Tor

Tor is an encrypted anonymising network that makes it harder to intercept internet communications, or see where communications are coming from or going to.

In order to use the WikiLeaks public submission system as detailed above you can download the Tor Browser Bundle, which is a Firefox-like browser available for Windows, Mac OS X and GNU/Linux and pre-configured to connect using the anonymising system Tor.

Tails

If you are at high risk and you have the capacity to do so, you can also access the submission system through a secure operating system called Tails. Tails is an operating system launched from a USB stick or a DVD that aim to leaves no traces when the computer is shut down after use and automatically routes your internet traffic through Tor. Tails will require you to have either a USB stick or a DVD at least 4GB big and a laptop or desktop computer.

Tips

Our submission system works hard to preserve your anonymity, but we recommend you also take some of your own precautions. Please review these basic guidelines.

1. Contact us if you have specific problems

If you have a very large submission, or a submission with a complex format, or are a high-risk source, please contact us. In our experience it is always possible to find a custom solution for even the most seemingly difficult situations.

2. What computer to use

If the computer you are uploading from could subsequently be audited in an investigation, consider using a computer that is not easily tied to you. Technical users can also use Tails to help ensure you do not leave any records of your submission on the computer.

3. Do not talk about your submission to others

If you have any issues talk to WikiLeaks. We are the global experts in source protection – it is a complex field. Even those who mean well often do not have the experience or expertise to advise properly. This includes other media organisations.

After

1. Do not talk about your submission to others

If you have any issues talk to WikiLeaks. We are the global experts in source protection – it is a complex field. Even those who mean well often do not have the experience or expertise to advise properly. This includes other media organisations.

2. Act normal

If you are a high-risk source, avoid saying anything or doing anything after submitting which might promote suspicion. In particular, you should try to stick to your normal routine and behaviour.

3. Remove traces of your submission

If you are a high-risk source and the computer you prepared your submission on, or uploaded it from, could subsequently be audited in an investigation, we recommend that you format and dispose of the computer hard drive and any other storage media you used.

In particular, hard drives retain data after formatting which may be visible to a digital forensics team and flash media (USB sticks, memory cards and SSD drives) retain data even after a secure erasure. If you used flash media to store sensitive data, it is important to destroy the media.

If you do this and are a high-risk source you should make sure there are no traces of the clean-up, since such traces themselves may draw suspicion.

4. If you face legal action

If a legal action is brought against you as a result of your submission, there are organisations that may help you. The Courage Foundation is an international organisation dedicated to the protection of journalistic sources. You can find more details at https://www.couragefound.org.

Submit documents to WikiLeaks

WikiLeaks publishes documents of political or historical importance that are censored or otherwise suppressed. We specialise in strategic global publishing and large archives.

The following is the address of our secure site where you can anonymously upload your documents to WikiLeaks editors. You can only access this submissions system through Tor. (See our Tor tab for more information.) We also advise you to read our tips for sources before submitting.

wlupld3ptjvsgwqw.onion

Copy this address into your Tor browser. Advanced users, if they wish, can also add a further layer of encryption to their submission using our public PGP key.

If you cannot use Tor, or your submission is very large, or you have specific requirements, WikiLeaks provides several alternative methods. Contact us to discuss how to proceed.

