ATTORNEYS:On
behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of James
A. Pelish and Joe Thrasher of Thrasher, Doyle, Pelish &
Franti, Ltd. of Rice Lake.

On
behalf of the defendant-third-party plaintiff-co-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Emile H. Banks, Jr., and John K. Garofani
of Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C. of Milwaukee.

Respondent

ATTORNEYS:On
behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of James
A. Drill and Brian H. Sande of Doar, Drill & Skow, S.C.
of New Richmond.

On
behalf of the defendant-third-party defendant-respondent-cross-respondent the
cause was submitted on the brief of Marlene A. Yoder, David R. Kelly
and Steven L. Reitenour of Bowman and Brooke LLP of
Minneapolis.

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

NOTICE

July 27, 1999

This opinion is subject to further
editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume
of the Official Reports.

Marilyn L. Graves

Clerk, Court of Appeals

of Wisconsin

A party may file with the Supreme Court
a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats.

No.98-0294

STATE OF WISCONSIN

IN COURT OF
APPEALS

Hope
J. Ellsworth, and Adam John Ellsworth,

David
Michael Gibson, Jr., and Lewis Jadwin

Asfeld,
minors, by their Guardian ad Litem,

Timothy
J. O'Brien,

Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-

Appellants,

Dunn
County Department of Human Services,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Mark
A. Schelbrock,

Defendant-Appellant,

MSI
Insurance Company,

Defendant-Third-

Party
Plaintiff-Co-Appellant,

General
Motors Corporation,

Defendant-Third-

Party
Defendant-Respondent-Cross-

Respondent,

ABC
Insurance Company,

Third-Party
Defendant.

APPEAL
and CROSS-APPEAL from a
judgment of the circuit court for St.
Croix County:c.a.
richards, Judge.Affirmed.

Before
Cane, C.J., Myse, P.J.,
and Hoover, J.

MYSE, P.J. Mark
Schelbrock and MSI Insurance appeal a judgment awarding damages and costs to
plaintiffs and further dismissing MSI’s third-party complaint and awarding
costs to General Motors Corporation and its insurer.[1]Schelbrock first contends that the trial
court erred by inserting into the special verdict an amount for past medical
expenses based upon Ellsworth’s expert witness’s uncontested testimony of the
reasonable and customary value of the services rendered instead of the amount
Dunn County paid as Medical Assistance benefits for those services, which was
considerably less than the amount the court inserted.Schelbrock argues Ellsworth is limited to recovering as past
medical expenses only the amounts Medical Assistance paid, rather than the
reasonable value of the services rendered.Because we conclude that the payment of Medical Assistance benefits
falls within the collateral source rule, the value of the services rather than
the amount actually paid determines the defendants’ liability for past medical
expenses.

Schelbrock
further contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by
allowing the jury to view photographs of Ellsworth’s severe burn injuries and,
further, that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after one of the
jurors fainted upon viewing those photographs.We conclude that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion in admitting the photographs.We further conclude that the court was not required to declare a
mistrial as the result of one of the jurors fainting after viewing the
photographs because the remaining jury panel was properly cautioned and
examined in regard to their willingness to continue and whether the juror’s
fainting would affect their deliberations.

Schelbrock
also contends that the record fails to support the jury award regarding the
Ellsworth childrens’ loss of their mother’s society and companionship.Because we conclude that the record
adequately demonstrates their loss, we reject Schelbrock’s contention.

MSI
contends that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on enhanced
injury.Because the jury determined
General Motors was not negligent, we conclude this allegation of error is
moot.MSI further contends that the
trial court erred by admitting into evidence General Motors’ crash test
videotapes made using a dissimilar automobile and demonstrating the consequences
of locating a gas tank as Ellsworth’s experts recommended.Because the crash test videotapes
demonstrated General Motors’ basis for locating the gas tank as it did and
rebutted Ellsworth’s expert’s testimony as to where the gas tank should be located,
the trial court properly exercised its discretion by admitting the videotapes
into evidence.

MSI
further contends that the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial because
General Motors’ attorney improperly informed the jury of the result of its
verdict at closing argument.Because
counsel’s advisement that General Motors would win the case based upon certain
jury findings was not improper, we conclude that the court did not err in
refusing to grant a mistrial.Finally,
MSI contends that the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence at trial,
requiring a new trial in the interest of justice.Because we conclude that the verdict is properly and adequately
supported by the evidence in the record, the trial court did not err by denying
MSI’s motion for a new trial in the interest of justice.We therefore affirm the judgment.

