CHAPTER IX

The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary People

History On Line

The Chinese Third Phase Offensive

On the morning of 23 December General
Walker left Seoul by jeep to visit units above Uijongbu. Ten miles north, his
jeep started past two 2½-ton trucks halted on the opposite side of the road
headed south. Almost at the same moment, a Korean civilian driving a ¾-ton truck
pulled out from behind the halted vehicles to proceed south and partially
entered the northbound lane to get past the parked trucks. Walker's driver
swerved away from the oncoming truck but was unable to avoid a collision. The
impact threw Walker's vehicle sideways and overturned it, and all occupants were
thrown out and injured. General Walker was unconscious and had no discernible
pulse when he was picked up by escorts in a following vehicle. At the 24th
Division clearing station nearby, he was pronounced dead of multiple head
injuries.1

Ridgway Takes Command

In routine anticipation of casualties
before Walker's death, General MacArthur had obtained
the agreement of the Army chief of staff that Walker's successor, if one was
needed, should be Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, then serving on the Department of
the Army staff as deputy chief of staff for operations and administration.

General Ridgway's experience in World War II as commander of an airborne
division and later an airborne corps and his strong leadership qualities had
MacArthur's high respect, and his staff assignment in Washington, which had
involved visits to the Far East, had kept him well informed of operations in
Korea.2

On receiving word of General Walker's
death, MacArthur telephoned General Collins in Washington to report the
distressing loss and to ask for Ridgway. (The I Corps commander, General
Milburn, temporarily assumed command of the Eighth Army.) Near midnight of 22
December Collins notified Ridgway that he was the new commander of the Eighth Army, and hurried preparations on the 23d put Ridgway in
the air en route to Tokyo that night.3

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway

Ridgway reached Tokyo's Haneda Airport
shortly before midnight on Christmas and was met by General Hickey, MacArthur's
acting chief of staff. En route by sedan to the American Embassy guesthouse,
General Hickey brought him up to date on operations. The enemy offensive
previously expected on Christmas Day had not materialized. Ridgway received
fuller briefings the next morning, first in private from General MacArthur,
later from General Stratemeyer and Admiral Joy.
MacArthur's instructions to Ridgway resembled those given to General Walker:
hold as far north as possible and hold Seoul as long as possible. The most to be
expected of the Eighth Army, MacArthur told Ridgway, was an eventual tactical
success that would clear and secure South Korea. A battlefield success of any
substance in the meantime would help Washington answer what MacArthur called the
"mission vacuum," meaning the question raised by the Chinese intervention of
whether UNC forces could or should stay in Korea.4

MacArthur did reveal a new view of air
power. A month earlier he had credited his air forces with a high degree of
effectiveness; now he cautioned Ridgway that tactical air power was much
exaggerated, that it could not stop the southward flow of enemy forces and
supplies. When Ridgway asked near the close of the meeting whether MacArthur
would object to a decision to attack, MacArthur replied, "The Eighth Army is
yours, Matt. Do what you think best."5 Here was another change. Earlier, MacArthur had played a key and
direct role in planning and conducting tactical operations. He would do so no
longer. General Ridgway would make all the decisions regarding the employment of
the Eighth Army with no requirement to refer them to MacArthur for approval.
Ridgway would always inform MacArthur in detail of those decisions, but
MacArthur would never question him.

Before leaving for Korea at noon, Ridgway
radioed his formal assumption of command of the Eighth Army with
instructions that his message, translated as necessary, be read by all officers
and by as many enlisted men as possible. "You will have my utmost," he advised
his new command. "I shall expect yours."6

Reaching the main Eighth Army headquarters
at Taegu late on the 26th, Ridgway was displeased at finding the bulk of his
staff so far to the rear, a matter he resolved to correct eventually. His
immediate step was to get to the army forward command post. In battle dress for
the first time since leaving Washington, at dawn the
next day, he flew to Seoul, where the handful of staff officers he found
deepened his resolve to remedy the headquarters arrangement.7
He planned not only to redistribute his staff but
also to move the forward command post to a more central location from where he
could reach all corps and divisions in minimum time.

