Sison / Juris Doctor 2-B / Special Issues in International Law (SIIL) /

I. CASE TITLE: SS LOTUS CASE

II. PARTIES: FRANCE AND TURKEY

IV. FORUM: Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)

V. DATE OF DECISION:September 7, 1927

VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On August 2 1926, a collision occurred on the high seas between the French mail steamer Lotus, proceeding to Constantinople, and the Turkish collier, Boz Kourt. The Boz Kourt sank and eight Turkish nationals perished. When, Lotus arrived in Constantinople, the Turkish authorities proceeded to hold an enquiry into the collision. They instituted joint criminal proceedings in accordance with the Turkish law against the captain of the Boz Kourt, and the officer on watch on board the Lotus at the time of the collision, Lieutenant Demons, a French citizen, on a charge of manslaughter.

The Criminal Court of Istanbul sentenced Demons to 80 days of imprisonment

and a fine. The proceedings had been instituted in pursuance of Turkish legislation. According, to the French Government, the Criminal Court claimed jurisdiction under Article 6 of the Turkish Penal Code. The French government protested, demanding the release of Demons or the transfer of his case to the French Courts. Turkey and France agreed to refer this dispute on the jurisdiction to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).

VII. ISSUE:

Whether or Not Turkey violate international law when Turkish courts exercised jurisdiction over a crime committed by a French national, outside Turkey? If yes, should Turkey pay compensation to France?

VIII. DECISION:

NO. Turkey, by instituting criminal proceedings against Demons, did not violate international law.

The Court found that the French contention that Turkey, in order to have Jurisdiction, should be able to point to some title of jurisdiction recognized by International law was opposed to generally accepted International law, as referred to by Article 15. It stated that the first restriction imposed by International law upon a state was that it could not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state. However, this did not imply that International law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory in respect of any case that relates acts that have taken place abroad and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of International law.

The Court found that Turkish Jurisdiction was justifiable not because of the nationality of the victims but because the effects of the offence were produced on a Turkish ship, and consequently, in a place assimilated to Turkish territory in which the application of Turkish criminal law cannot be challenged. Once it was admitted that the effects of the offence were produced on the Turkish Vessel, it became impossible to hold that there was a rule of international law that prohibited Turkey from prosecuting Lieutenant Demons simply because the author of the offence was on board the French Ship.

III. TOPIC: International Law; Jurisdiction of Collector of Customs

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Revenue cutter Arayat sighted a Japanese fishing boat named the Hosho Maru, anchored a short distance away from Salomague Island, a small island off the cost of Northern Luzon. A boarding party was put aboard the fishing vessel and found seven bags of rice, three sharks, three tunas, and three trays of bait, with fishing tackle but no articles of commerce or passengers. Upon a report being made to the Insular Collector of Customs, that official directed the seizure of the Hosho Maru and, after administrative proceedings, decreed the forfeiture of the vessel and directed its sale at public auction for the benefit of the Government, due to the violation of customs and quarantine laws and regulations. The captain appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila, where additional evidence was taken. That court held that the Hosho Maru took refuge in Philippine waters on account of stress of weather, that the Hosho Maru was not engaged in the importation of merchandise in any Philippine port, and that nothing had been found indicating that the fishing vessel unlawfully violated any customs or quarantine law or regulation. Therefore the order of confiscation and forfeiture was reversed and the vessel ordered returned to its owner, with costs against the Insular Collector of Customs. The Solicitor-General brings this appeal and asks this court to reverse the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila and affirm the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs. V. ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Collector of Customs has authority to order the forfeiture of the vessel.

