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Contract

Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 – Section 2(1)(v-i) -2(1)(k) : “Works contract” means a contract made by the State Government or the public undertaking with any other person for the execution of any of its works relating to construction, repairs or maintenance of any building or superstructure, dam, weir, canal, reservoir, tank, lake, road, well, bridge, culvert, factory or workshop or of such other work of the State Government or, as the case may be, of the public undertaking, as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette specify, and include – Continue reading →

One can Complain that the label did not contain “best before date” and hence the food item was misbranded, as it contravened R.32(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. Since the item involved in this case was having a short shelf life of less than three months, it was necessary to mention only the date of manufacture on the label. Therefore, the only violation alleged by the Public Analyst was that instead of showing “best before date” on the label, the food item in this case had the label “assurance 30 days”.

I may now consider as to whether by writing the words ‘assurance 30 days’ instead of ‘best before date’, it would contravene R.32(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. By using the words “best before date”, the meaning intended to be conveyed is that the consumer must use it before that date. I may now examine whether the public would be misguided by writing the words “assurance 30 days” instead of writing ‘best before date’ on the label. For that purpose, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the word “assurance”. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, fourth edition, the word ‘assurance’ in contract means “making secure” or “insure”. In Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, Ninth Edition, the synonym of the word ‘assurance’ is ‘guarantee’. Therefore, even though the terminology found in ‘assurance 30 days’ and ‘best before date’, differs in appearance, actually, no consumer would definitely be misguided, if he happens to see the words ‘assurance 30 days’. In the said circumstances, even if the words ‘best before date’ are not there and instead, the words assurance 30 days’ are there, it will not, in any way mislead the consumer, and hence by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the product had been misbranded, particularly when the product was not adulterated.

In an case in Nehrudasan v. Food Inspector, Madurai Corporation (2010 (1) FAC 49), a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras held that the absence of the words “best before date” and use of words “use within six months from the date of manufacture” would not in any way mislead the consumer and hence, it could not be termed as misbranding of the product.

By using the language ‘best before date’, the meaning to be conveyed is that the consumers must use it before the period mentioned therein and if such a meaning can be conveyed by the language ‘assurance 30 days, it cannot be said that there was misbranding of the food item. In this case, it is clear from the words ‘assurance 30 days’ that there was guarantee for the product only for thirty days. The date of manufacture was also mentioned on the label. Therefore, any consumer, who reads ‘assurance 30 days’ would be able to know that the product would be guaranteed only for a period of thirty days from the date of manufacture. The mere change of words would in no way, in my view, mislead the usage of the product among the public and hence, it cannot be said that the product had been misbranded. In the case on hand, the absence of the words ‘best before date” would not in any way mislead the consumer and hence, by no stretch of imagination, it could be treated as misbranding of the product contravening the provisions of R.32(i) of the Rules, particularly when the food item was not adulterated.[ (2016) CriLJ 2069 : (2016) 4 JCC 2302 : (2016) 1 KHC 752 : (2016) 1 KLT 753 : (2016) 4 RCR(Criminal) 41- KERALA HIGH COURT MARTIN JOSEPH — Appellant Vs. STATE OF KERALA — Respondent]

Excess Royalty Collection Contract” means a contract for specified mineral(s) and area given to collect royalty in excess of annual dead rent, on behalf of the Government from the holder of mining lease (s) under the contract whereunder the contractor shall pay a fixed amount annually to the Government as per terms of the contract.

‘Royalty Collection Contract’ is defined in Clause (xxi) of Rule 3 as follows:

Royalty Collection Contract” means a contract for the specific mineral or minerals given to collect royalty [with or without permit fee as the case may be] on behalf of the Government from the quarry licensees and short term permit holders who excavate minor minerals from the lands specified under the contract whereunder the contractor undertakes to pay fixed amount annually to the Government save as exempted under Rule 58; Continue reading →

Bombay Securities Contracts Control Act, 1925. The words ‘ready delivery contract’ has been defined in Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the said Act which reads as under:

(4) ‘ready delivery contract’ means a contract for the purchase or sale of securities for performance of which no time is specified and which is to be performed immediately or within reasonable time.

Under the said definition ready delivery contract is a contract for purchase or sale of securities for the performance of which no time is specified and it has to be performed within reasonable time. In that light of the matter, Division Bench has made a distinction between contingent contract and regular contract. It has been held by the Division Bench that a contingent contract is not contract at all till such contingency happens. However, provision of Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956 defines the spot delivery contract as under: Continue reading →

The observation of Lord Wright (on this subject) while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Mount Albert Borough Council v. Aus. T. and G Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd. (1937) 4 All ER 206 at p. 214 (C).

“The proper law of the contract means that law which the English or other court is to apply in determining the obligations under the contract. English Law, in deciding these matters, has refused to treat as conclusive, rigid or arbitrary criteria such as lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis and has treated the matter as depending on the intention of the parties, to be ascertained in each case on a consideration of the terms of the contract, the situation of the parties & generally on all the surrounding facts. It may be that the parties have in terms in their agreement expressed what law they intend to govern, and in that case prima facie their intention will be effectuated by the court. But in most cases they do not do so. The parties may not have thought of the matter at all. Then the Court has to impute an intention, or to determine for the parties what is the proper law which, as just and reasonable persons, they ought to or would have intended if they had thought about the question when they made the contract. No doubt there are certain prima facie rules to which a Court, in deciding on any particular contract, may turn for assistance, but they are not conclusive. In this branch of law, the particular rules can only be stated as prima facie presumptions. Continue reading →

Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, LXXIV of 1952, a ‘Forward Contract’ means a contract for the delivery of goods at a future date and which is not a ready delivery contract.

A ‘Ready Delivery Contract’ for the purpose of the Act means a contract which provides for the delivery of goods and the payment of a price therefore, either immediately or within such period not exceeding eleven days after the date of the contract and sublet to such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette specify in respect of any goods, the period under such contract not being capable of extension by the mutual consent of the parties thereto or otherwise. Continue reading →

Here we collected all the unique english words used by the legislature for constituting and drafting The Indian Contract Act. We shall gradually explain the use and inherent meaning attached to each word.

(a) Every vakalatnama in any cause, appeal or matter shall be executed by the party:

Provided that a person, other than a party to the cause, appeal or matter, may file vakalatnama on the basis of Power of Attorney but shall annex original Power of Attorney with the vakalatnama. Continue reading →

In Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam, (1971) 1 SCC 619 this Court while deciding whether an agreement was void and not enforceable under Section 23 of the Indian Contact Act held:

What makes an agreement, which is otherwise legal, void is that its performance is impossible except by disobedience of law. Clearly no question of illegality can arise unless the performance of the unlawful act was necessarily the effect of an agreement.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that unless the effect of an agreement results in performance of an unlawful act, an agreement which is otherwise legal cannot be held to be void and if the effect of an agreement did not result in performance of an unlawful act, as a matter of public policy, the court should refuse to declare the CONTRACT void with a view to save the bargain entered into by the parties and the solemn promises made there under. As has been observed by Lord Wright in Vita Food Products Incorporated v. Unus Company Ltd. (in liquidation) (1939) AC 277 at p. 293):

Nor must it be forgotten that the rule by which CONTRACTs not expressly forbidden by statute or declared to be void are in proper cases nullified for disobedience to a statute is a rule of public policy only, and public policy understood in a wider sense may at times be better served by refusing to nullify a bargain save on serious and sufficient grounds.