Mark Jackson, Fourth Quarter Collapses, and the Case for Change

The fourth quarter is quickly becoming a recurring nightmare for Mark Jackson and the Warriors. You don’t need any statistics to demonstrate the fundamental problems the team has suffered at both ends of the court in crunch time against quality opponents. As Jackson attempts to break his team out of its recent struggles, his challenge will be to identify what’s working and what isn’t late in the game. For that question, the statistics through the first 14 games tell an interesting, challenging story.

All the usual disclaimers about sample size and statistics in general apply. All stats below are from stats.nba.com. To help track the differences between the Warriors’ performance across the quarters, I looked at statistics that aren’t distorted by pace — field goal percentages and offensive/defensive ratings, measured per 100 possessions. The shooting percentage statistics match-up well with general perceptions:

Warriors’ Field Goal Percentage

1st Q: 48.7%

2nd Q: 49.5%

3rd Q: 49.8%

4th Q: 42.6%

There’s a dramatic drop in the Warriors’ ability to score in the fourth quarter — but the statistic needs to be broken out a bit given that many of the fourth quarters this season have been pure garbage time. As a point of reference, in the third quarter, the starters shoot 50.5% and the bench 47.1%. In the fourth quarter, the starters drop slightly to 47.9%, while the bench plummets a full 10 points to 37.1%. So while the starters have struggled to score at times — including Saturday night against the Blazers — the truly offensive fourth quarter offense is coming from the bench. On defense, the story has an interesting twist.

Warriors’ Opponents Field Goal Percentage

1st Q: 41.6%

2nd Q: 39.7%

3rd Q: 44.9%

4th Q: 42.6%

The fact that opponent shooting improves in the third quarter makes sense. In many games, the Warriors’ blow-out peaked early in the third, and the team seemed to relax a bit. That period of exhalation has allowed teams some easy runs late in the third quarter. Those runs in turn provoke tighter defense from the Warriors in the fourth quarter, so the opponent shooting percentage drops down again. Comparing the second half defensive performance of the starters and the bench spells this out. In the third quarter, the bench outperforms the starters in opponent field goal percentage — 45.5% against the starters, 42.9% against the bench. In the fourth quarter, there’s a dramatic flip — 38.7% against the starters (2nd best in the NBA) and 46.0% for the bench. Again, garbage time in the fourth likely skews the statistic for the bench, but the numbers show that the starters aren’t simply letting opponents score at will late in the game.

Where the Warriors are losing fourth quarters is in their own scoring efficiency. The offensive ratings (“OR” — points scored per 100 possessions a player is in the game) show the gradual devolution of the Warriors’ ability to score. While the defensive ratings (“DR” — points scored by opponents per 100 possessions) also degrade over the game for most of the Warriors, the variance isn’t as dramatic. Two Warriors stand out in their fourth quarter problems.

Stephen Curry

1st Q: 117.8 OR; 97.5 DR; +20.3

2nd Q: 124.5 OR; 89.9 DR; +34.6

3rd Q: 114.6 OR; 106.1 DR; +8.5

4th Q: 101.0 OR; 110.5 DR; -9.5

David Lee

1st Q: 117.o OR; 95.5 DR; +21.5

2nd Q: 112.1 OR; 88.6 DR; +23.5

3rd Q: 107.2 OR; 101.2 DR; +5.9

4th Q: 94.0 OR; 100.7 DR; -6.7

While Curry and Lee have the two largest differentials between their offensive and defensive ratings during the fourth quarter, the differentials reflect distinct problems. During Curry’s minutes, the defense collapses — ballooning to a 110.5 defensive rating. During Lee’s minutes, it’s the offense that stumbles, crashing to 94.0 rating (the lowest 4th quarter rating of any of the top 7 rotation players). To give some context to the fourth quarter struggles of Curry and Lee, here’s the remainder of the Warriors’ rotation:

Klay Thompson

1st Q: 110.6 OR; 93.6 DR; +17.0

2nd Q: 111.8 OR; 88.0 DR; +23.8

3rd Q: 104.8 OR: 104.3 DR; +0.5

4th Q: 106.7 OR; 96.9 DR; +9.8

The fourth quarter performance of the team with Thompson stands out among the rest of the rotation. The team has a positive differential of nearly 10 points when he’s playing in the fourth quarter. The ratings reflect Thompson’s skill set. On offense, he’s the Warriors’ best half-court scorer, whether working from the post, in a catch-and-shoot or rising up off the dribble. On defense, his ability to smother perimeter scorers and focus when it comes to sticking with scorers helps prevent easy baskets. His importance to the team in late-game situations makes his early fouls all the more costly. His scoring versatility also makes stretches where he doesn’t get off shots — like his 4 fourth quarter minutes against the Blazers — all the more frustrating. If the Warriors are looking to jump-start their fourth quarter offense, I’d start by seeing what Thompson can accomplish as a focal-point of the attack.

Andre Iguodala

1st Q: 118.9 OR; 94.8 DR; +24.1

2nd Q: 113.9 OR; 88.5 DR; +25.3

3rd Q: 103.2 OR; 100.7 DR; +2.5

4th Q: 99.3 OR; 94.1 DR; +5.2

Like Thompson, the team has positive differentials across all quarters with Iguodala in the game. When looking to quantify what his absence will mean to the team, no statistic captures it better than his rotation-best 94.1 defense rating in the fourth quarter. Iguodala provides smart, focused perimeter defense. He prevents the type of momentum-building shots like Lillard and the Blazers knocked down late in the third and early in the fourth on Saturday and helps in the post with harassing flashes and double-teams. When Thompson and Iguodala are off the floor — as they were for 8 minutes of the fourth on Saturday — the Warriors’ perimeter defense poses almost no threat, allowing opponents to run their offensive sets largely undisturbed.

