PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of conspiracy to commit armed
robbery, MCL 750.157a and MCL 750.529, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2),
assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful
intent, MCL 750.226, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b, and possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f. Defendant was sentenced as a
third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 4 to 10 years for his
conviction of carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, 5 to 10 years for his conviction
of possessing of a firearm as a felon, and 18 to 40 years each for his convictions of conspiracy to
commit armed robbery, first-degree home invasion, and assault with intent to rob while armed.
Defendant was also sentenced to consecutively serve a two-year term of imprisonment for his
felony-firearm conviction. We affirm defendant?s convictions, but remand for resentencing or
articulation of substantial and compelling reasons to support a departure from the appropriate
sentencing guidelines range.
Defendant was tried with codefendants David Barker and Freddie Williams in connection
with a home invasion, during which the residents of the home were held at gunpoint while the
intruders searched for money and drugs. On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants. Specifically,
defendant argues that he was unfairly disadvantaged because the joinder of trials hindered his
ability to argue that Barker and Williams were to blame for the home invasion. We disagree.
The decision to sever a joint trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See People v Hana, 447
Mich 325, 346; 524 NW2d 682 (1994).
?The general rule is that a defendant does not have a right to a separate trial.? People v
Hurst, 396 Mich 1, 6; 238 NW2d 6 (1976). However, ?[o]n a defendant?s motion, the court must
sever the trial of defendants on related offenses on a showing that severance is necessary to avoid

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prejudice to substantial rights of the defendant.? MCR 6.121(C). The defendant must provide
the trial court with a supporting affidavit or make an offer of proof that ?clearly, affirmatively,
and fully demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the
necessary means of rectifying the potential prejudice.? Hana, supra. ?Inconsistency of defenses
is not enough to mandate severance; rather, the defenses must be ?mutually exclusive? or
?irreconcilable.?? Id. at 349.
Initially, we note that defendant?s argument is logically inconsistent. Defendant argues
that while he was unable to point to Barker and Williams as the perpetrators because they
appeared beside him at trial, Barker and Williams could nonetheless point to defendant as the
guilty party. Certainly each of the three codefendants was similarly situated with respect to the
capacity and ability to point to the other two as being guilty of the crimes charged. Additionally,
defendant?s theory of defense was not irreconcilable with those of his codefendants. Id. Indeed,
all three codefendants argued that they had not broken into the victims? home. The record shows
that defendant was not hindered in his ability to argue this theory at trial. We also note that the
trial court specifically instructed the jury that the fact that the codefendants were ?on trial
together is not evidence that they are associated with each other [or] that either one of them is
guilty.? Juries are presumed to follow the instructions given to them by the trial court, People v
Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 717; 645 NW2d 294 (2001), and we see nothing in the record
before us to indicate that the jury here did not do so. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant?s
substantial rights were not undermined by the denial of his motion to sever.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury
regarding attempted armed robbery and felonious assault, as lesser included offenses of assault
with intent to rob while armed. Again, we disagree. We review de novo alleged errors in the
instruction of a jury. People v Hall, 249 Mich App 262, 269; 643 NW2d 253 (2002). The
question of whether an offense is a necessarily lesser included offense of a greater crime is also a
question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 531; 664
NW2d 685 (2003).
A trial court must instruct on a lesser offense only if it is necessarily included in the
greater offense and a rational view of the evidence supports the instruction. People v Nickens,
470 Mich 622, 626; 685 NW2d 657 (2004). ?Necessarily included lesser offenses are offenses in
which the elements of the lesser offense are completely subsumed in the greater offense.?
Mendoza, supra at 532 n 3. Where the lesser offense is a necessarily included lesser offense,
instruction on the lesser offense is required if ?the charged greater offense requires the jury to
find a disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view
of the evidence would support it.? People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).
The elements of assault with intent to rob while armed are an assault, committed with
force or violence and an intent to rob or steal while the defendant is armed. MCL 750.89; People
v Federico, 146 Mich App 776, 790; 381 NW2d 819 (1985). In contrast, the crime of attempt
consists solely of ??an intent to do an act or to bring about certain consequences which would in
law amount to a crime, and an act in furtherance of that intent which, as it is most commonly put,
goes beyond mere preparation.?? People v Adams, 416 Mich 53, 59 n 5; 330 NW2d 634 (1982),
quoting LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 59, p 423. In Adams, supra at 58-59, our Supreme
Court held that attempted robbery is a cognate lesser offense of assault with intent to rob while
armed, not a necessarily included lesser offense. In doing so, the Court reasoned that ?[n]either

