LETTERS OF ST. AUGUSTIN
LETTERS CLXVI & CLXVII
(TO JEROME: A TREATISE ON THE ORIGIN
OF THE HUMAN SOUL & ON JAMES II)

LETTER CLXVI. (A.D. 415.)

A TREATISE ON THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL, ADDRESSED TO JEROME.1

CHAP. I.-- I. Unto our God, who hath called us unto His kingdom and glory,2
I have prayed, and pray now, that what I write to you, holy brother Jerome,
asking your opinion in regard to things of which I am ignorant, may by His
good pleasure be profitable to us both. For although in addressing you I consult
one much older than myself, nevertheless I also am becoming old; but I cannot
think that it is at anytime of life too Rate to learn what we need to know,
because, although it is more fitting that old men should be teachers than learners,
it is nevertheless more fitting for them to learn than to continue ignorant
of that which they should teach to others. I assure you that, amid the many
disadvantages which I have to submit to in studying very difficult questions,
there is none which grieves me more than the circumstance of separation from
your Charity by a distance so great that I can scarcely send a letter to you,
and scarcely receive one from you, even at intervals, not of days nor of months,
but of several years; whereas my desire would be, if it were possible, to have
you daily beside me, as one with whom I could converse on any theme. Nevertheless,
although I have not been able to do all that I wished, I am not the less bound
to do all that I can.

2. Behold, a religious young man has come to me, by name Orosius, who is in
the bond of Catholic peace a brother, in point of age a son, and in honour
a fellow presbyter, -- a man, of quick understanding, ready speech, and burning
zeal, desiring to be in the Lord's house a vessel rendering useful service
in refuting those false and pernicious doctrines, through which the souls of
men in Spain have suffered much more grievous wounds than have been inflicted
on their bodies by the sword of barbarians. For from the remote western coast
of Spain he has come with eager haste to us, having been prompted to do this
by the report that from me he could learn whatever he wished on the subjects
on which he desired information. Nor has his coming been altogether in vain.
In the first place, he has learned not to believe all that report affirmed
of me: in the next place, I have taught him all that I could, and, as for the
things in which I could not teach him, I have told him from whom he may lean
them, and have exhorted him to go on to you. As he received this counsel or
rather injunction of mine with pleasure, and with intention to comply with
it, I asked him to visit us on his way home to his own country when he comes
from you. On receiving his promise to this effect, I believed that the Lord
had granted me an opportunity of writing to you regarding certain things which
I wish through you to learn. For I was seeking some one whom I might send to
you, and it was not easy to fall in with one qualified both by trustworthiness
in performing and by alacrity in undertaking the work, as well as by experience
in travelling. Therefore, when I became acquainted with this young man, I could
not doubt that he was exactly such a person as I was asking from the Lord.

CHAP. II. -- 3. Allow me, therefore, to bring , before you a subject which
I beseech you not to ; refuse to open up and discuss with me. Many are perplexed
by questions concerning the soul, . and I confess that I myself am of this
number. I shall in this letter, in the first place, state explicitly the things
regarding the soul which I most assuredly believe, and shall, in the next ,
place, bring forward the things regarding which I am still desirous of explanation.

The soul
of man is in a sense proper to itself immortal. It is not absolutely immortal,
as God
is, of whom it
is written that He "alone hath l immortality
for Holy Scripture makes mention of deaths to which the soul was able as m
the saying, "Let the dead bury their dead;"4 but. because when alienated
from the life of God it so dies as not wholly to cease from living in its own
nature, it is found to be from a certain cause mortal, yet so as to be not
without reason called at the same time immortal. The soul is not a part of
God. For if it were, it would be absolutely immutable and incorruptible, in
which case it could neither go downward to be worse, nor go onward to be better;
nor could it either begin to have anything in itself which it had not before,
or cease to have anything which it had within the sphere of its own experience.
But how different the actual facts of the case are is a point requiring no
evidence from without, it is acknowledged by every one who consults his own
consciousness. In vain, moreover, is it pleaded by those who affirm that the
soul is a part of God, that the corruption and baseness which we see in the
worst of men, and the weakness and blemishes which we see in all men, come
to it not from the soul itself, but from the body; for what matters it whence
the infirmity originates in that which, if it were indeed immutable, could
not, from any quarter whatever, be made infirm? For that which is truly immutable
and incorruptible is not liable to mutation or corruption by any influence
whatever from without, else the invulnerability which the fable ascribed to
the flesh of Achilles would be nothing peculiar to him, but the property of
every man, so long as no accident befell him. That which is liable to be changed
in any manner, by any cause, or in any part whatever, is therefore not by nature
immutable; but it were impiety to think of God as otherwise than truly and
supremely immutable: therefore the soul is not a part of God.

4. That
the soul is immaterial is a fact of which I avow myself to be fully persuaded,
although men of slow
understanding are hard to be convinced that
it is so. To secure myself, however, from either unnecessarily causing to others
or unreasonably bringing upon myself a controversy about an expression, let
me say that, since the thing itself is beyond question, it is needless to contend
about mere terms. If matter be used as a term denoting everything which in
any form has a separate existence, whether it be called an essence, or a substance,
or by another name, the soul is material. Again, if you choose to apply the
epithet immaterial only to that nature which is supremely immutable and is
everywhere present in its entirety, the soul is material, for it is not at
all endowed with such qualities. But if matter be used to designate nothing
but that which, whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth, and
height, so that with a greater part of itself it occupies a greater part of
space, and with a smaller part a smaller space, and is in every part of it
less than the whole, then the soul is not material. For it pervades the whole
body which it animates, not by a local distribution of parts, but by a certain
vital influence, being at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts
of the body, and not less in smaller parts and greater in larger parts, but
here with more energy and there with less energy, it is in its entirety present
both in the whole body and in every part of it. For even that which the mind
perceives in only a part of the body is nevertheless not otherwise perceived
than by the whole mind; for when any part of the living flesh is touched by
a fine pointed instrument, although the place affected is not only not the
whole body, but scarcely discernible in its surface, the contact does not escape
the entire mind, and yet the contact is felt not over the whole body, but only
at the one point where it takes place. How comes it, then, that what takes
place in only a part of the body is immediately known to the whole mind, unless
the whole mind is present at that part, and at the same time not deserting
all the other parts of the body in order to be present in its entirety at this
one? For all the other parts of the body in which no such contact takes place
are still living by the soul being present with them. And ira similar contact
takes place in the other parts, and the contact occur in both parts simultaneously,
it would in both cases alike be known at the same moment, to the whole mind.
Now this presence of the mind in all parts of the body at the same moment,
so that in every part of the body the whole mind is at the same moment present,
would be impossible if it were distributed over these parts in the same way
as we see matter distributed in space, occupying less space with a smaller
portion of itself, and greater space with a greater portion. If, therefore,
mind is to be called material, it is not material in the same sense as earth,
water, air, and ether are material. For all things composed of these elements
are larger in larger places, or smaller in smaller places, and none of them
is in its entirety present at any part of itself, but the dimensions of the
material substances are according to the dimensions of the space occupied.
Whence it is perceived that the soul, whether it be termed material or immaterial,
has a certain nature of its own, created from a substance superior to the elements
of this world, -- a substance which cannot be truly conceived of by any representation
of the material images perceived by the bodily senses, but which is apprehended
by the understanding and discovered to our consciousness by its living energy.
These things I am stating, not with the view of teaching you what you already
know, but in order that I may declare explicitly what I hold as indisputably
certain concerning the soul, lest any one should think, when I come to state
the questions to which I desire answers, that I hold none of the doctrines
which we have learned from science or from revelation concerning the soul.

5. I am, moreover, fully persuaded that the soul has fallen into sin, not
through the fault of God, nor through any necessity either in the divine nature
or in its own, but by its own free will; and that it can be delivered from
the body of this death neither by the strength of its own will, as if that
were in itself sufficient to achieve this, nor by the death of the body itself,
but only by the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ ;, and that there
is not one soul in the human family to whose salvation the one Mediator between
God and men, the man Christ Jesus, is not absolutely necessary. Every soul,
moreover, which may at any age whatsoever depart from this life without the
grace of the Mediator and the sacrament of this grace, departs to future punishment,
and shall receive again its own body at the last judgment as a partner in punishment.
But if the soul after its natural generation, which was derived from Adam,
be regenerated in Christ, it belongs to His fellowship,2 and shall not only
have rest after the death of the body, but also receive again its own body
as a partner in glory. These are truths concerning the soul which I hold most
firmly.

