It is a working principle of professional interrogators that every
detainee wants to tell his story. It did not take long for Riduan
Isamuddinthe al-Qaeda operative better known as Hambalito prove
that rule. In fact, it took less than two weeks. After his Aug. 11
arrest in southern Thailand, al-Qaeda's top man in Asia was turned
over by Thai authorities to his mortal enemies, agents of the U.S.
According to reports they wrote dated Aug. 22 and Aug. 26, copies of
which were obtained by TIME, Hambali confessed to his involvement in
recent terrorist attacks that have left hundreds dead in Southeast
Asia, detailed the relationships between al-Qaeda and terrorist
groups in Asia and listed the names of scores of associates.

Of course, Hambali, 39, may be lying about at least some of it. The
U.S. operatives who authored the documents for distribution to senior
intelligence and police officials around the region prefaced their
summaries of Hambali's questioning with a warning that the prisoner
may be practicing "counter-interrogation techniques." On the other
hand, much of what Hambali says is corroborated by the confessions of
two of his closest associates. Summaries of their interrogations were
also obtained by TIME. Together, these reports shed new light on how
al-Qaeda recruits suicide operatives, how it subcontracts terrorism
to like-minded groups and what types of targets it may go after next.

SIGNING UP FOR SUICIDE
Bashir bin Lap, a Malaysian known in radical circles as Lillie,
studied to be an architect at Malaysia's Polimas Polytechnic. But
drawn by the lure of jihad, he made his way to Kandahar, Afghanistan,
where he underwent basic military training in an al-Qaeda camp. After
the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Lillie, according to his own account,
received a letter from Hambali, an Indonesian who had started off as
an activist in Islamist causes in Southeast Asia but had gone on to
serve the global-reaching al-Qaeda. In the letter, Hambali asked
whether Lillie was prepared to join in a suicide attack. When he
replied yes, Lillie claimed, he received an invitation to meet with
Osama bin Laden in Kabul. There, Lillie said, he and three other men,
including an old classmate from the polytechnic, Mohammed Farik bin
Amin, swore allegiance to the al-Qaeda chief. Bin Laden, Lillie
maintained, discussed the group's commitment to Allah and told them
their duty was "to suffer." Lillie said he understood that the group
was to attack a U.S. target but he did not know if the site was
within or outside the U.S. He claimed to know no further details
about his intended mission.

But Hambali, who a regional intelligence official says is being
interrogated at the joint British-American air base on the remote
Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, knew more, according to his own
account. Hambali said he recruited the four members of the cell on
behalf of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of 9/11 who
was al-Qaeda's military commander until his arrest in Pakistan in
March. Mohammed told Hambali that the cell's mission involved
hijacking a plane, and instructed him to get in touch in Malaysia
with an activist named Zaeni, whom Hambali knew had trained as a
pilot. When Hambali did just that, Zaeni told him he was not prepared
to carry out the mission. Hambali assumed Zaeni had changed his mind
because he had small children. Later, according to Hambali, Zaeni was
arrested in Malaysia. As far as Lillie knew, the operation was called
off after the cell leader, Masran bin Arshad, was arrested.

SUBCONTRACTING TERROR
Their plans for "martyrdom" disrupted, Lillie and Amin found
themselves instead working directly for Hambali in Southeast Asia.
Hambali told interrogators the men had no other friends but him. Thai
police say it was Amin and Lillie who led them to Hambali. Trailing
Amin, they spotted him in the company of Lillie. Those two were
arrested in June and August, respectively, and Lillie directed police
to Hambali. Before the three were busted, they had worked, according
to their confessions, as a liaison unit between al-Qaeda and
extremist militants in Southeast Asia, principally those of Jemaah
Islamiah (J.I.), a network of radical groups.

The confessions of Hambali, Lillie and Amin draw the clearest line
yet connecting J.I. and al-Qaeda. For the past year, Hambali told his
interrogators, almost all J.I. funding came directly from al-Qaeda,
by way of Mohammed. Hambali added, with a touch of boastfulness, that
he alone decided what to do with the $130,000 he received through
June of this year. According to a copy of the interrogators' report
(which was translated into a regional language and then back into
English): "The prisoner said that al-Qaeda sent the money to him
without any condition and without any instruction."

Hambali said an initial al-Qaeda outlay of $30,000 was used to fund
the bombing a year ago of two nightclubs in Bali that left 202 dead.
"Al-Qaeda was highly satisfied with the Bali bombing and as a result
provided additional money" totaling $100,000, according to an
interrogation report. Of the $45,000 allocated to J.I. in Indonesia,
Hambali said, $15,000 was earmarked to support the families of the
jailed Bali plotters. The remaining $30,000 was to be used for
terrorist attacks. Hambali speculated that some of it was spent on
the August attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that killed 12
people.

Hambali told his jailers that another recipient of his largesse was
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (M.I.L.F.), which is fighting for
an independent Muslim state in the southern Philippines. The group
denies that it has ties to J.I. or al-Qaeda, but Hambali and Lillie
both described a transfer of some $27,000 to the M.I.L.F. this
summer. Lillie said an M.I.L.F. contact reported by e-mail that the
money would be spent on "cars and motorcycles," which were codes,
Lillie indicated, for M-16s and pistols. Regional intelligence
officials say J.I. operatives train in M.I.L.F.-protected camps, a
point Hambali confirmed under interrogation. Hambali's interrogators
say he told them it is "most likely a large number of members of J.I.
Indonesia are hiding in the Philippines and supporting the M.I.L.F."
U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Francis Riccardone told
journalists last week the U.S. was "very, very concerned" about links
between J.I. and the M.I.L.F. He warned that unless the latter group
severed those ties, the U.S. would cut M.I.L.F.-controlled areas out
of the $30 million in aid the U.S. has pledged if secessionists sign
a peace accord with Manila.

PICKING TARGETS
Hambali and his lieutenants were also charged with casing targets,
including the U.S and British embassies in Bangkok, various
nightclubs in Thailand and shopping complexes frequented by
Westerners in the elite Makati district of Manila. Jewish and Israeli
sites received close attention. Though anti-Semitism is central to
al-Qaeda's creed, the group has not traditionally focused on
attacking Jews. That may have changed last November, when suicide
bombers struck a Mombasa hotel frequented by Israelis, killing 13
people, and two shoulder-launched missiles were fired at an Israeli
plane nearby. The Kenyan attacks may presage more to come: Lillie
said he did surveillance on two Israeli-owned businesses on or near
Bangkok's Khao San Street, the region's most famous backpacker
district, as well as on the ticket counter and airplanes of Israeli
carrier El Al at the city's airport. Hambali scouted the Israeli
embassy and a synagogue in Manila. "The prisoner mentioned that
Jewish targets were always the main priority," reads a report about
Hambali.

One of the themes Hambali returned to repeatedly in his interrogation
is the notion that J.I. is collapsing. He complained that the network
is in a "very bad" state "because of those who had been captured," an
interrogator wrote. "All the group's savings has been lost to raids
and arrests," Hambali claimed. J.I. had been virtually "destroyed."
Many intelligence officials and analysts disagree, saying J.I. has
been wounded but remains extremely dangerous. Hambali was probably
"trying to steer his interrogators," argues Zachary Abuza, author of
a forthcoming book on al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, "trying to make
them feel complacent." Of the assertions Hambali made to his jailers,
his assessments of J.I.'s powers were the ones they were least likely
to trust.