(CNSNews.com) – A draft regulation by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would lift a 30-year-ban on Libyan nationals coming to the United States to work or train in “aviation maintenance, flight operations, or nuclear-related fields.”

In a statement on his congressional website, Rep. Chaffetz said that the draft final regulation could take effect without prior notice and comment. The congressmen say the prohibition was put in place in the 1980s after the wave of terrorist incidents involving Libyans.

"The administration justifies lifting this ban by claiming that the United States’ relationship with Libya has been ‘normalized,’” the statement said.

But the congressmen also say, "the terror threat continues and numerous news reports document recent terror-related stories coming from Libya. And just over a year ago the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi was attacked, which resulted in the death of four Americans, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens."

benghazi

The U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya on fire in the early morning of Sept. 12, 2012. (AP)

A House Judiciary Committee source said the document is an “internal draft regulation” and is not final yet, and was obtained by Reps. Chaffetz and Goodlatte. It is not known yet when DHS, formerly headed by Secretary Janet Napolitano -- and now awaiting a new leader -- will officially issue the regulation.

The actual rule says the “United States and the Government of Libya have normalized their relationship and most of the restrictions and sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations toward Libya have been lifted. Therefore, DHS, after consultation with the Department of State and the Department of Defense, is rescinding the restrictions that deny nonimmigrant status and benefits to a specific group of Libyan nationals.”

Libyan nationals who want to come to America to study aviation or nuclear science would have to undergo the “Visas Mantis” security clearance, reads the regulation, and be subject to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security-threat assessments.

Chaffetz: ‘If President Obama Wants Gun Control He Should Start With the United States Park Police’

Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah). (AP)

Goodlatte, in a statement on Chaffetz’s website, said, “Just over a year ago, four Americans were killed in the pre-planned terrorist attacks on the American Consulate in Benghazi. We still haven’t gotten to the bottom of the Benghazi terrorist attacks and continue to face additional terrorist threats from Libya, yet the Obama Administration is preparing to lift a longstanding ban that protects Americans and our interests.”

Chaffetz said, “It is unbelievable that this administration would again put Americans in harm’s way by lifting a decades old security ban on a country that has become a hotbed of terrorist activity. We must work with the Libyans to build mutual trust that ensures safety and prosperity for both countries to enjoy."

Judicial Watch, a government watchdog organization based in Washington, D.C., commented, “It’s incomprehensible that the U.S. government is even considering reversing the longstanding policy banning Libyans from working or training in areas so crucial to national security.”

Inquiries by telephone and e-mail from CNSNews.com to DHS for comment were not answered before this story was published.

WASHINGTON — Even as the international effort to destroy Syria’s vast chemical weapons stockpile lags behind schedule, a similar American-backed campaign carried out under a cloak of secrecy ended successfully last week in another strife-torn country, Libya.

The United States and Libya in the past three months have discreetly destroyed what both sides say were the last remnants of Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi’s lethal arsenal of chemical arms. They used a transportable oven technology to destroy hundreds of bombs and artillery rounds filled with deadly mustard agent, which American officials had feared could fall into the hands of terrorists. The effort also helped inspire the use of the technology in the much bigger disposal plan in Syria.Related Coverage

Since November, Libyan contractors trained in Germany and Sweden have worked in bulky hazmat suits at a tightly guarded site in a remote corner of the Libyan desert, 400 miles southeast of Tripoli, racing to destroy the weapons in a region where extremists linked to Al Qaeda are gaining greater influence. The last artillery shell was destroyed on Jan. 26, officials said.

As Libya’s weak central government grapples with turmoil and unrest, and as kidnappings and assassinations of military and police officers accelerate in the country’s east, American and international weapons specialists hailed the destruction of the Libyan stockpile as a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy security environment.

“It’s a big breakthrough,” said Paul F. Walker, an arms control expert with the environmental group Green Cross International who has helped in efforts to demilitarize the American and Russian chemical weapons stockpiles since the 1990s. “Even though Libya’s chemical stockpile was relatively small, the effort to destroy it was very difficult because of weather, geography and because it’s a dangerous area with warring tribes, increasing the risks of theft and diversion,” he said.

Libya’s last two tons of chemical weapons were dwarfed by the 1,300 tons that Syria has agreed to destroy. But American and international arms experts say the need for easily transportable and efficient technology to wipe out the Libyan arms became a model for the Syria program now underway.

For Libya’s fragile transitional government, such collaboration with the West on security matters is a delicate issue. It gives the country’s leaders desperately needed assistance to defuse internal threats, but also risks accusations of compromising national sovereignty.

Asked about the American efforts to destroy the chemical weapons, Libyan security officials in Tripoli initially issued sweeping denials. One later briefly acknowledged the operation on the condition of anonymity, and then officials stopped returning phone calls.

On Sunday, the White House said that it would ensure that the Syrian government complied with an accord to give up its chemical arsenal despite missed deadlines and delays in carrying out the deal.

The White House chief of staff, Denis McDonough, said on the CBS News program “Face the Nation” that the deal was “not falling apart, but we would like to see it proceed much more quickly than it is.”

The disposal of the last of Libya’s chemical weapons closes a chapter that Colonel Qaddafi began in early 2004, when his government turned over a vast cache of nuclear technology and chemical stockpiles to the United States, Britain and international nuclear inspectors.

At that time, Libya declared for destruction 24.7 metric tons of sulfur mustard, a syrupy liquid that when loaded into bombs or artillery shells and exploded creates a toxic mist that penetrates clothing, burns and blisters exposed skin, and can kill with large doses or if left untreated. The chemical was used extensively in World War I.

Libya had destroyed about half of these stocks when civil war broke out in 2011. Western spy agencies closely monitored the destruction site in the Libyan desert to ensure the stockpiles were not pilfered by insurgents.

When the new government took control in Tripoli that fall, it signaled its intent to finish the job. Libyan officials also surprised Western inspectors by announcing the discovery in November 2011 and February 2012 of two hidden caches of mustard, or nearly two tons, that had not been declared by Colonel Qaddafi’s government. That brought the total declared amount of chemical to 26.3 tons.

Unlike the majority of Libya’s mustard agents, which were stored in large, bulky containers, the new caches were already armed and loaded into 517 artillery shells, 45 plastic sleeves for rocket launchings and eight 500-pound bombs.

The new stockpiles immediately posed huge challenges for the fledgling Libyan government, which had no ability to destroy the combat-ready chemical weapons, as well as for its American and European allies called upon to help.

The disposal site is deep in the desert, in an area where Islamist militants hostile to the West wield growing influence. It also sits on the front line of the struggle between Libya’s eastern and western provinces over political power and oil revenue. A defining issue in post-Qaddafi politics, the regional rivalry has often spilled out into armed blockades of the national highways and crucial oil-export terminals as well.

Using $45 million from the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which has helped rid the former Soviet Union of thousands of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon and its Defense Threat Reduction Agency tapped the Parsons Corporation, a construction firm based in Pasadena, Calif., to work with Libya to oversee the rebuilding and safeguarding of the Libyan disposal site, which had been ransacked during the civil war.

Remarkably, the mustard agents stored in bulk containers at the site were untouched and their inspection seals unbroken, American and international officials said. These have all been destroyed, too.

Canada donated $6 million to help restore water, sewage service and electricity to the site, and to build living quarters for Western and Libyan contractors. Germany agreed to fly international inspectors to the site.

