On July 28, 2014, the CIA director wrote a letter to senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss — the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee (SSCI) and the panel's ranking Republican, respectively. In it, he admitted that the CIA's penetration of the computer network used by committee staffers reviewing the agency's torture program — a breach for which Feinstein and Chambliss had long demanded accountability — was improper and violated agreements the Intelligence Committee had made with the CIA.

The letter was never sent. Instead of an apology, the Senate received accusations of impropriety after the CIA threw out its Inspector General's report on the breach and performed an in-house "investigation" clearing the CIA of wrongdoing.

The letter was never signed by Brennan or sent. It was filed away somewhere in the CIA's archives, hopefully never to be seen again. But it was mistakenly handed over to Jason Leopold much to the CIA's chagrin. Additional chagrinment ensued.

After VICE News received the documents, the CIA contacted us and said Brennan's draft letter had been released by mistake. The agency asked that we refrain from posting it.

We declined the CIA's request.

So, the CIA has yet to officially admit any wrongdoing (as in a document -- such as the one it didn't want released -- entered into the public record), and yet, there's an admission of guilt in the public's hands. Makes it a bit harder to defend actions Senator Feinstein claimed violated pretty much everything that could be violated in a single act.

Feinstein wrote to Brennan on January 23, 2014 and told him she consulted with the Senate's legal counsel, who informed her that the CIA's search of the Senate's computer network "may have been inconsistent with the separation of powers principles embodied in the Constitution and essential to effective congressional oversight of intelligence activities."

"Second," her letter continued, "the search may have violated the Fourth Amendment, the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, various statutes (including federal criminal statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Executive Order 12333," which says it's unlawful for the CIA to conduct domestic spying.

In short, it appears that while some in the CIA knew what it did was clearly wrong (and potentially illegal), top management so insisted on denying it, that it wouldn't even send an apology letter -- and that would have stayed completely secret if someone hadn't slipped up and handed over the unsigned letter accidentally in a FOIA response dump.

from the that's-cheating dept

Against all the odds, legal challenges to UK surveillance are succeeding, as Techdirt has reported. At the forefront of bringing cases against GCHQ is the rights group Privacy International. In May 2014 it asserted that GCHQ's activities were illegal under the UK's Computer Misuse Act (CMA), which criminalizes breaking into digital systems. A year later, and just hours before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal hearing of Privacy International's complaint against GCHQ, the UK government revealed the following:

only a few weeks after the claim was filed, the [UK] Government quietly introduced legislation on 6 June 2014 that would amend the CMA to provide a new exception for law enforcement and GCHQ to hack without criminal liability. The change not only affects Privacy International's claim, but also grants UK law enforcement new leeway to potentially conduct cyber attacks within the UK.

That is, the UK government was implicitly admitting that GCHQ's activities were, once again, illegal, but fixed that problem with the simple expedient of changing the law to make them legal. That on its own is questionable, although some might say that spies and the police need to have immunity when carrying out certain authorized acts. But the real issue here is another: the fact that this change was pushed through with none of the usual scrutiny or debate accorded to laws with important effects. As Privacy International explains, although the UK government published an explanatory note about the proposed amendment, it neglected to mention its true impact. Moreover:

It appears no regulators, commissioners responsible for overseeing the intelligence agencies, the Information Commissioner's Office, industry, NGOs or the public were notified or consulted about the proposed legislative changes. There was no published Privacy Impact Assessment. Only the Ministry of Justice, Crown Prosecution Service, Scotland Office, Northern Ireland Office, GCHQ, Police and National Crime Agency were consulted as stakeholders. There was no public debate.

This is essentially secret law-making, where the only people consulted are the ones who will benefit. That's troubling at the best of times, but especially so in the context of a government abusing its powers to avoid yet another embarrassing defeat in the courts.

from the meh dept

We just had a story based on the Intercept breaking the fact that the CIA holds an annual hackathon (the CIA calls it a "Jamboree") to come up with new ways to hack secure systems, inviting in various contractors and government agencies. Much of the work is focused on hacking Apple's security, inserting backdoors and generally degrading security and encryption for everyone.

The CIA refused to comment on the Intercept's original story, but the reporters got former FTC official Steven Bellovin to sum it up as:

“Spies gonna spy,” says Steven Bellovin, a former chief technologist for the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and current professor at Columbia University. “I’m never surprised by what intelligence agencies do to get information. They’re going to go where the info is, and as it moves, they’ll adjust their tactics. Their attitude is basically amoral: whatever works is OK.”

