CHAPTER VIIIMakin Taken

The plan for the capture of Makin, though divided into three phases, was a
continuing process that involved no major regroupings of forces. After the
establishment of the beachheads on Butaritari the first objective had been the
reduction of the West Tank Barrier, and this was followed by a drive to the
east and pursuit of the enemy to outlying islands. The West Tank Barrier had
been reduced during the first day's action. The second day would see--in
addition to the mopping up of the area around the West Tank Barrier and of the
western end of Butaritari--the beginning of the drive to the east. The
situation at Tarawa had prevented General Ralph Smith from moving the 3d
Battalion, 165th Infantry, to Kuma Island early on the morning of the second
day, a move that would have eliminated much of the need for the third phase of
the operation. He dispatched that morning, however, a small party under Maj.
Jacob H. Herzog, assistant intelligence officer of the division, with orders to
investigate Kuma for the presence of Japanese forces.1
Also, air observers
were instructed to keep a close watch for any signs of a large enemy movement
to the outlying islands.2
With these precautions, the main attention of the
165th Regimental Combat Team was centered during the second day on the drive to
the eastern end of Butaritari.

The Main Action of the Second Day

The plan of attack for the second day provided that Company E and attached
elements should immediately push eastward from positions of the night before
while Company F should remain in reserve near Yellow Beach. General Smith's
order, sent out the previous evening, had set the jump-off hour at 0700,
following an intense artillery preparation.3
Colonel McDonough, however,
elected to defer the advance of the infantry until the medium tanks were ready,
and these were delayed until enough fuel could be brought forward.4

During the interim aircraft pounded the area in front of the 2d Battalion. At
0843 the air liaison party attached to McDonough's battalion requested bombing
and strafing of the zone ahead of Company E as far as the East Tank Barrier.
This was complied with. As soon as McDonough had ascertained that the tanks
would be fueled by 1045 he ordered the attack to

--112--

jump off at 1100. Meanwhile, at 1026 he radioed to his supporting aircraft
that "tanks and troops are moving forward" and that all bombing and strafing
should cease. Although this cancellation was acknowledged and confirmed, the
air columns formed for the bombing runs kept coming in as originally ordered.
Fortunately, Captain Ryan, Company E's commander, exercised firm control over
his troops and was able to hold back their advance until the air attacks had
ceased. Thus the faulty air-ground co-ordination caused no damage beyond
delaying the attack even longer.5

By 1110 the attack was at last in progress.6
Ten medium tanks had been
refueled and had moved into position to support the troops,7
and Colonel
McDonough chose to rely exclusively on these vehicles to support his infantry.
Although both the forward observer and the liaison officer from the artillery
battalion repeatedly suggested that fire be placed well in advance of the front
line to soften up the enemy, the infantry commander declined it. He even
refused to allow the forward observer to register the artillery battalion until
after the day's action had ceased.8
Although the 105-mm. pieces on Ukiangong
Point fired a total of twenty-one missions early in the morning, not a single
howitzer was fired after 0630.9

On the extreme left was Detachment Z of the 105th Infantry. Next to it came the
1st Platoon, Company G, which had reinforced the 3d Platoon, Company E,
throughout the night. In the center was the 1st Platoon and on the right the 2d
Platoon of Company E. All units moved forward in a skirmish line. Fifty yards
to the rear, mopping up Japanese stragglers, was a second formation consisting
of the 3d Platoon, Company E, the 2d and 3d Platoons, Company G, and a detail
of marines consisting of the 4th Platoon of the V Amphibious Reconnaissance
Company.10

The line advanced steadily, though slowly, averaging about three yards a
minute. 1st Sgt. Thomas E. Valentine of the front echelon of Company E
described the opposition encountered:

On the second day we did not allow sniper fire to deter us. We had already
found that the snipers were used more as a nuisance than an obstacle. They
would fire, but we noted little effect by way of casualties. We learned that by
taking careful cover and moving rapidly from one concealment to another we
could minimize the sniper threat. Moreover, we knew that our reserves would get
them if we did not. So we contented ourselves with firing at a tree when we
thought a shot had come from it and we continued to move on.11

West of the tunnel that had been taken during the previous afternoon but
subsequently relinquished, the enemy fell back again. In the next 200 yards,
from the tunnel to the road crossing the island from the base of King's Wharf,
the stiffest resistance of the day was encountered.

