SECURITY CONTROLS OVER WIRELESS
TECHNOLOGY WERE GENERALLY IN PLACE; HOWEVER, FURTHER ACTIONS CAN IMPROVE
SECURITY

Issued on September 26, 2011

Highlights

Highlights of Report Number:†
2011-20-101 to the Internal Revenue Service Chief Technology Officer.

IMPACT ON TAXPAYERS

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) currently uses limited
wireless technology but is in the process of expanding its use to help carry
out its mission.† TIGTA found that
controls over wireless technology were generally in place; however, further
actions can improve security.† Strong
security over wireless technology is critical for protecting IRS and taxpayer
data from attacker exploits.

WHY TIGTA DID THE AUDIT

This audit is
included in our Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Audit Plan and addresses the major
management challenge of Security.† The
overall objectives of this review were to determine
whether the IRS has implemented effective controls to detect unauthorized use
of the wireless local area network (WLAN) technology, and to determine whether the
IRSís current approved wireless network at its National Distribution Center and
its plans for increasing authorized use of WLAN technology at IRS facilities are
in accordance †with
Federal wireless security standards.

WHAT TIGTA FOUND

While IRS controls over wireless technology were
generally in place and operating effectively, TIGTA found areas where
improvements can be made.† Specifically, IRS network scan data
revealed that four users installed and used personal unauthorized wireless
devices on their laptops to connect to the IRS network.† Although the users of these laptops were
authorized to access the network, the use of personal wireless devices is prohibited.

In addition, the
IRS developed software to enable laptops to wirelessly connect to the IRS
network from non-IRS facilities (home, airport, or hotel) and allowed its use
by approximately 300 users before the software was properly tested and approved
for use enterprise-wide. †Due to a lack
of proper controls, the software was improperly shared and is currently in use
on an unknown number of IRS computers, even though the IRS has subsequently
abandoned this software and is currently testing a new wireless remote
configuration.

In addition, the IRS did not
ensure timely monitoring of the wireless router configuration files on the
existing approved WLAN.†

WHAT TIGTA RECOMMENDED

TIGTA recommended
that the Chief Technology Officer 1) implement automated nationwide network
scans for unauthorized wireless activity, devices, and software using automated
tools and improve incident handling and investigation processes so that when
unauthorized wireless activity is identified, subsequent investigations and disciplinary
actions are effective; 2) ensure that a security assessment and authorization is
completed for all wireless technologies prior to use in the IRS environment, in
compliance with IRS policy; and 3) ensure the Enterprise Networks
organization takes appropriate action to reinstate monitoring and tracking of
configuration files on the WLAN at the National Distribution Center at
appropriate intervals to ensure all files are set in accordance with IRS
security policy.†

The IRS agreed to
take corrective actions to address Recommendations 1 and 3, but disagreed with
Recommendation 2.† The IRS disagreed that
IRS policy requires completion of a security assessment and authorization
on wireless technologies that it is piloting or demonstrating.† TIGTA maintains that prior to placing
wireless technologies on the live IRS network, the IRS
should ensure that it has completed the required security assessment and
authorization.

READ THE FULL REPORT

To view the report,
including the scope, methodology, and full IRS response, go
to: †