May the learning of Daf Yomi be a zchus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of Life.He should be a melitz yoshar for his entire family and Klal Yisroel.

In his newest sefer Nasiach B'chukecha, Rabbi Avi Lebowitz (Rosh Kollel of the Palo Alto Kollel - Jewish Study Network) culls from the many works of the Rishonim and Gedolei Achronim to expound upon, elucidate and analyze the principles discussed by the Chayei Adam. His commentary are written both as footnotes and as additions of specific rules within each category.

Friday, June 15, 2007

The Gemara states that if a Beraisa existed that R' Yehudah HaNasi (Rebbi) did not learn, then R' Chiya, his disciple, could also not have known it. Yet, the Gemara (Moed Katan 16a) describes how Rebbi declared that no one should teach students Torah in the marketplace (as it was undignified), citing a Posuk as his source. R' Chiya disregarded the decree and taught his two nephews, Rav and Rabba b. Bar Chana in the marketplace, based on a different interpretation of the Pesukim. How could R' Chiya defy his teacher's edict?

Kehilas Prozdor cites the MaHarik (12) who explores the possibility that R' Chiya eventually became a disciple-colleague to Rebbi, which might permit it. However, the Gemara (Bava Basra 158b) derives that Ben Azzai was a disciple-colleague to R' Akiva from Ben Azzai's use of the word "you" rather than "Rebbi", when addressing R' Akiva. Yet, the Gemara (Kidushin 49b) states that if a man betroths a woman on condition that he is a Chochom, he needn't be a Chochom like R' Akiva to fulfill the condition; if he betroths her on condition that he is a Talmid Chochom, then he needn't be like Ben Azzai to fulfill the condition. Thus, we see that Ben Azzai was still held to be a disciple of R' Akiva, despite being labeled as a disciple-colleague.

Therefore, the MaHarik concludes that it is permitted for a student to disagree with his teacher in matters of prohibitions (as R' Chiya did). However, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 110a) which characterizes one who challenges, quarrels or complains about his Rebbi to be as one who had done so to the Shechinah, refers exclusively to one's primary teacher (who taught him most of his knowledge) and non-prohibition matters. This is derived from the fact that Korach's group quarreled with Moshe, indisputably the primary teacher of Bnei Yisroel, but were characterized as contenders against Hashem.

Rabbi Yochanan initially ruled that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi. (Rabbi Yosi said: All women may enter into erusin except for the widow, because of the mourning).

Rabbi Yirmiyah said to Rabbi Zerika: When you go before Rabbi Avahu, ask him the following question: How could Rabbi Yochanan say that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi? Isn’t Rabbi Yochanan of the opinion that the halacha follows the ruling of an anonymous Mishna, and the following Mishna was stated anonymously: All other previously married women may not be betrothed (erusin), or wed (nisuin) until they have three months, whether they are virgins or not, whether divorced or widows, whether wed or betrothed. How can Rabbi Yochanan rule that the women entering erusin are not required to wait?

Rabbi Avahu said to Rabbi Zerika: This is not a question. Whenever there is an anonymous ruling, and then an argument, the halacha is not in accordance with the anonymous ruling. Rav Pappa said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If first there is an argument, and then an anonymous ruling, the halacha follows the anonymous ruling. If, however, there is an anonymous ruling, and then an argument, the halacha is not in accordance with the anonymous ruling.

Rabbi Avahu said: If first there is an argument, and then an anonymous ruling, the halacha follows the anonymous ruling. If, however, there is an anonymous ruling, and then an argument, the halacha is not in accordance with the anonymous ruling. If there is an anonymous ruling in a Mishna and an argument in a braisa, the halacha follows the anonymous ruling. If there is an argument in a Mishna and an anonymous ruling in a braisa, the halacha does not follow the anonymous ruling. He explains: If Rebbe did not teach the ruling anonymously in the Mishna, how could his student, Rabbi Chiya (the one who compiled the braisos) know that this ruling is authoritative. (42b – 43a)

Rabbi Nachum asked Rabbi Avahu from an anonymous Mishna in Meseches Keilim, and the halachic ruling is not according to that Mishna.

Rabbi Avahu answered: Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish have both said that the text of that Mishna is not accurate.

The Gemora attempts to prove that the Mishna is not accurate because the two rulings of the Mishna contradict each other, but concludes that there is no difficulty.

The ruling does not follow that Mishna because in fact, the Mishna is not anonymous. The Mishna should conclude with the words: These are the words of Rabbi Shimon. (43a)

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba sent the following ruling: We are permitted to enter into erusin during the third month, and we have seen this done in practice. Similarly, Rabbi Elozar taught in the name of Rabbi Chanina the Great: She is required to wait most of the first month, and most of the third month, and the entire middle month.

Ameimar permitted her to enter into erusin on the ninetieth day (although that is before the three complete months).

Rav Ashi asked Ameimar: Didn’t Rav and Shmuel both say that she is required to wait three months, not including the day on which the husband died, and not including the day of erusin? (This would indicate that she must wait a complete ninety days.)

Ameimar answers: They were referring to a nursing woman (not a widow). They maintain that a nursing woman is required to wait twenty-four months, not including the day on which the child was born, and not including the day of erusin.

The Gemora asks: There was an incident that a man prepared an erusin feast on the ninetieth day (after the death of her first husband), and Rava (didn’t allow the wedding) caused him to lose the feast. (This would indicate that she must wait a complete ninety days.)

The Gemora answers: The feast was for a nisuin. (Erusin would be permitted prior to ninety days are complete, but not nisuin.)

The Gemora issues the halachic rulings: A nursing woman is required to wait twenty-four months, not including the day on which the child was born, and not including the day of erusin. A widow must wait three months, not including the day on which the husband died, and not including the day of erusin. (43a)

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yosi says, all women may enter into erusin except for the widow, because of the mourning (for thirty days).

Rav Chisda asks: Isn’t there a kal vachomer that erusin should be permitted? If it is forbidden to launder clothing during the week of Tisha b’Av, it is nevertheless permitted to enter into erusin; it is permitted to launder clothing during the thirty days of mourning for a close relative, shouldn’t it certainly be permitted to enter into erusin? Why does Rabbi Yosi maintain that erusin is forbidden?

