Is Putin Revisiting Stalin’s Plan to Conquer Europe??? – 07/29/2014

“The specific allegation dates to no later than 2013, senior U.S. officials told NBC News, but as long ago as 2007, the chief of Russia’s military General Staff was quoted as saying Russia was considering unilaterally dropping out of the agreement. “This is a very serious matter which we have attempted to address with Russia for some time now,” a senior administration told NBC News on Monday night. “The United States is committed to the viability of the INF Treaty. We encourage Russia to return to compliance with its obligations under the treaty and to eliminate any prohibited items in a verifiable manner.” Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee have been agitating for the White House to take a tougher stance against Russia’s alleged violations for more than a year.”

“For several years now, a former Soviet military intelligence officer named Vladimir Rezun has provoked heated discussion in Russia for his startling view that Hitler attacked Soviet Russia in June 1941 just as Stalin was preparing to overwhelm Germany and western Europe as part of a well-planned operation to “liberate” all of Europe by bringing it under Communist rule.”

“Writing under the pen name of Viktor Suvorov, Rezun has developed this thesis in three books. Icebreaker(which has been published in an English-language edition) and Dni M (“M Day”) were reviewed in the Nov.–Dec. 1997 Journal of Historical Review. The third book, reviewed here, is a 470-page work, “The Last Republic: Why the Soviet Union Lost the Second World War,” published in Russian in Moscow in 1996.”

“In “The Last Republic,” Suvorov adds to the evidence presented in his two earlier books to strengthen his argument that Stalin was preparing for an aggressive war, in particular emphasizing the ideological motivation for the Soviet leader’s actions. The title refers to the unlucky country that would be incorporated as the “final republic” into the globe-encompassing “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” thereby completing the world proletarian revolution.”

“As Suvorov explains, this plan was entirely consistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, as well as with Lenin’s policies in the earlier years of the Soviet regime. The Russian historian argues convincingly that it was not Leon Trotsky (Bronstein), but rather Stalin, his less flamboyant rival, who was really the faithful disciple of Lenin in promoting world Communist revolution. Trotsky insisted on his doctrine of “permanent revolution,” whereby the young Soviet state would help foment home-grown workers’ uprisings and revolution in the capitalist countries.”

“Stalin instead wanted the Soviet regime to take advantage of occasional “armistices” in the global struggle to consolidate Red military strength for the right moment when larger and better armed Soviet forces would strike into central and western Europe, adding new Soviet republics as this overwhelming force rolled across the continent. After the successful consolidation and Sovietization of all of Europe, the expanded USSR would be poised to impose Soviet power over the entire globe.”

“As Suvorov shows, Stalin realized quite well that, given a free choice, the people of the advanced Western countries would never voluntarily choose Communism. It would therefore have to be imposed by force. His bold plan, Stalin further decided, could be realized only through a world war.”

“Furthermore, and as Soviet theoreticians had always insisted, Communism could never peacefully coexist over the long run with other socio-political systems. Accordingly, Communist rule inevitably would have to be imposed throughout the world. So integral was this goal of “world revolution” to the nature and development of the “first workers’ state” that it was a cardinal feature of the Soviet agenda even before Hitler and his National Socialist movement came to power in Germany in 1933.”

“Stalin elected to strike at a time and place of his choosing. To this end, Soviet development of the most advanced offensive weapons systems, primarily tanks, aircraft, and airborne forces, had already begun in the early 1930s. To ensure the success of his bold undertaking, in late 1939 Stalin ordered the build up a powerful war machine that would be superior in quantity and quality to all possible opposing forces. His first secret order for the total military-industrial mobilization of the country was issued in August 1939. A second total mobilization order, this one for military mobilization, would be issued on the day the war was to begin.”

“Contrary to the official view that the Soviet Union was not prepared for war in June 1941, in fact, Suvorov stresses, it was the Germans who were not really prepared. Germany’s hastily drawn up “Operation Barbarossa” plan, which called for a “Blitzkrieg” victory in four or five months by numerically inferior forces advancing in three broad military thrusts, was doomed from the outset.”

“Moreover, Suvorov goes on to note, Germany lacked the raw materials (including petroleum) essential in sustaining a drawn out war of such dimensions.”

“Another reason for Germany’s lack of preparedness, Suvorov contends, was that her military leaders seriously under-estimated the performance of Soviet forces in the Winter War against Finland, 1939–40. They fought, it must be stressed, under extremely severe winter conditions — temperatures of minus 40 degrees Celsius and snow depths of several feet — against the well-designed reinforced concrete fortifications and underground facilities of Finland’s “Mannerheim Line.” In spite of that, it is often forgotten, the Red Army did, after all, force the Finns into a humiliating armistice.”

“It is always a mistake, Suvorov emphasizes, to underestimate your enemy. But Hitler made this critical miscalculation. In 1943, after the tide of war had shifted against Germany, he admitted his mistaken evaluation of Soviet forces two years earlier.”

