The revamped old Soviet ship's sea trial was in line with the schedule of its
refitting project and would not take long, the news agency said, quoting
military sources.

After returning from the trial, the carrier will continue its refit and test
work, the report said, adding that the vessel had set sail from its shipyard in
the city of Dalian.

Beijing last
month sought to downplay the capability of its first aircraft
carrier, saying the vessel would be used for training and "research", amid
concerns over the country's military build-up.

The project has added to regional worries over the country's fast military
expansion and growing assertiveness on territorial issues.

It also comes amid heightened tensions over a number of maritime territorial
disputes involving China, notably in the South
China Sea, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas and is claimed by
several countries.

China's People's Liberation
Army -- the largest armed force in the world -- is extremely secretive about
its defence programmes, which benefit from a huge and expanding military budget
boosted by the nation's runaway economic growth.

a truly 21st century Blue water navy with this updated old soviet CV RP2Ryan.

Remember when the USN had a few good frigates and not much else? TF 53/58 and 77 started from that.

IMNSHO, know matter how you cut it, an operational CV with a modern CAW (in the early days for that but they are making progress) with a few good escorts, is a power projecting Navy. Something very, very few nations have today.Granted the escorts are mostly evolutions of late soviet ships, which I never had much respect for[ although those commie bastards sure did build them pretty] with a few home grown classes that have shown me very, very little to fear YET. FWIW I see the PRC as an emerging REGIONAL naval power. I would not be surporised if we saw a naval building race in West Pac culminatign in a resurected Kito Butai. I am dead serious. The Japanese will not stand for an expansionist PRC and why else would you build a CV force?

That said, one thing I learned on many, many West Pac cruises is that the "Heathen Chinee" does things in his own way and very, very often his way works damn well.

The development of China's CVs seems to be following the path of their DDG escorts.

They started with the 051 which was a steam powered, gun armed Chinese built copy of a soviet ship. They then started to improve the designs, building one off classes of each improvement. S-300 missiles, new SSMs, HQ-9 SAMs, new radars, and for a couple of ships, gas turbine power. They also bought a number of Russian DDs, just to see what they could learn from them.

They appear to have settled on the type 052C design, and placed it into series production. This apperes to be slated to become their primary AAW ship. They've had a similar development with their Type 054A FFGs.

This seems to be their first stepping stone to a CVBG. Like you said, it's the Chinese's Langley. From here it's only a matter of time and money to a CVBG.

At this juncture in the development of China’s aircraft carrier force, the operational employment and integration of an aircraft carrier in a naval or joint task force remains very much in the realm of theory and speculation, yet with careful parsing of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as an organization, some insights can and have been made. These include Ken Allen and Aaron Shraberg’s insightful contributions in using the PLA’s grade system to conduct a thought experiment on locating aircraft carriers within the PLA grade hierarchy ("Assessing the Grade Structure for China's Aircraft Carriers [Parts 1 and 2]," China Brief, July 15 and July 29). This article seeks to add to their analysis by taking observations from recent PLA exercises that involved joint force structures and speculating where an aircraft carrier might fit into a similar PLA task force organization. Based to this analysis, an aircraft carrier within the PLA Navy (PLAN) probably would be assigned a grade of division deputy leader (Grade and the carrier strike group commander a grade of division leader (Grade 7)—a lower grade assessment than Allen and Shraberg. The implication is that the PLA is devolving joint command authority further down the grade scale as part of an overall attempt to transition away from centralized decision making.

Beginning in 2004, the PLA steadily built upon an experimental joint training program in which units of different services were organized into special “military training coordination zones” (junshi xunlian xiezuo qu / MTCZ). Within these zones, units from different services—of jun-level (corps-level)and below—were mandated to share training resources and integrate training objectives. In particular, Weifang MTCZ produced some key building blocks of the PLA’s joint training program, including the development of a “Joint Combat Training Outline” (lianhe zhandou xunlian gangmu) on behalf of the General Departments (zongbu) for dissemination throughout the rest of the PLA (PLA Daily, November 2, 2007). PLA news articles credit Weifang MTCZ and Jinan Military Region, where the zone is located, for making contributions to joint force development, particularly through the "Lianhe" (meaning "Joint") series of annual exercises. Through these exercises, army, navy and air force tactical- and campaign-level components worked through the obstacles and problems of coordinating and training with one another, making evolutionary progress in refining joint command structures and joint training methods (PLA Daily, November 11, 2008). By examining the different organizational echelons of the Lianhe exercise series, some generalizations may be applied to the question of how an aircraft carrier would fit within a PLA joint task force organization.

