It's not quite that straightforward. Hamas and Fatah did agree to an effective swap of political detainees/prisoners in Gaza and the West Bank and "to stop smear campaigns in the media". The 12 Palestinian groups also agreed to form five committees on prisoners, security, and elections. The committees will begin meetings on 10 March and issue reports by the end of the month.

The question, however, is whether the leaderships of the Palestinian factions will act on those reports. On the surface, this appears to be an immediate victory for Hamas, which did not want any quick pronouncement on the make-up of a Palestinian Government. They now have time to manoeuvre, building on the upswell of support from the Gaza War, while Fatah and the Palestinian Authority scramble to recover their position.

Earlier, Mitchell was in Ankara to ensure Turkish leaders, who had criticised Israel over its conduct in the Gaza War, were on board: "Turkey is a crucial ally of the United States and an important force for peace and security in the Middle East."

Morning Update (11 a.m. GMT; 1 p.m. Israel/Palestine): The Palestinian "reconciliation" talks, involving a dozen groups but with most attention focused on Hamas and Fatah, have opened in Cairo. Egypt, after the failure of its strategy in the Gaza conflict is hoping to recover a prime position in the region with a successful outcome; its head of intelligence, Omar Suleiman (pictured), told delegates,

Everyone is looking toward you ... and hanging their hopes on you. So do not prolong the disagreement and deepen the division. Unite ranks to fulfill the hopes of all for an independent Palestinian state.

Fatah, with the Palestinian Authority's legal and political mandate in the West Bank in jeopardy, is pressing for a quick agreement on a new Palestinian government; Hamas is signalling that it will seek a longer process.

Meanwhile, in Israel, it appears that any prospect of a coaltion government of Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, and Kadima, led by Tzipi Livni, has been doomed over differences on a two-state Israel-Palestine solution. Livni is insisting on a clear settlement; Netanyahu is holding out against it. Former foreign minister and Likud negotiator Silvan Shalom told Army Radio:

There is across-the-board agreement on Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas but there is a big gap between Kadima and Likud on the two states for two people. It's unsolvable.

For more than seven weeks, the international aid group Mercy Corps has been trying to send 90 tons of macaroni to the isolated Gaza Strip as part of a global campaign to help the 1.4 million Palestinians there rebuild their lives after Israel's recent devastating 22-day military operation.

Israel, which controls most of what goes into and out of Gaza, has said no repeatedly.

On Wednesday, days after American lawmakers raised pointed questions about the macaroni ban, Israeli authorities said that they were preparing to give the pasta a green light.

At first, Israeli officials said that they wanted to make sure that the macaroni wasn't destined for a Hamas charity. Then they said macaroni was banned because they didn't consider it an essential food item.

Representative Brian Baird, who just visited Gaza, offered the key military challenge: ""Is someone going to kill you with a piece of macaroni?"

Here are other items that pose imminent danger and thus have been blocked by Israel:

LentilsPaperCrayonsTomato Paste

Readers with far more scientific minds than mind can design weapons of mass destribution from this list. However, there might be a more prosaic political explanation Israel's continued economic stranglehold on Gaza:

"We want to make sure that reconstruction for the people of Gaza is not reconstruction for the Hamas regime," said Mark Regev, a spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Evening Update (5 p.m. GMT): Hamas and Fatah representatives have met in Cairo in advance of Thursday's "reconcilation" meeting of a dozen Palestinian groups. Ezzat al-Rishq, a member of the Hamas delegation, said, "There was a positive and promising atmosphere at ... today's session."

Morning Update (8:45 a.m. GMT; 10:45 a.m. Israel/Palestine): Having failed to get agreement with Kadima leader Tzipi Livni and Labor leader Ehud Barak on a possible coalition, Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud turns again to "right-wing" parties today. He will meet Israel-Beitenu's Avigdor Lieberman, third in the recent elections, and smaller political factions.

Simon Tisdall, writing in The Guardian of London on Monday, offered a valuable analysis of the recent dynamics surrounding US-Syrian relations and events in the Middle East. Tisdall noted (rightly, in my opinion) the "realist" outlook of Obama and Co. and suggested that "improved US relations with Syria could hold the key" three vital issues: avoidance of military confrontation with Iran, management of the Iraq withdrawal, "and some kind of half-credible peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbours". He supported this reading with the signals of engagement: Syrian President Bashir al-Assad's interviews welcoming a US "re-entry" into the Middle East peace process, Senator John Kerry's visit to Damascus last week, and conciliatory words from Arab states such as Saudi Arabia.

What can and should be added to Tisdall's analysis are the recent events that have not only promoted this engagement but strengthened Syria's position in negotiations. In December 2008, the foundations for direct Israel-Syria talks had been laid but the wider context for the diplomacy was still the call for Damascus to end its support of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas and to limit, if not cut, its ties with Iran.

Then the Olmert Government decided to gamble with the invasion of Gaza. The direct talks with Syria were suspended of course, alienating Turkey in the process, as Tel Aviv effectively hand-in-hand with Egypt and probably Saudi Arabia on the challenge to Hamas.

The significance was not only that this challenge failed but that it spurred a re-alignment which put Syria in the Middle Eastern ascendancy. By giving vocal and visible support to Hamas, Assad set himself up as the defender of Arab resistance to Israeli aggression, a position buttressed by the damage to Egypt's reputation. With Turkey and Iran recognising that position, as they quickly sent representatives to Damascus, and with platforms such as the Qatar Summit, the Syrians could look to a reconfigured diplomatic scene in the aftermath of Gaza.

Few have noted, for example, that there is no more talk of bringing Syrian leaders to account for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. It is also notable that no one, especially the US, is making a fuss about the alleged Syrian nuclear facility destroyed by Israel in October 2007, even though an International Atomic Energy Agency report last week pointed to the presence of uranium.

Instead, renewed Israeli-Syrian talks are being pursued so vigorously that Uzi Mahnaimi, who should be considered more a conduit for the Israeli military and intelligence services than a journalist for The Sunday Times, is writing: "Reports compiled by Mossad, the overseas spy agency, and by military intelligence, that strongly advocate opening negotiations with President Bashar al-Assad of Syria."

Which brings us back to the wider of the Damascene conversion of Gaza into a re-aligned position not only on its direct relations with Tel Aviv but on relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Tehran. Tisdall sees a trade-off: a new Israeli Government will have to engage in meaningful talks with Syria to maintain its isolation of Hamas: "If, as seems likely, [Benjamin Netanyahu] obstructs the Palestinian track, the Likud leader may have to give ground elsewhere, literally."

That might have been possible up to December, but no longer. Syria now has the cards for its territorial aims vis-a-vis Israel but for an inclusion of Hamas in the discussions on Palestine. The attempt to curb Hezbollah through talks with Damascus, which always was a curious exercise mssing the complexities of Lebanese politics and society, will now be kicked into touch. And the breaking of a supposed Syria-Iran axis is now less likelu than a dynamic in which engagement with both Damascus and Tehran takes place.

In 2003, chatter in Washington was "Baghdad, Then Turn Left". That thought of rolliing regime change can now be consigned to the dustbin of George W. Bush's history. It's envoys, not tanks, that are the talismen of this New Middle East Order.