The
Petitioner, Marcus Ward Strong, appeals the denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas
were unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

Just
after noon on July 19, 2012, the Petitioner, who was driving
a 1989 Ford Mustang, and the victim, Kiley Shelton, who was
the unrestrained passenger in the front seat of this vehicle,
were involved in a fatal wreck. The Petitioner, while
negotiating a slight left curve, lost control of his vehicle,
drove off the right side of the roadway, rotated
counter-clockwise and crossed back across both lanes of Route
351, and then traveled more than 100 feet before striking a
utility pole with the right front of his vehicle. Thereafter,
Petitioner's vehicle traveled another ninety feet and
rolled over two times before coming to a stop. During this
wreck, the victim was ejected from the vehicle and came to a
final rest entangled in nearby electrical wires, where she
died from her injuries. A highway patrolman responding to the
scene determined that the Petitioner, at the time of the
wreck, was driving at a speed of eighty-five miles per hour
in a thirty-five miles per hour zone.

The
Official Alcohol Report generated by the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation (TBI) stated that the blood sample collected
from the Petitioner at 3:20 p.m. on July 19, 2012, had a
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.05%.

The
TBI's Official Toxicology Report showed that the
Petitioner's blood sample also contained the following
substances:

7-Amino Clonazepam

8.9 ng/ml

Nordiazepam

211.8 ng/ml

Diazepam

108.6 ng/ml

Dihydrocodeinone

Less than 0.05 ug/ml

Citalopram

Less than 0.05 ug/ml

However,
this report showed that the Petitioner's blood sample
tested negative for cocaine, cannabinoids, and barbiturates.

On
March 19, 2013, Dr. Kenneth E. Ferslew, the State's
expert in the field of toxicology, drafted a letter after
reviewing several documents relevant to this case, including
the TBI's Official Alcohol Report and Official Toxicology
Report. After determining that the Petitioner "would
have eliminated a blood alcohol concentration of 0.045
gram%," Dr. Ferslew opined that the Petitioner's
"blood alcohol concentration at the time of the crash
would have been 0.095 gram%." He said that based on the
Petitioner's body weight, the Petitioner would have had
to consume at least "1.09 to 2.14 ounces of alcohol
prior to the crash." He explained that this amount of
alcohol was "equivalent to between 1.8 and 3.6, twelve
ounce, 5% [alcohol] beers" and was "consistent with
[the Petitioner's] statements to emergency and medical
personnel that he had been drinking a few beers earlier in
the day." Dr. Ferslew stated that the Petitioner's
BAC "would have produced removal of inhibitions, loss of
self[-]control, weakening of will power, development of
feelings of well[-]being, euphoria, increased confidence,
altered judgment, expansion of his personality, and dulling
of attention to some extent versus a sober condition."

In this
letter, Dr. Ferslew stated that 7-amino clonazepam was
"an active metabolite of Klonopin (clonazepam),"
which was also a "benzodiazepine used as a[n]
anxiolytic, minor tranquilizer, and sedative/hypnotic."
He said that the concentration of 7-amino clonazepam in the
Petitioner's blood was "subtherapeutic (therapeutic
0.023 to 0.137 ug/ml) but its presence indicate[d]
administration prior to the time of the crash with sufficient
time for biotransformation by his body." Dr. Ferslew
asserted that there was "no indication of this drug
being prescribed or administered to [the Petitioner] prior to
the crash."

Dr.
Ferslew stated, "Diazepam (Valium) is a minor
tranquilizer, anxiolytic, muscle relaxant, and antiepileptic
that is metabolized in the body to [N]ordiazepam (its active
metabolite)." He opined that the concentrations of
Diazepam and Nordiazepam, two benzodiazepines, were
"within the therapeutic range for these medications
(therapeutic 0.02 to 6 ug/ml, toxic 5 to 20 ug/ml, and lethal
greater than 30 ug/ml). Dr. Ferslew also noted that the
presence of Diazepam and Nordiazepam was "consistent
with [the Petitioner's] medical history of being
prescribed and taking Valium prior to the time of the
crash."

Dr.
Ferslew asserted that "Dihydrocodeinone
(hydrocodone)" was an "opiate analgesic" and
that the concentration of Dihydrocodeinone found in the
Petitioner's blood was "in a subtherapeutic to
therapeutic range (therapeutic 0.03 to 0.25 ug/ml, toxic 0.5
to 2 ug/ml, and lethal 0.7 to 12 ug/ml)." He noted that
the "presence of this analgesic [was] consistent with
[the Petitioner's] medical record which indicated that he
was prescribed and had been taking Norco (hydrocodone and
acetaminophen) prior to the time of the crash."

Dr.
Ferslew stated that Citalopram was a "SSRI
antidepressant" and that the concentration of Citalopram
in the Petitioner's blood "would not have had any
effect on [the Petitioner's] psychomotor performance at
the time of the crash."

After
evaluating the concentrations of the aforementioned
substances in the Petitioner's blood sample, Dr. Ferslew
provided the following conclusion:

Though many of these other medications found in [the
Petitioner's] blood at the time of the crash are from
subtherapeutic to within therapeutic ranges, the
combination of a significant blood alcohol concentration with
these benzodiazepines and opiate can produce additive to
synergistic central nervous system depression. This
would cause increased psychomotor impairment to [the
Petitioner] and would have contributed to his
misoperation of the vehicle . . . in this fatal
crash with [the victim]. [The Petitioner] was under the
influence of alcohol and these drugs at the time of the
crash.

