Languages

Available In

Maps

I. Summary

We
have been forgotten. It’s as if we don’t exist. The government says
the LRA are no longer a problem, but I know that’s not true. I beg of
you, please talk to others about what has happened to us.

‒80-year-old
traditional chief, grieving for his son killed by the LRA, Niangara, February
19, 2010

Between December 14 and 17, 2009, the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group, carried out a horrific attack in
the Makombo area of Haut Uele district in northeastern Democratic Republic of
Congo, near the border with Sudan. In a well-planned operation, the LRA killed
more than 321 civilians and abducted more than 250 others, including at least
80 children. The vast majority of those killed were adult men who were first
tied up before LRA combatants hacked them to death with machetes or crushed
their skulls with axes or heavy wooden sticks. Family members and local
authorities later found battered bodies tied to trees; other bodies were found
in the forest or brush land all along the 105-kilometer round journey made by
the LRA group during the operation. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that for
days and weeks after the attack, this remote area was filled with the
“stench of death.” The attack was one of the largest single
massacres in the LRA’s 23-year history.

The LRA used similar tactics in each village they attacked
during their four-day operation: they pretended to be Congolese and Ugandan
army soldiers on patrol, reassured people in broken Lingala (the common
language of northern Congo) not to be afraid, and, once people had gathered,
captured their victims and tied them up. LRA combatants specifically searched
out areas where people might gather—such as markets, churches, and water
points—and repeatedly asked those they encountered about the location of
schools, indicating that one of their objectives was to abduct children. Those
who were abducted, including many children aged 10 to 15 years old, were tied
up with ropes or metal wire at the waist, often in human chains of five to 15
people. They were made to carry the goods the LRA had pillaged and then forced
to march off with them. Anyone who refused, walked too slowly, or who tried to
escape was killed. Children were not spared.

Despite the enormous civilian death toll, the attack in the
Makombo area made no headlines. Congolese and Ugandan soldiers based in Haut
Uele district arrived in the area of the killings on December 18, 2009, alerted
by reports of an LRA attack. But the remoteness of the region and the lack of
telephone communications meant the news of the attack traveled slowly. On
December 26, the Congolese army sent a small investigation team to look into
the incident. After three days, the team returned, concluding that a large
massacre had occurred, perpetrated by the LRA. The Congolese army sent soldiers
to the area who established a base nearby, but no further action was taken by
the Congolese government or army to help the affected communities. Ugandan
soldiers attempted to pursue the LRA assailants but without success.

Publicly, the governments of Uganda and Congo both maintain
that the LRA is no longer a serious threat in northern Congo and that the bulk
of the rebel group has either moved to CAR or been neutralized. The LRA clearly
remains a threat to civilians. While the LRA may have been weakened and
dispersed as a result of the military campaign, the group’s ability to
attack and abduct civilians remains intact, as illustrated by the gruesome
operation in the Makombo area. Such public declarations by the Congolese and Ugandan
governments may have contributed to the burying of information about ongoing
LRA attacks. One effect has been that many people in northeastern Congo feel utterly abandoned and ignored.

At the end of December, the United Nations peacekeeping
mission in Congo, MONUC, received information about the attack. With its
resources thinly stretched and limited intelligence on the location of LRA
groups, MONUC was in no position to avert the Makombo massacre, but it took no
immediate steps to follow up on the reported LRA attack and to investigate what
had happened. At the time, MONUC had some 1,000 peacekeepers in Haut Uele
district but its focus was on responding to rumors of a possible LRA attack on
the district capital, Dungu, and other large population centers. MONUC also
remained concentrated on the crisis in the Kivu provinces of eastern Congo leaving limited resources to respond to LRA-affected areas to the north. With many
staff away for the Christmas holidays, no decision was made to change
priorities. In January 2010, MONUC officials again received reports indicating
that as many as 266 people may have died in the Makombo area, but no
investigation was launched. Only on March 11, 2010, nearly 10 weeks after first
receiving reports of the attack, and after briefings from Human Rights Watch,
did MONUC send a team of human rights specialists to the area.

The attack on the Makombo area was led by at least two LRA
commanders: Lt. Col. Binansio Okumu (also known as Binany) and a commander
known as Obol. According to abductees who later managed to escape and Ugandan
military sources, these two commanders report to one of the LRA’s senior
leaders, Gen. Dominic Ongwen, sought on an arrest warrant from the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes committed in northern Uganda. Ongwen is believed to command the LRA’s forces in northeastern Congo. According to escaped captives of the LRA, Ongwen met with his commanders, including
Binany and Obol, during the 2009 Christmas period to celebrate the
“success” of the Makombo attack, including the large numbers of
people killed and abducted. Following the celebrations, the new abductees were
divided up among the LRA commanders and separated into multiple smaller groups,
each heading in a different direction. Human Rights Watch calls upon the ICC
and the Congolese government to investigate the three LRA commanders –
Ongwen, Binany and Obol–for their role in committing or ordering alleged
war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The Makombo massacre may not be the only unreported large-scale
attack. Human Rights Watch has also received reports of LRA attacks in remote
regions of Central African Republic (CAR) that have received little attention
or follow-up from the CAR government or the UN.

The Makombo massacre is part of a longstanding practice of
horrific attacks and abuses by the LRA committed in four countries in the
central African region: Uganda, southern Sudan, CAR, and Congo. Initially restricted to northern Uganda, the LRA has evolved into a regional threat. Pushed
out of northern Uganda in 2005 by the Ugandan army, the LRA now operates in the
remote border areas between southern Sudan, Congo and CAR. Despite successive
military operations against the group over the years, the LRA has proven
remarkably resilient and able to regroup to continue their attacks against and
abductions of civilians. In December 2008, the governments in the region led by
the Ugandan military, with intelligence and logistical support from the United States, launched another military campaign against the LRA’s bases in northeastern Congo, known as Operation Lightning Thunder. It too failed to neutralize the LRA
leadership, which escaped. In retaliation for the military campaign, the LRA
attacked numerous Congolese villages over the 2008 Christmas period and into
January 2009, slaughtering over 865 civilians and abducting hundreds more.

On March 15, 2009, Operation Lightning Thunder officially
ended, following pressure from the Congolese government, which found it
politically difficult to support a continued Ugandan army presence on Congolese
territory. But the military campaign continued, moving into a covert stage,
with the quiet approval of the Congolese president, Joseph Kabila. This new
phase of military operations permitted limited coordination, planning and
intelligence sharing between the national armies of the region and the various
UN peacekeeping missions on enhancing protection for civilians at risk of
continued LRA attacks.

Military commanders from the affected countries hold
meetings every few months to discuss the LRA and some steps have been taken to
improve coordination between the four UN missions operating in the central
African region, but these efforts are far from adequate. The Makombo massacre,
and other atrocities by the LRA documented in this report, illustrates that the
LRA’s ability to attack civilians is far from over. More focused and
directed efforts are required by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) and regional government to establish an effective coordination
mechanism for civilian protection in LRA-affected areas across the UN missions,
including coordination with all relevant national armies.

One source of hope has come from the US government. On March 11, 2010, the US Senate unanimously passed the Lord’s
Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, which if enacted
into law, requires the administration of President Barack Obama to develop a
regional strategy to protect civilians in central Africa from attacks by the
LRA, work to apprehend the LRA leadership, and support economic recovery for
northern Uganda. The bill is currently pending before the US House of
Representatives.

On February 24, 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the LRA. She
said, “I have been following the Lord’s Resistance Army for more
than 15 years. I just don’t understand why we cannot end this scourge.
And we [the US government] are going to do everything we can to provide support
we believe will enable us to do that.”

The US and other concerned governments should work together with regional
governments and the UN to urgently turn this commitment into action. High-level
attention, bold steps and courageous leadership are necessary to develop and
implement a comprehensive regional strategy that resolves the LRA threat, with
a focus on protecting civilians from further attacks, rescuing abducted
persons, and apprehending LRA leaders wanted by the ICC.

The people of northeastern Congo and other LRA-affected
areas across the central African region have suffered for far too long. They
are waiting for strong, effective action to end the LRA’s atrocities, to
see the safe return of their children and other loved ones who remain with the
LRA, and to let them know they are not forgotten.

II. Methodology

This report is based on an eight-day Human Rights Watch
field research mission to Haut Uele district in northeastern Democratic
Republic of Congo from February 18-25, 2010, as well as additional research in
Kinshasa and Goma in Congo, and Kampala in Uganda. Three Human Rights Watch
researchers participated in the research, altogether conducting 128 interviews.

In Haut Uele, researchers visited the towns and villages of
Niangara, Tapili, Bangadi, Dungu, and Faradje, where they interviewed dozens of
victims, family members, and eyewitnesses to the Makombo massacre and other
attacks on civilians. Among these were individuals who helped bury the dead,
children and adults who had been abducted by the LRA and later escaped, local
authorities, religious leaders, civil society representatives, Congolese army
(FARDC) commanders, Ugandan army (UPDF) commanders, MONUC officials, and
representatives of nongovernmental organizations and UN agencies. In Tapili, one
of the towns in the Makombo area that the LRA attacked during the massacre,
researchers interviewed survivors and saw the houses the LRA used to imprison
adults and children.

In Goma, researchers interviewed two former Ugandan LRA
combatants who surrendered to the Congolese army near Doruma in late December
2009, as well as MONUC officials, diplomats, and representatives of UN
agencies. In Kinshasa, researchers interviewed diplomats, MONUC officials,
Congolese government officials, and representatives of UN agencies. Human
Rights Watch also interviewed Ugandan military intelligence and army officials
in Kampala, and received an official communication responding to many of our
questions. Human Rights Watch researchers were also in communication with
officials from the United States African Command (AFRICOM) and the US State
Department.

This report also benefited greatly from information
collected by civil society organizations, local authorities, and Congolese army
officials, as well as UN, US and other official documentation.

Statistics on the numbers killed during the Makombo massacre
and in other attacks are based on interviews with those who buried the dead.
Those left unburied have not been included in our calculations. Statistics on
the number of people abducted by the LRA during the Makombo massacre are based
on interviews with witnesses and children and adults who were captured by the
LRA during the attack and later managed to escape.

III. Recommendations

To the Lord’s Resistance Army and Its Representatives

Immediately cease all attacks on civilians and other
violations of international humanitarian law.

Immediately release all abducted children and adults.

To the Governments of DR Congo, Uganda, Central African
Republic, and Southern Sudan

In coordination with UN missions in each country, promptly
develop a comprehensive regional strategy to resolve the LRA threat, with
a focus on civilian protection, rescuing abducted persons, apprehending
LRA leaders wanted by the ICC, and facilitating the surrender of LRA
combatants.

Make the protection of civilians and rescue of abducted
persons a priority for any military operations against the LRA. Deploy
troops and logistical support as necessary to protect civilian populations
from LRA retaliatory attacks in areas most likely to be targeted or where
LRA combatants are known to be operating.

In partnership with the private sector and international
donors, urgently expand mobile phone communication networks to
LRA-affected areas, especially in northern DRC and southeastern CAR, to
ensure attacks on civilians are rapidly reported and to improve response
time to such attacks.

Give priority to the rehabilitation of children captured
or escaped from the LRA by promptly transferring them to UNICEF and
appropriate local and international nongovernmental organizations.

Transfer to the International Criminal Court surrendered
or captured LRA leaders who are sought under ICC arrest warrants.

To the Congolese Government and Armed Forces

Urgently establish mechanisms to implement the announced
“zero tolerance” policy to end abuses by Congolese army
soldiers during military operations, including those committed by the
“Ours” battalion in Bangadi, and establish joint investigation
teams with MONUC to investigate military abuses and hold those responsible
to account, regardless of rank.

Improve/Provide communication equipment for soldiers
operating in LRA-affected areas, including satellite phones and radios, to
allow a rapid response for civilian protection.

To discourage looting and other abuses, ensure all
soldiers receive a regular and adequate salary and food rations.

Consider establishing a special judicial mechanism within
the Congolese civilian justice system, with Congolese and international
judges, prosecutors, and other relevant experts, to investigate serious
international crimes, including crimes committed by senior LRA leaders on
Congolese territory who are not sought on arrest warrants by the
International Criminal Court.

To the Ugandan Armed Forces

In countries where Ugandan forces are deployed, enhance
coordination and detailed information-sharing with UN peacekeeping
missions and national armies to improve protection for civilians at risk
of LRA attack.

Deploy a liaison team to Dungu to regularly interact with
the UN and Congolese forces based there.

Make the protection of civilians and rescue of abducted
persons a priority for any military operations against the LRA

To the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and
UN Peacekeeping Forces in the Region (UNMIS, MONUC, MINURCAT, UNAMID)

Under the leadership of the Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations, urgently establish an effective UN coordination
mechanism for civilian protection in LRA-affected areas across the UN
missions, including coordination with all relevant national armies.
Prioritize improving coordination between MONUC and the Ugandan and
Congolese armies.

Identify full-time personnel to act as focal points on LRA
issues in each peacekeeping mission to regularly share information, plans
for military operations, and civilian protection deployments. Coordinate
these activities through DPKO headquarters in New York.

Urgently increase UN peacekeeping troops and UN civilian
staff in LRA-affected areas, especially in Haut and Bas Uele (Congo), and in Haut-Mbomou (CAR), and urgently reassess the current deployment of the existing force
strength to maximize the number of temporary field bases in northeastern Congo.

Together with the governments of the region, organize a
high-level conference to develop a comprehensive regional strategy to
resolve the LRA threat.

Ensure that UN field base commanders in LRA-affected areas
are supported by community liaison officers capable of facilitating
regular communication with local authorities, traditional chiefs, civil
society and displaced person representatives in their area of
responsibility. Give special attention to threats to children and how to
mitigate such risks.

Building on MONUC’s experience in North Kivu
province, establish a “priority protection planning mechanism”
for LRA-affected areas, and in other areas as appropriate, to identify and
respond to threats where civilians are most at risk.

Increase the frequency of the deployment of “joint
protection teams” to areas where civilians are most at risk and
ensure the full implementation of their recommendations.

Increase the logistical support, including further aerial
support, for the Congolese armed forces and other forces as necessary, to
ensure rapid deployment of troops for the purpose of civilian protection.
Ensure the full application of the UN’s human rights conditionality
policy for support to national armies.

As part of a strategy to enhance protection of civilians,
consider providing logistical and other types of support to mobile phone
companies seeking to establish a mobile phone network in LRA-affected
areas.

Support the establishment of community-run radio stations
in LRA-affected areas to assist efforts to facilitate LRA combatants to
surrender and to provide accurate and timely information to civilians
about LRA attacks.

Assist the Congolese and Ugandan armed forces in setting
up reception points for LRA defectors and abducted persons.

Create a demobilization program for non-Ugandan LRA
combatants, and request UN member states to provide the necessary
financial resources.

