This chart plots the "annual likelihood" of the onset of
political instability according to the POLITY score of regimes at
the point of onset for all cases of political instability for all
countries during the contemporary period, 1955-2006. The chart plots
three perspectives on political instability using solid, line-and-marker
plots. The dashed line plots use the POLITY2 values and incorporate
interpolated information regarding periods of "interregnum"
(-77) and "transition" (-88); in this rendition, periods
of "interruption" (-66) are treated as missing data. Both
of these plots exclude cases of political instability that take place
at the time of state independence (8 instability cases). The plots
are "smoothed" by taking three-score averages for both POLITY
scores and event counts (e.g., the number of POLITY years for POLITY
score -7 is calculated by summing the numbers for -6, -7, and -8 and
dividing by 3; likewise, the number of instability onsets for POLITY
score -7 is calculated by summing the numbers of onsets for -6, -7,
and -8 and dividing by three). This "smoothing" technique
is consistent with the estimated error in the POLITY scores of +/-
1 point.

The most restrictive perspective is the PITF definition of the "consolidated
case" of political instability (plotted by theteal lines), which is a continuous episode of political
instability defined by the occurrence of one or more cases of adverse
regime change or major political violence, overlapping in time or
in succession, during which there is no period of "stability"
between the end of an instability case and the beginning of another
case that lasts more than five years. This perspective distinguishes
between a general condition of "stability" and a phase shift
to a general condition of "instability" in a particular
state. The "annual likelihood" for this perspective on political
instability is calculated by determining the POLITY score of regime
at the point of "consolidated case" onset and, then, dividing
the number of onsets for a particular POLITY score by the number of
"stability years" that particular POLITY score occurs in
the dataset (i.e., a subset of the Polity IV data series that does
not include POLITY scores for years during which a state is considered
to be in an instability condition and for the five years immediately
following the end of a period of instability). For more detailed information
on the PITF "consolidated case" methodology, see the PITF
Web site.

The blue lines plot the "annual
likelihood" of the onset of any one event from either of the
two categories of political instability events included in the PITF
perspective: adverse regime changes and major political violence.
The category of "major political violence" includes ethnic
wars, revolutionary wars, and genocides and politicides; however,
cases of genocides and politicides are included only when they refer
to a distinct episode of political violence, rather than an escalation
of violence or additional tactical use of violence in an ethnic or
revolutionary war. Additionally, six cases of war are "double-counted"
in the PITF data as they are designated simultaneously as both ethnic
and revolutionary wars; these cases are counted only once in the onset
calculations. As onsets in this perspective can occur at any time,
regardless of whether a separate episode is already occurring in a
country, the "annual likelihood" for this plot is calculated
by determining the POLITY score of regime at the point of case onset
and, then, dividing the number of onsets for a particular POLITY score
by the total number of years that POLITY score occurs in the comtemporary
period dataset.

The maroon lines plot the "annual
likelihood" of the onset of any one event from either of the
three categories of political instability events that include "major
democratic transitions" with "adverse regime changes"
and "major political violence." "Major democratic transitions"
disrupt and destabilize status quo authority regimes in ways very
similar to "adverse regime changes" even though we may prefer,
or even encourage, changes toward greater democratic (or less autocratic)
authority. "Annual likelihoods: are calculated using the same,
basic methodology as the two plots already described (above).

In general terms, discounting "major democratic transitions"
in political instability analyses tends to bias findings toward over-emphasizing
the volatility and risk associated with democratic transitions and
under-estimating the volatility and risk associated with autocratic
regimes. Indeed, using the PITF "consolidated case" approach
gives the impression that "strongly institutionalized" autocracies
exhibit (low) levels of risk comparable to that of the most "highly
institutionalized" or "consolidated" democracies. Clearly,
the relative stability of democratic authority is only realized in
the consolidated democracies (+9 and, especially, +10 on the POLITY
scale). The various forms of "strongly institutionalized autocracies"
are 6 to 10 times more likely to experience an instability event than
are the "fully institutionalized (+10) democracies" according
to the full instability analysis presented here. "Non-consolidated
democracies" have levels of risk for political instability onset
similar to that of the autocracies and it is the category of "anocracies"
that have the highest risks of instability onset. Unfortunately, it
appears to be quite difficult, but not impossible, to avoid the highened
risk associated with the condition of "anocracy" as a preparatory
"step" to "fully institutionalized democracy."
There were 81 cases of "major democratic transitions" in
(-10 to -6) autocracies during the contemporary period. Of these,
about half (43 cases) resulted in shifts from autocracy to the higher
risk category of anocracy, while 32 resulted in shifts to the similarly
high risk category of "incomplete democracy" (+6 to +8).
Only 6 transitions resulted in shifts from "strongly autocratic"
to the lowest risk categories of "highly institutionalized democracies"
(+9 or +10).