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Program on Southern
Politics, Media and
Public Life
School of Journalism
and Mass
Communication
The University
of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill
O C T. 2001 • NUMBER 29
Thad Beyle
Editor & Associate Director
beyle@ email. unc. edu
Ryan Thornburg
Managing Editor & Assistant Director
thornburg@ unc. edu
Ferrel Guillory
Director
guillory@ unc. edu
NC DataNet is a quarterly publica-tion
of the Program on Southern
Politics, Media and Public Life in
the School of Journalism and Mass
Communication at The University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
To receive an electronic version
of future issues, send your name
and e- mail address to
SouthNow@ unc. edu.
To subscribe to a pritned version,
call ( 919) 843– 8174 or e- mail
SouthNow@ unc. edu.
2 Incumbent Wins Set Record
3 Without Serious Challengers,
Incumbents Still Spend Big
4 A Decade of Spending in N. C.
Congressional Races, 1992– 2000
5 2nd District: Etheridge
Stabilizes Swing District
6 8th District: Incumbency Turns
Tight Race Into Easy Win
7 11th District: Incumbency
Overcomes Scandal
8 1st & 12th Districts: Incumbents
Survive Changing Districts
9 Congressional Delegation
Increasingly Diverse
10 Voter Turnout Growing Faster
Than Population
12 GOP Delegates More Loyal To
Party Than Democrats
16 Parties’ Paths to Helms Seat
In This Issue
L eg i s l at ive Votes Just the Start
O f Long Redistricting Pro c e s s
RYA N TH O R N BU RG, AS S I S TA N T DI R E C TO R
Every 10 years, redrawing of the North Carolina
congressional map changes the manner in whic h
the state is represented in Washington. The highest
turnover of the decade occurs in the election after
the lines are redrawn. During the 1990s, redistrict-ing
helped elect the centur y’s first black representa-tives
from North Carolina and
helped increase Republican rep-resentation
on the state and fed -
eral levels.
The redistricting process of the
last decade brought not just new
representatives, but an entirely
new way of drawing congres-sional
districts. Legal wrangling
replaced backroom deals as the
primary tool used to draw North
Carolina’s political boundaries.
The minority- majority districts
drawn up for the 1992 elections
didn’t have their final court rul-ing
until this year. Already, the
state is in federal court fighting
Utah for an additional congressional seat that
would raise the state ’ s total to 13.
This issue of DataNet looks back at some voting ,
registration and demographic trends that shaped
the political personalities of North Carolina’s con-gressional
districts during the last decade. It is this
data that will form the starting point for discussions
about next decade’s district lines. The sophistica -
tion with which political data is collected and ana-lyzed
– in addition to the le gal quarrels – is one of
the primary reasons that judges and computers
crowded in on the politics of the redistricting
process.
There is so much dispute o ver the meaning of the
census numbers that federal judges will almost cer-tainly
be the final arbiters of district lines. These
court hearings will look very much like those dur-ing
the 2000 presidential election, with mathemati-cal
experts explaining theories and attorneys argu -
ing about the correct legal appli-cation
of those theories.
The burdens placed on the poor
souls who were forced to count
chads on national television
were nothing compared to those
state lawmakers will face in their
attempt to put voters into new
districts. Just as Florida counties
each used different standards to
count votes, the federal govern-ment
has handed down conflict-ing
standards on how states
must draw their districts without
reducing the voting power of
racial or political minorities.
The math of the redistricting process seems simple
- one person, one vote - but it's at the beginning of
a long problem about how to distribute democracy
fairly. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights
Act, which forced states, including North Carolina,
that had suppressed African- American voter
turnout to get approval for their congressional
maps from the U. S. Justice Department.
Because most Democrats and Republicans don't
vote for each other and because many whites still
don't vote for blacks, lawmakers struggle to divine
S E E R E D I S T R I C T I N G ON PAGE 13 ›
This issue of DataNet looks
back at some voting, regis-tration
and demographic
trends that shaped the
political personalities of
North Carolina’s congres-sional
districts during the
last decade.
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 2 A AND PUBL IC LI FE
Incumbent candidates met with success in each of
North Carolina’s 12 congressional districts in 2000.
The state had not returned an entire dele gation to
Capitol Hill since congressional veterans swept
North Carolina’s 11 districts in the 1988 elections.
Although neither 2000 nor 1988 saw a victorious
challenger, the 2000
election season was less
competitive than 1988.
In 2000, each of the 12
successful candidates
won at least 55 percent
of his or her district ’ s
vote. As the table on
page 14 indicates, nine
of the 12 districts saw
“ strong” victories last
year, meaning that the
winning candidate gar-nered
more than 58.6
percent of the vote.
There were no “ close”
races in which the win-ner
took less than 55
percent of the vote. In
1988, the last year in
which incumbents
swept, three seats were won with less than 53 per-cent
of the vote.
In looking over the last decade, it is notable that
the 1992 and 2000 elections shared a lack of close
r a c e s. Howeve r, wh e re only half o f the districts we re
won by strong victories in 1992, thre e - q u a rt e rs we re
won by strong victories in 2000.
The lack of competitiveness across the state is n o t
without consequence. Several of the stat e’s districts
have come to be considered “ safe” for either
Democrats or Republicans. The 1st and 12th dis-tricts,
created as minority- race districts following
the 1990 census, are considered “ safe” by virtue of
the strength with wh i ch they are held by Democrat s.
In 2000, Eva Clayton carried the 1st District with 66
percent of the vote, and Mel Watt took the 12th
District with 65 percent. Both Democratic cong res-sional
and presidential candidates have uniformly
posted convincing victories in both districts over the
last decade.
The 4th District, located in the Tr i a n gl e, also ge n e r a l-ly
favors the Democrats in congressional elections.
All the same, the Democrats’ “ safety” in the district
was challenged in 1994 when incumbent Democrat
David Price was unseated by Republican ch a l l e n ge r
Fred Heineman. Despite significant Republican
inroads, the 4th District is closest in fo l l owing the
1st and 12th districts in support for Democratic
presidential candidates. But Gore and Clinton victo -
ries in the district were quite narrow in the last two
presidential elections.
At both the congressional
and presidential levels,
the Republicans find
more safety in the Old
North State than do the
Democrats. The 6th, 9th
and 10th districts have all
been Republican strong-holds
over the last
decade, as Republican
candidates for both the
presidency and Congress
uniformly won at least
58.6 percent of the vote
in each of the three dis-tricts.
The 5th District has also
emerged as a Republican
bastion. Rep. R i ch a rd
B u rr ’ s landslide victory
over Demo c r atic ch a l l e n ger Mike Robinson in 1998
helped to discourage any opposition in 2000. The dis-trict
has add i t i o n a l ly show n i n c reased support fo r
Republican pre s i d e n t i a l candidates. Where the elder
George Bush edged out Bill Clinton with 52.6 perc e n t
o f the vote in 1992, Dole wo n by a comfortable mar-gin
in 1996, and George W. Bush took the district
from Al Gore by a 25- point margin in 2000.
Republican Walter Jones Jr. has solidified his base
of support in the 3rd District, winning with more
than 60 percent of the vote in each of his three
bids for reelection since taking the seat from
Democrat Martin Lancaster in 1992. Jones’ contin-ued
success over the last decade combined with
strong showings by Bush, Dole and Bush has given
the 3rd District a decidedly R epublican feel.
Democrat Bob Etheridge has tightened his grip on
his 2nd District seat, as has R epublican Robin Hayes
on his 8th District seat. Etheridge has carried his
district with an increasingly large percentage of the
vote in each of his last three tries for office. Hayes,
on the other hand, secured a full 55 percent of the
vote in 2000 after winning with only 50.7 percent in
1998. In presidential races, the 2nd District suppor t-
Incumbent Wins Set Re c o rd in
2000 Congressional Elections
CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
1st open * * * *
2nd * open LOST * *
3rd * LOST * * *
4th * LOST LOST * *
5th * open * * *
6th * * * * *
7th * * open * *
8th * * * open *
9th * open * * *
10th * * * * *
11th * * * * *
12th open * * * *
LOST - incumbent lost 4 ( 7%)
Open - no incumbent running 7 ( 12%)
* - incumbent ran and won 49 ( 82%)
Total races 60
Success of Incumbents,
1992– 2000
S E E I N C U M B E N T S ON PAGE 14 ›
Despite the lack of competitiveness in North
Carolina’s 2000 congressional races, campaign
spending was nearly 18 percent higher than
in 1998, making it the most expensi ve set of
c o n gressional elections of the past decade. The
second most expensive congressional election
year was in the “ Republican Revolution” of
1994, when two Democratic incumbents wer e
unseated and three open seats filled.
The table “ Congressional Campaign Costs,
1992– 2000” details the expenditures of the
two major party candidates in each of the
past five congressional campaigns, including
primary and general elections. For purposes
of comparison, all dollar amounts for these
five sets of elections were converted to
November 2000- dollar equivalents using the
Consumer Price Index- Urban. i
The 2000 numbers indicate that challenger s
generally did not run big- ticket campaigns
last year, as incumbent spending accounted
for 73 percent of total expenditures during an
election season when six of the incumbent
winners actually spent less than they had in
1998. A clear exception to this was Democrat
Leigh Harvey McNairy’s ch a l l e n ge of Rep u b l i c a n
incumbent Walter Jones in the 3rd District.
McNairy, who spent $ 1.176 million, matched
Jo n e s ’ s spending ($ 1.267 million) almost dollar-for-
dollar, forcing the incumbent to spend
about double the amount he spent two year s
b e fo re. Despite losing the race by 24 perc e n t age
points, McNairy’s efforts did result in a 147
percent increase in the total cost of the race
for the district ’ s seat from 1998 to 2000.
The six representatives spending less on their
campaigns in 2000 than in their previous suc-cessful
bids for office were Eva Clayton ( D- 1),
Bob Etheridge ( D- 2), David Price ( D- 4), Richard
Burr ( R- 5), Howard Coble ( R- 6) and Mel Watt
( D- 12). Factoring out the unopposed victories of
B u rr and Coble, the four Democratic incumbents
ave r aged 27 percent margins of v i c t o ry, ranging
from Etheridge’s win by 17 points to Clayton’s
landslide 33 percent margin. Mike McIntyre
( D- 7) spent only 4 percent more in 2000 than in
1998. Cass Ballenger ( R- 10) increased spending
in 2000 by about 25 percent more than his
1998 expenditure level – but he still won by
40 points in 2000 after being unopposed in 1998.
O bv i o u s ly, continu e d big spending on the part
o f an incumbent in the absence of a leg i t i m at e
ch a l l e n ger still does its part to solidify a voter
base and deter future challengers.
Republican candidates outspent their Demo-c
r atic rivals by a 1.3- to- 1 spending ratio in 2000.
Republicans spent $ 7,573,174 to the Democrat s ’
$ 5,996,534. Pa rt of the reason Republicans spent
so mu ch was that two Republican incumbents,
Richard Burr in the 5th District and Howard
Coble in the 6th District, had no Democratic
o p p o n e n t s. If t h e re had been Democratic com-p
e t i t i o n and money in these two races the
m a rgin between the two parties spending leve l s
would have narrowed considerab ly. For ex a m p l e,
the 12 Republican candidates for the 12 seats
spent an ave r age of $ 631,098 per seat while the
10 Democratic candidates for the 10 seats
they contested average was $ 599,653.
Without Serious Challenge rs,
Incumbents Still Spend Big
CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
Total # ofGeneral $ Spent
District $ Spent Election Votes per Vote
8th 2,759,169 203,464 13.56
3rd 2,442,940 198,455 12.31
11th 2,910,673 266,377 10.93
2nd 1,248,193 251,838 4.96
Avg. 1,130,809 231,650 4.88
9th 1,096,896 264,220 4.15
1st 481,401 189,168 2.54
12th 481,401 209,144 2.30
5th 421,060 185,855 2.27
4th 727,485 325,870 2.23
7th 432,143 229,666 1.88
6th 301,790 215,085 1.40
10th 266,557 240,658 1.11
Total 13,569,708 2,779,800
SOURCES: Federal Election Commission; North Carolina
State Board ofElections
Congressional Campaign Costs:
2000 Primary & General
District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Average
1st 691,264 509,709 368,281 713,415 481,401 552,814
Winner, % ii D 99% D 96% D 91% D 96% D 99% 96%
2nd 792,111 1,929,890 1,995,540 1,545,816 1,248,193 1,502,310
Winner, % D 72% R 44% D 41% D 76% D 73% 61%
3rd 973,718 1,665,920 712,244 987,408 2,442,940 1,356,446
Winner, % D 70% R 34% R 94% R 67% R 52% 63%
4th 566,413 1,103,931 2,425,272 1,785,821 727,485 1,321,784
Winner, % D 97% R 28% D 54% R 98% D 94% 74%
5th 875,588 1,762,592 996,688 621,050 421,060 935,396
Winner, % D 73% R 49% R 79% R 98% R 100% 80%
6th 574,337 411,949 599,383 426,331 301,790 462,758
Winner, % R 94% R 100% R 94% R 100% R 100% 98%
7th 337,411 1,073,132 928,679 416,471 432,143 637,567
Winner, % D 94% D 90% D 60% D 100% D 99% 89%
8th 872,145 1,162,139 797,624 1,688,926 2,759,169 1,456,001
Winner, % D 85% D 68% D 79% R 77% R 70% 76%
9th 331,549 878,947 689,382 796,717 1,096,896 758,698
Winner, % R 88% R 89% R 90% R 96% R 90% 91%
10th 374,770 260,019 296,207 213,895 266,557 282,290
Winner, % R 92% R 100% R 93% R 100% R 100% 97%
11th 2,040,307 1,885,675 596,549 1,242,399 2,910,673 1,735,121
Winner, % R 74% R 62% R 91% R 71% R 65% 73%
12th 624,658 315,041 174,834 1,085,947 481,401 536,376
Winner, % D 95% D 95% D 96% D 63% D 75% 85%
TOTAL 9,054,271 12,958,945 10,580,681 11,524,195 13,569,708 11,537,561
Winner, % 86% 60% 69% 79% 73% 73%
Avg. per seat 754,523 1,079,912 881,723 960,350 1,130,809 961,463
NOTES:
i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each ofthe years were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$
= 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541; 1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To convert these to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the
2000$ value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 ofthe 2000$; 1994$ = .852 ofthe 2000$; 1996$ = .886 ofthe 2000$; and 1998$ = .942 of
the 2000$.
ii Winner, % = party ofthe winning candidate and the percentage ofthe district total spent by the winner.
SOURCES: Almanac of American Politics; Federal Election Commission; the North Carolina Board ofElections
Congressional Campaign Costs, 1992– 2000 i
S E E S P E N D I N G ON PAGE 5 ›
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 4 AND PUBLIC L IFE
After the 2000 elections, we can now look at
the decade of spending in congressional races
following the 1990 U. S. census and the various
redistricting plans used in the period. Using the
same 2000- dollar equivalent data for those five
s ep a r ate elections we find the fo l l owing pat t e rn s :
• Between the 1992 and 2000 elections, the
cost of these five sets of 12 elections incre a s e d
by nearly 50 percent, from $ 9.054 million
in 1992 to $ 13.570 million in 2000. The
ave r age cost per seat moved from $ 755,000
in 1992 to $ 1.131 mil-lion
in 2000, with an
average cost per con-gressional
seat of
about $ 961,000 during
the decade.
• There are now five
“ million- dollar” con-gressional
seats in
North Carolina –
seats in which the
average cost of elec-tions
over the decade
was more than a
million dollars ( 2nd,
3rd, 4th, 8th and
11th), and nearly a
sixth ( 5th at
$ 935,396). There is
a “ three- quarter-million-
dollar” seat
( 9th), three “ half-million-
dollar” seats
( 1st, 7th, 12th), and
nearly a fourth ( 6th
at $ 462,758). The
final 10th seat has
been a “ quarter-million-
dollar” seat
with the incumbent
Cass Ballenger ( R)
winning each of the
five races.
• Money and winning
go hand- in- hand in
these races as the
winners of the
decade’s 60 races
outspent their
opponents by nearly
a 3- to- 1 ratio.
Incumbents espe-cially
benefit from this as was clear ly seen
in the 2000 elections when all races were
won by incumbents, and they outspent
their challengers by a 3- to- 1 ratio. And 13
of the 20 most expensive races over the
decade were won by incumbents.
• Wi n n e r ’ s spending has accounted for 73 per-c
e n t of the total spending in these 60 races.
The specific year range around that 73 per-cent
figure is instructive. The high point
was in 1992, when winners’ bank accounts
overwhelmed their opponents by making
86 percent of the campaign expenditures.
This was the year when e very candidate
faced the first newly drawn districts since
1981. The low point of 60 percent was in
1994, when there were three open seats
and two incumbents were defeated, so fi ve
of the 12 winners were not incumbents .
• T h e re has been a shift in the party spending
tied to the increasing Republican strength in
these races. In the 1992 elections, Democrat s
outspent their Republican competitors by a
3- to- 2 ratio, but in the 1994 elections the
D e m o c r atic adv a n t age dropped to a 1.3- to- 1
ratio. Then in 1996, the Republicans gained
the upper hand and outspent their Demo-cratic
competitors by a 3- to- 2 ratio. This
Republican advantage dropped off to a
1.1- to- 1 ratio in 1998 and then increased
slightly in 2000 to a 1.3- to- 1 ratio.
• Twenty of the 60 races cost more than $ 1 mil-l
i o n. They ranged from the $ 2.911 million
high in the 2000 8th District race to the
$ 1.073 million 1994 7th District race that
was Charlie Ro s e’s last hurrah. Several tre n d s
are visible. 1994 was a very expensive year
as seven of the 20 most expensive races
occurred then. The 1998 and 2000 elections
each had five $ 1 million- plus contests. The
2nd and 11th districts each had four of
their five contests in this high price level,
while the 4th and 8th districts had three
of their five there. The four races in which
an incumbent was defeated and three of
the six open seat races were also million-dollar-
plus specials. As already noted, 13 of
the 20 high- price races saw incumbents
win, some quite easily. Only two of these
races saw the winning margin in single
digits. The bottom line is money and
incumbents working together for the
future. n
A Decade of Spending in N. C.
C o n gressional Ra c e s, 1992– 2000
TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L, A N D
CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R , UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
Rank Dist. Year Amount Type Outcome Pts
1 11th 2000 $ 2.911 In. Taylor- R reelected 12
2 8th 2000 $ 2.759 In. Hayes- R reelected 11
3 3rd 2000 $ 2.443 In. Jones- R reelected 24
4 4th 1996 $ 2.425 In. Heineman- R defeated 10
5 11th 1992 $ 2.040 In. Taylor- R reelected 10
6 2nd 1996 $ 1.996 In. Funderburk- R defeated 7
7 2nd 1994 $ 1.930 Open seat R won 12
8 11th 1994 $ 1.886 In. Taylor- R reelected 20
9 4th 1998 $ 1.786 In. Price- D reelected 15
10 5th 1994 $ 1.763 Open seat R won 14
11 8th 1998 $ 1.689 Open seat R won 3
12 3rd 1994 $ 1.666 In. Lancaster- D defeated 6
13 2nd 1998 $ 1.546 In. Etheridge- D reelected 15
14 2nd 2000 $ 1.248 In. Etheridge- D reelected 17
15 11th 1998 $ 1.242 In. Taylor- R reelected 15
16 8th 1994 $ 1.162 In. Hefner- D reelected 4
17 4th 1994 $ 1.104 In. Price- D defeated 0.8
18 9th 2000 $ 1.090 In. Myrick- R reelected 39
19 12th 1998 $ 1.086 In. Watt- D reelected 14
20 7th 1994 $ 1.073 In. Rose- D reelected 4
KEY:
Amount = cost ofcampaigns in 2000$ ( millions)
Type = In. – incumbent; Open – no incumbent in race
Pts. = point margin ofvictory or defeat
Most Expensive Congressional Elections, 1992– 2000
Year Dems. Reps.
