In Russia, President Putin and his government have for the last ten years invested much effort into combining different elements of both the Tsarist and Soviet past into a national history of patriotic pride, bravery, and victory.

This narrative aims to provide a basis for a country that, more than twenty-five-years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, still finds itself in the middle of an unfinished process of nation building. Alas, the governmental version of history is merely eclectic and does not succeed in bridging the huge memory gaps that exist within the post-Soviet Russian society.

Much of Russia’s self-perception and self-confidence as a world power is based on two elements: first, that it is the juridical successor of the USSR and thus the heir of its Soviet imperial ideology; second, that it was victorious in World War II under the leadership of Stalin and thus liberated Europe from Fascism.

Both elements are intertwined and do not only affect Russia’s foreign policy—which sees Soviet successor states like Ukraine, Moldova, and others as part of the Kremlin’s national sphere of interest. They also determine Moscow’s domestic policies by willingly supporting a new Russian patriotism that rehabilitates Stalin as a successful military leader in the current public discourse.

Not surprisingly, in Russian foreign policy, patriotic history based on national exclusiveness and pride has fueled confrontation with neighboring countries such as Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Poland—all of which suffered from the Stalinist dictatorship and Soviet occupation with all its consequences. In Russia, the rehabilitation of Stalin goes hand in hand with minimizing his crucial role as the dictator who killed millions of Russian and Soviet citizens during his reign of almost thirty years.

This part of the narrative is particularly challenging for Russian society, where almost every single family was affected by the Stalinist dictatorship. Memories of family members who became victims of Stalinism are pushed back into the private sphere—a place from where they had only been released in the late eighties and early nineties.

That was when the archives were opened and people started to publicly write and talk about the scars that Stalinism had left in their families and surroundings.

This new atmosphere of silencing contradictory historical narratives about World War II and Stalin, and stigmatizing them as “non-patriotic” and “anti-Russian,” started already around 2008, but gained momentum with the annexation of Crimea.

One of the most telling examples of the Russian government’s increasingly nationalist approach to the history of World War II is the way Moscow deals with the so-called “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”—the 1939 nonaggression pact between Hitler and Stalin, and particularly its secret protocol in which the two dictators separated Eastern Europe into spheres of influence.

Both the pact and its secret protocol have been one of the most controversial historical topics in the Soviet Union and continue to be so in post-Soviet Russia, with its emphasis on its victorious battle against National Socialism in Europe.

When in 2009, the European Parliament announced August 23—the day that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed—as the “European day of remembrance for the victims of Nazism and Stalinism,” there was an immediate protest from Moscow. The Kremlin’s main argument was that a joint commemoration of victims of both dictatorships would belittle the crimes of National Socialism.

In November 2014, little more than half a year after the annexation of Crimea, Putin defended the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in a meeting with Russian academics stating that it was a “payback” for Poland because it incorporated a part of Czechoslovakia when Nazi Germany occupied the country in 1938.

In 2015, during a press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the Russian president again publicly defended the pact as being crucial for the security of the Soviet Union. With these statements, Putin legitimized both the historical and current policies of “spheres of influence” and occupation.

In today’s Russia, stating that Stalin and Hitler joined forces to attack Poland, carve up Eastern Europe, and start World War II in 1939 is illegal. In July 2016, the blogger Vladimir Luzgin was fined 200, 000 Rubles by the Perm District Court for making such a statement.

In September 2016, the Russian Supreme Court upheld the conviction arguing that it contributed to the “rehabilitation of National Socialism.”

A recent representative poll on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, published by the independent Levada Centre in September 2017, provides evidence of both growing support for the official historical narrative and deepening gaps within Russian society itself.

Whereas 40 percent of the respondents stated that they have already heard about the secret protocol of the nonaggression pact and think that it existed, 17 percent said that they had heard about it but think it is false; 33 percent stated that they had never heard about the pact at all. This means that half of the Russian population has either no knowledge of, or doesn’t believe in, the secret protocol as a historical fact. Keeping in mind that the secret protocol was rediscovered and published in Russia in the early nineties and triggered off a broad debate in Russian society and beyond, the new amnesia is even more alarming.

It is obvious that in Russia reinterpreting history in patriotic terms and creating juridical instruments to punish those who claim a more diverse historical narrative that includes both perpetrators and victims, victories and losses, has encouraged an authoritarian and anti-liberal climate in society. Those who are not in line with the official narrative are stigmatized and attacked. This split in Russian society will be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome in the near future.

Gabriele Woidelko is director of the “Russia in Europe” program at the Körber Foundation in Hamburg.

Every year, 08/23, the “European day of remembrance for the victims of Nazism and Stalinism,” should be a day of education for the millennial generation on how the Western civilization got to Nazism and Stalinism.
This transition from Kant, Goethe, Dostoyevsky, Tchaikovsky to swarms of Sturzkampfflugzeuge , Mein Kampf, Great Purges, Katyn, Tukhachevsky and the “victory” of communism in the “napkin treaty” countries is long, complex and involves many dereliction of duty events.
The millennial generation must learn about what has happened by learning the facts, in the intellectual European tradition. They must learn so hopefully they avoid a repeat, only with more powerful weapons and more ruthlessness; unfortunately the augurs are not great, so they may end up storming barbed wire fences on remote shores this time accompanied by drones and robots and guided by satellites.
Reading and learning they might untangle the untangled web of idiocies which led to the guns of August 1914 to May 1945; they might try to understand the crowds pouring in many European capitals elated that they finally the wars of peoples have replaced the wars of kings and they will get to use the newest destructive technology upon each other; this time the notion of civilian would be ignored. They should, so they don’t.
They should read Eric Maria Remarque (no Nobel), learn the way they should never feel and live, not Herta Muller (yes Nobel); they should watch many war movies so they understand how it works.
Most and foremost they should learn so they can ask their politicians why? Their forefathers could have asked: Why was Lenin sent to Russia by the German authorities when they knew that revolt was brewing even in Germany? Why not listen to Keynes at the peace table? Why withdraw from the League of Nations? Why the Great Depression? Why did the global hegemon of the time abandon the League of Nations? Why 1934? Why Guernica? Why Munich 1938, “Peace in our time” when Czechoslovakia would have fought? Why abandon a trusted ally with the only oil fields large enough to power the Wehrmacht? Why not fight, just phoney fighting when Poland was obliterated alone and then carved? Why sign a treaty on a napkin, and if you must, why not fight for Poland to be free? Why not help Hungary 1956? Why, why, why so many whys?
They should ask: Why the Great Recession? Why the international institutions for cooperation are falling apart? Why ERI, no ABM and INF treaties?
Most and foremost: why not peace?

Comment Policy

Comments that include profanity, personal attacks, or other inappropriate material will be removed. Additionally, entries that are unsigned or contain "signatures" by someone other than the actual author will be removed. Finally, steps will be taken to block users who violate any of the posting standards, terms of use, privacy policies, or any other policies governing this site. You are fully responsible for the content that you post.