The English translation of the Mimamsaslokavarttika, the magnumopus of Kumarilabhatta was prepared by Dr. Ganganath Jha and published by the Asiatic Society during 1900-1908. The work was long out of print. But the demand for the same persisted. The Society in its bicentenary year decided to issue a reprint of the same as a mark of respect to the learned translator who utilised both the Kasika of Sucaritamisra and the Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathimisra, which ascertain the view of Kumarila. I am happy that the book is available again to our scholars and researches.

Introduction

The word Mimasa more properly Purva Mimansa is applied to the system originally propounded by Jaimini. The other names given to this system are Pureakanda Karma Mimansa, Karmakanda, Yajnavidya, Adhvaramimansa, Dharmamimansa and so forth some people evern speak of it as the Dvadacalackshmi.

Inasmuch as the avowed object of this system is a consideration of Dharma it is commonly spoken of as Dharmanimansa of the Veda there are three sections or kandas. The Karmakanda the Upasanakanda and the juanankanda and it is only that portion of the Veda which is contained in the first of these that is dealt with in the purva mimansa and for this reason it is spoken of as purvukanda purvamimansa or karmamimansa. Though the karmakanda of the Veda treats of many such actions as sacrifice only. And for this reason people speak of this as yajnamimansa or Adhvara mimansa.

This consideration of dharma is found to consist of twelve parts and these parts have been put by Jaimini in the form of twelve Adhyayas and hence the system has come to be known by the name of Dvadacalaskshani.

For a detailed explanation of the subject matter of each Adhyaya and adhikaransa the render is referred to the Appendix.

While Chiefly dealing with these subjects Jaimini has in many places dealt with other things in connection with these. It is clear that all that is treated of by Jaimini is chiefly Vedic. In the work known as the Veda beginningless and authorless were found mentioned here and there at random many sacrifices offerings &c. and hence it was very difficult to understand and grasp the methods and procedure of the various sacrifices &c: Consequently at the time of the performance of a sacrifice at each step the performers would meet with serious doubts and difficulties. And all this difficulty has once for all been set aside by Jamini by means of the sutras dealt with here. And it was only after the Mimansa philosophy had been duly propounded that the path of karmakanda became easy.

At the very outset Jaimini divided the Vedic sentences into two kinds. The mantra and the Brahmana the former is now known as the Sauhita Rgveda samhita &c. there are many Brahmanas that we known as Upanishat the Brhadaranyaka and the ohandogya. Then again he proceeds to sub divide these two kinds into other sorts the Rk the sama and the yaju.

The definitions that he lays down for the differentiation of the mantra and the Brahmana are embodied in the sutras II -i-32 and 33 wherein it is said that which at the time of the performance of a sacrifice points out certain details in connection with it is called Mantra and the rest are called Brahmana. But the earlier author have distinctly declared that this definition of Mantra is only a tentative one as there are many Mantras that do not fulfill the conditions herein laid down and are yet called Mantras. The mantras in reality take the place of aphorisms dealing with sacrificial details and the Brahmanas are commentaries on them in fact they are frequently spoken of as such by Cankaracarya.

Rk Yajush and Sama are the three sub divisions of the said two divisions of the Veda. Among Mantras and Brahmanas that sentence wherein we have distinct divisions into feet is calle a Rk (Sutra II-i-35) the other names of which are Rca, Cloka, Mnatra the sentence that are capable of being sung are known as Sama (II-i-36) the rest are called yajush )II-i-37).

The text of the Mimansa philosophy is the most extensive of all the Sutras have twelve Adhyayas divided into sixty padas containing about 1,000 Sutras, dealing with 1,000 sections or Adhikaranas.

The word Adhikarana really means discussion Consideration Inquiry Investigation. In the Mimansa we find that each discussion is made up of five parts viz: (1) Vishaya the subject matter under consideration (2) vipaya or suncaya the doubt arising of the opponent and the arguments in support thereof (4) Uttara or Siddhanta the demonstrated conclusion (5) Sanguti Relevancy of the discussion with the particular context. Some author explain uttara as the arguments against the view of the opponent and instead of Sangati they have Nirmaya which then explain as siddhanta. This system of discussion is adopted more or less in all the Sanskrit philosophical systems.

The sutras are all arranged in the above order of discussion. But a mere reading of the Sutras does not afford us any idea as to where a discussions ends and another begins. For all these as also for a proper understanding of the Sutras themselves we have to fall back upon certain commentaries upon the sutras.

Of these commentaries and commentaries on commentaries we have an almost endless series. The oldest commentary on the sutras that is available now is the Bhashya by Cavara Svami (published in the bibliothen Indica) though we find this bhashya referring to other commentaries chief among which is the Vrtti of the revered Upavarsha. On the Bhashya we have the commentary of Kumarila Bhatta generally spoken of as Bhatta. This work is divided into three parts known under three different names (1) Clokavartika treating of the first the Tarka (polemical) Pada of the first adhyaya (published in the caukhambha sanskirt series Benares). (2) the Tantravartika dealing with the last three Padas of Adhyaya 1 and the whole of Adhyayas II and III (published in the Benares Sasnkrit series and being translated into English by the present translator) and (3) the Tuptika dealing with Adhyayas IV-XII (Published in the Benares Sanskrit Series ). On the first of these we know of two commentaries (1) the Kavika by sucarita Micra and (2) the Nyayaratnakara of parthasarathi Miera (published in the Caukhambha Sanskrit series Benares) extracts from these two commentaries have been put in as notes in the present work and (3) the Nyayasudha of Someovara Bhatta. On the second the only commentary we know of is the Nyayasudha generally known as Banaka by somevara Bhatta (in course of publication in the Caukhambha Sanskrit Series Benares) and on the third we have only one vartikabharana by Venkata dikshita the other the tantraratna cannot be spoken of as a commentary in the proper sense of the word as it is a semi independent commentary on the sutras themselves though here and therer taking up and explaining certain passages from the Bhashya and the Vartika. This closes the list of works indirectly dealing with the present work.

CONTENTS

Sutra I.

Subject-matter of the Treatise

1-20

Introduction (1)

1

Purpose of the Mimansa ? Castra (11)

2

Connection of the Castra (19)

3

Various interpretations of the opening passage of the Bhashya (26)

4

First Interpretation: Universal Explanation (28)

4

Second Interpretation: Censure (33)

5

Third Interpretation: Disavowal (37)

5

Fourth Interpretation: Specification (46-47)

7

Fifth Interpretation: Praise (59)

10

Sixth Interpretation: Objection to the use of the word 'atha' (60)

10

Meaning of the word 'atha' ? Sequence (61)

10

What is implied by this Sequence: Study of the Veda (69-70)

11

Other significations of the Sutra (78-82)

13

Preclusion of Studies other than that of the Veda (82)

13

Negation of the Bath before Investigation of Dharma (87-88)

14

Signification of the Bath (100-101)

17

Signification of the Bath word 'atah' (110)

18

Meaning of the word 'Dharmajijnasa (115-17)

18

The Usefulness of Investigation of Dharma (122)

19

Sutra II.

