II. Summary

-Interview with a man
from the village of Tore, Central Equatoria, Lumuke, who fled his village after
it was attacked by a group of bandits and renegade soldiers, April 2008.

Nearly four years after
the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that brought an end to
21 years of civil war, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has made limited
progress in addressing impunity and establishing the rule of law. Soldiers and
other security forces that commit human rights violations and other crimes
against civilians are rarely brought to account. The nascent justice system
suffers from systemic weaknesses leading to arbitrary detentions, prolonged
pre-trial detentions, and very poor prison conditions.

The GoSS, created under
the terms of the CPA in 2005, is responsible for administering a severely
under-developed area nearly twice the size of France that has been shattered by
civil war. Given the sheer scale of its state-building and reconstruction
challenges, the GoSS has made significant progress, including by absorbing
dozens of formerly hostile militia into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).
But the fledgling government, dominated by the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) has not managed to protect civilians from crimes committed by
its security forces, and public disquiet over these abuses is growing.

Southern Sudan's
security landscape remains extremely fragile. In addition to threats emanating
from national political tensions or attacks by the Ugandan rebel group Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA), many southerners' security and livelihoods are affected
by localized communal fighting, often linked to competition over land,
livestock, or other resources. Large numbers of weapons remain in civilian
hands, turning many disputes violent and deadly. Soldiers and renegade soldiers
from the SPLA also contribute to insecurity with infighting or by crimes
against civilians for personal gain.

The Southern Sudan
Police Service (SSPS) lacks resources and training to effectively provide
security. In their absence, GoSS officials, who are almost all former military
themselves, turn to SPLA soldiers to manage security threats. The soldiers are
untrained in civilian law enforcement and often undisciplined. For example, a
policing operation carried out by SPLA soldiers in Eastern Equatoria in June
2008 spiraled out of control, leading to the deaths of at least 12 civilians,
arbitrary arrests, torture and the displacement of 4,000 people. Nine soldiers
also lost their lives.

Very weak rule of law
institutions and insufficient attention by GOSS authorities to rule of law
issues have given rise to an environment of impunity, particularly for soldiers
who view themselves as "liberators" of the South and above the law. In this
environment, soldiers and other security forces commit serious crimes, often
opportunistically, against civilians. The crimes include beatings, robbery,
intimidation, land-grabbing, and sexual violence. In a series of cases in
2007-8, security forces carried out illegal arrests, beatings, robbery, and
sexual violence targeting foreign traders in major towns.

In the broader context,
the two parties to the CPA (Government of Sudan and SPLA/M) remain seriously
behind schedule in implementing key aspects of the CPA. The CPA, which sets out
a series of national reforms aimed at democratic transformation in Sudan,
provides an interim six-year period that ends when southerners vote on
self-determination in 2011. To date, the parties have not agreed to a
demarcation of the North-South border, completed security arrangements, or made
significant progress in preparing for national elections scheduled for
mid-2009-a key milestone in the agreement.

As the window of
opportunity for implementation gets smaller, it is becoming more urgent than
ever that parties to the CPA adopt and advance the agreement's human rights
agenda-both nationally and in Southern Sudan-as a means to achieving the
envisioned democratic transformation that would allow for free and fair
elections and enable a meaningful referendum. This agenda includes a
comprehensive law reform process at the national level, and action in Southern
Sudan to improve human rights and rule of law, and to address impunity.

Within Southern Sudan,
GoSS should hold soldiers and other security forces transparently accountable
for crimes against civilians. GoSS security sector reforms should include
appropriate human rights training of soldiers in their peacetime role. The SPLA
should issue clear instructions to soldiers that they are not above the law and
will be tried for their crimes, including illegal arrests and detentions. The
police should also establish transparent accountability mechanisms, accessible
to civilians. GoSS should expand training and support for police, legal
advisors, and judicial authorities and encourage a proactive approach to ending
illegal detentions.

These security sector
reforms are especially urgent in view of potential political tensions and
violence in the lead-up to national elections, currently scheduled July 2009,
and the 2011 referendum. Flashpoints could include the announcement of the
April 2008 national census results, the physical demarcation of the North-South
border, the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on Abyei's
boundaries, and demarcation of electoral constituency boundaries.

The GoSS's response to violent
crimes and inter-communal violence, which often erupts in predictable geographic
and seasonal patterns, should prioritize human rights and civilian protection
and be better coordinated, with involvement from relevant GoSS, State, and
local civilian authorities. GoSS should develop a coherent strategy for
managing conflict in a manner that protects human rights rather than violates
them.

GoSS should also
strengthen nascent rule of law institutions and ensure that the Human Rights
Commission, Land Commission, and Anti-Corruption Commission are empowered and
operational. Action in these areas could improve human rights in Southern Sudan
and contribute tangibly to "peace dividends" that have so far eluded Southern
Sudanese citizens.

The United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) should re-assess its role in civilian protection,
improve its monitoring of insecure and volatile areas by its military and
civilian components, and help local authorities respond effectively and
appropriately to civilian insecurity. UNMIS, together with United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and other international agencies, should also accelerate assistance
for appropriate training and reform of security forces, and ensure support for
the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) and Joint Integrated Police Units (JIPUs).
They should simultaneously strengthen civilian rule of law institutions-police,
prisons, and judiciary-and government commissions that help promote human
rights and rule of law. Another key measure that could improve human rights
protection is deployment of additional human rights officers more widely
throughout Southern Sudan by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights and UNMIS.

III. Recommendations

To the Government of National Unity

Transparently
develop and enact legal reforms as required under the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) including revisions to the National Security Act and the
Press and Publications Act, and the establishment of a National Human
Rights Commission.

Provide
support in accordance with obligations under the CPA to train and equip
Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) and Joint Integrated Police Units (JIPUs)
(deployed in Abyei) and ensure they protect and implement human rights and
are held accountable for human rights violations.

To the Government of Southern Sudan

Hold
soldiers accountable for all crimes against civilians including human
rights violations committed in the course of duty. The Sudan People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) should issue clear instructions to commanders that soldiers
will be prosecuted for any crimes they commit against civilians, including
illegally (or arbitrarily) arresting and detaining civilians. It should
promulgate an enforceable code of conduct and ensure the code is
disseminated to all soldiers.

Hold
police accountable for human rights violations. The Southern Sudan Police
Service should establish transparent accountability mechanisms, accessible
to civilians, and ensure police are prosecuted for crimes they commit
including illegal (or arbitrary) arrests and detentions. The GoSS should
enact the Police Act and promulgate an enforceable code of conduct.

The
Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development should
proactively supervise criminal investigations and ensure all detentions
are legal. The Judiciary of Southern Sudan should, on its own accord, review
all detentions at regular intervals to determine the legality and
necessity of detention, and order release of detainees if none exists.

The
judiciary, the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development,
or any other legally mandated body such the Southern Sudan Human Rights
Commission should regularly inspect all places of detention including
police stations, military installations, and jails operated by traditional
authorities.

Strengthen
the police force with equipment and training in their appropriate roles
and responsibilities, particularly within the criminal justice system. To
the extent possible, increase their deployment numbers throughout Southern
Sudan.

Ensure
soldiers who are deployed to perform policing functions are trained in
human rights and basic elements of policing.

Ensure
that government committees investigating human rights violations produce
reports that are transparently shared within legislative organs and
published for communities.

Ensure
the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission,
and Land Commissions are enabled with appropriate legislation and made effective
and operational in all States.

To the United Nations and International Donors

Urge
both parties to the CPA, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the
Government of Sudan, to provide support to the Joint Integrated Units and
Joint Integrated Police Units (deployed in Abyei) and ensure they uphold
human rights and are held accountable for human rights violations.

Assess
the need for increased support to the rule of law sector in Southern Sudan
including more support for training police and soldiers in their roles and
responsibilities, and projects that improve prison conditions,
particularly for vulnerable groups.

The
UNMIS should strengthen its civilian protection role and revise internal
military directives accordingly. It should increase its monitoring of
volatile areas in Southern Sudan especially in the three transitional
areas governed by separate protocols to the CPA (Abyei, Southern Kordofan,
and Blue Nile).

The
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) should deploy more human rights officers across
Southern Sudan, especially in disputed border areas and areas prone to
frequent communal conflict, and provide regular public reporting on human
rights violations.

Urge
the Government of National Unity (GNU) to engage in a transparent legal
reform process prioritizing reforms to the National Security Act and Press
and Publications Act and establishing a National Human Rights Commission.

Provide
technical support to the National Human Rights Commission when it is
formed and to the Southern Sudan Human Rights, Anti-Corruption, and Land
Commissions and assist them to become effective and operational in all ten
states

IV.
Methodology

This
report describes some of the most urgent human rights concerns facing Southern
Sudan and offers a set of recommendations to address them. It does not attempt
to fully assess the justice sector or describe all the human rights
implications of all issues.

The
report is based on research missions to Southern Sudan in March, June, and
December 2008, during which Human Rights Watch researchers conducted more than
120 interviews with a wide range of sources including government officials,
international and Sudanese organizations, local authorities including police,
lawyers and judges, civilians, and victims of human rights abuses by security
forces, criminals, and rebels.

