Tuesday, 29 January 2013

Even
in the visually spectacular field of missile testing, the sight of a
submarine-launched missile breaking through the surface is a breathtaking one.
On Sunday, Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) scientists cheered excitedly as
their indigenous, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) leapt out of the
water, its rocket motor fired soon after clearing the surface, and it soared off
in a while plume to accurately strike a target 700 kilometres away.

To
nobody’s surprise, the underwater launch went exactly according to plan. This
missile, called in turn the K-15, the Shaurya, and now the B-05, had already
been launched 10 times from under water and thrice from land. This exacting
test schedule is designed for assurance, since this is a missile that cannot
afford to fail. Until a better one is developed, this will be the backbone of
India’s underwater nuclear deterrence.

That
means that it will arm the INS Arihant, India’s first and only nuclear-armed
ballistic missile submarine, or SSBN. Tipped with nuclear warheads, the K-15
will be launched from the Arihant only after a nuclear attack on India. New
Delhi’s “no-first-use” nuclear policy prohibits the pre-emptive use of nuclear
weapons.

That
means that India’s land-based and air-based nuclear weaponry, such as the
Agni-series of missiles, might already have been destroyed by a pre-emptive
enemy nuclear attack. The Arihant, and the B-05 missiles that it carries, are
far more difficult to tackle, since they lurk underwater in complete secrecy.
The underwater leg of the nuclear triad (land-launched, air-launched and submarine-launched
weapons) has always been regarded as the most survivable. It is the ultimate
currency of a nuclear exchange.

Going
by what the DRDO said about its own test, the B-05 is well up to the task. “The
Missile, developed by DRDO, was launched from a pontoon and was tested for the
full range. It met all the mission objectives. The parameters of the
vehicle were monitored by radar all through the trajectory and terminal events took
place exactly as envisaged,” said an MoD release on Sunday.

The
B-05 (or K-15, or Shaurya) is no ordinary ballistic missile. Top DRDO
scientists briefed Business Standard that it is not a ballistic missile at all.
It could better be characterised as a hypersonic cruise missile, since it
remains within the earth’s atmosphere.

A
ballistic missile suffers from inherent disadvantages, since it is a relatively
crude device, akin to a stone that is lobbed upwards, propelled by a rocket. After
the rocket burns out, gravity comes into play, pulling the missile warhead down
towards the target. Buffeted by wind and re-entry forces, accuracy is a
problem; and, since the ballistic missile’s path is entirely predictable,
shooting it down is relatively easy.

The
Shaurya has overcome most of these issues. Its solid-fuel, two-stage rocket
accelerates the missile to six times the speed of sound before it reaches an
altitude of 40 kilometers (125,000 feet), after which it levels out and cruises
towards the target, powered by its onboard fuel. In contrast to conventional ballistic
missiles that cannot correct their course midway, the Shaurya is an intelligent
missile. Onboard navigation computers kick in near the target, guiding the
missile to the target and eliminating errors that inevitably creep in during
its turbulent journey.

“I
would say the Shaurya is a hybrid propulsion missile”, says Dr VK Saraswat, the
DRDO chief, talking to Business Standard in 2010. “Like a ballistic missile, it
is powered by solid fuel. And, like a cruise missile, it can guide itself right
up to the target.”

Making
the B-05 even more survivable is its ability to manoeuvre, following a twisting
path to the target that makes it very difficult to shoot it down. In contrast,
a ballistic missile is predictable; its trajectory gives away its target and
its path to it.

The
problem with the B-05 (or K-15, or Shaurya) remains its relatively short range
of just 750 kilometres. While it could reach major cities in most countries if
it were launched from just off the coast, that would necessitate a perilous submarine
journey to the vicinity of the coastline. Therefore, the DRDO is also
developing a longer-range missile, dubbed the K-4, which will have a range of
almost 4000 kilometers. An Indian SSBN that is armed with the K-4 missile would
be able to strike most likely targets from a safe patrol location in the Bay of
Bengal.

Saturday, 26 January 2013

This year’s Republic Day parade in New Delhi, a traditional showcase for India’s defence arsenal, featured an unusually large number of brand new military systems. At the very start four brand new Mi-17V5 helicopters flew past carrying the national flag, and these were followed by several other systems that were making their debut before the public.

This is noteworthy, given the flak that the defence ministry (MoD) has taken for endemic delays in procuring equipment for modernising the ageing military. But now, after years of restructuring its procurement institutions and regulations, the MoD appears to be delivering much-needed weaponry to the three services.

