[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
LEGACIES OF WAR:
UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE IN LAOS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 22, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-117
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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56-094 WASHINGTON : 2010
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee CONNIE MACK, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
LYNN WOOLSEY, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TED POE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
VACANTUntil 5/5/10 deg.
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
DIANE E. WATSON, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary and
Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 11
Ms. Channapha Khamvongsa, Executive Director, Legacies of War.... 28
Robert Keeley, Ph.D., Country Program Manager for Laos, The
Humpty Dumpty Institute........................................ 40
Mr. Virgil Wiebe, Member of the Board, Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
America........................................................ 48
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress
from American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the
Pacific and the Global Environment: Prepared statement......... 5
The Honorable Mike Honda, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Prepared statement........................ 10
The Honorable Scot Marciel: Prepared statement................... 14
Ms. Channapha Khamvongsa: Prepared statement..................... 33
Robert Keeley, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 43
Mr. Virgil Wiebe: Prepared statement............................. 51
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 62
Hearing minutes.................................................. 63
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega: Material submitted for the
record......................................................... 64
The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: Prepared statement.................... 88
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega: Additional material
submitted for the record....................................... 89
LEGACIES OF WAR: UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE IN LAOS
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific
and the Global Environment,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eni F.H.
Faleomavaega (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Faleomavaega. The hearing will come to order. This is
the hearing on the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the
Pacific and the Global Environment. Today's particular hearing
is on the subject of the legacies of war concerning unexploded
ordnance in the country of Laos.
Unfortunately my ranking member is also under the weather,
Congressman Manzullo from Illinois. I am extremely happy that I
have one of my colleagues who traveled with me to Laos,
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Japan recently, Congressman Mike Honda
from California.
I am going to begin with an opening statement, and then we
will proceed from there.
Ironically, 39 years ago to the day, in 1971, the late
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Investigative Problems, connected with Refugees
and Escapees, held a hearing on April 21 and April 22 in 1971
to address war-related civilian problems in Indochina, which
includes Laos.
Testifying before the subcommittee was the Honorable Paul
McCloskey, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California, who had just recently returned from a visit to
Laos, where he and his colleague, Congressman Waldie, also of
California, had obtained certain facts that totally
contradicted testimony that had been submitted to the
subcommittee by the Departments of State and Defense on May 7
of the previous year, which was 1970.
At issue was the causation of refugees and impact of U.S.
Air Force bombing operations in Laos. The Departments of
Defense and State suggested that U.S. bombing operations had
been carefully directed and that very few inhabited villages
were susceptible to being hit by U.S. air power.
But as Senator Kennedy learned that day, and as we now
know, the Departments of State and Defense submitted testimony
that was incorrect and misleading. The truth is, widespread
bombing had taken place and Lao refugees were succinct in
describing the destruction of their homes, as well as the use
of the CBU cluster bombs and white phosphorus.
How extensive were the U.S. bombing raids, was the
question. According to the Congressional Research Service,
``Laos has been characterized as the most heavily
bombed country in history, on a per-capita basis. From
1964 through 1973, the United States flew 580,000
bombing runs over Laos and dropped more than 2 million
tons of ordnance on the countryside, double the amount
dropped on Germany during World War II. Estimates of
the number of unexploded submunitions from cluster
bombs, range from 8 million to 80 million, with less
than \1/2\ of 1 percent destroyed, and less than 1
percent of contaminated lands cleared.''
To be clear about what this means, I want to display a map
of the U.S. Air Force bombing data that I obtained from our
U.S. Embassy in Laos 2 years ago. This map tells it all.
Looking at this map, can anyone honestly believe that there was
no impact on the civilian population?
What makes this so sickening is that cluster bombs and
white phosphorus were used against a civilian population of a
country against whom the United States was not at war. As
Congressman McCloskey stated, ``The bombing was done under the
direction and control of the State Department, not the U.S. Air
Force.''
In fact, the bombing was directed and controlled by the
U.S. Ambassador to Laos. ``Both the extent of the bombing and
its impact on the civilian population of Laos have been
deliberately concealed by the State Department,'' Congressman
McCloskey stated. And for historical purposes, I am submitting
the complete text of the 1971 hearing record to be made a part
of this record some 39 years later.
Some 39 years later, in my humble opinion, it is shameful
that the U.S. State Department has not taken a more active role
in making things right for the people of Laos. But for the
first time in 39 years, I am hopeful that Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton may be willing to champion their cause.
However, I am deeply disturbed that the State Department is
planning to request lower amounts of unexploded ordnance
removal in Laos for Fiscal Year 2011 than it spent in 2010. In
my humble opinion, this is a totally unacceptable course of
action.
During the Vietnam War, I served at the height of the Tet
offensive. And for as long as I live, I will continue to do all
I can to help the victims of Agent Orange as well as those who
are and were affected by U.S. bombing operations in Laos.
Calling for an official public hearing is one way to draw
more attention to the matter, but Vietnam and Laos deserve more
than a hearing. These countries deserve a concerted effort on
the part of the United States Government to help them rebuild,
especially since their civilian populations were wrongfully
targeted. Yes, we know that the U.S. bombing campaign in Laos
was designed to cut off North Vietnamese supply lines that ran
through Laos; but, no, the American people were not aware that
the United States had undertaken, ``the most protracted bombing
of civilian targets in history,'' as Fred Branfman put it in
his statement which was included in the 1971 hearing record.
To this day, America does not support the bombing of
civilian targets. And after every war, America has always
helped countries rebuild. Even after Japan attacked the United
States, U.S. assistance to Japan from 1946 to 1952 was about
$15.2 billion in 2005, of which 77 percent was in grants, 23
percent was in loans, according to the Congressional Research
Service.
Also, according to the Congressional Research Service, from
2003 to 2006, the USA appropriated $35.7 billion for Iraq
reconstruction. For Germany, ``in constant 2005 dollars, the
United States provided a total of $29.3 billion in assistance
from 1946 to 1952, with 60 percent in economic grants and
nearly 30 percent in economic loans, and the remainder in
military aid.''
What have we done for Laos as a government? For now, the
United States has been contributing about $3 million per year
since 1994 for unexploded ordnance clearance operations in that
country. As every single one of us knows, this pittance is as
disgraceful as the compensation we paid when the United States
accidently bombed the Ban Long village in Laos in January 1968,
which resulted in 54 persons killed. At the time, we
compensated the village, or villagers, $55 for every person who
had been killed.
Senator Kennedy found that to be distressing. I do too. So
enough is enough. Justice demands that these wrongs be set
right; yet our own State Department is planning to request
lower amounts for unexploded ordnance removal in Laos for
Fiscal Year 2011 than the meager amount barely spent in Fiscal
Year 2010. This is unconscionable. Laos is one of the poorest
countries in Southeast Asia and one of the smallest recipients
of U.S. assistance. As a country founded on Judeo-Christian
principles, we can and should do better.
I visited Laos again last year, and I can tell you I will
not rest until the U.S. Government begins to take action and
accepts moral and financial responsibility for the mess we left
behind. Children in Laos are counting on us. And I want to
especially recognize those who are being cared for at the COPE
Center, and applaud the work of nongovernment organizations
from around the world who are making a difference.
I thank our witnesses from Legacies of War, the Humpty
Dumpty Institute, and the Mines Advisory Group for their
leadership, and I assure them that they have the full support
of this subcommittee as we work together to make this right.
I also want to commend His Excellency Phiane Philakone, the
Ambassador of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, for the
service he has rendered on behalf of his country. It is because
of him that I was able to gain a firsthand understanding of how
catastrophic U.S. Air Force bombing operations really were and
are. To this very day, Thursday, April 22, 2010, these deadly
unexploded ordnance continue to claim the lives of a people who
are not and never were at war with us. And unless we rectify
this now, the loss of life will go on and on tomorrow, the next
day, and every day thereafter.
As a matter of record, I am including a statement prepared
by Minister Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission Mai Sayavongs
of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the United States. I
recognize the historic nature of this statement, and I pledge
to do all I can to provide assistance for the unexploded
ordnance clearance issue, mine awareness and victims assistance
programs, which is an investment in the future of the lives of
millions for the people of Laos.
Joining us today is the Honorable Scot Marciel, my dear
friend and Deputy Assistant Secretary and Ambassador for ASEAN
Affairs of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the
State Department. Hopefully, my good friend, Ambassador and
Secretary Marciel, can explain to us why the Bureau is not
increasing the money that is so clearly needed to clear up
unexploded ordnance.
Scot Marciel has served in posts in Vietnam, the
Philippines, Hong Kong, Brazil, Turkey, as well as with the
Economic Bureau with the Office of Monetary Affairs. As the
Deputy Assistant Secretary, he has done an excellent and
remarkable job, and I sincerely hope that we will continue to
work together on this issue and find resolution not only for
the people of Laos, but for our Government.
Secretary Marciel is a graduate of the University of
California-Davis and also from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy. He is the father of two daughters, and I am very,
very happy that we have the opportunity of having him testify
this afternoon.