ULAANBAATA 00000016 001.4 OF 038
//////////////////////////////
/////////////////////////////
ZFR ZFR
PLS CANCEL ULAANBAATAR 16 AND BLANK ALL ASSOCIATED
MCNS. CABLE IS A DUPE OF ULAANBAATAR 17.
SORRY FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE. THKS.
ZFR ZFR
///////////////////////////////
///////////////////////////////
ADDLETON
ULAANBAATA 00000016 002.2 OF 038
State participation (or share) is determined by an agreement on
exploitation of the deposit considering the amount of investment
made the state; or, in the case of a privately-explored strategic
deposit, by agreement between the state and the firm on the amount
invested by the state. Parliament may determine the state share
using a proposal made by the government or on its own initiative
using official figures on minerals reserves in the integrated state
registry.
Importantly, the state equity provision is not expropriatory on its
face, because the GOM has committed itself to compensating firms for
the share it takes at fair market value. Although experience is
limited with the law, so far the GOM has honored this commitment, as
experience with the recently signed agreement for the mega Oyu
Tolgoi copper-gold mine project confirms.
In addition, the current Minerals Law restricts the access of
petroleum and mineral licenses to entities registered in Mongolia
under the terms of the relevant company and investment laws. A
foreign entity, in its own right, cannot hold any sort of mining or
petroleum license. Should a foreign entity acquire a given
license as either collateral or for the purpose of actual
exploration or mining, and fail to create the appropriate Mongolian
corporate entity to hold a given license, that failure may serve as
grounds for invalidating the license. In essence, the foreign
entity may lose its security or its mining rights. We advise
investors with specific questions regarding the current status of
their respective licenses to seek professional advice on the status
of those licenses.
Reaching Agreement on the Oyu Tolgoi Project
In October 2009, the GOM, Ivanhoe Mines of Canada, and Rio Tinto
jointly negotiated an investment and development agreement for the
Oyu Tolgoi (OT) copper- gold deposit located in Mongolia's South
Gobi desert. The OT agreement vests the government of Mongolia with
34 percent ownership of the project and provides guarantees for
local employment and procurement. With estimated development costs
in excess of USD seven (7) billion, this 40-year plus mine is
conservatively expected to double Mongolia's annual GDP when it
becomes fully operational around 2020.
Observers of Mongolia's investment climate consider passage of this
agreement an unambiguously positive sign for foreign investors.
Although the deal took about six years to craft and several
conditions must still be met before implementation begins, nearly
all observers conclude that it shows Mongolia can say "Yes" to key
projects undertaken with foreign involvement and investment. In
addition, the agreement confirms the GOM's commitment to
compensating private rights holders of most deposits considered
strategic under the current minerals. Finally, the OT deal shows
that the GOM and Parliament are willing to amend laws and
regulations to enhance the commercial viability of mining projects
in Mongolia. As other projects of varying scales have been waiting
for OT to pass, the positive impact and message of the OT deal for
investors should not be underestimated.
2009 Laws Negatively Affecting Investor Rights
Although the OT deal was the big positive story for foreign
investors in 2009, the impact has been moderated by the passage of
two key laws that many foreign and domestic investors think detract
from Mongolia's claims to being a competitive, safe, and predictable
destination for investment.
The 2009 Uranium Law of Mongolia
In 2009 the Parliament imposed significant new controls on mining
and processing uranium in Mongolia. The law creates a new
regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Mongolia
(NRA), and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold assets
ULAANBAATA 00000016 003.2 OF 038
that the government will acquire from current rights holders. The
law imposes several conditions:
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses
with the NRA, for a fee.
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 51
percent of the company that will develop the mine -- as opposed to
just the deposit -- as a condition of being allowed to develop any
uranium property.
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework for
developing mineral and metal resources. Prior to the Uranium Law,
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to
other mineral and metals exploration.
The Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration in Water Basins
and Forested Areas of 2009
In 2009, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting mining in water
basins and forested areas of Mongolia. The stated intent was to
limit environmental damage caused primarily by placer gold mining in
and around forests and watersheds. The law imposes the following
restrictions on exploration and mining rights:
--Revokes or modifies licenses to explore for or mine any and all
mineral resources within an area no less than 200 meters from a
water or forest resource.
--Requires the government to compensate rights holders for
exploration expenses already incurred or revenue lost from actual
mining operations.
--Empowers local officials to determine the actual areas which can
be mined. In effect, the local official can extend the 200 meter
minimum at his discretion.
Both foreign and domestic investors have unambiguously criticized
these new laws and their respective implementations as both
non-transparent and potentially expropriatory. They argue that
these laws radically change the rules for investing in Mongolia's
vital minerals sector quite late in the game, raising the question
of Mongolia's reliability as an investment destination.
Further, observers note that these laws also raise the specter of
outright expropriation, which heretofore has not been present in
Mongolia. Although the Water Law requires compensation, the
government of Mongolia has not devised detailed plans for
indemnifying rights holders. In regards to the Uranium law, the
legislation explicitly rejects any obligation to compensate
investors for loss of economic rights and property; hence,
generating credible investor fears of government of expropriation.
Investors note that both laws passed without sufficient public
review and comment; and that the subsequent regulatory drafting
process occurred with little participation of the affected parties.
The resulting regulatory regimes do not generally specify how and on
what basis licenses will be revoked, nor do these new process detail
how investors might appeal non-renewals. The open-ended powers
seemingly granted Mongolian officials seem to give central,
regional, and local officials broad discretionary powers to curtail
rights without apparent limit.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 004.2 OF 038
Pending Elimination of the Windfall Profits Tax on Copper and Gold
Since passage in 2006, the Windfall Profits Tax Law has drawn
criticism regarding the GOM's commitment to creating an open,
predictable, and fair environment for foreign direct investment.
The speedy legislative process for passing the WPT was
unprecedented: The law passed in six days with no consultation on
any of its provisions with stakeholders. The entire process raised
concerns among investors about the stability and transparency of
Mongolia's legislative and regulatory environment, which three
intervening years of legislating have done little to alleviate.
The WPT imposes a 68 percent tax on the profits from gold and copper
mining respectively. For gold, the tax originally kicked in when
gold price hit USD500 per ounce; however, in late 2008 Parliament
raised the threshold to USD850. For copper, the threshold is USD
2,600 per ton. Mining industry sources claim that the 68 percent
tax rate, when combined with other Mongolian taxes, makes the
effective tax 100 percent on all proceeds above the copper threshold
price. In theory, the WPT proceeds are set aside in a special fund
for a combination of social welfare expenditures and a reserve fund,
although that fund, too, was modified in late 2009.
The recent OT Investment Agreement entailed further amendment to the
WPT as a condition precedent to its passage. OT's private investors
successfully argued that they would not be able to run a
commercially viable OT operation when faced with the WPT.
Consequently, Parliament amended the WPT Law: The WPT will
officially end for all copper concentrate and gold products in 2011.
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code
Effective since January 1, 2007, the current tax code reduces tax
rates, flattens the tax schedule, removes discriminatory loopholes
and exemptions, and provides for appropriate deduction opportunities
for corporate investment. The current code allows firms to deduct
more types of legitimate business expenditures: training, business
travel, cafeteria expenses, etc. The law also imposes a level
playing field between foreign and domestic investors. Specifically,
the current code eliminates the majority of discriminatory tax
exemptions and holidays (most of which favored international
investors).
As with the WPT, the OT Agreement had a salutary effect on key tax
provisions long-desired by foreign and domestic investors alike.
Before OT, firms could only carry-forward losses for two (2) years
after incurring the loss While most businesses approved of this
provision, many, especially those requiring large and long-term
infrastructure development, note that the two year carry-forward
limit is insufficient for projects with long development lead times,
as is typical of most large-scale mining developments. As a
condition precedent of passing the OT Agreement, Parliament extended
loss-carry forward to eight (8) years.
On the down side, Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption
available on value-added tax (VAT) taxes of 10 percent on equipment
used to bring a given mine into production, except on equipment to
be used in the production of highly processed mining products. For
example, if the OT project decides to smelt copper, imported
equipment supporting production of metallic copper might qualify for
a 10 percent reduction on VAT. However, in a effort to promote
value-added production in Mongolia, the GOM defines the production
of copper concentrate -OT's likely copper product - as
non-value-added output; and so, equipment imported to develop and
operate this sort of operation would not qualify for the 10 percent
VAT exemption.
Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines have long
development lead times before production begins, either waive or do
not tax such imports at all. Parliament, with no consultation with
investors, international advisors provided by donor organizations,
ULAANBAATA 00000016 005.2 OF 038
or even of its own tax officials, chose to impose the VAT, which
immediately makes Mongolian mining costs 10 percent higher than they
would otherwise be, impairing competitiveness and dramatically
varying from global practice.
Whether any mining output qualifies for this exemption seems
completely at the discretion of the GOM, which has not set out in
regulation or statute a process by which it will regularly
adjudicate such VAT exemption requests.
Unfinished Business (Including Customs Rates)
Both the GOM and Parliament continue to intend to debate additional
tax reform measures. Discussed since 2007, no substantive progress
has been made since. Proposed measures include revisions to the law
on customs and customs tariffs. While the exact nature of the
proposed changes in the customs law remains murky, the GOM states
that changes will be consistent with Mongolia's WTO obligations and
investment climate enhancement goals.
Despite overall solid, positive changes, international financial
institutions warn that the 2007 tax reforms by themselves are
insufficient to improve Mongolia's business environment. They
report that reform efforts need to go beyond changes to the tax code
to restructure the operations of the key agencies - the tax
department, the customs administration and the inspections agency -
that directly interact with private firms and individuals.
Issues in the Telecom and Aviation Sectors
While the Mongolian government supports FDI and domestic investment,
both foreign and domestic report that individual agencies and
elements of the judiciary often use their respective powers to
hinder investments into such sectors as meat production,
telecommunications, aviation, or pharmaceuticals. Investors report
similar abuses of inspections, permits, and licenses by Mongolian
regulatory agencies.
Abuses in Mongolia's telecom and information technology sector have
raised public and business concerns. The state-owned telecom
company, Mongol Telecom (MT) uses its regulatory and technical clout
to forestall or attack competition. As the monopoly supplier of
land-based lines through which much internet traffic has
traditionally flowed, MT charges predatory rates for access to all
other Internet Service Providers (ISPs) at a rate 10 times the
charges assessed to the state-owned ISP. These per-minute charges
add up and are hard for competitor ISPs to absorb. In addition,
some observers believe that the GOM, in an effort to make Mongol
Telecom more attractive for privatization, is inclined to make MT
the sole portal for all telecommunication into Mongolia. The
apparent intent here is to require licenses for both
telecommunication services and technology, which only MT could
satisfy. There has been significant lobbying against this policy by
ISPs, voice-over IP providers, cellular rights holders,
multi-lateral organizations, and diplomatic missions as contrary to
Mongolia's own competition law and long-term interests. So far
these efforts have delayed the passage of any damaging legislation.
Compounding these problems are the non-transparent activities of the
Mongolian Information, Communication Technology, and Post Agency
(ICTPA), which is charged with providing policy guidance to the
Communication Regulatory Commission of Mongolia (CRC). Companies
report that these agencies routinely act in ways that seem to have
no basis in law or regulation and which have harmed American
interests, not to mention those of investors from Mongolia and other
countries. For example, ICTPA has attempted to order internet
service providers to charge set access prices, without recourse to
the market. The CRC routinely tenders licenses for frequency and
information technology service allocation through a completely
non-transparent process that invariably seems to favor certain
domestic interests over other Mongolian companies and foreign
investors. While agreeing that the GOM has an interest in
ULAANBAATA 00000016 006.2 OF 038
allocating frequency, domestic and foreign investors question why
either the ICTPA or CRC need to interfere in the provision of ICT
services, which they believe should be left to the consumers to
decide.
The state also involves itself in the domestic aviation sector.
Mongolia has two domestic service providers, the privately owned
Aero Mongolia and EZNIS. Government regulation recommends maximum
ticket prices that airlines may charge for all domestic routes, but
the law does not strictly forbid airlines from charging fees higher
than the state carrier (which does not currently operate
domestically). However, the GOM frowns on domestic airlines that
charge more for service. These state prices are well below
operating costs and inhibit the private carriers from charging a
break-even fee. However, private carriers have decided to shake off
GOM prohibitions and are charging rates that might yield profits and
support safe and efficient flying arrangements.
State-owned MIAT formerly ran domestic operations which were heavily
subsidized, primarily through its foreign routes. This
state-subsidized competition with private carriers has inhibited
investors from participating in the provision of private domestic
service and consequently limited the aviation products and services
that U.S. firms might sell into the Mongolian market. Apart from a
brief and no-longer operating domestic service in 2009 using
aircraft from their international fleet, MIAT and the GOM have
failed to upgrade the domestic air fleet, which is effectively
non-existent. This seems to have opened the field for private
investment into the aviation sector.
The Mongolian Judiciary and the Sanctity of Contracts
We find no concerted, systematic, institutional abuse specifically
targeted at foreign investment. In the case of the
judiciary-corruption aside (see A. 11 Corruption)-most problems
arise from ignorance of commercial principles rather than antipathy
to foreign investment. In principle, both the law and the judiciary
recognize the concept of sanctity of contracts. However, the
practical application of this concept lags, with both foreign and
domestic investors reporting inconsistent enforcement of contracts
by the judiciary. This inconsistency comes from the slow transition
from Marxist-based jurisprudence to more market oriented laws and
judicial practices. Recent decisions in banking and land use cases
in which contract provisions were upheld reflect a growing
commercial sophistication among Mongolia's judges. As more judges
receive commercial training and as Soviet era (1921-1990) jurists
retire, we expect to see the gradual improvement of the entire
judicial system.
Concerns over Exit Visa's
Although not strictly a judicial issue, in 2009 a trend intensified
involving abuse of the country's requirement for exit visas by both
Mongolian public and private entities to exert pressure on foreign
investors to settle commercial disputes. The required valid exit
visas are normally issued at the port of departure (e.g. the
international airport), but may be denied for a variety of reasons
including civil disputes, pending criminal investigation, or for
immigration violations. If denied for a civil dispute, the visa may
not be issued until either the dispute is resolved administratively
or a court has rendered a decision. Neither current law nor
regulations establish a clear process or time-table for settlement
of the issue. Nor does the law allow authorities to distinguish a
criminal and civil case when detaining a person. In fact, the
Mongolian government maintains the right to detain foreign citizens
indefinitely without appeal until the situation has been resolved.
Research into issue has revealed that investors from countries other
than the U.S. are being affected by abuse of the exit-visa system.
All cases have a similar profile. A foreign investor has a
commercial dispute with a Mongolian entity, often involving assets,
management practices, or contract compliance. The Mongolian
entities respond by filing either civil or criminal charges with
ULAANBAATA 00000016 007.2 OF 038
local police or prosecutorial authority. It is important to note
that at this point there need be no actual arrest warrant or any
sort of official determination that charges are warranted: Mere
complaint by an aggrieved party is sufficient grounds to deny exit.
We should note that Mongolian investors are not subject to similar
detention when involved in commercial disputes. Mongolian citizens
do not require exit visas to depart Mongolia and can only be denied
exit with if an actual arrest warrant has been issued.
An investor in this situation is effectively detained in Mongolia
indefinitely. Some foreign investors have resolved the impasse by
settling, allowing them to depart Mongolia. If unwilling to settle,
the foreign investor will have to undergo the full investigatory
process, which may lead to a court action. Investigations commonly
take up to six months, and in one case an American citizen has been
denied an exit visa for two years pending a criminal investigation
into a failed business deal. In addition, even if a dispute seems
settled, it can be filed in the same venue again -- if the local
police and prosecutors are willing -- or in a different venue.
Privatization Policies and Resistance of Mongolian firms to Foreign
Investment
Privatization policies have favored foreign investment in some key
industries, including banking and cashmere production. The bidding
processes for privatizations and other tenders have generally been
transparent, and after some legal disputes among the winners and
losers lasting from late 2006 through mid-2008, most participants
have accepted the results.
Although the GOM routinely announces that it plans to privatize its
remaining assets, we have seen little real movement to privatize
state holdings in the aviation, telecommunications, power, and
mining sectors. Recent moves by the GOM to acquire assets in the
minerals sector - especially in uranium and coal -suggest to some
that, to the contrary, the GOM has no intention to extract the state
from ownership.
That said, the GOM has recently discussed initial public offerings
(IPO) for certain state-owned power, infrastructure, and mining
holdings. To date, the IPO discussion has developed at the
conceptual level, with little focus on the details.
Foreign companies and investors are subject to the same legal regime
imposed on Mongolian domestic firms regarding incorporation and
corporate activities. For example, casinos are illegal under
Mongolian law; and so, neither Mongolians nor foreigners may own or
operate them (except in one specifically designated free trade zone,
although no casino has been established there).
Generally, Mongolian private businesses seek foreign participation
and equity in all sectors of the economy. That said, some Mongolian
businesses use Mongolian institutions to stop competitors, if they
can. These actions represent no animus against foreign investment
as such; rather, they reflect individual businesses desire to keep
competitors, Mongolian or foreign, at bay.
Key Investment Laws
The Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (FILM) transformed the
anti-business environment of the Soviet era into today's generally
investor-friendly regime. Under the old system, everything not
provided for in law was illegal. Because such economic activities
as franchising, leasing, joint venture companies were not
specifically mentioned in earlier Mongolian statutes, they were
technically illegal. In 1993, the GOM enacted FILM to legalize all
manner of foreign investment in Mongolia (amended in 2002 to allow
for representative offices and franchises). This law and its
subsequent amendments define broad ranges of activity that would
otherwise have limited validity under Mongolian law. It also
defines the meaning of foreign investment under the civil code
without limiting activities that foreign investors can conduct.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 008.2 OF 038
FILM also establishes registration procedures for foreign companies.
Specifically, the law requires that any investment with 25 percent
or more of FDI must register as a foreign-invested firm with the
government. The law creates a supervisory agency, the Foreign
Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA), that runs the
registration process, liaises among businesses and the Mongolian
government, and promotes in- and out-bound investments.
In 2008, the Parliament of Mongolia amended the FILM. The stated
intent of the revision was to improve FIFTA's ability to track
foreign investment and to enhance the services provided by FIFTA to
foreign investors. The amendments apply only to investments
registered after the new law came into force in summer 2008. The
new law has raised the minimum level for new foreign investment from
USD 1,000 to USD 100,000 and imposed a series of requirements on
foreign investors seeking registration. Registered foreign
companies must now have FIFTA certify that their by-laws,
environmental practices, their technologies, etc., comply with
standards determined by FIFTA.
FIFTA officials admit that procedures are still under development;
and that because they lack specific expertise in most of these
areas, they will have to consult with the relevant ministries and
agencies as they assesses each firm's request for investment
registration. FIFTA has also not clearly defined what the precise
processes it will use to evaluate investments, what the exact
standards will be for any given investment, how it will determine
those standards, and how an investor might seek redress if FIFTA
denies a registration request. Foreign investors have expressed
concern over what they perceive as FIFTA's broad and seemingly
un-transparent regulatory authority; however, we have not received
any complaint of abuse of these new powers to date.
New Ministerial Structure Impacts Foreign Investment
In late 2008, the Parliament re-organized the government structure
by combining various ministries and agencies in an effort to
streamline government functions. Relevant to foreign investors,
Parliament took trade policy and trade promotion functions that had
been vested in the former Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) and
FIFTA respectively and merged them with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The new Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) has
assumed direct control all formulation and execution of trade
policies and promotion efforts, which includes export promotion and
in-bound investment efforts. FIFTA is now under MFAT's direct
supervision. Other units of MIT were absorbed by the now-named
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry and Ministry of
Nature, Environment, and Tourism.
Ministry officials have stated that the government will concentrate
on promoting Mongolian exports and foreign investment into Mongolia.
They want FIFTA to resemble counterpart agencies in South Korea,
Japan, or the U.S.; and have told both us and businesses that they
plan to get FIFTA out of the regulatory business. The intent is to
limit FIFTA's activities to supporting business in their efforts to
work in Mongolia and to registering in-bound investment for purposes
of investment tracking only.
A.2 CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES
The Mongolian government employs a limited regulatory regime for
controlling foreign exchange for investment remittances and
maintains exceptionally liberal policies for these transactions.
Foreign and domestic businesses report no problems converting or
transferring investment funds, profits and revenues, loan
repayments, or lease payments into whatever currency they wish to
wherever they wish. There is no difficulty in obtaining foreign
exchange, whether the investor wants Chinese Renminbi, Euros,
English Pounds, Rubles, or U.S. Dollars.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 009.2 OF 038
In regards to domestic transactions, the Parliament of Mongolia in
2009 closed a loophole that allowed local transactions to occur in
any currency desired. Now, all domestic transactions must be
conducted in Mongolia's national currency, the Tugrik, excepting
those entities allowed specific waivers as determined by the
Mongolian central bank, the Bank of Mongolia.
The Mongolian government wants funds to flow easily in and out of
the nation, with one exception. Foreign-held interest bearing
dollar accounts remain subject to a 20 percent withholding tax. The
bank retains 20 percent of all such interest payments sent abroad,
and remits this withholding to the Tax Authority of Mongolia.
Otherwise, businesses report no delays in remitting investment
returns or receiving in-bound funds. Most transfers occur within
1-2 business days or at most a single business week.
Ease of transfer aside, foreign investors criticize Mongolia's lack
of sophisticated mechanisms for converting currencies and parking
money. Letters of credit are difficult to obtain, and legal
parallel markets do not exist in the form of government dollar
denominated bonds or other instruments for parking funds in lieu of
payment. Many Mongolian financial institutions lack experience with
these arrangements. Moreover, Mongolian banking law currently
provides incomplete statutory grounds and regulatory support for the
activity to take place. The immediate impact has been to limit
access to certain types of foreign capital, as international
companies resist parking cash in Mongolian banks or in local debt
instruments.
A.3 EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION
Mongolia respects property rights as they apply to most asset types.
In 2009, we detected no wide-scale changes in policies, statutes,
or regulations related to the use and ownership of private property.
Foreigners face no legal bias in asset ownership (except that only
citizens of Mongolian may own land) or how they structure ownership.
Foreign investors need not seek local partners or share ownership
of most assets or endeavors as a condition of doing business.
However, in foreign-investor dependent crucial mining sector, 2009
saw the government of Mongolia (GOM) cross from actions that might
represent "creeping expropriation" to what many consider explicitly
expropriatory acts sanctioned through force of law, especially in
the uranium mining sector.
Security of Ownership
Mongolia and the United States signed and ratified a Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) which entered in force in 1997, and which
specifically enjoins both signatories from expropriatory acts
against private property and investments. In addition, both
Mongolian law and the national constitution recognize private
property and use rights and specifically bar the government from
expropriation of such assets. To date, the government of Mongolia
(GOM) has not expropriated any American property or assets. Thus,
we have no precedent from which to assess how the Mongolian system
would respond to seizure and compensation.
Like most governments, the Mongolian government can claim land or
restrict use rights in the national interest. Currently, this means
little, as most land outside Mongolia's few urban centers remains
government property, as provided in Mongolia's constitution. The
government has no plans to privatize these vast countryside
holdings, but it leases parcels for such economic activities as
mining, pasturage, timbering, etc. This practice remains in flux
because the government must still determine how to let these rights
and what fees to charge. Except for mining, most foreign firms
remain inactive in these sectors.
Since May 2003, land in the urban areas has been privatized to
citizens of Mongolia or leased to both citizens and foreigners for
periods ranging from 3-90 years. The legislation and implementing
regulations are evolving, but so far investors believe that the GOM
ULAANBAATA 00000016 010.2 OF 038
generally respects recently enacted property rights and leases.
I: Implications of the Current Minerals Laws
Minerals Law of 2006
We closely watch the key mining sector, Mongolia's major foreign
exchange earner and chief engine for economic and commercial growth
and development. The current Minerals Law has several provisions
that raise red flags for investors and observers alike. The law
does not allow the GOM to usurp rights to explore and exploit
natural mineral, metal, and hydrocarbons resources per se. Instead,
the law imposes procedural requirements and grants powers to
central, provincial, and local officials - powers that, if abused,
might prevent mineral license holders from exercising their
exploration or mining rights. The current law has the potential to
deny the rights holder access to his rights without formally
revoking use rights.
An example is the new tender process for apportioning some
exploration rights. The old law awarded exploration rights on a
"first come, first served" basis, a process that gave little
discretion to government officials to intervene. The new law lays
out a different procedure for obtaining exploration rights on land
explored with state funds or lands where the current holder has
forfeited exploration rights. The Mineral Resources Authority of
Mongolia (MRAM) will tender such exploration rights only to firms
technically qualified to conduct minerals work. The new tender
procedure neither requires nor allows for a cash-bid. Only the
technical merits of exploration proposals will determine who gains
exploration rights. MRAM staff has the authority and responsibility
to assess the merits of proposals to determine who wins the
tenders.
Both MRAM and its supervising authority, the Ministry of Mineral
Resources and Energy, now have broad discretionary authority to
select who will get tenements. Under the current system, it is
possible for a company to prospect virgin territory, and scope out a
potential exploration site, only to risk losing the site should MRAM
decide to grant the rights to another exploration company. This
authority disturbs miners, who fear this power will be the source of
corruption and arbitrary decisions by MRAM. Evidence suggests that
local mining guilds will define an expert in Mongolian mining as a
person who received a degree from a Mongolian institution, such as
the National University, rather than an internationally recognized
institution. While this enforced employment program for Mongolian
geologists would be an annoyance, the discretionary power MRAM now
has generates the most concern. If MRAM rejects a firm's experts
and mining plan as unqualified, no recourse is spelled out under the
new law, and the firm will in effect lose its rights.
The concept of "expertise" allows another potential avenue for
expropriation of rights by denying or preventing their use. The law
has the potential to limit the ability of rights holders to seek
financing, because it forbids transfer of mining licenses and
exploration rights to non-qualified individuals. Consequently, a
miner will not be able to offer his licenses as secured collateral
to banks or to any lender lacking the professional qualifications to
receive these rights if the miner defaulted on his debt obligations.
A given bank is unlikely to set up a "qualified" mining firm just
to receive a pledged license offered as collateral. Thus, the law
limits the investment pool that a mining firm might tap to finance
its mine, which might prevent bringing a property into production,
again denying licensees access to their legal economic rights.
The current law removed from its predecessor the Mongol word for
"exclusive" from the grant of exploration rights. The old article
read, "To conduct exclusive exploration for minerals within the
boundaries of an exploration area in accordance with this law." The
new article reads, "To conduct exploration for minerals. . . ." It
is unclear what, if anything, this deletion means. However, the
deletion would seem to allow the government to apportion mineral
ULAANBAATA 00000016 011.2 OF 038
rights per metal or mineral rather than as a whole, which has been
the standard practice. The deletion was apparently done
intentionally, as the word appeared in earlier drafts, right up to
the passage of the law.
Investors and observers are also concerned about new authority
granted to the MRAM Chairman to approve transfers of existing and
new licenses. The law grants final approval authority to the MRAM,
without specifying any check or balance on this official's
authority. This power is not a revocation but if abused would
certainly prevent exercise of economic rights.
Complicating matters is that in 2008 MRAM had been moved under the
direct authority of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy in
a sweeping re-organization of the government. Prior to this
restructuring, MRAM had been a quasi-independent agency, the acts of
which did not require ministerial approval. In the new structure,
the ministry can intervene in the registration and transfer of
exploration and mining licenses. The ministry seems to have only
intervened in cases where the license involves a "strategic"
deposit. (See A.1 Openness to Foreign Investment for explanation of
strategic deposits.) In this specific category, ministerial
officials have ordered MRAM to freeze all transfers and transactions
involving properties near or in strategic deposits, which includes
uranium deposits of any size and massive coal and copper deposits
near the Chinese border. Further, these same officials have
indicated that the government may then revoke the rights of those
holding exploration rights or mining licenses in or near strategic
deposits. Although the law seems to allow for compensation, the
ministry has not presented formal compensation packages or even
issued compensation guidelines to those potentially affected by its
actions.
Expropriatory Aspects of the 2009 Law on Uranium Mining
In 2009 the Parliament passed a new law imposing significant new
controls on mining and processing uranium in Mongolia. The law
created a new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of
Mongolia (NRA), and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold
assets that the government will acquire from current rights holders.
The law imposes several key policies:
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses
with the NRA, for a fee.
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 51
percent of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop
the mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium
property.
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing
for mineral and metal resources. Prior to the Uranium Law,
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to
other mineral and metals exploration.
To many foreign and domestic investors, this law is outright,
statutorily sanctioned expropriation, which heretofore had not been
present in Mongolia. Although the Minerals Law of Mongolia and
other pieces of legislation officially state that the GOM must
compensate rights holders for any taking, the Uranium Law gives the
GOM the unfettered right to take uranium holdings from whomever it
will with no obligation to compensate the rights holders.
Complicating the issue is that the law seems to conflate the deposit
and company mining the deposit, allowing the GOM to claim an
uncompensated share in any entity that might mine the deposit. In
ULAANBAATA 00000016 012.2 OF 038
effect, the GOM is demanding a free-carried, non-compensated
interest of no less than 51 percent of any uranium mine.
Acts of Provincial Administrations:
With regard to the issuance of both exploration permits and mining
licenses, provincial officials reportedly routinely use their
authority arbitrarily to block access to mining rights legally
granted under the current law. For example, reports regularly
circulate that some provincial government officials use their
authority to designate land as "special use zones" to usurp mining
exploration tenements. In a common technique, provincial governors
often reclassify property that has never felt the touch of the plow
or felt the tread of a tourist for agricultural use or cultural
tourism respectively, although the central government has legally
granted exploration rights to miners. In one case, a miner could
not gain access to the subsurface resources because the provincial
government claimed that doing so would damage a potato farm that had
suddenly appeared over the site.
Other miners harshly criticize the misuse of the local officials'
rights to comment on permits for water use and mining licenses.
Comments are advisory, and have limited legal force regarding
disallowing activity, but the central government routinely hesitates
to reject a governor's negative comment no matter the motives behind
it. The effect has been to stop progress for months, limiting
access to the resource and costing rights holders' time and money.
Whatever the motives, these provincial actions are often seen as a
creeping bureaucratic expropriation through denial of access and use
rights. The current Minerals Law provides no clear limit on
provincial control of permits and special use rights or guidance on
how to apply these powers beyond codifying that the provincial and
local authorities have some authority over activities occurring in
their provinces and soums (counties).
Faced with these unclear boundaries of authority, the central
government often interprets the rules and regulations differently
from the provincial authorities, creating administrative conflicts
among the various stakeholders. The central government acknowledges
the problematic ambiguity but has yet to definitively clarify the
situation in law or practice, even though the situation threatens
accessing one's rights. Mongolian and foreign permit holders have
advised the government that letting this problem fester raises
perceptions among investors that they may risk losing their economic
rights, which can scare away inbound investors.
Expansion of License Revocation Powers to the Soum Level
The recently passed Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration
in Water Basins and Forested Areas of 2009 represents a considerable
extension of unregulated authority to Mongolia's 320 soum (county)
administrations in regards to mining activities within their
respective jurisdictions.
In 2009, the Parliament prohibited mining in water basins and
forested areas of Mongolia. The stated and laudatory intent was to
limit environmental damage caused primarily by placer gold mining in
and around forests and watersheds. The law imposes the following
restrictions on exploration and mining rights:
--Requires the government of Mongolia to revoke or modify licenses
to explore for any and all mineral resources within an area no less
than 200 meters from a water or forest resource.
--Requires the government to compensate rights holders for
exploration expenses already incurred or revenue lost from actual
mining operations.
--Empowers local officials, the soum or county governors, to
determine the actual areas which can be mined. In effect, the local
official can extend the 200 meter minimum at his discretion.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 013.2 OF 038
Current rights holders are concerned that the power of local
governors to curtail mining in their respective jurisdictions seems
unlimited and unregulated. Although the governor cannot allow
mining within the 200 meter limit, the law sets no upper limit on
mining near water courses and forests in the respective soum. The
local administration has full discretion to prohibit operations 400
meters, 600, 1000, or more. Mining companies have to work out the
issue with the local governor; and should any company disagree with
a given soum administration's ruling, the law makes no provision for
administrative appeal. A company would then have to pursue redress
through a lengthy case in Mongolia's courts. In either case, the
rights holder would lose access to their economic rights for a
protracted period or permanently.
A.4 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The GOM consistently supports transparent, equitable dispute
settlements, but executing good intentions has proven problematic.
These problems largely stem from a lack of experience with standard
commercial practices rather than from any systemic intent by public
or private entities to target foreign investors. The framework of
laws and procedures is functional, but many judges remain ignorant
of commercial principles.
Problems with Dispute Settlement in Mongolia's Courts
Court structure is straightforward and supports dispute settlement.
Disputants know the procedures and the venues. Plaintiffs bring
cases at the district court level before a single district judge or
panel of judges, depending on the complexity and importance of the
case. The district court renders its verdict. Either party can
appeal this decision to the Ulaanbaatar City Court, which rules on
matters of fact as well as matters of law. It may uphold the
verdict, send it back for reconsideration or nullify the judgment.
Disputants may then take the case to the Mongolian Supreme Court for
a final review. Matters regarding the constitutionality of laws and
regulations may be taken directly before the Constitutional Court of
Mongolia (the "Tsetz") by Mongolian Citizens, Foreign Citizens, or
Stateless Persons residing legally in Mongolia.
Problems arise for several reasons. First, commercial law in
Mongolia and broad understanding of it remain in flux. New laws and
regulations on contracts, investment, corporate structures, leasing,
banking, etc. have been passed or are being considered at both the
ministerial and parliamentary levels. Mongolian civil law does not
work on precedents but from application of the statute as written.
If a law is vague or does not cover a particular commercial
activity, the judge's remit to adjudicate can be severely limited or
non-existent. For example, until recently leasing did not exist in
the Mongolian civil law code as such, but seemed to be covered under
various aspects of Mongolian civil law regarding contracts and other
agreements. But judgments on leasing made under these laws might
not have applied to an arrangement not otherwise specifically
recognized under its own exclusive law. Further, because precedents
are not legally relevant or binding on other judges and Mongolian
courts, decisions reached in one case have no legal force in other
suits, even when the circumstances are similar or even before the
same court and judges.
Trained in the former Soviet era, many judges lack training in or
remain ignorant of commercial principles, in some cases willfully.
They dismiss such concepts as the sanctity of the contract. This is
not a problem of the law, which recognizes contracts, but what most
conclude is faulty interpretation. In several cases courts have
misinterpreted provisions regarding leases and loan contracts,
allegedly intentionally in some cases. Judges regularly ignore
terms of a contract in their decisions. If someone defaults on a
loan, the courts often order assets returned without requiring the
debtor to compensate the creditor for any loss of value. Judges
routinely assert that the creditor has recovered the asset, such as
it is, and that is enough. Bad faith and loss of value simply have
no formal standing in judicial calculations of equity.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 014.2 OF 038
Replacing old-school judges is not an option. It is politically
impossible-if not functionally impractical-for the Mongolians to
dismiss its cadre of Soviet-era judges. There is a realistic hope
