Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare

ANTHONY J. RICE

From Parameters, Spring 1997, pp. 152-67.

"What experience and history teach us is this: that people and
governments never learn anything from history, or have ever acted upon
it." -- Hegel

The fundamental change in international relations
resulting from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact has reawakened interest
in coalition warfare. Unlike alliances, which have an enduring element
to them, coalitions are ad hoc, short term, and established for a specific
objective.[1] The best recent example is Operation Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, which showed the benefits and difficulties of coalition warfare.

The most contentious aspect of coalition operations is command and control.
This sensitivity reflects the participants' concern over who will command
their forces and what authority that commander will have. The converse
is equally significant to military and political leaders in each nation
contributing forces to a coalition: the degree of day-to-day control national
authorities will have over the employment of their own forces. These issues
will be developed in this article through an evaluation of salient lessons
from the wars of this century, with particular emphasis on the two World
Wars. Those lessons will be compared to current doctrine to discover whether
they appear to have affected current US doctrine on command and control
of coalition operations.

Within the US forces, recent joint and single-service doctrine has discussed
in varying detail principles for the planning and conduct of coalition
warfare. Of particular note is the absence of one of the principles of
war, unity of command. Instead, unity of effort is proposed, since the
former may not be achievable.

Coalition Operations as a Management Concept

The renewed interest in coalition warfare is reflected at the highest
level and featured in both the National Security Strategy (NSS)[2] and
the National Military Strategy (NMS)[3] of the United States. The NSS establishes
several circumstances favoring the use of coalitions in advancing the interests
of the United States and its allies:

We will act with others when we can.[4]

In alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others.[5]

Overseas Presence: Enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations,
by improving our abilities to operate with other nations.[6]

The NMS is equally specific: "While we maintain the unilateral
capability to wage decisive campaigns to protect US and multinational security
interests, our armed forces will most often fight in concert with regional
allies and friends, as coalitions can decisively increase combat power
and lead to a more rapid and favorable outcome to the conflict."[7]
Since coalition operations will therefore be the most common method for
the employment of US forces, the required doctrine must be developed or
adapted to post-Cold War requirements. This process is well under way,
albeit at an early stage. Useful insights for adapting current doctrine
can be developed from an inquiry into the evolution of coalition warfare
in modern history.

Coalitions Through World War I

Coalition warfare is not a new concept. It was the enduring feature
of European wars throughout much of the 18th and early 19th centuries.
Indeed, the Napoleonic Wars demonstrate graphically the key features of
coalitions: their short duration and their ad hoc nature. In this century
the World Wars were between coalitions, while Korea (under the UN), Vietnam,
and the 1990-91 Gulf War were fought by US-led coalitions. Even in the
Western Hemisphere, where the United States could be perceived as wholly
dominant, the political necessity of legitimacy has produced coalition
operations in Grenada and Haiti. The initial burden of the latter operation,
managed through the UN, fell on the United States.

The Cold War caused nations with common interests to join together in
pursuit of a common objective, although the enduring nature of the threat
at the time and the necessary response from the World War II Allies seemed
to favor an alliance over a coalition. For nearly 40 years, two alliances--the
Warsaw Pact and NATO--confronted one another across the inter-German border.
Elsewhere the United States aligned itself with friendly states in regional
alliances--CENTO and SEATO[8]--although they proved to be short lived when
compared to the North Atlantic Alliance.

It is the two World Wars, however, that have had the greatest effect
on our understanding of how coalition warfare can be conducted. There is
almost a continuum from the loose structures of 1914 through to the conclusion
of World War II in Europe in May 1945, wherein the most developed coalition
ever assembled achieved victory.

World War I was fought primarily between two coalitions, the Central
Powers (principally Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Turkey) and
the Allies (principally France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Italy, and
eventually the United States). The command arrangements for much of the
war were extremely loose, at best relying on cooperation and coordination
among the Allies, with nations pursuing their own national goals much of
the time. Today such arrangements are described as parallel command, which
"exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a
nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its
force, a parallel command structure exists."[9] It was only in 1918,
when the Allies on the Western Front were staring defeat in the face, that
a more thoroughly integrated command system was adopted.