The project has relied on a custom-built device from Dynasafe, a Swedish company, to destroy the weapons. It is essentially a giant, high-tech oven called a static-detonation chamber. The munitions were fed through an automated loading system into a gas-tight chamber, where the toxic materials were vaporized at temperatures between 750 and 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Gases created in the process were scrubbed by special filters.

“The destruction of these munitions was a major undertaking in arduous, technically challenging circumstances,” Ahmet Uzumcu, the director general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, whose inspectors supervised the destruction of the chemical weapons, said in a written statement.

Although American officials acknowledge that Libya is awash with conventional arms, they expressed confidence that the vast Libyan desert holds no other secret caches of unconventional arms for jihadis to exploit.

Andrew C. Weber, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, said, “This is the culmination of a major international effort to eliminate weapons of mass destruction from Libya and to ensure that they never fall into the hands of terrorists.”

Maj. Gen. Khalifa Haftar, a Gadhafi-era military commander who defected from the regime and attempted to aid the Libyan rebels during the 2011 uprisings, said Feb. 14 that Libya's beleaguered transitional political body should cede power because its mandate to rule ended Feb. 7. In his announcement on a Saudi-backed television channel, he ordered the General National Congress to step down in favor of fresh elections and claimed that Libyan army troops were in the streets of the capital. This statement was later proved false as local news stations went to the Congress and other government buildings in Tripoli and found lawmakers, including the prime minister and the president, working as usual.

Though Prime Minister Ali Zeidan referred to the episode as "laughable," this scenario underscores the often outwardly precarious situation facing Libya's political transition and its domestic stability now more than two years since the fall of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. Libya is indeed plagued by a stalled political transition process and a proliferation of armed groups vying to influence the formation of an eventual permanent government. But unlike in Egypt or Algeria -- other countries in the region with a tradition of a strong military influence in domestic politics -- Libya's fledgling military lacks both the physical presence and the institutional legitimacy to either meaningfully challenge the government or to successfully stabilize the anemic authority of the central government by ruling in its stead.

Analysis

Though Haftar's call for a coup did not prove to be an immediate threat to the current Libyan government, the General National Congress does face an uphill battle for successfully holding constituent assembly elections and pushing the country toward a more permanent form of governance under the framework of a new constitution. The transitional process since the fall of Gadhafi has been beset with a number of difficulties: a proliferation of armed groups and militias that claim oversight over the government, weak control of national borders and Libya's vast desert territories and persistent concerns over the numbers of militants entering the country. These problems have led to fluctuating oil production and ongoing challenges to the central government's attempts to implement policies and hold municipal and national elections that would replace the myriad forms of local governance, tribal authorities and rising militia strongmen with democratic institutions.

In Egypt, the military grew into the most powerful state institution, imposing a top-down order to Egyptian governance. It become the ultimate arbiter of political disputes and the guarantor of the state's domestic and international obligations. With the 80 million people living in Egypt, Cairo faces the daunting task of governing the Middle East's largest population, the vast majority of whom are densely settled along the banks of the Nile River. In this situation, the Egyptian military has been well suited to rule, with its organizational capabilities, available manpower and relative popularity among the Egyptian people.Libya's Population Density and RegionsClick to Enlarge

Gadhafi's Libya is markedly different. Its population is the smallest of the North African states at approximately 6.5 million. Spread primarily along the coast or in various smaller pockets within the Libyan desert, there is no unifying geographic feature to define Libyan society such as Egypt's Nile or the Atlas Mountains in Morocco and Algeria. Therefore, Libyan society has maintained its strong tribal identities and affiliations.

Rather than rule only through a crushing concentration of force wielded by a loyal army, Gadhafi maintained a delicate balancing act between Libya's opposing regions and local tribal competitions through his own patronage network that tied tribal networks into the regime. The People's Militia -- armed and loosely trained tribal networks -- also formed a significant number of the pre-revolutionary Libyan armed forces. Because Gadhafi took power through a military coup, as he grew older and increasingly paranoid he sought to limit the military's ability to concentrate force outside his control and thereby threaten his ability to rule the country.

Conversation: Libya's Deteriorating Security

In a bizarre twist of fate, post-Gadhafi Libya has in some instances seen the fruition of the previous dictator's supposed plans for the country -- specifically, the proliferation of local militias keeping in check the central government's ability to rule through force or unpopular decree. Though Gadhafi never intended for public opposition to rise up and depose him, or to effectively stall the government's ability to function, the rise of Libya's armed groups has underscored a startling truth for the General National Congress and Libya's foreign observers: the Libyan military is one of the most dysfunctional and poorly organized institutions within the Libyan state. Competitions for power within the Congress itself, a distrust of the lingering Gadhafi-era military leadership, a well-documented inability to delineate authority and a lack of clear communication have all hampered the military's ability to secure the country or push back against militia posturing.

The Libyan army suffered from large-scale defections and the loss of weapons, equipment and materiel following the 2011 revolution. The Libyan militias' refusal to disarm has created a scenario in which the military is no longer the strongest or most capable projector of force in the country. Local militia groups, such as those from Zintan or various pro-government militias of varying degrees of loyalty and dependability, support the national army in almost all of its operations in the country. Furthermore, there is still strong popular resistance to the formation of another strongman government rising in Tripoli, despite frustrations with the slow pace of change since the fall of Gadhafi.

Haftar's statement that the General National Congress should resign occurred against a backdrop of voices demanding that the General National Congress step down in favor of another governmental body ahead of the planned constitutional drafting process. Though Haftar's threats of a coup proved false, his sentiments correspond with those of many people in Libya who would like to see the General National Congress step aside and allow another group -- one that may be more amenable to the changes they would like to see in the constitution -- to come to power and oversee the drafting of Libya's constitution. However, Haftar is an interesting person to issue such a statement. A figure in Gadhafi's military structure, he defected nearly 20 years before Gadhafi fell, returning in Libya in 2011 to aid the rebellion. Haftar's role as a military commander during the rebellion was quickly ended over suspicions that he had ties to the CIA, and Haftar has lingered ever since with an unclear role in the current military structure and a poor record of military command or loyalty among troops.

The fact remains that Libya's army is demoralized, weak and out-armed by the various militias and armed groups that have risen to fill the void of the central government throughout Libyan territory. Even if a faction of the military could rise up and overthrow the current government, it would be unable to arbitrate between the various militias and political factions that would vie to replace the General National Congress. If it sought to hold power, the military would almost assuredly face the risk of another civil war as the country's tens of thousands of revolutionaries moved to prevent another unelected dictatorship in Tripoli.

Geographic realities also severely impede the army's reach. The army functions mostly as the country's largest militia, and it can reliably secure and protect only Tripoli and its immediate environs. The country's protracted stalemate, already often beset with violence, would further descend into chaos. For these reasons -- internal dysfunction, poor communication and a lack of institutional power -- a rise of the Libyan military similar to that in Algeria or Egypt is unlikely, and even if it were to happen, there is little chance that it would lead to greater stability.

As the country heads shakily into the next period of transition, stakeholders from the various elements of Libyan society will all seek to pressure the General National Congress, the constitutional commission and the eventual permanent government to make sure that their interests are safeguarded and guaranteed within the structure of the constitution. While the militias have weapons, fighters and a key method of pressuring the central state -- shutting off vital energy flows -- the military is less a agile or capable threat. In its inability to secure and support the wavering transitional government, Libya's military has already, albeit unintentionally, undermined the capabilities of Libya's civilian leadership.

