Can
Turkey be a model for Arab democracies? As Islamist parties come to power in
free and fair elections in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, the“Turkish model” or
Turkish democracy under the leadership of the conservative AKP government
attracts more attention. But what exactly is this “model”, and how promising is
it? Could it work as a guidance or inspiration to Arab countries in their
reforms?

Speaker: Mustafa
Akyol, columnist, Hürriyet Daily News and Star

Commentator:Anu
Leinonen, Executive Officer, Foundation of the Finnish Institute in the
Middle East

The speaker,
columnist Mustafa Akyol began by
asking the question why Turkish democracy has been discussed as a possible
model for the Arab world, particularly after the Arab Spring. In Tunisia and
Egypt, the parties that have come to power are inspired by Islam. Will they
turn these countries into theocracies? Turkey’s current governing party, the
AKP, is also inspired by Islamic values, yet it has not imposed religion.
Instead, the AKP has made democratic reforms. The Arab Islamists of the Tunisian
Ennahda party have announced their intention to follow Turkey’s example. But how
can the success of the Turkish model be explained?

To answer this
question, Mr Akyol turned to history. Turkey’s experience with democracy has
its roots in the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire made
political reforms inspired by Western modernity. Jews and Christians were
declared equal citizens, and Turkey became for a short time a constitutional
monarchy with a Parliament. When the Empire was succeeded by the Republic, more
reforms were introduced, for example regarding women’s rights. Under Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk, secularism was adopted. But according to Mr Akyol, it was still
possible for religion to evolve in a civil sphere, without government support.
Moderate movements like Sufism thrived, and started to support democracy
because of the freedom it offered.

Some Arab
countries and Iran have had similar phases of secularism, in which religion was
suppressed. Mr Akyol mentioned Nasser in Egypt, and the Shah of Iran whose
modernisation policies included banning the wearing of a veil for women. But in
these cases, the suppression of religion caused in turn the rise of terrorist
movements. In Iran, there never was a transition to a multi-party system, and
after the revolution the Khomeini movement actually forced women to wear a
veil. The pattern here is that authoritarian single-party regimes oppress
Islamic movements, giving rise to radical Islamism. Secular dictatorships are
the origin of such organisations as Al-Qaeda, Mr Akyol recalled.

Turkey was
different because of its Ottoman heritage. Furthermore, Turkish Muslims were
not ultra-conservative Wahhabis as in Saudi Arabia, but represented movements
like Sufism. Turkey had also had multi-party elections early on, whereas some
of the Arab Spring countries are only now able to organise free elections. The Turkish
Kemalist tradition allowed democracy to develop. In the 1950s an opposition
party, the Democratic Party, came to power. It managed to incorporate pious
people into the society by improving religious freedom. Iranians revolted, but
Turkish Muslims realised that they could make a difference by voting.

From the 1960s
to the 1980s Turkish democracy was harmed by several military coups, but a new
phase began in 1983 when Turgut Özal assumed office as Prime Minister. He began
opening Turkey up and liberalising the hitherto protective economy. Laws were
also liberalised, and the previous assimilation policy of Kurds began to
change. This accelerated the process that eventually led to the AKP
“phenomenon”. Mr Akyol pointed out that the religious-secular divide in Turkey
has been deepened by the existence of a class conflict between the less
privileged observant Muslims and a wealthy secular class. Özal’s economic
dynamism allowed an Islamic bourgeoisie to emerge. This new Muslim middle class
of hardworking businessmen who have been called “Islamic Calvinists” were not
militant, and were in favour of EU accession. This is the foundation on which
the AKP was built.

In the 1990s
theologians started making statements approving of a secular state. On the one
hand, they could see how Western countries functioned with religious freedom.
On the other, the example of Islamic states like Iran and Saudi Arabia was not
encouraging. What’s more, any Islamic state only represents one particular
denomination: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, Shiism in Iran. According to Mr Akyol,
Turkish clerics also realised that an Islamic state is not necessarily a good
idea to begin with: freedom of choice is better for authentic religion than
coercion.

Statements by
the Turkish Prime Minister endorsing a secular state while visiting Arab Spring
countries inspired a new debate in these regions. But why is the Turkish
example attractive to Arabs, even to some liberal-minded Islamists? Turkey
influences the Arab world in many ways: through TV soap operas and as a tourist
destination. Mr Akyol concluded his
presentation by saying that while Turkey is right in sharing its experience
with the Middle East, it should not turn away from the West.

Anu Leinonen, Executive Officer of the Foundation of the
Finnish Institute in the Middle East, commented on Mr Akyol’s speech. She said
that the idea of Turkey as a political and economic role model is attractive,
but it should be seen as a merely “symbolic” model. It cannot and should not be
replicated. After all, Turkish democracy is the result of a 200-year-long
process. Turkey also has its own problems, as evidenced by the coups d’état. Ms
Leinonen mentioned Mr Akyol’s book Islam
without Extremes, in which the author argues that Islam is compatible with
a secular state and democracy. The book, written in English, is being
translated into Turkish and Arabic. Its reception in the Muslim community
remains to be seen.

Dr Hanna Ojanen, who chaired the debate,
asked whether Mr Akyol considers religion a sort of soft power contributing to
Turkey’s growing international role. Mr Akyol replied that religion is not
explicitly used in this way. The reason the Turkish leaders are perceived as
Muslim has to do with identity, with their expression of sympathy for the
Palestinian people, and with Ottoman nostalgia.

Responding to a
question from the audience, Mr Akyol analysed Turkish foreign policy. According
to him, Turkey wants to continue the EU process, but there is a lack of
enthusiasm because of the state of the Turkish economy, and because of
uncertainty about being truly welcome in the Union. Turkey’s relations with
Middle Eastern neighbours have changed from a “zero problems” policy after
Turkey chose to side with the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime. Mr
Akyol sees potential in Turkey for mediation between Iran and the West, and for
solving problems in the Middle East through diplomacy.

The Palestinian
issue was also brought up. Mr Akyol’s opinion was that the issue is an engine
of radicalism, which stems from political problems expressed in the name of
Islam. The international system is seen as unfair for letting Israel get away
with too much. Mr Akyol hopes for a two-state solution. As for Turkish-Israeli
relations, Prime Minister Erdoğan has condemned certain policies but is not
categorically anti-Israel. Before 2008 there was cooperation between the two
countries; since then the relationship has deteriorated.

Other issues
were discussed. One of them was the Islamic Gülen movement that has grown more
critical of the AKP government that it has supported. Another topic was the
problem of freedom of the press, which is connected to legislation
(anti-terrorism laws and a law against insulting Turkishness) as well as to the
close ties of media companies to Ankara.