--113--

Map 6:Second Day's Action21 November 1943

From an enemy seaplane beached on the reef, machine gun and rifle fire struck
at the left flank and in toward the center of the line. To allay this nuisance,
four of the medium tanks finally pumped enough shells from their primary
weapons at close range to annihilate the eighteen occupants concealed in the
plane's body and wings.12
On the right an emplacement, intended mainly for
defense against landings from the ocean, contained three dual-purpose 3-inch
guns. Farther on, at the ocean end of the cross-island road, a twin-barreled,
13-mm. dual-purpose machine gun also covered part of the zone of advance.13

In the center, about thirty yards beyond the tunnel, there was a large
underground

--114--

Beached Seaplane and Rifle Pits (above and below, respectively) were Japanese points of resistance.

--115--

shelter, and about thirty yards farther on, six rifle pits connected by a
trench. Squarely across the King's Wharf road, a little south of the middle of
the island, was a longer trench with eleven rifle pits.14

Between noon and 1400 the advance passed through one of the most heavily
defended areas on the island. On the lagoon shore at the base of King's Wharf,
along the east-west highway, and along King's Wharf road were buildings and
tons of fuel and ammunition used by Japanese aviation personnel. A group of
hospital buildings was situated near the lagoon at the base of the wharf. Under
coconut trees along the ocean shore at the right were four machine gun
emplacements supported by ten rifle pits, the whole group being protected on
the east and west flanks by double-apron wire running inland from the water
across the ocean-shore road.15

One after another, all of these positions were overrun. On the left Detachment
Z of the 105th Infantry moved steadily along the lagoon shore, wiping out
trenches and emplacements with the help of one medium tank. Combat engineers
using TNT blocks were also employed. By the close of the day the detachment
unit had advanced from six to seven hundred yards east of King's Wharf,
suffering only six casualties.16
In the center and on the right of the line,
Company E met with equal success. Moving slowly but steadily forward, by 1700
it had pushed some 1,000 yards east of Yellow Beach. Tank-infantry
co-ordination was much improved over that of the previous day. Infantry troops
pointed out enemy strong points to their supporting tanks, covered them as the
tanks moved in for close-range fire, and mopped up the positions once the tanks
had withdrawn or moved forward.17
Meanwhile, in the rear areas, Company A
joined Company F at 1300 in the vicinity of the West Tank Barrier and proceeded
to mop up stranded enemy riflemen in that area.18

The day's advance had wrested from the Japanese their long-range radio
receiving station, a heavily revetted, seventy-eight by thirty-three foot
underground building at the south edge of a cleared rectangular area east of
King's Wharf. Other installations captured or destroyed left the main area of
enemy military positions entirely in American hands.19
When action ceased
about 1700, all Japanese resistance from Red Beaches to Stone Pier had been
eliminated with the exception of a few isolated snipers.20
Total U.S.
casualties for the day were even fewer than on the previous day--eighteen
killed and fifteen seriously wounded.21
Still ahead lay the East Tank
Barrier system, resembling that on the west and designed primarily to stop an
assault from the east.

The job of continuing the next morning's attack would not fall to McDonough's
battalion, which had carried the main burden of advance from Yellow Beach to
Stone Pier. Shortly after the day's fighting had ceased, the 2d Battalion was
ordered into reserve by General Ralph Smith. At the same time, Colonel Hart's
3d Battalion was ordered to relieve the 2d, commencing at daylight on 22
November, and to attack eastward vigorously, commencing at 0800.

