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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000918
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018
TAGS: PRELEUNTUCRCY
SUBJECT: U.S. AND EU DISCUSS TURKEY, CROATIA AT COELA
TROIKA MEETING ON ENLARGEMENT
Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS Laurence D. Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. EUR/SE Director Kathleen Fitzpatrick and
USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers met with
counterparts from the Slovenian Presidency, incoming French
Presidency, Commission, and Council Secretariat to discuss EU
candidate countries Turkey and Croatia at a regularly
scheduled COELA troika meeting June 4, 2008. Fitzpatrick
held side meetings with EU officials, member state
representatives, and the Turkish Deputy Chief of Mission. On
Turkey, topics of discussion included accession negotiations,
domestic politics, PKK, Cyprus, NATO-EU relations, Turkey's
geopolitical role, and public diplomacy efforts. On Croatia,
EU officials described Croatia's solid progress in meeting
accession benchmarks, but noted that the country will have to
maintain a steady pace of still-needed reforms in order to be
on track to conclude negotiations in late 2009. The talks
also provided a glimpse into the upcoming French EU
presidency's intended course of action on Turkey and Croatia.
End Summary.
Turkish Accession Negotiations
------------------------------
¶2. (C) Ms. Alenka Jerak, the Slovenian MFA's Deputy Head of
the EU Department, opened the COELA meeting by stressing the
Slovenian Presidency's commitment to the EU enlargement
process. On Turkey, Jerak noted that only six accession
chapters total had been opened and one provisionally closed
thus far, with no new chapters yet opened under the Slovenian
presidency. However, Jerak expressed hope that the
presidency could open up two more chapters -- chapters six
and seven on company law and intellectual property law -- at
the EU accession conference June 17. (Note: the chapters
were opened, as planned, June 17.) Jerak noted that Turkey
had made concrete progress during the Slovenian presidency,
amending Article 301 and adopting the law on foundations and
the southeast development plan. On the flip side, Riccardo
Serri of the Commission's Directorate General for Enlargement
observed that Turkey's progress on reforms had slowed since
¶2005. He and several other EU interlocutors noted that the
real test for Turkey would be how it implemented the amended
Article 301.
¶3. (C) EUR/SE Director Fitzpatrick stressed the importance of
continuing the process of EU accession negotiations with
Turkey. She underscored that while the United States was not
a member of the EU, it is clear that the United States and
the EU share a broad strategic interest in having a
democratic Turkey fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic
structures, including the EU. The EU process itself gives
shape, substance, and direction to Turkey's reform efforts
and should continue. While Turkey is undergoing some
political challenges, such as the closure case, it has
weathered some difficult crises over the past year, and the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to form a new
government and elect a new President after receiving 47 per
cent of the vote. Turkey has strengthened its democracy over
the past several years; while this year efforts have slowed,
Turkey did amend Article 301 (though not perfect, this was a
positive development) and passed a new Foundations Law. The
United States continued to press Turkey to re-open the Halki
Seminary and recognize the Ecumenical Patriarch, in addition
to expressing full support for EU-related reforms.
Fitzpatrick urged a broad view of Turkey's progress and said
that the EU accession process move forward.
¶4. (C) Separately, Commission and Council Secretariat
contacts told EUR/SE Director Fitzpatrick they were concerned
that preoccupation with domestic political issues had put the
EU accession negotiation process on the back burner in the
minds of Turkish decision makers, with all of their energy
focused on domestic concerns. Additionally, contacts said
that while Turkey had good, competent people dealing with EU
matters, Foreign Minister Babacan was over-burdened with
other responsibilities. They noted that it would be helpful
for Babacan to appoint a deputy coordinator for EU
negotiations.
¶5. (C/NF) Commission and UK Perm Rep contacts told
Fitzpatrick in separate meetings that Cyprus was as
obstructionist as ever in the EU's enlargement working group,
with no improvement since the election of President
Christofias. They surmised that this was due to the fact the
BRUSSELS 00000918 002 OF 004
Cypriot MFA was a bastion of the DIKO party, which was taking
a hard line on negotiations. The result was that a total of
about 18 out of 35 Turkish accession chapters were
effectively "blocked" by either Cyprus or France. Commission
contacts said it would be useful for the USG to question
Greek Cypriot interlocutors on why they continued to take
such a tough line on Turkish accession negotiations in
Brussels in light of the improved atmosphere on the island.
AK Party Closure Case
---------------------
¶6. (C/NF) Serri said that the Commission was monitoring the
AKP closure case as it pertained to EU standards for human
rights and the rule of law. Separately and privately, other
Commission contacts told Fitzpatrick the Commission was still
"brainstorming" regarding how it would react to closure of
the AKP. They noted that the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) case law and the Venice Commission were the principle
references the EU would draw on in reacting to a closure.
