In this sense, ASB may actually represent a potentially shrewd American use of the escalatory ladder. Faced with A2/AD threats, U.S. counter-moves would escalate by attacking some assets on the Chinese mainland, but not core strategic ones. The “burden” of any further potential escalation would thereupon fall upon Beijing, for China presently lacks any capability to execute analogous precision conventional strikes upon the U.S. homeland. It would thus have either simply to accept the loss of its A2/AD capabilities or to take the enormous escalatory step of moving to the use of nuclear weaponry — a step that would presumably result in catastrophe for China in the face of U.S. retaliation. Accordingly, it may be that contrary to the usual critique of ASB escalation logics, Air/Sea Battle actually presents China with bigger escalation challenges than it does the United States.

Unlike the Maritime Strategy, therefore — which threatened, in effect, to close the gap between conventional and strategic nuclear confrontation by threatening Moscow’s strategic assets with destruction — Air/Sea Battle would seem to permit U.S. forces to occupy the last “rung” of the escalation ladder before strategic warfare, to China’s detriment. If indeed Chinese generals believe, as they claim to, that the existence of strategic nuclear forces places an absolute cap on the scope of imaginable conflict between the two powers, ASB may be able to serve the interests both of prewar deterrence and of intrawar escalation management. This is a feat that the Maritime Strategy arguably never quite achieved.

There is, of course, no foolproof strategy in such things, and it is not a given that Chinese leaders will in fact see things in this fashion. This is an empirical question, on which one hopes that clever analysts and intelligence collectors have been (and remain) hard at work. Good competitive strategy is adversary-informedstrategy: it should be based upon not abstract logic or assumptions merely about what would deter or defeat us, but rather upon what we have reason to think would work vis-à-vis the competitor at which it is directed. There is certainly room for debate about Beijing’s strategic objectives, about the strong and weak points of its approach, and about what would best deter or confound today’s increasingly assertive China.

On present information, however, it would indeed appear that Air/Sea Battle has a stronger case to make for itself than its escalation-focused critics would admit. At the end of the day, the challenges of managing escalation in an ASB scenario may actually favor Washington over Beijing, making Air/Sea Battle a useful component of a broad competitive strategy after all.

Dr. Christopher Ford is a lawyer and former State Department official in Washington, D.C., and the author of "The Mind of Empire: China’s History and Modern Foreign Relations" (University Press of Kentucky, 2010). The opinions he expresses here are entirely his own, and do not necessarily reflect the view of anyone else in the U.S. Government.

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1.
FeralCat

“To be sure, the Pentagon has said little in public about what ASB actually envisions, and it reportedly exists at multiple levels of classification within the U.S. government. As a result, most commentators who write about it in the press are only speculating about its contents.”

Well, hopefully the Pentagon doesn’t have any of the “geniuses” who came up with COIN/”Winning Muslims Hearts and Minds” working on it, or anywhere near it, or we might as well surrender to the Chinese right now.

What is so ironic is that all we hear from the current regime is that we need to cut defense spending dramatically along with reducing our nuclear capability all the way down to 300 and then to zero.
If that’s not a complete surrender to Islam,the chicoms and the ruskies I don’t know what is.
Hence we have enemies from within hell bent on destroying us just as much as enemies from all over the world. Not a pretty picture at all.

“In this sense, ASB may actually represent a potentially shrewd American use of the [gradual] escalatory ladder. Faced with A2/AD threats, U.S. counter-moves would escalate by attacking some assets on the Chinese mainland, but not core strategic ones.”

And what will we call this new war then? Oh, I know, Vietnam Deja Vu All Over Again, or VDVAOA for short, or Vietnam II if you prefer.

That’s not a very accurate parallel. The lack of strategic bombing or invasion into North Vietnam permitted a safe haven for troops to be sent south to fight us. Unlike the NVA’s numerous foot soldiers and comparativly large population to draw from, the Chinese have a limited number of militarily useful ships and aircraft and a limited, and vulnerable, capacity to make more.

Destroying their A2/AD capabilities degrades the effectiveness of those limited forces, making them easier to destroy. Once they are destroyed there will be no more coming in the short term. Sea/Air battle won’t drag on because it can’t.

The Japanese thought the same thing about America. Of course, it took a very short amount of time to ramp up American industry to overwhelm them and the Germans. Where does ‘American Industry’ reside now? It shore as hell ain’t in America no more.

Actually, this whole thing has been, in one form or another, a discussion almost since the point of SEATO’s disbandment in 1977, being reevaluated as the geopolitical enviornment of the region evolves. Speculators miss one important element of the plan. That is the joint training missions part of the plan with China. What they may or may not be definitively, is again left to speculation as only certain of those missions come into public pervue. One thing rather obvious, is that the plan does not ‘center’ on the de-escalation of communism as was the focal of SEATO. That said, the old weak players of the old SEATO plus the new player, Vietnam, still share a similiar territorial threat risk interest from China though again, not a ‘communist’ threat. I think it will play out with a few rigid negotiation hiccups and eventually level out to be a rather good peacekeeping plan for the region if, the global economies come back and lessens the tensions of territorial conflicts. China has long seemed to make it a sport to rattle their sabers with neighbors when they have nothing better to occupy themselves with. They actually don’t believe that ‘war’ is of any benefit to their society and economy advancement though if put into a corner….

It is useless to respond to articles like this, but I will do so anyway. People like Mr. Ford are unable to see the forest for the trees. He is concerned with some new naval strategy, when the overarching issue is whether any strategy of any type will ever by used against China, due to an emasculated military as well as lack of political will from a corrupt illegitimate US government composed of leftists from top to bottom.

