The purpose of this letter is to provide
you with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) final significance
determination for a finding involving the lack of adequate procedural
controls for ensuring containment closure upon a possible loss of reactor
decay heat removal while Oconee Unit 1 was in reduced reactor coolant
system inventory conditions during the Fall 2000 refueling outage. The
finding was documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-269/00-07, 50-270/00-07,
and 50-287/00-07, dated January 29, 2001, and was assessed under the significance
determination process as a preliminary White issue, i.e., an issue of
low to moderate safety significance, which may require additional NRC
inspection. The NRC's letter of April 8, 2002, informed Duke Energy Corporation
(DEC) of the NRC's preliminary conclusion, provided DEC an opportunity
to request a regulatory conference on this matter, and forwarded the details
of the NRC's preliminary estimate of the change in Large Early Release
Frequency (LERF) for this finding. The issue involved LERF considerations
associated with the potential for a fission product release to the environment
approximately five hours following the postulated loss of reactor decay
heat removal capability.

In lieu of a regulatory conference, DEC
submitted a written response dated July 11, 2002, which confirmed the
completion of procedural revisions and provided DEC's additional perspective
on the issue. DEC acknowledged the finding and, in summary, disagreed
with an assumption used in the NRC's preliminary assessment regarding
whether operators would have relied on a non-qualified temporary hatch
cover to satisfy containment closure requirements and forego closure of
the outer emergency hatch door. DEC concluded that most operators, given
a loss of decay heat removal situation, would close the equipment hatch
door. This conclusion was based on discussions between DEC representatives
and plant operators following the NRC's identification of the issue. In
addition, given the expected slow development of a loss of decay heat
removal scenario and subsequent containment pressurization event, DEC
concluded that the Technical Support Center (TSC) would have been activated
and that TSC personnel would have been monitoring the status of each fission
product barrier. DEC stated that it was confident that the TSC would have
directed actions to ensure containment closure using the emergency hatch
door prior to any significant radiological release, and that the NRC's
Significance Determination Process (SDP) process apparently had no provision
to consider the TSC response in determining the increase in LERF for this
finding.

Based on the information developed during
the inspection and the information DEC provided by letter dated July 11,
2002, the staff concluded that the final risk significance of the inspection
finding is appropriately characterized as White, affecting the barrier
integrity cornerstone. The NRC also questioned plant operators soon after
identification of the issue to determine what actions would be taken for
a loss of decay heat removal scenario. The NRC concluded that the operators
would not have questioned the need to re-verify containment closure. As
part of this consideration, the NRC noted that no cues would be available
during the scenario to alert the operators of the need to question the
integrity of the foam seals/temporary cover or re-verify containment closure,
and that specific procedural steps did not exist to direct closure of
the outer emergency hatch door. This consideration was documented in the
NRC's Phase III analysis. DEC's response of July 11, 2002, provided no
new information to warrant changing this assumption.

Although consideration of the TSC was not
explicitly documented in the NRC's Phase III analysis, recovery actions
and human reliability factors from the TSC were, in fact, considered qualitatively
in the staff's risk-informed preliminary assessment. However, the staff
found an insufficient basis to conclude that either control room operators
or TSC personnel would recognize the need to question the integrity of
the foam seals/temporary cover or take other actions to ensure containment
integrity. We also note that, in the absence of adequate instructions
for operators to close one of the emergency hatch doors,
other factors would be required to
significantly improve the probability that operators would successfully
accomplish containment closure during a loss of decay heat removal scenario,
and thus lower the LERF to less than 10-7/year. DEC's response
of July 11, 2002, provided no new information to change the staff's conclusion
regarding the likelihood of operator or TSC personnel action to ensure
containment integrity.

You have ten business days from the date
of this letter to appeal the staff's determination of significance for
the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have
merit only if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter
0609, Supplement 2.

The NRC also determined that a violation
occurred involving the requirements of Technical Specification 5.4.1 and
Abnormal Procedure AP/1,2,3/A/1700/26, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, Revision
10. The violation is documented in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice),
and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject
inspection report. The NRC found that the immediate manual actions of
AP/1,2,3/A/1700/26 to establish containment closure lacked sufficient
instructions to ensure that operators would direct the closure of the
outer emergency hatch door upon a loss of decay heat removal. In accordance
with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement
Actions," NUREG-1600, the Notice is considered escalated enforcement action
because it is associated with a Whitefinding. The NRC
also notes that, as documented in our letter of April 8, 2002, and confirmed
in DEC's letter of July 11, 2002, the procedure has been revised to provide
clear guidance to operators to ensure closure of the outer emergency hatch
door. As such, this finding does not represent a current safety issue.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding
the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned
to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full
compliance was achieved is adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection
Report No. 50-269/00-07, 50-270/00-07, and 50-287/00-07, and in DEC's
letter of July 11, 2002. Therefore, you are not required to respond to
this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect
your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose
to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice.

Because plant performance for this issue
has been determined to be in the increased regulatory response band, we
will use the NRC Action Matrix to determine the most appropriate NRC response
for this finding. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of that
determination.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's
"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your
response (should you choose to provide one), will be available electronically
for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) or from the
Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).
To the extent possible, any response should not include any personal privacy,
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the
PDR and PARS without redaction.

For administrative purposes, this letter
is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report, No. 50-269/02-12, 50-270/02-12,
50-287/02-12, and the above violation is identified as VIO 50-269,270,287/02-12-01:
Inadequate Procedure Involving Containment Closure. Accordingly, the associated
unresolved item 50-269/00-05-11 is considered closed.

During an NRC inspection completed on April
8, 2002, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance
with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement
Actions," (Enforcement Policy), the violation is listed below:

Abnormal Procedure AP/1,2,3/A/1700/26,
Loss of Decay Heat Removal, was established and implemented by Oconee
Nuclear Station to combat the loss of shutdown cooling.

Contrary to the above, AP/1,2,3/A/1700/26,
Revision 10, was not adequately established to assure that containment
closure would be achieved prior to the time at which a core uncovery and
fission product release could result from a loss of shutdown cooling.
Specifically, the immediate manual actions of AP/1,2,3/A/1700/26 to establish
containment closure lacked sufficient instructions to ensure that operators
would not rely on a non-qualified temporary emergency hatch cover for
containment closure; but instead, disconnect temporary services running
through the temporary cover and shut the outer emergency hatch door.

This violation
is associated with a White SDP finding.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding
the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned
to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full
compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket
in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-269/00-07, 50-270/00-07, and 50-287/00-07,
and in DEC's letter of July 11, 2002. However, you are required to submit
a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201
if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective
actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly
mark your response as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it
to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control
Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator,
Region RII, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this
Notice of Violation (Notice).

If you contest this enforcement action,
you should also provide a copy of your response, with the basis for your
denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

If you choose to respond, your response
will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component
of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web
site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
(the Public NRC Library). Therefore, to the extent possible,
the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or
safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public
without redaction.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may
be required to post this Notice within two working days.