EA-02-142 - Peach Bottom 2 & 3 (Exelon
Generation Co., LLC)

FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR GREEN AND WHITE
FINDINGS AND A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AT PEACH BOTTOM (NRC Inspection
Report 50-277/02-07; 50-278/02-07)

Dear Mr. Skolds:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results of
our significance determination for two findings identified during an inspection
completed on July 1, 2002. The findings involved emergency preparedness
activities at Peach Bottom. The inspection findings were assessed using
the significance determination process and were preliminarily characterized
as White, findings with low to moderate importance to safety, which may
require additional NRC inspections. The results of the inspection were
discussed with Mr. Jay Doering and other members of your staff at exit
meetings on June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002.

The first finding involved an inadequate critique of a February 14, 2002
emergency preparedness exercise. Specifically, the critique did not identify
that key information needed by the Emergency Director (ED) to classify
the simulated event as a General Emergency was not provided to the ED
by members of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The finding was
preliminarily classified as White because the critique failed to identify
a problem associated with the implementation of a risk significant planning
standard. The second finding involved an undue delay by the shift manager
in declaring an Alert on June 2, 2002, after carbon dioxide discharged
into an emergency diesel generator room. This finding was also preliminarily
classified as White because it involved a failure to implement a risk
significant planning standard. These preliminary White findings were also
associated with apparent violations of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E and 10
CFR 50.47.

In a letter dated July 19, 2002, the NRC transmitted the inspection report
and provided you an opportunity to either request a regulatory conference
to discuss these findings, or explain your position in a written response.
At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on August 23, 2002,
at the Region I Office in King of Prussia, PA. A copy of the handout you
provided at the conference has been entered in the NRC's document system
(ADAMS) and is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html,
accession number ML022680034. You also provided a written response dated
September 4, 2002.

During the conference and in your response, you did not agree with the
NRC's preliminary assessment of these issues as White. Regarding the first
finding (inadequate critique), you contend that, while the exercise critique
was inadequate in some respects, the risk significant planning standard
was met because the declaration of a General Emergency during the exercise
was timely and appropriate. We have carefully reviewed the information
you provided during the conference and in your response dated September
4, 2002. We have concluded that the critique problems were more than minor
but the issuance of a White finding is not appropriate because the inadequate
critique did not result in a failure to identify a risk significant planning
standard (RSPS) problem. The exercise was not adequately monitored and
consequently the critique did not identify all relevant weaknesses and
performance lapses. In that regard, the NRC continues to maintain, despite
the views you have provided on this specific point, that crew performance
lapses in communicating reactor water level information to the ED were
relevant to the ED's responsibilities in classifying the event. Specifically,
information that reactor water level had gone below the top of the fuel
should have been provided to shift management and the ED to be considered
in conjunction with contemporaneous changes in plant radiological conditions
that were being interpreted. Nonetheless, the NRC concludes that, even
without the reactor water level information, the ED made a proper classification
of General Emergency Conditions in an acceptable time frame. Hence, the
critique inadequacies did not involve failures to identify problems with
any RSPS and are properly classified as a Green issue.

The Green finding is also a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F.2.g.
However, because of its very low safety significance and because it was
entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating it as
a non-cited violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement
Policy. The NRC expects that you would incorporate into your review of
this matter, the NRC feedback, as described above. If you deny the non-cited
violation, you should provide a written response with the basis for the
denial, within 30 days of the date of this letter, to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001;
with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I, the Director,
Office of Enforcement, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Peach Bottom
facility.

With respect to the second issue (untimely declaration of an Alert, during
an actual event), your staff contended that the risk significant planning
standard was met because your emergency classification system was in use,
the proper classification was made, and the delay by the shift manager
in declaring the Alert had no impact, noting that the delay did not significantly
compromise Exelon's ability to notify State and local authorities and
meet related regulatory requirements. In addition, you noted that the
delay was captured as an unsuccessful opportunity by your drill and exercise
performance indicator. Therefore, you contend that this performance deficiency
should be a Green finding. You further argued that even if this issue
did involve a failure to meet a risk significant planning standard, the
finding should be downgraded because: (1) there was no impact on public
health and safety; (2) the carbon dioxide was confined to one emergency
diesel generator room; (3) safe plant operation was maintained throughout
the event; and (4) there was no increase in core damage frequency because
the event screened out of the mitigating system and fire protection significance
determination processes (SDPs). You also stated that the NRC's preliminary
assessment of this finding as White is inconsistent with previous similar
events at other facilities.

The NRC acknowledges that: (1) the delay by the shift manager in properly
classifying this event as an Alert had no impact on actions to protect
public health and safety; (2) the delay did not significantly compromise
your ability to notify State and local authorities and meet related regulatory
requirements once the declaration was made 31 minutes after the event;
(3) no regulatory requirement exists for Peach Bottom to classify within
15 minutes, and as such, we are not imposing a new or different interpretation
of regulatory requirements; and (4) the delay was captured as an unsuccessful
opportunity by your drill and exercise performance indicator. However,
the NRC concludes that your emergency classification system was not properly
used during the event. After completing safety actions, as appropriate,
(i.e., personnel accountability and ensuring safe plant conditions), the
shift manager did not carry out his responsibilities to review emergency
action levels, classify the event, and assume the duties of the ED. Rather,
for about 8 minutes, the shift manager was engaged in non-emergency response
related issues implementing an administrative procedure for calling your
corporate duty officer in order to inform licensee senior management of
plant conditions. This administrative procedure is not a part of the Emergency
Plan or its implementing procedures. Furthermore, the sequence of steps
in this administrative procedure requires entry into the Emergency Plan
and its implementing procedures for applicable events prior to such notifications.
Consequently, the event classification system was not properly in use
for a period of time, and the classification of the event was unnecessarily
delayed. It appears that a knowledge deficiency contributed to this problem,
in that personnel on shift were not sufficiently expert in the emergency
action levels (EALs) to quickly associate the event, a carbon dioxide
discharge to the diesel generator building, with the correct EAL Category
(toxic gas).