% %
1992 60 40
1994 56 44
1996 40 60
1998 47 53
2000 44 56
K E Y: aThese perc e n t ages are of the two - p a rty spending
in the races. Third- party and independents’ spending
not included.
Partisan Spending in 1992–
2000 Congressional Races a
For the third time in a row, incumbent Bob
Etheridge won the 2nd Congressional District
in North Carolina. Although Etheridge is a
s t rong candidat e, the 2nd District has been
known to switch between Democrat and
Republican in any given year. Nationwide,
Democrats needed to win seven extra seats to
regain power in the U. S. House of
Representatives. Many closely watched the
race between Bob Etheridge and Doug
Haynes because any seat’s shift could a ffe c t
the congressional balance of p owe r. Wi t h the
state clearly favoring Bush, the Democrats
needed another way to gain support.
Bob Etheridge defeated Doug Haynes with 58
percent of the vote. Although new to the con-gressional
race, Doug Haynes still garnered 41
percent of the vote, showing the volatility of
the 2nd District voters. Haynes, a Republican
from Rocky Mount, attempted to link himself
to presidential candidate George W. Bush in a
m ove to use Bush’s popularity in North Caro l i n a
to gain support. He wanted to make funda-mental
ch a n ges in areas such as tax policy and
e d u c ation. He supported giving school districts
the power to spend money as they see fit.
Haynes told supporters that, in general, he
supported Bush’s policies and would push for
them in Congress; understanding the conserv-ativeness
of the 2nd District.
Haynes is a former John Locke Foundation
re s e a rcher who is known for his strong opinions
t h at he is not afraid to express. Soon after
winning the primary, Haynes challenged
Etheridge to a series of debates. He quickly
wanted to gain the support of the undecided.
He ch a l l e n ged Etheridge to speak on educat i o n ,
one of the main points of contention betwe e n
the two candidates.
In an early campaign ad, Haynes used Etheridge’s
stance on education against him. Haynes is
shown reading a quote from the News &
Observer where Etheridge had pushed for
Congress to assist in school renovation e ven
when the local area has rejected the bond
issue. Haynes stated that Etheridge belie ved
the voters were dumb and challenged the
voters to reject someone who did not believe
in their ability to think for themselve s. Hay n e s’
top priorities included moving power away
from Washington and into states, and creat-ing
a fairer tax code .
Bob Etheridge is a conserv at ive Democrat wh o
uses his beliefs to his advanta ge. In the past
three congressional elections, it has been dif -
ficult for a Republican to defe at him since many
o f his ideals are not too far from their own. The
fo rmer N. C. Superintendent of Public Instru c t i o n
strongly supports the reform of educa-tion.
In one television ad, he shows what
seems like a jail cell, but in reality it is a
trailer t h at has been at t a ched to an ove r-c
rowd e d s chool. He implores vo t e rs not to
let ch i ld ren continue to learn in these con-d
i t i o n s. Besides improving education,
Etheridge said he looked to help North
Carolina farmers, i m p rove safety and sup-p
o rt tech n o l o g i c a l advances.
With Gore’s popularity down in North
Carolina, Etheridge looked to separate
himself from the presidential candidate,
as did many Democratic candidates.
With Durham County removed from the
2nd District, many people felt a large base of
Democratic supporters for Etheridge had
been lost. Etheridge instead focused on the
m a ny undecided vo t e rs living in the 2nd District
who account for its voting unpre d i c t ab i l i t y. He
maintained contact with the strong Democrat i c
voters but pushed hard with mailings and
phone calls to win the votes of those who
were not sure. These independent voters were
m a i n ly white and in the middle- income range.
He looked to extend his presence in the com-munity
by participating in walks around
counties. Volunteers would hand out leaflets,
and Etheridge would meet and g reet con-stituents.
Etheridge’s top priorities include
improving education and protecting the
retirement security of the elderly.
In the 2000 election, voters in Wake and
Johnston Counties made up nearly 55 percent
of the district’s electorate — and the voters
there supported Etheridge. Wilson County,
with only 5 percent of the district’s voters,
was the strongest supporter for Haynes. With
the exception of Wilson County, Etheridge was
the victor in all other counties. The 2nd
District has always gone through periods of
change of political party leadership. In 1996,
Etheridge b e at incumbent Republican Dav i d
F u n d e r b u rk by less than 10,000 votes. His vic-tory
in 1998 was by nearly 44,000 votes.
In the 2000 election, perhaps the strangest part
of the campaign was the difference in money.
Etheridge raised approximately $ 1,030,216 to
Haynes $ 237,248. With a just over a fifth of
the incumbent’s budget, Haynes still manage d
to gain a sizeable amount of the vote; falling
s h o rt of E t h e r i d ge by 43,722 vo t e s. This should
send red flags to the Democrats that the wave
of support in the 2nd District may be coming
to an end. But the shape of the current 2nd
District is also coming to an end, which could
revive competition. n
2nd District: Etheridge Stablizes Swing District
JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
County Etheridge Jackson Haynes Totals
Dem. Lib. Rep. # %
Wake 61.8 1.1 37.2 95,482 37.9
Johnston 52.7 0.7 46.6 41,920 16.6
Nash 55.5 0.5 44.0 31,003 12.3
Harnett 59.6 0.7 39.6 24,455 9.7
Lee 59.1 1.0 40.0 16,054 6.4
Franklin 59.9 0.7 39.4 16,038 6.4
Wilson 48.9 0.5 50.6 10,997 4.4
Sampson 61.2 0.5 38.4 9,196 3.7
Granville 56.6 0.8 42.6 6,693 2.7
Totals 58.3 40.9 0.8 251,838 100.0
SOURCE: State Board ofElections
2nd District, by County
Total spending in the stat e’s three most ex p e n-s
ive 2000 congressional races topped $ 2 million
e a ch. The $ 2.911 million race in the 11th District
between incumbent Charles Taylor ( R) and
Sam Neill ( D) was the most expensive. Taylor
outspent Neill by a 1.8- to- 1 ratio and re t a i n e d
his seat with a 13- point margin. These two can-d
i d at e s spent $ 10.93 per vote in the general
election – yet that was less than the $ 13.56
spent per vote in the 8th District race and the
$ 12.31 spent per vote in the 3rd District race.
The 8th District race between Republican Ro b i n
H ayes and Democrat Mike Taylor was the second
most expensive race, costing $ 2,759,169 as
H ayes tried to ach i eve his first reelection. Haye s
outspent Taylor by nearly a 2.4- to- 1 ratio and
retained his seat by a 11- point margin. But as
just noted, the cost per vote in this race was the
most of any of the 12 races. The 3rd District
Jones- McNairy race also topped the $ 2 million
mark at $ 2,442,940, as the candidates spent
$ 12.31 per general election vote.
Two other races topped $ 1 million in cost last
year. In the 2nd District, incumbent Bob
E t h e r i d ge ( D) outspent ch a l l e n ger Doug Hay n e s
by a 3.2- to- 1 ratio while retaining his seat by a
17- point margin. In the 9th District, incum -
bent Republican Sue Myrick outspent chal-lenger
Edward McGuire by a 14- to- 1 ratio and
won reelection by 39 points. The ye a r ’ s barga i n
s e at belonged to incumbent Cass Ballenger ( R-
10), whose campaign spent only $ 266,557 to
win a 39- point margin race. n
i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of
1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each of the years
were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$ = 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541;
1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To con vert these
to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the 2000$
value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 of the 2000$; 1994$ =
.852 of the 2000$; 1996$ = .886 of the 2000$; and
1998$ = .942 of the 2000$.
› S P E N D I N G F ROM PAGE 3
The 2000 congressional election in District 8
provided another entertaining contest, as te x-tile
heir Robin Hayes and attorney Mike Taylor
went toe- to- toe for a rematch of their 1998
race. The district has a history of conservative
voting and traditional politics. Democratic
c o n gressman Bill Hefner held the seat betwe e n
1974 and 1996, winning consecutive — and
sometimes close — elections.
In 1998, most analysts thought Ha yes, the
Republican nominee for gove rnor in 1996, wo u l d
easily defeat relative newcomer Mike Taylor
because of H aye s ’ s name recognition and mon-e
t a ry strength as heir to the Cannon Textile
Mills fortune. Many Democrats felt Taylor had
no ch a n c e, and the party gave little personal or
financial support to his campaign. Meanwhile,
Hayes outspent Taylor 3- to- 1 and benefited
from campaign visits from Newt Gingrich and
Dan Quayle. However, Taylor stunned the
experts by gaining 48 percent of the popular
vote; Hayes won by a mere 3,378 votes.
In 2000, both sides geared up for what was
expected to be a hotly contested race. The
two major factors that helped T aylor compete
in 1998 were still relevant in 2000. First, the
1998 redistricting plan mandated by the U. S.
Supreme Court increased overall Democratic
registration in the district two points to 69
p e rcent, and it increased the number of A f r i c a n
American vo t e rs from 21 percent to 25 perc e n t .
Second, higher turnout among Democrat s, and
particularly African Americans, was expected
yet again in such a hard fought contest.
The Democratic Party recognized that 2000
offered a prime opportunity to unseat Ha yes,
and it poured monetary and personal re s o u rc e s
into the district. Nationally known Democrats
s u ch as House Minority Leader Rich a rd Gep h a rd t
of Missouri and Minority Whip David Bonior
of Michigan appeared on behalf of Taylor. The
D e m o c r atic Congressional Campaign Committee
in Washington contributed more than $ 600,000
for Taylor’s effort. Taylor spent more than
$ 700,000 during his campaign. Republicans
countered by sending Speaker of the House
Dennis Hastert, former presidential candidate
John McCain, Sen. Jesse Helms and NRA presi-dent
Charlton Heston to the district. Hayes
spent more than $ 1.5 million in 2000. In 1998,
the candidates spent a total of $ 1.5 million, but
in 2000 they spent a combined $ 2.25 million.
Somewhat surprisingly, the 2000 election was
a bigger victory for Hayes, who won with 55
percent of the vote compared to his winning
with just 50.7 percent of the vote in 1998.
Voting turnout was considerably greater in the
2000 presidential year race [ 203,464 total vo t e s ]
than it was in the 1998 U. S. Senate year race
[ 133,124 total votes]. This was a 53 percent
increase of more 70,000 votes. So running at
the same time George W. Bush was winning the
state seemed to help Hayes in his successful
bid for reelection.
The competitive nature of the 8th District race
provided some interesting and occasionally
amusing moments. When Gephardt spoke in
Ja nu a ry to Cab a rrus County high school students
on behalf of Taylor, Hayes showed up at what
was supposed to be an all- Democratic event,
causing a stir and no small amount of t e n s i o n .
In Fe b ru a ry, a national TV ad from the American
D a i ry Association praised “ the power of ch e e s e ”
in an imagined campaign pitting fake presi-dential
candidates John Hayes and Peter
Taylor, as well as Bob Dole. The ad depicted
cheese- lover Peter Taylor as a hero and
cheese- hater John Hayes as a loser. Real- life
candidates Hayes and Taylor were amused by
the ad’s irony, but Hayes was disappointed
that Dole did the ad without considering its
connection to the 8th District.
While Gephardt visited in January and David
Bonior held a fund- raiser for T aylor in
October 1999, big- name Hayes supporters
dominated in 2000. In a rare campaign
appearance for a fellow Republican, Helms
appeared in Concord to rally support for
Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple
8th District: Incumbency Tu rn s
Tight Race Into Easy Wi n
ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 6 AND PUBLIC LIFE
County Taylor Schwartz Hayes Totals
Dem. Lib. Rep. # %
Cabarrus 31.7 1.2 67.1 49,847 24.5
Union 32.0 1.2 66.8 45,179 22.2
Cumberland 64.0 0.8 35.2 30,955 15.2
Stanly 36.2 0.9 63.0 22,453 11.0
Richmond 49.9 0.6 49.5 14,582 7.2
Scotland 62.0 0.5 37.5 9,131 4.5
Montgomery 47.6 0.7 51.7 8,985 4.4
Anson 62.0 0.5 37.5 7,975 3.9
Hoke 60.2 1.5 38.3 7,578 3.7
Robeson 53.7 0.8 45.5 6,779 3.3
Totals 44.0 1.0 55.0 203,464 100
SOURCE: State Board ofElections
8th District, by County
Year of
Seat Member, Party 1st Elec. Service
US Sen. Jesse Helms, R 1972 29th
6th CD Howard Coble, R 1984 17th
10th CD Cass Ballenger, R 1986 15th
4th CD David Price, D 1986 13th
11th CD Charles Taylor, R 1990 11th
1st CD Eva Clayton, D 1992 9th
12th CD Mel Watt, D 1992 9th
3rd CD Walter B. Jones Jr., R 1994 7th
5th CD Richard Burr, R 1994 7th
9th CD Sue Myrick, R 1994 7th
2nd CD Bob Etheridge, D 1996 5th
7th CD Mike McIntyre, D 1996 5th
US Sen. John Edwards, D 1998 3rd
8th CD Robin Hayes, R 1998 3rd
Total Years ofService 140
Total Republican Years ofService 96
Total Democratic Years ofService 44
Seniority in the N. C.
Congressional Delegation, 2001
S E E 8TH DI STRICT ON PAGE 15 ›
North Carolina’s 11th District was a hotly con-tested
race in 2000, as incumbent Rep re s e n t a-tive
Charles H. Taylor defeated Democrat Sam
Neill with 55 percent of the vote. The 11th
District, in the western part of the state,
includes Asheville and 15 mountain counties .
Neill challenged Taylor in what had been for
some time a “ safe” Republican district. But
because of his strong candidacy and allegat i o n s
surrounding Taylor’s financial dealings, Neill
was able to give Taylor serious contention.
The recent history of the 11th District is help -
ful in framing the e vents of the 2000 election.
Before the 1980s the district was, like most
Southern districts, safely Democratic. During
the Republicanization of the South in the
1980s, the district became a “ revolving door”
district, throwing out five of six incumbents in
elections held between 1980 and 1990. The
district became more of a Republican strong-hold
at the end of the decade, as voters sup-p
o rted Jim Gardner in the lieutenant gove rn o r ’ s
race in 1988 and Jesse Helms in the senatorial
campaign of 1990. Taylor, a businessman and
tree farmer from Brevard, came close to
unseating the incumbent in 1988 and suc -
ceeded in 1990.
During the 1990s, Taylor supported 98 perc e n t
of his party’s “ Contract with America” legisla -
tion and built an incredible reputation for
constituent service. Rather than leading on
the ideological front, Taylor represents local
interests effectively. He holds town meetings
at local courthouses and other locations,
where he gives residents a chance to tell him
about local issues. Taylor has a reputation as
a hard worker with a top- notch staf f and
maintains several regional offices throughout
his district. His most controversial stand is on
environmental protection, which he makes
very clear is not as important as preventing
job loss. This resonates well with the natives
in the 11th District. Party leaders value his
loyalty and have rewarded him with a seat on
the Appropriations Committee and the chair-manship
of the District of Columbia Finance
Committee. While Taylor lost some g round in
the elections between 1994 and 1998, he still
held the district safely.
The 11th District has a high percentage of
white voters, and these white voters go to the
polls. For instance, in 1994 more than
190,000 district residents cast votes
in the congressional election, while
in the active, highly populated 4th
District fewer than 155,000 votes
were cast. In 1998, African Americans
made up 4 percent of the district’s
registered voters. Without much
support from black voters, the
Democratic Party is challenged to
compete. The Republican Party
dominates despite the fact that in
1998 only 35 percent of the reg i s t e re d
voters in the district belonged to the
GOP, a holdover from the days of the
Democratic Solid South.
In the 2000 election Taylor found a
strong opponent in Sam Neill, a
Hendersonville attorney who ser ved
on the University of North Carolina
Board of Governors for 12 years.
Neill’s ability and financial backing
combined with the financial scandal
involving Taylor to produce a close
race.
In August, a federal grand jur y
requested information regarding
loans made by Blue Ridge Savings
Bank — owned by Taylor — to one
o f the congre s s m a n’s political backe rs,
Sylva businessman Charles Cagle. The
five loans, given between 1992 and
1995, amounting to more than $ 1 mil-l
i o n, were never repaid in full and
ended in lawsuits and foreclosures.
The Charlotte Observer reported that
one of the loans involved forged sig-natures.
The bank denied lending
the money to Cagl e, once the Ja cks o n
County GOP chairman and a Taylor
campaign contributor. Taylor
claimed to not remember the details
of the loans, and accused Neill of
planting the story. The Taylor cam-paign
responded with television ads
painting Neill as a liar with an ever-growing
“ Pinocchio” nose. Taylor also
faced media scrutiny over his busi-ness
dealings in Russia and his problems with
Jackson and Transylvania counties regarding
property taxes.
In the end, though, Taylor’s superior con-stituent
serving in a staunch Republican
district enabled him to win with 55 percent
of the vote. Only one of the 15 counties in
his district, Jackson, gave more votes to his
opponent. Taylor proved the power of incum-bency
and constituent service. n
11th District: Incumbency Ove rcomes Scandal
ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
County Neill Williams Taylor Totals
Dem. Lib. Rep. # %
Buncombe 46.8 3.3 49.9 85,634 32.1
Henderson 35.0 2.7 62.3 37,137 13.9
Haywood 46.3 2.9 50.8 22,947 8.6
Rutherford 41.0 2.6 56.3 21,311 8.0
Transylvania 39.4 4.0 56.7 14,169 5.3
McDowell 33.5 2.4 64.1 14,049 5.3
Macon 39.1 2.8 58.1 13,062 4.9
Jackson 49.8 2.8 47.4 12,231 4.6
Cherokee 33.9 1.1 65.0 9,047 3.4
Yancey 44.0 1.3 54.8 8,922 3.3
Polk 40.0 3.2 56.8 8,192 3.1
Madison 43.9 2.0 54.1 8,024 3.0
Swain 48.2 1.4 50.4 4,309 1.6
Clay 37.0 1.1 61.9 3,921 1.5
Graham 29.4 1.2 69.4 3,422 1.3
Totals 42.1 2.8 55.1 266,377 100
SOURCE: State Board ofElections
11th District, by County
11th District Polls, 2000
Taylor Dem.
Year % % Total Vote
1988 49.6 50.4 215,343
1990 51 49 201,309
1992 55 45 238,161
1994 60 40 192,688
1996 58 40 228,025
1998 57 42 199,423
2000 55 42 266,377
KEY: Dem. = Democratic candidate
Charles Taylor and the
11th District, 1988– 2000
Date Taylor Neill Pollster Sample
7/ 22– 24 59 31 Pub. Opin. Strategies- R 300 lvs
9/ 22– 24 44 36 Cooper & Secrest- D 503 rvs
11/ 7 55 42 Actual Vote
SOURCE: The Cook Political Repor t [ December 20, 2000]: 60.
11th District Polls, 2000
In 1991, the state leg i s l at u re re d rew the congre s-sional
district lines, giving African Americans a
majority in the 1st and 12th districts. As a re s u l t ,
Eva M. Clayton and Mel Watt in 1992 became
the first African Americans elected to Congress
in more than 90 years. Running in predomi-nantly
African- American districts, C l ayton and
Watt seemed to be products of biased district
lines and there fo re we re victorious by defa u l t .
T h ey easily won reelection in 1994 and 1996.
In 1996, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled a gainst
the 1991 redistricting plan — especially the
long and narrow 12th District. While the 1996
elections went forward under the older plan,
in 1997 the leg i s l at u re re d rew the district lines
to more equitably split the population within
the districts for the 1998 elections. In April
1998 the court threw out this plan, too, and
the legislature had to once a gain redraw the
district lines in May for the 1998 elections.
The new redistricting plan of May 1998
decreased Clayton and Watt’s base of support
and challenged their incumbency. However,
their quest to continue as r epresentatives was
not stifled when their districts were changed
and the people who were thought to be their
sole support reduced in numbers. The per-centage
of African Americans in the 1st D i s t r i c t
d e c reased from 57 percent to 50 perc e n t . The
12th District was affected even more as the
percentage of African Americans dwindled
from 57 percent to 36 percent.
