I. Executive Summary

2009 should see a presidential election in
Angola, for the first time since 1992. Parliamentary elections held in September
2008 failed to fully meet regional and international standards. Urgent reforms
are essential if the people of Angola are to be able to freely exercise their
civil and political rights and vote for the presidential candidate of their
choice. Those reforms need to be entrenched ahead of Angola's first local
elections, to be held in 2010.

The parliamentary elections on September
5-6, 2008, were the first in 16 years. They brought a resounding victory for
the ruling Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), in power since 1975,
with 81.7 percent of the vote. The elections were contested by 14 political
parties and coalitions, but only four opposition parties were able to secure
representation in parliament, where the MPLA's landslide translated into 191 of
the 220 seats.

In 2008, in the months before the official
parliamentary election campaign, Human Rights Watch raised doubts about
prospects for the elections being free and fair: The oversight body, the
National Electoral Commission (CNE) lacked impartiality because it is dominated
by the ruling party; the media environment was unfavourable to the opposition
and freedom of expression restricted; unchecked intimidation and political
violence by ruling party supporters was preventing opposition parties from
campaigning freely throughout the country; and a climate of repression
prevailed in the enclave of Cabinda, where armed conflict has continued despite
a 2006 peace agreement.

During the one-month official election
campaign period, which opened on August 5, 2008, Human Rights Watch witnessed
some improvement. Unlike during the pre-campaign period, the police provided
protection to opposition parties, meaning they could campaign freely. However,
in many other ways the playing field remained considerably slanted in favour of
the ruling party. The CNE failed in its role as oversight body, doing nothing
to prevent or respond to major violations of election laws during the campaign,
such as unequal access to state funds and to the state media. It also obstructed
accreditation for national election observers from civil society. On polling
day, important safeguards against manipulation such as the use of voter's rolls
were breached, and the CNE obstructed independent monitoring of the tabulation
process.

Opposition parties and observers have not
presented evidence of deliberate government manipulation of the polls, and
political parties have accepted the election results after their formal
complaints were rejected by the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the scope
of shortcomings and uncertainty of their impact affected the credibility of the
election process. The government announced an independent inquiry into the
verified irregularities, but the inquiry that purportedly took place was not
independent and no report was published.

President José Eduardo dos Santos has already announced that a presidential election will
take place in 2009. The actual date has not been named, however, and the
president is required to give a minimum of 90 days' notice. For the 2008
parliamentary elections, the president left it to the very last minute to
announce the date, and there is a danger this scenario will be repeated.
Moreover, in November 2008 the president announced that a new constitution
would be approved before scheduling a presidential election and raised the
possibility that the new constitution may lead to the president's being elected
by parliament rather than through a new poll. This has raised uncertainty as to
whether the presidential election will take place in 2009, or at all.

Nevertheless, the uncertainty cannot be an
excuse for inaction. The government should correct the shortcomings observed
during the parliamentary election process and introduce reforms to ensure that
future electoral processes fully meet international standards and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing
Democratic Elections.

In addition, the government should
undertake efforts to ensure that space for opposition parties, independent civil
society, and media does not suffer further restrictions. Since the 2008
elections there have been no signs of improvement in that regard. Urgent
efforts are needed to safeguard the democratization process initiated in 1991
and build on the relative calm of September 2008's election.

II. Methodology

Between March and September 2008 Human
Rights Watch researchers visited Angola on three occasions. They conducted
research in the capital, Luanda, and the provinces of Huambo, Bie, Benguela,
and Cabinda.

Human Rights Watch chose to focus on
Huambo, Bie, and Benguela because, as strongholds of the main opposition party
UNITA in the 1992 elections, they had seen heavy fighting during the civil war
that resumed following those elections, and Human Rights Watch had been
concerned about high levels of political violence in those areas since the end
of the civil war in 2002.

The enclave of Cabinda was chosen because
voters there largely abstained in the 1992 elections due to popular separatist
sentiment, and because an unresolved separatist insurgency-despite a peace
agreement signed in 2006-presented a particular challenge for credible
elections.

Human Rights Watch researchers conducted
formal and informal interviews on the ground, by phone, and by email with more
than 200 persons, including members of the ruling party MPLA and opposition
parties, representatives of local and international NGOs, church leaders,
journalists, lawyers, human rights activists, and others. At provincial and
municipal levels, Human Rights Watch researchers were received by officials of
the electoral management bodies, local administrations, the police, and the
military. Additionally, Human Rights Watch researchers also met with Angolan
diplomatic representatives, and reviewed official statements from the
government, as well as reports and documents from local and international NGOs,
political parties, and the local media.

Most people interviewed requested that
Human Rights Watch withhold their names.

III. Background

The parliamentary elections of September 2008 were the
second multiparty elections in Angola's history. After independence in 1975,
the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA)
established a one-party state. The first multiparty, concurrent parliamentary and
presidential elections in 1992 had given the MPLA a majority of 129 out of 220
seats and the main opposition group the União Nacional para a Independência
Total de Angola (UNITA) 70, with 10 other opposition parties winning
representation in parliament.[1]
The first round of presidential elections that year was not conclusive, and a
run-off between incumbent president José Eduardo dos Santos and his main
competitor Jonas Savimbi, then president of UNITA, never took place. Dos Santos
has been in power since 1979.

These first multiparty elections in 1992
had been a traumatic experience. They were intended to consolidate the peace
and democratization process initiated with the peace accords signed in 1991 and
the new constitution in 1992, but civil war resumed when UNITA refused to
accept the results (UNITA only took up its seats in parliament in 1997). A
further peace agreement was signed in 1994, which established the Government of
National Unity (Governo de Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional, GURN) and a limited
power-sharing agreement between the MPLA and UNITA at national and local
levels. The war finally ended in 2002 following Savimbi's death in combat and
UNITA's ensuing military defeat.

The government repeatedly delayed new
elections until 2008, arguing that post-war reconstruction was a priority and a
necessary precondition for holding elections. The parliamentary elections on
September 5-6 brought a resounding MPLA victory, with 81.7 percent of the vote.
The elections were contested by 14 political parties and coalitions, but only
four opposition parties were able to secure representation in parliament, where
the MPLA's landslide translated into 191 of the 220 seats. Sixteen seats went to UNITA, eight to the Partido de Renovação Social
(PRS), three to the Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and two
to Nova Democracia. (The conduct of these elections is
described in the following chapters.)

In 2006 another peace agreement was signed
with a faction of the separatist guerrilla movement Frente
de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) in the
enclave of Cabinda. This has not been fully effective, with sporadic attacks
from remaining FLEC forces continuing in the north of Cabinda.

President Dos Santos announced on November
28, 2008, a project to revise the 1992 constitution, and an MPLA-dominated
Constitutional Commission has been tasked with this. Dos Santos stated that one
issue to be decided is whether to retain direct presidential elections or have
the president be elected indirectly, by parliament.[2]
This has stirred up controversy, including within the MPLA,[3]
and has added to uncertainly about whether a presidential election will take
place in 2009, or at all.

IV.
Electoral Institutions and the Legal Environment

Legal
Framework

The legislative framework for elections was
revised in 2005, when parliament passed a package of election-related
legislation, including laws on nationality, political parties and their
funding, voter registration, electoral observation, and the Electoral Law itself.
Parliament also passed an Electoral Code of Conduct for all groups and
individuals involved in the election process, including the media, police, and
the National Electoral Commission (CNE). However, no monitoring mechanism was
established for the Code.

The Electoral Law sets out the legal and
institutional framework for elections. Elections are scheduled by presidential
decree at least 90 days before the polls. The Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum rated this provision as bad practice,
since-especially in the Angolan context, where elections have not been regular
and have been repeatedly delayed-such a short timeframe to set an election date
may disadvantage the opposition.[4]
The electoral system is a two-level proportional system: 130 candidates are
elected from one national constituency, and 90 candidates from 18 provincial
constituencies (five per constituency, without regard to area or population
size), based on party and coalition lists (individuals cannot be nominated as
independent candidates).[5]

Election
Administration

The Electoral Law established the National
Electoral Commission with responsibility for oversight and coordination of the
election process. Its goal is to ensure a "free, fair and transparent" election
process.[6] At central level, six of its eleven members are appointed by
political parties, in proportion to their parliamentary representation (three
from the MPLA, two from UNITA, and one from the PRS). The other five members
are effectively government/MPLA appointees, as two are nominated by the
president and one each by the Supreme Court, the National Council on Media, and
the Ministry of Territorial Administration.[7] This
composition gives the MPLA political control of the CNE. This is in contravention
to the SADC's Principles and Guidelines and undermines the CNE's credibility.[8]
Responsibility for voter registration is assigned to the public administration
under CNE supervision.[9]
However, in fact the voter registration from November 2006 to May 2008 and the
defining of the polling stations' location remained under almost exclusive
control of a government body, the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the
Electoral Process (CIPE), which had been created in 2004 for the purpose.

The Constitutional Court, established in
June 2008, has responsibility for approving the registration of political
parties and for establishing rules for party candidate selection, and serves as
an appeal court for disputes over election results. Prior to June 2008 the
Supreme Court had assumed the role of a constitutional court.

