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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CAIRO 003424
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015
TAGS: PGOVPRELPTERKISLEG
SUBJECT: A SEASON OF UNCERTAINTY IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS
REF: A. CAIRO 3239
¶B. CAIRO 3089
¶C. CAIRO 3086
¶D. CAIRO 2536
¶E. CAIRO 2506
¶F. CAIRO 2433
¶G. CAIRO 1413
¶H. 04 CAIRO 8353
¶I. 04 CAIRO 8146
Classified by A/DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) As Cairo's weather warms up this spring, Egyptian
intellectuals and observers are preoccupied by a growing
sense of anticipation and uncertainty about Egypt's political
future. Contacts are focused on a series of "unprecedented"
recent developments which, in combination, are charging the
country's political atmosphere. These include:
-- President Mubarak's constitutional reform initiative and
the impending "competition" for the nation's highest office;
-- The continuing controversy surrounding opposition figure
Ayman Nour and his impending trial;
-- Mubarak's nine-hour interview aired on prime time
(alternatively interpreted as masterful and historic or
desperate and pathetic);
-- The "revolt" of judges demanding greater autonomy in
supervising ballot stations;
-- Protests by academics at state security's interference in
campus affairs;
-- The reemergence of domestic terrorism after a seven year
hiatus;
-- The continuation of demonstrations by the "Kifaya"
(Enough) movement, an umbrella movement encompassing a broad
spectrum of regime opponents; and
-- An increasingly assertive Muslim Brotherhood, which is
working to recast itself as a force for political reform.
¶2. (C) While the GOE has dealt in the past, individually,
with challenges of comparable magnitude, there is a sense
that the convergence of these factors this spring poses an
unprecedented challenge to the Mubarak regime, with the
potential to change the prevailing political dynamic in ways
that are still unclear. These factors, in accumulation, will
certainly have GOE policy circles working overtime and will
test conjectures on the degree to which Mubarak and his inner
circle have a master plan to shape and drive developments,
rather than just react to them. End summary.
----------------------
Presidency in Flux (?)
----------------------
¶3. (C) President Mubarak, by his own confession a man of
cautious and conservative tendencies, followed up on his
decisive cabinet shuffle in the summer of 2004 with an even
bigger surprise in February, when he announced that he would
support a constitutional amendment to allow for the first
direct, competitive elections for head of state in the 5,000
year history of the Egyptian state (ref D).
¶4. (C) More than two months after the announcement, the
modalities of the new presidential election system remain
undetermined, but there is general agreement that there is no
figure currently on the political stage capable of
effectively challenging Mubarak. As the implications of this
major systemic change were debated in March, many, including
(privately) Mubarak himself, expressed frustration at the
lack of viable competition. Finally, in mid-April, Khaled
Mohieldin, president of the leftist Tagammu' Party, began
sending clear signals that he was prepared to step into the
race (though he indicated that no formal announcement would
be made until parliament had finished preparing the
amendment).
¶5. (C) Mohieldin's apparent entry into the race was greeted
by most of our contacts, and a number of commentators, with
sadness. The 84 year-old political veteran, a core member of
the free officers' movement that deposed King Farouk in 1952,
is respected by many Egyptian political elites. (Note: He is
also the paternal uncle of current Minister for Investment
Mahmoud Mohieldin. End note.) Wafd Party Vice President
Mahmoud Abaza described him to poloff as "the only one of the
free officers truly committed to democracy." However, the
consensus among our contacts was that Mohieldin, in entering
the race, was allowing himself to be used as a prop. Some of
our contacts claim he is barely ambulatory, hard of hearing,
and perhaps even showing signs of senility. One of our
contacts quipped that Mohieldin was probably a favorite of
the palace to challenge Mubarak because he makes the
President (who turned 77 on May 4) look young and sprightly
by contrast. Prominent columnist Salama Ahmed Salama called
Mohieldin's decision to run "hasty" in the absence of clarity
about the modalities for the race, while another prominent
editorialist, Magdy Mehanna, predicted that Mohieldin's
participation in this "charade" would tarnish his reputation.