Niger Extradites Qaddafi’s Son to Face Charges in Tripoli Niger has extradited<http://link.foreignpolicy.com/525443c6c16bcfa46f732b5d1gv1y.1455/UxiFdOYQAzU136YRCe0ac>Muammar al-Qaddafi's son Saadi Qaddafi. The Libyan government had been seeking theextradition since 2011 when Saadi was granted entry

EDINBURGH, Scotland, March 11 (UPI) -- The 1988 Lockerbie jetliner bombing was payback for the U.S. Navy's downing of an Iranian airliner six months earlier, an ex-Iranian intelligence officer says. Abolghassem Mesbahi says Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the attack on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in which 290 people died, to avenge the accidental shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 over the Persian Gulf by the USS Vincennes and left 270 people dead, the Daily Telegraph reported Monday.

The London newspaper said previously unreleased evidence that was to have been used in an appeal hearing for Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the former Libyan intelligence officer convicted of the bombing, supports Mesbahi's contention. The Lockerbie bombing was carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- General Command, the newspaper said the evidence suggests.

The Telegraph said documents obtained by the Arab television network al-Jazeera for a documentary called "Lockerbie: What Really Happened?" names key individuals allegedly involved in the attack.

The Telegraph said the new evidence puts the conviction of al-Megrahi in question and supports allegations the truth about Lockerbie was covered up by Britain and the United States to avoid angering Syria, a key player in the Middle East

Al-Megrahi, the only man convicted in the Lockerbie attack, dropped his appeal after being released from prison in 2009 because he was suffering from cancer, though he maintained his innocence until his death in 2012.

Al-Megrahi's conviction was based on the prosecution's theory that Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi had personally ordered the Lockerbie attack in retaliation for the U.S. bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986, in which Gadhafi's daughter was killed.

But Mesbahi contends it was Iran, not Libya, that sought revenge.

"Iran decided to retaliate as soon as possible," Mesbahi, who had reported directly to Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and now lives under a witness protection program in Germany, told al-Jazeera. "The decision was made by the whole system in Iran and confirmed by Ayatollah Khomeini.

"The target of the Iranian decision-makers was to copy exactly what happened to the Iranian Airbus. Everything exactly the same, minimum 290 people dead."

The newspaper reported the U.S. State Department said it wanted all those responsible for the Lockerbie attack brought to justice, while Britain's Foreign Office said the case remains open because investigators believe al-Megrahi didn't act alone.

The Iranian government had no comment on the documentary's findings, but has previously denied any involvement in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.

Libya's parliament held a vote of confidence Tuesday to dismiss Prime Minister Ali Zeidan over the failure to prevent an oil tanker from exporting oil from the rebel-controlled Sidra port. Defense Minister Abdullah al-Thinni has been named as Libya's interim prime minister. Despite a travel ban against Zeidan, Malta's prime minister reported that Zeidan had arrived in Malta Tuesday en route to a European country. Libyan authorities seized a North Korea-flagged tanker Monday after it attempted to leave Sidra port, however the tanker escaped the naval blockade overnight. The tanker -- the first vessel to have loaded oil from a rebel-held port since the separatist revolt erupted in July 2013 -- is estimated to have taken on at least 234,000 barrels of crude oil from the rebels. On Monday the parliament ordered an operation to liberate all rebel-held oil terminals. Special forces are expected to deploy within one week. In related news, the U.N. Security Council's Libya sanctions committee reported this week that Libya had become "a primary source of illicit weapons," and that trafficking from Libya was fueling conflict and instability on several continents.

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The last point about arms trafficking is one we have been making here for quite some time-- including the notion that the US should have been scarfing these weapons (including MANPADs) up as part of our helping the overthrow of Kadaffy , , ,

Libya's parliament held a vote of confidence Tuesday to dismiss Prime Minister Ali Zeidan over the failure to prevent an oil tanker from exporting oil from the rebel-controlled Sidra port. Defense Minister Abdullah al-Thinni has been named as Libya's interim prime minister. Despite a travel ban against Zeidan, Malta's prime minister reported that Zeidan had arrived in Malta Tuesday en route to a European country. Libyan authorities seized a North Korea-flagged tanker Monday after it attempted to leave Sidra port, however the tanker escaped the naval blockade overnight. The tanker -- the first vessel to have loaded oil from a rebel-held port since the separatist revolt erupted in July 2013 -- is estimated to have taken on at least 234,000 barrels of crude oil from the rebels. On Monday the parliament ordered an operation to liberate all rebel-held oil terminals. Special forces are expected to deploy within one week. In related news, the U.N. Security Council's Libya sanctions committee reported this week that Libya had become "a primary source of illicit weapons," and that trafficking from Libya was fueling conflict and instability on several continents.

==============

The last point about arms trafficking is one we have been making here for quite some time-- including the notion that the US should have been scarfing these weapons (including MANPADs) up as part of our helping the overthrow of Kadaffy , , ,

U.S. Navy SEALs have seized a North Korean-flagged tanker loaded with oil from a rebel-held port in Libya. A separatist militia took control of the oil terminal in July 2013, demanding a greater share of the country's oil wealth. The tanker, the Morning Glory, evaded a naval blockade at the eastern port of Sidra last week, embarrassing the government and spurring the dismal of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. North Korea disavowed the ship, saying it did not provide authorization. According to the Pentagon, U.S. forces boarded the Morning Glory before dawn Monday in international waters off Cyprus, and took control of the tanker, at the request of the Libyan and Cypriot governments. The move may prevent further attempts by the rebels to sell oil on the black market. Meanwhile, a car bomb hit outside a military base in the eastern city of Benghazi killing at least five soldiers and wounding another 14 people.

Fighting erupted in Libya's capital city on May 18 when a militia loyal to Lt. General Khalifa Hafter reportedly attacked the Libyan Parliament. Earlier in the week Hafter-affiliated militias launched an operation against a February 17 Martyr's Brigade base in Benghazi. The government-aligned Martyr's Brigade is considered one of the biggest and best-armed Islamist militias in Libya. If the reports are confirmed, the assault on the Parliament in Tripoli means that Hafter’s forces are now engaged in battle across Libya’s two traditional seats of power. It is quite possible that Hafter is attempting to consolidate power in Libya, hoping to bring an end to the chaos that has wracked the country since the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime in 2011. It is believed that Hafter's broader intent is to push the Islamists out of Benghazi and oust the General National Congress from Tripoli, effectively taking control of Libya.

Haftar’s forces reportedly used airstrikes in their operations in Benghazi, though at this point Stratfor is unsure of the exact size and disposition of the force deployed to Tripoli, or indeed who may be allied with Haftar himself.

Haftar has a long relationship with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that has been well documented in the press. He worked with the Americans to form an anti–Gadhafi militia in the 1980s that operated in the south of Libya, and from neighboring Chad. The militia was reportedly forced to leave Chad in 1991, prompting Hafter to move to the United States.

Last week 200 U.S. Marines were prepositioned in Sicily, on alert to respond to contingencies in Northern Africa. This troop movement could be an indication that the U.S. government was aware of Hafter’s planned operations, having the Marines ready in advance to reinforce the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli if the need arises.

At this point there are more questions than answers, but it is possible that this move could be more than just another short-term militia event in Tripoli. If this is a drive to consolidate power in Libya, the parliamentary attack could lead to extensive fighting between Hafter’s forces, allies and opposing militias in Tripoli and Benghazi. Stratfor will keep a very close eye on Libya in the coming hours to further assess the situation.

