The non-modular linguistic program called cognitive grammar (CG),
proposed and pursued by Ronald Langacker in the general theory of
cognitive linguistics (cf. Langacker 1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1991a,
1991b, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2008),1 can be best characterized in opposition
to Noam Chomsky's generative grammar (TG), a modular approach to
language. According to Langacker (1987: 35), TG theory represents

a conception of grammatical structure [which] emphasiz[es] discrete
components [and which] naturally encourages the investigator to
focus his attention on phenomena consistent with this type of
organization. He concentrates primarily on prototypical instances
from each component, where the distinctions seem readily apparent,
and tends to overlook any data that do not fit neatly into the
pre-established boxes. [...] A case in point is the putative
distinction between syntax and lexicon. In the classic conception
(now considerably modified), syntax was thought to deal with novel,
multiword expressions (phrases, clauses, and sentences) assembled
in accordance with general rules. Lexicon was the province of fixed
expressions, most no larger than single words; not predictable by
rules of any generality, they had to be listed individually. The
two classes of phenomena thus stood sharply opposed with respect to
novelty, generality and size.

The sharp opposition between lexicon and syntax has led to a
situation where, as Langacker notes, "a large body of data fitting
neither category would be mostly ignored" (ibid.). A case in point
is idiomatic language, which includes various stock phrases,
collocations and formulaic expressions. Because in each language one can
find a huge number of such conventional expressions, "knowing them
is essential to speaking it well" (ibid.). This is why

a seemingly perfect knowledge of the grammar of a language (in the
narrow sense) does not guarantee fluency; learning its full complement
of conventional expressions is probably by far the largest task involved
in mastering it (ibid.).

Naturally, "the knowledge of conventional expressions"
can hardly be wholly accounted for by means of rules, which are a sine
qua non of the generalization postulate embraced by generative grammar.
Yet, the generalization postulate itself should not be treated as a
dogma, for, according to cognitivists, this postulate is based on the
misguided belief--on the so-called rule-list fallacy. Langacker (1987:
41) comments:

The reluctance of generative grammarians to concern themselves
seriously with conventional expressions is largely inspired by
their abhorrence of lists. [.] It would be fallacious, however, to
invoke the principle of economy to argue that conventional
expressions should not be listed in a grammar--one could just as
well argue that phonology should be excluded from a linguistic
description because a grammar containing a phonological component
is more complex than a grammar without one.

Because, as Langacker observes, the principal goal of generative
grammar was to achieve the economy of description and thus to capture
"significant linguistic generalizations," it was hoped that,
by capturing these generalizations, a particular statement could be
eliminated from the grammar in favor of a much smaller number of rules.
However, this line of thought, which illustrates the rule/list fallacy,
is misguided because, in Langacker's view (p. 41),

one is forced to choose between rules and lists: the options are
posed as rules alone vs. lists alone. If these are the only
options, it can be argued that the rules must be chosen, for lists
by themselves do not express generalizations. There is in reality a
third choice, however, both rules and lists.

In what follows we shall demonstrate how a non-modular approach to
language structure such as cognitive grammar captures generalizations
without falling into the trap of the rule-list fallacy.

2. The continuum of linguistic units

In accordance with Langacker's theory of cognitive grammar, a
linguistic expression of any size is claimed to have a bipolar structure
made up of the semantic pole--[S] (symbolized by capital letters) and
the phonological pole--[p] (small letters), as shown in (1) (cf.
Langacker 2005):

(1)

The pairing of [S] and [p] presupposes a continuum of linguistic
units , which we present, after Dirven and Verspoor (2004: 70; modified)
as follows:

The continuum of linguistic units thesis can best be illustrated by
a Polish expression such as piikapodstotem 'the ball under the
table', whose cognitive/semantic structure and the so-called
elaborative relations, holding between the component structures at
different levels of conceptual integration, are shown in (3) below (cf.
Kardela 2000: 16):

(3)

Dotted lines are correspondences; the lines and all figures in bold
are profiles, and the symbols tr and lm are salient substructures within
so-called relational profiles. Solid arrows symbolize elaborations of
more schematic structures by less schematic structures. At the lowest
level of conceptual organization, the component structure [STOL]
elaborates the maximally schematic structure of the [INST] case. At a
higher level of conceptual integration, the composite structure
[STOL-EM-INST] elaborates the structure of [POD]; the "highest
order structure" [PILKA-POD-STOL-EM] is a direct result of the
elaboration by [POD-STOL-EM] of the structure [PILKA].

What needs to be emphasized is the way the grammatical cases are
treated by cognitive linguistics. According to cognitivists, cases
(here: the Instrumental case) are claimed to have meanings in heir own
right, forming a network of interrelated senses which are organized in
terms of radial categories (for a discussion of radial categories, see,
for example, Lakoff (1987) and Taylor (1989). Thus the
preposition-governed Instrumental case expressing Location, which
appears in phrases such as pitka pod stotem, is held to be a variant of
the Instrumental case, the latter being defined by Janda (1993:181) as a
case in the cognitive structure of which "an instrumental acts on
an accusative in a setting." The meanings of the Instrumental case,
including the commitative sense, found in the expression pitka pod
stotem, can be presented as follows (Janda 1993):

(4)

Naturally, it is not only instrumental case but all other cases as
well are held to form networks of interrelated senses. Consider, for
instance the so-called Ethical Dative, one of the variants of the Free
Dative as shown in (5), which appears in sentences such as (6):

(5)

(6) Tylko mi-DAT nie choruj!