As I said earlier, I am very, very happy to have my good
friend and colleague here, the gentleman from California,
Congressman Mike Honda, who serves on the Committee on
Appropriations, and who I would like at this time to give an
opportunity for an opening statement if he has one.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega
follows:]Faleomavaega statement deg.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank Secretary
Marciel for being here.
I don't have too much to add to what Congressman
Faleomavaega had shared, except to add my sentiments, one of
shock, one of dismay and one of a sense we are not doing enough
and we are not doing quickly enough. If we expect to be helpful
in that country in terms of food security and its development,
then we have to address first the issue of unexploded ordnance.
The fact that we allow ourselves to go daily, knowing full
well what is out there and knowing full well that children are
playing in those areas and knowing full well that there are
families who want to convert a lot of this land into productive
land for food, and still be exposed to these types of
unexploded ordnance, is beyond belief.
We don't send anybody in this country to any worksite that
is dangerous, and yet we know things are existing in other
places where we are responsible, and it doesn't seem that the
level of urgency is met with the same amount of effort in terms
of providing the right resources to address it. So I will be
very interested in hearing a report.
I just have to say one more thing. It appears that we are
seeing that we are spending X amount of dollars per year, as if
it were adequate, as if it were a favor. I am hoping that is a
misreading of the print and not actually the sentiment or
attitude that we have.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for putting this hearing
together.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Honda
follows:]Honda statement deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman from California for
his comments and statement. I am just trying to figure it out.
I am no expert on Air Force strategic military strategies and
all of this, but I suspect that all of these red dots or all
the--I think we had them on the screen there. Can we have that
on the screen again? Could we have our red dots again?
I don't know what direction the bombing raids come from. I
suspect either from China, or also from Guam, and you are
talking about B-52s. And if you ever see how they go out there,
and what happens if they bomb the north, going up to near
Hanoi, then whatever amount of ordnance that is left, rather
than bringing them back to the station, they just drop them off
in Laos. That is exactly what they did.
And if they were going up north, fine. And if they find
that they still had ordnance left and they were on their way
down, they were on their way south, that is what happens.
If you look at the southern portion of where all those red
dots are--they are literally obliterated with bombing
operations. I cannot fathom or even to believe or suggest; and
I am not one to be pointing fingers here, but 39 years later we
find out that these people were devastated, literally, by the
bombing operations that we conducted.
They never attacked us, they never declared war against the
United States, but we did exactly what we felt like doing, and
we did. The same thing also happened to Cambodia.
I know that Secretary Marciel is an excellent student of
history, and maybe he could give me a better insight of what
took place during the Nixon administration. It is known as
Nixon's secret war, and the American people were never aware of
it until years later.
But I would like to take this time now to give Secretary
Marciel a chance for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR FOR ASEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Marciel. Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Honda,
members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting
me to testify today on the subject of unexploded ordnance in
Laos. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you also for your leadership on
this issue, which, as you stated, has not received enough
attention.
If I could, I do have a slightly longer written statement I
would like to submit for the record and then do a brief oral
statement, if that is okay with you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Without objection, your statement will be
made part of the record.
Ambassador Marciel. Thank you. As Secretary Clinton
observed last year, the United States is back in Southeast
Asia. And our efforts to build the United States' relationship
with Laos should be seen in the context of our efforts to
deepen our engagement in the region. We are making important
progress in the relationship with Laos, exchanging Defense
attaches, upgrading our bilateral dialogue, and working
together on a broader range of issues.
Our foreign assistance program in Laos is modest, but it
has grown in both size and scope. Our efforts in terms of
assistance are aimed at supporting economic reform and good
governance, building a vibrant civil society, and improving
health for the people of Laos.
One of the most important elements of our programmatic
engagement is in supporting the removal of unexploded ordnance,
or UXO. As you stated, Mr. Chairman, during the Vietnam War,
over 2.5 million tons of U.S. munitions were dropped on Laos.
This is more than was dropped on Germany and Japan combined in
World War II. Up to 30 percent of the bombs dropped over Laos
failed to detonate.
The U.S.-origin aerial weaponry accounts for a large
proportion of the unexploded ordnance that is still a
significant threat to public safety in Laos. The explosive
remnants of war continue to impede development and cause
hundreds of casualties a year.
While Laos also has a land mine problem, unexploded
ordnance is a much greater threat to the population, especially
because of the value of UXO scrap metal, the pursuit of which
brings people into direct contact with the weapons. Population
growth in rural areas and other socioeconomic trends are
increasing demand to put UXO-contaminated land into production,
a development that also increases human contact with all these
dangerous remnants of the war.
With U.S. and international support, the Laos Government is
creating a much-needed comprehensive national database to
consolidate different data sets and accurate and up-to-date
information on the scope of the contamination. Current
statistics on contamination, clearance, and casualties are not
always reliable, but efforts to refine the data are revealing
the continued seriousness of the problem.
The effects of the contamination are pervasive. The U.N.
Development Program has reported that, ``UXO/mine action is the
absolute precondition for the socioeconomic development of Lao
PDR'' and because of UXO, ``economic opportunities in tourism,
hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of
activity, considered the main engines of growth for the Lao
PDR, are restrictive, complicated, and made more expensive.''
At the level of individual victims, of course, the consequences
of death or maiming are catastrophic for entire families.
Despite the grim scope of the problem, it would be a
mistake to be pessimistic about our ability to help resolve it.
Our goal is not to remove the last bit of UXO from Laos,
anymore than Western Europe has removed any of its explosive
remnants from World War II, and even World War I. Instead, our
goal is to help Laos become as impact-free of its explosive
contamination as possible, and the country has made major
strides in that direction.
For example, international support to the solid Lao effort
amounted to about $15 million this year, resulting in the
clearance of hundreds of thousands of explosive items from
about 70 square kilometers of high-priority land. If
international support continues at that same level for a
decade, the results will be dramatic: Vastly reduced casualty
levels and the clearance of virtually all of the country's
highest-priority land areas.
To address this problem, the Department of State supports a
variety of humanitarian demining and unexploded ordnance
clearance projects with funding from the NADR appropriation
account. One of the top goals of that program is to clear all
high-priority areas, specifically agricultural land, health and
education facilities. Another is to develop indigenous mine and
UXO abatement capacity.
Although the bulk of U.S. NADR funds goes to UXO Lao, the
Government of Laos' quasi-independent government agency charged
with conducting clearance operations, we also fund NGOs that
conduct independent clearance operations and run school-based
campaigns to educate children about the dangers of tampering
with UXO. We view our programs in Laos as successful overall
and one in which the national authorities have established a
credible and effective UXO action system.
The United States is the single largest donor to the UXO
sector in Laos. From 1993 to 2009, U.S. assistance has totaled
more than $25 million. In Fiscal Year 2009, our total
assistance for Laos UXO projects was $3.7 million and in Fiscal
Year 2010 we will provide $5 million in UXO funding for Laos.
In addition to this direct funding for UXO programs, the
Department of Defense has provided technical and research
assistance to aid in the clearance of unexploded ordnance. At
the end of 2009, the Department of Defense provided UXO Lao
with a searchable database known as the Combat Air Activities
Southeast Asia Database, which is the most comprehensive
collection of strike information from the Vietnam War. This
information is critically important to the UXO sector for
identifying contaminated areas and for planning and
prioritizing clearance efforts.
Individual victims, who have been injured by UXO, also
require both our compassion and our support. The U.S. Agency
for International Development provides critical disabilities
assistance to help those whose lives have been irrevocably
altered by the explosive remnants of war through the Leahy War
Victims Fund. To date, USAID has provided more than $8 million
in support for programs for survivors.
We are now considering a program that would assist in the
establishment of a UXO demining capacity in the Lao People's
Army. The project would be phased in, and the initial
activities would be to train two Lao People's Army UXO demining
sections and fund initial operations in two provinces. The
project would eventually include more advanced training, as
well as expanding the number of Laos People's Army UXO demining
sections to five.
This capacity building may eventually lead Laos to be able
to contribute--not only in Laos but to international
peacekeeping efforts in UXO clearing and demining operations.
The United States has worked closely with Laos on the issue
of unexploded ordnance since 1993. Our aim has been to
strengthen the clearance and capacity development of UXO
institutions in Laos, along with providing victims assistance
and risk-education programs in public schools.
Through these joint efforts, we hope to improve the ability
of Lao authorities to protect the environment and promote
public health for future generations. As we continue forward,
we will work hard to ensure U.S. Government assistance helps
builds a safer society for the Laos people.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to
appear before you today, and I know from your opening remarks
that you have some questions. I will do my best to try to
answer them.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Marciel
follows:]Scot Marciel deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I am just curious, as you mentioned, that we didn't begin
our assistance program in dealing with Laos until 1993. What
happened between the span of 1960s and the 1970s and the 1980s,
because that is when when we continued the bombing, I guess.
Would you care to comment on that?
Ambassador Marciel. Mr. Chairman, you gave me probably too
much credit earlier for being an expert historian, and I am not
sure I am in all of this period.
Certainly from 1975 and the end of the war, until I began
working on Laos in 1990, relations were minimal; very limited
until the late 1980s, and there was minimal interaction between
our governments until the late eighties, really. But I would
have to go back and get you a more authoritative answer as to
when this was first looked at and discussed between our two
governments.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Could you? I would appreciate that
because there seems to be a void here.
