THE UNIVERSITY TEACHERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JAFFNA (UTHR(Jaffna))
Sri Lanka

Information Bulletin No. 18

Date of Release : 8th July 1998

THE DRIFT IN JAFFNA:
THE URGENCY OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT & THE IMPORTANCE OF
LARRY WIJERATNE'S LEGACY.

Brigadier Larry Wijeratne's Legacy

The most remarkable event in the whole war is surely the manner in which
the Vadamaratchy sector remained in two years of military control what
an
outsider described as 'a breath of fresh air' in the entire war-torn
North-East. Of course there were confrontations, search operations and
some
army misbehaviour as was to be expected. But the people remained
confident
under their brigade commander Larry Wijeratne, that their interests,
their
dignity, and their well-being would receive greater consideration than
any
short-term advantage to the Army. People said very enthusiastically that
'as long as Wijeratne is here, we have nothing to worry about'. To
Wijeratne himself this involved hard work and several risks. He
frequently
went out, conferred with people, tried to help out with their problems,
and
kept himself abreast of what was going on in his brigade division from
not
just a military man's angle, but also from a human perspective. Even
militarily he took calculated risks in the interest of winning the
support
of the people. He made a case for handling the situation in a humane
manner
and stopped the Special Forces Brigade, who were reputed to be ruffians,
functioning in his area. He had minors released who were caught helping
the
LTTE. On his own initiative he initiated schemes to help youth who
showed
themselves capable in studies and also arranged programmes for the youth
of
Vadamaratchy to interact with youth from the South. All this paid
military
dividends too, but that is a different story.

Although a prime target, the LTTE could not get him while he was alert
on
active duty. The people were confident that if there was any problem,
they
could go direct to him. The LTTE tried spreading rumours to discredit
him,
such as the blatant lie of his involvement in the Kokkadichcholai
massacre
of June 1991 [Our Report No.8]. About a month before he was killed, the
LTTE's overseas networks were full of a story of a woman being raped by
soldiers in Vadamaratchy, and her sister who went to complain being
burnt
along with a shop. The story was without substance.

The LTTE were able to get him on 14th May, when he had ceased to be on
active duty, while attending farewell functions hosted by the people and
his guard was down. The LTTE was initially annoyed that the Pt.Pedro
traders' association were giving him a farewell lunch. It is conceivable
that they later stopped interfering and merely monitored the
arrangements
to set a trap.

When he returned from the lunch a large group of people were waiting to
meet him a short distance from the camp. One lady for example was a
widow
whose son had been helped with educational arrangements by the
brigadier.
As he passed this group, he exchanged greetings. The vehicle then turned
from the town square into the road leading to the camp when an explosion
was heard. The suicide bomber was said to be a youth of about 21 who was
loitering about that area in a rain coat - it being a rainy day - and
was
not taken much notice of. Many civilians through sheer grief rushed to
the
area, which was about the entrance to the camp. Finally a soldier had to
slap a civilian to clear the place for an army survey team from Palaly.

A particular significance of the event should not be missed. This was
the
first time since the breakdown of communal relations that the death of a
Sinhalese soldier had been so deeply and spontaneously mourned by the
Tamil
population. Instead of recognising the momentousness of Larry
Wijeratne's
Legacy, some in the Army started talking and behaving as though the
people
were responsible for the murder, which was absolute nonsense. As
subsequent
events indicated, the threat to this valuable legacy was very real.

Dismantling the legacy

Colonel Sarath Karunaratne, Brigadier Wijeratne's replacement had two
meetings with a cross-section of Pt.Pedro's citizenry later in May. He
spoke only for 5 minutes at each meeting. He said, "I overheard someone
saying that they were checked three times. You will not be checked three
times, but ten times". What he then said was darkly threatening: "If you
want to be safe, you must make sure the Army is safe. I have told my
son,
if someone hits you, you must hit back. The soldiers under me are like
my
sons to me". Someone later got up at the meeting and praised Larry
Wijeratne. Karunaratne responded, "I was not born to Wijeratne's
father!".

He then proceeded to inform the civilians that he would, unlike
Wijeratne,
not be meeting civilians. He said that he had nominated three captains
at
three locations with full powers to take decisions on civilian affairs.
No
one should come to him, he said, and if it is necessary to see him, one
of
the captains would fix an appointment.

The new commander's message brought dismay as the news quickly spread
that
he had threatened reprisals. It affected civilian morale throughout
Jaffna
and rendered the Army more isolated.

It is incomprehensible how the Government blundered here by sending a
man
with a record for harshness in the Trincomalee District, with no
understanding of what had been achieved in an area and needed to be
preserved, to further the Government's stated political goals. His
appointment is an insult to Larry Wijeratne.

