A Bridge Too Far is one of my favourite war movies. Pretty much the last of the Big Screen Epics, with an All Star Cast, it doesn’t try to do much except simply tell what happened. No romantic sub plots, no political commentary, it just goes all-out to bring us the story. There’s a scene near the beginning, where von Rundstedt and Model are discussing if they need to worry about stopping Patton or Montgomery.

“He’s their best. I’d prefer Montgomery, but Eisenhower isn’t that stupid” says von Rundstedt. The whole Monty/Patton argument in general is frequent, and shows up even in the Hatch forum (See the El Alamein thread).

Spoiler

Now, this handsome fellow was a chap by the name of General der Panzertruppe Hermann Balck. By most accounts he was quite a competent chap, probably one of the best Panzergenerals the Germans had to offer. It is doubtful that many officers could have performed as he did in the Eastern Front. The Autumn of 1944 saw him in command of First Army, in central France. He had some issues to deal with. In a letter he wrote to von Rundstedt, he said “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equpped troops.” Certainly the German Army in October 1944 was not the same as it had been in 1941. His next sentence, however, bears some attention: “The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again and release the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division for the Northern front can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans and the French…” Later he said “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success.” The unit facing him was US Third Army, the bad and hesitating commander he referred to turned out to be this fellow.

When he was over to partake in Operation Think Tank, Harry Yeide gave me a copy of his new book, “Fighting Patton.” I love books like this. He completely ignores preconceptions, that which we know to be true simply because everybody knows it, and digs down to find the verifiable truth for himself. He said he was watching the movie “Patton”, and was intrigued by the German intelligence officer who kept the historical bio of the man. In this case, Yeide almost completely ignored the US writings, and instead went straight to the German war records and diaries of the people facing Patton to see what –they- were saying. It makes fascinating reading and throws a number of our preconceptions on their heads.

Now, I have somewhat mixed feelings about General Patton. The US Army has seen fit to name its museum of leadership after him, but while he may have been a great leader, I (please ignore the soap box under me) have something of a belief that his style of leadership belongs in a museum and there may be better role models for today’s young officers. The authoritarian style is something of an anathema to what I have seen work, but then, I work with 21st Century soldiers, not ones from 1940s. For current purposes, my opinion on this is irrelevant: What counts is what 1940s Patton did with his 1940s soldiers against 1940s Germans, Italians and French. Well, he led them to victory. What's interesting, though, is the perception of how he did it and of what people thought of him.

By and large in North Africa, the Germans not only had no clue who this Patton fellow was, they pretty much didn’t care anyway. The records show that their focus was Montgomery, the forces in the West facing the Americans basically had to work with whatever the Axis forces had to spare after taking Montgomery into account. Who the American commander was was somewhat irrelevant to them. Move to Sicily, and the great dash to Palermo didn’t impress the Germans either: They had voluntarily abandoned the territory. The reason why Montgomery was slow while Patton was able to loop around the island at high speed? The Germans had moved all available forces from the West to stop Montgomery, they didn’t care about the West of the island. After all, their escape route was to the East. And then they discovered, to somewhat their surprise, that the Allied advance was so hesitant that they were able to get most of their men and heavy equipment off the island, which they hadn’t thought would be possible when they started the Sicily defence. The name “Patton”, however, still didn’t seem to mean much to them.

Ok, we move on. Patton is beached for a while, as we know, and then put in charge of FUSAG, the fictional unit supposed to invade the Pas de Calais. The common story is that the Germans were so in awe of Patton that they were convinced that wherever he was, that’s where the main invasion would be, and that may have been the intent. Problem seems to be that most German officers had never heard of the man at that point. Just because the US newspapers or General Eisenhower may have thought the Germans feared Patton doesn’t mean that the Germans felt the same way! That they were worried about FUSAG is pretty much a given, but they were worried about a supposed huge body of men and equipment. It could have been commanded by General Snuffy, as far as they cared. When he does move to the continent and takes over the US Third Army, the Germans had already decided to withdraw to the German border, and the race across France actually took about four weeks longer than the Germans had anticipated it would. And while they were doing it, the primary focus of the Germans was, again, Montgomery. Units facing Bradley (and thus Patton) generally had to make do with what was left over. There seems to have been no "Patton Panic" in the German Army.

There’s a scene in “Patton” where the various allied officers are having a chat with Bradley about the German Ardennes offensive. Patton (George C Scott, of course) stuns the assembled men by announcing that he can have elements of his Army make a left turn and head for Bastogne in three days. All very impressive. German records for the planning of the Ardennes expedition indicate that they expected an attack from the South a little faster than that. And by the time Patton had actually gotten his forces to the fight, the German offensive was already considered a lost cause by the Germans. The commander of the forces which actually stopped the offensive? Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery overall, and General Courtney Hodges with his First Army in particular.

