Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF
NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the
good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?
(2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?
(3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is
stricken in consequence of sin.
(4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?
(5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
(6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For
man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good remains
unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes
remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents
are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore,
when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed
on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no
agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is
possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards
another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good
of his nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is
patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an
accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is
in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not
diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho
(Lk. 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts,
and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the Glossa
Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the
good of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are
the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that
flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly,
since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above
(Q[60], A[1]; Q[63], A[1]), this inclination to virtue is a good of
nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of
human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor
diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed
through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz.
the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because human
acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above (Q[50], A[1]).
Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two
contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be
diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact
that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which
is the inclination to virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of
nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone
may see who reads the context.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an
inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not
changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the
inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and
passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something is caused
or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the
production of habits (Q[51], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it
acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness
makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from
diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a
diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of
action. But as regards the inordinateness of the agent, we must say that
such like inordinateness is caused by the fact that in the acts of the
soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object
moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the
reason and will, as stated above (Q[77], AA[1], 2). The result of this is
the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject,
but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on
another and puts it out of order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be
destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human
nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if
the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be
continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be
entirely taken away.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are
uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies
with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since
therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the
whole can also be taken away by sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude
for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on account of
sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind
can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not
exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of
virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be
in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the good of nature, that is
diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is
befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it
is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is
to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact
that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of
sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed
entirely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished
by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example
of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely
destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a
finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it
will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite
length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the
subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same
quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a quantity be
halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on
thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less
than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question
at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature
less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the
aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two
others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends
to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently its
diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood,
secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished
by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above (A[1]). But
it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed
against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first
way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature
being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is diminished on the part of
the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident
that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed
indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin:
and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this
inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a
transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the
very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is
diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains
rooted in the nature of the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by
subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and
this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform:
nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term,
in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one
hand, and not on the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains,
else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to
act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus
even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his
nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet
this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of
reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably
reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence
are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin.
For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But
these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been
said above (Q[76], A[1]; Q[77], AA[3],5; Q[78], A[1]). Therefore they
should not be reckoned as effects of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no
place among the effects of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act
of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not be
reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be
reckoned a wound of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it has been stated (Q[77], A[3]) that to sin from
weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a
passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two
things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz.
ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which
four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that
one or the other reckoning is incomplete.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect
hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected
by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was
forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (Q[81],
A[2]); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute
of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue;
which destitution is called a wounding of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of
virtue, as stated above (Q[61], A[2]), viz. the reason, where prudence
resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of
fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in
so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the
wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of
good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is
deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and
in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the
delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human
nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination
to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of
actual sin, as was explained above (AA[1], 2), these four wounds are also
the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is
obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil,
good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be
the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more
easily inclined to sin again.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain
proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gn. 8:21: "Man's
senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and
thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth.'].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[82], A[3], ad 1), concupiscence is
natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far
as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a
weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the
reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to
fortitude which pertains to the irascible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of
Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers,
viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these
three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. "Error" and
"vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being
weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not
the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that "where
these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less
good; where they are not, there is no good at all." But sin does not
destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species
and order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the
"privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura
Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the
effect of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since
mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must
be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins.
Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body,
according to Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now
weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[5], A[5], mode, species and order
are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every
being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its form
from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether
substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some
measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms of
things are like numbers," so that a form has a certain "mode"
corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a
relation of "order" to something else.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order,
corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good
belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode,
species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There
is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode,
species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above (AA[1]
,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue
and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely
taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act
itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of
which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of
mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species
and order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as
explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the
result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these defects
are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas
original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is
equal in all, as stated above (Q[82], A[4]). Therefore death and suchlike
defects are not the result of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But
these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or
Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than
original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the body
by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin.
Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12), "By one man sin entered
into this world, and by sin death."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of
itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing is the
cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its
nature or form, the result being that the effect is directly intended by
the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the
intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the
cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the cause of another
if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys.
viii, text. 32, that "by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the
stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the
cause of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by
the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not
only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of
reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held
together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the
FP, Q[97], A[1]. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the
sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by
the disorder among the powers, as stated above (A[3]; Q[82], A[3]), so
also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment,
even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all
consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although
the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered
according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal,
produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, the
effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being
removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing a man employs equal
force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of
the stones resting on them will be equal; but that one will move with
greater velocity, which has the greater weight according to the property
of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is
removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the nature of the
human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural
temperaments, some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to
fewer, although original sin is equal in all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause
that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rm. 8:11): "He . .
. shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that
dwelleth in you": but each is done according to the order of Divine
wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of
all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before attaining to the
immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by
Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for
a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the
impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance
of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of the act,
actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through
eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which
is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we
may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore
actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether death and other defects are natural to man?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to
man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically"
(Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals
which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally
corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But such is
the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life
is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the vital
functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De
Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like defects are natural
to man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now
"God made not death" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural to man.
(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment
or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But death
and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above
(A[5]). Therefore they are not natural to man.
(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end.
Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5]
, AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was
proved in the FP, Q[75], A[6]. Therefore the human body is naturally
incorruptible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first,
in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular
nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and
self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every corruption and
defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since
this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which it
belongs.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 2/4
On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some
universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or
again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by
some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." This force intends the good and
the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and
corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect corruption and
defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the inclination of
the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards
the inclination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its
particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And
although every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form
of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the
rational soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to
matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation of its
own, as stated in the FP, Q[75], A[2]. Consequently as regards his form,
incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But
since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the
inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In
this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his
matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of his form.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 3/4
The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the
other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve
them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in
respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is
everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible,
considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form,
and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in
any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen
by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a smith in
order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can
be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in respect of this
condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be
breakable and inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of
iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he would do
without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not
adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the purpose of his art. In
like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of
its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable
as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers.
Whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter,
and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible
matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming
man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of original justice,
gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the FP, Q[97],
A[1]. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and
that death is the punishment of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[85] A[6] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?
(2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher
nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: hence the sun's
ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says
(Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a much higher
nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it
does not contract a stain from them by sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above (Q[74],
AA[1],2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text.
42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything
whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the
will stained by sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something
positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, it can only
be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be
caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit: for it happens
that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit;
for instance, in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality,
is so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the
stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it
a pure privation. Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and
privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain
caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. 47:22): "Thou hast
stained thy glory": and it is written (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present
it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each
case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect
of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a
comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, e.g.
a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed
to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul has a twofold
comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason,
whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the refulgence of
the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby man is also perfected
for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul
cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul: and
when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason
and of the Divine law, as shown above (Q[71], A[6]). Wherefore the loss
of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a
stain on the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own
power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, by
its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately,
against the light of reason and of the Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by the
intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the
intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them.
On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement towards
things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved.
Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves inordinately,
according to Osee 9:10: "They . . . became abominable as those things
were which they loved."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor
does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's
brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins
occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of
light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to
the diversity of the interposed bodies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after
the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul except
habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as
stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the stain does not remain in the
soul after the act of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body,
as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain when the
body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when
the act of sin is past.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the
stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no longer
there, neither is the stain in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jos. 22:17): "Is it a small thing to you
that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in
you [Vulg.: 'us'] to this day?"
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of
sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above (A[1]
), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its
withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And therefore
so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in
him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the Divine light and
to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin
ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine
law, man does not at once return to the state in which he was before, and
it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the
previous movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of
some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement
ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary
movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin,
except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something private,
viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent
body remains in the same position and relation as regards the
illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is
past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and so there
is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[86] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the
defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting.
Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed,
so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the
debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the
punishment due to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?
(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?
(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?
(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?
(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of
sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not seem to
be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related
to sin, for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the debt
of punishment is not an effect of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good,
since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin,
which is evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate
affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur a further
debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore
sin does not incur the debt of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 2:9): "Tribulation and anguish upon
every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin.
Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words
"tribulation and anguish."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that
whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment
therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary
supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason "hot
water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we
find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up
against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an order,
are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order.
Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that
order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act,
it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order:
wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which
repression is punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment
corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In
the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own
reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who governs
him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the
state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the universal
order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by
sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine
law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by
himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a
third, inflicted by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by
reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental to
the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of
punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God
or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, not
directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of
punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently
the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin
as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a further
punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the
purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to
the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. Therefore
sin is not the punishment of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq.
lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore
sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the
will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q[74], AA[1]
,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are
punishments of others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence,
as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such
can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its
essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that
it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially
something against the will, as stated in the FP, Q[48], A[5].
Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be
the punishment of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in
three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an
impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like
are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is
withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a
punishment, and is from God, as stated above (Q[79], A[3]), the result is
that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It
is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Rm. 1:24) when he says:
"Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their
passions; because, to wit, when men are deprived of the help of Divine
grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always
said to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the
substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an
interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior
act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in
order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: "We wearied
ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so
that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the
last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding
sin, but also with regard to itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into
sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for
the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin,
more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the amendment of
others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of
sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is evident that the
punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment, since the very fact
that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man
from sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the
same answer applies to the Third Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment.
For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality:
wherefore it is written (Is. 27:8): "In measure against measure, when it
shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore
it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But
no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, and
"what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states
(Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for
its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of men"
[Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal
punishment on man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is
accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore
it cannot be of infinite duration.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46): "These shall go into
everlasting punishment"; and (Mk. 3:29): "He that shall blaspheme against
the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an
everlasting sin."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), sin incurs a debt of punishment
through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause
remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the
debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is
sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which
destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved,
defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the
principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by
Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while
there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be
remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle
whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the
principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the
disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable,
although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the
principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity.
Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity,
considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity,
both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to
equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is
committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact
they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for
life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is not taken of the time
occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the
murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this punishment, in
its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now
according to Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned
against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A
man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards
continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the
very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin,
everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked
would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for
ever."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human
laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished,
but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not
for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at least they may
be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to Prov.
19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser."
Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate,
are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the
thought of those punishments, according to Ps. 59:6: "Thou hast given a
warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow,
that Thy beloved may be delivered."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but
He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to nature,
nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order,
and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the
punishment endures.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in
quantity. For it is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet
with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now
God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine
justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as
to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore
according to God's vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in
quantity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault,
according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the
measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against
God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the
greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a more grievous sin to
strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is
infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed
against God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in
quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore it is
infinite in quantity also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal
sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two
things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which
is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there
is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite,
both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement
of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be
infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from
something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also
is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But
in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding
punishment is the "pain of sense," which is also finite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner
to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible
with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated
above (A[3]). The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one
who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I . . .
have not charity, I am nothing."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers sin as turning away from something,
for it is thus that man sins against God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault,
not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for as long
as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment
corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is
irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it
incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the
thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur
punishment of infinite quantity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment.
Because punishment, as stated above (A[4]), is proportionate to the
fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal
punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from another,
since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore
some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above (A[4]),
it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore
Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment is
incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original
sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have died in
original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of
God, as shown by our Lord's words (Jn. 3:3): " Unless a man be born
again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Much more, therefore, will the
punishments of all other sins be everlasting.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being
united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its punishment to
each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to
a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of
sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment.
Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins
are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished
eternally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]), a sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order
of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that
order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is
disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the
last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, in so far
as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the
order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some
temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of
His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but
only temporal punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect
of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance of
the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their
turning away from something. Because some sins consist in turning away
from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to
the end: and the last end differs infinitely from the things that are
referred to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account
of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz. a
human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because
eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin,
but to its irremissibility, as stated above (A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin.
For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause
of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt
of punishment ceases also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a
virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is
removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But
a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. Therefore,
when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (2 Kgs. xii, 13,14): "David said to
Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The
Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless
because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme
. . . the child that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is
punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of
punishment remains, when the sin has been removed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and
the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the
act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes
man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of
Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of
penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so
that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too
indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers,
either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would
wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation
is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently
it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there
still remains the debt of punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident
that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul
being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that
it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as
stated above (Q[86], A[1]). Now man is united to God by his will.
Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will
accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his
own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear
patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways
punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory,
it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of
punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory
punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in
this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary.
Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain
respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the
involuntary (Q[6], A[6]). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of
sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed
of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains,
as stated above (Q[86], A[2]), so the debt of punishment also can remain.
But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not
remain in the same way, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he
may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands that he
should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as
regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the
other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the
sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the
contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in
order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given
to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified
by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
For it is written (Jn. 9:3,2) about the man born blind: "Neither hath
this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In
like manner we see that many children, those also who have been baptized,
suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession,
and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been
baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there is no more sin in
them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore
not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should
be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is
frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked
(Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be
scourged like other men"; and (Job 21:7): "[Why then do] the wicked live,
are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in
brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (Hab. 1:13): "Why lookest
Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and
holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'],
the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment
is inflicted for a sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pt. 2:22) that "He did no
sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said (1 Pt. 2:21)
that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted
by God for sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): "Who ever perished
innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen
those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and
Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is
inflicted for a sin."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As already stated (A[6]), punishment can be considered in
two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment
is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of
punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one
who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even
in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves.
If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being
something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished.
Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by
God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to
original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally,
the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself,
and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties
which result from this defect in human nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet
is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in
the FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good
is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods,
it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he
may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the
sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his
soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to
man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name
of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man
prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to
health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking, they
are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense:
because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal
medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the
punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of
innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so
that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original
sin as its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which
children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original
sin, as stated above (Q[85], A[5]); and they remain even after baptism,
for the cause stated above (Q[85], A[5], ad 2): and that they are not
equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to
itself, as stated above (Q[85], A[5], ad 1). Nevertheless, they are
directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those
who suffer, or of others who are admonished by their means---and also to
the glory of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they
are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief goods.
Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the
virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or evils, as suffices
for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does
not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The
very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their
spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6):
"Therefore pride hath held them fast."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for
our sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it
is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth
generation of them that hate Me"; and (Mt. 23:35): "That upon you may
come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now,
according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their
parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to
Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the
father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father's
wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of
outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they
imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their
own sins, but for those of their parents.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear
the iniquity of the father."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one
takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in so
far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above (A[7]). If, however,
we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is
penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because the sinful
act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is
medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another's
sin. For it has been stated (A[7]) that ills sustained in bodily goods or
even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the
health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have
such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either by God
or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their
masters, inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way,
however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this
penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one
punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in
the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom
the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it
is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's
sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it
patiently.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal,
because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good.
Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some
fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad
Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for
another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father's
property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying (Ezech.
18:4): "All souls are Mine."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to
temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the property of
their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be
referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood in reference
to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of
them that hate Me," and in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we
read: "Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers." The sins of the
fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are
the more prone to sin through being brought up amid their parents'
crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their
parents' example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they
deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their parents,
they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth
generation," because men are wont to live long enough to see the third
and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their
parents' sins so as to imitate them, and the parents can see their
children's punishments so as to grieve for them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for
another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or
medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are
punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[87] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather
than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment of
kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so
far as the child is the father's property, and because the examples and
the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving.
Consequently when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is
more eager to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their
punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to
deserve more severe punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] Out. Para. 1/2
OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)
In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the
debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider
venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider
venial sin in itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
(2) Whether they differ generically?
(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating
circumstance?
(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with
mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a word,
deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being
against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin
is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat or
drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever
sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God's glory.
Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it
seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as
enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i,
3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it:
because he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness,
which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to
enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," as Augustine again says
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin
'pervertere' means to overthrow, to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's
law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins,
sins mortally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns
away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and,
consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins
mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is
one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But a
crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided
with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if
taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken
metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we
speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh
with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be
taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply
opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But if mortal be
taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is
venial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (Q[71], A[1], ad
3; Q[72], A[5]; Q[74], A[9], ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison
with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an
irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated
above (Q[72], A[5]). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a
life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, as stated above
(Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be
repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as
stated above (Q[87], A[3]), because disorders in things referred to the
end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can
be repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of
order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a
higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore
such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand,
sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to
the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called
venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of
punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as
explained above (Q[87], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and
irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle,
but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of
the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided
with mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a
division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the
generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its
parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other
afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine
gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a
sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to
mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to
substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not
"against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law
forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts
"beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law
intends.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does
not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually refer
all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this
precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each time that one
fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer
oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes
only actual reference of the human act to God's glory, and not habitual
reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God
habitually. Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins
mortally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as
enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, by
referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in
contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein:
because what is referred to the end has not the character of finality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically
good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above (Q[18],
A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any
object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, either less than
God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin.
Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as stated above (A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin
is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired.
Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which,
according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins
committed through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore
mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from
sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins
differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1).
Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it was stated above (Q[74], A[3], ad 3; A[10]) that
sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial
sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins
are generically venial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal
sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon].
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial":
and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, a sin is called
venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally,
to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin contains
something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through weakness or
ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through
not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal,
but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to
speak now.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have
a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and
another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act
is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing
that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to his
last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently it is a
mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g.
blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of one's neighbor,
e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by
reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed
to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary
to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive
laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of
the agent, as stated above (Q[18], AA[4],6), it happens sometimes that a
sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal
on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein,
or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own
genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the commission of
adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a
sin generically mortal because venial, by reason of the act being
imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle
of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of
unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that is
contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of God,
and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it
belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary to
charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal
by reason of their genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers those sins which are venial from
their cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers those sins which are venial by
reason of the imperfection of the act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.
For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial and mortal sin
are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above (A[1]).
Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore
it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like dispositions
and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or
species, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore venial sin does not dispose to
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal
sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now
every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his
Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works that it may
destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is
absurd.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth small
things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems
to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little he is disposed to
fall away together into mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a
twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the
effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves
indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said
to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin
disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it disposes
to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does
not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal,
for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin
can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part
of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened
by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner
fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit,
as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be
that, by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin.
Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle
thereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin
generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial,
turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will
not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to
subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something
that is a mortal sin in its genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to
one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated above
(A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore
an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so can a venial
sin dispose to mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in
genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit in
different ways, as stated (AA[1],2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin;
but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas
a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For
Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth not the
Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest,"
i.e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them." Now a sin is called
mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a
venial sin can become mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of
reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as stated
above (Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable
disease, as stated above (A[1]). But a curable disease may become
incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a
disposition to mortal, as stated (A[3]). Therefore a venial sin can
become mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be
understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at
first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin,
like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an
act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be
continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it is not
possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial,
becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in
that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above
(A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins
constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many venial
sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the
venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that
of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the
punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while
venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated above (Q[87],
AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal
sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no
other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in
Matth.). It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the
remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments
may perhaps not be improportionate to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one
mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above (A[3]) with
regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin
disposes to mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins
making one mortal sin dispositively.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the
consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of the
reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding
disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo
change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be
taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect
thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected,
becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to
something differing generically, even as an accident which disposes to a
substantial form, into which it is never changed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal.
For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that
"if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they
become mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial
sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a
circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation,
if morose [*See Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not
morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a
circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin,
both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a good act
to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more,
therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be
venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an
accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity
of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q[72], A[5], ad 1;
Q[87], A[5], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10]
,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is
an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be
taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its
nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act.
This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another
genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the
deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another
man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which
forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly this
circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it
has been stated above (A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin consists
in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the
deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end.
Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin
to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only when it
transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the
specific difference of the moral act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to
another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something
accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species
through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something supervene
in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g.
disobedience, contempt, or the like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a
movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the angry
movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder
or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a
venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as
it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long
time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent of reason.
If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a
sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so
as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a
little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless
perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great
scandal or something of the kind.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of
its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere lust
of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to
God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue.
That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as
when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own
unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case
the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive
drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance no longer
avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to
drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin
returns to its specific nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those
matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the
delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of
the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because anger is
said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the
approval of the deliberating reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless
it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above (Q[18], A[5]
, ad 4).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial
sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a
venial sin can become mortal, as stated above (A[5]). Therefore also a
mortal sin can become venial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that
he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who sins
venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a
person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less than
God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a
mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits the sin of
fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to refrain from
that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the
love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal
sin can become venial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant
from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in
itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as
when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a mortal
sin become venial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal
sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal
punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the
genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can become
perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can
become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus
of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of
fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect, by
addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a
deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not
diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word;
rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by
reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not
completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a
deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said above
(A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate
reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason,
the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is
destroyed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even
as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not vice
versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as
the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits
fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or
venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance itself
is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so
far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby he can safeguard
himself in the love of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[88] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things
which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." Now
murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done.
But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge who sentences a
thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal,
are not murderers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] Out. Para. 1/1
OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay,"
"stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For
Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if venial sins
be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us
of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing
else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a
stain in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the
inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in venial
sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections.
Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a
temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (Q[86], A[1]). But,
in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through
inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the
gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to
mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of
comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal
matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of
similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one
resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the
other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul,
there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic,
the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a
hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because
it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other
virtues, as we shall show further on (SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad
2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes
something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the
nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore,
properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If,
however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is
in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that
results from acts of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins
lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would not sever
the soul from its heavenly spouse.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the
habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal
thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which
accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is
entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to
a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as
"wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are said (1
Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are
something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are
outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably
designated as wood, hay and stubble.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved
yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who commits a
venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in
mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are
unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who build
"gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and
good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But
those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit
venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that we have no
sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably
designated by these three.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees
of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds
up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he
will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal
punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (Q[87], A[5]).
Therefore these three signify venial sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith,
upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious
stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are
designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this
explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says (Gal.
5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom
of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he
who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire."
Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal
sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are
indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins:
as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good
thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his
possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that,
to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything
in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it
is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's
neighbor, wherefore they are designated by "gold," "silver," and
"precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate
themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated
by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house,
without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while
the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while
the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of
temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, and yet
he is saved for ever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual
foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they
are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (Ps. 136:1): "Upon
the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do
not destroy the edifice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and
stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" the
"foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have
esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted
and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with
venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built upon the
spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal
things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins,
and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore
they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in
them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain
longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the
fervor of charity in order to remove them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things
are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end."
Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to
"wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt up at
once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are
removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less
attached to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of
innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says:
"Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to
be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But
he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial
sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose
that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all there had
arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been
checked." Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat, which was
accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more
than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5)
that "man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, when
he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden
fruit." Again there seems to have been a certain movement of unbelief in
Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying
(Gn. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins.
Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the
original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally
notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could
also sin venially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal
was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him
of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's state.
Therefore he could not sin venially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a
venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be
understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin
which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had
committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that
aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless
there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow or the
like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is
venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the
excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to
mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to
commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of
the original state by sinning mortally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through
the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a
genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things
referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now each
of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the
lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising
of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being
perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of
reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of
reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a
higher good, as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be
out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the
end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the
end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest
place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the
appetite, as stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in
the state of innocence, as stated in the FP, Q[95], A[1], there was an
unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always
subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no
inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man were
not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is
evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial
sin, before committing a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same
sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily
forgiven.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first
mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the
outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the
desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she gave
way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept,
as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original
state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin cannot
do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with
any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could not
sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because
man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which is called
the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man
understands in common with the angels." But man can commit a venial sin
in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial
sin also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love
a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore
he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning
venially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins
generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like frivolities.
Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be
venial as stated above (A[3]), unless there is a special prohibition,
which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man
in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive
state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the FP, Q[58],
A[3]; FP, Q[79], A[8], is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from
principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do.
Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it
must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters of
appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], A[5]),
ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions.
Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, except as they
stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature,
they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the
same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is
a mortal sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in
subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are
acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand,
wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end
which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything
that they do of their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for
the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them (FP, Q[63],
A[4]; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or
intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God, without,
at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, or to some
inordinate end, for the reason given above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial,
that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal sin.
Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end
they have in view.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal
sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in
unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rm. 8:1) that "there
is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not
according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of
the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rm. 7). Therefore the reason
why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not
according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because
they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus.
Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the
first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are
not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the road of
damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation
is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the sting of
the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the
first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are mortal sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so
made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this liability
seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever
has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever, even
without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that "God is not a respecter
of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what
He does not impute to another. But he does not impute first movements to
believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to
unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of
unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is
evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not
be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (Q[79], A[4]). Now the
sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore
it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in
unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the sinner.
Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but,
on the contrary, increases it, as stated above (Q[73], A[10]). Therefore
a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much
more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness,
on account of their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I obtained the
mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief": whereas the
sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of
grace, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more, do you think, he
deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the
testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?"
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original
sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ,
although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that
believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the
condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the
Reply to the Second Objection is evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result
of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability
pertains, not to actual but to original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin
alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to
mortal sin, as stated above (Q[88], A[3]). Therefore in an unbeliever, in
whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin:
and so sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and
without mortal sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with
mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an unbeliever in
the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing
another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first
able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that time, it
can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because
this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for the child to
sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be.
Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's
limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on (SS,
Q[69], A[6]): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal
sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for
venial sin with no other than original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with
original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is
because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years
hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore,
much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which
is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is
not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the
first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate
about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by
means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does
not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is capable of
discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not
doing that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there
cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until afterwards all sin
shall have been remitted to him through grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary,
but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes to
fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone,
not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on account of
the lack of use of reason, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[89] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can
refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the
aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible.
For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think
of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since
the end is the first thing in the intention. Therefore this is the time
when man is bound by God's affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed
by saying (Zach. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] Out. Para. 1/3
TREATISE ON LAW (QQ 90-108)
OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the
extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations
we have spoken in the FP, Q[114]. But the extrinsic principle moving to
good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by
His Grace: wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the
second place, of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] Out. Para. 2/3
Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its
parts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our
consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The
effects of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
(2) Concerning the end of law;
(3) Its cause;
(4) The promulgation of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For
the Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my members," etc. But
nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not
make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit,
and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner,
neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the
intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Q[57]). Nor again is
it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason
ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing
pertaining to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright.
But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from
what has been said above (Q[9], A[1]). Therefore law pertains, not to the
reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i,
ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has
force of law."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it
belongs to reason to command, as stated above (Q[17], A[1]). Therefore
law is something pertaining to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced
to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from
"ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure
of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts,
as is evident from what has been stated above (Q[1], A[1], ad 3); since
it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first
principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys.
ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and
measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and
the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows
that law is something pertaining to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in
something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and
since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in
the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In
this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by
reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law, may be
called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus
the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the
members."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and
the work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so
in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to
understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard
to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly,
the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the
practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be
done, as stated above (Q[13], A[3]; Q[76], A[1]) and since as the
Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical
reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations,
as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to
conclusions. Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect
that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these
propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while
sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated
above (Q[17], A[1]): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end,
that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the
end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the
nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in
this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign
has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of
lawlessness rather than of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common
good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But
commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of
the law is not always the common good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions
are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is directed to
some particular good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on
reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason is the
foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of
that which is directed private good. Therefore the law is not only
directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an
individual.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for
no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the law belongs to that which is
a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as
reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is
something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to
this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the
first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the
practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is
bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3], A[1]).
Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to
happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as
imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect
community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to
universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition
of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he
says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are
adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body
politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i,
1.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of
the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that
thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat
in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a
share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the
common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must
needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the
common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A command denotes an application of a law to matters
regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the law
aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are
given even concerning particular matters.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but
those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a
common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the
common good is said to be the common end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative
reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable
principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason,
unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and
whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make
laws. For the Apostle says (Rm. 2:14) that "when the Gentiles, who have
not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . . . they are
a law to themselves." Now he says this of all in general. Therefore
anyone can make a law for himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the intention
of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man can lead another
to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so
every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a
state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can
make laws for his household.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of
the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with
the Commonalty."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the
order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good,
belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent
of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to
the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole
people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end
concerns him to whom the end belongs.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 1), a law is in a person not only
as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that is ruled.
In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares
the direction that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same
text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in their hearts."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue
efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken,
it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove
an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some
public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall
state further on (Q[92], A[2], ad 3; SS, Q[64], A[3]). Wherefore the
framing of laws belongs to him alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a
part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according to
Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end,
but is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one household is
ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community.
Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed make certain commands
or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether promulgation is essential to a law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For
the natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural law
needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be
promulgated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to
do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only
those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore
promulgation is not essential to a law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future,
since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the jurists say
(Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns
those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws
are established when they are promulgated."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), a law is imposed on others by way
of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied
to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that
a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be
applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made
by its being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is
necessary for the law to obtain its force.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be
gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the
common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God
instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are
bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified
to them by others, after it has been promulgated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[90] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future
time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it
is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that
"lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it is written."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is an eternal law?
(2) Whether there is a natural law?
(3) Whether there is a human law?
(4) Whether there is a Divine law?
(5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?
(6) Whether there is a law of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is an eternal law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is
imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law
could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is
eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could
not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be
promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to
an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is
eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is
the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable
and eternal."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; AA[3],4), a law is
nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler
who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the
world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the FP, Q[22],
AA[1],2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine
Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the
Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine
Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal,
according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be
called eternal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God,
inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Rm.
4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are."
Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of
an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of
things foreknown by Him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in
both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word
and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation
cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it
directs certain things to the end; but not passively---that is to say,
the law itself is not ordained to the end---except accidentally, in a
governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must
needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself,
and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is
not ordained to another end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is in us a natural law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is
governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all
things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound in
superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law
is natural to man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as
stated above (Q[90], A[2]). But the directing of human acts to their end
is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures,
which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts
for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law.
But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with
which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other
animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a
natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have not
the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as
follows: "Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural
law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what
is evil."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule
and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that
rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and
measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes
of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine
providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above
(A[1]); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal
law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive
their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among
all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the
most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by
being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share
of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper
act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational
creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps.
4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what
the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?"
in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O
Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason,
whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function
of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine
light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than
the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law were something
different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation
thereof, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which
is according to nature, as stated above (Q[10], A[1]): for every act of
reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act
of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite
in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts
to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the
Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the
rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational
manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational
creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to
reason, as stated above (Q[90], A[1]). Irrational creatures, however, do
not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no
participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a human law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law
is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (A[2]). Now
through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine
states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the
ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above
(Q[90], A[1]). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice
versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from
human reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph.
x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are
uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14: "The thoughts of mortal men are
fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from
human reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds
of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2), a law is a dictate
of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure
takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each
proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i,
6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from
naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the
various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature,
but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of
the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the
human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of
certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human
reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of
law be observed, as stated above (Q[90], AA[2],3,4). Wherefore Tully says
in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in
nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their
utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were
approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The human reason cannot have a full participation of the
dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and
imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a
natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of
certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single
truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part
of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal
law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the
particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however,
contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed
further to sanction them by law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the
principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of
all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the
rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from
nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The practical reason is concerned with practical matters,
which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with
which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot
have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of
sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring
and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there was any need for a Divine law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because,
as stated above (A[2]), the natural law is a participation in us of the
eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above (A[1]).
Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural
law, and human laws derived therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) that "God left man in the
hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated
above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore man was left to the direction of his
reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above
(A[3]). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a
Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational
creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the
natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the
rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Ps.
118:33): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary
for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for
four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to
perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were
ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural
faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of
the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is
derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness
which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above (Q[5],
A[5]), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human
law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 2/5
Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment,
especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form
different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary
laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt
what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man
to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is
certain that such a law cannot err.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 3/5
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is
competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior
movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and
yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct
himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not
sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this
purpose that a Divine law should supervene.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 4/5
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law
cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away
with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder
the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse.
In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and
unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all
sins are forbidden.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] Body Para. 5/5
And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said:
"The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin;
"converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but also
interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the
certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by
directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By the natural law the eternal law is participated
proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural
end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional
law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from
some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles
imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the
reasons given above: but there is need for certain additional principles,
namely, the precepts of the Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than
that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently the
comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is but one Divine law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where
there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of
mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. 46:8: "God is
the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver
intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the
same thing for all men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: "He will have all
men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore
there is but one Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law,
which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace
is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the
Divine law but one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being
translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law."
But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz. the
levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine
law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated in the FP, Q[30], A[3], distinction is the
cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as
those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g. a horse and
an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy
and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New.
Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25) compares the state of man under the Old
Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New
Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer under a pedagogue."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in
connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated above.
For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common
good as to its end, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). This good may be
twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was
directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very outset of the
law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans
(Ex. 3:8,17). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to
this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of
His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (Mt.
4:17): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence
Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal goods are
contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but
the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the
order of righteousness (A[4]): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old
Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Mt. 5:20: "Unless
your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you
shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the saying that "the
Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" ( Sentent.
iii, D, xl).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its
commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the New
Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ,
bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine
says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little
difference [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor'
and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel---fear
and love."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the father of a family issues different commands to the
children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one
kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another
more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a
greater capacity for Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than
through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: "There is no other name . . .
given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law that brings
all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But
before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ
was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto
salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain general
precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is
one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain
particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in
the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold,
as already explained.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For
Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But the "fomes"
of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the
"fomes" has not the nature of a law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it
are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, from not
following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his following
them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above
(Q[90], A[2]). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our
own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]; Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the law, as to
its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of
participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that every
inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the
law, is called a law by participation, as stated above (A[2]; Q[90], A[1]
, ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold
inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines
his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects to
different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a
mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that a
lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into
another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a
soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of
mercantile legislation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various
natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is
against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a
way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek
animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is
allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he
should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in
the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could
take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the
influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one
individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that,
after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse
of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did
not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like
to them."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the
"fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in so
far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct
inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather
is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence
of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of
its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it
is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper
dignity, has the nature of a law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an
incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as
stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine
law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to be
condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers law in the light of a rule or
measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law
become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but
by a kind of participation, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[91] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper
inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of
sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained
to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species
or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is
subject to reason. But it is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from
the order of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?
(2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and
to punish, as the Jurist states?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether an effect of law is to make men good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For
men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is
"that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God alone,
because He it is Who "works it in us without us," as we stated above
(Q[55], A[4]) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does
not make men good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the
very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. Therefore in
man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make
men good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above
(Q[90], A[2]). But some behave well in things regarding the community,
who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the
business of the law to make men good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects,
but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention
of every lawgiver is to make good citizens."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; AA[3],4), a law is
nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects
are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its
being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see
that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in
their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every
subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler," as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by those
who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect
of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue
is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect
of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in
some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on
true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine
justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good
simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which
is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in
opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply,
but in respect to that particular government. In this way good is found
even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good
robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Q[63], A[2]), viz.
acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action
contributes to both, but in different ways; for it causes the acquired
virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it
when it already exists. And since law is given for the purpose of
directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does
law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of
the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make men good by habituating
them to good works."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that
one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and
sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of
virtue, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with
the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is the part
that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is a part of
the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he be well
proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well consistent
unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the common good of
the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least
those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of
the community, that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey
the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2)
that "the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but
the virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a good man."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is
not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet
in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the
citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists in
its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at
being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not simply, but with
respect to that particular government.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as
consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and "punishment."
For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist states. But command
and precept are the same. Therefore the other three are superfluous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be
good, as stated above (A[1]). But counsel aims at a higher good than a
command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to
command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does
reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so also is
to reward.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as
stated above (A[1]). But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of
being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may be done
through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," as
Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore punishment is
not a proper effect of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits
something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids
something, as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage": or
punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting
something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now it
is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as,
in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain principles to
assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the
precept of the law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law
directs, as stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2; Q[91], A[4]). Again there are
three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above (Q[18], A[8]), some acts
are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the
act of the law is a precept or command, for "the law commands all acts of
virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil generically, viz. acts of vice,
and in respect of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically
indifferent, and in respect of these the law permits; and all acts that
are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called
indifferent. And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in
order to ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect of
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a
prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a
wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within
the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore
too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor. 7:12) says: "I
speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish
pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain
is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but
only to punish.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[92] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is
good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so
likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law, even by
punishing, leads men on to being good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2)
The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law,
which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the
"fomes," suffice what we have said when treating of original sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] Out. Para. 2/2
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(1) What is the eternal law?
(2) Whether it is known to all?
(3) Whether every law is derived from it?
(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?
(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?
(6) Whether all human things are subject to it?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type
existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many
types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
46) that God "made each thing according to its type." Therefore the
eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word,
as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name in God, as
stated in the FP, Q[34], A[1]: whereas type refers to the Essence.
Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above
our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is above our minds
is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of
truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the eternal law is
not the same as the sovereign type.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal
law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the
things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must
pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by
those who are subject to his government. And just as the type of the
things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the
products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his
subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be
present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God, by His wisdom, is
the Creator of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer
to the products of his art, as stated in the FP, Q[14], A[8]. Moreover He
governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single
creature, as was also stated in the FP, Q[103], A[5]. Wherefore as the
type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has
the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as
moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law.
Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine
Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types
which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently in
them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their
different relations to things, as stated in the FP, Q[15], A[2]. But law
is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as
stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And things, which are in themselves
different, may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to
one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type
of this order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be
considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the
word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and
expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to
the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by
the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So then in God
the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a
Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they
refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of God, are
expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And
among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is
expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal
name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship
between type and word.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same
relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the human
intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by
reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things,
since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the
reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since each
thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine intellect, as
was stated in the FP, Q[16], A[1]. Consequently the Divine intellect is
true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the eternal law is known to all?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because,
as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of God no man
knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing
in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law
is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But
all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not
know the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal
law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according to Ethic. i,
"any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is
not known to us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of
the eternal law is imprinted on us."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself;
secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found:
thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its
rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except
the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows
it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a
kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the
unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men
know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles
of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge
of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less
cognizant of the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in
themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to
Rm. 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according to his
own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it: for
it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not
follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows
also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as
when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job
12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that
eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher
alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by
judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In another way we
speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical
judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none
can judge of the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law.
For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above (Q[91], A[6]), which
is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since
thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," of which the Apostle says
(Rm. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore not
every law is derived from the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law,
because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is that,
according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly."
But some laws are unjust, according to Is. 10:1: "Woe to them that make
wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which
is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things which are
punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the
eternal law, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore not even every good law is
derived from the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign,
and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the
eternal law, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore all laws proceed from the
eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2), the law denotes a kind
of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers
ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be
derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does
not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we
observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government
is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the
plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to
his inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of
whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the
under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law
is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of
government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal
law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the
eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right
reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but
what man has drawn from the eternal law."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it
is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect it is
evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it
denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not
the nature of law, as stated above (Q[91], A[6]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of
right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from
the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called
an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence.
Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance
of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the
eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God, according to Rm. 13:1.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as
approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are
directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because
more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very
fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes
under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were
human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently it does
not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that
it is not on a perfect equality with it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to
the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the
Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to
(the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore
God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal.
Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the
King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28,24, "shall be subject
. . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the
Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the
eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many
necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for instance, the
stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore
even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and
consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order
to restrain them from evil, as explained above (Q[92], A[2]). Therefore
necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the eternal law is the type of
the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine
government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is not
subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal
law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by looking
around us. For those things are subject to human government, which can be
done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to
human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or
feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by God, whether it be
contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things
pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal
law, but are the eternal law itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the
will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it is
subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is
the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of God's will,
as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures; which things
are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are planned by Divine
Wisdom. In reference to these things God's will is said to be reasonable
[rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their
type [ratio].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of
God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to the
eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of
appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He is
said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in
respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary
things that are created.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some
necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive
from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is
in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained, is said
to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed
to.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the
eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above
(Q[90], A[4]). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational
creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore none
but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently
natural contingents are not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as
stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated
above (A[1]). Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in
any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not
subject to the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural
contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the eternal
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the sea
with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass
their limits."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the
eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to
rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law
directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of
someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own
actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things
subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things,
for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by
others, as stated above (Q[1], A[2]). Consequently man cannot impose laws
on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can
impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his
command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule
which is a principle of action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward
principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints on
the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this
way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps. 148:6:
"He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions
and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law.
Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through
being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are,
through understanding the Divine commandment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to natural
things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being
promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient
to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by obeying
it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than
human reason does. And as the members of the human body are moved at the
command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no
apprehension subordinate to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved
by God, without, on that account, being rational.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are
outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order of
universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose
providence nothing can escape, as stated in the FP, Q[22], A[2]. And
since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above
(A[1]), hence the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the
eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by the
spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the sons of
God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to Rm. 8:14:
"Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God."
Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.:
'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the
law of God." But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh
dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is
the law of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law
is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of
blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are
already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not under
the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades
the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of
the universe is administered."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the
eternal law, as explained above (A[5]): first, by partaking of the
eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion,
i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive
principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to
the eternal law, as stated above (A[5]). But since the rational nature,
together with that which it has in common with all creatures, has
something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently it is
subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational
creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (A[2]),
it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the
eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue"
(Ethic. ii, 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in
the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is
corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good
is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are
found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of
good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again,
besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added motive of
grace and virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as
always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the
eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but this
imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in
so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them,
according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. Hence Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the righteous act according to
the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of
the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts
of His creation with most suitable laws."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways.
First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being pinned
down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage
a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains from evil deeds,
through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of
virtue." In this way the spiritual man is not under the law, because he
fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is poured into his heart
by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the
works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy
Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under
the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (A[4], ad 2); it follows
that such works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under
the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of
God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to the
Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion;
since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of Divine
justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate
so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and consequently there
remains in man the inclination to act in accordance with the eternal law.
For we have seen above (Q[85], A[2]) that sin does not destroy entirely
the good of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[93] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end
by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in
the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We
therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that some
deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that
some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy state.
Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the natural law?
(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?
(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?
(5) Whether it is changeable?
(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the natural law is a habit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the soul:
power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's
powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going through
them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the
conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which can only apply
to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was shown in the
FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown
further on (A[6]). But man's reason, which the law regards, does not
always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an
act, but a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is
that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not the
natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by
it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First,
properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it
has been stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law is
something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason.
Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for
he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is
that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a
habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly,
since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason
actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this
way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters,
the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold
those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of
virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, he
mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz.
powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the soul
besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that
wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its own natural
properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it
is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the
first principles of human actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held
habitually; and this is granted.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a
man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on account
of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the
habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a
child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural
law, which is in him habitually.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several
precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above
(Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law,
it would follow that there are also many natural laws.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human
nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is manifold.
Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on
account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by reason
of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even
things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to
the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above
(Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one
precept of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in
relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of
demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles.
Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the
natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of
demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are
self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two
ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is
said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the
notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of
the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For
instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very
nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and
yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not
self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain
axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are
those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is
greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal
to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise,
who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one
who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an
angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the
unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension,
is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a
man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the
same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is
based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all
others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is
the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is
the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical
reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end
under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical
reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that
which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law,
that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever
the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs
to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a
contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural
inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and
consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and
objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in
man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the
nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every
substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its
nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in
common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those
things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to
all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse,
education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an
inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature
is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth
about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains
to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun
ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other
such things regarding the above inclination.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the character
of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human
nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they
are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one
first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law
are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things
regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained
under the law of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the
natural law. Because, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]) it is essential to a
law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are
ordained to the private good of the individual, as is evident especially
in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are
the subject of natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore
all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow
that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special
sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are common
to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing is
virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue
are prescribed by the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are
natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under
the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in
their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as
virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has
been stated (A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to which a
man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined
naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form:
thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is
the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to
act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue.
Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the
natural law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act
virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves,
i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed
by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature
does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have
been found by men to be conducive to well-living.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food,
drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural common
good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to
man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also
against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may
mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in this
sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary
to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual
lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing
to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous for
some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious
for others, as being out of proportion to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it
is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is that which
is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all
men; because, as it is written (Rm. 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel."
Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be
just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book that
nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard
to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs
everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now
different men are naturally inclined to different things; some to the
desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to
other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common
to all nations."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs
those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is
proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process
of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The
speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from
the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly
with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its
proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth
without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with
contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and
consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the
more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter
defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all
men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is
not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the
principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action,
truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of
detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the
same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether
of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for
all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the
speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally
known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle
are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all.
But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the
truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it
equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according
to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion,
that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now
this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular
case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore
goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of
fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail
the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were
to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a
guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of
conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle
may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles,
is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to
certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those
general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both
as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may
fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as
natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on
account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason
is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature;
thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural
law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates
(De Bello Gall. vi).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is
contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since
they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs
to the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after
saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the
Gospel," adds at once, by way of example, "by which everyone is commanded
to do to others as he would be done by."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things
that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions
drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing
in a few.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so
all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be
directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all
men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the natural law can be changed?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on
Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss
says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct
the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore
the natural law can be changed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are
against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when
God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and when he
ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Ex.
12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of
fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be changed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of all
things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But
these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems
that the natural law is subject to change.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law
dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary
according to time, but remains unchangeable."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two
ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the
natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of
human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the
Divine law and by human laws.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of
subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law,
ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether
unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles,
which, as we have said (A[4]), are certain detailed proximate conclusions
drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that
what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in
some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes
hindering the observance of such precepts, as stated above (A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The written law is said to be given for the correction of
the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the
natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of
some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good
which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of
nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on account
of original sin, according to 1 Kgs. 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh
alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on
any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever. In like
manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to
him by the law emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any
woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The
same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For
whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is
not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that
theft consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is
commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done
by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in the FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways.
First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm
to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus
we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because
nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense,
"the possession of all things in common and universal freedom" are said
to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions
and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason
for the benefit of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not
changed in this respect, except by addition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the
heart of man. Because on Rm. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not the
law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin had
blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace."
But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the law of
nature can be blotted out.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of
nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more therefore
can the law of nature be blotted out.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many
things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of nature.
Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in
the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which
is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law
cannot be blotted out.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[4],5), there belong to the natural
law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and
secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it
were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those
general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be
blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a
particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the
general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of
concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q[77], A[2]). But
as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be
blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in
speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or
by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even
unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Rm. i), were not esteemed sinful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not
universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the
natural law, in the way stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature
is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[94] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the
natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain
enactments which are unjust.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] Out. Para. 1/1
OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself;
(2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Its utility.
(2) Its origin.
(3) Its quality.
(4) Its division.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by
men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby,
as stated above (Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be induced to be good
willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of
laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have
recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is better
than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have
been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision
of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions,
as is evident from what has been stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2). But since
human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter
pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into
sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of
them. Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed
by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there
was no need of human laws.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in
fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might
be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of
punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these things
are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws
should be made.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[1]; Q[94], A[3]), man has a
natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be
acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that
man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and
clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason
and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have,
to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is
difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this
training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing
man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and
especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently
a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at
the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined
to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or
rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by
admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice,
and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be
restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they
might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they
themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do
willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now
this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the
discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and
virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher
says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect
in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and
righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to
do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by
being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed
are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that
all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": and
this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise
men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be
necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those
who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas
judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises:
and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances
into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly,
because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas
those who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are
affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their
judgment is perverted.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man,
and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever
possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters
to be left to the decision of men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law
"have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher says in
the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened
or not happened," and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the
natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just
is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things
which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference.
Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated
by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those
things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the
natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Q[94], A[4]).
Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the
natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is
equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from the
natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is
clearly false.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are
derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the reason
for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says
[*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore
not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence
for the laws."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not
just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on
the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be
just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first
rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been
stated above (Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human law has just
so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature.
But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer
a law but a perversion of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law
in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of
determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman
needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape.
Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the
natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one must not kill" may be
derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no
man": while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the
law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he
be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But
those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human
law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the
natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way,
have no other force than that of human law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are
by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument avails for those things that are derived from
the natural law, by way of conclusions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied
to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human
affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various
people.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring
to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural
law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is
based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what
is the best thing to decide.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we
ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions
of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their
demonstrations."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is
appropriate?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of
positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall
be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the
country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly
expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for
no private benefit, but for the common good." Because he had previously
expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying that "law is
anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful
to discipline, and further the common weal." Therefore it was needless to
add any further conditions to these.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic.
vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add "just."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to
Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the
definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be
necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is
necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human
law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may be
necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness.
Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and "useful."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be
determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as
to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that
is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and
measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is
both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz.
the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above (A[2]; Q[93], A[3]
). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states
[*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore
Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three
conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is
proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to discipline,"
inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and that it "further
the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of
mankind.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three.
For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes
on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the
customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on
the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly, it
depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be adapted
to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the
ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on children as
adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live
alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on
certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted to place and
time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law
should further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to the removal
of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of
expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law
itself. And since, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]), law is ordained to the
common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or
human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes the "law of
nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations use it."
But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all nations."
Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law,
but rather under natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not
formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the commonalty,
senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all
have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except materially. But
art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to
infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not appropriate.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and
soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems that, as
this division includes "military law," and "public law," referring to
priests and magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertaining
to other offices of the state.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over.
But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man.
Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of
lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" law, another the
"Falcidian" law, etc.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 1/6
I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something
contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or
irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is
divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or
irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are
entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law,
many things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be
divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the
notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained
above (A[2]). In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of
nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in which something
may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above (A[2]). Because,
to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law
of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings,
and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of
the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved
in Polit. i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of nature
by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according as
each state decides on what is best for itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 2/6
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the
common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided
according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the
common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by
governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people.
Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 3/6
Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one
who governs the community of the state, as shown above (Q[90], A[3]). In
this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms
of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10)
one is "monarchy," i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we
have "Royal Ordinances." Another form is "aristocracy," i.e. government
by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the
"Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa Prudentum] and "Decrees of the
Senate" [Senatus consulta]. Another form is "oligarchy," i.e. government
by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have "Praetorian," also
called "Honorary," law. Another form of government is that of the people,
which is called "democracy," and there we have "Decrees of the
commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also tyrannical government, which is
altogether corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally,
there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the
best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the "Lords and
Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 4/6
Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions.
In this respect, according to the various matters of which the law
treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after
their authors: thus we have the "Lex Julia" about adultery, the "Lex
Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way,
not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to which
they refer.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 5/6
Reply OBJ 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man,
in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from the
natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its
premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless it is
distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural
law which is common to all animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[95] A[4] Body Para. 6/6
The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?
(2) Whether human law should repress all vices?
(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?
(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?
(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?
(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the
law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the
individual?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for the
community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of
legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of
decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed
about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the
community, but also for the individual.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above
(Q[90], AA[1],2). But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore
human laws should be framed, not for the community, but rather for the
individual.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated above
(Q[90], AA[1],2). But a measure should be most certain, as stated in
Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no general proposition can be so
certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws
should be framed not in general but for individual cases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii,
art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the majority
of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly
happen in an individual case."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that
end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit,
but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence human laws should be
proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many
things. Wherefore law should take account of many things, as to persons,
as to matters, and as to times. Because the community of the state is
composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor
is it established to endure for only a short time, but to last for all
time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just, i.e.
positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down simply in a
general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he says that "the
legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference, but which,
when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing of the ransom of a captive.
Some things affect the community in one respect, and individuals in
another. These are called "privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were,
because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many
matters; and in regard to these, he adds, "and further, all particular
acts of legislation." Other matters are legal, not through being laws,
but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such
are decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he adds
"all matters subject to decrees."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to many;
wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things
belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in
that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as there are
things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use
consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law would be of no
use, if it did not extend further than to one single act. Because the
decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are
made for the purpose of directing individual actions; whereas law is a
general precept, as stated above (Q[92], A[2], OBJ[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all
things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as
natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as
being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and less
frequently it fail.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices.
For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order that, in
fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it would not be
held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law.
Therefore human laws should repress all evils.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens
virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from all kinds
of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated
above (Q[95], A[2]). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature.
Therefore human law should repress all vices.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the
law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits
these things, and that Divine providence punishes them." But Divine
providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly allows
some vices, by not repressing them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2), law is framed as a rule
or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous with that
which it measures, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different
things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men
should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to nature, and
according to the customs of the country." Now possibility or faculty of
action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing
is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to
one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child as to a full-grown
man: for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults,
since many things are permitted to children, which in an adult are
punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner many
things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue, which would be
intolerable in a virtuous man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all
vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices,
from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those
that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human
society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft
and such like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others.
Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor is
injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not
suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of
imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that
they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being
unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils:
thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): "He that violently bloweth his nose,
bringeth out blood"; and (Mt. 9:17) that if "new wine," i.e. precepts of
a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," i.e. into imperfect men, "the
bottles break, and the wine runneth out," i.e. the precepts are
despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal
law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine says
(De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the government of
states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished by
Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is
this a reason why it should be blamed for what it does." Wherefore, too,
human law does not prohibit everything that is forbidden by the natural
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the
virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But human law
does not prohibit all vices, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore neither
does it prescribe all acts of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the
end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under a
precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above
(Q[90], A[2]). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common
good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not prescribe all acts
of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law
"prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the acts
of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in like
manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the former,
forbidding the latter."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their
objects, as explained above (Q[54], A[2]; Q[60], A[1]; Q[62], A[2]). Now
all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of
an individual, or to the common good of the multitude: thus matters of
fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for
upholding the rights of a friend, and in like manner with the other
virtues. But law, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]) is ordained to the common
good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the
law. Nevertheless human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of
every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the
common good---either immediately, as when certain things are done
directly for the common good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver
prescribes certain things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens
are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the
obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of
virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes
some acts of each virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First,
from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act of justice
is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things:
and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue. Secondly an act of
virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous
man does it. Such an act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not
come under a precept of law, but is the end at which every lawgiver aims.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the
common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human law binds a man in conscience?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For
an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher power. But the
power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power.
Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in a Divine court, such as
is the court of conscience.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the
commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made void by
human laws, according to Mt. 15:6: "You have made void the commandment of
God for your tradition." Therefore human law does not bind a man in
conscience.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury on
man, according to Is. 10:1 et seqq.: "Woe to them that make wicked laws,
and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judgment,
and do violence to the cause of the humble of My people." But it is
lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore human laws
do not bind man in conscience.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 2:19): "This is thankworthy, if
the conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be
just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal law
whence they are derived, according to Prov. 8:15: "By Me kings reign, and
lawgivers decree just things." Now laws are said to be just, both from
the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common good---and from
their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed
the power of the lawgiver---and from their form, when, to wit, burdens
are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and with
a view to the common good. For, since one man is a part of the community,
each man in all that he is and has, belongs to the community; just as a
part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts
a loss on the part, in order to save the whole: so that on this account,
such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and
binding in conscience, and are legal laws.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being
contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned
above---either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his
subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but rather
to his own cupidity or vainglory---or in respect of the author, as when a
man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him---or in
respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally on the
community, although with a view to the common good. The like are acts of
violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i,
5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Wherefore such
laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal
or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right,
according to Mt. 5:40,41: "If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy
cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him
other two."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good:
such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to anything else
contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be
observed, because, as stated in Acts 5:29, "we ought to obey God rather
than man."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Apostle says (Rm. 13:1,2), all human power is from
God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in matters that are
within its scope, "resisteth the ordinance of God"; so that he becomes
guilty according to his conscience.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the
commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power.
Wherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on
its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not extend to this:
wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided
he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous hurt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all are subject to the law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those
alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle says
(1 Tim. 1:9): "The law is not made for the just man." Therefore the just
are not subject to the law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He that
is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by the public
law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the Holy Ghost,
for they are the sons of God, of whom it is said (Rm. 8:14): "Whosoever
are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not
all men are subject to human law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De
Leg. et Senat.] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws." But he that
is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are
subject to the law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 13:1): "Let every soul be subject
to the higher powers." But subjection to a power seems to imply
subjection to the laws framed by that power. Therefore all men should be
subject to human law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2; A[3], ad 2), the notion
of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts;
secondly, that it has coercive power. Wherefore a man may be subject to
law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator:
and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject to the law
framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one is not
subject to a power. In one way, by being altogether free from its
authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the
laws of the sovereign of another city or kingdom, since they are not
subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher
law; thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command, but
not in those matters in which the subject receives his orders from the
emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the
lower authority, since he is directed by that of a higher. In this way,
one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a subject thereto in
certain matters, in respect of which he is ruled by a higher law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject
to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous are not subject to
the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary
to the will: but the will of the good is in harmony with the law, whereas
the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Wherefore in this sense the
good are not subject to the law, but only the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion:
for, in this way, "the law is not made for the just men": because "they
are a law to themselves," since they "show the work of the law written in
their hearts," as the Apostle says (Rm. 2:14,15). Consequently the law
does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by man:
and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law of the
Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are
inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless the very
fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading of the
Holy Ghost, according to 1 Pt. 2:13: "Be ye subject . . . to every human
creature for God's sake."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sovereign is said to be "exempt from the law," as to
its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced by
himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the
sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be exempt from the law,
because none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the
law. Wherefore on Ps. 50:6: "To Thee only have I sinned," a gloss says
that "there is no man who can judge the deeds of a king." But as to the
directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by his own
will, according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum omnes) that
"whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep himself. And a wise
authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus] says: 'Obey the law that
thou makest thyself.'" Moreover the Lord reproaches those who "say and do
not"; and who "bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders, but
with a finger of their own they will not move them" (Mt. 23:3,4). Hence,
in the judgment of God, the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to
its directive force; but he should fulfil it to his own free-will and not
of constraint. Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when
it is expedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it according to
time and place.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the
letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31): "Although men
judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are
made they must pass judgment not on them, but according to them." But if
anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he observes the
intention of the lawgiver, he seems to pass judgment on the law.
Therefore it is not right for one who is under the law to disregard the
letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make
the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make the law.
Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver,
but should always act according to the letter of the law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by
words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: for Wisdom
says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things."
Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise
than by the words of the law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is said
is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not subject
to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take account of the
motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), every law is directed to the
common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law accordingly.
Hence the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et
Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us
to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which
have been enacted for the welfare of man." Now it happens often that the
observance of some point of law conduces to the common weal in the
majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since
then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the
law according to what happens most frequently, by directing his attention
to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of
that law would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be
observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an
established law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is
good for public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that
the enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the
city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not opened
to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to
the letter of the law, in order to maintain the common weal, which the
lawgiver had in view.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law
according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing instant
remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and
what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this who are in
authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to
dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to
allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority, the
mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the
law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which he sees
that the letter of the law is not to be observed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not
interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by reason
of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be
a matter of doubt, he must either act according to the letter of the law,
or consult those in power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[96] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every
single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words
all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even
if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into consideration, he
ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion: but should
frame the law according to that which is of most common occurrence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] Out. Para. 1/1
OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human law is changeable?
(2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs?
(3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the
force of law?
(4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by
dispensation of those in authority?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human law should be changed in any way?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at
all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above
(Q[95], A[2]). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human
law should also remain without any change.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should
be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human acts, as
stated above (Q[90], AA[1],2). Therefore it should remain without change.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as
stated above (Q[95], A[2]). But that which is right once is right always.
Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal law,
however just, may be justly changed in course of time."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[91], A[3]), human law is a dictate of
reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for
the just change of human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the
part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part of
reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from
the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that
the teaching of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was
afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical
matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for
the human community, not being able by themselves to take everything into
consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many
ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made
institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the
common weal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be
rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom
different things are expedient according to the difference of his
condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "If
the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most
careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law allowing
such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the
commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt
as to sell their votes, and entrust the government to scoundrels and
criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly
forfeit to such a people, and the choice devolves to a few good men."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as
stated above (Q[91], A[2]), and therefore endures without change, owing
to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author
of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore
his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law contains certain
universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains
certain particular precepts, according to various emergencies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing
can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. And
therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and
therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But right
is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and
the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above: wherefore
rectitude of this kind is subject to change.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better
occurs?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever
something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human reason,
like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give
place to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the same should
apply to human laws.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the
future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found possible
to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; because
the laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore it seems that laws
should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be enacted.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we
cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by
experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it
seems that as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur
for legislation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): "It is
absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those traditions
to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), human law is rightly changed, in
so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But, to a certain
extent, the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common
good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that
what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is
looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding
power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished.
Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or
other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm
done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from some very
great and every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from
the extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing
law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the
jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.]
that "in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of the benefit
to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered
just."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and
therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto
should be changed. But "laws derive very great force from custom," as the
Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently they should not be
quickly changed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not in
view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or in a case
of great urgency, as stated above. This answer applies also to the Third
Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether custom can obtain force of law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish
a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law and from the
Divine law, as stated above (Q[93], A[3]; Q[95], A[2]). But human custom
cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore
neither can it change human law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted
against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts, nothing
good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of
human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so that the mere
custom should obtain force of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose
business it is to govern the community; wherefore private individuals
cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals.
Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to abolish the law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): "The customs of
God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered
as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought
to be punished as those who disobey the law of God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and will of the
lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God;
the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as
human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by
speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses
as good that which he carries into execution. But it is evident that by
human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so far as it
manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by
actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law
can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which
obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external actions, the
inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually
declared; for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed
from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force
of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will,
as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding
from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no
custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for Isidore says
(Synon. ii, 16): "Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be
eradicated by law and reason."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[96], A[6]), human laws fail in some
cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely,
in a case where the law fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when
such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom
shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by
the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, the same
reason remains, for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the
custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes the
custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be
that it is not "possible according to the custom of the country" [*Q[95],
A[3]], which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it
is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two
conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, the
consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in
favor of a particular observance, that does the authority of the
sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing
the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot make laws, yet the
whole people can. If however the people have not the free power to make
their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority;
nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom obtains force of law,
in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for
that people: because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to
approve of that which is introduced by custom.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from
human laws. For the law is established for the "common weal," as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the
private convenience of an individual: because, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of
one man." Therefore it seems that a man should not be dispensed from
acting in compliance with the general law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as
follows (Dt. 1:17): "You shall hear the little as well as the great;
neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment of
God." But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all,
seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a community
cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the
Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the
natural and Divine laws: else it would not "foster religion," nor be
"helpful to discipline," which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid
down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from the Divine and
natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): "A dispensation is
committed to me."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out
to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household is
called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he
distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure.
Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very
fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled by each
individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to
the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular
individual, or in some particular case, either because it would hinder
some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as
explained above (Q[96], A[6]). But it would be dangerous to leave this to
the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident
and sudden emergency, as stated above (Q[96], A[6]). Consequently he who
is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that
rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application
to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to
be observed. If however he grant this permission without any such
reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent
dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent,
if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says
(Lk. 12:42): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser
[Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?"
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When a person is dispensed from observing the general law,
this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention of
benefiting, the common good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served
out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition of
any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment,
it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[97] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which
never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, however,
which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a
dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not be paid back to the
betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each
man stands as a private person to the public law to which he is subject.
Wherefore just as none can dispense from public human law, except the man
from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the
precepts of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but
God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law
itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the Old Law was good?
(2) Whether it was from God?
(3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?
(4) Whether it was given to all?
(5) Whether it was binding on all?
(6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law was good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written
(Ezech. 20:25): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments
in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be good except on
account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the
Old Law was not good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to
the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law was not
salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says (Rm.
7:8, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without
the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; and I died." Again he
says (Rm. 5:20): "Law entered in that sin might abound." Therefore the
Old Law was not good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be
possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according to human
custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts 15:10): "Why
tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which
neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" Therefore it seems
that the Old Law was not good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:12): "Wherefore the law indeed
is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a
doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right
reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the
Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it repressed concupiscence
which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, "Thou
shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods" (Ex. 20:17). Moreover the same law
forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are contrary to reason.
Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in
the same way (Rm. 7): "I am delighted," says he (verse 22), "with the law
of God, according to the inward man": and again (verse 16): "I consent to
the law, that is good."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, and an imperfect
good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a
thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end:
while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in
attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof.
Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; but it is
imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back
to health. Again it must be observed that the end of human law is
different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the
temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by directing
external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful
condition of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is
to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which end is
hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action.
Consequently that which suffices for the perfection of human law, viz.
the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the
perfection of the Divine law: but it is requisite that it should make man
altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be
done save by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which
fulfilleth the law . . . "is spread abroad in our hearts" (Rm. 5:5):
since "the grace of God is life everlasting" (Rm. 6:23). But the Old Law
could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as
it is written (Jn. 1:17), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth
came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but
imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: "The law brought nothing to
perfection."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are
said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the remission
of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a
sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and judgments in which they shall
not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text
goes on: "And I polluted them," i.e. showed them to be polluted, "in
their own gifts, when they offered all that opened the womb, for their
offenses."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the
cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in so
far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed,
and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not given to men,
but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rm. 5:11): "Sin, taking
occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me." In the
same sense when it is said that "the law entered in that sin might
abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as consecutive and not
final: in so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the
more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden it,
and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more
from its being forbidden.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of
grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written (Rm. 9:16): "It is
not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. that he wills and
runs in the commandments of God, "but of God that showeth mercy."
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32): "I have run the way of Thy
commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by giving me grace
and charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law was from God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is
written (Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was
imperfect, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore the Old Law was not from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all
the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law does
not continue for ever: since the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18): "There is
indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness
and unprofitableness thereof." Therefore the Old Law was not from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but also
the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of sin, as stated
above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain
to God, to Whom "none is like among the lawgivers" (Job 36:22).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that God "will have all men
to be saved." But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as stated
above (A[1]). Therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to
God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 15:6) while speaking to the Jews, to
whom the Law was given: "You have made void the commandment of God for
your tradition." And shortly before (verse 4) He had said: "Honor thy
father and mother," which is contained expressly in the Old Law (Ex.
20:12; Dt. 5:16). Therefore the Old Law was from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father
of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ in two
ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says (Lk.
24:44): "All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law
. . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning Me": and (Jn.
5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for
he wrote of Me." Secondly, as a kind of disposition, since by withdrawing
men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them in the
worship of one God, by Whom the human race was to be saved through
Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 3:23): "Before the faith came,
we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that faith which was
to be revealed." Now it is evident that the same thing it is, which gives
a disposition to the end, and which brings to the end; and when I say
"the same," I mean that it does so either by itself or through its
subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to
Christ, Who was to cast him out, according to Mt. 12:26: "If Satan cast
out Satan, his kingdom is divided" [Vulg.: 'he is divided against
himself']. Therefore the Old Law was given by the same God, from Whom
came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and yet
perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect, not simply,
but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are
given to children are perfect in comparison with the condition of those
to whom they are given, although they are not perfect simply. Hence the
Apostle says (Gal. 3:24): "The law was our pedagogue in Christ."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those works of God endure for ever which God so made that
they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But the Old
Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; not as though
it were evil, but as being weak and useless for this time; because, as
the Apostle goes on to say, "the law brought nothing to perfection":
hence he says (Gal. 3:25): "After the faith is come, we are no longer
under a pedagogue."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[79], A[4]), God sometimes permits
certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also
did He wish to give such a law as men by their own forces could not
fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find
themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse to the
help of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet
another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz. faith
in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we
were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him insufficient aids to
salvation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but
immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so that the word
"angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to Ps. 102:20,21:
"Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of His." But the
Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: for it is written (Ex.
20:1): "And the Lord spoke . . . these words," and further on: "I am the
Lord Thy God." Moreover the same expression is often repeated in Exodus,
and the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God
immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Jn. 1:17, "the Law was given by Moses." But
Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written (Ex. 33:11):
"The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his
friend." Therefore the Old Law was given by God immediately.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as
stated above (Q[90], A[3]). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the
salvation of souls: while the angels are the "ministering spirits," as
stated in Heb. 1:14. Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given
through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle said (Gal. 3:19) that the Law was "given
[Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator." And Stephen
said (Acts 7:53): "(Who) have received the Law by the disposition of
angels."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides
the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that "the
gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the angels," there is a
special reason why the Old Law should have been given through them. For
it has been stated (AA[1],2) that the Old Law was imperfect, and yet
disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race, which was to
come through Christ. Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an
order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself
exercises the principal and perfect acts; while those things which
dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his
subordinates: thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together,
but prepares the material by means of the workmen who assist him under
his direction. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of the
New Testament should be given by the incarnate God immediately; but that
the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the
angels. It is thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to
the Hebrews (1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the Old;
because in the New Testament "God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son,"
whereas in the Old Testament "the word was spoken by angels" (Heb. 2:2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef.
chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is
sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in
truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the external delivery;
and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who supported the
effectual power of speaking." Hence also it is that the angel spoke as
personating the Lord.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated in
Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and shortly
afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he
saw and he desired what he saw not." Hence he did not see the very
Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately.
Accordingly when Scripture states that "He spoke to him face to face,"
this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of the people, who
thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, when God spoke
and appeared to him, by means of a subordinate creature, i.e. an angel
and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision "face to face" means some
kind of sublime and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the
Divine Essence.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own
authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it through
others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it
through the angels.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given to the
Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation which was to
come through Christ, as stated above (AA[2],3). But that salvation was to
come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according to Is. 49:6: "It
is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes
of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel. Behold I have given thee to
be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to
the farthest part of the earth." Therefore the Old Law should have been
given to all nations, and not to one people only.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to Acts 10:34,35, "God is not a respecter of
persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh justice,
is acceptable to Him." Therefore the way of salvation should not have
been opened to one people more than to another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated above
(A[3]). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels not to
the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written (Ecclus. 17:14):
"Over every nation He set a ruler." Also on all nations He bestows
temporal goods, which are of less account with God than spiritual goods.
Therefore He should have given the Law also to all peoples.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 3:1,2): "What advantage then hath
the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God
were committed to them": and (Ps. 147:9): "He hath not done in like
manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto
them."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given
to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people alone
remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned away
to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the Law, lest
a holy thing should be given to dogs.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to
idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was more grievous, as
is clear from Ex. 32 and from Amos 5:25,26: "Did you offer victims and
sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But
you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols,
the star of your god, which you made to yourselves." Moreover it is
stated expressly (Dt. 9:6): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth
thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art
a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in the
preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word, which He
promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (Gal. 3:16) that
"to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, 'And to
his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And to thy seed,' which is
Christ." And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons to
that people, on account of the promised made to their fathers that Christ
should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of whom
Christ was to be born, should be signalized by a special sanctification,
according to the words of Lev. 19:2: "Be ye holy, because I . . . am
holy." Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that
this promise was made to him, viz. that Christ should be born of his
seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation. Hence it is written (Is.
41:2): "Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called him to
follow him?"
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election
that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung from
them received the law; according to Dt. 4:36, 37: "Ye did [Vulg.: 'Thou
didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy
fathers, and chose their seed after them." And if again it asked why He
chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be born thereof; a
fitting answer is given by Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): "Why He
draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish
not to err."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through Christ,
was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ should be
born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other
peoples; according to Rm. 9:4: "To whom," namely the Jews, "belongeth the
adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the testament, and the giving
of the Law . . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according
to the flesh."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things which are
given according to due; but it has no place in those things which are
bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his
own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of persons: but if he
were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them
according to personal merits, he would be a respecter of persons. Now God
bestows the benefits of salvation on the human race gratuitously:
wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some
rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. viii):
"All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity; but whom He teaches not,
out of justice He teaches not": for this is due to the condemnation of
the human race for the sin of the first parent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of
sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the ministries
of the angels, which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that
the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate beings: and also
bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to beasts,
according to Ps. 35:7: "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law.
Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject to his law.
But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the earth" (Ps.
46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe
the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old
Law: for it is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the
words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If therefore other
men could be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would
be in a worse plight than other men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and to
the observances of the Law: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If any
stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the
Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he
celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born
in the land." But it would have been useless to admit strangers to the
legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could have been
saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved
without observing the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the
Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that the
Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved without
observing the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law,
and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those precepts
of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe
the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but because they
belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by
the Old Law, they were not binding on save the Jewish people alone.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above (A[4]), was
given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative of
holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of that people. Now
whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones,
are binding on them alone: thus clerics who are set aside for the service
of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound;
likewise religious are bound by their profession to certain works of
perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like
manner this people was bound to certain special observances, to which
other peoples were not bound. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 18:13): "Thou
shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this
reason they used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Dt. 26:3:
"I profess this day before the Lord thy God," etc.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his law
which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things to be
observed by the servants of his household, others are not bound thereto.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his state
becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship
of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is
written (Dt. 4:8): "What other nation is there so renowned that hath
ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?" In like manner, from
this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of the
laity, and the state of religious than that of folk living in the world.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more
securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural
law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are
now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons to those of
the religious, although they can be saved without this.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time
of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation which was to
come through Christ, as stated above (AA[2],3). But man needed this
salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should
have been given immediately after sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those
from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the "seed,
which is Christ" (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as related in Gn.
12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of
Abraham.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe
through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He born of no other
of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed,
according to 2 Kgs. 23:1: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning
the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said." Therefore the Old Law should
have been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set
because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made
the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator":
ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains.
Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this order
of time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time
of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect of
which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on
some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law restrains and
tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by
the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to do. Hence it was
fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as would be
appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two
things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud of his knowledge, as
though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation: and
accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome in this matter,
man was left to the guidance of his reason without the help of a written
law: and man was able to learn from experience that his reason was
deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had fallen headlong into
idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore, after those times, it
was necessary for a written law to be given as a remedy for human
ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of sin" (Rm. 3:20). But,
after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his
weakness, through his being unable to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the
Apostle concludes (Rm. 8:3,4), "what the Law could not do in that it was
weak through the flesh, God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . .
that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was
most needed by the people, at the time when the natural law began to be
obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that
this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they
might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming
that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law of
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once
after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident in his
own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because
as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual
sinning.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A law should not be given save to the people, since it is a
general precept, as stated above (Q[90], AA[2],3); wherefore at the time
of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household
precepts: but when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so as to form a
people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that
they should be given a law; for "slaves are not that part of the people
or state to which it is fitting for the law to be directed," as the
Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[98] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only
those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole people,
who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the
promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, according to Rm. 4:11:
hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon
as they were collected together.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are
distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under the first
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?
(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?
(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral
precepts?
(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?
(5) Whether it contains any others besides these?
(6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.
™Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because
a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (Q[90], AA[2],3).
Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 13:9): "If there be any other
commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself." But this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law
contained but one commandment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 7:12): "All things . . . whatsoever
you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the
Law and the prophets." But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the
Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one
commandment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): "Making void the Law of
commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old Law,
as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises
many commandments.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something
which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from the
necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its
very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as being
necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be
necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given
about various things as being ordained to one end. Consequently we must
say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their
relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect of the diversity of
those things that are ordained to that end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end:
yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity of the
things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one
according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the building of a
house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of
acts ordained thereto.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the
commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing friendship,
either between man and man, or between man and God. Wherefore the whole
Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself," as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of
one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor for God's
sake. Hence the Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which
are about the love of God and of one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord
said (Mt. 22:40): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and
the prophets."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, "friendship towards another
arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on
another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever you
would that men should do to you, do you also to them," this is an
explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the
words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": so that it is an
explanation of this commandment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For
the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above (Q[91],
AA[4],5; Q[98], A[5]). But the moral precepts belong to the law of
nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance
where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things that are
of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to suffice for
the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old
Law, which is a Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that killeth" (2
Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to
Ps. 118:93: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou
hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the
Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover, He gave them
discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an
inheritance." Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on Heb.
12:11: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc., says: "Discipline is an
exercise in morals by means of difficulties." Therefore the Law which was
given by God comprised moral precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident
from Ex. 20:13,15: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." This was
reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law is to
created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of the
Divine law is to establish man in friendship with God. Now since likeness
is the reason of love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth
its like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is
supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it is written (Lev.
19:2; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy." But the goodness of man
is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore it
was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue:
and these are the moral precepts of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being
altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. For just as
grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the natural
law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's
assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but
also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now
human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as to the universal
principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it
became obscured in the point of things to be done in detail. But with
regard to the other moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from
the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went
astray, to the extend of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in
themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to
rescue man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not
only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the
Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain,
such as the Unity of the Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors
to which reason is liable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even the
letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the moral
precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without
furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial,
besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man is for the
purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral,
as stated above (Q[1], A[3]). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given
to men should not comprise other than moral precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer
to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a virtue, viz.
religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and
ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the moral precepts are about acts
of virtue, as stated above (A[2]), it seems that the ceremonial precepts
should not be distinct from the moral.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify
something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii,
3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place."
Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts
about certain figurative actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13,14): "Ten words . . . He wrote
in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should
teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do." But the ten
commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral
precepts there are others which are ceremonial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the Divine law is instituted
chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted
chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence human
laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything
relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common good of
mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating
to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the formation of
human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other
hand the Divine law directed men to one another according to the demands
of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the chief
aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts
of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain
external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God:
and it is these works that are said to belong to the Divine worship. This
worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was
the goddess of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were
made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus states
[*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word "ceremony" was introduced among
the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived from a town near
Rome called "Caere": since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred
chattels of the Romans were taken thither and most carefully preserved.
Accordingly those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship
are specially called ceremonial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and therefore
the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the natural
law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined
both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these very
determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of
natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of
the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral
precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since
it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination
of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such
sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremonial
precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the
moral precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot
be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. Now these
similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words,
but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the things of God are set forth
in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the
case of metaphorical expressions; but also by similitudes of things set
before the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also
judicial precepts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to
the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine says
(Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning
the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is
foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral
precepts; and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are
ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts we should not
put any judicial precepts in the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from Thy
judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But
a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial
precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to Ps.
93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of justice, like
the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the
moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not
be held as distinct from them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral precepts"
antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and
ceremonial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (AA[2],3), it belongs to the Divine law
to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the
abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral
precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined by
Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal,
both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly just as the
determination of the universal principle about Divine worship is effected
by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts
of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the
judicial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law;
viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law;
"ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship;
and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be
maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rm. 7:12) after saying that
the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy, and
good": "just," in respect of the judicial precepts; "holy," with regard
to the ceremonial precepts (since the word "sanctus"---"holy"---is
applied to that which is consecrated to God); and "good," i.e. conducive
to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the
ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under
one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the
life we have to lead.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of
the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the judicial
precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they
are derived from reason; and something in common with the ceremonial
precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This
explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise both judicial and moral
precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments";
and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: "You
shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts," where "precepts"
denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers to judicial and
ceremonial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral
precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs to
the judicial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and
ceremonial precepts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral,
judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong
to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial
precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is worshipped. Now
besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude,
liberality, and several others, as stated above (Q[60], A[5]). Therefore
besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God, and
observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments." Now
precepts concern moral matters, as stated above (A[4]). Therefore besides
the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others
which are called "commandments." [*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of
here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with the
Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of the Lord
thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: 'He
hath'] commanded thee." Therefore in addition to the above, the Law
comprises "testimonies."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications (i.e.
"Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore in the
Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but
also others, called "justifications."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you."
And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the
precepts of the Law are included under them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept;
other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now
the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their
fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of
the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit
consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous,
or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in
the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority
of God the lawgiver: e.g. Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is
one Lord"; and Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth":
and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the
Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law,
and punishments for those who transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28:
"If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee
higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called
"justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones
justly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 2/5
The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in
so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one
according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law
which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold
just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 3/5
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be
done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue
would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the
order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are
expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not
kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts."
Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as
something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because
they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an example
whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in
pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like
cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that
"justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty as fixed
by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human affairs;
to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 4/5
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and
rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the
Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled
"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the
commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things
be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those things
"commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the very
word seems to denote.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] Body Para. 5/5
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral,
ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the character
of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of
duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far as
they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says
(De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to
the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its
precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the
observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats.
For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and
love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth the
Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and
walk in His ways, and love Him?" But the desire for temporal goods leads
man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that
"covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and
threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this
makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii,
6).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in
sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher the means of
persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal
threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the Divine law should
have used, not these, but more lofty means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt
cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But as
stated in Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the just
and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the
unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth
sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth
as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): "If you be willing, and
will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you
will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to
the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every law,
men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and
rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences, the
means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore
the process of argument in sciences should be ordered becomingly, so that
the instruction is based on principles more generally known. And thus
also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs
to move him at first by things for which he has an affection; just as
children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts.
