Friday, September 26, 2008

The account of 9/11 and interaction between the al Qaeda terrorists and the CIA began in December 1999, when the NSA recorded a conversation from a phone in Yemen. This phone number was found in the back pocket of a terrorists who had taken part in the bombing of the embassies in east Africa in 1998. He had been uncovered because he had shrapnel in his back, indicating that he had been running away from the suicide attack on the embassies. The NSA concluded that this phone number was a number for the communications switch board for the east Africa attacks.

A conversation overheard on this phone in December 1999 described an important al Qaeda planning meeting about to take place in Kuala Lumpur and that Khalid, Nawaf and Saleem, thought to ne Nawaf's younger brother, were going to be traveling to this meeting. This information was sent to the CIA, the FBI HQ and to the FBI New York office. When Khalid passed through Dubai, his passport and passport photograph were photocopied by the CIA and this information sent to the CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA and FBI Headquartersm including the top managers at the CIA and FBI. Khalid was identified from his passport as Khalid al-Mihdhar. Also noted when this information was sent to the CIA HQ was the fact that Khalid al-Mihdhar had a multi-entry visa for the US and his destination was listed as New York City.

On January 3, 2000 the al Qaeda terrorists tried to bomb the USS the Sullivans in Aden, Yemen. The boat used in the attack sank because the explosives were far too heavy for the size of the boat they had used. Because a high level meeting was just about to start in Kuala Lumpur, several people that had taken part in the bombing of the USS the Sullivans were sent off to attend this meeting. Two of the al Qaeda terrorists who had been part of the attack on the Sullivans failed to get proper visas for Malaysia, and they became stuck in Bangkok while trying to reach the meeting in Kuala Lumpur. One of these terrorists was named Fahad al-Quso.

The al Qaeda meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur on January 5, 2000 and lasted to January 8, 2000. This information and the importance of this al Qaeda meeting was communicated to many people including several high level managers at the CIA and the FBI including CIA Director George Tenet and FBI Director Louis Freeh. All of the people who attended this meeting were photographed by the Malaysian Special Branch, the Malaysian intelligence unit, at the request of the CIA and many were identified as long time al Qaeda terrorists. These photographs were sent on January 9, 2000 to the CIA and CIA Director George Tenet and CTC Manager Cofer Black. When this meeting ended on January 8, 2000, the CIA found out that Nawaf and Khalid al-Mihdhar along with one other al Qaeda terrorist who had attended this meeting had boarded a flight to Bangkok. The CIA identified Nawaf as Nawaf al-Hazmi from the manifest for this flight.

After the Cole bombing in October 2000, the FBI New York office, headed by John O'Neill assigned a young FBI agent Ali Soufan, at the time only 29 years old, to head up the Cole bombing investigation. He was sent his off to Yemen in October 2000 to head up the investigation of the Cole bombing. Soufan had been assigned to this position because he had been born in Lebanon and was one the very few FBI agents that spoke fluent Arabic. FBI Special Agent Steve Bongardt was designated to be his assistant, and to stay behind in the FBI New Office to head up an entire team of FBI criminal investigators working on the Cole bombing investigation.

After the Cole bombing, the Yemen authorities quickly arrested Fahad al-Quso and learned from him that he had been assigned to photograph the attack on the Cole, but when he over slept he missed the attack. The Yemen authorities found out from Quso that a high level al Qaeda terrorist named Tawifq Bin Attash, nick named Khallad had purchased the boat used in the attack on the Cole. Khallad was an al Qaeda nick name meaning the one with one leg. Yemen authorities also found out that Fahad al-Quso had attempted to travel to Kuala Lumpur on January 6, 2000, after the failed attempt on the USS the Sullivans, to deliver money to Khallad.

FBI Agent Soufan was given this information by the Yemen authorities including a passport photograph of Khallad and knew that a high level al Qaeda terrorist with one leg named Khallad was already well known by the FBI. He also concluded that it was likely Khallad had to have been one of the masterminds behind the Cole bombing. Soufan also learned that Khallad had flown over to Bangkok on January 8, 2000 from Kuala Lumpur to pick up the money Quso was bringing from Yemen. To get further information Soufan made several contacts over the next many months to the CIA, to find out what the CIA knew about Khallad and if they were aware of a al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

The events on 9/11 were the most traumatic for the United States in this century. We cannot move on until we have learned the lessons of 9/11 and effected the changes needed to keep the American people safe from future terrorist attacks. So what are the real lessons of 9/11, what lessons can we learn?

