All the expenses of government being paid by the people,
it is the right of the people, not only, not to be taxed without
their own consent, or that of their representatives
freely chosen, but also to be actually consulted upon the
disposal of the money which they have brought into the [Volume 3, Page 378]
treasury; it is therefore stipulated that no money shall be
drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations,
previously made by law: and, that the people may
have an opportunity of judging not only of the propriety
of such appropriations, but of seeing whether their money
has been actually expended only, in pursuance of the
same; it is further provided, that a regular statement and
account of the receipts and expenditures of all public
money shall be published from time to time. These provisions
form a salutary check, not only upon the extravagance,
and profusion, in which the executive department
might otherwise indulge itself, and its adherents and dependents;
but also against any misappropriation, which a
rapacious, ambitious, or otherwise unfaithful executive
might be disposed to make. In those governments where
the people are taxed by the executive, no such check can
be interposed. The prince levies whatever sums he thinks
proper; disposes of them as he thinks proper; and would
deem it sedition against him and his government, if any
account were required of him, in what manner he had disposed
of any part of them. Such is the difference between
governments, where there is responsibility, and where
there is none.

Yet even this excellent regulation has an inconvenience
attending it, which was formerly hinted at. According to
the theory of the American constitutions, the judiciary
ought to be enabled to afford complete redress in all cases,
where a man may have a just claim for compensation for
any injury done him, or for any service which he may have
rendered another, in expectation of a just recompence.
According to the laws of Virginia, if a claim against the
commonwealth be disallowed or abated by the auditor of
public accounts, any person who may think himself aggrieved
thereby may petition the high court of chancery,
or the district court held at Richmond, according to the
nature of his case, for redress; and such court shall proceed
to do right thereon; and a like petition shall be allowed
in all other cases to any person who is entitled to
demand against the commonwealth any right in law or equity.
But although redress is thus intended to be afforded
in such cases, yet it seems to be held, that the treasurer
can not pay the money for which the claiment may have
obtained a judgment, or decree, until the general assembly
have passed a law making an appropriation, for that purpose,
if no law authorising such payment be previously
passed. But whatever doubt there may be upon the subject,
under the laws of the state, it seems to be altogether
without a question, that no claim against the United States
(by whatever authority it may be established,) can be paid,
but in consequence of a previous appropriation made by
law; unless, perhaps, it might be considered as falling
properly under the head of contingent charges against the
government. An interpretation which may be somewhat
strained, and which the executive department of the government,
to which the management of the fund appropriated
for contingent charges is committed, might be as little
disposed to admit, as congress might be to pass a law making
a specific appropriation.

Both the constitution and laws of the United States appear,
then, to be defective upon this subject; inasmuch, as
they neither provide in what manner a just claim against
the United States, which may happen to be disallowed by
the auditor and comptroller of the treasury, shall be judicially
examined; nor for the payment of any just claim
which might be judicially established, without submitting it
to the discretion of congress, whether they will make an
appropriation for that purpose. As the congress are supposed,
in all pecuniary cases, to have the same common
interest with their constituents, they can hardly be considered
in any other light than as parties, whenever a demand
is made against the public. They cannot then be
presumed to be altogether as impartial judges in such
cases, as those who are sworn to do equal right to all persons,
without distinction: and although the practice has
been to petition them for any disputed claim against the
United States, cases may arise where such a petition might
be highly improper, and yet the nature of the case be such,
as to entitle the party to obtain redress according to the
dictates of moral obligation. A judicial court is, according
to the true spirit of the constitution, the proper place in
which such a right should be enquired into, and from
which redress might be finally obtained: and that, without
impediment from any other department of the government.
This might be effected by an amendment, declaring,
that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in
consequence of appropriations made by law; or, of a judicial
sentence of a court of [the] United States.

Tucker, St. George. Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 5 vols. Philadelphia, 1803. Reprint. South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1969.