The
author will appreciate receiving eyewitness accounts, recollections
and documents related to the involvement of German citizens
in the Soviet rocket program, as well as comments on already
published material. Please contact Anatoly
Zak.

In October
1946, the best German engineers who worked for the Soviet missile program
were ordered on the trains and sent to the various locations in the USSR
to assist in the organization of missile production and design. By the
beginning of the 1947, Soviets completed the transfer of all works on
rocket technology from Germany into secret locations in the USSR. In the
fall of 1947, Soviet-German team launched eleven
A-4 rockets near the village of Kapustin Yar
in the steppes north of the Caspian Sea.

Given
a pathological obsession of the Soviet government with secrecy, it was
a remarkable phenomenon that Joseph Stalin did allow hundreds of Soviet
specialists, many of them recent GULAG
inmates, travel to postwar Germany and work side by side with their German
colleagues on the development of rocket technology. Inevitably, the whole
endeavor had a temporary nature, aimed to train Soviet cadre in the industry
that was virtually nonexistent in the USSR at the time. From the outset
of the program, Soviet authorities had grave concerns about engaging thousands
of Germans, who had relative freedom of movement, into the sensitive defense
project.

On
May 7, 1946,
Ivan Serov, the head of the Soviet security policy, NKVD, in Germany received
a letter from A. G. Mrykin from the artillery directorate, GAU, complaining
about overwhelming number of Germans involved in the Soviet rocket development
effort. The
document stressed that German specialists not only were gaining experience
in the production of the current German technology, but also had direct
access to the Soviet efforts to develop follow-on rocket systems. (170)

Along
with having their rocket program exposed to Western intelligence, the
USSR was now restoring military-industrial potential of Germany, something
the Soviet government was least interested to do. Not to mention, Soviet
authorities were concerned they would be accused by the allies of noncompliance
with Allied Control Council agreements on the liquidation of the German
war machine, which could lead to demands by the allies for inspections.
(172)

Official
decisions on the deportation of Germans

On
April 17, 1946, the Soviet of Ministers USSR issued a decree No. 874-366ss
ordering Ministry of Aviation Industry, MAP, to deport 1,400 German engineers
and workers in the USSR. Including family members, the number of deported
was expected to reach 3,500 people at that point.

On
August 24, 1946, Colonel General Ivan Serov, a secret police officer who
served as a Deputy Commander of the Soviet Administration in Germany,
SVAG, sent a letter to Georgy Malenkov, a top party official overseeing
rocketry, asking for government decision on the deportation of German
specialists in the USSR. A
draft of the government decree on the issue reviewed by the SVAG commander
V. D. Sokolovsky and leaders of the various industries was conveniently
attached to the letter. Among the officials who read the draft were Dmitry
Ustinov, the head of Ministry of Armaments, assigned
to host the rocket program; Mikhail Khrunichev, the head of Ministry
of Aviation Industry, Ustinov's deputy Ivan Zubovich and Soviet representatives
in Germany responsible for reactive and radar technology N. E. Nosovsky
and M. M. Lukin.

To
minimize the attempts of escape, Soviet authorities scheduled deportations
to take place simultaneously across the Soviet zone and in the shortest
possible period of time between 15th and 20th of October 1946. The head
of Soviet secret police in Germany Ivan Serov would personally lead the
operation. Major General A. M. Sidnev, the chief of operations department
of the Internal Affairs Ministry, MVD, in Berlin was delegated responsibilities
for the logistical support.

In
the recent past, Serov's chief Lavrenty Beriya had already accumulated
a "considerable experience" in forced deportations of entire
national minorities in the USSR, which were deemed to be a threat to the
Soviet regime.