The Supreme Court had varied strongly in
how it addressed election-related complaints depending on whether the MPLA or
UNITA had made the complaint. In 2005 both UNITA and the president lodged
complaints against different provisions of the Electoral Law and the Voter
Registration Law. The Supreme Court responded positively within 45 days to the
president's request to permit revision of the law to allow for three
consecutive or intermittent presidential mandates. The revised Electoral Law
was then reapproved by parliament and came into force in August 2005, despite
the fact that UNITA's complaint was still pending. UNITA's extensive complaints
included crucial issues such as the partisan composition of the CNE, the role
of the CIPE, and the demand for Angolans to be unconditionally entitled to be
registered as voters. The court finally responded to UNITA's complaints three
years later, in February 2008, when the election preparations were well
advanced and voter registration almost concluded. The Supreme Court ruled in
favour of UNITA's demand that Angolans abroad have to be registered as voters
and against the government's decision in May 2007 to abstain from registration
abroad (the government cited lack of administrative capacity),[10]
but the court stated that it was too late to implement its decision at that
stage.[11]
Since by law Angolans living abroad are excluded from voting in presidential
elections, they will only be able to vote for the next parliamentary elections,
due at the earliest in 2012.[12]

The Electoral Law provides for a one-off
state subsidy to be allocated in equal amounts to all political parties
eligible to run candidates, at least 90 days before elections.[13]
This funding is essential for political parties without a parliamentary seat
and access to regular funding from the state budget. The law requires that all
political parties, in order to run candidates, have to present documentary
proof of 14,000 supporters-500 in each of the 18 provincial constituencies and
5,000 for the national constituency-at least 60 days before the polls.[14]

Media Environment

The Electoral Law, in line with
international and regional standards, provides that each party be allocated
equal and free time on state radio and television during the campaign period.
According to the scheme, known as "direito de antena" ("right to broadcast"),
parties were assigned daily slots of between five and ten minutes each ahead of
the main news broadcast.[15]
However, beyond this space specifically assigned for campaigning, the press
legislation in force during the 2008 election process gave insufficient
guarantees for a level playing field among political contestants.

A new press law was enacted and entered
into force in 2006. This brought some improvements over the previous law. For
example, it eliminated the state monopoly over television broadcasting,
provided for creating public television to be governed by principles of public
interest, and included provisions that allow journalists accused of defamation
to cite in their defence the truthfulness of facts reported. Yet the law still
contains provisions that are not in line with international standards
concerning freedom of the press. Defamation remains a criminal offense and is
framed in broad terms under the category of "abuse of press freedom."[16]
Human Rights Watch has raised concerns that criminalization of defamation is a
violation of freedom of expression, while such vague definitions are
susceptible to be used against government opponents and may restrict the
freedom of journalists to carry out their profession.[17]

The government failed to enact necessary
regulations to the press law (this should have happened within a 90-day time
limit, as established by the law), which makes it largely inoperable. Separate
implementing legislation that would have clarified crucial aspects of the law
has yet to be passed.[18]

State-owned television (Televisão Pública
de Angola, TPA)-until recently the sole broadcaster-and radio (Rádio Nacional
de Angola, RNA) continue to operate under exclusive governmental control. The
government failed to pass the necessary legislation, as required by the press
law, to create a public broadcasting service that would guarantee impartial and
independent public media.[19]
Human Rights Watch has argued that implementing legislation for the public
media should include provisions for establishing a governing board protected
against arbitrary interference from the government, as recommended by the
Declaration of Principles on Freedom and Expression in Africa of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.[20]

In addition, the government failed to pass
specific legislation to set transparent criteria and procedures for licensing
television and radio broadcasters, as required by the press law. As a
consequence, licensing procedures for private radio broadcasters continue to be
opaque and bureaucratic. To date, only the state-owned RNA has a nationwide
broadcasting license, while independent, privately-owned radio broadcasters must
apply for different licenses for each frequency they intend to use.[21]
The government has prevented the Roman Catholic Church-owned Rádio Ecclésia
from retransmitting its signal outside of Luanda since the radio restored its
technical capacity to do so in 2003; the government alleges the station lacks a
legal basis for this, but church members and legal experts have argued the
church has a licence since the time of colonial rule for national broadcasting
that the government never revoked.[22]

The new press law provides for an "independent
body aimed at safeguarding the objectivity and impartiality of information, as
well as the freedom of expression and thought in the press"-a role that the law
assigns to the National Council on Media (Conselho Nacional para Comunicação
Social, CNCS).[23]
The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa recommends
self-regulation as a solution preferable to the establishment of such a
regulatory body.[24]
Nevertheless, an operable and independent CNCS could have contributed to serve
as a more effective watchdog over the media during the election process.
However, the government gave no priority to approving, before the elections, a
new law defining the composition, functions, and powers of the CNCS, as
required by the press law. In July 2008 the MPLA majority in parliament turned
down a UNITA-backed proposal meant to make the CNCS more independent and to
grant it more powers than the CNCS originally established in 1992.[25]
Consequently, the CNCS retains is original role, including the absence of
powers to impose sanction, and has failed even to make public comments calling
attention to violations of Angolan laws, such as the partiality of the state
media during the election process.

In December 2008 the spokesperson of the
Ministry of Social Communication announced that outstanding media legislation,
including the laws on radio and television broadcasting and the CNCS as well as
licensing regulations for radio and TV, would be passed and governing boards
for public broadcasters created in 2009.[26] It
remains vital that such legislation is enacted in line with international
standards and in a timely manner to make such legislation operable before the
prospective upcoming presidential election.

V.
Violations of Media Freedom in the 2008 Election

Unequal
Access to State Media

The "right to broadcast" time-an allocation
of equal time on state radio and television-was the only space formally
available to political parties during the campaign period, as no political
debates between candidates were broadcast. Broadcasters generally respected the
"right to broadcast." However, outside this provision for equal treatment
framed in the Electoral Law (see Chapter III), before and during the
one-month election campaign the MPLA dominated the news
broadcasts on the national state radio RNA, national state television TPA, and
coverage in the state-owned daily Jornal de Angola, in both quantitative
and qualitative terms.[27]

Observer groups noted systematic abuse of
the state media by the MPLA.[28]
The European Union Election Observer Mission (EU EOM) concluded that the
Angolan state media failed to meet international election standards and fulfill
provisions of Angolan law regarding equal treatment of contestants.[29]
Before and during the election campaign, however, only two Angolan civil
society groups, the Political and Social Observatory of Angola (OPSA) and the
Association Justice Peace and Democracy (AJPD), publicly expressed such
concerns: OPSA highlighted an increased pro-MPLA bias in Jornal de Angola
in the months prior to the election campaign, and observed that the state media
were "transforming banal state acts into propaganda events" while giving "at
times more space to an event of a MPLA local committee than to the leadership
of any other party."[30]
News broadcasts on state television and radio during the campaign were marked
by the complete absence of any voices critical of the government.[31]

Human Rights Watch observed both
qualitative and quantitative bias toward the MPLA. For example, during the last
two weeks of the campaign, public television and radio news bulletins were
dominated by President Dos Santos's visits to provincial capitals, including
Huambo, Saurimo, Uige, and Benguela. Coverage of the visits occupied a third of
a 90-minute television news bulletin, and would be partly repeated in summary
the following day.[32]
The president's visits and other events associated with the inauguration of
infrastructure projects were covered without distinction between the role of
party and state. The party-political character of the events, associating the
new infrastructure projects with the MPLA, was emphasized by interviewing party
officials who were present, or, in the case of television, including frequent
shots of party flags and banners.

MPLA officials have tried to justify
disproportionate coverage of MPLA campaign events in the state media on the
basis that their public events were more numerous, and that extensive coverage
of inaugural events for infrastructure projects was merely reflecting normal
government activity.[33]

State media tended to present the
opposition in a negative way during the campaign.[34]
Opposition parties were not given the opportunity to broadcast their opinions
on unfair campaign tactics of the ruling party, or comment on accusations
against them aired on the state media. For example, on August 28 TPA1 reported
in the evening news that suspects had been stopped at Luanda airport while
trying to illegally take large amounts of cash out of the country. The only
individual who was named in the report was David Mendes, an official of the
opposition Angolan Youth, Workers' and Peasants' Party (PAJOCA) and a
well-known human rights lawyer. A police official recounted at length what had
allegedly happened. Neither Mendes (who was not arrested or charged) nor a
legal representative was given the opportunity to comment.[35]

In another case, on September 1 UNITA made
use of its "right to broadcast" slot to present a letter it claimed showed a
state-owned bank had donated the equivalent of around US$43,000 to the MPLA's
election campaign. The same day, UNITA presented a formal complaint to the CNE,
attaching the letter as evidence of an illegal donation to the MPLA. State
television news said nothing about the allegation. The following night the
evening news devoted 12 minutes to a claim by the MPLA and the bank that the
letter was a forgery and accusing UNITA of abusing its "right to broadcast"
time.[36]
UNITA was given no opportunity to respond.

