Sunday, June 29, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Are Russian Attitudes on Ukraine Shifting Away from War toward Conflict Resolution?

Paul
Goble

Staunton, June 29 – Russian attitudes
toward Ukraine are appear to be shifting in response both to changes in the
Kremlin’s approach and to changes in the coverage Moscow television has given
to them. Only a few weeks ago, both were beating the drums for war; now, they
are talking about finding a way to avoid more conflict.

This shift underscores that Russian
public opinion is anything but an independent variable and that if it can be
moved in one direction by the Kremlin and its media at one point, it can be
moved in a very different one by the same forces at another. And consequently,
it is impossible to know whether the current shift will last or is only
temporary.

In an article on the “Svobodnaya
pressa” portal yesterday, Andrey Ivanov notes that throughout the crisis, “the
attitudes of the people practically completely correspond with the treatment of
events in Ukraine by Russian official media” and that when the Moscow media
line changes do too does Russian public opinion (svpressa.ru/society/article/91103/).

Only a few weeks ago, Ivanov notes,
Moscow television focused “mainly on the successes” of those fighting against
the Ukrainian central government. “Now,” he continues, “the accent is on
sympathy for the victims of the punitive operation and for the refugees.”The main message now is the need “to stop the
violence.”

Ivanov spoke with four experts and commentators
about this shift, its causes and its meanings.

Aleksey Levinson, a sociologist at
the Levada Center, said that in his view, the shift in Russian attitudes
reflects not only the impact of changes on Russian television but also the
effect of changes in the direction of Moscow’s foreign policy.At present, he continued, public opinion is
moving from one place to another.

The way this is happening is important,
Levinson says.Russians are not so much
changing their attitudes toward the secessionists as paying ever less attention
to them and instead “supporting those ideas which on the whole present Russia
in a positive light.” If viewing Russia as a peacemaker contributes to that,
then the Russian public will support “that point of view.”

Were the Russian government to make
a radical shift in its position very quickly, Levinson continues, that could
cost it support. But if it does so step by step and stresses popular themes
like “our country always supports peace,” public opinion will follow right
alone because “for the foreseeable future, the people will consider the actions
of the president correct.”

The only Russians not likely to
follow the majority will be those who “support consistent ideological
positions. But mass consciousness [on the whole] does not require ideological
consistency from the authorities,” the Levada Center researcher said.

Boris Kagarlitsky, head of the
Moscow Institute of Globalization and Social Movements, offered a somewhat
different view based on his conviction that many Russians find the social
program embodied in the Novorossiya project “more important than the information
policy” of the Russian state.

“If the information paradigm of our television
will be changed, Russians all the same will support the popular movement in the
South-East of Ukraine.The current
propaganda success of the Kremlin is connected with the fact that the line that
has been carried out by the authorities corresponds with public attitudes. They
re-enforce one another.”

“But if the Kremlin tries to change
course in a radical way, then it will become the victim of its former
propaganda,” Kagarlitsky said. And as a result, he suggests, the Kremlin will
not make any dramatic moves, even if parts of the Russian elite now would like
to see them in order to revive relations with the West.

Aleksandr
Buzlagin, a professor at Moscow State University, said that Russian public
opinion on Ukraine is being manipulated, but he argued that there are real
limits to this process. It affects, he said, “only that part of the citizens who
do not have definite views, ideological values and positions.”

Moreover,
he suggested, those without such views are in fact declining in number because
the Ukrainian events are forcing ever more Russians to think about who they
are, what they want and what they are prepared to do to get it. To the extent
that they find answers, they will be less subject to manipulation in the
future.

At
the same time, Buzlagin continued, “there is another side of the coin.” The
rise of “’hurrah patriotism’” by itself has had an impact on many because it
creates the sense that there is more unity than may in fact be the case.

And
finally, Vladimir Rogov, coordinator for the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Ukraine, said that in his view support by Russians for those challenging
Kyiv’s rule is broader and deeper than some think and therefore is not as
subject to manipulation as others currently believe.

That
is shown, he suggested by the assistance ordinary Russians have provided for
Donetsk and Luhansk, and consequently, he concluded that one ought not to “over-estimate
the influence of the mass media” on Russian attitudes. They are not infinitely
malleable but rather something the regime must take into account.