Why Think All Questions Have Scientific Answers?

Scientists working in origin of life research are fairly candid that they do not know how life originated, but they are quick to point out that they are making progress and that science will eventually be able to provide an answer to this question. I have always found this sort of faith in science a bit intriguing. It is just assumed that there must be a naturalistic cause/explanation for the origin of life, and that we will eventually be able to discover it. But why should we think this to be true? Given what needs to be explained (the origin of biological information), and given our understanding of the causal powers of naturalistic processes, the origin of life does not appear to be the kind of thing for which natural causes are adequate to explain it even in principle (See 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9).

Imagine a room that is filled with 1000 pizzas and a one year old toddler. Let’s say you leave the room for five minutes, and when you return all 1000 pizza boxes are empty. Your job as a scientist is to explain what happened to the pizzas. Since you know pizzas must be eaten, and that the only person in the room capable of eating them was the toddler, you set about to develop various theories as to how the toddler managed to consume 1000 pizzas in five minutes. After years of research you still have not answered the question, but you press on because you are sure science will be able to resolve the dilemma. It should be obvious that the scientist is pursuing the wrong kind of explanation. We know the capabilities of toddlers and human digestion, so we know it is not possible to explain the disappearance of the pizzas by appealing to the toddler. A different explanation is required. Similarly, we know the capabilities of naturalistic processes, and we know that they are wholly inadequate to explain the origin of the biological information necessary in the first life form. A different kind of explanation is required: one that involves an intelligent agent. Insisting that a naturalistic cause is responsible for the origin of life is like insisting that the toddler must have eaten the pizzas. While not impossible, it is improbable, and there is no good evidence to think it’s true. The evidence points in a different direction.

But scientists will retort, “The discipline of science requires that no appeal be made to intelligent or supernatural agents. Only naturalistic processes are allowed as valid explanations.” While I would dispute the notion that such methodological constraints are necessary to the discipline of science, let’s just assume that for science to be science it must exclude all non-naturalistic explanations. In that case, why can’t scientists just say that the origin of life may/does not have a scientific explanation, or that the scientific explanation for the origin of life is inferior to some non-scientific explanation? That never happens. Many scientists presuppose that the only kind of valid explanation is a scientific one. Of those who will allow for other types of explanation, they still presuppose that scientific explanations are always superior to other kinds of explanation. I contend that this kind of thinking needs to be challenged. Not all problems have a scientific answer, and not all scientific answers are superior to non-scientific answers. Some problems can only be answered by philosophy (what is real, how do we justify knowledge, what are numbers, where do logical laws come from, etc.). Others can only be answered by theology (was Jesus the Son of God). Just as it would be a mistake to think all problems have a philosophical answer, it is a mistake to think all problems have a scientific answer. If the evidence points against a naturalistic explanation and toward an intelligent explanation, then science should be willing to admit that, even if they are not willing to say that such an explanation is a scientific one.

Good question. I think the primary means of determining which explanation is best is by looking at the explanatory scope and explanatory power of the rival hypotheses. Regarding explanatory scope, let’s say that that there are three facts that need to be explained, and the scientific explanation can only account for two of them, whereas the philosophical explanation can account for all three, then the philosophical explanation should be preferred since it can account for more of the data. Regarding explanatory power, sometimes you may have two hypotheses which can account for all the data, but one may do so better than the other because it is more plausible.

Consider morality. There are several facts about morality that need to be explained: (1) Moral rules have no physical components; (2) the moral impulse is universal in nature; (3) Moral rules compel us to act in particular ways; (4) We feel guilt when we do not follow moral rules.

Naturalists can only account for #2, and possibly #3. Theists, however, can account for all 4, so theism should be preferred on the basis of explanatory scope alone.

