Video released by Ansar al Sharia Libya showing the use of an anti-tank missile against the forces of Khalifa Hiftar.

Ansar al Sharia Libya, an al Qaeda-affiliated group, has released a video showing them using what appears to be an anti-tank missile against a tank. The tank, which more than likely belonged to the forces of Khalifa Hiftar, was then subsequently destroyed. The video, which has been uploaded previously, was taken down last week and then reuploaded a few days ago. Ansar al Sharia and their allies in the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council have been fighting Khalifa Hiftar since May when the former Libyan general launched an operation to rid Benghazi of Islamists.

This is one of just a few videos released by the group showing the use of such a weapon. Last week, the group released a very similar video. It is important to note that such weapons, like the BGM-71 TOW system, is being sent to Syria to a select group of rebel groups via the United States. It is unsure what weapons system the group is using in the two videos, but it is likely the weapons were taken after capturing several Hiftar bases in Benghazi. The Libyan National Army was and is known to operate the French MILAN anti-tank system.

Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are two states that are known to support Hiftar's forces in their fight against Ansar al Sharia and their allies. In August, the two Middle Eastern countries launched airstrikesagainst Libyan rebels in Tripoli. It is very possible that one or both countries could be supplying Hiftar with various weapons. If they actually do, this could be another way that the group has gotten their hands on anti-tank missiles.

The photos, which are similar to those that have been released before by the group, show heavy artillery being fired at Hiftar positions. The weapons, mounted on the back of pickup trucks, are very common for Ansar al Sharia and have been used quite effectively for the group. In this promo video here, one can see various artillery-mounted technicals being used. As well as technicals, the group also operates various tanks, BMP's (Russian-made infantry fighting vehicles), and armored personnel carriers--also seen in the linked video.

While while everyone is quick to note the Islamic State's use of such weapons and vehicles, it should definitely be noted that al Qaeda groups do too--they also control territory much like the Islamic State, but I digress. It should be equally as worrying that groups like Ansar al Sharia, the group behind the 2012 terrorist attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, operates these vehicles and weapons. It should also be just as worrying that Ansar al Sharia runs training camps for fighters going to Syria, Iraq and Mali. As I noted here, fighters from Mokhtar Belmokhtar's forces involved in the In Amenas attack in Algeria trained in Ansar al Sharia camps in Libya. It is likely Belmokhtar has also helped train Ansar al Sharia fighters and based on the In Amenas attack, he has probably sent more fighters to Ansar al Sharia camps in Libya than what has been previously mentioned. Ansar al Sharia's Al Qaeda connections

I have previously outlined the groups al Qaeda connections in very thorough report broken down into two parts. Please read my reports, Ansar al Sharia and al Qaeda and More Proof of Ansar al Sharia's al Qaeda Connections. Moreover, my colleague Thomas Joscelyn over at The Long War Journal has written a plethora of reports on their al Qaeda connections. Please read his most recent report here. In this post, one can also click on a small sliver of his other reports on their al Qaeda connections.

It should also be noted that Ansar al Sharia has not sworn allegiance to the Islamic State unlike some people have said. It is very unlikely that the group would swear allegiance based on a few factors. One, the group shares many personal ties and connections to various al Qaeda figures, like Belmokhtar or Muhammad Jamal. Secondly, the group has sent fighters to support al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has sent fighters to support Ansar al Sharia. It would appear unlikely that the group would risk losing these connections and ties by switching over to the Islamic State.

Moreover, @MaliWitness has conducted an interview with a member of Majlis Shura Shabab al Islam, a group operating in Dernah that has sworn allegiance to the Islamic State. In the interview, the member openly states that the only group that has sworn allegiance to the Islamic State in Dernah is the Majlis Shura Shabab al Islam. not Ansar al Sharia or the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade. Any claims of Ansar al Sharia swearing allegiance to the Islamic State should be treated with skepticism until an official confirmation or denial from the group.

Map of significant al Qaeda-linked attacks in Mali this year. Map made by Caleb Weiss for The Long War Journal.

