Source: Johnson Library,
National Security File, NSC
Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. This information,
which has been excerpted from a Presidential Daily Brief (“PDB”),
was improperly declassified and released. The declassification and
release of this information in no way impacts or controls the
declassification status of the remainder of this PDB, other PDBs, or
the PDB as a series.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow “Hot-Line” Exchange, 6/5–10/67.
No classification marking. The message is labeled “Translation,”
with a typed notation that a sight translation was made at 8:05
a.m.; the message was received by the President at 8:15 a.m.; a
rough translation was made at 8:30 a.m.; and a final, official
translation was provided at 10:08 a.m. There is no indication of the
transmission time or time of receipt, but a typed notation on a copy
of the message in Russian states that it was transmitted by Soviet
Molink at 7:47 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 7:59 a.m.
According to an English translation attached to the Russian copy of
the message, the complete message begins: “The Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, Kosygin, wishes to know whether President Johnson is standing by the machine.
I would like to convey to President Johnson the following information.” (Ibid.)

Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow “Hot-Line” Exchange, 6/5–10/67.
Secret. A typed notation on the source text states it was
transmitted by U.S. Molink at 8:15 a.m., and received by Soviet
Molink at 8:33 a.m. It is addressed “To Chairman Kosygin, From The White House.” A
copy addressed “To Comrade Kosygin, Chairman Council of Ministers, USSR, From President of the United
States, Lyndon B. Johnson” is
ibid., Rostow Files, President-Kosygin Correspondence. According to Llewellyn E. Thompson, the U.S.
telegraph operators apparently had asked the Moscow operators the
proper way to address Kosygin
and were told, “Comrade Kosygin.” Ambassador Dobrynin, who had been at the Moscow end of the
line, told Thompson afterward that he had been quite startled, and
that the Russians wondered if the President was making a joke, or
making fun of them in some way. Dobrynin, however, told Thompson he guessed what had happened. (Memorandum
of conversation between Thompson and Nathaniel
Davis; ibid., NSC
Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 7, Appendix G)

Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL27
ARAB–ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis.
Received at 8:44 a.m. Walt
Rostow sent a copy to the President at 10:40 a.m.
with a brief memorandum stating that Eshkol “builds his case mainly on the general
environment, but refers to bombardment of three Israel towns as the
trigger.” (Johnson Library,
National Security File, NSC
Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III) At 11:10 a.m. Rostow sent
Johnson telegram 3937
from Tel Aviv, June 5, that reported a meeting among General Amit,
Barbour, and Special Counsel to the President Harry C. McPherson, Jr. Rostow's
brief covering memorandum commented that Amit's argument was consistent
with Eshkol's: that there had
been artillery fire on three Israeli villages and UAR air incursions, and then the
Israelis had “punched all the buttons.” Rostow added, “At least
that's his story.” (Ibid.) For McPherson's report of his visit to Israel, see Document 263.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow “Hot-Line” Exchange, 6/5–10/67.
Secret. A typed notation on the source text indicates it was
approved by the President at 8:47 a.m., transmitted by U.S. Molink
at 8:57 a.m., and received by Soviet Molink at 8:59 a.m. The message
is addressed “To Chairman Kosygin. From President Lyndon B. Johnson.” A copy is addressed “Personal
from the President to Chairman Kosygin.” (Ibid., Rostow Files, President-Kosygin
Correspondence) President Johnson met with Rusk, McNamara, Walt
Rostow, and George
Christian from 8:17 to 9:25 a.m. in the White House
Situation Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) There is no record
of the meeting. A draft in Rusk's handwriting with Rostow's handwritten
revisions is ibid., National Security File, Rostow Files,
President-Kosygin
Correspondence.

Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Office of the
Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190,
Box 16, State Memos. Secret. Rusk's initials appear on the memorandum indicating
that he read it. Marginal notations indicate the persons to whom
action on the various items was assigned. The meeting was held in
the Cabinet Room from 11:36 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. Those present were
the President, Acheson, Battle, Rusk,
Thompson, Bundy, Clifford, McNamara, Walt
Rostow, and George
Christian. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other
record of the meeting has been found. Bundy recalled later that the meeting was “mainly
concerned with the awful shape we would be in if the Israelis were
losing. We didn't really know anything about the situation on the
ground. When, in the course of that day, it became apparent that the
Israeli Air Force had won, the entire atmosphere of the problem
changed. It was in a way reassuring when it became clear that the
fighting was the Israelis' idea and that the idea was working. That
was a lot better than if it had been the other way around.”
(Memorandum of conversation, November 7, 1968; cited in Document 155.) See also Document 149.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. Secret. A
handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was received at
5:50 p.m.; a handwritten “L” indicates
it was seen by the President.

Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59,
Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Calls. No classification marking. The notes of the
conversation were prepared in the Secretary's office. Rusk was in Washington; Goldberg was in New York.

Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL 27
ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate. The telegram indicates the text was
received from the White House. It was approved for transmission by
Walsh; the message
conveyed in the telegram was apparently drafted by Walt Rostow.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow “Hot-Line” Exchange, 6/5–10/67.
No classification marking. The source text is labeled “Translation,”
with a typed notation indicating a sight translation was made at
5:50 a.m.; the message was received by the President at 5:50 a.m.; a
rough translation was made at 5:54 a.m.; and a final, official
translation was provided at 6:23 a.m. A typed notation on a copy of
the message in Russian states that it was transmitted by Soviet
Molink at 5:34 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 5:43 a.m.
(Ibid.)

Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow “Hot-Line” Exchange, 6/5–10/67.
Secret. A typed notation on the source text indicates it was
approved by the President at 10:03 a.m.; it was transmitted by US
Molink at 10:21 a.m. and it was received by Soviet Molink at 10:43
a.m. The President met with Vice President Humphrey, Rusk, McNamara, Katzenbach, Bundy, Walt Rostow, Clark Clifford, and Llewellyn Thompson from 6:40 to
8:54 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. (Ibid., President's
Daily Diary)

Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, NSC Histories, Middle East
Crisis, Vol. 3. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on
the memorandum indicates that is was received at noon, and a
handwritten “L” indicates the
President saw it.