The Wrong Route To Mideast Peace

June 07, 1985|By Stephen Chapman.

King Hussein of Jordan, who has been taking small but definite steps toward direct negotiations with Israel, has been properly rewarded by the U.S. Congress. Introduced this week was a resolution sponsored by no fewer than 69 senators opposing any sale of advanced weapons to the Hashemite kingdom until it enters formal peace talks. No good deed goes unpunished.

The resolution is as pointless as it is gratuitous. The nonbinding measure doesn`t actually forbid a sale. And no one imagines that the Reagan administration was planning to send out a batch of F-16s in tomorrow`s mail. Should a sale be proposed, Congress will have plenty of time to say its piece. President Reagan, who last year had to cancel a shipment of anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan because of congressional opposition, needs no reminder that Hussein will have to offer tangible progress toward a settlement to get more U.S. aid. Reagan`s attitude toward the Jordanian-Palestinian initiative has not been exactly overeager. Until last week, when the king came to Washington to plead his case, the administration had been skeptical to a fault.

The resolution can`t do any good and may very well do some harm. For Hussein, starting down the road to peace means taking serious risks, internal and external. An American commitment to support his effort will make it easier. An insistence on humiliating him if he fails to march at a prescribed pace will not. It will only bolster radical Arabs who believe the U.S. will not reward moderation.

The resolution, like a similar foreign aid amendment approved by a House committee, probably is less aimed at influencing Jordanian policy than at pandering to Israel`s more zealous American admirers. In classic fashion, it allows Congress to pretend to direct foreign policy, without accepting responsibility for its results.

The exercise is all the more unwise because it trivializes serious questions. Jerusalem would have grounds for concern if Jordan were to get the sort of sophisticated American weaponry that until now has been reserved mostly for Israel. Replacing the F-5 fighter planes Jordan now has with F-16s would narrow Israel`s margin of safety by sharply reducing the time it would have to foil an attempt to hit its coastal cities.

On the other hand, the mobile Hawk anti-aircraft missiles Jordan reportedly wants are, as Brookings Institution expert William Quandt says,

``as close to a purely defensive weapon as you can find.`` They would pose problems, of course, for an Israeli attack, provoked or otherwise.

A surprise Jordanian attack would be drastically out of character for Hussein, who has always preferred coexistence with Israel, if only for reasons of prudence. No one seriously suspects him of harboring military ambitions against Israel. This is the same leader who virtually boycotted the 1973 Arab- Israeli war. With or without F-16s, Jordan would face almost certain devastation in a war with its neighbor.

In any event, no American president is likely to give Jordan our most sophisticated weapons without a believable assurance--like a peace treaty

--that they won`t be used against Israel. Reagan knows that if Israel has to take expensive countermeasures, the U.S. surely will end up sharing the bill.

Hussein`s real concern is Syria, which opposes his peaceful gestures and which has a formidable military machine. It may be true that Jordan`s best protection lies in Syria`s fear of Israeli intervention. But the king can`t base his defense on the hope that Israel will come to the rescue--particularly in light of its bitter experience in Lebanon.

If Jordan decides to make peace with Israel, then it will deserve the help the U.S. customarily provides its friends. If not, its case for more aid will be considerably weaker. Lately Hussein has offered some reasons for hope, the first in a long time. Once he enters peace talks, there will be ample opportunity to make demands on him. Right now, the point is to get him in.