The main target of
Morton Abramowitz's late November Washington Post article
(reproduced in this
issue of Bosnia Report) was the US administration's misguided policies in the former Yugoslavia.
These had culminated in a reliance on authoritarian leaders in Zagreb and Belgrade the fragility of
whose power was suddenly visible. In Croatia, the serious illnesses of first Susak and then Tudjman,
in combination with the huge spontaneous rally that forced the government to retreat from its closure
of the popular radio station 101, necessarily focused attention on an imminent post-Tudjman future.
In Serbia, meanwhile, the sustained mass demonstrations that filled the country's cities day after day,
in response to the cancellation by Milosevic's tame courts of opposition victories in local elections,
threw an unmistakable light on the true extent of popular dissatisfaction with the regime. The
moment was indeed right for Abramowitz to ask whether the United States would not be better
advised, if it wanted stability, to rely on a democratic future rather than an undemocratic present to
provide the regional stability it desired.

All friends of Bosnia will hope that Abramowitz's basic message will have been heard in the White
House. Bosnian political leaders have repeatedly stressed that a democratic B-H is impossible
without democratic neighbours. Moreover, a change of US policy towards Croatia and Serbia would
certainly entail a shift in Bosnia too, away from the partitionist elements of Dayton and towards those
of potential reintegration.

At a more superficial level, however, the impact of Abramowitz's article was more immediate in
London, where foreign secretary Rifkind reacted furiously to the passing remark that Britain's envoy
in Belgrade was widely perceived as 'Milosevic's handmaiden'. Rifkind's response, in which he
defended Ivor Roberts as doing no more in his posting than what every good ambassador should, was
disingenuous. For the context, of course, in which Roberts had established such comfortable relations
with the man most responsible for war and genocide in Bosnia, was London's own longstanding
policies in the former Yugoslavia: policies more consistently favourable to Belgrade than those of any
other major player apart from Russia.

The reasons for London's stance have been much debated. They are probably a matter more of
ignorance, incoherent prejudice, inertia, false analogies, extraneous considerations and misconceived
self-interest than of any deeplaid conspiracy. But what is certain is that this stance has been adopted
and maintained without the kind of serious challenge that was mounted against administration policies
in the United States - by a Congress that overwhelmingly supported Bosnia's right to self-defence; by
a press and informed opinion that was by and large not ready to equivocate about genocide; by State
Department officials with sufficient integrity to resign over Bosnia. In Britain, despite the brave
contributions of many press or television reporters on the ground and the efforts of a tiny number of
MPs, Major, Hurd and Rifkind have never been put under any real pressure for their anti-Bosnian
policies. It was perhaps emblematic that the one-time authentic voice of domestic liberalism The
Observer should have run a prominent feature article (in the same month as Abramowitz's) asking
whether the work of the war crimes tribunal at The Hague was not in fact an impediment to peace in
Bosnia.

On the contrary, no one who has the cause of peace in Bosnia at heart should be in any doubt that
this can be durably built only upon justice and democracy. The world is full of situations where
quick-fix partitions have produced generations of misery and violence. Bosnia is no different. The
argument for arresting those indicted for crimes against humanity is overwhelming in moral terms. It
also indicates the essential first step towards creating a Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the population
can move freely, refugees can return home, serious economic reconstruction can begin, and a peaceful
democratic order can be built.