CHAP. III. -- 6. Permit me now, therefore, to bring before you the question
which I desire to have solved, and do not reject me; so may He not reject you
who condescended to be rejected for our sakes!

I ask
where can the soul, even of an infant snatched away by death, have contracted
the guilt which,
unless
the grace of Christ has come to the rescue by that
sacrament of baptism which is administered even to infants, involves it in
condemnation? I know you are not one of those who have begun of late to utter
certain new and absurd opinions, alleging that there is no guilt derived from
Adam which is removed by baptism in the case of infants. If I knew that you
held this view, or, rather, if I did not know that you reject it, I would certainly
neither address this question to you, nor think that it ought to be put to
you at all. Since, however, we hold on this subject the opinion consonant with
the immoveable Catholic faith, which you have yourself expressed when, refuting
the absurd sayings of Jovinian, you have quoted this sentence from the book
of Job: "In thy sight ,no one is clean, not even the infant, whose time
of life on earth is a single day,"3 adding, "for we are held guilty
in the similitude of Adam's transgression,"4 an opinion which your book
on Jonah's prophecy declares in a notable and lucid manner, where you affirm
that the little children of Nineveh were justly compelled to fast along with
the people, because merely of their original sin? it is not unsuitable that
I should address to you the question where has the soul contracted the guilt
from which, even at that age, it must be delivered by the sacrament of Christian
grace?

7. Some years ago, when I wrote certain books concerning Free Will, which
have gone forth into the hands of many, and are now in the possession of very
many readers, after referring to these four opinions as to the manner of the
soul's incarnation, -- (1) that all other souls are derived from the one which
was given to the first man; (2) that for each individual a new soul is made;
(3) that souls already in existence somewhere are sent by divine act into the
bodies; or (4) glide into them of their own accord, I thought that it was necessary
to treat them in such a way that, whichever of them tight be true, the decision
should not hinder the object which I had in view when contending with all my
might against those who attempt to lay upon God the blame of a nature endowed
with its own principle of evil, namely, the Manichaeans;6 for at that time
I had not heard of the Priscillianists, who utter blasphemies not very dissimilar
to these. As to the fifth opinion, namely, that the soul is a part of God,
-- an opinion which, in order to omit none, you have mentioned along with the
rest in your letter to Marcellinus (a man of pious memory and very dear to
us in the grace of Christ), who had consulted you on this question I did not
add it to the others for two reasons, first, because, in examining this opinion,
we discuss not the incarnation of the soul, but its nature; secondly, because
this is the view held by those against whom I was arguing, and the main design
of my argument was to prove that the blameless and inviolable nature of the
Creator has nothing to do with the faults and blemishes of the creature, while
they, on their part, maintained that the substance of the good God itself is,
in so far as it is led captive, corrupted and oppressed and brought under a
necessity of sinning by the substance of evil, to which they ascribe a proper
dominion and principalities. Leaving, therefore, out of the question this heretical
error, I desire to know which of the other four opinions we ought to choose.
For whichever of them may justly claim our preference, far be it from us to
assail this article of :faith, about which we have no uncertainty, that l every
soul, even the soul of an infant, requires to be delivered from the binding
guilt of sin, and that there is no deliverance except through Jesus i Christ
and Him crucified.

CHAP.
IV. -- 8. To avoid prolixity, therefore, let me refer to the opinion which
you, I believe, entertain,
viz.
that God even now makes each soul for
each individual at the time of birth. To meet the objection to this view which
might be taken from the fact that God finished the whole work of creation on
the sixth day and rested on the seventh day, you quote the testimony of the
words in the gospel, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work."1 This
you have written in your letter to Marcellinus, in which letter, moreover,
you have most kindly condescended to mention my name, saying that he had me
here in Africa, who could more easily explain to him the opinion held by you.2
But had I been able to do this, he would not have applied for instruction to
you, who were so remote from him, though perhaps he did not write from Africa
to you. For I know not when he wrote it; I only know that he knew well my hesitation
to embrace any definite view on this subject, for which reason he preferred
to write to you without consulting me. Yet, even if he had consulted me, I
would rather have encouraged him to write to you, and would have expressed
my gratitude for the benefit which might have been conferred on us all, had
you not preferred to send a brief note, instead of a full reply, doing this,
I suppose, to save yourself from unnecessary expenditure of effort in a place
where I, whom you supposed to be thoroughly acquainted with the subject of
his inquiries, was at hand. Behold, I am willing that the opinion which you
hold should be also mine; but I assure you that as yet I have not embraced
it.

9. You
have sent to me scholars, to whom you wish me to impart what I have not yet
learned myself.
Teach me,
therefore, what I am to teach them; for many
urge me vehemently to be a teacher on this subject, and to them I confess that
of this, as well as of many other things, I am ignorant, and perhaps, though
they maintain a respectful demeanour in my presence, they say among themselves: "Art
thou a master in Israel, and knowest not these things?"3 a rebuke which
the Lord gave to one who belonged to the class of men who delighted in being
called Rabbi; which was also the reason of his coming by night to the true
Teacher, because perchance he, who had been accustomed to teach, blushed to
take the learner's place. But, for my own part, it gives me much more pleasure
to hear instruction from another, than to be myself listened to as a teacher.
For I remember what He said to those whom, above all men, He had chosen: "But
be not ye called Rabbi, for one is your master, even Christ."4 Nor was
it any other teacher who taught Moses by Jethro,5 Cornelius by Peter the earlier
apostle,6 and Peter himself by Paul the later apostle;7 for by whomsoever truth
is spoken, it is spoken by the gift of Him who is the Truth. What if the reason
of our still being ignorant of these things, and of our having failed to discover
them, even after praying, reading, thinking, and reasoning, be this: that full
proof may be made not only of the love with which we give instruction to the
ignorant, but also of the humility with which we receive instruction from the
learned?

10. Teach me, therefore, I beseech you, what I may teach to others; teach
me what I ought to hold as my own opinion; and tell me this: if souls are from
day to day made for each individual separately at birth, where, in the case
of infant children, is sin committed by these souls, so that they require the
remission of sin in the sacrament of Christ, because of sinning in Adam from
whom the sinful flesh has been derived? or if they do not sin, how is it compatible
with the justice of the Creator, that, because of their being united to mortal
members derived from another, they are so brought under the bond of the sin
of that other, that unless they be rescued by the Church, perdition overtakes
them, although it is not in their own power to secure that they be rescued
by the grace of baptism? Where, therefore, is the justice of the condemnation
of so many thousands of souls, which in the deaths of infant children leave
this world without the benefit of the Christian sacrament, if being newly created
they have, not through any preceding sin of their own, but by the will of the
Creator, become severally united to the individual bodies to animate which
they were created and bestowed by Him, who certainly knew that every one of
them was destined, not through any fault of its own, to leave the body without
receiving the baptism of Christ? Seeing, therefore, that we may riot say concerning
God either that He compels them to become sinners, or that He punishes innocent
souls and seeing that, on the other hand, it is not lawful for us to deny that
nothing else than perdition is the doom of the souls, even of little children,
which have departed from the body without the sacrament of Christ, tell me,
I implore you, where anything can be found to support the opinion that souls
are not all derived from that one soul of the first man, but are each created
separately for each individual, as Adam's soul was made for him.

CHAP.
V. -- 11. As for some other objections which are advanced against this opinion,
I think that
I could
easily dispose of them. For example, some think
that they urge a conclusive argument against this opinion when they ask, how
God finished all His works an the sixth day and rested on the seventh day,8
if He is still creating new souls. If we meet them with the quotation from
the gospel (given by you in the letter to Marcellinus already mentioned), "My
Father worketh hitherto," they answer that He "worketh" in maintaining
those natures which He has created, not in creating new natures; otherwise,
this statement would contradict the words of Scripture in Genesis, where it
is most plainly declared that God finished all His works. Moreover, the words
of Scripture, that He rested, are unquestionably to be understood of His resting
from creating new creatures not from governing those which He had created for
at that time He made things which previously did not exist, and from making
these He rested because He had finished all the creatures which before they
existed He saw necessary to be created, so that thenceforward He did not create
and make things which previously did not exist, but made and fashioned out
of things already existing whatever He did make. Thus the statements, "He
rested from His works," and, "He worketh hitherto," are both
true, for the gospel could not contradict Genesis.