The most eye-popping new system on display today was the Agni-5 ballistic missile, which can carry a thermo-nuclear warhead to a target 5000 kilometres away. The giant 17.5-metre long, 50-tonne, three-stage missile rolled down Rajpath (New Delhi’s presidential avenue) on a special launcher vehicle built by a private Indian company. The Agni-5, built by the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) was successfully tested last April. After 2-3 more successful tests it will join the Strategic Forces Command.

The DRDO’s success in missile development was reflected in the awards won by three top DRDO scientists. Dr VK Saraswat, the DRDO chief and Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri, a key member of India’s missile development programmes for decades, was awarded the Padma Bhushan. So too was Dr Sivathanu Pillai, who oversees the Brahmos cruise missile programme, while Dr Avinash Chander, the DRDO’s chief controller of missile development, was awarded the Padma Shri.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) was relieved to display, even though it was a scaled-down model, the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II basic trainer aircraft that was recently procured from Swiss manufacturer, Pilatus, for Rs 1,800 crore. With the IAF’s basic trainer fleet of HPT-32 Deepak aircraft grounded after the deaths of 19 pilots in 17 crashes, this basic trainer aircraft will fill a crucial gap.

Also showcased on the IAF tableau was the C-17 Globemaster III, the purchase of which signaled that New Delhi was willing to pay big money for world-class systems. The IAF is paying Rs 22,800 crore for ten C-17s, making it the largest operator of this transport aircraft outside the US. Boeing will deliver the first five C-17s this year, with the next five coming in 2014. India is expected to place a follow-on order for this aircraft, which it needs for quickly reinforcing threatened sectors along the remote, Himalayan, northern border. The C-17 can deliver 74 tonnes of stores to a one-kilometre-long unpaved runway 4,500 kilometres away.

Another expensive, new aircraft featured on the IAF tableau was the AW-101 AgustaWestland helicopter. The MoD has bought twelve of these helicopters for Rs 3,550 crore for VVIP transportation. Delivery has begun, even as the Italian company is investigated in its home country after allegations of bribes paid to facilitate this and other contracts.

Another new IAF display was the Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, which the DRDO is developing. These indigenous airborne radars, which are mounted on Embraer executive jets, will greatly enhance the IAF’s ability to monitor Indian airspace and control the aerial battle. The AEW&C will operate at one-eighth the cost of the Phalcon Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) that the IAF currently uses.

Besides the IAF, the Indian Navy showcased the warships it is inducting. Most prominent amongst these was the nuclear-propelled attack submarine, INS Chakra, which was displayed on the navy’s tableau. The 12,000-tonne Chakra, which India has leased from Russia for ten years for about Rs 4,800 crore, joined the eastern naval fleet in April. With virtually unlimited operating endurance, the Chakra greatly strengthens the navy’s ability to choke off enemy shipping at Indian Ocean choke points like the Strait of Malacca.

Also displayed on the naval tableau, but not yet delivered, was the aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, formerly the Admiral Gorshkov in the Russian Navy. This jinxed vessel was bought in 2004 for Rs 5,000 crore and was to be delivered in 2008. By last year, the price was up to Rs 12,500 crore. Close to delivery, the vessel’s engine boilers failed during its final sea trials last September, leading to a delay of about a year. Now the MoD says the Vikramaditya “will join the naval fleet by the end of this year.”

Meanwhile, Russia has begun delivering to the navy the 19 MiG-29K/KUB fighters that will fly from the Vikramaditya. A follow-on order for 26 more Mig-29K/KUB has been placed on Russia.

Next year’s Republic Day parade could feature two more crucial aircraft. Firstly, the navy’s P8I Multi-Role Maritime Aircraft (MMA) that will enhance “maritime domain awareness” over India’s 2.54 million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The second could be the Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft, the purchase of which is currently being negotiated with Dassault of France. It is expected that negotiations will be concluded by mid-2013. While the first Rafale, which Dassault would deliver in flyaway condition, can only be expected by 2015, the IAF tableau would certainly feature the Rafale if the contract is signed this year.

The army’s presence, as always, mainly took the form of marching infantry contingents, a colourful and impressive sight. Given the army’s relatively sluggish procurement machinery, it had little to display by way of new equipment. There are plans for upgrading the soldier’s personal equipment, weaponry and clothing, but for now the Indian Army remains predominantly a light infantry force that consists mainly of lightly equipped foot soldiers that can operate across thousands of miles of high-altitude mountain border.