"That's what we do," the official said. "CIA collects information overseas, and this is focused on our adversaries, whether they be terrorists or other adversaries."

Except, of course, they don't just spy overseas. The CIA has done domestic spying as well, and the descriptions of the projects don't just impact people overseas. And then there's this one:

"There's a whole world of devices out there, and that's what we're going to do," the official said. "It is what it is."

It is what it is. That's someone who clearly doesn't care one bit about the negative consequences of attacking security and inserting backdoors that can harm everyone, just so long as they can also spy on people they don't like. You know, like the US Senate.

from the how-very-AT&T-of-you dept

To counter the PR hit from Google Fiber, AT&T has recently been proclaiming that it too is now offering 1 Gbps services under the company's "Gigapower" brand -- but pretending that Google has nothing to do with it. On the surface, it looks like AT&T is taking on Google blow for blow, and that this is a wonderful example of how competition works. And while that's true up to a point, as we've discussed previously, AT&T's offering is highly theatrical in nature. AT&T's actually been slashing its fixed-line CAPEX each quarter, but is offering 1 Gbps speeds to a few, scattered high-end developments where fiber is already in the ground.

But in the locations AT&T is deploying 1 Gbps services, it's actually engaged in something that -- in typical AT&T fashion -- sets an even worse precedent. On the heels of scattered Gigapower deployments in Austin, AT&T this week announced it's also offering symmetrical 1 Gbps speeds in portions of Kansas City. After the press release gets done insisting that AT&T "moved quickly to bring more competition to the Kansas City area" with a 1 Gbps offering for $70 a month, quadruple asterisked fine print explains that to actually get this $70 price point, you have to agree to opt-in to AT&T's "Gigapower Internet Preferences" program:

"U-verse High Speed Internet 1Gbps: Internet speeds up to 1Gbps for $70 per month****, includes waiver of equipment, installation and activation fees, and a three year price guarantee...**** U-verse with AT&T GigaPower Premier offer is available with agreement from customer to participate in AT&T Internet Preferences. AT&T may use Web browsing information, like the search terms entered and the Web pages visited, to provide customers with relevant offers and ads tailored to their interests."

Assuming the company's Kansas City pricing mirrors its Austin pricing, if you choose to opt-out of this particular brand of snoopvertising, you'll need to pay $100 a month. That's right: even when faced with real price competition, AT&T can't help but be AT&T -- and try to charge users a $30 premium just to opt-out of a behavioral ad program. AT&T's Internet Preferences FAQ can't be bothered to detail the technology used, though it's most likely deep packet inspection (you know, the kind of technology small companies like NebuAD and Phorm were absolutely destroyed for using).

AT&T's pretty clearly not very familiar with how this whole price competition thing works, and needless to say, most sensible Kansas City and Austin users will be taking their broadband business to Google if they want to avoid AT&T being AT&T. Not that we'll get to see this on AT&T earnings numbers; since the entire project is a bit of a show pony to begin with, the company doesn't disclose how many Gigapower customers it serves. AT&T just wants you to believe it's on the cutting edge -- even if that cutting edge predominantly involves make believe -- and forcing consumers to pay a premium for privacy.

Sir David, who was director of GCHQ from 1996-97, said: "One of the results of Snowden is that companies are now heavily encrypting [communications] end to end.

"Intelligence agencies are not going to give up trying to get the bad guys. They will have to get closer to the bad guys. I predict we will see more close access work."

According to The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which reported his words from a talk he gave earlier this week, by this he meant things like physical observation, bugging rooms, and breaking into phones or computers. Omand went on:

"You can say that will be more targeted but in terms of intrusion into personal privacy -- collateral intrusion into privacy -- we are likely to end up in an ethically worse position than we were before."

That's remarkable for its implied threat: if you don't let us ban or backdoor strong encryption, we're going to start breaking into your homes. And it's striking that Omand regards eavesdropping on all the Internet traffic flowing in to and out of the UK, or collecting thousands of sexually-explicit webcam pictures, as less reprehensible than a tightly-targeted operation against a few suspects. His framing also implies that he thinks those pesky civil liberties groups will protest more about the latter than the former. In fact, what defenders of privacy and liberty generally want is simply a proportionate response with judicial oversight -- something that is straightforward with targeted "close access" work, but impossible with the blanket surveillance currently employed.