----------------------
Ayman Nour Controversy
----------------------
¶6. (C) Also running for president is Ayman Nour, the
embattled leader of the opposition Ghad (Tomorrow) Party,
even as his lawyers prepare for his criminal trial on forgery
charges, set to begin June 28 (Ref E). Nour continues to
take an aggressive and defiant approach to his campaign,
hurling scathing criticism on Mubarak and the GOE. He
claimed to poloff in early May that the ruling party and the
State Security apparatus was hiring thugs to disrupt his
campaign rallies, particularly in the Nile Delta provinces,
pelting him and his entourage with garbage, insults, and
threats. (Comment: Nour's attempts to campaign outside his
own district are groundbreaking in Egypt and bound to
engender at least some hostility among local politicians and
their constituents. Nonetheless, we deem credible his claims
of GOE/NDP involvement in hiring thugs to make his
campaigning as unpleasant as possible. However, to the
extent that the GOE is behind this harassment, the GOE
appears to be trying to put some distance between itself and
his tormentors. End comment.) Nour also confirmed to poloff
in early May reports that "private citizens" had been filing
various complaints against him, which he described as part of
a campaign of harassment, requesting permits to demolish his
apartment for zoning violations, to demolish the social
services center he funded in his parliamentary district, and
even a motion to have him arrested for insulting the head of
state after a journalist claimed to have witnessed him
tearing up a picture of President Mubarak.
¶7. (C) Nour remains confident (and probably has an
exaggerated view) of his popularity on the Egyptian street,
and told poloff that, in a truly open electoral campaign, the
"real contest" would be not between his Ghad party and the
ruling NDP but between the Ghad and the Muslim Brothers.
Nour has many enemies, including many among regime opponents,
who believe he is "slick" a "phoney," or a "lightweight."
Some of our contacts are bemused by the fame and support he
has acquired in western capitals as a champion of democracy.
While it is difficult to quantify Nour's actual support on
the street, his ongoing presidential campaign and
controversial legal case are clearly additional complicating
factors in this year's political climate.
---------------------------
Hosni Up Close and Personal
---------------------------
¶8. (C) Meanwhile, back at the presidential palace, Egypt TV
aired on prime time, for three consecutive nights beginning
April 23, a nine-hour interview with President Mubarak (refs
A and C). The teasers aired to promote the interview series,
humbly entitled "Witness to History," claimed that Mubarak
would be making many revelations and at least one major
announcement. The interview was conducted by the celebrated
presenter (and satellite TV tycoon) Emad Eddin Adeeb and
produced by a prominent cinematic director. The result, it
was generally agreed, was anti-climactic: The interview
dealt extensively with Mubarak's recollections of his
military career, his observations about Egypt under Nasser
and Sadat, and his heroic role in the war of 1973. During
one of the brief references to the current political
situation and the issue of reform, the President told Adeeb
he had "never" been told directly by any USG official that
Egypt needed to undertake political reforms.
¶9. (C) After the interviews, a surprisingly broad range of
media commentators and Embassy contacts delivered a similar
verdict: The President dwelt too extensively on the past and
was far too vague in discussing his vision for the future of
the country and solutions to its various problems. Contacts
from reformist/civil society circles termed Mubarak's
performance "terrible" and "pathetic" and the act of a man
"out of ideas." Even Mustafa Bakry, editor of the reckless
and sensationalist tabloid al-Osboa, usually seen to be doing
the GOE's bidding by regularly and systematically defaming
its critics through innuendo and name calling, termed
Mubarak's interview "a big disappointment."
¶10. (C) Not all were critical of Mubarak's performance -
editors of the three principal pro-government papers all
praised Mubarak's statesman-like demeanor, maturity, and
wisdom. One contact told poloff that the Egyptian masses,
rather than its skeptical intellectuals, were the targeted
audience for the interview, and it was for their benefit that
Mubarak postured both as a great man of history and a patron
of stability and order. It appeared to most observers that
Mubarak's interview was a de facto launch of his reelection
campaign, though an anticipated announcement of his
intentions has yet to come, and will probably wait until
after parliament completes the legislation on the
constitutional amendment.