that young justices, trained in modern commercial principles by
international experts, will gradually improve judicial protections
for commercial activities in Mongolia. Lately, we have seen better
decisions in several cases involving Americans seeking to recover on
debts and contractual fees and to hold Mongolian government entities
to the terms of their respective contracts and regulations, but
these results tend to be limited to courts where modern-educated
judges preside.
Bankruptcy and Debt Collection
Mongolia's bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the
rights of creditors need serious reform. Mongolian law allows for
mortgages and other loan instruments backed with securitized
collateral. However, rudimentary systems for determining title and
liens and for collecting on debts make lending on local security
risky. Banks frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are
barely workable and unfair to creditors.
Although a system exists to register immovable property-structures
and real estate-for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current
system does not record existing liens against immovable property. In
addition, no system exists to register ownership of, and liens on,
movable property. Consequently, Mongolian lenders face the added
risk of lending on collateral that the debtor may not actually own
or which may have already been offered as security for another debt.
It is hoped that a project sponsored by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation to create a more modern and efficient property
registration system will help improve the ability of creditors and
debtors to prove ownership. For program details go to
http://www.mca.mn.
Overall, the legal system does recognize the concept of
collateralized assets provided as security for loans, investment
capital, or other debt-based financial mechanisms. The legal system
also provides for foreclosure, but this process is exceptionally
onerous and time consuming. A 2005 change to Mongolian law
attempted to simplify the process by allowing creditors to foreclose
without judicial review. Prior to this law, all creditors had to go
to court to collect on securitized collateral, adding months to the
entire collection process. However, the Constitutional Court of
Mongolia voided the law on constitutional grounds, slowing down debt
collection to pre-2005 levels. Waits of up to 24 months for final
liquidations and settlement of security were not uncommon.
Once a judgment is rendered, the disputant faces a relatively
hostile environment to execute the court's decision. For example, a
bank collecting on a debt in Mongolia must allow debtors to put
forward assets for auction and set the minimum bid price for those
assets. If assets do not sell, a second round of auctions occurs in
which a reduced minimum bid is put forward. The State Collection
Office (SCO) supervises this process but does not set the price.
However, the SCO receives 10 percent from the sales price or from
the second auction minimum price even if there is no sale.
The SCO does not allow collateralized assets to be valued by neutral
third parties. Because it derives income from the forced sale of
assets, the SCO has a conflict of interest; and, anecdotally, seems
to have failed as an impartial arbiter between debtors and
creditors. For banks, this has meant that forcing a company into
bankruptcy may be the safest way to recover rather than forcing
piecemeal sales of assets. This approach automatically puts all
assets into play rather than those selected by the debtor. However,
this procedure is onerous without a clear process behind it.
Purchase financing remains tricky. For example, a local car dealer
financed an auto for USD 20,000 down and USD 60,000 in credit,
complete with a local bank guarantee. The buyer subsequently
defaulted on the loan, the bank refused to honor its guarantee, and
ULAANBAATA 00000016 015.2 OF 038
the dealer took the buyer to court. Under current Mongolian law,
interest payments are suspended for the duration of such a case,
from first filing to final appeal before the Supreme Court of
Mongolia. Possibly months of interest-free time can pass while the
asset rusts in an impound lot. In this case, the dealer simply
reclaimed the car and dropped the lawsuit, swallowing the lost
interest payments and loss of value on the car. Domestic and
foreign businesses often respond by requiring customers to pay in
cash, limiting sales and the expansion of the economy.
Binding Arbitration: International and Domestic
The Mongolian government supports and will submit to both binding
arbitration and international settlement procedures. However,
glitches remain in local execution. Mongolia ratified the
Washington Convention and joined the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1991. It also signed and
ratified the New York Convention in 1994.
To our knowledge, the government of Mongolia has accepted
international arbitration in five disputes where claimants have
asserted the government reneged on a sovereign guarantee to
indemnify them. In all cases the government has consistently
declared that it would honor the arbitrators' judgments. However,
this resolution has not been put to the test. In the four cases
where a decision has been rendered, Mongolia has won each case; and
so, its commitment to imposing a negative international arbitral
decision remains untested.
More widely, Mongolian businesses partnered with foreign investors
accept international arbitration, as do government agencies that
contract business with foreign investors, rather than avail
themselves of the Arbitration Bureau operated by the Mongolian
National Chamber of Commerce and Industry. These entities tell us
that they seek redress abroad because they perceive that domestic
arbitrators are too politicized, unfamiliar with commercial
practices, and too self-interested to render fair decisions.
Although arbitration is widely accepted among business people and
elements of the government, support for binding international
arbitration has not penetrated local Mongolian agencies responsible
for executing judgments. In two cases, the Mongolian-state-owned
copper mine lost two international arbitral cases. The awards were
certified and recognized as valid and enforceable by Mongolian
courts. But the local bailiff's office has consistently failed to
execute the collection orders. Local business people routinely cite
the failure of SCO and the bailiffs to enforce court-ordered
foreclosures and judgments as the most common problem threatening
resolution of debt-driven disputes.
A.5 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES
Mongolia imposes few performance requirements on, and offers few
incentives to, investors. The few requirements imposed are not
onerous and do not limit foreign participation in any sector of the
economy. Performance requirements are applied somewhat differently
to foreign investors in a limited number of sectors.
Formally quite generous to foreign investors, the current Tax Law of
Mongolia (amended in 2006) offers few incentives and exemptions.
While preferential tax agreements made with most foreign investors
have been allowed to run their courses, the government of Mongolia
(GOM) has attempted to limit both exemptions and incentives and to
make sure that tax preferences offered are available to both foreign
and domestic investors.
Current exemptions are granted for imports of staples as flour and
for imports in certain sectors targeted for growth, such as the
agriculture sector. Exemptions apply to both import duties and
Mongolia's value-added tax (VAT). In addition, the GOM will extend
a 10percent tax credit on case by case basis to investments in such
key sectors as mining, agriculture, and infrastructure.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 016.2 OF 038
Foreign investors have accepted phasing out of tax incentives,
because the amendments have brought some needed best practices to
the tax code. These include provision for 8-year
loss-carry-forwards, five-year accelerated depreciation, and more
deductions for legitimate business expenses including but not
limited to marketing and training expenses.
Revocation of the VAT Exemption
Investors view 2009's changes into the tax code's treatment of
exemptions as something of a mixed bag. On the down side,
Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption available on value-added
tax (VAT) taxes of 10percent on equipment used to bring a given mine
into production, except on equipment to be used in the production of
highly processed mining products. For example, if the Oyu Tolgoi
(OT) copper-gold project were to smelt copper, imported equipment
supporting production of metallic copper might qualify for an
exemption from the VAT. However, to promote value-added production
in Mongolia, the GOM defines the production of copper concentrate
-OT's likely copper product - as non-value-added output; and so,
equipment imported to develop and operate this sort of operation
would not qualify for the 10percent VAT exemption.
Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines have long
development lead times before production begins, either waive or do
not tax such imports at all. Parliament, with no consultation with
investors, international advisors provided by donor organizations,
or even with its own tax officials, chose to impose the VAT, which
immediately makes Mongolian mining costs 10percent higher than they
would otherwise be, impairing competitiveness and dramatically
varying from global practice.
Pro-Investment Changes to the Tax Code
On the plus side, Parliament revised both the Windfall Profit Tax
(WPT) and loss-carry forward provisions. Under the old regime, the
WPT imposed a 68percent tax on the profits from gold and copper
mining respectively. (For more details on the WPT see Chapter A.1:
Openness of Government to Foreign Investment.) The recent OT
Investment Agreement entailed further amendment to the WPT as a
condition precedent to its passage. OT's private investors
successfully argued that they would not be able to operate OT
commercially if burdened with the WPT. Consequently, Parliament
amended the WPT Law: The WPT will officially end for all copper
concentrate and gold products in 2011.
Regarding the granting of more generous loss carry-forward
provisions, as a condition precedent of passing the OT Agreement,
Parliament extended the provision from two (2) years to eight (8)
years after incurring a loss. Most investors find eight years
sufficient for many Mongolian investments that require impose long,
expensive development horizons before producing any sort of profit.
Few Restrictions on Foreign Investment
The government applies the same geographical restrictions to both
foreign and domestic investors. Existing restrictions involve
border security, environmental concerns, or local use rights. There
are no onerous or discriminatory visas, residence, or work permits
requirements imposed on American investors. Generally, foreign
investors need not use local goods, services, or equity, or engage
in substitution of imports. Neither foreign nor domestic businesses
need purchase from local sources or export a certain percentage of
output, or have access to foreign exchange in relation to their
exports.
Although there remains no formal law requiring the use of local
goods and services, the GOM encourages firms to do value-added
production in Mongolia, especially for firms engaged in natural
resource extraction. All Mongolian senior officials and politicians
make in-country processing a consistent feature of their public and
private policy statements regarding the development of mining. For
ULAANBAATA 00000016 017.2 OF 038
example, the current but soon to sunset WPT applied the tax to
copper concentrate, but exempted metallic copper produced in
Mongolia. Recently concluded negotiations on the OT copper-gold
project ended with commitments by the companies to explore copper
smelting in Mongolia. Government talks on coal production
constantly feature discussions of power generation and coals-to-
liquid processing in Mongolia. Government plans also call for
increased investment in businesses and activities that keep the
"value" of a resource in Mongolia. Consequently, firms should
continue to expect the GOM to press aggressively for value-added
production in Mongolia.
Generally, foreign investors set their own export and production
targets without concern for government imposed targets or
requirements. There is no requirement to transfer technology. As
a matter of law, the government imposes no offset requirements for
major procurements. Certain tenders may require bidders to agree to
levels of local employment or to fund certain facilities as a
condition of the tender, but as matter of course such conditions are
not the normal approach of the government in its tendering and
procurement policies.
Investors, not the Mongolian government, make arrangements regarding
technology, intellectual property, and similar resources and may
generally finance as they see fit. Foreign investors need sell no
shares to Mongolian nationals. Equity stakes are generally at the
complete discretion of investors, Mongolian or foreign -- with one
key exception for strategic mining assets (For more detail on what
constitutes a strategic mining asset see Chapter A.1: Openness of
Government to Foreign Investment). Although Mongolia imposes no
official statutory or regulatory requirement, the GOM, as a matter
of foreign policy, sometimes negotiates restrictions on what sort of
financing foreign investors may obtain and with whom those investors
might partner or to whom they might sell shares or equity stakes.
These restrictive covenants will most likely be imposed in certain
sectors where the investment is determined to have national impact
or national security concerns, especially in the key mining sector.
Regarding employment, investors can locate and hire workers without
using hiring agencies-as long as hiring practices are consistent
with Mongolian Labor Law. However, Mongolian law requires companies
to employ Mongolian workers in certain labor categories whenever a
Mongolian can perform the task as well as a foreigner. This law
generally applies to unskilled labor categories and not areas where
a high degree of technical expertise not existing in Mongolia is
required. The law does provide an escape hatch for all employers.
Should an employer seek to hire a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot
obtain a waiver from the Ministry of Labor for that employee, the
employer can pay a fee of around USD140 per employee per month.
Depending on the importance of a project, the Ministry of Labor may
grant an employer a 50percent exemption of the waiver fees as an
incentive.
Limited Performance Requirements
Requirements in the Petroleum and Mining Sectors
Performance requirements are sparingly imposed on investors in
Mongolia with the exception of petroleum and mining exploration
firms. The Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (PAM) issues petroleum
exploration blocks to firms, which then agree to conduct exploration
activities. The size and scope of these activities are agreed upon
between PAM and are binding. If the firm fails to fulfill
exploration commitments, it must pay a penalty to PAM based on the
amount of hectares in the exploration block, or return the block to
PAM. These procedures apply to all investors in the petroleum
exploration sector.
Under the current Minerals Law of Mongolia, receiving and keeping
exploration licenses depends on conducting actual exploration work.
Each year exploration firms must submit a work plan and report on
ULAANBAATA 00000016 018.2 OF 038
the execution of the previous year's performance commitments, all of
which are subject to annual verification by the Minerals Authority
of Mongolia (MRAM). Failure to comply with work requirements may
result in fines, suspension, or even revocation of exploration
rights. Work commitments expressed in terms of US dollar expenses
per hectare per year:
-2nd and 3rd years miners must spend no less than US D.50 per
hectare on exploration
--4th to 6th years miners must spend no less than US D1.00 per
hectare on exploration
--7th to 9th years miners must spend no less than US D1.50 per
hectare on exploration
In addition to these performance requirements, the law also requires
holders of mining licenses for projects of strategic importance to
sell no less than 10percent of company shares on the Mongolian Stock
Exchange. Vaguely presented in the statute, the GOM has provided no
formal clarification in law or regulation of what this provision
means in practical terms or how it is to be implemented.
In 2009 the Parliament passed a new law imposing significant new
controls on mining and processing uranium in Mongolia. This law
created a new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of
Mongolia (NRA) and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold
assets that the government will acquire from current rights holders.
The law imposes several conditions:
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses
with the NRA, for a fee.
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 50percent
of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop the
mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium
property.
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing
for mineral and metal resources. Prior to the Uranium Law,
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to
other mineral and metals exploration
Requirements Imposed on Foreign Investors Only
All foreign investors must register with the Foreign Investment and
Foreign trade Agency (FIFTA). The Foreign Investment Law of
Mongolia requires all foreign investors to show a minimum of USD
100,000 in assets (cash, working stock, property, etc.) registered
in Mongolia as a precondition for registration. In addition to this
particular requirement, all foreign investors must pay an initial
processing fee of some 12, 000 Mongolian tugrik or about USD 8.00.
Foreign Investors must then pay a yearly prolongation fee of 6,000
Mongolian tugrik or about USD 4.00.
In addition to these fees, foreign investors must annually report on
their activities for the coming year to the government through
FIFTA. Businesses need not fulfill plans set out in this report,
but failure to report may result in non-issuance of licenses and
registrations and suspension of activities. This requirement
differs from that imposed on domestic investors and businesses.
Local investors have no yearly reporting requirement. Mongolians
pay lower registration fees, which vary too much to say with any
precision what the fees actually are.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 019.2 OF 038
FIFTA explains that the higher registration costs for foreign
investors arise from the need to compensate for the services it
provides to foreign investors, including assistance with
registrations, liaison services, trouble-shooting, etc. The
different reporting requirements provide the government with a
clearer picture of foreign investment in Mongolia. Foreign
investors are generally aware of FIFTA's arguments and largely
accept them, but they question the need for annual registrations.
Investors recommend that FIFTA simply charge an annual fee rather
than require businesses to submit a new application each year.
Regarding reports, foreign businesses are concerned about the
security of their proprietary information. Several foreign
investors have claimed that agents of FIFTA routinely use or sell
information on business plans and financial data. We have yet to
verify these claims, but FIFTA acknowledges that data security
largely depends on the honesty of its staff, as there are few
internal controls over access to the annual reports.
Tariffs
Mongolia has one of Asia's least restrictive tariff regimes. Its
export and import policies do not harm or inhibit foreign
investment. Low by world standards, tariffs of 5percent on most
products are applied across the board to all firms, albeit with some
concerns about consistency of application and valuation. However,
some non-tariff barriers, such as phyto-sanitary regulations, exist
that limit both foreign and domestic competition in the fields of
pharmaceutical imports and food imports and exports. The testing
requirements for imported drugs, food products, chemicals,
construction materials, etc., are extremely nontransparent,
inconsistent, and onerous. When companies attempt to clarify what
the rules for importing such products into the country are, they
receive contradictory information from multiple agencies.
WTO TRIMS Requirements
Mongolia employs no measures inconsistent with WTO TRIMs
requirements, nor has anyone alleged that any such violation has
occurred.
A.6 RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT
Mongolia has one of Asia's most liberal ownership and establishment
regimes. Unless otherwise forbidden by law, foreign and domestic
businesses may establish and engage in any form of remunerative
activity. All businesses can start up, buy, sell, merge; in short,
do whatever they wish with their assets and firms, with exceptions
in the mining and petroleum sectors.
Competition from the State-Owned Sector
Mongolia passed and implemented a competition law applying to
foreign, domestic, and state-owned entities active in Mongolia. As
a practical matter, competition between state-owned and private
businesses has been declining for the simple reason that many
parastatals have been privatized. The exceptions are the
state-owned power and telecom industries, a national airline
(international only at present), the national rail system
(half-owned by Russia), several coal mines, and a large copper
mining and concentration facility (also half-owned by Russia).
Currently, firms from Mongolia, China, Japan, Europe, Canada, and
the U.S. are actively seeking opportunities for renewable and
traditional power generation in Mongolia. However, few want to
invest in the power generation field until the regulatory and
statutory framework for private power generation firms up and
tariffs are set at rates allowing profits.
Regarding its railway sector, Mongolia has no plans to privatize its
existing railroad jointly held with the government of Russia, but
ULAANBAATA 00000016 020.2 OF 038
current law does allow private firms to build, operate, and transfer
new railroads to the state. Under this law several private mining
companies have proposed rail links, and obtained licenses to
construct these new lines from their respective coal mines to the
Chinese border or to the currently operating spur of the
Trans-Siberian Railroad. However, because landlocked Mongolia and
its neighbors have yet to resolve transnational shipping issues,
companies may not be able to access rights granted under these
licenses.
Although the trend had been for the GOM to extract itself from
ownership of firms and other commercial assets, both the current
Minerals Law of Mongolia and the 2009 Uranium Law bring the state
back into mining. (See Chapter A.1: Openness of Government to
Foreign Investment for fuller discussions of both the 2009 Uranium
Law and Minerals Law) Under both laws, the GOM granted itself the
right to acquire equity stakes ranging from 34 percent to perhaps
100 percent of certain deposits deemed strategic for the nation.
Once acquired, these assets are to be placed with one of two
state-owned management companies: Erdenes MGL, for non-uranium
assets; or MonAtom for uranium resources. These companies are then
mandated to use the proceeds from their respective activities for
the benefit of the Mongolian people.
The role of state as an equity owner, in terms of management of
revenues and operation of the mining asset, remains unclear at this
point. There are some concerns over the capacity of the GOM to
deal with conflicts of interest arising from its position as both
regulator and owner of these strategic assets. Specifically, firms
are worried that the GOM's desire to maximize local procurement,
employment, and revenues may comprise the long term commercial
viability of any mining project. In addition, discussions are
underway to set up three new state-owned holding entities to manage
assets in three priority areas -- mining, energy, and infrastructure
-- then take the companies public to raise investment revenues
through the capital markets.
A.7 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
The right to own private, movable and immovable property is
recognized under Mongolian law. Regardless of citizenship (except
for land which only citizens of Mongolia can own), owners can do as
they wish with their property. One can collateralize real and
movable property. If debtors default on such secured loans,
creditors do have recourse under Mongolian law to recover debts by
seizing and disposing of property offered as security. The only
exceptions to this liberal environment are current mining laws,
which either bar transfer of exploration and mining licenses to
third parties lacking professional mining qualifications or status
as a Mongolian registered entity, or which threaten to expropriate
without compensation certain mineral holdings outright.
Mongolia's Current Regime to Protect Creditors
The current protection regime for creditors functions but needs
reform. The legal system presents the greatest pitfalls. Although
the courts recognize property rights in concept, they have a
checkered record of protecting and facilitating acquisition and
disposition of assets in practice. Part of the problem is ignorance
of, and inexperience with, standard practices regarding land,
leases, buildings, and mortgages. As noted in Chapter A.4 Dispute
Settlement, some judges, largely out of ignorance of the concepts,
have failed to recognize these practices. Some newly trained judges
are making a good faith effort to uphold property rights, but need
time to learn how to adjudicate such cases.
Mongolia's bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the
rights of creditors need reform. Mongolian law allows for mortgages
and other loan instruments backed with securitized collateral.
However, rudimentary systems for determining title and liens and for
collecting on debts make lending on local security risky. Banks
frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are barely
ULAANBAATA 00000016 021.2 OF 038
workable and unfair to creditors.
Although a system exists to register immovable property-structures
and real estate-for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current
system does not record existing liens on immovable property; nor
does the current system record ownership and liens on movable
property. Consequently, Mongolian lenders risk lending on
collateral that the debtor may not actually own or which may have
already been offered as security for another debt. It is hoped that
a project sponsored by the Millennium Challenge Corporation to
create a more modern and efficient property registration system will
go some way to improving the ability of creditors and debtors to
prove ownership. For details: http://www.mca.mn.
Overall, the legal system recognizes the concept of collaterized
assets as security for loans, investment capital, or other
debt-based financial mechanisms. The legal system also provides for
foreclosure, but this process has proven exceptionally burdensome
and time consuming. Current law bars creditors from non-judicial
foreclosure, requiring them to submit all contested foreclosure
actions for judicial review through Mongolia's court system. This
approach slows debt collection substantially: Waits of up to 24
months for final liquidations and settlement of security are not
uncommon.
Debt Collection Procedures
Even with the delays, getting a ruling is relatively easy compared
to executing the court's decision. The problem is not the law but
the enforcement. A judge orders the State Collection Office (SCO)
to move on the assets of the debtor. The SCO orders district
bailiffs to seize and turn those assets over to the state, which
then distributes them to creditors. However, foreign and domestic
investors claim that the state collection office and the district
bailiffs frequently fail in their responsibilities to both courts
and creditors.
In some cases, bailiffs refuse to enforce the court orders. The
perception is that they do so because they have been bribed or
otherwise suborned. Bailiffs are often local agents who fear local
retribution against them and their interests if they collect in
their localities. In some cases, bailiffs will not collect unless
the creditor provides bodyguards during seizure of assets.
Creditors also have reason to believe that the state collection
office accepts payments from debtors to delay seizure of assets.
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Mongolia supports intellectual property rights (IPR) in general and
has protected American rights in particular. It has joined the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and signed and
ratified most treaties and conventions, including the WTO TRIPS
agreement. The WIPO Internet treaties have been signed but remain
un-ratified by Parliament. However, even if a convention is
un-ratified, the Mongolian government and its intellectual property
rights enforcer, the Intellectual Property Office of Mongolia
(IPOM), make a good faith effort to honor these agreements.
Under TRIPS and Mongolian law, the Mongolian Customs Authority (MCA)
and the Economic Crimes Unit of the National Police (ECU) also have
an obligation to protect IPR. MCA can seize shipments at the
border. The ECU has the exclusive power to conduct criminal
investigations and bring criminal charges against IPR pirates. The
IPOM has the administrative authority to investigate and seize fakes
without court order. Of these three, the IPOM makes the most
consistent good faith effort to fulfill its mandates.
Problems stem from ignorance of the importance of intellectual
property to Mongolia and of the obligations imposed by TRIPS on
member states. Customs still hesitates to seize shipments, saying
that their statutory mandate does not allow seizure of such goods,
but Mongolian statutory and constitutional laws clearly recognize
ULAANBAATA 00000016 022.2 OF 038
that international treaty obligations in this area take precedence
over local statutes and regulations. A clear legal basis exists for
Customs to act, which has been recognized by elements of the
Mongolian Judiciary, the Parliament, and the IPOM. Customs officers
may occasionally seize fake products, but it seems that Mongolian
customs law will have to be brought into formal compliance with
TRIPS before Customs will fulfill its obligations. The ECU has
also been lax. The ECU hesitates to investigate and prosecute IPR
cases, deferring to the IPOM. Anecdotal evidence suggests that ECU
officials fear political repercussions from going after IPR pirates,
many of whom wield political influence.
The IPOM generally has an excellent record of protecting American
trademarks, copyrights, and patents; however, tight resources limit
the IPOM's ability to act. In most cases, when the U.S. Embassy in
Ulaanbaatar conveys a complaint from a rights holder to the IPOM, it
quickly investigates the complaint. If it judges that an abuse
occurred, it will (and has in every case brought before it to date)
seize the pirated products or remove faked trademarks, under
administrative powers granted in Mongolian law.
We note two areas where enforcement lags. Legitimate software
products are rare in Mongolia. Low per capita incomes have given
rise to a thriving local market for cheap, pirated software. The
IPOM estimates pirated software constitutes at least 95percent of
the market. The Office enforces the law where it can but the scale
of the problem dwarfs its capacity to deal with it. The IPOM will
act if we bring cases to its attention.
Pirated optical media are also readily available and subject to
spotty enforcement. Mongolians produce no significant quantities of
fake CD's, videos, or DVD's, but import such products from China,
Russia, and elsewhere. Products are sold through numerous local
outlets and sometimes broadcast on private local TV stations. The
IPOM hesitates to move on TV broadcasters, most of which are
connected to major government or political figures. Rather the IPOM
raids local ("street") DVD and CD outlets run by poor urban youth
who lack the political and economic clout of the TV broadcasters.
Again, when an American raises a specific complaint, the IPOM acts
on the complaint, but IPOM rarely initiates action.
Restrictive Aspects of Current Mining Laws
Minerals Law of 2006
The current Minerals Law of Mongolia would seem on its face to
prevent transfer of exploration or mining rights to any third party
lacking professional mining qualifications as determined by the
Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM).
Under the Minerals Law, the concept of mining expertise can either
qualify or disqualify any entity from acquiring, transferring,
securitizing exploration and mining rights. The law has the
potential to limit the ability of rights holders to seek financing,
because it forbids transfer of mining licenses and exploration
rights to non-qualified individuals. Consequently, a miner might
not be able to offer his licenses as secured collateral to banks or
to any lender lacking the professional qualifications to receive
these rights if the miner defaulted on his debt obligations.
In addition, no foreign entity, in its own right, can hold any sort
of mining or petroleum license; only entities registered in Mongolia
under the terms of relevant company and investment laws may hold
exploration and mining licenses. Should a foreign entity acquire
a license as collateral or for the purpose of actual exploration or
mining, and fail to create the appropriate Mongolian corporate
entity to hold a given license, that failure may serve as grounds
for invalidating the license. In essence, the foreign entity may
lose its security or mining rights. We advise investors with
specific questions regarding the current status of their respective
to seek professional advice on the status of those licenses.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 023.2 OF 038
Uranium Law of 2009
The Uranium Law of 2009 dramatically curtails property rights
protection regime protecting most exploration and mining licenses.
The law imposes the following conditions upon investors in the
uranium mining sector:
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses
with the NRA, for a fee.
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an
absolute right to take - without compensation - at least 51percent
of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop the
mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium
property.
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing
for mineral and metal resources. Prior to the Uranium Law,
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to
other mineral and metals exploration
To both investors and observers, this law statutorily sanctions
expropriation, a concept heretofore alien to Mongolian law.
Although the Minerals Law of Mongolia and other pieces of
legislation officially state that the GOM must compensate rights
holders for any taking, the Uranium law allows the GOM unfettered
power to seize holdings with no obligation to compensate rights
holders. Complicating the issue, the law conflates deposits with
the companies developing those deposits, letting the GOM claim an
uncompensated share of any entity that might mine the deposit. In
effect, the GOM demands a free-carried, non-compensated interest of
no less than 51percent of any uranium mining firm in Mongolia.
Affected uranium rights holders contested the constitutionality of
these provisions before Mongolia's Constitutional Court, and lost
the case. The Court upheld the law, asserting that the all minerals
in the ground are the property of the Mongolian state even if
separated from the ground. Legal experts with whom we consulted
explained that the Court seems to make the extraordinary and
unprecedented claim that Mongolia's ownership extends to products
created with the ore; hence the state has a "legitimate" claim on
both the ore body and any company mining the resource. This theory
appears to undermine the property rights of uranium investors and
chips away at property rights protections granted both under the
constitution and Mongolia's Minerals, Company, and Foreign
Investment Laws.
A.8 TRANSPARENCY OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESS
Generally, Mongolia's problem is not lack of laws and
regulations-Mongolia has passed more than 1,600 laws since
undertaking its transition to a market economy 20 years ago-but
rather, the problem is that legislators lack knowledge on what
foreign and domestic investors need from the state when investing;
and that they do not consult with those affected by their
legislative actions. Corruption aside, the fact that laws and
regulations change with little consultation creates a chaotic
situation for all parties.
Problems with the Drafting Process for Legislation and Regulations
Normally, laws can be crafted in two ways. Once rare but now
common, Members of Parliament and the President of Mongolia may
draft their own proposals for direct submission to the Parliament.
Such bills need not be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers but can
ULAANBAATA 00000016 024.2 OF 038
be delivered directly to the Speaker of Parliament for consideration
by the relevant Standing Committee. The relevant Standing Committee
may either reject the bill (in which case it dies in committee) or
pass it on to the Parliament's plenary body, unaltered or revised
for a general vote. More typically, Parliament or the Cabinet of
Ministers requests legislative action. These institutions send such
requests to the relevant ministry. The Minister relays the request
to ministerial council, which in turn sends the request to the
proper internal division or agency within the respective ministry,
which in turn forms a working group. The working group prepares the
bill, submits it for ministerial review, makes any recommended
changes, and then the bill is reviewed by the full Cabinet of
Ministers. Relevant ministries are asked to comment and recommend
changes in the legislation.
Prior to a final vote by the Cabinet of Ministers, the National
Security Council of Mongolia (NSC)-consisting of the President of
Mongolia, the Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament-can review
each piece of legislation for issues related to national security.
Although the government has never clarified the legal and
constitutional authority of the NSC to veto or recommend changes to
draft legislation, the Cabinet to our knowledge will not and has
never overruled NSC recommendations.
Once through NSC and Cabinet reviews, the bill goes to Parliament.
In Parliament, the bill is vetted by the relevant Standing
Committee, sent back for changes or sent on to the full Parliament
for a vote. The President can veto bills, but his veto can be
overcome by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of Parliament.
For regulations, the process is truncated. The relevant minister
tasks the working group that wrote the original law to draft
regulations. This group submits their work to the minister who
approves or recommends changes. In most cases, regulations require
no Cabinet approval, and become official when the relevant incumbent
minister approves them. When legislation crosses inter-ministerial
boundaries, the Cabinet will authorize the most relevant ministry to
supervise an inter-ministerial approval process for regulations.
The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MOJHA) plays an important
role in drafting both laws and regulations. MOJHA vets all statutes
and regulations before they are passed for final approval. In the
case of legislation, MOJHA reconciles the language and provisions of
the law with both existing legislation and the constitution of
Mongolia, after which the law passes to the Cabinet and then
Parliament. In the case of regulations, MOJHA vets the regulations
to ensure consistency with current laws and provisions of the
constitution. In effect, MOJHA can either modify or even veto legal
or regulatory provisions that it finds inconsistent with the
statutes and constitution.
System lacks Transparency
Absent from these drafting processes is a statutory, systematic,
transparent review of legislation or regulations by stakeholders and
the public. Ministerial initiatives are not publicized until the
draft passes out of a given ministry to the full Cabinet.
Typically, the full Cabinet discusses and passes bills on to
Parliament, without public input or consultations. Parliament
itself issues neither a formal calendar nor routinely announces or
opens its standing committees or full chamber hearings to the
public. While Parliament at the beginning of each session
announces a list of bills to be considered during the session, this
list is very general and often amended. New legislation is commonly
introduced, discussed and passed without public announcement or
consideration. For example, in 2006, Parliament passed the
(since-amended) Wind Fall Profits Tax Law bill in six days without
consulting any business, NGO, or other entity about the impact and
desirability of the bill. In 2007, Parliament significantly amended
the Law on State Procurement within thirty days without any public
notification or comment regarding new limits on competitive,
transparent bidding practices and limits on access tender
ULAANBAATA 00000016 025.2 OF 038
opportunities to foreign bidders. In 2009, Parliament passed
legislation threatening property rights in the mining sector that
many view as expropriatory and revoked key tax exemptions affecting
major mining and construction projects, all with no formal or
informal public comment and review.
The U.S. Embassy in Ulaanbaatar and foreign and domestic investors
have repeatedly urged the Mongolian government to utilize the
government's Open Government web site to post draft and pending
legislation for public consultation and review before it is
finalized and sent to Parliament. Over the past couple of years, we
have noticed some improvement in the timeliness and completeness of
the postings.
To supplement this effort, the U.S. Embassy and local business
organizations have jointly created an informal system to identify
legislation and regulations under review. Once identified, we meet
with working groups, provide information on how other nations have
handled such legislation, share stakeholders' points of view, and
widely distribute publicly available draft bills, preferably before
they reach a minister's desk. Should a piece of vital legislation
pass on to the Minister, Cabinet, or Parliament, these
non-government organizations are prepared to lobby at the
appropriate level. Over the last three years we have found that
many agencies and Members of Parliament welcome our advice and
information, particularly if given in a non-confrontational way that
respects Mongolia's political process and right to deliberate.
Regulators resist consultation when it comes to implementation.
Bureaucrats are only slowly becoming comfortable with the concepts
and practices of broad, public consultation and information sharing
with their own citizens, let alone foreigners. Many times
businesses ask for a clear copy of the current regulations, only to
be met with blank stares or outright refusals. The government has
long acknowledged that the Soviet-era State Secrets Law requires
substantial amendment. Currently, most government
documents-including administrative regulations affecting investments
and business activities-can be technically classified as "state
secrets" not for release to the public. This technicality allows
bureaucrats and regulators a convenient excuse to deny requests for
information or, more commonly, to demand extra-legal fees to provide
documents. The legacy of secrecy has also resulted in cases where
government officials themselves cannot get up-to-date copies of the
rules. Mongolia is considering a freedom of information law for
several years, but it remains in its formative stages.
High officials acknowledge the value of, and need for, a more open,
transparent system. While laws are easy to fix, the behavior of
individual bureaucrats, Members of Parliament, and the judiciary
will only gradually change, with training and experience. Already a
younger generation of professionals, many trained abroad or during
Mongolia's democratic era, is taking hold and moving into senior
positions of authority. This bodes well for Mongolia's continuing
transition to a private sector-led, open, market economy underpinned
by good government and corporate governance.
The Impact of NGOS and Private Sector Associations on GOM Policy
The Mongolian government actively protects its prerogatives to
legislate and regulate economic activities in its domain. While
NGOs and private sector associations have wide latitude to run their
activities, the government of Mongolia has never allowed any
non-governmental entity-be it business, civil society, trade union,
etc.-to serve more than an advisory role over the formulation and
execution of both laws and rules, which also applies to setting
standards for various industries. Based on experience, the GOM will
routinely resists any expanded role for civil society and NGOs.
This unarticulated but tacit policy of the government of Mongolia
applies to both domestic and foreign entities.
Laws, Regulations, and Policies that Impede FDI
ULAANBAATA 00000016 026.2 OF 038
While the GOM supports FDI and domestic investment, individual
agencies and elements of the judiciary reportedly use their
respective powers to hinder investments into such sectors as meat
production, telecommunications, aviation, or pharmaceuticals. Both
domestic and foreign investors report similar abuses of inspections,
permits, and licenses by Mongolian regulatory agencies. However, we
generally note no consistent, systematic pattern of abuse
consistently initiated by either government or private Mongolian
entities aimed against foreign investors in general or against U.S.
investment in particular. The impediments more often than not are
opportunistic attempts by individuals to misuse contacts to harass
U.S. and other foreign investors with whom the Mongolian entity is
in dispute.
Alternatively, other reports suggest that Mongolians use connections
to well-placed regulators at all levels to extract extra-legal