Where was Mr. Ford while women have been placed into potential combat situations such as sea-going naval berthings and fighter aircraft? No doubt, he welcomed all these changes with open arms, or minimally shrugged them off as being of no concern. There is a code of silence by the military, but for years women in potential combat situations burdened it (but did not quite break it) with shenanigans such as the Lisa Nowak case.

Then in December 2010 the US military was given the coup de grace with the repeal of DADT. The addition of LGBTQ is the proverbial straw that breaks the military’s back. Personnel will increasingly be so self-absorbed accommodating and kowtowing to progressive agendas, that the real role of the military will be a thing of the past.

We can easily predict the kinds of things that will happen in the near future as rising powers correctly perceive our inability to identify enemies, kill them efficiently, break their war-making capacity, and project power throughout the world (which BTW does NOT include incursions into any Moslem country).

For example, now that vile Obama has been re-elected, sometime in the next three years the Chinese will deliberately provoke a confrontation with the US Navy over their claims to islands such as the Spratleys or the Senkakus. The US will come off second best as Chinese satellite-controlled anti-ship missiles slam into a carrier. Soon thereafter, the various nations in SE Asia will have no choice but to shift their de facto allegiance to Chinese economic and cultural proclivities, including such mundane aspects as what ‘international’ secondary language to teach in their schools.

Do you really think an LGBTQ armed forces chasing political correctness and lawyered up for rules-of-engagement is going to protect you and your family? Before this we could always count on the military to be the backbone of a traditional society… now, we can no longer assume that it will even protect us from foreign enemies, no matter how many shiny toys we have on our side. This nation is truly lost, and nothing anybody short of God can do will fix it.

Quite frankly, this article is a prime example of what is wrong with PJMedia.. it prattles on about business-as-usual, while refusing to understand that we are in an internal war with leftist adversaries that proclaimed their hatred for traditional America more than 70 years ago. To you PJ readers still living in the past, it is not your country anymore… from top to bottom the left has won, and only extraordinary measures and extreme sacrifice and long years ahead may start to make any difference.

You’ve written a prescient piece, ericcs. I agree completely with your assessment of the devastating effects of PC policies (i.e. feminism and homosexualism) on the war fighting capabilities of the US military. And your conclusion, too, points out that the complete political victory of the Marxocrats within our own country has destroyed the Constitutional Republic of old; thus, the next conflict is not likely to be a foreign one, but another American Civil War. Which, actually, makes a nuclear exchange more likely should a foreign power choose to intervene.

ericcs,
Thank you, perfect summary of the real situation. Given the result of the election does anybody seriously believe that the US will stand up to China? For God’s sake our political elite is so decadent and incompetent they can’t even pass a budget. Our military is so PC hamstrung they can’t even defeat the Taliban. See this David Goldman piece:http://pjmedia.com/spengler/2012/11/26/asia-shuts-obama-out-of-new-trade-bloc-what-you-really-should-worry-about/
China is already dominating SE Asia, including Australia and New Zealand, Canada will be next to join this bloc.
Washington DC is so useless we are done for.

You’re spot on. Our nation has come to rely upon intellectual elites of the many thnk tanks to a point of self defeat – especially the nation building strategies that have not to date, rendered a single long term victory of any kind. I learned one thing in 34 years of military environment. The intellectual elites, especially of economics and defense are the biggest threat to America! They’re NOT serving the nation in any ‘neutral’ objective capacity! They serve only the Brits and U.S. in the interests of CFR geopolitical ideologies. Iran from 1947, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many points inbetween. Not a single political or military victory for the billions (trillions) of dollars invested and the lives lost and mained. Look at the condition of relationships around the world today! Everyplace in the world they’ve meddled in foreign governments since 1947, the more unstable the regional and global relationships in the long term!

Think I’m wrong? Look again at the economic and polticial destabalization around the world created in large part, by the ideologies and strategies of the CFR, UK and U.S. intellectual elites never elected into any political offices.

Thank you for pointing out the one flaw in an otherwise very astute post. It’s not so much a matter of having gays & LGBT in the military, it’s the one of approaching them in typical elitist leftist PC fashion. They should be treated as being no different than anyone else in the military; IOW, they don’t follow established protocols & break the rules, they’re out. Simple as that.

It is useless to respond to articles like this, but I will do so anyway. People like Mr. Ford are unable to see the forest for the trees. He is concerned with some new naval strategy, when the overarching issue is whether any strategy of any type will ever by used against China, due to an emasculated military as well as lack of political will from a corrupt illegitimate US government composed of leftists from top to bottom.
…………………………………………………………………………
So good it had to be repeated.

“So we went over there and fought the war and eventually burned down every town in North Korea anyway, some way or another, and some in South Korea, too. We burned down Pusan—an accident, but we burned it down anyway…. Over a period of three years or so, we killed off—what—twenty percent of the population of Korea as direct casualties of war, or from starvation and exposure. Over a period of three years, this seemed to be acceptable to everybody, but to kill a few people at the start right away, no, we can’t seem to stomach that.” — Curtis LeMay

So ‘a quick escalation to nukes’ is a feature, not a bug. The 20th century is replete with wars our enlightened, lightworking leaders thought would be ‘over by Christmas,’ ‘finished in a few months,’ etc. etc.

“Air-Sea Battle” is actually a reversion to the strategies conceived before World War Two, to be used against Japan.

