John Abramson is retired and lives in the Lake District in Cumbria, England. He obtained an MSc in Transpersonal Psychology and Consciousness Studies in 2011 when Les Lancaster and Mike Daniels ran this course at Liverpool John Moores University. He is currently studying for a distance learning Buddhist Studies MA at the University of South Wales. He can be contacted at johnabramson@btinternet.com

I would also like to
acknowledge Hartelius' gripping style of
delivery during which I have been variously
likened in my manner of writing

to Bill Clinton's denial of having sexual
relations with Monica Lewinsky about my
insistence that Wilber does not assert a
single nondual ultimate.

Compared to a climate change denier
when I contended that Hartelius and
Ferrer had missed the point about T.R.V.
Murti's and Wilber's 'absolute'.

Accused of almost reaching the point of
dishonesty when I identified Wilber's
complaint that Ferrer can deduce that he
has shifted the ontological status of
Kosmic habits to the inner realm (upper
left quadrant) of the individual.

Hartelius has therefore employed sex,
ecology and (lack of) spirituality in his criticisms.
I respond to these below in the first
part of my response to Hartelius, but for the
present, although I realise Hartelius' 'sex'
comment was no doubt said tongue in cheek
there is nevertheless something in it, and
perhaps more than Hartelius realises.
However, the opposite applies to his remarks
concerning 'ecology' and 'lack of spirituality'.
Besides responding to Hartelius
(2015) I intend to attempt to move the
debate on by setting out some of my own criticisms of Wilber's and Ferrer's work.

Ferrer is precisely wrong about his claim that
participatory thinking radically departs
from perspectivist perennialism.

Hartelius characterises me as a supporter
of Wilber in the sense that he suggests I am
wedded to his views and am, for example,
willing to unearth 'a passage deeply
embedded within the technical concepts of
Wilber's complex worldview that would
scarcely be accessible to anyone outside of
Wilber's adherents'. In this instance
Hartelius conflates the need to be clear
about what is being discussed i.e. Wilber's
definition of integral post-metaphysics, and
the ease with which such a definition can be
accessed. Hartelius refers to this as 'a lucid
example of how Wilber and his supporters
insist that the debate with Wilber's ideas be
conducted within a comprehensive understanding
and presentation of Wilber's writings'.
But this is not the case; I just identify
what Wilber means when he refers to integral
post-metaphysics. I go along with
Hartelius insofar as Wilber's definition is
hard to find but his inflationary extension of
this is unwarranted.

I agree, of course, that Hartelius is entitled
to present whatever his interpretation of
my motivation in writing my article might be.
But I insist my motivation is to overcome
misunderstandings I perceive of Wilber's
work and I suggest that, in the case of considering
integral post-metaphysics, starting with
a definition is reasonable. As to whether I am
a supporter of Wilber's work and wedded
to his views; I am the former and am not
the latter. I am a supporter of Wilber's views
partly because, as Ferrer has to some extent
intimated, he is a genius[7] in the field
of transpersonal psychology[8]. And by
'supporter' I mean it is worthwhile making
an effort to understand, in the first instance,
Wilber's work in the terms he presents it but
certainly not an unqualified acceptance that
Hartelius attributes to me. I am not wedded
to Wilber's views because although I almost
invariably find them stimulating they can,
on investigation, appear misconceived.
Examples of two such instances are:

Wilber's technique of ranking spiritual states and stages (e.g. nondual higher than theism) is flawed.

Wilber has, I argue, fundamentally misunderstood the relationship between spiritual states and stages of development (cf. the Wilber-Combs matrix; Wilber, 2006, p.88–93). Insofar as I am correct about this, an important implication of this misunderstanding is that Wilber is largely misguided in one current area of his work i.e. promulgating a 'Fourth Turning of Buddhism' (cf. Wilber, 2014).

The Emperor's New Clothes

Jorge Ferrer

An elucidation of these criticisms of Wilber's
work will be the subject of later sections. But
first some areas of disagreement with
Ferrer's work will be discussed intertwined
with relevant rejoinders to issues raised by
Hartelius (2015).

