out of Beukes would constitute such a "chore."10. Interview with then SWAPO Representative to theUnited Nations, Theo-Ben Gurirab, 5 May 1983. Curiously, Gurirab,whom I interviewed at SWAPO's headquarters in New York and a closeadvisor to Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO leader and currently Namibia'shead of government, referred to William F. Buckley Jr. as one ofhis closest friends in New York. Buckley has acknowledged servingin the CIA.11. Gervasi and Adams, note 9, supra, were my sourcesfor this. This is confirmed by a document in Lowenstein's CIA filewhich I obtained via the Freedom of Information Act. Document No.10, dated 19 February 1962, a memorandum addressed to the Chief ofPersonnel, Security Division, OS, from the Chief of the ContactDivision, OO, states: "It is requested that prioritysecurity checks be procured on Subject as described in theattachment. Our deadline is 23 February 1962 for approval tocontact Subject on an ad hoc basis. Subject reportedly has statedthat he had done some work for CIA. If he were used in a [whitedout] capacity, then this is an indiscretion regarding which ourfield representative would like to know something about thebackground before contact is made." Other portions of the documentare whited out. This document has been confirmed to me by twoformer CIA station chiefs (Moscow and Saigon) as a "recruitmentdocument." The "work" for the CIA to which Lowenstein was referringis clearly the smuggling of Hans Beukes out of South Africa. As theformer Moscow station chief explained to me, Lowenstein was not aCIA "agent," which is a term of art referring usually to foreignersunder contract with the agency for specific periods of time and forspecific purposes, but rather a "consultant" to be used on an "adhoc" basis. Such people, I was told by the former Moscow stationchief, are generally older than the normal recruits to the agency.Lowenstein's situation at the time of his recruitment was that hewas in his thirties, an academic who taught courses on the politicsof southern Africa. Academics in such situations have beenroutinely recruited to the CIA. While such persons can be used asanalysts, the former Moscow station chief explained, they can alsoperform "operations, " as Lowenstein did, including the providing offunds to political organizations. Ironically, while the CIA wasrecruiting Lowenstein, the FBI, on 29 March 1962, concluded thatLowenstein had never been connected to the CIA, noting that as lateas 9 January 1961, the CIA had advised the FBI that Lowensteinnever had a relationship with the intelligence agency. Evidently,the FBI checked no further after that date, as Chafe indicates whenhe concludes, "None of this evidence is definitive." Chafe, supra.Further, in a letter dated 23 January 1985 to Bancroft Littlefield,a former Lowenstein aide who had married Lowenstein' s ex-wifeafter she had divorced Lowenstein, Lee Hamilton, chairman of theHouse Intelligence Committee said: "Based on representationsmade to me, I can say that Mr. Lowenstein was never an agent(italics added) of the CIA." Chafe, supra, note 20, p. 509. ToChafe, this is also not conclusive.As explained, Lowenstein was not a CIA agent and was not recruitedas one. He was recruited as an expert consultant. When I requesteda copy of the letter from the CIA to Hamilton, Thomas K. Latimer,Staff Director of the U.S. House of Representatives PermanentSelect Committee on Intelligence, wrote on 5 August 1985:"Mr. Hamilton has asked that I respond to your letter of 30 July1985 regarding certain correspondence to this committee from Mr.Briggs of the Central Intelligence Agency. The correspondence youreferred to is classified and therefore cannot be released. Iregret that we cannot be of assistance to you in this matter." Theyare clearly hiding something. Further, the exchange between the CIAand the FBI is an example of the ongoing war between those twoagencies over turf and budget.12. The International Confederation of Free TradeUnions (ICFTU), whose executive board was taken over by theAFL-CIO, gave the money for the establishment of The Federation ofFree African Trade Unions (FOFA-TUSA) in 1959, which was intimatelyconnected with the PAC. Barry Cohen, "The CIA and the African TradeUnions," AFRICA magazine, September 1976, Dirty Work 2,supra, p. 77. Jay Lovestone, who served as the Director of the Departmentof International Affairs for the AFL-CIO, "was one of the CentralIntelligence Agency's most important men." Ioan Davies, AfricanTrade Unions (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966), p. 201. A formermember of the Communist Party, U.S.A., Lovestone, who was actuallyexpelled from the Party, waged the Cold War from his vantage pointin the American labor movement. In "Fight U.S. Subversion of TradeUnion Movement in