At the time this article was
written Barry Kay was Professor of Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier
University in Waterloo.

In its final report the Royal
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing proposed to restrict the
publication of polls during the final 72 hours of election campaigns. This is
one of the few recommendations to be acted upon yet it is supported by little
documented evidence about the "contaminating" effect of polls. This
article questions the assumption that the publication of public opinion polls
have a "bandwagon" effect on election results.

American research experience on the
bandwagon effect has been mixed. As has been observed by others "some
researchers detect a bandwagon and others do not."1 In the
cases where evidence supporting a bandwagon effect is found, typically the data
are uncontrolled for campaign effects, or else a controlled hypothetical
experiment is created where individuals are asked to react to fictitious information.2
The limitations of such research are an indication of the enormous obstacles
that face any inquiry on this subject.

In order to be able to draw
conclusions with confidence, ideally the research situation should allow for
controlled samples during an electoral contest where one group has access to
polling information and the other does not. Such a situation is not easily
achieved with limited resources, and as a result adaptations frequently become
necessary.

Apart from those works, there are
other researchers who have been unable to corroborate a bandwagon effect in
their inquiry.3 Others still have found evidence for an opposite
underdog effect suggesting that unfavourable polling results for a party will
disproportionately attract voters to them to mitigate against an apparent loss.4
There is much additional literature on related themes that refer to the
conceptual implications of predictions affecting outcomes in the electoral
arena.5 Indeed beyond the bandwagon effect there are a variety of
other works concerning with other related hypotheses such as strategic voting.
References to such research are not to attempt an exhaustive literature review,
but rather to acknowledge that its cumulative impact has been anything but
definitive, whether we are considering the less studied case of Canada or other
comparable electoral systems.

The bandwagon effect is not the
only illustration of public opinion polls influencing the electoral process,
but it is a common enough example that it seems appropriate to explore the
relationship of Canadian federal election results with a portrait of the public
mood at the beginning of each of those campaigns. Table 1 reviews the last
pre-election Gallup polls over the period since 1945 when public access to such
polls has been available in Canada. The right-hand columns reveal the fortunes
of the party that was ahead at the outset of the campaign. It shows that of
sixteen elections during this time frame, on only five occasions did the early
leader increase its support.

Indeed, if one excludes the
earliest period when public access to polling figures was less available, there
has been only one occasion (1974) over the past eleven elections when the party
with the greatest support at the time an election was called, actually improved
its standing by the end of the campaign. Mention might also be made of the 1988
contest, the only other instance when there was no net loss in support for the
early front-runner. Polling data during that campaign shows a precipitous
decline for the Conservative following the televised debate resulting in a
slight Liberal lead, but a subsequent Liberal drop saw the Conservatives finish
at the same figure they began. Caution is certainly advisable in drawing any
conclusions from such a table, however if there was consistent evidence of a
net bandwagon effect at the national level, one would expect to see a different
pattern to the results. Chance alone would suggest that the pre-campaign
leading party would not decline so regularly.

Table 1

Pre-election Polls vs Election Results 1945 à
1993

Last Pre-Campaign Poll

Election Result

L

PC

CCF
NDP

L

PC

CCF-NDP

%
Change in Pre-election Leader

1945

36%

29%

20%

41%

28%

15%

+5%

1949

42

32

17

50

30

13

+8

1953

46

31

13

32

10

+4

1957

47

32

11

41

39

11

-6

1958

35

50

9

33

54

10

+4

1962

45

38

9

37

37

14

-8

1963

47

32

10

42

33

12

-5

1965

45

29

15

41

33

18

-4

1968

50

29

16

45

31

17

-5

1972

42

32

15

39

35

18

-3

1974

40

33

21

43

35

16

+3

1979

41

41

15

40

36

18

-
1

1980

47

27

23

44

32

20

-3

1984

48

39

11

28

50

19

-20

1988

33

43

22

32

43

20

0

1993

33

36

8

+11

+10

41

16

7

+19+14

-20

*The last two
figures for 1993 refer to the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois. Most of this
information is drawn from the Toronto Star, September 1, 1984. It has been
augmented with the comparable Gallup poll published on October 3, 1988. Since
no pre-election Gallup poll was a available in 1993, the analogous figure for
that year is drawn from the ComQuest poll in the Globe and Mail,
September 16, 1993.

