MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS GLENN, LEVIN, LIEBERMAN, AKAKA, DURBIN,
TORRICELLI AND CLELAND
Chapter 30: Roger Tamraz......................................... 8095
Findings..................................................... 8095
Overview..................................................... 8095
1970-1990: Tamraz's Business Ventures, Dealings With the CIA
and Political Contributions................................ 8096
Business Ventures........................................ 8096
Reported Contacts with the CIA........................... 8097
RNC's Recommendation for a Reagan Administration Position 8097
Tamraz Leaves Lebanon after Embezzlement Charges......... 8098
1994-1995: The Commerce Department........................... 8098
1995: The Caspian Sea Pipeline............................... 8099
U.S. Policy on the Caspian Sea Pipeline.................. 8099
May-June 1995: Meetings with Executive Branch Officials.. 8100
Bob of the CIA........................................... 8101
July-October 1995: Contributions to the Democratic Party..... 8103
Contribution History..................................... 8103
The DNC's Acceptance of Tamraz's Contributions........... 8103
September 1995: Request For an Official Meeting With the Vice
President.................................................. 8104
Tamraz's Attendance at DNC Events............................ 8105
Summary of Events........................................ 8105
Fowler's Role............................................ 8105
No Effect on Policy...................................... 8107
April 1996: Department of Energy Official Talks to Heslin.... 8107
Tamraz's Attendance at March 27 and April 1, 1996 DNC
Events................................................. 8107
Follow-Up on the Pipeline Project........................ 8108
The Request within the Department of Energy.............. 8109
Carter's Call to Heslin.................................. 8110
Heslin's Testimony....................................... 8110
Carter's Testimony....................................... 8110
The Department of Energy Responds to the Request for
Information Conclusions................................ 8111
Conclusion: Access Still for Sale in 1997.................... 8113
PART 5 FUNDRAISING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL PARTIES
AND ADMINISTRATIONS
Chapter 30: Roger Tamraz
Roger E. Tamraz is an American businessman involved in
investment banking and international energy projects. In the
mid-1990s, he sought to become a ``dealmaker'' in an oil
pipeline project that would cross the Caspian Sea region of
Central Asia. In the hope of obtaining U.S. Government support
for his project, Tamraz used his past relationship with the
Central Intelligence Agency, met with mid-level U.S. Government
officials, and made political contributions to the Democratic
Party.
The Committee's investigation focused on whether officials
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Council, the Democratic National Committee, the White House, or
the Department of Energy improperly promoted Tamraz's pipeline
proposal or gave him access to high-level government officials;
why Tamraz was permitted to attend DNC events in the White
House when staff had recommended that he not have any contact
with high-level officials; and whether U.S. policy on the
Caspian Sea pipeline changed as a result of Tamraz's political
contributions or access to government officials.
findings
(1) Roger Tamraz openly bought access from both political
parties.
(2) Tamraz's attendance at DNC events was based on his
political contributions and was unwise given the warnings that
he might misuse such attendance. DNC Chairman Donald Fowler
endorsed Tamraz's attendance at these events, despite early
warnings from DNC staff and opposition from NSC officials and
Vice President Gore's staff.
(3) A Central Intelligence Agency official promoted
Tamraz's pipeline proposal in 1995, despite knowing that the
NSC opposed it.
(4) An Energy Department official promoted additional
political access for Tamraz in 1996, despite knowing that the
NSC and other officials opposed it.
(5) U.S. policy in the Caspian Sea was not affected by
Tamraz's lobbying, political contributions, or presence at DNC-
related events. This policy was solidified in early October
1995 and did not incorporate any aspect of Tamraz's proposal.
overview
Tamraz was born in 1940 in Cairo, Egypt. He attended the
American University of Cairo, Cambridge University, and Harvard
Business School. In 1967, Tamraz went to work for the
investment firm of Kidder, Peabody & Co., first in New York
City, then in Beirut. He left in 1973 to establish his own
Beirut-based investment-banking firm, the First Arabian
Corporation. In the mid-1980s, Tamraz was chairman of Bank Al-
Mashrek, Lebanon's second largest bank, as well as the head of
Jet Holdings, which owned TransMediterranean Airway and Middle
East Airlines. In 1989, Tamraz left Lebanon after being charged
by the Lebanese government with embezzlement and negligence in
connection with the failure of his Bank Al-Mashrek. He moved to
the United States, became an American citizen, and founded
TAMOIL, an oil company. Tamraz is currently President of Oil
Capitol Limited.
Beginning as early as 1973, Tamraz's business ventures have
received significant media coverage. In the 1980s, Tamraz
learned the value of making political contributions when, as a
legal permanent U.S. resident living in Beirut, he became a
contributor to the Republican Party. As a result, he was
recommended by the chairman of the Republican National
Committee for a position with the Reagan Administration. Since
that time, Tamraz was also reported to have had significant
contact with the Central Intelligence Agency (``CIA''), which
apparently continued until shortly before this Committee's
proceedings began in 1997.
In the 1990s, Tamraz, who was then living in New York City
and Paris, was promoting a pipeline venture in the Caspian Sea
region. In May and June of 1995, Tamraz met with many foreign
officials and mid-level U.S. government officials, generally
attempting to use every possible avenue to gain support for his
pipeline proposal. In June 1995, the U.S. officials informed
Tamraz that his proposal would not gain Administration support.
Beginning that same month, a mid-level CIA official began to
advocate Tamraz's pipeline proposal to the NSC, despite knowing
that the NSC opposed it.
In July 1995, Tamraz began to contribute to the Democratic
Party and concurrently to request official meetings with
higher-level government officials. Tamraz never obtained an
official meeting with the President or Vice President. Tamraz
did, however, attend several DNC events where the President,
Vice President or other Administration officials were present,
despite opposition within the National Security Council and the
Vice President office's to Tamraz's contact with high-level
officials. DNC Chairman Donald Fowler supported Tamraz's
attendance at DNC events, despite being aware of the objections
to his attendance within the NSC and the Vice President's
office.
In April 1996, a mid-level Department of Energy official
also promoted Tamraz's efforts to gain access to President
Clinton during a telephone conversation with an NSC official.
Despite all of these efforts, Tamraz was not successful in
obtaining U.S. Government support for his Caspian Sea pipeline
proposal. In fact, the proposal supported by the U.S.--a
contract among several foreign governments and oil companies--
was signed on October 7, 1995, and did not involve Tamraz or
his proposal.
The Committee investigated these issues by conducting
numerous depositions and interviews, reviewing documents, and
hearing two days of public testimony.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnote at end of Chapter 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970-1990: TAMRAZ'S BUSINESS VENTURES, DEALINGS WITH THE CIA AND
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Business ventures
In 1973, Fortune magazine reported that the Egyptian
government had finally decided to build a pipeline from the
Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean Sea.2 According to
Fortune, ``What was most startling about the announcement was
that the Sadat government gave the job, not to the eleven-
nation consortium with which it had been negotiating for three
years, but to the Wall Street firm of Kidder, Peabody & Co.''
3 The magazine highlighted the role of Tamraz, then
34 and Kidder's vice president in Beirut, as the individual
responsible for negotiating the deal.4 The deal was
reportedly worth $345 million and Tamraz received a five
percent share--worth $15 million at the time.5
In 1974, Tamraz established the First Arabian Corporation,
which was a syndicate made up of wealthy Kuwaiti and Saudi
Arabian investors.6 In 1978, Newsweek reported that
Tamraz ``has been involved in some of the most widely
publicized international business transactions of recent
years.'' 7 Tamraz himself summarized his approach:
``I'm interested in things they say can't be done.''
8 Even then, Tamraz had detractors who saw him ``as
a promoter who hasn't delivered the goods.'' 9
Reported contacts with the CIA
According to Tamraz, it was during the early to mid-1970s
that the CIA first turned to him for advice regarding the oil
crisis.10 Thereafter, Tamraz apparently became a
regular unofficial contact of the CIA--``the kind of guy who
knew everybody and you had lunch with him every couple of
months,'' according to one former U.S. intelligence
official.11 Tamraz testified that since 1973, he has
been in constant contact with CIA officials on a voluntary
basis, estimating that in the past 25 years, he has probably
had contact with roughly 20 to 25 different CIA
employees.12
Tamraz testified that in the 1980s, his contacts with the
CIA continued.13 According to Tamraz and press
reports, then-CIA Director William J. Casey called on Tamraz
after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.14
Casey reportedly asked Tamraz to intercede with Prime Minister
Menachem Begin because Casey was frustrated with the slow pace
of U.S.-led negotiations and hoped that Tamraz could use his
high-level contacts to accelerate an Israeli withdrawal
fromLebanon.15 Throughout these years, Tamraz testified that
he has also hired former CIA employees, enhancing his connections with
the agency.16
RNC's recommendation for a Reagan administration position
Tamraz began to make political contributions to the
Republican Party in the 1980s. He testified that he contributed
enough money to the RNC to qualify as a Republican
Eagle.17 Federal Election Commission records show
that Tamraz gave $32,000 to the Republican Party between 1981
and 1992, but Tamraz told Congressional Quarterly that he
thought he gave more than that, possibly in ``soft money''
donations, which were not recorded at the FEC until
1991.18 Tamraz testified that he received a personal
thank-you letter from President Ronald Reagan'' 19
and an NSC official told the Committee that Tamraz had met
twice with President Reagan.20
In addition, then-RNC Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf, Jr., sent
a letter on behalf of Tamraz to Robert Tuttle, Reagan White
House Director of Presidential Personnel. Fahrenkopf
recommended Tamraz for a position in the Reagan Administration,
``on a committee or board connected with banking or petroleum,
specifically relating to Arab countries.'' 21 In
support of this recommendation, Fahrenkopf not only pointed out
that Tamraz was from Beirut, he also stated that ``Mr. Tamraz
is an Eagle, and a strong supporter of the Administration.''
