The generals strike

Thailand's move from the ranks of constitutional monarchies to military dictatorship has been sudden, well-executed and dismaying to those who hoped the country might overcome its severe problems through constitutional means. The prime ministership of Thaksin Shinawatra, a nationalist oligarch who ran the country as if it was his own private business and roused support from his rural powerbase through a well-funded appeal to patriotism, has been decaying for months. His rule did not serve the country well and he should have remained out of office after leaving it briefly following the country's confused general election earlier this year. Instead Thaksin persisted, driven by a mix of arrogance and greed, in the face of opposition in the country's main cities and from many of its established institutions, including the army and the monarchy.

These forces came together in a coup that had the tacit endorsement of the king and which has so far proved both bloodless and popular, at least in Bangkok. Adrift in London and facing the threat of prosecution, Thaksin is now unlikely to return to power, something which will not trouble most Thai democrats. But the manner of his removal pollutes the country's claim to be emerging as one of the world's developed democracies. It is a throwback to a time when the king and his army saw themselves as the guarantors of national stability. Democratic institutions, including parliament, the courts and the constitution, have turned out to have shallow roots, ripped out with ease by the tanks and troops which appeared on the streets of Bangkok. Promises of a return to civilian rule and elections within the next year are no substitute for a political system resilient enough to renew itself without the need to call on the army.

Blame for the crisis lies at Thaksin's door, not just because of the way he profited from his power but because of his systematic undermining of national order. This was most explicit in the south of Thailand, partly Muslim and witness to growing violence, where Thaksin's bull-headed confrontation made the situation worse. The coup leader and army chief, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who is Muslim, has called for a different approach, and military and royal concern about Thaksin's record in the south was a factor in his downfall. The opposition Democrat party, which can expect to gain from this week's events, is strong in that part of the country.

But however dubious his record, Thaksin retained the affection of many Thais, especially those who have not profited from the country's breakneck pace of development over the past two decades. The fact that his opponents had to wait for the military to remove him, rather than trust in a second general election which might have taken place before the end of the year, is a sign of this. Opposition democrats who took to the streets in Bangkok earlier this year rather than engage in the first election are also partly responsible for prompting this week's events. However well-intentioned, they too helped destabilise the country.

Without Thaksin's presence and his money, his Thai Rak Thai party is likely to fall apart. It remains to be seen whether he is confident enough to return to Bangkok: the failure of any part of the army to back him suggests he will not. Ultimate authority rests with the Thai king, who has proved his democratic sympathies in past coups and who is likely to hold the army to its promises this time. But he is ageing and increasingly unwell. In the long-term, Thais will not be able to rely upon his presence to untangle the country's political difficulties. The king's son and heir does not appear to have his father's wisdom. The country needs to build democratic institutions that are strong enough to ensure that Thailand's 18th military coup since becoming a constitutional monarchy in 1932 is also the country's last.