--116--

Hart was directed to employ, as the situation dictated, Companies A and C of
the 193d Tank Battalion, the 105th Field Artillery Battalion, and whatever
naval gunfire and aerial support he required. This relief was approved by
General Holland Smith, who had by that time come ashore and was with the
division commander.22

The Second Night

As night closed down on the second day's fighting on Butaritari, the supply
situation was still unsatisfactory. Earlier in the afternoon Colonel Ferris,
the 27th Division's supply officer, had reconnoitered Yellow Beach and
discovered that only amphibian tractors could negotiate the reef, that vehicles
were being drowned out when they struck potholes created in the reef shelf by
naval shells, and that pallets were being dunked as they were pulled off
landing craft at the edge of the beach. Also, the beachhead itself was so
cluttered with foxholes, tree trunks, and other obstacles that it was highly
unsatisfactory as a point of supply. Meanwhile, Admiral Turner had ordered all
ships excepting Pierce to unload on Yellow Beach, with the result that many
landing craft that might otherwise have been unloaded on Red Beaches were tied
up in the lagoon unable to dump their loads because of adverse hydrographic and
beach conditions. Ferris consulted with Admiral Turner late in the afternoon on
board the flagship Pennsylvania, and the admiral approved using Red Beaches as
much as possible until conditions on Yellow Beach had improved. A request to
permit night unloading was denied since Turner had already ordered his ships to
put to sea during the hours of darkness.23

Ashore, Company A was ordered to relieve at 1630 the advanced elements of
Company E and Company G on the front line. The latter withdrew to the lagoon
shore west of Company A and dug in. A little later Company E retired to a line
about 300 yards west of the Stone Pier road. In the center of the forward line
Company A established its perimeter and to the north, along the lagoon shore,
was Detachment Z, 105th Infantry.24

To the rear, Company B spread out to cover the West Tank Barrier. In an effort
to prevent the indiscriminate firing that had characterized the previous
night, orders were passed out to the troops to use hand grenades instead of
rifles. About a hundred grenades in all were thrown from Company B's perimeter
during the night. Next morning five dead Japanese were found lying beyond the
perimeter, all apparently killed by grenade fire. Then, just before the men
withdrew from their foxholes, they killed two more Japanese by machine gun fire
directed at surrounding tree tops.25

Early in the morning hours a sentry on the lagoon shore threw the troops in
that area into a brief fright by reporting the approach of landing craft
carrying Japanese reinforcements. "There are 200 Japs out there," he claimed as
he aroused Colonel Durand and Colonel McDonough in their foxholes. The two
officers got up and reconnoitered the beach, talking in loud voices to avoid
being shot by their own men. The boats proved to be American, and the "200
Japs" an illusion.26

--117--

The Third Day: Capture of the East Tank Barrier

Well before nightfall on the second day of fighting General Ralph Smith had
requested permission to use the 3d Battalion, 165th Regiment, which was still
held in reserve against the possibility of being employed at Tarawa. Since the
situation on that island had improved considerably during the day, his request
was granted at 1705.27
The 27th Division commander immediately ordered
Colonel Hart to leave his reserve area at daylight on the 22d and move to the
relief of the 2d Battalion facing the East Tank Barrier system. At 0800 the 3d
Battalion, aided by light and medium tanks as well as artillery, naval gunfire,
and carrier-based air support, was to attack vigorously to the east. All
command posts were to be moved forward to a point near Yellow Beach where
closer control could be exercised.28

In conjunction with the continuation of the drive eastward, an expedition
under Major Herzog would set out in LVT's early in the morning for Kuma Island
to intercept any Japanese who might seek refuge there. Another party was to
attempt an amphibious encirclement, going through the lagoon to a point east of
the front line and establishing there a strong barrier line across the
narrowest part of the island to stop any Japanese fleeing eastward from the
pressure of the 3d Battalion.29
Meanwhile, harassing artillery fire was to
be directed into the eastern end of the island from time to time.

