Oslo 20 years later: The origins and dangers of 'security zones'

How Israel succeeded in diluting the implementation of the Oslo Accords through a combination of hypothetical worst-case military scenarios and the misleading and incorrect attribution of the term ‘security zones’ to diplomatic texts.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regularly declares that in any agreement with the Palestinians, “security zones” – code for large settlement blocs and the “Jordan Valley” – will remain under Israeli sovereignty. But what is the origin of “security zones,” which repeatedly appear in the discourse of Israeli decision makers? The following is an analysis of “security zones” and the stories that we tell ourselves.

The main and lasting achievement of the Oslo Accords, whose 20th anniversary is approaching, was the mutual Israeli and Palestinian recognition of each side’s national aspirations. The anniversary provides us with an opportunity to examine a forgotten dimension of these accords – the birth of the “security zones.”

First, a few preliminary remarks. Wide ranging “security zones” are not equivalent to defined “security arrangements,” which are basically of a military character and are designed to facilitate the attainment of a peace agreement. According to the September 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II) the Palestinian Authority’s territory in the West Bank would be gradually expanded in three “stages” of withdrawal and “further redeployment.” At the conclusion of this agreement, the PA territory would include all of the West Bank except Jerusalem, settlements and specified military locations which would remain under Israeli control until the anticipated Final Status Agreement, which is derived from the Interim Agreement. The key lies in the concept of “specified military locations” that appears a number of times in the Interim Agreement.

Those who claim that Israel can unilaterally define large “security zones” – that would remain under Israeli control – create an equation, which has no basis in the peace process, between “specified military locations” and “security zones.” They also create the misleading impression that “security,” which is a multidimensional and subjective concept, and “military,” which is specific and relates only to armies and fighting forces and which appears explicitly in the agreement, are synonyms. This is not the case.

In order to understand that the Interim Agreement refers to the minimalist concept of the territory to remain under Israeli control until final status in accordance with the “military locations” construct, and not to the maximalist concept of “security zones,” it is necessary to examine how the minimalist concept originated. The concept of “specified locations” arose from American diplomacy during the Camp David negotiations (1978). When President Sadat demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank to the pre-1967 borders and the negotiations seemed to have reached an impasse, President Carter sent his National Security Council team with prepared compromise proposals. The book, Camp David: the Key to Peace (1979), by Haaretz Washington correspondent Yoel Marcus, provides us with a detailed and factual account of those crucial days at Camp David.

According to Marcus, the Americans presented a draft according to which “the IDF would withdraw and redeploy in accordance with security arrangements to limited specified locations for five years.” The Israeli delegation rejected the American proposal and erased the sentence. Instead, it wrote, “in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, there will be a withdrawal of IDF forces and there will be an Israeli military security presence in these areas.” In the end, however, Israel had to agree to a formulation closer to the American version. In the final binding English version of the Camp David Framework Agreement (1978), paragraph 1.B, which refers to withdrawal and redeployment in the West Bank, uses the formulation, “specified security locations.”

The non binding Hebrew version, however, apparently inspired by legal advisors Meir Rosen and Elyakim Rubinstein, who participated in the negotiations, states that “there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces to security zones to be specified.” The formulation “security zones to be specified” can be found nowhere in the binding Camp David Accords text. Israel seems to have used the Hebrew translation as a means of amending the Camp David Accords so that they would include the Israeli formulation that had been rejected during the negotiations – an irregular move in international relations that would seem to be an Israeli invention.

Paragraph 13 of the Declaration of Principles (Oslo I, September 1993), states that the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank will consist of “further redeployment to specified locations.” The 1995 Interim Agreement, in which the Americans were actively involved, included “military” in the binding formulation: further redeployment of Israeli forces to “specified military locations.” The Americans, who had learned from President Carter’s Camp David experience of the Israeli tendency to use wide ranging general formulations of “security zones,” this time managed to bring the sides to use an exact and specific formulation: “military” as opposed to the more general “security”; “location” with the clear connotation of a specifically defined place as opposed to “zone,” which has wide geographic connotations. Nevertheless, the binding agreement with the Palestinians has not hindered Israeli officials from continuing to use large “security zones” that would remain under Israeli control, and in their opinion, also under Israeli sovereignty.

An additional aspect of the Interim Agreement that enabled Israel to avoid full implementation was a contribution of the Israeli military establishment. Like all military systems, the Israeli one bases itself on a worst case analysis which is not appropriate for political issues. This contribution was the graphic model of areas “A, B and C,” which was intended to introduce a graduated withdrawal in stages. A close reading of the Interim Agreement and its annexes shows that a dynamic process was envisaged, in which Area C, except for settlements and specified military locations, were meant to become Area B, which would itself eventually become Area A.

