Center for Inquiry | It’s Only Natural with John Shookhttp://www.centerforinquiry.net/
It’s Only Natural with John ShookenCopyright 20152015-03-03T17:40:14+00:00A Confutation of both Sam Harris and Richard Carrier on Science and MoralityJohn Shookhttp://www.centerforinquiry.net/blog/a_confutation_of_both_sam_harris_and_richard_carrier_on_science_and_moralit/
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blog/a_confutation_of_both_sam_harris_and_richard_carrier_on_science_and_moralit/#When:19:06Z

A refutation of an argument typically exposes a false or unknowable premise, or a fallacious inference. A confutation can admit the soundness of argument, while pointing out how it fails to prove what it was intended to prove.

1. Morals and values are physically dependent (without remainder) on the nature of any would-be moral agent (such that given the nature of an agent, a certain set of values will necessarily obtain, and those values will then entail a certain set of morals).

2. By its own intrinsic nature, the most overriding value any conscious agent will have is for maximizing its own well-being and reducing its own suffering. This includes not just actual present well-being and suffering, but also the risk factors for them (an agent will have an overriding interest in reducing the risk of its suffering as well as its actual suffering; and likewise in increasing the probability of its long-term well-being as well as its present well-being).

3. All of the above is constrained (and thus determined) by natural physical laws and objects (the furniture of the universe and how it behaves).

4. The nature of an agent, the desires of conscious beings, and the laws of nature are all matters of fact subjectable to empirical scientific inquiry and discovery. (Whether this has been done or not; i.e. this is a claim to what science could do, not to what science has already done.)

5. Therefore, there are scientifically objective (and empirically discernible) right and wrong answers in all questions of moral fact and value (i.e. what values people have, and what morals those values entail when placed in conjunction with the facts of the universe).

My confutation is basically this: That it can be proven that truths ‘exist’ does not necessarily, by itself, either constitute a method for specifically learning those truths, or supplying the grounds for deducing those truths so that they can be known. Hence, this argument only creates the mirage that there are real answers, but there won’t really be any actual answers. Perhaps there can be scientifically objective knowledge about morality, in the abstract. I strongly doubt that this reliance on this applied science, or any amount of science and applied science, can concretely yield what we would all regard as objectively discernible knowledge about specific moral duties (or virtues, etc.) That is to say, moral truths there may be, but moral knowledge there may never be, if we rely only upon the sciences (broadly understood) alone.

In general, having a soundly deducible conclusion that there must be a truth to X doesn’t necessarily yield information about what specifically can be known by humans about X. Now, we must recognize how “There is a truth about X” cannot be disproven by “We can’t figure out what about X is specifically true.” Ignorance may be an excuse, but it is no counter-example. However, between the claims made by Harris and Carrier about science and applied science for application to morality, no detailed procedure or specific expectation about an actual person’s moral duty/duties in a concrete situation could ever follow. This isn’t really their fault alone. Some vague duties may be suggestible, but any specific moral duty so suggested is “radically underdetermined” by all the relevant scientific work available, even in principle.

Carrier helpfully exposes precisely where this confutation is directed, as he expands and simplifies his preferred argument to include this needed point:

5. What will maximize the satisfaction of any human being in any particular set of circumstances is an empirical fact that science can discover.

Seems so simple, yes? Yet applying this maxim involves maximizing the satisfaction for a person in “a particular set of circumstances”. There are three divergent and ineliminable senses to this phrasing.

5a. “What will maximize the satisfaction of any human being in any particular set of circumstances, as those circumstances are understood by that human being, is an empirical fact that science can discover.”

5b. “What will maximize the satisfaction of any human being in any particular set of circumstances, as those circumstances are understood by us science-minded observers, is an empirical fact that science can discover.”

5c. “What will maximize the satisfaction of any human being in any particular set of circumstances, as those circumstances truly are although we can’t ever know what they actually are, is an empirical fact that science can discover.”

Accepting 5a for applying moral calculations seems intuitively right, because we expect persons to grasp some connection between their understanding of their circumstances and what they morally ought to do. Suppose you instead claim, “No, it matters nothing whether a person grasps much of a connection between their circumstances and their moral duties.” This claim is unethical in the extreme. It denies a fundamental right to a person: to control their sense of moral duty. Perhaps complete autonomy shouldn’t be the ethical ideal either, nor am I endorsing the idea that all moral duties must be grounded solely in a person’s express beliefs. But extreme paternalism can’t be ethical. Some sense of autonomous control over our moral life is necessary for moral learning and ethical growth, and probably personhood in general. Denying 5a instead yields moral conformity, and also ethical tyranny. Religions may respect blind submission, but humanism shouldn’t.