Commencing at 0600, 22 November, the 3d Battalion moved along the island
highway in column of companies toward Yellow Beach. Elements of Company K led
the column, followed by a platoon of tanks. Company I, the battalion's antitank
platoon, the headquarters and headquarters company, two platoons of Company M,
medical units, and Company L followed in that order.30
As the column passed
along Yellow Beach, approximately thirteen medium and light tanks and some
engineer units fell in. Beyond King's Wharf, Company K swung to the right as
far as the ocean, while Company I filled the area at the left to the lagoon.
Together they moved ahead in a skirmish line, all other elements being in
reserve.31

At 0700 artillery on Ukiangong Point commenced shelling the East Tank Barrier,
while Company A and Detachment Z, 1O5th Infantry, withdrew. From then until
0820 artillery fired a total of almost 900 rounds. The 3d Battalion's line
moved swiftly ahead across the area taken on the previous afternoon but
abandoned during the night. At 0820, as the artillery preparation was lifted,
the tanks and infantry moved against the enemy. By 0915 the first 250 yards had
been traversed with only light opposition, but resistance became more stubborn
as the forces reached the road running south from Stone Pier.32

The first mission of the tanks was to shell the buildings ahead of them while
the infantry grenaded surface installations and small shelters. The
infantry-tank tactics that had been developed in the two preceding days for the
reduction of large shelters were employed. As the infantry approached air raid
shelters, tanks opened

--118--

up with their 75-mm. guns, knocking the shelters out as the infantry line
continued on. Surface structures and smaller shelters were disposed of with
hand grenades.33

At the ocean end of the Stone Pier road, and along the shore east of it,
Company K came upon a series of rifle pits and machine gun nests with one
70-mm. howitzer position, all abandoned by the enemy.34
At 0945, as the barrier
defenses came within range of the tanks, field artillery resumed its fire,
first on the clearing and then to the east of it. After twenty-five minutes the
shelling from Ukiangong Point ceased.35
The 105th Field Artillery Battalion
then began moving forward to a new position closer to the front while tanks and
troops entered the zone just shelled.36

With the 3d Battalion's attack moving steadily eastward, Colonel Hart, as
previously planned, sent a special detachment to cut off the enemy from retreat
to the eastern end of Butaritari. For this mission two reinforced platoons of
Company A, which had only that morning been relieved from its position in the
line, were sent with additional reinforcement of one section of light machine
guns and one platoon of heavy machine guns from Company D. This detail, under
command of Captain O'Brien, embarked at 1100 in six LVT's on a three-mile run
across the lagoon to a point on the north shore well to the east of the East
Tank Barrier. Around noon Captain O'Brien's men landed without opposition and
set up a line across the island. Ten natives encountered near the beach
informed the captain that the remaining Japanese were fleeing eastward across
the reef to Kuma.37

The longer U.S. amphibious move to Kuma Island was made by a detail under Major
Bradt. This group, in ten LVT's, was guided to Kuma by Major Herzog, who had
reconnoitered that island the day before. At 1400 nine of the amphtracks landed
without opposition in the vicinity of Keuea, about a mile from the southwestern
tip of the island. The enemy on Butaritari was now entirely cut off from
retreat.38

Meanwhile, tanks and infantry were moving upon and through the East Tank
Barrier. Although more heavily fortified than the West Tank Barrier, this
strong defensive system offered no opposition whatever. The enemy had
apparently abandoned the barrier during the night. Only a few dead Japanese
were found, evidently killed by earlier bombardment, in the barrier system.39

The Advance Beyond the East Tank Barrier

After passing through the tank barrier system, troops of the 3d Battalion did
not pause, but pushed eastward. Tanks were operating 200 to 300 yards east of
the barrier in the barracks area between the highway and the lagoon as early as
1042. Two hours later, while men from Company A were forming a line across the
island neck, tanks had reached a clearing about 800 yards short of that line,
and the two forces were in communication.40

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Map 7:Securing Makin22-23 November 1943

--120/121--

It was believed that the Japanese remaining between these two forces would be
trapped. In fact, no such event took place. By the time the 3d Battalion had
reached Company A's barricade line at 1330, they had encountered no opposition.
Either the enemy remnants had evaded discovery or had slipped east of the
island's neck before noon when Company A had landed from its LVT's. The only
sign of life in that area occurred shortly after the junction of forces when
about three hundred natives emerged to be taken under custody by the American
soldiers and escorted outside of the line of advance. After a short rest the 3d
Battalion pressed forward again, while the Company A platoons and their
attached units went to the rear.41

