Plato´s Republic is maybe the most widely read philosophical work of all times. It is the earliest surviving, systematic utopia in Europe´s history and continues to inspire people today. But who did Plato want to address with his work and why? In this paper I will discuss these issues. My thesis is that Plato wanted to direct his Republic to people, men and women, who have a good character and love wisdom in order to make them to think radically differently from the traditional norms. If these would-be philosophers could challenge the old-fashioned way of seeing things they could take the lead to establish a just society. I will also discuss critically two alternative approaches from other philosophers.

The purpose of this Master thesis is to give an account of and review the ideology yhat King presented through his preaching, speeches and other sources. The metod I have chosen for this purpose is to systematize King’s ideology and the to critically analyze it. When doing so I have discoverd that King’s non-violent ideology is coherent, but that his argumentation is somewhat defective, especially when examing its plausibility. King’s non-violence ideology was based on a theocentric wordview and a natural law pholosophy. He tought that all men are created in the image of God and that all humans have the possibility to do good. King’s non-violence ideology is based on active resistance where people use love and civil disobedience as tools to enforce subversive changes. King was against all types of violent actions and stated that violence never leads to sustainable change, that violence is immoral and unworthy of any human. King also said that non-violence is the only way to combat societal problems in a long-term perspective.

In the literature on intergenerational justice, there is a widely held view that in order to live up to the utilitarian ideal of equal regard for all individuals, including those who have not yet been born, we must impose infinite permutation invariance conditions known as axioms of extended anonymity. I argue that such conditions do not bear relevance to the utilitarian ideal. I do so by showing that all examples that have been used to motivate extended anonymity axioms can be accounted for with an alternative principle that is supported independently.

This article claims that the account of specification as a way to solve conflicts between rights, suggested by Göran Collste, is unsatisfactory. It is argued that specification is not a solution on its own, but is better described as a remedy in response to a political failure.

The relationship between libertarianism and state is a contested one. Despite pressing full and strict ownership of one’s person and any justly acquired goods, many libertarians have suggested ways in which a state, albeit limited, can be regarded as just. Peter Vallentyne has proposed that all plausible versions of libertarianism are compatible with what he calls ‘private-law states’. His proposal is underpinned by a particular conception of rights, which brings Interest Theory of rights and Will Theory of rights together. If convincing, Vallentyne’s theory of rights enables libertarians to accommodate a limited but nevertheless coercive state that can act without the full consent of the affected citizen. In this paper, it is argued that Vallentyne’s hybrid theory of rights is implausible from a libertarian perspective as well as fails to align itself with common and deeply held moral intuitions. Hence the conflict between mainstream libertarianism and the state is not solved by Vallentyne’s proposal.

Normative questions concerning the treatment of immigrants can be approached from various perspectives: consequentialistic, deontological, fairness-based, rectificatory, or similar. In this paper, the implications of the idea of quality of government for the treatment of immigrants are examined. It is argued that an acceptable definition of quality of governance includes a principle of beneficence, which prescribes a beneficial treatment of immigrants whenever laws and policies allow. The principle, which is not novel in itself, is presented in a more specified form and is provided with a philosophical justification.

Concepts such as “quality of government” and “good governance” refer to a desired character of the exercise of public authority. Recently the interest in good governance, the quality of government, and similar concepts has increased considerably. However, despite this increasing interest and use, an adequate definition of the concept of quality of government has proved difficult to find. This article criticizes recent attempts at such a definition and proposes an alternative, more complex definition that includes moral content and also encompasses a plurality of values and virtues at its core. An acceptable definition of the quality of governance must be consistent with the demands of a public ethos, the virtues of good decision making and reason giving, the rule of law, efficiency, stability, and a principle of beneficence. The article describes these components in detail and the relations among them.

It is often argued that Michael Walzer's theory of social criticism, which underpins his theory of justice, is not much of a theory at all, but rather an impressionistic collection of historical anecdotes. Contrary to this perception, I argue that Walzer's method can be accurately described as a version of John Rawls' well-known method of wide reflective equilibrium. Through a systematic comparison it can be shown that the two methods are strikingly similar. This implies that, far from the critics' claim, Walzer's method can be described as a philosophically sophisticated method. This also adds credibility to Walzer's views on politics and justice.

Creativity can be regarded as a property of semiotic resource exploration and niche construction. More specifically, and according to this perspective, creativity is distributed, in cognitive niches, as opportunities for niche-construction. Artistic cognitive niches represent established ways to exploit available artistic semiotic resources. When such opportunities are explored so that new relations between cognition and artistic semiotic resources are established (i.e., the artistic cognitive niche is constructed), then creativity is observed. This process of niche construction involves the transformation of problem spaces ("a branching-tree of achievable situations") through the exploration of cognitive artifacts (in dance, for example, softwares, techniques, equipments such as dance shoes, stage, dance and music notations). Our approach is supported by specific examples in history. In each of these examples, the introduction of artifacts changed not only how to make dance, but also the very concept of dance, opening opportunities for the exploration of new niches.

