Paul Mattick

A.F. of L. and Administration Break

1935

The pressure of class interests upon government is aptly illustrated by
Roosevelt’s recent turn to the right in New Deal policies. The president came
into office with a reputation for opportunism and vacillation. An astute
political engineer, he lacked all knowledge of fundamental social and economic
science. As a consequence, his cabinet is the most heterogeneous hodge-podge,
running wild in contradictory and conflicting policies.

The liberals, captivated by his radiant smile and the well-meaning platitudes
he uttered, as usual placed great hopes in him and were, as usual, disappointed
in the end. The president never had a clear policy. He gropes around hoping for
“something to turn up”, and just because of this lack of decision becomes a most
adept executive for the master class of the country. The influences of capital
are free to work upon him, and find no resistance such as would characterize a
man of firm convictions. Thus, without being fully conscious of it, in spite of
humanitarian sentiments, he pursues a course outlined for him by American
capitalism with all the accuracy of a man fully conscious of the course.

It was not personal astuteness that caused him, at the outset of NRA, to
curry favor with the A.F. of L. Finance and Manufacturing capital were
terrorized by the fear of incipient revolution. They needed peace, industrial
peace, in order to find their bearings, and NRA could not promise that without
the help of the A.F. of L. Thus special inducements were held out to Green and
his cohorts; and the A.F. of L. joyously accepted. It felt itself a partner in
the Fascist reorganization of America, and would have continued as a partner if
it had proved able to deliver.

It was intended that the A.F. of L. was to curb strikes, maintain industrial
peace and develop unflinching loyalty to NRA on the part of the workers; but the
A.F. of L. was unable to deliver. An unprecedented strike wave swept the
country: Toledo, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and the textile strike were the
high points of an upheaval that was continuous to the close of 1934. Rank and
file rebellions in coal, steel and automobile unions threatened at all times to
add to the confusion, and communist elements seemed to be gaining strength in
unexpected places. Not that harried and blundering William Green didn’t do his
best to head off militant action. He and John L. Lewis hastened to quell the
miners of Pennsylvania when they resorted to strikes. He pleaded with tears in
his eyes to prevent the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Tin and Steel Workers
from striking. His membership was kept in line in the auto plants while
independent and wild-cat strikes threatened to upset the auto industry. The San
Francisco strike was repudiated by him, and the socialistic leaders of the
Textile Workers’ Union called off its strike before attaining its objective.

One does not receive pay for good intentions. One must deliver; and Green,
though his intentions were the best, couldn’t deliver. Painfully he limped from
place to place trying to remedy conditions when the damage had already been
done.

The organization work of the A.F. of L. was hampered by craft divisions. The
NRA setup required vertical unions so that the workers, regimented in industrial
units, could be effectively handled by their leaders and delivered to their
masters. One prominent NRA executive resigned from his post because it was
inconceivable to him to use a “craft” A.F. of L., and Gerald Swope of the
General Electric voiced determined opposition to organizing his workers on a
craft basis.

At its 1934 convention, the A.F. of L. decided to adopt “vertical” unions in
some industries. That this was purely an opportunist maneuver was plain, as
Charles P. Howard, president of the International Typographical Union, who
fathered the compromise proposition on vertical unions, is a bitter enemy of all
progressive tendencies in the typographical union, which latter is one of many
crafts subdividing the printing industry.

But all of these efforts were belated. It had become obvious to NRA
chieftains that the A.F. of L., though reactionary enough, lacked the force to
become the Fascist labor adjunct of our dying capitalism. So the administration
turned from it in the automobile controversy. The administration decided to
continue the automobile code which admits company unions and independent unions
into the collective bargaining arrangements until June 16th. This
turn of events shows no deviation by the national administration from its
previous policy of regimenting workers in units that will serve the general
fascization of American labor. It merely represents a shift from the A.F. of L.
as the instrument of fascism, to the pure company union. It does not signify
that the A.F. of L. becomes progressive. It merely means that the latter will
act as a minor fascist agent in the labor movement instead of being the main
factor,

Green and his cohorts will call no general strikes. They may bluster as they
have done in the past, but there will be no action. The A.F. of L. has lost so
much ground in the auto industry, as a result of its temporizing policy, that it
couldn't call a strike if it would. There is no danger that the A.F. of L.
leaders will initiate in any industry a strike movement that very likely would
result in rank and file strength which would eventually overthrow the
leadership.