Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Stephen Jay Gould’s thesis that science and religion are “non-overlapping magisteria” has weaknesses enough when considered solely on the basis of his presentation of it. When one considers it in light of the original ecclesiastical meaning and use of the term “magisterium,” it appears positively grotesque.

A while back, I posted three entries on Stephen Jay Gould’s view of the relation between science and religion, a conception that he sums up as the principle of “non-overlapping magisteria” or “NOMA” (“Stephen Jay Gould on Science and Religion,” “More on Gould on Science and Religion,” and “A Dilemma for NOMA”). By “magisterium”—a bit of ecclesiastical Latin derived from magister, “teacher”—Gould says that he means “a domain of authority in teaching,” or, more specifically, “a domain where one form of teaching holds the appropriate tools for meaningful discourse and resolution” (see note at end for source). He explains further:

Each domain of inquiry frames its own rules and admissible questions, and sets its own criteria for judgment and resolution. These accepted standards, and the procedures developed for debating and resolving legitimate issues, define the magisterium—or teaching authority—of any given realm.

According to Gould, science and religion are two “non-overlapping magisteria.” The magisterium of science comprises “the empirical realm: what the universe is made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory),” while that of religion “extends over questions of ultimate meaning and moral value.” No question belongs within both magisteria: hence their “non-overlapping” character.

The idea that religion has or is a magisterium in Gould’s sense, and the idea that questions of ethical value and existential meaning belong within that magisterium, both invite strong objections, some of which I presented in my previous entries on this topic. Right now, though, I want to consider simply what the term “magisterium” means. I have presented Gould’s account of what he means by it. But it remains to consider what it means in the discourse from which he takes it, that of the Catholic Church. In what follows, I shall do my best to interpret accurately the passages that I have found, though I very much doubt that I shall avoid errors, not only because of my lack of familiarity with Catholic doctrine but because of my lack of comfort with it. Still, I believe that the evidence of the quotations will suffice to show how ill-suited the term “magisterium” is to the use to which Gould wants to put it.

The earliest occurrence of the word “magisterium” in Catholic ecclesiastical discourse that I have been able to find comes from a document of the First Vatican Council (1869–1870):

Wherefore, by divine and Catholic faith all those things are to be believed which are contained in the word of God as found in Scripture and tradition, and which are proposed by the Church as matters to be believed as divinely revealed, whether by her solemn judgment or in her ordinary and universal magisterium. (First Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 3, article 8)

The terms “solemn,” “ordinary,” and “universal” here are all technical terms. Definitive decrees made by the Pope and his councils belong to the “solemn” or “extraordinary” magisterium of the church, while all other teachings of the Pope and the bishops belong to the “ordinary” and “universal” magisterium of the church (source). The main point here is that the Bible and the traditions of the Catholic Church contain a body of teaching that is divinely revealed and therefore authoritative.

A passage from an encyclical by Pius IX, the Pope who presided over the First Vatican Council, lays stress on the point that it is solely the Pope and the bishops who bear the divinely conferred authority to determine revealed truth, not the laity (and, presumably, not the lower priesthood either):

For these writings attack and pervert the true power of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff and the bishops, who are the successors of blessed Peter and the apostles; they transfer it instead to the people, or, as they say, to the community. They obstinately reject and oppose the infallible magisterium both of the Roman Pontiff and of the whole Church in teaching matters. (On the Church of Italy, Germany, and Switzerland (1871), “Further Heresies”; source)

The same point was affirmed by the Second Vatican Council (1965), over which Pope Paul VI presided:

But the task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church [soli vivo Ecclesiae Magisterio concreditum est], whose authority [auctoritas] is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This teaching office [Magisterium] is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in accord with a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it draws from this one deposit of faith everything which it presents for belief as divinely revealed.

It is clear, therefore, that sacred tradition, Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church [Ecclesiae Magisterium], in accord with God’s most wise design, are so linked and joined together that one cannot stand without the others, and that all together and each in its own way under the action of the one Holy Spirit contribute effectively to the salvation of souls. (Dei Verbum, chapter two, article 10; English text; Latin text)

The gist of this passage is that the magisterium of the Church is an authority divinely vested in the Pope and the bishops to teach the members of the Church what is divinely revealed in scripture and tradition. (The alternation in the last-quoted passage between the two translations “teaching office” and “teaching authority” does not reflect a difference of meaning but rather a wish to avoid repetition in the sentence in which the word “authority” (auctoritas) also occurs.)