Some scholars argue that the principle of voluntary informed consent is rooted in the Western ethos of liberal individualism; that it would be difficult to implement this requirement in societies where the norms of decision-making emphasize collective rather than individual decision-making (for example, Sub-Saharan Africa); that it would amount to “cultural imperialism” to seek to implement the principle of voluntary informed consent in non-Western societies. This thesis rejects this skepticism about the possibility of implementing the informed consent requirement in non-Western environments and argues that applying the principle of voluntary informed consent in human subjects’ research in Sub-Saharan African communal culture could serve as an effective measure to protect vulnerable subjects from possible abuses or exploitations. The thesis proposes the “multi-step” approach to informed consent as the best approach to the implementation of the principle in the African communal setting. The thesis argues that the importance of the “multi-step” approach lies in the fact that it is one that is sensitive to local culture and customs. On the question of whether the principle of voluntary informed consent should be made compulsory in research, the thesis answers that we have no choice in the matter.

Debate over Intellectual Property Rights ‘IPRs’ particularly patent and copyrights is mainly on forward-looking industries in computer software. As part of a trade deal reached in 1994, the member nations of the World Trade Organisation must adhere to a global agreement known as TRIPS, for the Trade- Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights.

This study is to analyse the ethical conception of Intellectual Property Rights and in particular its implications on the developing countries in relation to TRIPS. The approach will be to analyse a broad philosophical theories of property to see if there is any justification for a software program to be treated as private property and also argue base on John Rawls two principles of justice in relation to TRIPS Agreement. Some reflections will be put on the use of open-source software by less developing countries.

From the study it was asserted that, strong IPRs protection would hinder technological transfer and indigenous learning activities in the early stage of industrialisation when learning takes place through reverse engineering. And policy makers should consider differentiation in terms of the level of economic and industrial development, if protection and enforcement of IPRs is intended to enhance technological development.

A set of moral problems known as The Trolley Dilemmas was presented to 3000 randomly selected inhabitants of the USA, Russia and China. It is shown that Chinese are significantly less prone to support utility-maximizing alternatives, as compared to the US and Russian respondents.

A number of possible explanations, as well as methodological issues pertaining to the field of surveying moral judgment and moral disagreement, are discussed.

In this study we tested the fruitfulness of advanced bibliometric methods for mapping subdomains in philosophy. The development of the number of publications on free will and sorites, the two subdomains treated in the study, over time was studied. We applied the cocitation approach to map the most cited publications, authors and journals, and we mapped frequently occurring terms, using a term co-occurrence approach. Both subdomains show a strong increase of publications in Web of Science. When we decomposed the publications by faculty, we could see an increase of free will publications also in social sciences, medicine and natural sciences. The multidisciplinary character of free will research was reflected in the cocitation analysis and in the term co-occurrence analysis: we found clusters/groups of cocited publications, authors and journals, and of co-occurring terms, representing philosophy as well as non-philosophical fields, such as neuroscience and physics. The corresponding analyses of sorites publications displayed a structure consisting of research themes rather than fields. All in all, both philosophers involved in this study acknowledge the validity of the various networks presented. Bibliometric mapping appears to provide an interesting tool for describing the cognitive orientation of a research field, not only in the natural and life sciences but also in philosophy, which this study shows.

In this study we tested the fruitfulness of advanced bibliometric methods for mapping subdomains in philosophy. The development of the number of publications on free will and sorites, the two subdomains treated in the study, over time was studied. We applied the cocitation approach to map the most cited publications, authors and journals, and we mapped frequently occurring terms, using a term co-occurrence approach. Both subdomains show a strong increase of publications in Web of Science. When we decomposed the publications by faculty, we could see an increase of free will publications also in social sciences, medicine and natural sciences. The multidisciplinary character of free will research was reflected in the cocitation analysis and in the term co-occurrence analysis: we found clusters/groups of cocited publications, authors and journals, and of co-occurring terms, representing philosophy as well as non-philosophical fields, such as neuroscience and physics. The corresponding analyses of sorites publications displayed a structure consisting of research themes rather than fields. All in all, both philosophers involved in this study acknowledge the validity of the various networks presented. Bibliometric mapping appears to provide an interesting tool for describing the cognitive orientation of a research field, not only in the natural and life sciences but also in philosophy, which this study shows.

In this study we tested the fruitfulness of advanced bibliometric methods for mapping subdomains in philosophy. The development of the number of publications on free will and sorites, the two subdomains treated in the study, over time was studied. We applied the cocitation approach to map the most cited publications, authors and journals, and we mapped frequently occurring terms, using a term co-occurrence approach. Both subdomains show a strong increase of publications in Web of Science. When we decomposed the publications by faculty, we could see an increase of free will publications also in social sciences, medicine and natural sciences. The multidisciplinary character of free will research was reflected in the cocitation analysis and in the term co-occurrence analysis: we found clusters/groups of cocited publications, authors and journals, and of co-occurring terms, representing philosophy as well as non-philosophical fields, such as neuroscience and physics. The corresponding analyses of sorites publications displayed a structure consisting of research themes rather than fields. All in all, both philosophers involved in this study acknowledge the validity of the various networks presented. Bibliometric mapping appears to provide an interesting tool for describing the cognitive orientation of a research field, not only in the natural and life sciences but also in philosophy, which this study shows.

