The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, was set up on November 27, 2002, "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks", including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.

The commission's final report was lengthy and based on extensive interviews and testimony. Its primary conclusion was that the failures of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) permitted the terrorist attacks to occur and that if these agencies acted more wisely and more aggressively, the attacks could potentially have been prevented.

After the publication of its final report, the commission closed on August 21, 2004. The commission's website was shut down, but has been archived.[1]

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The members of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was established on November 27, 2002, by PresidentGeorge W. Bush and the United States Congress, with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initially appointed to head the commission.[2] However, Kissinger resigned only weeks after being appointed, because he would have been obliged to disclose the clients of his private consulting business.[3] Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell was originally appointed as the vice-chairman, but he stepped down on December 10, 2002, not wanting to sever ties to his law firm.[4] On December 15, 2002, Bush appointed former New Jersey governor Tom Kean to head the commission.[5]

By the spring of 2003, the commission was off to a slow start, needing additional funding to help it meet its target day for the final report, of May 27, 2004.[6] In late March, the Bush administration agreed to provide an additional $9 million for the commission, though this was $2 million short of what the commission requested.[7] The first hearings were held from March 31 to April 1, 2003, in New York City.[8]

Then government officials who were called to testify before the commission included:

George W. Bush – President; testimony not under oath. The session was not officially transcribed because the White House considered it a "private meeting" in which highly classified information would be discussed. Asked to limit the length of testimony to one hour (However, the meeting lasted for three hours and ten minutes). Testimony took place in the Oval Office. Initially, Bush insisted that he testify only to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the commission, but later agreed to testify before the full panel.[14]

Dick Cheney – Vice President; testimony not under oath. The session was not officially transcribed because the White House considered it a "private meeting" in which highly classified information would be discussed. Testimony took place in the Oval Office.[14]

President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice President Al Gore all gave private testimony. President Bush and Vice President Cheney insisted on testifying together and not under oath, while Clinton and Gore met with the panel separately. As National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice claimed that she was not required to testify under oath because the position of National Security Advisor is an advisory role, independent of authority over a bureaucracy and does not require confirmation by the Senate. Legal scholars disagree on the legitimacy of her claim. Eventually, Condoleezza Rice testified publicly and under oath.[16]

The commission issued its final report on July 22, 2004. After releasing the report, Commission Chair Thomas Kean declared that both PresidentsBill Clinton and George W. Bush were "not well served" by the FBI and CIA.[17] The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary.

Additionally, the commission has released several supplemental reports on the terrorists' financing, travel, and other matters.

The commission was criticized for alleged conflicts of interest on the part of commissioners and staff (e.g., Philip D. Zelikow, 9/11 Commission Executive Director/Chair in 1995 co-authored a book with Condoleezza Rice[18]).[19] Further, the commission's report has been the subject of criticism by both commissioners themselves and by others.[20][21]

Months after the commission had officially issued its report and ceased its functions, Chairman Kean and other commissioners toured the country to draw attention to the recommendations of the commission for reducing the terror risk, claiming that some of their recommendations were being ignored. Co-chairs Kean and Hamilton wrote a book about the constraints they faced as commissioners titled Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission.

The book was released on August 15, 2006 and chronicles the work of Kean (Commission Chairman) and Hamilton (Commission Vice-Chairman) of the 9/11 Commission. In the book, Kean and Hamilton charge that the 9/11 Commission was "set up to fail," and write that the commission was so frustrated with repeated misstatements by officials from The Pentagon and the Federal Aviation Administration during the investigation that it considered a separate investigation into possible obstruction of justice by Pentagon and FAA officials.[22]

John Farmer, Jr., senior counsel to the Commission stated that the Commission "discovered that...what government and military officials had told Congress, the Commission, the media, and the public about who knew what when — was almost entirely, and inexplicably, untrue." Farmer continues: "At some level of the government, at some point in time … there was a decision not to tell the truth about what happened...The (NORAD) tapes told a radically different story from what had been told to us and the public."[23] Thomas Kean, the head of the 9/11 Commission, concurred: "We to this day don’t know why NORAD told us what they told us, it was just so far from the truth."[24]