On Nov 19, 2014, the Nigerien military scrambled helicopters after militants attacked the town of Bani Bangou near the border with Mali. Abu Walid al Sahrawi, the spokesman for the former Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), has claimed credit for the attack. This is interesting because Sahrawi was the figure who took credit for the May 2013 attack in a uranium mine in northwestern Niger; an attack that al Qaeda veteran, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MBM), said his forces undertook the attack in conjunction with MUJAO.

While MUJAO and MBM's guys would eventually unite, the interesting part is that MBM's spokesman did not take credit for the Nov 19 attack and that Sahrawi had not released a statement for quite some time previous to this attack. As @MaliWitness says here, this could signal that MBM's usual spokesman has been arrested in a Nigerien military raid. Indeed, Abu Assim al Muhajir, MBM's usual spokesman, was reported to have been captured earlier this year. It is also important to note that the majority of MUJAO merged with MBM with Omar Hamaha, while a faction of MUJAO continues to operate under Sultan Ould Bady. Bady, whom had a falling out with Omar Hamaha and MBM, continues to lead a small faction, but the key takeaway is that the good majority of MUJAO is now with MBM.

Al Mourabitoun was also behind an attack Oct 30 that left nine Nigerien troops dead. In this attack, Al Mourabitoun targeted a Malian refugee camp, a military outpost, and a prison. Before that, French special forces arrested members of the al Mourabitoun Brigade in two operations in Mali and Niger. The Malian region of Gao, which borders the Tillaberi region of Niger, is known as a hub for al Mourabitoun.

It may be too early to tell, but it would appear that al Qaeda is stepping up operations in Niger. This would make sense as al Qaeda in Mali is conducting a guerrilla warfare campaign against French and African forces. However, by expanding the conflict outside of the borders of Mali, they will be able to derail a large-scale counterterrorism operation in northern Mali. With French forces trying to contain al Qaeda in Mali and eventually render them combat ineffective, conflict spilling into Niger would certainly cast a defeat for the French.

But operations aren't just picking up in Niger. Mali has also seen a sharp increase in attacks, as well.

Increase of attacks in Mali

On Nov 9, a civilian passenger bus was targeted by a roadside bomb. Theattackleft a "number" of civilians injured--thankfully no one was killed.

On Oct. 29, one French commando was killed after a fierce firefight in the Adrar Tigharghar mountain range in the northern Mali province of Kidal. The soldier, Thomas Dupuy, an Afghanistan war veteran, was killed when his unit came into contact with "30 Islamists," about 20 of whom were killed in the firefight, according to the French government. Dupuy is the 10th French soldier to die since January 2013.

On Oct. 3, nine UN troops were killed in an ambush in the Gao region of Mali. A few days later, Sultan Ould Bady claimed responsibility for the attack. The ambush came just two weeks after five Chadian troops were killed when they drove over a mine in the Kidal region of northern Mali.

On Sept. 2, four UN peacekeepers were killed in a roadside bomb attack near the city of Kidal. The attack came just days after AQIM had taken responsibility for several attacks in Mali, including an Aug. 16 suicide bombing that killed two UN troops in Ber, a town close to Timbuktu, and three other attacks near Timbuktu in June and July.

Earlier, on July 15, a French soldier was killed in an IED attack in northern Mali. Several other attacks in Mali have also been attributed to al Qaeda-linked forces this year. I have compiled a list and a map (seen above) for The Long War Journal of al Qaeda linked attacks in Mali and Niger this year. At least 23 attacks have been recorded this year in Mali and Niger, with 13 of the compiled 23 attacks have taken place since August, with almost half of those occurring in the month of October. Three attacks, including two in Niger, have happened in the month of November. The list, however, is not exhaustive as some attacks have likely been missed.

A large Taliban offensive has allegedly started in the Bala Baluk district of the western province of Farah. The offensive, which began early this morning, is reported to have over 400 Taliban fighters taking part.

TOLO Television, an Afghan news agency, quoted Farah's police chief Abdul Razaq Yaqubi as saying, "Some 400 Taliban rebels attacked Balablok district at 05:30 a. m. local time today and fierce fighting continues." The police chief goes on to say "one police and eight Taliban militants had been killed and six more militants and a police constable sustained injuries."

