Ironically enough, the weakest link in the chain seems to be the United States, with leaks from their intelligence agencies putting everyone else at risk.

The FVEY collaboration between the United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA), Canada, Australia and New Zealand spans decades. It is a collaborative consortium not replicable by Russia, China, Iran or indeed any other single nation; perfecting the alliance’s mechanisms has taken tremendous funds and much practice. Instead, potential opponents are only left with the option of hacking into this tremendous database, or indeed waiting for WikiLeaks and the likes to do it for them. The difference with said potential opponents is that the Australian government (and indeed the other four partners) has laws and values that make it accountable to its people, whereas some other nations contain relatively uninformed or misinformed populations that do not have debates over social liberties.

The alliance survived that scandal and relationship strain with the US, and will likely survive this latest round of WikiLeaks information release too. Ultimately, the FVEY union is “deep” and unshakeable, too precious to all parties to be jeopardised by leaks. As of March 2017, the public now knows that they can be spied on by FVEY, anywhere in the world, à la Orwell’s 1984. Yet this does not come as a big surprise for most, only a confirmation that there truly is very little privacy left thanks to the cyber realm and all it enables. The privacy vs security debate will only keep raging on.

Meanwhile, further potential cracks from within can also be seen in the UK, with a new set of awkward dilemmas surrounding information sharing on Russia, given the ambiguous Trump-Putin situation. This is amidst allegations that the US intelligence agencies themselves may not necessarily abide by full disclosure with the “new, inexperienced administration.” Starting to hold back intelligence goes against the purpose of the Five Eyes and would certainly be detrimental in the long run for Australia.

The advantages provided by Australia’s membership of the Five Eyes web are many and varied; one could consider, for example, the geographical advantage as to the Asia-Pacific area. Access has been made readily available to bulk data harvested on Australia’s side of the world via undersea cable tapping, and then of course there is the use of physical assets for facilitating the sharing of information gathered online such as Pine Gap among others; Singapore and South Korea have been revealed as regional intelligence sources; and Australian banks have recently decided to join in and allow access to customers’ account details.

America has a strong foothold in Australia, arguably as a ‘way into’ Asia; the reverse is, however, not necessarily true. And while little is known of what tangible benefits Australia gains from the Five Eyes membership, it can be quite difficult to determine to what extent that multilateral arrangement is worth it over other regional opportunities. For example, an extradition treaty between Australia and China has been on hold since 2007, and ten years on, ratification is finally being sought. What this means is that Australia would join the ranks of Spain and France, the only two other Western countries to possess such an agreement – and certainly the first of the Five Eyes.

This deal with China is a two-edged sword: “If Australia learns that a person wanted by Chinese officials is indeed residing in Australia, would Australia be obligated to report that information to the Five Eyes? Reporting such information could impair China’s ability to repatriate that individual to its country if a Five Eyes member has human rights concerns or a particular stake in the person’s extradition.” Where do Australia’s loyalties lie?

Five Eyes membership may come with privileges, but its costs are also substantial for Australia: spying on otherwise friendly nations, remaining limited to similar technology and software – thus being open to the same cyber vulnerabilities, bearing the dark cloud of criticism above the association with the NSA (at home and internationally), tying in by extension in a physical/military capacity, limiting moves with other potential partners on a range of issues, and dealing with constant discussions around oversight.

Ana Stuparu is a PhD Candidate at the Australian National University. Her research examines the relationship between cyber security and national cultures. She has been in Australia since 2009, after completing undergraduate studies in Switzerland. Ana tweets at @anacanard. Image Credit: CC byJaymis Loveday/Flickr.