With the scheduled three days of oral argument six weeks away, Cato filed its fourth and final Supreme Court amicus brief in the Obamacare saga, this time on the most critical issue: the constitutionality of the individual mandate. Cato, alongside Pacific Legal Foundation, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 14 other organizations, and a bipartisan group of 333 state legislators, urges the Court to affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that the mandate exceeds Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Under modern doctrine, regulating intrastate economic activity can be a “necessary” means of carrying out Congress’s regulatory authority (as that term is understood under the Necessary and Proper Clause) if, in the aggregate, it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. But the obvious corollary is that regulating non-economic activity cannot be “necessary,” regardless of its economic effects. And a power to regulate inactivity—to compel activity—is even more remote from Congress’s commerce power. The government characterizes not being insured as the activity of making an “economic decision” of how to finance health care services, but the notion that probable future participation in the marketplace constitutes economic activity now pushes far beyond existing precedent. Further, that definition of “activity” leaves people with no way of avoiding federal regulation; at any moment, we are all not engaged in an infinite set of activities. Retaining the categorical distinction between economic and non-economic activity limits Congress to regulating intrastate activities closely connected to interstate commerce—thus preserving the proper role of states and preventing Congress from using the Commerce Clause as a federal police power. The categorical distinction also provides a judicially administrable standard that obviates fact-based inquiries into the purported economic effects and the relative necessity of any one regulation, an exercise for which courts are ill-suited. Finally, the mandate violates the “proper” prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause in that it unconstitutionally commandeers the people—and in doing so, circumvents the Constitution’s preference for political accountability. The Constitution permits Congress to intrude on state and popular sovereignty only in certain limited circumstances: when doing so is textually based or when it relates to the duties of citizenship. For example, Congress may require people to respond to the census or serve on juries. In forcing people to engage in transactions with private companies, the individual mandate allows Congress and the president to evade being held accountable for what would otherwise be a tax increase. In improperly commandeering citizens to engage in economic activity, the mandate obscures Obamacare’s true costs and thus avoids the political accountability and transparent budgeting that the Constitution demands. Thus, the mandate is neither a necessary nor proper means for carrying into execution Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. Upholding it would fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal government to the states and the people; nobody would ever again be able to claim plausibly that the Constitution limits federal power.

No. 11-398 In the Supreme Court of the United States __________ DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. STATES OF FLORIDA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS __________ On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit __________ BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CATO INSTITUTE, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, 14 OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, AND 333 STATE LEGISLATORS SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS (INDIVIDUAL MANDATE ISSUE) __________ TIMOTHY SANDEFUR Pacific Legal Foundation 930 G St. Sacramento, CA 95834 (916) 419-7111 tms@pacificlegal.org ROBERT A. LEVY ILYA SHAPIRO Counsel of Record ANASTASIA KILLIAN Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20001 (202) 842-0200 ishapiro@cato.org Counsel for Amici Curiae QUESTION PRESENTED Can a limited government to whom a free people have delegated only certain enumerated powers comman-deer that people into purchasing a product from a private business pursuant to its power to pass laws “necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the authority to “regulate Commerce . . . among the sev-eral States”? ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................v INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................................2 ARGUMENT...............................................................6 I. The Individual Mandate Exceeds the Scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause as Used to Execute the Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce Under the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine.................................................................6 A. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Applies the Necessary and Proper Clause to the Commerce Clause and Allows Congress to Use Its Regulatory Authority While Cabining That Authority.................................6 B. Compelling Activity Transcends the Neces-sary and Proper Clause’s Limits on the Commerce Clause...........................................12 C. The Comstock Factors That Are the Most Re-cent Articulation of the Necessary and Proper Clause’s Limits Weigh Against the Individual Mandate.......................................14 II. The Individual Mandate Cannot be Justified as an “Essential Part of a Broader Regulatory Scheme” Because Congress Cannot Regulate Inactivity.............................................................17 A. Inactivity is Not a Type of Activity...............18 B. The Activity-Based Categorical Distinction Provides Judicially Manageable Standards with a Minimum of Judicial Policymaking....20 ii i III.The Individual Mandate is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and Proper Clause Because It Constitutes an Unconstitutional Commandeer-ing of the People...................................................24 A. The Constitution Creates a Federal System That Recognizes and Protects Both State and Popular Sovereignty................................24 B. Congress Can Intrude on State and Popular Sovereignty Only for Certain Limited Pur-poses in Certain Circumscribed Ways...........26 1. Commandeering is constitutional only when it is textually based or when it re-lates to the functioning of the Republic or the duties of citizenship........................26 2. The individual mandate’s commandeer-ing of citizens intrudes on popular sover-eignty and allows Congress to avoid the Constitution’s call for political account-ability and transparent budgeting............28 a. The Origination Clause ensures that mandated wealth transfers are passed through the most politically accountable house of Congress............29 b. The Statement and Account Clause works with the Origination Clause to ensure that the people can accurately assess how much wealth is being ex-tracted from them.................................31 C. If Congress is Allowed to Avoid Both Politi-cal Accountability and Courts' Enforcement of the Necessary and Proper Clause's Lim-its, It Will Improperly Define the Limits of its Own Power.................................................34 iv CONCLUSION.........................................................36 APPENDIX...............................................................1a v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).......................26 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)....................9 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)...................13 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)......25 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)..............6 Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.).............................3 Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011)......................passim Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)......6, 7 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)................passim Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)....................6 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)................................................12 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).....................4 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).............................34-35 v i Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981)......................17 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907)......................6 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) ......7, 12 Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011)..18 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) .......................passim McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996)................................19 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)........................................24, 28, 33 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)................................................9, 12 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)....passim Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) ......27 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011)................................4, 35 Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)...............7 Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011)...........................2, 3, 35 