In addition, news bulletins broadcast on
TPA1 during the campaign regularly covered events where erstwhile opposition
party members announced they were abandoning their party and joining the MPLA.
Coverage of such events culminated on the last day of the official campaign,
September 3.

That day, the TPA showed particularly
strong political bias generally. Its evening news was dominated by MPLA events
in several provinces including the president's rally in Luanda, despite the
fact that all parties were holding events to wrap up their campaigns. Other
parties' final campaign events received a maximum of two minutes coverage each,
and the coverage of some of these events was immediately followed by public
statements from dissidents or defectors calling on people to vote for the MPLA.
For example, coverage of UNITA's final campaign event was followed by a public
statement by a son of the famous UNITA general Samuel Chiwale. He justified his
defection from UNITA alleging that his father's party was completely
disorganized in Luanda and had no clear program. The final event of PAJOCA was
followed by a public statement from the leader of a former breakaway faction,
Miguel Tetembwa, calling on voters to support the MPLA. The same broadcast
featured an interview with a woman who was weeping as she talked about her
painful experience of being with UNITA during the war. She said the current
UNITA leader Isaías Samukuva was lying when he said UNITA had left its military
past behind. The news broadcast on MPLA campaign events in several provinces also
featured defectors from UNITA and the PRS.[37]

During the whole campaign period, Jornal
de Angola featured a daily unsigned column under the title "Right to
broadcast," which ridiculed the radio and television airtime allocated to
opposition parties one by one, while praising the MPLA spots. The column
regularly attacked UNITA by blaming it for the country's destruction during the
civil war. It is a well-known phenomenon in Angola that Jornal de Angola-the
only daily and the cheapest and most widely distributed newspaper in the
country-has for many years made use of controversial and at times defamatory
opinion articles, written under pseudonyms, against opposition parties as well
as individuals and groups perceived as critics of the government. With the
daily comments on "right to broadcast" airtime, these methods became
commonplace during the election campaign.

At the time, the journalist unions, the
National Council on Media, and the National Electoral Commission remained
silent in the face of the array of abuses. It took until three months after the
elections for the RNA section of the Union of Angolan Journalists (Sindicato
dos Jornalistas de Angola, SJA) to admit that the principles of equal treatment
of election contestants were "systematically violated" in the state-owned
media.[38]

The CNE failed altogether to comment or
take any action despite daily examples in the state media that legal provisions
regarding equal access to the media were being violated. Equally, the National
Council on Media failed to issue public statements or otherwise comment during
the campaign to call attention to these violations of Angolan legislation,
after having urged media professionals to respect the Electoral Code of Conduct
in January 2008.[39]

Threats
against Independent Media

In the months before the elections,
journalists at private media outlets were sent a clear message of intimidation
when the editors of two privately-owned weeklies, Folha 8 and Semanário
Angolense, were summoned to court for trials in libel lawsuits initiated
several years previously. The lawsuit against Folha 8 editor William
Tonet, filed by the president's wife Ana Paula dos Santos, did not progress further, as the court session on June 13, 2008 was
cancelled due to the absence of the plaintiff. However, Semanário Angolense
editor Felisberto Graça Campos, facing three separate
libel cases filed by government officials, was convicted and sentenced on June 24, 2008 to a six-month prison
term, as well as being ordered to pay damages equivalent to US$90,ooo. Campos's appeal is pending at this writing and he remains at
liberty.[40]

The new press law's lack of clarity
regarding the definition of defamation and its criminalization restrict freedom
of expression as such, and pending libel lawsuits against journalists for
defamation in the period leading to elections compound that restriction.

Censorship of journalists in the state
media became evident before the elections when Ernesto Bartolomeu, a popular
presenter on TPA, was suspended for publicly criticizing growing government
interference in television. After the elections, Bartolomeu was restored to his
job.

Throughout the election process, access to
independent media was extremely limited outside of Luanda, which affected the
right of voters to access information. Due to widespread illiteracy, radio
broadcasting plays a crucial role in Angola's vast rural areas, but with a few
exceptions in some provinces (Benguela, Cabinda, and Huila) the state radio RNA
continues to be the only broadcaster outside of the capital.

No private radio station broadcast public
debates between candidates during the campaign, despite being allowed to do so.
Privately-owned radio stations have not been immune to government pressure to
give more prominence to government views during the election campaign. For
example, as local journalists told Human Rights Watch, Rádio Comercial in
Cabinda frequently broadcast campaign speeches of the provincial governor in
full, and airtime devoted previously to diverse opinions was gradually reduced
before the elections, a fact the journalists attribute to the radio's ownership
by senior MPLA officials.[41]

Implications
for the media environment in a 2009 election

Since the 2008 elections, journalists of
private media have been summoned for further libel lawsuits filed by senior
government officials. In November 2008 Elsa Alexandre, a journalist on the
private weekly Jornal Angolense, was informed of a libel lawsuit
lodged back in 2005 by a general, the head of the national bridge company, and
is awaiting trial.[42]
In January 2009 William Tonet of Folha 8 was summoned to court for a
further libel lawsuit filed in January 2008 by two generals, the heads of the
president's Military Office and the External Intelligence Services. This
lawsuit adds to another 22 lawsuits filed by the same generals against Tonet.
His lawyer complained to Human Rights Watch that these lawsuits are dealt with
separately by the courts, which increases judicial and other costs for his
client.[43]

Further suspensions of state media
journalists have occurred for legitimate criticism of the government. On
October 1, 2008, a senior journalist and director of the private weekly Novo
Jornal, Victor Silva, was sacked as a commentator by the state-owned RNA,
on the basis that he had violated the radio station's editorial line by voicing
during a debate program critical comments about some of the president's newly
appointed vice-governors. The program was taken off air immediately and two
journalists who were working on it were suspended.[44]

Political interference into privately-owned
radio stations has not stopped. For example, two journalists of Rádio Comercial
in Cabinda were reportedly suspended on the orders of the provincial delegate
of the Ministry of Social Communication on October 10, 2008, for having
criticized MPLA bias in the award of a journalism prize by the provincial
government.[45]

Since the elections, the private media
group Medianova has launched several new media outlets in Angola, including the
weekly newspaper O País, the radio station Rádio Mais in Luanda, and the
television channel TV Zimbo. New private media outlets, especially local radio
stations and television channels, contribute to increased diversity of
information in Angola. However, when the new television channel started
broadcasting for a three-month experimental phase it was allowed to bypass the
pending adoption of the respective legislation and licensing mechanisms that
should include a public tender for new television concessions. Similarly, Rádio
Mais has announced a plan to launch in eight provinces, although the relevant
legislation has not yet been passed.[46]
The government has not raised any legal obstacle against these media projects,
in clear contrast with the alleged legal restrictions brought against Rádio
Ecclésia (see Chapter III). Several observers told Human Rights Watch the
government's privileged treatment of Medianova's new outlets as compared with
Rádio Ecclésia was politically motivated, since Medianova is owned by senior
government officials close to the president.[47] Human
Rights Watch is not aware of any concrete developments regarding the government's
blockage of the Rádio Ecclésiasignal extension since the elections.[48]

VI. Flaws in the 2008 Election
Process

Possible Partiality in
Candidate Registration

Members of political parties and civil
society observers told Human Rights Watch the Constitutional Court has acted
more transparently and efficiently in dealing with election matters than the
Supreme Court, from which it assumed responsibility in June 2008 (see Chapter
III). For the September elections the Constitutional Court had to swiftly
approve lists of candidates from political parties, including some with
internal divisions meaning that dissident wings had filed separate lists.
However, at least in the case of PADEPA, an opposition party believed to have
considerable support from urban youth, the Constitutional Court took a
controversial decision: The court ruled in favour of a dissident faction,
despite a pending criminal investigation against the leader of this faction,
Luis Silva Cardoso, for shooting with a machine gun at a car in which former
party president Carlos Leitão was traveling on October 5, 2007.[49]
This raises suspicions that the court's decision was not politically
independent.[50]

Performance of National
Electoral Commission as Oversight Body

The fact that eight of the eleven CNE
members at central level are either formally or de facto MPLA appointees was
not the only issue preventing it fulfilling its independent oversight role for
the September 2008 elections. During voter registration, the CNE lacked
resources and powers to effectively supervise the process, and the central
voter database remained in the hands of the Inter-Ministerial Commission for
the Electoral Process (CIPE) until shortly before the elections. As numerous
members of opposition parties and civil society organizations as well as local
election commission members told Human Rights Watch, the CNE for a long time
lacked its own offices and shared senior staff with CIPE at local levels. Thus,
the supervisory body depended on government bodies that it should supervise,
and which were fully dominated by the MPLA.[51] "The
role of the CNE and CIPE was never clearly defined. In practice, the CNE ran on
the coat tails of the CIPE", a civil society organizer told Human Rights Watch.[52]
The European Union Observer Mission concluded that the CNE's supervisory role
of the voter registration was "at best limited."[53]

The weak role of the CNE as an oversight
body became even more evident during the campaign period, when it failed to
fulfil its role of taking any remedial action in response to violations of
election laws by the ruling party.[54]
For example, the CNE did not issue any public statement to reinforce equal access
to the state media (as noted in Chapter IV), or act to stop the abuse of state
resources by the ruling party. The CNE's credibility was further undermined by
indications of interference by the president's office prior to the elections,
through the gradual insertion of presidential appointees into the CNE
administrative apparatus.[55]
The involvement of the president's Military Office and the private company
Valleysoft, owned by a close relative of the president, in election logistics
during the polls has raised further suspicions.[56]
While there is no evidence that the involvement of presidential institutions
was a deliberate attempt to manipulate the polls, the CNE failed to disclose
the scope and nature of such arrangements.

