Summary:
Claimant moves for reconsideration of the Court's decision denying her
request for medical benefits.

Held: The
request is denied. The Court's original decision addressed her contentions
and stands.

Topics:

Procedure: Post-Trial
Proceedings: Motion for Reconsideration. It is improper for
a party to reargue his or her case through a motion for reconsideration.
Where the arguments have previously been raised, the proper remedy is
an appeal, not a motion to reconsider.

Statutes and Statutory
Interpretation: Plain Meaning. Legislative intent is in the
first instance gleaned from the words of the statute; if those words
are plain and clear, the Court must apply the statute as written.

Statutes and Statutory
Interpretation: Inserting or Removing Terms. Rules of statutory
construction prohibit a court from inserting entitlements, restrictions,
or other matters which are not in the statute. §1- 2-101, MCA.

Statutes and Statutory
Interpretation: General versus Specific. A general policy statement
of a statute must give way to the more specific provisions of the statute.

Procedure: Issues.
Issues cannot be raised for the first time in a pretrial motion for
reconsideration.

Procedure: Post-Trial
Proceedings: Motion for Reconsideration. Issues cannot be raised
for the first time in a pretrial motion for reconsideration.

¶1 Claimant moves for reconsideration
of this Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, 2001
MTWCC 52.

¶2 Initially, claimant takes
issue with the Court's construction of the settlement agreement. Reargument
of her position is improper. She had full opportunity to argue the position
before the Court issued its decision and the decision addressed her contentions.
While she may disagree with the Court's resolution of the matter, her
remedy is an appeal, not a motion for reconsideration.

¶3 Second, she argues that
the settlement agreement contained no provision conditioning payment of
medical benefits upon claimant being employed and that the insurer therefore
waived any objection to payment based upon claimant not being employed.
The argument is without merit. The agreement said nothing pro or con about
employment. It merely preserved claimant's right to medical benefits,
and that right is tied to her compliance with the statutes governing medical
benefits. By entering into the agreement, the insurer did not waive statutory
provisions governing payment of future medical benefits.

¶4 Third, she takes issue with
the Court's estoppel findings. She argues that she "probably could never
prove, after the fact, that she could have gotten a higher impairment
award" and contends that had she known that her construction was erroneous,
she would not have entered into the agreement and might have been able
to negotiate a higher impairment rating. (Brief in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration at 4.) Her contention is flawed. If indeed she was entitled
to a greater impairment award, she could have presented evidence of the
fact and had the Court determine her entitlement. If her position was
sound, then she might have proved detriment. If she could not prove that
she was entitled to a higher impairment award then detriment based on
negotiating possibilities is purely speculative; she did not carry her
burden of proof as to the element.

¶5 Fourth, she argues with
the Court's statutory interpretation, asserting that the Court's "literal
interpretation is that it fails to look to the legislative intent" and
the stated public policy concerning workers' compensation benefits, §
39-71-105, MCA. (Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at 6.)
There are multiple problems with adopting her arguments, however much
I would like to.

¶6 Legislative intent is in
the first instance gleaned from the words of the statute; if those words
are plain and clear, the Court must apply the statute as written. "When
interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain meaning of its words.
When the statute is plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute
speaks for itself and there is no need to resort to extrinsic means of
interpretation." Marriage of Christian, 1999 MT 189, ¶ 12,
295 Mont. 352, 983 P.2d 966. In a sense, the rule regarding intention
of the legislature is double talk. Intent in the ordinary sense is a subjective
matter, i.e., what was in the mind of the person or body at the time of
the act taken. But the plain meaning is an objective one and is conclusive
when the statute is unambiguous.

¶7 Moreover, rules of construction
prohibit a court from inserting entitlements, restrictions, or other matters
which are not in the statute. Section 1-2-101, MCA, provides, "In the
construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain
and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to
insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted." As I
read the decisions of the Montana Supreme Court of recent years, the Court
has strictly adhered to this rule and the plain meaning rule.

¶8 Moreover, a general policy
statement such as contained in section 39-71-105, MCA, must give way to
a specific statute. "[W]hen two statutes deal with a subject, one in general
and comprehensive terms and the other in minute and more definite terms,
the more definite statute will prevail to the extent of any opposition
between them." Smith v. State, Driver's Imp. Bureau, 1998 MT
94, ¶ 15, 288 Mont. 383, 958 P.2d 677 (1998).

¶9 Fifth, and finally, claimant
asserts that the decision in this matter deprives her of her constitutional
rights. The argument is belated. It was never raised in the pleadings,
Pretrial Order, or prior arguments.