-----------------------
The Judicial "Intifada"
-----------------------
¶11. (C) We continue to hear received mixed interpretations of
the significance of the April 15 declaration of 1000 Egyptian
judges who met in Alexandria (out of a total of 7000 judges
nationwide) in which they highlighted flaws in the current
system of judicial supervision of elections and demanded
passage of new legislation to expand guarantees of judicial
independence and threatened to sit out the next elections if
ignored (Ref B). Democracy advocates in Egypt and abroad
were stunned and elated at the judge's "unprecedented" and
"audacious" move and predicted it would put serious pressure
on the GOE to rethink its approach to elections, widely
acknowledged to be tarnished by various forms of fraud and
intimidation.
¶12. (C) The GOE has not taken the matter sitting down. The
Minister of Justice told the press his ministry would act
quickly to address the judges' concerns, while he reportedly
called the judges' bluff by circulating a form requesting
that they confirm their intent to fulfil their duties as
electoral supervisors. Assistant Minister of Justice
Iskandar Ghattas told poloff in early May that "every judge"
has already signed this pledge and was aggressively
dismissive of the effort, saying the organizers of the
"revolt" were gadflies cynically drawing on political reform
rhetoric to advance their "Islamist" agenda. (Comment: We
found Ghattas' dismissal of the organizers as
crypto-Islamists to be dubious. His very defensive reaction
was probably a sign of the actual significance of the judges'
action. End comment.) However, as noted in ref B, even a
decidedly liberal and reformist senior judicial contact told
poloff that the "democratic" effort was actually a stealthy
means of shaming the GOE into giving judges a pay raise. A
follow up to the April 15 meeting, tentatively set for May
13, may provide clarity on the resolve and resonance of the
judges' efforts.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Academics Want State Security to Move off Campus
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶13. (C) Another of the "unprecedented" recent developments
was the April 19 demonstration, held simultaneously at public
university campuses in Cairo, Minya, and Assiyut, in which
dozens of university faculty members staged a one hour silent
protest at the presence, and interference, of Egyptian State
Security in Egyptian academic life. State Security has long
maintained a significant presence on Egyptian university
campuses, particularly focused on containing and thwarting
recruitment and organization of students by Islamist groups.
As described in Ref I, State Security intervenes annually in
student union elections to preempt, by heavy-handed tactics
if necessary, the election of Islamists to student government
positions, but is also accused of stiffling the general
academic climate and harassing students and faculty who
challenge orthodoxy on various issues.
¶14. (C) During the April 19 protest, organized by a group
known as "Professors for Change," dozens of faculty members
on the three campuses donned black academic robes and stood
silently in front of university administration buildings for
an hour, carrying banners with slogans such as "No to
security interference in universities;" "Yes to free and
independent universities;" and "No future for Egyptian
students without freedom." An organizer, journalism
professor Awatef Abdel Rahman told the press that the
protests had been inspired by the growing calls and activism
in the country for political reform. Prominent intellectual
and Shura Council member Usama Ghazaly Harb (protect) told
poloff in late April that the faculty protests against State
Security were "very important" because they had "shattered
the fearful silence" of professors and openly expressed views
widely held among Egyptian academics.
-----------------------
"Enough" Flexes Muscles
-----------------------
¶15. (C) Clearly one of the most significant developments of
early 2005 has been the sustained emergence of the protest
movement Kifaya ("Enough") - a loose coalition of political
groupings and individuals united by their opposition to the
Mubarak regime (ref G). The group, which has captured the
attention of the international media, as well as a growing
number of Egyptians, has surprised observers by its ability
to repeatedly defy bans on its demonstrations and turn out on
the streets for a series of protests this spring. While the
numbers Kifaya turns out at demonstrations are modest by
international standards (usually around 200-500), their pluck
and resolve is undeniable and they can probably be credited
with having made routine previously unutterable slogans such
as "Mubarak must go," "No to a fifth term," "No to
bequeathment of power (to son Gamal)," etc.
¶16. (C) Kifaya's latest feat was staging simultaneous
demonstrations in 11 Egyptian cities on April 27, explicitly
unauthorized by the government, which led to 75-120 arrests,
(most were released within several hours). The Ministry of
Interior has openly lost patience with the movement and its
activities, but has so far refrained from either the arrest
and prosecution of Kifaya's leaders or authorizing a "head
cracking" approach by the riot police deployed to contain the
demonstrations - no doubt mindful of the domestic and
international fallout that would likely ensue. The
movement's strength - its simple, "unifying" message, will
also limit its development as a political force. As one
Internet commentator, and acknowledged supporter of Kifaya
concedes, the movement "binds together all sorts of
contradictory groups, organizations, ideologies, and visions.