There has been no official statement from the Taliban on their official website, Voice of Jihad, but a figure on Twitter claiming to be a member of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban's title for Afghanistan) says that 13 policemen were killed and 10 others wounded with 19 captured by the Taliban. The tweet can be seen below in Arabic.

In June, the Taliban amassed anywhere from 800-1000 fighters to attack government positions in the Sangin district of Helmand. The Afghan government were quick to call for peace talks in the district, which does signal that the government does not have a firm grip on the district.

In July, around 300 Taliban fighters were involved in an offensive that took the Char Sada district of the central province of Ghor. Then in August, more than 700 Taliban fighters launched an offensive in the Charkh district in the eastern province of Logar. The status of this district is not yet clear. In early October, a Balochi group loyal to the Taliban and al Qaeda claimed to have taken the Registan district of Kandahar.

The group, Junood al Fida, posted pictures of an overran military outpost in the remote district on their official Twitter page. As well as the pictures, the Taliban released an official statement claiming to have retaken the district. The Afghan government were quick to deny these claims, however. The group has also released a follow up video showcasing more battles in the remote regions of the deserts of Kandahar.

Then just a few weeks ago, the Taliban claimed to have retaken three more districts in Afghanistan. The Long War Journalsaid that, "the district of Sayyidabad in Wardak as well as the districts of Chahar Darah and Dasht-i-Archi in Kunduz province are under the Taliban's thumb."

The Taliban have been gaining ground in recent months in part due to the Western withdrawal from the country. As more and more Western troops leave the country, more districts are expected to fall into the Taliban's grip. Even with a small US residual force, the Taliban will more than likely continue to amass large numbers of troops to take back various districts.

In light of setbacks to the Syrian armed opposition from both the government and extremist groups, the Obama administration is apparently reconsidering its overall strategy to defeat the Islamic State. Since the September start of the airstrikes in Syria, the United States has maintained that its overall focus is on the situation in Iraq. Now into November, American generals are still supporting the same narrative, but signs are emerging that that may soon change.

The United States’ approach to defeating the Islamic State differs depending on country. In Iraq, where the government is (at least nominally) pro-US, President Obama has stated that military aid is conditional on political change. With the removal of Nouri al Maliki as Prime Ministerand his successor’s attempts to restructure approach both to Sunnis and to the military, Iraq seems to be at least moving toward the type of domestic reform essential to ensuring that the local support for the Islamic State evaporates -- a key in defeating the Islamic State.

Over in Syria, however, the Obama administration has drawn a clear line, choosing to avoid the subject of the government of Bashar al Assad (whom the West has called for removal of since uprisings began in 2011) in favor of the military option. The US-led coalition has made a point of bombing extremists in Syria en masse, lumping Jabhat al Nusra and even Ahrar al Shaminto its operations. Though Mr. Obama has called for a political solution, no serious effort has been made to that end since the collapse of the last round of Geneva talks earlier this year.

Specific signs are emerging that the United States is reworking its approach to the Islamic State situation and to Syria’s Assad. Mr. Obama has asked his national security team-- the same one that has adamantly called for increased support to Syrian rebels, which he has ignored -- to review the progress of the current game-plan and assess the need to actively seek political transition and the removal of Mr. Assad. At the same time as this review is happening, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) is hosting a planning conference “to strengthen relationships and further develop and refine military campaign plans to degrade and defeat” the Islamic State.

