A Report on the Crisis in the Catholic
Church in the United States, by Robert S. Bennett
et al., prepared by the National Review Board for the Protection of Children
and Young People (Washington DC: USCCB, 2004)

This report was commissioned by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
and was based on interviews with over 85 victims, bishops, priests, academics,
and others knowledgeable about the crisis. It was released on February
27, 2004. This posting was created from http://www.usccb.org/nrb/nrbstudy/nrbreport.htm.
Three adjustments have been made: 1) Footnotes have been moved to the
end of the report and hyperlinked; 2) Comments have been added in square
brackets to indicate the page breaks of the original report; 3) Minor
changes have been made to conform this Web posting to the original report,
including: removing optional hyphen symbols, restoring italics, and restoring
space between bullets. See the original report in PDF,
reprocessed so that it is searchable.

The National Review Board for the Protection
of Children and Young People (the "Review Board" or "Board"), composed
of lay Catholics and chartered by the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops (the "Conference" or "USCCB"), issues this Report as part of its
mandate to evaluate the "causes and context" of the crisis that has beset
the Catholic Church in the United States as a result of the sexual abuse
of minors by some members of the Catholic clergy and the inadequate response
of bishops and other Church leaders to that abuse.

The Charter for the Protection of Children
and Young People (the "Charter"), which the Conference adopted in June
2002, created the Review Board and directed it to "commission a comprehensive
study of the causes and context of the current crisis." In response, the
Board, acting through its Research Committee, has interviewed more than
eighty-five individuals in sixty separate interviews, including: cardinals,
archbishops, bishops, and other Church leaders in the United States and
the Vatican; priests, former priests, seminarians, and theologians; victims
of clergy abuse; psychiatrists, psychologists, and other medical professionals;
civil [page 2 begins] lawyers,
canon lawyers, and law enforcement officials; and other knowledgeable
lay people. Further, the Board has consulted numerous articles and studies
written or conducted by experts in pertinent fields, as well as various
public records relating to reported cases of abuse. In addition, the Board
commissioned a study by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the
City University of New York to develop empirical data on the nature and
scope of the problem that precipitated the crisis.

The purpose of the Report is to share the
Review Board's findings and recommendations based upon its evaluation
of the current crisis. Those findings seek to describe the problem and
to address two fundamental questions posed by it. First, why did individuals
with a disposition to prey sexually upon minors gain admission to the
priesthood? Second, how did they manage to remain in the priesthood even
after allegations and evidence of such abuse became known to their bishops
and other Church leaders?

Concerning the first of these questions,
the Report provides the Review Board's findings with respect to the process
of selecting and then forming candidates for the priesthood, with special
attention to issues relating to sexual orientation, celibacy, and spiritual
life. Concerning the second of these questions, the Report provides the
Board's findings with respect to a number of shortcomings on the part
of some bishops and Church officials, including: (i) a failure to grasp
the gravity of the problem of sexual abuse of minors by priests; (ii)
deficiencies in the response [page
3 begins] to victims; (iii) unwarranted presumptions in favor of
accused priests; (iv) reliance on secrecy and an undue emphasis on the
avoidance of scandal; (v) excessive reliance on the therapeutic model
in dealing with priest offenders; (vi) undue reliance upon legal advice
that placed a premium on adversarial defense tactics at the expense of
concern for victims of abuse; and (vii) a failure to hold themselves and
other bishops accountable for mistakes, including a failure to make use
of lay consultative bodies and other governance structures.

This Report also offers the Review Board's
recommendations based on those findings. These include recommendations
for enhanced screening, formation, and oversight of candidates for the
priesthood; for increased sensitivity in responding to allegations of
abuse; for greater accountability of bishops and Church leaders; for improved
interaction with civil authorities; and for greater participation by the
laity in the life of the Church.

The Review Board is pleased that the bishops
asked a group of lay Catholics to address these important issues. The
Board also appreciates the nearly uniform cooperation it received from
the bishops and other Church leaders, without which this Report would
not have been possible.[1] We join Pope
John Paul II in [page 4 begins]
earnest prayer that from this "pain" and "sorrow" might emerge "a holier
priesthood, a holier episcopate, and a holier Church."

The Review Board believes that the overwhelming
majority of priests serving the Church in the United States fulfill their
roles honorably and chastely. According to Church records, however, there
were credible allegations that several thousand priests, comprising four
percent of priests in ministry over the last half-century, committed acts
of sexual abuse of minors. There appears to have been a significant surge
in acts of abuse beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the mid-1980s.
The fallout resulting from this epidemic of abuse and the shortcomings
in the response of a number of bishops and other Church leaders to that
misconduct continues to this day.

The crime of sexual abuse of minors is
not a problem unique to the Catholic clergy. As Pope John Paul II stated
prior to the adoption of the Charter, "Abuse of the young is a grave symptom
of a crisis affecting not only the Church but society as a whole." (April
23, 2002 Address of Pope John Paul II to the United States Cardinals.)
Indeed, it is a contemporary societal problem that affects numerous families
and many secular organizations as well as other churches and ecclesial
communities. Although some evidence suggests that the abuse epidemic afflicted
[page 5 begins] many institutions
and organizations in our country, it is beyond the Board's mission to
determine whether the problem was more pervasive among Catholic clergy
than it was in other sectors of society or in the general population.
Reliable statistical evidence of the sexual abuse of minors is particularly
difficult to obtain because, according to experts, many if not most acts
of abuse occur within families and often are not reported.

Nevertheless, the number of incidents of
sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy, at least over the past fifty
years, is significant and disturbing. This is a failing not simply on
the part of the priests who sexually abused minors but also on the part
of those bishops and other Church leaders who did not act effectively
to preclude that abuse in the first instance or respond appropriately
when it occurred. These leadership failings have been shameful to the
Church as both a central institution in the lives of the faithful and
a moral force in the secular world, and have aggravated the harm suffered
by victims and their families. The bishops themselves recognized in the
Charter that both the abuse itself and the response of some of the bishops
to that abuse "caused enormous pain, anger, and confusion." The bishops
acknowledged that "in the past, secrecy has created an atmosphere that
has inhibited the healing process and, in some cases, enabled sexually
abusive behavior to be repeated." Finally, the bishops stated, "As bishops,
we acknowledge our mistakes [page
6 begins] and our role in that suffering, and we apologize and
take responsibility for too often failing victims and our people in the
past." (Charter, Preamble.)

The bishops were
right to recognize their part in the crisis and the extent and gravity
of the crisis. The Review Board believes, however, that effective measures
have been taken to ensure the safety of minors in the Church today. Actions
taken by many, but not all, dioceses in the 1980s and early 1990s significantly
reduced the number of reported incidents of abuse. More recently, in the
wake of the Charter, several hundred abusers who had not yet been removed
from ministry were laicized or otherwise removed from ministry over the
last two years. Many bishops have met with victims and their families,
even if belatedly, and have seen first-hand the horrific impact abuse
can have on victims and their families. In addition, most dioceses have
implemented safe-environment policies that train adults to recognize the
signs of abuse and teach children to report it.

Moreover, the "zero-tolerance" policy embodied
in the Essential Norms adopted in 2002 by the bishops in response to the
crisis specifies that no priest who has sexually abused a minor will continue
in ministry. To ensure that the zero-tolerance policy is applied consistently,
bishops must consult with lay review boards in assessing allegations of
sexual abuse of minors and making determinations about a priest's suitability
for ministry. [page 7 begins]

The policies and procedures put in place
over the last two years do not remediate, nor can they excuse, the multitude
of preventable acts of abuse that preceded them. But in acknowledgment
of those acts of abuse as crimes and sins lies hope for the future. That
hope can be fulfilled, however, only if the bishops maintain a commitment
to meaningful reforms and vigilant enforcement that outlasts the immediate
crisis and becomes ingrained in the character of the Church itself.

What is the nature of the current
crisis? Narrowly defined, the nature of the current crisis is
twofold: It consists both of the sexual abuse of minors by clergy and
the failure of many Church leaders to respond appropriately to that abuse.
But the crisis also has a spiritual dimension, for, as is the case with
all sinful conduct, it represents a failure to comport with divine law
and the teachings of the Church. Unless all aspects of the crisis are
addressed forthrightly, any steps to remedy it will bear only the patina
of reform and renewal.

Why did so many priests sexually
abuse minors? Although it is not possible to pinpoint any one
"cause" of the problem of sexual abuse of minors by priests, there were
two overarching contributing factors:

Dioceses and orders did not screen candidates for the priesthood properly.
As a result, many sexually dysfunctional and immature men were admitted
into seminaries and later ordained into the priesthood.

Seminaries did not form candidates for the priesthood adequately.
As a result, seminarians were not prepared for the [page
8 begins] challenges of the priesthood, particularly the challenge
of living a chaste, celibate life.

In addition, although neither the presence
of homosexually-oriented priests nor the discipline of celibacy caused
the crisis, an understanding of the crisis is not possible without reference
to these issues. There are, no doubt, many outstanding priests of a homosexual
orientation who live chaste, celibate lives, but any evaluation of the
causes and context of the current crisis must be cognizant of the fact
that more than eighty percent of the abuse at issue was of a homosexual
nature. Likewise, celibacy does not cause sexual abuse; but the Church
did an inadequate job both of screening out those individuals who were
destined to fail in meeting the demands of the priesthood, and of forming
others to meet those demands, including the rigors of a celibate life.

Why did Church leaders respond to
the problem of sexual abuse so poorly for so many years? Perhaps
even more troubling than the criminal and sinful acts of priests who engaged
in abuse of minors was the failure of some bishops to respond to the abuse
in an effective manner, consistent with their positions as leaders of
the flock with a duty to protect the most vulnerable among us from possible
predators. Sexual abuse of minors is an evil and, as one priest told the
Board, knowingly allowing evil conduct to continue is "cooperation with
evil." Causes of this failure include the following: [page
9 begins]

Bishops and other Church leaders did not understand the broad nature
of the problem but treated allegations as sporadic and isolated.

Some bishops and other Church leaders often put what they erroneously
believed to be the institutional concerns of the local Church above
the concerns of the universal Church. The fear of scandal caused them
to practice secrecy and concealment.

The threat of litigation caused some bishops to disregard their pastoral
role and adopt an adversarial stance not worthy of the Church.

Some bishops and other Church leaders failed to comprehend fully the
extent and magnitude of the harm suffered by victims of sexual abuse
by priests.

Bishops and other Church leaders relied too heavily on psychiatrists,
psychologists, and lawyers in dealing with a problem that, while it
undoubtedly has psychological causes and legal implications, is at its
heart a problem of faith and morality.

Bishops and other Church leaders did not do enough in the way of "fraternal
correction" to ensure that their brethren dealt with the problem in
an effective manner.

Some bishops and other Church leaders placed the interests of the
accused priests above those of the victims and too often declined to
hear from victims directly, relying instead on denials and assurances
from those accused of abuse.

Canon law and canonical procedures made it too difficult to remove
a predator priest from ministry, and bishops did not make sufficient
use of what canonical authority they did have to take action against
such priests and protect the children and young people of the Church.
[page 10 begins]

As a result, priests who had engaged in
sexual abuse of minors were, with distressing frequency, allowed to remain
where they had abused, reassigned to other parishes within the same dioceses,
or allowed to live in other dioceses where they posed a further threat
to children that predictably materialized into additional incidents of
abuse.

The leniency afforded predator priests
by some bishops may in some instances have been a misguided act of forgiveness.
Nevertheless, the failure of some bishops to temper forgiveness with responsible
actions to insulate minors from additional acts of abuse has seriously
undermined the confidence of the laity in the leadership of the Church
as a whole.

What can we as a Church do to ensure
that this never happens again? Ultimately, the crisis besetting
the Church is not a legal crisis, a media crisis, or a personnel crisis,
but a crisis of trust and faith; and it is only by the living out of their
faith by bishops, priests, and the laity that the Church will be able
to regain trust and fulfill its mission. By enacting the Charter and the
Essential Norms, the bishops have laid a framework for restoring the trust
of the laity in the Church hierarchy in the United States and ensuring
the safety of minors in the Church. The Review Board's most urgent hope
is that the bishops zealously enforce and adhere to the Charter and the
Essential Norms, which then can serve as a beacon for the Church in [page
11 begins] other countries, for other churches and ecclesial communities,
and for secular organizations.

But in order for the Church to achieve
the goal set out by the bishops of "restoring the bonds of trust that
unite us," more must be done, through a process that involves both transparency
and substantial participation by the laity. To that end, this Report offers
a number of recommendations, including the following:

Enhanced screening, formation, and oversight. The Church
must ensure that the men selected as candidates for the priesthood in
the Catholic Church are mature, well-adjusted individuals with a clear
understanding of the challenges of the priesthood, including the challenge
of celibacy; that candidates undergo proper formation as seminarians
to meet those challenges through a process for which responsible bishops
take personal ownership; and that the seminaries themselves are capable
of accomplishing this mission.

Increased sensitivity in responding to allegations of abuse.
Church leaders must not let concerns about the rights of accused priests,
the threat of scandal, and the potential adverse consequences of litigation
keep them from their primary duty when faced with allegations of abuse
– seeing to the welfare of victims of abuse. More openness regarding
allegations and evidence of abuse, and the response thereto, is needed.
Greater sensitivity to victims also requires the avoidance of harsh
litigation tactics that tend to compound the pain that already has been
inflicted.

Greater accountability of bishops and other church leaders.
The Church must choose bishops who see themselves first and foremost
as pastors; and the bishops must ensure that their brother bishops act
accordingly. Diocesan and presbyteral councils should be revitalized
to provide an increased measure of advice and oversight for bishops;
and other mechanisms, such as strengthened metropolitans, accreditation-type
visita- [page 12 begins]
tions of the dioceses, and lay diocesan consultative boards, should
be considered as a means of providing greater accountability on the
part of bishops and other Church leaders.

Improved interaction with civil authorities. Dioceses and orders
should report all allegations of sexual abuse to the civil authorities,
regardless of the circumstances or the age or perceived credibility
of the accuser, and should endeavor to resolve government investigations
and civil claims on reasonable terms and in a manner that minimizes
the potential intrusion of civil authorities into the governance of
Church matters.

Meaningful participation by the Christian faithful in the Church.
The bishops and other Church leaders must listen to and be responsive
to the concerns of the laity. To accomplish this, the hierarchy must
act with less secrecy, more transparency, and a greater openness to
the gifts that all members of the Church bring to her.

In June 2002, the United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops voted overwhelmingly to adopt the Charter for the
Protection of Children and Young People and the "Essential Norms for Diocesan/Eparchial
Policies Dealing with Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests,
Deacons, or Other Church Personnel" (the "Essential Norms") at its semi-annual
conference in Dallas. The Charter acknowledged the existence of a crisis
as a result of the abuse of minors by the clergy and the response to that
abuse by bishops. As part of its response to that [page
13 begins] crisis, the Charter created a National Review Board
for the Protection of Children and Young People.

1. The Membership of the Review Board and Its Mission.

The following individuals have served or are serving as members of
the National Review Board:

The Honorable Anne Burke, Interim Chair of the Board, is a Justice
on the Illinois Court of Appeals.

Robert S. Bennett, Chair of the Research Committee, is a former
federal prosecutor and special counsel for the United States Senate
Ethics Committee and is a partner at the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, LLP, in Washington, D.C.

Michael Bland, who holds a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology and
a Doctorate in Ministry, is a licensed clinical professional counselor
and clinical pastoral coordinator for Victims Assistance Ministry
in the Archdiocese of Chicago. Dr. Bland is also a thriving survivor
of clerical sexual abuse as a minor.

William Burleigh is the Chairman of the Board and former Chief Executive
Officer of the E.W. Scripps Company.

Nicholas P. Cafardi is the Dean of Duquesne University Law School
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and holds degrees in civil law and canon
law.

Jane Chiles is the former Executive Director of the Catholic Conference
of Kentucky.

Alice Bourke Hayes, Ph.D., is the former President of the University
of San Diego and a member of the boards of several companies.

Pamela Hayes is an attorney in private practice in New York City
specializing in defense litigation and civil rights. [page
14 begins]

The Honorable Frank Keating, who served as a Board member and chair
from June 2002 until June 2003, is the former Governor of Oklahoma
and has had a distinguished career of service in the public and private
sectors.

The Honorable Petra Jimenez Maes is the Chief Justice of the New
Mexico Supreme Court.

Paul McHugh, M.D., served as the psychiatrist-in-chief at Johns
Hopkins Hospital from 1975-2001 and is currently the Distinguished
Service Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine and Professor
at the Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University.

The Honorable Leon Panetta is a former United States Congressman
and Chief of Staff for President Clinton and currently serves as the
Director of the Panetta Institute for Public Policy at California
State University.

Ray Siegfried II is the Chairman of the Board of the NORDAM Group,
an aviation company in Tulsa, Oklahoma. [2]

Article 9 of the Charter directs the National
Review Board to perform several tasks. Among these tasks is overseeing
the creation and the work of a new office within the Conference – the
Office of Child and Youth Protection ("OCYP"). The Charter also requires
the Board to commission two discrete studies: (i) "a comprehensive study
of the causes and context of the current crisis;" and (ii) "a [page
15 begins] descriptive study . . . of the nature and scope of the
problem within the Catholic Church in the United States, including such
data as statistics on perpetrators and victims."

Although the direct source of the Review
Board's authority lies in Article 9 of the Charter, the Board's ultimate
authority lies in Church law. Canon 212 of the Code of Canon Law directs
not only that the Christian faithful must follow the teachings of the
Church, but also that they must at times make known to Church leaders
their opinion on matters which pertain to the good of the Church:

According to the knowledge, competence, and prestige which they [the
laity] possess, they have the right and even at times the duty to
manifest to the sacred pastors their opinion on matters which pertain
to the good of the Church and to make their opinion known to the rest
of the Christian faithful, without prejudice to the integrity of faith
and morals, with reverence toward their pastors, and attentive to
common advantage and the dignity of persons.

(Canon 212 § 3.) It is in that spirit that the members of the National
Review Board undertook this effort and in that spirit that we present
this Report.

2. The
Purpose and Scope of This Report.

This Report
is the Review Board's initial response to the Charter's request for a
"comprehensive study of the causes and context of the current crisis."
It provides context for the data generated by the John Jay College study
and identifies issues that need to be considered in a comprehensive study
of the causes of the sexual abuses that occurred. Accordingly, it examines
some of the most complex [page
16 begins] and vexing questions posed by that crisis, in furtherance
of the goal set forth in the Charter: That the bishops may "restore the
bonds of trust that unite us" and bring about "healing and reconciliation."

To understand the purpose and scope of
this Report, it is helpful to emphasize what it is not. First, this Report
is not intended to address Church doctrine or to serve as a sounding board
for those within the Church and outside the Church who wish to use this
scandal to accomplish objectives unrelated to or tangential to the goal
set forth above. The problem facing the Church was not caused by Church
doctrine, and the solution does not lie in questioning doctrine. Second,
this Report does not address specific instances of clerical sexual abuse
or inadequate episcopal response. Although the Report may refer to particular
dioceses, cases or incidents on the public record by way of illustration,
it is not the purpose of the Report to determine whether an individual
priest or bishop was responsible for a specific act or omission. Finally,
this Report is not, and does not purport to be, a scientific exercise.
With the exception of the analysis of the John Jay College study, discussed
below, the Report does not rely upon the scientific method. Thus, for
example, the Board has not attempted to conduct a comprehensive analysis
of factors that may have made sexual abuse of minors more or less likely
in a particular environment, or to develop an empirically-based profile
of a typical sexual abuse offender. [page
17 begins]

3. The
Methodology Employed by the Review Board.

In preparing
the Report, the Review Board, acting through its Research Committee, [3]
conducted lengthy interviews with more than eighty-five witnesses, including:
(i) cardinals, archbishops, and bishops in the United States and at the
Vatican; [4] (ii) diocesan officials; (iii)
priests, former priests, and seminarians; (iv) victims of clergy sexual
abuse; (v) experts in psychiatry, psychology, and sexual abuse; (vi) civil
lawyers, canon lawyers, and law enforcement authorities; (vii) concerned
lay Catholics, including Catholic thinkers and authors; and (viii) members
[page 18 begins] of diocesan
lay review boards. A list of the individuals whom the Board formally interviewed
is provided in the Appendix to this
Report. [5]

In addition to those interviews and numerous
less formal discussions with knowledgeable individuals, Board members
reviewed numerous books, studies, and articles on the subject, as well
as grand jury reports and depositions and other materials produced in
the course of litigation involving various dioceses. Although interviewing
so many men and women within the Church and outside the Church has given
the Board some understanding of the causes and context of the current
crisis, there are limits to this methodology. This Report is not the result
of a multi-year broad-based scientific study, and the findings and recommendations
addressed herein must be viewed with that in mind. However, the Board
is confident that it has accurately placed in context the reasons for
the current crisis. [page 19 begins]

In American society as a whole, sexual
abuse of minors appears to be far more widespread than earlier thought.
According to some estimates, one out of every four women and one out of
every seven men experienced some form of sexual abuse as minors. Most
abuse occurs in families. Because there are no reliable estimates of the
percentage of American adults who have engaged in sexual abuse of minors,
there is no way to determine whether the percentage of priests who reportedly
have engaged in such conduct is higher than the percentage in the general
population or in any other segment of the population, such as teachers,
coaches, and youth leaders.

It is clear that the abuse of minors is
not unique to the Church. However, given the moral stature of the Church,
the role of priests and bishops in providing moral leadership within the
Church, and the obligations of priests and bishops to foster the spiritual
and moral development of children and young people, when sexual abuse
of minors occurs in the Church it is particularly abhorrent. Thus, Catholics
take no solace from the fact that the sexual abuse of minors occurs outside
the Church as well.

In order to determine the scope and extent
of sexual abuse of minors by priests, the Conference, in consultation
with the Board, commissioned the research group at John Jay College of
Criminal Justice to conduct comprehensive [page
20 begins] surveys of all dioceses and religious orders in the
United States. Although the survey results, summarized below, are extremely
helpful in understanding the causes and context of the current crisis
for the Church, they cannot be relied upon to make generalizations about
the Church in relation to other institutions or to society as a whole,
because there are no comparative data for other elements of society.

In addition, there are at least two inherent
limitations to the data collected by the researchers at John Jay College.
First, some dioceses and orders may not have recorded or retained all
reports of allegations of abuse during this time period. Second, the data
was self-reported; no audit of the files was conducted to verify its accuracy.