Definition of Dharma

21-66

Authority or Means of knowing Dharma (1)

21

Meaning of the word 'Codana' (3)

21

Duplicate implication of the Sutra (3)

22

Authoritativeness of Word (5)

22

'Codana' = Word (7)

22

Significations of the word 'lakshana' (9-10)

22

The Character of Dharma lies not in the Sacrifice itself, but in its capacity of bringing about auspicious results (13)

23

Preclusion of all other Means of knowledge from the case of Dharma (16)

24

Authority of the Veda questioned (21)

24

Self-evident character of the Veda: Does authoritativeness lie in the conception itself, or is it extraneous? (33)

26

The theory of the extraneous characters of authoritativeness (38)

27

The theory refuted (47)

28

Notion of un-authoritativeness due to extraneous influences (53)

29

Three forms of un-authoritativeness (54)

29

Excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of un-authoritativeness (65-66)

31

Absence of an Author safeguards the Veda against all reproach (68)

31

Only human assertions dependent upon other Pramanas (71)

32

The authoritativeness of Pramanas does not lie in their compatiblity with one another (73)

32

The falsity of a Conception explained (86)

33

Inference not applicable to Veda (89)

34

Undisputed authority of the Veda (95-96)

35

Veda not due to human origin (97-98)

35

Falsity due to non-productiveness of conception (101-102)

36

'Pratyayita' explained (102-103)

36

Force of the word 'Va' (109-10)

37

No omniscient person (111)

38

Inference and Sense-perception not applicable to objects in the future (115)

38

Veda not the work of an Omniscient Author (120)

39

Scriptures composed by human beings not fully authoritative (122)

39

No grounds for assuming the existence of an omniscient person (132)

41

The character of the Veda itself does not lend support to the theory an Omniscient Author (149)

43

Absurdity incurred in denying the authority of the Veda (154)

43

The sentence 'Nanvavidusham,' explained (155)

44

The Buddhistic Scriptures false, because composed by human beings (169)

46

The sentence 'Nanu samanyatodrshtam explained (174-75)

46

The sentence 'Na, anyatwat' explained (175)

47

The sentence 'Na hi anyasya, explained (181-82)

48

Arguments in support of the authenticity of the Veda (184)

48

'Pratyakshastu, explained (187)

49

Full signification of the word 'Dharma' (190)

49

Other meanings refuted (195-96)

50

No Apurva apart from a potentiality of the Sacrifice (197)

51

Objections based upon the significance of the word 'Codana' (201)

51

Reply to these: Codana cannot be restricted to positive activity only (200)

53

Codana refers to Injunctions as well as Prohibitions (215-16)

54

Two kinds of consequences following from Sacrifices (221-22)

54

Action not prohibited cannot be sinful (232-33)

57

Result not always similar to the Action (235-36)

57

Vedic Injunctions and Prohibitions the only means of knowing Dharma and Adharma (242-43)

59

Utilitarian theory of Virtue not tenable (246-47)

59

Nor the 'Conscience' theory (247-48)

59

Sacrificial Slaughter not sinful (259)

61

'Cyena' sacrifice sinful, because resulting in the death of a person (267)

62

Interpretation of the Sutra justified (277-78)

64

Sutra III.

Declaration of the subject-matter

67

Declaration of the subject-matter of the Treatise (1-2)

67

Sutra IV.

Sense-perception not the means of knowing Dharma

68-112

The Sutra cannot be taken an embodying a definition of Sense-perception (1)

68

Change of reading proposed by the Vrtti, with a view to make it a regular definition (13)

69

Trae meaning of the Sutra (20)

70

Sense-perception not applicable to Dharma (36)

73

Necessity of the word 'sat' (36)

73

The particle 'sam' (38-39)

74

Functioning of the senses explained (44)

74

The words' purusha' and 'indriya' (52)

76

Buddhijanma,' (53-54)

76

Why Sense-perception is not applicable to Dharma (59)

77

Self-recognition not the true result of Pramana (79)

80

Inference, & preceded by Sense-perception (87)

82

Inference not applicable to Dharma (99)

84

Analogy not applicable to Dharma (100)

85

Apparent Inconsistency not applicable to Dharma (101-102)

85

Veda the only means of knowing Dharma (108)

86

Inference is based upon Sense-perception (111)

87

Vedanta theory controverted (114-116)

87

Abstract perception of an object (118-19)

88

Abstract ? How made Concrete (120)

88

Cognition of Class cannot be inferential (138)

92

Samavaya (148)

94

Mixed functioning of various sense-organs (159)

96

The numbers of Senses only Five (169)

98

Exclusive objects of the Senses-organs differentiated (170)

98

Cognition of objects not in the form of identification with their verbal expressions (172)

98

Cognition of objects independent of verbal expressions (176)

99

The class 'cow' not cognized always in the form of the word 'cow' (180)

100

Apparent identity of the Word, the Idea, and the Object explained (183)

100

Imposition of the form of the word on the object is impossible (183)

101

Words not independent of the material forms of objects (193)

102

In the expression 'blue lotus,' there can be no absolute non-difference between a particular blueness and a particular lotus (197)

103

Another reason against the imposition of the forms of words upon objects (200)

104

Until the object is known, the Word cannot give any idea of it (203)

105

Objects do not depend upon words (205)

105

It is the form of the object that is cognised through the Word, which cannot suppress it (206)

105

If verbal forms were imposed upon words, the meaning of the word 'hasta' would differ from that of the word 'kara' (203)

105

The Imposition theory would falsify all Inference and Verbal Testimony (213)

106

The form of the Object not dependent upon Word (215)

106

The relationship between Words and Objects it eternal (219)

106

In the case of Proper Names also, the words are eternal: it is only their particular application that has a beginning in time (224)

108

Denotativeness of words not always due to Convention (226)

108

Conventional restriction explained (228)

109

The factors of Memory and Perception explained (230-31)

109

Sense-perception precisely explained (236-37)

110

Cognitions undefined only so long as words are not found (245-46)

111

It is the Classes of Objects and their various relationships (as expressed in inferential arguments) that are amenable to Sense-perception, which would not be possible if Perceptive Cognition were always undefined (247-48)

111

The name of 'Sense-perception' applicable to only such cognitions as follow directly from Sense-contact (255)

112

Sutra V.

Authoritativeness of Injunction

113-408

Section 1: Vartika proper on the Sutra

112-16

Dharma not amenable to any other Means of Knowledge (2)

113

Injunction, the only means of knowing it (8)

114

Necessity of having recourse to Injunction (14)

115

Section 2: Introduction to the Vrtti on the Sutra

116-19

Transposition of the words 'tat' and 'sat' in Sutra (4), makes it a definition of Sense-perception (19-20)

116

Section 3: Nirdlambanavada

119-48

Necessity of the Discussion (1-3)

119

Reality of External Objects (4)

119

'Samurti Reality' synonymous with 'falsity' (8-9)

120

Pleasures of Heaven not similar to Dreams (11)

120

Diversity of opinion among various scions of the Bauddhas (14-16)

120

Two kinds of Denial of External Objects (17-18)

121

The Idealistic Position Expounded (20-22)

121

The Reply given by the Bhashya held by some people to be inadequate (28-29)

123

The Reply otherwise explained (30)

123

Necessity of the Reality of the External Word (32)

123

Denial of the Reality of Conceptions renders even the Bauddha tenet untenable (34)

124

Impossibility of Inference, if objects not real (35)

