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Title: The Second World War: The Grand Alliance

Date of first publication: 1950

Author: Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965)

Date first posted: Nov. 25, 2019

Date last updated: Nov. 25, 2019

Faded Page eBook #20191143

This eBook was produced by: David T. Jones, Al Haines, John Routh
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The Second World War

The

Grand

Alliance

Winston S. Churchill

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY BOSTON

The Riverside Press Cambridge

1950

COPYRIGHT, 1950, BY HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

All rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in part in any language strictly prohibited.

The quotations from The Unrelenting Struggle,

by Winston S. Churchill, are reprinted by the

courtesy of Cassell & Company Ltd.

The quotation from The Memoirs of Cordell Hull

is reprinted by the courtesy of The Macmillan

Company.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY

KINGSPORT PRESS, INC., KINGSPORT, TENNESSEE

Preface

This volume, like the others, claims only to be a contribution
to the history of the Second World War. The tale is
told from the standpoint of the British Prime Minister, with
special responsibility as Minister of Defence for military affairs.
As these came directly to some extent into my hands, British
operations are narrated in their scope and in some detail. At
the same time it would be impossible to describe the struggles
of our Allies except as a background. To do full justice these
must be left to their own historians, or to later and more
general British accounts. While recognising the impossibility
of preserving proportion, I have tried to place our own story
in its true setting.

The main thread is again the series of my directives, telegrams,
and minutes upon the daily conduct of the war and of
British affairs. These are all original documents composed
by me as events unfolded. They therefore constitute a more
authentic record and give, I believe, a better impression of
what happened and how it seemed at the time than any account
which I could write now that the course of events is known.
Although they contain expressions of opinion and forecasts
which did not come true, it is by them as a whole that I wish
my own share in the conflict to be judged. Only in this way
can the reader understand the actual problems we had to face
as defined by the knowledge then in our possession.

Space would not allow, nor indeed in many cases have I the
right, to print the replies, which very often took the form of
lengthy departmental memoranda. I have therefore been careful
to avoid, so far as I can, throwing blame on individuals.
Where possible I have endeavoured to give a summary of
replies to telegrams. In the main however the documents
which are printed tell the tale.

We are again dealing with war on the giant scale, and the
battle on the Russian front involved as many divisions on both
sides as were engaged in the Battle of France. At every point
along a far longer front the great masses engaged, with slaughter
incomparable to anything which occurred elsewhere during the
war. I cannot attempt to do more than refer to the struggle
between the German and the Russian Armies as the background
of the actions of Britain and the Western Allies. The
Russian epic of 1941 and 1942 deserves a detailed and dispassionate
study and record in the English language. Even
though no facilities for foreigners to narrate the Russian agony
and glory might be accorded, the effort should be made. Nor
should this impulse be chilled by the fact that the Soviet Government
have already claimed all the honour for themselves.

Hitler’s invasion of Russia brought to an end the period of
almost exactly a year during which Great Britain and her
Empire stood alone, undismayed, and growing continually in
strength. Six months later the United States, violently assaulted
by Japan, became our ally for all purposes. The ground for our
united action had been prepared beforehand by my correspondence
with President Roosevelt, and it was possible to
forecast not only the form of our operations but also their
sequence. The effective combination of the whole English-speaking
world in the waging of war and the creation of the
Grand Alliance form the conclusion to this part of my account.

Winston S. Churchill

Chartwell

January 1, 1950

Acknowledgments

I must again acknowledge the assistance of those who helped
me with the previous volume, namely, Lieutenant-General Sir
Henry Pownall, Commodore G. R. G. Allen, Colonel F. W.
Deakin, and Sir Edward Marsh, Mr. Denis Kelly and Mr. C. C.
Wood. I have also to thank the very large number of others
who have kindly read these pages and commented upon them.

Lord Ismay has continued to give me his aid, as have my
other friends.

I record my obligation to His Majesty’s Government for
permission to reproduce the text of certain official documents
of which the Crown Copyright is legally vested in the Controller
of His Majesty’s Stationery Office. At the request of His
Majesty’s Government on security grounds, I have paraphrased
some of the telegrams published in this volume. These changes
have not altered in any way the sense or substance of the
telegrams.

1The Desert and the Balkans

The Onset of Events in 1941—A Secure Foundation—The Hinge
of the War—False Dawn in the Desert—My War Appreciation
of January 6—A Firm Flank at Benghazi—The Campaign in
Abyssinia—The Spanish Riddle—Vichy Obscurities—Threat
of German Air Power in Sicily—Overriding Danger in the
Balkans—The Need to Support Greece—Our Main Task—Hitler’s
New Year Thoughts—His Letter to Mussolini, December
31, 1940—Coincidence of Our View About Spain—Hitler’s
Conclusions About Russia and Africa—Mr. Eden’s Anxieties—Need
to Limit Our Desert Advance—General Smuts’ Telegram
of January 8—Directions to General Wavell of January 10—Wavell
Flies to Athens—My Telegram to Wavell of January 26—My
Reply to General Smuts of January 12.

Looking back upon the unceasing tumult of the war, I cannot
recall any period when its stresses and the onset of so many
problems all at once or in rapid succession bore more directly
on me and my colleagues that the first half of 1941. The scale
of events grew larger every year; but the decisions required
were not more difficult. Greater military disasters fell upon us
in 1942, but by then we were no longer alone and our fortunes
were mingled with those of the Grand Alliance. No part of our
problem in 1941 could be solved without relation to all the
rest. What was given to one theatre had to be taken from
another. An effort here meant a risk there. Our physical
resources were harshly limited. The attitude of a dozen Powers,
friendly, opportunist, or potentially hostile, was unknowable.
At home we must face the war against the U-boats, the invasion
threat, and the continuing Blitz; we had to conduct the group
of campaigns in the Middle East; and, thirdly, to try to make
a front against Germany in the Balkans. And we had to do all
this for a long time alone. After shooting Niagara we had now
to struggle in the rapids. One of the difficulties of this narrative
is the disproportion between our single-handed efforts to
keep our heads above water from day to day and do our duty,
and the remorseless development of far larger events.

* * * * *

We had at any rate a solid foundation in Great Britain. I
was sure that, provided we maintained the highest state of
readiness at home and the necessary forces, a German attempt
at invasion in 1941 would not be to our disadvantage. The
German air strength in all theatres was very little greater than
in 1940, whereas our air fighter force at home had grown from
fifty-one to seventy-eight squadrons, and our bombers from
twenty-seven to forty-five squadrons. The Germans had not
won the air battle in 1940. They seemed to have little chance
of winning it in 1941. Our army in the Island had grown far
stronger. Between September, 1940, and September, 1941, it
was raised from twenty-six active divisions to thirty-four, plus
five armoured divisions. To this must be added the maturity of
the troops and the enormous increase in their weapons. The
Home Guard had risen from a million to a million and a half;
and now all had firearms. Numbers, mobility, equipment,
training, organisation, and defence works were vastly improved.
Hitler, of course, had always a superabundance of soldiers for
invasion. To conquer us he would have had to carry and supply
across the Channel at least a million men. He could by 1941
have had a large though not a sufficient quantity of landing-craft.
But with our dominant air force and naval power giving
us the command of both elements we had no doubt of our
ability to destroy or cripple his armada. All the arguments,
therefore, on which we had relied in 1940 were now incomparably
stronger. So long as there was no relaxation in
vigilance or serious reduction in our own defence the War
Cabinet and the Chiefs of the Staff felt no anxiety.

Although our American friends, some of whose generals
visited us, took a more alarmist view of our position, and the
world at large regarded the invasion of Britain as probable,
we ourselves felt free to send overseas all the troops our available
shipping could carry and to wage offensive war in the
Middle East and the Mediterranean. Here was the hinge on
which our ultimate victory turned, and it was in 1941 that
the first significant events began. In war armies must fight.
Africa was the only continent in which we could meet our foes
on land. The defence of Egypt and of Malta were duties compulsive
upon us, and the destruction of the Italian Empire the
first prize we could gain. The British resistance in the Middle
East to the triumphant Axis Powers and our attempt to rally
the Balkans and Turkey against them are the theme and thread
of our story now.

* * * * *

The Desert victories cheered the opening days of the year.
Bardia, with more than forty thousand men, surrendered on
January 5. Tobruk seemed certainly within our grasp, and
was in fact taken, with nearly thirty thousand prisoners, in a
fortnight. On the nineteenth we reoccupied Kassala, in the
Sudan, and on the twentieth invaded the Italian colony of
Eritrea, seizing the railhead at Biscia a few days later. On that
same day the Emperor Haile Selassie re-entered Abyssinia. But
all the while the reports accumulated of the German movements
and preparations for a Balkan campaign. I drew up for
the Chiefs of Staff an appreciation upon the war as a whole,
with which I found them in general agreement.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

6 Jan. 41

The speedy destruction of the Italian armed forces in Northeast
Africa must be our prime major overseas objective in the
opening months of 1941. Once the Italian army in Cyrenaica has
been destroyed, the Army of the Nile becomes free for other tasks.
We cannot yet tell what these will be.

2. The fall of Bardia should enable an advanced base to be
established there for the capture of Tobruk. With Bardia and
Tobruk in our hands it should be possible to drop the land communications
with Alexandria almost entirely and to rely upon sea
transport for our further westward advance. Every plan should be
made now to use Tobruk to its utmost capacity.

3. The striking force to be maintained west of Bardia and
Tobruk need not be large. The 2d and 7th British Armoured
Divisions, the 6th Australian Division, the New Zealand brigade
group, soon to become a division, with perhaps one or two British
brigades, comprising not more than 40,000 to 45,000 men, should
suffice to overpower the remaining Italian resistance and to take
Benghazi. The distance from Tobruk to Benghazi by the coastal
road is not much above 250 miles, compared with about 370 from
Alexandria to Tobruk.[1] Thus, once Tobruk is established as the
base and our land communications begin from there, no greater
strain should be thrown upon the land transport than at present,
and it should be possible to start afresh from Tobruk as if Tobruk
were Alexandria, and to maintain the moderate but adequate
striking force required. With the capture of Benghazi this phase
of the Libyan campaign would be ended.

4. The question is, how long will this take? Having regard to
the very heavy Italian losses in their best troops and in their
vehicles and equipment, and to the fact that we have the command
of the sea, the collapse in Cyrenaica might be very rapid. Indeed,
all might go with a run at any time. The need for haste is obvious.
It would, however, suffice for our general strategy if Benghazi and
everything east of it were effectively in our possession and occupied
as a military and naval base at any time during March.

5. The aforesaid Libyan operations need not, therefore, at all
affect the simultaneous pushing of the campaign against the Italians
in Abyssinia. General Wavell has already withdrawn the 4th
Indian Division. The 5th Indian Division is also available, and it
should be possible to carry out the Kassala operation and to spread
the revolt in Abyssinia, while at the same time the Kenya forces
press northward by Lake Rudolf. At any time we may receive
armistice proposals from the cut-off Italian garrison in Abyssinia.
This army must have been buoyed up with hopes of an Italian
conquest of the Delta and of the Canal, enabling communications
to be restored and supplies to reach them by the Nile and the Red
Sea. These hopes are already dead. On the other hand, the vast
size of Abyssinia, the lack of all communications, especially sea
communications, and the impossibility of nourishing large forces
may bring about an indefinite delay. It is, however, not an unreasonable
hope that by the end of April the Italian army in
Abyssinia will have submitted or been broken up.

6. The moment that this is apparent the northward movement
of all the effective forces in Kenya, as well as those in the Sudan
and Abyssinia, will become possible. These forces will thenceforward
become a reserve available for operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean. If we take the present total strength of the armies
in the Middle East at about 370,000 (including convoys W.S. 5 and
6), it might be reasonably expected that the equivalent of ten
divisions would stand in the Nile Valley, together with two additional
divisions from home, a total of twelve, after providing the
necessary garrisons and security troops for Abyssinia, Cyrenaica,
Egypt, and Palestine. These twelve divisions should thus be free
(apart from new distractions) by the end of April.

II

7. To invade and force a way through Spain to the Straits of
Gibraltar against the will of the Spanish people and Government,
especially at this season, is a most dangerous and questionable
enterprise for Germany to undertake, and it is no wonder that
Hitler, with so many sullen populations to hold down, has so far
shrunk from it. With the permission of the Spanish Government
it would, of course, be a short and easy matter for the Germans to
gain control of Lisbon and of the Algeciras and Ceuta batteries,
together with appropriate airfields. According to Captain Hilgarth
[our Naval Attaché in Madrid], who has lived long in Spain and is
fresh from contact with our Ambassador, it is becoming increasingly
unlikely that the Spanish Government will give Hitler passage or
join the war against us. General Wavell’s victories in Libya have
played, and will play, an important part in Spanish opinion. If
the Germans are refused permission it is most unlikely that they
will try to force their way into and through Spain before the month
of April. From every point of view this delay is helpful to us. We
have the use of Gibraltar; we have the time for our strength in the
Middle East to accomplish its task there and again to become free;
above all, there is the possibility of events taking a favourable turn
in France and at Vichy.

8. We must now be most careful not to precipitate matters in
Spain, or set the Spanish Government against us more than it is
already, or provoke Herr Hitler to a violent course towards Spain.
All these matters are highly speculative. There can be no certainty
about them. But the fact that Hitler has not acted through Spain
as we feared, when conditions, both political and climatic, were
more favourable to him, makes it on the whole a reasonable working
assumption that any German adventure in Spain will at least
wait for the spring.

III

9. The probabilities of delay in Spain until the spring give rise to
the hope that the Vichy Government, under German pressure or
actual German incursion, may either proceed to North Africa and
resume the war from there, or authorise General Weygand to do so.
If such an event could be brought about before the Straits of
Gibraltar fell into German control, we should have a very good
chance of resisting a German attempt against the Straits indefinitely.
We could move troops into Morocco by the Atlantic ports; we
should have the use of the French air bases in North Africa. The
whole situation in the Mediterranean would be completely revolutionised
in our favour. The position of any Italian forces remaining
in Tripoli would become impossible. We might well be able to
open the Mediterranean for supplies and reinforcements for the
Middle East.

10. We have, therefore, thought it right to assure Marshal Pétain
and General Weygand that we will assist them with up to six
divisions, substantial air forces, and the necessary naval power from
the moment they feel able to take the all-important step we so
greatly desire. We have also impressed upon them the danger of
delaying their action until the Germans have made their way
through Spain and become masters of the Straits and of Northern
Morocco. We can but wait and see what Vichy will do. Meanwhile
we enforce the blockade of France fitfully and as naval convenience
offers, partly to assert the principle, partly to provide a “smokescreen”
of Anglo-French friction, and especially not to let the Vichy
Government feel that if they do nothing life will be tolerable for
them so far as we are concerned. It is greatly to our interest that
events should develop rapidly in France. Presumably Herr Hitler
realises this. Nevertheless the probabilities are that the French
climax will come about before anything decisive happens in Spain.

IV

11. We must continually expect that Hitler will soon strike some
heavy blow, and that he is now making preparations on a vast scale
with customary German thoroughness. He can, of course, easily
come down through Italy and establish an air power in Sicily.
Perhaps this is already taking place.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee are requested to press on with
their study of “Influx” [a scheme for the occupation of Sicily],
which may conceivably require emergency treatment. It is not seen,
however, how “Influx” can be accorded priority over the operations
in Libya; certainly not, whatever happens, until Tobruk has been
taken and a good forward base made there—if not farther west—to
protect Egypt.

V

12. All the foregoing shows that nothing would suit our interest
better than that any German advance in the Balkans should be
delayed till the spring. For this very reason one must apprehend
that it will begin earlier. The exploits of the Greek Army have
been an enormous help to us. They have expressed themselves
generously about the extremely modest aid in the air which was
all we could give. But should their success be followed by a check
or a deadlock, we must expect immediate demands for more aid.
The only aid we can give quickly is four or five more squadrons
from the Middle East, perhaps some artillery regiments, and some
or all of the tanks of the 2d Armoured Division, now arrived and
working up in leisurely fashion in Egypt.

“Furious” has reached Takoradi, and forty Hurricanes, etc., will
soon raise Air Marshal Longmore’s strength to well over a hundred
Hurricane fighters. His losses in the offensive have been singularly
small. His action in withdrawing squadrons from Aden and the
Sudan has been vindicated. Tobruk may soon be in our hands, and
thereafter it would seem that a strong reinforcement of air power
for Greece should be provided. This should include Hurricane
squadrons. Have the aerodromes in Greece been lengthened and
adapted to them? Has the airfield in Crete yet been made suitable
for their landing on passage? The call, when it comes, may be very
urgent. Everything must be set in train now. We must know also
how long it would take to move the 2d Armoured Division to the
Piraeus, and what numbers are involved.

13. All accounts go to show that a Greek failure to take Valona
will have very bad consequences. It may be possible for General
Wavell, with no more than the forces he is now using in the Western
Desert, and in spite of some reduction in his air force, to conquer
the Cyrenaica province and establish himself at Benghazi; but it
would not be right for the sake of Benghazi to lose the chance of
the Greeks taking Valona, and thus to dispirit and anger them,
and perhaps make them in the mood for a separate peace with Italy.
Therefore, the prospect must be faced that after Tobruk the further
westward advance of the Army of the Nile may be seriously
cramped. It is quite clear to me that supporting Greece must have
priority after the western flank of Egypt has been made secure.

VI

14. The attitude of Yugoslavia may well be determined by the
support we give to Greece and by their fortunes before Valona.
While it is impossible to dogmatise, it would be more natural for
the Germans to push on through Rumania to the Black Sea and to
press down through their old ally Bulgaria to Salonika, rather
than to force their way through Yugoslavia. Many troop movements
and many more rumours would seem to point to this.
Evidently there is a great building-up of German strength, and
improvement of German communications towards the southeast.
We must so act as to make it certain that if the enemy enters
Bulgaria, Turkey will come into the war. If Yugoslavia stands firm
and is not molested, if the Greeks take Valona and maintain
themselves in Albania, if Turkey becomes an active ally, the attitude
of Russia may be affected favourably. Anyone can see how
obnoxious, and indeed deadly, a German advance to the Black Sea
or through Bulgaria to the Aegean must be to Russia. Fear only
will restrain Russia from war, and perhaps a strong Allied front in
the Balkans, with the growing prestige of the British Army and
sea and air power, may lessen that fear. But we must not count
on this.

VII

15. Last, but dominating all our war effort, is the threat of
invasion, the air warfare and its effects on production, and the
grievous pressure upon our western ports and northwestern communications.
One cannot doubt that Herr Hitler’s need to starve
or crush Great Britain is stronger than it has ever been. A great
campaign in the east of Europe, the defeat of Russia, the conquest
of the Ukraine, and an advance from the Black Sea to the Caspian
would none of them, separately nor all together, bring him victorious
peace while the British air power grew ever stronger behind
him and he had to hold down a whole continent of sullen, starving
peoples. Therefore, the task of preventing invasion, of feeding
the Island, and of speeding our armament production must in no
way be compromised for the sake of any other objective whatsoever.

* * * * *

Hitler also had his New Year thoughts, and it is interesting
to compare his letter to Mussolini written a week earlier with
my appreciation. Coincidence is evident about the attitude of
General Franco and Spain.

31 Dec. 40

Duce,

. . . In examining the general situation I reach the following
conclusions:

1. The war in the West is in itself won. A final violent effort is
still necessary to crush England. In order to determine the manner
of accomplishing this, we must weigh the factors which separate
England from a complete collapse after the intensification of our
air and submarine offensives will have produced their effect.

In this battle, and after we have achieved the first stages of success,
important German policies will be necessary for a final assault
against the British Isles. The concentration of these forces—and
particularly the enormous supply dumps—will require an anti-aircraft
defence far superior to our original estimates.

2. France. The French Government have dismissed Laval. The
official reasons which have been communicated to me are false.
I do not doubt for a moment that the real reason is that General
Weygand is making demands from North Africa which amount to
blackmail, and that the Vichy Government is not in a position to
react without risking the loss of North Africa. I also consider it
probable that there exists at Vichy itself a whole clique which
approves of Weygand’s policy, at least tacitly. I do not think that
Pétain personally is disloyal. But one never knows. All this demands
constant vigilance and a careful watching of events.

3. Spain. Profoundly troubled by the situation, which Franco
thinks has deteriorated, Spain has refused to collaborate with the
Axis Powers. I fear that Franco may be about to make the biggest
mistake of his life. I think that his idea of receiving from the
democracies raw materials and wheat as a sort of recompense for
his abstention from the conflict is extremely naïve. The democracies
will keep him in suspense until he has consumed the last
grain of wheat, and then they will unloose the fight against him.

I deplore all this, for from our side we had completed our preparations
for crossing the Spanish frontier on January 10, and to
attack Gibraltar at the beginning of February. I think success
would have been relatively rapid. The troops picked for this
operation have been specially chosen and trained. The moment
that the Straits of Gibraltar fell into our hands the danger of a
French change-over in North and West Africa would be definitely
eliminated.

I am, therefore, very saddened by this decision of Franco, which
is so little in accord with the aid which we, you, Duce, and myself,
gave him when he found himself in difficulties. I still have the
hope, the slight hope, that he will realise at the last minute the
catastrophic consequences of his conduct, and that even tardily
he will find his way to this battle front, where our victory will
decide his own destiny.

4. Bulgaria. Bulgaria equally is reluctant to associate herself
with the Tripartite Pact and to adopt a clear attitude in her international
relations. The growing pressure exercised by Soviet Russia
is the cause of this. If the King had adhered immediately to our
pact, no one would have dared to put such pressure on him. The
worst is that this influence poisons public opinion, which is not
insensible to Communist infection.

5. Without doubt it is Hungary and Rumania who in this conflict
have adopted the most clear-cut attitude. General Antonescu has
recognised that the future of his régime, and even of his person,
depends on our victory. From this he has drawn clear and direct
conclusions which make him go up in my esteem.

The attitude of the Hungarians is no less loyal. Since December
13, German troops have been continually in transit in the direction
of Rumania. Hungary and Rumania have put at my disposition
their railway network, so that German divisions can be rapidly
moved to the points of pressure. I cannot say any more yet of the
operations which we are planning or which may become necessary,
for these plans are being drawn up at this very moment. The
strength of our forces will in any case be such that any threat of
lateral counter-manoeuvre will be excluded.

It is simply necessary, Duce, that you stabilise your front in
Albania so as to contain at least a part of the Greek and Anglo-Greek
forces.

6. Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is prudently gaining time. If circumstances
are favourable it may be that she will conclude a non-aggression
pact with us, but it seems now that she will not adhere
in any case to the Tripartite Pact. I do not count on trying to
obtain anything more until our military successes have improved
the psychological climate.

7. Russia. Given the danger of seeing internal conflicts develop
in a certain number of Balkan countries, it is necessary to foresee
the extreme consequences and to have ready machinery capable
of avoiding them. I do not envisage any Russian initiative against
us so long as Stalin is alive, and we ourselves are not victims of
serious setbacks. I consider it essential, Duce, as a premise of a
satisfactory conclusion of this war that there should be in existence
a German army sufficiently strong to deal with any eventuality in
the East. The greater the strength of this army appears, the less
will be the probability that we shall have to employ it against an
unforeseen danger. I should like to add to these general considerations
that our present relations with the U.S.S.R are very good.
We are on the eve of concluding a trade treaty which will satisfy
both parties, and there is considerable hope that we can resolve in
a reasonable manner the remaining points at issue between us.

In fact, the only two questions which still divide us are Finland
and Constantinople. In regard to Finland, I do not foresee fundamental
difficulties, because we do not regard Finland as belonging
essentially to our sphere of influence, and the only thing that
interests us is that a second war should not break out in this area.

In contrast to this, it is not in our interest to abandon Constantinople
to Russia and Bulgaria to Bolshevism. But even here it
should be possible, with good intentions, to reach a solution which
will avoid the worst and facilitate what we want. It will be easier
to find a solution if Moscow is clear that nothing obliges us to
accept an arrangement which is not satisfactory to us.

8. Africa. Duce, I do not think that in this theatre any counter-attack
on a large scale can be launched at the moment. The preparation
of such an enterprise would take a minimum of three to
five months. In the meantime we shall reach the season of the year
in which the German armoured formations cannot successfully go
into action. For unless they are equipped with special cooling
devices even the armoured cars cannot be used in practice at such
temperatures. In any case they cannot be used for tactical operations
at long distances requiring a whole day.

The decisive solution in this sector seems to be to increase the
number of anti-tank weapons, even if that means that in other
sectors Italian formations must be deprived of these special guns.

Above all, as I stated recently, I believe nevertheless that we
should try by all means to weaken the naval position of Great
Britain in the Mediterranean with our air forces, because the
employment of our ground troops in this sector cannot improve
the situation.

For the rest, Duce, no decision of importance can be made before
the month of March.

* * * * *

Mr. Eden was watching with close attention the darkening
clouds in the East.

Foreign Minister to Prime Minister

6 Jan. 41

Salutations and congratulations upon the victory of Bardia! If I
may debase a golden phrase, “Never has so much been surrendered
by so many to so few.”

The object of this minute, however, is to call attention to a less
satisfactory sector of the international horizon, the Balkans. A mass
of information has come to us over the last few days from divers
sources, all of which tends to show that Germany is pressing forward
her preparations in the Balkans with a view to an ultimate descent
upon Greece. The date usually mentioned for such a descent is
the beginning of March, but I feel confident that the Germans must
be making every effort to antedate their move. Whether or not
military operations are possible through Bulgaria against Salonika
at this time of the year I am not qualified to say, but we may feel
certain that Germany will seek to intervene by force to prevent
complete Italian defeat in Albania. Already there are reports of
increased enemy air forces operating against the Greeks, and
General Papagos states that these are slowing down his advance. It
would be in accordance with German methods to establish superiority
in the air before making any move on land.

Politically the attitude of the Bulgarian Government causes me
grave disquiet. They give the impression of men who have now
little control of events. Their press is increasingly under German
control, and is now little else but the mouthpiece of Axis propaganda.
It is essential that our victories in North Africa should not
result in any decrease of watchfulness on the part of the Turks and
Yugoslavs, and we are doing what we can in the political sphere to
ensure this. You may wish to have all these questions considered
by the Defence Committee.

Alter reading this I issued the following minute:

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

6 Jan. 41

Pray see the attached from the Foreign Secretary. In spite of the
evident need to pursue the Italians along the Libyan coast while
the going is good, we shall have to consider the dispatch of four or
five more squadrons of the Royal Air Force to Greece, and possibly
the diversion of part of the 2d British Armoured Division.

I cannot look beyond Benghazi at the present time, and if
Tobruk is taken there will be very few Italian troops, and by no
means their best, east of Benghazi. . . .

Although perhaps by luck and daring we may collect comparatively
easily most delectable prizes on the Libyan shore, the massive
importance of the taking of Valona and keeping the Greek front in
being must weigh hourly with us.

* * * * *

On January 8 the Defence Committee agreed that in view
of the probability of an early German advance into Greece
through Bulgaria it was of the first importance, from the
political point of view, that we should do everything possible,
by hook or by crook, to send at once to Greece the fullest
support within our power. It was also agreed that a decision
on the form and extent of our assistance to Greece should be
taken within the next forty-eight hours. On this same day I
received the following telegram from General Smuts. This was
written quite independently of my minute two days earlier.
I was fortified by his complete agreement with my view,
endorsed as it was by the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence
Committee.

General Smuts to Prime Minister

8 Jan. 41

Magnificent victories in the Middle East open up a field of
speculation regarding our future course. Flowing tide will soon
carry Wavell to Tobruk. Should he go farther? Tripoli is much too
far. Even Benghazi is as far beyond the frontier as the frontier is
from Alexandria. But there may be sound reasons, naval or other,
for going so far as Benghazi. In the absence of good and special
reasons Tobruk seems to me the terminus. Beyond it lie risks not
necessary to detail. Leaving an adequate defensive force there in a
fortified position, the rest of the army should be withdrawn to
Egypt and the Middle East, where a strong army [of] manoeuvre
will be required against possible attack through the Balkans.

2. I would however suggest that at such a stage liquidation of
the Abyssinian situation should also be considered. Conquest of
Abyssinia would mean a deadly blow at Mussolini’s prestige and at
the Fascist plunder. Italy may possibly be forced out of the war and
the whole of the Mediterranean position transformed. Germany
would once more be isolated, with prospect of certain defeat.

3. For an early liquidation of Abyssinia there is also the argument
that the Italian morale there must be particularly low now,
and early finish of the campaign would release large forces for
reinforcing our front in the Middle East. If part of Wavell’s
Middle East army could be detailed shortly, reinforcing an attack
on Abyssinia from the north, and a simultaneous attack is launched
from Kenya, Italian resistance might rapidly disintegrate. I should
think that an additional division in the north and another in
Kenya would be sufficient if both attacks proceed simultaneously.

4. If such a plan for simultaneous attack is approved, I am
prepared to supply the additional division for the south. Except
for the deficiency in Bren guns, it is ready and could be moved as
soon as shipping could be provided. Transport of such large forces
both in the north and south must take some time, and if my suggestion
is approved decision should be made as soon as possible.
Attack from the south will rapidly push the fighting front away
from Kenya, and so involve the scrapping of much of the plan now
being worked on there. Plan of simultaneous attack from the
north and south is required if unnecessary risk and a long campaign
are to be avoided in so large an area as Eritrea and Abyssinia.
For this [the] additional division in the north will be necessary,
and probably sufficient. I hope it can be spared in spite of rumours
of large German concentrations in Rumania and Hungary.

Question is whether Germany can afford to set the Balkans ablaze
with Russia an incalculable factor and Turkey hostile. The Italian
defeat in Africa and Greece, together with the failure of the
German Air Force against Britain, have profoundly changed the
position, and the German concentrations may only be intended to
pacify the Italians, and to lure the British forces away from
Britain, where the main attack is intended and has to be made.
Whole situation is one for consideration of the General Staff, who
have full facts before them. To me it would in the circumstances
appear not to involve undue risk presently to detach one division
with the necessary air force from the Middle East army in order to
strengthen the Sudan force for this attack from the north. If the
operation is brought off soon and expeditiously it might produce
far-reaching results in Italy and the Middle East.