Nevertheless, the Review Board believes
that the results of the John Jay College study provide the most complete
and reliable picture to date of the nature and scope of sexual abuse of
minors by members of the Catholic clergy in the United States during the
latter half of the twentieth century. The Board notes, however, that the
findings and recommendations set forth in this Report are not dependent
on the precise nature and extent of this abuse and therefore do not rest
upon the analysis of the researchers at John Jay College alone.
[6] [page
21 begins]

As noted above, the bishops, through the
Charter, asked the Board to examine the causes and context of the current
crisis. The Conference, through the Board, commissioned a research group
at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of
New York to produce a descriptive study through a comprehensive survey
of all dioceses and religious orders in the United States. These surveys
requested detailed information about the number of allegations of sexual
abuse of minors by priests, the nature of the alleged abuse, responses
of Church leaders to allegations of abuse, and many other areas.
[7] The applicable time period is
1950 to 2002. Each diocese and religious order also was directed to report
the total amount of money it had paid out to victims or alleged victims
of sexual abuse during this time period, including money paid for counseling
and attorneys' fees. [8]
[page 22 begins]

The survey results, some of which are summarized
below, are extremely helpful in understanding the causes and context of
the current crisis for the Church. By calling for and agreeing to participate
in this scientific exercise, the bishops showed real leadership, and the
Board urges leaders of other institutions to follow their lead so that
our society can gain a better understanding of the nature and extent of
child sexual abuse in the United States. [9]

Church records
indicate that 4,392 priests were accused of engaging in sexual abuse of
a minor between 1950 and 2002. [11] This number represents
four percent of the 109,694 priests in active ministry during that time.
There were [page 23 begins]
approximately 10,667 reported minor victims of clergy sexual abuse during
this period, and the Church expended more than half a billion dollars
in dealing with the problem.

Eighty-one percent of the victims were
male. Although more than three-quarters of the victims were of an age
such that the conduct does not meet the clinical definition of pedophilia,
there were substantial numbers of very young children who were victimized
by priests during this time period. In addition, although many of the
reported acts of sexual abuse involved fondling or unspecified abuse,
there was also a very large number of allegations of more grave abuse,
including acts of oral sex and intercourse.

The number of priests who engaged in sexual
abuse of minors and the number of victims of that abuse changed dramatically
during this time period. Although there were reported acts of sexual abuse
of minors in every year, the incidence of reported abuse increased by
several orders of magnitude in the 1960s and 1970s. After peaking in the
1970s, the number of incidents decreased through the 1980s and 1990s even
more sharply than the incidence rate had increased in the 1960s and 1970s.

The incidence of sexual molestation of
a minor under eleven years of age did not vary as greatly throughout the
period as did the incidence of molestation of older children. In addition,
the incidence of abuse of females did not change as [page
24 begins] dramatically as did the incidence of abuse of males.
There was, however, a more than six-fold increase in the number of reported
acts of abuse of males aged eleven to seventeen between the 1950s and
the 1970s.

Finally, the data indicate that the problem
of sexual abuse of minors by priests affected all areas of the country,
and not simply certain dioceses that have received sustained public scrutiny,
but there was significant variation from diocese to diocese. Some dioceses,
even certain large dioceses, had very few or no reported acts of sexual
abuse whereas many other dioceses had twenty-five or more priests with
accusations of sexual abuse of minors, and one diocese reported that 165
priests in the diocese had been accused of sexual abuse of minors.

2. Data
Relating to Accused Priests.

According
to the survey data, four percent of priests who were in ministry between
1950 and 2002 have been accused of an act of sexual abuse of minors. The
prevalence was highest among diocesan priests. There were 75,694 priests
in diocesan ministry between 1950 and 2002. Of those priests, allegations
of sexual abuse of minors had been made against 3,265, or 4.3%. By contrast,
allegations of sexual abuse of minors had been made with regard to approximately
2.7% of the approximately 34,000 religious order priests in ministry during
the time period. The remaining approximately 200 priests alleged to have
sexually abused a minor [page
25 begins] during this period were "extern" priests; that is, priests
resident in a diocese different from the diocese in which they had been
incardinated. [12]

Fifty-six percent of the accused priests
had one reported allegation levied against them. Twenty-seven percent
of the priests had two or three allegations levied against them. Nearly
fourteen percent had four to nine allegations levied against them. Three
percent had ten or more allegations levied against them; these 149 priests
with ten or more reported allegations were responsible for almost 3,000
victims, or twenty-seven percent of the allegations.

3. Data
Relating to Victims

Diocesan
and order records identify 10,667 reports of minor victims of sexual abuse
by priests. More than ten percent of these allegations were characterized
as not substantiated. In addition, for approximately twenty percent of
the allegations, the priest was deceased or inactive at the time of the
receipt of the allegation and typically no investigation was conducted
in these circumstances. [13]
[page 26 begins]

Eighty-one percent of the reported victims
were male, and nineteen percent were female. The proportion of male and
female victims changed over time. In the 1950s, approximately sixty-four
percent of the victims were male. That percentage increased in the 1960s
to approximately seventy-six percent and increased again in the 1970s
to approximately eighty-six percent and remained at or near that percentage
through the 1980s.

Approximately seventy-eight percent of
the reported sexual abuse victims were between the ages of eleven to seventeen
when the abuse began. Sixteen percent were between the ages of eight to
ten, and slightly less than six percent were younger than eight years
old. Thus, although more than three-quarters of the victims were between
eleven and seventeen when the abuse began, a significant number of pre-pubescent
children were victimized. [14] The number
of reported victims under the age of eleven has fallen each decade since
the 1960s, but the fact remains that almost two thousand young children
were victimized by "pedophile priests," a number that is very troubling.
[page 27 begins]

The majority of the victims were males
between the ages of eleven and seventeen. [15]
The number of reported male victims in this age group increased from 353
in the 1950s, to 1,264 in the 1960s, to a peak of 2,129 in the 1970s.
The number then decreased to 1,403 in the 1980s and 363 in the 1990s.
The number of girls who have been the victims of sexual abuse by priests
has varied much less over time. The total number of female victims between
eleven and seventeen when the abuse began peaked in the 1960s at 305 and
has decreased every decade since then.

4. Data
Relating to the Types of Reported Abuse.

There is
a tremendous range in the type of abuse reported during this time period.
While all abuse is reprehensible and traumatic, the range in the type
of abuse is significant. As noted above, there were 10,667 reported victimizations.
Dioceses and orders were asked to indicate all of the aspects of the abuse
for each victimization. Thus, a single reported victimization could involve
several separate [page 28 begins]
acts of abuse of varying degrees. Detailed information on the nature of
the abuse was not reported for 26.6% of the reported allegations. 27.3%
of the allegations involved the cleric performing oral sex on the victim.
25.1% of the allegations involved penile penetration or attempted penetration.

5. Data
Relating to Responses to Allegations of Abuse.

In the majority
of the reported allegations when the accused priest was still living,
the diocese or religious order did take some action. [16] Nearly forty
percent of the accused priests participated in a sexual offender treatment
program. In very few cases, however, did the diocese or order report the
allegation to civil authorities. Nevertheless, according to the data,
more than one hundred priests or former priests served time in prison
for conduct involving sexual abuse of a minor.

Although there has been a great deal of
attention paid to certain cases in which a priest who had been accused
of molesting a minor took up residence in another diocese, there appear
in fact to have been relatively few such incidents. According to the survey
data, approximately 143 priests were alleged to have engaged in sexual
abuse of a minor in more than one diocese. [page
29 begins]

6. Data
Relating to Time Period of the Reported Abuse.

The survey
data are consistent with statements made by clergy, lawyers, psychologists,
and psychiatrists, indicating that the problem of clergy sexual abuse
of minors by priests significantly increased in the 1960s, peaked in the
1970s, and decreased thereafter.

According to the survey data, 9.7% of the
reported allegations of abuse began in the 1950s, 26.1% in the 1960s,
35.5% in the 1970s, 22.6% in the 1980s, and 6.2% began between 1990 and
2002. Likewise, the number of priests who were reported as having engaged
in sexual abuse of minors rose steadily in the 1960s, peaked in the 1970s,
and declined sharply throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Priests ordained
in the early 1970s were more likely to have been accused of sexual abuse
of a minor than priests ordained in any other period.

As noted above, abuse of males between
the ages of eleven and seventeen is primarily responsible for the spike
in the incidence rate of clergy sexual abuse between the mid-1960s and
the mid-1980s. The number of male victims between the ages of eleven and
seventeen increased more than six-fold from the 1950s (with 353 victims)
to the 1970s (with 2,129 victims). The number of male victims under the
age of eleven increased significantly as well – more than three-fold –
during the same period, from 135 to 434. [page
30 begins]

The data appear to support the view expressed
by many that the crisis has an epidemic character – exploding in the late
1960s and subsiding in the 1980s. The number of reported incidents of
sexual abuse of minors by priests significantly lessened after the bishops
began addressing the problem more forcefully in the late 1980s and early
1990s. It must be cautioned, however, that there typically is a long lag
between the occurrence of abuse and the report of that abuse, so additional
allegations of abuse during that time period will be reported in the coming
years. Given, however, the amount of attention paid to this issue in the
last few years, and the efforts by the dioceses to identify victims, it
is likely that abuse is reported more promptly today than in the past.

To place this crisis in perspective – and
to understand why it has evoked such a passionate response from the laity
– it is helpful to review the circumstances leading up to the promulgation
of the Charter. Psychiatric research as early as the 1930s recognized
the harm suffered by victims of child sexual abuse. In the 1960s and 1970s,
states enacted laws requiring certain professionals – but typically not
including clergy – to report such abuse. [17]
The problem of sexual abuse of minors [page
31 begins] did not gain widespread visibility within American society
until approximately twenty years ago.

The sexual abuse of a minor long has been
characterized within the Church as both a serious canonical crime and
a grievous sin. Church law historically has provided for punishment for
a priest who engaged in sexual abuse of a minor. According to the Third
Lateran Council in 1178, clerics who engaged in pederasty or sodomy were
to be "dismissed from the clerical state or else confined to monasteries
to do penance." [18]
A papal decree issued in 1566 stated that any cleric guilty of crimes
against nature should be "handed over to the secular authorities for punishment."
[19] Both the 1917 version of the Code
of Canon Law – at § 2 of Canon 2359, and the most recent version, promulgated
in 1983, provide for dismissal from the [page
32 begins] clerical state for any cleric who committed sexual abuse
of a minor. Specifically, Canon 1395 provides that any cleric who "has
committed an offense against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue .
. . with a minor . . . is to be punished with just penalties, not excluding
dismissal from the clerical state if the case so warrants."

Nevertheless, although Canon 1389 provides
for a penalty, including dismissal from office, for a Church official
who with culpable negligence fails to perform an act of ecclesiastical
governance, Church officials in the United States rarely enforced Canon
1395. Nor have any bishops in the United States been punished under Canon
1389 for a failure to enforce Canon 1395.

Despite this history, there was only limited
awareness within the Church of the widespread nature of the problem of
clerical abuse of minors until the 1980s. Indeed, the roots of public
and episcopal attention to this current crisis can be traced to 1984,
when the case of Father Gilbert Gauthé, a former priest of the Diocese
of Lafayette (Louisiana), received widespread attention. Reports that
Gauthé had abused several children gained national prominence when – foreshadowing
revelations in 2002 about the Boston Archdiocese – it was revealed that
diocesan officials had failed to act on numerous prior reports of abuse
by the same priest. As the disquieting details of the case became known,
one bishop told the Board, it "awakened the whole Church in the United
States"; many bishops began to realize, he added, "It could also happen
in my diocese." [page
33 begins]

Indeed, other cases of abuse did begin
to surface from around the country. In response, several dioceses and
the Conference began to develop guidelines for responding to allegations
of abuse. Some individuals pressed for a more comprehensive and uniform
approach to the problem. In 1985, three individuals who had been involved
with the Gauthé case drafted a report entitled "The Problem of Sexual
Molestation by Roman Catholic Clergy: Meeting the Problem in a Comprehensive
and Responsible Manner." Among other things, the report presented estimates
of the legal and financial liability facing dioceses in the United States
as a result of sexual abuse of minors by clergy and suggested policies
and procedures that dioceses or orders should follow in responding to
the problem. This report, widely known after the names of the authors
as the Peterson-Doyle-Mouton Report, was presented at a meeting of diocesan
attorneys and executive committee members of the Conference. Although
the executive committee elected not to present the report's recommendations
to the full Conference, the Peterson-Doyle-Mouton Report did help shape
guidelines for responding to allegations of abuse that many dioceses would
later adopt. In 1988, the Conference drafted a memorandum containing a
set of more comprehensive guidelines for responding to allegations of
abuse that all dioceses were urged to follow until they could devise their
own guidelines.

At the same time that some bishops were
trying to persuade others to give the issue more attention, events in
different areas of the country underscored the [page
34 begins] need for action. In 1991, the first of approximately
187 lawsuits and claims were levied against the Archdiocese of Santa Fe.
The lawsuits alleged acts of abuse committed by priests who were receiving
treatment for psychological problems at a Jemez Springs, New Mexico, center
run by a group of priests known as the Servants of the Paraclete. Several
notorious abusers had undergone "treatment" at the Jemez Springs center
and continued to abuse after leaving the center. For example, Father Rudolph
Kos, a priest of the Diocese of Dallas, was treated at the Jemez Springs
center after having been accused of sexual molestation of minors but later
was allowed to return to ministry. According to published reports, Kos
abused more than ten young boys before he was laicized in 1998. In 1992,
scores of allegations of abuse were levied against James Porter, a former
priest of the Fall River (Massachusetts) diocese who had left the priesthood
almost twenty years earlier in 1973. Porter had been sent to the Jemez
Springs center in 1967 but had continued to molest boys after his treatment
there.

In 1992, the Conference issued a policy
statement reiterating the principles outlined in the 1988 memorandum.
In that policy statement, the Conference set forth what has come to be
known as the "Five Principles":

Respond promptly to all allegations of abuse where there is reasonable
belief that abuse has occurred.

If such an allegation is supported by sufficient evidence, relieve
the alleged offender promptly of his ministerial duties [page
35 begins] and refer him to appropriate medical evaluation and
intervention.

Comply with the obligations of civil law as regards reporting the
incident and cooperating with the investigation.

Reach out to the victims and their families and communicate our sincere
commitment to their spiritual and emotional well-being.

Within the confines of respect for privacy of the individuals involved,
deal as openly as possible with members of the community.

The Five Principles were not, however,
binding on any of the bishops, and only about half of all dioceses implemented
a sexual abuse policy at that time. Even then, dioceses did not always
follow their policies consistently. Noting this, one individual who long
has been involved in this issue observed to the Board, "Good people are
better than good policies." As one bishop told us, "Some chose to ignore
those principles . . . as we painfully discovered in Boston and in some
other places." Another bishop commented, "Some bishops went home and put
[the recommendations] into effect and other bishops went home and decided
. . . that their colleagues were wrong, that they could proceed with business
as usual." As a result, according to one bishop, "There were just very
bad decisions. I just have to say that it's clear not every bishop got
it." This foot-dragging was inexcusable and, as we know now, had disastrous
consequences. [page 36 begins]

That same year, the Conference formed a
subcommittee to address the problem of clerical sexual abuse. The subcommittee
convened a meeting of experts on the sexual abuse of minors and presented
a report to the Conference at its June 1993 meeting. The report admonished
the USCCB to "be aware of the urgency which accompanied [its] recommendations"
because "the hierarchy's authority and credibility in the United States
is eroding . . . ." Based upon the report's recommendations, the Conference
then formed an "Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse."

The Ad Hoc Committee was given the following
broad mandate:

(i) to look at assisting the Conference in effectively dealing with
priests who sexually abuse minors and others; (ii) to examine what
the Conference can do pastorally nationwide to assist in the healing
of victims and their families; (iii) to address the issue of morale
of bishops and priests burdened with the terrible offenses of a few;
(iv) to assist bishops in screening candidates for ministry and assessing
the possibility of reassignment of clergy found guilty of sexual abuse
of minors; (v) to recommend steps to safeguard against sexual abuse
of minors by employees or volunteers of the Church; and (vi) to address
the national problem of sexual abuse of children, coming from many
directions, especially from within families.

Although this was an ambitious agenda, the Ad Hoc Committee did not have
as great an impact as some of the bishops had hoped it would have. One
bishop claimed that this was owing to the fact that the committee "had
no teeth" and was not supported [page
37 begins] by some influential bishops, out of concern that it
was an intrusion on a bishop's authority and it would increase litigation
against the Church. [20]

Problems continued to fester in other dioceses.
Litigation was filed against the Diocese of Bridgeport and then-Bishop
Egan in 1993 alleging that the diocese had been aware of complaints against
certain priests since at least 1982 but had failed to take actions to
remove the priests from ministry. For example, according to published
reports, a 1990 diocesan memorandum indicated that there was a "developing
pattern of accusations" that Father Charles Carr had abused young boys.
(Significantly, Carr had been admitted into a seminary years earlier despite
the fact that a priest who had known him for years reportedly had recommended
against his admission, asserting that he lacked the emotional maturity
required for the priesthood.) Nevertheless, Carr was not suspended until
1995. Indeed, Carr was actually reinstated in 1999 and served as a chaplain
in a nursing home until Bishop Egan's successor, Bishop Lori, removed
him in December 2002 and instituted laicization proceedings. Shortly after
Bishop Egan left Bridgeport and was installed as Archbishop of New York,
Bishop Lori settled pending litigation against the diocese for more than
$12 million. [page 38 begins]

Another troubled diocese was the Archdiocese
of Los Angeles. After allegations were made that Cardinal Mahony, the
Archbishop of Los Angeles, had allowed numerous predator priests to remain
in ministry, the Archdiocese engaged in a very public spat with law enforcement
authorities who questioned his level of cooperation in the criminal investigation
of sexual molestation charges. The Archdiocese resisted grand jury subpoenas
seeking priest personnel files by arguing that communications between
a priest and his bishop were privileged. This argument did little to enhance
the reputation of the Church in the United States for transparency and
cooperation.

* * *

As the above summary of the growing awareness
of the problem between 1984 and 2002 shows, at several junctures bishops
were presented with opportunities to address this problem effectively.
Some took advantage of those opportunities; others did not. The failure
to adopt mandatory guidelines throughout the country and recalcitrance
in certain dioceses in implementing voluntary ones despite burgeoning
problems set the stage for the current crisis. [In
the USCCB's Web version of this report, the three asterisks follow this
paragraph. We have moved them up to conform with the original PDF.]

In early 2002 news accounts revealed that
the Archdiocese of Boston had transferred a serial pedophile, Father John
Geoghan, from parish to parish decades earlier, despite numerous complaints
that he had molested young children. [page
39 begins] The Archdiocese first received a complaint that Geoghan
had sexually abused a boy in 1979. Additional reports came in to the Archdiocese
in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1989, law enforcement officials asked one of
Cardinal Law's auxiliary bishops about reports that Geoghan had molested
young boys. The Archdiocese informed the law enforcement authorities that
Geoghan was undergoing treatment but did not disclose prior abuse allegations
that had been levied against Geoghan. Geoghan continued in various positions
in the Archdiocese for another decade until he was charged with sexual
molestation of a ten-year-old boy. Geoghan was not laicized until 1998.

Public scrutiny later focused on another
priest in the Boston Archdiocese, Father Paul Shanley. As early as 1978,
the Vatican had written to Cardinal Medeiros, then-Archbishop of Boston,
expressing concern about Shanley's public statements seemingly in support
of homosexual conduct with minors. Shanley was shadowed by allegations
of improper sexual conduct for years, with few adverse consequences to
him, and was allowed to remain in ministry, albeit often on "sick leave,"
until 1996. It also came out that Father Joseph Birmingham, who died in
1989, had been accused of abusing at least fifty boys over a 29-year career
in the Boston Archdiocese.

When news accounts brought to light the
sexual abuse of minors by these and several other priests in Boston in
the 1970s, 1980s, and the early 1990s, and the ineffectual response by
archdiocesan officials to that abuse, Cardinal Law, [page
40 begins] who succeeded Cardinal Medeiros as Archbishop of Boston
in 1984, acknowledged that he had transferred priests to new parishes
after they had been accused of sexually abusing minors. Cardinal Law publicly
apologized and vowed both to implement a zero-tolerance policy and to
provide prosecutors with the names of all priests accused of sexually
abusing minors. Throughout the year, additional problems beset the Boston
Archdiocese. Finally, on December 13, 2002, Cardinal Law resigned as Archbishop
of Boston. He remains a member of the College of Cardinals.
[21]

The Board conducted numerous interviews
with individuals familiar with the response by the Boston Archdiocese
to the sexual abuse of minors by priests. Based upon those interviews,
as well as contemporaneous documentation and civil deposition transcripts,
the Board is deeply disturbed by the situation in Boston. The picture
that emerged was that of a diocese with a cadre of predator priests and
a hierarchy that simply refused to confront them and stop them.

For example, Bishop John D'Arcy, who was
an auxiliary bishop of the Boston Archdiocese until 1985, wrote several
letters to Cardinal Law and to other auxiliary bishops voicing concerns
about predator priests being allowed to remain in parish ministry. It
appears that his concerns were ignored. In a December 1984 letter [page
41 begins] to Cardinal Law, Bishop D'Arcy specifically expressed
alarm about the conduct of Geoghan, stating quite bluntly, "Fr. Geoghan
has a history of homosexual involvement with young boys." Unfortunately,
in Boston, Bishop D'Arcy appeared to be a voice in the wilderness, and
shortly after he raised troubling questions about a number of priests
he was asked to leave Boston and was installed as Bishop of the Diocese
of South Bend-Fort Wayne (Indiana).

In the early 1990s, as the number of allegations
of sexual abuse of minors by priests in the Boston Archdiocese mounted,
the Archdiocese created a position specifically to deal with such allegations.
The priests who held that position over the years, however, made decisions
that, at least in hindsight, were overly trusting of accused priests.
For example, Father John McCormack, later named Bishop of Manchester (New
Hampshire), held that position in the early 1990s and had responsibility
for dealing with Father Shanley. Both the Vatican and lay Catholics had
raised concerns about Shanley's statements seeming to endorse sexual interaction
between men and boys. Yet, the Archdiocese responded to these concerns
by drawing a distinction between Shanley's statements and his conduct.

Former Archdiocesan officials have asserted
that they did not know at that time that victims of abuse by Shanley had
filed complaints about him with the Archdiocese years earlier. Despite
these complaints, which apparently were not made available to all decisionmakers,
and despite Shanley's unsettling public [page
42 begins] statements (and his refusal to affirm that he followed
the teachings of the Catholic Church), Shanley was allowed to relocate
to Palm Springs and was provided with a letter of introduction to the
Bishop of San Bernardino stating that he was a priest "in good standing"
in the Archdiocese.