Tuesday, 22 January 2013

During my travels in Pakistan last week, I
could hardly miss the stark difference between Indian and Pakistani reactions
to the killing and mutilation of two Indian soldiers on the Line of Control
(LoC) in J&K. Oblivious to Indian jingoism, the Pakistani press covered,
minute-by-minute, the Anna Hazare style reality show that was Canada-based
cleric Tahir ul-Qadri’s challenge to that country’s political establishment.

This is a metaphor for a changing Indo-Pak
dynamic. For decades, India looked inward while Islamabad tom-tommed the
looming India threat. Today as Pakistan, while lurching toward a form of
democracy focuses mainly on its burgeoning internal challenges, India
increasingly obsesses about the terrorist threat from across the border. This
even as the tide of Pakistan-fomented violence recedes and Indian police and
intelligence officials shift focus to disaffection within the country.

But the fortuitous outcome of Pakistan’s
single-minded focus on Tahir ul-Qadri’s so-called Long March was that New
Delhi’s tough response to brutality on the LoC went almost unnoticed in
Pakistan, allowing Islamabad (which has little appetite for roiling the waters)
to settle for a pro-forma response. This avoided an acid exchange of
tit-for-tat statements that would have united Pakistan’s divided anti-India
constituency.

But that was luck, not design. New Delhi,
which views Pakistan in the context of an outdated and intellectually lazy
narrative of implacable hostility, needs a clearer understanding of a rapidly
changing Pakistani playfield. The most important transformation relates to
Pakistan’s most powerful organisation, the army; and the evolving relationship
between Pakistan’s five key institutions, viz the army, the polity, the
judiciary, civil society and the media.

While the India threat remains a convenient
drum for the Pakistan Army to beat, especially when New Delhi issues hawkish
statements, General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi is increasingly focused on
the tribal areas of the north-western frontier, now called Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
province. As Pakistani generals admit, their ill-conceived juggling act ---
which involved fighting the radically anti-establishment Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(the “bad Taliban”), while backing the Afghanistan-focused Haqqani Network (the
“good Taliban”) --- has become unsustainable because of close linkages amongst jihadis. Tanzeems in the tribal area now coordinate closely with groups
like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Lashkar-e-Toiba that are embedded within the
Punjab heartland.

With the tribal areas already aflame, the
generals worry that Taliban success in Afghanistan would inevitably blow back
into Pakistan, first into the tribal areas and from there into the heartland.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a perceptive observer
of the Pakistan Army, explains, “The army fears that Afghan Taliban success
would embolden the Pakistani Taliban. Through their links with extremist groups
in Punjab, this would raise terrorism, radicalization and extremism across
Pakistan. Taliban success would also galvanize the Deobandi and Wahabi
madrassas that do not today support the Taliban actively, like they did in the
1990s. The army believes that this would make the internal security situation
in Pakistan unmanageable.”

This apprehension provides a crucial window
for an Indo-Pakistan dialogue on Afghanistan. While both sides regard
Afghanistan as a zero-sum game that has no winners, this gloomy outlook on a
post-2014 Afghanistan could be brightened through a political initiative,
preferably through back channels, to address both sides’ concerns. An agreement
between New Delhi and Islamabad could backstop a mutually beneficial
stabilization of Afghanistan.

Top generals who have retired from the
Pakistan Army say it would be willing to support such a dialogue. Asked why GHQ
did not signal its changed attitude, these officers retort that the Pakistani
Army’s changing attitude towards India will never be reflected through public
pronouncements, so New Delhi should not hold its breathe waiting for those.
Instead India should scrutinise Islamabad’s recent public positions, which are
broadly cleared by Rawalpindi.

The Pakistan army’s current low-key posture
does not mean that it has ceased to be the country’s most powerful institution.
But while it continues to exercise political influence, its methods are getting
subtler because of the rise of balancing forces. These include an activist
judiciary and a media that has given voice to a previously disempowered civil
society. These alternative power centres make it difficult for the army to
envision single-handedly managing Pakistan.

Also deterring the Pakistani military from
assuming more visible power is its understanding that the Pakistani economy is
in trouble. GHQ possesses significant economic expertise, not only from
managing its own considerable commercial empire but also because the generals
study international thinking on Pakistan and interact reguarly with foreign
experts. Currently, the economic mess can be blamed on the politicians; but not
if the army assumed power.

