http://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/issue/feedJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy2019-01-21T02:12:24+00:00David Clarkjespmanagingeditor@gmail.comOpen Journal Systems<p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p>http://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/505Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts2019-01-21T02:12:24+00:00Javier González de Prado Salasjgonzalezdeprado@gmail.com<p>Ascriptions of rationality are related to our practices of praising and criticizing. This seems to provide motivation for normative accounts of rationality, more specifically for the view that rationality is a matter of responding to normative reasons. However, rational agents are sometimes guided by false beliefs. This is problematic for those reasons-based accounts of rationality that are also committed to the widespread thesis that normative reasons are facts. The critical aim of the paper is to present objections to recent proposed solutions to this problem, according to which the responses of deceived agents would be rationalized by facts about how things appear to them. My positive aim is to argue that accounts of reasons in terms of apparent reasons manage to capture the intuitions that seem to favor a normative account of rationality (more specifically, they capture the connection between attributions of rationality and praise and criticism).&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>2018-10-10T20:14:54+00:00Copyright (c) 2018 Javier González de Prado Salashttp://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/476Evolution and Moral Disagreement2019-01-21T02:12:24+00:00Michael KlenkM.B.O.T.Klenk@uu.nl<p>Several philosophers have recently argued that evolutionary considerations undermine the justification of all objectivist moral beliefs by implying a hypothetical disagreement: had our evolutionary history been different, our moral beliefs would conflict with the moral beliefs of our counterfactual selves. This paper aims at showing that evolutionary considerations do not imply epistemically relevant moral disagreement. In nearby scenarios, evolutionary considerations imply tremendous moral agreement. In remote scenarios, evolutionary considerations do not entail relevant disagreement with our epistemic peers, neither on a narrow nor on a broad conception of peerhood. In conclusion, evolutionary considerations do not reveal epistemically troubling kinds of disagreement. Anti-objectivists need to look elsewhere to fuel their sceptical argument.</p>2018-11-07T14:19:12+00:00Copyright (c) 2018 Michael Klenkhttp://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/391Oppression, Forgiveness, and Ceasing to Blame2019-01-21T02:12:23+00:00Per-Erik Milamper.milam@gmail.comLuke Brunningluke.brunning@philosophy.ox.ac.uk<p>Wrongdoing is inescapable.&nbsp; We all do wrong and are wronged; and in response we often blame one another.&nbsp; But if blame is a defining feature of our social lives, so is ceasing to blame.&nbsp; We might excuse, justify, or forgive an offender; or simply let the offence go.&nbsp; Each mode of ceasing to blame is a social practice and each has characteristic norms that influence when and how we do it, as well as how it’s received.&nbsp; We argue that how we relinquish blame, and how effective we are, depends on many circumstances only partially within our control.&nbsp; Like any norm-governed practice, one can do it well or poorly, appropriately or inappropriately, successfully or unsuccessfully.&nbsp; To successfully participate in a practice, one’s action must be done for the right reasons and secure uptake.&nbsp; We argue that social and material circumstances can compromise one’s ability to effectively cease to blame in the manner one prefers.&nbsp; But if one can fail, then one can lack access to particular ceasing to blame practices if one is regularly prevented from effectively relinquishing blame. However, uncooperative social and material circumstances do not only arise by chance.&nbsp; Our central argument is that circumstances of oppression can systematically compromise one’s ability and opportunities to effectively perform a variety of ceasing to blame practices. &nbsp;This deprivation is an insidious facet of oppression that is neglected both in theories of oppression and of forgiveness but which has significant implications for how we understand the power and purpose of forgiveness.&nbsp;</p>2018-11-07T14:20:11+00:00Copyright (c) 2018 Per-Erik Milam, Luke Brunning