Until the New Deal, most groups seeking protection from imports were successful in obtaining relief from Congress. In general the cost of paying the tariffs for consumers was less than the cost of mounting collective action to stop the tariffs. In 1934, with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, all of this changed. The six decades that followed have produced a remarkable liberalization of trade policy in the United States. This occurred despite the fact that domestic politics, according to some of the best developed theories, should have prevented this liberalization.

Michael Gilligan argues that liberalization has succeeded because it has been reciprocal with liberalization in other countries. Our trade barriers have been reduced as an explicit quid pro quo for reduction of trade barriers in other countries. Reciprocity, Gilligan argues, gives exporters the incentive to support free trade policies because it gives them a clear gain from free trade and thus enables the exporters to overcome collective action problems. The lobbying by exporters, balancing the interests of groups seeking protection, changes the preferences of political leaders in favor of more liberalization.

Gilligan tests his theory in a detailed exploration of the history of American trade policy and in a quantitative analysis showing increases in the demand for liberalization as the result of reciprocity in trade legislation from 1890 to the present. This book should appeal to political scientists, economists, and those who want to understand the political underpinnings of American trade policy.

Michael J. Gilligan is Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

Preface

1. Introduction

I. Theory

2. Reciprocal Trade Agreements and the Demand for Liberalization

3. Reciprocity and Congressional Delegation

II. Historical Overview

4. Reciprocity and American Trade Policy, 1890–1994

III. Quantitative Evidence

5. Estimating the Demand for Liberalization and Protection, 1890–1937

6. The Demand for Liberalization and Protection Today

7. Conclusion

Appendixes

A. Derivation of Real Income Effects from Reciprocal and Unilateral Liberalization

B. Comparative Statistics

C. Effects of Two-Thirds Majority and Gatekeeping Power

D. Data Sources

References

Index

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Until the New Deal, most groups seeking protection from imports were successful in obtaining relief from Congress. In general the cost of paying the tariffs for consumers was less than the cost of mounting collective action to stop the tariffs. In 1934, with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, all of this changed. The six decades that followed have produced a remarkable liberalization of trade policy in the United States. This occurred despite the fact that domestic politics, according to some of the best developed theories, should have prevented this liberalization.

Michael Gilligan argues that liberalization has succeeded because it has been reciprocal with liberalization in other countries. Our trade barriers have been reduced as an explicit quid pro quo for reduction of trade barriers in other countries. Reciprocity, Gilligan argues, gives exporters the incentive to support free trade policies because it gives them a clear gain from free trade and thus enables the exporters to overcome collective action problems. The lobbying by exporters, balancing the interests of groups seeking protection, changes the preferences of political leaders in favor of more liberalization.

Gilligan tests his theory in a detailed exploration of the history of American trade policy and in a quantitative analysis showing increases in the demand for liberalization as the result of reciprocity in trade legislation from 1890 to the present. This book should appeal to political scientists, economists, and those who want to understand the political underpinnings of American trade policy.

Michael J. Gilligan is Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

Preface

1. Introduction

I. Theory

2. Reciprocal Trade Agreements and the Demand for Liberalization

3. Reciprocity and Congressional Delegation

II. Historical Overview

4. Reciprocity and American Trade Policy, 1890–1994

III. Quantitative Evidence

5. Estimating the Demand for Liberalization and Protection, 1890–1937

6. The Demand for Liberalization and Protection Today

7. Conclusion

Appendixes

A. Derivation of Real Income Effects from Reciprocal and Unilateral Liberalization

B. Comparative Statistics

C. Effects of Two-Thirds Majority and Gatekeeping Power

D. Data Sources

References

Index

REQUEST ACCESSIBLE FILE

If you are a student who has a disability that prevents you
from using this book in printed form, BiblioVault may be able to supply you
with an electronic file for alternative access.

Please have the disability coordinator at your school fill out this form.