The Gemora answers: The premise for the kal vachomer is incorrect. It is actually forbidden to launder clothing during the week of Tisha b’Av.

Rava asks: There can still be a kal vachomer to ask on Rabbi Yosi. If it is forbidden to engage in commerce during the week that precedes the week of Tisha b’Av, it is nevertheless permitted to enter into erusin; it is permitted to engage in commerce during the thirty days of mourning for a close relative, shouldn’t it certainly be permitted to enter into erusin? Why does Rabbi Yosi maintain that erusin is forbidden?

The Gemora answers by emending the Mishna: Do not say that Rabbi Yosi was permitting previously married women to enter into erusin immediately; rather he was permitting all previously married women to enter into nisuin immediately, except for a widow because of mourning. (A widow cannot enter into nisuin, but erusin is permitted like it was derived through the kal vachomer.)

The Gemora asks: Does Rabbi Yosi not hold of waiting before nisuin (on account of distinguishing between the child of the first husband and that of the second)?

The Gemora answers: Yes indeed, he does not hold that there is a requirement to wait before nisuin.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers, that Rabbi Yosi was only referring to women who were divorced after erusin; they may get married immediately. Women who are divorced after nisuin are required to wait.

The Gemora asks: If so, this is precisely Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion; what is the difference between them?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a woman who was married with nisuin is permitted to enter erusin immediately, whereas Rabbi Yosi holds that she is forbidden to enter into erusin immediately; she is required to wait. (43a – 43b)

The Gemora asks: (It emerges from Rabbi Yosi that a widow from erusin is required to have a mourning obligation, and she must wait thirty days before entering into nisuin.) Does a widow from erusin have a mourning obligation? Rabbi Chiya bar Ammi taught the following braisa: If a wife from erusin dies, the husband is not deemed to be an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet), he may not become tamei to her if he is a Kohen; and similarly (if he dies) she is not an onein, she does not have to be busy with his burial. If she dies, he does not inherit her and if he dies, she collects her kesuvah. How can Rabbi Yosi state that a widow from erusin must wait on account of the mourning obligation?

(The Gemora reverts back to its original understanding of Rabbi Yosi: He allows a woman from nisuin to enter into erusin immediately except for a widow because of her mourning obligation. Rava asked that a kal vachomer should be applicable, and erusin should be permitted during the mourning period. The Gemora is answering this question.)

The Gemora states that there is indeed a Tannaic dispute regarding the permissibility of performing an erusin in the week preceding the week of Tisha b”Av.

Rav Ashi disagrees and proves from that braisa that there is no dispute and everyone would agree that erusin is permitted during that period. (Rava’s kal vachomer returns.)

Rav Ashi answers: A newer mourning (close relative) is different than an older mourning (the loss of the Beis HaMikdosh), and a communal mourning (the loss of the Beis HaMikdosh) is different than a private mourning (close relative). (This explains why we rule stringently regarding the mourning for a close relative, and erusin would be forbidden then whereas it would be permitted during the week preceding the week of Tisha b’Av.) (43b)

Thursday, June 14, 2007

Meoros HaDaf Yomi Vol. 296 brings the Gemara in Niddah which states something astounding. The nine months of pregnancy become shorter or longer according to how the Sanhedrin determines the calendar! The Gemara says that the shofar blown at the start of the month to announce the new month as determined by the beis din causes a new calculation concerning everything connected with calculating various dates.

The Rashba writes (Toras HaBayis, bayis 7, sha’ar 3,amud 9): “Certainly the shofar is the cause, because everything that beis din below does, the beis din on High agrees, as we are told: ‘(the appointed times) that you (beis din) shall call them’.” Hashem gave power to the beis din below and gave them authority and responsibility to decide the length of months and declare leap years by adding a month.

The Rashba says that if beis din declares a leap year, they delay Pesach by a month: on the days that originally would have been Pesach it is allowed to eat chametz, and they fixed a new Pesach.

The Rashba continues that the beis din above behaves according to the rulings of the beis din below. Even nature changes according to their decisions. We have gathered a few interesting examples to demonstrate this wonderful connection between people and the Heavenly beis din, by means of the Torah.

An infant suckles: A nursing mother is forbidden to re-wed till her infant becomes two years old (Yevamos 42a; Shulchan ‘Aruch, E.H. 13:11) lest she become pregnant and cut off the source of her infant’s sustenance while her husband, who is not the infant’s father, won’t see to alternative food. In a leap year, the author of Terumas HaDeshen writes (Responsa, 216), she must wait 25 months, as the Gemara explains that the suckling period is two years and in the leap year the suckling period is prolonged according to the year! (We should point out that the Remo ruled the halachah only “to worry as a first preference” while others disagree; see Pischei Teshuvah, ibid, S.K. 16, and Responsa Chasam Sofer, E.H. 137).

Treifah: A treifah animal (whose body is defective such that it cannot live longer than 12 months) doesn’t live longer than 12 months but some say that in a leap year it can live 13 months! (Shach, Y.D. 57, S.K. 18, and see Pri Chadash, ibid).

An animal’s life depends on the chacham’s ruling: The Chazon Ish zt”l writes (O.C. 39, os 15) wonderful things about the power of Torah: “But deciding the measure of an individual treifah was given to the chacham and what appears to him, is the root of the halachah said to Moshe at Mount Sinai… and it’s possible that its life depends on the chacham’s ruling, if the ruling was made during its life.” Worms live long: Certain fruits have worms in them only while they’re still attached to the tree. These fruits must be examined during 12 months after picking as the worm lives for six months and its body disintegrates after six more months and then there is no prohibition to eat it (Shulchan ‘Aruch, Y.D. 84:8, and ‘Aroch HaShulchan, ibid, se’if 66). However, in a leap year the worms live longer and the fruit should be examined for 13 months! (See Pri Megadim, ibid, and Gilyon Maharsha, ibid).

The Mishna had stated: And similarly, all other previously married women may not be betrothed (erusin), or wed (nisuin) until they have three months.

The Gemora asks: What is the necessity to wait three months?

Rav Nachman answers in the name of Shmuel: It is in order to distinguish between the offspring of the first husband and the offspring of the second husband.