* * * * *

On January 10 the Chiefs of Staff warned the commanders
in the Middle East that a German attack on Greece might start
before the end of the month. It would come, they thought,
through Bulgaria, and the probable line of advance would be
down the Struma Valley against Salonika. Three divisions,
supported by about two hundred dive-bombers, would be used,
and three or four more divisions might be added after March.
The Chiefs of Staff added that the decision of His Majesty’s
Government to give the greatest possible help to the Greeks
meant that once Tobruk was taken all other operations in the
Middle East must have second place, and they authorised the
dispatch therefrom of mechanised and specialist units and air
forces up to the following limits: one squadron of infantry
tanks, one regiment of cruiser tanks,[2] ten regiments of artillery,
and five squadrons of aircraft.

The Commanders-in-Chief in Cairo thought that the German
concentration in Rumania, of which we had warned them, was
merely a war of nerves, designed to induce us to disperse our
forces in the Middle East and stop our advance in Libya.
Wavell trusted that the Chiefs of Staff would “consider most
urgently whether enemy’s move is not bluff.”

On reading this reply, which was far astray from the facts,
I issued the following:

Prime Minister to General Ismay or Colonel Hollis, for C.O.S. Committee

10 Jan. 41

Chiefs of Staff should meet tomorrow, Saturday morning, to
consider the various telegrams from the Middle East H.Q., and they
are authorised to dispatch the attached telegram which I have
drafted to General Wavell and Air Marshal Longmore, unless they
wish to make any communication to me upon it.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

10 Jan. 41

1. Our information contradicts idea that German concentration
in Rumania is merely a “move in war of nerves” or a “bluff to
cause dispersion of force.” We have a mass of detail indicating that
a large-scale movement through Bulgaria towards the Greek
frontier, aimed presumably at Salonika, will begin before the end
of the month. Hostile forces to be employed in the aforesaid invasion
would not be large, but of deadly quality. One, perhaps two,
armoured divisions, with one motorised division, about 180 dive-bombers,
and some parachute troops, seems to be all that could
cross the Bulgarian-Greek frontier up till the middle of February.

2. But this force, if not stopped, may play exactly the same part
in Greece as the German Army’s break-through at Sedan played in
France. All Greek divisions in Albania will be fatally affected.
These are the facts and implications which arise from our information,
in which we have good reason to believe. But is this not also
the very thing the Germans ought to do to harm us most? Destruction
of Greece will eclipse victories you have gained in Libya, and
may affect decisively Turkish attitude, especially if we have shown
ourselves callous of fate of allies. You must now, therefore, conform
your plans to larger interests at stake.

3. Nothing must hamper capture of Tobruk, but thereafter all
operations in Libya are subordinated to aiding Greece, and all
preparations must be made from the receipt of this telegram for
the immediate succour of Greece up to the limits prescribed. These
matters have been earnestly weighed by Defence Committee of
Cabinet, and General Smuts has independently cabled almost
identical views.

4. We expect and require prompt and active compliance with
our decisions, for which we bear full responsibility. Your joint visit
to Athens will enable you to contrive the best method of giving
effect to the above decisions. It should not be delayed.

The Chiefs of Staff being in accord, this telegram was
dispatched. It will be seen that our intentions at this time did
not amount to the offer to Greece of an army, but only to
special and technical units.

On these orders General Wavell and Air Chief Marshal
Longmore flew to Athens for discussions with Generals Metaxas
and Papagos. On January 15 they told us that the Greek
Government were unwilling that any of our troops should land
in Salonika until they could do so in sufficient numbers to act
offensively. On receipt of this telegram the Chiefs of Staff
telegraphed on January 17 that there could be no question of
forcing our aid upon the Greeks. In consequence we modified
our view of the immediate future, decided to push on to
Benghazi, and meanwhile to build up the strongest strategic
reserve possible in the Delta.

On January 21 the Chiefs of Staff accordingly proposed to
Wavell that the capture of Benghazi was now of the highest
importance. They considered that if it were made into a
strongly fortified naval and air base the overland route might
be dropped and both men and transport saved. They also
urged him to seize the Dodecanese, and especially Rhodes, as
soon as possible, in order to forestall the arrival of the German
Air Force, with its consequent threat to our communications
with Greece and Turkey, and to form a strategic reserve of four
divisions to be ready to help these two countries.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

26 Jan. 41

The apparition of the German aircraft in the Central Mediterranean
has forced me for the time being to abandon the hopes I
had formed of opening and picketing the way through the Narrows,
thus enabling troop convoys to pass regularly. Unless this situation
can be rectified during the early months of this year, the lack of
shipping and the distance round the Cape will undoubtedly affect
the scale to which I had hoped to raise the Army of the Nile and
the strength of your command. It pained me very much to find
that the convoys sent at so much cost and risk round the Cape
should so largely consist of rearward services and make so small an
addition to our organised fighting units. I shall try my utmost to
support you in every way, and I must ask in return that you convince
me that every man in the Middle East is turned to the highest
possible use and that the largest number of organised divisional or
perhaps preferably brigade units are formed. The soldiers in the
rearward services and establishments should play an effective part
in internal security. . . .

The information reaching me from every quarter leaves me in no
doubt that the Germans are now already establishing themselves
upon the Bulgarian aerodromes and making every preparation for
action against Greece. This infiltration may, indeed almost certainly
will, attain decisive proportions before any clear-cut issue of
invasion has been presented to the Turks, who will then be told
to keep out or have Constantinople bombed. We must expect a
series of very heavy, disastrous blows in the Balkans, and possibly a
general submission there to German aims. The stronger the
strategic reserve which you can build up in the Delta and the more
advanced your preparations to transfer it to European shores, the
better will be the chances of securing a favourable crystallisation.

I now replied to General Smuts:

Prime Minister to General Smuts

12 Jan. 41

Your message of the 8th arrived when we had reached certain
definite conclusions after three or four days’ thought. I read it myself
to Defence Committee, three Chiefs of Staff, three Service
Ministers, Attlee, and Eden. All struck by complete coincidence of
view. Only point of difference is we think northward advance from
Kenya with large forces would involve long delay through transport
shortage. Rebellion making good headway; Emperor enters
soon. Advance Kassala-Agordat cuts tap-root. Force you mention
already on the way. Pressure from Kenya to be maintained at
utmost, but we cannot carry too many troops on this line. Please
send division at earliest. Perhaps by time it approaches can land
it in Red Sea. Better keep as fluid as possible in view of imponderabilia.
Come though, please, now.

Fully agreed to pay no heavy price beyond Tobruk, where very
likely 25,000 Italians in net, and to go on while the going is good so
as to make as far-thrown a western flank for Egypt as possible,
meanwhile shifting all useful elements to impending war front,
Bulgarian-Greek frontier. Naturally Wavell and Company heart-set
on chase, but Wavell is going Monday or Tuesday to Athens to
concert reinforcements with Greeks. Cannot guarantee success;
can only make what we think best arrangements. Weather,
mountains, Danube crossing, fortified Greek-Bulgarian frontier,
all helpful factors. Turkey, Yugoslavia, Russia, all perhaps
favourably influenced by evidences of British support of Greece.

Whatever happens in Balkans Italian army in Abyssinia probably
destroyable. If this should come off, everything useful from Kenya
should go forward to Mediterranean. Hope Army of South African
Union will be there for summer fighting. Very large reinforcements
coming continually round Cape. Most grateful for all your help,
and above all for your surefooted judgment, which marches with
our laboriously reached conclusions.

The “infantry” tank was a heavy, slow, strongly armoured tank designed
to accompany and support the infantry.

The “cruiser” tank was fast, better gunned than the infantry tank, but with
lighter armour. It had a highly mobile fighting rôle.

The “light” tank was fast, with thin armour and only machine guns for
armament. Used for reconnaissance.

2The Widening War

More Intimate Contacts with President Roosevelt—Arrival of
Harry Hopkins in London—A Precious Link with the President—Our
Journey to Scapa—Mr. Wendell Willkie—“Sail On,
O Ship of State!”—Politics and Strategy—Our Grim Alternatives—German
Designs upon Rumania and Bulgaria—Soviet
Concern—Ribbentrop’s Explanations—My Telegram of January
31 to President Inönü—Our Offer of Military Help to
Turkey—Turkish Lack of Modern Equipment—Vital Need
to Form a Balkan Front.

With the New Year more intimate contacts developed
with President Roosevelt. I had already sent him the
compliments of the season.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

1 Jan. 41

At this moment, when the New Year opens in storm, I feel it my
duty on behalf of the British Government, and indeed of the whole
British Empire, to tell you, Mr. President, how lively is our sense
of gratitude and admiration for the memorable declaration which
you made to the American people and to the lovers of freedom in
all the continents on Sunday last.

We cannot tell what lies before us, but with this trumpet-call we
march forward heartened and fortified, and with the confidence
which you have expressed that in the end all will be well for the
English-speaking peoples and those who share their ideals.

On January 10 a gentleman arrived to see me at Downing
Street with the highest credentials. Telegrams had been
received from Washington stating that he was the closest confidant
and personal agent of the President. I therefore arranged
that he should be met by Mr. Brendan Bracken on his arrival
at Poole Airport, and that we should lunch together alone the
next day. Thus I met Harry Hopkins, that extraordinary man,
who played, and was to play, a sometimes decisive part in the
whole movement of the war. His was a soul that flamed out of
a frail and failing body. He was a crumbling lighthouse from
which there shone the beams that led great fleets to harbour.
He had also a gift of sardonic humour. I always enjoyed his
company, especially when things went ill. He could also be
very disagreeable and say hard and sour things. My experiences
were teaching me to be able to do this too, if need be.

At our first meeting we were about three hours together,
and I soon comprehended his personal dynamism and the outstanding
importance of his mission. This was the height of the
London bombing, and many local worries imposed themselves
upon us. But it was evident to me that here was an envoy from
the President of supreme importance to our life. With gleaming
eye and quiet, constrained passion he said:

“The President is determined that we shall win the war
together. Make no mistake about it.

“He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all
means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to
him—there is nothing that he will not do so far as he has
human power.”

Everyone who came in contact with Harry Hopkins in the
long struggle will confirm what I have set down about his
remarkable personality. And from this hour began a friendship
between us which sailed serenely over all earthquakes and convulsions.
He was the most faithful and perfect channel of
communication between the President and me. But far more
than that, he was for several years the main prop and animator
of Roosevelt himself. Together these two men, the one a subordinate
without public office, the other commanding the
mighty Republic, were capable of taking decisions of the highest
consequence over the whole area of the English-speaking
world. Hopkins was, of course, jealous about his personal
influence with his Chief and did not encourage American competitors.
He therefore in some ways bore out the poet Gray’s
line, “A favourite has no friend.” But this was not my affair.
There he sat, slim, frail, ill, but absolutely glowing with refined
comprehension of the Cause. It was to be the defeat, ruin, and
slaughter of Hitler, to the exclusion of all other purposes,
loyalties, or aims. In the history of the United States few
brighter flames have burned.

Harry Hopkins always went to the root of the matter. I
have been present at several great conferences, where twenty
or more of the most important executive personages were
gathered together. When the discussion flagged and all seemed
baffled, it was on these occasions he would rap out the deadly
question, “Surely, Mr. President, here is the point we have got
to settle. Are we going to face it or not?” Faced it always was,
and, being faced, was conquered. He was a true leader of men,
and alike in ardour and in wisdom in times of crisis he has
rarely been excelled. His love for the causes of the weak and
poor was matched by his passion against tyranny, especially
when tyranny was, for the time, triumphant.

* * * * *

In order to clothe the arrival of our new Ambassador, Lord
Halifax, in the United States with every circumstance of importance,
I arranged that our newest and strongest battleship,
the King George V, with a proper escort of destroyers, should
carry him and his wife across the ocean. I accompanied them
north in my train and saw them off from Scapa Flow. I took
advantage of the occasion to visit the Fleet, which I had not
seen since I left the Admiralty. This fitted in with my plans
for making much closer acquaintance with Harry Hopkins.
We went together to the Fleet, inspecting ships and defences.
My wife came with me, and excelled all others in nimbleness
of skipping and scrambling from one destroyer to another.
Hopkins nearly fell into the sea. I returned in my train to
Glasgow. I was welcomed by very large crowds, saw all the
local authorities, walked through a number of workshops, inspected
the Defence, Fire, and Air Raid services, and made a
number of impromptu speeches. We then went on to Tyneside,
where the same thing happened. All the time I got to know
this man—and to know about his Chief. Hopkins was about
ten days with me, and in this time he put me into harmonious
mental relations with the newly rechosen Master of the great
Republic. Later on I took him to Dover to see our heavy
batteries glaring across the Channel at the coast of France—for
us Germany. He seemed to be keenly interested in all
he saw.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

13 Jan. 41

Hopkins and I spent the week-end together, and he is coming
along with me on a short tour of Fleet bases, so we shall have
plenty of time to cover all points at leisure. I am most grateful to
you for sending so remarkable an envoy, who enjoys so high a
measure of your intimacy and confidence.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

19 Jan. 41

You probably know that Halifax will arrive at Annapolis in our
new battleship H.M.S. King George V. She cannot of course stay
more than twenty-four hours. I don’t know whether you would be
interested to see her. We should be proud to show her to you, or to
any of your high naval authorities, if you could arrange that. She
is due at entrance of Chesapeake Bay at 7 A.M. on January 24. If
you will communicate to me any suggestions or wishes we will do
our best to meet them.

* * * * *

Later on in the same month there arrived in England Mr.
Wendell Willkie, the President’s opponent in the recent election.
He too brought recommendations of the highest character
from the President, and as he was the accepted leader of the
Republican Party every arrangement was made by us, with the
assistance of the enemy, to let him see all he desired of London
at bay. He also came to Chequers for a night, and I had a very
long talk with this most able and forceful man, whose life was
cut short so unexpectedly by illness three years later.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

28 Jan. 41

I received Willkie yesterday, and was deeply moved by the verse
of Longfellow’s which you had quoted. I shall have it framed as a
souvenir of these tremendous days, and as a mark of our friendly
relations, which have been built up telegraphically but also telepathically
under all the stresses.

All my information shows that the Germans are persevering in
their preparations to invade this country, and we are getting ready
to give them a reception worthy of the occasion. On the other
hand, the news from the East shows that a large army and air
force are being established in Rumania, and that the advance
parties of the German Air Force have already to the extent of
several thousands infiltrated themselves into Bulgarian aerodromes,
with the full connivance of the Bulgarian Government. It would
be natural for Hitler to make a strong threat against the British
Isles in order to occupy us here and cover his Eastern designs. The
forces at his disposal are, however, so large that he could carry
out both offensives at the same time. You may be sure we shall do
our best in both quarters.

I am most grateful to you for your splendid reception of Halifax
and for all you are doing to secure us timely help. It has been a
great pleasure to me to make friends with Hopkins, who has been
a great comfort and encouragement to everyone he has met. One
can easily see why he is so close to you. Colonel Donovan also has
done fine work in the Middle East.

All my respects and kindest regards. I hope you are already
better.

Here is the President’s letter:

The White House

Washington

January 20, 1941

Dear Churchill,

Wendell Willkie will give you this. He is truly helping to keep
politics out over here.

I think this verse applies to your people as it does to us:

“Sail on, O ship of State!

Sail on, O Union, strong and great!

Humanity with all its fears,

With all the hopes of future years,

Is hanging breathless on thy fate!”

As ever yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

These splendid lines from Longfellow’s “Building of the
Ship” were an inspiration.

* * * * *

It is not possible in a major war to divide military from
political affairs. At the summit they are one. It is natural that
soldiers should regard the military aspect as single and supreme,
and even that they should speak of political considerations with
a certain amount of disdain. Also the word “politics” has been
confused, and even tarnished, by its association with party
politics. Thus much of the literature of this tragic century is
biased by the idea that in war only military considerations count
and that soldiers are obstructed in their clear, professional view
by the intrusion of politicians, who for personal or party advantage
tilt the dread balances of battle. The extremely close,
intimate contacts which prevailed between the War Cabinet,
the Chiefs of Staff, and myself, and the total absence of party
feeling in Britain at this time, reduced these discords to a
minimum.

While the war with the Italians in Northeast Africa continued
to prosper, and while the Greeks in Albania had good
hopes of capturing Valona, all the news we got about the
German movements and intentions proved every day more
plainly that Hitler was about to intervene upon a large scale in
the Balkans and the Mediterranean. From the beginning of
January I had apprehended the arrival of German air power
in Sicily, with the consequent menace to Malta and to all our
hopes of resuming traffic through the Mediterranean. I also
feared they would set up an air station on Pantelleria, with all
the facilities this would give for a movement of German troops,
presumably armoured, into Tripoli. They did not, as it turned
out, think it necessary to occupy Pantelleria, but we could not
doubt that their plans were progressing to establish a north-and-south
passage through Italy to Africa, and at the same time
and by the same measures to interrupt all our movements east
and west in the Mediterranean.

On top of this now came the menace to the Balkan States,
including Greece and Turkey, of being enticed or coerced into
the Hitler empire, or conquered if they did not comply. Was
the same hideous process we had witnessed, in Norway, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, and France to be reproduced in
Southeast Europe? Were all the Balkan States, including heroic
Greece, to be subjugated one by one, and Turkey, isolated, to
be compelled to open for the German legions the road to
Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, and Persia? Was there no chance of
creating a Balkan unity and Balkan front which would make
this new German aggression too costly to be worth while?
Might not the fact of Balkan resistance to Germany produce
serious and helpful reactions in Soviet Russia? Certainly this
was a sphere in which the Balkan States were affected by
interest, and even, so far as they allowed it to influence their
calculations, by sentiment. Could we from our strained but
growing resources find the extra outside contribution which
might galvanise all these states, whose interests were largely the
same, into action for a common cause? Or ought we, on the
other hand, to mind our own business and make a success of
our campaign in Northeast Africa, let Greece, the Balkans, and
it might be Turkey and all else in the Middle East, slide to
ruin?

There would have been much mental relief in such a clear-cut
decision; and it has found its adherents in the books of
various officers occupying subordinate positions who have given
us their views. These writers certainly have the advantage of
pointing to the misfortunes which we sustained, but they had
not the knowledge to consider sufficiently what the results of
the opposite policy might have been. If Hitler had been able,
with hardly any fighting, to bring Greece to her knees and the
whole of the Balkans into his system and then force Turkey to
allow the passage of his armies to the south and east, might he
not have made terms with the Soviets upon the conquest and
partition of these vast regions and postponed his ultimate,
inevitable quarrel with them to a later part of his programme?
Or, as is more likely, would he not have been able to attack
Russia in greater strength at an earlier date? The main question
which the ensuing chapters will probe and expose is
whether His Majesty’s Government by their action influenced
in a decisive, or even in an appreciable manner, Hitler’s movements
in Southeast Europe, and moreover whether that action
did not produce consequences first upon the behaviour of
Russia and next upon her fortunes.

* * * * *

We had, as is set forth in the previous volume, already given
modest aid to Greece from the time when she was attacked by
Italy, and four British air squadrons were operating with some
success from Greek airfields. It is at this point worth while
seeing what was actually in progress on the German side.

On January 7 Ribbentrop informed the heads of the German
mission in Moscow:

Since early in January the movement of strong German troop
formations to Rumania has been going on via Hungary. The
movement of troops is being carried on with full concurrence of
the Hungarian and Rumanian Governments. For the time being
the troops will be quartered in the south of Rumania. The troop
movements result from the fact that the necessity must be seriously
contemplated of ejecting the English completely from the whole of
Greece. German troops have been provided in such strength that
they can easily cope with any military task in the Danubian region
and with any eventualities from any side. The military measures
being carried out by us are aimed exclusively against the British
forces getting a foothold in Greece, and not against any Balkan
country, including Turkey.

As for instructions for conversations, in general a reserved
attitude is to be taken. In case of urgent official inquiries it is to be
pointed out, depending on circumstances, that such inquiries are
to be made in Berlin. In so far as conversation cannot be avoided
an opinion in general terms is to be given. In so doing our having
reliable reports regarding larger and larger reinforcements of
English troops of all kinds in Greece may be given as a plausible
reason and the Salonika operation of the last World War may be
recalled.[1] Concerning the strength of the German troops, maintenance
of the present vagueness is desired for the time being. Later
on we shall presumably be interested in making known the full
strength of the troops, and, beyond that, in stimulating exaggeration.
The cue for that will be given at the proper time.

Also the same day to the German Ambassador in Japan:

I request that the Japanese Foreign Minister be personally and
confidentially informed that at present rather strong German troop
contingents are being transferred to Rumania. The movements
are carried on with the full concurrence of the Hungarian and the
Rumanian Governments. These troop shipments are being carried
out as a security measure for an intervention that may become
necessary in Greece if English military forces gain a foothold and
necessitate such intervention there.

Schulenburg, the German Ambassador at Moscow, replied
on January 8:

Numerous rumours are already circulating here concerning the
sending of German troops to Rumania; the number of men in the
movement is even estimated at two hundred thousand. Government
circles here, the radio, and the Soviet press have not yet
taken up the matter.

The Soviet Government will take the strongest interest in these
troop movements, and will wish to know what purposes these troop
concentrations serve, and particularly to what degree Bulgaria and
Turkey [Straits] might possibly be affected by them. Please give me
appropriate instructions.

The German Foreign Minister answered the same day.

Ribbentrop to Schulenburg

8 Jan. 41

I request you not to broach the question of increased German
troop movements to Rumania with the Soviet Government.

Should you be approached regarding the matter by Herr Molotov
or some other influential person in the Soviet Government, please
say that according to your information the sending of German
troops was exclusively a matter of precautionary military measures
against England. The English already had military contingents on
Greek soil, and it was to be expected that they would further increase
those contingents in the immediate future. Germany would
not under any circumstances tolerate England’s gaining a foothold
on Greek soil. Please do not go into greater detail until further
notice.

* * * * *

By the middle of January the Russians were deeply perturbed,
and raised the issue in Berlin. On January 17 the
Russian Ambassador called at the German Foreign Office and
communicated the substance of the following memorandum:

According to all reports, German troops in great numbers are in
Rumania, and are now prepared to march into Bulgaria, having
as their goal the occupation of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits.
There can be no doubt that England will try to forestall the operations
of German troops, to occupy the Straits, to start military
operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and turn
Bulgaria into a theatre of operations. The Soviet Government has
stated repeatedly to the German Government that it considers the
territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as the security zone of the
U.S.S.R., and that it cannot be indifferent to events which threaten
the security interests of the U.S.S.R. In view of all this the Soviet
Government regards it as its duty to give warning that it will consider
the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory
of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests
of the U.S.S.R.

On January 21 the Russian Ambassador was called to the
German Foreign Office and told that the Reich Government
had not received any reports that England contemplated occupying
the Straits. Nor did they believe that Turkey would
permit English military forces to enter her territory. However,
they were informed that England intended and was about to
gain a foothold on Greek territory. It was their unalterable
intention not to permit English military forces to establish
themselves on Greek territory, which would mean a threat to
vital interests of Germany in the Balkans. Certain troop concentrations
in the Balkans, which had the sole purpose of preventing
the British from gaining any foothold on Greek soil,
were therefore in progress. The Reich Government believed
that this action was also serving Soviet interests, which would
be opposed to England’s gaining a foothold in these regions.[2]

There for the moment the matter rested.

* * * * *

A few days later I addressed myself to the President of
Turkey.

Prime Minister to President Inönü, Angora

31 Jan. 41

The rapidly growing danger to Turkey and to British interests
leads me, Mr. President, to address you directly. I have sure information
that the Germans are already establishing themselves
upon Bulgarian aerodromes. Hutments are being prepared, and
advance servicing personnel numbering several thousands have
arrived. This has been done with the full connivance of the Royal
Bulgarian Air Force and undoubtedly of the Bulgarian Government.
Very soon, perhaps in a few weeks, the movement into
Bulgaria of German troops and air squadrons will begin. The air
squadrons will only have to fly from their stations in Rumania to
the bases they are preparing in Bulgaria, and will immediately be
able to come into action. Then, unless you promise the Germans
not to march against Bulgaria or against their troops passing
through Bulgaria, they will bomb Istanbul and Adrianople the
same night, and also dive-bomb your troops in Thrace. No doubt
they would hope either to reach Salonika unopposed or to compel
the Greeks to make peace with Italy and yield them air bases in
Greece and in the islands, thus endangering the communications
between our armies in Egypt and the Turkish Army. They would
deny the use of Smyrna to our Navy, they would completely control
the exits from the Dardanelles, and thus complete the encirclement
of Turkey in Europe on three sides. This would also facilitate
their attacks upon Alexandria and Egypt generally.

Of course I know, Mr. President, that, confronted with these
mortal dangers, Turkey would declare war. But why is it necessary
to hand over to the enemy the enormous advantage of being able
to secure the mastery of the Bulgarian airfields without a shot
being fired or a word being said?

Germany is in fact preparing to repeat on the frontiers of Turkey
the same manoeuvre as she accomplished on the frontiers of France
in April and May, 1940. But in this case, instead of hesitating and
overawed neutrals like Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, she has in
Bulgaria a confederate and former ally who has beyond all doubt
abandoned the will, and never had the power, to resist. All this, I
repeat, may fall upon us in February or in March, and all will be
open to the Germans even without moving any large masses of
troops from the moment when the Bulgarian airfields have been
fitted to receive the German Air Force and are occupied by the
advanced aircraft personnel and ground staff. Do we propose to sit
still with folded hands and watch the steady preparation of this
deadly stroke?

It seems to me that we should be held gravely blameworthy by
our respective nations if we were to fail in ordinary prudence and
foresight. Even now we have waited too long.

I therefore propose to you, Mr. President, that you and I should
repeat in defence of Turkey the same kind of measures which the
Germans are taking on the Bulgarian airfields. My Government
wish to send to Turkey at the earliest moment when accommodation
can be provided at least ten squadrons of fighter and bomber
aircraft, apart from the five now in action in Greece. If Greece
should surrender or be beaten down, we will transfer these other
five air squadrons to Turkish airfields, and, further, we will fight
the air war from Turkish bases with ever-increasing air forces of
the highest quality. Thus we shall help to give the Turkish Army
the additional air support which they need to sustain their famous
military qualities.

But, more than that, we shall place Turkey in a position, once our
squadrons are on the Turkish aerodromes, to threaten to bombard
the Rumanian oilfields if any German advance is made into
Bulgaria, or if the air personnel already in Bulgaria is not speedily
withdrawn. We will undertake not to take such action from
Turkish airfields except by agreement with you.

There is more to come. The attitude of Russia is uncertain, and
it is our hope it may remain loyal and friendly. Nothing will more
restrain Russia from aiding Germany, even indirectly, than the
presence of powerful British bombing forces which could [from
Turkey] attack the oilfields of Baku. Russia is dependent upon the
supply from these oilfields for a very large part of her agriculture,
and far-reaching famine would follow their destruction.

Thus Turkey, once defended by air power, would have the means
perhaps of deterring Germany from overrunning Bulgaria and
quelling Greece, and of counterbalancing the Russian fear of the
German armies. If this decisive position is to be saved there is
not an hour to lose, and on receipt of your assent His Majesty’s
Government will immediately give the necessary orders for our
advanced personnel, either in uniform or in plain clothes, as you
prefer, to start at once for Turkey.

Further, we are prepared to send you a hundred A.A. guns, which
are now either in or on their way to Egypt. These would be complete
with personnel, either in uniform, if you so desire, or in the
guise of instructors.

All other measures which have been discussed with Marshal
Chakmak, and also the naval measures, will at the right moment
be brought into operation.

The victories we have gained in Libya will enable us to give a
far more direct and immediate measure of aid to Turkey in the
event of our two countries becoming allied in war, and we will
make common cause with you and use our growing strength to aid
your valiant armies.

* * * * *

I also sent the following to the Chiefs of Staff:

Prime Ministry to C.O.S. Committee

31 Jan. 41

We must not overlook the decision we conveyed to General
Wavell, that once Tobruk was taken the Greek-Turkish situation
must have priority. The advance to Benghazi is most desirable, and
has been emphasised in later telegrams. Nevertheless, only forces
which do not conflict with European needs can be employed. As
the forecast is now that Benghazi cannot be captured till the end
of February, it is necessary that this should be impressed upon
General Wavell. For instance, the air support promised to Turkey
cannot be delayed till then. It may, however, be possible to
reconcile both objectives.

The Chiefs of Staff accordingly telegraphed to the Commanders-in-Chief
in the Middle East inviting their attention
to my message to President Inönü, and adding the following:

Steps to counter German infiltration into Bulgaria must now
have the highest priority. Advantage of going on to Benghazi and
thus securing Egypt and the fleet base in the Eastern Mediterranean
are fully realised, provided that it can be done without prejudice to
European interests. Its capture as soon as possible is, therefore, of
the highest importance. Your wish to take “Mandibles” [Rhodes]
is welcomed by us, and we have sent the three Glen ships to you at
the cost of paralysing for some months similar operations in the
Western Mediterranean. We did this in hope of preventing airborne
German air occupation of “Mandibles,” which would hamper
our communications with Turkey. We have asked you to speed this
operation as much as possible.

In conclusion we must repeat that the Graeco-Turkish situation
predominates and should have first place in your thoughts.

I understood at this time how perilous the position of Turkey
had become. It was obviously impossible to consider the treaty
we had made with her before the war as binding upon her in
the altered circumstances. When war had broken out in 1939,
the Turks had mobilised their strong, good, brave army. But
this was all based upon the conditions of the First Great War.
The Turkish infantry were as fine as they had ever been, and
their field artillery was presentable. But they had none of the
modern weapons which from May, 1940, were proved to be
decisive. Aviation was lamentably weak and primitive. They
had no tanks or armoured cars, and neither the workshops to
make and maintain them nor the trained men and staffs to
handle them. They had hardly any anti-aircraft or anti-tank
artillery. Their signal service was rudimentary. Radar was unknown
to them. Nor did their warlike qualities include any
aptitude for all these modern developments.

On the other hand, Bulgaria had been largely armed by
Germany out of the immense quantities of equipment of all
kinds taken from France and the Low Countries as a result
of the battles of 1940. The Germans had, therefore, plenty
of modern weapons with which to arm their allies. We, for our
part, having lost so much at Dunkirk, having to build up our
home army against invasion and to face all the continuous
pressure of the Blitz on our cities as well as maintain the war
in the Middle East, could only give very sparingly and at the
cost of other clamant needs. The Turkish army in Thrace was,
under these conditions, at a serious and almost hopeless disadvantage
compared with the Bulgarians. If to this danger
were added even moderate detachments of German air and
armour, the weight upon Turkey might well prove insupportable.

