Easement: Express or by Prescription, but not Both

In a property dispute between the Ryans and the Rays, the chancellor interpreted ambiguous language in a deed to create an express, perpetual easement in favor of the Rays. She went on and found alternatively that the Rays had proven the elements of a prescriptive easement. The Ryans appealed, contending that the chancellor erred in both findings.

In Ryan v. Ray, decided August 21, 2018, the COA affirmed the judge’s ruling that the language of the deed created an express grant of an easement. The court reversed and rendered on the issue of the prescriptive easement.

Remember that a prescriptive easement is in essence an easement by adverse possession. In Threlkeld v. Sisk, 992. So. 2d 1232, 1237 (Miss. App. 2008), the court said that, “One claiming an easement by prescription must show that the use of the property was (1) open, notorious, and visible, (2) hostile, (3) under claim of ownership, (4) exclusive, (5) peaceful, and (6) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years. Biddix v. McConnell, 911 So.2d 468, 475(¶ 18) (Miss.2005) (citing Sharp v. White, 749 So.2d 41, 42(¶ 7) (Miss.1999)).” And, as in adverse possession, the claimant must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. West v. Brewer, 579 So.2d 1261, 1262 (Miss.1991)).

Judge Lee, writing for the court in Ryan v. Ray, explained how the Rays fell short:

¶17. Although the chancellor found that there was an express, perpetual easement over the Ryan property for ingress and egress to the Ray property, the chancellor made an alternative finding that in the absence of a perpetual easement, there was clear and convincing evidence to support an easement by prescription using the doctrine of tacking. The Ryans argue on appeal that the Rays failed to satisfy the elements necessary for a prescriptive easement. We agree.

¶18. In this case, there was an express easement granted, which the chancellor found was one for perpetual ingress and egress to the property at issue. We affirm that decision as it was supported by substantial credible evidence. Therefore, an alternative theory for establishing an easement is unnecessary. But moreover, the alternative ground is legally contradictory. An express easement and a prescriptive easement cannot co-exist. “The rule is well settled that use by express or implied permission or license, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into an easement by prescription.” King v. Gale, 166 So. 3d 589, 594 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). Thus, the chancellor’s finding of a prescriptive easement was legally erroneous, and we do not affirm on these grounds. The error does not require reversal however, as the chancellor’s disposition is affirmed on other proper grounds as set forth in this opinion.