Abstract: This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerningKants model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude[Grbe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issueswhich are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recentanalytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status ofthe imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of theexegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kants views on these issues. Ithen develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kants theory of perception aselaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I showhow this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficultiesraised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kants position byconsidering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one wayto make sense of Kants argument is by juxtaposing it with Russells responseto Bradleys regress; I focus in particular on the concept of unity. Finally, I offer,in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant inSections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kants account has significant strengths, anumber of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenolo-gical tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps.

1. Conceptualism, Imagination and Atomism

I want to begin by introducing three issues which are central to KrV itself, andwhich connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception andintentionality. This section will sketch those issues and provide a brief overviewof my ultimate line of argument.

The first issue is the relationship between perception, intuition and theunderstanding. Perceptions, for Kant, are conscious representations (KrV:A320/B3767).1 My interest is in a subset of perceptions: those which refer [sichbeziehen] to an object [Gegenstand] either immediately, in the case of intuitions,or, in the case of concepts, mediately, by means of a mark . . . common to severalthings (KrV: A320/B3767). This subset of conscious representations, be theyintuitions or concepts, thus possesses intentionality: Kant accordingly refers tothem, in contrast to mere sensations, as objective [objective] perceptions (KrV:A320/B3767). The question I wish to highlight is this: to what degree does Kantregard these various modes of intentionality as separable? For example, is therepresentation of spatio-temporal particulars possible in the complete absence ofconceptual capacities? Let non-conceptualism refer to those positions which

answer this question positively and conceptualism to those which respondnegatively.2 Kants stance on conceptualism, in the sense just defined, has beenthe focus of intensive, recent debate.3 I agree with Ginsborg, however, that thedebate will remain intractable insofar as both sides can adduce, in addition to thefamiliar catalogue of texts, what appears a compelling structural rationale fortheir position.4 On the one hand, non-conceptualism captures the prima facieattractive assumption that spatio-temporal perception is, in at least some sub-stantive sense, a more primitive intentional state than conceptualization: forexample because such perceptions, as illustrated by the case of optical illusions,appear to lack the inferential relationships that seem built into Kants account ofconceptuality via the latters link to judgment and to syllogistic inference.5 Thisprimitiveness may be dramatized by the example of animal experience: Kantstates repeatedly that animals are conscious, that they can represent parti-culars in outer sense and yet that they lack understanding.6 On the other hand,however, the argumentative structure of the Transcendental Analytic seemsdesigned precisely to close off the possibility that intuition might represent objectsindependent of the functions of thinking.7 As Allison puts it, the spectre whichKant seeks to exorcise is exactly that of a model of intentionality on whichperception is defined prior to the understanding thereby raising the possibilitythat the contents of perception will fail to include any referent for the categories(Allison 2004: 162). This line of thought is bolstered by the structure of theTranscendental Deduction: it seems very plausible, as Longuenesse has recentlyemphasized, that the second half of the proof is intended to show that thecategories are conditions not just on thought but on the manner in which thingsare given to us (Longuenesse 1998: 213). As Kant himself puts it, all synthesis,through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the cat-egories (KrV: B161). It is this claim which frequently leads Kant to analyse thecapacity to represent objects in terms of the capacity to represent rules; since heholds that animals lack the latter, it would seem that they must also lack theformer.8 The ultimate result, given the weight of considerations on both sides,seems to be a standoff with respect to the issue of Kant and conceptualism.

The second, and intimately related, issue concerns the status of imaginationand of synthesis within Kants account of intentionality. Kant initially attri-butes the capacity for synthesis, the action of putting different representationstogether, to the imagination: synthesis is in general the mere effect of theimagination (KrV: A77/B103). But, as has been widely noted, by B130 he seemsto reverse course dramatically:

All combination [Verbindung], whether we are conscious of it or not,whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical ornon-empirical, or of various concepts, is an act of the understanding.(KrV: B130)

This apparent reversal, and the attendant question of whether the intentionalcontribution of imagination is reducible to that of the understanding, is centralto the readings of KrV offered by authors from Sellars to Strawson to Heidegger.9

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My interest, in particular, is in what seems the most plausible analysis of Kantsposition: the proposal, as Longuenesse put it, is that understanding operates asthe rule-giver for the syntheses of imagination (Longuenesse 1998: 63). Let meunpack this. Given the results of the Analogies, all of nature is governed byrules: every event thus presupposes something on which it follows in accord-ance with a rule (KrV: A189). However, Kant contends, only rational beings arecapable of representing rules, i.e. of representing normative requirements withinthe content of their intentional states (GMS: 413) Such representations are madepossible by the understanding: as Ginsborg incisively summarizes, to say thatsynthesis involves understanding is simply to say that it involves a conscious-ness of normativity (Ginsborg 2008: 71). Given this, the proposal is as follows.The reason Kant initially attributes synthesis to imagination is simply that thebasic form which such synthesis takes is associative: animals thus possessimagination and so connect representations according to the laws of sensibility(V-MP-L1/Plitz: 2757). In rational agents alone, however, this associativesynthesis is governed, or as Longuenesse puts it appropriated, by an awarenessof normativity (Longuenesse 1998: 207). To take the simplest case, to concep-tualize an object, for example as a body, is to represent certain properties asnecessarily attaching to it, for example impenetrability. My recall or reproduc-tion of these properties is thus governed by the normative demands of theunderstanding (KrV: A106). Since Kant believes this capacity for recall orreproduction to be the work of imagination, it follows that the understandingis the rule-giver for the syntheses of imagination. While attractive, this modelof the relationship between understanding and imagination remains, however,underdeveloped. I will outline a number of ways in which Kants work providesthe material for such a development.

The final topic in play is perceptual atomism. Consider the Analogies. Kantsargument there is premised on the claim that the apprehension of the manifoldof appearance is always successive (KrV: A189/B234). This premise is vital toKants case: it is this premise which undercuts what one might call the naveview of time-determination, a view on which I can simply see that an eventhas taken place, and so legitimates an appeal to the categories in order tore-construct the distinction between successive perception and the perception ofsuccession. The problem, however, is that this initial premise seems less thancompelling: why can I not simply see, at a single glance, the simultaneouslyexisting parts of a house just as I seem able to see, at a single glance, both acomputer and a pen on my desk? Lewis White Beck (1978: 144) provides a clearformulation of the problem:

Kant assumes that the manifold of representations is always successive.This is certainly wrong. When I open my eyes I do not scan the visualfield as if my eyes or my attention worked like the electron ejector in atelevision tube, aiming first at one point and then at an adjacent point.But as a consequence of his sensational atomism, Kant assumes that myapprehension does work in this way.

