]]>Podcast: My Interview on “Talking Terror” w/John Morrisonhttp://www.jamesforest.com/?p=560
Sun, 18 Mar 2018 23:45:20 +0000http://www.jamesforest.com/?p=560Here’s a link to a November 2017 podcast interview I did with the TERC Director John Morrison:

]]>December 2017 journal issue on Al Qaedahttp://www.jamesforest.com/?p=549
Fri, 29 Dec 2017 14:15:00 +0000http://www.jamesforest.com/?p=549For those encountering difficulties accessing the December 2017 issue of Perspectives on Terrorism on the main server, here’s an alternate link to download the full PDF version: http://bit.ly/2pb2K3r
]]>List of Academic Journalshttp://www.jamesforest.com/?p=545
Tue, 23 May 2017 16:50:36 +0000http://www.jamesforest.com/?p=545Here’s a long list provided by ASC of journals in criminology, criminal justice, security, law and other related topics. Many non-U.S. ones are listed here as well (e.g., Europe, Canada, Australia, UK).

]]>Reflections on Fear of Terrorismhttp://www.jamesforest.com/?p=473
Tue, 04 Apr 2017 23:59:37 +0000http://www.jamesforest.com/?p=473Continue Reading]]>Last weekend I was invited to give an hour-long talk about terrorism and radicalization to about 600 people at an event in New York City. The audience seemed honestly interested in what I had to say about the research in this field. I showed them some Powerpoint slides with research-based insights on radicalization, told some corny jokes, and concluded with some comments about community resilience and the fact that while many of the ideologies that fuel terrorism have a deep history, terrorist groups do eventually meet their demise.

But then afterwards, during the open question & answer period, it was my turn to learn from them. The questions they asked provided me with a lot of insight about how the general public views the threat of terrorism and what should be done about it.

They asked many intriguing questions like: “What do you think about the impact of the 24 hour news cycle?” I had spent some time in my presentation discussing how terrorists generally want to generate fear, through violence and the threat of violence, in order to coerce our behavior. An environment in which news media are competing against each other encourages the dramatization of events, which could actually benefit terrorists by encouraging perceptions of fear and vulnerability.

I had also mentioned in my talk that there was no common demographic or psychological profile regarding who had become terrorists in the past. One audience member cited some studies that she had read and asked what I thought about whether there were some “risk factors” that seem to suggest a higher possibility of radicalization. That’s a fair point, one I should have covered in my talk. I responded with some comments about bell curve data distribution, the point being that yes, there were studies showing that more terrorists have been young men, between ages 18-35, but I also tried to make the point that because there were lots of terrorists that did not fit that demographic profile, we need to look beyond demographics when trying to understand who can be influenced by a terrorist ideology. Not a very sophisticated or comprehensive answer, but these Q&A sessions have really never been my strong suit.

Then one audience member took the microphone and said “If you were asked by Trump what to do about terrorism, what would you say?” I have to admit, I was wholly unprepared for that question, and was only able to stumble through what I feel was a very unsatisfactory answer. Thinking about it now, what I should have said is “I’d ask him whether he had read my book, then I’d ask him to help fund the research of all my terrorism studies colleagues, and finally, I’d say please just don’t make matters worse by alienating the very communities whose help we need to combat Islamist extremism; If Muslims are treated as ‘the other’ we can anticipate having a more difficult time getting Muslim communities to provide intelligence on radicalized Muslims within their communities.” This is what I wish I had said, but didn’t. I’m sure we’ve all been in that kind of situation, thinking of something to say long after it would have been helpful.