The ecclesiastical use of the term “magisterium” differs from Gould’s appropriation of it on several points. First, in ecclesiastical usage, a magisterium is not a “domain” of teaching authority: it simply is teaching authority. There are, of course, discussions of the range of matters in which the Church has this authority; but the word “magisterium” signifies the authority itself and not the subject matter to which it pertains. Hence, in ecclesiastical usage, it would be plain nonsense to speak, as Gould sometimes does, of the magisterium of this or that subject matter (e.g., natural fact, ethical values, etc.). The magisterium is the magisterium of the Church. Second, the pertinent sense of “authority” is not merely epistemological but also institutional: the magisterium of the Church is the authority that a certain body, the Catholic episcopacy, has over the faithful in matters of faith and morals. Third, the term “teaching” here is not a byword for “inquiry” or “discovery” but signifies the handing-down of conclusions by those in authority to those who are obliged to accept them. The magisterium of the Church has nothing to do with procedures for posing questions and resolving disputes. The Church may have these, but they are not what the word “magisterium” signifies. Rather, it signifies the status of the upper priesthood’s conclusions as divinely revealed truth. Fourth, the term occurs (so far as I have found) only in the singular form, never in the plural: there is no ecclesiastical talk of “magisteria,” but only of the magisterium of the Church (Magisterium Ecclesiae). Thus the term does not serve to demarcate one subject matter from another or one way of answering questions from another, but only to identify who or what bears teaching authority in matters of revealed truth.

In my previous entries on Gould’s thesis, I argued that there is no compelling reason to believe that religion has teaching authority with respect to any subject matter whatever. Specific religious institutions may have sectarian authority over their adherents, but there is no “form of teaching [that] holds the appropriate tools for meaningful discourse and resolution” characteristic of religion as such.

As questionable as it is to speak of the “magisterium of religion,” to speak of the “magisterium of science” is even worse. In fact, it is positively grotesque. There are, of course, creationists who try to smear evolutionary biology with the tu-quoque claim that it is a religion (example 1; example 2). But even they do not hold that science has the authority structure of a religion: rather, their claim is that the theory of evolution is not science. Anyway, regardless of what such ideologues may say, there can be no question that in its original import, the term “magisterium” has no application to scientific inquiry.

Certainly science can be taught and is taught. Many of its practitioners are among its teachers. But the practice of science is not in any serious sense a “form of teaching,” in Gould’s phrase; much less is it a handing-down of dogmata from those in authority to those who must obey. There is, in fact, almost nothing in the notion of Ecclesiae Magisterium that applies to science. The mismatch between the original meaning of the term and the use to which Gould tries to put it is so stark that one has to wonder how Gould could profess to “find the term so beautifully appropriate for the central concept of this book that I venture to impose this novelty upon the vocabulary of many readers.” Whatever made the term seem that way to him, I suspect that it had very little to do with what the Vatican actually meant by it.

Monday, August 12, 2013

We typically use the plural noun “probabilities” only when speaking of events that are potentially repeatable, like throws of a pair of dice. But the notion of probability has another aspect, namely the degree of strength of belief warranted by evidence. This seems to apply, at least potentially, to the question of divine existence. But one may doubt whether the “God” about which some reason probabilistically can be identified with the God worshiped and served in any actual religion.

My previous entry addressed, but—characteristically, I confess—did not answer, the question “Is the existence of God a matter of probabilities?” I wish now that I had used the singular form of the noun “probability” rather than the plural, as the latter has associations that I don’t welcome. The plural form “probabilities” tends to suggest numerical values or measures of probability, which in turn (and this is the most unwelcome part) suggests the sort of case in which an event of a specific, repeatable type occurs under specific conditions—for instance, the event of a hand of five playing cards containing a pair, given that the five cards are dealt randomly from a deck of 52. Even if we are speaking, say, of the probability that candidate So and So will win the upcoming election, which is not a repeatable event-type but a single occurrence, we may consider that outcome as belonging to a type specifiable more or less broadly according to country, locale, time period, type of office, characteristics of the candidate, and so on; and we can then calculate the chances accordingly.

But what if we are speaking of the probability of a possible fact that is not an instance of a repeatable type? Discussions of the existence of God would be a case of this. The idea of assigning the existence of God to some type of repeatable event seems senseless. Perhaps some diligent analytic metaphysician somewhere has reckoned the probability of divine existence as the proportion of God-made possible worlds to Godless ones; but I don’t care to take account of all conceivable products of academic invention. If the concept of probability applies only to repeatable event-types, and if, as seems plain, the existence of God is not an event of a repeatable type, then the answer to the question “Is the existence of God a matter of probability?” is a flat and rather uninteresting “No.”

But the concept of probability is not restricted to such cases. When Bishop Butler remarked in the “Introduction” to his Analogy of Religion (1736) that “to us, probability is the very guide of life,” he was not referring to the calculus of chance, which was then in its infancy. He was speaking of probability in contrast with absolute certainty, and of the condition of finite intellects in contrast with that of an infinite one:

Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. . . .

Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information, and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite Intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely, as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But, to us, probability is the very guide of life.

Probability is our guide in life because our knowledge of the world is, by our nature, limited. To follow probability in the pertinent sense is not to reckon odds but to weigh what Butler calls “presumptions,” or reasons for belief. There is more to probability than mere chance. As Ian Hacking remarks in his historical study The Emergence of Probability,

Probability has two aspects. It is connected with the degree of belief warranted by evidence, and it is connected with the tendency, displayed by some chance devices, to produce stable relative frequencies.