===================================If I am not mistaken, folks here should be able to see this:

Retired Libyan General Khalifa Heftar, who has launched attacks on Islamist militias in Benghazi and on the Libyan government, has called on the judiciary to appoint an emergency cabinet and oversee parliamentary elections. Heftar called the country a "terrorist hub" and claimed the government had "fostered terrorism" and failed Libyans. Heftar's campaign, named "Libya's dignity" by supporters, got a boost when the country's top air defense commander, Juma al-Abani, and Culture Minister Habib Amin declared their support. The government said the operation was an attempted coup and Libya's new prime minister, Ahmed Maitiq, called for negotiations to end the political crisis.

News of an impending deal to bring oil exports back online is likely to create more problems for Libya's embattled central government rather than solve them. After the fall of Moammar Gadhafi's regime, Tripoli has found that such deals usually trigger a larger competition between various armed groups demanding often-competing concessions, further destabilizing the country. As long as Libya depends on cooperation from the various armed groups within its borders to maintain stability, its reliance on negotiating and granting concessions (rather than using force) to end protests and fighting will perpetuate the very pattern of extortion and violence by militias that Tripoli is trying to end.

Analysis

Libyan media outlets are reporting that members of the government-funded Petroleum Facilities Guards and Tripoli have reached an initial deal allowing for a temporary resumption of exports at the 90,000 barrels-per-day Marsa el Brega loading facility in eastern Libya. The deal, brokered by tribal elders from Marsa el Brega, is provisional. The guards whose protests closed the facility last week are demanding pay increases and, more controversially, the reinstatement of Brig. Idris Bukhamada, the former commander of the Petroleum Facilities Guards. The protestors are giving the government 20 days to meet their demands, though this process likely will be complicated by the impending dissolution of the outgoing General National Congress in favor of a new transitional political body, the House of Representatives, expected to take place in early August.

Bukhamada was removed in deals between the General National Congress and a group of renegade Petroleum Facilities Guards in April and earlier this month. Ibrahim Jathran, a former regional commander of the Petroleum Facilities Guards and leader of the breakaway group that has kept much of Libya's eastern oil exports offline for nearly a year, demanded that his forces be reincorporated into the larger body of the guards. Leveraging his control over the majority of eastern Libyan export capacity, Jathran also pushed the government to appoint new leadership for the force, effectively ousting Bukhamada, his professional and regional rival. The replacement was Ali al-Arash, a man seen as closer to Jathran than to the government and whose leadership has been contested and ultimately rejected by the Bukhamada loyalists within the Petroleum Facilities Guards.Libya's Urban and Rural Power CentersClick to Enlarge

The episode underscores the difficulty in reaching lasting arrangements in Libya's increasingly fragmented political and social order. Stratfor has long noted the temporary nature of agreements reached by the weak central government and the highly competitive tribal, militia and ethnic groups that have dominated post-Gadhafi Libya. It is nearly impossible to make concessions to one group without angering its competitors, and nearly all of the rival groups are able to control and take critical infrastructure -- including airports, pumping stations, oil refineries and export terminals -- offline.

The outgoing government and its successor body now must choose to either acquiesce to the demands of Bukhamada's supporters at Marsa el Brega and bring the terminal and its airstrip back online, or placate Jathran, whose forces still guard the bulk of eastern Libya's export capacity. While Jathran is present at more ports, Bukhamada's cousin, Col. Wanis Bukhamada, is head of Bengahzi's Sawaiq special forces currently fighting alongside retired Gen. Khalifa Hifter's anti-Islamist forces in the east.

The embattled central government's considerations go beyond pay scales and leadership structures of embittered petroleum guards into broader issues of renegade national forces, anti-incumbency movements and a risk of larger-scale fighting between the country's many competing armed groups. The central government will have a difficult time reaching a deal with one group of Petroleum Facilities Guards that does not violate the terms of its deal with the other, and risks angering both -- resulting in cutoffs of all or some of Libya's eastern oil terminals. Those on strike are unlikely to modify or lessen their respective demands, making a limited restart followed by a partial shutoff or delay from either Marsa el Brega or other eastern terminals the most realistic outcome. Such an outcome would occur within weeks rather than months

This unpredictability and the government's lack of enforcement capabilities is causing other larger, structural issues for a government keen to export what oil it can while some fields and terminals are still open. Buyers are demanding discounts -- rumored to be between $1-2 per barrel for now -- for spot purchases, making it more difficult for the National Oil Company to sign months-long supply contracts to traders who are wary of Libya's ability to guarantee stable, ongoing supply deals. After nearly a year of halted exports, Libyan crude supplies have become largely displaced in international markets. Buyers are also hesitant to buy Libyan crude blends of volatile and unknown quality at current prices, especially since the central government has been prevented from testing crude flows into coastal storage tanks and monitoring the additional processing necessary to refine crude blends.

Tripoli now has to deal with a national force tasked with protecting its oil fields and infrastructure that effectively is split into two camps: Jathran supporters and Bukhamada supporters, with both possessing questionable loyalty at best to the national government. Regional militias and tribal and ethnic groups continue to maintain a disjointed system of local fiefdoms, largely preventing the national government from controlling their oil resources and critical infrastructure. This scenario makes it quite probable that either Marsa el Brega or other eastern terminals, such as Ras Lanuf and As Sidra, will start cutting off oil exports again in the near future as Libya destabilizes rapidly beyond the point of political reconciliation.

Twice in the last seven days, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have secretly teamed up to launch airstrikes against Islamist-allied militias battling for control of Tripoli, Libya, four senior American officials said, in a major escalation between the supporters and opponents of political Islam.

The United States, the officials said, was caught by surprise: Egypt and the Emirates, both close allies and military partners, acted without informing Washington or seeking its consent, leaving the Obama administration on the sidelines. Egyptian officials explicitly denied the operation to American diplomats, the officials said.

The strikes are the most high-profile and high-risk salvo unleashed in a struggle for power that has broken out across the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolts, pitting old-line Arab autocrats against Islamists.

Fighters from the Fajr Libya (Libyan Dawn) coalition guard the entrance to the Tripoli International Airport on Aug. 24. (MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP/Getty Images)Summary

Weeks of fighting to the south of the Libyan capital have resulted in an uneasy stalemate. The lull came after Islamist fighters backed by the powerful coastal city of Misrata successfully ousted the Zentan-based al-Qaaqaa and al-Sawaaq militias from Tripoli International Airport. Misrata is Libya's third-largest city and has maintained a remarkable degree of localized stability and security, while the larger cities of Tripoli and Benghazi have grappled with repeated bouts of violence, militant activity and cuts in water and power supplies. The renewed presence and authority of the Misrata-backed brigades in Tripoli after their ouster in November 2013 will have broader political and security implications for Libya's post-revolutionary transition.

Early champions in the fight against former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, Misrata's political and militia leaders are attempting to leverage their strong presence in the capital to achieve broader national authority, a move that has sparked a violent and chaotic competition for power in the process. Neighboring countries and international observers are uneasy with the growing instability within Libya's borders, but calls for international intervention to prop up Libya's struggling transitional government will continue to be confounded by the difficulty of establishing who legitimately represents the fragmented and chaotic post-Gadhafi state.

