Category Archives: 32pdr SC Guns

One aspect of the operations of Charleston that I like to present is the evolution of fortifications around the harbor (Federal and Confederate). In my opinion, one should study such to appreciate the tactical aspects. Many authors will write on the subject as if a “battery” or “fort” was static and unchanged through the war, and thus representing a generic “unit” of force. However, I would offer the level of detail offered in reports and correspondence during the war indicate the participants saw no small importance in the evolution of those defenses. In other words, if the participants in 1864 thought it important to mention the different caliber of weapons, then 150 years later we should lend that aspect some manner of interpretation.

Battery Bee, upon the western extremity, is not yet quite completed, though a number of laborers are engaged upon it. Its armament is in an effective condition, the guns all working well and protected by merlons. The magazines are dry and kept with neatness. The ammunition in them, as far as could be judged without examining each cartridge, is in good order; the implements new. There are three chambers which have no cannon, which, I presume, will be furnished when necessity or opportunity requires.

Battery Marion, connected with Battery Bee, is neatly policed. The platform for the 7-inch Brooke gun has settled from its true position; the parapets in one or two places have a disposition to slide on account of the shifting character of the sand. Dampness begins to ooze through one place in the passage, not as yet sufficient to affect the ammunition, which is in good order.

Colonel [William] Butler complains of a defect in the powder sent from the naval ordnance bureau with or for the Brooke gun, saying experience has proven it to be defective in strength. To the eye it appears good; analysis can only disclose the reported defect. The same officer requests that efforts be made to procure for the guns in his command a small quantity of bar steel to repair the eccentrics of the columbiad carriages, which repairs, when necessary, can be made at the island. The battery is connected with Fort Moultrie by a sally-port.

Fort Moultrie, next in order upon the island, has now no quarters inside, which gives a good parade within its walls. It is well protected by a system of traverses and the guns in effective condition. The magazine is in good order and neatly kept. In the rear of the fort are a number of broken canister, which might be removed for renewal to Charleston. The ammunition in good order.

Battery Rutledge in good order, with its ammunition dry and well cared for. The batteries from Bee to this one constitute one continuous parapet, well protected with traverses and spacious, well arranged bomb-proofs, and in some instances with amputating rooms for the medical bureau; these of course were not visited.

Mayo turned next to the four numbered, and unnamed, batteries between Forts Beauregard and Marshall.

Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, two-gun batteries extending along the south beach at an average distance of about 500 yards apart, covering the space between Forts Beauregard and Marshall and intended seemingly as a protection against boat assaults, are small open works with no traverses. There being no magazine in this cordon of works, the ammunition is kept in chests, exposed to the weather. Some of the chests need repairs and tarpaulins as a protection.

Mayo suggested improvements to the parapet of No. 1; mentioned a carriage in No. 3 that required repair; and damages to the parapet of No. 4. Mayo also suggested these works needed iron traverse circles to replace wood circles then in place. Colonel Ambrosio Gonzales overruled, saying the 24-pdr guns should be mounted on siege carriages to allow redeployment where needed on the island. Mayo noted the “disparity” in the ammunition for each of these batteries:

The last work on the line inspected by Mayo was Fort (or Battery) Marshall, at Breach Inlet:

Battery Marshall, at Beach Inlet, is as yet in an incomplete condition, though the guns are all in working order. A large bomb-proof, in addition to those already complete, has been commenced, upon which a force is now at work. One of the 12-pounders has wheels of different sizes, and in another the cheeks of the carriage are not upon a level. These two defects in these two carriages should be remedied. The magazines are in good order, and dry, as well as the ammunition, but roaches, by which they are infested, cut the cartridge-bags. It would therefore be as well to keep the powder in the boxes and barrels until a necessity arises for use, so that the bags may be preserved. I noticed the passage-way to one of the magazines much encumbered with shell. A room constructed for such projectiles is decidedly to be preferred.

Mayo went on to discuss Batteries Gary, Kinloch and Palmetto on the mainland. But to serve brevity in a post already beyond my preferred word count, I will save those for later.