These districts had been challenged because
they were designed to give African- Americans
a majority, and the lawsuits focused specifically
on the 12th District as a “ racial gerrymander.”
In the 1991 plan, the 12th District’s lines
stretched from west of Charlotte along
Interstate 85 all the way to Durham and
included parts of Greensboro and Winston-
Salem.
The 1997 plan eliminated many areas, and
the only parts left in District 12 ran from
Charlotte up I- 85 to Greensboro and Winston-
Salem. The 1998 plan dropped Greensboro
from the 12th District, and the lines ran from
Charlotte north to Winston- Salem.
In their first races for office in 1992, Clayton
and Watt fought strongly contested primaries
and won handily in the No vember general
election. While Watt was able to best three
o t h e rs for the Democratic nomination, Clay t o n
faced six other Democrats and had to win a
runoff primary just to get into the November
race. She defeated the then- Democrat Walter
B. Jones Jr. in the runoff. Jones, the son of a
long- time Democratic congressman, soon
changed parties and won the 1994 race for
the 3rd Congressional District as a Republican.
C l ayton and Wat t’s tenu re in office continu e d
e a s i ly through the 1994 and 1996 elections. In
both cases, they defe ated the same ch a l l e n ger in
these two elections. Clayton prevailed over ch a l-l
e n ger Ted Tyler 61 percent to 39 percent in 1994
and increased her winning margin over him in
1996 to 33 points. Watt defe ated Joe Martino in
1994 by 66 percent to 34 percent and dominat e d
M a rt i n o, 72 percent to 27 percent, in 1996.
With the new redistricting plan in 1998, Clay t o n
and Watt seemed vulnerable to defeat. Man y
s p e c u l ated that their terms would be ch a l l e n ge d
with a bitter, drawn- out race to the finish. The
speculators proved to be wrong, and Clayton
and Watt prevailed again in their respective
d i s t r i c t s. Clayton again easily defe ated her per-petual
contender Ty l e r, 62 percent to 37 perc e n t ,
while Watt defeated Scott Keadle, 56 percent
to 42 percent. Their margins of victory were
narrower, but they were still winners.
In 2000, Clayton defeated Duane E. Kratzer,
Jr.’ s challenge for the 1st District seat. Clayton
advocated education, vocational traini n g, ru r a l
health, minimum wage and economic develop-ment.
Kratzer’s platform included working for
tax reform, a strong military, preserving 2nd
Amendment rights, health care reform and
opposition to abortion. He chall e n ge d
C l ay t o n’s ability to make real diffe re n c e s in the
community.
Mel Watt successfu l ly defended his 12th District
seat against Chad Mitchell. Watt’s platform
i n cluded protecting Social Security and ensuring
health care for the elderly. Mitch e l l ’ s goals we re
similar to Watt’s, but he dif fered because he
1st and 12th Districts: African- American
Incumbents Surv ive Changing Districts
JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 8 AND PUBLIC LIFE
Dist. Representative Dem. % ofOverall Vote Black % Voting Age Pop.
’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 ’ 00 ’ 91 ’ 98 Change
Plan Plan
1st Eva Clayton 67 61 66 62 66 57 50 - 7
12th Mel Watt 72 66 72 56 65 57 36 - 21
1st & 12th Districts:
A Decade of African- American Incumbency
S E E AFRICAN AMERICANS ON PAGE 15 ›
During the past 40 years, North Carolina’s
congressional delegation has had to change
with the times. Although the majority of rep-resentatives
are still white men, minorities
and women are now a part of the electoral
politics of the state. There has also been con -
side r able growth in Republican strength in
N o rt h Carolina’s politics over this period.
Politics has long been considered an all- male
game in this state. However, two women, Eva
Clayton ( D- 1) and Sue Myrick ( R- 9), broke the
gender barrier in the 1992 and 1994 congres-sional
elections. Then in 1996, Elaine Mars h a l l
was elected secretary of state. In the 2000
elections, North Carolina reelected Clayton,
Myrick and Marshall as well as three other
women to statewide office — Lieutenant
Governor Beverly Perdue ( D), Commissioner of
Agriculture Meg Phipps ( D) and Commissioner
of Labor Cherie Berry ( R).
Even more astounding is that Clayton is also
one of North Carolina’s two African- American
representatives. Clayton and Mel Watt ( D- 12)
we re first elected in 1992 after the controve rs i a l
creation of two majority- black districts. They
were the first minorities to be elected to
Congress from North Carolina since Recon-struction.
Despite consistently changing dis -
trict lines that decreased the minority race
voting base in their districts, both Clayton and
Watts retained their seats. On the other hand,
North Carolina has a large number of Native
American and Latin American communities
across the state. However, African Americans
remain the only minority g roup represented
in Congress.
The Republican Party has also made g reat
strides in their fight for representation in
Congress. In 1960, there was only one
Republican congressman in the state ’ s delega-tion.
In the 1994 “ Republican Revolution”
election, Republicans became the majority in
the delegation by winning eight of the 12
s e ats ( 67 percent). Fo l l owing the 2000 election,
seven Republicans now make up 58 percent
of the state’s delegation.
As rep re s e n t ation becomes gre ater for fe m a l e s,
b l a cks and Rep u b l i c a n s, incumbents continu e
to hold on to their seats. During the past 40
years, incumbents have won the majority of
seats in each election. In fact, there were six
elections — 1964, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1988 and
2000 — in wh i ch all incumbents re t a i n e d their
s e at. Only in the 1972, 1984 and 1994 elections
did the number of winning newcomers nearly
match the number of winning incumbents.
During two of these elections in which new-comers
nearly equaled incumbent winners,
there was a direct correlation between the
increase of Republican gains and new repre-s
e n t at ive s. In 1984, five newc o m e rs comprised
45 percent of the delegation. This is the same
year that President Ronald Reagan soundly
defeated challenger Walter Mondale, Senator
Jesse Helms won reelection over Governor Jim
Hunt’s challenge, and Republicans made
coattail gains by winning fi ve of the 11 con-gressional
seats. Ten years later during the
“ Republican Revolution” of 1994, only seven
incumbents held onto their seats, and
Republican representation jumped from
four to eight.
More change is afoot in the state ’ s congres-sional
delegation. New district lines and, if
Utah’s challenge is unsuccessful, an entirely
new district. Based on the trends of the past
four decades we can be sure of one thing —
no longer can white Democratic males
dominate the elections. Instead, women,
Republicans and minorities now have a
significant chance of winning. n
C o n gressional Delegation Incre a s i n gly Dive rse
Women, Blacks, Re p u blicans Make Gains
JONAT H A N TR I BU LA, SE N I O R PU B L I C PO L I C Y ANA LYS I S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
1960 ’ 62 ’ 64 ’ 66 ’ 68 ’ 70 ’ 72 ’ 74 ’ 76 ’ 78 ’ 80 ’ 82 ’ 84 ’ 86 ’ 88 ’ 90 ’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 2000 1960– 2000
BY PARTY:
#, Dem 11 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 7 9 6 8 8 7 8 4 6 5 5 162
%, Dem 92 82 82 73 73 73 82 82 82 82 64 82 55 73 73 64 67 33 50 42 42 69
#, Rep 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 5 3 3 4 4 8 6 7 7 75
%, Rep 8 18 18 27 27 27 18 18 18 18 36 18 45 27 27 36 33 67 50 58 58 31
BY GENDER:
#, Male 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 228
%, Male 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 83 83 83 83 96
#, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 9
%, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 17 17 17 17 4
BY RACE:
#, White 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 227
%, White 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 83 83 83 83 83 96
#, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 10
%, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 17 17 17 17 4
BY TENURE:
#, New 3 1 0 3 3 0 5 0 2 0 2 3 5 3 0 1 2 5 3 1 0 42
%, New 25 9 0 27 27 0 45 0 18 0 18 27 45 27 0 9 17 42 25 8 0 18
#, Incumbent 9 10 11 8 8 11 6 11 9 11 9 8 6 8 11 0 10 7 9 11 12 185
%, Incumbent 75 91 100 73 73 100 55 100 82 100 82 73 55 73 100 91 83 58 75 92 100 82
Trends in Congressional Demographics: 1960– 2000
During the past four decades, the number of
major party voters in cong ressional elections
has increased greatly, as would be expected in
a rapidly growing state. In 2000, 2.708 million
votes we re cast for congressional candidates in
the general election compared to the 1.185 mil-lion
votes cast in those elections in 1960 — an
increase of 128 percent. i In fact, the growth in
numbers of voters outpaced the growth in
actual population. The 1960 census counted
4.556 million people in North Carolina, which
has grown to 8.049 million people in the 2000
census — an increase of 77 percent.
Population growth is only one factor in the
i n c reasing number of vo t e rs in North Caro l i n a .
Included in any list of factors has to be the
opening of the electoral system to those who
had been excluded in the past. The Civil
Rights revolution, with the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
opened the voting booth doors for blacks to
become part of the electorate. The Vietnam
War and the 26th Amendment to the U. S .
Constitution, ratified in 1971, opened the
doors to those between 18 and 21.
The increase in partisan competition o ver the
40- year period was also a very important
factor. In the first three elections of the 1960s
Democratic voters outnumbered Republicans
by a 3- to- 2 ratio. In the most recent four
elections this has switched to a 1.25- to- 1
Republican voting edge. Between 1960 and
2000, the number of D e m o c r atic congre s s i o n a l
votes increased by 64 percent, while the
number of Republican congressional votes
increased by 230 percent. This shift in voting
support translated from a 6- to- 1 Democratic
c o n gressional seat winning ratio in those thre e
early 1960 races to a 1.4- to- 1 Republican con-gressional
seat winning ratio in the four most
recent elections. The table “ Congressional
Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000” demonstrates
the consistent erosion of the Democratic
control over these elections.
This Republican voting growth had to over-come
a depression in GOP turnout following
the Watergate scandal, reflected in the results
of the 1974, 1976 and 1978 elections. After
increasing their success ratio in the 1968 to
1972 elections to only a 1.8- to- 1 Democratic
advantage, Republicans saw those mid- 1970s
races elevate the Democratic success ratio to a
4.5- to- 1 high. Since the 1978 elections, the
Republican vote has been growing steadily.
T h e re are also some interesting pat t e rns hidd e n
in this 21 elections N. C. congressional voting
history. These patterns are tied to the differing
length of terms of elected officials. While two-year
term Congressional elections occur in
every even- numbered year [ 21 elections], the
four- year term presidential and gubernatorial
elections occur in every other e ven year [ 11
elections], and the six- year terms of the two
U. S. senators bring those statewide races into
these elections about two- thirds of the time
[ 14 elections].
Voter Tu rnout Grow i n g
Faster Than Po p u l at i o n
Re fo rm s, Pa rt i s a n s h i p, Big Races
Bring More People to Po l l s
TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L,
A N D JO H N BR A N C H, SE N I O R HI S TO RY MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POL ITIC S , MEDIA 1 0 AND PUBLIC LI FE
Votes ( thousands) % of Vote Seats Won Uncontested
Year Dem Rep Total Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep
1960 726 459 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0
1962 482 336 819 59 41 9 2 3 0
1964 788 511 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0
1966 484 432 916 53 47 8 3 2 0
1968 765 633 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1
1970 514 411 925 56 44 7 4 1 0
1972 735 610 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0
1974 638 348 986 65 35 9 2 3 0
1976 1,011 549 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0
1978 607 405 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1
1980 964 769 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0
1982 708 580 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0
1984 1,131 1,026 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0
1986 890 682 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0
1988 1,108 876 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0
1990 1,076 935 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0
1992 1,282 1,204 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0
1994 681 907 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1
1996 1,136 1,340 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0
1998 827 1,014 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2
2000 1,194 1,515 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2
KEY: Uncontested = number ofseats won in uncontested races
SOURCE: State Board ofElections
N. C. Congressional Voting Trends, 1960– 2000
›
There are four distinct patterns involved in
these elections: Pattern A is when there are
presidential, gubernatorial and U. S. senatorial
elections held at the same time as the con-gressional
elections. This has happened se ven
times since 1960. Pattern B, which has
happened three times, is when there ar e
presidential and gubernatorial elections being
held at the same time. P attern C, which has
happened seven times, is when there is just a
U. S. Senate race being held at the same time.
Pattern D, which has happened three times, is
when there are no major statewide elections
being held at the same time .
As can be seen in the table “ Patterns in N. C.
C o n gressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000,” the gre at e s t
turnout occurs when there are se veral impor-tant
statewide elections occurring at the same
time. Patterns C and D have had considerably
lower turnouts over the period. Voting in
elections when Jim Hunt was on the ballot
averaged 1.960 million voter s, while voting in
elections when Jesse Helms was on the ballot
averaged 1.800 million voters. ii The average
turnout during the past 40 years has been
1.585 million for all elections .
The 1994 Pattern D congressional elections, in
wh i ch the “ Republican Revolution” took place,
exemplified the impact of low turnout in a
volatile political atmosphere. The 1994 con-gressional
vote was the lowest since 1986 and
fell nearly 47 percent below the cong ressional
vote of 1992.
The upcoming 2002 congressional elections
will be a Pat t e rn C election. The only stat ew i d e
race will be for the U. S. Senate seat cur rently
held by Jesse Helms. With Helms retiring ,
there will be considerable statewide political
action, as an open seat race creates interest -
ing primaries in addition to a general election
with no incumbent run-ning.
There has not been
an open Senate seat race in
the state since 1974 when
Sam Ervin retired. The
upcoming race has already
attracted national media
interested in whether the
Democrats can keep their
tenuous hold on the U. S.
Senate, and the potential
for an ideological shift in
the Senate delegation.
This year’s redistricting
could also affect turnout in
2002. Will the new district
lines be “ incumbent friendly ”
and therefore not very con-troversial,
leading to some
rather uninteresting races?
Or will the new lines set up
some battle grounds that
may lead to some ver y
heated and controversial
races? And if North
Carolina fends off the
Utah challenge over which
state gains the additional
seat, will that 13th District
race between relative
newcomers to the congres-sional
scene attract or deter
voters from going to the
voting booth? n
i In the 2000 elections, there
were two seats not contested
by a Democratic candidate. If there had been
a Democratic candidate, the increase in the
number voting in the 2000 elections would
have been even greater vis- a- vis the 1960 vote ,
and the growth in the number of Democratic
votes would have also been g reater. n
ii Hunt ran for lieutenant governor in 1972,
governor in 1976, 1980, 1992 and 1996, and
for U. S. Senator in 1984. He won all but the
1984 race. Helms ran for a U. S. Senate seat in
1972, 1978, 1984, 1990 and 1996, and was
successful each time.
Party Voting Seats Uncon.
Votes Dem. Rep. D R D R
( thousands) % % # # # #
Pattern A: President, U. S. Senate, Governor Races [ 7]
1960 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0
1968 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1
1972a 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0
1980b 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0
1984a 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0
1992b 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0
1996a 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0
Avg. 1,826 54 46
% Change + 109 - 25 + 38
Pattern B: President and Governor Races [ 4]
1964 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0
1976b 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0
1988 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0
2000 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2
Avg. 1,888 57 44
% Change + 108 - 28 + 44
Pattern C: U. S. Senate Race [ 7]
1962 819 59 41 9 2 3 0
1966 916 53 47 8 3 2 0
1974 986 65 35 9 2 3 0
1978c 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1
1986 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0
1990c 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0
1998 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2
Avg. 1,308 56 44
% Change + 125 - 24 + 34
Pattern D: No Major Statewide Races [ 3]
1970 925 56 44 7 4 1 0
1982 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0
1994 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1
Avg. 1,267 51 49
% Change + 72 - 23 + 30
NOTES
Avg. – Average vote for that pattern ofraces over the period
% Change – percent change in totals from earliest to the most recent race in the pattern
Party Voting – % of2- party vote that was Democratic/ Republican
Seats – Number ofCongressional seats won by Democrats/ Republicans
Uncon. – Number ofuncontested races won by Democrats/ Republicans
a – Helms and Hunt in statewide races
b – Hunt in a statewide race
c – Helms in a statewide race
Pat t e rns in N. C. Congressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000
Decade Dem Rep Total D to R Ratio
1960– 68 43 12 55 3.6 to 1
1970– 78 41 14 55 2.9 to 1
1980– 88 38 17 55 2.2 to 1
1990– 98 30 29 59 1 to 1
2000 5 7 12 1 to 1.4
Total 157 79 236 2 to 1
Congressional Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000
An open seat Senate race
creates interesting
primaries, attracts national
media interested in
whether the Democrats
can keep their tenuous
hold on the U. S. Senate,
and holds the potential for
an ideological shift in the
state’s Senate delegation.
John McCain’s presidential campaign demon-strated
that being independent from your
political party could be the centerpiece of a
fairly successful national campaign. But in
c o n gressional districts dominated by one part y
or the other, independence can be seen as
disloyalty — and punished. In North Carolina,
most congressional delegates voted with their
party most of the time, but Republicans
showed more loyalty than Democrats during
the 1999– 2000 session.
The Congressional Quarterly rankings of the
state’s representatives reveal some surprises,
h oweve r. President Clinton did not re c e ive total
support from the North Carolina delegation,
even from his fellow Democrats. Mel Watt
( 12th) was Clinton’s strongest supporter from
the state. He voted with the president 82 per-cent
of the time. Bob Etheridge ( 2nd) vo t e d
with the president 65 percent of the time. Mike
McIntyre ( 7th) supported the president only 40
percent of the time.
The average presidential support rating of the
Democrats in the North Carolina dele gation
was nearly 70 percent, just
below the national
Democratic average of 73
percent. This differe n c e
highlights the fact that
S o u t h e rn Democrat s are
more conservative than
Democrats as a whole and
a re more like ly to oppose
the liberal plans of party
members.
None of the seven
Republicans the
state sent to Congress
broke ranks as often as
some Democrats did. The
highest support rating for
Clinton came from Sue
Myrick ( 9th) at 26 percent.
Two members tied for the
lowest, at 19 percent. The
gap between high and low
was much smaller than on
the Democratic side. O u t
o f eve ry five votes cast by
N. C. Rep u b l i c a n s, four
were in opposition to
Clinton.
N o rth Carolina Democrats we re also mu ch more
likely to go against their fellow Democrats in
Congress. McIntyre voted against the party 39
percent of the time. Etheridge, the next most
i n d ependent, bucked the party line 16 perc e n t
of the time. Both were reelected, despite what
some might consider damaging disloyalty to
the party. The average party opposition rating
for the North Carolina dele gation was nearly
16 percent, although McIntyre’s nu m b e rs skew
the average somewhat. Without McIntyre, the
North Carolina Democrats voted the party line
more than 90 percent of the time. Rega rd l e s s,
most of the Democratic delegat i o n supported
their party colleagues most of the time.
The Republicans delegates were much more
loyal to the GOP than their colleagues on the
other side of the aisle. Only one, Robin Hayes
( 8th), voted with the Democrats more than 8
percent of the time, and he buc ked the party
line only 11 percent of the time, voting with
the Republican party on nearly 9 of 10 votes.
On average, the GOP delegates from North
Carolina voted with the party more than 93
percent of the time, ignoring the party ’ s lead
on only 6.4 percent of the votes.
All but one of the members had voting partic-ipation
rates in the House of more than 90
percent, and all but two of the delegates had
participation rate scores between 96 and 99
percent. Charles Taylor ( 11th), required by a
very competitive reelection battle to spend
more time at home, had a voting rate of 91
percent — still good compared to Sue Myrick,
who voted only 86 percent of the time. Her
reelection campaign was by no means heated
— she won by more than 30 points and sits in
a safe Republican district. Most rep re s e n t at ive s
have made an effort to keep their voting rates
high ever since it became a campaign issue in
the mid- 1970s. Myrick’s low voting rate could
be somewhat of a liability in 2002.