Interviews
were conducted in Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria, and in Unity and
Lakes States. Researchers also conducted telephone interviews and e-mail
correspondence, and reviewed relevant materials published by the UN,
international and Sudanese organizations, and commissions and other bodies
within the Government of Southern Sudan

V. Background

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

In
2005, the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) bringing an end to more
than two decades of civil war in which more than two million people died. In so
doing, they agreed not only to a ceasefire, but also to a series of reforms
designed to bring democratic transformation to Sudan.

The
CPA sets out a six-year interim period in which the two sides agree to withdraw
troops to their respective sides of the North-South border, conduct a
population census, and hold national elections. At the end of the interim
period, southerners will vote by referendum whether Southern Sudan should
remain part of Sudan or secede.[1]

In
addition to these time-sensitive provisions, the CPA provides for new
government structures and reforms. It established the Government of National
Unity (GNU) in Khartoum, created a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan
(GoSS) in Juba, and set out power and wealth sharing provisions and various reforms
to achieve democratic transformation and "make unity attractive" to southerners
before the 2011 referendum.[2]

The
signing of the CPA was itself an achievement, and in the following months the
parties formed both the national and southern governments and enacted interim
constitutions at both levels.[3]
However, slow progress in implementing some of the CPA's key provisions has
strained the relationship between the two parties such that in October 2007,
the SPLM temporarily suspended participation in the GNU.[4] The party accused the National Congress Party (NCP), the Islamic party
that dominates the Sudanese government, of failing to share oil revenues,
failing to withdraw its troops from the south, failing to take steps to
demarcate the historic 1956 North-South boundary, and, crucially, failing to
implement the Abyei Protocol, an accord that aims to resolve the status of the
contentious border town and surrounding area of Abyei.[5]

Although
the SPLM rejoined the government in late 2007 and the parties addressed some of
the sticking points, the Abyei dispute went unresolved.[6]
Abyei is an oil rich territory straddling the North-South boundary,
historically home to both Dinka Ngok and Arab Misseriya ethnic groups. Political
control over Abyei-long a contentious issue-has taken on added significance
with the discovery of oil reserves. Failure of the parties to agree on
arrangements for administering the territory culminated in a conflict between the
SPLA on one side and the Sudanese army and allied militia on the other in May
2008, killing scores of civilians and causing some 60,000 to flee from their
homes.[7]

Demarcation
of the 1956 North-South borderline-a lynchpin in the agreement-also remains
contentious. The border determines which government may claim important oil and
other assets. It also affects the composition of constituencies in the upcoming
national elections. The demarcation process has been extremely slow,
complicated by the lack of documentation from 1956 showing the location of the
historic border.[8]
With a significant portion of the borderline believed to be contested, the
border commission's initial report-to be submitted to the Presidency before
the commission begins the process of physical demarcation-is likely to be
controversial.

The
parties have not fully implemented the agreed security arrangements. They were
to redeploy troops to either side of the North-South border by June 2007.[9]
They both claimed to have finished troop withdrawal by January 9, 2008-six
months later than agreed-but in fact neither side has yet fully complied.[10]
In addition, they both continue to flout the agreement by amassing weapons.[11]

Security
arrangements also call for Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), composed of equal
numbers of SAF and SPLA troops, to be deployed throughout the South, in
transitional areas, and in Khartoum in order to bring stability, symbolize
unity between North and South, and become the kernel of a new army if
southerners vote for unity in 2011.[12]
The units have been deployed to most (but not all) of the envisioned locations,
but remain under-equipped and fragile due to ethnic tensions, poor and
un-integrated command structure, lack of training, and the use of former
militia in JIUs that were not first integrated into SAF or SPLA.[13]
They tend to fall apart in times of crisis, notably in Malakal in November
2006,[14]
and were quick to join in fighting with their respective armies at Abyei and
other locations.[15]
The GNU's failure to contribute promised resources to them, especially in Abyei,
where the JIUs and joint police units are supposed to provide security under
the Abyei Roadmap agreement, has been a bone of contention.

The Road Ahead

The
CPA time-table commits the parties to holding both a national census and
elections before the interim period ends in 2011, when residents of Southern
Sudan and Abyei vote on self-determination (Under protocols to the CPA
governing Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, residents there will not participate
in the referendum[16]).
The parties held the census in April and May 2008, but the process was deeply
flawed in Darfur, where IDP populations refused to take part, and in parts of
Southern Sudan, where insecurity interrupted the counting.[17]
In Lakes State, communal violence killed an estimated 95 people and interfered
with census activities.[18]

Both
parties to the CPA have reserved the right to reject the census results. The
President of Southern Sudan (who is also the First Vice President of Sudan)
entreated the national and southern census commissions to seek agreement on the
results before submitting the final report, reflecting concern that a
controversy could fuel renewed violence, particularly in the lead-up to
national elections scheduled in 2009.[19]
The CPA's power-sharing agreement gave the SPLM one-third of the national
representation based on assumptions about the population of Southern Sudan. A
less than one-third count could weaken the SPLM's political power nationally.

Although
the parties have announced their willingness to hold elections on the CPA
time-table, which calls for elections by July 2009,[20] preparations are seriously behind schedule and many observers
expect the date to be postponed. The list of tasks includes agreeing on census
results, demarcating the North-South boundary, drawing boundaries for voter
constituencies (based on population counts), nominating candidates, and
registering voters. The National Elections Commission, appointed in November
2008, has yet to set a date for elections or appoint High Committees for
Southern Sudan and the States to administer voter registration and elections,
as required by the National Elections Act.[21]
The elections law sets out an extremely complicated process, particularly for
Southern Sudan, where residents will fill out twelve separate ballots for
regional, state, and national officials. Public information and voter education
campaigns-critical in the South where illiteracy rates are very high and where
the population has little or no experience of participating in democratic
elections-are just beginning.[22]

The
national unity government is behind implementing legal and institutional
reforms called for in the CPA that would create a free and fair elections
environment. While it has passed several laws implementing aspects of the
CPA-such as the Joint Integrated Units Act, the National Civil
Service Commission Act, and others-it has not made reforms with far-reaching
human rights implications. For example, the CPA calls for a new security
service that functions as information gathering and analysis organ.[23]

The GNU has yet to
reform the NISS, limit the arrest and detention powers of security officials,
or reform the criminal code and media laws to protect freedom of expression in line with the interim constitution and
international obligations. The CPA also calls on the national government to
establish a National Human Rights Commission and Land Commission, neither of
which it has done.[24]
These reforms have been the subject of political negotiations between the CPA
parties; the parties should not in their haste to reach a deal rush through
legislation without proper consultation when the assembly reconvenes in 2009.[25]

Southern Sudan

The
CPA is largely silent on governance in the ten States that make up Southern
Sudan beyond establishing the GoSS and various mechanisms such as the Southern
Sudan Land Commission. In an area almost the size of France that was never
developed and has rarely been at peace over the last fifty years, the GoSS
faces enormous state-building challenges.

It has
made substantial progress establishing new government structures and
institutions at the regional and state levels. It has largely succeeded in
incorporating dozens of militias into the SPLA, as required by the CPA. On the
development front it boasts improved roads, infrastructure, and new investment.[26]
But the southern economy remains heavily dependent on the GoSS share of
national oil revenues. The majority of the sizeable budget goes to the security
sector, and to salaries rather than development projects.[27]
Many commentators have noted the lack of transparency about how efficiently the
budget is spent.[28]

Southerners
criticize GoSS for keeping power and resources in the capital and for failing
to deliver basic services. The process of decentralization, a stated priority
for 2009, should in theory bring more services to people in rural areas.[29]
States will need assistance setting up systems to pay public servant salaries,
including for regular armed forces (police, wildlife service, fire brigade and
prison guards) that are to be decentralized. Failure to pay salaries can lead
to insecurity and human rights abuses. When teachers demonstrated over the lack
of payment of salaries in Bentiu in October, authorities in Unity State
responded by arbitrarily arresting and detaining several teachers.[30]
In Juba, a student demonstration over the non-payment of their teachers'
salaries in November also turned violent and led to human rights abuses when
police used excessive force and shot into the crowd, leading to injuries and
one death.[31]

Southerners
also criticize the GoSS for engaging in "tribalism," and specifically for
allowing the Dinka ethnicity to dominate government.[32]
Many have indicated that anti-Dinka sentiment is rising in Juba. In addition,
many have noted increasing signs of corruption and the head of the Southern
Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission, which has yet to be empowered legally, has
said "there is outright stealing throughout the nation because we have a
fragile institutional set-up,"[33]
In private conversations with Human Rights Watch, officials bemoaned the lack
of transparency and accountability within their own administrations. The types
of corruption officials mention include misuse of public funds, favouritism in
hiring practices, and inflated payrolls.[34]

And
while the architecture of government is largely in place, GoSS has been less
successful breathing life into it. With very little legal expertise and high
levels of absenteeism in the legislative assembly, the GoSS has been
overwhelmed with the task of drafting legislation and slow to establish a
needed legal framework.[35]
Laws on police, other regular forces, and land use are still in draft form,
leaving a legal and policy vacuum in critical areas. The law to enable the
Southern Sudan Human Rights passed in February 2009, while the laws enabling
Land and Anti-Corruption Commissions are still pending.

