Scriptiegegevens

Habermasian discourse ethics is a widely known deliberative democratic theory, often praised for its ideals. Nevertheless, as several authors have pointed out, it seems to be a theory that is not feasible, or at least not feasible enough. A theory that is infeasible may contain valuable ideals, but is not suited to practical reality. Exploring a new way in which Habermas’s theory can be made more feasible is the aim of this thesis. By pointing out the weaknesses of Habermasian theory, both in general and concerning feasibility issues specifically, it is argued that the theory’s feasibility must be increased. Based on existing literature concerning feasibility, a conception of feasibility is formulated. Through the application of this conception to Habermasian discourse ethics, the theory’s infeasibility is ascertained. Furthermore, it is argued that even the conception developed thus far is not entirely accurate nor complete, since feasibility considerations should go beyond the aspects of feasibility that other authors discuss. The impact of parts of a theory as well as the feasibility of the parts of a theory themselves should be considered as well, it is argued. For this purpose, a new feasibility framework is developed, in which the impact of parts of a theory, the feasibility of the parts of a theory as well as the feasibility of the preferred outcome of a theory have a place. This new framework is applied to an important part of Habermas’s discourse ethics: the discourse rules. The new feasibility framework provides the opportunity to judge a theory, or even merely parts of it, on its feasibility in a more complete and accurate sense than authors have done so far. The framework cannot only be utilized to judge and enhance the feasibility of Habermas’s theory, but can be used in the same way for other (political) theories as well.