rgentine citizens, submitted a complaint to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter "the Commission")
alleging that the
Republic of Argentina (hereinafter "the State" or "Argentina")
had violated articles 11 and 16 of the American Declaration of
the Rights and
Duties of Man (hereinafter "the American Declaration")
and article 9 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights in
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter
"Protocol of San Salvador"), and leaving open the possibility
of the Commission
finding other violations of fundamental rights recognized by the
relevant international instruments.

I. REPORTED FACTS

2. According to the complaint, Resolution 285 of August 10,
1965, issued by the Board of Directors of Yacimientos Petrolíferos
Fiscales
(hereinafter "YPF"), at that time a state-owned company,
authorized the President of that company to conclude an agreement
with the
authorized representatives and unions on establishing a compensatory
retirement fund called YPF Compensatory Retirement Fund [Fondo
Compensador para Jubilados de YPF] (hereinafter "the Compensatory
Fund").

3. By Resolution 494 of December 21, 1965, the Board of Directors
authorized the President of YPF to proceed to carry out the relevant
agreements, in order to put the Compensatory Fund into operation,
taking into account that its legal constitution was conditional
upon the final
approval of the Nation's Executive Branch. By the same token,
it authorized the President to make the corresponding deductions
from the
workers, as of January 1, 1966, to be paid into the above Fund.
Finally, it provided for the return of any contributions made
to the Fund in the
event that the legal establishment of the Compensatory Fund should
fail to come to fruition due to legal or administrative reasons
beyond the
control of the parties involved.

4. The above mentioned Fund was created subject to the condition
that the Government authorize its operation. This condition was
never
fulfilled, but the deductions began to be taken as of January
1, 1966.

5. On October 10, 1978, through Decree No. 44, the Board of
Directors of YPF agreed to withdraw its request for authorization
of the Fund
from the National Executive Branch, and provided for its liquidation;
deciding, in general terms, to discontinue the benefit which had
been given
to retirees since its inception, offering those affected a sum
equal to ten times the amount of the benefit, in exchange for
relinquishing those
benefits, and ordering that the funds be kept as reserves in anticipation
of potential applications for the return of contributions made
to the fund.

6. The petitioner, in his capacity as official representative
of a number of contributors to the fund, became a party to the
suit brought on
November 9, 1981 before the federal judge of La Plata against
YPF by other interested parties demanding an accounting. This
suit concluded
with a judgement in favor of the interests of the petitioner,
ordering YPF to return the funds to those who had contributed
to it. This decision was
appealed, presenting the argument, among others, that the suit,
being labor-related, had exceeded the statute of limitations.
On the 17th of
May, 1994, the Second Federal Court of Appeals of La Plata, ruling
that, in effect, the nature of the action fell into the category
of labor rather
than that of social security, applied the statute of limitations
established by article 256 of the Employment Law of Argentina
1 , and overturned the
judgement of the trial court.2

7. The petitioner submitted a motion seeking clarification,
which was denied on May 31, 1994 on the grounds that it was submitted
too late.
Subsequently, the petitioner submitted an appeal to the Court
of Appeals of La Plata, which was also rejected, on August 23,
1994. The
petitioner then lodged a complaint appeal to the National Supreme
Court, which in turn was denied on March 14, 1995.

8. The petitioner maintains that the ruling on the statute
of limitations by the Federal Court of Appeals of La Plata violated
domestic Argentine
law which prohibits the judge from making an official ruling on
the statue of limitations, as provided in article 3964 of the
Civil Code of
Argentina. 3The petitioner further maintains that the rule for
the statute of limitations applied by the Federal Court of Appeals
of La Plata was
incorrect. The complainant maintains that given that the Compensatory
Fund was of a social security nature and not labor-related, the
applicable standard was article 4023 of the Civil Code 4 relating
to joint obligations and not the statute of limitations of Article
256, already
described, relative to labor-related obligations.

II. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

9. The petition was transmitted to the State on December 18,
1995, which responded on April 30, 1996, setting out the reasons
for requesting
that the Commission declare the claim inadmissible.