Finally, I was asked by an audience member, “How can we not be afraid, and how can we help others not be afraid?” Another followed up with a similar question, “Aren’t you afraid your children will someday be killed in a terrorist attack?” I responded to those questions repeating something I had said in my talk about the importance of resolve and community resilience, about refusing to allow the terrorists to coerce our behavior through fear. But on the train ride back to Boston that evening, I found myself reflecting on the nature of the questions asked at this event. I’ve been studying and teaching in this field for almost two decades, and it strikes me that people today seem more afraid of terrorism than they were in the months following the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Terrorists want us to fear. They use violence and the threat of violence in an attempt to coerce our behavior. They want to use our fear to their advantage. But it seems that in the current U.S. political environment, politicians are able to benefit from exploiting that fear, in some cases even with the most authoritarian instincts and awful prejudices. A variety of media also benefit from exploiting that fear, attracting viewers, building and sustaining a base of followers who buy into the narrative that terrorism is the most important security threat we all face. Within this environment, rational voices who – based on a study of the history of terrorism, and a research-based understanding of terrorist radicalization – call for us to keep terrorism in perspective are shouted down by both the fearful and those exploiting the fear to their advantage.

My thinking on community resilience and perspective is informed by the response by the British to their latest terrorist attack in London. Here we have a country, and particularly a major city, that has endured a campaign of nationalist terrorism (IRA/PIRA) and more recently a campaign of Islamist-Jihadist attacks. And yet their resolve, their refusal to be coerced by terrorists, is worth taking to heart. After the worst of these Jihadist attacks (on July 7, 2005), the Queen of England visited hospitals to meet victims and express sympathy. During a visit to the Royal London Hospital, she stated “Those who perpetrate these brutal acts against innocent people should know that they will not change our way of life.” And indeed, the trains around London were operating at normal capacity the very next day, people were back to work, the economy did not grind to a halt. More noteworthy, very few political leaders in the UK made any effort to try and exacerbate or exploit the fear from terrorism in ways that we have seen here in the U.S. Now, after the most recent Jihadist attack in London, we see a similarly high level of resilience, an adamant refusal to be afraid, or to profit from the fear of terrorism. Perhaps there is something there that our American society can learn from.

Personally, I think each of us has a choice to make, though I recognize it’s a very difficult choice for most of us. On the one hand, we can choose to be fearful, which is what terrorists want. Apparently, being fearful is what many politicians and media want as well. Fear is a very powerful emotion. We should pause and ask ourselves: When we fear for our own personal safety, or for the security of those we love and care about, how does that impact our decision-making? And how can those decisions be manipulated by media and political elites? Furthermore, how can we ever get to a place of comfort and relaxation where that fear is not longer warranted – particular if some members of society don’t seem to want that to happen? Imposing new security procedures, physical barriers, policies targeting members of a population deemed a threat based on demographic attributes, displays of armed force – these all give the impression of “making us safer” but in 250 years of terrorist history, there’s virtually no evidence that such things actually diminish the ability of terrorists to make us fearful.

On the other hand, we can choose to reject any and all attempts to make us fearful. We can refuse to be terrorized, by the terrorists or by those who might try to benefit from exploiting fear. We can examine the evidence (nonpartisan, factual data on terrorism is plentiful if you look for it), and study the true nature of terrorism in all its forms. When we recognize what this evidence shows – that terrorism is a rare event compared to the many other tragic and criminal things that could happen to us – we have strong reason to question the intentions of those who seem to want us to fear. When each of us actively refuses to allow fear to coerce our behavior, this can strengthen our community resilience. The historical record shows that communities that are resilient, that refuse to be terrorized, will never be defeated by terrorists.

How does an effective system of security work in the real world, beyond political and media punditry? Ask a professional in law enforcement, military or the intelligence community and you’ll hear an overwhelmingly common response: security is built and maintained on relationships of trust, at every level. Healthy, trusted community and police relationships are key to maintaining peace and order, and for intelligence gathering on crime and security threats. Trust is critical for interagency cooperation and information sharing between local, state and federal agencies. At the national level, the different agencies and branches of government must trust each other implicitly in order to work together toward the overall common objective of ensuring security for the the nation and its interests. And at the international level, trusted relationships are vital for military cooperation, intelligence sharing, cross-national crime and terror investigations, diplomacy, economic security, energy security, cybersecurity, and so much more. These are all components of an effective security system for any country.