Joint Task Force Echelons

Three “joint” concepts emerge from the Lianhe series, which illustrate the PLA’s structure for organizing joint task forces [1]. The first concept is the joint tactical formation (lianhe zhanshu bingtuan). The joint tactical formation is the echelon encompassing division- and brigade-level organizations. For practical purposes, this echelon serves as the lowest and most tactically-oriented joint organization. Below this echelon are combat regiments and battalions, which operate largely in single-service fashion [2]. By looking at what units and who from those units occupy this echelon, we may understand better this part of the organizational framework. In Lianhe-2007, the joint tactical formation was composed of three service-specific tactical formations: the army tactical formation (lujun zhanshu bingtuan), the navy tactical formation (haijun zhanshu bingtuan) and the air force tactical formation (kongjun zhanshu bingtuan). The commander of the army tactical formation also served as the overall commander of the joint tactical formation. This post was occupied by a commander of a motorized infantry brigade (Grade (PLA Daily, September 11, 2007). Representing the Navy, the commander of a North Sea Fleet naval flotilla (Grade 7) served as the commander of the naval tactical formation (PLA Daily, November 2, 2007). The commander of the air force tactical formation was a deputy chief of staff of an Air Force aviation division (Grade 9), perhaps suggestive of the junior position of the Air Force among the armed services (PLA Daily, September 11, 2007). The grouping of these three service representatives into a single joint entity, however, suggests their peer status, at least at a functional level. For the captain of an aircraft carrier to sit at this level, he would have to be considered equivalent to a flotilla commander.

The second concept to emerge from the Lianhe series is the idea of the joint campaign formation (lianhe zhanyi juntuan), which supervises the joint tactical formation. This is the joint echelon for jun-class organizations, such as a group army and its commander [3]. In Lianhe-2007, the commander of a certain group army (Grade 5) that was frequently identified as the lead unit of Weifang MTCZ served again as the general exercise director (PLA Daily, September 8, 2007). Furthermore, this commander was also identified as the chair of the Weifang MTCZ Leading Group (Weifang xunlian xiezuo qu lingdao xiaozu zuzhang) and his chief-of-staff (Grade 6) as the director of the MTCZ Office, which is the executive agency of the Leading Group (Xinhua, September 5, 2007; PLA Daily, September 8, 2007). Also sitting at this level, in Lianhe-2008, was a North Sea Fleet deputy commander (Grade 5), with the rank of rear admiral (PLA Daily, November 11, 2008). He was identified as an exercise general director, making him a peer to the group army commander and political commissar. For an aircraft carrier captain to sit at this level, he would have to be equivalent to a fleet deputy commander, equivalent to a jun leader grade.

The highest echelon of this hierarchy is also the least well understood. The General Staff Department and service headquarters are considered widely to be at the strategic level of command, but between that level and the jun-level lies a transition between strategic and campaign command. In the Science of Joint Training, this level is divided into the “warzone strategic” (zhanqu zhanluexing) and“warzone direction” (zhanqu fangxiang), both concepts whose roles have yet to be fully clarified in practice [4]. There has been some indication as to what organs and personnel constitute this level. In 2009, the PLA established under the Jinan Military Region the military's “first warzone joint training leadership organ” (shouge zhanqu lianhe xunlian lingdao jigou) (PLA Daily, February 25, 2009). Although initial reports suggest it was to be a military region headquarters-level leading group, later reports indicated the chair of the group was a military region deputy commander (Grade 4) (PLA Daily, July 28, 2009). In addition, the commander of the North Sea Fleet (Grade 4) served as a deputy commander within the “warzone joint command post” in 2009 (Xinhua, June 30, 2009). This implies the warzone-level joint command is at the deputy military region leader level (Grade 4).

Taken together, these three echelons make up the warzone- or theater-level joint command organization, bridging the strategic, campaign and tactical levels. The grade structure implied by the incumbent officers largely corresponds to the grade hierarchy given for PLA rankings as depicted in Table 1.

