Transcript

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Labor & Worklife Program Updated August 2007
Harvard Law School
Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board:
Urban Investing Through a Transparent Selection Process
Lisa A. Hagerman, Gordon L. Clark, and Tessa Hebb
Oxford University Centre for the Environment
Harvard Law School, Pensions & Capital Stewardship Project, Labor and Worklife Program
Abstract. Investing in the economic growth of the state of Massachusetts has been a
practice of the state employees’ public pension fund for the past three decades. Such
investing is often perceived as falling outside the boundaries of a rigorous investment
selection process. We argue that current selection of investments in economic
development by the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board
(PRIM) is guided by a strict investment philosophy. Targeted investments are governed
by the same investment process that oversees traditional investments. The discipline
applied tames the politics that can interfere with investments in economic development.
In this paper we describe both the legislation and targeted policy that directs such
investing. The paper deconstructs the decision making process and shows how
investments in economic development are a part of that process.
Keywords: Economic development, public pension funds, investment selection.

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Executive Summary
• A board level champion, such as the Massachusetts State Treasurer, retains an
outside expert to structure an economically targeted investment (ETI) policy for
the pension fund. The outside expert, in PRIM’s case a consultant, constructs the
ETI criteria. This policy then guides the PRIM board and staff in pursuit of
qualified targeted investments. The board champion actively engages staff and
board members to ensure implementation of the policy.
• The legislative mandate to invest in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
together with the 2003 ETI policy, creates a safe haven for board members to
consider investments in the underserved markets.
• The ETI investment fund manager selection process should adhere to the same
investment philosophy as non-targeted investments. The selection process
involves evaluating potential fund managers based on several factors including:
• track records and ability to meet benchmarks,
• competitive fee structures and,
• ability to meet the five ETI criteria.
• The ETI Request for Proposal of 2006 allows for a transparent competitive
bidding process. The selection process allows market-based principles to govern
the process—not personal networks prone to political favors.
• Successful implementation of ETIs includes a monitoring component that tracks
performance against contractual benchmarks and requires fund manager reporting
back to the pension fund through ETI quarterly update reports.
• Current investments are being tracked for: 1) ability to achieve risk-adjusted
market-rate returns and, 2) ability to meet the five ETI criteria that includes
tracking of collateral benefits. Current investments are in Boston and surrounding
cities. These investments aim to outperform their contractual benchmarks, while
also revitalizing inner cities and benefiting the local economy.
• PRIM’s investment in Access Capital’s fixed income product (invests in
mortgages to homebuyers with income 80% or less than the Area Median Income
in MA counties) has consistently outperformed the Lehman Aggregate Bond
Index. The 2003 ETI program is still in its infancy and returns on investments in
the asset classes of private equity and real estate are not yet realized.
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1 Introduction
Investments in economic development can revitalize communities through affordable
housing and job creation among other social benefits. Investing in America’s inner cities
is a practice in which investors can achieve both an economic and a social benefit. Inner
cities provide investment opportunities through untapped resources such as: unmet local
demand, a strategic location, integration with regional clusters, and an underemployed
labor force (Porter, 1995). As a result of a higher population density in the inner cities,
they have greater purchasing power per square mile than their wealthier suburbs (Stanley,
2000; Stegman, 1998). This attribute can be seen in the inner cities of New York, Los
Angeles, Chicago, and Boston where pension funds have invested in the inner cities.
Investments in the inner cities or more broadly, economic development, has historically
been referred to as economically targeted investments (ETIs).
These investments can sometimes be politically motivated and prone to selecting a
politician’s favorite project rather than being part of the formal investment process
(Hagerman et al., 2005). When targeted investments fall outside of a rigorous selection
process they can fail yielding below market returns and a poor track record. Critics argue
that such investing is prone to political pressure and can fail (Nofsinger, 1998; Romano,
1993). Academic literature has raised awareness on the potential geographic impact
pension funds can have in real estate and venture capital investments (Bates et al., 2006;
Rosentraub and Shroitman, 2004; Fickes, 2003; Litvak, 1981). For example, Rosentraub
and Shroitman (2004) examine levels of public pension fund investment (e.g. Ohio, New
York, Illinois, and Texas) in real estate and define the makeup of thriving and declining
areas of investment. Meanwhile proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis argue
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that if there is a capital gap it reflects the market’s poor risk/return characteristics. These
failures and market prejudices influence a pension fund’s attitude towards investing in the
emerging domestic markets. Economic development policies that fall outside of the
process fail because they have bypassed a rigorous set of checks and balances similar to
any other prudent investment made by the pension fund.
Massachusetts has had a history of investing in the Commonwealth through targeted
programs intended to create economic activity in the state. Targeted investments can
spur economic growth in specific sectors such as the high-technology industry. Pension
fund targeted investing in Massachusetts has been driven by the state pension fund’s
legislative mandate to invest in the Commonwealth whenever possible. Investing in the
state has also occurred as a byproduct of the fact that Massachusetts is home to a number
of high-technology companies, including bio-technology firms. Since the 1980s, the
Massachusetts’ state pension fund has made a number of targeted investments. These
investments were made through investment vehicles such as the Massachusetts
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) and Commonwealth Capital that were
intended to create economic activity and spur jobs within the state. Another targeted
investment program included the American Dream that committed to the financing of
affordable housing mortgages and created home-ownership opportunities for low to
moderate income homebuyers. These targeted investments were either mandated by the
legislature or initiated by the PRIM board and staff. However, these investments were
not part of the formal ETI policy created in 2003.
In this paper we argue that the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment
Management Board (PRIM) managed their targeted investments through a formal
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investment process. This process was a change from earlier practices. We further argue
that these practices are distinguished by three factors: 1) the application of professional
investment principles honed in the investment community, 2) a market rate of return set
against policy benchmarks and 3) the separation between legitimate legislative and
political interests in urban economic development and the professional investment
management process. We argue that these factors framed targeted investments in the
Bay State and by virtue of the process tamed the politics that can interfere in such
investments.
The fund’s investments are managed through a selection process in which the
pension fund Board approves or rejects external fund managers. The decision-making
process is a formal one with checks and balances that involve both internal and external
managers. A pension fund’s fiduciary duty to meet its current and future liabilities drives
the investment process. Central to the process is a strategic asset allocation policy that
guides staff, consultants, committee members, and the Board in their investment choices.
While some might argue that choosing investments is a speculative process it can be
argued (Clark, 2000) that it is a “structured gamble” shaped by regulation and policy that
guide the decision makers and allow for protection in the case of failed investments.
