By Abdul Basit

The Long Road to Peace in Afghanistan

The
tragedy of the Afghan war has been that it has several villains but not many heroes.
However, June 2018 was different. The three-day Eid Ceasefire Agreement that allowed
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSFs) and the Afghan Taliban to pray and
celebrate Eid-ul-Fitr — the religious festival marking the end of the holy
fasting month of Ramadan — together with the general public was unprecedented. Despite
its short-lived nature, the Eid-truce has revived modest hopes of jumpstarting
the on-off peace process. It was an important confidence building measure and
has the potential to pave the way for larger peace negotiations.

Following
these developments, the US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
South and Central Asia Alice Wells visited Pakistan to further explore the
possibility of resuming the Afghan peace talks. Parliamentary elections in
Afghanistan are due on October 20 and efforts are underway to reach a
breakthrough before that. Ahead of Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections, these
developments have brought the Afghan peace process to a crossroads. If a
breakthrough is not achieved before the elections, then all stakeholders will
have to wait for conclusion of the elections and engage with the newly-elected
Afghan government. However, this is fraught with multiple risks. Holding
peaceful elections and ensuring a smooth power transition in Afghanistan can be
a contentious and long-drawn-out process. The opportunity created by the Eid
Ceasefire agreement hence should not be squandered.

First,
the three-day truce was a purely Afghan-initiated, led and owned process.
Symbolically, it has opened the imaginative space for peace and it will give
confidence to the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Afghan Taliban that —
despite all odds — peace is achievable, provided the political will and
sincerity are there. For the first time in 17 years, the war-weary Afghans have
experienced peace in the middle of the peak fighting season. President Ashraf
Ghani’s bold diplomatic move of offering a unilateral ceasefire to the Afghan
Taliban and his willingness to discuss the presence of US troops in Afghanistan
has put the onus on the Afghan Taliban to reciprocate.

Second,
the Eid-ceasefire is the first publicly acknowledged Confidence Building
Measure (CBM) between the NUG and the Taliban. It has ended years of bad blood
and animosity and will facilitate future peace talks. The euphoric manner with which
the general public in Afghanistan — including the common Taliban commanders and
fighters — welcomed the peace initiative showed that people are war-weary and
hungry for peace. Though, the Afghan Taliban did not extend the ceasefire, the
temporary lull in violence has created a grassroots constituency for peace. Now,
this peace constituency needs to be further strengthened and expanded. The
Eid-truce coincided with the entry of the Helmand Peace Marchers into Kabul who
travelled over 750 km in the sweltering heat demanding peace and the end of
hostilities. The Taliban fighters who celebrated Eid in a peaceful environment
with their families will create a bottom up pressure on the Taliban’s executive
council to reconsider its approach of fighting endlessly.

The
thaw in the Afghanistan-Pakistan relations prior to restoration of Afghan peace
talks is a positive sign as well.

Third,
the three-day ceasefire has proved to the US, NUG and other regional
stakeholders that if the Taliban’s executive council signed an agreement, other
associated insurgent factions will abide by it. The ceasefire has removed doubts
and confusion about the organizational coherence of the Afghan Taliban. In
2015, the former Taliban chief Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor failed to create a
consensus among the different insurgent factions to initiate peace talks. The
Taliban field commanders and fighters were opposed to peace talks while the Taliban’s
executive council feared that negotiations could divide the insurgent movement.
Despite his reputation as a political negotiator, Mansoor hence failed to
initiate peace talks.

Finally,
now that the psychological barrier of reaching a pause in violence has been
achieved, the debate will inevitability turn towards the US withdrawal from
Afghanistan. The time and manner in which the US will exit from Afghanistan
will determine the future trajectory of war and peace in the country. President
Ghani’s willingness to discuss the timeframe of the US exit from Afghanistan
indicates that the endgame narrative of the Afghan conflict has matured enough
to confront the elephant in the room. Encouraged by the success of the Eid
ceasefire agreement, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has indicated that the
Trump administration is ready to discuss with the Taliban the role of the US
and international forces in peace talks: “The United States is prepared to
support, facilitate, and participate in these discussions.”

Since
the launch of the Trump administration’s new Afghan policy that gave more
powers to US military commanders in Afghanistan, the situation has turned from
bad to worse. Intensified airstrikes have done little to nothing to reverse the
momentum of the Taliban’s battlefield advantage and territorial gains. The
Afghan Taliban now controls over 40 percent of Afghanistan’s territory. By
eliminating Mullah Fazlullah — Pakistan’s most wanted terrorist — in a drone
attack in eastern Kunar province, the US is once again banking on Pakistan to
pull it out of the Afghan quagmire. On June 22, US Defence Secretary James
Mattis acknowledged the role of US forces in neutralizing Fazlullah and urged
Pakistan to help in the Afghan peace process.

The
thaw in the Afghanistan-Pakistan relations prior to restoration of Afghan peace
talks is a positive sign as well. The recent high-powered trip of Pakistani
army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa to Kabul and the subsequent visits of
Afghanistan’s Interior Minister Wais Ahmad Barmak, National Security Adviser
Mohammad Hanif Atmar, and intelligence chief Masoum Stanikzai, show the revival
of the working relationship between the two countries. Earlier, the creation of
the Afghanistan-Pakistan joint working groups and the restraint shown from both
sides from unnecessarily criticizing each other publicly has also helped to create
an enabling environment to restart the peace process. Pakistan’s military
leadership has been cautious in its assurances to Kabul and has only pledged to
bring the Taliban to the negotiation table without taking any responsibility of
the outcome.

Despite
the Afghan Taliban’s territorial gains and intensified US airstrikes, the
Afghan conflict remains deadlocked. Neither the US nor the Taliban are in a
position to impose a military solution. Through their armed struggle, the
Taliban have not only obtained a seat on the negotiation table and received political
recognition from regional countries, but they have also compelled Kabul and Washington
DC to accept them as a legitimate stakeholder of the Afghan conflict. The
purpose of the insurgency is to create favourable political conditions to reach
a settlement through negotiations. Beyond tactical gains, both parties would
not gain much from fighting. Therefore, seizing the opportunity created by the Eid–truce
is essential.