In the 1950s, 60s and 70s, security experts worried about the spread of nuclear weapons. Now, after decades of academic analysis, some argue that nuclear weapons in more hands may be better. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump suggested the United States might be better off if Japan and South Korea got the bomb. All this raises the question: Should we let the bomb spread?

The authors in this volume present a variety of views. Some favor letting America's allies get nuclear weapons; others say preventing proliferation is more dangerous than allowing it. Still others argue that nonproliferation is more essential to U.S. security than ever before.

Want to get deeper into the debate? This book is the way in.

For hard copies of the Amazon version click here and for digital copies of the SSI version click here.

Published by:

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

For hard copies of the Amazon version click here and for the SSI version here.

Publication History:

NPEC created the first version of Underestimated in November of 2014. A slightly updated version was published by SSI at the end of 2015. On this website is the latest second edition, which includes the very latest citations and a number of minor editorial improvements.

Book Summary:

With the world focused on the nuclear crisis in Iran, it is tempting to think that addressing this case, North Korea, and the problem of nuclear terrorism is all that matters and is what matters most. Perhaps, but if states become more willing to use their nuclear weapons to achieve military advantage, the problem of proliferation will become much more unwieldy. In this case, U.S. security will be hostage not just to North Korea, Iran, or terrorists, but to nuclear proliferation more generally, diplomatic miscalculations, and wars between a much larger number of possible players.

This, in a nutshell, is the premise of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, which explores what we may be up against over the next few decades and how we currently think about this future. Will nuclear weapons spread in the next 20 years to more nations than just North Korea and possibly Iran? How great will the consequences be? What can be done?

In 2009, President Obama spotlighted nuclear terrorism as one of the top threats to international security, launching an international effort to identify, secure, and dispose of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials—namely highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. Since that time, three nuclear security summits have been held, along with scores of studies and workshops (official and unofficial), drawing sustained high-level attention to the threat posed by these materials. However, little attention has been given to incidences where sensitive nuclear materials actually went missing. This volume seeks to correct this deficiency, examining incidences of material unaccounted for (MUF) arising from the U.S. and South African nuclear weapons programs, plutonium gone missing from Japanese and British civilian production facilities, and a theft of highly enriched uranium from a U.S. military contractor in the 1960s that was used to help fuel Israel’s nuclear weapons program. This volume also questions the likelihood that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be able to detect diversions of fissile materials, whether large or small, and the likelihood that a state could or would do anything about the diversion if it was detected. What emerges from this book is an assessment of how likely we are to be able to account for past MUF quantities or to be able to prevent future ones.

This book is published online by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, where it is possible to order hard copies.

Published by:

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

The further proliferation and possible use of nuclear weapons are among the very greatest threats to U.S. and international security, yet most governments and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs and use this optimistic assessment in formulating U.S. and international nuclear trade and nonproliferation policies.

This volume taps the insights and analyses of 13 top nuclear and security experts to weigh the validity of their narrative. The result is a comprehensive counternarrative that recommends a significant tightening of current nonproliferation controls.

This book is published onlineby the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, where it is possible to order hard copies of the book.

Published by:

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

At the height of the Cultural Revolution a Chinese long-range nuclear missile is fired within the country, and the nuclear warhead it is carrying detonates. A French nuclear device is exploded in Algeria during a coup there. The Soviet empire has collapsed, and shots are fired at a Russian crowd intent on rushing a nuclear weapons-laden plane straining to remove a stash of nuclear weapons to a safer locale. Pakistani civilian governments are routinely pushed aside by a powerful, nuclear-armed military that observers worry might yet itself fall prey to a faction willing to seize a portion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. This volume reveals previously unknown details on each case and teases out what is to be learned. This book is ideal not only for policymakers and analysts, but for historians and teachers as well.

The book is published online by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

Published by:

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit,
educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates
policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.