U.S. Department of Energy SUPPLEMENTAL
Field Office, Albuquerque DIRECTIVE
AL 5610.13
DATE: September 23, 1991
SUBJECT: JOINT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPON
SYSTEM SAFETY, SECURITY, AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES
1. PURPOSE. This is a Supplemental Directive to the DOE Order 5610.13,
JOINT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM
SAFETY, SECURITY, AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES, dated October 10, 1990, to
implement those areas of the Department of Energy (DOE) Program
addressing joint DOE/Department of Defense (DOD) nuclear weapon and
nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control promulgated by DOE
Order 5610.13 which are the responsibility of the Manager, DOE Field
Office, Albuquerque (AL). This Supplemental Directive does not change
any requirements contained in the DOE Order, but contains administrative
or contractual guidance.
2. SCOPE. The provisions of this Supplemental Directive apply to AL and
its contractors and subcontractors that conduct nuclear weapon and
nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control activities in
support of the nuclear weapons programs, as provided by law and/or
contract and as implemented by the appropriate contracting officer. The
provisions of Supplemental Directive AL 5610.13 also apply to Sandia
National Laboratories (SNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) when their
participation in the program detailed in this Supplemental Directive is
required by DOE Order 5610.13.
3. APPLICABILITY. Requirements set forth in this Supplemental Directive
apply to all joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system
safety, security, and control activities from initial design through the
retirement phase of each nuclear weapon system.
4. REFERENCES.
a. The DOE 5610.10, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SAFETY PROGRAM, of
October 10, 1990, which establishes the DOE policy, authorities,
and responsibilities for nuclear explosive and weapons safety.
b. The DOE 5610.13, JOINT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM SAFETY, SECURITY, AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES, of
October 10, 1990, which establishes the DOE policy, procedures,
authorities, and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear
weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
activities in conjunction with the DOD.
c. The AL 56XC, AL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE EVALUATION PROGRAM, of
June 1, 1990, which sets forth the basic principles and policies
of, and assigns responsibilities for AL Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
Evaluation Program.
d. The AL supplemental Directive 5610.10, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon
Safety Program, of May 6, 1991 (draft), which implements DOE Order
5610.10 on nuclear explosive and weapon safety.
5. OBJECTIVE. To implement the provisions of DOE Order 5610.13.
6. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES.
a. The Manager, AL:
(1) Manages the DOE's program for participation in joint DOE/DOD
Safety Studies and Reviews of Nuclear Weapon Systems.
(2) Manages AL involvement in the Nuclear Safety activities
addressed in paragraph 7. of this Supplemental Directive.
(3) Assures AL line management is responsible and accountable for
nuclear explosive and nuclear weapon system safety, security,
and control.
(4) Appoints AL members to support the activities of the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC) Weapon Safety Committee (WSC).
(5) Approves and forwards to DOE Headquarters (HQ), Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Military Application (DASMA)
recommendations for nonconcurrence in Safety Rules Packages.
b. Director, Weapon Programs Division, AL reports to the Assistant
Manager for Operations and Weapons, and is responsible for:
(1) Assuring that nuclear weapon development safety activities as
outlined in paragraph 7. of this Supplemental Directive comply
with the policy of DOE 5610.10 for protection of the public
health and safety.
(2) Assuring that nuclear safety critical components are
identified during development and their manufacture is
controlled from the production through retirement phases.
(3) Designating a member to the Project Officer Group (FOG) and a
representative to safety subgroup for each weapon system.
(4) Providing, as required, participants for each of the nuclear
safety activities outlined in paragraph 7. of this
Supplemental Directive.
(5) Supporting periodic stockpile reviews of nuclear safety,
security, and control features.
c. Director, Weapons Quality Division, AL reports to the Assistant
Manager for Operations and Weapons, and is responsible for:
(1) Providing direction for new material and stockpile testing of
nuclear safety critical components.