124

Denial of the reality of external objects is self-contradictory (53)

127

Superfluity of the Idealistic Argument (60)

128

Cognitions are without substratum only at the time of their actual appearance (63)

129

If Cognitions were always without substratum they would never be amenable to Inferential Argumentation (65-66)

129

Universally recognised Distinctions between Virtue and Vice, Teacher and Pupil, &, would not be possible, if there were no reality in objects (72-73)

130

Idealism contradicted by facts of ordinary experience (74)

130

If all Ideas are false, there is universal negation (74-75)

130

Counter-argument against Idealism (79-80)

131

Certain self-contradictions in the Idealistic theory (81-82)

132

If idealism be accepted, all systems of Philosophy are equally false (85-87)

133

There could be no distinction between false dream cognition and true waking cognition, both being equally unreal (88-89)

133

No Yogic faculty can supply the necessary explanation (93-94)

132

Another self-contradiction in the Idealistic theory (99-100)

135

The Middle Term of the Idealistic Argument is one that is not recognised by the other party (101-102)

135

The Middle Term of the Argument contradictory and the Instance incompatible (106-107)

136

The causes of certain common delusions explained (109-13)

137

Only mistaken cognitions can be said to be devoid of real substratum (117-19)

138

No Instance of Dissimilarity mentioned in the Idealistic Argument (121-22)

138

The Mention of such an Instance would involve a double negation, ie., an affirmation ? which would be impossible if no objects existed (124-25)

139

A reasoning to be effective must be acceptable to both parties (130-31)

140

The Argument brought forward by the Idealist should contain nothing that he does not accept to be true (143)

141

That which is now held to be unreal could never have been real (156)

142

No reality can proceed from a reasoning that is unreal (159)

142

The Chief Elements in the reasoning of the Idealist are admittedly unreal (163)

143

Worldly activity not explicable by mere Idea (169)

143

No specification of Vasana Possible (178-79)

144

No proof for the existence of Vasana (180-81)

144

Vasanas, even if extant, could never bring about effects in a serial order (192-93)

146

It is only a permanent soul that can serve as the substratum of Vasanas (199-200)

147

Buddha propounded the Idealsitic theory with the sole view of turning the minds of men away from wordly objects (202)

148

Section 4: Cunyavada

148-82

Inferential Idealistic arguments expounded in detail (2-63)

No difference between the shape of the Cognition and the Cognised (6)

148

It is only that which is Cognised that can have an existence (7)

148

The Shape cognised cannot belong to the external object (9)

149

The character of the Cogniser cannot be attributed to the Object (13)

149

The real character of Cognitions is absolutely pure, and it is only ever-continuing Vasanas that make it appear in diverse forms (15-17)

149

Another reason for attributing the form to Cognitions (21)

150

Otherwise the Cognition could not appear prior to the comprehension of the Objects (25)

150

Third Argument to show that the form belongs to Cognitions (32)

151

The form of the Object cannot be said to be imposed upon the Cognition (35)

151

The form cannot be held to be a property of the contact of the Cognition with the Object (42)

152

Any such Contact not possible in the case (43)

152

The Idea and the Object both cannot have the same form (55)

153

Refutation of the above arguments (64-263)

Idea cannot be both the Cogniser and the Cognised (64)

154

The case of Self is different ? It can be both ? This fact explained (67)

155

There is often an idea of the Cognisable Object without that of the Cognising Idea (79)

156

The comprehension of the Object alone, or of te Idea alone, cannot be explained on the mere ground of Capability or Incapability (95)

158

The difference between Object and Idea not one of Time and Form only (100)

159

Predicability and Knowability explained (103)

159

No absolute difference between any two objects (105)

160

Cognition being one, the difference in conceptions is due to a diversity among objects (116)

161

A single object never cognised as both Comprehender and Comprehended (120)

Apoha cannot form the denotation of words, because it refers to Individuals (128)

319

Specially as no such intervening factor as 'Apohavattva' is possible (129-30)

319

No implication of the Apoha possible (133)

320

No gender, &c., could apply to the Apoha (135)

320

The individual is not implied by the Apoha (136)

320

The Apohas of gender, &c., could not be the object of Specification (137)

321

In the case of Verbs, there is no notion of Negation (139)

321

There can be no negation in a double negative (140)

321

Mutual Interdependence involved in basing Apoha upon the mutual negation of objects (147)

322

Non-Negation of the Class cannot be postulated (149-50)

322

The Apohist cannot explain 'Rajnah purushah' (157)

324

A negation cannot have properties (163)

324

Naiyayika argument against Apoha not tenable (165)

326

Refutation of Apoha must be based upon usage (176)

328

Section 15: Vanavada

329-47

The parts of the Cow are related to the Class, through the Individual (1)

329

The parts are not Manifesters of the Class (4)

329

The bring about the Idea of the Class (7)

330

Various usages based upon ideas of Class (15)

331

Meaning of the word 'Akrti' (16)

331

It cannot mean shape (17)

332

Specification of Class due to peculiarities of colour, &c. (26-27)

333

Class inhering in each Individual is perceived by the Senses (30-31)

334

The Class manifested by the Individual (43)

336

The idea of "Cow" not based upon individual Cows (45)

336

Object of the Idea of "Cow" (46)

337

The Class 'Cow' is one only (47)

337

Idea of 'Cow' not based upon Similarity (48)

337

Single idea of class 'Cow' not false (49)

337

Citing of the instance of 'Forest' not irrelevant (50)

337

The idea of Singleness with reference to the 'Forest' explained ? First Explanation (55-62)

339

The single word 'Forest' can apply to a number of trees (64)

341

Second explanation of Singleness of Forest (63-69) 341

Other explanations of the Word 'vana' (66)

341

Third Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (69-70)

341

Fourth Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (70-71)

343

Substrate of the idea of 'Cow' (73-74)

343

Whole not absolutely different from its parts-as class not different from the constituent individuals (75-76)

343

The idea of 'Cow' not due to the conglomeration of the various parts of its body (82-83)

345

The Fact of words denoting one or many objects fixed by Convention (86-89)

346

Section 16: Sambandhakshepaparihara

347-74

Propriety of the introduction of the questions of the relationship of Word and Meaning (1)

347

Relationship of name and named cannot determine the comprehension of the meaning of the word (5)

348

Nor, is the relationship one of Invariable Concomitance (7)

348

The question of relationship has been brought forward with a view to the ascertainment of its eternality or non-eternality (10)

349

Denotation of words not based pimarily upon Conventional Rules (12)

349

The denotation of words based upon the Class (25-26)

352

The necessity of assuming Potency (29)

353

If the relation were not eternal, all men could not comprehend the word (30)

353

The process of the transference of the knowledge of world-relations (41)

355

This knowledge cannot be based upon Conventional Rules (42)

355

The world could have had no beginning in time (47)

356

No personal Creator of the world possible (47-59)

356

The Veda could not have proceeded from any Creator (61)

358

Explanation of those Vedic passages which speak of 'Creator' (61)

358

No proof for admitting a 'Pralaya' (68)

359

Arguments in favour of the Creative agency combated (74-86)

360

So functioning of Sankhya "Attributes" possible (87)

360

The bondage of soul not due to any actions lying latent in themselves (89)