Rava asks from the following braisa: A male and a female convert who were married before the conversion must wait three months from the conversion before they resume having marital relations with each other. What is the necessity over here; she was married to the same man before and after the conversion?

The Gemora answers: It is necessary to distinguish between an offspring that was conceived in sanctity (when she was Jewish) to an offspring that was not conceived in sanctity.

Rava offers an alternative reason for the three month waiting period: We are concerned that the child will mistakenly marry his paternal sister, or perform a yibum with the wife of his maternal brother, or cause his mother to marry someone else (when she is actually a yevamah, and cannot marry anyone until she is released by the yavam), or he will exempt his mother from marrying someone else. (42a)

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t it be sufficient to wait one month and then marry; if she gives birth after seven months, it would be evident that the child is a seven-month baby from the second husband (since an eight-month baby cannot survive), and if she gives birth after eight months, it would be evident that the child is a nine-month baby from the first husband?

The Gemora answers: If she would give birth after eight months, there is still a possibility that the child is a seven-month baby from the second husband because perhaps she only conceived one month after her marriage.

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t it be sufficient to wait two and a half months and then marry; if she gives birth after seven months, it would be evident that the child is a seven-month baby from the second husband, and if she gives birth after six and a half months, it is evident that the child is a nine-month baby from the first husband, for if the child would have been fathered by the second husband, it would not be able to survive since the pregnancy lasted for only six and a half months?

The Gemora answers: If she would give birth after six and a half months, there is still a possibility that the child has been fathered by the second husband because Mar Zutra said: Even according to the opinion that a woman who gives birth at nine months cannot give birth in abbreviated months, a woman who gives birth at seven months may give birth in abbreviated months.

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t it be sufficient to wait a short amount of time and let her marry, and after three months, she should be examined to see if she has any signs of pregnancy; if she does, we will know that she is pregnant from the first husband?

Rav Safra answers: We do not examine married women so that they shall not appear offensive in the eyes of their husbands.

The Gemora asks: Let us examine her by her walking (a deeper footprint in loose earth would indicate that she is carrying a fetus, and this is not an intimate examination)?

Rami bar Chama answers: This is not a foolproof examination because she can cover up for herself (by walking differently) in order that her son (from the first husband) should inherit the property of her second husband. (42a)

The Gemora states: It emerges that a woman who is definitely pregnant may get married immediately.

The Gemora asks from a braisa: One should not marry a pregnant or nursing woman, and if he did marry her, he must divorce her and he is prohibited from marrying her again.

The Gemora answers: The decree was established because we were concerned that she might conceive while she is pregnant, and the new fetus can crush the earlier fetus.

The Gemora asks: If so, there should be this decree even by someone’s own child (he should be forbidden from cohabitating with his wife while she is pregnant)?

The Gemora answers: Either they would follow the opinion that said a pregnant woman should insert a wad into their bodies prior to cohabitating in order to prevent conception or they would follow the opinion that said these women should cohabit in the regular manner and Heaven will have compassion on them (becoming pregnant in these situations is highly unusual and therefore we prohibit them from utilizing and type of contraceptive measures as it is written [Tehillim 116:6]: Hashem protects the fools).

The Gemora asks: If so, let us apply the same options to marrying a pregnant woman?

The Gemora offers a different explanation for the decree: It is because we are concerned that the second husband might mistakenly kill the fetus during cohabitation by exerting pressure on the woman’s abdomen.

The Gemora asks: If so, let us be concerned that this might occur with his own pregnant wife?

The Gemora answers: He will have compassion on his own child and will be cautious during cohabitation.

The Gemora asks: Accordingly, he will be careful even when it is someone else’s child?

The Gemora offers a different explanation for the decree: A pregnant woman will usually become a nursing woman, and we were concerned that she might become pregnant while nursing, and her milk might spoil; this will cause the child to die.

The Gemora asks: If so, let us be concerned that this might occur with his own pregnant wife?

The Gemora answers: Regarding his own child, he will supply the child with milk and eggs.

The Gemora asks: Accordingly, he will be provide milk and eggs even when it is someone else’s child?

The Gemora answers: We are concerned that he will not supply her with the money to purchase these items.

The Gemora asks: Let us claim from the first husband’s inheritors; they are obligated to take care of this child?

The Gemora answers: A woman is embarrassed to come to Beis Din, and this will result in the death of her child. (42a – 42b)

One day, Rabbi Elozar did not go to the Beis Medrash. Afterwards, he found Rabbi Assi, and he asked him: What did the Rabbis say in the Beis Medrash today? Rabbi Assi replied: Rabbi Yochanan said that the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi. (Rabbi Yosi said: All women may enter into erusin except for the widow, because of the mourning).

The Gemora infers from here that a single Tanna disagrees with him, and not many Tannaim (for otherwise, we would not rule according to Rabbi Yosi.)

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting this: A woman who regularly goes to her father’s house (and was there for an extended period of time prior to her husband’s death), or she was angry with him (prior to her husband’s death and didn’t have relations with him), or her husband was in jail, or her husband was old or sick, or if she was sick, or if she miscarried after her husband’s death, or if she was a barren woman, or if she was old, or a minor, or an aylonis, or she was infertile, she is nevertheless required to wait three months before remarrying. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah said: She is permitted to marry immediately. (It is evident that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi both maintain that she must wait even though there is no possibility of being pregnant.)

Why is the betrothal of a yavam called ma’amar and not kiddushin like the marriage of any woman?

The Beis Aharon of Karlin answered this question at a siyum on Maseches Yevamos.

Firstly, we must explain why marrying a woman is referred to as a kiddushin. It is derived from the word ‘hekdesh,’ a consecration. The concept of consecrating an object is that something that was permitted to the entire world now becomes forbidden. This is true by kiddushin, as well. A woman is permitted to everyone until a man performs a kiddushin with her; she now becomes forbidden to the entire world.

A yevamah is different. She was married to a man and prohibited to marry anyone else. When her husband died childless, she is a yevamah awaiting either a yibum or chalitzah. She is still forbidden to marry anyone else. When the yavam betroths her, this cannot be referred to as a kiddushin because she was forbidden to everyone beforehand.

