Last October, the European Commission presented its 2012 Progress Report for Turkey. Since 1998, the annual document provides an assessment of Turkey’s progress towards the fulfillment of the criteria set to obtain full European Union membership, highlighting both the country’s achievements and shortcomings. Although over the years, Turkey’s high political echelons seem to have grown accustomed to the mixed feedback received by the EU; yet this year’s document triggered a wave of strong criticism, as its outspoken and concerned depiction of the status of Turkey’s democracy offers an accurate snapshot of the current status of EU-Turkey relations.

Even in its introductory section, the 2012 Progress Report does in fact provide a no-frills analysis of where Turkey stands vis-à-vis the European Union and its democratic standards. Not only does it stress Turkey’s unilateral suspension of relations with the Council’s presidency because of Cyprus’ temporary EU presidency, but the report expresses “serious concerns with regard to Turkish statements and threats”. In fact, the Cyprus issue stands as the single, most critical question Turkey needs to face if it wants to see substantive progress towards EU membership. Since 2006, the negotiations on eight of the thirty-five chapters Turkey needs to align itself with have been suspended, because of the country’s firm refusal to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, and its continuing and solitary support of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Unless this changes, these eight chapters will remain suspended, even assuming a successful progress and, eventually, full compliance on all the remaining chapters.

Turkish domestic politics also has a primary role in the 2012 Progress Report, especially with regard to three issues: the trials for the Ergenekon case (an alleged criminal network with possible ties to Turkish ultra-nationalist figures), the Sledgehammer case (an alleged plan for a military coup d’état) and the Kurdish issue. As for the two trials, the European Commission expressed its concerns over “the rights of the defense, lengthy pre-trial detention and excessively long and catch-all indictments”. It also deplored the general lack of transparency in dealing with witnesses and in managing the evidence.

On the Kurdish issue, the Commission flagged the lack of any visible progress since 2009, when the current government launched an initiative called the “Democratic Opening”, which failed to produce any tangible result. The report highlights how this initiative has been shelved, and how, despite some degree of inter-party dialogue, the government still has to come up with an alternative strategy. In sum, the Commission stressed that there seem to be persisting flaws in Turkey’s management of the Ergenekon/Balyoz trials and no significant progress on the Kurdish issue. Its assessment seems even more negative when it comes to the broader record of Turkey’s human rights: the report highlighted the worsening conditions of freedom of expression and restrictions to freedom of the media.

The publication of the report triggered a salvo of criticism from Turkish officials, who attacked the contents of the document and the allegedly biased stance of the European Commission. Turkey’s Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis claimed this year’s report openly aims at delaying the country’s progress towards full membership. In a note, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs labeled the document as “unbalanced”, claiming “Turkey’s constructive approach to the Cyprus issue is well-known”, stating that Ankara would “expect the EU to contribute to a solution rather than being a party to the Cyprus problem”. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan only added to it, unilaterally setting 2023 (Turkey’s 100th anniversary) as the ultimate deadline for EU membership, and arguing that Cyprus should not have been allowed to join the EU in 2004, defining that decision “a serious mistake, [a mistake that] continues with increasing effects”.

Fourteen years after the first Turkey Progress Report issued by the EU, both sides are progressively getting closer to laying their cards on the table. Several EU member states have become increasingly vocal in expressing their aversion towards Turkey’s potential admission to the European Union, and Turkey is well aware of the political weight such positions have over its chances to achieve that goal. At the same time, Turkey reached a point in which it seems definitively more eager to move alongside the European Union and reaffirm its ownership of domestic politics-related decision-making, rather than seeking full compliance with the EU’s rules. In today’s strongly polarized domestic political environment, chasing EU membership becomes a secondary issue, if not a liability – especially so as Turkish public opinion has lost any interest.

In economic terms, Turkey managed to pull through the global economic crisis with flying colors, averaging a GDP growth of +4.3% in the 2001-2011 period, and marking +9.16% and +8.49% in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Prime Minister Erdogan, emboldened by a staggering electoral result in 2011, when his party obtained 49.8% of the votes, knows he can count on solid political and electoral consensus. Investing such political capital in reform attempts that would alienate voters does not come as a viable option, especially at a time when Turkey is approaching a key political phase.

The current debate over the constitutional draft is namely accompanied by the AKP attempt to introduce a presidential system, which would allow Erdogan to stay in power for another mandate or two. The main partner of the horse trading involved in promoting this constitutional reform is the anti-EU Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The fact that Erdogan hinted at the possibility to reintroduce the death penalty, something which would please the electorate of the MHP, is revealing of the extent to which Turkish politics is currently tuned to domestic considerations, rather than to the increasingly remote possibility of obtaining EU membership.

Despite these domestic dynamics, the EU, in an unexpected intergovernmental twist, might change its stance on the ultimate membership perspective for Turkey. In particular, French president Francois Hollande is not as staunchly opposed to the idea as his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, and is discussing options aimed at not losing Turkey. It might be too late – but not necessarily, if Turkish domestic politics finds a new equilibrium.

A recently approved referendum in Turkey paves the way for constitutional reform and further improvements in civil-military relations. But whether the political will exists to transform these changes into tangible democratic advancements remains to be seen.