And so the generals watched as Tahir
ul-Qadri held the government to ransom, occupying an Islamabad square with
50,000 followers (he had promised four million). The fiery chief of the Tehrik
Minhaj-ul-Quran had hoped to paralyse the capital, forcing the army to move in.
But this hope was belied and the polity joined hands, forcing him to climb down
and sign an agreement that had been offered to him a week earlier. This was a
triumph for democracy, even though the politicians who sealed the deal were
hardly men of spotless reputation. In earlier times, many of them would have
asked the Pakistan Army to intervene.

Interestingly, even as Pakistan’s military
dims its public profile, New Delhi has taken to citing the Indian Army as the
basis for its policy positions. In choosing not to sign a Siachen Agreement
(wisely, but that is another debate!), New Delhi holds up the army’s objections
as a fig leaf. In hardening its condemnation of Pakistan after initially
soft-pedalling the recent LoC incident, the government took its cue from the
army. A disempowered Indian military probably basks in this show of concern,
but it would do well to remember that in the aspects that really matter ---
e.g. long-term strategic planning; equipment modernisation; and soldiers’
welfare --- the military remains out in the cold.

Monday, 21 January 2013

INS Saryu, the lead vessel of the indigenous Naval Offshore Patrol Vessel (NOPV) project, was inducted into the navy today. It was designed and built by Goa Shipyard Limited.

INS Saryu will help to meet the Indian Navy's growing requirements for ocean surveillance and patrolling. Its primary role will include EEZ surveillance, anti-piracy patrols, fleet support operations, maritime security to offshore assets and escort operations for high value assets.

Capable of carrying a helicopter (ALH) onboard, the ship’s weapon and sensor outfit includes a 76.2 mm super rapid gun mount with an electro-optic fire control system, two 30mm guns as close in weapon systems, new-generation navigational and early warning radars, chaff launchers for self protection and an integrated ESM system. The vessel is also equipped with two rigid inflatable fast motor boats.

INS Saryu is propelled by two SEMT diesel engines which are the largest engines of its type to be inducted in the Indian Navy, permitting speeds in excess of 25 knots. The ship's propulsion and power management is controlled through a Remote Control System which incorporates an Automatic Power Management System. An integrated LAN system onboard along with a CCTV management system ensures optimal utilization of onboard equipment and better crew efficiency.

Friday, 18 January 2013

Sharply contradicting the army’s claim that
Pakistan-based militancy remains active, and that cease-fire violations and
infiltration take place as frequently as ever, the J&K government’s count
of violence in Kashmir indicates that militancy has dramatically declined.

Government of J&K figures obtained by
Business Standard for the last three years, i.e. 2010-2011, conclusively show
that, on every important count, militancy has declined each year to half that
of the previous year.

In 2010, the number of security force
soldiers killed was 69; in 2011 that declined to 33; in 2012, it was 15. The
number of civilians killed in 2010 was 164; in 2011, it was 40; and last year
it was down to 24. The numbers of militants killed during those three years
were 232, 100 and 72 respectively.

These figures are compiled by J&K
government agencies on the basis of police records of each incident, which are
by and large reliable. This declining trend is also corroborated by respected
independent agencies like the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). According to
SATP records, there were a total of 375 fatalities (security forces, militants
and civilians) in 2010; this went down to 183 fatalities in 2011; and to 117
dead in 2012.

[The SATP compiles its figures from media
reports, while the J&K government compiles its figures from police station
records.]

In contrast to this declining trend of
violence, the army’s figures suggest a noticeable increase in militant activity
on the Line of Control (LoC) over these three years, especially last year.

The Army Liaison Cell (ALC), which handles
media relations for the army, tells Business Standard that there were 57
ceasefire violations in 2010; 61 in 2011; and 117 in 2012. This year, there
have already been 14 violations. In 2010, 90 militants infiltrated into J&K
across the LoC; this number declined to 55 in 2011; but then increased
dramatically to 120 last year.

Ajai Sahni, a respected expert on militancy
and terrorism from the Institute for Conflict Management, is deeply sceptical
about the army’s regular claims that militant infiltration is on the rise.

“The army’s infiltration figures are simply
not credible. One set of figures contradict another and, most noticeably, they
are in sharp variance with the overall trend of declining violence. When
militant infiltration increases, so too should killings, arrests and violent
incidents. Militants don’t infiltrate for fun,” says Sahni.

The army explains the killing of two Indian
soldiers near Poonch on Jan 8, and the mutilation of their bodies including the
beheading of one, as an indicator of increased Pakistani activity on the LoC.