This paper is structured in the following way. Sections two and three provide a
historical overview of the pension reforms that include a mandate to invest in the
Commonwealth and an 8.25% long-term actuarial return for the overall fund. The fourth
section outlines the pension fund’s investment selection process and the internal and
external managers in that process. Section five addresses PRIM’s economic development
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policy in practice. We conclude with arguments in favor of the adoption of best practice
for other public pension funds likely to implement similar targeted investment policies.
2 Legislative framework
Massachusetts has a rich history in pension reform legislation. Examining the
legislation is important as the reforms had implications for the investment management
process and future investing in economic development. The relevant history began in the
early 1980’s with pension reform acts created out of a need to address the state and local
retirement systems’ $10 billion unfunded liability position (amount of the actuarial
accrued liability over current assets). Today we see that a pension fund’s liability
position is a critical issue for cities, counties, and states nationwide.1
In addressing the pension fund’s growing liability position leaders saw a need for a
regulatory agency to provide oversight of the state’s decentralized system. In 1982,
former Governor Edward King signed legislation that created a statewide monitoring
system for the state and local retirement systems, the Public Employees Retirement
Administration (PERA). It was created to address the system’s abuse relative to
disability pensions (State House News Service, August 29, 1983). In 1996, PERA
became the Public Employees Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC or “the
Commission”) and is today an important governance mechanism for the state’s
decentralized system.2 Following the creation of PERA, Chapter 661 of the Acts of 1983
1
The December 2005 New York City transit strike that crippled the city for three days was set off in part
by increased costs for transit workers and highlighted the urgency of funding soaring pension costs.
2
Chapter 306 of the Acts of 1996 created PERAC (the Commission) and modified the oversight of the
system that today provides governance and oversight of the 106 different systems in the state’s
decentralized system (PERAC 2005a).
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established the framework for the operating and investment performance of the state
retirement system for the next two decades.
Chapter 661 of the Acts of 1983 was created out of a working group referred to as
the “Dunlop Commission or the Harvard Working Group”. The group was lead by John
Dunlop (distinguished labor negotiator and advisor to many U.S. Presidents, former U.S.
Secretary of Labor under former President Gerald Ford, and founder of the Harvard
Trade Union Program), Chester Atkins (former Senate Ways and Means Chairman), Paul
Quirk (PRIM Executive Director, 1984-1991) and former State Senator John Brennan.
Other members in the working group included labor leaders, legislators, and municipal
employers. The group recognized an urgent need to address pensioner’s abuse relative
to disability pensions and the system’s growing unfunded liability position.
The comprehensive pension reform legislation created out of the working group
had several components and implications for the future management of the state’s
retirement system. Most importantly it established the Pension Reserves Investment
Management Board (PRIM or “the Board”) to administer the retirement system with
oversight over the Pension Reserves Investment Trust (PRIT or “the Fund”). The trust
was created to serve as a pool of assets for the pensions of participating cities, towns, and
counties in the Commonwealth (then 103 local systems and the state and teachers’
retirement systems). This was important in terms of the future management of the fund
as it gave the fund the opportunity to manage investments of scale and hire professional
managers.
As of 2007 PRIT operates as a pooled investment trust that invests assets of the
state employees’ and teachers’ retirement systems and those of the “participating” and
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“purchasing” local systems.3 An investment program called “segmentation” (as per
Chapter 84 of the Acts of 1996) gives local retirement boards the authority to invest in
individual asset classes, depending on their needs, as an alternative to investing in the
aggregate of the PRIT fund.
The local systems may purchase shares in the separate accounts of the Fund. A
“participating” system transfers all their assets to PRIT and a “purchasing” system invests
in separate accounts through the segmentation program (PRIM, 2005a). See appendix
table 6 for a list of the purchasing and participating systems. PRIT’s net assets total
$41.9 billion (as of 6/30/06) and current beneficiaries include state employees and
teachers and the employees of the 52 local systems.4 In addition to PRIM and PRIT, the
1983 legislation created the Pension Reserve Fund to establish a reserve to meet future
pension fund costs. The reserve fund will be discussed in section three as part of the
subsequent revisions to the legislation.
Chapter 661 of the Acts of 1983 was also important in establishing standards of
fiduciary duty for the pension fund. It mandated that PRIM must comply with the
prudent person rule that sets forth the principles of a sound investment management
policy. The language mandated that a fiduciary’s sole duty is to provide benefits to its
members and their beneficiaries with “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” and with the
aim of diversifying investments and reducing risk as long as it is prudent to do so.
3
Local systems may be restricted by PERAC in their investment choices. Pension reform legislation of
2006 submitted to the Massachusetts General Court is reviewing this requirement.
4
The Massachusetts State Teachers’ and Employees’ Retirement Systems (“MASTERS”) merged into the
PRIT Fund as of January 1, 1997 as per Chapter 315 of the Acts of 1996 and invest all their assets in the
PRIT Fund.
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Massachusetts General Law (Chapter 32; Section 23, “Management of Funds”) also
mandates the “prudent expert rule” and sets forth for the management of the Fund:
…that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims
and by diversifying the investments of the system so as to minimize the risk of
large losses unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so”
(Massachusetts General Law, 2007).
In terms of enabling the Board to prudently diversify the plan’s assets, the legislation
removed quantitative restrictions on asset classes and specific investments for PRIM.
This piece of the legislation allowed for greater diversification of investments by moving
off legal lists.5 Initially the investment restrictions established in Chapter 343 of the Acts
of 1972 (subsequently amended) set forth legal investments as: not more than 20% in
railroad, not more than 35% in telephone, not more than 50% in public service/utility, not
more than 15% in bonds of optional companies on the state’s legal list, and not more than
25% in bank or insurance company stocks. The 1983 legislation amended this language
by striking out the investment restrictions and inserting the following:
Subject in each instance to the approval of the investment committee established
under the provisions of paragraph (a), the state treasurer shall invest and reinvest
such funds, to the extent not required for current disbursements as much as
reasonably possible to benefit and expand the economic climate within the
Commonwealth so long as such is consistent with sound investment policy…
(Massachusetts ACTS, 1983, p. 1267)
In making this change Senator Chester Atkins stated: “Present restrictions force the state
to invest in things that aren’t really good investments.” (Massachusetts State House News
Service, October 14, 1983). Giving PRIM the flexibility to choose the most prudent
investments and diversify the Fund’s portfolio was an important step in reducing the $10
billion unfunded liability position. In 1984 the Board’s asset allocation policy moved
5
Parameters for investing in Northern Ireland and South Africa remain in place as of 2005 (Massachusetts
General Law, 2007).