VI.
Context: Southern Sudan's Fragile Security Environment

One of
the GoSS's greatest challenges is to demonstrate to its citizens the "peace
dividend" in an extremely fragile security environment in which its own forces
are often not able to protect civilians from violence that leads to human
rights violations, and are often themselves responsible for human rights
violations. In a potent reminder of this fragile environment, the CPA's fourth
anniversary celebration at Malakal was marred by a conflict between Shilluk and
Dinka ethnic groups over ancestral land rights. An argument between members of
the two groups prompted police to fire guns, injuring six civilians. The
incident sparked further clashes between the two groups in areas outside
Malakal, in which eleven people were reported killed, houses were burned, and
thousands of civilians were displaced.[36]

External Threats

Southern
Sudan's fragility has roots in both external and internal threats. North-South
tensions fuel conflict, particularly in the disputed areas of the 1956 border,
such as oil-rich Abyei. Tensions between the parties to the CPA increased after
the northern National Congress Party rejected the finding of a boundaries
commission, formed in accordance with the Abyei Protocol of the CPA.[37]
The commission found that the ethnically southern Dinka Ngok communities had a
legitimate claim to the area of Abyei and adjacent oil fields.[38]
Following SAF and SPLA troop build-ups and months of skirmishes in the area,
clashes between the two forces erupted in May 2008, killing scores of civilians
and causing at least 60,000 to flee from their homes.[39]

Although
both sides claim to have withdrawn their troops to their own side of the
North-South border in accordance with the CPA, they have repeatedly deployed
forces in disputed areas. This was one reason for the SPLA withdrawal from the
GNU, and a direct cause of conflicts in both Abyei and in Kharasana, another
important contested town near the border where violent clashes erupted in the
spring of 2008.[40]
In the aftermath of the Abyei clashes, both sides withdrew their forces
pursuant to the Abyei Roadmap and allowed joint forces to secure the area.

In the
game of military shadow-boxing that characterizes border dynamics in the post
CPA-era, the parties have continued to build up forces on either side of their
respective borders. In December 2008, the Sudanese government reportedly
deployed six battalions of SAF soldiers to Southern Kordofan.[41]
The SPLA has also been slow to pull back from the border.[42]
Other disputed parts of the 1956 border are flashpoints for further violence.[43]
The UN and others have warned they could be potentially larger than the
conflict that occurred at Abyei.[44]

The
CPA prohibits all militia-known as Other Armed Groups (OAGs)-requiring their
dissolution or integration into the SPLA or the SAF. This has been largely
accomplished.[45] However, officials say some elements of other armed groups still
exist, such as remnants of the so-called "white army" in Jonglei or remnants of
former SAF-supported groups in Upper Nile and could be "reactivated" at any
time. There is evidence both sides have continued to back militia as proxy
forces, fuelling tension and violence.[46]

Uganda's
Lord's Resistance Army is another external threat that has especially affected
the Equatorian States. In September 2008, LRA attacked villages in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and an SPLA camp in Sakure, Western Equatoria
State, killing two civilians and abducted 14, including 12 children. Their
attacks intensified in the weeks before their leader, Joseph Kony, was
scheduled to sign a peace agreement but did not appear (the third such failed
attempt). In December 2008, the Ugandan army, supported by the Central African
Republic, Congolese and Southern Sudanese armies launched a coordinated
offensive, Operation Lighting Thunder, against the rebels.[47]
However, the attacks continued and by mid-January 2009, rebel attacks killed
over six hundred Congolese civilians and an estimated 50 Southern Sudanese,
abducted hundreds more, and caused thousands to flee their homes in Sudan.

Internal Threats

Armed
criminal groups and renegade soldiers with unknown affiliations also present
security threats in many parts of Southern Sudan, committing various abuses
against civilians. For example, according to a report issued by the Southern
Sudan Legislative Assembly's Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Committee,
groups of renegade soldiers known as "forgotten warriors" attacked civilians in
Upper Nile, looting homes and raping females.[48]
In Eastern Equatoria, a group of former SPLA calling itself "No Unit"
perpetrated a string of attacks on villages in April 2008, collecting supplies
along the way.[49]
In late June 2008, a group of disgruntled soldiers, Ugandan rebels and bandits,
attacked a village in Central Equatoria, looting goods and abducting scores of
men, women, and children, causing hundreds to flee.[50]

Large
numbers of underpaid soldiers who lack training in their peacetime
police-oriented role also represent a threat to security by committing human
rights abuses and other crimes (described in more detail below). Meanwhile
communal conflict persists in the form of cattle rustling and inter-communal
conflict over land use and ill-defined payam
and county boundaries. With small arms still in large supply despite various
attempts to disarm civilians, these conflicts often turn violent and exact high
death tolls on civilians. In one clash, in May 2007, armed Toposa massacred 54
Didinga women and children in Buda county, Eastern Equatoria, while in April
2008 a communal conflict in Lakes State led to approximately 95 deaths.[51]

Many
of these conflicts have deep historical roots and erupt in predictable cycles
and locations. In December 2008 alone, clan fighting and cattle raiding among
ethnic groups and sub-groups was reported in Warrap, Unity, Eastern Equatoria,
Jonglei, and in Juba town, leading to numerous civilian deaths and injuries.[52]
In late December and January 2009 clashes between Dinka sections killed more
than 20 people and caused hundreds to flee their homes in Wulu, Lakes State.[53] According to the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
communal clashes caused more displacement than any other factor in 2008.[54]

Boundaries
are often a cause of inter-communal fighting. In December 2008 a staff member
of the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission was shot when he tried to mediate
a dispute between Mundari and Bari communities over a county boundary north of
Juba.[55]
A dispute over boundaries was at the root of the clash between Shilluk and
Dinka communities near Malakal that killed at least 11 civilians in January
2009. In Warrap State, a long-standing dispute between two Dinka sections over
grazing lands led to renewed violence in spring 2008, causing at least 7
deaths, in part fuelled by disagreements over the creation of a county boundary
line.[56]

An
underlying cause of insecurity that leads to human rights violations is that
former soldiers have not yet benefited from Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) programs envisioned in the CPA.[57]
Plans include demobilization of 180,000 soldiers and 2,900 children, but the
process is highly sensitive and requires more donor support for reintegration
and livelihood. The inclusion of southern former SAF soldiers has been an
especially contentious matter, with thousands remaining in Juba, Wau, and
Malakal and still armed. Following the New Years day violence in Juba, GoSS
passed resolutions that included calling for DDR and resolving the status of
the former SAF soldiers.[58]

Observers
expect little progress on reforming or downsizing the SPLA anytime before the
2011 referendum in view of the political uncertainty facing the South and
security threats-real or perceived-that have roots in the civil war with the
North. As one long-term development agency worker told Human Rights Watch,
"they are still in a war mentality and they do not want DDR, they do not want
civilian oversight."[59]

Human Rights Concerns in the Lead Up to 2009 National Elections

In the
period leading up to the elections, a number of politically sensitive decisions
and events could become flashpoints. These include announcement of the results
of the April 2008 census, demarcation of the North-South border, and the
drawing of electoral constituencies (determined by population count). In
Southern Sudan, disputes over local boundaries and the socio-economic pressure
of more formerly displaced people and refugees returning to towns and villages
could exacerbate an already tense elections environment.

Communities
living near disputed areas of the North-South boundary may also become more
vulnerable to national political tensions, particularly in Abyei where a
shooting incident between a soldier and police in December caused hundreds of
recently returned civilians to again flee the town. The forthcoming decision by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding the boundaries of Abyei, expected
in the first half of 2009, is an obvious potential flashpoint.

The
GoSS, UN agencies, and donors should urgently develop coherent strategies to
prevent human rights violations arising from political tensions or communal
disputes. These strategies should ensure coordination between relevant
government bodies and mechanisms already established by GoSS. GoSS and
international agencies should also ensure public information and voter
education aim to reduce potential conflict and resulting human rights
violations.

VII. Southern Sudan's Human Rights Challenges

The
most pressing human rights challenges in Southern Sudan today arise out of the
GoSS's inadequate responses to various security threats and its failure to rein
in human rights abuses by security forces, primarily the SPLA. In addition,
systemic weaknesses in the rule of law institutions give rise to abuses in the
administration of justice and contribute to a culture of impunity for crimes
and human rights violations. The following provides an overview of key human
rights issues in Southern Sudan. It is not, however, an exhaustive catalogue of
all human rights challenges facing the South.

Lack of Civilian Protection

There are many examples
of authorities deploying soldiers to locations where civilians face security
threats. In Western Equatoria, GoSS security forces have conducted patrols
since December 2008 to protect civilians from attacks by the Lord's Resistance
Army. But there are just as many examples where authorities have not deployed
security forces to protect civilians from violent criminal acts or conflict
situations.