Background

Hope
Ellsworth was driving her 1975 Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme home during the early
morning hours after finishing her shift as a cab driver, when her vehicle was
struck from behind by an automobile Mark Schelbrock was
driving. Schelbrock was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
Following the rear-end impact, Ellsworth’s vehicle ignited into flames.Because she was unable to extricate herself
immediately from the vehicle, Ellsworth suffered third-degree burns over
approximately fifty-six percent of her body, as well as other substantial and
permanent injuries. Ellsworth filed suit against Schelbrock and his
insurance company, MSI. Dunn County Department of Human Services
intervened as a subrogated party plaintiff, alleging payment of Ellsworth’s
medical expenses in the amount of $328,931.90, through Medical Assistance which
Dunn County administered, as well as AFDC and Food Stamp benefits. At
trial, the reasonable and customary value of Ellsworth’s medical services,
however, was determined to be $597,448.27.

MSI
filed a third-party complaint against General Motors and its insurer alleging
that Ellsworth’s vehicle was negligently designed and/or was defective and
unreasonably unsafe for its user.MSI
contended that the fire was caused by General Motors’ negligence in improperly
locating the gas tank under the car’s trunk, where it was susceptible to
ignition in a rear-end crash, instead of over the rear axle. Ellsworth and
Schelbrock subsequently amended their complaints to allege similar causes of
action against General Motors.

The
jury returned a verdict finding that the vehicle was not so defective as to be
unreasonably dangerous and that General Motors was not negligent with respect
to the design and/or manufacture of the 1975 Cutlass. The trial
court had previously answered questions on the special verdict finding that
Schelbrock was negligent in operating his automobile and that his negligence caused
Ellsworth’s injuries. The trial court also determined that
Ellsworth’s past medical expenses amounted to $597,448.27.The jury awarded Ellsworth $20,806 for past
loss of earnings, $451,330 for loss of future earning capacity, $3,000,000 for
past pain, suffering and disability, and $1,730,000 for future pain, suffering
and disability. In addition, each of Ellsworth’s minor children were
awarded $50,000 for loss of their mother’s society and companionship. The jury
found Schelbrock’s conduct outrageous and assessed punitive damages in the
amount of $10,000.Ellsworth,
Schelbrock and MSI filed motions after verdict. The trial court denied the
motions and ordered judgment on the verdict.This appeal followed.Additional
facts will be set forth within the specific arguments.

Analysis

Schelbrock
first contends that Ellsworth’s recovery of past medical expenses is limited to
$354,941.21, the amount Medical Assistance paid, rather than the reasonable and
customary value of services rendered,which
Ellsworth’s expert, Dr. Arenholz’s, uncontested testimony established was
$597,448.27.MSI contends that the
trial court erred when it answered as a matter of law that the past medical
expenses were $597,448.27, rather than the amount Medical Assistance paid. We do not agree.

We
must consider the application of the collateral source rule to Medical
Assistance payments.[2]The collateral source rule provides that a
plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable and customary charges for past
medical expenses without regard to the payment of those expenses or the amount
of such payment by a third party.Payne
v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 433, 195 N.W.2d 641, 647 (1972).The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that
“there is no apparent difference between private health insurance and Medicare
other than that Medicare is administered by the federal government.”Merz v. Old Republic Ins. Co.,
53 Wis.2d, 47, 54, 191 N.W.2d 876, 879 (1971).The Merz court held that an injured party’s
compensation should not be reduced by the receipt of government-provided
medical services.Id.The collateral source rule has been expanded
to include situations where gratuitous medical services are provided or paid
for by the state.Rixmann v. Somerset
Pub. Schs., 83 Wis.2d 571, 580, 266 N.W.2d 326, 331 (1978) (citing Thoreson
v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 243, 201
N.W.2d 745, 751 (1972)).Because
Medical Assistance is a form of insurance paid for by a general societal tax
and is considered the equivalent of health insurance for the needy,Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d
734, 737-38 (N.C. 1987), we conclude that, as with other forms of insurance,
the collateral source rule is properly applied to Medical Assistance payments.

