Two legal propositions fall for
consideration in this appeal. The first proposition deals with the
question as to whether having framed charges against an accused, a
Magistrate has the jurisdiction in law to recall such order on the
ground that the prosecution had failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. An ancillary question
will also arise as to whether such failure would render the framing of
charge void.

3. The second proposition raises a question as to whether in exercise of
its inherent powers, the High Court could quash the charges framed and
acquit the accused on account of such non- compliance with the
provisions of Sections 207 and 238 of the aforesaid Code.

4. The appellant herein is the original accused No.5 in a special case
pending before the learned Special Judge, Mumbai in which charge was
framed against him and the other accused persons on 13th December, 1996
under Sections 120-B read with Sections 420, 468, 471, 477-A of the
Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Though such charge had been framed
against the appellant on 13th December, 1996, after about five years an
application was made on behalf of the appellant in 2001, before the
Special Court seeking directions for production of certain documents in
the custody of the prosecution. By order dated 27th August, 2001, the
said application was allowed and the prosecution was directed to produce
all the documents referred to in the statement of one Mr. P.K.R.K. Menon
made on 24th February, 1993. The said documents were ultimately produced
in 2002. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application for re-opening
the proceedings and for discharge, which was rejected by the learned
Special Judge by his order dated 1st April, 2006.

5. In rejecting the said
application, the learned Special Judge relied primarily on the decision
of this Court in the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani vs. State of
Maharashtra [AIR 1979 SC 94] in which this Court had held that once
a charge is framed, the Magistrate has no power under Section 227 or any
other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure to cancel such charge
and to discharge the accused. It was also observed that once charge has
been framed and the accused pleads not guilty, the Magistrate is
required to proceed with the trial to its logical end. In other words,
once a charge is framed in a warrant case instituted either on complaint
or a police report, the Magistrate has no power under the Code to
discharge the accused. He can, thereafter, either acquit or convict the
accused.

6. The learned Special Judge also
relied another decision of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs.
Golconda Linga Swamy and Anr. [AIR 2004 SC 3967], where similar
views have been expressed.

7. Aggrieved by the said order of
the learned Special Judge, the appellant filed an application under
Section 482 of the aforesaid Code before the Bombay High Court for
quashing the proceedings of the Special case pending before the learned
Special Judge, Mumbai and also for quashing the order dated 1st April,
2006, whereby the learned Special Judge had rejected the appellant's
application for discharge.

8. Taking a view, which was similar
to that expressed by the learned Special Judge, the Bombay High Court
dismissed the revisional application upon holding that there had been
sufficient compliance by the prosecution with the requirement of law and
that failure to produce the documents referred to in the order dated
27th August, 2001 would not nullify the proceedings from the stage of
framing of charge. On a reference to the decision in Ratilal Bhanji
Mithani's case (supra), the High Court took the view that since charge
had been framed, the case would have to go for trial as no case had been
made out for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code at
the said stage.

9. In this appeal, the appellant has
assailed the orders passed by the learned Special Judge, as also the
High Court.

10. On behalf of the appellant it
was submitted by learned senior counsel, Mr. Amit Desai, that the High
Court had misapplied the decision in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani's case
(supra) as it was the case of the appellant that non-compliance of the
provisions of Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had vitiated
the entire proceedings, including framing of charge. He submitted that
such non-compliance was antithetical to the concept of a fair and speedy
trial as contemplated in Article 21 of the Constitution as was held in
the case of Satish Mehra vs. Delhi Administration (1996) 9 SCC 766. It
was submitted that the entire proceedings were vitiated on such score as
well. It was urged that the High Court had erred in not exercising its
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the entire
proceedings, including framing of charge.

11. In support of his aforesaid
submission, Mr. Desai referred to the decision of a seven-Judge Bench of
this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4
SCC 578, wherein the question of speedy trial had been considered and
having regard to the views expressed in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case,
(1992) 1 SCC 225, it was held that if the delay in concluding a
trial was oppressive or unwarranted, it would violate Article 21 of the
Constitution and such trial or such proceedings would be liable to be
terminated.

