This letter was sent by certified mail to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld on 29 January 2001:

AntiPolygraph.org

GEORGE W. MASCHKE
HART NIBBRIGKADE 22
2597 XV DEN HAAG
NETHERLANDS
maschke@antipolygraph.org
Monday, 29 January 2001
THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1000
Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:
Congratulations on your recent confirmation as Secretary of
Defense. I wish you all the best as you take on the
responsibilities of that office for the second time in your
life. I especially admire the wit and wisdom expressed in your
"Rumsfeld's Rules" which I found on the DoD website:
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2001/rumsfeldsrules.pdf
In your rules for the Secretary of Defense, you wrote:
"Reserve the right to get into anything and exercise
it. Make your deputies and staff realize that,
although many responsibilities are delegated, no one
should be surprised when the Secretary engages an
important issue."
I am writing this open letter to you to bring to your attention
a matter that I believe deserves your personal engagement:
waste, fraud, and abuse in the DoD Counterintelligence-Scope
Polygraph (CSP) Program, the ostensible purpose of which is to
deter and detect espionage, sabotage, and terrorism.
The counterintelligence-scope polygraph format used by DoD since
1994 is the Test for Espionage and Sabotage (TES), which was
developed by Dr. Sheila Reed at the DoD Polygraph Institute
(DoDPI) in the early '90s. Dr. Reed conducted three laboratory
studies intended to determine the accuracy of the procedure. Her
first study suggested that the TES was 88.9% accurate with
truthful subjects and 83.3% accurate with deceptive subjects.
Her second study suggested that the TES was 98% accurate with
truthful subjects and 83.3% accurate with deceptive subjects.
But her third study, which also considered examiner influence on
test outcomes, suggested an accuracy rate of only 84.8% for
truthful subjects and 77.9% for deceptive subjects.
The accuracy rates suggested by Dr. Reed's 3rd study have
serious policy implications. Let us suppose that 1 person in
1,000 is a spy, saboteur, or terrorist. Let us suppose next that
we screen 10,000 persons using the TES, applying the accuracy
rates suggested by Dr. Reed's 3rd study. Of the 10 spies,
saboteurs, or terrorists in the population tested, about 8 will
be correctly identified as deceptive. But some 1,520 innocent
persons will also be wrongly identified as deceptive. For every
spy or saboteur correctly identified, 190 innocent persons would
be wrongly accused. The odds of any person who "fails" the TES
actually being a spy or saboteur would be about 1 in 200!
Dr. Reed concluded that the DoD security screening program
should be halted. In reward for her candor, DoDPI officials took
action to revoke her security clearance, and she was compelled
to leave DoDPI in 1995.
DoDPI also suppressed publication of Dr. Reed's report of her
3rd TES study. (Her first two studies were published as reports
DoDPI94-R-0008 and DoDPI94-R-0009, respectively). Dr. Reed has
told me that the data collected in her 3rd study indicated that
examiner bias plays a significant role in TES outcomes. While
Dr. Reed had prepared a preliminary report of this 3rd study
before leaving the Institute, DoDPI sat on it rather than
forwarding it to DoD for approval, as per DoDPI's standard
practice.
DoDPI's parent agency, the Defense Security Service (DSS),
refused to release any materials related to this study when I
requested it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552)
last year. DSS's file number for this FOIA request is FOIA #064-
20(2).
DSS's refusal to release these documents under the Freedom of
Information Act is cause for concern. DSS Office of Freedom of
Information and Privacy chief Leslie R. Blake at first withheld
these documents (which are unclassified) on the ground that the
study was not yet complete, adding, "[t]here is no estimated
date of completion at this time."
In appealing Mr. Blake's initial denial, I pointed out to DSS
Director Gen. Charles J. Cunningham, Jr. (ret.) that it seemed
clear that DoDPI had no intention of ever completing Dr. Reed's
3rd study. Gen. Cunningham upheld DSS's initial denial, claiming
that release of any information about the study would harm DSS's
decision-making process. Mr. Blake later informed me that the
information withheld consisted of only two 14-page reports.
If these were truly the only documents in DoDPI's possession
that responded to my request, then DoDPI must have destroyed Dr.
Reed's research materials, which she told me filled several
boxes. It also seems likely that the two 14-page reports cited
by DSS are too short to include Dr. Reed's draft report of her
3rd TES study.
Dr. Reed is not the only researcher whose warning about the DoD
Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program has gone unheeded.
It was the consensus of DoDPI's scientific advisory board that
polygraph screening is without validity. This independent board
had reviewed and provided comments on DoDPI's academic
curriculum and intramural research program. Former DoDPI
director Michael H. Capps promptly dismissed the entire
scientific advisory board upon his appointment in 1995. The
dismissed members were John Furedy, William Iacono, Ed Katkin,
Christopher J. Patrick, and Stephen W. Porges. They were
provided no explanation for their dismissal.