10. In the first place, it maintained that the Republic of
Argentina has not ratified the Protocol of San Salvador. Regarding
the official ruling on
the statute of limitations against the interests of those represented
by the petitioner, the State claims that the objection to the
ruling on the
statute of limitations was contested by the defendant (YPF) with
respect to all actions, including suits brought by the petitioner
and which, at the
petitioner's request, became part of the suit initiated for the
same purpose by another attorney, for which reason it is not true
that the Court of
Appeals issued an official ruling.

11. On April 9, 1996, the petitioner proceeded to broaden their
claim. In its broadened form, reference was made to the rulings
by the Fourth
Federal Trial Court of La Plata regarding professional fees imposed
on the petitioner's representatives at the request of YPF's
representatives. The petitioner further maintains that this judgment
harms the property rights of the principals, given that the payment
of
expenses and court costs must be paid by them. The petitioner
requested, furthermore, that precautionary measures be issued
by the
Commission in order to prevent these fees from being paid. On
April 11 of the same year, the Commission sent a communication
to the
petitioner in which it informed him that such measures were not
justified. It should be pointed out that the petitioner did not
provide to the
Commission any proof indicating that domestic remedies have been
exhausted in regard to the broadening of the claim.

12. The State's response was submitted to the petitioner on
May 17, 1996. In response to the State's observations, the petitioner
alleged
additional violations of rights provided for in Articles 21, 24
and 29 of the American Convention (hereinafter "the American
Convention") and
broadened his arguments as follows:

i. The reported facts constitute essentially a violation of
personal property rights, consisting in
the misappropriation by YPF of contributions paid into the Compensatory
Fund.

ii. Both civil and political rights as well as economic, social
and cultural rights are indissoluble
elements which form the basis for the recognition of human dignity,
in accordance with the
Preamble to the "Protocol of San Salvador".

iii. The juridical nature of the business involved is social
security-related, not labor-related.

13. On September 3, 1996, the petitioner's observations were
submitted to the State, which in turn responded on October 24,
1996, reiterating
its request that the Commission find the petition inadmissible.

14. Further, the Commission received, on October 3, 13 and
16, 1996, respectively, communications from the petitioner stating
that he was
being hounded and harassed in the courts by virtue of rulings
which were made against his clients' interests, relating to the
charging of
professional fees.

15. On November 5, 1996, the Commission transmitted to the
claimant the observations made by the State. The petitioner responded
on
December 5, 1996, reaffirming the submitted claim.

16. Subsequently, the Commission transmitted to the State of
Argentina, on December 19, 1996, the above mentioned response
of the
petitioner. The State responded on the 8th of January, 1997, asserting
that it was not contesting the "dogmatic statements"
made by the
petitioner.

17. On June 5, 1997, the petitioner requested the Commission
once again, to issue precautionary measures because of the ruling
regarding
charges for fees against representatives of the petitioner (supra
6). The Commission responded to this on July 7, 1997, informing
the
petitioner that such measures were not appropriate, given that
they were not provided for in the requirements specified in Article
29 of the
Commission's Regulations.

III. ADMISSIBILITY

18. The request meets the formal requirements of admissibility
provided for in Article 46 of the American Convention and Article
32 of its
Regulations.5

a. The petitioner has exhausted the remedies within the domestic
jurisdiction.

b. The claim was submitted within the time period established
by Article 46(b) of the Convention
and Article 38 of the Commission's Regulations.

c. To the Commission's knowledge, the matters which are the
subject of the claim are not
pending in any other international proceeding.

19. In accordance with Article 47(b) of the American Convention,
the Commission can declare a petition inadmissible when it does
not state
facts tending to establish a violation of rights guaranteed in
the Convention.

20. The Commission must establish whether the facts previously
described could constitute a violation of the human rights protected
by
Articles 21, 24 and 29 of the Convention, cited by the petitioner.

IV. ANALYSIS

21. Before proceeding to analyze whether petitioner's claims
satisfy the requirements of Article 47(b) of the Convention, the
Commission
wishes to point out that it does not, in principle, have the power
to make findings on how a State's domestic courts interpret and
apply juridical
rules.

22. In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, such
functions should be within the authority of the competent organs.
What the
Commission must verify, in a specific case, is whether a court
ruling violates any of the rights protected by the American Convention,
not
whether it is contrary to the domestic legal system of a State
Party.