Why is the betrothal called ma’amar? The essence of yibum is to perpetuate the name of the deceased. Yibum is actually a resurrection for the deceased brother. Ma’amar is the word of Hashem that brings the dead back to life as it is written: mechaye meisim b’ma’amoro, He resurrects the dead with His words. This explains why the betrothal of a yevamah is called ma’amar.

It is well known that Shabbos is a sampling of the World to Come. This is why we say in the zemiros of Shabbos: tehorim yiroshua vikadshua b’ma’amar kol asher asah vayechal Elokim bayom hashivii.

An alternative explanation is cited in Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 170:1). The expression ma’amar means a “saying” of our Rabbis. Biblically, only cohabitation can secure a yibum. The Rabbis established a form of betrothal, which they called ma’amar.

This explanation fits according to Beis Hillel, who maintains that ma’amar is only Rabbinically valid; however, according to Beis Shamai, who holds that ma’amar has Biblical ramifications, we must use the first explanation.

The Mishna states: If one of the brothers (Shimon) performed a chalitzah with his yevamah and a different brother (Levi) married her sister and subsequently died, Shimon can perform chalitzah, but not yibum (since she is the sister of his chalutzah – a Rabbinical prohibition).

Similarly, if a man divorces his wife and his brother marries her sister and subsequently died, she is exempt from yibum and chalitzah (since she is his wife’s sister).

A woman was awaiting the decision of the yavam, and his brother (who is also a yavam) betrothed the yevamah’s sister; it was said in the name of Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira that we should tell him (the one who married the sister) to wait (from consummating the marriage) until his brother performs a yibum or chalitzah with the yevamah. (This ruling is based on the concept of zikah; the brother is forbidden to consummate the marriage with the sister of the yevamah because she is prohibited to him on account of her being the sister of his zekukah.) If the brother performed a chalitzah or yibum, the other brother can now consummate his marriage. If the yevamah died (prior to any chalitzah or yibum), the other brother can consummate his marriage (since even a wife’s sister is permitted after the wife dies, certainly by the zekukah’s sister). If the yavam dies (prior to any chalitzah or yibum), he is required to divorce his wife, and he must perform a chalitzah with the yevamah. (41a)

The Gemora asks on the first two rulings of the Mishna: Why does the Mishna use the term “Similarly,” when in fact the two rulings are opposite of each other?

The Gemora emends the Mishna; it should say “However.”

Rish Lakish said: Here is where Rebbe stated: The prohibition of taking a divorcee’s sister is Biblical, whereas the prohibition of taking a chalutzah’s sister is merely Rabbinical. (41a)

The Mishna had stated a case regarding A woman was awaiting the decision of the yavam, and his brother (who is also a yavam) betrothed the yevamah’s sister. The Gemora inquires: What would be the halacha if his wife died (can he now perform a yibum with the yevamah)?

Rav and Rabbi Chanina maintain that he is permitted to take the yevamah. Shmuel and Rav Assi hold that he is prohibited from taking the yevamah.

Rava explains the reasoning for Rav: This yevamah was originally permitted (when she first fell for yibum), she then became forbidden (when the brother married her sister), and then she became permitted again (when his wife died); she should return to her original permitted state. (41a)

Rav Hamnuna asks on Rav from the following braisa: There were three brothers, two of whom were married two sisters, and one is unmarried. If one of the husbands of the sisters died, and the bachelor performed a ma'amar, and afterwards his second brother died. (Beis Hillel rules that he must release his ma’amar-wife with a get (bill of divorce) and with chalitzah, and his brother's wife with chalitzah. This is what they said, “Woe unto him because of his wife and woe unto him because of his brother's wife.”) If then, the wife of the second brother died, the first yevamah requires a chalitzah, but cannot be taken in yibum (since she was forbidden to the third brother after the second brother died). Rav Hamnuna asks: According to Rav, she should be permitted since she was originally permitted (when she first fell for yibum), she then became forbidden (when the other brother died), and then she became permitted again (when the second brother’s wife died); why can’t he perform a yibum?

Rav was initially quiet and then after Rav Hamnuna left, he said: Why didn’t I say that the braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Elozar who states that if the woman is prohibited even for one moment, she is forbidden forever?

Rav subsequently said: This would not be an answer since perhaps Rabbi Elozar only holds in this manner when the yevamah was forbidden at the time that she fell for yibum; however, in our case, she was permitted at that time, and therefore she would be permitted later even according to Rabbi Elozar.

Rav concludes that the braisa can in fact be following Rabbi Elozar’s opinion for we find that he rules explicitly that the yevamah remains forbidden even in a case where she was permitted at the time that she fell for yibum. (41a)

The Mishna states: The yavam does not perform a chalitzah or a yibum with the yevamah until she has three months (since her husband’s death). (This is in order to determine if the yevamah is pregnant.) And similarly, all other previously married women may not be betrothed (erusin), or wed (nisuin) until they have three months, whether they are virgins or not, whether divorced or widows, whether wed or betrothed. Rabbi Yehudah said: Women who had nisuin may enter into erusin (without waiting), and women who had erusin may enter into nisuin (without waiting), except for the women in who had erusin in Judea, for the groom is presumptuous with her (and we are concerned that they might have had relations during the erusin). Rabbi Yosi says, all women may enter into erusin except for the widow, because of the mourning (for thirty days). (41a – 41b)

The Gemora asks: It is understandable why the yavam does not perform a yibum with the yevamah until she has three months because she might have a viable child, and by cohabitating with her, he would have violated the prohibition against taking his brother’s wife (since there is no obligation for yibum); however, why can’t he perform a chalitzah with her?

Perhaps this would be a refutation of Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion who maintains that one who performed chalitzah with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries, she is not required to have a chalitzah from the brothers (the chalitzah has been retroactively determined to be valid). Our Mishna would be ruling that the chalitzah is not valid.

The Gemora answers: Perhaps the Mishna holds that the chalitzah is valid, but we instruct them to wait for a different reason. If she is pregnant and the child is viable, we will require an announcement that she is permitted to marry a Kohen (since the chalitzah was unnecessary).

The Gemora asks: So, why don’t we make the announcement?

The Gemora answers: Perhaps someone will be present by the chalitzah and will not hear of the announcement; he will be under the false impression that a chalutzah is permitted to a Kohen.

