The Approach to the Philippines covers a series of seven complex
amphibious and ground operations along the northern coast of New Guinea
during the period April-October 1944, in the Southwest Pacific Area, and
the capture of the southern Palau Islands, September-November 1944, in
the Central Pacific Area. These operations paved the way for the Allied
invasion of the Philippines in the late fall of 1944.

The Approach to the Philippines covers all activities-ground,
air, and naval- necessary for adequate understanding of the Army ground
narrative. The nature of combat usually involved a series of coordinated
but separate operations by regimental

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combat teams. Divisions seldom fought as integral units during the approach
to the Philippines.

The operations involved all the mechanics of amphibious warfare in 1944-strategic
and logistical planning, naval gunfire, carrier-based and land-based air
support, infantry maneuver, small-unit actions, artillery support, tank
actions, tactical supply ashore, medical problems, and civil affairs. The
series of operations described was unique, and the problems of execution
involved were vastly complicated by the fact that they were executed in
rapid succession. While one was being planned, another was being launched,
the height of combat was being reached in a third, and still others had
entered a consolidation stage.

Basically, The Approach to the Philippines becomes a story of
joint operations from the highest to the lowest levels. Pertinent information
about strategic planning by the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff is included
to fit the tactical narrative into its proper perspective in the global
war. At theater level the problems of joint planning, command, and organization
for amphibious operations are covered in detail. At the tactical level
may be found the story of a U.S. Army infantry company advancing along
a coastal strand with the support of a U.S. Navy PT boat, while a fighter-bomber
of the Royal Australian Air Force orbited overhead, ready to dive-bomb
or strafe targets that the ground and naval units could not destroy. Or
there is the story of a U.S. Navy destroyer and guns aboard amphibious
craft manned by U.S. Army engineers that covered the withdrawal of an Army
infantry battalion, while Army Air Forces planes protected all three elements.
Finally, the plans and actions of the enemy are covered, principally from
Japanese records.