The 9/11 Commission told us we need to have more imagination. But from the account of 9/11 in "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" it is clear that criminal elements had taken over at the CIA, and had subjugated groups at FBI Headquarters so they could hide critical information from the investigators on the Cole bombing and later shut down investigations of al Qaeda terrorists found to be inside of the US.

The investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi was shut down by CIA officer Tom Wilshire and FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi. First they hid from the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing the photograph of Khallad, taken at Kuala Lumpur. The FBI criminal investigators knew Khallad had been the mastermind of the Cole bombing. But without that photograph of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur, Bongardt could not directly connect Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing, even though he knew both Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at an al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur and knew that Mihdhar and Hazmi were al Qaeda terrorists inside of the US. In spite of not having this photograph, Bongardt still felt since all of these terrorists were known to have been in Kuala Lumpur at the exact same time, that he enough information to start an investigate and search for Mihdhar and Hazmi.

He clearly knew when he found out that they were inside of the US on August 28, 2001 that theses al Qaeda terrorists were inside the US to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack since both of these long time al Qaeda terrorists had been involved in the east Africa bombings that had killed over 200 people.

But FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi told Bongardt on August 28, 2001, that he would not be allowed to take part in any investigation of Mihdhar or Hazmi since the information on Mihdhar would have to come from the NSA and caveats on the front page of NSA information said that this information could not be shared with FBI criminal investigators without written permission from the NSA, since it might have been obtained with FISA search warrant.

But Corsi told Bongardt that he could never be part of any investigation of Mihdhar on August 28, 2001, after she had already received a written release from the NSA caveats from the NSA that very morning. Bongardt was sure that the NSA information had not been connected to a FISA warrant and requested that Corsi get a legal opinion from the NSLU attorneys at FBI Headquarters on this issue. He was confident because no FISA information was involved, that they would rule he could immediately investigate and find Mihdhar before Mihdhar had time to carry out a horrific terrorist attack inside of the US.

But Corsi called on August 29, 2001 and told Bongardt the NSLU had ruled that Bongardt could have nothing to do with any investigation of Mihdhar. But from information entered into the Moussaoui trial we know that Corsi fabricated this legal opinion from the NSLU attorneys. They had ruled the opposite and in fact had ruled and had even told Corsi that Bongardt could take part in any investigation for Mihdhar since the NSA information had not been obtained using any FISA warrant.

Bongardt was unaware that Corsi had fabricated this ruling. As requested by Corsi, he destroyed all of the information he had on Mihdhar and stopped all attempts to further investigate Mihdhar. He and his team had been blocked from taking part in any investigation that could have found Mihdhar in time to head off what was Bongardt clearly thought was going to be a horrific al Qaeda attack inside of the US.

It is now clear that the process of getting a ruling from NSLU attorneys was flawed. FBI HQ agents in this case Dina Corsi were able to talk to NSLU attorneys at FBI HQ when a ruling was requested by FBI field agents with no input to this process from the field agent, in this case, FBI Agent Steve Bongardt. FBI HQ agents were then able to give the legal running back to Bongardt orally, with no written record. Corsi had been working with Tom Wilshire, CIA former deputy chief at the Bin Laden unit at the CIA, to shut down the FBI criminal investigation of Mihdhar by FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team of Cole bombing investigators. Corsi was able to shut down Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar by first hiding the NSA release from the NSA caveats and by then fabricating the NSLU ruling. Both Corsi and Wilshire were involved in criminally obstructing not only Bongardt's Cole bombing investigation but also his investigation of Mihdhar, allowing the al Qaeda terrorist to murder almost 3000 Americans on 9/11.

This process should be fixed. Both the FBI field investigators that want a NSLU ruling and the FBI HQ agent who is blocking his investigation should both be present at any NSLU hearing where this issue is argued in front of a NSLU attorney. This hearing should be transcribed with a written ruling given back to the FBI field agent.

