Stakes high in Egypt unrest

From the “jasmine revolution" in the small North ­African state of Tunisia to the accelerating crisis in Egypt, the stakes for the Middle East and Western interests there have been dramatically raised. The ouster of a corrupt leader in Tunisia was a welcome development for its 10 million people but not a seismic event for the rest of the world – or even necessarily the Middle East.

Egypt is different. The West cannot allow Egypt to degenerate into another failed Islamic state. Its stability and moderation is central to Western and United States policy in the Middle East. President Hosni Mubarak is an ailing and unattractive dictator who has kept Egypt’s 80 million people firmly under the control of his security services. But his maintenance of Egypt’s peace with Israel and strategic support for the US in the Middle East has strengthened Washington’s hand in the region and underpinned the policy of every US president for 30 years.

Now that Mr
Mubarak
’s rule seems to be coming to an end, with protesters demanding he stand down for a new leader, all this has been thrown into doubt.

Egypt matters because it is the largest country in the Middle East, big enough to counterbalance Iran, and a leader of ­moderate opinion in the Arab world. As the custodian of the Suez Canal, a vital shipping link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, it is of immense strategic importance, ­geographically central to an unstable region. Vitally for ­Washington, it has allowed the US the use of its air bases at critical junctures.

In addition to these interests, Egypt is the largest customer for Australian wheat, and the unrest is feeding uncertainty. Although the consequence of this could be stockpiling and ­rising prices – benefiting growers – in the long term, instability is not in anyone’s interests. Falling stock prices around the world and a flight to safe-haven currencies underline the ­significance of the crisis. What follows from here is unclear.

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Mr Mubarak has clearly outstayed his welcome. His National Democratic Party has lost much of its credibility along with its leader. Despite his appointment of a former intelligence chief to the new position of vice-president, it is hard to see how Mr Mubarak can bring about the breadth of change needed to ­satisfy the protesters. Neither is it clear whether the street protesters are motivated by a desire for a democratically elected, secular government or simply an end to their economic subjugation, or both. Two-fifths of the country’s population subsists on less than $2 a day, the country has to import basic foods to feed them, and the government is corrupt and has so far been incapable of introducing economic reforms needed to bring about a fairer distribution of resources.

Egypt is the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has no formal representation in the Parliament but has ­representatives there. It cannot be assumed that free and fair elections would not produce a government in which this ­organisation had some, or even significant, leverage.

This is the paradox that bedevils Western efforts to implant democracy in the inhospitable soil of the Middle East. The most desirable outcome – but the least likely one given the lack of promising candidates – would be a transition to a democratic, secular, economically liberal government via scheduled ­elections in September. The negotiations between the ­various ­parties on the terms of the elections would be presided over by the military, which is the Egyptian institution with the most public ­credibility.

It had been widely hoped that the September elections would produce a fair and authentic outcome. With the shaking of Mr Mubarak’s power base this has now become imperative. The problem for Western backers of secular, democratic governments is that their cause has few credible champions in Egypt. Mohamed ElBaradhei, the former head of the Inter­national Atomic Energy Agency, is one aspirant who has lived for many years outside Egypt and lacks popular support.

Egypt is not Iran. It has an educated middle class and, despite some looting, its people have responded to the crisis with restraint. It is not descending into anarchy. Even so, the least desirable outcome of the unrest would be an Islamist ­government heavily influenced or controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. This would change the face of Egypt, raising the prospect of another large Middle Eastern state under sharia law, putting Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel at risk and ­potentially undermining Israel’s security.

The Middle East is already unpredictable. Iran’s nuclear ambitions have not been contained and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is going nowhere. But the crisis in Egypt looms as the gravest new foreign policy challenge facing US President
Barack Obama
and Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton
. ­Washington has leverage over Egypt’s government via its $US1.5 billion annual contribution to its military, but little influence over protesters. Its wisest role is to persistently press for reform, without going in so hard that it frightens moderates away. Australia’s Foreign Minister,
Kevin Rudd
, has sensibly followed this line.