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The difficulty is not confined to the Analogies. To take another case, Kant statesthat I cannot represent any line, no matter how small, without drawing it inthought, i.e. successively generating all the parts from one point (KrV: A162/B203). But as Van Cleve has emphasized this seems simply false: I can surelypicture a line instantly (Van Cleve 1999: 86). Van Cleve reinforces the point withanother example:

Imagine a page full of circles. Which circles did you fill in first, those inthe top half or the bottom half? If you are like me, you set the wholearray down at once. Even if you filled in one half of the page first, I betyou put down the individual circles whole, rather than generating thempoint by point. (Van Cleve 1999: 279n41)

The risk is that, precisely as Husserl and Heidegger later alleged, Kant hassimply distorted the phenomenological evidence in order to provide a platformfor the proof of the categories: if this is the case, that proof itself is open torejection. I will argue that Kants account contains a powerful response to suchconcerns, a response that feeds directly into the two issues sketched above.

I have emphasized the exegetical and philosophical centrality of three topicswithin Kants theory of intentionality: the status of conceptualism, of imagina-tion and of atomism. This paper obviously makes no pretence to provide acomplete treatment of these areas. My aim, rather, is to shed some fresh light onthem by focusing on the relationship between Kants conceptions of perception,of magnitude and of synthesis. Section 2 will introduce and develop the relevantaspects of his position, drawing in particular on KU. Using this framework, Icontrast, in Section 3, Kants argument in the Axioms of Intuition with theresponse developed by Russell to Bradleys attack on relations. This allows me,in Section 4, to pinpoint both the strengths and weaknesses of Kants positionwith respect to the three topics I have sketched; I suggest that the phenomeno-logical tradition, in particular Husserl and Heidegger, may plausibly be seen asresponding to those weaknesses.

2. Kant on Perception, Apprehension and the Basic Measure

In the A Deduction Kant introduces the synthesis of apprehension by makingthe following claims:

Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would notbe represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in thesuccession of impressions on one another; for as contained in onemoment no representation can ever be anything other than absoluteunity. (KrV: A99)

I want to begin by unpacking the various points made here. Every intuitioncontains a manifold because Kant holds that space and time, the forms ofintuition, are quanta continua: i.e. no part of them is the smallest (no part is

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simple) (KrV: A169/B211). Any intuition can thus be subdivided into a manifoldof parts. This naturally raises the following question: why do my perceptionsrepresent one particular level of decomposition as opposed to another? The coreof Kants answer lies in his conception of a basic measure [Grundma] which wetake in directly in one intuition [in einer Anschauung unmittelbar fassen] (KU:251). To explain this central aspect of Kants theory of intentionality, I need toaddress three inter-related points, each of which makes only limited sense whenviewed in isolation; I would therefore ask for the readers patience until all threeare in place. The first is the relationship between space and time. The term basicmeasure refers for Kant to the explanatorily primitive capacity for the repre-sentation of a determinate spatial extent: by explanatorily primitive here I meannot that this capacity depends upon no other capacities but that it depends uponno prior ability to represent particular spaces.10 More specifically, the basicmeasure may be understood as a unit of spatial representation: it consists in therepresentation of a specific spatial extent, for example, the height of a man (KU:256). Now, time, for Kant, is the form of inner sense, i.e. it is the form in whichthe subject intuits its own act of spatial representation:

[W]e cannot even represent time itself without, in drawing a straight line(which has to serve as the external figurative representation of time),attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold . . .Motion, as the action of the subject (not as a determination of an object),consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space . . . first produces theconcept of succession. (KrV: B1545)11

Given that the basic measure is the primitive mechanism by which the spatialdetermination of the manifold occurs, it follows that it is the iteration of the basicmeasure which generates the representation of succession; each particularinstance of the basic measure correlates to one moment in time.12 It is for thisreason, in part, that Kant describes the basic measure as a quantum or thatwhich I can cognize immediately, i.e., as A99 puts it, in one moment(V-MP/Dohna: 630).13 This brings me to the second point, the connection toconsciousness. Kant typically distinguishes between representations and repre-sentations of which the agent is conscious: the latter, as noted in Section 1,constitute perceptions (KrV: A320/B3767). The illustrations he gives of uncon-scious representations are mereological. To represent a man, for example, is torepresent his eyes, nose, mouth, etc. since the representation of the whole (ofthe head or of the human being) is composed of these partial ideas; neverthelessI am not conscious of these various parts (Anth.: 135). What determines thenthat of which we are conscious? Kants answer is the synthesis of apprehension.Specifically, we are conscious of those parts which have been distinguishedwithin the manifold by temporal succession: to say that as contained in onemoment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity is justto say that we are not conscious of the component parts of any instantaneousrepresentation. This, of course, raises a further question: what determines thescope of instantaneous consciousness? Obviously that scope can vary: just as I

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can see the mans face in an instant without being conscious of its parts, I cansee his eye in an instant without being conscious of its parts, and so on in linewith the quanta continua assumption. The answer is the size of the basicmeasure: as noted in the discussion of the first issue, one basic measure alwayscorrelates with one moment and thus, I can now add, with the threshold ofconsciousness. This leads to the third issue: what determines the basic measureitself? The initial answer Kant gives is the imagination (KU 2512). As noted inSection 1, Kant holds that non-rational but conscious subjects are, like any otherpart of nature, governed entirely by laws. In the case of animals, for example, theimagination would thus determine a basic measure entirely as a result of causalfactors. These will include the animals biologyan animal that preys on insectsand one that preys on large mammals will typically employ a different basicmeasure. These factors will also include context: in looking at the pyramids, touse Kants own example, one tends to employ the ready-made measure providedby the stones on top of one another; similarly, the measure used when standingon top of a hill will obviously differ from that employed when in a small,enclosed room.14 In the case of rational agents, however, the understanding isable to determine the nature of the measure employed:

If, for example, a savage [Wilder] sees a house from a distance, whose usehe does not know, he admittedly has before him in his representation thevery same object as someone else who knows it determinately as adwelling established for humans. But as to form, this cognition of oneand the same object is different in the two cases. With one it is mereintuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at the same time.(Log.: 33)