payments from both foreign and domestic businesses or otherwise
hinder their work. In the latter case the general approach is to
demand some sort of payment in lieu of not enforcing work,
environmental, tax, health and safety rules, otherwise imposing the
full weight of a contradictory mix of Soviet Era and the current
reformed rules on the firm. Most foreign businesses refuse to pay
bribes, and in turn accept the punitive inspections, concede to some
of the violations found, and contest the rest in the City
Administrative Court. In our experience companies that show resolve
against such predatory abuse of statutory and regulatory power will
face impediments at the start; but these usually ease over time as
state agents look for easier targets.
Although we have note no systemic and routine abuse of Mongolia's
legal system to hinder FDI and investors, a worrisome trend
affecting implementation of Mongolia's requirement for exit visas by
both Mongolian public and private entities to exert pressure on
foreign investors to settle commercial disputes.
Required, valid exit visas are normally issued pro forma at the port
of departure (e.g. the international airport), but may be denied for
a variety of reasons including civil disputes, pending criminal
investigation, or for immigration violations. The law does not
allow authorities to distinguish a criminal and civil case when
detaining a person. If denied for a civil dispute, the visa may not
be issued until either the dispute is resolved administratively or a
court has rendered a decision. Neither current law nor regulations
establish a clear process or time-table for resolution. In fact,
the Mongolian government maintains the right to detain foreign
citizens indefinitely without appeal until the situation has been
resolved.
Research into issue has revealed that investors from countries other
than the U.S. are affected by abuse of the exit-visa system. All
cases have a similar profile. A foreign investor has a commercial
dispute with a Mongolian entity, often involving assets, management
practices, or contract compliance. The Mongolian entities respond
by filing either civil or criminal charges with local police or
prosecutorial authority. It is important to note that at this point
there need be no actual arrest warrant or any sort of official
determination that charges are warranted: Mere complaint by an
aggrieved party is sufficient grounds to deny exit.
An investor in this situation is effectively detained in Mongolia
indefinitely. Some foreign investors have resolved the impasse by
settling, thereby allowing them to depart Mongolia. If unwilling to
settle, the foreign investor will have to undergo the full
investigatory process, which may lead to a court action.
Investigations commonly take up to six months, and in one case an
American citizen has been denied an exit visa for two years pending
a criminal investigation into a failed business deal. In addition,
even if a dispute seems settled, it can be filed in the same venue
again -- if the local police and prosecutors are willing -- or in a
different venue. In one case, an American citizen has been denied
an exit visa for over two years pending a criminal investigation
into a failed business deal with the Government of Mongolia.
We note that Mongolian investors are not subject to similar
ULAANBAATA 00000016 027.2 OF 038
impositions of their immigration codes when involved in commercial
disputes. Mongolian citizens do not require exit visas to depart
Mongolia and can only be denied exit with a pending arrest warrant.
A.9 EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Mongolia currently lacks the experience and expertise needed to
sustain portfolio investments. It has no regulatory apparatus for
these activities, and both the state and private entities are just
beginning to engage in them. However, Mongolia has active capital
markets. The government of Mongolia (GOM) imposes few restraints
on the flow of capital in any of its markets. Multilateral
institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, have
typically found the regime too loose, especially in the crucial
banking sector.
Although the government has clear rules about capital reserve
requirements, loan practices, and banking management practices, the
Bank of Mongolia (BOM), Mongolia's central bank, has historically
resisted restraining credit flows and interfering with operations at
Mongolia's commercial banks, even when the need to intervene has
been apparent. However, in response to the severe impact of the
ongoing global financial crisis on Mongolia's banking sector, the
BOM is striving to improve it capacity to deal with those insolvent
banks and improperly managed banks that have impaired the health of
Mongolia's financial system. To illustrate, two (2) of the
country's 16 banks are currently in receivership, and additional
consolidation under BOM supervision is likely.
Capital and Currency Markets
The global economic crisis savaged Mongolia's currency, capital, and
equity markets. While the currency had proved resilient, holding
its value against most international currencies, it fell some 40
percent against the U.S. dollar from late 2008 into spring 2009, as
the worst of the crisis hit. It has remained relatively stable and
even resilient since then. The currency's resiliency has largely
been attributed to the commodities boom, which saw Mongolia selling
such raw materials as copper, gold, and coal, primarily to China.
In mid 2008, the commodity markets began to cool and Mongolia's
foreign trade began to fall, leading to growing trade deficit as
imports no longer balanced or exceeded exports. Subsequently, once
the tugrik began to slide relative to the U.S. dollar,
import-related trade was affected as well.
Complicating matters, major banks and other institutions that
formally had access to international capital flows (in the form of
dollars, yen, Renmimbi, Euros, etc, which were parked in
high-interest yielding tugrik accounts), found in-flows reversing as
foreign depositors repatriated their funds, either because these
entities needed the money to weather their own financial crises or
feared that the tugrik's collapse would eat away the value of their
deposits. Banks no longer had access to easy capital and liquidity,
and began and continue to restrict lending to almost all clients,
who in turn found they lacked funds to finance construction
projects, trade, and other activities.
After several months of tapping reserves to slow the tugrik's
decline, Mongol Bank curtailed such infusions. Instead, the Bank
sells dollars into the system by auction to the local commercial
banks and lets the market decide the value of the exchange rate
rather than attempting to set the rate. . In addition, Parliament
closed a loophole that allowed local transactions to occur in any
currency desired. Now, all domestic transactions must be conducted
in Mongolia's national currency, the Tugrik, excepting those
entities allowed specific waivers as determined by the Mongolian
central bank, the Bank of Mongolia. The move was intended to
bolster the value of the Tugrik by increasing demand for the
currency.
Overall liquidity is sufficient but affordable capital remains
ULAANBAATA 00000016 028.2 OF 038
scarce. Local credit interest rates for customers range from
12percent for the most credit worthy to perhaps 90percent per annum
(or more) for the least. Foreign investors can easily tap into
these domestic capital markets; however, they seldom do, because
they can do better abroad or better locally by simply taking on an
equity investor, Mongolian or otherwise.
Equity Markets
Investors do not use stocks to raise equity for investment but to
gain control of companies listed on the exchange. As most of the
firms have been bought up, the market sees little trading.
Mongolian firms do not use shareholding relationships to restrict
foreign investment at this point. Part of this arises from lack of
experience with such devices. It also arises from the fact that
Mongolians prefer to concentrate ownership in their own hands,
rather than disperse it through complicated shareholding
relationships. They perceive such devices as weakening their
ability to control the companies, which is more important than
safeguarding the firm from foreign or domestic raiders or raising
capital for investment. If a foreign company wanted to purchase a
Mongolian firm, the foreign entity would have to contact the
shareholders and buy them out. These could not be hostile
takeovers, because few outstanding shares remain on the market to
buy. Eager to take on equity partners or sell businesses entirely,
the Mongolians would employ few defenses beyond sharp negotiating.
The current Minerals Law of Mongolia contains a provision that
requires that holders of mining licenses for projects of strategic
importance must sell no less than 10percent of the resulting
entity's shares on the Mongolian Stock Exchange. Vaguely presented
in the statute, what this new provision means in practical terms and
how it is to be implemented has yet to be spelled out in regulation.
The Banking Sector
Weakness in Mongolia's banking sector concerns all players,
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF: http://www.imf.org).
Small by American standards, the total assets of Mongolia's
remaining fourteen (14) commercial banks (down from 16 in 2008) adds
up to just around USD2 billion. The system has been through massive
changes since the Soviet era, during which the banking system was
divided into several different units. This early system failed
through mismanagement and commercial naivety in the mid-90s, but
over the last decade has become more sophisticated and somewhat
better managed.
Mongolia has three large, generally well-regarded banks owned
primarily by Japanese and Mongolian interests respectively. They
follow international standards for prudent capital reserve
requirements, have conservative lending policies, up-to-date banking
technology, and are generally well managed. As the global financial
storm has descended on Mongolia's banking sector, these banks have
weathered it well - so far.
However, concerns remain among bankers and the sector's observers
about the effectiveness of Mongolia's legal and regulatory
environment. As with many issues in Mongolia, the problem is not
lack of laws or procedures but the will and capacity of the
regulator, BOM, to supervise and execute mandated functions,
particularly in regard to capital reserve requirements and
non-performing loans.
From 1999 through late 2008, BOM consistently refused to close any
commercial bank for insolvency or malpractice. In late 2008,
Mongol Bank took Mongolia's fourth largest bank into receivership.
Most deposits were guaranteed and their depositors paid out at a
cost of around USD 150 million -- not an inconsequential sum in an
economy with a USD 5 billion per annum GDP. In 2009, Mongolia's
fifth largest bank went into receivership, and three (3) other
ULAANBAATA 00000016 029.2 OF 038
mid-tier banks are at the center of widespread discussion of future
consolidation.
The BOM and Mongolia's financial system have so far endured the
crisis. However, most observers note that the insolvent banks had
shown signs of mismanagement, non-performing loans, and
ill-liquidity for several years before the BOM moved to safeguard
depositors and the financial sector. They argue further that the
BOM withheld effective supervision fearing that closure would signal
weakness to, and spur panic among, the general public; and because
of interference on the part of those whose financial interests in
the troubled banks would have been threatened by regulatory action.
The latest crisis has spurred the BOM to develop a short run plan to
identify and close insolvent banks while preserving the integrity of
financial system. Reserve requirements will be raised to deal with
the on-going non-performing loan problem, too. Beyond this triage,
the BOM is in the process of instituting long-term reforms to
enhance its ability to supervise the banking system; however, such
reform depends on Parliament to amend both Mongolia's banking and
banking supervision laws, a process that may be completed by
mid-2010.
A.10 POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Mongolia is peaceful and stable. Political violence is rare.
Mongolia has held nine (9) peaceful presidential and parliamentary
elections in the past 16 years. However, a brief but violent
outbreak of civil unrest followed disputed parliamentary elections
on July 1, 2008. Accompanied by some property destruction and
bodily injury, the unrest was quickly contained and order restored.
There has been no repeat of this civil unrest since July 1.
Mongolia held peaceful presidential elections in May 2009 in which
the incumbent president was defeated and power smoothly transitioned
to the current president
Mongolia has an ethnically homogenous population: 97percent of the
population is Khalkh Mongol. The largest minority, numbering an
estimated 90,000 people, is Kazakh (Muslim), concentrated in the far
western part of the country.
There have been no known incidents of anti-American sentiment or
politically motivated damage to American projects or installations
in at least the last decade. However, Mongolia has seen a gradual
and perceptible level of rising hostility to foreign nationals in
general and to Chinese nationals in particular. This hostility has
led to some instances of improper seizure of Chinese-invested
property; and in more limited cases acts of physical violence
against the persons and property of Chinese nationals resident in
Mongolia. Other Asians living in Mongolia have expressed concern
that they may inadvertently become victims of this hostility.
A.11 CORRUPTION
Corruption in Mongolia, including bribery, raises the costs and
risks of doing business. Corruption corrodes market opportunities
in Mongolia for U.S. companies as well as the overall Mongolian
business climate. It also deters international investment into
Mongolia, stifles economic growth and development, distorts prices,
and undermines the rule of law.
It is important for U.S. companies, irrespective of their size, to
assess the business climate in Mongolia to have an effective
compliance program or measures in place to detect and prevent
corruption, including foreign bribery. U.S. individuals and firms
operating or investing in such foreign markets as Mongolia should
take the time to become familiar with the relevant anticorruption
laws of both Mongolia and the United States in order to comply with
them, and where appropriate, they should seek the advice of legal
counsel.
The U.S. Government seeks to level the global playing field for U.S.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 030.2 OF 038
businesses by encouraging other countries to take steps to
criminalize their own companies' acts of corruption, including
bribery of foreign public officials, by requiring them to uphold
their obligations under relevant international conventions. A U. S.
firm that believes a competitor is seeking to use bribery of a
foreign public official to secure a contract should bring this to
the attention of appropriate U.S. agencies, as noted below
Current Views on Mongolian Corruption
In mid-2005, the USAID Mission to Mongolia, in collaboration with
USAID/Washington and The Asia Foundation (TAF), funded a corruption
assessment conducted by Casals & Associates, Inc. (C&A) The
complete report is available at http://www.usaid.gov/mn. Follow-up
surveys of the problem show that the results of this assessment
remain valid in 2010. The study found that opportunities for
corruption continue to increase in Mongolia at both the "petty" or
administrative and "grand" or elite levels. Both types of
corruption should be of concern to Mongolians, but grand corruption
should be considered a more serious one because it solidifies
linkages between economic and political power that could negatively
impact or ultimately derail or delay democracy and development.
Several inter-related factors contribute to Mongolia's corruption
problem:
--A blurring of the lines between the public and private sector
brought about by systemic conflicts of interest at nearly all
levels;
--A lack of transparency and access to information, stemming in part
from a broad State Secrets Law that surrounds many government
functions and has yielded criticism that it renders the media
ineffective and hinders citizen participation in policy discussions
and government oversight;
--An inadequate civil service system that gives rise to a highly
politicized public administration and the existence of a "spoils
system;"
--Limited political will to actually implement required reforms in
accordance with the law, complicated by conflicting and overlapping
laws that further inhibit effective policy implementation;
--Weak government control institutions, including the Central Bank,
National Audit Office, parliamentary standing committees, Prosecutor
General, Generalized State Inspection Agency, State Property
Committee, and departments within the Ministry of Finance.
The aforementioned systemic shortcomings have allowed for an
evolution of corruption in Mongolia that "follows the money,"
meaning that graft on the most significant scales generally occurs
most often in the industries and sectors where there is the most
potential for financial gain. During the early 1990s, in the early
transition toward democracy and market economy, two areas that
offered particular opportunities for grand scale corruption at that
time were foreign donor assistance and privatization of state-owned
enterprises. As Mongolia later embarked on further policy changes
to institutionalize capitalistic practices, corruption reared its
head in the process of privatizing public land. As the economy
continues to develop, emerging areas for corruption include the
banking and mining sectors. There also are several areas that
provide stable and consistent opportunities for corruption, both
grand and administrative in nature, such as for procurement
opportunities, issuance of permits and licenses, customs,
inspections, the justice sector, among high-level elected and
appointed officials, and in the conduct a variety of day-to-day
citizen- and business-to-government transactions, notably in
education, health care, and city services.
Despite the fact that few of the conditions to prevent corruption
from getting worse are in place, the situation has not reached the
levels that are evident in many other countries with contexts and
ULAANBAATA 00000016 031.2 OF 038
histories similar to that of Mongolia. Perhaps more importantly,
there are a number of efforts underway to actively combat
corruption, including:
--Government commitments to international anti-corruption regimes
and protocols, such as the Anti-Corruption Plan of the Asian
Development Bank/Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (ADB/OECD) and the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC);
--Development of a National Program for Combating Corruption and
formation of a National Council for coordinating the Program and a
Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Working Group;
--Implementation of an anti-corruption law that has included the
formation of an independent anti-corruption body;
--Short- and medium-term anti-corruption advocacy and "watchdog"
programs initiated by civil society organizations, often with
international donor support.
There is, in fact, time for Mongolians and the international
community to nurture these efforts and take further action before
corruption grows too large to rein in. In general, the main need in
Mongolia is to develop effective disincentives for corrupt behavior
at both the administrative and political levels. In its broadest
configuration, this implies a strategy of increasing transparency
and effective citizen oversight, as well as intra-governmental
checks and balances. Without these major changes, administrative
reforms may provide some small improvements, but they are unlikely
to solve the problem. Specifically, the aforementioned
USAID-sponsored report of 2005 makes several strategic
recommendations, which remain relevant in 2010, including:
--Diplomatic engagement focused on keeping anti-corruption issues on
the policy agenda, promoting implementation of existing laws related
to anti-corruption, and highlighting the need for further measures
to promote transparency and improved donor coordination;
--General programmatic recommendations to address conflict of
interest, transparency/access to information, civil service reforms,
and the independent anti-corruption body, with a definitive focus on
engaging civil society and promoting public participation utilizing
UNCAC as a framework;
--Specific programmatic recommendations to address loci of
corruption, such as citizen- and business-to-government
transactions, procurement, privatization, customs, land use, mining,
banking, the justice sector, and the political and economic elite
In addition, the reputable international anti-corruption NGO
Transparency International (TI) opened a national chapter in
Mongolia in 2004 (for more information, see: www.transparency.org).
U.S. technical advisors are working with TI to train Mongolian staff
to monitor corruption and to advocate on behalf of anti-corruption
legislation and, TI first included Mongolia in its annual
"Perceptions of Corruption" survey in September 2004. In that
initial survey, Mongolia ranked 85 out of 145 countries and its
score of 3 on the Corruption Perception Index was "poor." (TI's CPI
Score relates to "perceptions" of the degree of corruption as seen
by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). TI's 2005 Survey ranked
Mongolia 85 out 158; and again Mongolia earned a "poor" score of 3.
In TI's 2006 survey, Mongolia had dropped to 99 out of 163
countries, receiving a score of 2.8-poor. In 2007, Mongolia was
still 99 but out of 179 nations and had achieved a score of 3.0, a
slight uptick but still poor. 2008 saw Mongolia drop to 102 out 180
nations, maintaining its poor score of 3. 2009 found Mongolia
dropping to 124 out of 180 nations, and declining to a poorer score
of 2.7, In short, Mongolia has declined.
One factor raising concerns about Mongolia's commitment to fight
ULAANBAATA 00000016 032.2 OF 038
corruption is the series of amnesties granted to Mongolians found
guilty of corruption or those under investigation for abuses. These
amnesties happen about every three years, usually through
presidential legislative action, with the most recent occurring in
late 2009. Because they allow corrupt officials and those who
enable them to avoid substantial prison time and fines for their
improper acts, these amnesties are demoralizing for the IAAC and the
public, who question the value of tackling corruption with a
government lacking the will to hold malefactors to account.
Current Anti-Corruption Law
In 2006, Parliament passed an Anti-Corruption Law (ACL), a
significant milestone in Mongolia's efforts against corruption. The
legislation had been under consideration since 1999.
The ACL created an independent investigative body, the Independent
Authority Against Corruption (IAAC). The IAAC has four sections.
The Prevention and Education Section works to prevent corruption and
educate the public on anti-corruption legal requirements. The
Investigation Section receives corruption cases and executes
investigations. The third section collects, checks, and analyzes the
legally required property and income statements of government
officials. The fourth section, the IAAC's Secretariat, handle s
administrative tasks. The IAAC formally began operations in August
2007. (For a review of the IAAC's activities from its inception
through late 2008 and a general assessment of the public's current
views of corruption in Mongolia see the series of Mongolia
Corruption Benchmarking Surveys prepared for USAID Mongolia:
http://www.usaid.gov/mn; and by The Asia Foundation Mongolia:
http://asiafoundation.org
Anti-Corruption Resources Available to U.S. Citizens about the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: In 1977, the United States
enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which makes it
unlawful for a U.S. person, and certain foreign issuers of
securities, to make a corrupt payment to foreign public officials
for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person. The FCPA also applies to foreign
firms and persons who take any act in furtherance of such a corrupt
payment while in the United States. For more detailed information on
the FCPA, see the FCPA Lay-Person's Guide at:
http://www.justice.gov/criminal
Guidance on the U.S. FCPA: The Department of Justice's (DOJ) FCPA
Opinion Procedure enables U.S. firms and individuals to request a
statement of the Justice Department's present enforcement intentions
under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA regarding any proposed
business conduct. The details of the opinion procedure are
available on DOJ's Fraud Section Website at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa. Although the Department of
Commerce has no enforcement role with respect to the FCPA, it
supplies general guidance to U.S. exporters who have questions about
the FCPA and about international developments concerning the FCPA.
For further information, see the Office of the Chief Counsel for
International Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce, Website, at
http://www.ogc.doc.gov. More general information on the FCPA is
available at the Websites listed below.
Other Assistance for U.S. Businesses: The U.S. Department of
Commerce offers several services to aid U.S. businesses seeking to
address business-related corruption issues. For example, the U.S.
and Foreign Commercial Service can provide services that may assist
U.S. companies in conducting their due diligence as part of the
company's overarching compliance program when choosing business
partners or agents overseas. The U.S. Foreign and Commercial
Service can be reached directly through its offices in every major
U.S. and foreign city, or through its Website at www.trade.gov/cs.
The Departments of Commerce and State provide worldwide support for
qualified U.S. companies bidding on foreign government contracts
through the Commerce Department's Advocacy Center and State's Office
ULAANBAATA 00000016 033.2 OF 038
of Commercial and Business Affairs. Problems, including alleged
corruption by foreign governments or competitors, encountered by
U.S. companies in seeking such foreign business opportunities can be
brought to the attention of appropriate U.S. government officials,
including local embassy personnel and through the Department of
Commerce Trade Compliance Center "Report A Trade Barrier" Website at
tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp.
Exporters and investors should be aware that generally all countries
prohibit the bribery of their public officials, and prohibit their
officials from soliciting bribes under domestic laws. Most
countries are required to criminalize such bribery and other acts of
corruption by virtue of being parties to various international
conventions discussed above.
Other Instruments: It is U.S. Government policy to promote good
governance, including host country implementation and enforcement of
anti-corruption laws and policies pursuant to their obligations
under international agreements. Since enactment of the FCPA, the
United States has been instrumental to the expansion of the
international framework to fight corruption. Several significant
components of this framework are the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Antibribery Convention), the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (UN Convention), the Inter-American
Convention against Corruption (OAS Convention), the Council of
Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions, and a growing list of
U.S. free trade agreements. Mongolia is party to the UN Convention
Against Corruption and prohibits the bribery and solicitation of its
public officials.
OECD Antibribery Convention: The OECD Antibribery Convention entered
into force in February 1999. As of December 2009, 38 nations are
party to it, including the United States (see http://www.oecd.org).
Major exporters China, India, and Russia are not parties, although
the U.S. Government strongly endorses their eventual accession to
the Convention. The Convention obligates the Parties to criminalize
bribery of foreign public officials in the conduct of international
business. The United States meets its international obligations
under the OECD Antibribery Convention through the U.S. FCPA.
Mongolia is not a party to the OECD Antibribary convention.
UN Convention: The UN Anticorruption Convention entered into force
on December 14, 2005, and there are 143 parties to it as of December
2009. The UN Convention is the first global comprehensive
international anticorruption agreement. The UN Convention requires
countries to establish criminal and other offences to cover a wide
range of acts of corruption. The UN Convention goes beyond previous
anticorruption instruments, covering a broad range of issues ranging
from basic forms of corruption such as bribery and solicitation,
embezzlement, trading in influence to the concealment and laundering
of the proceeds of corruption. The Convention contains
transnational business bribery provisions that are functionally
similar to those in the OECD Antibribery Convention and contains
provisions on private sector auditing and books and records
requirements. Other provisions address matters such as prevention,
international cooperation, and asset recovery. Mongolia is a member
of the UN Convention Against Corruption.
Local Laws: U.S. firms should familiarize themselves with local
anticorruption laws, and, where appropriate, seek legal counsel.
While the U.S. Department of Commerce cannot provide legal advice on
local laws, the Department's U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service can
provide assistance with navigating the host country's legal system
and obtaining a list of local legal counsel.
Anti-Corruption Resources: Documents and Contacts
Resources for combating corruption in global markets include the
following:
--Information about the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),
ULAANBAATA 00000016 034.2 OF 038
including a "Lay-Person's Guide to the FCPA" is available at the
U.S. Department of Justice's Website at:
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa.
--Information about the OECD Antibribery Convention including links
to national implementing legislation and monitoring reports is
available at: http://www.oecd.org. See also new Antibribery
Recommendation and Good Practice Guidance Annex for companies:
http://www.oecd.org
For general information about anticorruption initiatives, such as
the OECD Convention and the FCPA, including translations of the
statute into several languages, go to the Department of Commerce
Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce at:
http://www.ogc.doc.gov.
--Transparency International (TI) publishes an annual Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI measures the perceived level of
public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the
world. CPI is available at: http://www.transparency.org. TI also
publishes an annual Global Corruption Report which provides a
systematic evaluation of the state of corruption around the world.
It includes an in-depth analysis of a focal theme, a series of
country reports that document major corruption related events and
developments from all continents and an overview of the latest
research findings on anti-corruption diagnostics and tools. See
http://www.transparency.org.
--The World Bank Institute publishes Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI),which six dimensions of governance in 212 countries, including
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law
and Control of Corruption. See http://info.worldbank.org. The
World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys
may also be of interest and are available at:
http://go.worldbank.org.
--The World Economic Forum publishes the Global Enabling Trade
Report that assesses both border administration transparency
(focused on bribe payments and corruption) and corruption and the
regulatory environment: http://www.weforum.org
--For additional information on corruption see the U.S. State
Department's annual Human Rights Report at http://www.state.gov.
--Global Integrity, a nonprofit organization, publishes its annual
Global Integrity Report, which provides indicators for 92 countries
with respect to governance and anti-corruption. The report
highlights the strengths and weaknesses of national level
anti-corruption systems. The report is available at:
http://report.globalintegrity.org/
A.12 BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
(NOTE: Table of bi-lateral investment agreements entered into by
Mongolia deleted due to requirements of cable format. END NOTE.)
Taxation issues of Concern to American Investors
Taxation remains a key concern for Americans, other foreign
investors, and Mongolian domestic investors and businesses. 2009
saw some changes in the Mongolian tax system, most of which, with
the exception of the revocation of the value-added tax exemption for
mining equipment, were greeted positively by most foreign and
domestic investor in Mongolia. Observers noted that recent
experience with tax-code revisions does suggest that both the GOM
and Parliament are amenable to revising legislation if the economic
benefits to the state, the public, and investors can be proven.
Windfall Profits Tax on Copper and Gold Sunsets in 2011
Since passage in 2006, the Windfall Profits Tax Law has generated
criticism regarding the depth of the GOM's commitment to creating an
ULAANBAATA 00000016 035.2 OF 038
open, predictable, and fair environment for foreign direct
investment. The speedy legislative process for passing the WPT was
unprecedented. This bill was passed in six days without any
consultation with outside stakeholders on any its provisions. The
entire process raised concerns among investors about the stability
and transparency of Mongolia's legislative and regulatory
environment, which intervening years and experience with other
non-transparently passed legislation did little to alleviate.
The WPT imposes a 68percent tax on the profits from gold and copper
mining respectively, and for gold originally kicked in when gold the
price for gold hit USD500 per ounce; however, in late 2008
Parliament raised the threshold to USD850. For copper, the
threshold is USD 2,600 per ton. Mining industry sources claim that
the 68percent tax rate, when combined with other Mongolian taxes,
makes the effective tax 100percent on all proceeds above the copper
threshold price.
The recent Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement entailed further
amendment to the WPT as a condition precedent to its passage. OT's
private investors successfully argued that they would not be able to
run a commercially viable OT operation when faced with the WPT.
Consequently, the Parliament agreed to amend the WPT Law: The WPT
will officially end for all copper concentrate and gold products in
2011.
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code
Effective since January 1, 2007 the current tax code reduces tax
rates, flattens the tax schedule, removes discriminatory loopholes
and exemptions, and introduces appropriate deduction opportunities
for corporate investment. The current law allows firms to deduct
more types of legitimate business expenditures: training, business
travel, cafeteria expenses, etc. The current law levels the playing
field between foreign and domestic investors, eliminating the
majority of discriminatory tax exemptions and holidays, most of
which favored international investors.
2009 changes into the tax code's treatment of exemptions present
something of a mixed bag for investors. On the down side,
Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption available on value-added
tax (VAT) taxes of 10percent on equipment used to bring a given mine
into production. Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines
have long development lead times before production begins, either
waive or do not tax such imports at all. Parliament, with no
consultation with investors, international advisors provided by
donor organizations, or even of its own tax officials, chose to
impose the VAT, which immediately makes Mongolian mining costs
10percent higher than they would otherwise be, impairing
competitiveness and dramatically varying from global practice.
On the plus side, Parliament revised loss-carry forward provisions,
extending from two (2) years to eight (8) years the ability to
deduct losses from taxes after incurring a loss. Like the revision
of the WPT, this change is also a condition precedent of passing the
OT Agreement. Most investors find eight years sufficient for many
Mongolian investments that require impose long, expensive
development horizons before producing any sort of profit.
Unfinished Taxation Business: Improving Institutions and Practices
As reported in the 2009 Investment Climate Statement and Country
Commercial Guide, both the GOM and Parliament has been intending to
take up additional tax reform measures since 2007 but have made no
substantive progress since promising additional reforms. These
measures include revisions to the law on customs and customs
tariffs. While the exact nature of the proposed changes to the
customs law remains murky, the GOM states that changes will be
consistent with Mongolia's WTO obligations and best practices.
Despite overall solid, positive changes, international financial
institutions warn that tax reforms by themselves are insufficient to
ULAANBAATA 00000016 036.2 OF 038
improve Mongolia's business environment. They report that reform
must go beyond changes to the tax code to restructure the operations
of the key agencies - the tax department, the customs administration
and the inspections agency - that directly interact with private
firms and individuals.
Specifically, tax authorities charged with enforcing the tax codes
require a more customer-based approach to dealing with their
business clientele and a more detailed and rigorously enforced
regulatory framework under which to audit company accounts. Many
foreign and domestic investors argue that the lack of such a clear,
implementable code of ethics and enforceable set of guidelines leads
to arbitrary, capricious, or predatory tax audits.
A.13 OPIC AND OTHER INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS
The U.S. government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC:
(www.opic.gov) offers loans and political risk insurance to American
investors involved in most sectors of the Mongolian economy.
The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM: www.exim.gov)offers programs in
Mongolia for short-, medium-, and long-term transactions in the
public sector and for short- and medium-term transactions in the
private sector.
Mongolia is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA: www.miga.org).
A. 14 LABOR
Mongolia's labor pool is generally well educated, relatively young,
and adaptable, but shortages exist in most professional categories
requiring advanced degrees or training. Only time and investment in
education and training will remedy this deficit of trained skilled
labor. Unskilled labor is sufficiently available. Shortages exist
in both vocational and professional categories because Mongolians
who obtain such skills frequently go abroad to find higher wages.
Foreign-invested companies are dealing with this situation by
providing in-country training to their staffs, raising salaries to
retain employees, or hiring expatriate workers to provide skills and
expertise unavailable in the local market. In addition, the USG
funded Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is underwriting a
five-year training and vocational education program (TVET) to
develop sustainable programs to help Mongolia meet its needs for
skilled blue- collar workers (http://www.mca.mn or
http://www.mcc.gov).
Mongolian labor law is not particularly restrictive. Investors can
locate and hire workers without using hiring agencies -- as long as
hiring practices are consistent with Mongolian Labor Law. However,
Mongolian law requires companies to employ Mongolian workers in
certain labor categories whenever a Mongolian can perform the task
as well as a foreigner. This law generally applies to unskilled
labor categories and not areas where a high degree of technical
expertise nonexistent in Mongolia is required. The law does provide
an escape hatch for all employers. Should an employer seek to hire
a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot obtain a waiver from the Ministry
of Labor for that employee, the employer can pay a fee of USD 140.00
per employee per month. Depending on a project's importance, the
Ministry of Labor can exempt employers from 50percent of the waiver
fees per worker.
Foreign and domestic investors consistently argue that they bear too
much of the social security costs for each domestic and foreign hire
under the amended 2008 Social Insurance Law enacted in July 2008.
Foreign employees became liable for social insurance taxes if they
reside within Mongolia for 181 days within a 365 day period. Under
this law, foreign and domestic workers pay up to 108,000 tugrik per
month (USD 74) for this tax, no matter their respective rates of
pay. Employers must pay a tax equivalent to 13percent of the annual
wage on both domestic and foreign workers. Given that state
pensions have yet to broach even USD 100, employers argue that
ULAANBAATA 00000016 037.2 OF 038
pensions are not commensurate with worker contributions, especially
those of highly-paid ex-patriot employees. In addition, workers
must pay in for twenty years in order to be vested, highly unlikely
for many ex-patriot employees, who reside in Mongolia for less than
three years on average. Local and foreign business associations are
attempting to work with both the government and Parliament to
address these perceived inequalities.
ILO conventions
Mongolia has ratified 15 ILO conventions (http://www.ilo.org) (NOTE:
Table of ILO conventions ratified by Mongolia deleted due to
requirements of cable format. END NOTE.)
A. 15 FOREIGN TRADE ZONES/FREE PORTS
The Mongolian government launched its free trade zone (FTZ) program
in 2004. Currently there are two FTZ areas located along the
Mongolia spur of the trans-Siberian highway: one in the north at the
Russia-Mongolia border town of Altanbulag and the other in the south
at the Chinese-Mongolia border at the town of Zamyn-Uud. Both FTZs
are inactive, with no development at either site. The port of entry
of Tsagaan Nuur in Bayan-Olgii province is being considered as the
site of a third FTZ.
Management for the Zamyn-Uud Free Trade Zone (ZUFTZ) was originally
tendered to a Chinese firm. In 2006, the GOM voided the agreement
for non-compliance with the terms of the tender. The GOM
re-tendered the management contract in 2006, but later voided that
contract, alleging that the current holder of the management rights
in the ZUFTZ had failed to live up to the terms of the tender.
So far, there are no indications that government will not keep
promises to open the zone to any who satisfy the relevant legal
requirements. However, there are concerns about the Mongolian free
trade zones in general and Zamyn-Uud in particular. In April 2004,
the USAID sponsored Economic Policy Reform and Competitiveness
Project (EPRC: http://www.eprc-chemonics.biz/) made the following
observations of Mongolia's FTZ Program. In 2010, these issues
remain concerns:
--Benchmarking of Mongolia's FTZ Program against current successful
international practices shows deficiencies in the legal and
regulatory framework as well as in the process being followed to
establish FTZs in the country.
--Lack of implementing regulations and procedural definitions
encapsulated in transparency and predictability quotient required to
implement key international best practices.
--A process of due diligence, including a cost-benefit analysis, has
not been completed for the proposed Zamyn-Uud FTZ.
--Identifiable funding is not in place to meet off-site
infrastructure requirements for Zamyn-Uud and Altanbulag sites.
--Deviations from international best practices in the process of
launching FTZs risks repeating mistakes made in other countries and
may lead to "hidden costs" or the provision of subsidies that the
government of Mongolia did not foresee or which will have to granted
at the expense of other high priority needs.
A. 16 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS:
The Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA) provides
most of the data for tracking FDI in Mongolia. However, the data
has limitations:
Incomplete reporting
Many foreign firms provide FIFTA with inaccurate or incomplete data
on their annual investment amounts. FIFTA's registration regime
ULAANBAATA 00000016 038.2 OF 038
requires companies to document business plans and total FDI for the
coming year. FIFTA uses these amounts to determine FDI for the
year. However, firms reportedly believe FIFTA may not be able to
guarantee the confidentiality of proprietary business information,
and so they withhold complete data on their actual activities.
Mongolia suffers from promised investment that never materializes or
which comes in at a lower level than originally stated. FIFTA does
not update reports to account for these or other changes to
investments during the year. (See Chapter 6, Section A.5:
Performance Requirements and Incentives).
Many of Mongolia's largest foreign- owned or foreign-invested
entities are in the mining sector, which because of a quirk of the
current Minerals Law of Mongolia are not necessarily defined as
foreign-invested firms. The current minerals law specifies that
only domestically registered mining firms can have mining licenses
registered in their names, which means that foreign investments
associated with mining may not be recorded by FIFTA, even though the
investment is demonstrably foreign. For example, the investment by
Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia (a Canadian company) into Mongolia has
reached nearly USD 1 billion, yet this investment is not recorded
among the data provided by FIFTA.
Data not Available
Neither FIFTA nor any other Mongolian agency to our knowledge tracks
Mongolia's direct investment abroad.
(NOTE: Mongolian FDI statistics deleted due to requirements of cable
format. END NOTE.)