In Central Equatoria, for
example, a man who fled his village after it was attacked by a group of bandits
and renegade soldiers who perpetrated a string of attacks in early spring 2008
told Human Rights Watch, "No soldiers are being deployed and there is no
protection. Unless the situation is cooled down, I cannot go back. I ran from a
bullet. Even if soldiers are taken in there for protection, I want to see the
reality first."[60]

Even in Western
Equatoria, where GoSS security forces have patrolled main roads against attacks
by LRA, civilians have told UN staff they have lost confidence in the
government's ability to protect them and some villages have turned to
self-protection by youth groups armed with guns and bows and arrows.[61]

In the North-South
border areas, southern authorities have not deployed forces to protect
civilians in some instances-possibly because of the political implications of
deploying military in that area given the terms of the CPA. Victims of attacks
in Unity State prior to the population census in March and April 2008 reported
that they did not feel protected. "There was no South Sudan army, it was only
petroleum security at that place. There was no intervention," said one man who
was shot by a group of armed men, whom he described as Arab militia and
Sudanese Armed Forces.[62]

Weak Police Response

The
Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS), established under a separate command from
the Khartoum-based police service, is still in very early stages of
development. Most police are former SPLA soldiers, poorly trained and lacking
basic education. Challenges training them include lack of
infrastructure, lack of command and control, and low levels of literacy.[63] In many areas they are not sufficiently deployed to cover the
terrain (for example, there are only 700 police for all of Lakes State, an area
roughly the size of Switzerland with an estimated population of 350,000) and
lack the transportation and communications resources they need to respond
effectively to security problems.

The
police are vulnerable to attacks themselves. In November 2008 in Unity state,
for example, a feud between Nuer clans led to one death. Police arrested the
assailant, but the victim's family then attacked the police station, setting
fire to the cell, and killed the assailant.[64]
In Eastern Equatoria in December 2008, county authorities tried to quell a
cattle-raiding dispute by sending an official delegation to villages in Lopit
county, but armed men ambushed the team, killing ten people including a police
officer.[65]
In January 2009, an attack on one village in Western Equatoria by Lord's
Resistance Army rebels killed three people including police.[66]

In
some cases, the inappropriate use of force by police contributes to the
escalation of violence leading to human rights abuses. For example, in January
2009 in Malakal at the CPA anniversary celebrations, SSPS fired into a crowd
where Shilluk and Dinka traditional dancers were arguing over which group
should take the lead in the celebrations, resulting in six injuries. The
incident sparked clashes between the two ethnic groups in a nearby village,
resulting in a reported additional eleven deaths, burned houses, and
displacement of villagers.[67]
Police excess use of force also led to injuries and at least one death at
student demonstrations in November 2008 protesting non-payment of teacher
salaries in Juba.[68]

Human Rights Consequences of Using SPLA to Keep Public Order

As a
result of weak law enforcement capability in the police force, GoSS regional
and state authorities-almost all of whom are former soldiers themselves-turn to
the SPLA to patrol against crime, protect civilians from attacks from armed
criminal groups, and quell disputes.

Technically,
the SPLA does not have the legal authority to fulfil these functions unless
directed by civilian government officials.[69]
However, GoSS has not demonstrated the political will to ensure civilian oversight
of law enforcement operations conducted by military at this stage. Even in instances
in which civilian authorities call upon SPLA for law enforcement support they
do not actually oversee operations.

Under international
law, military personnel carrying out policing duties-such as searches, arrest,
and detention-are bound by the same human rights standards applicable to all
law enforcement officials.[70]Just as the police and other regular forces lack training as
to their roles, current soldiers lack the training required to fulfil civilian
law enforcement functions.

In March 2008 the GoSS
issued a White Paper on Defence,
describing the process of "transforming the SPLA into a regular, professional,
non-partisan modern army."[71]
Training needs are enormous and programs are just beginning, largely benefiting
the higher ranks. With illiteracy in the armed forces estimated at 80 percent,
the majority of soldiers lack basic education in addition to specialized
training in, and practical skills for, their peace-time role or in human rights
and humanitarian law.

In
practice, the soldiers often employ military tactics in civilian law
enforcement functions, such as by surrounding villages and using heavy weaponry
and otherwise intimidating civilians. The strategy often backfires, leading to
violent clashes with armed civilians and soldiers committing serious human
rights violations in the process, often with ethnic dimensions.

Case Study from Eastern Equatoria, June 2008

In one
example from Eastern Equatoria in June 2008, an SPLA operation to prevent a conflict
between two villages, Logurun and Iloli, turned into a deadly clash between
SPLA soldiers and civilians. At least 10 civilians and nine soldiers were
killed and an estimated 4,000 villagers were forced to flee to neighbouring
Hiyala village. The Governor of Eastern Equatoria ordered the operation after
he heard that the villages were preparing to fight. Representatives from the
communities told Human Rights Watch that the SPLA took a heavy-handed approach
that spiralled out of control.[72]

According
to eyewitnesses and local government officials Human Rights Watch interviewed,
at around 3 a.m. on June 4, on the Governor's instructions, several hundred
SPLA soldiers arrived on the outskirts of Logurun village with orders to secure
it and the neighbouring village of Iloli to curtail a cattle-raiding conflict
between the residents, to seize their cattle for return to their rightful
owners, and to disarm civilians.[73]
Men from Logurun saw soldiers in the bush and, believing they were "enemies"
from Iloli preparing to attack, opened fire, killing nine of the soldiers.[74]
SPLA soldiers fired back, entered the village, moved house to house with guns,
and ordered people to leave before setting fire to the huts and stealing
livestock.[75]

Meanwhile,
another contingent of soldiers who were surrounding neighbouring Iloli village,
some 10 kilometres away, attacked when they learned about fighting at Logurun.
The soldiers fired on the village, which sits on a hilltop, from positions at
the bottom of the hill, then went house-to-house threatening people and
ordering them to leave.[76]
Several witnesses said soldiers killed three men at close range, execution
style, during the incident.[77]

Soldiers
ordered the villagers to Hilaya village, where they stayed with host families
and in temporary shelters. They also arrested some males from both villages and
assaulted them. "I was beaten by the SPLA when they brought me to
Hiyala…the soldier hit me with metal on my head, and I was bleeding," recalled
one man who had been detained.[78]

Three
days after the clashes, in broad daylight, the soldiers killed an additional
two Lotuku civilians, an old woman and a 17-year-old boy, whom they encountered
in a garden near Hiyala, where both victims were residents. According to local
people, the victims were targeted because they belonged to the Lotuku
ethnicity. "The soldiers said 'you are all Lotuku' and did not care which
village we come from," the chief told Human Rights Watch.[79]

In the
clashes, at least 10 villagers and nine soldiers died, hundreds of homes were
destroyed, livestock was stolen, and some 4,000 villagers were displaced to
nearby Hiyala village. According to an official complaint submitted to the GoSS
Vice President by members of the Lotuku community, SPLA soldiers unlawfully
killed a total of six additional persons after the clashes, and arbitrarily
arrested civilians from the villages and detained and tortured them in their
barracks.[80]

International
law requires that the use of force by law enforcement officials, including
members of the armed forces, be proportionate and necessary to achieve law
enforcement ends.[81]
The evidence suggests the SPLA soldiers violated international law when they
committed extrajudicial executions, beat and tortured civilians, destroyed
civilian property, and stole livestock. The SPLA launched an investigation into
the incident, but the results have not been made public and to date there is no
indication soldiers have been prosecuted.[82]

This
incident shows the need to train soldiers in the applicable laws and in
civilian policing techniques, the need for accountability mechanisms, and for
more inclusive strategies for dealing with localized conflict. One
man from Logurun said, "The problem was that there was no communication with us
[villagers]. There was no warning and this was not organized."[83]

The Civilian Disarmament Challenge

Similar
violence and human rights violations have occurred in the context of civilian
disarmament operations, particularly when they are led by military rather than
civilian authorities.

One of
the GoSS' primary strategies for managing conflict has been to disarm civilians
to reduce armed inter-communal violence. This strategy, which has been used
piece-meal by state-level authorities for several years, became more prominent
in May 2008 when Southern Sudan's President Salva Kiir issued an order to all
states to conduct civilian disarmament over a six month period.[84]
Although the time-frame expired in December, Kiir has repeatedly urged the
States to continue to improve security by disarming civilians.[85]
Authorities in several states have proceeded with disarmament campaigns, forced
and voluntary, with varying degrees of consultation with the communities and
planning. The newly established GoSS Bureau of Community Security and Small
Arms Control aims to develop policies on disarmament and weapons storage, but
to date GoSS has not put into place a clear policy to guide civilian
disarmament efforts across Southern Sudan.

The
task of civilian disarmament in Southern Sudan is complicated by historical and
political realities. Communities that traditionally raised their own defence
forces are often the same ones that have not allied with SPLA. Many perceive
disarmament efforts as thinly veiled attempts by authorities to weaken
communities that do not support SPLM. Although the operation at Logurun and Iloli
was not strictly a disarmament campaign, villagers told Human Rights Watch they
believed the soldiers wanted to disarm their community because it has had a
troubled relationship with the SPLA.[86]

Moreover,
unless authorities disarm neighbouring communities simultaneously, they make
the disarmed communities more vulnerable to threats from armed neighbours with
whom they have long-running feuds. These political dimensions have fuelled
violence including serious violations of human rights in the past. In 2005-6 a
civilian disarmament operation targeting primarily Lou Nuer communities in
Jonglei state turned extraordinarily violent. The Lou Nuer, some of whom
perceived the disarmament to be a politically-motivated crack-down, objected
that they needed weapons to protect their cattle from seasonal raids by the
Murle, a different ethnic group who have carried out raids against the Lou and
other neighbours for decades.[87]

When
the SPLA refused to disarm the Murle at the same time as the Lou Nuer, battles
erupted between the SPLA and the Lou Nuer "white army" supported by elements of
former Southern Sudanese Defence Forces (SSDF) and the northern Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF). The battles left an estimated 1,600 soldiers and militia members
dead and an unknown number of civilian casualties.[88]

The
disarmaments in 2008-carried out according to the May Presidential Decree-have been
less violent than in 2006, but not all peaceful. In July 2008, soldiers
in Pibor, Jonglei, used force that UN monitors reported was excessive during
house-to-house searches.[89]
In Lakes State, authorities carried out a disarmament campaign in September
that spiraled out of control and led to violence and human rights violations.

