Operations to Reach the Rhine

In conformity with our strategic plans for operations
into the heart of Germany, the main effort in the
Allied operations west of the Rhine was to be in the
northern sector, with a view to seizing the crossings
north of the Ruhr. All our other operations were designed
primarily to assist this northern operation, to
gain secure flanks so as to permit of the heaviest concentration
with which to force a crossing in the north,
and eventually to provide the bases for a secondary
effort which would again assist the planned main effort.

Operations west of the Rhine were to be developed
in three distinct phases.

Phase I was to consist primarily of the operations
known as VERITABLE and
GRENADE, by which
respectively the Canadian Army and the U.S. Ninth
Army were to advance to the Rhine below Düsseldorf.
In addition, the U.S. First Army was to seize the line
of the Erft west and northwest of Cologne, thus insuring
the security of our communications between
Aachen and München-Gladbach. As soon as these
operations began, the existing offensive in the Ardennes
was to give place to a policy of aggressive defense designed
to contain the German divisions fighting there
and to widen the breaches made in the Siegfried Line.
South of the Moselle our forces were to remain on the
defensive, such local operations as were necessary to
contain the German forces on their front being conducted
with the maximum economy both of personnel
and of ammunition.

During Phase II, while the Rhine-crossing operations
were prepared and instituted in the north, the
enemy was to be driven back to the river north of its
confluence with the Moselle in order that the main
bridgeheads lines of communication should be absolutely
secure. Our southern forces were then to initiate
an offensive to capture the Saar Basin and begin their
advance to the Rhine in that sector.

Finally, in Phase III, while the northern bridgehead
was consolidated and expanded and the Central
Group of Armies remained on the defensive north of
the Moselle, the remaining forces in the south were to
complete their operations to reach the Rhine so that
the Allies would hold the entire left bank.

During the latter half of January and the beginning
of February the Central Group of Armies continued
to fight hard in the Ardennes sector to take
advantage of the check we had imposed upon the
enemy there. General Bradley was instructed to inflict
the maximum losses upon the Germans, to seize
any opportunity of breaching the Siegfried Line and,
if successful,to advance northeast on the axis Prüm-Euskirchen.
The attack was to be pressed with all
vigor as long as there was any reasonable chance of
securing a decisive success, but, as an alternative, we
had to be ready to pass quickly to the defensive in the
Ardennes and to launch the new attacks in the northern sector.

The latter offensive, comprising Operations VERITABLE
and GRENADE, was to be under the control
of 21 Army Group. The U.S. Ninth Army was to
remain under the command of Field Marshal Montgomery
for this purpose and was to be built up to a
strength of four corps, totaling twelve divisions, the
rate of build-up being determined by the progress of
operations in the Ardennes. In Operation VERITABLE,
the target date for which was to be not later
than 8 February, the Canadian First Army was to conduct
a strong offensive from the Nijmegen area southeast
between the Rhine and the Maas, carrying the
thrust as far as the general line Xanten-Geldern,
clearing the whole area and establishing a firm flank
along the Rhine. The attack was to be made on a
two-corps front, British 30 Corps on the right and
Canadian 2 Corps on the left, while British 1 Corps
was also to be under command of the Canadian Army.
In all, seven infantry and four armored divisions, with
four infantry and five armored brigade, were to be
employed. If, as was hoped, dry ground conditions
prevailed, the basis of the operation was to be speed
and violence, the armored columns passing through
the enemy lines and disrupting his rear areas. As
events turned out the state of the country was the
very reverse of what had been desired.

In order the Operation GRENADE might be
launched, 12th Army Group was to extend its left
wing northward as far as Jülich, and the Ninth Army
would then hold a front on the Roer River from
Jülich to Roermond. From the right portion of this
front it was to launch a strong attack toward the
Rhine, with its right flank on the line Jüluch-Neuss.

--87--

Operations to Reach the Rhine

The offensive was to be carried up to the Rhine between
Düsseldorf and Mörs. 12th Army Group was
initially to protect the Ninth Army's right flank. It
was hoped to commence GRENADE not later than
10 February.

