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The Proposed Fissile-Material Production Cutoff: Next
Steps

Preface

In September 1993, President Clinton announced that the United States
will take a comprehensive approach to the growing global accumulation of
fissile material. As an element of that approach, he proposed a multilateral
convention banning the production of such material for nuclear-explosives
purposes or outside international safeguards.

We examine and recommend next steps to the proposed convention. These
negotiating steps or options are to further strengthen the worldwide control of
weapon-usable material. In addition, we analyze the political
and economic obstacles that might hinder the negotiation of the recommended
next steps, and suggest measures that would mitigate these obstacles.

To study and recommend the next steps and measures, we first describe the U.S.
proposal, quantify various countries' inventories and ability to produce
weapon-usable material, and determine what remains to be done beyond the
proposed convention. These preliminary but necessary analyses then lead us to
the main part of this
report, where we describe possible next steps, identify potential obstacles to
these steps, and then suggest measures to mitigate opposition to them. Those
who are familiar with the proposed convention might skip Chapter Two on the
U.S. proposal.

The project was conducted under the International Security and Defense Policy
Center of RAND's
National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded
research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.
government.

Summary

Nuclear nonproliferation has long been a principal security objective of
the United States and most other countries. The nuclear nonproliferation
treaty (NPT), which took effect in 1970, sought to limit nuclear weapons to the
countries that then possessed them (the United States, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, France, and China). It is widely believed that, since then,
several other states (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have acquired
nuclear weapons. One objective of current nonproliferation policy is to cap
and eventually reverse the nuclear-weapon programs in these undeclared
nuclear-weapon states. Another is to prevent terrorist and other subnational
groups from gaining access to nuclear weapons or to sensitive nuclear
materials, i.e., plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Such materials
are produced in military and some civilian nuclear programs.

To help achieve these objectives, President Clinton outlined in September 1993
a "framework for U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction." This framework included a proposed multilateral convention
prohibiting the production of plutonium or HEU unless it is for purposes other
than nuclear-weapon production and then only if it is done under international
safeguards. The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the proposal within
three months subject to the important change that the convention be
"nondiscriminatory," that is, that it apply to declared and undeclared
nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states alike.

What will be the effect of such a convention on the future availability of
plutonium and HEU? Can additional steps reduce the opportunities for
nuclear-weapon proliferation? What might be done to gain the international
community's acceptance of further steps? In the research reported here, we
have attempted to answer these questions.

Availability of Sensitive Nuclear Materials

To assess the effects of the proposed convention, we began by analyzing
the current and near-future global availability of plutonium and HEU. We
evaluated available data to determine countries' stocks of and ability to
produce HEU and weapon- and reactor-grade plutonium (all of which can be used
in weapons) and divided these amounts by that necessary to make crude atomic
bombs. We carried out this analysis for undeclared nuclear-weapon states
(named above) and nonnuclear-weapon states that once had an interest in
nuclear-weapon development and have the ability to resume a weapon program
(Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa). We found that these seven countries
combined can now or will soon be able to produce enough sensitive nuclear
material to manufacture about 230 bombs per year. This is in addition to a
combined accumulated stockpile large enough to support the manufacture of about
220 bombs. (Seventy percent of this stockpile is in India and Israel.)

Some insight into the potential availability of sensitive nuclear materials can
be gained by considering the separated plutonium being generated in countries
with large reprocessing plants (France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Japan).
This plutonium is intended to be used in the nuclear fuel cycle, which will
involve transfers between holding points including transfers to other
countries. It is from these transfers and holding points that nations or
subnational groups might divert or seize some of the material. We estimate the
amount of plutonium in the cycle at any given time to be equal to the amount
that the system can produce in a year. Combined, these states process enough
plutonium annually to make approximately 4,400 atomic bombs; this number will
grow to 5,600 within a decade. Thus, the diversion or seizure of even a tiny
fraction of this material would be enough to make several bombs.

Effects of the Proposed Convention

What effect would the proposed convention limiting HEU and plutonium
production have? First, although the convention does not deal with existing
military stockpiles, it would put plutonium and HEU produced in the future in
non-NPT states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel under full-scope
international safeguards. This would have some of the effect of the NPT in
that implementation of safeguards would deter the diversion of this plutonium
and HEU for weapon purposes, and abrogation of the convention would afford some
warning that weapons were being manufactured using this material.

Second, the proposed convention would require that nuclear-weapon states stop
producing plutonium and HEU for weapon purposes. China would be most affected
by this requirement, because it is the only nuclear-weapon state that may still
be producing weapon-related plutonium. The other nuclear-weapon states no
longer produce plutonium for weapons, and none produces HEU for weapons.
However, the convention will formally commit them not to produce plutonium or
HEU for weapons in the future.

