Mont v. United States

United States Supreme Court

June 3, 2019

JASON J. MONT, PETITIONERv.UNITED STATES

Argued
February 26, 2019

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
Mont was released from federal prison in 2012 and began a
5-year term of supervised release that was scheduled to end
on March 6, 2017. On June 1, 2016, he was arrested on state
drug trafficking charges and has been in state custody since
that time. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to state
charges. He then admitted in a filing in Federal District
Court that he violated his supervised-release conditions by
virtue of the new state convictions, and he requested a
hearing. The District Court scheduled a hearing for November,
but later rescheduled it several times to allow the state
court to first sentence Mont. On March 21, 2017, Mont was
sentenced to six years' imprisonment, and his roughly 10
months of pretrial custody were credited as time served. On
March 30, the District Court issued a warrant for Mont and
set a supervised-release hearing. Mont then challenged the
District Court's jurisdiction on the ground that his
supervised release had been set to expire on March 6. The
District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§3583(1) based on a summons it had issued in November
2016. It then revoked Mont's supervised release and
ordered him to serve an additional 42 months'
imprisonment to run consecutive to his state sentence. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds, holding that
Mont's supervised-release period was tolled under
§3624(e), which provides that a "term of supervised
release does not run during any period in which the person is
imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a . . . crime
unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30
consecutive days." Because the roughly 10 months of
pretrial custody was "in connection with [Mont's]
conviction" and therefore tolled the period of
supervised release, the court concluded that there was ample
time left on Mont's term of supervised release when the
March warrant issued.

Held:
Pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new
conviction is "imprison[ment] in connection with a
conviction" and thus tolls the supervised-release term
under §3624(e), even if the court must make the tolling
calculation after learning whether the time will be credited.
Pp. 6-13.

(a)The text of §3624(e) compels this reading. First,
dictionary definitions of the term "imprison," both
now and at the time Congress created supervised release, may
very well encompass pretrial detention, and Mont has not
pressed any serious argument to the contrary. Second, the
phrase "in connection with a conviction"
encompasses a period of pretrial detention for which a
defendant receives credit against the sentence ultimately
imposed. "In connection with" can bear a
"broad interpretation," Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit,547 U.S. 71, 85, but
the outer bounds need not be determined here, as pretrial
incarceration is directly tied to the conviction when it is
credited toward the new sentence. This reading is buttressed
by the fact that Congress, like most States, instructs courts
calculating a term of imprisonment to credit pretrial
detention as time served on a subsequent conviction. See
§3585(b)(1). Third, the text undeniably requires courts
to retrospectively calculate whether a period of pretrial
detention should toll a period of supervised release by
including the 30-day minimum. The statute does not require
courts to make a tolling determination as soon as a defendant
is arrested on new charges or to continually reassess the
tolling calculation throughout the pretrial-detention period.
Its 30-day minimum-incarceration threshold contemplates the
opposite. Pp. 6-8.

(b)The statutory context also supports this reading. First,
§3624(e) provides that supervised release "runs
concurrently" with "probation or supervised release
or parole for another offense," but excludes periods of
"imprison[ment]" served "in connection with a
conviction." This juxtaposition reinforces the fact that
prison time is "not interchangeable" with
supervised release, United States v. Johnson, 529
U.S. 53, 59, and furthers the statutory design of
"successfulfly] transition[ing]" a defendant from
"prison to liberty," Johnson v. United
States,529 U.S. 694, 708-709. Second, it would be an
exceedingly odd construction of the statute to give a
defendant the windfall of satisfying a new sentence of
imprisonment and an old sentence of supervised release with
the same period of pretrial detention. Supervised release is
a form of punishment prescribed along with a term of
imprisonment as part of the same sentence. And Congress
denies defendants credit for time served if the detention
time has already "been credited against another
sentence." §3585(b). Pp. 8-10.

(c)Mont's argument that the statute's present tense
forbids any backward looking tolling analysis confuses the
rule with a court's analysis of whether that rule was
satisfied. The present-tense phrasing does not address
whether a judge must be able to make a super-vised-release
determination at any given time. Moreover, any uncertainty
about whether supervised release is tolled matters little
from either the court's or the defendant's
perspective. As for the court, the defendant need not be
supervised when he is held in custody; as for the defendant,
there is nothing unfair about not knowing during pretrial
detention whether he is also under supervised release. Pp.
10- 12.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
ROBERTS, C. J., and GlNSBURG, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ.,
joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BREYER, Kagan, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.

OPINION

THOMAS
JUSTICE

This
case requires the Court to decide whether a convicted
criminal's period of supervised release is tolled-in
effect, paused-during his pretrial detention for a new
criminal offense. Specifically, the question is whether that
pretrial detention qualifies as "imprison[ment] in
connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local
crime." 18 U.S.C. §3624(e). Given the text and
statutory context of §3624(e), we conclude that if the
court's later imposed sentence credits the period of
pretrial detention as time served for the new offense, then
the pretrial detention also tolls the supervised-release
period.

