Saturday, October 23, 2010

Method and Madness

A while back, Larry Moran, the Arthur Murray of the NANAs, touted a paper, entitled "How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism: Philosophical Misconceptions About Methodological Naturalism," by Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke and Johan Braeckman ("BBB"), two of whom Larry met recently on a trip to Europe. I was going to comment on it then but real life, not least of all having my throat cut and discovering the fragility of the human body in comparison to speeding automobiles, got in the way. Now Jerry Coyne, still stinging from Massimo Pigliucci's criticism of his primitive philosophy, has seized on the paper as showing that "serious philosophers" share his view that science can produce evidence supporting the existence of gods (and, of course, as far as Jerry is concerned, since it hasn't produced such evidence, we can take that absence as evidence that there are no gods).

Now, the paper is very well written (especially if you assume that English is not the authors first language) and certainly raises legitimate objections to the concept of Methodological Naturalism ("MN"). They propose, instead, Pragmatic Methodological Naturalism ("PMN"), which they describe as "a provisory and empirically grounded commitment to naturalistic causes and explanations, which in principle is revocable by extraordinaryempiricalevidence." Ultimately, I think that their objections to MN and their recommendation of PMN fail. (I also have to point out that the mere fact that some "serious philosophers" happen to converge on something similar to one of Coyne's opinions doesn't mean his philosophy isn't still primitive.)

The stated aim of BBB is to first show that "the most widespread view, which conceives of MN as an intrinsic or self-imposed limitation of science, is philosophically indefensible" and, secondly, it is also an ill-advised strategy to counter the claims of [Intelligent Design Creationism] and other forms of creationism."

I won't be able to do this all in one go but at the heart of my objection to BBB's proposal is the fact that they fail to take into account that science has (at least) two great objectives. The first (and lesser) objective is to determine which phenomena of the world are real -- that is, to empirically investigate and document what actually happens. The second (and greater) objective is to discover why phenomena happen -- that is, to develop testable theories as to the causes of phenomena that link those phenomena to the regularities of the world that we call "natural law."

This is actually nicely illustrated by BBB themselves (p. 230). In discussing the argument that MN is simply part of science by definition, they state:

The definition argument for IMN sits uncomfortable with the fact that reputable scientists and sceptics have investigated allegedly paranormal phenomena which, if corroborated through repeatable and careful experiments, would point to the existence of supernatural forces, or at least sotheyclaim.

There is no conflict with MN in investigating whether or not a claimed phenomena occurs. Doing repeatable and careful experiments to determine if, in fact, there is some correlation between, say, recovery from illness and prayer, is perfectly respectable science. The issue of MN arises only with the claim that supernatural forces are the cause of the phenomena.

Let's look at BBB's example that Coyne fixed on (even if that's not fair to BBB because Jerry is likely to glom onto their weakest arguments):

... suppose [a randomized controlled trial] in American Heart Journal turned out to confirm the hypothesis of therapeutic efficacy of intercessory prayer. Moreover, suppose that further experimental work following this demonstration, which would arguably mark a complete revolution in science, indicated that this form of supernatural causation is predictable because it exhibits certain regularities. For instance, it works only with prayers officially sanctioned by the Catholic Church, only if the ill person is baptised by a Catholic priest, etc. Though it may be ridiculous to speculate that anything of the sort would ever happen, as no alleged case of miraculous healing has even been authenticated scientifically, if it would, there is no obvious reason why the scientific enterprise would immediately and entirely collapse. The fact that some prayers actually do help people recover would admittedly cause a complete metaphysical revolution in science (imagine the enthusiasm of theologians), but if the range of action of this supernatural power turned out to be restricted, why would it endanger the rest of our scientific endeavours?

Notice anything missing here? They have posited a situation where we have a scientifically confirmed phenomena. But where is the extraordinaryempiricalevidence that this phenomena is caused by God? There is nothing but an assumption that because the phenomena involves Catholic prayers and Catholic patients that the cause must be supernatural. In point of fact, from a scientific standpoint, all you have is a phenomena that, at this time, is unexplained. We have lots of those and science does not go around assigning their causes willy-nilly to god(s). We still don't know how gravity acts at a distance. But if someone says the reason gravity works is "Intelligent Grappling," is that any different or any more scientific than just assuming "Catholic Healing"?

If such a phenomena was discovered, it might well cause Boudry, Blancke and Braeckman to undergo "a complete metaphysical revolution," but their metaphysics is not the same thing as "science.".

The fact that some prayers actually do help people recover would admittedly cause a complete metaphysical revolution in science (imagine the enthusiasm of theologians), but if the range of action of this supernatural power turned out to be restricted, why would it endanger the rest of our scientific endeavours?

I think if we narrow down those words a little more, then the question becomes a bit easier to answer. Would the the enthusiasm of theologians endanger scientific endeavors? Gee I dunno!

But "science" refers to a lot of things (e.g., institutions, process, bodies of knowledge, disparate disciplines, etc.), and, broadly speaking, people speak of "scientific explanations" that make metaphysical claims, including ontological claims about what entities exist, what their underlying structure is, and how they behave.

Historically, metaphysical naturalism really came into the picture in the 19th century as a mechanism for pushing religious authority out of science, as science became a government-funded set of institutions. And arguably, different notions of scientific practice have their roots in theological views about God and the universe (e.g., as argued by Margaret Osler and Peter Dear).

If MN is indeed now definitionally an assumption of science, that has not always been the case. If we thought that the best available explanations of the law-like regularities of the world included a God interacting with it, I expect that we would include God as an entity in some of our scientific theories.

If MN is indeed now definitionally an assumption of science, that has not always been the case.

That's hardly surprising. "Science" has existed long before the word was coined and long before Bacon first tried to formalize it. As a social institution, it has evolved.

It's been said that philosophers of science merely try to come along after the fact to figure out what scientists do. I think BBB are right that the scientific community learned over time that, as a practical matter, naturalistic causes and explanations were more successful in delivering knowledge about the world. That doesn't mean that what we now call "science" (here meaning the process by which humans actually conduct the enterprise of scientific research -- and, no, I can't come up with a better definition) doesn't have a philosophical commitment to naturalism as a methodology.

Notice anything missing here? They have posited a situation where we have a scientifically confirmed phenomenon. But where is the extraordinary empirical evidence that this phenomenon is caused by God?

You are trivially right, of course, in that this in isolation would only allow the scientists to conclude that somehow the miracle healings occur if you follow these procedures, yadda yadda. Certainly it alone would not be enough to say: therefore Jesus saves, therefore virgin birth, therefore transubstantiation. But that is just one example, and it would, at least, if we fail for decades to come up with any good physico-mechanistic explanation, shift the probability of a god existing a tiny bit towards yes, as a facet of the world that would have to be taken into account for a judgement on the question. And that is the point - you do not get one smoking gun for something in science (only against), you get a balance of evidence.

