However, all American soldiers
were giving food account of themselves in those hot July days. Marshal
Foch, as July 15th passed into the 16th, with the
allied lines everywhere holding solid, said: "Je suis
content." It was no longer possible that the world would
contain only two classes: Teutons --and others. Forthwith the High
Command began to study more closely their plans for a counter-offensive.
By the night of July 17th Marshal Foch was ready to strike.
The line chosen for the Allied blow was between Soissons and Chateau-Theirry,
a line of about twenty-five miles extending southward from the valley of
the Aisne to the Marne. The key position was Villers-Cotterets Forest.
To make the blow effective at that vital point, Marshal Foch must have
three divisions of the hardest fighters that the combined Allied Army of
eleven million possessed. Two of the divisions he chose were
American-the 1st and 2d Divisions; the other was partly
American--the Foreign Legion of the French Army. Great were the doing of
those fighting Americans next day, the 18th. The 1st
and 2d Divisions, with the For-

Page 1310

eign Legion between them, swept onward, taking position after
position, and sending back thousand of prisoners--haughty Germans who,
though dazed by the thud of the impact, were still unshaken in their
belief in the invincibility of the Teutons. They were not yet willing to
concede that their storm-troops had been countered by something more
boisterous. It was at this time that a Kansas coined a new troop-name. A
German prisoner, when asked what unit he belonged to, replied proudly in
English: "I am a storm trooper." At once, the interrogating
sergeant retorted: "Storm troops? Do you know what we are? We're
from Kansas. We're Cycloners."

The cyclone continued through the night of 18th, and when
morning broke, the Americans had so far broken through the enemy lines
as to have crossed the road running southward from Soissons to Chateau
Thierry. They had broken the enemy's lines of communication, leaving the
Germans no option by to retreat from Chateau Thierry, their nearest
point to the French capital. Gone was the Teuton dream of clanking his
spurs along the Parisian boulevards. Gone was his last chance to dictate
peace. Americans were congesting the roads, and there was not longer any
room for the Germans in Paris--in France, for that matter.

General Mangin, who commanded the operations on July 18th,
frankly gave his opinion of the American Army in the following order:

Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Soldiers of the American
Army:

Shoulder to shoulder with your French comrades, you threw
yourselves in to the counter-offensive begun on July 18th.
You ran to it as if going to a feast. Your magnificent dash upset and
surprised the enemy, and your indomitable tenacity stopped
counter-attacks by his fresh divisions. You have shown yourself to be
worthy sons of your great country and have gained the admiration of your
brothers in arms.

American comrades, I am grateful to you for the blood you generously
spilled on the soil of my country. I am proud of having commanded you
during such splendid days and to have fought with you for the
deliverance of the world.

The turn of the tide, which had been against the Allies since August
of 1914, cam e on July 18, 1918. Then the Germans began to retreat from
the Marne, mainly, let it be said with reasonable humility, because of
the vigor of the new element that had been injected in the Allied forces.
It was America's day. she did not win the war, but her strength was the
factor that turned the scale away from militaristic Germany.

Although the Germans still faced the enemy stubbornly, they began to
step backward from the Marne after the onslaught of the American
Regulars and Marines had made Chateau-Thierry untenable. The first
American units to enter that town, that "grave of German
hops," were the Yankee Division. They reoccupied chateau Thierry on
July 21st, jointly with French troops. The 26th
Division had long before relieved the 2d division after the Belleau Wood
fighting of the latter; and had been somewhat impatient that is own part
of the offensive of July 18th

Page 1311

should be restricted to such a small area. The Belleau position had
been trying, but now that the Germans were being pushed backward, the
lanky Yankees were to be allowed to stretch their legs a little more.
They did not stay long in Chateau-Theirry for they could find no Germans
there, and they had been given permission to chase them. They soon found
then--found that the Germans were able, in their retreat, to put very
awkward obstacles in the way. Two battalions of the 28th
American division went with the 26th. After eight days of
active engagements, the New Englanders were relieved by the 42nd
Division, which had been permitted to catch their breaths a little after
having met the impact of the last grand offensive of the Germans on July
15-17.