At this point General Ralph Smith, in pursuance of the original plans, assumed
full command of the island forces at 1510.42
Shortly thereafter he was ordered
to reembark the 1st and 2d Battalions, all medium tanks, all except five light
tanks, and all naval gunfire and air liaison parties the next morning (23
November).43

Beyond the narrow neck of the island where they had joined forces with the
Company A detachment, the 3d Battalion advanced some 9,100 yards, stopping
about 1645. With Company I on the right, Company K on the left, and Company L
in the rear, the battalion dug in for the night in perimeter defense.44

Ahead lay about 5,000 yards of Butaritari Island still unsecured by the
attacking forces. The escape of any enemy that might remain in that area across
the reef to Kuma was barred by Major Bradt's detachment on that island. From
his positions at the southwestern end of Kuma he could effectively cover any
crossing and in fact did repulse two enemy attempts to land on Kuma during the
night.45

The day's activity had been easy, except for the heat and the tangled tropical
growth through which the 3d Battalion had had to advance. Enemy resistance in
the area of the East Tank Barrier and eastward had been nominal. At the day's
end Admiral Turner announced the capture of Makin "though with minor resistance
remaining" and congratulated General Ralph Smith and his troops. All that
seemed to remain was to mop up a now thoroughly disorganized enemy trapped in
the extreme northeastern tip of Butaritari.46

The Last Night

After a wearisome but generally unopposed day's advance, the 3d Battalion dug
in in a series of separate company perimeters, stretching across the width of
the island in a line of about 300 yards in length.47
At the north Company I
covered the lagoon shore, the main highway, and about one half of the island's
width. In an oval clearing in the center of the island two small ponds
intervened between Company I and Company K, which set up a perimeter covering
the distance from there to the ocean shore. West of these two companies in a
long, narrow oval running all the way across the island was Company L, facing
west. Spaced along this entire position were the light machine guns of the
various company weapons platoons, and

--122--

the heavy machine guns of Company M. The battalion antitank guns were placed at
the point where the lines of defensive positions crossed the highway. One pair
faced to the west along the road while the second pair faced to the east. The
two antitank gun batteries were covered by heavy machine guns of the antitank
platoon and a few riflemen. The men from Company M covered their own guns,
while riflemen from the three rifle companies protected the remainder.

No very serious effort was made to establish a strong perimeter. No thorough
reconnaissance of the ground just ahead was made, although about an hour and a
half elapsed between the time the battalion began to dig in (1645) and sunset
(1818) and another hour and a quarter remained before total darkness set in
(1931).48
During the heat of the day's activity most of the men had dropped
their packs to the rear, including their entrenching tools. Foxholes were
therefore shallower than usual. In some cases men did not even bother with
them. Instead, they dragged coconut logs into place and built themselves
barricades above ground. The truth is that very few, if any, of either officers
or men entertained serious notions that there was much danger from the remnant
of Japanese facing them. This opinion was most succinctly expressed by 1st Lt.
Robert Wilson who later said, "Many of us had the idea there were no Japs left;
when the firing began, I didn't believe it was the real thing."49

The first effort of the enemy to penetrate the perimeter occurred shortly after
dark. Following close on the heels of a party of natives who had safely made
their way into the American lines, a group of Japanese advanced close to the
line, imitating baby cries as they came. The ruse was recognized by a member of
the engineer detachment, who opened fire with his machine gun killing about ten
Japanese. Thereafter until dawn, the night was broken by intermittent fire
fights, infiltrations, and individual attacks on the American positions.