Fahrenkopf then stated generally that Tamraz has expertise in
banking and the petroleum industry.22 Tuttle replied
to Fahrenkopf thanking him for his ``letter in [sic] behalf of
Roger Tamraz'' and requesting that he forward Tamraz's resume
for consideration.23
Tamraz was never appointed to a position in the Reagan
Administration, but the 1985 Fahrenkopf letter demonstrates
that the recommendation was based on his political
contributions. Upon learning that Tamraz had produced a copy of
the letter to the Committee, Fahrenkopf stated in a letter to
the Committee that during his tenure at the RNC he made many
recommendations for similar appointments, although he does not
believe he actually signed the Tamraz letter.24
Tamraz leaves Lebanon after embezzlement charges
Tamraz testified that in late 1988, forces hostile to
Tamraz came to dominate the Lebanese political
scene.25 At that time, a run on Tamraz's Al-Mashrek
Bank forced its collapse. Tamraz fled the country after
claiming to have been kidnapped and later released in return
for a multimillion-dollar ransom.26 Subsequently,
Lebanese officials brought charges against him for embezzlement
and mismanagement.27 Tamraz testified that these
charges were politically motivated and were largely a result of
his contacts with Israel.28 Tamraz also testified
that he was found innocent of any crime.29 Lebanese
authorities have sought his extradition through Interpol, but,
according to Tamraz, ``a Lebanese court-appointed authority
determined in 1990 that there was not criminal activity''
relating to his bank.30 In 1992, however, the
Lebanese authorities convicted him in absentia and there is an
outstanding Interpol warrant for his arrest.31
1994-1995: the commerce department
During the Committee's investigation, allegations surfaced
that the Clinton Administration's Commerce Department had
selected individuals for Department trade missions based on
their support of the Democratic Party. Although these
allegations were not supported by the evidence presented to the
Committee, see Chapter 26, the Committee obtained documents
regarding the Department's contacts with Tamraz and his
company, Oil Capital Limited. Documents and deposition
testimony reveal that Tamraz was twice rebuffed by the
Department of Commerce.
Prior to any political contributions to the Democratic
Party, which were first made in July of 1995, Tamraz submitted
an application to attend a 1994 trade mission with Secretary
Ronald Brown.32 Tamraz's name was initially placed
on a list of potential participants, but was later removed by
the Office of the General Counsel after its vetting process
discovered information on Lexis-Nexis that disqualified
Tamraz.33 Tamraz testified that he was told that he
would not be invited to the trade mission because the
department considered him unacceptable. Tamraz assumed that he
was rejected because of the publicized embezzlement charges
against him.34
In October of 1995, Oil Capital Limited submitted a request
to the Department seeking support for its attempt to purchase
an energy concern in Hungary. The Commerce Department rejected
this request as well. The Department's rejection was based
again on Tamraz's questionable background and on uncertainties
regarding Oil Capital's status as an American
company.35
1995: the caspian sea pipeline
U.S. policy on the Caspian Sea pipeline
The United States has pursued a consistent pipeline policy
throughout most of the world: the support of multiple pipelines
for the transit of energy resources in order to diversify
political and economic risks and enhance energy
security.36 U.S. policy in the Caspian Sea region of
Central Asia was established in early 1995 and has two primary
objectives: (1) support for multiple pipeline routes and (2)
insistence that pipeline contracts be established and operated
pursuant to commercially accepted principles.37
Sheila Heslin, the NSC official in charge of implementing the
U.S. Caspian Sea pipeline policy from April 1995 to November
1996, testified that in June 1995 the U.S. policy in the
Caspian Sea region was ``the development of multiple pipelines
on commercially viable international terms.'' 38
The crucial period for the implementation of U.S. policy
was from the spring of 1995 to October 7, 1995.39
During this time, U.S. and foreign officials, an international
consortium of foreign governments and private oil companies, as
well private businessmen like Tamraz were in a contest to
determine early pipeline routes and the financial terms for
constructing and operating those routes.40 Also
during this time, Heslin chaired an interagency group on
Caspian Sea pipeline policy, which according to Heslin,
``coordinated policy very carefully . . . . We were very
concerned to make sure U.S. policy was tightly coordinated
because we feared that different agencies could easily be
played off against each other.'' 41 Tamraz's
pipeline proposal and his activities in the Caspian Sea region
was a subject of discussion within the interagency group.
In the spring of 1995, the interagency group was concerned
because Tamraz apparently was traveling in the Caspian Sea
region attempting to become a dealmaker between governments and
oil companies who hoped to be involved in the construction of
an oil pipeline in the region.42 The group had also
heard that Tamraz was calling his pipeline proposal a ``peace
pipeline'' because he believed that his proposed route would
foster peace in the region. The group understood, however, that
the real incentive behind Tamraz's pipeline proposal was the
fact that he planned to retain five percent of the revenues in
exchange for forging a deal. According to Heslin, Tamraz's
proposal to become a dealmaker, if successful, would have
resulted in personal profit to Tamraz of approximately $125
million.43
The interagency group determined that Tamraz's proposal to
become a ``dealmaker'' in the Caspian Sea pipeline project was
contrary to U.S. policy, which sought commercially viable
contracts without the intervention of dealmakers.44
According to Heslin, the group nonetheless decided ``that as an
American, Roger Tamraz deserved a hearing in front of his
Government, but that we should do so at a mid-level initially
and then assess.'' 45 Agencies officials thereafter
met with Tamraz to discuss his proposal and the CIA also became
involved in the process.
Ultimately, on October 7, 1995, a contract was signed that
provided for multiple early pipeline routes pursuant to
commercially viable terms, thereby implementing U.S.
policy.46 Heslin testified that the success of U.S.
policy was due in large part to the coordination within the
executive branch of the Government, the importance placed on
the policy by National Security Advisors Anthony Lake and
Samuel R. Berger, and by President Clinton himself, who called
President Heidar Aliyev of Azerbaiijan ``at the key moment'' in
the negotiations.47
The project announced on October 7, 1995 did not
incorporate any aspect of Tamraz's proposal despite Tamraz's
efforts to become part of the project.48 The
Committee investigated some events surrounding the Caspian Sea
pipeline issue, focusing on Tamraz's attempts to become part of
the project.
May-June 1995: Meetings with executive branch officials
In May and June of 1995, several mid-level executive branch
officials met with Tamraz to discuss his proposal. During these
meetings, Tamraz sought to persuade the officials to support
or, at least, not object to, his ``peace pipeline''
proposal.49 This series of meetings was routine and
proper, and occurred prior to any political contribution by
Tamraz to the Democratic Party.50 Testimony
establishes that the officials met to listen to Tamraz's
proposal as they did with many private individuals and
businesses. No evidence was presented to the Committee that the
agencies offered support for Tamraz's commercial
interests.51
One of the meetings between Tamraz and executive branch
meetings was with Sheila Heslin. According to Heslin, the
meeting was scheduled after Ed Pechous, a former CIA official
employed by Tamraz, called Heslin ``repeatedly'' requesting
that she meet with Tamraz.52 Heslin agreed to meet
with Tamraz and scheduled the meeting for June 2, 1995. Heslin
testified that before the meeting, she ``tasked the interagency
[group] to basically check out the representations he had made
at the various departments with regard to support from various
entities and governments.'' 53 After receiving
information from a variety of sources, Heslin discovered that
Tamraz's representations ``did not check out.'' 54
Heslin had a 20-minute meeting with Tamraz and Pechous on
June 2, 1995. According to Heslin, she explained U.S. policy
and ``asked [Tamraz] a bunch of tough questions,'' including
why he had misrepresented his support and whether he was
seeking exclusive rights.55 Heslin testified that
she did not get very satisfactory answers and that Tamraz told
her that he was seeking to charge five percent of the overall
costs of the deal. Heslin explained that that ``was the
clincher'' against his deal, because such deals were against
U.S. policy and were not ``economically viable.'' 56
Tamraz testified that during this meeting, Heslin was in
``listening mode'' only, and that she was skeptical of his
proposal, as were the other mid-level officials with whom he
met in May and June.57 According to Tamraz, the mid-
level officials during these meetings in the spring of 1995
gave him ``the same song.'' 58 Tamraz had no other
contact with Heslin or the other agency officials after June
1995.59
Bob of the CIA
In preparation for her June 2 meeting with Tamraz, Heslin
requested information from the CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence (``DI''), the CIA division that analyzes
information.60 Heslin testified that just prior to
her meeting, both a colleague at the CIA's DI and an official
of the CIA's Directorate of Operations (``DO'')--the CIA
division that gathers information, often undercover--told her
that they would be sending her a report.61 The
official from the DO was referred to during Committee
proceedings as ``Bob of the CIA'' in order to protect his
undercover identity. Heslin ``was very surprised'' that the DO
would ``decide[] on its own'' to send a report on Tamraz, when
she had not requested one.62
Heslin did receive two separate CIA reports in May 1995,
prior to her June 2, 1995 meeting with Tamraz--one report was
from the DI and the other was from the DO. Heslin testified
that ``there was a very big difference between the reports.''
