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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
July 2013:
Transportation Security:
TSA Could Strengthen Monitoring of Allegations of Employee Misconduct:
GAO-13-624:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-13-624, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
DHS’s TSA employs approximately 56,000 personnel to ensure security at
about 450 TSA-regulated airports nationwide. News media have reported
allegations of misconduct by TSA employees, including theft. GAO was
asked to review TSA’s policies and procedures for addressing employee
misconduct. This report (1) summarizes data on TSA employee misconduct
cases, and (2) examines the extent to which TSA has taken actions to
manage and oversee the investigations and adjudications process.
Adjudication is the process through which TSA determines whether the
evidence is sufficient to propose and sustain a charge of misconduct,
and determines the appropriate penalty. GAO reviewed TSA procedures,
analyzed TSA misconduct data from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, and
analyzed a random, nongeneralizable sample of 50 allegations referred
from the DHS OIG to TSA to identify follow up actions.
What GAO Found:
According to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employee
misconduct data that GAO analyzed, TSA investigated and adjudicated
approximately 9,600 cases of employee misconduct from fiscal years
2010 through 2012. From fiscal years 2010 through 2012, the annual
number of TSA misconduct cases increased from 2,691 to 3,408. In that
same period, TSA’s workforce of Office of Security Operations
employees at the airport level grew by about 3,200 employees. Two
offense categories accounted for about half of all cases—(1)
attendance and leave, which accounted for 32 percent, and (2)
screening and security, which accounted for 20 percent. Charges for
screening and security related incidents pertain to violating standard
operating procedures, including not conducting security or equipment
checks, and allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. TSA’s
guidance delineates common employee charges, along with a suggested
range of penalties. Forty-seven percent of the cases that GAO analyzed
resulted in letters of reprimand, which describe unacceptable conduct
that is the basis for a disciplinary action; 31 percent resulted in
suspensions of a definite duration; and 17 percent resulted in the
employee’s removal from TSA. The remaining cases covered a variety of
outcomes, including indefinite suspensions.
While TSA has taken steps to help manage the investigations and
adjudication process, such as providing training to TSA staff at
airports, additional procedures could help TSA better monitor the
investigations and adjudications process. For example, TSA does not
have a process for conducting reviews of misconduct cases to verify
that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures
for adjudicating employee misconduct. Without a review process, it is
difficult to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist
in the adjudications process. Further, TSA does not record all
misconduct case outcomes, including cases that resulted in corrective
action or no penalty, in its Integrated Database (TSA’s centralized
case management system) because the agency has not issued guidance
requiring the recording of all outcomes. Issuing guidance to TSA staff
at airports about recording all case outcomes in the database would
emphasize management’s view of the importance of staff including such
information to provide a more complete record of adjudication
decisions. Moreover, TSA does not have reconciliation procedures—that
is, procedures to follow up on completed misconduct investigations to
ensure that the agency has identified cases requiring adjudication.
According to a random sample of 50 allegations referred from the
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG)
to TSA in fiscal year 2012, GAO found that 2 were not adjudicated by
TSA. As a result of GAO’s review, TSA made adjudication decisions on
these allegations,1 of which resulted in a 14-day suspension for the
employee because of disruptive behavior in the workplace. The results
from GAO’s sample cannot be generalized to the entire population of
over 1,300 allegations referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year
2012; however, they raise questions as to whether there could be
additional instances of allegations referred to TSA in this population
that the agency has not adjudicated. A senior TSA official agreed that
establishing reconciliation procedures would help TSA identify
allegations of misconduct that require adjudication.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that TSA establish a process to
conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at
airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating
employee misconduct, develop and issue guidance to the field
clarifying the need for TSA officials at airports to record all
misconduct case outcomes in the Integrated Database, and develop
reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of employee
misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication. DHS
concurred with the recommendations and TSA is taking actions in
response.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-624]. For more
information, contact Stephen M. Lord at (202) 512-4379 or
lords@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
TSA Investigated and Adjudicated Approximately 9,600 Misconduct Cases
from Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012:
TSA Has Taken Steps to Help Manage the Investigations and
Adjudications Process, but Could Develop Additional Procedures to
Better Monitor Employee Misconduct Cases:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Offense Categories and Examples of Possible Charges in TSA
Employee Misconduct Cases, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012:
Figures:
Figure 1: TSA Employee Misconduct Investigations and Adjudications
Process:
Figure 2: Final Outcomes for 9,622 TSA Employee Misconduct Cases
Closed in Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012:
Abbreviations:
AIM: Airport Information Management system:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ER: Employee Relations:
FSD: federal security director:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
OOI: Office of Inspection:
OPR: Office of Professional Responsibility:
OSO: Office of Security Operations:
SOP: Standard Operating Procedures:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSO: transportation security officer:
[End of section]
GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
July 30, 2013:
Congressional Requesters:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a component of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), employs approximately 56,000
transportation security officers (TSO) and other TSA personnel to
ensure the security of the traveling public at more than 450 TSA-
regulated airports nationwide.[Footnote 1] News stories in recent
years have highlighted several high-profile allegations of misconduct
by TSA employees, including TSOs being involved in theft and drug-
smuggling activities, as well as circumventing mandatory screening
procedures for passengers and baggage.[Footnote 2] For example, in
2011, a TSO at the Orlando International Airport pleaded guilty to
federal charges of embezzlement and theft for stealing more than 80
laptop computers and other electronic devices, valued at $80,000, from
passenger luggage. TSOs engaging in misconduct raise security concerns
because these employees are charged with helping to ensure the
security of our nation's aviation system. The potential impact on
aviation security underscores the importance of controls to help
prevent and detect instances of misconduct within the TSA workforce.
The process of addressing TSA employee misconduct involves various
components within DHS. For example, depending on the facts and
circumstances of a case, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG),
TSA Office of Inspection (OOI), or TSA Office of Security Operations
(OSO) may conduct an investigation into allegations of TSA employee
misconduct. OSO generally adjudicates misconduct cases at airports,
which is the process through which TSA determines whether the evidence
is sufficient to propose and sustain a charge of misconduct, and
determines the appropriate penalty. The TSA Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR), an independent office that TSA established in
2010 to provide greater consistency in misconduct penalty
determinations, adjudicates a more specialized set of cases, such as
misconduct involving senior-level employees and other TSA employees.
TSA has policies and procedures for investigating and adjudicating
employee misconduct and strives to follow the progressive discipline
model, which is the process of taking progressively more severe
action, when appropriate, until the unacceptable conduct is corrected
or the employee is removed from the agency. TSA requires removal for
certain TSO offenses, such as theft and intentional serious security
breaches, and allows removal for the first violation for other
offenses, such as sleeping while assigned to a security activity.
You asked us to review TSA's procedures for addressing employee
misconduct, including the potential risks associated with conduct
issues. This report (1) summarizes data on TSA employee misconduct
cases, and (2) examines the extent to which TSA has taken actions to
manage and oversee the investigations and adjudications process.
