Domain Name System Operations J. Kristoff
Internet-Draft DePaul University
Updates: 1123 (if approved) D. Wessels
Intended status: Best Current Practice Verisign
Expires: November 7, 2020 May 6, 2020
DNS Transport over TCP - Operational Requirements
draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-tcp-requirements-06
Abstract
This document encourages the practice of permitting DNS messages to
be carried over TCP on the Internet. This includes both DNS over
unencrypted TCP, as well as over an encrypted TLS session. The
document also considers the consequences with this form of DNS
communication and the potential operational issues that can arise
when this best common practice is not upheld.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 7, 2020.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Uneven Transport Usage and Preference . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Waiting for Large Messages and Reliability . . . . . . . 5
2.3. EDNS0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Fragmentation and Truncation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. "Only Zone Transfers Use TCP" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. DNS over TCP Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Network and System Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Connection Establishment and Admission . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Connection Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Connection Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. DNS-over-TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. DNS over TCP Filtering Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. DNS Wedgie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. DNS Root Zone KSK Rollover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Logging and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Standards Related to DNS Transport over TCP . . . . 20
A.1. IETF RFC 1035 - DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION AND
SPECIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.2. IETF RFC 1536 - Common DNS Implementation Errors and
Suggested Fixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. IETF RFC 1995 - Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS . . . . 21
A.4. IETF RFC 1996 - A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of
Zone Changes (DNS NOTIFY) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.5. IETF RFC 2181 - Clarifications to the DNS Specification . 21
A.6. IETF RFC 2694 - DNS extensions to Network Address
Translators (DNS_ALG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.7. IETF RFC 3225 - Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC . . 21
A.8. IETF RFC 3326 - DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver
message size requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.9. IETF RFC 4472 - Operational Considerations and Issues
with IPv6 DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.10. IETF RFC 5452 - Measures for Making DNS More Resilient
against Forged Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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A.11. IETF RFC 5507 - Design Choices When Expanding the DNS . . 22
A.12. IETF RFC 5625 - DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines . . . 22
A.13. IETF RFC 5936 - DNS Zone Transfer Protocol (AXFR) . . . . 23
A.14. IETF RFC 5966 - DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.15. IETF RFC 6304 - AS112 Nameserver Operations . . . . . . . 23
A.16. IETF RFC 6762 - Multicast DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.17. IETF RFC 6891 - Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0)) . 23
A.18. IETF RFC 6950 - Architectural Considerations on
Application Features in the DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.19. IETF RFC 7477 - Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS . 24
A.20. IETF RFC 7720 - DNS Root Name Service Protocol and
Deployment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.21. IETF RFC 7766 - DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.22. IETF RFC 7828 - The edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option . . . 24
A.23. IETF RFC 7858 - Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.24. IETF RFC 7873 - Domain Name System (DNS) Cookies . . . . 24
A.25. IETF RFC 7901 - CHAIN Query Requests in DNS . . . . . . . 25
A.26. IETF RFC 8027 - DNSSEC Roadblock Avoidance . . . . . . . 25
A.27. IETF RFC 8094 - DNS over Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.28. IETF RFC 8162 - Using Secure DNS to Associate
Certificates with Domain Names for S/MIME . . . . . . . . 25
A.29. IETF RFC 8324 - DNS Privacy, Authorization, Special Uses,
Encoding, Characters, Matching, and Root Structure: Time
for Another Look? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.30. IETF RFC 8467 - Padding Policies for Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.31. IETF RFC 8483 - Yeti DNS Testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.32. IETF RFC 8484 - DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH) . . . . . . 26
A.33. IETF RFC 8490 - DNS Stateful Operations . . . . . . . . . 26
A.34. IETF RFC 8501 - Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
Providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction
DNS messages may be delivered using UDP or TCP communications. While
most DNS transactions are carried over UDP, some operators have been
led to believe that any DNS over TCP traffic is unwanted or
unnecessary for general DNS operation. When DNS over TCP has been
restricted, a variety of communication failures and debugging
challenges often arise. As DNS and new naming system features have
evolved, TCP as a transport has become increasingly important for the
correct and safe operation of an Internet DNS. Reflecting modern
usage, the DNS standards were recently updated to declare support for
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TCP is now a required part of the DNS implementation specifications
[RFC7766]. This document is the formal requirements equivalent for
the operational community, encouraging system administrators, network
engineers, and security staff to ensure DNS over TCP communications
support is on par with DNS over UDP communications.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Background
The curious state of disagreement in operational best practices and
guidance for DNS transport protocols derives from conflicting
messages operators have gotten from other operators, implementors,
and even the IETF. Sometimes these mixed signals have been explicit,
on other occasions they have suspiciously implicit. This section
presents an interpretation of the storied and conflicting history
that led to this document.
2.1. Uneven Transport Usage and Preference
In the original suite of DNS specifications, [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]
clearly specified that DNS messages could be carried in either UDP or
TCP, but they also stated a preference for UDP as the best transport
for queries in the general case. As stated in [RFC1035]:
"While virtual circuits can be used for any DNS activity,
datagrams are preferred for queries due to their lower overhead
and better performance."
Another early, important, and influential document, [RFC1123], marked
the preference for a transport protocol more explicitly:
"DNS resolvers and recursive servers MUST support UDP, and SHOULD
support TCP, for sending (non-zone-transfer) queries."
and further stipulated:
"A name server MAY limit the resources it devotes to TCP queries,
but it SHOULD NOT refuse to service a TCP query just because it
would have succeeded with UDP."
