Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume
XXIX, Part 1, Korea

1067. In meeting with Bundy today Ambassador Kim
quoted Korean Ambassador Tokyo Kim Tong-cho to effect that signing of
Korea-Japan settlement before Park visit was now almost impossible
physically because FonMin Lee and Agriculture Minister Ch'a had had to
waste three weeks in Assembly interpellations and there are four or five
holidays in Japan in late April and early May.
Bundy expressed surprise, saying very high
level Japanese officials had expressed hope for signing before Park
visit and their intention work to that end. Bundy
said it is “strong” desire of U.S. Govt that settlement be signed before
Park visit, and urged everything possible be done to that end. If it
were not signed, we would try to make Park visit a success, but it would
be far better if it were. Bundy added we have, and
will continue, to do all we can to impress upon Japanese need for early
signing. Kim said Park was still determined to sign before visit and
some others in Korean Govt thought this still possible. He said he would
report Bundy's representations to his Govt.

In immediately prior talks, Poats2 and Barnett warned Kim that, in absence signature, U.S. Govt
could find it impossible to justify to members of Congress “unusual”
commitment of U.S. assistance for next several years, which it remains
our common view should be made at appropriate time.3

Request Embassies Tokyo and Seoul approach appropriate officials at their
discretion and make representations favoring early signature.

Rusk

Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JAPAN–KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Norred, cleared by Fearey
and Barnett, and approved by
Bundy. Also sent to Tokyo and repeated to
CINCPAC for POLAD.↩

Rutherford M. Poats was
Assistant Director for the Far East, Agency for International
Development.↩

Brown took “strong exception”
to this “warning” and found “this approach incomprehensible,” for
“at no time in our talks with Koreans has commitment of continued
support ever been connected with any specific deadline on ROK-Japan settlement.” Brown also mentioned that “such
virtual ultimatum totally unnecessary,” because any delays in
reaching an agreement could not be attributed to Korean reluctance
to achieve normalization. (Telegram 1104 from Seoul, May 1; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66,POL JAPAN–KOR S)↩