While CENTCOM’s conference has a stated goal of reworking the strategy in Iraq, it is without a doubt that the question of Syria will emerge as well. Depriving the Islamic State of Iraq does not wholly deprive the Islamic State of its caliphate thanks to declarations of allegiance from the Libyan Youth Council and Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, so the coalition cannot hope to solely focus on Iraq and neglect Syria.Supposedly on the table for Mr. Obama is a no-fly zone in the north, near the border with Turkey, and increasing aid to the moderate opposition, neither of which are political and that latter point has been discussed so much one can always expect it to be on the menu, though rarely actually ordered. Mr. Obama’s reservation about providing arms to the Syrian rebels is clear: he is against sending the type of arms that could make a difference, even to the extent of overruling the rest of his advisers.Fortunately (or more accurately, unfortunately) for him, that option of aiding the moderate rebels is not looking to be around much longer. Jabhat al Nusra has paired up with Ahrar al Sham and Jund al Aqsa in Idlib province to muscle aside Western-backed rebels. Assuming any legitimacy to assertions made to the Associated Press, Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State -- arch-rivals -- have reached an accord to pool their forces against mutual enemies, in the clearest example yet of coalition airstrikes polarizing the Syria situation. With the moderates slowly losing Aleppo to the government and sliding under the weight of extremist elements, there likely will not be many left in the near future for Mr. Obama to contemplate arming. With that, Mr. Obama has a delicate process of figuring out just how to create a political solution in Syria. Localized ceasefires, as proposed by the UN envoy to Syria,benefit the regime and there is no way to get Mr. Assad to relinquish his position now that it is clear that those actually willing to negotiate with him are so weak as to have no clout.

Getting Mr. Assad to step down is harder now than ever before and under no circumstances would Mr. Obama entertain allowing the extremists to capture Syria. This leaves him few alternatives, for studious neglect of the moderates -- for better or for worse -- is having the predictable consequence of leaving no decent option in Syria. Unless Mr. Obama’s review pulls a feat of magic, the most likely course of action (if change is to be made at all) will not involve taking on the Assad government, but rather advocating for the ceasefires plan as political progress. Whether or not those would be an effective means to end the war justly (Telkelakh, anyone?) is the subject for another discussion.Mr. Obama can speak of still wanting to remove Mr. Assad, but all signs point toward the United States finding a backdoor out of supporting the armed opposition. If this wasn’t apparent before, it was made clear the day Ahrar al Sham was bombed that Mr. Obama is searching for a way out.

Ansar al Sharia in Libya, which includes factions in Dernah and Benghazi, is one of the major militant organizations fighting in the chaotic crisis in Libya. Despite some media outlets claiming, on multiple occasions, that the group has sworn allegiance to the Islamic State, no proof has came out confirming this. Their official Twitter feed has said nothing of the sort and until it is confirmed by this account, these claims should be treated with skepticism. The group, led by Mohamed al Zahawi, has a deep history of connections to al Qaeda and is certainly within the al Qaeda network.

A Library of Congress report from August 2012 noted that Ansar al Sharia Libya "has increasingly embodied al Qaeda's presence in Libya." The report also says that "it is probable that Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and in Tunisia are communicating."

Some of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's most senior leaders have known al Qaeda ties, and at least two of them previously served as important al Qaeda operatives in Europe. The group's leadership openly praises al Qaeda and the organization's social media is littered with pro-al Qaeda messages. Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's Twitter account, before it was suspended, was known to re-tweet official messages disseminated by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) official media wing, Al Andalus Foundation. AQIM leaders have repeatedly praised and offered advice to Ansar al Sharia Tunisia.

The report also mentions that it is more than likely that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has made contact with Ansar al Sharia leaders. In addition, al Qaeda commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar has met with several leaders of Ansar al Sharia-allied militias in public. Belmokhtar reportedly met with Wisam Ben Hamid, who was at one time the leader of Katiba al Ahrar Libya (Free Libya Battalion), a group the report notes was likely part of "al Qaeda's clandestine network in Libya." That same network is headed by al Qaeda operatives who report to al Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan, including Ayman al Zawahiri. Wisam Ben Hamid is now a leader within Ansar al Sharia. Sufian Ben Qumu, the leader of Ansar al Sharia forces in Derna, Libya, was a former Guantanamo Bay inmate. A leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessment describes Ben Qumu as an "associate" of Osama bin Laden. JTF-GTMO found that Ben Qumu worked as a driver for a company owned by bin Laden in the Sudan, fought alongside al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and maintained ties to several other well-known al Qaeda leaders. The US State Department added Ben Qumu to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists in January 2014 and said his branch of Ansar al Sharia as well as the Benghazi branch was involved in the attack on the US diplomatic compounds in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012.