Hacking dubs the first aspect of probability the “epistemological” (from Greek epistēmē, “knowledge”) and the other the “aleatory” (from Latin ālea, “die” or, by derivation, “game of chance”). I think “epistemic” is a more widely used term for the former, although, since it is belief and not knowledge that is in question, “doxic” (from Greek doxa, “belief”) would be more apt. Whatever the terminology, and however we may try to understand the relation between these two aspects of probability, it is the doxic or epistemic aspect that is pertinent when the existence of God is treated probabilistically. The fundamental thought is not that we can calculate the chance that God exists as we can the chance of getting a certain result from throwing a pair of dice, say, but that some degree of strength of belief that God exists is warranted by the evidence available to us.

The question “Is the existence of God a matter of probability?” is a question about a question. It concerns how the question “Does God exist?” may be answered—what sort of thing one has to do, or may do, to answer it. Anyone who assumes that the question must be, or may be, answered by weighing what Butler terms “probable” evidence (meaning empirical evidence, as contrasted with the “demonstrative” evidence of proofs a priori) assumes that the answer to the first question is “Yes”—that the existence of God is a matter of probability.

Most writers who argue for atheism seem to make this assumption. They typically argue either that there is no evidence that God exists or that there is evidence that God does not exist. It seems to go without saying for them that to answer the question of God’s existence otherwise than by evaluating the available evidence would be incompatible with intellectual integrity. For instance, Richard Dawkins entitles one chapter of his book The God Delusion “The God Hypothesis” and another “Why There Almost Certainly Is No God.” For Dawkins, to treat belief in God as a “hypothesis” is what it means to take the proposition “God exists” seriously as a contender for truth. As for the probabilistic qualification “almost certainly,” it is not for him a sign of weakness but a point of strength, as it shows that he, like any good scientist and in contrast to the great majority of theistic believers, founds his opinion in the matter on where the preponderance of evidence lies. “What matters,” he says at one point, “is not whether God is disprovable (he isn’t) but whether his existence is probable”; which, of course, it isn’t, according to him.

I am inclined to agree, in a certain guarded fashion, with Dawkins that the existence of God is not probable—not, however, because it is improbable, as he thinks, but because it is not a matter of probability at all. I said in my previous entry that it is not easy to defend this claim. This evoked some interesting comments from Tommi Uschanov, who does not share my sense of difficulty on this point. The following two observations, which, he says, “have been presented often in Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, by O. K. Bouwsma or D. Z. Phillips, for instance,” he finds “do the work so well that nothing more needs to be said”:

1) If someone has lived his life atheistically or otherwise irreligiously through a wrong assessment of probabilities, due to an innate lack of talent for mathematics and statistics, this would seem to mean that God condemns him to perdition through a failure to endow him with sufficient talent to make the required calculations. But this is obviously contrary to the moral teaching of the religion itself. And indeed to the whole official self-image of the religion.

2) The importation of the probabilistic way of speaking to properly religious language makes this language (not unintelligible, which would be the positivist critique, but) uproariously funny.

The first argument seems to me an effective objection to anyone who, like William Lane Craig, uses probabilistic arguments to defend the reasonableness of Christianity; but only because Christianity, at least in some of its varieties, holds the non-acceptance of Christian doctrine to be a sin subject to divine retribution. There are, of course, interpretations of Christianity that reject this belief, but it has been a part of Christian doctrine historically and is, so far as I know, not found in any other major religion. In any case, it is not a part of theistic belief per se. The objection, therefore, tells only against probabilistic defenses of some varieties Christianity and not to probabilistic approaches to the question of divine existence in general. Further, the objection seems to be just a variant of the ancient one that if God makes human beings sinful that he cannot justly punish them for their sins: so if he makes someone inept at forming beliefs, he cannot justly punish that person for failing to arrive at the right beliefs. In any case, the most that this objection can show is that it is imprudent for a Christian to try to make probabilistic arguments for the existence of God. It doesn’t show that there is anything inherently wrong with doing this in general or with treating the question of God’s existence probabilistically in the first place.

Uschanov’s second argument may seem even less effective, as it can be rebutted on several grounds. For one thing, to make a probabilistic argument means only that the premises from which one argues provide reasons to accept one’s conclusion without entailing it with logical necessity. It does not mean that the conclusion has to include a probabilistic qualifier. For instance, if I know that Smith fell into a piece of industrial machinery and was ground to bits, and I conclude on that basis that he is dead, I am reasoning probabilistically; that does not mean that I am obliged to say only, “Smith is probably dead.” In such a case, my premise warrants my conclusion with moral certainty, which is certainty beyond a reasonable doubt (though not beyond all logically conceivable doubt). For another thing, if someone tries to show that there is sufficient empirical evidence to conclude that God exists, it does not follow that she is bound to import probabilistic language into her religious practices, such as prayers, or to rephrase scriptural passages to include such language. Finally, to advance a probabilistic argument for belief in the existence of God does not commit one to holding that theistic believers should base their belief on such a justification. One might offer the argument purely for the purpose of refuting skeptical doubts of God’s existence and showing that theistic belief is rationally warranted. (As I said in my reply to Tommi’s comment, William Lane Craig seems to be trying to do something parallel to this, but specifically for certain Christian doctrines, not for bare theism.)