Deploy more human rights staff to LRA-affected areas to
permit rapid documentation of abuses by all parties to the conflict and to
allow for frequent and timely public reporting.

To the UN Security Council

Direct UN missions operating in Congo, Sudan and CAR,
under the leadership of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Operations, to develop a comprehensive regional policy to resolve the
human rights challenge posed by the LRA and enhance civilian protection.

Support a strategy to apprehend LRA commanders wanted by
the ICC and others who have committed war crimes or crimes against
humanity, taking all feasible precautions to minimize risk to civilians,
and request member states to provide the necessary financial and
operational resources.

To UNICEF and Other Child Protection Agencies

Urgently increase teams working in the countries affected
by the LRA to document abductions and the mistreatment of children and set
up programs to support tracing as well as psychosocial assistance, family
reunification, and rehabilitation for those who have fled the LRA.

Ensure all funding gaps for implementation partners are
urgently resolved and increase support to LRA-affected areas.

To the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

Investigate and report on rape and other sexual violence
committed against women and girls in LRA-affected areas. Call for a
focused and coordinated cross-border response from UN agencies and UN
peacekeeping missions to address sexual and gender based violence by the
LRA and other armed forces operating in LRA-affected areas.

To the International Criminal Court Prosecutor

Investigate recent alleged crimes by the LRA in Congo, Central African Republic and southern Sudan with a view to expanding the charges for those
LRA leaders already subject to ICC arrest warrants and to bring new
charges against additional commanders responsible for attacks on
civilians.

To International Donors, Concerned Governments, and
Regional Bodies

Support the organization of a high-level international
conference to develop a comprehensive regional strategy to resolve the LRA
threat.

Provide UN peacekeeping missions in LRA-affected areas and
national armies with the necessary logistical capacity (with a particular
focus on helicopter support), intelligence, communications, and other
resources to adequately protect civilians from LRA attacks, rescue
abducted persons, and facilitate the surrender of LRA combatants.

Encourage capable UN member states to deploy a small,
highly trained military unit to assist the peacekeeping missions and
national armed forces in the apprehension of LRA leaders wanted by the
ICC, taking all feasible precautions to minimize risk to civilians.

Cooperate with governments in the region and relevant
peacekeeping missions to apprehend LRA leaders wanted by the ICC, taking
all feasible precautions to minimize risk to civilians.

Consider providing financial support, such as through
private/public partnerships, to urgently expand mobile phone communication
networks to LRA-affected areas to ensure attacks on civilians are rapidly
reported and to improve response time to such attacks.

Enhance emergency support to UN agencies and local and
international nongovernmental organizations to assist the victims and the
communities affected by LRA violence.

To the United States

Take strong leadership in coordination efforts to resolve
the LRA threat by: (i) supporting the organization of a high-level
international conference to develop a comprehensive strategy on resolving
the LRA threat; (ii) developing an interagency framework, including with
UN agencies, to enhance the response to threats to civilians; and (iii)
developing a specific LRA mechanism, building on the Tripartite Plus
Commission, with governments in the region and the UN DPKO, to enhance
diplomatic and military responses to the LRA, and to help ensure apprehension
of LRA commanders wanted by the ICC.

Continue to provide accurate and timely intelligence to UN
peacekeeping missions and national armed forces operating in the region to
enhance protection of civilians and strategies to apprehend LRA leaders.

Publicly condemn any abuses by national armed forces
operating in LRA-affected areas and urge that those responsible are held
to account.

Pass the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act
currently pending before Congress and ensure rapid and full implementation
of its provisions.

IV. Introduction

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed rebel group
led by Joseph Kony, has been fighting the Ugandan government since 1987.
Initially confined to northern Uganda, the LRA has evolved to become a regional
threat operating in the remote border areas between southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic (CAR). Throughout its
history, the LRA has been responsible for numerous atrocities, including
massacres, summary executions, torture, rape, pillage and forced labor. The
LRA’s brutality against children has been particularly grotesque: it
continues to replenish its ranks through the abduction of children, forcible
training and use of children in combat operations, and compelling compliance
through threats, violence, and mind control. While Ugandan counter-insurgency
operations brought an end to LRA attacks in Uganda in 2006, and other armed
forces have conducted their own anti-LRA operations, the group has retained the
ability to carry out devastating and widespread attacks against civilian
populations elsewhere in the region.

In the late 1980s the LRA had some popular backing from the
Acholi people of northern Uganda, a population marginalized by the central
government. But the group’s support waned as its violence against
civilians escalated.[1] Over
subsequent years, the LRA frequently moved between northern Uganda and southern Sudan, carrying out attacks in both countries. The Ugandan army, the Ugandan
People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), repeatedly tried to defeat the LRA
through counter-insurgency campaigns, some of which also involved serious human
rights violations by Ugandan soldiers,[2]but each time the LRA was able to regroup.
In 2005 and 2006, renewed Ugandan military campaigns compelled the LRA to
relocate its forces from Uganda and southern Sudan to the remote region of the Garamba National Park in northeastern Congo.

Attempts to negotiate peace with the LRA have repeatedly
failed, either due to intransigence by the rebels or the Ugandan government. In
2006, the Ugandan government engaged in new peace negotiations with Riek
Machar, the vice-president of southern Sudan, acting as mediator. The effort
was supported by then UN Special Envoy for the LRA-affected areas, former
president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano. These talks, known as the Juba peace process, progressed further than previous attempts, but they too ultimately
failed. Some claimed that LRA leaders entered talks in part to avoid
prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC).[3]
The ICC prosecutor had issued arrest warrants for the LRA’s top five
leaders, including Joseph Kony, in July 2005,[4]
following an earlier decision by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to refer LRA
crimes in northern Uganda to the court’s jurisdiction.[5]But others claimed the LRA entered the peace
process only to gain time to regroup, and never intended to reach a viable
agreement.[6]

Whatever the reason for entering the talks, Kony repeatedly
failed to sign the Juba peace agreement in 2008. While relative calm lasted
through the beginning of the peace process, from January to April 2008 the LRA
carried out a series of well-organized operations from their base in Garamba National Park to abduct persons from CAR and southern Sudan. A few months later, in
September and November 2008, the LRA attacked Congolese civilians in
communities bordering the park, killing at least 167 civilians and abducting
some 316 children.[7] On
November 30, 2008, Kony was given a final chance to sign the peace agreement,
but did not turn up at the agreed meeting point.

Operation Lightning Thunder and its Aftermath

With peace prospects stalled, Uganda, Congo, and southern Sudan entered an agreement to launch a joint military campaign against
the LRA supported by substantial planning, logistical, and intelligence
assistance from the United States military. On December 14, 2008, the campaign, called Operation Lightning Thunder, was put into action with a surprise aerial
strike on the main LRA camp in Garamba National Park. The strike failed to
neutralize the LRA leadership, which escaped.[8]

Using tactics similar to those it
had previously used in northern Uganda and southern Sudan, the LRA attacked
civilian populations in apparent retaliation for the military campaign against
them. During the Christmas 2008 holiday season and in the weeks thereafter, the
LRA with brutal efficiency simultaneously attacked locations hundreds of
kilometers apart in northern Congo and southern Sudan, killing more than 865 civilians
and abducting at least 160 children.[9] Tens of thousands of civilians fled for their lives,
seeking shelter from LRA attacks in the towns, and sparking a humanitarian
crisis in an already impoverished area.

National armed forces’ planners
had not prepared for the attacks on civilians and had failed to make adequate
contingency plans in the event that their strike on the LRA base in Garamba
National Park failed. The 2,000 Congolese army soldiers who had been deployed
to the area in the months before the strike were largely based in the Haut Uele
district capital of Dungu and were unable to prevent or effectively respond to
the LRA Christmas attacks. The 200 peacekeepers from the UN Mission in Congo, MONUC, present in the area at the time of the strike, had been excluded from the
planning of Operation Lightning Thunder and were in no position to provide
protection to communities at risk.[10]

Operation Lightning Thunder was intended
to last only a few weeks. On March 15, 2009, the operation officially ended
following pressure from the Congolese government, which found it politically
difficult to support a continued Ugandan army presence on Congolese territory.[11] The Ugandan and Congolese governments both maintained
publicly that the LRA were no longer a serious threat in northern Congo and
that the bulk of the rebel group had either moved to CAR or had been
neutralized.[12] The
Congolese government said it would continue to conduct “mop-up”
operations with the support of the remaining Ugandan military advisors and
MONUC against the few LRA groups said to be present.[13]

Despite
the official end of Operation Lightning Thunder, the Ugandan army continued
military operations in the LRA-affected areas of northern Congo. Quietly approved by the Congolese government, this new phase of military operations has been
largely covert, possibly to allow President Kabila to continue claiming
publicly that Ugandan troops had withdrawn from Congo. The Ugandan army moved
its main base from Dungu, in northern Congo, to Nzara, in southern Sudan, and
opened up a series of smaller and less visible bases in Nambia, Doruma, and
Bangadi in Haut Uele district, and in Banda in Bas Uele district of northern
Congo.[14] The Ugandan army also established new bases in Obo and
Djema in CAR.[15] Military experts estimate that some 3,000 to 5,000 Ugandan
soldiers still operate in the three countries against the LRA, of which some 2,000
to 3,000 soldiers are based in northern Congo.[16] Since the operations are covert, the objectives and
timescales for ongoing Ugandan-led military operations against the LRA are not
known.

Strength of the LRA

The
number of LRA combatants who remain is difficult to estimate accurately.
Following the aerial strike on the LRA’s main camp in Garamba National Park on December 14, 2008, the LRA dispersed into multiple smaller groups
divided up among Congo, southern Sudan and CAR. Since September 2009, a number
of LRA commanders have surrendered, including the director of operations in the
Faradje area, Lt. Col. Charles Arop. Ugandan army records state that since December 14, 2008, 305 LRA combatants have been killed, 50 captured, and a further 81 have
defected,[17] but
these figures could not be independently verified. In interviews with Human
Rights Watch, Ugandan army officers and UN officials estimate that between 200
to 250 Ugandan LRA combatants remain in the three countries.[18] These estimates do not take into account the number of abductees
still held by the rebels nor how many children abducted over the recent years
may have become LRA combatants.

The
LRA’s three most senior leaders—Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and
Dominic Ongwen—remain at large and are still believed to direct and
coordinate the group’s activities. The LRA leaders previously
communicated via satellite telephone and Motorola radios, but military experts
and former LRA combatants say that since Operation Lightning Thunder, the
communication between the groups of LRA combatants is conducted through
“runners,” to minimize any possible tracking of their locations, as
well as through face-to-face meetings at pre-determined meeting points.[19] Kony and Odhiambo are presumed to operate along the
CAR/Sudan border, with some reports claiming that Kony may have moved to
southern Darfur under the protection of the Sudanese military.[20] Ongwen allegedly remains in northern Congo with an estimated 80 to 120 combatants.[21]

Contrary
to a December 29, 2009 statement by the Ugandan military spokesperson that
“the LRA’s capacity to create havoc is no more,”[22] the continued military operations have not weakened the
LRA’s ability to conduct attacks against civilian populations. According
to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in 2009
the LRA killed 1,096 civilians and abducted 1,373 adults and 255 children in
Haut and Bas Uele districts of northern Congo. While all reports of LRA attacks
have not been independently verified, it is clear that the LRA maintains its
capacity to kill, abduct, and terrorize the civilian population. By January
2010, OCHA estimated that 282,661 people were displaced from their homes in
these districts, including 224,594 people in Haut Uele and another 58,067 in
Bas Uele.[23] These
figures and the brutal attacks against civilians carried out by the LRA
documented in this report undermine the claims made by President Kabila of Congo and President Museveni of Uganda that the LRA threat has substantially reduced. For the people
of northern Congo, the LRA remains a constant and dangerous threat, one that
requires an effective and coordinated strategy to better protect civilians and
bring those responsible for these horrific abuses to justice.

V. Massacre in the Makombo Area

From December 14 to 17, 2009, the LRA carried out one of the
most devastating single attacks in the group’s sordid history.[24]
During a four-day operation in northern Congo—the Makombo area and its
surroundings, in Niangara Territory, Haut Uele district, near the Sudan
border—the LRA killed at least 321 civilians and abducted more than 250
others, including at least 80 children. The vast majority of those killed were
adult men, but among the dead were at least 13 women and 23 children. The
youngest victim was a three year-old girl; the eldest was a 72-year-old man.[25]
Most of those killed were tied up before the LRA hacked them to death with
machetes or crushed their skulls with axes, clubs, or heavy sticks. The victims
were often deliberately taken away to be killed in the more remote forest and
brush land away from village centers or roads, possibly in an attempt to cover
up the crime. Some were tied to trees before their skulls were crushed with
axes. Those who were abducted but walked too slowly, refused or were unable to
carry the heavy loads, or who tried to escape were also killed. Bodies were
later found by family members and local authorities all along the 105-kilometer
round journey made by the LRA through the Makombo area and toward the small
town of Tapili. According to witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, for
days and weeks after the attack, this vast area was filled with the
“stench of death.”[26]

The attack was well-planned and organized. Under the
leadership of at least two LRA commanders, Lt. Col. Binansio Okumu (also known
as Binany)[27] and a
commander known as “Obol” (see below), LRA combatants attacked a
succession of villages and towns, each time posing as Ugandan or Congolese army
soldiers first, then killing and looting, before taking with them large numbers
of abductees tied together. The tactics used by the LRA during the Makombo
operation indicate that their purpose was to kill, abduct, and pillage. The
operation may in part have been to re-supply the group with new recruits and
essential supplies, such as salt, sugar, batteries, and clothes. LRA combatants
specifically searched out areas where people might gather—such as
markets, churches, and water points—and repeatedly asked those they
encountered about the location of schools, indicating that one of their
objectives was to abduct children. The LRA used similar tactics in each village
they attacked during their four-day rampage: they pretended to be Congolese and
Ugandan army soldiers on patrol, reassured people in broken Lingala (a common
language in northern Congo) not to be afraid, and, once people had gathered,
captured their victims and tied them up, often in human chains of 5 to 15
people long. Then the LRA forced their captives to march off with them. Adult
men who were considered to be of no use, possibly because they were more unruly
and difficult to control, those who confronted them, or those who just had the
misfortune of finding themselves near the end of the line were killed along the
way.