The J&K government figures also point
to reduced militant activity on the LoC. The number of militant-initiated
violent incidents has declined from 368 in 2010; to 195 in 2011; to just 124
last year. These incidents include grenade attacks, explosive devices, random
firing, arms snatching and abduction.

Also pointing to declining militancy in
J&K is the number of militants that surrendered to the government. In 2010,
20 militants laid down their arms and joined the mainstream; another 19 did so
in 2011; while just one militant surrendered last year.

“There are just about 150 militants active
in J&K now. Naturally, surrenders are going to decline,” says a senior
J&K Police officer.

Tuesday, 15 January 2013

Army chief says family of Indian soldier beheaded on the LoC as important to him as the families of the 90 other soldiers who died this last year

By Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 15th Jan 13

Six days after two Indian soldiers were
ambushed and mutilated on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, and just
minutes before a senior Indian commander conveyed a strong protest to his
Pakistani counterpart at a flag meeting near Poonch, in J&K, India’s army
chief, General Bikram Singh ratcheted up the rhetoric, warning Pakistan that
India would retaliate.

“We reserve the right to retaliate at the
time and place of choosing,” said the army chief.

Gen Singh asserted that Indian troops would
respond aggressively whenever provoked, instead of restraining themselves by
the ceasefire, as in the past. “I wish to assure you that I have given very
clear directions in this regard. I have told the Northern Army Commander that
we must maintain and retain moral ascendancy (over Pakistani troops) at all
costs.”

“We shall uphold the ceasefire as long as
the adversary upholds it. But we shall not be passive when we are fired at.
When we are fired at, when we are provoked, we will respond immediately. And
also to heinous acts of this kind which were committed at Mendhar sector on the
8th,” he said.

Terming the killings and mutilation of
Indian soldiers “a gruesome act, a most unpardonable act… that is against the
very ethics of soldiering and professionalism,” General Bikram Singh warned
that the beheading of a soldier’s body would impact on broader Indo-Pakistan
relations.

“Militarily this operation is at the
tactical level but it has got strategic nuances… and our concerns have been
conveyed to the Government of Pakistan by our government,” he said.

Even while recognising the potential for
tactical actions to spiral out of control, unleashing strategic consequences,
Gen Singh paradoxically claimed his LoC commanders would respond as
aggressively as they deemed fit to provocations by Pakistan.

“Operations would be undertaken as per the
plans made at the theatre level. We would not be (vetting) these plans at the
Army HQ, where we operate in the strategic arena… Tactical is left to the corps
commanders, the div commanders.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),
which manages the Indo-Pak dialogue process, is watching the rhetoric
carefully. A senior diplomat, speaking off-the-record to Business Standard,
said that the MEA understood the need to cater to outraged public sentiment,
but was also concerned that the dialogue process could be destabilised.

The dialogue currently centres on issues
that New Delhi holds important, i.e. trade and commerce, transit and travel and
terrorism, with inconvenient subjects like Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek
placed on the back burner. During nine years of relative peace on the LoC (the
ceasefire came into effect on Dec 26, 2003), Pakistan has moved out some 70,000
soldiers for counter terrorist operations in the tribal areas of
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

Even though the last year has seen 117
ceasefire violations, many of them during 62 bids by militants to infiltrate
across the LoC, the army chief termed the LoC as largely peaceful. Most
violations took place in just two sectors: Uri and Poonch.

With firing along the LoC claiming over a
hundred Indian soldiers’ lives each year before the ceasefire, at least a
thousand soldiers’ lives have been notionally saved over nine years of
ceasefire.

While citing the mutilation and beheading
of Indian soldiers as the reason for his outrage, Gen Singh conceded that this
was not the first such instance. He admitted that Pakistani soldiers had
beheaded some soldiers of 20 Kumaon last year, and others from a Rajput
battalion in 2011.

Rejecting media accounts that the Pakistani
raid at Mendhar was in response to an Indian raid on a Pakistani post in Uri on
Jan 6, the army chief alleged that the “pre-mediated and pre-planned” Pakistani
attack was previously orchestrated, since it came within 50 hours after the
alleged Indian raid in Uri.

“Such operations require time for planning…
it requires reconnaissance. In other words, their (Pakistan’s) troops were
poised for this operation. Therefore this entire information campaign, which
was launched by them, which is based on lies, has to be understood in the
correct perspective,” says General Singh.