The concept of parallel command therefore underpinned Allied command
relationships for much of the war. On the Western Front, where the British
army fought beside the much larger French army, command arrangements were
national. On his assumption as commander in chief of the British army in
France in 1915, General Sir Douglas Haig was reminded by the War Minister,
Lord Kitchener: "Your command is an independent one and you will in
any case not come under the orders of any allied general."[10] Haig,
however, had to command his army within the reality of the high-intensity
operations of the Western Front and rapidly came to a different conclusion.
Later that year he wrote, "I am not under General Joffre's orders,
but that would make no difference, as my intention was to do my utmost
to carry out General Joffre's wishes on strategic matters as if they were
orders."[11]

The arrival of the United States Army on the Western Front in 1917 saw
no immediate change in the extant arrangements. General John J. Pershing's
directive from the Secretary of War stated: "In operations against
the Imperial German government, you are directed to cooperate with the
forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in doing
so the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United
States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the
identity of which must be preserved."[12] Pershing's perception of
successful Allied command arrangements was to be revealed in April of the
following year.

It was not until the near collapse of the Western Front in March 1918
following the major German offensive that changes were made in command
and control among the Allies; even then they were not immediate. A resolution
signed at Doullens on 26 March 1918 stated: "General Foch is charged
by the British and French governments to coordinate the action of the Allied
armies on the Western Front. To this end he will come to an understanding
with the Commanders-in-Chief, who are to furnish him all the information
necessary."[13] So although General Foch was established as a supremo,
he was given no authority. Continued deterioration on the Western Front,
exacerbated by new problems of coordination between the British and French
armies, necessitated further action.

On April 3 the Prime Ministers of France and the United Kingdom, together
with their senior military commanders and General Pershing, met at Beauvais
to review again the command arrangements established little more than a
week earlier. With general agreement that the Doullens Resolution had not
achieved the desired result, General Pershing stated the case for unity
of command. His words then are as apposite today:

The principle of unity of command is undoubtedly the correct one for
the Allies to follow. I do not believe that it is possible to have unity
of action without a supreme commander. We have already experience enough
in trying to coordinate the operations of the Allied Armies without success.
There has never been real unity of action. Such coordination between two
or three armies is impossible no matter who the commanders-in-chief may
be. Each commander-in-chief is interested in his own army, and cannot get
the other commander's point of view or grasp the problem as a whole. I
am in favor of a supreme commander and believe that the success of the
Allied cause depends upon it. I think the necessary action should be taken
by this council at once. I am in favor of conferring the supreme command
upon General Foch.[14]

Pershing's view was reflected in the Beauvais Agreement:

General Foch is charged by the British, French and American governments
with the coordination of the action of the Allied Armies on the Western
Front; to this end there is conferred on him all the powers necessary for
its effective realization. To the same end, the British, French and American
governments confide in General Foch the strategic direction of military
operations. The Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French and American
Armies will exercise to the fullest extent tactical direction of their
armies. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right to appeal to his government,
if in his opinion his army is placed in danger by the instructions received
from General Foch.[15]

Between April and November 1918, however, General Foch was able to achieve
only a coordinating role, since his staff was smaller than that of a brigade.

World War I forced the evolution of command and control in a coalition
from parallel command to unity of command, exercised finally by a Supreme
Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front, General Foch. The inability
of coordination measures, even with a compliant British Commander-in-Chief,
Sir Douglas Haig, to meet the demands of Allied action against the rapidly
changing situation in the spring of 1918, persuaded the Allied leaders
that unity of command was a prerequisite to effective Allied warfighting.
The events of 1918 were to have a profound effect on the participants,
not in the immediate aftermath, but in their influence on the Anglo-American
alliance of World War II.

Coalitions in World War II

World War II gradually forced the development of coalition warfare to
the greatest level of integration and sophistication in history. The Franco-British
alliance of 1939-40 showed that some of the lessons of 1914-18 had been
assimilated. A Supreme War Council was established consisting of the two
Prime Ministers, their Foreign Ministers, and their senior military advisers.
A system of lead nation was established, based on preponderance of forces
within a given theater. In the Mediterranean Sea, the French led in the
west and the British, with a French naval squadron under command, led in
the east. In France, Lord Gort, commander of the British Expeditionary
Force (BEF), reported to the French commander in chief via the commander
of French forces in northeast France, General Georges.