This was no organized counterattack or banzai charge such as occurred later on
Saipan. Rather, it was a series of un-coordinated small unit, sometimes
individual, fights. In an effort to unnerve the Americans, the Japanese
periodically set up a tom-tom-like beating all over the front of the perimeter.
Periodically, also, they would yell or sing, apparently under the influence of
sake.50
They came on sometimes in groups and sometimes singly. A number of
them filtered into the American lines, and their fire engaged the perimeter
from both sides. The brunt of the attack fell on a few machine gun and heavy
weapons positions that were covering the front from the right and left of the
line. To the crews of these weapons the attack naturally appeared formidable
indeed. Actually, although from three to four hundred men of the battalion were
under Japanese mortar, machine gun, rifle, and grenade fire from time to time,
the enemy onslaught broke and disintegrated around these relatively few
positions held down by the heavy weapons and machine guns on the front. Those
who were only slightly to the rear of the guns were in the position of uneasy
onlookers, bound by the character of the defense to take relatively little hand
in the repulse given the enemy.

--123--

When daylight finally came it was apparent that the night's attack had been
both less massive and less deadly than it had seemed while it was going on.
Fifty-one enemy dead were counted in front of American guns, although more were
later found east of these positions. Some or all of these may have been wounded
during the night's activity and dragged themselves away from the perimeter to
die. American casualties for the night came to three killed and twenty-five
wounded.51

A few of the enemy also had tried to escape from Butaritari over the reef to
Kuma. At midnight about ten came upon the defense line set up by Major Bradt's
detail from the 105th Infantry and were either killed or wounded while making
an effort to cross it. Unless some had previously escaped beyond Kuma to the
other northern islets of the atoll, the last remnants of the original Japanese
forces were destined to be pinched off on 23 November, D plus 3. 52

Mop-Up

The sixty-odd Japanese killed during the night represented the bulk of the
remaining enemy soldiers on Butaritari. All that was left to be secured was the
eastern extremity of the island, including Tanimaiaki Village, and the few
scattered enemy left here were mostly labor troops and airmen.

The American attack was launched at 0715 with Company I in the advance. As many
men as possible rode on the five light and sixteen medium tanks that had been
sent up earlier to spearhead the drive.

Behind them, Company K on the left and Company L on the right formed a skirmish
line across the island. Still farther to the rear came the men of Company B
from the 1st Battalion, as reserve support. With the left flank rode a special
detail equipped with loudspeakers through which nisei interpreters were to
broadcast appeals for surrender to whatever enemy troops might be left in
Tanimaiaki Village. About 1015 it was discovered that some Japanese had moved
across the rear of the advance unit and cut its wire. Colonel Marshall, who was
in temporary command of the nisei detail, was ordered to return to the rear
with a message requesting Colonel McDonough to get his support element forward.
As his jeep started back from the front line it ran into an ambush that the
Japanese had set up for about 300 yards along the road, somewhat more than a
half a mile to the rear. At that point a support element making its way forward
arrived on the scene and cleared out the ambush in a short, sharp fight. This
was the last tactical encounter on Makin.53

By 1030 advanced elements of the 3d Battalion had reached the tip of
Butaritari, and organized resistance was declared to be over.54
Only a few
Japanese had been encountered on the way and these had been quickly silenced.
An hour later General Smith radioed to Admiral Turner, "Makin Taken! Recommend
command pass to Commander Garrison Force."55
Except for minor mopping-up
activities, the operation was over.

At 1400 the 2d Battalion under Colonel McDonough started to board Pierce from
Red Beach 2.56
At 1630 Admiral Turner ordered General Smith to turn over command

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of the island to the garrison force commander, Col. Clesen H. Tenney, the
following day at 0800.57
From 1900 to 2120 that evening and again during the
next morning, the 27th Division staff and the improvised staff of Colonel
Tenney conferred. It was decided to leave on the island a considerable quantity
of communications equipment already in operation, with the personnel to operate
it. All the LVT's were left, and with them a Navy boat pool of nine officers
and 1,943 enlisted men. Many of the trucks, bulldozers, and Jeeps were also to
remain.58

