Against Iran Apocalypticism

The hawks have made a consistent habit of apocalypticism when speaking of Iran’s nuclear program: if we don’t act within such and such a time frame, we will pass the point of no return, and then catastrophe will ensue. There has never been much justification for this tone (and I’m not going to use this space to rehash why). But there is similarly little justification for advocates of a diplomatic solution (among whom I include myself) taking an apocalyptic tone towards setbacks in negotiations. Indeed, such a tone plays entirely into the hands of the hawks.

The most fundamental premise of the Iran hawks is that a nuclear (or even nuclear-capable) Iran is absolutely unacceptable, and that we are justified going to war to try to prevent such an eventuality even if there is substantial uncertainty that military action will succeed, because doing nothing guarantees a catastrophic outcome.A key premise of Iran doves must therefore be that this is not the case – that nuclearization would be a bad outcome, one worth paying a real price to avoid, but not catastrophic, and certainly not something that would justify all the dangers of military action.

Moreover, the dovish position holds that Iran seeks a nuclear capability for rational reasons (deterrence and the desire to bolster regional influence), and for emotional reasons that are entirely comprehensible (national pride, primarily). If that premise is true, and if Iran has no more grandiose ambitions, to say nothing of suicidal plans to plunge the world into a nuclear maelstrom, then logically there really is no “point of no return” beyond which diplomacy becomes impossible. Instead, there are better and worse opportunities to get a deal on more or less favorable terms to ourselves.

If the possibility of a nuclear Iran is not worth launching a war over (and it isn’t), then by the same token we need not be so desperate for a deal that every mistake or setback raises the prospect of total failure and “inevitable” armed conflict. Instead of panicking at the possibility that a particular round of talks might fail, advocates of diplomacy should stress the clear rational interest for both parties in a diplomatic solution, and therefore express confidence that, ultimately, a diplomatic solution will be forthcoming – and that the real question is how long it will take and what price will be paid by both sides.

People should make the arguments they believe are true, of course, but the resort to hyperbole is really a rhetorical strategy rather than an argument, and in this case it’s a strategy that has the opposite effect of that intended, aiding the hawks more than the doves.

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5 Responses to Against Iran Apocalypticism

There are at least a couple big problems with your dovish argument. First of all, you’re identifying the threat from Iran with “Iran” itself. But there’s also the threat of some actors within the Iranian military and/or government launching an attack from messianic reasons.

That leads to the second big problem. The scenario I described is very unlikely. Therefore, it’s not a “catastrophe” if Iran gets the nuclear bomb. It’s a very small chance that there will be a catastrophe. The question is, how small? If the chance of that scenario is one in a hundred, that’s a huge risk. If it’s one in a million, then it’s a small risk. How do you estimate risk of very low probability, high cost events? That’s the question that Iran doves and hawks have to address.

There’s also the threat of a Cuban missile crisis kind of thing. Same deal: low probability of a nuclear war, but how low? I remember some guy involved in the Cuban missile crisis later said there was like a five percent chance of it leading to nuclear war. If his assessment was more or less reasonable, then that’s absolutely terrifying. A five percent chance of a crisis between Iran and Israel leading to a nuclear war is terrifying.

So of course a catastrophe is unlikely. The question is, how unlikely? And how unlikely is unlikely enough?

Namely, the assumption that Iran is actually trying to build a nuke. That is no more certain than Saddam’s possession of WMDs was certain in 2003. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has issued a fatwa stating that nuclear weapons are contrary to Islam — and while that does not prove that Iran isn’t building a nuke, it also is a fact that shouldn’t be completely disregarded in our rush to the conclusion that Iran is, in fact, building a nuke. Iran’s nuclear program could, in fact, be peaceful. It could be designed to prove to the world that Iran is a modern country, and to prove to Washington that the world’s supposed “superpower” can’t stop the Iranian people from developing nuclear energy.

The simple fact of the matter is the hawks don’t know that Iran is building a nuke — although the idiotic western press, having learned nothing from the run-up to the Iraq invasion, simply assumes this conclusion. And even if Iran is actually building a nuke, all that nuke would do is establish nuclear equilibrium (mutually assured destruction or MAD) between Iran and Israel. A bad outcome for warmongers, but not for the region.

I would simply reinforce that its easy, especially from the outside, to characterize Iran’s nuclear ambitions as limited to defense and pride, while forgetting that like any other country, the Islamic Republic has serious domestic energy issues. After all, its a country with 70,000,000 people roughly the size of Western Europe, with both remote agrarians and dense urbanites.

I suspect that what some doves might be overlooking is that Saudi Arabia and Iran have been, and continue to be, bitter rivals. If Iran was to build a nuke, my bet is they would target Riyadh rather than Tel Aviv – no way they would target Jerusalem.

The U.S. should take a “distrust an verify” approach with the Iranians, continuing to put pressure on the Iranian regime through sanctions until Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing facilities are completely and verifiably dismantled. The U.S. has spent more than a decade trying to slow down Iran’s nuclear program—all while Tehran has continued its improvement and expansion. Because the final solution, if there is one, will also demonstrate to other states what the U.S. considers acceptable, safe, and responsible behavior regarding nuclear technology, the U.S must not reward Iran for years of volatile and illicit activity. Obama should resist the temptation to settle for a short-term deal that merely buys Iran more time to either expand its program through other means or merely reopen it after a short pause. A long-term, permanent solution is required.