Application
of the collateral source rule to Medical Assistance payments is also justified
because Dunn County’s subrogation rights prevent Ellsworth from receiving a
double recovery.Wisconsin law entitles
the state to full reimbursement for any Medical Assistance benefits made on
Ellsworth’s behalf upon Ellsworth’s recovery of a damages
award. Section 49.89,
Stats. Because Medical Assistance
provides Dunn County a right of subrogation to recover the sums it paid for
Ellsworth’s medical expenses, we are satisfied that application of the
collateral source rule will not provide Ellsworth with a windfall profit.

Furthermore,
we are satisfied that Schelbrock will not be paying out twice to two parties.
The trial court judgment indicated that Dunn County may have an interest in the
amount Ellsworth receives from the judgment, subject to further order from the
court. Therefore, while Schelbrock will appropriately be obligated to pay the
full damage, he will not be subject to answer twice in damages.He will, however, be responsible for the
full amount of the value of the services rendered.See Jindra v. Diederich Flooring, 181 Wis.2d 579,
595, 511 N.W.2d 855, 860 (1994).

We
conclude, therefore, that the existence of a subrogated claim for Medical
Assistance payments does not affect the application of the collateral source
rule to Ellsworth’s claim for the customary and reasonable value of medical
services rendered.The rule is created
to prevent the tortfeasor from benefiting from third-party payments made for
the medical services rendered to an injured plaintiff.Thoreson, 56 Wis.2d at 243,
201 N.W.2d at 752.The public policy
underlying this rule is that between the injured plaintiff and the tortfeasor,
the plaintiff should benefit from third-party payments, not the
tortfeasor.Id.

We
see no reason that the rule does not apply in its full force under the facts of
this case.Ellsworth is entitled to the
reasonable value of the medical services rendered. The uncontradicted testimony
is that the reasonable and customary charges for the medical services rendered
was $597,448.27. The Medical Assistance payment is a collateral source even
though it is a subrogated claim.We
perceive no difference between the doctor who reduces his bill because of
Medical Assistance coverage and the doctor who voluntarily discounts his bill
because his patient is indigent.While
it is true that Dunn County may have a subrogation claim for the amount of
medical assistance it paid, Ellsworth is entitled to recover the reasonable
value of the services rendered rather than the amount of Medical Assistance
paid, because Schelbrock should not benefit from the availability of Medical
Assistance to Ellsworth. Because the Medical Assistance payment is a subrogated
claim, Dunn County has a right to recover the sums paid on Ellsworth’s behalf.

We
find additional support for our analysis in cases decided in other
jurisdictions holding that the collateral source rule applies to benefits which
are provided gratuitously by the government.InCates, the court held that evidence that gratuitous
public benefits served, and will serve, to mitigate medical malpractice
plaintiff’s damages violates the collateral source rule because it may affect
the jury’s consideration of liability issues;see also Johnson v. Baker, 719 P.2d 752 (1986).The court inCates v. Wilson,
350 S.E.2d 898, 902 (Ct. App. N.C. 1986), aff’d as modified byCates,
361 S.E.2d at 734, held that North Carolina’s Medicaid subrogation statute did
not remove Medicaid benefits from the collateral source rule’s protection
because to hold otherwise would serve to transfer responsibility for
malfeasance from the tortfeasor to the victim and the State.Thus, the availability of public assistance
should not operate to reduce a tortfeasor’s legal liability.InWerner v. Lane, 393 A..2d
1329, 1335 (Maine 1978), the court stated:

The overwhelming weight of authority in the country is to
the effect that the fact necessary medical and nursing services are rendered
gratuitously to one who is injured as a result of the negligence of another
should not preclude the injured party from recovering the reasonable value of
those services as part of his compensatory damages in an action against the tortfeasor.
This is known as the collateral source rule.Stated otherwise, it means that, if a plaintiff is compensated in whole
or in part for his damages by some source independent of the tortfeasor, he is
still permitted to have full recovery against him.

