China’s Nuclear Strategy

In a new article in International Security, Fiona Cunningham and I examine whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture.

We reach three conclusions:

Chinese analysts worry that advances in U.S. strategic capabilities could undermine China’s ability to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear attack.

China is unlikely to increase dramatically its relatively small nuclear force or abandon its second-strike posture. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity over its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first.

Limited ambiguity over no-first-use allows China to avoid an arms race, but it could increase risks of nuclear escalation in a U.S.-China crisis. Limited ambiguity might also energize U.S. pursuit of strategic superiority if the United States sees it as a broad exception to China’s no-first-use policy.