United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 1997)...9 United States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011)..........26 vi i United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010)................................14, 15, 16 United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838).......................................7 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)...7, 8 , 17 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)......................................................7 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ....passim United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)........................................passim United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994)..........19 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942)..................................................7 Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).......................3 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) .........4, 8, 12 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)..................26 Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)................passim 26 U.S.C. § 5000(A).....................................................2 vi ii U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3........................................27 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1........................................29 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18......................................24 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7..................................29, 31 U.S. Const. amend. III..............................................27 U.S. Const. amend. V................................................27 U.S. Const. amend. VI..............................................27 U.S. Const. amend. VII.............................................27 U.S. Const. amend. IX..............................................27 U.S. Const. amend. X................................................25 U.S. Const. amend. XIII...........................................27 U.S. Const. amend. XVI............................................27 Other Authorities Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L.L. 581 (2011)...8, 11 Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance (1994)........................................................................4 ix Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of Proposals to Change the Nation’s Health Insurance System (2009)........................................32 Cong. Budget Office, Budgetary Treatment of Propos-als to Regulate Medical Loss Ratios (2009)...........33 The Debates In The Several State Conventions On The Adoption Of The Federal Constitution (Jonathan Elliot, ed., 1859)..............................29-30 The Federalist (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961)...5, 28, 30 Philippa Foot, Killing and Letting Die, in Moral Dilemmas (2002)....................................................19 Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutional-ity of a National Bank (February 23, 1791), in Hamilton: Writings (J. Freeman, ed., 2001)...........9 Ezra Klein, The Number-Cruncher-in-Chief, The American Prospect, Jan. 14, 2009............31-32 Jeannie Jacobs Kronenfeld, The Changing Federal Role in U.S. Health Care Policy (1997).................15 Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpre-tation of The Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267 (1993).........................................15 Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You to Be Healthy? N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39........21 x J. Michael Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey, 23 Tulsa L. J. 165 (1987)........................................29 Robert Pear, The Clinton Budget: Health Care; Congress' Budget Office May Deal New Blow to Clinton Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1994 available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/08/us/clinton-budget-health-care-congress-s-budget-office-may-deal-new-blow-clinton.html...................................32 Propagandizing a Health Report, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1994, at A22.............................................32 Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984)....................................................18, 19 Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform Are Well Grounded in Law—and Pose Serious Challenges, 29 Health Affairs 1229 (June 2010)..36 Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Not Necessarily Proper: Comstock’s Errors and Limitations, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 413 (2011)..............................14 Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 2009-10 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 239 (2010)......14 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833)...............................27, 31 1 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 Amici groups are national and state think tanks and public-interest law firms dedicated to advancing individual liberty: the Cato Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Pacific Legal Foundation, Committee for Justice, National Tax Limitation Committee, Arkansas Policy Foundation, Common-wealth Foundation (Pennsylvania), Illinois Policy In-stitute, John W. Pope Civitas Institute (North Caro-lina), Minnesota Free Market Institute at Center of the American Experiment, Mississippi Center for Public Policy, Montana Policy Institute, Nevada Pol-icy Research Institute, North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law, Rio Grande Foundation (New Mexico), Texas Conservative Coalition Research In-stitute, and Wyoming Liberty Group. By publishing reports, books, and articles, as well as through litiga-tion, they have established themselves at the fore-front of the movement for limited government and free markets. Amici individuals are a bipartisan group of 333 legislators from 17 states (listed by name and state in the Appendix) that have not passed Health Care Freedom Acts.2 1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.3(a), all parties have filed letters with the Clerk granting blanket consent to the filing of amicus briefs. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, except that earlier versions of this brief that were filed in several lower courts were partly authored by Prof. Randy Bar-nett, who has since become of counsel to the private respondents here. No person or entity other than amici made a monetary contribution for the preparation or submission of this brief. 2 Legislators from states that have enacted HCFAs have joined an amicus brief filed by the Goldwater Institute. The American 2 This case concerns amici because it represents the federal government’s most egregious attempt to ex-ceed its constitutional authority since at least the Second World War. Amici believe that “the Court ei-ther should stop saying that there is a meaningful limit on Congress’s power or prove that it is so.” Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 555 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The individual mandate3 exceeds Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce under existing doctrine. The outermost bounds of this Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence—the “substantial effects” doctrine—stop Congress from reaching intra-state non-economic activity regardless of its effect on the economy. Nor can Congress compel someone to engage in commerce, even if it purports to do so as part of a broader regulatory scheme. The Constitution does not permit Congress to con-script citizens into economic transactions to remedy the admitted shortcomings—which the government usually terms “necessities”—of a hastily assembled piece of legislation. See Br. for State Petitioners on Severability at 2-4, NFIB v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-393 & 11-400 (recounting the “tortuous” legislative history of the Affordable Care Act). Although the Necessary Legislative Exchange Council has also filed a brief on behalf of its members (about 2,000 state legislators), some of whom have also individually joined this or the Goldwater brief. 3 26 U.S.C. § 5000(A). Also known as the “minimum coverage provision” of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or “ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 3 and Proper Clause allows Congress to execute its regulatory authority over interstate commerce, it is not a blank check permitting Congress to ignore con-stitutional limits by manufacturing necessities and commandeering citizens to do its bidding. “[Salutary] goals and creative drafting have never been sufficient to offset an absence of enumerated powers.” Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss on other grounds, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). The in-dividual health insurance mandate is not constitu-tionally warranted simply because it is “necessary” to make other legislation function properly. Indeed, any law—“necessary” or otherwise—that purports to compel otherwise inactive citizens to engage in eco-nomic activity is unconstitutional. While the government emphasizes the “unique-ness” of the healthcare market and the wisdom of the legislation, “this case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise…in fact, it is not really about our healthcare system at all. It is principally about our federalist system, and it raises very important issues regarding the Constitutional role of the federal gov-ernment.” Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in relevant part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). Moreover, what Congress is trying to do here is literally unprecedented, as recognized even by the lower courts that ruled for the government. “Congress has never exercised its commerce power in this way, and nothing suggests that this tradition reflects 220 years of self-restraint.” Thomas More Law Center, 651 F.3d at 549 (Sutton, J., concurring). “The Gov-ernment concedes the novelty of the mandate and the 4 lack of any doctrinal limiting principles.” Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Congressional Budget Office agrees: “The government has never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States.” Cong. Budget Office, The Budget-ary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994). Nor has Congress ever be-fore imposed on everyone a civil penalty for declining to participate in the market. And never before have courts had to consider such a breathtaking assertion of power under the Commerce Clause. Even in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the federal government claimed “merely” the power to regulate what farmers grew, not to mandate that people be-come farmers, much less to force people to purchase farm products.4 Even if not purchasing health insur-ance is considered an “economic activity”—which of course would mean that every aspect of human life is economic activity—there is no constitutional warrant for Congress to force Americans to enter the market-place to buy a particular good or service. Although often conceived as a Commerce Clause doctrine, the substantial effects test actually applies the Necessary and Proper Clause in the context of the power to regulate commerce. And the Necessary and Proper Clause’s grant of discretion to “carry into exe-cution” an enumerated power does not imply a one-way ratchet towards unlimited federal power. In-4 So, too, in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the govern-ment successfully defended the constitutionality of the Social Security Act in part by emphasizing that it did not compel eco-nomic activity. See id. at 621 (argument of Mr. Jackson) (“No compliance with any scheme of Federal regulation is involved.”) 5 stead, the clause both augments and limits Con-gress’s regulatory authority. Consequently, the out-ermost limits of the substantial effects doctrine are also the outermost limits of Congress’ discretion in enforcing its power to regulate commerce. Because economic mandates do not fall within these bounda-ries, it is unconstitutional to impose them under the guise of regulating commerce. Moreover, even if economic mandates are deemed “necessary,” they are not a “proper” means of execut-ing an enumerated power because they “comman-deer” individuals and thereby avoid constitutionally designated avenues of political accountability. Eco-nomic mandates alter the constitutional structure in an unprecedented way and thus do not “consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). The explicit purpose of Article I is to grant Con-gress certain enumerated powers and then strictly limit them. James Madison, the architect of our sys-tem of government, famously observed that “[i]n framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the gov-erned; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961). Thus, Article I gives Congress only certain legislative powers “herein granted,” Articles II and III check those powers, and the Tenth Amendment emphasizes that all other powers remain with those who breathed life into the new government in the first place: the sovereign “people of the United States.” The Framers believed that limiting federal power, and reserving the “residual” power in the hands of the states and 6 the people would help “ensure protection of our fun-damental liberties” and “reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citation omitted). Given the Framers’ clear intent to establish a lim-ited government of enumerated powers, it is unsur-prising that this Court has consistently reaffirmed that the federal government does not enjoy a general police power. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 87 (1907); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). The Court should not now break with this well estab-lished and foundational American principle. ARGUMENT I. The Individual Mandate Exceeds the Scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause as Used to Execute the Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce Under the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine A. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Ap-plies the Necessary and Proper Clause to the Commerce Clause and Allows Con-gress to Use Its Regulatory Authority While Cabining That Authority Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular “economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce” when considering whether Congress can regulate it. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). The New Deal cases which first developed the “substantial effects” doctrine, 7 however, found the authority for that doctrine not in the Commerce Clause itself but in its execution via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Although often de-scribed as expanding the definition of the word “commerce,” these cases show that the New Deal Court actually asked whether federal regulation of the activity in question was a necessary and proper means of exercising the regulatory power, because the activity substantially affects that commerce. “Con-gress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (cit-ing United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Congress has never been allowed to go further. In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court considered Congress’s power to “prohibit the employment of workmen in the produc-tion of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and hours.” Id. at 108. Instead of stretching the definition of “commerce,” the Court fo-cused on how congressional power “extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate com-merce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate.” Id. at 118. The authorities cited for this proposition did not come from Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)—the foundational Commerce Clause case cited 8 throughout Darby—but from McCulloch, the seminal Necessary and Proper Clause case. A year later, in Wickard, the Court used the same reasoning: not redefining “commerce,” but ruling that the challenged measures were necessary and proper for regulating commerce. Like Darby, Wickard explic-itly relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause, citing McCulloch. See, 317 U.S. at 130 n.29. Wickard did not expand the Commerce Clause itself to allow Con-gress power to regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated, substantially affects interstate com-merce. Instead, “like Darby, Wickard is both a Com-merce Clause and a Necessary and Proper Clause case[,]” with the substantial effects doctrine reaching Roscoe Filburn’s wheat growing via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeer-ing the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L.L. 581, 594 (2011). Thus the aggregation principle can only apply to economic activities the regulation of which is nec-essary and proper to effectuating Congress’s enumer-ated power to regulate commerce. Accordingly, the Court in Lopez found that aggre-gation could apply only to economic activity: “Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far-reaching ex-ample of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that pos-session of a gun in a school zone does not.” 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). And in United States v. Morrison, the Court held that gender-motivated violence is not economic activity and thus that the substantial ef-fects doctrine was inapplicable. 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). The Court thus clarified the substantial ef-fects doctrine by setting the regulation of intrastate 9 economic activity (in certain contexts) as the absolute limit of federal power under the Commerce and Nec-essary and Proper Clauses. “Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added). Conversely, non-economic activity (or, as in this case, inactivity) cannot be regulated merely because it affects interstate commerce through a “causal chain,” or has, in the aggregate, “substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599. The activity being regu-lated must have a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce,” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937), and that relation-ship must be qualitative, not just quantitative. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820, 843 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Mor-rison, supra; accord, United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 677 n.11 (5th Cir. 1997). Adopting such a categorical distinction between economic and noneconomic activity allowed the Court to determine whether legislation is “necessary” under the Necessary and Proper Clause without involving it in complex, potentially insoluble evaluations of the “more or less of necessity or utility” of the challenged law. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitu-tionality of a National Bank (February 23, 1791), in Hamilton: Writings 619 (J. Freeman, ed., 2001). This distinction limits congressional power when regulat-ing intrastate economic activity to activities closely connected to interstate commerce, thus withholding from Congress any unconstitutional police powers, see, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, preserving the role of 10 states in the federalist system, and minimizing the degree of judicial involvement in utilitarian consid-erations that are outside the courts’ expertise. Since the New Deal, the Court has eschewed fact-based inquiries into the degree of means-end fit (unless a fundamental right is at stake). In Lopez, and again in Morrison, the Court instead adopted a judicially administrable categorical distinction be-tween economic and non-economic activity. As the court below observed, abandoning this categorical rule would force courts to “sit in judgment over every economic mandate issued by Congress, determining whether the level of participation in the underlying market, the amount of cost-shifting, the unpredict-ability of need, or the strength of the moral impera-tive were enough to justify the mandate.” Florida, 648 F.3d at 1296-97. Legislatures are more suited for that task, in just the way that courts are more suited to enforce the Constitution’s principled limits on con-gressional power. By limiting the substantial effects doctrine to eco-nomic activities, Lopez and Morrison preserved the constitutional scheme of limited and enumerated powers, drawing a judicially administrable categori-cal line beyond which Congress cannot go when choosing “necessary” means to execute its authority. But if regulating intrastate economic activity can be a “necessary” means of regulating interstate com-merce as that term is understood under the Neces-sary and Proper Clause, the obvious corollary is that regulating non-economic activity cannot be “neces-sary,” regardless of its economic effects. And a power to regulate inactivity is even more remote from Con-gress’s power over interstate commerce. 11 Most recently, in Raich, the Court found the culti-vation of marijuana to be an economic activity—indeed, a type of “manufacture,” 545 U.S. at 22—that Congress could prohibit as a necessary and proper means of exercising its commerce power. Raich ex-plicitly adhered to the economic/non-economic dis-tinction set out in Lopez and Morrison: “Our case law firmly establishes Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Raich also rejected the government’s contention that it was Angel Raich’s or Roscoe Filburn’s non-purchase of an interstate-traded commodity that sub-jected them to federal law. See Barnett, supra, at 602-03. Instead, the Court invoked the Webster’s Dictionary definition of “economics”—“the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25—and refused to adopt the gov-ernment’s sweeping theory that any activity that substitutes for a market activity is “economic.” That rejected theory is akin to the one the government ad-vances here: that probable participation in the mar-ket in the future constitutes economic activity now. This Court’s precedents are clear: Congress may reach non-commerce under its power to regulate commerce only via the Necessary and Proper Clause, and this executory power is categorically limited—indeed must be categorically limited to be judicially administrable—to the qualitatively distinct class of economic activity. In other words, Congress’s regula-tory authority extends only to certain types of activ-ity, rather than to any activity (or inactivity) that passes some threshold degree of effect on interstate 12 commerce. The latter fact-based line would not be ju-dicially administrable, would undermine the principle of enumerated powers, and would involve courts in economic balancing and speculation beyond their ken. B. Compelling Activity Transcends the Nec-essary and Proper Clause’s Limits on the Commerce Clause This “Court has always described the commerce power as operating on already existing or ongoing ac-tivity.” Florida, 648 F.3d at 1285. Indeed, no prece-dent allows Congress to compel activity in the guise of regulating commerce. Roscoe Filburn was actively growing wheat. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-15. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was voluntarily engaged in the economic activity of steelmaking. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 26. The Civil Rights Era cases concerned parties that chose to engage in the economic activity of operating a restaurant, Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 296, or a hotel, Heart of At-lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964). The Raich plaintiffs grew, processed, and consumed medicinal marijuana—all voluntary activi-ties the Court characterized as “manufactur[ing].” 545 U.S. at 22. These cases fall into two general categories. Id. at 35-38 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the “two general circumstances” in which “the regulation of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce”). First, if persons voluntarily engage in economic activity, for example by undertaking a commercial endeavor, Congress can regulate the manner by which their ac-tivities are conducted. Such regulation of voluntary economic activity may include conditional mandates 13 such as recordkeeping requirements. The second category, exemplified by Raich, concerns Congress’s power to prohibit a type of commerce altogether—a power the Court has recognized at least since Cham-pion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). In Raich, the Court found that Congress may prohibit wholly intra-state instances of economic activity as a “necessary” means of prohibiting a type of interstate commerce. Under either theory, however, Congress can regulate or prohibit voluntary economic actions, but cannot force people to undertake such actions—even if those actions would have economic consequences. The distinguishing characteristic between a legiti-mate regulation within the constitutional scheme of enumerated powers, and a limitless federal police power capable of compelling whatever behavior Con-gress sees fit, is whether a person can, in principle, avoid federal regulations by choosing not to engage in the regulated activity—i.e., not engaging in an eco-nomic endeavor or obtaining contraband. See Flor-ida, 648 F.3d at 1286 (“[T]he diverse fact patterns of Wickard, South-Eastern Underwriters, Heart of At-lanta Motel, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich share at least one commonality: they all involved attempts by Congress to regulate preexisting, freely chosen classes of activities.”). No such option exists with re-gard to the individual mandate; it cannot be avoided in principle. It is not, therefore, a regulation of com-mercial activity, but an unprecedented command that individuals engage in commerce. 14 C. The Comstock Factors That Are the Most Recent Articulation of the Necessary and Proper Clause’s Limits Weigh Against the Individual Mandate In United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), this Court reiterated the limits of the Neces-sary and Proper Clause, noting that a law which “confers on Congress a general ‘police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States” would not be necessary and proper. Id. at 1964 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618). The Comstock Court upheld the federal civil commitment law at issue after weighing five factors: (1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in criminal prosecution, (3) the “sound reasons” for the statute given the government’s public safety goal, (4) “the statute’s accommodation of state interests” and (5) its narrow scope. Id. at 1965. The Court avoided calling these factors a “test”; nor did it explain how they inter-relate, which weigh most heavily, or what to do when different factors point in different directions. See Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Not Necessarily Proper: Comstock’s Errors and Limitations, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 413, 415 (2011). Nevertheless, most of these factors—the lack of a deep history of federal involvement, PPACA’s failure to accommodate state interests, and its ex-traordinarily broad scope—weigh against the consti-tutionality of the individual mandate. See Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 2009-10 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 239, 260-67 (2010) (assessing Comstock’s implications on PPACA litigation). 15 First, although the Necessary and Proper Clause is “broad,” in that it gives Congress leeway to choose the means for executing legitimate ends, it is not a grant of potentially endless power. McCulloch held that only those means which are “within the scope of the constitution . . . which are not prohibited, [and which] consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-tution, are constitutional.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. Cf. Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpreta-tion of The Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 297 (1993) (“executory laws must be consistent with prin-ciples of separation of powers, principles of federal-ism, and individual rights.”). The breadth of the Nec-essary and Proper Clause thus should not be used as a consideration to further expand the federal reach in a manner that contradicts fundamental constitu-tional principles like federalism and enumerated powers. The “breadth of the Clause” does not vary from case to case; it is a constant. Second, there is no “long history” of federal in-volvement here, unlike in Comstock. Not only is the individual mandate without constitutional parallel, but federal involvement in private health insurance is an entirely modern phenomenon. See, e.g., Jeannie Jacobs Kronenfeld, The Changing Federal Role in U.S. Health Care Policy 67 (1997) (“[T]he bulk of the federal health legislation that has health impact . . . has actually been passed in the past 50 or so years.”). Third, the mandate does not accommodate state interests. The provision challenged in Comstock al-lowed states to assert authority over any individual civilly committed under it, and indeed to prevent fed-eral detention at the outset. 