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an attempt to commit an offense nor all its elements are elements of the completed offense. . . .
If the elements of armed robbery were successively peeled away, singly or in various
combinations, the offense of attempt to commit armed robbery, or any necessarily included
offense of armed robbery, would not emerge.?1 Id. Therefore, because attempted armed robbery
is not a necessarily included lesser offense of assault with intent to rob while armed, the trial
court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on the former.
As for the requested instruction on felonious assault, although that crime is a necessarily
included lesser offense of assault with intent to rob while armed, People v Stubbs, 110 Mich App
287, 291; 312 NW2d 232 (1981), a rational view of the evidence and arguments presented at trial
did not support giving the instruction. Again, defendant?s primary theory of defense was that he
was not one of the three men who broke into the victims? home. Additionally, there was ample
evidence adduced that the men who broke into the victims? home did so with the intent to rob or
steal. Specifically, there was testimony from the victims that the men demanded money and
searched the home, going through drawers and the refrigerator. Given this evidence, we find no
error in the trial court?s refusal to instruct the jury regarding felonious assault.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in assessing him twenty-five points for
offense variable (OV) 13, and asserts that this scoring error caused the trial court to base his
sentence for assault with intent to rob while armed on an incorrect guidelines range of 108 to 270
months? imprisonment. Defendant argues that, scored properly, his guidelines range should have
been 81 to 202 months? imprisonment. The prosecution concedes that the trial court should have
scored zero points for OV 13, and that defendant?s proper guidelines range should have been 81
to 202, rather than 108 to 270, months? imprisonment. We agree.
MCL 777.43 instructs a court to score twenty-five points under OV 13 if ?[t]he offense
was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more crimes against a person.?
MCL 777.43(1)(b). Citing defendant?s instant convictions of conspiracy to commit armed
robbery, first-degree home invasion, assault with intent to rob while armed, and carrying a
dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, the trial court concluded that OV 13 was properly
scored at twenty-five points because each of the cited offenses constitute a crime against the
person for purposes of MCL 777.43(1)(b). However, as argued by defendant both at sentencing
and on appeal, although the offenses of first-degree home invasion and assault with intent to rob
while armed constitute crimes against a person for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, see
MCL 777.16d and MCL 777.16f, the offenses of conspiracy and carrying a dangerous weapon
with unlawful intent are classified as crimes against public safety, see MCL 777.18 and MCL
777.16m. Consequently, we agree that the trial court improperly scored OV 13 at twenty-five
points; rather, no points should have been scored. See MCL 777.43(1)(g). Moreover, because
the reduction in score for OV 13 places defendant?s sentence for his conviction of assault with
intent to rob while armed above the appropriate sentencing guidelines,2 we must remand this

1 Adams implicitly overruled this Court?s holding in People v Bryan, 92 Mich App 208, 225; 284
NW2d 765 (1979), that attempted robbery is a necessarily included lesser offense of assault with
intent to rob while armed. Defendant?s reliance on Bryan is, therefore, misplaced.
2 The trial court?s scoring of the guidelines for defendant?s assault with intent to rob while armed
(continued?)

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case for resentencing or articulation of a substantial and compelling reason for a departure from
that range. See MCL 769.34.
In doing so, however, we reject defendant?s claim that he was entitled at sentencing, and
thus remains entitled on remand, to preparation of a sentencing information report for each of the
enumerated felonies for which he was convicted. As recently recognized by this Court in People
v Mack, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2005), when sentencing a defendant for multiple
concurrent convictions a trial court is required to prepare a sentencing information report only
?for the highest crime class felony conviction . . . .? Id. at ___, citing MCL 777.14. Because, as
a class A offense against a person, defendant?s conviction of assault with intent to rob while
armed constitutes the highest crime class felony for which defendant was convicted, he was
entitled to preparation of a sentencing information report for that conviction only.
Additionally, we sua sponte note that the trial court erred in ordering that the two-year
mandatory sentence for defendant?s conviction of felony-firearm be served consecutively to each
of the other sentences imposed by the court. In People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463-464; 619
NW2d 538 (2000), our Supreme Court held that a felony-firearm sentence is to run consecutively
only to the sentence for the underlying or predicate offense, not to all other felonies of which a
defendant is convicted. In this case, defendant?s conviction of first-degree home invasion
constitutes the predicate felony for the sole count of felony-firearm of which defendant was
convicted. Consequently, defendant?s sentence for the felony-firearm conviction should run
consecutively only to his conviction of first-degree home invasion. Id.
We affirm defendant?s convictions, but remand this matter to the trial court for
resentencing or articulation of substantial and compelling reasons to support a departure from the
sentencing guidelines range. Regardless of which procedure is employed by the trial court, a
judgment of sentence appropriately reflecting the consecutive nature of defendant?s felony-
firearm conviction must be entered by the trial court on remand. See MCR 7.216(A)(7). We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Bill Schuette

(?continued)
conviction placed defendant in prior record level D and offense variable level III for class A
offenses against the person, resulting in a minimum sentence range of 108 to 225 months
imprisonment, as a third habitual offender. Reduction of OV 13 to a score of zero places
defendant in offense variable level II, and results in a new sentencing guidelines? range of 81 to
202 months? imprisonment. Thus, defendant?s minimum sentence of eighteen years?, i.e., 216
months?, imprisonment for his conviction of assault with intent to rob while armed exceeds the
applicable guidelines? range.