BOSNEWS Digest 421 -- 05/10/95

From: Nermin Zukic <n6zukic@sms.business.uwo.ca>

ON THE GROUND IN THE BALKANS:

On October 4, NATO warplanes fired anti-radar missiles at two Serbian missile
batteries in northwest Bosnia and one near Sarajevo after the planes were
targeted by Serbian radar. Russia promptly condemned the attacks, which NATO
said were legitimate acts of self-defense.

Serbian forces reportedly continue to retake ground in western Bosnia near
Kljuc, where the Bosnian Army uncovered mass graves apparently containing the
remains of Muslims and Croats massacred by Serbian forces early in the war.

Fighting broke out on October 3 around Trnovo, twenty-two miles south of
Sarajevo. U.N. officials report that Serbian forces initiated the fighting by
firing on Bosnian Army positions. However, the United Nations and senior U.S.
officials condemned the Bosnian Army for using four mortars inside the
Sarajevo exlcusion zone to support its troops to the south.

ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT:

The Croatian government and Serbian forces occupying eastern Slavonia agreed
on October 3 to vague guidelines for further negotiations on the region's
future. The guidelines call for a "transitiona period" for restoring Croatian
sovereignty and control over the region. During this period, of unspecified
duration, the U.N. Security Council would administer the region.
International forces would be stationed in eastern Slavonia to maintain peace
and enforce a final settlement. Zagreb had pledged to liberate the territory
by force if Croatian sovereignty was not restored peaceably by the end of
November.

Chief U.S. Negotiator Richard Holbrooke announced on October 4 that the
Bosnian government had made a "serious cease-fire proposal," which he is now
taking to Belgrade. Neither Holbrooke nor the Bosnian government provided
details of the proposal. Holbrooke is seeking to build on the agreement
reached on September 26 in New York between the Bosnian, Croatian, and
Serbian foreign ministers on a set of general constitutional principles
for a post-settlement Bosnia. Elements of the agreement include the "goal"
of democratic elections, a new presidency, a new parliament, and a new
constitutional court. One third of the seats in each would be reserved for
representatives of a Serbian "entity." Delegates from the Serbian entity
could veto any decisions in both the parliament and the presidency.

ANOTHER CLOSE CALL - by Thomas Warrick

A last minute compromise at the United Nations on July 14 ended another
close call for the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal. For more than two years,
the Tribunal was hostage to an arcane dispute over which of two accounts
should be used to pay for it. The impasse had become so bad that, in April,
UN officials issued ominous pronouncements about the Tribunal's future
operations. On July 14, the permanent members of the Security Council
reached agreement with the G-77 non-aligned countries on a 50/50 split of
the cost. This surprising result took 26 months of tough negotiations.

The latest crisis arose over a dispute within the Fifth Committee of the
General Assembly over whether the Tribunal should be funded out of the
general UN budget or out of the peacekeeping budget. From the start of the
Tribunal in May 1993 until recently, four of the permanent members of the
Security Council - France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States
- argued that the Tribunal should be funded out of the general UN budget.
This is how the United Nations funds the International Court of Justice,
which resolves disputes between governments. The Group of 77, the
developing countries, argued that because the Security Council set up the
Tribunal under the peacekeeping provisions of the UN Charter, the tribunals
should be paid out of the peacekeeping budget.

While secondary to the more important question of the amount of the
Tribunal's budget, that was settled in March, the consequences of this
dispute were potentially serious. The United Nations could not formally
approve the budget until there was agreement on which account should be
used. At worst, without a formally approved budget the Tribunal could
conceivably have had to shut-down . At best, the Tribunal would have had to
operate hand-to-mouth, putting it at the mercy of UN accountants shuffling
money from account to account to keep it going.

After a bitter disagreement on this issue in March of this year, signals
began coming out of NewYork that the UN Controller's office was not
enthusiastic about having to continue to shuffle money in this way. On
April 7, the warnings became more serious. UN ControllerYukio Takasu (in UN
doc. GA/AB/2999) warned the Fifth Committee that, by failing to agree on
this issue, they had"created a precarious situation." The Tribunal's
situation, he said,"could not be described as secure". He went on, "Should
the Secreteary General (meaning, the UN Secretariat) be unable to carry out
all mandated operations (meaning, should the Tribunal not be able to do
what it is supposed to do), it would not be his responsibility." Takasu,
using the diplomatic language required in UN documents, said, ominously,
"Such a precarious financial and staffing situation could hamper its [the
Tribunal's] functioning."

What were the stakes in this long-standing dispute? In dollar terms, the
difference was petty. For the general UN budget, member states contribute
at a "regular" rate roughly proportionate to their national wealth. The
United States, as the wealthiest nation in the world, contributes 25%.
France and Britain, fourth and sixth, respectively, contribute 6.32% and
5.27%. Less developed countries contribute less, 0.01%, of the general
budget.