130 S. Ct. at 1962-63. 16 The individual mandate, by contrast, does not allow states to assert authority or prevent the compulsory purchase of health insurance. Instead, it ejects states from their longstanding role as the primary authority for regulating this market. And with over half the states suing to have PPACA declared unconstitu-tional—and many enacting legislation challenging the individual mandate—it is clear that states do not believe their interests are being accommodated. Finally, the individual mandate is not narrow in scope. It unavoidably applies to every resident American, excepting only the impoverished, and pre-scribes a blanket rule: buy insurance or pay a fine. It asserts federal authority over not engaging in any ac-tivity that has ultimate economic consequences—hardly a “narrow” proposition. The individual mandate fails the Comstock multi-factor test and therefore cannot pass muster under the Necessary and Proper Clause.5 More broadly, it conflicts with fundamental principles of limited federal power, intrudes on traditional state autonomy, and essentially converts Congress’s power to regulate commerce into a generalized police power with no principled limit. The Constitution does not authorize such power either directly or by implica-tion. 5 For more discussion of the Comstock factors as they apply here, see the Washington Legal Foundation’s amicus brief. 17 II. The Individual Mandate Cannot Be Justi-fied as an “Essential Part of a Broader Regulatory Scheme” Because Congress Cannot Regulate Inactivity Unable to justify the individual mandate under existing doctrine, the government has resorted to a new theory: that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to mandate economic activity when doing so is an essential part of a broader regu-latory scheme. In other words, while not itself a regulation of interstate commerce, or of intrastate economic activity—or even of intrastate non-economic activity—the individual mandate is a necessary and proper means of exercising the lawful ends of regulat-ing the interstate health insurance industry. The government contends that Congress can ex-pand its own power by jerry-rigging a large legisla-tive scheme and then repairing its gaps and fissures by further legislation that Congress lacks any enu-merated authority to impose, thus “resort[ing] to the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires con-gressional action, the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997). But in all the cases the government cites for this proposi-tion, from Darby to Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), Congress only asserted power over individuals who were voluntarily engaged in economic activity, such as producing and shipping lumber, Darby, 312 U.S. at 108, or mining coal, Hodel, 452 U.S. at 318. The government also relies on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Raich, which analyzed Con-gress’s power under a broader regulatory scheme. Yet Justice Scalia only identified circumstances in which Congress may reach intrastate non-economic activity. 18 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our cases show that the regulation of intrastate ac-tivities may be necessary to and proper for the regu-lation of interstate commerce in two general circum-stances.” (emphasis added)). The first of these cir-cumstances included the substantial effects doctrine, which is limited to reaching economic activity. The second is the proposition that Congress may reach “even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of in-terstate commerce.” Id. at 37 (emphasis added). This rationale does not justify expanding Congress’s au-thority to allow it to compel economic activity. A. Inactivity Is Not a Type of Activity The government and the courts ruling in its favor have implicitly acknowledged that Congress can regulate only “activity” by redefining that word to in-clude the making of an “economic decision” concern-ing how “the uninsured finance what they will con-sume in the market for health care services.” Pet. Br. at 50; see also Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (activity/inactivity distinction is “pure semantics”; Congress can regulate any “mental activ-ity, i.e., decision-making,” that has ultimate economic effects). Thus, simply abstaining from buying some-thing—one of the infinite goods each of us is not cur-rently buying—is recharacterized as the “activity” of forestalling a purchase (regardless of whether the non-activity is the result of a conscious decision or in-ertia) and becomes subject to federal regulation. Such linguistic alchemy has at least three weaknesses. First, the categorical difference between activity and inactivity—or acts and omissions—is a genuine and long-respected one. See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton 19 on the Law of Torts § 56 at 373 (5th ed. 1984) (“there runs through much of the law a distinction between action and inaction.”). It is a basic principle of tort law, for example, that one has no duty to act, and cannot generally be punished for nonfeasance, but has only a duty to act reasonably, and not commit misfeasance. See, e.g., McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1996). So too in criminal law one cannot generally be convicted without engaging in some activity. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994) (the law “does not punish mere thought”). The categorical distinction between activity and inactivity is intuitively obvious and understood by the ordinary person. It is also the foundation of moral philosophy relevant to debates over healthcare law and policy. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Killing and Letting Die, in Moral Dilemmas 78-87 (2002) (distinguishing between prohibited killing and allowable withholding of care). Second, while activity means engaging in a par-ticular, definite act, inactivity means not engaging in a literally infinite set of acts. At any instant, there are innumerable economic transactions into which one is not entering. To allow Congress discretionary power to impose compulsory economic mandates within this infinite set of inactions would amount to granting it a plenary and unlimited police power of the sort the Constitution specifically withholds. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (“The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power”) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566); id. at 584-85 (“[W]e always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power.”) (Tho-mas, J., concurring). 20 Finally, if inaction is deemed “economic” due to its economic effects, then the categorical distinction be-tween economic and non-economic activity estab-lished in Lopez and reaffirmed in Morrison and Raich would collapse. Indeed, Lopez and Morrison stand for the proposition that Congress may not regulate intra-state non-economic activities even if, in the aggre-gate, they have substantial effects on interstate commerce. But any class of activity or inactivity, in the aggregate, can be said to have some economic consequences. To redefine inactivity as economic ac-tivity because of its effects would destroy the line the Supreme Court has time and again drawn between the intrastate economic activity that Congress may reach and the intrastate non-economic activity it may not. This Court should not so undermine its prece-dent now governing the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. B. The Activity-Based Categorical Distinc-tion Provides Judicially Manageable Standards with a Minimum of Judicial Policymaking There must be some principled limit to Congress’s regulatory authority to prevent it from laying claim to a general police power. The most obvious line to draw is one between regulating activity—whether economic or non-economic—and inactivity. Such a categorical distinction provides a judicially adminis-trable limiting principle with a minimum of judicial intrusion into complicated political or economic analysis. It is also both consistent with and implied by existing precedent. In Lopez, the Court observed that Congress can regulate intrastate non-economic activity when doing so is “an essential part of a larger 21 regulation of economic activity, in which the regula-tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). In Raich, Justice Scalia proposed that “Con-gress may regulate even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added). Indeed, in his Raich opinion, Jus-tice Scalia used the word “activity” or “activities” 42 times. See Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You to Be Healthy? N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39. That the government agrees that “activity” is a categorical prerequisite for federal power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is im-plied by the many pages of its individual mandate brief it expends trying to turn the inactivity of not buying something into some sort of activity. Thus the uninsured are “active in the market for health care” and the mandate “merely regulates how individuals finance and pay for that active participation.” Pet. Br. at 50 (emphasis added). But this verbal manipulation of the category of “economic activity” eliminates the principled limit on congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause this Court has devised. Virtually all forms of insurance represent “timing” decisions—paying up front for burial costs, loss of life, disability, supple-mental income, credit default, business interruption, etc. See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1296 (discussing cost-shifting and timing decisions in all insurance mar-kets). Only a government of unbounded powers could mandate that every American insure against such risks. Id. (“[T]here is no reason why Congress could not similarly compel Americans to insure against any 22 number of unforeseeable but serious risks.”). The government’s fact-based “unique market” plea thus provides no legal limit on federal authority, instead inviting standardless judicial examination of “how necessary” a congressional action is. Courts should not be drawn into factual determinations of whether a particular market is “unique” or judgment calls of whether it “makes sense” to require that a given product be paid for at one time or another. The government essentially asks this Court to predicate the application of our constitutionally lim-ited scheme of powers on a factual assessment of the relationship among those who pre-purchase health-care, those who go without insurance, and those who cost-shift their healthcare consumption. But these considerations do not provide a judicially adminis-trable line by which future courts can enforce limits on congressional power: They demand instead pre-cisely the sort of inquiry into the “more or less neces-sity” of a measure that this Court has always rejected as outside the judiciary’s proper sphere. Courts must “identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis).” Raich, 545 U.S at 47-48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting ac-tivity under both the “substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrines would serve the same general purpose as the cate-gorical distinction between economic and non-economic activity: ensuring that uses of the Neces-sary and Proper Clause to execute the commerce power are truly incidental to that power and not re-23 mote, or mere “pretext[s]” for “the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. While all categorical lines are imperfect, some such line must be drawn to pre-serve Article I’s structure of enumerated and thus limited powers. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Although the resolution of specific cases has proved difficult, we have derived from the Constitution workable standards to assist in preserv-ing separation of powers and checks and balances.”). The government’s theory here would effectively de-molish that structure while offering no suitable re-placement, which is constitutionally unacceptable. Denying Congress the power to mandate, as dis-tinct from regulate or prohibit, activity—whether economic or not—by contrast, requires no such judi-cial policymaking and would affect no other existing law. Congress could have reformed the healthcare system in many ways—including even a Medicare-for-all “single payer” scheme—that would have been legally unassailable under existing doctrine. That it chose a scheme so flawed as to require otherwise un-constitutional patches to make it function does not make those “essential” provisions constitutional. 24 III. The Individual Mandate is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and Proper Clause Because It Constitutes an Unconstitutional Commandeering of the People A. The Constitution Creates a Federal Sys-tem That Recognizes and Protects Both State and Popular Sovereignty Even if this Court agrees with the government that mandating activity is necessary to Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce, it can still hold the action improper because people are being comman-deered in a manner that violates their sovereignty and avoids political accountability. In two cases presenting then-unprecedented as-sertions of power under the Commerce Clause, this Court stated that Congress cannot use this power to mandate or “commandeer” state legislatures and ex-ecutive officers. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Such commandeering is “fundamentally in-compatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty,” and therefore improper under our fed-eralist system. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. That is, “re-sidual state sovereignty” was woven into the fabric of the Constitution and is “implicit . . . in the Constitu-tion’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmen-tal powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.” Id. at 919. Underscoring the enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8, is the Tenth Amendment, which reiterates that the Constitution preserves state and popular sovereignty by limiting Congress’s power. Id. Thus, the mandate struck down in Printz, even if necessary, could not be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause: “When a ‘la[w]…for carrying into 25 Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the princi-ple of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause.’” Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added). The Tenth Amendment thus recognizes the exis-tence of multiple sovereigns, of which the people are one: “The powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the peo-ple.” U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added). In this way, the Constitution protects not just state sover-eignty, but also popular sovereignty. Just as mandat-ing that states legislatures and executive officials take action is improper “commandeering,” so too is mandating that individual citizens enter into trans-actions with private companies. As Chief Justice John Jay noted in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471-72 (1793), the peo-ple are “truly the sovereigns of the country,” and elected officials merely their deputies, exercising delegated authority. Founding Father James Wilson agreed, recognizing that sovereignty starts with the individual: “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this like-wise?” Id. at 456 (emphasis added). Although the Eleventh Amendment reversed the outcome of Chis-holm and the Supreme Court interpreted that amendment as guaranteeing certain types of state sovereign immunity, this Court has never repudiated the priority of popular sovereignty. Instead, as re-cently as last term, this Court strongly endorsed 26 “[f]ederalism as secur[ing] the freedom of the individ-ual,” and “protect[ing] the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in ex-cess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions.” United States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[I]n our system, while sov-ereign powers are delegated to the agencies of gov-ernment, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.”); accord Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (“In our country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.”). B. Congress Can Intrude on State and Popu-lar Sovereignty Only for Certain Limited Purposes in Certain Circumscribed Ways The Constitution does allow the federal govern-ment to intrude on state and popular sovereignty by commandeering states and individuals for certain limited purposes in certain circumscribed ways. Comparing permissible with impermissible instances of commandeering can help sketch the outer limits of this dangerous power. 1. Commandeering is constitutional only when it is textually based or when it relates to the functioning of the Re-public or the duties of citizenship. The few examples of constitutional commandeer-ing are instructive for the exceptional occasions when commandeering is allowed. State officials can be called on to carry out explicit constitutional duties. In the words of Justice Story, 27 “The executive authority of the several states may be often called upon to exert Powers or allow Rights given by the Constitution,” such as temporarily filling vacant congressional seats or surrendering fugitives from justice. Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1839 (1833). Similarly, the few legal mandates imposed on the people by the federal government are either implied by specific constitutional clauses—such as responding to censuses, U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, serving on juries, U.S. Const. amend. VI & VII, or paying income taxes, U.S. Const. amend. XVI—or derive from the fundamental preexisting duties that citizens owe that government. See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378, 390 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation” to reject a Thirteenth Amendment claim). Not only are the instances of constitutional com-mandeering rare and carefully circumscribed, but the Constitution reflects an anti-commandeering princi-ple in various other provisions. For example, people may not be mandated to quarter soldiers in their homes in peacetime, testify against themselves, labor for another, or relinquish unenumerated rights. U.S. Const. amends. III, V, IX, XIII. There is not even a mandatory duty to vote. U.S. citizens are not owned by their government and cannot be presumed to be subject to an indefinite command by federal agents. There is certainly no preexisting “supreme and noble duty” to engage in economic activity whenever doing so would be con-venient to national regulatory schemes. To hold oth-erwise would be to deprive Americans of the residual 28 sovereignty recognized in the Tenth Amendment and make them the servants, rather than the masters, of Congress. Cf. The Federalist No. 78 supra, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[to say] that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers” would “be to affirm that the deputy is greater than the principal; that the servant is above his master.”). 