Ambassador Marciel. I would be happy to do that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
Unlike Vietnam and Cambodia, diplomatic relations with the United
States never were broken after the Lao People's Revolutionary Party
assumed control in 1975. However diplomatic representation in Vientiane
and Washington was reduced to the level of charge d'affaires, and the
United States Agency for International Development and the United
States Information Agency were forced to withdraw. Following the war,
the Lao government was not receptive to the formerly large United
States assistance program, which had supported the previous government.
Western aid was replaced by assistance from Soviet bloc countries
during the 1970s and 1980s.
Beginning in the late 1980s, the United States and Laos began to
cooperate on accounting for persons classified as prisoner of war/
missing in action (POW/MIA) and on counternarcotic issues. Diplomatic
relations were restored reciprocally to the ambassadorial level in the
summer of 1992. That same year, the U.S. Agency for International
Development made a $1.3 million grant for a prosthetics project in
Laos.
Mr. Faleomavaega Between our bombing raids and operations
and then, all of a sudden, oh, yeah, we started our assistance
program since 1993. And I am curious; the bombing went on in
the 1960s and 1970s, and I was wondering why the lapse. Is
there anything that we did that caused this problem or we may
have just simply forgotten about this? You had mentioned other
international organizations that are helping, addressing the
problem.
As I understand these unexploded ordnance, do we have a
record in terms of how many women, children, or even men, for
that matter, die every year as a result of unexploded ordnance?
Is there a record from the Lao people or the Lao Government?
Ambassador Marciel. Mr. Chairman, the information I have is
that we think there are approximately 300 casualties from UXO
in Laos every year. I am not sure that I have a number for
deaths per year, but we will seek to get that as well as
confirm the source of that information.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
In 2009 the National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action
Sector in Lao PDR (the ``NRA'') published the National Survey of UXO
Victims and Accidents. That report states that in recent years
approximately 35 percent of UXO accident victims are killed, while
approximately 65 percent are injured but survive. Using the same
report's figure of approximately 300 victims per year would mean that
as a result of UXO/mine accidents, roughly 100 persons die each year
and another 200 are injured.
Mr. Faleomavaega. That was the figure that was given to me
also. It was approximately 300 people die every year as a
result of unexploded ordnance.
I know that this is also a very controversial issue when
you talk about cluster bombs, and the nature of these cluster
bombs is that it is like a canister, and when it opens up you
have a little--they call them ``bombies.'' It may end up with
30 or 50 at a time. And so it doesn't necessarily explode, but
you could have these 30 to 50 bombies that explode in a wide
range, catching everything and anything in its path. It is like
a grenade, but smaller in scale. But this one is a big one.
This one is a big one.
Have you had a chance to review the proposed budget for how
much--that maybe we could afford a little more than $3 million
a year in helping out with the unexploded ordnance? To me, I am
sure our Government can do a lot better than this. We have got
a $58 billion proposed budget in the State Department this
coming year.
I didn't mean to put you on the spot, Mr. Secretary, but I
think the bottom line here is that without the financial arm of
people that could be given the opportunity to address these
issues, that we are going to continue doing this for the next
100 years at $3 million a pop.
It is a tremendous injustice, in my humble opinion. I am
just wondering if our good people there in the State Department
have had a chance to reevaluate. In fact, it is being proposed
that we even decrease the funding, less than $3 million. Whose
bright idea was that? I talked to our Ambassador there in Laos.
He wasn't very forthcoming and it was always like, well, we
don't have enough information. I would kind of like to think
that we are a lot better than that in addressing the issue. I
have a couple more questions.
Mr. Honda.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In our arsenal of
technologies, do we have the ability to be able to detect metal
from the air and metal or explosive kinds of chemicals that are
on the ground by sweeping over the terrain?
Ambassador Marciel. Mr. Congressman, I am afraid I don't
know the answer to that. I am not aware that we do, but I will
certainly check and see if that is something--certainly if we
had that technology it would be very useful for something like
this. But I don't want to hazard a guess because I am probably
the most technologically illiterate person in the room.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Mike Honda
No existing technology can reliably detect mines or UXO from the
air.
Mr. Honda. I must be, too. So I would appreciate it if
somewhere along the line we could get some information on that.
I saw your head nodding ``no,'' but it seems to me we have all
kinds of technology from satellites that we could pinpoint
individuals in terms of body heat. It seems to me that with
some work on programming, we would be able to detect metal
objects on the ground.
The other question is, Do we know how much money we spend
on food security to help Laos to sustain a level of--I guess, a
source of food for their own country? Do we know how much we
spend on that?
Ambassador Marciel. Thank you, Congressman. In response to
the first question about the technology, I am told we do not
have the technology from the air to do this. But if I could, I
will take this question back and get you a definitive answer,
the one on the technology.
In terms of economic and food security, I am just looking
at the numbers here, we have been spending about $1 million a
year on global health and child survival. That is , frankly,
more health than it is food security. And then about--just
several hundred thousand dollars on promoting economic growth;
that is, again, less directed to food security and more on
promoting, helping Laos get into WTO, the idea being that this
will contribute to overall economic development.
I don't believe there is a specific budget for food
security, but I will double-check and get back to you with
that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Mike Honda
The State Department does not provide food security assistance
through the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative. Since 2007,
USDA has awarded three McGovern-Dole Food for Education Programs in
Laos. The McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child
Nutrition Program helps promote education, child development, and food
security for some of the world's poorest children. It provides for
donations of U.S. agricultural products, as well as financial and
technical assistance, for school feeding and maternal and child
nutrition projects in low-income countries.
In FY 2008 the World Food Programme (WFP) was awarded 540 metric
tons (MT) of canned salmon, 1,250 MT of corn-soy blend, 4,890 MT of
milled rice, and 330 MT of vegetable oil to implement a three year
school feeding program in Laos. The total value of this program is
approximately $10.3 million. Additionally, in FY 2008, a private
voluntary organization (PVO) was awarded 170 MT of black turtle beans,
20 MT of canned salmon, 190 MT of corn-soy blend, 250 MT of milled
rice, and 20 MT of vegetable oil to provide direct feeding and take-
home rations to targeted beneficiaries. This two-year program was
valued at approximately $3.8 million. In FY 2010 the PVO was awarded an
additional $4.2 million to continue and expand its school feeding
program. Donated commodities under FY 2010 funding will include 300 MT
of beans, 40 MT of canned salmon, 140 MT of corn-soy blend, 460 MT of
milled rice and 30 MT of vegetable oil.
Mr. Honda. The petition given to the WTO, I would be
curious, which arena does the country see themselves pursuing
in terms of being involved and active in WTO? Perhaps somewhere
along the line that question can be answered.
The reason I ask is because if we have that kind of a
scattering of unexploded arsenals throughout that country, how
is it that they are going to be able to become active in the
world economy? I understand that we spent approximately $2
million a day dropping the bombs in Lao; that is, the value of
the dollar at that time. In today's dollars it is about $17
million a day. And yet we are still talking about single digit.
I know that Congresswoman McCollum in 2004 secured $2.5
million for Laos for cluster munition removal. In 2007, 2008
and 2009, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement allocated
less than $2 million for Laos. And then this year, Tim Reiser
was able to request $5 million for Laos, yet only $1.9 million
was spent.
I put in a request last year for $5 million, I think; and
then this year, this coming budget, to put in $7 million to be
added with the other countries' efforts. And I understand that
we have to get to about $24 million for the next 10 years to
have some sort of adequate program of removal.
I don't know what that means, because we don't talk about
the rate at which we want to remove these unexploded ordnance.
It is curious that we are looking at the military to remove
these unexploded ordnance, and perhaps the assumption is that
they are better equipped to do this.
I wonder whether this is not an opportunity, if we want to
create an economic development activity, that people will be
engaged and taught how to use up-to-date technology to remove,
detect and remove these unexploded ordnance and then also be
able to enjoy the sale of those unexploded ordnance, either the
metal--I understand there are some activities, economic
activities around that. It seems to me that should be something
that should be specifically done for the folks there, and it
appears that there is plenty of work there.
But the issue is training and having the state-of-the-art
equipment. And if food security is the issue, then we should be
on a very fast track in training, removal, and then the sale of
the metals, that all go back to the coffers of the people in
Lao. I don't know whether you have a comment to that.
Ambassador Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. A couple of
comments, if I could. In terms of the numbers, we have a
breakdown of the amount that we have spent from State
Department money on UXO removal since 1997. I won't read the
whole list, but I am happy to submit it.
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
NADR bilateral lines for Laos are as follows:
FY97 = $1M
FY98 = $1.7M
FY99 = $1.8M
FY00 = $1.486M
FY01 = $993K
FY02 = $1.323M
FY03 = $1.2M
FY04 = $1.412M
FY05 = $2.5M
FY06 = $3.3M
FY07 = $2.55M
FY08 = $2.953M
FY09 = $3.7m (1.9m bilateral and an additional $1.8m Global
NADR funds)
FY10 = $5M
Ambassador Marciel. But just for the last few years, Fiscal
Year 2008 was just under $3 million; Fiscal Year 2009, $3.7
million. In that case we had $1.9 million that was actually a
line item in the budget request, but an additional $1.8 million
was pulled out of the global NADR fund, if you will, for this
and spent in Laos. And then for Fiscal Year 2010, I have to say
with a lot of help from people up here, $5 million being spent.