Culminating in [RFC1536], DNS over TCP came to be associated
primarily with the zone transfer mechanism, while most DNS queries
and responses were seen as the dominion of UDP.
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2.2. Waiting for Large Messages and Reliability
In the original specifications, the maximum DNS over UDP message size
was enshrined at 512 bytes. However, even while [RFC1123] preferred
UDP for non-zone transfer queries, it foresaw DNS over TCP becoming
more popular in the future to overcome this limitation:
"[...] it is also clear that some new DNS record types defined in
the future will contain information exceeding the 512 byte limit
that applies to UDP, and hence will require TCP.
At least two new, widely anticipated developments were set to elevate
the need for DNS over TCP transactions. The first was dynamic
updates defined in [RFC2136] and the second was the set of extensions
collectively known as DNSSEC originally specified in [RFC2541]. The
former suggested "requestors who require an accurate response code
must use TCP," while the latter warned "... larger keys increase the
size of KEY and SIG RRs. This increases the chance of DNS UDP packet
overflow and the possible necessity for using higher overhead TCP in
responses."
Yet, defying some expectations, DNS over TCP remained little-used in
real traffic across the Internet around this time. Dynamic updates
saw little deployment between autonomous networks. Around the time
DNSSEC was first defined, another new feature helped solidify UDP
transport dominance for message transactions.
2.3. EDNS0
In 1999 the IETF published the Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
in [RFC2671] (superseded in 2013 by an update in [RFC6891]). This
document standardized a way for communicating DNS nodes to perform
rudimentary capabilities negotiation. One such capability written
into the base specification and present in every EDNS0-compatible
message is the value of the maximum UDP payload size the sender can
support. This unsigned 16-bit field specifies, in bytes, the maximum
(possibly fragmented) DNS message size a node is capable of
receiving. In practice, typical values are a subset of the 512- to
4096-byte range. EDNS0 became widely deployed over the next several
years and numerous surveys ([CASTRO2010], [NETALYZR]) have shown many
systems currently support larger UDP MTUs with EDNS0.
The natural effect of EDNS0 deployment meant DNS messages larger than
512 bytes would be less reliant on TCP than they might otherwise have
been. While a non-negligible population of DNS systems lacked EDNS0
or fell back to TCP when necessary, DNS over TCP transactions
remained a very small fraction of overall DNS traffic [VERISIGN].
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2.4. Fragmentation and Truncation
Although EDNS0 provides a way for endpoints to signal support for DNS
messages exceeding 512 bytes, the realities of a diverse and
inconsistently deployed Internet may result in some large messages
being unable to reach their destination. Any IP datagram whose size
exceeds the MTU of a link it transits will be fragmented and then
reassembled by the receiving host. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon
for middleboxes and firewalls to block IP fragments. If one or more
fragments do not arrive, the application does not receive the message
and the request times out.
For IPv4-connected hosts, the de-facto MTU is often the Ethernet
payload size of 1500 bytes. This means that the largest unfragmented
UDP DNS message that can be sent over IPv4 is likely 1472 bytes. For
IPv6, the situation is a little more complicated. First, IPv6
headers are 40 bytes (versus 20 without options in IPv4). Second, it
seems as though some people have mis-interpreted IPv6's required
minimum MTU of 1280 as a required maximum. Third, fragmentation in
IPv6 can only be done by the host originating the datagram. The need
to fragment is conveyed in an ICMPv6 "packet too big" message. The
originating host indicates a fragmented datagram with IPv6 extension
headers. Unfortunately, it is quite common for both ICMPv6 and IPv6
extension headers to be blocked by middleboxes. According to
[HUSTON] some 35% of IPv6-capable recursive resolvers were unable to
receive a fragmented IPv6 packet.
The practical consequence of all this is that DNS requestors must be
prepared to retry queries with different EDNS0 maximum message size
values. Administrators of BIND are likely to be familiar with seeing
"success resolving ... after reducing the advertised EDNS0 UDP packet
size to 512 octets" messages in their system logs.
Often, reducing the EDNS0 UDP packet size leads to a successful
response. That is, the necessary data fits within the smaller
message size. However, when the data does not fit, the server sets
the truncated flag in its response, indicating the client should
retry over TCP to receive the whole response. This is undesirable
from the client's point of view because it adds more latency and
potentially undesirable from the server's point of view due to the
increased resource requirements of TCP.
The issues around fragmentation, truncation, and TCP are driving
certain implementation and policy decisions in the DNS. Notably,
Cloudflare implemented what it calls "DNSSEC black lies" [CLOUDFLARE]
and uses ECDSA algorithms, such that their signed responses fit
easily in 512 bytes. The KSK Rollover design team [DESIGNTEAM] spent
a lot of time thinking and worrying about response sizes. There is
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growing sentiment in the DNSSEC community that RSA key sizes beyond
2048-bits are impractical and that critical infrastructure zones
should transition to elliptic curve algorithms to keep response sizes
manageable.
More recently, renewed security concerns about fragmented DNS
messages ([AVOID_FRAGS], [FRAG_POISON]) are leading implementors to
consider lower default EDNS0 UDP payload size values for both
queriers and responders.
2.5. "Only Zone Transfers Use TCP"
Today, the majority of the DNS community expects, or at least has a
desire, to see DNS over TCP transactions occur without interference.
However there has also been a long-held belief by some operators,
particularly for security-related reasons, that DNS over TCP services
should be purposely limited or not provided at all [CHES94],
[DJBDNS]. A popular meme has also held the imagination of some: that
DNS over TCP is only ever used for zone transfers and is generally
unnecessary otherwise, with filtering all DNS over TCP traffic even
described as a best practice.