Although a report issued by the Massachusetts
Attorney General in July 2003 concluded that neither Cardinal Law nor
any of the diocesan officials who worked with him had violated any laws,
it delivered a scathing rebuke of the Cardinal and other diocesan officials.
According to the report, hundreds of individuals claimed to have been
victimized as minors by priests in the Boston Archdiocese in the second
half of the twentieth century. Pointedly, the Attorney General's report
noted that its investigation "did produce evidence that the widespread
abuse of children was due to an institutional acceptance of abuse and
a massive and pervasive failure of leadership." The report also stated
that "Cardinal Law personally participated in decisions concerning the
final disposition of clergy sexual abuse cases, including decisions on
whether to permit accused priests to return to ministry duties."

In April 2002, Pope John Paul II summoned
cardinals from the United States and the leadership of the Conference
to the Vatican to discuss the problem of sexual abuse of minors by priests
in the United States. Following that meeting, the Holy Father issued a
clear statement that "there is no place in the priesthood or the [page
43 begins] religious life for those who would harm the young."
That statement paved the way for adoption of the Charter and the Essential
Norms by the bishops in June 2002.

Prior thereto, however, the Vatican had
refrained from assuming a significant role with respect to the response
of the bishops in the United States to allegations of sexual abuse of
minors by members of the clergy. The Vatican did not recognize the scope
or gravity of the problem facing the Church in the United States despite
numerous warning signs; and it rebuffed earlier attempts to reform procedures
for removing predator priests. [22]

Here, too, an historical perspective is
instructive. Beginning in the late 1980s, a number of influential bishops
in the United States began asking the Vatican to institute an expedited
administrative process for the removal of priests who had sexually abused
minors. This request was due, in part, to a deficiency in the canonical
system, which allowed dismissal from the clerical state as a penalty for
the sexual abuse of a minor, but only after a lengthy process. That process
required the participation of the victim. A number of bishops, concerned
in part that victims would find it traumatizing to address their abuse
in a formal proceeding, were [page
44 begins] reluctant to ask for their assistance. In addition,
the full penalty of dismissal from the clerical state could not be imposed
if the priest or his advocate demonstrated that the priest had acted under
some type of mental illness or psychological disturbance. Since many priests
who had committed such abuses had been sent to treatment centers where
various diagnoses of mental illness or psychological disturbance had been
rendered, the penalty of dismissal from the clerical state, even after
exhaustion of the full canonical process, was unavailable in such cases.

Moreover, once a finding of guilt in a
canonical penal process had been made, a convicted priest still had a
right of appeal to two higher levels of ecclesiastical tribunals (at the
second instance level and at the Vatican). Under canon law, an appealed
sentence automatically is suspended. As a result, a priest convicted as
a sexual abuser of minors after completion of a protracted diocesan penal
process would not face the imposition of any penalty until years later.
During those years, he would remain a priest, although perhaps without
an assignment (and often without oversight).

In addition, some diocesan
lawyers advised their bishop clients not to invoke a full penal process
in those cases where civil litigation was pending or likely because the
record of the testimony that was required to be kept in the canonical
proceeding would be subject to discovery by a civil plaintiff. Thus, some
bishops may have refrained from enforcing canon law to remove predator
priests out of [page 45 begins]
concern that victims and their lawyers would gain access to additional
information about the priests.

To allow a predator priest to remain in
ministry out of fear of litigation is simply immoral. Such an action is
also short-sighted as the failure to take action against a predator priest
increases the long-term legal exposure of the diocese.

When bishops in the United States first
requested a process to deal with sexual abuse of minors by priests, it
appears that the seriousness of this issue and the magnitude of the problem
were not appreciated fully in Rome, perhaps in part because, as noted
above, some bishops elected to sidestep the canonical process and consequently
never prosecuted cases that reached the Vatican. In any event, these requests
for an expedited process were not granted, largely out of concern that
such a process would prejudice the rights of the accused priests, even
though the bishops who had made the request were careful to restrict it
to those situations where the priest's guilt already had been established
in an impartial and objective forum, such as a state criminal trial or
civil litigation where the priest had been afforded full defense rights.

Requests to the Vatican by a number of
bishops in the United States for an expedited dismissal process were repeated
throughout the 1990s, but again to no avail. In 1993, however, Pope John
Paul II sent a letter to the bishops in the United States acknowledging
that the issue of sexual abuse of minors was arising [page
46 begins] frequently during their visits to the Holy See. As a
result, Pope John Paul II agreed to form a joint committee of experts
from the Vatican and the Conference to study how the "universal canonical
norms can best be applied to the particular situation of the United States."
This Committee approved experimental changes in canon law, effective as
of April 1994, which included expanding the limitations period within
which a laicization proceeding could be instituted against a priest under
canon law on grounds of sexual abuse of a minor until the victim's twenty-eighth
birthday. It was not until February 2003, however, that the Vatican created
the requested expedited process for the laicization of priests who have
sexually abused minors.

Many attribute the Vatican's inaction prior
to the current crisis to a general reluctance to interfere with bishops.
[23] Others
attribute it to a view in Rome that the sexual abuse of minors by members
of the Catholic clergy was uniquely an American problem. Whatever the
cause of its earlier inaction, the Vatican did respond with strong statements
once the depth of the scandal and full weight of its implications became
apparent in 2002. After meeting with United States Cardinals in April
2002, Pope John Paul II stated that he was "deeply grieved by the fact
that [page 47 begins] priests
and religious, whose vocation it is to help people live holy lives in
the sight of God, have themselves caused such suffering," and that, as
a result of the inadequate response to such conduct, "the Church is viewed
with distrust." A solution to the crisis must, he said, be built "upon
the solid foundation of faith." These statements provided a spiritual
framework for the work of the Conference in the ensuing months. [24]

At its meeting in Dallas in June 2002,
the Conference considered a collective response to the crisis – the Charter
for the Protection of Children and Young People – and a companion set
of national standards for dealing with sexual abuse of minors cases –
the Essential Norms, which include, among other things, a mandate that
any priest who has engaged in a single act of sexual abuse of a minor
be removed permanently from ministry. The Conference approved both the
Charter and the Essential Norms; and, after a joint commission of bishops
from the United States [page 48
begins] and officials from the Vatican resolved perceived conflicts
between the Essential Norms and canon law, the Vatican issued its recognitio
of the Essential Norms, rendering them particular law for the dioceses
and religious communities of priests located in the United States.
[25]

The adoption of the Charter for the Protection
of Children and Young People is a milestone in the history of the Church
in America. The Charter and the Essential Norms, even with their imperfections,
can serve as a blueprint for organizations dealing with this difficult
issue. As a result of the implementation of the Charter and the Essential
Norms, the Board is confident that effective measures are in place today
to help ensure the safety of children and young people in the Church.

1. The
Articles of the Charter.

The Articles
that comprise the Charter are divided into four sections, each dealing
with a different aspect of the crisis. The first three articles are intended
[page 49 begins] "to promote
healing and reconciliation with victims/survivors of sexual abuse of minors."
Article 1 requires every diocese to work with victims and their support
groups. Article 2 requires every diocese to "have a competent person or
persons to coordinate assistance for the immediate pastoral care of persons
who claim to have been sexually abused as minors by clergy or other Church
personnel." Article 2 also requires every diocese to have a lay review
board to assess allegations of sexual abuse. [26] Its procedures
must be made public. Article 3 prohibits dioceses from entering into confidentiality
agreements, "except for grave and substantial reasons brought forward
by the victim/survivor and noted in the text of the agreement."

Articles 4 through 7 are intended "to guarantee
an effective response to allegations of sexual abuse of minors." Article
4 requires dioceses to "report an allegation of sexual abuse of a person
who is a minor to the public authorities" and to cooperate with civil
authorities about reporting cases in which the victim is no longer a minor.
Article 5 embodies the "zero-tolerance" principle of the Charter. It requires
dioceses to perform "promptly" and "objectively" a preliminary investigation
when any allegation of sexual abuse of a minor by a priest is received.
If the investigation [page 50
begins] indicates that the priest has engaged in sexual abuse,
the bishop must notify the Vatican and "relieve the alleged offender promptly
of his ministerial duties." If the priest admits the charge or if the
truth of the allegation is established by the investigation, the priest
must be "permanently removed from ministry" and the bishop must seek laicization,
unless the priest is aged or infirm. Article 6 requires dioceses to establish
"clear and well-publicized . . . standards of ministerial behavior for
clergy and other Church personnel." Article 7 requires dioceses to deal
with allegations of sexual abuse of minors with "transparency and openness."

Articles 8 through 11 are intended "to
ensure the accountability of our procedures." Article 8 calls for the
creation of the Office for Child and Youth Protection and provides the
mandate for this body. The OCYP is responsible, among other things, for
assisting dioceses in creating "safe environment" programs and auditing
all dioceses for compliance with the Charter.
[27]

Article 9 directs that the Review Board
shall assist and monitor the OCYP. Article 9 also provides a basis for
this Report:

To understand the problem more fully and to enhance the effectiveness
of our future response, the National Review Board will commission
a comprehensive study of the causes and context of the current [page
51 begins] crisis. The Board will also commission a descriptive
study, with the full cooperation of our dioceses/eparchies, of the
nature and scope of the problem within the Catholic Church in the
United States, including such data as statistics on perpetrators and
victims.

Article 10 requires the re-organization
of the Ad Hoc Committee to ensure regional representation. Article 11
requires the President of the Conference to inform the Holy See of the
manner in which the bishops are addressing the crisis.

Articles 12 through 17 are intended "to
protect the faithful in the future." Article 12 directs dioceses to establish
"safe environment" programs. Article 13 requires dioceses to perform background
investigations on all diocesan and parish personnel who have regular contact
with minors. Article 14 prohibits transferring any priest who has committed
an act of sexual abuse of a minor to a new diocese or province. Article
15 directs the bishops to coordinate with leaders of religious orders
in responding to allegations of sexual abuse of minors. Article 16 expresses
the willingness of the bishops to coordinate with other churches, religious
bodies, institutions of learning, and other interested organizations in
conducting research in the area of sexual abuse of minors. Article 17
requires the bishops to offer "complete cooperation" with an upcoming
Apostolic Visitation of seminaries, which "will focus on the question
of human formation for celibate chastity," and requires the bishops to
develop "systematic ongoing formation programs . . . to assist priests
in their living out of their vocation." [page
52 begins]

2. The
Essential Norms.

The Essential
Norms, which apply with equal force to dioceses and to religious orders,
set forth the procedures that implement the Charter's broad principles.
Unlike the Articles of the Charter, the Essential Norms are Church law
for the dioceses and orders located in the United States. Accordingly,
violation of any of the Essential Norms carries with it canonical penalties.

The Preamble to the Essential Norms attempts
to define sexual abuse of a minor:

Sexual abuse of a minor includes sexual molestation or sexual exploitation
of a minor and other behavior by which an adult uses a minor as an
object of sexual gratification. Sexual abuse has been defined by different
civil authorities in various ways, and these norms do not adopt any
particular definition provided in civil law. Rather, the transgressions
in question relate to obligations arising from divine commands regarding
human sexual interaction as conveyed to us by the sixth commandment
of the Decalogue. Thus, the norm to be considered in assessing an
allegation of sexual abuse of a minor is whether conduct or interaction
with a minor qualifies as an external, objectively grave violation
of the sixth commandment . . . . A canonical offence against the sixth
commandment of the Decalogue . . . need not be a complete act of intercourse.
Nor, to be objectively grave, does an act need to involve force, physical
contact, or a discernible harmful outcome.

This definition is expansive and somewhat
amorphous. One consequence of this broad definition of sexual abuse is
that all acts of improper sexual conduct with a minor are subject to the
Charter's zero-tolerance policy, irrespective of the degree of impropriety
or seriousness of the consequences. The drastic consequences of a [page
53 begins] finding of abuse place a premium on determining in each
given case whether the conduct at issue meets the definition set forth
in the Essential Norms.

Many of the Essential Norms themselves
essentially mirror the articles of the Charter. Thus, for example, Norm
2 requires every diocese to have a written policy on the sexual abuse
of minors by priests, a copy of which is to be filed with the Conference.
Norm 3 requires the designation of a victim assistance coordinator. Norm
4 requires dioceses to have a review board to review policies and cases
relating to sexual abuse of minors by priests, and Norm 5 specifies the
composition of the review boards, requiring that a majority of the members
not be in the diocese's employ.

The Essential Norms also enumerate the
procedures that must be followed when an allegation of abuse is made.
Norm 6 requires the diocese to conduct a preliminary investigation "in
harmony with canon law" upon receipt of an allegation. When there is "sufficient
evidence that sexual abuse of a minor has occurred," the Norm requires
the bishop or religious ordinary to inform the appropriate officials at
the Vatican, remove the accused from sacred ministry, limit his area of
residence, and prohibit his public participation in celebration of the
Eucharist pending the outcome of the process. Norm 7 provides that the
alleged offender may be urged to seek an appropriate medical and psychological
evaluation. [page 54 begins]

Taken together, the Charter and the Essential
Norms do not provide much guidance on the conduct of an investigation.
They simply provide (i) that the diocese shall conduct an investigation,
in accordance with canon law, upon the receipt of an allegation; (ii)
that a diocesan lay review board shall "function as a confidential consultative
body to the bishop" and will advise the bishop "in his assessment of allegations
of sexual abuse of minors and in his determination of suitability for
ministry"; and (iii) that "all appropriate steps shall be taken to protect
the reputation of the accused during the investigation." Thus, there is
no guidance on the appointment of an individual to investigate allegations
and no requirement that a bishop or provincial provide information about
all allegations to his lay review board.

The Review Board believes that best practices
in this regard would include placing an accused cleric on administrative
leave pending the results of an initial investigation, having a qualified
independent investigator conduct the initial investigation, and providing
the lay review board with the results of all such investigations. Furthermore,
we understand that the final decision regarding whether to remove a priest
from ministry or institute canonical proceedings against the priest must
be made by the bishop or the provincial. Nevertheless, we are hopeful
that [page 55 begins] there
will be few situations in which the Church official disagrees with the
advice of the lay review board in this regard.
[28]

Norm 8 mirrors Article 5 and embodies the
"zero-tolerance" provision, requiring the immediate and permanent removal
from ministry of any cleric who admits or is proven to have committed
an act of sexual abuse against a minor:

When even a single act of sexual abuse by a priest or deacon is
admitted or is established after an appropriate process in accord
with canon law, the offending priest or deacon will be removed permanently
from ecclesiastical ministry, not excluding dismissal from the clerical
state, if the case so warrants.

The Norm requires a bishop to refer to the Vatican for laicization any
instance of sexual abuse of a minor which occurred within the limitations
period, which is within ten years after the victim of the abuse has turned
eighteen. [29] For cases that fall outside
that period, Norm 8.A directs that the bishop "shall apply" to the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith for dispensation of the statute of limitations.
Thus, the Essential Norms call for laicization for any priest who has
engaged in sexual [page 56 begins]
abuse of a minor, whether or not the limitations period has expired. [30]
The one apparent exception is set forth in Norm 8.B, which indicates that
laicization is not required for aged or infirm priests. Norm 8.B dictates,
however, that such a priest "ought to lead a life of prayer and penance"
and "will not be permitted to celebrate Mass publicly or to administer
the sacraments . . . wear clerical garb, or to present himself publicly
as a priest."

Norm 9 reaffirms that bishops may, by virtue
of their executive power of governance and separate from the canonical
process, remove an offending cleric from office, restrict his faculties,
or limit his ministry:

At all times, the diocesan bishop/eparch has the executive power
of governance, through an administrative act, to remove an offending
cleric from office, to remove or restrict his faculties, and to limit
his exercise of priestly ministry. Because sexual abuse of a minor
by a cleric is a crime in the universal law of the Church . . . and
is a crime in all jurisdictions in the United States, for the sake
of the common good and observing the provisions of canon law, the
diocesan bishop/eparch shall exercise this power of governance to
ensure that any priest who has committed even one act of sexual abuse
of a minor as described above shall not continue in active ministry.

Thus, the Essential Norms require bishops and provincials to remove a
priest from active ministry even if he cannot be laicized, or pending
laicization. [page 57 begins]

As noted above, Article 5 and Norm 8 provide
for the removal from the priesthood of any priest who has engaged in a
single act of sexual abuse of a minor. This principle has been referred
to by some as a policy of "zero tolerance" or a "one-strike-you're-out"
standard. It was deemed necessary because some bishops and religious superiors,
in their assessment of sexual abuse of minors by priests under their authority,
badly underestimated the seriousness of the misconduct and harm to the
victim, and allowed wrongdoers to continue in positions of ministry, from
which they went on to harm other minors. To prevent any recurrence of
such situations, the Charter and Essential Norms remove any further discretion
on the part of bishops and religious superiors in this regard.

Accordingly, the zero-tolerance policy
applies without regard to any assessment of the degree of culpability
of an offending priest based upon such factors as (i) the nature of the
sexual act (e.g., the improper touching of a fully clothed teenager versus
the sodomization of a child), (ii) the frequency of abuse (e.g., an isolated
event versus a protracted history), or (iii) efforts to address the problem
(e.g., successful treatment of a problem that had led to an act of abuse
years ago versus untreated problems that manifested themselves more recently).
The policy also applies with equal force to a priest who reports himself
as having engaged in an act of abuse in an effort to obtain help with
his problem. [page 58 begins]

Some observers – including a group of child
sexual abuse experts who participated in a Vatican-sponsored Conference
last April and recently issued a report entitled "Sexual Abuse in the
Catholic Church: Scientific and Legal Perspectives" – have expressed concerns
about the zero-tolerance principle. Both experts and Board witnesses have
noted that the public may be protected more effectively if such priests
remain under Church oversight rather than if they are laicized and live
in the secular world without any oversight. In addition, some individuals
with whom the Board spoke question whether the policy discourages self-reporting
that could pre-empt further acts of abuse, and whether it is inconsistent
with concepts of natural justice and canon law that are premised upon
differentiation in penalties depending upon the gravity of the misconduct.
Finally, given the nature of the priesthood, laicization is an extreme
remedy. As one priest said to the Board, "It's like being divorced by
your wife, fired from your job, and evicted from your home all at once."
Accordingly, the application of a zero-tolerance policy in certain instances
strikes many observers as inconsistent with Christian mercy.

The Review Board acknowledges this is a
difficult issue and that the zero-tolerance policy may seem to be too
blunt an instrument for universal application. Nonetheless, the Board
believes that for the immediate future the zero-tolerance policy is essential
to the restoration of the trust of the laity in the leadership of the
Church, provided that it is appropriately applied. In assessing individual
cases in [page 59 begins]
order to determine whether the priest engaged in an act of sexual abuse
of a minor, the bishops must consult with the diocesan lay review board,
so that together they might strive for individualized justice in light
of their developing experience and expertise.
[31]

The Review Board also believes that any
discussion of the Charter's zero-tolerance provision would be incomplete
without noting that there is no equivalent policy of zero tolerance for
bishops or provincials who allowed a predator priest to remain in or return
to ministry despite knowledge of the risks. In fact, in the minds of some
priests, the impression was created that the Dallas Charter and the Essential
Norms were the bishops' attempt to deflect criticism from themselves and
onto individual priests. To the extent that this impression exists, in
the minds of priests or anyone else, the members of the National Review
Board stress that we see this crisis as one of the episcopacy as much
as it is a crisis of the priesthood. Priests, who now stand uneasily under
a sword of Damocles, with their every action scrutinized, understandably
may ask why the bishops do not face such consequences if [page
60 begins] they fail to abide by the Charter.
[32] This distinction has deteriorated
the relationship between priests and bishops. Given the events of the
last two years, the bishops must place priestly morale high on their agenda
and must show that they are willing to accept responsibility and consequences
for poor leadership decisions if the confidence of the laity in the leadership
of the Church is to be restored.

Subsequent to the adoption of the Charter,
several grand juries in the United States investigated whether diocesan
leaders had engaged in criminal acts by not responding effectively to
clerical sexual abuse of minors. At least three dioceses entered into
plea [page 61 begins] agreements
with state authorities. Bishops have entered into plea agreements without
either the knowledge or the understanding of the Holy See, demonstrating
the general lack of scrutiny of the actions of individual bishops. In
other dioceses, grand juries issued reports detailing a history of widespread
sexual abuse of minors by priests and ineffectual responses to that abuse
by diocesan officials. Some state authorities made public dozens of previously
confidential Church files. Other state authorities imposed significant
state controls on the internal workings of the Church.

Diocese of Rockville Centre (New York). On January 17, 2003,
a Special Grand Jury of the Suffolk County (New York) Supreme Court
issued a report of its investigation of the handling of sexual abuse
allegations by the Diocese of Rockville Centre. The report detailed
testimony from several priests and victims relating to approximately
twenty priests in Long Island, New York, who had sexually abused minors.
According to the report, many priests witnessed or knew of these acts
of abuse, but none of them reported the abuse to civil authorities.
Because no law in New York required priests or diocesan authorities
to report rape or other acts of child sexual abuse, the grand jury did
not return an indictment against the diocese.

Diocese of Manchester (New Hampshire). On March 3, 2003, the
Attorney General of New Hampshire issued a report on its investigation
of the Diocese of Manchester. The report concluded that "in multiple
cases the Diocese knew that a particular priest was sexually assaulting
minors" and yet "the Diocese took inadequate or no action to protect
these children within the parish," and that the priest "subsequently
committed additional acts" of sexual abuse against children. The diocese
avoided prosecution by entering into a settlement agreement in which
it acknowledged that the state had evidence "likely to sustain a conviction
against the Diocese for child endangerment." The diocese agreed to comply
with reporting require- [page
62 begins] ments more stringent than those required by law, to
submit to an annual audit conducted by the state, and to disclose to
the state all facts relating to the diocese's past handling of sexual
abuse allegations against priests.

Diocese of Phoenix. On May 3, 2003, the Diocese of Phoenix
entered into a settlement agreement with the state of Arizona. As part
of the agreement, then-Bishop O'Brien acknowledged "that he allowed
Roman Catholic priests under his supervision to have contact with minors
after becoming aware of allegations of criminal sexual misconduct" and
acknowledged "transferring offending priests to situations where children
could be further victimized." In exchange for not prosecuting the bishop,
the diocese agreed to comprehensive oversight by the state in certain
affairs of the diocese. Among other things, by the agreement, the bishop
agreed to give up authority for dealing with issues that arise relating
to the revision, enforcement, and application of the diocese's sexual
misconduct policy. The bishop agreed to the appointment of a Youth Protection
Advocate, over whom the bishop would have no authority, and agreed to
give the state input into the appointment of the counsel to the Youth
Protection Advocate.

Archdiocese of Boston. As noted above, in July 2003, the Massachusetts
Attorney General issued a report detailing the findings of a grand jury
investigation of the Archdiocese of Boston. In its public report, the
Attorney General stated that the Archdiocese had refused to cooperate
with the investigation, forcing the Attorney General to issue fifty-three
subpoenas and compel testimony from numerous archdiocesan officials.
The Attorney General required the Archdiocese to agree to provide any
revised policies or procedures to the state before their adoption and
publication.