By this time the Marine salient has lost its pocketlike shape, and
now formed itself more like a bow. The German "backed out of the
Marne salient as a Western 'bad man' would back out of a saloon with an
automatic pistol in each hand." It tried the nerve of even strong
men to followed him closely in his retreat. But there was active as well
as strong men among the Americans who were pushing the desperate Germans
backward. On the right of the Rainbow Division was a brigade of the 28th,
and beyond the men from Pennsylvania were the irrepressibles of the 3d
division. The 32d division also went through its first experience of
major offensives at the Ourcq, behind which the Germans retreated. There
was grim fighting on the heights of the Ourcq. "On one of the
summits, after the fighting was over, ten Americans were lying dead
facing ten Germans. All the Americans had their bayonets fixed" but
it seemed hat both Germans and Americans were caught in a whirl of
cross-fire from machine guns. We had to pay a bloody price to break the
German resistance, but our men never faltered. There were never any half
measures. The Germans were given no rest, although of necessity we got
none ourselves. One of the hottest units on the trail was a battalion of
the New York Irish Regiment, that commanded by Major William J. Donovan.
He had already proved that he was a fearless commanders, had indeed,
while in the training sector, come tot he notice of the French by
intrepid coolness in one tight corner, and here, on the Ourcq, he was
destined to add the Distinguished Service Cross to the Croix de Guerre
which the French had bestowed upon him, for his previous exploit. #1 The
official citation tells not only of the bravery of Major

Page 1312

Donovan, but also the story of the 165th Regiment, during
those days of restless pursuit and punishment of the Germans:

He led his battalion across the river Ourcq and captured important
enemy strong holds near Villers-sur-Fere, France, on 28th to
30th July, 1918. He was in advance of the division for four
days, all the while under shell and machine gun-fire from the enemy, who
were on three sides of him, and hew was repeatedly and persistently
counter-attacked. Fifty per cent of his command were lost and he himself
wound twice. His coolness, courage, and efficient leadership rendered
possible the maintenance of this positions.

At no point ha the retreat of the Germans become a rout. The
retirement was orderly, deliberate. He fought savagely for every foot of
ground that he was forced to concede to the worrying Americans; and when
across the Ourcq, fresh divisions came to relieve the dog-tired German
rearguard. These new divisions had been ordered to prevent the crossing
of the Ourcq by the Americans al all costs. But to be to prevent and to
be able to prevent were not synonymous, as the Germans found. Led by
Major Donovan and his battalion of the Fighting 69th of New
York, the regiments of the Rainbow Division crossed, and could not be
driven back. But what fighting! On July 30th the town of
Sergy was captured and recaptured nine times within the twenty-four
hours. What a lesson for the Kaiser's own! When the remnants of the
fresh Prussian guard division at last left the town in our possession,
it was obvious that an American guardsman was at least the equal of the
Prussian guardsmen. The decimated Prussian guard units were into
enforced retirement, their place being taken by a Bavarain guard
division. Despite repeated attacks by the latter, the town of Sergy
remained in

American possession Major Donovan and his battalion of fighting
Irish-men had "cracked the shell," and the other units of the
Rainbow Division had savagely attacked the kernel of the German
positions across the Ourcq. There was no option therefore for the enemy
but to continue backward.

In view of the recapture of Soissons on August 2d, and of the driving
of the Germans from before Rheims, haste was imperative is the Germans
would reached the Vesle River, the next line of defense, before the
retreat had degenerated into a rout. The indefatigable 42d followed them
two-thirds of the way to the Vesle before relinquishing its place in the
front lien, to the supporting 4th Division. The advance had
by that time reached Chartreves. The 4th went on with the 32nd
Division, and on the night of August 3d looked down upon that terrible
valley of the Vesle, which, after the experience of another new York
division--the 77th--in it during the next few weeks was to
come into American history as "Hell-hole Valley." The 42d
Division went to well deserved rest, laving other less fatigued American
divisions to "carry on.' "In eight days of battle, the Rainbow
division had forced the passage of the Ourcq, taken prisoners from six
enemy divisions, met, routed and decimated a

Page 1313

crack Prussian division, a Bavarian division, and one other, and had
driven back the enemy's line for 16 kilometers." In every day of
the fight the new York regiment, the old 69th, had
participated. Major-General Menoher had reason to be proud of his
command.

While the 77th Division was chafing in the trenches along
the Vesle River, the 42d and other divisions were being reorganized for
another major operation. But before going farther into that matter it
would be well to close the Marne-Vesle operation by spreading upon these
pages General Pershing's letter of commendation, published in General
Orders in August 7th. His order ran:

It fills me with pride to record in general orders a tribute to the
service achievements of the First and third Corps. Comprising the 1st,
1d, 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, and 42d
Divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces.