“To prove that it was Stalin, and not Hitler, who was really prepared for war, Suvorov compares German and Soviet weaponry in mid-1941, especially with respect to the all-important offensive weapons systems — tanks and airborne forces. It is a generally accepted axiom in military science that attacking forces should have a numerical superiority of three to one over the defenders. Yet, as Suvorov explains, when the Germans struck on the morning of June 22, 1941, they attacked with a total of 3,350 tanks, while the Soviet defenders had a total of 24,000 tanks — that is, Stalin had seven times more tanks than Hitler, or 21 times more tanks than would have been considered sufficient for an adequate defense. Moreover, Suvorov stresses, the Soviet tanks were superior in all technical respects, including firepower, range, and armor plating.”

“As it was, Soviet development of heavy tank production had already begun in the early 1930s. For example, as early as 1933 the Soviets were already turning out in series production, and distributing to their forces, the T-35 model, a 45-ton heavy tank with three cannons, six machine guns, and 30-mm armor plating. By contrast, the Germans began development and production of a comparable 45-ton tank only after the war had begun in mid-1941.
By 1939 the Soviets had already added three heavy tank models to their inventory. Moreover, the Soviets designed their tanks with wider tracks, and to operate with diesel engines (which were less flammable than those using conventional carburetor mix fuels). Furthermore, Soviet tanks were built with both the engine and the drive in the rear, thereby improving general efficiency and operator viewing. German tanks had a less efficient arrangement, with the engine in the rear and the drive in the forward area.”

“When the conflict began in June 1941, Suvorov shows, Germany had no heavy tanks at all, only 309 medium tanks, and just 2,668 light, inferior tanks. For their part, the Soviets at the outbreak of the war had at their disposal tanks that were not only heavier but of higher quality.”

“The Russians introduced their giant Klim Voroshilov tanks into action near Raseiniai [Lithuania]. Models weighing 43 and 52 tons surprised the Germans, who found the KVs nearly unstoppable. One of these Russian tanks took 70 direct hits, but none penetrated its armor.”

“Even more lopsided was the Soviet superiority in airborne forces. Before the war, Soviet DB-3f and SB bombers as well as the TB-1 and TB-3 bombers (of which Stalin had about a thousand had been modified to carry airborne troops as well as bomb loads. By mid-1941 the Soviet military had trained hundreds of thousands of paratroopers (Suvorov says almost a million) for the planned attack against Germany and the West. These airborne troops were to be deployed and dropped behind enemy lines in several waves, each wave consisting of five airborne assault corps (VDKs), each corps consisting of 10,419 men, staff and service personnel, an artillery division, and a separate tank battalion (50 tanks). Suvorov lists the commanding officers and home bases of the first two waves or ten corps. The second and third wave corps included troops who spoke French and Spanish.”

“Because the German attack prevented these highly trained troops from being used as originally planned, Stalin converted them to “guards divisions,” which he used as reserves and “fire brigades” in emergency situations, much as Hitler often deployed Waffen SS forces.”(“Spetsnaz” anyone?)

“Suvorov admits to being fascinated with Stalin, calling him “an animal, a wild, bloody monster, but a genius of all times and peoples.” He commanded the greatest military power in the Second World War, the force that more than any other defeated Germany. Especially in the final years of the conflict, he dominated the Allied military alliance. He must have regarded Roosevelt and Churchill contemptuously as useful idiots.”

“In early 1941 everyone assumed that because Germany was still militarily engaged against Britain in north Africa, in the Mediterranean, and in the Atlantic, Hitler would never permit entanglement in a second front in the East. (Mindful of the disastrous experience of the First World War, he had warned in Mein Kampf of the mortal danger of a two front war.) It was precisely because he was confident that Stalin assumed Hitler would not open a second front, contends Suvorov, that the German leader felt free to launch “Barbarossa.” This attack, insists Suvorov, was an enormous and desperate gamble. But threatened by superior Soviet forces poised to overwhelm Germany and Europe, Hitler had little choice but to launch this preventive strike.”

“But it was too little, too late. In spite of the advantage of striking first, it was the Soviets who finally prevailed. In the spring of 1945, Red army troops succeeded in raising the red banner over the Reichstag building in Berlin. It was due only to the immense sacrifices of German and other Axis forces that Soviet troops did not similarly succeed in raising the Red flag over Paris, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Rome, Stockholm, and, perhaps, London.”

“Today, the Spetsnaz are Vympel and Alpha which are one of the best units in the world, compared to SAD operatives who are better than Seals. Having the best available tech, trained in everything, H2H, sniper, counter sniper techniques, special training, etc… They have multiple units, and some are intelligence officers, some sources have it, they use them as “sleepers” in other countries, they are learned to operate in other countries, and learn their tactics, and they say that they have to memorize up to 30 maps of the most important capitals by heart. And no one actually knows the nature of their operations, they blend as regular Spetsnaz and usually are said to be responsible for the assassination of the high government leaders of Chechnya. Russians actually threatened to deploy them in Syria a while ago should the US forces enter Syria.”