Defenders of 5b see a potential compromise: determine the relevant circumstantial facts for the moral calculations, and then instruct the people about them, so they ‘understand’ the grounds for their moral duties. But this only heightens the ethical problem here: what are the “relevant circumstantial facts” for determining morality? The very essence to the destructiveness of colonialism was the way that well-intentioned scientists, using the ‘best’ knowledge of facts ‘relevant’ to human welfare, approved of vast and abrupt social changes to “primitive” peoples, but few truly ethical results were obtained, alongside many fresh evils. Today, we shake our heads at 19th century colonialism and fault their “primitive” and biased science. But do we know that we are in the best ‘scientific’ position to paternalistically decree morality for all societies today? Is just science involved, if we do this?

When scientific-minded and logical aliens arrive to inform us that our most relevant circumstantial facts have largely to do with the suffering and/or extinction of insects, amphibians, fish, and wildlife, and then give us a moment to absorb that fact before announcing how all industrial production must be cut in half across the planet immediately, are we immediately enlightened about the most morally relevant circumstantial facts? Some ardent environmentalists would say, “We knew it all along!” The rest of us wouldn’t be so easily convinced. The aliens would remind us, “We have vastly superior science, so it is hardly your place to dispute our scientific methods and conclusions.” I expect that many of us would respond, “We want to see what normative premises you inserted into your ‘purely’ scientific reasonings about what constitutes our ‘morally’ relevant circumstances.” We’d suspect the presence of a deeply buried “Is-Ought” gap, and we’d be right. The “moral” to this story is that unless we exercise some control over the inclusion of normative premises within the scientific selection of “morally relevant circumstantial facts”, we won’t learn much from our moral instructors and we will feel unethically tyrannized. Perhaps that reaction would ‘objectively’ be in the wrong; my point is that our moral knowledge isn’t guaranteed.

Humbled admirers of science will now perceive the core to this problem: the very notion of how specifically to “maximize the satisfaction of any human being in any particular set of circumstances” is far too vague to apply methodologically for concrete results. The phrase “in any particular set of circumstances” is especially vague because (1) it fails to mention how only genuinely morally relevant sets of circumstances should be used for procedural calculations about moral duties, and (2) it therefore hides the way that science, by itself, does not discern what OUGHT to be the morally relevant circumstantial “facts”. The defender of strict science can try to respond like this: “Well, I already told you about the genuine morally relevant circumstantial facts, because they are precisely the ones relevant for maximizing the satisfactions of those human beings.” Yes, you have said some things about those crucial circumstantial facts, but you are now in a vicious circle, leaving matters too vague again. What maximizes human welfare must involve those relevant circumstantial facts, and the ‘right’ circumstantial facts are just the ones relevant to maximizing human welfare! Too neat! Also, too uninformative for yielding a specific method for determining moral duties for any actual person in a real situation.

Must we then resort to 5c? I hope not, because as worded, 5c seems paradoxical and false. Read 5c again: “What will maximize the satisfaction of any human being in any particular set of circumstances, as those circumstances truly are although we can’t ever know what they actually are, is an empirical fact that science can discover.” If you stubbornly want to retain some sense to 5c, you could claim that some perfected future science would discover those crucial empirical facts of the matter about our current moral circumstances, even if we won’t learn anything about all that. But this optional sense for 5c only ends up agreeing with my confutation: we can’t know enough now about our relevant circumstances now, so we can’t learn our true moral duties today. Moral truths ‘existing’ in some platonic or noumenal realm tell us nothing specific about our moral duties here and now. If you want to adore vaporous moral absolutes, consult your nearest religious authority, not an ethical humanist. Vague moralist platitudes like “Try not to steal” or “Don’t kill others” of course don’t count here either.

To summarize, there is no assignable sense to the phrase “in any particular set of circumstances” that avoids collapsing the entire procedure of applying science for determining specific moral knowledge into either unethical tyranny, hasty paternalism, fallacious “Is-Ought” leaps, tight vicious circles, utter paradoxes, or unknowable absolutes. That’s quite a list, and it looks familiar to any critic of religion’s tyranny over the spirit of humanity. If there is a genuinely ethical way to determine our concrete moral duties here and now, the procedures outlined by Harris and Carrier are not headed that way. Objective truths in no way guarantee human knowledge, or human wisdom.

Dying paradigms often burst into spectacular fireworks before expiring. I will be lectured about how the distinction between Objective Moral Truth and relative moral fallibility is the pillar holding up all that that is Good and Right about Progress and Civilization. (Which civilization, one needn’t wonder.) But I don’t frighten easily at ignorant darkness, and I don’t scare easily at false dichotomies either.