VI. DECISION:

NO. The Collector of Customs has no authority to order the forfeiture of the vessel. Our attention has not been called to any statute authorizing the Collector of Customs to order the forfeiture of this boat. Both in England and in the United States confiscation of a vessel for violation of a customs law cannot be had administratively but only by court proceedings. Section 1363 of the Administrative Code provides for the forfeiture of vessels engaged in certain specified illegal actions, none which apply in this case. It therefore must be held that the Collector of Customs was without authority to order the forfeiture of the vessel. In this kind of appeal the lower court had the right to take additional evidence and is not limited to the administrative record as in cases of immigration and deportation of aliens. The rule in this kind of case is correctly set forth in Smith, Bell & Co vs. Collector of Customs (37 Phil., 87). The right of asylum from stress of weather is a right well recognized by international law and is in accordance with the dictates of Christianity. The only limitation is that the weather must be such as to create an honest belief in the mind of a skillful and firm mariner. As the Solicitor-General is unable to point out the specific law or regulation that he claims the Hosho Maru violated, further proceedings are deemed unnecessary. The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed with the modification that costs in both instances will be de oficio.

II. FULL TITLE: WENEFREDO CALME, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

III. TOPIC: Jurisdiction; Vessel in transit

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Petitioner Calme and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly throwing him overboard the M/V Cebu City, an interisland passenger ship owned and operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12 May 1991.Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta RTCs jurisdiction over the offense charged through a motion to quash which, however, was denied by Judge Celso Conol of RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta City. Petitioner Calmes petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied due course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated 10 December 1993. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied in the Court of Appeals resolution of 14 July 1994. Hence this present appeal.

V. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner

VI. DECISION:

YES. The Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The exact location where the alleged offense was committed was not duly established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. In transit simply means on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the course of transportation, hence, undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which provides that where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(G.R. No. L-35385; January 31, 1983)

III. TOPIC: International Law; Jurisdiction

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The crew of a Q-boat of the Philippine Coast Guard spotted a vessel, the M/V Lucky Star I, owned by the private respondent Lucky Star Shipping Co., unloading cargo to several small watercrafts alongside the vessel off the coast of Zambales approximately thirty (30) nautical miles east of Scarborough Shoal or twenty-three (23) miles east of the International Treaty Limits. As the Q-boat was approaching the M/V Lucky Star I, it was met by gunfire from the smaller watercrafts which immediately fled from the scene. Only the M/V Lucky Star I was apprehended. Upon boarding the vessel, the Philippine Coast Guard officers discovered 3,400 cases of foreign made "Champion, menthol, filter-tipped, king-size cigarettes" allegedly owned by Teng Bee Enterprises Co. (HK) Ltd., co-respondent herein. The captain of the Lucky Star I, Li Tak Sin, was not able to present documents or papers for the "Champion" cigarettes. He and the crew were arrested for smuggling. The boarding officers also seized the Lucky Star I and ordered its complement. A warrant of seizure and detention was issued by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Sual-Dagupan against the vessel and articles seized for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code as to the vessel and as to the cigarettes. The Acting Provincial Fiscal filed before the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch II, an information against Li Tak Sin, the crew of Lucky Star I, and other persons. Meanwhile, the private respondents Lucky Star Shipping Company and Teng Bee Enterprises Company (HK) Ltd. filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIV, presided over by respondent judge, the Hon. Jesus de Veyra. a complaint for injunction and recovery of personal property against the petitioners praying for the return of the goods seized and the release of the M/V Lucky Star I. The respondent judge issued an order declaring itself without jurisdiction over the petition for mandatory preliminary injunction. The petitioners asked for a reconsideration of the aforequoted order. However, the respondent judge denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Alfredo de la Fuente, in his capacity as Collector of Customs.

V. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by the private respondents for the release of the vessel M/V Lucky Star I, which is the subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of the port of Sual-Dagupan.

NO. It is well-settled that the exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a Court of First Instance from assuming cognizance over such cases. We, therefore, set aside the assailed orders of the respondent judge. The contentions of the private respondents are untenable. The Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal expressly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of such proceedings without any interference from the Court of First Instance. The Collector of Customs of Sual-Dagupan in Seizure Identification No. 14-F-72 constituted itself as a tribunal to hear and determine among other things, the question of whether or not the M/V Lucky Star I was seized within the territorial waters of the Philippines. If the private respondents believe that the seizure was made outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, it should raise the same as a defense before the Collector of Customs and if not satisfied, follow the correct appellate procedures. A separate action before the Court of First Instance is not the remedy.