Now it has been said above (Q[98], AA[1],2,3) that the Old Law disposed
men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to
the perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in
comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming:
and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still
under a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in his
despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear
from the words of the Apostle (Phil. 3:13,15): "Forgetting the things
that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: 'and stretching'] forth myself to
those that are before . . . Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be
thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit
in subordination to God: whereas the perverse place their end in
temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct
men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an
affection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities,
is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which man
desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the
love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: "He will praise Thee, when Thou
shalt do well to him."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or
punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades men
by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this
respect it employs higher means.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[99] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of the
Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the Law as
long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of
the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain individuals,
although they observed the justice of the Law, met with
misfortunes---either because they had already become spiritual (so that
misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal
things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while
outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether
fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to Is.
29:13 (Mt. 15:8): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their
hearts is far from Me."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the
moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of
nature?
(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all
the virtues?
(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the
ten precepts of the decalogue?
(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?
(5) Their number;
(6) Their order;
(7) The manner in which they were given;
(8) Whether they are dispensable?
(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of
the Law?
(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law
of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He gave them
instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is
in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the law of nature is not
learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral
precepts belong to the natural law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human
law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that belong to
the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is
the same in all men, while these moral institutions are various for
various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law
should add to the law of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain
matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that faith
"worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature;
since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all the moral
precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who
have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which
must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the
moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and
judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to
good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason,
which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good
which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant
from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from
the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical
reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above (Q[94],
AA[2],4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge
of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so
evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to
approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles:
while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much
consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not competent
to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible
for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for
those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of
which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as
the articles of faith.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters
which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in
accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must
needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of
necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but
not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural
reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or
not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt
not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law of nature
absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful
consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of
nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the
less wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of
the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to judge of
which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about
the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing,
nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord
thy God in vain."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about
all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old Law is
called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy
justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore
the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a
duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to none of
the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to
each one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are not about
the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the common
good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts
are only about the acts of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a
transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments
of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue.
Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common
good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]), the precepts of the Law must needs
be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the
Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a
state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state
which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now
human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the Divine law for
another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community,
implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to
one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with one
another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose
proper function consists in directing the human community. Wherefore
human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands
acts of other virtues, this is only in so far as they assume the nature
of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men
in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. And
therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters
whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is united
to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore the
Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human reason
is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues:
since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason
in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order the acts of the
reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is
therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about
the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which
the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist,
come under an obligation of precept; while other matters, which pertain
to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of
those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character of
justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again,
inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should be subject to
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to
another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to
reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks
(Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about
the different kinds of community.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten
precepts of the decalogue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are
reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first and
principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,"
and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Mt. 22:37,39. But these
two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all
the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial
precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the decalogue,
one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day."
Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the
decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. But
among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of
justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts
of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The gloss on Mt. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they shall
revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts,
set them out in detail." Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so
many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other
precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given
the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the
people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those precepts the
knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which
with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general
principles: and those also which become known to man immediately through
divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not
reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz. first general
principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once
imprinted on the natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for
instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar
principles: and again those which the careful reflection of wise men
shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these
principles from God, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both
kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in
different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them,
as principles in their proximate conclusions; while those which are known
through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their
principles.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those two principles are the first general principles of
the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through
nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are
referred to these, as conclusions to general principles.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one
respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of
God, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am God." In this
respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to
the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as
it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues
are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of
justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts
of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one
another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably
distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct from
faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said
at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is added, "Thou shalt not
make . . . any graven thing," etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these
are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but
two.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from
the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and, "Thou
shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is affirmative: and
that which follows, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," is
negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says
(Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 7:7): "I had not known
concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence it
seems that this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," is one precept; and,
therefore, should not be divided into two.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on
Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring
to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by
different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev. 26:26, "Ten women
shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, "I am the
Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me,"
(thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on
Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] "two iniquities"); the third
precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven
thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God
in vain." He states that there are six precepts pertaining to our
neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou
shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth,
"Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness";
the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, if
it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is
written (Mt. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two statements,
"I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before
Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen
(Hom. viii in Exod.) who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to
God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place,
"Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not
take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth, "Remember that
thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way
as Hesychius.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything
is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as
gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be
made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex. 25:18---Augustine
more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," into one
precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the purpose of carnal
knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet
other things, which are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to
the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct
precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods, and that
which prohibits the coveting of another's wife. Thus he distinguishes
three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our
neighbor. And this is better.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the
precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those
about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather
than about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed to the
precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as
the first general principles of the natural law are self-evident to a
subject having natural reason, and need no promulgation; so also to
believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject
possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God, must believe that He is"
(Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of
faith.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative,
when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should honor his
parents does not include that he should not kill another man; nor does
the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept is
included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct
precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that "Thou shalt
not steal," and another binding one to keep another's property intact, or
to give it back to its owner. In the same way there are not different
precepts about believing in God, and about not believing in strange gods.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore the
Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it were
one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness,
therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions against
coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the
diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
x, 5).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably
set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso viii), is "a
transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of
heaven." But sins are distinguished according as man sins against God, or
his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any
precepts directing man in his relations to himself, but only such as
direct him in his relations to God and himself, it seems that the
precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the
worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and the
offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the
Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others also,
pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also
do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the teaching of
God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt not take the
name of the Lord thy God in vain." Therefore there should be also a
precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so
has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of charity extends
to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto
charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is
charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents, so should
there have been some precepts referring to children and other neighbors.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought
or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and adultery, the
prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the prohibition of the
sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife." Therefore the
same should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide and false
witness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the
concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible
part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said,
"Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue should have included some
precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. Therefore it
seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant,
which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two
tablets of stone."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), just as the precepts of human law
direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of
the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth
of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in a
community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well to
the head of the community; the other is that he behave well to those who
are his fellows and partners in the community. It is therefore necessary
that the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering
man in his relations to God; and in the second place, other precepts
ordering man in his relations to other men who are his neighbors and live
with him under God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 2/4
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity;
secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master consists in
his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the
first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to
him: and this is conveyed by the second commandment, "Thou shalt not take
the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Service is due to the master in
return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this
belongs the third commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in
memory of the creation of all things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 3/4
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in
general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying his
debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring
one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to none, either
by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one's
neighbor---sometimes in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence;
and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill": sometimes in a
person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is
prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit adultery": sometimes in
his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this
regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not steal." Harm done by word is
forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy
neighbor": harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt
not covet."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] Body Para. 4/4
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds;
wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the
second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name of
the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept,
requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps.
32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the
First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His
goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last
end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because
the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity.
Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his
neighbor, because in this respect the natural law had become obscured on
account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this
respect the natural law retained its vigor: or again, because love of
oneself is contained in the love of God and of one's neighbor: since true
self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the
decalogue includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and
to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are
those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is
written (Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written
before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence the precepts
of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once.
Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a man,
especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he owes
certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which
regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain duties to
himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that
everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And therefore the
precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself, reach
the people through the instruction of men who are versed through the
instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and, consequently,
they are not contained in the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in
celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, or in
sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were
offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favors to be
commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind
by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the reason for this
precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord made heaven and
earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the
repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in
the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in the
Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written (Is. 58:13): "If thou
turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy
day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious."
Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men,
especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were celebrated on
account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the
celebration of the Passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery
from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though
temporal and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual
Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other
solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by one greater
than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their
controversy." Hence, since oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing
is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue.
According to one interpretation, however, the words, "Thou shalt not take
the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a prohibition of false
doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: "Thou shalt not say that
Christ is a creature."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate
dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid
the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate
dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return for
another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's debt to
his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it by denying it:
since the father is the principle of generation and being, and also of
upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds
of kindness or service to be done to anyone except to one's parents. On
the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children for
any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child
is a part of his father; and "parents love their children as being a part
of themselves," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just
as the decalogue contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards
himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving
one's children.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in
so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, are of
themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be
forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But murder and
falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural
for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired only for the
sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder and
false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but
only sins of deed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: As stated above (Q[25], A[1]), all the passions of the
irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part.
Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first
elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible
passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set
in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly previous to
love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is;
according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth,
how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But the first three precepts
belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of
our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in
proper order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative
precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. But
according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [*Lib. iv, cap.
De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown. Therefore
among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should
have preceded the affirmative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But
actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore the
precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably
placed last in order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 13:1): "The things that are of
God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God'].
But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as
stated above (A[3]). Therefore they are arranged in becoming order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (AA[3],5, ad 1), the precepts of the
decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it
is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason,
as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it is
clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to
be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely contrary to
reason. Now the end of human life and society is God. Consequently it was
necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man
to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an
army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, it is requisite
first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the
opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he
should be in coordination with the other soldiers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Body Para. 2/3
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that
man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in common
with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the
third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an army, it is a greater
sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe,
than to be insolent to his commander: and this last is more grievous than
if he be found wanting in some point of service to him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] Body Para. 3/3
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor,
it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more grievous
sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he
is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct man in
his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which
regards his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to
be according to the gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more
repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by
thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one
already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of
the unborn child; and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards
external goods.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way
of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the love of
our neighbor, as shall be declared later on (SS, Q[25], A[1]; SS, Q[26],
A[2]). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of the
others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being in respect
of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect of his son.
Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the
precepts regarding God. This argument holds in respect of affirmative and
negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is
not altogether cogent. For although in the order of execution, vices
should be uprooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn
away from evil, and do good," and Is. 1:16,17: "Cease to do perversely;
learn to do well"; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice,
because "the crooked line is known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by
the law is the knowledge of sin" (Rm. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation
precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the
order, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding
God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed
last, since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order of
execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of
reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably
formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to acts of
virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But
in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another.
Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the
decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept.
Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in
some matters, and negative precepts in others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on
reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine law.
Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and
not only in the first and third.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by
God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts.
Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not
only in the second and fourth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so far as it
induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat of
punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law.
Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each, and
not only in the first and second.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the
memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): "Write them in the tables of thy
heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be
made in the third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the
precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that "God made all things,
in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a
suitable manner in formulating His Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the
Divine law: wherefore it is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to
arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be evident
that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its
opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to the
affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is
not black: but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is white:
because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that
one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to the negative
precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of reason, than
that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a
primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering
a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if he
has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can
sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as stated in Ethic. viii,
14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one
about the honor due to parents, the other about the celebration of the
Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest;
hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts
include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept;
thus the first precept includes the determination, "Thou shalt not make a
graven thing"; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed.
Consequently there was need to state the reason in each case.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some point
of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed that there
would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was
necessary to add a promise of reward. And since parents are already on
the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them: wherefore a
promise of reward is added to the precept about honoring one's parents.
The same applies to the precept forbidding idolatry: since thereby it
seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which
they think they can get by entering into a compact with the demons.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to
evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment is only
affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men
were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the general
custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on account of
the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is affixed to the
first two precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a
past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made therein.
Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed
to it that does not belong to the natural law, wherefore this precept
needed a special admonition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural law. But the
natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of law to apply in
certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above
(Q[96], A[6]; Q[97], A[4]). Therefore a dispensation can be granted in
the precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does
to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law made by
man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God,
it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our superiors are God's
viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:10): "For what I
have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it
in the person of Christ." Therefore superiors can dispense with the
precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding
murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in this precept:
for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as
evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue are dispensable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept
of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this precept; for it
is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in that day, saying:
Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will
fight against him." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are
dispensable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where some are reproved for
that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting
covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by
dispensation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[96], A[6]; Q[97], A[4]), precepts
admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if
the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is
frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and
chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue,
whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by
any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or
the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention
of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in
some community a law were enacted, such as this---that no man should work
for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its
enemies, or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts
would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted,
subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of
procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far
as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be
prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention of the
lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it
were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch
as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on
account of some greater utility.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct
us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is
God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice
to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that
each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take
the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the decalogue
admit of no dispensation whatever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which
contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing principle
that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in reference to
certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to apply in certain
cases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God continueth
faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He were
to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is justice
itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him
not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even
in those matters in which men are directed to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so
far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense the
precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it
lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers
or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the
precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by
that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner
when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose
it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 2/3
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away
the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to them
by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son,
he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain by the
command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts
the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of
the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the executor of that
sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God
would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or
an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication:
because he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is
the Author of the institution of marriage.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 3/3
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence
of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any
determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that
this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not---in this point they
admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such
matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the
like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are
subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place
of God: and yet not in all respects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This determination was an interpretation rather than a
dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does
something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mt. 12:3,
seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of
the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done
justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like
manner as to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt. 26:20) that
"thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." Therefore the mode
of virtue falls under the precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver
comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver is
directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it
belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of virtue
falls under the precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working
willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept of the Divine
law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye the Lord with gladness";
and (2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a
cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do gladly;
and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is
done in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the
precept of the law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the
habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). Now
whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence
it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would deserve
to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention
of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by habituating him to
good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of law has
compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is
brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now the law
compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, because
that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the penalty
of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently
situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law
is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of the
lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now
man, the framer of human law, is competent to judge only of outward acts;
because "man seeth those things that appear," according to 1 Kgs. 16:7:
while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of
the inward movements of wills, according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of
hearts and reins is God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Body Para. 2/4
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some
sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is
regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it
is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of
virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii.
The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject to the
judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does in
ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine
law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable
or pardonable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Body Para. 3/4
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about
which we have spoken above (QQ[8], 12): and concerning these two, Divine
law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human law does
not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine
law does, according to Mt. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with his brother,
shall be in danger of the judgment."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] Body Para. 4/4
The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable
principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that
the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of
virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human law,
since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who
gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the
precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not that they
be done from the habit of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the
first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law: and
this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter
itself of the precept: and this is something leading or disposing to
virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter
of the precept are not the same: just as neither in other things is the
end the same as that which conduces to the end.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls
under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness works
unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in
one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so far as pleasure ensues
from the love of God and one's neighbor (which love falls under the
precept), and love causes pleasure: and in another respect does not fall
under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; for
"pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in
Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure either on account of its end,
or through its proceeding from a becoming habit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of
the Divine law. For it is written (Mt. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into
life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow that the
observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into life. But good
works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from
charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should distribute all my
goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore the mode of charity
is included in the commandment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing
all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore the mode of
charity falls under the precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept,
it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without having
charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace,
which is always united to charity. Therefore one can fulfil the precepts
of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine
declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the mode of charity is included
in the commandment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If
therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has
not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows that
whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does, however good
this may be in itself: which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some
have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept;
and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this
precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor
(say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally
whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an affirmative
precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding not for all
time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the
other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is altogether outside
the precept.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] Body Para. 2/2
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of
charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and
thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it,
viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity;
since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses
it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as
being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i.e. inasmuch as the
acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of
the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above
(Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act
ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true in saying
that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, that is to say
that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean that a man must
honor his father from charity, but merely that he must honor him.
Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not break
this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of
charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep
one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among which is
included the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction that God
should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things would
be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of
charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore he that honors
his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue
of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother," but in virtue of the
precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." And
since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all times, they
can be binding, each one at a different time: so that it may happen that
a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at
the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of
charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless he
fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without charity.
Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to
fulfil the law without grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law
besides the decalogue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral
precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord declared
(Mt. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity "dependeth the whole
law and the prophets." But these two commandments are explained by the
ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other
moral precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and
ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But the
determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and
ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in the
decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated above
(A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts
besides the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the
virtues, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains, besides
the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy,
and chastity; so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to
the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. And
yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other
moral precepts in the Law besides those of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of sin,
and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides those of
the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral
precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99], AA[3],4),
the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their
institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed of no
consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the moral
precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason,
even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there are three
grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need no
promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our
neighbor, and others like these, as stated above (A[3]), which are, as it
were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can have an
erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed, the
reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they
need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few instances,
happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the precepts of the
decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so
evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral precepts added to
the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] Body Para. 2/2
But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know
those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to the
decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many
corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the
worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding
things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt. 18:10,11):
"Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son
or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let
there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic
spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead."
The second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition
of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine
(Dt. 13). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts.
To the fourth commandment prescribing the honor due to parents, is added
the precept about honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up
before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and
likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed
towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To
the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of
hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according
to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor":
likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev. 19:17): "Thou
shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth commandment which
forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about whoredom, according to
Dt. 23:17: "There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor
whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the prohibition against
unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22,23: "Thou shalt not lie with
mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast." To the seventh
commandment which prohibits theft, is added the precept forbidding usury,
according to Dt. 23:19: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to
usury"; and the prohibition against fraud, according to Dt. 25:13: "Thou
shalt not have divers weights in thy bag"; and universally all
prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth
commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition
against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2: "Neither shalt thou yield
in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth";
and the prohibition against lying (Ex. 23:7): "Thou shalt fly lying," and
the prohibition against detraction, according to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt
not be a detractor, nor a whisperer among the people." To the other two
commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden
all kinds of evil desires.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of
God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards them;
but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less
evidently.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial
and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of the
decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the
superadded moral precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as
stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And since those virtues which direct our
conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does
the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the
common good of the species; hence precepts bearing directly on these
virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to
the act of fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in
the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as is clear from Dt.
20:3, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do
not give back." In like manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is
left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the
household; hence it is said (Dt. 21:20) in the person of parents: "He
slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to
debauchery and banquetings."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified
man. Because the Apostle says (Rm. 2:13): "For not the hearers of the Law
are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified."
But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law.
Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of
justification.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): "Keep My laws and My
judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the spiritual
life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts
of the Law was a cause of justification.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But
human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice consisting in
fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law
justified man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth":
which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to the
moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that
which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign or
a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the
causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may
denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in
the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by the precepts of
the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to the justifying grace
of Christ, which they also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra
Faust. xxii, 24), "even the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed
Christ."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Body Para. 2/3
But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice
that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so that
accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as
man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of justice:
secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense
justification is nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice,
like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or the infused
virtue, as is clear from what has been stated (Q[63], A[4]). The acquired
virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God
Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which we are
speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is said to be just
before God, according to Rm. 4:2: "If Abraham were justified by works, he
hath whereof to glory, but not before God." Hence this justice could not
be caused by moral precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the
moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] Body Para. 3/3
If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of
justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in various
ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained
something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship to
God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just, not in
itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said
of these precepts that they did not justify man save through the devotion
and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the
moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in particular,
contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained
that which is just in itself according to that "general justice" which is
"every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts
belonged to "special justice," which is about contracts connected with
the human mode of life, between one man and another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said to
live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which the
Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this
passage (Gal. 3:12).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[100] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice:
it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about that
justice which is before God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider
them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their duration. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Whether there should have been many of them?
(4) Of their various kinds.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their
pertaining to the worship of God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not
consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, in the Old
Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food
(Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g. (Lev.
19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts"; and
again (Num. 15:38): "To make to themselves fringes in the corners of
their garments." But these are not moral precepts; since they do not
remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they do not
pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man. Therefore
they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the
worship of God. Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not
consist in their pertaining to Divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which
pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the "cerei"
[candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other things
besides solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore it does not
seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to
the Divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, i.e.
rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the same as the Latin
"salve." But all the precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not
only those that pertain to the worship of God. Therefore not only those
precepts which pertain to Divine worship are called ceremonial.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the
ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. But
there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God;
such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover and of
the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down
in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain
to the worship of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 18:19,20): "Be thou to the people in
those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the
ceremonies and the manner of worshipping."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[99], A[4]), the ceremonial precepts
are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God,
just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts
whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God by the
worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are properly called
ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The reason for their
being so called was given above (Q[99], A[3]), when we established the
distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the
like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those things
whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too in
other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes under the science
whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which
regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and other such
matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers, with the view
of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who administer to a
king make use of certain special observances. Consequently such are
contained under the ceremonial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very
probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of the
lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the
Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated in Lev. 24:2.
Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine worship
were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: so that all ceremonial
precepts may be included under the observance of solemnities.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very
much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek but Latin. We
may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from God, those precepts
above all seem to be rules of salvation, which direct man to God: and
accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial
precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain
amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial precisely
because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind of
consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine worship
must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on (A[2]), the
consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative.
For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in such a way as
to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10)
and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law: because precepts
of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a law should be
manifest, as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of
the Law were given as figures of something, it seems unbecoming that
Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they
signified.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be
entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in
representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama:
because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to represent
the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be
done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to
the Divine worship, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore they should not be
figurative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is
worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity." But the precepts of
faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial
precepts should not be figurative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they
that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But a figure is
not the very truth: in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore
the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not be
figurative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . .
judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the
new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]; Q[99], AA[3],4), the ceremonial
precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine
worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man is composed of
soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God; the
soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is
written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living
God." And as the body is ordained to God through the soul, so the outward
worship is ordained to the internal worship. Now interior worship
consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections.
Wherefore according to the various ways in which the intellect and
affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his
external actions are applied in various ways to the Divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the
Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship will not consist
in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from
the inward knowledge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: "Joy and
gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine
Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us
under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel.
Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the various states of
human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth
manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet
opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:8). Hence the external
worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future
truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who
is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New Law
this way is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to be
foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as
something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is
not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the
Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): "The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the
good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a shadow is
less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the
shadow to the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in
proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of downfall, were
he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the
Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured people under a veil of
figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using
those figures to the honor of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on
account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp Divine
things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain:
and therefore in both cases there is need of signs by means of sensible
figures.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to which,
however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were taught
by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial
precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be
proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above
(AA[1],2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing
of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all things . . . and
one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" (1 Cor. 8:6). Therefore
there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an
occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts 15:10):
"Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which
neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" Now the transgression
of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's salvation. Since,
therefore, every law should conduce to man's salvation, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 3), it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been
given in great number.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and
bodily worship of God, as stated above (A[2]). But the Law should have
lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught
them to worship God "in spirit and in truth," as stated in Jn. 4:23.
Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, (Osee 8:12): "I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him'] My
manifold laws"; and (Job 11:6): "That He might show thee the secrets of
His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[96], A[1]), every law is given to a
people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to evil, who
have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated above (Q[95],
A[1]); some, inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or
rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and improved by means
of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of the
law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that
the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that people
there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall
them by means of ceremonial precepts from the worship of idols to the
worship of God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary
on the other hand to devise many means of repressing every single one:
and again, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order that being
burdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they might
have no time for the service of idols. As to those who were inclined to
good, it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial
precepts; both because thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and
more continually; and because the mystery of Christ, which was
foreshadowed by these ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the
world, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified
by various ceremonies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to conduce
thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy, if it
be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and then the
remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that which conduces to an end
is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied: thus many remedies are
given to a sick man, when one is not enough to heal him. Now the
ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect, both for representing
the mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence; and for
subjugating men's minds to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18,19):
"There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the
weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought nothing to
perfection." Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions, that
the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the sin of
idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were
they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that they would in
consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from
giving them many ceremonial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it
forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. Many
such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as
Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii). Nevertheless it
behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so much as to allow
men to fall away into the worship of idols.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into
sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are unsuitably
divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances."
For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done
only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in which Christ
"delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2).
Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New Law
the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the Old Law
there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and "sacraments."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: in which
sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. But all
the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated
above (A[1]). Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore
"sacred things" should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "observances" are so called from having to be observed.
But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for it is written
(Dt. 8:11): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at any time
thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and judgments
and ceremonies." Therefore the "observances" should not be considered as
a part of the ceremonies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the
ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16,17):
and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the
words of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be inclined
in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of
ceremonies is unsuitable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony.
For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (Num. 15:24): "They shall offer
a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies
require." Of the sacrament of Order it is written (Lev. 7:35): "This is
the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies." Of sacred things
also it is written (Ex. 38:21): "These are the instruments of the
tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies of the Levites." And
again of the observances it is written (3 Kgs. 9:6): "If you . . . shall
turn away from following Me, and will not observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . .
. ceremonies which I have set before you."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2), the ceremonial precepts are
ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the
worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The
worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in honor
of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things," such as
the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the worshippers
two points may be considered. The first point is their preparation for
Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of the
people or of the ministers; and to this the "sacraments" refer. The
second point is their particular mode of life, whereby they are
distinguished from those who do not worship God: and to this pertain the
"observances," for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in
some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained to the
worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the
victim, so too their sacraments and sacred things of the New Law; while
their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the
New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist, contains
Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He sanctified "the
people by His own blood" (Heb. 13:12). Hence this Sacrifice is also a
sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, but
foreshadowed Him; hence they are not called sacraments. In order to
signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of
the Old Law, which sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come.
Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things.
But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to the Divine
worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they
retained the common designation of sacred things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the
people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of
observances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were not
called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection with the
worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort
of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they affected
the fitness of the people who worshipped God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so
were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn festivals
seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts are
counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1):
"Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things
that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or
figurative?
(3) The causes of the sacrifices;
(4) The causes of the sacrifices;
(5) The causes of the sacred things;
(6) The causes of the observances.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial
precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the
commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to the
carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts,
which are based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were
based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the
reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason for the
ceremonial observances of the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law
of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save that
man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
6,13), concerning the prohibition about the tree of life. Therefore in
the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of
testing man's obedience, having no reason in themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man's works are called moral according as they proceed
from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial
precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems
therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: for the
reason of a precept is taken from some cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:9): "The commandment of the Lord
is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial precepts are
commandments of God. Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not
be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts
have a reasonable cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it is
the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those things
which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the
Apostle states (Rm. 13:1). Now there are two conditions required for
things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end,
which is the principle of the whole order in matters of action: since
those things that happen by chance outside the intention of the end, or
which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate.
Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate
to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever conduces to
the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a
saw is taken from cutting, which is its end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9.
Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other
precepts of the Law, were institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is
written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of
nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts
were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be
gathered.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It may be said there was no reason for the observances of
the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very nature of
the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be made of wool
and linen. But there could be a reason for them in relation to something
else: namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby.
On the other hand, the decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to
faith and the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of the act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of
knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: and
yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, in
as much as it signified something. And so also the ceremonial precepts of
the Old Law were reasonable on account of their relation to something
else.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable
causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." But
the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to
something else, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a
figurative cause?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal,
but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, the
chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither
of these had any but a figurative cause: because each was given as a
sign. For it is written (Gn. 17:11): "You shall circumcise the flesh of
your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between Me and you":
and of the celebration of the Passover it is written (Ex. 13:9): "It
shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes."
Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts have none but a
figurative reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the
ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above (Q[101], A[2]).
Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain
thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it seems
that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the
ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of indifference, as to
whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number
of animals to be offered, and other such particular circumstances.
Therefore there is no literal cause for the precepts of the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so
did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (1 Cor. 10:11)
that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now in the stories
of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there is the
literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal,
besides their figurative causes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the reason for whatever conduces
to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial
precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for
that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the
words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be
utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on Osee 1:3.
Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be
taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine worship which was to
be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal:
whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry; or recall certain Divine
benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the
disposition of mind which was then required in those who worshipped God.
Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their
being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are
figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ Himself and
the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of
the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense; or to the state
of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which
refers to the anagogical sense.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture
belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in order to
convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal
ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, on account of
which they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged to that
time, does not go beyond the order of literal causes. Consequently when
we assert that the cause of the celebration of the Passover was its
signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign
of God's covenant with Abraham, we assign the literal cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had
been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the purpose
of worshipping God then and there.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As we have stated when speaking of human laws (Q[96], AA[1]
,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in regard to
particular conditions, which depend on the judgment of those who frame
them; so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old
Law have no literal cause, but only a figurative cause; whereas in the
abstract they have a literal cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which
pertained to sacrifices?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the
ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were offered
in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life:
such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs no such
sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks?
Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such sacrifices were
unfittingly offered to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice
to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally the turtledove
and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was
made of sparrows. Now many other animals are more noble than these. Since
therefore whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems that not
only of these three should sacrifices have been offered to Him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over
birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes.
Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine
sacrifices.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be
offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded to be offered,
so also should the young of the turtledove.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of
animals, as is clear from Gn. 1:20, seqq. Now death is opposed to life.
Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals
should be offered to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes us (Rm.
12:1), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto
God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to
God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore it was
unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially
as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption
and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God, it was
unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame,
or a blind, or otherwise defective animal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, those who offer victims to God should partake thereof,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): "Are not they that
eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was therefore
unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims,
namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right shoulder.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of God, so
also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female animals
was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of
both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsistent that female
animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and
that nevertheless birds should not be offered up in peace-offerings.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind.
Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so that it
was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the
following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other
peace-offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 11 Para. 1/1
OBJ 11: Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. Therefore, in
order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice should have been
offered up for all sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 12 Para. 1/1
OBJ 12: Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, were
offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem to be
suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways;
for sometimes an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of flour,
sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, sometimes in a
pan, sometimes on a gridiron.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 13 Para. 1/1
OBJ 13: Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be
recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that besides
animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be
offered to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Obj. 14 Para. 1/1
OBJ 14: Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the
heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward sacrifice,
the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which
salt represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27): "My spirit is sweet
above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of
leaven which makes bread savory, should be forbidden in a sacrifice;
while the use was prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense
which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertaining to
the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 1:13): "The priest shall offer it
all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet savor
to the Lord." Now according to Wis. 7:28, "God loveth none but him that
dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow that whatever is
acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these ceremonies of the
sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the ceremonies of the Old Law had
a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were intended
for Divine worship; and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they
were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies
pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the
divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two ways.
First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind
to God, to which the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in
order to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that whatever
he has is from God as from its first principle, and direct it to God as
its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and sacrifices, by the
fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of God, as
though in recognition of his having received them from God, according to
the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: and we
have given Thee what we received of Thy hand." Wherefore in offering up
sacrifices man made protestation that God is the first principle of the
creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be
directed. And since, for the human mind to be directed to God aright, it
must recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its
end in any other; for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer
sacrifice to any other but God, according to Ex. 22:20: "He that
sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord."
Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned to the ceremonies of
the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from
offering sacrifices to idols. Hence too it is that the precepts about the
sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had
fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten calf: as though those
sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to offer
sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols.
Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22): "I spake not to your fathers and I
commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of
Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and sacrifices."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had
fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; wherefore it is
written (Jn. 3:16): "God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten
Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have life
everlasting." Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ
Himself "delivered Himself . . . to God for an odor of sweetness" (Eph.
5:2). And for this reason all the other sacrifices of the Old Law were
offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount
sacrifice---the imperfect forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says
(Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the Old Law "often" offered "the same
sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but" Christ offered "one
sacrifice for sins, for ever." And since the reason of the figure is
taken from that which the figure represents, therefore the reasons of the
figurative sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true
sacrifice of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him on
account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He stood in
need of them: wherefore it is written (Is. 1:11): "I desire not
holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and lambs
and buckgoats." But, as stated above, He wished them to be offered to
Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the right ordering
of man's mind to God; and in order to represent the mystery of the
Redemption of man by Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 2: In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a
suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered in
sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters
offered all other animals to their gods, or made use of them in their
sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people had been dwelling)
considered it abominable to slay these animals, wherefore they used not
to offer them in sacrifice to their gods. Hence it is written (Ex. 8:26):
"We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our
God." For they worshipped the sheep; they reverenced the ram (because
demons appeared under the form thereof); while they employed oxen for
agriculture, which was reckoned by them as something sacred.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3
Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's
mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is chiefly by means of
these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are most
clean, and partake of a most clean food: whereas other animals are either
wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they be tame,
they have unclean food, as pigs and geese: and nothing but what is clean
should be offered to God. These birds especially were offered in
sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise.
Secondly, because the sacrificing of these animals represented purity of
heart. Because as the gloss says on Lev. 1, "We offer a calf, when we
overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our
unreasonable motions; a goat, when we conquer wantonness; a turtledove,
when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the unleavened
bread of sincerity." And it is evident that the dove denotes charity and
simplicity of heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3
Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they
might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, "Christ is
offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to
signify His innocence; in the ram, to foreshadow His headship; and in the
goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' [*An allusion to Col.
2:11 (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and dove denoted the union of the
two natures"; or else the turtledove signified chastity; while the dove
was a figure of charity. "The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of
believers with the water of Baptism."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Fish through living in water are further removed from man
than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish die as
soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in
the temple like other animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young;
while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi Moses
observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded
to be offered, because nothing should be offered to God but what is best.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain,
because it is by being killed that they become useful to man, forasmuch
as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt with
fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made fit for human
consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified the
destruction of sins: and also that man deserved death on account of his
sins; as though those animals were slain in man's stead, in order to
betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals
signified the slaying of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial
animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters
sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says (Doct.
Perplex. iii), "the Law chose that manner of slaying which was least
painful to the slain animal." This excluded cruelty on the part of the
offerers, and any mangling of the animals slain.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in
contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice to
God: and for this reason too they were forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer
"the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of . . . God."
For the same reason they did not offer animals before the seventh day,
because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on
account of its exceeding softness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 1/5
Reply OBJ 8: There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in
which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called "a
holocaust, i.e. all burnt." For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God
specially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His goodness: and
typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the
counsels. Wherefore the whole was burnt up: so that as the whole animal
by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so it might denote that the
whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the authority of
God, and should be offered to Him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 2/5
Another sacrifice was the "sin-offering," which was offered to God on
account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and this typifies the
state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two parts:
for one part was burnt; while the other was granted to the use of the
priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God through the
ministry of His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was offered for
the sins of the whole people, or specially for the sin of the priest, the
whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should
have the use of that which was offered for their own sins, to signify
that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, this would not be
satisfaction for sin: for if the offering were granted to the use of
those for whose sins it was offered, it would seem to be the same as if
it had not been offered.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 3/5
The third kind of sacrifice was called the "peace-offering," which was
offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the welfare and prosperity
of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to
be received: and this typifies the state of those who are proficient in
the observance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided into
three parts: for one part was burnt in honor of God; another part was
allotted to the use of the priests; and the third part to the use of the
offerers; in order to signify that man's salvation is from God, by the
direction of God's ministers, and through the cooperation of those who
are saved.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 4/5
But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted
to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: the blood being
poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was
burnt upon the altar (Lev. 9:9,10). The reason for this was, first, in
order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood and
eat the fat of the victims, according to Dt. 32:38: "Of whose victims
they eat the fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings." Secondly,
in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were forbidden
the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood;
wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:4,5): "Flesh with blood you shall not eat:
for I will require the blood of your lives": and they were forbidden to
eat the fat, in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is
written (Ezech. 34:3): "You have killed that which was fat." Thirdly, on
account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most necessary for
life, for which reason "life" is said to be "in the blood" (Lev.
17:11,14): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in
order to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency of all good
things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up in His honor.
Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding of Christ's blood, and the
abundance of His charity, whereby He offered Himself to God for us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 8 Para. 5/5
In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were
allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent a certain kind of
divination which is known as "spatulamantia," so called because it was
customary in divining to use the shoulder-blade [spatula], and the
breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these things
were taken away from the offerers. This is also denoted the priest's need
of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people---this was signified by
the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in
order to bear with human frailty---and this was signified by the right
shoulder.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of
sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because
the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves
was on account of the poverty of the offerers, who were unable to offer
bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and no one
was bound to offer them against his will, hence these birds were offered
not among the peace-victims, but among the holocausts and victims for
sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, on
account of their lofty flight, while befitting the perfection of the
holocausts: and were suitable for sin-offerings because their song is
doleful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 10 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 10: The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices: because
all were burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. The second
place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in
the court only, and on the very day of the sacrifice (Lev. 7:6,15). The
third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which
were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order
were the "ex-voto" peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten
even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is bound to
God, chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins
he has committed; thirdly, because of the benefits he has already
received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to
receive from Him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 11 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 11: Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the
sinner, as stated above (Q[73], A[10]): wherefore different victims are
commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of
some other private individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex.
iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the sin, the lower the
species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very
base animal, was offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered for a
priest's ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 12 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 12: In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the
poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a four-footed
animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; and that he who
could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and that if a man had
not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 12 Para. 2/2
The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the
"living bread" (Jn. 6:41,51). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it were,
during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He
was like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was
like perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked in the fire,
i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the virginal womb; baked
again in a pan by the toils which He suffered in the world; and consumed
by fire on the cross as on a gridiron.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 13 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 13: The products of the soil are useful to man, either as
food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine was
offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as
healing, and of these they offered incense, which both smells sweetly and
binds easily together.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 13 Para. 2/2
Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His blood,
whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace of Christ; salt, His
knowledge; incense, His prayer.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 14 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 14: Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both
because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in
order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from
those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not offered, to denote
the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be offered in
the sacrifices to idols.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 14 Para. 2/3
Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of
putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be incorrupt.
Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again,
mortification of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[101] A[3] R.O. 14 Para. 3/3
Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary
in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of a good name: for
incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And since the
sacrifice "of jealousy" did not proceed from devotion, but rather from
suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein (Num. 5:15).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining
to holy things?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the
ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For Paul said
(Acts 17:24): "God Who made the world and all things therein; He being
Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands." It was
therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be
set up for the worship of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by
Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law. Therefore it
should not have been changed by the building of a temple.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should lead
man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship requires
multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New
Law. Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law there should have
been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of
God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and simplicity.
Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided
by means of veils.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears first of
all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first movement
begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God. Therefore
it should have been built so as to point to the east rather than the west.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:4) that they should "not make
. . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything." It was therefore
unfitting for graven images of the cherubim to be set up in the
tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the
candlestick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there
without reasonable cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:24): "You shall make an altar
of earth unto Me": and again (Ex. 20:26): "Thou shalt not go up by steps
unto My altar." It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should
be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass; and
of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it except by steps.
For it is written (Ex. 27:1,2): "Thou shalt make also an altar of setim
wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad . . . and three
cubits high . . . and thou shalt cover it with brass": and (Ex. 30:1,3):
"Thou shalt make . . . an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and
thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for not
even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be found. But one
cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming
to furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz. curtains, curtains of
goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins (Ex. 26).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, the
subject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable for the
tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were inanimate
things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, it is written (Ps. 33:2): "I will bless the Lord at all
times, His praise shall always be in my mouth." But the solemn festivals
were instituted for the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that
certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that it
seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to
holy things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 8:4) that those who "offer gifts
according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly
things. As it was answered to Moses, when he was to finish the
tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the
pattern which was shown thee on the mount." But that is most reasonable,
which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the ceremonies
relating to holy things had a reasonable cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The chief purpose of the whole external worship is that
man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence less
those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas
he admires and reveres those things which are distinct from others in
some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among men for kings
and princes, who ought to be reverenced by their subjects, to be clothed
in more precious garments, and to possess vaster and more beautiful
abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a special abode,
special vessels, and special ministers to be appointed for the divine
worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater
reverence for God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above (A[2]; Q[100]
, A[12]; Q[101], A[2]), was instituted that it might foreshadow the
mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows something should be
determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently,
certain special points had to be observed in matters pertaining to the
worship of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who is
worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped,
is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part,
for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, who worship Him, are
corporeal beings: and for their sake there was need for a special
tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship of God, for two
reasons. First, that through coming together with the thought that the
place was set aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither
with greater reverence. Secondly, that certain things relating to the
excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature might be signified by the
arrangement of various details in such temple or tabernacle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
To this Solomon refers (3 Kgs. 8:27) when he says: "If heaven and the
heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which I
have built" for Thee? And further on (3 Kgs. 8:29,20) he adds: "That Thy
eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou hast said: My name
shall be there; . . . that Thou mayest hearken to the supplication of Thy
servant and of Thy people Israel." From this it is evident that the house
of the sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abiding
therein locally, but that God might be made known there by means of
things done and said there; and that those who prayed there might,
through reverence for the place, pray more devoutly, so as to be heard
more readily.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 2: Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law was
not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was effected in
Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition of the people
that were under the Law. Because, at first, the people were in the
desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were engaged in various
wars with the neighboring nations; and lastly, at the time of David and
Solomon, the state of that people was one of great peace. And then for
the first time the temple was built in the place which Abraham,
instructed by God, had chosen for the purpose of sacrifice. For it is
written (Gn. 22:2) that the Lord commanded Abraham to "offer" his son
"for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show thee": and
it is related further on (Gn. 22:14) that "he calleth the name of that
place, The Lord seeth," as though, according to the Divine prevision,
that place were chosen for the worship of God. Hence it is written (Dt.