On
March 25, 2013, a Greene County Grand jury indicted the
Petitioner in case number 12CR429 for aggravated vehicular
homicide, vehicular homicide, violation of the habitual motor
vehicle offender act, driving under the influence, and
driving under the influence, seventh offense. The record
indicates that at some later point, the Petitioner was
charged in case number 13CR660 with two counts of conspiracy
to introduce drugs into a penal institution and two counts of
conspiracy to sell or deliver a controlled substance, and his
parents were charged in 13CR658 and 13CR659 as co-defendants
to the Petitioner's drug-related charges in case number
13CR660.

Plea
Submission Hearing.

On
January 16, 2014, the Petitioner entered best interest pleas
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970), in case number 12CR429 to aggravated vehicular
homicide, vehicular homicide, violation of the habitual motor
vehicle offender act, driving under the influence, and
driving under the influence, seventh offense. The Petitioner
also entered guilty pleas in case number 13CR660 to two
counts of conspiracy to introduce drugs into a penal
institution and two counts of conspiracy to sell or deliver a
controlled substance. Although this plea agreement was a
package deal in which the State agreed to give the
Petitioner's parents probationary sentences for their
crimes, the trial court was not made aware of this package
deal at the time the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas.

During
the plea submission hearing, the trial court informed the
Petitioner that his vehicular homicide conviction would merge
with the aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and that
his convictions for DUI and DUI, seventh offense, would merge
with the aggravated vehicular homicide conviction.

The
trial court asked the Petitioner if he was "entering
this best interest plea freely and voluntarily of [his] own
free will," and the Petitioner responded, "Yes,
sir." The court then asked, "Any force, threats, or
pressure of any kind to cause you to enter this best interest
plea," and the Petitioner said, "No, sir." The
court also inquired, "Anybody promise you anything other
than what's on this Waiver Rights and Plea of Guilty
form," and the Petitioner answered, "No, sir."

The
court then detailed the terms of the Petitioner's plea
agreement in case number 12CR429: "Your agreement is
aggravated vehicular homicide, 18 years at 30 percent. It
carries . . . 15 to 25 [years] and you're [receiving] 18
years. . . . And violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle
Offender Act is one year at 30 percent on that." The
Petitioner replied that he understood that he would receive
these sentences pursuant to his plea agreement.

The
trial court then explained that the Petitioner would receive
concurrent two-year sentences for his guilty pleas to the two
counts of conspiracy to introduce drugs into a penal
institution and the two counts of conspiracy to sell or
deliver a controlled substance in case number 13CR660 and
that these concurrent two-year sentences would be served
consecutively to the eighteen-year sentence he received in
case number 12CR429, for an effective sentence of twenty
years with a release eligibility of thirty percent.

The
State summarized the facts supporting the aggravated
vehicular homicide charge:

On July 19[], 2012, a 1989 Mustang pulled off the lot of a
convenient store/grocery store on Highway 107 here in Greene
County. The vehicle was seen driving at a high rate of speed.
A little over a minute later that Mustang struck a utility
pole and the Mustang rolled over several times. A female,
[the victim], was thrown out of the Mustang and her body was
found entangled in the power lines, suspended above the
roadway.

The proof would be, Your Honor, that a video would have shown
that . . . at the time the Mustang left that grocery
store/convenience store this [Petitioner] was the driver. The
proof would be that . . . the distance that the vehicle
traveled was such that in a . . . minute and a few seconds,
beyond a minute, we would have been able to show that [the
Mustang] was traveling at an excessive rate of speed. The
proof would also be not only that [the Petitioner] was
driving when the vehicle left the grocery store, but he was
driving at the time that it struck the utility pole. . . .
[T]he toxicology report, the TBI lab report, showed that
there was .05[% of] alcohol . . . in his blood . . . . The
proof would be that Dr. Ferslew would have come and testified
that based upon the time frame when the alcohol . . . was
drawn from him and the time that had passed since the crash
of the vehicle [the Petitioner's] blood alcohol level
would have really been approximately .09[%]. In addition to
that, a toxicology composition showed that he had clonazepam,
diazepam, nordiazepam, dihydrocodeinone in his system. The
proof would be, Your Honor, that at the time of the crash
[the Petitioner] was a habitual motor vehicle offender.

The
Petitioner acknowledged that the State had provided a fair
statement of the evidence supporting his aggravated vehicular
homicide charge.

The
trial court accepted the Petitioner's best interest pleas
in case number 12CR429 to aggravated vehicular homicide and
violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender act as well
to vehicular homicide, DUI, DUI, seventh offense. The court
then accepted the Petitioner's guilty pleas in case
number 13CR660 to two counts of conspiracy to introduce drugs
into a penal institution and two counts of conspiracy to sell
or deliver a controlled substance.

Post-Conviction.

On
January 16, 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, seeking relief only from his
aggravated vehicular homicide conviction in case number
12CR429. Thereafter, the State filed its response and a
motion to dismiss the petition. The Petitioner then filed an
amended petition for post-conviction relief.

At the
December 18, 2017 post-conviction hearing, defense counsel
testified that he had been practicing law for less than three
years at the time the Petitioner entered his pleas. He said
that when he was retained to represent the Petitioner, he had
never conducted a jury trial at the criminal court level, had
never sat first chair on a Class A felony case, and had never
filed an appeal. Although defense counsel said he consulted
with experienced attorneys for guidance on the
Petitioner's case, he could not recall whether he asked
any of these experienced attorneys whether he needed to
retain a "lab expert" in the Petitioner's case.
However, defense counsel asserted that on September 25, 2013,
he filed a motion to continue the case because he had
"discovered the need to seek an expert regarding an
essential element of the defendant's case and that the
expert had been consulted but had not had adequate time to
analyze the material provided[.]" He stated that this
motion to continue was granted and that the Petitioner's
trial was set for ...

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