As I’m writing the final chapter of my series of debriefs about the air war in Libya, NATO’s Operation Unified Protector is not officially ended as it will end on Oct. 31. However, everybody knows by now that on Oct.20 Gaddafi has been captured, wounded and killed and his death has marked, more than any other official statement, the end of the war started on Mar. 19.

Gaddafi was trying to flee Sirte on a large convoy made of around 75 vehicles. The convoy was attacked at 08.30AM LT by a French Mirage 2000 that was called into action by a RAF E-3D AWACS. Gaddafi’s vehicle was intercepted by rebel fighters on the ground and he was killed (after being wounded) as he was being transferred.

Most probably, his decision to escape using such a large convoy was his last mistake. I can’t understand how someone could think that so many vehicles can move unnoticed from the many reconnaissance and intelligence gathering platforms still flying within a No-Fly Zone (increasingly permeable to civilian traffic). Even if almost all the NATO and non-NATO contingents taking part to Unified Protector were reduced during the last months, as the number of strike sorties flown on a daily basis shows, the number of SIGINT assets has remained almost constant.

It was one of these extremely important platforms to intercept a phone call made by Gaddafi in the days preceding the last attack on Sirte.

Even if the bombs dropped by the French combat jet didn’t destroy the whole convoy (two armed vehicles and several accompanying cars), they were decisive to halt it. Therefore, a French plane can claim to have started and (virtually) finished the war in Libya.

Later on Oct. 20, the Pentagon disclosed that a US Predator took part in the attack, firing its Hellfire missiles. Initially it was not clear whether it was the American drone or the French plane to have fired the last (?) weapon of the war but does it really matter?

The last attack

This is how the last strike mission in Libya took place: a Predator monitoring Sirte movements spotted a convoy attempting to flee the city. The convoy was identified as being pro-Gaddafi while attempting to force its way around the outskirts of the city. Since the vehicles had some mounted weapons and ammunitions, the US drone attacked it with Hellfire missiles. As a result of the first attack, only one vehicle was destroyed but many others dispersed in different directions. Shortly after the disruption, about 20 vehicles regrouped and tried to proceed in a southerly direction. NATO again decided to engage these vehicles. Orbiting nearby there was a mixed flight of a Mirage F1CR and a Mirage 2000D that were immediately directed to strike the target. The Mirage 2000D dropped a GBU-12 on the convoy, destroying 11 vehicles.

According to the official statement issued by NATO, at the time of the strike, NATO did not know that Gaddafi was in the convoy and “NATO’s intervention was conducted solely to reduce the threat towards the civilian population, as required to do under our UN mandate. As a matter of policy, NATO does not target individuals.”

As a policy NATO does not divulge specific information on national assets involved in operations. However, as the above text shows, some commanders were more than happy to let the details about their service’s involvement in the “decisive strike” leak.

This brings me to the first of a series of key points and Lessons Learned of this war:

1) Unlike the more effective Allied Force in Serbia and Kosovo, Unified Protector represents an example of how an air campaign should not be executed. As I’ve pointed out many times in the previous debriefings, the way the air campaign was conducted and planned, transformed what could have been a quick victory into an almost deadlocked battlefield.

Odyssey Dawn represented just a series of independent national missions: the US, French, British and Italian contingents were not fully integrated, to such an extent that each one had to have its own tankers. When NATO took over and the US stepped back to a support role withdrawing its attack planes, it took 2 months to understand that it was better to start targeting Gaddafi’s capacity to resupply his forces on the front rather than attacking each single vehicle on the frontline. Furthermore, coalition planes went after a large number of ammunition depots throughout the whole air campaign. Since there were 4000 in Libya, a wiser move would have been to attack the most important ones in the early stages of the air campaign, in order to prevent loyalist forces from being able to fight for about 7 months. Consider that 80 days since the beginning of Odyssey Dawn (then Unified Protector) NATO still had some fixed targets (like C2 sites, national intelligence centre, State TV antennas, and so on) to attack even if these targets should be hit in the very early phases of any offensive air campaign.

For this reason, in spite of the official statements, NATO has been criticised by the rebels and by many analysts for being too cautious. In my opinion this was caused by a series of reasons: a UN Security Council Resolution that was open to different interpretations and that prevented the alliance to strike Gaddafi forces if they were not threatening civilians; caveats and strict ROE imposed by those partner nations facing internal struggles and that could not “afford” the risk of collateral damages (UAE AF took part to the air strikes even if the news was initially kept secret but only attacking fixed ground targets); the need to provide cover to the “freedom fighters” in a typical TIC (Troops In Contact) scenario without troops on the ground; and the lack, especially at the beginning, of a direct contact and a standard communication protocol with the rebels.

By comparison, in 78 days of air strikes in Serbia in 1999, NATO flew 38.004 sorties, 14.112 of those were strike sorties. During Allied Force, on average, 487 sorties were launched each day, 180 being strike sorties, even if during the beginning phases of the war and towards the end, when the air strikes against the Serbian ground forces became more intense, the alliance flew more than 700 sorties every day with roughly one third being bombing missions. These figures shows how the operation in former Jugoslavia focused on a quick achievement of the air superiority and a subsequent intense use of the air power against the ground targets. A successful approach that was not followed in Libya.

To date, in more than 200 days of air operations, Nato has flown 26.323 sorties, including 9.658 strike sorties.

2) Some nations contributed actively to the Libyan air war, whereas others took part to Unified Protector almost only on paper. Furthermore, a war is always an opportunity for air forces to show their capabilities, to test their most modern equipment in a real environment and to fire live ordnance. However, along with “operational” purposes, there can be “propaganda” purposes too. Some services have seen their budgets cut over the last few years to such an extent that entire fleets have been grounded with (modern) aircraft retired earlier than initially planned. Intense and successful air ops during the Libyan air war have given them the opportunity to ask for the budget needed to save some planes from defense cuts.

For example, the RAF Sentinel R1 spyplane have provided important data about enemy movements in Libya, helping planners to choose among those targets detected by its onboard sensors. However, the Sentinel will be phased out in 3 years, when British troops will return from Afghanistan, merely 8 years after it was taken on charge. Given its good performance in Libya, the decision to withdraw from service the Sentinel so early might be reviewed.