63 According to Heslin, the DI report contained
negative information about Tamraz, whereas the DO report,
signed by Bob's supervisor William Lofgrin, ``was almost wholly
positive.'' 64 Heslin testified that she did not
understand this discrepancy.65 This CIA pattern of
the DO providing positive information about Tamraz to the NSC
continued in early June 1995, when Bob began to contact Heslin
and promote Tamraz and his pipeline proposal.
Heslin testified that shortly after her June 2 meeting with
Tamraz, she received a call from Bob of the CIA. During that
call, Bob apologized for the contents of the DO's report,
telling Heslin that his boss Lofgrin (who later went to work
for Tamraz) had ``asked him personally to call [Heslin] and
review his history.'' 66
According to Heslin, Bob knew details about her June 2
meeting with Tamraz, and began to ``rebut every tough
question'' she had posed to Tamraz in that
meeting.67 Heslin testified that Bob ``was
attempting to essentially provide [her] information to ease
[her] concerns on the questions that [she] had raised with
Tamraz.'' 68 Heslin found this ``strange.''
69 Heslin also testified that when talking about
Tamraz, Bob had a real reverence in his voice about some of
Tamraz's past involvement with the CIA.70
Heslin testified that between early June and late October
1995, Bob called her anywhere from three to five times in what
she testified could ``only be characterized as lobbying in
favor of Roger Tamraz.'' 71 Heslin testified that
she was ``astonished'' when Bob told her specific details about
Tamraz's pipeline deal, once even assuring her that the Turkish
government was almost ``on board.'' 72 According to
Heslin, Bob never mentioned Tamraz's political contributions,
and the evidence establishes that Bob's calls began before
Tamraz had begun to contribute to the Democratic Party in July
of 1995.73
Sometime in late August or early September 1995, evidence
presented to the Committee indicates that Bob also contacted
the Vice President's staff to discuss Tamraz.74 At
this time, Tamraz had requested an official meeting with Vice
President Gore and was waiting for a response.75
The last telephone call Heslin received from Bob was in
mid-October, after the Caspian Sea pipeline project had been
signed and U.S. policy had been implemented. During this call,
Heslin recalled that once again Bob urged her to support
Tamraz's deal, stating that it was important that they ``get
Tamraz back on board'' in the region.76
It was also in mid-October 1995 that Bob initiated a
telephone call to Donald Fowler, chairman of the DNC. Bob wrote
in an October 20, 1995 memorandum provided to the Committee
that ``[o]n October 19 Don Fowler called me at the behest of .
. . Roger Tamraz.'' 77 However, during his
deposition, portions of which have been declassified, Bob
testified that in fact he had called Fowler first. Bob
testified that he placed the first call to Fowler on October
18, before Fowler ever contacted him.78 Fowler was
not in, so Bob left his full name with a young man who answered
the phone.79
According to Bob, Fowler returned the call the next
day.80 Fowler testified that he does not have any
memory of this phone call, but according to Bob, Fowler told
him that he understood that Bob was in contact with the Vice
President's office.81 In response, Bob testified
that he informed Fowler that he could not help with a meeting
with the Vice President, referring Fowler to an individual
inside the Vice President's office.82 Bob also
testified that the conversation with Fowler was brief, that he
was working undercover and that he never mentioned his CIA
affiliation.83 Bob also testified that during the
call he was ``not sure that Fowler [knew] who he [was] talking
to.'' 84 (Bob and Fowler spoke one more time, in
mid-December 1995. These calls are both reviewed fully below.)
Bob's last contact with Heslin was at a dinner for federal
and foreign officials in late October 1995. According to
Heslin, after this dinner, Bob ``insisted'' that he drive
Heslin home.85 During the ride, Bob again stated
that he had more important information about Tamraz he wished
to share with her. According to Heslin, it was her view by this
point was that Bob was nothing more than a lobbyist for Tamraz,
and that she did not want any additional
information.86
Although the majority of Bob's deposition testimony remains
classified, it can be generally stated that Bob agreed with
Heslin that he was the one who initiated all contacts with
Heslin. Bob also testified, however, that contrary to Heslin's
testimony, he only provided Heslin with negative information
about Tamraz during those calls. Bob's testimony is contrary to
Heslin's public testimony before the Committee. Based on Bob's
deposition transcript as a whole, the testimony of Heslin,
Lofgrin's positive position and the positive DO reports, Bob's
assertion that he provided only negative information about
Tamraz to Heslin is not credible. Instead, the opposite
conclusion is warranted--that Bob of the CIA lobbied Heslin on
behalf of Tamraz and his pipeline project.
In sum, from June 1995 through October 1995, the evidence
establishes that Bob, then an employee of the CIA's Directorate
of Operations, lobbied the NSC on behalf of Tamraz and his
pipeline proposal. The lobbying began in May of 1995, when Bob
and his boss Lofgrin decided ``on their own'' to send a
positive report about Tamraz to Heslin. Heslin had not
requested this report and found it ultimately to be inaccurate.
Bob's lobbying began before Tamraz had made any political
contributions to the Democratic Party and there is no evidence
that he ever mentioned political contributions to Heslin. Bob's
lobbying seemed driven by a desire to promote the idea that the
U.S. Government should support Tamraz's pipeline deal. Of
significance is the fact that Bob's lobbying ended shortly
after Tamraz had been excluded from the pipeline deal in
October of 1995.
Although the reasons behind Bob's lobbying are unclear, it
is clear that Bob's lobbying was not tied to Tamraz's
involvement with either Fowler or the Democratic Party. The
Committee did not completely resolve these issues and further
investigation of CIA involvement with Tamraz is warranted.
JULY-OCTOBER 1995: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Contribution history
Tamraz testified quite bluntly about his persistence in
pursuing his business ventures with top officials in the U.S.
government: ``[I]f they kicked me from the door, I will come
through the window.'' 87
Tamraz began to contribute to the Democratic Party in July
1995, after the interagency group had given Tamraz the signal
that his pipeline proposal would not gain Administration
support. Tamraz's first substantial contribution to the
Democratic Party was July 19, 1995 and his last was October 19,
1995.88 Committee documents and FEC records show the
following contributions by Tamraz:
July 19, 1995:
to the DNC Federal Account................................ $20,000
to Virginia Democratic Party.............................. 25,000
to Louisiana Democratic Party............................. 25,000
to Richard Molpus for Governor of Mississippi............. 20,000
August 29, 1995: to Richard Molpus for Governor of Mississippi 5,000
September 10, 1995: to the DNC (for Tamoil Inc.).............. 50,000
October 19, 1995: to Virginia Democratic Party................ 75,000
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total: from July to October 1995........................ 220,000
Interestingly, Tamraz made no substantial contributions to
the Democratic Party after October 1995, which was the month
the contract for the Caspian Sea pipeline was signed.
Apparently, the mid-level U.S. officials had stopped Tamraz at
the front door in June of 1995, Bob of the CIA was not able to
help him, and thereafter Tamraz attempted to ``come through the
window'' 89 by way of political contributions.
Indeed, Tamraz testified that he had made political
contributions in order to gain access to the White House and
that one reason for seeking access was to promote his pipeline
project.90 As discussed below, Tamraz's efforts to
gain access to higher-level officials and promote his pipeline
by way of political contributions met with limited success.
The DNC's acceptance of Tamraz's contributions
According to Tamraz, sometime before July 1995, he received
a DNC solicitation letter incorrectly addressed to ``Robert
Tamraz.'' 91 In response, Tamraz stated that he
contacted the DNC to discuss contributions. Documents produced
to the Committee show that the DNC prepared a memorandum to
Chairman Fowler in anticipation of Fowler meeting with Tamraz
to discuss possible contributions.92 The memorandum,
dated July 12, 1995, was prepared by Alejandra Y. Castillo, a
DNC Finance Division employee. The memorandum explained that
Tamraz had indicated he would like to give $300,000, but warned
that accepting the contribution may ``generate considerable
problems for the DNC.'' 93 The memorandum set forth
in detail the controversies in Tamraz's past, including the
Lebanese embezzlement charges and the Commerce Department's
decision to bar Tamraz from participating in certain trade
activities. The memorandum even warned Fowler about Tamraz's
motivation, stating that ``Mr. Tamraz seeks political leverage
to secure his oil ventures in the Russian Republics (Caspian
Oil Project).'' 94
The memorandum, which concluded with ``Pay attention to
these warning signals!'', informed Fowler that the ``DNC
Finance Department is pending [sic] your guidance on whether to
continue our conversation with Mr. Tamraz and/or extend an
invitation to participate in DNC events.'' 95 Fowler
thereafter accepted contributions from Tamraz and supported his
attendance at a variety of DNC events. While these activities
were legal, Fowler's decision to support Tamraz's attendance at
DNC events was unwise given the warnings that Tamraz might
misuse his attendance at such events.