Ambassaddor John J. Muccio With President Syngman Rhee

Following a staff conference and meetings
with American Ambassador John J. Muccio and President Rhee in Seoul, Ridgway began a four-day
reconnaissance of the line B front that took him to all corps and divisions
except the ROK Capital Division on the east coast, whose sector was quiet and
unthreatened by impending enemy action.9

By evening of the 30th he was back at
Eighth Army main in Taegu, much disturbed by what he had learned. The Eighth
Army was clearly a dispirited command. "I could sense it the moment I came into
a command post . . . I could read it in the faces of . . . leaders, from
sergeants right on up to the top. They were unresponsive, reluctant to talk. I
had to drag information out of them. There was a complete absence of that
alertness, that aggressiveness, that you find in troops whose spirit is
high."10 The attack that Ridgway had hoped would be possible he now
considered plainly out of the question. He also considered it imperative to
strengthen the Eighth Army front if his forces were to hold line B. Whether he
had time enough to do so was questionable. Additional evidence of an imminent
enemy offensive had appeared as Ridgway reconnoitered the front, and the coming
New Year holiday was now a logical date on which to expect the opening
assault.11

Unit dispositions along the line had
changed little since General Walker succeeded in manning it. (Map 15) The
8213th Army Unit (Eighth Army Ranger Company) patrolled Kanghwa Island at the
extreme west in the I Corps sector. Next east, the
Turkish brigade overlooked the Han River estuary from the upper end of the Kimpo
peninsula. Above the Han, the 25th Division, to which the Turks and Rangers were
attached, straddled Route 1 along the lower bank of the Imjin River, and the ROK
1st Division defended the corps right from positions along the Imjin reaching
northeast almost to Route 33 in the Wonsan-Seoul corridor. The British 29th
Brigade was assembled in I Corps reserve along Route 1 just outside
Seoul.12

The IX Corps lay across the Wonsan-Seoul
corridor along the 38th parallel, the ROK 6th Division astride Route 33 at the
left, the 24th Division across Route 3 at the right. In corps reserve, the
British 27th Brigade was assembled near the junction of Routes 33 and 3 at
Uijongbu. The 1st Cavalry Division, also in reserve, retained the mission
assigned to it while under army control of blocking the Ch'unch'on-Seoul road.
Now attached to the cavalry division were the Filipino battalion and the Greek
Expeditionary Force, an infantry battalion that had reached Korea on 8
December.13

Near the 38th parallel above Ch'unch'on,
the ROK III Corps defended a wide sector with the ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th
Divisions on line and the ROK 7th Division in reserve. In the narrow ROK II
Corps sector next east, a single division, the ROK 3d, continued to block Route
24 running southwestward through the Hongch'on River valley. The ROK I Corps
defended a gaping line at the Eighth Army right, with the ROK
9th Division in the high mountains at the corps left, and the ROK Capital
Division across the slopes and coastal road at the eastern anchor of the
front.14

Ridgway's main reserve for strengthening
the front was the X Corps. Other resources present or scheduled to arrive in
Korea by the end of the year were exceedingly few. The 2d Division, still not
fully recovered from its late November losses but now reinforced by the
Netherlands and French battalions, was centrally located at Ch'ungju. In
the west, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team,
with the Thai battalion attached, was assembled at Suwon south of Seoul. Outside
these forces, the only available unit was the ROK 11th Division currently
operating against guerrillas in various locations to the south. The 2d Battalion
of Canada's Princess Patricia's Light Infantry had reached Korea in midDecember
but was at Miryang in the southeast for eight weeks of training before entering
battle. Similarly, the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment, actually an artillery
battalion, due to reach Korea on the 31st, would require training before it
moved to the front. The only units en route to Korea that might be able to move
forward upon arrival were two U.S. airborne Ranger companies,
the 2d and 4th.15

The Uijongbu Area

Holding against the threatening enemy
offensive, Ridgway judged, rested on committing most of his reserves early and
on revitalizing the spirit of the Eighth Army. By the time he returned to Taegu
on the 30th he had taken several steps toward achieving
both.16