In terms of the second question about the military doing it
versus civilians, it has been a civilian organization, the Lao
UXO, quasi-governmental, as I mentioned, that has been doing
the bulk of the work on this under the guidance of the Lao
National Regulatory Authority. And we have been funding them,
and I have gone there and met with them on a couple of
occasions.
What we are talking about with the military is to
supplement that; not to suggest that the military should take
over, but we think the military might be able to play a helpful
role supplementing it, and so the Defense Department is looking
at that.
Mr. Honda. If I may, to the chair, if we are looking at
economic development, it seems to me that we should try to put
that into the purview of the civilian sector rather than the
military, and this is about creating technology and knowledge
and skills among folks that we may be able to use in other
parts of the world where these skills are needed. The comment
about not completely eliminating or not completely eliminating
the unexploded ordnance, this doesn't sit well with me. I think
that we did it; we clean it. Our parents taught us that. Our
parents taught us to leave a place better than you found it.
I think that should be incumbent upon us, even though in
Western Europe they didn't do it. Well, that is there, this is
here, and this is more of an undeveloped country that is more
agricultural. And to leave even one behind, where a child or a
person may become maimed or killed because of that, is not
acceptable.
The fact that we talked about 2.5 million tons of ordnance
that was dropped, 26-30 percent have not exploded, sort of
speaks to the idea that we left behind on purpose this kind of
a situation so that it creates some sort of a psychological
edge for us in a land where we did not have those folks become
our enemy combatants, but we were trying to nail down the Ho
Chi Min Trail.
And I guess I wonder whether the practice of dumping the
rest of the arsenal after they do the bomb run, there is that
space in the middle where it is hardly any red dots, and then
there is a mass of red dots where we dumped the rest of our
ordnance. Whether that was a practice that was accepted by the
military, or whether it was a practice so that you go back
empty-handed so you can load up again and incur further costs.
I just don't know what the rationale behind that is except that
have it leaves it open to a lot of questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
I always try to remind myself, Mr. Secretary, you condemn
the act but not the person. So, please, just look at my
questions as the situation rather than any personal aspersion
against you, my dear friend.
Question. It seems that members of the international
community are more concerned about the unexploded ordnance than
our own Government, as it is reflected by the fact they donate
$15 million. I have met with some of those people, I think
either from the European Commission and from the European
community, and we are putting in a paltry $3 million; and yet
we are the ones that caused the whole problem, we are the ones
that caused the mess. It would have been nicer if we had
suggested we were the ones putting in $15 million and the rest
of the world committed and put in what they could; at least a
lot better than in terms of how we have been able to do this.
I just cannot perceive that the most powerful Nation in the
world can only afford $3 million to rectify or to clear this
problem that has been in existence now for over 40 years, not
of their doing. I don't know whether it is because we had
displaced such a tremendous amount of arrogance on our part,
thinking that we can beat anybody, we are the big kid on the
block, and therefore that is all we can do.
But when I met with the children and the people that have
been affected by these unexploded ordnance, I know the position
of our Government is currently that we will not support any
international convention to get rid of cluster bombs
altogether. Am I correct on that?
Ambassador Marciel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I believe we are probably one or two of
the only countries in the world that is not a subscriber or
signer to the international cluster bomb elimination or
prohibition or whatever we call it.
Ambassador Marciel. Mr. Chairman, it is true that the
United States is not a party to the Convention on Cluster
Munitions, that is true.
If I could just mention briefly a couple of other things,
and also in response to Congressman Honda's points, first, I
mean, I take your points and will take them back to the State
Department and to the Secretary of State, particularly about
the issue of cleaning up all the ordnance as opposed to a part
of it or a good part of it, as well as the amount of money that
we are spending.
As you know, you mentioned earlier our Ambassador in Laos,
Mr. Chairman, and we are not supposed to talk about who
suggested money and this sort of thing, but I can say with
confidence that it is not our Ambassador in Laos who is
suggesting we spend less.
Mr. Faleomavaega. It is the OMB. I know that.
Ambassador Marciel. He is very committed on this issue. And
another point. If I could just mention the question of was it
purposeful in some way to leave behind these munitions. Again,
I was not involved in the 1960s and early 1970s in this, so I
can't say with certainty, but I think the fact that about 30
percent of the munitions didn't explode was not intentional as
far as I understand. But in the end, for the people who are
living in Laos--and I have been there and I have seen people,
you know, using these bombies and so on, I mean, actually using
the shells to build fences and build houses. So for them it
doesn't matter, to be honest, whether it is intentional. It is
still a threat to them. And so I very much share in your view
to do everything we can to address it.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I believe the Humpty Dumpty Institute has
been one that has been very, very actively engaged on this
whole issue of getting rid of unexploded ordnance. It seems
that there is always a passing-the-buck going on between the
Department of Defense and the State Department. If we want to
get something, ``Oh, no, check with the DoD.'' And then we
would get to DoD and they would say, ``No, check with the State
Department.''
It gets to the point where playing this yo-yo game doesn't
seem to make it any better, I suppose. We have used between 8-
80 million cluster bombs, and according to the records that I
have, less than 1 percent of the contaminated lands have been
cleared. Yet I would say that a tremendous amount of economic
development in this country lies in agriculture development.
Could you provide for the record, Mr. Secretary, what
exactly is the status of the available agricultural land that
has now been cleared as a result of this program of cleaning up
the areas? I would appreciate it if we can provide that for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
The 2009 Landmine Monitor Report states that all operators in Laos
in 2008 cleared a total of over 54 square kilometers of land, most of
which was for agriculture. This figure represents a 29 percent increase
from 2007, and that increase is typical of what recent improvements in
methodology have made possible. For example, UXO Lao (the largest
clearance operator in the country) reports that from 1996 through 2008
it has cleared 145 square kilometers, of which 27 were cleared in 2008
alone.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Secondly, I would like to know if we have
any experts in the Department of Defense that know how to
dismantle these bombies so that perhaps something could come
out of the Department of Defense to be of help in this effort.
With a $756 billion budget, I would hope that a couple
million here or there should be sufficient--or even sending
experts, demolition experts that know how to clear up these
farmlands that are now contaminated simply because people are
afraid to go there and to conduct any harvesting or any
agricultural development because of the presence of these
harmful munitions. What is your sense of the Department of
Defense; they do not claim any responsibility for what has
happened?
Ambassador Marciel. We actually do work and coordinate with
the Department of Defense on this. As you suggested, the idea--
they do have expertise, certainly. And as I mentioned earlier,
there was the idea that we had been considering with the
Department of Defense, of them providing training, capacity
building, if you would, based on their own expertise. It is not
a program that is in effect, but it is one that I know they
were considering.
As I mentioned, it would be to train folks in the Lao
military. As you know, in a similar--well, somewhat different
situation, there was a lot of training done for Cambodians that
was in mine removal. It has been very helpful in Cambodia, but
actually now the Cambodians are actually clearing mines in
Africa in a major contribution under U.N. Auspices. So I think
there is a potential here, certainly.
I will get back to you. I will check and see what
information we have about, you know, land that has been
cleared. I have a little bit of information about the pieces of
ordnance, apparently 400,000--400,000 pieces of ordnance have
been cleared over the last 3 years. That is the combined
effort. It is hard to attribute just to the U.S. assistance
because these programs have been combined.
But needless to say, there is a lot more still to do and I
will see if I can find any information on the land.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Will the State Department be objecting to
anything that we may want to request through the appropriations
process, that perhaps a little increase on the funding that is
needed to be part of this munitions clearance program could be
better than what we have done now? So rather than decreasing
the amount, we ought to be increasing the request in some way
or form. I know that you are not in a position to tell me
whether or not you agree with my assessment but, Mr. Secretary,
I have got the record here.
And I just hate to see that when I am gone, another 39
years later the problem is still there. This is not the America
that I know of. This is not the America that I know of, and its
efforts to make or to correct the mistakes that we have made in
the past. And I don't think it requires billions of dollars to
do this but rather a little humanitarian view--and I realize
that some policymakers, I am sure here in Washington, look at
these people as backward and therefore have an attitude of who
cares?
I remember when we were negotiating the issues dealing with
the Micronesian countries. I believe it was Henry Kissinger who
made a statement, ``There is only 90,000 of them. Who gives a
damn?'' So that is the kind of attitude that I think that if he
does it for these lowly Micronesians, I can imagine that that
is the same attitude that prevails throughout major departments
like the State Department and the DoD.
But these people are human beings. They may live on the
other side of the world, but they have the same wants and
desires and hopes for a better life, and for their children to
get a better education, as all of us here will do.
I am not a pacifist, Mr. Secretary but, doggone it, I know
our country can do a lot better than what we are doing now
concerning this issue.
And I will appreciate if you could give me the best and the
highest person at DoD that I can talk to, I think our Assistant
Secretary for International Security--what is the gentleman's
name? I am sure you know him; he is in the Department of
Defense. I will definitely make contact with him concerning
this issue.