12:5,6): "You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall
choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and victims."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3
Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of
the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons assigned by Rabbi
Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly,
lest the Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason is lest each tribe
might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes and quarrels be
the result. Hence the temple was not built until they had a king who
would be able to quell such quarrels. Until that time a portable
tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no place being as yet fixed
for the worship of God. This is the literal reason for the distinction
between the tabernacle and the temple.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3
The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a
twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, signifies the
state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which was fixed
and stable, signifies the state of future life which is altogether
unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of the
temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to signify that all movements
of disturbance will be far removed from the future state. Or else the
tabernacle signifies the state of the Old Law; while the temple built by
Solomon betokens the state of the New Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at
the building of the tabernacle; whereas the temple was built with the
cooperation of the Gentiles, viz. the Tyrians and Sidonians.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle may be
either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the exclusion of
idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various times to various gods: and so,
to strengthen in the minds of men their belief in the unity of the
Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in one place only.
Another reason was in order to show that bodily worship is not acceptable
of itself: and so they restrained from offering sacrifices anywhere and
everywhere. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice whereof
spiritual grace is contained, is of itself acceptable to God; and
consequently the multiplication of altars and temples is permitted in the
New Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God,
consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there were, even
under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed for the
people to gather together for the praise of God; just as now there are
places called churches in which the Christian people gather together for
the divine worship. Thus our church takes the place of both temple and
synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is spiritual; wherefore
with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of
teaching. The figurative reason may be that hereby is signified the unity
of the Church, whether militant or triumphant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened the
unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division of the
tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things that are
subject to God, and from which we arise to the worship of God. Now the
tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called the "Holy of
Holies," and was placed to the west; the other was called the "Holy
Place" [*Or 'Sanctuary'. The Douay version uses both expressions], which
was situated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the
tabernacle. Accordingly there are two reasons for this distinction. One
is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained to the worship of God.
Because the different parts of the world are thus betokened by the
division of the tabernacle. For that part which was called the Holy of
Holies signified the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances:
while that part which is called the Holy Place signified the corporeal
world. Hence the Holy Place was separated from the Holy of Holies by a
veil, which was of four different colors (denoting the four elements),
viz. of linen, signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of
the earth; purple, signifying water, because the purple tint was made
from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it
has the color of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire: and
this because matter composed of the four elements is a veil between us
and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a
year, entered into the inner tabernacle, i.e. the Holy of Holies: whereby
we are taught that man's final perfection consists in his entering into
that (higher) world: whereas into the outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy
Place, the priests entered every day: whereas the people were only
admitted to the court; because the people were able to perceived material
things, the inner nature of which only wise men by dint of study are able
to discover.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
But regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, which was
called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the Old Law, as the Apostle
says (Heb. 9:6, seqq.): because into that tabernacle "the priests always
entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices." But the inner
tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified either the
glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law to come. To the
latter state Christ brought us; and this was signified by the high-priest
entering alone, once a year, into the Holy of Holies. The veil betokened
the concealing of the spiritual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old.
This veil was adorned with four colors: viz. that of linen, to designate
purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the sufferings which the saints
underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed, signifying the twofold love of God
and our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. With
regard to the state of the Old Law the people and the priests were
situated differently from one another. For the people saw the mere
corporeal sacrifices which were offered in the court: whereas the priests
were intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith
in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into the
outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided from the court by a
veil; because some matters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden
from the people, while they were known to the priests: though they were
not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently in the New
Testament (cf. Eph. 3:5).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law to the
exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in reverence to the sun,
worshipped towards the east; hence it is written (Ezech. 8:16) that
certain men "had their backs towards the temple of the Lord, and their
faces to the east, and they adored towards the rising of the sun."
Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the Holy of
Holies to westward, that they might adore toward the west. A figurative
reason may also be found in the fact that the whole state of the first
tabernacle was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which is
signified by the west, according to Ps. 67:5: "Who ascendeth unto the
west; the Lord is His name."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 1/5
Reply OBJ 6: Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for the
things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in connection
with the divine worship. And because, as already observed (ad 4), the
inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signified the higher world
of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle contained three things,
viz. "the ark of the testament in which was a golden pot that had manna,
and the rod of Aaron that had blossomed, and the tables" (Heb. 9:4) on
which were written the ten commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood
between two "cherubim" that looked one towards the other: and over the
ark was a table, called the "propitiatory," raised above the wings of the
cherubim, as though it were held up by them; and appearing, to the
imagination, to be the very seat of God. For this reason it was called
the "propitiatory," as though the people received propitiation thence at
the prayers of the high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by
the cherubim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of the
testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory.
These three things denote three things in that higher world: namely, God
Who is above all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness
of Him was set up; to denote His invisibility. But there was something to
represent his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath God, as
the seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that higher world
there are spiritual substances called angels. These are signified by the
two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that they are at
peace with one another, according to Job 25:2: "Who maketh peace in . . .
high places." For this reason, too, there was more than one cherub, to
betoken the multitude of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving
worship from those who had been commanded to worship but one God.
Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in that spiritual world, the
intelligible types of whatsoever takes place in this world, just as in
every cause are enclosed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman
the types of the works of his craft. This was betokened by the ark, which
represented, by means of the three things it contained, the three things
of greatest import in human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the
tables of the testament; the power of governing, betokened by the rod of
Aaron; and life, betokened by the manna which was the means of
sustenance. Or else these three things signified the three Divine
attributes, viz. wisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in
the manna---both by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through
the goodness of God that it was granted to man, wherefore it was
preserved as a memorial of the Divine mercy. Again, these three things
were represented in Isaias' vision. For he "saw the Lord sitting upon a
throne high and elevated"; and the seraphim standing by; and that the
house was filled with the glory of the Lord; wherefrom the seraphim cried
out: "All the earth is full of His glory" (Is. 6:1,3). And so the images
of the seraphim were set up, not to be worshipped, for this was
forbidden by the first commandment; but as a sign of their function, as
stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 2/5
The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained
three things, viz. the "altar of incense," which was directly opposite
the ark; the "table of proposition," with the twelve loaves of
proposition on it, which stood on the northern side; and the
"candlestick," which was placed towards the south. These three things
seem to correspond to the three which were enclosed in the ark; and they
represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly: because, in
order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the temple, might
grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary to express them more
manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic mind. Accordingly the
candlestick betokened, as a sensible sign thereof, the wisdom which was
expressed on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. The altar of
incense signified the office of the priest, whose duty it was to bring
the people to God: and this was signified also by the rod: because on
that altar the sweet-smelling incense was burnt, signifying the holiness
of the people acceptable to God: for it is written (Apoc. 8:3) that the
smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the "justifications of the
saints" (cf. Apoc. 19:8). Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the
priesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer
tabernacle, by the altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator
between God and the people, governing the people by Divine power, denoted
by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His government, i.e. the
holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, so to speak. The table
signified the sustenance of life, just as the manna did: but the former,
a more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, a sweeter
and more delicate. Again, the candlestick was fittingly placed on the
southern side, while the table was placed to the north: because the south
is the right-hand side of the world, while the north is the left-hand
side, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like other spiritual
goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs on
the left, according to Prov. 3:16: "In her left hand (are) riches and
glory." And the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and
spiritual wisdom; because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal
goods are dispensed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 3/5
Another literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained the
tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness of the Law,
wherefore it is written (Ex. 24:12): "I will give thee two tables of
stone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that thou
mayest teach them" to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron was placed
there to restrain the people from insubordination to the priesthood of
Aaron; wherefore it is written (Num. 17:10): "Carry back the rod of Aaron
into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a
token of the rebellious children of Israel." The manna was kept in the
ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on the children of
Israel in the desert; wherefore it is written (Ex. 16:32): "Fill a gomor
of it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they
may know the bread wherewith I fed you in the wilderness." The
candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the temple, for the
magnificence of a house depends on its being well lighted. Now the
candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii,
7,8), to signify the seven planets, wherewith the whole world is
illuminated. Hence the candlestick was placed towards the south; because
for us the course of the planets is from that quarter. The altar of
incense was instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a
sweet-smelling smoke; both through respect for the tabernacle, and as a
remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the
slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile,
whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. The table was place
there to signify that the priests who served the temple should take their
food in the temple: wherefore, as stated in Mt. 12:4, it was lawful for
none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on the table
in memory of the twelve tribes. And the table was not placed in the
middle directly in front of the propitiatory, in order to exclude an
idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a
table in front of the idol of the moon, wherefore it is written (Jer.
7:18): "The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 4/5
In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on
which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed were offered
to God: and consequently the people who offered these sacrifices to God
by the hands of the priest could be present in the court. But the priests
alone, whose function it was to offer the people to God, could approach
the inner altar, whereon the very devotion and holiness of the people was
offered to God. And this altar was put up outside the tabernacle and in
the court, to the exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles
placed altars inside the temples to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 5/5
The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the
relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed therein. Now
it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the
Law, various figures were instituted in the temple to betoken Christ. For
He was foreshadowed by the "propitiatory," since He is "a propitiation
for our sins" (1 Jn. 2:2). This propitiatory was fittingly carried by
cherubim, since of Him it is written (Heb. 1:6): "Let all the angels of
God adore Him." He is also signified by the ark: because just as the ark
was made of setim-wood, so was Christ's body composed of most pure
members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was full of wisdom and
charity, which are betokened by gold. And in the ark was a golden pot,
i.e. His holy soul, having manna, i.e. "all the fulness of the Godhead"
(Col. 2:9). Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power: for
"He was made a . . . priest for ever" (Heb. 6:20). And therein were the
tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ Himself is a lawgiver.
Again, Christ was signified by the candlestick, for He said Himself (Jn.
8:12): "I am the Light of the world"; while the seven lamps denoted the
seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in the table, because
He is our spiritual food, according to Jn. 6:41,51: "I am the living
bread": and the twelve loaves signified the twelve apostles, or their
teaching. Or again, the candlestick and table may signify the Church's
teaching, and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. Again, Christ
is signified by the two altars of holocausts and incense. Because all
works of virtue must be offered to us to God through Him; both those
whereby we afflict the body, which are offered, as it were, on the altar
of holocausts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind, are
offered to God in Christ, by the spiritual desires of the perfect, on the
altar of incense, as it were, according to Heb. 13:15: "By Him therefore
let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 7 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 7: The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering of
sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the
ministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction of
the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was at the beginning of
the Law (Ex. 20:24, seqq.) when the Lord commanded them to make "an altar
of earth," or at least "not of hewn stones"; and again, not to make the
altar high, so as to make it necessary to "go up" to it "by steps." This
was in detestation of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles made their
altars ornate and high, thinking that there was something holy and divine
in such things. For this reason, too, the Lord commanded (Dt. 16:21):
"Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy
God": since idolaters were wont to offer sacrifices beneath trees, on
account of the pleasantness and shade afforded by them. There was also a
figurative reason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in
Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature of flesh, as regards
His humanity---and this is to make an altar of earth; and again, in
regard to His Godhead, we must confess His equality with the Father---and
this is "not to go up" to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not
couple the doctrine of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes men
to lewdness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 7 Para. 2/3
But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of God,
there was no longer reason to fear these occasions of idolatry. Wherefore
the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be
conspicuous to all the people; and the altar of incense, which was
visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so precious as to give the
people an occasion for idolatry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 7 Para. 3/3
Since, however, the reason for the precept, "Thou shalt not go up by
steps unto My altar" (Ex. 20:26) is stated to have been "lest thy
nakedness be discovered," it should be observed that this too was
instituted with the purpose of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of
Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. But
later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the sake
of decency: so that without any danger the altar could be placed so high
that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up by steps of wood,
not fixed but movable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 8 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 8: The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed on
end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors,
viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These
curtains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle; and the roof
of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins; and over this
there was another covering of rams' skins dyed red; and over this there
was a third curtain made of goats' hair, which covered not only the roof
of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and covered the boards
of the tabernacle on the outside. The literal reason of these coverings
taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the tabernacle, that
it might be an object of respect. Taken singly, according to some, the
curtains denoted the starry heaven, which is adorned with various stars;
the curtain (of goats' skin) signified the waters which are above the
firmament; the skins dyed red denoted the empyrean heaven, where the
angels are; the violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 8 Para. 2/2
The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the
tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of Christ, who compose
the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of four
colors: because the faithful are inwardly adorned with the four virtues:
for "the twisted linen," as the gloss observes, "signifies the flesh
refulgent with purity; violet signifies the mind desirous of heavenly
things; purple denotes the flesh subject to passions; the twice dyed
scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the
love of God and our neighbor." The coverings of the building designate
prelates and doctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly
manner of life, signified by the violet colored skins: and who should
also be ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and
austere of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains of
goats' hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as the gloss observes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: The literal reason for the sanctification of the tabernacle
and vessels was that they might be treated with greater reverence, being
deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this consecration. The
figurative reason is that this sanctification signified the
sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the faithful of whom the
Church of Christ is composed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 10 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 10: Under the Old Law there were seven temporal solemnities,
and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from Num. 28,29. There
was a continual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morning
and evening: and this continual feast of an abiding sacrifice signified
the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the temporal feasts the first was that
which was repeated every week. This was the solemnity of the "Sabbath,"
celebrated in memory of the work of the creation of the universe. Another
solemnity, viz. the "New Moon," was repeated every month, and was
observed in memory of the work of the Divine government. For the things
of this lower world owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the
moon; wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full
moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who used to offer sacrifices to
the moon at that particular time. And these two blessings are bestowed in
common on the whole human race; and hence they were repeated more
frequently.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 10 Para. 2/3
The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they commemorated
the benefits which had been conferred especially on that people. For
there was the feast of the "Passover" in the first month to commemorate
the blessing of being delivered out of Egypt. The feast of "Pentecost"
was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of the giving of
the Law. The other three feasts were kept in the seventh month, nearly
the whole of which was solemnized by them, just as the seventh day. For
on the first of the seventh month was the feast of "Trumpets," in memory
of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham found the ram caught by its horns,
which they represented by the horns which they blew. The feast of
Trumpets was a kind of invitation whereby they prepared themselves to
keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth day. This was the
feast of "Expiation," in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of
Moses, God forgave the people's sin of worshipping the calf. After this
was the feast of "Scenopegia" or of "Tents," which was kept for seven
days, to commemorate the blessing of being protected and led by God
through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence during this feast
they had to take "the fruits of the fairest tree," i.e. the citron, "and
the trees of dense foliage" [*Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: 'Boughs of
thick trees'], i.e. the myrtle, which is fragrant, "and the branches of
palm-trees, and willows of the brook," which retain their greenness a
long time; and these are to be found in the Land of promise; to signify
that God had brought them through the arid land of the wilderness to a
land of delights. On the eighth day another feast was observed, of
"Assembly and Congregation," on which the people collected the expenses
necessary for the divine worship: and it signified the uniting of the
people and the peace granted to them in the Land of promise.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[4] R.O. 10 Para. 3/3
The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice
of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, Who is the "Lamb of
God," according to Heb. 13:8: "Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and the
same for ever." The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed by
Christ, as stated in Heb. 4. The Neomenia, which is the beginning of the
new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive Church by Christ's
preaching and miracles. The feast of Pentecost signified the Descent of
the Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signified the
preaching of the apostles. The feast of Expiation signified the cleansing
of the Christian people from sins: and the feast of Tabernacles signified
their pilgrimage in this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue.
The feast of Assembly or Congregation foreshadowed the assembly of the
faithful in the kingdom of heaven: wherefore this feast is described as
"most holy" (Lev. 23:36). These three feasts followed immediately on one
another, because those who expiate their vices should advance in virtue,
until they come to see God, as stated in Ps. 83:8.
™Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the
sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for the
purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of
idolaters: since it is written (Dt. 12:31): "Thou shalt not do in like
manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all the
abominations which the Lord abhorreth." Now worshippers of idols used to
knive themselves to the shedding of blood: for it is related (3 Kgs.
18:28) that they "cut themselves after their manner with knives and
lancets, till they were all covered with blood." For this reason the Lord
commanded (Dt. 14:1): "You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness
for the dead." Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be
prescribed by the Law (Lev. 12:3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things which are done for the worship of God
should be marked with decorum and gravity; according to Ps. 34:18: "I
will praise Thee in a grave [Douay: 'strong'] people." But it seems to
savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was unfittingly
commanded (Ex. 12:11) that they should eat the Paschal lamb "in haste."
Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb were prescribed,
which seem altogether unreasonable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the
sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the sacrament
of the Eucharist, according to 1 Cor. 5:7: "Christ our Pasch is
sacrificed." Therefore there should also have been some sacraments of the
Old Law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the New Law, such as
Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing
something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily thing is
reputed impure, because all bodies are God's creatures; and "every
creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with
thanksgiving" (1 Tim. 4:4). It was therefore unfitting for them to be
purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal infection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 34:4): "What can be made clean by
the unclean?" But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf. Heb. 9:13] which was
burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean: for it is stated
(Num. 19:7, seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered unclean
"until the evening"; likewise he that burnt her; and he that gathered up
her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed there that the unclean
should be purified by being sprinkled with those cinders.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried
from one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin by means of
something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of
expiating the sins of the people that the priest should confess the sins
of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might carry
them away into the wilderness: while they were rendered unclean by the
other, which they used for the purpose of purification, by burning it
together with the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their
clothes and their bodies with water (Lev. 16).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed again.
It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification to a man
cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in Lev. 14.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material
water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable that the
Lord ordered (Ex. 30:18, seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with its
foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before entering
the temple; and that He commanded (Num. 8:7) the Levites to be sprinkled
with the water of purification, and to shave all the hairs of their flesh.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that which
is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the higher and
lower priests, as stated in Lev. 8 [*Cf. Ex. 29], and the Levites,
according to Num. 8, should be consecrated with any bodily anointing,
bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, as stated in 1 Kgs. 16:7, "Man seeth those things that
appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." But those things that appear
outwardly in man are the dispositions of his body and his clothes.
Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed
to the higher and lower priests, as related in Ex. 28 [*Cf. Lev. 8:7,
seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone should be debarred
from the priesthood on account of defects in the body, as stated in Lev.
21:17, seqq.: "Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a
blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God . . . if he be blind, if he
be lame," etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments of the Old Law
were unreasonable.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 20:8): "I am the Lord that sanctify
you." But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is written (Ps.
103:24): "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Therefore there was
nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the Old Law,
which were ordained to the sanctification of man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[101], A[4]), the sacraments are,
properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their
consecration so as, in some way, to depute them to the worship of God.
Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole people; but
in a special way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, who were the
ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these sacraments of the
Old Law, certain things concerned the whole people in general; while
others belonged to the ministers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be
established in the state of worshipping God: and this institution was
brought about---for all in general, by circumcision, without which no one
was admitted to any of the legal observances---and for the priests, by
their consecration. The second thing required was the use of those things
that pertain to divine worship. And thus, as to the people, there was the
partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no uncircumcised man was
admitted, as is clear from Ex. 12:43, seqq.: and, as to the priests, the
offering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of proposition and
of other things that were allotted to the use of the priests. The third
thing required was the removal of all impediments to divine worship, viz.
of uncleannesses. And then, as to the people, certain purifications were
instituted for the removal of certain external uncleannesses; and also
expiations from sins; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing
of hands and feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far as
they were ordained to the worship of God for the time being, and
figurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we
shall see by taking them one by one.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order that
man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham was the
first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and
kindred, for this reason he was the first to receive circumcision. This
reason is set forth by the Apostle (Rm. 4:9, seqq.) thus: "He received
the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith which he
had, being uncircumcised"; because, to wit, we are told that "unto
Abraham faith was reputed to justice," for the reason that "against hope
he believed in hope," i.e. against the hope that is of nature he believed
in the hope that is of grace, "that he might be made the father of many
nations," when he was an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman.
And in order that this declaration, and imitation of Abraham's faith,
might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the Jews, they received in their
flesh such a sign as they could not forget, wherefore it is written (Gn.
17:13): "My covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant."
This was done on the eighth day, because until then a child is very
tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is considered as something
not yet consolidated: wherefore neither are animals offered before the
eighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might
refuse the sign of circumcision on account of the pain: and also lest the
parents, whose love for their children increases as they become used to
their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their children
from circumcision. A second reason may have been the weakening of
concupiscence in that member. A third motive may have been to revile the
worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that part of the body.
The Lord's prohibition extended only to the cutting of oneself in honor
of idols: and such was not the circumcision of which we have been
speaking.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the
removal of corruption, which was to be brought about by Christ, and will
be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of those who
rise from the dead. And since all corruption of guilt and punishment
comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our first parent,
therefore circumcision was applied to the generative member. Hence the
Apostle says (Col. 2:11): "You are circumcised" in Christ "with
circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but
in the circumcision of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 2: The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to
commemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by
celebrating this banquet they declared that they belonged to that people
which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were delivered
from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood on the
transoms of their house doors, as though declaring that they were averse
to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the ram. Wherefore they were
delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the
door-posts, from the danger of extermination which threatened the
Egyptians.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3
Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt: namely,
their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed them to go forth
speedily, as related in Ex. 12:33; and there was danger that anyone who
did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians.
Their haste was shown in two ways. First by what they ate. For they were
commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign "that it could not be
leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to depart"; and to eat roast meat,
for this took less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone
thereof, because in their haste there was no time to break bones.
Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is written: "You shall gird
your reins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding staves in your
hands, and you shall eat in haste": which clearly designates men at the
point of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the
command: "In one house shall it be eaten, neither shall you carry forth
of the flesh thereof out of the house": because, to wit, on account of
their haste, they could not send any gifts of it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3
The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild
lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice of the
paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to 1 Cor. 5:7:
"Christ our pasch is sacrificed." The blood of the lamb, which ensured
deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled on the transoms,
signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and on the lips of the
faithful, by which same Passion we are delivered from sin and death,
according to 1 Pt. 1:18: "You were . . . redeemed . . . with the precious
blood . . . of a lamb unspotted." The partaking of its flesh signified
the eating of Christ's body in the Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted
at the fire to signify Christ's Passion or charity. And it was eaten with
unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful who
partake of Christ's body, according to 1 Cor. 5:8: "Let us feast . . .
with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." The wild lettuces were
added to denote repentance for sins, which is required of those who
receive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of chastity:
and the shoes of their feet are the examples of our dead ancestors. The
staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority: and
it was commanded that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one house, i.e.
in a catholic church, and not in the conventicles of heretics.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding
figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is the sacrament
of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written (Col.
2:11,12): "You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of" Our Lord
Jesus "Christ: buried with Him in Baptism." In the New Law the sacrament
of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The
sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds to all the purifications
of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration
of the pontiff and of the priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation,
which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace, there would be no
corresponding sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of fulness had
not yet come, since "the Law brought no man [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to
perfection" (Heb. 7:19). The same applies to the sacrament of Extreme
Unction, which is an immediate preparation for entrance into glory, to
which the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the price had
not yet been paid. Matrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a
function of nature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ with
the Church, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the
Old Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, which is contrary to
the nature of the sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/7
Reply OBJ 4: As already stated, the purifications of the Old Law were
ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship: which
worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind to
God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations, and so forth. Now
men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, whereby men were said
to be polluted, for instance, by idolatry, murder, adultery, or incest.
From such pollutions men were purified by certain sacrifices, offered
either for the whole community in general, or also for the sins of
individuals; not that those carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power
of expiating sin; but that they signified that expiation of sins which
was to be effected by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers
by protesting their faith in the Redeemer, while taking part in the
figurative sacrifices.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 2/7
The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily
uncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as existing in
man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes,
dwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself uncleanness was considered as
arising partly from himself and partly from contact with unclean things.
Anything proceeding from man was reputed unclean that was already subject
to corruption, or exposed thereto: and consequently since death is a kind
of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean. In like manner,
since leprosy arises from corruption of the humors, which break out
externally and infect other persons, therefore were lepers also
considered unclean; and, again, women suffering from a flow of blood,
whether from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly course or at
the time of conception); and, for the same reason, men were reputed
unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed, whether due to weakness, to
nocturnal pollution, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor
issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves some unclean infection.
Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 3/7
Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these
uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence due to
those things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are not
wont, when unclean, to touch precious things: and in order that by rarely
approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for them. For
since man could seldom avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses, the result
was that men could seldom approach to touch things belonging to the
worship of God, so that when they did approach, they did so with greater
reverence and humility. Moreover, in some of these the literal reason was
that men should not be kept away from worshipping God through fear of
coming in contact with lepers and others similarly afflicted with
loathsome and contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to
avoid idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles
sometimes employed human blood and seed. All these bodily uncleannesses
were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of
those which were more grievous, by some sacrifice of expiation for the
sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 4/7
The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were figures
of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse signifies the
uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of
leprosy betokened the uncleanness of heretical doctrine: both because
heretical doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because no
doctrine is so false as not to have some truth mingled with error, just
as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the healthy parts
from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a
flow of blood denotes the uncleanness of idolatry, on account of the
blood which is offered up. The uncleanness of the man who has suffered
seminal loss signifies the uncleanness of empty words, for "the seed is
the word of God." The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman
in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness
of the woman in her periods signifies the uncleanness of a mind that is
sensualized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted
by touching an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness arising from
consent in another's sin, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go out from among
them, and be ye separate . . . and touch not the unclean thing."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 5/7
Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even by
inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any way by an unclean man,
became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of the
Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was contracted not only by touch, but
also by speech or looks, as Rabbi Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a
woman in her periods. The mystical sense of this was that "to God the
wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike" (Wis. 14:9).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 6/7
There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in
themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house or in clothes.
For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor causing
putrefaction and corruption in the flesh; so, too, through some
corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes a
kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is built, or in
clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the name of leprosy,
whereby a house or a garment was deemed to be unclean: both because all
corruption savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because the
Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this
corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses, where this kind of
corruption was of a lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to
be burnt, in order to avoid all occasion of idolatry. There was also an
uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written (Num. 19:15): "The vessel
that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean." The cause of
this uncleanness was that anything unclean might easily drop into such
vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command aimed at
the prevention of idolatry. For idolaters believed that if mice, lizards,
or the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols, fell into the
vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to the gods. Even
now some women let down uncovered vessels in honor of the nocturnal
deities which they call "Janae."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 7/7
The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a
house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of heretics; the leprosy
of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from bitterness of
mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment denoted the wickedness of
flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy
on the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the warp is in the woof, so
is the soul in the body. The vessel that has neither cover nor binding,
betokens a man who lacks the veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained
by any severity of discipline.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 5: As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold uncleanness in
the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body; and this
was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an unclean
thing, and this was less grave, and was more easily expiated. Because the
former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins, since all
corruption is due to sin, and signifies sin: whereas the latter
uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling of a certain water, of
which water we read in Num. 19. For there God commanded them to take a
red cow in memory of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf.
And a cow is mentioned rather than a calf, because it was thus that the
Lord was wont to designate the synagogue, according to Osee 4:16: "Israel
hath gone astray like a wanton heifer": and this was, perhaps, because
they worshipped heifers after the custom of Egypt, according to Osee
10:5: "(They) have worshipped the kine of Bethaven." And in detestation
of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact,
whenever sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins,
it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show that this
sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, "the priest" dipped
"his finger in her blood," and sprinkled "it over against the door of the
tabernacle seven times"; for the number seven signified universality.
Further, the very sprinkling of blood pertained to the detestation of
idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was not poured out, but
was collected together, and men gathered round it to eat in honor of the
idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either because God appeared to
Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst of fire; or to
denote that idolatry, together with all that was connected therewith, was
to be extirpated altogether; just as the cow was burnt "with her skin and
her flesh, her blood and dung being delivered to the flames." To this
burning were added "cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed," to
signify that just as cedar-wood is not liable to putrefaction, and
scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its color, and hyssop retains its
odor after it has been dried; so also was this sacrifice for the
preservation of the whole people, and for their good behavior and
devotion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: "That they may be
reserved for the multitude of the children of Israel." Or, according to
Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the four elements are indicated here: for
"cedar-wood" was added to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of
its earthiness; "hyssop," to signify the air, on account of its smell;
"scarlet twice dyed," to signify water, for the same reason as purple, on
account of the dyes which are taken out of the water: thus denoting the
fact that this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements.
And since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both "he
that burned her," and "he that gathered up the ashes," and "he that
sprinkled the water" in which the ashes were placed, were deemed unclean
in detestation of that sin, in order to show that whatever was in any way
connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From this
uncleanness they were purified by the mere washing of their clothes; nor
did they need to be sprinkled with the water on account of this kind of
uncleanness, because otherwise the process would have been unending,
since he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so that if he were to
sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle
him, that one would have become unclean, and in like manner, whoever
might sprinkle him, and so on indefinitely.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 2/3
The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow signified
Christ in respect his assumed weakness, denoted by the female sex; while
the color of the cow designated the blood of His Passion. And the "red
cow was of full age," because all Christ's works are perfect, "in which
there" was "no blemish"; "and which" had "not carried the yoke," because
Christ was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of sin. It was commanded
to be taken to Moses, because they blamed Him for transgressing the law
of Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered
"to Eleazar the priest," because Christ was delivered into the hands of
the priests to be slain. It was immolated "without the camp," because
Christ "suffered outside the gate" (Heb. 13:12). And the priest dipped
"his finger in her blood," because the mystery of Christ's Passion should
be considered and imitated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 3/3
It was sprinkled "over against . . . the tabernacle," which denotes the
synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of the unbelieving Jews, or
the purification of believers; and this "seven times," in token either of
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, or of the seven days wherein all time
is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to the Incarnation of Christ
should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should be understood spiritually;
for the "skin" and "flesh" signified Christ's outward works; the "blood"
denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His external deeds; the
"dung" betokened His weariness, His thirst, and all such like things
pertaining to His weakness. Three things were added, viz. "cedar-wood,"
which denotes the height of hope or contemplation; "hyssop," in token of
humility or faith; "scarlet twice dyed," which denotes twofold charity;
for it is by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The
ashes of this burning were gathered by "a man that is clean," because the
relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who were
not guilty of Christ's death. The ashes were put into water for the
purpose of expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's Passion the
power of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow,
and he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes, were unclean,
as also he that sprinkled the water: either because the Jews became
unclean through putting Christ to death, whereby our sins are expiated;
and this, until the evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the
remnants of Israel will be converted; or else because they who handle
sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain
uncleannesses, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the
evening, i.e. until the end of this life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 6: As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was caused by
corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by sin-offerings. Now
special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individuals:
but since some were neglectful about expiating such sins and
uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer this expiation; it
was laid down that once a year, on the tenth day of the seventh month, a
sacrifice of expiation should be offered for the whole people. And
because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28), "the Law maketh men priests,
who have infirmity," it behooved the priest first of all to offer a calf
for his own sins, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf;
and besides, to offer a ram for a holocaust, which signified that the
priestly sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the flock,
was to be ordained to the glory of God. Then he offered two he-goats for
the people: one of which was offered in expiation of the sins of the
multitude. For the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin
clothes are made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench,
uncleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated,
its blood was taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy
of Holies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled with it; to signify
that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of
Israel. But the corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been offered up
for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction of sins. They were
not, however, burnt on the altar: since none but holocausts were burnt
thereon; but it was prescribed that they should be burnt without the
camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was
offered for a grievous sin, or for the multitude of sins. The other goat
was let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to offer it to the demons,
whom the Gentiles worshipped in desert places, because it was unlawful to
offer aught to them; but in order to point out the effect of the
sacrifice which had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand on its
head, while confessing the sins of the children of Israel: as though that
goat were to carry them away into the wilderness, where it would be
devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment of the people's
sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because the
forgiveness of the people's sins was signified by its being let loose, or
because on its head written lists of sins were fastened.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 2/3
The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was foreshadowed
both by the calf, on account of His power; and by the ram, because He is
the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of "the likeness
of sinful flesh" (Rm. 8:3). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed for the sins
of both priests and people: since both those of high and those of low
degree are cleansed from sin by His Passion. The blood of the calf and of
the goat was brought into the Holies by the priest, because the entrance
to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's
Passion. Their bodies were burnt without the camp, because "Christ
suffered without the gate," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 13:12). The
scape-goat may denote either Christ's Godhead Which went away into
solitude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going to another place, but
by restraining His power: or it may signify the base concupiscence which
we ought to cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts
of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 6 Para. 3/3
With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these
sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned (ad 5) to
the sacrifice of the red heifer.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 7 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 7: The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his deformity,
but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the words of Lev. 14:3,
seqq., where it was said that the priest, "when he shall find that the
leprosy is cleansed," shall command "him that is to be purified":
consequently, the leper was already healed: but he was said to be
purified in so far as the verdict of the priest restored him to the
society of men and to the worship of God. It happened sometimes, however,
that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the
priest erred in his judgment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 7 Para. 2/3
Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first place,
he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was restored, as clean, to
the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit, after seven days.
At the first purification the leper who sought to be cleansed offered for
himself "two living sparrows . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop,"
in such wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied to the
cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so that the cedar-wood was like the
handle of an aspersory: while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of
the aspersory which was dipped into the blood of the other sparrow which
was "immolated . . . over living waters." These things he offered as an
antidote to the four defects of leprosy: for cedar-wood, which is not
subject to putrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction; hyssop,
which is a sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; a
living sparrow was offered up against numbness; and scarlet, which has a
vivid color, was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy. The
living sparrow was let loose to fly away into the plain, because the
leper was restored to his former liberty.
On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored to
the society of men; but only after having shaved all the hair of his
body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects the
clothes, and gives them an evil smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered
for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and some of
the blood of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the man that
was to be cleansed, "and on the thumb of his right hand, and the great
toe of his right foot"; because it is in these parts that leprosy is
first diagnosed and felt. In this rite, moreover, three liquids were
employed: viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to denote
the healing of the disease; and living waters, to wash away the filth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 7 Para. 3/3
The figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ
were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in likeness of His human
nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters, because
the waters of Baptism are sanctified by Christ's Passion. The other
sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living, because the
Godhead cannot die: hence it flew away, for the Godhead could not be
encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, together with the
cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e. faith, hope and
charity, as stated above (ad 5), was put into the water for the purpose
of sprinkling, because we are baptized in the faith of the God-Man. By
the waters of Baptism or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e. his
works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of
the man to be cleansed is moistened with some the blood and oil, in order
to strengthen his hearing against harmful words; and the thumb and toe of
his right hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other
matters pertaining to this purification, or to that also of any other
uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to other
sacrifices, whether for sins or for trespasses.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 8 Para. 1/4
Reply OBJ 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated by circumcision to
the divine worship, so were the ministers by some special purification or
consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be separated from other
men, as being specially deputed, rather than others, to the ministry of
the divine worship. And all that was done touching them in their
consecration or institution, was with a view to show that they were in
possession of a prerogative of purity, power and dignity. Hence three
things were done in the institution of ministers: for first, they were
purified; secondly, they were adorned [*'Ornabantur.' Some editions have
'ordinabantur'---'were ordained': the former reading is a reference to
Lev. 8:7-9] and consecrated; thirdly, they were employed in the ministry.
All in general used to be purified by washing in water, and by certain
sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the hair of their
bodies, as stated in Lev. 8 (cf. Num. 8).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 8 Para. 2/4
With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was
performed as follows. First, when they had been washed, they were clothed
with certain special garments in designation of their dignity. In
particular, the high-priest was anointed on the head with the oil of
unction: to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by him
on to others, just as oil flows from the head on to the lower parts of
the body; according to Ps. 132:2: "Like the precious ointment on the head
that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron." But the Levites
received no other consecration besides being offered to the Lord by the
children of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed for
them. The lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only, which were
to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear and the
thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right foot were
tinged with the blood of the sacrificial animal, to denote that they
should be obedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is
denoted by touching their right ear); and that they should be careful and
ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moistening
of the right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were
sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed, in
memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in
Egypt. At their consecration the following sacrifices were offered: a
calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; a
ram, for a holocaust, in memory of the sacrifice of Abraham, whose
obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram of
consecration, which was a peace-offering, in memory of the delivery form
Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in memory of
the manna vouchsafed to the people.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 8 Para. 3/4
In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the
ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were placed on their
hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things to
the Lord: while the Levites were initiated to the ministry by being
brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the
ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 8 Para. 4/4
The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be
consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should be first of all
purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in their
faith in Christ's Passion, which is a sacrifice both of expiation and of
purification. They have also to shave all the hair of their body, i.e.
all evil thoughts. They should, moreover, be decked with virtues, and be
consecrated with the oil of the Holy Ghost, and with the sprinkling of
Christ's blood. And thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their
spiritual ministry.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 10 Para. 1/5
Reply OBJ 10: As already stated (A[4]), the purpose of the Law was to
induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and this in two
ways; first, by excluding from the worship of God whatever might be an
object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine worship all
that seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this was observed in
regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the animals to be
sacrificed, much more was it to be observed in the very ministers.
Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was
prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or defect: since men so
deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same reason it was
also commanded that the choice of those who were to be destined to the
service of God was not to be made in a broadcast manner from any family,
but according to their descent from one particular stock, thus giving
them distinction and nobility.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 10 Para. 2/5
In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were
appointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. This indeed
is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest in
particular had eight vestments. First, he had a linen tunic. Secondly, he
had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed "little bells"
and "pomegranates of violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed."
Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his shoulders and his breast
down to the girdle; and it was made of gold, and violet and purple, and
scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and on his shoulders he bore two
onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children of Israel.
Fourthly, he had the rational, made of the same material; it was square
in shape, and was worn on the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On
this rational there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on
which also were graven the names of the children of Israel, in token that
the priest bore the burden of the whole people, since he bore their names
on his shoulders; and that it was his duty ever to think of their
welfare, since he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so
to speak. And the Lord commanded the "Doctrine and Truth" to be put in
the rational: for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth were
written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a
stone which changed color according to the various things which were
about to happen to the children of Israel: and this they call the "Truth
and Doctrine." Fifthly, he wore a belt or girdle made of the four colors
mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of
linen. Seventhly, there was the golden plate which hung over his
forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord's name. Eighthly, there were "the
linen breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness," when they went up
to the sanctuary or altar. Of these eight vestments the lesser priests
had four, viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 10 Para. 3/5
According to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that they
denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe; as though the
high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of the
world, wherefore it is written (Wis. 18:24): "In the robe" of Aaron "was
the whole world" described. For the linen breeches signified the earth
out of which the flax grows. The surrounding belt signified the ocean
which surrounds the earth. The violet tunic denoted the air by its color:
its little bells betoken the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning.
The ephod, by its many colors, signified the starry heaven; the two onyx
stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve
precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs of the zodiac: and
they are said to have been placed on the rational because in heaven, are
the types [rationes] of earthly things, according to Job 38:33: "Dost
thou know the order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason
[rationem] thereof on the earth?" The turban or tiara signified the
empyrean: the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the
universe.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 10 Para. 4/5
The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects
wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various vices and
sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he should
be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant: he must not be lame, i.e.
vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have "a little, or a
great, or a crooked nose," i.e. that he should not, from lack of
discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even exercise some
base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion, because it discerns
odors. It is forbidden that he should have "a broken foot" or "hand,"
i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or of advancing in
virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have a swelling either in front or
behind [Vulg.: 'if he be crook-backed']: by which is signified too much
love of earthly things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened
by carnal affections: for running of the eyes is caused by a flow of
matter. He is also rejected if he had "a pearl in his eye," i.e. if he
presumes in his own estimation that he is clothed in the white robe of
righteousness. Again, he is rejected "if he have a continued scab," i.e.
lustfulness of the flesh: also, if he have "a dry scurf," which covers
the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeliness of the
members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is rejected "if he have a
rupture" or hernia; through baseness rending his heart, though it appear
not in his deeds.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[5] R.O. 10 Para. 5/5
The vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers. Now there are four
things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz. chastity denoted by
the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation
of discretion, betokened by the girdle; and rectitude of purpose, denoted
by the mitre covering the head. But the high-priests needed four other
things in addition to these. First, a continual recollection of God in
their thoughts; and this was signified by the golden plate worn over the
forehead, with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to
bear with the shortcomings of the people: this was denoted by the ephod
which they bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people
in their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which
they wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by
performing works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet
tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed to the bottom of the violet
tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things united in the
high-priest to his godly mode of life. In addition to these were the
pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals:
because his doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should
not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the
ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:4), "every
creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with
thanksgiving." It was therefore unfitting that they should be forbidden
to eat certain foods, as being unclean according to Lev. 11 [*Cf. Dt. 14].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also are
herbs: wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): "As the green herbs have I
delivered all" flesh "to you." But the Law did not distinguish any herbs
from the rest as being unclean, although some are most harmful, for
instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems that neither
should any animals have been prohibited as being unclean.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be
unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is unclean.
But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not
prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither should blood
have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is engendered from
blood.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Our Lord said (Mt. 10:28; cf. Lk. 12:4), that those
should not be feared "that kill the body," since after death they "have
no more that they can do": which would not be true if after death harm
might come to man through anything done with his body. Much less
therefore does it matter to an animal already dead how its flesh be
cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in what is said, Ex.