Now play out a thought experiment where we would also observe other phenomena on a daily basis: blasphemers immediately being struck dead by lightning even on a sunny day; the pope regularly receiving what he claims to be divine instruction that proves both politically helpful and scientifically insightful, providing information about future events that could not possibly have been available by any other means; pious Catholics being immune to accidents and diseases, no matter how many others are killed directly next to them; Catholics winning all their crusades, no matter how outnumbered and outgunned, often because angels with flaming swords miraculously appear out of thin air and dice their opponents.

Would all that not kinda move the probability even more toward the yes answer? Perhaps you will say that there is still no definite smoking gun, no 100% certainty that it is not all mass hallucination or aliens messing with us, but that seems to put a rather unrealistically high burden of evidence onto the question, akin to asking science to provide positive proof that we are not all living in the matrix. You may expect that from deductive reasoning, but science is not equipped to do that, and no one can demand that. What we do is examine all the evidence and then decide on the most sensible explanation, always keeping it open to later retraction if other evidence shows up - such as the aliens fessing up.

Of course, after previous discussions and in the light of your perpetually condescending attitude, I do not have much hope left that you will even just grant that this position might, from a certain perspective, be understandable. I guess you could always say that under these circumstances, it would indeed be most sensible to tentatively entertain the possibility of the Catholic god existing, but that it would still not be scientific. Which just means that you have carefully defined the word science so narrowly that (1) not even our current understanding of evolution could be called scientific, as it is also only our best explanation built on a balance of evidence instead of one smoking gun showing with 100% certainty that ONLY mutation, natural selection and genetic drift explain it, and (2) you are correct by default. Oh well.

What we do is examine all the evidence and then decide on the most sensible explanation ...

That's it? That's the sum total of what "science" is? People deciding for themselves, individually, what the "most sensible" explanation of how the world works is?

Sorry, that sounds more like metaphysics to me (which, as Chris Schoen points out, is nothing dishonerable). But if there is a formal structure and method to science, then you're going to have to show how "science" would proceed to address the issue, not just spin ever more fantastical scenerios of things that would convince you in the absence of actual empirical evidence.

What it sounds like to me is that you are describing circumstances that would convince you, as a matter of metaphysics, that our current scientific practice is unworkable, rather than describing scientific evidence, as we recognize it today, that would support the existence of god(s).

Throwing out "science" as it exists today is certainly a possibility but that is not the same as saying that there could be evidence under our present understanding of "scientific" practice to support or refute the supernatural.

The difference between the two sides in this discussion is simply what we call science. If you reduce science to just a sequence of hypothesis tests, you are right. But that would just give us a whole list of claims of mechanistic relationships that are rejected, and that is it.

But you could also argue that we use all the data points collected by scientists, all the hypothesis tests that did not fail, plus a good helping of Occam's razor to construct a mental model of the world. And some of us call that process science, too.

Out of curiosity: how would you, for example, fit something like climate modeling into your idea of science as merely a series of hypothesis tests?

then you're going to have to show how "science" would proceed to address the issue, not just spin ever more fantastical scenerios of things that would convince you in the absence of actual empirical evidence.

You know, this is one thing that rather bothers me about this whole discussion. Of course you have to make up fantastical scenarios because our current world just plainly does not contain any gods. In our actual universe, we have a complete absence of evidence for them, and some of us conclude from that absence that they do not exist (which again seems to be very scientific to me!).

When discussing whether there could be empirical evidence for them, you cannot simply say "but it is not so". Not the point. When you started to set out to do science to your universe, you were not to know how it would turn out to be. And when you start collecting data, how would a angel with a flaming sword being summoned by a bishop to smite the an army of pagans not be evidence for the existence of angels? In much the same way as a recording of bird song in the Amazonian rain forest is treated as evidence for the existence of that bird?

Science (you would probably not call it that, though, but natural history) is under no obligation to proceed from there, but there is this data point that the bird exists. Evidence. If you are lucky, you can find it again and study its ecology or whatever. If angels existed, you could study how to summon them, maybe ask them a few questions, and, if you are very bold, ask them for a blood sample to study or whatever.

But that would just give us a whole list of claims of mechanistic relationships that are rejected, and that is it.

At the risk of being "condescending," could you actually read the posts you are criticizing? I explained the two great objectives of science. But theories must be testable and that requires that you have to be able to bring empiric evidence to bear on the theory in meaningful ways.

Out of curiosity: how would you, for example, fit something like climate modeling into your idea of science as merely a series of hypothesis tests?

While I am far from familiar with climate science, I assume the models make predictions about the empiric evidence that will be found ... that is, they are a form of theory that can be tested with empiric evidence. What form of empiric test are you going to propose for "it's God's will"?

But you could also argue that we use all the data points collected by scientists, all the hypothesis tests that did not fail, plus a good helping of Occam's razor ...

... to construct a mental model of the world. And some of us call that process science, too.

Yes, I know. I just object to your labeling your metaphysics, unchecked by review by the scientific community or any standard by which your "model of the world" can be even remotely objectively judged, as "science." Some of us think rather better of science.

Of course you have to make up fantastical scenarios because our current world just plainly does not contain any gods. In our actual universe, we have a complete absence of evidence for them, and some of us conclude from that absence that they do not exist (which again seems to be very scientific to me!).

If it is so "plain," where are the peer-reviewed papers? Where, for that matter, is the empiric evidence? Why do you have to strain at the gnat of god(s) when so much of what the rest of us call "science" is so easy to swallow?

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence except in cases of theories that are very specific as to what evidence must exist for the theory to be true. Most (though not all) religious belief is not that specific.

Again, I have no objection to your metaphysical conclusion that there are no gods. Nor do I object to any claims that your metaphysics are informed by science. I object only to your labeling your metaphysics AS science ... not only because it is a category error but because, if you can do it without objection, how can we object when the theists do it?

In much the same way as a recording of bird song in the Amazonian rain forest is treated as evidence for the existence of that bird

But don't you see? When we record a bird song in the forest, Methodological Naturalism tells us that the vibrations in the air are physical, empiric evidence of the existence of a natural being subject to the regularities of "natural law." When you "see" an angel with a flaming sword, you have accepted that such a vision can't be the result of empiric evidence of a natural being, subject to the regularities of "natural law, so the very basis for doing science (as we do it now) has been broken. If you want to believe that vision of an angel, you have admitted that "science" doesn't work and that it's foolish to call whatever is left "science."

Oookay. Until this reply, I was assuming it would be possible to make some progress. But this is just so far out...

While I am far from familiar with climate science, I assume the models make predictions about the empiric evidence that will be found ... that is, they are a form of theory that can be tested with empiric evidence.

Well yes, in 50 years we will be able to test if they predicted correctly for what will happen in 50 years. Their point is, however, to prepare us now for what to expect in 50 years, so that would not be very useful.

At the risk of being "condescending," could you actually read the posts you are criticizing? I explained the two great objectives of science. But theories must be testable and that requires that you have to be able to bring empiric evidence to bear on the theory in meaningful ways... What form of empiric test are you going to propose for "it's God's will"?