With that, Mr. Secretary, thank you so much. And I deeply
appreciate your taking the time to come and be with us this
afternoon. We will follow up on this. There are more questions
that other members will submit to you in writing. Thank you, we
appreciate it.
We have our next panel. We have three more distinguished
visitors here on our next panel: Channapha Khamvongsa, Dr.
Robert Keeley, and Mr. Virgil Weibe.
Channapha Khamvongsa is the executive director of Legacies
of War. It is an organization that seeks to address problems of
unexploded cluster bombs in Laos, provide space for healing the
wounds of war, and to create greater hope for the future of
peace. She was previously appointed to the Seattle Women's
Commission and served on the boards of the Refugee Women's
Alliance Conference in Asia Pacific American Leadership;
currently interim board chair of the Mines Advisory Group, USA.
Ms. Channapha's father is from Luang Prabang and her mother is
from Thakhek, both from Laos. She was born in Vientiane, came
to the United States at the youthful age of 7; studied at
George Mason University and also at Oxford. She received her
master's in public policy from Georgetown University.
Doctor Keeley is a former British armed bomb disposal
officer who has been working in humanitarian mine actions since
1991. His work has taken him to several countries, including
Kuwait, Bosnia, Croatia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos,
Afghanistan, Sudan, and Colombia. He was the first humanitarian
deminer to be sent to the former Yugoslavia to help transition
from the U.N. Peacekeeping mission, and was the head of the
U.N. Mine Action Center in Croatia until 1997. Dr. Keeley
conducted research and completed his doctorate from the
Imperial College in London. His thesis was the economics of
land mine clearance. His thesis has now been published in a
book form and I hope to get one copy from Dr. Keeley soon. He
is very, very actively engaged in the issues of land mines as
well as unexploded ordnance.
Professor Virgil Weibe is from from Saint Thomas and
received his doctorate from the New York University School of
Law, LLM from Georgetown, Latin American studies. He has a
master's in philosophy from Oxford, and a bachelor's from
Kansas State University. Professor Weibe after law school
clerked for Judge James Francis, a Federal magistrate judge in
the Southern District of New York in 1999, when he joined the
Center for Applied Legal Studies at Georgetown Law Center as an
advocacy Fellow. He has been an active participant in the
efforts to curb the use of land mines and cluster bombs in
armed conflicts.
Gentlemen and lady, thank you so much for being here. With
unanimous consent, your statements will be made part of the
record.
I would like to begin by letting Channapha begin. We will
go along in that sequence.
STATEMENT OF MS. CHANNAPHA KHAMVONGSA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
LEGACIES OF WAR
Ms. Khamvongsa. I will be making a shorter statement, but I
have a written statement we would like to submit for the
record. So good afternoon, Chairman Faleomavaega, Congressman
Honda, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to give
my sincere thanks to Chairman Faleomavaega, the subcommittee,
and its wonderful staff for organizing the historic hearing
entitled, ``Legacies of War: Unexploded Ordnance in Laos.''
From what I understand, this is the first hearing on the
scourge of unexploded ordnance, or UXO, in Laos, a legacy of
the U.S. bombing of Laos during the Vietnam War. Tragically,
more than four decades after the end of the bombing, more than
300 Lao people, one-third of them children, continue to be
killed or injured by UXO every year. Just this February, on
February 22, eight children from Champassak Province came upon
a cluster bomb similar to this one. They were in the rice
paddies near their home. Like many bombs, these deadly weapons
resembled a toy, and the children tossed it around in play. The
bomb exploded. Two children survived. One was severely injured
and five were killed. Beyond this terrible human toll, UXO
continues to hamper economic development in one of the poorest
countries in the world.
Today is also significant, as mentioned earlier, because 39
years ago this week, the Senate held a historic hearing on the
status of refugees in Laos. This hearing, chaired by Senator
Ted Kennedy on April 21 and 22 of 1971, helped to expose the
secret bombing of Laos. The bombing had begun in 1964, and had
displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians within Laos, but
had never been disclosed to Congress or the American public.
The bombing finally ended in 1973. This was the same year I
was born in Vientiane, the capital of Laos. When I was 6 years
old, my family left Laos due to the country's political
instability. We spent 1 year in a Thai refugee camp and
eventually resettled here in Virginia. Many of the 400,000 Lao
refugees who now reside in the United States have similar
stories. We were fortunate to resettle in America, but were sad
to leave behind family members and friends who we feared we
might never see again.
Much has changed since then. Over the past 10 years,
improved relations between the Lao and U.S. Governments have
allowed me to travel back to Laos numerous times. Like
thousands of other tourists who visit Laos every year, I feel a
deep affection for the people, culture, and land that I barely
remember from my childhood. Reconnecting with my Lao heritage
included discovering the dark history and lingering effects of
the secret war in Laos.
This discovery led me to establish Legacies of War, where I
currently serve as executive director. Legacies is the only
U.S.-based organization dedicated to raising awareness about
the current devastation that has resulted from the Vietnam War-
era bombing in Laos. Our mission is to advocate for the
clearance of unexploded bombs and provide space for healing the
wounds of war.
Since our founding in 2004, we have worked with Lao
Americans, bombing survivors, veterans, artists,
nongovernmental organizations, and others, to establish a
credible voice for reconciliation and justice. As we know, Laos
is the most bombed country per capita in history. U.S. bombings
left Laos contaminated with vast quantities of unexploded
ordnance. At least 20,000 people have been killed or injured by
UXO in Laos since the bombings ceased.
I would like to share with you some other disturbing facts
about the U.S. bombing of Laos and its tragic aftermath;
260,000 million cluster bombs were dropped in Laos during the
Vietnam War. An estimated 75 million cluster bombs did not
detonate, scattering throughout Lao villages, rice fields,
school yards, pasture lands, and forest. During the bombing,
the equivalent of a planeload of bombs was dropped every 8
minutes, 24 hours a day, for 9 years. About one-third--at least
one-third of the land in Laos is littered with UXO.
So for more than 20 years after the war ended, Lao
villagers struggled to survive among vast quantities of
unexploded ordnance without any organized technical assistance
or clearance program. The relationship between Laos and the
United States was strained, and there were no humanitarian
demining programs operational in the Lao NGO sector.
In the 15 years since the demining program began in 1994
with the help of the Mennonite Central Committee and the Mines
Advisory Group, it has grown, employing Lao nationals in nine
provinces. Undoubtedly, thousands of lives have been saved and
injuries avoided as a result of this work. Yet fewer than 0.5
million of the estimated 75 million unexploded bomblets have
been destroyed. As you mentioned, Chairman, less than 1 percent
of the contaminated land has been cleared.
Initially I was surprised by the small percentage of land
that has been cleared. Then, during a trip to Laos in 2008 as
part of a Legacies of War delegation, I observed a clearance
team working in the field. I witnessed the slow, dangerous,
tedious process of surveying, detecting, and detonating UXO. I
was humbled by the men and women we met during our trip who
risk their lives daily to make the land safe for others.
Formal UXO clearance in Laos is now coordinated by the Lao
Government's National Regulatory Authority, or NRA, with
several dozen partner organizations and international donors
that support the UXO clearance, victim assistance, and mine-
risk education. The UXO clearance sector has built up a well-
trained and experienced workforce. Through new, more effective
equipment and careful planning, clearance teams have
dramatically improved their efficiency.
An official of the State Department's Office of Weapons
Removal and Abatement has called the National Regulatory
Authority UXO program in Laos, ``one of the best programs in
the world. The gold standard.''
The NRA's newly completed strategic plan over the next 10
years offers clear, achievable goals, including the reduction
of UXO casualties from the current 300 to less than 75 per
year, and ensuring that the medical and rehabilitation needs of
all UXO survivors are met in line with obligations of the
Convention on Cluster Munitions, an international agreement
signed by 106 countries to ban the production, transfer, and
sale of cluster munitions and to destroy current stockpiles.
So what is the funding required? According to the NRA,
during each of the past 3 years, a total of $12-14 million was
spent for clearance goals. Funding for clearance comes from
international donors, including the U.S., but the NRA estimates
that the UXO sector will need at least double the amount per
year to meet its 10-year goals.
The problem for UXO clearance in Laos is the absence of a
long-term funding commitment that matches the scale of the
problem. In order to buy equipment and train and maintain
adequate staffing, clearance organizations working in the field
must have assurances of a continued, reliable stream of
funding. Therefore, we recommend a U.S. commitment of $7
million to support UXO clearance in Laos in Fiscal Year 2011, a
measured increase from this year's allocation of $5 million.
Thereafter, we recommend an annual U.S. commitment of $10
million over the next 10 years. This would strengthen and
secure the UXO sector's capacity and bring its already
effective programs to scale. This 10-year, $100 million
commitment to UXO removal in Laos would total less than what
the United States spent in 1 week bombing Laos.
I have focused primarily on UXO clearance in the statement,
but I also want to address the related need for victim
assistance. Close to 40 percent of UXO accidents result in
death, leaving many families without the primary breadwinner or
caregiver. For the 60 percent who survive, their lives will
never be the same. Almost 14,000 injuries have resulted in the
loss of one limb, while close to 3,000 victims have lost two
limbs. There is a serious need for better emergency health care
after accidents occur, as well as longer-term needs for
prosthetics, physical rehabilitation, and vocational
retraining.