Do not fall ill (for me/on my account)!

As noted by Janda (1993: 83), the use of the Ethical Dative is
"largely subjective (pragmatic) [in that] it is a device employed
by the speaker to capture the hearer's attention." What the
speaker does in this case is "map the case relationship [by the
above schema] onto the speech act domain, using the dative sphere to
claim the existence of a relationship between the hearer and the
narrated event. [...] the speaker projects this sort of a dative
relationship onto his interlocutor in order to involve him in his
narration" (ibid.). In order to see how "the speaker involves
the hearer in his narration," we have to introduce the notion of
so-called personal sphere, one of the cognitive principles held to
structure the meanings of morphological cases in general and the dative
senses in particular.

"Personal sphere" can be defined as a "mental sphere
which consists of persons, objects, localisations and facts so closely
connected with a given person, who is called the target person, that
"any change which these objects, facts and persons undergo will
directly or indirectly affect the target person" (cf. Dabrowska
1997: 17). Generally, as argued by Dabrowska, the use of the dative
signals that one's own sphere--the private sphere, sphere of
influence or sphere of potency--has been infringed. We can present,
after Dabrowska (1997: 65; modified), the personal sphere as follows:

(7)

The importance of personal sphere as a theoretical construct can
best be illustrated with the following examples involving the Polish
dative (source: Dabrowska 1997: Chapter 2):

The message conveyed in (8a) and (8b) is that Peter crashed
Robert's car; however there is a slight difference in meaning
between the (a) and (b) examples: the utterance in which the NP Robert
is expressed in the dative stresses the fact that Robert was affected by
the crash to a greater extent, that, for example, he will not be able to
use the car for some time. The difference between (9) and (10) on the
other hand is that in (9) the degree of affectedness of the target
person is more intensive than that in (10): the washing of Robert's
hair affects Robert to a greater extent than the switching off the light
does to Ola. The inappropriateness of (11b) stems from the fact that
looking into somebody's newspaper, unlike looking into
somebody's drawer, has no effect on the target person (here:
Johny). (12) illustrates the lack of control over one's action. As
noted by Dabrowska (ibid.: 37), "the loss of control [here] counts
as an infringement of the sphere of potency, thus opening the way for a
dative construal. The dative case thus replaces the nominative when the
most prominent participant is unable to act." The example in (13)
reports the breach of the target person's privacy, hence the use of
the dative form mu 'to him'. Finally, we have (14), which is a
typical example of the use of the Ethical Dative.

Given that the Ethical Dative is, as Dabrowska notes, closely
connected with the sphere of empathy (which is "close" to the
target person's body;" cf. (7)), it follows that the degree of
"affectedness" of the target person in this case will be
relatively stronger than in the case, say, when the dative evokes the
sphere of influence. (2)

3. The semasiological and onomasiological perspectives on the
form-meaning relation

Generally speaking, the meaning of a linguistic expression can be
studied from two perspectives: from the semasiological point of view and
from the onomasiological perspective. As noted by Grondelaers, Speelman
and Geeraerts (2010: 989), who quote Baldinger (1980: 278), whereas
"semasiology ... considers the isolated word and the way its
meanings are manifested, [...] onomasiology looks at the designations of
a particular concept, that is at a multiplicity of expressions which
form a whole ([Baldinger] 1980: 278). The distinction between
semasiology and onomasiology, the authors observe (2010: 989),
"equals the distinction between meaning and naming: semasiology
takes its starting point in the word as a form and charts the meanings
that the word can occur with; onomasiology takes its starting point in a
concept or referent and investigates by which different expressions the
concept or referent can be designated or named."

"What is the purpose of onomasiological analysis?,"
Dirven and Verspoor (2004) ask. And they answer:

The main purpose of onomasiological analysis is to discover
patterns in a group of conceptually related words, called a lexical
field. A lexical field is a collection of words that all name things in
the same conceptual domain. Thus words such as breakfast, lunch and
brunch are related and belong to the same lexical field because they all
name things in the domain of "meals". A conceptual domain, in
its turn, can be defined as any coherent area of conceptualization such
as meals, space, smell, colour, articles of dress, the human body, the
rules of football, etc., etc. (Dirven and Verspoor 2004: 37).

One of the best known representatives of onomasiological studies is
no doubt Milos Dokulil, whose theory of onomasiology has had an enormous
impact on modern onomasiological research. The basic concept of
Dokulil's theory is the notion of onomasiological category, a
category which offers a means of structuring those parts of a given
concept that are "pointed to" or "named" by the
expressions used by the speaker. In Dokulil's theory,
onomasiological categories possess a dual structure: an onomasiological
base and an onomasiological mark. The onomasiological base is a
collection of concepts and their functions which designate (or refer) to
a class of objects or phenomena of which a given object or phenomenon to
be named is part of, while the onomasiological mark is this part of
linguistic unit which explicitly points to the (part of) of the concept
to be named. In the case of taxi-driver, for instance, the
onomasiological base is driver, because the concept of DRIVER is common
to the whole conceptual 'grouping' of different kinds of
drivers, e.g. truck-driver, locomotive driver, bus-driver, tram-driver,
etc., while the concept's respective onomasiological marks are
truck, locomotive, bus and tram. In contrast to the base, which is, as a
rule, "simple", the mark can be either simple or complex. Thus
whereas in the case of taxi-driver, taxi is a complex mark because it
specifies the object of the action DRIVE (taxi-driver = 'sb. drives
a taxi', in the case of driver, the ACTION ('sb. drives')
is conceptualized with no reference to the object of the activity of
driving.