This is of course not a theory. A theory would be, for example: some entity, which I will now call god for want of a better word, makes it rain whenever you sacrifize a goat while praying to it in Hebrew (or whatever). You can test that: do it for a hundred times under varying conditions and see if p<0.05 for the correlation between praying and sacrificing on the one side and rain, healing or whatever on the other. See if it works in Latin, or if it works if you sacrifice a toad instead, etc. Now of course this in isolation does not give you any additional info about what that god thing is - but then, saying "objects attract each other because they have an inherent propertiy called mass" will also tell you zero about what mass is, except for the tautological "it is the property that makes objects attract each other". For some reason, that is considered science, but the first not?

Yes, I know. I just object to your labeling your metaphysics, unchecked by review by the scientific community or any standard by which your "model of the world" can be even remotely objectively judged, as "science." Some of us think rather better of science.

I do not know how that would not be checked by review. Do you think that the only way to discriminate between the plausibility of two ideas is to eliminate one with one single lab test? Certainly not - otherwise what you call metaphysics could not decide on anything either. Do you think that this is how we decided between Lamarckism and Darwinism? (only using that term for the nice parallel to the previous one, sorry)

If it is so "plain," where are the peer-reviewed papers?

There do not need to be any because it is so plain. Do you have any scientific papers that provide explicit evidence for the nonexistence of Santa?

Where, for that matter, is the empiric evidence?

The empiric evidence for what? If you study a lot of the phenomena that believers claim to exist, like faith healing or divine retribution, it is just a matter of testing correlations, see above. If it is about the actual entities like angels, djinni, spirit guides or demons, we would observe them like we observe beetles, flatworms or tumbleweeds. Or not, like Bigfoot and Nessie.

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence except in cases of theories that are very specific as to what evidence must exist for the theory to be true. Most (though not all) religious belief is not that specific.

I'd say most (though not all) is, if the believers are honest, but anyway, in the case of these unspecific, incoherent beliefs, we can just reject them on the same gounds as we would reject the claim that homeopathy works, only not when an evidence-based medical researcher is looking. If a scientist can say, qua scientist, that the second is bull, not allowing him to say that the first is bull on the same grounds is the very definition of special pleading.

Again, I have no objection to your metaphysical conclusion that there are no gods. Nor do I object to any claims that your metaphysics are informed by science. I object only to your labeling your metaphysics AS science ... not only because it is a category error but because, if you can do it without objection, how can we object when the theists do it?

Sorry, but I do not quite understand this question.

But don't you see? When we record a bird song in the forest, Methodological Naturalism tells us that the vibrations in the air are physical, empiric evidence of the existence of a natural being subject to the regularities of "natural law." When you "see" an angel with a flaming sword, you have accepted that such a vision can't be the result of empiric evidence of a natural being, subject to the regularities of "natural law, so the very basis for doing science (as we do it now) has been broken. If you want to believe that vision of an angel, you have admitted that "science" doesn't work and that it's foolish to call whatever is left "science."

I do not follow. Seriously, this goes completely off the rails. Reading this, words very nearly fail me, or rather, I hardly know how to answer, because I do not really grasp what you want to say. If we hear an angel speak, how would that be less physical, empirically observed air vibrations than in the case of the bird? And then maybe you see them regularly (physical, empirically observed photons), have them interacting with the world, ask them questions, etc., how would we not accept that as much as evidence that they exist as we do for bacteria or dolphins? I cannot bring myself to believe that you would expect a scientist to ignore an angel walking around his lab and pushing over containers because it just cannot be, so there must be some misunderstanding here. Perhaps you argue that a scientist is not allowed to accept anything that one single believer in history has ever made an incoherent or untestable claim about? But again, how is that different from other phenomena? Can a scientist not accept the existence of Troy the moment some raving nutcase has claimed that the city was built by a spiritual ancestral master race in a mystical golden age and could jump through time when it was still populated? I mean, the ruins are still there, and we can find out real stuff about them, no matter the deranged views of others.

I had tried to be nice because I thought it possible your complaints about how I treated you before might have had some justification but now ...

Well yes, in 50 years we will be able to test if they predicted correctly for what will happen in 50 years.

Really? These models make no predictions about what the climate will be in 5 years, 10 years, 25 years? The change they predict will all happen all at once 50 years from now? Please! The models, if they are worth spit, will be checked against data coming in constantly and updated as required. In short, they are hypotheses/theories. Their "use" in science as predictions of what might happen in 50 years if our science is correct is just that. A prediction from a hypothesis/theory that will be constantly checked.

A theory would be, for example: some entity, which I will now call god for want of a better word, makes it rain whenever you sacrifize a goat while praying to it in Hebrew (or whatever).

In other words, gods act with the same regularity that "natural laws" do? Then how do we distinguish that action from natural laws? We're just back in the position of assuming that because it involves these claimed supernatural causes that there are no possible natural causes. Think of all the things science would not have gone on to explain if we just accepted any claim that what we don't understand now must be supernatural. That was the point that PZ (correctly) made:

[A]ny evidence of a deity will be natural, repeatable, measurable, and even observable…properties which god is exempted from by the believers' own definitions, so there can be no evidence for it.

The gods claimed by religion don't act that way. They are capricious. For example, the Abrahamic god rejected Cain's sacrifice while accepting Abel's. Unlike the relationship between mass and gravity, there is no regularity that we call "natural law" in purported actions by gods. That's why, although Newton's theory was originally questioned because of its "occult" action at a distance, it was ultimately accepted as scientific. If there was such regularity in "godly" actions, we'd much better spend our time looking for a "naturalistic" cause than moonbeaming about when and if we should finally give up and believe in clockwork gods. Exactly as we have, for 300 years, gone on looking for an explanation of why gravity acts at a distance, even though we haven't found it yet.

Religious claims are not, and cannot be scientific theories, which is why MN rejects them as possible scientific explanations and, for the very same reason, cannot test them. That's the point of MN!

There do not need to be any because it is so plain. Do you have any scientific papers that provide explicit evidence for the nonexistence of Santa?

Why bother to make reasoned arguments when their is any easy cliché to fall back on? If there has been no scientific investigation, there is no scientific result. People can, based on their knowledge of how the Santa story is promulgated to children, reject the reality of Santa without a thought about what science has to say about it. But one thing is sure, if science did investigate Santa, it would look for a naturalistic explanation for any such phenomena. When, exactly, would it stop looking for a naturalistic explanation and accept the existence of elves? We've been looking for some 300 years for an explanation of gravity.

As to it being "plain", it seems that a significant minority of scientists (some 36%) disagree. What's the "magic number" of scientists that turns your "plain" metaphysics into a "scientific result"?

... in the case of these unspecific, incoherent beliefs, we can just reject them on the same gounds as we would reject the claim that homeopathy works, only not when an evidence-based medical researcher is looking.