Case
Study from Rumbek, September 2008

The disarmament
campaign in Rumbek, Lakes State, spiraled out of control when SPLA soldiers, deployed from other parts of Southern Sudan to carry
out the disarmament campaign, ran amok in the market, looting money and goods,
wounding eight civilians and beating a member of parliament.[90]

According
to state authorities and residents interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the
disarmament operation began early on September 8 without fair warning to
civilians except for radio announcements the night before instructing residents
to remain at home the following day. The soldiers were ethnically Dinka and
Nuer and not from the area-a factor that may have contributed to tensions with
the local civilians. They surrounded Rumbek town and began house-to-house
searches in the early morning. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that many
soldiers were drunk and beat civilians, shot at them, and stole personal items
including cash, mobile phones, and military uniforms from civilian homes.

"The
soldiers did not care who you were, they beat people and looted shops," said
one journalist who witnessed the events.[91]
By mid-afternoon, the SPLA commander in charge agreed to suspend the operation,
but more violence erupted later that evening in the market.[92]

Abraham,
a 26-year-old former security officer himself, was one of the first market
shooting victims and bore a fresh bullet wound scar on his back and stomach
when Human Rights Watch spoke to him. He told Human Rights Watch he went to the
market to charge his mobile phone, then noticed a group of soldiers trying to
commandeer a motorcycle from a young man he knew. They opened fire on the young
man, but Abraham, who was running away in the same direction, got shot instead.

"There
were about six of them chasing us. One of the soldiers started shooting at my
back," he recalled. "I fell down. After I fell they took my wallet. I heard a
voice saying in Arabic 'just leave him.' They took my money and left." He
claims to have lost more than $2,000, all of his savings that he put in his
wallet that morning so that soldiers could not take it from his home during the
disarmament campaign.

The
incident sparked an outbreak of more shooting violence in the market in which
at least seven civilians were shot.[93]
At least one civilian died.[94]
State and SPLA authorities suspended the disarmament operation and ordered SPLA
out of Rumbek following the day's events. SPLA reported they had arrested at
least 10 soldiers.[95] State authorities publicly apologized for the botched campaign and
announced some soldiers suspected of shooting civilians had been arrested and
would be tried in military court.[96] They also told UN human rights monitors that they registered cases
and compiled lists of lost or stolen items, and that the Governor paid several
hundred US dollars in compensation to some victims at the hospital.[97]

However,
these efforts at accountability have not been made public. "We do not know how
they work or the results of their investigation," the deputy Governor told
Human Rights Watch.[98] Moreover, some victims (including Abraham) say they have not
received promised compensation for loss and medical treatment. State
authorities told Human Rights Watch that the onus is on SPLA to pay
compensation.[99]

State
authorities acknowledge there was a break-down in communication with the
soldiers, and that the operation was not coordinated with civilian police and
other civilian authorities. The episode underscores the need for careful planning
and oversight, and also points to the lack of coherent GoSS-wide policies on
civilian disarmament and limitations in providing accountability.

VIII.
Abuses by Security Forces

Southern
Sudan's large security forces comprise soldiers, police, wildlife service, fire
brigade, and prison officials. The vast majority are ill-trained in their roles
and responsibilities. In all locations visited, Human Rights Watch received
reports of various types of abuses by security actors, ranging from harassment,
assault, and beatings in the course of official duty to other crimes committed
for personal gain. According to many observers, public disquiet over abuses by
state actors is growing.[100]

The
scale and gravity of offences vary depending on location, local dynamics, and
personalities. In Warrab State, the UNMIS reported that soldiers were involved
in at least eight killings, rapes, assaults, and stealing crops between July
and October 2008.[101]
In Juba, on New Years' Day, 2009, armed men believed to be security personnel
shot and killed four civilians, prompting the GoSS Council of Ministers to
convene and pass resolutions to improve security.

In one
high-profile case of abuse of power, soldiers acting on orders beat Rumbek
journalist Manyang Mayom while he was investigating allegations that cattle
keepers purchased weapons that had been collected in a previous disarmament
campaign. "Two of the soldiers forced me out of my car and beat me on my neck
with their gun, then on my chest and kidneys. My injuries were so bad I could
not speak," he told Human Rights Watch.[102]
The beating was so severe that he had to be transferred to Khartoum for medical
treatment.

Reports
of harassment and assault by police in the course of arrest are common. In
Juba, police harassment increased in October 2008, when, acting on an order by
the Juba County Commissioner criminalizing "all bad behaviours, activities and
imported illicit cultures of what is now known as 'Niggers'," police arrested
and detained at least 27 women including 11 girls for wearing trousers or short
skirts. Many of the females reported they were beaten. GoSS officials condemned
the arrest and the commissioner lost his job over the incident.

Similar
harassment occurred previously in Juba and in Malakal and Yei, where police
forced some girls to strip.[103]
In Juba residents complained in November and December 2008 of military police
operating illegal checkpoints demanding money in some cases and harassing
passengers at night in what many believe to be a continuation of the harsh
public order policy.

Trend of Criminality by Soldiers and Police

Since
2007, human rights monitors from UNMIS observed a trend of soldiers and police
targeting foreign traders, most from Uganda, in robberies, assaults, and
killings.[104]
The crimes appear opportunistic, targeting East African traders who run
lucrative business, also reflecting a resentment of the traders' economic
advantage. In a high profile murder from September 2007, for example, a group
of 15 policemen attacked the head of the Ugandan Trader's Association for
trying to prevent them from beating another trader. One policeman stabbed and
killed the trader. To date, the suspects have not been prosecuted.[105]

The
trend continued into 2008 in main towns such as Juba, Torit and Yei. In March
2008, SPLA soldiers beat and detained a Ugandan taxi driver in Juba for
allegedly helping a female passenger steal money from a soldier. The victim
told Human Rights Watch that eight soldiers took him to their barracks,
stripped him, beat him, and threatened to kill him before finally releasing him
after three days. "They were torturing me, kicking me in the chest, they beat
me with a stick and they pointed their guns at me," he stated.[106]

Security
forces have also targeted female traders in the markets of various towns,
particularly Juba and Torit, for sexual assault and rape.[107]
Police and soldiers have assaulted Ugandan women who spend nights in the market
to guard their goods or who work in restaurants and bars at night.[108]
In June 2008 a group of police raped four Ugandan women in Bor, Jonglei State.[109]

The
same month, police in Malakal, Upper Nile state, arrested a group of 11 Ugandan
women, beat them, and accused them of prostitution and tried to force them to
have sex with them.[110]
Soldiers in Malakal also used sexual violence against Sudanese women and girls
in June and August 2008.[111]
As elsewhere in Sudan, victims of sexual violence often do not report crimes
committed against them, especially by soldiers and other security forces.

Land Disputes Involving Abusive Soldiers

Southern
Sudan had yet to establish a legal and regulatory framework for land use and
ownership. The vacuum has opened the door to forcible land grabs, illegal
occupations, coerced sales, and multiple sales of the same property, fuelling
various types of land disputes during and after the war that have had an
especially negative impact on returning IDPs and refugees.[112]

Many
disputes in urban areas involve soldiers who occupy land that returning
refugees and IDPs now claim. Several Juba residents, including recent
returnees, reported to Human Rights Watch that soldiers intimidated and
threatened to kill them for contesting the soldiers' occupation of their land.[113]
One chief reported that soldiers put him in jail because he complained to SPLA
that they had built their barracks on his land.[114]

A
resident of Yei, Central Equatoria, told Human Rights Watch that soldiers
threatened to kill him whenever he attempted to regain his land, and soldiers
occupying his neighbour's land beat the neighbour so severely that he had to be
treated in a hospital.[115]
In another case from Yei, soldiers told a returning resident who claimed the
land that he would have to "use the gun to claim it back."[116]

In
cases reported to Human Rights Watch, soldiers often expressed a sense of
entitlement from having fought in the war.[117]
In one case a soldier who encroached on the land of a sub-chief and cut down
some trees refused to pay compensation saying he "was part of the liberation of
Yei."[118]
By the same token, when a soldier tried to occupy land owned by the Southern
Sudan Human Rights Commissioner, she challenged him to show his legal title to
the land but he replied "we don't need law because we liberated this land."[119]

This
sense of entitlement is reinforced by the de facto impunity soldiers and other
security personnel enjoy. "The soldiers are operating without being accountable
to anyone," said one lawyer who handles land cases.[120]

According
to judges and lawyers working on land cases in Yei and Juba, soldiers frequently
flout court orders to vacate land or pay compensation.[121]
In some cases, soldiers do not respond to court summonses. In other cases, they
appear in court but simply ignore court orders. When judicial authorities
request police to enforce the judgments, police often feel powerless to take
action against soldiers. According to the lawyers, soldiers only comply when
SPLA commanders order them to. In some areas, including in Juba, SPLA has
agreed to move barracks in response to the community's request.