The reasoning I have described is called abductive reasoning, or the inference to the best explanation. And you are right to point out that just because one hypothesis is superior to another (whatever the criteria might be, whether it be explanatory scope, explanatory power, etc.) does not mean that the hypothesis is true. The truth might lie elsewhere. But that possibility does not make the best explanation not the best explanation. It only means that the best explanation may not, after all, be the right explanation. But since all we have to go on is the evidence we have in the present, and not evidence that might be discovered in the future, we should adopt the best explanation until we have reason to prefer another one.

But still, being able to explain something doesn’t say anything as to that explanations validity, asides from the fact that explanation is possible. Simply being possible is, in my opinion, insufficient to justify calling something the best explanation.

I agree that being possible does not mean it is necessarily the case that it is true. But the possibility that there could be another explanation does not make the best explanation that we have not the best explanation since “best explanation” is a title given to what we know in the present, not what we may know in the future. In order to dethrone the best explanation one has to come up with a better explanation. And appealing to the possibility that there might be a better explanation that we have yet to discover is not justification for denying that the evidence we have now best supports hypothesis X. And in some cases there are only a limited number of possible explanations, so if the evidence supports one of them over the others then we have very good reason to think that the best explanation is the correct explanation.

And I don’t think we should be so skeptical that the best explanation is not the correct explanation. Of course, this could depend on just how much better the explanation is to alternative explanations. If you have 4 hypotheses, and the best explanation is only slightly better than the alternatives, then it doesn’t give us much confidence that the best explanation is the right explanation. But if the best explanation is far superior to its alternatives, then we have much more reason to suppose that it is indeed the right explanation. This is just the nature of abductive reasoning. And yet we rely on it all the time to draw conclusions about what is true.

I’m not trying to argue that one should not call the best explanation the best explanation because there may be potential future explanations (although the likelihood better explanations may arise should be a factor in how much stock you put in that explanation – if the best is likely to be overturned, there’s no sense believing it to be complete truth even though it is the best)

No, my point is simply that having a large explanatory power is insufficient justification for labelling something the best explanation, since explanatory power is detached from the reliability of the explanation. As I mentioned earlier, so long as the product of the explanation is the phenomena I am trying to explain, the mechanism could be completely divorced from reality and yet still have a high explanatory power. There is no guarantee that an explanation is correct simply because it explains.

I just don’t see why being the best explanation is not good justification for thinking that that explanation is the correct one. You say that explanatory power is detached from the reliability of experience, but I don’t see how. If you wake up in the morning and your grass is wet, and your driveway is wet, and the sidewalk in front of your house is wet, there are three ways to explain this: it rained, or the sprinklers were on, or someone washed the car. If you look at the car and it is not wet, then that is a mark against the car washing theory. If you look at your neighbor’s sidewalk and driveway across the street and it is dry, then that is a mark against the rain theory. The sprinkler theory is the best explanation, and that explanation is based on our experience of what things cause certain things to become wet. I don’t see any basis to be skeptical of this conclusion, or think that the explanation may lie elsewhere.

And so it is with other things that need to be explained. When it comes to the origin of material or biological entities, there are only so many causal entities that are capable of explaining it. And when the entities in question exhibit specified complexity, and we know from our uniform experience that only intelligent agents are capable of producing specified complexity, then an intelligent agent is the best explanation, and we are justified in thinking that the best explanation is the right explanation…at least until we have reason to believe otherwise (e.g. if it could be shown how naturalistic processes could produce specified complexity).

We seem to be talking at cross purposes, so I’m going to try and clarify the issue by running over what is – in my mind – the argument.

You suggest that there are alternate, non-scientific, explanations for phenomena and I query how one would determine the validity of these other explanations.

Your response is to suggest explanatory scope – whether an explanation accounts for all the phenomena – be used to determine which is best. I note that simply explaining something doesn’t necessarily mean that explanation is true or accurate, thus to use explanatory power to judge which explanation is superior is ultimately folly if one is seeking a true and accurate explanation.

In response you…moved on from the topic at hand. Whilst what you progressed onto is interesting and I would enjoy discussing with you, I would like to get this issue settled first before talking about other things.