Yes, MN holds that supernatural causes cannot be scientific explanations. Now, you have to do the philosophical heavy lifting of showing that everything that is not a scientific explanation has been shown to be scientifically refuted. You haven't come close yet.

If we hear an angel speak, how would that be less physical, empirically observed air vibrations than in the case of the bird?

But angels, if they are "supernatural" (i.e. not bound by natural law) are not restricted to using sound waves to make you "hear." That's the point of the "supernatural". If you're simply saying that nothing supernatural exists then you're just defining angels out of existence, without any empiric evidence showing that only natural causes and natural beings can exist. If "angels" are restricted to operating by natural causes, then there is no need to even consider them supernatural in the first place.

"They have posited a situation where we have a scientifically confirmed phenomena. But where is the extraordinary empirical evidence that this phenomena is caused by God? There is nothing but an assumption that because the phenomena involves Catholic prayers and Catholic patients that the cause must be supernatural. In point of fact, from a scientific standpoint, all you have is a phenomena that, at this time, is unexplained."

I find this a very weak argument; it is essentially one from Logical Positivism and amounts to the argument that we can only demonstrate associations between events, not causes.

... it is essentially one from Logical Positivism and amounts to the argument that we can only demonstrate associations between events, not causes.

Not at all. As I said in the original, the demonstration of associations between phenomena and causes is the greater of the objectives of science. The problem is what are we going to use to demonstrate those associations but empiric evidence? I still want to know what possible empiric evidence there could be of supernatural causation? And don't forget it was BBB who claimed that it would be "extraordinary empirical evidence" that would make us accept supernatural causation.

The reason that (IMNSHO) MN is a result of the definition of science is because the only class of causation that empiric evidence can bear on is "naturalistic" causation. It is just the [cough] nature of science that it can only deal in natural causation.

I object only to your labeling your metaphysics AS science ... not only because it is a category error but because, if you can do it without objection, how can we object when the theists do it?

Sorry, but I do not quite understand this question.

The IDers claim they have "extraordinary empirical evidence" showing that naturalism is false (i.e. that supernaturalism is true). If your "method" of doing "science" is correct, then ID is science, even if you may disagree about their "results."

I think ID is not merely false, it's not even wrong. If you're version of "science" cannot be rationally distinguished from ID, then its not even wrong either.

John. Please note that the argument you quote from BBB was _only_ a counterargument to the argument from the definition of science (what the paper labels "Argument 1"). Your own argument for IMN (such as it is) is not the argument from definition. You don't just say, "science excludes the supernatural by definition." Your argument seems to be something like what BBB call Argument 5 (with maybe some of Argument 2 thrown in). You haven't yet responded to the parts of the paper that address your arguments.

I spotted the same flaw as you did in BBB's response to Argument 1, and gave a better one here:http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2010/06/methodological-naturalism.html

I think a major problem with your arguments is your attempt to draw a sharp demarcation line between "metaphysics" (or "philosophy") and "science". Whenever anyone argues that science can address a supernatural hypothesis, you call that "metaphysics" or "philosophy", but never give any definition of those terms that would enable you to justify that label. I pointed out in a previous discussion that you adopted an unreasonably narrow definition of "science", so I won't go over that point again. I find it amusing that you call Coyne's arguments naive (or "primitive"). I think you have a naive attitude towards the meanings of words.

... the argument you quote from BBB was _only_ a counterargument to the argument from the definition of science ...

Yes, I noted I wasn't going to be able to do this all in one go. In an ideal world I'd have infinite time to engage in internet wrangles but, unfortunately ...

Your own argument for IMN (such as it is) is not the argument from definition. You don't just say, "science excludes the supernatural by definition." Your argument seems to be something like what BBB call Argument 5 (with maybe some of Argument 2 thrown in). You haven't yet responded to the parts of the paper that address your arguments.

Yes, I was going to address the rest, including that particular argument. Here's a hint: BBB are right ... if theists posited a particular world which was "good" instead of "evil" (the way that some posit a 6,000 year old Earth) that could be "falsified" (uh, oh ... Popper?). But take it the other way 'round. If we found a "good" world, would that be scientific evidence of the supernatural? Where's the extraordinary empiric evidence that a natural world must be "evil"? And, yes, I'm going to keep harping on "eee" because it is the heart of their claim that science can address the supernatural ... i.e., that there is a "class" of empiric evidence that bears on the supernatural ... hopefully more sophisticated than Coyne's bright lights and "angels" in the sky.

I think a major problem with your arguments is your attempt to draw a sharp demarcation line between "metaphysics" (or "philosophy") and "science".

Oh, I don't really think its all that sharp but, hell, just how much time am I going to spend on replies to comments to posts on an obscure blog floating forlornly in the ocean of the internet?

Whenever anyone argues that science can address a supernatural hypothesis, you call that "metaphysics" or "philosophy", but never give any definition of those terms that would enable you to justify that label.

They're pretty much the residue of whatever "science" is.

I pointed out in a previous discussion that you adopted an unreasonably narrow definition of "science"

[Shrug] So you say. Anybody can try to label their beliefs as "science," as the IDers well know. I'm still looking for some way to consistently and rationally differentiate the claims of Gnu Atheists to scientific support of their beliefs about gods from those of the IDers.

P.S. Dang, it looks like Springer has now put the final article behind a paywall and I foolishly didn't save a copy. If anyone did, I'd greatly appreciate it if you sent it to jtpieretATgmailDOTcom!

John wrote: If we found a "good" world, would that be scientific evidence of the supernatural?

Is anyone saying that it would be? And what do you mean by "the supernatural"? My position is that there's no reason in principle why we can't use broadly scientific reasoning to evaluate hypotheses that might typically be labelled "supernatural". I'm not concerned with whether scientists might actually label those hypotheses "supernatural". I'm not convinced that "supernatural" is a well-defined category of hypotheses or entities. But, since supporters of IMN insist on invoking such a category, they have an obligation to define that category, something I don't think you've done.

On another point, Alex made some good arguments, and I thought your response was unimpressive, especially on Occam's Razor (parsimony). If you deny that considerations of parsimony play a useful role in scientific inference then I think we are so far apart in our understanding of science that further discussion will be useless. If you accept that that they do play a useful role, then you need to give some reason why Alex was wrong to invoke such considerations, instead of just rejecting them out of hand.

P.S. I read your quote from Bronowski. I agree with him that theory choice cannot be reduced to a mechanizable algorithm (except insofar as a whole brain or AI can be thought of as following an algorithm). But considerations of parsimony don't have to be reduced to a mechanizable algorithm to play a useful role in scientific reasoning.

John wrote: If we found a "good" world, would that be scientific evidence of the supernatural?

Is anyone saying that it would be?