These voting rates and analyses confirm again
that presidential support and party unity,
especially on the Democratic side, are not
important issues that representatives from
North Carolina consider in their votes. Nor, it
appears, are these two scores important to
the voters of North Carolina when choosing
their representatives. n
GOP Delegates More Loyal
To Pa rty Than Democrat s
EVA N SAU DA, SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 1 2 AND PUBLIC LIFE
Clinton Administration Party Majority Voting
Dist. Rep. ( Party) Sup. Opp. Sup. Opp. Partic.
1st Clayton ( D) 79 21 93 7 97
2nd Etheridge ( D) 65 35 84 16 99
3rd Jones ( R) 19 81 92 8 97
4th Price ( D) 80 20 90 10 97
5th Burr ( R) 22 78 92 8 96
6th Coble ( R) 21 79 96 4 96
7th McIntyre ( D) 40 60 61 39 96
8th Hayes ( R) 19 81 89 11 99
9th Myrick ( R) 26 74 96 4 86
10th Ballenger ( R) 23 77 96 4 96
11th Taylor ( R) 21 79 94 6 91
12th Watt ( D) 82 18 94 6 97
Clinton Administration Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 69 relevant House votes in which the
legislator was present and either supported or opposed the position ofthe Clinton
administration.
Party Majority Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 259 House votes in which the legislator was
present and supported or opposed a majority ofhis or her party.
Voting Partic.: Percent ofthe 600 House votes in which the legislator voted.
SOURCE: “ Vote Studies,” CQ Weekly ( January 6, 2001): 52 – 74.
Congressional Quarterly’s Voting Analysis of
NC’s 2000 Congressional Delegation
how many members of a minority they must
put in a district in order for them to have a
fair chance of electing the representative of
their choice.
The ( George H. W.) Bush and Clinton Justice
Departments told state legislatures that they
must consider race when drawing districts ,
but the U. S. Supreme Court also said they
can't consider race too much. During the last
decade, judges and statisticians have joined
legislators in the redistricting process so that
almost all of the national conversation about
the topic is focused on which mathematical
mode will make the best defense in court. A
leading vendor of redistricting software mar-kets
it as a " litigation support" tool that can
help lawmakers use census and other data to
prove that they weren't thinking about race
too little or too much.
Despite the legal wrangling of the last 10
years, North Carolina’s congressional districts
became predictable, reelecting in 2000 a
record number of incumbents. Politicians –
especially incumbents – like this certainty. In
the past, lawmakers could assuredly play b y
the first rule of redistricting – protect incum-bents.
However, legislators will bear little responsi-bility
for the electoral districts the state finally
ends up with. When they finish their impossi-ble
task, lawsuits will ensue.
With better data about “ communities of inter-est”
that aren’t based on race, legislators per -
haps could more confidently defend at least
one of their two competing goals. But e ven
with better information, few lawmakers have
professional backgrounds in the type of data
modeling needed to crunch the numbers. So
the process still ends up in the hands of com-puter
analysts whose names ne ver appear on
a ballot.
The political process is just the first round of
redistricting. Regardless of how many votes
have been taken or how many le gal decisions
have been handed down, North Carolinians
can be certain that more lawsuits lie ahead
— until the next round of political numbers
are handed down. n
› R E D I S T R I C T I N G F ROM PAGE 1
Dist# Incumbent 2000 Pop Ideal Pop Ideal +/- Ideal Ideal Pop Ideal +/-
13 Seats 13 Seats +/- % 12 Seats 12 Seats %
1st Clayton, D 587,830 619,178 - 31,348 - 5.1 670,776 - 51,598 - 7.7
2nd Etheridge, D 730,266 619,178 111,088 17.9 670,776 59,490 8.9
3rd Jones, R 615,614 619,178 - 3,564 - 0.6 670,776 - 55,162 - 8.2
4th Price, D 765,876 619,178 146,698 23.7 670,776 95,100 14.7
5th Burr, R 637,158 619,178 17,980 2.9 670,776 - 33,618 - 5.0
6th Coble, R 689,529 619,178 70,351 11.4 670,776 18,753 2.8
7th McIntyre, D 690,054 619,178 70,876 11.5 670,776 19,278 2.9
8th Hayes, R 661,112 619,178 41,934 6.8 670,776 - 9,664 - 1.4
9th Myrick, R 693,042 619,178 73,864 11.9 670,776 22,266 3.3
10th Ballenger, R 655,413 619,178 36,235 5.6 670,776 - 15,363 - 2.3
11th Taylor, R 656,619 619,178 37,441 6.1 670,776 - 14,157 - 2.1
12th Watt, D 666,800 619,178 47,622 7.7 670,776 - 3,976 - 0.6
13th ———— - 0- 619,178 - 619,178 —— ——— ——— ——
NOTES:
Ideal Pop — the total population ofthe state divided by 13 seats or 12 seats to get equal representation.
Ideal +/- — the dif ference between the ideal and actual population for the district
Ideal +/- % — the percent that the actual population deviates from the ideal population
SOURCE: www. ncleg/ redistricting/ 2000BaseMapRpt
N. C. Congressional Districts: Ideal vs. Actual Populations
13 District Scenario
Incumbent District +/-%
Price, D 4th + 23.7
Etheridge, D 2nd + 17.9
Myrick, R 9th + 11.9
McIntyre, D 7th + 11.5
Coble, R 6th + 11.4
Watt, D 12th + 7.7
Hayes, R 8th + 6.8
Taylor, R 11th + 6.1
Ballenger, R 10th + 5.9
Burr, R 5th + 2.9
Jones, R 3rd - 0.6
Clayton, D 1st - 5.1
12 District Scenario
Incumbent District +/-%
Price, D 4th + 14.7
Etheridge, D 2nd + 8.9
Myrick, R 9th + 3.3
McIntyre, D 7th + 2.9
Coble, R 6th + 2.8
Watt, D 12th - 0.6
Hayes, R 8th - 1.4
Taylor, R 11th - 2.1
Ballenger, R 10th - 2.3
Burr, R 5th - 5.0
Clayton, D 1st - 7.7
Jones, R 3rd - 8.2
The Impact of Two District Scenarios
N C
DATA N
E T
N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 4 A AND PUBL IC L IFE
ed the Bushes in 1992 and 2000, but backed
Bill Clinton in 1996.
Rep. Charles Taylor ( R- 11) has comfortably
retained his seat in each of the five elections
since he initially won the seat from incumbent
Democrat James Clarke in 1990. The district ’ s
voters decisively favored the Republican can-didate
for congress over the past decade but
did not decisively favor Republican candidates
for president until 2000, when George W. Bush
made off with 59 percent of the district’s vo t e s.
Voters slightly favored Clinton in 1992 before
slightly favoring Dole four years later.
Over the past 10 years North Carolina has
moved clearly in the direction of supporting
Republican candidates for president. In 2000,
George W. Bush took the state with 56 percent
o f the vote and won in nine of the 12 districts.
The only districts he failed to carry were the
1st and 12th – safe Democrat districts – and
the 4th, a district in which voters cast a bare
majority of their votes for Al Gore. The state’s
s u p p o rt for Republican presidential candidat e s
has been widely dispersed unlike its support fo r
D e m o c r at s, wh i ch is ge o gr ap h i c a l ly concentrat e d .
The Republicans hold the majority of the stat e’s
s e ats in Congre s s, but the five Democrats in the
delegation were all reelected by convincing
margins last year. Both parties have “ s a fe ”
s e ats that are almost guaranteed victories, but
the Republicans find safety in more districts
than do the Democrat s. The state has continu e d
to lean slightly towa rd Republicans in congre s-sional
races since the 1994 shift fro m support
of Democratic to GOP candidates. n
Avg Avg
Congressional Race Scores Score Incumbent, Party ( County) Presidential Race Scoresd Score
Dist # 92a 94a 96a 98b 00c 92– 00 92 96 00 92– 00
1st 1 1 1 1 1 1 Eva Clayton, D ( Warren) 1 1 1 1
2nd 2 4 2 2 2 2.4 Bob Etheridge, D ( Harnett) 4 2 4 3.3
3rd 2 4 5 5 5 4.2 Walter Jones, R ( Pitt) 4 4 5 4.3
4th 1 3R 2 2 1 1.5 David Price, D ( Orange) 2 3D 3D 2.7
5th 2 4 5 5 5u 4.2 Richard Burr, R ( Forsyth) 3R 4 5 4
6th 5 5u 5 5u 5u 5 Howard Coble, R ( Guilford) 5 5 5 5
7th 2 3D 3D 1u 1 2 Mike McIntyre, D ( Cumberland) 3D 4 4 3.7
8th 2 3D 2 3R 4 2.8 Robin Hayes, R ( Cabarrus) 3R 4 4 3.7
9th 5 5 5 5 5 5 Sue Myrick, R ( Mecklenburg) 5 5 5 5
10th 5 5 5 5u 5 5 Cass Ballenger, R ( Lenoir) 5 5 5 5
11th 4 5 4 4 4 4.2 Charles Taylor, R ( Buncombe) 3D 3R 5 3.7
12th 1 1 1 2 1 1.2 Mel Watt, D ( Mecklenburg) 1 1 2 1.3
Avgs 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 3.6
KEY
COMPETITIVENESS SCORES: 1 = Strong Dem. 58.6%+; 2 = Leaning Dem. 52.6%– 58.5%: 3 = Toss- up 47.5%– 52.5%; 4 = Leaning Rep. 52.6%– 58.5%;
5 = Strong Rep. 58.5+; u = unopposed. For districts with results within the toss- up range, the party ofthe winner is indicated ( D, R) for the con-gressional
races and by the winner in the presidential race in the district.
a Elections conducted under the 1991 Redistricting Plan; b Elections conducted under the 1998 Redistricting Plan; c Elections conducted under the
1997 Redistricting Plan; d Presidential- race scores calculated only from votes for the two major- party candidates.
Competitiveness in the N. C. Congressional Districts, 1992– 2000
District Candidate, Party # of Votes % of Point
Total Spread
5th * Richard Burr, R 172,489 93u + 86 R
Steven LeBoeuf, Lib 13,366 7
6th * Howard Coble, R 195,727 91u + 82 R
Jeffrey Bentley, Lib 18,726 9
9th * Sue Myrick, R 181,161 69 + 39 R
Ed McGuire, D 79,382 30
10th * T. Cass Ballenger, R 164,182 68 + 39 R
Delmas Parker, D 70,877 29
3rd * Walter B. Jones Jr., R 121,940 61 + 24 R
Leigh McNairy, D 74,058 37
11th * Charles H. Taylor, R 146,677 55 + 13 R
Sam Neill, D 112,234 42
8th * Robin Hayes, R 111,950 55 + 11 R
Mike Taylor, D 89,505 44
2nd * Bob Etheridge, D 146,733 58 + 17 D
Doug Haynes, R 103,011 41
4th * David Price, D 200,885 62 + 25 D
Jess Ward, R 119,412 37
12th * Mel Watt, D 135,570 65 + 32 D
Chad Mitchell, R 69,596 33
1st * Eva Clayton, D 124,171 66 + 33 D
Duane Kratzer Jr., R 62,198 33
7th * Mike McIntyre, D 160,185 70 + 41 D
James R. Adams, R 66,463 29
KEY: D - Democrat; Lib - Libertarian; R - Republican; u - unopposed by
a major- party challenger; * - incumbent.
2000 Election Results, from
Most Republican to Most Democratic
› I N C U M B E N T S F ROM PAGE 2
teristics.
The data that follow help sketch the electoral
landscape for the 2002 Democratic and
Republican primaries.
In modern North Carolina politics, primar y
turnout has plummeted to only a fraction of
general- election turnout. Many voters in
North Carolina – and elsewhere in the South
– stand aside during the primaries and wait
to vote in the general election.
In 1998, for example, there were both
Democratic and Republican Senate primaries,
combining to bring out 805,319 voter s. The
general election – Democrat John Edwards vs.
Republican Lauch Faircloth – attracted 1.97
million voters. The primary turnout amount-ed
to only 40 percent of the general- election
turnout.
Candidates in Democratic primaries must
chase more voters than Republican candi-dates.
Registered Democrats out- number reg-istered
Republicans, 2.55 million to 1.74 mil-lion.
In addition, more people turn out for
Democratic primaries than for Republican
primaries. Two years ago, the Democratic
gubernatorial primary attracted 553,794 vot -
ers, the Republican primary 312,529. ( The
2000 general election turnout totaled 2.9 mil-lion
North Carolina voters.)
Under state law, a candidate can win a
party’s nomination in the first primary with
40 percent of the vote. Assuming a turnout of
310,000 voters in a GOP primar y, a
Republican Senate candidate could win with
as few as 124,000 votes. Assuming a
Democratic turnout of 550,000, it would take
220,000 votes for victory. Clearly, primaries
put a premium on candidates’ tar geting of
activist and regular- voting partisans.
While Democrats still out- number
Republicans as primary voter s, GOP primary
turnout has risen over the past 30 years and
Democratic turnout has fallen dramatically.
Democratic primary turnout peaked at
955,799 in 1984, and then dropped to
540,031 in 1998. Meanwhile, GOP primar y
turnout rose from barely 100,000 in 1972 to
more than 312,000 in 2000.
Geographically, Republican primary voter s
are somewhat more concentrated than
Democratic voters. The top 14 counties in
GOP registration contain more than half of
potential GOP voters. It takes 16 counties to
reach 50 percent of the Democratic regis-tered
voters. ( See chart)
Under North Carolina election rules, the
Republican and Democratic parties may per -
mit unaffiliated voters to participate in their
primaries, as both parties did in 1998.
An unaffiliated voter can choose to cast a bal-lot
in one primar y, but not both.
Because 2002 is not a presidential election
year, it will almost certainly have a lower
voter turnout, in both primaries and the gen-eral
election, than 2000. So- called off- year
elections typically have lower turnouts than
presidential- election years. Also, if the Senate
primary in either party results in a runoff, the
turnout for the runoff will surely be lower
than in the first primar y. n
Editor’s Note: Owen Covington, a master’s stu-dent
in the UNC School of Journalism and
Mass Communication, contributed to this arti -
cle and to the accompanying chart.
Further examination of Helms’s career can be
found on our Web site at www. southnow. org.
Look for more analysis of southern Senate
races in the forthcoming issue of SouthNow..
› P R I M A R I E S F ROM PAGE 16
Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple
appearances, and NRA president and actor
Charlton Heston spoke at rallies in Concord
and Albemarle on Hayes’s behalf. The NRA
had contributed $ 7,450 to Hayes in 1998. The
day before the 2000 election, John McCain
stumped for Hayes in Richmond County.
In the end, Haye s ’ s incumbency pro b ab ly
m a d e the difference in 2000. Campaigning
on his re c o rd of l o o king out for the district,
H ayes also benefited from Taylor’s inability to
distinguish himself from his opponent. The
candidates had similar views on many issues,
such as Taylor’s opposition to abortion. Their
TV ads attacked each other’s stances on issues
like prescription drugs and taxes, but issues
were lost amid the spectacle of visits from
major political players. Helms, Hastert,
Heston and McCain overshadowed Gephardt
and Bonior.
Just as in 1998, Taylor won a majority of the
counties. However, Hayes made major gains
in most counties, picking up one more than
in 1998 and coming within a percentage
point of winning Richmond, which gave him
only 38.9 percent in 1998. In almost every
county, Hayes garnered more new voters
than Taylor. Once again, Hayes dominated the
t wo largest counties in the district, industrial-ized
Cabarrus and Union counties. The supe -
rior resources and incumbent status of Hayes
trumped the energized Democratic effort for
Taylor. n
› 8TH DI STRICT F ROM PAGE 6
wanted to empower Americans to help them-selves.
In the year 2000, Clayton and Watt once
again were victorious. Clayton won handily
over K r atzer by 33 points ( 66 percent to 33 per-c
e n t ) , while Watt easily defe ated Mitchell by 32
p o i n t s ( 65 percent to 33 percent).
Being the first North Carolina African- Americans
elected to Congress in this century, they had
a great deal of pressure to perform excellent-ly.
Despite the challenges by other candidates,
the constant law suits and court decisions
against the N. C. district plans, and the con-stantly
changing redistricting plans, Clayton
and Watt have proved to be worthy of their
positions. They won with the support of
white as well as African- American voter s,
especially in their last two races. They also
d e m o n s t r at e d how important incumbency is
to a candidate, thus proving that knowledge
and experience are important in getting re-elected.
The N. C General Assembly will use the data
from the 2000 census to reconfigure the lines
for the stat e’s congressional districts beg i n n i n g
in 2001.
This will be the fo u rth plan in 10 ye a rs, due to
the court challenges faced by the 12th
District. The new lines may provide more cl a r i-t
y as to who belongs in each district. While
this could affect who will hold wh i ch congre s-s
i o n a l seats, incumbents Clayton and Watt
may well be able to maintain their seats in
the 2002 elections under the new redistrict-ing
plan. n
› AFRICAN AMERICANS F ROM PAGE 8
With Sen. Jesse Helms having decided not to
seek re- election, North Carolina has in store
competitive contests for both the Democratic
and Republican nominations for the U. S.
Senate seat in 2002.
In the days of the one- party South, the winner
of the Democratic primary was practically
assured of victory in the general election.
Naturally, voters who wanted to make a dif-ference
turned out for the primary. But since
the rise of the two- party South, North Carolina
has increasingly come to have two different
kinds of elections, primary elections and gen -
eral elections with distinctly dif ferent charac-
Pa rties’ Paths to the Helms Seat
FE R R E L GU I L LO RY, DI R E C TO R
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 6 A AND PUBL IC L IFE
Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life
School of Journalism and Mass Communications
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
CB # 3365
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC 27559– 3365
Non- Profit Organization
U. S. Postage
P A I D
Permit No. 177
Chapel Hill, NC
Democrats, by County
County Registered Turnout1
Mecklenburg 200,210 29,096
Wake 177,211 37,973
Guilford 144,413 30,745
Forsyth 97,834 22,712
Durham 97,819 22,072
Cumberland 87,363 17,586
Buncombe 69,118 11,593
Robeson 58,989 18,377
Orange 51,733 12,445
Gaston 50,654 7,492
New Hanover 50, 101 8,615
Pitt 46,100 11,290
Alamance 39,672 7,075
Davidson 36,508 5,841
Cabarrus 35,147 7,510
Nash 35,142 6,680
Sixteen counties account for 1,278,014 or 50.0 per-cent
of registered Democrats.
Republicans, by County
County Registered Turnout2
Mecklenburg 168,625 26,299
Wake 141,291 25,021
Guilford 96,826 19,592
Forsyth 77,823 12,993
Buncombe 46,687 7,459
New Hanover 46,121 8,051
Gaston 45,733 6,908
Cumberland 45,180 6,056
Davidson 43,380 6,353
Catawba 42,982 7,446
Randolph 38,217 5,646
Cabarrus 36,835 4,883
Durham 35,714 6,265
Rowan 35,415 6,272
Fourteen counties account for 900,829 or 51.7 per-cent
of registered Republicans.
Where the Primary Voters Are
NOTES:
1Average Democratic primary turnout in the 1996 senate, 1998 senate, and 2000 secretary ofstate race.
2Average Republican primary turnout in the 1992 Senate and 2000 gubernatorial races.
Sources: State Board ofElections; N. C. Carolina Manual, various years.
S E E P R I M A R I E S ON PAGE 15 ›

Program on Southern
Politics, Media and
Public Life
School of Journalism
and Mass
Communication
The University
of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill
O C T. 2001 • NUMBER 29
Thad Beyle
Editor & Associate Director
beyle@ email. unc. edu
Ryan Thornburg
Managing Editor & Assistant Director
thornburg@ unc. edu
Ferrel Guillory
Director
guillory@ unc. edu
NC DataNet is a quarterly publica-tion
of the Program on Southern
Politics, Media and Public Life in
the School of Journalism and Mass
Communication at The University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
To receive an electronic version
of future issues, send your name
and e- mail address to
SouthNow@ unc. edu.
To subscribe to a pritned version,
call ( 919) 843– 8174 or e- mail
SouthNow@ unc. edu.
