Objectivity Without Space

Pete Mandik

0. Introduction

[1] What, if anything, does space have to do with objectivity?
In this paper I argue that the correct answer to this question
is: "Not much". More specifically, I will be countering
arguments due to Peter Strawson (1959) and his student Gareth
Evans (1985a) that space is a necessary condition on objectivity.
Even more specifically, I will be articulating a theory of
objectivity that does not make space a requirement and defending
the theory against Strawson's and Evans' arguments to the
contrary. Along the way I hope to make some interesting remarks
about what objectivity is supposed to be. I regret that I have
considerably less to say about what space is supposed to be.

[2] This paper is organized as follows. In section 1, I
briefly address the questions of who cares and why. In section 2,
I discuss the various ways of drawing the objective-subjective
distinction that have appeared in the philosophical literature.
The notions I unpack in section 2 will be employed in the theory
I sketch in section 3. In section 4, I defend that theory against
Strawson's and Evans' arguments.

1. The Relevance of This Project to Others

[3] For several centuries and in many areas of philosophy various
species of the distinction between the objective and the
subjective are expressed in a spatial idiom. Philosophers
alternately worry about and shrug off the problem of the
external world. They wonder whether anything exists
outside of the mind. Metaphorical articulations of the
notions of subjectivity and objectivity exploit the spatial idiom
of seeing things from a point of view. What can be seen from
only one point of view is more subjective and less objective that
what can be seen from any point of view. The maximally objective
view is, to use Thomas Nagel's phrase, the view from nowhere
(see Nagel 1986).

[4] Space and objectivity are associated in doctrine as well
idiom. For Hobbes, the notion of mind-independent things just
was the notion of things existing in space (Elements of
Philosophy, II, 7, ii). The association of space and
objectivity is particularly strong in Cartesian dualism whereby
whatever is objective is physical, that it, has spatial
magnitude, whereby what ever is subjective in nonphysical, that
is, lacking in spatial magnitude (Meditations II).

[5] Philosophers like Thomas Nagel have worried that the
subjectivity of conscious experience bars the possibility of
giving a physicalistic explanation of consciousness (see also
McGinn 1995). The classical distinction between primary and
secondary properties, i.e., the distinction between objective
properties of objects and those "in the eye of the beholder"
properties fell along spatial/nonspatial lines. Primary
properties, that is, objective properties, of objects were cashed
out in terms of the occupation of and movement through space (see
Evans 1985a: 268-81). In the philosophy of mathematics, there is
a pervasive unease about attempts to cash out the objectivity of
mathematical knowledge in terms of reference to non-physical
objects (see, for example, Benacerraff 1965, 1973; Dummett 1975;
Field 1989; Quine 1980; Wrenn 1998).

[6] Several philosophers and psychologists interested in the
topic of spatial representation have identified a distinction
between egocentric and allocentric representations of space and
described this distinction as one between subjective and
objective ways of representing space (see, for example, Brewer
1996; Campbell 1996; Evans 1982, 1985b; O'Keefe 1996). O'Keefe
and Nadel (1978) argue that the function of the hippocampal
structure in brain is to facilitate the construction and use of
allocentric spatial representations. Cohen and Eichenbaum (1993)
have offered a theory of hippocampal function that downplays its
role in spatial representation: on their account hippocampal
structures are responsible for a class of representation that
includes but is broader than the spatial. On Cohen and
Eichenbaum's account, however, mention of allocentricity is
absent. If hippocampal representations are not spatial, does
this mean that they are not allocentric or objective? Or can the
notion of objective ways of representing things be extended to
apply to representations that do not represent things as being
spatial?

[7] In reviewing the above questions concerning the spatial
criteria of objectivity, one may suspect that more than a single
sense of "objectivity" is in question. The main point of the
next section is that such a suspicion is correct.

2 The Varieties of Objectivity

[8] In this section I give a brief gloss of some of the varieties of
objectivity that have been identified in the philosophical
literature.

2.1. Epistemic and Metaphysical Objectivity and Subjectivity

[9] A news reporter worries whether her moral commitment to
expose Bosnian war atrocities as atrocious conflicts with her
journalistic commitment to write an objective news report.
A microscopist worries whether an alleged cellular organelle is
an objective feature of the cell or instead, like beauty
and Martian Canals, merely in the eye of the beholder. Some
philosophers, including the present author, are inclined to
suspect that the journalist and the microscopist are worrying
about two different kinds of objectivity (see Audi 1992; Bell
1992; Foss 1993; Newell 1986; Searle 1992: 93-100; Rescher 1997:
3-5).

[10] The objective/subjective distinction has two senses: a
metaphysical sense and an epistemic sense. The journalist's
worry concerns epistemic objectivity, whereas the
microscopist's worry concerns metaphysical objectivity. At
the heart of the metaphysical notion of objectivity is the notion
of mind-independent existence (where metaphysical subjectivity is
just mind-dependent existence). What lies at that heart of the
epistemic notion of objectivity is difficult to specify without
describing a particular theory of epistemic objectivity--a task I
postpone until later in this section.

[11] For now I indicate the gist of the epistemic sense by way
of contrast against the metaphysical sense. The difference
between the epistemic and metaphysical senses hinges on the
different sorts of things that may be said to be either objective
or subjective. Only intentional phenomena -- things that have
aboutness (e.g., knowledge, beliefs, fears, judgments, theories,
sentences, mental representations, and news reports) -- are
epistemically objective or subjective. So, for example, one
might consider my judgment that the moon has no atmosphere an
epistemically objective judgment. In contrast, my judgment that
vanilla is the best ice cream flavor may be regarded as
epistemically subjective.

[12] The metaphysically objective and subjective are broader
categories than the epistemically objective and subjective.1 All things, in
the broadest sense of the word "thing" (e.g., objects,
properties, events, etc.) are either metaphysically objective or
subjective.2
Something is subjective in the metaphysical sense if it requires
a mind, or more specifically, being represented by a mind, for
its existence or instantiation. Something is metaphysically
objective if it may exist or be instantiated without being
represented. If beauty is in the eye of the beholder and truth
is what ever I believe to be the case and nothing is good or bad
but thinking make it so, then beauty, truth, and goodness would
be metaphysically subjective.

[13] It may be worth noting that something can be both
epistemically subjective and metaphysically objective. My belief
that vanilla is better than chocolate may be epistemically
subjective. But whether I have the belief may not depend on the
belief itself being represented, and thus, may be metaphysically
objective. Likewise, something can be both epistemically
objective and metaphysically subjective. Suppose that I believe
that frogs are amphibians only if someone believes that I believe
that frogs are amphibians. My belief may be metaphysically
subjective then. But it may be epistemically objective on the
grounds that whether frogs are amphibians isn't a mere matter of
idiosyncratic opinion or something. As mentioned above, it is
hard to say much about epistemic objectivity without describing
some theory or other. I turn, then, to the theories.

2.2. Theories of Epistemic Objectivity and Subjectivity

[14] As far as I can tell, theories of epistemic objectivity
and subjectivity fall into four main categories: consensus
theories, indexical theories, metarepresentational theories, and
correspondence theories.3 I discuss briefly the key features
of these theories in order to situate the theory I favor within
the broader philosophical literature.

