Davis v. Hot Springs School District

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

August 18, 2016

W.T. Davis, Individually and on behalf of a Class of Taxpayers of Garland County, Arkansas, Similarly Situated, and; Garland County Chapter of the N.A.A.C.P. Plaintiffs - Appelleesv.Hot Springs School District; Arkansas, State of; Arkansas State Board of Education Defendants-Appellees Earle Love, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; L.D. Harris, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; Jeff Starling, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; Robert L. Newton, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; Dr. Harry P. McDonald, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; Rae-Perry, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; Elaine Scott, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; Walter Turnbow, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; Nancy Wood, Individually, and as a Member of the Arkansas State Board of Education; Garland County Board of Education; Van Smith, Individually, and as a Member of the Garland County Board of Education; Carl L. Johnson, Individually, and as a Member of the Garland County Board of Education; Flora Kimball, Individually, and as a Member of the Garland County Board of Education; Ira Livers, Individually, and as a Member of the Garland County Board of Education; John Wainscott, Individually, and as a Member of the Garland County Board of Education; E.T. Shuffield, Individually, and as a Member of the Garland County Board of Education Defendant's, Cutter Morning Star School District; Fountain Lake School District; Jessieville School District; Lake Hamilton School District; Lakeside School District; Mountain Pine School District Defendants-Appellants

Submitted: April 14, 2016

Appeal
from United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas - Hot Springs

Before
GRUENDER, BRIGHT, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

KELLY,
CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Cutter
Morning Star School District, Fountain Lake School District,
Jessieville School District, Lake Hamilton School District,
and Mountain Pine School District (the school districts)
sought termination of the Garland County School Desegregation
Case Comprehensive Settlement Agreement (the Agreement) and
relief from the district court's 1992 order enforcing it.
The district court[1] denied their Rule 60(b)(5) motion. The
school districts appeal, alleging the district court applied
the wrong legal standard in analyzing their motion, and
arguing that it is no longer just or equitable to give the
1992 order or the Agreement prospective application in light
of the repeal of the Arkansas School Choice Act of 1989
(School Choice Act). See Ark. Code Ann. §
6-18-206 (repealed 2013). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Because the repeal of the School Choice
Act does not warrant termination of the Agreement, we affirm.

I.
Background

On
August 18, 1989, W.T. Davis filed, individually and on behalf
of a class of taxpayers of Garland County, Arkansas, a class
action lawsuit against Garland County alleging that it
maintained a racially-segregated public school system in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The parties agreed to settle the case and entered into
the Agreement on November 25, 1991. One provision of the
overall Agreement adopted the School Choice Act, which
allowed students to apply to attend a school outside of their
resident school district, but included a race-based
limitation on such transfers. After a fairness hearing, the
court entered an order on April 28, 1992, approving the
Agreement and dismissing the case with prejudice on the
merits.

In
2012, the district court, as a result of independent
litigation, held the provision of the School Choice Act
limiting transfers on the basis of race violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Teague ex
rel. T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 873 F.Supp.2d 1055,
1065-68 (W.D. Ark. 2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague
v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013).

The
court's decision was appealed but eventually rendered
moot because, in 2013, the Arkansas legislature repealed the
1989 Act and replaced it with the Arkansas Public School
Choice Act of 2013 (2013 School Choice Act). See
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-1901 et seq. The 2013 School
Choice Act removed the race-based limitation on public school
transfers and included a provision preventing the receiving
school district from discriminating on the basis of race. The
Act included, however, a carve-out restriction: Under the
2013 School Choice Act, nonresident transfers were only
permitted "provided that the transfer by the student
does not conflict with an enforceable judicial decree or
court order remedying the effects of past racial segregation
in the school district." Ark. Code Ann. §
6-18-1901(b)(3).

The
school districts wanted to know whether the changes to the
state law had any effect on their continuing obligations
under the Agreement, and on May 22, 2013, filed a petition
for declaratory relief seeking continued enforcement of the
Agreement. The school districts affirmatively argued that the
Teague ruling, as well as the 2013 School Choice
Act, did not have any impact on the efficacy of the
court's 1992 order approving the Agreement and its
inclusion of the race-based transfer limitation. The school
districts explained that:

The import [of entering the settlement agreement and
obtaining Court approval thereof] was to incorporate by
reference the language, terms and provisions of the 1989 Act
as a consent desegregation plan of the Court applicable to
all public school districts within Garland County, Arkansas,
for the purpose of remedy[ing] the vestiges of prior de
jure racial segregation within the public education
system of Garland County, Arkansas.

The
school districts expressed the view that because the
Agreement constituted a court order remedying the effects of
past discrimination (in other words, a consent decree), it
fell within the 2013 School Choice Act's carve-out
restriction. The district court agreed with the school
districts' assessment that none of the changes in the law
had impacted the Settlement, and granted their requested
declaratory relief. The district court stated that "the
Settlement Agreement constitutes a court-approved
desegregation plan that should remain in effect despite
recent changes to the law on which the Settlement Agreement
was partly based." Davis v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist.,
et. al., No. 6:89-CV-06088, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Ark.
June 10, 2013).

Now,
however, the same school districts have taken a different
position, explaining that they requested declaratory relief
in order to clarify the law during an emergency, but they had
"no time" to seek termination of the Agreement in
court. While the type of relief requested may have been
affected by timing, the districts state that their position
on the issue changed because of subsequent events. According
to the districts, "[t]he episode that awoke the
Districts to the inequity of the Settlement Agreement was the
injustice that befell the Walker children, who were denied
transfer solely because they are black." Therefore, on
August 25, 2014, the districts filed the present motion for
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(5), seeking termination
of the Agreement and relief from the court's 1992 order
in its entirety, on the grounds that it is no longer just or
equitable to give the 1992 order or the Agreement prospective
application in light of the repeal of the 1989 Act. The
district court concluded that the school districts had failed
to meet the standard for termination under Rule 60(b)(5) and
denied their motion. The school districts timely appeal.

II.
Discussion

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) allows the court, "[o]n
motion and just terms, " to "relieve a party or its
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding" because "the judgment has been
satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable." Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b)(5). The parties dispute the correct standard to apply
to the Rule 60(b)(5) motion at issue. The district court
held, and the appellees maintain, that in order to terminate
the Agreement, the moving party must demonstrate "full
compliance, " because the "&#39;core of the
termination standard&#39; is whether &#39;the vestiges of
past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent
practicable.&#39;" Davis v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist.,
et al., No. 6:89-CV-06088, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Ark.
March 31, 2015) (quoting Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of
Palestine-Wheatley Sch. Dist., 769 F.3d 566, 572 (8th
Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (explaining the test for
termination of a ...

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