This article presents new data on the direct and deliberate killings of civilians, called one-sided violence, in intrastate armed conflicts, 1989—2004. These data contribute to the present state of quantitative research on violence against civilians in three important respects: the data provide actual estimates of civilians killed, the data are collected annually and the data are provided for both governments and rebel groups. Using these data, general trends and patterns are presented, showing that the post-Cold War era is characterized by periods of fairly low-scale violence punctuated by occasional sharp increases in violence against civilians. Furthermore, rebels tend to be more violent on the whole, while governments commit relatively little violence except in those few years which see mass killings. The article then examines some factors that have been found to predict genocide and evaluates how they correlate with one-sided violence as conceptualized here. A U-shaped correlation between regime type and one-sided violence is identified: while autocratic governments undertake higher levels of one-sided violence than other regime types, rebels are more violent in democratic countries.

While case-based narratives from civil wars often stress the ethnic dimension of civilian atrocities, cross-national studies have found limited evidence in support of such contentions. Addressing this debate, we argue that warring actors often use ethnic affiliation to identify groups of suspected enemy supporters when individual wartime affiliations are not known. Since warring actors depend on their civilian constituencies for support, collective targeting of the enemy's co-ethnics becomes a strategy for weakening the enemy's capacity. Armed actors are thus more likely to engage in civilian abuse in areas where the enemy's ethnic constituency resides. To examine this argument, we combine new georeferenced event data on violence against civilians in African conflicts, 1989-2009, with spatial data on the location of the warring actors' ethnic constituencies. The analysis shows that the number of civilians killed by both governments and rebel groups is higher in areas inhabited by the enemy's ethnic constituency.

In recent years, international third parties have increasingly sought to manage the dire consequences of civil war, often by deploying peacekeeping operations. However, peacekeepers sometimes face deliberate attacks by armed groups. These attacks hamper efforts to provide humanitarian relief and security. This raises a critical question: what factors lead rebel groups to target peacekeepers? We argue that internal conflict dynamics are important for explaining this phenomenon. Rebels attack peacekeepers as an alternative strategy to undermine incumbent regimes. They adopt this strategy as the balance of power turns against them in their struggle against governments. We evaluate our argument using a novel event data set on violent attacks on peacekeepers in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2009. We find a positive relationship between rebel losses and violent attacks on peacekeepers. These findings hold when controlling for mission-specific characteristics, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and across different model specifications.

Are UN peacekeepers effective in protecting civilians from violence? Existing studies examine this issue at the country level, thereby making it difficult to isolate the effect of peacekeepers and to assess the actual mechanism at work. We provide the first comprehensive evaluation of UN peacekeeping success in protecting civilians at the subnational level. We argue that peacekeepers through their sizable local presence can increase the political and military costs for warring actors to engage in civilian targeting. Since peacekeepers’ access to civilian populations rests on government consent, peacekeepers will primarily be effective in imposing these costs on rebel groups, but less so for government actors. To test these conjectures we combine new monthly data on the location of peacekeepers with data on the location and timing of civilian killings in Africa. Our findings suggest that local peacekeeping presence enhances the effectiveness of civilian protection against rebel abuse, but that UN peacekeeping struggles to protect civilians from government forces.

We simulate how a set of different UN policies for peace-keeping operations is likely to affect the global incidence of internal armed conflict. The simulation is based on a statistical model that estimates the efficacy of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in preventing the onset, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of internal armed conflict. The model takes into account a set of important conflict predictors for which we have projections up to 2035 from the UN and the IIASA. The estimates are based on a 1970–2008 cross-sectional dataset of changes between conflict levels and new data on PKO budgets and mandates. The simulations show a strong effect of PKOs on the global incidence of major conflicts, although restricted to operations with robust mandates. Extensive use of ‘transformational’ PKOs can reduce the global incidence of the most lethal conflicts with 65%.

Previous research has indicated that democracy decreases the risk of armed conflict, while increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks, but we know little about the effect of democracy on violence against civilians in ongoing civil conflicts. This study seeks to fill this empirical gap in the research on democracy and political violence, by examining all rebel groups involved in an armed conflict 1989-2004. Using different measures of democracy, the results demonstrate that rebels target more civilians when facing a democratic (or semi-democratic) government. Democracies are perceived as particularly vulnerable to attacks on the population, since civilians can hold the government accountable for failures to provide security, and this provides incentives for rebels to target civilians. At the same time, the openness of democratic societies provides opportunities for carrying out violent attacks. Thus, the strength of democracy-its accountability and openness-can become an Achilles heel during an internal armed conflict.