[15] Consensus theories define the epistemic objectivity of a
judgment in terms of agreement. Depending on the theory, the
agreement may be actual or counterfactual. Where the agreement
required is actual, a judgment is epistemically objective to the
degree that it is agreed upon and subjective to the degree that
there is disagreement. Maybe a judgment is more objective as
more people agree on it or maybe a judgment is objective only if
everyone agrees on it and subjective otherwise. Christopher
Gauker (1995) defends a consensus theory whereby only
counterfactual agreement is necessary for objectivity. For
Gauker, the objectivity of a judgment has to do with the
likelihood that it would be agreed upon if rational people were
to entertain the judgment.4

[16] Indexical theories capitalize on the naturalness with
which we describe the subjective/objective distinction in terms
of the first- and third- person points of view. William Lycan's
biography, as told in the first-person point of view, would be
chock-full of statements employing self-referential indexicals.
Examples might include "I am a philosopher" and "I have a
mustache". If told instead from the third-person point of view
Lycan's biography would instead contain statements devoid of
indexicals. Examples might include "William Lycan is a
philosopher" and "William Lycan has a mustache". In indexical
theories of subjectivity, the subjectivity of a representation is
explicated by the representation's having indexical components.
A natural suggestion, then, is that representations that lack
indexical components are objective. An indexical account of
epistemic subjectivity and objectivity, then, would define as
subjective representational states that had indexical components
and define as subjective representational states that lacked
indexical components.5

[17] On metarepresentational theories, for there to be any
objectivity or subjectivity, there must be cognizers that grasp
the distinction between their own representations on the one hand
and, on the other hand, things that, while being what the
representations are representations of, may nonetheless exist
unrepresented. On the assumption that the grasp of such a
distinction is itself a representation of the distinction, it
becomes quite obvious why such a theory is correctly called
"metarepresentational". Thomas Nagel offers a
metarepresentational theory. Nagel writes:

Objectivity is a method of understanding. It is beliefs and
attitudes that are objective in the primary sense.... To
acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of life or
the world, we step back from our initial view of it and form a
new conception which has that view and its relation to the world
as its object. In other words, we place ourselves in the world
that is to be understood. The old view then comes to be regarded
as an appearance, more subjective than the new view, and
correctable or confirmable by reference to it. The process can be
repeated, yielding a still more objective conception. (1986:
4)

Nagel's account is metarepresentational since we are able to
have objective beliefs only if we are able to have beliefs about
our beliefs.6

[18] The core notion of correspondence theories is that an
epistemically objective belief or sentence must be in some sense
about something metaphysically objective. Rorty describes
this notion of objectivity as "mirroring" for it is a notion of
objectivity that involves the notion of representing things as
they really are, that is, the way they are independent of
the way they are represented.7 A description of something as
being a hunk of titanium would be epistemically objective,
according to the correspondence theory, because something can be
a hunk of titanium independently of any one's representing it as
such. In contrast, my belief that Brussels sprouts are
disgusting is epistemically subjective because being disgusting
requires being mentally represented as disgusting. To contort a
cliché: disgustingness is in the mouth of the taster.

[19] Gauker notes that since a judgment may be objective while
false, on a correspondence theory an objective belief need only
purport to describe the way things really are (1995: 160). Thus,
the aim of correspondence theories of objectivity is to reconcile
(i) the requirement that the objectivity of a belief consists in
its corresponding with metaphysically objective things and (ii)
the possibility of a belief being both objective and false.

[20] A natural, but I think incorrect, way of cashing out the
correspondence theory is by defining as subjective any thing that
depicts a metaphysically subjective state of affairs. On such an
account, the sentence "a is F" is epistemically objective
just in case the subject term and the general term both pick out
things that are metaphysically objective.8 This comports with the
intuitions that the sentence "Jane is a mammal" is epistemically
objective while "Jane is beautiful" is epistemically subjective.
However, this version of the correspondence theory has the
unintuitive consequence that the sentence "Beauty is a subjective
property" is epistemically subjective. This seems unintuitive
because while beauty may be in the eye of the beholder, whether
beauty is in the eye of the beholder need not itself be in the
eye of the beholder.

[21] On a correspondence theory, the difference between "John
Smith is ugly" and "John Smith is a mammal" in virtue of which
the former is epistemically subjective and the latter
epistemically objective does not consist in the fact that the
latter is true. This is because the correspondence theorist
wants to allow that the former may be true as well. Nor does the
difference hinge on whether the individual named by the subject
term is metaphysically objective, since the cases do not vary in
that regard. I offer, then, that the proper explication of a
correspondence notion of objectivity requires only that the
predicate correspond to something metaphysically
objective.9
Metaphysically objective objects need not be referred to in
singular sentences nor quantified over in quantified sentences in
order for the sentences to be epistemically objective. Instead, I
offer, what makes a singular sentence of the form "a is F"
metaphysically objective is that the property F named by
the predicate term "F" is metaphysically objective. Thus
I call the correspondence theory of epistemic objectivity that I
advocate the predicational theory of epistemic
objectivity.10
In section 3.1. I sketch how the predicational theory deals with
singular and quantified sentences and the corresponding
propositional attitudes. I turn now to unpack the notions of
metaphysical objectivity that the predicational theory
exploits.

2.3. The Varieties of Metaphysical Objectivity

[22] I think it important to distinguish two notions of
mind-independence. The first is the bare notion of something's
existing only if some mind or other exists. The second is the
less general notion of depending on being represented by a mind.
I call these two notions "mere mind dependence" and
"representation dependence".11 To illustrate the difference
consider the existence of my thought that grass is green. The
thought itself may exist only if there is some mind or other,
thus exhibiting bare mind dependence. However, I can think that
grass is green with out my, or anyone's, thinking anything about
that thinking. Thus, while being merely mind dependent, my
thinking that grass is green is nonetheless
representation-independent.

[23] If being an F is merely mind dependent then the
existence of an F entails the existence of a person. The
mere mind dependence of an F, however, does not entail
that any person represents an F. That is, mere mind
dependence does not entail representation dependence, though
representation dependence does entail mere mind dependence.

[24] As a first approximation of a definition of the
representation dependence of an F I offer that the
existence of an F entails and is entailed by the existence
of a person that represents

where "RFyx" is a binary first order predicate
used in lieu of "y represents x as F". As a second
approximation of a definition of representation dependence, I
would alter the definition so that the existence of Fs did
not require actually being represented as Fs but instead
the only the disposition to be represented as F. An
F is representation dependent just in case the existence
of Fs depends on a disposition to be represented as an
F.

[25] I define metaphysical subjectivity in terms of
representation dependence, not mere mind dependence. Metaphysical
subjectivity is representation dependence and metaphysical
objectivity as representation independence. I turn now to further
unpack my definition of metaphysical objectivity and subjectivity
by looking at the difference between the metaphysical objectivity
of objects and the metaphysical objectivity of properties.

[26] An object is metaphysically objective just in case the
existence of the object depends neither on (i) the inscription or
utterance of any sentence about the object, (ii) the tokening of
any propositional attitude about the object, nor (iii) any
disposition to token sentences or attitudes about it. An object
is metaphysically subjective if it is not metaphysically
objective. If the planet Earth would exist even if no one ever
mentioned or believed in its existence, the planet Earth would be
metaphysically objective. If the mere belief that Santa Claus
exists were sufficient to make Santa Claus exist, then Santa
Claus would be metaphysically subjective.

[27] A property is metaphysically objective just in case its
instantiation depends neither on (i) the inscription or utterance
of any sentence containing a predicate naming that property (ii)
the tokening of any propositional attitude that has a constituent
a concept of that property (iii) any disposition of persons to
token sentences or attitudes as described in (i) and (ii). A
property is metaphysically subjective just in case it is not
metaphysically objective.

3. The Predicational Theory of Epistemic Objectivity

3.1. Outline of the Theory

[28] I will define epistemic objectivity only for atomic
sentences and their corresponding propositional attitudes.12 I will also
restrict my attention to sentences containing binary or monadic
predicates and attitudes employing binary or monadic
concepts.

[29] The inscribed or uttered sentence token "a is F"
is epistemically objective just in case the property F is
metaphysically objective. "a is F" is epistemically
objective regardless of whether a is metaphysically
objective. The sentence "a is F" is epistemically
subjective just in case it is not epistemically objective.
Quantified sentences of the form "(Ex)(x is F)" and
"(x)(x is F)" are epistemically objective just in case the
instantiation of the property F is metaphysically
objective. The objects quantified over need not themselves be
metaphysically objective.

[30] I extend the treatment of the epistemic objectivity of
sentences to apply to propositional attitudes such as belief.
Propositional attitudes, I will suppose, require the possession
and deployment of concepts corresponding to the terms used in the
sentences that are their expression. My believing that a
is F involves my possessing and deploying the subject
concept of a and the predicative concept of being
F. The same predicative concept is employed in my
quantificational beliefs that all x's are F and
that some x's are F. The epistemic objectivity of
propositional attitudes such as belief that P and the
perception that P is due to my possessing and deploying a
predicative concept that picks out a metaphysically objective
property.