The savage lacks what Kant calls a rule of apprehension, i.e. an awareness ofcertain norms, i.e. concepts as defined in Section 1, which inform the perceptualprocess by determining what is to be apprehended or, equivalently, what basicmeasure is used.15 To put the point crudely, there is no reason for the savage toemploy the basic measure as opposed to, say, a basic measure within which the house would be no more significant than any othercomponent part of the terrain such as the rocks to its left or the empty field toits right. No doubt Kants educated audience would, likewise, miss manyfeatures of the same scene that would be immediately salient to the savage.Suppose, further, that the savage only employs the basic measure and no other. In that case, he will intuit the house but he will not be consciousof it, or perceive it in Kants sense of that term, any more than I perceive eachtimber on the dwellings porch. In practice, of course, the savage is likely toperceive the house even while lacking the relevant concept: this is because theimagination will recognize it as an unusual or even simply physically strikingfeature of the scene and thus, at some point, suggest an appropriate basicmeasure. Insofar as the savage is rational, he will, unlike an animal, possess thefurther ability to reflect on the features of this new basic measure and thus,ultimately, to arrive himself at the concept of a house.16

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The sketch of Kants theory of perception given here obviously requiresfurther development. Nevertheless, one can see how it relates directly to theissues introduced in Section 1. First, the account of the basic measure providesa concrete example of the interaction between imagination and understanding,and of the way in which capacities which function purely causally in animals,in this case the selection of a primitive unit of spatial perception, may beappropriated by the normative awareness characteristic of the understanding.Indeed, I agree with Longuenesse and Allison that the rule of apprehension isfunctionally equivalent to KrVs schema: both are rules for the determination ofour intuition in accordance with some universal concept (KrV: A141/B180).17

Second, this sketch sheds some light on the issue of atomism. Recall Van Clevesclaim: if asked to imagine a page of circles, I bet you put down the individualcircles whole, rather than generating them point by point (Van Cleve 1999:279n41). As I noted, this seems phenomenologically indisputable. But it is alsoperfectly in line with Kants theory. His theory of inner sense entails that anyiteration of the basic measure must occur successively; but there is no reason whythe basic measure itself cannot be a whole circle. Similarly, in the case of theSecond Analogy, Kant need not deny that, suitably positioned, we can intuit awhole section of the river or both the roof and base of a house at a single glance[in einem Blick] (KU: 254). His point is that, insofar as I do intuit both theupstream and downstream positions simultaneously, I cannot be conscious ofthem: the basic unit in such a case would be something like .Thus the premise needed for the Second Analogy is not that simultaneousrepresentation is impossible but simply that the representations of the partssucceed one another (KrV: A189/B234 emphasis added).

With this preliminary sketch of Kants position and of its relevance for the issuesdiscussed in Section 1 in place, I want to focus on the question of conceptualismand the potential separability of perception and understanding. I argue that Kantsposition can best grasped by contrasting the theory outlined here with what F. H.Bradley called my difficulty as to unities (Bradley 1911: 74).

3. Bradley, Russell and the B Deduction

In its simplest form, Bradleys difficulty as to unities is this:

Is there anything, I ask, in a unity beside its constituents . . . and, ifthere is anything more, in what does this more consist? (Bradley 1911:74)

Bradleys problem, and in particular its implications for the status of relations,was a key factor in the development of the early Analytic tradition: the youngRussell held that its solution would be the most valuable contribution which amodern philosopher could possibly make to philosophy (Russell 1990: 145).18

Within the early Analytic context, Bradleys challenge was typically treated inconnection with the proposition. Thus Russells 1903 formulation, for instance:

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Consider, for example, the proposition A differs from B. The constitu-ents of this proposition, if we analyse it, appear to be only A, difference,B. Yet these constituents, thus placed side by side, do not reconstitutethe proposition. It may be said that we ought, in the analysis, to mentionthe relations which difference has to A and B . . . These relations consistin the fact that A is referent and B relatum with respect to difference.[But] A, referent, difference, relatum, B is still merely a list of terms, nota proposition. (Russell 1903: 54)19

Russells point is that no set of propositional constituents or terms seemsitself sufficient to generate the requisite unity. In particular, the addition ofrelations to such a list serves, prima facie, simply to yield a longer list: loveswhen added to the names Desdemona and Cassio, would itself be onlyanother brick in the structure, not the cement (Russell 1912: 74). The result,Bradley predicted, is that we are hurried off into the eddy of a hopelessprocess, since we are forced to go on finding new relations without end(Bradley 1893: 278).

One can see how the central texts of the early Analytic period line up againstthis backdrop. Russells Theory of Knowledge manuscript, for example, attempts toavoid the regress by denying that that which supplies the relevant unity, namelylogical form, is itself part of the list of terms:

[The logical form] cannot be a new constituent, for if it were . . . we findourselves embarked on an endless regress. It is obvious, in fact, thatwhen all the constituents of a complex have been enumerated, thereremains something which may be called the form of the complex,which is the way in which the constituents are combined in the complex.(Russell 1992: 98)

Bradleys own proposed solution may be treated as a type of semantic holism.Of course, in the case of Bradley, of his respondents Moore and Russell, andindeed of Kant himself the semantic is inseparable from the ontological; but Ifocus for simplicitys sake on the former dimension alone. Confining myself,further, to the level of propositions as opposed to the entire Absolute, Bradleysproposal is that explanatory priority be granted to the proposition as a wholefrom which the individual components are merely false abstractions (Bradley1893: 32).20 I agree with Linsky that Freges appeal to a special class ofunsaturated propositional constituents is plausibly seen as an acceptance of thesame explanatory primacy of the complete thought (Linsky 1992: 268). But howexactly does all this connect to Kant? There are obvious links between Kantsposition on the unity of judgment and both the Fregean and the variousRussellian stories: with respect to the former, for example, Sluga in particular hasargued that Kants doctrine that concepts are possible predicates should bealigned with the context principle (Sluga 1980: 905). My interest, however, isnot, at least primarily, in Kants account of the unity of judgment but in hisaccount of the unity of perception. Specifically, my concern is with the claim,

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made in the Axioms of Intuition, that the unity of perception depends on theconcept of a magnitude, the schema of which is number (KrV: A142/B182,A161/B2023). I want now to consider the argument of the Axioms: myemphasis will be on its implications for the issues treated above.

I argued in Section 2 that Kants theory of perception should be understoodin terms of the concept of a basic measure. The basic measure delineates thespatial extent of individual, empirical perceptions. Suppose now that I have anentire series of perceptions (KrV: A121). Figure 1 may help to illustrate the case.