Reflective equilibrium is a method of justification in ethics. In this essay, I account for an argument against reflective equilibrium put forth by Theo van Willigenburg from a position of (weak) foundationalism. I attempt to demonstrate why it is flawed and how reflective equilibrium as a method of justification can withstand the foundationalist critique.

42.

Ahlin, Jesper

KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.

In this essay, the Scanlonian contractualist formula will be understood as follows: Within the domain of morality of what we owe to each other, an action is morally wrong if it follows principles that similarly motivated people can reasonably reject. Consequently, the concept of ‘reasonable rejection’ is the operative element in moral valuation, thus begging the question of what it is for a rejection to be reasonable. The problem of circularity in Scanlon’s contractualism builds upon a reading according to which Scanlon’s explanation of what it is to be ‘reasonably rejected’ seems to be understood as ‘when the action is morally wrong’. If this is the case, then Scanlon’s contractualism refers to its own thesis when performing moral valuations: that is wrong which can be reasonably rejected, and for an action to be reasonably rejected it must be morally wrong. The problem of circularity apparently renders Scanlon’s contractualism ‘empty’ as it cannot explain what it is for an action to be morally wrong without referring to its own thesis.

In this essay I will try to clarify the difference between welfarist and structural charges of circularity. I will argue that the structural charges of circularity are due to a fallacious constructivist reading of What We Owe to Each Other. As I understand Scanlon, the constructivist reading places Scanlon’s theory too close to the contractualist tradition. I will also argue that critics holding Scanlon’s contractualism to be circular have failed to note that his theory only claims to cover a narrow domain of morality. Where critics hold Scanlon’s contractualism to refer to its own thesis when performing moral valuations I will argue that the theory refers to moral domains outside that of what we owe to each other. Hopefully my discussion on constructivism and circularity will shed some light on the simple brilliance and practical applicability of Scanlon’s contractualism.

I will give a brief overview of What We Owe to Each Other before I present the critique put forth by Onora O’Neill, Mark Timmons and Joseph Raz. Then I will show how Scanlon treats the problem of circularity in his book, and how his defense targets substantial and not structural charges of circularity. I will then show that the structural critique is fallacious by analyzing the domain of morality that Scanlon’s contractualism targets. Finally I will try to apply Scanlon’s formula on personal relationships and on environmental issues. As of this point I will refer to Scanlon’s thesis as ‘contractualism’ while other theories following the contractualist tradition will be referred to as ‘contractarian’.

The aim of this essay is to discuss the meaning of the human and its possible overcoming in Friedrich Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same, with Martin Heidegger’s readings of Nietzsche as point of departure.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same represents the end of occidental metaphysical thinking. The thought concludes a thinking of being as the presence of beings, where the original question of being was never developed out of its own ground.

But at the heart of this interpretation, often considered “violent”, lies the question of whether man is able to think being out of his finitude. This is the question I will unfold, through a reading of Nietzsche’s thought of the eternal recurrence of the same, as it is presented in his Thus spoke Zarathustra, as an attempt to think beings in their being beyond a “humanization” of them, expressed in transcendental aims, purposes and categories. This attempt, I argue, is essentially bound up with a comportment toward the human self as the finite and the corporal. In this sense the human being in its finitude and corporeality is thefocus and the basis for the search for “the overman”.

But this focus on man, as he who can overcome himself, is at the same time a focus that canbe said to lead man away from himself, in not asking the deeper question about what it means to be this human being.

I will furthermore consider the tragic as the theme where this question of the overcoming of the human comes to the fore; the dionysic-tragic reveals both a view of man as the being that is mastered by the abyss that underlies this world, and therefore mastered by his finitude - and as the being who can master this same abyss, in thinking it as one with the human self.

The purpose is not to take a position for or against Heidegger’s reading, but to develop a discussion between Heidegger and Nietzsche about the human self as always being both the closed and the open, and about the ways in which human thinking can approach this.

This paper reflects on the status of Descartes' notion of the mind-body union as an object of knowledge in the framework of his new philosophy of nature, and argues that it should be taken seriously as representing a third kind of real thing or reality—that of human nature. Because it does not meet the criteria of distinctness that the two natures composing it—those of thinking minds and extended bodies— meet, the phenomena referred to it, which are objects of psychology as traditionally understood, fall outside the scope of clear and distinct perception required for knowledge. The prospects for rationalist psychology are bleak, since because of the mind-body union so little of the contents of the human mind are accessible to rational inspection or introspection. Mechanistic natural philosophy on the other hand gives us knowledge only of the physiological and corporeal aspects of the phenomena Descartes classifies as mental. What pertains to the mind-body union can only be known through the senses, moreover, we learn to conceive the mind-body union only through daily experience (“usant seulement de la vie et des conversations ordinaries”, AT 3, 695). I discuss the nature of this experience, and the sense in which Cartesian psychology without being part of his philosophy of nature in the strict sense of the term, can still be seen as a naturalist undertaking in a more traditional sense of nature where life, sentience, reasoning and rational action are all seen as natural phenomena.