Mayo expressed concerns about unmounted and unassigned guns on the island. “A 32-pounder banded rifle not mounted is laying upon the beach,” he noted. He also mentioned several 6-pdr field pieces not under any direct control of the battery commanders. In general, Mayo felt the guns needed “lacquer and paint” to improve appearances and protect against the elements. Lastly, he noted the presence of bedding in the magazines, but left that matter to the discretion of local commanders.

I plan, as part of my documentation of each individual work, to examine these batteries in detail. So please check back for follow up posts in regard to specific arrangements in each fortification.

On this day (March 14) in 1864, Federals under the command of Brigadier-General Andrew Jackson Smith attacked and seized Fort DeRussy on the Red River in Louisiana. In terms of blood spilled, the action was one of the war’s smaller actions, with less than sixty total casualties. But, with the fort in Federal hands, the lower Red River was open for the gunboats of Rear-Admiral David D. Porter. The Friends of Fort DeRussy maintain a website (recently revamped website I would add) with many articles and resources about the battle.

There is one surviving “witness” of that battle, which now resides at the Washington Navy Yard:

However the trophy inscription would lead you to believe this gun was not at Fort DeRussy during the battle on March 14, 1864.

The inscription reads:

Army 32-pdr //Banded and Rifled by Rebels // Captured from them by // Admiral D.D. Porter // At Fort DeRussy // May 4, 1863

But that inscription is in error. The Fort DeRussy website has an article explaining this error in great detail. The short version of that story is the reference found in the naval reports (ORN, Series I, Volume 26, page 26), under a listing of “guns captured at Fort DeRussy water battery.” Line six of that list is:

One 32-pounder U.S. rifled, marked W.J.W. No. 289. This gun is an old Army 32-pounder, rifled, with band shrunk on the breech.

The muzzle markings leave no doubt. This is that particular gun.

The inspector’s mark, “W.J.W.” for William Jenkins Worth, appear at the top of the face. The registry number, 289, appears at the bottom.

The trunnion tells a little more of the weapon’s history.

“I.M” and “C.F.” are John Mason and Columbia Foundry, respectively. This weapon was cast across town in Georgetown, D.C. On the other side, a sample scar cuts into the stamp showing the year of manufacture, which was 1834.

Seven grooves in what I consider a “sawtooth” pattern. While no definitive markings or documentation pin this as a Confederate modification, the rifling and profile of the band lend to that conclusion.

The band extended over the breech face. And it was built up with rings of wrought iron. However the gun retained the ring over the cascabel.

The gun itself offers an interesting study. While I cannot firmly state the banding and rifling were done by Confederates, the physical attributes give that indication. But where and who did the modifications? Eason & Brothers in Charleston did such modifications. But most of their work stayed in the Charleston or Savannah areas. Tredegar also modified weapons along these lines. Shops in Vicksburg and New Orleans had the capacity to do this work. Skates & Company, based in Mobile, Alabama, also may have done some modifications. But all those sources remain speculative without firm documentation or some unseen mark under the paint of old 289.

As to the question raised in the article on the cannon about relocating the gun to Fort DeRussy (linked above), I’d say that would be an excellent “loan” should the particulars be worked out. However, keep in mind this gun is now very close to its “birthplace,” if we can say such for a cannon. It was, after all, cast a few Metro-train stops over in Georgetown. Columbia Foundry was a vital weapons production facility for the early decades of the 19th century. Perhaps some interpretation on that aspect of the weapon’s history would also serve the public.

On January 8, 1864, Brigadier-General Thomas Jordon, Chief of Staff for General P.G.T. Beauregard, wrote to Major-General Jeremy F. Gilmer, second in command of Confederate forces in Savannah, Georgia:

The commanding general wishes to know if some way cannot be devised for destroying the enemy’s dock-yards, machine shops, &c, at Scull Creek [sic], either by an expedition specially organized for the purpose or by long-range rifled 32-pounder used as mortars, firing “liquid-fire shells” at from 3 ½ to 4 miles’ range.