With all that said, I think that there is at least potentially more to Uschanov’s objection (or to the sources from which he draws it) than such replies recognize. The point of the objection, as I understand it, is not to argue, “To defend theism probabilistically commits you to saying things like these; these things are patently ridiculous; therefore, it is misconceived to defend theism probabilistically.” At least, I think that the objection is much more effective if it is taken differently, as an attempt to bring out something incoherent in the probabilistic approach to divine existence precisely by taking it seriously. It is as if one were to say: “You want to treat the existence of God as a matter of probability? Fine! Let’s do that consistently and see what happens!”

The suggestion, in other words—at least, this is the suggestion that I derive from the objection as stated—is that if you adopt a probabilistic approach to the question of God’s existence, the “God” that you reason about, no matter whether your conclusion is theistic or atheistic, will be a philosophical fetish or idol and not that which is worshiped and served in any of the world’s religions. Probabilistic reasoning and religious practice are not two different ways of relating oneself to the same entity; rather, one is a way of relating oneself to God, if God exists, and the other is a way of relating oneself to a figment of the intellect mistakenly called by the same name. To put the point another way, a possible object of religious devotion is not a possible object of probabilistic reasoning.

That, at any rate, is the idea that Uschanov’s comment suggests to me. I think it can also be taken as a development of the objection that Duncan Richter was making in the blog entry that I discussed in my previous entry here, when he said that a probabilistic approach to the question of divine existence “treats God as the same kind of thing as a fluke gust of wind, i.e. something whose odds we might calculate or at least estimate, i.e. as something natural, however super.” If the objection can be satisfactorily worked out, it should be applicable to polytheistic religions as well as to monotheisms—or rather, not to the religions, but to probabilistic treatments of the question of the existence of their gods. It may even be applicable to probabilistic would-be defenses of revealed religion, such as that offered by Craig, who incorporates scripture into his evidence base.

I find it an attractive idea, but I don’t entirely trust it, and I certainly don’t have a defense of it ready. So, once again, I close with unfinished business.

Thursday, August 8, 2013

To treat the question whether God exists as a matter of probabilities seems to some people completely natural and to some utterly perverse. Believers and non-believers are found in both camps. I agree with Duncan Richter in finding such a way of thinking deeply wrongheaded, but I find his attempt to say what is wrong with it unsatisfactory.

I was delighted to find my previous two posts (1, 2) on ancient polytheism and the concept of evidence cited and discussed by Duncan Richter in his blog Language on Holiday. Richter’s discussion includes a parenthetical remark that approaches some lines of thought that I have pursued. He remarks that arguments for the existence of God that are founded on empirical observations, whether concerning religious experience, miracles, or design, all try to establish their conclusion as a matter of probability. (For the sake of simplicity, I shall in this entry equate questions of the existence of a divine being with the question of the existence of God, i.e., an inherently unique deity, leaving polytheism out of account.) He says of this way of thinking:

It is a logical and ethical mistake, an error in grammar and theology, to think of the existence of God as a question of probabilities. This might become clearer if one tried to calculate the odds, although I think people have done this and not achieved the clarity I have in mind. In case it isn’t clear, it’s a mistake because it treats God as the same kind of thing as a fluke gust of wind, i.e. something whose odds we might calculate or at least estimate, i.e. as something natural, however super. To think of God this way is to misunderstand what believers believe in a way that is both simply wrong (that isn’t what they believe) and insulting (it is to treat God as something less than what they believe). This is complicated by the fact that some believers (or “believers”) are idolaters in just this way, but that isn’t the kind of belief that interests me. There’s also the question whether non-believers like me should care about the alleged badness of insulting God, but we can at least respect the feelings of believers. And I think we can respect the concept of God, too, and want to do justice to it.

I suspect that the passage was written with some haste and impatience, for two reasons: first, it is rather long and contentious, not to say blustery, for a merely parenthetical remark; and second, saying exactly what is wrong with treating the existence of God as a matter of probability is no easy matter—or so, at any rate, say I. In this piece, I will give reasons for finding Richter’s presentation of the case unsatisfactory. I hope, though I dare not promise, to make a stronger case of my own in a subsequent entry to this blog.

Richter finds fault with probabilistic discourse about theism in two respects. One concerns the way in which it treats theistic believers. According to him, it insults them by treating God as “something less than what they believe [in].” He also implies that it fails to “respect their feelings.” Now it is possible that I am missing something here, but to me such claims seem simply irrelevant. If—and this is a large “if”—there is no fundamental conceptual error inherent in inquiring whether probability favors the existence or the non-existence of God, then I can see no compelling reason why those making such inquiries should care in the least whether they hurt the feelings of theistic believers or denigrate the object of their beliefs. At most, such considerations would be reasons to pursue such inquiries out of public hearing, so that they not offend the delicate ears of believers. But one could just as credibly argue that it is insulting to believers to assume that their sensibilities require this kind of protection. In any case, if they do, then it’s hard cheese for them and nothing more.