To summarize data on TSA employee misconduct cases, we reviewed
program documentation.[Footnote 3] For example, we reviewed standard
operating procedures, policy statements, and guidance for staff
charged with investigating and adjudicating allegations of employee
misconduct. Further, we conducted trend analysis on TSA misconduct
case data from fiscal years 2010 through 2012. As part of this work,
we assessed data reliability by testing data for potential gaps and
anomalies and interviewing TSA officials to discuss the mechanisms in
place to ensure data quality. We identified some instances of missing
and inaccurate data, including lack of data about employee pay bands
and incorrect job titles. We also determined that TSA does not
consistently track all employee misconduct cases, which we discuss
later in the report. While we identified such limitations, we found
the data sufficiently reliable for providing general information on
the nature and characteristics of employee misconduct.
To determine the extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and
oversee the investigations and adjudications process, we reviewed
TSA's standard operating procedures for addressing employee misconduct
through various types of investigations, including an administrative
inquiry, which is a formal investigation requested by a federal
security director (FSD) or designee, as well as TSA's procedures for
making adjudication decisions, including providing alleged offenders
with certain due process opportunities.[Footnote 4] We reviewed TSA's
Table of Offenses and Penalties, which provides guidance for officials
to follow in making adjudication decisions, such as a list of
potential offenses and penalty ranges. We compared TSA processes for
investigations and adjudications with TSA policies and procedures, as
well as with criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.[Footnote 5] We used fiscal year 2012 complaint data from
DHS OIG's Enforcement Data System as the population from which to
randomly select a nongeneralizable sample of 50 TSA employee
misconduct allegations referred from DHS OIG to OOI.[Footnote 6] We
requested that OOI provide us with the status and outcome of each of
the 50 allegations, including whether TSA had a record of the
allegations and had taken action to investigate and adjudicate each
allegation.
To address both objectives, we interviewed senior officials from TSA.
We also selected a sample of 7 airports from the approximately 450 TSA-
regulated airports nationwide and conducted site visits or telephone
interviews with TSA officials responsible for investigating and
adjudicating cases of employee misconduct.[Footnote 7] Further, we
interviewed senior officials from OOI and DHS OIG field offices with
oversight responsibilities for the airports included in our sample.
Specifically, we interviewed criminal investigators from 4 of the 6
OOI field offices.[Footnote 8] We also interviewed criminal
investigators from 5 of the 13 DHS OIG investigative field offices.
[Footnote 9] We selected these airports and OOI and DHS OIG field
office locations based on number and type of past cases of employee
misconduct and geographic dispersion. As we did not select a
probability sample of airports and OOI and DHS OIG field offices to
interview, the results of these interviews are not generalizable to
all TSA-regulated airports nationwide, OOI's 6 field offices, and DHS
OIG's 13 field offices. However, the interviews provided us with the
perspectives of DHS and TSA officials responsible for conducting TSA
employee misconduct investigations or adjudications, including their
views on potential internal control weaknesses, lessons learned, and
any challenges airports and field offices have faced in addressing
employee misconduct. Appendix I presents more details about our
objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2012 to July 2013
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on the audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on audit objectives.
Background:
Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA
Administrator sets the conditions of employment for screener
personnel, including disciplinary measures, as the TSA Administrator
determines to be necessary.[Footnote 10] To help implement this
authority, a TSA management directive specifies the steps the agency
must take in investigating and adjudicating employee misconduct.
[Footnote 11] Figure 1 below summarizes the process of investigating
and adjudicating employee misconduct.
Figure 1: TSA Employee Misconduct Investigations and Adjudications
Process:
[Refer to PDF for image: process illustration]
Investigation:
TSA Office of Security Operations (e.g., time and attendance);
TSA Office of Inspection (e.g., Criminal, senior-level, and law
enforcement employees);
DHS Office of Inspector General (e.g., criminal).
Adjudication:
TSA Office of Security Operations;
TSA Office of Professional Responsibility.
Case outcomes[A]:
No action;
Corrective action;
Disciplinary action;
Adverse action.
Source: GAO analysis if TSA employee misconduct policies and
procedures.
[A] Case outcomes represent potential adjudication decisions,
including the various types of penalties. For example, corrective
actions are administrative or nondisciplinary actions, such as a
letter of counseling. Disciplinary and adverse actions include
penalties that range from a letter of reprimand to removal. In some
cases, no action is taken based on available evidence.
[End of figure]
Investigations Process:
TSA receives allegations of TSA employee misconduct from a variety of
sources, including air passengers, DHS OIG, and Members of Congress.
For example, air passengers may submit a complaint directly to a TSA
manager at the screening checkpoint or may provide airport staff with
a customer comment card describing the alleged misconduct.[Footnote
12] The investigations process involves engaging in fact-finding to
the extent necessary to make an informed decision on the merit of an
allegation. For example, TSA supervisors or managers at airports
review evidence, such as video footage, and obtain a statement from
the alleged offender to determine what happened during the incident
and the extent to which the employee may have been at fault--for
example, whether a screener violated TSA standard operating procedures
(SOP), or behaved unprofessionally or inappropriately toward an air
passenger.[Footnote 13] In some instances, such as issues of a complex
or sensitive nature, including possible misuse of position or abuse of
power, TSA senior management at airports may appoint an independent
employee, known as an inquiry officer, to conduct an administrative
inquiry into allegations of employee misconduct. Inquiry officers
conduct administrative inquiries at the direction of TSA's FSDs or
their designees, according to specific policies and procedures.
[Footnote 14] TSA staff at airports are required to elevate misconduct
allegations involving senior-level and law enforcement employees, as
well as issues of a criminal nature, to OOI.[Footnote 15] Per DHS
policy, OOI must provide the DHS OIG with "right of first refusal" on
certain misconduct cases, such as criminal violations, which allows
the DHS OIG to either open an investigation or send the allegation
back to TSA for action.[Footnote 16] OOI maintains a Hotline Database
to record information on allegations related to TSA employee
misconduct, such as the date of the alleged incident, source of the
allegation, and a description of the alleged misconduct.
Adjudications Process:
TSA management officials at airports or OPR adjudicate misconduct
cases, depending on the source of the investigation and type of
case.[Footnote 17] TSA management officials at airports adjudicate the
majority of misconduct cases, such as attendance and leave, security
and screening, and alcohol-related violations. OPR adjudicates (1) all
TSA misconduct cases handled by DHS OIG, (2) all cases involving TSA
senior-level and law enforcement personnel, and (3) any matter that
the Assistant Administrator for OPR determines should be reviewed and
adjudicated by OPR. Depending on the preponderance of the evidence,
adjudication decisions may or may not result in a penalty for the
alleged offender.[Footnote 18] Cases in which TSA is unable to
substantiate that misconduct has in fact occurred are closed with no
action against the employee. If TSA substantiates the allegation, it
employs one of the following three types of penalties:
* Corrective action: This is an administrative or nondisciplinary
action, such as a letter of counseling or a letter of guidance and
direction, that informs an employee about unacceptable performance or
conduct that should be corrected or improved. TSA policy specifies
that a letter of counseling should include a statement informing the
employee that if he or she does not correct the misconduct, more
severe disciplinary or adverse action may be initiated.
* Disciplinary action: This includes actions resulting in a letter of
reprimand to a suspension of 14 days or less. A letter of reprimand
describes the unacceptable conduct that is the basis for a
disciplinary action, and represents the least severe form of
disciplinary action. Suspensions in this category involve the
placement of an employee in a nonduty, nonpay status for up to 14 days.