The position on restricting DNS over TCP had some justification given
that historic implementations of DNS nameservers provided very little
in the way of TCP connection management (for example see
Section 6.1.2 of [RFC7766] for more details). However modern
standards and implementations are nearing parity with the more
sophisticated TCP management techniques employed by, for example,
HTTP(S) servers and load balancers.
3. DNS over TCP Requirements
An average increase in DNS message size (e.g., due to DNSSEC), the
continued development of new DNS features [Appendix A], and a denial
of service mitigation technique [Section 9] have suggested that DNS
over TCP transactions are as important to the correct and safe
operation of the Internet DNS as ever, if not more so. Furthermore,
there has been serious research that argues connection-oriented DNS
transactions may provide security and privacy advantages over UDP
transport. [TDNS] In fact [RFC7858], a Standards Track document, is
just this sort of specification. Therefore, this document makes
explicit that it is undesirable for network operators to artificially
inhibit DNS over TCP transport.
Section 6.1.3.2 in [RFC1123] is updated: All DNS resolvers and
servers MUST support and service both UDP and TCP queries.
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o Authoritative servers MUST support and service all TCP queries so
that they do not limit the size of responses to what fits in a
single UDP packet.
o Recursive servers (or forwarders) MUST support and service all TCP
queries so that they do not prevent large responses from a TCP-
capable server from reaching its TCP-capable clients.
Regarding the choice of limiting the resources a server devotes to
queries, Section 6.1.3.2 in [RFC1123] also says:
"A name server MAY limit the resources it devotes to TCP queries,
but it SHOULD NOT refuse to service a TCP query just because it
would have succeeded with UDP."
This requirement is hereby updated: A name server MAY limit the
resources it devotes to queries, but it MUST NOT refuse to service a
query just because it would have succeeded with another transport
protocol.
Filtering of DNS over TCP is considered harmful in the general case.
DNS resolver and server operators MUST support and provide DNS
service over both UDP and TCP transports. Likewise, network
operators MUST allow DNS service over both UDP and TCP transports.
It is acknowledged that DNS over TCP service can pose operational
challenges that are not present when running DNS over UDP alone, and
vice-versa. However, it is the aim of this document to argue that
the potential damage incurred by prohibiting DNS over TCP service is
more detrimental to the continued utility and success of the DNS than
when its usage is allowed.
4. Network and System Considerations
This section describes measures that systems and applications can
take to optimize performance over TCP and to protect themselves from
TCP-based resource exhaustion and attacks.
4.1. Connection Establishment and Admission
Resolvers and other DNS clients should be aware that some servers
might not be reachable over TCP. For this reason, clients MAY want
to track and limit the number of TCP connections and connection
attempts to a single server. Additionally, DNS clients MAY want to
enforce a short timeout on unestablished connections, rather than
rely on the host operating system's TCP connection timeout, which is
often around 60-120 seconds.
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The SYN flooding attack is a denial-of-service method affecting hosts
that run TCP server processes [RFC4987]. This attack can be very
effective if not mitigated. One of the most effective mitigation
techniques is SYN cookies, which allows the server to avoid
allocating any state until the successful completion of the three-way
handshake.
Services not intended for use by the public Internet, such as most
recursive name servers, SHOULD be protected with access controls.
Ideally these controls are placed in the network, well before before
any unwanted TCP packets can reach the DNS server host or
application. If this is not possible, the controls can be placed in
the application itself. In some situations (e.g. attacks) it may be
necessary to deploy access controls for DNS services that should
otherwise be globally reachable.
The FreeBSD, OpenBSD, and NetBSD operating systems have an "accept
filter" feature ([accept_filter]) that postpones delivery of TCP
connections to applications until a complete, valid request has been
received. The dns_accf(9) filter ensures that a valid DNS message is
received. If not, the bogus connection never reaches the
application. Applications must be coded and configured to make use
of this filter.
Per [RFC7766], applications and administrators are advised to
remember that TCP MAY be used before sending any UDP queries.
Networks and applications MUST NOT be configured to refuse TCP
queries that were not preceded by a UDP query.
TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] (TFO) allows TCP clients to shorten the
handshake for subsequent connections to the same server. TFO saves
one round-trip time in the connection setup. DNS servers SHOULD
enable TFO when possible. Furthermore, DNS servers clustered behind
a single service address (e.g., anycast or load-balancing), SHOULD
use the same TFO server key on all instances.
DNS clients MAY also enable TFO when possible. Currently, on some
operating systems it is not implemented or disabled by default.
[WIKIPEDIA_TFO] describes applications and operating systems that
support TFO.
4.2. Connection Management
Since host memory for TCP state is a finite resource, DNS clients and
servers MUST actively manage their connections. Applications that do
not actively manage their connections can encounter resource
exhaustion leading to denial of service. For DNS, as in other
protocols, there is a tradeoff between keeping connections open for
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potential future use and the need to free up resources for new
connections that will arrive.
DNS server software SHOULD provide a configurable limit on the total
number of established TCP connections. If the limit is reached, the
application is expected to either close existing (idle) connections
or refuse new connections. Operators SHOULD ensure the limit is
configured appropriately for their particular situation.
DNS server software MAY provide a configurable limit on the number of
established connections per source IP address or subnet. This can be
used to ensure that a single or small set of users can not consume
all TCP resources and deny service to other users. Operators SHOULD
ensure this limit is configured appropriately, based on their number
of diversity of users.
DNS server software SHOULD provide a configurable timeout for idle
TCP connections. For very busy name servers this might be set to a
low value, such as a few seconds. For less busy servers it might be
set to a higher value, such as tens of seconds. DNS clients and
servers SHOULD signal their timeout values using the edns-tcp-
keepalive option [RFC7828].