On
September 13, 1946, Soviet of Ministers USSR issued decree No. 2163-880s
entitled"On removal of hardware from the German military enterprises."
The document officially launched the process of transfer of German rocket
production potential to the USSR. (170)

Operation
"Osoaviakhim"

The
Soviet plan to deport thousands of German specialists into the USSR received
code name Osoaviakhim, after formally volunteer Soviet organization which
in 1930s united many enthusiasts of aviation, rocketry
and related disciplines. Some two weeks prior to the operation, Serov
received a list of people targeted for deportation. It included 2,200
specialists in the fields of aviation, nuclear technology, rocketry, electronics,
radar technology and chemistry. They would be assigned to various industrial
enterprises of the USSR:

Number
of people to be deported

Specialization

Assigned
ministry

Official
overseeing the deportation

1,250

aircraft,
cruise missile experts

Ministry
of Aviation Industry

Major
General S. I. Filatov, MVD chief in Brandenburg

500

rocket
specialists

Ministry
of Armaments

Major
General S. A. Klepov, MVD chief in Saxonia

350

radar
and radio experts

Ministry
of Communications

Colonel
Svirin

30

specialists
in solid rocket propulsion

Ministry
of Agricultural Machine building

-

25

gyroscope,
navigation system experts

Ministry
of Ship Building

-

Counting
family members, the total number of people assigned for deportation would
reach 6,000 - 7,000 people.

October
22, 1946

Days
before deportation numerous passenger trains were pre-positioned on the
stations around Germany. In the early hours of October 22, 1945, around
2,500 internal police officers accompanied by soldiers were dispatched
to the homes of German specialists and ordered them to prepare for the
trip to the USSR. Soldiers would then start loading furniture and other
household items on tracks and transport them to the assigned railroad
stations.
(64) (170)

There
were somewhat conflicting reports about the Soviet approach to the deportation
of family members of the specialists. Wild rumors circulating for decades
told stories about security officers offering German engineers "to
take any woman they wanted." In reality, wives of German engineers
could choose to stay in Germany, if their husbands did not insist on them
going. In a few cases women apparently did take this option. In other
cases, unmarried couples traveled together rather than being separated.

The
ordeal experienced by family members of the German specialists was vividly
described in the memoirs of Irmgard Gröttrup, the wife of a leading
German rocket engineer:

Could
these be the same officers who not so long ago had tried, with a courteous
smile, to make the reconstruction of our experimental station palatable
to us? The same officers who, in response to our tentative inquiries,
assured us that we should never be sent to Russia? Their grin was as
friendly as ever. Indeed they even made a few promises: a flat much
larger and much nicer than ours, a life without any restrictions, a
life in a magnificent country, in a magnificent city amongst grand people.
The only thing they couldn't promise was when we should see our own
country again... At one point, simply to be free for a moment, I tried
to get out through the back door. Impossible! The barrel of a gun- a
broad face: "Nyet." (64)

It
took more than 24 hours for the train with German deportees to leave Bleicherode.
Gröttrup's family of two adults and two children was assigned three
slipping compartments, most other families had one compartment each. Separate
cars carried furniture and other household items. Yet, rumors circulated
about people being shipped in box cars, perhaps an irrelevant reminiscent
to Germany's barbaric methods during extermination of Jewish people few
years earlier.

Population
of the trains was also given out standard food rations:
flour, rusks, semolina, salt, hard mildew salami, and cheese. Field kitchens
were used during the trip to provide hot food.

Known
data on the number of German rocket engineers in the USSR

Western
sources provided various numbers of German rocket scientists deported
to the USSR. According to newly researched Russian data, the actual number
of deported German rocket specialists reached 177 people, including 24
people with doctorate degrees, 17 people with master degrees, 71 people
with engineering degrees and 27 workers.

Total
136 people were employed by a newly created NII-88 research institute,
including 111 people who were identified as heads of households, 18 people
without any dependents or family members and seven workers had been family
members of other German employees at NII-88. Total number of German citizens
under NII-88's responsibility reached 495 people, including family members.