23:19: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as
being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord (Ex. 13).
Therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in Lev. 19:23:
"when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it fruit
trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision [*'Praeputia,' which Douay
version renders 'first fruits'] of them," i.e. the first crops, and they
"shall be unclean to you, neither shall you eat of them."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's body.
Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden to the
Jews: for instance (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is
woven of two sorts": and (Dt. 22:5): "A woman shall not be clothed with
man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel": and further on
(Dt. 22:11): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of woolen and
linen together."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, to be mindful of God's commandments concerns not the
body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed (Dt. 6:8,
seqq.) that they should "bind" the commandments of God "as a sign" on
their hands; and that they should "write them in the entry"; and (Num.
15:38, seqq.) that they should "make to themselves fringes in the corners
of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue . . . they may
remember . . . the commandments of the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9) that God does not "take
care for oxen," and, therefore, neither of other irrational animals.
Therefore without reason is it commanded (Dt. 22:6): "If thou find, as
thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a tree . . . thou shalt not
take the dam with her young"; and (Dt. 25:4): "Thou shalt not muzzle the
ox that treadeth out thy corn"; and (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not make
thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, no distinction was made between clean and unclean
plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been made about
the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed (Lev.
19:19): "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds"; and (Dt.
22:9, seqq.): "Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds"; and: "Thou
shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most of all
subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to debar man
from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or anything they
found in the houses of idols, as expressed in the commandment of the Law
(Dt. 7:25, seqq.). It also seems an absurd commandment set forth in Dt.
23:13, that they should "dig round about and . . . cover with earth that
which they were eased of."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Obj. 11 Para. 1/1
OBJ 11: Further, piety is required especially in priests. But it seems
to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's friends: wherefore
Tobias is commended for so doing (Tob. 1:20, seqq.). In like manner it is
sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby
delivered from sin and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsistent for these
things to be forbidden to priests (Lev. 21).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:14): "But thou art otherwise
instructed by the Lord thy God": from which words we may gather that
these observances were instituted by God to be a special prerogative of
that people. Therefore they are not without reason or cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The Jewish people, as stated above (A[5]), were specially
chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests themselves were
specially set apart for that purpose. And just as other things that are
applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in some particular way
so that they be worthy of the worship of God; so too in that people's,
and especially the priests', mode of life, there needed to be certain
special things befitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or
corporal. Now the worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the mystery
of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure of things pertaining to
Christ, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All these things happened to them in
figures." Consequently the reasons for these observances may be taken in
two ways, first according to their fittingness to the worship of God;
secondly, according as they foreshadow something touching the Christian
mode of life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/4
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[5], ad 4,5), the Law distinguished a
twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin, whereby the soul was
defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the
body was in some way infected. Speaking then of the first-mentioned
uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can defile a man, by reason
of its nature; wherefore we read (Mt. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into
the mouth defileth a man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth
a man": which words are explained (Mt. 15:17) as referring to sins. Yet
certain foods can defile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes
of them against obedience or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or
through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason some refrain
from wine and flesh-meat.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 2/4
If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind of
corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean, either because like
the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their life is among
unclean surroundings: thus certain animals, like moles and mice and such
like, live underground, whence they contract a certain unpleasant smell;
or because their flesh, through being too moist or too dry, engenders
corrupt humors in the human body. Hence they were forbidden to eat the
flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e. animals having an uncloven hoof, on
account of their earthiness; and in like manner they were forbidden to
eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet, because
such are very fierce and their flesh is very dry, such as the flesh of
lions and the like. For the same reason they were forbidden to eat
certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain
water-fowl on account of their exceeding humidity. In like manner certain
fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on account of their
excessive moisture; such as eels and the like. They were, however,
allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided hoof, because in such
animals the humors are well absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for
neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they too
earthly, which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of
fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds, of which the fins
and scales are an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the
fish is tempered. Of birds they were allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such
as hens, partridges, and the like. Another reason was detestation of
idolatry: because the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom
they had grown up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols, or
employed them for the purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those
animals which the Jews were allowed to eat, but worshipped them as gods,
or abstained, for some other motive, from eating them, as stated above
(A[3], ad 2). The third reason was to prevent excessive care about food:
wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured
easily and promptly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 3/4
With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those of
any animals whatever without exception. Blood was forbidden, both in
order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of human
blood, as stated above (A[3], ad 8); and in order to shun idolatrous rite
whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to gather
together around it for a banquet in honor of the idols, to whom they held
the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded the blood to be
poured out and to be covered with earth (Lev. 17:13). For the same reason
they were forbidden to eat animals that had been suffocated or strangled:
because the blood of these animals would not be separated from the body:
or because this form of death is very painful to the victim; and the Lord
wished to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational
animals, so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through
being used to be kind to beasts. They were forbidden to eat the fat: both
because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used to
be burnt in honor of God; and, again, because blood and fat are not
nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex.
iii). The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in
Gn. 32:32, where it is stated that "the children of Israel . . . eat not
the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew of" Jacob's "thing and it
shrank."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 4/4
The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals
signified certain sins, in token of which those animals were prohibited.
Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): "If the swine and lamb be
called in question, both are clean by nature, because all God's creatures
are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean in a certain
signification. Thus if you speak of a foolish, and of a wise man, each of
these expressions is clean considered in the nature of the sound, letters
and syllables of which it is composed: but in signification, the one is
clean, the other unclean." The animal that chews the cud and has a
divided hoof, is clean in signification. Because division of the hoof is
a figure of the two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two
natures in Christ: of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing the
cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound understanding
thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is spiritually unclean. In
like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in
signification. Because fins signify the heavenly or contemplative life;
while scales signify a life of trials, each of which is required for
spiritual cleanness. Of birds certain kinds were forbidden. In the eagle
which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden: in the griffon which
is hostile to horses and men, cruelty of powerful men is prohibited. The
osprey, which feeds on very small birds, signifies those who oppress the
poor. The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are
fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture, which follows an army,
expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain, signifies those who like
others to die or to fight among themselves that they may gain thereby.
Birds of the raven kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts;
or those who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once
it had been let loose from the ark. The ostrich which, though a bird,
cannot fly, and is always on the ground, signifies those who fight God's
cause, and at the same time are taken up with worldly business. The owl,
which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime, denotes those
who are clever in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters. The
gull, which flies both in the air and swims in the water, signifies those
who are partial both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes
those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell in the waters of sensual
delights. The hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a figure of
those who assist the strong to prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which
seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who
seeks to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The cormorant, so
constituted that it can stay a long time under water, denotes the glutton
who plunges into the waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with
a long beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps it is the same as the
stork: it signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills
of others, as with snakes. The swan is bright in color, and by the aid of
its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water: it may
denote those who seek earthly profit though an external brightness of
virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East: it has a long beak, and its
jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at first,
after a time proceeding to digest it: it is a figure of the miser, who
is excessively careful in hoarding up the necessaries of life. The coot
[*Douay: 'porphyrion.' St. Thomas' description tallies with the coot or
moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from
one another.] has this peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a
webbed foot for swimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it swims
like a duck in the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks
only when it bites, since it dips all its food in water: it is a figure
of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in
the water of his own will. The heron [*Vulg.: 'herodionem'], commonly
called a falcon, signifies those whose "feet are swift to shed blood"
(Ps. 13:3). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators transcribed
from the Vulgate: 'charadrion'; 'charadrius' is the generic name for all
plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe,
which builds its nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose song is
like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works death in those who are
unclean. The bat, which flies near the ground, signifies those who being
gifted with worldly knowledge, seek none but earthly things. Of fowls and
quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer
than the forelegs, so that they can leap: whereas those were forbidden
which cling rather to the earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of
the four Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed
unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we are to
understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the soil
even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have been
introduced after the deluge; for it is written (Gn. 9:3): "Even as the
green herbs have I delivered . . . all" flesh "to you." The reason for
this was that the eating of the products of the soil savors rather of a
simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and
over-careful living. For the soil gives birth to the herb of its own
accord; and such like products of the earth may be had in great
quantities with very little effort: whereas no small trouble is necessary
either to rear or to catch an animal. Consequently God being wishful to
bring His people back to a more simple way of living, forbade them to eat
many kinds of animals, but not those things that are produced by the
soil. Another reason may be that animals were offered to idols, while the
products of the soil were not.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the
manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of
heartlessness if the dam's milk, which was intended for the nourishment
of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. It might also be said
that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of their idols prepared the
flesh of kids in this manner, for the purpose of sacrifice or banquet:
hence (Ex. 23) after the solemnities to be celebrated under the Law had
been foretold, it is added: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its
dam." The figurative reason for this prohibition is this: the kid,
signifying Christ, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rm.
8:3), was not to be seethed, i.e. slain, by the Jews, "in the milk of its
dam," i.e. during His infancy. Or else it signifies that the kid, i.e.
the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not
be cajoled by flattery.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 5: The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which
they held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the purpose of
secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon the
fruits of the first three years as unclean: for in that country nearly
all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to wit, that
are cultivated either from seed, or from a graft, or from a cutting: but
it seldom happens that the fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are
sown: since it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit: and the
Law considered what happened most frequently. The fruits, however, of the
fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean fruits, were offered to
God: and from the fifth year onward they were eaten.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 5 Para. 2/2
The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after the
three states of the Law (the first lasting from Abraham to David, the
second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until the time
of Christ), the Fruit of the Law, i.e. Christ, was to be offered to God.
Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on account of their
imperfection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: It is said of a man in Ecclus. 19:27, that "the attire of
the body . . . " shows "what he is." Hence the Lord wished His people to
be distinguished from other nations, not only by the sign of the
circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain difference of
attire. Wherefore they were forbidden to wear garments woven of woolen
and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed with man's apparel, or
vice versa, for two reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. Because
the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments of this sort, made
of various materials. Moreover in the worship of Mars, women put on men's
armor; while, conversely, in the worship of Venus men donned women's
attire. The second reason was to preserve them from lust: because the
employment of various materials in the making of garments signified
inordinate union of sexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or
vice versa, has an incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of
lust. The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment
woven of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the
simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the duplicity of malice,
betokened by linen. It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume
to teach, or perform other duties of men: or that man should not adopt
the effeminate manners of a woman.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 7 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 7: As Jerome says on Mt. 23:6, "the Lord commanded them to
make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments, so
that the Israelites might be distinguished from other nations." Hence, in
this way, they professed to be Jews: and consequently the very sight of
this sign reminded them of their law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 7 Para. 2/2
When we read: "Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be ever
before thy eyes [Vulg.: 'they shall be and shall move between thy eyes'],
the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the
decalogue of Moses on a parchment, and tied it on their foreheads like a
wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes": whereas the intention
of the Lord in giving this commandment was that they should be bound in
their hands, i.e. in their works; and that they should be before their
eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were
inserted in their cloaks signify the godly intention which should
accompany our every deed. It may, however, be said that, because they
were a carnal-minded and stiff-necked people, it was necessary for them
to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 8 Para. 1/4
Reply OBJ 8: Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of
reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man's affection be one
of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God has
subjected all things to man's power, according to Ps. 8:8: "Thou hast
subjected all things under his feet": and it is in this sense that the
Apostle says that "God has no care for oxen"; because God does not ask of
man what he does with oxen or other animals.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 8 Para. 2/4
But if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in
regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity is caused by the
afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational animals
are sensible to pain, it is possible for the affection of pity to arise
in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident that
if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more
disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore it is written (Prov.
11:10): "The just regardeth the lives of his beasts: but the bowels of
the wicked are cruel." Consequently the Lord, in order to inculcate pity
to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished them to practice
pity even with regard to dumb animals, and forbade them to do certain
things savoring of cruelty to animals. Hence He prohibited them to "boil
a kid in the milk of its dam"; and to "muzzle the ox that treadeth out
the corn"; and to slay "the dam with her young." It may, nevertheless, be
also said that these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For
the Egyptians held it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain
while threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare
the mother bird with her young during incubation, and to employ them for
the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up
children: also because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother
sitting on her young.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 8 Para. 3/4
As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason may
have been threefold. The first was to show detestation for the idolatry
of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in worshipping the
planets, which produce various effects, and on various kinds of things
according to their various conjunctions. The second reason was in
condemnation of unnatural sins. The third reason was the entire removal
of all occasions of concupiscence. Because animals of different species
do not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man; and movements
of lust are aroused by seeing such things. Wherefore in the Jewish
traditions we find it prescribed as stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall
turn away their eyes from such sights.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 8 Para. 4/4
The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life
should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth the corn, i.e. from the
preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states (1 Cor.
9:4, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young: because in
certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses, i.e. the offspring,
and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e. the mother, for
instance, in all the ceremonies of the Law. It is also forbidden that
beast of burden, i.e. any of the common people, should be allowed to
engender, i.e. to have any connection, with animals of another kind, i.e.
with Gentiles or Jews.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 9 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 9: All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture;
literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians in worshipping
the stars employed various combinations of seeds, animals and garments,
in order to represent the various connections of the stars. Or else all
these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural vice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 9 Para. 2/2
They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: "Thou
shalt not sow thy field with different seeds," is to be understood, in
the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the
Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. Likewise "the field," i.e. the
Church, must not be sown "with different seeds," i.e. with Catholic and
heretical doctrines. Neither is it allowed to plough "with an ox and an
ass together"; thus a fool should not accompany a wise man in preaching,
for one would hinder the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 10 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 10: [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the
codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was
supplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden (Dt. 7)
not as though they were not subject to the power of man, but because,
like the idols themselves, all materials out of which idols were made,
were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This is clear from the same
chapter, where we read further on (Dt. 7:26): "Neither shalt thou bring
anything of the idol into thy house, lest thou become an anathema like
it." Another reason was lest, by taking silver and gold, they should be
led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were inclined. The other
precept (Dt. 23) about covering up excretions, was just and becoming,
both for the sake of bodily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air
wholesome; and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the
covenant which stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said
to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after
expressing the command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: "For
the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and
to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy [i.e. clean],
and let no uncleanness appear therein." The figurative reason for this
precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which are the
fetid excretions of the mind should be covered over by repentance, that
we may become acceptable to God, according to Ps. 31:1: "Blessed are they
whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." Or else
according to a gloss, that we should recognize the unhappy condition of
human nature, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-up and
proud spirit in the deep furrow of self-examination.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 11 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 11: Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their rites,
of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to extirpate the
customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests of
inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the temple, should not
"incur an uncleanness at the death" of anyone except of those who were
closely related to them, viz. their father or mother, and others thus
near of kin to them. But the high-priest had always to be ready for the
service of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely forbidden to
approach the dead, however nearly related to him. They were also
forbidden to marry a "harlot" or "one that has been put away," or any
other than a virgin: both on account of the reverence due to the
priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be tarnished by such a
marriage: and for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by the
mother's shame: which was most of all to be avoided when the priestly
dignity was passed on from father to son. Again, they were commanded to
shave neither head nor beard, and not to make incisions in their flesh,
in order to exclude the rites of idolatry. For the priests of the
Gentiles shaved both head and beard, wherefore it is written (Bar 6:30):
"Priests sit in their temples having their garments rent, and their heads
and beards shaven." Moreover, in worshipping their idols "they cut
themselves with knives and lancets" (3 Kgs. 18:28). For this reason the
priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the contrary.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[102] A[6] R.O. 11 Para. 2/2
The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be entirely
free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should not shave their heads,
i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their beards, i.e. set aside
the perfection of wisdom; nor rend their garments or cut their flesh,
i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under
which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?
(2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any
power of justification?
(3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of
Christ?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in existence
before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies of the Old
Law, as stated above (Q[101], A[4]). But sacrifices and holocausts
preceded the Law: for it is written (Gn. 4:3,4) that "Cain offered, of
the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord," and that "Abel offered of
the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat." Noe also "offered
holocausts" to the Lord (Gn. 18:20), and Abraham did in like manner (Gn.
22:13). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of
the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded the Law. For
we read (Gn. 13:18) that "Abraham . . . built . . . an altar to the
Lord"; and (Gn. 28:18) that "Jacob . . . took the stone . . . and set it
up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it." Therefore the legal
ceremonies preceded the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been
circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears from Gn. 17.
In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written (Gn.
14:18) that "Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high God."
Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to
the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q[100], 2, A[6], ad 1).
But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written (Gn. 7:2,3): "Of
all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are
unclean, two and two." Therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach
you." But they would not have needed to be taught about these things, if
the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore the
legal ceremonies did not precede the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (Q[101], A[2]; Q[102]
, A[2]), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose; the
worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever worships God
must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to
external worship. But the fixing of the divine worship belongs to the
ceremonies; just as the determining of our relations with our neighbor is
a matter determined by the judicial precepts, as stated above (Q[99],
A[4]). Consequently, as among men in general there were certain judicial
precepts, not indeed established by Divine authority, but ordained by
human reason; so also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the
authority of any law, but according to the will and devotion of those
that worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading
men were gifted with the spirit of prophecy, it is to be believed that a
heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a
certain definite way, which would be both in keeping with the interior
worship, and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which were
foreshadowed also by other things that they did, according to 1 Cor.
10:11: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." Therefore there
were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal ceremonies,
because they were not as yet established by legislation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and
holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of their own
will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God
those things which they had received from Him, and thus to testify that
they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: They also established certain sacred things, because they
thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places should be
set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of
God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the Law as
though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance
included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 7:20) that circumcision was
"not of Moses, but of his fathers." Again, among those who worshipped
God, the priesthood was in existence before the Law by human appointment,
for the Law allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue
before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written (Gn.
9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you": but only
as to the offering of sacrifices because they used only certain animals
for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinction in regard to
eating; it was not that it was considered illegal to eat such animals,
since this was not forbidden by any law, but from dislike or custom: thus
even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some
countries, while people partake of them in others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any
power of justification?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of
justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation from sin and
consecration pertains to justification. But it is written (Ex. 39:21)
that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of
blood and the anointing of oil; and (Lev. 16:16) that, by sprinkling the
blood of the calf, the priest expiated "the sanctuary from the
uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions and
. . . their sins." Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power
of justification.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to justification,
according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is just and hath loved justice." But
some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to Lev. 10:19: "How
could I . . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful
heart?" Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of
justification.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the soul
rather than the body, according to Ps. 18:8: "The Law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls." But the leper was cleansed by means of the
ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated in Lev. 14. Much more therefore
could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by justifying it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2) [*The first words of the
quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory,
substituted them for 2:21, which runs thus: 'If justice be by the Law,
then Christ died in vain.']: "If there had been a law given which could
justify [Vulg.: 'give life'], Christ died in vain," i.e. without cause.
But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not
confer justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (Q[102], A[5], ad 4), a twofold
uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and is
the uncleanness of sin. The other was corporal, which rendered a man
unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion,
was said to be unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of
irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old Law
had the power to cleanse: because they were ordered by the Law to be
employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which
were contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law. Hence the
Apostle says (Heb. 9:13) that "the blood of goats and of oxen, and the
ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the
cleansing of the flesh." And just as this uncleanness which was washed
away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than the soul, so
also the ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before
(Heb. 9:10) justices of the flesh: "justices of the flesh," says he,
"being laid on them until the time of correction."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of
the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason of this was that
at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, "Who
taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world" (Jn. 1:29). And since
the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had not yet really taken
place, those ceremonies of the Old Law could not really contain in
themselves a power flowing from Christ already incarnate and crucified,
such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently they could
not cleanse from sin: thus the Apostle says (Heb. 10:4) that "it is
impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken
away"; and for this reason he calls them (Gal. 4:9) "weak and needy
elements": weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this
weakness results from their being needy, i.e. from the fact that they do
not contain grace within themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the
faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate and crucified; so
that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the
observance of these ceremonies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as they
foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered
up for sins, not as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away,
but because they were professions of faith which cleansed from sin. In
fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is
written (Lev. 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin "the
priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him," as though
the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the
faith and devotion of those who offered them. It must be observed,
however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed
away uncleanness of the body, was a figure of that expiation from sins
which was effected by Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the
ceremonies had no power of justification.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of their
apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling them with
blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and
to remove impediments from them, "to the cleansing of the flesh," as the
Apostle states (Heb. 9:13) in token of that sanctification whereby
"Jesus" sanctified "the people by His own blood" (Heb. 13:12). Moreover,
the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these
bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness of sin. Hence even the
sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is stated to be expiated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their
obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed;
not by reason of the things considered in themselves.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing of
a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the defilement
of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not
applied to a man until he was already healed: hence it is written (Lev.
14:3,4) that the priest, "going out of the camp, when he shall find that
the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be purified to
offer," etc.; whence it is evident that the priest was appointed the
judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies
were employed for the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of
irregularity. They do say, however, that if a priest were to err in his
judgment, the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God,
but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle that the
thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water "on
which" the priest had "heaped curses," as stated in Num. 5:19-27.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at
the coming of Christ. For it is written (Bar 4:1): "This is the book of
the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever." But the legal
ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to
last for ever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a
ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, who has been
cleansed, to make this offering (Mt. 8:4). Therefore the ceremonies of
the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. But
the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes, inasmuch as
they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they were
intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law
should not have ceased.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham's
faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing of creation:
and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as state above
(Q[102], A[4], ad 10; A[5], ad 1). But Abraham's faith is ever to be
imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other Divine favors
should never be forgotten. Therefore at least circumcision and the other
legal solemnities should not have ceased.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . .
judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the
new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come": and
(Heb. 8:13): "In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former old:
and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained
to the worship of God as stated above (Q[101], AA[1],2). Now external
worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists
in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had to be
subject to variations according to the variations in the internal
worship, in which a threefold state may be distinguished. One state was
in respect of faith and hope, both in heavenly goods, and in the means of
obtaining them---in both of these considered as things to come. Such was
the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior
worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods as
things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in
things present or past. Such is the state of the New Law. The third state
is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is
believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is
the state of the Blessed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God
will be figurative; there will be naught but "thanksgiving and voice of
praise" (Is. 51:3). Hence it is written concerning the city of the
Blessed (Apoc. 21:22): "I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God
Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb." Proportionately,
therefore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed
the second and third states, had need to cease at the advent of the
second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in
keeping with the state of divine worship for that particular time,
wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine favors
whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and absolutely,
as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial precepts it
lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies
foreshadowed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The mystery of the redemption of the human race was
fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: "It is
consummated" (Jn. 19:30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must
have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. As a
sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ "the veil of the
temple was rent" (Mt. 27:51). Hence, before Christ's Passion, while
Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were
concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but was not as
yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion,
commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The literal reasons already given (Q[102]) for the
ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in
that which was to come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to come, both
that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed in
God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations were to
blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it was
necessary to make profession of Abraham's faith by means of circumcision.
But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to be declared by
means of another sign, viz. Baptism, which, in this respect, took the
place of circumcision, according to the saying of the Apostle (Col. 2:11,
12): "You are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand, in
despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of Christ,
buried with Him in Baptism."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its
place is taken by the "Lord's Day," which recalls the beginning of the
new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other
solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because the
blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors granted us
by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover gave place to the feast of
Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast of Pentecost when the Old
Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of
the living spirit: the feast of the New Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared
the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the fulness of grace: the
feast of Trumpets, to the feasts of the Apostles: the feast of Expiation,
to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to the
feast of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection,
to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast of All Hallows.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed
without committing mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies
can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must not believe
that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost:
since by His fulness they were "endued with power from on high" (Lk.
24:49). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming
of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated (Acts 16:3) that Paul circumcised
Timothy: and (Acts 21:26) that Paul, at the advice of James, "took the
men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into the temple, giving
notice of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an
oblation should be offered for every one of them." Therefore the legal
ceremonies can be observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the
fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church complied with
this observance; for it is stated (Gal. 2:12) that, "when" certain men
"had come" to Antioch, Peter "withdrew and separated himself" from the
Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's
Passion without committing mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin.
But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles should observe
certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (Acts 15:28,29): "It
hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden
upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from things
sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from
fornication." Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since
Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): "If you be circumcised,
Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing save mortal sin hinders us
from receiving Christ's fruit. Therefore since Christ's Passion it is a
mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the
interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his
inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if
he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in
Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came
before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith is expressed in
different words, by us and by them. For by them was it said: "Behold a
virgin shall conceive and bear a son," where the verbs are in the future
tense: whereas we express the same by means of verbs in the past tense,
and say that she "conceived and bore." In like manner the ceremonies of
the Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer:
whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having suffered.
Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making
a profession of faith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the
fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal
sin now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled
with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust.
xix, 16), who says: "It is no longer promised that He shall be born,
shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments were a kind
of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and
risen again; of which our sacraments, in which Christians share, are the
actual representation."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: On this point there seems to have been a difference of
opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, 11,
seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time previous to
Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies were neither dead,
since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion; nor
deadly, because it was not sinful to observe them. But immediately after
Christ's Passion they began to be not only dead, so as no longer to be
either effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever observed
them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion
the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but
only by a kind of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize
the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however, is to be
understood, not as though they did not in reality perform those actions,
but in the sense that they performed them without the mind to observe the
ceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for
health's sake, not with the intention of observing legal circumcision.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid
scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life and
doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things
pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; therefore Augustine (Epist.
lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the
time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during which the legal
ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after the
publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both
dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz. from the Passion of
Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal
ceremonies were dead indeed, because they had neither effect nor binding
force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts
to Christianity to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in
them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though faith
in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other
hand, there was no reason why those who were converted from heathendom to
Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was
born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who was
of heathen nationality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be
debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, while converted
heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order
to show that there is a difference between these rites. For heathenish
ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by God
for all time; whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled
through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God as a figure of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the
Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, of
whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On
the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of blaming him, in
order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But
Augustine disapproves of this solution: because in the canonical
Scripture (viz. Gal. 2:11), wherein we must not hold anything to be
false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed." Consequently it is true
that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with
pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal ceremonial
for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was a converted
Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness in the observance of the
legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result being that he
gave scandal to the Gentiles.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 3: Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not
to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the prohibition of
blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things
strangled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition of things offered
to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil
in itself: which opinion they gathered from certain glosses, which
expound these prohibitions in a mystical sense. Since, however, murder
and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would
have been no need to give this special commandment to those who were
converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those
foods were forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal
ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech.
44:31 ("The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns
those priests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/3
But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive
to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should have been forbidden
more than the others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[103] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 3/3
We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods
were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing compliance
with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles
and Jews living side by side. Because blood and things strangled were
loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews might have
suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry if the latter had
partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were prohibited
for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become
united together. But as time went on, with the lapse of the cause, the
effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged,
wherein Our Lord taught that "not that which entereth into the mouth
defileth a man" (Mt. 15:11); and that "nothing is to be rejected that is
received with thanksgiving" (1 Tim. 4:4). With regard to fornication a
special prohibition was made, because the Gentiles did not hold it to be
sinful.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall
consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their
reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Their duration;
(4) Their division.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation
to his neighbor?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which
directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial precepts take
their name from "judgment." But there are many things that direct man as
to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to judgment. Therefore the
judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to
his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral
precepts, as stated above (Q[99], A[4]). But there are many moral
precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case
with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the judicial
precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the
judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above (Q[99], A[4];
Q[101], A[1]). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which
concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel,
of which we have already spoken (Q[102], A[6], ad 1,6). Therefore the
judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other works of a
good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man and
man." But judicial precepts are so called from "judgment." Therefore it
seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations
between man and man.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above (Q[95], A[2]
; Q[99], A[4]), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force
from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that
something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral"
precepts: since human morals are based on reason. At the same time there
are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very
dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply
an obligation of something due or undue); but from some institution,
Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral
precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by Divine
institution in matters relating to man's subordination to God, they are
called "ceremonial" precepts: but when they refer to man's relations to
other men, they are called "judicial" precepts. Hence there are two
conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer
to man's relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding
force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of
certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial
power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs
to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts
which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the
community at large and the government thereof. Consequently the judicial
precepts are not only those which concern actions at law; but also all
those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to
another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as
supreme judge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument holds in respect of those precepts which
direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding
force from the mere dictate of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are
moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened by
faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also
ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except in virtue of
their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the
sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever relates to the
fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. Because men
are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and,
consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, that man should show
some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not
ordained to his neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in
himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a
slave to his master, since a slave "is his master's in all that he is,"
as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial
precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because
the reason, which is the principal in moral matters, holds the same
position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or
judge holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the
relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the
relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed
in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is directed to God. For
the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in
the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative.
Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as
figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are
figurative, there will be no difference between the judicial and
ceremonial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the
Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. But the
judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated
what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial
precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to
be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are above our
reason, as stated above (Q[101], A[2], ad 2). But things concerning our
neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which
direct us in relation to our neighbor should not have been figurative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded both in the
allegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two ways. First,
primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally
that it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial
precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the very purpose
that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and
the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative, not primarily
and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the judicial precepts of
the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose
of being figurative, but in order that they might regulate the state of
that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did
foreshadow something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of
that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative,
according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All . . . things happened to them in figure."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way
as the judicial precepts, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be
born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had to be
prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24).
For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to this people
were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus,
too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded in the mystical
sense: but not the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or Romans, although
the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In this people the direction of man in regard to his
neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far as
it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this
respect it was figurative.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for
ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice:
since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now "justice
is perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial precepts
bind for ever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human
institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever.
Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18) that "there is a setting
aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and
unprofitableness thereof." Now this is true of the ceremonial precept,
which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect
that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and
justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:9,10). On the
other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect
of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish justice
and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are
not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that "the priesthood being
translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law."
But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the
entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no
longer in force.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were
annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the
ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as
to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe them since
the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On
the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have
no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to
order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not
sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as
though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the
Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said
above (A[2]). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are
figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for
the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the
other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be
figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were
directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed
with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding
force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in
Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not
for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of certain
deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith.
But the intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law,
is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the
former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet come.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual.
But the determination of those things that are just, according to human
or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the
different states of mankind.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their
binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains the
same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the
laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the
people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is
government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1).
Consequently when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts
had to be changed also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and
equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the coming
of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that
in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had
been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed
also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial
precepts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division
of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts direct men in
their relations to one another. But those things which need to be
directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and
which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are
infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign a distinct
division of the judicial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters.
But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, except in so
far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore
there is no distinct division of the judicial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial
precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing some as
"sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains no allusion
to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have
no distinct division.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be division.
But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts,
since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary
that they should have a distinct division.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or
ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division in
the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of
precepts: else the law would be rendered useless by confusion. We must
therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were
directed in their relations to one another, are subject to division
according to the divers ways in which man is directed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the
people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among
themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members
of the same household, such as the order of the father to his son; of
the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to
these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts
in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning the
institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the
respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial precepts. Again,
certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens:
for instance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties: this is
the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are
enjoined with regard to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged
against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers:
this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts
are given relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and
children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one
man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible to
certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one
man stands to another, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the
moral order, as stated above (Q[100], A[3]): and consequently it is
fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to
them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different binding
force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution
alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[104] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in
the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial precepts
of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the
rulers;
(2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;
(3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners;
(4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning
rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), "the ordering
of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler." But the Law contains no
precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler; and yet we find
therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers: firstly (Ex.
18:21): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.;
again (Num. 11:16): "Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of
Israel"; and again (Dt. 1:13): "Let Me have from among you wise and
understanding men," etc. Therefore the Law provided insufficiently in
regard to the rulers of the people.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "The best gives of the best," as Plato states (Tim. ii).
Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be ruled by a
king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance
to the Divine government, whereby God rules the world from the beginning.
Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should
not have been allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed
(Dt. 17:14,15): "When thou . . . shalt say: I will set a king over me . .
. thou shalt set him," etc.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Mt. 12:25: "Every kingdom divided against
itself shall be made desolate": a saying which was verified in the Jewish
people, whose destruction was brought about by the division of the
kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the
general well-being of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the
kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor should this have been
introduced even by Divine authority; as we read of its being introduced
by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite (3 Kgs. 11:29, seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the
people in things concerning God, as stated in Heb. 5:1; so are rulers set
up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things
were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests and Levites of the
Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore
in like manner certain things should have been determined for the
livelihood of the rulers of the people: the more that they were forbidden
to accept presents, as is clearly stated in Ex. 23:8: "You shall not
[Vulg.: 'Neither shalt thou'] take bribes, which even blind the wise, and
pervert the words of the just."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is
tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, He
established a tyrannical law; for it is written (1 Kgs. 8:11): "This will
be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your
sons," etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision with regard to the
institution of rulers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its
order (Num. 24:5): "How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy
tents." But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right
establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for
the people with regard to its rulers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Two points are to be observed concerning the right
ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some
share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace
among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring, as
stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of
the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the constitutions
are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as the Philosopher
states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the
"kingdom," where the power of government is vested in one; and
"aristocracy," which signifies government by the best, where the power of
government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best form of government
is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over
all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a
government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible
to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best
form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of
all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in
authority; partly democracy, i.e. government by the people, in so far as
the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right
to choose their rulers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses
and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of them
was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover,
seventy-two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for it is written
(Dt. 1:15): "I took out of your tribes wise and honorable, and appointed
them rulers": so that there was an element of aristocracy. But it was a
democratical government in so far as the rulers were chosen from all the
people; for it is written (Ex. 18:21): "Provide out of all the people
wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; and, again, in so far as they were
chosen by the people; wherefore it is written (Dt. 1:13): "Let me have
from among you wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc. Consequently it is evident
that the ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This people was governed under the special care of God:
wherefore it is written (Dt. 7:6): "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to
be His peculiar people": and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the
institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray (Num. 27:16):
"May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that
may be over this multitude." Thus by God's orders Josue was set at the
head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who
succeeded Josue that God "raised . . . up a saviour" for the people, and
that "the spirit of the Lord was" in them (Jgs 3:9,10,15). Hence the Lord
did not leave the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to
Himself, as appears from Dt. 17:15: "Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy
God shall choose."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so
long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king is so
great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power
is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the virtuous man that
conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect virtue is to be found in few: and
especially were the Jews inclined to cruelty and avarice, which vices
above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did
not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave them judges and
governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked Him to do
so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is
clear from His words to Samuel (1 Kgs. 8:7): "They have not rejected
thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish the
manner of election from the very beginning (Dt. 17:14, seqq.): and then
He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait
for the Lord's decision; and that they should not make a man of another
nation king, because such kings are wont to take little interest in the
people they are set over, and consequently to have no care for their
welfare: secondly, He prescribed how the king after his appointment
should behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not
accumulate chariots and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because
through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake
justice. He also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct
themselves towards God: namely, that they should continually read and
ponder on God's Law, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He
decided how they should behave towards their subjects: namely, that they
should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should
not depart from the paths of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was
rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many dissensions,
specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on
them for their profit. Hence it is written (Osee 13:11): "I will give
thee a king in My wrath"; and (Osee 8:4): "They have reigned, but not by
Me: they have been princes, and I knew not."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from
father to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater
respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since
honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine worship. Hence it
was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and
as to first-fruits, and, again, as to oblations and sacrifices, that they
might be afforded a means of livelihood. On the other hand, the rulers,
as stated above, were chosen from the whole people; wherefore they had
their own possessions, from which to derive a living: and so much the
more, since the Lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth to
make too much show of magnificence: both because he could scarcely avoid
the excesses of pride and tyranny, arising from such things, and because,
if the rulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work
and anxiety, it would not tempt the ambition of the common people; and
would not become an occasion of sedition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: That right was not given to the king by Divine institution:
rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right, by framing
unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their
subjects. This is clear from the context that follows: "And you shall be
his slaves [Douay: 'servants']": which is significative of tyranny, since
a tyrant rules is subjects as though they were his slaves. Hence Samuel
spoke these words to deter them from asking for a king; since the
narrative continues: "But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel."
It may happen, however, that even a good king, without being a tyrant,
may take away the sons, and make them tribunes and centurions; and may
take many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of
one man with another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed
as regards the relations of one man with another. Because men cannot live
together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this
seems to have been approved by the Law: since it is written (Dt. 23:24):
"Going into thy neighbor's vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as
thou pleasest." Therefore the Old Law did not make suitable provisions
for man's peace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has
been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher says (Polit.
ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is written (Num.
27:8): "When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his
daughter." Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision for the welfare of
the people.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human
society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying and
selling, as stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force of
sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the jubilee all that
is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev. 25:28). Therefore in this matter
the Law gave the people an unfitting command.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to lend:
which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the pledges: hence
it is written (Ecclus. 29:10): "Many have refused to lend, not out of
wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without cause." And yet
this was encouraged by the Law. First, because it prescribed (Dt. 15:2):
"He to whom any thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother,
cannot demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the Lord";
and (Ex. 22:15) it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while
the owner is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution.
Secondly, because the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for
it is written (Dt. 24:10): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any
thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a
pledge"; and again (Dt. 24:12,13): "The pledge shall not lodge with thee
that night, but thou shalt restore it to him presently." Therefore the
Law made insufficient provision in the matter of loans.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a
fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed in such
matters: hence it is stated in 2 Mach 3:15 that "the priests . . . called
upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things given to be
kept, that He would preserve them safe, for them that had deposited
them." But the precepts of the Old Law observed little caution in regard
to deposits: since it is prescribed (Ex. 22:10,11) that when goods
deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary.
Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in this matter.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do men
let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant to pay his
rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily
hard prescription (Lev. 19:13) that "the wages of him that hath been
hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it
should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting that the
Law (Dt. 17:8,9) should command them to go to a fixed place to ask for
judgment on doubtful matters.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more,
should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated (Dt.
19:15) that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall
stand."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, punishment should be fixed according to the gravity of
the fault: for which reason also it is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to
the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be." Yet
the Law fixed unequal punishments for certain faults: for it is written
(Ex. 22:1) that the thief "shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four
sheep for one sheep." Moreover, certain slight offenses are severely
punished: thus (Num. 15:32, seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks
on the sabbath day: and (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to
be stoned on account of certain small transgressions, viz. because "he
gave himself to revelling . . . and banquetings." Therefore the Law
prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 10 Para. 1/1
OBJ 10: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "Tully writes
that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment, indemnity, prison,
stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery." Now some
of these were prescribed by the Law. "Indemnity," as when a thief was
condemned to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. "Prison," as when
(Num. 15:34) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned. "Stripes"; thus
(Dt. 25:2), "if they see that the offender be worthy of stripes; they
shall lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before them."
"Public disgrace" was brought on to him who refused to take to himself
the wife of his deceased brother, for she took "off his shoe from his
foot, and" did "spit in his face" (Dt. 25:9). It prescribed the "death"
penalty, as is clear from (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or
mother, dying let him die." The Law also recognized the "lex talionis,"
by prescribing (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Therefore it
seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two other
punishments, viz. "exile" and "slavery."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 11 Para. 1/1
OBJ 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But dumb
animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable in
punishing them (Ex. 21:29): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a
woman," it "shall be stoned": and (Lev. 20:16): "The woman that shall lie
under any beast, shall be killed together with the same." Therefore it
seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one man with another
were unsuitably regulated by the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Obj. 12 Para. 1/1
OBJ 12: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 21:12) a murderer to be
punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much
less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be
sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is
unfittingly prescribed (Dt. 21:1,4) that "when there shall be found . . .
the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the
murder . . . the ancients" of the nearest city "shall take a heifer of
the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and
they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was
ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off the head of the
heifer."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps. 147:20) that
"He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He
hath not made manifest to them."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting Tully, "a
nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and by
community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence of a nation that
the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws. Now the
relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected under
the guidance of those in authority: others are effected by the will of
private individuals. And since whatever is subject to the power of an
individual can be disposed of according to his will, hence it is that the
decision of matters between one man and another, and the punishment of
evildoers, depend on the direction of those in authority, to whom men are
subject. On the other hand, the power of private persons is exercised
over the things they possess: and consequently their dealings with one
another, as regards such things, depend on their own will, for instance
in buying, selling, giving, and so forth. Now the Law provided
sufficiently in respect of each of these relations between one man and
another. For it established judges, as is clearly indicated in Dt. 16:18:
"Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy']
gates . . . that they may judge the people with just judgment." It is
also directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to Dt.