Andrew Bogut

1st Q: 117.1 OR; 95.8 DR; +21.3

2nd Q: 113.1 OR; 85.3 DR; + 27.8

3rd Q: 106.3 OR; 102.8 DR; +3.5

4th Q: 95.3 OR; 97.6 DR; -2.3

Unsurprisingly, the Warriors perform better on defense during Bogut’s fourth quarter runs than during Lee’s minutes (97.6 vs. 100.7). Surprisingly, the team also scores better during Bogut’s minutes than during Lee’s (95.3 vs. 94.0). If I had to guess at an explanation, I’d venture that Bogut’s disruptive potential on defense allows the Warriors to get out in the open court more frequently, allowing them the type of open offense that has become increasingly rare in walk-it-up fourth quarters. When Lee’s on the court without Bogut (or Bogut is in foul trouble), teams have started to isolate against Lee on defense, further slowing down the pace of the game — particularly when there are lots of whistles, as there were Saturday. To maximize his effectiveness, Bogut needs to avoid silly touch fouls early in the game so he can play aggressive crunch-time minutes without fear of fouling out.

Harrison Barnes

1st Q: 100.6 OR; 92.0 DR; +8.6

2nd Q: 101.2 OR; 101.0 DR; +0.2

3rd Q: 98.0 OR; 102.1 DR; -4.0

4th Q: 94.1 OR; 99.1 DR; -4.9

Barnes is the only member of the rotation with a negative differential in the entire second half. This may date back to when Jackson would bring him off the bench for Thompson or Iguodala in the middle of the third quarter when the Warriors had built up a lead. Barnes was often inserted just as the Warriors’ intensity started to dip, and Jackson’s repeated efforts to force the ball to Barnes in the post often contributed to the team’s disengaged sluggishness. While Jackson should be commended for experimenting with ways to diversify the Warriors’ offense, the force-feeding of Barnes has too often derailed the Warriors’ more free-flowing attack. When Barnes becomes better at drawing fouls or getting to the rim, it will be a better option. But right now, posting up Barnes results in fade-away jumpers as often as it delivers quality looks in the paint.

Draymond Green

1st Q: 79.7 OR; 67.0 DR; +12.8

2nd Q: 108.0 OR; 88.6 DR; +19.3

3rd Q: 90.9 OR; 102.0 DR; -11.1

4th Q: 95.1 OR; 94.4 DR; +0.8

Given the Warriors’ current injuries, Mark Jackson doesn’t have many variations to try with his closing line-up. One I’d be curious to see in upcoming games is Curry/Thompson/Barnes/Green/Bogut. Conventional wisdom says replacing Lee with the offensively-challenged Green is the last thing the Warriors need when they’re struggling to score, but the evidence suggests that they’re having a hard time scoring with Lee in the game. Green would give them a much better defensive option against opposing power forwards (frustratingly, he wasn’t available in the fourth on Saturday following his ejection) and generally seems to crank up the team’s activity level when he’s on the court. The 50/50 balls that the Warriors were losing in recent fourth quarters might have gone the other way with Green’s hustle. The substitution of Green for Lee is also the closest the Warriors can get to the stretch line-up they used so well in last year’s playoffs (when Iguodala returns, he could be used instead of Green). Four wings and Bogut allowed the Warriors to dictate the tempo of their playoff games and spread the court in ways that benefitted their passing game. It’s worth a shot to see if Jackson can recapture that aggressiveness in fourth quarters by experimenting with Lee on the bench.

Ultimately, the numbers above are just a snapshot of some of the forces at play in the Warriors first 14 games. But a few things are relatively clear:

Klay Thompson needs to put himself in a position to stay on the court in the fourth quarter. This is particularly the case with Iguodala out. And if Thompson can stay out of foul trouble, Jackson needs to call plays to make sure he gets as many looks as he does earlier in the game. He has the offensive attack best suited to grind-it-out fourth quarters, so he can’t be afterthought if the Warriors hope to close out quality opponents.

Stephen Curry’s late-game defense is a problem. Whether it’s fatigue or being out of position from taking control of the offense at the other end, teams have a much easier time scoring against him in the fourth than any other quarter. Last year, the Warriors tried to hide him by having Jarrett Jack defend opposing point guards. Mark Jackson needs to experiment with an equivalent solution (Thompson? Iguodala when he returns?) to see if he can minimize the defensive cost to Curry’s significant offensive advantages.

David Lee’s late-game performances have been statistically unimpressive at both ends of the floor. He has the worst fourth-quarter offensive rating of any rotation player and the second-worst defensive rating. Still, Mark Jackson continues to give him major crunch-time minutes. With both Memphis and Portland exploiting him in comebacks, I expect other opponents to attack him late in the game. As much as Jackson and ownership sing Lee’s praises, his presence may make it harder to close tight games against quality teams. The Warriors knocked off the Nuggets and nearly beat the Spurs without Lee last spring. Jackson needs to at least attempt to recreate that very successful experiment to see if it improves the Warriors’ late game play.

The numbers clearly map out the Warriors’ problem — leads built up in the first 2.5 quarters fall apart in the final 18 minutes of the game. It’s time for Mark Jackson to stop relying on the same approaches leading to the same frustrating outcomes. If this is a “no excuse” team, Jackson shouldn’t reward poor performances by maintaining the status quo.