The only policy or hope throughout this phase of the ever-extending
war was in an organised plan of uniting the forces of
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey; and this we were now trying
to do. Our aid to Greece had been limited in the first place to
the few air squadrons which had been sent from Egypt when
Mussolini first attacked her. The next stage had been the
offer of the technical units set out in the Chiefs of Staff telegram,
which had been declined by the Greeks on grounds which
were by no means unreasonable. We now reach the third phase,
where it seemed possible to make a safe and secure desert flank
at and beyond Benghazi and concentrate the largest army of
manoeuvre or strategic reserve possible in Egypt.

3Blitz and Anti-Blitz, 1941: Hess

The Blitz Continues—Need to Estimate the German Air Strength—Differences
Among the Departments—Mr. Justice Singleton’s
Inquiry, December, 1940—His Report, January 21, 1941—German
Preparations to Invade Russia—And to Bomb and
Starve Us Out—Three Phases in the Blitz—Our Smoke-Screens
and Decoy Fires—The Luftwaffe Turns to the Ports, March
and April, 1941—My Visit to Bristol, April 12—We Continue
to Twist the Enemy’s Beams—Incendiary Attack on London,
May 10—Fires out of Control—The House of Commons Is
Destroyed—The German Air Fleet Moves to the East—We
Investigate German Radar Defence—The Battle of the Beams
Postponed—A Week-End at Ditchley—Unexpected and Fantastic
News—Rudolf Hess Lands in Scotland—A Guess at His
Motives—The German Explanation—Lord Simon’s Interview
with Him, June 10—A Vision of Hitler’s Mind—My Directions
About His Treatment—I Tell President Roosevelt—Stalin’s
Curiosity in 1944.

As the end of the year 1940 approached and the Blitz continued
to assail us, it seemed most necessary to peer into
the future and attempt to measure our ordeal. How much
longer and with what increase of severity must we expect the
night onslaughts on our factories and people to continue?
First we must form the most trustworthy estimate of the
German air strength, actual and relative, and of their programme
for 1941.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

2 Dec. 40

One cannot doubt that the Germans will be making tremendous
efforts to increase their air force this winter, and that a far more
serious attempt must be expected against us in the spring. It is
most necessary to form the best opinion possible about the
potential scale of the German increase (a) by March 31, (b) by
June 30—these dates not being arbitrary if other dates are more
convenient and equally illustrative. It is important not to exaggerate
the German capacity, and therefore the limiting factors—for
example, engines, special raw materials, pilot-training, effect of
our bombing—are of special interest. On the other hand, full
weight should be given to the German use of factories in the
captive countries.

I should be glad if your Intelligence Branch would let me have
a paper (not more than two or three sheets) upon this vital matter,
and it would be convenient if they could keep in touch with
Professor Lindemann while they are preparing this, so that we do
not have to argue about the various bases of calculations adopted.
While I want the report to be short, I want to be cognisant of the
data and reasoning processes on which it has been built up. I am
not sure to what extent the Ministry of Aircraft Production comes
into this. It would be a comfort if an agreed view could be presented
by the departments. Let me know how you will set about
this. One week is all that can be spared.

* * * * *

With the aid of Professor Lindemann and his Statistical
Branch I began to explore this obscure domain. We probed
the Air Ministry statements. We confronted them with the
quite separate figures and widely differing judgments of the
Ministry of Economic Warfare and of the Air Ministry Intelligence,
and with the views of the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
I let the argument rip healthily between the departments.
This is a very good way of finding out the truth. There
was a great deal of friendship and accord between the less senior
officers of these three departments, and I was very glad to convene
them all together one afternoon at Chequers. Both sides
produced their facts and figures, and each was tormented by
doubt. The evidence was so conflicting, and all the witnesses so
earnestly desirous of finding the truth, that I felt a judicial
mind, a keen, clear, unhampered brain, should sift and weigh.
Accordingly I persuaded all concerned to give their best to a
factual inquiry by an eminent judge.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

9 Dec. 40

I spent four hours on Saturday with the officers of the Air
Ministry Intelligence Branch and those of the Ministry of Economic
Warfare. I have not been able to reach a conclusion as to which are
right. Probably the truth lies midway between them. The subject
is of capital importance to the whole future picture we make to
ourselves of the war. It would also influence the use we make of
our forces in the meanwhile. I am most anxious that the two
branches mentioned, whose officers are in the most friendly relations,
should sit together in an inquiry to sift the evidence and
ascertain the facts. There should be an impartial chairman accustomed
to weigh evidence and to cross-examine, and I wondered
whether for this purpose Mr. Justice Singleton, who had war experience
as a gunner and recently conducted an inquiry for me into
bomb-sights, would not be able to guide the discussions and throw
a valuable light on the obscurities of this all-important scene. He
would, of course, have to be given all the available information.
Before taking any decision I should like to have your views. Meanwhile
I have set out a statement of what I learned in our discussion
on Saturday, as something for the departments to bite on. Every
fact in it is open to question, modification, or offset. I have sent
a copy to each branch, and it would form the staple of the investigations
I contemplate.

I composed this statement myself, and it took a good many
hours’ concentration. As it is somewhat technical, I print it in
Appendix D where it should be read by those who wish to
probe the question at issue.[1]

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air

13 Dec. 40

Out of the estimated monthly German aircraft production of
1800 machines, the Intelligence Branch of the Air Ministry consider
that only 400 are provided for training. This seems very few,
considering that the Air Ministry’s view is that the Germans are
maintaining about two and a half times our strength in the front
lines. Alternatively, if the Air Ministry’s requirement of trainers is
warranted, and it our trainers are not profusely and unthriftily
used, and [if] large numbers [are not] kept about the aerodromes
in an unserviceable state, the German front-line strength cannot
well be maintained on such a small proportion of trainers.

Mr. Justice Singleton is coming to lunch with me on Sunday,
and I will set him to work on the inquiry on which we are agreed.

* * * * *

Mr. Justice Singleton got on famously with the airmen and
other experts. On January 21 he presented me with his final
report. It was most difficult to compare British and German
air strengths in actual figures. Each side divided its air force
into authorised establishments, total aircraft, “operationally
fit,” and “front line.” These categories were different,
arbitrary, and variable. Moreover, the Royal Air Force was
divided between home and overseas, while at this moment
the Germans were all at home. I do not therefore baffle the
reader with disputable statistics. The Judge concluded that
the strength of the German Air Force, compared with the
British, might be taken as roughly four to three. Although
the Air Ministry (Intelligence) still thought the Germans
had more and the Ministry of Economic Warfare that they
had less, there was a considerable measure of agreement, and
the Singleton estimate became our working basis. I was encouraged
by his report, which showed that we were steadily
overhauling the Germans in the air. At the beginning of the
Battle of France they were at least more than double. Now
they were reported as only four to three. After the war we
learnt that it was actually nearer three to two. This was a great
improvement. We had not yet reached our full rate of expansion,
nor had we received the great wave of American help
which was on the way.

* * * * *

At the end of 1940, Hitler had realised that Britain could
not be destroyed by direct air assault. The Battle of Britain
had been his first defeat, and the malignant bombing of the
cities had not cowed the nation or its Government. The
preparations to invade Russia in the early summer of 1941
absorbed much of the German air power. The many very
severe raids which we suffered till the end of May no longer
represented the full strength of the enemy. To us they were
most grievous, but they were no longer the prime thought
either of the German High Command or of the Fuehrer. To
Hitler the continuance of the air attack on Great Britain was a
necessary and convenient cover to the concentration against
Russia. His optimistic time-table assumed that the Soviets,
like the French, would be overthrown in a six-weeks campaign
and that all German forces would then be free for the final
overthrow of Britain in the autumn of 1941. Meanwhile the
obstinate nation was to be worn down, first, by the combination
of the U-boat blockade sustained by the long-range air, and
secondly, by air attacks upon her cities and especially her ports.
For the German Army “Sea Lion” (against Britain) was now
replaced by “Barbarossa” (against Russia). The German Navy
was instructed to concentrate on our Atlantic traffic and the
German Air Force on our harbours and their approaches. This
was a far more deadly plan than the indiscriminate bombing
of London and the civil population, and it was fortunate for
us that it was not pursued with all available forces and greater
persistence.

* * * * *

Viewed in retrospect, the Blitz of 1941 falls into three phases.
In the first, during January and February, the enemy were
frustrated by bad weather, and, apart from attacks on Cardiff,
Portsmouth, and Swansea, our Civil Defence Services gained a
well-deserved breathing-space, by which they did not fail to
profit. A system of Port Emergency Committees, representing
all the main interests concerned in port organisation, had been
set up long before the war by the Committee of Imperial
Defence. Sharpened by the hard experience of the winter of
1940, and aided by the readiness of the Ministry of War
Transport to decentralise, these bodies were now able to conduct
the struggle very much more efficiently themselves, and
could rely with confidence on outside assistance through the
regional commissioners. Nor were more active methods of
defence neglected. Smoke-screens, highly unpopular with the
local inhabitants whose homes they contaminated, were prepared,
and later proved their worth in protecting Midland
industrial centres. Decoy fires, or “starfish,” were made ready
for the distraction of enemy bombers, and the whole defensive
plan was knit together into one coherent system.

When better weather came, the Blitz started in earnest over
again. The second phase, sometimes called “the Luftwaffe’s
tour of the ports,” began in early March. It consisted of single
or double attacks, which, though serious, failed to cripple our
harbours. On the eighth and for three succeeding nights
Portsmouth was heavily attacked and the dockyards damaged.
Manchester and Salford were attacked on the eleventh. On
the ensuing nights it was the turn of Merseyside. On the thirteenth
and fourteenth the Luftwaffe fell for the first time
heavily on the Clyde, killing or injuring over two thousand
people and putting the shipyards out of action, some till June
and others till November. At John Brown’s Shipbuilding
Works large fires caused stoppages, and normal production was
only restored in April. This firm had been affected since
March 6 by an extensive strike. Most of the strikers had been
bombed out of their homes, but the raid sufferings and peril
brought them back to eager duty. Merseyside, the Midlands,
Essex, and London all had another dose before the month
was out.

The heaviest blows did not fall till April. On the eighth the
concentration was on Coventry, and in the rest of the country
the sharpest impact was at Portsmouth. London had heavy
attacks on the sixteenth and seventeenth; over twenty-three
hundred people were killed, more than three thousand seriously
injured. In this third and final phase the enemy went on
trying to destroy most of our principal ports by attacks prolonged
in some cases over a whole week. Plymouth was attacked
from April 21 to 29, and though decoy fires helped to save
the dockyard, this was only at the expense of the city. The
climax came on May 1, when Liverpool and the Mersey were
attacked for seven successive nights. Seventy-six thousand
people were made homeless and three thousand killed or
injured. Sixty-nine out of a hundred and forty-four berths
were put out of action, and the tonnage landed for a while was
cut to a quarter. Had the enemy persisted, the Battle of the
Atlantic would have been even more closely run than it was.
But as usual he turned away. For two nights he battered Hull
heavily, where forty thousand people had their dwellings destroyed,
the food stores were wrecked, and the marine engineering
works were crippled for nearly two months. In that month
he struck again at Belfast, already twice raided.

* * * * *

On April 12, as Chancellor of Bristol University, I conferred
the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws on Mr. Winant, the
United States Ambassador, on Dr. J. B. Conant, President of
Harvard University, and on Mr. Menzies, Prime Minister of
Australia. My wife came with me. Our train lay for the night
in a siding in the open country, but we could see and hear the
heavy air raid on the city of Bristol. We pulled into the station
early in the morning and went straight to the hotel. There I
met a number of dignitaries, and almost immediately started
on a tour of the most stricken parts of the town. The Air Raid
Services were feverishly at work and people were still being
dug out of the ruins. The ordeal had been severe, but the
spirit of the citizens was invincible. At one of the rest centres
a number of old women whose homes had been wrecked and
who still seemed stunned were sitting there, the picture of
dejection. When I came in they wiped away their tears and
cheered wildly for King and Country.

The ceremony went forward as planned. I spent an hour
driving round the worst hit places, and then repaired to the
University. Everything proceeded with strict formality, but
the large building next to the University was still burning and
the bright academic robes of some of the principal actors did
not conceal the soaked and grimy uniforms of their night’s toil.
The whole scene was moving.

Many of those here today [I said] have been all night at their
posts, and all have been under the fire of the enemy in heavy and
protracted bombardment. That you should gather in this way is a
mark of fortitude and phlegm, of a courage and detachment from
material affairs, worthy of all that we have learned to believe of
ancient Rome or of modern Greece.

I go about the country whenever I can escape for a few hours or
for a day from my duty at headquarters, and I see the damage done
by the enemy attacks; but I also see, side by side with the devastation
and amid the ruins, quiet, confident, bright, and smiling eyes,
beaming with a consciousness of being associated with a cause far
higher and wider than any human or personal issue. I see the
spirit of an unconquerable people. I see a spirit bred in freedom,
nursed in a tradition which has come down to us through the
centuries, and which will surely at this moment, this turning-point
in the history of the world, enable us to bear our part in such a
way that none of our race who come after us will have any reason
to cast reproach upon their sires.

* * * * *

Meanwhile the Wizard War was unfolding in its own strange
way. The forging of its first new weapons has already found
mention in an earlier volume.[2] The plans for the air defence
of Great Britain had, as early as the autumn of 1937, been
rewritten round the assumption that the promises made by our
scientists for the still unproven radar would be kept. The first
five stations of the coastal radar chain, the five guarding the
Thames Estuary, had watched Mr. Chamberlain’s aeroplane
go and come on its peace missions of September, 1938.
Eighteen stations from Dundee to Portsmouth began in the
spring of 1939 a twenty-four-hour watch, not to be interrupted
in the next six years. These stations were the watchdogs of the
air-raid warning service; they spared us alike grave losses in war
production and intolerable burdens on our civil defence
workers. They spared the anti-aircraft gun crews needless and
tiring hours at action stations. They saved us from the exhaustion
of man and machine that would have doomed our
matchless but slender fighter force had it been compelled to
maintain standing patrols. They could not give the accuracy
required for night-time interception, but they enabled the day
fighters to await their prey at the most favourable altitudes and
aspects for attack. In their decisive contribution to victory in
the day battles they were supported and supplemented by other
stations of new technical design,[3] which gave warning—all too
brief, but invaluable—of the approach of the low fliers.

* * * * *

During 1941 we went on deflecting the German beams
despite their various improvements. An example may be cited.
On the night of May 8 the Germans planned two attacks, the
first upon the Rolls-Royce Works at Derby and the second on
Nottingham. Through our interference with their beams,
which were set upon Derby, they bombed instead Nottingham,
where small fires were still burning from the previous night.
Their original error then carried their second attack to the Vale
of Belvoir, about as far from Nottingham as Nottingham is
from Derby. The German communiqué claimed the destruction
of the Rolls-Royce Works at Derby, which they never got
near. Two hundred and thirty high-explosive bombs and a
large number of incendiaries were, however, unloaded in the
open country. The total casualties there were two chickens.

The worst attack was the last. On May 10 the enemy returned
to London with incendiary bombs. He lit more than
two thousand fires, and, by the smashing of nearly a hundred
and fifty water mains, coupled with the low tide in the Thames,
he stopped us putting them out. At six o’clock next morning
hundreds were reported as out of control, and four were still
going on the night of the thirteenth. It was the most destructive
attack of the whole night Blitz. Five docks and seventy-one key-points,
half of which were factories, had been hit. All but one
of the main railway stations were blocked for weeks, and the
through routes were not fully opened till early June. Over
three thousand people were killed or injured. In other respects
also it was historic. It destroyed the House of Commons. One
single bomb created ruin for years. We were, however, thankful
that the Chamber was empty. On the other hand, our
batteries and night fighters destroyed sixteen enemy planes, the
maximum we had yet attained in night fighting, and largely the
fruits of our winter’s toil in the Wizard War.

This, though we did not know it, was the enemy’s parting
fling. On May 22 Kesselring shifted the headquarters of his
air fleet to Posen, and at the beginning of June the whole force
was moved to the east. Nearly three years were to pass before
our Civil Defence organisation in London had to deal with the
“baby Blitz” of February, 1944, and the later onslaught of the
rockets and the flying bombs. In the twelve months from
June, 1940, to June, 1941, our civilian casualties were 43,381
killed and 50,856 seriously injured, a total of 94,237.

Except for their radar aids to anti-aircraft gunnery the enemy
had hitherto concentrated on offensive devices like the beams,
and 1941 was far spent before they felt the need of looking after
themselves. In Britain, of course, we had trusted to our large
and costly navigation schools for finding our targets, and
thought of radar primarily for self-preservation. After the
beams had been mastered and as things got better generally, we
studied German radar for the purpose of removing obstacles
to our hitting back. In February, 1941, we found and photographed
for the first time a German radar station for detecting
aircraft, and almost at once we picked up its transmissions.
Having found this specimen near Cherbourg, we searched for
others like it along the western coastline of occupied Europe
by photographic reconnaissance and secret agents. By the
middle of 1941, the Royal Air Force was seeking to make heavy
night attacks on Germany. To do this we had to know all about
their defensive devices. These were likely to depend, as ours
did, largely upon radar. From a study of German radar on the
coast we gradually worked our way back to the German night-fighter
defences. These stretched in a great belt running from
Schleswig-Holstein through Northwest Germany and Holland
to the Franco-Belgian frontier. But neither our new measures
nor those of the enemy played a great part during the latter
months of 1941. The German bomber force had been hopefully
scheduled to begin its return from Russia six weeks after the
invasion. Had it returned, it would have been supported in its
attack, on Britain by many new beam stations with more powerful
transmitters along the Channel coast to help it bludgeon its
way through the English jamming. It would have encountered
many new transmitters on our side to distort and divert the new
beams, as well as greatly improved radar on our night fighters.
The ever-spreading character of the Russian entanglement prevented
this new battle of the beams, and the great radio efforts
on both sides remained for the time being unused.

* * * * *

On Sunday, May 11, I was spending the week-end at
Ditchley. After dinner news arrived of the heavy air raid on
London. There was nothing that I could do about it, so I
watched the Marx Brothers in a comic film which my hosts
had arranged. I went out twice to inquire about the air raid,
and heard it was bad. The merry film clacked on, and I was
glad of the diversion. Presently a secretary told me that the
Duke of Hamilton wished to speak to me from Scotland. The
Duke was a personal friend of mine, but I could not think of
any business he might have with me which could not wait till
the morning. However, he pressed to speak with me, saying it
was an urgent matter of Cabinet importance. I asked Mr.
Bracken to hear what he had to say. After a few minutes he
came back with the news, “Hess has arrived in Scotland.” I
thought this was fantastic. The report, however, was true. As
the night advanced, confirmatory messages arrived. There was
no doubt that Hess, the Deputy Fuehrer, Reich Minister without
Portfolio, Member of the Ministerial Council for the Defence
of the Reich, Member of the Secret Cabinet Council for
Germany, and the Leader of the Nazi Party, had landed alone
by parachute near the Duke of Hamilton’s estate west of Scotland.

Piloting his own plane and dressed as a flight lieutenant of
the Luftwaffe, he had flown from Augsburg and baled out. At
first he gave his name as “Horn,” and it was not till after his
reception at a military hospital near Glasgow, where he had
been brought for minor injuries caused by his drop, that it was
learned who he was. He was soon removed by various stages
to the Tower, and thence to other places of captivity in this
country, and remained here till October 6, 1945, when in the
cells of Nuremberg he rejoined such of his colleagues as had
survived the war and were being tried for their lives by the
conquerors.

I never attached any serious importance to this escapade.
I knew it had no relation to the march of events. Throughout
Britain, the United States, Russia, and above all Germany,
there was a profound sensation, and books have been written
about it all. I shall merely set down here what I believe to be
the true story.

* * * * *

Rudolf Hess was a good-looking, youngish man to whom
Hitler took a fancy, and who became an intimate member
of his personal staff. He worshipped the Fuehrer, and felt
passionately about the world issue at stake. He dined at Hitler’s
table, often alone or with two or three. He knew and was
capable of understanding Hitler’s inner mind—his hatred of
Soviet Russia, his lust to destroy Bolshevism, his admiration
for Britain and earnest wish to be friends with the British
Empire, his contempt for most other countries. No one knew
Hitler better or saw him more often in his unguarded moments.
With the coming of actual war there was a change. Hitler’s
meal-time company grew perforce. Generals, admirals, diplomats,
high functionaries, were admitted from time to time to
this select circle of arbitrary power. The Deputy Fuehrer found
himself in eclipse. What were party demonstrations now? This
was a time for deeds, not for antics.

We must discount to some extent the merits of his action
by a certain strain of jealousy which affected his nature at
finding that under war conditions he no longer played his
old part of friendly confidant with the beloved Fuehrer. Here,
he felt, are all these generals and others who must be admitted
to the Fuehrer’s intimacy, and crowd his table. They have their
parts to play. But I, Rudolf, by a deed of superb devotion will
surpass them all and bring to my Fuehrer a greater treasure
and easement than all of them put together. I will go and make
peace with Britain. My life is nothing. How glad I am to have
a life to cast away for such a hope! Such moods, however naïve,
were certainly neither wicked nor squalid.

Hess’s idea of the European scene was that England had been
wrested from her true interests and policy of friendship with
Germany, and above all from alliance against Bolshevism, by
the warmongers, of whom Churchill was the superficial manifestation.
If only he, Rudolf, could get at the heart of Britain
and make its King believe how Hitler felt towards her, the
malign forces that now ruled in this ill-starred island and had
brought so many needless miseries upon it would be swept
away. How could Britain survive? France was gone. The
U-boats would soon destroy all sea communications; the
German air attack would overpower British industry and beat
down British cities.

But to whom should he turn? There was the Duke of Hamilton
who had been known to the son of his political adviser Karl Haushofer.
He had met him at the Olympic Games. He knew
also that the Duke of Hamilton was Lord Steward. A personage
like that would probably be dining every night with the King
and have his private ear. Here was a channel of direct access.

* * * * *

“It seemed,” said a German press notice a few days later,
“that Party Member Hess lived in a state of hallucination, as a
result of which he felt he would bring about an understanding
between England and Germany. . . . The National Socialist
Party regrets that this idealist fell a victim to his hallucination.
This, however, will have no effect on the continuance of the
war which has been forced on Germany.” For Hitler the
event was embarrassing. It was as if my trusted colleague, the
Foreign Secretary, who was only a little younger than Hess, had
parachuted from a stolen Spitfire into the grounds of Berchtesgaden.
The Nazis no doubt found some relief in arresting
Hess’s adjutants.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

13 May 41

On the whole it will be more convenient to treat him [Herr
Hess] as a prisoner of war, under the War Office and not the Home
Office; but also as one against whom grave political charges may
be preferred. This man, like other Nazi leaders, is potentially a war
criminal, and he and his confederates may well be declared outlaws
at the close of the war. In this case his repentance would stand
him in good stead.

2. In the meanwhile he should be strictly isolated in a convenient
house not too far from London, and every endeavour should
be made to study his mentality and get anything worth while out
of him.

3. His health and comfort should be ensured, food, books, writing
materials, and recreation being provided for him. He should not
have any contacts with the outer world or visitors except as prescribed
by the Foreign Office. Special guardians should be appointed.
He should see no newspapers and hear no wireless. He
should be treated with dignity, as if he were an important general
who had fallen into our hands.

Prime Minister to Sir Alexander Cadogan

16 May 41

Please make now a fairly full digest of the conversational parts
of Hess’s three interviews, stressing particularly the points mentioned
by me in the statement I prepared [for the House] but did
not deliver. I will then send this to President Roosevelt with a
covering telegram.

2. I approved the War Office proposal to bring Hess to the
Tower by tonight pending his place of confinement being prepared
at Aldershot.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

17 May 41

Foreign Office representative has had three interviews with Hess.

At first interview, on night of May 11-12, Hess was extremely
voluble, and made long statement with the aid of notes. First part
recapitulated Anglo-German relations during past thirty years or
so, and was designed to show that Germany had always been in
the right and England in the wrong. Second part emphasised
certainty of German victory, due to development in combination
of submarine and air weapons, steadiness of German morale, and
complete unity of German people behind Hitler. Third part outlined
proposals for settlement. Hess said that the Fuehrer had
never entertained any designs against the British Empire, which
would be left intact save for the return of former German colonies,
in exchange for a free hand for him in Europe. But condition was
attached that Hitler would not negotiate with present Government
in England. This is the old invitation to us to desert all our friends
in order to save temporarily the greater part of our skin.

Foreign Office representative asked him whether when he spoke
of Hitler having a free hand in Europe he included Russia in
Europe or in Asia. He replied, “In Asia.” He added, however,
that Germany had certain demands to make of Russia which would
have to be satisfied, but denied rumours that attack on Russia was
being planned.

Impression created by Hess was that he had made up his mind
that Germany must win the war, but saw that it would last a long
time and involve much loss of life and destruction. He seemed to
feel that if he could persuade people in this country that there was
a basis for a settlement, that might bring the war to an end and
avert unnecessary suffering.

At second interview, on fourteenth May, Hess made two further
points:

(1) In any peace settlement Germany would have to support
Rashid Ali and secure eviction of British from Iraq.

(2) U-boat war with air co-operation would be carried on till
all supplies to these islands were cut off. Even if these islands
capitulated and the Empire continued to fight, the blockade of Britain
would continue, even if that meant that the last inhabitant of
Britain died of starvation.

* * * * *

At third interview, on May 15, nothing much emerged save
incidentally some rather disparaging remarks about your country
and the degree of assistance that you will be able to furnish to us.
I am afraid, in particular, he is not sufficiently impressed by what
he thinks he knows of your aircraft types and production.

Hess seems in good health and not excited, and no ordinary
signs of insanity can be detected. He declares that this escapade
is his own idea and that Hitler was unaware of it beforehand.
If he is to be believed, he expected to contact members of a
“peace movement” in England, which he would help to oust the
present Government. If he is honest and if he is sane this is an
encouraging sign of ineptitude of German Intelligence Service.
He will not be ill-treated, but it is desirable that the press should
not romanticise him and his adventure. We must not forget that he
shares responsibility for all Hitler’s crimes and is a potential war
criminal whose fate must ultimately depend upon the decision of
the Allied Governments.

Mr. President, all the above is for your own information. Here
we think it best to let the press have a good run for a bit and keep
the Germans guessing. The German officer prisoners of war here
were greatly perturbed by the news, and I cannot doubt that there
will be deep misgivings in the German armed forces about what
he may say.

Hess’s own explanations to the doctors were hardly more
illuminating. On May 22 his doctor reported as follows:

He said he was horrified at the heavy air raids on London in 1940,
and loathed the thought of killing young children and their
mothers. This feeling was intensified when he contemplated his
own wife and son, and led to the idea of flying to Britain and
arranging peace with the large anti-war faction which he thought
existed in this country. He stressed that personal advantage played
no part in this scheme—it was an increasing idealistic urge.[4]

It was with such thoughts in his mind that he was impressed on
hearing his astrologer or fortune-teller, Haushofer, express similar
sentiments, and mention the Duke of Hamilton as a person of
common sense, who must be horrified at this senseless slaughter.
Haushofer had also remarked that he had seen Hess on three occasions
in a dream piloting an aeroplane he knew not where. Hess
took these remarks, coming from such a man, as a message to fly to
this country as an emissary of peace, to seek the Duke of Hamilton,
who would conduct him to King George. The British Government
would be thrown out of office and a party desiring peace installed
in its place. He was insistent that he would have no dealings with
that “clique”—the ruling Administration—who would do all in
their power to thwart him, but he was very vague as to what statesmen
would replace them, and seemed to be extremely ill-informed
as to the names and standing of our politicians. . . . He described
how he approached Willi Messerschmidt and obtained facilities for
long-distance flying inside Germany in training for the event, and
how when he was prepared he set out on his voyage. He maintained
that there were no confederates, and that he showed considerable
skill in arranging his journey, working out the route
himself, and flying with an accuracy which enabled him to land
only some ten miles from his destination, Dungavel.[5]

* * * * *

The Cabinet invited Lord Simon to interview him, and on
June 10 a meeting took place. “When the Fuehrer,” said Hess,
“had come to the conclusion that common sense could not
prevail in England, he acted just according to the rule of conduct
of Admiral Lord Fisher: ‘Moderation in war is folly. If
you strike, strike hard and wherever you can.’ But I can confirm
that it was indeed always difficult for the Fuehrer to give
orders for these [air and U-boat] attacks. It pained him deeply.
He was constantly in full sympathy with the English people
who were victims of this method of waging war. . . . He said
that even if victorious one should not impose any severe conditions
on a country with which it was desired to come to an
agreement.” Then, the keynote for Hess: “I thought that if
England once knew of this fact it might be possible that England
on her part would be ready for agreement.” If only
England knew how kind Hitler really was, surely she would
meet his wishes!

* * * * *

Much learned medical investigation has been devoted to
Hess’s mental state. Certainly he was a neurotic, a split soul
seeking peace in the pursuit of power and position and in the
worship of a leader. But he was more than a medical case. He
believed passionately in his vision of Hitler’s mind. If only
England could share it too, how much suffering could be saved
and how easy it would be to agree! A free hand for Germany
in Europe and for Britain in her own Empire! Other minor
conditions were the return of the German colonies, the evacuation
of Iraq, and an armistice and peace with Italy. As it was,
England’s position was hopeless. If she did not agree to these
conditions, “sooner or later the day will come when she will
be forced to accede to them.” To this Lord Simon replied:
“I do not think that that particular argument will be very good
for the British Cabinet, because, you know, there is a good deal
of courage in this country, and we are not very fond of threats!”

Considering how closely Hess was knit to Hitler, it is surprising
that he did not know of, or that if he knew he did not
disclose, the impending attack on Russia, for which such vast
preparations were being made. The Soviet Government were
deeply intrigued by the Hess episode, and they wove many
distorted theories around it. Three years later, when I was in
Moscow on my second visit, I realised the fascination which this
topic had for Stalin. He asked me at the dinner table what was
the truth about the Hess mission. I said shortly what I have
written here. I had the feeling that he believed there had been
some deep negotiation or plot for Germany and Britain to act
together in the invasion of Russia which had miscarried. Remembering
what a wise man he is, I was surprised to find him
silly on this point. When the interpreter made it plain that he
did not believe what I said, I replied through my interpreter,
“When I make a statement of facts within my knowledge I
expect it to be accepted.” Stalin received this somewhat abrupt
response with a genial grin. “There are lots of things that
happen even here in Russia which our Secret Service do not
necessarily tell me about.” I let it go at that.