* Adverse action: This involves a suspension of more than 14 days,
including an indefinite suspension, an involuntary demotion for
conduct, or a removal. An indefinite suspension is appropriate when
evidence exists to demonstrate misconduct of a serious nature, such as
an employee has been indicted or has been arrested pursuant to a
judge's warrant for a crime involving potential imprisonment, or an
allegation of misconduct that, if proven, represents a threat to life,
property, safety, or the effective operation of the workplace. A
demotion is a voluntary or involuntary change to a lower pay band or
rate of pay. A removal is involuntary separation from TSA employment
in order to promote the efficiency of the federal service.
TSA may use an expedited process, known as one-step, for certain
allegations of TSO misconduct, such as allegations that may result in
indefinite suspensions or removals involving theft and intentional
serious security breaches, among other things. The one-step process
allows TSA to impose appropriate disciplinary or adverse actions in an
expeditious manner to address specific employee offenses. In the one-
step process, TSA must hold a pre-decisional meeting with the employee
to discuss the allegation, advise the employee of the possible
consequences, and provide the employee with an opportunity to respond
to charges prior to deciding the action. In other cases, a TSA
management official issues a notice of proposed action, including the
evidence used to support the charge, to provide the affected employee
with an opportunity to respond orally and/or in writing, and issues a
notice of decision after weighing input from the affected employee.
The affected employee may be represented by an individual of the
employee's choosing in preparing and presenting a response. In
addition to offering the opportunity to respond to charges through a
pre-decisional meeting or other means, TSA provides alleged offenders
with other due process opportunities, such as the ability to file a
grievance, engage in alternative dispute resolution, and make an
appeal on adverse actions.
TSA uses its Table of Offenses and Penalties as the framework for
corrective, disciplinary, and adverse actions, and this table provides
guidance to management officials for determining appropriate
penalties. Management officials are expected to consider applicable
mitigating and aggravating factors in determining an appropriate
penalty. Such factors can determine whether a penalty should be in the
lower or upper end of penalty ranges. Examples of mitigating factors
include self-reporting of the offense, efforts to remedy wrongdoing,
and a long period with no prior discipline. Examples of aggravating
factors include prior warning, failure to report the offense, and
impact on TSA's reputation.
Misconduct Oversight and Case Management:
TSA Employee Relations (ER) in the Office of Human Capital is
responsible for overseeing administrative inquiries, reviewing
disciplinary actions handled by TSA management at airports, and
managing the Integrated Database. TSA uses the Integrated Database to
track specific elements of misconduct case information. The Integrated
Database contains several modules, including investigative case
information from OOI, and information used by OSO staff at airports
and OPR to make adjudication decisions.[Footnote 19] The agency uses
information from the database to facilitate monitoring of the
investigations and adjudications process, allow for internal
reporting, and enable the agency to respond to data requests from
Congress and other stakeholders.
TSA Investigated and Adjudicated Approximately 9,600 Misconduct Cases
from Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012:
According to TSA employee misconduct data that we analyzed, TSA
investigated and adjudicated 9,622 employee misconduct cases from
fiscal years 2010 through 2012.[Footnote 20] From fiscal years 2010
through 2012, the annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased from
2,691 to 3,408.[Footnote 21] In that same period, TSA's workforce of
OSO employees at the airport/field level grew by about 3,200 employees.
As highlighted in table 1, two offense categories accounted for about
half of all cases--attendance and leave, which accounted for 32
percent of the cases, and screening and security, which accounted for
20 percent of the cases.
Table 1: Offense Categories and Examples of Possible Charges in TSA
Employee Misconduct Cases, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012:
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Attendance and
leave; Unexcused or excessive absences or tardiness, absence without
leave, failure to follow leave procedures;
Number and percentage of cases: 3,117;
Number and percentage of cases: 32%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Screening and
security; Failure to follow standard operating procedures, bypassing
screening, sleeping on duty;
Number and percentage of cases: 1,936;
Number and percentage of cases: 20%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Failure to follow
instructions; Insubordination, ignoring policies, disrespectful
conduct;
Number and percentage of cases: 1,548;
Number and percentage of cases: 16%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Inappropriate
comments or conduct; Inappropriate or sexual misconduct, fighting,
abusive language, or abusive use of authority;
Number and percentage of cases: 949;
Number and percentage of cases: 10%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Drugs and alcohol;
Use of drugs or alcohol on duty, refusal of drug test, positive drug
or alcohol test, driving under the influence, use or sale of drugs;
Number and percentage of cases: 456;
Number and percentage of cases: 5%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Neglect of duty;
Inattention to duty resulting in a loss of property or life, careless
inspection;
Number and percentage of cases: 426;
Number and percentage of cases: 4%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Integrity and
ethics; Bribing, conflicts of interest, criminal conduct, nepotism,
charge card abuse, misuse of government identification, accepting a
gift, improper association;
Number and percentage of cases: 384;
Number and percentage of cases: 4%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Falsification;
Lack of candor, forgery, unauthorized recording, time and attendance
fraud;
Number and percentage of cases: 312;
Number and percentage of cases: 3%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: Appearance and
hygiene; Uniform violations, keeping an unprofessional appearance;
Number and percentage of cases: 155;
Number and percentage of cases: 2%.
Offense categories and examples of possible charges: All other
categories of misconduct; Other (113); property damage (97);
unauthorized taking/theft (56); safety/security/health (30); inquiries
and investigations (17); reporting responsibilities (15); safeguarding
information (8); and mishandling of classified information (3);
Number and percentage of cases: 339;
Number and percentage of cases: 4%.
Total cases:
Number of cases: 9,622.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA employee misconduct data.
[End of table]
Attendance and leave cases may involve employees who were absent
without leave for 1 to 5 days or may have violated leave procedures.
Charges for screening-and security-related incidents pertain to
violating SOPs, including failing to conduct security or equipment
checks, and allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. For
example, at one airport checkpoint, a TSO was observed on the
airport's closed circuit television system intermittently running
passengers' property through an X-ray baggage conveyor belt without
stopping the conveyor belt to review each image, as required by TSA's
SOP. A subsequent investigation and adjudication resulted in the
employee being suspended for 30 days. In addition, a TSO at another
airport left the TSO's assigned checkpoint to assist a family member
at an airline ticket counter with a carry-on bag. The TSO assumed
control of the bag and instructed the family member to go through the
screening checkpoint without the bag, bypassed required screening of
the bag, and then returned the bag to the family member. However, a
TSA supervisor stopped the TSO in order to screen the bag--which was
found to contain numerous prohibited items. A subsequent investigation
and adjudication resulted in the employee being suspended for 7 days
for intentionally allowing property to bypass required screening.
The Table of Offenses and Penalties delineates common employee
charges, along with a suggested range of penalties that includes
letters of counseling, letters of reprimand, suspensions that range
from 1 day to an indefinite period, demotions, and removals. As shown
in figure 2, 47 percent of the cases that we analyzed resulted in
letters of reprimand, while 31 percent of the cases resulted in
suspensions of a definite duration. Additionally, in 17 percent of the
cases, the employee was removed by TSA.
Figure 2: Final Outcomes for 9,622 TSA Employee Misconduct Cases
Closed in Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Letter of reprimand: 47%;
Suspension for a defined period[C]: 31%;
Removal: 17%;
Resignation or retirement[B]: 4%;
Demotion: 1%;
Indefinite suspension[A]: 1%.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA employees misconduct data.
