A disability is the inability to participate in any substantial, gainful employment because of a medically demonstrable impairment which could be expected to last for at least a continuous twelve-month period. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The impairment must prevent a claimant from performing both her previous work and any other work existing in significant amounts in the economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

The Social Security regulations outline a five step inquiry for determining whether a claimant is "disabled." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). The ALJ must determine, in sequence, whether:

(1) the claimant is presently employed; (2) the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments are severe; (3) the impairment meets or equals any of the impairments listed by the Social Security Administration at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) her impairment prevents her from performing any work in the national economy.

A claimant has the burden of proof through step four. Sevcik, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8937, 1996 WL 361551, at *3; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). If a claimant satisfies steps one, two and three, she will automatically be found disabled. Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995); see Brewer, 103 F.3d at 1391. However, if a claimant only satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. Id. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id.

In this case, the ALJ determined that Rake was not currently employed, and that she had a severe impairment. However, the ALJ found that the medical evidence presented at the hearing failed to establish that Rake's impairment was among, or equivalent to, those listed in the regulations. The Based on the medical evidence, the ALJ stated that Rake had the residual functional capacity to perform work-related activities, including her past relevant work as a library clerk, with the exception of work involving lifting and carrying over twenty pounds. The ALJ rejected Rake's subjective representations regarding her pain and discomfort because they were "inconsistent and unsupported by objective clinical findings and other evidence of record." Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that she was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f).

Substantial Weight of the Evidence

In order for the court to uphold the ALJ's decision, the ALJ must have articulated his analysis at some minimal level. Incopero v. Chater, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 362, 1996 WL 19585, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1996). The evidence need not compel the ALJ's conclusion; rather, the evidence must simply support that conclusion. Id. Further, the ALJ is not required to submit a written evaluation of every piece of evidence. Rather, an ALJ must "sufficiently articulate his assessment of the evidence to 'assure us that the ALJ considered the important evidence . . . [and to enable] us to trace the path of the ALJ's reasoning.'" Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1986). The court concludes that the ALJ sufficiently articulated his reasons and conclusions based on substantial evidence.

Rake argues that the ALJ's decision runs contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. The court disagrees. The record reflects that the ALJ carefully considered all the medical evidence in determining whether Rake met the listing requirements under the Act. The ALJ thoroughly discussed the medical reports presented to him from November 1992 to June 1995. These reports included the opinions, findings, and diagnosis of several physicians, including Dr. Butler, Dr.. Moiduddin, Dr. Richardson, Dr. Curran, and Dr. Turk. The ALJ determined that the evidence, taken as a whole, failed to support Rake's general claim of being disabled. Furthermore, the ALJ stated in his decision that the medical evidence presented did not "serve to reduce her residual functional capacity for a full range of light work."

Nevertheless, Rake argues that the ALJ summarily rejected Dr. Butler's medical opinions, as well as her subjective complaints regarding pain and discomfort. These arguments lack merit. First, the record clearly reflects that the ALJ thoroughly considered Dr. Butler's medical reports. Although Dr. Butler's early reports noted a disc herniation, his subsequent examinations revealed no such condition. Dr. Butler's original diagnosis was also inconsistent with the other evaluating physicians.

Second, the ALJ's decision carefully outlines Rake's subjective complaints. However, when compared to the objective medical reports, the ALJ found that her subjective complaints were unsubstantiated. Specifically, the ALJ's decision stated that "evaluations have generally been negative, and revealed no limitation of movement nor any other limitations that would preclude her from meeting the requirements of light work." The ALJ also noted that one doctor reported "questionable" or "subjective" complaints of sensory deficits for which he could find no objective explanation. Finally, the ALJ regarded Rake's testimony regarding pain relief from Ibuprofen and limitation on fluid intake, as well as using protective shields, as further support of her ability to perform light work.

Rake briefly argues that the ALJ failed to properly develop the record by ordering suggested medical tests or examinations. That there could have been additional evidence does not warrant a finding that the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record. "It is always possible to do more. How much evidence to gather is a subject on which district courts must respect the . . . [ALJ's] . . . reasoned judgment." Kendrick v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 1993). Mere speculation that further evidence might have been available is insufficient to warrant reversal. Binion v. Shalala, 13 F.3d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1994). In this case, not only was the ALJ well within his discretion to not order additional medical tests or examinations, but he specifically made reference to Dr. Curran's report that Rake refused to undergo recommended NCS studies or EMG testing.

IV. CONCLUSION

The court concludes that the ALJ's decision was based on substantial evidence. In finding that Rake was not disabled, the ALJ issued a thoroughly articulated decision based upon the evidence presented to him at the administrative hearing. Furthermore, the ALJ did not substitute his judgment for that of the treating physicians, nor did he summarily disregard important evidence. Therefore, Defendant Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is granted, and Rake's motion for summary judgment is denied.

Our website includes the main text of the court's opinion but does not include the
docket number, case citation or footnotes. Upon purchase, docket numbers and/or
citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a legal proceeding.
Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.