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Small, smaller, smallest: The decline of SA’s minority parties

by The Editor

FEATURE: What follows is a brief 2009 election overview of the results of the five more established smaller parties: the African Christian Democratic Party, Freedom Front Plus, United Democratic Movement, Independent Democrats and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Outside of the ANC, DA and COPE, they constitute the five next biggest (or smallest) parties in the National Assembly. It suggests that, come 2014, there is little point to them standing in every province. Doing so might allow them the pretense of being ‘national’ but, in reality, their results are so poor as to render it a foolish exercise.

There are a number of stories that emanate from the 2009 Election. One of the more obvious is the poor showing of the smaller parties, which were, by all accounts, decimated.

What follows is a brief overview of the five more established smaller parties: the African Christian Democratic Party, Freedom Front Plus, United Democratic Movement, Independent Democrats and, as of this election, the Inkatha Freedom Party. Outside of the ANC, DA and COPE, they constitute the five next biggest parties in the National Assembly.

An analysis of their results shows that support for these smaller parties has declined dramatically and, where they do have support in the provinces, it is both limited and sporadic. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that, come 2014, all five parties would do well to stand in only a select number of provinces or run the repeat risk of a return which, in most regions, is nothing more than negligable.

• IFP: Lost 284 404 votes (or 26.1% of its support), down to 4.55%
• ID: Lost 106 850 votes (or 39.6% of its support), down to 0.92%
• UDM: Lost 206 037 votes (or 57.9% of its support), down to 0.85%
• FF+: Gained 10 331 votes but declined in percentage terms, down to 0.83%
• ACDP: Lost 107 614 votes (or 43.0% of its support), down to 0.81%

There is an argument to be made that the IFP’s 4.5% means it is not a ‘small party’. However, 97% of its support comes from KZN. Subtract that and the party is virtually non-existent in the rest of the country.

UDM leader Bantu Holomisa has argued that the message of the 2009 Election is that the electorate no longer wants a multitude of smaller parties, but a smaller number of bigger parties. That might be true, but to suggest this is the message of this most recent election is to ignore some longer term trends.

The IFP’s decline, for example, precedes the 2009 Election. In 2004 it lost 282 813 votes (20.6% of its 1999 support), down from 8.6% to 7%. That is almost the exact same number of votes (284 404) it lost in 2009. It has lost 567 217 votes since 1999. The UDM too, lost a significant amount of support in 2004 – 191 703 votes to be precise (or 35% of its 1999 support), down from 3.4% to 2.3%. So the decline of both these parties has now been unfolding for some time.

The ACDP and FF+ did gain some support in 2004 but, in percentage terms, it was so small as to be almost meaningless – 0.09% for the FF+ and 0.17% for the ACDP – certainly not the beginning of a huge upward swing (as the 2009 results would confirm).

The ID, of course, was only established prior to the 2004 Election, so it is not possible to gauge its support over a ten year period.

The smaller one’s percentage of the national vote, the more likely it is that one’s percentage of the provincial vote, in each province, will be smaller still. And as, for the most part, we are talking about parties with less than 1% of the national vote, when you turn to the provinces, it quickly becomes apparent just how thinly spread the smaller parties are.

The provincial ballot

All five parties stood in all nine provinces. The results would suggest this was folly. Standing for an election in all nine provinces not only involves a substantial financial commitment (for one, in the form of a deposit – returned only if you win a seat nationally or in the respective province) but it means you are stretching your limited resources across the whole country, instead of focusing them on those areas where your support is strongest.

Outside of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, the IFP obtained less than 1% of the vote in every other province: 0.10%, 0.22%, 0.06%, 0.5%, 0.15%, 0.19% and 0.08% (in fact, in five of those, it got less than 0.2% of the vote).

In absolute terms, in six provinces it got less than 2 500 votes. With the exception of the Northern Cape (where it increased its support by 6 votes, off a base of 751) it lost support in every province. In percentage terms, it lost 35% or more of its 2004 support in five provinces and 45% or more in three.

It won seats in just two of the nine legislatures and its total of 19 seats is 13 less than the 32 it won in 2004 and 18 less than the 37 it won in 1999.

Outside of the Northern and Western Cape, the ID obtained less than 1% of the vote in every other province (although in Gauteng this was enough to win a seat): 0.46%, 0.16%, 0.61%, 0.20%, 0.09%, 0.12% and 0.46% (four of those being 0.2% or less).

