Description:Synthese spans the topics of Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Coverage includes the theory of knowledge; general methodological problems of science, of induction and probability, of causation and the role of mathematics, statistics and logic in science; and the methodological and foundational problems of different sciences. The journal explores symbolic logic and foundations of mathematics relevant to the philosophy and methodology of science; and those facets of the ethics, history and sociology of science which are important for contemporary topical pursuits. The journal focuses on the role of mathematical, logical and linguistic methods in the general methodology of science and the foundations of different sciences.

The journal includes a section on Knowledge, Rationality and Action as a
platform for researchers. The scope of Knowledge, Rationality and Action is
interdisciplinary: it will be of interest to researchers in the fields of
artificial intelligence, agents, computer science, knowledge representation,
game theory, economics, logic, philosophy, mathematics, cognitive science,
cryptography, and auction theory, as well as to application specialists using
formal and mathematical methods and tools.

The "moving wall" represents the time period between the last issue
available in JSTOR and the most recently published issue of a journal.
Moving walls are generally represented in years. In rare instances, a
publisher has elected to have a "zero" moving wall, so their current
issues are available in JSTOR shortly after publication.
Note: In calculating the moving wall, the current year is not counted.
For example, if the current year is 2008 and a journal has a 5 year
moving wall, articles from the year 2002 are available.

Terms Related to the Moving Wall

Fixed walls: Journals with no new volumes being added to the archive.

Absorbed: Journals that are combined with another title.

Complete: Journals that are no longer published or that have been
combined with another title.

Abstract

In this article, I discuss several of the factors that jeopardize our understanding of the nature of qualitative experiences and the mind. I incorporate the view from neuroscience to clarify the naïve view from the first person perspective. I suggest that the most misleading factor in the understanding the nature of the mind and conscious processes is the transparency of experiences and the imperceptibility of the neurobiological processes that realize them. Transparency reflects the biological advantages provided to organisms by avoiding the proliferation of superfluous sensing and the regress implied in sensing the sensors and analyzers ad infinitum. The downside of simplicity and the price for biological efficiency is that through introspection, we cannot perceive the inner workings of the brain. Thus, the view from the first person perspective creates the pervasive illusion that the mind is nonphysical. Sensing the environment requires encoding information into neural surrogates, which I conceive as contingent processes that when incorporated into conscious processes become qualitative experiences. They are cognitive shortcuts with a variable degree of isomorphism, which partially falsify reality. Thus, the what-it-is-like is not the what-it-is. The first person perspective seemings should be corrected by the objective approach provided by neuroscience. To compensate for the contingency of experiences, organisms learn to rely on the aboutness of associated phenomenal concepts. Experiences have high biological value, because even in the absence of language, they allow organisms to make intelligent choices. Qualia are also necessary to ground words and language, which are essential to develop higher forms of cognition.