The Gemora asks: This answer is satisfactory regarding a woman who is a widow (for she is in fact still permitted to a Kohen), but why should we delay the chalitzah by a divorcee (she is forbidden to a Kohen anyway)?

The Gemora asks: This answer would not explain why we delay the chalitzah by a case where the divorcee was only married with erusin; she will not be supported from his estate anyway?

The Gemora offers an entirely different explanation for why the chalitzah is delayed: It is based on rabbi Yosi who said: Whoever is subject to yibum is subject to chalitzah and whoever is not subject to yibum is not subject to chalitzah. (41b)

Tuesday, June 12, 2007

What is the halacha if the yavam and the yevamah do not want to perform a chalitzah? If she is agreeing to remain an agunah her entire life, do we compel the yavam to perform a chalitzah?

Chacham Tzvi (1) writes regarding a woman who is a katlanis, she was married a few times previously and her husband’s died; she will not be able to get married anyway. He rules that since she is not going to get married anyway, we do not force the yavam to perform a chalitzah. The only reason that we normally force him to perform a chalitzah is for the benefit of the yevamah that she should be able to get married; if it will make no difference to her, we do not get involved.

The Chasam Sofer (E”H II, 85) rules in the same manner regarding an elderly yavam and yevamah that do not intend on marrying anyone else anyway; we do not compel the yavam to perform a chalitzah.

Reb Yitzchak Elchonon (E”H 17) explains that chalitzah is not a mitzvah by itself; rather, it is an action that allows her to get married. If there is no need to permit her to marry anyone else, Beis Din does not get involved, and a chalitzah is not necessary.

The Oneg Yom Tov (176) disagrees and maintains that chalitzah is a mitzvah, and even if both parties are not interested, we force the yavam to perform a chalitzah.

The Maharshal in Yam shel Shlomo (4:18) concludes: We compel the yevamah to partake in the chalitzah because chalitzah is a Biblical obligation, and we would even use bodily force to ensure that this mitzvah will be fulfilled. Even if she wants a yibum, and the yavam wants to do a chalitzah, we force her to accept the chalitzah.

The Gemora inquires as to the author of the following braisa: It is written: The yavam shall cohabit with her. This is a mitzvah. Initially (prior to her marriage), she was permitted to him. When she got married to the brother, she became prohibited to him on account of being his brother’s wife. When her husband died childless, she became permitted to him again. One might think that she returns to the original permissible status; the verse states: The yavam shall cohabit with her. This is a mitzvah.

Who taught this braisa?

Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi says: It is Abba Shaul, who maintains that one must have pure intentions when performing the mitzvah of yibum. This is the explanation of the braisa. It is written: The yavam shall cohabit with her. This is a mitzvah. Initially (prior to her marriage), she was permitted to him. He could have married her for her beauty or for the sake of marriage. When she got married to the brother, she became prohibited to him on account of being his brother’s wife. When her husband died childless, she became permitted to him again. One might think that she returns to the original permissible status and he can marry her for any purpose; the verse states: The yavam shall cohabit with her. This is a mitzvah. He may only cohabit with her if his intentions are purely for the sake of the mitzvah.

Rava interprets the braisa differently: The braisa can follow the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Abba Shaul and this is its explanation. It is written: The yavam shall cohabit with her. This is a mitzvah. Initially (prior to her marriage), she was permitted to him. The yavam could have married her then if he wanted. When she got married to the brother, she became prohibited to him on account of being his brother’s wife. When her husband died childless, she became permitted to him again. One might think that he has the choice of either performing a yibum or a chalitzah with her: the verse states: The yavam shall cohabit with her. Yibum is the preferential mitzvah. (39b)

The Gemora asks on Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi’s interpretation from the first part of the aforementioned braisa. The braisa stated: It is written [Vayikra 6:9]: It shall be eaten unleavened in a holy place. (This is referring to the remainder of a flour offering in the Beis Hamikdosh eaten by the Kohanim.) This is a mitzvah. Initially (prior to the sanctification of the mincha), it was permitted. Afterwards, when it became kodosh, it became forbidden to eat. After the removal of the kometz and its burning on the mizbeach, it becomes permitted for consumption. One might think that it returns to its original permissible status; the verse states: It shall be eaten unleavened in a holy place. This is a mitzvah.

The Gemora explains this braisa: It is understandable according to Rava; we can interpret the braisa according to the opinion of the Rabbis who maintained that yibum is the mitzvah which is more preferable than chalitzah. The explanation for this braisa is similar: It is written: It shall be eaten unleavened in a holy place. This is a mitzvah. Initially (prior to the sanctification of the mincha), it was permitted. If the Kohen desired, he may eat it, and if not, he could choose not to eat it. Afterwards, when it became kodosh, it became forbidden to eat. After the removal of the kometz and its burning on the mizbeach, it becomes permitted for consumption. One might think that it returns to its original permissible status; if the Kohen desired, he may eat it, and if not, he could choose not to eat it.

The Gemora interrupts to ask: Is there really a possibility that the Kohen can choose not to eat it? But it is written: And they shall eat them, those who gain atonement through them. This verse teaches that the Kohanim eat the offering and then the owner receives atonement.

The Gemora answers: One might think that it returns to its original permissible status; if the Kohen (who performed the mincha service) desired, he may eat it, and if he wishes, a different Kohen may eat it. The verse states: It shall be eaten unleavened in a holy place. This is a mitzvah (teaching us that there is a special mitzvah for the Kohen who performed the mincha service to eat it himself).

However, according to Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi, who holds that the braisa is following Abba Shaul’s opinion; what two possibilities of eating are there? What is the braisa teaching us?

Perhaps you will answer that one can eat the mincha with an appetite, or he can eat it ravenously by stuffing himself with the mincha even after he was full from eating other things.

This cannot be an option (we would never have thought that he can eat the mincha in such a manner) because Rish Lakish stated that one who eats ravenously on Yom Kippur is exempt from transgressing the prohibition of affliction on Yom Kippur. It is evident that this is not regarded as eating.

The Gemora answers: One would have thought that he can eat it as matzah (unleavened), and if he desires, he may eat it as chametz; the verse states: It shall be eaten unleavened in a holy place. This is a mitzvah (teaching us that it must be eaten as matzah).