While this might appear to show the lessons of 1918 being put into practical
effect, real unity of command was never established among the forces arrayed
initially against the Nazis. Field Marshal Montgomery, then a Division
Commander in the BEF, wrote: "Between September 1939 and May 1940,
the Allies had never conducted any exercises, either with or without troops,
[although] an indoor exercise on the model could easily have been held.
There was no coordination between the operations of the Belgians, the BEF,
and the First French Army."[16] The defeat of the French in the summer
of 1940 and the emergence of the Anglo-American alliance in 1941-42 fostered
a new approach to the problems of coalition warfare, specifically to the
particular issue of command of coalition forces.

These issues appeared at the forefront of Allied considerations within
weeks of the attack on Pearl Harbor, driven by the rapidly deteriorating
situation in the East Indies, the Philippines, and Malaya. The need for
a supreme commander in the theater was raised by General Marshall in December
1941 at the Arcadia Conference in Washington, when he declared "that
the adoption of unified command [in the theater] would solve nine-tenths
of the problems of British-American cooperation."[17] The resulting
Australian, British, Dutch, American Command (ABDACOM) under General Wavell
firmly established the principle of unity of command from the beginning
of the new coalition; that principle was to prove fundamental to success.

The difficulties of agreeing on the terms of reference and authority
of the commander in chief of ABDACOM were profound. Early drafts were full
of prohibitions, and his final powers were very constrained. General Marshall,
however, seemed undismayed: "If the Supreme Commander ended up with
no more authority than to tell Washington what he wanted, such a situation
was better than nothing, and an improvement over the present situation."[18]
Both sides appreciated the many failings of this initial attempt at establishing
the authority of a coalition commander, but the die was cast in the acceptance
of the principle of unity of command. It can be no accident that Marshall
was the proponent of this arrangement. As General Pershing's chief staff
officer from 1917 to 1924, he had witnessed firsthand the tribulations
of Allied command in 1918.

The difficulties encountered by the two allies in coming to a common
view and understanding of the principles of command should not be underestimated,
since their approach was diametrically different. Both accepted the need
for a coordinated higher direction of the war to refine grand strategy;
establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington met that need.
However, theater command and the authority vested in those commanders was
another matter. The British regarded service chiefs within a theater as
co-equals (a committee) and Churchill required close supervision of his
commanders, doubtless born out of the many failings of British generalship
in the early part of the war: "It is not sufficient to give a general
a directive to beat the enemy and wait and see what happens. The matter
is much more complicated. The general may well be below the level of his
task, and has often been found so. A definite measure of guidance and control
is required from the staffs and from the high government authorities."[19]
Conversely, the American tradition favored a broad delegation of responsibility
and authority to a commander, on the principle that he should be assigned
a job, given the means to do it, and held responsible for its fulfillment
without scrutiny of the measures employed.[20]

The decision to carry out a combined invasion of North Africa in late
1942 drew the issue of theater command to the fore. Fortunately, the American
view prevailed and General Eisenhower was appointed supreme commander for
Operation Torch. General Marshall advised him that "it is the desire
of the War Department that you as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces
should have the maximum feasible degree of authority and responsibility,
and that you should operate at all times under as broad a directive as
possible."[21] Whatever the difficulties, and they had been significant,
by the time the coalition's first real offensive operation began, the principle
of unity of command and a supreme allied commander for the theater had
been established. Recognizing, however, that this was the first time a
British army had served under a US commander, General Andersen, Commander
of 1st (British) Army, was given the right of appeal to national authorities--subject
to some constraints--if he felt his army was threatened with dire consequences.
While this right of appeal was in principle retained throughout the war,
it was seldom exercised.

Allied unity of command was confined to the Western Mediterranean and
later to the Western European and South East Asian theaters. Elsewhere--for
example in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Pacific--the old principle
of lead nation remained, since these were either single-nation areas, or
at least dominated by the commitment made by one nation. It could be argued
that a greater level of unity of command and integration of forces was
achieved in the coalition forces in Europe than in the US-dominated Pacific,
even up to the projected invasion of Japan.