Gröttrups'
train reached Moscow on October 28, 1946. Upon arrival to the USSR, 73
specialists assigned to NII-88 were shipped to the Island
of Gorodomlya, in the Seliger Lake, northwest of Moscow. However a
number of former Gröttrup's colleagues turned out to be missing altogether
from the lists of NII-88 employees.

In
the attempt to find out the fate of his missing men, Gröttrup came
to the following realizations, as recorded by his wife:

...The
whole thing's been planned in advance, and it is up to the individual
officers who are members of the Special Technical Commission to make
a success of the plan. When we were still
in Germany we were led to believe that all the officers of the Special
Commission belonged to one and the same ministry when in fact they belonged
to all sorts of different institutions
and ministries.

The shady
transactions between the ministries are difficult to fathom; they haggle
over every single ordinary measuring instrument, recorder, oscillograph,
etc. (64)

The
same was going on with the assignment of specialists. This "cattle
market," as Gröttrup put it, resulted in the situation, where
as many as 30 former employees from Nordhausen were sent to work for other
ministries, while German citizens from other Soviet enterprises ended
up under his supervision. After some lobbying, Gröttrup was able
to return some of the members of his team back into NII-88.

Germans
at OKB-456

In
the meantime, 23 German citizens were sent to work for the OKB-456 propulsion
development center of Valentin Glushko, which at the time had been under
jurisdiction of Ministry of Aviation Industry. Including family members,
the group counted 65 people and was led by Dr. Oswald Putze. At OKB-456,
German specialists held positions of deputy chief and chief engineer of
experimental construction, chief of oxygen production and deputy chief
of chief of several production shops and test stand. (113)

Yet,
another group involved in rocket development program went to work to the
flight control systems bureau, (later known as NII-885) under jurisdiction
of the Radio Technology Ministry.

Residency
around Moscow

Helmut
Gröttrup and other Germans from NII-88 were settled in mansions and
vacation houses just outside Moscow along the Yaroslavskaya Railroad,
near stations of Bolshevo, Valentinovka and Pushkino. Their workplace
would be NII-88 campus near the station of Podlipki on the same railroad.

According
to Irmgarg Gröttrup the average housing allocation for the German
specialists was one room to a family of three, two rooms to a family of
four. University graduates were allowed an additional room. Gröttrups
were provided with a six-room villa with a large hall and two anterooms,
the former home of a minister. To
complete the picture, by November 1946 the authorities shipped Gröttrup's
car from Germany and complemented it with a Russian chauffeur, whom Mrs.
Gröttrup was giving little rest while exploring Moscow. (64)

Specialists
who worked for OKB-456 in Khimki on the northwestern edge of Moscow also
lived around Podlipki, and would ride buses to work, until specially built
cottages had not been completed near the bureau. The German team from
NII-885, which was located at Shosse Enthusiastov was housed in sanatoria
in Monino, some 45 kilometers northeast of Moscow.

Conditions
at NII-88

First
several months in the USSR, legal status of German specialists remained
uncertain, as Soviet authorities were still figuring out how to treat
their captives. Germans had no passports or any other documents and they
were not be able to send letters home for the first two months in the
USSR. (64)

Yet,
the biggest frustration for the German specialists in Russia was not their
lack of freedom, or living conditions, but the chaos at work. The condition
of facilities of a semi-abandoned artillery plant in Podlipki, where they
were expected to build rockets, shocked even their Russian colleagues.
(53) Due to lack of storage facilities,
the hardware delivered from Institute Nordhausen had been unloaded on
the snow-covered ground along the railway lines, where it was quickly
turning into scrap metal. "Design offices" of NII-88 lacked
tools, materials and even tables. Numerous documents and blueprints generated
in Germany were lost in transit or were grabbed by competing ministries.
Gröttrup's appeals to the director of NII-88 Gonor and Minister of
Armaments Ustinov seemed to bear no fruits.

However
Gröttrup's official protest of his collective deportation, which
he wrote on the train to Moscow was returned to him by the Soviet officials
on December 6, 1946 along with the explanation that the USSR had legal
right to deport Germans for the reconstruction of the country and with
the warning that he could be sent to the Ural region unless he cooperates.