Peacekeeping, however, is controlled by the Security Council, so the five
permanent members contribute a slightly greater share to the UN
peacekeeping budget. For 1995, the United States, for example, contributes
about 31%. France and Britain contribute about 8% and 6.7%. Less-developed
countries contribute even less to thepeacekeeping budget than to the
regular budget,about 0.001% of the total peacekeeping budget.

Thus, if the Tribunal were funded out of peacekeeping, the permanent
members of the Security Council would pay a little more. Otherwise, if the
tribunals are funded out of the general budget, other countries would pay a
little more. Since the total budget for the Tribunal for -1995 is about
$28.4 million this means that the amount in dispute for the United States
was the difference between 31% and 25% of $28.4 rnillion, or about $1. 7
million. For France and Britain the difference was about $500,000 and
$400,000 respectively. For many countries, the difference was $2,500.

For some countries, the dispute was a matter of pride. Security Council
Resolution 827, which established the Tribunal, had said that the
Tribunal's cost would be borne out of the general UN bud get. To countries
that would have been resentful of the Security Council establishing on its
own a new organ of the United Nations, this was simply too much.To many of
the G-77 nations, the Security Council was trying to usurp the General
Assembly's power over the UN budget. Moreover, by acting through the
Security Council, the big powers had also effectively ensured that their
nationals would never be tried by a similar international tribunal in the
future - an immunity not available to countries lacking a veto in the
Council.

As the impasse over the source of funding for the Tribunal dragged on into
its third year, the Tribunal's supporters, most notably the United States,
were becoming increasingly embarrassed.The G-77, led by India, Mexico and
Brazil, took the position that the Tribunal should be financed 100% from
the peacekeeping budget.The permanent members' position softened. After
March's deadlock, the first offer on the table involved a 50/50 deal for
1995, so that half would come out of peacekeeping from unspent UNPROFOR
funds, and the other half out of the general budget. Future years would
revert to being paid 100% out of the general budget. This turned out to be
unacceptable to the G-77.

In early July, a number of human rights groups and other non-governmental
organisations (NGO's) began to pressure both sides towards a deal. Any
deal, they argued, was better than none. In addition, they argued to the
permanent members, the principle supposedly at stake in funding a UN organ
like the Tribunal out of the general budget had to be balanced against the
greater principles of justice and individual accountability represented by
the Tribunal itself. Failure to agree on such a small issue would have been
difficult for some countries to explain.

In the end, the deal ultimately struck in the 23rd hour was a compromise
that may reflect the Tribunal's true role: half peacekeeping, half regular
UN budget. To the peoples of the formerYugoslavia, the Tribunal is part of
efforts to establish a long-term peace by breaking the cycle of violence.
To the international community, the Tribunal is part of a longer-range
effort to advance the rule of law by hold specific individuals, not just
abstract political entities, accountable for crimes they have committed.
This arrangement will be in effect through at least 1997.

India did get in one twist of the diplomatic knife against the United
States: The Tribunal will appear as a separate budget category, meaning
that the United States contribution for 1995 will not be paid until 1996,
under a procedure adopted by the United States Congress years ago during an
earlier period of budgetary displeasure at the United Nations.

The next budget crisis for the Tribunal is already on their horizon. In
October, the Tribunal will need to submit a budget for the 1996-97 biennium
that the United Nations uses for budgetary purposes. The Tribunal will need
to request a significant increase in its present $28.4 million annual
budget in order to be able to hold more trials and hearings with live
witnesses. (Even if few defendants are apprehended, the Tribunal can still
hold hearings under Rule 61 at which live witnesses may appear to give
testimony.

After a Rule 61 hearing, the judges can issue international arrest warrants
that effectively make the suspect subject to arrest if he so much as sets
foot outside his home country so additional resources will be needed for
bringing witness to The Hague, for mass grave exhumations, for witness
protection, and for forensic services. For budgeting purposes, the Tribunal
also needs to plan for a second courtroom sometime during 1996-97.
Including both the Yugoslavia and Rwanda international Criminal tribunals
the combined budget ought to be on the order of $100 million a year for the
next two years.

To some in the United Nations, doubling the budget for the Tribunal will
seem like a steep increase. However, one just has to think of the money
that could be saved on the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).The
budget for UNPROFOR for calendar 1995 was more than $1.67 billion.The new
UN reaction force was anticipated to cost another $300 million for six
months. To fund both the formerYugoslavia and Rwanda war crimes tribunals
at a rate of$100 million a year would be the equivalent of what UNPROFOR
spent in less than 20 days. It will take a considerable effort to mobilise
international support for adequate funding for the Tribunal. Working in the
Tribunal's favour, at least, is the fact that they know who the war
criminals are.

Tom Warrick, a lawyer in Washington, is former senior counsel to the UN
Commission of Experts