(2) Providing, as required, participants for each of the nuclear
safety activities outlined in paragraph 7. of this
Supplemental Directive.
(3) Supporting periodic stockpile reviews of nuclear safety,
security, and control features.
(4) Developing and maintaining, in conjunction with the DOD, a
Non-nuclear Assurance Program to assure that Stockpile
Evaluation units provided to the DOD for field or flight
testing do not contain materials capable of producing nuclear
yield.
d. Director, Nuclear Explosive Safety Division, (NESD), AL reports to
the Assistant Manager for Environment, Safety, and Health, and is
responsible for oversight of activities throughout each of the
Nuclear Weapon Program phases to assure adequate attention is given
to safety, security, and control considerations. Specific
responsibilities are as follows:
(1) Appointing an employee to participate in all nuclear weapon
program activities in support of paragraph 7. that have or
could have an effect on nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon
system safety, security, or control. In some cases, DP-20
will designate this individual or additional individuals to
assure all relative activities are properly monitored.
(2) Assuring that all safety actions related to nuclear weapons
safety requiring a DOE concurrence to the DOD are thoroughly
analyzed from a safety viewpoint by qualified safety experts
with special emphasis on DOE's joint safety responsibility as
required by Presidential Directive.
(3) Assuring that all activities included in the definition of
design safety (DOE Order 5610.10) are carried out.
(4) Providing, as required, participants for each of the nuclear
safety activities outlined in paragraph 7. of this
Supplemental Directive.
(5) Designating an individual to participate in all POG's and
respective safety subgroups. The primary responsibility of
this individual is to assure that all safety, security, and
control issues are fully considered and adequately resolved.
(6) Evaluating reported accidents and incidents in the DOD and
making recommendations, where appropriate, to the Manager, AL
and DP-20 for improved safety.
(7) Assuring that planned and implemented safeguards and security
policies and standards are consistent with safety
requirements.
(8) Resolving issues resulting from joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon
and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
activities by the following procedures as applicable:
(a) Coordination between appropriate level DOE and DOD staff
members.
(b) Referral to DOE HQ, DASMA, through the Manager, AL, of
issues which require attention of the NWC-WSC and/or the
NWC for recommended action.
(c) Submission, with appropriate recommendations, to the
Manager, AL, of issues which require attention of the
Secretary for final disposition.
(9) Appointing Nuclear Weapon Safety Program Managers for each of
the Services' nuclear weapon systems. Program Managers have
the following responsibilities:
(a) Coordination with the Military Services, outside of
Nuclear Weapon Systems Safety Groups' (NWSSG) safety
studies and reviews, on all matters relating to AL
responsibilities in the nuclear safety programs of the
Military Services. Consultation with appropriate
national laboratory personnel will be effected in the
discharge of this function as deemed necessary.
(b) Serving as the point of contact to the Military Services
and their NWSSG concerning matters relating to the
Military Services' safety studies and operational safety
reviews.
(c) Serving as the DOE member on the Military Services' NWSSG
functioning under the following guidelines:
1 In evaluating the nuclear safety, security, and
control of nuclear weapon systems through
participation in studies and reviews conducted by
the DOD NWSSG, the DOE member shall employ the DOD
Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards contained in
DOD Directive 3150.2.
2 When requested by the Service, arrange with the DOE
designated weapon/design laboratory, for safety,
security, and control-related data on the specific
nuclear weapon to be addressed by the NWSSG.
3 The DOE member shall have as a primary
responsibility participation in the activities of
the NWSSG.
4 The DOE member shall not have current or have had
prior responsibility for the design, development, or
production of the specific weapon or weapon system
being evaluated.
5 The DOE member shall be qualified by education and
experience to identify, analyze and understand the
information necessary to conduct a proper evaluation
of nuclear weapon systems employed by the DOD. The
task of the DOE member is to make unbiased and
independent judgments regarding the nuclear safety
of the nuclear weapon system under consideration.
He shall not have responsibility for advocacy of
special interests of the DOE or any other agency.
