For decades now, strategic experts have predicted that our world was on the verge of a break-out in nuclear proliferation that would see us grappling with two- or three-dozen nuclear powers. Indeed, the inexorable spread of nuclear weapons is the closest thing to an unassailable canon in the field of international relations, as one cannot possibly employ the term "nuclear proliferation" without preceding it with the modifier "increasing." This unshakeable belief, wholly unsupported by any actual evidence, drives many Cold War-era "wise men" to argue that mutually assured destruction (MAD) and strategic deterrence in general are obsolete and therefore immoral in the post-Cold War era.

Reader Comments (2)

I've been writing about this on and off for several years, and my concern has never been the credibility of nuclear state to nuclear state deterrence. The tricky and most vexing question with respect to nuclear deterrence is situations where there are significant assymetries.

Is there a way to deter an actor from "going nuclear" when there appears to be insufficient reason?