At that time, the projections were that the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) would attempt limited force projection into the West Pacific, with the Philippines being its primary strategic objective and Australia being the “grand prize”. The Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) in the Java Sea/Indian Ocean area were considered a secondary objective, due to their oil resources.

The culmination of what the U.S. Navy called “Case Orange” was to have been a “Jutland”- type fleet engagement off Luzon within the first six months of hostilities. No attacks on the Japanese home islands were considered under this construct, both for political reasons and due to the difficulty of carrying out such attacks with the naval assets available.

“Case Orange”, unfortunately, failed to take three things into account;

1. The East Indies were a primary objective of Japan, not a secondary one;

2. The Philippines were seen by Japan as a steppingstone to the Central Pacific, not Australia; and

3. The objective of Japan was to create a “defensible perimeter” extending almost to the Hawaiian Islands, in effect locking the U.S. and Great Britain out of the region, and eventually (with land conquests in China and India) out of Asia altogether.

The “Jutland-type” battle envisioned did, in fact, happen. In 1944, at Surigao Strait. Which was just one part of the Philippines campaign as the U.S. pursued its “island-hopping” strategy, taking back the Pacific one piece at a time.

The wild cards in the mix were U.S. Navy fleet submarines, which succeeded in strangling Japanese commerce much as the German U-Boats tried, and failed, to do to Great Britain. And U.S. airpower, which allowed sustained attacks on the Japanese home islands once Alaska, the Aleutian chain, and parts of China were secured well enough to use as bomber bases.

Now, how does this relate to Air Sea Battle?

Simply put, it is based on the assumption that China will attempt force projection and area denial by naval assets. The only problem is, China has almost none. A single aircraft carrier, with minimal escorts, a force of essentially littoral-warfare (i.e., coastal) craft, and no more than two or at most three effective SSBNs plus at best two SSNs per boomer as escorts (when they’re not busy escorting the undersized carrier group, that is). Also, no effective amphibious warfare capability, that is, no way to get boots on the ground on the islands, not even Taiwan.

Force projection is a necessary part of area denial. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) isn’t up to the job.

What is, and what apparently is being overlooked, is the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Set up along Soviet lines, with emphasis on bombers with anti-shipping capability (notably copies of the Russian T-16 “Badger”, possibly to be joined by copies of the Tu-22m “Backfire” in the near future), the PLAAF is theoretically at least capable of sinking most surface assets we might send into the West Pacific (WESPAC).

This opens the interesting possibility that what the PRC plans for WESPAC is a sort of strategic “protection racket”. “That’s a really nice island country you have there, it’s be a shame if it got burnt down to bare coral”. Which could easily be done by purely conventional bombing, in absence of any credible air defense. (Defined here as “they have more bombers than you have fighters or SAMs”.)

In short, “Air Sea Battle” is likely to be a whole lot of “Air”, and very little “Sea”.

Unfortunately, if that is the PRC’s objective, there is only one practical response, and it was defined by Admiral Sir Percy Scott, Royal Navy (1853-1924), the Royal Navy’s premiere gunnery expert at the turn of the last century. When put in charge of defending London against German Zeppelin raids in 1915, his superiors expected him, as a gunner, to ring London with anti-aircraft artillery.

Instead, he stated that the only workable solution was to develop heavy bombers quickly, and go out to bomb the Zeppelins’ bases. In Germany. Which, in the end, was what the British did. (see “Handley-Page 0/400″ aka the “bloody paralyser of an aeroplane”.)

This element of Air Sea Battle, attacking Chinese assets on their mainland, is correct. Assuming, that is, that the assets they intend to go after are the ones that will actually be in use by China, i.e. airbases, aircraft and munitions factories, etc.

The wild card here, of course, is the question; Does China view its strategic nuclear deterrent as a trump card to prevent such “disarming attacks” against its purely conventional air assets to be used in creating a de facto set of “client states” in WESPAC?

Only the old men in the Forbidden City know the answer to that one. But based on their track record (ruthless and generally active/stupid), I suspect the answer is one we won’t like.

The moral is that, when you’re the one who is forced into war by someone else attacking you first, what you do in response is based on what the other guy does to you.

And your counter has to be tailored to what he is actually doing, with what he has. Not on what you would do with what you have, if you were in his place.

And you also have to consider what he is willing to do, when he concludes that you are not going to do what he wants you to.

In short, “Air Sea Battle” is likely to be a whole lot of “Air”, and very little “Sea”.

The preparedness of the US isn’t as poor as some make it out to be. If it *is* a lot of air as you suspect it doesn’t take a lot of time for the US to create fairly large UCAV drone fleets. The Strategy of Technology as postulated by Possony and Pournelle may not be formally recognised as the official position of the Obama administration but it’s being implemented nonetheless (probably as the philosphy of DARPA and more technologically aware pentagon planners.) Chinese may be winning the shorter term economic war but the long term war re patents is still being won by the US. As I see it there would have to be about 24 more years of Obama level incompetence before the US abandons Possony’s vector, so in the middle term things still appear to be sound. Since the chinese are also well aware of the SoT then it will take them some time to overtake the US in that arena (their long term game plan.) On the plus side the US is far enough ahead to be able to absorb an Obama or two.

A strategy is an overall plan for deciding operational and technological priorities. It arises from consideration of alternative goals within the constraints of how the opposition could act.

They had several military organizations that ad-hoc pushed for various operational goals. That was about the extent of their “strategy.”

They stumbled into war with the US as a byproduct of economic mismanagement, diplomatic confusion, strategic confusion in Manchuria, and the Emperor’s failure to control the military and the cabinet.