Application and Lessons, 1943-45

"Unity of command" in the Anglo-American alliance had a particular
meaning, distinct from the natural authority implicit in the term command.
One study noted: "It implies special arrangements to bring together
under a single commander elements ordinarily controlled by separate sources
of authority, each sovereign within its own sphere. Invariably the powers
of the joint commander have been closely hedged about by restrictions designed
to preserve the direct chain of command from the central authority of the
service or nation to its own commanders in the field."[22] The same
author continued, "Allied unified command was always primarily concerned
with control of forces rather than territory, and it shunned as far as
possible the administrative jurisdiction which was inseparable from territorial
control."[23] Despite restrictions on the scope of the authority of
an Allied commander exercising unity of command, it should not be presumed
that he lacked authority. Quite the contrary; it was in the final instance
General Eisenhower's decision alone to launch Overlord and Market Garden,
and later to pursue a broad front strategy in Western Europe.

For an allied commander to exercise his authority he required a headquarters
staff, a tool Marshall Foch lacked in 1918. Allied Forces Headquarters
for Torch was a new and unique structure: a fully integrated combined staff,
with a US commander and chief of staff and British component commanders.
Its genesis was almost certainly the combined staff that General Eisenhower
had assembled in London to plan Operation Torch, many of whose members
accompanied him when he subsequently assumed command of the forces that
were to invade North Africa. The Allied Forces Headquarters was criticized
for its large size, and the difficulties of matching two different staff
systems and nationalities should not be underestimated. But it performed
adequately and matured as the operation progressed.

The lessons of Operations Torch, Husky (the invasion of Sicily), and
the subsequent invasion of Italy all contributed to the final Allied command
and staff structures for Overlord. Command of Allied air forces, especially
the strategic bombers supporting the theater operation, had been problematic,
and the appointment of Air Marshal Tedder as both Eisenhower's deputy and
Commander-in-Chief of Allied Air Forces ameliorated the problem. Eisenhower
also decided that the land component command should reside with him and
not with a separate commander and staff. Lieutenant General Morgan and
his COSSAC[24] staff, charged with the planning of Overlord in 1943, had
to operate under a system of "opposite numbers" until General
Eisenhower arrived in January 1944 and insisted on an integrated combined
staff. Thus was the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF)
born. SHAEF was initially a combined army staff, with joint input
from collocated component planning staffs, and occasionally from the full
air and naval component staffs. Following the invasion, an air staff was
assembled to support Air Marshal Tedder as the Commander-in-Chief of Allied
air forces.

It was indeed fortunate for the Allied cause that General Eisenhower
was selected by General Marshall, and subsequently approved by the political
leaders of the United States and Britain, to lead Allied forces in Europe.
By the manner in which he discharged his duties he became the epitome of
the successful supreme allied commander. It is hard to imagine either Patton
or Montgomery in such an appointment.

Eisenhower described his concept of allied command and the requisite
characteristics of the commander in a letter to Admiral Mountbatten on
the latter's notification that he was to assume command of the Southeast
Asia Command:

The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives
issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest
cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theater. Since
cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to
a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy
to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the
individuals in the field. This is true if for no other reason than no commander
of an allied force can be given complete administrative and disciplinary
powers over the whole command. It will therefore never be possible to say
the problem of establishing unity in any allied command is ever completely
solved. This problem involves the human equation and must be met day by
day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings,
particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness,
are absolutely essential.[25]

General Eisenhower's influence was felt not only in the manner in which
he conducted himself as the Supreme Allied Commander but also in Allied
Forces Headquarters in the Mediterranean and later at SHAEF in northwest
Europe. With the exception of having his own chief of staff, he placed
no weight on any particular structure or organizational method within the
traditional staff framework, which he regarded as mere detail. Instead,
he emphasized the characteristics required of good staff officers: confidence,
logic, and loyalty.

