‘The Missiles of the Prophet”: That’s the code-name chosen by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for its latest naval exercises, which started Monday in the Strait of Hormuz.

The show of force is designed to coincide with the start in Istanbul of a new set of talks on Iran’s nuclear program, where Tehran faces the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.

The rendezvous was fixed last month, after Iran and the “sextet” failed to find any “substantive common ground” in high-level talks in Moscow. Rather than admit failure, the two sides agreed to have “technical experts” meet in Istanbul.

But what are these talks about?

Tehran claims that the aim is to “agree on the technical modalities” of further talks, perhaps at a higher level, to “dispel misunderstandings” about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Once these “technical” talks are over, a date can be set for another meeting at the political level, perhaps in September.

It must be clear to anyone who has followed all this that Iran is acting in accordance with a famous Persian proverb: Leading the horse to water and bringing it back thirsty. That is, Tehran will only make time-consuming gestures toward letting the “horse” drink — but will never actually agree to stop the core of its nuclear program, which consists of enriching as much uranium as it can at higher and higher levels.

Three years ago, Iran had a few kilograms of low-grade enriched uranium. Today, it has several tons of uranium enriched to about 20 percent.

The regime has also embarked on a vast program of building “protected sites” for its nuclear program, deep in mountains and designed to withstand air attacks. One site, at Fordo, is already operational; completion of five more is expected within the next two years.

As always, Tehran wants to buy time. And everyone knows it — well, everyone except (perhaps) Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s foreign-policy czarina and leader of the “sextet.”

Tehran’s calculation is that the talks would make it politically difficult for Israel to contemplate military action against Iranian nuclear sites. After all, the mantra of “give negotiations a chance” has many supporters, even within the Israeli leadership.

At the same time, President Obama can use the talks as a substitute for action even as he presses Israel to show restraint.

Tehran, for its part, is using the talks, combined with “The Missiles of the Prophet” and the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz (the world’s busiest oil route) to cast itself as the champion of militant Islam against the Infidel.

Tehran propaganda claims that Turkey’s Islamic-leaning government and its allies in the Arab Spring countries represent “a new brand of American Islam” (the old brand being that of Saudi Arabia).

“Today, only Iran is fighting for pure Muhammadan Islam,” President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Monday. “Our revolution was the most important event in the whole of history after the advent of Islam. And Muhammadan Islam can have no meaning apart from clashing with the Infidel and their symbol, the United States.”

Tehran’s game plan is to drag out the talks at least until the US presidential election in November. And, while the sextet’s wild-goose chase achieves nothing, Tehran’s Khomeinist leaders benefit from the talks for another reason: The hope that the talks might ease the pressure of sanctions on Iran helps calm down the domestic markets and slow the financial hemorrhage that has risen to dangerous levels in recent months.

The mirage of a negotiated settlement, that is, helps reduce the pain imposed by the economic and diplomatic sanctions that brought Tehran to the negotiating table in the first place. And even the remote prospect that the talks might end the regime’s isolation helps sow dissension among its opponents.

All that leads to a paradox.

By playing the game of talks according to rules set by Tehran, the sextet actually reduces the possibility of finding a negotiated settlement. Persuaded that it could achieve its objectives through meaningless and seemingly endless talks, why should Tehran offer any concessions?

Mrs. Ashton would do well to ponder this possibility: More talks could produce fewer results for the sextet.