Elements of Military Art and Science eBook

The war in the Crimea proved most conclusively the
vast superiority of the French administrative system
over that of the English—­of the military
over a civil organization of the administrative corps
of an army. The French troops before Sebastopol
were regularly, cheaply, and abundantly supplied with
every requisite of provisions, clothing, munitions,
medical stores, military utensils, and hospital and
camp equipages; while the English army, notwithstanding
an immense expenditure of money, was often paralyzed
in its operations by the want of proper military material,
and not unfrequently was destitute of even the necessaries
of life.

Instead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency
of our own government has been (especially in supplying
the army in Utah) to imitate the sad example of the
English, and to convert the supplying of our armies
into a system of political patronage to be used for
party purposes. If fully carried out, it must
necessarily result in the ruin of the army, the robbery
of the treasury, and the utter corruption of the government.

NOTE TO CHAPTER V.—­TACTICS.

The war in Mexico, from the small number of troops
engaged, and the peculiar character of the ground
in most cases, afforded but few opportunities for
the display of that skill in the tactics of battle
which has so often determined the victory upon the
great fields of Europe. Nevertheless, the history
of that war is not without useful lessons in the use
which may be made of the several arms in the attack
and defence of positions. The limit assigned to
these Notes will admit of only a few brief remarks
upon these battles.

The affairs of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma properly
constitute only a single battle. In the first,
which was virtually a cannonade, the lines were nearly
parallel, and Arista’s change of front to an
oblique position during the engagement, was followed
by a corresponding movement on the part of General
Taylor. Being made sensible of the superiority
of the American artillery, the Mexican general fell
back upon the Ravine of Resaca de la Palma, drawing
up his troops in a concave line to suit the physical
character of the ground. The Americans attacked
the whole line with skirmishers, and with dragoons
supported by light artillery, and the charge of a
heavy column of infantry decided the victory.
General Taylor’s operations at Monterey partook
more of the nature of an attack upon an intrenched
position than of a regular battle upon the field.
No doubt Worth’s movement to the right had an
important influence in deciding the contest, but the
separation of his column from the main body, by a
distance of some five miles, was, to say the least,
a most hazardous operation. The Mexicans, however,
took no advantage of the opening to operate between
the separate masses into which the American army was
divided. The loss which the Mexicans inflicted
upon us resulted more from the strength of their position