SEPTEMBER 1995: REQUEST FOR AN OFFICIAL MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT
In August 1995, Haroun Sassounian, a wealthy business
associate of Tamraz, requested that the Vice President have an
official meeting with him and Tamraz to discuss a Caspian Sea
pipeline venture.96 Tamraz testified that he never
requested this meeting and that Sassounian may have wanted to
push his pipeline proposal because it benefitted
Armenia.97 Nonetheless, the Vice President's staff
sought information in order to make a recommendation on whether
the Vice President should meet with Tamraz.
Heslin, who worked closely with the Vice President's
National Security staff on energy issues, was contacted by
Richard Grimes of the Vice President's National Security staff
about Sassounian's request.98 Heslin provided Grimes
with information about Tamraz and recommended against the
meeting.99 After Grimes consulted with Heslin and
other Vice Presidential staff members, Leon Fuerth, the Vice
President's national security advisor, sent a memorandum on
September 13, 1995 to the Vice President recommending that he
not meet with Tamraz.100 On October 2 and 3, the
Vice President's staff notified Sassounian and Tamraz that no
official meeting would be scheduled.101
Although Tamraz never had an official meeting with the Vice
President, he did attend several DNC-related events where the
President or Vice President were in attendance.
TAMRAZ'S ATTENDANCE AT DNC EVENTS
Summary of events
As discussed above, from 1994 to April 1996, a variety of
federal officials opposed Tamraz's efforts to have access to
high-level U.S. Government officials. In 1994 and 1995, the
Commerce Department twice decided not to support the business
ventures of Tamraz or his company. In June 1995, the Caspian
Sea pipeline interagency group decided that they would
recommend to their superiors that Tamraz not receive access to
higher-level federal officials. In September 1995, Fuerth
recommended against a Tamraz meeting with the Vice
President.102
In September and October 1995, Tamraz nonetheless attended
three DNC events. On September 11, he attended a Business
Council Reception at the White House where 320 people were in
attendance; on September 15, he attended a DNC Trustee Dinner
at the White House, where 80 people were in attendance; and on
October 2, he attended a fundraiser held at a private residence
and sat at the head table with Vice President
Gore.103
After the October fundraiser, the Vice President's staff
forwarded Fuerth's memo to the DNC, apparently in an attempt to
prevent future contact between Tamraz and the Vice
President.104 Thereafter, Tamraz was disinvited from
an October 5, 1995, DNC coffee at the White
House.105
As noted previously, on October 7, 1995, the Caspian Sea
pipeline contract was signed, and Tamraz was excluded from the
project. Thereafter, according to Heslin's testimony, she was
less concerned with Tamraz and his access to the federal
government because he was less able to misuse his access to
push for his Caspian pipeline deal.106
After Tamraz was excluded from the project, his
contributions to the Democratic Party dwindled. Perhaps in
hopes of encouraging more contributions, the DNC invited Tamraz
to a series of DNC events beginning on December 13, 1995. He
attended a 300-person holiday reception at the White House on
December 13, 1995; a 120-person DNC Trustee Dinner on March 27,
1996; a DNC coffee on April 1, 1996 where approximately 15
people were in attendance; and, finally, a showing of a movie
at the White House on June 22, 1996 organized by the DNC, where
approximately 50 people were in attendance.107
Tamraz testified that he did not have any substantive
conversations with the President or Vice President at these
events.108 Nonetheless, Tamraz's attendance at these
DNC events was contrary to the recommendations of federal
officials and was of concern to those involved in the Caspian
Sea pipeline project.
Fowler's role
In early October 1995, after Tamraz was notified that the
Vice President had declined to schedule a meeting with him and
after he had been disinvited from an October 5, 1995 DNC
coffee, Tamraz testified that he had a conversation with Fowler
and suggested that Fowler ``pick up'' information about him,
including information from the CIA, in order to clear his name
with the White House.109 Tamraz stated that he gave
to Fowler Bob of the CIA's name, most likely both his first and
last name, as well as his telephone number.110
Tamraz testified that he also spoke with Bob at this same time,
as he often did during his trips to Washington.111
In his deposition, Bob confirmed that he spoke to Tamraz in
October and testified that Tamraz informed him that Tamraz had
given his name and phone numbers to Fowler.112
On October 18, 1995, Bob of the CIA called Fowler and left
a message that he had called.113 On October 19,
1995, according to Bob of the CIA, Fowler returned his call and
the two discussed the issue of Tamraz meeting with the Vice
President.114 Bob testified that he told Fowler that
he could not assist with setting up any meetings, despite
evidence that Bob had already contacted the Vice President's
office on Tamraz's behalf.115
Two months later, on December 13, 1995, Fowler called Bob
again. According to Bob, Fowler repeated Tamraz's assertions
that the NSC was a captive of the oil companies and was
unfairly preventing Tamraz from attending DNC
events.116 Bob testified that he declined to provide
any information to Fowler.117 Bob also testified
that during this phone call, like his first phone conversation
with Fowler in October, he couldn't ``say for certain how
[Fowler] knew who he was talking to because CIA was never
mentioned.'' 118
According to documents presented to the Committee, Fowler
also telephoned Heslin in mid December 1995.119
Heslin testified that this was her first and only phone
conversation with Fowler.120 During that call,
Heslin testified that Fowler told her that she would be
receiving information about Tamraz from Bob of the
CIA.121 Heslin complained about the call to her
superior, Nancy Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.122 Soderberg told the
Committee during a staff interview that after talking to
Heslin, she spoke to Fowler and told him not to call NSC
staff.123
After talking to Fowler, Soderberg told the Committee that
she decided to check up on Tamraz herself. Soderberg and Heslin
stated that, as Heslin sat in Soderberg's office, Soderberg
called Randy Beers, senior director of intelligence at the NSC,
and asked him to find out about Tamraz and his relationship
with the CIA.124 Beers told the Committee that he
subsequently requested information from the CIA regarding
Tamraz.125 On December 29, 1995, the CIA faxed to
Beer's assistant a report containing information about
Tamraz.126
The December 1995 report was the third report that the CIA
had sent to the NSC regarding Tamraz. The first two reports
were sent to Heslin in May 1995 to prepare her for her June 2
meeting with Tamraz (one from the CIA's DI and the other from
the CIA's DO). The third report, although using the same format
as the reports in May, was faxed by the CIA directly to Beers's
office in late December 1995.
The Committee investigated whether it was Fowler who had
influenced the CIA's decision to send a third report to the NSC
and whether Fowler had any influence on the contents of that
report. These issues arose because Fowler had contacted Bob in
mid December before the report was sent, and because the report
contained only positive information about Tamraz. It does not
appear, however, that the CIA sent its third report in December
in response to Fowler's call to Bob. Because the report was
sent to Beers's office directly, following Beer's request to
the CIA for information on Tamraz, it is more likely that the
CIA sent the report in response to a request from Beers, not
Fowler. It also does not appear that Fowler had any influence
on the contents of the report. The third CIA report was drafted
by Bob of the CIA, who had already sent a report to Heslin in
May 1995 that, according to Heslin, had ``wholly positive''
information regarding Tamraz. Thus, it is no surprise, based on
Bob's first report, as well as on Bob's promotion of Tamraz
during calls to Heslin, that Bob's report in December contained
only positive information about Tamraz. The Committee was also
informed that the third report may have contained only positive
information due to appropriate internal legal restrictions
within the CIA itself. Fowler's contact with Bob was unwise
although he testified that he could not remember telephone
calls with anyone at the CIA.127
No effect on policy
Although Tamraz's political contributions to the Democratic
Party afforded him limited access to the President and Vice
President, U.S. policy toward the Caspian Sea pipeline project
was not affected by either Tamraz's contributions or his
access. Indeed, when Tamraz was asked whether he regretted
making his contributions to the Democratic Party, which
totalled less than $300,000, Tamraz responded that ``I think
next time, I'll give 600,000.'' 128
APRIL 1996: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICIAL TALKS TO HESLIN
Tamraz's attendance at March 27 and April 1, 1996 DNC events
On March 27, 1996, Tamraz attended a DNC Trustee Dinner at
the White House along with 120 other guests.129
Tamraz testified that during a brief ``introduction to the
President,'' he mentioned his pipeline project, but according
to Tamraz, the President's reaction was to respond that he
would ``like to see jobs coming to America.'' 130
Tamraz also testified that he told the President that ``if
somebody wants to hear me out, I'm available.'' 131
At that same event, Tamraz testified that he also spoke to
Thomas F. McLarty, Counselor to the President and Special Envoy
for the Americas, in a reception line and, in very brief
exchange, the two discussed the oil industry in
general.132 According to McLarty, Tamraz talked
about his pipeline project and then the two discussed more
generally ``the importance of lessening the U.S. dependence on
the Middle East for energy supplies, something that [McLarty]
felt very strongly about for a number of years and conveyed on
a number of occasions to the President and others.''