So please go over what I am saying again – or ask me to reiterate, I would be happy too – and tell me where our opinions diverge. Explain how, despite the objections I have raised, explanatory scope is the best means of determining which explanation is the best. Or acknowledge those objections and the idea that explanatory scope shouldn’t be the primary method used for differentiating explanations.

I don’t think explanatory scope is the only criterion, but I do think it is one of the most important. There is also explanatory power, plausibility, degree of ad hoc-ness, conforms to our prior background knowledge, etc.

I don’t think we need a different set of criteria to determine the validity of non-scientific explanations than we do to determine the validity of scientific explanations. Just as one would use the criteria above to determine which scientific hypothesis among a group of competing hypotheses is true, one would use the same criteria to judge between a group of scientific and non-scientific hypotheses.

And I do think that depending on how good the best explanation is, and depending on the nature of the what needs to be explained and how many possible explanations there might be for it, we can have good reason to think that the best explanation is the right explanation. Why? Because we use abductive reasoning in this way all the time in our daily lives and never question whether or not the “jump” from the inference to the best explanation to “this is the true explanation” is a legitimate one.

You say I moved on to a different topic, but I’m not sure how I did so. I thought I was quite on topic.

I’m not suggesting one uses a different criteria to test scientific and non-scientific hypotheses, indeed my opening post suggested that we should be using the same criteria making both essentially science.

What I’m saying is that in both lines of inquiry explanatory scope, whilst important, shouldn’t be the primary means of differentiating explanations since it has no mechanism by which to tell if an explanation is true or false (both this “http://cdnimg.visualizeus.com/thumbs/b8/eb/,,abstrusegoose,com,comics,humor,link,to,gallery,science,text,unicorn,o,,,,-b8eb7f05800945fc9fac28bffa6f3fc3_i.jpg” and this “http://media.web.britannica.com/eb-media/72/93572-034-26C16785.jpg” have the same explanatory scope, yet one is true and one is not).

Ultimately picking one explanation over another based on explanatory scope is saying that there is evidence which confirms one over the other. And without evidence “I don’t know” remains the best answer.

Jason, first I want to say that I am in full agreement with your overall points here I just have a question on one point.

Help me out here, here is your statement:

“We know the capabilities of toddlers and human digestion, so we know it is not possible to explain the disappearance of the pizzas by appealing to the toddler. A different explanation is required. Similarly, we know the capabilities of naturalistic processes, and we know that they are wholly inadequate to explain the origin of the biological information necessary in the first life form. A different kind of explanation is required: one that involves an intelligent agent. Insisting that a naturalistic cause is responsible for the origin of life is like insisting that the toddler must have eaten the pizzas. While not impossible, it is improbable, and there is no good evidence to think it’s true. The evidence points in a different direction.”

Would you agree that the level of improbability, mathematically equates to impossibility? If so, why is it necessary to avoid using the word “impossible” when referring to science when it does fit our general use and understanding of the word?

I ask because you did not use the word “impossible” when you referred to the science but you used “not possible” in your example referring to the toddler. You seem to carefully word your comment so as not to use “impossible” when referring to science. I assume that was intentional, am I correct, if so why?

“In that case, why can’t scientists just say that the origin of life may/does not have a scientific explanation, or that the scientific explanation for the origin of life is inferior to some non-scientific explanation? That never happens. Many scientists presuppose that the only kind of valid explanation is a scientific one.”

If you are referring to atheist scientists and some theistic evolutionists, (as creationists scientist are not in that category), I agree and the question is why?

After studying this debate for quite a few years and actually engaging scientists in dialogues about this, I have come to the conclusion that their reluctance to be balanced and honest on this issue is due to their world view or religious convictions and or their religiously slanted scientific training. It is not about “science” but about an atheistic influenced perspective of what science is.

There seems to be an agenda to keep God out of science because “science” has been hijacked and made to be an alternative to theism. Atheist and psudo-atheist have gained control of our science and education institutions and through them and the media have influenced even many Christian organizations with their interpretation of what science is. Also, it should be noted that this really concerns evolution as applied to science.

