Sunday, September 20, 2015

Barbarism and Civilization in the Letters of REH and HPL (Part 3), by David Piske

Two years into their well-known correspondence, Robert E.
Howard commented in a letter to H.P. Lovecraft about how strongly he identified
with the barbarians of history, rather than with any civilizations. Lovecraft
[HPL], who identified strongly with Rome,
and who considered himself a civilized intellectual, evidently took this as a
challenge and began to argue with Howard [REH] about this preference. While
discussing the subject in three subsequent letters, REH expressed a wish to
have been born into barbarism, and argued that there was contentment to be
found outside of civilization, even if the latter is generally better for
humanity. But by his fourth letter, prodded by HPL's insistence to argue for
civilization's obvious superiority, REH started inching into debate mode, criticizing
civilization and glorifying barbarism.

This entry is the third part in a project to examine this
debate, letter-by-letter (see also part one and part two.), as found in the two
volume set, A Means to Freedom: The Letters of H.P. Lovecraft and Robert E.
Howard, edited by S.T. Joshi, David E. Schultz, and Rusty Burke. (All page
numbers refer to these volumes.) The previous two parts of this series each
covered four letters, two by each man. As a result of the growing intensity of
their debate, the arguments grow more involved, and material from other parts
of their letters becomes more relevant. As a result, this third part examines
only two letters, one by REH and the response by HPL.

Letter 78: REH to HPL (March 6, 1933)

As their debate intensifies, other conversations in the
letters become more contentious, as well – the ideas of each topic feeding each
other. As with his previous letter (in December 1932), many of REH's comments
in other sections of this letter provide insight about his point of view on the
topic of the debate.

In their argument over the the value of the mental versus
the physical, REH is weary of debate. Both he and HPL believe in the
subordination of the body to the mind, REH asserts; the main difference between
them, he says, is too trivial to argue about. He is interested in mental and
physical pursuits, while HPL is interested exclusively in mental ones.
Accordingly, REH reiterates his agreement with HPL at several points over many
pages. On one of these occasions, REH admits that the physical side of man is
inferior to the mental, but asserts that it is yet a vital factor in the
development of society (541). This idea will be repeated in his argument for
the value of barbarism later in this letter, and in subsequent ones.

Celtic Ruler

Also, in their ongoing conversation about their political
views, REH acknowledges that individual liberty (which he previously identified
as his "supreme value") is impossible in highly developed
civilization, which he states "is one thing I have against such
civilizations" (542). He then indulges in a sarcastic rant.

"I realize the object of ‘good government'
is not to fulfill what you call the catch slogan of liberty. No; its object is
to emasculate all men, and make good little rabbits and guinea pigs out of them
that will fit into the nooks designed for them, and stay there contentedly
nibbling their fodder until they die of inanition. Liberty of action, is of course, impossible
under these ideal conditions" (543, emphasis mine).

REH allows that intellectual and creative freedom might
remain through civilized development, but asks, "what about the people who
are neither artists, intellectuals, or scientists? They do exist, in large
numbers" (543, emphasis mine). REH's sarcasm indicates his annoyance with
HPL's admittedly fascist outlook. Clearly one of REH's main criticisms of
civilization is that it subordinates men to its system, a system which HPL
lauds.

If the sarcasm is not enough to highlight REH's growing
exasperation, he states it more directly.

"I think any emotion that I waste in looking back and
wishing I had lived then instead of now, will hardly upset the social balance
of the civilization in which I live. . . . I think I've managed to adapt myself
fairly well to the conditions under which I am forced to live. . . . Because I
chance to voice my inner feelings in the matter to one I consider as a friend
doesn't necessarily imply that I go around in the buckskins and coonskin cap of
a former age, or waste my strength in vain striving against conditions beyond
my control" (543).

REH is beginning to express resentment that will continue to
grow as the correspondence continues. He has repeatedly stated that his favor
for barbarism is a personal preference, not indicating a political point of
view. (In reality, however, the two are intimately related.) But HPL has
insisted on attacking even REH's barbarian escapism as if it was a threat to
civilization.

REH continues to express this annoyance when he turns to
explicitly address the debate topic. Again he is bewildered about the direction
that this conversation has taken. All he maintains is personal preference to be
reborn among Celtic or Germanic tribesman, rather than Romans or Greeks for
whom he feels no connection. Better yet, he would choose the American frontier
between 1795 and 1895. This preference is no different, he says, than choosing
to live in Texas rather than in civilized New York. And he
reiterates: the "matter of relative superiority [of civilization] is
beside the point" (546). Here REH seems uninterested in debate, but he has
been dragged into it, and will by no means let HPL's presumed victory over
barbarism stand without a reply.