[31] Another way of stating the predicational theory of
objectivity is by saying that an intentional phenomenon is
epistemically objective just in case it has a predicational
structure, and the predicate names a metaphysically objective
property. Thus intentional phenomenon can fail to be
epistemically objective--be epistemically subjective--in
one of two ways. First, they may fail to have a predicational
structure.13
Second, they may have a predicational structure but have a
predicate that names a metaphysically subjective property.

[32] Examples of the first kind of epistemically subjective
intentional phenomena--intentional phenomena lacking
predicational structure--include items in feature-placing
representational schemes. Feature-placing utterances in our own
language might include "It is raining". Such utterances do not
serve to identify a particular and predicate some property of it,
but instead to merely indicate the occurrence of some feature. A
very young child or even a parrot may be trained to use a
feature-placing system by being trained to utter "red" and "blue"
in the presence of red and blue objects and "square" and "round"
in the presence of square and round objects. Training a subject
to use only feature-placing representations would yield a subject
that could utter "red blue square circle" with out discriminating
between the presence of a red square and a blue circle on the one
hand and the presence of a blue square and a red circle on the
other. If a child or parrot is trained to use only a
feature-placing language, then it can indicate the co-presence of
squareness and redness but be incapable of predicating either
redness of the square or squareness of the red.

[33] A non-predicational feature-placing semantics is a
plausible candidate for ascribing contents to sub-personal
representations. Many theorists may find it plausible to allow
that the activities of small numbers of neurons in my visual
system serve to represent the presence of motion in my visual
field. Such neural representations, however, seem not to be
predication of motion of any particular thing, however,
they just indicate the presence of the general feature of
motion.

[34] Another way that the representations may fail to have
predicational structure is if they are construed as being
imagistic in nature. While something like a sentence in an
public language or language of thought may exhibit predicational
structure, representations in imagistic formats rarely if ever do
so.

[35] Examples of the second kind of epistemically subjective
intentional phenomena--intentional phenomena that have
predicational structure but have predicates that name
metaphysically subjective properties--would include examples like
those given already. Such examples would include the belief that
spinach is yucky, the judgment that Beethoven is better than
Mozart, and the perception that Barney is purple. On the
supposition that colors are secondary properties, an object's
color, like its beauty, would be in the eye of the beholder.
Color would then be metaphysically subjective. Thus the
perception that Barney is purple would be epistemically
subjective because his being purple depends on there being people
that perceive him as purple (or, at least, a disposition to be
perceived as purple).

[36] It is worth noting the following consequence of the
predicational theory. That beauty is a metaphysically subjective
property is insufficient to make the sentence "beauty is a
metaphysically subjective property" epistemically subjective.
This is a felicitous consequence of the predicational theory
since beauty may be in the eye of the beholder, but the fact that
beauty is in the eye of the beholder is not itself in the eye of
the beholder.

3. 2. The Predicational Theory and Spatial Analyses of Objectivity

[37] While I have definitions of objectivity to offer, my
remarks on space will fall far short of definitions. Before
attempting to spell out what it might mean for the predicational
theory to incorporate spatial criteria for objectivity, I offer
some brief remarks about space.

3.2.1. About Space

[38]Real space and quasi-space. I need first to
distinguish real space from mere quasi-spaces. I cannot provide
anything like definitions by which to guide the distinction, but
perhaps the following will suffice. An object that changes
location from London to Paris has moved through real space. An
object that changes from red to orange to yellow may have moved
through a quasi-space--"color space"--but need not have moved
through real space to do so. This because dimensionality is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition on space. Colors and
sounds may vary along dimensions (e.g., hue and pitch) but these
are not genuine spatial dimensions as those involved in varying
your location from Chicago to New York. The distinction between
dimensions that do and dimensions that do not satisfy the
sufficient conditions for being space is the distinction between
real space and merely quasi-spaces. I hereafter will simply call
real space "space".

[38]Spatial properties and Spatial Relations.
Describing objects as square or spherical is to predicate spatial
properties of them. Describing an object as to the right of or
three feet away from another is to predicate real spatial
relations of those objects. I do not have definitions of spatial
properties and relations and must make do with examples such as
those given so far. Describing an object as the farthest pyramid
from the Taj Mahal is to predicate spatial properties and
relations of that object. Describing an object as a loud stinky
blue thing is not to predicate spatial properties of that
object.

[39]Not all experiences are spatial. Describing one
sound as louder than or a higher pitch than another is
insufficient to attribute real spatial properties or relations to
the things heard. One may supplement one's theory of the world
with theorems whereby one may infer that louder sounds are closer
than quieter ones, or that higher pitched sounds are moving
toward you and lower pitched sounds moving away. But, the
incorporation of such theorems are optional, I will suppose.
This much seems beyond doubt: we may experience things without
experiencing them as having spatial properties or relations.
Olfaction delivers many of what I regard to be non-spatial
experiences. One may smell one odor to be sweet and another to
be pungent without smelling either to be anywhere at all. In
much of this paper, I will follow Strawson and Evans in supposing
that auditory experience constitutes a source of non-spatial
experiences.

3.2.2. What are the Alleged Spatial Requirements of Objectivity?

[40] What sense then, can we make of the claim that
objectivity requires space? To stipulate the rules of the game I
shall play, space will count as a requirement of objectivity only
if at least one of the following sentences are added as theorems
to the predicational theory of objectivity:

SO1 A sentence or attitude is epistemically objective only
if it contains a predicate that names a spatial property or
relation

SO2 A property or relation is metaphysically objective
only if it is a spatial property or relation

SO3 An object is metaphysically objective only if it has spatial
properties or bears spatial relations to some other object(s).

In section 4, I argue that Evans' and Strawson's arguments
fail to establish the need to incorporate any of the three
propositions, SO1-SO3, into my theory of objectivity.

[41] There is no doubt that this short list fails to exhaust
the multifarious ways one could disambiguate the claim that
objectivity requires space. I justify the meager length of the
list on the following grounds. First, adding more items on the
list while giving them the attention that they deserve arguments
that follow would bring this paper to an excessive length.
Second, I justify the inclusion of SO1. on the perhaps
idiosyncratic grounds that it seems to me to be the most relevant
to concerns arising over the notion of allocentric cognitive
representations mentioned in section 1. If something like SO1 is
true, then the notion of allocentric representation cannot be
extended to apply to representations that do not represent
objects as shaped or located in space. Third, I justify the
inclusion of SO2 and SO3 on the grounds that these are very close
to theses that Strawson and Evans argue for under the heading of
a defense of the spatial requirements of objectivity. More
specifically, one of Evans' arguments concerns SO2, while two of
Strawson's and another of Evans' concern SO3.

[42] Note that given the predicational theory of objectivity,
SO2 entails and is entailed by SO1. SO3, however, is logically
independent of SO1. Strawson's and Evans' arguments for SO2 and
SO3, if sound, would require the inclusion of SO1, SO2, and SO3
as theorems of my predicational theory of objectivity. If my
arguments below are sound, however, then Strawson and Evans do
not supply compelling reasons for the inclusion of SO1, SO2, and
SO3 in the predicational theory.

4. Strawson's and Evans' Arguments for Spatial Objectivity

[43] Below I examine and critique two arguments of Strawson's
that objects (or particulars, to use the term that Strawson
favors) must have spatial properties and relations in order to be
metaphysically objective. I shall call these arguments "the
Reidentifiability Argument" and "the Elsewhere Argument". Evans
offers an argument regarding the metaphysical objectivity of
objects and I follow Strawson (1980) in calling the argument "The
Simultaneity Argument". Evans also offers an argument that may
be construed as an argument for the spatiality of any
metaphysically objective properties. I follow Strawson in
calling this latter argument "The Causal Ground Argument".