2 Incumbent Wins Set Record
3 Without Serious Challengers,
Incumbents Still Spend Big
4 A Decade of Spending in N. C.
Congressional Races, 1992– 2000
5 2nd District: Etheridge
Stabilizes Swing District
6 8th District: Incumbency Turns
Tight Race Into Easy Win
7 11th District: Incumbency
Overcomes Scandal
8 1st & 12th Districts: Incumbents
Survive Changing Districts
9 Congressional Delegation
Increasingly Diverse
10 Voter Turnout Growing Faster
Than Population
12 GOP Delegates More Loyal To
Party Than Democrats
16 Parties’ Paths to Helms Seat
In This Issue
L eg i s l at ive Votes Just the Start
O f Long Redistricting Pro c e s s
RYA N TH O R N BU RG, AS S I S TA N T DI R E C TO R
Every 10 years, redrawing of the North Carolina
congressional map changes the manner in whic h
the state is represented in Washington. The highest
turnover of the decade occurs in the election after
the lines are redrawn. During the 1990s, redistrict-ing
helped elect the centur y’s first black representa-tives
from North Carolina and
helped increase Republican rep-resentation
on the state and fed -
eral levels.
The redistricting process of the
last decade brought not just new
representatives, but an entirely
new way of drawing congres-sional
districts. Legal wrangling
replaced backroom deals as the
primary tool used to draw North
Carolina’s political boundaries.
The minority- majority districts
drawn up for the 1992 elections
didn’t have their final court rul-ing
until this year. Already, the
state is in federal court fighting
Utah for an additional congressional seat that
would raise the state ’ s total to 13.
This issue of DataNet looks back at some voting ,
registration and demographic trends that shaped
the political personalities of North Carolina’s con-gressional
districts during the last decade. It is this
data that will form the starting point for discussions
about next decade’s district lines. The sophistica -
tion with which political data is collected and ana-lyzed
– in addition to the le gal quarrels – is one of
the primary reasons that judges and computers
crowded in on the politics of the redistricting
process.
There is so much dispute o ver the meaning of the
census numbers that federal judges will almost cer-tainly
be the final arbiters of district lines. These
court hearings will look very much like those dur-ing
the 2000 presidential election, with mathemati-cal
experts explaining theories and attorneys argu -
ing about the correct legal appli-cation
of those theories.
The burdens placed on the poor
souls who were forced to count
chads on national television
were nothing compared to those
state lawmakers will face in their
attempt to put voters into new
districts. Just as Florida counties
each used different standards to
count votes, the federal govern-ment
has handed down conflict-ing
standards on how states
must draw their districts without
reducing the voting power of
racial or political minorities.
The math of the redistricting process seems simple
- one person, one vote - but it's at the beginning of
a long problem about how to distribute democracy
fairly. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights
Act, which forced states, including North Carolina,
that had suppressed African- American voter
turnout to get approval for their congressional
maps from the U. S. Justice Department.
Because most Democrats and Republicans don't
vote for each other and because many whites still
don't vote for blacks, lawmakers struggle to divine
S E E R E D I S T R I C T I N G ON PAGE 13 ›
This issue of DataNet looks
back at some voting, regis-tration
and demographic
trends that shaped the
political personalities of
North Carolina’s congres-sional
districts during the
last decade.
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 2 A AND PUBL IC LI FE
Incumbent candidates met with success in each of
North Carolina’s 12 congressional districts in 2000.
The state had not returned an entire dele gation to
Capitol Hill since congressional veterans swept
North Carolina’s 11 districts in the 1988 elections.
Although neither 2000 nor 1988 saw a victorious
challenger, the 2000
election season was less
competitive than 1988.
In 2000, each of the 12
successful candidates
won at least 55 percent
of his or her district ’ s
vote. As the table on
page 14 indicates, nine
of the 12 districts saw
“ strong” victories last
year, meaning that the
winning candidate gar-nered
more than 58.6
percent of the vote.
There were no “ close”
races in which the win-ner
took less than 55
percent of the vote. In
1988, the last year in
which incumbents
swept, three seats were won with less than 53 per-cent
of the vote.
In looking over the last decade, it is notable that
the 1992 and 2000 elections shared a lack of close
r a c e s. Howeve r, wh e re only half o f the districts we re
won by strong victories in 1992, thre e - q u a rt e rs we re
won by strong victories in 2000.
The lack of competitiveness across the state is n o t
without consequence. Several of the stat e’s districts
have come to be considered “ safe” for either
Democrats or Republicans. The 1st and 12th dis-tricts,
created as minority- race districts following
the 1990 census, are considered “ safe” by virtue of
the strength with wh i ch they are held by Democrat s.
In 2000, Eva Clayton carried the 1st District with 66
percent of the vote, and Mel Watt took the 12th
District with 65 percent. Both Democratic cong res-sional
and presidential candidates have uniformly
posted convincing victories in both districts over the
last decade.
The 4th District, located in the Tr i a n gl e, also ge n e r a l-ly
favors the Democrats in congressional elections.
All the same, the Democrats’ “ safety” in the district
was challenged in 1994 when incumbent Democrat
David Price was unseated by Republican ch a l l e n ge r
Fred Heineman. Despite significant Republican
inroads, the 4th District is closest in fo l l owing the
1st and 12th districts in support for Democratic
presidential candidates. But Gore and Clinton victo -
ries in the district were quite narrow in the last two
presidential elections.
At both the congressional
and presidential levels,
the Republicans find
more safety in the Old
North State than do the
Democrats. The 6th, 9th
and 10th districts have all
been Republican strong-holds
over the last
decade, as Republican
candidates for both the
presidency and Congress
uniformly won at least
58.6 percent of the vote
in each of the three dis-tricts.
The 5th District has also
emerged as a Republican
bastion. Rep. R i ch a rd
B u rr ’ s landslide victory
over Demo c r atic ch a l l e n ger Mike Robinson in 1998
helped to discourage any opposition in 2000. The dis-trict
has add i t i o n a l ly show n i n c reased support fo r
Republican pre s i d e n t i a l candidates. Where the elder
George Bush edged out Bill Clinton with 52.6 perc e n t
o f the vote in 1992, Dole wo n by a comfortable mar-gin
in 1996, and George W. Bush took the district
from Al Gore by a 25- point margin in 2000.
Republican Walter Jones Jr. has solidified his base
of support in the 3rd District, winning with more
than 60 percent of the vote in each of his three
bids for reelection since taking the seat from
Democrat Martin Lancaster in 1992. Jones’ contin-ued
success over the last decade combined with
strong showings by Bush, Dole and Bush has given
the 3rd District a decidedly R epublican feel.
Democrat Bob Etheridge has tightened his grip on
his 2nd District seat, as has R epublican Robin Hayes
on his 8th District seat. Etheridge has carried his
district with an increasingly large percentage of the
vote in each of his last three tries for office. Hayes,
on the other hand, secured a full 55 percent of the
vote in 2000 after winning with only 50.7 percent in
1998. In presidential races, the 2nd District suppor t-
Incumbent Wins Set Re c o rd in
2000 Congressional Elections
CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
1st open * * * *
2nd * open LOST * *
3rd * LOST * * *
4th * LOST LOST * *
5th * open * * *
6th * * * * *
7th * * open * *
8th * * * open *
9th * open * * *
10th * * * * *
11th * * * * *
12th open * * * *
LOST - incumbent lost 4 ( 7%)
Open - no incumbent running 7 ( 12%)
* - incumbent ran and won 49 ( 82%)
Total races 60
Success of Incumbents,
1992– 2000
S E E I N C U M B E N T S ON PAGE 14 ›
Despite the lack of competitiveness in North
Carolina’s 2000 congressional races, campaign
spending was nearly 18 percent higher than
in 1998, making it the most expensi ve set of
c o n gressional elections of the past decade. The
second most expensive congressional election
year was in the “ Republican Revolution” of
1994, when two Democratic incumbents wer e
unseated and three open seats filled.
The table “ Congressional Campaign Costs,
1992– 2000” details the expenditures of the
two major party candidates in each of the
past five congressional campaigns, including
primary and general elections. For purposes
of comparison, all dollar amounts for these
five sets of elections were converted to
November 2000- dollar equivalents using the
Consumer Price Index- Urban. i
The 2000 numbers indicate that challenger s
generally did not run big- ticket campaigns
last year, as incumbent spending accounted
for 73 percent of total expenditures during an
election season when six of the incumbent
winners actually spent less than they had in
1998. A clear exception to this was Democrat
Leigh Harvey McNairy’s ch a l l e n ge of Rep u b l i c a n
incumbent Walter Jones in the 3rd District.
McNairy, who spent $ 1.176 million, matched
Jo n e s ’ s spending ($ 1.267 million) almost dollar-for-
dollar, forcing the incumbent to spend
about double the amount he spent two year s
b e fo re. Despite losing the race by 24 perc e n t age
points, McNairy’s efforts did result in a 147
percent increase in the total cost of the race
for the district ’ s seat from 1998 to 2000.
The six representatives spending less on their
campaigns in 2000 than in their previous suc-cessful
bids for office were Eva Clayton ( D- 1),
Bob Etheridge ( D- 2), David Price ( D- 4), Richard
Burr ( R- 5), Howard Coble ( R- 6) and Mel Watt
( D- 12). Factoring out the unopposed victories of
B u rr and Coble, the four Democratic incumbents
ave r aged 27 percent margins of v i c t o ry, ranging
from Etheridge’s win by 17 points to Clayton’s
landslide 33 percent margin. Mike McIntyre
( D- 7) spent only 4 percent more in 2000 than in
1998. Cass Ballenger ( R- 10) increased spending
in 2000 by about 25 percent more than his
1998 expenditure level – but he still won by
40 points in 2000 after being unopposed in 1998.
O bv i o u s ly, continu e d big spending on the part
o f an incumbent in the absence of a leg i t i m at e
ch a l l e n ger still does its part to solidify a voter
base and deter future challengers.
Republican candidates outspent their Demo-c
r atic rivals by a 1.3- to- 1 spending ratio in 2000.
Republicans spent $ 7,573,174 to the Democrat s ’
$ 5,996,534. Pa rt of the reason Republicans spent
so mu ch was that two Republican incumbents,
Richard Burr in the 5th District and Howard
Coble in the 6th District, had no Democratic
o p p o n e n t s. If t h e re had been Democratic com-p
e t i t i o n and money in these two races the
m a rgin between the two parties spending leve l s
would have narrowed considerab ly. For ex a m p l e,
the 12 Republican candidates for the 12 seats
spent an ave r age of $ 631,098 per seat while the
10 Democratic candidates for the 10 seats
they contested average was $ 599,653.
Without Serious Challenge rs,
Incumbents Still Spend Big
CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
Total # ofGeneral $ Spent
District $ Spent Election Votes per Vote
8th 2,759,169 203,464 13.56
3rd 2,442,940 198,455 12.31
11th 2,910,673 266,377 10.93
2nd 1,248,193 251,838 4.96
Avg. 1,130,809 231,650 4.88
9th 1,096,896 264,220 4.15
1st 481,401 189,168 2.54
12th 481,401 209,144 2.30
5th 421,060 185,855 2.27
4th 727,485 325,870 2.23
7th 432,143 229,666 1.88
6th 301,790 215,085 1.40
10th 266,557 240,658 1.11
Total 13,569,708 2,779,800
SOURCES: Federal Election Commission; North Carolina
State Board ofElections
Congressional Campaign Costs:
2000 Primary & General
District 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Average
1st 691,264 509,709 368,281 713,415 481,401 552,814
Winner, % ii D 99% D 96% D 91% D 96% D 99% 96%
2nd 792,111 1,929,890 1,995,540 1,545,816 1,248,193 1,502,310
Winner, % D 72% R 44% D 41% D 76% D 73% 61%
3rd 973,718 1,665,920 712,244 987,408 2,442,940 1,356,446
Winner, % D 70% R 34% R 94% R 67% R 52% 63%
4th 566,413 1,103,931 2,425,272 1,785,821 727,485 1,321,784
Winner, % D 97% R 28% D 54% R 98% D 94% 74%
5th 875,588 1,762,592 996,688 621,050 421,060 935,396
Winner, % D 73% R 49% R 79% R 98% R 100% 80%
6th 574,337 411,949 599,383 426,331 301,790 462,758
Winner, % R 94% R 100% R 94% R 100% R 100% 98%
7th 337,411 1,073,132 928,679 416,471 432,143 637,567
Winner, % D 94% D 90% D 60% D 100% D 99% 89%
8th 872,145 1,162,139 797,624 1,688,926 2,759,169 1,456,001
Winner, % D 85% D 68% D 79% R 77% R 70% 76%
9th 331,549 878,947 689,382 796,717 1,096,896 758,698
Winner, % R 88% R 89% R 90% R 96% R 90% 91%
10th 374,770 260,019 296,207 213,895 266,557 282,290
Winner, % R 92% R 100% R 93% R 100% R 100% 97%
11th 2,040,307 1,885,675 596,549 1,242,399 2,910,673 1,735,121
Winner, % R 74% R 62% R 91% R 71% R 65% 73%
12th 624,658 315,041 174,834 1,085,947 481,401 536,376
Winner, % D 95% D 95% D 96% D 63% D 75% 85%
TOTAL 9,054,271 12,958,945 10,580,681 11,524,195 13,569,708 11,537,561
Winner, % 86% 60% 69% 79% 73% 73%
Avg. per seat 754,523 1,079,912 881,723 960,350 1,130,809 961,463
NOTES:
i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each ofthe years were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$
= 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541; 1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To convert these to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the
2000$ value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 ofthe 2000$; 1994$ = .852 ofthe 2000$; 1996$ = .886 ofthe 2000$; and 1998$ = .942 of
the 2000$.
ii Winner, % = party ofthe winning candidate and the percentage ofthe district total spent by the winner.
SOURCES: Almanac of American Politics; Federal Election Commission; the North Carolina Board ofElections
Congressional Campaign Costs, 1992– 2000 i
S E E S P E N D I N G ON PAGE 5 ›
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 4 AND PUBLIC L IFE
After the 2000 elections, we can now look at
the decade of spending in congressional races
following the 1990 U. S. census and the various
redistricting plans used in the period. Using the
same 2000- dollar equivalent data for those five
s ep a r ate elections we find the fo l l owing pat t e rn s :
• Between the 1992 and 2000 elections, the
cost of these five sets of 12 elections incre a s e d
by nearly 50 percent, from $ 9.054 million
in 1992 to $ 13.570 million in 2000. The
ave r age cost per seat moved from $ 755,000
in 1992 to $ 1.131 mil-lion
in 2000, with an
average cost per con-gressional
seat of
about $ 961,000 during
the decade.
• There are now five
“ million- dollar” con-gressional
seats in
North Carolina –
seats in which the
average cost of elec-tions
over the decade
was more than a
million dollars ( 2nd,
3rd, 4th, 8th and
11th), and nearly a
sixth ( 5th at
$ 935,396). There is
a “ three- quarter-million-
dollar” seat
( 9th), three “ half-million-
dollar” seats
( 1st, 7th, 12th), and
nearly a fourth ( 6th
at $ 462,758). The
final 10th seat has
been a “ quarter-million-
dollar” seat
with the incumbent
Cass Ballenger ( R)
winning each of the
five races.
• Money and winning
go hand- in- hand in
these races as the
winners of the
decade’s 60 races
outspent their
opponents by nearly
a 3- to- 1 ratio.
Incumbents espe-cially
benefit from this as was clear ly seen
in the 2000 elections when all races were
won by incumbents, and they outspent
their challengers by a 3- to- 1 ratio. And 13
of the 20 most expensive races over the
decade were won by incumbents.
• Wi n n e r ’ s spending has accounted for 73 per-c
e n t of the total spending in these 60 races.
The specific year range around that 73 per-cent
figure is instructive. The high point
was in 1992, when winners’ bank accounts
overwhelmed their opponents by making
86 percent of the campaign expenditures.
This was the year when e very candidate
faced the first newly drawn districts since
1981. The low point of 60 percent was in
1994, when there were three open seats
and two incumbents were defeated, so fi ve
of the 12 winners were not incumbents .
• T h e re has been a shift in the party spending
tied to the increasing Republican strength in
these races. In the 1992 elections, Democrat s
outspent their Republican competitors by a
3- to- 2 ratio, but in the 1994 elections the
D e m o c r atic adv a n t age dropped to a 1.3- to- 1
ratio. Then in 1996, the Republicans gained
the upper hand and outspent their Demo-cratic
competitors by a 3- to- 2 ratio. This
Republican advantage dropped off to a
1.1- to- 1 ratio in 1998 and then increased
slightly in 2000 to a 1.3- to- 1 ratio.
• Twenty of the 60 races cost more than $ 1 mil-l
i o n. They ranged from the $ 2.911 million
high in the 2000 8th District race to the
$ 1.073 million 1994 7th District race that
was Charlie Ro s e’s last hurrah. Several tre n d s
are visible. 1994 was a very expensive year
as seven of the 20 most expensive races
occurred then. The 1998 and 2000 elections
each had five $ 1 million- plus contests. The
2nd and 11th districts each had four of
their five contests in this high price level,
while the 4th and 8th districts had three
of their five there. The four races in which
an incumbent was defeated and three of
the six open seat races were also million-dollar-
plus specials. As already noted, 13 of
the 20 high- price races saw incumbents
win, some quite easily. Only two of these
races saw the winning margin in single
digits. The bottom line is money and
incumbents working together for the
future. n
A Decade of Spending in N. C.
C o n gressional Ra c e s, 1992– 2000
TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L, A N D
CO RY S. ME N E E S , SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R , UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
Rank Dist. Year Amount Type Outcome Pts
1 11th 2000 $ 2.911 In. Taylor- R reelected 12
2 8th 2000 $ 2.759 In. Hayes- R reelected 11
3 3rd 2000 $ 2.443 In. Jones- R reelected 24
4 4th 1996 $ 2.425 In. Heineman- R defeated 10
5 11th 1992 $ 2.040 In. Taylor- R reelected 10
6 2nd 1996 $ 1.996 In. Funderburk- R defeated 7
7 2nd 1994 $ 1.930 Open seat R won 12
8 11th 1994 $ 1.886 In. Taylor- R reelected 20
9 4th 1998 $ 1.786 In. Price- D reelected 15
10 5th 1994 $ 1.763 Open seat R won 14
11 8th 1998 $ 1.689 Open seat R won 3
12 3rd 1994 $ 1.666 In. Lancaster- D defeated 6
13 2nd 1998 $ 1.546 In. Etheridge- D reelected 15
14 2nd 2000 $ 1.248 In. Etheridge- D reelected 17
15 11th 1998 $ 1.242 In. Taylor- R reelected 15
16 8th 1994 $ 1.162 In. Hefner- D reelected 4
17 4th 1994 $ 1.104 In. Price- D defeated 0.8
18 9th 2000 $ 1.090 In. Myrick- R reelected 39
19 12th 1998 $ 1.086 In. Watt- D reelected 14
20 7th 1994 $ 1.073 In. Rose- D reelected 4
KEY:
Amount = cost ofcampaigns in 2000$ ( millions)
Type = In. – incumbent; Open – no incumbent in race
Pts. = point margin ofvictory or defeat
Most Expensive Congressional Elections, 1992– 2000
Year Dems. Reps.
% %
1992 60 40
1994 56 44
1996 40 60
1998 47 53
2000 44 56
K E Y: aThese perc e n t ages are of the two - p a rty spending
in the races. Third- party and independents’ spending
not included.
Partisan Spending in 1992–
2000 Congressional Races a
For the third time in a row, incumbent Bob
Etheridge won the 2nd Congressional District
in North Carolina. Although Etheridge is a
s t rong candidat e, the 2nd District has been
known to switch between Democrat and
Republican in any given year. Nationwide,
Democrats needed to win seven extra seats to
regain power in the U. S. House of
Representatives. Many closely watched the
race between Bob Etheridge and Doug
Haynes because any seat’s shift could a ffe c t
the congressional balance of p owe r. Wi t h the
state clearly favoring Bush, the Democrats
needed another way to gain support.
