Dozens of ethnic Uyghurs from a small village in northwestern China’s Xinjiang region, including several sets of siblings, have been swept up in a recent crackdown on “illegal religious activities” after they attended lectures by unsanctioned imams, according to local officials.

At least 52 Uyghurs in Tomosteng township’s No. 2 village, in Kashgar (in Chinese, Kashi) prefecture’s Yarkand (Shache) county, have been arrested under related charges, the 140-household village’s party secretary Ablet Hekim told RFA’s Uyghur Service in an interview earlier this week.

Chinese Terrorist on The Street in Ürümchi 2009
Of those arrests, 39 were the result of a “recent” sweep by local authorities, Hekim said, adding that 35 are now in jail and the remaining four—all of whom are “unofficial imams” that the state does not recognize—have been sent for “political reeducation.”

The other 13 have been serving sentences “since previous sweeps during the 2000s,” according to the party secretary.

“This week we have handed down verdicts for 13 out of the 35 [now held in jail] and delivered the official notices to their families, door to door,” Hekim said.

Sentences for the 13 ranged from two-and-a-half to 10 years in prison.

“The 35 listened to ‘illegal religious sermons’ at least two times, because we usually only warn one-time listeners and let them go,” he said.

According to Hekim, the sermons did not contain any sensitive references to “dividing the country” or anti-government rhetoric often linked to unsanctioned religious activities.

“They were sentenced simply because they had listened to sermons by the unofficial imam Abdukerim at an unauthorized venue [outside of a government sanctioned-mosque],” he said.

Hekim provided RFA with a list of all 35 Uyghurs held amid the crackdown, as well as their ages.

Among the 35, three women—Buhelish Nur, Heyrinsa Ehmet and Patima Seyittursun—were punished for “inviting people to attend” the sermons, he said.

At least five sets of siblings were jailed as part of the recent sweep, including brothers Ahmat, Tursun and Imin Zayit, as well as sister and brother Nurimangul and Memet Talip.

“Ahmat Zayit’s family has no one of working age left at home, so there is no one maintaining their fields,” he Hekim said.

“His kids have been taken in by his nephew’s family.”

2009-Ürümchi

Report of arrest

RFA obtained confirmation of the 52 arrests in No. 2 village while investigating a report published last week by exile Uyghur website Hoylam.com, which claimed that a 73-year-old Uyghur woman named Helchihan Hoshur was detained after making disparaging comments about Chinese policies during a “self-criticism” session in Tomosteng township’s neighboring No. 7 village.

Party secretaries from three different villages in Tomosteng township, including No. 3 village chief Qembernisa Hashim, were unable to confirm Hoshur’s detention.

“We do not have anybody like that—all the detainees in our village are males,” Hashim told RFA, without providing details about the detainees there.

“We would have recognized her, since we conduct a lot of political educational work with her family members.”

RFA was unable to confirm the identities of the male detainees from No. 7 village or the reason for their arrests.

China has vowed to crack down on what it calls religious extremism in Uyghuristan, and regularly conducts “strike hard” campaigns including police raids on Uyghur households, restrictions on Islamic practices, and curbs on the culture and language of the Uyghur people, including videos and other material.

While China blames Uyghur extremists for terrorist attacks, experts outside China say Beijing has exaggerated the threat from the Uyghurs and that repressive domestic policies are responsible for an upsurge in violence there that has left hundreds dead since 2009.

Reported by Shohret Hoshur for RFA’s Uyghur Service. Translated by Mamatjan Juma and Alim Seytoff. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

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On March 30, 2017, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, announced a new policy aimed at curbing Muslim extremism in the Uyghuristan (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region). The new policies appear to be aimed at Uyghuristan’s Uyghur minority, whose long history of autonomous rule and a distinct ethnic identity continue to create problems for the largely centralized Chinese government.

For the Uyghurs of Uyghuristan, repression of religious expression has long been seen as one dimension of a larger government campaign to decrease the influence of the Uyghur ethnic identity. For the Chinese government, the desire to maintain order has often come with good intentions, but often only resulted in exacerbated tensions in the regions.

A Complicated Position

Under the rule of the central Chinese government for hundreds of years, the Uyghurs (a distinct nomadic ethnicity of Turkic origin) of Uyghuristan have long exhibited nationalist and separatist tendencies. The region’s most recent expressions of an independent national identity emerged during the chaotic early decades of the twentieth century. On two separate occasions (1933-34 and 1944-49), Uyghuristan managed to declare its independence as the “East Turkestan Republic.” Even after Nationalist Chinese forces managed to establish control over the province, their appointed governors often aligned themselves closer to the Soviets over their own government, creating power structures separate from those of the central Chinese government.