The Agreement does not envisage the possibility of a permanent Area C as it is intended to disappear at the end of the process. There is no basis for the widely held Israeli view that the current large Area C (today about 60 percent of the West Bank) is intended, by definition, to remain under full Israeli military and civilian control.

The view of the Americans, who played an active role in Oslo II, was that Israel had freedom of action during the first phases of the withdrawal and the redeployment, but in the third and decisive stage, Israel was meant to complete the withdrawal and to stand at the finish line that was defined by the concept of “specified military locations.” As a theoretical illustration, we could say that Israel would abide by the Agreement with a first withdrawal of 2 percent, a second withdrawal of 3 percent, but the third and final withdrawal would have to be about 90 percent. This would bring us to the Clinton Parameters’ 95 percent, which the Americans still hoped would bring the two sides to a final agreement.

In the future, historians will examine a number of questions. They will have to explain how Israel succeeded in diluting the implementation of the agreements with the Palestinians through a combination of the military scenarios and the misleading and incorrect attribution of the term “security zones” to diplomatic texts. They will also have to explain how the three stages of the withdrawal became a chain of never-ending interim stages and sub stages. Finally, they will have to answer the question of whether there was an understanding and if so, of what kind, between the military and the decision makers on a diluted version of the implementation of the Agreements. It was this means of implementation that enabled the Israeli governments of 1995-2000 to ensure that Israel never reached the finish line of the third stage and a redeployment to “specified military locations.” To this day, Israel has not implemented the third stage.

Examining the origins of “security zones” provides us with insights into current Israeli-Palestinian relations. It can help us to filter out background noises (“security zones”) and spins (“no partner”) from authentic signals of the peace process. A better understanding of the past 20 years of Oslo enables us to see its influence on the current situation. The efforts of the past can help us to understand today’s renewed negotiations for a final status agreement based on the Obama Outline, and to internalize that the American concept for settling the conflict reflects a continuing and consistent vision from the Rogers Plan via Carter to Obama. It is not accidental that the Obama Outline, presented in his May 2011 State Department speech, talks about a two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 lines with agreed upon land swaps and minor alterations. The emphasis is on a sovereign and contiguous Palestine that borders on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, i.e. a final settlement that does not include “security zones” consisting of settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley. We have reached the end of the good old days of permanent interim agreements whose implementation can be stretched to the end of days, which in reality result in violent uprisings. The long corridor doctrine, whose intention was never to reach the finish line of a peace agreement, is no longer tenable. Peace agreements are first and foremost about territory and borders. This is how it works in the global system. Israel does not have an exemption.

Shemuel Meir is a strategic analyst and author of the Haaretz blog “Strategic Discourse” (Siah Estrategi), where a version of this post first appeared in Hebrew.

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COMMENTS

Kolumn9

WednesdaySeptember 4, 2013

No offense, but your entire analysis is purpose-driven garbage where the purpose is to present what is effectively the Palestinian spin on the Oslo Accords and not what was actually agreed to or signed by Peres and Rabin. If you think Rabin would have in 1993 signed a piece of paper that could be interpreted in the way you are interpreting (that Israel obligates itself to withdraw from 95% of the WB), you are nuts.

From your article:
“At the conclusion of this agreement, the PA territory would include all of the West Bank except Jerusalem, settlements and specified military locations which would remain under Israeli control until the anticipated Final Status Agreement, which is derived from the Interim Agreement. ”

BS. Just total garbage. I would even go as far as to call you a liar if I thought that would bother you. The Israeli argument for maintaining control over large chunks of territory isn’t based on the leeway provided by the ‘security zones’. It is based on the fact that the final status issues include BORDERS.

Here is the actual formulation of Oslo 2:

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In accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis;
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In other words, prior to permanent status negotiations the PA (the Council) will cover the West Bank and Gaza, except for where there are settlements, where there are “specified military locations” and where there is dispute over BORDERS. How do you get from what is actually in the text to your ridiculous assertion?

Here is another paragraph from the same document:
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The territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shown on map No. 2, and West Bank territory, except for Area C which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council. At this time, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
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Again, after the three phases of withdrawals from area C the PA (the Council) will cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues yet to be negotiated, which as defined previously include BORDERS.

I would paste more sections but that would be repetitive since they all say the same thing – that the extent of the Israeli redeployments is not going to be based on defining ‘specified military locations’, but on any issues that the sides define as being left for final status negotiations over borders (read the bloody text of the document not what you want it to read). Your interpretation on the other hand is based on nothing and your line of reasoning is meant to argue for your ideological approach to the conflict and its resolution on the absolutely inane basis of begging the definition of concepts irrelevant to the underlying case. I am glad you found your calling as a ‘strategic analyst’ because you would have made a piss poor lawyer.