By the way, those moral platitudes mentioned just now actually supply the needed clue to climb out of this ethical darkness of our own making. After all, those platitudes represent the collective accumulated experience of innumerable real humans living real lives. In that spirit of respect for ethical wisdom, I already explained in a blog years ago what is required. As pragmatist philosopher John Dewey realized a century ago, the path forward is not to derive morality from scientific procedure, but to make moralities more procedurally experimental. Since you can’t close the “Is-Ought” gap with more factual science, you have to improve your ethical practices with more intelligence. Some of that intelligence of course includes what science can tell us now, but there’s ethical matters we can understand just as well as anything scientific, for considering the future lives that we ought to lead.

]]>2013-09-05T19:06+00:00Religion is the Opposite of HumanismJohn Shookhttp://www.centerforinquiry.net/blog/religion_is_the_opposite_of_humanism/
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blog/religion_is_the_opposite_of_humanism/#When:18:02Z

The reflections of R. Joseph Hoffmann range widely across intellectual history and issues of broad humanist concern. A recent blog posting, “On the Dignity of Humanism,” makes uplifting observations about humanism’s lasting value, marked occasionally by his characteristic laments about the secular ‘movement’ lately.

Readers can judge the merits to his acerbic observations about the movement for themselves. I perked up at this passage about humanism and religion:

“Finally, humanism is not the opposite of religion. There are certainly things it opposes—injustice, oppression, poverty, enforced ignorance, the uglification of human life and predations on the environment or the freedoms we enjoy. But it opposes these things because they are attacks on our humanity—on the principle of the dignity of mankind. As a matter of fact, it does not matter too much whether one thinks this dignity comes from God or simply is: Both attributions are metaphors for the best that is in us, images of what we are when viewed in terms of our intelligence and ability. No one should be afraid to call herself a humanist simply because she believes in God, because belief in God is not self-evidently a denial of the dignity of man.”

I have always held that humanism IS an opposite (not the only opposite) to religion. Unless it’s all a matter of semantics, which I doubt, what is essential to humanism cannot be found in what is essential to religion.

Surely some moral goals of religions during certain time periods can overlap with moral principles to humanism. If one even wanted to assert that key humanistic moral ideals emerged from religious cradles, I couldn’t object on historical grounds. Across the world’s civilizations, all of them religious to some degree or another, it becomes a truism that religiosity and noble ethics were found together. One might as well argue that since all the foundations of mathematics originated from religious cultures from Egypt and Babylon to India and China, then mathematics is not opposed to religion. So what?

A liberally religious mind would assert that more than coincidence is involved where noble ethics and religiosity is concerned. Perhaps. Where far-seeing humanist ethics did arise, it never was due to traditional religiosity or established religion. The pioneering proto-humanist was always a heretic, a freethinker, a radical, a schismatic, a blasphemer, or something similarly dangerous. Some of these radicals founded new religious sects, some didn’t, and some were murdered by the faithful. Its hard to see how religion deserves credit for anything but supplying the backdrop resistance to humane charity and universal dignity for all.

That liberally religious mind would reply by re-defining religion at this point: “No, you’ve got it backwards - the radical humanistic ideals are the religious essence at work!” That’s a philosophical view, not even a theological one, or anything endorsed by cultural anthropology.

No, humanism is opposed to the essence of religion: humanity’s dependence on something unnaturally transcendent. It’s terribly nice of religions to catch up to the noble ethics of humanism, long after the burnt heretics have smoldered into dust. But humanism will always race ahead of its crucifiers.

There doesn’t seem to be some third thing to generate them, either. Then I asked myself this question, “What would Bertrand Russell suggest?”

One of the 20th century’s smartest and wisest nonreligious philosophers has a wider perspective, surely. If the essence of wisdom is the best advice one could give to humanity long after you are dead and gone, surely Russell’s advice must be wise indeed.

If you could go back in time to ask Bertrand Russell for his finest wisdom, what would he say? Turns out, some one did ask him. And his wisdom helped me with my question. Maybe you’ll hear some helpful wisdom, too.

Readers of the magazine Humanist Perspectives (Canada) are getting the latest issue (Summer 2013) and opening it to read a most alarming report of treachery and sedition.

This article is titled “Trouble With Humanists: How atheophobic attitudes among Humanists compromise the fight for freedom of conscience” by David Rand [presently online here].

