During 1995 Kuwait avoided acute new problems and made progress toward resolving some of its chronic difficulties. Others remained to trouble citizens and policy makers in the future. The October 1994 Iraqi military buildup provoked the U.S. and Great Britain to hold military exercises in Kuwait and urge the UN not to lift the sanctions it had imposed on Iraq. These rapid responses to Iraqi provocations eased Kuwaitis’ fears, but efforts by Russia and France to lift the UN sanctions highlighted Kuwait’s dependence on extraregional military intervention. Arms purchases from Western allies weakened Kuwait’s economy without enabling the country to defend itself. As the clock ran down on Kuwait’s military treaties with former coalition partners, its strategic vulnerability remained unchanged.

The domestic economy showed strength, but the lack of clear policies hampered growth. The drain on the treasury from arms purchases and the September compromise between the government and the National Assembly on the most recent plan to resolve the nation’s lingering debt crisis compounded the problem. The compromise received the endorsement of the crown prince, reputed to be among the largest debtors.

The construction industry and the stock market enjoyed minibooms. Privatization measures were greeted enthusiastically by Kuwaiti investors, although knowledgeable observers were concerned about the lack of planning and hints of insider trading. Oil industry recovery continued, with production averaging two million barrels per day. Repayment of Kuwait’s $5.5 billion foreign loan to finance postwar reconstruction proceeded on schedule.

Little progress was made on the resolution of structural deficits. The 1995-96 budget included no new taxes. A "defense tax" might have been feasible following the 1994 Iraqi scare, but no action was taken. Strategic insecurity and persistent polarization between the head of government and the national legislature foreshadowed continuing conflicts and an acrimonious election year in 1996.