(SUMMARY: Tosfos is curious to know why a. Why the Tana holds by 'Tiher es ha'Tamei, Mah she'Asah Asuy, and now that he does, how he can they say 'vi'Yeshaledm mi'Beiso'? They then ask why, if, as the Gemara says in Eruvin, the author of the Mishnah is R. Meir, how it can rule 'Mah she'Asah Asuy', in light of what R. Meir holds in Gitin 'Kansisan Shogeg Atu Meizid'?)

(c) Answer: At this juncture, he holds that it was the owner who mixed the fruit together with his fruit (although he ultimately learns that it was the Chacham who did so). Consequently, 'Mah she'Asuy, Asuy' refers to where he mixed with a majority of his Tahor fruit, whereas 've'Yeshalem mi'Beiso' speaks where he his fruit was in the minority.

(d) Question: According to the Sugya in Perek ad Kamah, which establishes this Mishnah like R. Meir, why is the fruit Bateil be'Rov, seeing as R. Meir holds in Perek ha'Nizakin (regarding a case where 'nuts fell and broke', that even if they fell be'Shogeg, they do not become Bateil because he holds that we punish Shogeg because of Meizid'? So why do we not apply that here as well?

וי"ל כיון דעל פי חכם עביד, לא קניס האי שוגג.

(e) Answer #1: We do not apply that principle here, because, since he acted on the ruling of a Chacham, it would not be appropriate to punish Shogeg in this case.

(f) Answer #2: Alternatively, it is only regarding the Din of Garmi that we establish the Mishnah like R. Meir, not with regard to other issues.

2) TOSFOS DH KA'AN BE'MUMCHEH

תוספות ד"ה כאן במומחה

(SUMMARY: After establishing our Sugya by an error through Shikul ha'Da'as, Tosfos asks why Rav Yosef, in the first Perek, exempted Mar Zutra b'rei de'Rav Nachman from having to pay assuming the litigants authorized him to adjudicate, seeing as our Sugya obligates a Mumcheh to pay even in such a case).

(a) Clarification: The entire Sugya speaks where the Chacham erred 'be'Shikul ha'Da'as (in his judgement), because with regard to an error based on 'a lack of knowledge of a specific Mishnah' (bi'D'var Mishnah), both Rav Nachman and Rav Yosef themselves rule in Kesuvos that 'If Beis-Din sold the debtor's property without first announcing it, it is if they had erred in a D'var Mishnah, and they are obligated to withdraw their ruling.

1. Question: Earlier in the first Perek, Mar Zutra the son of R. Nachman issued a ruling and erred. When he came before Rav Yosef, he ruled that as long as the litigants authorized him to adjudicate, he was Patur from paying. Why, even if he erred in Shkul ha'Da'as, was he Patur, seeing as he was an expert (whom we obligate here to pay)?

וי"מ, דמומחה דהכא היינו במומחה דסמיכא.

2. Answer: 'Expert' in our Sugya refers to someone who has Semichah, which the Amora'im of Bavel did not have.

3) TOSFOS DH HASHTA NAMI LO K'LUM OVDAS

תוספות ד"ה השתא נמי לא כלום עבדת

(SUMMARY: Firstly, Tosfos establish that R. Tarfon did not touch the animal. Then, despite the Gemara in Eruvin, which initially tries to establish the Mishnah of 'Dan es ha'Din' like R. Meir, they prove that our Sugya [which renders the Chacham Patur if had the owner not mixed it, he would have been able to retract], goes like the Rabbanan).

בלא נטל ונתן ביד איירי, דאי האכילה ר' טרפון לכלבים, א"כ, טובא עבד.

(a) Clarification: The Gemara must be speaking where R. Tarfon did not 'take it with his hands and deliver it', because if he had, then how can the Gemara say that he did not do anything?

(b) Question: In Perek 'Ad Kamah', the Gemara initially tries to establish the current case of 'Dan es ha'Din' like R. Meir, before concluding that it is speaking by 'Natal ve'Nasan be'Yad'. Why does the Mishnah then obligate the Chacham to pay when he declares Tahor what is Tamei, due to the fact that the owner mixed the fruit with his own Tahor fruit? Why do we not say that since, if he had not mixed it, he would have been able to retract, now too, it is as if did not do anything (like we say in our Sugya)?

(c) Answer: Our Sugya goes according to the Rabbanan. According to R. Meir, who holds of Dina de'Garmi, the Chacham will be Chayav, even though if he had not mixed it, he would have been able to retract.

(d) Proof: Like in the case of someone who shows a Dinar to a banker which later turns out to be a bad coin, where R. Meir, in 'ha'Gozel Kama', obligates the banker to pay, even though, had the coin been available, the banker would have been able to retract.