Lord Monboddo

HPL stated in his last letter that the defense of barbarism
depends on romanticism, and on that point compared REH with Scottish
anthropologist, Lord Monboddo. REH replies, "I never heard of that Lord—
whatever you call him. . . . I don't idealize anything" (546). And even if
he were idealizing barbarism, according to REH, HPL is just as guilty of
idealizing civilization. In any case, REH simply thinks he is better fitted to
the frontier than to the current mode of life.

Of all HPL's barbs, REH seems most irritated by the
implication underlying all of HPL's arguments – the superiority of the mind
over all else. REH counters:

"Because I have read a few more books than
my grandfathers read, and can scribble things on paper they couldn't, I am not
such a conceited jackass as to fancy that my life is fuller and richer than theirs,
who helped to fight a war, open a frontier and build up a new nation. Of all
snobberies, the assumption that intellectual endeavors, attainments and
accomplishments are the only worth-while and important things in life, is the
least justifiable" (546).

While, logically speaking, the quality of a person's life is
a different matter than its historical significance, a little trash-talking
seems appropriate here, especially considering the conceit of HPL's last
letter. REH's point is clear though, and echoes arguments he has made in other
letters on a different topic: intellect alone is not sufficient for life, nor
even the building of civilization.

Next, REH points out that HPL is misrepresenting his point
of view. "You say it would not be fair to hold back the superior types on
account of the inferiority of a portion of humanity. I never advocated that
plan" (546). Indeed, REH stated more than once that "even a decaying
civilization is preferable for humanity as a whole, than a state of barbarism"
(546). Despite a fantasy to be reborn to barbarism, he has repeatedly
maintained that in his "present state" he is unfitted for it. "I
have never made any remark about wishing civilization to fall back into
savagery. If I would wish personally to live life in a different sphere, that
is quite another matter" (546).

REH next refutes HPL's muddied argument that REH's
preference for barbarism is ironic. HPL stated that it is REH's imagination,
which is the product of civilization, that leads REH to prefer barbarism. REH
denies that his imagination is the product of civilization, as he is not
civilized "according to the urban, Eastern standard" (546), which his
friends frequently remind him. And he denies any irony or illogic in his
position. In any case, he would gladly abandon his imagination, along with any
other qualities that would not fit with barbarism, if he could only be reborn
as a barbarian.

REH admits that he wouldn't gain much by such a change, but
states that neither would he loose much, either. With this, he resumes arguing
for an equivalence of barbarism and civilization. A barbarian (at least the
original Aryan type) did take pleasure in slashing, and endured it when he
received the same. "That was part of his life, just as grinding men and
women to dust and crushing their souls into ashes is part of the civilized
system" (547). Just as the barbarian tortured others, so civilization
accepts and upholds "torture of its members in police-courts, prisons and
mad houses" (547). Between this and the violence of the barbarian, REH
sees "little difference." Furthermore, "civilized wars" any
no less brutal than those waged by barbarians. They are certainly no less
"disturbing to universal harmony" (547). While some of these
comparisons are exaggerated, REH seems simply to want HPL to acknowledge that
civilization does not alleviate all human suffering.

Next REH introduces a long overdue issue to the discussion,
that of definitions. "Just what is civilization? Where does barbarism
leave off and civilization begin?" (547). While initially they both took
the idea of civilization for granted, here REH argues it is actually ambiguous,
and lends to the impression of superiority without actually providing a measure
for it. Given such ambiguity, how could one compare various civilizations (such
as Egypt, Babylon,
Greece, Rome, and "ours"), even to one
another? Each could be argued superior to ours in various ways, and vice versa.

What is Civilization?

Furthermore, "[w]hat constitutes the barbarian?"
Far from being an obvious question, many groups that could be called barbaric
rivaled or surpassed civilizations existing in their own times in many ways.
REH's suggestions for areas of barbarian superiority range from vague and
romantic to incisive ("spirit of exploration and adventure,"
knowledge of war and voyaging, ship building and navigation, and literature).
Notably, REH lauds the Gauls and German tribes for courage, honor, and honesty
that surpassed Rome's.
Responding to HPL's earlier claim that barbarism is only attractive from the
perspective of decadent civilization, REH asks, "do you not think that
[Vikings] found their life good without that perspective?" (547). The
self-glorification in their sagas demonstrate a vital people: "They were
alive; they stung, burned, tingled with Life—life raw and crude and violent,
doubtless; but Life, just the same, and worthy to be classed with the best
efforts of the intellectual side of man" (547-8).