* * * * *

Reflecting upon the whole of this story, I am glad not to be
responsible for the way in which Hess has been and is being
treated. Whatever may be the moral guilt of a German who
stood near to Hitler, Hess had, in my view, atoned for this by
his completely devoted and frantic deed of lunatic benevolence.
He came to us of his own free will, and, though without
authority, had something of the quality of an envoy. He was a
medical and not a criminal case, and should be so regarded.

The Mediterranean War

Vital Importance of Malta—Admiral Keyes’s Plan to Take
Pantelleria—Its Postponement—Naval Encounter with the
German Air Force, January 10—The Aircraft-Carrier
“Illustrious” Disabled—“Southampton” Sunk and “Gloucester”
Damaged—Air Reinforcements for Malta—Determined German
Attacks on the Island—Governor Dobbie—Admiral
Somerville’s Raid on Genoa, February 9—Need for Carrier-Borne
Fast Fighter Aircraft—Reinforcement of the Malta
Garrison—Activities and Successes of Our Submarines—An
Enemy Convoy Annihilated—Capture of Benghazi, February 6—Conquest
of Cyrenaica Complete—The Eden-Dill Mission to
the Middle East—My Telegram to General Wavell of February
12—His Reply—Foreign Secretary’s Instructions—Telegram
to General Smuts, February 15—I Take Charge of the Foreign
Office—My Telegram to Mr. Eden, February 20—Mr. Eden’s
Simultaneous Message—Menace of Mines to the Suez Canal—Mr.
Eden’s Report of February 21—He Goes to Athens—His
Report of February 22—Greece Will Fight On—She Accepts
Offer of British Troops—War Cabinet in Favour of Sending an
Army to Greece—The Inscrutable Future.

Since the days of Nelson, Malta has stood a faithful British
sentinel guarding the narrow and vital sea corridor
through the Central Mediterranean. Its strategic importance
was never higher than in this the latest war. The needs of the
large armies we were building up in Egypt made the free
passage of the Mediterranean for our convoys and the stopping
of enemy reinforcements to Tripoli aims of the highest consequence.
At the same time the new air weapon struck a deadly
blow, not only at Malta but at the effective assertion of British
sea power in these narrow waters. Without this modern
danger our task would have been simple. We could have moved
freely about the Mediterranean and stopped all other traffic.
It was now impossible to base the main Fleet on Malta. The
island itself was exposed to the threat of invasion from the
Italian ports, as well as to constant and measureless air attack.
Hostile air power also imposed almost prohibitive risks upon
the passage of our convoys through the Narrows, condemning
us to the long haul round the Cape. At the same time the
superior air force of the enemy enabled them, by deterring our
warships from acting fully in the Central Mediterranean except
at much loss and hazard, to maintain a rivulet of troops and
supplies into Tripoli.

About 140 miles from Malta, in the throat of the western
Narrows between Sicily and Tunis, lay the Italian island of
Pantelleria, reputed strongly fortified and with an invaluable
airfield. This place was important to the enemy’s route to
Tunis and Tripoli, and in our hands would markedly expand
the air cover we could give around Malta. In September, 1940,
I had asked Admiral Keyes to make a plan for seizing
Pantelleria with the newly formed commandos. The idea was
to attach two or three troopships to the tail of one of our heavily
guarded convoys. While the main body was engaging the
enemy’s attention these would drop off in the darkness and
storm the island by surprise. The project, which was called
“Workshop,” gained increasing support from the Chiefs of
Staff. Keyes was ardent, and claimed to lead the assault in
person, waiving his rank as an Admiral of the Fleet.

In my circle we did not deem the actual capture too hard
to try, but the difficulties of holding the prize while we were
already hard pressed in Malta caused misgivings. Nevertheless,
on December 28, 1940, I issued the following minute:

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

Constant reflection has made me feel the very high value of
“Workshop,” provided that a thoroughly good plan can be made
and it is given a chance. The effect of “Workshop,” if successful,
would be electrifying, and would greatly increase our strategic hold
upon the Central Mediterranean. It is also a most important step
to opening the Narrows to the passage of trade and troop convoys,
whereby so great an easement to our shipping could be obtained.
Urgency is supplied by the danger that the Germans, if they take
over Italy, will take over “Workshop” island and make it a very
difficult proposition both for nuisance value and against assault.

The Chiefs of Staff set to work on the problem at once, and
I returned to the charge in the New Year.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

13 Jan. 41

The effective arrival of German aviation in Sicily may be the
beginning of evil developments in the Central Mediterranean. The
successful dive-bombing attacks upon Illustrious and the two
cruisers show the need for having these ships fitted with aerial mine-throwers.
I do not know why Illustrious could not have had a
couple. The improved naval pattern of aerial mine should be
pressed on with to the utmost. The need for high-speed aircraft to
catch dive-bombers out at sea seems very great. Surely we ought
to try to put half a dozen Grummans on Formidable before she
goes into the Mediterranean.

2. I am very apprehensive of the Germans establishing themselves
in Pantelleria, in which case with a strong force of dive-bombers
they will close the Narrows. I fear this may be another
example of the adage “A stitch in time saves nine.”

3. It is necessary now that “Workshop” should be reviewed. It
has become far more urgent, and also at the same time more difficult,
and once the Germans are installed there it will become more
difficult still. I should be glad if revised and perfected plans could
be ready by today week. Plans should also be made to find an
opportunity at the earliest moment. The question of whether to
try it or not can only be settled after these matters of method and
timing have been satisfactorily disposed of.

4. I remain completely of opinion that “Workshop” is cardinal.

All agreements were obtained, but with our other affairs we
could not meet the date at the end of January at which we had
aimed. At a conference at Chequers on the morning of January
18, I agreed with the First Sea Lord and the other Chiefs of Staff
to put it off for a month. I think I could have turned the
decision the other way, but, like the others, I was constrained
by the pressure of larger business, and also by talk about the
commandos not being yet fully trained. Keyes, who was not
present, was bitterly disappointed. The delay proved fatal to
the plan. Long before the month had passed, the German Air
Force arrived in Sicily, and all wore a very different complexion.
There is no doubt about the value of the prize we did not gain.
Had we been in occupation of Pantelleria in 1942 many fine
ships that were lost in our convoys, which we then fought
through to Malta, might have been saved, and the enemy communications
with Tripoli still further impaired. On the other
hand, we might well have been overpowered by German air
attack, lost our vantage, and complicated our defence of Malta
in the interval.

I felt acutely the need of Pantelleria. But our hour had
passed. Too much was upon us from many quarters. It was not
till May, 1943, after the destruction of the German and Italian
armies in Tunis, that, under a heavy bombardment, Pantelleria
was taken by a British landing force at the order of General
Eisenhower. We were then all-powerful in this theatre, and
though the task was deemed very serious beforehand there was
no loss.

* * * * *

Our first serious naval encounter with the German Air Force
occurred on January 10. The Fleet was engaged in covering a
series of important movements, including the passage of a
convoy through the Central Mediterranean from the west, the
replenishment of Malta from the east, and various minor
shipping movements to Greece. Early that morning the destroyer
Gallant was mined in the Malta Channel while attending
on the battle fleet. Presently shadowing aircraft appeared,
and in the afternoon the severe attack of the German bombers
began. Their efforts were concentrated on the new carrier
Illustrious, under Captain Boyd, and in three attacks she was hit
six times with big bombs. Heavily damaged and on fire, with
eighty-three killed and sixty seriously wounded, she successfully
fought back, thanks to her armoured deck, and her aircraft
destroyed at least five assailants. That night, under increasing
air attack, and with disabled steering gear, Captain Boyd
brought the Illustrious into Malta.

During the night Admiral Cunningham with the battle fleet
escorted the east-bound convoy south of Malta unmolested.
The next day the cruisers Southampton and Gloucester, by
then well to the east of Malta, were hit by dive-bombers
approaching unobserved down sun. The Gloucester was only
slightly damaged by a bomb which failed to explode, but the
Southampton was struck in the engine-room. A fire started
which could not be controlled, and the ship had to be abandoned
and was sunk. Thus, although the convoys passed on
safely to their destinations the cost to the Fleet was heavy.

The Germans realised the desperate position of the wounded
Illustrious in Malta, and made determined efforts to destroy
her. However, our air power in the island had already grown,
and nineteen enemy planes were shot down in a single day
during the contest. In spite of further hits while in the dockyard,
the Illustrious was made capable of sailing on the evening
of January 23. The enemy, seeing she was gone, tried hard to
find her, but she reached Alexandria safely two days later.

By this time no fewer than two hundred and fifty German
aircraft were working from Sicily. Malta was attacked fifty-eight
times in January, and thereafter till the end of May three or
four times daily with only brief respites. But our resources
mounted. Between April and June, 1941, Admiral Somerville’s
Force H ferried six considerable flights to within flying distance
of Malta, and two hundred and twenty-four Hurricanes, together
with a few of other kinds, reached the battle scene from the
west. Supplies and reinforcements also got through from the
east. By June the first fierce onslaught had been repulsed, and
by the skin of its teeth the island survived. Its main ordeal was
reserved for 1942.

In General Dobbie Malta found a governor of outstanding
character who inspired all ranks and classes, military and civil,
with his own determination. He was a soldier who in fighting
leadership and religious zeal recalled memories of General
Gordon, and, looking farther back, of the Ironsides and
Covenanters of the past.

Prime Minister to General Dobbie, Malta

21 Jan. 41

I send you, on behalf of the War Cabinet, our heartfelt congratulations
upon the magnificent and ever-memorable defence which
your heroic garrison and citizens, aided by the Navy and above all
by the Royal Air Force, are making against Italian and German
attacks. The eyes of all Britain, and indeed of the whole British
Empire, are watching Malta in her struggle day by day, and we are
sure that success as well as glory will reward your efforts.

* * * * *

Amid the stresses of the ever-expanding scale of events in the
Mediterranean we tried to find means of bringing the war to
the Italian mainland. The morale of the Italian people was
said to be low, and a blow here would depress them still more
and bring closer the collapse which we desired. On February 9,
Admiral Somerville carried out a daring and successful raid on
the port of Genoa. Force H, comprising the Renown, Malaya,
and Sheffield, appeared off the town and subjected it to heavy
bombardment for half an hour. At the same time aircraft from
the Ark Royal bombed Leghorn and Pisa and laid mines off
Spezia. Complete surprise was achieved, and the only opposition
from the shore batteries at Genoa was slight and wholly
ineffective. Much damage was done to port installations and
shipping. Aided by low clouds, Admiral Somerville’s ships
withdrew, successfully evading interference from the enemy
fleet, which was searching for them west of Sardinia.

The reinforcement of Malta, now that the Germans were
taking an interest in the Mediterranean, was urgent.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

6 Feb. 41

Although of course the difficulties of [the enemy] assaulting Malta
are enormously increased by the British fuelling base in Suda Bay,
nevertheless I shall be glad to see a second battalion sent there at
the earliest opportunity, making seven British battalions in all.
Considering that in view of the Italian rout there should be no
great difficulty in sparing this seventh battalion from Egypt, and
that the trouble is carrying them there by the Fleet, one must ask
whether it is not as easy to carry two as it is to carry one. It seems
a pity to let the baker’s cart go with only one loaf, when the journey
is so expensive and the load available, and it might as easily carry
two. Pray consider this. But no delay.

* * * * *

By the beginning of April we were able to intensify our
attacks on enemy shipping feeding Rommel’s forces in Libya.
In this British submarines operating from Malta played a leading
part, and the scale of their activities and successes mounted
steadily. In this sphere Lieutenant-Commander Malcolm
Wanklyn was outstanding, and his exploits later earned him the
Victoria Cross. The following year he was lost with his ship, the
Upholder, but his example lived among those who carried on
his work.

On April 10 a striking force of four destroyers under Captain
Mack in the Jervis was sent to Malta to operate against enemy
convoys. Within a week they achieved a spectacular success.
On a night of bright moonlight they encountered a convoy of
five southbound ships with an escort of three destroyers. All
were annihilated in a general scrimmage at close range. Our
destroyer Mohawk was also torpedoed and had to be sunk, but
her captain and most of her crew were saved. In this action
alone 14,000 tons of enemy shipping fully loaded with vital war
materials was destroyed.

* * * * *

Good news continued to reach us from the Desert. On
February 6 Benghazi was entered, three weeks ahead of the
expected date, by the 6th Australian Division. By daybreak on
February 5 the 7th British Armoured Division (now at a tank
strength of one brigade), had reached Msus after much rough
going. The division was directed to cut the coastal road. That
evening an enemy column of about five thousand ran into the
road block at Beda Fomm and promptly surrendered. Early on
February 6 the enemy main columns started to come down the
road, and there was severe fighting throughout the day with
successive groups, including a considerable number of tanks.
By nightfall the enemy were in a desperate plight, with a confused
mass of vehicles almost twenty miles in length, blocked
in front and attacked in flank. Soon after dawn on February 7
they made a final attack with thirty tanks. When this, too,
failed General Berganzoli surrendered with his army.

Thus, in two months the Army of the Nile had advanced
five hundred miles, had destroyed an Italian army of more than
nine divisions, and had captured 130,000 prisoners, 400 tanks,
and 1290 guns. The conquest of Cyrenaica was complete.

* * * * *

In spite of these victories, so grave and complex were the
issues, both diplomatic and military, which were at stake in
the Middle East, and General Wavell had so much on his hands,
that at the meeting of the Defence Committee on February 11
it was proposed to send the Foreign Secretary and General Dill,
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to join him in Cairo.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

12 Feb. 41

Accept my heartfelt congratulations on this latest admirable
victory, and on the unexpected speed with which Cyrenaica has
been conquered. I have carried out your wishes in mentioning
Generals O’Connor and Creagh.

2. Defence Committee considered whole situation last night,
comprising, first, the extremely favourable developments in United
States supplies; second, increasingly menacing attitude of Japan
and plain possibility she may attack us in the near future; third,
undoubted serious probability of attempt at invasion here. In this
general setting we must settle Mediterranean plans.

3. We should have been content with making a safe flank for
Egypt at Tobruk, and we told you that thereafter Greece and/or
Turkey must have priority, but that if you could get Benghazi
easily and without prejudice to European calls so much the better.
We are delighted that you have got this prize three weeks ahead
of expectation, but this does not alter, indeed it rather confirms,
our previous directive, namely, that your major effort must now be
to aid Greece and/or Turkey. This rules out any serious effort
against Tripoli, although minor demonstrations thitherwards
would be a useful feint. You should, therefore, make yourself
secure in Benghazi and concentrate all available forces in the Delta
in preparation for movement to Europe.

4. Both Greece and Turkey have hitherto refused our offers of
technical units, because they say these are too small to solve their
main problem, but conspicuous enough to provoke German intervention.
However, this intervention becomes more certain and
imminent every day, and may begin at any time now. If Turkey
and Yugoslavia would tell Bulgaria they will attack her unless she
joins them in resisting a German advance southward, this might
create a barrier requiring much larger German forces than are now
available in Rumania. But I fear they will not do this, and will
fool away their chances of combined resistance, as was done in the
Low Countries.

5. Our first thoughts must be for our ally Greece, who is actually
fighting so well. If Greece is trampled down or forced to make a
separate peace with Italy, yielding also air and naval strategic
points against us to Germany, effect on Turkey will be very bad.
But if Greece, with British aid, can hold up for some months
German advance, chances of Turkish intervention will be favoured.
Therefore, it would seem that we should try to get in a position
to offer the Greeks the transfer to Greece of the fighting portion
of the army which has hitherto defended Egypt, and make every
plan for sending and reinforcing it to the limit with men and
material.

6. We do not know what Greece will say to a great offer of this
kind. We do not know what are her means of resisting an invasion
from Bulgaria by German forces. It is reasonable to assume that
they have a plan to move troops from Albania to hold the passes
and the lines of defence already built along or near the Bulgarian
frontier. They cannot surely have pursued their advantage in
Albania without any thought of this mortal danger to their right
and almost rear. If they have a good plan it would be worth our
while to back it with all our strength and fight the Germans in
Greece, hoping thereby to draw in both Turks and Yugoslavs. You
should begin forthwith plans and time-tables, as well as any preparatory
movements of shipping.

7. It is not intended that you should delay [the capture of]
Rhodes, which we regard as most urgent.

8. In order to give the very best chance to concerting all possible
measures, both diplomatic and military, against the Germans in
the Balkans, we are sending the Foreign Secretary and General Dill
to join you in Cairo. They will leave on February 12, and should
reach you 14th or 15th February. Having surveyed the whole
position in Cairo and got all preparatory measures on the move,
you will no doubt go to Athens with them, and thereafter, if
convenient, to Angora. It is hoped that at least four divisions,
including one armoured division, and whatever additional air
forces the Greek airfields are ready for, together with all available
munitions, may be offered in the best possible way and in the
shortest time.

9. We can form no opinion here as to what ports of Greece we
should use or what front we should try to hold or try to get them
to hold. That can only be settled on the spot with the Greek
Command.

10. In the event of its proving impossible to reach any good
agreement with the Greeks and work out a practical military plan,
then we must try to save as much from the wreck as possible. We
must at all costs keep Crete and take any Greek islands which are
of use as air bases. We could also reconsider the advance on Tripoli.
But these will only be consolation prizes after the classic race has
been lost. There will always remain the support of Turkey.

General Wavell replied on February 12, returning me compliments
for my congratulations. He had naturally been considering
the problem of assistance to Greece and Turkey for
some time. He hoped he might be able to improve on his
earlier estimate of available reserves, especially if the Australian
Government would give him a certain latitude. He had already
spoken to Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, who
was in Cairo on his way to London, about this, and found him
very ready to agree to what he suggested. He welcomed the
visit of the Foreign Secretary and General Dill. “We will do
our best,” he said, “to frustrate German plans in the Balkans,
but Greek and Turkish hesitations and Yugoslav timidity have
made our task very difficult. Owing to difficulties of shipping
and ports our arrival is bound to be somewhat piecemeal.”

* * * * *

I drafted and obtained formal Cabinet approval for the
instructions to the Foreign Secretary on his mission.

12 Feb. 41

During his visit to the Mediterranean theatre the Foreign
Secretary will represent His Majesty’s Government in all matters
diplomatic and military. He will report whenever necessary to
the War Cabinet through the Prime Minister.

2. His principal object will be the sending of speedy succour to
Greece. For this purpose he will initiate any action he may think
necessary with the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East, with
the Egyptian Government, and with the Governments of Greece,
Yugoslavia, and Turkey. He will of course keep the Foreign Office
informed, and he will himself be informed by the Foreign Office or
the Prime Minister of all changes of plan or view occurring at
home.

3. The C.I.G.S. will advise on the military aspect, and the
Foreign Secretary will make sure that in case of any difference his
views are also placed before His Majesty’s Government.

4. The following points require particular attention: (a) What
is the minimum garrison that can hold the western frontier of
Libya and Benghazi, and what measures should be taken to make
Benghazi a principal garrison and air base? The extreme importance
is emphasised of dropping the overland communications at
the earliest moment, (b) The régime and policy to be enforced in
Cyrenaica, having regard to our desire to separate the Italian nation
from the Mussolini system, (c) The execution of the operation “Mandibles”
[Rhodes] at the earliest moment, including, if necessary,
repacking of the commandos at Capetown [for an opposed landing],
having regard, however, to its not becoming an impediment
to the main issue, (d) The formation in the Delta of
the strongest and best-equipped force in divisional or brigade
organisations which can be dispatched to Greece at the earliest
moment. (e) The drain to be made upon our resources for the
purpose of finishing up in Eritrea and breaking down the Italian
positions in Abyssinia. The former is urgent; the latter, though
desirable, must not conflict with major issues. It may be necessary
to leave it to rot by itself. (f) The great mass of troops, over 70,000,
now engaged in the Kenya theatre must be severely scrutinised in
order particularly to liberate the South African divisions for
service in Egypt. Any communication with General Smuts had
better pass through the Prime Minister. A further conference between
the Foreign Secretary and General Smuts might well be
convenient. (g) The Foreign Secretary, when visiting Athens with
the C.I.G.S., General Wavell, and any other officers, is fully empowered
to formulate with the Greek Government the best arrangements
possible in the circumstances. He will at the same time try
to keep H.M.G. informed, or seek their aid as far as possible. In an
emergency he must act as he thinks best. (h) He will communicate
direct with the Governments of Yugoslavia and Turkey, duplicating
his messages to the Foreign Office. The object will be to make them
both fight at the same time or do the best they can. For this
purpose he should summon the Minister at Belgrade or the
Ambassador in Turkey to meet him as may be convenient. He will
bear in mind that while it is our duty to fight, and if need be, suffer
with Greece, the interests of Turkey in the second stage are no less
important to us than those of Greece. It should be possible to
reconcile the Greek and Turkish claims for air and munitions
support. (i) The Foreign Secretary will address himself to the
problem of securing the highest form of war economy in the armies
and air forces of the Middle East for all the above purposes, and to
making sure that the many valuable military units in that theatre
all fit into a coherent scheme and are immediately pulling their
weight. (j) He should advise H.M.G. through the Prime Minister
upon the selection of commanders for all the different purposes in
view. In this he will no doubt consult with General Wavell, who
enjoys so large a measure of the confidence of H.M.G. The selection
of the general who commands in Greece is of the highest consequence,
and it is hoped that an agreed recommendation may be
made on this point. (k) Air Chief Marshal Longmore will be
required to give effect to the wishes and decisions of the Foreign
Secretary in accordance with the general scope of the policy here
set out. But here again in the event of any difference the Foreign
Secretary will transmit the Air Chief Marshal’s views to the War
Cabinet through the Prime Minister. The duty of the air force in
the Middle East is to provide the maximum air effort in Greece and
Turkey compatible with the nourishing of operations in the Sudan
and Abyssinia and the maintenance of Benghazi. (l) The Foreign
Secretary will consult with Admiral Cunningham upon naval
operations necessary for all the above purposes, and will ask H.M.
G. for any further support, either by transports or warships, which
may seem necessary. (m) He will propose to H.M.G. any policy
concerning Iraq, Palestine, or Arabia which may harmonise with
the above purposes. He may communicate direct with these
countries and with the Government of India, though not in a
mandatory sense. The India Office must be kept informed. (n) He
will report upon the whole position at Gibraltar, Malta, and, if
possible, on return, at Takoradi. (o) In short, he is to gather
together all the threads, and propose continuously the best solutions
for our difficulties, and not be deterred from acting upon his own
authority if the urgency is too great to allow reference home.

* * * * *

I thought that Smuts should know of Eden’s mission, and
hoped that he might be able to go to Cairo himself.

Prime Minister to General Smuts

15 Feb. 41

Joyful acceleration capture Benghazi, Cyrenaica, gives us secure
flank for Egypt. Kismayu is also good. We must now try to help
Greeks and spur Turks to resist forthcoming German offensive
towards Aegean. Cannot guarantee good results on mainland of
Europe, but we must do our best and save what islands we can
from the wreck should our utmost efforts prove vain. We have
therefore sent Foreign Secretary and C.I.G.S. to Cairo, thereafter
visiting Athens and Angora, in order to concert strongest possible
front. They will probably be three weeks in Middle East. Pray
consider whether you could meet them. Please duplicate to me
through United Kingdom High Commissioner any messages you
send to them.

During Mr. Eden’s absence I took charge of the Foreign
Office. This was, of course, a heavy addition to my work. I
had, however, been accustomed to read all the top-level daily
telegrams and special reports since I became Prime Minister,
and in my correspondence with President Roosevelt and other
heads of Governments I had drafted many of the most important
outgoing messages. Except in special cases I left the
interviews with foreign Ambassadors to the Permanent Under-Secretary,
Sir Alexander Cadogan, and to Mr. Butler, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary. The whole story of foreign affairs
and war strategy was at this time fused into one single theme,
and this I had in any case to comprehend, and as far as possible
shape.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Cairo

20 Feb. 41

Thankful you have arrived safely. I was making great exertions
to carry 50th Division to you, and had wrung additional shipping
from Shipping Ministry, with generous contribution by Admiralty.
Am baffled by reply. Clearly H.Q. Middle East is not accurately
informed about composition of convoys. . . . Hope you will be
able to clear all this up. Essential that exact details of convoys and
field states should be known at both ends. My impression is one
of enormous jumbles of ration-strength troops in Middle East with
many half-baked tactical formations. The 6th British Division
and 7th Australian Division both seem likely to be imperfect for
some time. Find out what we can send to make these effective
fighting units. Some local improvisation by transfer from other
half-baked units should surely be possible. Establishments are not
sacrosanct if practical results obtainable on different basis. Latest
Middle East ration-strength return shows increase of nearly 50,000
between December 31 and January 31. Does nothing emerge in
the shape of fighting units from this reinforcement? If fighting
formations are so few compared with ration strength, and in
addition movement of these few formations to another theatre is so
lengthy and nothing can be done to improve matters, we must
recognise limits of our power to act on mainland, and indeed whole
Middle East proposition must be relegated to secondary sphere.

2. Am concerned at check developing at Keren. Abyssinia might
be left, but we had hopes Eritrea would be cleaned up. Try to
include this in your disposition of air and other forces.

3. Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise
if in your hearts you feel it will only be another Norwegian fiasco.
If no good plan can be made please say so. But of course you
know how valuable success would be.

This crossed telegrams from Mr. Eden, which gave a clear
picture of the convictions of the men on the spot, and included
the conclusions of the conference in Cairo between him and
Dill with three Commanders-in-Chief.

We are agreed we should do everything in our power to bring
the fullest measure of help to Greeks at earliest possible moment.
If the help we can offer is accepted by the Greeks we believe that
there is a fair chance of halting a German advance and preventing
Greece from being overrun. Limitation of our resources, however,
especially in the air, will not allow of help being given to Turkey
at the [same] time if Greece is to be supported on an effective scale.

After explaining that the scantiness of our air resources made
it doubtful whether a line so advanced as to cover Salonika
could be held, he continued:

General Wavell proposes the following military dispositions:
Cyrenaica will be garrisoned by one of the less trained and
equipped Australian divisions, Indian Motor Brigade, at present
under training, and one armoured brigade group, which represents
all remaining at present of the 7th Armoured Division. You will
remember that this armoured division was never at full strength.
Further complication reported by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean
is that troops at Benghazi cannot at present be maintained
by sea owing to destruction of port. Supply must, therefore, be by
road from Tobruk. The 6th Division is being formed, and will be
used for Rhodes. Forces committed to operations in Eritrea cannot
be reduced until operations there have been successfully completed.
Keren is proving a tough nut to crack. On the other hand, it is
agreed that forces in Kenya can be reduced, and warning orders
have been issued for withdrawal of South African division with a
view to its movement to Egypt when shipping can be made available.
I hope to see Smuts on this and other matters before I return
home.

General Wavell has therefore the following forces available for
Greece in the immediate and near future: firstly, one armoured
brigade and the New Zealand division, now raised to three infantry
brigades, ready to sail; to be followed by Polish Brigade, an
Australian division, a second armoured brigade, if required, and a
second Australian division, in that order. Dispatch of this force will
inevitably strain administrative resources to the utmost and must
involve much improvisation.

Timings cannot yet be given, as these depend on discussion with
the Greeks and shipping. It is estimated that to move the above
forces at least fifty-three ships will be required. These can, of
course, only be obtained by holding ships of convoys arriving in
the Middle East, with all that that implies. Additional to present
anxiety is the menace of mines to the Suez Canal. Energetic
measures are being taken to deal with this, but until they are fully
organised and material arrives from home there is always a risk
that the Canal may be closed for from five to seven days.

My own conclusion, which General Dill and Commanders-in-Chief
share, is that in the immediate future assistance to the
Greeks, who are fighting and are threatened, must have first call
on resources. Extent of help which we can later give Turks must
depend upon volume of air reinforcements that can reach the
Middle East and war wastage in African operations.

My present intention is to tell the Greeks of the help we are
prepared to give them now, and to urge them to accept it as fast as
it can be shipped to them. If they will accept this help and brave
any risk it may entail of involving them in early hostilities with
Germany there is a fair chance that we can hold a line in Greece.
If we now split our small resources, especially in the air, we can
effectively help neither Greece nor Turkey.

The word “urge,” which I have italicised, in this telegram
must not be misunderstood. Mr. Eden meant it to apply, not to
the principle of acceptance by the Greeks of British help, but
to the timing of their acceptance, if that was their resolve.

I replied:

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Cairo

21 Feb. 41

I have always felt it essential you should see Greeks before
Angora, otherwise commitments might have been made to Angora
which would tie your hands about Greeks, who are actually fighting.
Therefore, am in complete agreement with procedure you propose.

And to General Smuts:

21 Feb. 41

I share your misgivings that Russian attitude has undermined
Turks, and it may be that they will do no more than maintain an
honest neutrality. Whole Greek position must be considered now
by our envoys at Cairo. Will keep you informed.

On the same day Mr. Eden sent another telegram from
Cairo:

As regards the general prospects of a Greek campaign, it is, of
course, a gamble to send forces to the mainland of Europe to fight
Germans at this time. No one can give a guarantee of success, but
when we discussed this matter in London we were prepared to
run the risk of failure, thinking it better to suffer with the Greeks
than to make no attempt to help them. That is the conviction we
all hold here. Moreover, though campaign is a daring venture, we
are not without hope that it might succeed to the extent of halting
the Germans before they overrun all Greece.

It has to be remembered that the stakes are big. If we fail to help
the Greeks there is no hope of action by Yugoslavia, and the future
of Turkey may easily be compromised. Though, therefore, none of
us can guarantee that we may not have to play trump cards, we
believe that this attempt to help Greece should be made. It is, of
course, quite possible that when we see the Greeks tomorrow they
may not wish us to come.

We have discussed the question of command. Dill, Wavell, and
I are all agreed that we must select a figure who will command
respect with the Greeks and exercise authority over the Greek
officers with whom he will have to work. It is also necessary to
choose a first-class tactical soldier. We have, therefore, decided that
the command should be given to Wilson, who will be replaced in
the military governorship of Cyrenaica by Neame, at present commanding
in Palestine. . . . Wilson has a very high reputation here
among the general public, as well as among the soldiers, and his
appointment to lead the forces in Greece will be a guarantee to the
Greeks that we are giving of our best.