6 The DOE member will carefully consider all technical
information and recommendations from the laboratory
technical advisors. Where possible, supporting
documentation for safety studies and reviews will be
studied by DOE members and their laboratory
technical advisor(s) to identify specific nuclear
weapon safety concerns prior to safety studies and
reviews. Should there be unreconciled differences
of opinion of the significance of a nuclear safety
concern prior to a safety study or review, these
differences will be made known to appropriate
management levels within AL and the cognizant
laboratory for resolution to the study or review.
Should such difference arise during a study or
review, responsibility for the position to be taken
rests with the DOE NWSSG member.
7 In those instances, during a safety study or review,
where the position of the DOE NWSSG member on a
nuclear safety issue differs from that of the
majority of the NWSSG, the DOE member will document
his position in a minority opinion in the NWSSG
report of the study or review. Upon request of the
DOE member, the laboratory technical advisor(s) will
assist in the preparation of the technical details
of the minority opinion.
(d) Reviewing all DOD safety rules packages forwarded from HQ
(DP-20) for action and submitting appropriate
recommendations on the rules packages to DP-20 using the
following procedures (formal correspondence will be
prepared for signature of the Director, NESD):
1 Procedures for Interim/Final Approval. Upon receipt
of a safety rules package from DP-20:
a Task the SNL technical advisor to the AL
Nuclear Weapon Safety Program Manager to assist
in the conduct of the review and analysis and
in the development of the AL comments and
recommendations.
b Conduct an analysis and review based on:
- The safety rules package
- The NWSSG findings and recommendations
- The Military Services' subsequent actions on
any NWSSG finding and/or recommendations
- Comments from the SNL technical advisor to
the AL Nuclear Weapon Safety program Manager
c In the event there are no unresolved safety
issues relating to the safety rules package,
forward AL comments recommending concurrence to
DP-20 within 10 days, when possible, from
receipt of the rules package.
d If, pending final approval, a Field Review is
deemed necessary, recommend such to DP-20 and
provide membership to the Field Review.
e In the event that the safety rules package
review reveals the need for revising any part
of the package, recommend the revision to
DP-20.
f In the event that the safety rules package
review reveals that the DOE should not concur
in the package, prepare the necessary
correspondence for nonconcurrence to DP-20 for
the signature of the Manager, AL.
2 Procedures for Administrative Changes. In the event
a revision in the rules is being processed as an
Administrative change pursuant to paragraph 10.c. of
DOE Order 5610.13:
a Make an independent assessment as to whether
the proposed change qualifies as an
administrative change.
b Provide DP-20 the AL position (in coordination
with the SNL technical advisor to the AL
Nuclear Weapon Safety Program Manager)
regarding the proposed administrative change.
c In the event that the NESD position is that the
revision does not constitute an administrative
change, prepare the necessary correspondence
for nonconcurrence to DP-20 for the signature
of the Manager, AL.
(e) Monitoring the actions of the Military Services in
responding to the findings and recommendations of the
NWSSG and making appropriate recommendations for DOE
action to DP-20.
(f) Resolving issues resulting from joint DOE/DOD nuclear
weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and
control activities using the following procedures as
applicable:
1 Coordination between appropriate level AL and DOD
staff members.
2 Submission, with appropriate recommendations, to the
Manager, AL for disposition.
3 Referral to DP-20 with appropriate recommendations.
(10) When the DOE conducts a Field Review in accordance with
paragraph 13 of reference 4.b.:
(a) Providing membership to the Field Review Team.
(b) Tasking appropriate weapon/design laboratories to provide
support to the Field Review.
e. President, SNL; Director, LANL; and Director, LLNL. The primary
responsibility of the National Laboratories is the development and
implementation of the technical processes to meet DOE and AL goals
and requirements in the areas of safety, security, and control.
Additionally, the National Laboratories shall provide support, as
appropriate, for the activities of DOE Order 5610.13. The
following examples of Laboratory support do not preclude additional
activities as may be deemed necessary.
