The following summarizes and reviews the current state of our contingency
planning for the possible outbreak of hostilities between India and
Pakistan.

I. The Prospects (pp. 1-2)

U.S. actions in the event of another Indo-Pak war would in part be conditioned by the circumstances
in which the hostilities broke out. The most likely scenarios are:

—An Indian military attack on Pakistan or direct Indian support for a
major insurgent effort to seize and hold a portion of East Pakistan.

—A gradual process of escalation involving incidents along the East
Pakistan-India border with confusion as to who is most at fault.

—Conceivably but less likely, the Pakistanis initiate hostilities by
attacking guerrilla sanctuaries in India and/or Indian military support
bases.

[—West Pakistanis, either to divert Indian attention or to demonstrate
Indian vulnerability, attempt to stir up trouble in India-held Kashmir
and/or along the Kashmir cease-fire line. As in 1965, the situation
rapidly escalates to full scale hostilities. The State paper does not
include this possibility but it seems real enough to be considered since
from a Pak point of view Kashmir is
India's most vulnerable point.]

Hostilities would probably initially involve only India and Pakistan.
However, there is real danger that (1) China would get involved by
provoking border incidents along the Indian Himalayan frontier in order
to ease pressure on
Pakistan; and (2) the Soviet Union would aid India, short of direct
military intervention.

II. U. S. Interests (p. 3)

Should war break out between India and Pakistan it would be in the U.S.
interest that:

—the hostilities not expand to include third parties, particularly China
(and the Soviets).

—to see that hostilities are not protracted since a prolonged war could
do profound damage to the political, economic and social fabric of India
and Pakistan.

Thus, the paper concludes, U.S. interests would be best served by an
early end to the conflict and by negotiations among all parties leading
to a withdrawal of Indian troops and an overall political
settlement.

III. Options in the Event of Hostilities (pp. 3-16)

The U.S., according to the paper, could pursue one of the following three
broad strategies in the event of hostilities between India and
Pakistan:

A. Passive International Role (pp. 4-6): The U.S. would assume a
"relatively passive" (or inactive) posture indicating our basic
neutrality. Such a role might be particularly appropriate in
circumstances where (a) responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities
was unclear, (b) the likelihood of Chinese involvement was judged to be
small and (c) the conflict appeared likely to be of short duration. In
pursuance of this strategy, we would:

—adopt a public position that we did not intend to become directly
involved and would not provide assistance to either side;

—support but not initiate efforts in the Security Council to end
hostilities and achieve a negotiated settlement;

—suspension of all economic and military aid to both sides;

—offer good offices to both Yahya and Mrs. Gandhi to arrange negotiations for a political
settlement;

—consult closely with Soviets and British;

—caution the Chinese and Soviets against involvement (presumably only if
they seemed to be heading in that direction).

The argument for is that U. S. involvement would be at a minimum and we
would maintain maximum flexibility as events unfolded. Also, an interim
relationship with both India and Pakistan would be preserved. (As long
as the Chinese stayed out and refrained from adopting a menacing posture
toward India, there would be a hope for maintaining our own relationship
with them.)

The arguments against are that (1) we would risk serious damage to our
interests if the conflict were protracted. Indian dependence on the
Soviets and Pakistani dependence on the Chinese could be increased
without any significant gain for the U.S.; (2) Cautioning the Chinese
could damage Sino-American relations; and (3) neutrality in general
could appear as de facto US opposition to
the aggrieved party.

B. Military Support (pp. 6-10): At the other extreme would be a decision
to support one side with military assistance. We have limited
commitments to both which they might seek to invoke (through SEATO and CENTO with Pakistan and through the 1963 Air Defense
Agreement with India) — although there are no provisions for automatic
U.S. involvement and these are, practically speaking, dead letters.

1. To Pakistan. (pp. 6-8) In the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan,
the Paks might well turn to us as they
did in 1965. Short of providing U. S. combat personnel, we could:

—develop an emergency military supply program;

—terminate all U.S. programs in India;

—take the lead in mobilizing international pressure on India to halt its
intervention;

—support a Security Council resolution condemning India.

The argument for is we would be supporting Pakistan's national unity,
diminishing Chinese influence (and marginally improve Sino-American
ties), and strengthening our position elsewhere in the Muslim world.