In Dokulil's' theory all onomasiological structure is
defined with respect to four basic types of conceptual categories:
SUBSTANCE, ACTION, QUALITY, CIRCUMSTANCE, which form the onomasiological
base, and in relation to the motive, i.e. "the determining element
of mark". Thus the concept of the category SUBSTANCE, for instance,
can be defined by its relation to the category ACTION (worker--work),
QUALITY (anxiety--anxious) or CIRCUMSTANCE (cinema goer--sb goes to the
(place called) cinema).) (For a succinct presentation of Dokulil's
theory, as well as the whole onomasiological research, including his
own, see Stekauer 2005.)

Now, because, as Langacker (1987: 11) notes, "cognitive
grammar embraces the spirit of classic Saussurean diagrams [representing
the linguistic sign--H.K]," one may reasonably expect that the
cognitive theory should be able to account for the signifier-signified
relation in a principled way. In particular, the theory should, in
contrast to the Saussurean theory of linguistic sign, account for
linguistic units extending far beyond morphemes and words, and thus--in
view of the semasiology-onomasiology distinction--it should be able to
provide a much richer account of the signifier-signified relation.

Perhaps the best exemplification of the "extended"
signifier-signified relation is the postulation by cognitive grammar of
the so-called compositional path, i.e., a path along which smaller
linguistic units are assembled to form larger, composite linguistic
units. The compositional path of pencil sharpener, for instance, looks
as follows (Langacker 1988: 25):

(15)

The figure in (15) shows the way in which the phonological and
semantic poles of categorial schemas (THING/X, PROCESS/Y, ER/er
(schematic conceptualization for Instrument) and EN/en (schematic
representation of "deadjectival process") are elaborated by
the respective component structures:
PENCIL/pencil-SHARP/sharp-EN/en-ER/er.

But what exactly is the nature of the [S]/[p] relation in composite
structures such as (15)? Assuming as Langacker does, that the relations
between the semantic and phonological poles of an expression involve
composition--c, integration--i and symbolization--s, in the case of a
composite expression like jar lid, for instance, the relations are as
follows (Langacker 2008: 162):

(16)

The picture of the relations in (16) becomes much more complex when
the semasiological and onomasiological perspectives on expressions'
meanings are taken into account, that is, when an attempt is made to
account for both the polysemy (semasiology) and the synonymy
(onomasiology) of jar lid. Suppose, for instance, that the expression
jar-lid is used (disrespectfully) in the sense of 'coffin lid'
or in (the somewhat twisted) sense 'anti-civil rights policies
(implemented by the government)', as in (17):

(17) The tight jar lid was loosened a bit by the communist regime
so that the Polish audience could finally see Slawomir Mrozek's
play Immigrants.

Seen from the semasiological and onomasiological perspectives,
these two extended meanings of jar lid, i.e., [COFFIN LID] and
[ANTI-CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES (IMPLEMENTED BY GOVERNMENT)] and the
"synonymous expressions" such as coffin lid and anti-civil
rights policies, might take the shape of a "3-D schematic
structure" as shown in (18):

(18)

Still, the figure in (18) does not do justice to the complexity of
the semasio-onomasiological relations. (3) The table given below, from
Dirven and Verspoor (2004: 41), illustrates the complex nature of these
relations:

In what follows, we shall discuss, based on (19), the cognitive
processes that, as we see them, are associated with either a
semasiological or onomasiological perspective.

4. Metaphor, metonymy and conceptual blending in word formation

Consider first the network of interrelated senses, associated with
the semasiological perspective, for the -er suffix in English, as given
in Panther and Thornburg (2003: 297; henceforth PT).

(20) The network of interrelated senses of the -er suffix:

According to PT, the central sense associated with - er is
'professional human agent', which has a number of metaphoric
and metonymic extensions, including 'human experiencer',
'human possessor', 'human like plants' (both
possessing, through metaphorical extensions, agent-like properties),
'purpose location', 'instrument' (exhibiting
agent-like properties), 'quasi-instruments (denoting 'articles
of clothing worn by an agent when involved in a particular action',
etc.

An example which illustrates fairly well the complexity of the
semasiological relations is an expression such as hoofer
'professional vaudeville/chorus dancer'. According to PT,
while the -er suffix is associated with the meaning 'professional
human agent', the nominal base [HOOF] opens access, via
metaphorical and metonymic mappings, to the sense 'professional
activity'. Consider (PT: 289):

(21)

Still, as noted by PT, the sense creation in the case of hoofer is
even more complex as the encircled part of the above diagram itself
contains a more elaborate structure, which can be represented as follows
(PT, 290):

(22)

The rounded boxes stand for the source and the target domain in the
metaphorical relation involving the conceptual structure of hoof. The
horizontal arrows symbolize correspondences between people and animals
captured by the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor. Within the source domain
the concept HOOF, part of the body of ungulate animals, is elaborated
and is linked, via the metonymic relation, to the trampling movement of
these animals. This movement, in turn, metonymically evokes the
expectation of noise produced on a hard surface. It is precisely these
features of the source domain, metonymically evoked, PT note, that are
metaphorically related to the target domain FOOT, providing in this way,
together with the metonymic schema in (22), the structure to the entire
concept of HOOFER.