Bob Etheridge defeated Doug Haynes with 58
percent of the vote. Although new to the con-gressional
race, Doug Haynes still garnered 41
percent of the vote, showing the volatility of
the 2nd District voters. Haynes, a Republican
from Rocky Mount, attempted to link himself
to presidential candidate George W. Bush in a
m ove to use Bush’s popularity in North Caro l i n a
to gain support. He wanted to make funda-mental
ch a n ges in areas such as tax policy and
e d u c ation. He supported giving school districts
the power to spend money as they see fit.
Haynes told supporters that, in general, he
supported Bush’s policies and would push for
them in Congress; understanding the conserv-ativeness
of the 2nd District.
Haynes is a former John Locke Foundation
re s e a rcher who is known for his strong opinions
t h at he is not afraid to express. Soon after
winning the primary, Haynes challenged
Etheridge to a series of debates. He quickly
wanted to gain the support of the undecided.
He ch a l l e n ged Etheridge to speak on educat i o n ,
one of the main points of contention betwe e n
the two candidates.
In an early campaign ad, Haynes used Etheridge’s
stance on education against him. Haynes is
shown reading a quote from the News &
Observer where Etheridge had pushed for
Congress to assist in school renovation e ven
when the local area has rejected the bond
issue. Haynes stated that Etheridge belie ved
the voters were dumb and challenged the
voters to reject someone who did not believe
in their ability to think for themselve s. Hay n e s’
top priorities included moving power away
from Washington and into states, and creat-ing
a fairer tax code .
Bob Etheridge is a conserv at ive Democrat wh o
uses his beliefs to his advanta ge. In the past
three congressional elections, it has been dif -
ficult for a Republican to defe at him since many
o f his ideals are not too far from their own. The
fo rmer N. C. Superintendent of Public Instru c t i o n
strongly supports the reform of educa-tion.
In one television ad, he shows what
seems like a jail cell, but in reality it is a
trailer t h at has been at t a ched to an ove r-c
rowd e d s chool. He implores vo t e rs not to
let ch i ld ren continue to learn in these con-d
i t i o n s. Besides improving education,
Etheridge said he looked to help North
Carolina farmers, i m p rove safety and sup-p
o rt tech n o l o g i c a l advances.
With Gore’s popularity down in North
Carolina, Etheridge looked to separate
himself from the presidential candidate,
as did many Democratic candidates.
With Durham County removed from the
2nd District, many people felt a large base of
Democratic supporters for Etheridge had
been lost. Etheridge instead focused on the
m a ny undecided vo t e rs living in the 2nd District
who account for its voting unpre d i c t ab i l i t y. He
maintained contact with the strong Democrat i c
voters but pushed hard with mailings and
phone calls to win the votes of those who
were not sure. These independent voters were
m a i n ly white and in the middle- income range.
He looked to extend his presence in the com-munity
by participating in walks around
counties. Volunteers would hand out leaflets,
and Etheridge would meet and g reet con-stituents.
Etheridge’s top priorities include
improving education and protecting the
retirement security of the elderly.
In the 2000 election, voters in Wake and
Johnston Counties made up nearly 55 percent
of the district’s electorate — and the voters
there supported Etheridge. Wilson County,
with only 5 percent of the district’s voters,
was the strongest supporter for Haynes. With
the exception of Wilson County, Etheridge was
the victor in all other counties. The 2nd
District has always gone through periods of
change of political party leadership. In 1996,
Etheridge b e at incumbent Republican Dav i d
F u n d e r b u rk by less than 10,000 votes. His vic-tory
in 1998 was by nearly 44,000 votes.
In the 2000 election, perhaps the strangest part
of the campaign was the difference in money.
Etheridge raised approximately $ 1,030,216 to
Haynes $ 237,248. With a just over a fifth of
the incumbent’s budget, Haynes still manage d
to gain a sizeable amount of the vote; falling
s h o rt of E t h e r i d ge by 43,722 vo t e s. This should
send red flags to the Democrats that the wave
of support in the 2nd District may be coming
to an end. But the shape of the current 2nd
District is also coming to an end, which could
revive competition. n
2nd District: Etheridge Stablizes Swing District
JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
County Etheridge Jackson Haynes Totals
Dem. Lib. Rep. # %
Wake 61.8 1.1 37.2 95,482 37.9
Johnston 52.7 0.7 46.6 41,920 16.6
Nash 55.5 0.5 44.0 31,003 12.3
Harnett 59.6 0.7 39.6 24,455 9.7
Lee 59.1 1.0 40.0 16,054 6.4
Franklin 59.9 0.7 39.4 16,038 6.4
Wilson 48.9 0.5 50.6 10,997 4.4
Sampson 61.2 0.5 38.4 9,196 3.7
Granville 56.6 0.8 42.6 6,693 2.7
Totals 58.3 40.9 0.8 251,838 100.0
SOURCE: State Board ofElections
2nd District, by County
Total spending in the stat e’s three most ex p e n-s
ive 2000 congressional races topped $ 2 million
e a ch. The $ 2.911 million race in the 11th District
between incumbent Charles Taylor ( R) and
Sam Neill ( D) was the most expensive. Taylor
outspent Neill by a 1.8- to- 1 ratio and re t a i n e d
his seat with a 13- point margin. These two can-d
i d at e s spent $ 10.93 per vote in the general
election – yet that was less than the $ 13.56
spent per vote in the 8th District race and the
$ 12.31 spent per vote in the 3rd District race.
The 8th District race between Republican Ro b i n
H ayes and Democrat Mike Taylor was the second
most expensive race, costing $ 2,759,169 as
H ayes tried to ach i eve his first reelection. Haye s
outspent Taylor by nearly a 2.4- to- 1 ratio and
retained his seat by a 11- point margin. But as
just noted, the cost per vote in this race was the
most of any of the 12 races. The 3rd District
Jones- McNairy race also topped the $ 2 million
mark at $ 2,442,940, as the candidates spent
$ 12.31 per general election vote.
Two other races topped $ 1 million in cost last
year. In the 2nd District, incumbent Bob
E t h e r i d ge ( D) outspent ch a l l e n ger Doug Hay n e s
by a 3.2- to- 1 ratio while retaining his seat by a
17- point margin. In the 9th District, incum -
bent Republican Sue Myrick outspent chal-lenger
Edward McGuire by a 14- to- 1 ratio and
won reelection by 39 points. The ye a r ’ s barga i n
s e at belonged to incumbent Cass Ballenger ( R-
10), whose campaign spent only $ 266,557 to
win a 39- point margin race. n
i From the Consumer Price Index ( CPI- U) base of
1982– 84 = 1.00, the values for each of the years
were 1992$ = 1.403; 1994$ = 1.482; 1996$ = 1.541;
1998$ = 1.639; and 2000$ = 1.740. To con vert these
to 2000$, each year’s value was divided by the 2000$
value. Thus, 1992$ = .806 of the 2000$; 1994$ =
.852 of the 2000$; 1996$ = .886 of the 2000$; and
1998$ = .942 of the 2000$.
› S P E N D I N G F ROM PAGE 3
The 2000 congressional election in District 8
provided another entertaining contest, as te x-tile
heir Robin Hayes and attorney Mike Taylor
went toe- to- toe for a rematch of their 1998
race. The district has a history of conservative
voting and traditional politics. Democratic
c o n gressman Bill Hefner held the seat betwe e n
1974 and 1996, winning consecutive — and
sometimes close — elections.
In 1998, most analysts thought Ha yes, the
Republican nominee for gove rnor in 1996, wo u l d
easily defeat relative newcomer Mike Taylor
because of H aye s ’ s name recognition and mon-e
t a ry strength as heir to the Cannon Textile
Mills fortune. Many Democrats felt Taylor had
no ch a n c e, and the party gave little personal or
financial support to his campaign. Meanwhile,
Hayes outspent Taylor 3- to- 1 and benefited
from campaign visits from Newt Gingrich and
Dan Quayle. However, Taylor stunned the
experts by gaining 48 percent of the popular
vote; Hayes won by a mere 3,378 votes.
In 2000, both sides geared up for what was
expected to be a hotly contested race. The
two major factors that helped T aylor compete
in 1998 were still relevant in 2000. First, the
1998 redistricting plan mandated by the U. S.
Supreme Court increased overall Democratic
registration in the district two points to 69
p e rcent, and it increased the number of A f r i c a n
American vo t e rs from 21 percent to 25 perc e n t .
Second, higher turnout among Democrat s, and
particularly African Americans, was expected
yet again in such a hard fought contest.
The Democratic Party recognized that 2000
offered a prime opportunity to unseat Ha yes,
and it poured monetary and personal re s o u rc e s
into the district. Nationally known Democrats
s u ch as House Minority Leader Rich a rd Gep h a rd t
of Missouri and Minority Whip David Bonior
of Michigan appeared on behalf of Taylor. The
D e m o c r atic Congressional Campaign Committee
in Washington contributed more than $ 600,000
for Taylor’s effort. Taylor spent more than
$ 700,000 during his campaign. Republicans
countered by sending Speaker of the House
Dennis Hastert, former presidential candidate
John McCain, Sen. Jesse Helms and NRA presi-dent
Charlton Heston to the district. Hayes
spent more than $ 1.5 million in 2000. In 1998,
the candidates spent a total of $ 1.5 million, but
in 2000 they spent a combined $ 2.25 million.
Somewhat surprisingly, the 2000 election was
a bigger victory for Hayes, who won with 55
percent of the vote compared to his winning
with just 50.7 percent of the vote in 1998.
Voting turnout was considerably greater in the
2000 presidential year race [ 203,464 total vo t e s ]
than it was in the 1998 U. S. Senate year race
[ 133,124 total votes]. This was a 53 percent
increase of more 70,000 votes. So running at
the same time George W. Bush was winning the
state seemed to help Hayes in his successful
bid for reelection.
The competitive nature of the 8th District race
provided some interesting and occasionally
amusing moments. When Gephardt spoke in
Ja nu a ry to Cab a rrus County high school students
on behalf of Taylor, Hayes showed up at what
was supposed to be an all- Democratic event,
causing a stir and no small amount of t e n s i o n .
In Fe b ru a ry, a national TV ad from the American
D a i ry Association praised “ the power of ch e e s e ”
in an imagined campaign pitting fake presi-dential
candidates John Hayes and Peter
Taylor, as well as Bob Dole. The ad depicted
cheese- lover Peter Taylor as a hero and
cheese- hater John Hayes as a loser. Real- life
candidates Hayes and Taylor were amused by
the ad’s irony, but Hayes was disappointed
that Dole did the ad without considering its
connection to the 8th District.
While Gephardt visited in January and David
Bonior held a fund- raiser for T aylor in
October 1999, big- name Hayes supporters
dominated in 2000. In a rare campaign
appearance for a fellow Republican, Helms
appeared in Concord to rally support for
Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple
8th District: Incumbency Tu rn s
Tight Race Into Easy Wi n
ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 6 AND PUBLIC LIFE
County Taylor Schwartz Hayes Totals
Dem. Lib. Rep. # %
Cabarrus 31.7 1.2 67.1 49,847 24.5
Union 32.0 1.2 66.8 45,179 22.2
Cumberland 64.0 0.8 35.2 30,955 15.2
Stanly 36.2 0.9 63.0 22,453 11.0
Richmond 49.9 0.6 49.5 14,582 7.2
Scotland 62.0 0.5 37.5 9,131 4.5
Montgomery 47.6 0.7 51.7 8,985 4.4
Anson 62.0 0.5 37.5 7,975 3.9
Hoke 60.2 1.5 38.3 7,578 3.7
Robeson 53.7 0.8 45.5 6,779 3.3
Totals 44.0 1.0 55.0 203,464 100
SOURCE: State Board ofElections
8th District, by County
Year of
Seat Member, Party 1st Elec. Service
US Sen. Jesse Helms, R 1972 29th
6th CD Howard Coble, R 1984 17th
10th CD Cass Ballenger, R 1986 15th
4th CD David Price, D 1986 13th
11th CD Charles Taylor, R 1990 11th
1st CD Eva Clayton, D 1992 9th
12th CD Mel Watt, D 1992 9th
3rd CD Walter B. Jones Jr., R 1994 7th
5th CD Richard Burr, R 1994 7th
9th CD Sue Myrick, R 1994 7th
2nd CD Bob Etheridge, D 1996 5th
7th CD Mike McIntyre, D 1996 5th
US Sen. John Edwards, D 1998 3rd
8th CD Robin Hayes, R 1998 3rd
Total Years ofService 140
Total Republican Years ofService 96
Total Democratic Years ofService 44
Seniority in the N. C.
Congressional Delegation, 2001
S E E 8TH DI STRICT ON PAGE 15 ›
North Carolina’s 11th District was a hotly con-tested
race in 2000, as incumbent Rep re s e n t a-tive
Charles H. Taylor defeated Democrat Sam
Neill with 55 percent of the vote. The 11th
District, in the western part of the state,
includes Asheville and 15 mountain counties .
Neill challenged Taylor in what had been for
some time a “ safe” Republican district. But
because of his strong candidacy and allegat i o n s
surrounding Taylor’s financial dealings, Neill
was able to give Taylor serious contention.
The recent history of the 11th District is help -
ful in framing the e vents of the 2000 election.
Before the 1980s the district was, like most
Southern districts, safely Democratic. During
the Republicanization of the South in the
1980s, the district became a “ revolving door”
district, throwing out five of six incumbents in
elections held between 1980 and 1990. The
district became more of a Republican strong-hold
at the end of the decade, as voters sup-p
o rted Jim Gardner in the lieutenant gove rn o r ’ s
race in 1988 and Jesse Helms in the senatorial
campaign of 1990. Taylor, a businessman and
tree farmer from Brevard, came close to
unseating the incumbent in 1988 and suc -
ceeded in 1990.
During the 1990s, Taylor supported 98 perc e n t
of his party’s “ Contract with America” legisla -
tion and built an incredible reputation for
constituent service. Rather than leading on
the ideological front, Taylor represents local
interests effectively. He holds town meetings
at local courthouses and other locations,
where he gives residents a chance to tell him
about local issues. Taylor has a reputation as
a hard worker with a top- notch staf f and
maintains several regional offices throughout
his district. His most controversial stand is on
environmental protection, which he makes
very clear is not as important as preventing
job loss. This resonates well with the natives
in the 11th District. Party leaders value his
loyalty and have rewarded him with a seat on
the Appropriations Committee and the chair-manship
of the District of Columbia Finance
Committee. While Taylor lost some g round in
the elections between 1994 and 1998, he still
held the district safely.
The 11th District has a high percentage of
white voters, and these white voters go to the
polls. For instance, in 1994 more than
190,000 district residents cast votes
in the congressional election, while
in the active, highly populated 4th
District fewer than 155,000 votes
were cast. In 1998, African Americans
made up 4 percent of the district’s
registered voters. Without much
support from black voters, the
Democratic Party is challenged to
compete. The Republican Party
dominates despite the fact that in
1998 only 35 percent of the reg i s t e re d
voters in the district belonged to the
GOP, a holdover from the days of the
Democratic Solid South.
In the 2000 election Taylor found a
strong opponent in Sam Neill, a
Hendersonville attorney who ser ved
on the University of North Carolina
Board of Governors for 12 years.
Neill’s ability and financial backing
combined with the financial scandal
involving Taylor to produce a close
race.
In August, a federal grand jur y
requested information regarding
loans made by Blue Ridge Savings
Bank — owned by Taylor — to one
o f the congre s s m a n’s political backe rs,
Sylva businessman Charles Cagle. The
five loans, given between 1992 and
1995, amounting to more than $ 1 mil-l
i o n, were never repaid in full and
ended in lawsuits and foreclosures.
The Charlotte Observer reported that
one of the loans involved forged sig-natures.
The bank denied lending
the money to Cagl e, once the Ja cks o n
County GOP chairman and a Taylor
campaign contributor. Taylor
claimed to not remember the details
of the loans, and accused Neill of
planting the story. The Taylor cam-paign
responded with television ads
painting Neill as a liar with an ever-growing
“ Pinocchio” nose. Taylor also
faced media scrutiny over his busi-ness
dealings in Russia and his problems with
Jackson and Transylvania counties regarding
property taxes.
In the end, though, Taylor’s superior con-stituent
serving in a staunch Republican
district enabled him to win with 55 percent
of the vote. Only one of the 15 counties in
his district, Jackson, gave more votes to his
opponent. Taylor proved the power of incum-bency
and constituent service. n
11th District: Incumbency Ove rcomes Scandal
ER I C JO H N S ON, SE N I O R PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
County Neill Williams Taylor Totals
Dem. Lib. Rep. # %
Buncombe 46.8 3.3 49.9 85,634 32.1
Henderson 35.0 2.7 62.3 37,137 13.9
Haywood 46.3 2.9 50.8 22,947 8.6
Rutherford 41.0 2.6 56.3 21,311 8.0
Transylvania 39.4 4.0 56.7 14,169 5.3
McDowell 33.5 2.4 64.1 14,049 5.3
Macon 39.1 2.8 58.1 13,062 4.9
Jackson 49.8 2.8 47.4 12,231 4.6
Cherokee 33.9 1.1 65.0 9,047 3.4
Yancey 44.0 1.3 54.8 8,922 3.3
Polk 40.0 3.2 56.8 8,192 3.1
Madison 43.9 2.0 54.1 8,024 3.0
Swain 48.2 1.4 50.4 4,309 1.6
Clay 37.0 1.1 61.9 3,921 1.5
Graham 29.4 1.2 69.4 3,422 1.3
Totals 42.1 2.8 55.1 266,377 100
SOURCE: State Board ofElections
11th District, by County
11th District Polls, 2000
Taylor Dem.
Year % % Total Vote
1988 49.6 50.4 215,343
1990 51 49 201,309
1992 55 45 238,161
1994 60 40 192,688
1996 58 40 228,025
1998 57 42 199,423
2000 55 42 266,377
KEY: Dem. = Democratic candidate
Charles Taylor and the
11th District, 1988– 2000
Date Taylor Neill Pollster Sample
7/ 22– 24 59 31 Pub. Opin. Strategies- R 300 lvs
9/ 22– 24 44 36 Cooper & Secrest- D 503 rvs
11/ 7 55 42 Actual Vote
SOURCE: The Cook Political Repor t [ December 20, 2000]: 60.
11th District Polls, 2000
In 1991, the state leg i s l at u re re d rew the congre s-sional
district lines, giving African Americans a
majority in the 1st and 12th districts. As a re s u l t ,
Eva M. Clayton and Mel Watt in 1992 became
the first African Americans elected to Congress
in more than 90 years. Running in predomi-nantly
African- American districts, C l ayton and
Watt seemed to be products of biased district
lines and there fo re we re victorious by defa u l t .
T h ey easily won reelection in 1994 and 1996.
In 1996, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled a gainst
the 1991 redistricting plan — especially the
long and narrow 12th District. While the 1996
elections went forward under the older plan,
in 1997 the leg i s l at u re re d rew the district lines
to more equitably split the population within
the districts for the 1998 elections. In April
1998 the court threw out this plan, too, and
the legislature had to once a gain redraw the
district lines in May for the 1998 elections.
The new redistricting plan of May 1998
decreased Clayton and Watt’s base of support
and challenged their incumbency. However,
their quest to continue as r epresentatives was
not stifled when their districts were changed
and the people who were thought to be their
sole support reduced in numbers. The per-centage
of African Americans in the 1st D i s t r i c t
d e c reased from 57 percent to 50 perc e n t . The
12th District was affected even more as the
percentage of African Americans dwindled
from 57 percent to 36 percent.
These districts had been challenged because
they were designed to give African- Americans
a majority, and the lawsuits focused specifically
on the 12th District as a “ racial gerrymander.”
In the 1991 plan, the 12th District’s lines
stretched from west of Charlotte along
Interstate 85 all the way to Durham and
included parts of Greensboro and Winston-
Salem.