The various perceptual contents here are the various iterations of the basicmeasure; in line with Section 2, this iteration necessarily occurs at successivemoments in time. I have, however, simplified matters in two ways. First, Irepresent only what Kant calls the formal aspects of the basic measure: itsextension in space and time. Clearly my perception normally contains morecontent than this: the basic measure will not be a line segment but a man or ahouse.21 Second, the basic measures in Figure 1 are shown as all being the samesize. As stated in Section 2, this need not be the case: if I look down at my mapand then up at the mountain, the extent of the basic measure has changedradically in those two moments. Granting these simplifications, Kant wishes toraise an important question. As they stand, these perceptions are dispersed andseparate in the mind (KrV: A120). The question then is how they are to beunified or combined?

Why is this question importantwhy does it matter if these perceptionsremain as illustrated in Figure 1? In answering, it is important to stress that Kantdoes not hold that such unification is a necessary condition on the occurrence oridentity of the individual perceptions; in the language of the early Analyticperiod, Kant does not hold that the relations between the various perceptionsare internal or constitutive. Thus the combination in question is an instance ofcomposition [Zusammenhang] precisely because it concerns the synthesis of amanifold of what does not necessarily belong to each other (KrV: B202n). Thepotential for confusion stems from the complexity of Kants mereology. Kantfrequently distinguishes between aggregates, in which the parts have explana-tory priority over the whole, and systems, in which the whole has explanatorypriority over the parts.22 In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant argues that therelationship between the forms of intuition, on the one hand, and individualspaces and times, on the other, is of the latter type: this conclusion is designedto refute models, such as Lockes or, ironically, Leibnizs, on which the repre-sentations of space and time are pieced together by an experience of multiple

Perceptual Content: ___ ___ ___ ___ ___

Time: T1 T2 T3 T4 T5

Figure 1

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individual places or durations.23 In the case of determinate space and times,however, the mereology is reversed: the parts which make up any particularspatio-temporal extent have explanatory priority over it. Thus Kant holds thatinsofar as we are conscious of appearances they are necessarily extensivemagnitudes (KrV: A161/B202):

I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representation of theparts makes possible the representation of the whole (and thereforenecessarily precedes the latter). (KrV: A162/B203)

So, the unity of the perceptual series is not a necessary condition on theoccurrence of its individual members. Nevertheless, one can see that some formof combination is necessary if intentionality is not to be radically impoverished:without such combination, each perception figures only at its own moment ofoccurrence, with the result that earlier perceptions are unable to inform laterones. The minimal required form of combination is thus what Kant callsreproduction: without this I would, at each successive moment, always lose thepreceding representations (KrV: A102). The result of such reproduction may berepresented by Figure 2.

I use the square brackets in Figure 2 to represent the idea that the informa-tional content of the various past representations is, in some sense, co-accessibleat the single moment T6. Here the recalled items are simply the line segmentsseen at T1T5 but what is reproduced will typically be governed by either thelaws of association or, in the case of rational agents, by an awareness of norms(recall Section 2 on the rule of apprehension). Kant attributes the capacity forreproduction, which is obviously close to what we would call memory, to theimagination (KrV: A100). Now, Kants account of reproduction is, undoubtedly,underdeveloped. It is worth, however, responding briefly to one objection, raisedby Van Cleve: if we are able to simultaneously access multiple parts in memory,why cannot we simply do so in perception, thus reinstating what I called, inSection 1, the nave view of time-determination?24 But this is unfair: it seemsreasonable to start from the assumption that perception and memory are distinctmodalities such that the access, and the laws governing it, characteristic of theformer is unlikely to be identical to the access, and the laws governing it,characteristic of the latter. I return to this in Section 4, but, for the moment, Iwant simply to grant that Kant either has, or can develop, some viable expla-nation of the shift from Figure 1 to Figure 2.

I stated in Section 1 that the second half of the B Deduction claims that evenperception is, in some sense, dependent upon the understanding. One can now

Perceptual Content: [___ ___ ___ ___ ___]

Time: T6

Figure 2

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see why this claim is problematic. On the one hand, as an aggregate, there is nomode of determinate combination such that it is a necessary condition on theexistence of the individual perceptions that they enter into it: the situation shownin Figure 1 thus cannot be dependent on the understanding since Kant definesthe latter precisely as a capacity for certain forms of combination.25 On the otherhand, the picture given in Figure 2 is intended, at least in part, to capture theway in which animals are able to associate, say, the sound of a bell with a feelingof hunger; but since animals lack understanding for Kant, Figure 2 cannot bedependent on the understanding either.

I want now to present Kants solution to this dilemma. The key is to recognizethat, in virtue of the aggregative mereology of determinate spatial representa-tions, the problem Kant faces in explaining the unity of perception is analogousto that facing Russell given the atomism of the Principles: in both cases the aimis to explain a unification which is not a necessary condition on the identityof the relevant perceptions or terms.26 Now, as with more familiar proofs suchas the Second Analogy, the Axioms are intended to establish a transcendentalcondition on a particular intentional achievement. In the case of the Axioms, therelevant intentional achievement, I suggest, is this: the mereological integrationof multiple perceptions. Let me explain. Suppose I walk closer to a particularpatch of ground, seeing first the grass, then a snake, before coming close enoughto perceive its fangs. On Kants model of perception, what is changing here is thebasic measure: I am initially conscious of a whole, the patch of ground, andthen progressively conscious, in line with the results of Section 2, of its con-stituent parts. But what I lack, in the absence of conceptuality, is any way torepresent the parts as parts of the whole. Even if I reproduce the parts, as inFigure 2, all I have, to use Russells term, is a list of perceptions, one afteranother. Note also, exactly as in Russells case, that no additional perception canresolve the problemany more than adding another relation to the set ofpropositional constituents will resolve Bradleys regress. The bluntest way to putthe point is this. Suppose the line segments in Figure 2 are the parts of one vastline. Figure 2, however, does not represent them as such; it represents a mereheap [Haufen] of line segments just as Russells lists were bricks withoutcement (KrV: A121; Russell 1912: 74). Furthermore, it is clear that addingadditional components will not suffice to represent the vast line but simplyyields an expanded list. The problem, in short, is how one gets from Figure 2 toFigure 3.

This brings me to Kants solution: the only way to represent the syntheticunity of this manifold is via an appeal to a distinct semantic capability: namely,

Perceptual Content: [________________]

Time: T6

Figure 3

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a second-order capacity to form representations of our representations based ontheir shared properties (KrV: A68/B94).27 Kant holds that this second ordercapacity has certain innate forms. The relevant one here is the schema ofmagnitude:

[T]he pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis), as a concept of theunderstanding, is number, a representation which compounds [zusam-menbefat] the successive addition of homogeneous units. Number istherefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homo-geneous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time itself inthe apprehension of the intuition. (KrV: A1423/B182)

Kant expands on the point in the 1793 Prize essay:

For we can represent a determinate space to ourselves in no other waythan by drawing it, i.e., by adding one space to the other, and so alsowith time.