This necessarily brief examination of World War II coalition command
can be summarized by reflections on allied command by two senior US Army
officers. General Devers, Commander of the 6th Army Group, listed the principal
problems that an allied theater commander should expect to have to confront:

(1) Characteristic lack of clarity and firmness of directives received
from the next superior combined headquarters or authority.
(2) The conflicting political, economic, and military problems and objectives
of each of the allied powers.
(3) The logistical capabilities, organization, doctrines, and characteristics
of each of [the] armed forces under command.
(4) The armament, training, and tactical doctrines of each of the armed
forces under command.
(5) Personal intervention and exercise of a direct, personal influence
to assure coordination and success in the initial phases of the mission
assigned by the next higher combined authority. Lastly, and in the final
analysis probably the most important of all:
(6) The personalities of the senior commanders of each of the armed services
of the allied powers under command, their capabilities, personal and professional
habits, and their ambitions.[26]

It is likely that each of these characteristics has influenced one or
another of the coalition operations conducted since 1945. They may simply
be inherent in human activities at a certain level of authority and intensity.

The other observation speaks clearly to contemporary members of NATO
and participants in any coalition operation. Major General Harold R. Bull,
US Army, was the Chief of the Plans Directorate in SHAEF. He noted, "I
can truly testify from my own experience that solving the problem of combined
command in war is simpler and more expeditious than solving the joint problems
in our national defense establishment in peace." He amplified that
insight in words that are remarkably fresh:

I can conceive of no scheme which will work unless three actions are
taken: First, firm political decisions made and clear objectives set by
national leaders above the theater commander. That is to ensure unity of
purpose. That I think is awfully important. If your international high
level decisions are to be made at theater level, I'd say, "God help
us in unity of purpose"; [second] Unity of Command to ensure unquestioned
and timely execution of directives; [third] Staff integration with mutual
respect and confidence in combined staffs to ensure sound development of
plans and directives fully representing the interests of the major elements
of the command.[27]

World War II saw the development of coalition warfare to a peak never
passed before or since. The principle of unity of purpose at the grand
strategic level, reflected by unity of command within specified theaters,
had been firmly established. The task of the great World War II coalition
was certainly made simpler by the two principal Allies speaking the same
language and sharing a common culture and common values. (Complications
arose later with the integration of French forces in General Devers' 6th
Army Group.) One must recall, too, that commanders had in many cases been
promoted rapidly up the ranks, reflecting the needs of the large wartime
armies, and the staffs were generally composed of officers with limited
troop and staff experience. Despite these potential inhibitors, the Allies
made the best of things in the interest of defeating the Axis powers.

Applications

Coalition operations since World War II have involved the United States
and a wide range of allied and friendly states; none has achieved a command
relationship that matched the level of sophistication and integration that
the Allies had achieved by 1945.

The Korean War, the first major commitment of US forces after 1945,
was fought under the auspices of the UN, but the command structure at theater
level reflected the domination and size of commitment by the United States.
There were numerous national contingents, but the United States exercised
the command function as lead nation. Given the speed with which the operation
had to be established, it was inevitable that a lead nation concept was
adopted.

In the Vietnam War, with the exception of the Australian and New Zealand
forces which were in effect under the operational control of the United
States, the command structure seemed to take a step back in time to World
War I, prior to the Beauvais Agreement. And this despite the concentration
of the warfighting in the US and South Vietnamese forces. A parallel command
structure was adopted which was even stretched to include the South Koreans.
This command relationship was criticized by General Bruce Palmer, Jr.,
in his book The 25 Year War:

In retrospect I believe that the advantages of having US commanders
exercise operational control over other national forces, especially South
Vietnamese, would have far outweighed the drawbacks, for the fact is that
we did not generate our best combined efforts. As a minimum we should have
insisted on having a substantive voice in the selection, promotion, and
removal of key South Vietnamese commanders.[28]

The operation to liberate Kuwait, Operation Desert Storm, achieved
a marked improvement on the command arrangements for Vietnam, but still
did not achieve unity of command. Instead, the theater commander, CINCENT,
strove to achieve unity of purpose and unity of effort. An interesting
hybrid command relationship was established which was both parallel and
lead nation, the United States leading the forces of the Western nations,
and Saudi Arabia leading those of the Arab nations. However, even then
it was abundantly clear to all that the United States was in the lead for
both campaign plan development and conduct of the campaign once hostilities
began.