When asked what might have motivated the
Pakistan Army to launch such an operation, Gen Singh said that the army was
still analysing the matter, but it could be because Pakistan wants the LoC to
become active again; or to boost their status within Pakistan.

Monday, 14 January 2013

Since the Jan 8 killing of two Indian
soldiers and the mutilation of their bodies in a Pakistani attack on the Line
of Control (LoC) in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), the government has faced a
growing clamour from hard-line nationalist sections of the media --- especially
electronic media --- for “action” to be taken against Pakistan.

After a relatively restrained response in
the immediate aftermath of the killings, the government --- apparently due to
relentless media pressure --- shifted to a harder line against Pakistan. On Jan
8, first reports from the army’s Northern Command of the deaths of two Indian
soldiers in a “ceasefire violation” in the Mendhar sector, had mentioned that
the bodies had been mutilated. Although the press release made no mention of
beheading, senior army officers quickly leaked the shocking news that one
soldier had been beheaded and the head taken away. Only four days later, on Jan
12, was this news corroborated by a MoD spokesperson.

But on the evening of the incident (Jan 8),
with a crop of retired generals baying on television for the army to be
“unleashed” against Pakistan, Foreign Minister Salman Khursheed appeared on
television, conveying serious concern but also restraint. The next morning,
Pakistani High Commissioner Salman Bashir was summoned to the foreign ministry
and conveyed India’s concern. Statements from Pakistan, including one by
Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, also sought to put a lid on the incident.

From New Delhi’s perspective this was
unsurprising, given the government’s wish to prevent this incident, howsoever
brutal, from derailing a ceasefire that had held for almost a decade, saving
countless lives. MEA sources emphasise that the Indo-Pak dialogue should not be
disturbed, since it is going India’s way. Discussions focus on the issues
important to India (commercial ties, liberalisation of visa regime, terrorism,
and people-to-people contacts); while there is lesser emphasis on the issues
that New Delhi wanted to avoid (Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek).

Nor is the MoD keen to disturb the
ceasefire; the Pakistan Army has shifted some 70,000 soldiers from the LoC to
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, for counter terrorist operations in the tribal
areas. If India turned on the heat seriously, an insecure Pakistan Army could
move troops back to the LoC. Indian intelligence agencies also worry that an
aggressive Indian response could cause the Pakistan Army to mend fences quickly
with the jehadi groups they are currently fighting.

But this logic has been ignored by large
sections of the Indian media, which covered the incident in gory detail on the
morning of Jan 9, even as there was deafening silence from the Pakistani press.
After a full day of Pakistan-bashing on television, Jan 10 saw two Indian
newspapers --- The Hindu; and Daily News and Analysis (DNA) --- prominently
headline the news that the Pakistani attack in Mendhar was in response to an
Indian attack in Uri the preceding Sunday, in which one Pakistani soldier was
killed and another grievously injured in an attack on a Pakistani post. The
article also stated that earlier Indian attacks on Pakistani posts on the LoC
had been accompanied by the beheading of Pakistani soldiers.

For many Indians, this revelation somewhat
changed the complexion of the debate. From a dastardly sneak attack that
involved the barbaric chopping off of Indian heads, the Pakistani action was
now retaliation; and its barbarity viewed in the context of a wider barbarism
on the LoC. But large sections of the media simply ignored the report,
maintaining a relentless drumbeat for action against Pakistan.

Like many Pakistani television guests, the
Pakistan Army’s former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Tariq
Majid, emphatically reject allegations that Pakistani soldiers could have
deliberately taken an Indian head. He argues that explosions during combat
sometimes mutilate soldiers’ bodied.

“The perception in our official circles is
that this (Indian allegation) is yet another manifestation of the
blow-hot-blow-cold policy being pursued to keep Pakistan under pressure,” says
General Majid.

Currently, even as the firing gradually
abates on the LoC (on Jan 10, a second Pakistani soldier was killed in alleged
firing by India), the government struggles to placate the nationalist media on
the one hand; and keep the Indo-Pak peace process afloat on the other. This is
proving difficult; the latest remark that the Indian media has seized upon is
the statement on Saturday by IAF boss, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, that if “these
violations continue to take place, then perhaps we may have to look at some
other options for compliance.”

With the TV channels flashing this
“Breaking News”, MoD spokespersons began calling in to clarify that the options
that Browne referred to included “political and diplomatic options as well.”

