(d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Although the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has
enjoyed a reputation for running safe and humane prisons,
Embassy officers have catalogued a number of recent incidents
that indicate increased influence and infiltration of
Jaysh-al-Mahdi (JAM) elements within the MOJ, specifically in
the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS). JAM elements have
reportedly participated in attacks against ICS staff,
orchestrated the illegal release of prisoners with JAM ties,
and kidnapped Sunni prisoners. Although Minister of Justice
Hashim al-Shibli told Emboffs on December 12 that ICS DG
Juma'a, who is suspected of facilitating JAM activities
within MOJ facilities, would be replaced, he has not yet
selected a successor. The Embassy will continue to push
Minister al-Shibli to replace corrupt staff and establish a
system for vetting both current and future employees. END
SUMMARY.
--------------
ICS Background
--------------
2. (C) The ICS was established in 2003 to staff the prisons
and jails operated by MOJ. Its organizational structure
included an aggressive internal affairs department and a
national training academy that stressed compliance with
international corrections practices and respect for UN human
rights standards. Working closely with MOJ/ICITAP advisors,
the ICS gained a reputation for running safe, secure and
humane prisons. Although MOI and MOD have both suffered from
prison abuse scandals, MOJ has maintained a clean record.
-----------------------------------
Attack on Juma'a the Turning Point?
-----------------------------------
3. (C) In late December 2005, ICS Director General (DG)
Juma'a's Sadr City home was attacked while he was at work.
Juma'a's nephew, a member of his personal security detail,
was killed and his son was seriously wounded. Emboffs
believe that the attack was perpetrated by JAM as an effort
to intimidate Juma'a and to coerce ICS staff to cooperate
with JAM members. During the period following the attack on
Juma'a, ICS staff members were kidnapped and beaten, and
some, including two Internal Affairs directors, were even
killed.
4. (C) The effects of the JAM intimidation campaign were
noticeable. Although attacks continued, for example on
convoys transporting prisoners, ICS staff members were
released while the prisoners were kidnapped. On October 11,
DG Juma'a personally arranged a prisoner swap between Rusafa
Prison in Baghdad and Baddush Prison in Mosul. Five Shia
prisoners were brought by a Baddush transport team to Rusafa.
After departing Rusafa to return to Mosul with the Sunni
prisoners, the transport team was intercepted and kidnapped.
During the incident, the warden from Mosul called Riyadh
al-Nouri, a close associate of Muqtada al-Sadr, and begged
for the lives of his prison guards. The attackers released
the prison guards four hours later; however the Sunni
prisoners have not been seen since and are suspected to have
become victims of sectarian violence.
------------------------------
Recent Events Raise Suspicions
------------------------------
5. (C) On November 18, 180 convicted prisoners were moved
from Rusafa Prison to Ft. Suse Prison near Sulaymaniyah as
part of the plan to create pre-trial bed space for MOI and
MOD prisoners. Soon after arriving at Ft. Suse, three
prisoners gave credible statements alleging that DG Juma'a
releases prisoners at the direction of JAM, disposing of old
inmate records and replacing them with arriving prisoner
records to balance prison count numbers.
6. (C) On November 23, DOJ/ICITAP advisors received a
confidential report that three Shia "death row" inmates were
SIPDIS
missing from the Ishkbarat Maximum Security Prison in
Baghdad. An inmate count confirmed the prisoners were
missing. Prison staff reported that the prisoners were
picked up by the Rusafa transportation section "to go to
court" on November 22 and never returned. Emboffs believe
that the prisoners were illegally released.
BAGHDAD 00000001 002 OF 002
7. (C) Also on November 23, fourteen convicted Shia prisoners
who were being staged for transportation to Ft. Suse escaped.
The prisoners were signed out for a visit to the Rusafa
prison hospital, but were never returned. The escapes
followed a recommendation from DOJ/ICITAP advisors to cancel
the hospital visit and increase security at the prison.
8. (C) On December 5, nine Sunni prisoners from Baladiyat
jail were picked up by what was described as a team from the
MOI IP criminal investigation division. The prisoners were
turned over to the IPs, despite the lack of proper
authentication of the release order that was delivered, and
were not seen again. They are presumed to be victims of
sectarian violence.
-------
Comment
-------
9. (C) Until recently, ICS custody procedures were closely
followed, and escapes were rare, usually involving "break
outs" or insurgent attacks. The ICS is presently
experiencing far too many questionable incidents which,
together with intelligence information, suggest that JAM is
exercising significant control over the ICS. Established ICS
policies and procedures are being ignored, and intelligence
suggests that DG Juma'a and his headquarters staff are
complicit in the escapes. Emboffs assess that the integrity
of the ICS has been severely compromised.
10, (C) In a December 12 meeting, Minister al-Shibli told
Emboffs that he is planning to replace DG Juma'a with an as
yet unselected Iraqi Army officer who is qualified,
courageous and loyal to the new government. While we believe
this is an appropriate first step to mitigate militia
influence in the ICS, more will need to be done to eliminate
embedded JAM elements and ensure that they do not return.
11. (C) Emboffs will continue to press GOI officials to
replace corrupted staff members and to establish a system,
including adequate checks and balances, to vet ICS employees
for militia involvement. We will press for new staff to be
hired and trained under this system, and for existing staff
to be re-vetted and dismissed if they are found to hold ties
to any militia. We will also continue to monitor the
Minister and Deputy Minister's security environment, to
ensure that they have enough resources and protection to make
the difficult changes necessary to counter militia influence
in the MOJ.