Operatio VERITABLER was duly launched on
the target date of 8 February, but the weather condiitons
could hardly have been more unfavorable. January
had been xceptionally severe, with snow lying on
the ground through the onth, and when the thaw
set in at the beginning of February, the ground became
extremely soft and water-ogged, while floods
spread far and wide in the area over which our advance
had been planned to take pace. The difficulties
thus imposed were immense, and the men had somtimes
to fight waist-deep in water. The privations
which they underwent were appalling, but their spirit
was indomitable, and they overcame their personal
hardships with great gallantry to inflict a major defeat
upon the enemy in some of the fiercest fighting of the
whole war.

Under such conditions it was inevitable that our
hopes for a rapid breakthrough should be disappointed,
and the fighting sooin developed into a bitter
slugging match in which the enemy had to be forced
back yard by yard. When the attack was first
launched the enemy's reaction was slow, but our own
difficulties gave him a chance to consolidate his defenses.
The Germans' trouble lay, as usual, in their
lack of mobility, for the stocks of gasoline which they
had laboriously accumulated for the Ardennes offensive
were now exhausted and the incesant Allied air
attacks upon the fuel-producing plants, the roads, and
the railways caused the situation daily to deteriorate
still further.

Apart from the German Army's logistical difficulties,
moreover, it was considerably weakened in numerical
strength on the Eastern Front by the date when
VERITABLE was launched as compared with that
army's state at the beginning of January. During the
closing stages of the Ardennes Battle, when the failure
of the offensive was seen to be inevitable, the Sixth
Panzer Army had been withdrawn from the line to
commence a weary and unhappy trek across Germany
to the Eastern Front. With it went the remnants
of some seven panzer and panzer grenadier divisions,
two panzer brigades, and three infantry divisions,
a force which included considerably over half the
armor which had confronted us when von Rundstedt

--88--

launched his attack in mid-December. As against
these departures and some 150,000 serious battle casualties,
the reinforcements sent to the Western Front
were insignificant in both quality and quantity. Now
that the Allies were once more on the general offensive,
all hope of any renewed major offensive by the
enemy disappeared, and it soon became merely a question
of how long von Rundstedt's skill and the stubborn
spirit of his depleted forces could maintain a
purely defensive battle west of the Rhine. Again the
desperate commitment of formations piecemeal to the
fighting, which we had first witnessed in Normandy,
was repeated. The enemy;s chief assets for the
moment lay in the weather and the terrain, but these
could never compensate for the seasoned fighting
forces which he had lost.

During the first days of VERITABLE good progress
was made through the forest called Reichswald and to
the outskirts of Kleve, but fierce resistance was then
encountered. The opposition on the southern edge
of the forest was particularly violent. Nevertheless,
Kleve fell by 12 February and on the 13th the first
was cleared. On the following day the Rhine was
reached opposite Emmerich, and on the 16th the Kalkar-Goch
road was crossed, although German forces of
the First Parachute Army continued to resist strongly
in the Goch sector. the town itself fell on 22 February,
two days before Operation GRENADE was launched.

Despite the comparative slowness of our progress,
VERITABLE achieved its strategic objectives. We
gained a footing on the west bank of the Rhine in the
area where our major crossing operations were subsequently
to be launched, and, equally important, heavy
losses were inflicted on the Germans west of the river.
Moreover, the offensive steadily drew in the enemy's
slender reserves and thus cleared the way for very rapid
progress by the Ninth Army when operation
GRENADE was initiated on 23 February.

GRENADE had of necessity been repeatedly postponed
on account of the ground conditions. The Ninth
Army was ready to strike on the target date appointed,
10 February, but the state of the terrain enforced delay
until the floods should subside. Apart from the effects
of the thaw, aggravated by the heavy rains which followed
the melting of the snow, the enemy was in a
position to flood the area further by reason of his control
of the Roer dams. The First Army was instructed
to concentrate on the capture of these prior to the
launching of GRENADE, and in heavy fighting its
forces pushed hard toward their objectives through
extremely difficult country of broken hills covered with
forests. The first of the seven dams was reached on
4 February, and the last and most important one--the
Schwammenauel Dam--on 10 February. The controls
of some of the dams had been hit by our air bombing
in December, but the damage had been partially repaired,
and before the enemy was compelled to abandon
the Schwamenauel Dam, he opened the sluices. Th
water poured down the valley, causing the level of the
Roer to rise about 4 feet, and it was not until 23
February that the flood subsided sufficiently to permit
the launching of GRENADE across the river.