The convention would thus increase the moral, legal, and to some extent,
practical constraints on the production of nuclear weapons by non-NPT states,
and it could decrease plutonium production by nuclear-weapon states. However,
the question of how much potential for bomb-making would remain is still to be
addressed. Our analysis shows why the proposed convention is only one element
in President Clinton's nonproliferation framework.

The convention would leave in place existing stocks of plutonium and HEU
accumulated for weapon-related purposes. There is also a residual risk
associated with further production and stockpile accumulation carried out for
nonweapon purposes--activities that would be allowed under the new convention
(with safeguards). Parties to the new treaty could clandestinely build
facilities to convert stored plutonium, which would probably be in oxide form,
into the metal form needed for bombs, while simultaneously constructing the
nonnuclear components of the weapons. Their efforts might not be detected
until the oxide was withdrawn from the storage site (in violation of
safeguards). It might be only a matter of days or weeks from that event until
nuclear weapons were completed. And, with large flows of civilian fuel-cycle
plutonium remaining, the threat of theft, as described above, remains .

Possible Further Steps

Having established that there will be a residual availability of
plutonium and HEU for weapon manufacture after the implementation of the
proposed convention, we considered two further steps as a means to reduce that
availability. First, current plutonium and HEU stockpiles (both safeguarded
and unsafeguarded) might be reduced or transferred to secure custody, and,
second, the production of these materials for any purpose might be abandoned or
restricted to fewer locations.

Reducing stockpiles should reduce the number of bombs that could be made. This
would be a valuable step but not by itself sufficient. Even if excess stocks
are eliminated, substantial plutonium would still be present at any given time
in the civilian fuel cycles of countries with reactors using plutonium. Also,
any nonnuclear nation interested in building nuclear weapons could provide
itself with a plutonium stockpile by establishing a plutonium-based civilian
fuel cycle.

Elimination of plutonium production for any purpose, on the other hand, should
have a very large effect on its availability for weapon manufacture. If
stockpiles were also eliminated, nonnuclear-weapon states would have nothing to
seize and convert to bombs and subnational groups would have nothing steal.
Nations such as Japan, France, and the United Kingdom, which are trying to
establish a plutonium-based civilian fuel cycle as a hedge against exhaustion
of uranium supplies, would be against a complete production cutoff.
Consequently, the U.S. government, understandably reluctant to cross its
allies, has declined to propose such a cutoff. However, because the economics
of and political support for the civilian use of plutonium have been steadily
deteriorating, various measures might be implemented to allay plutonium
producers' concerns:

Press the logic that plutonium stock disposition and a total cutoff or
severe
restriction on plutonium production will be necessary for effective control.

Point to the U.S. example--the abandonment of civilian uses of
plutonium--and
add other examples, e.g., Germany. Also point to regional opponents of such
programs, e.g., North and South Korea, and China with respect to Japan's
program and perhaps Israel with respect to its neighbors' programs.

As the number of holdouts is reduced, press harder on the remaining
plutonium
advocates.

Initiate international efforts to improve the alternatives to plutonium use,
including fuel-efficiency improvements in existing and advanced once-through
low-enriched or natural uranium-based nuclear reactors and to identify
additional uranium resources.

Suggest the stockpiling of natural and low-enriched uranium fuel as a more
immediate and proliferation-resistant energy security measure than plutonium
fuel cycles.

Suggest a progression of increasingly restrictive steps, beginning, for
example, with a ban on new construction of plutonium facilities.

Take actions to minimize the losses suffered by organizations currently
profiting from plutonium activities.

Cut off the production of "civilian" weapon-usable material first and use
existing stockpiles to support sensitive activities that require time to phase
out.

Suggest a renewable moratorium on plutonium production.

Conclusion

If the proposed convention is supplemented by stockpile reduction or
elimination and by severe restriction or total cutoff of plutonium and HEU
production for any purpose, the danger of proliferation will be greatly
reduced. The measures listed above might be taken to mitigate any negative
effects such additional steps would have on some countries and thus improve the
negotiating environment for further action.

We recommend that the United States at a minimum not foreclose, significantly
delay, or deemphasize the possibility of further action to substantially reduce
the availability of plutonium and HEU. It is important that the world perceive
a U.S. position along the following lines:

No nation should assume that the proposed convention offers an entitlement
to activities it does not prevent. Otherwise, it may be difficult in the future
to convince countries to abandon civilian plutonium fuel programs if they have
made additional large investments in such programs under the auspices of the
new treaty. To prevent such an eventuality, everyone must understand the
limits at the outset.

Negotiations over the proposed convention will be the first step, to be
followed by or, better, accompanied by negotiations over a broader plan to cut
off plutonium production and over stockpile disposition. Concurrent
negotiations are better than sequential ones, given the length of time
involved.

Contents

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: The U.S. Proposal

Scope
Reactions

Chapter Three: Third World Inventories and Ability to Produce Weapon-Usable
Material

Explore

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