Will Angela Merkel
double-cross Ukraine once again?

As pointed out by Eastwest Skytalets on 11Jul2014, Ukrainians have been
deeply disappointed by the reluctance of the EU leadership to
impose further sanctions against Vladimir Putin's regime:

"You
have to live here
to fully appreciate the swiftly diminishing respect for the EU and its
leadership across a large spectrum of the
local population. After
more than eight months of turmoil in Ukraine, the EU's vapid
declarations of
Russian sanctions and even open defiance by individual countries have
sent
Putin the message he most wanted to hear. Ukrainians are
getting the
message as well, although much slower, as it was not what they expected
to
hear."

Instead, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier have been repeatedly demanding that Ukraine
negotiate with the Russian terrorists, such as Igor Girkin
and Alexander Borodai. This matches perfectly with the rantings of
Putin sycophant Sergei
Markov, who decries Russophobia, but promotes Ukrainophobia:

"Anti-Semitism started
World War II. Russophobia can start a third world war. Finland is one
of the most Russophobic countries in Europe, after Sweden, Poland and
the Baltic countries."

Adolf Hitler became German Chancellor on 30Jan1933 -- at the height of
the Ukrainian Holodomor and in the depths of the World Depression of
the 1930s. Hitler made his intentions clear: (1) overturning the
onerous provisions of the Versailles Treaty; (2) gathering of German
lands inhabited by Volksdeutsche; (3) "drang nach Osten" to provide
"Lebensraum" for a German Empire to the East. (Are the intentions of
Vladimir Putin in the Russian context any different?) Hitler achieved
his first 2 goals with the anschluss of Austria, occupation of the
Sudetenland and the successful dismemberment of Poland as a result of
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact signed on 23Aug1939, which made the Soviet
Union a de facto
ally of Germany responsible for the initiation of World War II. (Putin
and his sychophants have never acknowledged or
accepted Stalin's responsibility for initiating WWII. Indeed, they even
laud the actions of Hitler and Stalin up until the attack on the Soviet
Union on 22Jun1941 launched to achieve Hitler's 3rd goal.)

Some four months ago, I archived an article titledWill
Germany double-cross
Ukraine again?politics@infoukes.com,
11Mar2014; Will Zuzak
which includes links to quotes
of Hitler and Himmler clearly indicating that the plan
of the Germans was to colonize Ukraine at the expense of the indigenous
population -- i.e. pure
unadulterated genocide.
The Germans have acknowledged and accepted responsibility for the
Holocaust, but they have never acknowledged and accepted responsibility
for their genocide of Ukrainians during WWII. Indeed, many Germans (due
to ignorance or perhaps for monetary gain) support or condone the
genocidal policies of Stalin and Putin towards Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Independence Movement has tried very hard to convince the
Germans to support a free, democratic, independent Ukraine -- via
Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky during WWI and the Declaration of Independence
of Ukraine on 30Jun1941 -- but have been disappointed every time. Will
Angela Merkel double-cross Ukraine once again?

Respectfully submitted.
Will Zuzak; 2014.07.15

[W.Z. 2014.08.20: The article below supports the thesis above. A separate copy of this article is archived in the Putin Files directory.]

Why Germany Won’t Get Real
with Russia

When the parliamentary elections last year ushered in a new government
in Germany, there was a collective sigh of relief. Guido Westerwelle,
foreign minister for four years, had never mastered his office and
always seemed to lack the sort of gravitas that the office demands. In
came Frank-Walter Steinmeier; Westerwelle’s predecessor would also be
his successor. With his calm demeanour, Steinmeier was considered by
many to be the ideal top diplomat. Less than a year into his term,
however, the disillusion is palpable, even among some of his
sympathisers.

Germany’s role in the
current conflict between Ukraine and Russia is that of a neutral
arbiter, at least if the German government’s position is to be taken at
face value (even though one is led to wonder why a western country
would want to be neutral in this conflict). But in reality, Berlin
seems much more interested in restoring good relations with Russia than
in preventing another frozen conflict on European soil. What is so
difficult to grasp, however, is why this government officially shared
western concerns and then did its utmost to stop any decisive action in
the face of the most daring aggression Europe has witnessed in decades?

It seems that two aspects
might offer a glimpse into what drives German foreign policy at this
stage. The first involves a fundamental misreading of what the Kremlin
is trying to achieve. The second aspect, even more worryingly, is a
considerable confusion among the political elite regarding the purposes
of the instruments of diplomacy. The implications are frightening:
Steinmeier and the government’s envoy for Eastern Europe and Russia,
Gernot Erler, are putting the brakes on any action Europe considers.
Yet, what they fail to realise is that by doing so, they invite further
aggression.