The “liquid fire” referred to was a phosphorus mixture. In the spring of 1863, Dr. James R. Cheves of Savannah received authorization to experiment with white phosphorus. As the compound will ignite under some conditions in contact with air, packaging of the material in the shell was as important as promoting the ignition at the target. By late August, he was ready to demonstrate his research. Cheves modified some 12-pdr shells, with the loading described in a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Jones:

Having been placed under war water, they were filled with lump phosphorus, which, under those circumstances, immediately melts. They were there upon transferred to cold water, and, upon the hardening of the phosphorus in each shell a cavity was bored out sufficiently large to receive the metallic tube, and also to admit a thin stratum of water around it after it had been hardened. The cavity of the shell thus charged is kept filled with water, the metallic tube inserted, and its tightness insured by means of a washer of lead, quite thin, and the use of white lead in screwing in the screw-stopper to which the metallic tube is attached.

The presence of water prevented contact with air. When readied for action, a bursting charge and fuse was placed in the metallic tube, and ignited as a standard fuse when fired. Jones reported the results of the test against a stand of pines at White Bluff, outside Savannah:

The first shell was fired at a considerable elevation, exploding at a distance of perhaps 300 yards from the muzzle of the piece and evolving a burning cloud of phosphorus, probably not less than 30 or 40 feet in diameter, from which particles of ignited phosphorus descended, reaching the ground, and for some moments continuing in a state of ignition.

The other shells were fired with second-fuses, and were exploded at one time in a clump of green pines, the leaves of which were considerably scorched, although dripping with rain-drops from the recent shower…. In each case there was a similar evolution of a large cloud of burning phosphorus, while the large particles, falling to the ground, in some instances fired the grass and twigs to a certain extent, the combustion continuing for several moments after the explosion of the shell.

Jones concluded that the wet conditions prevented a larger fire during the tests. The obvious conclusion was these shells would have considerable effect on wooden structures or positions inside tree-lines. “If exploded within the cavity of a vessel, their effects would be most disastrous.”

Through the fall, Cheves continued to refine the application and to produce a stockpile of incendiary shells (12-pdr and 8-inch mentioned) and grenades. The problem then became one of delivery.

The portions of Morris Island within range of Confederate guns did not present very good targets for incendiary devices. Save a lucky hit upon a magazine, the sand batteries were not vulnerable to fire. The Federal camps on the south end of Morris Island or on Folly Island, on the other hand, did present targets for incendiary shells. Likewise the complex of camps and buildings on Hilton Head also offered targets for these phosphorus shells. But the problem was ranging those bases.

That in mind, on January 4, Beauregard authorized Colonel J.R. Waddy to experiment with rifled 32-pdr guns fired at extreme elevation:

The commanding general wishes you to make experiments in the city with the 32-pdr rifle intended for Battery Haskell, with a view to ascertain its range when used as a mortar. The charge, which should be the smallest practicable, length of fuse, &c, must be determined for ranges from 2½ to 3½ miles. When in position at Battery Haskell, it will not be fired without orders from these headquarters.

But even with that extended range, the guns could not range all the desired targets. The map below demonstrates a 3½ mile range, with a red arc, from Battery Haskell:

Within range of the 32-pdr rifle/mortar arrangement were the camps on the south end of Morris Island, the ordnance and engineer depot, camps on Little Folly Island, and Light House Inlet. From the Confederate perspective, perhaps a chance to strike a blow directly against the troops firing on Charleston. But this implied firing the weapon at maximum range towards camps inside sand dunes. But one wonders about the effect of fires among all those ammunition crates in the Ordnance Depot. And the 32-pdrs would not range Major-General Quincy Gillmore’s headquarters on Folly Island.

As for any position on Skull Creek, consider the most advance posting I can think of:

Again, the red arc demonstrates the maximum range specified. Fort Mitchel falls in range, but that might be done with a direct fire weapon. The important targets fell well out of range. And this implies the Confederates could work under the noses of Federal pickets from Fort Mitchel.

While desiring to retaliate against the Federal bombardment of Charleston with “fire shells,” Beauregard simply lacked the weapons to reach the really good targets.