2. The individual mandate’s comman-deering of citizens intrudes on popular sovereignty and allows Congress to avoid the Constitution’s call for politi-cal accountability and transparent budgeting. New York and Printz expressed deep concerns that allowing Congress to commandeer state legislatures and officials would encourage it do so to avoid politi-cal accountability. As Justice O’Connor explained in New York, mandates on states are improper because, “where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain in-sulated from the electoral ramifications of their deci-sion.” 505 U.S. at 169. Similarly, the Printz Court found it significant that, “[b]y forcing state govern-ments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.” 521 U.S. at 930. These same accountability concerns are even more present here. Unlike the laws addressed by New York and Printz, PPACA is one of the largest, most politi-29 cally contentious, and most expensive laws ever en-acted. Congress realized the negative political reper-cussions of such legislation and thus tried to diffuse political accountability across a range of public and private actors. Yet the Constitution was designed to direct congressional action through politically ac-countable channels, as illustrated by the Origination Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, and the State-ment and Account Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. The individual mandate avoids such channels and thus does not “consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. a. The Origination Clause ensures that mandated wealth transfers are passed through the most politically accountable house of Congress. The generation of Americans that fought against taxation without representation was understandably wary of government’s power to take wealth. To pro-tect against the kind of taxing abuses that helped bring about the American Revolution, the Constitu-tion thus requires that “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. For many at the Constitu-tional Convention, it was so important for the taxing power to be closely accountable to the people that omitting the clause could have derailed the entire en-deavor. J. Michael Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey, 23 Tulsa L. J. 165, 170 (1987). As Convention Delegate Elbridge Gerry noted, “[t]axation and representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but their immediate representatives shall 30 meddle with their purses.” 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions 416 (J. Elliot, ed. 1836). Similarly, Madison wrote: “The House of Representatives can-not only refuse, but they alone can propose the sup-plies requisite for the support of the government. They, in a word, hold the purse . . . . This power over the purse may in fact be regarded as the most com-pleat and effectual weapon with which any constitu-tion can arm the immediate representatives of the people.” The Federalist, No. 58 supra, at 359. Although amici do not argue that the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause, that clause should be recognized for the principle it represents: the Framers’ concern that laws mandating wealth transfers and exactions should be the most account-able to the people. If commandeering the people through the individual mandate is allowed, then “Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 930. Instead, they can simply commandeer individuals into economic transactions and claim they did not raise taxes. Commandeering the people in this fashion creates constitutional con-cerns very similar to those recognized in Printz. Having granted the federal government the power to mandate that citizens give up some of their wealth for the support of the general government, the dele-gates to the Convention placed that power in the House so as to best check that power by popular sov-ereignty. Yet the individual mandate allows Con-gress (and the president) to escape political account-ability for what would otherwise be a tax increase on persons making less than $250,000 per year by com-31 pelling them to make payments directly to private companies rather than to the U.S. Treasury. That evasion of political accountability explains why the mandate was formulated as a regulatory “require-ment” enforced by a “penalty.” b. The Statement and Account Clause works with the Origination Clause to ensure that the people can accu-rately assess how much wealth is being extracted from them. The Origination Clause would be largely useless without a requirement that budgetary information be accurately kept and timely published. Article I, Sec-tion 9, Clause 7 thus requires “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money [to] be published from time to time.” According to Justice Story, this clause makes Con-gress’s “responsibility complete and perfect” by ensur-ing “that the people may know, what money is ex-pended, for what purposes, and by what authority.” 3 Commentaries § 1342. Congress tried to avoid this clause’s requirements and, more importantly with regard to PPACA, to thwart the Constitution’s underlying principle of ac-countability. Although the Act includes many taxes and fees, much of its total cost will be laid on private individuals, as citizens are commandeered to pur-chase health insurance many do not want and cannot afford. Through clever political machinations, these costs are largely kept off the books. In 1994, President Clinton introduced a major healthcare reform proposal that included many simi-larities to PPACA, most notably an individual health insurance mandate. See Ezra Klein, The Number-32 Cruncher-in-Chief, The American Prospect, Jan. 14, 2009, at 17. The Clinton proposal was unpopular in part because the Congressional Budget Office decided to include in the budget the costs incurred by those individuals. Robert Pear, The Clinton Budget: Health Care; Congress’s Budget Office May Deal New Blow to Clinton Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1994, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/08/us/clinton-budget-health-care-congress-s-budget-office-may-deal-new-blow-clinton.html. The CBO report galva-nized the bill’s opponents, who called it a “Federal takeover of health care and a mammoth tax hike to boot.” Propagandizing a Health Report, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1994, at A22. Fifteen years later, on the eve of PPACA’s enact-ment, the CBO again analyzed how the individual mandate would be treated for budgeting purposes. CBO, The Budgetary Treatment of Proposals to Change the Nation’s Health Insurance System 3 (2009). Specifically, the CBO asked whether “cash transactions between private entities—in which the funds do not pass through the U.S. Treasury—[could] be reflected in the federal budget” and whether the mandate could “justify inclusion in the budget of the private-sector costs of the mandated activity.” Id. It concluded that the budget should include private ex-penditures when a “nominally private entity is acting as an agent of the government in carrying out a fed-eral program.” Id. The important question is whether the federal controls “mak[e] health insurance an es-sentially governmental program, tightly controlled by the federal government with little choice available to those who offer and buy health insurance.” Id. at 4. 33 In a subsequent memo issued just 11 days before PPACA was passed, the CBO “determined that set-ting minimum MLRs6 under the PPACA at 80 per-cent or lower for the individual and small-group mar-kets or at 85 percent or lower for the large group market would not cause CBO to consider transactions in those markets as part of the federal budget.” CBO, Budgetary Treatment of Proposals to Regulate Medi-cal Loss Ratios 2 (2009). As enacted, PPACA man-dates these exact MLRs. PPACA § 1001 (adding § 2718(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) to the Public Health Service Act). The federal budget as interpreted by the CBO thus does not reflect the commandeered-citizen expendi-tures in the total cost of PPACA. Amici do not ask this Court to enforce the State-ment and Account Clause, except insofar as invalidat-ing the novel power to mandate economic activity would deprive Congress of a new way to evade the ac-countability imposed by this Clause. Nor do we have a view on the proper method of accounting for the CBO. We simply ask this Court to view the forgoing information in light of the entire circumstances sur-rounding PPACA, and with the same concern for the abuses of commandeering expressed in New York, Printz, McCulloch, and, ultimately, the Constitution. 6 Medical Loss Ratios: the proportion of premium dollars that an insurer spends on healthcare costs rather than administrative or other costs. 