03Jul14

The worsening situation in the Middle East and the collapse of Turkey's policy
of Neo-Ottomanism

A crisis is unfolding in the Middle East and almost all the regimes established
with Western assistance during the Arab Spring have now been destabilized,
thus thwarting not only America's strategic calculations in the region, but also
the expectations of those who were attempting to further their own interests by
playing along with the US plans. The biggest "loser" has been Turkey. Until
quite recently, the Turkish leadership, headed by Recep Erdogan, was
pursuing a strategy of Neo-Ottomanism that was intended to restore the
country's former influence throughout most of the geographical area that at
one time was under the sway of the Ottoman Empire. Then the Turkish foreign
minister, Ahmet Davutog(lu, added to this the doctrine of "strategic depth,"
which envisions Ankara's dominance in those parts of the Turkic world never
held by the Ottomans, particularly in Central Asia and Russia ... Hakan Fidan,
the head of Turkey's MIT intelligence service, has positioned the agency he
oversees as the most knowledgeable and influential bureau in the region,
capable of conducting major independent operations, including the subversion
of certain regimes. And they are now reaping the fruits of their overreach.

The "new Ottomans" simply do not possess the economic, military, political, or
other wherewithal to carry out their ambitious plans. For example, the regular
meetings of the heads of state within the Turkic world have become pompous,
expensive, and inefficient exercises, and an increasing source of exasperation
to many of those leaders. After reaching a certain level, the economic ties
within this community have begun to stagnate, and it is now obvious that their
hopes for Turkish financial assistance were unrealistically high. The leaders of
the post-Soviet Central Asian nations became convinced that almost every
national-security issue required Turkey's assistance to resolve. In addition,
they began to fear that country's attempts to disseminate its political model
and to plant its agents of influence within their borders. Even Baku, which is
closest to Ankara in terms of civilization and geography, began to evince a
certain wariness. A survey of experts from seven Middle Eastern countries
conducted in May and June of this year by Fatih University also showed that
most of them felt Turkey's foreign-policy goals were out of step with the
country's real capabilities.

Turkey's leaders have made a series of major and fatal errors. Of these, the
biggest was the intervention in Syria intended to establish a deferential
regime… But Assad held his ground, and now their former allies present
nothing but problems. Turkey's efforts have boomeranged right back in its
face. Originally placing their hopes on the opposition, the Turks quickly revised
their opinion of the abilities of the relatively moderate Free Syrian Army and
slowly found themselves drawn into supporting more militant jihadists. They
saw their unnatural alliance with avowed supporters of Al-Qaeda to be
temporary and officially denied it in every way. But the evidence of their close
ties was too strong. The leader of the Syrian Kurds, Salih Muslim, who takes
his bearings from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is active in
Turkey, cites numerous examples of proof that "official" Ankara assembled,
trained, and then armed Islamic radicals from around the world, including the
founders of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which is now beyond
Ankara's control. Nor did the jihadists feel much confidence in Ankara from the
onset, and it looks like they exploited her to advance their own interests much
more
than she managed to profit from them. The chairman of the Republican
People's Party of Turkey, Kemal K?l?çdarog(lu, confirmed that there is
evidence that the ruling Justice and Development Party sent arms shipments
to ISIS. In an interview with the Turkish newspaper Jumhuriyat, that Turkish
opposition leader predicted that Erdogan's government will pay dearly for its
policy in the Middle East.

One of the latest joint misadventures of the Turkish authorities and the radical
anti-Syrian insurgents was their failed invasion, backed by the military might of
the Turkish army, into the Syrian border province of Latakia - a stronghold of
the Assad dynasty. It began and apparently ended with the capture and
devastation of the Armenian city of Kasab, one of the few that had been left
unscathed by the Armenian genocide carried out by the Ottoman Empire. A
few days ago the Syrian army liberated Kasab, surrounding the group of
approximately four thousand jihadists in Latakia, an area that is now being
methodically obliterated. Having weighed all the risks, Ankara decided that it
would be in its own best interests to hold off on a massive military intervention.
Its soldiers have been abandoned to their fate and are not being allowed back
into Turkey.