I’m sure that many readers of this blog remember my article titled “RAF Tornados firing 900K Euro missiles in 8-hour round-trip mission from the UK: is the war in Libya a marketing campaign?” following the Royal Air Force’s proud annoucement of a Long-Range Libya mission from RAF Marham involving six Tornados carrying state-of-the-art (and costly) Storm Shadow missiles. It was extremely weird that such kind of weapon [whose unit price is about 900.000 Euro (£790,000 = 1.3 Milion USD)] was still needed in Libya after more than 100 days of air campaign, after the enemy’s air defenses both manned and unmanned (missiles) had been completely wiped out and that the mission was conducted from the UK instead of using some of the 16 Tonkas already deployed in Italy. Wasn’t the RAF trying to show that the lack of aircraft carriers does not limit the UK’s capability to project its firepower at long distance?

Anyway, not only the UK’s RAF was involved in this sort of “propaganda war”. Especially at the beginning of the air campaign, there was a “race” to claim the first air strike, the first air strike on Tripoli, the first air-to-air victory that could strengthen one nation’s foreign policy or a particular aircraft’s reputation for export purposes. Indeed I’m not sure the Rafale and the Typhoon would have been so extensively involved in Libya if they were not shortlisted in the Indian Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft tender.

For instance, on Mar. 26, French aircraft carried out several strikes around Misratah which, according to the French MoD “would indicate the destruction on the ground at Misratah of at least five Soko G-2 Galeb combat planes”. Various media headlines talked about “7 aircraft shot down” or “Gaddafi’s war planes downed”, even if those could not be considered air-to-air victories.

Later disclosed satellite imagery rendered available by the AAAS website at the following link showed that the French Air Force hadn’t shot down any aircraft and, above all, that those destroyed on the ground were far from being prepared for a sortie in the region as the French MoD press update explained: they were unserviceable Mig-23s originally captured by the rebels on Feb. 24 and then sabotaged, with the removal of their nose before the regime counterattack! Better intelligence, accurate reconnaissance, would have prevented allies from wasting LGBs.

3) If some nations and their air forces struggled to get media attention, others were compelled to keep a “low profile” for internal struggles. Italy is among them: while the RAF, the French and Danish air forces provided daily or weekly detailed bulletin about the missions flown in Libya, the amount of bombs dropped on specific targets and so on, there is very little information about the sorties flown by the Italian AF and Navy. For weeks, almost everyone thought that there was only one aircraft carrier off the Libyan coasts (the French Charles De Gaulle) while there was also the Italian Garibaldi full of AV-8B Harriers performing air strikes as well as NFZ enforcement missions. Even if the Italian MoD has affirmed that Italian contribution to Unified Protector has been second only to the one of the UK and France contingents, the actual amount of flown sorties and PGMs delivered has not been undisclosed. For this reasons, all the info I was able to provide on my debriefs about the Italian commitment was obtained by official sources or from the services’ websites.

Something similar happened for the U.S. whose support to Unified Protector was vital: without American tankers, there would not be any NATO air campaign. Predators and Global Hawks (offen recalled by Washington-centric media) were important as well as some special ops assets (spyplanes, PSYOPS, EW) the actual added value of the American contribution to Unified Protector was the air-to-air refueling capability. Other partner nations contributed with some tankers (Italy, France, UK, Sweden and Canada): not the amount needed by this kind of air campaign.

Anyway, since the U.S. stepped back and handed the leadeship of the air campaign over to NATO, many details of the American intervention were not unveiled, most probably because of the criticism that would accompany a broader involvement in a long lasting war. For example, the Predator drones were already flying over Libya at least two or three days before President Obama announced that the MQ-1s would strengthen NATO’s strike capability.

As many aircraft enthusiasts noticed, the Malta LiveATC.net feed was shut off towards the end of June. Officially, it was a computer problem, however, since the LMML airport was immediately removed from the list of airfields covered by the service, there are rumours that the local feeder was asked to cease “relaying” Malta ACC and TWR comms to the rest of the world using the web. I think that the end of the Malta streaming is more linked to the need to keep some information confidential rather than a concern for the security of the air operations. The Malta feed enabled everybody to listen to the radio comms of many of the aircraft involved in the air campaign as they transited through the Malta FIR (Flight Information Region) contacting Maltase air traffic control. In this way, you could listen to a traffic self-identifying itself as a “MQ-1” (hence a Predator) going tactical while entering the Libyan airspace some days before it became official.
I’m pretty sure that the concern dealt with the risk that such information spread before it was public and for this reason the feed was shut off (temporarily?).

Image source: USAF

4) Some air forces have suffered bomb shortage after dropping few hundred PGMs in the first three months of the war. This is unacceptable. European coalition partners ran out of bombs too early and asked other nations to replenish their almost empy stocks.

Wars can come unannounced and air forces can’t be found unprepared to that.

US SECDEF condemned European nations for years of shrinking defense budgets that have forced the US to play, once again, a major role in the NATO operation. With frustration, he said:

“The mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country, yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.”

5) Coalition planes flew undisturbed over Libya. The residual Libyan Arab Air Force did not pose any threat during the whole air campaign. However, NATO air defense planes flew a lot of Defensive Counter Air missions and the majority of the violations of the No Fly Zonewere made by rebel planes trying to support freedom fighters with isolated uncoordinated, appearantly unauthorized, sorties.

6) British attack helicopters were not decisive whereas French choppers were crucial. Flying in pairs, the British Apaches on board HMS Ocean completed roughly 50 combat sorties striking 100 targets in the coastal areas of Brega and Tripoli. On the other side, the French combat helicopters flew around 300 combat sorties and destroyed more than 500 targets.

The French choppers flew within strike packages that consisted of 2-6 Gazelles armed with HOT-ATGMs, 2 Tigers and 2 Puma, in cooperation with maritime gunfire support. The French usually deployed their helicopters within the frame of tightly-integrated strike packages, usually consisting of between 2 and 6 HOT ATGM-armed Gazelles, 2 Tigres and 2 Pumas (flying-CP and for CSAR), and in cooperation with naval gunfire support (100 and 76mm calibre rounds). “They have destroyed most of what was left of the regime’s armoured and mechanized forces (what was left after the wholesale destruction of the 32AB near Benghazi, on 19-21 March, and after the failure of assaults on Misurata)” Tom Cooper of ACIG.org commented.

Unlike all the reports I’ve written since April, this one comes in days of renewed interest about the current situation Libya. Hence, mass media have restarted publishing articles about Libya (even if sometimes reports lacked accuracy).

So, I will not write a detailed recap of what happened on the battlefield, trying to focus on the most interesting or weird things.

Noteworthy U.S. media have treated the war in a Washington-centric way. Surely the U.S. supported Operation Unified Protector but only with ISR (Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance), EW (Electronic Warfare), SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses), PSYOPS, AAR (Air-to-Air Refueling) and few (if compared to the others) Predator strikes (read Pt.1 below).