Had this been done in this case, Corsi never could have taken this investigation of Mihdhar away from Bongardt and the 3000 people killed on 9/11 would be alive today.

Had this process been in effect with the investigation of Harry Samit in Minneapolis of Zacarias Moussaoui, it is also possible that criminal elements at FBI HQ who at the very same time were sabotaging Samit's investigation by denying him a search warrant for Moussaoui's possessions would not have gotten away with criminally blocking Samit's investigation, an investigation that also would have prevented the attacks on 9/11.

Why did the 9/11 Commission not come up with this very obvious change to FBI procedures to obtain a legal ruling at FBI HQ?

For the 9/11 Commission to recommend this change to FBI procedures they would have had to show that Corsi had criminally fabricated this ruling from the NSLU attorney, Sherry Sabol. But they were chartered to do an investigation of 9/11 that blamed no one, even people at the CIA and FBI HQ who they found had criminally allowed the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out these attacks, by blocking all investigations of al Qaeda terrorists found inside of the US!

Tuesday, September 16, 2008

We now know that this explosive new information added to the other government accounts of 9/11 was able to provide enough information to build an accurate picture of what had allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place. This information was what had been missing from the 9/11 Commission account of 9/11, in order to put the entire story of 9/11 together.

This new information clearly details the crimes committed by the CIA and FBI HQ agents in obstructing the FBI investigation of the USS Cole after it had been bombed in Yemen. By concealing this information, the 9/11 Commission was able to hide the crimes committed by many groups at the CIA and FBI HQ who had obstructed the FBI investigation of the Cole bombing. It is now clear that the charter of the 9/11 Commission was to show that no one in the US government had committed any crime in allowing the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the attacks on 9/11. But it is now impossible to believe that the 9/11 Commission did not have this information. It is also clear that they made sure this information would not see the light of day and was kept hidden from the American people.

Since the 9/11 Commission had access to the DOJ/FBI IG report at the very same time they were doing their own investigation, any augment the 9/11 Commission might have why they did not have these documents has no credibility.

Are we to believe that the DOJ/FBI Inspector General did not know who FBI Agent Ali Soufan was when Soufan was the lead investigator on the Cole bombing? THIS IS NOT CREDIBLE!

First, the documents now on this web site are the source documents that come from the US government. The account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan is an account dictated to Lawrence Wright by FBI Special Agent Steven Bongardt, Soufan’s assistant on the Cole bombing. All of the information in this account of Ali Soufan was vetted by John Miller, information officer at the FBI. So this account can be considered to be the official FBI record of the interaction between Soufan, his Cole bombing investigating team, and the CIA and FBI HQ prior to the attacks on 9/11.

This information conclusively demonstrates that the CIA had not only criminally obstructed the FBI investigation of the USS Cole many times, but then they had criminally sabotaged any chance FBI Agent Steven Bongardt would have to be able to investigate and find Mihdhar and Hazmi in time, when he was told that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the US and knew they were going to take part in a horrific al Qaeda attack that would kill thousands of Americans.

CIA managers and officers, working with agents at FBI Headquarters they had subjugated, criminally obstructed the FBI investigation of the Cole bombing on numerous times, starting from November 2000 by hiding from the FBI criminal investigators the information on the al Qaeda planning meeting that took place in Kuala Lumpur from January 5-8, 2000, and the fact that this meeting had been attended by Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Tawfiq Bin Attash, also known as Khallad, the mastermind of the Cole bombing.

This is not only where the Cole bombing had been planned, but also where the attacks on 9/11 had also been planned. In November 2000, Soufan gave the Yemen CIA station a passport photo of Khallad with his official request for information from the CIA on any information the CIA had on Khallad Bin Attash and on any meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

When Khallad was identified by the FBI/CIA joint source in December 2000 as a high level al Qaeda terrorist, the CIA had the FBI/CIA source look at photographs taken at Kuala Lumpur of both Mihdhar and Khallad in January 2001. Khallad was immediately identified from these photographs as having been at that meeting with both Mihdhar and Hazmi.