You also indicated at the conference that the shift manager's notification
to the corporate duty officer can be a means for mobilizing corporate
support. The NRC does not take issue with this contention. However, as
you stated at the conference, this method of amassing help should not
take precedence over response actions of your ERO, as required by NRC
regulations and your emergency plan.

With respect to your position that the core damage frequency did not
increase or that the event screened out of the mitigating system and fire
protection SDPs, that contention has no bearing on the emergency preparedness
SDP. Per the emergency preparedness SDP (during an actual event), significance
is based on the event classification level, and whether or not there was
a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard. During the
time period noted above, the shift manager exhibited a performance deficiency
that involved a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard
during an Alert condition. Such a finding is considered White in accordance
with IMC 0609, Appendix B, and has low to moderate importance to safety.

We also reviewed the five cases that you referenced in your letter dated
September 4, 2002, concerning late declarations at other facilities. None
of these examples were inconsistent with NRC policy or the emergency preparedness
SDP. For two of these cases, green non-cited violations were issued because
an Unusual Event was declared late in one case and not at all in the second
case, which is consistent with the emergency preparedness SDP. The third
case did not meet an Unusual Event EAL, and therefore, did not result
in a violation. In the fourth case, the fire lasted less than 10 minutes,
which did not necessitate declaration of an Alert. In the fifth case,
an Alert declaration was made within the time allotted by the EALs after
the licensee recognized that a fire could not be extinguished.

Accordingly, after careful consideration of the information provided
during the Regulatory Conference and in your response letter, the NRC
concludes, based on the above, that this inspection finding is appropriately
characterized as White, an issue with low to moderate importance to safety,
which may require additional NRC inspections. You have 10 business days
from the date of this letter to appeal the staff's determination of the
significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered
to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, Attachment 2. In addition, the White finding is associated
with a violation as cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation. While the
NRC agrees with your contention that your procedure does not specifically
require you to classify the event in 15 minutes, your procedures were
nonetheless violated as described in the enclosed Notice. In accordance
with the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, this Notice of Violation
is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with
a White finding.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice of Violation when preparing your response.
Because plant performance for this issue has been determined to be in
the regulatory response band, we will use the NRC Action Matrix to determine
the most appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you,
by separate correspondence, of that determination.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy
of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for
public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly
Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS
is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public NRC Library).

During an NRC inspection conducted between April 1, 2002 and July 1,
2002, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with
the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a licensee authorized
to operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect
emergency plans which meet the standards in Section 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)
requires, in part, that on-shift facility licensee responsibilities for
emergency response are unambiguously defined, and adequate staffing to
provide initial facility accident response is maintained at all times.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires, in part, that a standard emergency classification
and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee.

The Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Plan for Peach Bottom
sets forth, among other things, on-shift facility licensee responsibilities
for emergency response (in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)), and delineates
the standard emergency classification and action level scheme in use by
the licensee (in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)). Section 2.0 of this
Emergency Response Plan states, in part, that the classification system
provided in Emergency Response Procedure (ERP)-101, provides for implementation
of certain actions immediately applicable to a specific condition, and
indicates that the Emergency Director determines the emergency classification
and the actions to be taken.

Emergency Response Procedure (ERP)-101, "Classification of Emergencies,"
delineates licensee emergency response responsibilities in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), as well the emergency action level scheme in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Sections 1.0 and 2.0, require, in
part, that shift management recognize and classify an event or condition,
and assume the duties of Emergency Director who shall: (1) select categories
appropriate for station events or conditions; (2) review emergency action
levels for categories selected; and (3) classify the event based on selected
categories and most severe emergency action levels. Section 8.2.2.b specifies
that an ALERT emergency action level is met when there is report or detection
of: 1) toxic gases within Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1) in concentrations
that will be life threatening to plant personnel; OR 2) flammable gases
within Plant Vital Structures (Table 8-1) in concentrations affecting
the safe operation of the plant. Table 8-1 lists the Diesel Generator
Enclosure as a Plant Vital Structure.

Contrary to the above, on June 2, 2002, the standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was not properly used by the operations
crew. Specifically, at 12:31 a.m., a condition occurred that warranted
an ALERT declaration in accordance with ERP-101 when the fire suppression
system inadvertently discharged carbon dioxide, a life threatening gas,
into the No. 3 emergency diesel generator room, a plant vital structure.
After the shift manager completed actions to assure safe plant conditions
and personnel accountability, the shift manager did not then carry out
his responsibility to review emergency action levels, classify the event
and assume the duties of Emergency Director. In particular, between 12:39
a.m. and 12:47 a.m., the shift manager was engaged in non-emergency response
related activities implementing an administrative procedure for calling
the licensee's corporate duty officer in order to inform licensee senior
management of plant conditions. As a result, there was an undue delay
in properly classifying the event and the ALERT classification was not
made until 1:02 a.m.

This violation is associated with a WHITE significance determination
process finding.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Exelon is hereby required
to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy
to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident
Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice of Violation
(Notice), within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice.
This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation;
EA-02-142" and should include: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if
contested, the basis for disputing the violation or significance, (2) the
corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the
corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4)
the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference
or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately
addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received
within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information
may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended,
or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the
response time.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy
of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.

Because your response will be made available electronically for public
inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available
Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS), to the
extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary,
or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public
without redaction. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
(the Public NRC Library). If personal privacy or proprietary
information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please
provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information
that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes
such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have
withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding
(e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b)
to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable
response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice
within two working days.