The vast majority of literature since the 2001 US-led multinational
military operation has focused on the role of the global powers in
Afghanistan. However, it is important to also discuss what interests
Central Asian states have in the country, since the view from Astana or
Tashkent is not that of a far-away government, but a neighbor with which
Afghanistan has strong cultural, geographic (it borders Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and political ties.

Central Asia-Afghanistan relations is a fairly complex topic, and fortunately new analyses have been published in recent years that discuss this issue in greater detail. Hence, for the sake of brevity, we will focus on recent developments.
Generally speaking, all Central Asian states have carried out some
type of initiative to aid the development of Afghanistan. Some recent
examples include:

Kazakhstan. Astana is very interested in educating Afghan youths so they can return to their homeland and help their nation develop. According to The Astana Times:
“since 2010, Kazakhstan has implemented a $50 million educational
program for Afghan citizens. Under the program, about 1,000 Afghan
citizens will receive professional training from 2010 to 2021.” In July
of this year, 53 Afghan students graduated, including surgeons, obstetricians, and pediatricians, from a Kazakh university. Astana has also separately called for a peace process in Afghanistan.

Kyrgyzstan. A considerable amount of ethnic Kyrgyz live in Afghanistan, particularly in the mountainous Wakhan Corridor,
and there have been meetings recently between the two governments
regarding their protection. Additionally, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan are
two of the four countries that form the joint Central Asia-South Asia energy project commonly known as CASA-1000.

Tajikistan. In mid-June, Dushanbe pledged to increase power exports to Afghanistan. According
to Azernews, “in 2017 Tajikistan supplied about 1.4 billion kWh of
electricity to Afghanistan. This year it plans to increase this figure
to 1.5 billion kWh.” Tajikistan is also part of the CASA-1000 project.
Even more, in a sign of Kabul’s willingness to further improve relations
with its direct neighbor, the Afghan government has extradited four supporters of the late Tajik rebel general Abduhalim Nazarzoda.

Turkmenistan. The two countries are
part of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas
pipeline, which would provide Ashgabat a corridor to increase its
exports. The first three aforementioned countries are also part of a
different energy project, TAP, which will “transmit 500 kilovolts of power from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan.” Finally, in December 2017, a MoU was signed to improve railway infrastructure between the two countries in order to help Afghan products reach new markets.

Uzbekistan. Tashkent is attempting to
mediate between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In December 2017,
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Tashkent; months later, in March,
Uzbekistan held a peace conference (which the Taliban skipped), and offered
its services to mediate between the Taliban and Kabul once again in
June. Additionally, Tashkent appears to be committed to promoting Afghan
development: in early July, Uzbekistan pledged
to “invest $500 million into the construction of railway tracks from
Mazar-i-Sharif city to Herat province.” Finally, there have been talks
recently about creating a free trade zone between the two states to
promote trade and development (bilateral trade in 2017 reached US$ 350 million).

The common denominators among Central Asian interests regarding
Afghanistan are stability and prosperity. By this we mean that regional
governments do not want the Taliban to return to power – a worrisome
possibility as the group has regained control of several provinces – since this might contribute to radicalism spreading throughout the region.

For the sake of argument, it is important to note that Central Asia
analysts have somewhat differing positions regarding how much of a
threat the Taliban and/or the so-called Islamic State present to the region. For example, a 2014 report
by the AAN argues that “security risks that link Afghanistan to the
former Soviet republics of Central Asia are often highly exaggerated” as
“in Central Asia the main players in narcotics trafficking are
government employees, security officers, and mafia figures,” while
insurgents tend to be more often local rather than originating in
Afghanistan.

Thus, the activities of Afghanistan-based violent extremists continue
to get closer to the three bordering Central Asian states, making a
spread of violence a valid possibility. Central Asia has already seen
its share of conflict since gaining independence from the Soviet Union,
such as the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) and Uzbekistan’s clashes with
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, whose remaining fighters have sworn
loyalty to the Taliban (though some other Uzbek nationals have joined
the IS branch in Khorasan province). Thus, it is a national security
interest for Central Asian governments to not only help Afghanistan
defeat the Taliban and other insurgent movements, but also to promote
the country’s development and prosperity in order to prevent new groups
from appearing.

Projects like CASA-1000, TAPI and TAP are good examples of Central
Asia providing Afghanistan with much needed energy, and we will have to
monitor whether any of these projects become operational in the near
future. On the other hand, it is debatable how much Central Asia can
actually profit from the Afghan market, as China, Europe, and Russia are
more desirable and lucrative targets. Afghanistan could serve as a
corridor for Uzbek, Tajik, and/or Turkmen products to reach India and
Pakistan, but this will depend on the construction of better roads and
railways in Afghanistan, not to mention the resolution of lingering
security issues.

Additionally, Central Asian states have much to gain from peace in
Afghanistan because it will mean the protection of ethnic minorities who
live there (and who in turn may become – or already are – influential
players in Afghan politics). For example, a July commentary in The Diplomat
explains, “if Tashkent can play a role in convincing some members of
the Taliban to come to the bargaining table, Uzbekistan’s status as a
regional mediator will increase greatly.” Astana has similarly attempted
to promote dialogue, but it seems that the Afghan conflict is so
complex, given the various players and interests involved, that it’s
unlikely that any peace process will bear fruit anytime soon.

Final Thoughts
Rather than a top-down or bottom-up approach, Central Asian
initiatives towards Afghanistan are all over the place, hinting at a
lack of coordination among these governments regarding how to handle
their neighbor. The lack of a regional blueprint (the Istanbul Process
notwithstanding) and the lack of any desire among the governments to
work together (e.g. Turkmenistan’s historic isolationism) are two
possible explanations of the current situation.

This does not mean that there have not been successes. The education
of Afghan doctors in Kazakhstan will hopefully pay off in the long-term,
and energy-related projects among the other states will hopefully
provide Afghanistan with development, jobs, and revenue – assuming that
Kabul manages to addresscorruption in the country, particularly in its fuel sector.

While the U.S. and its allies have generally focused on a military
approach to dealing with Afghanistan, Central Asian states have
approached the nation primarily via non-violent routes (mediation
attempts; nurturing investment and construction; and educating the
Afghan youth). But the overriding question is: How long can this
strategy last if Afghan-based insurgent groups carry out more attacks in
Central Asian regions bordering Afghanistan?
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do
not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author
is associated, and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.