The Gemora objects to this explanation as well: How could we have thought that the mincha could be eaten as chametz when Rish Lakish expounds a different verse to teach us that the Kohanim’s portion cannot be baked as chametz because it must be eaten as matzah?

The Gemora answers: The verse teaches us that the mincha must be eaten as matzah and not as scalded bread (first scalding the dough in boiling water and afterwards baking it). (39b – 40a)

The Gemora rules that although scalded bread is not regarded as matzah in respect to a mincha offering, one can fulfill his obligation of eating matzah on Pesach with it. Since it is baked in an oven after it is scalded, it is referred to as a poor man’s bread. (40a)

The Mishna states: One who performed a chalitzah with the yevamah is like any of the other brothers in regards to inheritance. If their father is alive, the father inherits the property (of the deceased brother).

One who performs a yibum with the yevamah merits the deceased brother’s entire estate. Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if he performs a yibum, the property belongs to their father if he is alive. (40a)

The Mishna had stated: One who performed a chalitzah with the yevamah is like any of the other brothers in regards to inheritance.

The Gemora asks: isn’t this obvious; why would we think differently?

The Gemora answers: One might have thought that he should be penalized and lose his share of the inheritance because his chalitzah accomplished that she is now prohibited to all the brothers; the Mishna teaches us that this is not so, and he inherits with all the brothers. (40a)

The Gemora presents a dispute if the halacha is according to the Rabbis or Rabbi Yehudah. (40a)

The Mishna states: One who performs chalitzah with his yevamah is prohibited from marrying her relatives, and she is not allowed to marry his relatives.

He is prohibited from marrying her mother, and her mother’s mother, and her father’s mother, and her daughter, and her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter, and her sister while she herself is still alive. The brothers are permitted to marry all of these women.

The chalutzah is forbidden to his (the one who performed the chalitzah) father, and his father’s father, and his son, and his son’s son, and his brother, and his brother’s son.

He is permitted to marry the relative of his chalutzah’s co-wife, but he is prohibited from marrying the co-wife of his chalutzah’s relative. (40a – 40b)

The Gemora inquires: Did the Rabbis decree that secondary arayos are prohibited by a chalutzah (in the same manner that they decreed regarding a regular wife)? Perhaps there was no necessity for the decree since even the chalutzah’s primary relatives are only Rabbinically forbidden.

The Gemora attempt to bring proofs from the Mishna, but they are all rejected.

The Gemora cites support from a braisa taught by Rabbi Chiya that the secondary arayos of a chalutzah are indeed forbidden. (40b)

Monday, June 11, 2007

The Gemora states that although it might be preferable for the older brother to perform a yibum, we do not wait for him. This is based on the principle that we do not delay the performance of a mitzvah in expectation of some future, better performance.

The Terumas Hadeshen (35) comments that the only time you do delay the performance of the mitzvah is we are concerned that by delaying, the mitzvah will not be fulfilled.

Similarly, the Gr”a (O”C 426) rules that this halacha is only applicable if the brother is overseas, but otherwise, we would be required to wait for him.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha brings a proof from here to the Rama’s ruling regarding Kiddush Levanah. One should wait to recite the blessing for the moon for Motzei Shabbos if it will occur prior to the tenth of the month, but if it is afterwards, one should not wait for Motzei Shabbos, and he should recite the blessing in middle of the week. This is because there might be a few consecutive cloudy days and he will have missed the opportunity for the mitzvah this month.

There is an argument between the Radvaz (187) and the Chacham Tzvi (106) regarding a person who was in jail and he did not have the ability to perform any mitzvos and his captors gave him one day that he can choose to be released and perform the mitzvos of that day, which day should he choose. The Radvaz says he should choose the first opportunity that he has and the Chacham Tzvi disagrees and holds that one should wait until there is a mitzva of great prominence.

The Gemora in Yoma (34a) discusses the obligation of nesachim - the wine libations by the two temidin which were brought every day. There is an argument there if we derive the morning tamid from the afternoon or vice-versa. Tosfos comments that there would be a difference l'halacha if they would have only enough nesachim for one korban; which tamid should have the nesachim. Is the primary tamid the morning or the afternoon? Rabeinu Chananel says that there is no difference l'halacha; it's just a matter as to how we expound the pesukim. The Sfas Emes asks on Tosfos that the din should be clearly that whichever mitzva one is holding by, that is the one he should perform and if one is ready to bring the morning tamid, he should bring the nesachim with that one, even if the afternoon tamid is the primary one.

The Biur Halacha (109) has a shaila if one davens normally a long Shemoneh Esrei and he will certainly miss kedusha, should he daven with the tzibur and fulfill the mitzva of tefila b'tzibur or should he wait and fulfill the mitzva of reciting kedusha.

Sunday, June 10, 2007

The Mishna states: If while a woman was awaiting yibum, she inherited property from her father, and subsequently sold it or gave it away, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that it is valid. (Although Beis Hillel rules that a woman who is an arusah may not sell property in which she inherited, the yevamah is permitted to do so.)

The Mishna asks: If she died, what shall they do with her kesuvah and with the property which comes in and goes out with her? (Does the yavam inherit her in the same manner that a husband inherits his wife?) Beis Shamai says: The husband’s heirs divide it with the father’s heirs (the woman’s inheritors). Beis Hillel disagrees: The property remains with those that presently possess it. The kesuvah goes to the husband’s heirs. The property which comes in and goes out with her goes to the father’s heirs.

Tosfos asks: Why is Beis Hillel’s ruling in this case different than the case in Bava Basra? The Mishna there (158a) states: If a house fell on him and on his mother, killing them both, and we are uncertain which one of them died first. The son’s heirs claimed that the mother died first and afterwards the son died. The mother’s heirs claim that the son died first and afterwards the mother died. Beis Hillel rules that the property is divided between them. Why there does he rule to divide the estate and here he rules that the property remains with those that presently possess it?