Now, as stated in (19), metonymic relations are held to obtain not
only in the case of semasiology, but in the case of onomasiology as
well. The role of these two relations in this case is different,
however. In contrast to the semasiology-based metaphor and metonymy, the
metaphor and metonymy in the onomasiology-related word formation process
structure this part of the concept which is named by the synonym used.
This requires a comment.

It will be recalled that, when formulating the goals of
onomasiological theory, Dirven and Verspoor made reference to the notion
of "conceptual domain", defining it as "any coherent area
of conceptualization such as meals, space, smell, colour, articles of
dress, the human body, the rules of football, etc" (cf. the
quotation above). It is precisely some portions of such a domain-- say,
the cognitive domain 'meals'--that, as Dirven and Verspoor
claim, are "named" by expressions such as, lunch, breakfast
and brunch.

While one can hardly question the basic tenets of this analysis, a
slight modification of the notion of 'cognitive domain' as
used by the authors is called for. In particular, what Dirven and
Verspoor call a 'cognitive domain' appears to correspond to
what Langacker (1988b) calls a matrix domain, i.e. a cluster of domains.
Indeed, because a 'cognitive domain of meals' or a
'cognitive domain of the human body' are complex concepts, it
is more appropriate, it seems, to refer to such concepts as "matrix
domains" or, as we will call them here--matrix concepts (MC). Thus,
given a matrix concept of [WORK], the English suffix -er can be claimed
to "name" (or: (en)code)) the "agentive part" of
this MC; the suffixes -un and -able, found, for instance, in the
expression unworkable, could be said to jointly "name" a
"privative" part of the MC, say, [LACK OF POSSIBILITY OF BEING
WORKED OUT]; and the noun phrase hard work could be seen as encoding
this part of the MC which relates to the [QUALITY OF WORK].

Now, because "the part of the concept that is named by a given
(synonymous) form" is structured in terms of (cognitive) metonymy
(as stated in (19)), we have to define the term "metonymy"
first. Following Janda (2011: 360), we define this term as "an
inferential relationship between two concepts: a source concept [...]
which provides mental access to a target concept in a given
context" (cf. Radden 2009). This being the case, we assume,
following Janda again, that (i) the source is associated with the source
words on which the derivation is based, (ii) the context for the
metonymic relationship is created by the affix, and (iii) the target is
the concept which corresponds to the derived word.

In conjunction with this, consider now the following "naming
functions" of the suffix Czech suffix -nik, discussed in Janda
(2011: 379):

Now, if, as Janda claims, "the context for the metonymic
relationship is the affix" (p. 360), then we can take the affix to
be precisely "this part of linguistic unit which, together with the
word's stem, explicitly points to the (part of) of the concept to
be named. " Thus, on this analysis, -nik in the derivative
sluzebnik 'servant' can be said to be capable of pointing to
this part of the Czech matrix concept [SLUZBA/SERVICE] which is
structured by the ABSTRACTION FOR ENTITY metonymy; in the case of
chodnlk 'sidewalk', -nik can be held to name this part of the
matrix concept [CHODIT/WALK] which is structured by the ACTION FOR
LOCATION metonymy; and, finally, -nik in zlatnik 'goldsmith',
can be said to relate to this part of the matrix concept [ZLATY/GOLD]
which is structured by the MATERIAL FOR AGENT metonymy.

Let us note in passing that although Janda does not address the
semasiology- onomasiology distinction directly, she offers a critique of
Milos Dokulil's theory, stating that (p.366)

[In] some ways, [Dokulil's] model is parallel to the one I advance
[...]. Dokulil presents a set of terms used to define the
relationships between the "mark" (= source) and the base (=
target), and he analyzes derived words in terms of "onomasiological
types", which contain a semantic relationship, a word-class
relationship, and an affix. However, Dokulil's set of terms is very
small and very abstract, consisting of only four terms: "substance"
(substantives), quality (adjectives), "action (verbs), and
"circumstance" (adverbs). Dokulil thus conflates the semantic and
the word-class aspects of word-formation, rather than trying to
tease them apart. He claims that all relationships are
bi-directional, but the resulting sixteen possible are illustrated
by only a handful of examples.

Janda's critique of the alleged "small and abstract
number" of Dokulil's "set of terms" most certainly
does not apply to the impressive list of so-called conceptual categories
involved in the onomasiological naming processes in Polish, proposed by
Grzegorczykowa and Szymanek (2001); also Szymanek (1988). According to
these authors, the set of conceptual categories includes:

Turning now to the metaphor-related onomasiological aspect of word
formation as stated in (19), note first that, according to cognitive
linguistics, we use one domain of the metaphor, the so- called source
domain, to structure another domain of the metaphor, the so-called
target domain (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987,
Kovecses 1986). In the case of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, for
instance, we structure the concept of LOVE (target domain) in terms of
the concept JOURNEY (source domain), and in the case of ANGER IS HEAT OF
A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, we structure the concept of ANGER in terms of
the concept of HOT FLUID (IN A CONTANER). But on what grounds can we
really postulate the existence of such cognitive metaphors? According to
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the evidence for such metaphors comes from a
huge number of expressions we find in every day language. Thus, in the
case of LOVE we have expressions such as our marriage is on the rocks,
look how far we have gone, etc., which appear to point to the "ups
and downs" of love relationships (just as they point to the
"twists and turns" of a journey) and in the case of ANGER, one
has expressions such as explode, boil with anger, etc., which
"name" the "explosive character" of this emotion.
Seen from the onomasiological point of view, the aforementioned
expressions should be seen as naming this part of the concept of ANGER
which structures its "explosive character", i.e., in terms of
the HOT FLUID (IN A CONTANER) metaphor. (4)