133
During this dinner, Ann Stock, a social secretary at the
White House, made notes about some of the President's
conversations that evening. In a memorandum to the President
the next day, March 28, Stock mentioned the President's brief
conversation with Tamraz, writing that Tamraz ``wanted to
discuss the pipeline that will go from the Caspian Sea to
Turkey. You told him that someone would follow-up with him. He
will be at the 4/1 breakfast.'' 134 The President
wrote on the memo: ``Does Azer. Gov't want this'' and ``cc M
McLarty.'' 135 Based on the President's notations,
McLarty understood that he was being asked to obtain
information about the pipeline proposal.136
On April 1, McLarty and Tamraz attended a breakfast/coffee
at the White House, along with approximately 13 other
guests.137 Tamraz testified that he spoke to McLarty
``for about 30 seconds before we sat down'' 138 and
gave him a brochure from his company and business
card.139 Tamraz said he did not expect to hear back
from McLarty, but again told McLarty that ``[i]f anybody is
interested to talk to me about it, I'm available.''
140 McLarty testified that he recalled attending the
coffee and seeing Tamraz, but did not recall this brief
exchange.141
Follow-up on the pipeline project
Between March 27 and April 1, records indicated that
McLarty sent a fax to Kyle Simpson, a senior advisor at the
Energy Department.142 McLarty and Simpson both told
the Committee that McLarty often contacted Simpson when he
needed information about energy issues, and that the two had
frequent contact with each other.143 The Committee
does not have a copy of this fax, but McLarty testified that it
``probably was just a brief note [on the pipeline project]
asking for information or telling Kyle [Simpson] I would call
him.'' 144
Pursuant to Stock's March 28 memorandum, McLarty also sent
brief notes to both the President and Simpson on April 2, 1996.
To the President, he noted that he had seen Tamraz at the April
1 coffee and would follow up with him ``in a supportive but
prudent and appropriate way.'' 145 To Simpson, he
faxed Tamraz's brochure and business card and wrote ``Please
review and let's discuss the attached. (Relates to the fax I
sent you last week.)'' 146
Shortly thereafter, McLarty and Simpson talked on the
telephone. Both testified that McLarty requested information
about Tamraz's pipeline proposal. Specifically, McLarty
testified that he called Simpson ``to inquire about the
pipeline project. That was the assignment I had been given.''
147 Simpson also testified that McLarty wanted
information about the ``pipeline project.'' 148
Thus, after the President and McLarty had brief exchanges with
Tamraz at DNC events, McLarty was asked by the President to
find out whether there was any merit to the pipeline proposal
that Tamraz claimed would bring peace to the region and jobs to
Americans. Simpson explained generally that the U.S. Government
often seeks this type of information because the Government
sees value in U.S. companies building and owning projects
outside the U.S., although the Government is ``not terribly
particular'' about which U.S. company it is if more than one is
vying for a project.149
McLarty and Simpson both testified that when McLarty
requested information about the Caspian Sea pipeline proposal,
McLarty did not mention the issue of whether Tamraz should have
a meeting with the President.150 In fact, Simpson's
testimony reveals that he thought that Tamraz had already met
with the President. He stated in his deposition that McLarty
called and ``said the President had met with Mr. Tamraz and Mr.
Tamraz had talked about his pipeline proposal and he . . .
asked Mr. McLarty to find out'' if the pipeline was
important.151
It is also significant that the testimony establishes that
McLarty's conversation with Simpson did not involve a
discussion of political contributions. McLarty and Simpson
testified in their depositions that not only did they not
discuss political contributions, but that neither of them knew
anything about Tamraz's contributions at that
time.152 Tamraz himself testified that he never
discussed political contributions with McLarty or Simpson and,
in fact, noted that ``nobody at the White House has ever talked
to me about contributions, ever.'' 153
The request within the Department of Energy
Shortly after he received the call from McLarty, Simpson
was approached after an Energy Department staff meeting
sometime in early April 1996 by John ``Jack'' Carter, also a
senior policy advisor at the Energy Department.154
Carter had been a Department of Energy representative on the
interagency group chaired by Heslin and was one of the mid-
level officials who met with Tamraz in the spring of 1995.
Simpson testified that during this brief exchange, the issue of
Tamraz arose. Simpson testified that he explained to Carter
that he was seeking information on Tamraz's pipeline project
and asked Carter to tell him ``what's going on with this
pipeline.'' 155 He also testified that he most
likely conveyed to Carter that the request had come from
McLarty.156 Simpson testified that he did not
mention anything about political contributions,157
nor did he ask Carter to contact anyone in particular about
this request.158
This exchange between Simpson and Carter was, by both of
their accounts, brief and informal. In fact, Carter testified
that his only knowledge ``about Mr. McLarty's inquiry was from
[this] brief conversation with Kyle Simpson on April 3rd,
1996.'' 159 Based on this ``brief conversation,''
however, Carter testified that he thought that Simpson asked
about a Presidential meeting.160 Carter also said
that he ``thought'' that he saw ``handwritten notes'' with
numbers on them, stating that ``there was a pad with some notes
on it. . . . I can't remember distinctly. It might have had
some numbers on it. I am just not sure.'' 161
Finally, Carter testified that Simpson, ``either on the pad or
mentioned that the fellow had made a contribution, was going to
make more contributions apparently to somebody, political
contributions.'' 162 Simpson, however, testified
that he was not aware of Tamraz's political contributions and
did not mention anything about political contributions during
this conversation.163
Carter also testified, however, that although he thought
contributions were mentioned during this conversation, Simpson
did not suggest to him that anyone thought that Tamraz should
meet with the President because of Tamraz's political
contributions.164 In fact, Carter testified that,
during this brief exchange, he immediately told Simpson that he
was aware of Tamraz's efforts in the Caspian Sea region, and
that the President should have nothing to do with
him.165 However, Carter testified that he offered to
call Heslin and determine if there was an update regarding
Tamraz's pipeline proposal.166 Carter agreed that it
was his suggestion to call Heslin and that no one had suggested
that he do so.167
Based on this brief conversation, Carter called Heslin the
next day.168 Carter testified that his only purpose
in calling Heslin was to see whether the policy about the
Tamraz project had changed.169
Carter's call to Heslin
Heslin's testimony
Carter called Heslin on April 4, 1996. At that time,
according to Heslin, Carter was a colleague with whom she had
worked for a year and who she knew was looking for a job in the
White House.170 She also testified that by April of
1996, she was not actively working on the Caspian Sea pipeline
policy, but was instead ``simply monitoring and supporting the
technical implementation of the deal that had been agreed [to]
in October.'' 171
Heslin testified that Carter began the phone conversation
in early April by saying that he was calling ``at the behest of
Mack McLarty who had recently met with Roger Tamraz and really
liked his pipeline proposal.'' 172 Heslin then
stated that Carter asserted that McLarty wantedTamraz to have a
meeting with the President and that it ``would mean a lot of money for
the DNC.'' 173 According to Heslin, Carter also told her
that Tamraz had already given $200,000 and if he got a meeting with the
President, he would give another $400,000. Heslin stated that Carter
then asserted that both McLarty and the President wanted
this.174 Heslin testified that she doubted some of Carter's
statements, and told him ``this is just unbelievable. . . . I can't
believe that, Jack.'' 175 When Heslin resisted the idea of a
meeting, Heslin said that Carter ``was pretty aggressive'' and warned
her that she shouldn't be ``such a Girl Scout.'' Heslin also testified
that Carter warned her that McLarty might become Secretary of the
Energy Department, implying that if she resisted this request, her
long-term career in the energy field might suffer.176 Heslin
testified that the phone call lasted about 25 minutes.177
Carter's testimony
Carter's recollection of the phone call was different than
Heslin's. Carter testified that he called Heslin to see ``[i]f
there had been any change in our policy, or view towards
Tamraz, and whether there was any reason the President should
meet with Tamraz.'' 178 He said that he remembered
the call lasting only three to five minutes, and that during
that time, he did not state that the President or McLarty
wanted a meeting, nor that McLarty might become Secretary of
Energy.179 Carter also testified in his deposition
that he did not call Heslin a Girl Scout, although at the
public hearing, he testified that he may have.180
Although Carter remembered mentioning political contributions
to Heslin, he testified that he did not tie the contributions
to a meeting with the President.181 In sum, Carter
testified that ``I would not try to bring any pressure on
Sheila Heslin having to do with political matters. Moreover, I
wouldn't do it with something that I opposed, which was a
meeting with Tamraz and the President.'' 182
Carter recognized, however, based on Heslin's public
testimony the day before, that she had felt pressure during the
call. He stated that at the time of the call, it hadn't
``register[ed]'' with him that he was pressuring
her.183 Carter's explanation for their different
recollections was that Heslin ``read more into it certainly
than I ever intended because there was no intention of mine to
pressure her in any way.'' 184
Carter's testimony also reveals that he was in no position
to speak on behalf of McLarty, let alone the President. Carter
testified that he had never spoken to McLarty about this
particular request and, in fact, never worked closely with
McLarty on anything. For example, in his two years at the
Energy Department, Carter only talked to McLarty four or five
times on the telephone about energy issues and never met with
him in his office.185 Carter also testified that he
had a total of two personal conversations with McLarty, during
which he inquired about jobs at the White House, in an attempt
``to get a little more visibility in the administration.''