But, then, except for determining whether or not particular phenomena exist, empiric evidence can't be brought to bear on the question of whether or not the "supernatural" exists. And, yes, people like Larry Moran claim that science shows that gods do not exist because the universe doesn't appear to be benevolent. But if a benevolent universe isn't evidence for gods, then how is a non-benevolent (whatever that might entail) universe be evidence against gods?

And what do you mean by "the supernatural"?

The "supernatural" is that set (quite possibly empty) of phenomena and causes that are not what we call "natural." The tough part is defining what "natural" is.

My position is that there's no reason in principle why we can't use broadly scientific reasoning to evaluate hypotheses that might typically be labelled "supernatural". I'm not concerned with whether scientists might actually label those hypotheses "supernatural". I'm not convinced that "supernatural" is a well-defined category of hypotheses or entities. But, since supporters of IMN insist on invoking such a category, they have an obligation to define that category, something I don't think you've done.

[Shrug] We're arguing about what "science" is and nobody has come up with a very good definition of it. We think we know what science is tolerably well enough to discuss it, just as we talk about day and night, despite the existence of twilight. I argue for a structural and formal definition of "science" ... what scientists collectively do when "doing" science. It's an empiric definition based on what we actually observe scientists doing, not just what someone thinks "scientific reasoning" might be. Scientists do not engage in the kind of processes -- repeatable observations and experiments formally reported and evaluated by the community as a whole -- about purported "supernatural" causes that they do when they are otherwise engaged in "science." If individual scientists who wade in on the question don't do what they would normally do when engaged in their regular work, it's hard for me to see how anyone can say they are doing the same "thing" ... i.e. "science".

If you accept that that they do play a useful role, then you need to give some reason why see Alex was wrong to invoke such considerations, instead of just rejecting them out of hand.

But Alex didn't "invoke" an actual use of the Razor. He just vaguely waived it in the direction of "supernatural causes" as if that was sufficient. I'm curious, do you know of any instance when a scientist has actually invoked the Razor in a formal scientific work? I wonder just how "useful" (i.e. how much it is actually used in science).

John: The "supernatural" is that set (quite possibly empty) of phenomena and causes that are not what we call "natural." The tough part is defining what "natural" is.

Yes, and you've ducked it. So you still haven't told us what category of hypotheses you're excluding from scientific evaluation.

John: Scientists do not engage in the kind of processes -- repeatable observations and experiments formally reported and evaluated by the community as a whole -- about purported "supernatural" causes that they do when they are otherwise engaged in "science".We're talking about what might happen in the future if there was compelling evidence for a "supernatural" phenomenon, so we need to extrapolate from what scientists do now to what they would do if such evidence were found. And just because much of what scientists do involves repeatable observations and formal experiments, it doesn't follow that those are the only observations that scientists consider. I believe scientists have, for example, looked at astronomical data from ancient Chinese sources, which obviously couldn't be repeated now. Nor have you established that there cannot be repeatable observations of and experiments on supernatural entities. Suppose that a god appeared on Earth and started performing miracles to order. Submitting requests for miracles and observing the results would be a form of experiment.

I'm going to call it a day there, except to ask some rhetorical questions. Why try to pre-specify some limitation on what scientists can and can't conclude? Why close off any options? Why not leave it up to scientists to decide on the merits of the case as they see it at the time? Who knows what might happen in the future?

One more thing I forgot to mention. I made too big an issue of parsimony before. It's not important to the question. The fact is philosophers can't agree among themselves what the principles of scientific epistemology are. All the more reason, then, why they shouldn't try to dictate to scientists in advance what conclusions they can and can't reach.

So you still haven't told us what category of hypotheses you're excluding from scientific evaluation.

"Natural causes" are those that appear to us to occur with such regularity and consistency as to operate in a lawlike manner. I made that point to Alex.

We're talking about what might happen in the future if there was compelling evidence for a "supernatural" phenomenon, so we need to extrapolate from what scientists do now to what they would do if such evidence were found.

The problem is that no one has given us any credible example of what that evidence might be. All the examples I've seen floated so far simply don't bear on the existence of the "supernatural." I don't think anyone on the IMN side is saying that some presently unimaginable evidence or technology (such as John Wilkins' "divinoscope") couldn't change things but "science" as it is practiced now, with our abilities now (which is, after all, a "definition" of science), simply is incapable of addressing the existence or nonexistence of the supernatural.

I believe scientists have, for example, looked at astronomical data from ancient Chinese sources, which obviously couldn't be repeated now.

Huh? That's observation just as fossils are observations of past life.

Suppose that a god appeared on Earth and started performing miracles to order. Submitting requests for miracles and observing the results would be a form of experiment.

So we're back to the 900 foot tall Jesus? What empiric evidence could there be that the being is supernatural and not just a natural being with unknown (to us) technology? "Miracles" are just things we do not understand the cause of and we have lots of those presently, without assigning them to the supernatural.

You're taking a very limited view of what scientists do.

And a lot of things that individual scientists do -- including metaphysics -- don't qualify as science. You've yet to give a good reason to accept an expansive definition of "science" ... other than some people's desire to use it as a stick to beat theists.

Why try to pre-specify some limitation on what scientists can and can't conclude?

To keep people from unfairly using the label "science" as a stick to beat theists ... among other things, such as avoiding category errors.

Why close off any options? Why not leave it up to scientists to decide on the merits of the case as they see it at the time? Who knows what might happen in the future?

And someday, somehow, in that indefinite future where all moonbeams reside, the IDers might eventually come up with actual evidence of a designer. But that's no reason to call ID "science" now.

All the more reason, then, why they shouldn't try to dictate to scientists in advance what conclusions they can and can't reach.

No body is "dictating" to scientists by attempting to define "science," anymore than dictionaries "dictate." But there may just be no way for science to get to where some people want it to go.

I think you are overstating their position. They are claiming that, based on "science" as we know it, a supernatural hypothesis can't be scientific, which I agree with. You're positing some sort of change in the very abilities of science -- a different "science" altogether -- which I think is overstating BBB's position. They seem, through their examples, to be positing only science as we know it.

And don't take my humble admission that I may be wrong as an admission that I've changed my opinion. ;-)

Ah, I see, your position is really precisely the same as that of Massimo: the supernatural is another word for "not exhibiting any describable regular behaviour" or "not understandable". Okay then, you are right as far as that definition goes, by default of course. It could be noted, however, that then there can also be no other way to understand it apart from science, so the whole point is moot.

Where I still disagree with both of you is the entirely unsupported assumption that this is, in fact, how believers define the supernatural. If they actually thought that god could not be relied on, why would they bother to worship him? Here is a fairly nice discussion of this mistake. Against your example of god seemingly being unfair to Cain (which by the way does make sense in that his sacrifice does not involve blood) we could raise others like god being powerless against iron chariots, or the Israelites losing a certain battle whenever Moses lowers his arms, and winning it whenever he raises them. The entire point of the old testament is that god deserts Israel whenever they stop following his laws, and rescues them when they repent - and the entire point of magic(k) is being a list of cause-effect magical spells! Surely if you polled believers in magic, exorcism or faith healing, they would overwhelmingly answer that they both call it supernatural and expect them to work reliably.