The foreign minister has now gone on record
to cool tempers, placing the issue in a larger context. In an interview on
Saturday he said, “There's a much larger situation... the situation demands
very responsible and sensible and moderate behaviour. We're not going to be
pressurised by wild calls for revenge and reaction. We will do what is in the
best interest of the country and peace, keeping in mind that there is a lot at
stake.”

Tuesday, 8 January 2013

Thanks to the defence ministry’s (MoD’s)
outdated belief that it must fill the order book of Bharat Electronics Ltd
(BEL), India’s military remains handicapped in night fighting against all its
likely adversaries. Even jehadis infiltrating
across the Line of Control into J&K have been found to have better night
vision devices (NVDs) than the lavishly funded Indian Army that is tasked to
intercept them. Worryingly, this disadvantage could continue. The reason: the
MoD is set to tailor its future requirements of NVDs to what BEL can supply,
rather than to what the army badly needs.

In a proposed MoD tender for 45,000 NVDs,
an initial buy that would expand into contracts worth thousands of crore
rupees, BEL is asking MoD officials to water down the specifications of the
“third generation” NVDs that the army badly wants. While the army wants NVDs
with a “Figure of Merit” (or FOM) rating of 1700 plus, BEL wants the
specifications set at FOM 1400 plus. That is because BEL does not have the
ability to deliver FOM 1700 plus NVDs in the quantities that the army wants.

Peering through an NVD with FOM 1400 plus,
a soldier can see clearly at dusk or dawn, and enjoy acceptable vision with a
quarter moon or brighter. FOM 1600 plus permits clear vision even in starlight,
i.e. on a clear night with no moon. But the army wants FOM 1700 plus, which
would allow soldiers to see clearly in pitch darkness, like on heavily clouded,
moonless nights, or at night in a thick jungle. This, the army rightly points
out, are the conditions that it often operates in.

In response to this demand, two Indian
companies --- BEL and Tata Power’s Strategic Electronics Division (Tata Power
SED) --- both confirmed to the MoD’s Services Capital Acquisition Plan
Categorisation Committee (SCAPCC) that they could supply the army with NVDs
with a rating of FOM 1700 plus. On BEL’s part that was apparently a bluff
because now, with procurement being finalised, MoD officials are getting quiet
requests from BEL to dilute the specifications so that it can remain in the
race.

BEL’s apparent inability to supply NVDs
with FOM 1700 plus comes despite the MoD having twice splashed taxpayer money
on foreign night vision technology for the Bangalore-headquartered defence
public sector undertaking (DPSU). In the 1990s, Dutch company Delft provided
“second generation” technology, setting up a joint venture with BEL before
walking out of the JV. As recently as 2010-11, the MoD handed more than Rs 100
crore to French company, Photonis, to give BEL “supergen” technology rated at
FOM 1250 plus. Once again BEL failed to absorb this technology; it did not
enhance its own technological capabilities in night vision; and it did not
evolve the received technology into more advanced versions.

Today the MoD no longer has the option of
spending more public money on a newer generation of technology for BEL. That is
because state-of-the-art night vision technology is closely guarded. The United
States government, which controls the world’s most advanced night vision
technology that is developed by world leading companies like ITT and L-3,
seldom allows the export of night vision technology better than FOM 1250 plus.
Where Washington does permit export, e.g. for night vision goggles for Pakistan
Army units that are fighting Taliban groups in the tribal areas along the
Afghanistan border, there is strict End User Monitoring (EUM), in which US
military officials physically inspect the equipment to ascertain that it has
not been supplied onwards to some undesirable party. For a prickly New Delhi,
EUM would be completely unacceptable.

Even BEL’s earlier supplier, Photonis,
would now probably be unable to supply BEL with advanced night vision
technology, since American companies are making a strong play for buying the
French company, thereby making it subject to US export control laws. Reuters
has reported that Photonis is on sale and US banker, Rothschild, which has
enduring links with American defence companies, is advising on the sale.

Given BEL’s increasingly constrained
situation, the army brass has strongly backed Tata Power SED for supplying the
army with its next generation of night vision equipment. Senior generals who
handle procurement say they are pleased at the way the Tata company has
partnered with German company, Harder Digital, which will transfer technology
to Tata Power SED for manufacturing and maintaining “third generation” FOM 1700
plus night vision equipment in India. The German government --- which has
thrown off traditional restraints in emerging as a strong defence technology
partner for India --- has already permitted Tata Power SED to import into India
NVDs with a specification of FOM 1700 plus. Making the arrangement even more
attractive, Berlin is not demanding End User Monitoring. The German authorities
have indicated they would be content with an End User Certificate from New
Delhi, certifying that the Indian military would not supply the NVDs onwards.

