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Tuesday, June 30, 2015

Earlier this year in March, the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) published the latest version of its
bylaws
which shall apply to the licensing practices of its members in so far as they relate
to the technology standards prescribed by the IEEE. Given that a lot has
already been written about the policy, I am not sure if I can add a new perspective
to it. Therefore, these series of posts I intend to pen may be treated as my
on-going attempts to make sense of the policy given its relevance to my current
body of work.

Articles 6 and
7 of the policy deal with the patent and copyright policies respectively. In this
post, I review certain aspects of the Patent policy, which I believe are significant
developments in SEP jurisprudence. Article 6.1 which contains the definitions
defines “Compliant Implementation” thus:

“Compliant Implementation” shall mean any
product (e.g., component,
sub-assembly, or end-product) or service that conforms to any mandatory
or optional portion of a normative clause of an IEEE Standard.

At a time when there is little or no judicial guidance, much less
clarity, on whether the policy of the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) envisages an obligation on SEP owners to grant FRAND-encumbered
licenses to component manufacturers such as chipset makers, the IEEE’s definition
of “compliant implementation” must be welcomed for its expansive scope and clarity.
The definition expressly treats a component or sub-assembly, and not just the
end-product, as product for the purposes of standard compliant implementation.

Although Intel has advanced a similar position in its amicus
briefbefore the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in Apple v. Motorola, the brief does
not undertake a systematic interpretation of terms such as “Manufacture”, “Equipment”
and “Methods” which have been defined in the ETSI IPR policy.
This is not to say that Intel’s argument is without basis, but the reasoning in
the brief could have been more comprehensive so as to deal with and negate the
position that only end-product manufacturers are entitled to a FRAND license
under the ETSI IPR policy. Fortunately, the IEEE policy leaves very little to
imagination in this regard giving the impression that the framers of this
policy have drawn important lessons from the ongoing debate with respect to the
ETSI policy.

The other important definition, perhaps a more critical one, is that of
an “Essential Patent Claim” which is defined as follows:

““Essential
Patent Claim” shall mean any Patent Claim the practice of which was necessary
to implement either a mandatory or
optional portion of a normative clause of the IEEE Standard when, at
the time of the IEEE Standard’s approval, there was no commercially and
technically feasible non-infringing alternative implementation method for such
mandatory or optional portion of the normative clause. An Essential Patent
Claim does not include any Patent Claim that was essential only for Enabling
Technology or any claim other than that set forth above even if contained in
the same patent as the Essential Patent Claim”

It is pertinent to note that the definition includes both
mandatory and optional portions of an IEEE standard. In other words, even if a
patent claim covers an optional portion of an IEEE standard, it shall be deemed to be an Essential Patent Claim. It would be interesting to see a Court
interpret this definition in the future in light of Fujitsu
v. Netgear, where the subject-matter of the dispute related to IEEE standards. In this decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that where a portion
of a standard is optional:…standards
compliance alone would not establish that the accused infringer chooses to
implement the optional section. In these instances, it is not sufficient for
the patent owner to establish infringement by arguing that the product
admittedly practices the standard, therefore it infringes. In these cases, the
patent owner must com-pare the claims to the accused products or, if
appropriate, prove that the accused products implement any relevant optional
sections of the standard. This should alleviate any concern about the use
of standard compliance in assessing patent infringement. Only in the situation where a patent covers every possible
implementation of a standard will it be enough to prove infringement by showing
standard compliance.”

In view of this test, can the updated definition of an Essential Patent Claim prevail over the Federal Circuit Court’s ruling? Given that ruling of the
Court, and not IEEE’s bylaws, has the force of law as to what constitutes "essential" and how essentiality may be established, the definition may not be of
much use to patentees who claim ownership of IEEE standards in circumventing the test laid down by the Court.

