TY - JOUR
AU - Kleiner,Morris M.
AU - Kudrle,Robert T.
TI - Do Tougher Licensing Provisions Limit Occupational Entry? The Case of Dentistry
JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL - No. 3984
PY - 1992
Y2 - February 1992
DO - 10.3386/w3984
UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3984
L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w3984.pdf
N1 - Author contact info:
Morris M. Kleiner
University of Minnesota
Humphrey School of Public Affairs
260 Humphrey Center
301 19th Street South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Tel: 612/625-2089
Fax: 612/625-6351
E-Mail: kleiner@umn.edu
AB - The effect of licensing as a mechanism to control entry into occupations has been a neglected area of both regulation and labor market research. This study examines the role of occupational licensing for entry into dentistry, an occupation with standards that vary by state. Our research first closely replicates Freeman's previous work on labor market cobwebs by employing national data to examine purely market phenomena in the determination of training for the dental profession. We subsequently approximate the government barrier to practice in the profession by adding a weighted average state examination pass rate to the previous model. Next, we employ pooled cross-section time series analysis to explore market determinants of professional entry with state level data. Finally, these results are supplemented by measures of statutory and pass rate entry restrictiveness. Our most consistent evidence suggests that a higher state licensing failure rate deters entry into dental practice.
ER -