In this article Louis Kriesberg presents two case studies of
the conflicts in the Middle East and Central Europe after World
War II. He describes efforts directed at prevention of their
intractability as well as those that encouraged their
transformation toward becoming more negotiable. In this summary,
I will present his ideas on the latter issue. According to
Kriesberg, for transformation to happen, a strategy should be
developed that incorporates "the appropriate parties,
issues, and combination of inducements for the desired movement
at a particular time" (p. 119). This might not be
consciously planned, but still involves some coherent actions.

Transforming Intractability

Efforts toward conflict transformation can be implemented by a
variety of parties. Who those parties are influences the
effectiveness of their efforts. The strategy for conflict
transformation combines certain choices of issues, parties and
inducements. It might seem that there are no common issues shared
between the parties. But this is often not true. Conflicts
develop constantly and even if they now lack any negotiation
potential, in some time they might regain it. Kriesberg provides
a few examples of agreements that were based on years of
negotiating on peripheral issues: the Helsinki Accords (November
1972-August 1975), agreements of detente which were accompanied
by bilateral agreements between countries besides the U.S. and
Soviet Union (the Austrian State Treaty (1955), U.S.-USSR
cultural exchange agreement (1958), a treaty prohibiting the
military use of Antarctica (1959), etc.). As with issues, the
positions of the parties in conflict may seem unchangeable. In
reality though, there are a multiplicity of conflicts
cross-cutting each other. Any conflict can be considered narrow
or broad depending on what angle we look at it. For example, the
Central European conflict could be regarded as one between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact, or between socialism and imperialism.

In order to de-escalate a conflict, the number of parties
might be increased to include those who want to reach an
agreement, or decreased to exclude those who are not willing to
moderate their positions. For example, at the beginning of the
Cold War, the Soviet Union was averse to negotiating with
multiple parties (U.S., Great Britain, and France) because it was
singled out. The situation changed when bilateral negotiations
between the Soviet Union and the U.S. were conducted. Basic
transformation is a long-term process, since it necessitates
altering the public opinion of large populations toward
accommodation. Intermediaries play a significant role in
transforming conflict toward becoming tractable. The
Israeli-Egyptian negotiations are an example. In the case of
Central Europe, intermediaries served as an "audience ... to
which appeals were made" and facilitated multilateral
negotiations (p. 125).

There are three types of inducements that are used by
adversaries and contribute to conflict transformation: coercion,
tradeoffs and persuasion. According to Kriesberg, the inducements
should create a situation where the status quo becomes attractive
to the parties. The sequence of inducements is very important. In
the early stage, coercion can play an important role, but it has
to be combined with trust-building inducements. For example, the
USSR gained considerable military strength in the 1960s, which
produced a status quo in Eastern and Central Europe. Western
powers were forced to accept it. At the same time the Soviet
Union tried to create an image of a reliable and not excessively
aggressive international partner by reducing its control in
Eastern Europe and relaxing domestic politics. The agreements of
1970s were the result.

In the Middle East, the PLO emerged in the 1960s. It was using
coercion to mobilize Palestinians and make the status quo more
costly for Israel. The PLO's strategies combined political and
diplomatic measures. Other organizations in the Palestinian
movement challenged the PLO's approach and resorted to violence.
Instead of becoming tractable, the conflict escalated to mutual
violence between Arabs and Jews. Palestinians were not able to
change the status quo and their actions prevented the emergence
of conditions supporting any kind of settlement.

Conclusions

Kriesberg suggests a few strategies for transformation of the
conflict in Middle East. Comparing the achievements of President
Sadat in dealing with Israel the author believes that the PLO was
lacking a large package of benefits that it could offer to
Israel. After a Palestinian uprising started on the West Bank and
Gaza, Israel's costs for maintaining the occupation increased. A
settlement does not look so unrealistic under contemporary
conditions. The creation of a small Palestinian state within the
framework of economic and military agreements with the Soviet
Union, Jordan and the United States might be beneficial for all
sides of the conflict. One strategy to transform the conflict
would be for Israel to provide an incentive for Jordan to start
negotiations with Israel. This would mean bringing governments
besides the U.S. and Egypt to the negotiation table, including,
he said in 1989, the Soviet Union. The uprising and King
Hussein's withdrawal from exercising authority in the occupied
territories make this strategy ineffective. Another strategy for
Israel would be direct negotiations with Palestinians from the
West Bank and Gaza to modify the status quo to make it mutually
acceptable. The effectiveness of this strategy is also unlikely
after the Uprising and the PLO's strengthening of its positions.
A third possible strategy would be to work with the PLO and
Palestinians from the occupied territories. The first step might
be conducting elections in West Bank and Gaza with PLO
participation in them. The next step would be to start
negotiations between Palestinians and Israel with mediation
provided by other countries. In the Central European conflict,
continuing attention is required to prevent the conflicts there
from becoming intractable.

Thus, conflicts are not necessarily totally nonnegotiable.
There are always peripheral parties that are willing to negotiate
on less substantial issues. Of course, those small settlements
might not have enough influence on the major actors to bring
conflict transformation. The essential issue in intractable
conflicts is that at least one of the parties perceives that the
adversary constitutes a threat to its values and identity. This
view is subjective and can be reframed. But this does not mean
that it is unrealistic. The adversary would have to change its
threatening behavior for the conflict to become negotiable. This
transformation is the result of internal change within the
parties.