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent because of rounding.
[A] Indefinite suspensions are for an open period of time based on
conditions such as an employee being indicted or arrested pursuant to
a judge's warrant for a crime involving potential imprisonment.
[B] These cases involve instances in which the employee resigned or
retired while a final adjudication decision was pending.
[C] Suspensions in this category are for a defined period of time and
range from 1 to 31 days.
[End of figure]
TSA Has Taken Steps to Help Manage the Investigations and
Adjudications Process, but Could Develop Additional Procedures to
Better Monitor Employee Misconduct Cases:
TSA Has Taken Steps to Help Manage the Investigations and
Adjudications Process:
TSA has taken steps to help manage the process of investigating and
adjudicating employee misconduct. First, TSA has established personnel
misconduct policies and procedures, which outline the agency's
responsibilities for addressing job-related or off-duty behavior that
violates standards described in laws, regulations, rules, and other
authoritative policies and guidance.[Footnote 22] According to these
policies and procedures, TSA must assess the incident or allegation of
employee misconduct, including but not limited to interviewing the
employee who is the subject of the allegation and witnesses, in
determining whether adverse, disciplinary, or corrective action is
appropriate. In making a penalty determination, TSA must consider
factors such as the seriousness and nature of the offense and the
relationship of the offense to the employee's position and
responsibilities. Second, in 2010, TSA created OPR to provide greater
consistency in misconduct penalty determinations and a more
expeditious and standardized adjudication process because prior to the
creation of OPR, some disciplinary actions experienced delays due to
unavailability of adjudicating officials and extended decision
consideration. OPR has 10 case managers that review reports of
investigation including reviewing the facts of each case based on
investigative results and determining a penalty that matches the
severity of the offense. In addition, OPR developed the Table of
Offenses and Penalties as a framework to help TSA officials determine
appropriate disciplinary actions involving misconduct.
Finally, TSA has provided a series of training classes for its staff
at airports to enhance their ability to investigate and adjudicate
employee misconduct. For example, in 2012, ER conducted training for
TSA managers and supervisors at airports on employee misconduct
topics, such as TSA policies and procedures for addressing employee
misconduct, management and employee rights, and use of the Table of
Offenses and Penalties to determine appropriate penalties. ER has also
provided training to staff at the airports on how to conduct
administrative inquiries, including techniques for conducting
interviews of witnesses and alleged offenders, and collecting and
documenting evidence to determine whether misconduct has occurred,
among other things.
Weaknesses in Procedures Impede TSA's Ability to Monitor Employee
Misconduct Cases:
TSA has taken steps to help manage the investigations and
adjudications process, but developing and implementing procedures in
four areas could help the agency better monitor misconduct cases: (1)
verifying that misconduct adjudications are compliant with policies
and procedures, (2) recording case information on all adjudication
decisions, (3) tracking the time to complete all phases of the
investigations and adjudications process, and (4) identifying
allegations not adjudicated by the agency.
Verifying that misconduct adjudications are compliant with policies
and procedures. TSA does not have a process for reviewing misconduct
cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies
and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct. ER has
responsibility for overseeing misconduct adjudications completed by
TSA staff at airports, including conducting training on the
adjudications process for TSA supervisors, managers, and other staff
at airports responsible for addressing employee misconduct. According
to a senior ER official, ER periodically reviews TSA case files at
airports using a document checklist to ensure that paperwork is
included in the file, such as evidence that the employee has been
afforded an opportunity to respond to misconduct charges. However, the
official indicated that ER is not currently conducting many of these
reviews because of resource constraints, and the official is unsure of
the frequency or the results of these reviews.
Consistent with TSA policies and procedures, adjudicating officials
need to collect sufficient evidence to support penalty charges,
consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances when determining a
penalty, and take certain actions, including removal, based on the
nature of the offense. However, TSA does not have a review process to
verify that TSA staff at airports are consistently following these
requirements. A review process might include evaluating misconduct
case files on a regular basis to identify compliance issues with the
adjudications process and develop corrective actions based on the
findings. A senior OPR official noted that some cases have been
overturned or the penalties reduced through the appeals process
because staff at airports had not supported the charges with
sufficient evidence or did not properly apply penalty factors. For
example, from January 2011 to June 13, 2013, the OPR Appellate Board,
which reviews appeals made by TSOs on certain adverse actions, either
overturned or reduced the penalty in 125 out of 836 cases (15
percent). Specifically, of the 125 cases, the OPR Appellate Board
overturned the penalty in 79 cases because the charges had not been
proven by preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the OPR
Appellate Board reduced the penalty in 34 cases because, among other
things, the adjudicating official did not consider mitigating factors.
Further, while TSA policy requires the removal of employees that have
committed an intentional serious security breach, such as
intentionally allowing persons or property to bypass screening, the
agency does not review misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at
airports are properly adjudicating cases involving an intentional
breach of security. Moreover, our evaluation of TSA's fiscal year 2012
data on cases involving sleeping while engaging in security duties
adjudicated by TSA staff at airports indicates that 50 percent of the
cases resulted in a lower penalty than the range included in the Table
of Offenses and Penalties.[Footnote 23]
A senior ER official agreed that TSA would benefit from a review
process to help verify that TSA staff at airports are making
adjudication decisions in conformance with policies and procedures.
The official noted that TSA's focus has been on other priorities such
as development of the Integrated Database. However, internal control
standards state that internal controls should generally be designed to
ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal
operations and that monitoring is performed continually.[Footnote 24]
Without a review process to verify that TSA staff at airports are
complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating misconduct, it
is difficult for TSA to provide reasonable assurance that cases have
been adjudicated properly and that risk to the agency is mitigated
accordingly. Furthermore, a review process could allow TSA to gain
knowledge regarding areas of noncompliance and identify the potential
causes, such as gaps in training or guidance, so that it could address
such gaps.
Recording case information on all adjudication decisions. TSA does not
record the results of all misconduct cases that have been adjudicated
by TSA airport staff in its Integrated Database, which could help the
agency oversee efforts at the airport level to address employee
misconduct. Specifically, the agency does not record all employee
misconduct case outcomes in the database, including cases that
resulted in a corrective action, which are actions that are
administrative or nondisciplinary in nature, such as a letter of
counseling. As discussed earlier, the Integrated Database is TSA's
centralized case management system used by staff to track and manage
employee misconduct cases. TSA strives to follow a progressive
discipline approach in adjudicating employee misconduct cases, which
means that managers must have access to information on an employee's
disciplinary track record in a centralized location.
However, we found that five out of the seven airports included in our
sample do not consistently track corrective actions in the Integrated
Database. A senior ER official stated that ER was unaware that TSA
staff at airports are not consistently recording corrective actions in
the Integrated Database, and there is a strong need for TSA to clarify
that TSA staff at airports should record corrective actions in the
database. The official stated that while TSA has communicated through
training that staff at airports should record corrective actions in
the Integrated Database, there is not a written policy or procedure
requiring such tracking. Of the airports that do not consistently
record corrective actions in the Integrated Database, three use the
Airport Information Management (AIM) system to record corrective
actions because there is not a policy or procedure requiring airports
to use the Integrated Database. However, AIM is not designed to be the
central database for information on outcomes resulting from employee
misconduct investigations, and it would be inefficient for TSA to
extract information on corrective actions from this system in addition
to the Integrated Database. For example, this system stores employee
information used for the management of day-to-day activities, such as
work schedules and controlling property, including issuance of
uniforms, among other activities.