The other interesting aspect of the definition of an Essential Patent
Claim is its express exclusion of any enabling technology. “Enabling Technology” has been defined thus:

““Enabling Technology” shall mean any technology that
may be necessary to make or use any product or portion thereof that complies
with the IEEE Standard but is neither explicitly required by nor expressly set
forth in the IEEE Standard (e.g., semiconductor manufacturing technology, compiler
technology, object oriented technology, basic operating system technology, and
the like)”

According to this definition, it appears that owners of essential patent
claims cannot extend their claim of essentiality over or treat as essential
those patent claims which are directed towards technologies/products that enable
the implementation of an IEEE standard. In other words, since an IEEE standard could be silent on the actual manner of its enablement, a patentee
which allegedly owns a Standard Essential Patent cannot claim that a specific
enabling technology is essential for the implementation of the standard since
there could be multiple ways of implementing the standard.This does not mean
that infringement cannot be alleged by the patentee. It only means that as
opposed to using the claim of essentiality to establish infringement, the
patentee would need to demonstrate a claim-based infringement using the conventional claim-to-product comparison. Therefore, only if the patent contains a claim which covers a particular manner of enablement
of the standard or a product which facilitates enablement, it would be available for the patentee to allege infringement based on the claim since the essentiality of the patent cannot aid him in this regard. In this sense, the definitions of Essential Patent Claim and Enabling Technology strike a distinction between technology/product which enables the implementation of the Essential Patent Claim and technology/product which actually implements/uses the Essential Patent Claim. This is yet another interesting aspect of the definitions whose
interpretation and application by Courts is bound to generate divergent views. In the next post, I shall continue with my review of the IEEE patent policy.

Friday, June 5, 2015

The erstwhile Companies
Act, 1956 provided for certain trademark remedies under Sections 20 and 22. Section 20 spelt out the criteria for names which were deemed “undesirable”
for registration as company names and Section
22 provided the mechanism for rectification of a company name. A more
rationalized framework for rectification is available under Section 16 of the
current Companies Act, 2013.

Extracted below is Section 16 of the 2013 Act:

16. (1) If, through inadvertence or otherwise, a
company on its first registration or on its registration by a new name, is
registered by a name which,—

(a) in the opinion of the Central Government, is
identical with or too nearly resembles the name by which a company in existence
had been previously registered, whether under this Act or any previous company
law, it may direct the company to change its name and the company shall change
its name or new name, as the case may be, within a period of three months from
the issue of such direction, after adopting an ordinary resolution for the
purpose;

(b) on an application by a registered proprietor of a
trade mark that the name is identical with or too nearly resembles to a
registered trade mark of such proprietor under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, made
to the Central Government within three years of incorporation or registration
or change of name of the company, whether under this Act or any previous
company law, in the opinion of the Central Government, is identical with or too
nearly resembles to an existing trade mark, it may direct the company to change
its name and the company shall change its name or new name, as the case may be,
within a period of six months from the issue of such direction, after adopting
an ordinary resolution for the purpose.

(2) Where a company changes its name or obtains a new
name under sub-section (1), it shall within a period of fifteen days from the
date of such change, give notice of the change to the Registrar along with the
order of the Central Government, who shall carry out necessary changes in the
certificate of incorporation and the memorandum.

(3) If a company makes default in complying with any
direction given under sub-section (1), the company shall be punishable with
fine of one thousand rupees for every day during which the default continues
and every officer who is in default shall be punishable with fine which shall
not be less than five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.

From the provision, it is clear that while Clause (b) of sub-Section (1)
allows only a registered proprietor of a trademark to apply to the Central
Government for rectification of the name of a company whose name is identical
to or “too nearly resembles” the registered trademark, the remedy under Clause (a)
is not limited to a registered proprietor of a trademark. In other words, a
company whose name is not a registered trademark too could invoke Clause (a) to seek rectification of the name of another company whose name is
identical or too nearly resembles its own. This is an additional expeditious remedy to a suit for passing off if the
trademark is used as a company name by a third party.

The remedy under Clause (a), which was available even under Section
22 of the erstwhile 1956 Act (albeit through a circuitous procedure), has probably been provided for in recognition of and as a counterpart to the action for
passing off available to owners of unregistered trademarks under the Trademarks
Act, 1999. That said, it is to be borne that while Clause (b) permits a registered proprietor of a trademark to apply for rectification of a company's name even if the former does not use the registered trademark as a company name, the remedy under Clause (a) is available only if both the applicant for rectification and the company against whom rectification is sought, use the trademark as company names. In this sense, the remedy under Clause (a) is narrower. On the positive side, while under Clause (b) a registered proprietor is
required to make an application for rectification within three years of
incorporation or registration or change of name of the company with respect to
whom the rectification is sought, there appears to be no such limitation period
under Clause (a).

