SUBJECT

Meeting of the President and Chairman Kosygin, the Middle East & Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS

Yuri N. Tcherniakov,
Counselor, USSR Embassy

Eugene V. Rostow, Under
Secretary for Political Affairs

Part I—Middle East

1.

Counselor Tcherniakov
apologized for shifting the lunch to which he had invited Rostow
some time ago from the Embassy to a restaurant. He explained that
the Embassy staff had been sent to New York, and hoped that it would
help facilitate a meeting between the President and Chairman
Kosygin. Rostow replied
that the President did indeed wish to see Chairman Kosygin. As Tcherniakov knew, an invitation had
been issued before we had been officially informed that the Chairman
was coming. Tcherniakov said
that that fact was appreciated, but, he said, there were
difficulties, since the main purpose of the Chairman's trip was his
appearance at the U.N., and there were complications with respect
“to allies and others.” Rostow said we understood these problems so
far as Chairman Kosygin was
concerned. There were complications also for the President. We
thought it natural for the Chairman, when in a country, to call on
the head of its government. However, the question of discussing the
possibility of a visit was in the hands of the Secretary, who was
doubtless in touch with Foreign Minister Gromyko on the subject. Tcherniakov said that was the case, and the men were
being assisted by the Dobrynin-Thompson “task force.” He hoped they succeeded in
solving the problem. Rostow said we hoped so too.

2.

Tcherniakov asked how
Chairman Kosygin's
speech2 was received in the State Department. Rostow
replied that we thought it was “not too bad.” In reply to a
question, Rostow remarked that we thought two points in the speech
were of particular importance: (1) Kosygin's assertion that Israel had the right to
live; and (2) his comment that the [Page 523]leading powers had to find a common vocabulary.
Tcherniakov agreed that
these two statements were the important aspects of the speech,
adding that he hoped we understood that propaganda efforts had to be
diminished “gradually.”

On the first point—Israel's right to live—Tcherniakov said that there never was any question of
the Soviet position on this issue, which they viewed as fundamental.
There had been a good deal of discussion about how much emphasis it
should receive in the Kosygin
speech, but all had agreed that the statement had to be made. Rostow
remarked that we were accustomed to reading Soviet speeches with care.
The important fact was that the theme had been stated. Tcherniakov said the Arab doctrine of a
right to destroy Israel was “nonsense,” and the source of a great deal
of the “tragedy” in the area.

He hoped we would use our influence with Israel not to be too hard in
their victory, referring to Arab pride, and confusion of thought at this
point. He thought time was needed for the dust to settle.

Rostow said that as Tcherniakov
could see from the President's statement, we did not think, in view of
what had happened during the last ten years, that it was practical or
realistic to expect the Israelis to withdraw until there were assurances
they would return to a condition of peace. Surprisingly, Tcherniakov said he fully agreed.
Rostow said there were natural anxieties everywhere that the Israelis
had large territorial ambitions. We could not speak for the Israeli
Government, but our impression so far was that Israel did not want great
territorial changes, but peace and security. There were marginal
problems, of course—the Syrian heights, Sharm al-Sheikh, the Gaza strip,
and, most difficult of all, Jerusalem. Tcherniakov said that naturally something would have to
be done about border security and international interests in
Jerusalem.

Rostow said that we had been interested during the last few days by a
flow of reports at various levels about a growing interest among the
Palestinian Arabs in an arrangement of reconciliation with the Israelis,
involving either the West Bank of the Jordan or even the whole of
Jordan. We had no governmental position on the question, but, on
preliminary consideration, we found the idea important. If the
Palestinians could reach an accommodation, through a federation or
otherwise, it could eliminate the refugee question, make it easier to
solve the question of Jerusalem, and relieve the other Arab states of
the incubus of their supposed obligation to wipe out Israel. Such a plan
could also simplify problems of border security.

Tcherniakov said, speaking
personally, that he was most interested in the possibility. He was not
aware that the idea had come forward in recent days. The Soviet
Government had supported a proposal of that [Page 524]kind in 1947 or 1948, when the Palestine problem was
acute. He asked whether he could call the possibility to the Foreign
Minister's attention. Rostow replied that of course he could, stressing,
however, that it was not a United States Government position.

Rostow put emphasis on the issue of arms limitation. We thought a
resumption of hostilities in the face of the cease fire was unthinkable.
Tcherniakov dismissed the
possibility.

On the second point in Kosygin's
speech-the need of the leading powers to achieve a common vocabulary,
Rostow said we were in full agreement. Tcherniakov would have noticed the President's care to
avoid making the propaganda war worse. The President's speech stressed
our interest in “narrowing differences” with the Soviet Union. The
Chairman would find us ready to cooperate in the effort. Tcherniakov referred to the spirit of
Tashkent, and the need for us together to work out an approach that
could bring peace to the Middle East. He stressed that the Soviet Union
had tried to prevent hostilities, as we did, but that there were forces
in the situation which couldn't be controlled. Rostow said we had been
puzzled by the rumors of an Israeli mobilization against Syria, which
seemed to persist even after the Secretary General had denied them.
Rostow said that we had been at pains to make our position clear to the
Soviet Union throughout the crisis. We had noted that they had never
publicly supported the Egyptian claim with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba.
From the point of view of the two countries' national interests, and in
the light of what Tcherniakov had
said, he thought it should not be difficult for the Soviet Union to
accept the approach indicated by the President's five principles.

Rostow asked Tcherniakov if they
thought Nasser could survive. He
replied that in their estimate it was possible. Nasser lacked a sense of reality, but
perhaps recent events would help in that regard.