The erosion of the CNE's credibility
culminated in its inability to prevent numerous procedural irregularities and
logistical failures from happening on polling day (see below). An official of
the National Civil Society Electoral Platform (PNASCAE) summarized to Human
Rights Watch his personal view, reflecting what many other observers,
journalists, and civil society activists have also expressed: "The CNE lost
administrative, logistical, legal, and political control of the election
process. These failures undermined the CNE's credibility."[57]

The most problematic breaches of election
laws and international standards, highlighted below, illustrate the urgent need
for a genuinely independent oversight body for future elections.

Unequal Access to State Funding and
Resources

Opposition
party activists told Human Rights Watch that late arrival of funding had been a
serious setback to their campaign efforts. The Electoral Law (as noted in
Chapter III) provides for state funding for political parties who are eligible
to run candidates, to be disbursed at least 90 days before election day. But
for the 2008 elections the process of determining which parties qualified for
funding was delayed because party candidates were only approved in mid-July
2008: Specific criteria to determine how political parties should document
their supporter numbers had only been issued by the newly-created
Constitutional Court on June 25. Consequently, the state subsidies for
campaigning, fixed by the government at US$1,200,000 each, arrived only after
the election campaign had started.

Political parties represented in parliament
had access to regular state funding from the state budget, in proportion to the
number of votes cast for each in previous elections.[58]
This provided UNITA with US$12 million and the MPLA with US$19 million
annually. However, the funds at the MPLA's disposal appeared to be well in
excess of what was recorded as having been provided by the state budget or
donations from private companies.[59]The MPLA started its campaign as early as
April 2008, by increasing the number of high-profile provincial visits and
public rallies with clear election-related content by senior government and
MPLA officials, in preparation for a party congress in May. In a high-cost
environment like Angola, organizing such events implies substantial funding. In
addition, as documented in the following section, the distribution of
substantial gifts was an integral part of the ruling party's campaigning.

The Electoral Law forbids, among others,
public institutions and companies as well as provincial governments from
funding political campaigns.[60]
However, the profound blurring of state and ruling party structures at all
levels of power, including government, the civil service, and public companies
in Angola, has contributed to obfuscating the use of state resources and
facilities for ruling party purposes. For example, opposition politicians in
all provinces we visited told Human Rights Watch that ruling party professional
cells, the so-called Speciality Committees (Comités de Especialidade)
established since 2003 by the MPLA in all public administration departments,
have played an active role in election campaigning. Interviewees said that
these party cells have also continually exerted pressure on civil servants by
making professional advancement dependent on joining the MPLA.

Unequal access to state funding and
resources has been a major point of criticism by several national and
international election observers and civil society groups.[61]

Preferential
treatment of some voters from abroad

No voter registration had taken place
outside of Angola (see Chapter III), but many Angolans living abroad came to
register and vote on their own initiative in border regions or from other
countries. European Union observers witnessed the MPLA transporting more than
1,500 people from the neighbouring Republic of Congo to vote in Cabinda on
polling day.[62]
An UNITA candidate told Human Rights Watch this practice took place at several
points at the border,[63]
and EU observers also reported similar cases at the border with the Democratic
Republic of Congo in Zaire province. UNITA party officials in Cabinda told
Human Rights Watch that logistical support by the MPLA and MPLA-run
administrations for cross-border voting in Cabinda raised strong suspicions that
primarily people willing to vote for the MPLA were selected for such
operations.[64]
The EU EOM concluded that the CNE's cooperation with such MPLA cross-border
operations put the independence of the oversight body into question.[65]

Buying
Political Favor

During the campaign, MPLA and government officials
distributed extravagant gifts in an apparent effort to buy political favor. In
most provinces, television coverage of MPLA rallies regularly
showed costly items such as motorbikes, televisions, and refrigerators being
lined up to be distributed to local dignitaries, as well as grain, seeds, and
agricultural equipment to be given out to farmers. In some cases, the MPLA flag
was shown flying from trucks that were distributing water-an expensive
commodity in Angola-and sacks of grain.

The Electoral Code of Conduct
forbids political parties from "resorting to corruption to seek activists for
the party," yet fails to define the term "corruption."[66]
Human Rights Watch received credible information that gifts were used by
government and MPLA officials to co-opt support for the party.

For example, local journalists and activists in Cabinda told
us that in the course of an MPLA election campaign there targeting churches,
the MPLA-run provincial government distributed large sums of money-between
US$100,000 and $200,000-as well as cars, motorcycles, corrugated sheet roofs,
and other valuable items to at least 20 churches and church groups.[67]
These donations were done during events in which the provincial governor, in
his capacity as provincial first MPLA secretary, called on churchgoers to vote
for the MPLA. The state media regularly reported on such events, quoting
assurances from church representatives that they intended to cast their vote
for the MPLA.[68]
Local journalists also told Human Rights Watch that during the months before
the elections the Cabinda provincial governor-acting as first provincial
secretary of the MPLA-distributed a large number of cars to representatives of
the state media (Jornal de Angola, Angop, TPA) and several associations
and trade unions, including two teachers' unions, the union of oil industry
workers, the association for medium and small private companies, the
association of young musicians and composers, and three journalist unions.[69]

Observations from other provinces reported by various
national and international observers and civil society groups indicate patterns
of gift distribution by the government and the MPLA that Human Rights Watch
documented in Cabinda were extensively used throughout the country, including
to traditional authorities in rural areas.[70]

Unequal Access to Public Facilities and
Space

During the
election campaign the MPLA enjoyed privileged access to public spaces to
organise their events. Government offices regularly closed when an MPLA event
was scheduled, to allow people to attend, at times under coercion. Before the
campaign school pupils were commonly strongly recommended to attend MPLA
pre-campaign events (during the one-month campaign schools were closed entirely).[71]
It is widely known that such practices, reminiscent of the previous one-party
state, are longstanding in Angola. By contrast, the Law on the Right of
Assembly and Demonstration only allows authorized public demonstrations to take
place outside working hours, and has been used by the authorities to prevent
legitimate public protest.[72]

For example, the MPLA had access to the
city's main stadium for its campaign rally in Cabinda on August 28, and the
government administration was closed. Local journalists and a lawyer in Cabinda
told Human Rights Watch that no opposition party or civil society organisation
had ever been allowed to use the main stadium or pavilion for their activities:
"The Tafe stadium and sports pavilion only opens when the governor wants to
organize something," a local lawyer remarked.[73]

Human Rights Watch also witnessed how in
the cities of Huambo and Cabinda the transport division of the Angolan National
Police closed off city streets for motorcycle races that formed part of MPLA
campaign events.[74]
Human Rights Watch received no report of similar cooperative attitudes from the
side of the state administration toward opposition party events.

In addition, as a side-effect of the
president's unprecedented series of provincial visits for campaigning purposes,
airspace was frequently closed. This hampered efforts of other campaigners.
According to Angolan practice, national airspace is closed off and scheduled
flights cancelled without prior warning for several hours before and after the
president travels.

Government Obstruction of Independent
National Observers

Domestic
election observation was permitted for the first time during the parliamentary
elections, in accordance with the election observation law passed in 2005. This
important initiative has the potential to contribute to the national and
international credibility of election processes in Angola. National observers,
who were far more numerous than international ones, are likely to be more alert
to flaws on polling day than short-term international observers, most of whom
did not speak Portuguese or any other Angolan languages. However, this
opportunity was largely missed in the 2008 parliamentary elections, as many
national observers were denied accreditation and others only accredited at the
very last minute. Some of this was due to bureaucratic delays and the
burdensome requirement that national observers provide evidence of having no
criminal record. This requirement was eventually dropped in most provinces but
retained in Luanda.

The government seemed particularly keen to
limit the number of election day observers from civil society groups that it
perceived as independent, especially in Luanda. Fewer than half of the national
observers trained by the Civil Society Electoral Platform, a coalition of civil
society organizations-1,300 out of 2,640-received accreditation.[75]
Accreditation was most restricted in Luanda: only 28 Electoral Platform
observers were accredited out of the proposed 370. Another civil society
coalition hosted by the local human rights organization Mãos Livres, the
Coordination Council for Human Rights (CCDH), had all of its 100 applications
for observers in Luanda refused.

According to Angola's election observation
law and regulations, the accreditation process for national observers should
have been conducted by the provincial Electoral Commissions. However, in
Luanda, where logistical challenges were considerable due to the high number of
polling stations, the process was transferred at the last minute to the central
CNE office, and then to a previously unknown structure, the Observation Office
of Angola (Gabinete de Observação de Angola), run by a senior government
official.