The rule that corresponds to Section 16 is Rule 8 of the Companies
(Incorporation) Rules, 2014 (which came into force on April 1, 2014) that enumerates detailed criteria to be mandatorily considered in deeming a proposed
company name undesirable for registration under the Companies Act. Interestingly,
Rule 8(2)(a) also deems undesirable a name which includes a trade mark that is subject of an application for registration under the Trademarks Act, 1999, unless the consent of the applicant for trademark registration has been
obtained and produced by the promoters of the company.

Rule 8(2)(b),
among other things, also bars a proposed company name which:

A. is identical with or too nearly
resembles the name of a limited liability partnership

B. resembles closely the popular
or abbreviated description of an existing company or limited liability
partnership

C. is identical with or too nearly
resembles the name of a company or limited liability partnership incorporated
outside India and reserved by such company or limited liability partnership
with the Registrar of Companies under Section 4 of the Act (read with Rule 9)

D. is identical to the name of a
company dissolved as a result of liquidation proceeding and a period of two
years have not elapsed from the date of such dissolution

E. is identical with or too nearly
resembles the name of a limited liability partnership in liquidation or the
name of a limited liability partnership which is struck off up to a period of
five years

F.is generic to the trade

G. contains only the name of a
continent, country, state, city

Clearly, Section 16 and Rule 8 seem designed to provide expeditious
alternatives to suits for trademark infringement and passing off in so far as
the use of marks as company names in concerned. I haven’t thus far come across
an order passed by the Central Government in an application under Section 16 and I am not sure orders
passed under Section 22 of the erstwhile 1956 Act were or are available on the website
of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. If they are not, they ought to be made
available because it is important to know the quality of reasoning adopted by
the Ministry in allowing or rejecting such applications. I request readers to share any such orders that they may be aware of.

Thursday, June 4, 2015

In my last
post I reviewed and differed with the decision of the Bombay High Court in Tata Sons & Anr. v. The State
of Maharashtra & Anr. wherein the central question was whether Tata
Sons’ Agreement for use of the Tata trademark with its group companies resulted
in transfer of right to use the mark to the latter. In this post, the idea is
to enquire deeper into the concept of “transfer” so as to understand the
distinction between a license to the use goods (including a trademark) and
transfer of right to use the goods.

Let’s start by breaking down “transfer of right to use the goods” into
its constituents. It cannot be denied that there is a clear distinction between
“right to use the goods” and “transfer of right to use the goods”. “Right to
use the goods” is perhaps synonymous with “permission to use the goods”, which
is very different from “transfer of the right to use goods”. In the case of “transfer”,
the common understanding of the term is that it results in conveyance of title
in the property, or one of the bundle of rights in the property to a third party.
Therefore, to equate transfer of right to use with a mere right to use would be
erroneous. A mere right to use the property with the consent of the owner of
the owner of the property is a license. However, if one of the rights in the
property, say the right of possession, were to be transferred by the owner of
the property to another party, it would result in transfer of the right of
possession, even if such transfer is for a limited period of time. It must also
be borne that transfer results in excluding the owner of the property as well
from exercising the right so transferred. It is for this reason that an
exclusive license (i.e. to the exclusion of the right owner and all third
parties) for howsoever a limited period of time, could qualify as transfer of
right to use.

“(32) Coming to the question that a
transaction in question is in the nature of a contract of bailment, it is true
that the High Court of Bombay in the judgment under appeal has taken the view
that the transactions of the transfer of the right to use goods are in the
nature of bailment. If such a view is taken then the State would not have the
power to levy sales tax on such transactions. Unless such transaction is held to be a sale or deemed sale in law and
it is only then the State legislature would be competent to enact law to levy
tax under Entry 54 of List II of Seventh Schedule. The levy of tax is not on
use of goods but on the transfer of right to use goods. The High Court
proceeded on the footing that the transfer of right to use is different from
sale or deemed sale without considering the legal fiction engrafted in clause
(29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the view that
the reasoning of the High Court in upholding the Explanation to Section 2(10)
of the Act is not tenable in law.”