¶7. (C/NF) UK Perm Rep contacts told Fitzpatrick they were in
the process of gauging member states' views on the closure
case to get a handle on how the EU might collectively respond
in the event AKP is closed. While hopeful no member states
would push for suspension of Turkish accession negotiations,
UK contacts conveyed concern that some member states might
push to "sanction" Turkey in some way. The ideal EU response
to a closure of the party, in the UK's view, would stress
that accession talks should continue, as these negotiations
were between the EU and Turkey, not between the EU and a
particular party.
The Fight Against PKK
---------------------
¶8. (C) Jerak said the EU had held its first troika with
Turkey on terrorism, and that the EU recognized Turkey's
difficult situation and right to defend itself against the
PKK terrorist threat. In a separate meeting, Commission
contacts noted that the apparent ability of the Turkish
civilian government to control the military's actions had
helped the EU to not "overreact" to Turkish military action
in Iraq. Fitzpatrick said that the United States, the EU,
Turkey and Iraq all agreed that the PKK is a terrorist
organization. President Bush had decided to support Turkey's
efforts against the PKK in Northern Iraq, and our efforts to
encourage cooperation between Turkey and the Iraqi government
and Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government - both
essential to combating the PKK - were bearing fruit. The USG
also encouraged Turkey to pursue a comprehensive approach
including outreach to the Turkish Kurdish population in the
southeast, by starting broadcasts in the Kurdish language and
other educational efforts. Jerak noted concerns that Turkish
attacks against the PKK could be destabilizing, and asked
whether they had achieved any significant results.
Fitzpatrick said that Turkish cross-border operations had
been limited in scope and duration and had successfully
focused on PKK targets, minimizing civilian casualties and
damage. The operations had helped disrupt PKK networks and
logistics. Fitzpatrick also encouraged EU members to take
steps to end PKK financing and propaganda efforts in Europe.
Cyprus
------
¶9. (C) On Cyprus, Fitzpatrick and Jerak agreed that the EU
should support the positive momentum resulting from recent
developments on the island, although the framework for
negotiations should fall under the UN. Fitzpatrick
underscored that we should not allow negative "static" that
inevitably surrounds these discussions to diminish positive
momentum, and that we should continue to support the efforts
of Talat and Christofias to move toward full-fledged
negotiations. She praised their March 21 and May 23
statements and the leadership the two have shown. Jerak
added that under the Slovenian presidency the EU had managed
to secure technical amendments to the green line regulations
in order to increase trade between the two communities. All
of Fitzpatrick's interlocutors in side meetings were hopeful
for progress in Cyprus and agreed that the recent meeting
between the two leaders on the island had been positive.
Commission interlocutors, however, expressed concern that the
BRUSSELS 00000918 003 OF 004
army and other "hard-liners" in Ankara remain quiet and said
that any messages the USG could pass Ankara to that end would
be helpful. Fitzpatrick assured them the USG was encouraging
all sides to be flexible and urged EU members to do the same.
Commission contacts added that Commissioner Rehn would
likely visit the island if full-fledged negotiations were
launched. They noted the Commissioner had previously
traveled to Cyprus with an EU presidency representative,
during the Luxembourg presidency. When questioned if the
incoming French presidency might accompany Rehn, contacts
said that was possible.
NATO-EU Relations
-----------------
¶10. (C/NF) Jerak emphasized that the EU not only welcomed,
but needed Turkey's participation in its European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions. Accordingly, she
stressed that a mutually acceptable solution to the obstacles
related to NATO-EU relations must be found. Fitzpatrick
stressed the importance of resolving these issues so that
essential planning could go forward in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and in any future NATO-EU operations. Separately, Commission
contacts told Fitzpatrick that the Commission was "sitting
on" the screening report for the Turkish accession chapter
that dealt with NATO-EU relations -- chapter 31 -- because
they were not getting encouraging signals from the Turks or
Cypriots that they would show flexibility on this issue
absent significant movement on the larger Cyprus problem.
USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers told
Commission interlocutors that Cypriot Perm Rep contacts had
indicated to him that with Malta now in PfP, Cyprus felt more
isolated. Wohlers suggested this might mean Cyprus would be
more flexible. Commission contacts replied that if momentum
on Cyprus negotiations increased, the French presidency might
try to build on that momentum to improve NATO-EU relations.