Finally, let us take a look at the blending process, which appears
to be primarily associated with the onomasiological perspective. In
conjunction with this, consider once again expressions such as jar lid
and pencil sharpener. These expressions represent rather simple cases of
concatenative morphology, where each morpheme exhibits an [S]-[p]
symmetry, that is, where one to one correspondence obtains between the
expressions' semantic and phonological poles. Yet, it is obvious
that many morphological formations do not exhibit this kind of symmetry.
A case in point are non-concatenative formations such as blends. In the
case of motel, for example, the semantic pole of this expression
consists of two units: [MOTOR] and [HOTEL], while its phonological pole,
of one unit only as motel is a monomorphemic word. (5)

Still, more complex cases of blends are represented by expressions
such as glitterati and swooshtica. Figure (25) represents the conceptual
integration (and composition) of two concepts (and meanings), [GLITTER]
and [LITTERATI] (Kemmer 2003: 84), while the figure in (8) shows what
happens at the phonological pole of swooshtica, when two morphemes
swoosh and swastika are integrated (Kemmer 2003: 82):

(25) Glitterati: the conceptual integration process

(26) Swooshtica: the phonological "overlap"

Figures (25 and (26) show the essential properties of the blends.
Figure (25) represents the conceptual integration of two mental spaces
associated with the concept (and the word) 'glitterati', i.e.,
the mental space relating of glitter and the mental space of litterati,
(cf. Kemmer, 84); figure (26), in turn, shows the integration of
segments at the phonological pole of the blend swooshtica: swoosh and
swastika (Kemmer, 82). Notice also that in the case of the conceptual
integration and in the case of "phonological integration" the
resultant blends contain elements that are absent in either of the input
spaces. In the case of glitterati, the blend contains such elements as
HOLLYWOOD, ENTERTAINMENT, SHOW BUSINESS (but lacks now LITERARY PEOPLE,
KNOWLEDGE). In the case of swooshtica, we have a phonological overlap: a
number of segments appearing initially in swoosh and swastika are now
gone; what is new are the phonological relations established between the
sequence of the vowels and the cluster sw, the relations that are only
partly based on syllabic segments.

5. Cognitive syntax: The construal of events

Since in Ronald Langacker's model of cognitive grammar
linguistic units are claimed to consist of the semantic and phonological
poles, with the symbolic relations holding between them, the obvious
question to be asked is: Where is syntax in cognitive grammar?

From our discussion it should be apparent by now that cognitive
linguistics embraces a much broader view of syntax than the generative
theory does. In contrast to the generative grammar's treatment of
syntax, the role of syntax in cognitive linguistics is to combine entire
linguistic units, with both their phonological and semantic/cognitive
poles. In what follows we take a look at the "cognitive
syntax" of the event structure of Polish clauses involving the
reflexive pronoun sic/siebie.

Generally speaking, an event can be viewed from two perspectives:
from the energy chain perspective (or force dynamics perspective) and
from the absolute (or zero construal) standpoint. Under the force
dynamics construal, an event is held to involve the flow of energy which
is transmitted from one participant to another (Langacker 1991b: 283):

(27)

The initial element of the chain, which is called the head of the
chain, transmits energy to the second element in the chain, the second
element imparts this energy to the third until the last element of the
chain, the tail, is arrived at. The energy chain, presented in (27),
gives rise to the so-called canonical event model, which underlies the
prototypical transitive construction and which, as Langacker (1991b:
285, 286) puts it, represents "the normal observation of a
prototypical action":

(28)

The canonical event model includes elements which provide
specifications for semantic roles such as agent, patient, instrument,
experiencer, etc. (6)

The energy chain plays a fundamental role in the characterization
of grammatical categories such as subject and object. Depending on which
part of the chain is profiled, i.e. which part is "made
salient", the subject can be seen to code an agent, a patient or an
instrument. Consider (Langacker 1991b: 333; also Ungerer and Schmid
1996: 176)

(29)

Notice that when the whole chain is profiled, then the agent
becomes a subject and the patient, an object, as in (29a). When the
instrument and patient plus the flow of energy between them are
profiled, then the instrument is a subject, while the patient becomes
the object (cf. 29b). Finally, when the last part of the energy chain,
i.e. the patient is profiled, then the patient becomes the subject, as
in (29c).

As already mentioned, the canonical event model, given in (28),
represents the prototypical transitive construction: the participant,
who is typically an agent, initiates the energy which is transmitted
onto the Patient. However, there exist constructions which depart from
their transitive prototype in that they form a hierarchical organization
in which each instance of such departure represents a "less
transitive" type. The departures from the prototype, which are
marked, inter alia, by the presence of a reflexive, form a cline (cf.
Maldonado 1992: 63):

According to this hierarchy, the most prototypical transitive
construction is (31), since the energy flows from the agent, which is
coded as a subject uczniowie, to the patient, which is coded by the
direct object, ksiqzkc. A less prototypical construction is (32), in
which one participant is coded by both the subject, ja 'I',
and the reflexive siebie 'myself. Finally, the least prototypical
is (34), in which only one participant appears. The absolute construal
construction in (35) ends the hierarchy; it codes the scene in the
"most neutral terms" and is a point of departure for the
alternative way of viewing an event, namely, through the prism of the
absolute construal of events.