Misreading
Russian intentions

When Russian soldiers
began occupying administrative buildings in Crimea, western nations
were still struggling to understand Russian objectives. The Kremlin
insisted that the “little green men” were local self-defence forces.
European and American leaders still considered what had started in
Moldova and continued in Georgia in 2008 as isolated conflicts. But
with Russia beginning to encircle Ukrainian bases in Crimea, a pattern
had in fact emerged. In what was blatant aggression, the Kremlin simply
redrew the borders of Europe, casting aside international law and
agreements signed by the Kremlin itself. Yet, the Russian president,
Vladimir Putin, certainly anticipated his revanchist policies would
elicit some punitive action by western and European nations. Standing
idly by was not an option if the West wanted to avoid similar episodes
in the future. Standing by, however, is exactly what the West did. And
few nations put as much effort into doing nothing as Germany.

The Kremlin masterfully
played western sentiments against western interests and nowhere did
this strategy work as well as in Germany. A recent poll conducted on
behalf of Germany’s foreign ministry found that 51
per cent of Germans think the most important goal of foreign policy
is world peace. The same poll found that a meagre 15 per cent want
Germany to defend freedom. Unsurprisingly, German diplomacy was
hesitant to embrace sanctions. Steinmeier portrayed diplomacy as the
opposite of sanctions and argued that pursuing sanctions would harm
diplomatic efforts.

The Kremlin, meanwhile,
devised a strategy that took German sentiments into account and offered
small steps that could, with an abundance of optimism, be interpreted
as tentative signs of de-escalation. It created the impression that
Germany’s quest for a diplomatic solution was not totally in vain, even
though Russia significantly upped the ante shortly after making the
smallest conciliatory gestures. The strategy worked. Berlin never
embraced sanctions and became convinced that a diplomatic solution was
just around the corner.

On July 2nd 2014, shortly
before the Malaysian airliner was shot down,the German government
invited the Russian, Ukrainian and French foreign ministers to Berlin
and exerted pressure on Ukraine to sign a ceasefire, even though
Ukrainian forces were finally beginning to seize the initiative on the
battlefield. Germany tried again for a ceasefire on August 17th, even
though the rebel forces seemed on the verge of collapse. If preserving
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and deterring future aggression was to
be the driving motivation of German foreign policy, than its policies
did not make any sense. To the contrary, the moment Ukrainian forces
could be expected to re-establish control, Berlin was doing its utmost
to freeze the conflict.

The push for a ceasefire
coupled with the establishment of a contact group would cement the
gains achieved by rebel forces. It would create exactly the sort of
frozen conflict that Putin wanted to achieve in the first place.

Misapplied
diplomacy

From the start of the
conflict, Germany proposed a contact group to initiate a diplomatic
process. Tellingly, it never went into more detail about the contact
group’s purpose. After Russia had first seized and then annexed Crimea,
Steinmeier and Erler were eager to return to the status quo.
Effectively acknowledging the loss of Crimea, they worked hard to
reinstate good relations with the Kremlin and continue the policy
Steinmeier had created during his first stint as foreign minister,
called the modernisation partnership (Modernisierungspartnerschaft).

The partnership was built
on the premise that good trade relations would eventually foster
liberalisation and modernisation of Russia itself. When first proposed,
it seemed like a good idea and allowed Steinmeier, a Social Democrat,
to claim foreign policy as a field in which Social Democrats excel.
After all, had it not been Willy Brandt, Germany’s first Social
Democratic chancellor, who had introduced the new Eastern policy (Neue
Ostpolitik) and its unique approach described as change through
rapprochement (Wandel durch Annäherung)?

The new Eastern policy was
meant to bridge the gap between the East and the West during the Cold
War, building trust and confidence whilst reducing the threat of war.
Until today, the approach is considered a resounding success. It was
the first time Germany did not simply follow its western allies after
the end of the Second World War, but designed and implemented its own
foreign policy.

The modernisation
partnership was meant to replicate that success even though it ignored
some basic realities. The most obvious is the different nature of the
world today. Eastern European nations now follow their own political
interests and no longer serve as Soviet proxies, yet more than the new
Eastern policy, the modernisation partnership is centred on Russia
alone. Put differently, even though Eastern Europe is more
heterogeneous and complex than ever, Germany’s foreign policy towards
the East is focused primarily on one country, Russia.

