piccolittle wrote:Ohh, interesting interpretation. I think it's Chirelstein using old-timey language here. I think he means may as in "may happen" to order, not may as in "is allowed" or "is able to" order.

Oh God, now I get what you mean. I should point out that Chirestein's style of writing has been frustrating me all semester, but I forced myself to read his book because my professor dotes on him. If I have to face language like this on my exam, I'm fucked.

Thanks guys - now could someone explain the more complicated version of illusory promises to me? The version involving good faith? Because that made even less sense to me when Chirelstein explained it. It's pg. 26-27 of Chirelstein (Mattei v. Hopper)

If this is the same as the lucy lady duff bitchface v. her promoter one, I hated it. Seems just like the court saying, equity demands this! Which would be cool, you know, if they were at all consistent in their application of equity where it's demanded.

ilovesf wrote:the civpro e&e has incorrect information about filing dates for rule 50 and 59 i am now doubting the information that i memorized out of the e&e

Several substantial changes were made to the FRCP in December 2009. Keep that in mind when using the 2009 edition of Glannon, which is the latest version and does not include these changes.

ETA: The majority of the amendments affect timing requirements and change how some deadlines are calculated. The most significant changes are to Rule 6. Also, the 2009 Glannon doesn't include any Iqbal and Twombly stuff.

ilovesf wrote:the civpro e&e has incorrect information about filing dates for rule 50 and 59 i am now doubting the information that i memorized out of the e&e

Could you be more specific? Also, which edition do you have?

I have the latest/sixth edition. The difference is that I guess prior to 2009 it was 10 days to file a post-verdict JMOL/motion for a new trial, and now it's 28 days. Not something ground breaking, but that would really mess me up on a multiple choice question or something. I'm going to double check my pleading timings now and stuff.

ilovesf wrote:the civpro e&e has incorrect information about filing dates for rule 50 and 59 i am now doubting the information that i memorized out of the e&e

Could you be more specific? Also, which edition do you have?

I have the latest/sixth edition. The difference is that I guess prior to 2009 it was 10 days to file a post-verdict JMOL/motion for a new trial, and now it's 28 days. Not something ground breaking, but that would really mess me up on a multiple choice question or something. I'm going to double check my pleading timings now and stuff.

Yea none of the changes are really significant. Just small timing things that people need to watch out for. The concepts are all still the same though.

ilovesf wrote:the civpro e&e has incorrect information about filing dates for rule 50 and 59 i am now doubting the information that i memorized out of the e&e

Could you be more specific? Also, which edition do you have?

I have the latest/sixth edition. The difference is that I guess prior to 2009 it was 10 days to file a post-verdict JMOL/motion for a new trial, and now it's 28 days. Not something ground breaking, but that would really mess me up on a multiple choice question or something. I'm going to double check my pleading timings now and stuff.

I think Chirelstein's writing is about as clear as possible. I suspect your trying to cram in too much at once if its not making sense. I don't mean this is a condescending manner it happens to me when I try to cram and read 230 pages in a sitting.

Also, I though the sum and substances (David Whaley) and Law School legends (David Epstein) tapes were helpful for contracts, if you needed an extra supplement while you drive.

A materially breaches, and upon learning of his material breach attempts to cure, but that attempt is rebuffed by B because B wants to cancel K. Is A saying it wants to cure and not being allowed to cure the same thing as A materially breach and curing (to turn material breach into substantial performance)?

Also, I seem to recall that if A materially breaches, A cannot sue on the K, correct?

shock259 wrote:I'm in a weird sport for leg reg. I've taken all the practice tests I can find, memorized my outline, and generally feel pretty comfortable with the all of the material and how to apply it.

My exam isn't until early next week. Now I don't know what to do with myself.

Study for other finals? I feel ready for mine tomorrow, but I feel like I'm being unfaithful to study for others...

shock259 wrote:I'm in a weird sport for leg reg. I've taken all the practice tests I can find, memorized my outline, and generally feel pretty comfortable with the all of the material and how to apply it.