Restoring the Eighth Army's morale and
confidence, Ridgway believed, depended mainly on improving leadership throughout
his command, but it was not his intention to start "lopping off heads." Before
he would relieve any commander, he wanted personally to see more of the man in
action, to know that the relief would not damage the unit involved, and, indeed,
to be sure that he had a better commander available. For the time being, he
intended to correct deficiencies by working "on and through" his current corps
and division commanders. One deficiency he had noted was that many commanders
conducted operations from command posts far behind the front. To correct this
practice, he ordered "division commanders to be up with their forward
battalions, and . . . corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the
hottest action."17

He saw further weaknesses in leadership and
staff work in the intelligence briefings he received. Confronted during one of
the first briefings with a map whose main feature was
"a big red goose egg . . . with `174,000' scrawled in the middle of it," Ridgway
was astounded. "Here the enemy was leaning right up against us, but we did not
know his strength, and we did not have his location pinpointed."18
He attributed such imprecision directly to the Eighth
Army's tendency to "look over its shoulder." As a result of this tendency, the
line troops had not maintained proper contact with enemy forces or learned
enough about the terrain to their front. He promptly rebuked his subordinates
for failing to meet these two basic combat requirements. They were to patrol
until they had defined the enemy's positions and determined the strengths of
units opposite them, and he warned that he "didn't want to ask any man where a
trail went and have him tell me he didn't know."19

Ridgway did receive another intelligence
report that, if unacceptably imprecise, was more than a "goose egg" estimate of
the opposition. The "174,000," Colonel Tarkenton explained, was the estimated
strength of the Chinese XIII Army Group. The group's six armies, each
with a strength of 29,000, were either along the Eighth Army front or in the
immediate enemy rear area. Tarkenton believed three North Korean corps totaling
65,800 men also were at the front and that a fourth was approaching
it.20

The greatest enemy strength seemed to be
massed opposite the Eighth Army's west central sector, an indication
that the main enemy attack would come through the Wonsan-Seoul corridor over
Routes 33 and 3. A strong secondary attack farther east also seemed probable,
either southwest over the Ch'unch'on-Seoul axis or south through Ch'unch'on and
Wonju via Route 29, in an, attempt to outflank the I and IX Corps above
Seoul.21

Two recent attacks by units of the North
Korean II and V Corps opened as Ridgway reached Korea, supported
Tarkenton's prediction of a strong secondary effort in the east. Fourteen miles
northeast of Ch'unch'on, two North Korean regiments coming from the Hwach'on,
Reservoir area hit the ROK 8th Division at the right of the ROK III Corps
and gouged a mile-deep salient before the South Koreans contained the attack.
Out of the Inje area, twenty-five miles northeast of Ch'unch'on, a larger force
believed to include a division and a reinforced regiment struck southwestward
through the ROK 9th Division's flimsy position at the left of the ROK I Corps.
Entering the rear area of the narrow ROK II Corps sector, the attack force by 30
December established a strong roadblock on the central arterial, Route 29,
almost twentyfive miles below Ch'unch'on. By extending these gains, especially
the deeper southwestward thrust out of the Inje area, North Korean forces
conceivably could sever the Eighth Army's main lines of
communication.22

Defensive Preparations

Committing the X Corps

Ridgway's first tactical move was to counter
this threat from the northeast. On the 27th, right after hearing Ambassador
Muccio give his evaluation of the tactical situation, Ridgway ordered part of
the 2d Division north from Ch'ungju into the North Koreans' projected path.
General McClure was to move a regimental combat team twenty-five miles north to
Wonju, from where it could oppose any North Korean attempt to advance south over
Route 29 or west along Route 20 and where it could protect a vulnerable link of
the central Pusan-Seoul rail line, which served as an Eighth Army supply
route.23

McClure was in the process of moving the
23d Infantry and the French battalion to Wonju on the 29th when the North Korean
attack out of Inje carried behind the ROK II Corps farther north. Ridgway
consequently ordered McClure to move the remainder of his division to Wonju and
to send one regiment twenty-five miles north of that town to Hongch'on where
Route 29 from Ch'unch'on and Route 24 from the northeast intersected. McClure
complied on the 30th, sending the 23d Infantry toward Hongch'on to join its
South Korean namesake, the 23d Regiment of the ROK 7th Division.24