Alternate explanations are
available including the underdog effect which may be more compatible with the
data presented in Table 1, but there is little in the way of cogent
argumentation that such a theory has widespread applicability in Canada. Even
if there is little indication of nation-wide bandwagon voting over time, is it
not possible that such a phenomenon could be occurring at sub-national or
regional levels? This was the suggestion made by Johnston et al., pertaining to
Quebec and it is quite plausible.6

Table 2

Percentage of Defectors
during 1988 and 1993 Campaign By Expectation of Party Performancei

Lib

PC

NDP

Reform

B.Q.

Chance
of Winning

National
1988

1993

National
1988

1993

National
1988

1993

National
1993

National

1993

0-49

30,5

4.2

49,0

37,8

46.4

18,8

12.1

0

50

13,1

5.1

35,0

33,3

47,6

23,8

18,9

0

51-74

19,8

8.4

26,1

36,6

45,5

56,3

15,9

3,9

75-100

15,3

8.1

18,1

42,9

32,5

33,3

20,0

5,1

C
TAU

0,10*

-.02

O,22*

-0,05

0,10*

-0,18*

-0,05

-0,03

*
Indicates that the risk of results occuring by chance is less than 1/20 (This
is known as the .0 level of significance test)

A related question arises however
as to whether increased support for a party in a region, subsequent to its
establishing a strong national popularity is necessarily an indication of that
region’s voters jumping on a bandwagon. There can be a number of other reasons
that account for a party gaining support in a region late in a campaign. If
this pattern of late movement to a winning party recurred systematically, then
the bandwagon explanation seems more valid. Some would question whether the
1988 example, even if joined by the 1958 and 1984 cases really constitutes a
systematic recurring bandwagon effect. As already mentioned, there is an
equally valid alternate explanation that in the modern Canadian experience,
Quebec makes the winner rather than moves toward it. Quebec’s habitual
widespread support for the Liberals prior to the Mulroney era is hard to
attribute to a bandwagon phenomenon.

In probing this matter more fully,
the most recent national election studies include question items that can shed
light on the relationship between individuals’ expectations of electoral
outcomes and how they vote. These items do not refer to polls, but do ask
respondents about their expectations of each party winning the national
election, as well as winning at the individual riding level. Although there is
no linkage provided indicating whether they are aware of certain polls, the
logic of the bandwagon thesis suggests that if voters expected their party to perform
poorly, they would be more likely to defect.

The figures presented in Table 2
take advantage of the panel aspect of the election studies. The respondents
expressing a voting preference during the campaign are monitored as to whether
they switched away on election day, in conjunction with their mid-campaign
assessment of the expected performance of their chosen party. For example, in
the left-hand column of Table 2, during the 1988 campaign, of those declared
Liberal voters who thought the party had less than a 50% chance of winning the
election 30.5% defected during the campaign, whereas among Liberals who thought
there was a 75% or better prospect of their party winning the election, only
15.3% defected. This is consistent with the bandwagon hypothesis. By contrast
in the adjacent 1993 column when few Liberals abandoned their party during the
campaign the defection rate was 4,2% among those who thought the Liberals’
prospects were under 50% nationally, but 8.1% among those most confident of a
national Liberal victory. These figures contradict the bandwagon hypothesis and
produce a negative correlation coefficient.

The bandwagon hypothesis
anticipates voters deserting a sinking ship and moving toward a vessel with
better prospects. The evidence in Table 2 is somewhat mixed, but there is
little consistent pattern to support the bandwagon effect. Only among
Conservative supporters in 1988 is there a strong trend to switch away among
those with gloomier evaluations of party fortunes. Indeed the 1993 study shows
a majority of cases with negative correlations, and the only strong coefficient
being negative for the NDP nationally. It might be mentioned that a series of
control variables were applied to these relationships, including province and
the date of interview, but none had much impact upon the overall trend.

Table 3

Percentage of voters
switching toward pary during 1988 and 1993 Campaign by expectationm of party
performance.

Lib

PC

NPDp

Reform

B.Q.

