Over Missiles, U.S. Ponders Whether a Rogue Is a Rogue

European governments have been howling the loudest over Washington's
plans to build a missile shield. They worry about its high cost and about
being left out of any defense system the U.S. deploys. But it may be Asia
that ends up pulling the rug out from under the son of Star Wars.

The
Clinton administration envisions deploying 100 rocket interceptors in
Alaska to counter a missile threat from North Korea, the rogue state it
considers most likely to field long-range missiles the soonest. Last week,
the CIA repeated a warning it has delivered to the White House before that
Pyongyang could have missiles capable
of striking the U.S. by 2005.

But North Korea has lately been sending signals that it might not
cooperate with that prediction. During his July 19 visit to Pyongyang,
Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that strongman Kim Jong Il had
told him North Korea would shelve its intercontinental ballistic missile
program if other countries would launch several of its satellites at their
expense. Washington was skeptical. Was Kim making the offer? Or was this an
offer Putin hoped he would make so Moscow could derail the U.S. missile
defense plan, which it opposes?

Suspicions increased nine days later when Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright met North Korean foreign minister Paek Nam Sun at a conference in
Bangkok. Paek told Albright he could say nothing about Kim's offer.
American diplomats say either Kim never made the offer or he simply hadn't
told Paek about his conversation with Putin. The latter is possible since
U.S. officials believe that Paek is only a flunky; Kim runs the country's
foreign policy.

But a week later, Russian officials revealed that they have a letter
they say Kim gave Putin during his July 19 visit, which reaffirms
Pyongyang's offer to halt its intercontinental ballistic missile program.
That pricked up ears in the State Department, which is now probing North
Korean diplomatic contacts to find out just what the "Dear Leader" has in
mind.

He may be trying to hatch a deal similar to the one he negotiated with
the U.S., Japan and South Korea that mothballed his nuclear weapons program
in exchange for oil shipments and civilian nuclear reactors. If so, it
might slow the U.S. rush to deploy missile defenses, at least for now. Why
erect a shield if the country you're worried about isn't building the
missiles? Launching North Korea's commercial satellites would be expensive,
but not nearly as much as the $60 billion missile defenses could cost.

China, as well, may dull Washington's appetite for a shield. The CIA
also warned the White House last week that Beijing might respond to a U.S.
missile defense by increasing its strategic missile force tenfold. China
now has 20 nuclear-tipped ICBMs, but the CIA worries that it might expand
that force so a U.S. shield doesn't render its strategic deterrence
worthless. That's a possibility that's very real, and Washington has to take
it seriously. The CIA intelligence on North Korea is based as much on
guesswork as on hard facts, but the agency knows that China can ramp up its
force.

Administration officials say China was planning to modernize its ICBMs
anyway and they're uneasy about "buying off" North Korea "for something
they shouldn't be doing in the first place," as one senior aide put it.
And, they argue, a missile shield is still needed to protect against other
rogue states like Iraq and Iran that are itching to deploy ICBMs. But it
may be a decade before those countries are a threat. If North Korea
abandons its program, billions wouldn't have to be spent for a shield so
soon, and free launch services may prove a small price to pay for it.