363

The Knowledge cannot be the cause of Deliverance (94-106)

364

The Eternal Character of Deliverance based upon its Negative Character (107)

367

The nature of Deliverance (108)

367

Method of obtaining Deliverance (110)

367

The existence of a Creator is an untenable as that of an Omniscient Person (114-16)

368

The verbal relationship of the Proper Name (120)

369

The verbal relationship distinguished from those of Common Name (122-23)

369

Eternality of the relationship based upon the eternality of Words and Meanings (136-27)

373

Process of comprehending the Meaning of a Word (140-42)

374

Section 17: Citrakshepaparihara

375-81

Falsity of the premises brought forward against the theory of sacrifices bringing about results (1)

375

Passages laying down such result do not lay down immediateness of their appearance (2)

375

The non-applicability of Sense-perception does not vitiate the validity of Verbal Authority (4-5)

379

Even in ordinary actions results do not follow immediately after them (7)

377

The fact of only some people possessing cattle, shows that it is the result of the Citra Sacrifice performed by them in their previous birth (13)

378

Results not due to mere chance (18)

379

The Naiyayika theory of immediate sequence of the result as untenable as the "Chance" theory (22)

380

The non-appearance of the results due to impediment in their appearance (26)

381

Section 18: Atmavada

382

The Soul connected with the sacrificial implements, through the Body (1)

382

Denial of Soul makes the whole Veda open to objection (3)

382

The Soul is different from the Body and is eternal (7)

383

Objections against the eternality of the Soul (8)

383

Reply to above (13)

384

People are always cognizant of the fact of a certain result as appearing from a certain action (15)

384

The Soul's liability to modification does not mean its destruction (22)

385

No absolute destruction of the Soul is possible (23)

386

The character of Doer and Enjoyer belong to the Person, the Soul continuing throughout the various modifications (29)

387

The "Series" of ideas as held by the Baudda not tenable (33)

387

It is not possible for mere "Ideas" to transfer themselves into another body at rebirth (59)

392

No intermediate subtle body is possible (62)

393

Even If such a body existed, no Ideas could enter into it (64)

393

Ideas cannot exist in the Sense-organs (68)

394

The first Idea of Man after birth cannot be proved to be the product of any foregoing idea (70)

394

A Person, or Soul, alone could bear within himself the potentialities of Idea (73)

395

Motion is not the only form of action: Hence Soul can be the performer of sacrifices (74)

395

The Person is the doer of all Beings and Ideas (76)

395

The Body, &c., could have no actions except, those that belonged to the Soul (78)

396

Even in regard to one and the same action, the operation of several Souls is not necessarily identical (85-86)

397

The Ego does not become affected by any action except his own (89)

397

In the case of the Measure laid down with reference to the sacrificial post, we must take it as referring to the size of his body (90)

398

The Vaceshika arguments for the existence of Soul put forward (92-101)

398

These arguments refuted by the Bauddha (101-106)

400

The arguments of the Bhashya: The soul is directly cognizable by the notion of 'I' (107)

401

Intelligence cannot belong to material things (111-12)

401

The knower cannot be a mere Idea (115-16)

403

The "Series" of Ideas cannot be the object of the recognitions of 'I' (120) 404

Impressions can bring about a recognition only in the case of the previous cognizing 'I' being the same as the present 'I' (124-25) 404

Such notions as 'I am fat' must be regarded as misconceptions (127)

405

The Sense-organs are always spoken of as different from 'I' (128)

405

The Idea of 'My Soul' is due to the Cognition being distinct from the Soul (130)

405

Refutation of arguments against the Existence of Soul (137-39)

407

In the Knowing of Soul, one must supplement the Veda with the Brahmanas (140)

407

The Soul is self-luminous (142): Hence it is not perceived by other Soul (143)

407

One Soul is cognised by another by as observance of its Actions (145)

408

The Soul is imperishable (147)

408

Sutras VI ? XXIII

409-495

On the Eternality Word

409

Reasons for insisting upon the eternality of Words(1, 2,)

409

A momentary word is incapable of affording any sense (3)

409

Objection against the eternality of words (Sutras 6-11)

410-12

Words are caused entites (and hence transient) (9)

410

Words are caused because there is a difference in the same word as pronounced by different persons (10)

411

They are not all-pervading (hence not eternal) (11)

411

They are caused because they are brought about by efforts (13)

411

Letters composing words are transient, as they undergo modifications (17)

412

They are transient, as their sound is capable of interception (18)

412

Reply to the above objection (Sutras 12-23)

412

All the above arguments are inconclusive (19-20)

412

The word is not accepted by all philosophers to be due to human efforts (20-22)

413

As Destruction also is uncaused, the argument urged in Sutra 6 becomes contradictory (29-30)

414

The perception of Akaca after an effort does not make it transitory (30-32)

414

Various interpretations of the 'non-eternality of the word' put forward and refuted

415

Though words have permanent existence, yet they are not always perceived, because of the absence of manifesting agencies (40)

416

It is by means of a Supersensuous power that the utterance imparts s Supersensuous faculty to the organ of hearing, and thereby it becomes the cause of the manifestation of the already-existing word (45)

417

The Utterance belongs to the Air, and not to the Organs (49-50)

417

Objections: The word being onluy a change in the Akaca of the ear, brought about buy utterance, must belong to the whole of it, and as such be all pervading (56-58)

418

Partial cognition of the word by some people only, is not possible (64-65)

420

Above objections answered: Diversity of auditory cognition is due to the diversity in the Ears (65-66)

420

The Ear is not identical with Akaca (66-67)

420

The organic change takes place in the physical substratum (the tympanum of the ear)

420

The cognition taking place in the bodily organs, one man's cognition does not imply cognition by all men (73-75)

421

Similarly one man's deafness does not imply deafness of all men (76-77)

422

Similarity of conditions between the Nyaya theory of the Production of words and the Mimansa theory of their manifestation

423

Method of Word-cognition explained: the Vaiceshika view (88-90)

423

Objection to the Vaiseshika view (90-106)

424

The Sankhya and Jaina views stated and refuted (106-121)

426

The Mimansaka view explained (121-30)

429

What is Cravanendriya? (130-134)

430

The argument propounded in Sutra 7, against Eternality of words found to be inconclusive (155)

434

Objections in Sutra 8, met by Sutra 14 (157)

434

Explanation of Sutra 15 (163): answer to Sutra 9

435

Explanation of Sutra 16 (201)

443

Explanation of Sutra 17: answer to Sutra 11 (211)

445

Explanation of Sutra 18: Eternality of Words (230)

448

The arrangement of letters in words is not 'caused' (288)

460

'Shortness,' 'Length,' &c., of vowel-sounds only mark divisions of time (303)

463

What do you mean by 'Non-eternality' in the case of words? (327): objections

466

Necessity of asserting 'eternality' of words (356)

470

It is necessary as it implies the eternality of (relations)

470

'Idea' and 'Action' as eternal as the class 'word' and class 'action' (398)

477

Arguments against 'subtle destructions' (425)

481

Arguments against non-eternality, and for Eternality of words summed up (443)

484

Sutras XXIV ? XXVI.