I agree with you that this kind of thinking needs to be challenged; I also know that it is being challenged and effectively refuted by Intelligent Design organizations like the Discovery Institute and Creationists organizations such as Institute For Creation Research, Answers In Genesis and Creation Ministries International, but that is not being conveyed by our media, the courts or our education institutions.

All dissenters from Darwin are labeled as religious quacks on a mission to evangelize and are conveniently side-stepped or pushed aside as being unscientific while atheist and theistic evolutionists are given most of the attention in media and in academia.

Jason, please forgive me for posting my questions before I read the other comments. I withdraw any questions so that you can focus on your dialogue with sahelanthropus.
I find him quite interesting and I have a few observations to post concerning his comments.

Sahelanthropus, perhaps we could bring this dialogue down from the air to the ground where there is less wiggle room. Am I correct in assuming that you are an atheist arguing against the creation view of origins in favor of evolution?

You seemd to be adding and deducting from clear comments that Jason has made as you go a long and it seems to be unnecessarily complicating your decussion.

For instance, Jason said:

“I think the primary means of determining which explanation is best is by looking at the
EXPLANATORY SCOPE AND EXPLANATORY POWER of the rival hypotheses”

But you replyed:
“But is providing a larger explanatory scope along [alone?] sufficient to view that explanation as superior?” leaving out “Explanatory power”. .

In your example:
“If I were to explain how my mug got on my table, the only piece of reality I would have to include is that the end result of this explanation is my mug on my table.
Every other facet of the explanation could be completely unfounded and invented, yet it would still have a large explanatory scope.”

You added “completely unfounded and invented” to the explination which was not a part of Jason’s example or argument and is therefore not acceptable as a part of the “scope” and “power” of the explanation.

You said:
“But still, being able to explain something doesn’t say anything as to that explanations validity, asides from the fact that explanation is possible. Simply being possible is, in my opinion, insufficient to justify calling something the best explanation.”

But Jason never said that explaining something makes it valid or that saying something is possible justifies calling it the best explanation.

You said:
“if the best is likely to be overturned, there’s no sense believing it to be COMPLETE TRUTH even though it is the best” when Jason never indicated that the best explanation was complete truth.

And when you said:

“No, my point is simply that having a large explanatory power is insufficient justification for labelling something the best explanation, since explanatory power is detached from the reliability of the explanation.”

You excluded “explanatory scope” which again Jason included with explanatory power in his remarks.

And finally, you said:
“since explanatory power is detached from the reliability of the explanation”

You detached “explanatory power” from the “reliability of the explanation” without explination or justification as Jason pointed out.

And you insisted that the “mechanism could be completely divorced from reality” and yet still have a high explanatory power, simply because the product is a phenomena. (That is not logical argument).

Then you said: “There is no guarantee that an explanation is correct simply because it explains.” Which Jason never suggested.

So I am confused by your communication, it seems that you are taking liberties outside of the bounds of logic to argue your case and it is complicating the dialogue.

And as I said, you seem to add and take away from what Jason actually said at will, which also make the dialogue difficult.

At this point I am willing to give you the benefit of the doubt and assume it is not intentional. But I have been in dialogues like this where the constant misrepresentation, misapplication and misappropriation of what was said by creationists were common. I trust that this will not turn out to be the same.

Jason has repeatedly indicated that both “explanatory scope” and “explanatory power” are necessary to arrive at reasonable conclusion:

“I think the primary means of determining which explanation is best is by looking at the explanatory scope and explanatory power of the rival hypotheses.”
“There is also explanatory power, plausibility, degree of ad hoc-ness, conforms to our prior background knowledge, etc.”

But you seem to mainly focus on “explanatory scope” to the exclusion of “explanatory power”:

“Explain how, despite the objections I have raised, explanatory scope is the best means of determining which explanation is the best. Or acknowledge those objections and the idea that explanatory scope shouldn’t be the primary method used for differentiating explanations.”
“What I’m saying is that in both lines of inquiry explanatory scope, whilst important, shouldn’t be the primary means of differentiating explanations…”
“Ultimately picking one explanation over another based on explanatory scope is saying that there is evidence which confirms one over the other…”

You seem to be minimizing Jason’s argument while maximizing your objection buy focusing only on his “explanatory scope” point and not including “explanatory power”.