Consider now the following examples:

(36)a. Kiedy leje jak z cebra dzieci bawia sie w domu.

When it pours with rain, the children play indoors.

b. * Kiedy sic rozleje jak z cebra dzieci bcda bawic sic w domu.

(37) Mleko sie rozlalo po kuchence.

The milk spilled all over the cooker.

(36a) exemplifies the absolute construal of events: the scene of
raining is construed as a normal weather phenomenon, with no reference
as to whether the rainfall was expected or not; (36a) thus can be seen
as providing the most "neutral" description of the event of
raining. The ungrammaticality of (36b) stems precisely from the fact
that, contrary to expectations, natural static forces of nature such as
rainfall are portrayed as gathering "dynamicity". In contrast,
it is perfectly natural to view (37) as involving an element of
dynamicity, since the event of the milk spilling creates a sense of
unexpectedness. What signals this dynamicity is the reflexive sic, as
the following contrast documents (cf. Kardela 2003: 683):

(38) * a. Nagle padalo-Imperf.

Suddenly it rained.

b. Nagle sic rozpadalo-Perf.

Suddenly it (started to) rain(ed).

(38a) is an equivalent of (37a), the ungrammaticality of which
stems from the fact that the absolute construal is
"unnaturally" dynamicised by the presence of the adverb nagle
"suddenly". In contrast, the adverb nagle is perfectly
legitimate in sentence (38b) because it portrays the suddenness of the
rainfall.

In order to account for the contrast in (38a-b), we have to
introduce the notion of upstream flow of energy. Thus note that whereas
in the energy chain, presented in (28), the energy flows
"down-stream", from the agent to the patient, the energy in
the absolute construal flows "up-stream". This is so because
the causer which "dynamicises" the event comes "from
outside". One way of accounting for this process is to assume that
the causation involved here is determined by the principle of A/D
functional layering. This requires a comment.

In Langacker's theory of cognitive grammar, the combination of
any two linguistic units which stand in the so-called valence
relationship, is subject to A/D asymmetry, where one of these units is
autonomous, while the other is dependent. The notion of dependence is
defined by Langacker as follows:

(39) Dependence (Langacker 1987: 300)

One structure, D, is dependent on the other, A, to the extent that
A constitutes an elaboration of a salient substructure of D.

David Tuggy (1992: 242) explains:

[The A/D parameter] can be understood as the extent to which one
structure can be conceived of independently of its syntagmatically
linked partner. An autonomous structure does not need its partner
in order to be a complete concept, whereas a dependent structure is
incomplete, and its partner supplies what is lacking to complete
it.

A/D asymmetry is one of the basic cognitive principles that
organize all of linguistic structure. In accordance with this principle,
in the stem-affix combination, for instance, the stems are treated as
autonomous, while affixes, as dependent elements in that they "need
a partner to form a complete concept." As we will show in a moment,
the A/D principle applies not only to morphological structure (cf.
Kardela 2000), but also, in the case of the absolute construal of
events, it applies to syntax and semantics as well. Before we go on
though, it is necessary to briefly digress on the nature of semantic
relations involving this construal.

In Langacker (1991a, 1991b) a distinction is made between thematic
relations and thematic relationships. Whereas the former term is used to
cover any semantic role such as agent, patient, instrument, etc., the
latter refers to conceptually autonomous event components and thematic
roles which instantiate these relationships, excluding the roles of
agent or instrument. The thematic roles which enter into thematic
relationships can be represented as follows (Langacker 1991b: 288):

(40)

Given the distinction between thematic relations on the one hand
and thematic relationships (and thematic roles) on the other, an event
can, as already mentioned, be looked upon from two perspectives: from
the force-dynamic construal, represented by the flow-of-energy chain
(cf. (27), (28) and (29)), and from the point of development of the
action itself, involving the absolute construal. In the latter case one
starts with the theme itself, the "minimal action structure,"
and by functionally elaborating the successive layers of such a
relationship (i.e. by making reference to causation and energy flow),
one can arrive at the full thematic relationship. Specifically, starting
with the autonomous core of action and adding a conceptually dependent
layer of causation involving a participant which supplies energy, we can
expand in this way the description of the event, from the absolute
autonomous construal to a fully fledged force- dynamics dependent
structure. The A/D asymmetry based on the functional layering so defined
can be represented by the following formula (Langacker 1991b: 292):

T represents a thematic relationship, i.e. a role such as theme
(which can be represented by the thematic role of zero, mover, patient,
experiencer), and E which stands for the energy responsible for the
process. (8)

Consider now the following sentences:

(42) a. The dry moss caught fire.

b. A piece of broken glass set the dry moss on fire.

c. Mark used a piece of broken glass to set fire to the dry moss.

d. Peter persuaded Mark to set fire to the dry moss with a piece of
broken glass.

An event whose functional structure is elaborated to the greatest
degree (i.e. E4(E3(E2 (E1(T))))) is exemplified by (42d) and (42c),
while an event described in absolute (or zero) terms (which involves
only (T)), is given by (42a). By adding successive layers of causation
to the event portrayed as the absolute construal (cf. (42a)), the
structures of the events involved become more elaborate which, as
already remarked, enables one to describe the events in terms of force
dynamics. One might say that structures such as (42c) and (42d) which
are arrived at in this way (i.e. by "ascending"--via
causation--the energetic chain) meet those "descending" the
detransitivization scale (see the examples in (31) through (35).

