Reagan’s Legacy On Israel

Ronald Reagan will be fondly remembered as perhaps the most
pro-Israel president in history, but that view is protected in part by the same
Teflon that allowed Reagan to avoid being tarnished by many of the negative
events of his presidency. While Reagan was indeed a great friend of Israel,
his administration also engaged in the most public rebukes of Israel.

At some gut level, Reagan understood and appreciated Israel,
though he never visited the Jewish state. Part of this emotional attachment
no doubt stemmed from his religious beliefs, and part from his Manichaean world
view that placed Israel clearly on the side of good against the Evil Empire.

Reagan’s greatest substantive contribution to the U.S.-Israel
relationship was the formalization of strategic cooperation, which created a
web of ties between the Pentagon and IDF and a progressive strengthening of
Israel’s military capability. At the same time, however, he also significantly
strengthened the Arabs by selling them some of America’s most sophisticated
weapons. In 1981, Reagan successfully overcame the Israeli lobby’s opposition
to his proposed sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia. This was a watershed
event because the lobby never mounted a significant challenge to an arms sale
again. The AWACs campaign was also notable for its nastiness. It was cast as
Reagan versus Israeli Prime Minister Begin, and the President did not hide his
distaste for the Israeli leader.

Also in 1981, Israel bombed the Iraqi reactor at Osirak. Reagan
was furious and the U.S. supported the UN Security Council resolution condemning
Israel. On the other hand, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick,
was one of Israel’s staunchest defenders, and the U.S. vetoed more than a dozen
other anti-Israel resolutions.

While other presidents privately threatened to withhold aid
or take other measures against Israel, Reagan did not hesitate to publicly punish
Israel. After Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, Reagan suspended the
strategic cooperation agreement prompting Begin to accuse Reagan of treating
Israel like a “banana republic.” The U.S. also suspended the delivery of F-16
jet fighters to Israel after the raid on Osirak. In both instances, the penalties
were only temporary.

Reagan worked to free of Soviet Jews, and also approved the
CIA-sponsored rescue of 500 Ethiopian Jews in 1985's Operation Joshua. He also
was responsible for helping to reform Israel’s economy. In 1985, following a
severe economic crisis in Israel, which sent inflation rates soaring as high
as 445%, the U.S. approved a $1.5 billion emergency assistance package and helped
formulate Israel’s successful economic stabilization plan.

Under Reagan, Israel began to receive $3 billion annually in
foreign aid and, from 1985 on, the aid was all in the form of grants. Israel
was allowed to use some of this aid in Israel and for a time was permitted to
devote U.S. funds to the development of its own fighter plane. In 1985, the
U.S. also signed its first Free Trade Agreement – with Israel. In fact, a series
of memoranda of understanding were signed during the Reagan administration between
U.S. agencies and their Israeli counterparts that promoted cooperation in a
range of fields such as education, space research and health.

When Israel decided to launch Operation Peace for Galilee,
Reagan was initially supportive, but he gradually soured on the Israeli operation
as it dragged on and drew U.S. forces into the Lebanese quagmire. In August
1982, Reagan gave Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership protection from Israel
and allowed them to go into exile in Tunis. More significantly, in December
1988, Reagan authorized the State Department to enter into a dialogue with the
PLO, reversing the U.S. policy of refusing to recognize the terrorist organization.
This ended Israel’s hope of marginalizing the PLO and stimulating the development
of an alternative leadership. In the short-run, this made Oslo possible, but,
today, Israel and the United States are trying to undo the longer-term damage
caused by that decision.

During the Lebanon war, unknown to Israel, Reagan formulated
a new diplomatic initiative designed to stimulate peace negotiations, improve
Israel-Egypt relations and provide impetus for Jordan to join the peace process.
It was also aimed at pleasing those Arab states who had accepted PLO evacuees
from Beirut and signaling them that the U.S. was seeking a solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Israel alone was not involved in the new American thinking.

On September 1, 1982, Reagan announced that he opposed the
creation of a Palestinian state, but believed the Palestinians should have self-government
in association with Jordan. He said Jerusalem should remain undivided, but its
final status negotiated. He called for a settlement freeze and suggested that
Israel could not be expected to return to the 1967 borders. Sounds pretty good
today, but Begin rejected the plan and when he heard about it said: “It is the
saddest day of my life.”

While Israel drew the United States into Lebanon, it was the
United States that drew Israel into the Iran-Contra affair. The sale of U.S.
arms to Iran through Israel began in the summer of 1985, after receiving the
approval of President Reagan.

When you look at the balance sheet presented here, and compare
it with other administrations, one might wonder how Reagan could be viewed as
“the most pro-Israel president” in history. Reagan was very tough on Israel,
and some of his policies caused both short and long-term damage, but his policies
also led to significant improvements in Israel’s economic and military strength,
and raised the U.S.-Israel friendship to a higher level.

The ledger doesn’t really capture the sense of the time and
the man, however, which takes me back to where I started. Reagan projected the
feeling that he truly appreciated Israel’s role in the world and that the occasional
tensions did not affect his fundamental commitment to Israel’s security, so
when he said Israel and America “will always remain at each othe’'s side,” we
believed him.