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from bonds and legal list investments to broader domestic and international equities. In
1986, PRIT had a target asset allocation of 50% equity, 30% fixed income, 15% real
estate, and 5% venture capital (Krauss, 1986). This policy was a deliberate strategy by
the then PRIM Executive Director aimed to reduce the unfunded liability. It is
worthwhile noting that in February 2006 the PRIM Board conducted an asset/liability
study to determine the optimum long-term asset allocation for the Fund and used the
PERAC valuation report as of January 1, 2005 which estimated a 72.3% funded ratio
(PRIM, 2006a). According to the most recent PERAC actuarial valuation report, the
estimated funded ratio (ratio of actuarial asset value to actuarial asset liability) as of
January 1, 2007 for PRIM is 85.1% (PERAC, 2006).
In summary, Chapter 661 of the Acts of 1983 became Massachusetts General Law
(Chapter 32, Retirement Systems and Pensions: Section 22 “Methods of Financings” and
Section 23 “Management of Funds”) and created the legislative framework that would
rehabilitate the system in the years to come. As Governor Dukakis said after signing the
bill, “The framework has now been provided to make our state’s pension systems sound.
This new law is aimed squarely at strengthening the public employee retirement system
and protecting the benefits of thousands of state and local retirees” (The Boston Globe,
December 21, 1983).
In addition to loosening restrictions on investments the pension reform legislation
of 1983 created public policy that would guide the pension fund to promote in-state
investments. The legislation mandated that the pension fund should make investments to
benefit the economic climate of Massachusetts whenever possible as per the following
language:
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Subject to the approval or ratification of the PRIM board, the executive director
shall invest and reinvest such funds…as much as reasonably possible to benefit
and expand the economic climate with the Commonwealth so long as such is
consistent with sound investment policy and the other requirements of this
section; provided, however, that no funds are to be invested directly in mortgages
or in collateral loans; provided, further, that the executive director shall transfer
not less than two million dollars of said fund into a fund managed by the
Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation on behalf of the board; and
provided, further, that said Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation
shall manage the fund in accordance with the provisions of section four A of
chapter forty G (Massachusetts ACTS 1983, p. 1271).
This language was important to Massachusetts in establishing a legislative framework to
target investments in economic development. As noted above it also mandated a $2
million investment in the Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation (MTDC).
Further language elaborated on the MTDC investment and set out that the fund shall
invest in a separate fund of MTDC provided that; 1) MTDC shall invest and reinvest the
monies to make funding available to enterprises that cannot obtain funding from the
traditional markets and 2) that the enterprise has the potential to create jobs within the
Commonwealth. The reforms of 1983 were the first to legislate that a pension fund
should invest in the state whenever possible, later we will address whether this directive
was enforced and how important it was for in-state investments.
The legislation had three important implications for the future management of the
fund. First, it was clear that there was an urgency to address the pension fund liability
that influenced the future investment strategy. Second, in looking for increased
investment opportunities, there was now a willingness to accept more risk for higher
returns—as a result of the removal of legal list investment restrictions. Third, this new
investment strategy allowed for more innovative investment alternatives such as
equities—at the time deemed very risky. With this legislation the fund now started to
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take significant equity positions in large corporations. Essentially the legislative
initiative and its implications set the framework for the management of the fund that
exists today.
3 Revisions to the legislation
Thus far we have reviewed the initial major pension reforms that created the
framework for the management of the state’s retirement system. This section addresses
two major revisions to the legislation in 1988 and 1998 that impacted the future
management of the fund. While the 1983 legislation set the framework for reducing the
unfunded liability position, it was not until 1988 that legislation more systematically
attacked the $11 billion unfunded position.6
In January of 1988 Governor Dukakis signed into law Chapter 697 of the Acts of
1988 that further regulated the pension system. The legislation established a funding plan
for the Commonwealth to meet its financial obligations that included annual payments to
reduce the unfunded liability by the year 2028. A funding schedule was created to move
from a pay-as-you-go system to a pre-funded one that draws on reserves to meet its
pension costs. Principally the legislation created the “Commonwealth Liability Fund”
and the “Commonwealth Funding Schedule” to pay current benefits and amortize over
the next 40-year period the unfunded liability (Massachusetts ACTS, 1988). Governor
Dukakis said in a state news release, “This is a comprehensive and fiscally sound plan to
eliminate finally a major problem that has created unnecessary concern among public
employees and retirees and diminished the Commonwealth’s credit rating” (February 3,
6
Records available show that as of January 1, 1987 the unfunded liability position was $10.5 billion and as
of January 1, 1990 it was $10.9 billion (PERAC Executive Office).
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1986). Reducing the unfunded liability is crucial to the economic stability of the
Commonwealth. The unfunded liability diminishes the state’s credit rating that affects
future investment growth in Massachusetts.
The 1988 legislation set up a policy with ambitious efforts to reduce to zero the
pension fund liabilities over the next 40 years. According to a State House News Service
press release (January 12, 1988) the legislation reorganized PERA lessening the
governor’s authority over the governing organization; improved benefits; and authorizing
five percent of state corporate, income, and sales tax increases to reduce pension costs.
According to the report, municipalities would receive $26 million for pension deficit
reduction in fiscal year 1989.7
Ten years later another piece of legislation was enacted that provided governance
and structure to the investment management process in an effort to reach a fully funded
position. The legislation started as a bill out of the House Ways and Means Committee
and was signed into law by the Governor as part of the 1998 fiscal year budget. 8 The
legislation mandated an overall return for the PRIT fund of 8.25%. Previous to this
legislation the policy was an informal target of 8.5% yet not mandated by the legislature.
This 8.25% mandate as stipulated in the 1998 fiscal year budget then became part of
PRIM’s Investment Policy Statement (IPS) in place today (PRIM, 2005b). The
7
As of 2005, “the provisions of Chapter 32, Section 22C require amortization payments such that the
Unfunded Actuarial Liability is reduced to 0 by June 30, 2023. Under the present schedule, the
amortization payments to eliminate the unfunded liability increase by 4.5% per year” (PERAC, 2005b, p.
2). The state appropriates funds to reduce the unfunded pension liability in which “each fiscal year the
Governor is required to recommend a minimum dollar amount equal to 1.3% of the permanent state
payroll, subject to legislative approval, to assist local retirement systems in reducing their unfunded
pension liabilities (M.G.L., c.32 Section 22B)” (PRIM, 2007).
8
Line item 0612-1010 of Fiscal Year 1998 budget of Chapter 43 of the Acts of 1997(Massachusetts ACTS,
1997).