Tosfos answers: It is more common for a mother to die before the son; the Gemora in Bava Basra (108a) considers it a tragedy when a son dies in the lifetime of the mother. It is for this reason that Beis Hillel rules that the money is divided between them and we do not award the property to the mother’s heirs.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha asks: The Gemora in Bava Basra is referring to a case where the son died from a sickness while the mother was alive; the mother is in tremendous grief and sorrow, and that is when it is regarded as a tragedy. In our case, a house fell on top of both of them, and that is a tragedy in itself. Since both of them died, the tragedy is not any more if the son died moments before the mother?

He continues that Tosfos could have said like he said in Kesuvos (52a) in the name of the Yerushalmi: It is common for women to die faster than men do. This is because women are generally weaker due to childbirth and the raising of children.

The Gemora discusses another case of inheritance: The uncertain child and the yavam come to inherit the possessions of the grandfather (the father of the deceased and the yavam). The uncertain one says: “I am the son of the deceased, and I am entitled to half of the estate.” (The deceased son inherits “while in the grave,” and he passes it on to his son, the uncertain one.) The yavam counters: “You are my son, and you have no claim on my father’s estate.”

The Gemora rules that the yavam receives the entire estate, for he is a definite inheritor of the grandfather (his father), and the uncertain one is only a possible heir, and the principle is that an uncertain claim cannot take away from a definite claim. (38a)

The Gemora discusses another case: The uncertain child and the sons of the yavam come to inherit the possessions of the grandfather (the father of the deceased and the yavam). The uncertain one says: “I am the son of the deceased, and I am entitled to half of the estate.” The sons of the yavam counter: “you are our brother, and you should receive an equal share together with us.

The Gemora rules: They should take half of the estate. A third of the estate he should take. The remaining sixth should be divided among them. (38a)

The Mishna states: If while a woman was awaiting yibum, she inherited property from her father, and subsequently sold it or gave it away, Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that it is valid. (Although Beis Hillel rules that a woman who is an arusah may not sell property in which she inherited, the yevamah is permitted to do so.)

The Mishna asks: If she died, what shall they do with her kesuvah and with the property which comes in and goes out with her? (Does the yavam inherit her in the same manner that a husband inherits his wife?) Beis Shamai says: The husband’s heirs divide it with the father’s heirs (the woman’s inheritors). Beis Hillel disagrees: The property remains with those that presently possess it. The kesuvah goes to the husband’s heirs. The property which comes in and goes out with her goes to the father’s heirs.

The Mishna concludes: If the yavam marries her, she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that the obligations stemming from the kesuvah rests upon the property of her first husband. (38a)

The Gemora asks: Why do Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree in the first part of the Mishna and argue in the latter part?

Ula answers: The first part of the Mishna is referring to a case where she fell for yibum as an arusah (her first husband died while they were only betrothed), and the latter part of the Mishna is referring to a case where she fell for yibum as a nesuah.

The Gemora explains: The zikah-attachment of an arusah to a yavam makes her like a possible arusah, and the zikah-attachment of a nesuah makes her a possible nesuah. (38a – 38b)

Rabbah asked: If Ula’s explanation is correct, why does the Mishna have to state a case in which she died, let Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel argue while she is alive in respect to the distribution of the produce? (Beis Shamai would rule that she and the yavam would divide the produce because she is a possible nesuah and Beis Hillel would rule that we apply the principle of chazakah and the produce would remain in her family, and she would have exclusive rights to the produce.)

Rabbah offers a different explanation of the Mishna: Both parts of the Mishna are discussing cases where she fell for yibum as a nesuah, and the zikah-attachment of a nesuah makes her a possible nesuah. The first part of the Mishna is discussing a case where she is alive (and the principle of the property certainly belongs to her); she has a definite claim and there claim is an uncertain one (since she is only possibly a nesuah). The principle is that an uncertain claim cannot take away from a definite claim. The latter part of the Mishna is discussing a case where she died, and the husband’s heirs and her father’s heirs are coming to inherit her inherited properties. (If she would be regarded as a nesuah, the husband’s heirs would inherit her properties; if she is not a nesuah, the father’s heirs would inherit her properties.) Since both claims are uncertain, they divide the property. (38b)

The Gemora asks on Rabbah: Is it true that Beis Shamai holds that an uncertain claim cannot take away from a definite claim; didn’t we learn in a Mishna in Bava Basra (157a) otherwise? The Mishna stated: If a house fell down on a person and his father, killing both of them, and we are uncertain which one of them died first. The son owed money for a wife’s kesuvah or to another creditor (and he died without any personal assets). The father’s heirs claimed that the son died first (and he doesn’t inherit anything from the father) and afterwards the father died. The creditor claims that the father died first (and the son inherits a share of the father’s assets) and afterwards the son died. Beis Shamai maintains that the father’s heirs and the creditors divide the money. The Gemora concludes its question: The father’s heirs have a definite claim and the creditors claim is an uncertain one; and nevertheless, Beis Shamai rules that an uncertain claim can take away money from a definite claim?

The Gemora answers: Beis Shamai maintains that a debt from a document which awaits collection is considered as if it has already been collected (and the creditors also have a definite claim). (38b)

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov ruled that one should not marry a woman in one place and marry another somewhere else. This might result in the children from these two marriages to encounter one another, and a brother could end up marrying a sister (since they are unaware that they are related).

The Gemora asks: But Rav, when he would arrive in the city of Dardeshir, he would announce, “Who wants to marry me for one day?” (This was done in order to protect him from sinning.) Rav Nachman, when he would arrive in the city of Shechantziv, he would announce, “Who wants to marry me for one day?”

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis are different because their names are famous (and the children will know who their father was).

The Gemora asks: But didn’t Rava say: If one proposed to marry a woman and she has consented, she is required to wait seven clean days prior to the consummation of the marriage?

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis informed them before by sending their emissaries seven days prior to their arrival.

Alternatively, you can answer that they would only seclude themselves with the women. This protected them from sin because of the saying, “You cannot compare one who has bread in his basket with one who doesn’t have bread in his basket.”

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in Shailos Ya’avetz (2:15) cites this Gemora as support for his opinion that it is permitted for a man to have a pilegesh (a woman designated for this man, but without a kesuvah or kiddushin).