* * * * *

On February 22, Mr. Eden, with General Wavell, Sir
John Dill, and other officers, flew to Athens, to confer with the
Greek King and Government. When Mr. Eden arrived in the
evening for the first contacts with the Greeks he was taken to
the Royal Palace at Tatoi. The King at once asked him if he
would receive his Prime Minister alone. He explained to the
King his reluctance to do this, because he wished the discussions
to be on an entirely military basis. If we were to send assistance
to Greece it should be because of military reasons, and he did
not want political considerations to play an undue part. However,
the King persevered in his request, and he consented. At
the meeting the Prime Minister, M. Korysis, read him a statement
setting forth the outcome of the Greek Cabinet discussions
in the past day or two.

As this statement forms the basis of our action, I set it forth
in full.

Mr. Eden to Prime Minister

22 Feb. 41

Following is summary of written declaration given to me by
President of the Council at outset of our meeting today:

“I desire to repeat most categorically that Greece, as a faithful
ally, is determined to go on fighting with all her forces until final
victory. This determination is not limited to the case of Italy, but
will apply to any German aggression.

“2. Greece has only three divisions in Macedonia on the Bulgarian
frontier. Consequently, a purely military problem arises of
what reinforcements should be sent to enable the Greek army to
resist the German. While more or less accurate information is
available about German forces in Rumania and about forces
mobilised in Bulgaria, the Greek Government, for their part, so far
only know what British help might be given to them within a
period of a month’s time. Moreover, they do not know what are
the intentions of Turkey and Yugoslavia. In these circumstances,
Your Excellency’s arrival in the Middle East is of the greatest help,
not only for the purpose of clarifying the situation, but also of turning
it to the common advantage of Great Britain and Greece.

“3. I desire to repeat once again that, whatever the outcome and
whether Greece has or has not any hope of repulsing the enemy in
Macedonia, she will defend her national territory, even if she can
only count on her own forces.”

The Greek Government wished us to understand that their
decision had been taken before they knew whether we could
give them any help or not. The King had wished Mr. Eden to
know this before the military conversations opened, and this
was the basis upon which they took place.

After military conferences and staff meetings held all night
and the next day, Mr. Eden sent us the following most important
telegram, dated the twenty-fourth:

Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister

24 Feb. 41

Agreement was reached today [23d] with the Greek Government
on all points.

When at the end of discussions I asked whether the Greek
Government would welcome the arrival in Greece of British troops
in numbers and on conditions we proposed, President of Council
slated formally that the Greek Government accepted our offer with
gratitude and approved all detailed arrangements reached between
the two General Staffs.

2. On arrival here this afternoon we met with the King of
Greece, the President of Council and General Papagos. I gave an
account of the international situation as we see it and dealt in
detail with German designs upon the Balkans. I then explained
that the conclusion had been reached by Ministers and Chiefs of
Staff in London, with which Commanders-in-Chief here are in full
agreement, that we should give maximum help to Greece at the
earliest possible moment. We then gave details of the forces which
we should be able to make available for Greece, explaining that
this was all we could do at the moment. What we should be able
to do in future depended on the development of the general war
situation and the state of our resources. All I could say was that
the troops we offered were well equipped and well trained and we
were confident that they would acquit themselves well.

3. The President of Council, after reaffirming the determination
of Greece to defend herself against Germany, reiterated the misgivings
of the Greek Government lest insufficient British help
should merely precipitate German attack, and stated that it was
essential to determine whether available Greek forces and forces
which we could provide would suffice to constitute efficacious
resistance to the Germans, taking into account the doubtful attitude
of Turkey and Yugoslavia. Before the Greek Government
committed themselves, the President of the Council, therefore,
wished the military experts to consider the situation in the light of
the British offer. I made plain the logical conclusion of the attitude
taken up by the President of Council. If we were to delay action
for fear of provoking the Germans, such action must inevitably be
too late.

4. From the ensuing discussion between General Dill, Commander-in-Chief
Middle East, and the Air Officer Commanding on
the one hand, and General Papagos on the other hand, it emerged
that in view of the doubtful attitude of Yugoslavia the only line
that could be held and would give time for withdrawal of troops
from Albania would be a line west of the Vadar, Olympus-Veria-Edessa-Kajmakcalan.
If we could be sure of Yugoslav moves it
should be possible to hold a line farther north from the mouth of
the Nestos to Beles, covering Salonika. It would be impracticable,
unless Yugoslavia came in, to hold a line covering Salonika in view
of exposure of Greek left flank to German attack.

He then described the detailed arrangements which had
been agreed:

The discussions lasted some ten hours, and covered the main
points of political and military co-operation. . . . We were all
impressed by frankness and fair dealing of Greek representatives on
all subjects discussed. I am quite sure that it is their determination
to resist to the utmost of their strength, and that His Majesty’s
Government have no alternative but to back them whatever the
ultimate consequences. While recognizing the risks, we must accept
them.

In a further message he said:

We are all convinced that we have chosen the right course and
as the eleventh hour has already struck felt sure that you would not
wish us to delay for detailed reference home.

The risks are great, but there is a chance of success. We are
accepting difficulties which will make a heavy demand upon our
resources, more particularly of fighter aircraft. . . .

On these messages, which carried with them the assent of
both Dill and Wavell, it was decided in the Cabinet to give
full approval to the proposals.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Cairo

24 Feb. 41

The Chiefs of Staff having endorsed action on lines proposed in
your telegrams from Cairo and from Athens, I brought whole
question before War Cabinet this evening, Mr. Menzies being
present. Decision was unanimous in the sense you desire, but of
course Mr. Menzies must telegraph home. Presume, also, you have
settled with New Zealand Government about their troops. No need
anticipate difficulties in either quarter. Therefore, while being
under no illusions, we all send you the order, “Full steam ahead.”

* * * * *

So far we had not taken any steps which went beyond gathering
the largest possible strategic reserve in the Delta and
making plans and shipping preparations to transport an army
to Greece. If the situation changed through a reversal of Greek
policy or any other event, we should be in the best position to
deal with it. It was agreeable, after being so hard pressed, to be
able to wind up satisfactorily the campaigns in Abyssinia,
Somaliland, and Eritrea and bring substantial forces into our
“mass of manoeuvre” in Egypt. While neither the intentions of
the enemy nor the reactions of friends and neutrals could be
divined or forecast, we seemed to have various important
options open. The future remained inscrutable, but not a division
had yet been launched, and meanwhile not a day was being
lost in preparation.

5Conquest of the Italian Empire

Origin and Growth of the Italian Empire in Africa—The Disaster
of Adowa, 1896—The Italian Descent on Tripoli in 1911—Mussolini’s
Ambitions—Remarkable Development of the Italian
Colonies—Imposing Fortifications and Military Power—“The
Chance of Five Thousand Years”—Wavell’s New Plan—Operations
to Clear the Sudan—The Hard Core of Keren—Wingate
Raises Rebellion—The Emperor Returns to Abyssinia—Unused
Forces in Kenya—Smuts Points to Kismayu—Cunningham
Calls a Halt—We Press for Action—Kismayu Taken—A
Lightning Campaign in Italian Somaliland—All British
Somaliland Regained—Attack on French Somaliland and
Blockade of Jibuti—President Roosevelt’s Concern for the Italian
Civil Population in Abyssinia—The Struggle for Keren—Tribute
to the Indian Troops—The Italian Navy Eliminated
from the Red Sea—Pursuit of the Italians—The Emperor Re-enters
his Capital—Surrender of the Duke of Aosta—The End
in Abyssinia.

When Mussolini declared war on Great Britain at the
moment of the fall of France in 1940, the Italian
Empire in North and East Africa presented a majestic appearance.
The kingdom of Italy had been a late-comer among the
nation states of nineteenth-century Europe. Weak in industrial
strength, and thus in military power, but thrust forward by
her expanding population, she entered the race for Africa
under a serious handicap. With the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869, Italian eyes had turned increasingly to African expansion.
Sixteen years later Massawa was occupied and the
Colony of Eritrea was formally established as Italian sovereign
territory. The colony of Italian Somaliland, with its access to
the Indian Ocean, also slowly grew. In between these two
early settlements lay the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia. Upon
this wild land Signor Crispi marched with the imperialist movement
of the nineties, and hoped thereby to gain for Italy the
prestige of a major Power in European affairs. The frightful
disaster at Adowa in 1896, when the Italian army invading
Abyssinia was annihilated, caused his fall and a halt to Italian
adventures in Africa.

This tragic episode bit deep into Italian memories. When
the Balkan States attacked Turkey in 1911, in the advent of
the First World War, the Italian Government shocked and
alarmed the sedate world of those days by leaping across to
Tripoli and beginning its conquest. The need of France and
Great Britain to gain Italy against the darkening German
menace and the Turkish defeat in the Balkan fighting enabled
a tenuous Italian foothold to be established on the North
African coast. The fact that Italy was on the winning side in
the first great struggle ratified her acquisition of Tripoli and
Cyrenaica, which reviving Roman memories, was presently rechristened
Libya. The rebellion of the Senussi remained a continuing
challenge to the industrious occupation and colonisation
of Arab deserts by the teeming population of Italy.

Such was the position when Mussolini came to power on
the flowing Fascist tide against Bolshevism. The years which
followed saw the planned expansion of Italy as an African
colonial Power. The North African territories were subjugated
under the stern military rule of General Graziani. Rebellions
were ruthlessly quelled; the settlers multiplied; the desert was
reclaimed; forts and aerodromes were built; roads and railways
spread along the Mediterranean shore. Behind all this heavy
but by no means ineffective expenditure of Italian resources
lurked the national desire to avenge the defeat and shame of
Adowa. My first volume has described the manner in which
Mussolini’s resolve and audacity overcame the timid, half-hearted
resistance of Britain through the League of Nations and
reduced to failure the authority of “fifty nations led by one.”
We have also seen how all this conflict and the conquest of
Abyssinia played its part in the advent of the Second World
War.

In June, 1940, when the British Empire seemed to Fascist
eyes reeling to ruin, and France was almost prostrate, the
Italian Empire in Africa spread far and wide. Libya, Eritrea,
Abyssinia, Somaliland, nourished by Italian taxation, comprised
a vast region in which nearly a quarter of a million
Italian colonists toiled, and began to thrive, under the protection
of more than four hundred thousand Italian and native
troops. All the ports on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean
were fortified. The British Intelligence readily accepted the
Italian statements of their scale of armament, and classed them
as naval bases of a high order. If the British Empire fell, as
then seemed to Mussolini certain, Egypt, British Somaliland,
and British East Africa, added to the existing possessions of
Italy, would form indeed an immense area of the earth’s surface
under Italian sovereignty, the like of which had not been seen
since the days of the Caesars. Here was what the ill-starred
Ciano had called “the chance of five thousand years.” It was
this gleaming vision which was now to be abruptly extinguished.

* * * * *

Up till December, 1940, our attitude towards the Italians
throughout the east of Africa had been purely defensive.
General Wavell held a conference in Cairo on December 2 at
which he laid down a new policy. He did not yet contemplate
any deep penetration by Regular troops into Abyssinia, but
the Italians, who had occupied Kassala and Galabat in the
Sudan on July 4, 1940, were to be ejected. When these minor
offensives were completed, Wavell originally intended to withdraw
the majority of the troops for operations in the Middle
East, leaving to the patriot movement, fostered and nourished
by British officers, arms, and money, the task of making the
Italian position within Abyssinia impossible, and eventually
of reconquering the country.

The operations to clear the Sudan began in January under
General Platt. The opening phase met with easy success. Platt
had the 5th British-Indian Division, which was reinforced in
January by the 4th British-Indian Division, brought over from
the Western Desert, where it had played its part in the victorious
battles of December. The force was supported by six
air squadrons. Two Italian divisions evacuated Kassala on
January 19 under the threat of attack and after a bombardment
from the air. Soon after they also withdrew from Galabat, and
quitted the Sudan. Our pursuit from Kassala was carried on without
serious check until it came up to the very strong mountain
position at Keren. At this point the enemy’s two metropolitan
divisions were firmly installed and holding tenaciously. Several
attacks in early February could make no progress, and Platt decided
that to force such a position he must accept the administrative
delays involved in staging a fully prepared assault.

Meanwhile the work of raising rebellion in Abyssinia
progressed. A small force under Brigadier Sanford of one
Sudanese battalion and a number of selected British officers
and N.C.O.’s, of whom Colonel Wingate was afterwards to gain
high distinction, formed the core of the rising. As their successes
grew they received help from increasing numbers of
patriots. The Emperor re-entered his kingdom on January 20,
and a large part of the western district of Gojjam was steadily
cleared of the enemy.

* * * * *

Readers of the previous volume will be aware of my discontent
with the large numbers of troops which had so long
stood motionless in Kenya. Smuts had visited Kenya in
November, 1940, and urged that we should assume the
offensive, aiming at the Italian port of Kismayu.

He had telegraphed to me as follows:

5 Nov. 40

In Kenya I visited most of the fronts and studied plans with
General Cunningham and his staff. There too the morale is good
and the general position favourable, but there too prolonged inactivity
in and by the desert will present danger to us. Best objective
to go for in the near future is Kismayu, which is serious present
threat to Mombasa, our essential base. Once Kismayu is captured
and well held the bulk of our forces could be moved from that forbidding
desert area towards the north so as to threaten Addis
Ababa. For the Kismayu move Cunningham requires larger force
than at first contemplated, and I shall send another infantry
brigade from the Union as soon as sea transport is available. Additional
Bren [guns] are badly wanted, and further transport for
water and supply purposes will be provided. With serious internal
unrest in Abyssinia and an attack both from the south and north,
the Italians may crack in the summer, and considerable forces may
thus be released for the more important theatre farther north.

This was in the fullest accord with my views. The brigade
was sent from the Cape, and I understood that all preparations
were moving for an advance in January before the rains set in.
I was therefore shocked to see the following telegram:

General Wavell to C.I.G.S.

23 Nov. 40

Cunningham has decided not possible to carry out bold operations
this winter. He proposes to carry out series of minor operations
in Northern Kenya about middle of December, and requires
both West African brigades for these. . . .

The High Commissioner for South Africa told us that
General Smuts had expressed disappointment that the expedition
against Kismayu, which he had hoped would be in
January, was apparently being postponed till May in spite of
the dispatch of the 3d Union Brigade. At the meeting of the
Defence Committee on November 25, 1940, I inquired why the
projected operation against Kismayu had been postponed until
May. Sir John Dill said that he had received a telegram from
General Wavell saying that he would shortly be holding a conference
of commanders, including General Cunningham, to
consider plans for the next six months.

We were none of us satisfied with this, and the Committee
invited the Chiefs of Staff to call for a full explanation of the
matter from General Wavell, and to report further to the
Prime Minister.

I minuted as follows to the Secretary of State for War and
the C.I.G.S.:

26 Nov. 40

I understand we are to receive from you a full account of the
reasons now alleged to prevent the operation against Kismayu
before May, and that you will make a strenuous effort not to succumb
to these reasons. If it should be decided that nothing can
be done till May, the West African brigade must go with the first
set of empty transports to the West Coast, relieving the battalion
now at Freetown.

The proposal to keep the brigade and not to fight is most
depressing.

As a result of Wavell’s conference on December 2, it was
decided to attack the Italians in Kassala and to stimulate the
rebellion in Abyssinia by all possible means. But the attempt
to capture Kismayu was still to be postponed till after the spring
rains, which meant May or June.

* * * * *

I continued to gird at the numbers and the inaction of
troops in Kenya.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

26 Jan. 41

I was perplexed by your telegram of the twenty-first. I thought
you wanted to have a large strategic reserve in the Delta, and this
is in accordance with the directions we have given from here. Certainly
there is no need to send another South African division to
swell the 70,000 troops of various kinds who are now virtually out
of action in Kenya. I asked General Smuts, and he has agreed, to
keep the destination of the new division fluid, as I thought that
by the time transport, etc., could be arranged he might be willing
for them to come north to join the Army of the Nile. How can
you expect me to face the tremendous strain upon our shipping,
affecting as it does all our food and import of munitions, in order
to carry more divisions from this country to the Middle East, when
you seem opposed to taking a South African division, which would
only have less than half the distance to come? I hope indeed that
both the South African divisions now in Kenya will in a few
months be moved to the Delta, and that the West African brigade
will be sent, as promised, back to Freetown. On no account must
General Smuts be discouraged from his bold and sound policy of
gradually working South African forces into the main theatre.

Under the strong pressure from home Wavell eventually
decided to make the effort before the rains. He animated the
Kenya Command, and we were presently informed that the
Nairobi forces hoped to carry out Operation “Canvas” (as the
attack on Kismayu was called) between February 10 and 16.
This signified a real movement in the East African theatre. I
was much relieved to get Wavell’s telegram of February 2, 1941,
in which he said:

In Kenya I have approved the proposal to attempt capture of
Kismayu about the middle of February. Enemy has strong positions
and supply situation limits our force, but think attempt has
reasonable chance of success. . . . Generally I have given instructions
to both Platt and Cunningham for the maximum effort they
can make against Italian East Africa in the next two months.

Thus we achieved the forward movement. The results showed
how unduly the commanders on the spot had magnified the
difficulties and how right we were at home to press them to
speedy action.

February marked the beginning of General Cunningham’s
attack in strength. An Italian force of six brigades and six
groups of local levies held the river Juba, near the mouth of
which lies the port of Kismayu. Against them General Cunningham
deployed, on February 10, four brigade groups.
Kismayu was taken without opposition on the fourteenth.
North of the port, beyond the river, stood the main enemy
position at Jelib. That was attacked on the twenty-second, from
both flanks and from the rear. A considerable success was
gained. The enemy was completely routed, over thirty
thousand being killed, captured, or dispersed into the bush.
The enemy air had been roughly handled by the South African
airplanes and took no part in the battle. Nothing now remained
to hinder the advance to Mogadishu, the major seaport
of Italian Somaliland, two hundred miles farther north. Our
motorised troops entered it on the twenty-fifth, to find great
quantities of material and stores and over four hundred
thousand gallons of precious petrol. On its airfield lay twenty-one
destroyed aircraft. General Cunningham rightly judged
that there was no enemy to oppose his next move. He had
sufficient troops, even though the 1st South African Division,
except for one brigade, was held back for operations elsewhere.
Distance was the only problem. Transport and supply were
the decisive factors. Cunningham got permission from General
Wavell to make his next objective Jijiga, no less than 740 miles
from Mogadishu. After pausing only three days the advance
was renewed on March 1, and, brushing aside only light opposition,
and meeting little interference from the enemy air force,
whose airfields were subjected to frequent attacks, reached
Jijiga on March 17. These were fine operations.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

1 March 41

Hearty congratulations on the brilliant result of the campaign
in Italian Somaliland. Will you convey to General Cunningham
the thanks and appreciation of His Majesty’s Government for the
vigorous, daring, and highly successful operations which he has
conducted in command of his ardent, well-trained, well-organised
army. Will you ask him to convey this message to his troops. Publish
as you find convenient.

You will no doubt discuss future operations with General Smuts
on the seventh. As you know, I have always wanted the South
African divisions to come forward to the Mediterranean shore.

General Wavell to Prime Minister

2 March 41

Your congratulations are very much appreciated. I have conveyed
your message to General Cunningham.

2. Cunningham is pushing light forces on to Ferfer [about two
hundred miles north of Mogadishu and Dolo], which will complete
occupation of Italian Somaliland. Owing to situation as regards
supplies and transport, he does not think he can advance on
Harrar before March 21. He is coming to Cairo March 7, and we
will discuss future plans and moves of South African divisions.

3. Have already instructed Aden to reconnoitre Berbera with
view to reoccupation if possible.

* * * * *

At this point our troops from Aden could help. Our four air
squadrons there had, apart from their duties over the Red Sea,
been supporting from their central position both Cunningham’s
and Platt’s campaigns by attacking the enemy air bases. On
March 16 two of our battalions were landed at Berbera. The
enemy garrison of a brigade melted away, leaving two hundred
prisoners in our hands. All British Somaliland was now quickly
regained, and through the port of Berbera General Cunningham’s
further advance could now be more readily sustained.
He resumed his advance to Harrar, which surrendered on
March 26, and on March 29 he entered Diredawa. This
brought us to the railway from French Somaliland. Had the
port of Jibuti been opened to us by the Vichy French, it would
have greatly eased supply. That, however, was not to be. At
Diredawa General Cunningham collected his resources for the
final bound to Addis Ababa. During the month of March he
had traversed eight hundred and fifty miles from Mogadishu
with the 11th African Division and the 1st South African
Brigade. Since the crossing of the river Juba his troops had
accounted for more than fifty thousand of the enemy, killed,
prisoners, or dispersed, at a cost of under five hundred
casualties.

As a result of these successes various complications arose.
General Wavell feared that the policy of strict blockade of
Jibuti favoured by Generals de Gaulle and Le Gentilhomme
would merely stiffen its resistance. He proposed instead making
an offer to admit sufficient supplies, such as milk for
children, to prevent distress, to allow any troops wishing to join
the Free French to do so and to evacuate the rest to some other
French colony, and to negotiate for the use of the railway for
supplying his own forces. But at home we took a different
view.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

1 April 41

We consider that you should follow policy laid down in Chiefs
of Staff telegram of March 25 as closely as possible, subject to any
modification which may seem desirable after your discussions with
General de Gaulle. In particular, the initial approach to French
Somaliland should be made by Free French authorities, and there
should be no hesitation in using the blockade weapon to the full.
Do not worry about the susceptibilities of Weygand and Vichy. We
will look after them at this end.

2. I hope that on this and similar matters you will feel able to
give full weight to the views of General de Gaulle, to whom His
Majesty’s Government have given solemn engagements, and who
has their full backing as leader of the Free French Movement.

* * * * *

President Roosevelt was concerned about the Italian civil
population in Abyssinia.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

4 April 41

Count Sforza’s suggestion [about Italian noncombatants] has
been most attentively considered here. I beg you to realise our
difficulties. Duke of Aosta might indeed be ready to yield Addis
Ababa and march off into the mountains to carry on the war for
some weeks, or even months, while leaving us with the whole
responsibility for the health and safety of the civilian population,
numbering scores of thousands. We have no means of discharging
such a task until the organised fighting ends. We do not even hold
port Jibuti, the railway line is broken, every ounce of transport
we possess is sustaining our troops in their long advance. Result
might well be a lamentable breakdown, whole burden of which
would be cast on us, like the concentration camps in the old South
African War. The moment the Duke brings the fighting to an end
we will strain every nerve, and there might be prospects of success.
Any prolongation of Italian resistance in Ethiopia delays our
reinforcement of Libya, and you can see how urgent that has become.
It is not merely a case of giving the enemy an immense military
advantage, but undertaking a task in which we should fail.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

30 May 41

It will be convenient to have [Jibuti] in the near future, and I
shall be glad if you will consider what forces would be necessary
to break the French resistance, and whether they could be found
without prejudice to other needs. The time to strike depends, of
course, upon events in Syria, which may lead to a breach with
Vichy, or alternatively to co-operation between the French army
in Syria and the Free French. Either way the seizure of Jibuti
might be fitted in. Meanwhile the blockade should be maintained
with the utmost strictness, and any preparatory concentrations on
the Jibuti frontier which you think helpful may be made. In this
way actual fighting may be avoided, as is greatly to be desired.
The moment for action can only be fixed in consultation with us.

* * * * *

Meanwhile the campaign in Abyssinia had progressed.
Keren resisted obstinately. The flanks of this position could
not be turned; only direct frontal attack was possible. To build
up his resources for this effort and to deploy both his divisions
Platt had but a single road, which lay in full view of the enemy.
Railhead was a hundred and fifty miles away, so that not only
did his preparations take several weeks, but surprise was out
of the question. The air forces, including those from Aden,
now played an invaluable part. In the first phase of this campaign
Italian pilots had shown considerable initiative, but
after the arrival of Hurricanes for the South African fighter
squadron superiority was soon achieved. During the preparatory
stages of the final Keren battle the Italian army was constantly
harried on the ground and in the air. Soon the enemy
ceased to interfere with troop movements, and when the battle
opened support from the air did much to pave the way for our
advance and to break enemy morale. The battle proved
stubborn and cost us three thousand casualties. After the first
three days, March 15 to 17, there was a pause for regrouping.
On the twentieth General Wavell telegraphed that the fighting
had been severe. The enemy had been counter-attacking
fiercely and repeatedly, and although their losses had been
extremely heavy and they had achieved only one success, there
were no immediate signs of a crack. The Italians were evidently
making desperate efforts to save this stronghold, and their air
force was active. From London it looked rather evenly
balanced, and we raised the question of reinforcements. These,
however, were not needed. The attack was renewed on March
25, and two days later the Italian defence broke and Keren fell.
Pursuit was rapid. Asmara fell on April 1, and Massawa, with
ten thousand prisoners, surrendered on April 8.

The victory at Keren was mainly gained by the 4th and 5th
British Indian Divisions. I paid them the tribute that their
prowess deserved.

Prime Minister to Viceroy of India

7 April 41

The whole Empire has been stirred by the achievement of the
Indian forces in Eritrea. For me the story of the ardour and perseverance
with which they scaled and finally conquered the precipitous
heights of Keren recalls memories of the North-West
Frontier of long years ago, and it is as one who has had the honour
to serve in the field with Indian soldiers from all parts of Hindustan,
as well as in the name of His Majesty’s Government, that I
ask Your Excellency to convey to them and to the whole Indian
Army the pride and admiration with which we have followed their
heroic exploits.

I hastened to send Generals Cunningham and Platt and their
gallant armies my heartfelt congratulations and those of His
Majesty’s Government upon “this timely and brilliant culmination
of your memorable and strenuous campaign.”

Other clearances were also effected. On entering the war
Italy had a force of nine destroyers, eight submarines, and a
number of minor vessels in the Red Sea. All these had now
been accounted for by the Royal Navy and the Fleet air arm.
By April 11 President Roosevelt was able to declare that the
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden were no longer “combat zones” and
were therefore open to American ships.

What remained of the Italian army in Eritrea retreated two
hundred and thirty miles south through the mountains and
fortified itself on the position of Amba Alagi. General Platt
followed in their tracks. The 4th Indian Division and the
majority of the supporting air squadrons were now diverted to
Egypt, as a part of events presently to be narrated. With what
remained Platt closed with the enemy. General Cunningham
had reached Addis Ababa on April 6, where remnants of the
Italian Air Force lay in wreckage on the airfield. He thrust the
South African brigade northward through Dessie, and it came
upon the rear of the Italians at Amba Alagi. With their retreat
thus cut off, with General Platt attacking from the north,
harassed by patriots, machine-gunned and bombed from the
air, the Italian resistance could not last long. In early April
Wingate’s Sudanese battalion and local units, together with the
irregulars who had come over to the Emperor, drove twelve
thousand of the enemy in Gojjam into Debra Markos. Half of
them were taken; the rest fled north to Gondar. The Emperor
re-entered his capital on May 5.

* * * * *

When we look back upon the part played by Mussolini in the
European crisis and the events leading to the war arising out of
his attack on Abyssinia, and remember how he had successfully
defied the League of Nations—“Fifty nations led by one”—we
can see how easily firmness and action might have cleared
this complication from the darkening European scene. Now, at
any rate, among all our stresses and dangers we had made a
good job of it. It was not without emotion springing from past
thoughts and experience that I was able to offer my salutations
to Haile Selassie.

Prime Minister to the Emperor of Ethiopia

9 May 41

It is with deep and universal pleasure that the British nation
and Empire have learned of Your Imperial Majesty’s welcome
home to your capital at Addis Ababa. Your Majesty was the first of
the lawful sovereigns to be driven from his throne and country by
the Fascist-Nazi criminals, and you are now the first to return in
triumph. Your Majesty’s thanks will be duly conveyed to the commanders,
officers, and men of the British and Empire forces who
have aided the Ethiopian patriots in the total and final destruction
of the Italian military usurpation. His Majesty’s Government look
forward to a long period of peace and progress in Ethiopia alter
the forces of evil have been finally overthrown.

The Duke of Aosta, a cousin of the King of Italy, had been
Governor-General of Italian East Africa and Viceroy of
Ethiopia since 1937, and Commander-in-Chief of the Italian
armies in these territories since 1939. A chivalrous and cultivated
man, partly educated in England and married to a French
princess, he was not popular with Mussolini. The Duce regarded
him with some justification as lacking in ruthlessness
and commanding military ability. He surrendered with the
remnants of his army on May 17, and died in 1942 as a prisoner
of war in Nairobi.

In the operations since January the greater part of the enemy
forces, originally more than 220,000 strong, had been captured
or destroyed. There still remained many thousand men in the
mountain fastnesses of Abyssinia.

* * * * *

It will be convenient to complete here the tale of the destruction
of the Italian Empire and armies in East Africa, which
formed the accompaniment of so many graver events elsewhere.
Our earlier fears that the Italian civil population of twenty
thousand in Addis Ababa would be slaughtered by the Abyssinians
were relieved. Farther north forty-five hundred Italians
and levies, pressed into Debra Tabor by patriots, surrendered
on July 2 to a British force of one squadron and one company.
Southwest Abyssinia was cleared by part of the 11th African
Division from Addis Ababa and the 12th advancing northward
from the Kenya border. In a long series of operations much
handicapped by ground and weather, by the first week of July
they cleared the whole area of forty thousand enemy. During
the summer native troops under Belgian command came from
the Congo, two thousand miles across Africa, to take part in
the final stages, and themselves took 15,000 prisoners. Only
Gondar remained. But by now the rains had come, and this
last stroke had to wait till they had passed. The net began to
close in late September, and when the end was reached on
November 27, 11,500 Italians, 12,000 local troops and forty-eight
field guns fell into our hands.

Thus ended Mussolini’s dream of an African Empire to be
built by conquest and colonised in the spirit of ancient Rome.