---

And yes, I would consider intelligent design a sensible scientific explanation if all evidence pointed towards it having poofed into existence fully formed a couple of thousand years ago. What alternative would you suggest in that case? Probably running around in circles for all eternity while repeating "there must be a gradualistic explanation somewhere, there simply must be!" In reality, the evidence points somewhere else, and so ID is a failed explanation, superseded by a better one at least for 151 years now.

It could be noted, however, that then there can also be no other way to understand it apart from science, so the whole point is moot.

Understanding what is not understandable is hardly moot.

Where I still disagree with both of you is the entirely unsupported assumption that this is, in fact, how believers define the supernatural. ...

Surely if you polled believers in magic, exorcism or faith healing, they would overwhelmingly answer that they both call it supernatural and expect them to work reliably.

Then why do most theists have sayings such as "the ways of God are mysterious," "God helps those who help themselves" and the like? I think it is you who has an unrealistic understanding of religion.

And yes, I would consider intelligent design a sensible scientific explanation if all evidence pointed towards it having poofed into existence fully formed a couple of thousand years ago.

But, of course, IDers don't say that. But even if they did, they'd just say, as in Omphalos and a 6,000 year old Earth, that empiric evidence is unreliable, which is deeply unscientific.

The point is, appealing to the supernatural is a way to avoid the value of empiric evidence. Trying to crowbar empiric evidence so that it addresses something that avoids empiric evidence is just the other side of the same coin and just as much a mistake. There's nothing wrong about the philosophical choice to value science over any other forms of "knowledge" but it isn't itself a scientific result.

Well, we will just have to disagree about what is the more realistic view of religion. My point is that they may claim capriciousness to, as you say yourself, deflect inquiries for evidence, but they do not behave as if they seriously believe that.

There's nothing wrong about the philosophical choice to value science over any other forms of "knowledge" but it isn't itself a scientific result.

We have been over that before - does anybody anywhere actually claim that? Not that I would be aware of. What Coyne continually says (just as an example, my own view is slightly different and probably even more "scientistic") is that science is the only way of knowing about the world around us that seems to work, in the sense of producing anything that deserves to be called knowledge in the first place.

Of course this justification for preferring science did not result from an experiment, and he has never claimed that. He just demands that another way of "knowing" has to come up with the goods - mostly objectivity and a way to know when you are wrong -, and so far nothing but science did that. For the universe around us, of course - math and logic come up with the goods, but not about the specific universe we live in, but only about things that must needs be true or false in every universe. If you want to know if Alpha Centauri has planets or why the leopard has spots, there is by definition no way to generate that knowledge except science.

That means, to slightly rephrase your sentence above: in using science, we make the philosophical choice of wanting to know anything at all about the universe. In not using science, we make the choice of not having knowledge about it. Or perhaps another way of looking at it: if we find new tools to generate knowledge about the universe, we immediately assign it to the toolbox we call science.

There's nothing wrong about the philosophical choice to value science over any other forms of "knowledge" but it isn't itself a scientific result.

We have been over that before - does anybody anywhere actually claim that?

I think some do. Especially if they claim that everything is subject to science, including the question of the existence of the "supernatural," then they are claiming exactly that, no matter how much lip service they may pay to a limited role for science.

If you want to know if Alpha Centauri has planets or why the leopard has spots, there is by definition no way to generate that knowledge except science.

And if you assume that is the only "knowledge" worth having.

In not using science, we make the choice of not having knowledge about it.

So we throw out art, literature and even the sense of wonder about the universe that Coyne and other Gnu Atheists talk about? That's too stark a choice for me.

You got me stumped. Of course art and literature are worthwhile, but in what way do they producing knowledge? They may transmit it (and many forms do not even attempt that), but generate it? You could just as well say: then we throw out cooking, or talking a walk in the park.

> I think you are overstating their position. They are claiming that, based on "science" as we know it, a supernatural hypothesis can't be scientific, which I agree with. <

No, you've misunderstood their position. Supporters of IMN say that a supernatural hypothesis cannot be scientific _in_principle_. They don't say "science as we know it". Try asking the NCSE crowd.

Since you accept that in principle a supernatural hypothesis could be scientific, your position is little different from BBB's. Your rejection of the supernatural is based on science as we know it now, i.e. on empirical grounds which in principle could be different in the future. That's PMN.

John, have you gone wobbly on me? Well, just to maintain balance, I, for one, continue to believe that by at least one definition of the word "supernatural," such a hypothesis "cannot in principle be tested." As far as I know this definition of supernatural is an empty set. But some "fictional" gods certainly fall under its mantle.

What is the experiment we run to see whether fossils are as old as they seem, or whether some God or Demon made them appear so to trick us or test our faith? What is the experiment we run to determine whether or not there is some heavenly realm (or parallel universe) permeable to us only at the moment of death?

Speaking of faith, it's the "faith is evil" lot that got us into this mess. Instead of making the perfectly sensible statement that we presume naturalism to be true when we do science (not all faith is blind faith; some is quite rational), now we have to pretend we have "evidence" for naturalism, a form of tortured logic a Jesuit would be proud of.

Of course art and literature are worthwhile, but in what way do they producing knowledge?

If you don't know more after reading great literature or seeing great art, you are doing it wrong.

Richard:

IMN say that a supernatural hypothesis cannot be scientific _in_principle_.

And has anyone posited to them, as you did, that there might be some completely unimaginable evidence or technology in the future? As science is presently, they are right: a supernatural hypothesis cannot be scientific in principle. You were positing completely new principles to work by. You can do that with anything but that doesn't mean the rest of us have to take you seriously in the here and now. Until you can give us at least a credible hint what these totally new principles might be, you're just passing hot air.

Chris:

John, have you gone wobbly on me?

Not really. I just have trouble ruling out presently unimaginable changes that might happen in the future. That's kinda why they call them unimaginable. Of course, trying to refute what we know about the limits of science today by saying that maybe science will somehow so completely change in the future to enable it to do something it can't even begin formulate a cogent test for today is exactly the same bull the IDers are selling.

Well, just to maintain balance, I, for one, continue to believe that by at least one definition of the word "supernatural," such a hypothesis "cannot in principle be tested."

Given our present knowledge, abilities and logic, it is, in principle, untestable. I cannot imagine how we could ever go about testing it and, more importantly, neither can the people who argue for PMN, since they haven't come up with anything remotely close to a true empiric test of the supernatural. If someone says "maybe someday something completely beyond our present knowledge, abilities and logic will make it testable," my reaction is "get back to me when it happens." Until then, there is no "science" of the supernatural (and no science if ID).

... a form of tortured logic a Jesuit would be proud of.

I much prefer the Jesuits since they decided to do logic rather than people.