23. In the area of international human rights law, it is relevant
to determine whether a judicial decision is in violation of the
international
obligations assumed by the party State. As the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights affirmed, referring to the consideration
of domestic laws
in relation to their compatibility with international treaties,

This the Commission can and should do upon examining communications
and petitions submitted to it concerning
violations of human rights and freedoms protected by the Convention.6

A. The right to property (Article 21)

24. Article 21 of the American Convention states:

1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.
The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to
the interest of society.

2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment
of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or
social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established
by law.

3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall
be prohibited by law.

25. In this particular case, the Commission must establish
whether the decision handed down by the Federal Court of Appeals
of La Plata
could involve a violation of Article 21 of the American Convention.
It is necessary to determine, first, whether the contributions
made by the YPF
workers to the Compensatory Fund are property within the meaning
of Article 21.

26. From the Commission's reading of the case file, it becomes
apparent that it was anticipated that repayment of the contributions
made both
by YPF and by the workers would be returned should the fund be
liquidated. Taking this into account, it is clear that the sums
of money involved,
paid monthly by the employees of YPF and by the company, were
part of the patrimony of each of the respective contributors,
in proportion to
the amount contributed.

27. Further, it should be specified that the complaint was
made on behalf of 350 workers. While the complaint is a response
to the fact that
YPF, having liquidated the Compensatory Fund, did not repay to
the workers the sums they were owed based on their contributions
to the
Fund, the Commission views the matter as one of evaluating whether,
in effect, the property rights of the individuals were violated
by the State
of Argentina. The Commission assumes, then, that the Convention
is applicable in accordance with the parameters of Article 1(2),
according
to which "for the purposes of this Convention, 'person' means
any human being."

28. In accordance with a previous decision of the Commission,

...in the inter-American system, the right to property is a
personal right. The Commission is empowered to vindicate the
rights of an individual whose property is confiscated, but is
not empowered with jurisdiction over the rights of juridical
beings, such as corporations or as in this case, banking institutions.7

29. In the same decision, the Commission declared inadmissible
a petition submitted by shareholders of the Bank of Lima in which,
by virtue
of an official announcement of expropriation of all shares of
Peruvian banks which at that time belonged to private individuals,
it was claimed
that the Peruvian State had violated Article 21, among others,
of the Convention.8

30. The primary reason which led the Commission to reach the
determination referred to, was that, taking into account that
the petitioners had
claimed that the State of Peru had taken actions affecting the
rights of the Bank of Lima, individual property rights were not
at issue.

31. In this particular case, the Commission finds that what
are in question are individual rights. In effect, it is a complaint
in which violation of the
American Convention and of the American Declaration is being alleged
for the failure to repay to individuals the sums they had contributed.
Also, the Commission cannot apply to this case the reasoning used
in the previously mentioned case against Peru, which also involved
a
Compensatory Fund, because the Fund in question in the instant
case did not satisfy all of the requisites for its legal operation,
given that the
Government never authorized its existence. This means that it
does not involve actions which affected a corporate entity, but
rather individuals.

32. The Commission in its Report 39/96, declared inadmissible
a petition submitted by Santiago Marzioni maintaining that the
concept of
property "cannot be extended to include a potential award,
or to the mere possibility of obtaining a favorable decision in
litigation that involves
monetary awards"9. The Commission considers that, unlike
that case, the instant case involves more than simply a legal
monetary claim. As
already noted in paragraph 2 supra, the YPF Board of Directors,
in authorizing the President to put the compensatory fund into
operation,
anticipated a return of the contributions made to the fund in
the event that the Compensatory Fund did not become legally established
for legal
or administrative reasons beyond the control of the parties involved.
In addition, according to the documents which the Commission possesses
and, in particular, a communication sent on September 27, 1978
by the Director in charge of administration to the Board of Directors
of YPF, it
was anticipated that the moment the Compensatory Fund was liquidated,
the company could be subject to claims for the return of received
contributions. In effect, that Director was proposing the issuance
of a Resolution in the following terms:

That it be stipulated that funds credited to account no. 2184
--Compensatory Retirement Fund-- be held in reserve to
respond to potential submissions seeking the return of previous
contributions to the fund.

33. Under the assumption, then, that article 21 of the Convention
is applicable in this particular case, the Commission shall proceed
to analyze
whether there is a violation of this provision.

