PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 September 2019

Conciliationism and Religious Disagreement

Conciliationism and Religious Disagreement

Chapter:

(p.80)
4 Conciliationism and Religious Disagreement

Source:

Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief

Author(s):

John Pittard

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.003.0005

Many have maintained that the nature and extent of religious disagreement ought to shake our confidence in our religious or explicitly irreligious beliefs, leading us to be religious skeptics. This chapter argues that the most plausible ‘conciliatory’ view of disagreement does not lend support to religious skepticism. ‘Strong’ conciliatory views that say that one’s response to a disagreement should always be entirely determined by dispute-independent reasons are implausible. The only plausible conciliationism is a moderate version (like that defended by David Christensen) that holds that one’s partisan reasoning about a disagreement is undermined only when one has sufficiently strong dispute-independent reasons for trusting the views of one’s disputants. But systems of religious belief often have certain features that make it unlikely that this moderate conciliationism will require a significant degree of conciliation when it is applied to religious disputes.

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 September 2019