I

A

In
2004, petitioner Jason Mont began distributing cocaine and
crack cocaine in northern Ohio. After substantial drug sales
to a confidential informant and a search of his home that
uncovered handguns and $2, 700 in cash, a federal grand jury
indicted Mont for multiple drug and firearm offenses. He
later pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine, and to possessing a firearm and
ammunition after having been convicted of a felony. See 18
U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (2000 ed.); 21 U.S.C.
§§841(a)(1), 846 (2000 ed.).

The
District Court sentenced Mont to 120 months'
imprisonment, later reduced to 84 months, to be followed by 5
years of supervised release. Mont was released from federal
prison on March 6, 2012, and his supervised release was
"slated to end on March 6, 2017." 723 Fed.Appx.
325, 326 (CA6 2018); see 18 U.S.C. §3624(e) (a
"term of supervised release commences on the day the
person is released from imprisonment"). Among other
standard conditions, Mont's supervised release required
that he "not commit another federal, state, or local
crime," "not illegally possess a controlled
substance," and "refrain from any unlawful use of a
controlled substance." Judgment in No. 4:05-cr-00229 (ND
Ohio), Doc. 37, p. 111.

Mont
did not succeed on supervised release. In March 2015, an Ohio
grand jury charged him with two counts of marijuana
trafficking in a sealed indictment. Mont was arrested and
released on bond while awaiting trial for those charges.
Things only got worse from there. In October 2015, Mont
tested positive for cocaine and oxycodone during a routine
drug test conducted as part of his supervised release. But
Mont's probation officer did not immediately report these
violations to the District Court; instead, the officer
referred him for additional substance-abuse counseling. Mont
proceeded to test positive in five more random drug tests
over the next few months. He also used an
"'unknown' liquid to try to pass two subsequent
drug tests." 723 Fed. Appx., at 326. In January 2016,
Mont's probation officer finally reported the
supervised-release violations, including Mont's use of
drugs and attempts to adulterate his urine samples. The
violation report also informed the District Court about the
pending state charges and the anticipated trial date of March
2016 in state court. The District Court declined to issue an
arrest warrant at that time, but it asked to "'be
notified of the resolution of the state charges.'"
Ibid.; see 18 U.S.C. §3606 (explaining that the
District Court "may issue a warrant for the arrest"
of the releasee for "violation of a condition of
release").

On June
1, 2016, approximately four years and three months into his
5-year term of supervised release, Mont was arrested again on
new state charges of trafficking in cocaine, and his bond was
revoked on the earlier marijuana-trafficking charges. He was
incarcerated in the Mahoning County Jail and has remained in
state custody since that date. Mont's probation officer
filed a report with the District Court stating that he had
violated the terms of his release based on these new state
offenses. The officer later advised the court that because
Mont's incarceration rendered him unavailable for
supervision, the Probation Office was "toll[ing]"
his federal supervision. App. 21. The officer promised to
keep the court apprised of the pending state charges and
stated that, if Mont were convicted, the officer would ask
the court to take action at that time.

In
October 2016, Mont entered into plea agreements with state
prosecutors in exchange for a predetermined 6-year sentence.
The state trial court accepted Mont's guilty pleas on
October 6, 2016, and set the cases for sentencing in December
2016.

Three
weeks later, Mont filed a written admission in the District
Court "acknowledg[ing]" that he had violated his
conditions of supervised release "by virtue of his
conviction following guilty pleas to certain felony
offenses" in state court. Record in No. 4:05-cr-00229
(ND Ohio), Doc. 92, p. 419. Even though he had yet to be
sentenced for the state offenses, Mont sought a hearing on
the supervised-release violations at the court's
"earliest convenience." Ibid. The court
initially scheduled a hearing for November 9, 2016, but then,
over Mont's objection, rescheduled the hearing several
times to allow for "the conclusion of the State
sentencing." App. 8; 723 Fed. Appx., at 327.

On
March 21, 2017, Mont was sentenced in state court to six
years' imprisonment. The judge "credited the roughly
ten months that Mont had already been incarcerated pending a
disposition as time served." Id., at 327. The
District Court issued a warrant on March 30, 2017, and
ultimately set a supervised-release hearing for June 28,
2017.

B

Two
days before that hearing, Mont challenged the jurisdiction of
the District Court based on the fact that his supervised
release had initially been set to expire on March 6, 2017.
The court concluded that it had authority to supervise Mont,
revoked his supervised release, and ordered him to serve an
additional 42 months' imprisonment to run consecutive to
his state sentence. The court held that it retained
jurisdiction to revoke the release under 18 U.S.C.
§3583(i), which preserves, for a "reasonably
necessary" period of time, the court's power to
adjudicate violations and revoke a term of supervised release
after the term has expired "if, before its expiration, a
warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an
allegation of such a violation." The court further held
that it retained authority to revoke Mont's term of
supervised release because it gave "notice by way of a
summons" on November 1, 2016, when it originally
scheduled the hearing. App. 22. The court also concluded that
the delay between the guilty pleas in October 2016 and the
hearing date in June 2017 was "reasonably
necessary." Id., at 24.