Nevertheless everybody know by now that Tripoli is in rebel hands after a (quick) rebel assault supported by NATO firepower and that Gaddafi has escaped using the network of tunnels that interconnects his headquarters in the capital with the airport, Rixos Hotel, and many other locations (some of which in the desert).

Anyway, what’s clear is that:

a) Even if the rebels moved additional units in direction of Tripoli, were backed by western Special Forces on the ground (many of which worked as old-fashioned FAC – Forward Air Controllers) and by NATO’s firepower, it’s at least surprising that the remnants of the regime troops in Tripoli withdrew or surrendered so quickly. Even Bab al-Aziziya, a nuclear-resistant heavily fortified bunker was infiltrated with only a couple of days of fighting (and some bombs).

b) Gaddafi (“Gathafi” according to his passport, found inside the Bab al-Aziziya bunker along with his hat, an album filled with photos of Condoleeza Rice) is not going to give up. Soldiers and snipers aside, he still manages a wide network of loyal intel officers that keep him very well informed about the rebels and the NTC. Some are believed to be also infiltrated among the rebel ranks. Obviously, until he’s captured, dead or alive, the rebels can’t declare a victory.

As already said, the regime can exploit the underground facilities located below Tripoli. This network includes not only bunkers capable of surviving near-direct hits by nuclear weapons, but also extensive storage facilities. Tunnels, that can be used to move unobserved from one place to another, and depots, some of which have been discovered in other regions of the country, can give loyalists time and ammunitions to retreat, hide, regorganize and then fight for extended periods of time.

As the war has reached downtown Tripoli, I think rebels will mostly have to rely on their own forces. Snipers have been hiding on top buildings (they were found in the vicinity of the Rixos Hotel where journalists were seized before being freed with money and written clearance to shot down civilians) and combatants units suddenly appear everywhere. In a urban fight scenario, it will not be easy for NATO planes to hit Gaddafi forces avoiding collateral damages or blue-on-blue episodes, even if they are helped by SAS FACs working with “boots on the ground” with the rebels. For this reason, NATO has conducted few sorties in the area in the last few days with some partner nations, like Italy, not taking part to the air strikes within urban areas.

Helicopters, are much more suitable for such a scenario, but I’ve not read any report about the British Apaches being used over the capital, perhaps for the residual risk of anti-aircraft artillery, MANPADS and SAMs. The accuracy of an Apache 30mm gun attack is particularly evident in this video, taken years ago in Iraq, that gives an idea of the impressive firepower provided by an AH-64D.

c) Even if the regime was taken by surprise by the sudden collapse of the 32AB’s and by the quick advance of the rebels into Tripoli backed by NATO airstrikes, its military was able to recover because all the rebel units were initially sent into Tripoli and were not used to cut off the capital with the regime stronghold of Tarhouna and Beni Wallid, to the southeast. A major road between the two cities and the capital, enabling pro-Gaddafi forces to bring in supplies, was secured on Aug. 24 when rebels took Tarhouna and cut off the regime forces between Tripoli and Sirte and Beni Wallid garrisons.

Map credit: @4Adam

The last major battle is being fought outside Sirte where, in fact, last day’s NATO air strikes focused. Rebels are approaching the last Gaddafi’s stronghold from all directions.

On Aug. 25, 29 armed vehicles and one command and control center have been hit in the area where the power is down has a consequence of the new frontline lying the vicinity of Gaddafi’s home town Sirte.

British Tornados, operating out of RAF Marham, fired Storm Shadow cruise missiles at a headquarters in the town of Sirte, in the night between Aug. 25 and 26. See also Pt. 4 below.

Fighting is also reported, in the town of Sebha, in Southern Libya.

d) Latest reports give Sirte as Gaddafi’s hideout. Italian Foreign Ministry Franco Frattini has recently affirmed that there were news he could try to reach Algeria through the desert while many believe that he is still in Tripoli.

Indeed at 15.55 local time on Aug. 25, rebels surrounded several appartment houses near the eastern gate of Bab al-Aziziya complex (slightly outside of it) and attacked it believing “the Colonel” was inside even if he wasn’t there.

Weeks before Tripoli was taken by rebels, the news spread of Venezuelan or South African airplanes in either Tripoli or Djerba ready to evacuate Gaddafi and his relatives.

e) Hard fighting took place at Tripoli IAP, on Aug 25. When they had conquered it few days before, rebels took possession of the Afriqiya airplanes based there, some of which were dedicated to the transportation of Gaddafi and his family. The most famous one is the VIP Airbus A340-213, MSN 151, registration “5A-ONE”, ex HZ-WBT4. The aircraft became famous at the beginning of the uprising when it was believed to be used by Gaddafi to escape in Venezuela or elsewhere. IIRC the aircraft can’t fly because it lacks maintenance activity that Lufthansa (?) refused to perform to the Gaddafi’s plane.

However, regime forces managed to hit three different aircraft there one of which Airbus A300 “5A-IAY” burned out. An Airbus of BuraqAir was reported hit but only damaged while CNN aired images of burning A300B4-620 “5A-DLZ.” An ex-LAAF C-130H, full of 14.5 and 106 mm ammo, appears to have survived too.

Image sources: Reuters and CNN

f) In the last days there have been several reports of Scud launched by the regime forces in the Sirte area towards Misratah. The news spread, following a post on AJE that at least one of them was intercepted by a NATO plane. I immediately answered to all those who asked me to comment the news that it was quite unlikely that a plane could be able to hit a flying Scud. I tweeted that it had to be a Scud on its TEL/launcher or the missile was intercepted by an AEGIS cruiser off the Libyan coasts.

NATO has not confirmed that any airplane has shot down the missile and The Guardian has reported that at least four Scuds have been intercepted before they were due to impact on the city by missiles fired by a USN cruiser operating in the Gulf of Sirte.

Other interesting information, things and thoughts:

1) Since the beginning of the NATO operation (Mar. 31, 2011, 06.00GMT) a total of 20.395 sorties, including 7.681 strike sorties, have been conducted.

Someone has tried to recap the number of sorties flown to date by each contingent, even if it is extremely difficult since there’s a general lack of detailed information. Many are interested in U.S. figures. Citing the Pentagon, Reuters reported that from Apr. 1 (beginning of Unified Protector) to 07.00 CET to Aug. 22, U.S. has conducted 5.316 sorties: 1.210 were strike sorties, 101 of those Predator ones. Number of U.S. strike sorties that dropped ordnance: 262.

During the same period, NATO has conducted 19.994 sorties, including 7.541 strike sorties. This means that US has conducted 26,5% of all sorties and 16% of the air strikes.