Chance of winning

1988

1993

1988

1993

1988

1993

1993

1993

75-100%

33,0

16,5

17,3

3,0

14,4

0

0

1,6

51-74%

22,5

15,4

10,5

2,2

13,6

13,3

13,3

1,7

50%

18,8

15,6

12,9

0,3

8,0

5,1

5,1

1,9

0-49%

7,5

15,2

8,1

0,8

4,0

6,4

6,4

0,3

TAY
C

0,16*

0,01

0,06

0,01

0,05

0

00

0,01

Inicates
that the risk of results occuring by chance is less tht 1/20. (This is known
as the .05 level of significance test)

Shortcomings can be found with this
particular research procedure. Interviews were conducted at different times
during the campaigns, and accordingly the respondents by definition were
subject to differing election stimuli. Moreover, individual assessments of
party performance could well change between the original interview and election
day.7Another complicating factor is that for some voters,
partisan support can come to cloud one’s judgement about electoral
prospects, such that the wish becomes father to the perception. By contrast
with 1988, some of the parties in 1993 have relatively smaller vote bases from
which these figures are derived.

Table 3 is an analogue to Table 2
in that it correlates vote switching during the 1988 and 1993 elections by
voter perceptions of how they expect the parties to perform. To illustrate with
the upper left-hand column of Table 3, during the 1988 campaign, 33.0% of
non-Liberals who thought the Liberal party had a 75% or better chance of
winning the election nationally eventually switched toward the Liberals while
only 7.5% among those who thought the Liberal prospects were under 50%
switched, a result supporting the bandwagon hypothesis. In the adjacent 1993
column, the table shows a much more consistent pattern of switching toward the
Liberals ranging from 16.5% among those non-Liberals most confident of a
national Liberal victory to 15.2% among those most doubtful of a national
Liberal victory. Hence the correlation coefficient is only .01 in this case.

The difference is that Table 3
examines the propensity of respondents to move toward (rather than away from) a
party based upon their sense of its electoral prospects. To complete the
analogy, if the bandwagon effect pertains, voters are more likely to switch to
a party they feel has a better chance of winning. This table examines the
proportion of respondents not supporting a party during their mid-campaign
interview that reported switching to it on election day.

Again there is little patterned
evidence of a bandwagon. Only in the case of the Liberals in 1988 is there
clear support for the hypothesis that voters are attracted to a party they
think has a better chance of winning.8In 1993, apart from
the local riding perceptions of those switching to the Liberals (not shown in
the table) there were no other examples that were statistically significant. As
with Table 2, the 1993 data are hindered by a small vote base in some
categories for a number of parties.

It is not the intent of the paper
to deny the existence of evidence that is consistent with the bandwagon
phenomenon. Circumstances can occur where voters move to parties that they think
may have a better chance of winning, quite possibly including the 1988 Quebec
example. It is also entirely possible that some voters are motivated by the
underdog effect, or a variant of it, in which they may vote against a party
with a big lead or to which they wish to deny a parliamentary majority. There
are numerous other conceptual adaptations of strategic voting which can
generate a range of alternate hypotheses, that link some expectations of
electoral outcome to an individual’s voting decision. In each of this host of
possible examples, access to polling information might well influence how
voters ultimately behave.

Does such influence constitute
interference or even contamination of the Canadian electoral process? For this
to be true, a case should be made that publicopinionpolls
present a systematic pattern of intervention in the outcome of elections.
Although the bandwagon effect has been the focus of this paper, it certainly is
not the only type of intervention that could interfere with the process. In
addition to the bandwagon hypothesis’ assumption that parties leading in the
polls, will win by even larger margins as impressionable voters move toward
them, there are other possible systematic effects. The underdog thesis suggests
that parties leading in the polls will tend to lose support. One form of
strategic voting suggests that third place parties will decline, while second
place parties improve their position to more effectively challenge the first
place party. Each of these possible theories could apply nation-wide or
systematically among some demographic category or sub-region, as was
hypothesised about Quebec. By this criterion, it would appear that there is no
compelling evidence of polls having a systematic pattern of intervention in the
electoral process.

If there is such insubstantial
evidence to corroborate the supposition that polls interfere with Canadian
elections, why is the view so widespread among elites? It might be an extension
of a more generalized concern that polls have a negative impact upon the
conduct of Canadian politics. This has been expressed in the view that social
critics and activists condemn polls as tending to institutionalize a
conservative anti-innovative mass impulse.9The disdain
suggests that pollsters have "replaced elected representatives ... as the
major determinants of political action."10

Jeffrey Simpson of the Globe and
Mailhas stated that polls are responsible for timidity in
politicians and incrementalism in policy-making. Worse still is their impact
upon his own breed, the fourth estate. He has written that "just as love
is wasted on the young, so polls are often wasted on the media. More
specifically he is critical of the media’s obsession with a horserace
perspective, and the inability of journalists to report polls responsibly.
Among his comments are that "once the media rush to judgement following a
given poll ... the politicians feel they must shift their behaviour
accordingly." It has been suggested by others that horserace stories are
more easily reported than substantive issues.