During the morning Major Mahoney's 1st Battalion went aboard Calvert, while
other detachments embarked on other transports. At noon the special detail
returned from Kuma and began to board Leonard Wood, following the headquarters
staff.59
The 3d Battalion under Colonel Hart was left behind to assist and
protect the construction forces. Also remaining for the time being on the
island were Battery C, 105th Field Artillery; one platoon of Company C, 193d Tank Battalion; the LVT
detachment from Headquarters Company, 193d Tank Battalion; the Collecting
Platoon and the Clearing Company and surgical team, 102d Medical Battalion;
Company C, 102d Engineers; the 152d Engineers; Batteries K and L, 93d Coast
Artillery (AA); Batteries A, B, C, and D, 98th Coast Artillery (AA); and the
Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 165th Infantry.60

The remainder of the troops that had fought on Butaritari were boated and ready
to sail by noon of 24 November. A short delay caused by the report of nearby
enemy planes held up the convoy until 1400, but at that time the ships finally
shoved off for the more inviting shores of Oahu.61
The capture of Makin was
history.

Profit and Loss

Reckoned in terms of the casualties sustained by the 27th Division, the seizure
of Makin at first glance appears to have been cheap. Total battle casualties
came to 218, of which 58 were killed in action and 8 died of wounds. Of the 152
wounded in action and the 35 who suffered non-battle casualties, 57 were
returned to duty while action was going on.62
At the end of the fighting,
enemy casualties were estimated to come to 550 including 105 prisoners of war,
all but one of whom were labor troops.63
Later mopping-up activities
accounted for still more, and in the end the total enemy garrison, none of whom
escaped, was either captured or killed. Thus, a total of about 300 combat
troops and 500 laborers was accounted for at Makin.64

In view of the tremendous superiority of American ground forces to those of the
enemy and the comparatively weak state of Japanese defenses, the ratio of
American combat casualties to those of Japanese combat troops was remarkably
high-about two to three. In other words, for every three Japanese fighters
killed, two Americans were either killed or wounded. Thus the cost of taking
Makin was not quite so low as it had first seemed.

Naval casualties incident to the capture of Butaritari were much higher than
those of the ground forces. During the preliminary

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naval bombardment on 20 November, the battleship Mississippi had a turret
explosion resulting in the death of forty-three men and the wounding of nineteen
others. More important was the sinking of the escort carrier Liscome Bay. On
the morning of 24 November she was operating about twenty miles southwest of
Butaritari in company with two other escort carriers, all under command of Rear
Adm. Henry M. Mullinix, USN. At 0513 Liscome Bay was hit admidship by one or
more torpedoes fired from an undetected enemy submarine. Her bombs and
ammunition exploded and within twenty-three minutes she sank. Fifty-three
officers, including Admiral Mullinix, and 591 enlisted men were lost and
many others seriously wounded and burned.65

This sinking, occurring on D plus 4, gave point to an argument repeatedly put
forth in naval circles that in amphibious operations time was of the essence,
that ground operations prolonged beyond the time compelled by absolute
necessity constituted an unacceptable risk to naval shipping and to the lives
of naval personnel. Liscome Bay when torpedoed was standing by to furnish air
cover for Admiral Turner's attack force on its voyage back to Oahu. Had the
capture of Makin been conducted more expeditiously, she would have departed the
danger area before 24 November, the morning of the disaster.

General Holland Smith was later of the opinion that the capture of Makin was
"infuriatingly slow."66
Considering the size of the atoll, the nature of the
enemy's defenses, and the great superiority of force enjoyed by the attacking
troops, his criticism seems justified. It is all the more so when to the cost
of tardiness is added the loss of a valuable escort aircraft carrier with more
than half the hands aboard.

10.
V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl C, G-2 Rpt, Incl D, Rpt of 1st Lt Harvey C.
Weeks, USMCR, p. 2; Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41. These
marines had been part of the reinforced 2d Platoon of Company G, which had been
landed from Neville at Kotabu and Tukerere Islands on D Day. Having
reconnoitered the tiny islets and discovered no opposition, they had returned
to their ship the same day and were subsequently landed on Butaritari.

65.
Samuel Eliot Morison, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR
II, Vol. VII, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1951), pp. 140-41.