Looking into the name 'Ansar al Sharia' in depthMoreover, there are several credible accounts asserting that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al Sharia in both Tunisia and Libya cooperate. The Tunisian Prime Minister said to Reuters, "There is a relation between leaders of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al Sharia in Libya. We are coordinating with our neighbors over that." Moreover, Ansar al Sharia Libya severely denounced the capturing of Abu Anas al Libi, a senior al Qaeda operative that assisted in the 1998 Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

I have already mentioned Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, but there is also an Ansar al Sharia Egypt and one in Yemen. The one in Egypt, as noted here by The Long War Journal, "An Ansar al Sharia chapter in Egypt has hardly concealed its loyalty to al Qaeda. Its founder, an extremist who has long been tied to al Qaeda's senior leadership, has said that he is "honored to be an extension of al Qaeda." The Ansar al Sharia in Yemen is recognized by the US government as an alias for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. It is extremely likely the moniker "Ansar al Sharia" is used by al Qaeda to (a) conceal activities in areas where they do not wish to be formally recognized and/or (b) as part of a rebranding to improve their public image. In early 2013, a letter was found in Mali written by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb head Abdelmalek Droukdel, where he states that it's better to conceal their activities as part of a "domestic movement".

To again quoteThe Long War Journal, Droukdel goes on to say "As for foreign policies, you must adopt mature and moderate rhetoric that reassures and calms," he writes. "To do so, you must avoid any statements that are provocative to neighboring countries and avoid repeated threats. Better for you to be silent and pretend to be a 'domestic' movement that has its own causes and concerns. There is no call for you to show that we have an expansionary, jihadi, Qaeda or any other sort of project." Droukdel then says for part of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali to fold into Ansar Dine to accomplish this. This is very similar to Usama bin Laden instructing Mukhtar Abu al Zubayr, the late head of al Shabaab, to hide Shabaab's ties to al Qaeda. It is also worth noting that Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in Syria, did something similar where they went official with their al Qaeda ties when al Baghdadi tried to assimilate them into al Qaeda in Iraq. Known ties to al Qaeda brings unwanted attention to their clandestine activities and could potentially bring military action against them.

It is therefore rational to believe that Ansar al Sharia Libya is following this basic archetype of concealing their al Qaeda ties. Furthermore, they have seemed to have learned from past mistakes by al Qaeda. For one, they haven't been too quick to enact Sharia. Secondly, they started as a Dawah group, which means that they started off as a peaceful group advocating the turn to Islam. They worked with local citizens and were quick to help with social services. They were also quick to work with other local groups to meet shared goals. This is very similar to what Jabhat al Nusra has done in Syria.

Last pointsThe last thing I want to point out is that several Western countries have motioned for the United Nations to add Ansar al Sharia Libya (and Tunisia) to their list of al Qaeda affiliated groups. While this should have been done long ago, it is nevertheless a welcoming motion. One reason for this motion was that several fighters from a group loyal to Mokhtar Belmokhtar trained in Ansar al Sharia bases in Libya for the In Amenas attack in Algeria.

While Mokhtar Bemokhtar and his al Mourabitoun (Those Who Sign in Blood) Brigades operate in Mali, Belmokhtar is also known to operate in Libya. Belmokhtar is thought to have been recruiting fighters returning to Libya from Syria. It is likely he has also helped train Ansar al Sharia fighters and based on the In Amenas attack, he has probably sent more fighters to Ansar al Sharia camps in Libya than what has been previously mentioned.

It is also important to note that in several Ansar al Sharia publications, the black flag first used by al Qaeda in Iraq is shown. While the Islamic State uses this flag (as they were, after all, al Qaeda in Iraq), other groups using this flag does not necessarily mean an affiliation with the Islamic State. For example, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula uses this same flag, as does Boko Haram and al Shabaab. However, it was an al Qaeda branch that popularized this style that then found its way to other al Qaeda branches.

On Tuesday November 4th, Republican lawmakers made huge gains in the midterm elections by adding control of the Senate and strengthening their hold on the House of Representatives. This wave of victories is largely seen as the result of a referendum on President Barack Obama’s policies, which many voters are disillusioned with. Now that Republicans are in control of both chambers of Congress, there will certainly be a lot more opposition to Mr. Obama’s plans, namely in the realm of foreign policy.