Before the 23d Infantry could complete its
move above Wonju, the North Koreans reported by the ROK III Corps to number
between seven hundred and twelve hundred men, blocked Route 29 six miles below
Hongch'on. The 23d's advance became a clearing operation, made in concert with a
battalion of the ROK 23d Regiment, which moved south out of Hongch'on and with
the reserve 5th Regiment of the ROK 3d Division, which dropped south from
Ch'unch'on to a point west of the North Korean position and then struck eastward
against it. The concerted effort cleaned out most of the roadblock on the 31st.
The battalion of the ROK 23d Regiment returned to Hongch'on while the ROK 5th
Regiment and the leading battalion of the 23d Infantry stayed to clear the
remainder of the enemy position. The balance of the 23d Infantry was strung out
on Route 29, a battalion at Hoengsong nine miles below the roadblock site, the
remainder still in Wonju where the rest of the 2d Division was now
assembling.25

While installing the 2d Division in the Hongch'on-Wonju
area might hold off the North Koreans currently advancing from the northeast,
the defensive weakness in the three South Korean corps sectors left open the
likelihood of stronger, more effective enemy penetrations. Against this
possibility, Ridgway planned to reinforce this portion of the front, much as
General Walker had decided earlier, by setting the X Corps in the Ch'unch'on
sector now held by the ROK III Corps and by placing the bulk of his South Korean
forces along a narrower, more solid front in the higher mountains and coastal slopes to the east.26

Since time was critical, Ridgway on 28
December pressed General Almond and the commander of the 2d Logistical Command,
General Garvin, to quicken the readiness preparations of the 1st Marine, 3d, and
7th Divisions. The marines, now reattached to the X Corps, and the 7th Division
were fully assembled but were still refurbishing, and the 3d Division, last to
leave Hungnam, was not yet three-quarters ashore. The ships carrying General
Soule's remaining troops were in Pusan harbor, however, and following Ridgway's
29 December order that these ships be unloaded without delay, the balance of the
3d Division was ashore and en route to the division's assembly area south of
Kyongju by nightfall on the 30th.27

Since it was nevertheless obvious that the
X Corps as currently constituted could not move forward for some time, Ridgway
on the 29th approved plans developed by his staff for adjusting Almond's order
of battle to permit earlier commitment. Under these plans the X Corps
headquarters and whichever of Almond's present divisions completed its
preparations first would move to Wonju, where Almond would add the 2d Division
and possibly one ROK division to his command as substitutes for the two
divisions left behind. Even this arrangement would take time; the estimate for
moving one of Almond's current divisions from its southern assembly area to the battle zone was eight to ten days.
Once forward, the X Corps was to operate with the initial mission of destroying
any enemy penetration of the South Korean front above it and of protecting the
IX Corps' east flank.28

Ridgway gave Almond detailed instructions on the 30th.
Having learned that the 7th Division would be ready ahead of the other two
divisions, he directed Almond to move one of its regiments the next day to
Chech'on, twenty miles below Wonju, where Route 60 and a mountain road coming
from the east and northeast joined Route 29. When Almond could get the remainder
of General Barr's forces forward, he was to assemble the 7th near the 2d so that
both divisions could be deployed quickly against any enemy penetration from the
direction of Ch'unch'on and Inje or from the east toward Hoengsong and Wonju.
Almond subsequently could expect to occupy a sector of the front. In the
meantime, he was to develop Route 29 southeastward from Wonju through Chech'on,
Tanyang, Yongju, and Andong as the main X Corps supply
route.29

On the last day of the year Ridgway placed
the 1st Marine and 3d Divisions in army reserve. When fully refurbished, the
marines were to move from Masan to an east coast assembly in the
Yongch'on-Kyongju-P'ohangdong area and prepare to occupy blocking positions
wherever needed to the north. The 3d Division was to reassemble in the west. As
soon as General Soule finished reorganizing and reequipping his forces he was to
move them into the P'yongt'aek-Ansong area forty miles south of Seoul and
prepare them for operations in either the I or IX Corps
sector.30

