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Western in the Hartford Courant on Iraq, "Baghdad or Bust"

This op-ed ran in the Hartford Courant on
Tuesday, September 10, 2002.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President
Bush and his advisers concluded that although the United States
would win a military showdown with Iraq, there was a range of
uncertainty associated with war that could quickly and
unpredictably escalate the costs.

As a result, the first Bush administration decided that
developing a U.S.-led multinational coalition was the best strategy
to manage the potential risks. First, the multinational coalition
gave the effort full international legitimacy, which greatly aided
in constraining and marginalizing opposition to the war -
especially in the Arab world. Second, it allowed for greater
strategic and tactical flexibility, thereby enabling military
planners to minimize the risk not only to coalition forces, but
also to Iraqi civilian populations. Finally, the multinational
coalition gave the war a legitimacy that helped President Bush
secure widespread American public and congressional support.

This administration's planning and posturing on Iraq, however,
has taken a decisively different tack. It is motivated by a
hard-line unilateralist ideology that is so hyper-focused on Saddam
as a threat that it has been unwilling and unable to consider the
range of uncertainty or the potential costs of going to war. In
this sense, the current war planning is reminiscent of the
ideologically motivated wishful thinking that dominated American
planning in Vietnam: The administration and the war hawk pundits
simply believe this war will be quick, decisive and easy.

This optimism is dangerous. It is largely speculative, and it
obscures very real risks.

For example, in response to concerns that an American attack
could be destabilizing throughout the Middle East, administration
officials proclaim that "Saddam's neighbors want to see him removed
more than we do." Vice President Cheney recently suggested that the
"Arab street" will be dancing with joy when American forces
liberate Baghdad. Not only is the vice president asserting
something that no one can predict with any degree of confidence, he
and others in the administration are dismissing any consideration
of alternative scenarios. If the war becomes difficult, if there
are any military setbacks or if Iraqi civilian death counts
increase - all unknowns - the risks of broader instability within
the "Arab street" could increase exponentially. This instability
could pose a threat to regimes throughout the Arab world and create
global economic and political turmoil.

In addition, the administration believes that it can fight this
war without active participation by others. But if American troops
have to pursue Iraqi troops into civilian areas a likely scenario
as Saddam fights to defend his regime - American troops could well
face opposition from hostile civilian populations. Without allies
participating in the fight, video footage of American troops (and
only American troops) exchanging gunfire with armed civilians or
pictures of dead Iraqi children could dramatically alter the
international political balance.

This could have dramatic consequences at home as well. Public
opinion polls suggest that Americans generally are supportive of
"regime change" in Iraq, but it is clear that the public believes
the administration that this war will be relatively cost-free. If
hundreds or thousands of American troops are killed, if Iraqi
civilians die in large numbers and if the world seems united
against us, American public opinion could quickly turn. Worse, like
in Vietnam, war in Iraq could rip apart the American public.

Deploying a massive army to fight a war on the other side of the
globe is a perilous enterprise that defies absolute predictions. It
is dangerous to think otherwise. Planning for war requires
strategies for fighting and for managing the potential range of
costs. On Iraq, this almost certainly requires enlisting the active
support of others.

If this war becomes difficult, we may find ourselves needlessly
revisiting much of the Vietnam-era trauma and finding ourselves in
a long and bloody fight. That's an awfully big chance to take -
especially when there is no immediate imperative in the threat
posed by Saddam and plenty of time to develop a more comprehensive
strategy.

Jon Western is a professor of international relations at Mount
Holyoke College in South Hadley, Mass. He served as an intelligence
analyst at the State Department from 1990 to 1993.