People of every secular persuasion may take a passing interest in sparring among self-appointed nonbelieving ‘denominations’. (Remember the flare-up between confrontationists and accommodationists from a couple years ago?) Rand is worried about the relations between “Atheism” and “Humanism” and speaks about them as if they were doctrinal camps. Rand proudly stands up for the ‘Atheists’ and he evidently has been holding a grudge against Humanism for a long time. Every grudge match requires a participating opponent, of course. Rand expresses his long-standing distaste for Paul Kurtz, but he is no longer with us. Looking around for Kurtz’s proxy, he somehow settles on me, but not on my own ample writings about my atheist views—just a single thing I wrote, a book review in Free Inquiry magazine about Kurtz’s posthumous volume Meaning and Value in a Secular Age.

Rand’s grand thesis is that Humanists scorn mere atheism and say mean and lowly things about atheists so that Humanism can appear superior. Maybe such things are heard out in the open fields of grassroot secular activism, or over in the wilds of internet blogging, but such things hardly ever reach my ears, I have to say. People simply enjoy their own preferred labels for themselves, and I’ve never chastized anyone for adopting one or another from the many options. But Rand must have someone to joust with, so he tears out a few phrases from my article describing Kurtz’s philosophy in order to misrepresent what I say and accuse me of openly castigating all of atheism and every single atheist. No such thing appears in my review, I can assure everyone (go read it yourself) nor does any blanket condemnation of all atheists stain the pages of anything Paul Kurtz published. What Rand manages to quote from my review is what Kurtz did say repeatedly, that mere disbelief in God isn’t a sufficient worldview for life. And that’s true. Saying over and over “there’s no god” cannot be equivalent to affirming worthy ideals for life. Nothing Rand throws out in his lurching diatribe manages to bridge that Is-Ought logical gap.

The funny (sad?) thing is the way that Rand himself indicates in his article how atheists should be motivated by humanist ideals. If atheism per se should be so complete and self-sufficient, it wouldn’t need humanism. Everyone knows that. That’s why the petty little denominational games get started. Nonbelievers who just want “Atheism” headlined then argue that the ‘meaning’ of atheism necessarily includes the humanist basics. Nonbelievers who just want “Humanism” headlined up front instead argue that the ‘meaning’ of humanism necessarily includes disbelief in gods. Then atheists reply by saying that dropping god-belief automatically exposes a person’s moral soundness. Sounds like magical thinking, responds the humanists, since people are basically nice but not that intrinsically ethical. And this sort of bickering can be kept up ad nauseum. Petty games can keep small-minded people endlessly occupied, but thinkers of wider vision realize what is actually going on.

Kurtz did not play petty semantic word games, but he did suggest one unifying term that should have ended all this bickering long ago: Secular Humanism. Secular Humanism regards disbelief in gods and confidence in humans as co-dependent and cooperatively victorious. Neither mere disbelief in religion, nor mere idealism about humanity, could by themselves forge a reasoned and wise philosophy of life. And Kurtz really didn’t loose sleep over whether everyone adopted his label instead—his point was only that whatever you call that integrated worldview, no separate part of it could stand alone for long. Not anger at religion, not admiring science, not ethical principles, not seeking inner peace, not political activism—no individual part by itself fulfills the secular life, nor stands a chance at replacing religion. Of course each individual nonbeliever finds satisfaction in just one or another activity, and no one should fault them for doing what they feel they need to do. But a philosophical perspective over the entire nonreligious world is a quite different matter.

One gets the impression from Rand that he actually agrees in spirit with all this. Yet Rand must have some battle victory somewhere in the name of Atheism, so he insists that Kurtz (and myself) are spending careers denigrating atheism in general as worthless and dismissing all atheists as fools. Rand labels this antipathy against atheists as “atheophobia”—“fear of atheism”. It’s common enough among the religious, surely, but the nonreligious too? Rand needs to identify instigators provoking this deteriorating situation, and he thinks we serve that purpose. Really? Considering how both Kurtz and myself have been in the business of making careers out of publicly advocating atheism at the top of our lungs, this would be a bizarre and alarming situation indeed. And Rand declares that the main symptom of “atheophobia” among the secular is a reluctance to call oneself an atheist. But Rand confidently diagnoses how both Kurtz and I suffer from this “atheophobia” despite the way we have been proud to attract public attention for being prominent atheists. Perhaps this nefarious plot goes even deeper—Kurtz and I are cleverly disguising our fear of atheism by making sure everyone we meet sees how comfortable we are with being called atheists. Truly fascinating!

Has Rand uncovered a secret plot to treacherously divide and rot the secular world from within? Has Rand discerned a rare psychological neurosis behind the “self-hating” atheist? It would surely be astounding if all this were really true.