Establishing the Seoul
Bridgehead

While reinforcing the South Korean sector
of the front, Ridgway also deepened the defense of Seoul. After conferences with
General Milburn and General Coulter on the 27th, he instructed them to organize
a bridgehead above Seoul along a line curving from the north bank of the Han
west of Seoul through a point just below Uijongbu at the junction of Routes 33
and 3 to the north and back to the Han east of the city. The bridgehead would be
deep enough to keep the Han bridges below Seoul free of enemy artillery fire.
The position therefore would be suitable for covering a general withdrawal below
Seoul that might accompany or follow the occupation of the bridgehead
line.31

Milburn and Coulter each were to place a
division on the bridgehead line if the expected enemy attack forced them to
vacate their line B positions. Ridgway at first restricted any I and IX
Corps withdrawal from the present front to
his own personal order. But on reconsidering the high estimate of Chinese
strength opposite the two corps, the tendency of some South Korean units to
break under pressure, and the demonstrated Chinese preference for night attacks,
he realized that this restriction could create a costly delay should Milburn and
Coulter be unable to contact him promptly. He therefore authorized the two corps
commanders to withdraw on their own at any time they agreed that it was
necessary but could not reach him.32

No matter who gave the order, Ridgway
insisted that a withdrawal to the bridgehead be more than a mere move from one
line to another; both corps were to attack enemy forces who followed. The
terrain could accommodate this tactic, especially in the Wonsan-Seoul corridor
where the enemy would be obliged to use routes surrounded by higher ground.
Ridgway expected Milburn and Coulter to leave strong forces of infantry and
armor posted in this high ground as the two corps withdrew; these forces would
strike advancing enemy units and disrupt the followup before they themselves
moved back to the bridgehead.33

Ridgway Returns to Seoul

In smaller steps taken before the year was
out, Ridgway attached the 2d Ranger Company to the 1st Cavalry Division in the
west and the 4th Ranger Company to the 7th Division in the east. Since the 2d
Division was operating in the Wonju area where the surrounding mountains
prohibited armor, he ordered McClure's 72d Tank
Battalion to the west for attachment to the IX Corps, which might use it to
punish an enemy advance on Seoul.34

Anticipating an opening enemy attack toward
the capital on New Year's Day, Ridgway returned there on the afternoon of the
31st.35 According to Colonel Tarkenton's latest intelligence
estimate, enemy forces were fully deployed. In the west, the North Korean I
Corps straddled Route 1 at the lmjin with the Chinese 50th Army
concentrated just behind it; the 39th Army had spread out near the
Imjin between Routes 1 and 33; the 38th Army sat astride Route 33 below
Yonch'on with the 40th Army assembled to its rear; and the 66th Army
lay across Routes 3 and 17, its forces pointed at both Uijongbu and
Ch'unch'on, with the 42d Army backing it up at
Kumhwa.36

Farther east, the full North Korean V
Corps, previously in the area now occupied by the 66th Army, had
joined the North Korean II Corps in the region between and below Hwach'on
and Inje. This concentration, the expected arrival of the North Korean III
Corps in the same area, and the probability that forces from the Chinese
IX Army Group would move down into the same region from Hungnam
represented, in Tarkenton's estimation, a sufficient force to exploit
successfully the North Korean gains already registered in the
east.37

The preponderance of enemy forces above Seoul still
pointed to a main effort against the South Korean capital over the
Uijongbu-Seoul axis. In addition, enemy artillery positions sighted from the air
disclosed a large number of guns generally astride an extension of the I and IX
Corps boundary, all well disposed to support an attack through the Wonsan-Seoul
corridor. Further, aerial observers had spotted an enemy buildup of bridging
materials near the lmjin. Prisoners confirmed these indications. Several
revealed that a main
offensive toward Seoul would open on the night of 31 December, and an officer
from the 38th Army said that the offensive would begin with a coordinated attack by
the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42d
Armies.38

The Opening Enemy Assaults

Ridgway had judged the signs correctly. As
he flew into Seoul and visited the western front by jeep during the afternoon of
the 31st, vanguards of the 116th Division, 39th
Army, moved down to the Imjin near Korangp'o-ri
and forced outposts of the ROK 1st Division to withdraw below the river. Behind
a thirty-minute artillery preparation, forces of the 116th then crossed the lmjin
just after full dark to attack the ROK division's main defenses.39