I don’t want to disrupt the interesting dialogue here, but just make a quick point.

Science is how we explain or describe the physical universe. So science can explain what is already there or existing. When speaking of origins though, we are talking about how what exists came to be in the first place. I think this is a round hole square peg argument. While science is a great tool in describing the physical universe, it is not a good tool in describing the mechanism for the origin of the universe because science can only work with what already exists by definition.

Indeed Naz, but the question is why does a certain group of scientists insist on rejecting an intelligent, alternate possibility purely on the bases that it is not naturalistic. If naturalistic explanations are impossible or for argument sake highly improbable, then what logic or justification is there in rejecting non-naturalistic possibilities?
I submit to you that such thinking hinders scientific progress rather than advancing it.

The venomous attacks that “Darwin dissenters” and even “Darwin doubter” suffer from same Darwinists is amazing. But their pretense that the origin issue is not relevant to the debate is nothing short of illogical.

Creationist have great respect for science and scientists, and understand the limited benefit of Methodological Naturalism. However, to ignore the clear limitations of Methodological Naturalism in origins is not logical.

Danzil, I agree, that insisting on a naturalistic explanation of origins will hinder scientific progress. I cannot imagine where humanity would be scientifically and spiritually for that matter if they would as a whole embrace Almighty God as the creator of the universe instead of their ridiculous notions of Darwinian evolution.

The point is that one explanation might have a more of an explanatory scope than another and all other things are equal. Same level of plausibility, evidentiary support etc.

In such a situation, if one places emphasis on explanatory scope then one would accept the explanation with the higher explanatory scope as the best explanation over the alternative and they would be making such a call on explanatory scope alone as that is what they are using to differentiate the two hypotheses.

From there my arguments against using explanatory scope alone flow. Namely, the fact that explaining something is no guarantee that explanation is accurate so using it to justify an explanation is inaccurate is ultimately unfounded.

One should side with indicators of accuracy, such as evidence, when deciding on the superior explanation and if the only thing which supports one over another is explanatory scope then the correct response is accept neither until further information comes to light.

So true, I wasn’t quoting Jason’s entire position in my post but at the same time I don’t believe I was misrepresenting it

I understand your problem with relying only on “explanatory scope” for accuracy but, I think you are minimizing the concept of “explanatory scope” to “simple explanation” rather than “the highest percentage that the explanation can explain” as in Jason’s example in response #2.

Jason’s point seemed to be “getting at the most accurate answer using what is available”.

While Explanatory Scope alone could get us there as Jason indicated; he also included “explanatory power” which increases that possibility and I was asking why you seemed determined to detach it from the equation?

Because by including explanatory scope one runs the risk of accepting an explanation based on explanatory scope alone and that shouldn’t be done, as I’ve mentioned several times before.

Even if one is including explanatory power when deciding which explanation to favour, you can still wind up accepting something on explanatory scope alone, as I mentioned above.

Say there are two explanations, both with the same level of evidence. But one has a greater explanatory scope. Using both scope and power to evaluate which explanation to pick, one would side with the explanation with a greater explanatory scope.

And why would one be doing that? It can’t be based on power, since they both have the same level of evidence. It would be because of explanatory scope. You would’ve chosen one explanation over the other based on scope alone.

Mr. Benton you said:
“Because by including explanatory scope one runs the risk of accepting an explanation based on explanatory scope alone and that shouldn’t be done, as I’ve mentioned several times before.”

First, by this statement you neglect the obvious consequence of excluding explanatory scope which is to decrease the possibility of arriving at the best explanation, and secondly you make the error of assuming that because it is “possible” someone “could” rely on explanatory scope along, that they “would” do so and therefore… what? Does the possibility of ignorance mandate the exclusion of using the best available methods? The best available methods should not be avoided because of what someone might foolishly do so I am not clear on your argument.