As the Court rightly notes, in understanding the import of the words “transfer
of right to use goods”, it is important to understand the need for treating
such transfer of right to use as deemed sale for the purposes of taxation. Extracted
below is Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution, which
enumerates transactions that are deemed sales and to which sales tax applies:

(29A). Tax on the sale or purchase
of goods' includes –

(a) a tax on the transfer,
otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of property in any goods for cash,
deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

(b) a tax on the transfer of
property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) Involved in the
execution of a works contract;

(c) a tax on the delivery of goods
on hire-purchase or any system of payment by instalments;

(d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for
any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment
or other valuable consideration;

(e) a tax on the supply of goods
by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof for cash,
deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

(f) a tax on the supply, by way of
or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being
food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not
intoxicating), where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or
other valuable consideration, and such transfer, delivery or supply of any
goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the
transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to
whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made.

It is evident from that above that Sub-clause (d) of Clause (29A) treats
transfer of right to use goods as deemed sale. As I said in the last post, the
purpose of the legal fiction created by the Constitution (or State legislations) to deem transfer of right to
use goods as “sale”, is to tax transfer of divisible rights (even if such
transfer is for a limited period) despite the title in the goods remaining with
the transferor. This fiction helps to prevent mischief in instances
where a transaction, which for all intents and purposes is a sale of a right
(if not the good itself), is sought to be couched as a license. However, the concept of transfer remains unaltered i.e. the
result of the transaction must be to the exclusion of the owner and all third
parties for it to acquire the status of a transfer. Simply stated, exclusivity, for howsoever limited a period, is inherent in transfer of any
kind. This
view finds resonance in the following observations of the Supreme Court in Twentieth Century:

“64. A perusal of
Sub-clause (d) shows that the tax, envisaged therein, is on the transfer of the
right to use any goods for any purpose, the period of use may or may not be
specified, the consideration whereof may be cash, deferred payment or any other
valuable consideration (need not necessarily be cash consideration). As the tax
is on the transfer of right to use any goods, we shall ascertain the meaning of
the word 'transfer'.

65. In The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary 1993 Edition, Volume 2, Page 3367, its meaning is given,
inter alia, as follows: '(Law)-conveyance of property, especially of stock of
shares, from one person to another.' In Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition,
Page 1497, the word 'transfer' is
defined to mean, inter alia, "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property
or with an interest in property...'. In Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 87,
Page 892, it is defined to mean, "common
use of the word 'transfer' is, to denote the passing of title in property or an
interest therein from one person to another and in that sense the term means
that the owner of the property delivers it to another person with the intent of
passing the rights which he had in it to the latter."

66. Our endeavour
here is to discern what transfer, in the context of Clause (d), means. Is it
simply signing of a document that brings about a transfer of right to use any
goods or is it also necessary to give control of the goods to complete the
transfer with the Intent of passing the right to use the goods to the hirer? A
combined reading of the first and the second limb of Clause (29A) suggests that
mere execution of a document de hors passing the domain of the goods does not
result in transfer of right to use any goods and will not constitute a 'deemed
sale' within the meaning of Clause (29A), The 'deemed sale' envisaged in
Sub-clause (d) involves not only a verbal or written transfer or right to use
any goods but also an overt act by which the transferor places the goods at the
disposal of the transferee to make their use possible. On this construction, it is explicit that the transfer of right to use
any goods involves both passing of a right in as well as domain of the goods in
which right to use is transferred.

