Globalization
is the context of our times. Almost nowhere in the world can a viable
set of economic, political, or educational goals (policies/initiatives)
be developed without taking into consideration our new global context
of free markets, New Information and Communication Technologies (NICTs),
and the political and cultural consequences those dynamics create.

It is not
difficult to find dozens of definitions of globalization. Carnoy (1999)
argues that globalization is not merely a matter of trade, investment,
or national economy, but a "new way of thinking about social space
and time" and that this has occurred primarily because the NICTs
have redefined distance and time (p.19). One particularly useful definition
of globalization that emphasizes our interdependencies is given by
Blackmore (2000) who describes globalization as "increased economic,
cultural, environmental, and social interdependencies and new transnational
financial and political formations arising out of the mobility of capital,
labor, and information, with both homogenizing and differentiating
tendencies" (p. 133). Another similar definition, which puts more
emphasis on the economic, is by Gibson-Graham (1996) who defines globalization
similarly as "a set of processes by which the world is rapidly
being integrated into one economic space via increased international
trade, the internationalization of production and financial markets,
the internationalization of a commodity culture promoted by an increasingly
networked global telecommunication system" (p. 121). In most cases,
globalization is considered to be a relatively new phenomenon, though
some critics argue that globalization is not new at all and can be
traced back to the emergence of universal religions or the flowering
of capitalism in the 16th century (see Robertson, 1997; Wallerstein,
1987). In most cases, globalization is considered to be primarily an
economic phenomenon, though some critics examine and define globalization
from a variety of social and theoretical perspectives, including discourse
theory, gender studies, narratology, and multiculturalism (for overview
of theoretical approaches, see Kellner, 2000; McCarthy and Dimitrades,
2000; Hoppers, 2000).

Thomas Friedman
(2005, pp. 9-11) usefully describes globalization has having three
great eras. Globalization 1.0, according
to Friedman, occurred between 1492 and 1800--when the Old World was
expanding markets and acquiring riches primarily by discovering the
New World. Globalization 2.0, according to
Friedman, lasted from about 1800 to the year 2000--the era when the
world continued to "shrink," when multinational companies
increasingly went global for markets and labor, and when technological
innovations continued to reduce transportation, communication, and
production costs. In about the year 2,000, says Friedman, globalization
3.0 began. What is particularly special about this most
recent stage is the empowerment of the individual made possible, primarily,
by NICTs. As a result of NICT, individuals no longer have to live in
or travel to America or Europe to participate in educational, cultural,
or business relationships. Further, while Globalization 1.0 and 2.0
were primarily in the hands of Europeans and Americans, Globalization
3.0, says Friedman, will driven increasingly by non-Western groups
and individuals.

Since the
point of this paper is to consider possibilities of success or failure
for cross-border education, the focus here will be on globalization
as a recenteconomic, technological, political and cultural phenomenon
of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In Friedman's terms, we
will examine some of the successes and failures of "late" globalization
2.0, and try to understand how, during the era of "early" globalization
3.0, cross-border education can contribute to sustainable economic
development in Latin America and even, perhaps, contribute to a globalization
3.1.

But whatever
definition one accepts from whatever approach one might take, globalization
is, obviously, a multidimensional process with, at the very least,
four primary dimensions. Briefly, they are:

1.
The Economic. This central dimension of globalization
refers primarily to the increase in international trade and the
success of the free market economy. What is startlingly new, however,
is that these recent economic policies have effectively created
a world market where workers, consumers, and companies have the
potential (whether they know it or not) to enter into economic
relationships with other workers, consumers and companies anywhere
in the world. This extraordinary capability for global business,
educational, and cultural interrelationships is due primarily to
recent innovations in NICTs (but also to increasingly lower transportation
costs). And these interrelationships have significant political
and cultural implications.