12. When, however, these things are brought forward by persons who advance
them as conclusive against the opinion that God now creates new souls as He
created the soul of the first man, and who hold either that He forms them from
that one soul which existed before He rested from creation, or that He now
sends them forth into bodies from some reservoir or storehouse of souls which
He then created, it is easy to turn aside their argument by answering, that
even in the six days God formed many things out of those natures which He had
already created, as, for example, the birds and fishes were formed from the
waters, and the trees, the grass, and the animals from the earth, and yet it
is undeniable that He was then making things which did not exist before. For
there existed previously no bird, no fish, no tree, no animal, and it is clearly
understood that He rested from creating those things which previously were
not, and were then created, that is to say, He ceased in this sense, that,
after that, nothing was made by Him which did not already exist. But if, rejecting
the opinions of all who believe either that God sends forth into men souls
existing already in some incomprehensible reservoir, or that He makes souls
emanate like drops of dew from Himself as particles of His own substance, or
that He brings them forth from that one soul of the first man, or that He binds
them in the fetters of the bodily members because of sins committed in a prior
state of existence, if, I say, rejecting these, we affirm that for each individual
He creates separately a new soul when he is born, we do not herein affirm that
He makes anything which tie had not already made. For He had already made man
after His own image on the sixth day; and this work of His is unquestionably
to be understood with reference to the rational soul of man. The same work
He still does, not in creating what did not exist, but in multiplying what
already existed. Wherefore it is true, on the one hand, that He rested from
creating things which previously did not exist, and equally true, on the other
hand, that He continues still to work, not only in governing what He has made,
but also in making (not anything which did not previously exist, but) a larger
number of those creatures which He had already made. Wherefore, either by such
an explanation, or by any other which may seem better, we escape from the objection
advanced by those who would make the fact that God rested from His works a
conclusive argument against our believing that new souls are still being daily
created, not from the first soul, but in the same manner as it was made.

13. Again,
as for another objection, stated in the question, "Wherefore
does He create souls for those whom He knows to be destined to an early death?" we
may reply, that by the death of the children the sins of the parents are either
reproved or chastised. We may, moreover, with all propriety, leave these things
to the disposal of the Lord of all, for we know that he appoints to the succession
of events in time, and therefore to the births and deaths of living creatures
as included in these, a course which is consummate in beauty and perfect in
the arrangement of all its parts; whereas we are not capable of perceiving
those things by the perception of which, if it were attainable, we should be
soothed with an ineffable, tranquil joy. For not in vain has the prophet, taught
by divine inspiration, declared concerning God, "He bringeth forth in
measured harmonies the course of time."1 For which reason music, the science
or capacity of i correct harmony, has been given also by the kindness of God
to mortals having reasonable souls, with a view to keep them in mind of this
great truth. For if a man, when composing a song which is to suit a particular
melody, knows how to distribute the length of time allowed to each word so
as to make the song flow and pass on in most beautiful adaptation to the ever
changeling notes of the melody, how much more shall God, whose wisdom is to
be esteemed as infinitely transcending human arts, make infallible provision
that not one of the spaces of time alloted to natures that are born and die
-- spaces which are like the words and syllables of the successive epochs of
the course of time -- shall have, in what we may call the sublime psalm of
the vicissitudes of this world, a duration either more brief or more protracted
than the foreknown and predetermined harmony requires! For when I may speak
thus with reference even to the leaves of every tree, and the number of the
hairs upon our heads, how much more may I say it regarding the birth and death
of men, seeing that every man's life on earth continues for a time, which is
neither longer nor shorter than God knows to be in harmony with the plan according
to which He rules the universe.

14. As
to the assertion that everything which has begun to exist in time is incapable
of immortality,
because all
things which are born die, and all things
which have grown decay through age, and the opinion which they affirm to follow
necessarily from this, viz. that the soul of man must owe its immortality to
its having been created before time began, this does not disturb my faith;
for, passing over other examples, which conclusively dispose of this assertion,
I need only refer to the body of Christ, which now "death no more; death
shall have no more dominion over it."1

15. Moreover, as to your remark in your book against Ruffinus, that some bring
forward as against this opinion that souls are created for each individual
separately at birth the objection that it seems worthy of God that He should
give souls to the offspring of adulterers, and who accordingly attempt to build
on this a theory that souls may possibly be incarcerated, as it were, in such
bodies, to suffer for the deeds of a life spent in some prior state of being,2
-- this objection does not disturb me, as many things by which it may be answered
occur to me when I consider it. The answer which you yourself have given, saying,
that in the case of stolen wheat, there is no fault in the grain, but only
in him who stole it, and that the earth is not under obligation to refuse to
cherish the seed because the sower may have cast it in with a hand defiled
by dishonesty, is a most felicitous illustration. But even before I had read
it, I felt that to me the objection drawn from the offspring of adulterers
caused no serious difficulty when I took a general view of the fact that God
brings many good things to light, even out of our evils and our sins. Now,
the creation of any living creature compels ever), one who considers it with
piety and wisdom to give to the Creator praise which words cannot express;
and if this praise is called forth by the creation of any living creature whatsoever,
how much more is it called forth by the creation of a man! If, therefore, the
cause of any act of creative power be sought for, no shorter or better reply
can be given than that every creature of God is good. And [so far from such
an act being unworthy of God] what is more worthy of Him than that He, being
good, should make those good things which, no one else than God alone can make?

CHAP. VI. -- 16. These things, and others which I can advance, I am accustomed
to state, as well as I can, against those who attempt to overthrow by such
objections the opinion that souls are made for each individual, as the first
man's soul was made for him.

But when we come to the penal sufferings of infants, I am embarrassed, believe
me, by great difficulties, and am wholly at a loss to find an answer by which
they are solved; and I speak here not only of those punishments in the life
to come, which are involved in that perdition to which they must be drawn down
if they depart l from the body without the sacrament of Christian grace, but
also of the sufferings which are to our sorrow endured by them before our eyes
in this present life, and which are so various, that time rather than examples
would fail me if I were to attempt to enumerate them. They are liable to wasting
disease, to racking pain, to the agonies of thirst and hunger, to feebleness
of limbs, to privation of bodily senses, and to vexing assaults of unclean
spirits. Surely it is incumbent on us to show how it is compatible with justice
that infants suffer all these things without any evil of their own as the procuring
cause. For it would be impious to say, either that these things take place
without God's knowledge, or that He cannot resist those who cause them, or
that He unrighteously does these things, or permits them to be done. We are
warranted in saying that irrational animals are given by God to serve creatures
possessing a higher nature, even though they be wicked, as we see most plainly
in the gospel that the swine of the Gadarenes were given to the legion of devils
at their request; but could we ever be warranted in saying this of men? Certainly
not. Man is, indeed, an animal, but an animal endowed with reason, though mortal.
In his members dwells a reasonable soul, which in these severe afflictions
is enduring a penalty. Now God is good, God is just, God is omnipotent -- none
but a madman would doubt that he is so;let the great sufferings, therefore,
which infant children experience be accounted for by some reason compatible
with justice. When older people suffer such trials, we are accustomed, certainly,
to say, either that their worth is being proved, as in Job's case, or that
their wickedness is being punished, as in Herod's; and from some examples,
which it has pleased God to make perfectly clear, men are enabled to conjecture
the nature of others which are more obscure; but this is in regard to persons
of mature age. Tell me, therefore, what we must answer in regard to infant
children; is it true that, although they suffer so great punishments, there
are no sins in them deserving to be punished? for, of course, there is not
in them at that age any righteousness requiring to be put to the proof.