The attack was begun, in clear moonlight, by VII
Corps of the First Army, over the Roer south of Düren
at 0330 hours. An hour later, XIX and XIII Corps of
the Ninth Army commenced their crossing of the
river in the Jülich sector. The attacks were preceded by
45 minutes' intensive artillery bombardment which effectively
reduced enemy interference with our initial
assault, but considerable difficulties were experienced
from the mines sown in the river and from the swiftness
of the current which rendered the passage of the assault
boats extremely hazardous. However, bridgeheads
were speedily gained and consolidated. Once across
the river, our forces met their chief opposition from
the German artillery, which also bombarded the
bridging sites, while the enemy infantry generally fell
back after rallying for only one real counterattack. The
enemy also made a considerable air bombing and
strafing effort against the bridges, but they were unable
to hold the advance.

Our offensive rapidly gathered momentum. II
Corps cleared Düren by 25 February, Jülich had fallen
the day before, and the enemy recoiled north and northeast
of Linnich as the Ninth Army armor passed
through the infantry to thrust forward in spearheads.
While the First Army forces pushed toward Cologne,
those of the Ninth Army were directed toward
München-Gladbach and Grevenbroich. The speed of
the advance increased daily, and whole units of the
German \Fifteenth Army surrendered as their losses in
both men and ground began to tell. By 1 March the
industrial center of München-Gadbach had been
cleared, Brevenbroich had fallen, Neuss was entered,
Venlo reached, and Roermond found abandoned by
the enemy. With General Simpson, the Ninth Army
Commander, I visited München-Gladbach to catch a
glimpse of the fighting north and east of that city.

--89--

The troops definitely sensed ultimate victory and were irresistable.

Meanwhile, the First Parachute Army had been
fighting stubbornly to hold the continued pressure by
the Canadian Army between the Rhine and the Maas
farther north, but the advance of the Ninth Army now
threatened its rear and its withdrawal became inevitable.
Although an armored division fought hard to retain the
wooded area south of Marienbaum and keep us back
from the Rhine, on 4 March the two Allied armies
made contact in the Geldern area and the success of
the combined VERITABLE-GRENADE operations
was assured. By 5 March there were no enemy left west
of the Rhine between Neuss and Homberg, but the
Parachute Army struggled bitterly to retain its last
bridgehead across the river in the Wesel-Xanten area.
It was not until 10 March that this bridgehead finally
collapsed, the enemy blowing the bridges behind him as
his last forces withdrew to the east bank. On the following
day the task of mopping up the whole area on
the west bank was completed. The prisoners brought
our total captured since D-day to over 1,000,000.

While the Ninth Army was pushing to the Rhine
in its sector, the First Army was exploiting its successful
crossing of the Roer and thrusting toward Cologne.
This operation, however, may more correctly be considered
as part of those which comprised Phase II of
the whole campaign west of the Rhine. It was intended
that the First Army should close in upon the
river from the northwest and the Third Army from the
southwest, eliminating the enemy north of the Moselle.
While these operations, known under the general name
of LUMBERJACK, were being executed, 6th Army
Group, south of the Moselle would remain basically on
the defensive, while in the north 21 Army Group
would complete its preparations for the forthcoming
major assault across the Rhine north of the Ruhr.

The plan of Operation LUMBERJACK was for the
First Army to seize the high ground east of the Erft
River northwest of Cologne and to close to the Rhine
south of Düsseldorf. Farther south, the road center
of Euskirchen was to be captured, bridgeheads established
over the Erft in that sector, and for es concentrated
for an advance to the southeast. Cologne was
then to be invested from the northwest, and, at the
appropriate moment, a strong attack on a narrow front
was to be driven southeast from Euskirchen to converge
with the Third Army advance, and the Rhine
was to be reached in the army zone. The Third Army
was to seize bridgeheads over the Kyll River, on which
its forces at present stood, and then, when so ordered,
to drive hard eastward to seize the Mayen-Coblenz
area and complete the clearance of the enemy from the
west bank of the Rhine between the Moselle and the
Ahr. If the enemy defenses proved weak, the Third
Army was also, in a subsequent stage, to obtain a
bridgehead over the Moselle to the southeast, to facilitate
the operations which were to be initiated in that sector.