Tata Power SED has written to the MoD,
detailing its readiness to supply the army with NVDs of the latest generation.
Given that public tenders issued recently by Pakistan, and even Bangladesh,
indicate that these countries are procuring “third generation” NVDs, it is
difficult for South Block to dilute the specifications to cater for BEL’s lack
of capability. For decades, while the MoD’s wayward child has fronted the
import of foreign technology and sub-systems, passing them off as “indigenous”,
the defence ministry (MoD) has continued to feed the DPSU with orders, ensuring
healthy profit at the cost of defence readiness and self-reliance. But a
changing MoD and a more assertive army may be unwilling to allow that any
longer.

Saturday, 5 January 2013

The defence ministry (MoD) will no longer
ask French aircraft engine builder Snecma to help in resurrecting the
indigenous Kaveri jet engine, which has reached a dead end in development.

Instead major global aero engine
manufacturers will compete in a global tender to partner the Gas Turbine
Research Establishment (GTRE) --- the Bangalore-based DRDO engine laboratory
--- in refining the Kaveri engine to the level where it can power the Advanced
Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), an indigenous, fifth-generation fighter that is
on the MoD’s long-term horizon.

“We are abandoning the plan for
co-development with Snecma. We still need an overseas partner. But it will not
be Snecma on a single-vendor basis. We will select our partner through
competitive bidding,” says Dr CP Ramnarayanan, Director, GTRE.

Business Standard, on a visit to GTRE in
Bangalore, was briefed that the Kaveri still delivered significantly less power
than what a modern fighter requires. In flight-testing last year at the Gromov
Flight Research Institute (GFRI) in Russia, the Kaveri’s maximum thrust (termed
“wet thrust") was measured at 70.4 KiloNewtons (KN). High-performance
fighters like the Tejas or the AMCA need engines that generate at least 90 KN
of thrust.

“To develop a more powerful Kaveri engine
quickly and to become self-reliant in engine design, we need a foreign partner
who can bring in core technologies. Otherwise the next cycle of engine
development could take another 15-20 years,” admits Ramnarayan frankly.

Developing a jet engine for a
high-performance fighter is technologically more demanding than any other
aircraft system. Only a handful of countries have been able to develop aircraft
engines; China, like India, has not yet achieved success. The DRDO is
struggling in developing the Nickel and Cobalt superalloys for the Kaveri’s
turbine, where temperatures of 1,600 degrees Centigrade warp normal metals.

Shaping the alloys into engine parts is an
equal challenge. GTRE has learned how to make “directionally solidified”
turbine blades; but it has not mastered the making of “single-crystal blades”,
which are now standard.

The process for selecting a partner that
has these technologies is under way. A DRDO committee is identifying
specifications for the engine. Based on these, a Request for Proposals (RfP)
will be issued to engine makers.

Meanwhile, as already reported by Business
Standard (“Kaveri engine to fly futuristic unmanned aircraft”, Dec 26, 2012)
GTRE is developing a spin-off Kaveri engine that will propel India’s first
unmanned bomber, termed the Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (USAV). The Kaveri’s
current “dry thrust” of 50 KN will suffice for the USAV.

The refined Kaveri engine that will come
out of the foreign collaboration will be used for the futuristic AMCA, but not
for the Tejas fighters of the Indian Air Force (IAF), which American engines
will power. The first 40 Tejas Mark I are being built with the General Electric
F-404IN engine, while the subsequent Tejas Mark II would have the more powerful
GE F-414 engine.

“We were planning to re-engine first 40
Tejas fighters with the Kaveri. But now they will continue to fly with the
F-404 engine,” says the GTRE director.

The DRDO has moved a paper to the MoD that
strongly backs the Kaveri programme as the foundation of aero engine
development in the country. The DRDO calculates that India’s aerospace
requirements over the coming decade will include jet engines worth Rs 1,60,000
crore.

Major aero-engine development facilities
are being set up in Chitradurga, where a 5,600-acre hub of strategic industry
will house R&D, testing and production units of the DRDO, Department of
Space (DoS) and Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). These will include an
official altitude test facility for aero engines, which US defence major Boeing
is providing as an offset in India’s Rs 22,800 crore ($4.12 billion) purchase
of ten C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft. So far, GTRE has had to do all
its testing in Russia.