The 1997 plan eliminated many areas, and
the only parts left in District 12 ran from
Charlotte up I- 85 to Greensboro and Winston-
Salem. The 1998 plan dropped Greensboro
from the 12th District, and the lines ran from
Charlotte north to Winston- Salem.
In their first races for office in 1992, Clayton
and Watt fought strongly contested primaries
and won handily in the No vember general
election. While Watt was able to best three
o t h e rs for the Democratic nomination, Clay t o n
faced six other Democrats and had to win a
runoff primary just to get into the November
race. She defeated the then- Democrat Walter
B. Jones Jr. in the runoff. Jones, the son of a
long- time Democratic congressman, soon
changed parties and won the 1994 race for
the 3rd Congressional District as a Republican.
C l ayton and Wat t’s tenu re in office continu e d
e a s i ly through the 1994 and 1996 elections. In
both cases, they defe ated the same ch a l l e n ger in
these two elections. Clayton prevailed over ch a l-l
e n ger Ted Tyler 61 percent to 39 percent in 1994
and increased her winning margin over him in
1996 to 33 points. Watt defe ated Joe Martino in
1994 by 66 percent to 34 percent and dominat e d
M a rt i n o, 72 percent to 27 percent, in 1996.
With the new redistricting plan in 1998, Clay t o n
and Watt seemed vulnerable to defeat. Man y
s p e c u l ated that their terms would be ch a l l e n ge d
with a bitter, drawn- out race to the finish. The
speculators proved to be wrong, and Clayton
and Watt prevailed again in their respective
d i s t r i c t s. Clayton again easily defe ated her per-petual
contender Ty l e r, 62 percent to 37 perc e n t ,
while Watt defeated Scott Keadle, 56 percent
to 42 percent. Their margins of victory were
narrower, but they were still winners.
In 2000, Clayton defeated Duane E. Kratzer,
Jr.’ s challenge for the 1st District seat. Clayton
advocated education, vocational traini n g, ru r a l
health, minimum wage and economic develop-ment.
Kratzer’s platform included working for
tax reform, a strong military, preserving 2nd
Amendment rights, health care reform and
opposition to abortion. He chall e n ge d
C l ay t o n’s ability to make real diffe re n c e s in the
community.
Mel Watt successfu l ly defended his 12th District
seat against Chad Mitchell. Watt’s platform
i n cluded protecting Social Security and ensuring
health care for the elderly. Mitch e l l ’ s goals we re
similar to Watt’s, but he dif fered because he
1st and 12th Districts: African- American
Incumbents Surv ive Changing Districts
JOY GA N E S , SE N I O R BU S I N E S S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 8 AND PUBLIC LIFE
Dist. Representative Dem. % ofOverall Vote Black % Voting Age Pop.
’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 ’ 00 ’ 91 ’ 98 Change
Plan Plan
1st Eva Clayton 67 61 66 62 66 57 50 - 7
12th Mel Watt 72 66 72 56 65 57 36 - 21
1st & 12th Districts:
A Decade of African- American Incumbency
S E E AFRICAN AMERICANS ON PAGE 15 ›
During the past 40 years, North Carolina’s
congressional delegation has had to change
with the times. Although the majority of rep-resentatives
are still white men, minorities
and women are now a part of the electoral
politics of the state. There has also been con -
side r able growth in Republican strength in
N o rt h Carolina’s politics over this period.
Politics has long been considered an all- male
game in this state. However, two women, Eva
Clayton ( D- 1) and Sue Myrick ( R- 9), broke the
gender barrier in the 1992 and 1994 congres-sional
elections. Then in 1996, Elaine Mars h a l l
was elected secretary of state. In the 2000
elections, North Carolina reelected Clayton,
Myrick and Marshall as well as three other
women to statewide office — Lieutenant
Governor Beverly Perdue ( D), Commissioner of
Agriculture Meg Phipps ( D) and Commissioner
of Labor Cherie Berry ( R).
Even more astounding is that Clayton is also
one of North Carolina’s two African- American
representatives. Clayton and Mel Watt ( D- 12)
we re first elected in 1992 after the controve rs i a l
creation of two majority- black districts. They
were the first minorities to be elected to
Congress from North Carolina since Recon-struction.
Despite consistently changing dis -
trict lines that decreased the minority race
voting base in their districts, both Clayton and
Watts retained their seats. On the other hand,
North Carolina has a large number of Native
American and Latin American communities
across the state. However, African Americans
remain the only minority g roup represented
in Congress.
The Republican Party has also made g reat
strides in their fight for representation in
Congress. In 1960, there was only one
Republican congressman in the state ’ s delega-tion.
In the 1994 “ Republican Revolution”
election, Republicans became the majority in
the delegation by winning eight of the 12
s e ats ( 67 percent). Fo l l owing the 2000 election,
seven Republicans now make up 58 percent
of the state’s delegation.
As rep re s e n t ation becomes gre ater for fe m a l e s,
b l a cks and Rep u b l i c a n s, incumbents continu e
to hold on to their seats. During the past 40
years, incumbents have won the majority of
seats in each election. In fact, there were six
elections — 1964, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1988 and
2000 — in wh i ch all incumbents re t a i n e d their
s e at. Only in the 1972, 1984 and 1994 elections
did the number of winning newcomers nearly
match the number of winning incumbents.
During two of these elections in which new-comers
nearly equaled incumbent winners,
there was a direct correlation between the
increase of Republican gains and new repre-s
e n t at ive s. In 1984, five newc o m e rs comprised
45 percent of the delegation. This is the same
year that President Ronald Reagan soundly
defeated challenger Walter Mondale, Senator
Jesse Helms won reelection over Governor Jim
Hunt’s challenge, and Republicans made
coattail gains by winning fi ve of the 11 con-gressional
seats. Ten years later during the
“ Republican Revolution” of 1994, only seven
incumbents held onto their seats, and
Republican representation jumped from
four to eight.
More change is afoot in the state ’ s congres-sional
delegation. New district lines and, if
Utah’s challenge is unsuccessful, an entirely
new district. Based on the trends of the past
four decades we can be sure of one thing —
no longer can white Democratic males
dominate the elections. Instead, women,
Republicans and minorities now have a
significant chance of winning. n
C o n gressional Delegation Incre a s i n gly Dive rse
Women, Blacks, Re p u blicans Make Gains
JONAT H A N TR I BU LA, SE N I O R PU B L I C PO L I C Y ANA LYS I S MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
1960 ’ 62 ’ 64 ’ 66 ’ 68 ’ 70 ’ 72 ’ 74 ’ 76 ’ 78 ’ 80 ’ 82 ’ 84 ’ 86 ’ 88 ’ 90 ’ 92 ’ 94 ’ 96 ’ 98 2000 1960– 2000
BY PARTY:
#, Dem 11 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 7 9 6 8 8 7 8 4 6 5 5 162
%, Dem 92 82 82 73 73 73 82 82 82 82 64 82 55 73 73 64 67 33 50 42 42 69
#, Rep 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 5 3 3 4 4 8 6 7 7 75
%, Rep 8 18 18 27 27 27 18 18 18 18 36 18 45 27 27 36 33 67 50 58 58 31
BY GENDER:
#, Male 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 228
%, Male 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 83 83 83 83 96
#, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 9
%, Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 17 17 17 17 4
BY RACE:
#, White 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 227
%, White 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 83 83 83 83 83 96
#, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 10
%, Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 17 17 17 17 4
BY TENURE:
#, New 3 1 0 3 3 0 5 0 2 0 2 3 5 3 0 1 2 5 3 1 0 42
%, New 25 9 0 27 27 0 45 0 18 0 18 27 45 27 0 9 17 42 25 8 0 18
#, Incumbent 9 10 11 8 8 11 6 11 9 11 9 8 6 8 11 0 10 7 9 11 12 185
%, Incumbent 75 91 100 73 73 100 55 100 82 100 82 73 55 73 100 91 83 58 75 92 100 82
Trends in Congressional Demographics: 1960– 2000
During the past four decades, the number of
major party voters in cong ressional elections
has increased greatly, as would be expected in
a rapidly growing state. In 2000, 2.708 million
votes we re cast for congressional candidates in
the general election compared to the 1.185 mil-lion
votes cast in those elections in 1960 — an
increase of 128 percent. i In fact, the growth in
numbers of voters outpaced the growth in
actual population. The 1960 census counted
4.556 million people in North Carolina, which
has grown to 8.049 million people in the 2000
census — an increase of 77 percent.
Population growth is only one factor in the
i n c reasing number of vo t e rs in North Caro l i n a .
Included in any list of factors has to be the
opening of the electoral system to those who
had been excluded in the past. The Civil
Rights revolution, with the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
opened the voting booth doors for blacks to
become part of the electorate. The Vietnam
War and the 26th Amendment to the U. S .
Constitution, ratified in 1971, opened the
doors to those between 18 and 21.
The increase in partisan competition o ver the
40- year period was also a very important
factor. In the first three elections of the 1960s
Democratic voters outnumbered Republicans
by a 3- to- 2 ratio. In the most recent four
elections this has switched to a 1.25- to- 1
Republican voting edge. Between 1960 and
2000, the number of D e m o c r atic congre s s i o n a l
votes increased by 64 percent, while the
number of Republican congressional votes
increased by 230 percent. This shift in voting
support translated from a 6- to- 1 Democratic
c o n gressional seat winning ratio in those thre e
early 1960 races to a 1.4- to- 1 Republican con-gressional
seat winning ratio in the four most
recent elections. The table “ Congressional
Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000” demonstrates
the consistent erosion of the Democratic
control over these elections.
This Republican voting growth had to over-come
a depression in GOP turnout following
the Watergate scandal, reflected in the results
of the 1974, 1976 and 1978 elections. After
increasing their success ratio in the 1968 to
1972 elections to only a 1.8- to- 1 Democratic
advantage, Republicans saw those mid- 1970s
races elevate the Democratic success ratio to a
4.5- to- 1 high. Since the 1978 elections, the
Republican vote has been growing steadily.
T h e re are also some interesting pat t e rns hidd e n
in this 21 elections N. C. congressional voting
history. These patterns are tied to the differing
length of terms of elected officials. While two-year
term Congressional elections occur in
every even- numbered year [ 21 elections], the
four- year term presidential and gubernatorial
elections occur in every other e ven year [ 11
elections], and the six- year terms of the two
U. S. senators bring those statewide races into
these elections about two- thirds of the time
[ 14 elections].
Voter Tu rnout Grow i n g
Faster Than Po p u l at i o n
Re fo rm s, Pa rt i s a n s h i p, Big Races
Bring More People to Po l l s
TH A D BE Y L E, PE A R S A L L PRO F E S S O R O F PO L I T I C A L SC I E N C E, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L,
A N D JO H N BR A N C H, SE N I O R HI S TO RY MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POL ITIC S , MEDIA 1 0 AND PUBLIC LI FE
Votes ( thousands) % of Vote Seats Won Uncontested
Year Dem Rep Total Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep
1960 726 459 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0
1962 482 336 819 59 41 9 2 3 0
1964 788 511 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0
1966 484 432 916 53 47 8 3 2 0
1968 765 633 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1
1970 514 411 925 56 44 7 4 1 0
1972 735 610 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0
1974 638 348 986 65 35 9 2 3 0
1976 1,011 549 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0
1978 607 405 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1
1980 964 769 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0
1982 708 580 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0
1984 1,131 1,026 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0
1986 890 682 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0
1988 1,108 876 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0
1990 1,076 935 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0
1992 1,282 1,204 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0
1994 681 907 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1
1996 1,136 1,340 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0
1998 827 1,014 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2
2000 1,194 1,515 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2
KEY: Uncontested = number ofseats won in uncontested races
SOURCE: State Board ofElections
N. C. Congressional Voting Trends, 1960– 2000
›
There are four distinct patterns involved in
these elections: Pattern A is when there are
presidential, gubernatorial and U. S. senatorial
elections held at the same time as the con-gressional
elections. This has happened se ven
times since 1960. Pattern B, which has
happened three times, is when there ar e
presidential and gubernatorial elections being
held at the same time. P attern C, which has
happened seven times, is when there is just a
U. S. Senate race being held at the same time.
Pattern D, which has happened three times, is
when there are no major statewide elections
being held at the same time .
As can be seen in the table “ Patterns in N. C.
C o n gressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000,” the gre at e s t
turnout occurs when there are se veral impor-tant
statewide elections occurring at the same
time. Patterns C and D have had considerably
lower turnouts over the period. Voting in
elections when Jim Hunt was on the ballot
averaged 1.960 million voter s, while voting in
elections when Jesse Helms was on the ballot
averaged 1.800 million voters. ii The average
turnout during the past 40 years has been
1.585 million for all elections .
The 1994 Pattern D congressional elections, in
wh i ch the “ Republican Revolution” took place,
exemplified the impact of low turnout in a
volatile political atmosphere. The 1994 con-gressional
vote was the lowest since 1986 and
fell nearly 47 percent below the cong ressional
vote of 1992.
The upcoming 2002 congressional elections
will be a Pat t e rn C election. The only stat ew i d e
race will be for the U. S. Senate seat cur rently
held by Jesse Helms. With Helms retiring ,
there will be considerable statewide political
action, as an open seat race creates interest -
ing primaries in addition to a general election
with no incumbent run-ning.
There has not been
an open Senate seat race in
the state since 1974 when
Sam Ervin retired. The
upcoming race has already
attracted national media
interested in whether the
Democrats can keep their
tenuous hold on the U. S.
Senate, and the potential
for an ideological shift in
the Senate delegation.
This year’s redistricting
could also affect turnout in
2002. Will the new district
lines be “ incumbent friendly ”
and therefore not very con-troversial,
leading to some
rather uninteresting races?
Or will the new lines set up
some battle grounds that
may lead to some ver y
heated and controversial
races? And if North
Carolina fends off the
Utah challenge over which
state gains the additional
seat, will that 13th District
race between relative
newcomers to the congres-sional
scene attract or deter
voters from going to the
voting booth? n
i In the 2000 elections, there
were two seats not contested
by a Democratic candidate. If there had been
a Democratic candidate, the increase in the
number voting in the 2000 elections would
have been even greater vis- a- vis the 1960 vote ,
and the growth in the number of Democratic
votes would have also been g reater. n
ii Hunt ran for lieutenant governor in 1972,
governor in 1976, 1980, 1992 and 1996, and
for U. S. Senator in 1984. He won all but the
1984 race. Helms ran for a U. S. Senate seat in
1972, 1978, 1984, 1990 and 1996, and was
successful each time.
Party Voting Seats Uncon.
Votes Dem. Rep. D R D R
( thousands) % % # # # #
Pattern A: President, U. S. Senate, Governor Races [ 7]
1960 1,185 61 39 10 1 0 0
1968 1,398 55 45 7 4 2 1
1972a 1,345 55 45 7 4 2 0
1980b 1,733 56 44 7 4 1 0
1984a 2,157 52 48 6 5 0 0
1992b 2,486 52 48 8 4 0 0
1996a 2,476 46 54 6 6 0 0
Avg. 1,826 54 46
% Change + 109 - 25 + 38
Pattern B: President and Governor Races [ 4]
1964 1,299 61 39 9 2 2 0
1976b 1,560 65 35 9 2 2 0
1988 1,984 56 44 8 3 2 0
2000 2,708 44 56 5 7 0 2
Avg. 1,888 57 44
% Change + 108 - 28 + 44
Pattern C: U. S. Senate Race [ 7]
1962 819 59 41 9 2 3 0
1966 916 53 47 8 3 2 0
1974 986 65 35 9 2 3 0
1978c 1,012 60 40 9 2 1 1
1986 1,572 57 43 8 3 0 0
1990c 2,011 54 46 7 4 0 0
1998 1,841 45 55 5 7 1 2
Avg. 1,308 56 44
% Change + 125 - 24 + 34
Pattern D: No Major Statewide Races [ 3]
1970 925 56 44 7 4 1 0
1982 1,288 55 45 9 2 0 0
1994 1,588 43 57 4 8 0 1
Avg. 1,267 51 49
% Change + 72 - 23 + 30
NOTES
Avg. – Average vote for that pattern ofraces over the period
% Change – percent change in totals from earliest to the most recent race in the pattern
Party Voting – % of2- party vote that was Democratic/ Republican
Seats – Number ofCongressional seats won by Democrats/ Republicans
Uncon. – Number ofuncontested races won by Democrats/ Republicans
a – Helms and Hunt in statewide races
b – Hunt in a statewide race
c – Helms in a statewide race
Pat t e rns in N. C. Congressional Vo t i n g, 1960– 2000
Decade Dem Rep Total D to R Ratio
1960– 68 43 12 55 3.6 to 1
1970– 78 41 14 55 2.9 to 1
1980– 88 38 17 55 2.2 to 1
1990– 98 30 29 59 1 to 1
2000 5 7 12 1 to 1.4
Total 157 79 236 2 to 1
Congressional Wins by Decade, 1960– 2000
An open seat Senate race
creates interesting
primaries, attracts national
media interested in
whether the Democrats
can keep their tenuous
hold on the U. S. Senate,
and holds the potential for
an ideological shift in the
state’s Senate delegation.
John McCain’s presidential campaign demon-strated
that being independent from your
political party could be the centerpiece of a
fairly successful national campaign. But in
c o n gressional districts dominated by one part y
or the other, independence can be seen as
disloyalty — and punished. In North Carolina,
most congressional delegates voted with their
party most of the time, but Republicans
showed more loyalty than Democrats during
the 1999– 2000 session.
The Congressional Quarterly rankings of the
state’s representatives reveal some surprises,
h oweve r. President Clinton did not re c e ive total
support from the North Carolina delegation,
even from his fellow Democrats. Mel Watt
( 12th) was Clinton’s strongest supporter from
the state. He voted with the president 82 per-cent
of the time. Bob Etheridge ( 2nd) vo t e d
with the president 65 percent of the time. Mike
McIntyre ( 7th) supported the president only 40
percent of the time.
The average presidential support rating of the
Democrats in the North Carolina dele gation
was nearly 70 percent, just
below the national
Democratic average of 73
percent. This differe n c e
highlights the fact that
S o u t h e rn Democrat s are
more conservative than
Democrats as a whole and
a re more like ly to oppose
the liberal plans of party
members.
None of the seven
Republicans the
state sent to Congress
broke ranks as often as
some Democrats did. The
highest support rating for
Clinton came from Sue
Myrick ( 9th) at 26 percent.
Two members tied for the
lowest, at 19 percent. The
gap between high and low
was much smaller than on
the Democratic side. O u t
o f eve ry five votes cast by
N. C. Rep u b l i c a n s, four
were in opposition to
Clinton.
N o rth Carolina Democrats we re also mu ch more
likely to go against their fellow Democrats in
Congress. McIntyre voted against the party 39
percent of the time. Etheridge, the next most
i n d ependent, bucked the party line 16 perc e n t
of the time. Both were reelected, despite what
some might consider damaging disloyalty to
the party. The average party opposition rating
for the North Carolina dele gation was nearly
16 percent, although McIntyre’s nu m b e rs skew
the average somewhat. Without McIntyre, the
North Carolina Democrats voted the party line
more than 90 percent of the time. Rega rd l e s s,
most of the Democratic delegat i o n supported
their party colleagues most of the time.
The Republicans delegates were much more
loyal to the GOP than their colleagues on the
other side of the aisle. Only one, Robin Hayes
( 8th), voted with the Democrats more than 8
percent of the time, and he buc ked the party
line only 11 percent of the time, voting with
the Republican party on nearly 9 of 10 votes.
On average, the GOP delegates from North
Carolina voted with the party more than 93
percent of the time, ignoring the party ’ s lead
on only 6.4 percent of the votes.
All but one of the members had voting partic-ipation
rates in the House of more than 90
percent, and all but two of the delegates had
participation rate scores between 96 and 99
percent. Charles Taylor ( 11th), required by a
very competitive reelection battle to spend
more time at home, had a voting rate of 91
percent — still good compared to Sue Myrick,
who voted only 86 percent of the time. Her
reelection campaign was by no means heated
— she won by more than 30 points and sits in
a safe Republican district. Most rep re s e n t at ive s
have made an effort to keep their voting rates
high ever since it became a campaign issue in
the mid- 1970s. Myrick’s low voting rate could
be somewhat of a liability in 2002.