Given the absence of unity of command in the 1990-91 Gulf War, a new
structure was born. The coalition coordination, communications, and integration
center (C3IC) had neither overall command authority nor a direct role in
the campaign planning process. However, it did formalize coordination and
liaison arrangements between the leaders and staffs of the two lead nations,
the United States and Saudi Arabia. One author described the function of
the C3IC as follows: "It is important to note that the C3IC did not
command any units. The C3IC advised the separate commanders and their staffs,
and it transmitted orders of one national command chain to the other. The
C3IC integrated the effort of both parties into a unity of effort, not
a unity of command."[29] While these arrangements suited the particular
circumstances of Desert Storm, it should not be assumed that they will
be relevant in future coalition operations.

The Desert Storm coalition enjoyed overwhelming force and the objective
was limited and clearly achievable in a short period of time, so the shortfalls
in such an arrangement, if there were to be any, had little opportunity
to be exposed. Operations involving greater risk, increased opportunities
for deviation from the agreed mission, or longer duration could well see
coalition partners seeking greater representation among the headquarters
staff charged with planning the operation they would be expected to conduct.
The C3IC does not fill that need. But with that desire from coalition partners
for greater representation on the staff should come a parallel demand from
the coalition leader for greater unity of command.

Doctrinal Implications

With the renewed interest in coalition warfare, it is useful to look
at current US doctrine for command and control of coalition operations
at the theater level. The assessment covers mode of command, the integration
of staffs, and the idea of unity of command as a desirable feature of coalition
operations, including its application to service components.

Mode of command. US joint publications[30] propose three possible
command arrangements for coalition operations: parallel command, lead nation
command, or the combination of the two that was used in Operation Desert
Storm. They offer no guidance as to which may be preferable, nor do they
note the strengths and weaknesses of each mode of command. In those publications,
furthermore, the principle of unity of command is more honored in the breach
than the observance.

Parallel command. US Joint Publication 3-0 notes that parallel
command is the "simplest to organize and often the organization of
choice."[31] It emphasizes achieving unity of effort, since it seems
to assume that, by definition, unity of command is not achievable under
a parallel command concept. The Army's FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational
Operations, suggests that parallel command is often the organization
of choice, but notes that "while other command arrangements emerge
as the coalition matures, the parallel model is often the starting point,"
a sensible, if uninspiring, conclusion.[32]

Lead nation command. US Joint Publication 3-16 states that a
lead nation command arrangement will achieve unity of command, though how
it might do so is not explained. It notes that "unity of command established
early on facilitates unity of effort. However, nations are generally reluctant
to grant extensive control of their forces to one lead nation."[33]
It is unclear whether this comment is based on recent and regular experience
or is mere supposition. This observation, while perhaps true in the abstract,
could readily change if a coalition were faced with a truly formidable
threat to a national interest vital to most, if not all, of its members.

Parallel and lead nation. Operation Desert Storm provides a
recent example of this option. Here, as described earlier, the coalition
was split into two blocks, with the United States leading the Western nations
and Saudi Arabia leading the Arabs. Saddam Hussein tried to exploit the
most evident weakness in this arrangement through his SCUD attacks on Israel.
Had he succeeded in provoking a response from the Israelis, it is conceivable
that the coalition command arrangements might have been sufficiently disrupted
to have affected the outcome of the war.

Integration of staffs. The historical examples suggest that
full integration of staffs, regardless of the difficulties such a decision
entails, is a prerequisite to true unity of command. Joint Pub 3-0 observes
that lead nation command "is characterized by some integration of
staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership."
It goes so far as to suggest augmenting the headquarters staff with representatives
of the participating coalition members, but it does not propose full integration.