The Rambam in Hilchos Melochim (4:4) and in Hilchos Isus (1:4) rules that only a king is permitted to have a pilegesh, but a common person would be prohibited from taking a pilegesh. In Sefer HaMitzvos (213), he writes that every man is commanded to marry a woman with a kesuvah and kiddushin, and one is forbidden from cohabitating with a woman without a kesuvah and kiddushin.

The Rashba in a teshuva (4:314) and Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaarei Teshuva (3: 94,95) concur with the Rambam that a pilegesh is Biblically forbidden on account of the passuk: lo sihye kedeisha.

The Ra’avad, Ramban and the Ran disagree and maintain that it is permitted to take a pilegesh. They cite proof from Calev and Gideon and many others throughout Tanach, who had pilagshim.

The Peri Chadash says that the Rambam would concede that a pilegesh is indeed permitted if his intent is to designate her to be exclusively for him.

Reb Yaakov Emden concludes his teshuva that although he holds that one is permitted to take a pilegesh, one should only do so if it is endorsed by other scholars of his generation and they should arrange the relationship that it should be done in a manner which is permissible. He then lists the guidelines and restrictions regarding this relationship. (The teshuva goes on to say how having a pilegesh will rectify many social problems. It is quoted in the name of Reb Chaim Brisker that this is an example of a novol b’rshus haftorah, one who is vile, but nevertheless, it is within the confines of halacha.)

The Gemora states: There is a dispute between Rav Acha and Rafram regarding a case where one betrothed a woman within three months of being a widow or divorced, and then he ran away. One of them said that we put him in cheirem (ban) until he divorces her and the other one says that running away is sufficient (he obviously does not intend on consummating the marriage until the proper time). (37a)

The Mishna had stated: One who performs yibum with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is viable, but we are uncertain if the child is a nine-month-old baby from the first brother or the seven-month-old child of the second brother; he must divorce her, and the child is deemed to be legitimate, and they are required to bring an asham taluy (a korban that one is required to bring if he is uncertain if he mistakenly committed a transgression).

Rava asked Rav Nachman: Let us follow according to the majority of women, who give birth after nine months?

Rav Nachman replied: The women by us give birth after seven months.

Rava persisted: But the majority of women in the world give birth after nine months?

Rav Nachman explained himself: Most women give birth after nine months, but some give birth after seven months. One who gives birth after nine months; her fetus is recognizable after a third of her pregnancy days (three months), and since in this case, it was not recognizable, it weakens the majority and we cannot determine based on it.

The Gemora asks: Let the fact that her fetus was not recognizable after a third of her pregnancy days be a proof that the baby is a seven-month one?

The Gemora answers: Most women who give birth after nine months; their fetus is recognizable after a third of her pregnancy days, but some are not. Since in this case, it was not recognizable, it weakens the majority and we cannot determine based on it. (37a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: The first child (the uncertain one) is fit to become a Kohen Gadol (whether he is from the first or the second brother). The second son (if they remain married to each other) is a mamzer out of doubt. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: He is not a mamzer out of doubt.

The Gemora asks: What is the explanation for Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov?

Abaye explains: The Tanna Kamma maintained that the second son is a possible mamzer and he would be prohibited from marrying a certain mamzeres. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov disagrees and holds that he is treated as a certain mamzer and he is permitted to marry a mamzeres.

Rava explains: The Tanna Kamma maintained that the second son is treated like a certain mamzer and he would be permitted to marrying a certain mamzeres. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov disagrees and holds that he is a possible mamzer and he is prohibited to marry a mamzeres.

The Gemora cites a Tannaic dispute if a possible mamzer is permitted to marry a certain mamzer. (37a – 37b)

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov ruled that one should not marry a woman in one place and marry another somewhere else. This might result in the children from these two marriages to encounter one another, and a brother could end up marrying a sister (since they are unaware that they are related).

The Gemora asks: But Rav, when he would arrive in the city of Dardeshir, he would announce, “Who wants to marry me for one day?” (This was done in order to protect him from sinning.) Rav Nachman, when he would arrive in the city of Shechantziv, he would announce, “Who wants to marry me for one day?”

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis are different because their names are famous (and the children will know who their father was).

The Gemora asks: But didn’t Rava say: If one proposed to marry a woman and she has consented, she is required to wait seven clean days prior to the consummation of the marriage?

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis informed them before by sending their emissaries seven days prior to their arrival.

Alternatively, you can answer that they would only seclude themselves with the women. This protected them from sin because of the saying, “You cannot compare one who has bread in his basket with one who doesn’t have bread in his basket.” (37b)

The Gemora discusses different inheritance disputes that can emerge when we are uncertain if the child is a nine-month baby from the deceased brother or a seven-month baby from the yavam.

The uncertain child and the yavam come to inherit the possessions of the deceased. The uncertain one says: “I am the son of the deceased, and I am entitled to the full estate.” The yavam counters: “You are my son, and you have no claim on my brother’s estate.” This is a case where the money lies in doubt, and the halacha is that the estate should be divided amongst them.

The Gemora discusses another case: The uncertain child and the sons of the yavam come (the yavam died before the division of his brother’s estate) to inherit the possessions of the deceased. The uncertain one says: “I am the son of the deceased, and I am entitled to the full estate.” The sons of the yavam counter: “You are our brother, and you are entitled to a share together with us.”

Rav Mesharshiya rules that one-third of the estate should go to the uncertain one and the remaining two–third’s should be divided between the uncertain one and the two sons of the yavam.

The Gemora discusses another case: The uncertain child and the sons of the yavam come to inherit the possessions of the deceased after the yavam has already taken his half of his brother’s estate (according to the ruling above that the yavam and the uncertain one divide the estate equally). The sons of the yavam claim: “Bring a proof that you are our brother and we will divide our father’s estate with you.” The uncertain one counters: “No matter what, I should certainly receive a portion together with you. If I am your brother, give me a portion, and if I am not your brother (and I am the son of the deceased), give me the half that was previously given to your father (since if the deceased had a son, there was no yibum, and he should not have inherited my father in the first place).

Rabbi Abba says in the name of Rav: The initial judgment stands (we cannot reverse the first ruling and the yavam rightfully owns half the estate, and the uncertain one must bring a proof that he is a son of the yavam in order to receive a portion). Rabbi Yirmiyah says: We reverse the previous judgment. (37b)

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