A quick caveat before I continue, as a response to some angry messages I have received from Trump supporters. The criticisms that I have shared publicly over the past few weeks about the current presidential administration and its policies have nothing to do with being against one political party or in favor of another. I have always registered to vote as an independent, and I much prefer discussions that focus on data, evidence and academic objectivity over politicized debates. My criticisms are based on what I have learned about effective counterterrorism (and security writ large), and my concerns over policy decisions that may result in our being less secure over time. There are two main themes in my criticisms: 1) the lack of real operational effectiveness and the potential damage this approach may have on our overall national security objectives; and 2) the rhetoric which is being utilized by some members of the administration (and supporters, including some in the media) in their attempts to justify these policies. Both of these areas of concern threaten to undermine critical relationships and trust on different levels, as described below.

Operational Effectiveness
Policy decisions over the last several weeks threaten to damage and undermine the very relationships which are required by law enforcement, intelligence and military organizations to keep us as secure as possible. At the local level, when members of a community feel that they face unwarranted suspicion based on their ethnicity, race or religion, they are less likely to voluntarily work with police forces to identify persons whose behavior should be cause for concern. At the national level, pitting agencies against each other – and creating fissures between the executive branch and the judiciary – creates an environment that jeopardizes trust and working relationships. And at the international level, policies and rhetoric that vilifies people based on their country of origin or their religion jeopardizes the likelihood those people would be willing to help us identify and counter a terrorist threat emanating from their countries.

The truth about terrorism is that it stems from personal decisions influenced by beliefs and contexts. Virtually anyone, from any country (including our own) can become a terrorist. Decades of research have revealed no singular profile of a terrorist, and particularly none that suggests individuals from one country are more likely to become a terrorist than another. The logical conclusion from this reality is that the security of our nation has almost nothing to do with banning an entire population of other countries from traveling here. I think terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins put it best in his recent commentary, Why a Travel Restriction Won’t Stop Terrorism at Home.

Border security and visa restrictions have always – and will always – be a necessary component of a much broader, comprehensive security strategy. But it is dangerously misleading to try and convince the public that our ability to prevent terrorist attacks in the U.S. is jeopardized unless we enact a draconian travel ban against everyone from these 7 countries.

I understand the concern about properly vetting people who want to come to the United States. I am certainly not opposed to that. The truth is, a great deal of scrutiny is already applied across the visa application process, and rightly so. Examining it for vulnerabilities and fixing shortcomings is a reasonable and worthwhile goal that I support. But to impose a “country of origin” travel ban that applies to people about whom we know nothing except their country of origin has several needlessly negative consequences.

First, it gives some people a false sense of security which is not supported by the facts or evidence. No terrorist attack on U.S. soil has been committed by a citizen of any of the 7 countries listed in the travel ban. Second, this type of ineffective defense measure does little to truly counter terrorism. It says to a potential terrorist in one of those countries, “Hey, we don’t think you’re smart enough to figure a way around this obstacle.” Underestimating the malevolent creativity of terrorists is a recipe for disaster.

Furthermore, we must keep in mind that anyone from any country can play a role in preventing terrorism. In countries around the world—including ours and those countries listed in the travel ban—Muslims have helped prevent terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists. This is an obvious fact, but one that needs to be mentioned given the current political climate.

This is where my main criticisms of the proposed “travel ban” are rooted. Yes, I know it is not a “Muslim ban”, nor a widescale ban on immigration or refugees from around the world. It is a ban on admitting individuals from 7 countries into the U.S., something our country’s leadership can do under certain circumstances (e.g., if they have evidence of an imminent threat to our security from those countries). The fact that these are all Muslim-majority countries is in my view secondary to the more important rationale that these 7 countries have significant amounts of political violence and conflict, and that our administration is not confident in the strength of the current vetting system when it comes to visa and immigration policies associated with those countries. I hear the argument that “there is inadequate vetting in those 7 countries” – but does that mean we are not doing the vetting ourselves? If that’s the case, it should not be. In no country – ally or weak, fragile state – should the U.S. rely on others to do our visa applicant vetting for us. If we are doing our own visa applicant vetting, it should not matter which country we are doing this in.

