Title

Authors

Document Type

Article

Abstract

This paper shows close connections between CEOs’ absences from headquarters and corporate news disclosures. I identify CEO absences by merging corporate jet flight histories with records of CEOs’ property ownership near leisure destinations. I find that CEOs go to their vacation homes just after companies report favorable news, and CEOs return to headquarters right before subsequent news is released. When CEOs are away, companies announce less news than usual, mandatory disclosures are more likely to occur late, and stock prices exhibit sharply lower volatility. Volatility increases when CEOs return to work. CEOs spend fewer days out of the office when their ownership is high and when the weather is bad at their vacation homes.

Date of Authorship for this Version

11-2013

Keywords

Disclosure, corporate jets, CEO vacations

Recommended Citation

Yermack, David, "Tailspotting: Identifying and profiting from CEO vacation trips" (2013). New York University Law and Economics Working Papers. Paper 293.http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/293