The CIA at this point not only knew that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing at Kuala Lumpur, but the CIA themselves were culpable in allowing that bombing to take place for having photographed the terrorists at that meeting, and then allowing them to leave this meeting, with no effort to identify what they had been up to or where they went after this meeting.

Once the CIA was aware that they, themselves had been culpable in the Cole bombing, they started a wide ranging criminal conspiracy to keep this information away from FBI criminal investigators on the FBI Cole bombing investigation.

But the horror story of all horror stories is when the CIA officers and the FBI HQ agents with whom they were working, found out both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US on August 22, 2001, they immediately knew these al Qaeda terrorists were in the US to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack.

Yet, they continued to hide the information on this meeting and the people who had attended this meeting from the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing. FBI HQ agents who were part of this criminal conspiracy went so far as to conceal the fact that they had obtained a written release from NSA caveats, even before they told FBI agents on the Cole bombing investigation that they could not take part in any investigation of Mihdhar due to the NSA caveats. These FBI HQ agents then fabricated the ruling from NSLU attorneys, claiming the NSLU attorney, Sherry Sabole had ruled they could not take part in any investigation of Mihdhar when in fact Sabol had ruled that the Cole bombing investigators could take part in any investigation of Mihdhar. These FBI HQ agents and the CIA managers they were working with knew this would shut down the only effective investigation that could have found Mihdhar and Hazmi quickly.

Because both these CIA officers and FBI HQ agents knew a huge attack that was about to occur inside of the US, they clearly knew that by shutting down this investigation oif Mihdhar by the FBI Cole investigators, thousands of Americans were going to perish in these attacks, as a direct result of their actions.

Monday, September 15, 2008

"She (Sherry Sabol) denies advising that the agent (FBI Agent Steve Bongardt) could not participate in an interview and notes that she would not have given such inaccurate advice. The attorney (Sherry Sabol) told investigators that the NSA caveats would not have precluded criminal agents from joining in any search for Mihdhar... Moreover she (Sabol) said that she (FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi) could have gone to the NSA and obtained a waiver of any such caveat because there was no FISA information involved in this case (the original reason for the NSA caveats)." This information was from testimony by NSLU attorney Sherry Sabol given to DOJ IG investigators on November 7, 2002

When FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi told FBI Agent Steve Bongardt he could not be part of any investigation of Mihdhar, he asked if she could obtain a ruling from the legal department at the FBI NSLU unit. But evidence now shows that Corsi fabricated the ruling she relayed to Bongardt on August 29, 2001. The NSLU Attorney, Sherry Sabol, who gave Corsi the ruling, later told FBI IG investigators on November 7, 2001, that she told Corsi that Bongardt could take part in any investigation of Mihdhar, because the NSA information had no FISA component, and that if Corsi was confused, Corsi herself could have obtained a release directly from the NSA (Sabol was unaware that the NSLU had given Corsi this release two days before, and that Corsi had not revealed this informatuion when she had asked Sabol for a NSLU ruling on whether Bongardt could take part in an investigation of Mihdhar.)

The NSA gave a release from the NSA caveats to FBI IOS HQ Agent Dina Corsi on August 27, 2001. This release occurred before Corsi told FBI Cole investigator Steve Bongardt that he could not take part in any investigation of Mihdhar because of NSA caveats. But it turns out that there was no legitimate reason FBI Agent Bongardt could not have investigated and searched for Mihdhar once he knew Mihdhar was inside of the US! This investigation would have started almost 2 weeks prior to the attacks on 9/11 and would almost certainly have prevented the attacks on 9/11.

In “The Substitution for the Testimony of John” entered into the evidence in the Moussaoui trial on March 11, 2006, “John” is Tom Wilshire, former Deputy Chief of the CIA bin Laden unit, who was reassigned in mid-May 2001, to be liaison to Michael Rolince, Head of the FBI ITOS unit. This evidence item shows that the CIA knew in July 2001, that Mihdhar, and by association Hazmi, ( the terrorists aboard AA 77 which hit the Pentagon,) were going to take part in the next big al Qaeda operation. This same document shows that Wilshire was told on August 22, 2001, by FBI IOS Agent Margaret Gillespie, that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US. Wilshire and the CIA knew immediately at this point that both al Qaeda terrorists Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in the huge al Qaeda attack which the CIA had been warned about since April 2001, an attack they were told would kill thousands of Americans.

