10/05/08 "CommonDreams"
-- -
There is
direct evidence
that President
George W. Bush
did not
honorably lead
this nation, but
deliberately
misled it into a
war he wanted.
Bush and his
administration
knowingly lied
to Congress and
to the American
public — lies
that have cost
the lives of
more than 4,000
young American
soldiers and
close to $1
trillion.

A
Monumental Lie

In his first
nationally
televised
address on the
Iraqi crisis on
October 7, 2002,
six days after
receiving the
National
Intelligence
Estimate (NIE),
a classified CIA
report,
President Bush
told millions of
Americans the
exact opposite
of what the CIA
was telling him
-a monumental
lie to the
nation and the
world.

On the evening
of October 7,
2002, the very
latest CIA
intelligence was
that Hussein was
not an imminent
threat to the
U.S. This same
information was
delivered to the
Bush
administration
as early as
October 1, 2002,
in the NIE,
including input
from the CIA and
15 other U.S.
intelligence
agencies. In
addition, CIA
director George
Tenet briefed
Bush in the Oval
Office on the
morning of
October 7th.

According to the
October 1, 2002
NIE, “Baghdad
for now appears
to be drawing a
line short of
conducting
terrorist
attacks with
conventional or
CBW [chemical
and biological
warfare] against
the United
States, fearing
that exposure of
Iraqi
involvement
would provide
Washington a
stronger case
for making war.”
The report
concluded that
Hussein was not
planning to use
any weapons of
mass
destruction;
further, Hussein
would only use
weapons of mass
destruction he
was believed to
have if he were
first attacked,
that is, he
would only use
them in
self-defense.

Preparing its
declassified
version of the
NIE for
Congress, which
became known as
the White Paper,
the Bush
administration
edited the
classified NIE
document in ways
that
significantly
changed its
inference and
meaning, making
the threat seem
imminent and
ominous.

In the original
NIE report,
members of the
U.S.
intelligence
community
vigorously
disagreed with
the CIA’s
bloated and
inaccurate
conclusions. All
such opposing
commentary was
eliminated from
the declassified
White Paper
prepared for
Congress and the
American people.

The
Manning Memo

On January 31,
2003, Bush met
in the Oval
Office with
British Prime
Minister Tony
Blair. In a memo
summarizing the
meeting
discussion,
Blair’s chief
foreign policy
advisor David
Manning wrote
that Bush and
Blair expressed
their doubts
that any
chemical,
biological, or
nuclear weapons
would ever be
found in Iraq,
and that there
was tension
between Bush and
Blair over
finding some
justification
for the war that
would be
acceptable to
other nations.
Bush was so
worried about
the failure of
the UN
inspectors to
find hard
evidence against
Hussein that he
talked about
three possible
ways, Manning
wrote, to
“provoke a
confrontation”
with Hussein.
One way, Bush
said, was to fly
“U2
reconnaissance
aircraft with
fighter cover
over Iraq,
[falsely]
painted in UN
colors. If
Saddam fired on
them, he would
be in breach” of
UN resolutions
and that would
justify war.
Bush was
calculating to
create a war,
not prevent one.

Denying
Blix’s Findings

Hans Blix, the
United Nation’s
chief weapons
inspector in
Iraq, in his
March 7, 2003,
address to the
UN Security
Council, said
that as of that
date, less than
3 weeks before
Bush invaded
Iraq, that Iraq
had capitulated
to all demands
for
professional,
no-notice
weapons
inspections all
over Iraq and
agreed to
increased aerial
surveillance by
the U.S. over
the “no-fly”
zones. Iraq had
directed the UN
inspectors to
sites where
illicit weapons
had been
destroyed and
had begun to
demolish its Al
Samoud 2
missiles, as
requested by the
UN. Blix added
that “no
evidence of
proscribed
activities have
so far been
found” by his
inspectors and
“no underground
facilities for
chemical or
biological
production or
storage were
found so far.”
He said that for
his inspectors
to absolutely
confirm that
Iraq had no
weapons of mass
destruction
(WMD) “will not
take years, nor
weeks, but
months.”

Mohamed
ElBaradei, the
chief UN nuclear
inspector in
Iraq and
director of the
International
Atomic Energy
Agency, told the
UN Security
Council that,
“we have to date
found no
evidence or
plausible
indication of
the revival of a
nuclear weapon
program in
Iraq.”

