Keeping the Hotline Warm

Six months ago, Russia's President Putin was the first foreign leader
to express sympathy and solidarity with the United States following the
attacks on New York and Washington. Using the hotline established between
the two superpowers during the Cold War, Putin said Russia is with America
and against the terrorists. Based on this position, Russia contributed
several kinds of support for the Western military action in Afghanistan,
and an air corridor for the flights of American aircraft was provided.
Furthermore, Russia stands in for American interests in its Central Asian
Alliances and supports the West with intelligence information. In addition
to supporting the US, Russia also acts in its own direct interests, particularly
in Central Asia and the Caucasus where it has to prevent potential terrorist
threats.

Apart from military and strategic action, Putin has been opening new
windows of opportunity for relations between Russia and the West. Russia's
short-term signals surprised the international community, but in the half
year that has followed, the long-term tasks have come increasingly into
focus. Putin's most significant foreign address on both short and long-term
developments was his speech given in the German Bundestag at September
25th in Berlin. He started by highlighting the worldwide background to
the tragedy of September 11th and continued with the need to build a new
security architecture. In doing this, he suggested strengthening European
integration but also thinking in a wider, i.e. pan-European security context.
Russia's clear support for the US and Putin's declaration of the end of
the Cold War surprised the Western world. At the same time most of the
Russian political elite is critically astonished about Putin's current
position. One has to ask how far and by whom the President is supported,
whether he is expressing his own power over other actors and influence
groups, or whether he is under serious pressure from his opponents. Furthermore,
the immediate co-operation on strategic aspects, like providing the air
corridor, is no guarantee of a strategic and sustainable partnership.
Some doubts should be considered about the support for Putin among the
Russian elite and public opinion.

Russia's new strategic approaches

Taking lessons from history seriously, one has to consider that East
and West have collaborated before under the pressure of common enemies
and threats, but, for instance, after the end of World War II co-operation
turned very quickly into the new confrontation of the Cold War. Furthermore,
at least some doubts should be considered about the support for Putin
among the Russian elite. The strongest criticism is formulated by Communist
and/or Nationalist representatives, who are comparing Putin with Yeltsin
or Gorbachev. Beyond radical positions, even analysts and politicians
who usually support Putin are much more sceptical now. Even if they do
not criticise, they have started to brick up the new windows of opportunity
with wish lists for compensation. The list starts with understanding Russia's
military action in Chechnya. The bombing of apartment buldings in Moscow
and other Russian cities in summer 2000 is once more propagated as a terrorist
attack from the Caucasus, even if any kind of official proof is still
missing. The intervention in Chechnya is portrayed as fighting against
terrorism, and the West should support it instead of constantly criticising
Moscow.
Other analysts assess the close co-operation between Russia and the West
as a tactical policy which will not lead to any new medium-term strategic
alliances. For instance, the journalist Alexeij Pushkov argues that the
window of opportunity for new co-operation is already closed, since the
US pulled out of the ABM treaty and Tony Blair's proposal to install a
new NATO Russia institution was blocked.

Even if Putin's position is not shared by all members of the Russian
elite, he is supported by reform oriented representatives, such as the
member of the Russian state Duma Vladimir Ryshkov, or Dmitri Trenin, deputy
director of Carnegie Moscow. They mostly share the position of a new window
of opportunity of Russia's external relations and internal development.
Under this assumption, the EU is of growing importance for Russia and
the events of September 11th have an impact on almost all areas of co-operation
between Russia and the European Union.

Challenges for Partnership

Security Partnership

Since Russia started to widen its perception of the EU from a purely
economic player to a political actor, Russia has been interested in security
co-operation with the European Union. The intention is connected with
Russia's concept of a multilateral world order. In this concept, the EU
is seen as an alternative to a US-dominated world. Therefore, the Russian
government has been welcoming the strengthening of the EU's Common Security
and Defence Policy, but did not agree with the western security concept
that strengthening European security and defence co-operation is part
of transatlantic co-operation.
Even before September 11th the US refused to participate directly in the
NATO operations in Macedonia. As an indirect consequence of September
11th, one should assume decreasing American involvement in European conflicts.
Therefore Western Europe has a need to establish a new security partnership
with Russia to cooperate in preventing and fighting regional conflicts
in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the western part of the CIS.
Following from Putin-oriented statements and official action after September
11th, Russia is no longer interested in a multilateral world order, but
is part of the international anti-terrorist operation. Once more Putin's
speech in the German Bundestag can be mentioned as a signal for overcoming
the legacies of the Cold War and proclaiming Russia an ally of the West.
This also includes close co-operation or even membership in western organizations,
not excluding NATO. In addition to NATO issues, Russian positions are
also focusing on strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy,
as well as increasing security co-operation between Russia and the EU.
The new goals of security co-operation were part of the EU-Russia summit
in Brussels in October 2001. The output fixed in a "Joint declaration
on stepping up dialogue and co-operation on political and security matters"
opens opportunities for Russian participation in civilian and military
crisis management operations of the European Union Defence and Security
Policy. Furthermore a statement on mutual co-operation to combat international
terrorism in compliance with the international law and the UN Charter
was signed. Russia's requirement to strengthen the ESDP should be considered
as an opportunity for deepening EU integration.