Analysis

On Aug. 27, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 2174 authorizing sanctions against individuals and groups that undermine Libya's political transition, as well as those who attack ports, diplomatic offices and key infrastructure. Libya has also been under an arms embargo since the 2011 revolution, though it has done little to halt the proliferation and transfer of weapons across its vast deserts and into neighboring states. Even though Libya's newly installed transitional government, the House of Representatives, issued multiple requests for foreign intervention to help stabilize the country, outside observers, including the United Nations, the United States and NATO, balked at the idea of placing troops on the ground to help limit violence and support Libya's political transition.

There are multiple conflicts spanning the Libyan political space. Competition between advocates of either a centralized or federal model of governance brought much of Libya's oil exports offline for over a year. Meanwhile, regional, sectarian, ethnic and tribal disputes regularly erupt in armed clashes that affect urban centers and target key infrastructure installations. The return of groups from Misrata to Tripoli is itself part of a larger battle that has turned Benghazi and the region south of Tripoli into battlefields, pitting foreign-backed forces organized under retired Libyan Gen. Khalifa Hifter's Operation Dignity campaign against alliances of jihadist and Islamist forces. In Benghazi, Islamist militias that are rumored to be supported by states such as Qatar and Turkey have partnered with jihadist groups like Ansar al-Sharia to fight Hifter's forces, while in western Libya -- and specifically the area around Tripoli -- Misrata-backed regional fighters allied with Islamist forces under Operation Dawn have banded against Hifter's Zentan-based allies, the al-Qaaqaa and al-Sawaaq brigades.Libya's Urban and Rural Power CentersClick to Enlarge

Hifter's rumored foreign backing, demonstrated by alleged Egyptian and Emirati coordinated airstrikes against Operation Dawn targets in Tripoli and claims of his cooperation with the CIA, has left much of Libya's powerful network of nationalistic tribes and militias apprehensive of directly engaging in fighting against other forces on his behalf, despite many regional centers' growing fear of the rising regional clout of Misrata and its Islamist allies. Herein lies the challenge for outside observers, including the United States and NATO: The international community is concerned about the geographic space Libya's post-revolutionary chaos has made available to regional militants, but fighters within the current battlefield spectrum -- from Misrata-backed forces, to Islamist fighters, to the divided national army -- do not always fit neatly into the category of ally or foe. There are serious fears that a foreign intervention launched to tackle jihadists or renegade militias could quickly turn into a broader conflict between foreign forces and the very revolutionaries that they trained and armed to fight Gadhafi.

The United States' and Libya's primary partners in NATO -- the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy -- have all publicly decried the alleged Emirati airstrikes in Libya, warning against adding violence to the country's already volatile security situation. Western states, the United Nations and neighboring Algeria and Tunisia are calling for a "political process" to solve Libya's problems. Since early August, Libya's struggling national parliament, the House of Representatives, has convened in Tobruk instead of Benghazi as originally planned because of security concerns. Some 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) away from the nation's capital, the internationally recognized parliament has struggled to make its voice heard in the power centers of Tripoli, Misrata, Zentan and Benghazi.

In response to the most recent ouster of the Hifter-aligned Zentan militias in Tripoli, members of the defunct General National Congress have reconvened in the capital, leaving Libya with two competing parliaments, a divided army and an uncertain political future. Clashes and violence are inevitable, and covert involvement by states -- particularly Egypt and its primary Gulf backers, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- is likely. The competition for legitimacy between the two parliaments will also likely extend into a fight for control of the country's sizable oil revenues and the right to receive revenues from export cargos -- a dispute that will probably cause production and exports to falter yet again. Additionally, the decision by Libya's more moderate Islamists to reject their erstwhile jihadist partners after their gains against the Zentan militias may reflect a desire to portray a more moderate disposition but also risks pushing the jihadists to target the more moderate Islamist militias as well as the Operation Dignity forces lead by Hifter.

Libya's democratic transition will remain stagnant until Libyans themselves can coalesce across tribal and regional lines to form a majority body that external governments can more effectively support. Even then, Libya will likely face a broader conflict than the ongoing localized fighting between regional competitors as the national government attempts to bring opposition forces -- of which Libya has many -- under a single national authority through either coercion or force. Outside powers such as the United States are still unwilling to designate who is "good" or "bad" within Libya's divided landscape, and even power centers such as Misrata remain too fundamentally weak to extend authority beyond their immediate geography, leaving Libya without any force that can operate on a national scale. A foreign intervention in Libya still seems unlikely, and there are few indigenous solutions to keep the country from moving closer to an eventual de facto fragmentation along its internal fissures. Meanwhile, Libya remains without a permanent government, national Cabinet or expectations of a constitution or national elections before the end of 2014 -- in short, without an effective domestic entity that is capable of working with outside governments.

And, regarding the airliners, not to belabor the theory, but they also would potentially have 'motive', especially the Egyptians... I read someplace that if commercial jets were launched form Libya, that they would have literally "minutes" to react as far away as Saudi Arabia. The threat being a transhipment facility or something in an effort to destabilize world markets.

ShareExternal Powers Have Good Reason Not to Intervene in LibyaAnalysisSeptember 10, 2014 | 1108 Print Text SizeExternal Powers Have Good Reason Not to Intervene in LibyaA Libyan flag flutters under a bridge near Tripoli on Sept. 9. (MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP/Getty Images)SummaryFrance continues to focus attention on Libya. Most recently, on Sept. 9 the Elysee issued a call for joint international action in the North African country. While France stopped short of discussing military intervention, Stratfor sources say that Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have approached Paris about just such an option, and they may also approach the United States.

Countries wanting to intervene in Libya face considerable constraints, and the objectives that could be attained are unclear. Regional actors will probably continue to be those most involved in direct and indirect interventions in Libya.AnalysisEgypt and the Emiratis have been the most overt supporters of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives that was elected in June and of retired Gen. Khalifa Hifter, who leads a coalition of Libyan troops, loyalists to former Libyan ruler Moammar Gadhafi and a special operations forces unit against Islamist militias in eastern Libya. Saudi Arabia has also supported Hifter, but less visibly. Egypt wants to remove the Islamist threat on its western border, or at the very least ensure that Libya's Islamist actors only play a minimal role in the government. Cairo is wary of militancy spreading across its borders, and Egypt has propped up actors such as Hifter's Operation Dignity forces and the democratically elected House in an attempt to establish a buffer in eastern Libya. Egypt has a limited capacity to address Libyan unrest due to insecurity at home and a dire financial situation, so Cairo has come to depend on the Emiratis and Saudis to back its interests in Libya.

By backing Egypt in Libya, the United Arab Emirates is seizing an opportunity to prevent rival Qatar from regaining leverage in North Africa. Having solidified their influence in Cairo, the Emiratis would rather not see this undermined by instability generated by Islamists in neighboring Libya. Abu Dhabi has a tense relationship with its own domestic Muslim Brotherhood movement, al Islah, and would like to see Qatar's leverage with Islamist communities held to a minimum. The United Arab Emirates has also joined Egypt in limited airstrikes over Libya, deploying aircraft from Egyptian air bases. These airstrikes have had at best a minimal effect on the situation on the ground.

Striving to turn the security situation around in Libya, Abu Dhabi and Egypt have purportedly turned to Paris for help. France has notable interests in the region -- energy, military basing and arms trade -- and Cairo and Abu Dhabi are hoping the French are willing to consider a serious intervention. France has repeatedly pushed the issue before the U.N. Security Council, but so far France has stopped far short of anything that suggests a full-scale intervention. Paris did announce Sept. 9 that it could deploy forces based in countries bordering Libya in an attempt to shore up border security, but that would not be a substantial commitment.