According to the NRA, only $2.5 million a year currently
goes toward victim assistance needs in Laos. Agency staff
estimates that at least $5 million a year will be required to
adequately help victims and their families.
So what is the current U.S. funding support? The United
States has provided about $40-50 million in funding for UXO
removal in Laos over the last 15 years. It averages about $2.7-
3 million per year. Compare this to $7 million the United
States spent each day for 9 years bombing Laos. In other words,
the United States spent more in 3 days dropping bombs on Laos
than it has spent in the last 15 years cleaning them up.
In Fiscal Year 2010, Congress designated $5 million
specifically for UXO clearance in Laos, the largest amount
allocated in any given year to date. Unfortunately, despite a
specific congressional mandate for $5 million for bomb removal
in Laos this year and in subsequent years, the Department of
State is only requesting $1.9 million for next year.
The funding levels for UXO clearance in Laos have been
disproportionate to the magnitude of the problem. There seems
to be little regard for the level of contamination in the
country or the source of the UXO. One-third of worldwide
cluster munitions casualties occur in Laos, yet the funding
doesn't reflect this stark reality.
It has been nearly 40 years since the secret U.S. bombing
campaign in Laos was finally revealed to Congress and the
American public, yet all of these years later massive
quantities of UXO remain a dangerous threat to the daily lives
of the people in Laos.
I would like to mention Mor. She is a 5-year-old girl from
Thaijok Village in Xieng Khouang Province. Unlike hundreds of
Lao children who have been killed or injured by cluster bombs
each year, Mor is still alive and healthy. But she lives and
plays among these deadly weapons every day. She has never known
a bomb-free backyard. We must do what we can to protect
children like Mor and clear the land so that when she walks to
school or her family plows their fields, everyone returns home
safely at the end of the day. We should want this for Mor and
the generations that will follow her.
The problem of UXO in Laos has been allowed to persist far
too long. Too many innocent lives have been lost. But it is not
too late to stop this senseless suffering. This is one of those
rare problems, rare policy problems with a clear and effective
solution. The United States has a responsibility to clean up
the unexploded bombs it left behind in Laos and provide support
for those harmed since the end of the war. It would require
only a relatively modest increase in U.S. funding to
dramatically improve clearance and victim assistance in Laos.
Clearing cluster bombs and supporting those injured by them
is an act of humanity and decency. It is the right thing to do.
The State Department must make a sustained commitment to
solving this problem.
We recommend an allocation of at least $7 million next
year, followed by a subsequent increase of $10 million per year
over the next 10 years. Only with this kind of consistent
support will the scourge of UXO in Laos finally come to an end.
Thank you, Chairman Faleomavaega, Congressman Honda, for
the opportunity to offer our statement today. We appreciate the
attention that you have brought to this important issue.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Khamvongsa
follows:]Channapha Khamvongsa deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you very much.
Dr. Keeley.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT KEELEY, PH.D., COUNTRY PROGRAM MANAGER FOR
LAOS, THE HUMPTY DUMPTY INSTITUTE
Mr. Keeley. Thank you very much. Can I start by saying it
is quite an honor to be called to testify. I am quite grateful
for the opportunity. I would like to say as well that my
testimony, which is in full, obviously, and I will summarize
it--but Ms. Khamvongasa and I have never met before today, but
actually what you will hear is that although we have worked on
this from a completely different angle, some of our conclusions
are remarkably similar, which seems to triangulate some of our
findings.
So as you mentioned, I studied life as a bomb disposal
officer, so I have a technical perspective; but I am also an
economist as well. So I am going to testify in both directions.
There is one area, another perspective on this which you may
consider helpful, which is when large unexploded aircraft
bombs--they constitute a point hazard, but cluster munitions
contaminate a whole area within their footprint.
I did a lot of work with the people in Laos 2 years ago on
this map. What we did was we removed all of the aircraft bombs
from the map and we looked at the points that represent cluster
munitions. Basically, there is about 0.5 million hectares
covered by cluster munitions on that map which translate into
1,930 square miles. So that is a way of conceptualizing the
problem slightly differently from the way we have been talking,
because when we clear weapons, we tend to think in how many
square meters we clear a day. So it is worth scoping the
problem in terms of area.
In the questions that you sent me, you asked me a question
about the effects of these weapons on the economy. First of
all, as has already been mentioned, most of the economy in Laos
is based on agriculture production, and rice in particular. So
it is possible to use the opportunity cost of the land that
can't be used as a measure of the impact. I will talk about
that more later.
Also, where there are infrastructure projects--road
clearance, dams, hydroelectric power--the UXO clearance acts as
a tax of about 30 or 40 cents per square meter. So any
infrastructure project that is planned in Laos has to carry the
cost of the UXO clearance as a line item, which obviously makes
those projects more expensive.
But in the private sector there is an unseen impact. I am
not talking about the village level, but the small to medium
enterprise level. These costs can act as a barrier to entry,
particularly in projects such as forestry or agribusiness where
the cost of investing in a project becomes significantly higher
because of the cost of the UXO. Unfortunately, we can't measure
this because we don't know how many people have chosen not to
invest in projects because of the cost of the UXO clearance.
For example, I was helping a Japanese agribusiness that had
been looking at growing medicinal plants. And the startup cost
was going to be significantly increased by the cost of the UXO
clearance. I think they may have decided not to invest. At the
village level, most of the poorest people, as we have heard,
they can't afford a choice. So they have to use this land as
contaminated.
It should also be emphasized from an economic point of view
that some of these families are forced to make the otherwise
incomprehensible choice of sending their children out
deliberately to look for these bombs. These children are kept
out of school. They are given a $15 homemade metal detector and
they go and look for scrap metal. There is a very strong
correlation between the casualty rates, the price of scrap
metal, and the price of food. I think it is quite clear that we
can see as people need more food, they take more risks and go
and look for this stuff. In fact, that is one of the major
causes of the casualties today.
I would like to go now in the rest of my time to talk about
answering the last question you gave us, which is about how
much would it cost. As a bomb disposal officer and somebody
committed to this subject, I would like to be clearing every
last weapon there is in Laos, and that would take many years
and cost billions of dollars. As an economist, I recognize we
have scarce resources and we have to make some harsh choices.
If we use the principle of cost-benefit analysis and look at
the land that is potentially of the most value and remove the
areas which are otherwise unusable--mountainous areas, for
example, in Laos--we actually get down to about 78,000 hectares
of the original 500,000, or 300 square miles. If we were able
to use new techniques--and I will talk more about technology
later--but if we were able to use new survey techniques, it is
conceivable we could get the area down to 22,000 hectare, which
would be 84 square miles. That is about 7.5 percent of the
actual contamination, but it represents the most important land
to be cleared.
When we did the calculations on this 2 years ago, it
basically worked out at about $138 million, so it is very close
to the number that you have come up with. That is $138 million
spent over 16 years would be needed to clear the most impacted
land. Now I know that sounds like a lot of money, but it is
only 7.5 percent of the total contamination. I think we should
remember, to put this into context, that the clearance of the
Exxon Valdez cost $2 billion. So this is quite a small budget
and it is quite justifiable by any criteria.
So, to summarize, there is a sound economic argument for
increasing the budget for the UXO clearance, making longer-term
commitments. And I completely agree that one of the problems is
that the sector out there is constantly living on a hand-to-
mouth situation. They can't budget properly. They don't know
where next year's money is coming from. So whatever we do, it
should be more long term and more measurable so the people can
predict what they are going to have available next year. If we
did that, we can actually measure the benefits to the economy
as an investment. So this isn't a cost; this is a benefit. We
can consider this an investment in the Laos economy.
I would like to say in support for the Office of Weapons
Removal and Abatement, they already support a number of
programs throughout the world. One of the things I am worried
about is if we force them to just reallocate their existing
budget from other countries to solve the Laos problem, we are
simply robbing Peter to pay Paul. So this really would need to
be new money, as opposed to taking money out of their existing
pocket and spending it somewhere else.
So I would just like to finish the answer to the question
you asked about technology earlier. So I will put my bomb
disposal hat back on. And I would like to speak on behalf of
all the bomb disposal and land mine clearance organizations
that can't be here today. We have been promised a lot from
technology over the last 20 years or so since we have been
doing this sort of work. It hasn't really delivered very much.
In fact, the problem in Laos is comparatively simple. We don't
need detectors from space. We really don't. And I am worried if
we started spending money on the research, people would take
the money, but we wouldn't actually get results. We can achieve
the result in Laos with existing technology. There is room for
improved techniques and improved efficiency. But it would be a
false horizon, in my humble opinion, to start spending research
dollars on this. We know what we need to do. We just need the
budget.
I know that the American Army and the Special Forces
Training Team have already committed a lot of effort in the
past to providing the training. In fact, the core training in
Laos was done in 1994, 1995, 1996 by the U.S. Army. So they
have already contributed quite a lot. We probably don't need
them back for the civilian program. In fact, quite humbly, some
of the Laos guys I have worked with, they could probably teach
me a few things. I am not sure we need to give them much
technical training anymore. It is simply about the budget. And
that is what I would like to say. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Keeley
follows:]Robert Keeley deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Dr. Keeley.