[44] Before proceeding, I first remark on the notions of
objectivity employed by Strawson and Evans. In the arguments
that I consider, Strawson and Evans both employ a metaphysical
notion of objectivity (Strawson 1959: 60-62, 66-9; Evans 1985a:
250-251).14
Both are concerned with the concept of the mind-independent
existence of particulars. More specifically, they are concerned
with the concept of the perception-independence of
particulars. It is worth noting, however, that throughout
Strawson (1959) and Evans (1985a), the authors do not separate in
their arguments the separable notions of, on the one hand,
perceptible particulars that endure when unperceived and, on the
other hand, things that are neither a subject, nor states of a
subject. Strawson and Evans thus conflate two distinct notions
of mind-independence: a perceptual instance of
representation-independence and mere mind-independence. I think,
however, that their arguments may be interpreted as applying only
to (perceptual) representation independence.15 That is the only notion of
mind independence that I am interested in here, I will interpret
their arguments in suit.16

[45] At the heart of all four arguments is Strawson's thought
experiment from his "Sounds" chapter of Individuals. In this
thought experiment Strawson invites his readers to attempt to
imagine a subject that does not experience things as having
spatial properties or relations. The point of this thought
experiment is to see if it is conceivable that such a subject be
able to grasp the concept of objectivity. According to Strawson,

the question we are to consider, then, is this: Could a being
whose experience was purely auditory have a conceptual scheme
which provided for objective particulars? (66)

(For ease of exposition, Evans called Strawson's imagined
subject "Hero". I follow this practice and also shall, for ease
of exposition, call the imagined purely auditory world
"Auditoria".)

4.1. Strawson's Reidentifiability Argument

[46] Strawson sets out to see if Hero can "make sense of" and
"have a use for" a concept of objective particulars (ibid.
: 69).17
Toward this end, Strawson sets out to see if Hero can make sense
of the notion of particulars, postponing their objectivity for
the moment. According to Strawson, in order to get a decent
concept of particulars in Auditoria, one must (i) get
identifiable, in the sense of distinguishable, sound-particulars
(ibid. : 69-70) and (ii) get identifiable, in the sense of
reidentifiable, sound-particulars (ibid. : 70). For
Strawson, having an auditory perception is sufficient for the
identification of a sound particular, and the auditory experience
of continuity and discontinuity is sufficient for distinguishing
sound particulars. A C# ("C#" names a universal
here) that plays (gets instantiated for a duration), stops, then
plays again, gives example of two distinguishable tokens of the
same type, and if the note played did not stop and start again,
there would be just be one token. But for the
reidentification of sound particulars, more that
continuity and discontinuity of sounds is needed: spatial
criteria are needed. Below (in section 4.1.2.) I describe why
Strawson thinks space is needed for reidentification, but for now
I describe what Strawson thinks reidentification is. According
to Strawson, a particular is reidentified if and only if it is
perceived for some continuous period that ceases, and perceived
some second time and identified by the perceiver as the
numerically same particular perceived earlier. Thus a particular
is reidentifiable only if it can be perceived twice.

[47] Reidentification lies on the path from objectivity to
spatiality in Strawson's argument. Objective particulars must be
able to exist unperceived. Strawson argues further that any
particular that exists unperceived must be reidentifiable, which
means, if it is perceived for some continuous period that ceases,
it must be able to be perceived some second time and identified
by the perceiver as the same particular perceived earlier.
Strawson also argues that the only criteria by which one may
sensibly regard some perceived thing as the same as some
particular earlier perceived are spatial criteria.

[48] There are, then, two key stages to Strawson's argument,
both of which I call into question. The first is the argument
from the metaphysical objectivity of particulars to their
reidentifiability. The second stage is the argument from
reidentifiability of particulars to the necessary employment of
spatial criteria for their reidentification.

4.1.1. Does Objectivity Entail Reidentifiability?

[49] According to Strawson, objectivity entails a conceptual
scheme that allows for particular reidentifiability. Strawson
argues that this entailment holds because objectivity entails
that there are things that exist independently of whether one
perceives them. It also entails the logical possibility of
perceiving something at two different disjoint times that
persists unperceived between those two times. Thus, if it is
possible for x to exist while you are perceiving it and it
is possible for x to exist while you are not perceiving
it, then it is possible for you to see x at time t,
not see x at t+1, and see x--the numerically
same x--again at t+2. And, if you can see x
twice, then you could identify x twice, that is, identify
x and then reidentify x.

[50] Is Strawson right that objectivity entails particular
reidentifiability? Is every objective particular that you can
perceive an object that you can perceive twice? No and no. I
offer that it is simply false that every metaphysically objective
particular that you can perceive at some time t must be
perceivable at some time t+n.

[51] Consider a particular time slice of an event or process
(a slice thick enough to be perceived at least once). This seems
like a particular that you can perceive only once, but
nonetheless might have existed even if no one perceived it (or
represented it in any other way). When I booted up my computer
this morning, I perceived the beginning of that process--I
perceived the particular initial time slice of my computer's
booting up this morning. And, I suppose, that particular time
slice may have existed unperceived. But that particular
time slice is not something I can perceive a second time. The
moment has passed, alas. To multiply examples, consider also
extremely short lived particulars, like particular explosions or
particular flashes of lightning. Again, they seem plausibly
metaphysically objective without being reidentifiable.

[52] Chase Wrenn (personal communication) offers as a possibly
perceived but not reidentifiable class of particulars the
fictional (we assume) class of particles called "nihilons".
Nihilons exist until they are finished being perceived for the
first (and only) time. A nihilon may exist unperceived, but once
perceived, its existence is terminated at the end of an episode
of perceiving it. Any reidentified entity would not be a
nihilon. Since Strawson's inquiry concerns the structure of our
conceptual scheme, and since nihilons are clearly conceivable,
then the conceivability of objective particulars seems not to
require their reidentifiability. Strawson is committed to the
claim that for any object that we can conceive of perceiving and
also conceive of existing unperceived, we can further conceive of
perceiving on more than one occasion. Thus, he is committed to
the claim that nihilons are inconceivable. But clearly they are
conceivable. At least Chase Wrenn and I can conceive of
them.

[53] Counterexamples to the claim that objectivity entails
particular reidentifiability include (i) particular time slices
of long duration events and processes, (ii) short duration events
and processes, and (iii) nihilons.

4.1.2. Does Reidentifiability Require Spatiality?

[54] Strawson takes himself to have shown that objectivity
entails reidentifiability. His next move is to show that trying
to get reidentifiability into Auditoria will require treating one
of the dimensions of Auditoria as an analog to spatial dimensions
in our conceptual scheme. According to Strawson, some
non-temporal dimension in Auditoria must be sought to go proxy
for the absent spatial dimensions. This proxy dimension will
provide subsidized housing for unperceived yet enduring
sound-particulars.

[55] Auditory candidates for this dimension include timbre,
pitch, and volume. Strawson dismisses timbre immediately for its
lack of obvious systematic ordering of different timbres. (I
suspect this to be due to the fact that any plausible ordering
scheme for timbres will be multidimensional.) Strawson prefers
pitch. So be it. Experiences in Auditoria will have the
following structure. Items in Auditoria are sounds and sound
sequences like pieces of music. Items are accompanied by
continuous back-ground noise known as the Master Sound. The
pitch of the Master Sound is going to be Auditoria's
psuedo-spatial dimension. The "location" of a particular sound
or sound sequence is that pitch of the Master Sound that is
contemporaneous with the sound sequence instance. Suppose that
particular sound sequence is a particular playing of Ode to
Joy (a dated occurrence or tokening of the song
type/universal Ode to Joy). This instance of Ode to
Joy is heard by a Hero over a finite duration. At a
particular instance, the pitch of the master sound is, say,
C#. Imagine hearing the pitch of the Master Sound
increase while Ode to Joy's volume decreases, and
eventually, at some pitch of the Master Sound, Ode to
Joy's volume is inaudibly low. Imagine further that the
increasing pitch of the master sound, accompanied by the
decreasing volumes of Ode to Joy is also accompanied by
the increasing volume of some other sound sequence
instance--Jesu: Joy of Man's Desiring. All this is
reversible too: as the pitch decreases, returning to C#,
Jesu: Joy of Man's Desiring gradually quiets down
while Ode to Joy's thunder swells. Thus, during
duration d in which the pitch of the Master Sound is going
up and down, Ode to Joy is maximally audible while
contemporaneous with one pitch of the master sound, whereas
Jesu: Joy of Man's Desiring is maximally audible
while contemporaneous with a different pitch of the master-sound.
The intuition being urged here is that these two different sound
sequence instances, Ode and Jesu, exist during the
same duration d, but at different "locations" i.e.,
different pitches of the Master Sound.