I disagree that the PLAN has no resources. They now have large number of smaller surface frigates that can act as pickets or which can attack US/Japanese Navy ships or provide ISR. They have over 80 of these ships each armed with both Anti-ship and SAM missiles that can threaten both US ships, jets, and helos. These little ships are hard to find and fast. They can get data from satellites including firing solutions.

The PLAN also has about 80 destroyers and frigates. Many carry the sophisticated Russian derived BUK SAM system which has a 30 KM range and which can engage smart bombs and UAVs.

The PLAN can put to sea a sophisiticated SAM/Missile boat network which can completely deny much of the sea around China to the US and its allies.

Top this off with about 60 attack subs which can be forward deployed in front of the ship screen by 1000-2000 km to hunt US pickets and Carriers.

Beyond this, the PLAAF is developing long-legged stealth fighter bombers which can patrol out 4000 KM from China and which can serve to vector in long-range carrier killing units and missiles or which can attack US C3I assets like AWACS.

And the PLA has several Airborne divisions and a large SOF force which can be delpoyed to take and hold airfields for a critical few days or to attack US strategic targets in the US.

The Chinese know they do not want to defeat the US, just be perceived to have won a limited conflict. Sinking a carrier task force and shooting down a few dozen US planes and keeping the US out of the South China Sea would be a win for them.

I am astounded at the level of ignorance concerning basic military strategy presented by this post, and many responses:

1. News Flash boys and girls: ‘Red’ China cannot conquer Taiwan/Formosa via Air Power; only infantry on the ground can complete an occupation, ‘airborne’ infantry is sexy and fun to talk about but has never been able to deliver a large force, and there is a sufficiently large Taiwan defense capability to beat back even a relatively large set of air drops (which btw are incredibly brutal low probability of survival missions).

2. *All* Large invasion forces are transported by Sea (the casual reader in encouraged to do a quick refresh of physics concerning energy requirements), and a quite small force of US SSNs could permanently prevent any and all ‘Red’ China Amphibs / Troop Transports from completing the crossing of the straights.
>>> we need not conduct *any* provocative attacks on ‘Red’ Chinese mainland based capabilities whatsoever to remain certain that we could prevent an invasion.

3. The author, and several commenters assume the ‘Air Battle’ is the decisive issue which is just plain not true. While it *is* true that the mainlanders would need to achieve decisive air superiority to conduct a successful invasion, the converse is not true; Taiwan need not maintain air superiority to deter an invasion . . . it is wholely sufficient to simply sink the troop transports before they are able to land the invasion force.

Capt.(?) Mike: I see your ignorance and raise you.
1. So you know the CHinese order of battle, do you? What makes you think they will not bombard Tiawan first with cruise missles and bombers. They have a fifth gen stealth fighter which could be used to gain air superiority.

2. “…we need not conduct *any* provocative attacks on ‘Red’ Chinese mainland based capabilities whatsoever to remain certain that we could prevent an invasion.”

So you want to involve us from the get-go using our SSNs to sink a Chinese amphibious landing and seaborne assault? And China will do what in retaliation?? There is no way Taiwan can hold off a Chinese attack.

3. “…and several commenters assume the ‘Air Battle’ is the decisive issue which is just plain not true.”

Gee, glad you were not leading us at Normandy. We needed to have air superiority or Operation Overlord would not have been successful. Air superiority IS the key to a successful land operation. Think Desert Storm…

If troop transports have the cover of air superiority, they can land, end of story. As for points south, China can’t extend it’s air cover to protect an operation. I doubt China has any plans to invade anyone anyway. Things are going good for them and they have no wish to risk the fate of Japan over – what?

Someone needs to tell the elites in Washington that the Cold War ended 21 years ago and we, like the Soviet Union, are bankrupt. The new war isn’t being fought with guns, but with economics, and the US is losing it rapidly.

The major difference between the old Soviet Union and today’s China is that when we were going up against the Soviet Union we actually had a large Navy to put some credibility behind our strategy and our threats. Ronald Reagan understood that you could make all the plans and threats in the world, but if you didn’t have the “muscle” behind it to enforce these threats, then you were see as being weak and impotent. In fact, that very weakness could encourage your enemy to make the first move, because they probably believed that you were a paper tiger and not able to follow through on your threats. That is why there was a major naval buildup during the Reagan administration. Reagan really believed in the “500 Ship Navy” and spent a lot of money to achieve it. THAT is what got the Soviet’s attention and THAT is why they believed him, because Reagan put his money where his mouth was.

Not today. Today our Navy is shrinking real fast and the Chinese know it. As the Chinese keep adding new ships to their growing fleet, we keep losing ships and our fleet shrinks. And if these “Sequestration” cuts really do take place, our Navy will be decimated. And this isn’t World War II anymore. With all the modern electronics and weapons on board today’s ships, you cannot build a ship in a few weeks like we did during World War II. It literally takes years to build a ship today and arm it with modern weapons and train a highly-technical crew to operate it. What does this mean? Well it means that you’re going to have to fight the next major naval war with the ships that you have and hope you win before you run out of those ships. With our shrinking Navy and China’s rapidly expanding Navy, that idea is becoming more and mre unlikely as the days go by.