6Decision to Aid Greece

A Strategic Reserve in the Delta—The Moment of Resolve—Our
Freedom to Withdraw—Hopes of a Balkan Front—Admiral
Cunningham on the Naval Risks to Be Run—My Telegram
to General Smuts of February 28— Mr. Eden’s Discussions
with the Turks, February 28—My Comment Thereon—Yugoslavia
the Key—The German Army Moves into Bulgaria—Changed
and Disturbing Situation at Athens—Views of the
Chiefs of Staff—My Reflections upon It and My Message to
Mr. Eden, March 6—Distress of Our Ambassador at Athens—To
Help or to Abandon Greece?—A Measured Reply from
Mr. Eden—Smuts and the Commanders-in-Chief Advise Us to
Go On—A Short Cabinet and a Final Decision, March 7—Response
from New Zealand—And from the Poles—My Telegram
to Mr. Eden of March 14—My Message to President
Roosevelt of March 10.

Hitherto we had not committed ourselves to the Greek
adventure, except by continuous large-scale preparations
in Egypt, and by the discussions and agreements at Athens
which have been described. The preparations could be arrested
by a single order, and anyhow the assembly of a strategic
reserve of four divisions in the Delta was good in itself. The
Greeks had departed in so many ways from the terms of the
Athens Agreement that we could, had we so wished, have asked
for release from it. Dangers approached from every quarter,
but up to the early days of March I felt fairly comfortable and
in essentials free, with a “mass of manoeuvre” in hand.

Now the moment had come when the irrevocable decision
must be taken whether or not to send the Army of the Nile to
Greece. This grave step was required, not only to help Greece
in her peril and torment, but to form against the impending
German attack a Balkan Front comprising Yugoslavia, Greece,
and Turkey, with effects upon Soviet Russia which could not
be measured by us. These would certainly have been all-important
if the Soviet leaders had realised what was coming
upon them. It was not what we could send ourselves that
could decide the Balkan issue. Our limited hope was to stir
and organise united action. If at the wave of our wand
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey would all act together, it
seemed to us that Hitler might either let the Balkans off for
the time being or become so heavily engaged with our combined
forces as to create a major front in that theatre. We did
not then know that he was already deeply set upon his gigantic
invasion of Russia. If we had, we should have felt more confidence
in the success of our policy. We should have seen that
he risked falling between two stools, and might easily impair
his supreme undertaking for the sake of a Balkan preliminary.
This is what actually happened, but we could not know at the
time. Some may think we builded rightly; at least we builded
better than we knew. It was our aim to animate and combine
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Our duty so far as possible
was to aid the Greeks. For all these purposes our four divisions
in the Delta were well placed.

* * * * *

On March 4 Admiral Cunningham left us in no doubt as to
the considerable naval risks in the Mediterranean which were
involved in the move of the Army and the Royal Air Force to
Greece. This meant continuous convoys of men, stores, and
vehicles for the next two months. Destroyers in particular
would have to be very heavily worked, and fighter and anti-aircraft
defence would be weak for some time to come. If the
Germans started an air offensive from Bulgaria we must expect
losses in the convoys both at sea and at their ports of disembarkation,
Nor could we rule out surface action by the Italian
Fleet. This could be met by our battleships based on Suda Bay
in Crete, but only at the expense of weakening the destroyer
escort for the convoys and leaving the supply line to Cyrenaica
practically unprotected. All this in its turn would increase
the strain on Malta. The vulnerability of the Suez Canal to
magnetic and acoustic mines gave cause for much anxiety just
when these big movements of troops and convoys were starting.
All offensive plans, including the combined operations against
Rhodes, must, the Admiral said, be postponed. His resources
would be taxed to the limit, but he was convinced that our
policy was right and that the risks should be faced. The
shelving of Rhodes was to us all a serious disappointment.We
recognised its commanding importance. Rhodes, and also
Scarpanto, with their invaluable airfields so near to Crete, were
key points. Many times in the years that followed did we plan
to assault Rhodes. Never could we fit it in to the main course
of events.

* * * * *

I now learned that General Smuts was going to Cairo at Mr.
Eden’s earnest request, and I cabled to him:

28 Feb. 41

I am so glad you are going to meet Eden and Dill. We have
taken a grave and hazardous decision to sustain the Greeks and try
to make a Balkan Front. I look forward to receiving your personal
views upon this after your conference. This decision makes it
most necessary to reinforce Egypt and Libya, and I hope you will
arrange with Wavell and Dill to bring “Acanthus” [the 1st South
African Division] forward to the Mediterranean at the earliest
moment, asking me about shipping difficulties, which are great.
Our affairs are helped by rapid successes gained in East Africa.
It is only a few weeks ago they were telling us they could not move
on Kismayu till May. Now we have Mogadishu and the whole
place in our hands.

* * * * *

Mr. Eden’s account of his discussions with the Turks was
not encouraging. They realised their own dangers as acutely
as we did, but they, like the Greeks, were convinced that the
forces we could offer would not be sufficient to make any real
difference to an actual battle.

Mr. Eden to Prime Minister

28 Feb. 41

C.I.G.S. and I this morning had discussion on extremely frank
and friendly basis with President of the Council, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and Marshal Chakmak.

Our decision to send Greece the maximum assistance at the
earliest possible moment was well received. They reiterated Turkey’s
determination to fight if attacked by Germany, and stated
their conviction that German attack on Greece meant that Turkey’s
turn would come next. But since Turkey’s forces at present
had no offensive power they considered the common cause would
be better served by Turkey remaining out of the war until her
deficiencies had been remedied and she could be employed with
the maximum effect.

If attacked, Turks felt confident that they could hold the Germans
for a time, though they would hope that we should be able
immediately to come to their assistance. . . . They stated their readiness
to concert action with Yugoslav Government, from whom,
however, they had so far only received an evasive reply to [their]
approach made at our instance. They felt concerned lest Russians
should attack [them] if Turkey became involved in war with Germany.

The upshot of these discussions is that Turkey undertakes in any
event to enter the war at some stage. She will, of course, do so
immediately she is attacked. But if she is given time by Germans
to re-equip herself she will take advantage of it, and will then
make war at a moment favourable to the common cause, when her
weight can be used with real effect.

To this I replied:

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Athens

1 March 41

Obvious German move is to overrun Bulgaria, further to intimidate
Turkey by threat of air attacks, force Greece out of the war,
and then turn on Yugoslavia, compelling her to obey; after which
Turkey can be attacked or not, at their hostile convenience.

Your main appeal should now be made to Yugoslavia. A sudden
move south by Yugoslavia would produce an Italian disaster of the
first magnitude, possibly decisive on whole Balkan situation.[1] If
at the same moment Turkey declared war the enemy could not
gather sufficient forces for many months, during which our air
strength will grow. I am absolutely ready to go in on a serious
hazard if there is reasonable chance of success, at any rate for a
few months, and all preparations should go forward at fullest
speed. But I should like you so to handle matters in Greece that
if upon final consideration of all the factors, including Rhodes
possibilities, you feel that there is not even a reasonable hope, you
should still retain power to liberate Greeks from any bargain and
at the same time liberate ourselves. Evidently you and we have a
few days in which to make our final decision. Meanwhile all
should proceed as arranged.

* * * * *

Our efforts to warn the Yugoslavian Government must now
be described. The whole defence of Salonika depended on
their coming in, and it was vital to know what they would do.
On March 2 Mr. Campbell, our Ambassador at Belgrade, met
Mr. Eden in Athens. He said that the Yugoslavs were frightened
of Germany and unsettled internally by political difficulties.
There was a chance, however, that if they knew our plans for
aiding Greece they might be ready to help. Mr. Eden and the
Greeks feared lest the enemy should find out. On the fifth the
Foreign Secretary sent Mr. Campbell back to Belgrade with a
confidential letter to the Regent. In this he portrayed Yugoslavia’s
fate at German hands, and said that Greece and Turkey
intended to fight if attacked. In such a case Yugoslavia must
join us. The Regent was to be told verbally that the British
had decided to help Greece with land and air forces as strongly
and quickly as possible, and that if a Yugoslav staff officer could
be sent to Athens we would include him in our discussions. The
defence of Salonika would depend on Yugoslavia’s attitude. If
she gave way to Germany the consequences would be obvious.
She was urged instead to join us and have a British army to
fight by her side. Our effort in Greece would be a vigorous one,
and we had a good chance of holding a line.

* * * * *

On March 1 the German Army began to move into Bulgaria.
The Bulgarian Army mobilised and took up positions along
the Greek frontier. A general southward movement of the
German forces was in progress, aided in every way by the
Bulgarians. On the following day Mr. Eden and General Dill
returned to Athens from Angora and military conversations
were resumed. As the result of these Mr. Eden sent a very
serious message.

Mr. Eden and C.I.G.S. to Prime Minister

5 March 41

On arrival here we found a changed and disturbing situation
and the atmosphere quite different from that of our last visit.

2. General Papagos had on the last occasion insisted strongly
that the withdrawal of all troops in Macedonia to the Aliakhmon
line was the only sound military solution. We had expected that
this withdrawal to the Aliakhmon line had already begun. Instead
we found that no movement had in fact commenced, Papagos
alleging that it had been agreed that the decision taken at our
last meeting was dependent on the receipt of an answer from Yugoslavia
as to their attitude. . . .

3. Papagos now proposed to hold the line of fortifications near
the Macedonian frontier with four divisions, although he thought
they could not hold out for long, and also simply to remain where
he was on the Albanian front. This seemed an admission of
despair, as he himself practically admitted.

4. He proposed that British troops should, as they arrived, be
moved up piecemeal to the Macedonian frontier line, although it
was unlikely that they could arrive in time. We naturally refused
to accept this proposal, which was so entirely different from the
conditions under which we had agreed to send our forces. We
telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief Middle East to come to
Athens for discussion. He arrived March 3, and discussions have
been practically continuous. As attitude of Papagos was unaccommodating,
we had to enlist the aid of the King, who was throughout
the very trying discussions which followed calm, determined,
and helpful.

5. We were finally offered three Greek divisions. . . .

6. We were thus faced with following alternatives: (a) To accept
the plan of Papagos, to which he constantly returned, of attempting
to dribble our forces piecemeal up to Macedonian frontier.
(b) To accept three Greek divisions offered for Aliakhmon line,
the equivalent of about sixteen to twenty-three battalions, instead
of thirty-five we had been led to expect on our previous visit, and
to build up our concentration behind this. (c) To withdraw our
offer of military support altogether.

7. We were agreed that course (a) could only lead to military
wavering, while course (c) seemed equally disastrous. . . .

8. We therefore agreed, after some misgivings, to solution (b),
but with the proviso that the command and organisation of the
whole Aliakhmon line was entrusted to General Wilson as soon
as he was in a position to take it over. This was agreed to.

9. Our military advisers did not consider it by any means a hopeless
proposition to check and hold the German advance on this
line, which is naturally strong, with few approaches. At the worst
it should always be possible to make fighting withdrawal from this
line through country eminently suitable for rear-guard action. . . .

10. We are all sure that we have in a very difficult situation
arrived at correct decision. These two days have been indescribably
anxious, but now that decision has been taken there is a marked
improvement in the general atmosphere on Greek side. The hard
fact remains that our forces, including Dominions contingents, will
be engaged in an operation more hazardous than it seemed a week
ago. You will no doubt decide on any communications to be made
to the Dominions Governments. . . .

* * * * *

A marked change now came over our views in London. The
Chiefs of Staff recorded the various factors developing unfavourably
against our Balkan policy, and particularly against
sending an army to Greece. They first emphasised the main
changes in the situation: the depression of the Greek Commander-in-Chief;
the omission of the Greeks to carry out their
undertaking of twelve days earlier to withdraw their troops to
the line we should have to hold if Yugoslavia did not come in;
the fact that thirty-five Greek battalions were to have helped
us hold this line, and that now there were to be only twenty-three
at most, all newly formed, untried in battle, and lacking
in artillery. In addition it had been expected that the Greeks
would be able to withdraw some divisions from their Albanian
front. “General Papagos now says that this cannot be done, as
they are exhausted and outnumbered.”

Turning to our own difficulties, the Chiefs of Staff pointed
out that they had always expected that Rhodes would be captured
before, or simultaneously with, the move to Greece;
instead, this could not now be done till the move was over.
This would mean that instead of our being able to concentrate
our air forces against the German advance we should now have
to conduct “considerable” air operations against Rhodes in
order to protect our lines of communication to Greece. Finally,
the Suez Canal was for the moment completely blocked by
mines, and was not expected to be cleared until March 11.
Half the ships carrying motor transport were north of the
Canal and all the personnel ships south of it. Time, moreover,
was running short. The Chiefs of Staff estimated that the
Germans could concentrate two divisions on the Aliakhmon
line by March 15 and three more by the twenty-second. One of
these would be armoured. Assuming that the Greeks could
only delay them in front of this line for a short time, the best
we could hope for would be to have one armoured and one
New Zealand brigade against the first two German divisions.

“The hazards of the enterprise,” they concluded, “have considerably
increased.” They did not, however, feel that they
could as yet question the military advice of those on the spot,
who described the position as not by any means hopeless.

* * * * *

After reflecting alone at Chequers on the Sunday night upon
the Chiefs of Staff paper and the trend of discussion in the
War Cabinet that morning I sent the following message to Mr.
Eden, who had now left Athens for Cairo. This certainly
struck a different note on my part. But I take full responsibility
for the eventual decision, because I am sure I could have
stopped it all if I had been convinced. It is so much easier
to stop than to do.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Cairo

6 March 41

Situation has indeed changed for worse. Chiefs of Staff have
presented serious commentary, which follows in my next. Failure
of Papagos to act as agreed with you on February 22, obvious
difficulty of his extricating his army from contact in Albania, and
time-table of our possible movements furnished by Wavell,
together with other adverse factors recited by Chiefs of Staff—for
example, postponement of Rhodes and closing of Canal—make
it difficult for Cabinet to believe that we now have any power to
avert fate of Greece unless Turkey and/or Yugoslavia come in,
which seems most improbable. We have done our best to promote
Balkan combination against Germany. We must be careful
not to urge Greece against her better judgment into a hopeless
resistance alone when we have only handfuls of troops which can
reach scene in time. Grave Imperial issues are raised by committing
New Zealand and Australian troops to an enterprise which,
as you say, has become even more hazardous. We are bound to
lay before the Dominions Governments your and Chiefs of Staff
appreciation. Cannot forecast their assent to operation. We do
not see any reasons for expecting success, except that, of course,
we attach great weight to opinions of Dill and Wavell.

We must liberate Greeks from feeling bound to reject a German
ultimatum. If on their own they resolve to fight, we must to
some extent share their ordeal. But rapid German advance will
probably prevent any appreciable British Imperial forces from
being engaged.

Loss of Greece and Balkans is by no means a major catastrophe
for us, provided Turkey remains honest neutral. We could take
Rhodes and consider plans for “Influx” [descent on Sicily] or
Tripoli. We are advised from many quarters that our ignominious
ejection from Greece would do us more harm in Spain and Vichy
than the fact of submission of Balkans, which with our scanty
forces alone we have never been expected to prevent.

I send you this to prepare your mind for what, in the absence
of facts very different from those now before us, will probably be
expressed in Cabinet decision tomorrow.

Attached to this was the grave commentary, summarised
above, of the Chiefs of Staff.

* * * * *

As soon as my warning telegram was read by Sir Michael
Palairet in Athens he showed lively distress, and telegraphed
to the Foreign Secretary, who had now reached Cairo, as
follows:

6 March 41

I have just read the Prime Minister’s message to you. I need
not emphasise to you the effect of our now withdrawing from the
agreement actually signed between Chief of the Imperial General
Staff and Greek Commander-in-Chief and now in process of
execution here by General Wilson himself. How can we possibly
abandon the King of Greece after the assurances given him by
the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the Imperial General Staff
as to reasonable chances of success? This seems to me quite unthinkable.
We shall be pilloried by the Greeks and the world in
general as going back on our word.

2. There is no question of “liberating the Greeks from feeling
bound to reject the ultimatum.” They have decided to fight
Germany alone if necessary. The question is whether we help or
abandon them.

And again to Mr. Eden later in the day:

King of Greece spoke today to Air Attaché with deep appreciation
of your visit and absolute determination to carry out
agreed plan of action against German attack. He has every confidence
in the chances for success, and is satisfied that this confidence
is shared by General Papagos and his Government. He
emphasised the great importance of speed, and particularly of
adequate air forces here, in order to break up the German air
attack, which is their customary opening offensive. Initial German
defeat in the air would, more than anything else, do away with
the myth of German invincibility and give the whole country the
same confidence which he has in prospects for success. I have not
yet seen him myself since you left.

And still later:

General Wilson has had a most satisfactory talk with General
Papagos this morning. He is greatly encouraged by the marked
improvement in the latter’s attitude. He found him most helpful
and anxious to co-operate in every possible way.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (Cairo)

6 March 41

War Cabinet are taking no decision until we receive your reply.

Mr. Eden to Prime Minister

6 March 41

Chief of Imperial General Staff and I, in consultation with the
three Commanders-in-Chief, have this afternoon re-examined the
question. We are unanimously agreed that, despite the heavy
commitments and grave risks which are undoubtedly involved,
especially in view of our limited naval and air resources, the right
decision was taken in Athens. Palairet’s telegrams to Cairo show
the position from Greek angle.

2. This is merely to indicate to you how our minds are working
while we await Cabinet view.

And later:

Mr. Eden to Prime Minister

6 March 41

We have had further discussion this evening with General
Smuts and Commanders-in-Chief, and further detailed appreciation
follows tomorrow morning.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Cairo

7 March 41

I will bring your measured and deliberate reply before the
Cabinet today. Meanwhile all preparations and movements should
go forward at utmost speed.

2. I am deeply impressed with steadfast attitude maintained by
you and your military advisers, Dill, Wavell, and, I presume,
Wilson, on the broad merits, after full knowledge of local and
technical situation and in view of the memorandum by the C.O.S.
Committee.

3. Two points are dominant. First, we must not take on our
shoulders responsibility of urging Greeks against their better
judgment to fight a hopeless battle and involve their country in
probable speedy ruin. If, however, knowing how little we can
send at particular dates, they resolve to fight to the death,
obviously we must, as I have already said, share their ordeal. It
must not be said, and on your showing it cannot be said, that,
having so little to give, we dragged them in by overpersuasion. I
take it, from your attitude and Athens telegrams, that you are sure
on this point.

4. Second point. It happens that most of the troops to be
devoted to this solemn duty are the New Zealand Division and
after March the Australians. We must be able to tell the New
Zealand and Australian Governments faithfully that this hazard,
from which they will not shrink, is undertaken, not because of
any commitment entered into by a British Cabinet Minister at
Athens and signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but
because Dill, Wavell, and other Commanders-in-Chief are convinced
that there is a reasonable fighting chance. This I regard as
implied by your positive reactions to our questioning telegrams.

5. Please remember in your stresses that, so far, you have given
us few facts or reasons on their authority which can be presented
to these Dominions as justifying the operation on any grounds
but noblesse oblige. A precise military appreciation is indispensable.

6. You know how our hearts are with you and your great
officers.

On the seventh the promised fuller statement of the case
reached us in London.

Mr. Eden to Prime Minister

7 March 41

Following are the views of your envoys:

Whole position again fully reviewed with the Commanders-in-Chief
and Smuts. While we are all conscious of the gravity of
the decision, we can find no reason to vary our previous judgment.

2. There has been no question of urging Greece against her
better judgment. At our first meeting at Tatoi Greek Prime
Minister handed me at the outset of the proceedings written statement
announcing Greece’s determination to resist an attack by
Italy or Germany, if necessary alone. The Greek Government
have consistently maintained this attitude, with varying degrees of
confidence as to the outcome. The Greeks appreciate that there
is no honourable peace open to them with Italy and Germany
menacing their frontiers. The Greeks can only share the fate of
Rumania, or continue the struggle whatever the odds.

3. We have already undertaken commitments towards Greece.
Eight squadrons of the R.A.F., ground defences and anti-aircraft
personnel, have been operating there for months past.

4. Collapse of Greece without further effort on our part to save
her by intervention on land, after the Libyan victories had, as all
the world knows, made forces available, would be the greatest
calamity. Yugoslavia would then certainly be lost; nor can we
feel confident that even Turkey would have the strength to remain
steadfast if the Germans and Italians were established in Greece
without effort on our part to resist them. No doubt our prestige
will suffer if we are ignominiously ejected, but in any event to
have fought and suffered in Greece would be less damaging to us
than to have left Greece to her fate. . . .

In the existing situation we are all agreed that the course advocated
should be followed and help given to Greece.

We devoutly trust, therefore, that no difficulties will arise with
regard to the dispatch of Dominions forces as arranged. At the
same time, if the operation is to have a fair chance of success, it is
vital to find means of supplementing the very serious gap in our
forces, particularly in the air. As we have already many times
emphasised since our arrival, weakness in the air is our chief
anxiety in this theatre of war. Germans, working on interior lines,
are increasing their weight of attack from Sicily and Tripoli, from
the Balkans and the Dodecanese. We are making no corresponding
increase in our own reinforcements, and drastic reduction in the
promised allotment of Tomahawks has come as a grievous blow.
Royal Air Force here are daily engaged with the Italian Metropolitan
Air Force in Albania, and with an ever-increasing proportion
of German Air Force in other areas.

The struggle in the air in this theatre will be a stern one. Longmore
requires all the help that can be given. If he can hold his
own most of the dangers and difficulties of this enterprise will
disappear.

Accompanied by the Chiefs of Staff, I brought the issue
before the War Cabinet, who were fully apprised of everything
as it happened, for final decision. In spite of the fact that we
could not send more aircraft than were already ordered and on
the way, there was no hesitation or division among us. Personally
I felt that the men on the spot had been searchingly tested.
There was no doubt that their hands had not been forced in
any way by political pressure from home. Smuts, with all his
wisdom, and from his separate angle of thought and fresh eye,
had concurred. Nor could anyone suggest that we had thrust
ourselves upon Greece against her wishes. No one had been
overpersuaded. Certainly we had with us the highest expert
authority, acting in full freedom and with all knowledge of the
men and the scene. My colleagues, who were toughened by the
many risks we had run successfully, had independently reached
the same conclusions. Mr. Menzies, on whom a special burden
rested, was full of courage. There was a strong glow for action.
The Cabinet was short; the decision final.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Cairo

7 March 41

Cabinet this morning considered project in light of your telegrams
from Athens and Cairo, and my telegrams. Chiefs of Staff
advised that, in view of steadfastly expressed opinion of Commanders-in-Chief
on the spot, of the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, and commanders of the forces to be employed, it would be
right to go on. Cabinet decided to authorise you to proceed with
the operation, and by so doing Cabinet accepts for itself the fullest
responsibility.[2] We will communicate with Australian and New
Zealand Governments accordingly.

In a more personal strain I telegraphed two days later:

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Cairo

9 March 41

I entirely agree with all your handling of the Balkan telegrams.
There seems still a chance of Yugoslavia coming in, and
more than a chance of her keeping the door shut.

2. While you are on the spot you should deal faithfully with
Egyptian Prime Minister, Farouk, and anyone else about our
security requirements. It is intolerable that Rumanian Legation
should become a nest of Hun spies, or that the Canal Zone should
be infested by enemy agents. I am relying on you to put a stop
to all this ill-usage we are receiving at the hands of those we have
saved.

3. Will you tell Smuts how glad I should be if now he is so
near he could come and do a month’s work in the War Cabinet
as of old.

4. Do not overlook those parts of your instructions dealing with
the economy of the Middle East armies. Am relying on you to
clean this up, and to make sure that every man pulls his weight.
A few days might well be devoted to this.

* * * * *

Meanwhile New Zealand made a fine response to our request
for her division.

Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand

12 March 41

We are deeply moved by your reply, which, whatever the fortunes
of war may be, will shine in the history of New Zealand and
be admired by future generations of free men in every quarter of
the globe.

To make good the request and assumption at the end of your
message shall be our faithful, unremitting endeavour.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Cairo

14 March 41

I have come to the conclusion that it is better for you to stay
in Middle East until the opening phase of this crisis has matured.
Your instructions give you the means of concerting the political
and military action of all the factors involved. The attitude of
Yugoslavia is still by no means hopeless, and a situation may at
any moment arise which would enable you to go there. Turkey
requires stimulus and guidance as events develop. No one but you
can combine and concert the momentous policy which you have
pressed upon us and which we have adopted. The War Cabinet
needs a representative on the spot, and I need you there very much
indeed.

2. I saw Sikorski this morning and asked for the Polish Brigade.
He agreed in the most manly fashion, but he asked that this Brigade,
which was one of the few remaining embodiments of Polish
nationality, should not be lightly cast away or left to its fate. I
promised full equipment and no greater risks than would be run
by own flesh and blood. He said, “You have millions of soldiers;
we have only these few units.” I hope you appreciate what we are
asking of these valiant strangers, and that General Wavell will
have this in his mind always.

3. I feel very much the fact that we are not using a single British
division. I am arranging to send the 50th Division with Convoy
W.S. 8, leaving April 22. A special convoy would only have
saved a week, and we cannot afford the extra escort.

4. We have not been told by Wavell whether Glens[3] got through
Canal, but presume this will be regarded as urgent in the highest
degree. A source of which you are aware shows that preparations
are being made to withdraw German personnel from Rhodes in
expectation of its British occupation. You ought not to be easily
contented with delaying Rhodes indefinitely. We need to take it at
earliest moment, and thereafter we need the 6th British Division,
whether things go well or ill. We must not be reproached with
hazarding only other people’s troops. You ought to press hard and
long for taking Rhodes before the end of this month.

5. Can you tell me why Papagos does not draw three or four
divisions from Albania to strengthen his right front? Recent check
which Italians are said to have received and fact that German
advance has not yet begun may still give time for this. Present
strategic layout of Greek Army looks to me most dangerous.
Papagos must have good reasons, and if you have learned them
pray let me know.

6. Of course, if Yugoslavia came in this would justify Greek
strength in Albania. But this is not yet known. Presume you and
Dill have studied carefully possibilities of a Yugoslav attack on
Italians in Albania. Here they might win victory of the first order,
and at the same time gain the vast mass of the equipment they
need to preserve their independence and can never find elsewhere
in time.

7. Do not let Lemnos be picked up by the Germans as an air
base for nothing.

8. It seems right to obtain a decision at Keren before withdrawing
air squadrons you have thereabouts.

9. Your message containing Longmore’s complaints overlooks
what is on the way.

After giving the details of these air reinforcements I added:

The fact that Longmore thinks you ought to come home via
Lagos, in which view Portal concurs, is final reason for my wish
for you and Dill to remain on scene. For otherwise, apart from
larger considerations in my paragraph 1, you will both be out of
action at either end during a most critical seven days. Everything
is going quietly here, and we have begun to claw the Huns down
in the moonlight to some purpose. God bless you all.

I thought it right to inform President Roosevelt of our plans
in a message which may well end this anxious chapter.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

10 March 41

I must now tell you what we have resolved about Greece. Although
it was no doubt tempting to try to push on from Benghazi
to Tripoli, and we may still use considerable forces in this direction,
we have felt it our duty to stand with the Greeks, who have
declared to us their resolve, even alone, to resist the German invader.
Our Generals Wavell and Dill, who accompanied Mr. Eden
to Cairo, after heart-searching discussions with us, believe we have
a good fighting chance. We are therefore sending the greater part
of the Army of the Nile to Greece, and are reinforcing to the
utmost possible in the air. Smuts is sending the South Africans to
the Delta. Mr. President, you can judge these hazards for yourself.

At this juncture the action of Yugoslavia is cardinal. No country
ever had such a military chance. If they will fall on the Italian rear
in Albania there is no measuring what might happen in a few
weeks. The whole situation might be transformed, and the action
of Turkey also decided in our favour. One has the feeling that
Russia, though actuated mainly by fear, might at least give some
reassurance to Turkey about not pressing her in the Caucasus or
turning against her in the Black Sea. I need scarcely say that the
concerted influence of your Ambassadors in Turkey, Russia, and
above all in Yugoslavia, would be of enormous value at the moment,
and indeed might possibly turn the scales.

In this connection I must thank you for magnificent work done
by Donovan in his prolonged tour of Balkans and Middle East.
He has carried with him throughout an animating, heart-warming
flame.

This refers to three fast transports specially prepared for military operations.
See Volume II, page 463.

7The Battle of the Atlantic, 1941

The Western Approaches

A Supreme Anxiety—Combination of U-Boats and Aircraft—Strain
on the Western Approaches—Our Counter-Measures—A
Struggle to Breathe—Landed Cargoes Drop by Half—Damage
to Shipping and Congestion at the Ports—Formation of the
Import Executive, January—The Work of the Lord President’s
Committee—My Minute of January 28—And of February 22—Move
of the Command of the Western Approaches from
Plymouth to Liverpool, February 17—Storm Havoc Among Our
Older Ships—Hitler’s Menace of January 30—The Admiralty
Salvage Organisation—Sorties by German Cruisers—The
“Scheer” in the South Atlantic—The “Scharnhorst” and
“Gneisenau” Break Out—Eighty Thousand Tons of Shipping
Sunk in Two Days, March 15-16—Raiders Take Refuge in
Brest, March 22—Hitler’s Error—The Battle of the Atlantic—The
Battle of the Atlantic Committee—My Directive of
March 6—The U-Boats in “Wolf-Packs”—Tactical Problems—Help
from the United States, March 11—Passing of the
Lend-Lease Bill—The Imports Budget, March 26—Close Relations
with the United States—The “Dunkerque” Incident—Pressure
by President Roosevelt on Vichy.

Amid the torrent of violent events one anxiety reigned
supreme. Battles might be won or lost, enterprises might
succeed or miscarry, territories might be gained or quitted, but
dominating all our power to carry on the war, or even keep
ourselves alive, lay our mastery of the ocean routes and the free
approach and entry to our ports. I have described in the previous
volume the perils which the German occupation of the
coast of Europe from the North Cape to the Pyrenees brought
upon us. From any port or inlet along this enormous front the
hostile U-boats, constantly improving in speed, endurance, and
radius, could sally forth to destroy our seaborne food and trade.
Their numbers grew steadily. In the first quarter of 1941 production
of new craft was at the rate of ten a month—soon
afterward increased to eighteen a month. These included the
so-called 500-ton and 740-ton types, the first with a cruising
range of 11,000 miles and the latter of 15,000 miles.

