Hegel on Daoism (Taoism)

Dao generally means "the
way," the right way of spirit, i.e., it means "reason." The sect
of the Dao occurs already (as we see) in the twelfth century B.C. It was a noteworthy event that the emperor passed over esteemed officers
with his rewards; his intention was in a subtle way to put them to one side,
to separate them from his other retainers. These gallant officers included masters
of the teaching as well as some who were only initiates at a lower level. Seven
noble officers had distinguished themselves by particular deeds of valor; in
the eyes of the mass of soldiers they were regarded as Shen who had only assumed
human bodies, and they presented themselves in that light as well. On a ceremonial
day the emperor addressed them, saying he had not forgotten them, that he recognized
very well the value of their merits. "Even though you have bodies,"
he continued, "you are Shen, of that there is no doubt. The outstanding
actions that you have performed under my eyes are sufficient proof of that to
me. The intention, for the sake of which you returned to the earth, can only
be to acquire for yourselves new merits, to disclose new virtues. I can do no
better than to put you in a position to practice these virtues, by safeguarding
you against the corruption of the times." He therefore determined the mountains
to be their residence, where they could spend their remaining time in intimate
association with the Shen who no longer have human shape. They were supposed
to take with them all who belonged to their sect, all who strove solely to attain
immortal life. He made these seven into chiefs over all the mountains of the
realm and gave them all rights of dominion over the initiates. Thus they
were to apply themselves to the study of the Dao and to the effort to make themselves
immortal; together with the other Shen, they were also supposed to acquire information
about the secrets of nature that are impenetrable to other human beings. Thus
they were separated from actual society.

From this account we see that
at that time there was already a class of people who occupied themselves with
the inner life, who did not belong to this universal state religion but built
up a sect that devoted itself to thinking, withdrew within itself and in its
thinking sought to bring to consciousness what the true might be.

Therefore, the next stage of
this initial configuration of nature religionwhich was this very knowing
by immediate self-consciousness of itself as the highest, as the ruling element,
i.e., this immediacy of taking immediate willing to be what is highestis
the return of consciousness into itself, the demand that consciousness should
be inwardly meditativeand that is the sect of the Dao. Linked with this,
in any case, is the fact that human beings who recede into thought or into the
inner domain, who applied themselves to the abstraction of thought, have at
the same time the intention of being immortal, of being pure sages, of whom
some are newly initiated while others have attained the mastery or the goal
and already regard themselves as higher essences also with respect to their
existence and actuality.

Therefore we already find among
the Chinese in antiquity this orientation toward the inner, to the Dao, an orientation
to abstractly pure thinking, which orientation constitutes the transition to
the second form of nature religion. There occurred in later times a renewal
or improvement of the Dao teaching, attributed especially to Lao‑zi, a
sage who was somewhat older than Confucius but who lived contemporaneously with
Confucius and Pythagoras. Confucius is thoroughly moralistic and no speculative
philosopher. Tian, this universal power of nature, which by the emperor's authority
is an actuality, is linked to the moral nexus, and Confucius chiefly developed
this moral aspect. His teaching coalesced with the state religion. All the mandarins
had to have studied Confucius. But the sect of the Dao based itself solely on
abstract thinking.

Dao is the universal. It is
quite noteworthy that the determination "three" immediately comes
into play to the extent that Dao is something rational and concrete. Reason
has produced one, one has produced two, two produced three, and three the universethe
same doctrine that we see in Pythagoras. The universe rests upon the dark principle
and is at the same time embraced by the bright principle, by light. A spirit
or breath unites them, and brings about their harmony and maintains it. The
initial determination of the triad is the One, and is called J; the second determination
is the Chi or light breathing; the third is Wei, what is sent, the messenger.
These three symbols are perhaps not Chinese; one sees in them the three letters
J, H, W, and correlates this with the Hebraic tetragram Jehovah, and with the
trigram Yao of the Gnostics. The One is the indeterminate, that without characteristics,
the impoverished initial abstraction, what is wholly empty. If it is to be internally
concrete, to be living, then it must be determinate, and thus it is the Two,
and the Third is the totality, the consummation of determinateness. Thus, even
in the first efforts of humanity to think in the form of triunity or trinity,
we can observe this necessity.­ Unless three determinations are recognized in
God, "God" is an empty word. Right at the beginning of thinking we
find the very simplest and most abstract determinations of thought. If, from
this assertion that the absolute power is, there occurs the progression to the
universal, then thinking begins, though the thinking itself is originally quite
empty and abstract. Further developments of this relationship are found in Chinese
literature. The symbol of the Dao, is on the one hand a triangle, and on the
other hand three horizontal lines one above the other, the middle one of which
is shortest, with a vertical stroke through all three as a sign that these three
are to be grasped essentially as one. In China these symbols are called Gua.
The [eight] Gua embody the elements of the higher Chinese reflection.