The good news here is that Omand has indirectly confirmed that the current strategy of rolling out strong encryption as widely as possible is the right one. Provided it is not derailed by any government moves to weaken crypto, it will increase the cost of online surveillance, and force intelligence services to return to targeted spying -- which is what they should have done in the first place.

from the just-some-harmless-toll-data,-right? dept

What data is harmless in the hands of the government? Apparently, not much. Case in point: the data collected by E-ZPass transponders. While the system helps alleviate traffic congestion, it also tracks drivers' movements. If you thought it just triggered toll payments, you're drastically underestimating the government's desire for data.

Back in 2013, Mike covered one NYC driver's experience with his E-ZPass device, finding it was triggered all over the city -- not just on toll roads. The company claimed the signal was scrambled and travel data collected in aggregate. Whether or not that remains true is open for debate, but even the data collected where drivers are expecting data collection can be revealing. E-ZPass data has been used in divorce cases to prove a spouse's whereabouts as well as against a city official, who falsified time sheets.

"Respectfully, Senator, you only started paying tolls recently," [Port Authority Deputy Chief Bill] Baroni said, according to a transcript of the exchange. "In fact, I have a copy of your free E-ZPass," he continued, holding up a physical copy of the toll pass Lautenberg had received as a benefit from his tenure as a Port Authority commissioner. "You took 284 trips for free in the last 2 years you had a pass."

At a press conference, he alleged that the senator didn't "pay for parking at Port Authority facilities" and said Lautenberg went "through the tunnel to New York three or four times a week in 2005 and 2006."

I find it interesting, too, by the way, in 2005 and 2006, that he went over the Hudson River 284 times. Where was he going?... I think he needs to answer that. 'Cause he's supposed to be the senator from New Jersey. So what's he doing going over the bridge or through the tunnel to New York three or four times a week for 2005 and 2006?... Did he ever spend any time in New Jersey?

Obviously, this is an abuse of government-collected data. Bill Baroni admitted during the 2013 Bridgegate scandal investigation that he possessed driving data on those interrogating him. To add insult to injury, the governor's office claimed it had no records on Lautenberg's driving habits in response to IBTimes' 2012 open records request -- the same records he used to criticize Lautenberg in an earlier press conference.

EZ Pass and other electronic toll booth systems should have the option for anonymous use, where money on the devices is treated like cash, for users who prefer privacy to the convenience of having named accounts. A driver, in other words, should be able to buy a transponder for cash, and use cash to store and re-load value on it. The Washington DC Metro system, for example, offers this option for users of its contactless transit passes.

Obviously, whatever protections the state of New Jersey affords these data are inadequate. Sure, driving in public isn't necessarily private, but the use of travel data to attack political opponents is still an abuse of state-collected data. Supposedly, the data is exempt from public record laws, which locks citizens out of acquiring the data without a subpoena. But nothing's stopping the Port Authority from using it for its own political ends and passing it on to the governor to do the same.

Driving on public roads may not be private, but there's a lot that can be ascertained about a person simply by looking at this data -- information that could only otherwise be acquired by nonstop physical "tailing." When collected and stored, it runs the risk of being abused. The Port Authority already grants police open access to the records (limited only to "purposes of discharging their duties," whatever that actually means in practice) and has shown its willingness to puts its self-interest ahead of state law when it comes to disseminating this information. Better policies and practices are in order, and Governor Chris Christie should be waist deep in investigators (a belated call for a DOJ investigation of Christie and Baroni has been issued by NJ Congressman Frank Palone) rather than considering a 2016 presidential run.

from the CIA-says-CIA-did-nothing-wrong.-No-news-at-11. dept

Now that the long-delayed CIA Torture Report has been released, it's time to find someone to blame. Not for the torture, of course. There will apparently be no punishments handed down for the abuse uncovered by the Senate Intelligence Committee. (Also, apparently, there will be no huge international fallout. Remember just a few short weeks ago when we were promised increased terrorist activity if the report was released? Still waiting…) But there will be some noise made about the Senate's alleged impropriety.

Contrary to accusations leveled by the Senate, a 38-page report has found that the CIA did not breach the computers of Senate Intelligence Committee staffers and spy on them while they were investigating the CIA's torture program.

The report was released today by the CIA. And is based on a review conducted by a CIA accountability board.

