The Kansas Supreme Court released the following published decisions today:

The Supreme Court affirmed Sedgwick County District Court's summary denial of Noyce's request for habeas corpus relief in his case involving convictions for capital murder, premeditated first-degree murder, and aggravated arson. Noyce's convictions stemmed from his 1999 guilty plea to setting fire to a residence and killing his wife and 2-year-old son. Noyce filed his habeas corpus motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel years after the Legislature's one-year deadline to file such claims. The court held Noyce failed to establish the deadline should be extended to prevent an obviously unfair result. The court reasoned Noyce's counsel negotiated a plea to avoid the death penalty, Noyce had not filed a motion to withdraw his plea but instead asked the district court to vacate his convictions with prejudice, and the legal argument Noyce relied on to reverse his first-degree premeditated murder conviction was not precedential until years after Noyce pleaded guilty.

The Supreme Court vacated the probation portion of Hambright's sentence and remanded for resentencing because Sedgwick County District Court did not follow the Supreme Court's mandatory case law, which required the sentencing court to provide substantial and compelling reasons to increase the statutorily recommended term of probation.

The Supreme Court affirmed Chavez' stalking and criminal threat convictions in Wyandotte County District Court, rejecting his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the stalking conviction. The court also held Chavez was not entitled to a jury instruction on the victim's implied waiver of a protection from abuse order because a protected person cannot unilaterally modify or extinguish a court order.

In a K.S.A. 60-1507 action, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirement a movant must show exceptional circumstances that justify filing a second or a successive 60-1507 motion to avoid having the motion dismissed as an abuse of remedy. Littlejohn argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of mental disease or defect during Littlejohn's jury trial for his role in a 2008 murder, but Sedgwick County District Court dismissed Littlejohn's 60-1507 motion as successive because Littlejohn already had unsuccessfully sought 60-1507 relief in a previous motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Littlejohn's claims had any merit. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the appropriate standard was whether Littlejohn demonstrated exceptional circumstances existed, which would excuse his failing to raise his claims during his previous 60-1507 motion. The court remanded to the Court of Appeals to apply the exceptional circumstances standard.

In a Johnson County case arising from the administrative suspension of a driver's license following a motorist's arrest for DUI, the Supreme Court held a $50 fee imposed as a precondition to being granted administrative review of the suspension, without any provision for indigency, was an unconstitutional violation of procedural due process rights. However, as Meats did not appeal the district court's ruling that the issue was moot as applied to him, he was not entitled to any relief. The court upheld the suspension of the motorist's license, finding the implied consent advisories used were legally sufficient to advise of legal consequences and the motorist received sufficient personal service of the notice of his license suspension.

In a Johnson County case arising from the administrative suspension of a driver's license following a motorist's arrest for DUI, the Supreme Court held a $50 fee imposed as a precondition to being granted administrative review of the suspension, without any provision for indigency, was an unconstitutional violation of procedural due process rights. The court ordered the $50 fee be refunded but upheld the suspension of the motorist's license, finding the motorist received personal service of the notice of license suspension as required by statute, the motorist failed to prove his inability to complete the breath test was caused by a medical condition, and the implied consent advisories sufficiently advised the motorist of the potential legal consequences of failing or refusing to complete a post-arrest breath test.

In this Miami County case, the Supreme Court reinstated the Kansas Department of Revenue's administrative suspension of Rosendahl's driving privileges. Rosendahl argued her license should not be suspended because the law enforcement officer did not have reasonable grounds to request an evidentiary breath test based on her post-driving alcohol consumption. The court rejected this argument because the officer did not maintain a posture of willful ignorance regarding Rosendahl's post-driving alcohol consumption; instead, the circumstances known to the officer when he requested the breath test did not indicate Rosendahl had consumed alcohol after driving.