Saturday, October 31, 2015

After Putin, Russia Likely to Become Even Greater Threat to Ukraine, Kyiv Analyst Says

Paul
Goble

Staunton, October 31 – Many Ukrainians
and others believe that after Vladimir Putin leaves the scene, Moscow will
return Crimea and the Donbas to Ukraine and relations between the two Slavic
countries will normalize, Anatoly Oktisyuk says.But in fact, Russia may become an even
greater threat to Ukraine than it is now.

Even
more than Putin, Oktisyuk says, these Russian nationalists “do not understand
why “Kiev is the mother of Russian cities’ but still up to now is the capital of
an independent Ukraine;” and they are likely to act on that belief and take an
even more aggressive line regarding Ukrainian statehood.

Consequently,
there is “every reason to think” that those who believe a post-Putin Russia
will necessarily be better for Ukraine (or indeed for itself and the rest of
the world) almost certainly are deluding themselves about the nature and even
more the source of the Russian “problem.”

Looking
into the future, “after Putin, power in the Kremlin could be seized by
representatives of the army and force structures or the nationalists. Either of
these variants will carry with them great risks and threats for Ukraine.” Neither
of these groups understands why Putin didn’t follow up his success in Crimea by
seizing even more of Ukraine.

“Over
the course of the last 15 years,” Oktisyuk says, “an entire generation raised
in the spirit of Russian chauvinism and great power views. Moscow, in its opinion,
is ‘the third Rome,’ the new center of a world forced which everyone must take
into consideration as they did at some point with the Soviet Union.”

As
a result, he continues, “the new Russian geopolitical paradigm by itself
excludes the existence of the politically and economically independent states
which arose on the post-Soviet space” and in the first instance, this include
Ukraine, whose appearance “on the world map” many in Russia and elsewhere
consider “a geopolitical ‘misunderstanding.’”

Putin’s
approach to Ukraine, with all its reactive and unpredictable qualities,
reflects his effort to balance among various groups in Russia – big business, the
bureaucracy, the church, the army and the force structures – all of whom are
united by money and power, the Ukrainian analyst argues.

But
“the ‘nationalists in principle’ are very angry” about what Putin has not done
in Ukraine, and “it is not excluded that under the impact of sanctions and in
connection with the significant reduction of Russia’s ‘resourced base’ on which
the entire system of Putin’s power rests, this boat will begin to rock” because
the nationalists want to take command.

If
the Russian nationalists came to power, then there would be “more challenges
and problems” for Ukraine and the other countries in the region, Oktisyuk says.
And “if [Ukraine] withstood the first wave of Russian aggression only thanks to
the heroism of the army and volunteers and the mobilization of the active
strata of the population, the second wave could be still more destructive.”

Because
of that possibility, even likelihood, he concludes, Ukraine must “prepare
itself already now,” with the government carrying out “real reforms,
modernizing the country and struggling with corruption.”