Conclusion

The analysis of Allen and Shraberg finishes off with certain remaining questions, which might be illuminated further through this analysis. One question posed was to whom the carrier would be subordinated. According to the joint organizational framework depicted here, a carrier participating in a joint task force probably would be subordinated to the joint campaign formation, the jun leader grade formation at the fleet deputy commander level (Grade 5). This is because a carrier strike group would first be considered part of a navy tactical formation, whose commander would represent the service within the joint tactical formation (Grade 7). Hence, the carrier strike group commander and the rest of the joint tactical echelon would report directly to the joint campaign formation [5]. This implies, then, that the billet of aircraft carrier commander would be below the flotilla commander grade, since the strike group commander would already sit in that chair. As Allen and Shraberg noted, “no vessel can be assigned the same grade as that of the organization to which it is subordinate” ("Assessing the Grade Structure for China's Aircraft Carriers: Part 1," China Brief, July 15). This means that if the carrier was to form part of a naval flotilla, it could not occupy the same grade as the flotilla itself. Since the joint tactical formation grade is a flotilla commander grade, the carrier itself must reside below it. That leaves a deputy division commander grade billet (Grade , which also happens to be the grade given to China’s nuclear-powered submarines.

Given the strictures of the grade hierarchy, the experience of previous joint task force structures suggests that the aircraft carrier itself will be given the grade of deputy division leader (Grade and the carrier strike group a grade of division leader (Grade 7). Whether the air wing commander is assigned the same rank as the carrier commander remains an open question, as previously an Air Force aviation division deputy chief-of-staff served with a navy flotilla commander in a peer relationship. The PLAN may see its own aviation forces in a better light than the PLA Air Force, but given the junior status of the Naval Aviation branch within the Navy, the air wing commander is likely to be at the grade of deputy division leader (Grade or lower.

This casting most closely adheres to the lines of authority established in Lianhe, including allowing for a substantial degree of joint interaction and decision-making in the joint tactical formation. However, in an alternate scenario, the carrier strike group commander could be considered the overall joint campaign formation commander, making the person who filled that billet a deputy fleet commander (Grade 5). Under such a framework, the strike group commander would not only be in charge of the naval tactical formation, but would oversee the entire joint tactical formation, including other service components. This would allow space in the hierarchy for a division-grade carrier. The carrier would probably not be considered to be in an organic flotilla with its escorts, but would operate in coordination with any escort flotilla. How the carrier captain would relate to a peer flotilla commander and whether they would represent one or multiple naval tactical formations would have to be worked out in practice, as would other relationships within the joint tactical formation.

While giving rise to potential organizational frictions, it is completely within reason to suggest that the Navy may alter convention for an aircraft carrier, giving the vessel equal status to a flotilla, or higher, and subordinating the strike group directly to fleet or Navy headquarters. This may be somewhat more complicated in terms of command and control relationships, but such an arrangement could be accommodated by PLAN organizational structure. Hong Kong-based observers have made similar predictions that the carrier would stretch convention and receive higher grade status, “due to the first carrier’s importance” (Tzu Ching Magazine, August 2011). Until sea trials are concluded and the ex-Varyag engages in training missions of substance, we will have to wait and see.

Notes:

The PLA literature seldom uses the phrase “task force”, but in reference to its own joint organization it uses the terms described herein. For Western readers, however, “joint task force” serves as useful shorthand.

Notwithstanding marginal progress in the development of joint combat units, such as the “integrated battalion” (jicheng ying) and “joint combat subunit” (lianhe zhandou fendui), these do not figure significantly in Lianhe exercises.

Many translate juntuan as “large formation”; either way the significance is lost without understanding that the Chinese juntuan connotes a corps- (or jun-) level organization.

This may be just normal publicity but if the People's Liberation Army Navy has combed its ranks to select the best and brightest to crew this broken down, obsolete, ex-Soviet museum piece with no air group, then the PLAN is seeing the Liaoning more as a flagship than an experiment likely to fail.

