1.
For an illuminating discussion of the analogies between semantic
rules and systems of etiquette, see McKeown-Green 2002.

2.
This way of putting the point assumes that contents can have
different references with respect to different times; this is a
controversial assumption discussion of which would take us too far
afield. (For an argument against this assumption, see Richard 1981.)
Even if this assumption is false, an argument for double-indexing
semantics parallel to the above could be constructed using changes in
reference across worlds rather than across times.

3.
According to the first sort of Russellian, we can’t adequately
decide disputes about the semantics of names without also
investigating the relationship between semantics and pragmatics; one
of the important trends in recent semantics has been an increasing
attempt to explain linguistic phenomena with an eye on both possible
semantic and pragmatic explanations.

4.
This is not to say that there is not controversy over the existence
of these sorts of entities; there is. (See for discussion nominalism
in metaphysics.) The point is just that many believe in the existence
of entities of these kinds for reasons unconnected to the philosophy
of language; these entities were not introduced to play the role of
the contents of expressions.

6.
This is most natural for views, like Millian-Russellian views, which
make meaning closely related to the entity in the world for which the
word stands.

7.
Horwich (1998: 85–6) suggests that cases of this sort can be
handled by adding to his account a clause which makes it sufficient to
mean (for example) dog by “dog” that one be disposed to
defer to experts whose use of the term is explained by the canonical
basic acceptance regularity, so long as one’s use is
“close enough” to theirs. But it is hard to see why the
absence of such a disposition, perhaps out of simple obstinacy or
distaste for experts, should disqualify a biologically unsophisticated
person from meaning by “dog” what we do.