The decision to refuse the majority of
observer accreditation applications in Luanda was announced on state television
only 12 hours before polls opened. The decision, as explained in the
announcement, was on the grounds of the Justice Ministry's having detected "forged"
evidence of a clean record by 90 percent of applicants.[76]
Yet, despite the seriousness of the accusations, no judicial action has been
taken subsequently against the rejected observers, nor has they been given any
official explanation for the rejection of their applications.[77]
According to the EU EOM, the authorities in Luanda refused to accept criminal
record checks obtained through a fast-track service-an unofficial method widely
used to avoid lengthy procedures.[78]

The Electoral Platform denied the
accusation of forged records, and made a public statement on election day expressing
its "deep concern that the CNE deliberately limited the number of independent
observers in Luanda, which is home to about one-third of all Angolan voters,
obstructing impartial and independent verification, and undermining confidence
in the process."[79]
The lack of observation data for Luanda has undermined the value of the overall
observer results, making them almost "meaningless," one international observer
told Human Rights Watch.[80]

By contrast, several government-sponsored
civil society associations received their accreditations without major
problems. Of these, only the Angolan Bar Association voiced any criticism of
the conduct of the elections, while most declared the elections "free, fair,
transparent, and democratic."[81]

The preferential treatment apparently given
to government-funded civil society organizations in allowing them to observe
the elections is a strong indicator of an official attempt to weaken national
observer groups that are more likely to be independent and speak out about their
findings. The government had already previously expressed suspicion about the
involvement of civil society organizations funded by foreign donors in civic
education for voter registration. The CIPE head and Minister of Territorial
Administration Virgílio Fontes Pereira articulated this in September 2006 when
he said, during a meeting with civil society organizations engaged in civic
education, that some NGOs were "tied to foreign interests."[82]
At the same time the government has denied state funding for the large part of
these civil society organizations, so they have depended on often unpredictable
foreign donor money to conduct civic education and train and deploy observers.
The government has long followed the practice, however, of selecting
MPLA-friendly civil society organizations for legalisation as "associações de
utilidade pública" ("associations of public interest"), which makes them
eligible for regular government funding.[83]

One of the few Angolan human rights
organizations which has regularly criticized the government's conduct of the
election process, the AJPD, was officially informed on the eve of polling day
about a lawsuit filed by the attorney general in 2003, threatening the AJPD
with closure on the grounds that its statutes are not in conformity with the
law. The AJPD has presented counter-arguments and has been awaiting trial
since. Why it took the authorities five years to act is unclear.

Human Rights Watch has argued that the
government's unease with independent human rights scrutiny over the elections
period contributed to its precipitate decision to close down the office of the
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Angola in May 2008,
three months before the elections.[84]

Irregularities
in Conduct of Voting, Counting, and Tabulation

Voting day was marred by widespread
logistical and procedural flaws, most visibly in Luanda (where voting was
extended to the following day), but also in other provinces. The EU EOM
presented the most detailed analysis of observed flaws in its final report.[85]
The main problems, beyond late or non-opening of many polling stations, flawed
distribution of ballot papers, and late accreditation of polling station staff,
party delegates, and national observers, included serious breaches of
safeguards against fraud: The voters' roll was not available in most cases, and
where it was available, it was not used to check voters' identity.[86]
In addition, the government allowed no independent scrutiny of the results
tabulation.

The European Union observers concluded that
lack of technical experience was the main reason for these flaws, rather than a
deliberate attempt to commit fraud. [87]
Yet, as an international observer told Human Rights Watch, the considerable
scope of the breaches hampered the transparency of the process: "It is
difficult to judge the impact the verified irregularities had on the election
results, because too many safeguards for best practice were breached."[88]

Flawed
voter verification

SADC Guidelines require the existence of an
updated and accessible voters' roll, and national safeguards to protect against
people voting more than once.[89]
The Electoral Law provided for the use of a voters' roll as an important
safeguard. Absent a voters' roll in print or electronic version, indelible ink
applied to voters' fingers was the only safeguard left during the polls, yet
procedures to check each voter's fingers before voting were not applied
consistently.[90]

According to the EU EOM, one of the main
reasons for the lack of voters' rolls on polling day was their late submission
by the CIPE to the CNE: only on August 17, three weeks before the elections.
This was much too late to verify and correct possible errors and publish the
rolls as prescribed by law.[91]
The voter registration process carried out by the CIPE allowed political
parties and observers only restricted access to the central voter register
database (Ficheiro Central do Registo Eleitoral, FICRE), and no external audit
was conducted.[92]"Nobody knows whether the voters' rolls available on polling day were
correct," an international observer told Human Rights Watch.[93]

In addition, in a controversial last-minute
decision on September 3, the CNE allowed that voters could cast their vote
wherever they wanted within the municipality where they resided. According to
the Electoral Law, votes from voters who lost their voter cards or voted
elsewhere than originally registered should be cast in special ballot boxes, in
order that they could be counted separately at provincial level.[94]
According to the EU EOM, this CNE decision aimed to facilitate voting, but the
decision came too late for polling station officials to be instructed on the
changed procedures.[95]
Local and international observers told Human Rights Watch that the counting
procedures to deal with these special ballot boxes in practice was largely left
to the discretion of polling station officials and thus varied greatly.[96]

"As a consequence of the fact that in most
cases voters' rolls were not available or not used, and of the lack of uniform
criteria for counting the special ballot boxes, it will be impossible to
establish beyond doubt how many people actually did not vote," an international
observer told Human Rights Watch.[97]

Lack
of independent scrutiny of the tabulation process

The SADC Principles and Guidelines
Governing Democratic Elections establish that member states should allow
unrestricted access of political parties and observers to the counting centres,
as an integral part of the state's responsibility to ensure the transparency
and integrity of the election process.[98]

However, national observers only had access to some counting
centers at provincial level, and international observers were not allowed
unrestricted access to the National Tabulation Centre in Luanda to monitor the
final tabulation process.[99]
Taking into consideration the breaches of crucial safeguards against fraud
during the polls, independent monitoring of the counting and
tabulation process throughout the whole country would have been particularly
important. In addition, results were not published at the polling stations, as
required by the Regulations of the Electoral Law, making it difficult to
compare local figures with the final tabulated results.[100]
The EU EOM concluded that since they were not allowed to monitor the tabulation
process and voters' rolls were not used, it could not confirm the high turnout
reported by the CNE.[101]

Need
for an independent post-elections inquiry

Despite the range and scope of the observed
procedural irregularities and breaches of crucial safeguards against fraud,
only a few formal complaints were filed by opposition parties. UNITA formally
challenged the election results in Luanda, requesting a rerun. It filed a
complaint with the CNE on September 7, claiming that the CNE's decision to allow
voters to cast their vote wherever they wanted within their municipality of
residence, to allow polling stations to remain open after dark, and to extend
the polls to a second day in Luanda were illegal, and that the CNE failed to
ensure timely delivery of material to polling stations and enforce safeguards
against double voting. The CNE's rejection was appealed before the
Constitutional Court on September 11, which on September 16 upheld the CNE's
position. The court ruled that UNITA's complaint was unfounded, among other
reasons because complaints were not filed by party delegates at the polling
stations, as required by law.[102]

According to the EU EOM report, the
opposition parties primarily failed to file complaints effectively due to lack
of experience and technical knowledge of the legal procedures, but also due to
a lack of definition in the Electoral Law about how to file complaints
regarding breaches committed by the election management bodies themselves.[103]

At this writing, no opposition party or observer
group has publicly presented evidence that the verified irregularities were
deliberate. However, UNITA presented a post-elections report detailing a number
of serious allegations of irregularities that had not been referred to by
international observers.[104]
These included allegations of significant discrepancies between the numbers of
polling stations that had been approved and those whose results figured in the
final CNE voting figures, discrepancies between the numbers of distributed,
received, and used ballot papers in several provinces, deliberate
non-accreditation of more than half of opposition party delegates at the
polling stations, and interference in the election management by the president's
Military Office and state security Information Services.[105]

Human Rights Watch has already called for
an independent and impartial inquiry of irregularities reported on voting day,
but this has not been answered.[106]It remains vital to establish how far irregularities affected people's
right to vote in the first elections in 16 years, and to avoid similar
scenarios in future elections.[107]
On September 19, 2008, the CNE announced a commission of enquiry to prepare a
report within 30 days.[108]
At this writing, nearly five months later, neither the full composition of this
commission nor its report has been disclosed to the public. This raises serious
doubts about the adequacy and independence of this purported inquiry.