So it seems to me that Richter’s would-be ethical objection can be set aside. The entire weight of his objection must rest on its logical and grammatical part—“grammatical” here in Wittgenstein’s sense of concerning what one can intelligibly say and under what conditions. I believe that if this element of the objection could be satisfactorily articulated, the ethical aspect would emerge by itself. In fact, if I may mix the terms of the later Wittgenstein with the phrasing of the earlier, I would say that on this point grammar and ethics are one: if we could understand exactly what is so perverse about talking probabilistically about the existence of God, we would not distinguish a logical an ethical objections. Richter seems to me to move, or at least to face, in this direction when he describes theistic believers who take the question of divine existence to be a matter of probability as “idolaters,” a term that implies perversion of both intellect and will; but to make such a heavy charge stick would require an argument than I, for one, have not got at the ready.

What, then, is wrong with trying to assess the probability of divine existence? Richter holds that to do so “treats God as the same kind of thing as a fluke gust of wind, i.e. something whose odds we might calculate or at least estimate, i.e. as something natural, however super.” To take the first point first: what are the conditions under which we can calculate or at least estimate the odds of something? Richter may be assuming that we can do this only when we are talking about a type of event that occurs and recurs unpredictably under certain specifiable conditions, such a gust of wind of such and such a character that occurs a certain number of times in a certain location over a certain period of time. Given such specifications, we can observe a sample of cases and calculate the relative frequency of the event in question. The larger the sample that we have observed, the more confidently can we identify this relative frequency with the probability of a gust of wind occurring under the specified conditions.

Obviously, none of this is applicable to the existence of God, since that is not a repeatable event. So, if those who think of the existence of God probabilistically operate with a frequentist interpretation of probability, then they are hamstrung from the outset. But, of course, they do nothing of the sort; or at least, they need not do so. Here is the philosopher and Christian apologist—and, if Richter’s assessment is just, idolater—William Lane Craig on his website Reasonable Christianity answering a correspondent who is perplexed by the application of probabilistic terms to the question of the existence of God. Craig’s correspondent understands probability not in terms of relative frequency but according to what is known as the classical interpretation of probability, in which probability values are equated with the ratio of the number of cases in which a certain event occurs to the total number of possible cases. But Craig’s reply is equally applicable to the frequentist interpretation:

Probabilities are always relative to some background information. . . . Now the atheist says God’s existence is improbable. You should immediately ask, ‘Improbable relative to what?’ What is the background information? . . . The interesting question is whether God’s existence is probable relative to the full scope of the evidence.

Had you asked that question of your friend, it would have been evident that he is considering no background information at all! He seems to be talking about a sort of absolute probability of God’s existence Pr (G) in abstraction from any background information B and specific evidence E. That’s a pointless exercise. He seems to be imagining all the possible deities that could exist and asking, “What are the chances apriori that a certain one of these exists?” How silly! That’s like inquiring about the absolute probability that a certain person, for example, you, exists, given the infinite number of possible persons there could be. Nobody is interested in such absolute probabilities, if there even are such things. What we want to know, rather, is the probability of your existence or God’s existence relative to our background information and specific evidence: Pr (G|E & B).

Craig operates with a subjectivist or, as it is widely known, Bayesian interpretation of probability. On this interpretation, the values that are assigned to probabilities of events represent degrees of confidence in the occurrence of those events. Such assignments do not require that the events be repeated or repeatable at all: one can attribute a degree of probability to any event whatever, even the existence of God (or of a god of some specific description). (“Event” here is a technical term in probability theory for that to which a probability value is assigned and is not contrasted with “fact” or “state of affairs.”)

The competition among interpretations of probability is a vast and complicated issue, into which I don’t propose to enter any farther. My point here is simply that, if one holds there to be a confusion inherent in treating the existence of God as a matter of probability, one cannot support that claim by simply assuming an interpretation of probability that requires a repeated event or a countable set of possible outcomes, as there are interpretations of probability that don’t require those things. To Richter’s remark that to talk of the existence of God in probabilistic terms treats it as “something whose odds we might calculate or at least estimate,” Craig would reply, or anyway could reply, “Yes; so what?” So, for that matter, could Richard Dawkins.

I can imagine one of these probabilists saying to Richter (and, for that matter, to me): “I suspect that the reason why you dislike this talk of the probability of God’s existence is that it seems to kill all the existential drama and to make the business of believing or not believing in God out to be a matter purely of the intellect. But, look you, I am not touching at all on the question of what moves people to believe or disbelieve in God, or what difference their belief or lack of belief makes to their lives. I am just assuming that when we ask, ‘Does God exist?’, we are posing a genuine and well-formed question—one that has a correct answer. The correct answer is either ‘Yes, God exists’ or ‘No, God does not exist.’ To determine which is the correct answer, one has to determine where the preponderance of evidence lies. To do this is to assess the probability of the proposition ‘God exists.’”

I do not think that this argument is unanswerable, but I do think that to answer it is not easy. In any case, I leave the task for a later post.

Wednesday, August 7, 2013

The issue of whether the ancient Greeks could have had good
evidence of the existence of their gods comes down to the issue of
whether a theistic explanation of their religious experiences can
be a better explanation than any naturalistic one.