France also has the ability to mount a wider air campaign over Libya, but the effects of this would likely be minimal and France would probably avoid carrying the full weight of such an intervention. Other Western allies, such as the United States, have announced support for the Libyan government but have been reluctant to match that support with direct military efforts -- anything beyond training elements of the Libyan armed forces. Even Italy -- which sits close to Libya, has direct energy interests there and is vulnerable to streams of immigrants seeking refuge on European shores -- doesn’t want to overcommit. During the air campaign in 2011, Rome only dedicated a portion of its full capabilities to operations in Libya.Regional Actors' LimitationsQatar has been active in Libya but has sought to support anyone who is not pro-Hifter or supportive of the elected House. Doha was the leading Arab force in toppling the Gadhafi regime in 2011, going so far as to deploy its highly trained special operations forces. Qatar's currency reserves have allowed Doha to funnel cash and weapons to militias in Libya.

The distance between Qatar and Libya limits Doha's involvement; there are no nearby friendly bases from which it could stage operations. Turkey has offered Qatar some limited backing because Ankara saw Egypt's deposed President Mohammed Morsi as a key ally and would prefer not to see Egypt dislodge another entrenched Islamist polity, this time in Libya. Access to cheap energy and potential infrastructure bids for the firms that support Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling party have also compelled Turkish involvement, but Libya simply is not high enough of a Turkish priority to justify a level of engagement similar to that of Qatar.

Doha has also likely worked through Sudan to deliver arms to Libya, which puts it in direct competition with Egyptian and Saudi interests for influence in Khartoum. The Sudanese military industrial complex is useful in directing secondhand support of armed groups, but Sudan depends on investments and loans from both Qatar and Saudi Arabia to keep its economy going. Conflicting influences could therefore limit Sudan's usefulness in this particular situation.

Even if the actors backing Tobruk and Hifter's forces want to increase their active support, they would have to act cautiously because their assistance would undermine the credibility of the supported militias in Libya itself. Further, the effect of an air campaign would be fairly limited. Only a few Islamist groups would be targeted so as not to antagonize the Libyan population at large. While this could ease the pressure on Hifter's forces, targeting groups such as Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi would only have temporary benefits. The targeted militias could simply deploy forces that are being held back right now because they are not necessary. Any air campaign over Libya would thus be mostly a token intervention with little real chance of stabilizing Libya.

An airstrikes offensive against Islamist militias in cities such as Tripoli and Benghazi would be difficult, and to have a lasting effect it would need to be followed by intense state-building operations that would require a level of commitment nobody is willing to offer. External actors will remain reluctant to move forward with such a campaign.

Read more: External Powers Have Good Reason Not to Intervene in Libya | StratforFollow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook

Libyan army troops aligned with former General Khalifa Heftar have intensified a ground assault and airstrikes against a coalition of Islamist militias in the eastern city of Benghazi. The offensive has come a day after Heftar vowed to "liberate" Benghazi in a televised address following an attack by militants from Ansar al-Sharia on one of the last army bases controlled by government forces in the city. The Associated Press reported two Egyptian officials said Egyptian warplanes were attacking Islamist militias in Libya, though Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi denied the report. Egypt has pledged to train Libyan soldiers, and in Heftar's address Tuesday, he thanked countries that had helped in his fight against what he referred to as "terrorism."

Egotistically I note that this was something I discussed in my proffered strategy.

Warplanes struck Libya’s port city of Misurata for the first time Sunday. The air force, allied with Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni’s Tobruk-based government, launched up to three airstrikes in Libya’s third-largest city hitting an air base, the port, and a steel factory. The strikes came after the air force issued an ultimatum to the Misurata-led Libya Dawn militias, following their attacks on the oil ports of el-Sidr and Ras Lanuf, as well as an attack on a Sirte power plant on Dec. 25. Rocket strikes ignited fires at el-Sidr, though the fires at three of five oil-storage tanks have been extinguished. According to officials, fire has destroyed about 850,000 barrels of crude, over two days of Libya’s output.

Islamic State Secures New Haven in LibyaA country torn by civil war provides fertile ground for the extremist group—right on Europe’s doorstepBy Yaroslav TrofimovFeb. 16, 2015 7:10 p.m. ET

Two rival governments in Libya have fought an increasingly bloody civil war since last summer, as the world paid little attention. While they battled for control of the country’s oil wealth, a third force—Islamic State—took advantage of the chaos to grow stronger.Analysis

The beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians by Islamic State followers has finally drawn the global spotlight to the group’s rising clout in Libya, which not long ago was touted as a successful example of Western intervention. The killings prompted Egyptian airstrikes on Islamic State strongholds in Libya and spurred calls for more active international involvement in what is fast becoming a failed state on Europe’s doorstep.

The Libyan affiliate of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has, in fact, been spreading its sway for months. First it established an area of control last fall in and around the eastern city of Derna, a historical center of Libyan jihadists. Recently, it also took over parts of former dictator Moammar Gadhafi’s hometown of Sirte, on the central coast, setting up a radio station there and sending Islamic morality patrols onto the streets.

All the while, the two rival governments of Libya focused on combatting one another, each supported by regional powers. Both preferred to largely ignore the influx of foreign jihadists forming new alliances with local extremists—and their unification under Islamic State’s banner.

“As all the attention of the two sides was on fighting the other side, this kind of group prospered in the political and military void,” said Karim Mezran, a Libya expert at the Atlantic Council in Washington. “There are no good guys or bad guys there—both sides have been acting in bad faith.”

Libya isn’t the only place outside Syria and Iraq where the extremist group has established affiliates, largely by absorbing homegrown jihadist groups into its project of world domination and religious war until the total triumph of Islam. There are also Islamic State “provinces” in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, in Yemen, and in so-called Khorasan, a region straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Islamic State’s slickly produced video of the slaughter of the Egyptian Copts, released on Sunday, concluded with the promise to conquer Rome, the historic center of Christendom. That threat is bound to reinforce existing pressure in countries such as France and Italy for a military intervention to stave off the complete collapse of Libya, which is just across the Mediterranean Sea from Italy.

“The situation in Libya has been out of control for three years,” Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi cautioned in a television interview after the video’s release. “We shouldn’t go from total indifference to hysteria.”

Libya has been unstable since Gadhafi’s ouster and killing in 2011, but it descended into all-out civil war last summer.

One side is the old parliament, elected in 2012 and dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies. It includes militias from the conservative city of Misrata, a key force in the revolution against the Gadhafi regime. That parliament, known as the General National Congress, was replaced in last summer’s elections by another legislature, the House of Representatives, dominated by more secular and nationalist forces.

While the international community has recognized the new House of Representatives as the legitimate new authority in Libya, the GNC refused to accept its electoral defeat. Militias affiliated with the GNC last summer drove the new administration out of Tripoli to the eastern city of Tobruk, triggering what soon became an all-out war that destroyed the Tripoli airport and valuable oil infrastructure.

As the West was distracted by Islamic State’s blitz through Syria and Iraq last year, regional powers unleashed a proxy war in Libya. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, who ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power in his own country in 2013, threw his weight behind the Tobruk government, arming and assisting it. So did Egypt’s regional allies, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

Meanwhile, Turkey and Qatar—supporters of Islamist causes around the region—rallied behind Tripoli, as did Sudan. It was only last month that a cease-fire in Libya was reached, following United Nations-sponsored talks in Geneva.