VII.
Election-Related Violence in Huambo and Benguela

The voting in the September 2008 elections
was free from violence, a first in Angola. The same was not entirely true of
the pre-election period, however. Prior to the election campaign, Human Rights
Watch highlighted cases of intimidation and unchecked violence by local MPLA
supporters in rural areas of Huambo, Benguela, and Bie.[109]

Huambo, Bie, and the rural areas of
Benguela have long been strongholds of UNITA and received a high number of
demobilized UNITA combatants after the end of the civil war in 2002. However,
in September 2008's elections, UNITA lost its lead in those provinces, having
won the majority of parliamentary seats in the 1992 elections; in 2008 UNITA
won only one seat in Bie.[110]

The "Bilateral Mechanism" established
between the MPLA and UNITA to deal with outstanding issues from the 2002 peace
agreement has been discussing such election-related violent incidents, and some
joint MPLA-UNITA delegations have conducted investigations on the ground
following the most serious incidents, yet the results of these investigations
have not been published. Since 2006 the Roman Catholic Church's Justice and
Peace Commissions have organized "Pro Pace" peace congresses to promote
political tolerance in a number of dioceses across the country
where there has been a pattern of political violence. However, several priests
of provincial Justice and Peace Commissions have complained to Human Rights
Watch about intimidation and accusations from local MPLA officials of being
friendly toward UNITA.[111]

As the election neared, there was a
noticeable improvement. During the campaign, police forces offered better
security for opposition parties, which allowed them to campaign freely in more
areas than before.[112]
However, Human Rights Watch documented some of the incidents that did occur in
Huambo and Benguela, as highlighted below.

Incidents in Huambo

In Huambo
province Human Rights Watch documented three incidents of violence against
UNITA delegations trying to campaign during the election campaign period. The
police escorted the UNITA delegations and did intervene to prevent further
escalation, but there is no indication that the police have prosecuted those
suspected of responsibility for the attacks.

The first two incidents took place between
Londwimbali town and Ngalanga commune, an area that has witnessed sporadic
political violence in past years. UNITA provincial
secretary Anastásio Vianeke, who had been part of the UNITA delegation
travelling there, told Human Rights Watch that they had been escorted by a
senior police commander and several police officers. According to Vianeke,
about 35 kilometers from Londwimbali town, his car and a truck carrying UNITA
members were attacked by a group of about 100 people who threw stones and hit
the vehicles with sticks, while others blocked the road. "They were prepared
and waiting for us-some were wearing MPLA t-shirts," Vianeke said. He said that
the people waiting by the road had shouted, "They've arrived, we must attack
them, kill them, throw them in the wells. No one is going to escape today." The
policemen got out of the car and fired shots into the air, whereupon the
attackers ran away, and the delegation continued towards Ngalanga, while two
police officers remained behind. When the delegation reached a place known as
Aldeia Cinco (Village 5), another crowd of people started throwing stones at
the car and truck. The police officers again fired shots into the air. The
UNITA supporters apprehended one of the attackers, and, according to Vianeke,
later handed him over to the police commander.[113]
At this writing, Human Rights Watch has no information to suggest there has
been any follow up.

A third incident took place as UNITA
members were trying to hold a public meeting in the commune of Chipeio (Ekunha
municipality). UNITA provincial official Ricardo Noe Ekupa, who was part of the
delegation, told Human Rights Watch that a large group of people-assumed to be
MPLA supporters-attacked the delegation by throwing stones, injuring at least
eight people. As in the previous cases, UNITA members apprehended one man and
handed him over to the police, and reported the incident to the provincial
police commander in Huambo.[114]
A journalist who visited Chipeio days after the attack told Human Rights Watch
he had interviewed local residents who said they would attack UNITA again if they
were to come back to Chipeio. Human Rights Watch has received no indication of
action taken against the alleged perpetrators.[115]

Incidents
in Benguela

In Benguela province Human Rights Watch
documented two incidents of violence that occurred during the election campaign
in rural areas of Balombo municipality. Again, the police intervened to stop an
escalation of the violence, but there is no evidence of prosecutions having
taken place.

On August 8 in the village of Elongo
(Chindumbo commune) there was an attack by alleged MPLA supporters on the homes
of known UNITA supporters. A local researcher who visited the area in late
August told Human Rights Watch he interviewed three victims, all of them
demobilized UNITA combatants who had returned to their home village after the
2002 peace accord. According to the victims, a group of 50 men-believed by them
to be MPLA supporters from several neighboring villages-destroyed six of their
houses and a community meeting point (jango), stole some of their belongings, and
physically attacked their wives. The attackers had arrived early in the morning
at their houses, armed with machetes, stones, and picks, destroyed their homes,
and then threatened to kill them. One victim told the local researcher they had
filed complaints with the police, who had arrested four attackers and stated
they would be prosecuted, but the interviewee did not know about further
developments.[116]

The second incident happened on August 23
in the village of Chico da Waiti (Macambombolo commune), where UNITA members
had already complained previously about violent incidents directed against
them. A UNITA provincial secretary in Benguela city, Victorino Nhany, told a
press conference that his party's delegation was attacked at the entrance to
the village, where they had intended to campaign. The delegation comprised 40
UNITA members, two members of parliament, and the provincial deputy governor
from UNITA, and was escorted by police. On the way to the village, the
delegation found the road blocked by tree trunks decorated with MPLA flags. The
police removed these obstacles and the delegation proceeded to the village,
where they were met by a group of children threatening them with knives. The
police chased them away, then a larger group of youths arrived throwing stones
at the delegation, injuring eight people and damaging five cars. The UNITA
provincial secretary said the police did not arrest anybody in this case.[117]

Government
Response

Senior MPLA officials have often said
publicly and to Human Rights Watch that such incidents were a spontaneous
expression of popular resentment against UNITA for atrocities committed during
the war.[118]
Members of churches and civil society organizations conducting civic education
campaigns told Human Rights Watch such resentments undoubtedly exist in areas
that were under UNITA control during the civil war.[119]

However, the ruling party has done nothing
to exert control over its local leaders, who in some cases are suspected of
encouraging such acts of violence. Roman Catholic priests engaged in civic
education campaigning and the Justice and Peace Commission's Pro Pace
congresses told Human Rights Watch on several occasions that uneducated
villagers were in most cases being "manipulated by more informed people."[120]

For example, the communal first secretary
of the MPLA of Macambombolo explained to Human Rights Watch that UNITA
campaigning in that area was unacceptable due to what UNITA had done during the
war, and said, "The president Jose Eduardo dos Santos in his speech spoke about
tolerance and peace. He spoke very well. But here the people rule and the
people are the MPLA."[121]

Members of various churches, civil society
organizations, and opposition parties told Human Rights Watch in June 2008 that
some local MPLA leaders in Benguela have been actively fuelling fear and
resentments against UNITA in the communities for a longer period of time. For
example, the second municipal MPLA secretary of Balombo municipality in
Benguela was quoted as having threatened UNITA members in April 2008 by saying,
"After the elections, if UNITA wins, we go back to 1992"-a clear reference to
the post-election civil war, and reportedly not an isolated statement from this
official.[122]
Despite frequent complaints from representatives of several opposition parties
and from church representatives against this specific MPLA leader, the MPLA has
not removed him.[123]

In addition, senior MPLA officials and
members of the government during the pre- campaign period repeated accusations
in public speeches that UNITA still had hidden arms caches, implying this
constitutes a danger for the elections. For example, in a controversial speech
on peace day, April 4, 2008, in Bocoio, Benguela, Defense Minister Kundy
Paihama raised alarm when he said that "some demobilized UNITA soldiers are
being prepared to launch confusion around the elections."[124]
Members of churches and civil society organizations told Human Rights Watch
they were concerned that such speeches fuelled fear among local communities.[125]
UNITA members in those areas of Benguela told Human Rights Watch they have been
threatened in the months before the elections by local MPLA leaders and
traditional authorities to leave the villages, and were in some cases attacked
by MPLA supporters.[126]
In such an environment, public speeches suggesting UNITA was still armed
clearly encouraged local MPLA members to prevent UNITA from campaigning there.

In addition, doubts remain about the
effectiveness of the police in investigating recent and earlier cases of
violence involving ruling party supporters and bringing perpetrators to court.
Especially in rural areas that have been seriously affected by the civil war,
and in which reconciliation between local MPLA and UNITA supporters remains
fragile, action of the authorities against perpetrators and instigators of
political violence continues to be crucial. The fact that for the first time
elections have passed without major incidents of violence in most parts of the
country should make it easier for strong action to be taken to hold perpetrators
accountable for the violence that did take place.

Opposition party representatives in
Benguela and Huambo told Human Rights Watch during the months before the
elections that newly appointed provincial police commanders had made efforts to
reinforce non-partisan policing. However, despite what appears to be genuine
efforts of the police during the campaign to guarantee security for opposition
parties in many parts of the country (as described above), police investigation
and prosecution of perpetrators of political violence still seems to be
inadequate. For example, the provincial police commander of Benguela,
interviewed by a local researcher in August 2008, clarified that no one had
been held accountable for the attack in Macambombolo commune on August 23,
claiming "it was difficult to identify the attackers in a riot."[127]
Local police chiefs in Benguela have previously given this excuse when asked by
Human Rights Watch for the reason for inaction in other cases of political
violence.[128]

In areas where the MPLA and UNITA are the
only political forces, and traditional authorities are increasingly aligned
with the MPLA, a possible involvement of local MPLA structures in organizing
attacks on UNITA should at least be considered and investigated by the police.