[56] At least as far as Strawson is concerned, we have now
accumulated the minimal ingredients for citizens of Auditoria to
have a distinction between numerical and qualitative identity.
Qualitative identity/distinctness is easy, and needs no further
comment. Numerically distinct tokens of the same type might be
conceived of as follows. If, at some pitch of the master sound
L, Jesu: Joy of Man's Desiring is maximally
audible, and the pitch rises to some other pitch L', while
Jesu gets quieter, and then promptly changed back to
L while Jesu returns to its maximal volume, then we
may suppose that the same token has been heard at different
times. If, however, we go from L past L' to
L'' while Jesu gets quieter and then louder, we may
suppose that we have come across a different (numerically
distinct) tokens of the Jesu sound sequence type.

[57] One might object here that in this imagined case it is
hard to pretend that there is anything like a fact of the matter
about such questions of "numerical identity".18 I interpret this objection as
the worry that what constitutes the conditions of numerical
identity for sound particulars is more a matter of a
judgment-call on our part and less a matter of a discoverable and
mind-independent fact. I suspect that Strawson might respond by
agreeing that it is indeed more a judgment-call on our part. But,
I think Strawson would add, the point of the project is to
investigate what kinds of experiences would allow for us to have
uses for and make sense of certain kinds of judgment-calls. To
return to the example from an earlier note, suppose that we
introduce by stipulation the term "blorg". The proper use of the
term, since stipulated, will constitute a judgment-call on our
part. But only if we have certain kinds of experiences will we
be able to have a use for certain stipulations about the term's
applicability to experience.

[58] Strawson's question regarding the numerical identity
criteria of sound particulars is the following. Could any
criteria of numerical identity--and thus reidentifiability--be
stipulated that would allow for the application of the concept of
objective particulars to experiences that did not consist of
representations of objects as having spatial properties and
relations? Strawson answers "No" but I answer "Yes". Criteria of
reidentifiability need not be spatial. This can be shown by
showing that criteria of reidentifiability can be spelled out
with out appeal to one of the necessary conditions on spatiality,
namely, dimensionality.19

[59] The Master Sound need not be a set of sounds ordered
along some dimension like pitch or volume. The Master Sound
could be a set of the following sounds: the sound of a washing
machine, the sound of a saxophone, and the sound of a baby
crying. If at one time, Hero hears Jesu accompanied by
the baby cry and at another time, Jesu accompanied by the
sound of washing machine, those would count as two different
instances of the same sound type. If instead, both times Hero
heard Jesu being played along with baby crying, that could
count as hearing the same instance at two different times. Hero,
need not, in this case, recognize any ordering to the Mater
Sounds. There could, of course be a case in which he did, that
is, in which the three Master Sounds were a saxophone playing a
C, a C# and a D. But the point here is that
Hero need not recognize any ordering of the Master Sound in order
to identify and reidentify an instance of Jesu with respect to
it.

[60] Now one might object, in a way suggested by Evans (1985a:
253), that such a move does not employ any real notion of
numerical identity as distinct from a notion of qualitative
identity, since if occasions of Jesuare
distinguished in virtue of co-occurring with different Master
Sounds (a baby cry and a saxophone blast), then the auditory
experiences in question are qualitatively distinguishable. Thus
reliance on the Master Sound seems not to be a reliance on
genuine criteria of numerical identity.

[61] As a response against Evans, I note that this problem
arises only by treating the experience of the Master Sound at a
given moment and the other, non-Master, sound heard at that
moment to be blended into a single particular. Allowing that
this need not be the case, that is, allowing that Hero can
distinguish between the Master Sound at a moment and a
non-Master-Sound at the same moment resurrects the possibility of
the application of genuine criteria of numerical identity.
Perhaps the Master Sound and non-master sounds are distinguished
by timbre: the master sounds are a perfect sine-wave, and a
perfect saw-tooth wave, whereas the non-master sounds are
saxophone performances. By treating the perfect sine-wave and
saw tooth wave tones and saxophone performances as different
particulars, Hero can make sense of qualitatively identical but
numerically distinct saxophone performances.

[62] It seems, then, that Hero can apply criteria of
particular reidentifiability without conceiving of the
particulars as being ordered along any dimension. And insofar as
dimensionality is necessary condition for spatiality,
reidentifiability does not require space.

[63] It is puzzling that Strawson originally stipulated that
Hero's experiences were devoid of spatial content: while
satisfying some of the necessary conditions of real space,
Strawson at least would grant that not all of them were satisfied
in Auditoria. It seems then that even if Strawson succeeded in
showing that Hero did need to treat an ordered series of master
sounds as criteria for the reidentifiability of song
performances, this is insufficient to make the criteria
spatial.

[64] Before leaving this section I want to consider a possible
objection against me. It may be objected that I have, in
discussing space and reidentifiability, overlooked a way that
Strawson characterizes space and thus not done justice to his
Reidentifiability Argument. Strawson and Evans both characterize
space as that in virtue of which different things can
simultaneously exhibit a system of relations over and above those
which arise from the definite (intrinsic, non-relational)
character of each (Strawson 1959: 79; Evans 1985a: 253). They
say little to flesh out this sparse characterization.
Nonetheless, this characterization, with or without flesh, is
insufficient to characterize real space. Below I show that this
characterization can be satisfied by a system of non-spatial
relations.

[65] Strawson and Evans do not unpack the "over and above"
characterization but I think that the idea is essentially the
following. In Hero's theory of the world, he subscribes to some
statements the predicates of which are monadic. To these
correspond the intrinsic properties of objects. Other predicates
in Hero's theory are binary: to these correspond the relations.
To unpack the notion of "relations over and above those which
arise from the intrinsic character" of the relata, I propose the
following. Let us suppose that in Hero's scheme, he has only the
following kinds of predicates: monadic predicates for pitch and
timbre, and the binary predicates "x has a higher pitch than
y" and "x is louder than y". Hero's theory contains
theorems regarding the "x has a higher pitch than y"
predicate that make its application depend on the applicability
of the monadic pitch predicates. For example, it may be a
theorem for Hero that if x is a C and y is a
C#, then y has a higher pitch than x. Thus,
relative to Hero's conceptual scheme, the relation of one sound's
having a higher pitch than another is a relation that arises out
of the intrinsic characters of the sounds. In contrast, Hero has
theorems regarding which sounds are louder than others, but the
application of the relational predicate "x is louder than
y" is not contingent on what pitch or timbre the sounds
happen to be. Thus the relation of one sound's being louder than
another, as conceived of in Hero's scheme, is my best
guess as to what Strawson and Evans might mean by relations over
and above those which arise from the definite (intrinsic,
non-relational) character of each. This is not to say that I
endorse this or any account of the distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic properties. But I propose to grant Evans and
Strawson the distinction and focus on a different aspect of their
account.

[66] The next question to ask is the following. Can volume
underwrite a set of relations between things (sounds) that arise
over and above those that are due to the intrinsic natures of
those things? Let us suppose that Hero conceives of the
intrinsic properties of sounds as those of pitch and timbre.
Suppose also that Hero conceives of different sounds as bearing
louder than relations to each other that are over and
above those that arise from the intrinsic character of each.
Contrast these relations to those such as x has a higher pitch
than y, which, in Hero's conceptual scheme, do arise
from the intrinsic character of each. Hero can do all of this
without conceiving of the sounds as instantiating real spatial
properties and relations. Thus the "over and above"
characterization is insufficient to distinguish real space from
quasi-spaces and any argument that does not go beyond the "over
and above" characterization of space is insufficient to show that
real space is a requirement for objectivity. I turn now to
another of Strawson's arguments.