On Sentence

486-552

Objections against the Eternality of Sentences in general, and of the Veda in particular (1-110)

The English translation of the Mimamsaslokavarttika, the magnumopus of Kumarilabhatta was prepared by Dr. Ganganath Jha and published by the Asiatic Society during 1900-1908. The work was long out of print. But the demand for the same persisted. The Society in its bicentenary year decided to issue a reprint of the same as a mark of respect to the learned translator who utilised both the Kasika of Sucaritamisra and the Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathimisra, which ascertain the view of Kumarila. I am happy that the book is available again to our scholars and researches.

Introduction

The word Mimasa more properly Purva Mimansa is applied to the system originally propounded by Jaimini. The other names given to this system are Pureakanda Karma Mimansa, Karmakanda, Yajnavidya, Adhvaramimansa, Dharmamimansa and so forth some people evern speak of it as the Dvadacalackshmi.

Inasmuch as the avowed object of this system is a consideration of Dharma it is commonly spoken of as Dharmanimansa of the Veda there are three sections or kandas. The Karmakanda the Upasanakanda and the juanankanda and it is only that portion of the Veda which is contained in the first of these that is dealt with in the purva mimansa and for this reason it is spoken of as purvukanda purvamimansa or karmamimansa. Though the karmakanda of the Veda treats of many such actions as sacrifice only. And for this reason people speak of this as yajnamimansa or Adhvara mimansa.

This consideration of dharma is found to consist of twelve parts and these parts have been put by Jaimini in the form of twelve Adhyayas and hence the system has come to be known by the name of Dvadacalaskshani.

For a detailed explanation of the subject matter of each Adhyaya and adhikaransa the render is referred to the Appendix.

While Chiefly dealing with these subjects Jaimini has in many places dealt with other things in connection with these. It is clear that all that is treated of by Jaimini is chiefly Vedic. In the work known as the Veda beginningless and authorless were found mentioned here and there at random many sacrifices offerings &c. and hence it was very difficult to understand and grasp the methods and procedure of the various sacrifices &c: Consequently at the time of the performance of a sacrifice at each step the performers would meet with serious doubts and difficulties. And all this difficulty has once for all been set aside by Jamini by means of the sutras dealt with here. And it was only after the Mimansa philosophy had been duly propounded that the path of karmakanda became easy.

At the very outset Jaimini divided the Vedic sentences into two kinds. The mantra and the Brahmana the former is now known as the Sauhita Rgveda samhita &c. there are many Brahmanas that we known as Upanishat the Brhadaranyaka and the ohandogya. Then again he proceeds to sub divide these two kinds into other sorts the Rk the sama and the yaju.

The definitions that he lays down for the differentiation of the mantra and the Brahmana are embodied in the sutras II -i-32 and 33 wherein it is said that which at the time of the performance of a sacrifice points out certain details in connection with it is called Mantra and the rest are called Brahmana. But the earlier author have distinctly declared that this definition of Mantra is only a tentative one as there are many Mantras that do not fulfill the conditions herein laid down and are yet called Mantras. The mantras in reality take the place of aphorisms dealing with sacrificial details and the Brahmanas are commentaries on them in fact they are frequently spoken of as such by Cankaracarya.

Rk Yajush and Sama are the three sub divisions of the said two divisions of the Veda. Among Mantras and Brahmanas that sentence wherein we have distinct divisions into feet is calle a Rk (Sutra II-i-35) the other names of which are Rca, Cloka, Mnatra the sentence that are capable of being sung are known as Sama (II-i-36) the rest are called yajush )II-i-37).

The text of the Mimansa philosophy is the most extensive of all the Sutras have twelve Adhyayas divided into sixty padas containing about 1,000 Sutras, dealing with 1,000 sections or Adhikaranas.

The word Adhikarana really means discussion Consideration Inquiry Investigation. In the Mimansa we find that each discussion is made up of five parts viz: (1) Vishaya the subject matter under consideration (2) vipaya or suncaya the doubt arising of the opponent and the arguments in support thereof (4) Uttara or Siddhanta the demonstrated conclusion (5) Sanguti Relevancy of the discussion with the particular context. Some author explain uttara as the arguments against the view of the opponent and instead of Sangati they have Nirmaya which then explain as siddhanta. This system of discussion is adopted more or less in all the Sanskrit philosophical systems.

The sutras are all arranged in the above order of discussion. But a mere reading of the Sutras does not afford us any idea as to where a discussions ends and another begins. For all these as also for a proper understanding of the Sutras themselves we have to fall back upon certain commentaries upon the sutras.

Of these commentaries and commentaries on commentaries we have an almost endless series. The oldest commentary on the sutras that is available now is the Bhashya by Cavara Svami (published in the bibliothen Indica) though we find this bhashya referring to other commentaries chief among which is the Vrtti of the revered Upavarsha. On the Bhashya we have the commentary of Kumarila Bhatta generally spoken of as Bhatta. This work is divided into three parts known under three different names (1) Clokavartika treating of the first the Tarka (polemical) Pada of the first adhyaya (published in the caukhambha sanskirt series Benares). (2) the Tantravartika dealing with the last three Padas of Adhyaya 1 and the whole of Adhyayas II and III (published in the Benares Sasnkrit series and being translated into English by the present translator) and (3) the Tuptika dealing with Adhyayas IV-XII (Published in the Benares Sanskrit Series ). On the first of these we know of two commentaries (1) the Kavika by sucarita Micra and (2) the Nyayaratnakara of parthasarathi Miera (published in the Caukhambha Sanskrit series Benares) extracts from these two commentaries have been put in as notes in the present work and (3) the Nyayasudha of Someovara Bhatta. On the second the only commentary we know of is the Nyayasudha generally known as Banaka by somevara Bhatta (in course of publication in the Caukhambha Sanskrit Series Benares) and on the third we have only one vartikabharana by Venkata dikshita the other the tantraratna cannot be spoken of as a commentary in the proper sense of the word as it is a semi independent commentary on the sutras themselves though here and therer taking up and explaining certain passages from the Bhashya and the Vartika. This closes the list of works indirectly dealing with the present work.

CONTENTS

Sutra I.

Subject-matter of the Treatise

1-20

Introduction (1)

1

Purpose of the Mimansa ? Castra (11)

2

Connection of the Castra (19)

3

Various interpretations of the opening passage of the Bhashya (26)

4

First Interpretation: Universal Explanation (28)

4

Second Interpretation: Censure (33)

5

Third Interpretation: Disavowal (37)

5

Fourth Interpretation: Specification (46-47)

7

Fifth Interpretation: Praise (59)

10

Sixth Interpretation: Objection to the use of the word 'atha' (60)

10

Meaning of the word 'atha' ? Sequence (61)

10

What is implied by this Sequence: Study of the Veda (69-70)

11

Other significations of the Sutra (78-82)

13

Preclusion of Studies other than that of the Veda (82)

13

Negation of the Bath before Investigation of Dharma (87-88)

14

Signification of the Bath (100-101)

17

Signification of the Bath word 'atah' (110)

18

Meaning of the word 'Dharmajijnasa (115-17)

18

The Usefulness of Investigation of Dharma (122)

19

Sutra II.