We had good reason to hope for sweeping success
in these operations, for the enemy's forces, reduced as
they were both by their contributions to the Eastern
Front and by the heavy casualties inflicted on them
by our armies, had, in the VERITABLE-GRENADE
campaign, shown themselves inadequate to contain
simultaneous Allied attacks on a broad front. The
same policy of converging major thrusts which had
proved successful in 21 Army Group sector was now
about to be repeated by 12th army Group. Apart
from the damaging losses which the enemy ad incurred,
the fighting spirit of his armies, taken as a
whole, had undergone a decline, and at certain points
his defensive system was manifestly disorganized.
Few--if any--trained reserves outside the wet were
believed to be available, and in the hard fighting which
had taken place since the New Year virtually all the
reserves in the west had been committed to the defensive
battle. Under the circumstances, it seemed to me
that the enemy's only course would be to do as he had
done in the north ad make as orderly a retreat as
possible to the east of the Rhine, though it appeared
likely that he would try to hold small bridgeheads on
the west bank. Our plans were designed to prevent
a safe withdrawal over the river.

Meanwhile the increased hammering of the fuel
installations in Germany, which followed the improvement
in weather conditions after January, had made
the enemy's situation more grave than ever in this respect.
The February output fell to a total only 14 percent
of normal, representing barely half the minimum
requirements to maintain full-scale military effort. The
effects of this and of the transportation crisis in Germany
were seen not only on our own front but also
on that facing the Russians, where, despite the transfer
of the Sixth Panzer Army, the enemy had shown himself
incapable of mounting an effective counterattack
to stem the growing tide of Soviet successes.

Operation LUMBERJACK fulfilled expectations.

--90--

In the First Army drive, with VII Corps, toward
Cologne, heavy opposition was for a time encountered
east of the Erft Canal, but the three armored formations
brought up to block our advance were dispersed
by our air attacks, carried out in strength. The Erft
bridgeheads were expanded, and on 5 March the advance
elements of VII Corps were entering Cologne.
By the afternoon of the 7th the city was entirely in
our hands, the enemy resistance having collapsed once
the Allied forces had reached the outskirts. The untrained
Volkssturm left as a forlorn hope when the
regular forces withdrew over the Rhine, blowing the
bridges behind them, were capable of little fight. On
the same day that Cologne fell, the remainder of the
enemy evacuated the west bank north to Düsseldorf.
This success had a profound effect on our subsequent
operations, as the divisions which would have been
used to invest Cologne became available to assist in
exploiting the great opportunity we were shortly to
be offered.

Farther south, the progress of the First Army was
even more spectacular. III Corps attacked southeast
in accordance with the operational plan, rolled up the
disorganized enemy confronting it and closed to the
Rhine at Remagen on 7 March. It was here on that
day that occurred one of those rare and fleeting opportunities
which occasionally present themselves n war,
and which, if grasped, have incalculable effects in determining
future success. In his confusion before the rapidity
of the Allied thrust, the enemy failed to complete
the destruction of the Ludendorff railroad bridge across
the Rhine. Before he could rectify his mistake, a
small spearhead of 9th Armored Division with the
greatest determination and gallantry had seized the
bridge--the only one to be left intact by the Germans
throughout the entire length of the river.

The Remagen bridge was not in a sector from
which it had been intended to launch a major thrust
eastward, but I at once determined, at the expense of
modifying details of the plan of campaign, to seize
the golden opportunity offered to us. It was obvious
that possession of a foothold over the Rhine here would
constitute the greatest possible thrust as a supporting
effort for the main attack north of the Ruhr. In
order, therefore, to exploit the situation and establish
an adequate bridgehead, consolidated in readiness for
an offensive therefrom as soon as the progress of our
operations south of the Moselle permitted, I ordered
General Bradley, when he telephoned me to report
the occurrence, to put not less than five divisions onto
the far bank.