IX. Abusive
Practices in the Administration of Justice

Weaknesses
in Southern Sudan's justice sector have given rise to various human rights
violations in the administration of justice. Key areas of concern include, but
are not limited to, interference of military authorities in the civilian
justice system, arbitrary arrests and detentions by police, and poor conditions
of detention.[122]

Military Arrests and Detentions

Under
international law, military authorities should not assert criminal jurisdiction
over civilians except in special circumstances, specified by law.[123]
Under Southern Sudan's laws, primary authority for law enforcement lies with
civilian police, with limited authority for armed forces.[124] The Southern Sudanese constitution says the armed forces have no
mandate for internal law and order, except as requested by civilian authorities
when necessity requires.[125]

Despite
the legal proscription, military authorities continue to interfere in the
administration of civilian justice by arresting civilians and detaining them in
military facilities. Arrests by soldiers are more common in areas where the
relationship between soldiers and the community has been troubled. In Nimule, a
town on the border of Uganda and Central Equatoria, for example, local
communities objecting to the presence of large numbers of predominantly Dinka
soldiers and settlers from Jonglei have reported numerous cases of human rights
violations by the soldiers, including arbitrary arrest and detentions.

In one
example, Joseph Modi Lado Vuni, a trader from the Madi ethnic group, reported
to Human Rights Watch that a soldier arrested, beat, and detained
him for nine days in April 2008 after he tried to intervene in a dispute
between the soldier and his brother over the price of a welding job. The
dispute escalated until he was surrounded by soldiers holding guns.[126]

"They told me I was
under arrest and started beating me all the way to the barracks. On reaching
the barracks he ordered the soldiers to give me 100 lashes and put me jail." Vuni
alleges he was beaten severely in the following days, and only after friends
and family intervened in his case was he released to police, who, he claims,
did not detain him because his arrest was without legal basis and because they
were afraid of being "stormed" by the army.

The
head of the Southern Sudanese Human Rights Commission (SSHRC) has called the
problem of illegal military detentions "common" and has spent considerable
energy to "convince the SPLA that the law says you cannot detain people."[127]
In its first annual report, the SSHRC found that soldiers had arrested the
majority of the detainees the Commission visited in six civilian detention
facilities in 2007, often on orders from the relevant State Governor.[128]

Both
the UNMIS Human Rights Unit and the GoSS Human Rights Commission have reported
soldiers have detained civilians in military barracks, including in secret
detention facilities. In some locations parallel structures, relics of wartime
structures, still rival civilian authority.[129]
In 2007, a High Court judge in Eastern Equatoria discovered that nine prisoners
in Kapoeta were held in military custody in shipping cargo containers in
unacceptable conditions, rather than in Torit County prison.[130]

Police Arrests and Detentions

The
Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly adopted new criminal laws in 2008, but
police in many locations have yet to receive copies or instruction, and
continue to operate on the basis of the earlier 2003 laws passed by the SPLA
and the 1991 criminal procedure act passed in Khartoum. Many police are not
versed in the criminal law or in their roles and responsibilities. The Police
Act is still pending in the assembly (as is legislation governing the fire
brigade, wildlife, and prison services).

Illegal
arrests and detentions occur throughout Sudan in similar patterns, reflecting
practices often rooted in custom.[131]
In Southern Sudan a formal judicial system has been largely absent, and
customary law, recognized in the constitution as a source of law, is especially
pronounced.[132]
Most southerners in rural areas turn to traditional authorities for justice,
rather than to the less accessible statutory courts located in main towns.

The
SSPS, like the Sudan police force in the rest of the country, engage in the
practice of arresting friends or family of suspects when suspects are not
available. "Justice by proxy" reflects notions of collective responsibility.[133]
In an example from Torit, police arrested a man for a murder committed by his
brother at the request of the victim's family to pressure the suspect's family
to pay compensation, or blood money known in Sudan by the Arabic term diya.[134]

In
Rumbek, a random visit by Human Rights Watch to the police station revealed a
40 year old woman detained instead of her son, who was accused of stealing
clothes, and a 22 year old woman detained instead of her cousin, who had
borrowed money and disappeared.[135]
In another Rumbek case, the wives of two suspects were held instead of their
husbands (who had absconded) for two weeks without charge and stated that they
had been beaten while in custody.[136]

Detention
for debt is also widespread in Sudan, often justified by the concept of
"protective custody".[137]
In an example from Yei, prisoners were held after completion of their sentences
because they had not paid compensation, and the county judge ordered them to
stay in detention supposedly for their protection against the families of their
victims.[138]
UNMIS human rights monitors have also documented the trend of police or
judicial authorities detaining females in protective custody when they are
victims of domestic violence, rather than prosecuting the abusive husband.[139]

Across
Southern Sudan, many prisoners serve time for morality offences involving
extramarital sex because they could not afford to pay compensation.[140]
UNMIS officials estimate that of the prisons and detention centres it monitors,
nearly half the detainees are held for crimes committed by others as a way of
pressuring families to reconcile or pay.[141]
These forms of detention are not based on law and violate national and
international protections against arbitrary detection.[142]

In
many cases, individuals are detained at the request of family, traditional
authorities, soldiers, or even politicians. For example, in March 2008 a group
of soldiers beat a trader with a stone to make him divulge the whereabouts of a
motorcycle driver whom they said collided with their vehicle. The soldiers then
ordered police to arrest him and detain him for several days and the police
complied.[143]
In some instances, government authorities have ordered SPLA to conduct illegal
detentions without seeking police or judicial involvement at all.[144]

In the
absence of any mental health services, authorities also detain mentally ill
people, often at the request of relatives, in violation of the law.
The head of the Southern Sudanese Commission for Human Rights told Human Rights
Watch that mentally ill detainees are often held in shackles, without treatment
or judicial review of their detention.[145]

Authorities
sometimes detain children at the behest of their parents, disregarding the age
threshold for legal criminal responsibility under Sudanese law. According to
one paramount chief in the Azande community of Western Equatoria, "If the
parents ask, the chiefs will order the children to [suffer] lashings or prison
sentences."[146]
The GoSS has enacted a Child Act and UNICEF and other agencies are training
authorities in juvenile justice.

Discrimination Against Women and Girls

Family matters are
governed by customary laws, usually applied by traditional authorities. Customary traditions of most of Southern Sudan's ethnic groups limit
the choices available to women and girls, particularly in respect of marriage,
and are inherently discriminatory.[147]
Judicial and traditional authorities acknowledge the need for harmonizing
customary law with Sudan's laws and constitutions, and ultimately with
international standards. However, the task of harmonization invites difficult
decisions including whether to codify oral customary law traditions. As of December
2008, the process had barely started.

Many
cases of illegal arrest and detention of females stem from application of these
customary laws, especially as they relate to dowry (or bride price) payments.
In some cases, human rights monitors reported that police or traditional courts
arrest and detain women and girls for refusing to marry someone that the family
has chosen for her or for running away from the husband after dowry has been
arranged or paid.[148]

Police
also arrest and detain women on adultery charges without a legal basis. The
criminal law defines adultery as a crime by a married woman, but authorities do
arrest unmarried women and girls for adultery.[149]
Authorities apply the charge more frequently to females than to males. Human
rights activists in Yei reported that a large percentage of women in detention
there were detained on charges of adultery quite often at the behest of a
jealous husband.[150]
In Rumbek, UN police monitors reported that females are most commonly arrested
and detained for either adultery or elopement, a charge police apply for
pre-marital sexual relations although the charge does not appear in the
statutory criminal codes.

In
recent months, police have also arrested and punished women and girls for
wearing clothes they considered too tight or inappropriate, although this is
not a crime under the criminal code. In 2007 and 2008, police conducted large
campaigns-sometimes violently-arresting women for wearing trousers or skirts in
Malakal, Yei, and Juba.[151]
In January 2009, the Commissioner's Office in Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria,
issued a similar decree, prohibiting "tight trousers and tight blouses with the
navel exposed" among other offences and imposing a fine or jail time for
violators.[152]

Poor Conditions of Detention

Prison
conditions are extremely poor across Southern Sudan, with many facilities
lacking the most basic infrastructure. After visits to prisons in Lakes,
Warrap and Eastern Equatoria the Southern Sudanese Human Rights Commission
reported publicly on the poor sanitation, lack of ventilation, lack of beds,
the failure to separate children from adults, and lack of medical care and
food.[153]
The Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Committee of the Southern Sudan
Legislative Assembly reported very poor conditions in Malakal prison,
particularly for mothers detained with their babies.[154]

Some
detainees alleged to the committee members serious ill-treatment including
torture in retaliation for using the bathroom or seeking fresh air.[155]Detainees also reported inmate-on-inmate violence. One former
detainee in Juba prison told Human Rights Watch he was beaten by other
prisoners while police looked on. "We were about 30 people in a very small
cell. There is no place to sleep there. The other prisoners beat me, they beat
the new ones.[156]

Another
man who was urinating blood and had visible signs of beating said he had been
kicked in the groin and stomach by a fellow prisoner.[157]
One doctor told Human Rights Watch that he regularly sees cases of injured
detainees who are brought to the clinic by the police. The most common injuries
are "broken bones, bruises, lacerations, beating with a stick."[158]

