In response to demand from reserve managers, Central Banking Publications is proud to bring you our 6th Renminbi Roundtable. In this meeting we will discuss opportunities for, and practicalities of, â¦

Designed for industry leaders in fixed income trading and portfolio management. Two-stream event covering topics on changing fixed income market structure, automation of the bond market, liquidity isâ¦

Following the success of 2016, Structured Products is delighted to be returning to Washington next November to host its second forum focusing on developments in the legal, regulatory and compliance lâ¦

Structured Products runs three global awards programmes - for the Americas, Asia, and Europe - to celebrate excellence across the structured products markets. The Structured Products awards are the iâ¦

The Energy Risk Asia Awards will be held in Singapore, and recognises excellence across global commodities market as well as provides a unique opportunity for companies across the industry to gain vaâ¦

Further investigation into the chaotic aftermath of the Brexit vote in June has thrown light on the stress it inflicted on central counterparties (CCPs) and their members. Last month, it emerged one clearing house in particular, LCH, had come under fire for making several extremely large margin calls in the wake of the vote. But it was not the only one – estimates of the total margin demanded by clearing houses on June 24, the day after the vote, range from $25 billion to more than $40 billion, in several calls for intra-day margin, each of which had to be met within an hour.

Since central clearing was first proposed as a remedy for the counterparty exposures that did so much to spread the 2008 crisis, industry observers have warned this simply substitutes liquidity risk for counterparty risk. CCPs are caught in a cleft stick: the more they try to protect themselves and their members by collecting additional margin as markets move, the more they increase the pressure on members already suffering from those markets.

In the event, every margin call was met without incident. But the truly worrying part is how few banks were involved – most of the volume in the cleared over-the-counter derivatives market goes through just a handful of banks. The failure of even one of these dominant players would be a truly shocking event. Yes, CCPs should be able to survive the default of their largest customer – even of their two largest customers. But if they were to impose 11-figure margin calls over a single day again – especially in a more long-lived and widespread crisis – would the consequences be limited to just two banks? "We survived that time" is not another way of saying "everything is fine and we should not worry".