Further, TSA's policy on administrative inquiries states that it is as
important to back findings of no fault, no loss, or no wrongdoing with
documentary evidence as it is to document findings resulting in
disciplinary action. According to the policy, the investigative report
must include sufficient documentation to convince the appointing
authority and others who may review the matter that the evidence is
appropriate. While TSA's data indicate that OPR and some TSA officials
at airports record cases that resulted in no penalty in the Integrated
Database, we found that all seven airports in our sample do not
consistently record case outcomes that result in no penalty in the
database, which are instances in which TSA investigated an allegation
of misconduct, but could not substantiate the misconduct based on
available evidence. These airports are not recording case outcomes
that result in no penalty in the database because TSA has not provided
guidance requiring such tracking. However, internal control standards
state that control activities should be established to help ensure,
among other things, that all documentation and records are properly
managed and maintained, which facilitates monitoring and resource
management.[Footnote 25] Recording corrective actions and no-penalty
outcomes in the Integrated Database would help provide a centralized,
institutional record on past misconduct, and enable managers to follow
a progressive discipline approach because all case outcomes would be
documented. For example, according to the senior ER official, in
situations where an employee transfers between airports, lack of
information on previous corrective actions taken against the employee
would hamper TSA's ability to follow progressive discipline at the new
airport. In fiscal year 2012, about 2,100 TSA employees transferred
between airports. Developing and issuing guidance for TSA staff at
airports on the need to record all misconduct case outcomes in the
Integrated Database would emphasize management's view of the
importance of staff including such information to provide a complete
record of adjudication decisions.
Tracking the time to complete all phases of the investigations and
adjudications process. TSA does not consistently track the cycle time
associated with completing the misconduct investigations and
adjudications process. TSA policies and procedures state that
investigations should generally be completed within 30 days of an
allegation of employee misconduct, and the notice of proposed action
to an alleged offender should generally be issued within 30 days of
completing the investigation.[Footnote 26] Further, TSA's
administrative inquiry policy states that administrative inquiries
should generally not exceed 15 calendar days. Our review of TSA data
from the Integrated Database on misconduct cases handled by TSA
airport staff identified that TSA does not capture information on the
amount of time to complete the investigations and adjudications
process, including the number of days to complete an investigation and
issue a notice of proposed action. While TSA has established standards
for cycle times, according to a senior ER official, the agency has not
required TSA staff at airports to track their performance against the
standards because the amount of time to complete the investigative and
adjudications process can vary based on the complexity of the case.
However, internal control standards state that agencies need to
compare actual performance with planned or expected results throughout
the organization and analyze significant differences. Tracking cycle
times would provide TSA with operational information, such as the
variance in processing time by type of case and geographic location.
For example, according to an OOI senior official, OOI, which typically
investigates cases of a complex nature, tracks the cycle time
associated with its misconduct investigations to allow headquarters to
look across OOI field offices to evaluate patterns, and make resource
management and other decisions. Specifically, the OOI senior official
stated that paying attention to investigative timelines allowed OOI to
identify that theft cases were staying open in the Integrated Database
for an excessive amount of time due to a process issue, which OOI
resolved based on cycle time tracking.
We found that TSA officials at two of the seven airports in our sample
have established a process to track the cycle time for active employee
misconduct cases. For example, TSA staff at one of the airports in our
sample track the following time frames: (1) completion of the
investigation; (2) review of the proposed decision by various
organizational units, such as the Office of Chief Counsel; and (3)
issuance of the decision letter to the offender. Tracking the cycle
time for active employee misconduct cases provides a number of
benefits for the airport, including allowing the airport to identify
cases that are delayed, uncover where the delay is in the process and
specific reasons for the delay, and make adjustments to expedite the
cases. Specifically, tracking cycle times would provide TSA with an
opportunity to identify delays associated with evidence collection.
For example, misconduct investigations must be completed as quickly as
possible because evidence has a finite life span. According to a
senior TSA official at an airport in our sample, TSA officials at
airports often have to rely upon video footage to substantiate whether
misconduct has occurred, such as alleged theft of a passenger's
property. The official stated that it can be challenging for TSA to
obtain video in a timely manner given that a third party, such as an
airport authority, generally controls an airport's closed circuit
television system, so it is important for TSA to view video footage
prior to a third party taking steps to archive or destroy the content.
Establishing a policy to track cycle times for misconduct cases
handled by airport staff could help TSA ensure that this information
is consistently recorded to identify how long it is taking for
misconduct cases to progress through the investigations and
adjudications process. TSA senior officials agreed that tracking cycle
times for investigations and adjudications completed by airport staff
would provide valuable information on the differences across airports
related to case processing, and that instituting a tracking process
would not be cumbersome for the agency.
Identifying allegations not adjudicated by TSA. Our review indicates
that OOI has not established procedures to reconcile completed
misconduct investigations against OSO or OPR adjudication decisions to
identify cases not resolved by OSO or OPR. Specifically, OOI is not
matching its completed investigations against OSO and OPR adjudication
decisions to identify any gaps, following up with OSO and OPR to help
resolve these outstanding cases, and updating the status of the cases
in the Integrated Database. Previously, OOI matched its completed
records of investigation against OSO or OPR adjudication decisions to
ensure that OSO or OPR had received the record and made an
adjudication decision. According to an OOI senior official, the
previous Assistant Administrator for OOI determined that this type of
reconciliation process was too resource intensive and discontinued the
process because OOI had to manually sort through open investigations
listed as "pending an adjudication decision" and then contact OSO or
OPR to determine the status of each case. However, the OOI senior
official stated that although the process was manual in nature, it was
beneficial in identifying allegations that had not been adjudicated by
TSA. For example, we reviewed a random sample of 50 allegations of
employee misconduct referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 2012
and found 2 out of 50 allegations that were not adjudicated by TSA.
Specifically, OOI investigated the allegations and referred the cases
to OSO staff at the airport for adjudication; however, at the time of
our review, OSO had not made adjudication decisions on the cases
because the investigative reports were either never received or were
missing because of record-keeping issues. As a result of our review,
TSA subsequently made adjudication decisions on these allegations; 1
of the adjudication decisions resulted in a 14-day suspension for the
employee because of disruptive behavior in the workplace, and the
other adjudication decision resulted in no penalty. The results from
GAO's sample cannot be generalized to the entire population of
referrals from DHS OIG to TSA; however they raise questions as to
whether there could be additional instances of allegations that TSA
had not adjudicated in the population of over 1,300 allegations of TSA
employee misconduct that DHS OIG referred to TSA for action in fiscal
year 2012. A senior TSA OOI official agreed that since TSA does not
have reconciliation procedures, there may be other allegations the
agency is unaware of that TSA OOI has investigated, but have not been
adjudicated by OSO or OPR, and a reconciliation process would offer
benefits to TSA.