17. What shall I say, moreover, as to the [difficulty which besets the theory
of the creation of each soul separately at the birth of the individual in connection
with the] diversity of talent in different souls, and especially the absolute
privation of reason in some? This is, indeed, not apparent in the first stages
of infancy, but being developed continuously from the beginning of life, it
becomes manifest in children, of whom some are so slow and defective in memory
that they cannot learn even the letters of the alphabet, and some (commonly
called idiots) so imbecile that they differ very little, from the beasts of
the field. Perhaps I am told, in answer to this, that the bodies are the cause
of these imperfections. But surely the opinion which we wish to see vindicated
from objection does not require us to affirm that the soul chose for itself
the body which so impairs it, and, being deceived in the choice, committed
a blunder; or that the soul, when it was compelled, as a necessary consequence
of being born, to enter into some body, was hindered from finding another by
crowds of souls occupying the other bodies before it came, so that, like a
man who takes whatever seat may remain vacant for him in a theatre, the soul
was guided in taking possession of the imperfect body not by its choice, but
by its circumstances. We, of course, cannot say and ought not to believe such
things. Tell us, therefore, what we ought to believe and to say in order to
vindicate from this difficulty the theory that for each individual body a new
soul is specially created.

CHAP.
VII. -- 18. In my books on Free Will, already referred to, I have said something,
not l in
regard to
the variety of capacities in different souls,
but, at least, in regard to the pains which I infant children suffer in this
life. The nature of the opinion which I there expressed, and the reason why
it is insufficient for the purposes of our present inquiry, I will now submit
to you, and will put into this letter a copy of the passage in the third book
to which I refer. It is as follows: -- "In connection with the bodily
sufferings experienced by the little children who, by reason of their tender
age, have no sins -- if the souls which animate them did not exist before they
were born into the human family -- a more grievous and, as it were, compassionate
complaint is very commonly made in the remark, 'What evil have they done that
they should suffer these things?' as if there could be a meritorious innocence
in any one before the time at which it is possible for him to do anything wrong
I Moreover, if God accomplishes, in any measure, the correction of the parents
when they are chastised by the sufferings or by the death of the children that
are dear to them, is there any reason why these things should not take place,
seeing that, after they are passed, :they will be, to those who experienced
them, as if they had never been, while the persons on whose account they were
inflicted will either become better, being moved by the rod of temporal afflictions
to choose a better mode of life, or be left without excuse under the punishment
awarded at the coming judgment, if, notwithstanding the sorrows of this life,
they have refused to turn their desires towards eternal life? Morever, who
knows what may be given to the little children by means of whose sufferings
the parents have their obdurate hearts subdued, or their faith exercised, or
their compassion proved? Who knows what good recompense God may, in the secret
of his judgments, reserve for these little ones? For although they have done
no righteous action, nevertheless, being free from any transgression of their
own, they have suffered these trials. It is certainly not without reason that
the Church exalts to the honourable rank of martyrs those children who were
slain when Herod sought our Lord Jesus Christ to put Him to death."1

19. These things I wrote at that time when I was endeavouring to defend the
opinion which is now under discussion. For, as I mentioned shortly before,
I was labouring to prove that whichever of these four opinions regarding the
soul's incarnation may be found true, the substance of the Creator is absolutely
free from blame, and is completely removed from all share in our sins. And,
therefore, whichever of these opinions might come to be established or demolished
by the truth, this had no bearing oft the object aimed at in the work which
I was then attempting, seeing that whichever opinion might win the victory
over all the rest, after they had been examined in a more thorough discussion,
this would take place without causing me any disquietude, because my object
then was to prove that, even admitting all these opinions, the doctrine maintained
by me remained unshaken. But now my object is, by the force of sound reasoning,
to select, if possible, one opinion out of the four; and, therefore, when I
carefully consider the words now quoted from that book, I do not see that the
arguments there used in defending the opinion which we are now discussing are
valid and conclusive.

20. For
what may be called the chief prop of my defence is in the sentence, "Moreover,
who knows what may be given to the little children, by means of whose sufferings
the parents have their obdurate hearts subdued, or their faith exercised, or
their compassion proved? Who knows what good recompense God may, in the secret
of His judgments, reserve for these little ones?" I see that this is not
an unwarranted conjecture in the case of infants who, in any way, suffer (though
they know it not) for the sake of Christ and in the cause of true religion,
and of infants who have already been made partakers of the sacrament of Christ;
because, apart from union to the one Mediator, they cannot be delivered from
condemnation, and so put in a position in which it is even possible that a
recompense could be made to them for the evils which, in diverse afflictions,
they have endured in this world. But since the question cannot be fully solved,
unless the answer include also the case of those who, without having received
the sacrament of Christian fellowship, die in infancy after enduring the most
painful sufferings, what recompense can be conceived of in their case, seeing
that, besides all that they suffer in this life, perdition awaits them in the
life to come? As to the baptism of infants, I have, in the same book, given
an answer, not, indeed, fully, but so far as seemed necessary for the work
which then occupied me, proving that it profits children, even though they
do not know what it is, and have, as yet, no faith of their own; but on the
subject of the perdition of those infants who depart from this life without
baptism, I did not think it necessary to say anything then, because the question
under discussion was different from that with which we are now engaged.

21. If,
however, we pass over and make no account of those sufferings which are of
brief continuance,
and which,
when endured, are not to be repeated,
we certainly cannot, in like manner, make no account of the fact that "by
one man death came, and by one man came also the resurrection of the dead;
for as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."1 For,
according to this apostolical, divine, and perspicuous declaration, it is sufficiently
plain that no one goes to death otherwise than through Adam, and that no one
goes to life eternal otherwise; than through Christ. For this is the force
of all in the two parts of the sentence; as all men, by their first, that is,
their natural birth, belong to Adam, even so all men, whoever they be, who
come to Christ come to the second, that is, the spiritual birth. For this reason,
therefore, the word all is used in both clauses, because as all who die do
not die otherwise than in Adam, so all who shall be made alive shall not be
made alive otherwise than in Christ. Wherefore whosoever tells us that any
man can be made alive in the resurrection of the dead otherwise than in Christ,
he is to be detested as a pestilent enemy to the common faith. Likewise, whosoever
says that those children who depart out of this life without partaking of that
sacrament shall be made alive in Christ, certainly contradicts the apostolic
declaration, and condemns the universal Church, in which it is the practice
to lose i no time and run in haste to administer baptism to infant children,
because it is believed, as an i indubitable truth, that otherwise they cannot
be made alive in Christ. Now he that is not made alive in Christ must necessarily
remain under the condemnation, of which the apostle says, that "by the
offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation."2 That infants
are born under the guilt of this offence is believed by the whole Church. It
is also a doctrine which you have most faithfully set forth, both in your treatise
against Jovinian and your exposition of Jonah, as I mentioned above, and, if
I am not mistaken, in other parts of your works which I have not read or have
at present forgotten. I therefore ask, what is the ground of this condemnation
of unbaptized infants ? For if new souls are made for men, individually, at
their birth, I do not see, on the one hand, that they could have any sin while
yet in infancy, nor do I believe, on the other hand, that God condemns any
soul which He sees to have no sin.

CHAP. VIII. -- 22. Are we perchance to say, in answer to this, that in the
infant the body alone is the cause of sin; but that for each body a new soul
is made, and that if this soul live according to the precepts of God, by the
help of the grace of Christ, the reward of being made incorruptible may be
secured for the body itself, when subdued and kept under the yoke; and that
inasmuch as the soul of an infant cannot yet do this, unless it receive the
sacrament of Christ, that which could not yet be obtained for the body by the
holiness of the soul is obtained for it by the grace of this sacrament; but
if the soul of an infant depart without the sacrament, it shall itself dwell
in life eternal, from which it could not be separated, as it had no sin, while,
however, the body which it occupied shall not rise again in Christ, because
the sacrament had not been received before its death?