Archdiocese of Cincinnati. In November 2003, Archbishop Pilarczyk
entered a guilty plea on behalf of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, resulting
in a finding that the Archdiocese violated Ohio law in the late 1970s
and early 1980s by failing to report crimes of sexual abuse of minors
by priests. The plea agreement avoided the indictment of any individuals.
[page 63 begins]

In addition to these government actions,
there were throughout the country in 2003 several significant settlements
of civil lawsuits arising from the crisis. For example, the Archdiocese
of Boston settled claims relating to Father John Geoghan and other predator
priests for approximately $85 million, forcing the Archdiocese to plan
the closing of a significant number of parishes and to sell the Cardinal's
residence. In other dioceses, multi-million dollar settlements led to
the closure of some parishes and schools and threatened the viability
of some of the diocesan charitable works.

These grand jury investigations and settlement
agreements and the images of bishops in courtrooms and depositions are
disturbing. In addition, the Board is concerned that some of these agreements
give or appear to give civil authorities power to intrude into internal
Church matters. In the Board's view, any agreement between a diocese and
civil authorities in which the diocese gives power to the civil authorities
to oversee the diocese is a troubling infringement of the First Amendment's
guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Unfortunately, it was the
serious failings of some bishops that caused this exercise of state authority
over Church matters. Finally, to the extent that a bishop avoids consequences
for himself [page 64 begins]
by agreeing to provisions that impose onerous financial or operational
restrictions on the diocese, the Board has grave concerns about the apparent
conflict of interest. [33]

Just as no one factor "causes" a priest
to molest a minor, no one cause is responsible for the incidence of sexual
abuse of minors by clergy generally. The debate over what caused the current
crisis often has given way to a search for an easy answer that comports
with the individual observer's preconceived views. As one bishop commented
to the Board, "If you're conservative, homosexuality is the problem; if
you're liberal, celibacy is the problem. So you tell me who you are, and
I'll tell you what the problem is."

Certainly, the debate implicates important
developments in both the universal Church and the Church in the United
States over the past fifty years. These developments include: the significant
increase in vocations in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s; the
Ecumenical Council of Bishops held from 1962 to 1965 known as Vatican
II; the publication of the papal encyclical Humanae Vitae
in 1968, [page 65 begins]
which reaffirmed traditional Church teaching on sexual morality and artificial
contraception, and the negative reaction to that encyclical by many priests
and laity in the United States, fostering what is often termed the "culture
of dissent" within the American Church; the exodus of almost twenty thousand
men from the priesthood in the late 1960s and 1970s; and attempts to reform
the priesthood and seminary formation by Pope John Paul II, culminating
with the publication in 1992 of Pastores Dabo Vobis.

As several priests and bishops told us,
discussions about the "causes" of the current crisis often are seen as
an opportunity to rehash old arguments about Vatican II and the other
developments summarized above. As one bishop put it, echoing the comments
of the bishop quoted above, those of a "conservative bent" lay the blame
for the crisis on changes made at Vatican II and the culture of dissent,
whereas the "progressives" lay the blame for the crisis on the failure
to implement the reforms of Vatican II. There is, he added, a "little
truth" in both points of view.

Despite the predictable liberal/conservative
dichotomy, however, there is a surprising amount of consensus across the
"political" spectrum regarding the issues underlying the crisis. The commonality
of view among the broad range of people interviewed by the Review Board,
in fact, gives credibility to the conclusions that the Board members reached
as a result of their investigation. [page
66 begins]

The Review Board has determined that any
discussion of the "causes and context" must address certain issues relating
to the selection of candidates for the priesthood and to the formation
of priests, as well as special issues relating to sexual orientation,
celibacy, and spiritual life. Each of these subjects is discussed below.

1. Issues
Relating to the Selection of Candidates for the Priesthood.

In the 1992
Apostolic Exhortation Pastores Dabo Vobis ("I Will Give You Shepherds";
cf. Jer. 3:15), Pope John Paul II emphasized the importance of selecting
and training young men for the priesthood. [34]

The formation of future priests, both diocesan and religious, and
lifelong assiduous care for their personal sanctification in the ministry
and for the constant updating of their pastoral commitment is considered
by the Church one of the most demanding and important tasks for the
future of the evangelization of humanity.

(Pastores Dabo Vobis ¶ 2.) Since the issuance of Pastores
Dabo Vobis, there has been a renewed emphasis on the selection and
formation of young men for the priesthood. This renewed commitment is
vital, for it is clear that some men became [page
67 begins] priests over the last fifty years who never should have
been admitted into the seminary or never should have been allowed to continue
to ordination.

The archetype for such a priest is Father
John Geoghan, who molested scores of young boys in the Boston area for
years and who was murdered last year while serving a ten-year prison sentence.
By all accounts, Geoghan was an insecure, immature, and psychologically
disturbed person, and these traits were apparent to some from the outset.
In a letter written by the rector of the seminary where he was studying,
Geoghan was described as having a "very pronounced immaturity." Yet, he
was admitted to the seminary in 1953, ordained in 1962, and allowed to
serve as a priest for more than thirty years. Geoghan reportedly began
abusing boys at his first parish assignment, and scores of individuals
ultimately came forward alleging that Geoghan had abused them over a course
of decades at several different parishes.

There appear to be several reasons why
some in the Church in the past allowed young men and boys into seminaries
who did not belong there. One reason may have been that seminaries simply
presumed that no one afflicted with a severe sexual dysfunction would
have heard the call to the priesthood in the first instance. The notion
that a bishop should not make careful inquiry of a candidate for the priesthood
because he should not question a calling from God is premised on a [page
68 begins] misunderstanding of the process by which the candidate
and the bishop discern whether, in fact, the candidate has such a calling.
[35]

Another reason for the laxity in admissions
may have been that the significant increase in candidates for the priesthood
in the 1950s so overwhelmed seminaries that they did not pay sufficient
attention to the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate. One bishop
who had served as a seminary rector told the Board that seminaries took
in almost anybody who applied during the 1950s, and many of these young
men were there not because they wanted to become priests but because of
family pressure. Then, as vocations declined in the 1970s and 1980s and
thousands of men left the priesthood to marry, the pressure to ordain
a certain number of priests may have contributed to a reluctance to determine
that a particular individual was not well-suited to the priesthood for
psychological reasons.

The maturity of candidates for the priesthood
has played a role as well. As recently as two decades ago, many candidates
for priesthood had entered [page
69 begins] the seminary when only thirteen or fourteen years of
age. Numerous individuals interviewed by the Board believe that these
boys were denied the opportunity to develop socially and psychologically
because of the closed culture of the seminary. Some of these individuals,
ordained in their mid-twenties, had the emotional maturity of adolescents.
This lack of "normal" psychosexual development may have hindered some
of these priests from achieving a healthy celibacy and may explain why
some of them sought the company of adolescent boys. The Review Board was
struck by the large number of individuals who believed that many offender
priests lacked emotional and psychological maturity and considered this
phenomenon to be a cause of the incidence of sexual abuse of minors by
clergy. The full extent to which such immaturity leads to abuse requires
further study.

Most dioceses and religious orders have
closed the minor seminaries in which boys began preparing for the priesthood
at age thirteen or fourteen. Although there may be outstanding minor seminaries
and there may be some adolescents who are ready to enter a seminary, the
Board believes, as a general rule, that the increase in the average age
of new seminarians over the last two decades is a positive development.
At a minimum, bishops and seminary leaders must keep in mind that formation
in a minor seminary has its own special considerations. Chief among these
is the development of an environment where the boys and young men are
able to grow not only intellectually and spiritually but also emotionally.
[page 70 begins]

In the last ten to fifteen years, dioceses
and seminaries increasingly have employed psychological tests and background
checks to screen candidates prior to admission. Virtually all, if not
all, dioceses and seminaries now screen candidates for ordination with
great care. Although there is no test that will identify a pedophile or
sexual predator, psychologists now have developed improved methods for
discerning the presence of a psychosexual dysfunction or personality disorder
and are better able to identify certain "red flags" that indicate an individual
may be prone to sexually abuse a child. Such red flags include confusion
about sexual orientation, narcissism, childish interests and behavior,
lack of peer relationships, and extremes in sexual development. These
screening procedures should help to reduce the likelihood of ordination
of individuals with sexual pathologies, although the nature of such pathologies
makes their discovery uncertain. The significant decrease in reported
acts of sexual abuse of minors among priests ordained since 1990 may serve
as some evidence that these screening procedures are generally effective.

The Review Board thus believes that bishops
and other Church leaders must continue to take advantage of psychological
screening and background checks in determining whether a young man is
suited to the priesthood and must bring greater consistency to their utilization
of these tools. To this end, the Board believes that applicants should
be required to provide written statements regarding their desire to enter
the priesthood; that they should be required to respond to [page
71 begins] questionnaires designed to flag issues that beg further
inquiry; that they should be thoroughly interviewed; that they should
be required to furnish qualified references (e.g., teachers, counselors,
and other presumably reliable sources); and that these references should
be contacted and questioned carefully about the applicant's suitability
for the vocation of the priesthood.

The process must be ongoing and interactive.
In that regard, one bishop told the Board that in his diocese a candidate
is interviewed several times over a significant period of time, and the
quality of the candidate's social interactions as viewed over time is
the predominant determinant of his suitability for the priesthood. The
Board believes, further, that applicants who appear unfit should be rejected
regardless of extrinsic considerations; and that the results of the application
process should be shared among dioceses to avoid inconsistent determinations
regarding unsuitable candidates. [36]

Nevertheless, the Board believes that psychological
screening is not a substitute for the exercise of good judgment by a bishop,
who should get to know every potential candidate for the priesthood before
the candidate is accepted into the [page
72 begins] seminary. [37]
The Holy Father's words in his recent Apostolic Exhortation Pastores
Gregis (Shepherds of the Flock) must be heeded:

The Bishop will not fail to visit the seminary frequently . . . .
A genuine personal knowledge of the candidates for the priesthood
in his particular Church is indispensable for the Bishop. On the basis
of these direct contacts he will ensure that the seminaries form mature
and balanced personalities, men capable of establishing sound human
and pastoral relationships, knowledgeable in theology, solid in the
spiritual life, and in love with the Church.

(Pastores Gregis ¶ 48.)

2. Issues
Relating to the Formation of Candidates for the Priesthood.

A successful
priest must be well developed not only intellectually and spiritually
but also emotionally and psychologically. Given the considerable demands
placed upon priests, particularly by their vow of celibacy, it is vitally
important that seminaries prepare candidates properly for the full range
of the implications of priesthood, including its social and sexual ramifications.
On the specific issue of sexual abuse of minors, a priest's formation
in a seminary is key. As one witness who had been involved for many years
in treatment of offender priests told the Board, "There is a very definite
relationship between [a priest's] formation experience" and the possibility
that the priest will sexually abuse a minor. [page
73 begins]

For many years, seminaries focused almost
exclusively on intellectual preparation and neglected human formation.
Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, some seminaries yielded to a culture
of sexual permissiveness and moral relativism. Although there have been
improvements in seminary conduct over the last ten years, forming priests
who are fully prepared to meet the demands of the priesthood (and dismissing
those seminarians judged incapable of meeting those demands) must remain
a high priority. As Pope John Paul II has written, it is the bishop's
responsibility to know his seminarians; the "bishop should make a point
of visiting them often and in some way 'being' with them as a way of giving
significant expression to his responsibility for the formation of candidates
for the priesthood." (Pastores Dabo Vobis ¶ 65.) Sadly, according
to some witnesses, not all bishops in the United States fulfilled this
responsibility.

Pastores Dabo Vobis states that
"human formation" is the "basis of all priestly formation." Through the
process of human formation, a future priest must "cultivate a series of
human qualities" so that his "human personality . . . becomes a bridge
and not an obstacle for others in their meeting with Jesus Christ the
Redeemer of humanity." (Pastores Dabo Vobis ¶ 43.) Thus, seminarians
"need to be educated to love the truth, to be loyal, to respect every
person, to have a sense of justice, to be true to their word, to be genuinely
compassionate, to be men of integrity and, especially, to be balanced
in judgment and behavior." (Id.) [page
74 begins]

The Review Board believes that, historically,
seminaries paid inadequate attention to the human formation of candidates
for the priesthood. The seminary experience of the 1940s and 1950s differed
radically from the seminary experience of the 1970s and 1980s, but neither
was fully satisfactory. Each period had its own weaknesses that contributed
to the problem. According to many witnesses, these historical problems
largely have been dealt with, but much room for improvement remains.

Older members of the clergy who went through
the seminary before Vatican II described an experience that focused almost
exclusively on intellectual and theological formation. It was, according
to one bishop, "a little bit like kind of a military academy." There was
"nothing in the formation program to deal with what we now call human
formation." Sexuality was not meaningfully discussed. As two bishops recounted,
issues relating to the Sixth Commandment were addressed in Latin, whereas
other subjects were covered in English. A third bishop echoed this and
noted, "When I was in the seminary the boundary issues were taught with
one sentence, 'numquam solus cum sola,' never one man [alone] with one
woman. That was it."

According to numerous interviews, although
some seminaries provided instruction on the Church's teachings on sexuality
prior to Vatican II, they did not permit or encourage seminarians to discuss
their concerns about sexuality and [page
75 begins] celibacy; nor were seminarians given access to psychological
counseling. As a consequence, the Board was told, some seminarians avoided
or repressed their sexual problems. For some priests, it was not until
well after ordination that these problems manifested themselves, often
with tragic results for victims of sexual abuse.

After Vatican II and the upheaval of Humanae
Vitae and the response to it, seminaries changed in significant ways.
Some of the changes were for the better. For example, psychological and
sexual issues were more freely aired, which may have reduced the risk
of an unhealthy burying of sexual problems by candidates. On the other
hand, some of the changes appear to have contributed to the current crisis.
A large number of witnesses, both "liberal" and "conservative," agreed
with the sentiment of one bishop who stated that, from the mid-1960s to
the early 1980s, "seminaries lost their way." The rigid moral absolutism
that had guided clergy and laity alike was giving way to moral relativism,
with its attendant uncertainties and ambiguities. This may have contributed
to a sense that individuals were free to do as they wished. As one bishop
observed: "I think a lot of guys just lost a sense of direction, a sense
of moral focus. . . . All the values that used to help them keep that
dark, unredeemed side under control were just gone, and I think we just
had a lot of people who let go."

It seems to be generally
agreed that seminaries did not adequately address the sexual revolution
that began in the 1960s, resulting in confusion about [page
76 begins] priestly identity on the part of some seminarians and
priests. One of the consequences of this confusion in identity was confusion
in behavior. Many seminaries provided seminarians with an inadequate training
in the theology of the priesthood and failed to follow Church teaching
on issues of sexual morality. In some instances, according to one bishop,
the "culture of 'if it feels good, it's all right' infiltrated seminaries"
and thereby "had its infiltration in the Church." As a result, a homoerotic
culture took root at some seminaries. The Board was told that some seminarians
were propositioned (or worse) by older seminarians or faculty, and little
was done when complaints were made about this misconduct.

In addition, in the 1960s and 1970s, there
was an expectation among many that the Vatican was contemplating modifying
Church doctrine on sexuality and perhaps even abolishing the discipline
of celibacy for priests. As one bishop stated when discussing seminaries
of the late 1960s and 1970s, "You had professors who were saying, 'Don't
worry; they're going to change the celibacy rule any day, and you will
be able to get married.' So guys were going through thinking that they
. . . could get married after ordination."

The Church has an obligation to ensure
that its candidates for the priesthood are made aware not only of Church
doctrine and discipline, but also of the [page
77 begins] rationale for Church doctrine and discipline. [38] The post-Vatican
II obsession with psychology at many seminaries left many priests without
an adequate understanding of the theological and historical basis for
celibacy. The failure to have seminarians study and discuss the meaning
of celibacy and the rationales for celibacy contributed to an atmosphere
in which it was possible for many priests to disregard or distort their
promise of celibacy. Also, "There wasn't enough attention to the spiritual
life," according to one former seminary rector. He went on, "There were
seminaries in which daily mass was not required, seminaries in which the
divine office was not required. . . . The spiritual direction was just
many times a hodgepodge."

Although some witnesses
told the Board that pre-Vatican II "repression" led to problems and others
told the Board that post-Vatican II laxity led to problems, all agreed
that the rapidly changing climate – from a strictly regimented atmosphere
to an "anything-goes" atmosphere – contributed to the current crisis.
One bishop who was in the seminary during the early 1970s noted that it
"was a time of transition from the old formation system to a new formation
system and a lot of confusion in between – theological confusion, doctrinal
confusion." But the inclination of some to "blame" Vatican II for the
subsequent decline in moral standards in [page
78 begins] the Church is simply an "easy out," as one bishop put
it, that fails to take account of numerous other important factors and
changes in society. The apparent significant increase in acts of sexual
abuse of minors by priests in the 1960s and 1970s cannot be viewed without
acknowledging significant changes in sexual behavior in the culture at
large during the same time period.

Problems with seminaries in the post-Vatican
II era were dealt with to a certain extent by an Apostolic Visitation
of seminaries in the 1980s. This process was begun after many had expressed
concerns about the direction of seminaries in the United States. The Visitation
took seven years to conclude and consisted, in effect, of an accreditation-type
examination of seminaries by bishops and seminary rectors. In the wake
of the Apostolic Visitation, according to several observers, seminaries
improved, but problems relating to acceptable standards of behavior and
formation remained at some seminaries.

The Review Board believes that seminaries
must deal with issues of sexual conduct more openly and more forthrightly.
As Pastores Dabo Vobis makes clear, in current Western culture,
"an education for sexuality becomes more difficult but also more urgent."
(Pastores Dabo Vobis ¶ 44.) Even apart from the teaching of the
Church on sexuality, candidates for the priesthood must be made more mindful
of the criminal nature of sexual abuse of minors; they must have reinforced
for them the gravity of this sin and its consequences for the victim,
the priest, and the Church; and [page
79 begins]they must be encouraged to raise concerns that they have
about the sexual conduct of other priests or seminarians, with the assurance
that those concerns will be acted upon.

Pastores Dabo Vobis also stresses
the importance of ongoing formation after a priest's ordination. As noted
above, the Review Board believes that it is vitally important for a priest
to have strong connections with others, including his bishop. Some bishops
have had insufficient contact with individuals studying to be ordained
in their dioceses and little contact thereafter. A bishop who does not
get to know his priests and his seminarians will not be able to determine
whether a person is and continues to be suited for the priesthood or is
in need of counseling or other forms of assistance. In large dioceses,
in particular, it appears that some bishops, who often came from other
dioceses, were not able to establish and maintain sufficient contact with
those under their supervision and tutelage to detect problems in their
incipiency and address them in a proper manner.

* * *

In sum, the bishops cannot keep the promise
of the Charter without continuing to reform and renew the seminaries.
This reform, whether it be through the upcoming Apostolic Visitation referenced
in Article 17 of the Charter or an ongoing accreditation process, must
be undertaken by strong Church leaders – lay and clerical – and must include
those who are not part of the current seminary [page
80 begins] system. The scrutiny must have consequences. Ridding
the Church of the hundreds of priests who have engaged in sexual abuse
of minors is not enough. There also must be consequences for bishops,
diocesan leaders, and seminary administrators.

3. Special
Issues Relating to Sexual Orientation.

As noted
above, the overwhelming majority of reported acts of sexual abuse of minors
by members of the clergy victimized boys. Accordingly, the current crisis
cannot be addressed without consideration of issues relating to homosexuality.

According to Church
doctrine, homosexuality is an intrinsic disorder and homosexual acts are
gravely immoral. At the same time, the Church has long been known for
its position that a homosexual is not to blame for his orientation. So
too, the Review Board draws a distinction between homosexual individuals
and homosexual acts. We do not seek to place the blame for the sexual
abuse crisis on the presence of homosexual individuals in the priesthood
as there are many chaste and holy homosexual priests who are faithful
to their vows of celibacy. However, we must call attention to the homosexual
behavior that characterized the vast majority of the cases of abuse observed
in recent decades. That eighty-one percent of the reported victims of
child sexual abuse by Catholic clergy were boys shows that the crisis
was characterized by homosexual behavior.

It has been reported to the Review Board
that, in some areas, the large number of homosexual priests or candidates
had the effect of discouraging heterosex- [page
81 begins] ual men from seeking to enter the priesthood. In the
1970s and 1980s, in particular, there developed at certain seminaries
a "gay subculture," and at these seminaries, according to several witnesses,
homosexual liaisons occurred among students or between students and teachers.
Such subcultures existed or exist in certain dioceses or orders as well.
The Board believes that the failure to take disciplinary action against
such conduct contributed to an atmosphere in which sexual abuse of adolescent
boys by priests was more likely. In light of this background, it is vital
that bishops, provincials, and seminary rectors ensure that seminaries
create a climate and a culture conducive to chastity.

Before the 1990s, candidates for the seminary
were not asked about their sexual orientation. Over the last fifteen years,
however, as dioceses and seminaries established screening procedures,
it has become routine to inquire about a candidate's sexual orientation.
Currently, some bishops do not accept men with a homosexual orientation
as candidates for the priesthood. Homosexual orientation is seen by some
as a barrier to ordination for theological reasons, given that a priest
conceptually is a generative "father" married to the Church as bride.
As one bishop said to the Board: "I do believe that a priest must be able
to relate to a parish the way a healthy father of a family would relate
to a family . . . . It's not for nothing they call you 'Father.'" Others
express a concern that individuals of a homosexual orientation face greater
temptations in the priesthood or note that a homosexually-oriented [page
82 begins] candidate, unlike a heterosexually-oriented candidate,
is not sacrificing the good of married life and fatherhood when he enters
the priesthood.

Some of those bishops who oppose admitting
homosexual candidates into the seminary acknowledge that "there are some
very fine people who have been priests and religious who have been of
a homosexual orientation and have done a wonderful job." Nevertheless,
given what they view as the "glorification" of homosexual behavior in
contemporary culture, they see too great a risk in today's climate in
ordaining homosexuals to the priesthood.

Other bishops apply no such blanket prohibition
and distinguish between candidates of a homosexual orientation and those
who have led a "gay lifestyle." One priest who has serious concerns about
the "gay subculture" in some dioceses nonetheless opposes a blanket prohibition
of ordination of individuals of a homosexual orientation in the belief
that ordination can be "an invitation to holiness." Moreover, "making
an official declaration that homosexuals are not welcome" will not have
the effect of excluding homosexuals from seminaries, religious communities,
or the priesthood; but rather, "it will have the effect of driving them
underground, so that this subculture exists in an even more hidden way."
Even bishops who believe individuals of a homosexual orientation should
be allowed to become priests stress, however, that it is the role of the
priest – heterosexual or [page
83 begins] homosexual – to act as a married man because he is,
according to Scripture, espoused to the Church.