Identification
of the LRA

Those who witnessed the killings and those who were captured
but escaped days or weeks later identified their attackers as the LRA and
described them in detail to Human Rights Watch. The LRA forces altogether
numbered between 25 to 40 combatants who operated in two or three separate
groups, often coming together at night. Dozens of witnesses interviewed by
Human Rights Watch consistently described the LRA as wearing either camouflage
army uniforms similar to those of the Ugandan army (some with the Ugandan flag
on the sleeve) or olive drab green uniforms similar to those of the Congolese
army. Many of the uniforms appeared new.[28] Witnesses
said the uniforms were not dirty or torn, although some were older. Some of the
LRA had short razored hair, while others had long or “rasta-like”
hair and had an unkempt appearance. In their attempts to pose as Ugandan and
Congolese soldiers, the LRA often left behind those with long or dirty hair on
village outskirts or hid their hair under hats to minimize suspicion about
their true identity.[29]

Witnesses repeatedly told Human Rights Watch that the LRA
spoke poor Lingala with a strong accent, which they recognized as foreign.[30]
The LRA also spoke a mixture of other languages including Swahili, English,
French, Zande and other Ugandan languages which the local population did not
understand.[31]

Known LRA commanders were present during the attack on Makombo,
providing clear indications that the assailants were the LRA.[32]
For example, dozens of witnesses described one LRA commander, known as
“Obol” who operated as a senior leader during the operation and was
easily identifiable, as he was missing one eye, was very tall, and appeared well
over 60 years old. (See below for further information.)[33]
In the weeks following the Makombo massacre, the LRA combatants, together with
their captives, joined other LRA forces at what was likely a pre-arranged
meeting point near where the Kapili and Uele Rivers meet.[34]
According to abductees who later escaped, Gen. Dominic Ongwen, one of the top
three leaders of the LRA, sought on an arrest warrant from the ICC, was present
at this meeting.

The tactics documented in this report are typical LRA
tactics used in northern Uganda, southern Sudan and in Congo over many previous years.

Day
One: The Attack Begins

Since 2008, when the LRA first began to attack Congolese
civilians, the LRA had rarely ventured south of the Uele River, a major
waterway that cuts through Haut Uele district. As a result, the communities who
live south of the river suffered less from LRA attacks than those to the north,
and few had organized local self-defense groups, as had those in the north. On December 13, 2009, this changed. A group estimated at between 25 to 40 LRA combatants
quietly arrived on the northern bank of the Uele River, just across from the
Makombo area, a small fishing and farming region of around 700 inhabitants.
Early in the morning on December 14, the LRA crossed the river at the small
hamlet of Mavanzonguda and began their attack.

A 64-year-old woman preparing breakfast for her family in
Bapu, a village just west of Mavanzonguda, saw the LRA approach soon after
dawn. Seeing the military uniforms, she believed the strangers were soldiers
from the Congolese army and called out a greeting to them in Lingala. She told
Human Rights Watch:

They called back to me and asked “What’s
new?” I said, “Oh nothing much.” Then they asked me,
“Where do the local children study, and is there a school?” I
replied that our school was not really functioning. Then they asked me,
“Is there a church nearby where Christians might be praying?” I
said no and that since it was not Sunday there was no one at the church. Then
they asked, “Is there a market nearby where there might be lots of
people?” I said, “Oh yes, there is a fishermen’s market at
Mabanga Ya Talo, not too far away,” and I pointed in the market’s
direction. I thought their questions were strange, and they spoke Lingala with
a foreign accent.[35]

After she had answered their questions, the LRA combatants
quickly turned on the elderly woman. They broke into her home, stole items they
found there, and forced her to carry the looted goods. They marched her toward
a local water point in the direction of the fishermen’s market at Mabanga
Ya Talo, where another group of LRA combatants had already begun rounding up
the local population. The elderly woman described what she saw there:

At the water point, there were many LRA and they were tying
people up, including men, women, and children. They were tying them together in
a line with a cord around their waists. I saw my son there and also some of my
neighbors and their children. The man giving the orders was very tall and big
and had only one eye. He would give orders with gestures and a shake of his
head. He was very mean and was hitting people. The LRA all had weapons. There
were many of us there and at one point, when they were not watching, I managed
to slip away into the forest to hide. I was terrified and stayed hidden for two
days. It was only days later when I went looking for my family that I
discovered they had killed my son.[36]

The LRA continued on to Mabanga Ya Talo. One group of LRA
combatants, including some of those who had the “rasta-like” hair,
stayed behind and out of sight to guard the people they had already captured,
while a second group, including LRA combatants who spoke some Lingala, entered
the busy fishermen’s market. According to witnesses, the LRA pretended to
be Congolese army soldiers and told people in broken Lingala they had come to
protect them. They were assisted in their efforts by the president of the local
fishermen’s collective, a Mr. Amokabo, who worked alongside the LRA and
told people not to be afraid.[37] A few
days earlier, Amokabo had informed local residents that the Congolese army was
coming and had urged them to start collecting food rations for the soldiers.[38]
The arrival of the LRA, some wearing green uniforms very similar to those of
the Congolese army, therefore initially raised few suspicions.

Once in the market and surrounded by people, the LRA quickly
turned on the population and began to capture and to kill. An elderly man from
Mabanga Ya Talo told Human Rights Watch that his 22-year-old daughter was
abducted that day, along with at least 30 other young women and girls and
another 10 boys. His two sons were also abducted and killed during the attack.
He later found their bodies tied to two other men; all of them had large cuts
from a machete on the back of their heads.[39] Another
man at Mabanga Ya Talo market saw the LRA combatants capture his brother and
uncle and then tie them up.[40]

After abducting people, the LRA continued toward Makombo
village some eight kilometers away. En route, they began to kill the adult men
they had captured. Dozens of victims were later found with their hands tied and
their skulls crushed either by an axe, large wooden sticks, or by machete. The
witness from Mabanga Ya Talo who had seen his brother and uncle abducted hid in
the forest for two days. When he emerged from his hiding place he found a trail
of death. He said:

[When I came out] on Wednesday [December 16], I found
bodies everywhere, all along the road..., including those of my older brother
and uncle. I buried 22 bodies that day, between one and six kilometers from
Mabanga Ya Talo. I saw at least another 40 bodies that I didn’t have time
to bury because I was scared and wanted to get to Niangara. Some of the victims
were tied together in groups of three or four. They were all killed with four
blows of the axe on the back of the head... Some of the bodies had pieces of
wood stuck in the side or the chest. Some of the bodies were on the road;
others were 10 meters off the road.[41]

At least 10 men were tied to trees in the forest in small
groups of two or three, a short distance from the road. Their skulls were
crushed with the blows of an axe, which family members later found nearby
covered in blood. Some of the men also had their throats slit and had stab
wounds on their stomachs and chests.[42] Among
the dead tied to a tree was the 37-year-old deputy chief of the area, Marco
Mbale; a well-known businessman, Florentine Maraze; and a 17-year-old boy, Dieu
Donne Mando Assiayagwene. Many of the others were fishermen who often worked at
the Mabanga Ya Talo market. One victim, a 22-year-old man who was also tied to
a tree and left for dead by the LRA, described to Human Rights Watch what
happened to him:

The [LRA] came into my house and immediately tied me up. I
didn’t know who they were. They first took me to the [market at the]
river and there they captured other people. They pillaged everything in all the
houses and then continued toward Makombo. Along the way, they killed groups of
people. There were two groups of LRA: one that was well-dressed in
military uniforms and another group of combatants with long, dirty hair. I was
captured by the clean-cut group. The “dirty group” was behind, and
their job was to kill people. There was one commander with one eye. He was in
the “dirty group,” behind me.

When we were close to Makombo, the combatants took another
cord [not the one tied around my arms] and tied me to a tree. Then they struck
me over the head twice with a machete and left. I stayed there all alone, tied
to the tree, until Wednesday [December 16]. Finally people found me and came to
untie me. I made it back to my home, but the entire village had fled. I
didn’t have the strength to go anywhere, and after a week, my family came
back to look for me and they were able to take me to the hospital in Niangara.[43]

When interviewed by Human Rights Watch on February 19, 2010, the young man was still recovering from the serious wounds to his head and those
on his arms and shoulders caused by the cords used to tie him to the tree.

Upon their arrival in Makombo village on December 14, the
LRA used similar tactics as at Mabanga Ya Talo, abducting dozens of people,
including children, before they forced those they had captured to march at a
quick pace toward the next village, Mangada. One woman from Makombo village
told Human Rights Watch that her three children—her 12 and 13-year-old
daughters and her 15-year-old son—were captured by the LRA during the
attack at Makombo.[44]

On the 16-kilometer stretch between Makombo and Mangada, the
LRA continued to kill adult men as well as other abductees who were either too
slow or who tried to flee. Those who later buried the dead told Human Rights
Watch that the largest concentration of bodies was found in the forest and
brush along this stretch of road. The victims were found alone or in small
groups of two or three. Many had been tied up before they were killed with
blows to the head.[45]

According to witnesses, the LRA camped the night of December
14 at Mangada, guarding those they had abducted. Here too they killed more of
their captives, specifically adult men. A 52-year-old man, Moponi Galaga, who
watched the LRA kill his two sons and brother, bravely tried to confront the
LRA. Early in the morning of December 15, he emerged from his hiding place.
According to a witness who was hiding in the bushes nearby, Moponi was overcome
with emotion and anger. He approached LRA leader Obol and demanded to know why
they had killed his family. The LRA chief did not respond but took a large
wooden stick and struck Moponi repeatedly on his head and body until he died.[46]

At Mangada the LRA also killed Mobaya Pelagi, the
30-year-old daughter of a local chief. Family members later found her body
naked, with her arms and legs spread apart. It appeared she had been raped. The
naked body of Danga Atinengwe, the son of a chief from Tapili, was found on top
of her. Both had been hit on the head with axes and stabbed multiple times.[47]

Day
Two: Attack on Tapili

Early the next day, December 15, the LRA left Mangada in the
direction of Tapili, the largest village in the area about 34 kilometers away.
Word had begun to spread of the LRA attack, but in an area with no
telecommunication networks, the information was sketchy. At Ngiribi village
people were preparing to flee when the LRA arrived. Many were quickly captured.
Those who later buried the dead found dozens of bodies of adult men in the
forest and brush nearby.[48] One
resident told Human Rights Watch, “The LRA captured nearly everyone from
this village.”[49]

As the LRA progressed rapidly on foot, community leaders in
Tapili met to discuss the rumors that the LRA were approaching. They had
received information about the attack on Mabanga Ya Talo, but since the
fishermen’s market was some 56 kilometers away, they believed it was
unlikely the LRA would arrive so quickly. The community leaders decided to
verify the information and sent the administrative chief (the chef de poste),
Pascal Bolongo, and a Congolese army soldier, 1st Sgt. Maj. Jon
Dbere Alati, who happened to be in Tapili that day, to go and check.[50]
At about 10 a.m., the two set off on a motorcycle in the direction of Mangada.
But they did not return. Three kilometers out of Tapili they were ambushed by
LRA combatants, who shot and killed them. The LRA stripped the soldier of his
uniform and gouged out his eyes. They cut off one of Chief Bolongo’s
fingers and then set fire to the motorcycle and the two bodies.[51]

Upon hearing the shots and failing to see the return of
Chief Bolongo and Sergeant Alati, the population of Tapili began to flee. But
the LRA were marching quickly and soon arrived in the village. Similar to the
attacks on the other villages, the first LRA to arrive at Tapili pretended to
be Ugandan and Congolese army soldiers carrying out a joint patrol. A group of
about a dozen LRA combatants, some who spoke a bit of Lingala, attempted to
assure the population they would do them no harm and gestured to people to
approach them. This reassured the population. One 19-year-old student told
Human Rights Watch:

They said we should not be scared, so I and a small group
of others went over to them. One of them spoke Lingala and asked us questions.
He wanted to know where to find batteries, where the local Catholic parish was,
the name of the priest, where the school was, and if it was functioning. We
answered their questions. Then they asked us to come with them to the market
area, which we did. We thought they really were Congolese army soldiers.[52]

At the market, the LRA combatants began to buy goods, paying
well above the asking price. This tactic reassured people further and attracted
others to the market eager to make a profit. As soon as a large group had
gathered, the LRA turned on the population. They quickly captured people and
tied them up in human chains, specifically focusing on children. Possibly
because Tapili was really a small town, much bigger than the villages the LRA
had attacked the previous day, the LRA guarded those they had captured in two
houses used as temporary holding areas while they pillaged houses and shops.
One holding area was a small thatch house near the market; the other was a more
solid concrete home about 400 meters away.[53] A
17-year-old boy captured by the LRA in Tapili told Human Rights Watch what
happened to him:

I was trying to run away but they captured me. They tied me
at the waist together with others. There were 14 in my chain. They hit us with
their guns and told us not to scream. They spoke to us in bad Lingala, some
French, and also some English. They put us in the small house near the market
and made us all sit on the floor. We were packed in very tightly as there were
many of us, both adults and children. There was another house they used as a
prison where they also guarded people. I spent at least seven hours in the
house before they forced us to leave with them.[54]

While one group of LRA abducted and pillaged in Tapili,
another waited a few kilometers away with the people they had abducted from
Mabanga Ya Talo and Makombo. A trader and his wife on their way to the market
in Tapili came across them on the road. The trader said:

It was about noon and we came across three LRA. They first
captured my wife who was ahead of me on the road and then I approached them to
try to discuss her release. They were young and spoke Zande. My wife said she
needed to go to the toilet and they let her go into the forest. I called after
her in our local language [Mangwetu] to go and hide. They got angry when she
did not return. They took me into the forest and told me to call her, but I
again shouted in our local language that she should run away. They tied up my
hands and my feet, threw me on the ground, began to beat me and walked on me.
They cocked their gun to shoot me but I pleaded for my life. Then another LRA
shouted from the road that they should come. They untied my feet, grabbed me
and forced me to walk with them. On the road, about a kilometer away, we came
across a big group of people who had also been captured and who were being
guarded by a group of about 12 LRA. I was tied up at the waist to a group of
nine other people making me the tenth in the chain. There were about 40 people
who were captured like me, maybe more. They told me they had been captured at
Mabanga Ya Talo and that I should not try to flee as there were LRA everywhere
in the surrounding forest.[55]

As evening fell, the LRA group in Tapili moved those they
had captured from the holding areas into a long line and gave each abductee
goods to carry that they had pillaged from the market and other homes,
including heavy bags of salt, sugar, and batteries. They forced the terrified
adults and children at gunpoint to march out of Tapili back down the road
toward Mabanga. According to witnesses and the abductees who later managed to
escape, nearly 200 people had been captured at Tapili.[56]

About six kilometers out of Tapili, the LRA group joined up
with their colleagues who had waited with the abductees from Mabanga Ya Talo
and Makombo. They further divided the pillaged goods between the abductees to
carry as much as possible and then diverted from the main road onto a narrow
footpath in the direction of Kiliwa and back toward the Uele River. According to abductees who later managed to escape, the LRA gave the order that they
would kill anyone who tried to flee or who walked too slowly. Many of the
abductees could not keep up the fast pace or carry the heavy loads assigned to
them. One boy witnessed the LRA kill people that night with blows to the head
from an axe for walking too slowly.[57] Those
who later buried the dead found a trail of bodies along the footpath that the
LRA had taken.[58]

Late into the evening, about 17 kilometers away from the
main road, the LRA camped for the night. According to abductees who later
escaped, interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the LRA commanders and the
combatants divided up the money they had stolen and the girls and young women
they had abducted. The choice of girls was carried out according to hierarchy
with the leader of the group, Binany (see below), having first choice, followed
by a commander known as Bukwara, then Obol, and then the others. Once the girls
were assigned, many were raped in front of the other abductees. One witness who
had escaped the LRA later recounted to Human Rights Watch how he and the others
watched as the LRA combatants raped seven girls, some as young as 11 years old.[59]

Days
Three and Four: Return to the Uele River

On December 16, the LRA group continued its journey and
reached Kiliwa village, some 12 kilometers from where they had camped the
previous night. The large group of abductees, many of whom were carrying heavy
loads, slowed down the pace of the LRA operation. LRA combatants continued to
kill civilians they met along the way and abductees who walked too slowly. One
abductee recalled witnessing LRA combatants summarily execute five people in
his group as they were marched towards Kiliwa. The night of December 16, the
LRA camped at Kiliwa and killed a number of people in the village before moving
on the next day, December 17, back toward Makombo and the Uele River.