1:16,17: "Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own country
or a stranger: there shall be no difference of persons." It also removed
an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbidding judges to
accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Dt. 16:19). It prescribed the number of
witnesses, viz. two or three: and it appointed certain punishments to
certain crimes, as we shall state farther on (ad 10).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the
Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should be distinct,
and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly granted to others
by the will of the possessors. These three points were provided for by
the Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions themselves were
divided among individuals: for it is written (Num. 33:53,54): "I have
given you" the land "for a possession: and you shall divide it among you
by lot." And since many states have been ruined through want of
regulations in the matter of possessions, as the Philosopher observes
(Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided a threefold remedy against the
regularity of possessions. The first was that they should be divided
equally, wherefore it is written (Num. 33:54): "To the more you shall
give a larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser." A second remedy was that
possessions could not be alienated for ever, but after a certain lapse of
time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid confusion of
possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the removal of this
confusion, and provided that the dead should be succeeded by their next
of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the
brother; fourthly, the father's brother; fifthly, any other next of kin.
Furthermore, in order to preserve the distinction of property, the Law
enacted that heiresses should marry within their own tribe, as recorded
in Num. 36:6.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things
should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards the care of them; for
it was prescribed (Dt. 22:1-4): "Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest
thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring them back
to thy brother," and in like manner as to other things. Secondly, as
regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a friend's
vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not to take any away. And, specially,
with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves,
and the bunches of grapes and fruit, should be left behind for them (Lev.
19:9; Dt. 24:19). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh year was common
property, as stated in Ex. 23:11 and Lev. 25:4.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner.
There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written (Dt.
14:28,29): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . and the
Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow . . .
shall come and shall eat and be filled." And there was a transfer for a
consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by letting out and
hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we find
that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it is clear that the Old
Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual relations of one man with
another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Apostle says (Rm. 13:8), "he that loveth his
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts of
the Law, chiefly those concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the end
that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that men
give their own goods to others: because, as stated in 1 Jn. 3:17: "He
that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels
from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Hence the purpose of
the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others readily: thus
the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich "to give easily and to
communicate to others." Now a man does not give easily to others if he
will not suffer another man to take some little thing from him without
any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it should be
lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor's vineyard, to eat of the
fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to the
infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a disturbance of the peace: for
among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not disturb the
peace; in fact, it rather strengthens friendship and accustoms men to
give things to one another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to
their father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which it
was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in
order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to think that his
estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due caution
in the matter, by providing that those women who succeeded to their
father's estate, should marry within their own tribe, in order to avoid
confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in Num. 36:7,8.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation of
possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or nation.
Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the law in some
of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell his possessions, except
to avoid a manifest loss." For if possessions were to be sold
indiscriminately, they might happen to come into the hands of a few: so
that it might become necessary for a state or country to become void of
inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, ordered
things in such a way that while provision was made for men's needs, by
allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period, at the
same time the said danger was removed, by prescribing the return of those
possessions after that period had elapsed. The reason for this law was to
prevent confusion of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a
definite distinction among the tribes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore
the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like movable goods.
Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a
fixed limit to the amount of estates, which could not be exceeded, while
the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other hand,
houses situated not in a town, but "in a village that hath no walls,"
could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses are built merely
with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions; wherefore the Law
rightly made the same prescription in regard to both (Lev. 25).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to
accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another's
assistance: because this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law
granted these facilities for helping others in the matter not only of
gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of mutual transfers: because
the latter kind of succor is more frequent and benefits the greater
number: and it granted facilities for this purpose in many ways. First of
all by prescribing that men should be ready to lend, and that they should
not be less inclined to do so as the year of remission drew nigh, as
stated in Dt. 15:7, seqq. Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to
whom they might grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting
necessities of life in security; and by prescribing that when this had
been done they should be restored at once. For it is written (Dt. 23:19):
"Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and (Dt. 24:6):
"Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he
hath pledged his life to thee": and (Ex. 22:26): "If thou take of thy
neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before
sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding them to be importunate in exacting
payment. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any of
my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard
upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too, it is enacted (Dt.
24:10,11): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he oweth
thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, but thou
shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath": both
because a man's house is his surest refuge, wherefore it is offensive to
a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the Law does not allow
the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security, but rather
permits the debtor to give what he needs least. Fourthly, the Law
prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of seven
years. For it was probable that those who could conveniently pay their
debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the
lender without cause. But if they were altogether insolvent, there was
the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was
for renewing the loan on account of their need.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through the
neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or
deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if
they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper care
of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they were
hired for a consideration: because they might have died or deteriorated
in the same way if they had remained in possession of the lender, so that
if the animal had been saved through being lent, the lender would have
gained something by the loan which would no longer have been gratuitous.
And especially was this to be observed when animals were hired for a
consideration: because then the owner received a certain price for the
use of the animals; wherefore he had no right to any profit, by receiving
indemnity for the animal, unless the person who had charge of it were
negligent. In the case, however, of animals not hired for a
consideration, equity demanded that he should receive something by way of
restitution at least to the value of the hire of the animal that had
perished or deteriorated.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a loan
is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to whom they
are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the depositor.
Hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation of returning a
loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because the latter might be
lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i.e. either through a natural
cause, for instance if an animal held in deposit were to die or
depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it
were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a beast (in which case, however, a
man was bound to restore to the owner what was left of the animal thus
slain): whereas in the other cases mentioned above, he was not bound to
make restitution; but only to take an oath in order to clear himself of
suspicion. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost through an
avoidable cause, for instance by theft: and then the depositary was bound
to restitution on account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he
who held an animal on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were
absent when it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for
less negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case
of theft.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men who
toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded wisely that
they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who
offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich: nor are they in
such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood: and consequently
the comparison does not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed among men, is
that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now a matter
may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded people: and in
order to remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed (Dt. 16:18) that
"judges and magistrates" should be appointed in each tribe, "to judge the
people with just judgment." Secondly, a matter may be doubtful even among
experts: and therefore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law
prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen by God,
where there would be both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful
matters relating to the ceremonies of divine worship; and the chief judge
of the people, who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men:
just as even now cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by
appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written (Dt. 17:8,9): "If thou
perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment .
. . and thou see that the words of the judges within thy gates do vary;
arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and
thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge
that shall be at that time." But such like doubtful matters did not often
occur for judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this
account.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 8 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as
demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with a certain
conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs to
persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible for two or three
witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor probable
that they succeed in so doing: wherefore their testimony is taken as
being true, especially if they do not waver in giving it, or are not
otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might not easily
depart from the truth, the Law commanded that they should be most
carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful should be
severely punished, as stated in Dt. 19:16, seqq.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 8 Para. 2/2
There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in
token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, Who are sometimes
mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two
Persons; and sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on Jn. 8:17: "In
your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 9 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the
gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account of the
greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal,
deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a habitual sin,
since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe
punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire for or a great
pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from such sins
unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of
committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like sins, when
discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter others
from committing them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 9 Para. 2/3
Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be
observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin is
committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether
involuntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is written
(Dt. 22:25, seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not
guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no man to help her."
But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and yet through weakness, as
for instance when a man sins from passion, the sin is diminished: and the
punishment, according to true judgment, should be diminished also; unless
perchance the common weal requires that the sin be severely punished in
order to deter others from committing such sins, as stated above. The
second degree is when a man sins through ignorance: and then he was held
to be guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negligence in
acquiring knowledge: yet he was not punished by the judges but expiated
his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is written (Lev. 4:2): "The soul that
sinneth through ignorance," etc. This is, however, to be taken as
applying to ignorance of fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine
precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree was when a man
sinned from pride, i.e. through deliberate choice or malice: and then he
was punished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf. Dt. 25:2]. The
fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and
then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of the
commandment of the Law [*Cf. Num. 15:30,31].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 9 Para. 3/3
Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft,
the Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently (Ex.
22:1-9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can easily be
safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their value. But
sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze in
the fields: wherefore it happened more frequently that sheep were stolen
in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a heavier penalty, by
ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to cattle,
they were yet more difficult to safeguard, because they are kept in the
fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more
heavy penalty was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be
restored for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the animal itself
were discovered in the thief's possession: because in that case he had to
restore only twice the number, as in the case of other thefts: for there
was reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he
kept it alive. Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow is
useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for
food, for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes": and
therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep was useful
in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool." The
unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank: but on account of his
stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished by death, as stated
above. As to the man who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as
a breaker of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be observed, to
testify the belief in the newness of the world, as stated above (Q[100],
A[5]): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 10 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 10: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more
grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and for
murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents, adultery
and incest. In the case of thief of other things it inflicted punishment
by indemnification: while in the case of blows and mutilation it
authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise for the sin of bearing
false witness. In other faults of less degree it prescribed the
punishment of stripes or of public disgrace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 10 Para. 2/3
The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases. First,
in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of the
privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the
seventh year of remission: wherefore he was punished by remaining a slave
for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith to make
restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 10 Para. 3/3
The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because
God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other nations were
given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people
absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry. For this
reason it is related (1 Kgs. 26:19) that David said to Saul: "They are
cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have case me out this day, that I
should not dwell in the inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve
strange gods." There was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is
written in Dt. 19:4 [*Cf. Num. 35:25] that "he that striketh [Vulg.:
'killeth'] his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred
against him, shall flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide there
until the death of the high-priest." For then it became lawful for him to
return home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they
forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were
not so eager to kill the slayer.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 11 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 11: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account of
any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had not
safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was more
severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday or the day
before" (in which case steps might have been taken to butting suddenly).
Or again, the animal was slain in detestation of the sin; and lest men
should be horrified at the sight thereof.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 12 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 12: The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi Moses
declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was frequently from
the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of
investigating the hidden murder. This was brought about in three ways. In
the first place the elders of the city swore that they had taken every
measure for safeguarding the roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was
indemnified for the slaying of his beast, and if the murder was
previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the place, where
the heifer was slain, remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid
this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily make known the
murderer, if they knew who he was: and it would seldom happen but that
some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or again, this was done
in order to frighten people, in detestation of murder. Because the
slaying of a heifer, which is a useful animal and full of strength,
especially before it has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever
committed murder, however useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit
his life; and that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking
off of its head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut
off from the fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that the
heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated
place.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[2] R.O. 12 Para. 2/2
Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of
Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor did it
plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The fact of
the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified the despised
death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is shown
to be the arch-murderer.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a
suitable manner?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners
were not suitably framed. For Peter said (Acts 10:34,35): "In very deed I
perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he
that feareth Him and worketh justice is acceptable to Him." But those who
are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church of God.
Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:3) that "the Ammonite and
the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the
church of the Lord for ever": whereas, on the other hand, it is
prescribed (Dt. 23:7) to be observed with regard to certain other
nations: "Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy brother;
nor the Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things which
are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be an eunuch, or
born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:1,2)
that "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter into the
church of the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be molested:
for it is written (Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor
afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the land of Egypt":
and (Ex. 23:9): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know the
hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt."
But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury. Therefore the Law
unsuitably permitted them (Dt. 23:19,20) to lend money to the stranger
for usury.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we should
show greater care and love for these things that are nearest to us,
according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like: so also every
man him that is nearest to himself." Therefore the Lord unsuitably
commanded (Dt. 20:13-19) that all the inhabitants of a captured hostile
city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should not be cut down.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to the
good of the individual. But the common good is sought in a war which men
fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt.
20:5-7) that certain men should be sent home, for instance a man that had
built a new house, or who had planted a vineyard, or who had married a
wife.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a man's
fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary to the
virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are
unfittingly excused from the toil of battle (Dt. 20:8).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom declares (Prov. 8:8): "All my words are
just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful,
and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained
suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of
peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners passed through
their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in their land
as newcomers. And in both these respects the Law made kind provision in
its precepts: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt not molest a
stranger [advenam]"; and again (Ex. 22:9): "Thou shalt not molest a
stranger [peregrino]." Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted
entirely to their fellowship and mode of worship. With regard to these a
certain order was observed. For they were not at once admitted to
citizenship: just as it was law with some nations that no one was deemed
a citizen except after two or three generations, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. iii, 1). The reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed
to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled down in
its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having
the common good firmly at heart might attempt something hurtful to the
people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed in respect of certain
nations that had close relations with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among
whom they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau,
Jacob's brother), that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the
people after the third generation; whereas others (with whom their
relations had been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were
never to be admitted to citizenship; while the Amalekites, who were yet
more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to
be held as foes in perpetuity: for it is written (Ex. 17:16): "The war of
the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation to generation."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the Law
contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, it commanded that
war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is commanded (Dt. 20:10)
that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first make an
offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when once they had entered on
a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their trust in
God. And in order that they might be the more heedful of this command, it
ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should hearten them by
promising them God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever
might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that certain men, who might be
in the way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they should
use moderation in pursuing the advantage of victory, by sparing women
and children, and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of
God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul: for it is
written (Ex. 12:48): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and
to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first be circumcised,
and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner, and he shall be
as that which is born in the land." But in temporal matters concerning
the public life of the people, admission was not granted to everyone at
once, for the reason given above: but to some, i.e. the Egyptians and
Idumeans, in the third generation; while others were excluded in
perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i.e. the peoples of
Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin
committed by him, in order that others seeing this may be deterred and
refrain from sinning; so too may one nation or city be punished for a
crime, that others may refrain from similar crimes.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted to
citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus it is related (Judith
14:6) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, "was joined to
the people of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred." The same
applies to Ruth the Moabite who was "a virtuous woman" (Ruth 3:11):
although it may be said that this prohibition regarded men and not women,
who are not competent to be citizens absolutely speaking.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is said to
be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a restricted sense.
A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of citizenship, for
instance, the right of debating or voting in the popular assembly. On the
other hand, any man may be called citizen, only in a restricted sense, if
he dwells within the state, even common people or children or old men,
who are not fit to enjoy power in matters pertaining to the common weal.
For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, were excluded
from the "ecclesia," i.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth
generation. The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to
receive the honor due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the
divine worship was continued through carnal generation: for even among
the heathens, those who had many children were marked with special honor,
as the Philosopher remarks (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters
pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from
others, as neither were strangers, as already stated: for it is written
(Iss 56:3): "Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the Lord
speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His people. And
let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the
acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on account of
the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable
feeling towards those out of whom they made a profit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: A distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities.
For some of them were far distant, and were not among those which had
been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they killed all
the men who had fought against God's people; whereas the women and
children were spared. But in the neighboring cities which had been
promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, on account of their
former crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as executor of
Divine justice: for it is written (Dt. 9:5) "because they have done
wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in." The fruit-trees were
commanded to be left untouched, for the use of the people themselves, to
whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard, the
newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for two reasons.
First, because man is wont to give all his affection to those things
which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having, and
consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above other things.
Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of this affection they
would fear death all the more, and be so much the less brave in battle.
Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5), "it is a
misfortune for a man if he is prevented from obtaining something good
when it is within his grasp." And so lest the surviving relations should
be the more grieved at the death of these men who had not entered into
the possession of the good things prepared for them; and also lest the
people should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune: these
men were taken away from the danger of death by being removed from the
battle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The timid were sent back home, not that they might be the
gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their
presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid
and run away.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the
household?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable precepts
about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every respect his
master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that
which is a man's property should be his always. Therefore it was
unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that slaves should "go out
free" in the seventh year.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an animal,
e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (Dt. 22:1-3) with regard to
animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be found
going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:15): "Thou
shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even than the
human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat their servants
and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse treatment of all
seems to be that which results in death. Therefore it is unfittingly
commanded (Ex. 21:20,21) that "he that striketh his bondman or bondwoman
with a rod, and they die under his hands . . . if the party remain alive
a day . . . he shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his
money."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from
that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion of master
over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or maidservant.
Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to sell his
daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has power
over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses. Therefore
it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) that a father should bring
his son to the ancients of the city for punishment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the Lord forbade them (Dt. 7:3, seqq.) to make marriages
with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such as had been
contracted (1 Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to
marry captive women from strange nations (Dt. 21:10, seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 7 Para. 1/1
OBJ 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of
consanguinity and affinity, according to Lev. 18. Therefore it was
unsuitably commanded (Dt. 25:5) that if any man died without issue, his
brother should marry his wife.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 8 Para. 1/1
OBJ 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and
wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is impossible
if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the
Lord to allow (Dt. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife away, by writing a bill
of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her again to wife.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Obj. 9 Para. 1/1
OBJ 9: Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband, so can a
slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the Law did not
command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the injury
done by a servant to his master, or by a son to his father. Therefore it
seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the "sacrifice of
jealousy" in order to investigate a wife's adultery (Num. 5:12, seqq.).
Consequently it seems that the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts
about the members of the household.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The judgments of the Lord
are true, justified in themselves."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The mutual relations of the members of a household regard
everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the Philosopher
states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life may be
considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of the
individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his individuality: and for
the purpose of the preservation of life, considered from this standpoint,
man has at his service external goods, by means of which he provides
himself with food and clothing and other such necessaries of life: in the
handling of which he has need of servants. Secondly man's life is
preserved from the point of view of the species, by means of generation,
for which purpose man needs a wife, that she may bear him children.
Accordingly the mutual relations of the members of a household admit of a
threefold combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband
and wife, and those of father and son: and in respect of all these
relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard
to servants, it commanded them to be treated with moderation---both as to
their work, lest, to wit, they should be burdened with excessive labor,
wherefore the Lord commanded (Dt. 5:14) that on the Sabbath day "thy
manservant and thy maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"---and also
as to the infliction of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their
servants, to set them free (Ex. 21:26,27). Similar provision was made in
favor of a maidservant when married to anyone (Ex. 21:7, seqq.).
Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken from
among the people, the Law prescribed that they should go out free in the
seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their clothes
(Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded (Dt. 15:13) that they
should be given provision for the journey.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those who
were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that they should marry a wife
from their own tribe (Num. 36:6): and this lest confusion should ensue in
the property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry the wife of
his deceased brother when the latter died without issue, as prescribed in
Dt. 25:5,6: and this in order that he who could not have successors
according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a kind of
adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely forgotten. It
also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women of strange
nations, through fear of their losing their faith; and those of their
near kindred, on account of the natural respect due to them. Furthermore
it prescribed in what way wives were to be treated after marriage. To
wit, that they should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it
ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his
wife of a crime (Dt. 22:13, seqq.). Also that a man's hatred of his wife
should not be detrimental to his son (Dt. 21:15, seqq.). Again, that a
man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather that he
should write a bill of divorce and send her away (Dt. 24:1). Furthermore,
in order to foster conjugal love from the very outset, it was prescribed
that no public duties should be laid on a recently married man, so that
he might be free to rejoice with his wife.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by
instructing them in the faith: hence it is written (Ex. 12:26, seqq.):
"When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this
service? You shall say to them: It is the victim of the passage of the
Lord." Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right
conduct: wherefore it is written (Dt. 21:20) that the parents had to say:
"He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and
to debauchery."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the children of Israel had been delivered by the Lord
from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of God, He
did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written (Lev.
25:39, seqq.): "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to
thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: but he
shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for they are My servants,
and I brought them out of the land of Egypt: let them not be sold as
bondmen": and consequently, since they were slaves, not absolutely but in
a restricted sense, after a lapse of time they were set free.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This commandment is to be understood as referring to a
servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing some
sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law seems
to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not: since if
it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was
forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered to be given his liberty: while
for slaying, the punishment was that of a murderer, when the slave died
under the blow of his master. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but
only probable, the Law did not impose any penalty as regards a man's own
servant: for instance if the servant did not die at once after being
struck, but after some days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as
a result of the blows he received. For when a man struck a free man, yet
so that he did not die at once, but "walked abroad again upon his staff,"
he that struck him was quit of murder, even though afterwards he died.
Nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim
of his assault. But this was not the case if a man killed his own
servant: because whatever the servant had, even his very person, was the
property of his master. Hence the reason for his not being subject to a
pecuniary penalty is set down as being "because it is his money."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as a slave
absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a fixed
time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a
man might sell his son or daughter. This is shown by the very words of
the Law, where we read: "If any man sell his daughter to be a servant,
she shall not go out as bondwomen are wont to go out." Moreover, in this
way a man might sell not only his son, but even himself, rather as a
hireling than as a slave, according to Lev. 25:39,40: "If thy brother,
constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him
with the service of bondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a
sojourner."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the paternal
authority has the power only of admonition; but not that of coercion,
whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this
case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished by the rulers of
the city.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on account of
the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry.
And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those nations
who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that they would adopt
their religious practices. When, however, the woman was willing to
renounce idolatry, and become an adherent of the Law, it was lawful to
take her in marriage: as was the case with Ruth whom Booz married.
Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (Ruth 1:16): "Thy people shall be
my people, and thy God my God." Accordingly it was not permitted to marry
a captive woman unless she first shaved her hair, and pared her nails,
and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and mourned for her father
and mother, in token that she renounced idolatry for ever.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 7 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.), "because
death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with a
view to the present life, it was ordained that children should be born to
the dead man through his brother: thus affording a certain mitigation to
his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other than his brother
or one next of kin should marry the wife of the deceased, because" the
offspring of this union "would not be looked upon as that of the
deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be under the obligation to
support the household of the deceased, as his brother would be bound to
do from motives of justice on account of his relationship." Hence it is
evident that in marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead
brother's place.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 8 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 8: The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though it
were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews' hardness of
heart, as Our Lord declared (Mt. 19:8). Of this, however, we must speak
more fully in the treatise on Matrimony (SP, Q[67]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[105] A[4] R.O. 9 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 9: Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both easily,
for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since "the eye of the adulterer
observeth darkness" (Job 24:15). But this does not apply to a son in
respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his master: because
the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but
rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of an
adulterous woman.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR
ARTICLES)
In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which
is called the New Law: and in the first place we must consider it in
itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat
of those things that are contained in the New Law. Under the first head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled
in the heart?
(2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?
(3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the
world?
(4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another
law take its place?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law is a written law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the New Law
is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth in writing,
according to Jn. 20:31: "But these are written that you may believe."
Therefore the New Law is a written law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the natural
law, according to Rm. 2:14,15: "(The Gentiles) do by nature those things
that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: 'show'] the work of the law
written in their hearts." If therefore the law of the Gospel were
instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law of nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in the
state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled in the heart is
common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who are in the
Old Testament: for it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine Wisdom "through
nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God
and prophets." Therefore the New Law is not instilled in our hearts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But the
law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the Apostle,
quoting the authority of Jeremias 31:31,33: "Behold the days shall come,
saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and unto the
house of Judah, a new testament," says, explaining what this statement is
(Heb. 8:8,10): "For this is the testament which I will make to the house
of Israel . . . by giving [Vulg.: 'I will give'] My laws into their mind,
and in their heart will I write them." Therefore the New Law is instilled
in our hearts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, "Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in
it," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is
preponderant in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its
efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through
faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of
the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe in Christ. This is
manifestly stated by the Apostle who says (Rm. 3:27): "Where is . . . thy
boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of
faith": for he calls the grace itself of faith "a law." And still more
clearly it is written (Rm. 8:2): "The law of the spirit of life, in
Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death." Hence
Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxiv) that "as the law of deeds was
written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the
hearts of the faithful": and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): "What
else are the Divine laws written by God Himself on our hearts, but the
very presence of His Holy Spirit?"
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to
receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to the use of that
grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New
Law; and the faithful need to be instructed concerning them, both by word
and writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they
should do. Consequently we must say that the New Law is in the first
place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that secondarily it is a
written law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain to
the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or by
directing us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, the
Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation of
Christ's Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith through
which we receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: and with regard to the
affections, it contains matters touching the contempt of the world,
whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for
"the world," i.e. worldly men, "cannot receive" the Holy Ghost (Jn.
14:17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists in works of
virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort men in divers
ways.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into
man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the natural law is
instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as
it were, added on to his nature by a gift of grace. In this way the New
Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should
do, but also by helping him to accomplish it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except through
faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by faith in Christ man
belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the law of grace
instilled into them belonged to the New Testament.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law justifies?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no man is
justified unless he obeys God's law, according to Heb. 5:9: "He," i.e.
Christ, "became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation." But
the Gospel does not always cause men to believe in it: for it is written
(Rm. 10:16): "All do not obey the Gospel." Therefore the New Law does not
justify.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that the
Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased at its advent:
for it is stated (Rm. 4:15): "The Law worketh wrath: for where there is
no law, neither is there transgression." But much more did the New Law
increase transgression: since he who sins after the giving of the New Law
deserves greater punishment, according to Heb. 10:28,29: "A man making
void the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three
witnesses. How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments,
who hath trodden underfoot the Son of God," etc.? Therefore the New Law,
like the Old Law, does not justify.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according to
Rm. 8:33: "God that justifieth." But the Old Law was from God just as the
New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more than the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 1:16): "I am not ashamed of the
Gospel: for it is in the power of God unto salvation to everyone that
believeth." But there is no salvation but to those who are justified.
Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), there is a twofold element in the
Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy
Ghost bestowed inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence
Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): "There," i.e. in the Old
Testament, "the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the ungodly
might be afraid"; "here," i.e. in the New Testament, "it is given in an
inward manner, that they may be justified." The other element of the
Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, and those
commandments which direct human affections and human actions. And as to
this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6)
"The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth": and Augustine explains
this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that the letter denotes any
writing external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are
contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would
kill, unless there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its
principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas and
precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to avoid
sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin: for this
belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the
grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater punishment, as being
ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the help given to him.
And this is why the New Law is not said to "work wrath": because as far
as it is concerned it gives man sufficient help to avoid sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in
different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone:
whereas He gave the New Law written "in the fleshly tables of the heart,"
as the Apostle expresses it (2 Cor. 3:3). Wherefore, as Augustine says
(De Spir. et Lit. xviii), "the Apostle calls this letter which is written
outside man, a ministration of death and a ministration of condemnation:
whereas he calls the other letter, i.e. the Law of the New Testament, the
ministration of the spirit and the ministration of justice: because
through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are delivered from
the condemnation due to transgression."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the
world?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law should have been given from the
beginning of the world. "For there is no respect of persons with God"
(Rm. 2:11). But "all" men "have sinned and do need the glory of God" (Rm.
3:23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the
beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succor to all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in
various times. But God, "Who will have all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4),
commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the
last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the Law of the Gospel should
have been at hand for all times, so as to be given from the beginning of
the world.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all eternity,
more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But God provided
man from the beginning of the world with things that are necessary for
the health of his body, by subjecting to his power whatever was created
for the sake of man (Gn. 1:26-29). Therefore the New Law also, which is
very necessary for the health of the soul, should have been given to man
from the beginning of the world.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not first
which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But the New Law is highly
spiritual. Therefore it was not fitting for it to be given from the
beginning of the world.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting for
the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The first is
because the New Law, as stated above (A[1]), consists chiefly in the
grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given abundantly
until sin, which is an obstacle to grace, had been cast out of man
through the accomplishment of his redemption by Christ: wherefore it is
written (Jn. 7:39): "As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was
not yet glorified." This reason the Apostle states clearly (Rm. 8:2,
seqq.) where, after speaking of "the Law of the Spirit of life," he adds:
"God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, of sin* hath
condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be
fulfilled in us." [*St. Thomas, quoting perhaps from memory, omits the
"et" (and), after "sinful flesh." The text quoted should read thus: "in
the likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering ({peri hamartias}),
hath," etc.]
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law. Because
a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the outset, but through
an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a
man. And this reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25): "The Law
was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by faith. But
after the faith is come, we are no longer under a pedagogue."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of
grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left to himself under
the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he might
realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need of grace. This reason is
set down by the Apostle (Rm. 5:20): "The Law entered in, that sin might
abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents deserved
to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so "from whom it is withheld it
is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given," as
Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf. Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer.
et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not follow that there is respect of
persons with God, from the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to
all from the beginning of the world, which Law was to be published in due
course of time, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The state of mankind does not vary according to diversity
of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the New Law avails
for all places, but not for all times: although at all times there have
been some persons belonging to the New Testament, as stated above (A[1],
ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Things pertaining to the health of the body are of service
to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy: whereas things
pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is
forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison will not hold.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law will not last until the end of
the world. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10), "when that which
is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." But the
New Law is "in part," since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:9): "We know in
part and we prophesy in part." Therefore the New Law is to be done away,
and will be succeeded by a more perfect state.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Our Lord (Jn. 16:13) promised His disciples the
knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should come.
But the Church knows not yet all truth in the state of the New Testament.
Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will
be revealed by the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the Son
from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the Father and the
Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father,
viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein men were intent on begetting
children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to the Person of
the Son: viz. the state of the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent
on wisdom (which is appropriated to the Son) hold a prominent place.
Therefore there will be a third state corresponding to the Holy Ghost,
wherein spiritual men will hold the first place.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Our Lord said (Mt. 24:14): "This Gospel of the kingdom
shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the
consummation come." But the Gospel of Christ is already preached
throughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet come.
Therefore the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but
another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like unto another
Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 24:34): "I say to you that this
generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done": which passage
Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii) explains as referring to "the generation of
those that believe in Christ." Therefore the state of those who believe
in Christ will last until the consummation of the world.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The state of the world may change in two ways. In one
way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will succeed
this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law succeeded the
state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less perfect one. Now no
state of the present life can be more perfect that the state of the New
Law: since nothing can approach nearer to the last end than that which is
the immediate cause of our being brought to the last end. But the New Law
does this: wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 10:19-22): "Having therefore,
brethren, a confidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of
Christ, a new . . . way which He hath dedicated for us . . . let us draw
near." Therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than
that of the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more
perfect it is.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
In another way the state of mankind may change according as man stands
in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly. And thus the
state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws
were very well kept, and at other times were altogether unheeded. Thus,
too, the state of the New Law is subject to change with regard to various
places, times, and persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost
dwells in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless we are not to look
forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost
more perfectly than he has possessed it hitherto, especially the apostles
who "received the firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more
abundantly than others," as a gloss expounds on Rm. 8:23.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold
state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is that of
the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in heaven.
But as the first state is figurative and imperfect in comparison with the
state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and imperfect in
comparison with the heavenly state, with the advent of which the present
state will be done away as expressed in that very passage (1 Cor. 13:12):
"We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and
Priscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise to give the Holy Ghost was
fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner the
Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes whom they held to be
the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts of the Apostles,
where it is clearly shown that the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the
apostles: just as Our Lord promised them a second time (Acts 1:5): "You
shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence": which we
read as having been fulfilled in Acts 2. However, these foolish notions
are refuted by the statement (Jn. 7:39) that "as yet the Spirit was not
given, because Jesus was not yet glorified"; from which we gather that
the Holy Ghost was given as soon as Christ was glorified in His
Resurrection and Ascension. Moreover, this puts out of court the
senseless idea that the Holy Ghost is to be expected to come at some
other time.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters
necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that we are bound to
believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all future events: for
this did not regard them according to Acts 1:7: "It is not for you to
know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but also
to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence Our
Lord said (Jn. 5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps
believe me also; for he wrote of Me." In like manner the New Law
corresponds not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost; according to
Rm. 8:2: "The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," etc. Hence we
are not to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[106] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching of
the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Mt. 4:17), it is most
absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom.
But the preaching of the Gospel of Christ may be understood in two ways.
First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge of Christ: and
thus the Gospel was preached throughout the world even at the time of the
apostles, as Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in Matth.). And in this sense
the words that follow---"and then shall the consummation come," refer to
the destruction of Jerusalem, of which He was speaking literally.
Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be understood as extending
throughout the world and producing its full effect, so that, to wit, the
Church would be founded in every nation. And in these sense, as Augustine
writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the
whole world yet, but, when it is, the consummation of the world will come.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?
(2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?
(3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?
(4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the Old.
Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God: since
"without faith it is impossible to please God," according to Heb. 11:6.
But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the gloss
says on Mt. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip. xvii)
that "there is little difference between the Law and Gospel" [*The
'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor']---"fear
and love." But the New and Old Laws cannot be differentiated in respect
of these two things: since even the Old Law comprised precepts of
charity: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" (Lev. 19:18), and: "Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God" (Dt. 6:5). In like manner neither can they differ
according to the other difference which Augustine assigns (Contra Faust.
iv, 2), viz. that "the Old Testament contained temporal promises, whereas
the New Testament contains spiritual and eternal promises": since even
the New Testament contains temporal promises, according to Mk. 10:30: He
shall receive "a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and
brethren," etc.: while in the Old Testament they hoped in promises
spiritual and eternal, according to Heb. 11:16: "But now they desire a
better, that is to say, a heavenly country," which is said of the
patriarchs. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not distinct from the
Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by calling
the Old Law "a law of works," and the New Law "a law of faith" (Rm.
3:27). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, according to Heb. 11:39:
"All were [Vulg.: 'All these being'] approved by the testimony of faith,"
which he says of the fathers of the Old Testament. In like manner the New
Law is a law of works: since it is written (Mt. 5:44): "Do good to them
that hate you"; and (Lk. 22:19): "Do this for a commemoration of Me."
Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being
translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law."
But the priesthood of the New Testament is distinct from that of the Old,
as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also
distinct.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[2]; Q[91], A[4]), every law
ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an end may be
divided in two ways, considered from the point of view of the end. First,
through being ordained to different ends: and this difference will be
specific, especially if such ends are proximate. Secondly, by reason of
being closely or remotely connected with the end. Thus it is clear that
movements differ in species through being directed to different terms:
while according as one part of a movement is nearer to the term than
another part, the difference of perfect and imperfect movement is
assessed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two
ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from the fact that they
are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic
government, would differ specifically from a law ordained to government
by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one
another, through one of them being more closely connected with the end,
and the other more remotely: thus in one and the same state there is one
law enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish that
which pertains to the common good; and another law regulating the
education of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve manly
deeds later on.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is
not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have the same end,
namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and
of the Old Testament, according to Rm. 3:30: "It is one God that
justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith."
According to the second way, the New Law is distinct from the Old Law:
because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says
(Gal. 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is
the law of charity, of which the Apostle says (Col. 3:14) that it is "the
bond of perfection."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The unity of faith under both Testaments witnesses to the
unity of end: for it has been stated above (Q[62], A[2]) that the object
of the theological virtues, among which is faith, is the last end. Yet
faith had a different state in the Old and in the New Law: since what
they believed as future, we believe as fact.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 2: All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws
are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For the
precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as
yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are directed in one way to
perform virtuous acts, while those who are perfected by the possession of
virtuous habits are directed in another way. For those who as yet are not
endowed with virtuous habits, are directed to the performance of virtuous
acts by reason of some outward cause: for instance, by the threat of
punishment, or the promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor,
riches, or the like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were
imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called
the "law of fear," inasmuch as it induced men to observe its commandments
by threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing
temporal promises. On the other hand, those who are possessed of virtue,
are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account
of some extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law which derives
its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts, is
called the "Law of love": and it is described as containing spiritual and
eternal promises, which are objects of the virtues, chiefly of charity.
Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects, not
as to something foreign but as to something of their own. For this
reason, too, the Old Law is described as "restraining the hand, not the
will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]; since when a man refrains from
some sins through fear of being punished, his will does not shrink simply
from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of
righteousness: and hence the New Law, which is the Law of love, is said
to restrain the will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3
Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who,
having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked chiefly to
spiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to the
New Law. In like manner in the New Testament there are some carnal men
who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New Law; and these it
was necessary, even under the New Testament, to lead to virtuous action
by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3
But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless it
did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity . . . is spread abroad in
our hearts" (Rm. 5:5).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[106], AA[1],2), the New Law is called
the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very
grace which is given inwardly to believers, and for this reason is called
the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists secondarily in certain
deeds, moral and sacramental: but the New Law does not consist chiefly
in these latter things, as did the Old Law. As to those under the Old
Testament who through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect they
belonged to the New Testament: for they were not justified except through
faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the New Testament. Hence of Moses
the Apostle says (Heb. 11:26) that he esteemed "the reproach of Christ
greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old. Because
to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids or excludes the
observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): "If you be
circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Therefore the New Law is
not a fulfilment of the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another. But Our
Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary to precepts of
the Old Law. For we read (Mt. 5:27-32): You have heard that it was said
to them of old: . . . "Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give
her a bill of divorce. But I say to you that whosoever shall put away his
wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery." Furthermore, the same
evidently applies to the prohibition against swearing, against
retaliation, and against hating one's enemies. In like manner Our Lord
seems to have done away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the
different kinds of foods (Mt. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the
mouth defileth the man: but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a
man." Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law. But
Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched the leper
(Mt. 8:3), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have
frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of Him (Jn.
9:16): "This man is not of God, who keepeth not the sabbath." Therefore
Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law given by Christ is not
a fulfilment of the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial, and
judicial, as stated above (Q[99], A[4]). But Our Lord (Mt. 5) fulfilled
the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the judicial and
ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not a
complete fulfilment of the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 5:17): "I am not come to destroy,
but to fulfil": and went on to say (Mt. 5:18): "One jot or one tittle
shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the New Law is compared to the
Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect fulfils that
which is lacking in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils
the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as
was stated above (Q[92], A[1]): and consequently the end of the Old Law
was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish
this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it
in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old by justifying
men through the power of Christ's Passion. This is what the Apostle says
(Rm. 8:3,4): "What the Law could not do . . . God sending His own Son in
the likeness of sinful flesh . . . hath condemned sin in the flesh, that
the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." And in this
respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law promised, according to 2 Cor.
1:20: "Whatever are the promises of God, in Him," i.e. in Christ, "they
are 'Yea'." [*The Douay version reads thus: "All the promises of God are
in Him, 'It is'."] Again, in this respect, it also fulfils what the Old
Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written (Col. 2:17) concerning the
ceremonial precepts that they were "a shadow of things to come, but the
body is of Christ"; in other words, the reality is found in Christ.
Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law
is called the law of shadow or of figure.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and
in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing to be circumcised
and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were binding for the
time being; according to Gal. 4:4: "Made under the Law." In His doctrine
He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining
the true sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of murder and
adultery, the prohibition of which the Scribes and Pharisees thought to
refer only to the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by
showing that the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins.
Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing the
safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old
Law forbade perjury: and this is more safely avoided, by abstaining
altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord
fulfilled the precepts of the Law, by adding some counsels of perfection:
this is clearly seen in Mt. 19:21, where Our Lord said to the man who
affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: "One thing is
wanting to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast,"
etc. [*St. Thomas combines Mt. 19:21 with Mk. 10:21].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law except
in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[103], AA[3],4).
Now the latter were figurative of something to come. Wherefore from the
very fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled when those things
were accomplished which they foreshadowed, it follows that they are no
longer to be observed: for it they were to be observed, this would mean
that something is still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus
the promise of a future gift holds no longer when it has been fulfilled
by the presentation of the gift. In this way the legal ceremonies are
abolished by being fulfilled.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those precepts
of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law. For what Our
Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is not contrary to
what the Law prescribed. "For the Law did not say: 'Let him that wills,
put his wife away': the contrary of which would be not to put her away.
On the contrary, the Law was unwilling that a man should put away his
wife, since it prescribed a delay, so that excessive eagerness for
divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the
bill. Hence Our Lord, in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not
easily to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of
fornication." The same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as
stated above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibition of
retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by forbidding men to
seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas Our Lord deprived them of vengeance
more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With
regard to the hatred of one's enemies, He dispelled the false
interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the
person, but his sin. As to discriminating between various foods, which
was a ceremonial matter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed: but
He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of
something else, as stated above (Q[102], A[6], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper; because by
doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as also by
touching the dead, as stated above (Q[102], A[5], ad 4). But Our Lord,
Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. By those things
which He did on the sabbath, He did not break the sabbath in reality, as
the Master Himself shows in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles
by His Divine power, which is ever active among things; and because He
worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active among things;
and because His works were concerned with the salvation of man, while the
Pharisees were concerned for the well-being of animals even on the
sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He excused His disciples
for gathering the ears of corn on the sabbath. But He did seem to break
the sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation of the
Pharisees, who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works of
kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the intention of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are not
mentioned in Mt. 5 is because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance
was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He
mentioned that of retaliation: so that what He said about it should refer
to all the others. With regard to this precept, He taught that the
intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of
justice, and not as a punishment out of revengeful spite, which He
forbade, admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and
this remains still in the New Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the Old.
Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is called the
"law of faith" (Rm. 3:27). But many points of faith are set forth in the
New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore the New Law is not
contained in the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss says on Mt. 5:19, "He that shall break one of
these least commandments," that the lesser commandments are those of the
Law, and the greater commandments, those contained in the Gospel. Now the
greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore the New Law is not
contained in the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If,
therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that whoever
had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to give men a New
Law when once they had the Old. Therefore the New Law is not contained in
the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, As expressed in Ezech. 1:16, there was "a wheel in the
midst of a wheel," i.e. "the New Testament within the Old," according to
Gregory's exposition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, One thing may be contained in another in two ways. First,
actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually; as an
effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is incomplete;
thus a genus contains its species, and a seed contains the whole tree,
virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained in the Old:
for it has been stated (A[1]) that the New Law is compared to the Old as
perfect to imperfect. Hence Chrysostom, expounding Mk. 4:28, "The earth
of itself bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards
the full corn in the ear," expresses himself as follows: "He brought
forth first the blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law
of Moses; lastly, the full corn, i.e. the Law of the Gospel." Hence then
the New Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly and
openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old Testament as a matter
of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, even as to
those things which we are bound to believe, the New Law is contained in
the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than
those of the Old Law, in the point of their being set forth explicitly.