Soufan asked the CIA Yemen station in November 2000, for any information the CIA had on Khallad Bin Attash, and on any information on the al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur on November 2000. The FBI asked again in April 2001; this time sending this request directly to the CIA Headquarters. The CIA told Soufan they had no such information, and thereafter refused to respond to Soufan’s requests, when, in reality, the CIA had all of this information. The CIA knew Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had been at this meeting planning the Cole bombing with Khallad Bin Attash.

The CIA not only had all of this information, but even had photographs all of the terrorists at this meeting in January 2000, and had identified Khalid al Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Saleem al-Hazmi (who were hijackers on Flight AA 77 which hit the Pentagon.) The CIA had also photographed Tawfig Bin Attash (later identified by the FBI as the mastermind of the Cole bombing) at that same meeting in Kuala Lumpur, which directly connected both Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing. By refusing to forward this information in response to an official FBI request on a murder investigation, the CIA withheld material information from an on-going FBI investigation into the deaths of 17 US sailors. This is a crime. This is more severe than what was alleged by the 9/11 Commission, which stated that it was simply a case of the CIA not talking to the FBI.

Soufan, in November 2000, asked FBI Director Louis Freeh, to request this same information of the CIA and of the CIA Director, George Tenet, Director of the CIA. Again, Soufan was told there was no information at the CIA on any of this. But Freeh himself knew about the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, and even knew that Khalid al-Mihdhar had been at the meeting with Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Freeh had been given this information by the NSA in December 1999, and again by the CIA in January 2000, and this information appeared in Freeh's daily briefing papers on January 4, 2001 [see 9/11 Commission report 181 and DOJ-FBI IG report 238-239.] FBI Director Freeh had criminally obstructed his own FBI investigation of the Cole bombing!

Palo Alto Publishing will hold a press conference on September 11, 2008, at 9 AM at the National Press Club at 529 14th St. NW, Washington D.C., to detail new information revealed since the release of the 9/11 Commission Report. Entirely sourced from government reports, court documents, and the account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan, this analysis, never before fully detailed, shows that CIA officers, working through liaisons at FBI Headquarters, had repeatedly and criminally obstructed investigations that could have prevented the attacks on 9/11.

This book details the numerous times the CIA interacted with the FBI. In particular, the times lead FBI Cole investigator, Ali Soufan, made several official requests to the CIA: one through FBI Director Freeh, asking for any information the CIA had on an al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur and on Khallad Bin Attash, (at that time thought to be mastermind on the Cole bombing).Despite the fact that the CIA did indeed have this information, they either denied its existence or refused to respond to Soufan’s requests. The CIA withheld material information from an ongoing FBI investigation, which was a crime, and not due to the fact that “the CIA did not talk to the FBI”, as suggested by the 9/11 Commission report.

In July 2001, emails between high-level CIA managers and CIA officers, entered into evidence in the Moussaoui trial, indicated that Mihdhar was going to take part in the next big al Qaeda attack. When these CIA officers requested permission to transfer this information to the FBI, they were denied. Yet, at almost the same time, CIA Director Tenet was holding meetings at the White House describing a huge al Qaeda attack about to take place inside of the US.

On August 22, 2001, when the CIA discovered that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the US, the CIA knew they were here to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack. Yet, the CIA, working with FBI IOS agents at FBI HQ, sabotaged the last chance FBI Cole investigators would have to investigate Mihdhar and prevent the attacks on 9/11. The CIA concealed the photograph of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur that connected Mihdhar to the planning of the Cole bombing. FBI HQ agents also concealed the fact that they had received the NSA release from the NSA caveats the very day they told the FBI Cole investigators they were forbidden from investigating Mihdhar, due to NSA caveats. FBI HQ agents then fabricated a NSLU ruling, and told the FBI Cole investigators that the NSLU had ruled they were not allowed to be part of any investigation for Mihdhar when in fact the NSLU attorneys had ruled just the opposite, and stated to FBI IG investigators that the Cole investigators could have been part of the investigation for Mihdhar, since the NSA information had no FISA component. [9/11 Commission report, Footnote 81, p 581]

This new information shows that almost 3000 innocent people in the US paid, with their lives, for the actions at the CIA and FBI HQ, actions that should have been uncovered by the 9/11 Commission, using the very same new information, easily obtainable with their subpoena powers.