These voting rates and analyses confirm again
that presidential support and party unity,
especially on the Democratic side, are not
important issues that representatives from
North Carolina consider in their votes. Nor, it
appears, are these two scores important to
the voters of North Carolina when choosing
their representatives. n
GOP Delegates More Loyal
To Pa rty Than Democrat s
EVA N SAU DA, SE N I O R JO U R NA L I S M MA J O R, UNC- CH A P E L HI L L
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TTER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDIA 1 2 AND PUBLIC LIFE
Clinton Administration Party Majority Voting
Dist. Rep. ( Party) Sup. Opp. Sup. Opp. Partic.
1st Clayton ( D) 79 21 93 7 97
2nd Etheridge ( D) 65 35 84 16 99
3rd Jones ( R) 19 81 92 8 97
4th Price ( D) 80 20 90 10 97
5th Burr ( R) 22 78 92 8 96
6th Coble ( R) 21 79 96 4 96
7th McIntyre ( D) 40 60 61 39 96
8th Hayes ( R) 19 81 89 11 99
9th Myrick ( R) 26 74 96 4 86
10th Ballenger ( R) 23 77 96 4 96
11th Taylor ( R) 21 79 94 6 91
12th Watt ( D) 82 18 94 6 97
Clinton Administration Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 69 relevant House votes in which the
legislator was present and either supported or opposed the position ofthe Clinton
administration.
Party Majority Sup./ Opp.: Percent ofthe 259 House votes in which the legislator was
present and supported or opposed a majority ofhis or her party.
Voting Partic.: Percent ofthe 600 House votes in which the legislator voted.
SOURCE: “ Vote Studies,” CQ Weekly ( January 6, 2001): 52 – 74.
Congressional Quarterly’s Voting Analysis of
NC’s 2000 Congressional Delegation
how many members of a minority they must
put in a district in order for them to have a
fair chance of electing the representative of
their choice.
The ( George H. W.) Bush and Clinton Justice
Departments told state legislatures that they
must consider race when drawing districts ,
but the U. S. Supreme Court also said they
can't consider race too much. During the last
decade, judges and statisticians have joined
legislators in the redistricting process so that
almost all of the national conversation about
the topic is focused on which mathematical
mode will make the best defense in court. A
leading vendor of redistricting software mar-kets
it as a " litigation support" tool that can
help lawmakers use census and other data to
prove that they weren't thinking about race
too little or too much.
Despite the legal wrangling of the last 10
years, North Carolina’s congressional districts
became predictable, reelecting in 2000 a
record number of incumbents. Politicians –
especially incumbents – like this certainty. In
the past, lawmakers could assuredly play b y
the first rule of redistricting – protect incum-bents.
However, legislators will bear little responsi-bility
for the electoral districts the state finally
ends up with. When they finish their impossi-ble
task, lawsuits will ensue.
With better data about “ communities of inter-est”
that aren’t based on race, legislators per -
haps could more confidently defend at least
one of their two competing goals. But e ven
with better information, few lawmakers have
professional backgrounds in the type of data
modeling needed to crunch the numbers. So
the process still ends up in the hands of com-puter
analysts whose names ne ver appear on
a ballot.
The political process is just the first round of
redistricting. Regardless of how many votes
have been taken or how many le gal decisions
have been handed down, North Carolinians
can be certain that more lawsuits lie ahead
— until the next round of political numbers
are handed down. n
› R E D I S T R I C T I N G F ROM PAGE 1
Dist# Incumbent 2000 Pop Ideal Pop Ideal +/- Ideal Ideal Pop Ideal +/-
13 Seats 13 Seats +/- % 12 Seats 12 Seats %
1st Clayton, D 587,830 619,178 - 31,348 - 5.1 670,776 - 51,598 - 7.7
2nd Etheridge, D 730,266 619,178 111,088 17.9 670,776 59,490 8.9
3rd Jones, R 615,614 619,178 - 3,564 - 0.6 670,776 - 55,162 - 8.2
4th Price, D 765,876 619,178 146,698 23.7 670,776 95,100 14.7
5th Burr, R 637,158 619,178 17,980 2.9 670,776 - 33,618 - 5.0
6th Coble, R 689,529 619,178 70,351 11.4 670,776 18,753 2.8
7th McIntyre, D 690,054 619,178 70,876 11.5 670,776 19,278 2.9
8th Hayes, R 661,112 619,178 41,934 6.8 670,776 - 9,664 - 1.4
9th Myrick, R 693,042 619,178 73,864 11.9 670,776 22,266 3.3
10th Ballenger, R 655,413 619,178 36,235 5.6 670,776 - 15,363 - 2.3
11th Taylor, R 656,619 619,178 37,441 6.1 670,776 - 14,157 - 2.1
12th Watt, D 666,800 619,178 47,622 7.7 670,776 - 3,976 - 0.6
13th ———— - 0- 619,178 - 619,178 —— ——— ——— ——
NOTES:
Ideal Pop — the total population ofthe state divided by 13 seats or 12 seats to get equal representation.
Ideal +/- — the dif ference between the ideal and actual population for the district
Ideal +/- % — the percent that the actual population deviates from the ideal population
SOURCE: www. ncleg/ redistricting/ 2000BaseMapRpt
N. C. Congressional Districts: Ideal vs. Actual Populations
13 District Scenario
Incumbent District +/-%
Price, D 4th + 23.7
Etheridge, D 2nd + 17.9
Myrick, R 9th + 11.9
McIntyre, D 7th + 11.5
Coble, R 6th + 11.4
Watt, D 12th + 7.7
Hayes, R 8th + 6.8
Taylor, R 11th + 6.1
Ballenger, R 10th + 5.9
Burr, R 5th + 2.9
Jones, R 3rd - 0.6
Clayton, D 1st - 5.1
12 District Scenario
Incumbent District +/-%
Price, D 4th + 14.7
Etheridge, D 2nd + 8.9
Myrick, R 9th + 3.3
McIntyre, D 7th + 2.9
Coble, R 6th + 2.8
Watt, D 12th - 0.6
Hayes, R 8th - 1.4
Taylor, R 11th - 2.1
Ballenger, R 10th - 2.3
Burr, R 5th - 5.0
Clayton, D 1st - 7.7
Jones, R 3rd - 8.2
The Impact of Two District Scenarios
N C
DATA N
E T
N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 4 A AND PUBL IC L IFE
ed the Bushes in 1992 and 2000, but backed
Bill Clinton in 1996.
Rep. Charles Taylor ( R- 11) has comfortably
retained his seat in each of the five elections
since he initially won the seat from incumbent
Democrat James Clarke in 1990. The district ’ s
voters decisively favored the Republican can-didate
for congress over the past decade but
did not decisively favor Republican candidates
for president until 2000, when George W. Bush
made off with 59 percent of the district’s vo t e s.
Voters slightly favored Clinton in 1992 before
slightly favoring Dole four years later.
Over the past 10 years North Carolina has
moved clearly in the direction of supporting
Republican candidates for president. In 2000,
George W. Bush took the state with 56 percent
o f the vote and won in nine of the 12 districts.
The only districts he failed to carry were the
1st and 12th – safe Democrat districts – and
the 4th, a district in which voters cast a bare
majority of their votes for Al Gore. The state’s
s u p p o rt for Republican presidential candidat e s
has been widely dispersed unlike its support fo r
D e m o c r at s, wh i ch is ge o gr ap h i c a l ly concentrat e d .
The Republicans hold the majority of the stat e’s
s e ats in Congre s s, but the five Democrats in the
delegation were all reelected by convincing
margins last year. Both parties have “ s a fe ”
s e ats that are almost guaranteed victories, but
the Republicans find safety in more districts
than do the Democrat s. The state has continu e d
to lean slightly towa rd Republicans in congre s-sional
races since the 1994 shift fro m support
of Democratic to GOP candidates. n
Avg Avg
Congressional Race Scores Score Incumbent, Party ( County) Presidential Race Scoresd Score
Dist # 92a 94a 96a 98b 00c 92– 00 92 96 00 92– 00
1st 1 1 1 1 1 1 Eva Clayton, D ( Warren) 1 1 1 1
2nd 2 4 2 2 2 2.4 Bob Etheridge, D ( Harnett) 4 2 4 3.3
3rd 2 4 5 5 5 4.2 Walter Jones, R ( Pitt) 4 4 5 4.3
4th 1 3R 2 2 1 1.5 David Price, D ( Orange) 2 3D 3D 2.7
5th 2 4 5 5 5u 4.2 Richard Burr, R ( Forsyth) 3R 4 5 4
6th 5 5u 5 5u 5u 5 Howard Coble, R ( Guilford) 5 5 5 5
7th 2 3D 3D 1u 1 2 Mike McIntyre, D ( Cumberland) 3D 4 4 3.7
8th 2 3D 2 3R 4 2.8 Robin Hayes, R ( Cabarrus) 3R 4 4 3.7
9th 5 5 5 5 5 5 Sue Myrick, R ( Mecklenburg) 5 5 5 5
10th 5 5 5 5u 5 5 Cass Ballenger, R ( Lenoir) 5 5 5 5
11th 4 5 4 4 4 4.2 Charles Taylor, R ( Buncombe) 3D 3R 5 3.7
12th 1 1 1 2 1 1.2 Mel Watt, D ( Mecklenburg) 1 1 2 1.3
Avgs 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 3.6
KEY
COMPETITIVENESS SCORES: 1 = Strong Dem. 58.6%+; 2 = Leaning Dem. 52.6%– 58.5%: 3 = Toss- up 47.5%– 52.5%; 4 = Leaning Rep. 52.6%– 58.5%;
5 = Strong Rep. 58.5+; u = unopposed. For districts with results within the toss- up range, the party ofthe winner is indicated ( D, R) for the con-gressional
races and by the winner in the presidential race in the district.
a Elections conducted under the 1991 Redistricting Plan; b Elections conducted under the 1998 Redistricting Plan; c Elections conducted under the
1997 Redistricting Plan; d Presidential- race scores calculated only from votes for the two major- party candidates.
Competitiveness in the N. C. Congressional Districts, 1992– 2000
District Candidate, Party # of Votes % of Point
Total Spread
5th * Richard Burr, R 172,489 93u + 86 R
Steven LeBoeuf, Lib 13,366 7
6th * Howard Coble, R 195,727 91u + 82 R
Jeffrey Bentley, Lib 18,726 9
9th * Sue Myrick, R 181,161 69 + 39 R
Ed McGuire, D 79,382 30
10th * T. Cass Ballenger, R 164,182 68 + 39 R
Delmas Parker, D 70,877 29
3rd * Walter B. Jones Jr., R 121,940 61 + 24 R
Leigh McNairy, D 74,058 37
11th * Charles H. Taylor, R 146,677 55 + 13 R
Sam Neill, D 112,234 42
8th * Robin Hayes, R 111,950 55 + 11 R
Mike Taylor, D 89,505 44
2nd * Bob Etheridge, D 146,733 58 + 17 D
Doug Haynes, R 103,011 41
4th * David Price, D 200,885 62 + 25 D
Jess Ward, R 119,412 37
12th * Mel Watt, D 135,570 65 + 32 D
Chad Mitchell, R 69,596 33
1st * Eva Clayton, D 124,171 66 + 33 D
Duane Kratzer Jr., R 62,198 33
7th * Mike McIntyre, D 160,185 70 + 41 D
James R. Adams, R 66,463 29
KEY: D - Democrat; Lib - Libertarian; R - Republican; u - unopposed by
a major- party challenger; * - incumbent.
2000 Election Results, from
Most Republican to Most Democratic
› I N C U M B E N T S F ROM PAGE 2
teristics.
The data that follow help sketch the electoral
landscape for the 2002 Democratic and
Republican primaries.
In modern North Carolina politics, primar y
turnout has plummeted to only a fraction of
general- election turnout. Many voters in
North Carolina – and elsewhere in the South
– stand aside during the primaries and wait
to vote in the general election.
In 1998, for example, there were both
Democratic and Republican Senate primaries,
combining to bring out 805,319 voter s. The
general election – Democrat John Edwards vs.
Republican Lauch Faircloth – attracted 1.97
million voters. The primary turnout amount-ed
to only 40 percent of the general- election
turnout.
Candidates in Democratic primaries must
chase more voters than Republican candi-dates.
Registered Democrats out- number reg-istered
Republicans, 2.55 million to 1.74 mil-lion.
In addition, more people turn out for
Democratic primaries than for Republican
primaries. Two years ago, the Democratic
gubernatorial primary attracted 553,794 vot -
ers, the Republican primary 312,529. ( The
2000 general election turnout totaled 2.9 mil-lion
North Carolina voters.)
Under state law, a candidate can win a
party’s nomination in the first primary with
40 percent of the vote. Assuming a turnout of
310,000 voters in a GOP primar y, a
Republican Senate candidate could win with
as few as 124,000 votes. Assuming a
Democratic turnout of 550,000, it would take
220,000 votes for victory. Clearly, primaries
put a premium on candidates’ tar geting of
activist and regular- voting partisans.
While Democrats still out- number
Republicans as primary voter s, GOP primary
turnout has risen over the past 30 years and
Democratic turnout has fallen dramatically.
Democratic primary turnout peaked at
955,799 in 1984, and then dropped to
540,031 in 1998. Meanwhile, GOP primar y
turnout rose from barely 100,000 in 1972 to
more than 312,000 in 2000.
Geographically, Republican primary voter s
are somewhat more concentrated than
Democratic voters. The top 14 counties in
GOP registration contain more than half of
potential GOP voters. It takes 16 counties to
reach 50 percent of the Democratic regis-tered
voters. ( See chart)
Under North Carolina election rules, the
Republican and Democratic parties may per -
mit unaffiliated voters to participate in their
primaries, as both parties did in 1998.
An unaffiliated voter can choose to cast a bal-lot
in one primar y, but not both.
Because 2002 is not a presidential election
year, it will almost certainly have a lower
voter turnout, in both primaries and the gen-eral
election, than 2000. So- called off- year
elections typically have lower turnouts than
presidential- election years. Also, if the Senate
primary in either party results in a runoff, the
turnout for the runoff will surely be lower
than in the first primar y. n
Editor’s Note: Owen Covington, a master’s stu-dent
in the UNC School of Journalism and
Mass Communication, contributed to this arti -
cle and to the accompanying chart.
Further examination of Helms’s career can be
found on our Web site at www. southnow. org.
Look for more analysis of southern Senate
races in the forthcoming issue of SouthNow..
› P R I M A R I E S F ROM PAGE 16
Hayes. Speaker Dennis Hastert made multiple
appearances, and NRA president and actor
Charlton Heston spoke at rallies in Concord
and Albemarle on Hayes’s behalf. The NRA
had contributed $ 7,450 to Hayes in 1998. The
day before the 2000 election, John McCain
stumped for Hayes in Richmond County.
In the end, Haye s ’ s incumbency pro b ab ly
m a d e the difference in 2000. Campaigning
on his re c o rd of l o o king out for the district,
H ayes also benefited from Taylor’s inability to
distinguish himself from his opponent. The
candidates had similar views on many issues,
such as Taylor’s opposition to abortion. Their
TV ads attacked each other’s stances on issues
like prescription drugs and taxes, but issues
were lost amid the spectacle of visits from
major political players. Helms, Hastert,
Heston and McCain overshadowed Gephardt
and Bonior.
Just as in 1998, Taylor won a majority of the
counties. However, Hayes made major gains
in most counties, picking up one more than
in 1998 and coming within a percentage
point of winning Richmond, which gave him
only 38.9 percent in 1998. In almost every
county, Hayes garnered more new voters
than Taylor. Once again, Hayes dominated the
t wo largest counties in the district, industrial-ized
Cabarrus and Union counties. The supe -
rior resources and incumbent status of Hayes
trumped the energized Democratic effort for
Taylor. n
› 8TH DI STRICT F ROM PAGE 6
wanted to empower Americans to help them-selves.
In the year 2000, Clayton and Watt once
again were victorious. Clayton won handily
over K r atzer by 33 points ( 66 percent to 33 per-c
e n t ) , while Watt easily defe ated Mitchell by 32
p o i n t s ( 65 percent to 33 percent).
Being the first North Carolina African- Americans
elected to Congress in this century, they had
a great deal of pressure to perform excellent-ly.
Despite the challenges by other candidates,
the constant law suits and court decisions
against the N. C. district plans, and the con-stantly
changing redistricting plans, Clayton
and Watt have proved to be worthy of their
positions. They won with the support of
white as well as African- American voter s,
especially in their last two races. They also
d e m o n s t r at e d how important incumbency is
to a candidate, thus proving that knowledge
and experience are important in getting re-elected.
The N. C General Assembly will use the data
from the 2000 census to reconfigure the lines
for the stat e’s congressional districts beg i n n i n g
in 2001.
This will be the fo u rth plan in 10 ye a rs, due to
the court challenges faced by the 12th
District. The new lines may provide more cl a r i-t
y as to who belongs in each district. While
this could affect who will hold wh i ch congre s-s
i o n a l seats, incumbents Clayton and Watt
may well be able to maintain their seats in
the 2002 elections under the new redistrict-ing
plan. n
› AFRICAN AMERICANS F ROM PAGE 8
With Sen. Jesse Helms having decided not to
seek re- election, North Carolina has in store
competitive contests for both the Democratic
and Republican nominations for the U. S.
Senate seat in 2002.
In the days of the one- party South, the winner
of the Democratic primary was practically
assured of victory in the general election.
Naturally, voters who wanted to make a dif-ference
turned out for the primary. But since
the rise of the two- party South, North Carolina
has increasingly come to have two different
kinds of elections, primary elections and gen -
eral elections with distinctly dif ferent charac-
Pa rties’ Paths to the Helms Seat
FE R R E L GU I L LO RY, DI R E C TO R
NC DATA N E T N E W S L E TT ER OF THE PROGRAM ON SOUTHERN POLITIC S , MEDI 1 6 A AND PUBL IC L IFE
Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life
School of Journalism and Mass Communications
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
CB # 3365
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC 27559– 3365
Non- Profit Organization
U. S. Postage
P A I D
Permit No. 177
Chapel Hill, NC
Democrats, by County
County Registered Turnout1
Mecklenburg 200,210 29,096
Wake 177,211 37,973
Guilford 144,413 30,745
Forsyth 97,834 22,712
Durham 97,819 22,072
Cumberland 87,363 17,586
Buncombe 69,118 11,593
Robeson 58,989 18,377
Orange 51,733 12,445
Gaston 50,654 7,492
New Hanover 50, 101 8,615
Pitt 46,100 11,290
Alamance 39,672 7,075
Davidson 36,508 5,841
Cabarrus 35,147 7,510
Nash 35,142 6,680
Sixteen counties account for 1,278,014 or 50.0 per-cent
of registered Democrats.
Republicans, by County
County Registered Turnout2
Mecklenburg 168,625 26,299
Wake 141,291 25,021
Guilford 96,826 19,592
Forsyth 77,823 12,993
Buncombe 46,687 7,459
New Hanover 46,121 8,051
Gaston 45,733 6,908
Cumberland 45,180 6,056
Davidson 43,380 6,353
Catawba 42,982 7,446
Randolph 38,217 5,646
Cabarrus 36,835 4,883
Durham 35,714 6,265
Rowan 35,415 6,272
Fourteen counties account for 900,829 or 51.7 per-cent
of registered Republicans.
Where the Primary Voters Are
NOTES:
1Average Democratic primary turnout in the 1996 senate, 1998 senate, and 2000 secretary ofstate race.
2Average Republican primary turnout in the 1992 Senate and 2000 gubernatorial races.
Sources: State Board ofElections; N. C. Carolina Manual, various years.
S E E P R I M A R I E S ON PAGE 15 ›