Turkey's Geopolitical Role
--------------------------
¶11. (C) In the COELA meeting, Fitzpatrick said that the
strategic role Turkey played throughout the world was useful
for the EU as well as the United States. She noted the
United States maintained strong relations with Turkey on a
wide range of issues, including Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle
East (noting Turkey's mediation effort between Syria and
Israel), the Balkans, Caucasus, and energy security. The USG
urged Turkey and Armenia to repair relations and open the
border, and noted recent expressions by Turkish and Armenian
leaders to this end. Jerak agreed with both points and
highlighted the value to the EU of Turkey's leadership,
including its mediation in talks between Israel and Syria,
its presence in Lebanon, and its active role at the Annapolis
Conference. Jerak added that Slovenia had played an advisory
role with regard to Turkey and Armenia, based on Slovenia's
experience with Italy, and noted the importance of easing
tensions between Turkey and Armenia for reasons of regional
stability as well as oil and gas resources. Fitzpatrick
noted that Slovenia's efforts demonstrated the value of the
EU's experience in reconciliation.
Turkish and EU Public Opinion
-----------------------------
¶12. (C) Wohlers asked the Commission what it was doing to
improve Turkish public opinion toward the EU and vice versa.
In response, Serri described the Commission's Civil Society
Dialogue with Turkey, noting the Commission had spent
approximately 20 million EUR in 2007 and would spend more in
2008, with a focus on cultural programs for Istanbul as the
European Capital of Culture in 2010. Serri explained that
the program was managed out of Commission DG Enlargement
together with Turkish authorities, but said that Turkey had
not done as much as it could with the program.
What to Expect from the French Presidency
-----------------------------------------
¶13. (C) French MFA Deputy Director for European Affairs Joel
Meyer told Fitzpatrick that the incoming French presidency
would work on the basis of the EU's December 2007 Council
Conclusions on Turkey. He stressed that France hoped to open
additional chapters during its presidency, but only chapters
that were compatible with "both visions for Turkey" - that of
accession and that of an alternative option, more in line
BRUSSELS 00000918 004 OF 004
with President Sarkozy's personal views. Meyer said France
agreed with the Slovenian presidency on the importance of
resolving the Cyprus problem and that France would like to
help both parties move toward resolution. He stressed that
France was waiting for the UN and the communities themselves
to move first, but that Paris stood ready to help and had
begun making contacts with all of the parties involved.
Again, Fitzpatrick stressed the importance for Turkey's
reform process of continuing the accession process under the
French Presidency, as Turkey's readiness for EU membership
will evolve over time.
Croatia's Accession Negotiations
--------------------------------
¶14. (C) In contrast to Turkey, Presidency and Commission
officials commented that Croatia has made significant
progress in its EU accession negotiations. EC enlargement
official Allan Jones explained that Croatia has opened 18 of
33 accession chapters, with two provisionally closed, adding
that the numbers do not necessarily reflect the amount of
work Croatia has done to meet the required benchmarks. He
expressed hope that Croatia will open a few more chapters by
the end of the year. French official Mathilde Grammont
added that the incoming presidency would do its best to help
Croatia make progress on opening and closing chapters. The
EU will continue to encourage Croatia to be a positive model
for its neighbors in the Balkans, according to the European
officials. In response to Wohlers' question about the timing
of Croatia's accession, Presidency and Commission officials
noted President Barroso's view that, pending continued
efforts by Croatia, negotiations could technically be closed
by the end of 2009. Accession would take at least an
additional year. Jones admitted that the schedule is
"extremely tight" for both sides.
¶15. (C) Despite Croatia's good progress, shortcomings remain
in key areas including judicial reform, public
administration, corruption, minority rights, refugee returns,
war crimes, cooperation with the ICTY, property restitution
and regional cooperation. Jones explained that in order to
move forward, Croatia will need to provide not only plans,
but also evidence of implementation of measures to
demonstrate commitment before new chapters can be opened.
Three specific chapters that will prove difficult for Croatia
relate to public procurement, competition policy (state aid
to shipbuilding) and political reform. Jones also noted the
need for Croatia to focus on meeting economic criteria
including improvements in the general business environment
and greater accountability for the 140 million Euros Croatia
receives each year in pre-accession funding.
¶16. (C) Wohlers emphasized U.S. support for Croatia's EU
accession and agreed with the EU's assessment that Croatia is
an important success story and model for the region. He also
noted Croatia's progress on NATO membership and U.S.
expectations for accession in 2009. He mentioned ICTY
concerns about Croatian cooperation on war crimes, and asked
for the EU's assessment on the Ademi-Norac trial. Jones
allowed that there were "hiccups" at the beginning of the
case, including technical difficulties protecting witness
identities, but said that the trial ran fairly well after
that. He added, however, that the Croatians had a big
incentive to run the case well, as this was the only case
transferred from ICTY, and they would be under international
scrutiny. He added that the EC will be watching Croatia's
cooperation on local cases where there will less
international attention and less pressure. These less
publicized cases will provide the real test for how Croatia
deals with witness protection, informants and the
confidentiality of proceedings.
¶17. (U) This cable has been cleared by EUR/SE Director
Kathleen Fitzpatrick.
MURRAY
.