mypapers2

PAPERS ON PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS:

Abstract:In this paper, I focus on an influential account of
phenomenal concepts, the recognitional account, and defend it from some recent
challenges. According to this account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional
concepts that we use when we recognize experiences as “another one of those.”
Michael Tye has argued that this account is viciously circular because the
relevant recognitional abilities involve descriptions of the form “another
experience of the same type,” which is also a phenomenal concept. Tye argues
that we avoid the circularity worry if we explain the reference-fixing of
phenomenal concepts in terms of dispositions to re-identify tokens of the same
type without appealing to any further phenomenal concepts. However, he argues,
this account is incompatible with the intuitive claim that phenomenal concepts
seem to involve rich modes of presentation of their referents. Philip Goff and
others have similarly argued that a recognitional account of phenomenal
concepts would make phenomenal concepts opaque, that is, unable to reveal
anything about their referents, which seems problematic. In this paper, I
present a new version of the recognitional account that avoids the circularity
worry without entailing that phenomenal concepts are opaque.

Abstract: A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida-Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish to defend a posteriori physicalism from this new and interesting challenge, by arguing that a posteriori physicalists have the resources to explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal at least something of what it would take for the corresponding phenomenal property to be instantiated.

Abstract: The inference from conceivability to possibility has been
challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal
concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the
conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has
recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has
argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine
the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude that
Chalmers has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy
to succeed in blocking the conceivability argument. In doing so, my aim is not
only to show that Chalmers’s argument has not refuted the phenomenal concept
strategy, but also to clarify what any version of the strategy should achieve
in order to be successful.

PAPERS ON PHYSICALISM, NATURALISM, AND ZOMBIES:

Abstract: David Papineau (1999) argues that norms of
judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, because all such norms of
judgement are derived from moral or personal values. Papineau claims that this
account of the normativity of judgement presupposes an account of content that
places normativity outside the
analysis of content, because in his view any accounts of content that place
normativity inside the analysis of
content cannot explain the normativity of judgement in the derivative way he
proposes. Furthermore, he argues that normative accounts of content along those
lines are independently problematic. In this paper I aim to respond to both
objections, by arguing that normative accounts of content can be seen as
naturalist accounts, even if they place normativity inside the analysis of
content; and that normative accounts of content are compatible with a
derivative account of norms of judgement of the sort Papineau advocates.

This
paper discusses Stoljar's comparison of the conceivability argument
against physicalism (i.e. the zombie argument) and the conceivability argument against
behaviourism (i.e. the actor argument), which can be found in Stoljar's "Physicalism and
Phenomenal Concepts", Mind and Language 2005, and Stoljar's "Two Conceivability Arguments Compared", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2007. Stoljar argues that both arguments stand or fall together, but I argue that there are crucial differences, so that a posteriori physicalists can reject the zombie argument against physicalism and accept the actor argument against behaviourism.

Is physicalism committed to the a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths? Is the reductive explanation of consciousness committed to the a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths? Block & Stalnaker (1999) say NO. Chalmers & Jackson (2001) say YES. In this paper I argue for a negative answer to those questions.

PAPERS ON GENDER, RACE, AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION:

Abstract: Are sexual orientations freely chosen? The idea that someone’s sexual orientation is not a choice is very influential in the mainstream LGBT political movement. But do we have good reasons to believe it is not a choice? Going against the orthodoxy, William Wilkerson has recently argued that sexual orientation is partly constituted by our interpretations of our own sexual desires, and we choose these interpretations, so sexual orientation is partly constituted by choice. In this paper I aim to examine the question of whether our interpretations of our own sexual desires are constitutive of our sexual orientations. I will argue that whereas Wilkerson’s argument for the claim that sexual orientations are in part constituted by our chosen interpretations of our sexual desires is not sound, there are good reasons for endorsing a weaker claim, namely, that there are different but equally apt descriptions of the same sexual desires, depending on which concepts we have.

Abstract: What
does ‘woman’ mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex
term or as a gender term. Recently, Jennifer Saul has put forward a
contextualist view, according to which ‘woman’ can have different meanings in
different contexts. The main motivation for this view seems to involve moral
and political considerations, namely, that this view can do justice to the
claims of trans women. Unfortunately, Saul argues, on further reflection the
contextualist view fails to do justice to those moral and political claims that
motivated the view in the first place. In this paper I argue that there is a
version of the contextualist view which can indeed capture those moral and
political aims, and in addition, I use this case to illustrate an important and
more general claim, namely, that moral and political considerations can be relevant
to the descriptive project of finding out what certain politically significant
terms actually mean.

Abstract: In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a
property is socially constructed. I focus on an influential project that
many social constructivists are engaged in, namely, arguing against the
inevitability of a trait, and I examine several recent
characterizations of social construction, with the aim of assessing
which one is more suited to the task.

Abstract: Social
constructivism about races holds that races are socially real, that is, they
are identical with socially constructed properties, or social kinds. One
particular version of social constructivism, namely, historical
constructivism, claims that the properties that make a group of people a
race are certain historical properties of the individuals that belong to
that group (e.g., the life histories of the members of the group, or their
ancestors). Joshua Glasgow has recently argued, following Appiah,
Gooding-Williams and others, that historical constructivism faces several
problems. In particular, he argues, it faces a trilemma: either the
characterization of races provided is circular, or, if it wants to avoid
circularity, it will turn out to be either redundant or indeterminate. In this
paper, my main aim is to explore this interesting challenge to historical
constructivism about races, and argue that it can escape Glasgow’s trilemma. I
will focus on historical constructivism about races, but I hope my discussion
will shed some light on the question of whether social constructivist accounts
in general are tenable.

This paper explores some issues in the recent debate about the new biology of race, focusing on the recent exchange by Joshua Glasgow and Robin Andreasen at the Journal of Philosophy 2003 and 2005 respectively.