The
Sixth Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds. The court
could find no evidence in the record that a summons had
issued within the meaning of §3583(i). 723 Fed. Appx.,
at 329, n. 5. But because Circuit precedent provided an
alternative basis for affirmance, the court did not further
consider the Government's argument that the District
Court retained jurisdiction under §3583(i). Instead, the
court held that Mont's supervised-release period was
tolled while he was held in pretrial detention in state
custody under §3624(e), which provides:

"(e) Supervision After Release.- . . . The term of
supervised release commences on the day the person is
released from imprisonment and runs concurrently with any
Federal, State, or local term of probation or supervised
release or parole for another offense to which the person is
subject or becomes subject during the term of supervised
release. A term of supervised release does not run during any
period in which the person is imprisoned in connection
with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime
unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30
consecutive days." (Emphasis added.)

Relying
on Circuit precedent, the Sixth Circuit explained that when a
defendant is convicted of the offense for which he was held
in pretrial detention for longer than 30 days and
'"his pretrial detention is credited as time served
toward his sentence, then the pretrial detention is "in
connection with" a conviction and tolls the period of
supervised release under §3624.'" Id.,
at 328 (quoting United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d
416, 417 (2008)). Because Mont's term of supervised
release had been tolled between June 2016 and March 2017,
there was ample time left on his supervised-release term when
the warrant issued on March 30, 2017.

The
Courts of Appeals disagree on whether §3624(e) tolls
supervised release for periods of pretrial detention lasting
longer than 30 days when that incarceration is later credited
as time served on a conviction. Compare United States v.
Ide,624 F.3d 666, 667 (CA4 2010) (supervised-release
period tolls); United States v. Molina-Gazca, 571
F.3d 470, 474 (CA5 2009) (same); UnitedStates
v. Johnson,581 F.3d 1310, 1312-1313 (CA11 2009) (same);
Goins, supra, at 417 (same), with United States
v. Marsh,829 F.3d 705, 709 (CADC 2016)
(supervised-release period does not toll); United States
v. Morales-Alejo,193 F.3d 1102, 1106 (CA9 1999) (same).
We granted certiorari to resolve this split of authority. 586
U.S.__(2018).

II

We hold
that pretrial detention later credited as time served for a
new conviction is "imprison[ment] in connection with a
conviction" and thus tolls the supervise d-release term
under §3624(e). This is so even if the court must make
the tolling calculation after learning whether the time will
be credited. In our view, this reading is compelled by the
text and statutory context of §3624(e).

A

Section
3624(e) provides for tolling when a person "is
imprisoned in connection with a conviction." This
phrase, sensibly read, includes pretrial detention credited
toward another sentence for a new conviction.

First,
the definition of "is imprisoned" may well include
pretrial detention. Both now and at the time Congress created
supervised release, see §212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1999-2000,
the term "imprison" has meant "[t]o put in a
prison," "to incarcerate," "[t]o confine
a person, or restrain his liberty, in any way."
Black's Law Dictionary 681 (5th ed. 1979); 5 Oxford
English Dictionary 113 (1933); accord, Black's Law
Dictionary 875 (10th ed. 2014). These definitions encompass
pretrial detention, and, despite the dissent's reliance
on a narrower definition, post, at 5-7 (opinion of
SOTOMAYOR, J.), even Mont has not pressed any serious
argument to the contrary. As the Sixth Circuit previously
recognized, if imprisonment referred only to
"confinement that is the result of a penalty or
sentence, then the phrase 'in connection with a
conviction' [would] becom[e] entirely superfluous."
Goins, supra, at 421.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Second,
the phrase "in connection with a conviction"
encompasses a period of pretrial detention for which a
defendant receives credit against the sentence ultimately
imposed. The Court has often recognized that "in
connection with" can bear a "broad
interpretation." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v. Dabit,547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006)
(interpreting "in connection with the purchase or
sale" broadly in the context of &sect; 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. &sect;78j(b));
see, e.g., United States v. American Union Transport,
Inc.,327 U.S. 437, 443 (1946) (describing the phrase
"in connection with" in the Shipping Act, 1916, 39
Stat. 728, as "broad and general"). The Court has
also recognized that "&#39;in connection with&#39; is
essentially indeterminate because connections, like
relations, stop nowhere." Maracich v. Spears,570 U.S. 48, 59 (2013) (quotation altered). Here, however, we
need not consider the outer bounds of the term "in
connection with," as pretrial incarceration is
directly tied to the conviction when it is credited
toward the new ...

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