To the U-boat scourge was now added air attack far out on
the ocean by long-range aircraft. Of these the Focke-Wulf 200,
known as the Condor, was the most formidable, though happily
at the beginning there were few of them. They could start from
Brest or Bordeaux, fly right round the British Island, refuel in
Norway, and then make a return journey next day. On their
way they would see far below them the very large convoys of
forty or fifty ships to which scarcity of escort had forced us to
resort, moving inward or outward on their voyages. They could
attack these convoys, or individual ships, with destructive
bombs, or they could signal the positions to which the waiting
U-boats should be directed in order to make interceptions.
Already in December we had begun preparations for the desperate
expedient of an underwater dynamite carpet from the
mouths of the Mersey and the Clyde to the hundred-fathom
line northwest of Ireland.[1]

Meanwhile we had ordered the expansion and redeployment
of the Air Coastal Command, giving it high priority in pilots
and machines. We planned to increase this command by fifteen
squadrons by June, 1941, and these reinforcements were to
include all the fifty-seven American long-range Catalinas which
we expected to receive by the end of April. The denial to us
of all facilities in Southern Ireland again exerted its baleful
influence on our plans. We pressed forward with the construction
of new airfields in Ulster as well as in Scotland and the
Hebrides.

The evil conditions thus described continued, some in an
aggravated form. The stranglehold of the magnetic mine, was
only loosened and kept from closing by triumphs of British
science and ingenuity, carried into effect by the ceaseless toil
of twenty thousand devoted men in a thousand small craft
with many strange varieties of apparatus. All our traffic along
the east coast of Britain was under constant menace from
German light bombers or fighter aircraft, and was in consequence
severely restricted and reduced. The port of London,
which in the First World War had been deemed vital to our
existence, had been cut down to a quarter of its capacity. The
Channel was an actual war area. Bombing raids on the
Mersey, the Clyde, and Bristol gravely hampered these sole
remaining major commercial ports. The Irish and Bristol
Channels were closed or grievously obstructed. Every expert
authority, if presented a year earlier with the conditions now-prevailing,
would have pronounced our plight hopeless beforehand.
It was a struggle to breathe.

The very magnitude and refinement of our protective
measures—convoy, diversion, degaussing, mine-clearance, the
avoidance of the Mediterranean—the lengthening of most
voyages in time and distance and the delays at the ports
through bombing and the black-out, all reduced the operative
fertility of our shipping to an extent even more serious than
the actual losses. At the outset the Admiralty naturally
thought first of bringing the ships safely to port, and judged
their success by a minimum of sinkings. But now this was
no longer the test. We all realised that the life and war effort
of the country depended equally upon the weight of imports
safely landed. “I see,” I minuted to the First Lord in the
middle of February, “that entrances of ships with cargo in
January were less than half of what they were last January.”

The pressure grew unceasingly, and our shipping losses were
fearfully above our new construction. The vast resources of
the United States were only slowly coming into action. We
could not expect any further large windfalls of vessels such
as those which had followed the overrunning of Norway,
Denmark, and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940. Moreover,
damaged shipping far exceeded our repairing resources,
and every week our ports became more congested and we fell
further behind. At the beginning of March over 2,600,000
tons of damaged shipping had accumulated, of which about
930,000 tons were ships undergoing repair while loading
cargoes, and nearly 1,700,000 tons were immobilised by the
need of repairs. Indeed, it was to me almost a relief to turn
from these deadly undertides to the ill-starred but spirited
enterprises in the military sphere. How willingly would I
have exchanged a full-scale attempt at invasion for this shapeless,
measureless peril, expressed in charts, curves, and
statistics!

* * * * *

Early in January, 1941, we had formed the Import Executive,
consisting of the principal importing departments, under
the chairmanship of the Minister of Supply, and the parallel
body, the Production Executive, under the Minister of
Labour. The principal object of the first of these bodies was
to grapple with the import situation, to improve the organisation
of shipping and transport, and to solve the many intricate
problems of labour and organisation arising at the ports. I
now worked closely with these powerful bodies, which often
sat together, and I sought to concert their action.

Prime Minister to Minister of Shipping

4 Jan. 41

The Import Executive will explore the whole of this situation,
the development of which was one of the reasons for calling the
said Executive into being. I shall myself keep in the closest touch
with the Import Executive, and will endeavour to give the necessary
decisions. It is hoped that by the more efficient use of our
shipping, its turn-round, port and labour resources, the tonnage
available may be increased beyond the 33,000,000 tons which is all
you can at present foresee. The Ministry of Shipping and the Ministry
of Transport, together with the Ministry of Labour, will co-operate
actively with the Import Executive, and their work will
be effectively concerted by that Executive. In addition to this, the
Admiralty will be asked to concentrate more effort upon the repair
of ships, even to some extent to the detriment of new merchant
shipbuilding. We hope American aid will be forthcoming, and
that greater security will be achieved by our convoys as the nights
shorten and our main reinforcements of escorting craft come into
service.

Prime Minister to Import Executive

23 Jan. 41

I request that you will not consider yourselves bound by the
estimate of losses put forward by the Ministry of Shipping, or take
that as the foundation for future calculations. The Ministry of
Shipping have reached a total of 5,250,000 tons per annum by taking
as their basis the period since the collapse of France, including
the quite exceptional losses of the Norwegian and French evacuations.
A better alternative method of calculation would be to take
the monthly rate for the whole year 1940, which is 4,250,000 tons;
or, again, for the whole war, which is between 3,750,000 and 4,000,000
tons, provided the extraordinary evacuation losses are deducted.

2. It is probably prudent to assume that this rate will continue.
It does not follow, however, that it will not be reduced as our improved
methods come into play and the additional destroyers reach
the Fleet. Bearing this in mind, I think it would be safe to work
on the monthly average since the beginning of the war.

My estimate was fully justified by events in the year 1941.

* * * * *

At the beginning of the year, I asked Sir John Anderson, the
Lord President of the Council, to make it his particular task to
grip and drive forward the plans for harnessing to our warmaking
machine the full economic resources of the nation.

Prime Minister to Lord President of the Council

28 Jan. 41

While the Import and Production Executives necessarily are concerned
with the practical handling of the business committed to
them, it is essential that the larger issues of economic policy should
be dealt with by your committee, and primarily by you. This is in
accordance with the drift of well-informed public opinion. You
should, therefore, not hesitate to take the initiative over the whole
field. You should summon economists like Keynes to give their
views to you personally. You should ask for any assistance or staff
you require, utilising, of course, the Statistical Department. Professor
Lindemann and his branch will assist you in any way you
wish, and will also act as liaison between you and me. I wish you
to take the lead prominently and vigorously in this committee,
and it should certainly meet at least once a week, if not more often.

Will you consult with Sir Edward Bridges on the above, and
let me know how you propose to implement it.

Anderson bent to this task, his energy, mature judgment,
and skill in administration. His long experience as a civil
servant at home, and as Governor of Bengal, had given him
a wide knowledge of Government departments and of the
official machine. He soon gained the confidence of his Ministerial
colleagues, and shaped the Lord President’s committee
into a powerful instrument for concerting departmental plans
over the whole range of wartime economic policy. As time
went on this committee came to exercise on behalf of the War
Cabinet a large measure of authority and power of decision in
this and other spheres. Its sure control over economic policy
and Home Front problems helped to free me for the military
field.

* * * * *

Prime Minister to Sir Andrew Duncan, Minister of Supply

22 Feb. 41

The Prime Minister would be glad if you would bring the attached
notes and diagrams to the attention of the Import Executive.
They have been prepared under the Prime Minister’s personal
direction by Professor Lindemann. They disclose a most
grave and as yet unexplained tendency, which, if it is not corrected,
will hazard the life of Britain and paralyse her war effort.

The Prime Minister does not understand how it is that, when
the sinkings are less (although very serious) and the volume of
tonnage (apart from its routing) very little diminished, there
should be such a frightful fall in imports.

He is very glad to see that there is a sharp recovery in the last
two weeks, and he hopes this may be the first fruits of the Import
Executive.

The Prime Minister will be glad to see the Import Executive
Committee at 5 P.M. on Tuesday, with a view to learning from
them whether they have any further measures to propose to avert
a potentially mortal danger.

* * * * *

As early as August 4, 1940, I had asked the Admiralty to
move the controlling centre of the western approaches from
Plymouth to the Clyde.[2] This proposal had encountered
resistance, and it was not until February, 1941, that the increasing
pressure of events produced Admiralty compliance.
The move to the north was agreed. The Mersey was rightly
chosen instead of the Clyde, and on February 17 Admiral
Noble was installed at Liverpool as Commander-in-Chief of the
western approaches. Air Chief Marshal Bowhill, commanding
the Coastal Command, worked with him in the closest intimacy.
The new joint headquarters was soon operating, and
from April 15 the two commands were forged into a single
highly tempered weapon under the operational control of the
Admiralty.

* * * * *

The new year opened with violent and almost continuous
storms, causing much havoc among the older ships which,
despite their age and infirmity, we had been compelled to use
on the ocean routes. Presently, in Berlin, on January 30, 1941,
Hitler made a speech threatening us with ruin and pointing
with confidence to that combination of air and sea power
lapping us about on all sides by which he hoped to bring
about our starvation and surrender. “In the spring,” he said,
“our U-boat war will begin at sea, and they will notice that
we have not been sleeping [shouts and cheers]. And the air
force will play its part, and the entire armed forces will force
a decision by hook or by crook.”

Prime Minister to Import Executive

25 Feb. 41

I learn that the Admiralty salvage organisation has recently made
as great a contribution to the maintenance of our shipping capacity
as new construction, about 370,000 gross tons having been saved in
the last five months of 1940, as against 340,000 tons built, while
the number of ships being dealt with by the salvage organisation
has increased very rapidly, from ten in August to about thirty now.

They are to be congratulated on this, and I feel sure that if anything
can be done to assist in the expansion of their equipment
and finding of suitable officers your Executive will see that such
measures are taken.

Meanwhile we cannot take full advantage of these results owing
to shortage of repairing capacity. I have no doubt that your Executive
is planning an increase of this capacity, and meanwhile is
making use of facilities overseas in the case of all vessels capable
of doing one more voyage before repair.

* * * * *

Apart from the U-boat war upon us, we were at this time
seriously affected by the sorties of powerful German cruisers.
The attack on a convoy by the Scheer in November, 1940,
when she sank the noble Jervis Bay, has already been recorded.
In January she was in the South Atlantic, moving towards the
Indian Ocean. In three months she destroyed ten ships, of sixty
thousand tons in all, and then succeeded in making her way
back to Germany, where she arrived on April 1, 1941. We had
not been able to deploy against her the powerful forces which
a year before had tracked down the Graf Spee. The cruiser
Hipper, which had broken into the Atlantic at the beginning
of December, 1940, was sheltering in Brest. At the end of
January the battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, having
at length repaired the damage inflicted upon them in Norway,
were ordered to make a sortie into the North Atlantic, while
the Hipper raided the route from Sierra Leone. In their first
attempt to break out, these battle-cruisers, under the command
of Admiral Lutjens, narrowly escaped destruction by the Home
Fleet. They were saved by persistent fogs, and on February 3
successfully passed through the Denmark Strait unobserved.
At the same time the Hipper had left Brest for the southward.

On February 8 the two German battle-cruisers, astride the
Halifax route, sighted an approaching British convoy. The
German ships separated so as to attack from different angles.
Suddenly, to their surprise, they perceived that the convoy was
escorted by the battleship Ramillies. Admiral Lutjens at once
broke off the engagement. In his basic instructions he had been
ordered to avoid action with an equal opponent, which he was
to interpret as meaning any one British fifteen-inch-gun battleship.
His prudence was rewarded, and on February 22, he sank
five ships, dispersed from an outward-bound convoy. Fearing
our reactions, he then moved to an area farther south, and on
March 8 he met a convoy from Freetown. But here again he
found a battleship, the Malaya, in company, and he could do
no more than call for U-boats to converge and attack. The
U-boats sank five ships. Having shown himself in this area, he
once more returned to the West Atlantic, where he now
achieved his biggest success. On March 15 he intercepted six
empty tankers, dispersed from an outward-bound convoy, and
sank or captured them all. The next day he sank ten more
ships, mostly from the same convoy. Thus in these two days
alone he destroyed or captured over eighty thousand tons of
shipping.

But the Rodney, escorting a Halifax convoy, was drawing
near. Admiral Lutjens had run risks enough and had much
to show. Early on March 22 he entered Brest. During their
cruise of two months the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had sunk
or captured twenty-two ships, amounting to 115,000 tons.
Meanwhile the Hipper had fallen upon a homeward-bound
Sierra Leone convoy near the Azores which had not yet been
joined by an escort. In a savage attack lasting an hour she
destroyed seven out of nineteen ships, making no attempt to
rescue survivors, and regained Brest two days later. These were
heavy losses for us, additional to the toll of the U-boat war.
Moreover, the presence of these strong hostile vessels compelled
the employment on convoy duty of nearly every available
British capital ship. At one period the Commander-in-Chief
of the Home Fleet had only one battleship in hand.

The Bismarck was not yet on the active list. The German
Admiralty should have waited for her completion and for that
of her consort, the Tirpitz. In no way could Hitler have used
his two giant battleships more effectively than by keeping them
both in full readiness in the Baltic and allow rumours of an
impending sortie to leak out from time to time. We should
thus have been compelled to keep concentrated at Scapa Flow
or thereabouts practically every new ship we had, and he would
have had all the advantages of a selected moment without the
strain of being always ready. As ships have to go for periodic
refits, it would have been almost beyond our power to maintain
a reasonable margin of superiority. Any serious accident would
have destroyed that power.

* * * * *

My thought had rested day and night upon this awe-striking
problem. At this time my sole and sure hope of victory depended
upon our ability to wage a long and indefinite war
until overwhelming air superiority was gained and probably
other Great Powers were drawn in on our side. But this mortal
danger to our life-lines gnawed my bowels. Early in March
exceptionally heavy sinkings were reported by Admiral Pound
to the War Cabinet. I had already seen the figures, and after
our meeting, which was in the Prime Minister’s room at the
House of Commons, I said to Pound, “We have got to lift this
business to the highest plane, over everything else. I am going
to proclaim ‘the Battle of the Atlantic.’ ” This, like featuring
“the Battle of Britain” nine months earlier, was a signal intended
to concentrate all minds and all departments concerned
upon the U-boat war.

In order to follow this matter with the closest personal
attention, and to give timely directions which would clear
away difficulties and obstructions and force action upon the
great number of departments and branches involved, I brought
into being the Battle of the Atlantic Committee. The meetings
of this committee were held weekly, and were attended by all
Ministers and high functionaries concerned, both from the
fighting services and from the civil side. They usually lasted
not less than two and a half hours. The whole field was gone
over and everything thrashed out; nothing was held up for want
of decision. An illustration of the tempo of the Battle of the
Atlantic in 1941 is afforded by the meetings of this committee.
It met weekly without fail during the period March 19 to
May 8. It then met fortnightly for a spell, and finally much
less frequently. The last meeting was on October 22.

Throughout the wide circles of our war machine, embracing
thousands of able, devoted men, a new proportion was set, and
from a hundred angles the gaze of searching eyes was concentrated.
March 6, as the preceding chapter may have shown,
was an exacting day, when the decision about sending the Army
to Greece hung in the balance. Nevertheless, before it ended
my directive entitled “The Battle of the Atlantic” was achieved.
I read this to the House in the Secret Session of June 25, 1941,
but it is necessary to the story to reprint it here.

The Battle of the Atlantic

Directive by the Minister of Defence, March 6, 1941

In view of various German statements, we must assume that the
Battle of the Atlantic has begun.

The next four months should enable us to defeat the attempt
to strangle our food supplies and our connection with the United
States. For this purpose—

1. We must take the offensive against the U-boat and the Focke-Wulf
wherever we can and whenever we can. The U-boat at sea
must be hunted, the U-boat in the building yard or in dock must
be bombed. The Focke-Wulf and other bombers employed against
our shipping must be attacked in the air and in their nests.

2. Extreme priority will be given to fitting out ships to catapult
or otherwise launch fighter aircraft against bombers attacking our
shipping. Proposals should be made within a week.

3. All the measures approved and now in train for the concentration
of the main strength of the Coastal Command upon the
northwestern approaches, and their assistance on the East Coast by
Fighter and Bomber Commands, will be pressed forward. It may
be hoped that, with the growing daylight and the new routes to be
followed, the U-boat menace will soon be reduced. All the more
important is it that the Focke-Wulf, and, if it comes, the Junkers
88, should be effectively grappled with.

4. In view of the great need for larger numbers of escorting
destroyers, it is for consideration whether the American destroyers
now in service should go into dock for their second scale of improvements
until the critical period of this new battle has been
passed.

5. The Admiralty will re-examine, in conjunction with the Ministry
of Shipping, the question of liberating from convoys ships
between thirteen and twelve knots, and also whether this might
not be tried experimentally for a while.

6. The Admiralty will have the first claim on all the short-range
A.A. guns and other weapons that they can mount upon suitable
merchant ships plying in the danger zone. Already two hundred
Bofors or their equivalents have been ordered to be made available
by Air Defence Great Britain and the factories. But these
should be followed by a constant flow of guns, together with crews
or nucleus crews, as and when they can be taken over by the
Admiralty. A programme for three months should be made.

7. We must be ready to meet concentrated air attacks on the
ports on which we specially rely (Mersey, Clyde, and Bristol
Channel). They must, therefore, be provided with a maximum
defence. A report of what is being done should be made in a week.

8. A concerted attack by all departments involved must be made
upon the immense mass of damaged shipping now accumulated in
our ports. By the end of June this mass must be reduced by not
less than 400,000 tons net. For this purpose a short view may for
the time being be taken both on merchant and naval shipbuilding.
Labour should be transferred from new merchant shipbuilding
which cannot finish before September, 1941, to repairs. The Admiralty
have undertaken to provide from long-distance projects of
warship building or warship repairs up to five thousand men at
the earliest moment, and another five thousand should be transferred
from long-distance merchant shipbuilding.

9. Every form of simplification and acceleration of repairs and
degaussing, even at some risk, must be applied in order to reduce
the terrible slowness of the turn-round of ships in British ports. A
saving of fifteen days in this process would in itself be equivalent
to 5,000,000 tons of imports, or a tonnage [equal to] 1,250,000 of
the importing fleet saved. The Admiralty have already instructed
their officers in all ports to aid this process, in which is involved
the process of repairs, to the utmost. Further injunctions should
be given from time to time, and the port officers should be asked
to report what they have done and whether they have any recommendations
to make. It might be desirable to have a conference of
port officers, where all difficulties could be exposed and ideas interchanged.

10. The Minister of Labour has achieved agreement in his conference
with employers and employed about the interchangeability
of labour at the ports. This should result in a substantially effective
addition to the total labour force. In one way or another, at
least another forty thousand men must be drawn into ship-repairing,
shipbuilding, and dock labour at the earliest moment. Strong
propaganda should be run locally at the ports and yards, in order
that all engaged may realise the vital consequences of their work.
At the same time, it is not desirable that the press or the broadcast
should be used unduly, since this would only encourage the enemy
to further exertions.

11. The Ministry of Transport will ensure that there is no congestion
at the quays, and that all goods landed are immediately
removed. For this purpose the Minister will ask the Chairman of
the Import Executive for any further assistance required. He
should also report weekly to the Import Executive upon the
progress made in improving the ports on which we specially rely
by transference of cranes, etc., from other ports. He should also
report on the progress made in preparing new facilities at minor
ports, and whether further use can be made of lighterage to have
more rapid loading or unloading.

12. A Standing Committee has been set up of representatives
from the Admiralty Transport Department, the Ministry of Shipping,
and the Ministry of Transport, which will meet daily and
report all hitches or difficulties encountered to the Chairman of
the Import Executive. The Import Executive will concert the
whole of those measures and report upon them to me every week,
in order that I may seek Cabinet authority for any further steps.

13. In addition to what is being done at home, every effort must
be made to ensure a rapid turn-round at ports abroad. All concerned
should receive special instructions on this point, and should
be asked to report on the measures which they are taking to implement
these instructions, and on any difficulties that may be encountered.

* * * * *

On this same busy March 6 I also produced a memorandum
on the strength of the Army in the light of all I had learnt
about the import situation. This will be found among the
Appendices.[3]

* * * * *

The U-boats now began to use new methods, which became
known as “wolf-pack” tactics. These consisted of attacks from
different directions by several U-boats working together.
Attacks were at this time usually made by night, the U-boats
operating on the surface at full speed unless detected in the
approach. Under these conditions only the destroyers could
rapidly overhaul them.

These tactics, which formed the keynote of the conflict for
the next year or more, presented us with two problems. First,
how to defend our convoys against this high-speed night attack,
in which the Asdic was virtually impotent. The solution lay
not only in the multiplication of fast escorts, but still more in
the development of effective radar. Moreover, a prompt answer
here was imperative or our losses would soon become unbearable.
The small scale of the earlier onslaughts of the U-boats,
against which we had been relatively successful, had created an
undue sense of security. Now, when the full fury of the storm
broke, we lacked the scientific equipment equal to our needs.
We addressed ourselves vigorously to this problem, and by the
unsparing efforts of the scientists, supported by the solid teamwork
of sailors and airmen, good progress was made. The
results came slowly, and meanwhile grave anxiety and heavy
losses continued.

The second need was to exploit the vulnerability to air attack
of the surfaced U-boat. Only when we could afford to court
attack in the knowledge that we were masters would the long-drawn
battle be won. For this we needed an air weapon which
would kill, and also time to train both our sea and air forces in
its use. When eventually both these problems were solved the
U-boat was once more driven back to the submerged attack, in
which it could be dealt with by the older and well-tried
methods. This vital relief was not achieved for another two years.

Meanwhile the new “wolf-pack” tactics, inspired by Admiral
Doenitz, the head of the U-boat service, and himself a U-boat
captain of the previous war, were vigorously applied by the
redoubtable Prien and the other tiptop U-boat commanders.
Swift retribution followed. On March 8 Prien’s U-47 was sunk
with himself and all hands by the destroyer Wolverine, and
nine days later U-99 and U-100 were sunk while engaged in a
combined attack on a convoy. Both were commanded by outstanding
officers, and the elimination of these three able men
had a marked effect on the progress of the struggle. Few U-boat
commanders who followed them were their equals in ruthless
ability and daring. Five U-boats were sunk in March in the
western approaches, and though we suffered grievous losses,
amounting to 243,000 tons, by U-boat, and a further 113,000
tons by air attack, the first round in the Battle of the Atlantic
may be said to have ended in a draw.

* * * * *

An all-important event now impended upon the other side
of the Atlantic. I was in close touch with Hopkins in these
days. After thanking him for the “packet of 250,000 rifles and
ammunition, which has safely arrived,” I cabled on February 28:

I am, however, increasingly anxious about the high rate of shipping
losses in northwestern approaches and the shrinkage in tonnage
entering Britain. This has darkened since I saw you. Let me
know when the [Lend-Lease] Bill will be through. The strain is
growing here.

Presently came good tidings from the United States. The
Lend-Lease Bill had passed Congress, and on March 11 received
the eager assent of the President. Hopkins sent me the earliest
intimation. This was at once a comfort and a spur. The stuff
was coming. It was for us to get it over.

Prime Minister to Mr. Hopkins

9 March 41

Thank God for your news. Strain is serious. Kindest regards.

To President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person

9 March 41

Our blessings from the whole British Empire go out to you and
the American nation for this very present help in time of trouble.

In my broadcast of February 9 I had already said, “Give us
the tools and we will finish the job.” This could only be an
interim pronouncement. Far more was needed, but we did our
best.

* * * * *

We had now to make our budget of imports for the U-boat
year 1941, exactly like a Chancellor of the Exchequer in
finance. By the end of March all the studies and discussions
of our ways and means were completed, and I could submit to
the War Cabinet my final proposals for the size and character
of the three branches of the fighting services, and also the
quantity and character of the imports for which we should
strive.

The Import Programmes

Memorandum by the Prime Minister, March 26, 1941

We should assume an import of not less than 31,000,000 tons
in 1941. On this basis food cannot be cut lower than 15,000,000
tons, and 1,000,000 is required for the Board of Trade. This leaves
15,000,000 for the Ministry of Supply, as against 19,000,000 to
which they were working on the 35,000,000 programme. A cut of
4,000,000 has therefore to be made by the Ministry of Supply, for
which a revised programme should be framed. Ferrous metals,
timber, and pulp seem to offer the main field of reduction. As we
can now buy steel freely in the United States, the keeping in being
of the whole of the existing steel industry cannot be accepted as an
indispensable factor. We must try to import in the most concentrated
forms and over the shortest routes. This principle must also
influence food imports.

2. Should our total imports fall below 31,000,000, the deficit
should for the present be met by the Ministry of Food and the
Ministry of Supply on the basis of one ton cut in food to two tons
in supply. Should the imports exceed 31,000,000, the benefit will
be shared in the same proportion. The position will be reviewed
in the autumn, when this year’s harvest is known.

3. I have received from the War Office a reply to my notes about
Army Scales, which they have had under consideration for three
weeks.[4] My notes do not look farther ahead than 1942, and must
be subject to review in the light of events. My figure of “about
two millions” may be interpreted as desired by the War Office at
“2,195,000 [men],” for which the arrangements are completed. The
War Office proposal to substitute for my figure of fifteen armoured
divisions twelve armoured divisions and nine army tank brigades
may be approved, and the target figure for the grand total of the
Imperial Army in March, 1942, of fifty-nine and one third “equivalent
divisions” may be accepted. The resultant saving on man-power
intake from now to the end of 1942 is about 475,000. This
saving, and the increase in armoured forces at the expense of infantry
and artillery, should afford an important relief to the Ministry
of Supply in hutments, clothing, and projectiles.

4. The Purvis Programme, which was submitted to President
Roosevelt in January to give him the general scale, may now be
more precisely defined as the Ministry of Supply desire, and in so
doing, if convenient, the adjustment may be made to cover the
change in the proportion of armoured forces. However, it is important
that no diminution should be made in anything we need
and are likely to get from the United States; in particular, the
equipment for the ten extra divisions should stand.

5. The Naval Programme is the subject of a separate note,[5] but
the following principles which have a bearing on imports may be
stated here.

The remaining three King George V class battleships must be
completed at full speed. The construction of Vanguard, which is
the only capital ship which can reach us in 1943 and before 1945,
is most desirable. One new monitor is also needed. No other
heavy ships can be proceeded with at present, and no more armour-plate
can be provided for other naval purposes for the next six
months; nor should new armour-plate factories be laid down. This
position will be reviewed on September 1 in the light of (a) the
Battle of the Atlantic, (b) the relationship of the United States to
the war.

The requirements of the Admiralty for armour-plate must not
exceed the 16,500 tons provided for 1941, nor the 25,000 tons for
1942. If these limits are observed, the Ministry of Supply should
be able to execute the increased tank programme.

6. The Ministries of Food and Agriculture should, upon the
basis of 15,000,000 tons import in 1941, concert an eighteen months’
programme, drawing as may be necessary upon our meat reserves
on the hoof to cover the next six months, but endeavouring to provide
by concentrated imports the most varied dietary possible for
the nation at war. By taking a period as long as eighteen months
it should be possible to avoid hurried changes in policy, to use
reserves as balancing factors, and to make the best use of the
assigned tonnage.

7. The British air power will continue to be developed to the
utmost within the above limits and with the present priorities and
assignments.

When these precise instructions received the assent of the
War Cabinet they were obeyed without demur by all concerned.

* * * * *

From the time of the passing of the Lend-Lease Bill our
relations with the United States grew steadily closer. Under
our pressures we adopted a stronger attitude towards Vichy
France. The recent depredations of the German battle-cruisers
had shown the mischief of these powerful ships, soon to be
reinforced by the Bismarck. There was also the fear that the
Germans might gain control over the French Fleet and bring
the fast battleship Dunkerque into their service.

I cabled to President Roosevelt:

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

2 April 41

We have entirely trustworthy information that Vichy Government
received “permission” from Armistice Commission to transfer
the battleship Dunkerque, with escort protection of the whole
Strasbourg group, from Oran to Toulon for “disarmament.”

2. It seems certain that object of transfer is to effect repairs, and
we must, of course, assume it is being done on German orders.

3. I do not need to point out to you the grave danger to which
this exposes us. The menace from German surface raiders is
already great enough. The addition of such a vessel to the raiding
fleet would set us a hard problem indeed. If any value were to be
attached to Admiral Darlan’s word, it might be hoped that he
would in the last resort order out of French metropolitan ports
naval units ready for sea. But if Dunkerque is docked and immobilised
for repairs, that gives the Germans time to swoop and
gain possession of her.

4. I fear this is a sinister confirmation of our worst suspicions of
Darlan.

5. You have already, through your Ambassador in Vichy, indicated
to the French Government that negotiations for the supply
of grain to unoccupied France would be greatly facilitated if
French warships in metropolitan ports were gradually transferred
to North African Atlantic ports. Here we have Darlan not merely
failing to comply with your wishes, but deliberately flying in the
face of them.

6. I earnestly hope that you may at once indicate to Marshal
Pétain that if Darlan persists in this action he will be cutting off
relief from his country and finally forfeiting American sympathy.
We ourselves in this situation could, of course, lend no assistance
to the revictualling of France. There may be just a chance that
Marshal Pétain may deter him from this action, but if not the
matter for us is so vital that we may, even in spite of all the dangerous
implications, have to make an effort to intercept and sink
this vessel. I should like to hear from you that you would understand
the necessity for such a step.

7. It is, of course, of first importance that neither the French
nor their masters should be made aware that we might take the
drastic action mentioned in paragraph 6.

Urgent as was the matter, I would not take action till I knew
what the President felt and wished.

Prime Minister to First Lord

3 April 41

No attack should be made upon the Dunkerque unless or
until an answer is received from President Roosevelt which expresses
no objection. Absence of any reference to the topic in his
answer may be taken as consent.

2. On this reply being received, the First Lord should, if possible,
consult the Lord Privy Seal in my absence, and decide.

3. Personally, my bias is strongly in favour of making the attack.
Alas, we cannot be sure of success. Perhaps it is ten to one against
a successful attack on a ship properly escorted by destroyers.

4. The reaction on Vichy would not, in my opinion, be serious.
They would know they were found out doing a pro-Hun trick. So
far as the French people are concerned, nothing would be easier
than by repeated broadcasts to explain that this ship was being
delivered over in a helpless condition into the German power, as
in the event of a German descent she could not get away from the
dock at Toulon like the mobile units of the French Fleet.