In my opinion, from a certain definition
of perennialism[9], Ferrer's depiction of the
mystery is arguably perennialist. Since the
participatory paradigm involves intimate
participation with the mystery, my argument
therefore extends to attributing perennialism
to Ferrer's participatory turn. As both
Hartelius and Ferrer make clear, 'perennialism
begins with the assumption that there
is a single truth underlying various traditions'
(Hartelius and Ferrer, 2013, p.190).
And Ferrer's depiction of the Mystery
includes precisely this assumption:

There is a way, I believe, in which we can
legitimately talk about a shared spiritual
power, one reality, one world or one truth…
a common spiritual dynamism underlying
the plurality of spiritual insights and ultimates.
(Ferrer, 2002, p.190; cited in
Abramson 2014, p.5; emphasis added)

In my 2014 article, I used this quote to
compare Wilber's and Ferrer's position on a
single truth. But now I wish to draw its
arguably more startling significance i.e. as a
pointer towards the perennial nature of
Ferrer's account of the mystery. Hartelius
rejected my proposition of a linkage between
Wilber and Ferrer's position on a single truth
based in part on a complaint that I based this
on 'a 36-word quote [as above] from Ferrer
(2002)' (Hartelius, 2015). Hartelius implies
that this was an isolated comment by Ferrer,
but similar references connecting the
mystery to a single truth are very common in
Ferrer's writing e.g. 'There is a way, I believe,
in which we can legitimately talk about a
shared spiritual power, one reality, one world
or one truth…' (Ferrer and Sherman, 2008,
p.156; Ferrer, 2005, p.127); the mystery is the
'generative power of life, the cosmos, and/or
the spirit' (Ferrer, 2011, p.2); 'the mystery
that is source of all' (Ferrer, 2002, p.xiv); 'the
Mystery out of which everything arises'
(Ferrer et al., 2005, p.311; Ferrer and
Sherman, 2008, pp.40,137,152; Ferrer, 2006);
'a mystery out of which everything arises'
(Ferrer, 2013, p.102); 'the ultimate unity of
the mystery' (Hartelius and Ferrer, 2013,
p.197); the participatory approach does not
seek… [to refute] …an ultimate beyond all
possible ultimates… rather it rejects dubious
perennialist equivalences among religious
ultimate's' (Ferrer, 2011a, p.19).

The above analysis and the weight of the
above quotes from Ferrer and Hartelius
suggest that 'In any ordinary usage of the
term, … [Ferrer's] system… is accurately and
usefully described as perennialist'. This
quote is from Hartelius, 2015, and relates to
his justification to tie Wilber's system to
perennialism. However, as will now be
apparent, this same justification by Hartelius
apparently ties Ferrer's account of the
mystery to perennialism. After all as Hartelius
says 'if one makes perennialist claims, it is
reasonable that one's work will be characterised
as perennialist' (Hartelius, 2015).

The question might naturally arise of why
an explicit perennialist charge has not, to my
knowledge, previously been made in relation
to Ferrer's account of the mystery. However,
George Adams' review of 'The participatory
turn' (Ferrer and Sherman, 2008) can be
interpreted to go some way towards this:

… in terms of the work still facing Ferrer,
there is the challenge of clarifying his position
regarding the nature of the spiritual
reality which is the object of religious experience.
Ferrer declares that his approach is
free of any ontological objectivity ('no pregiven
ultimate reality exists' (Ferrer and
Sherman, 2008, p.142)), but he frequently
uses terms such as 'mystery,' 'spiritual
power', 'reality,' and other designations that
imply that there is some sort of spiritual
reality out there (or in here), however varied
are its expressions. In other words, there is
an implied ontological objectivity in Ferrer's
model, even if it is an objectivity that avoids
essentialist reifications and that cannot be
divorced from the elusive variability and
radical creative undeterminacy of the
sacred. Further clarification of Ferrer's
understanding of this sacred reality is called
for, however challenging that task might be
while operating from a participatory model.
(Adams, 2011).

Compare Adams' assessment that Ferrer:

… frequently uses terms such as 'mystery', …
'reality', … that imply that there is some sort
of spiritual reality … In other words, there is
an implied ontological objectivity in Ferrer's
model. (Adams, 2011)

with Hartelius' comment about perennialism's
shared spiritual goal, or ultimate of
all possible ultimate realities:

Even if the ultimate spiritual goal [of perennialism]
is ineffable but remains factually
the same for all traditions, it must be in
some sense objective.[10] (Hartelius, 2015)

Hartelius' point is that the assertion of
perennialism of one truth, or an ultimate
spiritual goal, for all traditions necessarily
implies that this one truth/ultimate spiritual
goal 'must be in some sense objective'. In
other words an objective one truth/ultimate
spiritual goal is perennialist. But Adams
charges Ferrer with an implied objectivity of
Ferrer's account of the Mystery which is the
same, according to my analysis, as Hartelius'
implying the Mystery is perennialist.