12. Reference was also made to a
decision of a three-Judge Bench in State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath
Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, wherein while called upon to answer the
wider question as to whether at the time of framing charge the trial
court can consider material filed by the accused, reference was
disapprovingly made to an earlier two-Judges Bench decision in the case
of Satish Mehra vs. Delhi Administration. In fact, the matter was
heard on a reference as there was a conflict of views between two

Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
In Satish Mehra's case (supra) it was held that at the time of framing
of charge the trial court was competent to consider material produced on
behalf of the accused in the light of Section 227 of the Code which
provides for an opportunity of being heard to the accused so that he was
not unnecessarily made to undergo the entire gamut of a trial which
could be concluded at the time of framing of charge itself, if the trial
court was satisfied upon the material produced both by the prosecution
and the accused that there was no need to proceed to conduct the trial.
The said view taken in Satish Mehra's case was, however,
overruled in Debendra Nath Padhi's case.

13. Reference was lastly made to a
decision of a single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Dhananjay
Kumar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Crl.L.J. 3873, where the
principles of natural justice were held to be an integralpart of a fair
trial in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations on 10th
December, 1948.

14. Appearing for the Central Bureau
of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as `CBI'), learned Additional
Solicitor General, Mr. Mohan Parasaran, submitted that a similar
application (Criminal Application No.1129 of 1997) made by the appellant
had been dismissed on 2nd November, 1998, as none of the parties were
represented at the time of hearing of the application. He also submitted
that having regard to the decision in Debendra Nath Pathi's case
(supra) and also in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani's case (supra), the
earlier ambiguity had been removed and it had been clearly laid down
that not only could the trial court not recall its order framing charge,
which would result in re-opening of the proceedings, but it could not
also consider the material produced on behalf of the accused at the time
of framing charge.

15. Of the two propositions raised
in this appeal, the first proposition has been completely answered in
Debendra Nath Padhi's case (supra) regarding the trial court's power
to recall its order framing charge against an accused. Having regard to
the language of Sections 207 and 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
while framing charges the trial court can only look into the materials
produced by the prosecution while giving an opportunity to the accused
to show that the said materials were insufficient for the purpose of
framing charge. The decision in Satish Mehra's case (supra)
having been overruled in Debendra Nath Padhi's case (supra) the
contention of Mr. Desai that the Magistrate should have re-opened the
matter on the basis of the documents produced by the prosecution at the
instance of the accused, is no longer res-integra. The question of
discharge by the learned Magistrate after framing of charge does not,
therefore, arise, notwithstanding the submissions advanced with regard
to denial of natural justice and a fair and speedy trial as contemplated
under Article 21 of the Constitution, which have no application
whatsoever to the facts of this case.

16. With regard to the second
proposition regarding the High Court's powers to look into materials
produced on behalf of or at the instance of the accused for the purpose
of invoking its powers under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the
charges framed, it has to be kept in mind that after the stage of
framing charge evidence has to be led on behalf of the prosecution to
prove the charge if an accused pleads not guilty to the charge and/or
charges and claims to be tried. It is only in the exceptional
circumstances enumerated in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992
Suppl.(1) SCC 335, that a criminal proceeding may be quashed to secure
the ends of justice, but such a stage will come only after evidence is
led, particularly when the prosecution had produced sufficient material
for charges to be framed. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi's case
(supra) at the stage of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is
impermissible and a mini trial cannot be conducted at such stage. At the
stage of framing of charge the submissions on behalf of the accused has
to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. The
accused will get an opportunity to prove the documents subsequently
produced by the prosecution on the order of the Court, but the same
cannot be relied upon to re-open the proceedings once charge has been
framed or for invocation of the High Court's powers under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.

17. Accordingly, no interference is
warranted with the orders passed by the learned special Judge or the
High Court, and the appeal is, therefore, dismissed.