Drawing upon decades of experience, RAND provides research services, systematic analysis, and innovative thinking to a global clientele that includes government agencies, foundations, and private-sector firms.

The Pardee RAND Graduate School (PRGS.edu) is the largest public policy Ph.D. program in the nation and the only program based at an independent public policy research organization—the RAND Corporation.

Proven Strategies vs. Terror

President Bush is addressing the United Nations today, and part of what he'll
be talking about is the war against terror. As America enters its second year
in this war, it would do well to note the successes and failures of countries
that have fought terrorism for many years.

The first lesson is that counterterrorism efforts should focus on midlevel
leaders in terrorist groups. By setting its sights on Osama Bin Laden in its
fight against Al Qaeda, the United States is rejecting this basic precept.

Israel learned this lesson the hard way. Over the years, it often removed
the leadership of Hezbollah, but midlevel leaders stepped easily into place.
Israel managed to deport almost the entire top-level leadership of Hamas in
1992, but this served to radicalize the group. The midlevel leaders - relatively
less moderate - took control and increased suicide bombing almost to the extent
that is seen in Israel today.

This is not to say it is pointless to capture or kill terrorists' top leaders.
But while targeting Bin Laden makes sense politically, it is the midlevel leaders
who sustain the control, communication and operations up and down the chains
of command.

By removing Al Qaeda's midlevel leaders, the U.S. would not only interrupt
planned attacks, but also stunt the group's growth by eliminating the development
of future decision makers.

Another lesson: The U.S. emphasizes efforts to undermine Al Qaeda's front
organizations, which funnel money to terrorists, as a key strategy. Colombia
discovered that it makes more sense to focus on disrupting terrorists' support
networks and trafficking activities - for example, the middlemen who purchase
diamonds from terrorists or sell them weapons on the black market.

Essentially, this tactic hinders the ability of a group to conduct sophisticated
attacks - such as the one on the World Trade Center - because it cannot rely
on a steady stream of money or other essential resources.

In 1998, Colombia's security forces focused on the financiers and middlemen
who sold illegal weapons to the terrorist organization known as FARC (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia). Recent communiques show that the organization is
concerned that it will be deprived of supplies crucial to its campaign. The
strategy may, potentially, render it unable to conduct attacks.

The events of Sept. 11 make it clear that groups like Al Qaeda do not attack
without reconnaissance and planning. The greatest return on investment, therefore,
is in halting terrorists' activities before an attack.

Given the highly fluid and transnational nature of the threat we face, establishing
such a unit within the U.S. intelligence community is critical.

To paraphrase Santayana, those who do not heed the mistakes of the past may
be condemned to repeat them.

Hoffman and Cragin are terrorism experts with RAND Corp.

This commentary originally appeared in New York Daily News on September 12, 2002. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.

Stay Informed

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.