Lessons of 'Civilizing Missions' Are Mostly Unlearned

By A. G. HOPKINS

Published: March 23, 2003

ACCORDING to the latest official reports, the United States envisages a short, ''necessary occupation'' in Iraq, lasting months and intends to have ''the structure of a post-Saddam society in place within a year.'' If this occurs, the world will witness an exercise in social engineering on a scale of intensity never before contemplated, still less achieved.

Unfortunately, history demonstrates that there is room for skepticism. In the 19th century, when Europe's great modern empires were assembled, Britain and France formulated ''civilizing missions'' that were equally wide ranging and optimistic. Having invaded occupied and annexed, they too had a peace to win.

Everything we know about the ''civilizing mission'' of the 19th century reveals how difficult it was to convert others to different ways of thinking, and how consistently the difficulties were underestimated.

After defeating Napoleon in 1815, Britain emerged as the strongest power of the day, and proceeded to launch the world's first comprehensive development plan. The liberal ideals of free trade and constitutional government would transform the world. The British expected that, by showing the light, others in foreign lands would surely follow the way. Yet establishing a liberal, progressive order, even among congenial partners in areas of European settlement -- like Canada, Australia and New Zealand -- was an arduous task that took generations.

Elsewhere, in the non-Western world, optimism that the moral force of Victorian values would easily convert others, if not to Christianity then to free trade and constitutional government, faded as the century advanced.

When disillusion set in, the recipients were blamed, but never the plan. States that failed to conform were cordoned off or incorporated according to estimates of value and cost. The Ottoman Empire, which sprawled across the greater part of the Middle East, was one example of disappointed expectations. The Ottomans were exposed to the benefits of free trade and offered a program of what today would be called structural adjustment.

But the chance was missed. The empire fell into debt and became the ''sick man of Europe.'' It was propped up by the great powers, and staggered on until World War I brought its demise. The alternative was thought to be anarchy, which would have damaged foreign interests in the region.

Across the globe, brief occupations had the habit of becoming long-term commitments. Early in the 19th century, Egypt had pushed through a program of modernization that promoted export development and secured greater political autonomy from its Ottoman overlords. But the white hope of European improvers became a white elephant in 1876, when Egypt was unable to service its foreign debt.

Unlike the rest of the Ottoman empire, however, Egypt was judged to have potential that could be realized at little cost. In 1882 the British moved in for what was to be a short stay. They claimed to be reluctant to act, but had been compelled by irresponsible elements in Egypt that threatened the onward march of civilization.

Britain's proclaimed motives were phrased in high-minded generalities. Prime Minister William Gladstone once said this was a ''just war, a holy war.'' Regime change was quick and easy. But the brief occupation lasted three-quarters of a century, and Britain's initially limited aims reached the point where the security of Egypt required annexation of the Sudan too.

Even when installed, colonial rulers too often lacked legitimacy. They could command acquiescence but not consent. The gratitude they expected for bringing the benefits of the West to the Rest was either not forthcoming or was short-lived. So they devised alternative means of control.

One strategy, direct rule, had a strong military component; another, indirect rule, relied on local collaborators. Direct rule, which was more likely to be oppressive, usually created a focus for resistance, and even terrorism. It was also costly.

Indirect rule was less visible and far cheaper, but it obliged the colonial authorities to meddle in local society and to juggle endlessly with landlords, warriors, bureaucrats, merchants and peasants.

After a full century of endeavor, Britain's development plan was no more than a qualified success, even when viewed in a good light. And by the middle of the 20th century, when the idea of empire was fading, it was apparent that the coercion and the juggling had ignited the forces of opposition that fed into colonial nationalism.

It does not follow that the difficulties experienced by Britain's attempt to manage the world will apply to the United States. Time and circumstance are different. The most striking difference is the unprecedented military might of the world's first hyperpower. It might be concluded that the United States possesses a level of technology and know-how that will enable it to overcome the obstacles that hampered the civilizing missions of the European empires.

But the problem can be looked at from a different angle. Recent experience does not suggest that the United States has developed a talent for bringing freedom and democracy to subject peoples. Reconstruction in Afghanistan still has a long way to go, and has run into familiar difficulties.

The same may be true of Iraq. Whatever the initial reception, it is inevitable that foreign rule will be resented, especially a postcolonial world. Proclamations of democracy and freedom may satisfy the public at home but will be meaningless unless made to work in Iraq.

How should this done? Direct rule, as the British found, can be costly. Moreover, people cannot be forced into freedom: they have to grow into it. Opting for indirect rule will drag the United States into the complexities of local politics and will compromise the principles of reconstruction.

When the British occupied Iraq in 1918 and then ruled it under a mandate from the League of Nations, they quickly realized that they needed to cooperate with the Sunni minority, which had filled the senior ranks of the military and civil service. The British merely took over from the Ottomans; the United States may find itself reinventing Britain's formula for indirect rule.

It is also important to consider the interests as well as the principles of the ruling power. Large contracts for reconstruction have reportedly already been issued to American companies. It is inconceivable that these companies will invest heavily in Iraq without adequate political security. That must come either from direct rule by Washington, which would be unpopular, or from a compliant government.

Can a compliant government also be a democratic one? If democracy means, minimally, one person one vote, then power is likely to shift away from the Sunni minority and toward the Shiites and the Kurds. The problem here is that the Shiites have close affiliations with Iran, which is on the axis of evil, and that the Kurds have their own agenda -- and oil resources.

With its occupation of Iraq, the United States faces some longstanding imperial problems. Since it has yet to announce any novel solutions, is it possible that some of the old imperial remedies will be applied?