Now the representation of a composite, as such, is not a mere intuition,but requires the concept of a composition [Zusammensetzung], so far asit is applied to intuition in space and time. So this concept (along withthat of its opposite, the simple), is one that is not abstracted fromintuitions, as a partial representation contained in them, but is a basicconcept, and a priori at that. (FM: 271)

To possess the pure schema number is simply to possess an awareness of theline segments illustrated in Figure 2 as homogenous units, an awareness whichis in turn both necessary and sufficient, at least for Kant, to allow the represen-tation of their combination or composition through summing them (KrV: A164/B205). Their composition thus occurs by means of the representation of number,which itself consists solely in the consciousness of the unity . . . of the successivesynthesis of units [Einheiten] (KrV: A103).28 As Longuenesse (2005: 44) neatlyputs it:

When we measure a line by adding units of measurement, what we doin effect is recognize in the line a plurality of elements thought under thesame concept: line segment equal to segment s.

Segment s here corresponds to the basic measure. Kants claim is, in short, thatthe capacity to integrate determinate spatio-temporal parts and wholes, thecapacity to represent those parts as units, and the capacity to employ the conceptof number are inter-defined and inter-dependent. This conceptual awarenessneed not, as Kant himself makes clear, yield an explicit or reflected act ofjudgment: it rather consists, at least primarily, in the possession of a rule forapprehension (KrV: A1034). Of course, the categories are not intended to solveall mereological problems: to understand how the fangs and tongue are both partof one entity I require not just a pure concept but an empirical one, . Butit is the schema of magnitude which makes possible the composition of the

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spatio-temporal manifold and thus the representation of the segments of Figure2 as one intuition.29 Kant summarizes the point in a 1792 letter to Beck:

Composition [Zusammensetzung] itself cannot be given by means ofmere intuition and its apprehension, but only through the self-activecombination of the manifold in intuition . . . this combination and itsfunction must be subject to rules a priori in the mind, which consti-tute the pure thought of an object in general (the pure concept of theunderstanding), by which the apprehension of the manifold must begoverned, insofar as it amounts to one intuition; furthermore, these apriori rules constitute the condition of all possible empirical cognitionof the composite (or that which belongs to it). (Letter to J. S. Beck, 16October 1792, Br Ak. XI 376)

4. An Assessment of Kants Position

I want now to assess, philosophically and textually, the account which I haveattributed to Kant in Sections 1-3; for conveniences sake I label this account X.Recall, first, what I called the question of conceptualism: can perception repre-sent empirical particulars in the absence of conceptual capacities? It seems thatX strikes a plausible balance here. On the one hand, it allows an affirmativeanswer: an owls consciousness, for example, will be biologically determinedsuch that the basic measure which it uses will automatically pick out entitiesof a certain size. Animals can thus possess conscious and immediate spatio-temporal representations of particulars while lacking the various intentionalachievements which Kant holds depend on a consciousness of normativity:animal intentionality would not contain, for example, any distinction betweensuccessive perception and the perception of succession.30 Kant himself makesexactly this point:

To make a concept, by means of an intuition, into a cognition of anobject, is indeed the work of judgment; but the reference [Beziehung] ofan intuition to an object generally is not. (Letter to J. S. Beck, 11November 1791, Br Ak. XI 311)

Admittedly, matters here are complicated by Kants tendency to shift betweenweaker and stronger definitions of object and related terms such as cogni-tion.31 Nevertheless, the final clause of Kants remark is clear enough and it fitsprecisely with my analysis: the reference of intuitions does not depend onconceptuality or judgment just as, within the Russellian example used above, thereference of Desdemona and Cassio is not dependent upon their satisfactoryunification within a proposition (Russell 1912: 74). On the other hand, however,X constitutes one portion of an extended transcendental argument for thelegitimate application of the categories to intuition. This argument is directedprimarily against Humean scepticism about the semantics of concepts not drawn

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from experience and the justification of propositions which are neither empiricalnor definitional.32 It is therefore vital that X shows that the relevant category,in this case magnitude, is a necessary condition for some comparatively basicperceptual achievement, an achievement which either Kants opponents acceptor to which he can plausibly argue from premises that they do accept. Morespecifically, Kants argument is designed to establish to necessity of the catego-ries with respect to:

[W]hatever objects may come before our senses, not as far as the formof their intuition, but rather as far as the laws of their combination[Verbindung] are concerned. (KrV: B159)

Verbindung is Kants umbrella term for both the mode of composition [Zusam-mensetzung] characteristic of the mathematical categories and the connection[Verknpfung] characteristic of the dynamical categories (KrV: B202n). In bothcases, therefore, his claim is that the unity of the synthesis of the manifold isdependent on the understanding: it is because of this basic similarity that Kantgroups together the Axioms and the Analogies at B1624.33 With respect to X,specifically, Kants transcendental argument is this. The synthesis of apprehen-sion is the process by which the basic measure is iterated or, equivalently, theprocess through which representations become conscious or, equivalently, theprocess through which I make an intuition into a perception (KrV: B162). Kantsclaim is that the synthetic unity of this process depends upon the categoryof quantity. And the reason for this is that illustrated in Section 3: only the shiftin semantic register, from intuition to concepts, allows the integration of thevarious basic measures. This is, from Kants dialectical perspective, a suitabletranscendental argument precisely because the premise from which it begins, theability needed to represent parts as parts of a whole, is one which his opponentsregard as comparatively unproblematic. While the issue of Humes mereology isa complex one, consider these remarks from the perspective of the argumentoutlined above:

That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and allits qualities are qualities of a perception. Now the most obvious of all itsqualities is extension. The perception consists of parts. These parts are sosituated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length,breadth, and thickness. (Hume 1978: 1.4.5.15)

There is another very decisive argument, which establishes the presentdoctrine concerning our ideas of space and time, and is founded only onthat simple principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of parts,which are indivisible. (Hume 1978: 1.2.3.12)

The reference to compounding here is precisely the operation which Kantidentifies as composition [Zusammensetzung]; the argument above, if valid,would show, contra Hume, that this capacity is dependent upon certain a prioriconceptual abilities. As Falkenstein neatly put it in a recent paper, the problem

