'Too unclear to answer' is an unclear answer, and it may be that all the questions here are "too unclear to answer." But 'a priori' is a technical term, and it is used in different ways by philosophers. So for that reason, I single out this particular question as "too unclear to answer." I would grant that introspective belief can be justified. Yet I agree with Quine that anything is revisable, and that for many purposes, there is no interesting distinction between dictionary vs. encyclopedic knowledge.

Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?

Accept an intermediate view

Insofar as abstracta exist at all, they are imaginary objects which are imagined as mind-independent objects that necessarily exist. (This parallels the way that Pegasus is imagined as a mind-independent horse that possibly exists). But qua imaginings, abstract objects aren't actually mind-independent, nor do they necessarily exist. (The parallel is that Pegasus is not actually mind-independent and, if Kripke is right, cannot possibly exist).

Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?

The question is too unclear to answer

I'd need clarification on the objective/subjective distinction. On one construal, the categories are not exclusive: "Subjective facts," if they exist at all, objectively exist as facts about subjectivity.

Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?

Accept an intermediate view

On my read, Quine only rejects an *absolute* distinction between necessity vs. non-necessity. In _Word and Object_, "Intensions Revisited," and _Pursuit of Truth_ he suggests that it make sense to speak of what is "necessarily" true, relative to the assumptions of an inquiry. I agree. An analogous point holds re: analyticity. (Though of course, there is a difference between each of analyticity, necessity, and the apriori.)

Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?

Accept an intermediate view

I accept that there are different, legitimate senses of the term 'justification' and its cognates.

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?

Accept an intermediate view

I defer to the skeptic in contexts where skeptical hypotheses are taken seriously, but talk in the manner of a non-skeptical realist in other contexts. Regarding the interpretation of the realist talk, I'm ultimately a quietist.

Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?

Accept more than one

(Humean) compatibalism is correct as far as it goes, but it concerns 'free will' in a different sense than hard determinism. The upshot is that, oddly, hard determinism and (Humean) compatibilism are compatible. (Of course, I'm not a determinist, re: the quantum level. But at the macro level, the sciences assume something like determinism by default.)

God: theism or atheism?

Skip

Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?

The question is too unclear to answer

Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?

Accept an intermediate view

Some uses of 'know' have a context-sensitive parameter; other uses do not. This is somewhat akin to 'them' being a pronoun on some occasions of use, and the name of a horror movie on other occasions.

Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?

Agnostic/undecided

I would really like to be a Humean, and Quine in "Necessary Truth" is the sort of Humean I would be. But I'm more agnostic. And as with all ontological questions, I ultimately wind up in quietism.

Logic: classical or non-classical?

Accept an intermediate view

Liar-sentences in nat'l language show that such languages are non-classical. But in many contexts, classical logic is justifiably assumed regardless.

Mental content: internalism or externalism?

Accept: externalism

Externalism is trivial if "content" is a function from environments to extensions. However, 'content' is a term of art, and it can be used to name things other than intensions. Even so, the best regimented conceptions of "content," I think, are all anti-individualistic.

Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?

Accept an intermediate view

An act/state is good to the degree that it satisfies peoples' (weighted) personal preferences (whether or not these preferences or their weights are known). However, I agree that it is sometimes best not to think in such calculating terms.

Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?

Accept an intermediate view

Sometimes, we have no choice but to engage the "manifest image" (and there, philosophy is not necessarily continuous with science). But we should draw from the "scientific image" as much as possible.

Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?

The question is too unclear to answer

Sometimes I talk like an eliminativist (if only because my quantifier is contextually restricted.) Other times I do not. In the latter cases, I occasionally deny physicalism since philosophers sometimes have a rather restrictive definition of 'physical'. On other uses of 'physical', I talk as a physicalist, yet am ultimately a quietist on how to interpret this talk.

Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?

The question is too unclear to answer

'Cognitivism' can mean different things in this literature, so I'd first want to ask for clarification.

Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?

Agnostic/undecided

Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?

The question is too unclear to answer

Most descriptions of the problem are cagey on what exactly we are assuming about the predictor. Basically, if we can reasonably believe there is a law-like explanation of her reliability (which need not invoke backwards causation), then one box. Otherwise, two boxes.

Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?

Accept: consequentialism

For philosophical purposes, I'm pretty much a consequentialist, though sometimes the best way to maximize valuable consequences is not to think like a consequentialist. Also, n.b., one can accept consequentialism, without being a hedonist about "valuable consequences." (Instead, one might take a weighted count of the virtues that an act exemplifies.)

For a range of important cases, talk of "the self" is most feasibly regimented as talk of a fictitious object. Even so, talk about fictions is easiest to regiment as talk about things that exist (albeit things that exist as mind-dependent objects). But as usual, I end up in quietism after a certain point.

Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?

Reject all

There should be an option for responding "too hard to answer"

Proper names: Fregean or Millian?

Accept: Fregean

But to be clear, one can accept Fregean senses without embracing his Platonism. One also need not say that terms refer to their senses in indirect discourse. Also, Fregean senses need not be "narrow contents," if senses are identified as Carnapian intensions rather than in descriptivist terms. But one could still invoke senses to explain Frege's puzzle about informative identity statements.

Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?

Accept an intermediate view

I talk as a realist, though I'm a quietist on how ultimately to interpret this talk. I take quietism about unobservables to be different from scientific anti-realism, since a quietist may *believe* the first-order scientific thesis "electrons exist." Yet s/he refrains from metaphysical claims about what the truthmaker is for this belief. [Why? (Anti/)Realism is either based in science or not. If so, it begs the question (/is incoherent). If not, it is unscientific.]

Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?

Accept: death

There may be contexts where we'd say the person survives, but for most purposes, this is misleading.

Time: A-theory or B-theory?

Accept: B-theory

I defer to physicists on this one.

Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?

Accept: switch

Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?

Accept another alternative

I talk like a correspondence theorist though I'm ultimately a quietist

Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?

The question is too unclear to answer

Both "conceivable" and "metaphysically possible" are not sufficiently clear to be confident on the matter.