Thus in the sect of the Dao
the beginning consists in passing over into thought, the pure element; but one
should not believe that a higher, spiritual religion has established itself
in this case. The determinations of the Dao remain complete abstractions, and
vitality, consciousness, what is spiritual, do not, so to speak, fall within
the Dao itself, but are still completely within the immediate human being. Thus
Lao‑zi is also a Shen, or he has appeared as Buddha. The actuality and
vitality of the Dao is still the actual, immediate consciousness; in fact, it
is even a deceased individual such as Lao‑zi, although it transforms itself
into other shapes, into another human being, and it is vitally and actually
present in its priests. Just as Tian, this One, is the ruling element, though
as this abstract foundation, whereas the emperor is the actuality of this foundation,
the one who in fact rules; so the same is the case with the Dao, with the representation
of reason. Reason is likewise the abstract foundation that has its actuality
for the first time in existing human beings. Since the universal, the higher,
is only the abstract foundation, the human being thus abides in it without any
properly immanent, fulfilled inner element; one has no inner hold on oneself.
One has for the first time a footing within oneself when freedom and rationality
emerge, when one has the consciousness of being free and when this freedom elaborates
itself as reason. This developed reason provides absolute principles and duties;
and people who are themselves conscious of these principles in their freedom
and within their consciencepeople in whom they are immanent characteristicshave
for the first time a footing within themselves, in their conscience. But insofar
as human beings find themselves in that preceding relationship, where the absolute
is only an abstract foundation, they have no footing within themselves, no immanent,
determinate inwardness. For that reason everything external is for them something
inward; everything external has significance for them, it has a relation to
them, and indeed a practical relation. This relationship is in general the constitution
of the state, the circumstances of being ruled from without.

SOURCE: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Lectures on the Philosophy
of Religion. Volume II: Determinate Religion. Edited by Peter C. Hodgson;
translated by R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson, and J.M. Stewart, with the assistance
of J.P. Fitzer and H.S. Harris. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995
(orig. 1987). (Translation of: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.)
This extract (pp. 556-561) is from the Lectures of 1827; A. Immediate Religion,
or Nature Religion; 1. The Religion of Magic; c. The State Religion of the Chinese
Empire and the Dao.

Note: The footnotes have been stripped from this extract, as have indicators
of page numbers and page breaks of the German edition.

The section in which this extract appears can be found in the cited Hegel volume,
pp. 547-562. Daoism is compared with Buddhism (568-9) in the subsequent section
of the 1827 lectures: 2. The Religion of Being-Within-Self (Buddhism, Lamaism)
(pp. 562-579).

See also in this volume:

The Lectures of 1824: A. Immediate Religion, or Nature Religion; 1. The Religion
of Magic; c. The Religion of Ancient China; pp. 299-303.

The Lectures of 1831: 1. Chinese Religion: The Religion of Measure; pp. 729-731.

In addition to the footnotes, additional editorial remarks can be found on
pp. 5, 36, 59-60, 76.

Secondary Literature

Zhang Yunyi. "Philosophy's Predicament and Hegel's Ghost: Reflections
on the View That There Is "No Philosophy in China"," Frontiers
of Philosophy in China, vol. 2, no. 2, April 2007, pp. 230-246. Available
to subscribers via Springer.

Abstract: When Western science was introduced to modern China, more
translated words were used to express fundamental concepts and terms than
borrowed words. The process of academic translation, commensuration, and communication
between Western and Chinese philosophy is a process of comparative philosophical
research. Nowadays, however, it seems that Chinese philosophy is evaluated
by a Western Hegelian criterion. This leads to the debate over whether or
not China has philosophy. But it is meaningless to argue about whether or
not China has the name of philosophy. The key issue is whether or not China
has the actuality of philosophy. Looking at the history of Western philosophy,
it seems that the Hegelian definition of philosophy was the only one that
existed in Europe. However, during the last 200 years after Hegel that the
two main philosophical trends of positivism (scientism) and irrationalism
developed from anti-Hegelianism or "Spurning Metaphysics." As metaphysics
is being reconstructed, the ghost of Hegel has reappeared. It is clear that
in the future, philosophy will evolve from the development of human metaphysics
or cultural philosophy. It is a process of the "negation of negation":
from traditional metaphysics to the spurning of metaphysics, and then to human
metaphysics.

Abstract: The author deals with two basic problems in this paper.
Hegel's interpretation of Chinese philosophy is discussed first, and Hegel's
relation towards the oriental religion in general is explored in greater detail.
Hegel's understanding of the relation is then connected with the Daodejing's
philosophy.

Abstract: The text can be divided into six chapters. (1) I make some
introductory remarks on German Thinkers on China'. (2) I try to give an outline
of Hegel's thoughts about the Orient on the whole. (3) I concentrate on Hegel's
reflexions on China. (4) I have a closer look at Hegel's remarks concerning
Laozi. (5) I focus on the confrontation of Hegel's separation of nature and
freedom on the one hand and the impossibility to separate nature from freedom
in Laozi's concept of ziran' (self-so-ing). (6) I close with some final remarks
on the necessity of comparative philosophy.