Schelbrock
contends that because there was a subrogation claim on Dunn County’s behalf,
Dunn County owned all the rights to the claim for past medical expenses and its
claim is thus limited to the amount it actually paid.In support of his contention, Schelbrock relies on Lambert
v. Wrensch, 135 Wis.2d 105, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987); Cunningham v.
Metropolitan Life Ins., 121 Wis.2d 437, 360 N.W.2d 33 (1985); and Heifetz
v. Johnson, 61 Wis.2d 111, 211 N.W.2d834 (1973).While these cases do address the existence
of subrogation claims, we believe the law has clearly established that the
collateral source rule applies even when payment is made by a third party who
possesses a subrogated claim.In Thoreson,
56 Wis.2d at 243, 201 N.W.2d at 752 , the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared:

The general rule in Wisconsin has been that a plaintiff
who has been injured by the tortious conduct of another is entitled to recover
the reasonable value of his medical costs reasonably required by the injury. In
most cases this is the actual expense, but in some cases it is not.But the test is the reasonable value, not
the actual charge, and therefore there need be no actual charge.Under this theory of recovery, the fact that
necessary medical and nursing services are rendered gratuitously to one who is
injured should not preclude the injured party from recovering the value of
those services as part of his compensatory damages.The reason for this view is often given that the recovery has a
penal effect on a tortfeasor and the tortfeasor should not get the advantage of
gratuities from third parties.

The court subsequently held that “the collateral source
rule is not limited to paid-for benefits but applies to gratuitous medical
services provided or paid for by the state.” Id. at 245, 201
N.W.2d at 752.While Thoreson
does not discuss subrogation in relation to the collateral source rule, we
concludethat the rules underlying the
holding apply notwithstanding the existence of a subrogated claim.The subrogated claim, however, must be paid
to the subrogee so as to eliminate double recovery.

Schelbrock’s
reliance on Lambert and Heifetz isunpersuasive.
Both Heifetz and Lambert are cases involving the
narrow situation where a subrogation claim was lost by the statute of limitations
and the tortfeasor was no longer answerable because the subrogee’s claim was
extinguished, but the court nevertheless concluded that the public policy
underlying statutes of limitations inured to the benefit of the tortfeasor.Accordingly, in those cases, the court
concluded that the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover the full amount
of the medical expenses incurred when such amount was not subject to a
subrogationclaim because that claim
expired as a result of the statute of limitations. Heifetz, 61
Wis.2d at 124-25, 211 N.W.2d at 841; Lambert, 135 Wis.2d at 119,
399 N.W.2d at 375. Because of the factual dissimilarity of these cases to the
case at bar, we conclude their holdings are inapposite.

Schelbrock
next contends that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view
photographs of the burns Ellsworth sustained as a result of the car’s
incineration following impact.Schelbrock contends that the photographs were so shocking, graphic and
inflammatory that their viewing ignited the jury’s passions, making it unable
to render a considered judgment on the amount of money necessary to compensate
Ellsworth for her injuries.The
admission of photographs into evidence is a matter within the trial court’s
discretion.Sage v. State,
87 Wis.2d 783, 788, 275 N.W.2d 705, 708 (1979).The trial court’s decision will be upheld unless it is wholly
unreasonable or if the only purpose of the photographs is to inflame and
prejudice the jury.State v.
Thompson, 142 Wis.2d 821, 841, 419 N.W.2d 564, 571 (Ct. App.
1987).Discretionary acts are upheld so
long as the trial court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard
of law, and used a rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable
judge could reach.Ritt v. Dental
Care Assocs., S.C., 199 Wis.2d 48, 52, 543 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Ct. App.
1995).

Photographs
should be admitted if they help the jury gain a better understanding of
material facts and should be excluded if they are not “substantially necessary”
to show material facts and will tend to create sympathy or indignation or
direct the jury’s attention to improper considerations.Sage, 87 Wis.2d at 788, 275
N.W.2d at 708.Here, the photographs
were admittedly graphic in nature.Nonetheless, they accurately reflected the injuries Ellsworth sustained
and aided the jury in understanding the medical conditions and treatment
Ellsworth required and would require in the future.Therefore, the photographs provided an understanding of material
facts in this case.The record
demonstrates that the trial court weighed the potential inflammatory prejudice
against Ellsworth’s right to demonstrate the nature of her injuries and found
that because the photographs accurately reflected her injuries, the jury could
properly view them.We conclude that
the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in allowing the jury to
view the photographs of Ellsworth’s injuries.

Schelbrock
next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion after verdict
seeking a new trial on the issue of damages for the childrens’ loss of their
mother’s society and companionship.Schelbrock contends that there was no evidence introduced demonstrating
the quality of the relationship between Ellsworth and her children.Schelbrock’s contention is without merit.

No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a
matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer in a verdict, shall be granted
unless the court is satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a
finding in favor of such party.