In addition, opposition politicians,
researchers, and civil society representatives in all provinces visited
repeatedly told Human Rights Watch that the state security Information Services
(Sinfo), which collaborate with the police, have been acting on behalf of the
MPLA by monitoring movements and meetings of opposition parties as well as
other people perceived to be potentially critical to the government. Our
interviewees said this has fuelled widespread fear of surveillance and state
repression, and contributed to self-censorship within Angolan society.

VIII.
Ongoing Armed Insurgency and Intimidation in Cabinda

In Cabinda, ongoing low-intensity
activities of the armed insurgency, and the government's efforts to contain the
insurgency and close down space for the local civil society movement for
self-determination, negatively affected the political climate for elections
there.[129]
Human Rights Watch found that despite a relatively calm campaign period in
August 2008, the political climate has not improved there since.

The armed separatist FLEC guerrilla
movement has been fighting for the Cabinda enclave's independence since 1975.
After 2002 the Angolan Armed Forces launched several military operations in
Cabinda that considerably weakened the guerrilla movement. In August 2006 the
government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Peace and Reconciliation in
Cabinda with a faction of FLEC represented in the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue
(FCD) and rewarded its members with a number of government posts. Members of
political parties and civil society told Human Rights Watch the 2006 peace
agreement has enjoyed little credibility, however, because the government has
not made significant political concessions, and influential parts of local
civil society were excluded from the talks. The armed insurgency has continued.

Aside from the FLEC, the independence
movement has been based on civil society, rather than political parties, as
locally- and regionally-based parties and calls for secession are prohibited by
Angolan law.[130]
Thus, the local Roman Catholic clergy in 1992 backed FLEC's successful call for
a boycott of the elections in Cabinda and in 2005 local civil society and
church representatives formed part of the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue created
as a joint ad hoc commission with FLEC to establish peace talks with the
Angolan government. However, the Angolan constitution does not make a clear
distinction between peaceful and armed movements calling for secession.[131]
International human rights law, although permitting governments to take action
against opposition groups using violence, does not allow the banning of
political parties because they are regionally based or solely because they
peacefully support autonomy or even secession.[132]
In November 2006 the authorities banned a public debate on an autonomy statute
promoted by the opposition party Frente para a Democracia (FpD) under the
allegation that this constituted an "attempt to subvert the constitutional
order." In August 2007 a court sentenced an FpD representative to five months'
imprisonment suspended for two years for "insubordination and incitement of
violence" for attempting to distribute a news release supporting autonomy.[133]

In recent years the Angolan government has
increasingly used security concerns to crack down on the peaceful civil society
pro-independence movement and restrict freedom of expression, assembly, and
association. In 2006 the government banned the civic association and human
rights organization Mpalabanda, alleging it had incited violence. An appeal
against the ban has been pending since, but the organization's former members
complained to Human Rights Watch about continued harassment by the authorities.
For example, José Marcos Mavungo, human rights activist and former Mpalabanda
deputy president, told Human Rights Watch he has not been able to travel out of
the country since the Migration Services confiscated his passport at Cabinda
airport in July 2007, but he has not been informed of any judicial proceedings
against him.[134]

Police have also regularly intimidated and
arrested individuals belonging to church groups protesting against the new
Roman Catholic bishop appointed by the Vatican in 2005, with the justification
that the police were protecting the bishop from threats allegedly coming from
these groups.[135]
The new bishop has close family links to MPLA elites, and his appointment has
been fiercely contested by influential sectors within the local clergy.

Human Rights Watch found that in the months
before the 2008 elections, levels of surveillance and intimidation of
opposition politicians, journalists, and individuals from church and civil
society groups favoring self-determination and opposing the terms of the 2006
peace agreement have been particularly high in Cabinda.[136]

In September's elections, voter turnout in
Cabinda was high-despite some divisions within civil society on whether to
participate or abstain, and FLEC's call for a boycott. UNITA achieved its best
election results in Cabinda, where it won 31 per cent of the vote, despite
irregularities of the kind mentioned in Chapter V. This result was mainly due
to UNITA's promises to consider autonomy for the enclave within the
constitutional review process, and because it ran candidates from local civil
society who had been leaders of Mpalabanda.

During the election campaign the
environment for political parties appeared to be relatively calm. Opposition
party officials told Human Rights Watch they had experienced fewer problems
during the campaign than before. For example, the FpD campaigned under the
slogan "vote for autonomy of Cabinda," despite the previous conviction of its
representative for expressing his party's view on the matter.[137]

However, police pressure on church groups
perceived as dissident continued throughout the campaign. On August 23 the
police briefly detained five catechists of the dissident Catholic movement
Lumbundunu, to prevent them from holding a public religious ceremony. They were
released after a week, without charge. This happened despite alleged orders
from the police commander to abstain from arrests in Cabinda city during the
election campaign "in order to avoid damage to the image of the government," as
a human rights activist told Human Rights Watch. A member of the group told
Human Rights Watch the provincial Sinfo delegate had threatened him in May
2008, saying, "We are going to prove that you organize political activities."[138]

The early presence in Cabinda of
international long-term observers from the European Union may have contributed to
government efforts to temporarily reduce ostentatious surveillance by police
and Sinfo agents. However, international observers abstained from observing
elections further north than the surrounding area of Cabinda city for security
concerns, due to reports of ongoing armed attacks from the FLEC. This left the
most sensitive areas in the north unmonitored by international observers.[139]
Local journalists, human rights activists, and priests described the situation
in the northern border regions to Human Rights Watch as "unpredictable,"
especially since FLEC had called for an election boycott.[140]

Since the elections, the clampdown against
civilians accused of "crimes against the security of the state" has continued.
On September 16-one week after the election-the former Voice of America
correspondent Fernando Lelo was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for "crimes
against the security of the state" and acts of rebellion allegedly committed
together with four soldiers of the Angolan Armed Forces. He had been tried in
May by a military court that did not produce evidence of the charges against
him. Local human rights activists and journalists told Human Rights Watch that
Lelo's conviction had been deliberately delayed until after the elections, in
order to prevent popular unrest or damage to the MPLA's election campaign in
Cabinda.[141]
The arbitrariness of Lelo's detention and denial of a fair trial raises
concerns about what will happen with another 14 civilians who have been in
pretrial detention for "crimes against the security of the state" since their
arrest between December 2007 and April 2008. Human Rights Watch has documented
that these civilians, and the soldiers co-accused with Fernando Lelo, have been
beaten and tortured in military custody.[142] A
lawyer confirmed to Human Rights Watch that in October 2008 another seven
civilians were arrested in Cabinda and across the border in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, accused of crimes against the security of the state, and
were being held under the same detention conditions in Cabinda.[143]

Since the elections the authorities have
also continued to impose arbitrary travel restrictions on individuals in
Cabinda. From October 15 to early December 2008, the Catholic priest Pedro Sevo
Agostinho was prevented from leaving Angola after a short visit to Cabinda from
Spain, where he had been studying. The Migration Services gave no explanation
for confiscating his passport, which was eventually returned to him.[144]

IX. Recommendations

To the
Angolan Government

Regarding management
and oversight of the elections

Reform the
National Electoral Commission to ensure its members reflect a genuine
balance between ruling party and opposition, and include also independent
representatives from civil society.

Provide the
CNE with adequate resources to run the next and subsequent elections, and
ensure its full independence.

Establish a
commission of inquiry that impartially, thoroughly, and transparently
investigates violations of election laws during the 2008 parliamentary
elections, and publish its results.

Ensure timely
and equal access to state funding for all political parties

Guarantee
that updated voters' rolls are available and used to check voter identity
in upcoming elections.

Ensure
timely, transparent, and impartial accreditation procedures for national
and international observers.

Allow free access of national and
international observers to all geographical areas and at all stages of the
process, including counting and tabulation of the results.

Regarding the media
environment

Enact all
necessary implementing regulations and laws relating to the 2006 press
law, in line with international standards.

Review the
press law in order to decriminalize defamation and related offenses, in
line with international standards.

Enact legislation
to guarantee that public media are accountable to the public and not the
government, as stated in the press law.

Enact
legislation to establish fair and transparent licensing procedures for
private radio and television, and ensure supervision by an independent
body, as stated in the press law, in order to prevent discriminatory
licensing practices and to enhance diversity of information throughout the
country.

Enact
legislation regarding the establishment of the National Council on Media
(Conselho Nacional da Comunicação Social) as an independent body, as
stated in the press law, with sufficient powers to play its role
effectively.

Ensure equal access for all political
parties to the state media beyond stipulated airtime during the official
election campaign.

Regarding
acts of political violence and intimidation

Ensure free
and secure access by all political parties to all parts of the country at
all times, and not only during the official campaign period.

Ensure that
all allegations of political violence and intimidation that occurred
during and before the election campaign are investigated promptly, and
that persons against whom there is evidence of criminal liability for
these acts are prosecuted and brought to a speedy and impartial trial.

Ensure that
agents of the police and of the Information Services act professionally
and impartially at all times, including before and during the campaign
period.

Guarantee the right to a fair trial to
persons accused of state security offences related to the armed conflict
in Cabinda, and ensure the freedom of expression, association, and
assembly there as elsewhere in the country..

