Each time slot of contributed
papers will be
scheduled in 3 parallel sessions (logic / philosophy of science /
history of science), with 3 talks per session and per discipline. Each talk is 25 min + 5
min for discussion.

This paper offers a framework for empiricist conceptions of laws of
nature based on the following three negative principles that have been
entertained by empiricists.
A. There is no necessity in nature; no necessary connections between distinct existences.
B. There are no universals as distinct from classes of resembling particulars.
C. There are no powers as distinct from their manifestations.
These principles place important constraints on what laws are not and
what they can be. After discussing them, the paper focuses on the
strengths and weaknesses of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis approach to lawhood.

We will deal with ways of studying and applying probability
theory from a logical point of view. On the probabilistic side, this leads
us to an investigation of (unary) absolute probability measures and
(binary) conditional probability measures on propositional or first-order
languages. In particular, we will show (i) how the standard axioms of
probability may be justified in terms of "closeness to the truth", (ii) how
logical truth can be pinned down by purely probabilistic means, (iii) how
conditional probability measures on formulas may be represented as limits
of ratios of absolute probability measures on formulas, (iv) what a
probabilistic semantics for conditional logic looks like, (v) how a
probabilistic theory of truth for semantically closed languages can be
developed, and finally (vi) how models for higher-order probabilities,
probabilistic reflection principles, and type-free probability can be
constructed.