3) French contingent, since Aug.18 has provided 65% of air strikes according to the French MoD. France has deployed one Harfang UAV to Sigonella that has flown the first mission over Libya on Aug. 24.

Image source: French MoD

4) The UK’s Royal Air Force has proudly announced a recent Long-Range Libya mission involving six Tornados carrying state-of-the-art (and costly) Storm Shadow missiles. According to this article on the Service’s website, on Aug. 10 night, six GR4s armed with stand-off missiles, conducted a round-trip mission over Libya “to target elements of Colonel Qadhafi’s military command and control facilities and air defence infrastructure.” This means that the aircraft flew long range sorties from RAF Marham and RAF Lossiemouth carrying 2 Storm Shadows each, for a total of 12 missiles.

A similar mission was flown between Aug. 25 and 26 to attack a Gaddafi headquarters in Sirte area.

Dealing with the Typhoon, the 6 FGR4 deployed to Gioia del Colle had dropped 100 bombs by Aug. 9, when an article about Sqn Ldr Jody McMeekin achieving his 1.000th flying hour on the Eurofighter was published on the RAF website.

6) Mermaid Dawn is the (translated) name of the rebel ground advance into Tripoli. It is neither a NATO nor U.S. codename.

7) After publishing images of the Italian Libya patches, here are some French ones (thanks to FX!).

8) Some more details have been made available about the BAF commitment in Op. Unified Protector (thanks to @youssefsan for the info). The MoD has said that the 6 Belgian F-16s made 448 missions (even if these should be sorties), worth 1.890 flying hours, and dropped 365 bombs (97% hit their target).

Latest update:on Aug. 3, at 10.40LT, a missile exploded 2 km from the Italian frigate Bersagliere, that was patrolling the sea some 15 miles off Libya. According to the Italian MoD, it could be either a missile launched from the coast towards the ship or, more likely, a ballistic fired SAM missile that fell into the sea after missing any target. In both cases, the episode shows that Gaddafi forces still have weaponry to threaten NATO units.

More than one month has passed since my last Debrief on Unified Protector. I’ve already posted a couple of Libya-related articles since then, but here’s a quick recap of the most interesting things.

On Jul. 28, Abdel Fattah Younes, the rebel military chief who had defected from Gaddafi’s inner circle to the opposition, joining the “revolution” on Feb. 22, was shot dead in mysterious circumstances.

Rebel sources said that Younes had been recalled from the front line and placed under arrest to face questioning in Benghazi on suspicious that his family had contacts with the regime (even if there were also rumors that he was suspected of having held secret talks with Gaddafi’s government). However, he never made it to the meeting and his body and those of two of his officers were found on the outskirts of Benghazi: they had been shot and their bodies burnt.

Although, what really happened is still not clear, rebels have said that Gen. Younes was shot dead by militiamen allied in their war, raising questions about divisions and lawlessness within anti-Gaddafi ranks.

On the battlefield, fighting is still taking place close to the coastal town of Zlintan, in the Western Mountains, where rebels seized the town of Ghazaia . In the east, rebel forces fought loyalist in clashes against gunmen loyal to Gaddafi and agents who have infiltrated the rebel-held area.

Misratah is now enjoying relative security even if NATO has reported occasional shelling by pro-Gaddafi forces operating out of Tawurga, which is south of the town.

The shelling has focused on the port facilities and the airport, as well as the LISCO fuel storage facility.

The following Reuters map gives an idea of the fighting around Tripoli.

In the meanwhile, NATO air campaign continues with improving concerns of partner sides, some of which have already reduced, if not withdrawn, their contingents. For instance, the Charles De Gaulle and Garibaldi aircraft carriers returned home and, on Aug. 1, the RNoAF has in fact completed its mission. The problem is the sustainibility of an air campaign whose length is still unclear.

But we have always said that a military solution is not enough in Libya: there has to be a political solution to the crisis. Our military pressure is helping to set the conditions for a political solution. Meanwhile, the Qadhafi regime is increasingly isolated. The question is not if Qadhafi will have to step down, but when.

Since the beginning of the NATO operation (Mar. 31, 2011, 06.00GMT) a total of 17,443 sorties, including
6,590 strike sorties, have been conducted.

In the last few days, the air strike on three critical satellite dishes of the Libyan State TV made the news. According to NATO, the attack was aimed at reducing the regime’s ability to broadcast messages inciting attack on civilians. However, the Libyan State TV continued to broadcast and condemned the air strike saying that it caused three employees were killed and 15 were wounded.

Not only the Libyan TV has been attacked, but also the Tripoli airport’s radar that was used by Gaddafi forces to get early warning of allied air strikes.

We have entered the period of Ramadan and NATO has declared it will continue its air strike, as Colonel Roland Lavoie Operation, ‘’Unified Protector’’ military spokesperson, said.

NATO and partnering nations have a profound and sincere respect for Muslims and their faith. As we enter the holy month of Ramadan we are all reminded that we share a common respect for human life.

There’s never a wrong time to protect human life.

Other interesting information, things and thoughts:

1) As said, since Aug. 1, Norway has withdrawn its F-16s from Unified Protector. The decision has nothing to do with the Oslo and Utøya attacks, as it was taken on Jun. 10. RNoAF flew 596 missions with 6 F-16s deployed to Souda Bay.

2) Since Jul. 10, French Rafales were moved from Solenzara to Sigonella. Official explaination is that they are nearer to Libya, hence they can reduce transit time to the operative area. According to speculation the move was made to operate the French fighters next to the UAE contingent (flying from Sigonella with the F-16 and Mirage 2000), since UAE could be interested in the Rafale. Mirage 2000s deployed to Souda Bay returned home since they are no longer needed to enforce the NFZ (due to the lack of air threats).

3) The RAF has deployed 4 more Tornado GR4s to Gioia del Colle, bringing the total to 22 aiplanes: 16 Tornado GR4s and 6 Typhoons. The four additional “Tonkas” are mainly used for reconnaissance purposes using the Goodrich Raptor pod.

According to Air Vice Marshal Greg Bagwell, who spoke at the RIAT at RAF Fairford in mid July, the RAF contingent has performed 15% of all allied air strikes. However, he underlined that the 90% of RAF strike missions have been conducted against targets of opportunity, often located in urban areas, while other partners, like Italy and UAE have flown 100% of their attack sorties against pre-planned/fixed targets. Dealing with Italy, the decision to attack only fixed targets away from populated areas was taken at political level to prevent collateral damages.