34 C. If Congress is Allowed to Avoid Both Po-litical Accountability and Courts’ En-forcement of the Necessary and Proper Clause’s Limits, It Will Improperly Define the Limits of its Own Power By permitting the unconstitutional commandeer-ing of citizens, the individual mandate crosses the fundamental line between limited, accountable con-stitutional government and unlimited power cabined only by Congress’s political will—which is to say, not cabined at all. Congress’s “political will” often directs it to the path of least political resistance, which will often be the path of least political accountability. If Congress can mandate whatever behavior it believes appropriate, without a principled constitutional limit, Congress becomes the sole judge of its powers, con-trary to the Constitution. In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), for example, this Court rejected the proposi-tion that Congress is the sole arbiter of what acts are necessary and proper to carrying out its own enu-merated powers. To admit that Congress has such unreviewable discretion, and, then, to exercise absolutely and without liability to question, in cases involving private rights, the powers thus determined to [be “necessary and proper”], would completely change the nature of American government. It would convert the government, which the peo-ple ordained as a government of limited pow-ers, into a government of unlimited powers…. It would obliterate every criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated Chief Justice [Marshall] in [McCulloch], established 35 for the determination of the question whether legislative acts are constitutional or unconsti-tutional. Id. at 617-18. If the word “proper” is more than dead letter, it must at least mean that acts that destroy the very purpose of Article I—to enumerate and thus limit Congress’s powers—are improper. If the federal power to enact economic mandates is upheld, Con-gress would be free to require anything that is part of a national regulatory plan and to then hide those costs from the American public. “If the commerce power permits Congress to force individuals to enter whatever markets it chooses, any remaining hold on national power will evaporate, leaving future limits to the whims of legislative restraint, the epitome of a system without restrictions, balance or any other con-straints on power.” Thomas More Law Center, 651 F.3d at 549 (Sutton, J.). “Indeed, at oral argument, the Government could not identify any mandate to purchase a product or service in interstate commerce that would be unconstitutional, at least under the Commerce Clause.” Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 14-15. Outside of explicit constitutional authority or a preexisting duty of citizenship, imposing “economic mandates” on people is improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses of that word. Allowing Con-gress to exercise such power would convert it from a government of delegated powers into one of general and unlimited authority, and would reverse the rela-tionship of American citizens to their government. 36 CONCLUSION For the first time, the federal government has im-posed a mandate not derived from specific constitu-tional clauses or duties of citizenship. Such man-dates cannot be justified by existing doctrines defin-ing and limiting Congress’s powers. Upholding the power to impose them “would fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal government to the states and the people; nobody would ever again be able to claim plausibly that the Constitution limits federal power.” Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Re-form Are Well Grounded in Law—and Pose Serious Challenges, 29 Health Affairs 1229, 1232 (June 2010). In sum, there is no “generally applicable, judi-cially enforceable limiting principle that would . . . uphold the mandate without obliterating the bounda-ries inherent in the system of enumerated congres-sional powers.” Florida, 648 F. 3d at 1328. Unless this Court wishes to make federal power boundless—a result contrary to the Constitution’s text, structure, and history—it should affirm the judgment below. Respectfully submitted, TIMOTHY SANDEFUR Pacific Legal Foundation 930 G St. Sacramento, CA 95834 (916) 419-7111 tms@pacificlegal.org ROBERT A. LEVY ILYA SHAPIRO Counsel of Record ANASTASIA KILLIAN Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20001 (202) 842-0200 ishapiro@cato.org Counsel for Amici Curiae February 13, 20121a APPENDIX List of Amici Curiae State Legislators Arkansas Sen. Gilbert Baker Sen. Cecile Bledsoe Sen. Jonathan Dismang Sen. Jake Files Sen. Bruce Holland Sen. Jeremy Hutchinson Sen. Missy Irvin Sen. Johnny Key Sen. Michael Lamoureux Sen. Jason Rapert Sen. Bill Sample Sen. Eddie Joe Williams Rep. Denny Altes Rep. Duncan Baird Rep. Jonathan Barnett Rep. Nate Bell Rep. Lori Benedict Rep. Mark Biviano Rep. David Branscum Rep. John Burris Rep. Les Carnine Rep. Davy Carter Rep. Ann Clemmer Rep. Charlie Collins Rep. Linda Collins-Smith Rep. Bruce Cozart Rep. Robert Dale Rep. Gary Deffenbaugh Rep. Jane English Rep. Jon Eubanks Rep. Ed Garner Rep. Jeremy Gillam Rep. Kim Hammer Rep. Justin Harris Rep. Prissy Hickerson Rep. Debbie Hobbs Rep. Karen Hopper Rep. Jon Hubbard Rep. Donna Hutchinson Rep. Lane Jean Rep. Josh Johnston Rep. Allen Kerr Rep. Bryan King Rep. Andrea Lea Rep. Kelley Linck Rep. Stephanie Malone Rep. Loy Mauch Rep. Andy Mayberry Rep. David Meeks Rep. Stephen Meeks Rep. Terry Rice Rep. David Sanders Rep. Matt Sheperd Rep. Mary Lou Slinkard Rep. Gary Stubblefield Rep. Tim Summers Rep. Bruce Westerman Rep. Jon Woods Illinois Rep. Joe Sosnowski Iowa Rep. Erik Helland 2a Kentucky Sen. Joe Bowen Sen. Tom Buford Sen. Jared Carpenter Sen. Julie Denton Sen. Carroll Gibson Sen. David Givens Sen. Ernie Harris Sen. Jimmy Higdon Sen. Paul Hornback Sen. Tom Jensen Sen. Alice Forgy Kerr Sen. Bob Leeper Sen. Vernie McGaha Sen. Dan Seum Sen. John Schickel Sen. Brandon Smith Sen. Katie Stine Sen. Robert Stivers II Sen. Damon Thayer Sen. Jack Westwood Sen. David L. Williams Sen. Charles M. Wilson Sen. Ken Winters Rep. Kevin D. Bratcher Rep. Regina Petrey Bunch Rep. Dwight D. Butler Rep. John “Bam” Carney Rep. Tim Couch Rep. Ron Crimm Rep. Jim DeCesare Rep. Bob M. DeWeese Rep. Myron Dossett Rep. C.B. Embry, Jr. Rep. Bill Farmer Rep. Danny Ford Rep. Joseph M. Fischer Rep. David Floyd Rep. Sara Beth Gregory Rep. Mike Harmon Rep. David B. Housman Rep. Thomas R. Kerr Rep. Kimberly P. King Rep. Adam Koenig Rep. J. Stan Lee Rep. Donna K. Mayfield Rep. Michael L.Meredith Rep. Brad Montell Rep. Tim Moore Rep. Lonnie Napier Rep. David Osborne Rep. Ryan F. Quarles Rep. Marie L. Rader Rep. Steven Rudy Rep. Sal Santoro Rep. Tommy Turner Rep. Ben Waide Rep. Alecia Webb-Edgington Rep. Addia Wuchner Rep. Jill K. York Maine Rep. Jonathan McKane Maryland Del. Susan Aumann Del. Joe Boteler III Del. Addie Eckardt Del. Bill Frank 3a Del. Jeannie Haddaway-Riccio Del. Michael Hough Del. Wade Kach Del. Susan McComas Del. Anthony J. O’Donnell Del. Charles Otto Del. Neil Parrott Del. Justin Ready Del. Kathy Szeliga Michigan Sen. Dave Hildenbrand Rep. Tom McMillin Minnesota Sen. Bill Ingebrigtsen Sen. Amy Koch Sen. Warren Limmer Sen. Sean Nienow Sen. Julianne Ortman Rep. Sarah Anderson Rep. King Banaian Rep. Mike Benson Rep. Bob Dettmer Rep. Keith Downey Rep. Steve Drazkowski Rep. Dan Fabian Rep. Steven Gottwalt Rep. Glen Gruenhagen Rep. David Hancock Rep. Andrea Kieffer Rep. Mary Kiffmeyer Rep. Kathy Lohmer Rep. Pat Mazorol Rep. Carolyn McElfatrick Rep. Pam Myhra Rep. Branden Peterson Rep. Duane Quam Rep. Chris Swedzinski Rep. Doug Wardlow Rep. Torrey Westrom Rep. Kelby Woodard Mississippi Sen. Phillip A. Gandy Sen. Angela Hill Sen. Chris McDaniel Sen. Giles K. Ward Rep. Tracy Arnold Rep. Mark Baker Rep. Jim Beckett Rep. Randy P. Boyd Rep. Chris Brown Rep. Charles Busby Rep. Bubba Carpenter Rep. Gary A. Chism Rep. Becky Currie Rep. Dennis DeBar, Jr. Rep. Mark Formby Rep. Andy Gipson Rep. Rita Martinson Rep. Kevin McGee Rep. Doug McLeod Rep. Alex Monsour Rep. John Moore Rep. Randy Rushing Rep. Greg Snowden Rep. Jody Steverson Rep. Jerry Turner Rep. Jessica Upshaw 4a Montana Sen. Ron Arthun Sen. Joe Balyeat Sen. John Brenden Sen. Taylor Brown Sen. Ed Buttrey Sen. Jeff Essmann Sen. Greg Hinkle Sen. Verdell Jackson Sen. Llewelyn Jones Sen. Bob Lake Sen. Dave Lewis Sen. Eric Moore Sen. Carmine Mowbray Sen. Alan Olson Sen. Jim Peterson Sen. Jason Priest Sen. Rick Ripley Sen. Jim Shockley Sen. Jon Sonju Sen. Donald Steinbeisser Sen. Bruce Tutvedt Sen. Chas Vincent Sen. Ed Walker Sen. Art Wittich Sen. Ryan Zinke Rep. Elsie M. Arntzen Rep. Mark Blasdel Rep. Joanne Blyton Rep. Randy Brodehl Rep. Tom Burnett Rep. Christy Clark Rep. Patrick Connell Rep. Rob Cook Rep. Mike Cuffe Rep. Champ Edmunds Rep. Ron Ehli Rep. John Esp Rep. Kelly Flynn Rep. Steve Gibson Rep. Alan Hale Rep. Kris Hansen Rep. Gordon Hendrick Rep. Brian Hoven Rep. David Howard Rep. Pat Ingraham Rep. Douglas Kary Rep. Dan Kennedy Rep. Krayton Kerns Rep. James Knox Rep. Austin Knudsen Rep. Steve Lavin Rep. Cleve Loney Rep. Gary MacLaren Rep. Tom McGillvray Rep. Jonathan McNiven Rep. Mike Miller Rep. Jesse O’Hara Rep. Jerry O’Neil Rep. Ryan Osmundson Rep. Ken Peterson Rep. Lee Randall Rep. Joe Read Rep. Keith Regier Rep. Don Roberts Rep. Matt Rosendale Rep. Dan Skattum Rep. Derek Skees Rep. Cary Smith Rep. Janna Taylor Rep. Gordon Vance Rep. Wayne Stahl 5a Rep. Bob Wagner Rep. Wendy Warburton Rep. Jeff Welborn New Jersey Sen. Joseph M. Kyrillos Sen. Steve Oroho Asm. Gary Chiusano Asm. Alison Littell McHose New Mexico Sen. Sue Wilson Beffort Rep. Yvette Herrell Rep. Dennis Roch North Carolina Sen. Austin Allran Pennsylvania Sen. Rich Alloway Sen. Dave Argall Sen. Patrick Browne Sen. Jane Earll Sen. John Eichelberger Sen. Ted Erickson Sen. Mike Folmer Sen. Bob Mensch Sen. Chuck McIlhinney Sen. Jane Orie Sen. Jeff Piccola Sen. Joe Scarnati Sen. Pat Vance Sen. Mike Waugh Sen. Don White Rep. Ryan Aument Rep. Matthew Baker Rep. Stephen Bloom Rep. Michele Brooks Rep. Jim Christiana Rep. Gordon Denlinger Rep. Mark Gillen Rep. Mauree Gingrich Rep. Seth Grove Rep. Rob Kauffman Rep. Daryl Metcalfe Rep. Jerry Stern Rep. Rosemarie Swanger Rep. Will Tallman South Dakota Sen. Stanford Adelstein Sen. Tim Begalka Sen. Corey Brown Sen. Joni Cutler Sen. Art Fryslie Sen. Jeff Haverly Sen. Reid Holien Sen. Jean Hunhoff Sen. Kent Juhnke Sen. Shantel Krebs Sen. Dan Lederman Sen. Ryan Maher Sen. Al Novstrup Sen. Russell Olson Sen. Tim Rave Sen. Larry Rhoden Sen. Larry Tideman Rep. Jim Bolin Rep. Jenna Haggar Rep. Steve Hickey Rep. Lora Hubbel 6a Rep. Melissa Magstadt Rep. Patty Miller Rep. David Novstrup Rep. Manny Steele Rep. Mark Willadsen Texas Rep. Ralph Sheffield Washington Rep. Jan Angel Rep. Barbara Bailey Rep. Vincent Buys Rep. Cathy Dahlquist Rep. Susan Fagan Rep. Bill Hinkle Rep. Shelly Short

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