The case for re-nationalising Britain’s railways

The case for re-nationalising Britain’s railways

Author

PhD Researcher and Research Assistant in Transport Policy and Governance at University College London, UCL

Disclosure statement

Nicole works on LSE Cities' New Urban Governance project which is funded by the McArthur Foundation. Nicole's PhD studentship is funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council via the Transforming the Engineering of Cities for Societal and Planetary Wellbeing Research Programme (Liveable Cities). Nicole sits on the London Transport Expert Panel of the Institution of Civil Engineers.

Labour leadership hopefuls Jeremy Corbyn and Andy Burnham have both spoken of re-nationalising the UK’s railways. National ownership of such a crucial piece of a country’s infrastructure is the source of much debate. But the evidence suggests that integrating the UK’s expensive and fragmented rail network under public ownership could save hundreds of millions and also provide a better service.

At a smaller level, Transport for London shows the success of an integrated network run by the public sector. If a similar model was applied to national rail all profits made in the sector would be reinvested, fares could be cut and government subsidies reduced. This compared to how costly and inefficient privatising the national rail network has been.

Public support

The latest two YouGov Surveys indicate majority support for taking rail back into public ownership. Opposition to the idea has fallen from March to August.

The overwhelming reason for this is a belief that rail fares would go down as a result. For example a YouGov Survey of 2014 found the top three reasons for re-nationalising the railways were:

Railways would be accountable to the taxpayer rather than shareholders.

Rail fares would go down.

It would be more cost effective overall.

Only a third think ticket prices would go up under public ownership. Half think the fares would fall.Survation - May 2014

The belief is justified. In 2013, journey prices were 23% higher in real terms than in 1995 (the year rail was fully privatised). Research by Transport for Quality of Life indicates creating a unified publicly owned railway could save enough to fund a 10% cut on regulated fares, which constitute half of all tickets sold, including season and day return tickets.

A costly experiment

Today’s part public, part private system is a reflection of the Great British rail privatisation experiment. The 1993 Railways Act split responsibility for physical rail infrastructure and the train services. Railtrack, a for-profit company, took on infrastructure and the passenger rail network was split into 25 companies, each to be run by the private sector.

Infrastructure has since been returned to public ownership. After four fatal rail accidents around the millennium exposed Railtrack’s dangerous under-investment in infrastructure and spiralling project costs, Network Rail, was created, a not-for-dividend company to replace it. Its high dependence on subsidy and government-guaranteed borrowing then required its reclassificaion from a non-profit company to a central government body.

There has also been significant growth in Network Rail debt from £9.6 billion in 2003 to £34 billion in 2014, which has grown in an effort to upgrade the under-invested infrastructure inherited from Railtrack but also due to debt services. With Network Rail now a central government body it can borrow through the Treasury rather than from the City – which is slightly cheaper.

As the graph below shows, not at any point in recent history has the British railway network managed to cover its costs. On average, passenger fares have made up 60% of total rail income in the past 25 years – peaking at 85%. The 1992 White Paper on rail privatisation, drafted to inform the 1993 Railways Act, recommended that rail infrastructure remain publicly owned as there was no record of profitability.

Passenger fare revenue as a percentage of total GB rail system revenue.A Bowman (2015) An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation

Yes, passenger numbers have risen – average annual passenger numbers rose 4% between 1997 and 2012 compared to 1.73% between 1982 and 1996 and the annual journeys per head rose from 14.9 in 1997-98 to 22.4 in 2010-11. But the rise in passenger numbers is arguably symptomatic of wider trends such as urbanisation, centralisation of employment and non-car lifestyle choices, particularly of millenials, rather than credit to the privatisation of the rail industry. These lifestyle changes are reflected by growth in the frequency of journeys over individual journey distances, as shown below.

Under the current system, the various train operating companies bid to run each rail franchise. The problem is, central government ultimately pays for the costs involved in these bids. The train operators are not directly reimbursed for the incurred cost of bidding, they will recoup it by factoring it into the franchise price. So scrapping the bidding process would cut this cost, which was conservatively estimated to be £15-20m per franchise competition in 2010 (though the competition for Great Western’s services in 2012 cost a total of £40m).

So, if three franchises are up for renewal a year from now until the end of 2019, between £45m and £120m could be saved by scrapping these competitions and managing the rail routes under one umbrella.

4. Administration costs

If the franchising system was abolished, more than £2m a year could be saved on in-house Department for Transport administration costs. Cutting the external consultants and contractors involved in franchise specification and procurement would save the department an additional £4m a year.

Additional savings could be reaped from an integrated structure such as getting rid of duplicate senior management and marketing.

Thus, the case for re-nationalising all of Britain’s railways is a strong one. Privatisation has proven extremely costly and an integrated national network would be better value for both consumer and government.