(1) The SNL is responsible for designating representatives of the
nuclear safety staff, as a primary duty, to function as
technical advisors and consultants to the AL Nuclear Weapon
Safety Program Managers, one for each Program Manager. In
addition to other technical assistance that may be requested
by the Program Managers, the SNL technical advisors shall:
(a) Accompany the DOE NWSSG members during NWSSG activities
and provide to them technical information on any aspect
of the nuclear weapon system that could affect nuclear
safety.
(b) Review and make timely comments to the Program Managers
on all safety rules packages submitted to AL for comment.
(2) Assigning, when requested by the AL Nuclear Weapon Safety
Program Manager, additional qualified personnel to accompany
DOE NWSSG members during NWSSG activities and provide them
technical information on any aspect of the nuclear weapon
system which could affect safety of the nuclear warhead.
(3) Performing analyses and research, as required by DOE Orders,
in support of paragraph 7. and providing objective evidence of
compliance with design safety criteria using appropriate
analytical methodology. For a given situation, AL may request
one or more of the following methodologies:
(a) Fault tree or similar analyses.
(b) Failure modes and effects analyses.
(c) Probabilistic risk analyses.
(d) Radiation shielding analyses.
(e) Criticality analyses.
(4) Providing support to Field Review Teams.
(5) Providing other safety, security, and control related
functions.
7. SAFETY, SECURITY, AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES BY WEAPON PROGRAM PHASE.
Throughout each phase of the weapon development cycle AL will
participate in activities appropriate to that phase. The AL will
provide comments and recommendations at each phase to the responsible
official regarding the readiness of a program to proceed.
a. Phase 1, Weapon Conception. An AL employee will participate, as
appropriate, in all Phase 1 activities addressing conceptual
nuclear safety, security, and control issues.
b. Phase 2, Program Feasibility Studies. An AL employee shall
participate in a formal evaluation of the weapons lab developed
nuclear safety theme and its implementation. The nuclear safety
theme will describe how the design addresses the nuclear explosive
safety standards defined in DOE Order 5610.10.
c. Phase 2A, Design Definition and Cost Study. An AL employee will,
as required, participate in, review, and comment on appropriate
nuclear safety activities/documents such as:
(1) Applicable Interface Control Drawings (ICDs).
(2) Nuclear Safety Theme.
(3) The initial design to assure that features of the Safety Theme
are included.
(4) Preliminary definition of nuclear safety critical features.
d. Phase 3, Development Engineering. An AL employee will, as
required, participate in, review, and comment on appropriate
nuclear safety activities/documents such as:
(1) Applicable ICDs.
(2) Definition of the nuclear safety hardware test and evaluation
program.
(3) An initial plan for the safety aspects of new material and
stockpile testing will be prepared.
(4) Nuclear safety focused design reviews.
e. Phase 4, Production Engineering and Phase 5, First Production.
Nuclear safety activities during Phases 4 and 5 are similar. In
addition to continuing the activities of Phase 3, an AL employee
will, as required, participate in, review, and comment on
appropriate nuclear safety activities/documents such as:
(1) New material and stockpile test planning.
(2) Validation of nuclear safety critical design features by
analysis and test.
(3) Evaluation and approval of acceptance test equipment
concerning nuclear safety features.
(4) Product evaluation activities including nuclear safety
considerations.
(5) Production process controls for safety critical features.
f. Phase 6, Quantity Production and Stockpile and Phase 7, Retirement.
Nuclear safety activities during Phases 6 and 7 are similar. An AL
employee will, as required, participate in, review, and comment on
appropriate nuclear safety activities/documents such as:
(1) New material and stockpile evaluation of safety critical
features.
(2) Review and approval of nuclear safety aspects of Limited Life
Component Exchanges.
(3) Periodic stockpile reviews from a nuclear safety standpoint.
(4) Repair activities on weapons at the production agency.
Bruce G. Twining
Manager