Partially anticipating this decision, General Bradley
had begun the exploitation of the bridgehead immediately
the bridge fell into his hands. A combat
command was rapidly passed across, and by 9 March
we held a lodgement area some three miles deep. It
was several days before the enemy recovered sufficiently
from his surprise and overcame his transport difficulties
to send reinforcements to the threatened sector,
and by the time they arrived the bridgehead had been
enlarged and strengthened to a degree which rendered
its elimination impossible. Enemy armored forces
were again, as in Normandy, committed to battle
piecemeal as they arrived on the scene, and no concerted
major attack was mounted on a scale sufficient
to effect a serious penetration. Such efforts as the
enemy did make were unable to check the further expansion
of the bridgehead; and as its area grew, the
north-south autobahn east of the river, so vital to the
enemy, was severed. By 24 March, when our main
attacks eastward from the Rhine began in the north,
the area held by the First Army at Remagen was 25
miles long and 10 miles deep, and within its three corps
were poised to strike!

In the meantime the enemy had made desperate
efforts to destroy the bridge while the security of the
lodgement area was still dependent upon it. Long-range
artillery was brought to bear on it, and the German
Air Force put up the strongest effort of which it
was capable in attempts to cut the structure by bombs,
rocket projectiles, and canon fire. All these efforts
proved equally unsuccessful. The air battles over
Remagen provided the Luftwaffe with its greatest
test, and it failed. The umbrella established over the
vital area by the U.S. Ninth Air Force effectively disrupted
the attacks, and the enemy's losses. both to our
fighter planes and to the heavy concentration of AA
guns established on the river banks, were severe.

The enemy onslaught nevertheless made the area
extremely uncomfortable, especially for the engineers
who carried out, with conspicuous gallantry and determination,
the dangerous work of repairing damage
and of strengthening the bridge to bear the enormous
strains to which it was subjected and which it had
never been intended to undergo. These strains eventually
proved too much for the damaged structure, and
on 17 March the center span (which had been damaged
in the Germans' unsuccessful last-minute

--91--

attempts at demolition on the 7th) collapsed into the
river. Although a disappointment, this had no serious
effect upon our operations, for by this time a number
of supplementary floating bridges had been constructed
and the build-up of the forces on the east
bank continued without interruption.

While III Corps of the First Army was establishing
th bridgehead at Remagen, V Corps, on its right flank,
struck to the south to make contact with the advancing
spearheads of the Third Army. The German Fifth
Panzer Army, disorganized, offered little resistance,
and the Allied thrust made rapid progress. Bad Godesberg
and Bonn fell on 9 March, and on the following
day the link-up along the Rhine with th Third Army
forces which had closed to the river in the Andernach
area was accomplished. Considerable elements of the
Fifth Panzer Army were cut off to the west by these
converging drives; they fought courageously to the
last, but it was the courage of despair, and they made
no organized attempt to force a way out of the trap.

During February, the Third Army had been engaged
in making the necessary preparations for its subsequent
push to the Rhine. XX Corps had eliminated
enemy resistance in the Saar-Moselle triangle by 23
February, and bridgeheads had been established over
the Saar at Ockfen and Serrig in the teeth of violent opposition.
The Siegfried defenses were penetrated, and
Trier fell on 2 March. Farther north, the German
Seventh Army had been forced back successively over
the Our and Prüm Rivers, despite extensive minefields
and obstacles, and on 4 March the first bridgeheads were
gained across the Kyll.

The Third Army advance to the Rhine now began.
VII Corps, spearheaded by the 11th Armored Division
broke through north of Kyllburg on 7 March. Advancing
northeast with increasing rapidity, it reached
the Rhine at Andernach on the 9th and linked up with
the First Army, as already described, on the following
day. To the south of VIII Corps, on 5 March, 4th
Armored Division of XII Corps, with great boldness,
charged along the north bank of the Moselle, parallel
to VIII Corps, toward its confluence with the Rhine.
This objective was attained on 10 March, large quantities
of enemy equipment being captured in the process.
By the next day, the left bank of the Rhine from Coblenz
to Andernach had been cleared, and the enemy ad
virtually be eliminated along its length north of the
Moselle, thus accomplishing Phase II of the operations
to close the river.