Definition of Dharma

21-66

Authority or Means of knowing Dharma (1)

21

Meaning of the word 'Codana' (3)

21

Duplicate implication of the Sutra (3)

22

Authoritativeness of Word (5)

22

'Codana' = Word (7)

22

Significations of the word 'lakshana' (9-10)

22

The Character of Dharma lies not in the Sacrifice itself, but in its capacity of bringing about auspicious results (13)

23

Preclusion of all other Means of knowledge from the case of Dharma (16)

24

Authority of the Veda questioned (21)

24

Self-evident character of the Veda: Does authoritativeness lie in the conception itself, or is it extraneous? (33)

26

The theory of the extraneous characters of authoritativeness (38)

27

The theory refuted (47)

28

Notion of un-authoritativeness due to extraneous influences (53)

29

Three forms of un-authoritativeness (54)

29

Excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of un-authoritativeness (65-66)

31

Absence of an Author safeguards the Veda against all reproach (68)

31

Only human assertions dependent upon other Pramanas (71)

32

The authoritativeness of Pramanas does not lie in their compatiblity with one another (73)

32

The falsity of a Conception explained (86)

33

Inference not applicable to Veda (89)

34

Undisputed authority of the Veda (95-96)

35

Veda not due to human origin (97-98)

35

Falsity due to non-productiveness of conception (101-102)

36

'Pratyayita' explained (102-103)

36

Force of the word 'Va' (109-10)

37

No omniscient person (111)

38

Inference and Sense-perception not applicable to objects in the future (115)

38

Veda not the work of an Omniscient Author (120)

39

Scriptures composed by human beings not fully authoritative (122)

39

No grounds for assuming the existence of an omniscient person (132)

41

The character of the Veda itself does not lend support to the theory an Omniscient Author (149)

43

Absurdity incurred in denying the authority of the Veda (154)

43

The sentence 'Nanvavidusham,' explained (155)

44

The Buddhistic Scriptures false, because composed by human beings (169)

46

The sentence 'Nanu samanyatodrshtam explained (174-75)

46

The sentence 'Na, anyatwat' explained (175)

47

The sentence 'Na hi anyasya, explained (181-82)

48

Arguments in support of the authenticity of the Veda (184)

48

'Pratyakshastu, explained (187)

49

Full signification of the word 'Dharma' (190)

49

Other meanings refuted (195-96)

50

No Apurva apart from a potentiality of the Sacrifice (197)

51

Objections based upon the significance of the word 'Codana' (201)

51

Reply to these: Codana cannot be restricted to positive activity only (200)

53

Codana refers to Injunctions as well as Prohibitions (215-16)

54

Two kinds of consequences following from Sacrifices (221-22)

54

Action not prohibited cannot be sinful (232-33)

57

Result not always similar to the Action (235-36)

57

Vedic Injunctions and Prohibitions the only means of knowing Dharma and Adharma (242-43)

59

Utilitarian theory of Virtue not tenable (246-47)

59

Nor the 'Conscience' theory (247-48)

59

Sacrificial Slaughter not sinful (259)

61

'Cyena' sacrifice sinful, because resulting in the death of a person (267)

62

Interpretation of the Sutra justified (277-78)

64

Sutra III.

Declaration of the subject-matter

67

Declaration of the subject-matter of the Treatise (1-2)

67

Sutra IV.

Sense-perception not the means of knowing Dharma

68-112

The Sutra cannot be taken an embodying a definition of Sense-perception (1)

68

Change of reading proposed by the Vrtti, with a view to make it a regular definition (13)

69

Trae meaning of the Sutra (20)

70

Sense-perception not applicable to Dharma (36)

73

Necessity of the word 'sat' (36)

73

The particle 'sam' (38-39)

74

Functioning of the senses explained (44)

74

The words' purusha' and 'indriya' (52)

76

Buddhijanma,' (53-54)

76

Why Sense-perception is not applicable to Dharma (59)

77

Self-recognition not the true result of Pramana (79)

80

Inference, & preceded by Sense-perception (87)

82

Inference not applicable to Dharma (99)

84

Analogy not applicable to Dharma (100)

85

Apparent Inconsistency not applicable to Dharma (101-102)

85

Veda the only means of knowing Dharma (108)

86

Inference is based upon Sense-perception (111)

87

Vedanta theory controverted (114-116)

87

Abstract perception of an object (118-19)

88

Abstract ? How made Concrete (120)

88

Cognition of Class cannot be inferential (138)

92

Samavaya (148)

94

Mixed functioning of various sense-organs (159)

96

The numbers of Senses only Five (169)

98

Exclusive objects of the Senses-organs differentiated (170)

98

Cognition of objects not in the form of identification with their verbal expressions (172)

98

Cognition of objects independent of verbal expressions (176)

99

The class 'cow' not cognized always in the form of the word 'cow' (180)

100

Apparent identity of the Word, the Idea, and the Object explained (183)

100

Imposition of the form of the word on the object is impossible (183)

101

Words not independent of the material forms of objects (193)

102

In the expression 'blue lotus,' there can be no absolute non-difference between a particular blueness and a particular lotus (197)

103

Another reason against the imposition of the forms of words upon objects (200)

104

Until the object is known, the Word cannot give any idea of it (203)

105

Objects do not depend upon words (205)

105

It is the form of the object that is cognised through the Word, which cannot suppress it (206)

105

If verbal forms were imposed upon words, the meaning of the word 'hasta' would differ from that of the word 'kara' (203)

105

The Imposition theory would falsify all Inference and Verbal Testimony (213)

106

The form of the Object not dependent upon Word (215)

106

The relationship between Words and Objects it eternal (219)

106

In the case of Proper Names also, the words are eternal: it is only their particular application that has a beginning in time (224)

108

Denotativeness of words not always due to Convention (226)

108

Conventional restriction explained (228)

109

The factors of Memory and Perception explained (230-31)

109

Sense-perception precisely explained (236-37)

110

Cognitions undefined only so long as words are not found (245-46)

111

It is the Classes of Objects and their various relationships (as expressed in inferential arguments) that are amenable to Sense-perception, which would not be possible if Perceptive Cognition were always undefined (247-48)

111

The name of 'Sense-perception' applicable to only such cognitions as follow directly from Sense-contact (255)

112

Sutra V.

Authoritativeness of Injunction

113-408

Section 1: Vartika proper on the Sutra

112-16

Dharma not amenable to any other Means of Knowledge (2)

113

Injunction, the only means of knowing it (8)

114

Necessity of having recourse to Injunction (14)

115

Section 2: Introduction to the Vrtti on the Sutra

116-19

Transposition of the words 'tat' and 'sat' in Sutra (4), makes it a definition of Sense-perception (19-20)

116

Section 3: Nirdlambanavada

119-48

Necessity of the Discussion (1-3)

119

Reality of External Objects (4)

119

'Samurti Reality' synonymous with 'falsity' (8-9)

120

Pleasures of Heaven not similar to Dreams (11)

120

Diversity of opinion among various scions of the Bauddhas (14-16)

120

Two kinds of Denial of External Objects (17-18)

121

The Idealistic Position Expounded (20-22)

121

The Reply given by the Bhashya held by some people to be inadequate (28-29)

123

The Reply otherwise explained (30)

123

Necessity of the Reality of the External Word (32)

123

Denial of the Reality of Conceptions renders even the Bauddha tenet untenable (34)

124

Impossibility of Inference, if objects not real (35)