Thus, “if there is
any credible evidence which, under any reasonable view, fairly admits an
inference that supports a jury’s finding, that finding may not be
overturned.”Foseid v. State Bank
of Cross Plains, 197 Wis.2d 772, 782, 541 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Ct. App.
1995).

The
evidence here demonstrates that at the time of Ellsworth’s accident, two of the
three children were living with their mother as a family unit. Because of the
disability attending to her injuries and because of the psychological impact
the injuries had on Ellsworth, she was no longer able to provide for the
children.They had to be placed with
other family members for a substantial and indefinite period of time. Here, the
evidence demonstrates that a family relationship was destroyed by virtue of
Ellsworth’s injuries.This destruction
of the family unit is sufficient to support the award for loss of society and
companionship. Ellsworth need prove nothing more to support the award for the
loss of society and companionship on behalf of her children.

MSI
contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on enhanced
injuries.A trial court has wide
discretion as to the instructions it will give to a jury in any particular
case.Anderson v. Alfa-Laval
Agri, Inc., 209 Wis.2d 337, 344, 564 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Ct. App.
1997).Instructions must fully and
fairly inform the jury as to the applicable principles of law.Id.As long as the instructions adequately advise the jury as to the
law it is to apply, the court has the discretion to decline to give other
instructions even though they may properly state the law to be applied.Id.If the trial court erroneously refused to give a proper
instruction, a new trial will not be ordered unless the trial court’s error was
prejudicial.Id. at 345,
564 N.W.2d at 792.An error is
prejudicial only if it appears that the result would have been different had
the error not occurred.Id.

Because
the jury determined that Ellsworth’s car was not unreasonably dangerous and
that General Motors had no liability, this claim of error has been rendered
moot. The jury determined that the vehicle was not unreasonably dangerous and
that General Motors was not liable for Ellsworth’s injuries, and therefore
would not have reached the enhancement instruction had it been given.We cannot conceive from MSI’s nebulous
argument nor does the record disclose how the jury’s deliberations would have
in any way changed even if the enhancement instruction had been given.See Allen v. State Farm & Cas.
Co., 71 Wis.2d 212, 216-17, 238 N.W.2d 104, 106-07 (1976) (Because jury
never reached the negligence question, the trial court’s failure to give an
instruction that was dependent on a negligence finding could not have been
prejudicial even if it were error, a question we need not consider).Even if it was error to refuse to give the
enhancement instruction, and we do not so hold, because there is no prejudice,
MSI’s allegation of error must fail.

MSI
next alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to direct a mistrial
after General Motors’ counsel improperly informed the jury as to the result of
their verdict at closing argument.The
decision to grant a motion for a mistrial lies within the trial court’s sound
discretion.Haskins v. State,
97 Wis.2d 408, 419, 294 N.W.2d 25, 33 (1980).The trial court must determine, in light of the whole proceeding,
whether the claimed error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new
trial.State v. Grady, 93
Wis.2d 1, 13, 286 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Ct. App. 1979).

The
fundamental rule in Wisconsin is that it is reversible error for counsel to
inform the jury of the effect of its answer on the ultimate result of its
verdict, especially if it appears that the error complained of has affected the
substantial rights of the party seeking to revise or set aside the judgment or
secure a new trial.Kobelinski v.
Milwaukee Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis.2d 504, 520, 202 N.W.2d 415,
425 (1972).This is true whether the
jury is explicitly informed or informed by implication.Id.An argument is not improper, however, merely because an
intelligent juror might be able to infer therefrom the effect upon the final
result of his answers to the special verdict.Id.

We
see no merit to MSI’s contention.Counsel’s argument to the jury spoke in terms of General Motors
“winning” upon certain jury findings.Such a statement does not advise the jury of the effect of its verdict
and states no more than is apparent to the entire jury panel based on the parties’
contentions during the trial.Nor did
counsel’s remarks constitute prejudicial error or influence the jury’s
verdict.The jurors were properly and
fully instructed as to their role as fact-finder and all of the relevant bases
they must employ to fulfill that role.We conclude, therefore, that counsel’s statements to the jury made
during closing argument did not improperly advise the jury as to the results of
its verdict, and therefore a mistrial was not required.