In many intrastate armed conflicts civilians are the direct targets of violence by both governments and rebel groups; nonetheless, no quantitative study has ever examined and compared the determinants for government and rebel violence. I explain government and rebel attacks on civilians as violent bargaining strategies aimed at improving the bargaining position, and these strategies are dependent on the intensity level of the conflict. I propose that when fighting is low governments try to avoid killing civilians unless the threat is large enough, and rebels kill civilians to signal resolve in order to gain concessions. However, as the intensity level increases control becomes more important, so both parties target civilians to establish territorial control and undermine the support of the opponent. Using new data on killings of civilians I examine all conflict actors in an internal armed conflict, 1992 to 2004. The findings suggest that rebels use violence for communicative purposes in less intense conflicts, characterized e.g. by more violence when rebels are relatively strong and early in the conflict. In more intense conflicts, on the other hand, violence is used to secure control and compensate for lack in military capacity – then the weaker groups kill more civilians, and they are likely to kill more civilians the longer the conflict. Governments kill more civilians when the rebel opposition is strong; surprisingly they kill fewer civilians the longer the conflict, and democracy is not found to have any effect on government behavior.

Theories and counterinsurgency doctrines emphasize the importance ofavoiding civilian casualties. Yet,many operations produce large numbers of socalledcollateral civilian deaths. I present two competing arguments for whencollateral deaths occur. One the one hand, they could be the unintentional resultof offensives when trying to maintain force protection; on the other hand, theycould be the result of a deliberate choice of relying on indiscriminate violencewhen pressured on the battlefield. I use new data on violence in Afghanistan2004–2009, disaggregated by province and month, to examine what type ofbattlefield dynamics are more likely to produce high levels of collateral civiliancasualties. The results show that civilian casualties are particularly high aftercounterinsurgency forces suffer losses in combat.

This paper deals with the question why rebels groups in intrastate conflicts choose to kill civilians, despite both domestic and international audience costs. From a bargaining perspective, I argue that rebels that are losing on the battlefield may target civilians in order to signal their resolve to the government. Since it is assumed to be a costly action, the rebels can thereby prove their determination to continue and consequently affect the overall bargaining range of the conflict. A further implication of the argument is that conflict duration should have negative effects on rebel violence against civilians, since the expected effect of violence as a signal decreases over time. The study is based on a dataset with monthly observations over rebel killings of civilians in all intrastate armed conflicts from January 2002 to December 2004. The hypotheses are tested using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model, and the empirical results support the theoretical argument.

13.

Hultman, Lisa

Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

The current counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan has failed to defeat the insurgency and levels of violence have increased over time. Even though there are several potential factors explaining this development, it prompts the question of how effective the military offensives are at weakening the insurgents and their ability to carry out violent attacks. I propose that targeted killings of insurgents reduce their fighting capacity in the short term, which leads to fewer attacks against government targets as the insurgents shy away from costly combat. However, as a way of adapting to a temporary reduction in capacity, insurgents may instead increase their targeting of the civilian population with the purpose of undermining the legitimacy of the government and the international forces. This potential double effect of military offensives is examined using monthly data on violence in Afghanistan by each province, 2004–2009. The findings provide some support for the contention that killing insurgents can reduce their attacks against government targets, but at the same time risk leading to an increase in attacks against civilian targets. The use of force thus seems to be a double-edged sword in the struggle against the insurgents in the present war in Afghanistan.

How is rebel violence against civilians linked to the overall fighting in internal conflicts? This paper approaches the question by arguing that the way rebels respond to fighting depends on their military capabilities relative to the government. The dynamics of violence tend to be different depending on whether parties approach parity or if there is a strong asymmetry: whereas strong groups, usually operating in militarily weak states, can use more offensive tactics, weak groups challenging a strong state have to rely much on guerrilla tactics. It is proposed that weak groups target civilians to compensate for lacking resources, and therefore the magnitude of violence against civilians increases as fighting intensifies. Strong groups, on the other hand, produce a different dynamic where civilians are often targeted with the intention of gaining territorial control, and such violence is consequently unrelated to the intensity of fighting. Using detailed data on the number of civilians killed by each rebel actor in all internal conflicts from 1992 to 2004, the argument is evaluated statistically and by a careful examination of the data. The empirics clearly show that violence by weak groups indeed is closely correlated with the intensity of fighting, whereas there is no correlation to be found for strong groups. It is concluded that by looking deeper into the interplay between various forms of violence and the complexities of relative military capabilities, we can further our understanding of contemporary warfare.