DNS server software MAY provide a configurable limit on the number of
transactions per TCP connection. This document does not offer advice
on particular values for such a limit.
Similarly, DNS server software MAY provide a configurable limit on
the total duration of a TCP connection. This document does not offer
advice on particular values for such a limit.
Since clients may not be aware of server-imposed limits, clients
utilizing TCP for DNS need to always be prepared to re-establish
connections or otherwise retry outstanding queries.
4.3. Connection Termination
In general, it is preferable for clients to initiate the close of a
TCP connection. The TCP peer that initiates a connection close
retains the socket in the TIME_WAIT state for some amount of time,
possibly a few minutes. On a busy server, the accumulation of many
sockets in TIME_WAIT can cause performance problems or even denial of
service.
On systems where large numbers of sockets in TIME_WAIT are observed,
it may be beneficial to tune the local TCP parameters. For example,
the Linux kernel provides a number of "sysctl" parameters related to
TIME_WAIT, such as net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout, net.ipv4.tcp_tw_recycle,
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and net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse. In extreme cases, implementors and
operators of very busy servers may find it necessary to utilize the
SO_LINGER socket option ([Stevens] Section 7.5) with a value of zero
so that the server doesn't accumulate TIME_WAIT sockets.
4.4. DNS-over-TLS
DNS messages may be sent over TLS to provide privacy between stubs
and recursive resolvers. [RFC7858] is a standards track document
describing how this works. Although DNS-over-TLS utilizes TCP port
853 instead of port 53, this document applies equally well to DNS-
over-TLS. Note, however, DNS-over-TLS is currently only defined
between stubs and recursives.
The use of TLS places even stronger operational burdens on DNS
clients and servers. Cryptographic functions for authentication and
encryption require additional processing. Unoptimized connection
setup takes two additional round-trips compared to TCP, but can be
reduced with Fast TLS connection resumption [RFC5077] and TLS False
Start [RFC7918].
5. DNS over TCP Filtering Risks
Networks that filter DNS over TCP risk losing access to significant
or important pieces of the DNS namespace. For a variety of reasons a
DNS answer may require a DNS over TCP query. This may include large
message sizes, lack of EDNS0 support, DDoS mitigation techniques, or
perhaps some future capability that is as yet unforeseen will also
demand TCP transport.
For example, [RFC7901] describes a latency-avoiding technique that
sends extra data in DNS responses. This makes responses larger and
potentially increases the effectiveness of DDoS reflection attacks.
The specification mandates the use of TCP or DNS Cookies [RFC7873].
Even if any or all particular answers have consistently been returned
successfully with UDP in the past, this continued behavior cannot be
guaranteed when DNS messages are exchanged between autonomous
systems. Therefore, filtering of DNS over TCP is considered harmful
and contrary to the safe and successful operation of the Internet.
This section enumerates some of the known risks known at the time of
this writing when networks filter DNS over TCP.
5.1. DNS Wedgie
Networks that filter DNS over TCP may inadvertently cause problems
for third-party resolvers as experienced by [TOYAMA]. If, for
instance, a resolver receives a truncated answer from a server, but
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when the resolver resends the query using TCP and the TCP response
never arrives, not only will a complete answer be unavailable, but
the resolver will incur the full extent of TCP retransmissions and
timeouts. This situation might place extreme strain on resolver
resources. If the number and frequency of these truncated answers
are sufficiently high, the steady-state of lost resources as a result
is a "DNS wedgie." A DNS wedgie is generally not easily or
completely mitigated by the affected DNS resolver operator.
5.2. DNS Root Zone KSK Rollover
The plans for deploying a new root zone DNSSEC KSK highlighted a
potential problem in retrieving the root zone key set [LEWIS].
During some phases of the KSK rollover process, root zone DNSKEY
responses were larger than 1280 bytes, the IPv6 minimum MTU for links
carrying IPv6 traffic [RFC2460]. There was some concern that any DNS
server unable to receive large DNS messages over UDP, or any DNS
message over TCP, would experience disruption while performing DNSSEC
validation.
However, during the year-long postponement of the KSK rollover there
were no reported problems that could be attributed to the 1414 octet
DNSKEY response when both the old and new keys were published in the
zone. Additionally, there were no reported problems during the two
month period when the old key was published as revoked and the DNSKEY
response was 1425 octets in size [ROLL_YOUR_ROOT].
6. Logging and Monitoring
Developers of applications that log or monitor DNS SHOULD NOT ignore
TCP due to the perception that it is rarely used or is hard to
process. Operators SHOULD ensure that their monitoring and logging
applications properly capture DNS message over TCP. Otherwise,
attacks, exfiltration attempts, and normal traffic may go undetected.
DNS messages over TCP are in no way guaranteed to arrive in single
segments. In fact, a clever attacker might attempt to hide certain
messages by forcing them over very small TCP segments. Applications
that capture network packets (e.g., with libpcap [libpcap]) SHOULD be
prepared to implement and perform full TCP segment reassembly.
dnscap [dnscap] is an open-source example of a DNS logging program
that implements TCP reassembly.
Developers SHOULD also keep in mind connection reuse, query
pipelining, and out-of-order responses when building and testing DNS
monitoring applications.
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As an alternative to packet capture, some DNS server software
supports dnstap [dnstap] as an integrated monitoring protocol
intended to facilitate wide-scale DNS monitoring.