From this opening at the I Corps right, the
XIII Army Group commander broadened his attack eastward. Around midnight units of
the 116th Division and of the 113th Division, 38th
Army, struck hard at
the ROK 6th Division on the IX Corps left while the 114th Division, 38th Army, opened smaller, intermittent assaults against the 24th Division at
the IX Corps right. Two hours later the 66th Army
sent forces against the ROK 5th Division in the
center of the ROK III Corps sector and near 0500 hit the ROK 2d Division
at the ROK III Corps left.40

In grand tactics, the Chinese New Year's
offensive, or Third Phase Offensive as the Chinese called it, resembled their
previous effort, strong forces pushing a main attack in the west while other
forces threatened envelopment in the east. The hard jolts of the 38th and 39th Armies against the I and IX
Corps aimed the main Chinese effort generally south astride Route 33 toward
Seoul. The 66th Army's attacks against the ROK III Corps farther east widened the Chinese
advance to a front of forty-five miles but were pointed mainly at Kap'yong,
thirty-five miles northeast of Seoul and twelve miles west of Ch'unch'on.
Seizure of Kap'yong, situated as it was on the Ch'unch'on-Seoul road, could be
the beginning of a flanking movement against Seoul or the start of a deeper
sweep to envelop the city. It also posed the danger of envelopment to the South
Korean forces defending Ch'unch'on, forces whose positions already were
threatened by the deep North Korean salient in the Hongch'on
area.41

The 38th
and 39th Armies
reinforced the main drive during the night but
kept it massed near the I-IX Corps boundary. The 25th Division on the left flank
of the I Corps was not touched, and attacks against the 24th Division
on the IX Corps right, though numerous,
remained small and ineffective. Either by a decision to single out the interior
ROK 1st and 6th Divisions or by the coincidence of their adjoining positions
athwart Route 33, the Chinese concentrated on wedging through the South Koreans,
particularly the 1st Division.42

The reinforced night attack of the
116th Division against the ROK 1st Division shoved the 12th Regiment out of
position on the division right and sent its troops streaming to the rear.
General Paik tried to refill the vacated sector with his reserve 15th Regiment,
but that regiment and the 11th on the division left were hit hard and forced
back to the south and west, leaving much ground open to Chinese exploitation.
The ROK 6th Division fared better, giving little ground to the 116th and 113th Divisions, but by daylight
faced a threat of entrapment, posed to some extent by enemy groups who managed
to work into its rear area but posed most seriously by those forces of the
116th cutting deep
through the ROK 1st Division to its left.43

The deepest point of Chinese penetration by
daylight on 1 January had been marked by Battery C of the U.S. 9th Field
Artillery Battalion, which had been supporting the ROK 1st Division from
positions behind the 12th Regiment. When the battery withdrew after the 12th
abandoned its position, the artillery column was caught in an ambush about eight
miles south of the Imjin and lost four 155-mm. howitzers before it could escape
the trap. From this point the edges of the V-shaped enemy salient driven into
the right half of the ROK 1st Division sector traced secondary Route 5Y
northwestward to the Imjin through the middle of General Paik's sector and
traced secondary Route 11 northward, not far west of the I-IX Corps
boundary.44

From reports reaching Eighth Army
headquarters through the night, General Ridgway suspected that the Chinese
advance toward Seoul was fast becoming more than the I and IX Corps could
handle. No more than three Chinese divisions so far had been identified in the
assault in the west, but the Chinese, in all logic, would exploit their gains in
the ROK 1st Division sector and could commit additional divisions with no great
delay. A paucity of reports left Ridgway somewhat in the dark about what was
happening in the South Korean sectors farther east. Although American advisers,
the main sources of information on ROK Army operations, were at the principal
South Korean headquarters, breakdowns in communication between front line and
headquarters seemed to be the rule rather than the exception in ROK units.
Ridgway nevertheless was aware that Chinese forces had hit the ROK III Corps, a portent that made the I and IX Corps positions even less
tenable.45