And Obama and his minions are promoting this really stupid idea that our Navy is bigger than the next 10 Navy’s combined. What rubbish. True, right now we have a good number of ships, but no other country has the global naval committments that we do. We have ships spread out literally all over the world, so if we do have a confrontation with China, do we really want to leave the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean totally defenseless to fight China? And, with Naval assets spread out all over the world, how long would it take to shift all of these assets to the Far East? Would the crisis be over and would the Chinese have won before our ships even got there, especially if the problem was over Taiwan or Japan or South Korea? One ship can only be in one place at one time. So if your focus is on the Pacific, don’t cry and say “Where are the carriers” if something goes horribly wrong in places like the Persian Gulf or off the coast of Lebanon or Syria and we don’t have enough ships to cover those global hot spots.

Our current policy of gutting our Naval forces will only lead to disaster if we actually do have a serious confrontation with a major power like China. Our lack of ships could actually rapidly increase the chances that any such confrontation could escalate into a nuclear war simply because we will not have enough ships to fight a prolonged conventional naval war. This is the same problem Reagan faced when he came into office in 1980, when America’s military was nearly gutted by the disastrous 1970s under the Carter administration. If anything, we are going to need A LOT more ships and crews in the very near future if we are going to convince the Chinese that we have enough assets in the Pacific to fight a prolonged conventional naval war. If we do NOT do that, it will only convince the Chinese that we are not serious about waging a prolonged conventional war, that all our threats are just that, threats, and that they will be able to enforce their will with impunity.

This is NOT a good strategic position to be in. Unless we get serious about building a larger Navy that matches our global committments and strategies, we are going to lose the next Naval war with a country like China. Either that, or it will go nuclear very, very, quickly as soon as we start losing a significant number of warships, especially aircraft carriers.

Not very well said; China has no real blue water navy. They have no capability to extend their air very far off the coasts. They can do nothing outside their own coasts when it comes to the sea. Combined arms is the name of the game; China is not building ships for outside their sphere of influence, but for within the range of their mainland air bases.

Well, Burton, I guess China is just building and buying aircraft carriers for the fun of it. You are so wrong it’s not even funny.

China is building a major naval base in Pakistan and its ships have been making trips literally all over the world, to not only “show the flag,” but to also show off their new hardware. Add to that the fact that China, yes CHINA, made a significant contribution to the anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia, and you have a country that is not only rapidly expanding its naval assets but also wants the whole world to know about it, too.

And, by the way, China really doesn’t need to have a huge blue-water navy because most of the countries it seeks to intimidate are right next to it, like Taiwan (which is literally off its coast), Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China also has a growing air force and an enormous supply of missiles, all designed to give anyone trying to attack it a very, very, hard time. Meanwhile, all of our naval assets that are not based at either Guam or Japan have to sail from either Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, or the west coast, adding days to the transit time to a trouble spot near China.

China not only wants to be a regional power, but it also wants to be a world power as well, able to project power to places like the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (hence the major naval base in Pakistan). So before you make bad statements and accuse people of being flat-out wrong, do a little reading first. You may find out how dangerous a threat China really is becoming.

OMG, we might have to “attack the Chinese mainland” in response to an attack, say, on Guam? Damn straight. And if we don’t do it with everything we have we are just plain stupid. MAD is a concept even the old fogies in Beijing understand. An attack on Guam and/or a U.S. ship in the Pacific should simply be well understood in Beijing to be a trigger to an all out nuclear war. Not, of course, that Beijing has anything to worry about for the next four years.

May 14, 1940: The Netherlands surrenders to the Germans. Nazi ground forces had quickly overwhelmed the tiny Dutch army, but while surrender negotiations were in progress, and Dutch politicians were stalling in an attempt to get a better deal, a single Luftwaffe wing of bomber aircraft attacked Rotterdam, killing some 800 people and making 80,000 homeless. This time the bombing of civilians was not an accident as it had been in Guernica in April 1937 during the Spanish Civil War, but a deliberate act of Nazi terror to force immediate compliance. Dutch politicians were shocked speechless by the intensity of the devastation, and the Dutch commander then instantly surrendered unconditionally, citing this terror bombing as the reason.

German and Japanese High Commands noted this connection (heavy city bombing and lots of dead civilians = quick surrender), as well as did all the other world powers, and strategists on all sides adjusted their war plans accordingly. But the effectiveness of massive aerial bombardment of cities to demoralize the people into surrendering, will be proven to have been highly overestimated in future cases, although it will be tried again and again. Eventually strategists will realize that the bombing of Rotterdam had been effective only because it had been first. There can only be one “first”, and the next time it happens people will be more or less psychologically prepared. Then when the next city bombing does not result in immediate surrender, the intensity of bombing of civilians will be increased incrementally, but no matter how bad it becomes, the civilian population will get used to it over time. Then as the bombings slowly increase in intensity, additional raids will actually strengthen the resolve of the population to hate the enemy even more, and to resist to the bitter end. What happened at Rotterdam was that the initial bombing was of sufficiently horrific magnitude – & being the first time a Western city was ever deliberately bombed – that it shocked the population into giving up immediately, before the people had a chance to build up a psychological “immunity”.

The bottom line is whether or not Chinese leaders will respond as did the Dutch, or being heirs to Mao’s murderous regime, they are already immune and will simply accept whatever we hit as collateral damage and push forward.

Use ‘em or lose ‘em. If the PRC openly attacks our forward deployed forces, nuke hell out of them, STARTING with the Three Gorges Dam.

As the Sicilian said, “You can’t win a land war in Asia.” So don’t try. Destroy their power projection capability (PLAN, PLAAF), put an end to their infrastructure and wait for famine and disease to do the rest.

Not so fast, just yet, Doctor StrangeHarryLovinHorrible; that’s too simplistic for right now.

Let’s review Containment, Cold War style. The land mass of China and Iran is much less than the eleven time zones of the Soviet Empire. Included in their isolation will be more Stuxnets, but we have to be first and hardest with that, as several will be able to retaliate.