Raw content

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 38 ULAANBAATAR 000016
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR, USTDA, OPIC, AND EXIMBANK
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EEB/CBA
USAID FOR ANE FOR D. WINSTON
USDOC FOR ZHEN-GONG CROSS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EINV, ECON, OPIC, KTTB, USTR, MG
SUBJECT: 2010 Mongolia Investment Climate Statement
ULAANBAATA 00000016 001.4 OF 038
//////////////////////////////
/////////////////////////////
ZFR ZFR
PLS CANCEL ULAANBAATAR 16 AND BLANK ALL ASSOCIATED
MCNS. CABLE IS A DUPE OF ULAANBAATAR 17.
SORRY FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE. THKS.
ZFR ZFR
///////////////////////////////
///////////////////////////////
ADDLETON
ULAANBAATA 00000016 002.2 OF 038
State participation (or share) is determined by an agreement on
exploitation of the deposit considering the amount of investment
made the state; or, in the case of a privately-explored strategic
deposit, by agreement between the state and the firm on the amount
invested by the state. Parliament may determine the state share
using a proposal made by the government or on its own initiative
using official figures on minerals reserves in the integrated state
registry.
Importantly, the state equity provision is not expropriatory on its
face, because the GOM has committed itself to compensating firms for
the share it takes at fair market value. Although experience is
limited with the law, so far the GOM has honored this commitment, as
experience with the recently signed agreement for the mega Oyu
Tolgoi copper-gold mine project confirms.
In addition, the current Minerals Law restricts the access of
petroleum and mineral licenses to entities registered in Mongolia
under the terms of the relevant company and investment laws. A
foreign entity, in its own right, cannot hold any sort of mining or
petroleum license. Should a foreign entity acquire a given
license as either collateral or for the purpose of actual
exploration or mining, and fail to create the appropriate Mongolian
corporate entity to hold a given license, that failure may serve as
grounds for invalidating the license. In essence, the foreign
entity may lose its security or its mining rights. We advise
investors with specific questions regarding the current status of
their respective licenses to seek professional advice on the status
of those licenses.
Reaching Agreement on the Oyu Tolgoi Project
In October 2009, the GOM, Ivanhoe Mines of Canada, and Rio Tinto
jointly negotiated an investment and development agreement for the
Oyu Tolgoi (OT) copper- gold deposit located in Mongolia's South
Gobi desert. The OT agreement vests the government of Mongolia with
34 percent ownership of the project and provides guarantees for
local employment and procurement. With estimated development costs
in excess of USD seven (7) billion, this 40-year plus mine is
conservatively expected to double Mongolia's annual GDP when it
becomes fully operational around 2020.
Observers of Mongolia's investment climate consider passage of this
agreement an unambiguously positive sign for foreign investors.
Although the deal took about six years to craft and several
conditions must still be met before implementation begins, nearly
all observers conclude that it shows Mongolia can say "Yes" to key
projects undertaken with foreign involvement and investment. In
addition, the agreement confirms the GOM's commitment to
compensating private rights holders of most deposits considered
strategic under the current minerals. Finally, the OT deal shows
that the GOM and Parliament are willing to amend laws and
regulations to enhance the commercial viability of mining projects
in Mongolia. As other projects of varying scales have been waiting
for OT to pass, the positive impact and message of the OT deal for
investors should not be underestimated.
2009 Laws Negatively Affecting Investor Rights
Although the OT deal was the big positive story for foreign
investors in 2009, the impact has been moderated by the passage of
two key laws that many foreign and domestic investors think detract
from Mongolia's claims to being a competitive, safe, and predictable
destination for investment.
The 2009 Uranium Law of Mongolia
In 2009 the Parliament imposed significant new controls on mining
and processing uranium in Mongolia. The law creates a new
regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Mongolia
(NRA), and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold assets
ULAANBAATA 00000016 003.2 OF 038
that the government will acquire from current rights holders. The
law imposes several conditions:
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses
with the NRA, for a fee.
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 51
percent of the company that will develop the mine -- as opposed to
just the deposit -- as a condition of being allowed to develop any
uranium property.
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework for
developing mineral and metal resources. Prior to the Uranium Law,
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to
other mineral and metals exploration.
The Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration in Water Basins
and Forested Areas of 2009
In 2009, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting mining in water
basins and forested areas of Mongolia. The stated intent was to
limit environmental damage caused primarily by placer gold mining in
and around forests and watersheds. The law imposes the following
restrictions on exploration and mining rights:
--Revokes or modifies licenses to explore for or mine any and all
mineral resources within an area no less than 200 meters from a
water or forest resource.
--Requires the government to compensate rights holders for
exploration expenses already incurred or revenue lost from actual
mining operations.
--Empowers local officials to determine the actual areas which can
be mined. In effect, the local official can extend the 200 meter
minimum at his discretion.
Both foreign and domestic investors have unambiguously criticized
these new laws and their respective implementations as both
non-transparent and potentially expropriatory. They argue that
these laws radically change the rules for investing in Mongolia's
vital minerals sector quite late in the game, raising the question
of Mongolia's reliability as an investment destination.
Further, observers note that these laws also raise the specter of
outright expropriation, which heretofore has not been present in
Mongolia. Although the Water Law requires compensation, the
government of Mongolia has not devised detailed plans for
indemnifying rights holders. In regards to the Uranium law, the
legislation explicitly rejects any obligation to compensate
investors for loss of economic rights and property; hence,
generating credible investor fears of government of expropriation.
Investors note that both laws passed without sufficient public
review and comment; and that the subsequent regulatory drafting
process occurred with little participation of the affected parties.
The resulting regulatory regimes do not generally specify how and on
what basis licenses will be revoked, nor do these new process detail
how investors might appeal non-renewals. The open-ended powers
seemingly granted Mongolian officials seem to give central,
regional, and local officials broad discretionary powers to curtail
rights without apparent limit.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 004.2 OF 038
Pending Elimination of the Windfall Profits Tax on Copper and Gold
Since passage in 2006, the Windfall Profits Tax Law has drawn
criticism regarding the GOM's commitment to creating an open,
predictable, and fair environment for foreign direct investment.
The speedy legislative process for passing the WPT was
unprecedented: The law passed in six days with no consultation on
any of its provisions with stakeholders. The entire process raised
concerns among investors about the stability and transparency of
Mongolia's legislative and regulatory environment, which three
intervening years of legislating have done little to alleviate.
The WPT imposes a 68 percent tax on the profits from gold and copper
mining respectively. For gold, the tax originally kicked in when
gold price hit USD500 per ounce; however, in late 2008 Parliament
raised the threshold to USD850. For copper, the threshold is USD
2,600 per ton. Mining industry sources claim that the 68 percent
tax rate, when combined with other Mongolian taxes, makes the
effective tax 100 percent on all proceeds above the copper threshold
price. In theory, the WPT proceeds are set aside in a special fund
for a combination of social welfare expenditures and a reserve fund,
although that fund, too, was modified in late 2009.
The recent OT Investment Agreement entailed further amendment to the
WPT as a condition precedent to its passage. OT's private investors
successfully argued that they would not be able to run a
commercially viable OT operation when faced with the WPT.
Consequently, Parliament amended the WPT Law: The WPT will
officially end for all copper concentrate and gold products in 2011.
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code
Effective since January 1, 2007, the current tax code reduces tax
rates, flattens the tax schedule, removes discriminatory loopholes
and exemptions, and provides for appropriate deduction opportunities
for corporate investment. The current code allows firms to deduct
more types of legitimate business expenditures: training, business
travel, cafeteria expenses, etc. The law also imposes a level
playing field between foreign and domestic investors. Specifically,
the current code eliminates the majority of discriminatory tax
exemptions and holidays (most of which favored international
investors).
As with the WPT, the OT Agreement had a salutary effect on key tax
provisions long-desired by foreign and domestic investors alike.
Before OT, firms could only carry-forward losses for two (2) years
after incurring the loss While most businesses approved of this
provision, many, especially those requiring large and long-term
infrastructure development, note that the two year carry-forward
limit is insufficient for projects with long development lead times,
as is typical of most large-scale mining developments. As a
condition precedent of passing the OT Agreement, Parliament extended
loss-carry forward to eight (8) years.
On the down side, Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption
available on value-added tax (VAT) taxes of 10 percent on equipment
used to bring a given mine into production, except on equipment to
be used in the production of highly processed mining products. For
example, if the OT project decides to smelt copper, imported
equipment supporting production of metallic copper might qualify for
a 10 percent reduction on VAT. However, in a effort to promote
value-added production in Mongolia, the GOM defines the production
of copper concentrate -OT's likely copper product - as
non-value-added output; and so, equipment imported to develop and
operate this sort of operation would not qualify for the 10 percent
VAT exemption.
Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines have long
development lead times before production begins, either waive or do
not tax such imports at all. Parliament, with no consultation with
investors, international advisors provided by donor organizations,
ULAANBAATA 00000016 005.2 OF 038
or even of its own tax officials, chose to impose the VAT, which
immediately makes Mongolian mining costs 10 percent higher than they
would otherwise be, impairing competitiveness and dramatically
varying from global practice.
Whether any mining output qualifies for this exemption seems
completely at the discretion of the GOM, which has not set out in
regulation or statute a process by which it will regularly
adjudicate such VAT exemption requests.
Unfinished Business (Including Customs Rates)
Both the GOM and Parliament continue to intend to debate additional
tax reform measures. Discussed since 2007, no substantive progress
has been made since. Proposed measures include revisions to the law
on customs and customs tariffs. While the exact nature of the
proposed changes in the customs law remains murky, the GOM states
that changes will be consistent with Mongolia's WTO obligations and
investment climate enhancement goals.
Despite overall solid, positive changes, international financial
institutions warn that the 2007 tax reforms by themselves are
insufficient to improve Mongolia's business environment. They
report that reform efforts need to go beyond changes to the tax code
to restructure the operations of the key agencies - the tax
department, the customs administration and the inspections agency -
that directly interact with private firms and individuals.
Issues in the Telecom and Aviation Sectors
While the Mongolian government supports FDI and domestic investment,
both foreign and domestic report that individual agencies and
elements of the judiciary often use their respective powers to
hinder investments into such sectors as meat production,
telecommunications, aviation, or pharmaceuticals. Investors report
similar abuses of inspections, permits, and licenses by Mongolian
regulatory agencies.
Abuses in Mongolia's telecom and information technology sector have
raised public and business concerns. The state-owned telecom
company, Mongol Telecom (MT) uses its regulatory and technical clout
to forestall or attack competition. As the monopoly supplier of
land-based lines through which much internet traffic has
traditionally flowed, MT charges predatory rates for access to all
other Internet Service Providers (ISPs) at a rate 10 times the
charges assessed to the state-owned ISP. These per-minute charges
add up and are hard for competitor ISPs to absorb. In addition,
some observers believe that the GOM, in an effort to make Mongol
Telecom more attractive for privatization, is inclined to make MT
the sole portal for all telecommunication into Mongolia. The
apparent intent here is to require licenses for both
telecommunication services and technology, which only MT could
satisfy. There has been significant lobbying against this policy by
ISPs, voice-over IP providers, cellular rights holders,
multi-lateral organizations, and diplomatic missions as contrary to
Mongolia's own competition law and long-term interests. So far
these efforts have delayed the passage of any damaging legislation.
Compounding these problems are the non-transparent activities of the
Mongolian Information, Communication Technology, and Post Agency
(ICTPA), which is charged with providing policy guidance to the
Communication Regulatory Commission of Mongolia (CRC). Companies
report that these agencies routinely act in ways that seem to have
no basis in law or regulation and which have harmed American
interests, not to mention those of investors from Mongolia and other
countries. For example, ICTPA has attempted to order internet
service providers to charge set access prices, without recourse to
the market. The CRC routinely tenders licenses for frequency and
information technology service allocation through a completely
non-transparent process that invariably seems to favor certain
domestic interests over other Mongolian companies and foreign
investors. While agreeing that the GOM has an interest in
ULAANBAATA 00000016 006.2 OF 038
allocating frequency, domestic and foreign investors question why
either the ICTPA or CRC need to interfere in the provision of ICT
services, which they believe should be left to the consumers to
decide.
The state also involves itself in the domestic aviation sector.
Mongolia has two domestic service providers, the privately owned
Aero Mongolia and EZNIS. Government regulation recommends maximum
ticket prices that airlines may charge for all domestic routes, but
the law does not strictly forbid airlines from charging fees higher
than the state carrier (which does not currently operate
domestically). However, the GOM frowns on domestic airlines that
charge more for service. These state prices are well below
operating costs and inhibit the private carriers from charging a
break-even fee. However, private carriers have decided to shake off
GOM prohibitions and are charging rates that might yield profits and
support safe and efficient flying arrangements.
State-owned MIAT formerly ran domestic operations which were heavily
subsidized, primarily through its foreign routes. This
state-subsidized competition with private carriers has inhibited
investors from participating in the provision of private domestic
service and consequently limited the aviation products and services
that U.S. firms might sell into the Mongolian market. Apart from a
brief and no-longer operating domestic service in 2009 using
aircraft from their international fleet, MIAT and the GOM have
failed to upgrade the domestic air fleet, which is effectively
non-existent. This seems to have opened the field for private
investment into the aviation sector.
The Mongolian Judiciary and the Sanctity of Contracts
We find no concerted, systematic, institutional abuse specifically
targeted at foreign investment. In the case of the
judiciary-corruption aside (see A. 11 Corruption)-most problems
arise from ignorance of commercial principles rather than antipathy
to foreign investment. In principle, both the law and the judiciary
recognize the concept of sanctity of contracts. However, the
practical application of this concept lags, with both foreign and
domestic investors reporting inconsistent enforcement of contracts
by the judiciary. This inconsistency comes from the slow transition
from Marxist-based jurisprudence to more market oriented laws and
judicial practices. Recent decisions in banking and land use cases
in which contract provisions were upheld reflect a growing
commercial sophistication among Mongolia's judges. As more judges
receive commercial training and as Soviet era (1921-1990) jurists
retire, we expect to see the gradual improvement of the entire
judicial system.
Concerns over Exit Visa's
Although not strictly a judicial issue, in 2009 a trend intensified
involving abuse of the country's requirement for exit visas by both
Mongolian public and private entities to exert pressure on foreign
investors to settle commercial disputes. The required valid exit
visas are normally issued at the port of departure (e.g. the
international airport), but may be denied for a variety of reasons
including civil disputes, pending criminal investigation, or for
immigration violations. If denied for a civil dispute, the visa may
not be issued until either the dispute is resolved administratively
or a court has rendered a decision. Neither current law nor
regulations establish a clear process or time-table for settlement
of the issue. Nor does the law allow authorities to distinguish a
criminal and civil case when detaining a person. In fact, the
Mongolian government maintains the right to detain foreign citizens
indefinitely without appeal until the situation has been resolved.
Research into issue has revealed that investors from countries other
than the U.S. are being affected by abuse of the exit-visa system.
All cases have a similar profile. A foreign investor has a
commercial dispute with a Mongolian entity, often involving assets,
management practices, or contract compliance. The Mongolian
entities respond by filing either civil or criminal charges with
ULAANBAATA 00000016 007.2 OF 038
local police or prosecutorial authority. It is important to note
that at this point there need be no actual arrest warrant or any
sort of official determination that charges are warranted: Mere
complaint by an aggrieved party is sufficient grounds to deny exit.
We should note that Mongolian investors are not subject to similar
detention when involved in commercial disputes. Mongolian citizens
do not require exit visas to depart Mongolia and can only be denied
exit with if an actual arrest warrant has been issued.
An investor in this situation is effectively detained in Mongolia
indefinitely. Some foreign investors have resolved the impasse by
settling, allowing them to depart Mongolia. If unwilling to settle,
the foreign investor will have to undergo the full investigatory
process, which may lead to a court action. Investigations commonly
take up to six months, and in one case an American citizen has been
denied an exit visa for two years pending a criminal investigation
into a failed business deal. In addition, even if a dispute seems
settled, it can be filed in the same venue again -- if the local
police and prosecutors are willing -- or in a different venue.
Privatization Policies and Resistance of Mongolian firms to Foreign
Investment
Privatization policies have favored foreign investment in some key
industries, including banking and cashmere production. The bidding
processes for privatizations and other tenders have generally been
transparent, and after some legal disputes among the winners and
losers lasting from late 2006 through mid-2008, most participants
have accepted the results.
Although the GOM routinely announces that it plans to privatize its
remaining assets, we have seen little real movement to privatize
state holdings in the aviation, telecommunications, power, and
mining sectors. Recent moves by the GOM to acquire assets in the
minerals sector - especially in uranium and coal -suggest to some
that, to the contrary, the GOM has no intention to extract the state
from ownership.
That said, the GOM has recently discussed initial public offerings
(IPO) for certain state-owned power, infrastructure, and mining
holdings. To date, the IPO discussion has developed at the
conceptual level, with little focus on the details.
Foreign companies and investors are subject to the same legal regime
imposed on Mongolian domestic firms regarding incorporation and
corporate activities. For example, casinos are illegal under
Mongolian law; and so, neither Mongolians nor foreigners may own or
operate them (except in one specifically designated free trade zone,
although no casino has been established there).
Generally, Mongolian private businesses seek foreign participation
and equity in all sectors of the economy. That said, some Mongolian
businesses use Mongolian institutions to stop competitors, if they
can. These actions represent no animus against foreign investment
as such; rather, they reflect individual businesses desire to keep
competitors, Mongolian or foreign, at bay.
Key Investment Laws
The Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (FILM) transformed the
anti-business environment of the Soviet era into today's generally
investor-friendly regime. Under the old system, everything not
provided for in law was illegal. Because such economic activities
as franchising, leasing, joint venture companies were not
specifically mentioned in earlier Mongolian statutes, they were
technically illegal. In 1993, the GOM enacted FILM to legalize all
manner of foreign investment in Mongolia (amended in 2002 to allow
for representative offices and franchises). This law and its
subsequent amendments define broad ranges of activity that would
otherwise have limited validity under Mongolian law. It also
defines the meaning of foreign investment under the civil code
without limiting activities that foreign investors can conduct.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 008.2 OF 038
FILM also establishes registration procedures for foreign companies.
Specifically, the law requires that any investment with 25 percent
or more of FDI must register as a foreign-invested firm with the
government. The law creates a supervisory agency, the Foreign
Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA), that runs the
registration process, liaises among businesses and the Mongolian
government, and promotes in- and out-bound investments.
In 2008, the Parliament of Mongolia amended the FILM. The stated
intent of the revision was to improve FIFTA's ability to track
foreign investment and to enhance the services provided by FIFTA to
foreign investors. The amendments apply only to investments
registered after the new law came into force in summer 2008. The
new law has raised the minimum level for new foreign investment from
USD 1,000 to USD 100,000 and imposed a series of requirements on
foreign investors seeking registration. Registered foreign
companies must now have FIFTA certify that their by-laws,
environmental practices, their technologies, etc., comply with
standards determined by FIFTA.
FIFTA officials admit that procedures are still under development;
and that because they lack specific expertise in most of these
areas, they will have to consult with the relevant ministries and
agencies as they assesses each firm's request for investment
registration. FIFTA has also not clearly defined what the precise
processes it will use to evaluate investments, what the exact
standards will be for any given investment, how it will determine
those standards, and how an investor might seek redress if FIFTA
denies a registration request. Foreign investors have expressed
concern over what they perceive as FIFTA's broad and seemingly
un-transparent regulatory authority; however, we have not received
any complaint of abuse of these new powers to date.
New Ministerial Structure Impacts Foreign Investment
In late 2008, the Parliament re-organized the government structure
by combining various ministries and agencies in an effort to
streamline government functions. Relevant to foreign investors,
Parliament took trade policy and trade promotion functions that had
been vested in the former Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) and
FIFTA respectively and merged them with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The new Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) has
assumed direct control all formulation and execution of trade
policies and promotion efforts, which includes export promotion and
in-bound investment efforts. FIFTA is now under MFAT's direct
supervision. Other units of MIT were absorbed by the now-named
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry and Ministry of
Nature, Environment, and Tourism.
Ministry officials have stated that the government will concentrate
on promoting Mongolian exports and foreign investment into Mongolia.
They want FIFTA to resemble counterpart agencies in South Korea,
Japan, or the U.S.; and have told both us and businesses that they
plan to get FIFTA out of the regulatory business. The intent is to
limit FIFTA's activities to supporting business in their efforts to
work in Mongolia and to registering in-bound investment for purposes
of investment tracking only.
A.2 CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES
The Mongolian government employs a limited regulatory regime for
controlling foreign exchange for investment remittances and
maintains exceptionally liberal policies for these transactions.
Foreign and domestic businesses report no problems converting or
transferring investment funds, profits and revenues, loan
repayments, or lease payments into whatever currency they wish to
wherever they wish. There is no difficulty in obtaining foreign
exchange, whether the investor wants Chinese Renminbi, Euros,
English Pounds, Rubles, or U.S. Dollars.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 009.2 OF 038
In regards to domestic transactions, the Parliament of Mongolia in
2009 closed a loophole that allowed local transactions to occur in
any currency desired. Now, all domestic transactions must be
conducted in Mongolia's national currency, the Tugrik, excepting
those entities allowed specific waivers as determined by the
Mongolian central bank, the Bank of Mongolia.
The Mongolian government wants funds to flow easily in and out of
the nation, with one exception. Foreign-held interest bearing
dollar accounts remain subject to a 20 percent withholding tax. The
bank retains 20 percent of all such interest payments sent abroad,
and remits this withholding to the Tax Authority of Mongolia.
Otherwise, businesses report no delays in remitting investment
returns or receiving in-bound funds. Most transfers occur within
1-2 business days or at most a single business week.
Ease of transfer aside, foreign investors criticize Mongolia's lack
of sophisticated mechanisms for converting currencies and parking
money. Letters of credit are difficult to obtain, and legal
parallel markets do not exist in the form of government dollar
denominated bonds or other instruments for parking funds in lieu of
payment. Many Mongolian financial institutions lack experience with
these arrangements. Moreover, Mongolian banking law currently
provides incomplete statutory grounds and regulatory support for the
activity to take place. The immediate impact has been to limit
access to certain types of foreign capital, as international
companies resist parking cash in Mongolian banks or in local debt
instruments.
A.3 EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION
Mongolia respects property rights as they apply to most asset types.
In 2009, we detected no wide-scale changes in policies, statutes,
or regulations related to the use and ownership of private property.
Foreigners face no legal bias in asset ownership (except that only
citizens of Mongolian may own land) or how they structure ownership.
Foreign investors need not seek local partners or share ownership
of most assets or endeavors as a condition of doing business.
However, in foreign-investor dependent crucial mining sector, 2009
saw the government of Mongolia (GOM) cross from actions that might
represent "creeping expropriation" to what many consider explicitly
expropriatory acts sanctioned through force of law, especially in
the uranium mining sector.
Security of Ownership
Mongolia and the United States signed and ratified a Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) which entered in force in 1997, and which
specifically enjoins both signatories from expropriatory acts
against private property and investments. In addition, both
Mongolian law and the national constitution recognize private
property and use rights and specifically bar the government from
expropriation of such assets. To date, the government of Mongolia
(GOM) has not expropriated any American property or assets. Thus,
we have no precedent from which to assess how the Mongolian system
would respond to seizure and compensation.
Like most governments, the Mongolian government can claim land or
restrict use rights in the national interest. Currently, this means
little, as most land outside Mongolia's few urban centers remains
government property, as provided in Mongolia's constitution. The
government has no plans to privatize these vast countryside
holdings, but it leases parcels for such economic activities as
mining, pasturage, timbering, etc. This practice remains in flux
because the government must still determine how to let these rights
and what fees to charge. Except for mining, most foreign firms
remain inactive in these sectors.
Since May 2003, land in the urban areas has been privatized to
citizens of Mongolia or leased to both citizens and foreigners for
periods ranging from 3-90 years. The legislation and implementing
regulations are evolving, but so far investors believe that the GOM
ULAANBAATA 00000016 010.2 OF 038
generally respects recently enacted property rights and leases.
I: Implications of the Current Minerals Laws
Minerals Law of 2006
We closely watch the key mining sector, Mongolia's major foreign
exchange earner and chief engine for economic and commercial growth
and development. The current Minerals Law has several provisions
that raise red flags for investors and observers alike. The law
does not allow the GOM to usurp rights to explore and exploit
natural mineral, metal, and hydrocarbons resources per se. Instead,
the law imposes procedural requirements and grants powers to
central, provincial, and local officials - powers that, if abused,
might prevent mineral license holders from exercising their
exploration or mining rights. The current law has the potential to
deny the rights holder access to his rights without formally
revoking use rights.
An example is the new tender process for apportioning some
exploration rights. The old law awarded exploration rights on a
"first come, first served" basis, a process that gave little
discretion to government officials to intervene. The new law lays
out a different procedure for obtaining exploration rights on land
explored with state funds or lands where the current holder has
forfeited exploration rights. The Mineral Resources Authority of
Mongolia (MRAM) will tender such exploration rights only to firms
technically qualified to conduct minerals work. The new tender
procedure neither requires nor allows for a cash-bid. Only the
technical merits of exploration proposals will determine who gains
exploration rights. MRAM staff has the authority and responsibility
to assess the merits of proposals to determine who wins the
tenders.
Both MRAM and its supervising authority, the Ministry of Mineral
Resources and Energy, now have broad discretionary authority to
select who will get tenements. Under the current system, it is
possible for a company to prospect virgin territory, and scope out a
potential exploration site, only to risk losing the site should MRAM
decide to grant the rights to another exploration company. This
authority disturbs miners, who fear this power will be the source of
corruption and arbitrary decisions by MRAM. Evidence suggests that
local mining guilds will define an expert in Mongolian mining as a
person who received a degree from a Mongolian institution, such as
the National University, rather than an internationally recognized
institution. While this enforced employment program for Mongolian
geologists would be an annoyance, the discretionary power MRAM now
has generates the most concern. If MRAM rejects a firm's experts
and mining plan as unqualified, no recourse is spelled out under the
new law, and the firm will in effect lose its rights.
The concept of "expertise" allows another potential avenue for
expropriation of rights by denying or preventing their use. The law
has the potential to limit the ability of rights holders to seek
financing, because it forbids transfer of mining licenses and
exploration rights to non-qualified individuals. Consequently, a
miner will not be able to offer his licenses as secured collateral
to banks or to any lender lacking the professional qualifications to
receive these rights if the miner defaulted on his debt obligations.
A given bank is unlikely to set up a "qualified" mining firm just
to receive a pledged license offered as collateral. Thus, the law
limits the investment pool that a mining firm might tap to finance
its mine, which might prevent bringing a property into production,
again denying licensees access to their legal economic rights.
The current law removed from its predecessor the Mongol word for
"exclusive" from the grant of exploration rights. The old article