By the time Ridgway started north out of
Seoul near dawn on New Year's Day toward the sectors of the ROK 1st and 6th
Divisions, he had few doubts that he would have to withdraw from line B. His
concern heightened to alarm a few miles north when he met trucks packed with South Korean troops. No weapons
other than a few rifles were in sight. He sensed immediately that the South
Koreans were running and jumped from his jeep to wave the trucks to a halt. But
he "might as well had tried to stop the flow of the Han." The most he could do
was order straggler points established where retreating troops could be stopped
and reassembled.46

The episode on the road, as Ridgway
discovered when he visited the I and IX Corps headquarters before noon, had not
signaled the collapse of the two ROK divisions. The bulk of both was still
forward, and both were attempting to erect defenses along the shoulders of the
Chinese penetration. General Paik was setting his 11th and 15th Regiments across
hills overlooking Route 5Y along the southwestern shoulder, a small part of the
15th stood below the point of the wedge, and about half the 12th Regiment was
now loosely assembled some two miles below the deepest penetration. On the other
side of the salient, Brig. Gen. Chang Do Yong, commander of the ROK 6th
Division, was moving his reserve 2d Regiment into position along Route 33 to
refuse his left flank. Rearward along this long open flank, General Coulter had
ordered the British 27th Brigade from Uijongbu into blocking positions near
Tokchong, eight miles north, where a road coming southeastward out of the area
invested by Chinese joined Route 33.47

General Milburn, Ridgway learned, had
started the British 29th Brigade up Route 1 from
Seoul toward a forward assembly behind the 25th Division. From there the British
were to attack northeast into the flank of the enemy salient. Ridgway
discouraged this move, believing a counterattack to have any chance at all would
require at least a full American division. But such a commitment seemed neither
wise nor feasible. The two nearest U.S. divisions were the 25th and 24th. The
25th, though still not directly involved except for having received mortar and
artillery fire, was the only unit standing before the North Korean I Corps and
the Chinese 50th Army. The 24th on the opposite flank had been hit hard after daylight,
apparently by all three regiments of the 114th
Division, and had backed away to positions two
miles south. Even if one of these divisions were to be used, Ridgway saw no way,
in view of their dispositions on the flanks, that a counterattack could be
started in less than forty-eight hours. Such an effort, he judged, would be too
late since the Chinese were not only maintaining strong pressure but, according
to early morning air reports of heavy troop movements down Route 33 from the
direction of Ch'orwon, also were showing clear signs of further reinforcing
their advance.48

From additional reports reaching Ridgway by
noon of the 1st, he now knew that the ROK III Corps had been under attack
since early morning, that the ROK 2d and 5th Divisions at the corps left and
center had received the attacks, and that the heaviest assaults had hit the 5th. While these reports still
gave Ridgway scant information, they made plain that the Chinese were moving on
a broad front and pointed out more sharply the possibility of a flanking or
enveloping move against Seoul. From this clearer picture of the Ch'unch'on
sector and the circumstances facing the I and IX Corps in the west, Ridgway was
fully convinced that the wisest moves were to withdraw the latter two corps to
the Seoul bridgehead and to pull all South Korean forces in the east to line C. Although having to call a withdrawal only six
days after he had taken command of the Eighth Army was disappointing and was
certainly contrary to his original intention of attacking or at least standing
fast, he gave General Milburn and General Coulter withdrawal orders at
noon.49

Notes

1 Report of Inquiry Into Accidental Death of Lt. Gen.
Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army, 11 Jan 51. According to a ROK Ministry of
National Defense publication, Korean War History for One Year: 1 May 1950 to
30 June 1951, the driver of the truck was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment. See English translation of publication in CMH, p. B-347.

31 MS, Ridgway, The Korean
War, Issues and Policies, p. 356; Ridgway, Soldier,
pp. 207-08; Rad, GX 10009 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs
I and IX Corps, 28 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 28 Dec 50. Most of the
fortification work at the bridgehead line was to be done by South Korean
laborers. During the meeting with President Rhee on the 27th, Ridgway asked him
for 30,000 civilian laborers to be employed in building fortifications above and
below Seoul, and Rhee provided the first 10,000 by dawn on the 28th.