Unity of command. US Joint Publication 3-0, in its section on
multinational operations, discusses at some length the concept of unity
of effort, but does not even mention unity of command, despite the latter
being a US principle of war. It continues later: "The purpose of unity
of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander
for every objective. Unity of command means all forces operate under a
single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed
in pursuit of a common purpose."[34] The joint doctrine cited to this
point suggests that without a threat to vital national interests, the perceived
surrender of sovereignty associated with unity of command may be an unpalatable
option for some political leaders. But these same leaders are willing participants
in the coalition, seeking a common objective and prepared, if necessary,
to sacrifice the lives of their service men and women.

The examples from World War II show that coalition unity of command
can be very constrained; General Marshall's comments on General Wavell
related to command of ABDACOM illustrate a pragmatic approach to responding
to national constraints on a coalition commander. Furthermore, as Eisenhower
and others noted, the success of Allied unity of command in World War II
rested not so much on regulation as on mutual confidence, which admittedly
took time to develop. Today, however, those whom the United States would
be most likely to seek as coalition partners share NATO membership or association
with NATO norms through the Partnership for Peace, recent operations, and
multinational exercises. These are the ideal conditions under which to
develop the mutual understanding and confidence that appealed to senior
World War II leaders as the secret of true unity of command exercised through
a fully integrated combined (and joint) staff.

A coalition commander has always had to operate within constraints of
one sort or another. Providing that these are made clear to him from the
outset by contributing nations, he should in general be able to operate
successfully despite the disadvantages of the constraints. A US joint task
force commander is no different in having to operate within constraints;
whether imposed by existing doctrine (for example, no integration of logistics)
by the joint force commander, or indeed Rules of Engagement, it is a matter
of degree.

Hard-won experience indicates the importance of unity of command in
a coalition operation. The concept has been expressed as follows: "The
fundamental purpose of combined military command is to direct the massed
military effort of a coalition of nations toward the accomplishment of
commonly accepted objectives in the areas for which such a command has
been designated."[35] Coalition unity of command requires there to
be one person in command, to whom coalition partners owe unswerving obedience,
but within the constraints established for their employment. How
else can national political and military leaders expect to create conditions
appropriate to success in conflicts against determined enemies? Has US
doctrine dismissed too quickly the principle of unity of command at the
theater level in multinational operations in favor of the less demanding,
but higher risk, unity of effort? It is of note that the most recent coalition
operation, IFOR in Bosnia, has adhered to the principle of unity of command.
While it could be argued that this is a NATO operation, it is in fact a
coalition with NATO providing the command and control. Of the 27 nations
participating, only 12, a significant minority, are members of NATO's integrated
military structure. Of equal significance, the Russians accepted unity
of command as a fundamental pillar of the operation.

There remains to be considered the issue of command arrangements within
the service components of a coalition. These will be different within each
component, as forces that are contributed to a coalition vary in their
size, complexity, and familiarity with the concept of unity of command.

The ground component invariably has been the most difficult to integrate,
because doctrinal and equipment differences affect the lowest echelons
of command in all armies. In World War II, the Allies did not plan to integrate
forces below corps level, although divisions were exchanged among national
commands occasionally for a short duration. In Korea many nations sent
battalion task forces to assist the US and South Korean forces. These organizations
had to be integrated into US regimental combat teams, often at significant
cost to the United States, since the integrated units were inadequately
supported logistically. Following the debacle at the Imjin River, the UK
withdrew its brigade from US divisional command and together with other
Commonwealth forces established the Commonwealth Division. Until recently
in NATO, integration did not occur below division level, but this policy
reflected the employment of heavy divisions in high-intensity operations
in Western Europe. In low-intensity conflict, wherever it may occur, soldiers
may not even discharge their basic load of ammunition during a six-month
assignment. Such operations may therefore offer greater scope for integrating
battalions within a multinational brigade.

Naval forces have in many respects achieved a level of integration
unmatched among the services. Most Western navies subscribe to the concept
of the composite warfare commander, whereby responsibility is delegated
to a specific commander in a task group for a particular discipline, such
as anti-surface warfare or anti-aircraft warfare. This principle has allowed
the assembly of multinational task groups as seen in the NATO Standing
Naval Forces, in the Gulf War, and in operations in the Adriatic seeking
to enforce the embargo against Serbia. In addition, as a result of the
larger NATO navies routinely conducting exercises with many other navies
during their worldwide deployments, NATO doctrine and procedures have become
almost the common currency in multinational maritime operations. Command
arrangements for naval operations are also simplified to an extent by the
limited number of ships involved in them, and by the fact that each ship
is a self-contained unit, albeit with a significant logistic liability.