By then, however, it may have already been too late to stop Islamic State’s spread, especially as the Tripoli administration has long played down the threat posed by Islamist militants. On Jan. 27, Islamic State attacked the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli, killing several foreigners and showcasing its ability to operate in the heart of the capital. Amazingly, the Tripoli administration’s reaction to that outrage was to allege that the massacre was a provocation carried out by its Tobruk rivals and Egypt. Since then, most of the last Westerners in town left Tripoli.

The latest Islamic State attack, on the Coptic Egyptians, was intended to directly draw Egypt into the Libyan conflict, said Khalil al-Anani, an Egyptian scholar of Islamist movements at Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. Sisi, whose takeover in 2013 was widely popular among Egypt’s Coptic minority, has positioned himself as a defender of the country’s Christians; last month, he became the first Egyptian president to visit a Coptic church on Christmas.

But his task of thwarting Islamic State grows more complicated. His army already faces a deadly Islamic State insurgency in the eastern Sinai Peninsula, losing hundreds of soldiers over the past two years.

“ISIS wants to drain the Egyptian army,” Mr. Anani said. “Egypt now has ISIS on both sides. They did not succeed in Sinai, so how will they do it in Libya?”

Almost four years to the day after the Libyan uprising began, the U.N. Security Council will meet to determine whether it should intervene militarily in the beleaguered North African country.

On Tuesday, Egypt, Libya's eastern neighbor, became the latest in a growing number of countries to implore the international body to act after Islamic State militants killed 21 Egyptian Copts in the Libyan city of Sirte. Egypt, situated so close to Libya, is naturally concerned about instability to the west. But since Mohammed Morsi, the former Muslim Brotherhood-backed president, was removed from office in 2013, its position on the matter has been fairly consistent: It has provided limited logistical assistance to actors who can advance its interests. Likely, it has done so with the help of its main backers, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

But Egypt certainly is not the only country put ill at ease by what Libya has become. Europe, too, has cause for alarm. As a former colonial power, France has deep-rooted interests in the region surrounding Libya, and Italy, Libya's former colonizer, has extensive economic interests in the country's oil industry. And both, but especially Italy, have struggled to manage the flow of illegal immigrants from across the Mediterranean.

What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.

Other countries farther afield broadly agree that Libyan instability poses a significant security risk not just to Libyans and neighboring states but also to international interests. But they cannot agree on how to create stability from the chaos. After all, there is no central government in Libya, let alone a national military force. Libya's problems with militancy are symptomatic of its disunity, not the cause of it. And so international efforts meant to route jihadist groups such as the Islamic State will do little to heal the political, ideological and tribal wounds that have torn Libyan society apart since the fall of Moammar Gadhafi in 2011.

Regional leaders like Algeria and Egypt understand as much and are therefore disinclined to take a bigger role in rebuilding Libya. Even if they wanted to help, they probably could not afford it. Those who could afford it — the European Union, NATO and the broader international community — have yet to volunteer for the job. Egypt is content to continue direct, albeit limited, involvement.

But not everyone agrees with Cairo's approach. Qatar, Algeria and Turkey have strongly advocated negotiation as a solution to the Libyan problem — an approach that has also received support from the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom, which have worked behind the scenes to monitor militant groups and to encourage reconciliation talks between the competing governments in Tripoli and Tobruk. Washington has even publicly warned against unilateral airstrikes, since they may make the security environment even worse.

And as the killing of the Egyptian Copts shows, direct attacks also run the risk of retaliation against those who meddle in Libyan affairs. The Egyptian military has since deployed soldiers throughout the country to defend key infrastructure and population centers from potential reprisal attacks. (Of course, Egyptian citizens have long been the target of Libyan militants, organized crime groups and local tribal elements for a variety of "offenses," including proselytization by Christian Copts and competition for jobs in a region ravaged by the Arab Spring uprisings.)

At best, the U.N. Security Council, which will meet Feb. 18, can condemn the instability in Libya and perhaps even authorize a military operation like the one underway in Iraq and Syria. But the United States will be only a marginal participant in such an operation, and indigenous Middle Eastern militaries probably cannot handle the logistical and economic demands of maintaining an open-ended air campaign against Libyan militants. In any case, Washington probably would not trust Cairo and its regional backers to lead the operation on their own — in the past, they have targeted more moderate Islamist groups and political opposition groups. Even France, which has worked closely with Arab states in pushing for a U.N. Security Council meeting on Libya, has sought to bring together an international coalition to avoid shouldering all the responsibility on its own (as it did in Mali in 2012).

Ultimately, the international community is most likely to leave Libya to its own devices, waiting to work with whoever wins the conflict. Tomorrow's council meeting may offer a solution to the problem posed by the Islamic State in Libya, but it will fail to address the broader challenges brought on by four years of instability.

According to recent reporting from the Long War Journal and Agence France Presse, Salafist jihadist militia Ansar al-Sharia and its allies have seized Camp Thunderbolt, a key base for Libyan Special Operations Forces located in Benghazi. The base is reported to have fallen following a week’s worth of sustained artillery shelling.Related Posts

Ansar al-Sharia, the Islamist group responsible for the 11 September 2012 Benghazi attack on the US Temporary Mission Facility and CIA Annex that left four Americans dead (as SOFREP has extensively reported), also announced complete control over the city in the form of an “Islamic emirate” earlier this week.

This attack and announcement of an Islamic emirate follow weeks of intensified fighting in Tripoli and Benghazi that pits Islamist and jihadist militia coalitions against secular militias and government forces, and also follows the recent evacuation of US and other western embassy officials from the country earlier this week.

The Long War Journal reports that Ansar al-Sharia is “currently fighting under the umbrella of the ‘Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council’, and is an alliance of multiple [Salafist jihadist] groups.” Ansar al-Sharia claims that the seizure of Camp Thunderbolt deals a blow to the secular militias and government forces currently working to regain control over the city, namely career Libyan soldier General Haftar and the forces loyal to him.

Haftar, a “renegade general who last month launched an offensive against Islamist militias and their suspected political backers”, has been working closely with Libyan special forces to target the various Islamist militias in Benghazi. It remains to be seen how the loss of Camp Thunderbolt will affect these operations.

Ansar al-Sharia uploaded photos of the weapons, munitions, and equipment it seized following the assault on Camp Thunderbolt to its official Twitter account (which they’ve operated since November 2013 as SOFREP has previously reported), which can be found below (courtesy of the Long War Journal).

Among the captured equipment are vehicles used by Libyan Special Forces, countless US and foreign munitions, SA-7 MANPADS, PK machine guns, explosive detection equipment, mortar systems, assault rifles, and much more.

Regardless of the strategic value the seizure of Camp Thunderbolt provides to Ansar al-Sharia in the coming weeks, it is clear that the immediate tactical-level benefits gained by Islamist militants in Benghazi now pose an even greater threat to any forces working to stem their control over the city.

This increased threat will also be of significant concern to any additional nations planning to evacuate their embassies, facilities, or personnel in the coming weeks should fighting intensify further. It has already been reported that a British convoy came under small arms fire during an evacuation of personnel to Tunisia earlier this week.

For a quick refresher on Ansar al-Sharia, visit this BBC Profile or the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium’s (TRAC) profile. SOFREP’s List of Terrorism Resources will also provide additional resources that contain more in-depth information if required.

Thanks for listening.