7. Acknowledgments
This document was initially motivated by feedback from students who
pointed out that they were hearing contradictory information about
filtering DNS over TCP messages. Thanks in particular to a teaching
colleague, JPL, who perhaps unknowingly encouraged the initial
research into the differences between what the community has
historically said and did. Thanks to all the NANOG 63 attendees who
provided feedback to an early talk on this subject.
The following individuals provided an array of feedback to help
improve this document: Piet Barber, Sara Dickinson, Bob Harold,
Tatuya Jinmei, and Paul Hoffman, Puneet Sood, Richard Wilhelm. The
authors are also indebted to the contributions stemming from
discussion in the tcpm working group meeting at IETF 104. Any
remaining errors or imperfections are the sole responsibility of the
document authors.
8. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
9. Security Considerations
Ironically, returning truncated DNS over UDP answers in order to
induce a client query to switch to DNS over TCP has become a common
response to source address spoofed, DNS denial-of-service attacks
[RRL]. Historically, operators have been wary of TCP-based attacks,
but in recent years, UDP-based flooding attacks have proven to be the
most common protocol attack on the DNS. Nevertheless, a high rate of
short-lived DNS transactions over TCP may pose challenges. While
many operators have provided DNS over TCP service for many years
without duress, past experience is no guarantee of future success.
DNS over TCP is not unlike many other Internet TCP services. TCP
threats and many mitigation strategies have been well-documented in a
series of documents such as [RFC4953], [RFC4987], [RFC5927], and
[RFC5961].
10. Privacy Considerations
Since DNS over both UDP and TCP use the same underlying message
format, the use of one transport instead of the other does change the
privacy characteristics of the message content (i.e., the name being
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queried). DNS over TLS or DTLS is the recommended way to achieve DNS
privacy.
Because TCP is somewhat more complex than UDP, some characteristics
of a TCP conversation may enable fingerprinting and tracking that is
not possible with UDP. For example, the choice of initial sequence
numbers, window size, and options might be able to identify a
particular TCP implementation, or even individual hosts behind shared
resources such as network address translators (NATs).
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
11.2. Informative References
[accept_filter]
FreeBSD, "FreeBSD accept_filter(9)", May 2018,
<https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=accept_filter>.
[AVOID_FRAGS]
Fujiwara, K., "It's time to consider avoiding IP
fragmentation in the DNS", Jul 2019,
<https://blog.apnic.net/2019/07/12/its-time-to-consider-
avoiding-ip-fragmentation-in-the-dns/>.
[CASTRO2010]
Castro, S., Zhang, M., John, W., Wessels, D., and k.
claffy, "Understanding and preparing for DNS evolution",
2010.
[CHES94] Cheswick, W. and S. Bellovin, "Firewalls and Internet
Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker", 1994.
[CLOUDFLARE]
Grant, D., "Economical With The Truth: Making DNSSEC
Answers Cheap", June 2016,
<https://blog.cloudflare.com/black-lies/>.
[DESIGNTEAM]
Design Team Report, "Root Zone KSK Rollover Plan",
December 2015, <https://www.iana.org/reports/2016/root-
ksk-rollover-design-20160307.pdf>.
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[DJBDNS] D.J. Bernstein, "When are TCP queries sent?", 2002,
<https://cr.yp.to/djbdns/tcp.html#why>.
[dnscap] DNS-OARC, "DNSCAP", May 2018,
<https://www.dns-oarc.net/tools/dnscap>.
[dnstap] Edmonds, R. and P. Vixie, "dnstap", May 2018,
<https://dnstap.info>.
[FRAG_POISON]
Herzberg, A. and H. Shulman, "Fragmentation Considered
Poisonous", May 2012,
<https://u.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/security/13-03-frag.pdf>.
[HUSTON] Huston, G., "Dealing with IPv6 fragmentation in the DNS",
August 2017, <https://blog.apnic.net/2017/08/22/dealing-
ipv6-fragmentation-dns/>.
[LEWIS] Lewis, E., "2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover", RIPE 74 Budapest,
Hungary, May 2017, <https://ripe74.ripe.net/
presentations/25-RIPE74-lewis-submission.pdf>.
[libpcap] Tcpdump/Libpcap, "Tcpdump and Libpcap", May 2018,
<https://www.tcpdump.org>.
[NETALYZR]
Kreibich, C., Weaver, N., Nechaev, B., and V. Paxson,
"Netalyzr: Illuminating The Edge Network", 2010.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.
[RFC1536] Kumar, A., Postel, J., Neuman, C., Danzig, P., and S.
Miller, "Common DNS Implementation Errors and Suggested
Fixes", RFC 1536, DOI 10.17487/RFC1536, October 1993,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1536>.
Kristoff & Wessels Expires November 7, 2020 [Page 15]Internet-Draft DNS Transport over TCP May 2020
[RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1995>.
[RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1996,
August 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>.
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.
[RFC2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181>.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.
[RFC2541] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Security Operational
Considerations", RFC 2541, DOI 10.17487/RFC2541, March
1999, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2541>.
[RFC2671] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
RFC 2671, DOI 10.17487/RFC2671, August 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2671>.
[RFC2694] Srisuresh, P., Tsirtsis, G., Akkiraju, P., and A.
Heffernan, "DNS extensions to Network Address Translators
(DNS_ALG)", RFC 2694, DOI 10.17487/RFC2694, September
1999, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2694>.
[RFC3225] Conrad, D., "Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC",
RFC 3225, DOI 10.17487/RFC3225, December 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3225>.
[RFC3226] Gudmundsson, O., "DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver
message size requirements", RFC 3226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3226, December 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3226>.