What the accountability board's review did find, however, is that Senate Intelligence Committee staffers stole documents from the CIA and violated an agreement it entered into with the agency over the use of a classified computer network. On several occasions between 2009 and 2013, while the committee was writing its report, committee staffers allegedly gained access to CIA documents they were not authorized to see — such as a spreadsheet that contained a list of videos apparently related to the torture program — and admitted as much when confronted by agency officials.

So, the CIA took it upon itself to perform an investigation no one asked for in order to clear itself of allegations that it had spied on Senate staffers. Chalk that one up to active disinterest by the administration in pursuing any allegations of wrongdoing associated with the Torture Report. Several months ago, the Senate claimed the CIA had hacked its computers and accessed Torture Report work-in-progress but the DOJ declined the invitation to investigate further.

Now, the CIA is claiming it was blameless (you know, other than the torture), based on its own internal investigation. The OIG report alleging CIA abuse of Senate computers was reviewed by the CIA's in-house Accountability Board and determined to be "riddled with errors."

The CIA's accusations against the Senate boil down to a bundle of classified internal CIA documents known as the "Panetta Review."

The Intelligence Committee made a formal request to the CIA for the Panetta Review in November 2013 — but unbeknownst to the CIA, the Senate already had a copy. According to the accountability board's report, the request set off alarm bells at the CIA, leading the agency to believe that the committee may have already accessed the Panetta Review. At that point, the Senate had already completed a draft of its torture report and was battling the CIA over the veracity of the findings and conclusions — that the CIA's program had been ineffective.

According to the CIA accountability board, the agency went back and reviewed the draft copy of the Senate report and the Panetta Review and found the language in both documents to be "remarkably similar," meaning that the Senate probably relied on the Panetta Review to draft its report.

If the CIA didn't want the Senate to access these documents, it's left unexplained as to how it failed to prevent this. The CIA supposedly had "walled off" space for the Senate to work within its network and actively monitored staffers' activity. In fact, it was this active monitoring that led to the Senate's accusations of CIA impropriety in the first place.

[CIA Director John] Brennan later revealed to Feinstein that he authorized the CIA employees to conduct a search of Intelligence Committee computers at the secure facility to determine how they obtained the Panetta Review. A CIA review of computer "audit logs" concluded that no one at the CIA had voluntarily turned over the Panetta Review.

That disclosure led Feinstein to make a dramatic speech on the Senate floor last March in which she accused the CIA of unlawfully monitoring Senate staffers' computers and attempting to sabotage the committee's investigation, which "undermined the constitutional framework essential to effective congressional oversight of intelligence activities or any other government function."

The agency determined that no one on its side had handed over the forbidden Panetta Review, so somehow the Senate had managed to thwart the CIA's secured system and access documents it wasn't supposed to see. Now, the CIA is pressing the DOJ to investigate the Senate. If this push is successful, the only people to be punished for years of unlawful torture will be Senate staffers. This won't do anything to salvage the CIA's reputation, but it may deter further investigations and oversight by the Congress and Senate. There's really only one reason the CIA wanted to keep the Panetta Review out of the Senate's hands, and it has nothing to do with national security and everything to do with self-preservation.

[T]he Intelligence Committee had found the findings of the Panetta Review — which had been conducted internally by the CIA — to be very different from what the CIA was telling the Intelligence Committee in response to the committee's torture report.

The fact that the CIA wants to punish the Senate for the Torture Report has provoked some heated responses from Senate Intelligence Committee members. Dianne Feinstein issued this short statement late Wednesday:

"Let me be clear: I continue to believe CIA's actions constituted a violation of the constitutional separation of powers and unfortunately led to the CIA's referral of unsubstantiated criminal charges to the Justice Department against committee staff," Feinstein said. "I'm disappointed that no one at the CIA will be held accountable. The decision was made to search committee computers, and someone should be found responsible for those actions."

Ron Wyden issued a longer statement in response, one that shows his irritation at the CIA being so willing to let itself off the hook:

"Both the CIA Inspector General and the review board appointed by Director Brennan have now concluded that the CIA's unauthorized search of Senate files was improper. It is incredible that no one at the CIA has been held accountable for this very clear violation of Constitutional principles. Director Brennan either needs to reprimand the individuals involved or take responsibility himself. So far he has done neither.