Despite the costs of killing civilians in intrastate armed conflicts, in terms of effects on domestic support and international condemnation, civilians are often the direct targets of violence by both governments and rebel groups. In this paper, I propose that one way of understanding this violence is by looking at the bargaining process of war, and how targeting of civilians may sometimes be used in addition to the fighting on the battlefield for strategic purposes. Conflict actors target civilians in order to improve their bargaining position, and there are two aspects of this argument. First, by targeting civilians that are believed to be potential supporters of the other side, conflict actors try to secure territorial control, which in turn gives them bargaining leverage. Second, actors target civilians to signal their resolve and commitment to continued conflict, regardless of their capabilities of fighting. Five factors that affect conflict actors’ propensity for targeting civilians are suggested and tested using new data on direct and deliberate killings of civilians by all actors involved in an intrastate armed conflicts from 1992 to 2004. The results show that battlefield intensity is a strong predictor of violence, but at the same time actors are less likely to target civilians when the other party is already employing such a strategy. Moreover, governments tend to be more likely to target civilians when there is an external audience in the form of a third party present in the conflict.

17.

Hultman, Lisa

Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

This article develops a theoretical explanation for the seemingly indiscriminate violence used by Renamo during the civil war in Mozambique, a phenomenon which dominant theories on civil war violence cannot account for fully. The analysis builds on interviews with the Renamo leadership and Mozambican academics as well as secondary sources on the patterns of violence. It concludes that Renamo used mass violence to weaken the support for the government and create war fatigue. The main strategy was to cause enough damage to pressure the government into entering negotiations. The use of most violence against civilians in those areas where the population was believed to support the government, in combination with a clear objective to destabilise the government and a disciplined military organisation, support the argument that mass violence was employed to demonstrate ‘the power to hurt’.

Protection of civilians is now at the forefront of the responsibilities of the international community. There is a strong international norm that civilian populations should be protected from violence. But how committed is the United Nations to acting in line with this norm? I argue that the UN Security Council (UNSC) has an interest in demonstrating that it takes violence against civilians seriously. Through a broadened security agenda including human security, the legitimacy and the credibility of the UNSC hinges on its ability to act as a guarantor of civilian protection. As a consequence, the UN is more likely to deploy peace operations in conflicts where the warring parties target the civilian population. The argument is supported by a statistical examination of all internal armed conflicts in 1989-2006. The results show that the likelihood of a UN peace operation is higher in conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians, but this effect is mainly visible after 1999. This year marked a shift in the global security agenda and it was also when the UNSC first issued an explicit mandate to protect civilians. Conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians are also more likely to get operations with robust mandates. This suggests that the UNSC is not just paying lip service to the protection norm, but that it actually acts to implement it.

While United Nations peacekeeping missions were created to keep peace and perform post-conflict activities, since the end of the Cold War peacekeepers are more often deployed to active conflicts. Yet, we know little about their ability to manage ongoing violence. This article provides the first broad empirical examination of UN peacekeeping effectiveness in reducing battlefield violence in civil wars. We analyze how the number of UN peacekeeping personnel deployed influences the amount of battlefield deaths in all civil wars in Africa from 1992 to 2011. The analyses show that increasing numbers of armed military troops are associated with reduced battlefield deaths, while police and observers are not. Considering that the UN is often criticized for ineffectiveness, these results have important implications: if appropriately composed, UN peacekeeping missions reduce violent conflict.

How do the qualities of United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) influence the duration of peace after civil wars? Recent work shows that UN peacekeeping extends the duration of peace. However, this work has only been able to assess whether the presence or absence of UN missions affects post-conflict peace processes. Such analyses offer little in the way of policy prescriptions for planning and structuring PKOs to effectively pursue their goals. By employing fine-grained data on the personnel composition of PKOs, and generating expectations from rationalist bargaining models of civil war, we argue that the number and type of personnel deployed to a PKO influence the UN's ability guarantee peace by addressing the information and commitment problems that so often lead to the collapse of post-conflict peace. We analyze how the composition of missions influences the duration of peace, finding that, as the number of UN military troops deployed increases, the chance of civil war recurring decreases. However, other personnel types do not have the same effect. We conclude that the effectiveness of post-conflict peacekeeping lies in the ability of PKOs to alleviate commitment problems through the deployment of military troops that are able to defend the peace.