The argument against is that U.S. interests in and relations with India
would be damaged and the Soviets would gain ground there. Moreover, our
actions would probably have little effect on the military outcome of the
conflict and there would be no basis left for a conciliatory U.S.
role.

2. To India. (pp. 8-10) If India were not the initiator of hostilities,
this contingency could arise. If China were to intervene massively on
Pakistan's side and seemed to threaten India in a major way we might
want to consider providing military assistance to India. Short of
providing combat personnel the U.S. might:

—offer to consult with India under the 1963 Air Defense Agreement;

—develop an emergency military assistance program focussed primarily on
meeting the Chinese threat;

—share intelligence on Chinese military deployments;

—coordinate with the British and the Soviets on additional assistance
measures.

The argument for is that it would be consistent with our overall Asian
policy of assisting states threatened by external aggression and would
at the expense of the
Soviets create a firm basis for a future close relationship with India
and with the possible future state of Bangla Desh.

The argument against is that very severe strains would be created in our
relations with Pakistan and, more importantly, with China. There would
also be the risk of creeping involvement leading to a more extensive
commitment involving a direct U.S. confrontation with outside powers
(China).

C. Political Intervention (pp. 10-16): Going beyond assuming a relatively
neutral political posture (Option A) and short of intervening with
military assistance to one side (Option B), we could intervene
politically. The main purpose of an activist political role would be to
first localize the hostilities and then work for a settlement which
would remove the basic causes of the fighting.

Immediately upon the outbreak of war we could:

—call for a UN Security Council meeting
and support a demand for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations
between the parties;

—support any UN direct initiative in Delhi
and Islamabad;

—support UN peace-keeping efforts;

—send Presidential messages to Yahya and Mrs. Gandhi calling for an end to the fighting and a
negotiated settlement; notify the parties of aid suspension;

—engage in immediate talks with the Soviets and British on ways to end
the hostilities;

—privately and publicly urge restraint on the Chinese (and if possible
engage them also in the peace-making effort);

—explore the possibilities for an international conference to bring about
(and guarantee) a political and military settlement;

—limit other countries' involvement by discouraging transfer of US equipment to Pakistan by Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, etc; [We would not pursue this if India
initiated hostilities and we decided to reopen the pipeline to
Pakistan.]

If hostilities have broken out because of an Indian attack or because of
Indian support to the Bengali insurgents we should also:

—after carefully assessing the likelihood on a Chinese attack on India,
move to terminate our residual military sales program for India;

—Bold up on all shipments and licenses of military supplies destined for
India;

—hold economic assistance to India in abeyance at least for the duration
of the hostilities.

If the circumstances of the outbreak of hostilities were thoroughly
ambiguous then we should also:

—publicly suspend military supply to both countries;

—consider suspending economic assistance to both sides;

—urge other major arms supplying countries (Soviets, Chinese, British and
French) to suspend arms shipments to both sides.

—take action in the India and Pak
consortia to urge international economic pressure on both.

The arguments for include:

—would provide maximum U.S. flexibility in a complex situation and
maximize the use of international organizations and multi-lateral
diplomacy;

—would maximize use of U. S. programs and influence to shorten
hostilities and inhibit external military intervention;

—would contribute directly to a realistic political settlement;

—would increase chances for U.S. to maintain relations with both India
and Pakistan (and perhaps even Bangla Desh) in the aftermath of
hostilities;

—might create conditions in which the US
and USSR (and possibly China) could
cooperate fully in a common political and peace-making role.

The arguments against include:

—since the real effect of this policy would be felt on the invader
(probably India), a heavy, perhaps unbearable, strain would be placed on
our relations with India;

—at the same time the Paks could also
feel sold out;

—might not succeed in shortening hostilities and could strain our
relations with others whose involvement we are trying to discourage.

1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 11/12/71.
Secret; Exdis. The summary was
attached to and summarized an undated paper that outlined
contingency planning in the event of an outbreak of war between
India and Pakistan. Neither the contingency paper nor the analytical
summary have drafting information, but the former was apparently
drafted in the Department of State and the summary was prepared by
the NSC staff. Samuel Hoskinson and Richard Kennedy probably drafted
the summary, which they forwarded with the contingency paper to
Kissinger on November 11
under a covering memorandum for use by the Washington Special
Actions Group at their November 12 meeting. (Ibid)