Professor Weibe.
STATEMENT OF MR. VIRGIL WIEBE, MEMBER OF THE BOARD, MINES
ADVISORY GROUP (MAG) AMERICA
Mr. Weibe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Honda.
It is an honor to appear before you today, along with
colleagues from Legacies of War and the Humpty Dumpty
Institute, to discuss this important issue. The Mines Advisory
Group, better known as MAG, is an international humanitarian
organization that saves lives and builds futures by destroying
weapons in conflict-affected countries. MAG is currently
working in 35 countries across the globe helping communities to
escape the poverty and devastation caused by conflict. I serve
on the board of MAG's U.S. partner, MAG America.
In 1994, MAG established operations in Laos in cooperation
with the Mennonite Central Committee and Laos National
Committee. MAG thus became the first international NGO to begin
clearing the country of its extensive UXO contamination. As we
have heard from preceding testimony, Laos is one of the most
heavily UXO-contaminated countries in the world. A thorough
survey of the country has never been completed and much of the
land along the eastern border is densely forested. The National
Regulatory Authority in Laos is currently addressing this
shortcoming by developing a national contamination database.
And a clearer picture of the remaining amount of UXO will
become available in the not-too-distant future.
A point that is indisputable and most important to note is
that serious levels of UXO contamination in Laos continue to
have an extremely detrimental and damaging impact on the
country's people, its economy, and its future. Widespread
contamination restricts economic growth by limiting the
population's ability to grow cash crops thereby forcing
individuals and families into subsistence farming. Those
efforts at subsistence farming are themselves hampered by the
presence of UXO.
Since the inception of MAG's program in 1994, our approach
has not focused solely on finding and destroying UXO and
cluster munitions. Rather, MAG's has seen its clearance
activities as the first step in relieving the very problems I
have just mentioned. Currently, MAG operates in Khammouan and
Xiangkhoang provinces, two of the most contaminated provinces
in the country, where our goal is to alleviate poverty through
safe and effective UXO clearance.
MAG achieves this by linking its activities and strategies
to the Laos national growth and poverty eradication strategy.
UXO clearance is one of the three poverty-related programs
outlined in this national strategy, and MAG is committed to
achieving the clearance targets and priorities set forth in the
government's plan.
MAG also partners with and clears land in support of
development agencies such as the World Food Program, World
Vision, and the Laos Red Cross. By linking directly with
development projects, MAG contributes to improved food security
and provides access to basic services and infrastructure to
some of the poorest, most marginalized communities in Laos.
This integrated approach ensures that our grassroots
intervention makes an impact not only for our beneficiary
communities, but also at the regional and national level.
An impact assessment that MAG completed in 2009 has proven
that MAG's work results in much more than cleared land. Sixty-
three percent of village groups interviewed in Khammouan and 83
percent in Xiangkhoang reported increased yield and
productivity following clearance conducted by MAG. Some
households reported that they could now plow their land more
deeply because they were confident they would not be injured as
a result, again, increasing agriculture productivity. As a
result of increased crop yield, approximately three out of four
respondents said their household income had increased.
In addition to eradicating poverty, MAG's work was proven
to improve people's sense of security and self-respect by
removing a sense of risk and hopelessness associated with UXO
contamination. Ninety-seven percent of the people interviewed
in Khammouan and 94 percent in Xiangkhoang reported feeling a
restored sense of pride and a greater feeling of safety and
security for themselves and their families.
MAG's program in Laos currently employs 235 individuals;
229 of which are national staff members. MAG also hires
community members temporarily to cut vegetation in village-
assisted clearance. For example, in the last quarter of 2009,
nearly 1,000 community members were employed in such projects.
By employing individuals from the local community, MAG builds a
sustainable capacity and empowers them to play a key role in
recovery from conflict. We recruit women and individuals who
have been disabled for UXO accidents, as they are too often the
most marginalized members of their community.
MAG has been able to achieve these results thanks to
support from its donors, including the U.S. Department of
State's U.S. Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, the U.K.
Department for International Development, the European Union,
OZ Aid for Australia, and World Vision. Ongoing support from
the State Department has resulted in the destruction of over
30,000 items of UXO.
In another project, over 2.6 million square meters of land
was cleared for agricultural use, infrastructure development,
access to water and schools, in a project funded by the Humpty
Dumpty Institute and the U.S. Department of Agriculture in a
space of a year, in 2008 and 2009.
Unfortunately, as has been mentioned by my colleagues, the
investment, or, perhaps more aptly put, the disinvestment made
in contaminating Laos with UXO has far outweighed the
investment made in cleaning it up. UXO clearance assets
currently deployed by MAG and other operators are not adequate
to tackle the extensive challenge presented by such widespread
contamination. With limited resources, MAG focuses on the
poorest, most threatened communities and clearing enough land
to enable them to grow crops and have a sustainable food source
year round.
Additional support will enable MAG and other organizations
to scale-up operations to address these urgent cases more
quickly and then tackle other unmet demands, such as clearance
of land for larger-scale farming, commerce and trade, thereby
increasing the multiplier effect of clearance on poverty
eradication.
In closing, I would like to thank the U.S. Government, in
particular, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, for
its ongoing support to MAG's Laos program. I would like to ask
the U.S. Government to provide additional funding for UXO
clearance in Laos. Without increased support, the men, women,
and children will continued to be killed by the legacy of our
secret war.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wiebe
follows:]Virgil Wiebe deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. All three of you have had an opportunity
to listen to the testimony from our Deputy Assistant Secretary
Marciel from the State Department. Would you say that there is
consensus not necessarily where we have to reinvent the wheel
or get more organizations involved; we have enough
organizations; it is just the resources that they need to
really get the thing moving. Would there be agreement in that
assessment? In other words, we don't have to go look for some
more people to come in and help. We have the organizations, but
they just need more resources like funding to increase their
operations. Am I correct on this?
Mr. Keeley. Yes, more or less. It is certainly not about
new training. I don't really think it is about new technology,
either. There is room for improvement in the planning and in
the resource allocation processes in Laos, but the problem is,
at the moment, management people spend most of their time
running around looking for cash. It takes away their time they
have got available to sit down and plan what they are going to
do.
Mr. Faleomavaega. In other words, I don't need to be
looking for 50 specialists from the Department of Defense to
tell the Laotians how to demine these unexploded ordnance. Do
you think we have the expertise now in place? Is it just a
matter of getting more resources?
Mr. Keeley. I have been doing this type of work since 1981,
sir, and the Lao people can teach me stuff about these bombs
because they have been doing this since 1994. So there is a lot
of expertise in country, both in the organizations that are
there and amongst the Laos people. So it is not a technical
question, and I don't think we need much in the way of new
technology either. It is really--we have a phrase in England,
``Let the dogs see the rabbit.'' It is more about getting the
money available.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Let the dogs see the rabbits.
Mr. Keeley. It is a sporting term from the greyhound track.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am just searching. Let's say we come up
with an increase in funding. We don't need to depend on the
Department of Defense for expertise to go down there and
utilize the funds. That is what I am trying to get at.
Ms. Khamvongsa.
Ms. Khamvongsa. I would just like to add, I don't feel like
we got clear answers today about the reduction in the State
Department funding amount.
Mr. Faleomavaega. There are clear answers. It was very
clear; the fact that they did reduce the funding.
Ms. Khamvongsa. Right.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So there is no ambiguity about that.
Ms. Khamvongsa. As to why that has happened. I think it
still remains unclear to us, and baffling.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I will tell you why. Nobody pays any
attention to the problems in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam. That is
the bottom line. I hate to say this, but sometimes when we
visit our friends in these countries, we are so taken by so
many voices, interests coming from other countries in the world
or regions in the world, that sometimes they are not on the
train.
I think Laos has been one of the classic examples, even
though we have some 400,000 Laotians living here in America. I
think this is something that maybe we need to have more active
members of our Laotian American community. This is the only way
that Washington is going to turn. I wish there was a better
way, but that is the bottom line for members to get their
attention to any problems affecting--whether it be Laotian
Americans or Laos itself, that is the reality that we are faced
with.
I wish I could be kinder in saying that Laos is the very
center of attention in our American foreign policy. I hate to
say this, but we are not on the map yet. Why it has taken 39
years that all of a sudden a little subcommittee chairman
thought this may be something we ought to look into; it is
simply because this is unbelievable. But I am not surprised
that things like this happen. Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, just
falls through the cracks. You can also talk about the Hmong
people. We can talk about some of our Southeast Asian people
who migrated to this country. Tremendous hardships. But we are
not going to give up because of this.
I wanted to raise another additional question about let's
say that we do get an increase in funding. I just want to get a
sense from you. We currently have the current structure that
can implement the program of clearing up the unexploded
ordnance. Have we actually taken section by section of the
country in terms of saying this is certified cleared? Go do the
farming of whatever? Has there been any effort taken by the
Laos Government to do this?
