TY - JOUR
AU - Fernandez,Raquel
AU - Rosenthal,Robert W.
TI - Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations Revisted
JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL - No. 2981
PY - 1989
Y2 - May 1989
DO - 10.3386/w2981
UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2981
L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w2981.pdf
N1 - Author contact info:
Raquel Fernández
Department of Economics
New York University
19 West 4th Street, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012
Tel: 212/998-8908
Fax: 212/995-4186
E-Mail: raquel.fernandez@nyu.edu
AB - The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. An earlier paper provided a game-theoretic basis for this contention. in that all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game modeled have an extreme form in which the game's surplus is captured by the creditor. Two related games are analyzed here. Equilibria in which the debtor captures some of the surplus are shown to exist in one of them but not the other, and the roles of various assumptions in all three games is examined.
ER -