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North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un (R) claps during the unveiling ceremony of two statues of former leaders Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang on April 13, 2012. North Korea's new leader Kim Jong-Un on April 13 led a mass rally for his late father and grandfather following the country's failed rocket launch. (Image credit: AFP/Getty Images via @daylife)

North Korea has made its third generational power transfer. Although Kim Jong-un, or the Cute Leader—officially known as the “Great Successor”—may not really be in charge, the system remains as tyrannical as ever.

The regime rests on several agencies of repression, explains Ken E. Gause, a director at the research group CNA, in a recent study of how the Kim family and allied elites have been able to exploit the North Korean people for more than six decades. His report, “Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State,” is published by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was formally established in 1948. The country has suffered through war, poverty, and famine. However, the regime may have suffered its greatest shock when “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung, who had ruled his country for 46 years, died in 1994. Nevertheless, Kim had prepared well, anointing his son, Kim Jong-il as his successor 20 years before. The regime continued with “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il in charge for the next 17 years. Now Kim Jong-un has taken over, at least in name.

How have the Kims survived, even thrived? “One of the reasons for political continuity despite economic deprivation is the total control the regime maintains over society,” explains Gause. Government controls are pervasive and brutal. “Overseeing this apparatus of coercion and repression are a number of internal security—or domestic spying—agencies,” Gause adds. They squabble over jurisdiction while battling “to prove their absolute loyalty to the Supreme Leader.”

The DPRK’s form of totalitarianism is unique. In certain ways North Korea resembles Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union or Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China: There is a blood-soaked dictator, communist ideology, secret police, and ruling political party. However, “it is how these pieces of the totalitarian puzzle fit together that makes North Korea unique and explains how the regime controls society,” notes Gause.

The system evolved along with Kim Il-sung’s successful grab for supreme power. It’s a fascinating if familiar tale of human cruelty and depravity. But Kim’s task was no cakewalk: he asserted control over a society anti-communist in tradition, maintained power after starting a war which he would have lost without Chinese support, destroyed factions allied with the Soviet Union and China, eradicated domestic opponents, and formalized an unnatural monarchical power transfer. His success came at enormous human cost, of course, and several agencies of repression were critical in Kim’s various campaigns. Notes Gause: “what began as a purge of the party by 1957 evolved into a campaign to thoroughly exert the regime’s control over North Korean society.”

Cute Leader Kim Jong-un recognizes the importance of the organs of internal security and, reports Gause, apparently “has spent a great deal of time since becoming heir apparent in 2009 forging ties to key security leaders and overseeing internal security policy, including a severe crackdown on North Korea’s border with China in 2011 and 2012." Whether Kim is in charge, merely sits at the table, or is but a figure-head, he represents an entire exploitative class. Repression will remain the primary means of preserving the North’s rapacious regime. Observes Gause: “While Kim Jong-un may be more dependent on a collective support network, all initial indications are that he will run the regime in a similar manner.”

Policy so far dims hopes that Kim will inaugurate a North Korean version of glasnost and perestroika. Some of the changes that we’ve seen so far, such as the public introduction of Kim’s wife, seem designed more to enhance the impact of Pyongyang’s PR than improve the lives of the North Korean people. The unexpected purge of military leaders has not reduced the importance of the military as an institution.

And then there are those internal security agencies.

Americans extol individual liberty and justly worry about the expansion of police powers after 9/11. The North Korean system is almost unimaginable in comparison. The State Security Department has existed for years but was not mentioned by the North Korean media until 1987. With some 50,000 employees, the agency “is charged with searching out anti-state criminals—those accused of anti-government and dissident activities, economic crimes, and disloyalty to the political leadership,” explains Gause. The SSD maintains a “Special Mission Group” which can move against top party, military, and SSD officials.