My previous entry on this blog (“Ancient
Polytheism and the Concept of Evidence,” August 2, 2013),
written in response to a piece by Gary Gutting (“Did
Zeus Exist?”, The New York Times on line, July 31,
2013), grew out of a couple of paragraphs that I had posted in a
discussion of Gutting’s piece on Facebook. I thought at the time
that I needed only to add
some circumstantial explanation to what I had written to
make an entry for this blog but instead I ended up writing a
completely new piece
twelve paragraphs long. It is bad enough to put so much time and
so many words into commenting on someone else’s blog post; what
makes matters worse is that by writing at such length I make it all
the more unlikely that anyone, even among the small number of people
who ever see this blog, will read what I wrote. Today I will try
to make up for the verbosity of that entry by setting forth
my main thoughts in this matter concisely and without much reference
to the details of Gutting’s piece. I have on some points modified the
position that I took in the earlier piece, as I have come to a
more charitable assessment of what Gutting does with the concept of
evidence, but I do not bother to indicate the modifications here.

(1) If some people, such as the ancient Greeks in Parker’s account,
have experiences that they take to be theophanies (manifestations of
a god or of gods), these experiences may be the basis of their
belief in their gods. But that does not mean that they take these
experiences to be evidence of the existence of those gods.

(2) In fact, no one who experiences what seem to him to be
theophanies can coherently regard his experiences as evidence of the
existence of gods, since the presumption of the existence of gods is
inherent in the experiences themselves. An ancient Greek who claims to have experienced a theophany might say, e.g., “Zeus
manifested himself to me.” To make such a statement is not to cite anything that can possibly count as evidence
of the existence of Zeus, as the statement presupposes the
existence of Zeus.

(3) For an ancient polytheist to be in a position to cite his
religious experiences as evidence of the existence of his gods, he
must renounce the naive conviction that originally characterized his
experiences in favor of a skeptical attitude, and must redescribe
his experiences in terms that are neutral with respect to the
existence of gods. So he must say, e.g., not “Zeus manifested
himself to me,” but rather, “It seemed to me as though Zeus
manifested himself to me.”

(4) Note that such a person would have to do this across the board with regard
to everyone’s putatively theophanic experiences. The issue
is not the veracity of this or that person’s religious experience
but rather the existence of the gods themselves. It would be no
effective argument to say, e.g., “What I saw and felt during the
ritual agrees with the accounts of others to whom Zeus has appeared;
therefore, Zeus exists”; for the statement that Zeus has appeared
to others presupposes that Zeus exists. To cite religious
experiences as evidence of the existence of gods, one must describe
all such experiences in terms that are neutral with respect
to the existence of gods.

(5) For an ancient Greek apologist for polytheism to get from the
premise “Such and such Greeks have had such and such experiences”
(the experiences being described in terms that are neutral with
respect to the existence of gods) to the conclusion “The gods
exist,” he would have to supply some further premise or premises.
Otherwise, the premise of his would-be argument provides no reason
to accept its conclusion. That is to say, the cited experiences do
not constitute evidence of the existence of the Greek gods unless a
further premise or premises can be supplied that makes the argument
cogent.

(6) What might this premise be? One possibility is: “So many pious
Greeks can’t be wrong.” That, of course, invites the rebuttal: “Yes,
they can.” The issue, as far as I can tell, comes down to the question of what
sort of explanation of the Greeks’ religious experiences is most
compelling: a theistic one, according to which the gods really did
appear to the ancient Greeks, or a non-theistic one, such as one in
terms of natural causes. If the polytheistic apologist can
establish the claim that the best possible explanation of the data
that he has cited is that the Greek gods really have appeared to him
and to his fellow Greeks, then he has a cogent argument, and the
religious experiences of ancient Greeks do indeed constitute
evidence of the existence of the Greek gods. But can he establish
such a claim?

(7) Gutting argues, in effect, that we have no rationally compelling
basis for rejecting such a claim. The modern rejection of
supernatural causes, he holds, is not a finding of science but an a
priori presupposition of scientific procedure. Therefore, we
have no rational basis for dismissing the possibility that the
ancient Greeks had good evidence of the existence of their gods.
Therefore, we have no rational basis for dismissing the possibility
that their gods existed.

I have further thoughts on the last point, but rather than include
them in this entry I will simply post this part by itself.

Added August 7, 2013: Upon further consideration of Gutting’s piece, I have concluded that its arguments do not merit further close attention. We have abundant reason to prefer a naturalistic
explanation of Greek or any other religious experiences to a theistic one. A
naturalistic explanation can
be thoroughly well-integrated with everything else that we know
about how the natural world works, while a theistic one cannot be.
A naturalistic explanation needs to posit no entities that act in
contravention of the known laws of nature, while theistic
explanation (at least as understood by Gutting) does so. The principles of a naturalistic explanation
admit of the derivation of predictions that can be empirically
tested and confirmed, while those of a theistic explanation do
not. The theistic explanation may have an advantage in simplicity
(though even that may be contested: see this
piece at Philosophical Disquisitions for reasons why
the notion of simplicity of explanation is not itself simple), but it is
a clear non-starter in all other respects.