4) After reporting many fuel diversions to Malta International Airport by the French fighters of all types (Rafale, Mirage 2000, Super Etendard, Mirage F1), during the last month, Luqa airfield was visited twice by RAF Tornados (one of which had to perform an emergency landing for a hydraulic failure) and once by a Danish F-16 on Jul. 29.

Many fighters are still enforcing the NFZ while E-3 AWACS are still patrolling the Libyan airspace so, unless common procedures are used and prior coordination is made to establish routes, control agencies, IFF squawks, etc, flying within the NFZ could be a risk for Free Libya Air Force fighters.

Since it is impossible to operate those flights without NATO’s approval, these photos explain the reason why the Mig-21s were flying over Benina on Jun. 27: a limited rebel flight activity must have been granted to the rebels (probably in the form of a transit corridor between Benina and Rhebat).

7) Misratah airport opened again on Jul. 19 with a humanitarian flight flown by an AN-26 with registration 5A-DOG.

At this link, you can find a video of the Antonov 26 landing at Misratah airfield. The above screenshot was taken from that video.

According to the official MoD press release, the AMXs belong to the 32° Stormo, based at Amendola. Since the same press release doesn’t mention the F-2000 Typhoons, most probably, these were replaced by the AMXs due to the total lack of air threats in the NFZ (as France did with its Mirages).

The Sole 24 ore financial newspaper published on Aug. 2 some previously unreleased figures about the Italian involvement in Unified Protector: with 1.700 sorties conducted to the date, Italy has flown the 10% of all the combat sorties in Libya, with an effort that is second only to UK and France.

9) With the AMX taking part to the air campaign, a new patch was designed by the air crews at Trapani, home of the Task Group Air, that includes all the ItAF assets assigned to Unified Protector. That’s actually a limited edition patch sold by the 18° Gruppo to raise funds for a Hospital in Africa. For more information, send an email to this address.

10) The Malta LiveATC.net feed was shut off towards the end of June. Officially, it was a computer problem, however, since the LMML airport was immediately removed from the list of airfields covered by the service, there are rumours that the local feeder was asked to cease “relaying” Malta ACC and TWR comms to the rest of the world using the web. OPSEC or INFOSEC concern?

With the air campaign in Libya in progress for more than 100 days, I think it’s better to give the blog’s reader an extremely quick recap of the main political and military updates (just to recall the latest developments that can be found on mainstream media) and then focus a bit more on the many “Other interesting things, information and thoughts” section of my Debriefs.

On Jun. 27, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant on suspicion of crimes against humanity for Libyan leader Gaddafi along with his closest aides: his son Saif al-Islam and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi. Libya dismissed the ICC warrant, rejecting the authority of the tribunal.

In the meanwhile, with the air support of NATO, rebels are continuing their advance towards Tripoli: their forces are now within 50 miles from the capital. They have recently seized some Libyan arms depots located 25 km south of Zenten and collected many weapons left on the field by the retreating Gaddafi’s troops. Actually, they have also been supplied with large amounts of rocket launchers, assault rifles, machine guns and anti-tank missiles, into the Jebel Nafusa region by France, Le Figaro newspaper reported on Jun. 28 (citing an undisclosed source). These “humanitarian drops” gave the anti-Government forces the impetus to push towards the capital and to protect undefended civilians that were threatened by loyalists. For sure such air drops could not be done without a prior coordination with NATO, required for planes deconfliction; however, as important as informing partners of such mission was a prior coordination with liaison officers on the ground (like those I talked about on my last report) who could ensure that the dropped “goods” did not go in the wrong hands.

Anyway, NATO and partners’ air and sea activities have contributed to bring some stabilization in certain parts of Libya as Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, Commander of the Operation Unified Protector, explained in Jun. 28 Press Briefing. Benghazi is now seeing signs of normalcy, while Brega and Ajdabiya continue to stabilize, even if “a significant size force in the Brega area” is still under the regime control.

Further to the west, in the Misratah area, the population has been able to move forward from the port while in the area between Zlitan and Dafiniyah the regime forces have placed around 300 civilians to shield themselves against any operations.

In the west, Nalut area is still under shelling by artillery pieces while fighting in the town of Yafran and Zlitan have stopped. “In Tripoli, the situation remains very tense. We have reports that the population has tried at some places to show some demonstrations against the regime. But these demonstrations have been very severely put down by a very repressive security force” Bouchard said.

Noteworthy, during the Press Briefing NATO showed reconnaissance imagery showing the words “TNX NATO” or “Thank you” written on a road next to a check point or on a roof top to be seen from above: a sign of appreciation for what NATO is doing in Libya from local population.

Dealing with figures of NATO air campaign, since the beginning of Unified Protector (Mar. 31, 08.00GMT) a total of 13.035 sorties, including 4.908 strike sorties, have been conducted.

Above: air strike sorties trend since Mar.31 (courtesy of @88simon88)

Few days earlier, on Jun.10, outgoing US Defense SecretaryRobert Gates had lashed out US European allies complaining that the poorly effective air campaign in Libya was pushing NATO towards “collective military irrelevance.”

US SECDEF condemned European nations for years of shrinking defense budgets that have forced the US to play, once again, a major role in the NATO operation. With frustration, he said:

“The mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country, yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.”

However “a NATO with reduced capabilities is still better than no NATO at all”, he said.

Under a political point of view, another interesting news is that Germany will supply bombs and other ordnance components to help NATO in Libya in spite of Berlin’s opposition not only to join air strikes but also to flying support missions (you’ll remember the decision to remove their crews from NATO AWACS operating in Libya). It looks like the decision came after a request from NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).

On Jun. 14 Tunisian AF F-5s & reconnaissance helicopters flew along the Tunisia-Libya bordar after Libyan troops fired rockets (thanks to @Marguer_D for the heads up). Tunisian planes had been reported flying along the border as “show of force” even on May 17, after pro-Gaddafi forces had fired shells to retake the border crossing near the small Tunisian town of Dehiba.

Other interesting information, things and thoughts:

1) On Jun. 19 NATO acknowledged that a missile had destroyed a civilian home in Tripoli, saying it may have killed civilians. Although NATO’s bombs had already hit rebels in the past months, it was the first such admission of collateral damages involving civilians in the three-month-long air campaign of airstrikes in Libya.

2) On Jun. 21, a US Navy unmanned helicopter MQ-8B Fire Scout, flying a reconnaissance mission over Libya, crashed at 07.20 AM LT. The only information disclosed by both NATO and USN is that the aircraft crashed on the coast so it is still unknown whether the UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) lost control or was attacked and from where it was being controlled (even if it must have been a US ship in the area). It would be extremely interesting to know if the drone suffered communication link loss like the example lost on Aug. 2, 2010 when the little remotely-piloted helo, departed from NAS Patuxent River, because of a software glitch flew towards Washington DC and entered restricted airspace before another ground control station was able to regain command of the UAS and directed it to Webster Field, MD.