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legislation provided governance to keep the board from pursuing bad investments and
stipulated:
For the Commonwealth’s Pension Liability Fund established under Section 22 of
chapter 32 of the General Laws; provided, that the amount appropriated herein
shall constitute the first-year payment of a 20 year, level-funded funding schedule
for the Commonwealth’s unfunded liability; provided further, that said funding
schedule shall be predicated upon an assumed investment rate-of-return of 8 ¼
percent; [emphasis added] provided further, that said amount shall meet the
Commonwealth’s obligations under section 22C of said chapter
32…(Commonwealth of MA Treasurer and Receiver General Fiscal Year 1998 Budget).
Over the course of twenty years PRIM has targeted the 8.25% return and the PRIT
Fund’s net assets have grown from $597 million (as of June 30, 1985) to approximately
$41.9 billion (as of June 30, 2006). Figure 1 shows the fund’s growth in net assets from
fiscal years 1985 to 2004.
Figure 1 PRIT Fund Growth in Net Assets Fiscal Years 1985 to 2004
The legislation provided the Board with a mandate to achieve the actuarial long-term
return of 8.25%. We recognize that this is a target return and the market cannot be
legislated. Some might argue that with this mandate a pension fund manages return,
instead of managing risk, a practice that is not good public policy. The legislation does
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however provide structure and a formal policy to reach a targeted return. The PRIM staff
and board must balance an aggressive investment policy with their fiduciary
responsibility to safeguard the fund. In so doing the investment policy selection process
discussed in the following section provides the governance mechanism to achieve that
balance and focuses the fund managers.
4 Investment process
Since the 1970’s PRIT has invested in economic development yet the extent to which
these investments were a result of a rigorous selection process is debatable. The key word
in this discussion is “process”. From the 1970s to 2003 PRIM in-state investing was not
part of a defined policy. Prior to 2003, targeted investments were made through
investment funds such as the Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation
(MTDC) and Commonwealth Capital intended to create economic activity and stimulate
job growth. Other programs included the American Dream, a mortgage program to
create homeownership opportunities for low to moderate income homebuyers. While
investments had been made in the domestic emerging markets, there was no framework
for such investing. PRIM staff and the Board reluctantly considered ETIs that could be
prone to political interference.
In January of 2003, Timothy P. Cahill was sworn in as State Treasurer. One of his
first acts was to engage an outside expert, a private equity fund manager and political
consultant, to chair his transition team and assess PRIM’s policies and directives. As part
of this process the transition team contracted an outside consultant to structure an ETI
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policy.9 The study evaluated successful and failed ETI programs and identified the
components of a successful initiative. The exercise involved changing the mindset of
both staff and the Board who were of the opinion that if a policy did not look solely at the
return then it would risk diluting the return.
In July 2003 the McKinsey study was complete and PRIM had a clear directive with
the ETI policy supported by Treasurer Cahill. The study resulted in the PRIM Board
adopting the ETI policy. The complete ETI Policy is found in appendix table 7. The
final policy included a clause that all ETIs must be in-state and benefit the economic
growth of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Travaglini, 2005). The policy mandated
that ETIs adhere to the same rigorous investment philosophy and selection process as
traditional investments. The New York City Employees’ Retirement System and the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System policies target 2% of their total
portfolio to ETIs (Hagerman et al. 2005; Hebb, 2005). The PRIM ETI policy took a
slightly different approach and set a cap of 2% for ETI investments giving board
members assurance that ETIs would not exceed two percent of total assets.
PRIM targeted investments are part of a four-step selection process that follows the
same investment discipline as non-targeted investments. The process incorporates checks
and balances that give board members the assurance that proper due diligence was
performed before reaching a final vote. Figure 2 illustrates the investment selection
process guided by three key factors: 1. an ETI criteria and legislated mandate to invest in
the Commonwealth, 2. reaching the 8.25% long-term actuarial return for the overall fund,
9
The transition team contracted McKinsey & Company to conduct a pro-bono study to evaluate ETIs
modeling State Treasurer Phil Angelides’ “California Initiative”.
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and 3. assessing fund managers in their ability to meet the policy benchmarks.10 Pension
fund staff, in some cases with a consultant, evaluate submissions and perform the due
diligence. Consultants may provide outside advice on potential candidates. They can
reassure the Board that someone other than PRIM staff is reviewing the potential fund
manager. The most recently issued ETI Request For Proposal (RFP) (December 2006)
states that the “Search Committee” includes a member of the Investment/Real Estate
Committee or its representative and as well as PRIM staff.
The search committee usually performs a due diligence interview with the
proposers and then chooses finalists based on the selection criteria. A member of the
search committee may then visit the finalists’ offices and performs on-site due diligence.
The committee ranks the finalists and proposes the selected fund managers to the PRIM
Real Estate/Investment Committee and the PRIM Board. Finalists selected may need to
make a presentation (or finalist interview) to the Investment/Real Estate Committee
and/or the PRIM Board. The Investment/Real Estate Committee will either accept or
reject the recommendations and may propose a different manager to the PRIM Board
(PRIM, 2006b, p. 10).
10
“The investment policy benchmark is calculated by applying the investment performance of the asset
class benchmarks to the Fund’s asset allocation targets. The investment policy benchmark permits the
Board to compare the Fund’s actual performance to a passively managed proxy, and to measure the
contribution of active investment management and policy implementation” (PRIM, 2005c, p. 77).
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Figure 2 PRIM’s 2007 ETI Investment Manager Selection Process
As the process shows, three bodies are part of the selection process: the Board, the
advisory committees, and the consultants.
The Board serves as trustee for each retirement system that invests in PRIT and is
responsible for management of the Fund. The Board has nine members and is chaired by
Massachusetts State Treasurer and Receiver General, Timothy P. Cahill. There are two
outside experts on the Board in the field of investment management; one is an investment
consultant with Cambridge Associates appointed by the Governor. The second outside
expert, a Professor at Brandeis University, is appointed by the Treasurer. Appointed
members serve a term of four years. Other members include a Governor designee that is
the Chief Administrative Officer for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a Governor
appointee that is a state police officer, and four elected members for a term of three years
representing state employees and teachers’ retirement board (PRIM, 2006a). As per the
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Massachusetts General Law Chapter 32 Section 23 (2Ai) there shall be at least two
minority members on the Board.
The Board members are fiduciaries of the Fund and have final decision making
authority and accountability. Board members meet six times a year for approximately
two hours per meeting and serve without compensation net of expenses. Board meetings
are open to the public. The ethical guidelines and responsibilities of the Board, chairman,
executive director, and advisory committees are outlined in detail in the publication,
PRIM Charters and Policies. The publication is specific regarding governance, education,
and communication (PRIM, 2004a). Academic studies have noted that governance,
education policies, and professional qualifications are important components of a Board’s
function (Clark, 2006).