Since we all agree that explanatory scope “alone” is not the best way to arrive at the best answer, why dwell on that alone to the exclusion of the other principles that add to the best result?

You said:
“Even if one is including explanatory power when deciding which explanation to favour, you can still wind up accepting something on explanatory scope alone, as I mentioned above.”

But your point sounds contradictory, if it is established that explanatory power is being included in the final decision how is it also excluded? Also, you seem to keep falling back on the “possible” as if you are unwilling to face the “probable” and “plausible”, which is why I inquired about your world view and also requested that we minimize the wiggle room by speaking plainly about what we are actually talking about.

You said as your example:
“Say there are two explanations, both with the same level of evidence. But one has a greater explanatory scope. Using both scope and power to evaluate which explanation to pick, one would side with the explanation with a greater explanatory scope. And why would one be doing that? It can’t be based on power, since they both have the same level of evidence. It would be because of explanatory scope. You would’ve chosen one explanation over the other based on scope alone. And doing so is fundamentally flawed.”

But again your comment seems to be contradictory, if both explanations have the same level of evidence, how can one of them have greater explanatory scope than the other? Also, you seem to be making an effort to stack the deck against explanatory scope for some reason and without an actual subject to relate all this to I can’t understand why. If as I suspect this has to do with the atheist convictions against theism then I can see the reason for your efforts but I think they are wasted.

I hope I am not coming off sounding accusitive as that is not my intention. I just want to get clarity and hopefully get to the real issue.

In answer to your post #12, yes, I think that certain levels of improbability translate to impossibility. Specifically, if the likelihood of some X is less than the total number of events since the origin of the universe 13.7 billion years ago (which is 10 to the 139th power), then it is effectively impossible. So I’m not opposed to ruling some things out as impossible. Indeed, I think the OOL is impossible by purely naturalistic processes because the odds far exceed the possibility threshold I mentioned above.

To your comment #13, I agree that atheists are influenced by their worldview, but even Christians often agree that science, for it to be science, must limit itself to natural causes as explanations for natural phenomenon. So one can have a theistic worldview, but not allow an intelligent cause as a viable scientific explanatory because of their philosophy of science; i.e. how science needs to be conducted in order for it to be considered science. I disagree, but that is their thinking.

Precisely, Jason, and I suspect that that thinking is the result of their accepting what they have been taught in school, college and through the media about the evidence for evolution and the lack of evidence for God.

I have been conducting interviews with college students and professors concerning their view about evolution and a high percentage of all that I have spoken to so far have admitted that their convictions about evolution are mainly due to the claim that most scientists believe it and they must know what they are talking about because they have dedicated their life to science. Yet is it acknowledged by evolutionist scientists that scientists generally don’t understand the science in fields other than their own and usually just accepts what other scientists say as true.

I also found that a large percentage of those interview had either never been exposed to creationist scientists arguments against evolution or had rejected it without examining it when they were exposed to it because of what they had been told about it being merely religions and unscientific. Surprisingly many science professors demonstrated that they were simply following the party line and parroting the textbooks and were lost when I scientifically refuted their arguments for evolution and they even admitted that I was making good sense. Huston I think we have a problem!!!

Loving your blog posts, Jason. The more I read, the more I see you’ve put intellectual thought into a broad array of things I have thought about myself. As for this post, I think a fair term for the phenomenon is “science of the gaps” or perhaps “naturalism of the gaps”, with obvious reference to atheists’ “God of the gaps” retort.
Not just with OOL theory, but with all sorts of physical and cosmological problems. “Science will eventually solve it” feels like a bit of an arrogant approach. It may be true. Hopefully it will be true. But who knows.

Great post. I was checking constantly this blog and I’m impressed! Very useful info specifically the last part 🙂 I care for such info a lot. I was seeking this particular info for a very long time. Thank you and good luck.