Such decisions are the prerogative of a
bishop, although it seems clear to the Board that the paramount question
in this area must be whether a candidate for priesthood is capable of
living a chaste, celibate life, not what that candidate's sexual orientation
might be. But given the nature of the problem of clergy sexual abuse of
minors, the realities of the culture today, and the male-oriented atmosphere
of the seminary, a more searching inquiry is necessary for a homosexually-oriented
man by those who decide whether he is suitable for the seminary and for
ministry. For those bishops who choose to ordain homosexuals there appears
to be a need for additional scrutiny and perhaps additional or specialized
formation to help them with the challenge of chaste celibacy. One bishop
pointedly stated that "training for celibacy is different if someone is
homosexually oriented or heterosexually oriented. The occasions of sin
are different. The danger flags are different."

4. Special
Issues Relating to Celibacy.

Although
the discipline of celibacy is not itself a cause of the current crisis,
a failure properly to explain celibacy and prepare seminarians for a celibate
life has contributed to it. As both bishops and priests made clear to
the Review Board, a successful celibate life requires proper formation
and discipline, without which those candidates who were most troubled
sexually were most likely to fail. [page
84 begins]

According to some witnesses, certain sexually
immature or conflicted individuals and certain homosexual men appear to
have been attracted to the priesthood because they mistakenly viewed the
requirement of celibacy as a means of avoiding struggles with their sexual
identities. Others may have felt it provided them with "cover" – a ready
explanation as to why they were not married. One psychiatrist opined that
some troubled priests felt "You could hide your sexual problem in the
priesthood." One cleric echoed this view: "My fears about celibacy in
the present world is that it can become a place for people with sexual
disorders to hide."

The Review Board therefore believes that
bishops must exercise exceptional care in the selection of candidates
for admission to the seminaries, to ensure that individuals ill-suited
for the demands of the priesthood are screened out before the commencement
of a process at which they are likely to fail and before they are placed
in a position where they could pose a risk of harm to minors.

A candidate for the priesthood must have
proper training to understand the meaning of celibacy and guidance on
how to live a celibate life. It must be presented as one with the entire
Catholic sexual ethic. The Review Board believes this is a critical aspect
of the formation process discussed at greater length above. The celibate
life is especially difficult in our culture today, where the perception
is, as one bishop put it, that "unless you're sexually active, you're
not an adult." [page 85 begins]

According to Pastores Dabo Vobis,
"Of the greatest importance for formation for chastity in celibacy are
the bishop's concern and fraternal life among priests." (Pastores
Dabo Vobis ¶ 50.) Thus, as part of seminary training, "celibacy should
be presented clearly, without any ambiguities, and in a positive fashion."
(Id.) Yet, as one priest, stated, "Very few bishops sit down
with the priests and say, 'What's it like being celibate?' I don't mean,
'Are you having an affair right now?' But, 'What kind of a struggle has
it been, or has it been easy?'" The Review Board believes that avoiding
discussions of this topic contributed to an environment where a priest
having difficulty with celibacy was more likely to find an unhealthy (and
possibly criminal) outlet for his frustrations, thereby providing fuel
for the current crisis, however unwittingly.

To be a successful celibate, one must understand
the meaning and purpose of priestly celibacy. Priestly celibacy is not
simply an unmarried state or even refraining from sexual relations – although
it is obviously both of those things. Rather, as Pope Paul VI wrote, priestly
celibacy is intended to enable the priest to further model Christ, to
espouse himself to the Church, and to serve as a sacrifice for the entire
People of God. (Sacerdotalis Caelibatus ¶¶ 17-34.) As
one bishop explained, successful celibacy requires more than simply saying
"No" to sex:

I don't think celibacy is the problem unless you understand it as
bachelorhood and as a kind of unhealthy bachelorhood. . . . Celibacy
has got to be understood relationally. You cannot be a good celibate
without some intimacy in your life. You cannot be a good celibate
[page 86 begins] unless
you can relate equally well to women and men and have friendships
among women and men. You cannot be a good celibate without a prayer
life, without a confessor and a spiritual director.

It appears that too many priests and too
many bishops acted as if celibacy was something that could be imposed
as part of the formation process and then taken for granted. Whether such
an approach ever was possible, it is clear that in the hyper-sexualized
American society of the past few decades, living a celibate life takes
commitment and dedication on a daily basis both before and after ordination.
As Pope John Paul II has noted, priests who have given a promise or a
vow of celibacy still must struggle with desires and yearnings just like
all humans: "Since the charism of celibacy, even when it is genuine and
has proved itself, leaves one's affections and instinctive impulses intact,
candidates to the priesthood need an affective maturity which is prudent,
able to renounce anything that is a threat to it, vigilant over both body
and spirit, and capable of esteem and respect in interpersonal relationships
between men and women." (Pastores Dabo Vobis ¶ 44.)

As with so many aspects of the crisis,
the interaction of celibacy cannot be isolated from cultural changes in
American society. Reflecting this, one bishop said that living a celibate
life always has been a "struggle" for priests, but that it is an even
greater struggle today because the "culture and the community" no longer
"sustain it." That is, whereas living a celibate life was once more generally
appreciated as heroic, today often it is seen as peculiar or even perverse.
Another bishop [page 87 begins]
told the Board that the most healthy celibate is probably the one who
struggles most with his human sexuality, and who every day has to say
"yes to celibacy." According to this bishop and others, to maintain his
vow of celibacy, a priest needs (i) a solid prayer life; (ii) friendship
with peers, married and unmarried, clergy and laity; and (iii) job satisfaction.

The effect of the discipline of celibacy
on the behavior of priests should be viewed in light of the reality that
priests traditionally have not been subject to close oversight. For young
priests who had just left the rigid pre-Vatican II seminary, where they
were under constant scrutiny, becoming an assistant pastor at a parish
was a liberation. These individuals suddenly were respected and trusted
without question, and just as suddenly given responsibility for dealing
with youth groups. This abrupt change, both in increased responsibility
and decreased oversight, increased the risk of sexual misconduct by priests
– particularly those who were not properly selected and trained. The lack
of oversight is particularly troubling. According to one priest: "I see
my bishop four times a year at public gatherings. I could have a concubine
and three children and nobody would know it except the housekeeper in
the rectory." The Board believes that each bishop should know his priests
and he should consider, as another priest suggested, following a policy
of meeting personally and privately with each of his priests at least
once or twice a year. [page 88
begins]

Unlike religious order priests who take
a vow of celibacy but live in community with other priests of the order,
many diocesan priests live alone in isolated rectories with little sense
of community or oversight and thus may lack some of the emotional benefits
afforded by a sense of community. This isolation in some instances may
have afforded some priests the freedom to commit acts of abuse without
detection. Religious order priests often comment that they believe it
is easier for them to live a celibate life because they live in a community
that provides them support and intimacy. Diocesan living arrangements
bear revisiting in light of the scandal of sexual abuse of minors by priests.
Several witnesses recommended that dioceses consider establishing residential
living centers for priests that would help to meet the twin purposes of
fostering community and healthy intimate relationships and ensuring oversight
of priests. Indeed, such a living situation for diocesan priests is highly
recommended by the Code of Canon Law in Canon 280.

Although beyond the scope of this Report,
there are a number of other issues relating to celibacy that could provide
a breeding ground for other crises. For example, numerous witnesses told
the Board that they believe there were more incidents of sexual relationships
between a priest and a consenting adult woman or man than between a priest
and a minor. Although it is typically not a crime to engage in sexual
relations with a consenting adult, men and women involved in sexual affairs
with priests are often vulnerable, and in any event such conduct by a
priest is [page 89 begins]
gravely immoral. Bishops and other church leaders cannot allow such conduct
to occur without consequences. Statements to the effect that it is "nobody's
business" if a priest engages in sexual conduct with an adult are fundamentally
wrong. Whether a priest keeps his vows and lives in accordance with the
moral precepts of the Church is the business of his bishop, his fellow
priests, and his parishioners.

* * *

In sum, there can be no doubt that while
it is a gift for some, celibacy is a terrible burden for others, resulting
in loneliness, alcohol and drug abuse, and improper sexual conduct. That
does not mean, of course, that celibacy should not remain a principle
of priestly life. Living a celibate life can allow a priest to model Christ
more fully and to commit himself completely to his people in a way that
many believe would not be possible if the priest were married. And many
priests firmly believe that, as one priest stated, the "genuine sacrifice"
of celibacy "can be converted into a form of prayer that provides additional
grace to others who may be struggling with various problems."

It would be presumptuous of the Review
Board, and beyond its mandate, to opine on the relative merits of a celibate
or non-celibate priesthood. But it is clear that bishops must remain watchful
to ensure that priests embrace chaste celibacy as part of their priestly
identity and not as a burden imposed upon them or as a means of escape
or denial. In addition, because celibacy is widely misunderstood [page
90 begins] by the American public, the Church must take care to
address issues relating to celibacy in an open and forthright manner.

The Board also notes that dioceses in the
United States today vary widely in their treatment of priests who violate
their vows of celibacy in situations that do not involve abuse of minors,
and that the Church would be well advised to consider establishing guidelines
for addressing such lapses that would bring greater clarity to the meaning
of celibacy, both for priests and the public. Finally, the Board believes
that greater examination by the Church of the role of, extent of compliance
with, and consequences of celibacy would be beneficial given the ramifications
of celibacy with respect to many aspects of Church life. It is a subject
that demands further study.

5. Special
Issues Relating to Spiritual Life.

While there
are many ways to view the current crisis, as a crisis of priestly identity
or a crisis of episcopal leadership, the Board believes that the over-riding
paradigm that characterizes the crisis is one of sinfulness. The actions
of priests who sexually abused minors were grievously sinful. The inaction
of those bishops who failed to protect their people from predators was
also grievously sinful. Somehow, the "smoke of Satan" was allowed to enter
the Church, and as a result the Church itself has been deeply wounded.
Its ability to speak clearly and credibly on moral issues has been seriously
impaired. [page 91 begins]

The only way to combat sinfulness is with
holiness. This is not a public relations battle for the approval of the
press or the loyalty of the laity. It is, fundamentally, the age-old issue
of good and evil. The Church must be holy; her ministers must be holy;
her people must be holy. The foundation of holiness is a strong spiritual
life, a life of prayer and simplicity. Priests who were truly holy would
not have abused young people; nor would they have allowed others to do
so.

In this regard, individuals who have spoken
with priest perpetrators note that sexual misconduct typically followed
a failure to maintain a daily prayer life. A priest is not a social worker
or a youth counselor. A priest brings the word of God to the People of
God, and this is not possible without a strong spiritual life.

In sum, as Pope John Paul II emphasized
in his address to the U.S. bishops in 1993 on the sexual abuse of minors
by clergy, "this whole sad question must be placed in a context which
is not exclusively human." Because of this, of the many necessary responses
to the scandal, "the first and most important is prayer: ardent, humble,
confident prayer."

[The next four paragraphs
do not appear in this location in the PDF
of the original report. In the original report, the paragraphs are
placed several pages later. Click here
to go to the spot where they originally appeared.]

[midway
down page 94]Many Church leaders appeared to
have avoided dealing with problems of sexual abuse, perhaps because of
a discomfort about addressing sexual issues and a reluctance to exercise
their authority over priests, often leaving to others with less authority
the management of critical issues they should have addressed themselves.
[page 95 begins] In addition,
some bishops delegated this responsibility. For example, it is clear from
the Review Board's examination of the Boston Archdiocese that Cardinal
Law paid insufficient personal attention to the problem of sexual abuse
of minors by priests under his authority and that the clerics to whom
he delegated responsibility for this issue often failed in their handling
of it. Nor did Cardinal Law properly supervise those to whom he delegated
authority, essentially abdicating responsibility for a matter of paramount
importance to the integrity of the Church. As one bishop said of Cardinal
Law, "I think he wasn't even paying attention."

Many in the Church failed to realize or
appreciate that sexual conduct by an adult with an older minor is a criminal
act. As a result of this failure to appreciate the legal (as well as moral)
dimension of this conduct, clergy abuse of minors was very rarely reported
to the civil authorities. One priest stated, "I just don't think it ever
occurred to them that there was a law out there; that the ethos of the
society was that . . . you go to prison for this." To the extent that
bishops and provincials really did not comprehend that sexual conduct
between an adult and an adolescent was a crime, the fault must lay somewhat
with their legal counsel.

The Review Board recognizes that bishops
have numerous obligations. But surely none of these should be allowed
to take precedence over protecting children and young people whose religious
instruction is entrusted to their care, or to preclude responding to problems
that threaten the well-being of the presbyterate [page
96 begins] itself. It may be true that some bishops were not aware
of numerous allegations against priests under their supervision, but that
is no defense – instead, it is part and parcel of the problem. Ignorance
is no excuse here. As one victim of clergy sexual abuse said to the Board,
bishops must be told, "Sir, it's your job to know what's going on. It's
your job to know what happened."

Even a bishop with responsibilities for
the administration of hundreds of parishes and big-picture issues such
as social and economic justice or respect for life cannot allow those
responsibilities to eclipse his fundamental duty to ensure that each of
the people of his diocese is in the care of a good pastor. "The best thing
you ever do as a bishop is to give a parish a good priest," one bishop
told us. Unfortunately, as we have seen, not all bishops appear to have
shared or acted on that view. [ends midway down
page 96]

Although the fact that approximately four
percent of clergy have sexually abused minors outrages and saddens the
laity, the overwhelming majority of the clergy have led honorable lives
of dedication to the Church and her people. More distressing to the laity
is the inadequate response by bishops and other Church [page
92 begins] leaders to this problem over the last twenty-five years.
Too many bishops in the United States failed to respond to this problem
forthrightly and firmly. Their responses were characterized by moral laxity,
excessive leniency, insensitivity, secrecy, and neglect. Aspects of the
failure to respond properly to sexual abuse of minors by priests included:
(i) inadequately dealing with victims of clergy sexual abuse, both pastorally
and legally; (ii) allowing offending priests to remain in positions of
risk; (iii) transferring offending priests to new parishes or other dioceses
without informing others of their histories; (iv) failing to report instances
of criminal conduct by priests to secular law enforcement authorities,
whether such a report was required by law or not; and (v) declining to
take steps to laicize priests who clearly had violated canon law.

Most fundamentally, some bishops in the
United States did not appreciate the gravity of the problem of sexual
abuse of minors by clergy. Until recently, these bishops all too often
treated victims of clerical sexual abuse as adversaries and threats to
the well-being of the Church, not as injured parishioners in need of healing.
Far too frequently, they treated predator priests as misdirected individuals
in need of psychological treatment or a simple change in environment,
rather than as criminal offenders to be removed from ministry and reported
to civil authorities for possible prosecution and appropriate punishment.
These approaches did not solve any problems but rather served to exacerbate
them. [page 93 begins]

Certain bishops and other Church leaders
in the United States were altogether too easy on their fellow clergy and
too willing to take the easy way out themselves. All of the presumptions
weighed in favor of the accused priest at the expense of the victim. This
tilt is attributable in part to "clericalism" – an attitude that priests
and bishops are apart from and superior to the laity – and in part to
idiosyncracies in canon law. In addition, the failure of some bishops
to exercise proper governance, choosing instead to minimize or rationalize
or forgive or just ignore misconduct, or else to pass along problems to
other unsuspecting dioceses, has led to governmental intervention that
could threaten the independence of the Church in the United States. The
civil authorities, when dealing with the Church, must be sensitive to
this concern and should take pains to ensure that they do not unnecessarily
intrude upon internal workings of the Church, which are protected by the
First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion. For its part,
Church leaders must understand that a failure properly to police themselves
simply invites this type of governmental intrusion.

1. Understanding
the Nature and Scope of the Abuse and the Harm it Caused.

Church leaders
failed to appreciate the harm suffered by victims of sexual abuse by priests,
the seriousness of the underlying misconduct, and the frequency of the
abuse. In the 1950s and early 1960s, many Church leaders viewed sexual
abuse as a moral lapse only and did not understand the psychological causes
[page 94 begins] and
consequences of such conduct. More recently, some Church leaders viewed
sexual abuse as a psychological problem only and placed undue reliance
on therapy as a solution. The failure of Church leaders to recognize sexual
abuse of minors as a crime, and not just the manifestation of a moral
failing and psychological disorder, and to deal with it accordingly, has
contributed enormously to the current crisis.

Many bishops and other Church leaders either
did not feel or did not express the sense of outrage experienced so overwhelmingly
by the broader community at the heinous acts committed by priests under
their authority. [39]
Their failure to exercise their authority in a manner that properly redressed
past abuse and precluded further abuse has badly compromised the ability
of the Church to play a leadership role with respect to important contemporary
moral issues.

[In the PDF of the original
report, four paragraphs appear here. Those paragraphs also appear in the
USCCB's Web version of the report, but in a different place in the text.
See our note above.]

[midway
down page 96]2.
Responding to Victims.

The first
role of a bishop or any other Church leader must be to act as a pastor
to the Catholic faithful. When faced with allegations by parishioners
of abuse by clerics, however, far too many Church leaders did not deal
with victims in a pastoral fashion. As one survivor of clergy sexual abuse
told the Board, what victims typically want is to be "treated with respect
and dignity." In too many cases, however, victims were marginalized and,
in effect, re-victimized.

As noted above, far too few bishops grasped
the severity of the harm experienced by victims of clergy sexual abuse,
particularly minors. Several victims [page
97 begins] have committed suicide. Others have struggled for decades
with psychological complications of the abuse, including depression, drug
dependency, and sexual dysfunction. These effects often do not manifest
themselves for years. One victim told us that the "shame and the guilt"
borne of clerical sexual abuse is "so strong that people keep it silent
for years, well into adulthood." [40]
Victims who came forward and told their story showed tremendous courage,
as was clear to the Board from meeting with many of them.

The Review Board believes the failure to
understand the harm is attributable, in large measure, to the fact that
bishops and other Church leaders rarely spoke personally with victims
of sexual abuse, in part, as discussed more fully below, in misplaced
reliance upon myopic legal advice. Time and again, bishops informed the
Board that they did not fully comprehend the horror of sexual abuse and
the damage it wrought until they had met with a number of victims. As
one said, "Anyone should have seen the horror of it. But unless you listen
to victims, survivors, you don't really have that sense of the horror."
Another bishop said that there was "a disconnect whereby for some reason
at a pastoral level bishops and priests did not grasp how horrified the
average parent would be over the thought that his or her child would be
sexually abused by a member of the clergy." [page
98 begins]

Sexual abuse inherently is traumatic; and
when committed by a priest, it is especially traumatic. Because a priest
is quite literally a "father figure," abuse by a priest is likely to cause
more harm to a child than abuse by any other individual outside of the
family. Moreover, a unique consequence of abuse by a member of the clergy
is the damage to the victim's faith. Indeed, some priests committed these
crimes in connection with the sacrament of confession or in relation to
other Church liturgies, aggravating the spiritual damage. Abusing priests
also have, by their conduct, made many victims feel that it is difficult,
if not impossible, to remain in communion with the Church or indeed to
hold any religious belief. [41]

Many Church leaders refused to meet with
victim support groups because they disagreed with the agendas of some
of these groups. Although some members of victim support groups are not
always fair to the bishops and are unwilling to give credit when it is
due, disregarding these groups is short-sighted and contributes to the
perception of a closed and secretive Church. Distaste for the messenger
too often blinded Church leadership to the significance of the message.
It should come as no surprise that many victims and their friends and
families feel alienated from the institutional Church and turn to support
groups that appear hostile [page
99 begins] to it. The Review Board believes that the proper response
of the Church in these circumstances is to strive for rapprochement and
reconciliation, and not to interpose rejection or condemnation.

The failure to meet with victims often
resulted in bishops making decisions based on a one-sided version of events.
As one bishop said to the Board: "Bishops are human. Sometimes they get
diffident about walking into situations where they don't know what's going
to be waiting for them there, and so they back off and say, 'Well, maybe
I won't go there; but here, I know this priest and I'll talk to him.'"
It should have been obvious that talking only to priests about allegations
against priests was unlikely to provide an adequate basis for determining
the validity of allegations and responding to a problem of enormous magnitude.

The Review Board believes that bishops
should seek to participate in face-to-face meetings with victims and their
families whenever possible. As one bishop told us, these meetings help
both the victims and the bishops by providing solace to the former and
catharsis for the latter. And as another bishop observed: "I think if
we can't talk to people and listen to people, then we're in the wrong
business." Yet one bishop who had served as a diocesan official told us
that he had been reprimanded by a diocesan attorney for speaking to victims
and saying that he was sorry for what the victim had suffered. [page
100 begins]

The importance of a holistic approach should
not be underestimated. Parents of victims can feel angry at the Church
while also feeling guilty that they did not prevent their child from being
harmed. Often, too, they feel ashamed that their child did not tell them
what happened or that they responded poorly when told by their child.
The full range of these emotions must be addressed, however painfully,
if bishops truly are to fulfill their pastoral responsibilities.

In sum, failure to meet with victims and
their families prevented bishops from comprehending the nature and the
scope of the problem. More importantly, those Church leaders who did not
meet with victims and their families, and did not endeavor to bring healing
to them, failed in their pastoral duties. This failure of the Catholic
clergy to attend to the pain of its parishioners is all the more egregious
inasmuch as the underlying injury was inflicted by a member of the clergy
itself.

3. Presumptions
in Favor of Accused Priests.

A significant
cause of the inadequate response of Church leaders to allegations of sexual
abuse was the fact that in assessing allegations against accused priests,
presumptions rooted in both theology and Church culture heavily favored
the accused priest. Surveying the landscape in certain dioceses, one bishop
noted, "There is a larger pattern of protection of priests first, rather
than protecting the children first." [page
101 begins]

a.
The Presumed Right to Ministry.

Under
Church doctrine, when a man is ordained as a priest he is permanently
marked with the sign of Christ and ontologically changed. That is, unless
the ordination was somehow invalid, a priest is always a priest, even
if laicized. This concept gave rise to an unfounded perception that a
priest had a "right" to his ministry and caused unwillingness or reluctance
on the part of bishops to take steps to remove a priest from ministry.
This reluctance may have been reinforced by a view that regardless of
other conduct, through the power of his ordination, a priest still was
able to perform his essential function – that is, to offer mass and administer
the sacraments.

But even if a priest had not been formally
laicized, there were no bars, theological or otherwise, to excluding him
from public ministry. To a degree, orders may have found it easier than
dioceses did to deal with problem priests in this regard. A diocesan priest
typically is a parish priest, and the dioceses do not have a significant
number of non-ministry positions to which priests can be assigned. By
contrast, the typical religious house has a variety of positions that
involve no ministry or contact with children.

b.
The Process of Laicization Under the Code of Canon Law.