TSA has a contract in place to develop reporting capabilities in the
Integrated Database that may allow OOI to match its completed
investigations against adjudication decisions made by OPR and OSO,
thereby helping to maximize TSA's resources. As of May 2013, the
contractor has modified the database to allow TSA to match OOI's
completed investigations against OPR's adjudication decisions, and
plans to develop the same capabilities related to OSO's adjudication
decisions. However, according to a senior OOI official, OOI is not
leveraging the capability to match OOI's completed investigations
against OPR's adjudication decisions because the agency has not
identified the staff or developed protocols for conducting a
reconciliation process. Moreover, the agency does not currently have
procedures to reconcile OOI's completed investigations against OSO's
adjudication decisions while the database is under development.
Internal control standards advise agencies to establish monitoring
activities, such as reconciliations, to ensure that management's
directives are carried out and risks are mitigated.[Footnote 27]
Developing reconciliation procedures could help TSA ensure that it
identifies allegations of employee misconduct not previously addressed
through adjudication.
Conclusions:
TSA has taken actions to help manage the investigations and
adjudications process, but procedural weaknesses have hampered the
agency's ability to monitor employee misconduct cases. Specifically,
TSA does not have a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to
verify that TSA staff at airports responsible for adjudicating
employee misconduct comply with policies and procedures, nor does the
agency record the outcomes of all cases or track the cycle time to
complete the investigations and adjudications process. Consistent with
internal controls, conducting reviews of misconduct cases and
consistently recording all outcomes could provide TSA with reasonable
assurance that cases have been adjudicated properly and there is a
complete institutional record of adjudication decisions. In addition,
tracking cycle times would provide TSA with operational information,
including helping the agency identify how long it is taking for
misconduct cases to progress through the investigations and
adjudications process. Moreover, developing reconciliation procedures
could help reduce the risk that TSA does not address all allegations
of employee misconduct not previously adjudicated.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve TSA's management and oversight of efforts to address
allegations of employee misconduct, we recommend that the
Administrator of TSA take the following four actions, consistent with
standards for internal control, to:
* establish a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify
that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures
for adjudicating employee misconduct,
* develop and issue guidance to the field clarifying the need for TSA
officials at airports to record all misconduct case outcomes in the
Integrated Database,
* establish an agency-wide policy to track cycle times in the
investigations and adjudications process, and:
* develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of
employee misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS,
in written comments received July 18, 2013, concurred with the
recommendations and identified actions taken, under way, or planned to
implement the recommendations. Written comments are summarized below,
and official DHS comments are reproduced in appendix II. In addition,
DHS provided written technical comments, which we incorporated, as
appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that TSA establish a process to
conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at
airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating
employee misconduct, DHS concurred with the recommendation. DHS stated
that TSA is currently taking steps to provide increased auditing of
disciplinary records to help ensure that airport staff are complying
with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct. TSA
expects to complete these actions by March 31, 2014. These actions,
once implemented, should help address the intent of our
recommendation. In response to our recommendation that TSA develop and
issue guidance to the field clarifying the need for TSA officials at
airports to record all misconduct case outcomes in the Integrated
Database, DHS concurred with the recommendation. DHS stated that TSA
plans to develop and disseminate additional guidance to the field to
ensure that all corrective and disciplinary actions are recorded in
the database. TSA expects to develop and disseminate additional
guidance to the field by August 30, 2013. We believe that this is a
beneficial step that would address our recommendation once it is
implemented, provided that the guidance also specifies that cases
resulting in no penalty should be recorded in the database.
In response to our recommendation that TSA establish an agency-wide
policy to track cycle times in the investigations and adjudications
process, DHS concurred with the recommendation, and stated that TSA
will develop a process and mechanism to track airport cycle times for
misconduct cases. TSA expects to develop a process and mechanism by
March 31, 2014. This action, once implemented, would address the
intent of our recommendation. In response to our recommendation that
TSA develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of
employee misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication, DHS
concurred with the recommendation. DHS stated that TSA will implement
a reconciliation process to ensure that OOI investigations are
adjudicated by OSO, and noted that OPR currently has a process to
communicate adjudication decisions to OOI. TSA expects to implement a
reconciliation process by March 31, 2014. We believe that these are
beneficial steps that would address our recommendation once
implemented, provided that TSA develops a process to reconcile OOI's
completed investigations against adjudication decisions made by both
OSO and OPR. It is unclear whether the process TSA plans to develop
would involve matching completed investigations against adjudication
decisions made by OPR, including identifying the staff and developing
the protocols for the process.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the TSA Administrator, appropriate congressional committees,
and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at
no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4379 or at lords@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Stephen M. Lord:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Government Operations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jeff Duncan:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report (1) summarizes data on Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) employee misconduct cases, and (2) examines the
extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and oversee the
investigations and adjudications process.
To summarize data on TSA employee misconduct cases, we reviewed
program documentation, collected data on TSA employee misconduct cases
from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, and interviewed officials from
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA. In particular, we
reviewed TSA documentation, such as standard operating procedures,
policy statements, and guidance for staff charged with investigating
and adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct. To understand the
magnitude of previous cases of TSA employee misconduct, we obtained
information presented in TSA and Federal Bureau of Investigation press
releases, and interviewed criminal investigators from the TSA Office
of Inspection (OOI) and DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). We also
collected information from TSA on resources, such as staffing numbers,
and protocols for information management. Specifically, we reviewed
information on TSA's Integrated Database, which comprises misconduct
case data and supporting documentation, such as evidence used to
support a misconduct penalty.[Footnote 28]
We also conducted an analysis of TSA misconduct case data from the
Integrated Database from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify
trends related to both misconduct offenses and penalties. As part of
this work, we assessed the reliability of data in the Integrated
Database by interviewing TSA officials to discuss the mechanisms in
place to ensure data quality and tested the data for potential gaps
and anomalies. We identified some instances of missing and inaccurate
data, including lack of employee pay band and incorrect job title. For
example, we evaluated TSA's data to identify instances in which cases
involving senior-level employees may have been adjudicated by OSO
rather than OPR, as specified by policy. As a result of that analysis,
we identified data entry and other issues related to 14 cases. We also
determined that TSA does not consistently track corrective actions and
cases adjudicated with no penalty, which we discuss in the report.
While we identified such limitations, we found the data sufficiently
reliable for providing general information on the nature and
characteristics of employee misconduct.
Moreover, we interviewed TSA officials to identify information that
the agency collects about the nature and magnitude of cases of
employee misconduct. We met with senior officials from TSA, including
the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR), the Executive Advisor to the Assistant
Administrator for OOI, the Senior Advisor to the Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Security Operations (OSO), and the
Director for Employee Relations (ER). We also selected a sample of 7
airports from the approximately 450 TSA-regulated airports nationwide
and conducted site visits or telephone interviews with TSA officials
responsible for investigating and adjudicating cases of employee
misconduct. We conducted site visits with Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport, Miami International Airport, Southwest Florida
International Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, and
Newark Liberty International Airport, and conducted telephone
interviews with officials from San Francisco International Airport and
Chicago O'Hare International Airport.[Footnote 29] Further, we
interviewed senior officials from OOI and DHS OIG field offices with
oversight responsibilities for the airports included in our sample.