4.2. Strawson's Elsewhere Argument

[67] In order for us to conceive of unperceivable particulars,
we must, according to Strawson, have some understanding of why
they might be unperceived. Before Strawson turns to consider
how this necessary condition might be met in Auditoria, he asks
how it is met in our familiar world. His answer, unsurprisingly,
emphasizes the importance of the imperceptibility of the
spatially distant, that is, the importance of

a spatial system of objects, through which oneself, another
object, moves, but which extends beyond the limits of one's
observation at any moment.... Thus the most familiar and
easily understood sense in which there exist sounds that I do not
now hear is this: that there are places at which those sounds are
audible, but these are places at which I am not now stationed.
(1959: 74)

Strawson considers and dismisses the following non-spatial
alternative. Perhaps a subject can think of unobservable
existence as a function of the failure of sensory powers.
Strawson dismisses this suggestion on the grounds that such an
alternative cannot allow for being able to distinguish the
failings of sense from the fading of the world. According to
Strawson, the application of such a distinction requires spatial
criteria. Unperceived particulars must be elsewhere.

[68] I offer, contra Strawson, that we are able to conceive of
objective things without conceiving of them as being elsewhere.
I can conceive of myself as existing unperceived. I can conceive
of myself as being knocked unconscious and locked in a darkened
cellar. It is quite conceivable that several hours could pass
without my being perceived by anyone, not even myself. And
certainly I cannot help but be where I am. As Buckaroo Bonzai
says: "Where ever you go, there you are". Thus there is at least
one thing I can conceive of as existing unperceived without that
thing being elsewhere: me.

[69] I offer that part of the Strawson's failure to recognize
this kind of point is due to his failure of separating mere mind
dependence from representation dependence. Even if we grant that
I and my states of perception are where I am, I and my states of
perception need only be subjective in the weak sense of mere
mind-dependence. But in the sense of mind-independence that I am
restricting attention to for the purposes of this
paper--representation independence--I and my states of perception
may be entirely objective without being somewhere I am not. The
Elsewhere Argument goes nowhere.

4.3. Evans' Simultaneity Argument

[70] According to Evans, an essential feature of our concept
of an objective world of spatially located objects is that of
many things, perceived and unperceived, existing
simultaneously. This is integral to objectivity insofar
as conceiving of existence unperceived involves conceiving of the
objects unpercieved as existing at the same time that they
are being thought about though not perceived. Simulteneity may
be a concept whose application is clearest in visual experience.
Vision allows us to be simultaneously aware of distinct objects.
Such experiences afford an opportunity for the direct application
of what Evans calls "simultaneous spatial concepts" (1985a: 283).
Simultaneous spatial concepts are concepts of the spatial
relations between two or more relata the application of which
requires the simultaneous perceptual experience of all of the
relata. In contrast, "serial spatial concepts" require only the
non-simultaneous experience of the spatial relata for their
application. For examples of the latter kinds of experiences,
Evans asks us to consider the way a blind person may come to know
the spatial configuration of a large object such as a table by
running his hands over its edges and surfaces. Here the
experience of all of the table's features are not perceived
simultaneously but instead, in succession. Such experiences
seldom afford opportunities for the direct application of
simultaneous spatial concepts. Relatively small objects,
however, can be taken in tactually all at once, as when a small
cube is cupped in the hands. According to Evans, a subject of
purely auditory experiences, however, never has the
opportunity for the direct application of simultaneity concepts
and thus could never have simultaneity concepts. Thus,
according to Evans, such a subject is barred from having
genuinely objective experiences, since objectivity entails
simulteneitiy and Hero's experience of his auditory quasi-space
does not allow for genuinely simultaneous experiences.

[71] I propose to resist Evans' denial of Hero's application
of simultaneity concepts as follows. I grant that simultaneity
is a feature of real space. However, the mere fact that some set
of properties may be instantiated simultaneously is insufficient
to make those properties spatial. A purple object may be
regarded as the simultaneous instantiation of two different
things: a red one and a blue one. The co-perception of a red
object and a blue object need not be a perception of the objects
as being located at two different places. To make the same point
in terms of the "sounds" thought experiment, consider the
following.

[72] Suppose that, until today, Hero has been listening to a
series of alternating HONKs and DINGs. Imagine that the HONKs
are bass blasts from a baritone saxophone and that the DINGs are
tinny tones from a diminutive xylophone. Hero is hearing the
following series: HONK DING HONK DING HONK DING. Suppose that
one day Hero hears a sound that is qualitatively identical to
what we would hear if a DING and a HONK occurred simultaneously.
Now it seems that Hero could interpret this occurrence in one of
two ways, one of which involves the application of a concept of
simultaneity, the other does not:

The Simultaneity Option: I (Hero) just heard two
different features simultaneously: a HONK and a DING

The Non-Simultaneity Option: I (Hero) just heard a
(third) feature that I've never heard before: a DONK.

Now, according to Evans, Hero is barred from the simultaneity
option. But this invites the following question: Why should
Hero conceive of today's experience as a DONK rather than as a
simultaneous occurrence of a HONK and a DING? Evans' take on
this issue has not been argued for, nor does it seem obviously
correct.

[73] I am prepared to grant that if Hero only heard
HONKs and DINGs simultaneously, he would never be compelled to
interpret them as anything other than the presentation of the
single feature DONK. However, given the supposition that he
frequently, if not usually, hears them separately, then I see no
reason for him to be barred from hypothesizing that DONK-ish
experiences are actually the simultaneous occurrence of HONKs and
DINGs, i.e., that DONKs reduce to HONKs and DINGs. It seems,
then, that Hero can conceive of distinct events occurring
simultaneously without having to conceive of them in different
spatial locations. Thus, even if objectivity required
simultaneity, as Evans suggests, simultaneity does not require
space. Thus the road from objectivity through simultaneity to
space is blocked at the path from simultaneity to space.

4.4. Evans' Causal Ground Argument

[74] This argument represents a departure from the previous
three in that Evans attention is turned from the metaphysical
objectivity of objects (i.e. particulars) to the metaphysical
objectivity of properties.

[75] Evans argues that the properties we perceive objects as
having--properties Evans calls "sensory properties"--can be
conceived as instantiated unperceived only if they are conceived
as causally grounded in spatial properties.

[76] Evans' argument can be seen as having two parts. The
first part is the suggestion that we cannot conceive of the
sensory properties as being instantiated unpercieved without
supposing that they instantiate these properties in virtue of
instantiating some other properties. The second part is the
suggestion that these other properties--the causal ground of the
sensory properties--must be spatial properties.

[77] The two parts open the argument to two lines of attack.
The first is to question the necessity of supposing unperceived
sensory properties being co-instantiated with some other
properties. I pursue this line of attack at some length below.
The second line of attack questions the need for these other
properties to be spatial. Even if Evans is correct that sensory
properties must be conceived of as having a causal ground, why
must this causal ground be thought of as consisting of spatial
properties? I do not pursue this second line of attack beyond
pointing out here that Evans seems not to have argued for the
necessity of the spatiality of the causal ground. I am more
interested in pursuing a third line of attack, namely, to point
out an incoherence in the way Evans' describes the objectivity of
sensory properties. In the remainder of this section I offer two
arguments that flesh out the first and third lines of attack,
respectively. First, I argue that the objectivity of so-called
sensory properties does not require them to have a causal ground.
Second, I argue that Evans' characterization of sensory
properties renders incoherent the suggestion that we conceive of
them as objective properties.

[78] Before turning to my arguments against Evans, I want to
remark upon the relevance of the Causal Ground argument to

SO2 A property is metaphysically objective only if it is a
spatial property.

