Democracy Is Overrated

American
policymakers love to see purple thumbs in the developing world, especially
in countries in which the United States has undertaken “nation-building”
projects (read: invasions and occupations). The recent Afghan
parliamentary elections are a case in point. Yet elections in
the developing world are not usually what they are cracked up to be
and can be downright destabilizing.

Many
despots in the developing world have realized that the United States
is obsessed with exporting democracy to the world (at least on a theoretical
basis until U.S. government interests require the overthrow of democratically
elected leaders in favor of more pliant puppets – such as in Iran, Guatemala,
the Dominican Republic, and Chile). So modern-day autocrats are
sophisticated enough to conduct slanted plebiscites that will allow
them to show the international media and the U.S. government that they
have been “elected.” And as long as such authoritarian regimes’
policies don’t deviate too much from what the United States wants – as
they have in Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – the
“elected” dictators will be left alone.

President
Hamid Karzai would have gotten away with this too in Afghanistan during
last year’s presidential election, if there hadn’t been so much blatant
fraud. Had Karzai chosen a more sophisticated and subtle way to
steal the election, the United States could have looked the other way
while its client regime misbehaved. But to have Karzai’s main
opponent drop out of the race before the final round because he believed
the final vote would be rigged only amplified reports of massive fraud.
This election merely made Karzai’s government more illegitimate for
many Afghans, increased instability, and worked to the Taliban insurgents’
advantage.

A
year later, the same outcome will likely arise from the Afghan election
for members of parliament. The recent plebiscite also has
been victimized by fraud, intimidation, and violence. Again,
the legitimacy of those elected will be undermined and the Taliban will
probably gain from the debacle.

In
Iraq, elections usually reinforce ethno-sectarian fissures in the country
and can last six months or more. In 2005, ethno-sectarian voting
in the last parliamentary election destabilized the country and led
to a spike in violence. After the election, it took six months
for a backroom deal to be cut, bringing the current prime minister,
Nouri al-Maliki, to power. After an inconclusive election earlier
this year, the electoral stalemate has lasted even longer than the marathon
deadlock of 2005. Almost no one outside Maliki’s Shi’ite coalition
wants him to return to power. His top challenger, Ayad Allawi – who
is a former CIA asset, is liked by the Sunni Arabs, and whose coalition
won two more seats than Maliki’s – has had no more luck forming a
government.

This
year’s election flipped Iraqi public opinion on whether the country
was headed in the right or wrong direction. In December 2009,
according to a poll taken by the International Republican Institute
of the National Endowment for Democracy and reported in the New York
Times, 51 percent of Iraqis thought the country was headed in the
right direction. Another poll by the same organization taken six
months later, in June 2010, reflected plummeting public confidence and
showed that 59 percent of Iraqis believed the country was headed on
the wrong path. The electoral stalemate and continuing violence
undoubtedly had much to do with this plunging level of public confidence.

As
the American military presence is reduced, many Iraqis feel their politicians
are fiddling while Rome – well, Baghdad – burns. Of course, even
when the country has a non-caretaker prime minister and a sitting parliament
meeting for real (instead of as a charade), important issues that should
be addressed – for example, the need for a law governing oil, the potentially
explosive status of the city Kirkuk, and reintegrating Sunnis into the
Iraqi government and armed forces – are stalemated by all-encompassing
ethno-sectarian fissures in the society. Thus, a sense of impending
disaster pervades the country – not an irrational feeling on the part
of Iraqis.

And
U.S. policy is probably making things worse. The United States
has been pushing for Maliki and Allawi to form a grand governing coalition,
so disaffected losers won’t turn to violence. Yet party leaders,
hoping for such a coalition, keep blocking a real session of parliament
because they fear its members will vote for someone else. Besides,
one could also ask, why have elections in a democracy if everyone wins?

Of
course, even if genuine democracy – that is, supremacy of the majority
will – were instituted in the developing world (an arduous task), creating
liberal democracy is even harder. Avoiding tyranny of the majority
by instilling respect for minority and human rights – that is, liberty – is
even more important than adopting democracy. We are nowhere close
to this state of political nirvana in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in many
other developing nations and should stop trying to export such fantasies
at gunpoint.