186 In early 1996, Carter testified that McLarty
informed him that he would not be hired.187
Carter was, however, familiar with Heslin and Tamraz. He
had been a member of the interagency group on Caspian Sea
policy and had traveled with Heslin and other officials to the
region in 1995. In May of that year, Carter was one of the mid-
level officials who met with Tamraz about his pipeline
proposal, and was opposed to it. However, unlike Heslin, Carter
thought that in the scheme of things, Tamraz ``was not an
important factor'' in the region.188 After October
1995, when the pipeline agreement was signed, Carter had little
contact with Heslin.
The Department of Energy responds to the request for information
After his call to Heslin, Carter testified that he reported
back to Simpson that the Tamraz's pipeline proposal did not
have merit and that the NSC had further information if McLarty
wanted to pursue the matter.189 Simpson testified
that he recalled conveying this information to McLarty, and an
April 8, 1996, telephone message from him to McLarty contains
the information.190 McLarty remembered Simpson
conveying that the pipeline proposal did not have ``any
uniqueness about it; there was nothing else that needed to be
done that was not already being done, and he did raise, as I
remember, . . . some caution flag about Mr. Tamraz.''
191 McLarty testified that, after receiving this
information from Simpson, he believes he orally conveyed it to
the President.192 The officials had no further
contact with Tamraz after April 1996.193
Conclusions
The evidence presented to the Committee establishes that in
late March 1996, Tamraz caught the President's ear at a DNC
function and told him that he was working on a supposedly
important peace pipeline proposal in the Caspian Sea region
that would bring jobs to Americans. The next day, the President
wrote ``cc'd McLarty'' and ``does the Azerb. Gov't want this''
on a memorandum from his social secretary. McLarty understood
this notation as a request to inquire about the merits of
Tamraz's pipeline proposal. On April 1, McLarty met Tamraz
briefly at a coffee, where he obtained Tamraz's business
brochure.
McLarty faxed the brochure to Simpson, his usual contact at
the Energy Department, and asked for information about Tamraz's
pipeline project. After an April 3 staff meeting within the
Energy Department, Carter and Simpson spoke briefly and the
issue of Tamraz and his pipeline arose. Simpson told Carter
during this exchange that McLarty had asked for information
about Tamraz's pipeline project. Carter offered to call Heslin
to respond to McLarty's request. The Minority believes,
however, that Carter did not accurately understand--or did not
accurately testify to--his brief exchange with Simpson.
Carter's testimony about the exchange, which he described as
Simpson posing a question whether Tamraz should meet with the
President, and some mention of political contributions, is full
of ``maybe's'' and ``I don't remember distinctly's'' and ``I
thought's.'' In contrast, Simpson and McLarty's testimony about
the request, which was for information about Tamraz's pipeline
proposal, is straightforward and follows logically from the
President's notation on the March 28 memorandum asking about
the pipeline. In his eagerness to respond to McLarty, Carter
likely assumed that the request was for a meeting between
Tamraz and the President, which would have been a logical
assumption based on Carter's experience with the interagency
group, where the subject of Tamraz and his attempts to meet
with government officials had often been discussed.
There is evidence that Carter also likely wanted to respond
to this request from McLarty in order to gain higher visibility
in the Administration, something he testified he was seeking at
that time. Additionally, Carter probably did not obtain the
contribution figures he conveyed to Heslin from Simpson. The
figure of $200,000 of past contributions by Tamraz was
generally correct, but had been reported in the energy
community and discussed in the interagency task force
meetings.194 In addition, press reports on Tamraz's
political contributions were found in files of both Department
of Energy and NSC officials, including Heslin. The second
figure Carter purportedly conveyed to Heslin was that Tamraz
was prepared to contribute an additional $400,000 to the DNC.
That figure is not correct, nor had Tamraz promised to
contribute more money at that time.195 Tamraz's last
substantial contribution had been many months before, in
October of 1995. Furthermore, Simpson and McLarty both
testified unequivocally that political contributions and a
potential meeting with the President were never discussed in
relation to their request for information about Tamraz's
pipeline proposal. In sum, Carter's testimony that Simpson
mentioned political contributions or a meeting with the
President is subject to question. Rather, it is likely that
Carter assumed that a meeting was requested and determined on
his own to aggressively respond to a request he had
misunderstood.196
Carter's testimony in that regard is also subject to
additional scrutiny because of contradictions between his
testimony and that of Heslin's regarding their phone
conversation. Carter stated that he called Heslin only to ask
her whether there had been a change in policy that would permit
a meeting between the President and Tamraz. Carter testified
that he never spoke to McLarty about the request, never
intended to pressure Heslin to agree to a meeting based on
political contributions, and never chastised her with names or
warnings about her future career in the energy field. Heslin,
however, testified that Carter invoked the names of McLarty and
the President, did pressure her based on political
contributions, and called her a Girl Scout and warned about
McLarty becoming Secretary of Energy.197
In the Minority's view, the evidence strongly supports a
conclusion that Carter acted on his own in making certain
statements to Heslin during their phone call, and that he did
so inappropriately. In fact, Heslin's supervisor Nancy
Soderberg came to this very conclusion when Heslin informed her
about the telephone call.198 Carter likely thought
he could win visibility in the Administration by putting some
pressure on a friend, and, when she resisted, he dropped the
matter. Heslin also probably reacted particularly strongly
because she had already been contacted about Tamraz by Bob of
the CIA several times, and Fowler once.
conclusion: access still for sale in 1997
In February 1997, Tamraz received letters from Republican
Senators Trent Lott and Mitch McConnell inviting him to become
a member of the Senatorial Inner Circle.199 Senator
Lott encouraged Tamraz to join the Inner Circle, stating, ``I
know you will enjoy meeting my Senate colleagues. . . . at the
meetings we have scheduled this year.'' Senator McConnell was
more specific. His letter stated that for a contribution to the
Republican Party, Tamraz could discuss high-level policy issues
at exclusive dinners with the Senate leadership.
Tamraz attempted to take up this offer of access, but his
contribution was returned. When asked why he had contributed
this time, Tamraz responded, ``you set the rules, and we are
following the rules. . . . [T]his is politics as usual. What is
new?'' 200 In reply, Senator Carl Levin summarized
the story of Tamraz:
I think that is exactly the point. . . . I just hope
our colleagues will closely follow these hearings,
enough so that we can vote to change politics as usual
because that is exactly what the problem is. It is
politics as usual.201
footnotes
\1\ Depositions were taken of Roger Tamaraz, John ``Jack'' Carter,
Kyle Simpson, Thomas McLarty, Donald Fowler, Bob of the CIA, and
several Department of Commerce officials. Interviews were conducted of
a variety of NSC employees, including Samuel ``Sandy'' Berger, Sheila
Heslin, Nancy Soderberg, Robert Suettinger, Randy Beers, Jamona
Broadway, and Melanie Darby. Documents were produced by Tamraz, the
Department of Commerce, the White House, the NSC, the CIA, the State
Department, and the DNC. Pub.ic testimony was taken of Heslin, Tamraz,
Carter and Simpson during Committee's hearings held on September 17 and
18, 1997.
\2\ Fortune magazine, 11/73.
\3\ Fortune magazine, 11/73.
\4\ See also Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 135-36
(discussion of Fortune magazine article and Tamraz's role in the 1973
pipeline deal).
\5\ Washington Post, 9/9/97.
\6\ New York Times, 5/4/78; Newsweek, 2/10/75.
\7\ Newsweek, 2/10/75.
\8\ Newsweek, 2/10/75.
\9\ Newsweek, 2/10/75.
\10\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 11-13; Washington Post,
9/9/97.
\11\ Washington Post, 9/9/97.
\12\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 11-14.
\13\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 3 & 12.
\14\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 4; Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/
13/97, pp. 123-24 ; Washington Post, 9/9/97.
\15\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 3-4; Washington Post, 9/9/97.
According to Tamraz, the U.S. also asked him to arrange for the safe
passage into Lebanon of William Buckley, who was sent in to negotiate
the release of American hostages. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 4. For
additional information, see New York Times, 12/12/86, 12/11/86, 9/7/80;
Washington Post, 12/11/86; Los Angeles Times, 12/12/86; Chemical Week,
4/11/79.
\16\ Tamraz testified that he had a pattern of hiring former CIA
agents. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 42.
\17\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 36. Tamraz asserts that
he was a permanent resident in the United States since 1967 and became
a U.S. citizen in 1989, Statement of Roger Tamraz, 5/13/97, thus making
him eligible to contribute to the RNC in 1985.
\18\ Congressional Quarterly, 8/20/97; see also public FEC records.
\19\ Congressional Quarterly, 8/20/97; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg.,
p. 65.
\20\ Staff Interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\21\ Exhibit 1064M: p. 1, Letter from Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr. to
Robert Tuttle, Special Assistant to the President for Presidential
Personnel, 6/25/85.