[RFC4472] Durand, A., Ihren, J., and P. Savola, "Operational
Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS", RFC 4472,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4472, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4472>.
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[RFC4953] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks",
RFC 4953, DOI 10.17487/RFC4953, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4953>.
[RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5452] Hubert, A. and R. van Mook, "Measures for Making DNS More
Resilient against Forged Answers", RFC 5452,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5452, January 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5452>.
[RFC5507] IAB, Faltstrom, P., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and P. Koch,
Ed., "Design Choices When Expanding the DNS", RFC 5507,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5507, April 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5507>.
[RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines",
BCP 152, RFC 5625, DOI 10.17487/RFC5625, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5625>.
[RFC5927] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5927>.
[RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
(AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.
[RFC5961] Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5961, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5961>.
[RFC5966] Bellis, R., "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
Requirements", RFC 5966, DOI 10.17487/RFC5966, August
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5966>.
[RFC6304] Abley, J. and W. Maton, "AS112 Nameserver Operations",
RFC 6304, DOI 10.17487/RFC6304, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6304>.
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[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
[RFC6891] Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.
[RFC6950] Peterson, J., Kolkman, O., Tschofenig, H., and B. Aboba,
"Architectural Considerations on Application Features in
the DNS", RFC 6950, DOI 10.17487/RFC6950, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6950>.
[RFC7413] Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.
[RFC7477] Hardaker, W., "Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS",
RFC 7477, DOI 10.17487/RFC7477, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7477>.
[RFC7720] Blanchet, M. and L-J. Liman, "DNS Root Name Service
Protocol and Deployment Requirements", BCP 40, RFC 7720,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7720, December 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7720>.
[RFC7766] Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S., Bellis, R., Mankin, A., and
D. Wessels, "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
Requirements", RFC 7766, DOI 10.17487/RFC7766, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7766>.
[RFC7828] Wouters, P., Abley, J., Dickinson, S., and R. Bellis, "The
edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option", RFC 7828,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7828, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7828>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC7873] Eastlake 3rd, D. and M. Andrews, "Domain Name System (DNS)
Cookies", RFC 7873, DOI 10.17487/RFC7873, May 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7873>.
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[RFC7901] Wouters, P., "CHAIN Query Requests in DNS", RFC 7901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7901, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7901>.
[RFC7918] Langley, A., Modadugu, N., and B. Moeller, "Transport
Layer Security (TLS) False Start", RFC 7918,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7918, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7918>.
[RFC8027] Hardaker, W., Gudmundsson, O., and S. Krishnaswamy,
"DNSSEC Roadblock Avoidance", BCP 207, RFC 8027,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8027, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8027>.
[RFC8094] Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.
[RFC8162] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "Using Secure DNS to
Associate Certificates with Domain Names for S/MIME",
RFC 8162, DOI 10.17487/RFC8162, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8162>.
[RFC8324] Klensin, J., "DNS Privacy, Authorization, Special Uses,
Encoding, Characters, Matching, and Root Structure: Time
for Another Look?", RFC 8324, DOI 10.17487/RFC8324,
February 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8324>.
[RFC8467] Mayrhofer, A., "Padding Policies for Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0))", RFC 8467, DOI 10.17487/RFC8467,
October 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8467>.
[RFC8483] Song, L., Ed., Liu, D., Vixie, P., Kato, A., and S. Kerr,
"Yeti DNS Testbed", RFC 8483, DOI 10.17487/RFC8483,
October 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8483>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8490] Bellis, R., Cheshire, S., Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S.,
Lemon, T., and T. Pusateri, "DNS Stateful Operations",
RFC 8490, DOI 10.17487/RFC8490, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8490>.
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[RFC8501] Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
Providers", RFC 8501, DOI 10.17487/RFC8501, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8501>.
[ROLL_YOUR_ROOT]
Mueller, M., Thomas, M., Wessels, D., Hardaker, W., Chung,
T., Toorop, W., and R. Rijswijk-Deij, "Roll, Roll, Roll
Your Root: A Comprehensive Analysis of the First Ever
DNSSEC Root KSK Rollover", Oct 2019, <TBD>.
[RRL] Vixie, P. and V. Schryver, "DNS Response Rate Limiting
(DNS RRL)", ISC-TN 2012-1 Draft1, April 2012.
[Stevens] Stevens, W., Fenner, B., and A. Rudoff, "UNIX Network
Programming Volume 1, Third Edition: The Sockets
Networking API", November 2003.
[TDNS] Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Wessels, D., Mankin, A., and N.
Somaiya, "Connection-oriented DNS to Improve Privacy and
Security", 2015.
[TOYAMA] Toyama, K., Ishibashi, K., Ishino, M., Yoshimura, C., and
K. Fujiwara, "DNS Anomalies and Their Impacts on DNS Cache
Servers", NANOG 32 Reston, VA USA, 2004.
[VERISIGN]
Thomas, M. and D. Wessels, "An Analysis of TCP Traffic in
Root Server DITL Data", DNS-OARC 2014 Fall Workshop Los
Angeles, 2014.
[WIKIPEDIA_TFO]
Wikipedia, "TCP Fast Open", May 2018,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCP_Fast_Open>.
Appendix A. Standards Related to DNS Transport over TCP
This section enumerates all known IETF RFC documents that are
currently of status standard, informational, best common practice, or
experimental and either implicitly or explicitly make assumptions or
statements about the use of TCP as a transport for the DNS germane to
this document.
A.1. IETF RFC 1035 - DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIFICATION
The internet standard [RFC1035] is the base DNS specification that
explicitly defines support for DNS over TCP.