PERAC is a regulatory agency that helps board members in their education
policies and provides guidance to the local retirement systems. PERAC does not have
jurisdiction over the PRIM Board. Recent legislation does however impact PRIM in
terms of future local system’s investment in PRIT. In May of 2005 PERAC approved the
Advisory Committee’s (made up of five governance experts from business and academia)
Reform Initiatives booklet that made recommendations related to investment decisions,
enforcement issues, conflict of interest, board structure, and education policies for the
106 retirement systems (PERAC, 2005a). The Massachusetts Joint Committee on Public
Service adopted the Advisory Committee recommendations in January of 2006. Sections
requiring legislative approval are in the document 2006 Pension Reform Legislation
submitted to the Massachusetts General Court. The proposed legislation would give
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PERAC the enforcement power to order local systems in breach of their fiduciary duty to
invest assets in PRIT. PERAC would control the day-to-day operations of the system.
In addition to the Board there are three advisory committees: Investment,
Administration/Audit, and Real Estate/Timber. The advisory committees are made up of
board members and private citizens that provide external investment expertise. The
investment committee meetings are not open to the public and are confidential. The staff
sets the agenda and distributes the investment fund manager finalists to the committee in
advance of the meeting. The closed investment committee meetings allow for more open
discussion of the staff proposed investment managers in all asset classes (except for real
estate and timber with their own committee).
It is at the investment committee level that staff submits several recommendations
and committee members determine whether the investment manager has the
qualifications and track record to meet the expected performance results. It is worth
noting that sixty five percent of PRIT is actively managed and the investment committee
selects and recommends managers to the Board, as opposed to investing in index funds
that passively invest in the broader market. These managers are evaluated and expected to
outperform their respective contractual benchmarks (PRIM, 2006a).
As referred to in section two, PRIM follows the “prudent expert rule” of Chapter
32: Section 23. The rule requires board trustees to select and hire experts to manage the
pension fund’s assets. As Ghilarducci (1994, p.7 ) points out, the “prudent expert rule”
calls for pension funds to retain outside experts to achieve adequate portfolio
diversification and risk-adjusted “reasonable” returns that may allow for the pursuit of
“social criteria” as long as risk-adjusted rates of return are not compromised. Investment
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managers have the expertise to manage investments and seek risk-adjusted market-rate
returns (that may have a collateral benefit). Outside consultants are retained to assist
staff in the hiring of active investment managers and in establishing the pension fund’s
strategic asset allocation policy. A pension fund’s general consultant is involved in
overall asset allocation strategies and hiring of managers across asset classes. An asset
class specific consultant advises on investments for that particular asset class (e.g.
alternative/private equity or real estate).
PRIM’s outside consultants provide advice to staff on asset allocation and the
selection of fund managers. A pension fund looks at four factors when choosing a
consultant:
1. Qualifications and track record,
2. Experience with similar clients (e.g. large public sector pension funds),
3. Objectivity and no conflict of interest and,
4. Competitive fees.
Cliffwater LLC is PRIM’s general consultant (as of July 2005 with a three year contract)
and provides advice in allocating assets, monitoring existing assets, and assessing new
opportunities for the Fund. Pathway Capital is PRIM’s asset consultant in alternatives
and Townsend Group and Morris & Morse is their real estate consultant (PRIM, 2006b).
The consultant world is complex in terms of the type of expertise provided and
level of fiduciary responsibility. Consultants can have discretionary and non-
discretionary clients. Consultants are often referred to as “gatekeepers” between the
pension fund decision makers and a potential investment fund manager. This term is
used as the consultant’s advice to the pension fund determines where and how
investments are made. In some cases, a pension fund hires a consultant to independently
manage assets. Here these consultants only report back to the pension fund with
performance returns. In other cases, for example PRIM, a pension fund hires a consultant
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to advise on asset allocation and perform due diligence on potential investment fund
managers. The third type of consultant may produce general reports on industry trends
and manager performance with no client work in setting asset allocation polices or
selecting fund managers. A partial list of pension fund consultants, either general or
specific to real estate and private equity, is listed in appendix table 8. Academic
literature has referred to the principal-agent relationship in which the “principal” is the
investor or beneficiary and the “first-tier agent” is the external money manager (Black,
1992), to which consultants can be considered an agent in this complex chain (Clark,
2000).
Consulting firms are structured with “research staff” and “field consultants”. The
research staff track investment manager performance and manage databases of
information on managers relevant to existing clients. Research staff has a product focus
in an asset class such as fixed income, private equity, or real estate. The field consultants
interface with clients and think about market solutions for the client and report back to
research staff with requests. The consulting industry is dynamic as sub-asset classes
emerge and alternative consultants compete to be general consultants.
It is widely believed that consultants are not in favor of ETIs as they perceive the
investments to be low performing. Typically the client directs a consultant to evaluate a
potential ETI fund manager. Some consultants consider an ETI proposal evaluation to be
more time consuming than a proposal for traditional investments. The client’s directive
is usually the only incentive for a consultant to pursue ETI investments. Unlike PRIM, a
pension fund client does not usually direct the consultant to pursue targeted investments.
An important factor for a consultant is that the ETI product has a market based pricing
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mechanism, as in the case of the fixed-income mortgage backed securities product. A
consultant may find selecting a targeted investment fund manager unwieldy if there is no
market based pricing mechanism.
This section has deconstructed the components of the investment decision-making
process. PRIM staff, committees, consultants, and the Board each offer a different
perspective and challenge assumptions. With a competitive selection process and
investment philosophy a pension fund can gain access to top-tier investment firms and
grow its assets to meet its future liabilities.
5 Economic development as part of the process
Investments in economic development add needed diversification and performance
to the Fund and cover three asset classes: fixed income, real estate, and alternatives.
Strategic asset allocation and portfolio optimization are the building blocks of a pension
fund and allow the fund to meet its investment objectives. With a properly executed
strategic asset allocation policy the fund can significantly grow its net assets. PRIT’s
investment performance in relation to the actuarial target goal of 8.25% and the policy
benchmark are shown in figure 3.
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Figure 3 PRIT Fund Performance Summary
Source: PRIM, 2006a
Overall asset allocation policy is set every three to five years by staff with advice
from the general consultant and is approved by the investment committee and Board.
The PRIM Board recognizes that over the long-term, asset allocation is the most
important contributor of return and risk to the PRIT Fund. In February 2006 the
strategic asset allocation review concluded that:
…the Board agreed to not add any new asset classes to the PRIT Fund, but instead agreed to
add new investment techniques. Accordingly, the Board voted to implement a 5% Portable
Alpha strategy within the domestic equity portfolio. Other notable changes included a
reduction of high yield debt from 9% to 5%, a reduction in the timber target from 5% to 4%
and an increase in the international equity target from 15% to 20% reflecting the world
equity market capitalization weighting.