We already knew that, along with armed US Predators, unarmed US Global Hawks were flying reconnaissance missions in Libya in support of Unified Protector and that these could be soon joined by recently acquired (unarmed) Italian Air Force Predator B (MQ-9 Reaper) based in Amendola, that Italy could use over Libya by mid July. Now we know that also smaller drones flying from ships have been conducting ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) missions.

3) On Jun. 10, the Dutch Government decided to extend the RNlAF contribution to the NATO operation in Libya until September 2011. The six F-16s deployed to Decimomannu airbase will not change their role and will not take part in air strikes.

However, in the same days, the Netherlands were asked to help replenish the RDAF stock because, having flown 346 sorties dropping 565 PGMs to date, Danish F-16s deployed to Sigonella have almost ran out of bombs.

On Jun 9, the Norwegian government decided to keep contributing to Unified Protector with a reduced contingent of 4 (instead of 6) F-16s until Aug. 1. On Jun. 14 Aksel Magdahl provided the following tally of the RNoAF effort in Libya: 198 missions, 445 sorties, 409 bombs dropped. An interesting 6 mins movie about Norwegian missions from Souda Bay can be found here: http://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/publisert/nyheter/Sider/Rundet–2000-flytimer.aspx

4) Canadian air sorties as of 2359Z Jun. 27: CF-188: 461; CC-150: 138; CC-130: 46; CP-140: 82. Dealing with the 2 CP-140s, an interesting article published on the Canada National Defense website, explains that the “Aurora”, originally designed for anti-submarine warfare is being used also in ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) missions.

Here’s an excerpt:

Throughout thosee early maritime surveillance missions, the Auroras showed their top-class form. Not only fast — they can do 400 knots, as fast as the CT-114 Tutor jets the Snowbirds fly — Auroras have plenty of stamina, staying aloft for up to 12 hours. They carry an array of sensors to gather and record the precise, reliable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data required to create a clear picture of the situation at ground level or at sea. With this unique combination of capabilities, the Auroras were a natural choice for inland ISR missions, and they now provide ISR data on Libya’s coastline, highways and command and control centres.

“This is a new role for us,” said Captain Stephanie Hale, the Air Combat Systems Officer and Operations Officer on Roto 0 of the Sigonella detachment. “The new mission suite systems, including electro-optic infrared and overland equipment, have changed what we’re able to provide, and changed where we’re able to work.”

For what concerns the CF-188s, on the Canadian Combat Camera website I’ve found a nice picture of a Hornet being washed (on Apr. 20) on arrival to Trapani from Iceland. Interestingly, it’s using the same “showers” used in the past by the 82° CSAR HH-3F of the ItAF based in Trapani as the picture below on the right (taken in 2008) shows.

According to what a senior Canadian official told AFP on condition of anonymity, the Canadian Air Force has decided to pull out of the NATO AWACS program to trim costs and eliminate budget deficit.

5) The recent Paris Air Show 2011, at Le Bourget, gave both Eurofighter and Dassault the opportunity to showcase their now combat-proven fighters, shortlisted for the Indian MMRCA tender. Hence, Typhoon and Rafale fought virtually with a series of press briefings and war stories aimed at showing aircraft advantages on competitor hiding its flaws.

The “omnirole” Rafale can claim to have been the first aircraft to enter to Libyan airspace on Mar. 19 (even though I’ve already explained this happened in the Benghazi area where the risk of SAM and AAA fire was low) thanks to the Spectra integrated defensive aids suite developed by Thales. For sure although it can’t be considered as multirole as to be capable to perform a typical SEAD strike as an F-16CJ or a Tornado ECR, the French plane has the possibility to combine its sensors (such as the Spectra) and the AASM (Armement Air-Sol Modulaire – Air-to-Ground Modular Weapon) PGM to identify, designate and hit ground targets. Furthermore, during Unified Protector, the AASM demonstrated to be effective against a tank at a range of 57 km.

The Rafale will also be the first European combat plane to use an electronic scanning radar; with “Tranche 4”, expected to be handed over from 2013, the 60 French upgraded Rafales will carry an AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) RBE2 radar (compatible with long range METEOR air-to-air missiles) whose beam can be pointed from one area to another one quickly, in all weather and in a jammed environment, and that can be used in air-to-air and air-to-ground modes at the same time, with an enhanced detection capability.

Image: French MoD

RAF 11 Sqn’s Squadron Leader Rupert Joel, just returned from Gioia del Colle, met the press at Le Bourget to talk about Typhoon’s sorties in Libya. He explained that Tornado GR4s are flying joint sorties with Eurofighter Typhoons as happened during Desert Storm, when Buccaneers accompanied Tornados in Iraq. Mixed pairs have been useful because “Tonka” navigators have assisted Typhoon pilots with laser targeting although GPS-guide has been preferred in many cases.

So, who’s gonna win in India? Difficult to say. Surely, Rafale is a more mature plane, capable of performing a wide variety of missions, from SEAD(-lite) to reconnaissance, and it is already available in navalised version for aircraft carrier ops. BTW for all Rafale news, info, configurations, etc, I suggest you to visit the Rafale News blog.

However, Eurofighter already has export customers that Rafale lacks, and it has an attractive user community that could give stronger strategic ties with 4 European nations. Furthermore, the Typhoon has a more powerful engine, a better BVR capability and is able to pull max G-load while launcing its weapons and carrying three external fuel tanks. It has also an extensive air-to-air missile load and can perform supersonic launching while supercruising with a large missile load. The Typhoon has a very lightweight operational bifocal Helmet Mounted Display, which in combination with the IRIS-T or ASRAAM High Off Boresight Missiles provides the F-2000 with superior dogfight capabilities. So, it’s a lethal weapon in the air-to-air scenario, and it has a potential still to be developed to become a real multirole. Finally, Eurofighter is working on a navalised Typhoon too….

6) Times Of Malta website has a video showing the last French emergency landing in Malta international airport in the night between Jun.30 and Jul. 1. It’s the second to involve Rafales. Although Times Of Malta says it is the first time, another Rafale diversion took place on Jun.8, 2011.

7) Again slightly off topic.

On Jun 22, Alenia Aeronautica, announced that it is evaluating the feasibility of an aircraft for the Italian Air Force to support National Special Forces Operations.

“The Italian Defence has decided to launch the so called Pretorian Programme, as a special version of the C-27J, in order to analyse potential technical solutions for providing weapons and integrated weapon systems, Communications Intelligence (COMINT), EO/IR Sensor (Electro optical/Infra-red) to the C-27J Aircraft, as existing platform”.