The stage was now set for the initiation of the
joint offensive operations by the Third and Seventh
Armies south of the Moselle which had been anticipated
as Phase III of the campaign west of the Rhine. In the
6th Army Group sector, operations during January and
February had, in accordance with our over-all plan, been
mainly of a defensive nature. Such local operations as
had been conducted were designed to eliminate the
dangerous situation created in the south, as I have
earlier described, following the enemy attacks in support
of his Ardennes offensive and our weakening of
6th Army Group when divisions had to be moved
northward to meet the major threat.

Chief among the tasks which had to be accomplished
was the destruction of the Colmar pocket. An
attack was launched by the French I Corps against the
southern edge of the pocket on 20 January, but this
at first made little progress, partly because of bad
weather. North of the pocket the French II Corps
fared similarly. However, we had assembled and
turned over to the French First Army the U.S. XXI
Corps, composed of the 3d, 28th, and 75th Infantry
Divisions, and the 12th Armored Division, under Maj.
Gen. Frank W. Milburn, to carry the brunt of the battle
by an attack between the two French corps. Its efforts
quickly became effective. Lack of reinforcements
caused the enemy resistance to crumble at the end of
the month and at the same time the weather improved.
Before our three-corps attack the German disintegration
developed rapidly: Colmar itself fell on 3 February, and
by the 6th the enemy was mainly east of the Rhine-Rhöne
canal. The evacuation of the disorganized remnants
across the Rhine was then in progress, and with
the collapse of opposition at Neuf Brisach on 9 February
all organized resistance west of the Rhine in that zone
ceased. In the course of the operation the enemy suffered
over 22,000 casualties and considerable losses of
equipment; the German Nineteenth Army was virtually
destroyed.

After the elimination of the Colmar pocket, interest
in the 6th Army Group area centered in the Seventh
Army zone, in front of th Siegfried defenses. The
French Army maintained the defensive along the
Rhine, and its left wing assumed responsibility for the
front as far north as Bishweiler. During the latter
half of February and early March the chief activity on
the Seventh Army front was in the Saarbrücken-Forbach
area, where bitter fighting took pace and restricted
Allied advances were made.

--92--

Following the Third Army successes north of the
Moselle, the time had arrived for launching Operation
UNDERTONE, the major offensive south of the
Moselle, with the objectives of destroying the enemy
west of the Rhine and closing on that river from Coblenz
southward. By this means crossing sites for the
establishment of bridgeheads would be secured in the
Mainz-Mannheim sector and more enemy forces would
be drawn away from the area where our main effort
was shortly to be made in the north. To this end,
the Seventh Army was to assume control of elements
of the French fores known as the Groupement
Montbur-Kaiserslautern-Worms, It was to breach the
Siegfried Line, destroy the enemy in its zone, close on
the Rhine, and seize a bridgehead. Meanwhile the
French Army was to protect the right flank of the
Seventh Army and to conduct an aggressive defense
along the Rhine. In cooperation with the Seventh
Army effort, General Bradley was instructed to launch
a thrust by the Third Army forces southeast across the
lower reaches of the Moselle, with the object of turning
the German line and thrusting deep into the rear
areas of the forces facing the Seventh Army. He was
also to attack the nose of the Saar salient.

On 15 March the offensive began. While XX
Corps of the Third army struck from the Allied
bridgeheads over the Saar and Moselle into the forested
hills of the Hunsrück from the west, VI and XV Crops
of the Seventh Army, with the French elements under
command, attacked north between Haguenau and
Saarbrücken. The former attack met with stiff opposition
from the enemy's prepared positions, but the southern
thrust took the German First Army by surprise
and, following the capture of Haguenau on the first
day, a number of deep penetrations were made.
Zweibrücken and Saarbrücken were occupied by 20
March and resistance in the western portion of the front
became disorganized; but the defenders in the Siegfried
Line father to the east stood firm against the Allied attacks.

