Not sure why, since such a treatise will have less influence on the subsequent behavior of the Trump administration than its predecessors.

That’s not necessarily a criticism.

Paper says China, Russia are threats

For what it’s worth, the white paper itself was rooted in useful realpolitik. “A central continuity in history is the contest for power” is an anchoring precept.

The overarching threat to the United States, according to the document, is geopolitical competition with China and Russia. The competition is not only over influence and power, but legitimacy: “These are fundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive systems and those who favor free societies.”

After 9/11, the construct of Samuel Huntington that the world order was being remade through a clash of civilizations was much in vogue. According to Huntington, in the post Cold War era, there would be a regional realignment along cultural and ethnic lines that would overwhelm differences in political systems.

Robert Kagan proffered a different construct in his slender 2008 book, The Return of History. The post Cold War era, according to Kagan, would feature tensions between democratic and authoritarian governments. The later necessarily rejecting the notion that legitimacy comes from the consent of the governed and that there is a universal human right to freedom that limits the power of government.

Does Trump actually believe that?

Kagan’s book was far less vetted than Huntington’s. But thus far, he seems to have had the better argument. The fault lines in international relations do seem to be more along democratic vs. authoritarian divisions than civilizational ones.

The Indo-Pacific best illustrates that. Democratic Japan and South Korea continue to align with the United States, and to a lesser extent fellow democracies Australia and India, rather than find accommodation with authoritarian China as a culturally related regional hegemon.

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy is rooted in Kagan’s view of the principal challenge of our times. The question is whether President Trump shares it.

There was a disconnect between the Trump speech announcing the white paper and the white paper itself.

The white paper was anchored in the geopolitical competition with China and Russia. The speech barely mentioned it in passing.

Instead, Trump’s speech was a reprise of his economic nationalism. Other countries are taking advantage of the United States in trade. Our allies are freeloaders. Past presidents were stupid and did nothing about it. And didn’t protect our borders.

Trump's policy: Do what seems right to him

Does this disconnect matter? Arguably not.

Ever since the attack on the Syrian airfield in retaliation for the use of chemical weapons, it was clear that the Trump foreign policy was going to be an ad hoc affair, a reaction to circumstances that arise rather than an attempt to pursue a particular strategic vision.

There was no preconceived articulated policy that resulted in the retaliatory attack. To Trump, it seemed like the right thing to do. So, he did it.

The administration is feeling its way to a response to North Korea’s impending capability to strike the United States with a nuclear weapon. Piling up international sanctions. Inducing, cajoling and pressuring China to use its leverage against North Korea. Beefing up missile defenses. Ratcheting up the threat of U.S. military action.

Having an overarching construct of China as a geopolitical competitor and North Korea as a rogue state doesn’t contribute much to mitigating the nuclear threat. Ad hoc efforts to find a combination that produces results is as good as it gets.

Theory, practice are two different things

Between the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, I had the opportunity to interview Doug Feith, a Defense official who was a principal architect of the Bush administration’s response to the 9/11 attacks. I was trying to discern the principles that would govern when the Bush administration used military force to protect the country against terrorism.

After a while, Feith became mildly frustrated, stating that such questions are often “more difficult in theory than in practice.”

At the time, I thought that a dodge and an indication of a failure to have thought things through.