This episode further illustrates the cumulative corrosive effects of the CIA's torture program. First, agency officers and contractors went far beyond the limits set out even in the Justice Department's torture memos. Then, top officials spent a decade making inaccurate statements about torture's effectiveness to Congress, the White House and the American people. Next, instead of acknowledging these years of misrepresentations, the CIA's current leadership decided to double down on denial. And when CIA officials were worried that the Intelligence Committee had found a document that contradicted their claims, they secretly searched Senate computer files to find out if Senate investigators had obtained it.

At a time when the CIA appears incapable of policing itself, the intelligence community needs more external oversight, not less.

Last June senior officials from the NSA, FBI and ODNI all testified that their agencies did not have the authority to conduct a search of U.S. Senate files without external authorization, but Director Brennan has refused to say what rules apply to the CIA. This is unacceptable in a democracy. It is time for the Director's stonewalling to end."

Now, let's suppose that all of the CIA's allegations are true. If so, should the Senate be held accountable for actions it took that resulted in the exposure of CIA wrongdoing? Obviously, the CIA feels it should. But the documents "improperly accessed" were internal CIA documents that showed the agency was lying to its overseers about its interrogation techniques. Without this "improper" access, it's likely the Torture Report wouldn't have been as devastating. Large amounts of CIA wrongdoing would have remained undisclosed.

What's included in the Panetta Review is information the Senate Intelligence Committee should have had access to in the first place. But the CIA deliberately and wrongfully withheld information that contradicted the narrative it was feeding to its overseers. If the Senate is to be punished for its wrongful access, then it follows that the CIA should be held accountable for its deliberate misrepresentation of its torture programs. Instead, there's now a chance the investigators will pay for their (mild in comparison) misconduct while the agency walks away clean.

from the show-trials dept

After the CIA's Inspector General basically revealed that not only did the CIA spy on the network of Senate Intelligence Committee staffers who were investigating the CIA, but that CIA boss John Brennan lied about it and that the breaches were much worse than originally detailed, Brennan appointed a panel to "investigate." Take a wild guess what the panel appointed by the guy who lied about the spying has concluded? If you said that it found serious problems and recommended real consequences for those involved and their leadership, you haven't been paying much attention.

While effectively rejecting the most significant conclusions of the inspector general’s report, the panel, appointed by Mr. Brennan and composed of three C.I.A. officers and two members from outside the agency, is still expected to criticize agency missteps that contributed to the fight with Congress.

But its decision not to recommend anyone for disciplinary action is likely to anger members of the Intelligence Committee, who have accused the C.I.A. of trampling on the independence of Congress and interfering with its investigation of agency wrongdoing. The computer searches occurred late last year while the committee was finishing an excoriating report on the agency’s detention and interrogation program.

The message that we keep sending is, if you're powerful enough, there's almost nothing you can do with any actual consequences attached. Is it any wonder that the intelligence community keeps pushing the boundaries further and further?

from the privacy-schmivacy dept

Over the last few years, Verizon has been ramping up its behavioral tracking efforts via programs like Verizon Selects and its Relevant Mobile Ad system, which track wireless and wireline subscriber web behavior to deliver tailored ads and sell your information to third parties. Unknown until a few weeks ago however was the fact that as part of this initiative, Verizon has started using what many are calling controversial "stealth," "super" or "perma" cookies that track a user's online behavior covertly, without users being able to disable them via browser settings.

Lawyer and Stanford computer scientist Jonathan Mayer offered up an excellent analysis noting that Verizon was actively modifying its users' traffic to embed a unique identifier traffic header, or X-UIDH. This header is then read by marketing partners (or hey, anybody, since it's stamped on all of your traffic) who can then build a handy profile of you. It's a rather ham-fisted approach, argues Mayer, who notes that while you can opt-out of Verizon selling your data, you can't opt out of having your traffic embedded with the unique identifier. He also offered up a handy graphic detailing precisely how these headers work:

As the story grew the last few weeks, ProPublica noted that Twitter's mobile advertising arm is already one of several clients using Verizon's "header enrichment" system, though Twitter didn't much want to talk about it. Several tools like this one have popped up since, allowing users to test their wireless connections (note it doesn't work if your cellular device is connected to Wi-Fi, and may be masked by the use of Google Mobile Chrome, Opera Mini, or if viewed through apps like Flipboard).