Now, I’m going to go off-track for a second here. Whatever the merits of Patton, Hodges is someone who probably deserved to have a movie of his own. He joined the Army as a private only three years before Patton commissioned as a lieutenant, yet was his equal under Bradley in the French campaign. His First Army undertook some of the most significant fighting of the Western front, but it seems that few people have even heard of him. If you get the opportunity, he might be worth a little personal research. To a large extent, this demonstrates the folly of the Monty/Patton argument: In France, Montgomery and Patton were not even competitors, except perhaps for press coverage. Montgomery’s counterpart was Omar Bradley, Patton’s counterparts as Army commanders were Hodges, Simpson, and Gerow. How many Patton/Hodges arguments are there on the Internet?

Now, I’m not saying that Patton didn’t have his good points. When he knew he was free to advance, he did so with a speed that few could, or would, match. His philosophy of offence above all else is matched by some of the most successful generals out there (although, granted, it worked for Custer as well during the US Civil War, and we know how that ended up afterwards), and he was a senior commander on the winning side so he must have had merit. “Fighting Patton” is a 500-page opus, almost 20% of which is supporting notes and references, and Yeide reports both the praise that the Germans gave Patton as well as their criticism. It really is worth the read. Fundamentally, Patton was the US Army’s best tank general in WWII in a field of… erm… Quick! Name a US ‘tank general’ in WWII other than Patton? And to crown off the mythology and seal his fame, he died tragically. That, colorful and competent, there’s little wonder he’s the US’s most famous general of the time, if not ‘ever.’ To the Germans, though, he was pretty much just another general, not anyone to take really significant note of.

The point of this all, though, is one which I try to make repeatedly. Take conventional wisdom with a grain of salt. For example, there’s nothing wrong with being slow and methodical as a commander when you can afford to be, a trait commonly associated with Montgomery. Which is fortunate, because that’s how a good number of German officers described their opposition, which turned out to be Patton. (“Hesitant “and “missing opportunities” was another common de​sc​ri​ption, mind). And, of course, Patton never faced the ultimate test of conducting a fighting withdrawal. We know that Patton was a commander worthy of praise, the Germans credited him for it when they felt it was deserved. But Harry Yeide went further, took the initiative and effort to challenge the “US side of the US story” and look into the background, only to reinforce that the truth as we know it may not be the whole truth. Good for him, and may he continue.

Patton wasn't as good as many think he was & Monty was better than most give him credit for. That said, like all commanders in the field. They had their flaws. It does help explain why the British/Canadian armies in Normandy had such a hard go.

Most people in the west lack a bit of perspective. Patton and his Third Army, were they dropped into the eastern front, would have disappeared without a ripple. Unfortunately, for most, what they know of Patton is what they've seen in that movie.

if you gave Patton the unlimted resources like Monty had and No political crap invovled, he would have ended the war sooner.. Remember that Monty was given more fuel that Patton needed to keep pushing east. He had to stop and wait for the supplies to catch up since alot of them were transferred to Monty..

It's good to see a US historian challenge the US version of history. What made Patton stand out from his contemporaries was that he was a "diva", constantly needing to have attention and have his ego stroked. In fact, he was a master at being a "media whore", willing to say or do anything to keep himself in the press. Perhaps kim Kardashian could take a few lessons from ol' Blood and Guts?

if you gave Patton the unlimted resources like Monty had and No political crap invovled, he would have ended the war sooner.. Remember that Monty was given more fuel that Patton needed to keep pushing east. He had to stop and wait for the supplies to catch up since alot of them were transferred to Monty..

The british people wanted Monty to get more glory..

He was given the fuel so Brian Horrox's British XXX Corps could support Market Garden. As a Canadian I want more credit for Crear & Simmons for there part in Falaise & the Battle of the Sheldt. (Try reading a book about WWII that wasn't printed in the U.S.A. or written by an American.)

It's good to see a US historian challenge the US version of history. What made Patton stand out from his contemporaries was that he was a "diva", constantly needing to have attention and have his ego stroked. In fact, he was a master at being a "media whore", willing to say or do anything to keep himself in the press. Perhaps kim Kardashian could take a few lessons from ol' Blood and Guts?

I'm not sure basing any sort of historical analysis off reports which had been gathered as hostile intelligence is a sound method of analyzing things.

Military Intelligence is historically spotty (and the rear end of many jokes). I'm not saying Patton was fantastic (he certainly did his job when he needed to). But the documents used here are not valid primary sources.

if you gave Patton the unlimted resources like Monty had and No political crap invovled, he would have ended the war sooner.. Remember that Monty was given more fuel that Patton needed to keep pushing east. He had to stop and wait for the supplies to catch up since alot of them were transferred to Monty..