Focusing specifically on one foreign policy issue of Mr. Obama’s, he is likely to find it harder to conclude a nuclear deal with Iran by November 24th -- the deadline set by the “P5+1” and Iran -- due to Republican skepticism of Iran’s intentions. This is a good thing.

To be sure, a resolution to Iran’s nuclear program is in everyone’s best interests. Iran is adamant that it will never give up its program, even with debilitating sanctions in place and threats of military action by the United States and Israel. Iranians are in favor of their country’s program; if the country gave it up, the government would be seen as buckling under pressure from the West, something that Iran has actively resisted since the 1979 revolution. So the program isn’t going anywhere and neither is the fear by the West and Israel that Iran is really after nuclear weapons. A nuclear-armed Iran, even if it didn’t seek to make good on threats to “wipe Israel off the map,” would spark a regional arms race. Saudi Arabia, it seems, would be quick to acquire weapons from Pakistanand given the amount of sectarian violence raging across the Levant and the Gulf recently, fear of a Saudi-Iran war would be heightened.

Because of the severe consequences of Iran getting a nuclear weapon, it is therefore important for the “P5+1” to tread cautiously in its nuclear dealings. President Hassan Rouhani is a pleasant alternative to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but his election last year does not mean a complete redirection of Iranian policy. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is still in charge of the show and as hardline as ever.

The reason why it is a good thing that Mr. Obama will face renewed pressure from Congress over the deal is that it lessens the chance that a bad deal will get passed. Certainly, one can hope that the “P5+1” will devise a “mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution" that would ensure Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful but, in pursuit of such, the West may be tempted to take a bad deal for the sake of some form of progress. Doing so is risky, not just for the threat that a nuclear-armed Iran poses to the region but for the fact that it further isolates regional allies of the United States. Plenty of discrepancies still exist (the Supreme Leader, though largely taking a hands-off approach, over the summer said Iran needed far more centrifuges than is being discussed by negotiators).

It is therefore important for Mr. Obama to ensure that the right deal is made. Considering the damage wrought by sanctions -- the Congressional Research Service estimates that Iran’s oil production has more than halved after the new restrictions-- the “P5+1” is negotiating from a position of strength.

Mr. Rouhani has staked his presidency from its outset on bringing relief to Iranians from sanctions, so even if no deal is reached now one can be found later. For Iran to become the stronger power that it perceives itself as, the country needs to be integrated into the world economy, not isolated through sanctions.There are 18 days left until November 24th, the anniversary of last year’s interim agreement and the date set for the expiration of the current talks aimed at achieving a solution. The United States, along with its partners on this issue, should continue to press Iran for a solution that will not just be deemed acceptable today, but in decades from now as well. The advantage is with the “P5+1” now, but the moment sanctions are removed it will prove far harder to put them back on, especially given rising animosity between the West and Russia over Ukraine. Sanctions are leverage -- it was a smart move to trade some for concessions over the program in the interim agreement, but real progress needs to be made for the whole batch of sanctions to be taken away.

The political party not in the White House is often called obstructionist by the other when it blocks plans by the president. In this case, if Republicans do block a deal, it may not be a bad thing if the solution crafted is more beneficial to Iran. The presence of a Republican-held Congress may even convince Iranian negotiators that they (rather than the “P5+1”) need to make a greater effort to reconcile discrepancies. For Iran, it now has to worry about the fact that Mr. Obama, who to his credit has thus far been receptive to a deal, is going to be a lot more cautious on what the United States agrees to. The waiting game doesn’t work for Iran, because sanctions will continue to bite and in two years, Mr. Obama will be out of office, perhaps in favor of a president less amenable to the idea of negotiating with Iran. The upper hand rests with the United States after the midterm elections (whether or not Mr. Obama wants to admit that is another story) and so Mr. Obama should take advantage of it, for he now has the opportunity to press Iran harder. For all Iran’s defiance over the program, it needs a solution the most. The “P5+1” can therefore afford to be picky.