I. SHORT TITLE: US VERSUS LOOK CHAW

II. FULL TITLE: THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LOOK

III. TOPIC: Criminal Jurisdiction prevails in the absence of an

agreement under International treaty.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu, to inspect and search its cargo where they found 2 sacks of opium. 2 charges were then filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu: (1) unlawful possession of opium and (2) unlawful sale of opium. Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The court sentenced him to 5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government. Hence, this present appeal.

V. ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

VI. DECISION:

YES. although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

I. CASE TITLE: THE IM ALONE CASE

II. PARTIES: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

III. TOPIC: Hot Pursuit on the High seas

IV. FORUM: Appointment of two commissioners under Article IV of the

Liquour Convention of January 23, 1924 between the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

V. DATE OF DECISION:January 5, 1935

VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The Im Alone, a British ship of Canadian registry controlled and managed by

United States citizens was sunk by gunfire from a US Coast guard vessel at a point on the high seas more than 200 miles from the coast of the United States. It was alleged that the ship was used in smuggling alcoholic liquor into the United States. At that time, it was illegal to smuggle alcohol. It was ordered to stop for inspection at a point outside the U.S territorial waters but declined. This led to a pursuit of the ship by a vessel, Wolcott and after two days of pursuit it was joined by the coast guard vessel, Dexter, which eventually sunk the Im Alone. This resulted to death of one person and the rest of the crew was rescued.

The above actions led to diplomatic row between the US and Canada. Canada claimed that sinking the ship was illegal and not justified according to the Convention between The United States Of America and Great Britain to Aid in The Prevention of The Smuggling Of Intoxicating Liquors Into The United States. The dispute between the parties was subsequently submitted to a commission prescribed then by article 4 of that convention.

While the U.S claimed that their actions were justified pursuant to the Anglo- American Convention signed by the US and Britain and Britain could raise no objection since it was within the one hour steaming zone designated by the convention; Canada contended that the convention did not confer any right of hot pursuit even within the conventional limit.

VII. ISSUE:

Whether or Not the US Government under the convention has the right of Hot Pursuit where the offending vessel is within an hours sailing distance of the shore at the commencement of the hot pursuit and beyond that distance at its termination.

VIII. DECISION:

NO. The Commissioners said that the United States might, consistently with the Convention, use necessary and reasonable force for the purpose of effecting the objects of boarding, searching, seizing and bringing into port the suspected vessel; and if sinking should occur accidentally, as the result of the exercise of necessary and reasonable force for such purpose, the pursuing vessel might be entirely blameless. The commissioners considered that the sinking of the vessel was not justified by anything in the convention nor in any principle of International law. The Commissioners also recommended that the United States ought formally to acknowledge its illegality and to apologize to his Majestys Canadian Government, therefore, and further, that as a material in respect of the wrong, the United States should pay the sum of $25,000 to his Majestys Canadian Government.

Right to hot pursuit is highly appreciated. However, this right is subject to

reservations. The first is that the pursuing country must pay due regard to the equality of states principle that is contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Also, the ship may only pursue the foreign ship to a distance of 12 nautical miles from its territory. It is also required that the pursuit may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if it has been continuous and not interrupted. An order to stop must have been given to the vessel before being pursued and it has defied. Another condition is that the pursuit may only be exercised by warships, military aircraft or ships or aircraft clearly marked as being on governmental service, that is, marine police officers. Finally, once the ship enters its territorial waters or those of another state, the pursuit must stop. [1] This is aimed at observing the principle of territorial sovereignty.[2] However, foreign states may be allowed to conduct hot pursuit through territorial waters if certain conditions are met, for example, when the hot pursuit continues uninterrupted.