Reply to Comment

tod

WednesdaySeptember 4, 2013

No offense, you are an idiot.

Reply to Comment

Y-Man

WednesdaySeptember 4, 2013

“The main and lasting achievement of the Oslo Accords, whose 20th anniversary is approaching, was the mutual Israeli and Palestinian recognition of each side’s national aspirations.” Well, Israel’s national aspirations ceased being “aspirations” and became “reality” in 1949. Also, Rabin never actually endorsed the concept of a Palestinian state. The first Israeli head of state to do so was, believe it or not, Ariel Sharon. The article is good, but I don’t want to look at history through erroneous rose-colored glasses.

Even before the 2000+ suicide bombings, “security” included (relative) immunity from bombings as well as military territorial integrity. While early post 67 settlements were implicitly justified by the latter, the presence of settlements with associated IDF oversight is now seen by many, I think, as somehow deterrent to suicide cells as well. The conflation of military “security arrangements” with a more generic “security zone” equates the (perceived) control of social structure with military readiness. This is why I cannot see Israeli approval of, as you say, a truly sovereign Palestinian State. The Israelis will want more than assurances that Palestinian State police will, well, cauterize the development of cells; they will want carte blanche to intervene upon perceived failure of these police. Probably since the bombings targeting the Rabin/Arafat Oslo process, “security” has meant much more than military integrity; certainly Bibi used such to propel his later successful bid to be a directly elected PM.

A viable Palestinian State (shunting aside Gaza) will have to be allowed significant economic integration with Israel, risking bombings. I do not see Israel trusting Palestinian police adequately in this area. So, even apart from the national/religious dynamic of settlements, I still see One State as inevitable outcome. I say this with no glee; it is just that short term definitions seem to place feet only on that walk.

Reply to Comment

Kolumn9

FridaySeptember 6, 2013

That is just silly. Your response to Israel not trusting Palestinian society to not generate suicide bombings which causes it to prevent Palestinians integration into the Israeli economy is to believe that the Palestinians would at some point be invited to join a common state. You choose to jump over logical inconsistencies into your chosen delusional prophesy.

The Palestinians have nothing belonging to Israel and there is no legal obligation for the Palestinians to forgo any of their legal rights per the International Laws and UN Charter Israel agreed to uphold.

Israel offers nothing while expecting to be able to militarily impinge on the sovereignty of Palestinian independence and to keep Palestinian territory it has illegally acquired by war and never legally annexed. http://wp.me/pDB7k-Xk

65 years of purposefully created illegal facts on the ground have put Israel in a situation where it cannot now afford to adhere to the law, it would be sent bankrupt attempting to pay rightful compensation as it also tried to re-settle hundreds of thousands of illegal settlers back behind Israel’s internationally recognized boundaries (as it asked to be recognized “MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947, and that a provisional government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the state against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The Act of Independence will become effective at one minute after six o’clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.” )

Israel must strike a plea bargain with the Palestinians in order to circumvent the eventual consequences of its belligerence

Reply to Comment

Kolumn9

FridaySeptember 6, 2013

Israel offers the Palestinians a state in which they can be independent while the Palestinians continue to insist on Israel’s elimination via the implementation of a ridiculous interpretation of their “rights”.

There is no compensation due for defending oneself against one’s murderous neighbors which up to and until the late 1980s insisted on the destruction of Israel as their ultimate goal and still consider any peaceful interaction to be “normalization with the enemy”. There is no compensation due for annexing land that had no sovereign and which most certainly never belonged to any entity owned or controlled by the “Palestinians” who only came into existence as a people as a result of the confrontation of local Arabs with Jews and Israel. There is no need or obligation to resettle Jews who have created thriving cities, towns and villages in their homeland. The “law” is UNSC 242, 338 which state clearly that future borders between Israel and the Palestinians will be determined in negotiations between the parties. In other words you are totally full of it.

Reply to Comment

Stan Squires

FridaySeptember 13, 2013

I am from vancouver,canada and i wanted to say that the Oslo Accords betrayed the Palestinian people.Peace talks with an apartheid gov. is a waste of time.The problem of the israeli apartheid gov.needs to be solved first.
Needless to say the western govs.like canada,usa and the european govs.support israeli apartheid so they are part of the problem.
The BDS Campagne and the fight against israeli apartheid is making good progress in many countries of the world.That is worth more to the Palestinian people than what these western govs.are doing.I am going to a rally here in vancouver today organized by palestinian orgs.to condemn the Oslo Accords.

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+972 is an independent, blog-based web magazine. It was launched in August 2010, resulting from a merger of a number of popular English-language blogs dealing with life and politics in Israel and Palestine.

+972 is an independent, blog-based web magazine. It was launched in August 2010, resulting from a merger of a number of popular English-language blogs dealing with life and politics in Israel and Palestine.