The only consensus is that Mubarak must go; everything else
is up for debate."
-------------------
Emboldened Brothers
-------------------
¶17. (C) For their part, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB),
which is banned but tolerated by the GOE within certain
parameters, and which claims to be the nation's most popular
political movement, has also seized perceived opportunities
in Egypt's changing political atmosphere - by adopting
political reform as their mantra in place of their
traditional calls for the implementation of Shari'a Law. As
discussed in ref H, the MB in the past year adopted its own
"blueprint for political reform," established its own "human
rights" organization, and adopted a generally more strident
(though enigmatic and often contradictory) political
discourse. In late April, for example, MB Supreme Guide
Mahdy Akef pledged the group's loyalty to President Mubarak
(while continuing to demand the dissolution of the Emergency
law), but then subsequently qualified his comments as
"respect and support for the office of the President," while
in a statement posted on the group's website in early May,
Akef's deputy, Mohammed Habib, called on Egyptians to boycott
the coming Presidential elections.
¶18. (C) In the past two months, the MB, likely inspired by
Kifaya's activities (in which it has conspicuously
participated), has shown a greater willingness than at any
time in the recent past to defy government bans on
demonstrations: Their March 27 demonstration (ref F), was
successfully thwarted by the GOE, but the massive security
deployments paralyzed central Cairo for hours and prompted
much criticism of the GOE in the independent press. The MB
appeared to up the ante with demonstrations it staged on May
4 in Cairo and six provinces, reportedly attended by
thousands of MB cadres and sympathizers. The GOE responded,
according to an MOI statement with 400 arrests - the largest
number of MB arrests in a single day that we can recall. The
demonstrations reportedly devolved into clashes with police
in some spots, the worst probably being in Fayyoum, where 43
demonstrators were injured (according to the MB), while the
MOI claimed that an undisclosed number of police were
injured.
-------------------------
Domestic Terror Reemerges
-------------------------
¶19. (C) The apparent reemergence, however tentative, of
domestic terrorism, is an additional factor that has added to
the mood of uncertainty and concern in Egypt this spring.
The calm that had prevailed since the infamous Luxor massacre
of 1997 was first shattered in October 2004, when a group of
Egyptians, reportedly led by a disaffected Palestinian,
detonated several explosives at several tourist sites
frequented by Israelis on the east coast of the Sinai
peninsula (septels). The GOE was quick to emphasize that the
group that conducted the attack had been identified and
quickly captured, and that the perpetrators had no
connections to wider terror networks. Though the GOE's
public analysis had some clear flaws, it was effective in
forestalling any major impact on the country's tourist
industry. However, three other terrorist incidents which
occurred in Cairo in April 2005 (septels) have undermined the
public mood and raised fears that Egypt's victory against the
terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s might be eroding.
-------
Comment
-------
¶20. (C) The GOE has considerable experience dealing, in one
form or another, with each of the issues and areas discussed
above. However, contacts and observers cannot recall a time
in which so many significant and sensitive issues have
converged at the same time. Usama Ghazaly Harb (protect),
the prominent intellectual, told poloff that Egypt has
"arrived at one of the most sensitive moments in its modern
history" and confided that he was unable to predict with
confidence "what will happen next month, let alone six months
from now." These various developments, in accumulation, will
certainly have GOE policy circles working overtime and will
test conjectures on the degree to which Mubarak and his inner
circle have a master plan to shape and drive developments,
rather than just react to them.
¶21. (C) With so many variables in play, we cannot rule out
the possibility that the GOE may feel compelled to crack down
on one or more of the groups challenging its legitimacy as
elections draw closer. Conversely, we would not be surprised
if additional strands of opposition emerge, or if the
existing strands continue to seek opportunities to make
common cause with each other in an effort to challenge the
GOE more effectively.
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo
You can also access this site through the
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website.
GRAY