A fair-minded reader should instead be asking if this investigative “reporting” could pass simple skeptical tests. Isn’t it a little suspicious that Rand must first declare the existence of two antagonistic camps, one just for ‘atheists’ and the other just for ‘humanists’, so that he can then accuse some secular leaders of trying to divide us? One should ask whether that black-and-white depiction of the situation fairly corresponds to what they see in the secular world around them. And Rand’s cherry-picking reporting doesn’t arouse more confidence. Rand’s primary source consists of quotations from me about Kurtz’s views, composed in an eulogistic tone to express with regrettable brevity a handful of philosophical ideas. I don’t even supply quoted passages from Kurtz’s writings (no space for that), yet neither does Rand for his much longer piece. I do manage to convey how atheism and humanism should be co-dependent and cooperative. Yet Rand spends far more time in his piece trying to clumsily agree with that view, than he does trying to prove how Kurtz and I have been supposedly betraying it.

It’s apparently too much to ask a very expansive and diverse movement to stop imitating the religious impulse to raise up artificial sects and get fights started. But I don’t think that it is too much to ask would-be spokespeople for the movement to refrain from encouraging the worst in us, instead of the best in us. That’s a humanist ideal worth broadcasting.

If any “Church of Atheism” needs to assemble its own sacred relics, here’s how to get started!

The Secular Hub in Colorado - www.secularhub.com - recently hosted the second annual Colorado Secular Conference on July 20.

Yes, secular folks have a dry sense of humor too. This photo (thanks to Bob Cook) was taken of a display at the Secular Hub. The sign reads:

“English tea cup used by Richard Dawkins on his visit to the Hub February 28, 2013”

Since Russell’s teapot hasn’t yet been retrieved from outer space, Dawkins’ tea cup may be the closest earthly example of skeptic relic. If only archaeologists could someday dig up Occam’s razor!

]]>2013-07-24T15:50+00:00You Aren’t Religious, But Who Are You?John Shookhttp://www.centerforinquiry.net/blog/you_arent_religious_but_who_are_you/
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blog/you_arent_religious_but_who_are_you/#When:17:39Z

Researchers at University of Tennessee at Chattanooga have released some initial findings about the kinds of people who are generally categorized as unaffiliated—the “Nones”.

What did they find about the kinds of people within the Nones category? Let’s look a bit at their six sub-types. I have re-ordered the subtypes for easier comprehension.

1. Intellectual Atheist/Agnostic (IAA)

“IAA typology includes individuals who proactively seek to educate themselves through intellectual association, and proactively acquire knowledge on various topics relating to ontology (the search for Truth) and non-belief. They enjoy dialectic enterprises such as healthy democratic debate and discussions, and are intrinsically motivated to do so. ... However, not only is the IAA typically engaged in electronic forms of intellectualism but they oftentimes belong to groups that meet face to face offline such as various skeptic, rationalist and freethinking groups for similar mentally stimulating discussions and interaction. The modus operandi for the Intellectual Atheist/Agnostic is the externalization of epistemologically oriented social stimulation.”

People reading this blog are probably thinking, “Sounds like me!” Of course that could sound familiar, since you are reading this blog at the website of an educational nonprofit organization for nonbelievers. These well-informed folks are typically able to know pretty clearly what they think. If they are an atheist, or an agnostic, they are able to speak up and say so.

2. Anti-Theist

“While the Anti-Theists may be considered atheist or in some cases labeled as “new atheists,” the Anti-Theist is diametrically opposed to religious ideology. As such, the assertive Anti-Theist both proactively and aggressively asserts their views towards others when appropriate, seeking to educate the theists in the passé nature of belief and theology. In other words, antitheists view religion as ignorance and see any individual or institution associated with it as backward and socially detrimental. The Anti-Theist has a clear and – in their view, superior – understanding of the limitations and danger of religions.”

We all know some anti-theists, and they are also quite capable of speaking up about their atheism. One might wonder how this category could be separated apart from the IAA Intellectual type. Surely Dawkins etc. are both Intellectual and Anti-Theist! But this new research found that people who prioritize anti-theism are not simply the same people intellectually devoted to nonbelief. The anti-theist type is simply passionately antagonistic against religion, without necessarily having an informed background about religion or even nonreligion. What they have is passion, and often anger. The divide between Intellectual Irreligion and Passionate Anti-Religion is precisely what sociologists would recognize as the inevitable divide between the High Church (intellectual) and Low Church (emotional) sides to any ideological movement or religion. Welcome to normalcy, nonbelievers.