The PLAN must be an equal opportunity employer who is just interested in selecting the best person for the job. The pictures and photo opportunities of having female sailors are meant to appeal to female voters in the democratic Chinese Communist Party of China. Or, they are there for visits to Western ports where some competent, photogenic female Chinese officers will be appreciated.

The PLAN is not so large that it can afford to post her best and brightest to a dead-end career move. The Chinese are big on having educated teachers. If the PLAN really do have many of the best on board then the Liaoning will not be China's last carrier.

I was in Shanghai last month and I took a cruise down to the Yangtze delta, I was surprised at the amount of naval building going on, they had almost a dozen ships in the yards of various states of completion. Looked to be mainly Destroyers and Amphibs. I've heard the PLAN’s new Destroyers (Lanzhou class?) are meant to be fairly decent AAW bits of kit, anyone know any more on them?

This new Carrier isn’t designed to be a deployable asset as far as I know, they’re going to use it to train up pilots for carrier operations. They’ve also built a mock up of the ships flight deck far inland, presumably for the same reason. I wouldn’t be surprised if they’re already laying down their own indigenous carriers at the moment. We are most certainly seeing China laying the seeds for a blue water Navy capable of significant power projection. That’s not an immediate threat to the US, America has, for economic reasons, going to have to give China a fairly broad spectrum of movement for the time being, but, as others have said, it’d be a worry for Japan. As it already stands tensions are high between the two, but the Japanese are constitutionally bounded not to have offensive weaponry, which a carrier most assuredly is. This is more than just political convenience too, recall that when Japan sent non combatant personnel to Iraq there was political uproar and domestic unrest. I’m not too such building a Carrier fleet would be popular in Government or public circles in Japan.

The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force is technologically superior, I reckon, to the PLAN. The Japanese helicopter destroyers are most formidable ships. Only Americans can look at them and correctly say that their least carrier is far better than the best Japan can muster. Any other nation but America would be saying that the anti-shipping role, the anti-submarine role and the ampibious landing support role, the Japanese have covered better than any other nation. Their navy is the best. [after the USN]

The PLAN is playing catch-up. This stage of the game has only just begun. Where some indications are needed is whether or not Japan is prepared to confront China. I am not at all convinced that Japan is prepared to confront China even if the strategic and tactical advantage lies with them. This is not where I expected my thoughts to be. China is warning Japan to pull back on territorial claims. The evidence that I have presently observed suggests that the Japanese will fade when the Chinese play hardball.

China's aircraft carrier air operations have started on "Liaoning" (ex-Varyag)

Shortly after its official delivery and commissioning to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy last month, China's first aircraft carrier has already started training for air operations with helicopters and naval jets.Pictures have emerged on the Chinese internet showing a Shenyang J-15 fighter performing "touch and go" maneuvers onboard Liaoning, indicating that the Chinese Navy is wasting no time in training its crew for carrier air operations.The Shenyang J-15 is a carrier-based fighter aircraft in development by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and the 601 Institute specifically for the Chinese Navy's of a carrier based jet to be operated from its newly commissioned aircraft carrier. While the J-15 is based on Russian-designed Sukhoi Su-33, it is reported to share a large portion of electronics and avionics with the J-11.

That is all most impressive. Did say that because the PLAN had gone through her ranks to select the best and brightest, this only makes sense if the Liaoning is going to be the training and development model for a fleet of carriers. Just so the skills and programes developed are not lost and to maximise the return on the massive investmwent in naval personnel, the next carriers have to be in commission before Liaoning needs a major refit.

On board the Liaoning right now a whole lot of training, operations and maintenance manuals are being written or rewritten. There is no point in having these just to rewrite them. The PLAN will want some of the crew ready for training a new crew in about two years, maybe a little more or a little less. It is simply an issue of human resource management. In a couple of years of no expense spared training, at least some of these boys and girls will have hit close to their peak. If they are put out on other ships while the carrier is refitted they will not start from scratch but they will have gone a long way backwards. More especially, these high quality recruits will be using up their irreplaceable prime operational and teaching years. Some of them will be used up. The longer the time period the more that will be used up.

Next time I read that the PLAN will launch a pair of new carriers within two years, I expect it will be true.

most impressive video . more importantly did you notice the FOD walkdown . The Chinese are not making mistakes with this new evolution in naval capability . The Sky Jump is a dead end however for now it works.