Nuremberg Tribunal and Code

Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal. Adopted by
the International Law Commission of the United Nations, 1950.

Introductory note: Under General Assembly Resolution 177 (II), paragraph
(a), the International Law Commission was directed to "formulate
the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal." In the course of the
consideration of this subject, the question arose as to whether or not
the Commission should ascertain to what extent the principles contained
in the Charter and judgment constituted principles of international law.
The conclusion was that since the Nuremberg Principles had been affirmed
by the General Assembly, the task entrusted to the Commission was not
to express any appreciation of these principles as principles of international
law but merely to formulate them. The text below was adopted by the Commission
at its second session. The Report of the Commission also contains commentaries
on the principles (see Yearbook of the Intemational Law Commission, 1950,
Vol. II, pp. 374-378).

Authentic text: English Text published in Report of the International
Law Commission Covering its Second Session, 5 June-29 July 1950, Document
A/1316, pp. 11-14.

Principle I

Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international
law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.

Principle II

The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person
who committed the act from responsibility under international law.

Principle III

The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime
under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government
official does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law.

Principle IV

The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or
of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

Principle V

Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right
to a fair trial on the facts and law.

Principle Vl

The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under; international
law:

a. Crimes against peace:

i. Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
ii. Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the acts mentioned under (i).

b. War crimes:

Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not
limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity.

c. Crimes against humanity:

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman
acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions
are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against
peace or any war crime.

Principle VII

Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime,
or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principles VI is a crime under
international law.

SOME PRINCIPLES OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL
Adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations

- The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act
which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the
person who committed the act from responsibility under international
law.

- The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a
crime under international law acted as head of state or responsible
government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law.

- The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his government
or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international
law:

Crimes against peace: Planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances; Participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned . . .

War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include,
but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labor
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity.

Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation
and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or
such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with
any crime against peace or any war crime.

Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime,
or a crime against humanity . . . is a crime under international law.

From Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuremberg, October 1946–April
1949. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O, 1949–1953.

The great weight of the evidence before us is to the effect that certain
types of medical experiments on human beings, when kept within reasonably
well-defined bounds, conform to the ethics of the medical profession generally.
The protagonists of the practice of human experimentation justify their
views on the basis that such experiments yield results for the good of
society that are unprocurable by other methods or means of study. All
agree, however, that certain basic principles must be observed in order
to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts:

The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power
of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint
or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension
of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make
an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires
that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental
subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected;
and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from
his participation in the experiment. The duty and responsibility for
ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who
initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty
and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.

The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and
not random and unnecessary in nature.

The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the
disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will
justify the performance of the experiment.

The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.

No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason
to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps,
in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as
subjects.

The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined
by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.

Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided
to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities
of injury, disability, or death.

The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through
all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.

During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical
or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to
be impossible.

During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must
be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably
cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill
and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment
is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental
subject.