This criminal activity was carried out by individuals at the CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA Yemen station, high level managers at the CIA, who prevented the transfer of information regarding the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the FBI investigators, the FBI Bin laden unit, the FBI RFU and even by the Director of the FBI.

All of this new information is detailed in “Prior Knowledge of 9/11″ at eventson911.com by Robert Schopmeyer, owner of an EDA software company in Silicon Valley.

Sunday, September 7, 2008

This book is an account of how I found out about the attacks on 9/11 on February 11, 2001 on a trip out to New York from San Francisco. The information I was able to put together was as follows:

The al Qaeda terrorists were planning an enormous terrorist attack on the US aimed at destroying the World Trade Center Towers.

The al Qaeda terrorists were going to hijack four large aircraft in midair departing from eastern airports.

The planes would be of type 767 and 757.

They would use four to five al Qaeda terrorists per plane using concealed four inch knives as weapons, to hijack these planes.

They would fly these hijacked aircraft to the sides World Trade Center Towers.The terrorists would be in place and ready to carry out this attack by September 1, 2001, and would carry out these attacks between September 1 and September 14, 2001.

On February 14, 2001, I stood in front of these buildings to see if I could envision them continuing to stand after sustaining collisions from large commercial aircraft. I concluded they would in almost all certainly collapse. It was clear that the open floor plan combined with the estimated 100,000 pounds of aviation fuel in each plane was going to cause these structures to collapse.

On September 8, 2001, I went through Logan airport to see if I could find the al Qaeda terrorists who were going to hijack these airplanes in front of the airport departure security points surveying the security procedures to find out how they could get their weapons, the four inch knives through security without alerting security personnel. I apparently missed seeing them by just a few hours.

On September 11, 2001 right after the attack, I contacted the FBI field office in Boston and gave them this information. I told the FBI that not only myself but almost every single person in my company was aware of this attack.

When I was not re-contacted by Boston FBI, after I retuned back to San Francisco, I gave this information to the FBI field office in San Francisco, and in to the field office San Jose.

When the Joint Inquiry Committee of the House and the Senate started an investigation of 9/11, I provided them summaries of the FBI interviews and this information on how it had been possible to uncover the actions of the al Qaeda terrorists prior to 9/11.

It turns out that there was in fact a completely systematic process to go from the material that the al Qaeda terrorists had written down to virtually every single detail of the attacks that took place on 9/11.

This information was sent to investigators on the Joint Inquiry Committee, to both a Michael Jackson, and to Rick Cinquergrana, who was the deputy to Staff Director Eleanor Hill. On April 13-14, 2004 I gave this information to the 9/11 Commission.

After listening to the testimony of George Tenet at the 9/11 Commission public hearings on April 14, 2004 and unable to figure out why the CIA could not have figured this plan out prior to 9/11, and prevented these attacks. I went back to carefully research all of the information that came out these investigations to try to find the real reasons why the CIA had not prevented these attacks. I also started to put this research into a book. It was not until late July of 2006 that I was able to finally find the most of the missing pieces I had been looking for and finally see exactly why the CIA had allowed almost 3000 people to be killed in the attacks on 9/11 that were entirely preventable.

About Me

Prior Knowledge of 9/11 details how a businessman had become aware of the upcoming events of 9-11 in February 2001, while on a business trip to New York.
This book describes how the events of 9/11 had been uncovered seven months prior to the actual event, and why even with this detailed knowledge, there was no way to stop the attack. The book also details the two official investigations of 9/11, and poses the question why the FBI and CIA were not able to uncover this plan of 9/11, when they had significantly more in-depth information than a businessman from Palo Alto. (See Book reviews, Prior Knowledge of 9/11).