The language used by Karunaratne is the language of an alien and brutal
army of occupation. It is the language of a Rip van Winkle waking up
after
a long slumber from the 80s not knowing what such attitudes had cost the
country. In the situation of persons from the political establishment of
any standing never visiting the area, the military commander also
becomes
in effect the representative of the President, his commander-in-chief.
Such
language, also, in the context, had communal overtones even if not
intended. It is an indication of the extent to which the Government has
lost its bearings in its handling of the problem.

In Vadamaratchy itself no notable violations have taken place to date
under
Karunaratne. There was a rumour of a rape in Yakkarai and of two dead
bodies being sited at Nelliady. As far as we were able to check, these
rumours are without substance. But again under the present dispensation
a
cover-up would be much easier. A complainant can go only as far as the
local captain or major. Only at their discretion can the complainant go
higher. Earlier, the smallest person had the confidence of being able to
go
straight to Wijeratne. It would make it easier now to intimidate
complainants and suppress reports of misdemeanor.

There are frequent cordon and search operations and persons are taken to
Polikandy camp for questioning and are sometimes released in the night
with
passes to go home. There have so far been no reports of beating or
mistreatment. We also do not know how many, if any, have continued in
detention. There are frequent check points along the Jaffna Road, which
strike people as punitive rather than rational. For example, at Puloly
check point soldiers recheck those they have seen being checked at
Saraiady, 250 yards away. Earlier movement within Vadamaratchy was
unhampered by check-points compared with the rest of Jaffna. Today's
situation is the reverse. People generally travel through lanes avoiding
the main roads.

The most significant difference is the change of psychology. People,
especially those with children, have been applying for permission to fly
to
Colombo with the intention of going for good - from Colombo to India and
then to the West with the help of relatives. Others have been looking
for
houses in Jaffna town. Those who were earlier happy to visit
Vadamaratchy
are now reluctant. After what the new commander spoke, there is fear
that
the LTTE may try some major provocation in the hope of large-scale
reprisals. Most people clearly remember how the situation became
intolerably worse after the Indian Army went on a course of reprisals
from
June 1988. Then even small boys started signalling the LTTE on the
Indian
Army's movements, making life difficult for them. Some do not learn.

Effects on Jaffna peninsula as a whole

The situation under the Army outwardly looked fairly stable until the
LTTE
killed Larry Wijeratne and the Jaffna Mayor Sarojini Yogeswaran in quick
succession [May 14th & 17th]. Around Jaffna town and in Thenmaratchy
LTTE
infiltrators have followed up with provocations in an attempt to
unsettle
the Army. New infiltration on a larger scale was facilitated by thinning
down troop numbers, moving seasoned soldiers who were quite competently
able to maintain order for offensive operations in Killinochchi, and
replacing some of them with re-inducted deserters. Known LTTE spies in
Jaffna have also been seen to be more active. With the civilian
population
scared and unnerved by the two murders, the LTTE moved to try to rebuild
its network and reassert its control through terror. Thooyavan, the LTTE
leader in Pungudutivu, wanted Namasivayam, Secretary to the traders'
association to collect several crores of rupees from the traders
[Namasivayam was later killed by the LTTE].

The situation would have remained more promising if the Army had kept
its
balance. In 1996 people were praising the Army for ensuring the safety
of
civilians before responding to the LTTE's calculated provocations, such
as
throwing bombs or shooting at the Army in crowded places. As a general
rule
the civilians too were confident that there would be no reprisals. One
cannot say that the general rule prevails today. There are too many
exceptions where civilians have been beaten up or worse. When the Army
tries to cover up, which is inexplicable after all this experience, its
credibility is dangerously eroded. For the first time in more than two
years there have been reports of recruitment by the LTTE in Jaffna, even
if
the numbers are small. We take one incident which illustrates how things
can go wrong.

30th May 1998: Incident at Gurunagar

About 6.30 PM, two women tiger infiltrators cycled towards the Graveyard
junction sentry point and shot dead two soldiers. The soldiers then went
on
a rampage, according to local sources, assaulting 'infants, men and
women'.
These are the indisputable facts. There were two statements issued on
the
incident by the Army HQ in Palaly, on 31st May and 2nd June. The first
of
these statements says that the Army returned fire in the direction in
which
the Tigresses were escaping and that 5 civilians were injured by the
explosion of 3 grenades thrown by one of the attackers.