Kashmir Hill at Forbes also has a great article exploring the ramifications of the system and asked Verizon and AT&T (who has started trials of a similar system) what consumer protections are in place. Both companies proclaimed that the characters in their headers are rotated on a weekly and daily basis to protect user information. But as we've noted time and time again, there's really no such thing as an anonymized data set, and security consultant Ken White argues that only part of the data in the headers is modified, if at all:

"White has been tracked for the past 6 days across 550 miles with a persistent code from both Verizon and AT&T. He has a smartphone with Verizon service and a hotspot with AT&T service. In AT&T’s case, the code has four parts; only one part changes, he says. “It’s like if you were identified by a birth month, a birth year, a birth day, and a zip code, and they remove one of those things,” said White. You’d still be able to reasonably track that person with the other three. Verizon’s code meanwhile hasn’t changed for him, and it’s been almost a week."

"A couple of years back during the debate on net neutrality, I made the argument that industry leadership through some form of oversight/self-regulatory model, coupled with competition and the extensive oversight provided by literally hundreds of thousands of sophisticated online users would help ensure effective enforcement of good practices and protect consumers."

Yet here we have an example where the behavior Verizon was engaged in was so surreptitious, even some of the best networking and security experts in the business didn't notice Verizon was doing it until two years after the effort was launched. Apparently, holding Verizon accountable is going to take a little more than a public scolding in the town square. The EFF has stated they're taking a look at possible legal action against Verizon for violating consumer privacy law.

from the more-to-this-story-than-the-headline dept

A woman deploys spyware on her soon-to-be ex-husband's phone, an act that is probably more common than anyone wants to admit, but one that rarely results in criminal charges. In this case, however, her husband happened to be employed by the Pacific Grove (CA) Police Department. If not for that simple fact, would there have been an investigation, much less charges brought? This story deals with multiple layers of official privilege -- the extra attention those labeled "law enforcement" receive as victims of criminal activity, as well as the extra access law enforcement officers have, and how easily it can be abused.

Kristin Nyunt was charged by information* today with two counts of illegal wiretapping and the possession of illegal interception devices, announced United States Attorney Melinda Haag and FBI Special Agent in Charge David J. Johnson.

According to the information, from 2010 to 2012, Nyunt, 40, most recently of Monterey Calif., is alleged to have intercepted communications, including sensitive law enforcement communications, by means that included “spy software” that the defendant secretly installed on the mobile phone of a police officer. The information also alleges that during the same period she illegally possessed interception devices, namely spy software including Mobistealth, StealthGenie, and mSpy, knowing that the design of those products renders them primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications.

According to the San Francisco Gate, Nyunt tapped a specific target with this spyware (including the spyware law enforcement loves to hate: StealthGenie): her (now) ex-husband. This is the sort of thing one expects to be more frequent, considering the ease of use and the ubiquitousness of cell phones. Estranged wife spies on spouse. (Or vice versa.)

A former Pacific Grove police commander has pleaded guilty to charges that he steered a possible crime victim to his private investigation firm, then merely pretended to look into her case after accepting $10,000, authorities said Wednesday.

John Nyunt, 51, admitted Tuesday in U.S. District Court in San Jose that he hadn’t investigated the woman’s complaint that she was the victim of electronic surveillance and stalking after referring her to his private firm.

Nyunt also promised the woman a security force comprised of off-duty officer and told another officer to not follow up on her complaint but instead forward any information given directly to him. Despite having all the tools to do the job, Nyunt did nothing.

That Kristin wouldn't trust her husband isn't surprising. Untrustworthy people find it very hard to trust others. Kristin didn't use her illegal access to the law enforcement database to help the Nyunts' fledgling, completely illegal private investigation firm get off the ground. No, she used it to commit identity theft. When she wasn't pretending to be a cop so she could pretend to be someone else, she was stealing paintings and collectors coins from people's homes.

The mobile spyware is the tip of the iceberg. The irony that law enforcement would love to have this much access to everyone's cell phone isn't exactly lost in this situation. But it is very muted. The bigger story here is that the spyware charges are the final detail of a long, sordid narrative where everything trust-related that could be abused WAS abused. A cop uses his extra access privileges to run a home business. He shares the wealth and his wife steals peoples' identities and physical belongings. Along the way, the cop/private dick screws customers and tries to kill his wife. In the end, they'll both be serving time, but it took more than two straight years of access without accountability before investigators brought it to a halt. And it took Nyunt's being a cop to even get investigators to look twice at his wife's use of mobile spyware.