The gods claimed by religion don't act that way. They are capricious. For example, the Abrahamic god rejected Cain's sacrifice while accepting Abel's. Unlike the relationship between mass and gravity, there is no regularity that we call "natural law" in purported actions by gods.

My understanding was that this wasn't a capricious act. Cain's sacrifice was crops and Abel's was animals. God likes the animals.

So we make ten animal sacrifices and ten vegetable sacrifices. Then we keep track of the health and wealth of each of the 20 subjects. Based on what we know about God, the animal sacrificers should be healthier and wealthier.

Consider the alternative: God didn't reject Cain's offering and accept Abel's offering for any reason, such as a preference, that would constitute a regularity in the behavior of God. Well, the only alternative is that he doesn't have a preference -- he flipped a metaphysical coin.

Any coherent notion of "capriciousness" or "lack of regularity" with regards to physical law simply reduces to pure randomness or chaos. First of all, rather than helping to justify God belief, this shreds it -- "capriciousness" or "lack of regularity" cannot itself account for the sorts of intentional and teleological behaviors ascribed to supernatural beings. A preference such as God's for meat is a regularity. And in fact, human nature is encrusted all over with biases and preferences that entail certain sorts of reliability and predictability -- if God is truly capricious, then we're not really made in his image, as far as I can tell.

Second of all, it reduces the entire meaning of "the supernatural" to "the incomprehensible." If the supernatural is, by supposition, "capricious" in the way you seem to want it to be, then it seems to me to mean nothing more nor less than that there is no pattern to it that we can find, that it is simply causal stuff with maximal Komogorov complexity. In other words, you are simply begging the question by presupposing the existence of something incomprehensible and then labeling it "supernatural." Can you provide any reason to believe that's NOT what you're doing?

John, that was not really an answer. Knowledge is defined as true, justified beliefs; I would also add objective. That means, to qualify as knowledge, a mental concept must be arrived at via some kind of mechanism that goes beyond simply making it up, one that has a way of differentiating true and false proposals built into it, plus it should be possible to teach this mechanism to an intelligent being from whatever cultural or ideological background and, if they follow the procedures correctly, have them arrive at the same conclusion.

This works for math, logic, and science. I have no idea how it is supposed to work for literature - I am correct in assuming that you are talking novels, poems and theater plays? The ones where people can notoriously not even agree on what the author wanted to express, much less whether the author's opinion is actually justified or correct?

As Jerry Coyne and Russell Blackford have discussed to death, this is even worse for religious faith and theology: there is no way to differentiate true and false propositions*, so there is no knowledge there, just unfounded assertions - turtles all the way down, as the saying goes.

* Apart from where somebody who just happens to have "professor of theology" written on his door in reality does philosophy instead of theology.

My understanding was that this wasn't a capricious act. Cain's sacrifice was crops and Abel's was animals. God likes the animals.

God's liking animal sacrifices over vegetable sacrifices isn't capricious? If the only relationship between the sacrifice and outcome is what God likes, then it can change with nothing more than God changing his mind. And by all accounts, gods change their mind frequently.

... "capriciousness" or "lack of regularity" cannot itself account for the sorts of intentional and teleological behaviors ascribed to supernatural beings. A preference such as God's for meat is a regularity. And in fact, human nature is encrusted all over with biases and preferences that entail certain sorts of reliability and predictability -- if God is truly capricious, then we're not really made in his image, as far as I can tell.

Sorry. I'm not getting what you are trying to say here. Are you saying that intentional and teleological behaviors have to be as regular as what we call "natural causes"? And why wouldn't there be differences between human intentional and teleological behaviors (if that's got something to do with it) from those of an allegedly infinitely intelligent and knowledgeable being?

Second of all, it reduces the entire meaning of "the supernatural" to "the incomprehensible."

Umm, if we assume that science is human beings' best way to comprehension (as I do) why should the fact that something that is untestable by science is incomprehensible to us pose a problem?

In other words, you are simply begging the question by presupposing the existence of something incomprehensible and then labeling it "supernatural."

I'm not presupposing the existence of the supernatural. In fact, I think it is highly unlikely. On the other hand, I can certainly rationally consider the possibility that something something incomprehensible to us might exist and then ask the rational question whether or not we could test that. The sole question here is how to go about testing for the supernatural, if at all, using science. If we can't, then my skepticism about the supernatural, no matter how much you and I may think that is reasonable, is not a scientific result and should not be labeled as such.

... plus it should be possible to teach this mechanism to an intelligent being from whatever cultural or ideological background and, if they follow the procedures correctly, have them arrive at the same conclusion.

So no individual can have or acquire "knowledge." The only knowledge is collective across all cultures and beliefs? Out of curiosity, how would you justify your beliefs when there are many people who deny the efficacy of "science"? Do you just believe that they are obstinent or stupid or do you have some kind of objective mechanism that goes beyond simply making it up that shows that the particular "mechanism" called "science" is "objective"? Of course, if you don't have an objective mechanism that, when done right, shows that the mechanism of "science" is objectively right, you've failed your own test.

As Jerry Coyne and Russell Blackford have discussed to death, this is even worse for religious faith and theology: there is no way to differentiate true and false propositions*, so there is no knowledge there, just unfounded assertions - turtles all the way down, as the saying goes.

As Hume pointed out 200 years ago (and no one has satifactorily answered yet -- though Samir Okasha has apparently claimed recently to have a solution but I haven't seen it) you can't justify a belief in science through science. It seems Coyne, Blackford and you are standing on at least one turtle yourselves and maybe shouldn't be so smug. Who is to say which turtle is shakier?

I didn't say anything at all about new principles. And what do you mean by "completely"? Your point seems equivocal. Science develops as new evidence is found. Science today is not the same as science 100 years ago, or even 1 year ago. In a reasonable sense of the word science does develop new principles. So what? It's still science, isn't it?

John: As science is presently, they are right: a supernatural hypothesis cannot be scientific in principle.

That makes no sense. If you're only talking about the present state of science then you're not make an _in_principle_ claim.

----

Chris, you're playing the same bait-and-switch game that Massimo does. You're giving an example of type of supernatural hypothesis that science couldn't accept, and implying that therefore it couldn't accept _any_ supernatural hypothesis.

----

Now, this really is my last post here. I'm not going to waste more time arguing with equivocators.

John, my last post was rather hasty and I want to apologise for my final remark. I think we were talking at cross-purposes, because somewhere along the line you got the idea that I was talking about a science with completely differerent epistemological principles from present day science. But I wasn't.

Returning to something you wrote earlier:

What empiric evidence could there be that the being is supernatural and not just a natural being with unknown (to us) technology?

"Supernatural" is poorly defined, and, as I said before, I'm not saying that it's a label scientists would necessarily want to use. But, if an an entity could perform "miracles" on demand, apparently unlimited by physical laws as we know them, I think we would want to consider it a very special and new category of entity. Suppose, moreover, that we were each granted the power to have some unspoken wishes come true. I think there are limits to what we would attribute to technology.

