See page 45, June 5, 2012, Points 8 and 9 (signed off by Stevens) Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman ...down to... that the attacks were the work of extremists who are opposed to western influence in Libya. A number of local contacts agreed, noting that Islamic extremism appears to be on the rise in eastern Libya and that the Al-Qaeda flag has been spotted several times flying over government buildings and training facilities in Derna,

P 57, Sept 11, 2012 (day of the attack), signed off by Stevens, Section 4

****Militia commanders discuss Muslim Brotherhood, Jibril, their political aspirations, the economy, and security: In a September 9 meeting, local area militia commanders Wissam bin Ahmed (Commander, Libya Shield 1) and Muhammad al-Gharabi (Commander, Rafa al-Sahti Brigade, Libya Shield 2) discussed the very fluid relationships and blurry lines they say define membership in Benghazi-based brigades under the February 17, Libya Shield, and SSC umbrellas. They themselves were members of multiple brigades, they said. They debated  hotly and without resolution  about which brigades supported or opposed specific causes. They claimed to exercise control over Libyan Armed Forces Chief of Staff Yusef Mangoush who depends on them to secure eastern Libya. In times of crisis, Magoush has no other choice than to turn to their brigades for help, they said, as he did recently with unrest in Kufra. As part of this arrangement, Mangoush often provides the brigades direct stocks of weapons and ammunition, they said. Al-Gharabi and bin-Ahmed support the Libyan Muslim Brotherhoods Justice and Construction Party backed candidate Minister of Electricity Awad Al Barasi for Prime Minister and they said that. if elected, Al Barasi would appoint Fawzi Bukatif, Commander of the February 17 Brigade, as Minister of Defense. Bukatifs appointment would open the MOD and other security ministries and offices to plum-appointments for his most favored brigade commanders  giving February 17 and Libya Shield tacit control of the armed forces. They criticized the USG for supporting National Forces Alliance (NFA) leader and Prime Mininister Candidate Mahmoud Jibril. If Jibril wom, they said, they would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a critical function they asserted they were currently providing. Growing problem with security would discourage foreign investment and led [sic] to persistent stagnation in eastern Libya, but the US could play a role by pressuring American business to invest in Benghazi***