Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

by Doug Bandow

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and the author and editor of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World. He is a former special assistant to
President Reagan and visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

Executive Summary

Ever since North Korea's dramatic revelation
that it was producing materials that
could be used to make nuclear weapons,
the Bush administration has considered a
range of policy options—including a military
strike on North Korean nuclear facilities.
Although the administration officially
dismisses such talk, President Bush has left
the military option on the table, and influential
advisers outside of the administration
have openly called for military action
along the lines of the Israeli attack on Iraqi
nuclear facilities at Osirak in 1981.

But a military strike is the least desirable of a
range of unpalatable policy choices. An attack
on North Korea is likely to result in a full retaliatory
response by the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, which would threaten the
lives of hundreds of thousands of South
Koreans, as well as the nearly 37,000 Americans
stationed on the peninsula. Even a successful
attack could spread nuclear fallout throughout
East Asia. Finally, a unilateral U.S. attack that
destabilized the peninsula could upset relations
with China and South Korea.

Rather than adopting the most dangerous
course of action as a first resort, the
United States should instead take the
opportunity to reduce its threat profile in
the region by focusing on multilateral
diplomatic efforts that place primary
responsibility for resolving the crisis on
those regional actors most threatened by
the North Korean nuclear program.