23. This
opinion I have never heard or read anywhere. I have, however, certainly heard
and believed
the statement
which led me to speak thus, namely, "The
hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear His voice,
and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life," --
the resurrection, namely, of which it is said that "by one man came the
resurrection of the dead," and in which "all shall be made alive
in Christ," -- "and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection
of damnation."1 Now, what is to be understood regarding infants which,
before they could do good or evil, have quitted the body without baptism? Nothing
is said here concerning them. But if the bodies of these infants shall not
rise again, because they, have never done either good or evil, the bodies of
the infants that have died after receiving the grace of baptism shall also:
have no resurrection, because they also were not: in this life able to do good
or evil. If, however,. these are to rise among the saints, i.e. among: those
who have done good, among whom shall the others rise again but among those
who have done evil -- unless we are to believe that some human souls shall
not receive, either in the resurrection of life, or in the resurrection of
damnation, the bodies which they lost in death? This opinion, however, is condemned,
even before it is formally refuted, by its absolute novelty; and besides this,
who could bear to think that those who run with their infant children to have
them baptized, are prompted to do so by a regard for their bodies, not for
their souls? The blessed Cyprian, indeed, said, in order to correct those who
thought that an infant should not be baptized before the eighth day, that it
was not the body but the soul which behoved to be saved from perdition -- in
which statement he was not inventing any new doctrine, but preserving the firmly
established faith of the Church; and he, along with some of his colleagues
in the episcopal office, held that a child may be properly baptized immediately
after its birth.2

24. Let every man, however, believe anything which commends itself to his
own judgment, even though it run counter to some opinion of Cyprian, who may
not have seen in the matter! what should have been seen. But let no man believe
anything which runs counter to the perfectly unambiguous apostolical declaration,
that by the offence of one all are brought into condemnation, and that from
this condemnation nothing sets men free but the grace of God through our Lord
Jesus Christ, in whom alone life is given to all who are made alive. And let
no man believe anything which runs counter to the firmly grounded practice
of the Church, in which, if the sole reason for hastening the administration
of baptism were to save the children, the dead as well as the living would
be brought to be baptized.

25. These things being so, it is necessary still to investigate and to make
known the reason! why, if souls are created new for every individual at his
birth, those who die in infancy without the sacrament of Christ are doomed
to perdition; for that they are doomed to this if they so depart from the body
is testified both by Holy Scripture and by the holy Church. Wherefore, as to
that opinion of yours concerning the creation of new souls, if it does not
contradict this firmly grounded article of faith, let it be mine also; but
if it does, let it be no longer yours.

26. Let
it not be said to me that we ought to receive as supporting this opinion
the words of Scripture
in
Zechariah, "He formeth the spirit of man within
him,"3 and in the book of Psalms, "He formeth their hearts severally."4
We must seek for the strongest and most indisputable proof, that we may not
be compelled to believe that God is a judge who condemns any soul which has
no fault. For to create signifies either as much or, probably, more than to
form [fingere]; nevertheless it is written, "Create in me a clean heart,
O God,"5 and yet it cannot be supposed that a soul here expresses a desire
to be made before it has begun to exist. Therefore, as it is a soul already
existing which is created by being renewed in righteousness, so it is a soul
already existing which is formed by the moulding power of doctrine. Nor is
),our opinion, which I would willingly make my own, supported by that sentence
in Ecclesiastes, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and
the spirit shall return to God who gave it."6 Nay, it rather favours those
who think that all souls are derived from one; for they say that, as the dust
returns to the earth as it was, and yet the body of which this is said returns
not to the man from whom it was derived, but to the earth from which the first
man was made, the spirit in like manner, though derived from the spirit of
the first man, does not return to him but to the Lord, by whom it was given
to our first parent. Since, however, the testimony of this passage in their
favour is not so decisive as to make it appear altogether opposed to the opinion
which shall gladly see vindicated, I thought proper to submit these remarks
on it to your judgment, to prevent you from endeavouring to deliver me from
my perplexities by quoting passages such as these. For although no man's wishes
can make that true which is not true, nevertheless, were this possible, I would
wish that this opinion should be true, as I do wish that, if it is true, it
should be most clearly and unanswerably vindicated by you.

CHAP.
IX. -- 27. The same difficulty attends those also who hold that souls already
existing elsewhere,
and prepared
from the beginning of the works of
God, are sent by Him into bodies. For to these persons also the same question
may be put: If these souls, being without any fault, go obediently to the bodies
to which they are sent, why are they subjected to punishment in the case of
infants, if they come without being baptized to the end of this life ? The
same difficulty unquestionably attaches to both opinions. Those who affirm
that each soul is, according to the deserts of its actions in an earlier state
of being, united to the body alloted to it in this life, imagine that they
escape more easily from this difficulty. For they think that to "die in
Adam" means to suffer punishment in that flesh which is derived from Adam,
from which condition of guilt the grace of Christ, they say, delivers the young
as well as the old. So far, indeed, they teach what is right, and true, and
excellent, when they say that the grace of Christ delivers the young as well
as the old from the guilt of sins. But that souls sin in another earlier life,
and that for their sins in that state of being they are cast down into bodies
as prisons, I do not believe: I reject and protest against such an opinion.
I do this, in the first place, because they affirm that this is accomplished
by means of some incomprehensible revolutions, so that after I know not how
many cycles the soul must return again to the same burden of corruptible flesh
and to the endurance of punishment, -- than which opinion I do not know that
anything more horrible could be conceived. In the next place, who is the righteous
man gone from the earth about whom we should not (if what they say is true)
feel afraid lest, sinning in Abraham's bosom, he should be cast down into the
flames which tormented the rich man in the parable?1 For why may the soul not
sin after leaving the body, if it can sin before entering it ? Finally, to
have sinned in Adam (in regard to which the apostle says that in him all have
sinned) is one thing, but it is a wholly different thing to have sinned, I
know not where, outside of Adam, and then because of this to be thrust into
Adam -- that is, into the body, which is derived from Adam, as into a prison-house.
As to the other opinion mentioned above, that all souls are derived from one,
I will not begin to discuss it unless I am under necessity to do so; and my
desire is, that if the opinion which we are now discussing is true, it may
be so vindicated by you that there shall be no longer any necessity for examining
the other.

28. Although,
however, I desire and ask, and with fervent prayers wish and hope, that by
you the
Lord may
remove my ignorance on this subject, if, after
all, I am found unworthy to obtain this, I will beg the grace of patience from
the Lord our God, in whom we have such faith, that even if there be some things
which He does not open to us when we knock, we know it would be wrong to murmur
in the least against Him. remember what He said to the apostles themselves: "I
have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now."2 Among
these things, so far at least as I am concerned, let me still reckon this,
and let me guard against being angry that I am deemed unworthy to possess this
knowledge, lest by such anger I be all the more clearly proved to be unworthy.
I am equally ignorant of many other things, yea, of more than I could name
or even number; and of this I would be more patiently ignorant, were it not
that I fear lest some one of these opinions, involving the contradiction of
truth which we most assuredly believe, should insinuate itself into the minds
of the unwary. Meanwhile, though I do not yet know which of these opinions
is to be preferred, this one thing I profess as my deliberate conviction, that
the opinion which is true does not conflict with that most firm and well grounded
article in the faith of :he Church of Christ, that infant children, even when
they are newly born, can be delivered from perdition in no other way than through
the grace of Christ's name, which He has given in His sacraments.

LETTER CLXVII. (A.D. 415.)

FROM AUGUSTIN TO JEROME ON JAMES II. 10.

CHAP.
I. -- 1. My brother Jerome, esteemed worthy to be honoured in Christ by me,
when I wrote to you
propounding
this question concerning the human soul,
-- if a new soul be now created for each individual at birth, whence do souls
contract the bond of guilt which we assuredly believe to be removed by the
sacrament of the grace of Christ, when administered even to new-born children?
-- as the letter on that subject grew to the size of a considerable volume,
I was unwilling to impose the burden of any other question at that time; but
there is a subject which has a much stronger claim on my attention, as it presses
more seriously on my mind. I therefore ask you, and in God's name beseech you,
to do something which will, I believe, be of great service to many, namely,
to explain to me (or to direct me to any work in which you or any other commentator
has already expounded) the sense in which we are to understand these words
in the Epistle of James, "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet
offend in one point, he is guilty of all."3 This subject is of such importance
that I very greatly regret that I did not write to you in regard to it long
ago.