At first glance it may seem that the Causal Argument is not
relevant to SO2 since Evans' aim is to show that sensory
properties are objective only if co-instantiated with spatial
properties. To be relevant to SO2, the objectivity of sensory
properties must require more than co-instantiation with spatial
properties but instead identification with spatial properties. I
think that Evans does allow for the eventual identification of
the spatial causal ground of sensory properties and the sensory
properties. Evans describes sensory properties (which he
identifies with secondary properties) as follows.

For an object to have such a property is for it to be such
that, if certain sensitive beings were suitably situated, they
would be affected with certain experiences, though this property
may, in its turn, be identified with what we should normally
regard as the ground of the disposition. (268-269)

4.4.1. Can Properties as We Perceive Them Be Instantiated Unperceived?

[79] Evans argues that since sensory properties are secondary
properties, there is a theoretical difficulty in imagining them
instantiated unperceived. According to Evans the closest that we
can come to imagining sensory properties instantiated unperceived
is by imagining their non-sensory causal ground unperceived. And
further, this causal ground must be comprised of spatial
properties. What I want to do in this section is block the very
first move that Evans makes in this argument, that is, block the
move that sensory properties by themselves cannot be imagined to
be instantiated unperceived.

[80] Evans argues that it is quite difficult to see how an
object "as we see it" can be the same as when we do not see it
(ibid.: 272-274). Suppose that I am seeing an apple as
red. How can it be red when no one is seeing it, when, say, it
is locked in an dark cellar? Evans contends that this is
inconceivable (ibid.: 274).

[81] Evans writes that "All it can amount to for something to
be red is that it be such that, if looked at in the normal
conditions, it will appear red" (ibid.: 272). Evans
contrasts this view with one that tries "to make sense of the
idea of a property of redness which is both an abiding property
of the object, both perceived and unperceived, and yet 'exactly
as we experience redness to be'" (ibid.). Evans objects
against this latter view that "it would be quite obscure how a
'colour-as-we-see-it' can exist when we cannot see it, and how
our experiences of colour would enable us to form a conception of
such a state of affairs" (ibid.: 273).

[82] I want to defend this latter view by suggesting that the
obscurity alleged by Evans arises due to a concealed ambiguity in
sentences employing phrases like "as I see it". Once such
phrases are properly disambiguated, it becomes quite clear how a
color as we see it may be the same when it is not seen.

[83] I begin by considering sentences employing phrases with
the form "x as I am F-ing it". Consider the sentence

The chair as I am standing next to it is the same as when I
am not standing next to it.

There is a reading of this sentence whereby it is quite
clearly contradictory. On such a reading the sentence expresses
the claim that a chair stood next to is a chair not stood next
to. This is contradictory on the supposition that a chair cannot
be both stood next to and not stood next to at the same time.
Suppose, then, that we were to read the following sentences along
similar lines.

The chair as I see it is the same as when I do not see
it.

On such a reading, Evans would be correct that it is quite
obscure how the chair as I see it can be the same as when I do
not see it. There is a difference between the chair as I
see it and the chair when it is not seen by me, namely, in the
first case I am seeing it and in the second I am not. And on the
supposition that the chair cannot be both seen and unseen at the
same time, the sentence under consideration expresses a
contradiction.

[84] Sentences employing phrases with the form "x as I am
F-ing it" may be read in different way than considered so
far. This alternative reading shows the noncontradiction of

The chair as I see it is the same as when I do not see it.

I call your attention to an analogy between the above sentence
and the following.

The chair as I am describing it is the same as when I am
not describing it.

This sentence admits of a reading whereby it expresses a
contradiction. On such a reading the above sentence is equivalent
to

The chair described is not described.

But on the alternative reading I want to consider, a chair can
be as I describe it even when I am not describing it. Suppose
that I am describing the chair as having been manufactured in
Switzerland. I am uttering the sentence "This chair was
manufactured in Switzerland". My describing the chair is just my
uttering a sentence. The chairs' being as I describe it however,
is not its being a chair in the proximity of someone uttering a
sentence. The chair's being as I describe is, in this case, its
having been manufactured in Switzerland. Clearly a chair may
have been manufactured in Switzerland regardless of whether I am
now describing it as such. With this last point in mind, then,
we may read

The chair as I am describing it is the same as when I am
not describing it.

as noncontradictory on the grounds that a Swiss chair doesn't
stop being Swiss when I stop talking.

[85] To sum up what I have said so far, I would say that

The chair as I am describing it is the same as when I am
not describing it.

admits of two readings: a representational reading and a
non-representational reading. On the representational reading,
the sentence is not a contradiction. On the non-representational
reading, the sentence is a contradiction. On the
representational reading, I am predicating being manufactured
in Switzerland of the chair. The chair may very well
instantiate the property of being manufactured in Switzerland
even when I am not representing it as such. On the
non-representational reading,

The chair as I am describing it is the same as when I am
not describing it.

is analogous to

The chair as I am standing next to it is the same as when I
am not standing next to it.

and both are contradictory on the following grounds. A chair
stood next to is different from a chair not stood next to and a
chair described is different from a chair not described.

[86] Evans detects obscurity and unintelligibility in the
supposition that "a 'colour-as-we-see-it' can exist when we
cannot see it" (ibid.). I suggest that the supposition is
clear and intelligible if read representationally. If we analyze
perception as a representational affair, then

The chair as I see it is the same when I am not seeing
it.

is no more a contradiction than the representational reading
of

The chair as I am describing it is the same when I am not
describing it.

I may describe a chair as being Swiss and it can continue to
be Swiss during periods when it is not described. Likewise, I
can see a chair as being brown and it can continue to be brown
during periods when it is not seen.

[87] Allowing representational readings of sentences employing
phrases of the form "x as I am F-ing it" shows how the
first part of Evans' Causal Ground Argument is blocked. The
first part of Evans' argument is his allegation that there is
something obscure and unintelligible in the claim that objects
can be the way that we perceive them even when unperceived. A
representational analysis of perception renders the claim clear
and intelligible. Thus the first move in Evans' Causal Ground
Argument--the move by which Evans alleges to show that we cannot
conceive of sensory properties by themselves being instantiated
unpercieved--is blocked by adopting a representational analysis
of perception. I turn now to my second problem with Evans' Causal
Ground argument.

4.4.2. If Sensory Properties are Secondary Properties, then
are they Objective After All?

[88] One of the upshots of a representational analysis of
perception is the allowance for a distinction between the
properties of perceptions and the properties of the things
perceived. This distinction is analogous to the distinction
between my stating that water is wet and water's being wet. The
supposition that a property is objective just is the supposition
that its instantiation does not depend on its being represented.
Why, then, does Evans think that there is a special problem in
conceiving as objective sensory properties--the properties we
perceive objects as instantiating? The answer to this question,
I suggest, is that the problem arises because Evans thinks that
sensory properties are subjective properties. He describes them
at length as secondary properties--properties whose defining
essence is their disposition to cause certain experiences
(ibid.: 268-272). On my view of metaphysical objectivity
and subjectivity, secondary properties are the prototype of the
metaphysically subjective. Thus the problem that Evans sets for
himself in his Causal Ground argument is the problem of trying to
figure out how it is that we conceive of subjective properties as
being objective. But if we are prepared to admit that they are
subjective, then it seems that we have lost interest in trying to
conceive of them as objective. If sensory properties are not
really objective after all, then they are an entirely useless
platform from which to launch a defense of the spatial criterion
of objectivity.

[89] I should note that there is something unfair about my
complaint as waged against Evans. Evans analyses colors as
depending on a disposition to be experienced, but does not equate
them with a property that is instantiated only when experienced.
Evans' notion of objectivity in the Causal Ground Argument is no
more than that of a property that can be instantiated even when
unperceived. Both Evans and I allow that secondary properties
may be instantiated unperceived. But unlike me, Evans does not
regard secondary properties as subjective, but instead,
objective. In fairness, the remarks in the current section
should not be regarded so much as critical of Evans, but instead
as a way of showing that , as I use the terms "objective"
and "subjective", secondary properties cannot serve as a platform
upon which to erect an argument for the spatial criteria of
objectivity.