read, "To conduct exclusive exploration for minerals within the
boundaries of an exploration area in accordance with this law." The
new article reads, "To conduct exploration for minerals. . . ." It
is unclear what, if anything, this deletion means. However, the
deletion would seem to allow the government to apportion mineral
ULAANBAATA 00000016 011.2 OF 038
rights per metal or mineral rather than as a whole, which has been
the standard practice. The deletion was apparently done
intentionally, as the word appeared in earlier drafts, right up to
the passage of the law.
Investors and observers are also concerned about new authority
granted to the MRAM Chairman to approve transfers of existing and
new licenses. The law grants final approval authority to the MRAM,
without specifying any check or balance on this official's
authority. This power is not a revocation but if abused would
certainly prevent exercise of economic rights.
Complicating matters is that in 2008 MRAM had been moved under the
direct authority of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy in
a sweeping re-organization of the government. Prior to this
restructuring, MRAM had been a quasi-independent agency, the acts of
which did not require ministerial approval. In the new structure,
the ministry can intervene in the registration and transfer of
exploration and mining licenses. The ministry seems to have only
intervened in cases where the license involves a "strategic"
deposit. (See A.1 Openness to Foreign Investment for explanation of
strategic deposits.) In this specific category, ministerial
officials have ordered MRAM to freeze all transfers and transactions
involving properties near or in strategic deposits, which includes
uranium deposits of any size and massive coal and copper deposits
near the Chinese border. Further, these same officials have
indicated that the government may then revoke the rights of those
holding exploration rights or mining licenses in or near strategic
deposits. Although the law seems to allow for compensation, the
ministry has not presented formal compensation packages or even
issued compensation guidelines to those potentially affected by its
actions.
Expropriatory Aspects of the 2009 Law on Uranium Mining
In 2009 the Parliament passed a new law imposing significant new
controls on mining and processing uranium in Mongolia. The law
created a new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of
Mongolia (NRA), and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold
assets that the government will acquire from current rights holders.
The law imposes several key policies:
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses
with the NRA, for a fee.
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 51
percent of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop
the mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium
property.
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing
for mineral and metal resources. Prior to the Uranium Law,
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to
other mineral and metals exploration.
To many foreign and domestic investors, this law is outright,
statutorily sanctioned expropriation, which heretofore had not been
present in Mongolia. Although the Minerals Law of Mongolia and
other pieces of legislation officially state that the GOM must
compensate rights holders for any taking, the Uranium Law gives the
GOM the unfettered right to take uranium holdings from whomever it
will with no obligation to compensate the rights holders.
Complicating the issue is that the law seems to conflate the deposit
and company mining the deposit, allowing the GOM to claim an
uncompensated share in any entity that might mine the deposit. In
ULAANBAATA 00000016 012.2 OF 038
effect, the GOM is demanding a free-carried, non-compensated
interest of no less than 51 percent of any uranium mine.
Acts of Provincial Administrations:
With regard to the issuance of both exploration permits and mining
licenses, provincial officials reportedly routinely use their
authority arbitrarily to block access to mining rights legally
granted under the current law. For example, reports regularly
circulate that some provincial government officials use their
authority to designate land as "special use zones" to usurp mining
exploration tenements. In a common technique, provincial governors
often reclassify property that has never felt the touch of the plow
or felt the tread of a tourist for agricultural use or cultural
tourism respectively, although the central government has legally
granted exploration rights to miners. In one case, a miner could
not gain access to the subsurface resources because the provincial
government claimed that doing so would damage a potato farm that had
suddenly appeared over the site.
Other miners harshly criticize the misuse of the local officials'
rights to comment on permits for water use and mining licenses.
Comments are advisory, and have limited legal force regarding
disallowing activity, but the central government routinely hesitates
to reject a governor's negative comment no matter the motives behind
it. The effect has been to stop progress for months, limiting
access to the resource and costing rights holders' time and money.
Whatever the motives, these provincial actions are often seen as a
creeping bureaucratic expropriation through denial of access and use
rights. The current Minerals Law provides no clear limit on
provincial control of permits and special use rights or guidance on
how to apply these powers beyond codifying that the provincial and
local authorities have some authority over activities occurring in
their provinces and soums (counties).
Faced with these unclear boundaries of authority, the central
government often interprets the rules and regulations differently
from the provincial authorities, creating administrative conflicts
among the various stakeholders. The central government acknowledges
the problematic ambiguity but has yet to definitively clarify the
situation in law or practice, even though the situation threatens
accessing one's rights. Mongolian and foreign permit holders have
advised the government that letting this problem fester raises
perceptions among investors that they may risk losing their economic
rights, which can scare away inbound investors.
Expansion of License Revocation Powers to the Soum Level
The recently passed Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration
in Water Basins and Forested Areas of 2009 represents a considerable
extension of unregulated authority to Mongolia's 320 soum (county)
administrations in regards to mining activities within their
respective jurisdictions.
In 2009, the Parliament prohibited mining in water basins and
forested areas of Mongolia. The stated and laudatory intent was to
limit environmental damage caused primarily by placer gold mining in
and around forests and watersheds. The law imposes the following
restrictions on exploration and mining rights:
--Requires the government of Mongolia to revoke or modify licenses
to explore for any and all mineral resources within an area no less
than 200 meters from a water or forest resource.
--Requires the government to compensate rights holders for
exploration expenses already incurred or revenue lost from actual
mining operations.
--Empowers local officials, the soum or county governors, to
determine the actual areas which can be mined. In effect, the local
official can extend the 200 meter minimum at his discretion.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 013.2 OF 038
Current rights holders are concerned that the power of local
governors to curtail mining in their respective jurisdictions seems
unlimited and unregulated. Although the governor cannot allow
mining within the 200 meter limit, the law sets no upper limit on
mining near water courses and forests in the respective soum. The
local administration has full discretion to prohibit operations 400
meters, 600, 1000, or more. Mining companies have to work out the
issue with the local governor; and should any company disagree with
a given soum administration's ruling, the law makes no provision for
administrative appeal. A company would then have to pursue redress
through a lengthy case in Mongolia's courts. In either case, the
rights holder would lose access to their economic rights for a
protracted period or permanently.
A.4 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The GOM consistently supports transparent, equitable dispute
settlements, but executing good intentions has proven problematic.
These problems largely stem from a lack of experience with standard
commercial practices rather than from any systemic intent by public
or private entities to target foreign investors. The framework of
laws and procedures is functional, but many judges remain ignorant
of commercial principles.
Problems with Dispute Settlement in Mongolia's Courts
Court structure is straightforward and supports dispute settlement.
Disputants know the procedures and the venues. Plaintiffs bring
cases at the district court level before a single district judge or
panel of judges, depending on the complexity and importance of the
case. The district court renders its verdict. Either party can
appeal this decision to the Ulaanbaatar City Court, which rules on
matters of fact as well as matters of law. It may uphold the
verdict, send it back for reconsideration or nullify the judgment.
Disputants may then take the case to the Mongolian Supreme Court for
a final review. Matters regarding the constitutionality of laws and
regulations may be taken directly before the Constitutional Court of
Mongolia (the "Tsetz") by Mongolian Citizens, Foreign Citizens, or
Stateless Persons residing legally in Mongolia.
Problems arise for several reasons. First, commercial law in
Mongolia and broad understanding of it remain in flux. New laws and
regulations on contracts, investment, corporate structures, leasing,
banking, etc. have been passed or are being considered at both the
ministerial and parliamentary levels. Mongolian civil law does not
work on precedents but from application of the statute as written.
If a law is vague or does not cover a particular commercial
activity, the judge's remit to adjudicate can be severely limited or
non-existent. For example, until recently leasing did not exist in
the Mongolian civil law code as such, but seemed to be covered under
various aspects of Mongolian civil law regarding contracts and other
agreements. But judgments on leasing made under these laws might
not have applied to an arrangement not otherwise specifically
recognized under its own exclusive law. Further, because precedents
are not legally relevant or binding on other judges and Mongolian
courts, decisions reached in one case have no legal force in other
suits, even when the circumstances are similar or even before the
same court and judges.
Trained in the former Soviet era, many judges lack training in or
remain ignorant of commercial principles, in some cases willfully.
They dismiss such concepts as the sanctity of the contract. This is
not a problem of the law, which recognizes contracts, but what most
conclude is faulty interpretation. In several cases courts have
misinterpreted provisions regarding leases and loan contracts,
allegedly intentionally in some cases. Judges regularly ignore
terms of a contract in their decisions. If someone defaults on a
loan, the courts often order assets returned without requiring the
debtor to compensate the creditor for any loss of value. Judges
routinely assert that the creditor has recovered the asset, such as
it is, and that is enough. Bad faith and loss of value simply have
no formal standing in judicial calculations of equity.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 014.2 OF 038
Replacing old-school judges is not an option. It is politically
impossible-if not functionally impractical-for the Mongolians to
dismiss its cadre of Soviet-era judges. There is a realistic hope
that young justices, trained in modern commercial principles by
international experts, will gradually improve judicial protections
for commercial activities in Mongolia. Lately, we have seen better
decisions in several cases involving Americans seeking to recover on
debts and contractual fees and to hold Mongolian government entities
to the terms of their respective contracts and regulations, but
these results tend to be limited to courts where modern-educated
judges preside.
Bankruptcy and Debt Collection
Mongolia's bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the
rights of creditors need serious reform. Mongolian law allows for
mortgages and other loan instruments backed with securitized
collateral. However, rudimentary systems for determining title and
liens and for collecting on debts make lending on local security
risky. Banks frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are
barely workable and unfair to creditors.
Although a system exists to register immovable property-structures
and real estate-for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current
system does not record existing liens against immovable property. In
addition, no system exists to register ownership of, and liens on,
movable property. Consequently, Mongolian lenders face the added
risk of lending on collateral that the debtor may not actually own
or which may have already been offered as security for another debt.
It is hoped that a project sponsored by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation to create a more modern and efficient property
registration system will help improve the ability of creditors and
debtors to prove ownership. For program details go to
http://www.mca.mn.
Overall, the legal system does recognize the concept of
collateralized assets provided as security for loans, investment
capital, or other debt-based financial mechanisms. The legal system
also provides for foreclosure, but this process is exceptionally
onerous and time consuming. A 2005 change to Mongolian law
attempted to simplify the process by allowing creditors to foreclose
without judicial review. Prior to this law, all creditors had to go
to court to collect on securitized collateral, adding months to the
entire collection process. However, the Constitutional Court of
Mongolia voided the law on constitutional grounds, slowing down debt
collection to pre-2005 levels. Waits of up to 24 months for final
liquidations and settlement of security were not uncommon.
Once a judgment is rendered, the disputant faces a relatively
hostile environment to execute the court's decision. For example, a
bank collecting on a debt in Mongolia must allow debtors to put
forward assets for auction and set the minimum bid price for those
assets. If assets do not sell, a second round of auctions occurs in
which a reduced minimum bid is put forward. The State Collection
Office (SCO) supervises this process but does not set the price.
However, the SCO receives 10 percent from the sales price or from
the second auction minimum price even if there is no sale.
The SCO does not allow collateralized assets to be valued by neutral
third parties. Because it derives income from the forced sale of
assets, the SCO has a conflict of interest; and, anecdotally, seems
to have failed as an impartial arbiter between debtors and
creditors. For banks, this has meant that forcing a company into
bankruptcy may be the safest way to recover rather than forcing
piecemeal sales of assets. This approach automatically puts all
assets into play rather than those selected by the debtor. However,
this procedure is onerous without a clear process behind it.
Purchase financing remains tricky. For example, a local car dealer
financed an auto for USD 20,000 down and USD 60,000 in credit,
complete with a local bank guarantee. The buyer subsequently
defaulted on the loan, the bank refused to honor its guarantee, and
ULAANBAATA 00000016 015.2 OF 038
the dealer took the buyer to court. Under current Mongolian law,
interest payments are suspended for the duration of such a case,
from first filing to final appeal before the Supreme Court of
Mongolia. Possibly months of interest-free time can pass while the
asset rusts in an impound lot. In this case, the dealer simply
reclaimed the car and dropped the lawsuit, swallowing the lost
interest payments and loss of value on the car. Domestic and
foreign businesses often respond by requiring customers to pay in
cash, limiting sales and the expansion of the economy.
Binding Arbitration: International and Domestic
The Mongolian government supports and will submit to both binding
arbitration and international settlement procedures. However,
glitches remain in local execution. Mongolia ratified the
Washington Convention and joined the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1991. It also signed and
ratified the New York Convention in 1994.
To our knowledge, the government of Mongolia has accepted
international arbitration in five disputes where claimants have
asserted the government reneged on a sovereign guarantee to
indemnify them. In all cases the government has consistently
declared that it would honor the arbitrators' judgments. However,
this resolution has not been put to the test. In the four cases
where a decision has been rendered, Mongolia has won each case; and
so, its commitment to imposing a negative international arbitral
decision remains untested.
More widely, Mongolian businesses partnered with foreign investors
accept international arbitration, as do government agencies that
contract business with foreign investors, rather than avail
themselves of the Arbitration Bureau operated by the Mongolian
National Chamber of Commerce and Industry. These entities tell us
that they seek redress abroad because they perceive that domestic
arbitrators are too politicized, unfamiliar with commercial
practices, and too self-interested to render fair decisions.
Although arbitration is widely accepted among business people and
elements of the government, support for binding international
arbitration has not penetrated local Mongolian agencies responsible
for executing judgments. In two cases, the Mongolian-state-owned
copper mine lost two international arbitral cases. The awards were
certified and recognized as valid and enforceable by Mongolian
courts. But the local bailiff's office has consistently failed to
execute the collection orders. Local business people routinely cite
the failure of SCO and the bailiffs to enforce court-ordered
foreclosures and judgments as the most common problem threatening
resolution of debt-driven disputes.
A.5 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES
Mongolia imposes few performance requirements on, and offers few
incentives to, investors. The few requirements imposed are not
onerous and do not limit foreign participation in any sector of the
economy. Performance requirements are applied somewhat differently
to foreign investors in a limited number of sectors.
Formally quite generous to foreign investors, the current Tax Law of
Mongolia (amended in 2006) offers few incentives and exemptions.
While preferential tax agreements made with most foreign investors
have been allowed to run their courses, the government of Mongolia
(GOM) has attempted to limit both exemptions and incentives and to
make sure that tax preferences offered are available to both foreign
and domestic investors.
Current exemptions are granted for imports of staples as flour and
for imports in certain sectors targeted for growth, such as the
agriculture sector. Exemptions apply to both import duties and
Mongolia's value-added tax (VAT). In addition, the GOM will extend
a 10percent tax credit on case by case basis to investments in such
key sectors as mining, agriculture, and infrastructure.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 016.2 OF 038
Foreign investors have accepted phasing out of tax incentives,
because the amendments have brought some needed best practices to
the tax code. These include provision for 8-year
loss-carry-forwards, five-year accelerated depreciation, and more
deductions for legitimate business expenses including but not
limited to marketing and training expenses.
Revocation of the VAT Exemption
Investors view 2009's changes into the tax code's treatment of
exemptions as something of a mixed bag. On the down side,
Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption available on value-added
tax (VAT) taxes of 10percent on equipment used to bring a given mine
into production, except on equipment to be used in the production of
highly processed mining products. For example, if the Oyu Tolgoi
(OT) copper-gold project were to smelt copper, imported equipment
supporting production of metallic copper might qualify for an
exemption from the VAT. However, to promote value-added production
in Mongolia, the GOM defines the production of copper concentrate
-OT's likely copper product - as non-value-added output; and so,
equipment imported to develop and operate this sort of operation
would not qualify for the 10percent VAT exemption.
Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines have long
development lead times before production begins, either waive or do
not tax such imports at all. Parliament, with no consultation with
investors, international advisors provided by donor organizations,
or even with its own tax officials, chose to impose the VAT, which
immediately makes Mongolian mining costs 10percent higher than they
would otherwise be, impairing competitiveness and dramatically
varying from global practice.
Pro-Investment Changes to the Tax Code
On the plus side, Parliament revised both the Windfall Profit Tax
(WPT) and loss-carry forward provisions. Under the old regime, the
WPT imposed a 68percent tax on the profits from gold and copper
mining respectively. (For more details on the WPT see Chapter A.1:
Openness of Government to Foreign Investment.) The recent OT
Investment Agreement entailed further amendment to the WPT as a
condition precedent to its passage. OT's private investors
successfully argued that they would not be able to operate OT
commercially if burdened with the WPT. Consequently, Parliament
amended the WPT Law: The WPT will officially end for all copper
concentrate and gold products in 2011.
Regarding the granting of more generous loss carry-forward
provisions, as a condition precedent of passing the OT Agreement,
Parliament extended the provision from two (2) years to eight (8)
years after incurring a loss. Most investors find eight years
sufficient for many Mongolian investments that require impose long,
expensive development horizons before producing any sort of profit.
Few Restrictions on Foreign Investment
The government applies the same geographical restrictions to both
foreign and domestic investors. Existing restrictions involve
border security, environmental concerns, or local use rights. There
are no onerous or discriminatory visas, residence, or work permits
requirements imposed on American investors. Generally, foreign
investors need not use local goods, services, or equity, or engage
in substitution of imports. Neither foreign nor domestic businesses
need purchase from local sources or export a certain percentage of
output, or have access to foreign exchange in relation to their
exports.
Although there remains no formal law requiring the use of local
goods and services, the GOM encourages firms to do value-added
production in Mongolia, especially for firms engaged in natural
resource extraction. All Mongolian senior officials and politicians
make in-country processing a consistent feature of their public and
private policy statements regarding the development of mining. For
ULAANBAATA 00000016 017.2 OF 038
example, the current but soon to sunset WPT applied the tax to
copper concentrate, but exempted metallic copper produced in
Mongolia. Recently concluded negotiations on the OT copper-gold
project ended with commitments by the companies to explore copper
smelting in Mongolia. Government talks on coal production
constantly feature discussions of power generation and coals-to-
liquid processing in Mongolia. Government plans also call for
increased investment in businesses and activities that keep the
"value" of a resource in Mongolia. Consequently, firms should
continue to expect the GOM to press aggressively for value-added
production in Mongolia.
Generally, foreign investors set their own export and production
targets without concern for government imposed targets or
requirements. There is no requirement to transfer technology. As
a matter of law, the government imposes no offset requirements for
major procurements. Certain tenders may require bidders to agree to
levels of local employment or to fund certain facilities as a
condition of the tender, but as matter of course such conditions are
not the normal approach of the government in its tendering and
procurement policies.
Investors, not the Mongolian government, make arrangements regarding
technology, intellectual property, and similar resources and may
generally finance as they see fit. Foreign investors need sell no
shares to Mongolian nationals. Equity stakes are generally at the
complete discretion of investors, Mongolian or foreign -- with one
key exception for strategic mining assets (For more detail on what
constitutes a strategic mining asset see Chapter A.1: Openness of
Government to Foreign Investment). Although Mongolia imposes no
official statutory or regulatory requirement, the GOM, as a matter
of foreign policy, sometimes negotiates restrictions on what sort of
financing foreign investors may obtain and with whom those investors
might partner or to whom they might sell shares or equity stakes.
These restrictive covenants will most likely be imposed in certain
sectors where the investment is determined to have national impact
or national security concerns, especially in the key mining sector.
Regarding employment, investors can locate and hire workers without
using hiring agencies-as long as hiring practices are consistent
with Mongolian Labor Law. However, Mongolian law requires companies
to employ Mongolian workers in certain labor categories whenever a
Mongolian can perform the task as well as a foreigner. This law
generally applies to unskilled labor categories and not areas where
a high degree of technical expertise not existing in Mongolia is
required. The law does provide an escape hatch for all employers.
Should an employer seek to hire a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot
obtain a waiver from the Ministry of Labor for that employee, the
employer can pay a fee of around USD140 per employee per month.
Depending on the importance of a project, the Ministry of Labor may
grant an employer a 50percent exemption of the waiver fees as an
incentive.
Limited Performance Requirements
Requirements in the Petroleum and Mining Sectors
Performance requirements are sparingly imposed on investors in
Mongolia with the exception of petroleum and mining exploration
firms. The Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (PAM) issues petroleum
exploration blocks to firms, which then agree to conduct exploration
activities. The size and scope of these activities are agreed upon
between PAM and are binding. If the firm fails to fulfill
exploration commitments, it must pay a penalty to PAM based on the
amount of hectares in the exploration block, or return the block to
PAM. These procedures apply to all investors in the petroleum
exploration sector.
Under the current Minerals Law of Mongolia, receiving and keeping
exploration licenses depends on conducting actual exploration work.
Each year exploration firms must submit a work plan and report on
ULAANBAATA 00000016 018.2 OF 038
the execution of the previous year's performance commitments, all of
which are subject to annual verification by the Minerals Authority
of Mongolia (MRAM). Failure to comply with work requirements may
result in fines, suspension, or even revocation of exploration
rights. Work commitments expressed in terms of US dollar expenses
per hectare per year:
-2nd and 3rd years miners must spend no less than US D.50 per
hectare on exploration
--4th to 6th years miners must spend no less than US D1.00 per
hectare on exploration
--7th to 9th years miners must spend no less than US D1.50 per
hectare on exploration
In addition to these performance requirements, the law also requires
holders of mining licenses for projects of strategic importance to
sell no less than 10percent of company shares on the Mongolian Stock
Exchange. Vaguely presented in the statute, the GOM has provided no
formal clarification in law or regulation of what this provision
means in practical terms or how it is to be implemented.
In 2009 the Parliament passed a new law imposing significant new
controls on mining and processing uranium in Mongolia. This law
created a new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of
Mongolia (NRA) and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold
assets that the government will acquire from current rights holders.
The law imposes several conditions:
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses
with the NRA, for a fee.
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 50percent
of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop the
mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium
property.
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing
for mineral and metal resources. Prior to the Uranium Law,
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to
other mineral and metals exploration
Requirements Imposed on Foreign Investors Only
All foreign investors must register with the Foreign Investment and
Foreign trade Agency (FIFTA). The Foreign Investment Law of
Mongolia requires all foreign investors to show a minimum of USD
100,000 in assets (cash, working stock, property, etc.) registered
in Mongolia as a precondition for registration. In addition to this
particular requirement, all foreign investors must pay an initial
processing fee of some 12, 000 Mongolian tugrik or about USD 8.00.
Foreign Investors must then pay a yearly prolongation fee of 6,000
Mongolian tugrik or about USD 4.00.
In addition to these fees, foreign investors must annually report on
their activities for the coming year to the government through
FIFTA. Businesses need not fulfill plans set out in this report,
but failure to report may result in non-issuance of licenses and
registrations and suspension of activities. This requirement
differs from that imposed on domestic investors and businesses.
Local investors have no yearly reporting requirement. Mongolians
pay lower registration fees, which vary too much to say with any
precision what the fees actually are.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 019.2 OF 038
FIFTA explains that the higher registration costs for foreign
investors arise from the need to compensate for the services it
provides to foreign investors, including assistance with
registrations, liaison services, trouble-shooting, etc. The
different reporting requirements provide the government with a
clearer picture of foreign investment in Mongolia. Foreign
investors are generally aware of FIFTA's arguments and largely
accept them, but they question the need for annual registrations.
Investors recommend that FIFTA simply charge an annual fee rather
than require businesses to submit a new application each year.
Regarding reports, foreign businesses are concerned about the
security of their proprietary information. Several foreign
investors have claimed that agents of FIFTA routinely use or sell
information on business plans and financial data. We have yet to
verify these claims, but FIFTA acknowledges that data security
largely depends on the honesty of its staff, as there are few
internal controls over access to the annual reports.
Tariffs
Mongolia has one of Asia's least restrictive tariff regimes. Its
export and import policies do not harm or inhibit foreign
investment. Low by world standards, tariffs of 5percent on most
products are applied across the board to all firms, albeit with some
concerns about consistency of application and valuation. However,
some non-tariff barriers, such as phyto-sanitary regulations, exist
that limit both foreign and domestic competition in the fields of
pharmaceutical imports and food imports and exports. The testing
requirements for imported drugs, food products, chemicals,
construction materials, etc., are extremely nontransparent,
inconsistent, and onerous. When companies attempt to clarify what
the rules for importing such products into the country are, they
receive contradictory information from multiple agencies.
WTO TRIMS Requirements
Mongolia employs no measures inconsistent with WTO TRIMs
requirements, nor has anyone alleged that any such violation has
occurred.
A.6 RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT
Mongolia has one of Asia's most liberal ownership and establishment
regimes. Unless otherwise forbidden by law, foreign and domestic
businesses may establish and engage in any form of remunerative
activity. All businesses can start up, buy, sell, merge; in short,
do whatever they wish with their assets and firms, with exceptions
in the mining and petroleum sectors.
Competition from the State-Owned Sector
Mongolia passed and implemented a competition law applying to
foreign, domestic, and state-owned entities active in Mongolia. As
a practical matter, competition between state-owned and private
businesses has been declining for the simple reason that many
parastatals have been privatized. The exceptions are the
state-owned power and telecom industries, a national airline
(international only at present), the national rail system
(half-owned by Russia), several coal mines, and a large copper
mining and concentration facility (also half-owned by Russia).
Currently, firms from Mongolia, China, Japan, Europe, Canada, and
the U.S. are actively seeking opportunities for renewable and
traditional power generation in Mongolia. However, few want to
invest in the power generation field until the regulatory and
statutory framework for private power generation firms up and
tariffs are set at rates allowing profits.
Regarding its railway sector, Mongolia has no plans to privatize its
existing railroad jointly held with the government of Russia, but
ULAANBAATA 00000016 020.2 OF 038
current law does allow private firms to build, operate, and transfer
new railroads to the state. Under this law several private mining
companies have proposed rail links, and obtained licenses to
construct these new lines from their respective coal mines to the
Chinese border or to the currently operating spur of the
Trans-Siberian Railroad. However, because landlocked Mongolia and
its neighbors have yet to resolve transnational shipping issues,
companies may not be able to access rights granted under these
licenses.
Although the trend had been for the GOM to extract itself from
ownership of firms and other commercial assets, both the current
Minerals Law of Mongolia and the 2009 Uranium Law bring the state