The underdetermination of theory by evidence always means that scientists have to make a judgement of which is the best explanation among theories which all fit the evidence. There may be a point at which it is better to accept that something really weird is happening than to stick with "unknown technology".

I see no justification for trying to predetermine what might be the best explanation in scenarios we haven't even imagined.

Incidentally, on the subject of ID, the ID hypothesis does not claim that the designer is "supernatural". So in using IMN to exclude ID from science regardless of any evidence, the NCSE crowd are going much further than just saying a hypothesis cannot refer to the supernatural.

Chris, you're playing the same bait-and-switch game that Massimo does. You're giving an example of type of supernatural hypothesis that science couldn't accept, and implying that therefore it couldn't accept _any_ supernatural hypothesis.

Not quite. I'm saying that supernatural = "immune to science." A tautology, yes. If there was a naturalistic "god," subservient to the known laws of nature, then I'd give science a shot as sussing him out, but I'm not sure I'd label him "supernatural" in that case.

Most of the postulated entities that fall under this category are given the attributes of being somehow above or outside the laws of nature. An omnipotent deity could, for example, create 6 earths before breakfast, all appearing to be 4 billion years old. There are reasons to doubt the existence of such a god, but epistemically we can't refute him.

Oh come on now. Are you seriously suggesting solipsism, or postmodern "everything is just an opinion"? And you charge what you call scientism with being self-defeating?

To paraphrase Sokal: If you think that science is on similarly shaky ground when describing gravity as a theologian pontificating about the trinity, you are invited to put your money where your mouth is and jump off a high cliff (or at least throw down something valuable and fragile).

You are using induction every single day; without it, you would not even be able to decide which words to type to express your ideas. You do not, for good reason, apply the "epistemology" of religion, i.e. wishful thinking, when you make financial or career decisions. Or so I hope. And it is just childish to pretend both are equally unjustified like some 14 year old who is all flush with excitement that he has understood the Wikipedia entry on the problem of induction and now considers himself a sophisticated thinker.

John: As Hume pointed out 200 years ago (and no one has satifactorily answered yet -- though Samir Okasha has apparently claimed recently to have a solution but I haven't seen it) you can't justify a belief in science through science. It seems Coyne, Blackford and you are standing on at least one turtle yourselves and maybe shouldn't be so smug. Who is to say which turtle is shakier?

I can't resist jumping in on this one. The problem of induction says nothing about justifying "science through science". It says that induction cannot be justified at all. Hume's conclusion (I believe) was that ultimately we think inductively because it's in our nature to do so. I agree with that. (I've read Okasha's paper and I disagree with it.)

The irony here is that you're the one trying to put a priori limits on science. Those of us who reject IMN are saying that science is a fallible, empirical process, and we shouldn't rule out anything in advance. If anyone is failing to take note of the inherent uncertainty of science, it's you.

... somewhere along the line you got the idea that I was talking about a science with completely differerent epistemological principles from present day science. But I wasn't.

This all came up because you jumped on my comment that "there may just be no way for science to get to where some people want it to go" to mean I didn't think addressing the supernatural is beyond "science" in principle. That comment was made, however, in context of your asking:

Why close off any options? Why not leave it up to scientists to decide on the merits of the case as they see it at the time? Who knows what might happen in the future?

Since I had already pointed out that no one (including you) has posited any credible way that empiric evidence could even possibly bear on whether or not the cause of a phenomena is supernatural, I did allow for some epistemological method totally unknown today. But if we are excluding a "divinoscope," you'll still have to show just how empiric evidence can bear on the causes of phenomena or it is fair to say that, in principle, it can't.

I think we would want to consider it a very special and new category of entity.

But would "science" assume it was "supernatural," that is, not subject to "natural laws"?

I think there are limits to what we would attribute to technology.

For such an advocate of science, you seem to have a poor opinion of its potential.

There may be a point at which it is better to accept that something really weird is happening than to stick with "unknown technology".

That may be the choice of any individual scientist (heck, a lot of them today believe in the supernatural, for which they are reviled by the Gnu Atheists) but would that be the conclusion of the formal and structured thing we call "science"? Or would that continue to be skeptical?

I see no justification for trying to predetermine what might be the best explanation in scenarios we haven't even imagined.

And I see no reason why unimaginable scenarios should be considered as overruling the clear principles by which science works today.

... the ID hypothesis does not claim that the designer is "supernatural".

There's clear evidence that the IDers are lying about that. Does science have to credit liars?

Those of us who reject IMN are saying that science is a fallible, empirical process, and we shouldn't rule out anything in advance. If anyone is failing to take note of the inherent uncertainty of science, it's you.

I raised Hume in response to Alex going on about "justified true belief." But if the "inherent uncertainty" of "science" means that it has no rules, no way to distinguish it from every other "way of knowing," then what the heck are we arguing over? If, on the other hand, science has rules ... principles ... by which it works, then we can determine what those principles rule out.

Alex:

Oh come on now. Are you seriously suggesting solipsism, or postmodern "everything is just an opinion"?

Of course not, as any anyone remotely familiar with this blog knows. But if you want to use "justified true belief" as a bludgeon against others, you have to live up to it yourself.

> And I see no reason why unimaginable scenarios should be considered as overruling the clear principles by which science works today. <

That makes no sense. If you're claiming that science can never accept a supernatural hypothesis, then you're claiming that there are no possible scenarios in which that could occur. (Simply arguing that such scenarios are unlikely won't do the trick. We agree they are unlikely. The question is whether they're impossible.)

> There's clear evidence that the IDers are lying about that. Does science have to credit liars? <

That makes no sense. The question is whether their stated hypothesis could be scientific given suitable evidence. Their ulterior agenda and beliefs are irrelevant to that question.

If you're claiming that science can never accept a supernatural hypothesis, then you're claiming that there are no possible scenarios in which that could occur. (Simply arguing that such scenarios are unlikely won't do the trick. We agree they are unlikely. The question is whether they're impossible.)

I'm sorry, you've got that exactly backwards. If you're claiming that science, which for some 300+ years has agreed (despite the personal beliefs of its practitioners) that supernatural explanations are not acceptable as science, could possibly change, then simply arguing that such scenarios are remotely possible won't do the trick.

Funny how the Gnu Atheists idea of "burden of proof" is so malleable. Gods can be ruled out merely because of a lack of "scientific" evidence but any old remote possibility should be accepted as science ... as long as it serves Gnu Atheist purposes.

Their ulterior agenda and beliefs are irrelevant to that question.

Oh, right! Fraud is acceptable in science! I won't bother to start listing the scientists who have been ousted from the scientific community for lying ... unless you are really ignorant of them!

About Me

John (catshark) Pieret is a professional loudmouth and troublemaker with an abiding interest in preventing creationist promotion of ignorance in public education. He once could be frequently found wasting his and others' time in the usenet group "talk.origins" but times change.
He was also the editor of the resource known as "The Quote Mine Project" at the Talk Origins Archive.