124

Denial of the reality of external objects is self-contradictory (53)

127

Superfluity of the Idealistic Argument (60)

128

Cognitions are without substratum only at the time of their actual appearance (63)

129

If Cognitions were always without substratum they would never be amenable to Inferential Argumentation (65-66)

129

Universally recognised Distinctions between Virtue and Vice, Teacher and Pupil, &, would not be possible, if there were no reality in objects (72-73)

130

Idealism contradicted by facts of ordinary experience (74)

130

If all Ideas are false, there is universal negation (74-75)

130

Counter-argument against Idealism (79-80)

131

Certain self-contradictions in the Idealistic theory (81-82)

132

If idealism be accepted, all systems of Philosophy are equally false (85-87)

133

There could be no distinction between false dream cognition and true waking cognition, both being equally unreal (88-89)

133

No Yogic faculty can supply the necessary explanation (93-94)

132

Another self-contradiction in the Idealistic theory (99-100)

135

The Middle Term of the Idealistic Argument is one that is not recognised by the other party (101-102)

135

The Middle Term of the Argument contradictory and the Instance incompatible (106-107)

136

The causes of certain common delusions explained (109-13)

137

Only mistaken cognitions can be said to be devoid of real substratum (117-19)

138

No Instance of Dissimilarity mentioned in the Idealistic Argument (121-22)

138

The Mention of such an Instance would involve a double negation, ie., an affirmation ? which would be impossible if no objects existed (124-25)

139

A reasoning to be effective must be acceptable to both parties (130-31)

140

The Argument brought forward by the Idealist should contain nothing that he does not accept to be true (143)

141

That which is now held to be unreal could never have been real (156)

142

No reality can proceed from a reasoning that is unreal (159)

142

The Chief Elements in the reasoning of the Idealist are admittedly unreal (163)

143

Worldly activity not explicable by mere Idea (169)

143

No specification of Vasana Possible (178-79)

144

No proof for the existence of Vasana (180-81)

144

Vasanas, even if extant, could never bring about effects in a serial order (192-93)

146

It is only a permanent soul that can serve as the substratum of Vasanas (199-200)

147

Buddha propounded the Idealsitic theory with the sole view of turning the minds of men away from wordly objects (202)

148

Section 4: Cunyavada

148-82

Inferential Idealistic arguments expounded in detail (2-63)

No difference between the shape of the Cognition and the Cognised (6)

148

It is only that which is Cognised that can have an existence (7)

148

The Shape cognised cannot belong to the external object (9)

149

The character of the Cogniser cannot be attributed to the Object (13)

149

The real character of Cognitions is absolutely pure, and it is only ever-continuing Vasanas that make it appear in diverse forms (15-17)

149

Another reason for attributing the form to Cognitions (21)

150

Otherwise the Cognition could not appear prior to the comprehension of the Objects (25)

150

Third Argument to show that the form belongs to Cognitions (32)

151

The form of the Object cannot be said to be imposed upon the Cognition (35)

151

The form cannot be held to be a property of the contact of the Cognition with the Object (42)

152

Any such Contact not possible in the case (43)

152

The Idea and the Object both cannot have the same form (55)

153

Refutation of the above arguments (64-263)

Idea cannot be both the Cogniser and the Cognised (64)

154

The case of Self is different ? It can be both ? This fact explained (67)

155

There is often an idea of the Cognisable Object without that of the Cognising Idea (79)

156

The comprehension of the Object alone, or of te Idea alone, cannot be explained on the mere ground of Capability or Incapability (95)

158

The difference between Object and Idea not one of Time and Form only (100)

159

Predicability and Knowability explained (103)

159

No absolute difference between any two objects (105)

160

Cognition being one, the difference in conceptions is due to a diversity among objects (116)

161

A single object never cognised as both Comprehender and Comprehended (120)

Apoha cannot form the denotation of words, because it refers to Individuals (128)

319

Specially as no such intervening factor as 'Apohavattva' is possible (129-30)

319

No implication of the Apoha possible (133)

320

No gender, &c., could apply to the Apoha (135)

320

The individual is not implied by the Apoha (136)

320

The Apohas of gender, &c., could not be the object of Specification (137)

321

In the case of Verbs, there is no notion of Negation (139)

321

There can be no negation in a double negative (140)

321

Mutual Interdependence involved in basing Apoha upon the mutual negation of objects (147)

322

Non-Negation of the Class cannot be postulated (149-50)

322

The Apohist cannot explain 'Rajnah purushah' (157)

324

A negation cannot have properties (163)

324

Naiyayika argument against Apoha not tenable (165)

326

Refutation of Apoha must be based upon usage (176)

328

Section 15: Vanavada

329-47

The parts of the Cow are related to the Class, through the Individual (1)

329

The parts are not Manifesters of the Class (4)

329

The bring about the Idea of the Class (7)

330

Various usages based upon ideas of Class (15)

331

Meaning of the word 'Akrti' (16)

331

It cannot mean shape (17)

332

Specification of Class due to peculiarities of colour, &c. (26-27)

333

Class inhering in each Individual is perceived by the Senses (30-31)

334

The Class manifested by the Individual (43)

336

The idea of "Cow" not based upon individual Cows (45)

336

Object of the Idea of "Cow" (46)

337

The Class 'Cow' is one only (47)

337

Idea of 'Cow' not based upon Similarity (48)

337

Single idea of class 'Cow' not false (49)

337

Citing of the instance of 'Forest' not irrelevant (50)

337

The idea of Singleness with reference to the 'Forest' explained ? First Explanation (55-62)

339

The single word 'Forest' can apply to a number of trees (64)

341

Second explanation of Singleness of Forest (63-69) 341

Other explanations of the Word 'vana' (66)

341

Third Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (69-70)

341

Fourth Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (70-71)

343

Substrate of the idea of 'Cow' (73-74)

343

Whole not absolutely different from its parts-as class not different from the constituent individuals (75-76)

343

The idea of 'Cow' not due to the conglomeration of the various parts of its body (82-83)

345

The Fact of words denoting one or many objects fixed by Convention (86-89)

346

Section 16: Sambandhakshepaparihara

347-74

Propriety of the introduction of the questions of the relationship of Word and Meaning (1)

347

Relationship of name and named cannot determine the comprehension of the meaning of the word (5)

348

Nor, is the relationship one of Invariable Concomitance (7)

348

The question of relationship has been brought forward with a view to the ascertainment of its eternality or non-eternality (10)

349

Denotation of words not based pimarily upon Conventional Rules (12)

349

The denotation of words based upon the Class (25-26)

352

The necessity of assuming Potency (29)

353

If the relation were not eternal, all men could not comprehend the word (30)

353

The process of the transference of the knowledge of world-relations (41)

355

This knowledge cannot be based upon Conventional Rules (42)

355

The world could have had no beginning in time (47)

356

No personal Creator of the world possible (47-59)

356

The Veda could not have proceeded from any Creator (61)

358

Explanation of those Vedic passages which speak of 'Creator' (61)

358

No proof for admitting a 'Pralaya' (68)

359

Arguments in favour of the Creative agency combated (74-86)

360

So functioning of Sankhya "Attributes" possible (87)

360

The bondage of soul not due to any actions lying latent in themselves (89)

