Details of Thesis

Title

Platonic Prophecy and the Possibility of Philosophy

Author

Weierter, Stuart

Institution

Australian Catholic University

Date

2010

Abstract

In this thesis I
explore the question of the possibility of philosophy. Initially I frame
this question in response to Aristophanes’ portrayal of Socrates in his
Clouds. According to Aristophanes, Socrates’ philosophical way of life
is comedic, in so far as he is unable to distinguish the serious from
the trivial. It is also dangerous, because in placing the serious and
the trivial on the same foundation, Socrates liberates what was bound by
way of traditional practice. Philosophy, according to Aristophanes’
accusation, is ignorant of everyday life, for it is concerned with the
theoretical and insubstantial. The question of the possibility of
philosophy is, I argue, central to how Plato might be understood. If
philosophy is nothing more than culture and history, if it is really
nothing, then Plato’s dialogues might only be read as historical
fiction. I will argue that to read Plato with this assumption is to
anachronistically limit what can be known by way of philosophical
practice. Consequently, I argue that we must approach Plato in the
spirit in which he writes, in so doing giving up on those assumptions
which might preclude us from understanding philosophy as a way of life.
Having thus outlined my interpretive credo, and opened up the debate
around traditional practice and philosophical theory, I move on to
examine the foundation of the religious tradition – divine wisdom.
Bringing divine wisdom back from the past into the present is the
religious prophet who, along with the philosopher, seeks to live not
just according to tradition, but according to truth. An examination of
the religious prophet is also, therefore, an examination of the limits
of philosophy. With an interpretation of Plato’s Euthyphro I show that
the foundational speech of the religious prophet – Euthyphro – is rooted
in his distorted philosophical desire; a desire sated in eternity only
with the perversion of history. In all, Plato shows that it is a lack of
self‐knowledge, brought about a pious devotion to history, which
separates the prophet from the philosopher. Turning to Plato’s Phaedo I
explore Plato’s understanding of the possibility of philosophy. In this
dialogue Socrates, on the day he is to be put to death, tells his
friends that philosophy is a practice for dying. He fears not his own
death, he says, for the soul is immortal. Philosophy, it would seem, is
founded on prophecy. In the Phaedo we come to see the nature of this
prophetic insight. In the first half of the dialogue Socrates introduces
death as in a cycle with life and argues, from this position, of the
ongoing existence of the soul. Yet, as I will show, in making the soul
immortal Socrates denies death and thereby calls into question the
practice of philosophy. After disagreements from his friends he
approaches the question of the soul’s immortality from within the
circumference of his own life. From here, death does have significance.
Death, we come to see, both defines our temporality and is the path
through which we approach eternity. Philosophy is possible, according to
my interpretation of Plato, because our soul attains itself through the
intelligibility of the lifeless things‐in‐themselves, such
intelligibility itself providing the foundation to our own existence – a
foundation inaccessible to philosophical analysis.