The State v. Wilforth,
Appellant.

1. Ignorance of the Law excuses no one for its
Violation. See State v. Welch, 73 Mo. 284.

2. Instructions suggesting theories of the
case not supported by any evidence are properly refused.

3. Carrying Weapons into Church:constitutional law. The act of March 30th,
1875, made it a misdemeanor for any one "to go into any church or place
where people have assembled for religious worship, * * having upon or about his
person any kind of fire-arms, bowie-knife, dirk, dagger, slung-shot or other
deadly weapon." Acts 1875, p. 50. Held, that this
act was directed against the practice of carrying concealed weapons,
and was not an infringement of the constitutional right of the people to keep
and bear arms, as secured by the second amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.

Appeal from Cape Girardeau Circuit
Court.--Hon. D. L. Hawkins, Judge.

Affirmed.

Wm. M. Morgan for appellant.

D. H. McIntyre, Attorney General, for the
State.

The law prohibiting the wearing of concealed
weapons, is a police regulation for the protection of society and not an
infringement of the constitutional right to bear (p.529)arms. It does not prohibit the right to bear arms, but
provides that they shall not be worn in a manner dangerous to the welfare of
society. Nunn v. State, 1 Kelly (Ga.) 243; State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399; Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387; State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18; State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 229.

Norton, J.--Defendant was
indicted at the May term, 1877, of the circuit court of Cape Girardeau county
for going into a church house in said county where people were assembled for
literary purposes, viz: for the purposes of a school exhibition, the said
defendant having about his person fire-arms, the said defendant not being a
person whose duty it is to bear arms in the discharge of duties imposed upon him
by law. On the trial defendant was convicted and fined $10, and the cause is
here on his appeal. There being neither assignment of errors nor brief on the
part of defendant, we are driven to the record for the ascertainment of the
errors relied upon by him. These errors, as disclosed by the record, are the
action of the court in rejecting evidence, and refusing instructions asked by
defendant, and the refusal of the court to arrest the judgment on the ground
that the statute on which the indictment is founded is unconstitutional.

The only evidence rejected by the court was that of defendant, who
being introduced as a witness, was asked to state whether, at the time he
entered the house where a school exhibition was in progress, he knew it was
contrary to law to carry arms, and whether or not he believed he had the right
to carry arms. This evidence was properly refused. Ignorantia legis excusat
neminem.

Defendant also asked the court to instruct the jury to the effect
that if they believed defendant carried the pistol for the purpose of trade, or
went into the house where the exhibition was going on having reasonable cause to
believe that he would be in danger of bodily harm, and procured the pistol to
protect himself against such harm, they would (p.530)acquit. These instructions were properly refused for the
reason (if for no other) that there was not a scintilla of evidence upon which
to base them.

It is also insisted that the statute on which the indictment was
framed is in conflict with the 2nd article of amendments to the
constitution of the United States, which declares "that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." The statute which gave
origin to the indictment, (Acts 1875, § 1, p. 50,) is
directed against the practice of carrying concealed weapons or fire-arms, and
the pernicious consequences flowing from such a practice. In Kentucky it has
been held that any statute which denies to the citizen the right to carry arms,
whether openly or concealed, is an infringement of the right guaranteed by the
constitution. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90. The same
doctrine prevails in Tennessee. On the other hand, in the states Of Georgia,
Louisiana, Arkansas, Indiana and Alabama, it has been held that a statute making
it a misdemeanor for a person to carry concealed weapons, was not obnoxious to
said constitutional provision. Nunn v. State, 1 Kelly (Ga.)
243; State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399; State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18; State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229;
Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387; State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612. In the
last case above cited, in the disposition of the question, it was observed that
"the constitution, in declaring that every citizen has the right to bear arms in
defense of himself and the state, has neither expressly nor by implication
denied to the legislature the right to enact laws in regard to the manner in
which arms shall be borne. We do not desire to be understood as maintaining that
in regulating the manner of bearing arms the authority of the legislature has no
other limit than its own discretion. A statute which, under the pretense of
regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be
so borne as to render them wholly useless for purposes of defense, would be
clearly unconstitutional. But a law which is merely intended to promote personal
security, and (p.531)to put down lawless
aggression and violence, and to this end prohibits the wearing of certain
weapons in such a manner as is calculated to exert an unhappy influence upon the
moral feelings of the wearer, by making him less regardful of the personal
security of others, does not come in collision with the constitution." Whether
such statutes are or not in conflict with the federal constitution, is an open
question so far as the federal courts are concerned, the question never having
been passed upon by any of them, so far as we know. Following the weight of
authority as indicated by the state courts, and in the light of section 17, article 2 of the constitution of this State, which
declares "that the right of no citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his
home, person or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereto legally
summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained is intended
to justify the practice of wearing concealed weapons," we must hold the act in
question to be valid and binding, and as intending only to interdict the
carrying of weapons concealed. Judgment affirmed, in which all
concur.