All three systems i.e. Murti's, Ferrer's, and perspectivist perennialism's have an ultimate beyond all possible ultimates, which for Murti is an absolute.

I argued that Ferrer's account of the mystery
is perennialist, which Ferrer associates with
Wilber's work, which in turn is associated
with T.R.V Murti's absolute. I will now
consider how this impacts on Hartelius'
assertion that I am a 'climate change denier'
when I contended that Hartelius and Ferrer
had missed the point about T.R.V. Murti's
and Wilber's 'absolute'. As a starting point
for this, Ferrer introduces the role of the
absolute in perennialism:

[P]erennialists often assert that, because
multiplicity implies relativity, a plurality of
absolutes is both a logical and a metaphysical
absurdity: 'The absolute must of necessity
be one and, in fact, the one as asserted
by so many metaphysicians over the ages'
(Nasr, 1996, p.19). This commitment to a
monistic metaphysics is closely related to
the perennialist defense of the universality
of mysticism. As Perovich (1985), a perennialist
philosopher, puts it: 'The point [of the
perennial philosophers] in insisting on the
identity of mystical experiences was, after
all, to bolster the claim that the most varied
mystics have established contact with 'the
one ultimate truth' (p.75). (Ferrer, 2000,
pp.17,18)

There is an apparent confusion here
concerning Ferrer's, Nasr's and Perovich's
use of the term absolute, at least as far
as Murti/Wilber understand the term
absolute, and similarly how I define absolute
in the context of the ultimate realities of
perspectivist perennialism. T.R.V. Murti's
account of 'the absolute' is of an absolute
beyond all possible absolutes (1960,
pp.320,321,327). Thus there is a two stage
structure of absolutes according to Murti
and this is mirrored in both:

Ferrer's account of two stages of
ultimate realities stemming from the
mystery, and

All three systems i.e. Murti's, Ferrer's, and
perspectivist perennialism's have an ultimate
beyond all possible ultimates, which for
Murti is an absolute that is beyond all Hindu
and Buddhist religious absolutes, for Ferrer
is the mystery, and for perspectivist perennialism
is what Ferrer describes as a ground of
being (Ferrer, 2002, p.78). All three also
have multiple ultimates that are sourced
from these i.e. multiple absolutes (Murti),
multiple ontological ultimate's (Ferrer) and
using Ferrer's terminology, many goals of
perspectivist perennialism. Examples of
Murti's 'second stage' absolutes are the
absolutes of Advaita Vedanta in Hinduism,
and Vijńanavada and Madhyamika in
Buddhism. These three examples from
Murti are included in the multiple 'second
stage' ultimate realities of Ferrer's participatory
model and perspectivist perennialism
except they are referred to as ultimate realities
rather than Murti's reference to them as
multiple absolutes. The participatory and
perennial models also encompass additional
ultimate realities to that recognised by Murti
e.g. God, Allah.

I conclude from the above analysis that

there is congruence between the two
stage structure of the account of
ultimate realities in Ferrer's work
and in perspectivist perennialism. This
congruence can be extended to Murti's
system but with the import caveats that
Murti refers to absolute rather than
ultimate reality and he restricts 'second
stage' ultimate/absolute realities to those
in the Hindu and Buddhist religions.
This supports my contention that Ferrer's
account of the mystery is perennialist[12].

Ferrer's (Ferrer, 2000, pp.17–18) above
use of the quote by Nasr that mentions
'The absolute must of necessity be one' is
problematic because it should be
qualified to relate to the 'absolute that is
beyond all religious absolutes'. That is,
Ferrer, following Nasr, has conflated the
'absolute that is beyond all religious
absolutes' with the multiple absolutes of
the different traditions.

this is a further reason to support the
contention I made in Abramson, 2014,
pp.5–8 that Ferrer's dismissal of Murti's
'absolute' is almost wholly unwarranted
i.e. Ferrer appears to overlook that his
account of the 'one truth' mystery that is
the source of all ontological ultimate
realities is structurally very similar to
Murti's 'the absolute' that is the source of
all Hindu and Buddhist absolutes. I have
more to say about Ferrer's dismissal in a
latter section.