33b----------------------------------------33b

4) TOSFOS DH SHE'ITVAN IM PEIROSAV

תוספות ד"ה שעירבן עם פירותיו

(SUMMARY: Tosfos discuss R. Efrayim's Kashya that, according to the Salka Da'atach, that it is the owner who mixed the fruit, the Chacham ought to have been Paur, like 'Metamei be'Shogeg', which the Gemara in ha'Nizakin rules is Patur. They explain why the Kashya is confined to R. Yochanan, but is not a problem according to Chizliyah, before finally answering it).

(b) Qualification: Granted, according to Chizkiyah, who holds there that min haTorah both Shogeg and Meizid are Chayav, and the reason that they said 'be'Shogeg Patur' is in order not to discourage the perpetrator to inform us of what he did, it is clear that this reason does is not applicable here, seeing as a Chacham will inform us even if he he is Chayav to pay.

(c) Question (Part 2): But according to R. Yochanan, who holds that min ha'Torah, both Shogeg and Meizid are Patur, and the reason that they said 'be'Meizid Chayav' is to discourage people from running around rendering everyone's crops Tamei, seeing as he is Patur from having to pay, that reason to make him Chayav does not apply here?

(d) Qualifying the Question: Granted, according to the Gemara's conclusion, where it establishes the case where it is the Chacham who mixed the fruit, it is correct to declare him Chayav to pay, seeing as taking the fruit with his hands and mixing it was un-called, and renders him a Meizid; According to our initial understanding however, where it was the owner who mixed them, the Kashya remains.

(e) Answer: Still, he is considered Meizid, seeing as, knowing of the likelihood of the owner taking the fruit and mixing it with his own, he should have been more careful in his ruling.

5) TOSFOS DH ASYA RASHA RASHA TANYA NAMI HACHI (#1)

תוספות ד"ה אתיא רשע רשע תניא נמי הכי

(SUMMARY: Based on this Sugya, Tosfos query Rava in a number of places in Shas where he declines to apply the D'rashah of "Rasha" "Rasha", [and likewise R. Yochanan in one place, where he does the same]. They also ask how it is that that the Gemara in the first Perek in Makos appears to hold like Abaye? Whilst on the other hand, the Gemara later learns that Mamon in the place of Malkos is Patur from"K'dei Rish'aso"? They give two answers to resolve the many questions).

(a) Question #1: This Beraisa poses a Kashya on Rava, who (commenting on R. Yishmael, who maintains that Malkos requires twenty-three Dayanim) cites the D'rashah that Malkos stands in the place of Misah, and declines to learn it from the Gezeirah-Shavah of "Rasha" "Rasha"?

(b) Question #2: And one can ask the same question on him, when in the first Perek of Makos, regarding the Din of 'dividing Mamon among Eidim Zomemin, but not Malkos', he gives the reason for the latter ruling as being that it would not be fulfilling the requirement of "Ka'asher Zamam" (rather than from "Rasha" "Rasha")?

(c) Question #3: Furthermore, how come that the S'tam Gemara there holds like Abaye, when it learns that 'Eidim Zomemin cannot be sentenced to Malkos until the Din has been concluded' by Chayvei Misah with the Gezeirah-Shavah of "Rasha" "Rasha"?

ויש לומר, דרבא אית ליה ג"ש, אלא דלהנך מילי קאמר דלא צריך.

(d) Answer: In principle, Rava holds of the Gezeirah-Shavah, only in those two cases, he maintains that it is not needed.

(e) Question #1: The question remains however, that in 'Eilu Na'aros' in connection with 'Chayvei Malkos Shogegin', which Abaye learns are Patur from Mamon from "Rasha" "Rasha", whereas Rava learns it from "Makeh" "Makeh".

(g) Question #3 (Part 1): Moreover, later in the Perek, why does the Gemara learn that Malkos and Mamon is Patur (from Malkos) from "K'dei Rish'aso", and not from the Gezeirah-Shavah of "Rasha" "Rasha"?

(h) Answer: Rava and R' Yochanan do not Darshan the Gezeirah-Shavah of 'Rasha' there, since the Gezeirah-Shavah is coming to exempt Mamon that comes together with Malkos, whereas the Pasuk of "Rasha" ("ve'Hayah Im bin Hakos ha'Rasha") is written in connection with the actual Malkos.

6) TOSFOS DH ASYA RASHA RASHA TANYA NAMI HACHI

תוספות ד"ה אתיא רשע רשע תניא נמי הכי

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why it is that, despite their previous statement, Rava in Kesuvos, does Darshen "Makeh" "Makeh". And finally they explain why the Gemara later that learns Malkos and Mamon from "K'dei Rish'aso" must go according to Rava [and what Abaye will then learn from the spare Pasuk there]).

והא דדריש רבא "מכה מכה"?

(a) Implied Question: And the fact that (in spite of what we just explained) in the Sugya in Kesuvos, Rava does Darshen "Makeh" "Makeh" ...

משום דגבי תשלומים כתיב "מכה נפש בהמה ישלמנה".

(b) Answer (Part 1): This is because the Pasuk ("Makeh Nefesh Beheimah Yeshalmenah") is written in connection with the actual payment.