\22\ Exhibit 1064M: p. 1, Letter from Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr. to
Robert Tuttle, Special Assistant to the President for Presidential
Personnel, 6/25/85.
\23\ Exhibit 1064M: p. 2, Letter from Robert H. Tuttle, director of
presidential personnel to Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., chairman of the
RNC, 7/10/85.
\24\ Senator Levin, 9/18/97, Hrg., pp. 64-66 (discussing Frank
Fahrenkopf's letter to the Committee regarding Roger Tamraz).
\25\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 4-6; Roger Tamraz deposition,
5/13/97, pp. 8-10; Washington Post, 9/19/97.
\26\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 4-6; Roger Tamraz deposition,
5/13/97, pp. 8-10; Washington Post, 9/19/97.
\27\ Roger Tamraz, 9/19/97 Hrg., pp. 4-6; DNC 3234854-58 (Three
articles describing the events found in DNC files: Financial Times, 9/
13/89; AP, 3/11/89; Reuters, 3/10/89).
\28\ Roger Tamraz, 9/19/97 Hrg., pp. 5-6. In 1989, Tamraz was
portrayed in the Lebanese media as an agent of Israel. Beirut
Newspaper, 1/1/89; Roger Tamraz, 9/19/97 Hrg., p. 5.
\29\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 5.
\30\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 5.
\31\ Department of Commerce Memorandum from Interpol, 4/11/97.
\32\ Application submitted to Melissa Moss, director of Office of
Business Liaison at Commerce, 3/1/94.
\33\ Melissa Moss deposition, 6/11/97, pp. 190-93.
\34\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 5-9. Tamraz admitted
that if ``anyone puts my name in Nexus-Lexus [sic], you get a lot of
horror stories. So I think it was justifiable, but they could have
given me a chance to explain the circumstances.'' Roger Tamraz
deposition, 5/13/97, p. 6.
\35\ A series of memoranda circulated between the Commerce
Department in Washington and the Commercial Service office in Hungary
reveal that in October 1995, Commerce had once again reviewed Tamraz's
questionable background and other issues concerning Oil Capital and
determined that the U.S. should not advocate on behalf of Oil Capital.
Memorandum from Jonathan Marks to Ann Ngo, 10/25/95; e-mail from Ira
Sockowitz to Jonathan Marks, 10/27/95; e-mail from Jonathan Marks to
Ira Sockowitz, 11/2/95.
\36\ Statement of Lanny J. Davis, 6/3/97; Federal Clearinghouse
(FDCH); FDCH Political Transcripts, 11/26/97.
\37\ On February 2, 1995, Platt's Oilgram quoted an administration
official as saying, ``we support multiple routes.'' On February 24,
1995, a senior State Department official said that ``in the short-run
there should be a variety of viable alternatives, and that in the
medium- to long-run the resource based in the region should support
pipelines.'' State Department press guidance on February 3, 1995 noted
that ``we expect eventual production in the Caspian region to require
multiple pipelines.'' A March 9, 1995 State Department message stated
that ``the USG still believes multiple routes are necessary and that
their development will provide additional security for oil companies as
they proceed. To this day, the U.S. has not taken a position on which
route the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline should take. The U.S. maintains that the
routes chosen is a decision for private companies and should be based
on commercial principle, non-discriminatory access, and market-based
tariffs. And in May 1995, President Clinton delivered a letter to
Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev. President Clinton wrote in the
letter that ``[t]he U.S. will work actively with Azerbaijan, other
governments in the region, the international financial institutions,
and private companies to support the development and export of the
Caspian Sea's vast energy reserves. Over the next several months, it
will be important to ensure that early oil can be exported reliably and
economically to the West.''
\38\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 4, 49-50.
\39\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 4; 50-51.
\40\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 51; Staff interview with
Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\41\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 6.
\42\ Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\43\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 10.
\44\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 8.
\45\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 7.
\46\ Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\47\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 52; see also pp. 5-6, 19-20,
72.
\48\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 5-6, 19-20, 50-51, 72;
Senator Lieberman, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 75.
\49\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 22-28.
\50\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 44-47. Tamraz first met with
the DNC to discuss donations in July of 1995. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97
Hrg., p. 15. Tamraz began contributing to the Democratic Party on July
19, 1995. A DNC Memorandum to Tamraz from Richard Sullivan of the DNC,
dated March 28, 1996, states that Tamraz's contributions began on July
19, 1995 and ended on September 10, 1995. Exhibit 1168.
\51\ See Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 25-26; Roger Tamraz,
9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 45-48.
\52\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 7; 53.
\53\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 8.
\54\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 8, 33.
\55\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 9-10.
\56\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 10-11.
\57\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 26-28.
\58\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 28.
\59\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 28; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/98
Hrg., p. 47-48; John Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 155; Kyle Simpson, 9/18/
97 Hrg., pp. 53-54; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\60\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 54.
\61\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 54; 56.
\62\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 54
\63\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 54-55.
\64\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 54-55; Staff interview with
Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\65\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 55-57; Staff interview with
Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\66\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 12.
\67\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 12.
\68\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 57.
\69\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 12.
\70\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 57-58; Staff interview with
Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\71\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 20.
\72\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 58-59.
\73\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 60.
\74\ Four pieces of evidence support this conclusion. In a
Committee interview, Heslin stated that it was her understanding that
Bob had also contacted someone in the Vice President's office to lobby
for Tamraz, and that she thought it might have been Dana Marshall.
Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97. Supporting Heslin's
statement are two e-mails produced to the Committee by the Vice
President's office. The first e-mail, dated September 6, 1995, was sent
by Richard Grimes of the Vice President's office to Leon Fuerth, the
Vice President's National Security Advisor. The e-mail discusses
Tamraz's request for a meeting and sets forth negative information
about Tamraz. Grimes had obtained this information about Tamraz from
Heslin. Dana Marshall was copied on the e-mail. Exhibit 1124, EOP
56535. The second e-mail is the one Marshall sent in response to
Grimes's e-mail about Tamraz. Marshall replied, ``Let's discuss this,
in light of my discussion with the individual I mentioned.'' 9/6/95 e-
mail from Richard Grimes to Leon Fuerth, EOP 56538. Marshall's response
e-mail concerning ``the individual'' he spoke to about Tamraz, worded
in such a secretive manner, suggests that Heslin was correct--Bob had
called Marshall of the Vice President's office to discuss Tamraz. The
fourth piece of information supporting this conclusion is a
declassified memorandum dated 10/20/95, written by Bob himself. Bob
stated that during a conversation with Donald Fowler, chairman of the
DNC, ``Fowler said he understood that I was in contact with the Vice
President's office concerning Tamraz.'' Memorandum for the Record,
written by Bob of the CIA, dated 10/20/95 and produced in declassified
form by the CIA. (The contacts between Bob and Fowler are reviewed more
fully below.)
Although the evidence does not definitely establish that Bob
lobbied the Vice President's office on behalf of Tamraz, largely
because the Committee never interviewed or deposed Grimes or Marshall,
it appears that Bob did in fact contact Vice President staff employee
Marshall in August or early September 1995 to discuss Tamraz's request
to meet with Vice President Gore.
\75\ Exhibit 1127: Memorandum to the Vice President from Leon
Fuerth, 9/13/95, EOP 45766-67.
\76\ Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\77\ Memorandum for the Record, written by Bob of the CIA, produced
in declassfied form by the CIA, 10/20/95.
\78\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 3.
\79\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 3.
\80\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, pp. 4-5.
\81\ Memorandum for the Record, written by Bob of the CIA, produced
in declassified form by the CIA, 10/20/95.
\82\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 7.
\83\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 6.
\84\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 6.
\85\ Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\86\ Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\87\ Roger Tamraz, 9/19/97 Hrg., p. 66.
\88\ Exhibit 1168; FEC records demonstrate that Tamraz's only other
contribution was $2,000 in September of 1996 for tickets to the DNC
Presidential Gala held at the Radio City Music Hall in New York City.
\89\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 66.
\90\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 81-83.
\91\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 36-37.
\92\ Exhibit 1117: Memorandum to Fowler from Alejandra Y. Castillo,
7/12/95, DNC 3116351-53.
\93\ Exhibit 1117: Memorandum to Fowler from Alejandra Y. Castillo,
7/12/95, DNC 3116351-53.
\94\ Exhibit 1117: Memorandum to Fowler from Alejandra Y. Castillo,
7/12/95, DNC 3116351-53.
\95\ Exhibit 1117: Memorandum to Fowler from Alejandra Y. Castillo,
7/12/95, DNC 3116351-53.
\96\ EOP 5635, EOP 56539-40. Sassounian made this request at a DNC
breakfast on 8/8/97.
\97\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 53-54.
\98\ E-mail from Grimes to Heslin, 8/11/95, EOP 56532.
\99\ Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97; Exhibit 1200;
Heslin notes from conversations with Grimes, EOP 25068; Grimes e-mail
to Fuerth discussing information received from Heslin, 6/6/95, EOP
56535.
\100\ Exhibit 1127: Memorandum to the Vice President from Leon
Fuerth, 9/13/95, EOP 45766-67.