Taking the broader scope of the correspondence with HPL into
account, especially REH's remarks in other parts of this letter, it is clear
that REH wants to demonstrate that life is more than merely intellect, which
HPL alone prizes above all else. Indeed,
this is REH's conclusion on the topic: "Because a man lives an active life
rather than one of study and contemplation does not necessarily imply that he
is dead from the neck up" (548).

Letter 79: HPL to REH (March 25, 1933)

In this letter HPL writes more on the debate topic than he
has in any previous letter. Consisting of just over ten pages in the printed
volume (one can only imagine how many handwritten pages!), his coverage of the
subject here consists mostly of meandering arguments punctuated by reiterations
of the same basic point – that civilization is superior to barbarism in that it
minimizes human suffering and "expands man's natural capacities" as
much as possible beyond those of animals (574). HPL makes several good points
in the course of this series of arguments, but often they don't quite hit the
target, or their force is diminished by some other factor. At this point, the
debate feels like it has become plodding and muddy. As a result, the focus here
will be only on select comments and arguments.

From the beginning of this section HPL persists in
misconstruing REH's comments as an attack on civilization, and in projecting
viewpoints on him that he never articulated. In addition, HPL heavy-handedly
frames the discussion, assuming the role of the reasonable, clear-thinking
gentleman, and portraying REH as misguided (even if sympathetically so).
Indeed, HPL's opening comment appears to be an insincere expression of sympathy
with REH's point of view. Rather than draw the two together, it seems like
HPL's approach will only distance them, both through an odd use of third,
rather than second person, and in minimizing REH's view while ostensibly sympathizing
with it. He states that he can sympathize and has no quarrel with a person's
romantic feeling of identity with barbarism, and his half-serious wish to
escape reality into a fantasy world of his own imagining. Rather, HPL states
that his quarrel lies with REH's "underlying assumption . . . that the
barbaric state is intrinsically superior—in a serious sense—to civilisation .
. ." (564). He portrays REH's "tacit position" as that
"barbarism actually satisfied more of the normal human personality than
civilisation does" (565). This seems like an odd claim. If REH had seemed
to suggest at some point that barbarism was better for the normal human person
than civilization, he more than cleared up that misconception in his last
letter.

HPL states that barbarism is a normal, but early
and temporary stage of social development. A race of people, he says, develops
like a man. Accordingly, barbarism is akin to boyhood, characterized by
"cruelty, callousness, thoughtlessness, ignorance, and general emotional underdevelopment"
(565). As it matured, the "species" outgrew barbarism. There are
still "backward" races that can be satisfied with barbarism, but at
least for the Aryan, barbarism is obsolete.

Stone Age Hunter Gatherers

Surely HPL is right that barbarism represents a temporary, early
stage of social development, but the force of this point is diminished by
several factors. First, REH had stated in an earlier letter that change is a
law of nature, and that no state of affairs, including anarchy, can endure
indefinitely (500). Again, HPL's argument is against a "straw man" of
his own making. Furthermore, HPL's ideal civilization, if it ever existed, is
hardly the reality from which REH would like to escape; when the two think of
"civilization," they are clearly thinking of two separate things.
Finally, HPL's view is dependent on the concept of "race" as a
definite category. (A concept which is now obviously erroneous.) When he states
that "the species outgrew barbarism," it appears he means
collectively or universally. However, he reveals otherwise when he says some
"races" are yet suited to barbarism. It appears he believes that
certain "races" (which attain civilization) set the high-water mark
for the species' development, which is not necessarily attained (nor even
possible) for all members of the species (including lesser "races").

Next, HPL undermines REH's fantasy to be born as a
barbarian. In essence, HPL argues that this fantasy is incoherent:
"[D]on't you realize that without that part of your personality—your
imagination, perspective, etc.—you could not be yourself at all?"
(565-6). He presses further, supposing what REH meant to say, and then
refutes that, as well. HPL is not wrong; REH's wish to be reborn as a barbarian
was an escapist fantasy from the beginning, and it became even more fantastic
when he proposed becoming a different person. But this is the nature of
fantasies, and HPL's insistence on taking away any ground for REH's fantasy,
and arguing about it's probability seems unduly argumentative. He concludes
this argument by suggesting that if REH would only think about the matter more
seriously he would find that he doesn't really wish to revert to a barbaric
"‘paradise' of slashing and mangling and plundering" (566).