In discussing perennialism Hartelius
appears, like Ferrer, to have conflated the
'ultimate reality beyond all possible ultimates',
which he refers to as an ineffable ultimate
spiritual goal, with the multiple
ultimate realities of the different traditions.

Ferrer pointed to the simple and logical
fact that a perennialist model requires an
objective, transcendent ultimate that is
apprehended deep within personal subjectivity.
That ultimate must be objective in
order for it to be the consistent destination
of all traditions. (Hartelius 2015).

Besides the conflation I have referred to,
Hartelius also apparently fails to realise he is
misapplying conventional logic in relation
to ultimate reality. As I mentioned in
Abramson, 2014, p.5 Hartelius and Ferrer
have failed to understand that drawing an
absolute and relative distinction is an essential
element in understanding ultimate
reality and as Mipham, 2005, p.99, cautions
us, failure to do this will result 'in hopeless
confusion'[13] if we fail to differentiate conventional
from ultimate perspectives on reality.
With both a lack of such differentiation and
conflation present in the above quote by
Hartelius, it will take some unpicking.

As Hartelius implies, it is 'simple and
logical' reasoning that would lead to a
conclusion that a perennialist model
requires an objective transcendent ultimate.
But simple and logical reasoning in relation
to ultimate reality is precisely what Mipham
warns us will lead to confusion. The premise,
for example, of a) perspectivist perennialism,
b) Murti's account of the absolute and
c) Ferrer's account of the mystery is that
their respective understanding of an ultimate
reality beyond all other ultimates
cannot be directly known[14]. To assign objectivity
to this ultimate by conventional logic is
fanciful. As Ferrer would say in respect of the
mystery e.g. Ferrer, 2002, p.180 (citing Sells,
1994); and as Murti would say in respect of
'the Absolute' e.g. Murti, 1960, p.320; and as
can also be said of the ultimate beyond all
possible ultimates of perspectivist perennialism;
nothing can be said of these ultimates
– including that.

In the light of the preceding analysis it is
informative to review Ferrer's opinion about
the key differences between the participatory
model and perennialism:

[H]ere is where participatory thinking
radically departs from perennialism, I maintain
that there is a multiplicity of transconceptual
disclosures of reality. Perennialists
erroneously assume that a transconceptual
disclosure of reality must be necessarily
'one', and, actually, the one metaphysically
envisioned and pursued in certain traditional
spiritual systems. Put somewhat
differently, perennialists generally believe
that plurality emerges from concepts and
interpretations, and that the cessation of
conceptual proliferation must then result in
a single apprehension of 'things as they
really are.' (Ferrer and Sherman, 2008, p.139).

Ferrer is precisely wrong about his claim that
participatory thinking radically departs
from perspectivist perennialism. This is so
for the simple reason that the transconceptual
disclosure of reality in perspectivist
perennialism is multiple and indeed parallels
that of the participatory model. What is
apparent here is lack of differentiation
between transconceptual disclosure of realities
on the one hand and an ultimate
beyond all possible ultimates on the other.
Ferrer could conventionally refer to the latter
as 'one' in perspectivist perennialism. But as
I have been at pains to point out, this is not
a difference with the participatory model; it
is a similarity i.e. the mystery can be conventionally
referred to as 'one' and as the many
citations I provide in the 'The Emperor's
New Clothes' section testify; Ferrer does
exactly that.

T.R.V. Murti's model of ultimate or
absolute reality

As Murti (1960) explains, transconceptual
disclosure of reality depends on the tradition
that is practised to enable one to disclose
that reality. The analogy he uses is the way
'the centre of a circle is reached from the
periphery by different radii' (p.327) and
each tradition is attempting to reach the
centre of the circle i.e. 'the absolute', by its
exclusive radii. Murti further explains that
the centre of the circle can be approached
but not reached by any of the possible radii
i.e. authentic paths, but that 'persons
adopting different radii may genuinely feel
that they are on the right path to the centre
and others are not. For each votary may see
the centre looming ahead of him; but he
cannot, from the nature of his predicament,
see that others also may be reaching the
centre through their particular modes of
approach.' (p.321).