“Containment” is what you do BEFORE the shooting starts.
Once the shooting starts, hit the enemy with everything you have, and keep hitting until either you or the enemy can strike no more. We are not talking about proxy warfare here – we are talking about a PRC attack on US Forces.
The reason we haven’t decisively won a war since Vietnam (and yeah, I include both Gulf Wars) is because we keep forgetting this. “Proportional Response” just guarantees we lose, slowly.

If we go to war with them, it will have to be hard, fast and ruthless. Otherwise, we’d just piss them off.

They sat up and took notice during our first war in the gulf. They changed their military defense and war fighting strategy. Dramatically. They’ve been preparing for war ever since.

Their new doctrines included a dual-use civilian-military infrastructure. Older assets have been converted or replaced. This infrastructure includes everything from cargo ships to aviation to railways to manufacturing and industry to airports, roads and highways. In the end, every man or woman of military age, every vehicle, every rice paddy, every utility, every bite of food and scrap of cloth becomes a military asset.

In short, the entire nation will become largest ‘military industrial complex’ in the largest military base in history.

The entire nation of China in effect, becomes a military base with one focus, with over two decades of preparation as a foundation for their strategy and war fighting abilities:

Fighting the US military.

So, if we ever go to war with them, put the boots to them. Don’t piss on them and tell them it’s raining.

I am surprised the author of this piece did not mention “Offshore Control (OC)” as a potential course-of-action (COA) when when thinking strategically about war with China.

OC was recently discussed in a December 2012 “Proceedings” article by Colonel T.X. Hammes, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired.

The article’s take-away is contained in the final paragraph;

“The concept of offshore control, in summary, is predicated on the idea that the presence of nuclear weapons makes any strategy aimed at the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (or it’s surrender) too dangerous to contemplate. It offers, however, a practical and politically more palatable alternative should we ever be faced with such a conflict: Waging a war of economic attrition that concludes with minimal casualties on all sides and with limited damage to mainland China’s infrastructure.”

The other aspect is that the US retains nuclear superiority over China. MAD doesn’t apply here because China lacks sufficient firepower to force it. A first-strike can take out 90% of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, leaving roughly a dozen nukes to retaliate with. We’d lose a large number of people, but we’d win the war. Any scenario in which the US actually fights seriously can only end one way: conclusive victory for the United States and conclusive defeat for China. The weak link in this strategy is President Obama, because it is not clear that he possesses the willingness to fight should the scenario play out.

And China is dependent on the United States for many important raw materials, and on open sea lanes for many more. A naval blockade would shut down most of their industrial base, and the Chinese navy isn’t strong enough to brake the blockade going up against two carrier battle groups with submarine support. China might be able to win a non-nuclear land war against us, but our navy against theirs is no contest in our favor, even with the cutbacks that are being discussed.

ASB, in other words, is decried in some circles for being likely to take things one step closer to a general (and implicitly nuclear) war by involving us in strikes upon China itself in response to Chinese attacks merely upon forward-deployed U.S. forces.

This is sad. During the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, we were admonished because the politicians would not carry the war to the enemy, attacking camps and supplies there were located in Cambodia, Laos, and China – even though everybody knew that were not actually fighting the Vietnamese or Koreans but the Chinese, by proxy. We won WWII because we didn’t fight using “proportional response” but rather went all out.

If China attacks U.S. forces, it is an attack upon the U.S. and should be carried to the Chinese mainland. Trying to “restore the status quo” simply makes them angrier and more willing to attack us directly the next time. The Queensbury rules are for sport boxing only, not for defending yourself against a mugging.

Guys, all this sounds real purdy but I’m sure some of older folk are sitting here remembering what was said back in the days of Mao. China then and I’m pretty sure now seem to think they can win a nuclear war merely by numbers alone. They figured there was so many of them that by the time the missiles stopped flying not only the United States but Russia and most of the rest of the world would be decimated. Afterwards they could come crawling out of their holes in sufficient numbers to conquer and repopulate what was left.

The Chinese then and still don’t care about the peons other than as cannon fodder. Remember the human waves of Chinese troops in Korea? Only the first couple of lines were armed, the rest were expected to grab a rifle as they climbed over the bodies of their fallen comrades. It worked pretty well too but I don’t see many people taking that into consideration now.

The Chinese tactics in the Korean War were actually taken from the Japanese. Given the nature of most of the Chinese peasants, massed infantry attacks were about all they could expect of them.

Unlike the anecdote here, each PLA soldier was well-armed with weapons suitable for close range combat, well-dressed for the cold, and well-led. Officers conducted recon and placed their forces well. PLA supply was well planned and well executed, where not interdicted by US air and artillery.

In any case, the US/ROK Armies learned how to deal with these kinds of attacks. And the Marines had not forgotten the lessons of WWII.

Austin, may I respectfully ask your sources for some of this post? My reading on the Korean War is that PLA meals for the most part consisted of rice balls, dried fish and lots of garlic.

I’ve read several times that their footwear was gym shoe type sneakers. Difficult to believe that their feet could survive long in cold weather. But what did they wear?

What was their standard rifle? I would guess but never seen it cited authoritatively that it was the Mosin Nagant but I used to know a man that brought back a Mauser and I’ve seen Thompson submachineguns mentioned twice.

One other point perhaps you’ll find interesting, in Eric Hammel’s “Choson” he says that officers in the 1st Marine division were astonished at the detailed plans known to the average Chinese rifleman that was captured, saying that, “…they possessed knowledge of strategy and plans” that would be held at the regimental level in the Marines so they simply discounted the information as unreliable.