When HPL addresses the accusation that he idealizes
civilization, his response basically amounts to, I don't idealize; you do! He
points out that he has admitted defects in civilization. Certainly he has, but
very minor ones which affect a very small number of people. He then refutes
REH's criticisms of civilization, if naively. Social injustices only affect a
small proportion of people, whereas "barbarism's cruelty affected
virtually everyone" (566). And besides, civilization should not be
faulted for its injustices because it is doing its best to abolish them (567).
Abuses of power by police happen, but they affect only a microscopic segment of
the population, consisting mostly of "emphatically degraded types"
(567). He asserts that most normal people in Anglo-Saxon society don't
experience such troubles. Instead, all the cases of extreme cruelty mentioned
by REH happen in parts of the country "which are least evolved out of
the recrudescent barbarism of the frontier" (567). In any case, again,
these abuses amount to nothing against the cruelty of barbarism. And
lastly, modern wars are merely reversions to barbarism, not an attribute of
civilization, occurring "not because of civilization but in spite of
it" (567, emphasis mine). HPL misses REH's point, here. REH had not
suggested that war (or any of the other faults he listed) is an attribute of
civilization, but its continued existence mitigates the relative value of
civilization.

Turning to REH's question of where barbarism ends and
civilization begins, HPL acknowledges imprecision; the process is gradual, and
impossible to classify except by recognizing various tendencies. He does not
seem to recognize how the subjectivity of the task of classifying civilization
actually strengthens REH's argument. REH had offered numerous examples of
historical "barbarous" societies that rivaled civilization. His
suggestion was that distinguishing barbarism from civilization is problematic.
However, HPL seems obtuse to this point. He dismisses REH's historical
examples, and praises these barbarous societies for being on the verge of
becoming civilized. By acknowledging the subjectivity of classifying
civilizations, he still has not recognized the bias in his own understanding of
it.

"Civilization Versus Barbarism” by Bill Bonner

When HPL does attempt to define civilization, he lists
several characteristics: permanent residence, the development of industries to
support settlement, efficient social organization (in order to reduce waste and
encroachment), elevated standards of knowledge and beauty, and a tendency to
encourage personal development (569). This is the most concrete definition of
civilization either party has offered up to this point. Arguably the last two
items represent aims of one segment of society, but if the debate had started
here it might have gone in a more constructive direction. When he turns to
define barbarism, however, HPL is less succinct. He seems to have more of an
impression than a clear definition. As a "mode of life" barbarism
generally makes people more mindless and dull than civilized people. They are
characterized by "orgiastic animal reactions" and "callousness
toward the mutilation of living things" (569). They lack delicacy,
sensitivity, and sympathetic imagination. In barbarism, "[t]he worst and
most beastlike sides of man were overdeveloped, and the best and most human
sides were underdeveloped" (569). Again, HPL seems to be simply
contrasting a barbarian with his own concept of a refined, civilized
intellectual, rather than offering any objective characteristics.

While refuting REH's equivalence between barbarism and
civilization, HPL charges him with "undervaluing the human side of
life" (569). The charge is based on a remark REH had made about the
meaninglessness of art. HPL says that REH's prejudice "against the highest
expression of the human personality" interferes with his ability to form a
correct perspective on society (570). He suggests that REH encourages a form of
social organization which fails to bring about the best in man, calling this
position "destructive and anti-human" (571). A better policy, he
says, is to encourage the development of those powers which distinguish humans
most from animals.

Picking up on REH's honorable preference for directness over
deception, HPL presents a new argument. Barbarism should not be preferred based
on a false moral antithesis with civilization. A person might view barbarism as
being characterized by directness, as opposed to the seeming trickery and
deception common in civilization (572). But the real antithesis is not between
barbarism and civilization, says HPL, but between those who are direct, and
those who are tricky. He asserts (without argument or evidence) that there are just
as many straightforward men in civilization as in barbarism. Those who are
direct have the ethical sensitivity to recognize the rights of others, while
those who don't have this quality are motivated by anti-social selfishness,
and use whatever means are best suited to them. The civilized offender resorts
to trickery, while the barbarian resorts to brute force. If barbarism appears to be more direct, it is because its anti-social offenders don't know how to
use stratagem, and so resort to slashing. (This seems to be a clear instance of
special pleading. He suggests that the directness of a civilized man is based
on ethical sensitivity, but the directness of a barbarian is based on
stupidity.) Nevertheless, there is a seed of a good point here. Barbarism is
surely not as honest and straightforward as a romantic might believe. An
ancient war chief would certainly use any advantage, even deception, over a
rival cohort. It remains to be seen whether REH's romanticized view of
barbarians will allow him to recognize it.

The rest of HPL's coverage of the topic consists mostly in
clarifying his positions and assuring REH of his respect, though it comes off
as patronizing. Even as he attempts to express his regard for REH's scholarship
and imagination, he suggests that if REH would think more carefully he could
abandon his sentimental biases and finally agree with him (HPL). Accordingly,
HPL ends his argument by defending his association of REH with romanticist
anthropologist Lord Monboddo, concluding "You err in damned good
company!" (575).