Mr. Keeley. Sir, with the help of the international
community, the National Regulatory Authority has quite an
impressive database, not only of the contamination, but
increasingly they are mapping the records of the clearance work
that has been done. Now there are some historical legacy work
that was done precomputer, which they are having trouble now
putting into that database. So work that is being done today is
being recorded, and the perimeter is being measured and
recorded and included in a database.
Mr. Faleomavaega. This is something my staff will just have
to follow up on to see where we are at right now.
Mr. Keeley. The Swiss Government has been supporting the
management and creation of this.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I hate to keep saying that 1 percent of
the contaminated lands have been cleared. I don't want to keep
saying this for the next 10 years. Have we done anything? I am
totally not satisfied with the responses that I have been
getting from the State Department, but we just have to move on.
I am going to withhold a couple of more questions.
Congressman Honda, please.
Mr. Honda. Thank you very much. Thank you for the
clarification on technologies. The recommendation was 7 for
2011 and 10 for the next 10 years. Is that the optimum pace
that we can go at?
Ms. Khamvongsa. I think that there is growing capacity, and
I think the State Department, because of their doubling in
funding from the previous year, I think is evidence that the
capacity can be met. I would imagine that, with additional
resources--I mean we are talking about 30 percent increase
between last year and this year to $7 million. We hope that
that will then allow for additional technicians, equipment, and
more long-term planning, which I think is not possible at the
current rate of funding.
Mr. Honda. So at that rate of funding that you would
expect, that you are recommending, we have folks on the ground
that are prepared to be able to move everything forward and
expend the resources as it comes? Are we ready to go?
Mr. Keeley. More or less, yes, sir. The risk of spending
more faster is that you would get inefficiencies, because there
wouldn't be a capacity big enough to absorb it. The numbers
that are being spoken about, I think it is reasonable. There is
a need for a bit of institutional strength. I think there is a
need for perhaps some better decisions on resource allocation.
At the moment, they spend all their management time worrying
about where next month's money is going to come from. And as a
result, they never have the chance to draw a breath and step
back and work out. If they had some consistency of funding, we
would see better mechanisms so that they could make better
resource allocation decisions.
Mr. Honda. With the President's budget they allocated $5
million, and then the State Department only utilized $1.9. Is
there anybody from the State Department here? Do you know why
the State Department did not utilize the full 5?
Voice. Actually, we will use the entire $5 million. The
$1.9 million is what is being requested for Fiscal Year 2011.
So it is going to drop back down in the State Department
request. But the $5 million that Congress did put into the
budget for Fiscal Year 2010 will be spent in Laos, all $5
million.
Mr. Honda. The request will be put in for $7 million for
2011. Is there a reason why we would feel that the State
Department would not spend the $7 million? And then it will be
our plan to continue the increase to $10 million for the next
10 years. I guess if you need that sense of certainty, I think
we can do it. Hopefully, with some sense of commitment, we will
try and find the appropriate wording that will direct the
spending in those areas.
Having said that, you are telling me that there are some
organizational things that need to be done so that the
allocation and distribution will be done appropriately so there
is some accountability on that. And then the mapping and the
way of looking at how it is going to be done in a systematic
way so that folks can expect clearance of land in ways that
will anticipate utilization of land in that manner, is that
what I hear and understand?
Ms. Khamvongsa. Yes. Also, I think for our future record,
it might be good to look into the strategic plan that the NRA
has, which includes input from all the various donor partners
as well as NGOs working in this sector. And that strategy then,
I think, lays out specifically how the institutions will be
strengthened; how they are going to build capacity over the
next 10 years.
Mr. Honda. Mr. Chairman, through the chair, would it be
inappropriate to ask the group that would be involved how that
cost breaks down in terms of best equipment to be purchased,
the cost of training, and the other costs that need to be done
in order to be able to execute the plan, so that we have an
idea?
Mr. Faleomavaega. If the gentleman will yield, I believe
the Laos Government does have a national commission
specifically addressing the very issues that we are talking
about--unexploded ordnance and that of cluster bombs--and they
do have a commission or committee organized in such a way that
many aspects of the whole issue dealing with the unexploded
ordnance and things, I am sure they would have the information.
And I am sure they would be more than willing to cooperate with
us if we needed more information. It will definitely be the
intent of the chair to pursue this as a followup as a result of
our hearing this afternoon, as well as with the State
Department, and to see that there is absolutely no question.
The fear of lack of continuity is something that is common
practice here in Washington, depending on who the new President
is. The unfortunate thing with our foreign policies here in
Washington is that we have become very inconsistent, simply
because whoever is the new President changes the whole
landscape of whether we are going to do anything to help that
country and whether or not priorities are shifted to some other
area or region. Just like $150 billion is being planned for
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. That has been the core central
issues of our foreign policies right now, and that is where it
is at--$150 billion-plus. So that is the reality that we are
faced with here.
Mr. Honda. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I understand
working through the government. As we know it, working with the
government, there is always the need for partnership with the
civilian section and oversight, so that there is transparency
and a sense of a higher level of confidence that it is going in
the right direction.
Mr. Faleomavaega. If the gentleman will yield, I definitely
think we both agree on that line of thought in terms of how we
can follow up with this.
Dr. Keeley.
Mr. Keeley. Sir, thank you. Mr. Honda asked earlier the
question about food security. Actually, one of the things that
may be some good news--I kept quiet out of an unusual sense of
modesty--but one of the areas where Humpty Dumpty has been able
to tie into other funding that you haven't mentioned is we had
a very generous grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
over the last 3 to 4 years. In fact, we have received a total
of $9 million for school feeding. I am looking at food security
at 150 villages. By the time we are finished, we will be
feeding up to 20,000 children and their families and their
teachers. And of that, some $3 million is actually spent on UXO
clearance.
We have had two phases of this so far, as Mike mentioned.
We will be studying a third phase of this in September. So
there are two point. First, we are looking at the question of
food security. I know other money is also spent by the USDA
through the World Food program. So there is that significant
American contribution. And also it is another source of money
not accounted for in the State Department or DoD budgets for
UXO clearance.
Mr. Honda. Mr. Chairman, if I may, this is off the subject,
but as land becomes available, it would be of interest to me
that the land that becomes available stays in the hands of the
landowners, and not speculators or anything else, so that the
ability to use the land for families or tribal clans or
whatever, that that is where the basic control of the land
should be. Not knowing Laos that well, I guess what I am trying
to say is that it stays close to the community.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you so much for making the effort
to come and testify this afternoon. I promise you the chair is
not going to finish here. We will continue to pursue this
issue.
I believe my good friend, Secretary Clinton, I am sure she
is not aware that all this has been going on in Laos. We have
got to come up with the data and the evidence and the
information to show that the good people of Laos need help.
With your testimony and your expertise in this area, I do want
to thank you very much for your coming here.
My staff definitely will be in touch with you respectively.
I sincerely hope that we will come up with better results in
just having a hearing. I sincerely hope that we will be able to
do this.
Mr. Honda. Mr. Chairman, before you drop the gavel, let me
just say publicly that I really appreciate your focus on this.
I remember you said that we have to have a public hearing when
we were going through this in our trip to the countries.
And so just to let folks know that there is a true champion
who won't tolerate double-talk and is very unabashed about how
he feels. I just want to let you know that I appreciate that.
They say the squeaky wheel gets the grease. I hope there is a
lot of grease out there, because if there is not, I know you
will squeak louder than hell. I do thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
This is not to suggest that I am some do-gooder out there. I am
just proud of being an American. When you see things that need
to be corrected, this is one of them. Like I said, I am sure
that the general public out there throughout America has never
heard of these things. I am willing to believe and I have
complete faith in the willingness of the American people to
come through and to make sure that our leaders here in
Washington will pay attention to the problems of this country,
a least developed country.
But we have 400,000 Laos people living in this country, so
it is connected to America. I sincerely hope that those that
get an education, that they will have an opportunity to go back
to their homeland and be a contributing member of the community
and to be of help. They are beautiful people. I just sincerely
hope that part of the legacy of our great country here in
America is that we will make every effort to correct our
mistakes, as we have done in the past. Thank you very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
Minutes deg.
War-Related
Civilian
Problems
in
Indochina-
-hearing
COVER deg.
War-Related
Civilian
Problems
in
Indochina-
-hearing deg.
[Note: The preceding document was not reprinted here in its entirety
but the full document is available in committee records.]
Problems of
War
Victims in
Indochina-
-hearing
cover deg.
Hearing--
Problems
of War
Victims in
Indochina deg.
[Note: The preceding document was not reprinted here in its entirety
but the full document is available in committee records.]
Map of
Laos deg._
La
o People's
Democratic
Republic deg.
__________
Watson
statement deg.
__________
A
Peaceful
Legacy
Now: deg._
[Note: The preceding document was not reprinted here in its entirety
but the full document is available in committee records.]
UX
O Sector
Evaluation deg.
__________
[Note: The preceding document was not reprinted here in its entirety
but the full document is available in committee records.]
St
atement by
Constance
Woodberry deg.
__________
St
atement by
Handicap
Internation
al deg.___
St
atement by
Titus
Peachey deg.
__________
St
atement by
Zach
Hudson deg.
__________
St
atement by
Dori
Shimoda deg.
__________
St
atement by
Arthur
Crisfield deg.
__________