You came to the battle field at a crucial hour for the allied cause.
For almost four years the most formidable army the world had yet seen
has pressed it invasion of France and stood threatening its capital. At
no time has that army been more powerful and menacing then when, on July
15, it struck again to destroy in one great battle the brave men opposed
to it and to enforce its brutal will upon the world and civilization.

Three days later, in conjunction with our allies, you
counter-attacked. The allied armies gained a brilliant victory that
marks the turning point of the war. You did more than to give the allies
the support to which, as a Nation, our faith was pledged. You proved
that out altruism, our pacific spirit, and our sense of justice have not
blunted our virility or our courage.

You have shown that American initiative and energy are as fit for the
tasks of war as for the pursuits of peace. You have justly won unstinted
praise from our Allies and the eternal gratitude of our countrymen.

We have paid for our successes with the lives of many of our brave
comrades. We shall cherish their memory always and claim for our history
and literature their bravery, achievement, and sacrifice.

Perhsing's order, it will be noticed, was addressed to the units of
the 1st and 3d Corps, of the American Expeditionary Forces;
but A. E. F. had by that time expanded to such an enormous extent that
Perishing, in organizing the American First Army found himself in
command of five full army corps.

The fortunes of war were all with the Allies then, it seemed. In
April, 1918, the allied commanders had had to bear up as well as they
could while realizing that Germany was about thirty per cent stronger
than the Allies on the Western Front. Since that time, the German
military machine had been inconstant use; had been exposed to the most
boisterous weather; and had begun to show woeful signs of wear, no
opportunity having come for overhauling. On the other hand, the allied
machine had been receiving brand new parts from America and soon, in the
next overhauling, would become, to all intents, "as good as
new." Palmer, in thinking of he great transformation that had
occurred in the military situation in two months, marvelled. He writes:

Page 1314

What was it that the Allies were saying in June and early in July? If
we could hold until August 1, the arrival of American troops would make
our defense secure. On August 1 we had conquered the heights of the
Ourcq and were starting in pursuit of the Germans to the Vesle. Has
there ever been such a transition of feeling as that which began on July
18 with the drive to Soissons? Stroke after stroke driving the enemy
back! More and more prisoners and guns! That great German army was
fighting in a muddling defensive. Accepting the word of the German staff
that the withdrawal was. . . . . . .July and August were great months
for civilization. They saw old armies galvanized with fresh energy; and
a new army prove itself.

The new and proved army that he refers to, it would seem, comprised
those divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces that had fought so
valiantly alongside French or British armies. But up to the end of
August no war correspondent had seen more than two American divisions in
the front line, side by side, under an American corps commander. This
state of affairs was, however, destined to change. Indeed, the change
had already come. On august 10th, to be exact, the
organization of the American First Field Army had been completed. From
then on the American Expeditionary Forces were to be just as independent
an organization as was the British Army, commanded by Field Marshal Sir
Douglas Haig, or as was the French Army, commanded by General Petain.
Perhsing was coming into his own. He who, in the blackest days of march,
1918, had so nobly set aside all personal vanity effacing himself as a
commanding general, by placing at the disposal of French and British
generals, all the American troops that were available, was now to assume
command of an army of five army corps., al American. Even some French
units were to move to his command.

After the withdrawal of the 28th and 42d Divisions from
the front-line in Champagne in the early days of August, Perhsing had
been quietly drawing to Lorraine, the "Transplanted untied States
in France," almost all the division that were not vitally and
imperatively needed in the line. And in Lorraine, Perhsing 's new
American Army was quietly but quickly organized.

Nearly all the American divisions saw Lorraine. When divisions came
out of the line for a rest period, or a new division came to France, the
invariable destination was Lorraine. How Americanized the province had
become! And what ambitious operations were quietly, but
enthusiastically, talked of in army circles in Lorraine during the
latter days of August and the first of September. The Germans, no doubt,
would have liked to have had a much more efficient espionage system in
operation in the vicinity of the American G. H. Q. during August, when
American units seemed to be pouring into Lorraine like Moslems into
Mecca. The German Staff probably dreaded that soon something sensational
would happen. They may have imagine American armies darting this way,
plunging that way, coming with a terrific thud

Page 1315

Somewhere--to the woeful wearing of German legions; but they had no
firm convictions, until too late, that St. Mihiel, the salient which had
defied all the attacks of French, was the real objective of General
Pershing's "Wild West Show." They were more inclined to look
upon the presence of so many American units in Lorraine as no more than
that province had become a rest-area as well as a training-center for
American units. And, as everyone knew, there were an appalling, or
rather deplorable, number of absolutely green American divisions then in
France. Many an American who had been quietly pursuing this prosaic
tasks of civil life in May and had never handled a rifle was in France
in August.