(PRIM, 2006a, p. 59)
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Further, the long-term expected rate of return of the Fund from was revised to 8.30%, up
from the expected 8.14%. The changes build upon the approved asset allocation policy
in 2003 and implemented through 2005. The Fund noted that, “The expected risk of the
PRIT Fund, as measured by standard deviation, is 11.65% down significantly from an
expected risk of 12.75% in 2003.” The changes in expected return were made in
conjunction with the goal of reducing the volatility of the overall portfolio (PRIM 2006a,
p. 60). PRIT’s asset allocation distribution from 1997 to 2007 and most recent asset
allocation targets are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1 PRIT Capital Fund Asset Allocation Policy Targets
Source: PRIM 2006a
Table 2 PRIT Capital Fund Asset Allocation
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There has been a gradual increase in real estate and alternatives—for PRIT this
includes private equity, venture capital, and natural resources. Economic development
investments are included in the current asset allocation across the three classes: fixed
income (allocation of 15.4%), alternative investments (6.5%), and real estate (11%). The
Fund’s rebalancing policy states, “Rebalancing is not time-based (e.g., every twelve
months), but is triggered when an asset class exceeds or falls below its target allocation
range” (PRIM 2006a, p. 93). The ETI criteria states that investments must not exceed a
reasonable weighting in the portfolio and in this regard should adhere to the same
investment philosophy as non-targeted investments.
The December 15, 2005 and December 15, 2006 ETI RFP highlighted the fact that
an important part of the selection process is the description of the firm’s investment
philosophy.11 Within the philosophy the question is asked: “What benchmark is
appropriate? How important is benchmark-tracking error? What has been the historical
tracking error for the subject product?” (PRIM, 2006b; 2005d, p. 23). 12 A benchmark is
essentially a road signal along the way to measure how the investment manager is doing
based on the stated goals and performance. It is important for PRIM management and the
potential investment manager to agree on what will be the contractual benchmark for the
investment as the benchmarks vary.
As with other investments, PRIM staff and consultants monitor targeted investment
performance against the defined asset class benchmarks defined as: The PRIM Board
compares the effective duration of a manager’s portfolio to the Lehman Brothers
11
According to the PRIM Executive Office, allocations from the 2006 RFP were approved in July 2006 and
allocations from the 2007 RFP were approved in June 2007.
12
“Tracking errors are reported as the difference between the return achieved and the targeted benchmark.
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Aggregate Index for domestic core fixed income securities and for real estate the
benchmark is primarily the NCREIF Property Index. PRIM however does not use any
defined benchmark for alternatives.13 The Wilshire’s Trust Universe Comparison Service
(TUCS) Median is also used as an overall benchmark for the performance of institutional
funds as well as the TUCS Universe Ranking. PRIM also uses a “policy benchmark”
(compares asset class benchmarks to asset allocation targets) and the PRIT overall rate of
return in fiscal year 2006 yielded 15.49% surpassing the policy benchmark of 13.89%
(PRIM, 2006a).
The PRIM Board decided at the October 2005 Board meeting that PRIM staff should
review ETI investments in response to an RFP issued annually. Considering that
investments in economic development are more time intensive than the core portfolio,
investment managers now have a 60-day window to respond. The PRIM board issues
the RFP and places an advertisement on PRIM’s website, in Pensions & Investments
trade magazine, and in the Massachusetts Register for Goods & Services. The
advertisement directs interested firms to PRIM's ETI criteria as firms must demonstrate
that they meet the set criteria. This strategy allows PRIM board and staff to review ETIs
annually and frees staff time for the core portfolio.
The RFP formally established the PRIM ETI selection process that calls for
proposals from investment managers across the three ETI asset classes (fixed income,
private equity, and real estate). The RFP makes the bidding process a transparent one
and puts the ETI criteria out in the marketplace. The RFP was mentioned in Money
Management Letter (January 31, 2006), a publication widely read by the investment
13
An industry benchmark in venture capital and private equity is the Venture Economics Young Funds
index however as Hebb notes, “without knowledge of the vintage years of the exited investments in this
index it doesn’t provide a meaningful benchmark at this early stage of investment” (Hebb 2005, p. 17).
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community, “…The $40 billion Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment
Management Board recently issued an RFP for economically-targeted investments. The
board adopted a policy in 2003 to seek out investments that benefit the local economy,
but this is the first time a formal RFP has been issued…” In the January 9, 2006 issue of
the Pensions & Investments trade magazine, the RFP was advertised as follows:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management
(PRIM) Board, a $39 billion public pension fund, is soliciting proposals from firms
interested in providing a Commonwealth of Massachusetts Based Economically Targeted
Investment (ETI) Investment Management Services Program. The Board will accept and
evaluate equity, fixed income, real estate, and alternative investment (venture capital and
buyout) proposals to manage these assets in an approach that meets the Board’s Specific
ETI criteria and is at least 50% invested in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
[emphasis added]….(Pensions & Investments 2006, p. 24)
It is important to note that in addition to meeting the ETI criteria the advertisement states
that the investment manager must be “at least 50% invested in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts”. The PRIM ETI RFP made for a transparent selection process and
together with the ETI Policy of 2003 sets forth how the investments can link into urban
revitalization or more broadly economic development. Appendix table 9 details how the
RFP and ETI Policy ask the right questions such that the selection process seeks out firms
that will make investments in the underserved markets.
PRIM made its first ETI investment prior after the creation of the 2003 ETI Policy
(yet before the issuance of the formal ETI RFP of 2005), with an allocation of $25
million to Access Capital in March of 2004. The firm manages the “Access Capital
Strategies Community Investment Fund” that invests in securities with at least an Aaa
Moody’s rating, an AAA rating from Standard & Poors, or issued or guaranteed by the
US Government, government agencies or government-sponsored agencies (Fannie Mae,
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Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae).14 The securities are targeted to support low and
moderate-income individuals in Massachusetts for affordable housing mortgages, small
business loans, and health care loans. The firm’s practice is to invest in geographically
specific private placement debt securities designed to support underlying community
development activities serving low and moderate-income individuals (Access Capital,
2005).
The decision to invest in Access Capital came before the first ETI RFP was issued
but was part of the PRIM investment selection process. In addition to Access Capital
meeting with PRIM staff they also met with the general consultant (then Wilshire) twice
during the selection process. It was Access Capital’s six-year track record and
competitive returns that were attractive to both Wilshire and the PRIM Board. As the
first PRIM ETI investment under the new ETI policy, the evaluation focused on what the
fund might be “giving up” because these were economically targeted investments. As
PRIM was already investing in non-targeted mortgage-backed securities it was an easy fit
to continue in this type of fixed-income product but with a focus in the state of
Massachusetts (Interview, 2006a). PRIM staff saw that the Access Capital allocation was
a logical fit based on PRIM’s familiarity and success with their ongoing investments in
mortgage-backed securities (Interview, 2006b).
