(TS) A major Air Force objective was to
obtain administration approval to relax the rules of engagement for the lst Air
Commando Squadron. Adopted in late 1961., these rules authorized operations when
the MP lacked the necessary training and equipment, combined USAF-VNAF crews
were aboard, and the missions were confined to South Vietnam. In addition, the
aircraft carried VNAF rather than USAF markings and there were strict target
verification procedures. Previous USAF efforts to modify the rules were
unsuccessful.

(TS) Because of the rising need for air
support and the slow growth of the VNAF, the lst Air Commando sortie rate
increased. It was felt that more effective air support would be possible if the
rules were relaxed, but administration officials retained them for political
reasons. Meanwhile, U.S. Army aviation appeared to be interpreting the rules
more freely, their armed helicopters carried U.S. markings, and their pilots
received more public recognition, a circumstance that greatly troubled the Air
Force.

(TS) In March and May 1964, after visits to
Saigon and Honolulu, McNamara reaffirmed the rules for the 1st Air Commando
Squadron. The official view was that, despite U.S. assistance, the war was
primarily Vietnamese and that there was Presidential understanding that the lst
Commando's activities were temporary until the VNAF "could do the
job.

(S) In April and May the role of tie 1st
Air Commando became a public issue after the publication in tie press and Life
magazine of the letters of Captain Shank, who died on 24 March in the crash of a
T-28. As noted earlier., he complained about inadequate aircraft and equipment.
But Shank's letters alsoindicated that the Commando Pilots often engaged
more in combat than in training. Commando pilots and top U.S. officials, were
called to testify before special Senate and House investigating subcommittees.

(S) General LeMay took the occasion to urge
the JCS to persuade McNamara to change the rules of engagement, as the United
States had more to lose than gain by denying a fact of USAF activity in the
war.

(TS) LeMay was unsuccessful. Indeed, on 20
May the JCS tightened the rules of engagement: 1st Air Commando pilots could fly
only bonafide combat training missions against hostile targets with VNAF pilots
in training and not with Vietnamese "observers" (the intent being to eventually
eliminate the squadron and leavecombat support tothe
VNAF); no armed helicopters should be used as a substitute forclose
air support strikes; and U.S. advisors should be exposed to combat only to the
extent that U.S. advisory duties required this.

(S) General Smart, PACAF's commander,
believed that the latest JCS guidance left unclear whether lst Air Commando
pilots should"fight or not."
Nor was the Air Force's disenchantment with the rules dispelled by MAC/V's
continued freer interpretation of them for armedhelicopters,
despite the injunction against combat-type missions except to protect vehicles
and passengers.

(S) Four months later military
deterioration in South Vietnam again forced a change in the rules. With
Westmoreland's and Sharp's support, the JCS recommended that the lst Air
Commando be authorizedto fly with
either VNAF observers or student pilots, to fly with USAF pilots alone for
immediate air support if requests were beyond the VNAF's capability or if
no VNAF crew member was available, and to assign a dual training and combat
support mission to the 1st Air Commando. On 25 September McNamara agreed to only
one change: either a VNAF observer or a student pilot could be used, thus
reverting to a practice in effect prior to 20 May. The JCS sent an implementingdirective on 14 October.

(TS) Meanwhile, the possibility of Communist
air activity after the Gulf of Tonkin incident resulted in a general relaxation
of the rules of engagement for other USAF and Navy air activities. Decisions in
August and September gave General Westmoreland or Admiral Sharp greater
authority to engage enemy aircraft over South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos and in
international airspace, and to attack hostile vessels in international waters.