Gutting’s insistence that the Greeks may have had good evidence of the reality of their gods because we have not got decisive evidence that they did not have such evidence is as fatuous as the assertion that the Greeks may have had the technology to build nuclear reactors or that it may have been possible for human beings to fly by attaching wings made of wax to their bodies in those days, since we have no decisive evidence to the contrary (by the standard of decisiveness that Gutting’s reasoning seems to presuppose). In each case, the assertion of what “may have” been the case amounts to nothing more than the proposal of a fantasy in which there is no obvious logical incoherence. It provides not the slightest reason to take such fantasies seriously as real possibilities or to set them alongside the contrary assertions—viz., that the ancient Greeks had no nuclear technology, could not fly with waxen wings, and had no good evidence of the reality of their gods—and to say that there is no sufficient reason to choose between the two.

Agnosticism about the existence, past or present, of the Greek gods seems to me a defensible position; but Gutting’s argument for such agnosticism, founded as it is on the assertion of agnosticism about the former availability of now-unknown evidence for the existence of those gods, is itself indefensible.

Friday, August 2, 2013

Gary Gutting offers a double-layered agnosticism about the existence
of the gods of ancient Greece: we are in no position to say with
assurance that the ancient Greeks did not have good evidence for the
existence of Zeus and company, he argues, and therefore, we are in no position to say with
assurance that their gods did not exist. The first claim is mistaken, and
it is mistaken because the facts that Gutting marshals to support his case have nothing to do with evidence at all.

In a
piece recently published in The Stone, a part of the
Web site of the New York Times, Gary Gutting poses the
question whether we are in a position to deny the existence of the
gods of ancient Greece. If, he says, we cannot “eliminate the very
real possibility” that for the ancient Greeks “divinity was
. . . a widely and deeply experienced fact of life”—and he
goes on to assert that we cannot—then “shouldn’t we hold a merely
agnostic position on Zeus and the other Greek gods, taking seriously
the possibility that they existed but holding that we have good
reason neither to assert nor deny their existence?” After
considering and rebutting several arguments for a negative answer to
this question, he opts for an affirmative one: a denial of the
existence of Zeus, he says, is “ungrounded,” and, although “there is
no current evidence of his present existence,” we have no reason “to
assume that there was no good evidence for his existence available
to the ancient Greeks.”

Gutting recommends agnosticism, and even what one might call adoxism
(absence of belief one way or the other), on two distinct questions:
(1) whether Zeus and the other gods of ancient Greece existed and
(2) whether the ancient Greeks had good evidence of their existence.
He holds that we lack sufficient evidence for either an affirmative
or a negative answer to the second question, and that for that
reason we lack sufficient evidence for either an affirmative or a
negative answer to the first. In other words, we are, according to Gutting, in no
position to answer the question
of whether the ancient Greeks had good evidence of the existence of
their gods, and in consequence we
are in no position to affirm or deny that the Greek gods existed.
(Gutting has further considerations on the question whether we are
in a position to affirm or deny that Zeus and company do
(now, still) exist, but they seem to me secondary and I prefer to leave them aside for the sake
of simplicity.)

Clearly, then, the weight of Gutting’s position falls on his claim
that, for all we know, the ancient Greeks may have had good evidence
of the existence of their gods. His argument for this claim is contained in a paragraph that begins thus:

Why did belief in the gods persist in spite of critical
challenges? What evidence seemed decisive to the ancient Greeks?
Robert Parker, in his recent authoritative survey, “On
Greek Religion,” emphasizes the role of what the Greeks saw
as experiences of divine actions in their lives. “The
greatest evidence for the existence of gods is that piety works
. . . the converse is that impiety leads to disaster,”
with by far the most emphasis given to the perils of ignoring the
gods.

One might wonder whether Parker, in the quotation within this
quotation, is making an assertion of his own about evidence or is
merely reporting on what the ancient Greeks took for evidence. Is he
saying that, in ancient Greece, piety toward the gods produced good
effects and impiety or disregard of the gods bad effects? Or is he
saying merely that the Greeks experienced the world as if it worked
in this way? The first, stronger claim surely goes beyond anything that
can be justified by historical evidence. Presumably Parker is making
only the second, weaker claim—and so, presumably, is Gutting. No
doubt, ancient Greeks, like other theistic believers, took note of
instances in which pious conduct was followed by good fortune or the
lack or the opposite of it by ill fortune, and tended to
disregard counterinstances. No doubt, like other
theistic believers, they were very resourceful in finding
correlations where none was obvious, and in positing unobserved acts
of piety or impiety to make sense of occurrences of good or ill
fortune that seemed to lack the required antecedent. But
these are simply the common tricks of confirmation bias,
not instances of following evidence in any serious sense.

So far, if this is the kind of “evidence” of the existence of the
gods that “seemed decisive to the ancient Greeks,” it does not
support Gutting’s recommended agnosticism at all. The cited observations of Parker concern how the theistic beliefs of the ancient Greeks
influenced their perception of the workings of the world. They do
not provide the least reason to believe that the Greeks actually had
anything that merits the description “evidence of the existence of
gods,” much less “good evidence” thereof. If what the Greeks thought of as evidence was just
their perception of correlations between one’s comportment toward
the gods and one’s fortunes, then agnosticism about whether they had
such evidence is not warranted at all: rather, we have good reason
to conclude that they had no such evidence.