You might better fit into this next category:

3. Activist (AAA)

“Individuals in the AAA typology are not content with the placidity of simply holding a non-belief position; they seek to be both vocal and proactive regarding current issues in the atheist and/or agnostic socio-political sphere. This sphere can include such egalitarian issues, but is not limited to: concerns of humanism, feminism, Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgendered (LGBT) issues, social or political concerns, human rights themes, environmental concerns, animal rights, and controversies such as the separation of church and state.”

Now, you and I know lots of people who seem to fit into both (1) and (3), or into both (2) and (3). But you have to forgive these demographics researchers, who must sort people according to their dominant interests and lifestyles. Unlike the intellectual or anti-theist types, this activist type isn’t as likely to confidently affirm their identity as ‘atheist’ or even ‘agnostic’, because some of them regard contentious labels as detrimental to advancing their highest causes of activism, which aren’t just about antagonism against religion.

4. Ritual Atheist/Agnostic (RAA)

“The RAA holds no belief in God or the divine, or they tend to believe it is unlikely that there is an afterlife with God or the divine. They are open about their lack of belief and may educate themselves on the various aspects of belief by others. One of the defining characteristics regarding Ritual Atheists/Agnostics is that they may find utility in the teachings of some religious traditions. They see these as more or less philosophical teachings of how to live life and achieve happiness than a path to transcendental liberation. Ritual Atheist/Agnostics find utility in tradition and ritual.”

This type looks familiar—they often like to call themselves religious humanists. Many of them attend Unitarian Universalist churches or Ethical Culture assemblies, or they organize other sorts of humanist communities. They are often intellectual, to be sure, but they put their energies into local communal activities.

Perhaps you can’t see where you’d fit into any box at all. Then the next two categories might be for you.

5. Seeker-Agnostic (SA)

“Seeker-Agnostic typology consists of individuals attuned to the metaphysical possibilities precluding metaphysical existence, or at least recognizes the philosophical difficulties and complexities in making personal affirmations regarding ideological beliefs. They may call themselves agnostic or agnostic-atheist, as the SA simply cannot be sure of the existence of God or the divine. They keep an open mind in relation to the debate between the religious, spiritual, and antitheist elements within society. ... In some cases, Seeker-Agnostics may generally miss being a believer either from the social benefits or the emotional connection they have with others such as friends or family. At times, their intellectual disagreement with their former theology causes some cognitive dissonance and it is possible they may continue to identity as a religious or spiritual individual. However, taking those exceptions into account, the majority of Seeker-Agnostics should in no way be considered “confused.” For the Seeker-Agnostic, uncertainty is embraced.”

These seekers usually turn up in other polls as “transient” Nones. They sometimes attend worship services, they won’t let themselves get pinned down into those “atheist/agnostic categories,” and they might answer “Yes” to the question “Do you believe in god or a universal spirit?”

Finally, the last category belong to all the remaining non-conformists.

6. Non-Theist

“For the Non-Theists, the alignment of oneself with religion, or conversely an epistemological position against religion, can appear quite unconventional from their perspective. However, a few terms may best capture the sentiments of the Non-Theist. One is apathetic, while another may be disinterested. The Non-Theist is non-active in terms of involving themselves in social or intellectual pursuits having to do with religion or anti-religion. A Non-Theist simply does not concern him or herself with religion. Religion plays no role or issue in one’s consciousness or worldview; nor does a Non-Theist have concern for the atheist or agnostic movement. No part of their life addresses or considers transcendent ontology. They are not interested in any type of secularist agenda and simply do not care. Simply put, Non-Theists are apathetic non-believers.”

We’ve heard about this type before—I have labeled them as “Apatheists.” If you have reached this far into the six categories to find out where you fit, perhaps now you don’t even care and completely lost interest in the whole issue. Good for you!

Atheists are an interesting group of people. They have little in common, in general. A finer bunch of reasonable people couldn’t be wished for. But maybe I’m just saying that because they are my “tribe.”

Like any “tribe,” they differ about how they express their disbelief in god and religion. Yet you definitely know that you’ve encountered a staunch atheist upon hearing one of them piously proclaiming doctrines of a mythological nature.

Atheism cannot be a mythology, but atheists sometime say the most intriguing things, things that appear fictionally composed in an organized fashion in order to recount a cosmology, an origin story, a moral code, a special role for the chosen, and a destiny for the world, all according to atheists. “Atheist mythology” could happen, in a way that “atheism mythology” couldn’t, precisely because individual atheists are free to generate and informally transmit all manner of stories.