In
this context, the problem of prolonged pre-trial detention is even more urgent.
In many cases reported by UNMIS human rights monitors, detainees were held for
prolonged periods without legal assistance or judicial review of their cases.
In a case from Bor prison in Jonglei state, UNMIS monitors encountered a former
SPLA soldier accused of murder who has not had access to a judge for two years.[159]

In
northern Bahr el Ghazal and Wau, 11 detainees were held from two to four years
without arrest warrants and never appeared in court or received any legal
assistance.[160]
In Torit, detainees were kept in police cells for 23 days without charges brought
against them.[161]
Since January 2007 there have been three prison riots resulting from
frustration over lengthy detention periods on remand.[162]

Lack of Oversight of Detentions by Judicial Institutions

Several
actors in the criminal justice sector, including members of the Southern Sudan
Human Rights Commission, are entitled to inspect prisons under the current
legal framework. However, only judicial actors have the authority to order the
release of illegally detained prisoners. There are insufficient judicial and
prosecutorial personnel deployed to the regions to ensure the legality of
continued detentions.[163]

Judicial
authorities have addressed the problem of illegal detentions in the past. In
Lakes State, Special Courts comprised of traditional authorities and statutory
court judges reviewed pre-trial detention cases in 2007-8. In February 2008 one
court ordered the release of 45 detainees from Rumbek Central Prison after
finding the charges without merit.[164]
If conducted properly and by qualified individuals, such reviews could help
alleviate crowding in the prisons and ensure the
legality of detentions.

X. Lack
of Accountability for Human Rights Violations

According
to one of the highest ranking judges in Southern Sudan, "there is a lot of
aggressive behaviour and impunity for those with guns." He attributed this to
the militarization of the criminal justice system-soldiers taking the law into
their own hands-and to the lack of independence in the judiciary, citing a
well-known 2006 case in which a judge was beaten up in Aweil by guards in front
of the Governor's office.[165]

Southern
Sudan's justice system is in an embryonic stage of development and still too
weak to provide accountability for most human rights violations. The judiciary
and prosecution staff from the Judiciary of Southern Sudan and the Ministry of
Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development lack basic training, English
skills, equipment, libraries, and other resources, and remain concentrated in
Juba and other main towns. The State of Eastern Equatoria, for example had only
five judges covering an area twice the size of Switzerland, while the even
larger Western Bahr el Ghazal had judicial staff in only one town.[166]

One
obstacle to holding human rights violators accountable is the reluctance of
police to investigate crimes involving soldiers or other security personnel. In
many cases, police simply do not open a case. In an alleged case of rape of
three Ugandan women by six soldiers from SPLA and Joint Integrated Units (joint
forces made up of SPLA and SAF soldiers, created under the CPA) in the Torit
market in December 2007, police refused to take victims' statements and open an
investigation.[167] Instead, police may refer victims to national security or to SPLA's
military police unit. Following the September 2008 violence in Rumbek, victims
reported that police initially refused to open investigations, and referred
people instead to SPLA.[168]

The
police's reluctance to investigate human rights violations-including by other
police-may reflect their fear of violent retaliation. In one incident in
Western Equatoria in November 2007, a group of SPLA soldiers serving in the JIU
at Yambio attacked local police, killing ten, including three senior police
officers.[169] Authorities often cite the incident as illustrative of soldiers'
interference in the justice system and impunity. The incident was prompted
because the civilian police arrested a soldier suspected of killing another
soldier.

The
extent to which the military justice system punishes soldiers for human rights
violations remains unclear as the courts martial are closed to the public.[170] After the clashes at Logurun and Iloli villages a local chief
reported that the SPLA commander and 12 soldiers investigated the killings of
civilians, but no one was punished for them.[171] The SPLA subsequently launched an investigation into the incident.[172] However, results have not been made public.[173] The results of investigations into the Rumbek violence have also
not been made public.

SPLA
is starting to develop a military justice system and improve accountability
measures.[174] A new SPLA Act, passed in January 2009, could help provide guidance
and discipline. The law defines military crimes and it applies the civilian penal
code for non-military crimes. It also references a code of conduct to be
drafted by military authorities.

The
police disciplinary system also lacks transparency. Police who are implicated
in human rights violations, such as arbitrary arrests and detentions, are
rarely held accountable in the civilian courts. UNMIS monitors reported that in
only one of the arbitrary arrest and detention cases they monitored were perpetrators
disciplined.[175] According to UNMIS police advisers, the office of inspector
general, based in Juba, has so far largely focused on minor disciplinary
breaches such as drunkenness rather than serious human rights violations.[176] A Police Act, currently in draft, is urgently needed to clarify the
roles and responsibilities of police and provide a basis for more transparent
accountability.

Committees
in the legislative assembly, such as the Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Committee, investigate some of the larger-scale conflicts and document abuses
including in detention facilities.[177] Their reports complement the work of the Southern Sudan Human
Rights Commission (SSHRC) in raising awareness about human rights violations
and trends, but the Commission's reports have not led to prosecutions for
specific crimes. An assembly committee report on the massacre of 54 Didinga
women and children by armed Toposa at Buda County, Eastern Equatoria, in May
2007 has not been discussed publicly because it is considered too sensitive.[178]

In
February, the legislative assembly passed a long-awaited bill giving the
Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission legal standing to summons state actors. If
the Commission is adequately supported by GoSS and donors, its work could
provide the basis for prosecutions in criminal courts. Other commissions,
notably Land and Anti-Corruption, will also help promote accountability for
abuses. The Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission collected some 14,000
complaints against officials in the first half of 2008 alone, but its enabling
law is still pending.[179]

XI.
The Role of UN and International Donors

The
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) established in 2005 by Security Council
resolution 1590,comprises close to 10,000 military personnel including military
observers, protection force and staff for logistical support, 600 UN police
advisers, as well as civilian staff including human rights monitors, protection
and child protection officers, civil affairs officers, elections officers, and
gender advisors.

The
mission is mandated to support implementation of the CPA largely through
monitoring of the ceasefire agreement and other aspects of the CPA. However,
lack of access to many parts of Southern Sudan's vast and difficult terrain has
hampered the mission's monitoring function by both military and civilian staff,
and this has also affected its human rights monitoring work.[180]
With many remote areas beyond reach except by flight, UN personnel are often
not able to fully document deadly conflicts and their human rights
implications. An inter-agency conflict management taskforce has been formed to
improve monitoring of potential conflicts across Southern Sudan and could help
GoSS plan more effective and appropriate responses.

UNMIS
also has a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence, "in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its
capabilities... and without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government
of Sudan."[181]
To date, the mission has not interpreted this provision robustly. To many
observers, the mission's failure to protect civilians during and immediately
after the May 2008 clashes at Abyei encapsulated its shortcomings in civilian
protection.[182]
In an assessment of its own response to that crisis, UNMIS recommended
additional military deployment to flashpoint areas.[183]
The mission is in the process of redeploying forces to transitional areas, but it
has not revised its directives to reflect a more robust interpretation of the
civilian protection aspects of its mandate.

Various
UN and bilateral agencies are meanwhile making efforts to strengthen rule of
law institutions. UNMIS police advisors co-locate in police stations and
monitor cases and police holding cells, while UNMIS corrections officers
monitor the main prisons. This presence, according to UN, has helped reduce
incidents of illegal arrests and detentions in some locations.[184]

Agencies
and donors are also supporting police, courts, and prisons through training,
material support, and by providing consultants to the judiciary and the
Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development. At the same time,
agencies and donors have begun focusing more on security sector reform-a broad
field that includes DDR, SPLA reform and rule of law programs.[185]
A major goal is to promote civilian (rather than military) oversight of law and
order functions such as civilian disarmament.

With
many actors involved in security sector and rule of law work, donors should
assess the need for more coordination to rationalize resources and provide
support to fill gaps that improve human rights in the short term. For example,
donors could provide more support for specialized training for soldiers and
police on their roles and responsibilities and applicable human rights
standards; increase support for judicial and traditional authorities to work
together to reduce instances of illegal and pro-longed detentions; and give support
to detention facilities designed to bring them in line with basic minimum human
rights standards.

In the
lead-up to elections, UN agencies and donors should help GoSS develop a
coherent strategy for managing conflict in a manner that protects human rights
rather than violates them. They should also help ensure public education about
the elections begins well in advance.

[1]
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement did not resolve other issues, such as land
ownership or accountability for human rights violations during the 21 year
civil war, although it established land commissions (nationally and
regionally).

[2]
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of The
Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army
(CPA), signed January 9, 2005 Chapter I, Part A, Art. 1.5.5.
http://www.unmis.org/English/documents/cpa-en.pdf (accessed October 19, 2008).

[3]
The GNU passed the Interim National Constitution and the GoSS passed the
Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. The GNU's National Assembly has enacted
several CPA laws such as the Joint Integrated Units Act, the Organization of
Voluntary and Humanitarian Work Act (NGO Act), the National Civil Service
Commission Act, and others.

[4]
The parties agreed to the CPA in large part because of the personal
relationship between NCP's Ali Osman Taha, currently Vice President, and SPLM
leader John Garang. Garang's death in July 2005 changed the dynamics of the
peace agreement. See International Crisis Group "A Strategy for Comprehensive
Peace in Sudan," Africa Report No. 130, July 26, 2007, pg. 3, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4961
(accessed February 2, 2009).