However, the only information that could be positively accepted by
the Germans, in probing American plans, was that there was a huge
American Army in France, and an ominous concentration of it in Lorraine.
They probably knew that five Army corps was about as large as a normal
French Army. They probably knew that Americans always to go "one
better" than the best; that Americans are so apt to think and do
things in a big way. An American division was almost equivalent to a
French corps, and Pershing now possessed in France thirty divisions. He
had under his command approximately a million and a quarter men. Quite a
disturbing aggregation, perhaps the Germans thought--if even half of
them measured up to the standard of the Marines of the 2d Division or of
the Fighting Irishmen of the Rainbow Division, or of the men of the Iron
Division, or the New Englanders, or the New York Guardsmen of the 27th.
If he went close into analyses, the German would concede that all
Americans--green or otherwise--that they had yet collided with were good
fighters.

Undoubtedly a great operation was impending. The German Intelligence
Department could be sure of that; but by this time they probably knew
enough about the American characteristics to imagine that when the time
for stroking came, the blow would be sudden and hard, that, to use the
common parlance of the men of the Melting-Pot division, "they'd be
somep'n doin'," when the boys for "good and ready." They
probably had on file a good character-sketch of the American commander,
and knew that Pershing usually went "hot and strong;" at
whatever he undertook. Altogether, their deductions of American
possibilities of action cannot have brought them much ease of mind early
in September.

The five American Army corps at that time were as follows:

First Army Corps--1st and 2d Divisions of the
Regular Army; the 26th (New England), 32d (Michigan and
Wisconsin), 41st (Sunset), 42d (Rainbow), divisions of the
National Guard.

Second Army Corps--4th Division of the Regular
Army, 28th (Pennsylvania), 30th (Tennessee, North
and South Carolina and District of

Page 1316

Columbia), 36th (Missouri and Kansas), divisions of the
National Guard, 77th (New York) and 82d (George, Alabama and
Florida) Divisions of the National Army.

Third Army Corps--3d and 5th divisions of the
Regular Army, the 27th (New York), 33d (Illinois) divisions
of National Guard, the 78th (New Jersey and New York), 80th
(Delaware, Virginia, Maryland and District of Columbia) divisions of the
National Army.

Fourth Army Corps--83d (Ohio and Pennsylvania), 89th
(Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, Nebraska, Colorado, New Mexico and
Arizona), 90th (Texas and Oklahoma), and 92d (Negro troops)
division of the National Army, the 37th (Ohio) and 29th
(New Jersey, Virginia, Delaware, Maryland and District of Columbia)
divisions of the National Guard.

Fifth Army Corps--6th division of Regular Army, 36th
(Texas and Oklahoma) division of National Guard, 75th (New
England), 79th (Pennsylvania, Maryland, and District of
Columbia), 85th (Michigan and Wisconsin), and 91st
(Pacific Coast) divisions of National Army.

Not all of these thirty divisions were needed for this first
all-American offensive. Pershing, in his report, refers to only seven
American divisions as in the line of attack on the first day at St.
Mihiel; but there were many supporting divisions that went up for severe
fighting on the second and succeeding days. A German official report of
the battle states that there were "at least nine American
divisions" in it. (By the way, the German classification of those
nine American divisions will interest those men of the Rainbow Division
who labor under the conviction that the Yankee division (the 26th)
from New England had "nothing on" the Rainbow Division from
all of U. S. A. The German report reads: "Of these nine
divisions, two, the 1st, 2d and 42d, were first-class
attacking divisions; two, the 4th and 26th, were
good fighting divisions." The Rainbows had, apparently, impressed
the Germans).

