As expected, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) is
emerging as the dominant party, making its chief
mentor and spiritual adviser, Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, the clear winner of the Iraqi
elections of January 30 (see Note below). Only US President
George W Bush and his tight-lipped advisers
know whether this is the beginning of the United
States' nightmare in Iraq. Sistani never had any
doubts about what he wanted: use the
much-cherished democracy of the US invaders
to enable his people - the Shi'ites - to emerge as
governors of Iraq, after years of being
marginalized by the
minority Sunnis. The most dominant question is how
Islamic the emerging government of Iraq is likely
to be.

The US may not have any problem
with Islam as a religion; there is no doubt,
however, that the entire notion of "Islamic
government" has never been an acceptable
proposition in Washington. That was true in
Afghanistan after the dismantlement of the Taliban
regime, and it has been true in Iraq. US
presidents, starting from Jimmy Carter, know only
too well how chaotic a system can be created under
the rubric of "Islamic government". The Islamic
Revolution in Iran in 1979 was the beginning of
Washington's nightmare. If Carter had to identify
one reason why he remained a one-term president,
he would readily state: the Islamic Revolution of
Iran, under which the US was humiliated by the
Islamic cadres of the late ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. Islamic government is once again
emerging as an issue of utmost concern for another
president, except this time he, Bush, might be the
direct reason for the materialization of an
Islamic government in Iraq.

Leading Shi'ite clerics in Iraq are reportedly
"pushing for Islam to be recognized as the
guiding principle of the new constitution". Such
a proposal is in stark contrast from
the transitional law the US enacted before
installing the Iraqi interim government headed by
Prime Minister Iyad Allawi last June. The US
then succeeded in pressing Iraqi politicians to
grant equal rights to women and minorities and,
above all, "to designate Islam as just 'a source'
of legislation". The handpicked secular Iraqi
members of the government had no problem with
that US preference. However, the Shi'ite clerics
are now "advocating for Islam to be acknowledged
as the underpinning of the government". In
addition, the clerics are demanding that the
Americans "stay away from the writing of the
constitution".

The Shi'ite clerics might
be forced to compromise on the issue of Islam in
order to forge a compromise to form a government.
How far they would go in formulating that
compromise depends on the final number of votes
the UIA receives.

There is also that
likelihood that a strong push for an Islamic
government would bring together the Kurds and
secular Shi'ites like Allawi as a voluble, even if
not a numerically powerful, opposition. Moderate
clerics may not want to enhance acrimony as they
go through the delicate and intricate process of
establishing a government.

Another
powerfully divisive issue is that of writing the
next constitution of Iraq. The Iranian model of
vilayat-e-faqih (rule of the clergy) may
not be used, for two reasons. First, it has not
resulted in the creation of an effective
government in Iran. Second, and more important
than the previous one, is the fact that Iraq,
unlike Iran, is a multi-ethnic and multifunctional
polity, where the vilayat-e-faqih model
would only serve as the lightning rod of
divisiveness and instability.

Even if
a "theocracy" is not established in Iraq in
the immediate future, a close semblance of it seems
to be very much in the cards. The US never
understood the significance of Islam to a Muslim
country. Believing that the adage "render unto
Caesar what's Caesar's and render unto God what's
God's" is (or should be) applicable to the entire
world, US politicians have been on a global
(secular) crusade to transform the world in the image
of their own country. They do understand that such
a proposition is not only alien to the world
of Islam - most established governments have
constantly rejected it. However, the establishment
of secular government worldwide has emerged as
America's new crusade in the post-September 11
world, or at least that's what Bush wants the
world to believe during his second term.

Even when Sistani rejects Khomeini's model
of vilayat-e-faqih , he is not proposing
the kind of secularism that US or any other
Western politicians have in mind. Under the
Sistani model of separation of religion and
politics, representatives of the grand ayatollahs
(ie the marjaiah) would play a highly
visible and crucial role in framing the
constitution, especially regarding the maintenance
of Islamic identity. In fact, it can be argued
that the entire involvement of Sistani since the
US-led invasion of Iraq has been a perfect example
of how the power of the marjaiah has been
imposed on the mandarins of the secular
superpower. It was Sistani who demanded speedy
elections. He knew what the outcome of that
election was going to be. When Bush balked about
holding elections, Sistani demonstrated his power
by calling on his followers to fill the Iraqi
streets in protest. It was he who insisted that
the United Nations should be brought back to
conduct or to oversee the conducting of elections
in Iraq. It was Sistani's refusal to condemn the
US presence in Iraq that kept the Shi'ite protest
a minor problem for the Western occupying forces.
Sistani's role in calming the firebrand rhetoric
and activities of Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
should not be underestimated.

It was
Sistani, once again, who issued a religious decree
exhorting the Shi'ites to vote as a religious
obligation. There is absolutely no doubt that
Sistani and other grand ayatollahs will
demonstrate the same type of unequivocal and
unambiguous resolve to create a government where
Islam maintains a powerful presence. It will be a
quintessentially Iraqi model, but an Islamic model
nevertheless. In all likelihood the
marjaiah would insist that "no laws passed
by the state contradict a basic understanding of
sharia as laid out in the Koran". The issue of
equal treatment of women has to be resolved
through public debates, and by arriving at a new
interpretation of Islam by Muslims of Iraq, not
through the "enlightened" insistence of the US.
The same goes for dividing family property and
other issues affecting Muslims of that country.
It is another irony of history that the US is
hoping to use the Kurdish or even Sunni Arab
voting power to modify the Shi'ite notions of
Islamic government in the coming weeks and months.

The Bush administration is also watching
Muqtada, who wants Islam enshrined as the
national religion and sharia recognized as the new
law of the state. Followers of Muqtada have been
carrying around a pamphlet that Muqtada's mentor,
Ayatollah Khadim Hussein al-Haeri, wrote a while
back. It said, "The infidel coalition forces want
to make a constitution for our dear Iraq and carry
out their infidel agenda through the current
government. This is the most dangerous thing for
Iraq and Islam. They want to change our identity,
habits, morals and Islamic way of life."

The US wanted Iraq to become a democracy.
It has indeed started its march in that direction.
A democratic Iraq is not likely to be anyone's
puppet. It is likely to reflect the will of its
own people - except in the case of Iraq, it will be
a long time before the modalities of the "will" of
its people will finally crystallize. Even with all
the uncertainties revolving around Iraq, one can
be certain about one thing: a democratic Iraq, as
it is emerging at least for now, is not something
even Bush had preferred.

NoteWith 3.3 million
votes in from mainly Shi'ite provinces, Sistani's
United Iraqi Alliance has polled 2.2 million or
67%, far ahead of their nearest rival, the group
led by interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.
Allawi's Iraqi List has 17.5% and the Kurds, who
are expected to make a strong showing, have so far
scored far fewer votes, with none of the results
from the three Kurdish-dominated provinces
counted. The Electoral Commission said the count
to date represented 35% of more than 5,000 polling
centers.