It was at this point that the intervention of the
Third Army across the lower Moselle became devastatingly
effective. XII Corps had attacked across the
river on 14 March, and the bridgehead gain was rapidly
expanded. The Germans were, in fact, completely misled
by the Allied tactics. Following the Third Army's
swift arrival on the Rhine north of the Moselle they had
expected its forces to erupt through the Remagen
bridgehead. Instead when the Third Army turned
southeast, the enemy was taken off balance, being
utterly unprepared for such a development. No real
opposition to the XII Corps drive was offered, and the
unready enemy forces were brushed aside as the Allies
swept up the Rhine. At the same time, Coblenz was
occupied, and by 10 March the river bank was cleared
from there as far as the Bingen bend. On the 22d all
resistance ceased in Mainz and the following day
Speyer was reached.

The enemy was still holding out in the Siegfried
positions in the Rhine valley west of Karlsruhe, but,
with the escape routes across the river cut by the Third
Army advances in their rear, his situation was now
hopeless. General Patton's aggressive tactics culminated
in a surprise night crossing of the Rhine on 22
March. He sent over the U.S. 5th Division without
formal preparations of any kind and with negligible
losses. Thus, before our main "power" crossing of the
Rhine was attempted by 21 Army Group, we were
already in possession of two sizeable bridgeheads in
the south. Farther west the German units were in a
state of chaos and their positions were rapidly overrun
and enveloped. By 25 March an end came to ll organized
resistance west of the Rhine, and Phase III of the
operations to close the river was over, with the added
accomplishment of two Rhine crossings completed. As
Phase III closed, while we were rounding up the broken
remnants of the enemy First Army, surrounded to
the west, we had launched our carefully prepared main
effort in the north in our invasion of the German
hinterland over the last great barrier remaining to its
defenders.

All these operations west of the Rhine had, like
those in France, been greatly assisted by the vast weight
of Allied air power which we had been able to bring
to bear in their support. While the long-range
strategic effort was maintained against the fuel and
industrial targets in the heart of Germany, a steady
offensive was kept up against the enemy lines of communication
westward across the Rhine. In addition,
the heavy bombers were also employed in direct support
of the ground tactical operations whenever the
weather conditions permitted They were further
during this period, engaged in the extensive and remarkable
Ruhr interdiction program, which will be
mentioned later.

The wether, although persistently bad, could not
halt the operations of the tactical air forces, whose

--93--

performance was never more magnificent than during this
time. The ground advances were supported resolutely
by these tactical forces; their operations at once
warded off the German Air ore attempts at interference
and at the same time greatly contributed to the
disorganization of the German armies opposing us,
strafing and bombing the enemy positions and causing
havoc in his supply system. Particularly noteworthy
was the work of the First Tactical Air Force in support
of the Saar offensive, when 8,320 sorties were
flown in a single week, with claims of 2,440 motor
vehicles, 85 armored vehicles, 146 locomotives, and
1,741 railroad cars. In addition, over 2,000 motor
vehicles and 100 armored vehicles were damaged and
over 300 rail cuts made. These great efforts played
an important part in assuring the success of the ground
campaign in the southern sector.

By this time the broad pattern of air-ground operations
had become almost a fixed one--subject to adjustment
of details to terrain, weather, hostile communications,
and so one. Faith in the ability of the
Air Force to intervene effectively i the ground battle
was the vital feature of the original invasion plan; the
general scheme thus used for the isolation of the battlefield,
for direct action against selected targets, for air
cover, and for other important missions, including
supply, had by now been so perfected that teamwork
was easy and the results obtained were regularly
decisive in the area of attack.

In conjunction with the Allied air activities during
the early months of 1945, the operation known
as CLARION, carried out o 22 February, is worthy
of special mention. Nearly 9,000 aircraft, from bases
in England, France, Holland, Belgium, and Italy, took
part in this gigantic onslaught, which involved targets
covering an area of a quarter of a million square
miles, extending from Emden to Berlin, Dresden,
Vienna, and Mulhouse. The aim was to attack incidental
communications facilities, such as railroad signal
points and grade crossings, canal locks, and junctions,
in order to aggravate the growing difficulties experienced
in keeping open the German life lines. It had
been found by experience that such local attacks, complementary
to large ones, had far-reaching effects in
slowing down enemy movement, and it was hoped that
CLARION would spread the paralysis throughout
Germany. It was a bold scheme, demanding great
skill and daring on the part of all involved. Confounded
by the widespread nature of the blow, the
enemy's attempts at defense were completely ineffective.