The UN
inspectors were
making
substantial
progress and
Hussein was
giving them
unlimited
access. Why was
Bush in such an
incredible rush
to go to war?

Hussein
Disarms, so Bush
… Goes to War

When it became
clear that the
whole purpose of
Bush’s prewar
campaign — to
get Hussein to
disarm — was
being (or
already had
been) met, Bush
and his people
came up with a
demand they had
never once made
before — that
Hussein resign
and leave Iraq.
On March 17,
2003, Bush said
in a speech to
the nation that,
“Saddam Hussein
and his sons
must leave Iraq
within 48 hours.
Their refusal to
do so will
result in
military
conflict.”
Military
conflict — the
lives of
thousands of
young Americans
on the line —
because Bush
trumped up a new
line in the
sand?

The
Niger Allegation

One of the most
notorious
instances of the
Bush
administration
using thoroughly
discredited
information to
frighten the
American public
was the 16 words
in Bush’s
January 28, 2003
State of the
Union speech:
“The British
government has
learned that
Saddam Hussein
recently sought
significant
quantities of
uranium from
Africa.” The
Niger allegation
was false, and
the Bush
administration
knew it was
false.

Joseph C. Wilson
IV, the former
ambassador to
Iraq, was sent
to Niger by the
CIA in February
2002 to
investigate a
supposed memo
that documented
the sale of
uranium
yellowcake (a
form of lightly
processed ore)
to Iraq by Niger
in the late
1990s. Wilson
reported back to
the CIA that it
was “highly
doubtful” such a
transaction had
ever taken
place.

On March 7,
2003, Mohamed
ElBaradei told
the UN Security
Council that
“based on
thorough
analysis” his
agency concluded
that the
“documents which
formed the basis
for the report
of recent
uranium
transactions
between Iraq and
Niger are in
fact not
authentic.”
Indeed, author
Craig Unger
uncovered at
least 14
instances prior
to the 2003
State of the
Union address in
which analysts
at the CIA, the
State
Department, or
other government
agencies that
had examined the
Niger documents
“raised serious
doubts about
their legitimacy
— only to be
rebuffed by Bush
administration
officials who
wanted to use
them.”

On October 5 and
6, 2002, the CIA
sent memos to
the National
Security
Council,
National
Security Advisor
Condoleezza
Rice, and to the
White House
Situation Room
stating that the
Niger
information was
no good.

On January 24,
2003, four days
before the
president’s
State of the
Union address,
the CIA’s
National
Intelligence
Council, which
oversees all
federal agencies
that deal with
intelligence,
sent a memo to
the White House
stating that
“the Niger story
is baseless and
should be laid
to rest.”

The 9/11
Lie

The Bush
administration
put undue
pressure on U.S.
intelligence
agencies to
provide it with
conclusions that
would help them
in their quest
for war. Bush’s
former
counterterrorism
chief, Richard
Clarke, said
that on
September 12,
2001, one day
after 9/11, “The
President in a
very
intimidating way
left us — me and
my staff — with
the clear
indication that
he wanted us to
come back with
the word that
there was an
Iraqi hand
behind 9/11.”

Bush said on
October 7, 2002,
“We know that
Iraq and the Al
Qaeda terrorist
network share a
common enemy —
the United
States of
America. We know
that Iraq and Al
Qaeda have had
high level
contacts that go
back a decade,”
and that “Iraq
has trained Al
Qaeda members in
bomb-making and
poisons and
deadly gasses.”
Of Hussein, he
said on November
1, 2002, “We
know he’s got
ties with Al
Qaeda.”

Even after Bush
admitted on
September 17,
2003, that he
had “no
evidence” that
Saddam Hussein
was involved
with 9/11, he
audaciously
continued, in
the months and
years that
followed, to
clearly suggest,
without stating
it outright,
that Hussein was
involved in
9/11.

On March 20,
2006, Bush said,
“I was very
careful never to
say that Saddam
Hussein ordered
the attack on
America.”

Vincent
Bugliosi
received his law
degree in 1964.
In his career at
the L.A. County
District
Attorney’s
office, he
successfully
prosecuted 105
out of 106
felony jury
trials,
including 21
murder
convictions
without a single
loss. His most
famous trial,
the Charles
Manson case,
became the basis
of his classic,
Helter Skelter,
the biggest
selling
true-crime book
in publishing
history.
The Prosecution
of George W.
Bush For Murder
is available May
27.

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