Early on the morning of December 18, the LRA group, together
with an estimated 250 abductees, crossed the Uele River at Mavanzonguda, the
same place they had crossed four days earlier. Once on the opposite bank of the
river, the girls and women they had captured were forced to wash the uniforms
the LRA had worn throughout the four-day operation. The LRA then forcibly
marched the large group of adults and children off into the remote and
unpopulated savannah terrain north of the river. They left behind them a trail
of death and communities devastated and traumatized by the attack.

March
into the Wilderness

In the days following the river crossing, the LRA forced
their captives to march about 20 kilometers a day. According to those who later
escaped, the LRA separated the children from the adults and kept the children
close to the commander of the group. The captives remained tied up to each
other at the waist with ropes or metal wire in human chains of between 5 to 15
captives, also sleeping tied up. The LRA began to conduct military parades each
morning, when the combatants paid homage to the commander, stood for military
inspection, and were given their orders for the day. This daily military
routine was conducted in front of the children who had been taken captive,
while the adult abductees were excluded from the ceremony. The LRA also began
to conduct daily counts of their captives.[60]

The 17-year-old boy abducted in Tapili and held for two
weeks described his ordeal:

Each day the LRA would kill people who were too slow. They
killed Pascal, who was only 12 years old, as he was tired and could no longer
walk. They also killed at least two other people I knew. They split the
children into a separate group from the adults. I was in the children’s
group and there were about 30 boys and 50 girls. We were constantly tied up to
each other, even when we slept... Each night we slept near to the LRA chief of
the group who called himself ‘Captain Joseph’ [Binany]. Whenever
they played music we were all obliged to dance. They said we would also be
trained to be soldiers.

They counted us at the beginning and end of every day. This
is how I know how many we were. When I escaped there were 186 of us.

One day, when we were crossing a small river where there
was a lot of mud, seven of us tried to escape. We were tied to each other but
became separated, though I was still tied up to my best friend. We hid and they
didn’t find us. But they did find the other five and killed them. They
included two girls who were 15 years old and three boys. I later saw their
bodies. My best friend and I walked for four days to get back. We had no food
the entire time. Eventually we found a village that we recognized and we were
saved.[61]

Those who remained with the LRA continued to march. On
around Christmas Day 2009, the LRA group together with their captives from
Makombo and Tapili met up with other LRA groups near the confluence of the Uele and Kapili Rivers, in what was probably a pre-arranged meeting place. According to
Ugandan military officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch and abductees who
later escaped, the meeting included a number of senior LRA commanders and was
led by Gen. Dominic Ongwen, a senior LRA commander wanted on an arrest warrant
by the International Criminal Court.[62] The LRA
commanders spent several days together, held meetings, and conducted military
training of children they had taken captive. According to the abductees who
later escaped, the group celebrated Christmas and the success of the attack at
Makombo. The LRA commanders then divided up the new abductees and separated
into multiple smaller groups, each heading in a different direction.[63]

A 16-year-old Congolese girl, held by the LRA for eight
months, recalled the meeting. She said:

The LRA group who attacked [Makombo] returned many weeks
later. They were very happy. They said they had killed many people. They
brought with them others they had captured from Tapili and other places,
including a lot of children. It was a big group. Then there was a big
celebration that a lot of other LRA commanders came to as well. We all spent
Christmas together and they did military training for the children so we could
learn how to shoot. I was trained as well. After a few days they divided us up
again into smaller groups and we went in separate directions.[64]

Aftermath

Following the Makombo massacre, the population of the area
fled. Many sought refuge in Niangara and Ndingba to the east, while others fled
south to Isiro and Rungu. By January 2010, Niangara hosted a population of
11,750 internally displaced people and Rungu 14,200.[65]

In the immediate day or two after the killings, those who
could find their loved ones quickly buried them before fleeing, but scores of
other bodies were left behind. Between Christmas 2009 and New Year 2010, local
authorities from Makombo and other residents who had fled to Niangara returned
to begin the task of burying the dead.[66]
Frightened that the LRA might return, the teams worked quickly over a three-day
period, burying the bodies where they found them to make the task easier and
also because the bodies were so badly decomposed it was difficult to move them
elsewhere. Those who carried out the burials told Human Rights Watch that they
buried bodies along nearly the entire 105-kilometer circular journey the LRA
had taken during the attack. The largest concentration of bodies was along the
16-kilometer stretch between Makombo and Mangada. On the third day of burials,
the teams heard rumors that the Congolese army was approaching. Scared that
they might face problems, they halted their work and returned to Niangara. In
interviews with Human Rights Watch, they said their tasks had not been
completed and that they left behind bodies still unburied.[67]

A number of those who buried the dead were deeply affected
by the gruesome task and the horrible deaths their family members, neighbors
and friends had endured. One told Human Rights Watch, “I can still smell
the stench of death on my clothes and on myself. I wash constantly but I
don’t think it will ever go away. What happened to my family and friends
is ingrained on my memory forever. No human being should have to die like they
died. Those who did this must be punished.”[68]

Based on the interviews with those who buried the dead,
including with Congolese army soldiers who assisted in burials in Mabanga Ya
Talo on December 18, and in Mangada and Makombo on January 4, 2010 (see below),[69]
Human Rights Watch has calculated that at least 321 people were killed by the
LRA in the Makombo area and its surroundings between December 14 and 17, 2009.[70]
Those left unburied have not been included in our calculations.

It is not clear how many of those captured at Makombo and
Tapili were killed and how many are still with the LRA. In interviews with
those who later managed to escape, Human Rights Watch received information
about the deaths of at least nine abductees killed by the LRA after the Makombo
massacre, once the LRA had crossed the Uele River,[71]
although this information is, at best, only partial. By mid-February 2010, the
Congolese army had registered 35 adults and 5 children from Makombo and Tapili
who had managed to escape the LRA following their abduction. The youngest was
eight years old.[72] Many
others remain with the LRA.

Protection arrives too late

Congolese army soldiers based near Niangara were informed of
the attack in the Makombo area on December 16, 2009. The armed forces sent
soldiers to the area, but since the units were traveling on foot they arrived
too late.[73] After
marching for two days, a small unit of Congolese soldiers arrived at Mabanga Ya
Talo on December 18, 2009, after the LRA and their captives had already crossed
the Uele River.[74] Without
access to boats to cross the river or communications equipment to inform their
superior officers of what had happened, the Congolese army soldiers were unable
to pursue the LRA. The soldiers helped to bury 17 bodies found near the market
area and returned to Niangara to seek reinforcements.[75]

Ugandan soldiers based in Nambia, just north of Niangara,
were also informed about the attack in the Makombo area and on December 16 sent
an “intelligence squad” to the area to pursue the LRA. An official
communication from the Ugandan Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence to Human
Rights Watch on March 17, 2010, said Ugandan soldiers were unable to track the
LRA, despite exchanges with the Congolese army about satellite coordinates for
the affected area and multiple efforts to find the exact spot where the LRA had
crossed the Uele River.[76]
The Ugandan Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence said that the Ugandan army did
not have information regarding widespread killing in the Makombo area, though
they had been informed about some killings and abductions.[77]
Human Rights Watch was not informed of any further attempts by the Ugandan army
to uncover details about the attack or its scale (see below for further
information).

At the time of the killings, MONUC had no peacekeepers in
Niangara and received no information about the LRA attack until late December
when they received an unconfirmed report of possibly 100 civilians dead.[78]
In January the mission received a further report of 266 deaths in the Makombo
area but still did not investigate.[79] MONUC
officials told Human Rights Watch that due to the remoteness of the region and
competing priorities, its peacekeepers did not immediately conduct detailed
investigations into these killings.[80] MONUC
began an investigation on March 11, 2010 following briefings from Human Rights
Watch researchers about the extent of the atrocities committed by the LRA (see
below).

More than two months after the massacre, very little
information had surfaced about what had happened in the Makombo area. One
elderly chief still grieving for his dead son said to Human Rights Watch,
“We have been forgotten. It’s as if we don’t exist. The
government says the LRA are no longer a problem, but I know that’s not
true. I beg of you, please talk to others about what has happened to us.”[81]

VI. Other Attacks by the LRA

While the Makombo area killings were the most deadly attack
by the LRA in northeastern Congo since the Christmas massacres of 2008, LRA
attacks against civilians have also been perpetrated in other areas in 2009 and
2010. Small groups of LRA combatants operating north of the Uele River, including some groups who later carried out the Makombo massacre, have also carried
out dozens of attacks on civilians in villages and farms near the towns of
Bangadi and Ngilima, and in the Manziga chieftainship. In these areas, Human
Rights Watch has documented the deliberate killing by the LRA of 42 civilians
between September 2009 and January 2010. The killings occurred in the villages
and towns of Nakwa, Nagilidangue, Diagbe, Napopo, Birisi, Yamba, Kumbari,
Bafuka, Kisimu, Lindimbia, Makpesela, Ngulu, Diadupo, Madudu, Badolo, Nandike,
Nangula and areas around Nambia.[82]

The killings documented by Human Rights Watch are likely to
be only a fraction of the total. Congolese civil society groups reported an
additional 33 civilians killed in the same time period. At least seven others
were seriously wounded, often only surviving because their assailants thought
they were dead. A further six civilians, four women and two men, were horribly
mutilated by LRA combatants who used razors to cut off each victim’s lips
and an ear. The killings and mutilations spread terror among the local
population. Over 19,080 people fled to the towns of Bangadi and Ngilima to seek
safety from the LRA attacks.[83]

Killings

Nakwa

In November 2009, LRA combatants attacked the village of Nakwa, about 15 kilometers south of Bangadi. They attacked a small farm just as
the family who lived there had gathered for dinner. A family member told Human
Rights Watch:

They came up to our house. There were seven of them and
each one had a gun. They said they were not against us but that we should go
into the house to eat. We didn’t know what to do, and they just came and
kicked over the pots of food. Some of my family managed to quickly run away.
But they captured the two young boys who were with us, including my son, and
then forced eight of us into the house and set fire to it. I tried desperately
to open the window and I managed to climb through it. One of the LRA came after
me with a large stick of wood and tried to hit me, but failed. Then another one
shot at me. The bullet hit my shoulder and came out through the back of my
neck. I ran into the forest. My brother also managed to get out of the house
though he was badly burned on his arms. The others did not and they were all
burned to death.[84]

The dead included four women—three of whom were over
65 years old—and two men.

Nagilidangue

In late December 2009, the LRA surprised a group of farmers
harvesting peanuts near Nagilidangue, a small farming community some 45
kilometers southwest of Bangadi. The combatants abducted a man and forced him
back to their camp. A few days later, on January 2, 2010, a group of 15 LRA combatants returned to the same area near Nagilidangue with the captured man and
brought him to his neighbor’s house. The neighbor told Human Rights
Watch:

One of the LRA made my neighbor sit down and eat with us
while the other LRA combatant pillaged all the goods in my house. My neighbor
didn’t have an appetite, but the LRA forced him to eat. Once they had
taken everything from the house, the LRA told my wife and kids to carry the
goods into the forest. I tried to escape, but as I was fleeing, one of the LRA
grabbed my clothes, pulled me down, and then started to cut me with his
machete—three times on my head, seven times on my back, and twice on my
arm.

I tried to escape again, but the LRA shot me in the leg as
I was running. I fell on the ground and had no strength left to get up again.
The LRA thought I was dead and didn’t come over to check. Then I heard
gunshots firing in all directions, and the LRA started to pack up the pillaged
goods and go into the bush. My wife and children were able to drop what they
were carrying and run away. I was left alone and felt like I was already dead.
An hour later, a bit of life came back to me and I could hear my child’s
voice in the distance. I called out to him, and my wife and children eventually
found me.[85]

The man’s 18-year-old daughter was also wounded during
the attack. She had tried to flee with her young baby, when one of the LRA
combatants shot her in the foot.[86]

The next day, January 3, the same group of LRA combatants
attacked another house, about six kilometers away. There they killed Reginard
Ngisakumba, 45, and Fuoyo, 50, by blows to the head with large wooden sticks.
Fuoyo’s wife, Koakpi, was also killed. Those who later buried her body
said she had a wooden stick inserted so far up her vagina that it came out
through the upper part of her chest. Her skull had also been crushed.[87]

The same day, about two dozen LRA combatants attacked a
second home less than a kilometer away, killing the 30-year-old owner of the
house and abducting his three young sons, aged 6, 10 and 13; the youngest two
later managed to escape. The man’s body was found with a piece of wood
stuck in his side, a machete wound to his head, and his entire body burned
except for his face.[88] The
man’s wife described what happened:

They [the LRA combatants] made everyone in the house get on
the ground, and then they started pillaging everything. They took my three
children and my husband into the forest behind our house. There they started
hitting my husband with a wooden stick—on the back of his head, on his
eyes, on his side, and on his stomach. After he was dead, they lit him on fire.
All this was done in the presence of my three children, just 500 meters from
our house. After the killing, some of the LRA came back to my house where I had
been hiding. They took our manioc and then set the house on fire. My
husband’s second wife had escaped. One LRA asked me where she was. I said
I didn’t know, and then he took out a machete to cut my feet, telling me
that this would prevent me from fleeing. Luckily I was wearing thick boots so
it didn’t cut my skin. Then the group of LRA combatants and the people
they had captured spent the night in my compound. In the morning, they left and
they didn’t try to take me with them. My two youngest sons managed to
escape. They showed me where the LRA had killed their father. My eldest son is
still missing.[89]

Mutilations

In December 2009, LRA combatants mutilated six civilians
near the towns of Bangadi and Ngilima in Congo by cutting off the
victims’ lips and one ear with a razor. The LRA then released their
victims and sent them back to Bangadi and Ngalima with a chilling warning to
others that anyone who heard or spoke about the LRA would be punished.[90]
Similar mutilations were a trademark of LRA attacks in the early 1990s in
northern Uganda, but previously they had not been reported in Congo

In early December, two women and a man were captured by LRA
combatants while they were gathering their sweet potato and cassava harvest
from their farm about five kilometers from Bangadi. The LRA combatants tied the
three together with a cord around their waists and took them into the forest
where a small group of LRA combatants had set up camp. They accused their
victims of telling the Congolese army about their locations and said they would
leave them with a “sign” to tell the population to stop talking
about the LRA.[91] Among
the seven LRA combatants were a number of children, including a young Congolese
combatant, about 14 years old, who spoke the Zande language, and was likely a
child who had been abducted months or years earlier by the LRA.[92]
The next morning, this young combatant carried out the mutilation. One of the
victims, a 38-year-old woman, told Human Rights Watch:

In the morning, at around 6 or 6:30 a.m., they started
cutting off our lips and ears with a razor. The older Ugandan combatant gave
the order to the Congolese boy to cut us. They cut the man first, and then me
and the other woman–first the upper lip, then the lower lip, and then one
ear. When they finished, they told us to leave and return to our village. We
eventually found the path and then met Congolese soldiers along the road who
brought us on their bicycles to the Bangadi health center. There was lots of
blood. I still have really bad headaches. When I talk, it’s like my mouth
is on fire.[93]

In a separate incident in early December, a 44-year-old man
was mutilated in the same manner by LRA combatants near Bangadi. Later in the
month, a 50-year-old woman and a 23-year-old woman were also mutilated near
Ngilima town. In all cases, the LRA combatants cut off both lips and one ear.[94]

VII. Atrocities during
Captivity

Interviews by Human Rights Watch with children and adults
who managed to escape the LRA provide an insight into the extreme brutality
they endured. Every person captured by the LRA quickly learned the two rules of
survival: 1) if you walk too slowly or appear tired, you are killed; and 2) if
you try to escape, you are killed. To ensure that no one had any doubt about
what the consequences would be for those who broke these rules, the abductees
were forced to watch the LRA kill those who disobeyed or were themselves forced
to carry out the killings.