The underlying message here is that the current administration does not believe we have accurate intelligence sources in (or from) those countries, and thus we may be blind to an imminent terrorist threat. This fear of the unknown, combined with a clear bias against Muslims (as evidenced by widely publicized statements by Trump, Bannon, Gorka, Miller, et al. that are obviously derogatory towards all Muslims) are probably what drove the decision to quickly impose an executive order that, in hindsight, could have gone much differently.

For example, it would have been more effective (and much less controversial) to announce a major, intensive review of the immigration and visa granting processes for those 7 countries (and perhaps others as well), and that travelers from those countries may thus experience delays for the next few months due to the additional scrutiny as we work to make sure our vetting process is as good as we can get it. Legally permanent residents in the U.S. from any of those countries – whom presumably have already been closely scrutinized – would not be affected except under extraordinary circumstances. Exemptions for medical and other justifiable reasons would also be, as always, part of the visa decision-making process. This kind of “tightening up the filter” approach would have been seen as far more reasonable then the “nobody gets in” approach that led to thousands of people stranded at airports (including young children, Iraqi interpreters to whom our military owes a great debt, and others who could not reasonably be considered a security threat). Whether it would still have inspired protests, or judicial injunctions, is debatable.

The bottom line is this: Effective counterterrorism requires intelligence on individuals’ motives and capabilities, and then stopping those specific individuals from proceeding with their plans for terrorism. A travel ban like the one put forth in the original Executive Order last month is a defensive measure only, and a relatively ineffective one at that.

Dangerous Rhetoric
Of equal concern is that the tone and rhetoric associated with such a ban jeopardizes the critical relationships described above between communities and law enforcement, military-to-military cooperation, and transnational intelligence sharing. We should ask ourselves, are we willing to risk alienating the very people whose help we need to combat terrorism effectively? Note that I am not saying a travel ban like this will radicalize Muslims or benefit ISIS. Others have making that argument, but I remain ambivalent on that question. I’m not really certain whether ISIS would benefit from a travel ban like this, but it certainly does not hurt them nor prevent them from carrying out acts of terrorism. Therefore, the actual effectiveness of this as a counterterrorism effort is questionable at best.

But it seems counter-intuitive to project open hostility toward communities that play a critical role in combating terrorism, potentially making them reluctant to do so. This is why senior military officers, like newly-appointed Secretary of Defense GEN (ret) Jim Mattis and National Security Advisor LTG H.R. McMasters have argued against using the term ‘radical Islamic terrorism.’ A system of security at the community level (where the rubber meets the road in countering terrorism) can only be effective when everyone in the community sees it as in their best interests to work together toward providing that security.

Unfortunately, prejudice and bigotry among some members of our government and media now threaten undermine effective counterterrorism, by focusing our nation’s attention on the wrong problems. Ask any law enforcement professional whether they can guarantee the safety of a community without having information and intelligence sources within that community. Ask a military veteran who’s been deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan or other countries whether they could have “been just fine” without assistance from foreign military officers, interpreters, or local community members in those countries. Ask an intelligence community professional in the U.S. whether it matters if other countries stop sharing information with us about individuals of concern in those countries.

Trust between nations and individuals can be seen as a fabric that is tightly interwoven with security. Without trust, the systems of security at the community, homeland, national and international levels all unravel. And here is where the current political climate is most concerning. Uncertainty damages trust. Hateful rhetoric damages trust. Policies that target millions of people about whom we know nothing except for their country of origin or immigration/refugee status, damage trust.

