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Abstract

A successful American grand strategy requires a close integration of international and domestic institutions and practices. This Essay explores the vital interdependence of grand strategy and law, both international and domestic. First, it asks how the United States should formulate its foreign policy strategy by pointing to the three primary components that must be deployed in tandem to forge a successful American foreign policy—persuasion, inducements, and force. Second, this Essay shows that in light of the distribution of powers between the president and Congress, and within the executive branch, the execution of that strategy requires a high level of bipartisan consensus in favor of an approach that neither disclaims the use of American power nor solely relies on it. The soundness of this strategy is tested against the American experience in Iraq and elsewhere.