By Francesco F Milan for ISN Insights

On 12 September a referendum promoted by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan’s party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partısı (AKP), resulted in a major constitutional reform. While several of the newly adopted constitutional amendments have been heavily criticized, perceived by their detractors as part of a political manoeuvre to centralize power in the executive, others have been hailed as an important advancement of Turkish democratic standards. In particular, amendments related to civil-military relations have been praised as legitimate and timely, although doubts remain about whether long-term priorities, rather than short-term political advantages, will inspire their application.

Significantly, the referendum came 30-years-to-the-day after a military coup, led by Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, placed Turkey under direct military rule for the following three years: the military junta drafted and adopted a constitution on which Turkey relied until recent reforms were implemented.

The referendum’s effects

The referendum affects several main aspects of Turkish civil-military relations. One of the most important, heavily stressed by the referendum’s promoters during the last months of campaigning, is the repeal of Provisional Article 15 of the Constitution, which prohibited any legal action against military officers involved in the 1980 coup and members of the ruling junta that followed.

With the elimination of Provisional Article 15, a stream of complaints against members of General Evren’s junta have been immediately issued by both human rights associations and individuals. The feasibility of legal prosecution is now the main concern: General Evren is 93 years old, and other members of the former junta are only slightly younger; moreover, such an important trial would require significant political will and resources. Recent problematic experiences with other major Turkish investigations and trials should be kept in mind.

Indeed, the ‘Ergenekon‘ investigation is a case in point. A subversive ultranationalist network, Ergenekon is allegedly composed of top military brass members, politicians, academics and journalists. Its goal, apparently, was to lead Turkey toward nationalistic drift. Three years of investigations have led to the interrogation and detention of hundreds of suspects, and, according to media reports, the organization’s reach is growing every day. The political independence of the investigation is a matter of debate, and the alleged involvement of Ergenekon members in all of Turkey’s recent, major criminal events has raised questions about the existence of political manipulation at the trial.

The concern about political independence can also be raised in relation to the referendum’s other main reform: the regulation which allows the constitutional court to try the chief of general staff and the chiefs of all the different armed forces’ branches (land, air, naval and gendarmerie forces) in case of offenses against the security or the functioning of the state. According to the newly amended version of constitutional article number 148, former Chief of General Staff General Ilker Başbuğ, who resigned from his post in order to retire in the last days of August 2010, can be put on trial in the charge of being supposedly aware of the so-called ‘Sledgehammer’ plan. Allegedly conceived by the military in 2003 in order to discredit the AKP, undermine national security and eventually stage a coup, the ‘Sledgehammer’ investigation led to dozens of interrogations and detentions, and is allegedly linked to the Ergenekon organization. In April, however, 28 suspects were released because the judges doubted that a fully-fledged crime had been perpetrated, casting a shadow on the investigation’s credibility and transparency.

Civil-military reforms 10 years in the making

Reforms introduced by the recent referendum truly have the potential to represent a significant step forward for Turkish democracy. Moreover, they are part of a decade-long process of normalization of Turkish civil-military relations which have transformed the balance of power between the military and the executive.

One of the most important bills was passed in October 2001: A new version of article 118 of the Turkish Constitution resized the role and powers of the National Security Council (NSC), the main forum for confrontation between the government and military, transforming it into a civilian-dominated institution.

A second bill, which came into force in July 2003, opened the post of NSC secretary, traditionally held by a military officer, to civil servants. In 2004, another reform increased the transparency of military expenditures, although defense procurement and relevant expenditures are still not completely under political oversight.

In 2009, the Turkish Parliament passed a law according to which military personnel can be put on trial in civilian courts if accused of subversive activities or of taking part in illegal activities linked with organized crime. Another recent, fundamental step toward the improvement of civilian oversight of the military was the abolition of the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order in early 2010. Also known as the ‘EMASYAProtocol’, it permitted, under specific conditions, the implementation of military operations without prior authorization from civilian authorities.

A litmus test for civil-military relations

The reforms implemented in the field of civil-military relations across the past decade were significantly different from those adopted last month: the 2001 restructuring of the NSC brought a civilian majority into the most important civil-military platform; in 2004, accountability for defense expenditures was increased, and murky areas of military decision-making autonomy were cleared.

What the September 2010 referendum has brought is the right to put the military junta that seized power in 1980 on trial. However, this right comes attached with Erdoğan’sstatement that all detractors of the referendum should be considered ‘coup supporters’. It brought an enhanced role for the constitutional court, especially vis-à-vis military top brass. Nevertheless, it increased the number of court members to be nominated by the president of the republic, currently Erdoğan’s right-hand man Abdullah Gül, who now appoints 14 out of 17 judges, with the remaining three elected by the parliament.

Interestingly, no amendment has been proposed to increase military budget oversight, despite the fact that the issue has been stressed in the last report released by the European Commission, and despite the recently alleged cases of major corruption in military procurement.

The success of this referendum serves to provide a decisive opportunity for Turkish civil-military relations: should the government let the judiciary perform its duties without political interferences, the country might finally be able to shed light on the dark era that followed the 1980 military coup, as well as on the more recent Ergenekon case. However, if reforms were implemented to control and politicize the judiciary, and to eventually get AKP’s political revenge on the military, then the result would be a massive witch-hunt – something that, unfortunately, the ongoing Ergenekon case already vaguely resembles.

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francesco.milan [at] kcl.ac.ukffmilan [at] yahoo.it

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