Canon
law long has provided that a priest can be laicized for engaging in sexual
abuse of a minor. Nevertheless, bishops and religious ordinaries very
rarely [page 102 begins]
responded to evidence of a violation of canon law by resorting to a canonical
charge, in part because canon law procedures made it very difficult to
take action against a priest. As one bishop told the Board, "I'm not a
canon lawyer, but I happen to think that the Code of Canon Law we've got
is flawed. . . . I just think it's so much weighted toward the rights
of the individual that the common good of the Church is not adequately
protected." Indeed, canon law experts have informed the Board that, prior
to the adoption of the Essential Norms, there were exceptionally few cases
in which priests who had engaged in sexual abuse of minors were dismissed
from the clerical state as a result of the diocesan panel process stipulated
in canon law.

Canon law has proven to be an inadequate
method of dealing with cases of sexual abuse of minors for many reasons.
First, the canonical tribunals in dioceses simply did not have the expertise
to handle involuntary laicization cases. These tribunals dealt almost
exclusively with annulment cases. The canonists in the tribunals had little
training in the canons and procedures relating to punishment of clerics,
including Canon 1395. The Board interviewed several individuals with degrees
in canon law, and the remarks of one regarding laicization provisions
captured the views of many: "This was seen as something very extreme and
so you probably wouldn't be using it very much. At least that was the
impression that I got when we were studying it." In hindsight, the Church
would have been better served if a national canonical tribunal or regional
tribunals had been established to hear and [page
103 begins] decide cases involving abuse by priests. Within the
past year, such regional tribunals have been proposed to hear laicization
cases in the wake of the implementation of the Essential Norms.

The canon law process for dealing with
sexual abuse cases was impeded further by the concept of "imputability,"
which provided that the penalty of laicization could not be handed down
if the priest or his advocate were able to show that the priest was not
completely responsible for his actions because of an illness or some other
psychological condition. Thus, the worst predators, who actually had been
diagnosed as pedophiles or as suffering from some other "illness," paradoxically
were the most difficult to laicize under canon law. Evidence that the
priest was under the influence of alcohol also could serve as a mitigating
factor.

In addition, process often took precedence
over substance. Under canon law, some convictions could be reversed by
tribunals in Rome years after the fact because of a failure to follow
all technical procedural requirements, injecting the potential for inordinate
delays into cases that did go forward. One bishop told us that his fellow
bishops avoided recourse to canon law because they "weren't sure where
Rome would come down," adding that "it was extremely hard to press your
case in Rome and be sure that you would be heard." Another told the Board,
"We were all very hesitant to do a canonical trial because if there's
any procedural flaw in it you can easily be overturned on appeal to Rome."
[page 104 begins]

Reportedly, the Vatican courts tended to
err on the side of protecting a priest because of a concern that bishops
could seek to use canon law to rid themselves of priests whom they did
not like or with whom they disagreed on some point or another. The focus
of the law and of the canonists interpreting and applying the law historically
was on protecting the rights of the accused. Although the Review Board
believes it is important to protect the rights of accused priests, it
also believes that greater consideration must be given to the protection
of the faithful.

c.
Clericalism.

Clerical
culture and a misplaced sense of loyalty made some priests look the other
way in the face of evidence of sexual abuse of minors, and contributed
to the unwillingness of members of the clergy to condemn the conduct of
a brother priest. Some witnesses likened the clerical culture to a feudal
or a military culture and said that priests and bishops who "rocked the
boat" were less likely to advance. Likewise, we were told, some bishops
did not want to be associated with any problem for fear of criticism because
problems arose on their watch. As a result, problems were left to fester.

Clericalism also contributed to a culture
of secrecy. In many instances, Church leaders valued confidentiality and
a priest's right to privacy above the prevention of further harm to victims
and the vindication of their rights. Both confidentiality and privacy
are valuable, and obviously it is important to take steps to [page
105 begins] ensure, to the extent possible, the privacy and rights
of the accused. But these values should not be allowed to trump the duty
to keep children safe from harm or to investigate claims of sexual abuse
against clerics and respond appropriately.

Until recently, few dioceses relied on
qualified independent fact-finders to assist in assessing the validity
of allegations. Indeed, in some cases, the cleric making the decision
about the future of a priest had known the priest for many years. For
example, in Boston, the priest assigned responsibility for interviewing
other priests accused of abuse and determining their credibility was a
friend or seminary classmate of some of the accused priests. Moreover,
the investigating official did not hear directly from the victim accusers.
Rather, a woman religious spoke to victims and a priest spoke to accused
priests. Although the nun found the victims almost uniformly to be credible,
she played no role in deciding whether to return a priest to ministry;
whereas those who participated in that decision had contact only with
the accused, and were predisposed to believe self-serving assertions that
no wrongdoing had occurred.

Clericalism also can be blamed for the
fact that, to a great degree, bishops and other Church leaders engaged
in massive denial. Church leaders often were reluctant to acknowledge
that a priest, a man ordained to be "another Christ," could have engaged
in the horrific acts of which he was accused. Thus, some diocesan leaders
were too willing to accept exculpatory explanations by priests even [page
106 begins] when it appeared that the accuser was credible. With
the benefit of hindsight, it appears that many of the clerics charged
with investigating accused priests were either incredibly naive or willing
to look the other way. Indeed, Church officials seemed to want to keep
information from themselves. One priest who tried to bring his concerns
about clergy sexual abuse of minors to his bishop in a letter was chastised
by the vicar general for doing so. "It was," the priest asserts, "total
denial."

Finally, the haughty attitude of some bishops,
which has exacerbated the crisis, is a byproduct of clericalism. Just
as priests are often placed on a pedestal far above the laity that they
serve, certain bishops appear far removed from their priests. As several
exemplary bishops have displayed in responding to the crisis, a bishop
must lead with humility, not hubris, and never forget that he is first
and foremost a pastor to his people.

d.
Forgiveness Without Condemnation.

Even
where the evidence of misconduct was incontrovertible, many bishops felt
compelled to forgive the offending priest so long as that priest appeared
contrite. Clearly, where brother priests were concerned, bishops often
felt more comfortable forgiving than condemning, even where condemnation
was demanded by the nature of the offense. This eagerness to forgive (and
forget) failed to take into account the harm the offending priest had
caused and the potential for repeated violations. Jesus did not fail to
condemn when condemnation was called for. [page
107 begins] Indeed, speaking of children, he said that "anyone
who is the downfall of one of these little ones who have faith in me would
be better drowned in the depths of the sea with a great millstone around
his neck." (Matthew 18:6.) The laity expect bishops likewise to condemn
when necessary, both in public statements and in private conversations
with their priests.

Forgiveness is not incompatible with consequences
as the concept of penance clearly shows. But too many bishops and other
Church leaders simply forgave the errant priest, in effect immunizing,
rather than punishing, conduct that violated both canon and civil law.
And too many were too willing to accept without question the word of predator
priests who voiced repentance and then, immune from any consequences for
past misconduct, went on to repeat their criminal sins.
[42]

4. Secrecy
and the Avoidance of Scandal.

Faced with
serious and potentially inflammatory abuses, Church leaders placed too
great an emphasis on the avoidance of scandal in order to protect the
reputation of the Church, which ultimately bred far greater scandal and
reputational injury. One bishop opined that because the Church in the
United States historically is a minority, immigrant institution, it has
been particularly desirous of [page
108 begins] seeking to solve its own problems without exposing
them to a hostile culture. Several others echoed this thought. This desire
to keep problems "within the family" also may have stemmed from a shortsighted
concern that the faith of the laity would be shaken by their exposure.
At heart, this was a failure of Church leadership, which lacked the vision
to recognize that, unless nipped in the bud, the problems would only grow
until they no longer could be contained, and that then the problems would
have an even greater propensity to undermine the faith of the laity.

The impulse to avoid scandal at all costs
manifested itself in several ways. First, Church leaders kept information
from parishioners and other dioceses that should have been provided to
them. Some also pressured victims not to inform the authorities or the
public of abuse. For example, some dioceses did not inform parishioners
when allegations about a priest who had served at that parish arose, although
such a practice might have given additional victims the courage to come
forward and would have helped the diocese determine the validity of complaints.
Bishops and other Church leaders often did not tell their brethren the
full story when a priest took up residence in a new diocese, and the bishop
in the receiving diocese often did not ask all of the questions about
the incoming priest that he should have asked. This lack of candor – with
parishioners, with civil authorities, with fellow bishops – avoided scandal
in the short term while sowing seeds for greater upheaval in the long
term. [page 109 begins]

The Review Board is concerned that, even
today, some bishops and priests fail to address the issue of clerical
sexual abuse in a sufficiently open manner. Bishops and priests have a
duty to bring others to the gospel. Given the highly public profile of
the current crisis, that evangelization must include addressing the scandal
of clergy sexual abuse of minors. The Church must inform current parishioners
and potential converts of the steps that the Church has taken and is taking
to deal with both the causes of clergy sexual abuse of minors and its
consequences. Yet, with some notable exceptions, priests and bishops still
shy away from the subject and revert to defensive postures. [43]
Such a stance will do little to renew the trust of the laity or encourage
others to learn more about the Catholic faith.

Four implications of the impulse to avoid
scandal are particularly troubling to the Review Board in the context
of the current crisis. First, time and again Church leaders failed to
report incidents of possible criminal activity to the civil authorities.
[44] In
fairness, at the time, Church leaders typically were not required [page
110 begins] to report allegations of sexual abuse of minors to
civil authorities. In addition, civil authorities often showed little
interest in receiving information about cases that were beyond the statute
of limitations. But it is clear in hindsight that the Church could have
prevented numerous acts of sexual abuse had its leaders reported all allegations
of sexual abuse by priests to the civil authorities. Where the evidence
warranted, offenders could have been prosecuted and punished before they
were able to perpetuate their misconduct; and by their example, other
priests could have been deterred from engaging in similar misconduct.
Article 4 of the Charter requires dioceses to report allegations of sexual
abuse of a minor, even when not required by law to report, and to "cooperate
with public authorities about reporting in cases when the person is no
longer a minor." The Board believes that dioceses should report all such
cases to civil authorities, regardless of whether the victim is still
a minor or not.

Second, in some instances Church leaders
discouraged victims or their parents from reporting the abuse to authorities.
Again Article 4 now requires dioceses to "advise victims of their right
to make a report to public authorities" and to support this right. Alternatively,
victims or their families did not go to law enforcement because they trusted
the Church to take care of the problem. That trust [page
111 begins] repeatedly was breached, in itself a serious failing;
and the public disclosure of that breach has magnified the loss of faith
on the part of some of the laity.

Third, certain witnesses stated that in
some instances bishops may not have punished priests who engaged in sexual
abuse because the bishops were themselves compromised. That is, priests
either explicitly or implicitly threatened to reveal compromising information
about a bishop if the bishop took steps against the priest. It should
go without saying that any priest who believes that there is a basis upon
which he could be subject to blackmail should not allow himself to be
elevated to bishop or placed in any other position of authority.

Finally, in part out of an overemphasis
on secrecy, dioceses and religious orders did not utilize adequate methods
to track allegations against priests. Because records relating to an individual
priest often would be kept in three or four separate files, Church leaders
investigating allegations of sexual abuse by an individual priest did
not always have all of the information they needed in order to assess
the credibility of the allegations. Important documents often were maintained
in "secret archives" pursuant to canon law, and Church officials without
access to these files often were unaware of critical past allegations
against a priest when addressing other allegations. Reflecting this, Cardinal
Law at one point put the blame for the transfer of predator priests in
part on an inadequate filing system. [page
112 begins]

The Review Board believes that dioceses
and religious orders must maintain more open and accurate personnel records
regarding priests, which should be audited and reviewed by diocesan lay
boards or outside auditors. Nevertheless, the existence of a bad filing
system only partially explains, and in no way excuses, the failing of
various dioceses to respond properly to evidence of sexual abuse by members
of their clergy. Had bishops placed the issue of sexual abuse of minors
by the clergy at the top of their agenda, we have no doubt that the filing
system on priest perpetrators would have been improved.

5. Dependence
on the Therapeutic Model.

Bishops were
too willing to turn over the problem of sexual abuse of minors to psychiatrists
and psychologists. Moreover, even after the inherent limitations of treatment
became well recognized, Church leaders continued to accept favorable reports
as a basis, without any other considerations, to return perpetrators of
abuse to positions of ministry.

To a certain degree, the response of many
bishops demonstrates, as one witness stated, "the triumph of the bureaucratic
and therapeutic over the theological." As discussed in greater detail
below, even where the priest was removed from ministry on a temporary
basis, some bishops were too ready to seize upon optimistic statements
by therapists in deciding whether to return a priest to ministry. Some
Church leaders withheld important and damaging information from treatment
[page 113 begins] centers.
Others solicited second opinions where the prognosis offered by the first
professional was not to their liking, or relied on treatment centers that
were more likely to provide a clean bill of health. This excessive dependence
upon therapy, and worse, skewing of its outcome, compromised the ability
of Church leaders to evaluate properly the prospective role of priests
who had engaged in the sexual abuse of minors.

A psychiatric evaluation has limits, and
the result of such an evaluation is only one of the factors that a bishop
should consider in determining a priest's future. In a 1990 letter to
a diocesan official, one psychiatrist underscored that the responsibility
for determining whether to allow a priest to return to ministry, or to
continue in any other capacity within the Church, belongs with the bishop
and not the treatment center:

We [psychiatrists] are certainly in a weak position when we try to
make predictions about future behavior. . . . Because of the inherent
weakness in the psychiatric assessment in determining whether or not
an event has occurred, or may occur in the future, it is important
that a separate administrative procedure, or internal due process
procedure be established within an organization to deal with concerns
about aberrant behavior. . . . A psychiatric evaluation can be helpful
in providing information about whether or not a mental illness exists,
but such an evaluation cannot be the determining factor in deciding
what administrative action should be taken.

Reiterating this point, one bishop told the Board, "I don't think any
bishop has the right to blame [treatment centers] for anything because
the ultimate decision is the bishop's, not theirs." [page
114 begins]

Nonetheless, the Review Board is aware
that other psychiatrists and psychologists have been willing to state,
to bishops or other diocesan authorities, that priests who had sexually
abused minors, and then had undergone treatment, did not pose a threat
if returned to ministry. For example, one treatment center in 1989 diagnosed
Father Geoghan as having "atypical pedophilia" and stated that he was
"psychologically fit" to continue working with children. One assessment
letter for another priest from another center indicated that the priest
"is ready for re-assignment in the archdiocese" and that the priest would
"do well in 'a solo project', provided that the Doctor's recommendations
could be followed; i.e., not too lonely and isolated a place,
and with the provision that he keep in touch with the Doctor from time
to time." It is not surprising that such vague recommendations resulted
in simply returning priests to ministry with little follow-up or oversight.

An early 1990s report to a bishop from
one therapist is almost effusive in praise of the patient, a priest who
had engaged in sexual abuse of minors. After noting the "impressive improvement"
shown by the priest in therapy, the letter states that the priest "has
been a deeply frightened man, quick to cover his own spontaneity, and
has suffered a significant degree of sexual confusion which has marred
his ability to adjust as an adult to his social and intimate relationships."
The letter goes on to note that it is "deeply gratifying to me as his
therapist to witness his emergence from deep-seated shame and guilt,"
anticipates "an excellent outcome [page
115 begins] from his stay here," and thanks the bishop for "sending
this courageous, talented man to us." The letter concludes, "It has been
a privilege to know him."

Letters such as these and others, many
of which have been made public as a result of litigation and government
investigations, show that the staffs of treatment centers must shoulder
some of the blame for decisions to allow priests who had abused minors
to return to positions where they were able to repeat their offenses.
A man who has sexually abused minors ought to be filled with "deep-seated
shame and guilt," and bishops ought not to have countenanced such coddling
of criminals. Indeed, a few treating physicians actually told bishops
that returning a priest-perpetrator to ministry was a necessary part of
that priest's recovery. One psychiatrist told the Board that it was not
until the 1980s that treatment professionals realized that "part of successful
treatment is to not put these folks out into situations where they would
be tempted and where innocent children can be harmed." The Review Board
believes, however, that Church leaders should have recognized sooner the
inherent limitations of treatment, as well as the inflated sense of accomplishment
displayed by some treatment centers.

Indeed, the Review Board found that treatment
centers upon which Church leaders elected to rely – almost all of which
were Church affiliated – had a vested interest in an ability to "cure"
pedophiles and other individuals who had engaged in sexual abuse so that
the centers would continue to receive referrals. [page
116 begins] Because the objective of the referral to the treatment
center, whether express or implied, was the return of the patient to the
priesthood, there was little if any incentive to help a priest realize
he could not return to the priesthood or to prepare him for life outside
the priesthood. The lack of alternative treatment goals increased the
propensity of some treatment centers to become advocates for the patient
priests, as seen in the letters excerpted above. Although some treatment
centers assert that the recidivism rate for those offenders who went through
treatment was low, no reliable objective data is available on the rate
of recidivism of priests who received treatment at particular centers.
According to the diocesan officials familiar with the treatment centers,
some had markedly worse records than others. [45]

Moreover, psychologists and psychiatrists
told the Board that, since the mid to late 1980s, it generally has been
understood that men who have engaged in frequent sexual abuse of minors
can be treated but not cured. But many Church leaders continued to rely
on reports of successful treatment as a license to return [page
117 begins] priests to ministry. Won over by the promise of therapeutic
cures, some bishops failed to recognize the typically compulsive and habitual
nature of sexual abuse. This was understandable in the 1960s and 1970s,
when even psychologists lacked a genuine understanding of the nature of
sexual disorders. However, some bishops continued to return abusive priests
to ministry after the compulsive nature of their afflictions became generally
accepted within the medical profession. Many of the worst abusers were
described as "manipulators" and "con artists," and it appears that they
were able to con doctors and bishops as well as victims. In deciding their
fate, however, bishops should have considered deeds, not words.

It also should be noted that, even when
treatment centers indicated that an individual priest may no longer have
presented a significant threat, the centers often based that assessment
on an assumption that the priest would receive extensive post-treatment
care in the form of counseling and monitoring. In reality, however, priests
typically did not receive such follow-up care after returning to ministry
from a stay in a treatment center. Through painful experience, dioceses
learned that "supervised ministry" did not work because complete supervision
was impossible.

In sum, by viewing sexual abuse with minors
primarily as an issue of "psychosexual identity" and not primarily as
a crime and a grave sin, bishops failed to fulfill their responsibilities
to members of the public and members of the Church. Although psychiatry
may play a role in diagnosis of sexual disorders and in treat- [page
118 begins] ment, some Church leaders appeared, as one bishop put
it, to have replaced theology with psychiatry and to have shown, as another
bishop stated, "a much greater willingness to accept the authority [of
psychologists and psychiatrists] than their science or art justified."

The inherent limitations of treatment centers
were aggravated by the fact that they were not always provided by the
dioceses with all of the information about a priest that would be needed
to diagnose and treat him properly. Sometimes, this was due to inadvertence
on the part of referring dioceses, which often did not retain allegations
about a priest in an organized fashion. However, it appears that on other
occasions dioceses intentionally withheld information from treatment centers.

For example, the Archdiocese of Boston
sent Father Geoghan to one particular treatment center for an evaluation
in 1996. Although Geoghan already had been evaluated by at least two other
treatment centers, and although several allegations relating to him were
by that time in the files of the Archdiocese, the receiving center was
not provided with Geoghan's full history. Through sheer coincidence, the
Board was told, a psychologist from a different institution who had treated
Geoghan previously was asked by the new center to evaluate him. Only then
did the treating professionals hear about additional allegations relating
to Geoghan. Of course, the fact that Geoghan was repeatedly referred to
several different treatment centers is [page
119 begins] testament to the limitations of treatment as well as
the Church's over-dependence on treatment as a way of dealing with predator
priests. [46]

As noted above, in some instances, when
confronted with unfavorable treatment reports, Church leaders sought second
opinions in an apparent effort to be able to return a priest to ministry.
Father Geoghan was returned to ministry at one point based merely on a
letter written by his family physician, who hardly was qualified to assess
whether he was afflicted with a threatening sexual disorder. Many problem
priests were sent to multiple treatment centers. One priest with experience
in dealing with priests who had sexually abused minors told the Review
Board that some bishops "were actually looking for some kind of window
from the psychologists that would allow them to reassign the priests in
good conscience." The Review Board believes that this kind of opinion-shopping
to enable a priest to return to ministry was an abdication of responsibility
on the part of the bishops who engaged in it.

6. Reliance
on Attorneys.

Many Church
leaders tended to respond to allegations of sexual abuse of minors by
clergy as a legal problem rather than as a pastoral problem. As a result,
[page 120 begins] they
relied too heavily on the advice of attorneys whose tactics often were
inappropriate for the Church, and which tended to compound the effects
of the abuse that already had been inflicted. These tactics included raising
inappropriate defenses that could be construed as blaming the victim,
such as assumption of risk or contributory negligence; disclaiming responsibility
for their priests by claiming that they were "independent contractors";
and, in general, adopting an overly adversarial approach. Even when cases
were being settled, certain lawyers recommended, and certain bishops insisted,
that the victims sign confidentiality agreements, which stifled their
ability to discuss their experience openly and thwarted awareness by the
laity of the problem.

As a general matter, as one bishop observed,
"the Church has not always been served well in a legal way." Indeed, it
appears that many dioceses and orders made disastrous pastoral decisions
relying on attorneys who failed to adapt their tactics to account for
the unique role and responsibilities of the Church. In many instances,
the selection of a diocesan attorney was based less on the ability of
the lawyer and more on friendship and a misguided perception of the lawyer's
loyalty to the Church.

In addition, neither dioceses nor U.S.
Church leaders as a whole appeared to have developed a consistent, coordinated
approach to dealing with the growing crisis and its litigation consequences.
In this respect, the Conference could [page 121
begins] have served as a clearinghouse and strategic resource for
the dioceses; but many dioceses did not seek guidance from the Conference.
In some cases, dioceses settled cases for large sums without informing
the Conference's General Counsel of the matter. As a result of this fractured
approach, the problem was able to metastasize.

Many diocesan attorneys counseled Church
leaders not to meet with, or apologize to, victims even when the allegations
had been substantiated on grounds that apologies could be used against
the Church in court. The Review Board believes that offering solace to
those who have been harmed by a minister of the Church should have taken
precedence over a potential incremental increase in the risk of liability.
Moreover, the judgment that the risk would be increased itself was questionable.
The views of one bishop on the reliance on attorneys in this regard are
instructive:

We made terrible mistakes. Because the attorneys said over and over
"Don't talk to the victims, don't go near them," and here they were
victims. I heard victims say "We would not have taken it to [plaintiffs'
attorneys] had someone just come to us and said, "I'm sorry." But
we listened to the attorneys.

