The $300+ billion, multi-national F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is the largest single military program in history. It’s also reaching a critical nexus. In order to keep costs under control and justify the industrial ramp up underway, participating countries need to sign order agreements soon. The problem is that the F-35 isn’t a proven fighter design, with a demonstrated baseline of performance in service. It’s a developmental aircraft in the early middle of its test program, which is now scheduled to continue until 2018 or even 2019.

As one might expect, this status makes the F-35 a controversial long-term bet in many of the program’s member countries. Costs aren’t certain, numbers ordered are slipping in many countries, and timelines aren’t certain after numerous schedule delays. With combat testing still a year or 2 away, even operational performance isn’t certain. That performance is a big deal to many air forces that expect to field the F-35 as their only fighter.

This article takes a much closer look at the F-35’s real air superiority potential and weaknesses, from the 2008 RAND Pacific Vision study that triggered so much controversy, to other analyses and subsequent developments. Understanding and their implications for partner nation participation has only grown in importance since 2008. Let us begin…

4 major defense-focused American think tanks joined forces to weight budget trade-offs for the Pentagon over the next 10 years. They have a clear consensus [PDF] to primarily target personnel, and more specifically DoD civilians, for cuts, whether sequestration is applied fully or partially. 3 of them also seem to really like stealthy UAVs, while AEI likes their stealth aircraft manned (probably a more realistic option given the chosen timeframe) and doesn’t see the same need for a cyber splurge. Surface combatants would also be significantly cut under most of their scenarios. These organizations are possibly starting to think too much alike.