The second statement also mentioned the grenades thrown, but later gives
the names of 4 injured civilians whom it claims were injured during
cross-fire (Uthayan 3.6.98). This would suggest that they were injured
when
the Army opened fire without being too particular about who was going to
get hit. A fifth girl who was injured, Thanarajah Suganthy, was admitted
to
hospital by a man [named Victor], says the statement, was found to be a
confirmed Tigress. A search of her home in the Thiddy area (formerly
occupied by conservancy labourers) is said to have produced a pistol,
grenades and other accessories. The man is also under arrest. The day
after
the incident, Brigadier Mendis, the Town commandant, met the civilians
at
St. Thomas' Church and apologised for the Army's behaviour.

Yet, a most tragic aspect of the incident is being covered up with scant
regard for consistency or accountability. This is the fate of the 19
year
old girl Thevathas Jethina (Subajini) of Passayoor. The first statement
from the Army Command (31.5.98) claims that when the Army searched the
area
after the incident, a Tigress tried to escape and the Army opened fire,
and
subsequently recovered her body. The reference is no doubt to Subajini
as
she was the only civilian killed in the incident.

The second statement mentions Subajini by name, but tells a different
story: ".... [Subajini] got into an auto (three-wheeled cab) and tried
to
get away from the search party. A civilian who recognised her as a
member
of the LTTE informed the troops, who then arrested her. During her
interrogation, she tried to grab the weapon of a soldier. When the
concerned soldier shot the maiden, she expired".

Any intelligent person would detect several absurdities in the second
story
taken by itself, and the two taken together are without any credibility.

The truth is that the girl from Passayoor went to visit her married
sister
living near the water-tank in Gurunagar. Her brother-in-law was taking
her
back home on the bicycle when they were stopped by soldiers at the
Graveyard junction at 7.00 PM (half an hour after the incident).
Mariyathas, the brother-in-law, was beaten and chased away, while
Subajini
was detained. The following morning Mariyathas who went to the hospital,
apparently to get himself treated, was told of a female corpse in the
mortuary and identified the corpse as Subajini's. The Army wanted her
mother to certify her daughter as having been a Tigress before taking
the
body. She refused and later received the body after the magistrate's
order.

Another circumstance further highlights the Army's gross insensitivity
and
indifference to the truth. Subajini's father and brother, when the LTTE
was
in control, had been arrested and done away with, for having been
supporters of the EPRLF. It appears that to the high command in Palaly,
when it comes to covering up, any old story would do, even if it means
different stories at different times.

There are several more reports of death and injury which need to be
investigated and reported by groups functioning locally. Why this is not
happening has nothing to do with the Army - it is a home-bred paralysis.
The Human Rights Commission has so far not made any visible impact. The
LTTE too is using the poorest sections of the population - many of them
returned from the Vanni - to bring about destabilisation. In our Special
Report of April, we draw particular attention to the alienation of
coastal
folk. The Army carries on regardless.

The fact that the Army Commander in Vadamaratchy can threaten reprisals
and
the command in Palaly could issue nonsensical statements and pretend
that
things would get back to normal, suggests that there is a very dangerous
drift.

Failure of Rehabilitation and Militarisation

The most immediately worst affected in the present drift are the
communities that had been traditionally oppressed and are at present
without economic means. One of the girls in the pistol gang involved in
the
Gurunagar incident appears to have come from Thiddy, an area of the kind
referred to. Almost unnoticed by the outside world, baneful tendencies
are
taking root. A year ago [Jaffna Survey, Bulletin No.14] we quoted an
observation by one familiar with the Gurunagar area that vice and
illicit
liquor which substitute for a livelihood, will eventually drive the Army
which is tasked with maintaining security there, to go to pieces along
with
the community itself. There is a very urgent task of rehabilitation here
that has not been addressed. Bureaucrats functioning from Colombo do not
even seem to appreciate the urgency. An order from Colombo has now gone
out
to significantly cut the number of those receiving dry rations. This
would
have been justified if there had been a commensurate improvement in the
economic base. The reality is quite different.

Mine-clearing which should have begun two years ago is only beginning
now.
Many lands which provided work for the depressed folk cannot be worked
because of mines, the Army's bunds running through them, or because the
owners do not want to invest capital amidst political uncertainty. For
the
large fishing population, restrictions and undisciplined attacks by the
Navy being as they are, things remain bad. In the case of the Vanni
returnees, again a large section of the population, after deprivation
and
continual illness, many of the breadwinners are unable to do much
physical
labour. For two years now hardly anything has been done to revive
economic
activity among these groups.