Specifically, we interviewed criminal investigators from 4 of the 6
OOI field offices. We conducted a site visit with OOI's Atlanta field
office, and conducted telephone interviews with OOI field offices in
Detroit, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. Further, we interviewed DHS
OIG criminal investigators from 5 of the 13 DHS OIG investigative
field offices. We conducted site visits with DHS OIG's Atlanta and
Miami field offices, and conducted telephone interviews with DHS OIG
field offices in Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Diego. We selected
these TSA airport locations, and OOI and DHS OIG field office
locations based on the number and type of past cases of employee
misconduct and geographic dispersion. As we did not select a
probability sample of TSA airport locations, OOI, and DHS OIG field
offices to interview, the results of these interviews cannot be
generalized to all TSA-regulated airports nationwide, OOI's 6 field
offices, and DHS OIG's 13 field offices. However, the interviews
provided us with the perspectives of DHS and TSA officials responsible
for collecting information on TSA employee misconduct investigations
or adjudications.
To determine the extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and
oversee the investigations and adjudications process, we analyzed the
processes TSA uses to (1) conduct investigations of allegations of
employee misconduct, and (2) make adjudication decisions, including
determining any relevant penalties. In particular, we analyzed TSA's
oversight and monitoring processes for investigations and
adjudications handled by TSA staff at airports. As part of our effort
to evaluate these processes, we reviewed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, pursuant to which TSA implements its
human capital management responsibilities.[Footnote 30] We also
reviewed TSA's standard operating procedures for addressing employee
misconduct through various types of investigations, including an
administrative inquiry, which is a formal investigation requested by a
federal security director or designee, and making adjudication
decisions, including providing alleged offenders with certain due
process opportunities.[Footnote 31] We reviewed TSA's Table of
Offenses and Penalties, which provides guidance for officials to
follow in making adjudication decisions, such as a list of potential
offenses and recommended, mitigated, and aggravated penalty ranges. We
compared TSA processes for investigations and adjudications with TSA
policies and procedures, as well as with internal control standards.
[Footnote 32]
We used complaint data from DHS OIG's Enforcement Data System as the
population from which to randomly select a nongeneralizable sample of
50 TSA employee misconduct allegations referred from DHS OIG to OOI in
order to evaluate whether TSA had addressed the allegations.[Footnote
33] We focused our analysis on fiscal year 2012 misconduct allegations
that DHS OIG referred to TSA for follow-up action. We requested that
OOI provide us with the status and outcome of each of the 50
allegations, including whether TSA had a record of the allegations and
had taken action to investigate and adjudicate each one. While not
generalizable to all allegations referred from DHS OIG to OOI, the
results of our review provided insight about TSA's procedures for
ensuring that allegations are addressed.
In addition, we interviewed senior officials from TSA, including the
Assistant Administrator for OPR, the Executive Advisor to the
Assistant Administrator for OOI, the Senior Advisor to the Assistant
Administrator for OSO, and the Director for ER to determine the extent
to which TSA has developed internal controls for addressing
allegations of employee misconduct. We also interviewed senior
officials from our selected airport locations and corresponding OOI
and DHS OIG field offices to obtain their views on TSA's efforts to
investigate and adjudicate employee misconduct.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2012 to July 2013
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
July 18, 2013:
Stephen M. Lord:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: Draft Report GAO-13-624, "Transportation Security: TSA Could
Strengthen Monitoring of Allegations of Employee Misconduct"
Dear Mr. Lord:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and
conducting its review and issuing this report.
DHS appreciates GAO's acknowledgment that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has taken steps to more effectively manage the
investigation and adjudication process. Ensuring the security of the
Nation's aviation system requires integrity and vigilance of staff
members. When employees engage in misconduct, it undermines the
mission and the public trust. TSA takes these matters very seriously
and strives to ensure that the actions taken in response to
allegations of misconduct are appropriate and timely.
Since its creation, TSA has recognized the impact employee misconduct
may have on aviation security and has implemented policies to expedite
the disciplinary process. Under the unique personnel management
authority set forth in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of
2001, TSA developed and employs an expedited process to terminate
Transportation Security Officers who engage in serious misconduct,
including theft, use of illegal drugs, use of alcohol on duty, and
intentional serious security breaches.
In 2004, to provide supervisors and managers with the ability and
authority to address misconduct, TSA delegated authority to airport
management to take disciplinary actions against employees and
established a robust Office of Human Capital (OHC)/Employee Relations
(ER) training program regarding investigation and adjudication. TSA
consolidated its internal investigative functions into one
organizational unit, the Office of Inspection (001), to maximize
resources and enhance its capability to investigate allegations of
misconduct.
In 2010, TSA created the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
to review and adjudicate allegations of misconduct investigated by the
DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and allegations of
misconduct involving senior-level and law enforcement employees.
In 2011, TSA consolidated the two case management systems for tracking
misconduct investigations and adjudications of disciplinary actions,
and are developing a reporting mechanism to capture the results of the
investigation and adjudication process. The new reporting capability
reflects investigations and adjudications throughout TSA.
The draft report contained four recommendations with which the
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the
Administrator of TSA take the following actions:
Recommendation 1: Establish a process to conduct reviews of misconduct
to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and
procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct.
Response: Concur. Currently, a sample portion of airport disciplinary
actions and administrative inquiries are reviewed for accuracy and
completeness on a periodic basis to ensure policy compliance. 00I is
currently developing a more robust process to provide the increased
auditing of disciplinary records to ensure that airport staff are
complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee
misconduct. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): March 31, 2014.
Recommendation 2: Develop and issue guidance to the field clarifying
the need for TSA officials at airports to record all misconduct case
outcomes in the Integrated Database.
Response: Concur. The Integrated Database has the ability to record
corrective/disciplinary actions and to upload the supporting
documentation for these actions. To ensure consistency of application,
additional guidance will be developed by 001 and disseminated to field
offices to ensure that all corrective and disciplinary actions are
recorded in the database. ECD: August 30, 2013.
Recommendation 3: Establish an agency-wide policy to track cycle times
in the investigations and adjudications process.
Response: Concur. 00I currently tracks cycle times of misconduct
investigations. OPR also tracks cycle times of cases it adjudicates.
001 will develop a process and mechanism to track airport cycle times
on the review and adjudication of misconduct actions for local and
administrative inquiries to identify process improvements. ECD: March
31, 2014.
Recommendation 4: Develop reconciliation procedures to identify
allegations of employee misconduct not previously addressed through
adjudication.
Response: Concur. Currently, OPR forwards written notifications to 001
and OIG of OPR adjudication of their respective investigations to 001
and OIG. TSA will implement a reconciliation process in the integrated
database for 00I and OIG investigations to ensure that all such
investigations are appropriately adjudicated by OHC/ER and the Office
of Security Operations. ECD: March 31, 2014.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jim H. Crumpacker:
Director:
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Stephen M. Lord, (202) 512-4379 or LordS@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Jessica Lucas-Judy (Assistant
Director), Anthony C. Fernandez, Sally Gilley, Eric Hauswirth, Tom
Lombardi, Lara Miklozek, Lerone Reid, and Kelly Rubin made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The total number of TSA employees at TSA-regulated airports
represents personnel within the Office of Security Operations, such as
TSOs, supervisory TSOs, lead TSOs, transportation security managers,
transportation security inspectors, and behavior detection officers.
