The government has decided to constitute a permanent
tribunal to adjudicate on all inter-state disputes over river waters, doing
away with the current practice of having a separate tribunal for every dispute
that arises.

All existing
tribunals will be subsumed in this new permanent tribunal.

Last week, the
Cabinet approved an amendment to the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956
to allow for the setting up of a permanent tribunal, and a few regional
benches based on requirement.

In
the past till now ?

Under current
provisions of the law, an affected government has to make a request to the
Centre, which, after having convinced itself that the dispute cannot be
settled through negotiations, can constitute a tribunal.

So far, eight
tribunals have been set up under this law, including one on the Cauvery
water dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.

All of these
tribunals have already given their awards.

What else does the amendment include ?

Apart from the
tribunal, the proposed amendment to the 1956 law also seeks to create an
agency to collect and maintain all relevant
water data, like rainfall, water flow and irrigation area, in each of the
river basins of the country.

Collection of
data is usually the first exercise in resolution of water disputes. A specialised agency would ensure that
this kind of data is always available, in updated form, and does not need
to be collected after a dispute has arisen.

The
Centre has already envisaged such a data agency as part of the institutional
restructuring it is planning in the water sector. The government has proposed a new National Water Commission (NWC) in
place of the existing Central Water Commission (CWC) and Central Ground Water
Board (CGWB). One of the departments of the NWC is supposed to act as a
comprehensive and specialised water data bank.

Before referring
a dispute to the new permanent tribunal, the proposed amendment provides
for setting up a Disputes Redressal
Committee comprising experts.

It is hoped that
most of the disputes would be settled at the committee level itself, if
the committee has access to reliable and updated data. The committee would
also serve as the technical advisor to the tribunal.

Sources
said the proposed amendment asks the tribunal to give its verdict within
two years. Under the current law, the tribunals have three years to
give their awards.

Why is this move SIGNIFICANT ?

This
move is significant in following ways:

• It is expected to provide speedier adjudication.
• Setting up a Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) comprising experts and policy
makers to handle dispute prior to tribunal is likely to lessen the number of
disputes before the tribunal.
• As there will be a body of experts, it will
have a neutral and holistic view on the issue. As it will have
reliable data in its hand, it can fiercely question the data provided by
states.

What are the CONCERNS involved ?

•
It is unlikely that a single institution can handle so many
disputes.
• The verdict of Tribunal can be appealed to
the SC. Thus the finality & enforcement of tribunal’s award
may remain elusive.
• It is also not clear how these temporary benches
will be different form present tribunals.
• Reluctance of state parties to abide by judicial orders.

The Centre’s decision
to create a permanent water tribunal to adjudicate over inter-state water
disputes may, at first glance, look
like an improvement over the current ad hoc nature of such tribunals, but
it is unlikely to work very much better.

The long-running
Cauvery water dispute between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka could not be solved
this time even by the Supreme Court, since Karnataka, plagued by a weak
monsoon, more or less refused to comply with it. Karnataka also had
problems with the Mahadayi river tribunal verdict, which the state saw as
favouring Goa.So the presumption
that a permanent tribunal will do the job is naïve.

Solving inter-state water disputes needs a different
approach, one which does not merely look at distributing shortage, but optimising water use and augmenting
supplies. In an era of growing
demands for water and competing needs, the issue is not the forum used to
settle disputes, but something larger.

First, the disputes need to be framed
correctly.

The
problems cannot be assumed to be only between states; they could also be
intra-state. Is the Cauvery water about Tamil
Nadu and Karnataka, or also about upstream and downstream usage in
Karnataka itself?

The dispute is as much between upper riparian districts, which
use the water for farming, and the lower riparian users, including cities
like Bengaluru.

This dispute,
though, gets suppressed in inter-state political posturing. Water disputes
should thus be framed holistically. Without a proper framing of the dispute,
you will not get optimal solutions.

Second, optimising water
usage.

States and
centre must evolve a hierarchy of water usage, with drinking water
being prioritised over farming, industrial and other needs.

Economic
value-add could be a criterion. If metros and
cities add more economic value, they can well afford to pay more for water
and be given a higher share too.

Within farming,
too, we need to prioritise. If sugarcane and rice are water
guzzlers, logically cane and paddy farmers should be expected to pay more
for growing such crops than those growing wheat or coarse cereals.

Since
livelihoods are at stake, water subsidies may be unavoidable, but this can
only happen if water is paid for by all users to some extent. The free water threshold has to be low, so as to
disincentivise wastage.

Third, tapping alternate
sources.

Coastal states
must, by law, be asked to use more desalinated water.

They can be
subsidised by the centre for the installation of such plants.

Both Tamil
Nadu and Karnataka are coastal states, and there is no reason why both
should not be asked to augment supplies by tapping sea water for
non-potable uses.

Tamil Nadu
already does so; Karnataka needs to be encouraged to follow suit. This way
the Cauvery water can be used for higher-priority needs.

Fourth, compensation must be
the norm when monsoon fails.

Once a
water-sharing formula is agreed both between states and between districts
within states, if water is in short supply due to monsoon failure, those
who get less than they were guaranteed should be compensated financially
by state or centre.

Thus, if
Karnataka does not release water, it should be asked to pay Tamil Nadu for
the shortfall; but this can happen only after both states agree to the
primary sharing formula.

A
tribunal should not only work out the water-sharing percentage in heavy
and lean months, but also the financial compensation when a shortage
develops.

Fifth, fiscal incentives to
reduce water usage.

India wastes too
much water, whether in farming or in industrial areas or even for urban
home consumption.

Clearly, water
must be paid for, and fiscal incentives to reuse waste water, to adopt
drip irrigation, and to line canals to prevent wastage are critical.

MORAL OF THE STORY !!

The
only way to end the water wars is to think abundance, not shortage. This calls
for less wastage, economising on consumption, and getting people to pay a price
for it. What is not paid for will be wasted.