2. For
whereas in the question which I thought it neccessary to submit to you concerning
the soul,
our inquiries
were engaged with the investigation
of a life wholly past and sunk out of sight in oblivion, in this question we
study this present life, and how it must be spent if we would attain to eternal
life. As an apt illustration of this remark let me quote an entertaining anecdote.
A man had fallen into a well where the quantity of water was sufficient to
break his fall and save him from death, but not deep enough to cover his mouth
and deprive him of speech. Another man approached, and on seeing him cries
out in surprise: "How did you fall in here?" He answers: "I
beseech you to plan how you can get me out of this, rather than ask how I fell
in." So, since we admit and hold as an article of the Catholic faith,
that the soul of even a little infant requires to be delivered out of the guilt
of sin, as out of a pit, by the grace of Christ, it is sufficient for the soul
of such a one that we know the way in which it is saved, even though we should
never know the way in which it came into that wretched condition. But I thought
it our duty to inquire into this subject, lest we should incautiously hold
any one of those opinions concerning the manner of the soul's becoming united
with the body which might contradict the doctrine that the souls of little
children require to be delivered, by denying that they are subject to the bond
of guilt. This, then, being very firmly held by us, that the soul of every
infant needs to be freed from the guilt of sin, and can be freed in no other
way except by the grace of. God through Jesus Christ our Lord, if we can ascertain
the cause and origin of the evil itself, we are better prepared and equipped
for resisting adversaries whose empty talk I call not reasoning but quibbling;
if, however, we cannot: ascertain the cause, the fact that the origin of, this
misery is hid from us is no reason for our being slothful in the work which
compassion demands from us. In our conflict, however, with those who appear
to themselves to know what they do not know, we have an additional strength
and safety in not being ignorant of our ignorance on this subject. For there
are some things which it is evil not to know; there are other things which
cannot be known, or are not necessary to be known, or have no bearing on the
life which we seek to obtain; but the question which I now submit to you from
the writings of the Apostle James is intimately connected with the course of
conduct in which we live, and in which, with a view to life eternal, we endeavour
to please God.

3. How,
then, I beseech you, are we to understand the words: "Whosoever
shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all"?
Does this affirm that the person who shall have committed theft, nay, who even
shall have said to the rich man, "Sit thou here" and to the poor
man, "Stand thou there," is guilty of homicide, and adultery, and
sacrilege ? And if he is not so, how can it be said that a person who has offended
in one point has become guilty of all? Or are the things which the apostle
said concerning the rich man and the poor man not to be reckoned among those
things in one of which if any man offend he becomes guilty of all ? But we
must remember whence I that sentence is taken, and what goes before it, and
in what connection it occurs. "My brethren," he says, "have
not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of Glory, with respect of
persons. For if there come into your assembly a man with a gold ring, in goodly
apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile raiment; and ye have respect
to him that weareth the gay clothing, and say unto him, Sit thou here in a
good place; and say to the poor, Stand thou there, or sit here under my footstool;
are ye not then partial in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts
? Hearken, my beloved brethren, Hath not God chosen the poor of this world,
rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which He hath promised to them that
love Him ? But ye have despised the poor,"1 -- inasmuch as you have said
to the poor man, "Stand thou there," when you would have said to
a man with a gold ring, "Sit thou here in a good place." And then
there follows a passage explaining and enlarging upon that same conclusion: "Do
not rich men oppress you by their power, and draw you before the judgment-seats?
Do not they blaspheme that worthy name by the which ye are called? If ye fulfil
the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as
thyself, ye do well: but if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and
are convinced of the law as transgressors." See how the apostle calls
those transgressors of the law who say to the rich man, "Sit here," and
to the poor, "Stand there." See how, lest they should think it a
trifling sin to transgress the law in this one thing, he goes on to add: "Whosoever
shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty Of all.
For He that said, Do not commit adultery, said also, Do not kill. Now if thou
do not kill, yet, if thou commit adultery, thou art become a transgressor of
the law," according to that which he had said: "Ye are convinced
of the law as transgressors." Since these things are so, it seems to follow,
unless it can be shown that we are to understand it in some other way, that
he who says to the rich man, "Sit here," and to the poor, "Stand
there," not treating the one with the same respect as the other, is to
be judged guilty as an idolater, and a blasphemer, and an adulterer, and a
murderer -- in short, -- not to enumerate all, which would be tedious, -- as
guilty of all crimes, since, offending in one, he is guilt), of all."

CHAP. II. -- 4. But has he who has one virtue all virtues? and has he no virtues
who lacks one? If this be true, the sentence of the apostle is thereby confirmed.
But what I desire is to have the sentence explained, not confirmed, since of
itself it stands more sure in our esteem than all the authority of philosophers
could make it. And even if what has just been said concerning virtues and vices
were true, it would not follow that therefore all sins are equal. For as to
the inseparable co-existence of the virtues, this is a doctrine in regard to
which, if I remember rightly, what, indeed, I have almost forgotten (though
perhaps I am mistaken), all philosophers who affirm that virtues are essential
to the right conduct of life are agreed. The doctrine of the equality of sins,
however, the Stoics alone dared to maintain in opposition to the unanimous
sentiments of mankind: an absurd tenet, which in writing against Jovinianus
(a Stoic in this opinion, but an Epicurean in following after and defending
pleasure) you have most clearly refuted from the Holy Scriptures.1 In that
most delightful and noble dissertation you have made it abundantly plain that
it has not been the doctrine of our authors, or rather of the Truth Himself,
who has spoken through them, that all sins are equal. I shall now do my utmost
in endeavouring, with the help of God, to show how it can be that, although
the doctrine of philosophers concerning virtues is true, we are nevertheless
not compelled to admit the Stoics' doctrine that all sins are equal. If I succeed,
I will look for your approbation, and in whatever respect I come short, I beg
you to supply my deficiencies.

5. Those who maintain that he who has one virtue has all, and that he who
lacks one lacks] all, reason correctly from the fact that prudence cannot be
cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate; for if it were any of these it would
no longer be prudence. Moreover, if it be prudence only when it is brave, and
just, and temperate, assuredly wherever it exists it must have the other virtues
along with it. In like manner, also, courage cannot be imprudent, or intemperate,
or unjust; temperance must of necessity be prudent, brave, and just; and justice
does not exist unless it be prudent, brave, and temperate. Thus, wherever any
one of these virtues truly exists, the others likewise exist; and where some
are absent, that which may appear in some measure to resemble virtue is not
really present.

6. There
are, as you know, some vices opposed to virtues by a palpable contrast, as
imprudence is the
opposite
of prudence. But there are some vices opposed
to virtues simply because they are vices which, nevertheless, by a deceitful
appearance resemble virtues; as, for example, in the relation, not of imprudence,
but of craftiness to the said virtue of prudence. I speak here of that craftiness
2 which is wont to be understood and spoken of in connection with the evilly
disposed, not in the sense in which the word is usually employed in our Scriptures,
where it is often used in a good sense, as, "Be crafty as serpents,"3
and again, to give craftiness to the simple."4 It is true that among heathen
writers one of the most accomplished of Latin authors, speaking of Catiline,
has said: "Nor was there lacking on his part craftiness to guard against
danger,"5 using "craftiness" (astutia) in a good sense; but
the use of the word in this sense is among them very rare, among us very common.
So also in regard to the virtues classed under temperance. Extravagance is
most manifestly opposite to the virtue of frugality; but that which the common
people are . wont to call niggardliness is indeed a vice, yet one which, not
in its nature, but by a very deceitful similarity of appearance, usurps the
name of frugality. In the same manner injustice is by , a palpable contrast
opposed to justice; but the desire of avenging oneself is wont often to be
a counterfeit of justice, but it is a vice. There is an obvious contrariety
between courage and cowardice; but hardihood, though differing from courage
in nature, deceives us by its resemblance to that virtue. Firmness is a part
of virtue; fickleness is a vice far removed from and undoubtedly opposed to
it; but obstinacy lays claim to the name of firmness, yet is wholly different,
because firmness is a virtue, and obstinacy is a vice.

7. To avoid the necessity of again going over the same ground, let us take
one case as an example, from which all others may be understood. Catiline,
as those who have written concerning him had means of knowing, was capable
of enduring cold, thirst, hunger, and patient in fastings, cold, and watchings
beyond what any one could believe, and thus he appeared, both to himself and
to his followers, a man endowed , with great courage.6 But this courage was
not prudent, for he chose the evil instead of the good; was not temperate,
for his life was disgraced by the lowest dissipation; was not just, for he
conspired against his country; and therefore it was not courage, but hardihood
usurping the name of courage to deceive fools; for if it had been courage,
it would not have been a vice but a virtue, and if it had been a virtue, it
would never have been abandoned by fie other virtues, its inseparable companions.