Confident in Assad's tenacious hold on his positions in central Syria, the
jihadists decided to shift their main push eastward. The ISIS invasion of Iraq
itself started with a major strategic deception, which more than anyone, Hakan
Fidan, the head of Turkish intelligence, "bought into" - a mistake that could be
seen as an enormous personal failure for him. According to Syrian sources,
the Turks helped rearm and reposition the ISIS divisions eastward, believing
that there they would be drawn into battle with pro-Assad forces and
adversaries from Jabhat al-Nusra in the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa,
but that in Iraq they would not be able advance beyond the Anbar province.

The Turks could not imagine that this organization, which never particularly
distinguished itself fighting the battle-hardened army of Bashar al-Assad, and
which was for the most part drawn into the fight (during which as many as
1,400 were killed) with adversaries from Jabhat al-Nusra, would be so
devastatingly successful in Iraq. It was there that its main forces were actually
sent, instead of to Deir Ez Zor or Raqqa. And in Turkey public scorn is being
heaped on the fact that ISIS has taken about a hundred Turkish citizens
hostage in Mosul, including the country's consul general in that city along with
all his staff. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, has now issued a public
challenge to all "apostates" in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. For all
practical purposes, ISIS has, as one should have expected, proceeded to the
subsequent stage of its jihad - against its own recent sponsors.

These events have greatly damaged Turkey's image and economy (among
other things), and the efforts to whitewash the consequences have been
clumsy. For example, a court in Ankara has forbidden Turkish journalists from
writing about their fellow citizens who have been kidnapped in northern Iraq.
That court based its decision on the need to protect the safety of the hostages.
Earlier, Prime Minister Recep Erdogan accused the opposition and the more
critically-minded Turkish media of wanting to use the subject for their own
political ends and thus "putting human lives at risk." Journalists loyal to the
regime, trying to prove that ISIS is the love child of no one but the American
CIA (as was Al-Qaeda at one time), are denying the obvious role in the birth
process played by the other parent - Erdogan's government.

Iraq was previously one of the biggest importers of Turkish products,
responsible for as much as $12 billion in annual sales. The giant Ceyhan oil
terminal was built with Iraqi oil in mind, and only about a tenth of its capacity is
needed to handle the supplies now piped in from Baku. Experts estimate
Turkey's damages from the Iraqi turmoil to total $8.5 billion over the medium
term.

However, the most unpleasant surprise for the Turks took place in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Quite recently, fearing the growth of separatist sentiments among
Turkey's Kurdish population, Ankara stated that it was prepared to launch a
military intervention in the Kurdish autonomous zone within Iraq, if the Iraqi
Kurds tried to occupy Kirkuk. And it cited the substantial breach of the rights of
Turkish minority (Turkomans) in Iraq as another reason for intervening in Iraq.
But now Ankara has been forced to sit silently and watch as the Kurds have
taken Kirkuk and might possibly even add Mosul to their holdings. Once those
areas have been annexed, Turkey would not only be unable to threaten the
significantly strengthened Iraqi Kurdistan, it would even become dependent on
it, because Iraqi oil travels right through Kirkuk and Mosul on its way to the
Turkish port of Ceyhan. And particularly humiliating for the Turks was that,
despite their stated commitments, they were in no position to protect the Iraqi
Turkomans, particularly in Tal Afar, and their tribal leaders even raised the
issue of being joined to Iraqi Kurdistan. It is not hard to predict that in the
coming years the Kurdish problem in Turkey will become catch fire once
again. The boomerang is on its way back.

The Turkish political columnist Ergin Y?ld?zog(lu compares America's imperial
aspirations to the fantasies about "the 'new Ottoman Empire,' which the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) has so cherished in its dreams about
'strategic depth,' and which, just like a parasite, has been latched onto a
project of Washington's." According to that columnist, "one need only lift one's
head and look around" in order to see that America's imperial plans, based on
absurd ideas that involve rebuilding regions at gunpoint and democratizating
"from without," are disintegrating. Thinking about the parallel ambitions for the
restoration of the Ottoman Empire's sphere of influence, he poses a rhetorical,
but very reasonable question: "If America's imperial strategy is foundering,
how can the parasite that's latched onto to its back not founder as well?"

This document has been published on 07Jul14 by the Equipo Nizkor and Derechos Human Rights. In accordance with
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