Americans have faith and trust in our legal system and the rule of law. It is a good sign that the courts have continued to block previous attempts at this “travel ban”, largely on the basis that the administration has failed to substantiate with any evidence that it is in the best interests of our nation’s security. Indeed, even though the administration rejects the conclusions of its own intelligence community, thus far we have seen a great deal more evidence supporting the arguments against it than for it. This fact alone sends an important message to communities worldwide that hopefully they will find comforting – our nation values rule of law over political ideologies.

My own views on the matter are not based on political, moral, legal or ethical arguments about immigration or refugees, but rather, on the impact this approach has on effective counterterrorism and security. In the future, the people making decisions about our nation’s security would be wise to review the vast body of evidence-based research on terrorism and counterterrorism studies, and solicit the opinions of law enforcement, military and intelligence professionals about the impact of suggested policy actions – before announcing them as executive orders.

James J.F. Forest, Ph.D. is Professor of Security Studies in the School of Criminology & Justice Studies at UMass Lowell, Visiting Professor at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, and Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. His latest book is Essentials of Counterterrorism (Praeger, 2016).

]]>Predicting the Next Terrorist Attack in the U.S.http://www.jamesforest.com/?p=457
Wed, 22 Feb 2017 15:32:27 +0000http://www.jamesforest.com/?p=457Continue Reading]]>Based on the historical record and current threat analysis of available evidence, some projections can be made about the next major terrorist attack in the U.S.

First, it is roughly 85% likely to be linked to some kind of religious extremism. Global jihadism (a type of Sunni Islamist extremism) has been the predominant ideological motivation in recent years, but there have been several (often ignored) Christian extremist attacks in the U.S. as well.

Second, it is approximately 96% likely that the next attack will have nothing at all do with immigration. In other words, a travel ban focused on persons from specific countries, or even giving special scrutiny to travelers of certain religions, would likely have little or no impact on preventing the next terrorist attack.

Third, based on what we know about terrorist targeting preferences, the next attack is 99% likely to take place in an urban area. We know that most terrorists prefer to attack public gathering spaces, public transportation, a hotel or office building, but the specific target(s) of the next attack could literally be anything that the terrorist views as being strategically valuable for achieving their objectives.

If you want to do your own analysis on terrorist attack trends (including perpetrators, ideologies, locations, targeting, etc.), please see the Global Terrorism Database, at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

James J.F. Forest, Ph.D. is professor in the School of Criminology & Justice Studies at UMass Lowell, Visiting Professor at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, and Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. His latest book is Essentials of Counterterrorism (Praeger, 2016).

]]>Clarification about the Links between Islam and Terrorismhttp://www.jamesforest.com/?p=452
Tue, 21 Feb 2017 14:26:25 +0000http://www.jamesforest.com/?p=452Continue Reading]]>Much as I’ve wanted to avoid this debate about Islamophobia and current members of the presidential administration, as a research and educator in terrorism studies there are some things I need to point out.

1). Islamist extremists have been blowing up themselves and others in dozens of countries for the last half century, including our own. Nobody I know or care about is trying to minimize this reality. That said, mis-diagnosing the nature of this threat as one that applies throughout all of Islam – and formulating polices based on false perceptions – is dangerous and ill-advised. Criticisms of those misperceptions are not “libtard apologists for Islam” or any such nonsense. Many experts in security studies and counterterrorism have been pushing back against the Islamophibic primarily because they want to see a more effective counterterrorism approach, one based on evidence and thorough intelligence analysis rather than fear and hysteria.

2). No religion is immune to the efforts by a small minority of believers to use sacred texts to try and justify violence against others. Within any religion, the majority of the faithful reject interpretations of their sacred texts that are used to try and justify violence against others. Those rejectionists of violence are vital allies in combating religiously-oriented terrorism.

3). Anyone who can’t fill out the chart below (re: Islamist, Jewish and Christian extremists) doesn’t know enough yet about the intersections of political violence and religion that are common across all major faiths. The fact is that extremists within any religion justify among themselves the need for violence in order to “defend the faithful”, to “inspire others” and to serve God’s will, among other goals. This kind of comparative analysis is extremely unpopular among the anti-Islam crowd, but it is crucial to step away from the kinds of inferred cultural superiority that blinds accurate analysis of the threat.