Secondly, the new Eastern
policy of the 1960s and 1970s was first and foremost of a political
nature, whereas the modernisation partnership is solely built around
trade and economic relations. The results thus far have been
devastating. Nearly a decade after Steinmeier launched the
modernisation partnership Russia is more authoritarian and aggressive
than it has ever been since the fall of the Berlin wall.

The modernisation
partnership did more than simply forge a closer relationship with
Russia. Steinmeier had effectively re-positioned German foreign policy.
Berlin had embraced a policy of equal distance to both the West and
Russia. While the institutional framework might suggest otherwise,
Berlin is in fact no longer a staunch western ally.

Soul
searching

The crisis Russia has
created in Ukraine constitutes the most serious aggression the
continent had witnessed in decades. Russian-led separatists have
established a reign of terror in the territories they control, taken
hostages, shot down planes and tortured and executed opponents. Yet,
German foreign policy is still driven by the desire to return to the
economically beneficial relationship that dominated its approach to
Russia over the past several years. To that end, the German government
seemed ready to sacrifice not just the territorial integrity of
Ukraine, but also its relationship with its Eastern European allies. If
good policy is about adapting to the changing nature of the conflict,
then German foreign policy would fail any test. Yet, if its goal is
simply to salvage beneficial relations with Russia, no matter what
happens to Ukraine, it makes perfect sense.

Still, Steinmeier is
genuine in his desire to establish peace. But this time around, his
good intentions clearly pave an autobahn to hell and his stubborn
insistence on peace, even if it means abandoning freedom, the rule of
law, and nurturing aggression is as ill-fated as it is naïve. The
reluctance with which Germany reacted to the annexation of Crimea
invited Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine.

Despite the many
chess-related metaphors, the current crisis seems more like a game of
poker. The German position involves throwing away all its cards, boldly
declaring that it will not pick up any new ones, hoping to achieve a
draw. It even managed to call this approach diplomacy. When the dust
over the ruins of Donetsk settles, Germany will have to re-examine its
policies. More than anyone else, intentionally or not, Berlin has
contributed to the prolonging of the crisis. And more than any other
western party, Berlin needs to take a hard look at what it has done
over the past couple of months.

Dustin
Dehez
is a managing partner at Manatee Global Advisors, a German-based
political and international relations consultancy firm.

COMMENTS
evanlarkspur:
By all legal and rational definitions, Russia is waging war
against Ukraine. Why is this so hard for world leaders and the media to
state clearly and unequivocally? The rule of law is the very foundation
of the world peace and prosperity we have achieved (imperfect though it
still is, a standard of living beyond subsistence exists for a greater
part of the world population than at any time in recorded history).
Given this reality, our goal needs to be upholding the rule of law, as
peace naturally flows as a consequence of this. And if we decide that
we must uphold the rule of law, then Russia's actions are war, pure and
simple, and Russia must be stopped WITH ANY MEANS THEY MAKE NECESSARY.
Russia leaders must be charged in international courts, and Russia must
pay reparations for the damage its violations of law and treaty have
caused. We must make the consequences of violating the rule of law so
severe that Russia decides that it is too costly a course to pursue.

Peace naturally follows the rule of law, not vice-versa.
Peter1619:
If the reported figures for those who believe freedom should be
defended is right then the German people should be ashamed of
themselves for their short collective memory. When faced with a bully
trampling on agreed norms of behaviour then pacifistic appeasement is
not an option, no matter how many jobs ride on it. Other western
countries learned that lesson to their cost back in 1936-39 when
dealing with another extremist country, Germany itself! Freedom has to
be defended by those that have it.

Steve:
It seems that this time around as Toft and Sons designed and built
crematoria to incinerate the gassed bodies of the Jews (the first
gassed victims where SLAVIC soldiers used to test the procedure) it now
seems Germany is intent on not losing money on selling military weapons
and technology to Russia so it can be proxy to the killing of more
SLAV's (Ukrainians). Seems to appear the Fourth Reich is here. Seems
Germany has failed to learn from its own past and today has no honor
and knows no shame.

Irakli Bokuchava:
Now in eastern Ukraine war between Ukrainian patriots and Russian
regular army.Russians try to occupy back Luhansk and Donetsk,which are
liberated.Ukraine is Putin's Waterloo.Neutrality of Germany doesn't
look like realpolitik,but mercantilism of merchant.Its time for
bold,clear support of young Ukrainian democracy,if Germany wants to
stay as leader of European politics.Brotherhood with Putin,who declared
Russia as leader of anti Western world,now position of odious
regimes.Germany must return its previous role of leader of Western
democracy in EU.