This is a familiar situation for the cultural anthropology of mythic narrative. Much in the way that a mythology generated by religious intellectual leadership, especially any mythology reaching written form, can sound quite different from the many oral narratives passed among religious laypeople, local atheist myth cannot be traced to any single author or definitive book. Also of interest to historians of religion is the way that a novel mythology can imitate the core mythic structure of a rival mythology.

Contemporary atheist mythology, to repeat, has no scripture, no authoritative leadership, and no official propaganda outlet, yet plenty of atheists can be heard repeating the same sorts of things over and over. Only by collecting sayings from many different sources makes it possible to assemble something like the “doctrines” of this “atheist mythology.” Here, presented for the first time, is one (incomplete and unauthorized) version of this mythology.

There is Truth about the One Reality, a Truth supremely valid over anything else people believe.

This Truth arises from Reason, and failure to acknowledge this Truth signals lack of Reason.

Atheists acknowledge this Truth, while religious people are bereft of this Truth, lost in Error, mired in Evil, and unable to know Reality.

Atheists acknowledge Truth and know Reality because they have been the sole possessors of Reason.

Witnessing to this Truth is necessary for the Ethical advancement of humanity, its liberation from irrationality, and its reconciliation with Reality.

Witnessing to this Truth is all atheists can and need do, since the religious lack Reason to understand explanations of the Truth.

Confronting the religious with the Truth is an effective means of converting them, because the Truth has its own Power to arouse Reason.

Attempting to explain this Truth to the religious on their own terms only compromises the Purity of the Truth.

Atheists encouraging the religious to come to the Truth by approximation or accommodation only betrays the Purity of the Truth.

Atheists doing anything other than Witnessing to the Truth to the religious are heretical and false atheists, who are compromising with Evil and should be Shunned.

Witnessing to the Truth is the Path towards the inevitable world enlightenment, when complete adherence to Truth and the elimination of religion’s Evils will bring about Human Utopia.

Any Atheist activity looking anything like religion must be avoided, to keep Atheists from Evils and preserve the Destiny of the Path.

Since the religious in their lack of Reason admire communal group-think, Atheists shall witness to the Truth and be Ethical from their own individual convictions.

Since the religious in their lack of Reason admire dogmas, no Atheist shall offer the Truth in the form of dogmas.

If confronted by the unworthy for preaching dogmas, Atheists must reply that there are no atheist dogmas and that anything could be Error.

Atheists cannot be blamed for confusing the religious by demanding submission to the one Truth that yet might be Error, since the religious lack Reason anyways.

Atheists cannot be blamed by appearing to behave like the religious by demanding group-think and fidelity to the True Path, since the religious can only perceive Error anyways.

Atheists must continually proclaim that there is no Atheist mythology or faith-based dogma.

... and anthropologists would be able to add more dogmas with many nuances, but this suffices.

As fascinating as this oddly assembled mythology may be, it surely couldn’t be controlling much of atheism. No respected Atheist of any serious stature has endorsed these views. And if any Atheist ever appeared to endorse some of these views, that is only erroneous misinterpretation. After all, as the final dogma says, atheists cannot have a mythology.

]]>2013-06-19T22:36+00:00Does the Internet Generation Have Its Own Priorities?John Shookhttp://www.centerforinquiry.net/blog/does_the_internet_generation_have_its_own_priorities/
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blog/does_the_internet_generation_have_its_own_priorities/#When:16:45Z

Watching and waiting for the Millennials has kept lots of cultural observers busy for a long time.

Ever since the team of Howe and Strauss predicted back in 1991 that this generation would repeat the civic virtues of the GI ‘Greatest’ generation (see also their 2000 book Millennials Rising), endless forecasts about what drives this generation have been formulated.

Now in their young adulthood, more and more data is accumulating about their behavior as well as their thinking, statistically speaking. Any member of a generation intuitively “knows” what it feels like to be a member, even if their own experiences couldn’t match those of all their peers. Call it a sensibility, or a vague temperament, or just a common sort of worldview—the general outlook of a person couldn’t be expected to imitate that of someone 20 years older, or 20 years younger. If the times help to shape a person’s development, then a person’s developed temperament will later shape the times. How will Millennials try to shape their own coming times?

Joel Stein’s recent article in Time magazine has sparked plenty of commentary, pro and con. Aimee Groth’s supportive commentary over at Business Insider helpfully centers around what can be seen in the Millennials’ values. I have no idea if the Millennials will save us all (sage wits have remarked that it may also require Generation Xers as well, to clean up messes the Elder Boomers leave behind), but it is crucial to think about what the Millennials themselves will reagrd as worth saving. Aimee offers five key points about the Millennials, worth remembering:

They believe they can change the world.