It would be interesting to know whether this aircraft is intended to replace or to support the only Italian G-222VS (currently used in Libya under NATO command).

8) More ItAF updates? Check its official website or the Italian MoD one once a week.

As reported in the previous Debriefs, although not being as intense as one might expect, NATO air campaign may be slowly paying off. Thanks also to the coalition’s air strikes (and to some modern equipment along with a better organization) the rebels have been able to establish a stable control over the east of the country and the mountain range southwest of Tripoli, as well as breaking the siege on Misratah, from where they are trying to advance west, towards Libya’s capital city.

Reuters reported that Gaddafi’s forces are still quite active in Zintan, another mountain town about 40 km (25 miles) west of Yafran, that was attacked with Grad rockets, and in the rebel-held town of Ajdabiyah in the east where pro-Gaddafi forces fired rockets.

Even if loyalists seem to resist, three months into the revolt against Gaddafi’s 41-year power, the regime could be close to collapse. His forces, suffering significant losses and reduced to just a fifth of their strength, can’t be supplied and the number of members of the armed forces who have defected or deserted increases each day. For instance, eight senior officers (including four generals) of Gaddafi’s military defected on May 30 (BTW: this is considered an Italian intelligence success). Shortage of food and fuel have had a significant impact on army and population’s morale.

Therefore, NATO has focused on Libyan leader’s stronghold in central Tripoli where allied aircraft have bombed the area around Gaddafi’s Bab al-Aziziya compound.

Map by @LibyaMap

According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen air strike have destroyed or damaged some 1.800 legitimate targets in Libya including around 100 Command and Control sites, 700 ammunition storage facilities and almost 500 tanks, APCs and rocket launchers. What is weird and gives an idea of the lack of strategy NATO has shown so far is that coalition planes, 80 days since the beginning of Odyssey Dawn (then Unified Protector) still has some fixed targets (like C2 sites, national intelligence centre, State TV antennas, and so on) to attack: as already said many times, these targets should be hit in the very early phases of any offensive air campaign.

Since NATO took over command of air strikes on March 31, its aircraft have conducted a total of 10.020 sorties, including 3,794 strike sorties. NATO mission was extended for another 90 days.

Here’s the trend of air strikes and key engagements (as reported by NATO), based on the graphs made by @88simon88

Other interesting things, information and thoughts:

1) I’ve often explained that “liaison officers” (or Special Forces) from some coalition partners were already operating on the ground in Libya. The following AJE video shows some of them supporting rebel forces. One of them can be seen at 00:04s the other one from 02.12s.

According to the Guardian, those with “boots on the ground” are SAS veterans and private security firm employees, there with the blessing of coalition partners which have supplied them with communication equipment, helping NATO identify Gaddafi targets in Misratah and pass them to attack helicopters. The targets are then verified by spy planes and US drones because “One piece of human intelligence is not enough” a source said to the British newspaper.

2) In the night between Jun. 3 and 4, the attack helos were ordered into action: the French heli group, comprosing (according to sources) 12 Gazelles, 2 Tigers and 4 Pumas operating from Tonnerre, 15 vehicles and 5 command and control targets located in the Brega area; two British Apaches launched from HMS Ocean (and flown by crews with a certain experience in Afghanistan) hit a radar site and an armed checkpoint. The attack choppers operated in the darkness because of the residual risk to come under fire from small arms, RPGs and MANPADS. Noteworthy, the Apaches returned safely to the Royal Navy warship after briefly coming under fire from AK47s.

The Express.co.uk website interviewed one of the AH-64 pilots involved in the first mission in anarticle that can be read here. Here’s an excerpt (I’ve underlined few interesting things):

The mission commander told how the two attack helicopters used cover of darkness early on Saturday to fly from HMS Ocean and destroy a radar installation, which had already survived a raid by Nato fast jets, and then eliminate an anti-­aircraft gun.

White flashes from the explosions 30 miles away were visible from the flight deck of the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean – the Royal Navy’s largest warship.

The pilot, who cannot be named for security reasons, ­destroyed the 3ft sq radar on top of a 100ft mast with just one ­laser-guided Hellfire missile.

The Apaches then raced off to observe a checkpoint manned by Gaddafi’s forces, where they came under small-arms fire.

When an anti-aircraft gun on the back of a big flatbed truck turned on the Apaches, one of them destroyed it with a couple of well-aimed bursts from his 30mm cannon, triggering a chain reaction of explosions so fierce the Apaches had to pull away.

[…]

Earlier that evening, HMS Ocean and the Royal Navy Task Group, maintaining radio ­silence and with lights dimmed, had closed to within sight of the ­Libyan shore, whose shimmering lights would help guide the helicopters to their targets.

[…]

The Apaches lifted off on a night so dark many other aircraft would not have been able to operate.

­Invisible against the night sky, they raced for 20 minutes across the Mediterranean towards Brega – now in Gaddafi’s hands.

Just a couple of hours after the raid, the pilot said: “Tonight was absolutely black but we used ­infra-red.

“The first target was a radar installation.

“It was a coastal defence radar which was monitoring shipping and aircraft. We are here to ­protect civilians and we need to stop things that are stopping us. It has been bombed before but it is difficult to drop a bomb on a target like this.

“But I can fly the helicopter from sea level to very high, I can get absolutely the right angle and I fired a laser-guided Hellfire ­missile – the time from pulling the trigger to impact was about 12 seconds – and got it first time.

“I also fired two Hellfire into the base of the radar site, which buckled the tower, and then two more into the buildings either side, while the other Apache fired another into the base.”

Ten minutes later they closed in on the checkpoint, ­before ­returning safely to HMS Ocean.

What’s interesting is that NATO aircraft were unable to destroy a simple, almost undefended, fixed target and helicopters had to be sent to destroy it. The ship had to get closer to the coast in order to reduce the transit time to the target area and to improve the helicopters endurance (I’ve already said that, unless they are based on the ground, attack choppers will be able to operate only in coastal areas).

Isn’t that unusual? Modern warplanes can fly at night and can (quite easily) destroy a fixed target located on the coast. Why using helicopters in a sort of SEAD strike? Only to claim an helicopters attack?

The following video shows French helos being prepared for a mission: the more modern Tiger are equipped with a 30mm gun and 68 mm rockets while the obsolete Gazelles carry 4 HOT missiles. Since those deployed are in the HAP version and can only carry guns or Mistral air-to-air missiles, the role of the French Tigers should be limited to the reconnaissance, fire support or escort, not including anti-tank duties.

