Edwards v. Cornell

FABIAN EDWARDS and KENVILLE EDWARDS, Plaintiffs,v.MATTHEW CORNELL, CHRISTOPHER MAY, and THE CITY OF HARTFORD, Defendants.

RULING ON CITY OF HARTFORD'S RULE 50 MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this
civil rights action, plaintiffs Fabian Edwards and his
brother Kenville Edwards brought claims against the City of
Hartford and Harford police officers Matthew Cornell and
Christopher May. After a jury trial, on April 27, 2017, a
jury rendered a verdict for Officer Cornell on all claims
brought by Fabian Edwards. The jury also returned a verdict
for Kenville Edwards on his claims against Officer May. The
jury found that Officer May violated Kenville's rights by
using excessive force against him; it awarded $135, 000.00 in
compensatory damages and $275, 000.00 in punitive
damages.[1] Now before the Court is the City of
Hartford's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. [Doc.
# 170]. For the reasons set forth below, the City's
motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Legal
Standard

Rule
50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for the
entry of judgment as a matter of law if a jury returns a
verdict for which there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. “A district
court may not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law
unless the evidence is such that, without weighing the
credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the
weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to
the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have
reached.” This Is Me, Inc. v. Taylor, 157 F.3d
139, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations marks omitted).
The standard under Rule 50(b) is not one of strength or
weakness of the evidence; rather, “the evidence must be
such that a reasonable juror would have been
compelled to accept the view of the moving
party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added). In short, judgment as a matter of law may
not be granted unless

(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting
the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been
the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or

(2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor
of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could
not arrive at a verdict against [it].

Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev.
Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir. 1998). In determining
whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate,
“the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000).

Discussion

The
issue presented in the City's motion is one of great
import for all involved: whether, under Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 7-465, a municipality is required to indemnify an
officer for compensatory damages in an excessive force case
when a jury also awards punitive damages. § 7-465,
provides, as relevant, that a municipality “shall pay
on behalf of any employee of such municipality ... all sums
which such employee becomes obligated to pay ... for damages
awarded for infringement of any person's civil rights ...
if the employee, at the time of the occurrence, accident,
physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the
performance of his duties and within the scope of his
employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury
or damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of
such employee in the discharge of such duty.”

Here,
it is undisputed that Officer May was acting in the
performance of his duties and within the scope of his
employment at the time of the incident involving Kenville
Edwards. The City argues that, since the jury made an award
of punitive damages, it necessarily found that Officer
May's conduct was willful or wanton, and thus not subject
to indemnification under § 7-465. Kenville Edwards
objects to the City's statutory interpretation, and
argues a municipality must indemnify for compensatory and
punitive damages arising out of the excessive force verdict.
He agrees that in circumstances inapposite to those here, a
municipality would not be liable for losses and expenses
resulting from a wilful or wanton act that is not a civil
rights violation. The argument hinges, in sum, on this matter
being a civil rights case. Inexplicably, counsel for Officer
May did not present any meaningful argument that would have
advanced the clear interest of his client: that, at a
minimum, the statute requires indemnification of Officer May
for the compensatory damages award. Officer May's
counsel, despite the existence of a sound argument, did not
distinguish between compensatory and punitive damages in his
feckless one-and-a-half page response to the City's
motion, much to the disadvantage of the actual client and to
the advantage of the entity paying the bills.

The
Supreme Court of Connecticut has provided helpful guidance in
City of W. Haven v. Hartford Ins. Co., 221 Conn.
149, 154 (1992), which involved a jury award of $30, 000 in
compensatory damages and $60, 000 in punitive damages in a
civil rights case. West Haven's insurance company paid
the compensatory damages, plus attorney's fees, but
refused to pay the punitive damages portion of the award;
West Haven paid the punitive damages and sought to recover
the amount from its insurer. Id. The trial court
found that because West Haven was not legally required to pay
the punitive damages award, the insurer was not obligated to
reimburse it for the amount. Id. West Haven
appealed.

The
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that West Haven was
not under a legal obligation to pay the punitive damages
award. Id. at 159-63. It reasoned that “the
municipality is obligated, pursuant to § 7-465, to
indemnify a municipal employee unless the municipal employee
acted wilfully or wantonly.” Id. at 159.
Wanton acts include those performed in “reckless and
callous disregard of the rights of others.”
Id. at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted).

While
the case is silent on the municipality's legal obligation
to indemnify for the compensatory portion of the award, it is
clear from its analysis that the parties and the court viewed
them as indemnifiable. The court examined and approved the
jury instructions given at the civil rights trial, which
explained that “[p]unitive damages are additional
damages beyond those awarded as compensatory to be awarded to
the plaintiff as a deterrent to the defendants to discourage
them from committing the conduct complained of in the future
… You may add such amount as you shall unanimously
agree is proper to punish the defendants for
extraordinary misconduct and to serve as an example
or warning to others not to engage in such conduct.”
Id. at 162 (emphasis in original).[2] Thus, the
court's reasoning indicates that, at least in
interpreting §7-465, damages for civil rights violations
are categorical by degree. An award of compensatory damages
addresses the civil rights violation. As the statute states,
“a municipality shall pay on behalf of any employee of
such municipality ... all sums which such employee becomes
obligated to pay ... for damages awarded for infringement of
any person's civil rights ...” An award of punitive
damages, however, is for conduct that goes beyond merely a
civil rights violation; such an award provides additional
compensation for “extraordinary misconduct, ” or
conduct that is more severe than the civil rights violation
itself. Under § 7-465, then, it is the damages awarded
for that extraordinary conduct, conduct that was “the
result of any wilful or wanton act, ” that does not
give rise to municipal indemnification. In this case, the
City must indemnify Officer May for the compensatory damages
award. The punitive damages award does not require
indemnification.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The
City did not cite any case that holds that an award of
punitive damages for a civil rights violation relieves a
municipality from its obligation to pay compensatory damages
for the same violation. In fact, the cases cited in the
City&#39;s motion are consistent with this Court&#39;s
analysis of City of W. Haven. In Gothberg v.
Town of Plainville, 148 F.Supp.3d 168, 194 (D. Conn.
2015), the court granted a municipality&#39;s motion for
judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiff&#39;s &sect;
7-465 claim for indemnification for a Section 1983 claim
alleging an intentional violation of the 14th
Amendment. In fact, the complaint expressly described the
defendants&#39; actions as &ldquo;willful and wanton.&rdquo;
Id. at n. 13. This is distinguishable from the
Section 1983 violation in the instance case - excessive force
- because proof of an excessive force violation does not
require a showing of specific intent. See Graham v.
O&#39;Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (explaining that
...

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