SCOBEY

Raw content

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000001
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2016
TAGS: IZ, KDEM, KJUS, PGOV, PHUM
SUBJECT: JAM INFLUENCE IN MOJ/IRAQI CORRECTIONS SERVICE
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Margaret Scoeby for reasons 1.5(b) and
(d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Although the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has
enjoyed a reputation for running safe and humane prisons,
Embassy officers have catalogued a number of recent incidents
that indicate increased influence and infiltration of
Jaysh-al-Mahdi (JAM) elements within the MOJ, specifically in
the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS). JAM elements have
reportedly participated in attacks against ICS staff,
orchestrated the illegal release of prisoners with JAM ties,
and kidnapped Sunni prisoners. Although Minister of Justice
Hashim al-Shibli told Emboffs on December 12 that ICS DG
Juma'a, who is suspected of facilitating JAM activities
within MOJ facilities, would be replaced, he has not yet
selected a successor. The Embassy will continue to push
Minister al-Shibli to replace corrupt staff and establish a
system for vetting both current and future employees. END
SUMMARY.
--------------
ICS Background
--------------
2. (C) The ICS was established in 2003 to staff the prisons
and jails operated by MOJ. Its organizational structure
included an aggressive internal affairs department and a
national training academy that stressed compliance with
international corrections practices and respect for UN human
rights standards. Working closely with MOJ/ICITAP advisors,
the ICS gained a reputation for running safe, secure and
humane prisons. Although MOI and MOD have both suffered from
prison abuse scandals, MOJ has maintained a clean record.
-----------------------------------
Attack on Juma'a the Turning Point?
-----------------------------------
3. (C) In late December 2005, ICS Director General (DG)
Juma'a's Sadr City home was attacked while he was at work.
Juma'a's nephew, a member of his personal security detail,
was killed and his son was seriously wounded. Emboffs
believe that the attack was perpetrated by JAM as an effort
to intimidate Juma'a and to coerce ICS staff to cooperate
with JAM members. During the period following the attack on
Juma'a, ICS staff members were kidnapped and beaten, and
some, including two Internal Affairs directors, were even
killed.
4. (C) The effects of the JAM intimidation campaign were
noticeable. Although attacks continued, for example on
convoys transporting prisoners, ICS staff members were
released while the prisoners were kidnapped. On October 11,
DG Juma'a personally arranged a prisoner swap between Rusafa
Prison in Baghdad and Baddush Prison in Mosul. Five Shia
prisoners were brought by a Baddush transport team to Rusafa.
After departing Rusafa to return to Mosul with the Sunni
prisoners, the transport team was intercepted and kidnapped.
During the incident, the warden from Mosul called Riyadh
al-Nouri, a close associate of Muqtada al-Sadr, and begged
for the lives of his prison guards. The attackers released
the prison guards four hours later; however the Sunni
prisoners have not been seen since and are suspected to have
become victims of sectarian violence.
------------------------------
Recent Events Raise Suspicions
------------------------------
5. (C) On November 18, 180 convicted prisoners were moved
from Rusafa Prison to Ft. Suse Prison near Sulaymaniyah as
part of the plan to create pre-trial bed space for MOI and
MOD prisoners. Soon after arriving at Ft. Suse, three
prisoners gave credible statements alleging that DG Juma'a
releases prisoners at the direction of JAM, disposing of old
inmate records and replacing them with arriving prisoner
records to balance prison count numbers.
6. (C) On November 23, DOJ/ICITAP advisors received a
confidential report that three Shia "death row" inmates were
SIPDIS
missing from the Ishkbarat Maximum Security Prison in
Baghdad. An inmate count confirmed the prisoners were
missing. Prison staff reported that the prisoners were
picked up by the Rusafa transportation section "to go to
court" on November 22 and never returned. Emboffs believe
that the prisoners were illegally released.
BAGHDAD 00000001 002 OF 002
7. (C) Also on November 23, fourteen convicted Shia prisoners
who were being staged for transportation to Ft. Suse escaped.
The prisoners were signed out for a visit to the Rusafa
prison hospital, but were never returned. The escapes
followed a recommendation from DOJ/ICITAP advisors to cancel
the hospital visit and increase security at the prison.
8. (C) On December 5, nine Sunni prisoners from Baladiyat
jail were picked up by what was described as a team from the
MOI IP criminal investigation division. The prisoners were
turned over to the IPs, despite the lack of proper
authentication of the release order that was delivered, and
were not seen again. They are presumed to be victims of
sectarian violence.
-------
Comment
-------
9. (C) Until recently, ICS custody procedures were closely
followed, and escapes were rare, usually involving "break
outs" or insurgent attacks. The ICS is presently
experiencing far too many questionable incidents which,
together with intelligence information, suggest that JAM is
exercising significant control over the ICS. Established ICS
policies and procedures are being ignored, and intelligence
suggests that DG Juma'a and his headquarters staff are
complicit in the escapes. Emboffs assess that the integrity
of the ICS has been severely compromised.
10, (C) In a December 12 meeting, Minister al-Shibli told
Emboffs that he is planning to replace DG Juma'a with an as
yet unselected Iraqi Army officer who is qualified,
courageous and loyal to the new government. While we believe
this is an appropriate first step to mitigate militia
influence in the ICS, more will need to be done to eliminate
embedded JAM elements and ensure that they do not return.
11. (C) Emboffs will continue to press GOI officials to
replace corrupted staff members and to establish a system,
including adequate checks and balances, to vet ICS employees
for militia involvement. We will press for new staff to be
hired and trained under this system, and for existing staff
to be re-vetted and dismissed if they are found to hold ties
to any militia. We will also continue to monitor the
Minister and Deputy Minister's security environment, to
ensure that they have enough resources and protection to make
the difficult changes necessary to counter militia influence
in the MOJ.
SCOBEY