8. On this account, when it is asked also concerning vices, whether where
one exists all in like manner exist, or where one does not exist none exist,
it would be a difficult matter to show this, because two vices are wont to
be opposed to one virtue, one that is evidently opposed, and another that bears
an apparent likeness. Hence the hardihood of Catiline is the more easily seen
not to have been courage, since it had not along with it other virtues; but
it may be difficult to convince men that his hardihood was cowardice, since
he was in the habit of enduring and patiently submitting to the severest hardships
to a degree almost incredible. But perhaps, on examining the matter more closely,
this hardihood itself is seen to be cowardice, because he shrunk from the toil
of those liberal studies by which true courage is acquired. Nevertheless, as
there are rash men who are not guilty of cowardice, and there are cowardly
men who are not guilty of rashness, and since.in both there is vice, for the
truly brave man neither ventures rashly nor fears without reason, we are forced
to admit that vices are more numerous than virtues.

9. Accordingly, it happens sometimes that one vice is supplanted by another,
as the love of money by the love of praise. Occasionally, one vice quits the
field that more may take its place, as in the case of the drunkard, who, after
becoming temperate m the use of drink, may come under the power of niggardliness
and ambition. It is possible, therefore, that vices may give place to vices,
not to virtues, as their successors, and thus they are more numerous. When
one virtue, however, has entered, there will infallibly be (since it brings
all the other virtues along with it) a retreat of all vices whatsoever that
were in the man; for all vices were not in him, but at one time so many, at
another a greater or smaller number might occupy their place.

CHAP.
III. -- 10. We must inquire more carefully whether these things are so; for
the statement that "he who has one virtue has all, and that all
virtues are awanting to him who lacks one," is not given by inspiration,
but is the view held by many men, ingenious, indeed, and studious, but still
men. But I must avow that, in the case -- I shall not say of one of those from
whose name the word virtue is said to be derived,1 but even of a woman who
is faithful to her husband, and who is so from a regard to the commandments
and promises of God, and, first of all, is faithful to Him, I do not know how
I could say of her that she is unchaste, or that chastity is no virtue or a
trifling one. I should feel the same in regard to a husband who is faithful
to his wife; and yet there are many such, none of whom I could affirm to be
without any sins, and doubtless the sin which is in them, whatever it be, proceeds
from some Vice. Whence it follows that though conjugal fidelity in religious
men and women is undoubtedly a virtue, for it is neither a nonentity nor a
vice, yet it does not bring along with it all virtues, for if all virtues were
there, there would be no vice, and if there were no vice, there would be no
sin; but where is the man who is altogether without sin ? Where, therefore,
is the man who is without any vice, that is, fuel or root, as it were, of sin,
when he who reclined on the breast of the Lord says, "If we say that we
have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us"?2 It is
not necessary for us to urge this at greater length in writing to you, but
I make the statement for the sake of others who perhaps shall read this. For
you, indeed, in that same splendid work against Jovinianus, have carefully
proved this from the Holy Scriptures; in which work also you have quoted the
words, "in many things we all offend,"3 from this very epistle in
which occur the words whose meaning we are now investigating. For though it
is an apostle of Christ who is speaking, he does not say, "ye offend," but, "we
offend;" and although in the passage under consideration he says, "Whosoever
shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all," 4
in the words just quoted he affirms that we offend not in one i thing but in
many, and not that some offend but that we all offend.

11. Far
be it, however, from any believer to think that so many thousands of the
servants of Christ,
who,
lest they should deceive themselves, and the
truth should not be in them, sincerely confess themselves to have sin, are
altogether without virtues For wisdom is a great virtue, and wisdom herself
has said to man, "Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom."5
Far be it from us, then, to say that so many and so great believing and pious
men have not the fear of the Lord, which the Greeks call <greek>eusebeia</greek>,
or more literally and fully, <greek>qeosebeia</greek> And what
is the fear of the Lord but His worship ? and whence is He truly worshipped
except from love? Love, then, out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and
faith unfeigned, is the great and true virtue, because it is "the end
of the commandment."1 Deservedly is love said to be "strong as death,"2
because, like death, it is vanquished by none; or because the measure of love
in this life is even unto death, as the Lord says, "Greater love hath
no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends;"3 or,
rather, because, as death forcibly separates the soul from the senses of the
body, so love separates it from fleshly lusts. Knowledge, when it is of the
right kind, is the handmaid to love, for without love "knowledge puffeth
up,"4 but where love, by edifying, has filled the heart, there knowledge
will find nothing empty i which it can puff up. Moreover, Job has shown, what
is that useful knowledge by defining it where, after saying, "The fear
of the Lord, that is wisdom" he adds "and to depart from evil, I
that is understanding."5 Why do we not then say that the man who has this
virtue has all virtues, since "love is the fulfilling of the law?"6.
Is it not true that, the more love exists in a man the more he is endowed with
virtue, and the less love he has the less virtue is in him, for love is itself
virtue; and the less virtue there is in a man so much the more vice will there
be in him ?: Therefore, where love is full and perfect, no vice will remain.

12. The Stoics, therefore, appear to me to be mistaken in refusing to admit
that a man who is advancing in wisdom has any wisdom at all, and in affirming
that he alone has it who has become altogether perfect in wisdom. They do not,
! indeed, deny that he has made progress, but they say that he is in no degree
entitled to be called wise, unless, by emerging, so to speak, from the depths,
he suddenly springs forth into the free air of wisdom. For, as it matters not
when a man is drowning whether the depth of water above him be many stadia
or only the breadth of a hand or finger, so they say in regard to the progress
of those who are advancing towards wisdom, that they are like men rising from
the bottom of a whirlpool towards the air, but that unless they by their progress,
so escape as to emerge wholly from folly as from an overwhelming flood, they
have not virtue and are not wise; but that, when they have so escaped, they
immediately have wisdom in perfection, and not a vestige of folly whence any
sin could be originated remains.

13. This
simile, in which folly is compared to water and wisdom to air, so that the
mind emerging,
as it
were, from the stifling influence of folly breathes
suddenly the free air of wisdom, does not appear to me to harmonize sufficiently
with the authoritative statement of our Scriptures; a better simile, so far,
at least, as illustration of spiritual things can be borrowed from material
things, is that which compares vice or folly to darkness, and virtue or wisdom
to light. The way to wisdom is therefore not like that of a man rising from
the water into the air, in which, in the moment of rising above the surface
of the water, he suddenly breathes freely, but, like that of a man proceeding
from darkness into light, on whom more light gradually shines as he advances.
So long, therefore, as this is not fully accomplished, we speak of the man
as of one going from the dark recesses of a vast cavern towards its entrance,
who is more and more influenced by the proximity of the light as he comes nearer
to the entrance of the cavern; so that whatever light he has proceeds from
the light to which he is advancing, and whatever darkness still remains in
him proceeds from the darkness out of which he is emerging. Therefore it is
true that in the sight of God "shall no man living be justified,"7
and yet that "the just shall live by his faith."8 On the one hand, "the
saints are clothed with righteousness,"9 one more, another less; on the
other hand, no one lives here wholly without sin -- one sins more, another
less, and the best is the man who sins least.

CHAP. IV. -- 14. But why have I, as if forgetting to whom I address myself,
assumed the tone of a teacher in stating the question regarding which I wish
to be instructed by you ? Nevertheless, as I had resolved to submit to your
examination my opinion regarding the equality of sins (a subject involving
a question closely bearing on the matter on which I was writing), let me now
at last bring my statement to a conclusion. Even though it were true that he
who has one virtue has all virtues, and that he who lacks one virtue has none,
this would not involve the consequence that all sins are equal; for although
it is true that where there is no virtue there is nothing right, it by no means
follows that among bad actions one cannot be worse than another, or that divergence
from that which is right does not admit of degrees. I think, however, that
it is more agreeable to truth and consistent with the Holy Scriptures to say,
that what is true of the members of the body is true i of the different dispositions
of the soul (which, though not seen occupying different places, are by their
distinctive workings perceived as plainly as the members of the body), namely,
that as in the same body one member is more fully shone upon by the light,
another is less shone upon, and a third is altogether without light, and remains
in the dark under some impervious covering, something similar takes place in
regard to the various dispositions of the soul. If this be so, then according
to the manner in which every man is shone upon by the light of holy love, he
may be said to have one virtue and to lack another virtue, or to have one virtue
in larger and another in smaller measure. For in reference to that love which
is the fear of God, we may correctly say both that it is greater in one man
than in another, and tim there is some of it in one man, and none of it in
another; we may also correctly say as to an individual that he has greater
chastity than patience, and that he has either virtue in a higher degree than
he had yesterday, if he is making progress, or tim he still lacks self-control,
but possesses, at the same time, a large measure of compassion.