Yet,
at the end of April 1947, Gröttrup frustrated, among other things,
by the lack of insight in the work of NII-88 and noncooperation of some
Russian colleagues went on strike and offered his resignation as the head
of the German collective. This was certainly the only instance of the
protest of this sort in the Stalinist Russia. Surprisingly, by May 1947,
NII-88 set official salaries for the German employees. (64)
For Helmut Gröttrup it was lower than 10,000-ruble monthly honorariums
which he had been receiving previously, still he clearly remained highest
paid rocket scientist in the USSR.

Salary
range comparison of German and Soviet engineers at NII-88 in 1947-1948
(170):

German
citizens

Soviet
citizens

Helmut
Gröttrup (Chief of German collective)

8,500

Sergei
Korolev (Chief Designer and Department Chief)

6,000

Kurt
Magnus (Doctor of Science)

6,000

Yuri
Pobedonostsev (Chief Engineer)

5,000

Engineers
with a diploma

4,000

Vasily
Mishin (Deputy Chief Designer)

2,500

At
the time average Russian engineer would earn around 1,000 rubles a month.

Gröttrup
did remain at his post and he officially resumed work at NII-88 full time
in July 1947. Around the same period of time, he also visited rest of
his German compatriots at Gorodomlya Island.
He found living conditions on the island much worse than in Podlipki.
However by the end of the summer 1947, the Soviet authorities started
removing German employees from their positions in Podlipki and sending
them to Gorodomlya.

G-1
project - the first review at NII-88's Scientific and Technical Council,
NTS.

In
the first few months at NII-88, the Soviet management engaged German specialists
into several aspects of work, including the assistance in issuing Russian-language
documentation on the A-4 and starting prospective research on future ballistic
and antiaircraft missiles, as well as on more powerful rocket engines.
Germans also assisted in organization of rocket production at NII-88's
experimental plant and preparations for the flight tests of the A-4.

However,
the main task for the Germans at NII-88 was the development of proposals
for the improvements in the A-4 design. The fruit of this effort was the
G-1, or German Rocket No. 1 -- a radical upgrade of the A-4. The project,
officially started around June of 1947, incorporated many engineering
ideas and technical innovations, some of which were conceived back in
Peenemunde.

On
September 25, 1947, NII-88 hosted a major scientific review of the G-1
project. (84) A diary published by Gröttrup's
wife dated the event at the end of 1947, and this date was then often
was then quoted by Western historians. Yet, the description provided by
Mrs. Gröttrup, apparently from the words of her husband, still provides
a unique glimpse inside NII-88 in the 1940s:

Seated
in the festively decorated conference room at the long tables covered
with red cloth were sixty Russians, the cream of their intelligentsia
and military forces. There were high-ranking representatives of the
Government Army and Air Force and from the various ministries concerned,
and there were senior lecturers from the universities, and the departmental
heads of the TsAGI Institute (Central Institute of Aerodynamics). They
were there to listen, and to ask searching questions. Helmut, on his
side, had the German scientists responsible for the various departments:
Dr. Wolff (ballistics), Dr. Albring (aerodynamics), Dr. Umpfenbach (propulsion),
Engineer Mueller (statics), Engineer Blass (firing equipment) and Dr.
Hoch (controls).

Helmut
made his report with the help of twelve huge drawings on the wall showing
the projected improvements on the new A-4, and his report was followed
by further comments from each of the scientists in his own field of
research. Then there were further talks by Ryazansky, a Russian, and
Professor Frankl, an aerodynamic expert who emigrated to Russia from
Austria, both of whom have had an opportunity to work on all the data.
(64)

Vasily Mishin, Korolev's deputy, and Mikhail Tikhonravov from NII-4 research
institute were to review and critique the G-1 project. (84)
Although, at the time Korolev's team had been working on its own successor
to the A-4, designated R-2, both Tikhonravov and
Mishin gave generally positive feedback about the German work. However,
Mishin stressed that the R-2 project would be easier to implement given
current Soviet production potential. During 1947, Korolev retreated from
the original goal of using both fuel and oxidizer tanks as external walls
of the rocket body and resorted to placing the oxidizer tank inside protective
casing as it was done in the A-4. In contrast, the G-1 would have both
tanks carrying flight loads and only thin divider separated two propellant
compartments.