back into mining. (See Chapter A.1: Openness of Government to
Foreign Investment for fuller discussions of both the 2009 Uranium
Law and Minerals Law) Under both laws, the GOM granted itself the
right to acquire equity stakes ranging from 34 percent to perhaps
100 percent of certain deposits deemed strategic for the nation.
Once acquired, these assets are to be placed with one of two
state-owned management companies: Erdenes MGL, for non-uranium
assets; or MonAtom for uranium resources. These companies are then
mandated to use the proceeds from their respective activities for
the benefit of the Mongolian people.
The role of state as an equity owner, in terms of management of
revenues and operation of the mining asset, remains unclear at this
point. There are some concerns over the capacity of the GOM to
deal with conflicts of interest arising from its position as both
regulator and owner of these strategic assets. Specifically, firms
are worried that the GOM's desire to maximize local procurement,
employment, and revenues may comprise the long term commercial
viability of any mining project. In addition, discussions are
underway to set up three new state-owned holding entities to manage
assets in three priority areas -- mining, energy, and infrastructure
-- then take the companies public to raise investment revenues
through the capital markets.
A.7 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
The right to own private, movable and immovable property is
recognized under Mongolian law. Regardless of citizenship (except
for land which only citizens of Mongolia can own), owners can do as
they wish with their property. One can collateralize real and
movable property. If debtors default on such secured loans,
creditors do have recourse under Mongolian law to recover debts by
seizing and disposing of property offered as security. The only
exceptions to this liberal environment are current mining laws,
which either bar transfer of exploration and mining licenses to
third parties lacking professional mining qualifications or status
as a Mongolian registered entity, or which threaten to expropriate
without compensation certain mineral holdings outright.
Mongolia's Current Regime to Protect Creditors
The current protection regime for creditors functions but needs
reform. The legal system presents the greatest pitfalls. Although
the courts recognize property rights in concept, they have a
checkered record of protecting and facilitating acquisition and
disposition of assets in practice. Part of the problem is ignorance
of, and inexperience with, standard practices regarding land,
leases, buildings, and mortgages. As noted in Chapter A.4 Dispute
Settlement, some judges, largely out of ignorance of the concepts,
have failed to recognize these practices. Some newly trained judges
are making a good faith effort to uphold property rights, but need
time to learn how to adjudicate such cases.
Mongolia's bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the
rights of creditors need reform. Mongolian law allows for mortgages
and other loan instruments backed with securitized collateral.
However, rudimentary systems for determining title and liens and for
collecting on debts make lending on local security risky. Banks
frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are barely
ULAANBAATA 00000016 021.2 OF 038
workable and unfair to creditors.
Although a system exists to register immovable property-structures
and real estate-for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current
system does not record existing liens on immovable property; nor
does the current system record ownership and liens on movable
property. Consequently, Mongolian lenders risk lending on
collateral that the debtor may not actually own or which may have
already been offered as security for another debt. It is hoped that
a project sponsored by the Millennium Challenge Corporation to
create a more modern and efficient property registration system will
go some way to improving the ability of creditors and debtors to
prove ownership. For details: http://www.mca.mn.
Overall, the legal system recognizes the concept of collaterized
assets as security for loans, investment capital, or other
debt-based financial mechanisms. The legal system also provides for
foreclosure, but this process has proven exceptionally burdensome
and time consuming. Current law bars creditors from non-judicial
foreclosure, requiring them to submit all contested foreclosure
actions for judicial review through Mongolia's court system. This
approach slows debt collection substantially: Waits of up to 24
months for final liquidations and settlement of security are not
uncommon.
Debt Collection Procedures
Even with the delays, getting a ruling is relatively easy compared
to executing the court's decision. The problem is not the law but
the enforcement. A judge orders the State Collection Office (SCO)
to move on the assets of the debtor. The SCO orders district
bailiffs to seize and turn those assets over to the state, which
then distributes them to creditors. However, foreign and domestic
investors claim that the state collection office and the district
bailiffs frequently fail in their responsibilities to both courts
and creditors.
In some cases, bailiffs refuse to enforce the court orders. The
perception is that they do so because they have been bribed or
otherwise suborned. Bailiffs are often local agents who fear local
retribution against them and their interests if they collect in
their localities. In some cases, bailiffs will not collect unless
the creditor provides bodyguards during seizure of assets.
Creditors also have reason to believe that the state collection
office accepts payments from debtors to delay seizure of assets.
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Mongolia supports intellectual property rights (IPR) in general and
has protected American rights in particular. It has joined the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and signed and
ratified most treaties and conventions, including the WTO TRIPS
agreement. The WIPO Internet treaties have been signed but remain
un-ratified by Parliament. However, even if a convention is
un-ratified, the Mongolian government and its intellectual property
rights enforcer, the Intellectual Property Office of Mongolia
(IPOM), make a good faith effort to honor these agreements.
Under TRIPS and Mongolian law, the Mongolian Customs Authority (MCA)
and the Economic Crimes Unit of the National Police (ECU) also have
an obligation to protect IPR. MCA can seize shipments at the
border. The ECU has the exclusive power to conduct criminal
investigations and bring criminal charges against IPR pirates. The
IPOM has the administrative authority to investigate and seize fakes
without court order. Of these three, the IPOM makes the most
consistent good faith effort to fulfill its mandates.
Problems stem from ignorance of the importance of intellectual
property to Mongolia and of the obligations imposed by TRIPS on
member states. Customs still hesitates to seize shipments, saying
that their statutory mandate does not allow seizure of such goods,
but Mongolian statutory and constitutional laws clearly recognize
ULAANBAATA 00000016 022.2 OF 038
that international treaty obligations in this area take precedence
over local statutes and regulations. A clear legal basis exists for
Customs to act, which has been recognized by elements of the
Mongolian Judiciary, the Parliament, and the IPOM. Customs officers
may occasionally seize fake products, but it seems that Mongolian
customs law will have to be brought into formal compliance with
TRIPS before Customs will fulfill its obligations. The ECU has
also been lax. The ECU hesitates to investigate and prosecute IPR
cases, deferring to the IPOM. Anecdotal evidence suggests that ECU
officials fear political repercussions from going after IPR pirates,
many of whom wield political influence.
The IPOM generally has an excellent record of protecting American
trademarks, copyrights, and patents; however, tight resources limit
the IPOM's ability to act. In most cases, when the U.S. Embassy in
Ulaanbaatar conveys a complaint from a rights holder to the IPOM, it
quickly investigates the complaint. If it judges that an abuse
occurred, it will (and has in every case brought before it to date)
seize the pirated products or remove faked trademarks, under
administrative powers granted in Mongolian law.
We note two areas where enforcement lags. Legitimate software
products are rare in Mongolia. Low per capita incomes have given
rise to a thriving local market for cheap, pirated software. The
IPOM estimates pirated software constitutes at least 95percent of
the market. The Office enforces the law where it can but the scale
of the problem dwarfs its capacity to deal with it. The IPOM will
act if we bring cases to its attention.
Pirated optical media are also readily available and subject to
spotty enforcement. Mongolians produce no significant quantities of
fake CD's, videos, or DVD's, but import such products from China,
Russia, and elsewhere. Products are sold through numerous local
outlets and sometimes broadcast on private local TV stations. The
IPOM hesitates to move on TV broadcasters, most of which are
connected to major government or political figures. Rather the IPOM
raids local ("street") DVD and CD outlets run by poor urban youth
who lack the political and economic clout of the TV broadcasters.
Again, when an American raises a specific complaint, the IPOM acts
on the complaint, but IPOM rarely initiates action.
Restrictive Aspects of Current Mining Laws
Minerals Law of 2006
The current Minerals Law of Mongolia would seem on its face to
prevent transfer of exploration or mining rights to any third party
lacking professional mining qualifications as determined by the
Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM).
Under the Minerals Law, the concept of mining expertise can either
qualify or disqualify any entity from acquiring, transferring,
securitizing exploration and mining rights. The law has the
potential to limit the ability of rights holders to seek financing,
because it forbids transfer of mining licenses and exploration
rights to non-qualified individuals. Consequently, a miner might
not be able to offer his licenses as secured collateral to banks or
to any lender lacking the professional qualifications to receive
these rights if the miner defaulted on his debt obligations.
In addition, no foreign entity, in its own right, can hold any sort
of mining or petroleum license; only entities registered in Mongolia
under the terms of relevant company and investment laws may hold
exploration and mining licenses. Should a foreign entity acquire
a license as collateral or for the purpose of actual exploration or
mining, and fail to create the appropriate Mongolian corporate
entity to hold a given license, that failure may serve as grounds
for invalidating the license. In essence, the foreign entity may
lose its security or mining rights. We advise investors with
specific questions regarding the current status of their respective
to seek professional advice on the status of those licenses.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 023.2 OF 038
Uranium Law of 2009
The Uranium Law of 2009 dramatically curtails property rights
protection regime protecting most exploration and mining licenses.
The law imposes the following conditions upon investors in the
uranium mining sector:
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses
with the NRA, for a fee.
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an
absolute right to take - without compensation - at least 51percent
of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop the
mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium
property.
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing
for mineral and metal resources. Prior to the Uranium Law,
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to
other mineral and metals exploration
To both investors and observers, this law statutorily sanctions
expropriation, a concept heretofore alien to Mongolian law.
Although the Minerals Law of Mongolia and other pieces of
legislation officially state that the GOM must compensate rights
holders for any taking, the Uranium law allows the GOM unfettered
power to seize holdings with no obligation to compensate rights
holders. Complicating the issue, the law conflates deposits with
the companies developing those deposits, letting the GOM claim an
uncompensated share of any entity that might mine the deposit. In
effect, the GOM demands a free-carried, non-compensated interest of
no less than 51percent of any uranium mining firm in Mongolia.
Affected uranium rights holders contested the constitutionality of
these provisions before Mongolia's Constitutional Court, and lost
the case. The Court upheld the law, asserting that the all minerals
in the ground are the property of the Mongolian state even if
separated from the ground. Legal experts with whom we consulted
explained that the Court seems to make the extraordinary and
unprecedented claim that Mongolia's ownership extends to products
created with the ore; hence the state has a "legitimate" claim on
both the ore body and any company mining the resource. This theory
appears to undermine the property rights of uranium investors and
chips away at property rights protections granted both under the
constitution and Mongolia's Minerals, Company, and Foreign
Investment Laws.
A.8 TRANSPARENCY OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESS
Generally, Mongolia's problem is not lack of laws and
regulations-Mongolia has passed more than 1,600 laws since
undertaking its transition to a market economy 20 years ago-but
rather, the problem is that legislators lack knowledge on what
foreign and domestic investors need from the state when investing;
and that they do not consult with those affected by their
legislative actions. Corruption aside, the fact that laws and
regulations change with little consultation creates a chaotic
situation for all parties.
Problems with the Drafting Process for Legislation and Regulations
Normally, laws can be crafted in two ways. Once rare but now
common, Members of Parliament and the President of Mongolia may
draft their own proposals for direct submission to the Parliament.
Such bills need not be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers but can
ULAANBAATA 00000016 024.2 OF 038
be delivered directly to the Speaker of Parliament for consideration
by the relevant Standing Committee. The relevant Standing Committee
may either reject the bill (in which case it dies in committee) or
pass it on to the Parliament's plenary body, unaltered or revised
for a general vote. More typically, Parliament or the Cabinet of
Ministers requests legislative action. These institutions send such
requests to the relevant ministry. The Minister relays the request
to ministerial council, which in turn sends the request to the
proper internal division or agency within the respective ministry,
which in turn forms a working group. The working group prepares the
bill, submits it for ministerial review, makes any recommended
changes, and then the bill is reviewed by the full Cabinet of
Ministers. Relevant ministries are asked to comment and recommend
changes in the legislation.
Prior to a final vote by the Cabinet of Ministers, the National
Security Council of Mongolia (NSC)-consisting of the President of
Mongolia, the Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament-can review
each piece of legislation for issues related to national security.
Although the government has never clarified the legal and
constitutional authority of the NSC to veto or recommend changes to
draft legislation, the Cabinet to our knowledge will not and has
never overruled NSC recommendations.
Once through NSC and Cabinet reviews, the bill goes to Parliament.
In Parliament, the bill is vetted by the relevant Standing
Committee, sent back for changes or sent on to the full Parliament
for a vote. The President can veto bills, but his veto can be
overcome by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of Parliament.
For regulations, the process is truncated. The relevant minister
tasks the working group that wrote the original law to draft
regulations. This group submits their work to the minister who
approves or recommends changes. In most cases, regulations require
no Cabinet approval, and become official when the relevant incumbent
minister approves them. When legislation crosses inter-ministerial
boundaries, the Cabinet will authorize the most relevant ministry to
supervise an inter-ministerial approval process for regulations.
The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MOJHA) plays an important
role in drafting both laws and regulations. MOJHA vets all statutes
and regulations before they are passed for final approval. In the
case of legislation, MOJHA reconciles the language and provisions of
the law with both existing legislation and the constitution of
Mongolia, after which the law passes to the Cabinet and then
Parliament. In the case of regulations, MOJHA vets the regulations
to ensure consistency with current laws and provisions of the
constitution. In effect, MOJHA can either modify or even veto legal
or regulatory provisions that it finds inconsistent with the
statutes and constitution.
System lacks Transparency
Absent from these drafting processes is a statutory, systematic,
transparent review of legislation or regulations by stakeholders and
the public. Ministerial initiatives are not publicized until the
draft passes out of a given ministry to the full Cabinet.
Typically, the full Cabinet discusses and passes bills on to
Parliament, without public input or consultations. Parliament
itself issues neither a formal calendar nor routinely announces or
opens its standing committees or full chamber hearings to the
public. While Parliament at the beginning of each session
announces a list of bills to be considered during the session, this
list is very general and often amended. New legislation is commonly
introduced, discussed and passed without public announcement or
consideration. For example, in 2006, Parliament passed the
(since-amended) Wind Fall Profits Tax Law bill in six days without
consulting any business, NGO, or other entity about the impact and
desirability of the bill. In 2007, Parliament significantly amended
the Law on State Procurement within thirty days without any public
notification or comment regarding new limits on competitive,
transparent bidding practices and limits on access tender
ULAANBAATA 00000016 025.2 OF 038
opportunities to foreign bidders. In 2009, Parliament passed
legislation threatening property rights in the mining sector that
many view as expropriatory and revoked key tax exemptions affecting
major mining and construction projects, all with no formal or
informal public comment and review.
The U.S. Embassy in Ulaanbaatar and foreign and domestic investors
have repeatedly urged the Mongolian government to utilize the
government's Open Government web site to post draft and pending
legislation for public consultation and review before it is
finalized and sent to Parliament. Over the past couple of years, we
have noticed some improvement in the timeliness and completeness of
the postings.
To supplement this effort, the U.S. Embassy and local business
organizations have jointly created an informal system to identify
legislation and regulations under review. Once identified, we meet
with working groups, provide information on how other nations have
handled such legislation, share stakeholders' points of view, and
widely distribute publicly available draft bills, preferably before
they reach a minister's desk. Should a piece of vital legislation
pass on to the Minister, Cabinet, or Parliament, these
non-government organizations are prepared to lobby at the
appropriate level. Over the last three years we have found that
many agencies and Members of Parliament welcome our advice and
information, particularly if given in a non-confrontational way that
respects Mongolia's political process and right to deliberate.
Regulators resist consultation when it comes to implementation.
Bureaucrats are only slowly becoming comfortable with the concepts
and practices of broad, public consultation and information sharing
with their own citizens, let alone foreigners. Many times
businesses ask for a clear copy of the current regulations, only to
be met with blank stares or outright refusals. The government has
long acknowledged that the Soviet-era State Secrets Law requires
substantial amendment. Currently, most government
documents-including administrative regulations affecting investments
and business activities-can be technically classified as "state
secrets" not for release to the public. This technicality allows
bureaucrats and regulators a convenient excuse to deny requests for
information or, more commonly, to demand extra-legal fees to provide
documents. The legacy of secrecy has also resulted in cases where
government officials themselves cannot get up-to-date copies of the
rules. Mongolia is considering a freedom of information law for
several years, but it remains in its formative stages.
High officials acknowledge the value of, and need for, a more open,
transparent system. While laws are easy to fix, the behavior of
individual bureaucrats, Members of Parliament, and the judiciary
will only gradually change, with training and experience. Already a
younger generation of professionals, many trained abroad or during
Mongolia's democratic era, is taking hold and moving into senior
positions of authority. This bodes well for Mongolia's continuing
transition to a private sector-led, open, market economy underpinned
by good government and corporate governance.
The Impact of NGOS and Private Sector Associations on GOM Policy
The Mongolian government actively protects its prerogatives to
legislate and regulate economic activities in its domain. While
NGOs and private sector associations have wide latitude to run their
activities, the government of Mongolia has never allowed any
non-governmental entity-be it business, civil society, trade union,
etc.-to serve more than an advisory role over the formulation and
execution of both laws and rules, which also applies to setting
standards for various industries. Based on experience, the GOM will
routinely resists any expanded role for civil society and NGOs.
This unarticulated but tacit policy of the government of Mongolia
applies to both domestic and foreign entities.
Laws, Regulations, and Policies that Impede FDI
ULAANBAATA 00000016 026.2 OF 038
While the GOM supports FDI and domestic investment, individual
agencies and elements of the judiciary reportedly use their
respective powers to hinder investments into such sectors as meat
production, telecommunications, aviation, or pharmaceuticals. Both
domestic and foreign investors report similar abuses of inspections,
permits, and licenses by Mongolian regulatory agencies. However, we
generally note no consistent, systematic pattern of abuse
consistently initiated by either government or private Mongolian
entities aimed against foreign investors in general or against U.S.
investment in particular. The impediments more often than not are
opportunistic attempts by individuals to misuse contacts to harass
U.S. and other foreign investors with whom the Mongolian entity is
in dispute.
Alternatively, other reports suggest that Mongolians use connections
to well-placed regulators at all levels to extract extra-legal
payments from both foreign and domestic businesses or otherwise
hinder their work. In the latter case the general approach is to
demand some sort of payment in lieu of not enforcing work,
environmental, tax, health and safety rules, otherwise imposing the
full weight of a contradictory mix of Soviet Era and the current
reformed rules on the firm. Most foreign businesses refuse to pay
bribes, and in turn accept the punitive inspections, concede to some
of the violations found, and contest the rest in the City
Administrative Court. In our experience companies that show resolve
against such predatory abuse of statutory and regulatory power will
face impediments at the start; but these usually ease over time as
state agents look for easier targets.
Although we have note no systemic and routine abuse of Mongolia's
legal system to hinder FDI and investors, a worrisome trend
affecting implementation of Mongolia's requirement for exit visas by
both Mongolian public and private entities to exert pressure on
foreign investors to settle commercial disputes.
Required, valid exit visas are normally issued pro forma at the port
of departure (e.g. the international airport), but may be denied for
a variety of reasons including civil disputes, pending criminal
investigation, or for immigration violations. The law does not
allow authorities to distinguish a criminal and civil case when
detaining a person. If denied for a civil dispute, the visa may not
be issued until either the dispute is resolved administratively or a
court has rendered a decision. Neither current law nor regulations
establish a clear process or time-table for resolution. In fact,
the Mongolian government maintains the right to detain foreign
citizens indefinitely without appeal until the situation has been
resolved.
Research into issue has revealed that investors from countries other
than the U.S. are affected by abuse of the exit-visa system. All
cases have a similar profile. A foreign investor has a commercial
dispute with a Mongolian entity, often involving assets, management
practices, or contract compliance. The Mongolian entities respond
by filing either civil or criminal charges with local police or
prosecutorial authority. It is important to note that at this point
there need be no actual arrest warrant or any sort of official
determination that charges are warranted: Mere complaint by an
aggrieved party is sufficient grounds to deny exit.
An investor in this situation is effectively detained in Mongolia
indefinitely. Some foreign investors have resolved the impasse by
settling, thereby allowing them to depart Mongolia. If unwilling to
settle, the foreign investor will have to undergo the full
investigatory process, which may lead to a court action.
Investigations commonly take up to six months, and in one case an
American citizen has been denied an exit visa for two years pending
a criminal investigation into a failed business deal. In addition,
even if a dispute seems settled, it can be filed in the same venue
again -- if the local police and prosecutors are willing -- or in a
different venue. In one case, an American citizen has been denied
an exit visa for over two years pending a criminal investigation
into a failed business deal with the Government of Mongolia.
We note that Mongolian investors are not subject to similar
ULAANBAATA 00000016 027.2 OF 038
impositions of their immigration codes when involved in commercial
disputes. Mongolian citizens do not require exit visas to depart
Mongolia and can only be denied exit with a pending arrest warrant.
A.9 EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Mongolia currently lacks the experience and expertise needed to
sustain portfolio investments. It has no regulatory apparatus for
these activities, and both the state and private entities are just
beginning to engage in them. However, Mongolia has active capital
markets. The government of Mongolia (GOM) imposes few restraints
on the flow of capital in any of its markets. Multilateral
institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, have
typically found the regime too loose, especially in the crucial
banking sector.
Although the government has clear rules about capital reserve
requirements, loan practices, and banking management practices, the
Bank of Mongolia (BOM), Mongolia's central bank, has historically
resisted restraining credit flows and interfering with operations at
Mongolia's commercial banks, even when the need to intervene has
been apparent. However, in response to the severe impact of the
ongoing global financial crisis on Mongolia's banking sector, the
BOM is striving to improve it capacity to deal with those insolvent
banks and improperly managed banks that have impaired the health of
Mongolia's financial system. To illustrate, two (2) of the
country's 16 banks are currently in receivership, and additional
consolidation under BOM supervision is likely.
Capital and Currency Markets
The global economic crisis savaged Mongolia's currency, capital, and
equity markets. While the currency had proved resilient, holding
its value against most international currencies, it fell some 40
percent against the U.S. dollar from late 2008 into spring 2009, as
the worst of the crisis hit. It has remained relatively stable and
even resilient since then. The currency's resiliency has largely
been attributed to the commodities boom, which saw Mongolia selling
such raw materials as copper, gold, and coal, primarily to China.
In mid 2008, the commodity markets began to cool and Mongolia's
foreign trade began to fall, leading to growing trade deficit as
imports no longer balanced or exceeded exports. Subsequently, once
the tugrik began to slide relative to the U.S. dollar,
import-related trade was affected as well.
Complicating matters, major banks and other institutions that
formally had access to international capital flows (in the form of
dollars, yen, Renmimbi, Euros, etc, which were parked in
high-interest yielding tugrik accounts), found in-flows reversing as
foreign depositors repatriated their funds, either because these
entities needed the money to weather their own financial crises or
feared that the tugrik's collapse would eat away the value of their
deposits. Banks no longer had access to easy capital and liquidity,
and began and continue to restrict lending to almost all clients,
who in turn found they lacked funds to finance construction
projects, trade, and other activities.
After several months of tapping reserves to slow the tugrik's
decline, Mongol Bank curtailed such infusions. Instead, the Bank
sells dollars into the system by auction to the local commercial
banks and lets the market decide the value of the exchange rate
rather than attempting to set the rate. . In addition, Parliament
closed a loophole that allowed local transactions to occur in any
currency desired. Now, all domestic transactions must be conducted
in Mongolia's national currency, the Tugrik, excepting those
entities allowed specific waivers as determined by the Mongolian
central bank, the Bank of Mongolia. The move was intended to
bolster the value of the Tugrik by increasing demand for the
currency.
Overall liquidity is sufficient but affordable capital remains
ULAANBAATA 00000016 028.2 OF 038
scarce. Local credit interest rates for customers range from
12percent for the most credit worthy to perhaps 90percent per annum
(or more) for the least. Foreign investors can easily tap into
these domestic capital markets; however, they seldom do, because
they can do better abroad or better locally by simply taking on an
equity investor, Mongolian or otherwise.
Equity Markets
Investors do not use stocks to raise equity for investment but to
gain control of companies listed on the exchange. As most of the
firms have been bought up, the market sees little trading.
Mongolian firms do not use shareholding relationships to restrict
foreign investment at this point. Part of this arises from lack of
experience with such devices. It also arises from the fact that
Mongolians prefer to concentrate ownership in their own hands,
rather than disperse it through complicated shareholding
relationships. They perceive such devices as weakening their
ability to control the companies, which is more important than
safeguarding the firm from foreign or domestic raiders or raising
capital for investment. If a foreign company wanted to purchase a
Mongolian firm, the foreign entity would have to contact the
shareholders and buy them out. These could not be hostile
takeovers, because few outstanding shares remain on the market to
buy. Eager to take on equity partners or sell businesses entirely,
the Mongolians would employ few defenses beyond sharp negotiating.
The current Minerals Law of Mongolia contains a provision that
requires that holders of mining licenses for projects of strategic
importance must sell no less than 10percent of the resulting
entity's shares on the Mongolian Stock Exchange. Vaguely presented
in the statute, what this new provision means in practical terms and
how it is to be implemented has yet to be spelled out in regulation.
The Banking Sector
Weakness in Mongolia's banking sector concerns all players,
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF: http://www.imf.org).
Small by American standards, the total assets of Mongolia's
remaining fourteen (14) commercial banks (down from 16 in 2008) adds
up to just around USD2 billion. The system has been through massive
changes since the Soviet era, during which the banking system was
divided into several different units. This early system failed
through mismanagement and commercial naivety in the mid-90s, but
over the last decade has become more sophisticated and somewhat
better managed.
Mongolia has three large, generally well-regarded banks owned
primarily by Japanese and Mongolian interests respectively. They
follow international standards for prudent capital reserve
requirements, have conservative lending policies, up-to-date banking
technology, and are generally well managed. As the global financial
storm has descended on Mongolia's banking sector, these banks have
weathered it well - so far.
However, concerns remain among bankers and the sector's observers
about the effectiveness of Mongolia's legal and regulatory
environment. As with many issues in Mongolia, the problem is not
lack of laws or procedures but the will and capacity of the
regulator, BOM, to supervise and execute mandated functions,
particularly in regard to capital reserve requirements and
non-performing loans.
From 1999 through late 2008, BOM consistently refused to close any
commercial bank for insolvency or malpractice. In late 2008,
Mongol Bank took Mongolia's fourth largest bank into receivership.
Most deposits were guaranteed and their depositors paid out at a
cost of around USD 150 million -- not an inconsequential sum in an
economy with a USD 5 billion per annum GDP. In 2009, Mongolia's
fifth largest bank went into receivership, and three (3) other
ULAANBAATA 00000016 029.2 OF 038
mid-tier banks are at the center of widespread discussion of future
consolidation.
The BOM and Mongolia's financial system have so far endured the
crisis. However, most observers note that the insolvent banks had
shown signs of mismanagement, non-performing loans, and
ill-liquidity for several years before the BOM moved to safeguard
depositors and the financial sector. They argue further that the
BOM withheld effective supervision fearing that closure would signal
weakness to, and spur panic among, the general public; and because