When hostility to the role of polls
in the political process has reached such intensity among the journalistic
elite, is it such a leap of faith that unsubstantiated assertions be attributed
to the potential impact upon the public? The claims made about undue influence
upon the electoral process then rest in part on the fact that the media does
not trust its ability to present the material appropriately.

One wonders if the publication of
polls was restricted as some media commentators wish, how they would perceive
similar constraints upon their own ability to publicly speculate about election
outcomes, and the possibility that might alter how some citizens vote.

It is difficult to draw definitive
conclusions from the research reported in this paper. While one can affirm the
absence of any prevailing general bandwagon effect, there is little basis to
suggest that the thesis can be categorically dismissed in all circumstances.Evidence exists, idiosyncratic as it might be, that in some situations
Canadian voters may be more likely to defect from a party if they expect it to
perform poorly. There is also scattered evidence, that in a few cases Canadians
may be less likely to switch away from a party they feel has little chance of
success. Although these data were derived independently of any information
about poll awareness by respondents, nothing found has precluded the
possibility that a small minority of Canadians might be influenced by polling
information. However if this is so, there is also little persistent pattern to
the direction of the phenomenon. Rather it is more likely that the effect, if
any, is diffuse with a number of cross-cutting manifestations that result in
minimal net impact upon election results.

Another perspective on this matter
suggests that concern with whether a bandwagon or comparable effectexists,
finesses a more important point. Such an argument suggests that whether people
are affected by polls is of less concern than why they may be affected. The
gaining of information that permits a voter to make an informed strategic
decision is not of the same order as someone who merely wants to be on the
winning side as an end in itself. Those who would restrict public access to
polls should then have an additional burden of proof to establish, beyond the
question of influence upon the electorate. Namely, is the influence
dysfunctional for the political system or constructive?

Notes

1. Richard Henshel and William
Johnston, "The Emergence of Bandwagon Effects: A Theory", The
Sociological Quarterly, 28, 1987, p. 493.

6. See Richard Johnston, André
Blais, Henry Brady and Jean Crête, Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a
Canadian Election, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 1992, pp.
199-200. Probably the most useful attempt to provide research data on the
electoral impact of polls in Canada is contained in the National Election
Studies of 1988 and 1993. Its treatment of this subject focuses upon
expectations of electoral outcomes during the 1988 campaign by monitoring
trends within the rolling samples. After acknowledging limitation with the
bandwagon hypothesis applicability nationwide in 1988, the primary example
offered is the Quebec subsample whose support for the Mulroney Tories is
presented as a response to strong Conservative polls, part of an extended
pattern of voting for the likely election winners, a perception that usually
meant Liberal support historically. There is anecdotal evidence in 1984 at
least, and probably 1958 as well to show that Quebec moved to Conservative
support after a Tory victory was indicated elsewhere, apart from the 1988 case.
The 1993 federal election result in Quebec, on the other hand, would lead to a
different interpretation. Conceptually, Johnston presents two models to account
for the Québécois tendency toward block voting. In one model "Quebecers go
with winners" while in the other model they "make the winner".
As is stated in the book, "only the first model is really about a kind of
bandwagon." During modern times there are really only three elections
1958, 1984 and 1988 where there is evidence consistent with substantial numbers
of Quebecers voting because of a bandwagon effect, and even then alternate
models exist to explain the phenomenon. The 1993 success of the Bloc Québécois
suggests anything but bandwagon voting, at least in the traditional sense.

7. As respondents in the rolling
samples were interviewed over seven week periods, it is reasonable to expect a
greater tendency of vote switching among those contacted earlier in the
respective campaigns. This anticipated effect was monitored by dividing the
samples into four categories based upon interview date, and this control
variable was found to have little impact upon the relationships presented.

8. This finding, together with the
observation in Table 2 that Conservatives were less likely to defect in 1988 if
they were confident of the party’s national prospects, led to the use of a
control on Conservative expectations for voters switching to the Liberals, and
produced a .11 Tau C coefficient. Other applications of this cross-party
control produced substantially weaker or negative correlations.