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A.2. IETF RFC 1536 - Common DNS Implementation Errors and Suggested
Fixes
The informational document [RFC1536] states UDP is the "chosen
protocol for communication though TCP is used for zone transfers."
That statement should now be considered in its historical context and
is no longer a proper reflection of modern expectations.
A.3. IETF RFC 1995 - Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS
The [RFC1995] standards track document documents the use of TCP as
the fallback transport when IXFR responses do not fit into a single
UDP response. As with AXFR, IXFR messages are typically delivered
over TCP by default in practice.
A.4. IETF RFC 1996 - A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)
The [RFC1996] standards track document suggests a master server may
decide to issue NOTIFY messages over TCP. In practice, NOTIFY
messages are generally sent over UDP, but this specification leaves
open the possibility that the choice of transport protocol is up to
the master server, and therefore a slave server ought to be able to
operate over both UDP and TCP.
A.5. IETF RFC 2181 - Clarifications to the DNS Specification
The [RFC2181] standards track document includes clarifying text on
how a client should react to the TC bit set on responses. It is
advised that the response should be discarded and the query resent
using TCP.
A.6. IETF RFC 2694 - DNS extensions to Network Address Translators
(DNS_ALG)
The informational document [RFC2694] enumerates considerations for
network address translation (NAT) devices to properly handle DNS
traffic. This document is noteworthy in its suggestion that
"[t]ypically, TCP is used for AXFR requests," as further evidence
that helps explain why DNS over TCP may often have been treated very
differently than DNS over UDP in operational networks.
A.7. IETF RFC 3225 - Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC
The [RFC3225] standards track document makes statements indicating
DNS over TCP is "detrimental" as a result of increased traffic,
latency, and server load. This document is a companion to the next
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document in the RFC series expressing the requirement for EDNS0
support for DNSSEC.
A.8. IETF RFC 3326 - DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver message
size requirements
Although updated by later DNSSEC RFCs, the standards track document
[RFC3226] strongly argued in favor of UDP messages over TCP largely
for performance reasons. The document declares EDNS0 a requirement
for DNSSEC servers and advocated packet fragmentation may be
preferable to TCP in certain situations.
A.9. IETF RFC 4472 - Operational Considerations and Issues with IPv6
DNS
This informational document [RFC4472] notes that IPv6 data may
increase DNS responses beyond what would fit in a UDP message.
Particularly noteworthy, perhaps less common today then when this
document was written, it refers to implementations that truncate data
without setting the TC bit to encourage the client to resend the
query using TCP.
A.10. IETF RFC 5452 - Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against
Forged Answers
This informational document [RFC5452] arose as public DNS systems
began to experience widespread abuse from spoofed queries, resulting
in amplification and reflection attacks against unwitting victims.
One of the leading justifications for supporting DNS over TCP to
thwart these attacks is briefly described in this document's 9.3
Spoof Detection and Countermeasure section.
A.11. IETF RFC 5507 - Design Choices When Expanding the DNS
This informational document [RFC5507] was largely an attempt to
dissuade new DNS data types from overloading the TXT resource record
type. In so doing it summarizes the conventional wisdom of DNS
design and implementation practices. The authors suggest TCP
overhead and stateful properties pose challenges compared to UDP, and
imply that UDP is generally preferred for performance and robustness.
A.12. IETF RFC 5625 - DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines
This best current practice document [RFC5625] provides DNS proxy
implementation guidance including the mandate that a proxy "MUST
[...] be prepared to receive and forward queries over TCP" even
though it suggests historically TCP transport has not been strictly
mandatory in stub resolvers or recursive servers.
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A.13. IETF RFC 5936 - DNS Zone Transfer Protocol (AXFR)
The [RFC5936] standards track document provides a detailed
specification for the zone transfer protocol, as originally outlined
in the early DNS standards. AXFR operation is limited to TCP and not
specified for UDP. This document discusses TCP usage at length.
A.14. IETF RFC 5966 - DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
Requirements
This standards track document [RFC5966] instructs DNS implementers to
provide support for carrying DNS over TCP messages in their software.
The authors explicitly make no recommendations to operators, which we
seek to address here.
A.15. IETF RFC 6304 - AS112 Nameserver Operations
[RFC6304] is an informational document enumerating the requirements
for operation of AS112 project DNS servers. New AS112 nodes are
tested for their ability to provide service on both UDP and TCP
transports, with the implication that TCP service is an expected part
of normal operations.
A.16. IETF RFC 6762 - Multicast DNS
In this standards track document [RFC6762], the TC bit is deemed to
have essentially the same meaning as described in the original DNS
specifications. That is, if a response with the TCP bit set is
received, "[...] the querier SHOULD reissue its query using TCP in
order to receive the larger response."
A.17. IETF RFC 6891 - Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0))
This standards track document [RFC6891] helped slow the use of and
need for DNS over TCP messages. This document highlights concerns
over server load and scalability in widespread use of DNS over TCP.
A.18. IETF RFC 6950 - Architectural Considerations on Application
Features in the DNS
An informational document [RFC6950] that draws attention to large
data in the DNS. TCP is referenced in the context as a common
fallback mechanism and counter to some spoofing attacks.
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A.19. IETF RFC 7477 - Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS
This standards track document [RFC7477] specifies a RRType and
protocol to signal and synchronize NS, A, and AAAA resource record
changes from a child to parent zone. Since this protocol may require
multiple requests and responses, it recommends utilizing DNS over TCP
to ensure the conversation takes place between a consistent pair of
end nodes.