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14Charlie is a young intelligence professional supporting an airborne-capable unit. Not SOF, just a regular guy. He holds a commission, a BS in Political Science with a German minor from a small engineering school in Colorado, and loves the adventure found in mountains, foreign travel, and single malt scotch. He strongly advocates admitting nothing, denying everything, and making counter-accusations. Nothing written here is in an official capacity or represents the positions of the USG. NFQ

Consensus continues to elude participants in U.N.-backed reconciliation talks aimed at cobbling together a national unity government in Libya. Myriad competing groups and feuding parliaments in Tripoli and Tobruk have found their conflict right in the middle of several regional crises. Headlines have focused on escalating numbers of illegal migrants making their way to Europe, difficult negotiations, fighting between militias and attacks by Islamic State-affiliated militants. But local interests continue to compete and complicate international efforts to resolve the Libyan conflict. Moreover, Libyan leaders can concede on a few points despite generally opposing another Western intervention.

Nevertheless, outside powers such as the European Union, NATO and the United States are unlikely to consider a military intervention on the ground in Libya before U.N.-sponsored talks designate a recognized national unity government. And as that process plays out, Libya's instability will continue to hamper the country's oil output and give safe haven to a range of militant actors and various organized criminal activities.Analysis

NATO foreign ministers gathered in Antalya, Turkey, on May 13 for two days of talks focused on the threats emanating from the bloc's southern periphery. The host state of Turkey is the only NATO member that borders Islamic State-controlled territories in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, in the days leading up to the NATO meeting, Libyan military forces (loyal to the staunchly anti-Turkey government in Tobruk) fired upon a Turkish ship, killing one seaman. Although the bloc will undoubtedly focus on Russian activities along its eastern periphery, especially in Ukraine, recent events are likely to focus at least part of the discussion on the situation in Libya.

Libya's vast space has flourished as a haven for regional militant groups because of the absence of a strong central government. Local groups pledging loyalty to the Islamic State have gained particular notoriety in recent months. But while militancy has been a persistent threat, both to Libya and Algerian natural gas flows, the lack of reliable law enforcement has exposed much of Europe's southern flank to a different kind of problem: organized crime.

Libya has become a prime staging ground for a variety of criminal activities, such as smuggling weapons and drugs across a sprawling network of traditional desert trading routes and human trafficking. The Syrian civil war, and poor conditions across much of sub-Saharan Africa, has transformed Libya by some estimates into the largest transit hub for non-European migrants in the European Union. Illegal immigrants from Libya, almost entirely Syrian and African refugees, numbering in the tens of thousands have sparked policy debates among EU member states. Sharing the burden of migrant populations, reforming immigration and asylum policies, and policing the Mediterranean are just some of the fractious discussions going on in Europe.What Europe Wants

Still, of all EU member states, Italy has borne the brunt of rescue and coast guard operations because of its proximity to the Libyan coast. Over 4,100 migrants were rescued off the shores of Libya between May 2 and May 3 alone. EU policy has since shifted away from active rescue activities to remove the incentive for migrant behavior. But the decision has resulted only in the unfortunate drowning of thousands of people each month in their effort to cross the Mediterranean, intensifying the EU policy debate of how to best handle the crisis.

Since April, EU member states have sought to address the problem within Libya itself, with potential scenarios including airstrikes against human smuggling positions along the coast and attempted naval blockades, among others. Many of these plans rely on U.N. or NATO support and could involve the United States. Some countries, including Italy and France, have also reportedly consulted Egypt and some Arab states in the Gulf to garner regional support for international involvement.

In the days leading up to the NATO meeting, the European Union decided to focus its plans on policing Libya's maritime waters and pursuing U.N.-backing for the operation. However, strong opposition from both Libyan governments has again put the European Union's plans on hold. Furthermore, the United States, Libya and Algeria are advocating that the international community give the U.N.-backed, national unity negotiations process more time.

But Libya's spot within several overlapping peripheries does not help efforts for stabilization. Outside powers in the Middle East and Europe either do not want the responsibility of reconstructing Libya alone, or do not want a potential rival increasing its influence over Libyan factions and the country's sizable oil reserves. Often it is both. Consequently, the collapse of Libyan power structures will continue to be managed in a piecemeal fashion. Foreign stakeholders instead prefer a more distant, capable partner, such as the United States, to take on the costs of rebuilding a Libyan state, or for indigenous forces to slowly come together to partner effectively with the international community. Both preferences require waiting.The Impediments

All the while, both Libyan governments have continued to take part in the U.N. talks. Leaders generally agree to form a unified body with additional councils that will include traditional tribal leaders and potentially militia commanders. Yet the internationally recognized government in Tobruk, the House of Representatives, has failed to establish control over much of the country since its inception. The decision to move the government to Tobruk to avoid violence in Tripoli and Benghazi alienated many of the country's powerful revolutionary militias. It also enabled a reformed General National Congress in Tripoli to take control of bureaucratic institutions, including the Oil Ministry.

The House of Representatives tried to counter this weakness by working with rogue Gen. Khalifa Hifter, who had attempted a military coup to topple its predecessor body. Hifter's strong anti-Islamist position gained the support of eastern Libyan strongmen such as rebel commander Ibrahim Jadhran, remnants of pro-Gadhafi fighters and foreign support from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Tripoli's General National Congress has enjoyed the backing of the city-state of Misrata and its powerful militias, as well as a constellation of Islamist groups opposed to Hifter's anti-Islamist military operations.

Though violent clashes between Tripoli and Tobruk aligned, forces have slowed since late March and intra-regional competition has begun to intensify. Over the course of the summer we expect increased fighting between militias aligned with the General National Congress — especially those from Misrata — and a broad array of hard-line Islamist groups, including the Islamic State. Both want to increase their bargaining position ahead of an eventual negotiated deal. Eastern Libyan forces, such as Jadhran's Petroleum Facilities Guards and Libya's divided military, may also fight among themselves. Such conflict will exacerbate Libya's security vacuum in the short term as the groups fight to stabilize the country and reap the benefits of rising economic activity and oil production.

The biggest impediment is what to do with the extremist elements that support each government. Divisive hard-line Islamist fighters with links to the Islamic State and other jihadist groups, pro-Gadhafi fighters and Hifter himself have all contributed to a gradual but steady violence against the bases of support for each government. Misratan militias increasingly fight Islamist fighters opposing a future unity government that will not make room for their views. In the east, strong personal differences between leaders such as Jadhran, Hifter and Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani have slowed the momentum of the military campaign to secure Benghazi from Islamist forces and to combat Islamic State forces in Darnah.

Oil production has suffered as well. As fighting spread across the oil-rich Sirte Basin, competition for control of the country's export facilities has brought total production to about 260,000 barrels per day as of mid-May 2015. Other financial pressures on both governments are also a key motivator to keep talks moving forward. Libya's central bank, specifically its reserves, has opted to support neither the House of Representatives nor the General National Congress until a unity government is formed.

Ultimately, the competing governments are loath to cede authority to a unity government with each other. More important, the dialogue has served as the backdrop for a convoluted vetting process, as each government tries to separate itself from the more extreme elements of its respective support base. European and regional Arab actors are still largely unwilling to bear the burden of restructuring Libya out of its chaos on their own. Libyans will be left to consolidate their ranks and cobble out a fledgling national government to partner with international support in the future. The process will be difficult and violent. Instability will get worse before domestic forces are able to effectively police the state with outside assistance.