Most oil-rich Third World economies have had difficulty in evolving into true economically liberal societies. By owning or con-trolling twenties generated by oil, the state is able to dominate society snaking all classes and groups economically dependent on their ‘Black Gold’. Oil tends to centralize state power in the Middle East, as this commodity contributes […]

The western-backed Shah of Iran, who grandly styled himself as the “king of kings”, was overthrown by “people power” when millions of Iranians took to the streets to call for his removal. The Islamic Republic of Iran was born out of this huge social mobilisation in 1978-79 when the entire country – men and women, young and old, urban and rural – came together to express its dismay, its total disgust with the social, economic, and political situation that the Shah had presided over. Reza Molavi is executive director of the Centre for Iranian Studies, University of Durham

The “people” of this great movement came from all walks of Iranian life: the marginal and insecure from the cities and the countryside joined hands with the technocratic-academic middle classes, students and businesspeople in a national uprising inspired by one cry: the Shah must go.

What they had not thought about was who should replace the ruler they wanted to shake off.

Thirty years on, Iran is again witnessing “people power” at work. The numbers may not yet be comparable (the initial huge post-election demonstration of 15 June 2009 excepted) and the majority may so far from the educated middle-classes; but people from many backgrounds and walks of life are continuing – despite stringent security – to pour onto the streets. The immediate trigger for the protest is the irregularities surrounding the presidential election of 12 June, which official results almost instantly awarded to the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But this event, which has cast doubts over the very legitimacy of the state’s leadership, has now provoked the deeper conviction among millions of Iranians that Ahmadinejad – whom many refer to as “the dictator” – should go. As in 1978-79, however, they do not know what they have bargained for.

A moral-political balance

The consistent hard line of the official leadership continues to flow from every political and media outlet. The supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in his speech at Friday prayers in Tehran on 19 June gave unbending support to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Even more significant than his endorsement of the president as the true winner in the elections, was his allusion to the fact that the two men

shared the same philosophy and approach to governing; indirectly, Khamenei was declaring that Ahmadinejad’s main rival Mir-Hossein Moussavi was unfit for power as well as the election’s loser.

Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei, the mouthpiece of the Guardian Council – the body charged with reviewing contested individual results and complaints – confirmed the expectation that the process would be little more than a formality. There was some acknowledgement of extraordinary inconsistencies (votes exceeding the number of registered voters in some areas, for example), but the overall conclusion was clear: “Fortunately, we found no witness of major fraud or breach”.

Against this backdrop, it is understandable that voices in the west cheer the marchers on and challenge them to go out and continue the struggle to the end. The ruthlessness of the regime’s thuggish apparatus should give them pause. When plainclothes basijis and regime diehards venture out on their motorcycles equipped with clubs, chains, knives and Kalashnikovs – working in parallel with police in full riot-control gear – to suppress peaceful marchers, it is hard to ask anyone that they should endure the beating, arrest and even killing that may follow.

After all, the events of June 2009 contain echoes of the past. Iran’s Islamic Republic has lived through many crises: it was forged in revolution and war, and experienced targeted killings of dissidents and mass student demonstrations in the late 1990s, during Mohammad Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005). The actions of the regime – from vote-rigging to political repression – must be seen in this context, as part of a long process of political and social turbulence. In such circumstances, outsiders especially must be very careful about exhorting people in Iran to confront the autocracy and violence of the state.

The very fact that the restraint and dignity of the huge majority of the marchers in Tehran and other cities are admirable, and that the forces ranged against them are powerful, should advise caution. Moreover, beyond the moral drama there are political realities that must be taken into account: that the supreme leader’s inflexible stance guarantees further bloodshed, that the nuclear centrifuges are spinning at maximum speed in Natanz as part of an issue that still needs diplomatic resolution, that

Moussavi is as much of an establishment figure as Ahmadinejad – and that political change is in the air in Tehran, even if it will take a little more time to arrive than Iranians and their friends in the west might hope.

A breach of trust

What core message, then, does the wave of current demonstrations and clashes send? The Ian Fleming short story of our title explains the “quantum of solace” as the amount of comfort and humanity sufficient for love between two people to survive, of trust in the belief that the other will not harm you. In attacking protestors on the streets of Tehran, the Iranian authorities are depriving their own citizens of this measure of comfort and humanity; the result is a dramatic erosion of trust between Iranian citizens and the Iranian state. The quantum of solace is gone, and there is no James Bond to come to Iranians’ rescue.

The election fallout shows that the legitimacy of the regime is being deeply and publicly compromised. But this is only the first step on the road. It is truly shocking to see the blood in the

streets of Tehran and the security forces of the Islamic Republic shooting innocent people. Iranians will not forget this deplorable human-rights fiasco. But by standing back from the drama of Iran’s post-election landscape, analysts might reflect more deeply on the current balance of power in Iran – and conclude that, this time unlike 1978-79, the change that is coming to Iran will be more through evolution than revolution.

As demonstrators take to the streets of Iran, Mark Summers talks to Iranian Dr Reza Molavi, of Durham University, about his interpretation of recent events in his homeland.

THE Islamic Republic of Iran was born 30 years ago after people took to the streets to call for the overthrow of the Western-backed Shah, who grandly styled himself “King of Kings”.

The Shah had been installed in 1953 in a CIA/MI6-engineered coup, after the country’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, made the fatal mistake of nationalising the country’s oil industry, thus unleashing the wrath of Washington and London on his administration. Read the rest of this entry →

The official result of the Iranian election has left Iranians as well as Iran-watchers in the West baffled, disgusted and bewildered. Perhaps from the start, however, Mirhossein Mousavi was destined to fail. He hoped to combine the articulate energies of the liberal upper- and middle-classes with the business interests of the bazaar merchants. But his campaigns conducted via text messages and Facebook were irrelevant to the rural and working classes, those struggling to make ends meet, day in, day out. Although Mr Mousavi tried to appeal to them by addressing the problems of inflation and poverty, they were not convinced. And one should remember that Iranians living in the fringes of the major cities and in the villages, while not enjoying the same ability to talk to the international media, constitute a large proportion of the voting public. Read the rest of this entry →

Summary: Britain withdrew from the Persian Gulf in 1971, leaving behind a security vacuum that only the regime of Shah MohammadReza Pahlavi could fill. With America’s support, Iran under the shah became the policeman of the Persian Gulf. But with the advent of the Islamic Revolution, power in the Gulf region was dispersed among the United States, Iraq, Iran and to some degree Saudi Arabia.

The situation in the direct neighbourhood of the European Union has come to a head in recent years. The Israeli-Arab and the intra-Palestinian conflict with the coup of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the uncertain future of the statehood of Lebanon, the imminent disintegration of Iraq and the conflict on Iran’s nuclear programme: these different levels of conflict are not only interwoven, they also have regional, if not international impact. With the start of negotiations for an accession of Turkey to the European Union the hot spot Middle East has come closer to the EU.