363

The Knowledge cannot be the cause of Deliverance (94-106)

364

The Eternal Character of Deliverance based upon its Negative Character (107)

367

The nature of Deliverance (108)

367

Method of obtaining Deliverance (110)

367

The existence of a Creator is an untenable as that of an Omniscient Person (114-16)

368

The verbal relationship of the Proper Name (120)

369

The verbal relationship distinguished from those of Common Name (122-23)

369

Eternality of the relationship based upon the eternality of Words and Meanings (136-27)

373

Process of comprehending the Meaning of a Word (140-42)

374

Section 17: Citrakshepaparihara

375-81

Falsity of the premises brought forward against the theory of sacrifices bringing about results (1)

375

Passages laying down such result do not lay down immediateness of their appearance (2)

375

The non-applicability of Sense-perception does not vitiate the validity of Verbal Authority (4-5)

379

Even in ordinary actions results do not follow immediately after them (7)

377

The fact of only some people possessing cattle, shows that it is the result of the Citra Sacrifice performed by them in their previous birth (13)

378

Results not due to mere chance (18)

379

The Naiyayika theory of immediate sequence of the result as untenable as the "Chance" theory (22)

380

The non-appearance of the results due to impediment in their appearance (26)

381

Section 18: Atmavada

382

The Soul connected with the sacrificial implements, through the Body (1)

382

Denial of Soul makes the whole Veda open to objection (3)

382

The Soul is different from the Body and is eternal (7)

383

Objections against the eternality of the Soul (8)

383

Reply to above (13)

384

People are always cognizant of the fact of a certain result as appearing from a certain action (15)

384

The Soul's liability to modification does not mean its destruction (22)

385

No absolute destruction of the Soul is possible (23)

386

The character of Doer and Enjoyer belong to the Person, the Soul continuing throughout the various modifications (29)

387

The "Series" of ideas as held by the Baudda not tenable (33)

387

It is not possible for mere "Ideas" to transfer themselves into another body at rebirth (59)

392

No intermediate subtle body is possible (62)

393

Even If such a body existed, no Ideas could enter into it (64)

393

Ideas cannot exist in the Sense-organs (68)

394

The first Idea of Man after birth cannot be proved to be the product of any foregoing idea (70)

394

A Person, or Soul, alone could bear within himself the potentialities of Idea (73)

395

Motion is not the only form of action: Hence Soul can be the performer of sacrifices (74)

395

The Person is the doer of all Beings and Ideas (76)

395

The Body, &c., could have no actions except, those that belonged to the Soul (78)

396

Even in regard to one and the same action, the operation of several Souls is not necessarily identical (85-86)

397

The Ego does not become affected by any action except his own (89)

397

In the case of the Measure laid down with reference to the sacrificial post, we must take it as referring to the size of his body (90)

398

The Vaceshika arguments for the existence of Soul put forward (92-101)

398

These arguments refuted by the Bauddha (101-106)

400

The arguments of the Bhashya: The soul is directly cognizable by the notion of 'I' (107)

401

Intelligence cannot belong to material things (111-12)

401

The knower cannot be a mere Idea (115-16)

403

The "Series" of Ideas cannot be the object of the recognitions of 'I' (120) 404

Impressions can bring about a recognition only in the case of the previous cognizing 'I' being the same as the present 'I' (124-25) 404

Such notions as 'I am fat' must be regarded as misconceptions (127)

405

The Sense-organs are always spoken of as different from 'I' (128)

405

The Idea of 'My Soul' is due to the Cognition being distinct from the Soul (130)

405

Refutation of arguments against the Existence of Soul (137-39)

407

In the Knowing of Soul, one must supplement the Veda with the Brahmanas (140)

407

The Soul is self-luminous (142): Hence it is not perceived by other Soul (143)

407

One Soul is cognised by another by as observance of its Actions (145)

408

The Soul is imperishable (147)

408

Sutras VI ? XXIII

409-495

On the Eternality Word

409

Reasons for insisting upon the eternality of Words(1, 2,)

409

A momentary word is incapable of affording any sense (3)

409

Objection against the eternality of words (Sutras 6-11)

410-12

Words are caused entites (and hence transient) (9)

410

Words are caused because there is a difference in the same word as pronounced by different persons (10)

411

They are not all-pervading (hence not eternal) (11)

411

They are caused because they are brought about by efforts (13)

411

Letters composing words are transient, as they undergo modifications (17)

412

They are transient, as their sound is capable of interception (18)

412

Reply to the above objection (Sutras 12-23)

412

All the above arguments are inconclusive (19-20)

412

The word is not accepted by all philosophers to be due to human efforts (20-22)

413

As Destruction also is uncaused, the argument urged in Sutra 6 becomes contradictory (29-30)

414

The perception of Akaca after an effort does not make it transitory (30-32)

414

Various interpretations of the 'non-eternality of the word' put forward and refuted

415

Though words have permanent existence, yet they are not always perceived, because of the absence of manifesting agencies (40)

416

It is by means of a Supersensuous power that the utterance imparts s Supersensuous faculty to the organ of hearing, and thereby it becomes the cause of the manifestation of the already-existing word (45)

417

The Utterance belongs to the Air, and not to the Organs (49-50)

417

Objections: The word being onluy a change in the Akaca of the ear, brought about buy utterance, must belong to the whole of it, and as such be all pervading (56-58)

418

Partial cognition of the word by some people only, is not possible (64-65)

420

Above objections answered: Diversity of auditory cognition is due to the diversity in the Ears (65-66)

420

The Ear is not identical with Akaca (66-67)

420

The organic change takes place in the physical substratum (the tympanum of the ear)

420

The cognition taking place in the bodily organs, one man's cognition does not imply cognition by all men (73-75)

421

Similarly one man's deafness does not imply deafness of all men (76-77)

422

Similarity of conditions between the Nyaya theory of the Production of words and the Mimansa theory of their manifestation

423

Method of Word-cognition explained: the Vaiceshika view (88-90)

423

Objection to the Vaiseshika view (90-106)

424

The Sankhya and Jaina views stated and refuted (106-121)

426

The Mimansaka view explained (121-30)

429

What is Cravanendriya? (130-134)

430

The argument propounded in Sutra 7, against Eternality of words found to be inconclusive (155)

434

Objections in Sutra 8, met by Sutra 14 (157)

434

Explanation of Sutra 15 (163): answer to Sutra 9

435

Explanation of Sutra 16 (201)

443

Explanation of Sutra 17: answer to Sutra 11 (211)

445

Explanation of Sutra 18: Eternality of Words (230)

448

The arrangement of letters in words is not 'caused' (288)

460

'Shortness,' 'Length,' &c., of vowel-sounds only mark divisions of time (303)

463

What do you mean by 'Non-eternality' in the case of words? (327): objections

466

Necessity of asserting 'eternality' of words (356)

470

It is necessary as it implies the eternality of (relations)

470

'Idea' and 'Action' as eternal as the class 'word' and class 'action' (398)

477

Arguments against 'subtle destructions' (425)

481

Arguments against non-eternality, and for Eternality of words summed up (443)

484

Sutras XXIV ? XXVI.

On Sentence

486-552

Objections against the Eternality of Sentences in general, and of the Veda in particular (1-110)

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