“The study considers the question of why China has built a vast network of tunnels — often called China’s “underground great wall” — that stretch for some 3,000 miles. Karber’s report PDF suggests that the tunnels could hide as many as 3,000 nuclear weapons.”

What total crap. All the USA needs is another conflict 10,000 miles away and, win or lose, it will totally and completely bankrupt the already bankrupt USA just as WWI finished off the UK.
Let China have the S.China Sea – IT IS THEIR BACKYARD !!! China needs to trade with all of Asia and the world and they know it. They will not shut down that ocean corridor because there is no reason for them to do so.
Yea, they may grab some inconsequential chunks of rock from Japan or Vietnam or the Philippines, but let these nations sort it out.
What China wants in the S. China Sea is NOT a threat to the USA !!

Look, we will be far better off staying friends with China – and DEVELOPING FULLY OUR OWN NATURAL RESOURCES (OIL AND GAS) .

Our “victory” in the Spanish American War led to US possessions and military bases in the Pacific and led the Japanese to take aim at the USA which gave us WWII.
NO ONE COULD HAVE FORESEEN THIS RESULT OF THE US VICTORY OVER SPAIN !!

Our “victory” in WWI led to Hitler, Lenin and Stalin. The belligerents in that conflict had no desire at all to attack or get the USA into that war. Frankly, “winning” that war was far more costly than if we had stayed out of that war.

WWII followed directly from WWI and the Spanish American War.

And now look at Vietnam. Our “enemy” for 20 years is now engaging in naval exercises with the US Navy.

The results of OUR wars have been totally unpredictable and frankly have hurt us far more than they have helped.

It is high time we mind our own damn business.
Yes, we need to arm ourselves to the teeth – literally, and TOTALLY DESTROY any adversary, but first we must mind our own damn business.

By the way, when/if Japan goes to war with China over those rocks out in the middle of the S. China Sea, Japan WILL LOSE even if they win because their trade with China will go to ZERO !! and Japan today is even more bankrupt than the USA. Japan needs to “negotiate” away those “islands” in exchange for greater trade with China and if they do this, Japan will benefit greatly.

Nice read! I contend that the world would have been better off, had the U.S. and the UK NOT gone to bed with the nation building idiots, post WWII. USSR would have been a problem and dealt effectively with as was done. Other than that instance, we should have stayed out of everybodys business and reserved our military presence for defending ‘real threats’ to our ‘closest’ allies and threats to our own soveriegnty. As I stated erlier, China is not fond of war and especially world wars in these times, as it is not of benefit to their people, their government and their growing economic status on the world stage.

Not sure why so many war mongers are so eager for the U.S. to ‘create’ conflict with China.

Given that North America is rapidly on the road to energy independence, particularly in oil where we have historically been most vulnerable, it seems a real possibility that we could consider leaving the Persian Gulf and let China or some other lucky country/group keep the peace there. China is most exposed there, but so is every Asian country from India to Japan. Couldn’t we redeploy assets from there and force the Chinese to protect their own supply lines (which we do for free now)?

In all these strategies isn’t a piece being left out; that in the case of open conflict that time is a wasting asset for the Chinese? The existence of the present government is premised on seaborne trade out and oil and other materials brought in.

How long can their economy be disrupted before the peasant and middle class become regime changers, how much do the presently leaders what to test the idea? They are in, somewhat, the same position as France just before the revolution.

I will suggest then that it is the Chinese with a profound political/economic weakness. Our strategy should be to close the sea lanes to China with submarines.

Carriers back, there is no point in putting our carriers in harms way in exchange for what they can contribute. Island defense as far as possible, there are no islands that the Chinese can seize that will compel the US to ask for quarter because none are strategically that important and time will not be on their side.

What they are capable of is something quick and ruthless but in a confrontation with the US what a very finely wrought calculation that would have to be. What is really to be feared is Chinese witless miscalculation, witness how over the last few years they have managed to bring about a strategic situation in the area that is the exact opposite of what they want.

ASB is NOT a strategy, it’s a concept, mainly looking at interoperability. Also, A2/AD scenarios are not limited to China — Straits of Hormuz, for example. Or almost anywhere we we don’t have a major presence when the SHTF (’cause you know damn well it’s going to take our leadership a while to make any decision, thus we’ll be in the react mode).

It seems that someone here thinks that he/she is smarter than other (China) – wait and see who will be the most suffered if the war break out in the South China Sea. Surely, there will be left over a hugely dark cloud of ashes and widows, widowers. I can’t wait to see this sort of thing happening. People keep talking about non-sense.

Thank you for your input but golly, gee, wiss rather than looking forward to the apocalypse you might take a look at how your overlords poisoned all the milk for babies a few years ago… how in western china a few other years ago during an earthquake all the schools collapsed while government buildings remained standing… how your country poisoned several thousand people in South America with cough medicine (although it is true that after they took the medicine they didn’t cough anymore). Same with tooth paste and adulterated protein that poisoned pets around the world.

Care to discuss Tiananmen Square, ’76? Oops, another blank in the old history books.

You people probably aren’t even aware of all this because your government treats you like mushrooms… keeps you in the dark and feeds you nothing but bullshit.

But hey, no hard feelings we love you guys just as all your neighbors do.

Offshore Control is another theory mentioned with ASB. Actually it’s an old theory. The US can easily blockade China at a few pinch points without even firing a shot. That’s offshore control’. And China knows how vulnerable it is too.