34. In this respect, as has already been stated, it is relevant
to determine whether the decision of the Federal Appeals Court
of La Plata to
apply the statute of limitations to the suit by those whom the
petitioner represented, was a violation of property rights recognized
by the
American Convention. It should be pointed out that YPF is a corporation
which was privatized by Statute 24.145 of 1992; thus, the Commission
is not competent to analyze if said company's failure to return
the sums contributed constitutes a possible violation of personal
property rights,
given that the organs of the inter-American human rights system
do not, in principle, have the power to examine the actions of
non-state actors.

35. First, the petitioner refers to the application of the
official statute of limitations by the Court of Appeals. In this
respect, the Commission
does not consider that it can regard this fact as violating the
international obligations which the State of Argentina is obligated
to observe in its
capacity as a party to the Convention. In the particular case,
the petitioner questions a judge's interpretation of a rule of
domestic law. It is not
for this monitoring body to review the correctness of the judge's
interpretation when no direct violation of the Convention can
be inferred from it.

36. Second, the petitioner refers to an error committed by
the Court of Appeals judge in applying the rule governing the
statute of limitations for
the suit brought by petitioner's representatives along with other
YPF workers. In accordance with what was stated, given that the
process of
accounting involved a fund meant for the company's pensioners,
the nature of the suit is social security-related and not labor-related.
This, in
the judgement of the petitioner, meant that the applicable statue
of limitations was the one corresponding to ordinary civil suits
(article 4023 of
the Civil Code) and not the one which could be argued to apply
in labor-related suits, which was precisely the one the Court
of Appeals judge
applied in ruling on the statute of limitations.

37. The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals in mistakenly
applying the statute for labor issues to a suit of a civil nature
violated the
property rights of the principals, as it prevented their reimbursement
of the monies owed them. The petitioner, nevertheless, and as
will be
seen further on, did not present any evidence whatsoever that
may tend to demonstrate that the Federal Court of Appeals of La
Plata erred in
such a way as to constitute clear arbitrariness and, therefore,
a potential direct violation of the property rights protected
by the Convention.
While it is clear to the Commission that the contributions paid
by the workers could potentially have been returned to them in
the event of the
liquidation of the Compensatory Fund, it is no less clear that
in a legal claim, the courts could determine to hear the case
according to the
interpretation of rules already established for that purpose.
If the interpretation does not violate any of the rights protected
by the American
Convention, the Commission lacks the ability to review it.

B. Right to equal protection of the law (Article 24)

38. Article 24 of the American Convention establishes the general
principle according to which all persons are equal before the
law and are
entitled to its protection without discrimination. In support
of the alleged violation in the complaint, the petitioner refers
to an idea expressed by
the Labor Attorney General, codified in a decision by the same
Appeals Court judge, in a proceeding Vitale, Vicente J. and others,
vs.
Electric Services of Greater Buenos Aires, S.A., according to
which a pension fund would have "a particular solidarity"
("una solidaridad
peculiar"). The petitioner does not explain what "particular
solidarity" refers to, nor does the petitioner provide more
details on the final result of
the verdict.

39. The fact that the Labor Attorney General, in an isolated
case, referred to a Compensatory Fund as having a "particular
solidarity", is not
evidence of a violation of the principle of equality. An isolated
view expressed by the Labor Attorney General, is not sufficient
to constitute
violation of article 24 of the Convention. In any case, the Commission
notes that the above mentioned official is a representative of
the State,
who defends its interests in court, and therefore his opinion
cannot be compared to a judicial decision.

40. For the sake of illustration, it must be stressed that
Article 24 of the Convention establishes a paradigm the opposite
of which is unequal
treatment. Therefore, in order to determine that a ruling handed
down by a court violates article 24 of the Convention, it is necessary
to find, at
least, that the court ruled in a manner radically different from
a previous ruling involving a legal situation with nearly identical
factual elements.
As stated by E.W. Vierdag,

Unequal treatment can be defined as:

i. the denial of a right to someone which is accorded to others;

ii. diminishing the right accorded to some, while fully granting
it to others;

iii. the imposition of a duty on some which is not imposed
on others; or

iv. the imposition of a duty on some which is imposed less
strenuously on others.10