5. Conclusion

[90] I have argued for the failure Evans' and Strawson's
arguments that the objectivity of objects (particulars) and
properties requires them to be spatial. Evans and Strawson thus
do not provide compelling reasons for amending the predicational
theory of objectivity to include spatial requirements on the
metaphysical objectivity of objects (SO3) and properties (SO2).
If Evans' Causal Ground argument for the spatial requirements on
the metaphysical objectivity of properties had succeeded, then it
would have served--given the predicational theory-- as an
argument that epistemically objective intentional phenomena must
have predicates that name spatial properties (SO1). Evans and
Strawson's arguments fail to provide compelling reasons for the
inclusion of SO1-SO3 in the predicational theory of epistemic
objectivity.

[91] I want to close by noting the degree to which a broader
case for spatial objectivity remains open. As already noted, it
is implausible that SO1-SO3 exhaust the possible ways of
interpreting the claim that objectivity requires space.
Questions concerning objectivity pursued in this paper concern
what it means to be objective, that is, what it means to say that
some thing is objective. Other questions remain unanswered by
the current account, however. Such questions include, among
others, questions of how one would know whether any thing is
objective or subjective and questions of how thinkers have come
to have a grasp a distinction between the objective and the
subjective. In other words, while the metaphysics of objectivity
has been addressed here, the epistemology, ontogeny, and
phylogeny of objectivity have scarcely been touched upon. These
latter avenues may lead to theories of objectivity worth calling
"spatial". Perhaps cognizers must acquire a concept of space
before they acquire a concept of objectivity. Perhaps cognizers
must know where things are before they can have any objective
knowledge. These possibilities are consistent with the
objectivity of nonspatial things. All I have argued in this paper
is that metaphysically and epistemically objective things
(objects, properties, and intentional phenomena) need not be
spatial to be objective.

Acknowledgments
I owe enormous debts of gratitude to Rick Grush and Chase Wrenn
for stimulating conversations on the topics covered in this
paper. I am grateful for comments made by William Bechtel, Andy
Clark, Rick Grush, and Joe Ullian on earlier versions of the
present paper.

Brewer, B. (1996) "Thoughts about Objects, Places and Times. In
Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness:
Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind (Proceedings of the
British Academy, Vol. 83), C. Peacocke (ed.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

Campbell, J. (1996) "Objects and Objectivity". In Objectivity,
Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the
Philosophy of Mind (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol.
83), C. Peacocke (ed.) . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O'Keefe, J. (1996) "Cognitive Maps, Time and Causality". In
Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness:
Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind (Proceedings of the
British Academy, Vol. 83), C. Peacocke (ed.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

O'Keefe, J. and L. Nadel (1978) The Hippocampus as a
Cognitive Map. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Quine, W. (1980) "On What There Is" In From a Logical Point
of View. Second Edition, revised . Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.

2 Note that throughout
this paper I use "object" and "particular" interchangeably and
reserve "thing" to denote a broader category of metaphysical
types, inclucing objects/particulars, properties, relations,
states, events, and processes, to name a few. (back)

3 See Rorty (1979) and
Gauker (1995) for discussion of the difference between
objectivity as consensus and objectivity as correspondence. For
discussion of indexical theories see Bell (1992), Lycan (1996),
and McGinn (1983). (back)

4 More specifically,
Gauker construes the degree to which a judgment is objective as a
function of three dimensions: the probability agents would come
to agree, the degree of rationality of the agents, and the level
of agreement (1995: 173). (back)

5 Its worth noting,
however, that while Lycan explicates subjectivity in terms of
representations that have indexical components, it is not clear
that he intends to explicate objectivity in terms of
representations lacking indexical components. Indeed, sometimes
when he uses the word "objective", he is referring to things that
are not representations, indicating that while he is using the
word "subjective" in its epistemic sense he is using the word
"objective" in its metaphysical sense. It may not be accurate
then, to describe Lycan as an indexical theorist of epistemic
subjectivity and objectivity, since it is not clear what his
views on epistemic objectivity are. I will continue, however,
to classify his view on subjectivity as epistemic. (back)

6 See also Rick Grush
(unpublished) for a metarepresentational theory of objectivity.
(back)

8 For simplicity's sake,
I consider only atomic sentences with monadic predicates (and
later, atomic sentences wth binary predicates), but I intend the
points made to generalize beyond these simple cases. (back)

9 I am especially
grateful to Chase Wrenn for pressing me on this point. (back)

10 The predicational
correspondence theory I offer differs from the non-correspondence
theories I mentioned earlier in the following ways (to name a
few): (i) unlike consensus theories, on the predicational theory
consensus (actual or possible) is not necessary for objectivity;
(ii) unlike indexical theories, being devoid of indexical
components is not necessary objectivity; and (iii) unlike
metarepresentational theories being able to represent a
distinction between your own representational states and the
things that the representations are about is not necessary for
objectivity. I only note these points of departure here and
defend them elsewhere (Mandik (in progress)). (back)

11 Frederick Schmitt
draws the same distinction between kinds of mind-dependence under
the labels "mere constitution by the mind" versus "constitution
by the mind in virtue of being represented by it" (1995: 12).
Ruth Millikan draws a similar distinction (1993: 208). (back)

12 I will not go into
detail about the right way to deal with molecular sentences here.
The question arises of what to say about the conjunctions and
disjunctions in which of not all of the conjuncts and/or
disjuncts are objective (or subjective). While I will not
provide the argument for solution to the problem of the
molecules, I do offer the following. Sentence P is
objective if and only if ~P is objective. P is
subjective if and only if ~P is subjective. A conjunction
is objective if and only if all of its conjuncts are objective
and subjective otherwise. A disjunction is objective if and only
if at least one of its disjuncts is objective and subjective
otherwise. (back)

13 Epistemic
subjectivity of representations due to lack of predicational
structure is, I think, the ultimate explication of the
subjectivity of conscious experience. I thus oppose Lycan's
(1996) indexical account of the subjectivity of consciousness.
Unlike Lycan, I do not think that subjectivity requires the
possession of self-referential indexical concepts (or any
concepts). Lycan's account is as follows. Experiences are
representations. My visual experience of my blue coffee mug is a
mental representation of the mug as being blue. When I
introspect my experience, I form a second-order representation of
the first-order representation of the coffee mug. Other people
may form syntactically similar second-order representations, but
those representations will be about their first-order states, not
my own. The crucial analogy here is to the use of indexicals in
speech. When I say "my leg hurts" I am referring to my leg, and
only I can refer to my leg by using that utterance. You may use
a syntactically similar construction: you may utter the words "my
leg hurts", but in doing so, you would be representing your leg,
not mine. Analogously, only I can represent my first-order
states by the introspective application of self-referential
indexical concepts. (back)

14 Strawson also employs
the metaphysical notion elsewhere. See Strawson (1966: 150-2).
Note also that while Evans (1985a) is concerned with metaphysical
objectivity, in work that was not published until after his death
(Evans 1982 and 1985b) he employs an epistemic notion of
objectivity (especially in his discussions of objective and
egocentric ways of thinking about space). (back)

15 I also have the hunch
that they are much more interested in representation-independence
than mere mind-independence. (back)

16 I return to the
issue of the conflation in my discussion of Strawson's Elsewhere
Argument in section 4.2. (back)

17 I understand the gist
of Strawson's method of inquiry as follows. Strawson's inquiry
regarding Auditoria is the question of whether it can provide
Hero with experiences the structure of which would allow Hero to
"make sense of" and "have a use" for criteria of identification
and reidentification. To unpack the idea behind the method a bit
more, imagine the introduction of the sortal term "blorgs". If
the identity criteria for blorg-hood are spatiotemporal, for
instance, no two blorgs can occupy all and only the same spatial
locations at the same time, then a creature lacking spatial
sensory experience would lack "sense of and a use for" the sortal
concept "blorgs". If that creature was incapable of experiencing
objects as having shapes or being located in space, then that
creature would be incapable of grasping the proposed identity
criteria for being a blorg. This is the best sense I can make of
Strawson's notions of having a sense of and a use
for a concept. (back)

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