of interference on the part of those whose financial interests in
the troubled banks would have been threatened by regulatory action.
The latest crisis has spurred the BOM to develop a short run plan to
identify and close insolvent banks while preserving the integrity of
financial system. Reserve requirements will be raised to deal with
the on-going non-performing loan problem, too. Beyond this triage,
the BOM is in the process of instituting long-term reforms to
enhance its ability to supervise the banking system; however, such
reform depends on Parliament to amend both Mongolia's banking and
banking supervision laws, a process that may be completed by
mid-2010.
A.10 POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Mongolia is peaceful and stable. Political violence is rare.
Mongolia has held nine (9) peaceful presidential and parliamentary
elections in the past 16 years. However, a brief but violent
outbreak of civil unrest followed disputed parliamentary elections
on July 1, 2008. Accompanied by some property destruction and
bodily injury, the unrest was quickly contained and order restored.
There has been no repeat of this civil unrest since July 1.
Mongolia held peaceful presidential elections in May 2009 in which
the incumbent president was defeated and power smoothly transitioned
to the current president
Mongolia has an ethnically homogenous population: 97percent of the
population is Khalkh Mongol. The largest minority, numbering an
estimated 90,000 people, is Kazakh (Muslim), concentrated in the far
western part of the country.
There have been no known incidents of anti-American sentiment or
politically motivated damage to American projects or installations
in at least the last decade. However, Mongolia has seen a gradual
and perceptible level of rising hostility to foreign nationals in
general and to Chinese nationals in particular. This hostility has
led to some instances of improper seizure of Chinese-invested
property; and in more limited cases acts of physical violence
against the persons and property of Chinese nationals resident in
Mongolia. Other Asians living in Mongolia have expressed concern
that they may inadvertently become victims of this hostility.
A.11 CORRUPTION
Corruption in Mongolia, including bribery, raises the costs and
risks of doing business. Corruption corrodes market opportunities
in Mongolia for U.S. companies as well as the overall Mongolian
business climate. It also deters international investment into
Mongolia, stifles economic growth and development, distorts prices,
and undermines the rule of law.
It is important for U.S. companies, irrespective of their size, to
assess the business climate in Mongolia to have an effective
compliance program or measures in place to detect and prevent
corruption, including foreign bribery. U.S. individuals and firms
operating or investing in such foreign markets as Mongolia should
take the time to become familiar with the relevant anticorruption
laws of both Mongolia and the United States in order to comply with
them, and where appropriate, they should seek the advice of legal
counsel.
The U.S. Government seeks to level the global playing field for U.S.
ULAANBAATA 00000016 030.2 OF 038
businesses by encouraging other countries to take steps to
criminalize their own companies' acts of corruption, including
bribery of foreign public officials, by requiring them to uphold
their obligations under relevant international conventions. A U. S.
firm that believes a competitor is seeking to use bribery of a
foreign public official to secure a contract should bring this to
the attention of appropriate U.S. agencies, as noted below
Current Views on Mongolian Corruption
In mid-2005, the USAID Mission to Mongolia, in collaboration with
USAID/Washington and The Asia Foundation (TAF), funded a corruption
assessment conducted by Casals & Associates, Inc. (C&A) The
complete report is available at http://www.usaid.gov/mn. Follow-up
surveys of the problem show that the results of this assessment
remain valid in 2010. The study found that opportunities for
corruption continue to increase in Mongolia at both the "petty" or
administrative and "grand" or elite levels. Both types of
corruption should be of concern to Mongolians, but grand corruption
should be considered a more serious one because it solidifies
linkages between economic and political power that could negatively
impact or ultimately derail or delay democracy and development.
Several inter-related factors contribute to Mongolia's corruption
problem:
--A blurring of the lines between the public and private sector
brought about by systemic conflicts of interest at nearly all
levels;
--A lack of transparency and access to information, stemming in part
from a broad State Secrets Law that surrounds many government
functions and has yielded criticism that it renders the media
ineffective and hinders citizen participation in policy discussions
and government oversight;
--An inadequate civil service system that gives rise to a highly
politicized public administration and the existence of a "spoils
system;"
--Limited political will to actually implement required reforms in
accordance with the law, complicated by conflicting and overlapping
laws that further inhibit effective policy implementation;
--Weak government control institutions, including the Central Bank,
National Audit Office, parliamentary standing committees, Prosecutor
General, Generalized State Inspection Agency, State Property
Committee, and departments within the Ministry of Finance.
The aforementioned systemic shortcomings have allowed for an
evolution of corruption in Mongolia that "follows the money,"
meaning that graft on the most significant scales generally occurs
most often in the industries and sectors where there is the most
potential for financial gain. During the early 1990s, in the early
transition toward democracy and market economy, two areas that
offered particular opportunities for grand scale corruption at that
time were foreign donor assistance and privatization of state-owned
enterprises. As Mongolia later embarked on further policy changes
to institutionalize capitalistic practices, corruption reared its
head in the process of privatizing public land. As the economy
continues to develop, emerging areas for corruption include the
banking and mining sectors. There also are several areas that
provide stable and consistent opportunities for corruption, both
grand and administrative in nature, such as for procurement
opportunities, issuance of permits and licenses, customs,
inspections, the justice sector, among high-level elected and
appointed officials, and in the conduct a variety of day-to-day
citizen- and business-to-government transactions, notably in
education, health care, and city services.
Despite the fact that few of the conditions to prevent corruption
from getting worse are in place, the situation has not reached the
levels that are evident in many other countries with contexts and
ULAANBAATA 00000016 031.2 OF 038
histories similar to that of Mongolia. Perhaps more importantly,
there are a number of efforts underway to actively combat
corruption, including:
--Government commitments to international anti-corruption regimes
and protocols, such as the Anti-Corruption Plan of the Asian
Development Bank/Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (ADB/OECD) and the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC);
--Development of a National Program for Combating Corruption and
formation of a National Council for coordinating the Program and a
Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Working Group;
--Implementation of an anti-corruption law that has included the
formation of an independent anti-corruption body;
--Short- and medium-term anti-corruption advocacy and "watchdog"
programs initiated by civil society organizations, often with
international donor support.
There is, in fact, time for Mongolians and the international
community to nurture these efforts and take further action before
corruption grows too large to rein in. In general, the main need in
Mongolia is to develop effective disincentives for corrupt behavior
at both the administrative and political levels. In its broadest
configuration, this implies a strategy of increasing transparency
and effective citizen oversight, as well as intra-governmental
checks and balances. Without these major changes, administrative
reforms may provide some small improvements, but they are unlikely
to solve the problem. Specifically, the aforementioned
USAID-sponsored report of 2005 makes several strategic
recommendations, which remain relevant in 2010, including:
--Diplomatic engagement focused on keeping anti-corruption issues on
the policy agenda, promoting implementation of existing laws related
to anti-corruption, and highlighting the need for further measures
to promote transparency and improved donor coordination;
--General programmatic recommendations to address conflict of
interest, transparency/access to information, civil service reforms,
and the independent anti-corruption body, with a definitive focus on
engaging civil society and promoting public participation utilizing
UNCAC as a framework;
--Specific programmatic recommendations to address loci of
corruption, such as citizen- and business-to-government
transactions, procurement, privatization, customs, land use, mining,
banking, the justice sector, and the political and economic elite
In addition, the reputable international anti-corruption NGO
Transparency International (TI) opened a national chapter in
Mongolia in 2004 (for more information, see: www.transparency.org).
U.S. technical advisors are working with TI to train Mongolian staff
to monitor corruption and to advocate on behalf of anti-corruption
legislation and, TI first included Mongolia in its annual
"Perceptions of Corruption" survey in September 2004. In that
initial survey, Mongolia ranked 85 out of 145 countries and its
score of 3 on the Corruption Perception Index was "poor." (TI's CPI
Score relates to "perceptions" of the degree of corruption as seen
by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). TI's 2005 Survey ranked
Mongolia 85 out 158; and again Mongolia earned a "poor" score of 3.
In TI's 2006 survey, Mongolia had dropped to 99 out of 163
countries, receiving a score of 2.8-poor. In 2007, Mongolia was
still 99 but out of 179 nations and had achieved a score of 3.0, a
slight uptick but still poor. 2008 saw Mongolia drop to 102 out 180
nations, maintaining its poor score of 3. 2009 found Mongolia
dropping to 124 out of 180 nations, and declining to a poorer score
of 2.7, In short, Mongolia has declined.
One factor raising concerns about Mongolia's commitment to fight
ULAANBAATA 00000016 032.2 OF 038
corruption is the series of amnesties granted to Mongolians found
guilty of corruption or those under investigation for abuses. These
amnesties happen about every three years, usually through
presidential legislative action, with the most recent occurring in
late 2009. Because they allow corrupt officials and those who
enable them to avoid substantial prison time and fines for their
improper acts, these amnesties are demoralizing for the IAAC and the
public, who question the value of tackling corruption with a
government lacking the will to hold malefactors to account.
Current Anti-Corruption Law
In 2006, Parliament passed an Anti-Corruption Law (ACL), a
significant milestone in Mongolia's efforts against corruption. The
legislation had been under consideration since 1999.
The ACL created an independent investigative body, the Independent
Authority Against Corruption (IAAC). The IAAC has four sections.
The Prevention and Education Section works to prevent corruption and
educate the public on anti-corruption legal requirements. The
Investigation Section receives corruption cases and executes
investigations. The third section collects, checks, and analyzes the
legally required property and income statements of government
officials. The fourth section, the IAAC's Secretariat, handle s
administrative tasks. The IAAC formally began operations in August
2007. (For a review of the IAAC's activities from its inception
through late 2008 and a general assessment of the public's current
views of corruption in Mongolia see the series of Mongolia
Corruption Benchmarking Surveys prepared for USAID Mongolia:
http://www.usaid.gov/mn; and by The Asia Foundation Mongolia:
http://asiafoundation.org
Anti-Corruption Resources Available to U.S. Citizens about the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: In 1977, the United States
enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which makes it
unlawful for a U.S. person, and certain foreign issuers of
securities, to make a corrupt payment to foreign public officials
for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person. The FCPA also applies to foreign
firms and persons who take any act in furtherance of such a corrupt
payment while in the United States. For more detailed information on
the FCPA, see the FCPA Lay-Person's Guide at:
http://www.justice.gov/criminal
Guidance on the U.S. FCPA: The Department of Justice's (DOJ) FCPA
Opinion Procedure enables U.S. firms and individuals to request a
statement of the Justice Department's present enforcement intentions
under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA regarding any proposed
business conduct. The details of the opinion procedure are
available on DOJ's Fraud Section Website at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa. Although the Department of
Commerce has no enforcement role with respect to the FCPA, it
supplies general guidance to U.S. exporters who have questions about
the FCPA and about international developments concerning the FCPA.
For further information, see the Office of the Chief Counsel for
International Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce, Website, at
http://www.ogc.doc.gov. More general information on the FCPA is
available at the Websites listed below.
Other Assistance for U.S. Businesses: The U.S. Department of
Commerce offers several services to aid U.S. businesses seeking to
address business-related corruption issues. For example, the U.S.
and Foreign Commercial Service can provide services that may assist
U.S. companies in conducting their due diligence as part of the
company's overarching compliance program when choosing business
partners or agents overseas. The U.S. Foreign and Commercial
Service can be reached directly through its offices in every major
U.S. and foreign city, or through its Website at www.trade.gov/cs.
The Departments of Commerce and State provide worldwide support for
qualified U.S. companies bidding on foreign government contracts
through the Commerce Department's Advocacy Center and State's Office
ULAANBAATA 00000016 033.2 OF 038
of Commercial and Business Affairs. Problems, including alleged
corruption by foreign governments or competitors, encountered by
U.S. companies in seeking such foreign business opportunities can be
brought to the attention of appropriate U.S. government officials,
including local embassy personnel and through the Department of
Commerce Trade Compliance Center "Report A Trade Barrier" Website at
tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp.
Exporters and investors should be aware that generally all countries
prohibit the bribery of their public officials, and prohibit their
officials from soliciting bribes under domestic laws. Most
countries are required to criminalize such bribery and other acts of
corruption by virtue of being parties to various international
conventions discussed above.
Other Instruments: It is U.S. Government policy to promote good
governance, including host country implementation and enforcement of
anti-corruption laws and policies pursuant to their obligations
under international agreements. Since enactment of the FCPA, the
United States has been instrumental to the expansion of the
international framework to fight corruption. Several significant
components of this framework are the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Antibribery Convention), the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (UN Convention), the Inter-American
Convention against Corruption (OAS Convention), the Council of
Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions, and a growing list of
U.S. free trade agreements. Mongolia is party to the UN Convention
Against Corruption and prohibits the bribery and solicitation of its
public officials.
OECD Antibribery Convention: The OECD Antibribery Convention entered
into force in February 1999. As of December 2009, 38 nations are
party to it, including the United States (see http://www.oecd.org).
Major exporters China, India, and Russia are not parties, although
the U.S. Government strongly endorses their eventual accession to
the Convention. The Convention obligates the Parties to criminalize
bribery of foreign public officials in the conduct of international
business. The United States meets its international obligations
under the OECD Antibribery Convention through the U.S. FCPA.
Mongolia is not a party to the OECD Antibribary convention.
UN Convention: The UN Anticorruption Convention entered into force
on December 14, 2005, and there are 143 parties to it as of December
2009. The UN Convention is the first global comprehensive
international anticorruption agreement. The UN Convention requires
countries to establish criminal and other offences to cover a wide
range of acts of corruption. The UN Convention goes beyond previous
anticorruption instruments, covering a broad range of issues ranging
from basic forms of corruption such as bribery and solicitation,
embezzlement, trading in influence to the concealment and laundering
of the proceeds of corruption. The Convention contains
transnational business bribery provisions that are functionally
similar to those in the OECD Antibribery Convention and contains
provisions on private sector auditing and books and records
requirements. Other provisions address matters such as prevention,
international cooperation, and asset recovery. Mongolia is a member
of the UN Convention Against Corruption.
Local Laws: U.S. firms should familiarize themselves with local
anticorruption laws, and, where appropriate, seek legal counsel.
While the U.S. Department of Commerce cannot provide legal advice on
local laws, the Department's U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service can
provide assistance with navigating the host country's legal system
and obtaining a list of local legal counsel.
Anti-Corruption Resources: Documents and Contacts
Resources for combating corruption in global markets include the
following:
--Information about the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),
ULAANBAATA 00000016 034.2 OF 038
including a "Lay-Person's Guide to the FCPA" is available at the
U.S. Department of Justice's Website at:
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa.
--Information about the OECD Antibribery Convention including links
to national implementing legislation and monitoring reports is
available at: http://www.oecd.org. See also new Antibribery
Recommendation and Good Practice Guidance Annex for companies:
http://www.oecd.org
For general information about anticorruption initiatives, such as
the OECD Convention and the FCPA, including translations of the
statute into several languages, go to the Department of Commerce
Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce at:
http://www.ogc.doc.gov.
--Transparency International (TI) publishes an annual Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI measures the perceived level of
public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the
world. CPI is available at: http://www.transparency.org. TI also
publishes an annual Global Corruption Report which provides a
systematic evaluation of the state of corruption around the world.
It includes an in-depth analysis of a focal theme, a series of
country reports that document major corruption related events and
developments from all continents and an overview of the latest
research findings on anti-corruption diagnostics and tools. See
http://www.transparency.org.
--The World Bank Institute publishes Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI),which six dimensions of governance in 212 countries, including
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law
and Control of Corruption. See http://info.worldbank.org. The
World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys
may also be of interest and are available at:
http://go.worldbank.org.
--The World Economic Forum publishes the Global Enabling Trade
Report that assesses both border administration transparency
(focused on bribe payments and corruption) and corruption and the
regulatory environment: http://www.weforum.org
--For additional information on corruption see the U.S. State
Department's annual Human Rights Report at http://www.state.gov.
--Global Integrity, a nonprofit organization, publishes its annual
Global Integrity Report, which provides indicators for 92 countries
with respect to governance and anti-corruption. The report
highlights the strengths and weaknesses of national level
anti-corruption systems. The report is available at:
http://report.globalintegrity.org/
A.12 BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
(NOTE: Table of bi-lateral investment agreements entered into by
Mongolia deleted due to requirements of cable format. END NOTE.)
Taxation issues of Concern to American Investors
Taxation remains a key concern for Americans, other foreign
investors, and Mongolian domestic investors and businesses. 2009
saw some changes in the Mongolian tax system, most of which, with
the exception of the revocation of the value-added tax exemption for
mining equipment, were greeted positively by most foreign and
domestic investor in Mongolia. Observers noted that recent
experience with tax-code revisions does suggest that both the GOM
and Parliament are amenable to revising legislation if the economic
benefits to the state, the public, and investors can be proven.
Windfall Profits Tax on Copper and Gold Sunsets in 2011
Since passage in 2006, the Windfall Profits Tax Law has generated
criticism regarding the depth of the GOM's commitment to creating an
ULAANBAATA 00000016 035.2 OF 038
open, predictable, and fair environment for foreign direct
investment. The speedy legislative process for passing the WPT was
unprecedented. This bill was passed in six days without any
consultation with outside stakeholders on any its provisions. The
entire process raised concerns among investors about the stability
and transparency of Mongolia's legislative and regulatory
environment, which intervening years and experience with other
non-transparently passed legislation did little to alleviate.
The WPT imposes a 68percent tax on the profits from gold and copper
mining respectively, and for gold originally kicked in when gold the
price for gold hit USD500 per ounce; however, in late 2008
Parliament raised the threshold to USD850. For copper, the
threshold is USD 2,600 per ton. Mining industry sources claim that
the 68percent tax rate, when combined with other Mongolian taxes,
makes the effective tax 100percent on all proceeds above the copper
threshold price.
The recent Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement entailed further
amendment to the WPT as a condition precedent to its passage. OT's
private investors successfully argued that they would not be able to
run a commercially viable OT operation when faced with the WPT.
Consequently, the Parliament agreed to amend the WPT Law: The WPT
will officially end for all copper concentrate and gold products in
2011.
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code
Effective since January 1, 2007 the current tax code reduces tax
rates, flattens the tax schedule, removes discriminatory loopholes
and exemptions, and introduces appropriate deduction opportunities
for corporate investment. The current law allows firms to deduct
more types of legitimate business expenditures: training, business
travel, cafeteria expenses, etc. The current law levels the playing
field between foreign and domestic investors, eliminating the
majority of discriminatory tax exemptions and holidays, most of
which favored international investors.
2009 changes into the tax code's treatment of exemptions present
something of a mixed bag for investors. On the down side,
Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption available on value-added
tax (VAT) taxes of 10percent on equipment used to bring a given mine
into production. Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines
have long development lead times before production begins, either
waive or do not tax such imports at all. Parliament, with no
consultation with investors, international advisors provided by
donor organizations, or even of its own tax officials, chose to
impose the VAT, which immediately makes Mongolian mining costs
10percent higher than they would otherwise be, impairing
competitiveness and dramatically varying from global practice.
On the plus side, Parliament revised loss-carry forward provisions,
extending from two (2) years to eight (8) years the ability to
deduct losses from taxes after incurring a loss. Like the revision
of the WPT, this change is also a condition precedent of passing the
OT Agreement. Most investors find eight years sufficient for many
Mongolian investments that require impose long, expensive
development horizons before producing any sort of profit.
Unfinished Taxation Business: Improving Institutions and Practices
As reported in the 2009 Investment Climate Statement and Country
Commercial Guide, both the GOM and Parliament has been intending to
take up additional tax reform measures since 2007 but have made no
substantive progress since promising additional reforms. These
measures include revisions to the law on customs and customs
tariffs. While the exact nature of the proposed changes to the
customs law remains murky, the GOM states that changes will be
consistent with Mongolia's WTO obligations and best practices.
Despite overall solid, positive changes, international financial
institutions warn that tax reforms by themselves are insufficient to
ULAANBAATA 00000016 036.2 OF 038
improve Mongolia's business environment. They report that reform
must go beyond changes to the tax code to restructure the operations
of the key agencies - the tax department, the customs administration
and the inspections agency - that directly interact with private
firms and individuals.
Specifically, tax authorities charged with enforcing the tax codes
require a more customer-based approach to dealing with their
business clientele and a more detailed and rigorously enforced
regulatory framework under which to audit company accounts. Many
foreign and domestic investors argue that the lack of such a clear,
implementable code of ethics and enforceable set of guidelines leads
to arbitrary, capricious, or predatory tax audits.
A.13 OPIC AND OTHER INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS
The U.S. government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC:
(www.opic.gov) offers loans and political risk insurance to American
investors involved in most sectors of the Mongolian economy.
The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM: www.exim.gov)offers programs in
Mongolia for short-, medium-, and long-term transactions in the
public sector and for short- and medium-term transactions in the
private sector.
Mongolia is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA: www.miga.org).
A. 14 LABOR
Mongolia's labor pool is generally well educated, relatively young,
and adaptable, but shortages exist in most professional categories
requiring advanced degrees or training. Only time and investment in
education and training will remedy this deficit of trained skilled
labor. Unskilled labor is sufficiently available. Shortages exist
in both vocational and professional categories because Mongolians
who obtain such skills frequently go abroad to find higher wages.
Foreign-invested companies are dealing with this situation by
providing in-country training to their staffs, raising salaries to
retain employees, or hiring expatriate workers to provide skills and
expertise unavailable in the local market. In addition, the USG
funded Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is underwriting a
five-year training and vocational education program (TVET) to
develop sustainable programs to help Mongolia meet its needs for
skilled blue- collar workers (http://www.mca.mn or
http://www.mcc.gov).
Mongolian labor law is not particularly restrictive. Investors can
locate and hire workers without using hiring agencies -- as long as
hiring practices are consistent with Mongolian Labor Law. However,
Mongolian law requires companies to employ Mongolian workers in
certain labor categories whenever a Mongolian can perform the task
as well as a foreigner. This law generally applies to unskilled
labor categories and not areas where a high degree of technical
expertise nonexistent in Mongolia is required. The law does provide
an escape hatch for all employers. Should an employer seek to hire
a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot obtain a waiver from the Ministry
of Labor for that employee, the employer can pay a fee of USD 140.00
per employee per month. Depending on a project's importance, the
Ministry of Labor can exempt employers from 50percent of the waiver
fees per worker.
Foreign and domestic investors consistently argue that they bear too
much of the social security costs for each domestic and foreign hire
under the amended 2008 Social Insurance Law enacted in July 2008.
Foreign employees became liable for social insurance taxes if they
reside within Mongolia for 181 days within a 365 day period. Under
this law, foreign and domestic workers pay up to 108,000 tugrik per
month (USD 74) for this tax, no matter their respective rates of
pay. Employers must pay a tax equivalent to 13percent of the annual
wage on both domestic and foreign workers. Given that state
pensions have yet to broach even USD 100, employers argue that
ULAANBAATA 00000016 037.2 OF 038
pensions are not commensurate with worker contributions, especially
those of highly-paid ex-patriot employees. In addition, workers
must pay in for twenty years in order to be vested, highly unlikely
for many ex-patriot employees, who reside in Mongolia for less than
three years on average. Local and foreign business associations are
attempting to work with both the government and Parliament to
address these perceived inequalities.
ILO conventions
Mongolia has ratified 15 ILO conventions (http://www.ilo.org) (NOTE:
Table of ILO conventions ratified by Mongolia deleted due to
requirements of cable format. END NOTE.)
A. 15 FOREIGN TRADE ZONES/FREE PORTS
The Mongolian government launched its free trade zone (FTZ) program
in 2004. Currently there are two FTZ areas located along the
Mongolia spur of the trans-Siberian highway: one in the north at the
Russia-Mongolia border town of Altanbulag and the other in the south
at the Chinese-Mongolia border at the town of Zamyn-Uud. Both FTZs
are inactive, with no development at either site. The port of entry
of Tsagaan Nuur in Bayan-Olgii province is being considered as the
site of a third FTZ.
Management for the Zamyn-Uud Free Trade Zone (ZUFTZ) was originally
tendered to a Chinese firm. In 2006, the GOM voided the agreement
for non-compliance with the terms of the tender. The GOM
re-tendered the management contract in 2006, but later voided that
contract, alleging that the current holder of the management rights
in the ZUFTZ had failed to live up to the terms of the tender.
So far, there are no indications that government will not keep
promises to open the zone to any who satisfy the relevant legal
requirements. However, there are concerns about the Mongolian free
trade zones in general and Zamyn-Uud in particular. In April 2004,
the USAID sponsored Economic Policy Reform and Competitiveness
Project (EPRC: http://www.eprc-chemonics.biz/) made the following
observations of Mongolia's FTZ Program. In 2010, these issues
remain concerns:
--Benchmarking of Mongolia's FTZ Program against current successful
international practices shows deficiencies in the legal and
regulatory framework as well as in the process being followed to
establish FTZs in the country.
--Lack of implementing regulations and procedural definitions
encapsulated in transparency and predictability quotient required to
implement key international best practices.
--A process of due diligence, including a cost-benefit analysis, has
not been completed for the proposed Zamyn-Uud FTZ.
--Identifiable funding is not in place to meet off-site
infrastructure requirements for Zamyn-Uud and Altanbulag sites.
--Deviations from international best practices in the process of
launching FTZs risks repeating mistakes made in other countries and
may lead to "hidden costs" or the provision of subsidies that the
government of Mongolia did not foresee or which will have to granted
at the expense of other high priority needs.
A. 16 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS:
The Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA) provides
most of the data for tracking FDI in Mongolia. However, the data
has limitations:
Incomplete reporting
Many foreign firms provide FIFTA with inaccurate or incomplete data
on their annual investment amounts. FIFTA's registration regime
ULAANBAATA 00000016 038.2 OF 038
requires companies to document business plans and total FDI for the
coming year. FIFTA uses these amounts to determine FDI for the
year. However, firms reportedly believe FIFTA may not be able to
guarantee the confidentiality of proprietary business information,
and so they withhold complete data on their actual activities.
Mongolia suffers from promised investment that never materializes or
which comes in at a lower level than originally stated. FIFTA does
not update reports to account for these or other changes to
investments during the year. (See Chapter 6, Section A.5:
Performance Requirements and Incentives).
Many of Mongolia's largest foreign- owned or foreign-invested
entities are in the mining sector, which because of a quirk of the
current Minerals Law of Mongolia are not necessarily defined as
foreign-invested firms. The current minerals law specifies that
only domestically registered mining firms can have mining licenses
registered in their names, which means that foreign investments
associated with mining may not be recorded by FIFTA, even though the
investment is demonstrably foreign. For example, the investment by
Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia (a Canadian company) into Mongolia has
reached nearly USD 1 billion, yet this investment is not recorded
among the data provided by FIFTA.
Data not Available
Neither FIFTA nor any other Mongolian agency to our knowledge tracks
Mongolia's direct investment abroad.
(NOTE: Mongolian FDI statistics deleted due to requirements of cable
format. END NOTE.)