\101\ Handwritten notes from Scott Patrick to Jack Quinn regarding
Tamraz saying ``hasn't been regretted'' and ``NSA said no,'' 10/2/95,
EOP 25006-007; Notations on same page say ``10/2--left msg'' and ``10/
3--left msg.'', EOP 25004; Exhibit 1135: Memorandum to Jack Quinn and
Kim Tilley from Richard Grimes, 10/2/95, attaching copy of Fuerth's 9/
13/95 Memorandum to the Vice President.
\102\ Also in September 1995, Heslin checked the President's
schedule for that month and was informed that no meeting with Tamraz
was scheduled. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
\103\ Exhibit 1136: Schedule for Vice President Al Gore, 10/2/95,
EOP 63857-68
\104\ Exhibit 1137; EOP 045764-67; Fax to Richard Sullivan of the
DNC from the Office of the Vice President dated 10/3/95.
\105\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 34-35.
\106\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97, Hrg., p. 20, 51-53.
\107\ Statement of Lanny J. Davis, 3/3/97; EOP 024911-14 (White
House WAVES records for Tamraz).
\108\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 22-24. Tamraz also told CBS's
Rita Braver that ``Maybe once, standing in line I said, ``I'm working
on a pipeline and that it's going to bring a half million jobs to
Americans'' and he said ``Good for you. Good luck,'' and that's about
it.'' CBS Television Broadcast, 3/17/97. Tamraz told NBC ``There was
never any one-on-one, it was with many other donors and you never had
more than 30 seconds with the President.'' NBC television broadcast 3/
17/97. Both interviews were reported in Hotline, 3/18/97.
\109\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97, Hrg., pp. 17-18.
\110\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 18, 22, 55. Fowler never told
Tamraz, however, that he had contacted Bob. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg.,
p. 21; Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 65; Tamraz also doesn't
recall Bob telling him that Bob had ever spoken to Fowler. Roger Tamraz
deposition, 5/13/97, p. 65.
\111\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 59-60, 63-64.
\112\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 2.
\113\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, pp. 3--4, 16-17.
\114\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, pp. 7, 17-19.
\115\ See endnote 74
\116\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 11.
\117\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 10-11.
\118\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 11.
\119\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 23.
\120\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 23, 60.
\121\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 23.
\122\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 24.
\123\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 26-27; Staff interview with
Nancy Soderberg, 5/30/97; Donald Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, p. 230.
\124\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 63-64; Exhibit 1159; E-mail
from Soderberg's assistant, Kenneth Baldwin, to Beers, 12/21/97, EOP
056543; Staff interview with Nancy Soderberg, 5/30/97; Staff interview
with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97; Staff interview with Randy Beers, 5/23/97
and 6/13/97.
\125\ Staff interview with Randy Beers, Senior Director for
Intelligence, NSC, 5/23/97 and 6/13/97.
\126\ The CIA report faxed to Randy Beers, NSC's Senior Director of
Intelligence, on December 29, 1995 is lodged in the Office of Senate
Security.
\127\ Don Fowler deposition, 5/21/87, p. 229.
\128\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97, Hrg. p. 86. Senator Lieberman asked
Tamraz whether he felt ``badly about having given the 300,000.'' FEC
records indicate that Tamraz gave $220,000 to the Democratic Party from
July to October, 1995.
\129\ Exhibit 1164: 3/27/96 DNC Trustee Dinner invitation
acceptance report, 10/20/96, EOP 031249-54.
\130\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 22-23.
\131\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 24.
\132\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 24, 28.
\133\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 28-29.
\134\ Exhibit 1165: Memorandum from Ann Stock to the President, 3/
28/96, EOP 046305.
\135\ Exhibit 1166: Memorandum from Ann Stock to the President, 3/
28/96, with notations, EOP 046305.
\136\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 56.
\137\ Exhibit 1170: DNC Memorandum re 4/1/96 coffee, 3/29/96;
Exhibit 1171: List of 4/1/96 coffee attendees.
\138\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 25.
\139\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 27.
\140\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 27.
\141\ Thomas F. McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 44.
\142\ Exhibit 1174: Memorandum from Mack McLarty to Kyle Simpson
stating, ``Relates to the fax I sent you last week,'' 4/2/96, EOP
024980-81.
\143\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 42-43; Kyle Simpson
deposition, 6/25/97, p. 26.
\144\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 39.
\145\ Exhibit 1173: Memorandum from Mack McLarty to the President,
4/2/96, EOP 041537; Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 50-51.
\146\ Exhibit 1174: Memorandum from Mack McLarty to Kyle Simpson,
4/2/96, EOP 024980-81.
\147\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 56.
\148\ Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 43-48; Kyle Simpson, 9/
18/97 Hrg., pp. 49-51.
\149\ Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 54.
\150\ Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 43, 46-48; Kyle
Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 50; Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p.
60.
\151\ Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 43.
\152\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 30, 56-57; Kyle
Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 50-51; Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp.
43, 46-48.
153 Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 73. On March 28,
Tamraz received two memoranda from the DNC which he had been requesting
for months. Exhibit 1167: Memorandum from Richard Sullivan and Ari
Swiller to Roger Tamraz, 3/28/96, DNC 3116355; Exhibit 1168: Memorandum
from Richard Sullivan and Ari Swiller to Roger Tamraz, 3/28/96, DNC
3116354. The memoranda list Tamraz's political contributions to date,
one adding up to $300,000, the other adding up to $205,000. Tamraz
testified that he had requested these memoranda for his records and
never showed them to anyone. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 73. Simpson
and another Energy Department official, John Carter, all testified that
they had not seen the document until preparing for depositions in 1997.
Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97, Hrg., p. 50; John Carter, 9/18/97, Hrg., p. 32.
McLarty testified that he had no knowledge of Tamraz's political
contributions at the time. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 30.
154 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 29-30; Jack Carter
deposition, 6/23/97, p. 44.
155 Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 57.
156 Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 55; Kyle
Simpson, 9/18/97, Hrg., p. 52.
157 Kyle Simpson, Hrg., pp. 74-75, 91; Kyle Simpson
deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 55-57; See also endnote 149.
158 Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 55-57.
159 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 60, 48.
160 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 30; 35; Jack Carter
deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 44-45.
161 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 44-45.
162 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 45.
163 Kyle Simpson, Hrg., pp. 74-75, 91; Kyle Simpson
deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 55-57.
164 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 31-32, 36-37; John
Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 79.
165 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 30.
166 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 30.
167 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 130-31.
168 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 28-29.
169 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 30, 33, 37.
170 Sheila Heslin, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 28, 44.
171 Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 28.
172 Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 29.
173 Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 29.
174 Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 29-30.
175 Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 46.
176 Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 30, 47; Staff
interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
177 Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 31, 42.
178 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 45.
179 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 60-63; Jack
Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 126-27.
180 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 64; Jack Carter,
9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 125-26.
181 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 79.
182 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 92.
183 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 37.
184 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 93.
185 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 19-20.
186 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 20-21.
187 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 21.
188 Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 42.
189 Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 59-60.
190 Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 62-63; Exhibit
1182: Phone message slip, EOP 024962.
191 Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 62-63.
192 Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 67-69.
193 Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 28; Roger
Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 47-48; John Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 155;
Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 53-54; Staff interview with Sheila
Heslin, 5/28/97; Thomas McLarty deposition 6/30/97, p. 72.
194 Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 33.
195 Hearing Exhibit 1158; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97, Hrg.,
p. 51.
196 Senator Domenici concluded after a morning of
testimony that he believed that Carter was telling the truth about this
exchange with Simpson, and that Simpson was not being truthful. Senator
Domenici, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 101-02. This conclusion, however, is not
supported by the record. It is quite clear that Carter's testimony was
faulty on every count--it contradicts the sworn testimony of not only
Simpson and McLarty, but also of Heslin. Considering that Heslin
apparently was found by the Majority and Minority to be a highly
credible witness, it is relevant that it is Carter's testimony that
directly and specifically contradicts Heslin's.
If Heslin's testimony was accurate regarding her telephone call
with Carter, then it is necessary to conclude that Carter's testimony
was not accurate. Thus, if Carter's testimony about his phone call with
Heslin is not accurate, it is difficult to argue that Carter's version
of his brief conversation with Simpson is accurate, particularly when
it is also contradicted by two individuals.
197 During her public testimony, Heslin speculated that
Carter acted in the manner because he was acting on the behalf of
someone else. However, this speculation is contradicted by the evidence
before the Committee. For example, Carter himself testified that he was
not trying to pressure Heslin based on political contributions and that
one had even suggested that he do so. In addition, although Heslin
thoughts that Carter was close to McLarty, and therefore might do
something on his behalf, this was not the fact. In his two years at the
Energy Department, Carter had spoken to McLarty on the phone a few
times, but had never met with him personally. Furthermore, no one but
Carter contacted Heslin in the spring of 1996 with any type of request
that Tamraz have a meeting with the President. Finally, Heslin's
speculaiton is contradicted by testimony establishing that Tamraz had
not in fact requested a meeting with the President and that no one in
the While House even contacted Tamraz after April of 1996. See full
text of chapter for a full discussion of these issues as well as
supporting citations.
198 Staff interview with Nancy Soderberg, 5/30/97;
Minority counsel, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 40-41.
199 Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 67, 169; Exhibits
1065 & 1066.
200 Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 170;
201 Senator Levin, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 170.