A.20. IETF RFC 7720 - DNS Root Name Service Protocol and Deployment
Requirements
This best current practice [RFC7720] declares root name service "MUST
support UDP [RFC768] and TCP [RFC793] transport of DNS queries and
responses."
A.21. IETF RFC 7766 - DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
Requirements
The standards track document [RFC7766] might be considered the direct
ancestor of this operational requirements document. The
implementation requirements document codifies mandatory support for
DNS over TCP in compliant DNS software.
A.22. IETF RFC 7828 - The edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option
This standards track document [RFC7828] defines an EDNS0 option to
negotiate an idle timeout value for long-lived DNS over TCP
connections. Consequently, this document is only applicable and
relevant to DNS over TCP sessions and between implementations that
support this option.
A.23. IETF RFC 7858 - Specification for DNS over Transport Layer
Security (TLS)
This standards track document [RFC7858] defines a method for putting
DNS messages into a TCP-based encrypted channel using TLS. This
specification is noteworthy for explicitly targeting the stub-to-
recursive traffic, but does not preclude its application from
recursive-to-authoritative traffic.
A.24. IETF RFC 7873 - Domain Name System (DNS) Cookies
This standards track document [RFC7873] describes an EDNS0 option to
provide additional protection against query and answer forgery. This
specification mentions DNS over TCP as a reasonable fallback
mechanism when DNS Cookies are not available. The specification does
make mention of DNS over TCP processing in two specific situations.
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In one, when a server receives only a client cookie in a request, the
server should consider whether the request arrived over TCP and if
so, it should consider accepting TCP as sufficient to authenticate
the request and respond accordingly. In another, when a client
receives a BADCOOKIE reply using a fresh server cookie, the client
should retry using TCP as the transport.
A.25. IETF RFC 7901 - CHAIN Query Requests in DNS
This experimental specification [RFC7901] describes an EDNS0 option
that can be used by a security-aware validating resolver to request
and obtain a complete DNSSEC validation path for any single query.
This document requires the use of DNS over TCP or a source IP address
verified transport mechanism such as EDNS-COOKIE [RFC7873].
A.26. IETF RFC 8027 - DNSSEC Roadblock Avoidance
This document [RFC8027] details observed problems with DNSSEC
deployment and mitigation techniques. Network traffic blocking and
restrictions, including DNS over TCP messages, are highlighted as one
reason for DNSSEC deployment issues. While this document suggests
these sorts of problems are due to "non-compliant infrastructure" and
is of type BCP, the scope of the document is limited to detection and
mitigation techniques to avoid so-called DNSSEC roadblocks.
A.27. IETF RFC 8094 - DNS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
This experimental specification [RFC8094] details a protocol that
uses a datagram transport (UDP), but stipulates that "DNS clients and
servers that implement DNS over DTLS MUST also implement DNS over TLS
in order to provide privacy for clients that desire Strict Privacy
[...]." This requirement implies DNS over TCP must be supported in
case the message size is larger than the path MTU.
A.28. IETF RFC 8162 - Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with
Domain Names for S/MIME
This experimental specification [RFC8162] describes a technique to
authenticate user X.509 certificates in an S/MIME system via the DNS.
The document points out that the new experimental resource record
types are expected to carry large payloads, resulting in the
suggestion that "applications SHOULD use TCP -- not UDP -- to perform
queries for the SMIMEA resource record."
Kristoff & Wessels Expires November 7, 2020 [Page 25]Internet-Draft DNS Transport over TCP May 2020
A.29. IETF RFC 8324 - DNS Privacy, Authorization, Special Uses,
Encoding, Characters, Matching, and Root Structure: Time for
Another Look?
An informational document [RFC8324] that briefly discusses the common
role and challenges of DNS over TCP throughout the history of DNS.
A.30. IETF RFC 8467 - Padding Policies for Extension Mechanisms for DNS
(EDNS(0))
An experimental document [RFC8467] reminds implementers to consider
the underlying transport protocol (e.g. TCP) when calculating the
padding length when artificially increasing the DNS message size with
an EDNS(0) padding option.
A.31. IETF RFC 8483 - Yeti DNS Testbed
This informational document [RFC8483] describes a testbed environment
that highlights some DNS over TCP behaviors, including issues
involving packet fragmentation and operational requirements for TCP
stream assembly in order to conduct DNS measurement and analysis.
A.32. IETF RFC 8484 - DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)
This standards track document [RFC8484] defines a protocol for
sending DNS queries and responses over HTTPS. This specification
assumes TLS and TCP for the underlying security and transport layers,
respectively. Self-described as a a technique that more closely
resembles a tunneling mechanism, DoH nevertheless likely implies DNS
over TCP in some sense, if not directly.
A.33. IETF RFC 8490 - DNS Stateful Operations
This standards track document [RFC8490] updates the base protocol
specification with a new OPCODE to help manage stateful operations in
persistent sessions, such as those that might be used by DNS over
TCP.
A.34. IETF RFC 8501 - Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
Providers
This informational document [RFC8501] identifies potential
operational challenges with Dynamic DNS including denial-of-service
threats. The document suggests TCP may provide some advantages, but
that updating hosts would need to be explicitly configured to use TCP
instead of UDP.
Kristoff & Wessels Expires November 7, 2020 [Page 26]Internet-Draft DNS Transport over TCP May 2020Authors' Addresses
John Kristoff
DePaul University
Chicago, IL 60604
US
Phone: +1 312 493 0305
Email: jtk@depaul.edu
URI: https://aharp.iorc.depaul.edu
Duane Wessels
Verisign
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
US
Phone: +1 703 948 3200
Email: dwessels@verisign.com
URI: http://verisigninc.com
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