With this in mind, we can now return to Polish data. Consider now
the following dynamicity hierarchy for Polish middles (cf. Kardela 2000:
197)

(44(i)) represents cases of an absolute construal, with no energy
input. The activity of John's taking a nap is described without
taking into account all the circumstances accompanying this activity. In
(ii) John does not have control over his activities: he is dozing off or
slipping on the wet floor regardless of his will. (44(iii)) involves
construals which suggest some energy control: John willfully takes a
walk round the city, visiting the churches. Finally, in (44(iv)), which
involves the sequence of the emphatic sam and the heavy reflexive
siebie, the activity depicted leads to a counter-to-expectation change:
(44(v)) could, for instance, be said of a person (here John) who, even
to his own surprise, performed very well at the concert, playing the
violin.

Now, the obvious question to ask is: Why do we need a dual
perspective on event structure? One of the reasons has to do with the
appearance of the reflexive sic in the context of causality (see
Grzegorczykowa 1996, for a discussion of causation in Polish involving
the reflexive sic). We have already seen that a reflexive pronoun in
Polish (as well as in Slavic and Romance languages) is a marker of the
deagentivisation process, where a construction containing a reflexive
loses its transitive character (cf. (31) through (35)) However, a
reflexive in Polish (and in many other languages) can have an opposite
function: it can be a marker of the causation process, which involves
the absolute construal of events and the upstream flow of energy.

(45a) is ambiguous, it can either mean (45b), i.e. that Mary did
the dying herself without going to a hairdresser's, or (45c), in
which case the hairdresser did the actual dying for Mary. Observe now
that in the first case we have an energetic chain construal, where the
reflexive sobie marks the departure of the transitive construction from
its prototype. The reflexive here functions as a de-agentivizer
(detransitivizer). On the second reading, (45a) must be treated as a
causative construction, with the hairdresser being the causer of the
dying. Here the reflexive functions as a causitivizer. It is obvious
then that these two ways of looking at the event of dying are not
equivalent: in (45b) Marysia is an agent and still performs the
activity, while in (45b) the causer of this activity is the hairdresser,
not Marysia.

Turning to (46), observe that (46a) has an energetic construal:
woda 'the water' is a patient/theme. Because only this role is
profiled here, woda is coded as the subject of the sentence (cf. (29b).
The addition of sic in (46b) changes the whole configuration: the verb
becomes "transitivized" and wanna 'the tub', not
woda, becomes its subject. More importantly, this means that (46b) could
never be derived via the energy chain construal because on this
construal, only an agent or instrument are held to belong to the source
domain and thus induce changes in the patient. Finally, (46c) is a case
of a typical causative construction with a causative verbpozwolic
(przelewac sic) 'let (it overflow)'.

Following Maldonado's (1993) analysis of dynamic construals in
Spanish, we would like to claim that the function of sic in
constructions such as wanna sic przelewa 'the bathtub
overflows' is to impart dynamicity and "unexpectedness"
to the absolute construal of a scene. The event thus described acquires
a quality of accidentality and, as Maldonado puts, it "goes counter
to the expected conceptualization." (See the discussion in
Maldonado (1993: 551) of examples such as El tejado se llovio 'The
ceiling got rained through' [lit. The ceiling rained], La banera se
salio 'Watter dripped out of the bathtub [lit. The bathtub went
out].)

To conclude, the upstream flow of energy (cf. (41), (42), (43)
(44)) correlates with the appearance of the reflexive clitic se/sic,
which is a reflection of the dynamicity process. The process starts with
absolute construal constructions such as (35) or (44(i)), through a
middle construction such as (34) and gathers in strength "the
higher we get" on the dynamicity hierarchy. Note again that the
greatest degree of dynamicisation in (44) display the Polish middles
involving "the counter-to-expectation energy impact". The
unexpectedness of the event in Jan przeszedl sam siebie 'John
surprised him himself [lit. John himself went beyond himself], for
instance, is marked by the presence of two reflexive forms: the emphatic
sam 'all by himself and the reflexive siebie (9)

6. Conclusion

If one were to propose, appropriately enough in a cognitive
context, a metaphor which could aptly describe a non-modular approach to
linguistic structure, a suitable metaphor in this case would no doubt be
the metaphor of 'cake slicing'. That is, in a non-modular
approach, linguistic structure is expected to be cross-cut so that each,
even the smallest meaningful linguistic element, becomes a
well-structured linguistic unit which is held to involve all
"levels" of conceptual organization, including the unit's
phonological structure, its morphology, syntax, semantics and
pragmatics. This can be envisaged, in the form of a 3-D structure, as
follows (cf.(18)):

(47) The 3-D schematic structure of a linguistic continuum

Naturally, this "3-D cross-cut" of the form-meaning
gestalt is, as we hope to have shown, a well- organized structure.
Underlying the form-meaning relation in this gestalt are cognitive
processes and principles including conceptual integration, metaphor,
metonymy, A/D asymmetry, personal sphere as well as the deagentivization
and dynamicization processes associated with the construal of events.

The emphatic use of the dative pronoun is possible only when the
relationship between the nominative and the dative participant is so
close that the dative participant shares all the emotions of the
nominative participant. The archetype of this kind of relationship is
that between a mother and her young child; the relationship between
lovers would also be a good example. The close emotional link motivates
the use of the dative case, since the dative participant is seen as
affected by anything that happens to the nominative participant: the
latter is in the former's sphere of empathy, another subregion of
the personal sphere. The main difference between this use of the dative
case and lexically governed and non-pronominal free datives is that in
this case, information about inclusion in the personal sphere is not
stated explicitly in the sentence, but must be deduced from the context.

