Appellant commenced this negligence action alleging that she
was injured on July 19, 1986, by a metal strip protruding
from the base of respondent's store counter. Appellant asserts
that on the date of the injury, respondent either knew or
should have known this dangerous condition existed and
that for this reason, respondent is liable for damages.
Respondent denied negligence and pled contributory negligence
as an affirmative defense. Discovery was taken by way of
interrogatories and depositions. The circuit court granted
respondent's motion for summary judgment.

Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in granting respondent
summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material
fact as to whether respondent knew or should have known a dangerous
condition existed on its premises and failed to warn appellant.
In order for appellant to recover damages for injuries
caused by a dangerous or defective condition on respondent's
premises, appellant must show either (1) that the injury
was caused by a specific act of the respondent which created
the dangerous condition; or (2) that the respondent had actual
or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and failed
to remedy it.
SeePennington v. Zayre Corp.,
252 S.C. 176, 165 S.E.2d 695 (1969);
Hunter v. Dixie Home Stores,
232 S.C. 139, 101 S.E.2d 262 (1957).

In order to be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party
must show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact
and that such party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See
S.C. Rule Civ. P. 56(c) (1988);
see alsoTom Jenkins Realty, Inc., v. Hilton,
278 S.C. 624, 300 S.E.2d 594 (1983);
and
Sumter Dairies v. Pelfrey,
268 S.C. 437, 234 S.E.2d 490 (1977).

Respondent contends the circuit court ruled properly because
appellant presented no evidence that respondent had actual or
constructive knowledge of the projecting metal strip prior to
the accident. Evidence offered on behalf of the respondent by
its cashier and store manager indicated that they were both on
duty at the time of the incident. They testified that they did
not "recall" a metal strip protruding into the aisle; and had
there been, they would have observed it during the course of
their duties. They further testified that appellant was
barefoot
and had injured herself, but they could not
determine whether the accident occurred
inside or outside the store.

To the contrary, appellant offered evidence by way of
affidavit asserting that eleven months after the incident, she,
her mother and their attorney went to the store, took photographs
of the scene, and that the metal piece and surrounding area looked
"exactly like we both remember it looked on July 19, 1986." These
photographs were introduced at the hearing and were before the
trial court when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment.

Considering the evidence and all the reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the appellant,
we find that respondent's summary judgment motion should have
been denied.
Hammond v. Scott,
268 S.C. 137, 232 S.E.2d 336 (1977).
It is our opinion that the photographs, when considered in
conjunction with appellant's affidavit, are sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact.
Tom Jenkins Realty, Inc., v. Hilton,
supra.

We venture no opinion concerning the authenticity or admissibility
of the photographs since these issues were not raised on appeal.
We note also that the trial judge ruled as a matter of law that
the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence for walking
barefoot through the store and was not paying attention to where
she was going. In view of our holding on the trial court's
granting respondent summary judgment, we make no disposition of this
issue and appellant's remaining exceptions.

Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment was improvidently
granted and reverse the circuit court's decision.