Teaching Children to Kill

The LRA usually separated children from the adult abductees
soon after capture and forced them to undergo “military training.”
Through mind-control methods, instilling fear, and sheer brutality, the LRA has
been able to turn nine to 15-year-old boys and girls into killers. The children
are dabbed with “magic” oils, which they are told make them a
member of the LRA and will prevent them from being harmed by bullets. In many
of the attacks documented by Human Rights Watch, such as the case of the
mutilations near Bangadi (see above), the Ugandan LRA combatants forced the
young, newly abducted Congolese boys to carry out the killings, mutilations, or
other attacks.[95]

One of the most brutal forms of violence used by the LRA is
to force children to kill other children. Usually the victim is a child who has
disobeyed the rules. Other children are then ordered to surround the victim in
a circle and take turns beating the child on the head with a large wooden stick
until the child is dead.[96] Human
Rights Watch documented numerous cases of such cruel killings.

In late October 2009, an 11-year-old boy from Kapanga, near
Nambia, was captured by the LRA when he was with his father at their farm.
After killing his father in front of him, the LRA combatants took the young boy
into the forest with them. The boy managed to escape captivity one month later
and told Human Rights Watch what happened to him:

After they captured me, they told me they wanted me to be a
soldier. When I protested and told them that I was too young, they stabbed me
under my eyes with a bayonet. Then they took me to their camp. While I was
there, they gave military training to all the children. We were in teams, and
each team had to come in at certain times for training, and to kill people.
They treated their victims like animals and told us, “When you kill
someone, it’s like killing an animal.”

They often asked the children to kill people in the bush. I
saw this myself, and they even asked me to kill someone. They first tied the
person up, and then they asked me to kill him with a large wooden stick. It was
a Congolese Zande boy. I saw 10 people killed like this–girls and boys.
Each time they were killed by other children who had been abducted. They chose
the victims randomly and then would give us the order: “Take your bat.
Kill this animal.”[97]

Sexual Slavery

Girls abducted by the LRA are often forced to become the
“wives,” or sexual slaves, of LRA combatants.[98]
They usually stay with the same combatant during their entire time in
captivity. Regular LRA combatants are allowed one “wife,” while
commanders have numerous “wives” and are given first pick after an
abduction operation, such as the one in Makombo.

A 17-year-old girl from a village near Bangadi was abducted
by the LRA in January 2009 and held as a sexual slave for the commander of her
group until she managed to escape in early June 2009:

There were more than 20 combatants in my group and 40
girls. I was given to one combatant and stayed with him the whole time. He was
a commander named “Wila” who had two Ugandan wives, plus me. He
took turns sleeping with me and his other two wives. During the five months, we
moved around all the time to different camps. We always moved together, except
when they went to get food, we stayed in the camp. They beat us a lot, and
sometimes we were tied together. I escaped when they were trying to mix us with
another group. After I ran away, I met a man named Michel who took me here [to
Bangadi] on a bike.[99]

Adults in Captivity

Adults abducted by the LRA are often used as porters, with
adult women also used as sexual slaves. They are also forced to cook and clean.
Adults are rarely, if ever, forced to undergo military training, but they too
endure extreme brutality.

A 27-year-old woman who was abducted by the LRA in January
2009 witnessed, or was forced to participate in, the killing of 55 other
abductees during her nine months in captivity. She later described her ordeal
to Human Rights Watch. She said:

I was at my house in Diagbe when the LRA came and started
calling the population together, telling us they were Ugandan soldiers who had
come to protect the population. Once we were all together, they started to grab
us. Four people were killed. Then they captured 30 of us and took us into the
bush. Soon after we left Diagbe, they killed 15 of the
abductees—including three boys aged 10, 13, and 15. The others were older
men. The rest of us—14 men and me—walked for two days before we
arrived at the LRA camp. I was tied around the waist, and an LRA combatant
pulled me along with the loose end of the rope. When we got to the camp, we
were divided into small groups. I was given as a “wife” to the
commander of the group. There were about 30 people in our group, including
seven women. All seven of us were for the chief. We would spend one day in one
place and then go on to a new place. I had to prepare the food and do laundry.

The combatants were all Ugandan. They only spoke their
mother tongue. In the beginning, we communicated by gestures, but then we
started to learn their language. They didn’t speak any Lingala. It was
prohibited to speak with the other abductees. They beat us if we tried. The LRA
killed lots of abductees while I was with them.[100]

VIII. Responsibility of
LRA Leaders

Since the failed attack on the main LRA camp in Garamba National Park in December 2008, the LRA has split into multiple smaller groups
operating between Congo, Sudan and CAR. The rebel group is still believed to
operate under the leadership of Joseph Kony. According to interviews with
witnesses, and Ugandan and Congolese military personnel, a group of between 80
to 120 LRA combatants continues to operate in Congo,[101]
though these figures are difficult to confirm. Since the LRA also holds
hundreds of abductees, including children who are being trained as combatants,
their numbers could be higher and might grow in the future.

Ugandan and Congolese military sources told Human Rights
Watch that the LRA who operate in Congo are under the leadership of Gen.
Dominic Ongwen,[102] one of
the LRA’s top leaders wanted on an arrest warrant from the International
Criminal Court. According to the same sources, Lt. Col. Binansio Okumu (also
known as Binany),[103] is one
of the commanders who reports to Ongwen and operates in Congo, in the area north of the Uele River.[104]
Children abducted by the LRA who later managed to escape, especially those who
had spent many months with the LRA and had learned the names of LRA commanders
in whose groups they were held, confirmed the presence of Ongwen, Binany, and a
commander known as Obol, whom they called “One-Eye.”[105]
These same children also confirmed that Ongwen, Binany, and other commanders
held a meeting during the 2009 Christmas period, indicating that Ongwen’s
leadership of the Congo LRA group remains intact.[106]

According to both children and adults captured by the LRA
during the Makombo massacre who later escaped, the leader of the group who
conducted the four-day operation in the Makombo area was a man about 50 years
old who wore a black beret and told the abductees to call him “Captain
Joseph.”[107] This
leader was the first to select which girls he wanted among the abductees and
was the commander whom other LRA combatants saluted during the military parades
held daily in the days following the attack at Makombo. Children who had been
held for many months by the LRA told Human Rights Watch that Binany was the
only commander who wore a black beret.[108]
Congolese military sources also told Human Rights Watch that the LRA commander
who operated in the area north of Niangara was Binany and that they believed he
was responsible for the killings at Makombo.[109] This
information indicates Binany may have both led and participated directly in the
Makombo operation. Criminal investigations, whether by national jurisdictions
or the ICC, should be conducted to determine his role in ordering and
participating in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity for the Makombo
massacre.

Following the Makombo massacre, the LRA combatants who
carried out the operation, together with some 250 abductees, joined other LRA
groups over the 2009 Christmas period in a meeting led by Ongwen. According to
witnesses, the LRA commanders celebrated the “success” of the
Makombo operation, conducted training for children captured by the LRA, and
later split the abductees between various LRA groups.[110]
Ongwen’s leadership at this meeting strongly indicates he knew, or should
have known, about the massacre at Makombo and the widespread abduction of
civilians, including children. Human Rights Watch believes there is sufficient
information linking Ongwen to the massacre at Makombo in which widespread
abuses occurred that he should be investigated for his role in ordering alleged
war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Those who were captured during the Makombo massacre by the
LRA and others who were present described in detail to Human Rights Watch one
of the commanders directly involved in the Makombo operation: a 60-year-old
tall, large, very dark-skinned man with rasta-like hair, with only one eye,
known as Obol.[111] Witnesses
repeatedly told Human Rights Watch that “One-Eye” gave orders to
kill people and also frequently killed people by himself. Human Rights Watch
believes there is sufficient information linking Obol directly to the massacre
at Makombo that he should be investigated for his role in ordering and
participating in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

IX.
The Search for Justice

International
Law

International law calls for accountability for serious
crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture.
International treaties, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its
additional protocols, the Convention against Torture, and the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, oblige states parties to investigate allegations
of serious violations of international law and ensure that the perpetrators are
prosecuted. Uganda and Congo have ratified each of these as well as various other
treaties on international human rights and humanitarian law.

War crimes

The armed conflict in northern Congo is governed by
international humanitarian law (the laws of war), which applies to both states
and to non-state armed groups such as the LRA. Relevant treaty law includes
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which sets forth minimum
standards for the treatment of persons within a party’s control.[112]
Also applicable are the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions (Protocol II),[113]
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict, which bans all recruitment and use
of children by state and non-state military forces,[114]
and relevant customary international humanitarian law.[115]

Individuals who willfully commit serious violations of
international humanitarian law are responsible for war crimes. War crimes
include a wide array of offenses, including murder, torture and other
mistreatment, rape and other sexual violence, enslavement, forced displacement,
recruitment and use of child soldiers, and pillaging.[116]
Commanders may be held criminally responsible for ordering, planning, or
instigating the commission of a war crime. They may also be prosecuted for war
crimes as a matter of command responsibility when they knew, or should have
known, about the commission of war crimes and took insufficient measures to
prevent them or punish those responsible.[117]

Crimes against humanity

The concept of crimes against humanity has been
incorporated into a number of international treaties and the statutes of
international criminal tribunals, including the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. The definition of crimes against humanity has
been defined as a range of serious human rights abuses committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack by a government or non-state actor against a
civilian population.[118] Murder, rape, and other inhumane acts intentionally causing great
suffering, all fall within the range of acts that can qualify as crimes against
humanity.[119] The civilian population must be the primary object of the attack.[120]

The attack against a civilian population
underlying the commission of crimes against humanity must be widespread or
systematic. It need not be both.[121]
“Widespread” refers to the scale of the acts or number of victims.[122] A
“systematic” attack indicates “a pattern or methodical
plan.”[123] International courts have considered to what extent a systematic
attack requires a policy or plan.[124]

Lastly, for individuals to be found culpable
for crimes against humanity requires their having the relevant knowledge of the
crime.[125] That is, perpetrators must be aware that their actions formed part of
the widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.[126] While
perpetrators need not be identified with a policy or plan underlying crimes
against humanity, they must at least have knowingly taken the risk of
participating in the policy or plan.[127] Individuals
accused of crimes against humanity cannot avail themselves of the defense of
following superior orders. Because crimes against humanity are considered
crimes of universal jurisdiction, all states are responsible for bringing to
justice those who commit crimes against humanity. There is an emerging trend in
international jurisprudence and standard setting that persons responsible for
crimes against humanity, as well as other serious violations of human rights,
should not be granted amnesty.

International Criminal Court

Congo is a party to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), providing the ICC jurisdiction over crimes in violation
of international law committed in Congo, including by the LRA. Uganda is also a party to the ICC statute, giving the court jurisdiction over such crimes
committed by Ugandan nationals, which would include LRA commanders. The ICC may
exercise jurisdiction for “the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole,”[128]
specifically genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

In December 2003, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni referred
LRA crimes in northern Uganda to the ICC and in mid-2004, the ICC prosecutor
announced the opening of an investigation into crimes committed in northern Uganda.[129]
In March 2004, the Congolese government referred the situation in Congo to the ICC,[130]inviting the ICC prosecutor to investigate
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute on its territory.

After approximately a year of investigations in northern Uganda, the ICC issued warrants in July 2005 for the arrest of five LRA leaders for war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed on Ugandan territory.[131]
While the ICC also has issued arrest warrants for serious crimes committed in
Congo, it has not brought charges for LRA crimes committed in Congo. The ICC
arrest warrants for LRA suspects who remain alive are currently outstanding as
no LRA suspects have been apprehended.

Ugandan Amnesty Act

In 2000, the Ugandan parliament passed the Amnesty Act,
which established an Amnesty Commission and procedures for granting amnesty to LRA
members and members of other Ugandan rebel groups. The legislation, effective
from January 26, 1986, states that it is applicable to “Ugandans involved
in acts of a war-like nature in various parts of the country”[132]
and sets out specific requirements for eligibility including renouncing and
abandoning involvement in the war or armed rebellion.[133]
Individuals who meet the amnesty requirements cannot be prosecuted or punished
for their alleged crimes in Uganda, although under a 2006 amendment to the law,
in exceptional circumstances, the Ugandan Minister of Internal Affairs can
declare an individual ineligible if the Ugandan parliament agrees.[134]
According to statistics from the Ugandan Amnesty Commission, 24,000 LRA members
have received amnesty since 2000, of which 17,000 were combatants.[135]
The Ugandan Amnesty Act does not apply to crimes committed by Ugandan citizens
before national courts in other countries. As a result, Uganda cannot grant amnesty abroad for LRA crimes committed in Congo, Sudan and CAR. Domestic
amnesties should also not be a bar to prosecution before the ICC.

