WHEREAS Kierkegaard's concern with Being, basic
as it is, is never made the object of explicit
philosophical research, except in relation to more
directly existential problems, Heidegger sets the problem
of Being in the very centre of his concern. He maintains that
Being is a problem that has been forgotten and that only its
resurrection can direct philosophy to that area of thought
in which it can function most properly. In spite of this he
makes clear at the outset of his thinking that if concern with
the problem of Being implies, as its aim, a drawing up of a
definition of Being, then disappointment is inevitable. The
reason for this is that 'Being, for purposes of definition,
cannot be deduced from higher concepts and cannot be
presented by lower.'1. That it cannot be deduced from higher
concepts is the result of its all-embracing generality. That
it cannot be presented by lower is based on the distinction
between Being per se and a being. No being, in the sense of a being, can represent Being because it is precisely by virtue
of Being that something is a being and not vice versa.
This unique position that Being occupies thus prevents
the possibility of formulating a definition of it in the sense
in which traditional logic speaks of definition.

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