They don’t believe in hierarchy.

They’re resourceful and adaptable.

They want to have a sense of mission.

They think before they act.

Other commentators, too many to count, have further noted how the Millennials in general expect a higher comfort level with diversity and toleration, yet they also expect conformity to firm ethical principles about equality, community, and justice. Indeed, they are already proving to be the most civic-minded and pro-government generation since, well, you know who….

What does this all mean for any activist organization interested in staying relevant for more than the next five years? I have been commenting on the fine compatibility of Humanism with the values of Millennials. But make no mistake—the Millennials will make up their own minds about what still has Value and what doesn’t, and what needs to be done about the difference.

I can’t say who really “speaks” for the skeptic movement. I can observe that much of the current leadership of Skepticism (capitalized and organized) advocates only scientific skepticism. Scientific skepticism was not promoted by scientists centuries ago (few scientists could afford to even be openly agnostic). Nope, the biggest public advocates for scientific skepticism were modernizing theologians during the Enlightenment era and after.

Why does modern theology benefit from scientific skepticism? It’s a simple matter: so long as religion’s supernatural claims cannot be contradicted by anything science would ever say, then religion can continue to enjoy its own reasonable autonomy as a source of genuine knowledge about god. All scientific skepticism has to do is agree to this proposition: Where science can never disprove, science must fall silent. The Enlightenment bargain was struck: science is limited to knowledge about the natural world, and religion knows about the supernatural world. Not all of Christianity agreed to that bargain, of course—fundamentalists insisted on observable miracles, visible angels, hurtful demons, and the like—but much of Christianity has moderated to the point where plenty of good Christians don’t really believe much of that outdated claptrap anymore. Which was one of the goals of modernizing theology.

Enlightenment theologians had to strike a bargain with scientific skepticism since they were terrified by a different, far older kind of skepticism: ancient Greek Skepticism. This rationalistic skepticism demanded high standards of provability before accepting anything as knowledge. The basic idea for a rationalist skeptic during the Enlightenment was something like this: Where reason and empirical inquiry cannot confirm, it must be disbelieved as unreasonable. For this rationalist skepticism, all the gods must go. The core of religion, and not just the claptrap, is entirely unreasonable and unbelievable, since no theological argument demonstrates a god’s existence and no empirical evidence is sufficient to support a god’s existence. Instead of saying “No Comment” to religion’s core claims, rationalist skepticism says “That’s unreasonable for anyone to accept.”

To this day, many skeptics rely on both scientific skepticism and rationalist skepticism. It’s all about the appropriate use of reason. That is why being a genuine skeptic means being a disbeliever and being open about disbelieving everything religions talk about. But joining up with this current Skeptic(TM) movement means never having to tell the faithful how their god isn’t real. Is that too big a price to pay, to get more science accommodated by society?

I had the pleasure of engaging him recently, at an event at the University at Buffalo. You can watch the video here.

Baggett kept asking whether a naturalist and humanist philosopher (like me) could take morality to be objective. I kept replying “Yes,” and I kept explaining how. He never took ‘Yes’ for an answer!

After the event, he wrote about how he has “found a recent trend” among naturalists trying to explain why humanity relies on morality—we are using evolution in explanations for human sociality and morality. A recent trend? Not yet looked into Darwin, perhaps? You can read his blog at First Things.

Baggett accuses me (and others) of encouraging the notion that morality is entirely reducible to sexual advantage or that morality amounts to whims of instinct. My explanation for morality doesn’t reduce morality to either of those things, yet Baggett was so unprepared for a complex naturalistic answer that he kept replying to a strawman of his own imagination. Watch the whole dialogue for his tiresome repetitions - at one point, lacking any original thoughts to share with me, he opens up a handy book of Nietzsche to read an irrelevant passage to the audience!

Baggett kept returning to his basic problem, “what makes a moral judgment really true?” I kept pointing to the quite obvious features of a situation, such as an innocent child urgently needing care, which makes a judgment that care ought to be given quite objectively true. Nope, not good enough, Baggett declares—a god has to exist too, before a moral obligation gets serious. Really? That sounds like a horribly inhuman answer to me. According to Baggett, until I open my eyes to god’s existence, I can’t truly know right and wrong. According to me, because Baggett needs a god to guarantee what is truly right and wrong, then he’s the one blind to the reality right in front of his eyes.

Baggett gives away what he is really looking for. He keeps demanding moral ‘authority’ behind any obligation. Unable to see anything in the human world that tells him where his real moral obligations lie—not in our humanity, and not even in the real suffering of a child—he needs a “Decider” just to be sure.