First, the GIF approach explains the economic success of a very diverse group of countries: China (with 1.3 billion population), Japan (100 million); Taiwan-China (20 million); Korea (40 million); Singapore (5 million); or Mauritius (400.000). The framework has also been applied in large Western countries such as Germany, France, and United States, and small European countries like Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Ireland. The political systems of those economies are also very different, some are democratic and some are authoritarian.

I am therefore not too worried about the idea of choosing a federal sub-continent of 1 billion people, such as India, as a model for a centralized country of 39 million, such as Kenya. There are already successful examples in the services sector. The case of call centers is well known. After they mushroomed spontaneously in India in the 1980s, Kenyan firms discovered that they, too, had latent comparative advantages there. Kencall, a call center established by a private entrepreneur in Nairobi in the 2000s, imitated India’s call centers. Its entry/operation was made possible by subsidies from the government and World Bank support for the cost difference between satellite transmission and sea-cable transmission. The subsidies were eliminated after the sea-cable project was completed.

The major difference between a large economy and a small one is that the former can specialize in many tradable sectors while the later will only focus on a few tradable sectors. Therefore, when a small economy uses a large one as the model for its tradable sectors’ development, it must choose sectors to upgrade (or for the economy to diversify into), based on two criteria: path dependence (increasing returns based on past decisions), and market potential in the domestic and global markets.

High-tech sectors in India grew out of the legacy of the country’s capital-intensive heavy industries-oriented development strategy adopted in the 1950s. That strategy went against India’s comparative advantage. Nonetheless, it enabled India to establish some “advanced industries.” Like China and many socialist and non-socialist countries that pursued a similar strategy before the reform/transition in the 1980s, India’s economic performance under that strategy was poor. The annual GDP growth rate was 3.6% between 1950-1980, according to Angus Maddison’s estimates. Even if it chooses to emulate India, Kenya needs not to follow the wrong model in the choice of industries.

It was not surprising that India had to resort to restrictive labor regulations, which are endogenous to a development strategy is comparative advantage defying. I discussed this problem in my Marshall Lectures [Economic Development and Transition: Thought, Strategy, and Viability, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009], and a working paper “Development Strategy, Viability and Economic Distortions in Developing Countries”. While such regulations originated in misguided economic policy, they quickly became politically difficult to eliminate. A pragmatic way to deal with such types of distortions is to avoid “big-bang” changes and follow instead a gradual, dual-track approach, as done in Mauritius, China and other successful transition/reforming economies. such gradualism often entails continued government support to “nonviable” firms in priority sectors and, at the same time, liberalization of the entry of private enterprises, joint ventures, and foreign direct investment in labor-intensive sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage.

Shanta’s observation that once an industry has been identified, it may not be competitive because policies and regulations in many poor countries make certain prices immovable is inconsistent with the very premise of the GIF framework. The GIFF stresses the necessity of only identifying sectors that are consistent with the country’s (latent) comparative advantages, so that the government’s facilitation does not rely on distortions that impede competition. If a formal dual-track approach à la Mauritius is not politically feasible in South Africa, another possibility is to find other pragmatic ways to remove constraints and facilitate entry and growth of small or medium-sized owner-operated firms. Improving the infrastructure required for SMEs’ operations near shanty towns might be an example.

Comments

Justin Lin's research has actually turned on the heat on growth and development. His ideas on industrial policy and role of state in development have provided a great food for thought.
What amazes me how much economists move into two different extremes. One says state matters and the other says market matters. We all know it is the middle ground which works. People just point to failures of state (ignoring the successes) and point to the successes of the market (ignoring the failures and role of state in earlier development). Much of silicon valley is because of initial interest shown by government to develop earlier technologies.
Just like in a crisis, economists jump to show that the problem was not with respect to markets. It was the market participants who did not understand the risks etc. Same thing applies for government as well. The problem is with state of governance in a country and intent of polity. If it is corrupt, little can be done to improve state of affairs. Though, this does not mean we are talking about increase role of government in life/economic activity/budget deficits etc. What we are saying is that government can play a useful role in development.
Take the case of Bihar in India. A state known for its corruption and malaise is the talk of the town for its improved governance and high economic growth. It was simply because the new government laid out the rules for private sector to come in. Though not a example of industrial policy, it shows what the government can do if it wants to. Next step in Bihar could be better usage of industrial policy.
And there are so many such examples which Dani Rodrik keeps pointing out time to time on his blog/articles.