2.
The Technological. The technological dimension of globalization
refers primarily to the advancements of (a) NICTs which have fueled
the communication and information revolution of recent years; and
(b) new production technologies, which have produced efficiencies
in production and created the so-called "post-Fordist" era
of manufacturing. The technological dynamic of globalization includes
everything from the internet and mobile phones,
which have done much to create the "interconnectedness" of
the world, to improved logistics systems,
which have enabled industries worldwide to function more efficiently
and profitably, to modern agronomic practices,
which are restoring infertile lands and opening up new opportunities
in agriculture.

3.
The Political. The political dimension refers primarily
to the decline of the sovereign state, which is due in part to
the rise of multinational corporations, but also due to globalization's
ties with neoliberalism. Neoliberalism--promoted by the Reagan
and Thatcher governments of the 1980s-- essentially calls for a
less interventionist state in both economic and social arenas,
and its adherents, who have been in power at the World Bank and
International Monetary fund for over twenty years, have proposed
and imposed: (a) deregulation and free markets, with less power
for the sovereign state to set economic policies, (b) decentralization
of government, shifting power from the sovereign to the more local,
and (c) reduction of the role of the state by increasing the role
of the private sector in most areas of economic and social life.

4.
The Cultural. The cultural dimension of globalization
appears at first glance to be a schizophrenic one. On the one hand,
our increasing global interconnectedness has helped to produce
a kind of homogenous mass culture (mostly American and mostly English
language). On the other hand, these same dynamics have led to the
mixing of many different cultures and societies, helping to produce
a new multiculturalism. Strangely, both dynamics seem to be happening
at the same time. The cultural dimension of globalization also
deals with gender issues, questions of identity, and the social
construction of reality, as well as the production and consumption
of media. But while the cultural dimension of globalization is
certainly a significant one, the focus here, since we are concerned
primarily with sustainable development, will be more on the economic,
technological and political.

SUCCESSES,
FAILURES, AND CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION

Without
question, globalization has yielded some extraordinary successes.

Globalization
has helped to produce an explosion of new technologies, an abundant
production of goods and services, and increasing levels of wealth for
millions. As a result of globalization, more people are living under
democratic systems, more societies are recognizing the importance of
human rights, and never before in world history have so many people
had so many opportunities for education and knowledge. Further, because
of globalization, a number of developing countries have grown far more
quickly than they could have otherwise. Because of international trade
and export-led economic growth, for instance, millions of people in
East Asia are now far better off now than they were just a few years
ago (and being "better off" is not just a function of a larger
GNP, but also includes citizens living longer and living healthier).

It
must be recognized, however, that for all the successes of globalization,
it has simply not lived up to its promise for many developing countries
(as well as for Russia). As a matter of fact, during the same time
that the total world income increased by an average 2.5 percent annually,
the actual number of people living in poverty has increased by almost
100 million (Stiglitz, p. 5). Globalization, which has helped to create
wealth and improved living conditions for many, has simultaneously
been the context for the growing divide between the haves and the have-nots.
Under globalization, increasing numbers of people have been left in
dire poverty, living on less than a dollar a day.

Why?

A number
of critics (Sachs, 2005 ; Stiglitz, 2002; Carnoy, 2000; Stromquist,
2002; Apple, 2000; Sunkle, 2005) blame, in varying degrees, the failures
of globalization on neoliberalism--or, more
specifically, on the ideological fervor and cookie-cutter mentality
that neoliberal policies were imposed on developing countries by the
World Bank and the International Monetary fund.

In essence,
neoliberalism is an economic ideology (closely identified with the
economic policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s)
centered around the beliefs that free markets, free trade, decentralized
governments and increased privatization will produce the greatest social,
political and economic good. Neoliberalism advocates minimal regulations,
minimal taxation, as well as minimal government spending and direct
involvement in the economy. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the World
Bank and the International Monetary fund imposed neoliberal policies
on developing countries as conditions for loans. These neoliberal condition-laden
loans were called structural adjustment programs. In almost every case,
the developing country ended up worse off than before.