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for Hume, in its most basic form, is that he cannot explain how one might movefrom multiple simple impressions to the representation of their unity:

Suppose that four impressions, A, B, C, D, are arranged in the configu-ration of a square. According to Hume, each of these impressions isdistinct and distinguishable and separable from all the others andconstitutes, in effect, a distinct substance in its own right, unrelated toany of the others (Treatise 1.4.5.5). Accordingly, no one of these impres-sions could be considered to be the impression of a square, or indeed ofanything extended . . . But what, on Humes account, makes a collectionof four simple impressions disposed in the configuration of a square acompound impression of a square? . . . It cannot be just the bare fact ofthe contiguity of the impressions in space, for there can be a contiguityof impressions even where there is no compound impression of conti-guity . . . If we say that a compound impression does not just consist ofthe four simple impressions disposed in the configuration of a square,but of an awareness of each of the four impressions and of their spatialrelations to one another, then we need to explain what it means to beaware of a relation between a group of impressions. (Falkenstein 2005:432 emphasis added).

Kants claim is that nothing other than a second order capacity to representour own representations, i.e. self-consciousness in the Critical sense of thatphrase, can provide the answer. I have focused on perception but here, withthe reference to self-consciousness, it is worth highlighting the full implica-tions of the type of argument I have sketched. One familiar objection to theHumean model of consciousness is that it covertly assumes some thicker selfresponsible for the various operations, association for example, performed onthe bundled perceptions. The natural Humean response is to argue that allsuch operations can be reduced, as Beauchamp put it, to facts about theperceptions themselves: for example, about the causal chains connecting them(Beauchamp 1979: 50). Consider, for example, Pikes influential suggestion thatself-consciousness can be captured within a Humean context simply by allow-ing impression A to be of itself (i.e. of A) standing in relation to represen-tations B, C, and D just as a picture P might be of P itself and hanging nextto three other pictures (Pike 1967: 162). As Allison has recently emphasized,the difficulty with this move is that there remains no explanation as to howthis would allow A to represent the unity of itself with the other impressions:it is no better, to return to Russells example, than if I carefully inscribed theword Cassio in such a way that one could, with a magnifying glass, detectminute versions of the words Cassio, loves, Desdemona in the individualpen strokes (Allison 2008: 303). The problem is that while Pikes model allowsa superficial ascent to the second order in the sense that A is an impressionof various other impressions, the basic type of content remains, from aKantian perspective, at the level of consciousness not self-consciousness.Switching again to a linguistic context, precisely the same problem occurs in

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accounts such as Russells Principles which attempts to explain unity byarguing that certain members of the list are somehow both pieces of firstorder content and yet explain the unification of such content (Russell 1903:525). To adapt an example from Linsky, Russells claim would be that theindividual impressions, A, B, C, D of the four sides of the square add up toa representation of the square as a whole precisely because at least one of theimpressions, A perhaps, plays a special double role as a constituent to beunified, on the one hand, and as a unifier of constituents on the other (Linsky1992: 273). The problem, as Linsky observes, is that Russell is unable toexplain how one type of content can perform both tasks. Kants responsewould be that it cannot: thus the need for a fundamental distinction betweenintuition and apperception.

Kant, of course, deploys multiple arguments against multiple forms ofempiricism. The benefit of emphasizing mereology, as I have done in present-ing X, is that Kant is able to begin, exactly as he tries to do in the SecondAnalogy, from a premise which Hume thought unproblematic: the capacity tocompound parts or the capacity to represent events. In contrast, those argu-ments which begin from, say, the capacity to conceptualize or to judge andmove from there to the categories risk simply begging the question since Humedoes not believe that we need to posit judgments in Kants distinctive sense ofthe term.34 Here I agree with Ginsborg that readings on which the categoriesare necessary only for modes of experience more sophisticated than thoserecognized by the empiricists risk trivializing Kants project by leaving theempiricist account of perception untouched (Ginsborg 2006: 62). What myapproach offers is a careful balance. On the one hand, it shows the under-standing to be necessary for perceptual representation as Hume himself under-stood it. Chang, in a recent article, has defended an account of certain a priorimetaphysical principles based on their analytic connection to various epistemicactivities: for example, if we want to engage in the activity of counting, thenwe have to presume that the things we are trying to count are discrete (Chang2008: 122). Kants claim, in contrast, is that because we represent things asdiscrete (Section 2) it follows that we must engage in the activity of countingif we wish to unify them (Section 3). X thus provides what is, prima facie atleast, a viable transcendental argument. On the other hand, however, X alsooffers a satisfactory solution to the textual problem of animal cognition: itentails that individual intuitions can occur, as in Figures 1 and 2, in beings,such as animals, which lack all conceptual capacities. More broadly, X resolvesthe problem of perceptual atomism: as noted in Section 2, Kant is simply notcommitted to the claim that, in representing a circle, I necessarily represent onepart after another. X also sheds some light on the relationship between theimagination and understanding. It highlights, for example, why Kant is insist-ent on keeping the two faculties separatethe transition from Figure 1 toFigure 2 which is explained by imagination can occur in agents lacking con-ceptual capacities. Finally, it illustrates how the understanding may be said toappropriate or govern the imagination: as seen in the case of the savage, the

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choice of basic measure, i.e. the choice of the unit of apprehension may or maynot be determined by an agents conceptual capacities, which thus may or maynot function as a rule for apprehension.35

There are, of course, texts in which Kant appears to defend a less plausible setof claims than those which I have attributed to him. Consider this:

I cannot represent to myself any line, no matter how small it may be,without drawing it in thought, i.e. gradually generating all its parts fromone point [von einem Punkte alle Theile nach und nach zu erzeugen] andthereby first sketching this intuition. It is exactly the same with even thesmallest time. I think therein only the successive progress from onemoment to another [den successiven Fortgang von einem Augenblick zumandern], where through all parts of time and their addition a determinatemagnitude of time is finally generated. (KrV: A1623/B203)