The british people wanted Monty to get more glory..

This is not true.

21st Army Group (Montgomery) was on the coast for the entire war, post Normandy. For that reason alone, it was always much easier to supply 21AG than Patton. This is also one of the primary reasons that Market-Garden happened at all: because it was virtually impossible to deploy the 1st Allied Airborne Army anywhere else (not enough transport). It might be useful to look at a map and actually consider the logistical challenges of supplying Patton.

Plus, a little dose of reality: Patton was an army commander, Montgomery was in charge of an army group. Kind of a different scale of needs there.

21st Army Group (Montgomery) was on the coast for the entire war, post Normandy. For that reason alone, it was always much easier to supply 21AG than Patton. This is also one of the primary reasons that Market-Garden happened at all: because it was virtually impossible to deploy the 1st Allied Airborne Army anywhere else (not enough transport). It might be useful to look at a map and actually consider the logistical challenges of supplying Patton.

Plus, a little dose of reality: Patton was an army commander, Montgomery was in charge of an army group. Kind of a different scale of needs there.

Look at the proportions though. I remember reading some stats that in North Africa, Italy/Sicily, and into Europe Monty would hesitate to attack until he had an insane amount of material advantage, only to allow the Germans to harden defenses. Then Monty seemed to refuse to do any sort of attack that might put victory at risk and thus seemed to have insisted on frontal assaults with a HUGE amount of material. I think the real measure of the Monty vs Patton would be the ratios of friendly casualties to enemy casualties of all their battles. I would love to see those ratios, but alas, I do not have the time to compile them. I think Patton was better because Monty seemed to be so spineless and got a lot of men killed with needless frontal assaults.

It doen't matter who was better because they dont win wars. It was the barve men and women from all the countrys who foght and died who won the war. No one conutry could have done it alone. It was all the allies that did it.

I'm not sure basing any sort of historical analysis off reports which had been gathered as hostile intelligence is a sound method of analyzing things.

Military Intelligence is historically spotty (and the rear end of many jokes). I'm not saying Patton was fantastic (he certainly did his job when he needed to). But the documents used here are not valid primary sources.

Contemporary, first-hand accounts written by German officers are "not valid primary sources" for a book about German officers' experience fighting forces commanded by Patton? The sometimes limited perspective of military reports and personal diaries should be taken into account when weighing their significance, but that doesn't diminish their validity as primary sources. They're certainly as valid as U.S. military reports concerning the actions and performance of Patton's forces. In my opinion, any analysis that excludes source material because it was "gathered as hostile intelligence" would be fundamentally unsound.

I'm 16 years old turning 17 and want to go to West Point when i graduate high school. I'm actually taking the physical exam for it in June and applying soon after. Ever since i was 6 I've wanted to join the army, and around this time all i started to do was watch military movies and read military books, many non-fictional. It seems that in any piece of military literature about the Western front, North Africa, Italy and Sicily, there is a highlight of General Patton and his great accomplishments. But the man researching this is right, these are all American made books and American wartime records. Now i don't wish to slander General Patton's name or anything because, by all means, the Germans were the Germans. They had superior technological advantages in tank warfare and knew what the hell they were doing. Regardless the numbers against Patton, small or large, he got the job done. In the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans attacked the American front with everything they had left. Bastogne was surrounded by multiple Panzer, Tiger, and SS divisions. No one could have reached the town in time, and Patton declared he would do it in three days, and all the other Generals declared him mad. Check any book or historical records, its a fact, and he indeed did do it in three days, jumping right into the hailstorm of the Germans with his 3rd army. The fact is that Patton and Montgomery both went up against tough odds or small odds depending on the situation (one of Montgomery's toughest ones being in North Africa). They were both good generals and they both won us the war. But on a side note, lets not forget Montgomery wouldn't even be able to wage war without the Lend-Lease act and the Americans constant supply line giving Montgomery tanks and weapons, because British Industry was beyond crippled, and wouldn't have been able to give Montgomery a thing if it wasn't for the U.S.

I'm not sure basing any sort of historical analysis off reports which had been gathered as hostile intelligence is a sound method of analyzing things.

Military Intelligence is historically spotty (and the rear end of many jokes). I'm not saying Patton was fantastic (he certainly did his job when he needed to). But the documents used here are not valid primary sources.

The only military intelligence sources used are those he obtained from US Army sources, such as the unit histories, with intelligence as reported at the time. Official unit records of the German Army such as a Kriegstagebuch, and official military correspondance viewed after the war in the German archives are to be considered primary source documents, not military intelligence which I would define as having been obtained 'about the enemy' at the time of conflict.