Partnership of modernization

If Russia keeps the door open to being a western country, it has the
opportunity to transform itself from a historically great power to a prosperous
European nation. This transformation would decide a fundamental Russian
debate about self-definition between being a superpower on the one hand
or being a successful modern state on the other. If the reaction to September
11th leads to the latter approach, Russia's future development will further
co-operation with Europe.

The European Union and its member states fulfil several conditions for
a modernisation partnership. The EU is costumer number one for Russian
exports, and with about 40 percent amount of foreign direct investment,
the EU member states are the biggest direct investors in Russia. The Union
is also the largest provider of technical assistance to Russia. Furthermore,
supporting the Central and East European candidates states through the
combination of becoming members and rule-setting for internal development
from the outside is a unique success story for stabilising transition
processes. If Russia is setting new goals for its transition, the Union
should use these experiences to stabilise internal Russian developments.
Potentially, the EU policies of the technical assistance program TACIS
and the humanitarian aid office ECHO can
be adopted to the additional requirements. The recently adopted EU Country
Strategy Paper 2000-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2003 for
the Russian Federation include some important areas of further technical
assistance for Russia. By identifying areas of co-operation such as administrative
reform, civil society development, deregulation, corporate governance
and social reform, the approach goes far beyond the Washington Consensus
based on supporting liberalisation and privatisation at the beginning
of the 90s. In evaluating the capacity of the EU's technical assistance
to Russia, one should also take into consideration the comparatively low
amount of resources budgeted. Since 1991, when the EU set priorities in
its external relations and its function as a soft security provider, the
Union has provided € 6.2 billion in technical assistance to the Balkans
and only € 1.5 billion to Russia.

Economic partnership

The events of September 11th are also a new impulse for economic co-operation
between Russia and the EU. This very area was the beginning of Russia's
co-operation with the EU. The Union is the most important trade partner
for Russia, and the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement signed in July
1994 already contained the option of a European free trade area. The trade
relations between Russia and the European Union are dominated by Russian
energy exports. On the one hand this trade structure is of mutual interest,
but on the other hand strengthening the energy-based economy allows Russia
to postpone further modernisation.

September 11th has an additional impact on Russian-European economic
relations. At the Brussels summit in October 2001 Russia and the European
Union declared the creation of a Common European Economic area. The guidelines
are restricted to the idea of bringing EU and Russia closer together,
to removing obstacles to trade, investment and transit and to paving the
way for negotiations on Russian WTO accession. A clear concept of designing
a common European economic area is still missing, but nevertheless it
might be a fresh impulse to extend security related co-operation towards
a widespread partnership. Taking into consideration requirements of Russian
modernisation the economic relationship should go beyond energy exports
from Russia to Europe.

Further conclusions

In order to define the impact of September 11th on EU-Russian relations
one should consider three aspects. First of all, the internal Russian
discussion has been dominated by US and NATO related issues; second the
discussion is not finished; and finally, Putin in his clearly post-Cold
War styled policy is not being supported by all Russian decision makers
and analysts.

The crucial question remains to what extent the consequences of September
11th will go further than single-issue short-term action toward impulses
to strengthen integration and co-operation between East and West. Taking
into account all the threats and challenges to Russia's current position,
the most important task is to transform tactical co-operation in sustainable
partnerships between Russia, Europe and the United States. These partnerships
have to be based on widespread numbers of actors and can not be limited
to security-related issues. At this very point the problem of belonging
to different kinds of societies plays a significant factor, and the alliance
can by no means limited to common security interests. While Western societies
are consolidated democracies, market economies and pluralistic civil societies,
Russia is still under transition from authoritarian rule toward Western
modernisation and pluralism.

The current situation can be best described as a window of opportunity.
If Russia continues its policy of becoming a modern European country,
the EU is challenged to have a growing function. In the fields of modernisation
and economic co-operation, the EU is already a strong actor - its role
as a security and defence provider still has to be improved. While September
11th has already had some considerable consequences for relations between
Russia and the West, even after six months it is still too early to asses
the sustainable impact on EU-Russia relations. Future developments depend
on Russia's strategic choice for further modernisation and the EU's capacity
and capability to be a security and defence actor in the international
arena.