3) The RAF has deployed the Enhanced Paveway III LGBs with BLU-109 warheads to Gioia del Colle airbase. The bunker-buster bomb is carried by the Tornado GR4s. However this kind of bomb is used also by the Italian Air Force, that has finally disclosed some more details about the armament used in Unified Protector.

According to the Aeronautica Militare (ItAF) official website, the type of weapons used by ItAF Tornados are:

GBU-16 PAVEWAY II – EGBU-16: the Italian Tornado IDSs, as shown in the released images, carry the CLDP pod and one GBU-16 with Mk-83 warhead (1.000 lbs). The Enhanced version uses a dual mode GPS/Laser (DMLGB) guidance.

According to the Sole 24 ore newspaper, the Italian contingent dropped +200 PGMs & missiles in Libya during the first month of bombing campaign. That is a significant amount of PGMs if compared to the British that have been performing air strikes since Day 1 of Odyssey Dawn, have passed 500 sorties, and released “only” 300+ precision-guided weapons. Since they have joined the air strikes in Libya on Apr. 28, summing up information released by the It MoD, Italians have flown 247 missions (something around 500 sorties), some of which are air defense ones with F-16s and Typhoons. Italian Navy totalled in 80 days 820 flying hours with the AV-8B+ Harrier and 536 flying hours with its helos.

5) The Italian AF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Giuseppe Bernardis, gave Defense News’ Tom Kington an extremely interesting interview covering also the current involvement of the Aeronautica Militare in Unified Protector. Here’s an excerpt (I’ve underlined some interesting things) but I suggest you reading it all since it provides some details about other air force programs:

[…] We are satisfied we can cover the roles we have been given, from transport, support and air defense to attack roles. We are covering almost the whole spectrum of missions, and the results are very good. Like almost everyone else, we lack munitions for moving targets. As such, we have a requirement for next-generation aircraft – meaning the Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] with suitable sensors – that will have the capability to use the Small Diameter Bomb Increment II or an equivalent to strike a moving target with precision.

[About Tornado IDS being used in Unified Protector] We are using our Ret. 6 upgrade aircraft, which have limited night-vision capability. The Tornado ECR [electronic combat and reconnaissance] aircraft have Link 16 ahead of the installation of Link 16 on all Tornados in the future. The IDS [interdictor/strike] aircraft are also flying reconnaissance missions with the Reccelite pod.The Italian AMX fighter bomber is, meanwhile, being used extensively in Afghanistan. […]

[About the multirole Typhoon] The Eurofighter is giving us good performance and reliability in support of attack forces, and this operation is the demonstration that we were right to hold back further developments and consolidate the aircraft’s air superiority capability. When this is consolidated, we can go forward. We think we should not skip areas of the development of the main role in favor of another role, leaving holes in the primary role. […] We are involved with another platform – the JSF – which we consider more dedicated and more capable of the secondary role without overspending.We are still discussing this [the e-scan radar]. I was one of the first to say e-scan radar is a must for Eurofighter, but you cannot ask me to scrap a state-of-the-art mechanically scanned radar that I am obliged to receive until 2016. You cannot ask me to throw away good equipment in order to receive better equipment […].

[About flying hours reduced by cuts and need for separate funding] We can do projections, but we don’t know how long this operation will last. For sure we will need something extra, but we don’t know if there will be extra spending freed up for the mission, or if there is, where it will come from. That is a political decision.

We were due to fly 90,000 hours this year. Right now, including Libyan flights, we have slightly exceeded the training flying hours we were due to have flown by this time of the year. And this is just combat flying, so other types of flying hours are being reduced. We are unlucky enough to be near an area of operations, but lucky since it cuts down on flying hours.

[About the danger of Libya becoming a marketing opportunity for aircraft] That is my concern. I was joking with someone that they had transferred Le Bourget to Libya. It is a cynical view, but we have seen evidence of that.

[…] My doubt is that sometimes the desire for high visibility can hamper the nature of the task.

We are built to mount operations – we are not built for demonstrations. Le Bourget should stay in Paris and Farnborough should stay in the U.K. One can start talking about being combat-proven at the end of the operation, but not during. An operation is a serious thing.

[About KC-767A problems] There is still a problem with the fuel hoses, notably those under the wings. To expand the flight envelope, we will need to take care of the stabilization of the hoses when they are extended from the drums. It is not a bad problem.

6) Another set of interesting pictures appeared on the hungarian blog I already mentioned in my last Debrief. Here you can see some close-ups on the weapons carried by some coalition aircraft operating from Trapani and Sigonella. Pictures clearly show that the Italian Typhoons, Canadian CF-188s and the UAE AF F-16 Block 60s carry the AIM-120C AMRAAM, while Danish and Turkish F-16s and Swedish Gripens carry the AIM-120B air-to-air missile.

Swedish AF (that has taken 82.500 pictures during Gripen reconnaissance sorties) is reportign ‘daily NFZ violations by helos & small planes for transport, bomb release and artillery targeting (thanks to @GripenNews for the heads up). That’s why many aircraft are still involved in the enforcement of the No-Fly Zone.

As I’ve already explained in the last Debrief, the Swedish Gripens are also flying air defense sorties with AIM-120s and Litening pod. According to the SwLM website the targeting pod gives the Gripen the ability to discern and identify slow-moving and low-flying air targets using the pod video cameras that can be useful for visual target acquisition at long distances. That must be the reason why also the Spanish EF-18s and Dutch F-16s are flying with the Litening targeting pod their DCA missions.

In the meanwhile Swedish could reduce to 4 their Gripens deployed to Sigonella and replace them with VBSS boarding team for the enforcement of the maritime arms embargo.

7) On May 28 and 31 once again French fighters were compelled to divert to Malta International Airport during their Unified Protector missions. Last episode involved two Mirage 2000s, one of those could not refuel because of a refueling probe failure. For some days I tried to understand why only French Mirage 2000s, Mirage F1s and Super Etendard were so frequently diverting to Luqa (for sure the fact that some are based at Solenzara, Corsica, that is quite far from Libya, doesn’t help). Then, I was told that on Jun. 3 also a Danish F-16 diverted to Malta.

Dealing with failures, I was told by @TheSNAFU via Twitter that in the early morning of Jun. 7, a US KC-10 using c/s “Shell 66” encountered a problem with engine No 2 and had to shut it down declaring an emergency. However, the aircraft did not divert but headed to its homebase, Moron, in Spain.

8) Many official and unofficial patches and sketches of new models were produced during Unified Protector or inspired by the Libyan operations. Here are some of the latest ones:

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