[6]
The parties have made progress on the wealth sharing provisions, but the
Assessment and Evaluation Commission, an independent body established by the
CPA to monitor its implementation, recommends more transparency in the oil
sector. Republic of the Sudan, Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), Mid
Term Evaluation Report, July, 9, 2008, p. 18, http://www.aec-sudan.org/mte/mte_english.pdf
(accessed October 7, 2008).

[7]
Human Rights Watch, Sudan - Abandoning Abyei: Destruction and Displacement, May
2008, July 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/21/abandoning-abyei-0.
The parties have since made progress deploying new joint security forces and
appointing an Administration pursuant to a June 8 agreement. However, the
underlying boundary dispute, deferred to international arbitration, remains,
and there have been reports of continued troop build ups in the area.

[9]
CPA, Ch. VI, Art. 3. The term "boundary," used interchangeably herein with
"border," refers to the boundary drawn by the British colonial administration
dividing North and South Sudan as of the date of Sudan's independence on January
1, 1956.

[17]
The national census, conducted in April 2008 after several delays, was marred
in part by a spate of attacks on civilians by Sudanese Armed Forces-supported
militia in the preceding weeks. "Militia Attacks Threaten Crucial Census,"
Human Rights Watch news release, April 10, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/04/08/sudan-militia-attacks-threaten-crucial-census.

[18]
United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the
Sudan," S/2008/485, para. 5, July 23, 2008, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2008/485
(accessed October 7, 2009).

[19]
"Speech of South Sudan President Salva Kir on Fourth Anniversary of CPA in
Malakal," New Sudan Vision,
January 11, 2009 http://www.newsudanvision.com/news/speech-south-sudan-president-salva-kiir-fourth-anniversary-cpa-malakal-1467
(accessed February 2, 2009).

[20]
CPA, Ch. II, 1.8.3 calls for elections by the end of the third year of the
interim period, while implementation modalities (Annexure II) of the CPA call
for elections no later than end of fourth year of interim period.

26See "Speech of South Sudan President Salva Kir on
Fourth Anniversary of CPA in Malakal," New
Sudan Vision, January 11, 2009,
http://www.newsudanvision.com/news/speech-south-sudan-president-salva-kiir-fourth-anniversary-cpa-malakal-1467
(accessed February 2, 2009).

[27]
The 2008 GOSS budget for SPLA Affairs alone was 1 billion Sudanese Pounds,
representing nearly a third of the total 3.428 billion Sudanese Pounds. Close
to half the budget went to salaries. http://mpagoss.org/budget.html (accessed
October 7, 2008). In January 2009, GoSS passed a 3.6 billion Sudanese Pounds
budget despite overspending in several sectors including security, and falling
oil revenues.

[28]
See John G. Nyout Yoh, "Countdown: Two Years to the Referendum," Gurtong,
January 20, 2009, http://www.gurtong.org/ResourceCenter/editorscorner/edart_details.asp?editorsitem_id=1020
(accessed February 2, 2009).

[29]
See "Speech of South Sudan President Salva Kir on Fourth Anniversary of CPA in
Malakal," New Sudan Vision,
January 11, 2009 http://www.newsudanvision.com/news/speech-south-sudan-president-salva-kiir-fourth-anniversary-cpa-malakal-1467
(accessed February 2, 2009).

[32]
Traci D. Cook, "A place to call their own: Southern Sudanese comment on the
hard work & struggles of self-governance," Findings from Focus Groups with
Men and Women in Southern Sudan, National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, September 18, 2007, http://www.ndi.org/node/13793
(accessed January 28, 2009).

[34]
Traci D. Cook, "Intergovernmental Relations in Southern Sudan," Findings From
Interviews with Government Officials and Legislators and the GoSS and State
Levels," The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, September
30, 2008, p. 75, http://www.ndi.org/node/14950 (accessed February 2, 2009).

[35]
Human Rights Watch interviews with members of Parliament (names withheld),
Juba, March 17-18 and June 28, 2008.

[39]
Human Rights Watch, Sudan - Abandoning
Abyei: Destruction and Displacement, May 2008, July 2008,
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/sudan0708/. The parties have since made progress
deploying joint security forces to Abyei and appointing a civil administration
there. However, the GNU has yet to release funding for the administration and
joint forces. As of January 2009 the majority of residents have not returned.

[40]
Clashes erupted between Sudanese government-backed militia and SPLA near
Kharasana in April 2008, then spread to Kharasana town, killing 18 civilians
and causing thousands to flee. The clashes were preceded by disagreements over
the location of SPLA troops. Similar disagreements caused violence at Abyei
and contributed to tensions near White Lake/Jaw. United Nations Security
Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," S/2008/267, para. 11, April
22, 2008, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2008/267 (accessed
October 6, 2008).

[45]
Following the January 2006 "Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of SPLA
and the SSDF," many other armed groups integrated into the SPLA. The Southern
Sudan Defense Forces is an umbrella organization of formerly SAF-aligned armed
groups.

[51]
See United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the
Sudan," S/2008/485, para. 5, July 23, 2008, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/430/60/PDF/N0843060.pdf?OpenElement
(accessed February 2, 2009).

[63]
See United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the
Sudan," S/2008/485, para. 47, July 23, 2008, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/430/60/PDF/N0843060.pdf?OpenElement
(accessed February 2, 2009).

[69]
The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan Art. 154 (c) states that armed
forces do not have a mandate for internal law and order,"except as may be
requested by the civil authority with necessity so requires."

[71]
"SPLA White Paper on Defense: Towards a Secured Southern Sudan/Sudan for All,"
Government of Southern Sudan, March 2008, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[72]
Human Rights Watch interviews with Members of Parliament (names withheld), June
27, 2008. See also Otuho Community Association, "Complaint against SPLA
military operations in the villages of Iloli and Oguruny on 4th June 2008," on
file with Human Rights Watch.

[73]
Memorandum addressed to the President of GoSS from the Eastern Equatoria State
Governor's Office, June 10, 2008, on file with Human Rights Watch. The villages
had remained armed despite a disarmament program in 2007 that collected some 100
weapons from the area.

[74]
Both villages have a protection force, known as "monyomiji," that also serves
as the village government. Youth from Lotuku villages are inducted into the
village government and protection force once every two decades.

[84]
GoSS, Operation Order No.1/2008: Disarmament of Civil Population in Southern
Sudan, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[85]
At a governor's forum in October 2008, Kiir again encouraged governors to
improve security in their states by disarming civilians. "H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir
Mayardit Key Note Address at the 6th Governor's Forum," September
29, 2008, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[87]
John Young, "Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to War," The
Small Arms Survey, pp. 24-29, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SWP%207%20North-South%20tensions.pdf
(accessed February, 3, 2009). The SSDF, which had been receiving support from
Khartoum, were effectively integrated into the SPLA with the 2006 Juba
Declaration but some elements participated in the Jonglei battles fighting
against SPLA because of ethnic loyalties.

[89]
United Nations Security Council, "The Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,"
S/2008/485, para. 6, July 23, 2008,
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2008/485 (accessed October 6,
2008).

[112]
Sara Pantuliano, "The land question: Sudan's peace nemesis," HPG Working Paper,
Humanitarian Policy Group, December 2007, http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/wplandsudan.pdf
(accessed February 3, 2009). The legal vacuum has also had a negative impact on
rural communities that rely on traditional land tenure systems, and on women
whose land and property rights are not protected in the absence of a legal
framework.

[113]
Human Rights Watch group interview with Juba men and women, Juba, March 29, 2008.

[114] Human Rights Watch group interview with Juba men and women, Juba, March 29, 2008.

[122]
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Arbitrary
arrest and detention committed by national security, military and police,"
Tenth periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, November 28, 2008, provides a
far more thorough discussion of these problems.

[124]
The criminal laws give soldiers some authority to make arrests in the context
of keeping public order. Criminal Procedure Act, 2008, Sections 163-5. The new SPLA Act, passed in January 2009, also gives soldiers a
role in internal security but does not specify what that entails.

[129]
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Arbitrary
arrest and detention committed by national security, military and police,"
Tenth period report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on
the situation of human rights in the Sudan, November 28, 2008, p.24-25

[147]Under the system of
"bride wealth," the groom's family pays cattle for the bride so the bride's
family has an interest in marrying her to the highest bidder. Since the bride's
family must repay it if the couple divorces, women and girls are pressured to
stay in their marriages, regardless of abuses they may suffer. In some
traditions, the age of marriage is as low as 14.

[149]
UNMIS report December 2007, on file with Human Rights Watch; see also, Human
Rights Watch, "The Impact of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on Southern Sudan,"
March 2006, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/sudan0306/index.htm.

[150]
Human Rights Watch interview with member of Southern Sudan Law Society, Juba,
July 4, 2008.

[167]
"Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Sudan, Sima Simar," Human Rights Council, A/HRC/7/22, March 3, 2008, para. 68.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47df89002.html (accessed February 3, 2009).

[185]
The UN Secretary-General, acknowledging that CPA implementation depends on
successful integration of former SPLA combatants into professional military,
police and other uniformed services, called for UN to coordinate security and
justice sector projects more comprehensively. United Nations Security Council, "Report
of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," S/2008/267, para. 58, April 22, 2008, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2008/267
(accessed October 6, 2008).