PRIM’s initial $25 million investment in Access Capital included 312 loans
(affordable housing, small business, and economic development) in 135 cities and towns
throughout Massachusetts. “To support affordable homeownership, the Fund invests in
mortgages to homebuyers with income that is 80% or less than Area Median Income
14
The federal chartered and stockholder-owned mortgage finance companies, Government Sponsored
Enterprises (GSEs), are not allowed by their charters to originate loans but purchase and/or securitize
mortgage loans made by others.
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(AMI) [emphasis added] or the Fund acts as the take-out for loans originated under
special affordable housing programs” (Access Capital 2005, p. 3).
A key aspect to the Access Capital fund is that it buys specially created mortgage-
backed securities that are sourced from community loan programs such as Massachusetts
Housing Partnership among other local affordable housing groups. This frees up
commitments so that these organizations can make new loans to low and moderate-
income families in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and at the lowest current rate
supported by the secondary market. The fund also invests in “high impact” transactions
such as the Massachusetts based Holyoke Health Center located in a federally designated
“Medically Underserved Area and a Health Professional Shortage Area” (Access Capital,
2005).
As a large institutional investor PRIM takes advantage of the diversified returns
of a commingled vehicle (Access Capital Strategies Community Investment Fund) yet
can invest in a target specific area like Massachusetts (Homer, 2004). The institutional
investor also enjoys the benefits of the investment sub-manager that has expertise in the
fixed income market and portfolio management. PRIM receives a customized report of
the target specific low-income loans made in their state. In terms of performance, table 3
shows Access Capital has in comparison to the fund’s blended benchmark (80% Merrill
Agy MBS index (MF30) & 20% Merrill U.S. Treasury 1-10yr. Index).
Table 3 Access Capital Investment Performance (net of fees) March 31, 2006
Access Capital 1 Year Fiscal Year 2005 Since Inception
Annualized 3/31/04
Return 2.59% 6,17% 2.70%
Benchmark 2.41% 5.67% 2.41%
Difference +18 basis points +50 basis points +31 basis points
Source: PRIM Executive Office, ETI March 31, 2006.
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At the October 2005 Board meeting a motion was approved to increase allocations to ETI
managers that had met the ETI criteria and thus approved a $50 million increase to
Access Capital. PRIM now has committed $75 million to the Access Capital Fund. At
the October 2005 Board meeting it was noted that since inception Access Capital net
return was 3.40% and had outperformed the plan’s core fixed income return of 2.97%.
Access Capital provides an investment product to PRIM in line with their investment
philosophy, adding performance and diversification to the Fund while benefiting the local
economy.
Currently the PRIM ETI program is in its infancy. However, the program, as of
July 1 2007, has committed capital of $230 million with $173 million deployed as
detailed in table 4. The table details the asset class, amount of capital committed, product
type and inner city focus.
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These investments were approved based on staff recommendations and sometimes with
consultant due diligence as well. Community Capital Management, Castile Ventures,
and Flagship Ventures were approved through the December 2005 ETI RFP. AFL-CIO
HIT Fund and the second allocation to Flagship Ventures were approved through the
December 2006 ETI RFP. It is however important to recognize that the remaining
investments were approved before the current ETI RFP process was put into effect. As
of December 31, 2005 PRIM ETI Fund Managers are required to report to PRIM a
“PRIM ETI Quarterly Update” as shown in table 5.
Table 5 PRIM ETI Quarterly Update Form
Asset Class Quarter Ending
Firm
AUM Committed Capital Capital Called
Program Objective (Please describe your investment vehicle and its objectives. Please attach an additional page if more space is required.)
Gross Performance
Quarter Year to Date 1 Year 3 Year Inception to
Annualized Annualized Date
Return
Benchmark Return
Difference
(In Basis Points)
Residual Benefits of Program in Massachusetts
(Please quantify or explain how this investment program benefits Massachusetts and its residents. Quantify
the number of jobs that have been created in Massachusetts as a result of the program, if applicable. Please
attach an additional page if more space is required.)
PRIM’s real estate consultant, the Townsend Group, advised PRIM staff in the
selection process of the real estate fund managers. The alternative investment consultant,
Pathway Capital, was not part of the selection process. While the economic and social
returns have not yet been realized, on the real estate side there are collateral benefits in
the employment of construction workers. In the December 6th 2005 board meeting
agenda, staff examined Castile Ventures15 ability to meet the five ETI criteria. In doing
15
Castile Ventures, based in Waltham, Massachusetts, makes early-stage venture capital investments in
communications, software, and information technology infrastructure.
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so the agenda showed that Castile’s track record was comparable to other private equity
firms within the same time period. The investment committee saw that Castile’s
professionals had experience in managing venture capital investments having previously
worked for well established private equity firms. In the selection of venture capital
investments it was important for the committee to believe that the fund manager would be
able to interpret shifts in the sector and successfully manage the changes. The investment
recommendation provided in the December 6th board materials gave a full assessment of
the risks associated with Castile Ventures. The report also showed that PRIM’s $10
million allocation in Castile Ventures represented a reasonable weighting in the PRIT
portfolio of approximately 0.025% of the total Fund. In targeting a “capital gap” Castile
Ventures strategy is focused on early stage investments. The fund and its investments
will be tracked on the same basis as PRIM’s other alternative investments (PRIM
Executive Office, 2005, p. 30-31). The Board presentation showed that Castile aimed to
meet the ETI criteria while achieving performance returns comparable to non-targeted
investments. PRIM selected Castile Ventures for its professional management and
investment focus in the state of Massachusetts, characteristics of a sound ETI investment.
Similarly, after the second 2006 ETI RFP the Board approved two new investments
(AFL-CIO HIT and an additional allocation to Flagship Ventures) in June 2007 that met
the ETI criteria and passed the standards of a rigorous investment philosophy that target
risk-adjusted market-rate returns.16
16
During the 2007 ETI RFP the Search Committee eliminated 8 of the 11 proposals based on unsatisfactory
factors to meet the ETI criteria, investment philosophy, management, performance, and fees among other
factors. The Search Committee interviewed the remaining 3 finalist proposals and two were approved by
the Investment Committee and then the Board at the June 2007 PRIM Board Meeting (PRIM Executive
Office 2007b).