To
Future National and International Observers

Take into
account all aspects of the election process, before and during the election
campaign, including media bias, intimidation, and the use of state
resources, when assessing election fairness.

Issue public
statements, noting any concerns about preelection human rights conditions
and recommending corrective measures ahead of the polls, in a timely
fashion so that remedial action can be taken.

Remain in the country for a reasonable
period beyond the polls to ensure monitoring of the tabulation process.

Acknowledgments

The report was researched by two Human Rights Watch
researchers and written by a Human Rights Watch researcher with the assistance
of a consultant. It was edited by Carolyn Norris, deputy director of the Africa
Division of Human Rights Watch, and Ian Gorvin, senior program officer. Legal
review was conducted by Clive Baldwin, senior legal advisor. Charlene Harry,
associate for the Africa Division, provided production assistance.

Human Rights Watch acknowledges with gratitude the
contribution provided in and outside Angola by members of local and
international civil society organizations, churches and political parties,
journalists, lawyers, national and international election observers and
government officials who agreed to be interviewed for this report. We own
especial gratitude to those individuals who gave us invaluable support during
our research on the ground and to NOVIB for the funding that made this research
possible.

[8]
SADC Principles and Guidelines (2004), section 2.1.7 stipulates impartiality of
the electoral institutions. Both the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the
Pan-African Parliament have urged the government to reform the CNE as an
independent and impartial body. See Parliamentary Forum of the Southern African
Development Community: Interim statement of the Registration Mission to the
Republic of Angola 19th to 24th March, 2007; Pan-African
Parliament: Interim statement on the Observer Mission to the Parliamentary
Elections in Angola, September 7, 2008.

[10]
The Voter Registration Law (3/05) stipulated in article 9,3 that voters living
abroad are to be registered only "as far as material conditions and
accompanying mechanisms by the competent entities" are established.

[11]
The Supreme Court suggested that the change in legislation may not be
implemented for the time being "for exceptional reasons of public interest." Tribunal Supremo (Tribunal Constitucional): Acordão, Processo 17/05,
submitted to UNITA on February 6, 2008, p. 8.

[16]
The Press Law (7/06) in article 74 defines under "crimes of abuse of press
freedom" among others " fraudulent promotion of persecution and defamation
campaigns, through the systematic and continued publication of partially or
totally false information about facts, attitudes, and professional, administrative
or commercial performance of any person." See Human Rights Watch, Still Not
Fully Protected: Rights to Freedom of Expression and Information under Angola's
New Press Law, vol. 18, no. 11(A), November 2006,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/11/15/still-not-fully-protected, p. 11.

[17]
For a detailed analysis of the 2006 Press Law in the light of international
standards, the implications of lacking implementing legislation, and associated
recommendations, see Human Rights Watch, Still Not Fully Protected.

[18]
Issuing basic laws with general provisions that need to be followed by specific
legislation detailing implementation is a common feature of civil law countries
such as Angola. Ibid., p. 17, footnote 48.

[25] "Parliament rejects projects of the Law on the Right to Broadcast and
the CNCS" ("Parlamento rejeita projectos de Lei do Direito de Antena e do
CNCS"), Angop, July 9, 2008. Two parliamentary commissions had rejected
the bill on the CNCS, arguing that there were already two pending proposals
from the government and the CNSC that needed to be considered first.

[27]
According to the EU observer mission media monitoring, from August 11 to
September 3, quantitatively the MPLA occupied between 57 and 65 percent of
airtime and space, UNITA between 12 and 19 percent, and the rest of the
opposition parties together less than 4.8 percent on the public media (TPA1,
RNA, and Jornal de Angola). European Union Election Observation Mission
(EU EOM) Angola, Preliminary statement, September 8, 2008.

[28]
The EU EOM, the Pan-African Parliament, the United States Embassy, the Angolan
Bar Association, the National Civil Society Electoral Platform, and the Council
of Coordination of Human Rights.

[30]
According to OPSA, the MPLA featured on the back or front page of 22 out of 91
editions of Jornal de Angola, while other parties only occupied the same
space four times (UNITA three times and FNLA once). Observatório
Político e Social de Angola (OPSA), "Posição sobre as eleições legislativas de
2008 em Angola," July 2008.

[31]
Human Rights Watch interview with civil society representatives and journalists
in Luanda, May to September 2008.

[32]
For example, coverage of the president's visit to Saurimo on TPA1 evening news
on August 23, with repeated coverage of the same event on August 24, 2008.

[34]
According to the EU EOM media monitoring from August 11 to September 3, 2008,
more than 46 percent and 41 percent of the news that TPA1 and RNA allocated to
UNITA was presented in a negative tone. See EU EOM, Final Report, p. 26.

[40]See "Angola: Doubts over Free and Fair Elections,"
Human Rights Watch news release, August 13, 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/13/angola-doubts-over-free-and-fair-elections.
Also, two months before the elections the privately-owned
Rádio Despertar was threatened with suspension by the government on a technical
issue: its signal reached beyond the geographic area (Luanda) for which it was
licensed. The issue was resolved and Rádio Despertarcontinued broadcasting.

[41]
Human Rights Watch interview with local journalists in Cabinda, August 28,
2008. Rádio Comercial in Cabinda, Rádio 2000 in Huila, and Rádio Morena in
Benguela were set up by senior MPLA officials before the 1992 elections.

[48]
The Vatican's nuncio in Luanda recently stated that the government has signaled
to be willing to lift the blockage of Rádio Ecclésia at the occasion of the
Pope's planned visit to Angola in March."Nuncio expects
lifting of Rádio Ecclésia blockage to country-wide broadcasting" (Núncio
apostólico espera levantamento de bloqueio ã emissão da Ecclésia para todo o
país"), Apostolado, February 2, 2009.

[49]
After the incident Cardoso was arrested, but initially he was only accused of
illegal possession of arms and was quickly released. Leitão told Human Rights
Watch the police later launched a criminal investigation against Cardoso for
attempted murder. Human Rights Watch interview with Carlos Leitão (PADEPA),
Luanda, March 20, 2008, and phone interview with lawyer André Dambi, January
21, 2009.

[50]Official harassment against the former PADEPA president Carlos
Leitão has continued since the elections: On December 16, 2008, Leitão
was arrested on the orders of the attorney general, accused of having forged
the party statutes. The Supreme Court had previously dismissed the respective
complaint. He was released on January 8, 2009, and is awaiting trial. Human
Rights Watch phone interview with lawyer André Dambi, January 21, 2009. The Cardoso PADEPA faction running in the elections did not reach the
minimum of o.5 per cent of the votes required to continue to be registered as a
political party.

[59]
Voice of America reported that following the third national Congress of the
MPLA in May 2008, 70 businessmen donated the equivalent of US$30 million for
MPLA's campaign. Luis Costa, "MPLA victory was prepared
meticulously" ("Vitória do MPLA foi preparada a rigor"), Voz da América,
September 26, 2008.

[72]
Law on the Right of Assembly and Demonstration (16/91), art. 5. See also Human
Rights Watch, Unfinished Democracy. Media and Political Freedoms in Angola,
July 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/77703.

[81]
Declaration of the Liga dos Militares de Angola na Reserva (Angola Military
Reservists' League, LIMIAR), Angop, September 8, 2008. Other government-funded
organizations accredited as observers, such as the Conselho Nacional de
Juventude (National Youth Council, CNJ), and the Instituto Angolano de Sistemas
Eleitorais e Democracia (Angolan Institute of Electoral Systems and Democracy,
IASED) made similar statements after the polls.

[83] Regulamento das associações de utilidade pública (decree 5/01). A
striking example for ruling party bias in attributing this status is the fact
that the National Spontaneous Movement (Movimento Nacional Espontâneo, MNE)-the
president's youth support group-is registered as a public interest association.

[102] Tribunal Constitucional: Acórdão No 74/2008, September 16, 2008,
available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.ao. Complaints at
national level were later also filed by Frente para Democracia (FpD), PDP-ANA,
PLD, and AD Coligação.

[112]
The EU EOM, which had long-term observers in all 18 provinces claimed that
there were a few isolated cases of election-related violence in Benguela,
Huambo, and Luanda. EU EOM Angola, Final Report, p. 20.

[116]
Human Rights Watch phone and email interviews with a local researcher in
Benguela (name withheld), August-September 2008. The researcher conducted the
interview with three victims from UNITA in Elongo on August 28, 2008.

[131]
The constitution defines Angola as a "unitary and indivisible State" that will
"fight against any separatist attempt." Constitutional Law (1992), art. 5.

[132]
See, for example, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in United
Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey (19392/92) (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 121. See
also the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights ruling in
Communication 75/92, Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, Eighth
Activity Report 1994-95.

[139]
Luisa Morgantini, head of the EU EOM Angola, explained that the EU EOM
abstained from observing the interior of Cabinda in order "not to put [our]
observers at risk." EU EOM Angola press conference, Cabinda, August 28, 2008.
Observers from the pan-African Parliament followed the EU EOM's approach in
this regard.