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This case centers around the shareholder dispute between three major shareholders of Turkcell, and how its management vied against increasing regulatory intervention and market competition in the absence of a fully-functioning board. The battle for control of the Turkish telecom giant led to several years in which the company could not hold annual shareholder meetings, renew its board of directors, or pay dividends, and lacked a board-approved operating budget. Nevertheless, it maintained its majority market share and was the only telecom player with positive EBITDA in the market. What were the implications of this dispute for Turkcell's broad ambitions? How would the continuing battle affect management, talent, and the company's financial performance?

Market imperfections are central to understanding the mechanisms that permit firms to capture value. Through competition, leading firms often reduce these imperfections, making markets more efficient. The remaining imperfections become a primary impetus for government intervention. Hence, understanding residual market imperfections—those imperfections that persist after market competition and regulation are accounted for—must undergird any assessment of the long-term attractiveness of firm strategies. Our proposed framework provides an integrated view of competition and government intervention, two of the principal forces that influence variation in firm profitability.