MSI
next contends that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence
videotapes of crash test results of a dissimilar vehicle.MSI alleges that there is no relevance to
these crash test results because the circumstance of the crash test and
vehicles involved were dramatically different than those involved in
Ellsworth’s accident.Here, Ellsworth’s
expert opined that the gas tank on Ellsworth’s car was improperly located and
should have been placed above the rear axle instead of under the trunk. To
rebut that testimony, General Motors introduced a videotape of a crash test
General Motors conducted with a car that had the gas tank located as
Ellsworth’s expert recommended.The
results of the test demonstrated that a car with a gas tank so located was
susceptible to fire caused by a leaking tank damaged from a rear end collision.

In Wisconsin, “pretrial experiments may be
admitted into evidence if their probative value is not substantially outweighed
by prejudice, confusion, and waste of time.” Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 125 Wis.2d 145, 165, 370 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Ct. App.
1985).The court should let the
evidence in if enough of the obviously important factors in the case are
duplicated in the experiment, if the failure to control other possibly relevant
variables is explained, and if the jury is aided by the evidence’s
admission.Id.While there were vast dissimilarities
between the vehicle in this case and the vehicle reflected in the video, the
trial court could properly conclude that the video adequately demonstrated the
problems with Ellsworth’s expert’s opinion that the gas tank should be located
over the rear axle.Location of the gas
tank was a material issue in the case against General Motors.In addition, to minimize any prejudicial
effect, the court permitted only one showing of an edited version of the tape
to be viewed.The court also permitted
extensive cross-examination about the videotape crash test directed at the
dissimilarities between the vehicle depicted in the video and Ellsworth’s
vehicle. We conclude that the trial court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion in admitting the videotape.

MSI
next contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it
denied MSI’s and General Motors’ motion for a mistrial after one of the jurors
fainted upon viewing the photographs of Ellsworth’s injuries.As we have stated, the decision whether to
grant a mistrial lies within the trial court’s sound discretion.State v. Bunch, 191 Wis.2d
501, 506, 529 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Ct. App. 1995).The trial court must determine, in light of the entire proceeding,
whether the basis for a mistrial is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new
trial.Id.The trial court properly exercises its
discretion if it examines the relevant facts, applies the proper standard of
law, and engages in a rational decision-making process.Id. at 506-07, 529 N.W.2d
at 925. “We accord great deference to a trial court’s decision on a
motion for mistrial.”Broadhead
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 217 Wis.2d 231, 579 N.W.2d 761,
763-64 (Ct. App. 1998).

After
one of the jurors fainted, the trial court examined the balance of the panel to
determine whether the incident involving the juror was likely to improperly
influence the remaining jurors in their deliberations and whether they were
willing to continue.The remaining
jurors indicated to the court that the incident had not affected them in any
way and that they would prefer to proceed. After making this inquiry, the trial
court determined that the jury was willing and able to continue hearing the
evidence in the case and that the jurors’ deliberations would not be unduly
influenced by a member of the panel fainting.We conclude on this basis that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in refusing to order a mistrial.

Finally,
MSI contends that the trial court erred when it denied the motion after verdict
requesting a new trial becausethe
verdict was contrary to law and the evidence and a new trial was warranted in
the interest of justice.We dispose of
this claim summarily.MSI grounds this
claim on “the reasons set forth in the prior sections” of its brief and “based
upon all of the objections previously set forth by MSI.”We have already disposed of MSI’s claims and
affirmed the trial court’s determinations on those issues.Furthermore, we consider
“for-reasons-stated-elsewhere” arguments to be inadequate and decline to
consider them. Calaway v. Brown County, 202 Wis.2d 736, 750-51,
553 N.W.2d 809, 815 (Ct. App. 1996).

By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.

[1] Ellsworth
cross-appeals contending that:(1) the
trial court properly inserted into the special verdict the reasonable and
customary value of medical services rendered instead of Dunn County’s Medical
Assistance payment; (2) the trial court properly admitted photographs of
Ellsworth’s injuries into evidence; (3) the record supports the childrens’
award for loss of their mother’s society and companionship; (4) the trial court
properly denied the motion for mistrial after a juror fainted; and (5) the
trial court properly denied the motion after verdict seeking a new trial in the
interests of justice.The analysis in
the body of our decision disposes of these contentions.

[2] We do not
address the situation where a medical bill is discounted in return for other
considerations such as a contract for exclusive treatment as occurs with a
health maintenance organization.