We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Specification discloses sufficient structure to fulfill the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (sixth paragraph). “It is axiomatic that claims must ‘particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.’” Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (second paragraph)). The sixth paragraph of section 112 allows “a claim [to] state the function of the element or step, and the ‘means’ covers the ‘structure, material, or acts' set forth in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The trade-off for allowing such claiming is that “the specification must contain sufficient descriptive text by which a person of skill in the field of the invention would ‘know and understand what structure corresponds to the means limitation.’” Id. at 1383–84 (quoting Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

typhoon touch HARMON 5: 18, 19; 6: 12; MV6: 253, 283

finisar HARMON 3: 45
...The use of a computer is inherent in the disclosure, because a person of ordinary skill in the art would realize that it is necessary to employ a computer to run the disclosed computer program—software is useless without hardware. See Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The very essence of inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that a reference unavoidably teaches the property in question”).