My exam isn't until early next week. Now I don't know what to do with myself.

Study for other finals? I feel ready for mine tomorrow, but I feel like I'm being unfaithful to study for others...

I'm in the same spot. First exam is tuesday. I've been ready to go since yesterday. I'm kinda chillin, because i'm worried that I'll forget the material if I start studying for my second exam.

shock259 wrote:I'm in a weird sport for leg reg. I've taken all the practice tests I can find, memorized my outline, and generally feel pretty comfortable with the all of the material and how to apply it.

My exam isn't until early next week. Now I don't know what to do with myself.

Study for other finals? I feel ready for mine tomorrow, but I feel like I'm being unfaithful to study for others...

I'm in the same spot. First exam is tuesday. I've been ready to go since yesterday. I'm kinda chillin, because i'm worried that I'll forget the material if I start studying for my second exam.

This happened to me. I started studying for my second exam first because civpro is the class that is most challenging for me, and then I started studying for my first final a week before it. Then after my first final, I realized I had nearly forgotten everything I studied for civpro.

A materially breaches, and upon learning of his material breach attempts to cure, but that attempt is rebuffed by B because B wants to cancel K. Is A saying it wants to cure and not being allowed to cure the same thing as A materially breach and curing (to turn material breach into substantial performance)?

Also, I seem to recall that if A materially breaches, A cannot sue on the K, correct?

I'm not sure about the amending and curing part, but I know that breaching party can sue based on the contract if the non-breaching party has been unjustly enriched. The example my prof used was if you're leasing an office and you have a big $15k printer/copier and you breach but leave the printer with the office, you can sue to reclaim the unjust enrichment against the office owner to recover for the cost of the printer.

Granted the office owner may sue for breach, w/ expectation dmg, etc. but you can still sue for Unjust Enrichment and are entitled to Restitution.

A materially breaches, and upon learning of his material breach attempts to cure, but that attempt is rebuffed by B because B wants to cancel K. Is A saying it wants to cure and not being allowed to cure the same thing as A materially breach and curing (to turn material breach into substantial performance)?

Also, I seem to recall that if A materially breaches, A cannot sue on the K, correct?

I'm not sure about the amending and curing part, but I know that breaching party can sue based on the contract if the non-breaching party has been unjustly enriched. The example my prof used was if you're leasing an office and you have a big $15k printer/copier and you breach but leave the printer with the office, you can sue to reclaim the unjust enrichment against the office owner to recover for the cost of the printer.

Granted the office owner may sue for breach, w/ expectation dmg, etc. but you can still sue for Unjust Enrichment and are entitled to Restitution.

right but when you sue for unjust enrichment that isn't a suit on the contract. that is a quasi-contract suit

A materially breaches, and upon learning of his material breach attempts to cure, but that attempt is rebuffed by B because B wants to cancel K. Is A saying it wants to cure and not being allowed to cure the same thing as A materially breach and curing (to turn material breach into substantial performance)?

Also, I seem to recall that if A materially breaches, A cannot sue on the K, correct?

I'm not sure about the amending and curing part, but I know that breaching party can sue based on the contract if the non-breaching party has been unjustly enriched. The example my prof used was if you're leasing an office and you have a big $15k printer/copier and you breach but leave the printer with the office, you can sue to reclaim the unjust enrichment against the office owner to recover for the cost of the printer.

Granted the office owner may sue for breach, w/ expectation dmg, etc. but you can still sue for Unjust Enrichment and are entitled to Restitution.

True. But there wouldn't be anything for them to sue on based on contract since they breached. Could you give an example of what situation you inquiring about then? My understanding is that once a party materially breaches, the non-breaching party may terminate the contract and after terminated, then they cannot collect for any form of unjust enrichment because it was not solicited after the termination occurred.

right but when you sue for unjust enrichment that isn't a suit on the contract. that is a quasi-contract suit

I have 2.5 days between each exam. I'm also a bit worried I'll forget everything if I start studying for another subject now. I didn't realize how nice it that we get these breaks between the exams. I'd die if I had exams back to back.