72. Reverting to
Sub-clause (d) of Clause (29A), a perusal of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons appended to The Constitution (Forty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, shows that the Parliament has taken note of
the fact that the main right in regard to films relates to its exploitation and
after exploitation for a certain period of time, in most cases, the film ceases
to have any value, so instead of resorting to the outright sale of a film, only
a lease or transfer of the right to exploit the film is made. The device by way
of lease of films has been resulting in avoidance of sales tax so to curb that
device, Sub-clause (d) is inserted in Clause (29A). Even so, Sub-clause (d) is
wider import than a mere leasing of films. It applies to all kinds of
leasing/hiring of goods, for example, leases of plants, machinery, computers,
cars, planes, furniture etc,

73. A sale of any goods is
complete when the property in the goods passes to the purchaser pursuant to a
contract of sale of those goods. So also, a deemed sale of goods under
Sub-clause (d), as has been pointed out above, will be complete when the
control of the goods in which the right to use is transferred, passes to the
transferee under the contract of transfer. Such a transfer of right to use any
goods may be effected either by the execution of a written contract between the
parties indicating the mode by which giving the control or domain of the goods
to the hirer is contemplated or by an oral contract coupled with delivery of
the goods to the hirer. There can be no oral contract with regard to
unascertained goods because there can be no delivery of such goods. Where a written contract exists whether in
regard to ascertained goods or unascertained goods, the intention of the
parties, as evidenced by the terms of the contract to 'transfer of right to use
the goods' is determinative of the fact as to when, how and where the right to
use the goods is transferred. It is a well-settled principle of
interpretation of contracts that the contract must be construed as a whole.
When and where such a deemed sale, under Sub- clause (d), takes place is a
question of fact which has to be decided on the facts and circumstance of each
case, Including the terms and conditions of the contract evidencing the transaction.

74. It may also be pointed out
that though the ingredients of a sale of the goods as defined in the Sales of
Goods Act and a deemed sale of goods as defined in Clause (29A) of Article 366
are different there can be no difference in the incidence of tax and they
cannot be treated differently for the purpose of levy of sales tax.”

These findings of the Court are consistent with Justice Lakshmanan’s enumeration of the ingredients of
transfer of right to use goods in BSNL v. Union of India, whichperhaps captures the spirit of the transaction best, as follows:

“To constitute a
transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must
have the following attributes:

a. There must be
goods available for delivery;

b. There must be a
consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c. The transferee
should have a legal right to use the goods. Consequently all legal consequences
of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be
available to the transferee;

d. For the period
during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to
the transferor. This is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the
statute viz. a "transfer of the right to use" and not merely a
licence to use the goods;

e. Having transferred the right
to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner
cannot again transfer the same rights to others.”

From
these decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the legal
fiction of “deemed sale” does not alter the character and ingredients of “transfer”.
Therefore, grant of a non-exclusive right to use a trademark does not, in my
opinion, amount to “transfer of right to use the mark”. One hopes the decision
of the Bombay High Court in the Tata Sons case is set aside by the Supreme
Court and the law relating to transfer of right to use incorporeal goods such
as IP is laid down with clarity.

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

On January 20, 2015, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court delivered
a 53-page decision in Tata Sons Limited & Anr. v. The State of
Maharashtra & Anr. which assumes significance for IP licensing and taxation.
The broad issue before the Court was the applicability of the Maharashtra Sales Tax on the Transfer of Right to use any Goods for any
Purpose Act, 1985 to the TATA
Brand Equity and Business Promotion Agreement entered into by Tata Sons
with its group companies.

As the name of the Agreement suggests, its
object was to protect, enforce and enhance the image and goodwill of the TATA
name and its brand equity. In a nutshell, the Agreement permitted the
use of the TATA brand name and its trademarks by the Tata Group of companies,
subject to compliance with quality control conditions laid down in the
Agreement by Tata Sons.

The specific issue before the Court was
whether the nature of the transaction between Tata Sons and its group companies
in relation to the permitted use of the brand amounted to “transfer of right to
use any goods for any purpose” within the meaning of the Act. According to the
tax authorities of the State of Maharashtra, Tata Sons was liable to pay sales
tax on the Agreement since the transaction resulted in transfer of right in the Tata trademark (and
therefore amounted to sale within the meaning of the Act), while Tata Sons
contended that there was no transfer of right under the Agreement.