The whole of the Allied campaign west of the
Rhine had gone according to plan to an extraordinary
degree, and my fullest hopes were realized. Two features
of the operations upon which I had not originally
calculated were the rapid capture of the Cologne
area and the seizure of the Remagen bridge. Both
these events turned wholly to our profit, for, thanks to
the flexibility of our plans, we were able to take full
advantage of the opportunity which the prizes offered
without sacrifice of our planned objectives. In each
of the three phases of the campaign, two converging
armies had thrust to the Rhine and cut off and destroyed
the German forces which had been disposed
to bar their way. We had attained along the whole
length of the Rhine in German territory the economically
defensible front upon which I had insisted as an
essential prerequisite to the launching of the concentrated
thrusts over the river which were to strike at the
heart of Germany, and in the process we had eliminated
her own future defensive abilities. The armies
which she now so sorely needed to man the last great
natural barrier left to her had been broken to pieces in
fruitless attempts to halt our slashing blows among
the floods of the lower Rhineland, in the Eifel, and
amid the hills and forests of the Saar Palatinate.

Field Marshal Montgomery's attack, in the extreme
north, got off on 8 February, exactly as planned. The
Ninth Army was to join this attack on 10 February, and
was ready to do so. Field Marshal Montgomery and I
had already agreed that while the ideal situation would
be for the Second Army and the U.S. Ninth Army to
attack almost simultaneously, het, realizing that flood
conditions on the Roer Rover might hold up the Ninth
Army indefinitely, we were fully prepared to accept a
2 weeks' delay in the Ninth Army attack in the
confidence that the shifting of German reserves to the
north would facilitate victory in that sector. Events
fully justified this estimate. The Ninth Army's attack
across the Roer River on the 23d rapidly converged with
the Canadian Army and we held the Rhine in the Wesel region.

In the 12th Army Group, General Bradley's plan
for supporting the Ninth Army and then for the destruction
of the German forces north of the Moselle by
swift converging blows materialized in almost exact
accordance with his diagrammatic plans. Moreover
his constant concern was to see that at the culmination
of each offensive his forces were so situated as to

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undertake the next succeeding step without delay for regrouping,
and from such direction as to surprise and
confuse the enemy. He went into the attack with instructions
for each unit to look for and to seize any
opportunity to cross the Rhine.

Finally, the 6th Army Group, which had been confined
heretofore largely to a holding, protecting, and supporting
role, was suddenly unleashed with the Seventh
Army brought up to a strength of 15 United States divisions.
We knew that the enemy was at that time discounting
the strength of the Seventh Army and that he
felt relatively safe lying in the Siegfried Line facing
General Patch's forces. No defeat the Germans suffered
in the war, except possibly Tunisia, was more devastating
in the completeness of the destruction inflicted
upon his forces than that which he suffered in the Saar
Basin. Yet this attack was conducted by portions of
two Army Groups and, though a boundary between
such large forces is ordinarily considered one of the
weakest tactical spots in a major front, no real difficulty
was encountered in coordination and unification
of the battle. Although I personally kept in touch with
details and was in position to make tactical decisions
when such proved necessary, the real reason for this
lack of confusion and for the incisiveness of the whole
operation is to be found in the identity of tactical training,
organization, and mutual confidence among all
the divisions and commanders participating in the battle.
The whole operation was characterized by boldness,
speed, and determination, and the victory was so complete
that when General Patton thrust a division across
the Rhine on the night of 22-23 March, he was able to do
so with almost no reaction from the enemy.

I unhesitatingly class General Bradley's tactical
operations during February and March, which witnessed
the completion of the destruction of th German
forces west of the Rhine, as the equal in brilliance of
any that American forces have ever conducted. The
cooperation during the latter part of this period between
General Bradley's 12th Army Group and General
Devers' 6th Army Group was a superb example of
Grand Tactical cooperation on the battlefield.