By Abdul Basit

Trump’s Victory and Future of US-Pakistan Relations

Brexit
shook Europe; Trump’s victory shocked the whole world. Perhaps, Trump’s 11/9 is
more baffling than OBL’s 9/11. He not only bludgeoned the 24/7 US media
punditry but also falsified the pre-electoral projections which termed Hillary
Clinton as the favorite candidate.

After
his victory, US’ friends and foes are equally worried about Tump’s future
course of action. During his election campaign, he has blown hot and cold
against his allies and opponents alike. For instance, he praised Russian
President Putin, US’ arch rival, for fighting Islamic radicalism and criticized
NATO, US’ closest ally, as a redundant organization that should be disbanded.

In
Pakistan, Trump’s victory has evoked mixed responses about the possible impact
of his presidency on US-Pakistan relations. Presently, Islamabad features quite
low on Washington’s priority list.

Before
getting to that, one thing less surprising about Trump’s victory is the
consolidation of right-wing votes in the West. Traditional-realism and
native-nationalism are on the upsurge in the West, while neo-liberal values and
institutions are on the decline. The West, as we know it, is changing rapidly.
Will the upsurge of realism and the revival of ultra-nationalism continue? The
upcoming elections in France, Germany and the Netherlands will be key
determinants of this trend or its reversal.

What
does Trump’s victory mean for Pakistan? Will the coldness in US-Pakistan ties
increase further or will they remain at their current level? More importantly,
what are the benchmarks to evaluate Trump’s future policies? His election
campaign rhetoric, his post-election appointments, and the inaugural-speech he
is going to make in January. Probably, these factors will combine to shape his
future policies.

In
Washington, Trump is considered an outsider to the system. Foreign policy is
not his strong area. He has no knowledge about the diplomatic complexities and
the bureaucratic intricacies of foreign affairs. His election agenda focused
heavily on internal policies; therefore, his immediate focus will be domestic.

Political
rhetoric is one thing, the reality of running the office is quite another. After
briefings from the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA, and other key
institutions, Trump’s pre-electoral rhetoric is likely to tone down.
Notwithstanding his promises, in retrospect, President Obama could not shut down
the Guantanamo Bay detention camp or withdraw American troops from Iraq and
Afghanistan. It remains to be seen how much space the US system will afford
Trump to translate his election agenda into policies.

Under
President Trump, the low-key US-Pakistan relations are likely to continue
without facing any immediate rupture or downgrade. However, the ties will
remain trouble-prone and bumpy. Since 2011, Pakistan’s importance as a key US
ally has lessened following the killing of Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in a US
Navy Seal operation in Abbottabad. One measure of that is no visit to the US was
made by the former Pakistani army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani in his
second extension (2011-13) while only one trip was made by the incumbent
military chief General Raheel Shareef in 2015.

There is a bipartisan consensus in Washington on South
Asia that is tilted in favor of India and which keeps separate and
de-hyphenated engagements with Pakistan.

Notwithstanding
Trump’s victory, US-Pakistan ties are already very cold and cannot sink any further.
Washington and Islamabad do not look toward each other favorably. In future,
Pakistan will not be very keen to depend on the US for military and economic
assistance. Pakistan has already bid farewell to the IMF programme this year.
Since the onset of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Beijing has replaced
Washington as Islamabad’s major strategic, economic, and diplomatic partner.

The US
has already left Pakistan out of the Afghan peace process by droning the former
Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansoor in Balochistan and scuttling the Pakistan-initiated
QCG-process. The Coalition Support Funds, which have been earmarked for
counter-terrorism cooperation since 9/11, elapsed last year. Future US military
and economic aid to Pakistan has been slashed and made conditional on
certification.

Pakistan
will continue to be a distant US partner and a troubled ally. Under Trump, the
framework of US-Pakistan ties will remain transactional and security-centric.
It will revolve around counter-terrorism, the peace process in Afghanistan, and
nuclear non-proliferation. The “do more” demands from the Trump-led White House
and the Republican-dominated Congress will become a routine occurrence. The Pentagon
will have a greater say in determining future US policies toward Pakistan.

Generally,
the US will deal with India and Pakistan separately while formulating its
policies for South Asia. Keeping long-term US strategic interests in focus,
India will feature quite high on the American priority list due to their commonality
of goals and interests in defeating terrorism, containing China, and enhancing
economic ties. The US is already helping India become a member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, supporting its stance on Kashmir, and favoring the Indian bid for
permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.

The
Trump administration will certainly turn the heat on Pakistan to expedite the
slow-moving Mumbai trial case and bring it to its logical conclusion.
Similarly, the pressure to act against the India-focused militant groups like
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad will increase. Likewise, demands to
dismantle Taliban sanctuaries on Pakistani soil will also escalate.

The
immediate negative fallout of Trump’s polices on US-Pakistan relations will be
indirect. For instance, his Middle East policy could result in a reduction in remittances
as well as layoffs of Pakistani workers in the Gulf States. Similarly, his
stringent visa policy towards Muslim countries is likely to affect Pakistan as
well. Moreover, if high tariff barriers are instituted it could negatively
affect Pakistani exports to the US.

Presently,
there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington on South Asia that is tilted in
favor of India and which keeps separate and de-hyphenated engagements with
Pakistan. Pakistan would do well to work with the US in areas where their interests
converge and have frank talks on issues of divergence to articulate its
reservations instead of making false promises.