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6 Conclusion
The Massachusetts legislative framework is important to the public pension fund’s
targeted investment program. While the mandate to invest in the Commonwealth has
existed for the last two decades, the directives in the 2003 ETI policy paved the way for
investments in economic development. In PRIM’s case a Board champion, the state
treasurer, began the process by engaging an outside expert to review these types of
investments and develop a formal policy. The policy was approved and the Board
champion followed up with PRIM staff to ensure that the policy was put into effect.
Today both the legislative mandate to invest in the Commonwealth and the formal ETI
criteria provide the Board and staff with a safe haven to pursue targeted investments.
Targeted investing is only successful if it is part of a rigorous selection process equal
to selecting traditional investments. A stringent process examines track records
beforehand and monitors progress against contractual benchmarks. Without this process
ETIs are prone to political interference and failure. The selection process encourages
decision-making that aims to separate itself from political forces that can lead to bad
investment choices.
The selection process shows that best practice in targeted investing should include an
ETI RFP that goes out to the market annually. This strategy allows more staff time for
the core portfolio. The RFP and its advertisements carefully stipulate that potential
investment firms must show that fifty percent of PRIM’s investment in the portfolio will
be invested in the state of Massachusetts.
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This research examined the role of the consultants in the investment selection
process. Consultants often feel it is not in their interest to pursue targeted investments
without a client directive. However, a consultant and the pension fund may be more
inclined to pursue a targeted investment if the product can be priced in the market. In
general a consultant considers investments in economic development only at the client’s
directive.
In analyzing a pension fund’s targeted investments, programs can take shape in
different capacities. The New York City Employees’ Retirement System formed an ETI
policy to address a failing city in the late 1970s. The California Public Employees
Retirement System began with an eye towards building their in-state real estate portfolio
in the form of the California Urban Real Estate (CURE) Program. In the case of the
Massachusetts State Retirement System targeted investing has a legislative agenda.
Investing in economic development took shape in the legislature as part of the 1983
pension reforms and then established itself as a formal ETI policy in 2003.
This research has implications for other pension funds with potential to invest in
urban revitalization. We find three best practice implications. First, a board level
champion involves outside experts to construct an ETI policy. Second, an ETI RFP
makes the bidding process transparent and deflects political interference. Third, ETIs are
approved through an investment selection process that incorporates a rigorous investment
philosophy. We argue targeted investments can be successful with an ETI policy and
selection process that evaluates and monitors targeted investments like any other
potential investment.
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Table 7 PRIM ETI Policy
Adopted 8/14/03
A. PRIM recognizes its obligations under Massachusetts law include a responsibility to seek
out investment opportunities that will benefit the economic climate of the Commonwealth as a
whole, provided that such investments are consistent with the Board’s obligations to the members
and beneficiaries of its participating retirement systems. (See M.G.L. ch. 32, sec. 23(2A)(h))
Accordingly, in cases where investment characteristics, including returns, risk, liquidity,
compliance with allocation policy, and others, are equal, PRIM will favor those investments that
have a substantial, direct and measurable benefit to the economy of the Commonwealth.
B. Such Economically Targeted Investments (“ETI’s”) must meet the following criteria:
1. Investments must target risk-adjusted, market-rate returns and provide net returns equivalent to
or higher than other available investments, at commensurate levels of risk. Economic or social
benefits will not justify a lower return on any PRIM investment. When evaluating ETI
opportunities, PRIM will discount projected returns for any subsidies, deferral of income, higher
risk levels, and other concessions to reach a real rate of return for comparison with other ETI and
non-ETI investment alternatives. Similarly, ETI benefits will not justify higher investment risk.
However, where appropriate, the PRIM staff, its managers, and its consultants will actively seek
out and develop guarantees, third party recourse, hedging, and other acceptable and customary
risk management vehicles to reduce or eliminate risk in ETI investments.
2. Investments must not exceed a reasonable weighting in the portfolio, including tracking the
degree of exposure to the Massachusetts economy and ensuring appropriate geographic
diversification. Investments should maintain the overall portfolio’s compliance with its asset
allocation strategy. ETI benefits will not justify deviation from the Asset Allocation Plan adopted
by the PRIM Board.
3.Investments should be placed with an experienced and capable manager through an objective
and transparent process. Investments should be managed by qualified discretionary investment
managers. PRIM will not make any direct investments.
4. Investments should target a “capital gap” where there are likely to be underserved markets.
5.Investments must be tracked (both investment performance and collateral benefits) and
managed with the same rigor and discipline imposed on other investments. Investments should
be reviewed and monitored by PRIM staff and consultants without disproportionate expenditure
of time and resources. (PRIM 2005d, p. 53).
Note: earlier in the ETI RFP on page 13 within the basic selection criteria for proposing firms it
adds:
f. “Investment managers must demonstrate that 50% of PRIM’s investment in the portfolio
will be invested within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” (PRIM 2006b, page 13).
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Table 9 Linking PRIM ETIs with urban revitalization
The 2003 PRIM ETI Policy and the 2006 and 2007 PRIM ETI RFP incorporates policy
and process in choosing investments aimed at the emerging domestic markets.
1. The ETI Policy links targeted investments to underserved communities with
criteria number four of the ETI policy as follows:
Investments should target a ‘capital gap’ where there are likely to be underserved
markets.
2. The ETI RFP asks the question in examining the fund manager’s investment
philosophy:
Describe how your product differentiates itself from those of PRIM’s current
managers. What role would your portfolio play in PRIM’s ETI program? (PRIM
2006b, p. 24)
3. The ETI RFP further mandates that the proposing investment fund manager:
Demonstrate that your firm will invest 50% of PRIM’s investment in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (PRIM 2006b, p.13).
4. The ETI RFP also asks fund managers to describe the risk components
inherent in an emerging domestic market by asking:
What is your firm’s definition of risk with respect to this product? If more than
one, specify each with its percentage of importance. Describe how you monitor
and manage risks such as: residual risk versus the benchmark, common factor
analysis, security, sector, and industry weightings, and, value at risk.
Describe any risk measurement models used and how this analysis is incorporated
in the portfolio management process.
These four points seek to address how a potential fund manager’s product intends to
address the underserved markets in Massachusetts.
Current fund managers, while not approved through the 2006 and 2007 ETI RFP, were
approved with respect to meeting the five ETI criteria of the 2003 ETI Policy.
Allocations to investment vehicles that have an inner city focus (e.g. South Boston,
Quincy, Mattapan) include: AFL-CIO HIT, Canyon Johnson, Intercontinental, New
Boston, Access Capital, Flagship Ventures, and Castile Ventures. Through these
investment vehicles PRIM is investing in the underserved urban markets.
43