However, Gutting offers further observations, still drawing on Parker’s work:

There were also rituals, associated with the many cults
of specific gods, that for some worshippers “created a sense of
contact with the divine. One knows that the gods exist because one
feels their presence during the drama of the mysteries or the
elation of the choral dance.” More broadly, there were
“epiphanies” that could “indicate not merely a visible or audible
epiphany (whether in the light of day or through a dream
. . .) but also any clear expression of a god’s favor
such as weather conditions hampering an enemy, a miraculous
escape, or a cure; it may also be used of the continuing
disposition of a god or goddess to offer manifest assistance.”

I take it that in the passages quoted within the quotation Parker
is, once again, adopting a kind of disguised indirect speech. That
“one knows” that the gods exist because “one feels” their presence
in the course of ritual observances is what “one” would say if “one”
were an ancient Greek. Of course, we moderns, speaking of and for
ourselves, will say no such things, and not only because we do not
participate in ancient Greek religious rituals or have seeming
epiphanies of their gods. Setting aside all ironic,
disguised, or “inverted comma” modes of expression, surely what we
will say of the ancient Greeks’ experience of their rituals
and their epiphanies is not that they (really, literally) felt the
presence of their gods but only that they experienced these
activities as if the gods were present in them, or that they
took them to be experiences of divine presences.

What, then, if anything, in these facts can constitute, or
even be a candidate for constituting, evidence of the
existence of the Greek gods? Some, perhaps most or even all Greeks, it seems, had certain
experiences, which they attributed to the influence of their gods.
Is the mere fact that they attributed these experiences to divine
influence supposed to be evidence that this attribution was correct?
Surely such a suggestion would rob the term “evidence” of all meaning:
it would amount to making a belief count as “evidence” for itself.

Perhaps what Gutting has in mind is this: The ancient Greeks had certain
experiences which they described in terms of the presence and the
influence of their gods. If their gods really existed, then those
experiences were evidence of the existence of their gods; if their gods
did not exist, then those experiences were not evidence of the existence
of their gods. Although we moderns do not believe that their gods existed, we do not know
that they did not exist. Therefore, we do not know that the Greeks had
no evidence of the existence of their gods. For all we know, they may
have had such evidence.

But that won’t do: it reverses the order of argumentation that Gutting
sets out. Gutting argues first that we don’t know that the Greeks had no
evidence of the existence of their gods, and then in consequence that
we don’t know that their gods did not exist.

Rather than try out further interpretations I will simply confess at
this point that, if Gutting has a coherent position in this matter, I
have been unable to find it. In fact I believe that he has made a coherent
position impossible for himself by introducing the
term
“evidence” where it does not belong. The point in whose service
Gutting quotes Parker, namely that for the Greeks “divinity was
. . . a widely and deeply experienced fact of life,” has nothing to
do with evidence at all. I can gather from Parker’s statements that if I
were an ancient Greek, I would experience religious observances as
involving the presence or the influence of Zeus and company. That does
not mean that I would regard my experiences as having a sort of
divine-presence quality to them and then, from the fact that I had
experiences of this character, draw the conclusion that I had genuine
experiences of divine presence. Such a manner of thinking would be a
bizarre case of self-dissociation. In any case, it is certainly not what
Parker is describing in the passages that Gutting quotes. If the Greeks
commonly had what they interpreted as experiences of the presence and
the actions of their gods then it would have been idle and pointless for
them in addition to cite those experiences as evidence that their gods
existed.

“Very well,” one might reply in defense of Gutting: “the Greeks
themselves did not regard their religious experiences as evidence of the
existence of their gods, but they could have done so. They could
have cited the fact that they had certain experiences as evidence that
their gods existed.” Could they indeed? How could
they have identified and described the pertinent experiences? If they
had done so in terms of the presence of their gods, then they would be
building into their statements of the so-called “evidence” the very
claim for which those statements are supposed to constitute evidence, namely that their gods exist. To
avoid doing that, they would have had to describe their experiences in
terms that were completely neutral with regard to the existence of their
gods. But how could they have gone about doing that? Would they even
have been capable of doing that? As I understand what Parker is telling
us, it is in the very nature of the experiences that the Greeks had of their religious observances that, to those who had
them, they seemed to be experiences of the presence of gods. So it is
doubtful that those who had such experiences could ever describe them in
non-theistic terms. It is therefore doubtful that the ancient Greeks
could ever have cited such experiences as evidence of the existence of
their gods. Their belief in their gods was not derived from evidence,
and Gutting provides no reason to believe that it ever was or even could
have been supported by any evidence.

So what comes of Gutting’s argument for agnosticism about the existence
of the gods of the ancient Greeks? Its main premise, that we are in no
position to say whether the Greeks had good evidence of the existence of
their gods, is false: we have in fact good reason to conclude that they
had no such evidence. There may be grounds for agnosticism about
the existence of the Greek gods, but agnosticism about the existence, in
ancient times, of evidence for the existence of those gods is not a support for it.

REFERENCES

Gary Gutting, “Did
Zeus Exist?”, The New York Times on line, July 31,
2013.