[2] This review is focused on TSA personnel at TSA-regulated airports.
We excluded from our review TSA employees at headquarters, the Federal
Air Marshal Service, regional offices, and other nonairport locations,
and do not include private sector screeners employed by contractors
providing screening services at airports participating in TSA's
Screening Partnership Program. For purposes of this review, employee
misconduct is generally job-related or off-duty behavior that does not
meet expected standards described in laws, regulations, rules, and
other authoritative policies and guidance. Misconduct may represent an
intentional refusal to perform or a negligent failure to perform
acceptably because of inattention to duty. Categories of employee
misconduct include drugs and alcohol and screening and security, among
others.
[3] For the purposes of this review, employee misconduct cases refer
to allegations for which TSA has completed an investigation and
adjudication.
[4] FSDs are the ranking TSA authorities responsible for leading and
coordinating TSA security activities at TSA-regulated airports. Not
every TSA-regulated airport has an FSD dedicated solely to that
airport. Most large airports have an FSD responsible for that airport
alone. Other, smaller airports are arranged in a "hub and spoke"
configuration, in which an FSD is located at or near a hub airport but
also has responsibility over one or more spoke airports of the same or
smaller size.
[5] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).
[6] DHS OIG's Enforcement Data System is an electronic case management
and tracking system used to manage information related to DHS OIG
investigations.
[7] We interviewed TSA officials at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport, Miami International Airport, Southwest Florida
International Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Newark
Liberty International Airport, San Francisco International Airport,
and Chicago O'Hare International Airport. While the focus of our
review was on TSA employees, we met with TSA officials from San
Francisco International Airport, which maintains contract screeners
under the Screening Partnership Program, in order to better understand
TSA's processes for addressing both contractor and employee misconduct
at the airport. Under the Screening Partnership Program, which is
overseen by TSA, TSA-regulated airports may apply to have a private
screening company under contract to TSA perform screening services at
the airports, provided, among other considerations, that the level of
screening matches or exceeds that of federal screeners. See GAO,
Screening Partnership Program, TSA Should Issue More Guidance to
Airports and Monitor Private versus Federal Screener Performance,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-208] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 12, 2012) and 49 U.S.C. § 44920 for more information on the
program and related requirements.
[8] We interviewed officials from OOI field offices in Atlanta,
Georgia; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Detroit, Michigan; and San
Francisco, California.
[9] We interviewed officials from DHS OIG field offices in Atlanta,
Georgia; Miami, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Chicago,
Illinois; and San Diego, California.
[10] See generally Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). See also
49 U.S.C. § 44935; 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.101-1544.111. On November 9,
2012, TSA ratified a collective bargaining agreement with the American
Federation of Government Employees, which covers TSA's nonsupervisory
screening workforce; however, according to TSA, this contract does not
affect TSA's range of possible penalty actions to use in addressing
employee misconduct.
[11] See TSA Management Directive: Addressing Unacceptable Performance
and Conduct, 1100.75-3, Feb. 2, 2012, and TSA MD 1100.75-3, Handbook,
Addressing Unacceptable Performance and Conduct, Dec. 20, 2012.
[12] See GAO, Air Passenger Screening: Transportation Security
Administration Could Improve Complaint Processes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-43] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15,
2012).
[13] For the purposes of this review, TSA staff, supervisors,
managers, and senior management at airports refers to OSO employees.
[14] See TSA Management Directive: Informal Administrative Inquiries,
700.2, February 23, 2004. An inquiry officer should be at a level
equal to or higher than the alleged offender and typically works in a
separate organizational unit at the airport than the alleged offender.
The duties of an inquiry officer are expected to take priority over
the individual's regular daily duties.
[15] Senior-level employees within OSO include all persons in the
Transportation Security Executive Service, K through M Pay Bands,
FSDs, Deputy FSDs, Assistant FSDs, and Deputy Assistant FSDs.
[16] See DHS Management Directive: The Office of Inspector General,
0810.1, June 10, 2004.
[17] Adjudication is the process through which TSA determines whether
the evidence is sufficient to propose and sustain a charge of
misconduct, and determines the appropriate penalty.
[18] Per the Handbook to TSA Management Directive 1100.75-3, TSA
defines preponderance of the evidence as that degree of relevant
evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole,
would accept as sufficient to find that a purported fact is more
likely to be true than untrue.
[19] The Integrated Database contains documentary evidence used to
make penalty determinations, such as witness statements, and
investigative reports. The database includes fields to capture
misconduct case information, such as employee name, employee position,
employee pay band, employee work location, category or type of
misconduct, case status, disciplinary action, and case disposition.
[20] Our analysis includes closed misconduct cases involving OSO
employees at the airport/field level that were adjudicated by either
OSO or OPR, and resulted in a disciplinary or adverse action. We
excluded from our analysis cases open at the time of our review; cases
involving the Federal Air Marshal Service; cases involving TSA
employees at headquarters, regional offices, and other nonairport
locations; and cases with missing data fields. Cases resulting in a
corrective action (i.e., those that are administrative or non-
disciplinary in nature), or no penalty, which TSA does not track
consistently in the Integrated Database, are discussed later in the
report.
[21] The number of cases may exceed the number of employees as one
employee may have been involved in multiple cases of misconduct.
[22] See TSA Management Directive, 1100-75-3 and Handbook.
[23] Sleeping while engaging in security duties has a penalty range
spanning from a suspension of 14 days to removal, which indicates the
gravity of this offense. We found that 50 percent of the cases
resulted in penalties ranging from a letter of reprimand to a
suspension of 1 to 3 days.
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[26] According to an OOI senior official, OOI's investigations
generally take longer than 30 days to complete because of the
complexity of the cases.
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[28] The Integrated Database is a tracking system composed of case
management information for OOI, the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) and Office of Security Operations (OSO). OOI
inputs investigative information into the database, while OPR and OSO
input the results of adjudication decisions, including supporting
evidence. The Office of Employee Relations oversees information
inputted by OSO staff at airports across the nation.
[29] While the focus of our review was on TSA employees, we met with
TSA officials from San Francisco International Airport, which
maintains contract screeners under the Screening Partnership Program,
in order to better understand TSA's processes for addressing both
contractor and employee misconduct at the airport. Under the Screening
Partnership Program, which is overseen by TSA, TSA-regulated airports
may apply to have a private screening company under contract to TSA
perform screening services at the airports, provided, among other
considerations, that the level of screening matches or exceeds that of
federal screeners. See GAO, Screening Partnership Program, TSA Should
Issue More Guidance to Airports and Monitor Private versus Federal
Screener Performance, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-208] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12,
2012) and 49 U.S.C. § 44920 for more information on the program and
related requirements.
[30] See generally Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[31] FSDs are the ranking TSA authorities responsible for leading and
coordinating TSA security activities at TSA-regulated airports. Not
every TSA-regulated airport has an FSD dedicated solely to that
airport. Most large airports have an FSD responsible for that airport
alone. Other, smaller airports are arranged in a "hub and spoke"
configuration, in which an FSD is located at or near a hub airport but
also has responsibility over one or more spoke airports of the same or
smaller size.
[32] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).
[33] DHS OIG's Enforcement Data System is an electronic case
management and tracking system used to manage information related to
DHS OIG investigations.
[End of section]
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