1994 Congressional Elections: An Analysis

Realignment and Dealignment

The Republican Party won a majority of the votes cast for Congress for the first time
since 1946 in 1994, which featured only the second significant increase in mid-term
turnout in a quarter century.

In all, 75,114,722 eligible Americans voted in the 1994 election, a 38.8% turnout -- up
2.3 percentage points from 1990. An estimated 108,000,000 eligible Americans did not vote
and turnout was more than 20% lower than in the 1960s.

These findings are from a report on the 1994 mid-term election by the Committee for the
Study of the American Electorate (CSAE), a non-partisan, non-profit research organization.
This study was based on the final and official registration and turnout statistics from 50
states and the District of Columbia and an analysis of the U.S. Bureau of the Census
Current Population Survey report on the 1994 election.

Among the principal findings of the Committee's study were:

The Republicans garnered 19.0% of the eligible vote for Congress, exceeding the
Democrats (16.6%) for the first time since 1946.

The GOP bested the Democrats in the vote for Congress (17.1% versus 13.5%) in the South
and gained a majority of House seats in the region, both for the first time since
Reconstruction.

Overall turnout was up in every region in the nation except New England and the farm
states. It was fueled by major surges in turnout in Tennessee and Virginia and substantial
turnout increases in many of the most populous states, including Florida, Maryland,
Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania. Turnout declined in several states with tight or
highly publicized races, including: Alabama, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Ohio and Vermont.

Republican turnout was up in every region of the country, while Democratic turnout was
down in every region of the country except the Middle Atlantic States and the Far West,
where the party recorded exceedingly modest gains.

A modest increase in registration, fueled by a 36% increase in registration of those
affiliated with neither major party. Registration for both Democratic and Republican
parties was down.

Census Bureau Data

The Committee's analysis of the Census Bureau's survey showed:

A 21% drop in the reported participation rates of those with incomes of $15,000 and
lower (from a 34.3% rate in 1990 to a 27.1% rate in 1994).

A 33% increase in the share of the vote cast by those whose incomes were $50,000 and
over (from 23.7% of the voting electorate in 1990 to 31.5% in 1994).

A modest decline in the reported participation rates of blacks -- down two percentage
points from 39.2 in 1990 to 37.0 in 1994. This decline, however, was composed of surges in
some individual states and declines in others.

A return to very low levels of reported partici¨ pation rates of young citizens aged
18-24. After a 25% surge in the 1992 Presidential elections, this year's level of reported
18-24 participation was the lowest (at a reported 20% but likely at least two percentage
points lower due to over-reporting) since the Census has been conducting these surveys.
The rate of participation of first time youth voters (18-19 years old) dropped from a
reported 17.3% in 1990 to 14.5% in 1994.

A minor increase (0.3 percentage points) in the male share of the vote and a similar
decrease in the female share, neither proving nor disproving the idea of angry males
fueling the 1994 election.

Realignment in the South

While the election was a resounding victory for the Republicans -- no incumbent
Republican lost, its lasting effect may well be limited to the South, where a realignment
toward the GOP seems to be in place for at least a generation.

This election was the first, but surely not the last, in which the GOP won a majority
of the votes for Congress and a majority of House seats. It was an accident awaiting an
unpopular (in the region) Democratic President to happen. The region as a whole is more
conservative than the nation, and the GOP is the more conservative party.

While the Democrats still enjoy a 37.8% to 22.4 registration advantage in the South,
that registration advantage has slipped from a 53.8% to 11.8% edge which existed in 1962.
And it is likely to slip even further as being a Republican in fact as well as in voting
behavior becomes more respectable in the region and as the impact of the new motor voter
law is felt in the region whose restrictive registration laws the new legislation will do
most to repair.

Despite the lingering Democratic registration advantage in the region, Southerners have
been more likely to vote for the GOP in Presidential elections since the late 1960s and
the number of Democratic statewide office-holders has dwindled.

The trend in the South is unmistakable. Since 1970, after the full impact of the Voting
Rights Act was felt, the Republicans have reversed what was a 18.5% to 10.0% deficit in
House votes into the 17.1% to 13.5% majority it enjoyed in the 1994 election.

That trend is likely to continue for at least a generation. There will likely be
further defections of Democratic office-holders to the GOP and more GOP victories in
marginal districts. The Democrats went into the 1994 election with an 8-5 margin of House
seats. It would not surprise me if the GOP achieved that margin in the next two election
cycles.

No Realignment Elsewhere

No similar realignment could be seen nationally in the 1994 vote. While the Republicans
won the House vote in every region except New England, their biggest margins over the
Democrats were in the farm belt of the Midwest (9.1 percentage points), the Rocky Mountain
States (8.8), the South (7.5) and the Southwest (5.3), all (save the South) previously GOP
strongholds. Margins in other regions were 2.5 percentage points or lower.