Murti's model is consistent with the first
and second stage ultimate realities that I
have referred to previously i.e. Murti's
'centre of a circle' would correspond to the
unknowable ultimate beyond all possible
ultimates and different radii of the circle
correspond to, for example, the ultimate
realities of the traditions. Interestingly, given
Ferrer's critical view of Murti's absolute e.g.
Ferrer, 2002, pp.102,103; Murti's model
seems appropriate to describe the relationship
between Ferrer's account of the mystery
i.e. 'centre of the circle', and the ontologically
real ultimates stemming from the
mystery i.e. 'the possible radii'.

Murti's model is one way of pointing to
ultimate reality. In the context of this
response to Hartelius it helps illustrates
some import commonality between Murti's,
Ferrer's, and perspectivist perennialism's
account of reality. I will now introduce
another such model which has, I argue,
some additional explanatory advantages
over Murti's model; albeit it is rather
more complex.

A model of ultimate reality using the
properties of infinity

This model uses some properties of infinity
to provide a pointer to ultimate reality. It
presupposes no mathematical knowledge
and only requires an appreciation of certain
properties of infinity that are illustrated in
the following two citations:

Spatial infinity is beyond conception…
neither reason nor imagination can grasp it,
for any conception necessarily limits what
is, by definition illimitable… The science of
mathematics accepts the notion of infinity
even though it is beyond and apparently
contrary to reason. It is a concept accepted
without being understood: a baffling yet
necessary idea, something known about
without in any real way being known. (Hill,
1997, p.46)

… what Cantor's research demonstrates is
that there are multiple infinities, multiple
kinds of infinities, infinities that can be rigorously
differentiated, infinities that are greater
than other infinities. (Sallis, 2012, p.199)

Reasons for the effectiveness of choosing the
properties of infinity as a pointer to ultimate
reality include:

infinity is unbounded (Hill, 1997, p.46).
In that respect it is like the absolute
which has no boundary (Murti, 1960,
p.285, n.3).

infinity is beyond reason (Hill, 1997,
p.46) and again, this is a property of the
absolute (Murti, 1960, p.135)

there are multiple kinds of infinity
(Sallis, 2012, p.199) and there are
multiple kinds of absolute (Murti, 1960,
Chapter 13).

there are infinities that can be rigorously
differentiated (Sallis, 2012, p.199) and
there are Absolutes e.g. the absolutes
of Advaita Vedanta, Vijńanavada and
Madhyamika, that are rigorously
differentiated (Murti, 1960, Chapter 13).

there are infinities that are greater than
other infinities. (Sallis, 2012, p.199) and
The absolute (Murti, 1960, p.320) is
beyond (or greater than) all religious
absolutes.

Thus the properties of infinity, which are
established by rigorous mathematical proof,
appear to be a useful guide to the properties
of absolute reality. Indeed, Infinity is
referred to extensively in some Buddhist
scriptures that refer to absolute reality. Some
extracts from 'The Flower Ornament Scripture'
and Thomas Cleary's commentary,
gives a flavour of this:

Yet another function of the scripture, often
unsuspected or considered gratuitous hyperbole,
is to affirm the infinity of the path.
(Cleary, 1993, p.51)

… the real potential of humanity is so much
greater than imagined as to be virtually infinite
even if that infinity can never embrace
the infinity of infinities. (Cleary, 1993, p.52)
By transcendence of all perceptions of
form… they attain to and abide in the realm
of infinity of space, aware of infinite space.
Totally transcending the realm of infinity of
space, they attain to and abide in the realm
of infinity of consciousness, aware of
boundless consciousness. By totally transcending
the realm of infinity of consciousness,
they attain to and abide in the realm of
nothingness, aware of the absence of
anything at all. ([trans] Cleary, 1993, p.724)

Murti's account of the absolute

Hartelius' depiction of me, and those
holding the opinion I express on this issue,
as akin to climate change deniers demands a
robust response. As I indicated in Abramson
(2014), I believe Ferrer's dismissal of Murti's
(and Wilber's) account of the absolute,
although apparently well argued and well
supported by other scholars, is radically
flawed. Once the blinkers Ferrer is unaware
he is wearing are removed, his arguments
are exposed as a full explanation of just one
side of what has been widely recognised for
centuries among scholars and practitioners
as an unresolved issue.