Sachs (2005,
pp. 74-79) points out that the IMF-World Bank structural adjustment
programs were designed to address four primary problems assumed to
be the cause of the developing countries' economic ills: (1) poor governance,
(2) excessive government intervention in markets, (3) excessive government
spending, and (4) too much state ownership. Sachs acknowledges that
there was some truth to this diagnosis, but the structural adjustment
policies belied a simplistic (if not simpleminded) view of poverty.
Clearly, there had been economic mismanagement. And clearly, a number
of developing economies did need to reorient themselves to more global
market-based systems. But such policy and governance problems were
only a part of the problem--often not the central
problem.

Sachs argues
(pp. 56-74) that a society's economic system has too many "moving
parts" for us to presume that only one or two things can go wrong.
Different problems can occur in different parts of the "economic
machine" in different ways in different countries. The causes
of poverty could include: (1) physical geography, (2) debt overhang,
(3) governance failures, (4) cultural barriers, (5) geopolitics, (6)
lack of innovation culture, and (7) demographics. Only one, possibly
two, of those reasons ("governance failures" and possibly "lack
of innovation culture') are addressed by neoliberalist policies.

According
to Sachs, geography is, perhaps, the most frequently overlooked cause
for economic failure. For instance, many of the world's poorest countries
have high transportation costs because they are landlocked and/or mountainous,
or they lack navigable rivers, or good coastlines and harbors. Other
geographical factors that impede economic growth might be an arid climate
prone to drought, or a tropical climate that cruelly favors killer
diseases. None of these conditions are fatal, argues Sachs, but they
must be recognized in planning for economic development so that appropriate
investments can be made to overcome them. If the country is landlocked,
then perhaps a program of deregulation and decentralization is appropriate,
but certainly a program to invest in roads needs to be implemented.
If the country is assaulted by tropical diseases, then perhaps a plan
to reduce tariffs and increase privatization would be appropriate,
but certainly a program to invest in healthcare needs to be done. The
point is that an effective development economics should be able to
address problems of, say, closed trading systems and poor governance without ignoring
the other very real (and often very specific) problems that are causing
poverty.

Globalization
has often failed for developing countries because its economic agents
(IMF and World Bank) consistently imposed wrong solutions for the wrong
problems. Joseph
E. Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize Winner in Economics wrote:

The IMF
has made mistakes in all the areas it has been involved in:development,
crisis management, and in countries making the transition from communism
to capitalism. Structural adjustment programs did not bring sustained
growth even to those, like Bolivia, that adhered to its strictures;
in many countries, excessive austerity stifled growth; successful economic
programs require extreme care in sequencing--the order in
which reforms occur--and pacing (2005, p. 18).

Stiglitz points
out that if markets are opened up to competition too soon (before strong
financial institutions can be established), then old jobs will be lost
faster than new jobs can be created to replace them. Mistakes in sequencing
and pacing, Stiglitz argues, have done much to contribute to the rise
in unemployment and increase in poverty. In other words, it is not globalization
per se that has increased poverty, but economic strategies imposed by
those "agents" of globalization--the World Bank and the IMF.

While the
neoliberalist ideology of the 1980s and 1990s may have had much to do
with globalization's acceleration at the end of globalization 2.0, it
has also had much to do with globalization's failures, especially concerning
the economies of developing countries. Our argument here, in terms of
cross-border education and sustainable economic development, will be
for a kind of globalization 3.1, where developing countries (specifically
in Latin America) are not subjected to the same cookie-cutter neoliberal
policies, but, rather, allowed (even under loans and support from the
World Bank and IMF) enough sovereignty to set their own appropriate pace
and sequencing in market liberalization, and enough freedom to work with
a state-specific set of economic initiatives (roads, sanitation, e-Readiness,
etc.) appropriate to their own specific set of economic conditions.