There were many famous American division absent from the St. Mihiel
array. The 27th (New York) guard division was still fighting
shoulder to shoulder with British and Australians, Field Marshal Haig
thinking so well of their fighting qualities as to appeal to Pershing
not to draw them away from the British area. The same applies to the 30th
(Wild Cat) division, which, throughout the war, was to be linked in
battle-service with the 27th, both being destined to see the
war through in the British area of operations. The other New York
division, the 77th, was too much engrossed in chasing the
Germans from the Vesle to the Aisne (in company with men from
Pennsylvania) to think of "going home" to Lorraine for the
great American "fireworks." But there was another New York
division which, in addition to the Rainbow, had a part in the St. Mihiel
offensive. New York should be bracketed with

Page 1317

New jersey, it would seem, in thinking of the 78th
division, which was one of the supporting units on the opening day of
St. Mihiel, and went up and into severe fighting on the second and
succeeding days of that operation. The 78th division is
generally classified as of New Jersey, but a considerable portion of its
personnel came from Western New York. Other divisions that came into
notice in the St. Mihiel battle include the 3d and 5th of the
Regular Army, the 33d and 35th divisions of the National
Guard, and the 80th, 82d, 90th and 91st
divisions of the National Army. In his St. Mihiel report, Pershing
speaks of the First, Fourth, and Fifth corps of the American First Army.

At all events, military activity in the "transplanted Untied
States of France' during the month of August and first half of
September, in preparation for the Great Adventure, was on such a
prodigious scale as to make even war-calloused "official
observers" gasp. War correspondents who had had much experience
along the Western Front during the four woe-begotten and war-blasted
year, in which killing had seemed to be the all-absorbing purpose of
everybody, had grown accustomed to stupendous troop-movements. Yet it
must be confessed that the flicker of hope, of seeing a great American
Army in France, which had been before American correspondents as they
had wandered in and out of the battle area, seeing British and French
soldiers in millions, but Americans only here and there had lone since
flickered out. Now, however, these correspondents were going about with
300-watt faces. Their radiant hope could light a hall, and what they
could tell of the great happening in the constantly-growing American
center in France could fill a city hall to overflowing. The American
doughboy was in evidence, here, there, everywhere--wherever one turned
in Lorraine. He had multiplied a million times; and the accumulation of
the wheels of war--transports, guns, ambulance, motor truck, wagons, and
all the military miscellany that came, many deep, in a never-ending line
from the S. O. S. was staggering. In a letter home, one doughboy
pictured it thus: :No doubt you think Fifth Avenue, New York, a very
busy thoroughfare, but after seeing military traffic on the roads of
France, it would look like the Main Street of a deserted village."
Here, indeed, in Lorraine, was an American Army of a size that was in
keeping with the standing of the Untied States among the great Nations
of the world. Here, in his headquarters, the so-called :Advanced G. H.
Q.," was a real typical American general, the clean-cut,
hard-as-nails Pershing: and within easy call were an inconceivable
number of American divisions. One seemed to see a new regimental or
divisional number every hour. "Had we really grown this
great?" pondered Palmer. "Had the Allied shipping been able to
bring all this force, human, mechanical and material, across the
Atlantic in face of the submarine?" the answer was before his eyes.
Undoubtedly what he saw was American. Beyond a doubt the allies had
accomplished this.

Page 1318

Yes, this and more, for he knew that there were still many American
divisions that he could not see, but were actively in the mélée
somewhere along the long Western Front. And he knew that there were many
more in the making in America; also that ships would be available to
bring them over. Certainly, he had reason for confidence in the future;
even in the immediate future. He knew that America could pinch off this
salient without drawing upon that part of its manhood which was already
at grips with the Germans on other parts of the French Front. And he was
confident that greater achievements than this were to be gloriously
accomplished by the ever-growing American Army. Certainly, those of
Pershing's aides, who a year before, had been working out American
projects on the basis of army of a million, or of two million, American
soldiers were not mere dreamers.

It was not a simple operation this St. Mihiel offensive. Indeed, it
called for superior generalship, for the operation that Pershing had in
mind was a daring one. Some of the strategists of the French and British
staffs looked upon his plan as something more than daring; they viewed
it almost as suicidal for anew , untried army to approach such defenses.
All were agreed that it would prove a much more difficult operation than
would develop in a straight frontal attack. But frontal attacks during
the four years of war had failed, with casualties greater then the total
force that Pershing now planned to use. Undoubtedly, the task before him
was a difficult one; yet Pershing--who if only in this test has proved
himself to be worthy of a place among great military commanders--found
the simple way of carrying through a difficult operation. It was not
simple thinking. His thought on the subject had been profound. Ever
since he had been in France, the St. Mihiel salient had been in his
mind. In the clearness of original thought, when he had first studied
the map, he had seen that the logical attack was at the bases of the
salient. Even before he had a full division in France, he had to all
intents marked off St. Mihiel as American ground. When he had first
looked up at Mont Sec, which stood guard like a geologic giant over that
salient, he had said: "We ought to have that mountain." And
the unfortunate doughboys in the Toul Sector echoed his words--to a man.
Mont Sec, towering above them had long since "got their goat.'
Their experience was :like sitting at the foot of the stairs and having
a fellow at the top throw rocks at you from behind a curtain,"
writes Palmer. Certainly, we ought to have that mountain. All Pershing's
study of military tactics, all his profound thought of a year, merely
confirmed his original conviction, and plan of operations.