In addition, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Drew C. Richardson,
who holds a doctorate in physiology and is the Bureau's top
polygraph expert, testified before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary's Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts on 29 September 1997:
1. [Polygraph screening] is completely without any
theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity.
Although there is disagreement amongst scientists
about the use of polygraph testing in criminal
matters, there is almost universal agreement that
polygraph screening is completely invalid and should
be stopped. As one of my colleagues frequently says,
the diagnostic value of this type of testing is no
more than that of astrology or tea-leaf reading.
2. If this test had any validity (which it does not),
both my own experience, and published scientific
research has proven, that anyone can be taught to beat
this type of polygraph exam in a few minutes.
3. Because of the nature of this type of examination,
it would normally be expected to produce large numbers
of false positive results (falsely accusing an
examinee of lying about some issue). As a result of
the great consequences of doing this with large
numbers of law enforcement and intelligence community
officers, the test has now been manipulated to reduce
false positive results, but consequently has no power
to detect deception in espionage and other national
security matters. Thus, I believe that there is
virtually no probability of catching a spy with the
use of polygraph screening techniques. I think a
careful examination of the Aldrich Ames case will
reveal that any shortcomings in the use of the
polygraph were not simply errors on the part of the
polygraph examiners involved, and would not have been
eliminated if FBI instead of CIA polygraphers had
conducted these examinations. Instead I believe this
is largely a reflection of the complete lack of
validity of this methodology. To the extent that we
place any confidence in the results of polygraph
screening, and as a consequence shortchange
traditional security vetting techniques, I think our
national security is severely jeopardized.
Although Dr. Reed's research indicates that the TES should have
a high false positive rate, in practice, just as Dr. Richardson
testified, "the test has now been manipulated to reduce false
positive results, but consequently has no power to detect
deception in espionage and other national security matters."
The Department of Defense Polygraph Program Report to Congress
for FY 2000, prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
has recently been published and is available on-line at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/dod-2000.html
In FY 2000, 7,890 DoD and contractor personnel underwent
polygraph security screening, not including NSA and NRO.
This report indicates that the only individuals who "failed"
their DoD polygraph screening tests were those who made
significant admissions. Everyone else "passed." Thus, the key to
passing is to simply to make no significant admissions! The
report states:
Approximately 71 percent of our polygraph tests are
conducted as a condition for access to certain
positions or information under the DoD
Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Program. The
DoD CSP Program is authorized by Public Law 100-180.
The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect
activity involving espionage, sabotage, and terrorism.
The DoD conducts CSP examinations on military
personnel, DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor
personnel. Of the 7,890 individuals examined under the
CSP Program in Fiscal Year 2000, 7,688 showed no
significant physiological response to the relevant
questions (non-deceptive) and provided no substantive
information. The remaining 202 individuals provided
substantive information. Of these 202 individuals, 194
received a favorable adjudication, three are still
pending adjudication, five are pending investigation,
and no one received adverse action denying or
withholding access.
The report goes on to clarify:
There were 7,688 individuals whose polygraph
examination results were evaluated as no significant
response to the relevant questions (non-deceptive).
The remaining 202 individuals yielded significant
responses and/or provided substantive information.
This report makes it clear that the polygraph charts are not
being used to determine whether individuals pass or fail: if
the individual provides no "substantive information," then
any physiological responses he/she may have shown to the
relevant questions are deemed not to be significant, and the
individual "passes." If the individual provides substantive
information, then he/she "fails," regardless of polygraph
chart readings.
While the report claims that "[t]he purpose of the
[Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph] Program is to deter and
detect espionage, sabotage, and terrorism," it seems that the
only spies, saboteurs, or terrorists who will be deterred or
detected by it are those who are stupid enough to make
admissions.
Dr. Reed was right when she said that the entire polygraph
screening program should be shut down. Some may argue that DoD
must continue to rely on these unreliable polygraph "tests"
because there is no better solution. But you should know better.
As you noted in "Rumsfeld's Rules":
"For every human problem there is a solution that is
simple, neat and wrong." (H.L. Mencken)
"If a problem has no solution, it may not be a
problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped
with over time." (Shimon Perez)
Polygraph screening is a prime example of a solution that is
simple, neat, and wrong. The problems of espionage, sabotage,
and terrorism are better coped with through conventional
counterintelligence and force protection methods than through
the make-believe solution of polygraph screening.
Mr. Secretary, the DoD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph
Program is at best a farce, and at worst, a massive fraud. I
urge you to engage this important issue personally.
Sincerely,
[signed]
George W. Maschke
AntiPolygraph.org
PS: A copy of this letter will be made available on-line at:
http://antipolygraph.org/articles/article-011.shtml