No one has ever been convicted for crimes committed by the
LRA, though one LRA member awaits trial in Uganda.[136]
To date, LRA-affected communities outside of Uganda have not had the
opportunity to present to any government or UN body the remedies they seek for
the crimes they have suffered. In addition, no criminal investigations or
prosecutions of LRA commanders for crimes outside of Uganda have to our
knowledge been pursued.

Congolese Requests for Justice
and Reparations

The armed conflicts that have devastated Congo over the past
decade have fostered pressure on the Congolese government to provide amnesties
for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the hope it would encourage
peace. Congolese government officials and legislators have successfully and
repeatedly resisted such efforts. Congolese society continues to express a strong
preference for justice, not amnesties, for perpetrators of serious crimes. An
August 2008 survey on Congolese attitudes about peace, justice and social
reconstruction found that accountability and justice for grave crimes were very
important to people in eastern Congo, and that people believed these concepts promoted
peace. In the survey, 85 percent of respondents deemed it important to hold
accountable those who committed war crimes in eastern Congo.[137]

Civil society groups in LRA-affected areas in Congo and victims of LRA crimes have expressed a strong desire to see LRA commanders brought
to justice and have requested reparations for the material losses they have
suffered.[138] These demands for justice have been
particularly pronounced in the town of Faradje, in northeastern Congo. On December 25, 2008, the LRA, commanded by Lt. Col. Charles Arop, carried out a
brutal attack on Faradje killing at least 143 people and abducting 160 children
and dozens of adults.[139] During the attack, the LRA also looted
extensively and burned 940 houses, three primary schools, and nine churches
leaving large parts of Faradje destroyed.[140]

In September 2009, Arop surrendered to Ugandan soldiers
based near Faradje and was transferred to Uganda, where he is seeking amnesty
under the Ugandan Amnesty Act.[141] In press
interviews, Arop admitted to the attack on Faradje, claiming the town was
chosen because “it was the nearest place where such massacres would have
an impact and where they would get international publicity.”[142]
He said he was acting under orders from LRA leader Kony, in which he received
instructions that “anybody found in Faradje had to be killed; those able
to be turned into soldiers had to be abducted.”[143]
When later asked about how he felt about the killings, Arop said, “It was
painful but you have to do it. I want to ask the relatives of those we killed
to forgive me. Whatever we did, we did it under orders.”[144]

In February 2010, 19 civil society representatives and local
authorities told Human Rights Watch that they wished to see the LRA commander
brought to justice for crimes he committed in their town. One civil society
representative said:

Arop is someone who should be brought before justice, and
he should be judged in Congo. If the Congolese courts aren’t capable, the
International Criminal Court is there for that. Here in Faradje, we have witnesses
who are fully ready to testify openly in court against this man... The
Congolese people have nothing to do with why the LRA are fighting. Because of
this, the Ugandan government should also provide some reparations for all the
human and material losses we’ve suffered.[145]

On March 13, 186 residents of Faradje, including many who
were victims of the LRA attacks, wrote an official letter to the Congolese
Minister of Justice and Human Rights requesting the Congolese government to
launch judicial proceedings against Arop for the crimes he committed and for
reparations for the victims.[146] A copy
of the letter can be found in the annex of this report.

Options for Justice

There are a number of options to bring to justice LRA
commanders for international crimes committed in Congo that should be explored:

a)The ICC could issue charges with regard to the
LRA’s more recent crimes, including those in Congo.

b)Congolese authorities could seek to prosecute
before Congolese courts those LRA commanders who have committed crimes on
Congolese territory, including those in Uganda or elsewhere for whom Congo
should seek extradition.

c)Since Congo’s civilian justice system remains
weak and, under Congolese law, war crimes currently may be prosecuted only
before military courts, the Congolese government should consider the establishment
of a mixed national-international chamber within the civilian justice system.
The chamber, composed of Congolese and international judges and prosecutors, would
prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity not
sought on arrest warrants by the ICC. Such a chamber could try LRA commanders who
are Ugandan or other nationals who committed crimes within Congolese territory.[147]

d)The Special Division of Uganda’s High Court, whose creation
was prompted by agreements made during peace talks between the Ugandan
government and the LRA between 2006 and 2008,[148]
could seek to prosecute Arop and other LRA commanders outside Uganda. Notably,
on March 10, 2010, Uganda’s parliament passed an international crimes
bill, which makes crimes under the ICC statute prosecutable offenses under
Ugandan law. If signed into law, the bill provides that Ugandan courts can
prosecute serious crimes committed outside Uganda if the suspect is Ugandan, if
the offense was committed against a Ugandan, or if the alleged perpetrator is
present in Uganda.[149] The
bill appears to be silent on how it will interact with Uganda’s amnesty law.

With regard to national options, the Ugandan Special
Division’s status as an established entity, while still in the very early
stages of development, underscores the utility of pursuing cases through this court.
At the same time, it is crucial to ensure that domestic prosecutions adhere to
international due process and fair trial standards.[150]

X. Response to Ongoing Abuses

Congolese Government and Armed
Forces

Following the end of Operation
Lightning Thunder in March 2009, the Congolese government repeatedly maintained
that the LRA threat was substantially reduced, and nearly over.[151] But
despite such public proclamations, a number of government and military
authorities recognized that the LRA remained a danger.[152]
In May 2009, the Congolese government and MONUC launched a new joint
initiative, Operation Rudia II, to contain the
LRA and help protect civilians. MONUC agreed to provide food rations and
logistical support to the Congolese army and to conduct joint patrols in key
population centers.[153] Congolese military authorities also continued to quietly
cooperate with the Ugandan army, which maintained a sizeable presence in
LRA-affected areas of northern Congo that the Congolese government publicly
described as only “military advisors.”[154] Congolese and Ugandan officers still meet to discuss
strategy and their troops continue to conduct joint patrols and, on occasion,
joint operations against the LRA.[155]

The estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Congolese soldiers in Haut Uele
and Bas Uele districts face immense challenges in their work: the soldiers have
few vehicles, no helicopters, and inadequate communications systems. They move
around on foot in a vast terrain making their response time to LRA attacks
exceedingly slow, if they can respond at all. The soldiers’ salaries and
rations arrive irregularly or do not arrive at all.[156]
Despite these limitations, many Congolese army soldiers have made valiant
efforts to protect civilians from LRA attacks and to rescue abducted children
who had escaped from LRA captivity.[157]

As described above, following the Makombo massacre,
Congolese army soldiers helped to bury the dead and reported to their superiors
about the attack. On December 26, 2009, a small military team from the
battalion headquarters at Bangadi arrived to the area to investigate what had
happened, an unusually rapid response from the army. Following a three-day
investigation, led by Major Kibomango, the military team confirmed that a
“massacre” had been perpetrated by the LRA.[158]
In late December and early January 2010, the Congolese army deployed a small
unit of soldiers to Tapili and the Makombo area to avert further LRA attacks.
The soldiers were still there at the time of writing.

Less clear is whether Congolese authorities have taken any
steps in response to the army’s report about the massacre. By mid-March
2010, no Congolese judicial officials had yet been sent to document the
atrocities, and Congolese officials with whom Human Rights Watch spoke in Kinshasa were unaware of the LRA attack and the scale of the violations. MONUC officials
said they had not received information from the Congolese army about the
killings.[159]

Abuses by the FARDC: The “Ours
Battalion” in Bangadi

Some Congolese army soldiers have
attacked civilians rather than protect them. In mid-2009, the Congolese
government replaced its elite Republican Guard units in Haut Uele with regular
army soldiers, some of whom were new “mixed brigades” from
the Kivu provinces in eastern Congo. The mixed brigades include soldiers from
former, often abusive, armed groups recently integrated into the army.[160]
Reports of violations against civilians began to increase. The most serious
abuses were committed by the 911th Battalion, known as the “Ours”
Battalion (“bear” in French) deployed in the Bangadi area of Haut
Uele from January to early December 2009.[161] The
battalion was led by Major Mogabo, who, like a significant number of his
soldiers, was reportedly a former member of an armed group recently integrated
into the army with minimal military training.[162]
The reports of the abuses were so widespread that many humanitarian
organizations refused to work in Bangadi throughout 2009, resulting in further
isolation of the local population.[163]

During their time in the area,
soldiers from the “Ours” Battalion were reportedly responsible for
the killing of at least seven civilians, the rape of at least nine women and girls,
arbitrary arrests and widespread looting and extortion. The seven murders in
Bangadi reported to Human Rights Watch were often associated with looting and
extortion activities.[164] In one
case, at least, those implicated in murder were arrested: the authorities
arrested three soldiers accused of murdering Bolingwa Dieudonne, 38, on May 17, 2009, near Diagbe by stabbing him in the neck and beating him on the face.[165]
Human Rights Watch is not aware if they have yet been brought to trial.

Sexual violence against women and girls has been a hallmark
of the conflict elsewhere in Congo and the increase in reported rape cases by
Congolese army soldiers in Haut Uele has been a troubling development.
Women’s rights organizations reported the rape of five girls and four
women, including a 12-year-old girl, in and around Bangadi town in 2009 by
Congolese army soldiers of the “Ours” Battalion.[166]
In one case, a woman raped by a soldier on April 5, 2009, identified the
perpetrator and demanded his arrest. According to the victim, Major Mogabo, the
battalion’s commanding officer, did not believe the charges, conducted no
investigation nor did he refer the case to judicial authorities. The alleged
perpetrator was transferred to another town, but the soldier returned only a few
months later.[167]

In early December 2009, the “Ours” battalion was
transferred to Banda in Bas Uele and Ngilima in Haut Uele and was replaced in
Bangadi by the 912th Battalion, known as the“Guépard”Battalion (“cheetah” in French). Nearly all civil society
representatives, religious leaders, humanitarian workers, and residents of
Bangadi interviewed by Human Rights Watch said the relations between Congolese
army soldiers and the population dramatically improved with the “Ours”Batallion’s departure.

There have yet to be any judicial investigations into
alleged abuses by “Ours” Battalion soldiers in Bangadi. On February 23, 2010, Human Rights Watch met with Col. Eric Mbabazi, commander of the 4th
Brigade, to which the “Ours” Battalion reports, to urge him to open
judicial investigations by military magistrates into alleged criminal offenses.
He agreed to do so.[168]

Human Rights Watch has also received reports of abuses by
Congolese soldiers deployed in other areas in Haut Uele, including in and
around the district capital of Dungu. On the main road from Dungu to Aba, soldiers have reportedly set up 36 checkpoints where they illegally tax civilians and
extort money and other belongings.[169]
Several civilians have been wounded or killed in and around Dungu by attackers
claiming to be LRA combatants. In most cases, it is unclear whether these
attacks were carried out by Congolese army soldiers, local bandits or actual
LRA combatants.[170]

Ugandan Army

The Ugandan army is believed to retain an estimated 2,000 to
3,000 soldiers in northern Congo to conduct operations against the LRA.[171]
Ugandan military officers say they take the protection of civilians during LRA
operations seriously, though they believe this is primarily the responsibility
of the host nation on whose territory the Ugandan army operates.[172]
An official communication from the Ugandan Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence
to Human Rights Watch on March 17, 2010, stated that:

[The] Ugandan government takes the protection [of]
civilians during LRA operations very seriously. It is on that basis that IDP
camps were created in Northern Uganda.[173]
However with operations in DRC/Sudan and CAR, the responsibility to protect the
people largely resides with the host nations since the core task of UPDF [Ugandan
army] squads is to conduct mobile operations which are in most cases away from
the population centers. Besides, our squads are very few for a theatre
stretching almost 700 km. The local forces then concentrate on guarding
population centers and securing the communication infrastructure, especially
roads. However despite our generally mobile posture, there are many cases where
we have positional defenses, as our bases, reinforcing the local forces in the
protection of those centres.[174]

While the Ugandan army does not have primary responsibility
for protecting civilians from LRA attacks, efforts to ensure their security
will be vastly improved if there is greater communication with local
communities and between national armies and UN missions operating in
LRA-affected areas. Appropriate logistical support to protect civilians and
apprehend LRA leaders is also a critical requirement. In February 2010, the
Ugandan government’s Minister of Defence sought an additional US$12.1
million for its military operations against the LRA to cover food, medicine,
wages and ammunition.[175] Since
much of the military spending is classified, it is not known how much, if any,
of this additional funding is being made available to enhance protection of
civilians.

Improving civilian protection, as the Ugandan army claims,
further requires obtaining accurate intelligence about LRA attacks, something
the Ugandan army did not appear to have done in the case of the Makombo
massacre.

In response to Human Rights Watch questions about what
information the Ugandan army had in relation to the massacre, Ugandan Military
Intelligence stated that “not much is known” about the attack
except for information it received from the Congolese army on December 16, 2009
that “the LRA rebels crossed the Uele [River] on 15 Dec 09 into Tapili
village, and killed 02 civilians and 01 FARDC soldier, taking his
firearm.”[176] In
response to this information, the Ugandan army sent out an “intelligence
squad” to where the LRA was suspected of having crossed the river but,
was unable to “get the exact spot where the enemy [the LRA] crossed and
the general direction the enemy took.”[177] A few
days later, on December 22, in a location near Mabanga Ya Talo, the Ugandan
soldiers “found civilians with sketchy information that the enemy generally
crossed through that area.”[178]

Later, on February 28, 2009, Ugandan soldiers rescued two
Congolese children during an attack on the LRA north of Dukuma village.
According to Ugandan Military Intelligence, one of the children had been
abducted at Tapili in December 2009 and told the Ugandan soldiers about other
children and adults abducted and killed in the same incident.[179]

Despite receiving this and other information about the LRA
attack in the Makombo area, Human Rights Watch is not aware of any further
investigation by the Ugandan army into the massacre, nor steps taken to prevent
similar attacks on civilians in the future.

MONUC

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1906 of 2009 and
previous resolutions, MONUC has a mandate to protect civilians throughout Congo, with a specific focus on eastern Congo.[180] With
its attention and resources often directed towards the volatile eastern
provinces of North and South Kivu, where protection of civilians has been an
exceedingly difficult task, minimal resources have been available for the
LRA-affected areas of northern Congo. Following the
2008 Christmas massacres, MONUC increased the number of peacekeepers in Haut
Uele district and enhanced its civilian staff component, including by deploying
a small number of staff working on child protection, human rights and civil
affairs. By March 2010, MONUC had nearly 1,000 peacekeepers deployed in the
area.[181] Although an important increase, the number was still
inadequate to meet the urgent protection needs of the population. An additional
battalion of 800 Tunisian peacekeepers was due to be deployed to LRA-affected
areas in June 2009 but it was redirected to Equateur Province, in western Congo, to help calm an unexpected conflict there.[182] At the time of writing, it is unclear when or if these
peacekeepers or others will be sent to the LRA-affected areas.