Some 25 per cent of my 2014 article was
related to Murti's absolute and this material
was summarily dismissed in Hartelius' 2015
response. Hartelius' adopts the tactic of
failing to address the points I make in a
scholarly manner and instead responds with
an unsubstantiated claim that the case I
make is akin to that of a climate denier. This
does no service to an informed debate and I
will therefore attempt to put a further reason
for Hartelius and Ferrer to look again at the
evidence I have presented.

One of the notable scholars that Ferrer
2002, p.103) cites in his dismissal of Murti's
account of the absolute is Jay Garfield
(1994). Indeed Garfield, together with many
other distinguished scholars[15] is opposed
to Murti's account of the absolute. But
Garfield[16], together with many other
scholars who are opposed to Murti's absolutist
views, nevertheless recognises the legitimacy
of the polarised views regarding an
absolute in Buddhism (e.g. Thakchöe, 2007,
p.90; Newland and Tillemans[17], 2011, p.4). Is
Hartelius saying these scholars, not to
mention Capriles (2009), Chatterjee (1962),
Coward (2003), Hookham (1992), Lindtner
(1982), Sebastian (2008) and Sprung (1979)
whom I mentioned in Abramson (2014, p.6)
are all, by taking an interpretation of an
absolute in Buddhism seriously, are akin to
climate deniers?

The Wilber-Combs lattice is
misconceived (Part 1)

In this section I critique a key aspect of
Wilber's work i.e. the Wilber-Combes Lattice.
The issue that Ken Wilber and Allan Combs
(independently) addressed that resulted in
the Wilber-Combs Lattice was the way
Western stages of development (e.g. Hy and
Loevinger, 1996; Cook-Greuter, 2011) relate
to Eastern spiritual states (e.g. using Wilber's
terminology, gross, psychic, subtle, causal
and nondual states of consciousness). The
background to Wilber's and Combs' work on
this was presented in a previous issue of this
journal by Michael Daniels in Rowen et al.,
2009, pp.12–16. I will therefore just give a
very brief resume of this.

For the purpose of my critique I would
just note that in the two decades leading up
to the turn of the century, Western
researchers such as Wilber and Combs integrated
western stages of development[18] with
eastern states of consciousness by stacking
the latter on top of the former. This implied
that someone experiencing a higher stage of
consciousness would necessarily have had to
be at among the less than 1 per cent of the
population thought to be at the highest level
of development. Remarkably, this odd implication
did not prevent this 'stacking' model
prevailing through the 1980's and 1990's.
But then it became apparent to Wilber (and
independently to Combs) that a higher state
of consciousness can be experienced at any
stage of development (Wilber, 2006, p.89) –
and they jointly promulgated the Wilber-
Combs Lattice that reflects this (see table 1).

Thus the Wilber-Combs lattice represents
a considerable advance in terms of an
explanatory model compared to the clearly
flawed earlier model. For example it illustrates
that although anyone can potentially
experience any state of consciousness, they
will always report that in the terms of the
stage of consciousness that they have
attained. However Daniels (Rowen et al.,
2009, pp.13–16) raises an important objection
regarding the particular structure stages
in the above model. He points out that the
bottom five are Piagetian (p.14) whereas the
top five are taken from Aurobindo's work.
And he is adamant that Wilber (2006) gives
no justification for including the Aurobindo
stages. Wilber appears to be making a similar
mistake to that when he stacked eastern states
on western stages. That is, Aurobindo's stages
of development are intimately related to the
sequential states of psychic, subtle, causal and
nondual and therefore it appears Wilber
is once again stacking states on
stages by introducing the five Aurobindo
stages onto those of recognised western
Piaget/Loevinger stages of development.

The Wilber-Combs lattice is
misconceived (Part 2)

Table 1: The Wilber-Combs lattice (adapted from Wilber, 2006).

Just as Wilber (2006) explains how he and
Combs missed something that, in retrospect,
was obvious i.e. that the attainment of states
and stages can be achieved independently of
each other, I suggest their Wilber-Combs
lattice has overlooked another apparently
obvious error in its construction. Although
they correctly note from the evidence of
eminent researches such as Cook-Greuter
(2011) that stage development is sequential
and that stages cannot be skipped; they fail
to recognise that this un-skippable stage
progression can occur independently within the
gross, subtle and causal realms. Wilber says as
much in his book 'one taste':

… that ego and soul and spirit can in many
ways coexist and develop together, because
they are relatively separate streams flowing
through the waves in the great nest of being.
And there can be, on occasion, rather uneven
development in between these streams…. This
is why some early cultures apparently showed
advanced psychic capacities but rather poor
frontal development. (Wilber, 2000, p.275).