The
NTS formally approved the G-1 project, however requested more detailed
design work before it could be practically implemented. As Germans will
learn, it will become be a standard excuse for not going ahead with the
development of German designs in the next several years. We know in the
retrospect that G-1 project had never had a chance to be implemented,
since Soviet authorities limited role of German specialists to consulting
and practical training. (64)

At
the time Germans only knew that their interaction with the Soviet counterparts
was almost entirely a one-way street -- they submitted all their work
to the institute, while they had little information about the work done
by the Soviet teams.

Tests
in Kapustin Yar

Along
with working on prospective designs during summer of 1947, NII-88 completed
assembly of several A-4 rockets of the "T" series, in addition
to "N" series assembled
back in Germany. Both batches, along with auxiliary hardware from
Germany were shipped to a newly founded test range in Kapustin
Yar. On July 26, 1947, the Soviet of Ministers officially scheduled
test launches of the A-4 missiles in Kapustin
Yar during September-October 1947. (52)

Transfer
to Gorodomlya

After
completion of tests in Kapustin Yar, Soviet authorities intensified transfer
of German specialists from Podlipki to Gorodomlya. Irmgard Gröttrup
made following entries in her diary dated by January 1948:

Once again
we are faced with the nightmare of moving. They are making a tremendous
drive to transplant everyone to an island near the source of the Volga
... In spite of all protests, the first transport to the island in the
Volga is already under way. Helmut has gone with them. He did not want
the idea to get about that "It's the boss that's sending us away."
Besides, his presence there is meant to boost their morale.

According
to the Russian data, as of January 1, 1948, the number of German specialists
at Gorodomlya Island was 96 people, not counting family members, while
a year later all but two out of 172 Germans working for the Ministry of
Armaments were within the confines of the island.

Helmut
Gröttrup departed for Gorodomlya on February 20, 1948. His wife was
allowed to stay in the suburbs of Moscow until June to care for a sick
son. One of the last trains carrying Germans to Gorodomlya left on June
16, 1948. Dr. Umpfenbach remained one of the few Germans in Podlipki,
before he was also removed to Gorodomlya. (64)

End
of German involvement at OKB-456

From
around mid-1948, Germans at OKB-456 were also denied active involvement
in the development of a next generation engines. They were still receiving
various assignments, however were no longer able to see a "big picture."
According to German authors, Germans participated in the development of
the KS-50 and ED-140 experimental engines, which could pave the way to
the RD-110 engine -- a significantly scaled up version of the propulsion
system from the German A-4 rocket. However all related information in
the German source clearly came from a single Russian publication, (113)
which in turn gives no credit to German engineers for the respective work.
The time frame within KS-50 engine was developed and tested (1949) does
not match the period, in which German specialists were actively involved
into development work at OKB-456, according to the Russian sources. Therefore,
the level of German contribution in the project is still open to interpretation.

By the end of 1950, Germans who worked for OKB-456 were sent back to Germany.
(113)

German
citizens employed by NII-88, most likely Mr. and Mrs. Schwarz. An expert
in Russian language, Mrs. Schwarz worked as an interpreter at NII-88.
This photo was apparently taken in front of their residence in Bolshevo
(see photos below) around 1947. If you have more information about these
individuals please contact Anatoly
Zak.

The
construction of a test stand for live firings of rocket engines 18 kilometers
from the town of Zagorsk in 1949. The project apparently used German
expertise and hardware from Germany. Credit: NIIKhIMMash