MONUC’s activities in
northern Congo are largely set by Operation Rudia II
(“return” in Swahili), a joint initiative with the Congolese army
to contain the LRA and help protect civilians, launched in March 2009 following
the end of Operation Lightning Thunder. The initiative builds on an earlier
operation, known as Rudia I, which ran between September 2008 and March
2009. As part of the joint initiative, MONUC provides food rations and fuel to
Congolese army soldiers as well transport assistance.[183] As with similar support provided to the Congolese army in
the Kivu provinces in 2009, minimal monitoring is in place to track whether the
support reaches the troops on the ground, allowing for misappropriation of the
support and undermining both MONUC and Congolese army efforts to protect
civilians.[184] Apart from a failed operation in January 2006 to capture
Vincent Otti, one of the LRA’s top leaders at the time,[185] MONUC has not engaged in active offensive operations
against the LRA.

MONUC officials were not involved in the planning or
execution of Operation Lightning Thunder in December 2008 and had minimal
coordination with the Ugandan army during the duration of the operation.[186]
When the operation officially ended in March 2009, the Ugandan military base at
Dungu airport was moved to southern Sudan. Although many Ugandan soldiers
remained in northern Congo, no working mechanism was established by either
party, or by the Congolese military, to coordinate efforts to protect
civilians, make maximum use of available logistical resources or to share
intelligence. The military chiefs of staff of the Congolese, Ugandan and CAR
armies together with the MONUC force commander met in July 2009, and, in a
public statement following the meeting, said that the LRA had been
“dramatically reduced” and were “fighting for their
survival.”[187] They
further agreed to enhance intelligence sharing but set out no practical
mechanism for how this would be done. MONUC officials in Haut Uele district in
February 2010 said they did not coordinate with the Ugandan army since it was
not officially on Congolese soil.[188]
Ugandan army officials, in turn, claimed MONUC did little to protect civilians
and hence saw few benefits to coordinating their efforts with the UN mission,
though some added that MONUC’s logistical capacity, such as its
helicopters, could be useful.[189]
Congolese army officials interacted separately with both parties.

MONUC’s response to the Makombo
massacre

With no coordination between the three major military forces
in northern Congo, resources thinly stretched, and limited intelligence on the
location of LRA groups, MONUC was in no position to avert the Makombo massacre.
On December 24, MONUC established a small temporary operating base in Niangara
with 31 Moroccan peacekeepers. The base was established in reaction to concerns
that the LRA might attack Niangara or other towns over the Christmas period, as
they had during the 2008 Christmas period,[190] rather
than reacting to the Makombo attack of which MONUC was still unaware.[191]
Only by late December 2009, did MONUC officials begin to receive information
about a possible large-scale LRA attack around Makombo. MONUC officials told
Human Rights Watch the information was initially sketchy and unconfirmed,[192]
but no immediate efforts were made to follow-up, even though one of the reports
received by MONUC indicated that over 100 civilians had been killed. One
possible explanation for the lack of response was that MONUC’s focus
remained on the Kivu provinces and the rumored LRA attacks on Dungu and other
towns for which troops has been put on high alert.[193]
With many staff away for the Christmas holidays, no decision was made to change
priorities.

On January 20, 2010, a MONUC human rights official arrived
in Niangara for 90 minutes to follow up on the rumors of an LRA attack at
Makombo. Based on the information he received, the official recommended a
special mission to investigate, but none was approved.[194]
On January 26, MONUC received another report from civil society groups, this
time detailing 266 dead in the Makombo area,[195] a
figure that should have triggered a response. MONUC officials later told Human
Rights Watch that without the GPS coordinates for Makombo village it could not
land a helicopter there to conduct investigations[196]
and no concerted efforts were made to find alternatives.

On February 23, March 2, March 5, and March 9, 2010, Human
Rights Watch researchers briefed MONUC staff in Dungu, Goma, and Kinshasa about
the extent of the killings and abductions by the LRA in the Makombo area. On
March 11, nearly 10 weeks after learning about one of the gravest atrocities in
Congo in 2009, MONUC deployed an investigation team to document the killings.

Humanitarian and Child Protection Agencies

There was a notable increase in humanitarian organizations
working in the LRA-affected areas of northern Congo in 2009, yet the response
is still vastly inadequate compared to the scale of the problem. A number of UN
agencies and some 15 international nongovernmental organizations were working
in the region at the time of writing. The lack of communications,
infrastructure, and roads, as well as the concentration of human and other
resources in North and South Kivu provinces of eastern Congo, has made the humanitarian response particularly slow.

Child protection needs are particularly acute. Between June
2009 and January 2010, the UN children’s fund, UNICEF, and its partner
agencies registered 891 children who escaped from the LRA’s captivity,
including 472 in Dungu, 246 in Faradje, and 173 in Doruma. Of those, 43 children
were foreign nationals, mostly from Sudan and CAR.[197]
Many others have escaped in areas where UNICEF and its partner agencies are not
operating, such as in Niangara and Bangadi, and in the more remote villages
outside of the larger population centers. In these areas children who have
escaped the LRA have not been officially registered, received minimal or no assistance
in finding their families, nor have they had access to psychosocial support. In
Bangadi, for example, civil society groups registered 113 children who escaped
from the LRA in 2009, including 54 girls and 59 boys, plus a further five girls
and four boys who escaped in early 2010. While some were able to return to
their families, many are living with host families who do not have the means to
feed and clothe them or pay their school fees.[198]

At this writing, UNICEF had also not yet received funding
for the continuation of its 2010 program in the LRA-affected areas of
northeastern Congo and since January its implementing partners have been
without financing.[199]

Other
UN Bodies

The UN Security Council has retained some focus on the LRA
threat and encouraged greater cooperation between UN missions operating in the
central African region affected by the LRA. On November 17, 2009, the council
issued a press statement condemning the ongoing LRA attacks and calling for
“coordination strategies... for the protection of civilians” among
the UN missions.[200] On December
23, 2009, the Security Council passed Resolution 1906 calling on “the
governments of the Great Lakes region to coordinate their efforts to address
the threat posed by the LRA” and strongly encouraging “enhanced
regular information-sharing... with MONUC and other United Nations Missions in
the areas where the LRA is threatening the population.”[201]
The council specifically called on the UN secretary-general to enhance
cooperation and information-sharing between the various UN missions operating
in the region. While some steps have been taken in this direction, for example
the re-activation of the UN headquarters’ task force on the LRA in late
2009, they are still far from effective.

In December 2009, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights and MONUC published a long-delayed report on the atrocities
committed by the LRA between September 2008 and June 2009. The report called
for any military operations against the LRA to be “reoriented” and
“redefined” in order to better protect civilians and to succeed at
dismantling the LRA.[202]

United States

Following the collapse of the Juba peace process in November
2008, the US government has become the primary international actor supporting
national armed forces in military operations against the LRA. The US military,
through the United States African Command (AFRICOM), provided substantial
support to Operation Lightning Thunder including intelligence, planning,
technical and logistical support.[203] On February 24, 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the US had provided US$6.4 million worth of
support and supplies to militaries in the region. She stated that although the
military operation had unfortunately not led to the result the US government had been seeking, she believed that “[US] support of these operations has helped
to degrade the capacity of the LRA.” She highlighted the importance of
civilian protection and better information and intelligence sharing between the
militaries in the region and the UN missions. In closing she said, “I
have been following the Lord’s Resistance Army for more than 15 years. I
just don’t understand why we cannot end this scourge. And we’re
going to do everything we can to provide support we believe will enable us to
do that.”[204]

US officials have given no timescale for how long they will
continue to support Ugandan military operations against the LRA. In response to
Human Rights Watch, the US State Department on March 22, 2010 said that its
“plans to continue support to counter-LRA operations in Central Africa
are based on Uganda’s willingness to continue the operation, the
continued regional cooperation and support for the operations, and our
assessment of the prospects for success.”[205] General William E. Ward, the US
commander of AFRICOM, in a press conference on January 21, 2010 said that in
his opinion the operation against the LRA worked on an African timescale
“because things don’t happen fast in Africa.”[206]

Members of the US Congress have expressed support for
operations against the LRA, but seek a clear strategy from the Obama
administration on how to end the LRA problem. In May 2009, several senators and
representatives introduced the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and
Northern Uganda Recovery Act.[207] If
passed, the law would require the Obama administration to develop a regional
strategy to protect civilians in central Africa from LRA attacks, “to
apprehend or otherwise remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the
battlefield,” and ensure full humanitarian access in LRA-affected areas. It
further commits the US government to increase support to economic recovery and
transitional justice efforts in Uganda.[208] Since
being introduced, the bill has received broad bipartisan support.[209]
The bill passed the Senate on March 11, 2010, and is currently pending with the
House Foreign Relations Committee.

On January 22, 2010, representatives of civil society in
Dungu, also indicated they were frustrated with the long wait to end the LRA
attacks. In a public memorandum to the Congolese government and the
international community they denounced repeated statements that the LRA threat
is diminishing and pleaded for urgent action to end the LRA’s atrocities.
The memo said:

“We proclaim to the highest level to say STOP to the
atrocities by the Ugandan rebels, the LRA, against civilians in the Uele districts and in Dungu territory in particular. Enough is enough!”[210]

Re: Complaint
against Charles AROP, Commander of the LRA Operation in Faradje

To His
Excellency the Minister of Justice in KINSHASA

Your
Excellency,

We, the disaster-stricken population of Faradje Territory,
submit the aforementioned complaint before your Benevolent Authority.

The arrival of the LRA into Faradje Territory, with its
heinous crimes and indescribable destruction, has led to an unprecedented loss
of human life and material damage.

Your Excellency, this exceedingly disastrous situation has
caused horrible catastrophes of which no one can claim to be unaware, namely:

1.The
loss of human life (kidnappings, killings, etc);

2.Sexual
violence;

3.Pillage
of goods;

4.Burning
and malicious destruction of homes ...

These abuses have resulted in further harmful consequences:
Massive displacement of the civilian population in all directions; homeless
people living in conditions not only difficult, but completely inhuman;
increased food shortage; disruption to children’s schooling; and lack of
access to primary health care, amongst others.

As a result, Your Excellency, the population of Faradje
Territory submits to you this formal complaint against Lt. Col. Charles AROP,
who commanded these violent acts in the said Territory, so that he may be
prosecuted and brought to justice in order that responsibility is determined
and to allow the peaceful population to obtain reparations in accordance with the
material interest of the victims.

We hope we will receive a satisfactory response from you.

Respectfully yours,

FOR THE COORDINATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

IN FARADJE TERRITORY

Mathieu KAMBA TAMARU

President

[Signed by 186 victims and
residents of Faradje]

Acknowledgements

This report was researched and written by a team of
researchers in the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch including Anneke Van
Woudenberg, Ida Sawyer, and Maria Burnett, with additional expertise provided
by Elise Keppler from the International Justice Division. The report was
reviewed and edited by Rona Peligal, deputy director of the Africa Division; Juliane
Kippenberg, senior researcher in the Children’s Rights Division; Andrew
Mawson, deputy program director; and James Ross, legal director at Human Rights
Watch. Rachel Nicholson, associate in the Africa Division, provided invaluable
production assistance and support. Grace Choi, publications director, provided
production coordination. John Emerson designed the maps. Danielle Serres translated
this report into French, and the translation was vetted by Peter Huvos, French
website editor.

Human Rights Watch would like to thank the many courageous
human rights activists and civil society representatives in Haut Uele district for
their invaluable assistance and support. This report would not have been
possible without them. Because of the sensitivity of our research, we regret
that we have to withhold the names of those whose assistance we greatly
appreciated and whose work we admire immensely.

We would also like to thank the eyewitnesses, victims,
officials, and others who agreed to speak to us about their experiences. Their
courage and fortitude in light of the brutal atrocities documented in this
report touched us deeply.

[1]In March 1991, the Ugandan Army launched
“Operation North,” a campaign to eliminate the LRA threat and end
support for the LRA among the local community. Both sides committed abuses
against the civilian population and the campaign failed. For more on abuses
committed during the 1990s, see Human Rights Watch, The Scars of Death:
Children Abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, September
1997, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1997/09/18/scars-death.

[3]After unprecedented
consultations throughout Uganda on accountability and reconciliation, the
parties agreed in February 2008 to establish a special division of the Ugandan
High Court to try war crimes committed during the conflict. This option could
satisfy LRA demands to avoid trial in The Hague, while meeting requirements
under the ICC statute. See Annex to the Agreement on Accountability and
Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the
Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan, June 29, 2007, February 19,
2008, paras. 7, 10-14. For more detailed analysis of the justice issues in the
Juba talks, see Human Rights Watch, Benchmarks for Justice for
Serious Crimes in Northern Uganda, September 2, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/09/01/benchmarks-justice-serious-crimes-northern-uganda.

[4]
The five wanted on arrest warrants are: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot
Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, and Dominic Ongwen. Lukwiya died in 2006 and Otti is
believed to have been killed on the orders of Joseph Kony in late 2007.

[5]“Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court opens an investigation into Northern
Uganda,” ICC press release, July 29, 2004, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20opens%20an%20investigation%20into%20nothern%20uganda
(accessed March 24, 2010). Once the court exercises its jurisdiction, it has
the authority to prosecute crimes by any individual, regardless of affiliation,
provided the crimes were committed after 2002. Despite evidence of serious
abuses by Ugandan army troops, the ICC has not issued warrants for any Ugandan
government officials or military officers.

[6]Human Rights Watch interviews with international analyst
and diplomats, Kampala, January 20 and 23, 2009.

[12]
President Joseph Kabila, Address to the Nation, December 7, 2009. “LRA is history, says President Museveni,” State House Online, February 2, 2009,
http://www.statehouse.go.ug/news.php?catId=1&item=457 (accessed March 24,
2010); “Ugandan President says Rebel Chief is Likely in Darfur,”
Agence France-Presse, March 13, 2010.

[16]
Military experts estimate four UPDF battalions are based in northern Congo. Human Rights Watch interviews with Congolese and international military experts, and
UN officials, northern and eastern Congo, February 19-28, 2010, and the United
States, March 18, 2010.

[17]
General Summary of the Achievements Against the LRA, December 14, 2008-February 22, 2010. Records obtained from the Ugandan Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence, Kampala, February, 26, 2010. On file at Human Rights Watch.

[19]Human Rights Watch interviews with Ugandan and UN military
officials, northern and eastern Congo, February 19-28, 2010; Human
Rights Watch interview with former LRA combatants who surrendered in late
December 2009, Goma, March 16, 2010.

[21]
In DRC, the LRA mostly operate in the areas north of
Dungu around Duru towards the border with
Sudan; north of the Uele River around Bangadi, Ngilima, and Diagbe; and in Ango
Territory (Bas Uele) around Banda and Dakwa. Human Rights Watch interviews with
Ugandan army officer, Haut Uele, February 2010; Congolese army officer, Haut
Uele, February 2010; and UN official, February 28, 2010.