In addition, the evidence Wilber uses from
western researchers to support his
contention that stages of development
cannot be skipped are almost wholly within
the gross realm. Thus for example in some
recent results from Cook-Greuter (2011,
p.59) only 0.06 per cent of the protocols
came from Stage 10 (i.e. the subtle realm).
If my reasoning stands up to scrutiny, it
seems to imply that there should be three
relatively independent sets of Wilber-Combs
lattices in respect of a person's development
of their ego in the gross realm, their soul in
the subtle realm and their spirit in the causal
realm. It would answer Daniels' point
about why Wilber has added Aurobindo's
stages of development on top of those
of Piaget/Loevinger because only the
Piaget/Loevinger stages would be in the first
of the three Wilber-Combs lattices and
Aurobindo's stages would be appropriately
split up between the other two.

It would also help explain why enlightenment,
contra Wilber, is substantially the same
for, say, the historical Buddha as it is for an
enlightened person today i.e. it is only
different in terms of ego stage development.
It also has radical implications for Wilber's
current work on his proposed fourth turning
of Buddhism. But exploring that is for
another day.

Notes

[7] ‘As I believe Wilber himself would admit, his particular genius manifests not in invention, but in the integration
of others’ ideas.’ Ferrer (2011b, p.13)

[8] Many scholars within transpersonal psychology continue to make use of Wilber’s work, or at least to criticise it,
notwithstanding his now longstanding disassociation from the field in favour of integral spirituality.

[9] i.e. perennialism In the sense of all religions stemming from ‘one truth’ which I agree with Hartilius is the
generally held view of perennialism. Specifically this one truth is broadly as described under the heading of
perspectivist perennialism, which is one of five types of perennialism’s described by Ferrer (2002, pp.78–79)
i.e. ‘many paths and many goals’, but excluding Hick’s (1992) depiction of ultimate reality as Noumenal.
A more complete account of how I choose to define perspectivist perennialism is developed below.

[10] In my opinion the sense in which perspectivist perennialism, as defined here, is objective should be related to
the perspective of the two truths of Buddhism. Using that perspective, the sense is conventional rather than
the ultimate. That is, although I agree with Hartelius and Ferrer (but only from a conventional perspective)
that perspectivist perennialism does imply a single truth – as indeed my analysis suggests that so does the
mystery; neither perspectivist perennialism or the mystery suggest one truth from an ultimate perspective.
(cf Abramson 2014, p.5).

[11] This is another way of referring to an ultimate reality that is beyond any religious ultimate realities.

[12] On one of Ferrer’s definitions of perennialism i.e. perspectivist perennialism’s; but one such definition is
sufficient to label Ferrer’s account of the mystery as peennialist.

[13] The context in Abramson, 2014 was Wilber’s account of what Hartelius and Ferrer described as a single
nondual reality – but Mipham’s sentiment applies equally to Hartelius’ account of a ‘transcendent ultimate’.

[14] In this connection it is notable that Wilber claims nondual emptiness is an ultimate beyond all possible
ultimates i.e. the very ground of all other ultimates. As Buddhist texts make clear, nondual emptiness can be
directly known through, for example, meditative equipoise. But I agree, with Hartelius and Ferrer that, in my
terminology, nondual emptiness is a ‘second stage’ ultimate reality, intrinsically undifferentiated in its spiritual
efficacy with other ‘second stage‘ ultimates. This is consistent with the point made here i.e. all ‘second stage’
ultimates can be known (usually in higher states of consciousness) but the ‘first stage’ ultimate that is beyond
any of them cannot be known, by humans at least, in its entirety.

[15] e.g. the nine scholars who together with Garfield comprise the Cowherds (2011) among many others. But as I
point out (Abramson,2014) there are many contemporary scholars who accept Murti’s account of the absolute.

[16] e.g. see Garfields foreword to Thakchöe, 2007, or Garfield, 1994, pp.vii,viii where Garfield suggests Murti’s
interpretation of Nagarjuna is as valid as his.

[17] Newland and Tillemans refer (p.4) to the 15th century Madhyamika Gorampa, who had similar views to Murti
on the absolute.

[18] the highest stage of development in the Western models at that time was ‘somewhere around… Loevinger’s
integrated’ (Wilber, 2006, p.88).