Call this passage Y. I have argued that the categories are necessary for theunification of the various moments of consciousness or basic measures. In Y,however, Kant claims that to represent any spatial extent, no matter how smallit may be, I must first represent its parts. This is problematic since, in virtueof the quanta continua assumption, such subdivision may be extended indefi-nitely, so implying an endless regress. I want to explain why I believe Y isconfused. Kant has a tendency to treat any determinate spatial perception onthe model of the vast line example in Section 3: that is, as the perception ofan object whose size exceeds the basic measure being used and thus whereconceptual unification is necessary simply for perception of that object. In theProlegomena for example, he maintains that that which determines space toassume the form of a circle . . . is the understanding, so far as it contains theground of the unity of [its] construction (Prol.: 3212). What Kant is effectivelydoing here is retaining the idea of the basic measure, as he must do if he isto avoid an endless decompositional regress, but assuming that the measure isnecessarily smaller than the object to be represented, namely the circle: as aresult the categories are required even to perceive that object.36 In texts such asY, this assumption about the relative size of the basic measure vis--vis theobject is smuggled in via the reference to drawing or gradually generating:insofar as time arises from the iteration of the basic measure, any objectgradually generated over time will necessarily be one represented by multiplebasic measures. The unification of these basic measures will then, in line withX, depend on the category of magnitude. But there is simply no reason toaccept the claim that most perception fits this vast line model: if it did, ananimal could not perceive the circle. Moving beyond Y, there are other texts inwhich Kant seems to make a stronger claim that the ones defended in X. Thefamous footnote at B1601, for example, can plausibly be read as arguing thatthe unity of the pure forms of intuition themselves, as distinct from and priorto the unity of determinate spatio-temporal magnitudes, depends on the under-standing.37 Call this footnote Z. Both the acceptance and the rejection of theclaims made in Z will be compatible with X, provided simply that Zs accept-

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ance does not rule out the possibility of animals possessing intuition. Thisprovision will almost certainly be met since the obvious way to motivate Z isto argue that apperception is necessary for some comparatively sophisticatedawareness of spatio-temporal unity, one which an animal might lack while stillbeing able to see a rock, say, in front of it: apperception would, for example,plausibly be necessary to distinguish between successive perception and theperception of succession.

I want to close by looking directly at four aspects of X itself which demandsubstantive, further development; I suggest that the natural place to look forsuch developments is the phenomenological tradition. First, Kants argumentagainst the possibility of the simultaneous perception of, say, two ships in theabsence of the categories rests on a trilemma: either (i) the basic measure issmaller than a single ship in which case one cannot even represent one ship ina single moment, or (ii) it is the same size as a single ship in which case onecannot represent both ships at a single moment, or (iii) it is large enough toencompass both ships in which case while they are represented, one is notconscious of them since as contained in one moment no representation can everbe anything other than absolute unity (KrV: A99). The question is whether amore developed phenomenological mereology might challenge (iii). Could I, forexample, be conscious of the spatial subcomponent of the basic measure in virtueof their distinctive colours? Kant is unable to address this question adequatelyin part because of a fundamental difficulty regarding the status of colour withinhis theory, one which has been widely discussed in relation to KUs formalistaesthetics: simply put, is colour an aspect of the form of perception or merelyof its matter? The issue is further complicated by the notorious textual difficultiessurrounding the remarks on Euler and pure colour at KU 224.38 I cannotaddress those issues here; my point is that the obvious place to start to do sowould be with a phenomenological mereology such as that set out in the thirdof Husserls Logische Untersuchungen. The second issue concerns the status ofreproduction. Kant, in line with authors such as Wolff and Baumgarten, definesthe imagination as the capacity to represent objects in their absence.39 One cansee why memory might then be treated as a subset of such a capacity. But canthis supposed connection between memory and the imagination be furtherdeveloped? The phenomenological traditions notion of a horizon [Horizont]offers one potential avenue. Heideggers Kant commentary, for example, analy-ses memory in terms of a horizon of the past and horizon in terms of animage anticipated in imagination; Heidegger thus explains memorys connec-tion to the imagination by reference to the latters other traditional role as thefaculty of images.40 Third, what are the implications, if any, for Kants notion ofexplanatory priority given the fact that both Figures 1 and 2 can occur inde-pendently of conceptual intentionality and are necessary conditions on it?Husserls Erfahrung und Urteil, for example, seeks to provide a genealogy oflogic, demonstrating how conceptual and predicative intentionality emergesfrom, and so depends upon, a pre-predicative and typically associative base: forHusserl the Analytic is thus founded on the Aesthetic (Husserl 1978: 2912). But

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what should be Kants view of such projects, and of their attendant notion ofexplanatory priority? Fourth, I have argued that Kant explains the unity ofperception by appeal to concepts. This raises the obvious question: what explainsconcepts? Kants answer is, at least prima facie, the capacity to form judgments:thus we can . . . trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments (KrV:A69/B94). One striking feature of the recent analytic literature has been anattempt, however, to separate conceptualization from judgmental or proposi-tional intentionality: to take one prominent example, McDowell has recentlyretracted his earlier model of human experience in favour of the view that suchexperience contains concepts but not judgments (McDowell 2009: 2608). Theobvious difficulty in assessing such a proposal is to work out what exactly thedifference between conceptual and judgmental or propositional intentionalityamounts to. In particular, one needs to avoid trivializing the debate by equatingjudgmental intentionality with, say, an explicit awareness either of the act ofjudgment or of the content of the predicates used. This trivializes the issuebecause Kant, and surely all other parties to the debate, are well aware that suchawareness is unusual and derivative.41 What I want to suggest is that if thisdebate is to be well-formed one needs to understand why Kant thinks thatconceptuality must be explained via judgment. As noted in Section 1, Kantanalyses concepts in terms of the consciousness of normativity. Crucially, he thenanalyses the ability to represent norms in terms of the table of judgments or, inmodern language, in terms of the logical constants. Unlike in Frege, say, theKantian quantifiers, for example, are not themselves concepts, second order orotherwise: that would make the putative explanation of conceptuality circular.Rather, the logical constants define the range of normative relations which wecan establish between pieces of semantic content; the universal, affirmative,categorical form, for example, is a rule which relates two concepts, F and G, byrequiring that I, and presumptively all other rational, sensible agents, must applyG to anything to which F is applied.42 The forms of judgment thus define thebasic structure of the understanding, i.e. of the capacity to represent rules: assuch, they constitute pure, general logic for Kant.43 Furthermore, since they arethemselves defined in abstraction from all semantic content, this logic is, asMacFarlane has recently emphasized, without all content and merely formal[blo formalen].44 This is not a trivial thesis as one can see by noting that,unsurprisingly given his treatment of quantification, Frege in contrast acceptsthat logic has its own concepts and so is not at all formal (Frege 1906: 428).Kants theory of judgment is thus, simultaneously, a theory of intentionality, atheory of syntax, a theory of logic, a theory of form, and his explanation of therational agents unique capacity to represent normativity: it is, as Kant puts it,the universal grammar for understanding (Log.: 13). The result of this is asfollows. If one is to engage with Kants argument for the dependence of conceptson judgment, one needs to unpick the connections he postulates between theconcepts of logic, of formality, of grammar and, fundamentally, of the capacityfor what Heidegger calls free, self-binding, the ability to self-prescribe norma-tive connections among my representations (Heidegger 1997b: 255). When Sein