41. The same author continues by stating that:

It is clear that each type of unequal treatment requires a
comparison and, therefore, a standard for comparison. For this
it is necessary to determine who are the "some" and
who are the "others" in a particular case, i.e., what
categories
should be compared to others with regard to their respective legal
positions.11

42. On this matter, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
has stated the following:

Accordingly, no discrimination exists if the difference in
treatment has a legitimate purpose and if it does not lead to
situations which are contrary to justice, to reason or to the
nature of things. It follows that there would be no
discrimination in treatment of individuals by a state when the
classifications selected are based on substantial factual
differences and the aims of the legal under review. These aims
may not be unjust or unreasonable, that is, they may not
be arbitrary, capricious, despotic or conflict with the essential
oneness and dignity of humankind.12

43. In this case, it is not possible for the Commission to
apply the criteria proposed by the above quoted author and those
set forth by the
Inter-American Court, given that, as already stated, such reasoning
is not supported by the presence of any element that would legally
justify it.
Thus, the Commission cannot conclude that, in this specific case,
the State of Argentina and, in particular, the Federal Court of
Appeals of La
Plata, ruled in a manner that might raise a colorable claim of
violation of Article 24 of the American Convention.

C. Rules of interpretation (Article 29) and the American Declaration

44. The petitioner argues that civil and political rights,
as well as economic, social and cultural rights are indissoluble
elements which form the
basis for a recognition of human dignity, such as is expressed
in the Preamble to the Protocol of San Salvador.

45. The Commission and the General Assembly of the Organization
of American States have, on numerous occasions, issued findings
precisely along these same lines. For example, the Commission
has stated that "the General Assembly of the Organization
has also
repeatedly recognized that the American Declaration is a source
of international obligations for the member states of the OAS."
13 Additionally, in
the previously quoted Advisory Opinion, the Court stated:

It can be considered, then, that the official interpretation
by the Member State is that the Declaration contains and
defines those essential human rights referred to in the Charter.
Thus the Charter of the Organization cannot be
interpreted and applied as far as human rights are concerned without
relating its norms, consistent with the practice of
the organs of the OAS, to the corresponding provisions of the
Declaration.14

46. The American Declaration states the following:

Article XI. Right to the preservation of health and to well-being.

Every person has the right to the preservation of his health
through sanitary and social measures relating to food,
clothing, housing and medical care, to the extent permitted by
public and community resources.

Article XVI. Right to social security.

Every person has the right to social security which will protect
him from the consequences of unemployment, old age,
and any disabilities arising from causes beyond his control that
make it physically or mentally impossible for him to earn
a living.

47. Further, the rules of interpretation contained in Article
29 of the Convention establish the following:

No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:

a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress
the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms
recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater
extent than is provided for herein;

b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom
recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by
virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is
a party;

c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent
in the human personality or derived from representative
democracy as a form of government; or

d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international
acts of the same nature may have.

48. In this regard, the Inter-American Court has also stated:

For the States Parties to the Convention, the specific source
of their obligations with respect to the protection of human
rights is, in principle, the Convention itself. It must be remembered,
however, that, given the provisions of Article 29(d),
these States cannot escape the obligations they have as members
of the OAS under the Declaration, notwithstanding
the fact that the Convention is the governing instrument for the
States Parties thereto.15

49. In accordance with what has been stated by the Court in
relation to article 29 of the Convention, it must be determined
whether the petition
raises a colorable claim of violation by the State of any of the
provisions of the American Declaration.

50. It is worth pointing out that articles XI and XVI invoked
by the petitioner establish, for a Party State, the obligations
to protect people's right
to health and to social security. In this specific case, the Commission
does not find any connection between the rights invoked and the
dissolution of the Compensatory Fund. It had its origin in the
voluntary agreement between the company's workers and company,
which was at
that time state-owned, aimed at improving the income of retired
employees. The makeup and operation of that Fund were outside
the general
Argentine pension system. The economic benefits to the retirees
were in addition to those benefits received through the normal
pension
system. Furthermore, in the Fund's constitution, possible reasons
for the Fund's dissolution were anticipated. This implied that
the potential
rights emanating from the Fund were neither absolute nor acquired.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that the petition does not
raise a
colorable claim of violation of the above cited provisions of
the American Declaration.