He manoeuvred his troops into position with masterly skill, and, if
the actual fighting had been strenuous, there is no doubt that Pershing,
in generalship, would have been equal to the emergency. As a matter of
fact, however, it proved to be necessary to do not much more than

Page 1319

parade the American Army before St. Mihiel to win the salient. It was
to all intents ours at the end of the first days fighting. The fact that
we were there, and in such numbers, and all imbued with the irresistible
American spirit, ready to tear our way through anything, was sufficient
to bring the St. Mihiel German forces to the opinion that "they
preferred living as prisoners to dying for their Emperor in hopeless
resistance." Pershing won this spectacular victory to some extent
by display of force, and to a greater extent by dash of attack. There
was no long period of artillery preparation,. At one o'clock on the
morning of September 12 we sent our challenge to the enemy. It was
inclosed in a bombardment of sufficient intensity to make them realize
that big operations were impending. All the efforts of the American
Nation seemed to be concentrated in that bombardment. As Palmer, who
watch the operation from a commanding hill, describes it:

The labors and sacrifices of the people at home were concentrated in
this inferno of accumulated preparation. Our guns were speaking the
power of the Mississippi's flow; of the heat of the desert; of the coal
and metals from our mines; of the throbbing life of our cities and wheat
fields--top support the flesh and blood of our men waiting in the
front-line trenches to commence our first attack as an army. It was the
thought of our men which made you pray that all the shells screaming
over their heads would go straight to their targets.

There was hardly any reply from the German batteries. Either the
Germans thought that this was only the first of many days of preparatory
bombardment, or the spirit of resistance had left them. The following
extract of letter found upon a captured German next day confirms the
latter thought. The letter reads:

FROM HEINRICH KIRSCHKE, 47th Infantry.

Sept, 11, 1919.

. . . . When will that time cone again that we can live together
again so comfortably in Berlin? It looks very day for our beautiful
Germany. Who knows whether the Americans will not even yet break
through? This morning at 3 o'clock, we were again alerted, and thought
the Americans were going to attack, but nothing as yet. However, we
captured a couple of prisoners who said that they would be in Germany in
eight days.. . . . . We few fellows cannot hold up this superior might
and most all go helplessly into captivity, and, of course, most of the
prisoners are murdered . . . . .

According to all appearance, we are approaching turbulent days. We
are constantly alerted and it is feared that the Americans are going to
attack in this sector. They are said to have assembled tremendous
numbers of tanks and troops on the other side. In that case we are lost.

It seems, from other evidence, that this was a general opinion among
the rank and file of the Germans in the St. Mihiel defences. They
numbered only about 50,000, but, if possessed of fighting spirit like
that shown by the average Prussian six months before, they might have
defied an army twice as large as that which Pershing used. The Germans
had the guns, but did not use them. German batteries which still had the
camouflage on them and had not fired a shot were found next

Page 1320

Day. had the enemy used their machine guns as the Germans had on the
Marne , our losses would probably have been proportionately as appalling
as those at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood, or as those to be suffered
by the New York Division in breaking the Hindenburg Line. But, as Palmer
writes of the St. Mihiel Germans: "The die-hard spirit was not in
this command." In the face of the overwhelming force of Americans,
evacuations of the salient had, it seems, been decided upon. The German
do not relinquish what they can keep, but at that time the average
German in the St. Mihiel area had no other desire than to avoid the
enemy.

Of course, as a soldier from Kansas expressed it: "We had the
jump on them." Pershing had had no intention of politely knocking
on the door of St. Mihiel, and of patiently waiting for someone to
answer. He wanted the door opened, and, with characteristic American
vim, he planned to bump into it and force it open. He would not wait, or
stand upon ceremony. An artillery preparation of four hours would do, he
thought, just as well as one of four days.

The History of New York State,
Lewis Historical Publishing Company, Inc., 1927