Africa!" B.S. Nyameko directly accused the CIAof creating the Pan Africanist Congress to undermine theCommunist-backed African National Congress. He wrote:"Throughout Africa labour organizations are infiltrated by CIAagents posing as private individuals or under nonofficial cover, asemployees in private companies or as U.S. Embassy staff in theInformation Department and Labour Attaché men succeeded inestablishing the PAC in 1959 to disrupt our ANC." The AfricanCommunist, No. 87, Fourth Quarter, 1981, pp. 56-57.13. O'Donovan, Patrick, secret interview with NelsonMandela, 30 May 1961. It is widely believed that the CIA fingeredMandela to the South African police, which would have been aninside job, almost certainly one of the white liberals pretendingto be a supporter. Lowenstein was privy to the secret interviewand may well have participated in the fingering of Mandela.14. Cummings, Richard, The Pied Piper: AllardK. Lowenstein and the Liberal Dream (New York, Grove, 1985), p. 136.15. Interview with Harris Wofford, supra. Other CIA"good wingers" of that generation included the Rev. William SloaneCoffin, Jr. (See Coffin, Once To Every Man (New York, Atheneum,1977); author and naturalist Peter Matthiessen, for whom the ParisReview was his cover and who, according to James Linville, theManaging Editor of The Paris Review, is "haunted by the CIA."Conversation with James Linville, Oxford, MS, April 1993, at the40th anniversary celebration of The Paris Review (The New YorkTimes first reported Matthiessen' s CIA employment); GloriaSteinem, who worked for three years for the Independent ResearchService, an organization totally supported by the CIA and whosepurpose was to disrupt Communist youth festivals. This was firstdisclosed by Ramparts and later reported in The New York Timesin 1967. See Press Release, 9 May 1975, Redstockings of the Women'sLiberation Movement; letter from Jane Barry of Redstockings, 19February 1987, and ultra liberal author/activist Robert Sam Anson(Interview with Robert Sam Anson, May 1985). The theoreticalintellect behind "good wing" ideology in the CIA was HarryRositzke, who argued that democracy and capitalism were notnecessarily synonymous and that the United States should supportprogressive social democratic or democratic socialist approaches incritical countries. See Rositzke, supra, p. 268.16. See Allard Lowenstein and John Marcum,"Force: Its Thrust and Prognosis," in South Africa inTransition, (New York, Praeger, 1966): "In the absence ofinternal collapse in Portugal and of external intervention in SouthAfrica and Southern Rhodesia, the period of violent upheaval may beprolonged. Neither collapse nor intervention now appears likely,and the legacy of European settlement in southern Africa mayconsequently be hatred and destruction of catastrophic proportions.This prospect will not dissuade Africans from force. It will berecalled that Americans fought an extended War for Independencethat was prompted by grievances that look paltry compared to thosenow present in southern Africa." Praeger, the publisher of thepaper, which was given at a conference at Howard University in 1963sponsored by the American Society of African Culture, a CIA front,was later revealed by Ramparts, to have had a CIA affiliation.17. Interview with Hal Minus, Lowenstein aide on 1966trip, March 1981.18. Telephone interview, 5 April 1994.19. Paul Taylor of The Washington Post has providedan excellent overview of the South African scene prior to theelections in "Outlook," Washington Post, 3 April 1994.20. Telephone interview with Professor William Foltz,4 April 1994.21. "South Africa: Policy Alternatives for theUnited States," Report of a Wingspread Conference convened by theJohnson Foundation, April 1975, Racine, Wisconsin. Others inattendance were George Hauser of the American Committee on Africa;Africanist Gwendolen Carter; and Donald F. McHenry of the CarnegieEndowment for Peace and later Andrew Young's deputy and thenreplacement at the United Nations in the Carter administration. Seealso Alun Robert, The Rossing File (London, Namibia SupportCommittee, CANUC, 1980).22. Wingspread Report, supra.23. Letter to Hank Slack from Ernest Wentzel, 12 June1979; telephone interview with Ernest Wentzel, Johannesburg, 9August 1983.24. Interview with Frank Carlucci, 19 July 1983.25. Memo by Mark Childress, undated.26. Moose quoted by Adams, telephone conversationwith Adams, 1982.27. Interview with Carlucci.28. See Treverton, Covert Action, supra, atpp. 220-221.29. Interview with Professor William Foltz, supra.30. Foltz, supra31. Foltz, supra. See, generally, Chester Crocker'smemoir, High Noon In Southern Africa (New York, W.W.Norton, 1992).32. Foltz, supra33. Foltz, supra.34. Foltz, supra.35. Interview, supra.36. 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