D. Competence of the Commission

51. As stated previously, the international protection guaranteed
by the monitoring bodies of the American Convention is complementary
to
that provided under the domestic law of the American States, as
established in the Preamble to the Convention.16

52. The Commission has stated on other occasions that:

...the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is based
on the principle that a defendant state must be allowed to
provide redress on its own and within the framework of its internal
legal system. The effect of this rule is "to assign to
the jurisdiction of the Commission an essentially subsidiary role".17

53. The complementary role of the Commission is the basis of
the so-called "fourth instance formula" applied also
by the European human
rights system. According to this formula, the Commission cannot
review decisions handed down by national courts acting within
their authority
and applying the appropriate legal guarantees, unless it is found
that there has been a violation of some right protected by the
Convention.

54. The Commission is competent to declare a petition admissible
and rule on its merits when it raises a colorable claim that a
decision by the
domestic courts is in violation of due process, or if it tends
to characterize a violation of any of the other rights guaranteed
by the American
Convention. If the allegation is that the decision was mistaken
or even unfair but otherwise is not contrary to international
human rights
instruments, the request must be rejected according to the formula
described above:

The Commission's task is to ensure the observance of the obligations
undertaken by the States parties to the
Convention, but it cannot serve as an appellate court in order
to examine alleged errors of internal law or fact that may
have been committed by the domestic courts acting within their
jurisdiction.18

55. In the present case, the alleged violations have been studied
and from this it is not possible to establish that the courts
with domestic
jurisdiction have acted at the margin of, or in violation of the
rights protected by the Convention or by the American Declaration.
The petitioner
requests that the Commission determine whether the particular
rulings handed down by the Argentine courts and, in particular,
the ruling of the
Federal Appeals Court of La Plata, were mistaken in the interpretation
and subsequent application of certain rules of domestic civil
and labor
law regarding the statute of limitations. The Commission is not
a fourth instance court of appeals, and therefore is not competent
to review a
decision made by the judicial authorities of Argentina --or any
other member state of the OAS-- acting within their competence.

IV. CONCLUSION

56. The Commission concludes that this petition meets the requirements
of formal admissibility provided for in article 46 of the American
Convention; and that it does not establish a colorable claim of
violation of any of the rights protected by the American Convention
or by the
American Declaration. Accordingly,

THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,

DECIDES:

A. To declare the inadmissibility of the present case, in accordance
with article 47(b) of the American Convention.

B. To transmit the instant report to the parties; to make it
public; and include it in its Annual Report to the OAS General
Assembly.

Endnotes:

1. Article 2256 of the Contract Labor Law States:

There is a statute of limitations of two years on claims related
to debts deriving from individual work relationships and, in
general, from collective agreements, rulings which have the effect
of collective agreements and legal or regulatory Labor Law provisions.

This rule serves as a public order, and the time period can
not be modified by individual or collective agreements.

2. To substantiate his decision, the ruling judge stated:

The claims of the plaintiffs--in particular, the one that
prevailed, but not only that one--can not, in my opinion, be
considered either social security issues nor civil issues, but
rather labor issues.

Their basis and origin derived from a contract or agreement
between unions with formal representation for the workers and
the company which was their employer, and it concerns a fund
formed with money deducted from the workers' pay and intended
to benefit them.

(...)

If, to these considerations, is added the position of responsibility
held by the parties that initiated the plan for the deductions
which were lost, and the particular circumstance that they bore
the burden of responsibility for the workers' pay, no decisive
factors are noted which would justify considering the matter
being argued as being of a civil nature.

3. Aticle 3964. The judge can not officially supply the statute
of limitations.

4. Article 4023. Any personal suit for demand of a callable
debt has a statue of ten years, except in the case of special
circumstances.

5. The Commission declines to consider the additional request
related to fees, given that the claimant did not demonstrate having
exhausted remedies within the domestic jurisdiction.

13. Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989, "Interpretation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in the Framework of
Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights", par.
42.

14. Idem, par. 43.

15. Idem, par. 46.

16. The second paragraph of the Preamble to the American Convention
states:

Recognizing that the essential rights of man are not
derived from one's being a national of a certain state, but are
based upon attributes of the human personality, and that they
therfore justify international protection in the form of a convention
reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic
law of the American states...