Instructions

ZOOM IN by clicking on the page. A slider will appear, allowing you to adjust your zoom level. Return to the original size by clicking on the page again.

MOVE the page around when zoomed in by dragging it.

ADJUST the zoom using the slider on the top right.

ZOOM OUT by clicking on the zoomed-in page.

SEARCH by entering text in the search field and click on "In This Issue" or "All Issues" to search the current issue or the archive of back issues respectively. If you would like to clear the your search, click on your browser refresh button.

PRINT by clicking on thumbnails to select pages, and then press the
print button.

SHARE this publication and page.

ROTATE PAGE allows you to turn pages 90 degrees clockwise or counterclockwise.Click on the page to return to the original orientation. To zoom in on a rotated page, return the page to its original orientation, zoom in, and
then rotate it again.

CONTENTS displays a table of sections with thumbnails and descriptions.

ALL PAGES displays thumbnails of every page in the issue. Click on
a page to jump.

BOOK REVIEWS
44 Policy • Vol. 30 No. 3 • Spring 2014
aspects of British policy and strategy in Malaya and
during Konfrontasi; caution, prudence and scepticism
were noticeably scarcer with regards to Vietnam.
Edwards writes that Australian political and
military leaders, most notably Menzies, ‘accepted
uncritically what the United States said and did
about events in Vietnam and its policies there’.
He suggests that Menzies simply assumed American
military superiority and the viability of the US
strategy and ensured that this was not questioned.
This is obvious in how Australian troops operated
in Vietnam. Edwards establishes at length that the
first battalion deployed to Vietnam was best trained
in counter-insurgency tactics, and this would have
represented the most effective contribution that
could be made to the war effort. Army chief
Wilton had his doubts from the outset about
Australian troops being subject to American ‘meat-
grinder’ tactics. As the war escalated and public
opposition mounted in both countries, there was
more and more pressure for Australian forces to
be engaged in traditional attrition strategies which
required numbers and were costing so many lives.
By mid-1968, the counter-insurgency tactics
Australians were best placed to use were put aside
in favour of escalating conventional warfare under
US command. Yet, as Edwards discusses in his
final chapter, 1968 also marked the point at which
Australian strategic objectives had been achieved.
The key contribution of this book is that it
situates Australian involvement in Vietnam against
a broader backdrop of Australian security interests
in Southeast Asia, as well as the management of
the alliances with the UK and the US.
Edwards’s process of exploring the nature
of Australia’s historical regional and alliance
relationships also sheds light on how these ought
to be managed into the future, particularly with
the rise of the islamic State (iS) and the return
of Australian combat forces to Iraq. Ham-fisted
historical allegories and use of the word ‘quagmire’
are past their use-by date, but a few things are worth
bearing in mind.
At the end of his book, Edwards reflects that the
problems caused by a lack of clearly defined and
achievable goals, a recognisable enemy, realistic
definitions of success, and an exit strategy are all
lessons learned in Vietnam that should be borne
in mind in the future.
Bellicose Australian rhetoric on iS—the ‘death
cult’ and ‘a war that calls to us’—is reminiscent of
Australia ‘looking for a way in and not a way out’
of Vietnam, as Menzies once put it. It is indicative
of an Australian prime minister signalling his
country’s willingness to get involved in a manner
that pre-empts the US government making a final
decision. That the Australian commitment has
escalated so rapidly (and with little public debate)
from humanitarian assistance, to ‘non-combat’
combat advisers, to RAAF Super Hornets being
involved in airstrikes against military targets
(undoubtedly a military role), is not encouraging
for anyone who wishes to avoid seeing Australian
troops in a protracted entanglement.
Such urgency may have been appropriate in
Vietnam, firmly ensconced in Australia’s region.
Today it seems imprudent, even in the face of
a virtual killing spree on the part of IS militants. It
is not unreasonable to wonder
whether, if the current strategy
of advisers and airstrikes proves
ineffective, the decision will be
made to send in ground troops,
as once happened in Vietnam.
Trisha Jha is a policy
analyst at the Centre
for Independent Studies.