We have in the meantime received reports of the EPDP recruiting in
deprived
areas. Several of these areas can be identified around Jaffna. In
Pt.Pedro
for example there are three areas occupied by descendants of conservancy
labourers - in 3rd Cross Street, Punithanagar east of Katkovalam and
near
Manthikai Hospital. The EPDP has recruited about 4 persons in the latter
area and some from Santha Thottam, an area occupied by a toddy tapping
community in Puloly East. In a particular area, EPDP cadre walked into
the
village and asked some young men of about 18 years to come with them. In
the EPDP office they were promised a salary and dry rations for their
family if they joined. A mother anxious to get her son out said that the
manner in which it was carried out hardly gave the son an option. In
another case the recruit is said to receive a monthly salary of about
Rs.4000/=, but it is deemed too risky for him to come home. The LTTE too
has long fished in such areas. The delays in genuine rehabilitation and
a
political solution are thus driving these oppressed communities towards
further violence and misery.

It is hard to see how the Government's patronage of certain groups with
several faces, as MPs, security operators with blood on their hands,
extortioners, and collectors of illegitimate taxes in certain areas, can
offer the people a healthy political direction. The most questionable of
these activities have the connivance of the security forces.

A Case of Political Neglect

The main fault, as many observers in Jaffna see it, and as we see it,
lies
with leaving an Army cooling its heels in Jaffna without any serious
political task to co-ordinate with. With the political package having
lost
its momentum there is no linkage between what goes on in the highest
political circles in Colombo and the needs of the North-East.
Disagreements
among the major parties on the political solution, puerile skirmishing
about snap presidential elections, and the present Government's
dilly-dallying, have very unhealthy repercussions in the North-East.
People
began to wonder if there will ever be continuity of policy in Colombo.

Lessons need to be learnt quickly from what has been going on in Jaffna.
The local council elections in January stirred up enthusiasm because the
people believed that the Government was serious about a revival of
political activity through reconstruction and that this would also help
them to assert themselves. Then there were severe shortcomings in fund
allocation and Mrs.Yogeswaran was left too isolated a target, which
enabled
the LTTE to dampen all hope by shooting one individual. On the other
hand a
strictly followed time table for devolution would have had its own
impact
on revival of political activity which the LTTE would have found
difficult
to confront. The present manner of drift and the loss of faith in the
continuity of government policy would also dampen the commitment of army
officers who want to see something constructive achieved. Today, it is
like
asking these officers to plod on, feeling cynical about the Government
and
with an end nowhere in sight. The conduct of the Army from April to June
1996 reflected an admirable sense of purpose. Now that is mostly gone.

What has amounted to an almost total bar on ministerial visits to Jaffna
has also been largely instrumental in the loss of any sense of urgency.
The
security services have had enough experience in VIP security over the
last
5 years and providing security in Jaffna is no more demanding than in
Colombo. Larry Wijeratne's death was largely avoidable. With the loss of
attention, the rehabilitation exercise is out of joint. The body created
for this purpose by the President, the RRAN, had very little, if any,
input
from local experts who would have been happy to contribute. It was
largely
a UNDP funded bureaucratic exercise from Colombo that has so far made no
significant impact.

If there was political will to go ahead with devolution, much more could
have been accomplished, bringing further political dividends. The
present
approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction may turn out to be an
exercise in shutting the stable door after the horse had bolted.

The speech of the new Pt.Pedro brigade commander referred to is again a
reflection of the absence of any serious thinking on what such a person
should do in a very sensitive political environment. This should not be
left to the whims of individual officers. The kind of cover up we have
referred to in the Gurunagar incident points to the near absence of
checks.
The arrangements proposed by the new commander in Pt.Pedro are
unprecedented. Entrusting authority to local captains or majors with no
appeal to higher authority will no doubt encourage corruption and abuse.

The Government needs to do something quickly to reassure the people of
Jaffna, and particularly the people of Vadamaratchy that the high
standards
set by Brigadier Larry Wijeratne will be maintained. The judgment in the
Krishanthy Kumarasamy rape and murder trail, where the convicted
received
maximum sentences, is a welcome one. One of those convicted alleged in
court that a large number of the bodies of those who disappeared in 1996
are buried in the same location. To give substance to the President's
pledge to probe the disappearances impartially, it would be more
immediately meaningful to appoint an independent body to go into the
allegations made by the convicted man. There is good reason to believe
that
there is truth in what the convicted man said.

It must also be kept in mind that the only rationale for deploying the
Army
on the streets today, is to hasten the day there will be no need for it
in
maintaining order. Only then can there be a real settlement of the
problem
- that is when the people have the democratic space to assert their
dignity. It is a task calling for political wisdom. This task also calls
for much more serious reflection in the South, particularly among the
intelligentsia and the press. As long as there is a strong inclination
to
treat devolution as unnecessary, and the problem as one of law and order
concerning a congenitally recalcitrant people, it would also sustain the
dangerous illusion among a significant section of Tamils, that as much
as
they dislike its ways, it is only the LTTE that can extract a solution
from
a government in Colombo.