In addition, while statutes of limitation serve a vital role in a system
of ordered justice, it must be stressed that, as one victim told us, although
the expiration of the statute of limitation "can be a vindication in terms
of legal responsibility or even financial responsibility . . . morally
as we stand as Christians and as a Church, it's no vindication." [page
122 begins]

Furthermore, many dioceses and orders refused
to settle claims without a confidentiality clause that bound the victim
from speaking about the abuse. Although such clauses are common in litigation
settlements and victims or their attorneys often requested such clauses,
the insistence by certain dioceses and orders on confidentiality agreements
when settling claims of abuse brought by victims raises several concerns.
First, confidentiality agreements made it less likely that other victims
would come forward and provide the Church with additional information
about a problem priest. Second, these agreements often hindered victims
from healing by causing them to consider incidents of abuse shameful secrets.
Third, the agreements deterred any restoration of faith in the Church
by the victims and their families by reinforcing the perception that the
Church was unwilling to take ownership of its problems. Fourth, the agreements
contributed to an overall atmosphere of secrecy within the Church that
prevented Church leaders from realizing the scope of the problem of clerical
sexual abuse of minors. And finally, when it became known, predictably,
that some dioceses had insisted on confidentiality as a condition of settlement
in order to hide the existence and extent of sexual abuse of minors of
priests, the public reaction to the crisis, again predictably, became
substantially more negative.

In short, the Church cannot and should
not hide behind its lawyers or the law blindly and in all circumstances.
The words of one victim to the Board are [page
123 begins] plain and to the point: "Folks, this is the Catholic
Church. People expect a higher moral standard."

7. Considerations
Relating to the Religious Orders.

Approximately
one-third of the estimated 45,000 priests in the United States today are
not diocesan priests under the direct authority of bishops but are instead
members of religious orders and societies, such as the Jesuits, Dominicans,
Franciscans, and others. Like certain dioceses, certain orders were plagued
with a large number of priest offenders, and the leaders of the orders,
known as major superiors or provincial superiors, often responded inadequately
and inappropriately to the sexual abuse of minors by priests within their
orders.

The Essential Norms apply equally to religious
order priests and the leaders of religious orders, mutatis mutandis.
However, the orders were not involved in the drafting of the Essential
Norms, and were hesitant initially to embrace what essentially is a creation
of the bishops. As one bishop noted, "If I were a Religious Superior .
. . I would feel that our independence has been trampled to some extent,
and it has been." Given the vital role of many religious orders in the
education of children, it is crucial that the orders follow through on
their commitment to apply and follow the Essential Norms.

This is particularly important given that
a lack of communication between the religious orders and the dioceses
contributed to the problem. There [page
124 begins] often has been an uneasy relationship between the religious
order clergy and the diocesan clergy. Some religious order priests with
a history of abuse were sent to various dioceses without disclosure to
the dioceses of that history and thereby were enabled to continue to offend.
There also was a lack of clarity regarding the responsibilities of a bishop
when faced with an accusation concerning a member of a religious order
who resides in or works in the bishop's diocese. Then, too, many religious
order priests work abroad and therefore are not under the authority of
any U.S. bishop. It is the understanding of the Review Board that such
a religious priest is subject to the Essential Norms, and that his superior,
located in the United States, is responsible for enforcing the Essential
Norms. Cooperation among the bishops and religious superiors is critical
to ensure that lines of authority and responsibility are clear.
[47]

In establishing better communication and
clearer lines of authority in this area, the Review Board believes it
is important to respect the historical independence of the orders. As
one bishop noted, historically, the orders have risen up as "reform movements"
when the "bishop and the local Church have become somewhat lax." The orders
thus can represent a useful check on the exercise of authority by the
[page 125 begins] bishops. One traditional
role of the religious orders, he added, is "to correct the bishop," and
to call for greater accountability on his part. The orders, however, did
not fulfill their traditional role in relation to the secular clergy in
the context of the current crisis; to the contrary, they themselves were
plagued by many of the same problems and exacerbated the situation by
the same inaction.

8. Episcopal
Accountability.

The Review
Board found that the failure of bishops to hold themselves accountable
for their decisions and to make use of governance structures combined
to exacerbate the problem. It would not have been possible for numerous
predator priests to continue abusing children even after Church leaders
became aware of the abuse were it not for the fact that their bishops
effectively lacked accountability. Today, almost two years after the promulgation
of the Charter and the Essential Norms, several hundred priests have been
removed from ministry, but few bishops have left the episcopacy.

In particular, there appears to have been
a general lack of accountability for bishops for the reassignment of priests
known to have engaged in the sexual abuse of minors. Perhaps this is because,
as one priest put it, "Bishops are not used to explaining their decisions."
Such reassignments, which have become public as a result of lawsuits and
criminal investigations, seem to have been made by bishops in [page
126 begins] the belief that they were answerable to no one in the
process. This lack of accountability is one of the causes of the current
crisis.

As a matter of Church doctrine, the authority
of bishops has its source in the Holy Spirit. As the successors of the
apostles, bishops exercise a divinely-given authority. It in no way diminishes
this authority to require that bishops must be accountable – to the Holy
Father, to other bishops, and to the Catholic faithful. As stated in the
Roman Pontifical in the Homily for the Rite of Ordination of a Bishop,
"The title of Bishop is one of service, not of honor, and therefore a
Bishop should strive to benefit others rather than to lord it over them.
Such is the precept of the Master."

The concept of servant-leadership, and
its application to Bishops, was made clear by the Holy Father in November
2003 in his post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Pastores Gregis,
in which he wrote, "All that was said in the Synod Hall about the image
of the washing of feet, and the connection made in that context between
the figure of the servant and that of the shepherd, helps us to understand
that the episcopacy is truly an honour when it is a form of service."
(Pastores Gregis ¶ 43.) The exercise of authority without accountability
is not servant-leadership; it is tyranny. Again, in Pastores Gregis,
the Holy Father writes, "A lived ecclesial communion will lead the Bishop
to a pastoral style which is ever more open to collaboration with all.
There is a type of reciprocal interplay between what a Bishop [page
127 begins] is called to decide with personal responsibility for
the good of the Church entrusted to his care and the contribution that
the faithful can offer him through consultative bodies . . . ." (Pastores
Gregis ¶ 44.)

By law and tradition, there are many ways
in which other members of the clergy and the laity can help a bishop in
his service as leader. These include the authority of the metropolitan
archbishop over suffragan bishops, the authority of diocesan councils
established by the Code of Canon Law, and the practice of "fraternal correction."
As discussed below, however, these governance mechanisms were all but
ignored by certain bishops.

a.
The Selection and Assignment of Bishops.

Many
witnesses believe that the crisis has made manifest the need to scrutinize
the process for the selection of bishops. Many have expressed concern
that the pool of available bishops has been limited too narrowly to those
priests who have held positions at the Vatican, in seminaries, and within
the diocesan hierarchy. The process needs greater lay involvement, both
in putting forth the names of priests who might be considered for the
episcopacy and in vetting those who have been put forward, to ensure that
a wide net is cast when selecting bishops.

For example, some bishops had had little
experience as parish pastors, and therefore may have lacked the ability
to understand and relate to the problems and concerns of the laity. Others,
who relied on a management mindset rather than a [page
128 begins] pastoral mindset, were too willing to allow the administrative
demands of their dioceses to preempt the human demands of their parishioners.

Because bishops often moved from one diocese
to another, there often was insufficient institutional memory within a
diocese, at least with respect to individual priests. A new bishop often
received little or no information from the prior bishop or his staff about
problem priests. Individuals who would have known the identity of these
priests (for example, the vicar general) frequently had moved on to new
positions. Accordingly, there were many instances where allegations about
a particular priest made during the tenure of one bishop never were disclosed
to his successor, who then was left to resolve issues with respect to
a problem priest on the basis of the most recent allegation only.

Finally, as noted elsewhere in this Report,
a "don't-rock-the-boat" attitude prevailed among the bishops for too long.
According to many people interviewed by the Board, outspoken priests rarely
were selected to be bishops, and the outspoken bishops rarely were selected
as archbishops and cardinals. The predictable result was that priests
and bishops did not speak out when that is exactly what the situation
demanded. Many witnesses believe that the crisis has made manifest a need
to open up the type of priests who are chosen as bishops by the Holy See
and to reduce the movement of bishops from diocese to diocese to ensure
that the bishop develops and maintains strong ties to the local clergy
and laity. [page 129 begins]

Many priests and laity believe that greater
lay consultation in the selection of bishops and other aspects of Church
governance is required to avoid these problems. The laity largely have
been excluded from matters of Church governance in the United States,
although fortunately under the Charter they have been asked to play a
vital role in reviewing allegations of abuse and restoring trust. Greater
involvement of the laity in Church governance might well have lessened
both the extent of the current crisis and the magnitude of the laity's
negative response to it. In addition, greater involvement by the laity
in the selection of bishops could help to ensure that future bishops are
pastors, prophets, and men of honor and not mere management functionaries.

b.
Diocesan and Presbyteral Councils.

The
bishops failed to make effective use of the accountability mechanisms
already built into the Church's structure by Church law through the diocesan
councils, and those councils failed to assert themselves. Every diocese
is to have a pastoral council which "investigates, considers and proposes
practical conclusions about those things which pertain to pastoral works
in the diocese." (Canon 511.) Members of this council are to be "designated
in a manner determined by the diocesan bishop." (Canon 512 § 1.) Although
the role of these councils is consultative only, and they are required
to meet only once a year, the Review Board believes [page
130 begins] they could and should have been more involved in addressing
issues of sexual abuse of minors by members of the clergy.

In addition, every diocese should have
a presbyteral council (consisting of some priests elected by their fellow
priests and others selected by the bishop), whereby priests can make their
concerns known to the bishop and assist the bishop in promoting the pastoral
welfare of the people of the diocese. (Canons 495, 497.) The utility of
these councils will depend upon whether the bishops use them, whether
the councils speak frankly, and whether the bishops follow their advice.
Obviously, at least with respect to the problem of the sexual abuse of
minors by members of the clergy, these councils did not exercise sufficient
influence to prevent or mitigate the current crisis.

We cannot accept that the universal law
of the Church establishes such councils only to be window-dressing. We
know, from the many parish priests that we have spoken to, that the diocesan
clergy frequently know or intuit when one of their own has a serious problem
– the colleague who never comes to class reunions, who has no contact
with his fellow priests, who has visible problems with drugs or alcohol,
who establishes age-inappropriate friendships. While the laity of a diocese
might not have been as aware as the clergy of these individual problems,
they certainly could have given the bishop solid advice on priorities
– namely, that protecting their children was more important than the right
to ministry of a priest [page 131 begins]
with a history of child sexual abuse. If the bishops had honestly used
their diocesan pastoral councils and presbyteral councils to discuss the
issue of priests who sexually abused young people, the advice they would
have heard well may have prevented the current crisis.

Every diocese also is to have a diocesan
finance council, with members appointed by the diocesan bishop. (Canon
492.) Church law requires that this finance council approve all acts of
"extraordinary administration" by the diocese. (Canon 1277.) Acts of extraordinary
administration are defined as acts that "do not occur regularly and routinely."
Certainly the payment of large sums of money to the victims of priest-abusers
is not a routine occurrence. Canon law mandates that such payments require
review and approval by the diocesan finance council. Yet, to the knowledge
of the Review Board, not all dioceses were honoring this requirement.
[48] The
Board believes that if canon law had been followed in this regard, the
crisis would not have grown to its current proportions, because the diocesan
practices and underlying conduct that led to such large payments long
ago would have been questioned. [page 132 begins]

Another body that must review an act of
extraordinary administration, such as a large financial settlement for
diocesan liability for clergy abuse of young people, is the college of
consultors. (Canon 1277.) This is a group of six to twelve priests chosen
by the diocesan bishop from among the members of the diocesan priests’
council. While a diocesan bishop could choose from the priests’ council
as consultors only those priests who he knows will tell him what he wants
to hear, that would be contrary to the spirit of the law. Canon 127, which
establishes the legal elements for "consent" and "advice" when they are
required by the law, speaks of the "sincere opinion" of those whose advice
or consent is required. It is not meant to be a rubber-stamp process.
Greater involvement by the college of consultors would have helped bishops
respond to allegations of sexual abuse of minors by clergy more appropriately.

Bishops need not fear the active participation
of faithful Catholics, whether they be clergy or laity, when they function
in these councils required by the Church’s own law. Pope John Paul II
writes in Pastores Gregis:

If communion expresses the church’s essence, then it is normal that
the spirituality of communion will tend to manifest itself in both
the personal and community spheres, awakening ever new forms of participation
and shared responsibility in the faithful of every category. Consequently,
the Bishop will make every effort to develop, within his particular
Church, structures of communion and participation which makes it possible
to listen to the Spirit who lives and speaks in the faithful, in order
to guide them in carrying out whatever the same Spirit suggests for
the true good of the Church. [page 133 begins]

(Pastores Gregis ¶ 44.) Bishops need to learn to trust these
councils of laity and clergy and learn "to listen to the Spirit who lives
and speaks" in them. Ignoring these bodies was a significant factor in
the cause of the current crisis.

In sum, the People of God are both clergy
and laity. They both have a role. Priests and bishops must learn to trust
the laity and not fear their participation in the life of the Church.
The lay faithful must learn to exercise their roles within the structure
of the Church. The clergy, especially the bishops, teach the faith authoritatively.
Lay people do not. The clergy exercise the full power of governance. Lay
people do not. But turning to the laity and relying on the participation
of the laity does not subvert this structure and does not diminish the
authority of the bishops. Already in the structure of the Church there
is a requirement for bishops to rely on the advice, and sometimes even
the approval, of consultative bodies, such as the diocesan pastoral council
or the diocesan finance council. If the laity demand that these bodies
truly function – staffed with talented, faithful, independent laypersons
giving the bishops honest advice – they are only asking that the bishops
follow the law of the Church.

c.
The Roles of the Metropolitan and the Conference

By
tradition and by Church law, the metropolitan, an archbishop at the head
of an ecclesiastical province (a geographic grouping of dioceses), is
charged with exercising some degree of authority over the bishops within
his province. [page 134 begins] Canonically,
a metropolitan has certain oversight authority with respect to the other
bishops, known as "suffragan" bishops, in his province. Several witnesses
with whom we spoke believe that the historical authority of the metropolitan
has waned, and needs to be reinvigorated. The Holy Father also urged recently
that the bishops "restore vitality" to this "ancient institution." (Pastores
Gregis ¶ 62.) As one bishop told the Board, an effective metropolitan
should intervene with a "recalcitrant bishop" in his area and "take it
to the Congregations of Bishops in Rome." Of course, when the "recalcitrant
bishop" is himself a metropolitan, such a hierarchy is of limited utility.
In such a situation, however, the suffragan bishops should have the courage
to raise their concerns with the metropolitan and with other bishops.

As the authority of the metropolitans tended
to wane during the last three decades of the twentieth century, the prominence,
if not authority, of the national conference of bishops grew. The U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, however, exercises no power over its bishop
members. As one bishop said of the Conference, "They have zero authority
over the local bishop." Thus, although the Conference promulgated guidelines
for dealing with allegations of sexual abuse of minors by clergy in 1992,
individual bishops were under no obligation to follow the guidelines,
and some did not. The Conference also considered authorizing a study to
look at the problem of clerical sexual abuse of minors in the late 1980s
and again in the early 1990s, but too few bishops voted to proceed and
the project was shelved. [page 135 begins]

Even though the Conference could not have
exercised binding authority over bishops, it could have served as a clearinghouse
for information and a resource for the formulation of a coherent, appropriate
response by the United States dioceses to the problem of sexual abuse
of minors by members of the U.S. clergy. Because dioceses did not share
information with other dioceses about incidents of alleged abuse, however,
many bishops failed to realize that the problem was national in scope
and not limited to certain dioceses. As a result, there was insufficient
communication between dioceses and orders, both with respect to specific
priests and with respect to evolving best practices for responding to
allegations of sexual abuse.

This experience has led some witnesses
with whom the Review Board met to question whether more power should not
be given to the national conferences. There are, however, strong arguments
against investing national conferences with greater power. As a matter
of creed, the Catholic Church is universal. There is, institutionally,
no "Church of the United States," or "Church of China." There is only
"one holy Catholic Apostolic Church." Some fear that giving additional
authority to national conferences would widen rifts between nations and
tend to weaken the universality of the Church. Furthermore, as Pope John
Paul II has emphasized, conferences must avoid "an excessively bureaucratic
development of offices and commissions" and bishops must keep in mind
that conferences "exist to [page 136 begins]
be of help to the Bishops and not to substitute for them." (Pastores
Gregis ¶ 63; cf. Pope John Paul II, Motu Proprio, Apostulos Suos
653 (1998).)

The Review Board believes nonetheless that
the bishops must devise ways to make greater use of the Conference to
ensure that dioceses learn from each other, and that recalcitrant bishops
are not allowed to expose the Church to risks such as those that precipitated
the current crisis. Ultimately, of course, discipline of bishops who do
not act in accordance with the requirements of canon law is a matter for
the Apostolic See. But the Vatican cannot act on such matters if they
are left to languish beyond its field of vision.

Some witnesses suggested that dioceses
can perform a much more important job of monitoring other dioceses in
a way that involves neither a reinvigoration of the authority of the metropolitan
nor an expansion of the authority of the Conference. Specifically, just
as universities and colleges undergo an accreditation process whereby
professionals from other institutions are invited to visit and examine
them on a regular basis, it is possible that a similar process could be
developed within the present strictures of canon law to bring greater
oversight to the performance of bishops. A visitation of the diocese,
conducted by one or two bishops from another diocese as well as competent
priests and lay people from other dioceses, could be undertaken in conjunction
with the quinquennial ad limina visit to the Apostolic See that
every bishop undertakes. Although Vatican oversight would be [page
137 begins] needed for such a process, the diocesan ad limina
visitation could consist of a review of books and records, policies such
as the sexual abuse policy, and discussions with priests and selected
laity from the diocese.

There is ample precedent for such an outside
review in the practices of the religious orders. Although these diocesan
ad limina visitations would be voluntarily entered into, the
Review Board believes that a bishop who wished to be responsive to his
priests and people would welcome the fresh look that only an outside perspective
can bring. Certainly, by agreeing to such a review the bishop would send
a signal to other bishops and to the faithful in his diocese that he intends
to lead with transparency and accountability.

d.
Fraternal Correction.

It
is perhaps understandable that bishops and priests may be reluctant to
tell others that they are acting wrongly, but it is their responsibility
to do so. The history of the Church is replete with examples of bishops
properly taking other bishops to task, beginning with Paul's remonstrance
to Peter at Antioch. (Galatians 2:11.) For some reason, however, confronted
with the problem of sexual abuse of minors by clergy, such instances of
fraternal correction – a private process in which brother bishops may
offer criticism of each other – have been the exception, not the rule.
[page 138 begins]

Fraternal correction is a natural outgrowth
of the collegiality of the bishops and it should be, as Pope John Paul
II says in Pastores Gregis (¶ 8), based upon "the Bishops' concern
for the other particular churches [i.e., dioceses]." As a member
of the college of bishops, no bishop is ever alone. He is "always and
continuously united with his brothers in the episcopate." (Id.)
From this union flows at least a moral responsibility to correct errant
brother bishops. For example, it was reported to the Review Board that
the response of one bishop to the suggested adoption of the Five Principles
in 1992 was: "No one is going to tell me how to run my diocese." We do
not know what the reaction of his fellow bishops was to this statement,
but we hope that, should such a statement be made today, the other bishops
would correct such myopia by telling the bishop that no one, not even
a bishop, has the right to risk the well-being of youngsters entrusted
to his care; nor does he have the right to risk the good name of his fellow
bishops and the entire Church in the United States by his intransigence. [49] [page
139 begins]

The Review Board was surprised and distressed
to hear bishops acknowledging that "there's none of this networking [among
bishops] going on that should be going on," and urging that ways be found
to help bishops "bring pressure on the brother bishops." As one individual
told the Board, "Only one, or very, very few members of [the Conference]
are willing to get up, even in the executive session, and say, 'Your Excellency,
Your Eminence, this is wrong.'" This absence of fraternal correction compounded
the lack of episcopal accountability and further fueled the current crisis.

The Charter and Essential Norms have placed the Catholic Church in the
United States on a course to ensure the safety of its children and young
people and to recover the confidence of the laity that so badly has been
shaken by the current crisis. The Review Board believes, however, that
additional measures are necessary to hasten that recovery and ensure that
it is complete.

The bishops and religious ordinaries should continue to support the
undertaking of a comprehensive scientific study relating to the causes
and context of sexual abuse in the Church and in society. In Article
16 of the Charter, the bishops pledged their willingness to cooperate
in such research "with other churches and ecclesial communities, other
religious bodies, institutions of learning, and other interested organizations."
The problem of sexual abuse of minors is a societal problem, and the
Church can take the lead in addressing the problem throughout society. [50][page
140 begins]

The bishops should agree to ongoing diocesan audits to ensure compliance
with the Charter and the Essential Norms.

There should be a periodic review of the effectiveness and fairness
of the zero-tolerance policy to ensure the application of individualized
justice.

Bishops and seminary leaders must ensure that each candidate is a
mature, psychologically well-adjusted individual, with an unequivocal
commitment to a life of service to the Church and her people, and a
clear understanding of the challenges of the priesthood, including celibacy,
before admission into the seminary. A bishop must get to know each potential
candidate and exercise good judgment in determining whether the candidate
is suitable for the priesthood. Candidates should be thoroughly vetted
through all appropriate methods. [page 141 begins]

Seminaries must provide better preparation for the challenges of living
a celibate life in today's culture.

Seminaries must institute rigorous procedures for continually evaluating
the suitability of those admitted to study for the priesthood, as well
as mechanisms (including expulsion) for addressing problems identified
in the evaluation process.

Seminaries themselves must be more rigorously evaluated. The upcoming
Apostolic Visitation should be conducted by independent, knowledgeable
individuals who can provide an honest, informed, and unbiased evaluation.
It must examine both the curriculum and the formation program. To the
extent that institutions operating certain seminaries are not providing
adequate oversight, the seminaries should be placed under different
authority.

A healthy priest is connected to God, connected to his bishop or religious
superior, connected to his fellow priests, and connected to the People
of God. Accordingly, there must be ongoing intellectual, spiritual,
and psychological formation and monitoring of priests after ordination.
Priests should be encouraged to participate in fellowship groups with
other priests, to form close, healthy relationships with priests and
with laity, and to maintain an active prayer life.

Bishops must meet frequently with their priests to monitor their morale
and emotional well-being. A bishop must know his priests.

Each bishop should meet annually with the religious superior for any
non-diocesan priests who are resident in his diocese to ensure that
the religious superior takes responsibility for monitoring the non-diocesan
priests engaged in ministry in the diocese. [page
142 begins]

Seeing to the welfare of victims of abuse must be the primary duty
of the Church when confronted with evidence of abuse. Dioceses must
ensure that victims of clergy sexual abuse are encouraged to come forward
and are treated with respect, dignity, and compassion.