A materially breaches, and upon learning of his material breach attempts to cure, but that attempt is rebuffed by B because B wants to cancel K. Is A saying it wants to cure and not being allowed to cure the same thing as A materially breach and curing (to turn material breach into substantial performance)?

Also, I seem to recall that if A materially breaches, A cannot sue on the K, correct?

I'm not sure about the amending and curing part, but I know that breaching party can sue based on the contract if the non-breaching party has been unjustly enriched. The example my prof used was if you're leasing an office and you have a big $15k printer/copier and you breach but leave the printer with the office, you can sue to reclaim the unjust enrichment against the office owner to recover for the cost of the printer.

Granted the office owner may sue for breach, w/ expectation dmg, etc. but you can still sue for Unjust Enrichment and are entitled to Restitution.

True. But there wouldn't be anything for them to sue on based on contract since they breached. Could you give an example of what situation you inquiring about then? My understanding is that once a party materially breaches, the non-breaching party may terminate the contract and after terminated, then they cannot collect for any form of unjust enrichment because it was not solicited after the termination occurred.

right but when you sue for unjust enrichment that isn't a suit on the contract. that is a quasi-contract suit

A material breach in and of itself is not sufficient to allow the non-breaching party to cancel the K. You have to run through a § 242 analysis of the material breach to decide if you've allowed enough time to cure. If A materially breaches and wants to cure but is not allowed to do so, what is his remedy? Essentially, if B cancels without allowing time to cure, B has breached the K, but from what I remember from class is that a party that has materially breached cannot sue on the contract, therefore it seems that A could only get reliance damages, not expectation damages, which seems unfair.

Now I can only see 2 ways around this. Either by offering to cure, A has not materially breached at all, but has substantially performed (weighing the cure factor in the § 241 test heaviest), or equating an offer to cure as the same thing as actually curing which allows A to claim he has turned material breach into substantial performance.

nonprofit-prophet wrote:A material breach in and of itself is not sufficient to allow the non-breaching party to cancel the K. You have to run through a § 242 analysis of the material breach to decide if you've allowed enough time to cure. If A materially breaches and wants to cure but is not allowed to do so, what is his remedy? Essentially, if B cancels without allowing time to cure, B has breached the K, but from what I remember from class is that a party that has materially breached cannot sue on the contract, therefore it seems that A could only get reliance damages, not expectation damages, which seems unfair.

Now I can only see 2 ways around this. Either by offering to cure, A has not materially breached at all, but has substantially performed (weighing the cure factor in the § 241 test heaviest), or equating an offer to cure as the same thing as actually curing which allows A to claim he has turned material breach into substantial performance.

Alright, nvm. Our Prof refused to really go into anything associated with UCC or Restatements. If anyone in the class referenced UCC or something from not within class, he dismissed it. So, yeah, I guess we got a rather simplistic view on what the approach is. Sorry I cant help.

nonprofit-prophet wrote:A material breach in and of itself is not sufficient to allow the non-breaching party to cancel the K. You have to run through a § 242 analysis of the material breach to decide if you've allowed enough time to cure. If A materially breaches and wants to cure but is not allowed to do so, what is his remedy? Essentially, if B cancels without allowing time to cure, B has breached the K, but from what I remember from class is that a party that has materially breached cannot sue on the contract, therefore it seems that A could only get reliance damages, not expectation damages, which seems unfair.

Now I can only see 2 ways around this. Either by offering to cure, A has not materially breached at all, but has substantially performed (weighing the cure factor in the § 241 test heaviest), or equating an offer to cure as the same thing as actually curing which allows A to claim he has turned material breach into substantial performance.

Alright, nvm. Our Prof refused to really go into anything associated with UCC or Restatements. If anyone in the class referenced UCC or something from not within class, he dismissed it. So, yeah, I guess we got a rather simplistic view on what the approach is. Sorry I cant help.