But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they
are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix,
23,28) that "nearly all Our Lord's admonitions or precepts, where He
expressed Himself by saying: 'But I say unto you,' are to be found also
in those ancient books. Yet, since they thought that murder was only the
slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to them that every wicked
impulse to hurt our brother is to be looked on as a kind of murder." And
it is in the point of declarations of this kind that the precepts of the
New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however,
prevents the greater from being contained in the lesser virtually; just
as a tree is contained in the seed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared
explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also had
to be given.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.
For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of an unknown
author]) say: "The commandments given to Moses are easy to obey: Thou
shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery: but the commandments of
Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give way
to anger, or to lust." Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the
Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than to
suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance of the Law was
followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from Dt. 28:1-14;
whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the New Law, as
stated in 2 Cor. 6:4-10: "Let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of
God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses,"
etc. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the New Law
is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade perjury, while the
New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to cast off
his wife without a bill of divorce, while the New Law forbade divorce
altogether; as is clearly stated in Mt. 5:31, seqq., according to
Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the
Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 11:28): "Come to Me, all you that
labor and are burdened": which words are expounded by Hilary thus: "He
calls to Himself all those that labor under the difficulty of observing
the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world." And further on He
says of the yoke of the Gospel: "For My yoke is sweet and My burden
light." Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden than the Old.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A twofold difficult may attach to works of virtue with
which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of the
outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and
burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier burden than
the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many
more outward acts than the New Law, which, in the teaching of Christ and
the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the natural law;
although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the
holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says that moderation should be
observed, lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful. For
he says in reply to the queries of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, "whereas God
in His mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public
solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments, certain
persons make it a slave's burden; so much so that the state of the Jews
who were subject to the sacraments of the Law, and not to the
presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts:
for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and pleasure.
It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act thus is
difficult for a man without virtue: but through virtue it becomes easy
for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome
than those of the Old; because the New Law prohibits certain interior
movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in the Old Law
in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, without, however, any
punishment being attached to the prohibition. Now this is very difficult
to a man without virtue: thus even the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9)
that it is easy to do what a righteous man does; but that to do it in the
same way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who
is not righteous. Accordingly we read also (1 Jn. 5:3) that "His
commandments are not heavy": which words Augustine expounds by saying
that "they are not heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a
burden to him that loveth not."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of
the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New Law
are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily borne, on
account of the love in which the same Law consists: since, as Augustine
says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes light and nothing of things
that seem arduous and beyond our power."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[107] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of these additions to the precepts of the Old
Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as Augustine states
[*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26]. Accordingly this does not
prove that the New Law is more burdensome, but rather that it is a
lighter burden.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law:
under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward
works?
(2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and
forbidding external acts?
(3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?
(4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit
any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom,
according to Mt. 24:14: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in
the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior, but
only in interior acts, according to Lk. 17:21: "The kingdom of God is
within you"; and Rm. 14:17: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink;
but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore the New Law
should not prescribe or forbid any external acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the New Law is "the law of the Spirit" (Rm. 8:2). But
"where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now
there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external
acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or forbid any external
acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the
hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is assigned as
the difference between the New and Old Laws that the "Old Law restrains
the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii,
D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain prohibitions and
commands about exterior deeds, but only about interior acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are made "children of light":
wherefore it is written (Jn. 12:36): "Believe in the light that you may
be the children of light." Now it is becoming that children of the light
should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to
Eph. 5:8: "You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk
. . . as children of the light." Therefore the New Law had to forbid
certain external acts and prescribe others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[106], AA[1],2), the New Law consists
chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith
that worketh through love. Now men become receivers of this grace through
God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed
forth to us. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14): "The Word was made flesh,"
and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and further on: "Of His
fulness we all have received, and grace for grace." Hence it is added
that "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently it was becoming
that the grace flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by
means of certain external sensible objects; and that from this inward
grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external
works should ensue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In
the first place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the
sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the
Eucharist, and the like.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the
promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a difference. For there
are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to
inward grace consisting in faith that worketh through love. Such external
works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus confession of
faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written
(Mt. 10:32,33) "(Every one) that shall confess Me before men, I will also
confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me before men,
I will also deny him before My Father." On the other hand, there are
works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith that
worketh through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the
New Law, by virtue of its primitive institution; but have been left by
the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so
to each one it is free to decide what he should do or avoid; and to each
superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they
must do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is called the
"law of liberty" [*Cf. Reply OBJ[2]]: since the Old Law decided many
points and left few to man to decide as he chose.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: but
as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts belong
also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal
righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts that are
incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in
opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently should be forbidden in
the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those things that are
indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or
that food, are not part of the kingdom of God; wherefore the Apostle says
before the words quoted: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is "free
is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his own
accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit
that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines one as a second
nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man would not
act according to his nature, but according to some corruption affecting
that nature. Since then the grace of the Holy Ghost is like an interior
habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do
freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed
to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects.
First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things, except
such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come
under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because it
also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions,
inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace. It is for these two
reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect liberty" (James
1:25).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate
movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which
ensue from inward movements.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law made insufficient ordinations
about external acts. Because faith that worketh through charity seems
chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to Gal. 5:6: "In Christ Jesus
neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith
that worketh through charity." But the New Law declared explicitly
certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old
Law; for instance, belief in the Trinity. Therefore it should also have
added certain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, but
also certain sacred things, as stated above (Q[101], A[4]; Q[102], A[4]).
But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our
Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification of a temple
or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast.
Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external
matters.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain observances
pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain observances
pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we were treating of
the ceremonial of the Old Law (Q[101], A[4]; Q[102], A[6]). Now in the
New Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to the ministers
of God; as may be gathered from Mt. 10:9: "Do not possess gold, nor
silver, nor money in your purses," nor other things which are mentioned
here and Lk. 9,10. Therefore certain observances pertaining to the
faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial precepts,
there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law there are no
judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations
about external works.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 7:24): "Every one . . . that heareth
these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built
his house upon a rock." But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is
necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words contain all things
necessary for man's salvation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, as stated above (A[1]), the New Law had to make such
prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the reception
or right use of grace. And since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but
through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments
whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist, Orders of the ministers
of the New Law, by the institution of the apostles and seventy-two
disciples, Penance, and indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation
through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that by His
institution the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil (Mk.
6:13). These are the sacraments of the New Law.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so far
as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the moral precepts, which
also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had
nothing to add as regards external action. The determination of these
works in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the ceremonial
precepts of the Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to the judicial
precepts, as stated above (Q[99], A[4]). And therefore, since these
determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward
grace wherein the Law consists, they do not come under a precept of the
New Law, but are left to the decision of man; some relating to
inferiors---as when a precept is given to an individual; others, relating
to superiors, temporal or spiritual, referring, namely, to the common
good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by
prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and those moral
precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance,
that one must not kill, or steal, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we cannot
attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace came to be
bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the number of
explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it is through human reason
that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the rule of human
action, as stated above (Q[19], A[3]; Q[63], A[2]). Wherefore in such
matters as these there was no need for any precepts to be given besides
the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed from the dictate of reason.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed, which
cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had to be
instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for
instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the like, or,
again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the
institution of such things to the discretion of the faithful, since they
have not of themselves any necessary connection with inward grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial
observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be understood in two
ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as being not
commands but permissions. For He permitted them to set forth to preach
without scrip or stick, and so on, since they were empowered to accept
their livelihood from those to whom they preached: wherefore He goes on
to say: "For the laborer is worthy of his hire." Nor is it a sin, but a
work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of livelihood with
him, without accepting supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul
did (1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be
considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles for the time
during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion.
For the disciples, being yet as little children under Christ's care,
needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all subjects
receive from their superiors: and especially so, since they were to be
accustomed little by little to renounce the care of temporalities, so as
to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole
world. Nor must we wonder if He established certain fixed modes of life,
as long as the state of the Old Law endured and the people had not as yet
achieved the perfect liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished
shortly before His Passion, as though the disciples had by their means
become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said (Lk. 22:35,36) "When I sent
you without purse and scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But they
said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let
him take it, and likewise a scrip." Because the time of perfect liberty
was already at hand, when they would be left entirely to their own
judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in
respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the common
notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to
the discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge of
others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old Law, some of them
He explained, because they were misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we
shall state later on (A[3], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as
regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of the decalogue
directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only
three of them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of murder, of
adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by omitting to fulfil
the other precepts, He directed man insufficiently.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained
nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing of wife, of
punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But there
are many other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (Q[104],
A[4]; Q[105]). Therefore, in this respect, He directed human life
insufficiently.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there were
ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination. Therefore it
seems that He ordained insufficiently.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, man
should do no good deed for any temporal whatever. But there are many
other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are many other
good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer. Therefore Our Lord
unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and of no
other earthly goods ought we to shun the glory of human favor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is by
nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other animals share
with man: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:6,8): "Go to the ant, O
sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself
in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." But every command
issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust command, forasmuch
as it is contrary to the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord
unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition.
Now judgment is an act of justice, according to Ps. 18:15: "Until justice
be turned into judgment." Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly
forbade judgment: and consequently that the New Law directed man
insufficiently in the matter of interior acts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We should
take note that, when He said: "'He that heareth these My words,' He
indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the
precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted, the
sermon, contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian.
Therein man's interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring
that his end is Beatitude; and after commending the authority of the
apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated,
He orders man's interior movements, first in regard to man himself,
secondly in regard to his neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Body Para. 2/4
This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to
man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective action, viz.
volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in
the first place, He directs man's will in respect of the various precepts
of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those
external works that are evil in themselves, but also from internal acts,
and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the second place He directs
man's intention, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek
neither human praise, nor worldly riches, which is to lay up treasures on
earth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Body Para. 3/4
Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his
neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him rashly,
unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too
readily with sacred things if he be unworthy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] Body Para. 4/4
Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by
imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by the narrow door of
perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil
influences. Moreover, He declares that we must observe His commandments,
and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work
miracles, or merely to hear His words.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts
which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand: and this
affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that
the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external act only, and
not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about murder and
adultery rather than about theft and false witness, because the movement
of anger tending to murder, and the movement of desire tending to
adultery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of
stealing or bearing false witness. They held a false opinion about
perjury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths
were of themselves to be desired and to be taken frequently, since they
seem to proceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath
is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without
oaths, unless necessity forces us to have recourse to them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial precepts
in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters contained in
the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in themselves: namely,
divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from strangers. Wherefore Our
Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife (Mt. 5:32); and to receive usury
(Lk. 6:35), when He said: "Lend, hoping for nothing thereby."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the Old
Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should be done out of desire
for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of one's
enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For they thought that
desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept concerning
punishment by retaliation: whereas this precept was given that justice
might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. Wherefore, in
order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared
in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary. They thought that movements
of covetousness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts which
prescribed restitution of what had been purloined, together with
something added thereto, as stated above (Q[105], A[2], ad 9); whereas
the Law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to
encourage covetousness. Wherefore Our Lord teaches that we should not
demand our goods from motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to
give yet more if necessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was
lawful, on account of the commandments of the Law about the slaying of
one's enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of
justice, as stated above (Q[105], A[3], ad 4), not to satisfy hatred.
Wherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to
be ready to do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be
taken as binding "the mind to be prepared to fulfil them," as Augustine
says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under
the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to virtue: whereas
the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the
same way as had been fixed by the Law: this was left to man to decide in
one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us becomingly with regard to
these two kinds of precepts. On the other hand, the observance of the
ceremonial precepts was totally abolished by the advent of the reality;
wherefore in regard to these precepts He commanded nothing on this
occasion when He was giving the general points of His doctrine.
Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the entire bodily worship
which was fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual worship: as
is evident from Jn. 4:21,23, where He says: "The hour cometh when you
shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . .
but . . . the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: All worldly goods may be reduced to three---honors, riches,
and pleasures; according to 1 Jn. 2:16: "All that is in the world is the
concupiscence of the flesh," which refers to pleasures of the flesh, "and
the concupiscence of the eyes," which refers to riches, "and the pride of
life," which refers to ambition for renown and honor. Now the Law did not
promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade
them. But it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is
written in reference to the former (Dt. 28:1): "If thou wilt hear the
voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the
nations"; and in reference to the latter, we read a little further on
(Dt. 28:11): "He will make thee abound with all goods." But the Jews so
distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that we ought
to serve God, with these things as the end in view. Wherefore Our Lord
set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not
be done for human glory. And He mentions three works, to which all others
may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires,
comes under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of
his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does
for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And He mentions
these three specifically, as they hold the principal place, and are most
often used by men in order to gain glory. In the second place He taught
us that we must not place our end in riches, when He said: "Lay not up
to yourselves treasures on earth" (Mt. 6:19).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solicitude.
Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal matters.
First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of
the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore He says: "Lay not up for
yourselves," etc. Secondly, we must not be so anxious about temporal
things, as to despair of God's help: wherefore Our Lord says (Mt. 6:32):
"Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things." Thirdly, we
must not add presumption to our solicitude; in other words, we must not
be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts
without God's help: such solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying that a
man cannot add anything to his stature (Mt. 6:27). We must not anticipate
the time for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not
of the present, but of a future time: wherefore He says (Mt. 6:34): "Be
not . . . solicitous for tomorrow."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[3] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without
which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But he
forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly
proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that which is
expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel (Q[14]
, A[2]). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain
definite counsels should not be proposed to all.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no
definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels should
not be given.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But
obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was unfitting
that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are
found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your enemies" (Mt.
5:44), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles (Mt. 10).
Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law: both because
they are not all mentioned; and because they are not distinguished from
the commandments.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of great use,
according to Prov. (27:9): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: and
the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul." But Christ is our
wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely useful
and becoming.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a commandment is
that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to the
option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which
is the law of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments, and not in
the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore understand
the commandments of the New Law to have been given about matters that are
necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss, to which end the New Law
brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that render
the gaining of this end more assured and expeditious.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual goods
wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more he cleaves to the
one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he
that cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make them his
end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls
away altogether from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by
the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the end aforesaid, he
does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he
can, while using the things of this world, attain to eternal happiness,
provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more
speedily thereto by giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore
the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, consist
in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining to the "concupiscence
of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the "concupiscence of the
flesh"; and honors, which pertain to the "pride of life," according to 1
Jn. 2:16: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as possible,
that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form of the
religious life that professes the state of perfection is based on these
three: since riches are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by
perpetual chastity; and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the
counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one of them in a
particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense,
namely, as applying to that particular case. For instance, when anyone
gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the
counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when a man for some
fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself to
prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when
a man follows not his will as to some deed which he might do lawfully, he
follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he do good
to his enemies when he is not bound to, or if he forgive an injury of
which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all
particular counsels may be reduced to these three general and perfect
counsels.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are
expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it happens
that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not
inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the evangelical
counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the
counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual poverty (Mt. 19:21), He
begins with the words: "If thou wilt be perfect," and then He adds: "Go,
sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." In like manner when He gave the
counsel of perpetual chastity, saying (Mt. 19:12): "There are eunuchs who
have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," He adds
straightway: "He that can take, let him take it." And again, the Apostle
(1 Cor. 7:35), after giving the counsel of virginity, says: "And this I
speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the
individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good in
general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may be
reduced, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been
given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For we follow
Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His
commandments, according to Jn. 10:27: "My sheep hear My voice . . . and
they follow Me."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[108] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true love
of our enemies, and other similar sayings (Mt. 5; Lk. 6), may be referred
to the preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for
salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do good to his enemies,
and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are
placed among the precepts. But that anyone should actually and promptly
behave thus towards an enemy when there is no special need, is to be
referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to those matters
which are set down in Mt. 10 and Lk. 9 and 10, they were either
disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as stated
above (A[2], ad 3). Hence they are not set down among the counsels.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] Out. Para. 1/3
TREATISE ON GRACE (QQ[109]-114)
OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in
so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first,
we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its
effects.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] Out. Para. 2/3
The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall
consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its essence;
(3) its division.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether without grace man can know anything?
(2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any good?
(3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things?
(4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law?
(5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life?
(6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace?
(7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin?
(8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin?
(9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without
any further Divine help?
(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether without grace man can know any truth?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For, on 1
Cor. 12:3: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost," a
gloss says: "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost."
Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know truth
without grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that "the most certain
sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now God
Himself is He Whom sheds the light. And reason is in the mind as sight is
in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul." Now the
bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible object, without the
sun's light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by
reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: and this pertains to the
aid of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the human mind can only understand truth by thinking, as
is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle says (2 Cor.
3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of
ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." Therefore man cannot, of
himself, know truth without the help of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): "I do not approve
having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to know
the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many
truths." Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps. 50:12:
"Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my
bowels." Therefore without grace man of himself can know truth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light,
since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made manifest
is light." Now every use implies movement, taking movement broadly, so as
to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear from the Philosopher
(De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see that for movement there
is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or
action, but there is also required the motion of the first mover. Now
the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the heavenly body.
Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat, it would not bring about
alteration, except by the motion of the heavenly body. But it is clear
that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly
body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal
and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And
hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed
to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but this
motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by necessity
of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now not only is every
motion from God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is
from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act of the intellect or of
any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two ways: first,
inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts;
secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a
determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper
endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a superadded form,
as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the human
understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, which of itself is
sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz. those we can
come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things of the human
intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz.
the light of faith or prophecy which is called the "light of grace,"
inasmuch as it is added to nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man
needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But
he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order to know
the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural
knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace
in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes
brings about miraculously what nature can do.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as
bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak the
truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing
any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes place with
regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and especially in
regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the Apostle speaks.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The material sun sheds its light outside us; but the
intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light
bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened
to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there is required
no further knowledge, but only for such things as surpass natural
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He
moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand anything is to
think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man can wish or do any good without grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man can wish and do good without grace. For
that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is master of his
acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]; Q[13],
A[6]). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the help of
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man has more power over what is according to his nature
than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against his nature, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of virtue are
according to his nature, as stated above (Q[71], A[1]). Therefore since
man can sin of himself he can wish and do good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the understanding's good is truth, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intellect can of itself know truth, even as
every other thing can work its own operation of itself. Therefore, much
more can man, of himself, do and wish good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 9:16): "It is not of him that
willeth," namely, to will, "nor of him that runneth," namely to run, "but
of God that showeth mercy." And Augustine says (De Corrept. et Gratia ii)
that "without grace men do nothing good when they either think or wish or
love or act."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its
integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is
corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states
human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good
whatsoever, as stated above (A[1]). But in the state of integrity, as
regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural
endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such
as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of
infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of
what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil it by his
own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted
by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of
corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some
particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like;
yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in
nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he
cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, unless by
the help of medicine he be cured.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength
superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order to do and
wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt
nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out
works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both
states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man is master of his acts and of his willing or not
willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one side
or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not
deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and since
it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that man's
free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human
mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chapter "On Good
Fortune" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man still unweakened is
not so much master of its act that it does not need to be moved by God;
and much more the free-will of man weakened by sin, whereby it is
hindered from good by the corruption of the nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which
belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created thing
has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so
does it need to be preserved by another in the good which pertains to its
nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall
into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man cannot even know truth without Divine help, as stated
above (A[1]). And yet human nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to
the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God
above all things?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all
things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things is the
proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself possess
charity, since the "charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost Who is given to us," as is said Rm. 5:5. Therefore man by his
natural powers alone cannot love God above all things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God above
all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help of grace
no created nature can love God above itself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best love,
which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man is not
capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would
be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his natural
powers alone, cannot love God above all things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made with only natural
endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to some
extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than
himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above
himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more
than himself and above all things.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As was said above (FP, Q[60], A[5]), where the various
opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, man in
a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do the good
natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not
without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is
natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and
even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love which can belong
to each creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to
seek and love things according as they are naturally fit (to be sought
and loved) since "all things act according as they are naturally fit" as
stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is
for the good of the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and
love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the
whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"God leads everything to love of Himself." Hence in the state of perfect
nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the
love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and
above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of
this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is cured by
God's grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption of
nature. And hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did
not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to
love God above all things naturally, although he needed God's help to
move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for
this, the help of grace to heal his nature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than
nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the
beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He
is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual
fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a
certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue
adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man
who has not the habit of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, we
must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object above
itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can
know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God.
But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the
proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such
an act; for it is natural to every creature, as was said above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Love is said to be best, both with respect to degree of
love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. And
thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the
giver of beatitude, as was said above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the
commandments of the Law?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural
powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle says (Rm.
2:14) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things
that are of the Law." Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself
without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of the Law without
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [*Symboli Explanatio ad
Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to
Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities
upon man." Now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is impossible to him.
Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is
this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" (Mt.
27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by
loving God above all things, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore man can
fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part of
the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man can fulfil
all the Divine commandments."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the
Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does
works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in
the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the Law;
otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to sin is
nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state
of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments without
healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled,
not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the
mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way,
neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt
nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence,
Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having stated that "without grace men
can do no good whatever," adds: "Not only do they know by its light what
to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know." Beyond this, in
both states they need the help of God's motion in order to fulfil the
commandments, as stated above (AA[2],3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), "do not be
disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are of
the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us
the image of God, after which we were naturally made."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: What we can do with the Divine assistance is not altogether
impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): "What we
can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves."
Hence Jerome [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious
works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius] concedes that "our will is
in such a way free that we must confess we still require God's help."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil the
precept of the love of God, as stated above (A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man can merit everlasting life without grace.
For Our Lord says (Mt. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the
commandments"; from which it would seem that to enter into everlasting
life rests with man's will. But what rests with our will, we can do of
ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting life of himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by God on
men, according to Mt. 5:12: "Your reward is very great in heaven." But
wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works,
according to Ps. 61:12: "Thou wilt render to every man according to his
works." Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is
within his power to reach everlasting life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now
every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much
more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his natural
endowments, without grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 6:23): "The grace of God is life
everlasting." And as a gloss says, this is said "that we may understand
that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end.
But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we
see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an
effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate
to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of
human nature, as is clear from what we have said above (Q[5], A[5]).
Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works
proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is
needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit
everlasting life; yet he can perform works conducing to a good which is
natural to man, as "to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have
friends," and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the
Pelagians [*Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine].
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man, by his will, does works meritorious of everlasting
life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it is necessary
that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As the gloss upon Rm. 6:23, "The grace of God is life
everlasting," says, "It is certain that everlasting life is meter to good
works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God's grace." And it
has been said (A[4]), that to fulfil the commandments of the Law, in
their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious, requires
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now
human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a
higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a man who can
recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health
than one who can nowise recover it, as the Philosopher observes (De Coelo
ii, 12).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can
prepare himself for grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help
of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing impossible is laid
upon man, as stated above (A[4], ad 1). But it is written (Zach. 1:3):
"Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." Now to prepare for grace is
nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself,
and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him
to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny him
grace, for it is written (Mt. 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit "to
them that ask Him." But what is in our power is in us to do. Therefore it
seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with
equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace;
and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must
not go beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of himself and without
grace, can prepare himself for grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that "it is the part of man
to prepare the soul." Now an action is said to be part of a man, when he
can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare
himself for grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:44): "No man can come to Me except
the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him." But if man could prepare
himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot
prepare himself without the help of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The preparation of the human will for good is twofold:
the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God;
and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual
gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated
above (A[5]). There is a second way in which the human will may be taken
to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in order that
man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to
presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go
on to infinity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who
moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For in these two ways
do we need the Divine assistance, as stated above (AA[2],3). Now that we
need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts
for an end, every cause must direct is effect to its end, and hence since
the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must
be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the
proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the
spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion
of the leader of the army---and towards following the standard of a
regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the
First Mover, simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks to be
likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"God turns all to Himself." But He directs righteous men to Himself as to
a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling,
according to Ps. 72:28, "it is good for Me to adhere to my God." And that
they are "turned" to God can only spring from God's having "turned" them.
Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God;
just as, whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun,
prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards
the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the
light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is
bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to God,
when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: "Convert me and I shall be
converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God"; and Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O
Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to Jn.
15:5: "Without Me, you can do nothing." Hence when a man is said to do
what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is
moved by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection regards habitual grace, for which some
preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in that
which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God,
no further motion is presupposed since God is the First Mover. Hence we
need not go to infinity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he does
this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the help of
God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of
grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without grace. But
to rise to sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace; since it is
written (Eph. 5:14): "Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten
thee." Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as stated
above (Q[71], A[1], ad 3). Now, man, by force of his nature, can rise
from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since
there still remains in him the principle of life, from which the natural
operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man may be
restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of
justice without the help of external grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act
befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural
coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural
movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from Damascene
(De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself can return
from sin to the state of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf. Gal. 3:21): "For if
there had been a law given which could give life---then Christ died in
vain," i.e. to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature,
whereby he can he justified, "Christ died in vain," i.e. to no purpose.
But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he cannot be
justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of
justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help
of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in its
guilt, as stated above (Q[87], A[6]), to rise from sin is not the same as
to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored
to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning,
as was clearly shown above (Q[85], A[1]; Q[86], A[1]; Q[87], A[1]), viz.
stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a
stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity
of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is
disordered by man's will not being subject to God's; and this order being
overthrown, the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man
remains disordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as
by sinning man deserves everlasting damnation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by
God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of Divine
light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light
anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of grace.
Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e. man's will can
only be subject to God when God draws man's will to Himself, as stated
above (A[6]). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by
God alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who is man's Judge.
And thus in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of
grace, both as regards a habitual gift, and as regards the internal
motion of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of
free-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise from
sin. Hence when it is said, "Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee," we
are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the
enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved by God,
strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the
health that is in man by justifying grace. This principle is grace which
is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be restored by himself; but he
requires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if the soul
were infused into a dead body for its resurrection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When nature is perfect, it can be restored by itself to its
befitting and proportionate condition; but without exterior help it
cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And thus human nature
undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer perfect, but
corrupted, as stated above (Q[85]); nor can it be restored, by itself, to
its connatural good, much less to the supernatural good of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man without grace can avoid sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin. Because "no
one sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. x,
xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid
sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin, which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If therefore a
man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem to be given to
no purpose; which is absurd.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18): "Before man is life and
death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him." But
by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in his power to
choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): "Whoever denies
that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation' (and they
deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to man
for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will)
ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be
anathematized by the tongues of all."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of
perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the
state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid sinning
either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than to stray
from what is according to our nature---and in the state of perfect nature
man could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not have done it without
God's help to uphold him in good, since if this had been withdrawn, even
his nature would have fallen back into nothingness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in
order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life this
healing is wrought in the mind---the carnal appetite being not yet
restored. Hence the Apostle (Rm. 7:25) says in the person of one who is
restored: "I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the
flesh, the law of sin." And in this state man can abstain from all mortal
sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as stated above (Q[74], A[5]);
but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption
of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed, repress each of
its movements (and hence they are sinful and voluntary), but not all,
because whilst he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because
the reason is always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above
(Q[74], A[3], ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by
justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since it
is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it cannot
be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says
(Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that " a sin not at once taken away by repentance,
by its weight drags us down to other sins": and this because, as the
lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so should the reason be
subject to God, and should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by
the end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the
judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be
regulated. And thus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive
appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to
reason, so likewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God,
the consequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For when
man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from
Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things
happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and
breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally: especially since, when
surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived end and his
pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with
premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of
his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man
cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he
acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace,
he is quickly brought back to the due order.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man can avoid each but every act of sin, except by grace,
as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own shortcoming that he
does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin
without grace does not excuse him from sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Correction is useful "in order that out of the sorrow of
correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who is
corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the noise of
correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden
inspirations is inwardly causing to will," as Augustine says (De Corr. et
Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact that man's
will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet it is not sufficient
without God's help. Hence it is written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the
works of God that no man can correct whom He hath despised."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious
works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of man in the
state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin. Hence he
was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a man wills, is given
to him; but his willing good, he has by God's assistance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without
further help of grace, do good and avoid sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace, can by
himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin. For a
thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was given
for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from sin.
Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either
useless or imperfect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to 1
Cor. 3:16: "Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the
Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Now since the Spirit of God is
omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from
sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two things
without any further assistance of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of
grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with equal
reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has obtained this
first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity; which is
impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in
order to do righteously and to keep free from sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that "as the
eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is helped by the
brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he is most righteous,
live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of justice."
But justification is by grace, according to Rm. 3:24: "Being justified
freely by His grace." Hence even a man who already possesses grace needs
a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[5]), in order to live righteously a
man needs a twofold help of God---first, a habitual gift whereby
corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so
as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the
capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to
be moved by God to act.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] Body Para. 2/2
Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further
help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of
grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act
righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that
no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine
motion. Secondly, for this special reason---the condition of the state of
human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains
corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves "the law of sin,"
Rm. 7:25. In the intellect, too, there seems the darkness of ignorance,
whereby, as is written (Rm. 8:26): "We know not what we should pray for
as we ought"; since on account of the various turns of circumstances, and
because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is
for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: "For the thoughts of mortal men are
fearful and our counsels uncertain." Hence we must be guided and guarded
by God, Who knows and can do all things. For which reason also it is
becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: "Lead
us not into temptation," and "Thy Will be done on earth as it is in
heaven," and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining
to this.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us
that we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature needs to
be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after having
received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be concluded
that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man
will need the Divine help even in the state of glory, when grace shall
be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch
as it does not completely heal man, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and protects,
is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it causes in
us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father and the Son,
moves and protects us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This argument merely proves that man needs no further
habitual grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to
persevere?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help to
persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as
continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7,9). Now
since man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace in
order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he need the help of
grace to have perseverance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But perseverance is
put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together with grace,
perseverance is given to the other infused virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as the Apostle says (Rm. 5:20) more was restored to man
by Christ's gift, than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam received what
enabled him to persevere; and thus man does not need grace in order to
persevere.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. ii): "Why is perseverance
besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking
request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power
without His giving it?" Now perseverance is besought by even those who
are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we say "Hallowed be Thy
name," which Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et
Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs perseverance
to be given to him by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to signify a
habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he be moved by
the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to
sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, perseverance may be called a
habit, whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good unto the end.
And in both these ways perseverance is infused together with grace, even
as continence and the other virtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is called
the abiding in good to the end of life. And in order to have this
perseverance man does not, indeed, need another habitual grace, but he
needs the Divine assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks
of the passions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence after
anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for the
aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from evil till the
end of his life. For to many grace is given to whom perseverance in grace
is not given.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: This objection regards the first mode of perseverance, as
the second objection regards the second.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[109] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xliii) [*Cf. De
Correp. et Grat. xii]: "in the original state man received a gift whereby
he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But now, by the
grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace whereby they may
persevere, and the further gift of persevering," and thus Christ's gift
is greater than Adam's fault. Nevertheless it was easier for man to
persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of innocence in which the
flesh was not rebellious against the spirit, than it is now. For the
restoration by Christ's grace, although it is already begun in the mind,
is not yet completed in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man
will not merely be able to persevere but will be unable to sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace implies something in the soul?
(2) Whether grace is a quality?
(3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue?
(4) Of the subject of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace implies anything in the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the soul. For
man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of man. Hence it
is written (Gn. 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph "grace [Douay:
'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison." Now when we say
that a man has the favor of another, nothing is implied in him who has
the favor of the other, but an acceptance is implied in him whose favor
he has. Hence when we say that a man has the grace of God, nothing is
implied in his soul; but we merely signify the Divine acceptance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken the
soul; hence it is written (Dt. 30:20): "He is thy life." Now the soul
quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as a medium
between God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, on Rm. 1:7, "Grace to you and peace," the gloss says:
"Grace, i.e. the remission of sins." Now the remission of sin implies
nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the sin,
according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not
imputed sin." Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Light implies something in what is enlightened. But
grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia
xxii): "The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law,
and those who have been thus deserted become blind." Therefore grace
implies something in the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, According to the common manner of speech, grace is
usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are
accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king,
i.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any gift
freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of grace.
Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given "gratis,"
inasmuch as we are said to be "grateful" for benefits. Of these three the
second depends on the first, since one bestows something on another
"gratis" from the love wherewith he receives him into his good "graces."
And from the second proceeds the third, since from benefits bestowed
"gratis" arises "gratitude."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something in
him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the
acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must
be noted between the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the
creature's good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature
flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On the
other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things;
and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but
pre-supposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is clear that
every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in the
creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love. And according to this
difference of good the love of God to the creature is looked at
differently. For one is common, whereby He loves "all things that are"
(Wis. 11:25), and thereby gives things their natural being. But the
second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above
the condition of its nature to a participation of the Divine good; and
according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by
this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for
the creature.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is
signified something bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless the grace of God
sometimes signifies God's eternal love, as we say the grace of
predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits
predestines or elects some; for it is written (Eph. 1:5): "He hath
predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of
the glory of His grace."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Even when a man is said to be in another's good graces, it
is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the other; even
as anyone is said to have God's grace---with this difference, that what
is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love, but whatever
is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the Divine love, as was said
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God is the life of the soul after the manner of an
efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the manner of
a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and matter, since the
form, of itself, "informs" the matter or subject; whereas the agent
"informs" the subject, not by its substance, but by the form, which it
causes in the matter.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): "When I said that grace
was for the remission of sins, and peace for our reconciliation with God,
you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain
to general peace, but that the special name of grace signifies the
remission of sins." Not only grace, therefore, but many other of God's
gifts pertain to grace. And hence the remission of sins does not take
place without some effect divinely caused in us, as will appear later
(Q[113], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is a quality of the soul?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. For no
quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is not without
the action of its subject, and thus the subject would necessarily act
upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore
grace is not a quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is
nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by grace,
to which nature is not equal, as stated above (Q[109], AA[1],2,3).
Therefore grace is not a quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its
subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for thus it would
be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing; hence it is
called a "new creature"(Gal. 6:15).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, on Ps. 103:15: "That he may make the face cheerful with
oil"; the gloss says: "Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which wins the
Divine love." But beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body.
Therefore grace is a quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), there is understood to be an
effect of God's gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God's grace.
Now it was stated (Q[109], A[1]) that man is aided by God's gratuitous
will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man's soul is moved by God to know
or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is
not a quality, but a movement of the soul; for "motion is the act of the
mover in the moved." Secondly, man is helped by God's gratuitous will,
inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for this
reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide less for those He
loves, that they may acquire supernatural good, than for creatures, whom
He loves that they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for
natural creatures, that not merely does He move them to their natural
acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the
principles of acts, in order that they may of themselves be inclined to
these movements, and thus the movements whereby they are moved by God
become natural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. 8:1: "she . . .
ordereth all things sweetly." Much more therefore does He infuse into
such as He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good, certain
forms or supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly
and promptly to acquire eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a
quality.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not
after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal
cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof
it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as matter and form
are called substance. And because grace is above human nature, it cannot
be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the
soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the soul
participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge.
And thus because the soul participates in the Divine goodness
imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which is grace,
has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in
itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participation
of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though
not in its mode of being.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist] says, the
"being of an accident is to inhere." Hence no accident is called being as
if it had being, but because by it something is; hence it is said to
belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. vii, text. 2). And
because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly
speaking, no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to
come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or
ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is said to be
created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e. are given
a new being out of nothing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10,
"created in Jesus Christ in good works."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is the same as virtue?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For Augustine
says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is faith that worketh
by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore
grace is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the
definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, since
"it makes its subject good, and his work good," and "it is a good quality
of the mind, whereby we live righteously," etc. Therefore grace is virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the
"fourth" species of quality; viz. "form" which is the "abiding figure of
things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the "third,"
since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," which is in the
sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and grace is
principally in the mind. Nor is it in the "second" species, which is
"natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is above nature and does not
regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the
"first" species which is "habit" or "disposition." Now habits of the mind
are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as
stated above (Q[57], AA[1],2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be
one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor
hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity,
since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in his book on the
Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is
not virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in
essence, and differed only logically---in the sense that we speak of
grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given
gratuitously---and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly.
And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold,
since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), "virtue is
disposition of what is perfect---and I call perfect what is disposed
according to its nature." Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a
thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that
everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it
is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke
above (Q[55], seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly
disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas
infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end,
and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a
participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pt. 1:4: "He hath
given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be
made partakers of the Divine Nature." And it is in respect of receiving
this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the
acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the
light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is
something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are
ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): "For you were
heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as children of
the light." For as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk, in
accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused virtues
enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity" grace,
since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first act by
which sanctifying grace is manifested.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with reference
to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or participated.
Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of
goodness in man, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet
it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which is
presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of
the powers?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the soul, as in
a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says (Hypognosticon
iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that grace is related
to the will or to the free will "as a rider to his horse." Now the will
or the free will is a power, as stated above (FP, Q[83], A[2]). Hence
grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine says (De
Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which proceed from
a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the soul.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of
grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of grace.
But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would be capable
of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now what
is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it follows
that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or
power of the soul---viz. neither the will, nor the intellect, nor
anything else; which is impossible.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But generation
terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is in the
soul's essence prior to being in the powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is
the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as
in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject of virtue,
as stated above (Q[56], A[1]). But if grace differs from virtue, it
cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since
every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue, as stated
above (Q[55], A[1]; Q[56], A[1]). Hence it remains that grace, as it is
prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that
it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective powers
participates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in
his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue of
charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the
Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain
regeneration or re-creation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which are
the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are
moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. And thus grace
is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the same
comparison as that of a horseman to the horse---but not as an accident to
a subject.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace
is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as
the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the
medium of the powers.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the species
of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed in a
species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural properties of
the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul differs specifically
in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb animals, and of plants.
Consequently it does not follow that, if the essence of the human soul is
the subject of grace, every soul may be the subject of grace; since it
belongs to the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[110] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural properties
following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, granted
that it was without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or
rational in its species, not that it would actually have these powers,
but on account of the essence of such a species, from which these powers
naturally flow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and
sanctifying grace?
(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;
(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;
(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;
(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous
grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, as is
clear from what has been already stated (Q[110], A[1]). But man is not
therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by God, but
rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by God, because
man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding merits is
given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without preceding
merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is
given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with grace. Therefore
to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as a difference of
grace, since it is found outside the genus of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But even
sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us gratuitously,
according to Rm. 3:24: "Being justified freely [gratis] by His grace."
Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratuitous grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to sanctify
and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says (Eph.
1:6): "He hath graced us in His beloved son." And with regard to the
second (Rm. 2:6): "And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise
grace is no more grace." Therefore grace can be distinguished by its
having one only or both.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rm. 13:1), "those things that are of
God are well ordered [Vulg.: 'those that are, are ordained by God]." Now
the order of things consists in this, that things are led to God by other
things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace is
ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so that
some are led to God by others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to
God, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby
one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is
called "gratuitous grace," since it is bestowed on a man beyond the
capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas it
is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may
cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying
grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): "And the
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i.e. of
others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently but
formally, i.e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy to
be called pleasing to God, according to Col. 1:21: "He hath made us
worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the
notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first, as arising from
merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious works,
according to Rm. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not
reckoned according to grace, but according to debt." The second debt
regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have
reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in neither way is
debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but
rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, that the Divine
ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should
have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it
should attain to something further. And hence natural endowments are not
a debt in the first sense but in the second. Hence they especially merit
the name of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace
something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man pleasing
to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the
common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the two parts of
the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into operating
and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated above (Q[110],
A[2]). Now no accident can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can
be called operating.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings
about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine says,
on Jn. 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do," says (Serm. clxix):
"He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without
thyself." Therefore no grace ought to be called simply operating.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and
not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than free-will,
according to Rm. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that
runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Therefore no grace ought to be
called cooperating.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and
to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing can both operate
and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating
and cooperating.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "God by
cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since He
who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, beings by operating
that they may will." But the operations of God whereby He moves us to
good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into
operating and cooperating.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (Q[110], A[2]) grace may be taken in two
ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and to act;
secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and
cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the
thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is
moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the
operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that we
speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind both
moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, but also
to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of
"cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the
interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing
moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which hitherto
willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the
human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is
another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was
shown above (Q[17], A[9]) the operation of this act is attributed to the
will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our
will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the
capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of
cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins:
"He operates that we may will; and when we will, He cooperates that we
may perfect." And thus if grace is taken for God's gratuitous motion
whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into
operating and cooperating grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a
double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which
is "being," and the second, "operation"; thus the work of heat is to make
its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace,
inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God,
is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of
meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is called
cooperating grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does
not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness makes a
surface white.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst
we are being justified we consent to God's justification [justitiae] by a
movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of
grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains to grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely when
it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it helps to the
end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the
means of operating grace. And hence, the end being already intended,
grace cooperates with us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace; but are
distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what has been
said.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient
and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love. But God's love
is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to 1 Jn. 4:10: "Not
as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us."
Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and subsequent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it is
sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for thee."
But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not
fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an infinite
number of effects---one preceding another. Hence it with regard to these,
grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem that
there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes note of the
infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient
and subsequent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are
said in Ps. 58:11: "His mercy shall prevent me," and again, Ps. 22:6:
"Thy mercy will follow me." Therefore grace is fittingly divided into
prevenient and subsequent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, with
regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient and
subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects of
grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to
desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the
fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And hence
grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called prevenient
with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it causes the second, it is
called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And as one effect is
posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so may grace be called
prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect viewed relatively
to divers others. And this is what Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia
xxxi): "It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch
as, being healed, we are strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we
are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God's love signifies something eternal; and hence can never
be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a temporal effect,
which can precede and follow another; and thus grace may be both
prevenient and subsequent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not
divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was already said
of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it
pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from prevenient grace
whereby we are at present justified. For even as the charity of the earth
is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said of the light of grace,
since the notion of neither implies imperfection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in number,
even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all reduced to some of a
determinate species, and moreover all coincide in this---that one
precedes another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided by the
Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may be called a
gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of gifts freely
bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the good
of the body---and yet they do not make us pleasing to God. Hence
gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain division.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from sanctifying
grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we are justified by
it, according to Rm. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by faith." Hence it
is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous graces, especially
since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope and charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers tongues
are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains either to
wisdom or to knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: "And to these children
God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom." Hence it
is not correct to divide the grace of healing and kinds of tongues
against the working of miracles; and the interpretation of speeches
against the word of wisdom and knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy Ghost, so
also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear, as stated
above (Q[68], A[4]). Therefore these also ought to be placed amongst the
gratuitous gifts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8,9,10): "To one indeed by
the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of
knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the working of
miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to
another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of speeches."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As was said above (A[1]), gratuitous grace is ordained to
this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God. Now no man can
help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to God alone), but
only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence gratuitous grace
embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct another in Divine
things which are above reason. Now for this three things are required:
first, a man must possess the fullness of knowledge of Divine things, so
as to be capable of teaching others. Secondly, he must be able to confirm
or prove what he says, otherwise his words would have no weight. Thirdly,
he must be capable of fittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in
human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science must first
be certain of the principles of the science, and with regard to this
there is "faith," which is certitude of invisible things, the principles
of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to know the
principal conclusions of the science, and hence we have the word of
"wisdom," which is the knowledge of Divine things. Thirdly, he ought to
abound with examples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at times he
needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of "knowledge," which
is the knowledge of human things, since "the invisible things of Him . .
. are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rm.
1:20).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon
arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what is
proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the teacher
of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous deeds,
whether with respect to bodily health---and thus there is the "grace of
healing," or merely for the purpose of manifesting the Divine power; for
instance, that the sun should stand still or darken, or that the sea
should be divided---and thus there is the "working of miracles."
Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know, and these are
either future contingents---and thus there is "prophecy," or also the
secrets of hearts---and thus there is the "discerning of spirits."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a
person can be understood, and thus there is "kinds of tongues"; or it can
regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the "interpretation
of speeches."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As stated above (A[1]), not all the benefits divinely
conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but only those that
surpass the power of nature---e.g. that a fisherman should be replete
with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like; and such as these
are here set down as gratuitous graces.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous graces, not
as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a super-eminent
certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for instructing others
concerning such things as belong to the faith. With regard to hope and
charity, they belong to the appetitive power, according as man is
ordained thereby to God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the general
working of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one to
the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe when he has
received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith. So, too,
to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have special
efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as special
gratuitous graces.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the gratuitous
graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man's mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy
Ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge; for thus they are gifts of
the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q[68], AA[1],4). But they are numbered
amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch as they imply such a fullness of
knowledge and wisdom that a man may not merely think aright of Divine
things, but may instruct others and overpower adversaries. Hence it is
significant that it is the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge
that are placed in the gratuitous graces, since, as Augustine says (De
Trin. xiv, 1), "It is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in
order to reach everlasting life, and another thing to know how this may
benefit the godly and may be defended against the ungodly."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying
grace. For "the people's good is better than the individual good," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is ordained to the
good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is ordained to the common
good of the whole Church, as stated above (AA[1],4). Hence gratuitous
grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon another,
than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is the brightness
of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of that which can only
shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1)
"that justice is the most excellent of the virtues," since by it a man
bears himself rightly towards others. But by sanctifying grace a man is
perfected only in himself; whereas by gratuitous grace a man works for
the perfection of others. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than
sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is common
to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man is nobler than to feel,
which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common to all
members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper gift of the
more exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than
sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having enumerated the
gratuitous graces adds: "And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way";
and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity, which pertains to
sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than gratuitous
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, the
more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than the
means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with
his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is
preparatory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, men
are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence sanctifying
grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52), a
multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the multitude
itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate from the
multitude, viz. the good of the leader---and this is better good, since
the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is ordained to the
common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical order, whereas
sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common good, which is God.
Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have sanctifying
grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the nobler; even as
the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more excellent than that of
an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous grace a man cannot cause
another to have union with God, which he himself has by sanctifying
grace; but he causes certain dispositions towards it. Hence gratuitous
grace needs not to be the more excellent, even as in fire, the heat,
which manifests its species whereby it produces heat in other things, is
not more noble than its substantial form.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[111] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and thus, to
reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is proper is
ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?
(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the
recipient, by an act of free-will?
(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?
(4) Whether grace is equal in all?
(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether God alone is the cause of grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is
written (Jn. 1:17): "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Now, by the
name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assuming,
but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of the
New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law cause
grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the
sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore God is
not the only cause of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii, viii),
"Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and men." Now
the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected by grace.
Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must
always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses
every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a
partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature. And
thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as
necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of the
Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that
anything save fire should enkindle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Christ's humanity is an "organ of His Godhead," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not bring
forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue
of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not cause grace by
its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to it, whereby
the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes our
salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so
likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from Christ,
grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the
power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to Jn. 3:5:
"Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter
into the kingdom of God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men, by
instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "this cleansing and enlightenment and
perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man's
part?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is
required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Rm. 4:4), "To him
that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but
according to debt." Now a man's preparation by free-will can only be
through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing himself to
have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is given, as is
clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he was "breathing
our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord" (Act
9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on man's part.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in
matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in creation, to
which grace is compared, which is called "a new creature" (Gal. 6:15).
But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as stated above (A[1]
). Hence no preparation is required on man's part to obtain grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): "Be prepared to meet thy
God, O Israel," and (1 Kgs. 7:3): "Prepare your hearts unto the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[111], A[2]), grace is taken in two
ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from God, Who
moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain
preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in
disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from God
to move us to good, no preparation is required on man's part, that, as it
were, anticipates the Divine help, but rather, every preparation in man
must be by the help of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the
good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared for receiving
the gift of grace is an act of the free-will moved by God. And thus man
is said to prepare himself, according to Prov. 16:1: "It is the part of
man to prepare the soul"; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the
free-will. Hence it is said that man's will is prepared by God, and that
man's steps are guided by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with
the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not indeed of
grace, which is already possessed---but of glory which is not yet
possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes
precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from God's motion.
But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified by
grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be seen further on
(Q[114], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God
prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone arrive
at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it is
written (Ecclus. 11:23): "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to
make the poor man rich." Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man to
good, but not perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But He
sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives
grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the
Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." And thus it happened to Paul,
since, suddenly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly
moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace
suddenly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition
of matter, brought about by the action of something else; and yet,
looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing
caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the form. So
likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required
which He Himself does not bring about.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or
to whoever does what he can?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares
himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on Rm. 5:1,
"Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace," etc. the gloss says:
"God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be injustice
with Him." But it is impossible for injustice to be with God. Therefore
it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he
receives grace of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the reason why
God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not wish, nor was
he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect must
needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace
it is bestowed on them of necessity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from Dionysius
(Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the good of nature.
Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much more
does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares
himself for grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, according
to Jer. 18:6: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My
hand." But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily
receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares
himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), man's preparation for grace is
from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the
preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will,
and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the
gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be
considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus it has a
necessity---not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility---as regards
what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail,
according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of
the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that "by God's good gifts whoever is
liberated, is most certainly liberated." Hence if God intends, while
moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will
infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath
heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a
meritorious act of their free-will, already "informed" with grace; for if
they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He
Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will before
grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is by a
Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but
the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's according to Osee
13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily ensue
the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent that
causes the disposition.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is greater in one than in another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another.
For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above (Q[110],
A[1]). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): "He made the little and the great
and He hath equally care of all." Therefore all obtain grace from Him
equally.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or
less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our last
end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater
in one than in another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above (Q[110], A[1],
ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there
in grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): "But to every one of us is
given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." Now what
is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an
equal grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[52], AA[1],2; Q[56], AA[1],2), habits
can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or object, as when a
virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good;
the other on the part of the subject, which more or less participates in
the habit inhering to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater
or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good, which
is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less,
inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than another.
And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself
for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace, receives more
grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this
diversity, since man prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is
prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought
on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in
order that the beauty and perfection of the Church may result from these
various degree; even as He instituted the various conditions of things,
that the universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said
(Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure
of the giving of Christ," having enumerated the various graces, he adds
(Eph. 4:12): "For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of
the body of Christ."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as
regards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His care
looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things
and little. But, "secondly," it may be considered in those things which
come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus, inequality is found,
inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser
gifts for others.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude of
grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good, but
inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of
the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and remissness,
both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence cannot
be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, and
hence man may possess it more or less.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man can know that he has grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace by
its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most certain
knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical reality, as
appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace may be known
most certainly by one who has grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But whoever
receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge, according to
Wis. 7:17: The Lord "hath given me the true knowledge of the things that
are." Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace from God, knows
that he has grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since, according
to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made manifest is light," Now
sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that
is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be
known.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received
not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may
know the things that are given us from God." Now grace is God's first
gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same
Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham (Gn. 22:12): "Now I
know that thou fearest God," i.e. "I have made thee know." Now He is
speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man
may know that he has grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 9:1): "Man knoweth not whether
he be worthy of love or hatred." Now sanctifying grace maketh a man
worthy of God's love. Therefore no one can know whether he has
sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by
revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a
special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of
safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry on
toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the
evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2 Cor. 12:9):
"My grace is sufficient for thee."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty; and
in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude about a
thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle.
Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude is
obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one can know he has
the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know its principle. But the
principle of grace and its object is God, Who by reason of His very
excellence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26: "Behold God is
great, exceeding our knowledge." And hence His presence in us and His
absence cannot be known with certainty, according to Job 9:11: "If He
come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand."
And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, according to
1 Cor. 4:3,4: "But neither do I judge my own self . . . but He that
judgeth me is the Lord."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may
know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of
despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any
mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): "To him that overcometh
I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, but he that
receiveth it," because whoever receives it knows, by experiencing a
certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it, does not experience.
Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): "I
am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified,"
since, according to Ps. 18:13: "Who can understand sins? From my secret
ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Those things which are in the soul by their physical
reality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as through
acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus when we wish, we
perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the functions of life,
we observe that there is life in us.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man should
have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is an essential
condition of faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith,
and this, because certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect,
wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever has knowledge or faith is
certain that he has them. But it is otherwise with grace and charity and
such like, which perfect the appetitive faculty.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sin has for its principal object commutable good, which is
known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us on account
of the greatness of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16: "Who . . .
inhabiteth light inaccessible."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory, which
have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly by faith,
although we do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to
merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the privileged
knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds (1 Cor. 2:10): "But
to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[112] A[5] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental
knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant. For in the
deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally that he
had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of
the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit, which
is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there are ten
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the justification of the ungodly?
(2) Whether grace is required for it?
(3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required?
(4) Whether a movement of faith is required?
(5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required?
(6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing?
(7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is
sudden?
(8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification;
(9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?
(10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not the
remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only to justice, but to all the
other virtues, as stated above (Q[71], A[1]). Now justification signifies
a certain movement towards justice. Therefore not even remission of sin
is justification, since movement is from one contrary to the other.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, everything ought to be named from what is predominant in
it, according to De Anima ii, text. 49. Now the remission of sins is
brought about chiefly by faith, according to Acts 15:9: "Purifying their
hearts by faith"; and by charity, according to Prov. 10:12: "Charity
covereth all sins." Therefore the remission of sins ought to be named
after faith or charity rather than justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the remission of sins seems to be the same as being
called, for whoever is called is afar off, and we are afar off from God
by sin. But one is called before being justified according to Rm. 8:30:
"And whom He called, them He also justified." Therefore justification is
not the remission of sins.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, On Rm. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also justified,"
the gloss says i.e. "by the remission of sins." Therefore the remission
of sins is justification.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Justification taken passively implies a movement towards
heat. But since justice, by its nature, implies a certain rectitude of
order, it may be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right
order in man's act, and thus justice is placed amongst the
virtues---either as particular justice, which directs a man's acts by
regulating them in relation to his fellowman---or as legal justice, which
directs a man's acts by regulating them in their relation to the common
good of society, as appears from Ethic. v, 1.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain
rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, in so far as
what is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the
soul are subject to the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this
disposition the Philosopher calls "justice metaphorically speaking"
(Ethic. v, 11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by
simple generation, which is from privation to form; and thus
justification may belong even to such as are not in sin, when they
receive this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received original
justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought about in man by a movement
from one contrary to the other, and thus justification implies a
transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid state of
justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of the justification of the
ungodly, according to the Apostle (Rm. 4:5): "But to him that worketh
not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly," etc. And because
movement is named after its term "whereto" rather than from its term
"whence," the transmutation whereby anyone is changed by the remission of
sins from the state of ungodliness to the state of justice, borrows its
name from its term "whereto," and is called "justification of the
ungodly."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a mind
not subject to God, may be called injustice, as being contrary to the
aforesaid justice, according to 1 Jn. 3:4: "Whosoever committeth sin,
committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity." And thus the removal of
any sin is called the justification of the ungodly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith and charity imply a special directing of the human
mind to God by the intellect and will; whereas justice implies a general
rectitude of order. Hence this transmutation is named after justice
rather than after charity or faith.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Being called refers to God's help moving and exciting our
mind to give up sin, and this motion of God is not the remission of sins,
but its cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt,
i.e. for the justification of the ungodly?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is the
justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. For
anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other, if
the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of
grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle state of
innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt. Hence a man may be
pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a state of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine
imputation, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord
hath not imputed sin." Now the infusion of grace puts something into our
soul, as stated above (Q[110], A[1]). Hence the infusion of grace is not
required for the remission of guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now
some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence whoever
is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to
the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been subject to it
hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness he is freed from
the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin is remitted without grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 3:24): "Justified freely by His
grace."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, by sinning a man offends God as stated above (Q[71], A[5]
). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the
offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when
God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God
loves us. Now God's love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is
eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on
us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of
it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us,
which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of
eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive
the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: More is required for an offender to pardon an offense, than
for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it may happen
amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. But if the
other offends him, then the forgiveness of the offense can only spring
from a special goodwill. Now God's goodwill is said to be restored to man
by the gift of grace; and hence although a man before sinning may be
without grace and without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after
sinning can only be because he has grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As God's love consists not merely in the act of the Divine
will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated above (Q[110],
A[1]), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there is
implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; for it
proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to leave
off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough if
Scripture warned us thus: "'My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?' Now
this is not enough, but it is added: 'But for thy former sins also pray
that they may be forgiven thee.'" For the act of sin passes, but the
guilt remains, as stated above (Q[87], A[6]). Hence when anyone passes
from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have
the act of the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt, hence
he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins are not contrary to
each other on the part of their turning from God, wherein sin has its
guilt.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether for the justification of the ungodly is required a movement of
the free-will?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will is required for
the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the sacrament of
Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified without a movement of
their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess. iv) that when one of his
friends was taken with a fever, "he lay for a long time senseless and in
a deadly sweat, and when he was despaired of, he was baptized without his
knowing, and was regenerated"; which is effected by sanctifying grace.
Now God does not confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can
justify a man without the sacraments, and without any movement of the
free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and without
it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon received from
God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in 3 Kgs. 3 and 2 Paral 1.
Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace is sometimes
bestowed by God on man without the movement of his free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it into
being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "so ought man to
turn to God as he is ever made just by Him." Now grace is preserved in
man without a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be infused in the
beginning without a movement of the free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard of
the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now to learn cannot be
without a movement of the free-will, since the learner assents to the
teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without a
movement of the free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God
moving man to justice. For He it is "that justifieth the ungodly"
according to Rm. 4:5. Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as
we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light are moved
differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He moves man to
justice according to the condition of his human nature. But it is man's
proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use of reason,
God's motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the
free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the
same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace, in such as
are capable of being moved thus.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Infants are not capable of the movement of their free-will;
hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God moves them to
justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because as
original sin, from which they are justified, does not come to them from
their own will, but by carnal generation, so also is grace given them by
Christ through spiritual regeneration. And the same reason holds good
with madmen and idiots that have never had the use of their free-will.
But in the case of one who has had the use of his free-will and
afterwards has lost it either through sickness or sleep, he does not
obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other
sacrament, unless he intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can
only be by the use of his free-will. And it was in this way that he of
whom Augustine speaks was regenerated, because both previously and
afterwards he assented to the Baptism.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 2: Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst asleep;
but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of his previous
desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in his
person (Wis. 7:7): "I wished, and understanding was given unto me."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 2/3
Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep of
prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet of the
Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a
dream." In such cases the use of free-will remains.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 3/3
And yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of
wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. For the gift of
justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the object of
the will; and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the will which
is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the intellect which
precedes the will; hence without any complete movement of the free-will,
the intellect can be enlightened with the gift of wisdom, even as we see
that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to Job 33:15,16:
"When deep sleep falleth upon men and they are sleeping in their beds,
then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching, instructeth them in what
they are to learn."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain
transmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of the human
soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own manner.
But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: no movement on
the part of the soul is required but only a continuation of the Divine
influx.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the
ungodly?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no movement of faith is required for the
justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith, so also
by other things, viz. by fear, of which it is written (Ecclus. 1:27):
"The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear cannot
be justified"; and again by charity, according to Lk. 7:47: "Many sins
are forgiven her because she hath loved much"; and again by humility,
according to James 4:6: "God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the
humble"; and again by mercy, according to Prov. 15:27: "By mercy and
faith sins are purged away." Hence the movement of faith is no more
required for the justification of the ungodly, than the movements of the
aforesaid virtues.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the act of faith is required for justification only
inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in other
ways, viz. by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act
of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if the
act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would
seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he is first
justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such thought would require
a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith is not required
for the justification of the ungodly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 5:1): "Being justified therefore by
faith, let us have peace with God."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[3]) a movement of free-will is
required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man's mind is
moved by God. Now God moves man's soul by turning it to Himself according
to Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): "Thou wilt turn us, O God, and bring us to
life." Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the mind
is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the first turning to God
is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God must believe
that He is." Hence a movement of faith is required for the justification
of the ungodly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened
by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a movement of
charity is infused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will is
moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act of filial fear and an
act of humility also concur. For it may happen that one and the same act
of free-will springs from different virtues, when one commands and
another is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be ordained to various
ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying
for it, and thus it follows justification; or by way of preparation,
inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it can either precede
justification, or concur with the other virtues towards justification,
inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God, according
as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence
such knowledge does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom
presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated above (Q[68], A[4], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Apostle says (Rm. 4:5), "to him that . . . believeth
in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to justice,
according to the purpose of the grace of God." Hence it is clear that in
the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in order
that a man may believe that God justifies man through the mystery of
Christ.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement
of the free-will towards sin?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will towards sin is
required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity alone suffices
to take away sin, according to Prov. 10:12: "Charity covereth all sins."
Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justification of
the ungodly no movement of the free-will towards sin is required.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back,
according to Phil. 3:13,14: "Forgetting the things that are behind, and
stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards the
mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation." But whoever is stretching
forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he ought to forget
them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of his free-will.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not
remitted without another, for "it is irreverent to expect half a pardon
from God" [*Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.]. Hence, in the
justification of the ungodly, if man's free-will must move against sin,
he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly, both because a
great space of time would be required for such thought, and because a man
could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten. Hence
for the justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will is
required.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 31:5): "I will confess against
myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of
my sin."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the justification of the ungodly
is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God from the
state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human
mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in local
movement is related to both terms of the movement. Now it is clear that
in local movement the moving body leaves the term "whence" and nears the
term "whereto." Hence the human mind whilst it is being justified, must,
by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and draw near to justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of
free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine says on the words
"the hireling fleeth," etc. (Jn. 10:12): "Our emotions are the movements
of our soul; joy is the soul's outpouring; fear is the soul's flight;
your soul goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, when you are
afraid." Hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts
of the free-will---one, whereby it tends to God's justice; the other
whereby it hates sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: It belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and to
avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to love God, so
likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man ought not to return to those things that are behind,
by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget them, lest he be
drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest
them; for this is to fly from them.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he
remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes on
to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins
committed, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten. For a
man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even for those
he does not remember, if they were present to his memory; and this
movement cooperates in his justification.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things
required for justification?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned
amongst the things required for justification. For the substance of a
thing is not reckoned together with those that are required for a thing;
thus a man is not reckoned together with his body and soul. But the
justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins, as stated
above (A[1]). Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned
among the things required for the justification of the ungodly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the same; as
illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a thing ought
not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to
multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with
the infusion of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause, from
the free-will's movement towards God and sin; since it is by faith and
contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned
with its cause; since things thus enumerated together, and, as it were,
condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the remission of sins ought
not to be reckoned with the things required for the justification of the
ungodly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not
to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the
remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for it
is written (Is. 27:9): "This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof
should be taken away." Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned
amongst the things required for justification.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, There are four things which are accounted to be necessary
for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of grace, the
movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the
free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for this is
that, as stated above (A[1]), the justification of the ungodly is a
movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state
of justice. Now in the movement whereby one thing is moved by another,
three things are required: first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the
movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the
attainment of the end. On the part of the Divine motion, there is the
infusion of grace; on the part of the free-will which is moved, there are
two movements---of departure from the term "whence," and of approach to
the term "whereto"; but the consummation of the movement or the
attainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of
sins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The justification of the ungodly is called the remission of
sins, even as every movement has its species from its term. Nevertheless,
many other things are required in order to reach the term, as stated
above (A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin may be
considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of the act,
and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and
remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of the objects;
and thus they differ by the difference between guilt, which is taken
away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural things generation
and corruption differ, although the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This enumeration is not the division of a genus into its
species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous; but it is
division of the things required for the completion of anything; and in
this enumeration we may have what precedes and what follows, since some
of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede and some
follow.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or
successively?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take
place in an instant, but successively, since, as already stated (A[3]),
for the justification of the ungodly, there is required a movement of
free-will. Now the act of the free-will is choice, which requires the
deliberation of counsel, as stated above (Q[13], A[1]). Hence, since
deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and this implies
succession, the justification of the ungodly would seem to be successive.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual
consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things actually
and at once, as stated above (FP, Q[85], A[4]). Hence, since for the
justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the
free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards sin, it
would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an
instant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g. blackness or
whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace may be
greater or less, as stated above (Q[112], A[4]). Hence it is not received
suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace is
required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that the
justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in
justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace,
without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on (Q[114],
A[2]). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this form. Hence
grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved towards God and
to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an
instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is forgiven
there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the
same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same simultaneously.
Hence they must be two successive instants; between which there must be
time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1). Therefore the justification
of the ungodly takes place not all at once, but successively.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The justification of the ungodly is caused by the
justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to men's
minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came a sound
from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss says that
"the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence the
justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to
its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that free-will is
moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace takes place in an
instant and without succession. And the reason of this is that if a form
be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because that
subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs time to dispose the
subject. Hence we see that immediately the matter is disposed by a
preceding alteration, the substantial form accrues to the matter; thus
because the atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive light, it is
suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it was stated
(Q[112], A[2]) that God, in order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no
disposition, save what He Himself has made. And sometimes this sufficient
disposition for the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes
gradually and successively, as stated above (Q[112], A[2], ad 2). For the
reason why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the
matter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the power
of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the more
speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is
infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and
much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous.
Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God takes place in an
instant.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the
justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw
near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it
happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance of
justification, but a way of justification; as local movement is a way of
illumination, and alteration to generation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated above (FP, Q[85], A[5]), there is nothing to
prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are
somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate together,
inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in the
same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in so far as
one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement towards sin is
ordained to the free-will's movement towards God, since a man detests
sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling. Hence in the
justification of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously detests sin and
turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and withdraws from
another simultaneously.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The reason why a form is not received instantaneously in
the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for thus the
light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can be illumined
more or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part of the
disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins to
operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves
upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be terminated in
the same instant. Now to will and not to will---the movements of the
free-will---are not successive, but instantaneous. Hence the
justification of the ungodly must not be successive.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject must be
looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in those
that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no last
instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject; but there is
the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres in
the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that in time we are not
to consider one instant, since neither do instants succeed each other
immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is proved in Physic. vi, 1.
But time is terminated by an instant. Hence in the whole of the previous
time wherein anything is moving towards its form, it is under the
opposite form; but in the last instant of this time, which is the first
instant of the subsequent time, it has the form which is the term of the
movement.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 2/3
But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be any
succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as in the
angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but by
discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, as stated
above (FP, Q[53], AA[2],3). In these, therefore, there is a last instant
in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which the subsequent
is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is no continuity of
time, which this would necessitate.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 3/3
Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but
is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with
continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it considers
the intelligible species, as stated above (FP, Q[85], AA[1],2). We must,
therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the condition of
temporal movements, i.e. we must say that there is no last instant that
sin inheres, but a last time; whereas there is a first instant that grace
inheres; and in all the time previous sin inhered.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things
required for the justification of the ungodly?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is naturally
required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we withdraw from
evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from
evil, and do good." Now the remission of sins regards the turning away
from evil, and the infusion of grace regards the turning to good. Hence
the remission of sin is naturally before the infusion of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to which it
disposes. Now the free-will's movement is a disposition for the reception
of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God. Now a
hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes place.
Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement towards sin are
naturally before the infusion of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now the
infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the
justification of the ungodly, as stated above (A[7]). Therefore it is
naturally prior to it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The aforesaid four things required for the justification
of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the justification of the
ungodly is not successive, as stated above (A[7]); but in the order of
nature, one is prior to another; and in their natural order the first is
the infusion of grace; the second, the free-will's movement towards God;
the third, the free-will's movement towards sin; the fourth, the
remission of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover is
naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of the
moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the motion of
the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover is the infusion
of grace, as stated above (A[6]); the movement or disposition of the
moved is the free-will's double movement; and the term or end of the
movement is the remission of sin, as stated above (A[6]). Hence in their
natural order the first in the justification of the ungodly is the
infusion of grace; the second is the free-will's movement towards God;
the third is the free-will's movement towards sin, for he who is being
justified detests sin because it is against God, and thus the free-will's
movement towards God naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards
sin, since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the
remission of sin, to which this transmutation is ordained as to an end,
as stated above (AA[1],6).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The withdrawal from one term and approach to another may be
looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing moved, and thus
the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to a term,
since in the subject of movement the opposite which is put away is prior
to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by its movement. But
on the part of the agent it is the other way about, since the agent, by
the form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal of the opposite form;
as the sun by its light acts for the removal of darkness, and hence on
the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness;
but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from
darkness is, in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although
both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of grace and the
remission of sin regard God Who justifies, hence in the order of nature
the infusion of grace is prior to the freeing from sin. But if we look at
what is on the part of the man justified, it is the other way about,
since in the order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the
obtaining of justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term "whence"
of justification is sin; and the term "whereto" is justice; and that
grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of justice.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the reception of
the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the agent,
whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the free-will's movement
precedes the reception of grace in the order of nature, and follows the
infusion of grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in movements of the
soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the practical end
is the very first, but in exterior movements the removal of the
impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as the free-will's
movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of nature it moves
towards God as to its end, before removing the impediment of sin.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not God's
greatest work. For it is by the justification of the ungodly that we
attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification we receive heavenly
grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and men is a
greater work than the justification of the ungodly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the justification of the ungodly is ordained to the
particular good of one man. But the good of the universe is greater than
the good of one man, as is plain from Ethic. i, 2. Hence the creation of
heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to make something from nothing, where there is nought to
cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something with the
cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation something is
made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with the agent; but
in the justification of the ungodly God makes something from something,
i.e. a just man from a sinner, and there is a cooperation on man's part,
since there is a movement of the free-will, as stated above (A[3]). Hence
the justification of the ungodly is not God's greatest work.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are over
all His works," and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost] we say:
"O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness most by pardoning and
having mercy," and Augustine, expounding the words, "greater than these
shall he do" (Jn. 14:12) says that "for a just man to be made from a
sinner, is greater than to create heaven and earth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the
part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the greatest
work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be
called great on account of what is made, and thus the justification of
the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the
Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth, which
terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying
that "for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to create
heaven and earth," adds, "for heaven and earth shall pass away, but the
justification of the ungodly shall endure."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] Body Para. 2/3
Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways:
first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of glory is greater
than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this respect
the glorification of the just is greater than the justification of the
ungodly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be great in proportionate
quantity, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is
greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the gift of
grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who are worthy of
punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the
just, who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory. Hence
Augustine says: "Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to create
the angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they both
betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] Body Para. 3/3
And thus the reply to the first is clear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The good of the universe is greater than the particular
good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the good of grace
in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in which way
creation is God's greatest work.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a
miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous.
Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous
works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine (A[9]). Hence the
justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural
inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural things
against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as
when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will of the
ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a man moves him
to good, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is
miraculous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now it
is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without
study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by
God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the
justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine
says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that "to be capable of having faith and to be
capable of having charity belongs to man's nature; but to have faith and
charity belongs to the grace of the faithful." Therefore the
justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find three things: the
first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be
performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their
cause is hidden, as stated above (FP, Q[105], A[7]). And thus both the
justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and,
generally speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is
miraculous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form
introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the
resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body.
And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the
soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having been made to
the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as Augustine
says, in the above quotation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and
customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and
beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect
health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous
and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of justification is
that God moves the soul interiorly and that man is converted to God,
first by an imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become perfect;
because "charity begun merits increase, and when increased merits
perfection," as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God
sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of
justice at once, as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was
accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence
the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the
justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are beyond the
wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a
miracle.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing is
moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be miraculous for
water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only
whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper cause, which
naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can justify the ungodly,
even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence the justification of the
ungodly by God is not miraculous in this respect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[113] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge from God by
his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise
or learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally acquire
justifying grace by his own action, but by God's. Hence there is no
parity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] Out. Para. 1/1
OF MERIT (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace;
and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can merit anything from God?
(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life?
(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly?
(4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that
grace is the principle of merit?
(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself?
(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else?
(7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin?
(8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity?
(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance?
(10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man may merit anything from God?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For no one,
it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the good we
do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due,
as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is written (Lk.
17:10): "When you have done all these things that are commanded you, say:
We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do."
Therefore a man can merit nothing from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by
what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a
man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is written (Job
35:7): "If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He
receive of thy hand." Hence a man can merit nothing from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his
debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's
debtor; hence it is written (Rm. 11:35): "Who hath first given to Him,
and recompense shall be made to him?" Hence no one can merit anything
from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 31:16): "There is a reward for thy
work." Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it
would seem that a man may merit from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means
something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it.
Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything
received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return
for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between those that
are simply equal; but where there is no absolute equality between them,
neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a certain manner of
justice, as when we speak of a father's or a master's right (Ethic. v,
6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is justice simply,
there is the character of merit and reward simply. But where there is no
simple right, but only relative, there is no character of merit simply,
but only relatively, in so far as the character of justice is found
there, since the child merits something from his father and the slave
from his lord.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest
inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from
God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and
God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after
their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man
from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the presupposition of
the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his
operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural
things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they
were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature
moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its action has the character
of merit, which is not so in other creatures.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his
free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a debt
would not be meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e. the
manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His own works.
Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of Him.
Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues to Him,
but inasmuch as we work for His glory.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only on the
presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that God is
made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His
will should be carried out.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that without grace anyone can merit eternal life.
For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained to, as stated above
(A[1]). Now man by his nature is ordained to beatitude as his end; hence,
too, he naturally wishes to be blessed. Hence man by his natural
endowments and without grace can merit beatitude which is eternal life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the less a work is due, the more meritorious it is. Now,
less due is that work which is done by one who has received fewer
benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has received
fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well as nature,
it would seem that his works are more meritorious with God. And thus if
he who has grace can merit eternal life to some extent, much more may he
who has no grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass human
mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even though he
has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it seem that
a man without grace may merit eternal life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 6:23): "The grace of God, life
everlasting."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as was
said above (Q[109], A[2]): the first, a state of perfect nature, in which
Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt nature, in which
we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if we speak of man in
the first state, there is only one reason why man cannot merit eternal
life without grace, by his purely natural endowments, viz. because man's
merit depends on the Divine pre-ordination. Now no act of anything
whatsoever is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the proportion of
the powers which are the principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine
providence that nothing shall act beyond its powers. Now everlasting life
is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds
its knowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "Eye hath not seen,
nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man." And hence
it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act
meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural gift,
which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin, a second
reason is added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For since sin is an
offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as is clear from
what has been said above (Q[71], A[6]; Q[113], A[2]), no one existing in
a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life unless first he be
reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven, which is brought about
by grace. For the sinner deserves not life, but death, according to Rm.
6:23: "The wages of sin is death."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal
life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in this way
its act can be meritorious of eternal life.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work
proceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the more
perfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed the
operations equal in both cases.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: With regard to the first reason adduced, the case is
different in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of
well-doing from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing from
God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying (Rm.
11:35): "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to
him?" But man may merit from man, before he has received anything from
him, by what he has received from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
But as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the
case is similar with man and God, since one man cannot merit from another
whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and is
reconciled.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal life
condignly, for the Apostle says (Rm. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time
are not worthy [condignae] to be compared with the glory to come, that
shall be revealed in us." But of all meritorious works, the sufferings of
the saints would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no works of men are
meritorious of eternal life condignly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, on Rm. 6:23, "The grace of God, life everlasting," a
gloss says: "He might have truly said: 'The wages of justice, life
everlasting'; but He preferred to say 'The grace of God, life
everlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life everlasting of
His own mercy and not by our merits." Now when anyone merits something
condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from merit. Hence it would
seem that a man with grace cannot merit life everlasting condignly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be condign.
Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life, which
surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses the
charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. Therefore
with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with a fair judgment,
would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is granted by God, in
accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: "As to
the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the
just judge, will render to me in that day." Therefore man merits
everlasting life condignly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways:
first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the
grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance of
the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can be no
condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is congruity,
on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem congruous
that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him according to the
excellence of his power.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds
from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is
meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its
merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life
everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of water
springing up into life everlasting." And the worth of the work depends on
the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine
Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by
right of adoption, according to Rm. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these
sufferings.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This saying is to be understood of the first cause of our
reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit is a
subsequent cause.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present,
although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of
a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the
Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of life
everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of our
inheritance.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the
other virtues?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit through
charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to work,
according to Mt. 20:8: "Call the laborers and pay them their hire." Now
every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue is an
operative habit, as stated above (Q[55], A[2]). Hence every virtue is
equally a principle of merit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): "Every man shall receive
his own reward according to his labor." Now charity lessens rather than
increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis Dom., Serm.
lxx), "love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing."
Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than any other virtue.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the one
whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and patience or
fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears in the
martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even till death.
Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be
loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him."
Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, according
to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only
true" and living "God." Hence the merit of eternal life rests chiefly
with charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As we may gather from what has been stated above (A[1]),
human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and chiefly
from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good
to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free-will,
inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the power of voluntary
acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways does merit chiefly rest
with charity. For we must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in
the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's movement to the fruition of
the Divine good is the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the
other virtues are ordained to this end, since all the other virtues are
commanded by charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first
to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts
are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do
out of love we do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends
on voluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object, moves
the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end pertains always
commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was said above (Q[9],
A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways: first,
from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the work
pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the
toil---rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils, "for it does
great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxx).
Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not done with a
ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this toil lessens
merit and is removed by charity.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith . . .
worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and
fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity,
according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace,
because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits justification."
Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the
first grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is said
to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly. Therefore
we may merit the first grace condignly.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus if a
man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use of it in
his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than man. Much more,
therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the first grace already
received from God.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works,
according to Rm. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not
reckoned according to grace but according to debt." Now a man merits what
is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works. Hence a
man may not merit the first grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first in
the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all merit
is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rm. 11:6), "if by
grace, it is not now by works." Secondly, it may be considered as regards
the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the
merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of
nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an
obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone has grace, the
grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward is the term
of the work, but grace is the principle of all our good works, as stated
above (Q[109]). But of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue
of the preceding grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is
manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on this
point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from us, and its
consummation to be granted us by God; and this he here retracts. And
seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith as meriting
justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth of faith, that
the beginning of faith is in us from God, the first act must flow from
grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first grace. Therefore
man is justified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to merit
justification, but that, he believes, whilst he is being justified;
inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for the justification of the
ungodly, as stated above (Q[113], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that they
were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them worthy, Who
alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed" (Job 14:4).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first grace as from
its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there is no
comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for another.
Because on Mt. 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a gloss says: "How
much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a price on
another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly!" Now
inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man can merit the first
grace for another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but efficacious,
according to James 5:16: "The continued prayer of a just man availeth
much." Now he had previously said: "Pray one for another, that you may be
saved." Hence, since man's salvation can only be brought about by grace,
it seems that one man may merit for another his first grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive you into
everlasting dwellings." Now it is through grace alone that anyone is
received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does anyone merit
everlasting life as stated above (A[2]; Q[109], A[5]). Hence one man may
by merit obtain for another his first grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had
great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first
grace for another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As shown above (AA[1],3,4), our works are meritorious
from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and thus we merit
condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from free-will in so far
as we do them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit, since it is
congruous that when a man makes good use of his power God should by His
super-excellent power work still higher things. And therefore it is clear
that no one can merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ
alone; since each one of us is moved by God to reach life everlasting
through the gift of grace; hence condign merit does not reach beyond this
motion. But Christ's soul is moved by God through grace, not only so as
to reach the glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it,
inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author of human
salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: "Who hath brought many children into
glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a man
in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony with
friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation of
another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part of him
whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense that the
passage from Jeremias speaks.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by congruous
and not by condign merit.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas condign
merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things from the
Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, according to
Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we present our
prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive others into
everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their forgiveness in prayer,
or by meriting congruously by other good works, or materially speaking,
inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, exercised towards the poor, we
merit to be received into everlasting dwellings.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself restoration after
a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may justly merit. Now
nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be restored after a
fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps. lxx.], according to Ps.
70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me." Hence a man
may merit to be restored after a fall.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another. Now a
man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after a fall,
even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself
restoration after a fall.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life everlasting
by the good works he does, as was shown above (A[2]; Q[109], A[5]). Now
no one can attain life everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence
it would seem that he merits for himself restoration.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn
himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices
which he hath done shall not be remembered." Therefore his previous
merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, No one can merit for himself restoration after a future
fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself
condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of Divine
grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin; hence all
benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is restored, do
not fall under merit---the motion of the preceding grace not extending to
them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the first grace for
another, is prevented from having its effect on account of the impediment
of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the
efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who
merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these are in the same
person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration
after a fall.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is
called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is besought
is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on
justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his first grace,
because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of him who merits),
such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after the merit of
grace.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[114] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Some have said that no one "absolutely" merits life
everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only "conditionally,"
i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say this, for sometimes
the act of the last grace is not more, but less meritorious than
preceding acts, on account of the prostration of illness. Hence it must
be said that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely; but by
subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to the preceding merit, so
that it does not obtain its effect; just as natural caus