In absolute terms, it lost support in every province, getting less than 6 500 votes in five provinces and less than 2 000 in three. In percentage terms, it lost 40% or more of its support in six provinces and 50% or more in five.

It won seats in just three of the nine legislatures and its total of five seats is one less than the six it won in 2004.

Outside of the Eastern Cape, the UDM obtained less than 1% in every other province: 0.36%, 0.4%, 0.23%, 0.35%, 0.26%, 0.51%, 0.15% and 0.71% (in six of those it managed 0.4% or less).

In absolute terms, it lost support in every province, getting less than 8 000 votes in six provinces. In percentage terms, the damage was far worse: in eight out of nine provinces (the ninth being 49%) the UDM lost more than 50% of its 2004 support. In seven it lost more than 55% and in three more than 60%.

It won just three seats in one legislature in 2009, a dramatic decline from the 10 seats it won in five legislatures in 2004 and the 14 in six it won in 1999.

Outside of the Free State and Gauteng (it won one seat in each), the FF+ obtained less than 1% of the vote in five provinces: 0.2%, 0.05%, 0.61%, 0.89% and 0.43%.

In absolute terms, it lost support in six out of nine provinces, getting less than 10 000 votes in five provinces and less than 6 000 in three. In percentage terms it lost 15% or more of its 2004 support in five provinces.

The FF+ won one seat in two different legislatures, three fewer than the five seats it won in 1999 and 2004, on each occasion spread across five different legislatures.

Outside of the Western Cape, the ACDP obtained 1% or less in every other province (although in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal this was enough to win a seat): 0.53%, 0.73%, 0.87%, 0.68%, 0.69%, 0.51%, 0.69% and 1% (five of those were less than 0.7%).

In absolute terms, it lost support in every province, getting less than 8 000 votes in four provinces but, as with the UDM, it was in percentage terms that the real damage was done. The ACDP lost a minimum of 30% of its support in every province; in six provinces it lost more than 40% and in three it lost 50% or more.

The party won three seats in three different legislatures in 2009. In 2004 it has won eight seats in six different legislatures and, in 1999, four in four different legislatures.

Weakness in numbers

A review of the facts confirms the obvious: the smaller parties lost a substantial amount of support in 2009, both in absolute and percentage terms and, for all intents and purposes, across the board.

Collectively these fives parties achieved less than 1% of the vote in 34 provinces; less than 0.5% in 21 and less than 0.25% in 14. In only one province did one of them manage more than 5%, in just five, more than 2%.

Some individual cases are simply silly: In Limpopo the IFP got 936 votes (0.06%) and the ID 1 333 (0.09%). In the Northern Cape, the UDM scraped together 604 votes (0.15%) and in KwaZulu-Natal the FF+ garnered just 5 760 votes (0.05%). In the Western Cape the IFP managed only 1 158 votes (0.08%).

To put those results into some sort of context, compare them to how some of the really small parties did (and here I refer to those regional – and often radical – parties that exist only in a specific province).

For example, in the Western Cape, the CAPE Party – which is advocating for the Northern and Western Cape to breakaway from South Africa and become a separate state (“The Cape is not only a sustainable country but with independence it would flourish and could potentially be one of the top 10 wealthiest countries income per capita in the world”) – got 2 552 votes, more than double the IFP. In fact, that’s more votes than these five parties individually managed in eight of the 45 provinces they collectively stood in.

No doubt pride plays a part in the decision to stand nationally: any party that has the financial resources to stand in every province, one would think, has some clout. And that message is not without its marketing strengths either – the projection of growth and size is helpful for any party trying to increase its percentage of the vote. But there comes a point where one needs to do some hard sums; and there is a strong case to be made that, if the reason behind these five parties’ respective decisions to stand in every province was a show of strength, they’ve achieved the exact opposite.

Logic would suggest that, come 2014, these five parties should contest only those provinces where they won a seat or grew their support. That would allow them to focus their limited resources on those regions where their support is strongest. Perhaps most importantly, it might reverse a trend whereby South Africa’s smaller parties are increasingly defined by weakness and irrelevance.

This article was first published on 3 May 2009.

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I realize this is a very old post, so perhaps commenting is silly, but one things puzzles me nevertheless: the FF+ received a higher voter share percentage wise in the North West province in 2009 compared to 2004 yet still lost the seat they held since 2004. How could they lose their seat when their voter share increased?

Hey Markus, I can’t remember the details but you must remember between elections the general population grows, so just to retain your seats you need to grow at the same rate. I suspect the FF+ grew but at less than the required rate so, relatively, it actually shrunk. Gareth