We report results from a simultaneous bilateral bargaining experiment with attention to the
effects of a settlement bonus on strategic decision-making behavior. In instances with a sufficiently
large settlement bonus, truthful revelation emerges as the dominant strategy. However previous
work (Parco and Rapoport, 2004) has experimentally tested this ―Bonus Effect‖ and found that
although the presence of a settlement bonus improves efficiency, behavior falls drastically short of
the normative predictions. This finding illustrates the persistent tendency of decision makers to bid
strategically, i.e. shading their bids, even when truthful revelation is a strictly dominant strategy.
Herein we investigate the influence of the framing of information and look for ways to nudge
decision makers toward making better choices in these strategic environments. Additional results
from an adaptive reinforcement-based learning model are discussed as they relate to a potential
innate bias for strategic misrepresentation even when contrary to self-interest and collective-interest.