Does United Nations peacekeeping protect civilians in civil war? Civilian protection is a primary purpose of UN peacekeeping, yet there is little systematic evidence for whether peacekeeping prevents civilian deaths. We propose that UN peacekeeping can protect civilians if missions are adequately composed of military troops and police in large numbers. Using unique monthly data on the number and type of UN personnel contributed to peacekeeping operations, along with monthly data on civilian deaths from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa, we find that as the UN commits more military and police forces to a peacekeeping mission, fewer civilians are targeted with violence. The effect is substantialthe analyses show that, on average, deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings. We conclude that although the UN is often criticized for its failures, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection.

Several studies show a beneficial effect of peacekeeping operations (PKOs). However, by looking at individual effect pathways (intensity, duration, recurrence, diffusion) in isolation, they underestimate the peacekeeping impact of PKOs. We propose a novel method of evaluating the combined impact across all pathways based on a statistical model of the efficacy of UN PKOs in preventing the onset, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of internal armed conflict. We run a set of simulations based on the statistical estimates to assess the impact of alternative UN policies for the 2001-13 period. If the UN had invested US$200 billion in PKOs with strong mandates, major armed conflict would have been reduced by up to two-thirds relative to a scenario without PKOs and 150,000 lives would have been saved over the 13-year period compared to a no-PKO scenario. UN peacekeeping is clearly a cost-effective way of increasing global security.

Despite the frequent use of economic and military-specific sanctions against countries affected by civil conflicts, little is known about the possible impact that these coercive tools have on conflict dynamics. This article examines how threats and imposition of international sanctions affect the intensity of civil conflict violence. We formulate and test two competing views on the possible effect of economic and military-specific sanctions on conflict dynamics by combining data on fatalities in battle-related violence in all internal armed conflicts in Africa from 1989 to 2005 with data on economic sanctions and arms embargoes. The results indicate that threats of economic sanction and arms embargo are likely to increase the intensity of conflict violence. Similarly, imposed economic sanctions are likely to contribute to the escalation of conflict violence. Imposed arms embargoes, on the other hand, are likely to reduce conflict violence. We conclude that international sanctions appear to be counterproductive policy tools in mitigating the human cost of civil conflicts unless they are in the form of imposed arms embargoes attempting to limit the military capacity of the warring parties.

In some ethno-separatist wars, rebel groups direct a large share of violence against members of their own ethnic community. But why do rebels target the co-ethnics they claim to represent in the war against the government? Our aim in this paper is to provide the components for a conceptual framework that we assess using unique disaggregated casualty data on violence committed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against co-ethnic Tamils in territories claimed for the Tamil Eelam state in the early phase of the Sri Lankan conflict, 1985-88. We propose that there are two distinct processes of intraethnic violence: violence against co-ethnic civilians and violence against co-ethnic rivals. While the former aims at controlling the population to win the war against the government, the latter aims at establishing leadership dominance over the ethnic minority. We examine the role of ethnic homogeneity in shaping the use of violence directed against the two types of co-ethnic targets in the buildup phase of ethno-separatist war. We conclude that ethnic demographic structures matter for how the rebels treat co-ethnics in the early phase of war before they have established territorial control.

In some ethno-separatist wars, rebel groups direct a large share of violence against members of their own ethnic community. But why do rebels target the co-ethnics they claim to represent in the war against the government? Our aim in this paper is to provide the components for a conceptual framework that we assess using unique disaggregated casualty data on violence committed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against co-ethnic Tamils in territories claimed for the Tamil Eelam state in the early phase of the Sri Lankan conflict, 1985–88. We propose that there are two distinct processes of intraethnic violence: violence against co-ethnic civilians and violence against co-ethnic rivals. While the former aims at controlling the population to win the war against the government, the latter aims at establishing leadership dominance over the ethnic minority. We examine the role of ethnic homogeneity in shaping the use of violence directed against the two types of co-ethnic targets in the buildup phase of ethno-separatist war. We conclude that ethnic demographic structures matter for how the rebels treat co-ethnics in the early phase of war before they have established territorial control.