Unity of air effort is best achieved when command and control are exercised
from the highest practicable level by a designated theater commander.[36]
The success of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) concept
during Desert Storm has proved a system that is capable of commanding an
air operation whatever the aircraft's origin. The JFACC concept is capable
of employing any aircraft that is offered for tasking provided that its
characteristics match the requirements of the planned missions. As with
the naval component, NATO procedures have again provided a common procedural
basis for multinational operations.

Conclusions

The lessons of both World Wars have provided clear models of how coalition
command should be arranged to "direct the massed military effort of
a coalition of nations toward the accomplishment of commonly accepted objectives
in the areas for which such a command has been designated." Unity
of effort was inadequate to cope with the demands of the German offensives
in spring 1918 and summer 1940. Unity of command and integrated staffs
were at the heart of the successful Allied commands in World War II. Command
structures and relationships to support unity of command must be established
from the outset of campaign planning. They are not easily constructed under
the pressure of operational reverses.

Yet despite these lessons, we appear to have surrendered too easily
the principle of unity of command and the integrated command structures
that flow naturally from it. Regrettably, Operation Desert Storm has assumed
a position of role model that it ill deserves. Aspects of warfare that
stress coalitions--reverses such as occurred in Somalia--did not occur
during the 100 hours of ground combat. Therefore one must ask, "Is
unity of command so hard to achieve?" Coalitions are accepted by many
countries today as the norm for military action, since they reduce costs
and convey legitimacy. Equally, they allow the sharing of the burden among
those with particular skills or capabilities that other coalition members
may lack. When compared with the United States and the United Kingdom in
1941, who shared a common language but little else, certainly not common
doctrine or even the experience of training together, the position of many
countries today is immeasurably better.

Unity of command is seen by some as a surrender of sovereignty which,
unless a nation is in peril, should not be attempted. But in order to minimize
their political risks, those same leaders who are concerned over sovereignty
are also concerned with an efficient and timely operation and with minimum
casualties. The military leader must explain to policymakers the benefits
that even a constrained coalition unity of command may bring when set against
these potential risks.

NATO has by default provided a common doctrine (which includes unity
of command as a fundamental principle), common operating procedures, and
experience of combined training and combined staffs. These standards are
taken for granted among its membership; they are also permeating states
who aspire to membership, especially those who have joined the Partnership
for Peace. In many other countries there is commonality of equipment, while
the principal Western states train the forces of other nations as well
as participate in exercises with them. These circumstances all contribute
toward the potential cohesion of coalitions, the bedrock of which is trust.
This was the strength of Allied unity of command in World War II. Should
it not contribute equally today, in supporting the principle of unity of
command for coalition warfare?

NOTES

1. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0
(Washington: Joint Staff, 1 February 1995), p. VI-1: Alliances and coalitions
are defined as follows: a. Alliance. An alliance is a result of
formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives.
b. Coalition. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or
more nations for common action.

2. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement (Washington: The White House, February 1995). Hereafter
NSS.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United
States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement
(Washington: GPO, 1995). Hereafter NMS.

4. NSS, p. ii.

5. Ibid., p 7.

6. Ibid., p. 9.

7. NMS, p. 13.

8. CENTO was formed in 1959 and dissolved in 1979. Members were the
UK, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. Although the United States was not a formal
member, it had bilateral defense treaties with the latter three countries.
SEATO was formed in 1954 and dissolved in 1977. Members were Australia,
France, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, the UK, and the United
States.

Colonel Anthony J. Rice (UK) is currently assigned as the Deputy Commander
of the British Military Mission, Kuwait. He is a 1996 graduate of the US
Army War College. He was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1968
from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. His assignments have included
command of an airborne artillery battery during the Falkland Islands War
in 1982 and command of an airmobile artillery battalion. He attended the
Joint Service Defence College in 1987. His more recent assignments have
been with joint staffs, including chief of staff of a joint task force.