No party which can only get 19% of the vote can claim a national mandate. The fact that
there was a slight rise in the vote indicates that a portion of the electorate was
activated in the 1994 election, but the size of the rise and the level of overall GOP
support indicates that this was more of a negative mandate against the Democrats rather
than a positive mandate for the Republicans.

Democratic Disarray

Nothing in this election can be comforting to the Democrats. Not only did they lose
their majorities in both Houses of Congress, they also lost their voting power relative to
Republicans in every region of the country -- including the regions which they won -- New
England and the Middle Atlantic states. Perhaps of equal import, three groups key to their
1992 electoral success -- the poor, the blacks and young citizens -- all reported lower
participa¨ tion. In the case of both the poor (those with incomes under $15,000) and
first time voters (those aged 18-19), the decline was particularly sharp.

The Democrats face a very difficult immediate future. They are operating under a number
of constraints which make victory in 1996 very problematic. They are unlikely to win any
state in the South, save perhaps Arkansas. Their hands will be tied by budget constraints
on any new substantive initiatives. And they must fashion an electoral strategy to win in
New England, the Middle Atlantic states, the Rust Belt and the Far West, with key core
constituencies necessary for that victory in an apparent state of demobilization.

The Democratic disarray is a deserved product of two major missteps -- the failure in
1994 to offer any theme or message around which to rally and the failure over a 25-year
period to fashion an approach uniting the middle and underclass wings of the party. They
seem no closer to such a message now.

The only comfort the Democrats can draw is that their national decline in turnout was
only 1.26 percentage points and that the Presidential electorate (an election in which
citizens vote at a 10-15 point higher rate than in mid-term elections) is likely to be far
less skewed toward high income brackets.

Future Voter Turnout

Two factors point to increased turnout: the implementation of the National Voter
Registration Act (the so-called motor voter law), which is likely to substantially
increase registration and thus those who have the potential to vote -- particularly in the
South -- and the increasing likelihood of credible candidates beyond the two major
parties.

Factors pointing to the potential of decreased turnout include: the general
demobilization of the electorate over the last three decades; the decreased allegiance to
and mobilizing ability of either major political party; the hope factor -- the lack of
feeling that the results of the 1996 election will produce significant beneficial changes
in the lives of most Americans; and the continuing conduct of campaigns at the most
negative and destructive levels.

What we are seeing is dealignment rather than realignment -- a turning away from
both major political parties.

Dealignment and Democratic Decay

Three pieces of information from this study stand out as a harbingers of future
politics:

The decline in registration for both major parties and the rise in registration for
independents: Since 1966 -- the high point in both turnout and registration in mid-term
elections since women were given the franchise in 1920 -- Democratic registration (in the
District of Columbia and the 26 states which registered by party) has declined steadily
from a 1966 high of 44.2% to a 1994 low of 31.5%. Republican registration has declined
slightly from 25.0% in 1966 to 22.6% in 1994. And independent registration (for other
parties or unaffiliated) has increased from 3.9% in 1966 to 12.4%1 in 1994.

The decline in voter participation by young voters: With the single exception of the
1992 election, the turnout of young people (aged 18-24) and first-time voters (aged 18-19)
has been declining steadily in both Presidential and mid-term elections since
18-to-19-year-olds were given the franchise in 1972. In the 1994 election, the reported
turnout level of 18-19 year-olds was 14.5%, with actual turnout levels likely at least two
percentage points lower than that. Reported turnout for all other age levels up to age 45
also declined. In the 1994 election, there were significant increases in turnout, based on
age, only for the age group 75 years-old and over.

Continuing low voter turnout: Despite a significant partisan change in the results of
the election, turnout was up only modestly (2.3 percentage points) and remains at a level
more than 20% lower than it was in the 1960s.

What we are seeing is dealignment rather than realignment -- a turning away from both
major political parties. And despite the increases in turnout in both the 1992
Presidential election and the 1994 midterm, the future trend is toward disengagement and
non-participation. The 1994 election can properly be seen as similar to the elections of
1966, 1974, 1980 and 1992 -- as rejections of the party in power, but without offering
much hope for long term citizen re-engagement in the future.

Given two factors -- the growing disaffection from both major parties and nominating
rules that will likely select the nominees of the two major parties by the end of March
1996 -- a serious independent or third party candidacy becomes an increasing possibility.

Curtis Gans is director of The Committee for the Study of the American Electorate in
Washington, D.C. For information, write to 421 New Jersey Ave., SE, Washington, DC 20003
(202) 546-3221.