Apart from relying on several decisions of
the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal in support of its contention, Tata Sons also
relied upon the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in BSNL v. Union of India (2006) (links here and here) where the essential
ingredients of a transfer of right to use goods was spelt out by the Supremes. It
was Tata Sons’ contention that the issues considered and the conclusions
arrived at by the Supreme Court in the BSNL case squarely applied to its Agreement
with its group companies.

Following are the ingredients of transfer
of right to use identified by Justice Lakshamanan in the BSNL decision:

“To constitute a transaction for the transfer of
the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

a. There must be goods available
for delivery;

b. There must be a consensus ad
idem as to the identity of the goods;

c. The transferee should have a
legal right to use the goods. Consequently all legal consequences of such use
including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to
the transferee;

d. For the period during which the
transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor.
This is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a
"transfer of the right to use" and not merely a licence to use the
goods;

e. Having transferred the right to
use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner
cannot again transfer the same rights to others.”

Applying the above ingredients to its Agreement, Tata Sons
contended that it did not envisage any kind of transfer of right as required by
the Act for levying of sales tax. The limited purpose of the Agreement,
according to Tata Sons, was to permit its group companies to use the Tata mark
which was a mere license to use the mark, and not transfer of right to use the
mark. It was also submitted that the Agreement was not a composite
one for sale and service, consequently no part of the Agreement lent itself to
the levying of sales tax. Critically, given that non-exclusive rights to use the mark were
created in favour of 113 group companies, there was no
factual or legal basis to arrive at the conclusion that “transfer" of right to
use the mark was either provided by or was a consequence of the Agreement.

Despite these compelling arguments by Tata Sons,
surprisingly the Bombay High Court went on to hold that the transaction
provided for in the Agreement amounted to transfer of right to use goods. Although
it cannot be disputed that goods under the Act include goods of incorporeal or
intangible character such as patents and trademarks, the central issue is
whether the Agreement resulted in a “transfer” of right to use the Tata mark. This
issue, in my humble opinion, was not addressed convincingly by the Court.

A perusal of Paras 40 and 41 of the judgment reveals that the
Court’s reasoning was based on the fallacious assumption that since the Act did
not expressly require “exclusive” transfer, multiple non-exclusive rights of
use being created in favour of third parties by Tata Sons too would amount to “transfer” within
the meaning of the Act. What is astounding is that the Court acknowledged that in
the facts of the case, the right to use the Tata mark was not granted to the group companies to the
exclusion of Tata Sons, and yet concluded that there was a “transfer”
of right to use.

The clear impression that one gets based on a reading of
the judgment is that the Court was swayed entirely by the fact that (a) trademarks
constituted goods and (b) that Tata Sons had created rights in favour of third
parties to use the mark. The requirement of “transfer”, which is a condition
precedent for application of the Act to a transaction, appears to have been
given a complete go by. In the process, the Court has blurred a critical
distinction between a trademark license and the transfer of right to use a
trademark. Simply put, if an agreement between a trademark owner and a third
party which permits non-exclusive use of the trademark by such
third party in return for payment of royalty is not a license to use the
trademark, then what constitutes a license so as to not attract the levying of
sales tax?

In my opinion, the purpose of the legal fiction created by the Act to
deem transfer of right to use goods as “sale” is to tax transfer of divisible
rights (even if such transfer is for a limited period) despite the title in the
goods remaining with the transferor. Further, this fiction helps to prevent
mischief in instances where a transaction, which for all intents and purposes
is a sale of a right (if not the good itself), is sought to be couched as a
license. That said, I dont believe the concept of what constitutes transfer is altered
i.e. the result of the transaction must be to the exclusion of the owner and all
third parties for it to acquire the status of a transfer. Although the Act may not use the word “exclusive”, in my opinion, exclusivity for howsoever limited a period is inherent in transfer of any kind. To delve deeper into the issue, in the next few posts I will look into what constitutes "transfer" in general and for the specific purpose of taxation. Fortunately, the Bombay High
Court’s decision is not final since Tata Sons has preferred an appeal before
the Supreme Court. It would be interesting to see how the Supreme Courts treats
IP licenses.