[24]Other major massacres by
the LRA include Lamwo, in Kitgum territory (northern Uganda), January 1994; Barlonyo
displacement camp, Lira district (northern Uganda), February 21, 2004; Atiak
town, Gulu district (northern Uganda), April 20; 1995; and Doruma area (DRC),
December 24-29, 2008. There were also reports of killings by the LRA in the Imotong Mountains of Eastern Equatoria (southern Sudan) in June 2002 that have yet to be fully
documented.

[25]
Registration list of those killed by the LRA during the Makombo massacre
prepared by local human rights activist, March 2010. On file at Human Rights
Watch. The work of registering the dead continues.

[26]Human Rights Watch interviews with witnesses who
took the route days and weeks after the massacre, Niangara, February 18 and 19,
and Tapili, February 20, 2010.

[27]
Lt. Col. Binansio Okumu, aka Binany. He may also be called Vincent Okumu. Witnesses
also said that he referred to himself as “Captain Joseph.”

[28]
Ugandan and Congolese army officers told Human Rights Watch that the LRA took
uniforms from soldiers who had been killed in battle or were stolen. In some
cases the LRA may have bought the uniforms. Human Rights Watch interviews, Haut
Uele, February 20 and 23, 2010.

[29]
Human Rights Watch interviews with 35 witnesses and victims of the Makombo
massacre–including those who were captured but later escaped from the
LRA, Niangara, Tapili, Bangadi, and Dungu, February 19-25, 2010.

[30]
The Makombo area is largely populated by people from the Mangbetu tribe who
speak both Mangbetu and Lingala.

[31]
Children held by the LRA for many months, who later escaped, told Human Rights
Watch that a common language used by the LRA commanders operating in Congo was Acholi, the northern Ugandan language of LRA’s original territory. A number
of these children had learned to speak Acholi. Human Rights Watch interview
with children who escaped the LRA, Bangadi and Dungu, February 22 and 24, 2010.

[32]
LRA spokespeople frequently dismiss claims of attacks on civilians by the
group, claiming that other groups pose as the LRA in order to give them a bad
name. See Human Rights Watch, The Christmas Massacres, p. 46.

[33]
Human Rights Watch interviews with 46 witnesses and abductees taken during the
Makombo operation, Niangara and Tapili, February 19 and 20, 2010.

[34]
Human Rights Watch interview with military sources, Bangadi, February 22, 2010
and former abductees, Bangadi and Dungu, February 22 and February 24, 2010.

[69]
Congolese army soldiers assisted in the burial of 36 bodies. Of these, 17 were
bodies found at Mabanga Ya Talo on December 18. A further 19 bodies were found
on January 4, including three bodies found in a village near Makombo, four
bodies in Makombo, three bodies at Kilometer 14 (between Tapili and Mangada),
and a further nine bodies at Kilometer 18 (between Tapili and Mangada). Human
Rights Watch interview, FARDC soldiers present at the burials, February 20,
2010.

[70]
Human Rights Watch interviews with five persons who helped to bury the dead
including local authorities; with family members who buried their loved ones;
and with FARDC soldiers present at other burials, Niangara and Tapili, February
19 and 20, 2010.

[71]
Human Rights Watch interviews with those who escaped the LRA, Tapili, Bangadi
and Dungu, February 20, 22, and 24, 2010.

[72]
“List of Escapees,” registered by the FARDC,
Bangadi, February 23, 2010. On file at Human Rights Watch.

[73]Human Rights Watch interviews with FARDC soldiers present at
Mabanga Ya Talo, February 20, 2010. On December 16, witnesses in
Niangara saw Ugandan soldiers marching through the town in the direction of
Makombo and Tapili, Human Rights Watch interview with witness,
Niangara, February 19 and 20, 2010.

[74]In an interview with Human Rights Watch, a FARDC officer
claimed that the FARDC arrived in Mabanga Ya Talo on December 15. Human Rights
Watch researchers discounted this claim since the FARDC had no vehicles, were
on foot, and had to cover a distance of 62 kilometers from Niangara. The
population in Mabanga Ya Talo and other villages confirmed to Human Rights
Watch that the FARDC arrived on December 18, 2009. Human Rights Watch interviews, Niangara, February 19, 2010.

[101]
Human Rights Watch interviews with Ugandan and Congolese military experts, Haut
Uele, February 21 , 22 and 23, 2010; Human Rights Watch interviews with
children and adults held by the LRA who later escaped, Tapili, February 20;
Bangadi, February 22; and Dungu, February 24, 2010.

[102]
Human Rights Watch interviews with Ugandan and Congolese military experts, Haut
Uele, February 21, 22 and 23, 2010. Official communications between Human
Rights Watch and the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, Kampala, March 17, 2010.

[104]The same sources also reported that the following commanders
continue to operate in DRC: Major Ocen, Major David Lakwo, and Commander
Kidega, amongst others. Human Rights Watch interviews with Ugandan and
Congolese military experts, Haut Uele, February 21, 22 and 23, 2010. Children held by the LRA abducted at Makombo and Tapili also
described another commander who they called “Bukwara.” Human Rights
Watch interviews with children abducted by the LRA who later escaped,
Tapili, February 20, 2010.

[105]
Human Rights Watch interviews with children held by the LRA who later escaped,
Tapili, February 20, Bangadi, February 22, Dungu, February 24, 2010.

[106]
Human Rights Watch interviews with children and adults held by the LRA who
later escaped, Bangadi, February 22, and Dungu, February 24, 2010.

[107]
Human Rights Watch interviews with children and adults held by the LRA who
later escaped, Tapili, February 20, and Bangadi, February 22, 2010.

[108]
Human Rights Watch interviews with children and adults held by the LRA who
later escaped, Tapili, February 20; Bangadi, February 22; and Dungu, February
24, 2010.

[110]
Human Rights Watch interviews with children and adults held by the LRA who
later escaped, Bangadi, February 22, and Dungu, February 24, 2010. Human Rights
Watch interviews with Ugandan military officers, Haut Uele, February, 2010.

[111]
Human Rights Watch interviews with dozens of witnesses and abductees taken
during the Makombo operation, Niangara and Tapili, February 19 and 20, 2010.

[113]Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, entered into force December
7, 1978. DRC ratified Protocol II in December 2002.

[114]Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, G.A. Res. 54/263,
Annex I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000),
entered into force February 12, 2002. The optional protocol defines children as
all persons under age 18. The DRC ratified the optional protocol in November
2001.

[115]
See generally International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[118] See Rodney Dixon, “Crimes against
humanity,” in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), p. 122. This is the standard applied by
article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force
July 1, 2002.

[119]Murder and torture are among the core offenses that
have been included within the definition of crimes against humanity at least
since the adoption of the charter establishing the Nuremberg tribunal after
World War II. Deportation (to another country) was listed but not (internal)
forced transfer. Rape was not explicitly included in the charter’s
definition of crimes against humanity in article 6(c), although it could be
derived from that definition’s general prohibition against “other
inhumane acts.” This ambiguity has been resolved in recent years; the
statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as the Rome Statute, all explicitly include rape in the list of
enumerated offenses that can constitute crimes against humanity. The Rome
Statute also lists: extermination, enslavement, deportation, and forcible
transfer of population, imprisonment, persecution, enforced disappearance,
apartheid, and “other inhumane acts.” Rome Statute, article 7(1).

[121] See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTY, Case No.
IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Trial Chamber), May 7, 1997, para. 646 (“it is now well established that…the acts…can…occur on either
a widespread basis or in a systematic manner. Either one of these is sufficient
to exclude isolated or random acts.”).

[127]See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, ICTY, Case No.
IT-95-14-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber), March 3, 2000, para. 257. Blaskic (paras. 258-259) listed factors from which could be inferred knowledge of the
context: (a) the historical and political circumstances in which the acts of
violence occurred; (b) the functions of the accused when the crimes were
committed; (c) his responsibilities within the political or military hierarchy;
(d) the direct and indirect relationship between the political and military
hierarchy; (e) the scope and gravity of the acts perpetrated; and (f) the
nature of the crimes committed and the degree to which they are common
knowledge.

[128]
Rome Statute, ratified by the Democratic Republic of Congo on September 8, 2000
and by Uganda on June 14, 2002, art. 5.

[129]“Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court opens an investigation into Northern Uganda,” ICC press release,
July 29, 2004, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20opens%20an%20investigation%20into%20nothern%20uganda?lan=en-GB.
Once the court exercises itsjurisdiction,
it has the authority to prosecute crimes by any individual, regardless of
affiliation, provided the crimes were committed after 2002.

[130]“Prosecutor receives referral of the
situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” ICC press release, April
19, 2004, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/prosecutor%20receives%20referral%20of%20the%20situation%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo
(accessed March 25, 2010).

[136]
Only one LRA member is currently awaiting trial. Col. Thomas Kwoyelo Latoni,
who was captured by the Ugandan army in Congo on February 3, 2009, was charged on June 3, 2009, with 12 counts of murder with intent to kidnap stemming from
incidents in 1994 and 1996. Chris Ocowun, “LRA’s Kwoyelo charged with kidnap,”The New
Vision (Kampala), June 4, 2009. Kwoyelo was held in unclear legal
circumstances from February to June 2009. Ugandan authorities stated he was
held as a prisoner of war, but Uganda has no domestic definition of such a
legal status. He was not charged for any crimes committed in Congo. According to the Amnesty Commission, mandated to manage the amnesty process, Kwoyelo
has applied for amnesty but to date no determination has been made. Human
Rights Watch interview with Amnesty Commission official, March 16, 2010.

[137]
Human Rights Centre (University of California, Berkeley), International Center
for Transitional Justice and Payson Center for International Development
(Tulane University), “Living with Fear: A
Population Based survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social
Reconstruction in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” August 2008, http://hrc.berkeley.edu/pdfs/LivingWithFear-DRC.pdf
(accessed March 15, 2010).

[138]Letter to the Congolese Minister of Justice and
Human Rights from Faradje Civil Society, Formal complaint against LRA Commander
Charles Arop, March 13, 2010. On file at Human Rights Watch.

[144]
Ibid. International humanitarian law rejects the so-called “Nuremberg defense,” unsuccessfully used by Nazi war criminals after the Second World
War. Obeying a superior’s order does not relieve a subordinate of
criminal responsibility if the subordinate knew or should have known that the
act ordered was unlawful. See, for example, Rome Statute, article 33.

[147]Draft legislation
implementing the Rome Statute of the ICC currently before parliament vests the
civilian courts with the jurisdiction to try ICC crimes. However, the civilian
justice system has its own shortcomings and lacks expertise in trying these
crimes compared to the military justice system. For further information see
Human Rights Watch, Soldiers who Rape, Commanders who Condone: Sexual
Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo, July 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/07/16/soldiers-who-rape-commanders-who-condone-0;
Human Rights Watch, Discussion paper: A “mixed
chamber” for Congo?, September 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11/19/mixed-chamber-congo.

[148]Annex to the Agreement on Accountability and
Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's
Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan, June 29, 2007, February 19, 2008.

[149]
As of this writing, it could not be confirmed which draft text of the ICC bill
was considered and approved by parliament with amendments on March 10, 2010.
There have been several versions of the bill. It is our understanding that the
provisions for the exercise of jurisdiction for crimes committed outside Uganda were included in the different versions considered. See International Criminal Court
Bill, 2006 (draft), International Crimes Bill of 2009 (draft) and Report of the
Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on the International Criminal
Court Bill, 2006 stating amendments. On file at Human Rights Watch. The
president must sign the bill before it becomes law.

[151]
President Joseph Kabila, Address to the Nation, December 7, 2009. “LRA is history, says President Museveni,” State House Online, February 2, 2009,
http://www.statehouse.go.ug/news.php?catId=1&item=457 (accessed March 24,
2010); “Ugandan President says Rebel Chief is Likely in Darfur,”
Agence France-Presse, March 13, 2010.

[157]
Human Rights Watch has interviewed several wounded civilians and former
abductees who said that while they were escaping the LRA, they eventually found
Congolese army soldiers who escorted them to health centers or the nearest
town, sometimes by transporting them on their bicycles.

[158]Human Rights Watch interviews with civil society and other
officials in Niangara, February 19 and 20, 2010.

[164]
Human Rights Watch interview with civil society representative, Bangadi,
February 21, 2010; Human Rights Watch interview with witness to one murder,
Bangadi, February 22, 2010. List of civilians killed in the Bangadi area,
compiled by local civil society representatives, received February 23, 2010, on file at Human Rights Watch. Those killed included a man killed in Bangadi on
February 22, a man killed in Kana on February 28, a man and his child killed in
August 2009 near Bangadi, a 35-year-old man shot dead in Kombali on March 27,
and a 38-year-old man and a 19-year-old man shot dead three kilometers from
Diagbe on the road towards Doruma on May 17, 2009. Human Rights Watch could not
independently confirm each incident.

[171]
This figure was neither confirmed nor denied by the Ugandan military. Military
experts estimate four UPDF battalions are based in northern Congo. Human Rights Watch interviews with Congolese and international military experts, and UN
officials, northern and eastern Congo, February 19-28, and the United States,
March 18, 2010.

[172]
Official communications between Human Rights Watch and the Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence, Kampala, March 17, 2010.

[173]
The forced regroupment by the Ugandan government of almost 1.7 million
civilians into camps in northern Uganda with little or no protection during the
LRA conflict was disastrous for civilians, increased their suffering and
violated international protocols. See Human Rights Watch,
Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda, July 14, 2003,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/07/14/abducted-and-abused-0.

[174]
Official communications between Human Rights Watch and the Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence, Kampala, March 17, 2010.

[181]By late
December 2009, MONUC troops were deployed in Dungu, Duru, Dingila, Faradje,
Niangara, Bangadi, and Ngilima towns. The peacekeepers were mostly Moroccan
infantry with some Indonesian engineers and Bangladeshi air force personnel.

[183]MONUC’s support to the Congolese army consists
of 19 tons of food rations plus 660 liters of fuel each week. The support is
calculated to assist 5,250 soldiers, though the number of Congolese army
soldiers in the area is said to be far fewer. Human Rights Watch
interview with UN official, Dungu, February 25, 2010. Human Rights Watch has also seen an official document detailing the food and fuel support. Notes on
file at Human Rights Watch.

[202]
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and MONUC, “Summary of fact finding missions on alleged
human rights violations committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in
the districts of Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé in
Orientale province of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Special Report,
December 2009.

[203]Human Rights Watch
interviews with international analyst and diplomats, Kampala, January 20 and
23, 2009. “U.S. Military Helped Plan and Pay for Attack on Ugandan
Rebels,” New York Times, February 7, 2009.

[204]
Testimony of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, February 24, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/02/137256.htm.

[205]Electronic communication between Human Rights Watch and
the US State Department, March 22, 2010. On file at Human Rights Watch.