(3) The semasio-onomasiological relations are particularly complex
when identical modifying expressions (or identical marks in the sense of
Dokulil) are used by the speaker. A case in point is a slang expression
such as jar head, which is used to denote a Marines soldier. Although at
first glance jar lid and jar head seem to have nothing in common, as jar
lid denotes part of the concept of 'jar' while jar head is an
expression which relates metonymically, via the concept of
'head', to the concept of 'soldier', still, from the
point of view of mental lexicon and the information processing
mechanism, the use of the modifier jar can be crucial in retrieving from
the mental lexicon both the meaning of jar head and the meaning of jar
lid. The modifier jar can also play an important role in the acquisition
of the two expressions (and concepts) by a child or a learner of English
as a foreign language.

(4) Note that, as things stand now, the idea of onomasiology as a
theory accounting for the relations between synonymous expressions,
which name (parts of) concepts, must be modified to include such
multifarious expressions as (in the case of 'anger') foam at
the mouth, sth begins to get to sb., wrestle with anger, fly off the
handle, blue in the face, do a slow burn, etc. (Kovecses 1986: 11). It
is precisely for this reason--because of its highly unconstrained
character (where, effectively, any expression can be associated with a
given conceptual metaphor)--that the theory of conceptual metaphor as
proposed by Lakoff, Johnson and Kovecses, has been subject to increasing
criticism (see, for example, Strugielska 2012).

(5) In fact, similar "mismatches" between the semantic
and the phonological poles obtain in a great number many other cases,
including, for instance, the irregular past tense verb form brought, as
contrasted with the regular form worked, and, say, the plural nominal
form geese, as contrasted with the regular plural form places. In the
case of brought and worked we have the respective structures
[[BRING][PAST]]/[brought] and [[WORK][PAST]]/[[work][ed]], while in the
case of geese and places, the structures are [[GOOSE][PL]/[geese]] and
[[PLACE][PL]/[place][iz]], respectively.

(6) In contradistinction to traditional approaches, however, these
roles, called by Langacker "role archetypes", are treated not
as linguistic roles but as pre-linguistic conceptualisations. Thus, the
archetypal agent is a person who volitionally "initiates physical
activity" as a result of physical contact in the transfer of energy
to an external object. The archetypal patient "absorbs" the
energy and undergoes a change of state (represented as a wavy arrow in
(28)). The instrument is a physical object which is manipulated by the
agent and serves as the "intermediary" in the transmission of
energy. The experiencer is a person who is engaged in mental activity,
and the mover (or theme) is an entity which changes its location.

(7) The same contrast: lack of energy vs. suddenness/dynamicity of
event, signaled by a reflexive, is displayed by Spanish data. Consider
the following examples from Maldonaldo (1992: 537; also quoted in
Kardela 2003: 683):

I don't want to have breakfast now. I would rather wait until
Valeria wakes up.

b. Me (*0) desperte a media noche y ya no me (*0) pude dormir.

I woke up in the middle of the night and I couldn't go back to
sleep.

(ii) No (*me) pude dormir durante una semana.

I couldn't sleep for a week.

Notice that the lack of the reflexive me in (i) b)) leads to
ungrammaticality as it is precisely the presence of the reflexive me
here that designates (or profiles) the change of state: from sleep to
waking up. In contrast, in (ii), the presence of the reflexive is
illegitimate because sleeping is a static event, stretching over a week.
What this means is that the Spanish reflexive particle se, just as the
Polish particle sic, reflects the dynamic character of the event
construal.

(8) The A/D asymmetry involved in this layering can best be
captured by quoting from Langacker (1991b: 292):

Thus, if T represents a thematic relationship, and E the input of
energy responsible for the occurrence of a process, the progressive
assembly of the complex event conception in (a) The ice cracked; (b) A
rock cracked the ice; (c) A waiter cracked the ice with a rock; (d) The
manager made a waiter crack the ice with a rock; (e) The owner had the
manager make a waiter crack the ice with a rock (see also the examples
in (17)--H.K.], can be represented as follows: (T) > (E1(T)) >
(E2(E1(T))) > E3(E2(E1(T)))) > (E4(E3(E2(E1(T))))). The brackets
indicate A/D organization, but if one ignores them and reads each
formula linearly, it is equivalent to an action chain (the initial
formula, T, represents the degenerate case of an action chain with a
tail but no head.

(9) A similar situation holds in Spanish. Consider the following
examples (Nishida 1994: 442; also quoted in Kardela 2003:688)

a. ME pase un dia entero viendo la tele (preferred)

b. --pase un dia entero viendo la tele.

I spent one entire day watching TV.

As noted by Nishida, native speakers of Spanish strongly prefer
sentences with se over those without the reflexive se. This is so,
Nishida claims, because they wish to "highlight the fact that the
totality of an object is involved in the situation [...] or that the
event was completed" (1994: 442). (The reason for this is that
perfective forms, accompanied here by the reflexive se, denote a
completion of the event.) By marking "the totality of an object
involved in the situation," the perfective form of the verb plus
the clitic sie/se, play a fundamental role in the causation process
involving the absolute construal of events.

Henryk Kardela

Maria Curie-Sklodowska University

Nowa Humanistyka

20-031 Lublin

Poland

henkar@klio.umcs.lublin.pl

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