As Communist forces consolidated control over mainland China in 1949, the last “East Turkestan Republic” crumbled as Soviet support evaporated. When Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic (PRC) that same year, the newly-centralized government began to give greater attention to the province. In 1956, Mao Tse-Tung warned ominously of how the Chinese had “sowed feelings of estrangement among our various nationalities and bullied the minority peoples.” To that end, China could not be divided by what he described as “Han-Chauvinism”—a term used to describe the historical domination of the Han minority over other regional ethnic groups. The native peoples of Xinjiang constituted one of the small ethnic groups Mao was describing.

The Constitution of the PRC guarantees that all citizens shall enjoy “enjoy freedom of religious belief.” However, the government also prioritizes the need for order, especially in regions like Uyghuristan and Tibet, where political instability is a common worry for the authorities. Thus, the very same article declares that “no one shall make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order.” So long as the Uyghurs are seen as a threat to the stability of the Chinese state, expression of cultural identity will be construed by officials as a threat to the government.

Frontiers of Opportunity

Economic development has changed the face of Uyghuristan in the last few decades. The segregation between Uyghurs and Hans (the main ethnic group of China) in Urumqi, the capital of the province, has become a symbol of the divide between the two groups. Chinese companies in Uyghuristan have displayed hiring practices that reportedly favor ethnic Hans, whose migration to Uyghuristan in the last few decades has made them equal in population to the native Uyghurs, and comparatively wealthier. Without assimilation into mainstream Chinese culture, most Uyghurs cannot expect to enjoy the wealth which continues to flow into the province.

On top of rising economic inequality, new educational practices have also led to concerns about the role of education in destroying Uyghur values. As traditional Islamic-oriented education is replaced by more modern forms of education, Islamic identity has become increasingly connected to the Uyghur self-identity. Most recently, China Daily announced that 20,000 predominantly Uyghurs students would be sent to “inland cities” to gain an otherwise national education at multiple levels.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that China’s government does not persecute Islam specifically; the Hui Muslims (ethnic Hans who practice Islam) have been noted for their prosperity in China over the last few decades. Persecution, in fact, would appear to be aimed at the Uyghur ethnic identity itself. With their history as a people separated from the larger Chinese identity, Uyghurs in Uyghuristan view increased Chinese involvement in the province with suspicion: in some cases, this contempt for the Chinese government has resulted in acts of terrorism.

President Xi Jinping’s recent call for a “Great Wall of Iron” in response to a continual barrage of terrorist attacks raises the specter of just how serious the conflict has become. In the last few years, vernacular to describe governance over the province has been expanded to include phrases like “security state.” As Chinese officials look to prevent chaos in the province, their approach raises the perennial question regarding state policies on terrorism: Does repression fuel extremism, or does extremism fuel repression? In containing Xinjiang within a “great wall of iron,” the Uyghurs of Uyghuristan may be pushed to suffer even more by the Chinese authorities. As they lose their identity to the influence of the East, many Uyghurs may look to an expanding Chinese state with even more disdain.

Owing to the region’s strategic location in Central Asia, many Uyghur extremists can easily travel abroad to train with foreign terrorist organizations. As Muslim extremism becomes increasingly common, Chinese authorities see an expanding state presence in the region as a necessary preventative measure. These actions, in creating a more suppressed atmosphere that in turn emboldens extremism, may be planting the seeds of the very insurrection many fear will never take place.

Looking Ahead

The preamble to the Chinese constitution declares a need “to promote the common prosperity of all nationalities.” For China’s leaders, the harsh realities of the real world present serious obstacles to this vision. In working to find a balance between security, national unity, and minority rights, certain priorities inevitably become more important than others. In the eyes of exiled Uyghur groups like the World Uyghur Congress (WUS), the Chinese state continues to be seen as a force of brutal repression.

Outside groups like the World Uyghur Congress generally assert Uyghur identity as of Central Asian origin, and culturally distinct from that of China. In a 2010 interview with the Harvard Political Review, Rebiya Kadeer, President of the World Uyghur Congress and a former PRC official, bluntly stated that “Uyghurs are not Chinese,” and dismissed the view that Xinjiang could ever be a part of China. More recently, the World Uyghur Congress has continued to criticize the Chinese government’s approach to fighting terrorism, arguing that the PRC’s current policies are contributing little to actually solving the crisis.

With China showing no signs of giving up Uyghuristan, Kadeer’s hopes for a new “East Turkestan Republic” appear unrealistic for the foreseeable future. Even with the WUS adopting the framework of a “nonviolent and peaceful opposition movement,” violence continues to be pervasive throughout the province. The impasse between the PRC and activists like Kadeer demonstrates continued difficulty of cooperation between both sides. For now, violence seems likely to continue on China’s “new frontier.”