Personally, I think China will shoot first. And I think it will escalate quickly. But offshore contol combined with ASB will be a lethal combination. My biggest worry is that Obama is CinC. America’s enemies see that as weakness. And between now and 2016, they may take the opportunity to strike.

Watch for China to move on Japan or the Philippines in the event of a US conflict with Iran.

I think CAPT Mike is correct, China would need boots on the ground at some point.

I could see China moving on Taiwan, maybe even taking it and holding it long term. Japan, or the Philippines? I don’t think so. They don’t have the ability to sustain the force in terms of weapons, food, and additional troops, over a long term.

The US does have that transportation capability, and while strained, we can fight a war in two theaters. Submarines, AEGIS, and aircraft will deny China that ability to resupply. At that point, it’s a matter of waiting them out, or they go nuclear.

Back in college folks would always crack open a few beers before playing Risk. Perhaps the campaign to dominate the region begins with a scientific conference that not coincidently dredges up the old idea of nuclear winter. A few cable channels show some indie “after the bomb” movies. Dark Angel becomes a re-run hit on cable again. A Hollywood studio flush with some “Asian” money does a project that is quite a bit like an update of “The Day After.” Once everyone is all abuzz about the silliness of bombs, then our friends in Asia play their opening move. We can talk about where, but the opening salvo is an airburst nuclear weapon with a big EMP, but not so much ground damage. Perhaps they do a second over another city somewhere not the United States. Just as it can be more useful when fighting an infantry campaign to saddle your opponent with a slew of wounded, it can be as delightful to take out all of the enemy’s electronics and water plants and let him sort out the mess. Once the folks in LA, Seattle, and San Francisco read about other nations that were zapped by EMP there would be riots in the streets if the US dreamed of intervention on any side. Of course bloggers and other Internet types penning columns about the effects of an EMP burst over LA would not help quiet things down. But why think that the Other side would begin small, when it can start off big and send a better message.

but we have 80 million and, climbing, black plastic rifles in our gun cabinets. they couldn’t invade the USA and resupply, unless the longshoremen in Long Beach allow it. this sounds like Black Jack Pershing chasing Pancho Villa all over Northern Mexico. or the Japanese taking control of china in WW11. the Germans conquering the Russian winter. War game scenarios, if a frog had wings he wouldn’t bump his butt. I’m going to Walmart and getting me a piece of China right now.

I know this sounds farfetched, but IMO, analysis/data interpretation has been the weak in our overall intel ops for the past 35 years or more, what role would Russia have to play in a potential collaborative attack on USA assets (mainland or periphery)?

I think this whole “pivot” to China is just smoke and mirrors. Our whole middle East strategy, whatever it was, is nothing but smoking rubble now. We need a way out so we invent a new crisis needing our attention. This one will keep the military employed and busy but the odds of actual war with China are almost zero.

I hear no mention of EMP nuclear strikes, either by China or the USA. Would a nuke at low earth orbit altitude or less, with no ground level physical footprint be considered in the same fashion as nuking a city? How much of our (or their) military and civilian infrastructure is EMP resistant? China also has a robust ASAT program and I believe blinding the GPS, communication, and intel satellites would be a certain part of any serious Sino / US conflict.

The history of warfare is about fighting with what you have not what you need and is based on lessons and equipment for the LAST war.

Name one time where we were correct in our prognostications and preparations.
Even Desert Storm was flawed in that it didn’t FINISH the job.

I think many of our planners are setting our nation up for a crisis that we cannot possibly win. If our main deterrent is only our nuclear arsenal we will be ill-prepared to defend our interests abroad. Without a large Navy and contingent of Marines our deterrence becomes hollow.

Of course the last time the US fought an Asian war to victory, the US used atomic weapons to close the deal. It is likely the case that any serious Asian war must end that way. Since the last time the US won, every US Asian war has ended in US defeat or stalemate. To fight any campaign the US must first define its interests. What are the US interests in Asia? The US does not get much in the way of raw materials from Asia. If you count the Middle East as “Asia,” we continue to rely on some oil. The US does not sell much to Asia. The US has historical connections with a few Asian countries. The US stays involved with Japan and Korea as a counterweight to China. But there is not really any other reason to care much for either Korea or Japan. They are mature countries that can manage their own affairs. The US should be friendlier with Vietnam if it wants to be allied with a country with a proven track record of standing up to China. Vietnam has also demonstrated its ability to field a better army than the US or France. It is nice to game things out. It would help to know why all the fuss.

I agree with most of what you write and I mean no offense, but I don’t think you understand Vietnam or the war very well.

There can’t be any alliance worth having with Hanoi. Why?
Spend some time on the ground in Vietnam and try to get someone to make a decision.
Then you’ll understand why. That’s not what they do. They’re magnificent & lethal when some nation
tries to force a decision on them. But Hanoi making a decision? It ain’t gonna happen.

How do I know? First, I look at a map & see how close Hanoi is to Guangdong, Guangxi & Yunnan.
Second, I have spent a lot of time there.

IMO, the only two strategic nations in that part of the world are the Philippines & Japan.
Manila is a three hour flight from US territory. So it’s worth defending. Guam and several
US island territories are vulnerable if China takes the west coast of that archipelago.
Japan may be strategic too, because of its proximity to the Aleutians and Hawaii, not to mention all the hi-tech they have.

No public appearance of the Clinton woman yet?
Btw has anyone seen the Saudi top spy that was reported not assassinated a while back but hasn’t been seen since? I guess the question is whether he is under ground literally of metaphorically.