Bishops and Church leaders must recognize both the criminal and the
sinful nature of the sexual abuse of minors by members of the clergy.
Bishops must respond vigorously to all allegations of abuse, maintain
accurate records of such allegations and the responses thereto, and
openly exchange information with other dioceses about such allegations.

All bishops and leaders of religious orders should meet with victims
and their families to obtain a better understanding of the harm caused
by the sexual abuse of minors by clergy. Bishops and leaders of religious
orders must be personally involved in this issue and not delegate a
matter of such importance to others.

In assessing individual cases in order to determine whether the priest
engaged in an act of sexual abuse of a minor and therefore must be removed
from ministry, bishops and other Church leaders should honor the rights
of accused priests and consult with their lay review boards, so that
together they might strive for individualized justice in light of their
developing experience and expertise.

Dioceses and religious orders should re-examine their litigation strategies
to ensure that a pastoral response takes precedence over legal tactics.
Dioceses should eschew litigation when possible and earnestly pursue
other avenues of resolving allegations of abuse.

In seeking therapeutic options for priests who have engaged in sexual
abuse of minors, the dioceses should use only well-qualified treatment
centers that specialize in treating sexual [page
143 begins] disorders and that are able and willing to evaluate
patient outcomes in a disinterested professional fashion.

The Church should make use of national or regional canonical tribunals
in the United States to consider cases for laicization under the Charter
in order to ensure that experienced individuals hear and decide these
cases and that they are decided in a consistent fashion. Bishops should
ensure that the appropriate authorities at the Vatican are provided
with a comprehensive and complete file to review when determining whether
to laicize a priest.

The process for selecting bishops should include meaningful lay consultation.

The bishops should trust and learn to make greater use of those consultative
and deliberative bodies established by canon law to assist them in the
pastoral care and governance of their dioceses. These bodies should
be filled with faithful laypersons and priests who are talented, responsible,
and dedicated to the Church, but who are also capable of offering, and
who are expected to offer, truly independent counsel to the bishop.

The Church should consider restoring and strengthening the role of
the metropolitan archbishop in overseeing suffragan bishops and should
consider steps to enable the national conferences to serve as information
clearinghouses and to provide enhanced information flow among dioceses
about critical issues facing the Church.

The bishops should be more willing to engage in fraternal correction
and should appeal to the Vatican to intervene if a particular bishop
appears unable or unwilling to act in the best interests of the entire
Church. [page 144 begins]

An audit team through the Office of Child and Youth Protection should
review the handling of abuse allegations by individual dioceses and
orders. The audit team should publish its findings in a report so that
the laity will be apprised of the results.

Dioceses and orders should report all allegations of sexual abuse
to the civil authorities, regardless of the circumstances, or the age
or perceived credibility of the accuser.

Dioceses and orders should endeavor to resolve civil claims and government
investigations on reasonable terms and in a manner that minimizes the
potential for intrusion of civil authorities into the governance of
Church matters.

The bishops and other Church leaders must listen to and be responsive
to the concerns of the laity. To accomplish this, the hierarchy must
act with less secrecy, more transparency, and a greater openness to
the gifts that all members of the Church bring to her.

Finally, it has been observed that the
current crisis at heart is one of faith and morality. Accordingly, the
Review Board believes that, ultimately, the resolution of the crisis will
require an abiding faith and commitment to morality for all members of
the Church. [page 145 begins]

In making public this report and recognizing the stain that it exposes
on the Church that we love, we can but recall the Old Testament words
of the psalmist who taught that while hidden guilt festers, honest admission
of guilt heals:

As long as I kept silent,
My bones wasted away;
I groaned all the day . . .
Then I declared my sin to you;
my guilt I did not hide.
I said, "I confess my faults to the Lord,"
and you took away the guilt of my sin.

(Psalm 32.)

It is with that faith in the merciful powers of the Almighty that we
members of the National Review Board offer the candid judgments we have
been asked to give. How, one may ask, can any forgiveness, much less renewal,
emerge from such a sordid history of misdeeds? We are inspired, as always,
by the example of Jesus, who two thousand years ago founded this Church
and who during his life on earth once instructed his disciples: "For human
beings this is impossible, but for God all things are possible." [page
App. 1 begins]

Between December 2002 and January 2004,
the Review Board's Research Committee conducted sixty separate interviews
with more than eighty-five individuals. All but a few of the interviews
were conducted in person; the remaining interviews were conducted via
teleconference. All individuals listed below participated in formal interviews
with the Board. In addition, the Review Board consulted numerous other
individuals on a more informal basis.

Archibald, Susan President, The Linkup - Survivors of
Clergy Abuse

Arinze, Francis Cardinal Prefect of Divine Worship and the Discipline
of the Sacraments, Roman Curia, The Vatican

The Review Board notes that all witnesses participated in the Board's
interviews voluntarily and paid for their own expenses associated with
the interview. The Board is grateful for their assistance.
[end of text - the notes that follow were printed as footnotes in the
original report]

[NOTES]

1. Of particular note, Bishop Wilton Gregory
of the Diocese of Belleville (Illinois), the current President of the
Conference, has offered unflagging support to the Board and its work.

2. The other members of the Review Board feel compelled
to note the exemplary dedication to this task that Ray Siegfried, who
is in an advanced stage of Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, has exhibited
during his tenure on the Board. Ray's service to the Church in what he
has called the "twilight of my life" stands as a testament to him and
to the Church, which brings forth so much good from so many. We are all
grateful to him for his strength, integrity, and commitment.

3. Robert S. Bennett serves as the Chair of the Research
Committee. Its other members are Michael Bland, William Burleigh, Nicholas
P. Cafardi, Jane Chiles, Alice Bourke Hayes, Pamela Hayes, Paul McHugh,
and Leon Panetta.

4. A note about terminology is appropriate here. There
are 177 Latin Rite dioceses in the United States and one apostolic administration,
each headed by a bishop known as the ordinary. In addition, many dioceses
have one or more auxiliary bishops who assist the ordinary. Certain dioceses
– typically those that are larger or historically important – are known
as archdioceses, and the ordinary bishops of archdioceses are known as
archbishops. Each archdiocese is the "metropolitan see" of an ecclesiastical
province, which is comprised of the metropolitan see and the suffragan
or diocesan sees in the province. In addition, there are seventeen "eparchies"
in the United States, which are the Eastern Rite equivalent of dioceses.
Any generic reference in this report to "dioceses" includes dioceses,
archdioceses, and eparchies. In addition, any generic reference to bishops
includes bishops and archbishops, including those archbishops who also
serve as cardinals. Institutes of consecrated life and societies of apostolic
life are groups of men or women who typically take vows or promises of
poverty, chastity, and obedience. In lay language, these institutes and
societies are referred to as "religious orders." Ordained priests who
belong to certain orders (such as the Franciscans or Jesuits) are subject
to the direct authority not of a bishop but of a "provincial" or "superior."

5. All interviewees were told that the Report would
identify them as interviewees, but they were also told that the Report
would not quote them for attribution. Accordingly, although the Report
quotes liberally from the interviews, the Report identifies the individual
who made a particular statement only generically. Thus, for example, if
the Report attributes a particular quote to a "bishop," then the individual
who made the statement to the Board would be one of the twenty-four bishops,
archbishops, and cardinals interviewed by the Board. This approach resulted
in great candor. Particular quotes included in this Report were selected
not on the basis of the stature of the individual who made the statement
but because they represent the views or experiences of many of the individuals
with whom the Board spoke or because they capture in a concise fashion
the essence of one of the issues raised in the Report.

6. In addition, the report of John Jay College addresses
only the nature of the abuse of the minor not the characteristics of the
abuser, such as sexual orientation, sexual continence, religious fidelity,
and the like. Only a population-based interview survey contrasting offending
priests against non-offenders can fully address these aspects of the problem.
As set forth in the Recommendations, the Board urges that such a scientific
study be undertaken.

7. The study requested data on deacons and bishops as
well as priests. Any reference to the number of priests here should be
read as inclusive of deacons and bishops.

8. John Jay College researchers were not provided with
the identity of any submitting diocese or order, and their report analyzes
aggregate data, not data for specific dioceses or orders. Many dioceses
have published on their web sites a summary of the data that they provided
to John Jay College and have discussed the survey results with parishioners.
The Board supports these steps and urges other dioceses, and orders, to
act likewise.

9. Ninety-seven percent of all dioceses, representing
approximately ninety-nine percent of the Catholics in the United States,
completed the surveys that were sent to them. The response rate for religious
orders was much lower. This diocesan response rate is high by any standard,
and very high in comparison to survey studies generally. The high response
rate reflects the bishops' cooperation with the work of the Review Board.

10. The data discussed herein were provided to the
Board by John Jay College. The Board has been informed that the exact
numbers included herein are subject to minor modification as John Jay
College researchers finalize their report over the next few weeks.

11. The survey results do not include "unfounded" or
withdrawn allegations of abuse, but they do include allegations of abuse
that were "not substantiated" and allegations for which no investigation
was conducted. Given that many individuals identifying themselves as victims
did not come forward until decades after the alleged abuse, often after
the accused priests had died, there is no way to substantiate many allegations.

12. These numbers include allegations that were not
substantiated or were not investigated. Because many victims of sexual
abuse never tell anybody about the abuse, however, the actual number of
priests who engaged in sexual abuse of a minor during the last half century
was likely higher, not lower.

13. That a particular allegation was not substantiated
does not mean that the allegation was false; it means only that the diocese
or order could not determine whether the alleged abuse actually took place.

14. The crisis often has been referred to in as one
of "pedophile priests," which is an inaccurate, or incomplete, appellation.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric
Association(IV) classifies pedophilia as a psychiatric
disorder and defines it as the sexual attraction of an adult to pre-pubescent
children. According to the John Jay College researchers, although it is
difficult to make generalizations about whether a particular act of sexual
abuse of a minor qualifies as an act of pedophilia, and the age at which
puberty begins varies for each child, molestation that begins when the
child is under the age of eleven is generally accepted as indicative of
pedophilia.

15. Unlike sexual attraction to pre-pubescent children,
sexual attraction to pubescent or post-pubescent children is not considered
indicative of a psychological disorder, although acting on any such attraction
is rightly treated as a crime. Those who obsessively engage in sexual
abuse of post-pubescent minors may suffer from a recognized disorder,
such as obsessive-compulsive disorder. In addition, certain psychiatrists
or psychologists designate adult men who are sexually attracted primarily
to adolescent males as being "ephebophiles." The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (IV) does not recognize
"ephebophilia" as a distinct disorder. Ephebophilia is thus not a disorder
in the technical sense, but rather a newly-coined descriptive term for
homosexual attraction to adolescent males.

16. Approximately twenty percent of the priests were
either deceased, retired, or inactive at the time of the receipt of the
first allegation, and dioceses and orders could take no action in those
cases.

17. Between 1962 and 1967, every state enacted a statute
requiring some form of reporting of child abuse. These statutes were generally
limited, however, to non-accidental physical injury, and it was not until
later that the statutes were amended to encompass other forms of abuse,
including sexual abuse and neglect. In addition, most child abuse statutes
initially required only physicians to report suspected abuse, but states
have since expanded the list of mandatory reporters to include many of
the professionals who work with children, and approximately half of all
states now include clergy as mandatory reporters of abuse. Nevertheless,
according to one government source, many of these statutes require abuse
to be reported only if it is committed by a parent or caretaker.

20. In addition, in the early 1990s, the Conference
considered gathering data on allegations of sexual abuse of minors by
clergy from all U.S. dioceses. Unfortunately, the bishops voted to discontinue
the study, because diocesan attorneys advised that the results would be
subject to subpoena and could be used in future litigation.

21. Cardinal Law was succeeded by Archbishop Seán O'Malley.
Archbishop O'Malley immediately replaced the lawyers who had long represented
the Archdiocese and promptly settled numerous cases against the Archdiocese
that had been pending for years.

22. The Review Board did meet with several members
of the Roman Curia at the Vatican and from those meetings it was clear
that the Holy See is now devoting significant attention and resources
to the current crisis in the Church in the United States. In addition,
the Review Board was encouraged by the wholehearted expressions of support
for the work of the Board expressed by several cardinals at the Holy See.

23. In fact, some witnesses stated that the Vatican
had not sufficiently criticized or pressured recalcitrant bishops in the
United States. The Church is understandably sensitive to preserving its
independence from secular authorities, which in many areas of the world
still attempt to influence the selection of bishops. Nevertheless, allowing
a bishop to remain in office after he, due to his own actions or omissions,
has lost support from Catholics in the diocese, priests in the diocese,
and other bishops erodes the authority of all bishops.

24. Charges that the Vatican promulgated a policy of
secrecy for dealing with allegations of sexual abuse by priests are, however,
without basis. Although some have claimed that a 1962 Vatican document,
known as Crimen Sollicitationis, instituted a policy of secrecy
for cases involving clerical sexual abuse of a minor, the document clearly
was intended to apply only to the limited situation of allegations that
a priest had used the sacrament of reconciliation to facilitate or conceal
the abuse. Because priests are prohibited from discussing anything learned
in the confessional, Crimen Sollicitationis established special
procedures for these limited instances. It appears that few, if any, U.S.
bishops had even heard of the document until 2003, when it was unearthed
by plaintiffs' attorneys.

25. Some commentators have charged that the revised
Essential Norms were watered down by the Vatican, but the resulting changes
do not in any way weaken the mandate to ensure that any priest who has
engaged in an act of sexual abuse of a minor be removed permanently from
ministry. Perhaps the most significant change is the imposition of a ten-year
limitations period for imposing canonical penalties on a cleric. But that
ten-year period does not begin to run until the victim reaches the age
of majority, and the bishop must seek a waiver from the Holy See when
the statute of limitations already has expired. In any event, a bishop,
by virtue of his "executive power of governance," must remove a priest
from ministry who has engaged in a single act of sexual abuse even if
that priest is not laicized. Other changes strengthened the Essential
Norms by, for example, clarifying that the Essential Norms apply with
equal force to religious order priests and deacons.

26. The Review Board interviewed several members of
the clergy review board in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles and the clergy
review board in the Archdiocese of St. Paul-Minneapolis as well as the
head of the board in the Archdiocese of Detroit. The Board was struck
by the expertise and dedication of these review board members. Such review
boards can serve as a model for lay involvement in important Church issues.

27. In January 2004, the OCYP issued its first audit
report. The report stated that more than ninety percent of the dioceses
were in full compliance with the Charter. The report included numerous
suggestions for improving practices and recommended that the dioceses
complete a second audit the following year.

28. As noted, Norm 2 requires every diocese to promulgate
a written policy on the sexual abuse of minors by clergy. Most dioceses
have posted their policies on their diocesan web sites. These policies
often provide additional details on the procedures for investigating and
processing complaints.

29. In February 2003, the Vatican promulgated procedures
whereby a priest who had engaged in sexual abuse of a minor could be involuntarily
laicized without recourse to the full range of canonical procedures. These
changes are separate from those imposed by the Essential Norms and, unlike
the Essential Norms, are operative throughout the world, not just in the
United States.

30. It is not clear what the dioceses have done with
respect to priests who left ministry years ago as a result of allegations
of sexual abuse of a minor but who were never laicized. Under the Essential
Norms, it would appear that bishops should seek laicization of these individuals
as well.

31. Applying a zero-tolerance policy does not mean,
however, that the Church can simply rid itself of a priest who has engaged
in sexual abuse of a minor. Both for his own good and for the good of
society, a priest who has engaged in sexual abuse of a minor should be
offered psychological and spiritual counseling and succor. Furthermore,
dioceses and religious orders have an obligation to these individuals
as long as they remain priests. (Canon 1350, § 1.) The Church cannot simply
tell them to pack their bags and leave.

32. Several priests interviewed by the Board indicated
that they now feel that the public looks at priests as pariahs because
of the conduct of predator priests. A story one priest told to the Board
about an incident that occurred on his way to his meeting with the Board
is worth quoting in full.

I arrived at the airport early this morning to fly
to Washington, and near the gate, before boarding the plane, I went
to the restroom. Just ahead of me was a young mother with two small
boys, about four and six. The older was saying to his mother, "We're
going to go into the men's room," and she said, "Okay," until she
turned around to watch them go in and saw me behind them, and looked
at my clerical collar, and said to her sons, "On second thought, here
in the airport, you all come with me. Follow me." And against their
protest took her sons with her into the ladies' room rather than watch
them follow me into the men's room.

That priests have to endure the shame of such encounters
speaks volumes about the failure of the Church hierarchy on this issue.

33. Many dioceses are structured as a "corporation
sole," whereby the bishop owns and is responsible for all of the diocesan
assets. This structure may increase the risk of a conflict of interest
between the bishop and his diocese.

34. As Pope John Paul II notes, the verse from Jeremiah
3:15 – "I will give you shepherds after my own heart" – stands as a promise
from God that he will never leave his people without shepherds "to gather
them and guide them." Of course, Jeremiah also prophesies woe to the shepherds
"who lose and scatter the sheep of my pasture" and fail to take care of
his flock. As the Holy Father recognizes, a Catholic priest or bishop
by virtue of his role as shepherd to the People of God can bring about
both great good and great harm.

35. In his 1967 encyclical letter, Sacerdotalis
Caelibatus, Pope Paul VI emphasized this very point: "Those who are
discovered to be unfit for physical, psychological or moral reasons should
be quickly removed from the path to the priesthood. Let educators appreciate
that this is one of their very grave duties. They must neither indulge
in false hopes and dangerous illusions nor permit the candidate to nourish
these hopes in any way, with resultant damage to himself or the Church.
The life of the celibate priest, which engages the whole man so totally
and so delicately, excludes in fact those of insufficient physical, psychic
and moral qualifications. Nor should anyone pretend that grace supplies
for the defects of nature in such a man." (Sacerdotalis Caelibatus
¶ 64.)

36. In 1999 the Conference promulgated norms for admitting
to a seminary men who previously had been enrolled as seminarians elsewhere
or had been members of a religious order. Consideration should be given
to establishing similar standards for admitting to a seminary men who
previously had been rejected for admission by another diocese or seminary.

37.This is so not only to ensure unsuitable candidates
are not admitted, but also, to avoid the unwarranted rejection of inspired
candidates merely because they appear somewhat eccentric.

38. The discipline of celibacy is not mandated by Church
dogma, although it has been a constant discipline in the Latin Rite Church
since the twelfth century. There have been and are married priests in
the Church, including priests of the Eastern Rite and priests who have
converted from other churches and ecclesial communities.

39. The lack of expressions of outrage by bishops –
both at the time they first learned of the abhorrent acts of some priests
and in dealing with the crisis publicly – is troubling. The Board has
seen no letters condemning the men who have engaged in such conduct. To
the contrary, Cardinal Law's letter in 1996 placing Geoghan on "sick leave"
concludes by expressing the Cardinal's "warmest personal regards," and
Cardinal Law's letter later that year accepting Geoghan's request for
retirement states, "Yours has been an effective life of ministry, sadly
impaired by illness."

40. For this reason, it may be too soon to know whether
the significant decrease in the number of reported incidents of sexual
abuse of minors over the last twenty years represents as great a decrease
in the actual number of incidents.

41. As Bishop D'Arcy noted in one of his letters from
the early 1980s to archdiocesan authorities in Boston raising concerns
about priests who had sexually abused young boys, "Young people are open
to priests and when assaulted in this way, their souls are often irreparably
damaged."

42. Some bishops and priests believe that the scandal
is cause to re-examine confessional practices. The seal of confession
must never be violated, but a priest hearing a confession that involves
the commission of a crime has the authority to withhold absolution subject
to certain conditions, such as turning oneself into the authorities or
seeking help for a problem.

43. One such exception is a diocese in which the bishop
asked all of his pastors to show a video on the sexual abuse crisis during
mass. In addition, parishioners received copies of a special bulletin
devoted to this issue. Such actions cannot be viewed simply as damage
control; rather, such outreach to parishioners on this issue is an important
part of the Church's mission to strengthen and spread the faith.

44. In discussing the reluctance of some bishops to
report the conduct of priests to the authorities one bishop noted the
"father-son" relationship between a bishop and the priests he ordains.
Surely, however, even a father must take steps to prevent his son from
harming others if put in a position to do so.

45. Dioceses tended to rely on treatment centers affiliated
with the Church that treated only priests. It appears that some of these
centers may have been less rigorous than non-affiliated treatment centers,
either in their treatment or in their willingness to opine about the priest's
suitability for continued ministry. In addition, it appears that many
of the individuals previously managing certain treatment centers had notions
of sexuality that at best could be termed inconsistent with Catholic teaching.
In light of all this, it is now clear that no bishop or provincial should
have sent a priest to any treatment center without having first assured
himself, through background checks and other methods of verification,
that the treatment being offered was effective.

46. In addition, the January 2003 report issued by
the grand jury in Suffolk County, New York, stated that a Rockville Centre
diocesan official acknowledged to the grand jury that treatment centers
often were not provided with the complete file of a priest referred by
the diocese to that treatment center for evaluation and treatment.

47. Just as there is concern about U.S. priests engaged
in ministry abroad, there is also concern about the large number of foreign-born
or foreign-trained priests engaged in ministry in the United States. Bishops
and other Church leaders must ensure that these priests also are screened
and are given a proper formation and education for chaste celibacy.

48. As has been publicly reported, the former Archbishop
of Milwaukee settled a charge relating to a relationship with an adult
male by paying the individual $450,000 out of Church funds. The Archbishop
would have been required to seek permission for the payment if it had
been $50,000 more. Clearly, a bishop should not be allowed to make such
a large payment, whether on behalf of himself or priests in his diocese,
with no oversight.

49. In this regard, the Board notes that although the
bishops in general demonstrated support for the work of the Board and
the John Jay College survey, the vicar general for the Diocese of Lincoln
(Nebraska) wrote a letter indicating that the Most Reverend Fabian Bruskewitz,
Bishop of Lincoln, would not cooperate with the efforts of either the
Board or John Jay College. Specifically, the letter stated that Bishop
Bruskewitz "does not recognize any jurisdiction claimed over him or his
pastoral activity by the 'National Review Board'" and that he "is prepared
to take any appropriate and suitable measures necessary, including legal
action, were that Board, your institution, or the United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops to attempt to coerce him by adverse publicity, the
threat of such, or other similar actions."

50. The next step for the bishops and the Board is
to commission a broad-based and multi-year study of the epidemic of abuse
that the John Jay College study describes. It is hoped that such a study
will identify the interactive causal factors in a systematic, epidemiological
(host/victim-agent/predator-environment/culture) fashion. Such a study
will enable the Church to develop additional policies for the protection
of children and also will bring light to the factors that lead to child
abuse in society at large and the steps that can be taken to protect children
from the physical and psychological trauma of sexual abuse in the future.