4). Islam is not a monolithic entity. The threat of jihadism (and the violence associated with it) is rightly situated within a series of nested levels of discourse and divisions within Islam.

Islam – A global religion of 1.8 billion people, with large concentrations in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. There are many divisions within, including Sunni, Shia, Sufi, and Deobandi. There is considerable animosity between Sunni and Shia Muslims.

Sunni (roughly 85% of Muslims) follow the example of Muhammad and believe that the first four caliphs were legitimate rulers. Sunnis have no central religious organization or centers of authority.

Shia (roughly 15% of Muslims) believe that only the descendants and relatives of Muhammad are the legitimate rulers of all Muslims.

Sufi are mystics, found among both Sunni and Shia Muslims, who seek to draw close to God through various rituals

Deobandi is a popular revivalist movement among Sunni Muslims, particularly in Asia, that emphasizes scholastic traditions.

Islamism: An ideological argument, supported by some Muslims, that politics and society must be organized according to Islamic doctrine

Salafism is a Protestant-like fundamentalist version of Sunni Islamism that seeks to purify Islam from outside cultural influences. Salafists (also Wahhabists) want politics and society to be organized according to the ways in which the religions “forefathers” (salaf) lived, including the prophet Muhammad and the first few generations of Mulims.

Salafi-Jihadism is a subset of Salafism whose believers try to justify using violence to achieve the Salafist political agenda. Al-Qaida, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups support this Salafi-Jihadist ideology.

5) As thousands of scholars have shown, there are many drivers of conflicts and political violence (including insurgency, terrorism, civil war and genocide) beyond religion. An argument that there is something inherently violent within all of Islam ignores the fact that violence is rare among the 1.8 billion Muslims worldwide. If Islam was truly a major factor in violence, Southeast Asia (where there are far more Muslims than in the Middle East) would be embroiled in the same kinds of conflicts we see in Iraq and Syria.

6). Images and stories from politically-oriented media outlets and individuals who misinterpret events and factual information provide an all-too-easy confirmation bias for viewers. Further, from decades of research in psychology, we know that people prefer information consistent with their beliefs, views and prior behaviors, and avoid information that’s inconsistent. Provocative narratives like Islamophobia don’t have to be true to be believed. The creation of massive echo chambers, in which a person can get all their information about religion and conflict from like-minded sources, has led to a dangerous polarization in the public debate about how to understand and effectively counter the threat of jihadist terrorism.

7). The bottom line: Within Islam, the Salafists have for many centuries argued that their conservative, fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran should be adhered to by all Muslims. The Salafists are a relatively small (but significant) minority within the overall Muslim world. Among the Salafists, a small minority of jihadists employ a narrative that tries to justify the use of violence toward achieving this goal. The majority of Salafists – and indeed the overwhelming majority of Muslims worldwide – reject this Salafi-Jihadist argument. These rejectionists are necessary allies in combating Salafi jihadist terrorism promulgated by the likes of al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Furthermore, global jihadist ideologues (like al-Baghdadi and al-Zawahiri) are constantly trying to justify the killing of bystanders (including Muslim women and children) and have difficulties finding credible Islamic scholars to support these actions. They often twist and misrepresent ancient texts and fatwas (including those of 13th century cleric Ibn Taymiyyah) to justify their type of violence. The illegitimacy of this theological twisting is also a source of animosity and rejection among the overwhelming majority of the Muslim world. This is why it is misguided and counterproductive to portray the rejectionists of jihadism as our enemies. If anything, they have just as much interest as we do in defeating this violent ideology – not the least of which is because the data clearly show that far more Muslims have died than non-Muslims from Salafi-Jihadists attacks over the past two decades.

James J.F. Forest, Ph.D. is professor in the School of Criminology & Justice Studies at UMass Lowell, Visiting Professor at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, and Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. His latest book is Essentials of Counterterrorism (Praeger, 2016).