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und Zeit talks of liberating grammar from logic, it is, I would suggest, preciselythis project on which it is embarked.45

Sacha GolobDepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of CambridgeUKsyjg2@cam.ac.uk

NOTES

1 Similarly Log.: 64.2 Both non-conceptualism and conceptualism are used across the literature for a

wide variety of distinct positions: I define them as I do to bring out the fact that thereare structural pressures pushing Kant towards both positions. With respect to the recentliterature (for example Heck 2000), I assume that Kant is addressing a state, as opposedto content, model of non-conceptualism but nothing in what I say here turns on thedifference. Similarly, with regards to Speaks 2005, I present Kant as considering onlya relative, as opposed to an absolute, non-conceptualism: I believe that there arearguments in Kants work for the latter, stronger view, notably the argument fromincongruent counterparts, but they are beyond this piece. Similar simplifying assump-tions concerning the relationship between Kant and Speaks are employed by Allais 2009:386.

3 Allais 2009; Hanna 2005; 2008, Ginsborg 2008. For a stronger version of conceptu-alism than that defended by Ginsborg see Falkenstein 2006. Much of the recent discussionwas sparked by McDowell 1994 but the debate is not, of course, a new one: consider, forexample, Natorp 1910: 2767 or Cassirer 1907: 35.

4 Any adequate textual survey would need to consider, at the bare minimum, thefollowing texts within the Transcendental Analytic alone: KrV: A501/B746, A69/B94,A778/ B103, A79/B1045, A8990/B1223, A93/B126, A112, A11820, B12930, B1378,B145, B1604. There are, in addition, numerous relevant passages in works fromthe logic lectures to the third Critique: I draw on several of these in what follows.As stated, however, I do not believe that any purely textual survey, no matterhow extensive, will resolve the matter until the underlying structural question isaddressed.

5 On optical illusions see, for example, Crane 1992. For a superb treatment of theconnection between concepts and the syllogistic structure in Kant see Longuenesse 1998:903. I return to the broader issue of the connection between conceptual and judgmentalor propositional intentionality in Section 4.

6 For example Log.: 33, 64; SvF: 59; KU: 464n; V-Lo/Dohna: 702; V-MP/Heinze:2757; V-MP/Mron: 87885; V-MP/Volckmann: 44950; V-MP-L1/Plitz: 2757. Myclaim is not that texts such as these are entirely unambiguous: many are obscured bythe lack of a clear distinction between inner sense, consciousness and apperception(compare V-Lo/Wiener: 8456 with KrV: A320/B3767 or Log.: 64). But it seems thatthe general position is clear: ultimately, once it is conceded that animals perceive it ishard to see what the content of those perceptions could be other than objects of outersense.

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7 Compare the apparent threat at KrV: A8990/B1223 with the proposed solution tothat threat at A79/B1045.

8 See, for example, KrV: A104 or A197/B242. The representational capacities ofanimals are, of course, as part of nature, governed by rules; but Kant holds that onlyrational agents may represent rules (GMS: 412).

9 See, in particular, Sellars 1978, Strawson 1982, Heidegger 1997a10 It does depend, for example, on the capacity, analysed in the Transcendental

Aesthetic, to represent the pure form of space as a whole: this is the infinite, givenmagnitude within which individual spaces are delineated (see, for example, KrV:A25/B401). I return to the relationship between determinate spatio-temporal perceptionsand the pure forms of space and time in Sections 3 and 4.

11 Compare KrV: A22/B37.12 It should be stressed that both the manifold and the basic measure here may be

pure; thus, for example, the construction of geometric figures such as the line referredto at KrV: B1545.

13 I am indebted here to the textual treatment of Kants various remarks on magnitudegiven by Longuenesse 1998: 2647. Immediacy is not, of course, the only reason forreferring to the basic measure as a quantum: in virtue of the assumption of continuity itnecessarily contains a multiplicity of parts (see V-MP/Herder: 21).

14 The pyramid case, and the cited remark about the stones, is taken from KU: 252.15 Refl.: 2880 (Refl. Ak. XVI 557).16 On reflection as the basis for Kants account of concept formation, see Log. 936.17 See Longuenesse 1998: 11618 and Allison 2001: 2030.18 I owe the reference to Stevens 2005: 15.19 I follow Russells punctuation.20 I should stress that the presentation of Bradley here is obviously a highly simplified

one: my aim is to highlight one central aspect of the Bradley-Russell debate in order tomake sense of Kants position.

21 One may read necessarily for normally here depending on how one understandsKants stance on empty space and time (see, for example, KrV: A18892/B2317).

irreducible role for what Kant calls systems: Moores view that this doctrine . . . that apart can have no meaning or significance apart from its whole must be utterly rejectedwould be alien to Kant (Moore 1903: 22).

27 I address the relationship between concepts and judgment in Section 4.28 I have inverted Kants word order.29 Letter to J. S. Beck, 16 October 1792, Br Ak. XI 376.30 On the connection between objects and normativity see, for example, KrV: A198/

B242.31 Compare, for example, KrV: A50/B74 and A320/B376.32 The role of Cartesian scepticism within KrV is, outside of the Refutation, extremely

limited in my view; I cannot, however, treat this here.33 Clearly, Kant also believes that there are certain fundamental differences between

the Axioms and the Analogies: that issue, in particular its textual dimension, is beyondthis piece.

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34 For an example of the inference from conceptualization or judgment to thecategories see KrV: A93/B126.

35 Refl.: 2880 (Refl. Ak. XVI 557).36 This is not the only explanation for the Prolegomena text. Another strong possibility,

given the context, is that Kant is thinking not just of the ability to represent a circle butto recognize it as a circle and thus as governed by certain geometric laws: as I emphasizedsuch consciousness of normativity is, by definition, conceptual for Kant. This readingwould fit equally with my interpretation: it would entail that understanding was notrequired simply to perceive circles.

Indiana University Press. (2000), Being and Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Hume, D. (1978), A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Husserl, E. (1978), Formal and Transcendental Logic. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.Linsky, L. (1992), The Unity of the Proposition, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 30:

24373.Longuenesse, B. (1998), Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press. (2005), Kant on the Human Standpoint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.MacFarlane, J. (2002), Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism, The Philosophical Review,