(d) Extention (Part 2): And the Sugya later in the Perek which learns Malkos and Mamon from "K'dei Rish'aso" goes according to Rava, since Abaye would learn it (from Misah u'Mamon) from "Rasha" "Rasha".

ומוקי חדא למיתה ומלקות כר"מ.

(e) Extention (Part 3): And he (Abaye) will establish the spare Pasuk there by Misah and Malkos, according to R. Meir.

2. Explanation (Part 2): Since according to Abaye, neither Malkos nor Mamon require a Pasuk, seeing as learns them the Gezeirah-Shavah of "Rasha" "Rasha". He will therefore establish one for Misah and one for Malkos, like Rebbi Meir.

7) TOSFOS DH TA'AH BE'NO'EF VE'NO'EFES MAHU

תוספות ד"ה טעה בנואף ונואפת מהו

(SUMMARY: Tosfos query Rashi, who explains the question as to what there is regarding adultery that Beis-Din may have erred by ruled leniently, from the Gemara in Makos, which presents various such possibilities. Tosfos therefore explain the question in connection with whether there is any ruling regarding the adulterer and the adulteress with which the Tzedokim do not agree. And they explain the rest of the Sugya accordingly).

פירש הקונטרס דבנואף ליכא טעות לזכות.

(a) Explanation #1: Rashi explains that by the case of adultery, there is no room for error that the Beis-Din may have ruled leniently.

(b) Question: But that is simply not true? The Gemara in the first Perek of Makos refers to the question of whether it will suffice for the witnesses to see the adulterers in a compromising position, or whether they need to actually witness the act from close; Whether or not a 'Chaver' (Talmid-Chacham) requires warning or not; whether or not, the defendant needs to declare that he is prepared to die, and whether the two witnesses must warn him or it will suffice for somebody else to do so?

וי"ל, דמבעיא ליה 'אם יש בנואף ונואפת דבר שאין הצדוקין מודין בו'.

(c) Explanation #2 (Part 1): The She'eilah is whether there are any rulings regarding the adulterer and the adulteress with which the Tzedokim do not agree.

1. Explanation #2 (Part 2): To which R. Yochanan replies 'a'de'Mokdach Yakid Kotz ... ' - in other words, whilst you are busying yourself with what I instructed you, to discover the difference between what the Tzedokim do agree and what they don't, first make a point of getting to know with what they agree and with what they don't.

ועתה, מפרש הש"ס ה"ד דבר שאין הצדוקין מודין בו.

2. Explanation #2 (Part 3): And now, based on that, the Gemara explains what it is that the Tzedokim do not agree with.

8) TOSFOS DH SHE'TA'AH SHE'LO KE'DARKAH

תוספות ד"ה שטעה שלא כדרכה

(SUMMARY: Tosfos query with Rashi, who establishes the Gemara by a regular case of she'Lo ke'Darkah, and who maintains that the Tzedokim disagree with that ruling, which is Asur min ha'Torah, only not written explicitly ... . So they establish it by Ha'ara'ah of she'Lo ke'Darkah).

(a) Claification: Rashi explains that the Chiyuv is not mentioned in the Torah, only we learn it from "Mishk'vei Ishah", from which we learn that there are two 'Mishkavos on a woman, to which the Tzedokim do not agree.

(b) Question: The Tzedokim do, in fact, agree with this D'rashah, as is evident in the first Perek of Horayos. Shmuel rules there that 'Beis-Di are not Chatav (a Par He'elam Davar) until the issue a ruling with which the Tzedokim do not agree. And the Gemara concludes - that they rules that 'she'Lo ke'Darkah is permitted'. On which the Gemara asks 'But does the Torah not write "Mishkevei Isha?" - meaning that the Tzedokim do agree with it?

(c) Answer: It must therefore be speaking here with regard to 'Ha'ara'ah' (the first stage of intimacy); And what they ruled was that, although by ke'Darkah, Ha'ara'ah is forbidden, by she'Lo ke'Darkah, it is permitted.

אע"ג דפריך התם אההיא שינויא?

(d) Implied Question: Even though the Gemara there queries this distinction ...

מכל מקום לפי המסקנא דהתם, איתוקם ההיא שינויא שפיר.

(e) Answer: Nevertheless, according to the conclusion there, it is well established.

9) TOSFOS DH ECHAD MIN HA'tALMIDIM

תוספות ד"ה אחד מן התלמידים

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why a Talmid is permitted to voice his opinion regarding a litigant, whereas a Dayan who has already claimed that he does not know, is not).

(a) Question: When, at the end of the first Perek, the Gemara rules that if a Dayan initially claims that he does not know and then wants to retract, we do not listen to what he has to say. Why is he any different than a Talmid, whose opinion is taken into account even though he is not part of the Beis-Din?

וי"ל, דהתם באומר טעמא לחובה, והכא באומר טעמא לזכות.

(b) Answer: The Gemara there speaks where the Dayan now wants to make a statement that will render the litigant guilty, whereas our Gemara is speaking where the Talmid makes a statement in his favor.