15. To
sum up generally and briefly the view which, so far as relates to holy living,
I entertain
concerning
virtue, -- virtue is tile love with which that
which ought to be loved is loved. This is in some greater, in others less,
and there are men in whom it does not exist at all; but in the absolute fulness
which admits of no increase, it exists in no man while living on this earth;
so long, however, as it admits of being increased there can be no doubt that,
in so far as it is less than it ought to be, the shortcoming proceeds from
vice. Because of this vice there is "not a just man upon earth that doeth
good and sinneth not;"1 because of this vice, "in God's sight shall
no man living be justified."2 On account of this vice, "if we say
that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."3
On account of this also, whatever progress we may have made, we must say, "Forgive
us our debts,"4 although all debts in word, deed, and thought were washed
away in baptism. He, then, who sees aright, sees whence, and when, and where
he must hope for that perfection to which nothing can be added. Moreover, if
there had been no commandments, there would have been no means whereby a man
might certainly examine himself and see from what things he ought to turn aside,
whither he should aspire, and in what things he should find occasion for thanksgiving
or for prayer. Great, therefore, is the benefit of commandments, if to free
will so much liberty be granted that the grace of God may be more abundantly
honoured.

CHAP.
V. -- 16. If these things be so, how shall a man who shall keep the whole
law, and yet offend
in one
point, be guilty of all ? May it not be, that
since the fulfilling of the law is that love wherewith we love God and our
neighbour, on which commandments of love "hang all the law and the prophets,"5
he is justly held to be guilty of all who violates that on which all hang?
Now, no one sins without violating this love; "for this, thou shalt not
commit adultery; thou shall do no murder; thou shall not steal; thou shalt
not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended
in this saying, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill
to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law."6 No one,
however, loves his neighbour who does not out of his love to God do all in
his power to bring his neighbour also, whom he loves as himself, to love God,
whom if he does not love, he neither loves himself nor his neighbour. Hence
it is true that if a man shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point,
he becomes guilty of all, because he does what is contrary to the love on which
hangs the whole law. A man, therefore, becomes guilty of all by doing what
is contrary to that on which all hang.

17. Why,
then, may not all sins be said to be equal ? May not the reason be, that
the transgression
of the
law of love is greater in him who commits a more
grievous sin, and is less in him who commits a less grievous sin? And in the
mere fact of his committing any sin whatever, he becomes guilty of all; but
in committing a more grievous sin, or in sinning in more respects than one,
he becomes more guilty; committing a less grievous sin, or sinning in fewer
respects, he becomes less guilty, -- his guilt being thus so much the greater
the more he has sinned, the less the less he has sinned. Nevertheless, even
though it be only in one point that he offend, he is guilty of all, because
he violates that love on which all hang. If these things be true, an explanation
is by this means found, clearing up that saying of the man of apostolic grace, "In
many things we offend all."7 For we all offend, but one more grievously,
another more slightly, according as each may have committed a more grievous
or a less grievous sin .; every one being great in the practice of sin in proportion
as he is deficient in loving God and his neighbour, and, on the other hand,
decreasing in the practice of sin in proportion as he increases in the ;love
of God and of his neighbour. The more, therefore, that a man is deficient in
love, the more is he full of sin. And perfection in love i is reached when
nothing of sinful infirmity remains in us.

18. Nor,
indeed, in my opinion, are we to esteem it a trifling sin "to
have the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ with respect of persons," if we
take the difference between sitting and standing, of which mention is made
in the context, to refer to ecclesiastical honours; for who can bear to see
a rich man chosen to a place of honour in the Church, while a poor man, of
superior qualifications and of greater holiness. is despised? If, however,
the apostle speaks there of our daily assemblies, who does not offend in the
matter? At the same time, only those really offend here who cherish in their
hearts the opinion that a man's worth is to be estimated according to his wealth;
for this seems to be the meaning of the expression, "Are ye not then partial
in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts?"

19. The
law of liberty, therefore, the law of love, is that of which he says: "If
ye fulfil the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thyself, ye do well: but if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and
are convinced of the law as transgressors.1 And then (after the difficult sentence, "Whosoever
shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all," concerning
which I have with sufficient fulness stated my opinion), making mention of
the same law of liberty, he says: "So speak ye, and so do, as they that
shall be judged by the law of liberty." And as he knew by experience what
he had said a little before, "in many things we offend all," he suggests
a sovereign remedy, to be applied, as it l were day by day, to those less serious
but real] wounds which the soul suffers day by day, for he says: "He shall
have judgment without mercy that hath showed no mercy."2 For with the
same purpose the Lord says: "Forgive, and ye shall be forgiven: give,
and it shall be given unto you."3 After which the apostle says: "But
mercy rejoiceth over judgment: it's not said that mercy prevails over judgment,
for it is not an adversary of judgment, but it "rejoiceth" over judgment,
because a greater number are gathered in by mercy; but they are those who have
shown mercy, for, "Blessed are the merciful, for God shall have mercy
on them."4

20. It
is, therefore, by all means just that they be forgiven, because they have
forgiven others,
and that what
they need be given to them, because they
have given to others. For God uses mercy when He judgeth, and uses judgment
when He showeth mercy. Hence the Psalmist says: "I will sing of mercy
and of judgment unto Thee, O Lord."5 For if any man, thinking himself
too righteous to require mercy, presumes, as if he had no reason for anxiety,
to wait for judgment without mercy, he provokes that most righteous indignation
through fear of which the Psalmist said: "Enter not into judgment with
Thy servant."6 For this reason the Lord says to a disobedient people: "Wherefore
will ye contend with me in judgment? 7 For when the righteous King shall sit
upon His throne, who shall boast that he has a pure heart, or who shall boast
that he is clean from sin ? What hope is there then unless mercy shall "rejoice
over" judgment? But this it will do only in the case of those who have
showed mercy, saying with sincerity, "Forgive us our debts, as we forgive
our debtors," and who have given without murmuring, for "the Lord
loveth a cheerful giver."8 To conclude, St. James is led to speak thus
concerning works of mercy in this passage, in order that he may console those
whom the statements immediately foregoing might have greatly alarmed, his purpose
being to admonish us ]low those daily sins from which our life is never free
here below may also be expiated by daily remedies; lest any man, becoming guilty
of all when he offends in even one point, be brought, by offending in many
points (since "in many things we all offend"), to appear before the
bar of the Supreme Judge under the enormous amount of guilt which has accumulated
by degrees, and find at that tribunal no mercy, because he showed no mercy
to others, instead of rather meriting the forgiveness of his own sins, and
the enjoyment of the gifts promised in Scripture, by his extending forgiveness
and bounty to others.

21. I
have written at great length, which may perhaps have been tedious to you,
as you, although
approving of
tile statements now made, do not expect
to be addressed as if you were but learning truths which you have been accustomed
to teach to others. If, however, there be anything in these statements -- not
in the style of language in which they are expounded, for I am not much concerned
as to mere phrases, but in the substance of the statements -- which your erudite
judgment condemns, I beseech you to point this out to me in your reply, and
do not hesitate to correct my error. For I pity the man who, in view of the
unwearied labour and sacred character of your studies, does not on account
of them both render to you the honour which you deserve, and give thanks unto
our Lord God by whose grace you are what you are. Wherefore, since I ought
to be more willing to learn from any teacher the things of which to my disadvantage
I am ignorant, than prompt to teach any others what I know, with how much greater
reason do I claim the payment of this debt of love from you, by whose learning
ecclesiastical literature in the latin tongue has been, in the Lord's name,
and by His help, advanced to an extent which had been previously unattainable.
Especially, however, I ask attention to the sentence: "Whosoever shall
keep the whole law, and offend in one point, is guilty of all." If you
know any better way, my beloved brother, in which it can be explained, I beseech
you by the Lord to favour us by communicating to us your exposition.