* * * * *

The next days we learned from the President that there
would be at least a pause, because the Dunkerque would not be
leaving Oran within the next ten days. On April 6 he told
us that Mr. Matthews, the American Counsellor at Vichy, had
asked Marshal Pétain for an urgent appointment. This was
granted, but as soon as Matthews told Pétain that he wished to
discuss the Dunkerque the Marshal, who was obviously not
informed upon the situation, sent for Darlan. Darlan arrived
and said that, of course, this information came from the English,
and complained that they wanted theirs to be the only fleet in
the Mediterranean. He admitted that he was bringing the
battleship to Toulon because he could not have it repaired at
Oran, and anyway he was not going to leave it there. The
Marshal and he had pledged their word of honour that French
ships would not fall into German hands, and he repeated this
assurance. The Dunkerque would not be moved immediately,
and would not be ready for ten days or more. The American
Embassy at Vichy believed that this was true, and thought that
even if the ship were brought to Toulon she could not be put
into service before the end of August. Darlan had then made
a series of anti-British statements, and the Marshal had
promised Mr. Matthews a formal reply. The President said
that Pétain apparently grasped the written word better than he
trusted his memory, and might upon closer study give us the
promise for which we asked.

I expressed my thanks and continuing concern.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

6 April 41

Most grateful for your spirited intervention about Dunkerque.
It is quite true that Toulon could not repair her for from three
to six months, but why do we want that hanging over our head
anyway? Darlan’s honour about her never falling into German
hands is rooted in dishonour. A ship in dry dock or under heavy
repair could not possibly get away before the Germans could lay
hold of Toulon. Their officers and agents are on the spot all the
time, and remember how easy we found it to cop the French ships
at Portsmouth and Plymouth. We ought to stick to our settled
policy of resisting all transfers of French ships from African to
German-controlled or potentially German-controlled French ports,
and encourage all movement the other way. If Darlan gets Dunkerque
to Toulon, why should he not ask for Jean Bart from Casablanca
or Richelieu from Dakar? Therefore, I urge strong and
stern continuance of utmost pressure you can exert. Evidently this
is most powerful, as we have certain knowledge that they were to
sail morning fourth and all preparations made. Pétain does not
know half what this dirty Darlan does. It would be far better if
your pressure deterred Darlan, as it has already, than that we
should have to take rough action, with all its dangers.

2. Question is whether timely publicity might not help deter.
Do you mind if I say something like this on Wednesday in Commons:
“There was always the risk that Darlan might bring Dunkerque
from Oran to Toulon in order to prepare her for war purposes.
Such an act would affect the balances of naval power
throughout the world, and would affect American interests besides
our own. Representations have been made to Marshal Pétain by
the United States Government which should have shown Vichy
Government how undesirable this step would be from the point of
view of French interests. His Majesty’s Government would certainly
be bound to regard it as a menacing act done at Hitler’s
instigation and as a step in Admiral Darlan’s schemes for gaining
personal control of France as the Germans’ trusted agent. In these
circumstances His Majesty’s Government would hold themselves
free to take any action which was suitable against this ship, either
in passage or while under repair in Toulon Harbour. They would
greatly regret if such a situation arose, as they have no wish or
policy towards France other than her liberation from the German
yoke and the maintenance of the integrity of the French Empire.”
Please let me know what you think of this, or whether you can get
the matter settled behind the scenes.

On April 9 I used these words to the House of Commons,
and the Dunkerque incident was finally settled by the submission
of the Vichy Government to President Roosevelt’s
pressure.

President Roosevelt to Former Naval Person

11 April 41

I have received the following [note] from Vichy, dated April 8:

“By a memorandum handed to Marshal Pétain on April 4, the
American Chargé d’Affaires called attention to a report according
to which the French Government, ‘authorised by the Wiesbaden
Armistice Commission,’ was preparing to transfer the Dunkerque
from Oran to Toulon, at the very moment when the Government
of the United States was expressing its interest in an opposite movement
of naval forces. ‘Should such a transfer take place,’ adds the
memorandum, ‘the Government of the United States could no
longer envisage the continuation of the policy which it desired to
pursue for the supplying, as far as possible, of its indispensable aid
to unoccupied France, to say nothing of the other acts of co-operation
envisaged.’

“The Marshal’s Government loyally admits without any embarrassment
that it had in fact intended to have the Dunkerque made
ready for transfer to Toulon in the near future. But this measure
had been envisaged with full sovereignty, without any foreign
pressure whatsoever, and solely for technical reasons.

“The Government of the United States is fully aware that the
Dunkerque was severely damaged in the month of July, 1940, as
the result of an odious assault in which numerous Frenchmen
were killed.

“The ship is today in condition to move; but its final repairs
require a stay in dry dock, which can only be made in Toulon, the
only arsenal of either North Africa or the unoccupied zone able
to accommodate it. This is the sole reason why the transfer of the
Dunkerque was envisaged and remains necessary. Nevertheless, in
view of the political significance which the Government of the
United States seems disposed to attach to this transfer, the French
Government agrees to delay the preparation of the ship until the
conclusion of an agreement on this subject. It desires thus to show
the Federal Government its will to pursue loyally, for its part, as
far as its means will permit, the policy undertaken with a view to
assuring the supplying of French Africa and the unoccupied zone.

“But by postponing putting into final shape one of its most
precious war vessels the French Government is making a heavy
sacrifice of self-respect and interest which affects its possibilities of
defending its Empire as well as its means of protecting French
maritime traffic.

“The French Government thus expects the American Government
to use its good offices in London in order to obtain from
the British Government the guarantee that as long as the Dunkerque
remains in North Africa no further capture will be exercised
against our legitimate commercial traffic between the French
colonies, French Africa, and the unoccupied zone. It is evident
in fact that a country as threatened with famine as France is cannot
be asked to renounce the utilisation of all its means of defence
if the commercial maritime traffic for the protection of which
guarantees have been offered continues to be pursued and attacked.”

Of course no such guarantee was given by us, and the powerful
intervention of President Roosevelt at this time enabled our
relations with Vichy France to become somewhat less hostile.

8The Battle of the Atlantic: 1941

The American Intervention

Armed Aid from the United States—Secret Staff Discussions in
Washington—Development of American Naval Bases—The
U-boats Move Westward—Importance of Iceland—The Halifax
Route—Growth of the Royal Canadian Navy—Advanced
Escort Base at St. John’s, Newfoundland—Losses Continue to
Mount—More Than Eight Hundred Thousand Tons Sunk in
Three Months—Further American Aid—Extension of the
Security Zone, April 11—The Sea Frontier of the United States—The
Azores—My Telegram of April 24—Admiralty Talks
with Admiral Ghormley—President Roosevelt Declares an Unlimited
National Emergency, May 27—Hitler’s Dread of War
with the United States—U-Boat Difficulties—A Dangerous
Combination Disrupted—We Begin to Gain the Upper Hand,
June—Our Need for More and Faster Escorts—And Lone-Range
Aircraft—And Good Radar—Catapulting of Fighters
Against the Focke-Wulf—Publication of the Weekly Sinkings
Discontinued—Achievements of Our Combined Headquarters
at Liverpool—The United States Occupy Iceland, July 7—The
Threat from Brest—The Unified Direction of the War Machine—Our
Losses and Intense Efforts—Appointment of Lord
Leathers—Mr. Lewis Douglas—Improvement in Clearance of
Goods from Our Ports.

Important changes now took place in the U-boat war. The
elimination of the three German “aces” in March and the
improvement in our defence measures had their effect on
U-boat tactics. Finding the western approaches too hot, they
moved farther west into waters where, since the Southern Irish
ports were denied us, only a few of our flotilla escorts could
reach them and where air protection was impossible. From
our bases in the United Kingdom our escorts could only
provide effective protection to our convoys over about a quarter
of the route to Halifax. Early in April a wolf-pack struck a
convoy in longitude 28° West before the escort had joined it.
In a protracted action ten ships were sunk out of a total of
twenty-two, one U-boat also being destroyed. Somehow we
had to contrive to extend our reach or our days would be
numbered.

Hitherto help from across the ocean had been confined to
supplies; but now in this growing tension the President, acting
with all the powers accorded to him as Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces and enshrined in the American Constitution,
began to give us armed aid. He resolved not to allow the
German U-boat and raider war to come near the American
coast, and to make sure that the munitions he was sending
Britain at least got nearly halfway across. As early as July,
1940, he had sent a naval and military mission to England for
“exploratory conversations.” Admiral Ghormley, the United
States Naval Observer, was soon satisfied that Britain was inflexibly
resolved, and could hold out against any immediate
threat. His task, in collaboration with the Admiralty, was to
determine how the power of the United States could best be
brought to bear, first under the existing policy of “all aid short
of war,” and secondly in conjunction with the British armed
forces if and when the United States should be drawn into war.

From these early beginnings sprang the broad design for the
joint defence of the Atlantic Ocean by the two English-speaking
Powers. In January, 1941, secret Staff discussions began in
Washington covering the whole scene, and framing a combined
world strategy. The United States war chiefs agreed that should
the war spread to America and to the Pacific the Atlantic and
European theatre should be regarded as decisive. Hitler must
be defeated first, and on this conception American aid in the
Battle of the Atlantic was planned. Preparations were started
to meet the needs of joint ocean convoy in the Atlantic. In
March, 1941, American officers visited Great Britain to select
bases for their naval escorts and air forces. Work on these was
at once begun. Meanwhile the development of American bases
in British territory in the West Atlantic, which had begun in
1940, was proceeding rapidly. The most important for the
North Atlantic convoys was Argentia, in Newfoundland. With
this and with harbours in the United Kingdom American
forces could play their fullest permissible part in the battle, or
so it seemed when these measures were planned.

Between Canada and Great Britain are the islands of Newfoundland,
Greenland, and Iceland. All these lie near the flank
of the shortest, or great-circle, track between Halifax and Scotland.
Forces based on these “stepping-stones” could control
the whole route by sectors. Greenland was entirely devoid of
resources, but the other two islands could be quickly turned
to good account. It has been said, “Whoever possesses Iceland
holds a pistol firmly pointed at England, America, and
Canada.” It was upon this thought that, with the concurrence
of its people, we had occupied Iceland when Denmark was
overrun in 1940. Now we could use it against the U-boats, and
in April, 1941, we established bases there for the use of our
escort groups and aircraft. Iceland became a separate command,
and thence we extended the range of the surface escorts
to 35° West. Even so there remained an ominous gap to the
westward which for the time being could not be bridged. In
May a Halifax convoy was heavily attacked in 41° West and
lost nine ships before our anti-U-boat escort could join it.

Meanwhile the strength of the Royal Canadian Navy was
increasing, and their new corvettes were beginning to emerge
in good numbers from the building yards. At this crucial
moment Canada was ready to play a conspicuous part in the
deadly struggle. The losses in the Halifax convoy made it
quite clear that nothing less than end-to-end escort from
Canada to Britain would suffice, and on May 23 the
Admiralty invited the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland
to use St. John’s, Newfoundland, as an advanced base for
our joint escort forces. The response was immediate, and by
the end of the month continuous escort over the whole route
was at last a reality. Thereafter the Royal Canadian Navy
accepted responsibility for the protection, out of its own resources,
of convoys on the western section of the ocean route.
From Great Britain and from Iceland we were able to give
protection over the remainder of the passage. Even so the
strength available remained perilously small for the task, to
be performed. Meanwhile our losses had been mounting
steeply. In the three months ending with May U-boats alone
sank 142 ships, of 818,000 tons. Of these, 99 ships, of about
600,000 tons, were British. To achieve these results the Germans
maintained continuously about a dozen U-boats in the
North Atlantic, and in addition endeavoured to spread-eagle
our defence by determined attacks in the Freetown area, where
six U-boats in May alone sank thirty-two ships.

* * * * *

In the United States the President was moving step by step
ever more closely with us, and his powerful intervention soon
became decisive. As we had found it necessary to develop bases
in Iceland, so he in the same month took steps to establish an
air base for his own use in Greenland. It was known that the
Germans had already installed weather-reporting stations on the
Greenland east coast and opposite Iceland. The President’s
action was therefore timely. Furthermore, by other decisions
not only our merchant ships but our warships, damaged in the
heavy fighting in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, could be
repaired in American shipyards, thus giving instant and much-needed
relief to our heavily strained resources at home. The
President confirmed this in a telegram of April 4, which also
stated that he had allotted funds to build another fifty-eight
launching yards and two hundred more ships.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

4 April 41

I am most grateful for your message just received through the
Ambassador about the shipping.

2. During the last few weeks we have been able to strengthen
our escorts in home northwestern approaches, and in consequence
have hit the U-boats hard. They have now moved farther west,
and this morning (April 3) sank four ships on the twenty-ninth
meridian one day before our escort could meet them. Beating the
U-boat is simply a question of destroyers and escorts, but we are
so strained that to fill one gap is to open another. If we could get
your ten cutters taken over and manned we would base them on
Iceland, where their good radius would give protection to convoys
right up to where they meet our British-based escorts. Another
important factor in northwestern approaches is long-distance aircraft.
These are now coming in. Meanwhile, though our losses
are increasingly serious, I hope we shall lessen the air menace when
in a month or six weeks’ time we have a good number of Hurricane
fighters flying off merchant ships patrolling or escorting in
the danger zone.

Great news arrived a week later. The President cabled me
on April 11 that the United States Government proposed to
extend their so-called security zone and patrol areas, which
had been in effect since very early in the war, to a line covering
all North Atlantic waters west of about West Longitude 26°.
For this purpose the President proposed to use aircraft and
naval vessels working from Greenland, Newfoundland, Nova
Scotia, the United States, Bermuda, and the West Indies, with
possibly a later extension to Brazil. He invited us to notify
him in great secrecy of the movement of our convoys, “so that
our patrol units can seek out any ships or planes of aggressor
nations operating west of the new line of the security zones.”
The Americans for their part would immediately publish the
position of possible aggressor ships or planes when located in the
American patrol area. “It is not certain,” the President ended,
“that I would make a specific announcement. I may decide to
issue the necessary naval operative orders and let time bring
out the existence of the new patrol area.”

I transmitted this telegram to the Admiralty with a deep
sense of relief.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

16 April 41

I had intended to cable you more fully on your momentous
message about the Atlantic. Admiralty received the news with the
greatest relief and satisfaction, and have prepared a technical
paper. They wonder whether, since Admiral Ghormley arrives here
in about two days, it would be better to discuss this with him
before dispatch. I do not know whether he is apprised or not. The
matter is certainly of highest urgency and consequence. There are
about fifteen U-boats now operating on the thirtieth meridian, and
of course United States flying-boats working from Greenland would
be a most useful immediate measure.

Two days later, on April 18, the United States Government
announced the line of demarcation between the Eastern and
Western Hemispheres to which the President had referred in
his message of April 11. This line, drawn along the meridian
of 26° West, became thereafter the virtual sea frontier of the
United States. It included within the United States’ sphere all
British territory in or near the American continent, Greenland,
and the Azores, and was soon afterward extended eastward to
include Iceland. Under this declaration United States warships
would patrol the waters of the Western Hemisphere, and would
incidentally keep us informed of any enemy activities therein.
The United States, however, remained non-belligerent and
could not at this stage provide direct protection for our convoys.
This remained solely a British responsibility over the
whole route.

Both the British and American naval chiefs were at this time
anxious about the Azores. We strongly suspected that the
enemy were planning to seize them as a base for U-boats and
aircraft. These islands, lying near the centre of the North
Atlantic, would in enemy hands have proved as great a menace
to our shipping movements in the south as Iceland in the
north. The British Government for its part could not tolerate
such a situation arising, and in response to urgent calls from
the Portuguese Government, who were fully alive to the danger
to their own country, we planned and prepared an expedition
to forestall such a German move. We had also made plans to
occupy Grand Canary and the Cape Verde Islands, should
Hitler move into Spain. The urgency of these expeditions
vanished once it became clear that Hitler had shifted his eyes
towards Russia.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

24 April 41

I now reply in detail to your message of April 11. The delay
has been caused by waiting for Admiral Ghormley, whose arrival
was uncertain. The First Sea Lord has had long discussions with
Ghormley, as the result of which I am advised as follows:

2. In the Battle of the Atlantic we have two main problems to
deal with in addition to the menace from aircraft round our coast.
These problems are those of the U-boats and the raiders.

3. As regards the U-boats, we have had considerable success in
dealing with these pests when they were working somewhere in the
longitude of 22° West in the northwestern approaches. Whether
it was because of our success or for some other reason, they are
now working in about 30° West.

4. We have, however, been able gradually to strengthen our
escorting forces, thanks to the United States destroyers which were
sent us, and by the use of Iceland as a refuelling base for the
escorts.

5. It may be expected that the enemy’s reaction to this will be
to send his U-boats still farther west, and as most of them are based
on either L’Orient or Bordeaux they can do this without operating
farther from their bases than they are at the present time.

6. It is quite likely therefore that the area to the westward of
35° West and to the southward of Greenland will be the next
danger area, and it is one which it is difficult for us to deal with.
Aerial reconnaissance which could be carried out from Greenland
to cover this area would therefore be of the greatest value, as if a
U-boat were located we should be able to reroute our convoys by
signal so as to pass clear of the danger.

7. Another area in which we are having considerable trouble is
that from Freetown up through the Cape Verdes to the Azores.
We cannot route our convoys very far to the west owing to the
[limited] endurance of the vessels on this run. In fact, it is only by
reducing their cargo and taking in extra fuel that they can make
the passage. We are providing such escort for these convoys as we
are able, but it is quite inadequate, and it would be of the greatest
help if air reconnaissance by one of the United States carriers
would cover the water some distance in advance of the convoys.

8. There will be no difficulty in giving the American naval
authorities notification of the movements of convoys.

9. As regards raiders, one great danger point is off Newfoundland,
as we have a very large amount of shipping proceeding independently
through this area. This was the area in which the
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau made such a bag. Any additional long-range
air reconnaissance which could be carried out from Newfoundland
or Nova Scotia would be of the greatest assistance.

10. We hope to station a powerful capital ship in either Nova
Scotia or Newfoundland, which would be able to take advantage
of any information which we receive regarding the activities of
raiders.

11. There are various areas on our trade routes in which the
enemy is liable to operate and which are west of the longitude 26°
West. There are also certain areas in the North and South Atlantic
off the trade routes in which the enemy maintain their supply ships
and where they go to refuel. Up to the present time we have been
unable to search out these seas, as we have not had the ships to do
it with. If we knew that reconnaissance was going to take place
over any given area we would endeavour to have in the vicinity a
force which would be capable of dealing with any raider which
was located. Apart from any information which your ships were
able to broadcast, the mere fact of air reconnaissance taking place
over these areas would give the enemy a great feeling of uneasiness.

12. It is understood that arrangements have already been made
for secret intercommunication between British and United States
warships.

13. For yourself alone. There is another matter closely connected
with the above which is causing me and the Naval Staff increasing
anxiety. The capacity of Spain and Portugal to resist the
increasing German pressure may at any time collapse, and the
anchorage at Gibraltar be rendered unusable. To effect this the
Germans would not need to move a large army through Spain, but
merely to get hold of the batteries which may molest the anchorage,
for which a few thousand artillerists and technicians might
be sufficient. They have already done some of their usual preliminary
penetration into Tangier, and thus both sides of the Straits
might quickly pass into the hands of expert hostile gunners.

14. Of course, the moment Spain gives way or is attacked we
shall dispatch two expeditions which we have long been holding
in readiness, one from Britain to one of the islands in the Azores,
and subsequently to a second island, and the second expedition to
do the same in the Cape Verdes. But these operations will take
eight days from the signal being given, and one can never tell that
the Germans may not have forestalling plans on foot. With our
other naval burdens we have not the forces to maintain a continuous
watch. It would be a very great advantage if you could send
an American squadron for a friendly cruise in these regions at the
earliest moment. This would probably warn Nazi raiders off, and
would keep the place warm for us as well as giving us invaluable
information.

15. I have had long talks with Mr. Forrestal, and am taking him
and Harriman with me tomorrow night to study the position in
the Mersey area, so important to the northwestern approaches.

* * * * *

Meanwhile, as a result of the Admiralty talks with Admiral
Ghormley, a detailed plan for helping us in the Atlantic had
been arranged with the United States.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

24 April 41

Greatly cheered by the news about “Navy Western Hemisphere
Defence Plan No. 2.” It almost entirely covers the points made
in my cable to you, which crossed the official communication. We
are deeply impressed by the rapidity with which it is being brought
into play. We have just received a report which indicates that a
surface raider is operating in a position about three hundred miles
southeast of Bermuda. Everything will be done to tell the Commander-in-Chief
of the United States Fleet about our convoys and
other matters. Admiral Ghormley is in closest touch with the Admiralty,
and the necessary Staff arrangements will be perfected.

2. The route taken by British shipping to and from the Cape
is dependent on the areas in which U-boats are suspected, but a
route west of 26° West is being used at the present time, and will
be used whenever possible.

3. We welcome the energetic steps the United States Navy are
taking to prepare the bases in the northwestern approaches. . . .
The action you have taken may well decide the Battle of the Atlantic
in a favourable sense.

We are, of course, observing the strictest secrecy. You will, I am
sure, however, realise that if it were possible for you to make any
kind of disclosure or declaration on these lines, it might powerfully
influence the attitude both of Turkey and Spain at a cardinal
moment.

The effects of the President’s policy were far-reaching, and
we continued our struggle with important parts of our load
taken off our backs by the Royal Canadian and the United
States Navies. The United States was moving ever nearer to
war, and this world-tide was still further speeded by the irruption
of the Bismarck into the Atlantic towards the end of May.
This episode will be described in due course. In a broadcast
on May 27, the very day that the Bismarck was sunk, the President
declared, “The war is approaching the brink of the
Western Hemisphere itself. . . . The Battle of the Atlantic now
extends from the icy waters of the North Pole to the frozen
continent of the Antarctic.” He went, on, “It would be suicide
to wait until they [the enemy] are in our front yard. . . . We
have accordingly extended our patrols in North and South
Atlantic waters.” At the conclusion of this speech the President
declared an “Unlimited National Emergency.”

* * * * *

There is ample evidence to show that the Germans were
greatly disturbed at this extension of American activity, and
Admirals Raeder and Doenitz besought the Fuehrer to grant
greater latitude to the U-boats and permit them to operate
towards the American coast as well as against American ships
if convoyed or if proceeding without lights. Hitler, however,
remained adamant. He always dreaded the consequences of
war with the United States, and insisted that German forces
should avoid provocative action against her.

* * * * *

The expansion of the enemy’s efforts also brought its own
correctives. By June he had, apart from those training, about
thirty-five U-boats at sea, but the manning of the numbers of
new craft now coming forward outstripped his resources in
highly trained crews, and above all in experienced captains.
The “diluted” crews of the new U-boats, largely composed of
young and unpractised men, showed a decline in pertinacity
and skill. Furthermore, the extension of the battle into the
remoter expanses of the ocean disrupted the dangerous combination
of the U-boats and the air. German aircraft in large
numbers had not been equipped or trained for operations over
the sea. None the less, in the same three months of March,
April, and May 179 ships, of 545,000 tons, were sunk by air
attack, mainly in the coastal regions. Of this total 40,000 tons
were destroyed, as has been described in an earlier chapter, in
two fierce attacks on the Liverpool docks early in May. I was
thankful the Germans did not persevere on this tormented
target. All the while the stealthy, insidious menace of the
magnetic mine had continued around our coasts, with varying
success; but our counter-measures remained dominant, and by
1941 sinkings by mines were greatly diminishing.

By June the steady growth of our defence measures both in
home waters and in the Atlantic, aided by Canada and America,
began once more to gain the upper hand. The utmost exertions
were being made both to improve the organisation of our
convoy escorts and to develop new weapons and devices to aid
them in their task. The chief needs were for more and faster
escorts with greater fuel endurance, for more long-range aircraft,
and above all for good radar. Shore-based aircraft alone
were not enough, and every convoy needed shipborne airplanes
to detect any U-boat within striking distance in daylight, and
by forcing it to dive prevent it making contact, or making a
report which would draw others to the scene. Even so, the
value of the air arm at this stage was still chiefly for reconnaissance.
Aircraft could observe U-boats and force them down,
but the power to kill was not yet developed, and at night their
value was greatly limited. The lethal power of the air in
U-boat warfare was yet to come.

Against the Focke-Wulf assailant, however, the air weapon
could be quickly turned to good account. By the use of fighter
aircraft discharged from catapults mounted in ordinary merchant
ships, as well as in converted ships manned by the Royal
Navy, we soon met this thrust. The fighter pilot, having been
tossed like a falcon against his prey, had at first to rely for his
life on being retrieved from the sea by one of the escorts.

The Focke-Wulf, being challenged itself in the air, was no
longer able to give the same assistance to the U-boats, and
gradually became the hunted rather than the hunter.

* * * * *

Our losses from enemy action during the fateful months show
the stresses of this life-and-death struggle:

Gross Tons

January

320,000

February

402,000

March

537,000

April

654,000

May

500,000

June

431,000

The April figures, of course, include the exceptional losses in
the fighting around Greece.

* * * * *

I watched the process with constant attention.

Prime Minister to Minister of Information

14 April 41

The publication of the weekly sinkings is to be discontinued
henceforward—that is, no more, no publication next Tuesday.
When the press ask why have the week’s figures not come out, the
answer will be they are to be published monthly instead of weekly.
When the comment is made that we are afraid to publish weekly
because, as you say, we “desire to cover up the size of our most
recent shipping losses,” the answer should be, “Well, that is what we
are going to do anyway.” Friends and enemies will no doubt put
on their own interpretation. But only the facts will decide. We
shall have a lot of worse things than that to put up with in the
near future.

I will answer any questions on the subject myself in the House.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges, General Ismay, and other members of Atlantic Committee concerned

28 April 41

It is not intended to use the catapult ships as ordinary freighters;
nor can a number like two hundred, which has been mentioned,
be at any time contemplated.

2. There are at present five catapult patrol vessels working like
the Pegasus. These should be joined at the earliest moment by the
first ten catapult-fitted merchant ships, and from these fifteen vessels
there must be found a regular patrol covering or accompanying
the convoys in the Focke-Wulf zone.

3. As some of these vessels are probably heavier, faster, and more
valuable merchant vessels than are required for this patrolling
service, they are to be replaced at earliest by other smaller vessels
which the Ministry of Shipping can better spare. The large ones
already fitted, having been relieved, may ply on the Freetown-Britain
route, as they will have the opportunity of going through
two danger zones in each voyage, and the catapult Hurricanes will
thus have adequate opportunities of fighting.

4. If the fifteen ships devoted to the northwestern approaches
patrol are proved to be a success and it is thought necessary to
increase their numbers, a proposal should be put forward. At the
same time the Beaufighter aircraft now employed on patrol duties
should be returned to Fighter Command, where they are most
urgently needed for night fighting.

* * * * *

We developed and expanded our bases in Canada and Iceland
with all possible speed, and planned our convoys accordingly.
We increased the fuel capacity of our older destroyers and
their consequent radius. The newly formed Combined Headquarters
at Liverpool threw itself heart and soul into the
struggle. As more escorts came into service and the personnel
gained experience, Admiral Noble formed them into permanent
groups under group commanders. Thus the essential
team spirit was fostered and men became accustomed to working
in unison with a clear understanding of their commander’s
methods. These escort groups became ever more efficient, and
as their power grew that of the U-boats declined.

* * * * *

Meanwhile in June President Roosevelt made an important
move. He decided to establish a base in Iceland. It was agreed
that United States forces should relieve the British garrison.
They reached Iceland on July 7, and this island was included
in the defence system of the Western Hemisphere. Thereafter
American convoys escorted by American warships ran regularly
to Reykjavik, and although the United States were still not at
war they admitted foreign ships to the protection of their
convoys.

Throughout these critical months the two German battle-cruisers
remained poised in Brest. At any moment it seemed
that they might again break out, to cause further havoc in the
Atlantic. It was due to the Royal Air Force that they continued
inactive. Repeated air attacks were made on them in port,
with such good effect that they remained idle through the year.
The enemy’s concern soon became to get them home; but even
this they were unable to do until 1942. Hitler’s plan for the
invasion of Russia soon brought us much-needed respite in the
air. For this new enterprise the German Air Force had to be
re-deployed in strength, and thus from May onward the scale
of air attack against our shipping fell.

* * * * *

It is worth while at this point to anticipate some of the
results which were gained in the Battle of the Atlantic by the
intensive study which we made of all the knowable factors at
work. It was a great advantage that the whole process of our
many decisions could be passed continuously through a single
mind, and that, as Prime Minister, I received in so full a
measure from my colleagues the authority necessary to give a
unified direction throughout this vast administrative sphere.
The war machine over which I presided as Minister of Defence
was capable of enforcing all decisions with precision.

At the end of June I reported, on the authority of the
Admiralty, to the House of Commons a decisive decline in
British losses by aircraft attack in the North Atlantic:

In my directive of March 6 I had aimed at reducing the
1,700,000 tons of shipping immobilised by the need for repairs
by 400,000 tons by July 1. Later on we became more ambitious
and set ourselves as a target a reduction of 750,000 tons by the
same date. Actually we achieved a reduction of 700,000 tons.
This was accomplished in the teeth of the air attacks made on
the Mersey and the Clyde at the beginning of May. The welcome
addition of a large number of ships, hitherto given up as
hopeless, which were rescued by our splendid Salvage Service
and added to the repair list, was another gain. A substantial
saving in the turn-round of ships was also effected by various
processes, and every day’s saving in the turn-round was worth a
quarter of a million tons in effective imports during a year.

There were many complications in all this. We could not
always arrange to discharge a ship at the most convenient port.
One carrying a mixed cargo might have to visit several ports
during the process of discharge, with added risk of destruction
by air or mine during coastal passages; and all the time the
ports themselves, particularly those on the East Coast, were
subject to attack which might temporarily paralyse them.
London, by far our main port, was largely immobilised
owing to the risk of sending large vessels round to the
East Coast in the face of attacks by air, by E-boats, and
by mines. Thus the East Coast ports could not take their full
share of the load, and the greater burden fell upon the ports in
the west—Liverpool, the Clyde, and the Bristol Channel. None
the less, by intense efforts London, the Humber, and the more
northerly ports on the East Coast remained open to coastal and
a certain amount of ocean-going traffic throughout these harassing
times.

* * * * *

At the height of this struggle I made one of the most important
and fortunate appointments of my war administration.
In 1930, when I was out of office, I accepted for the first and
only time in my life a directorship. It was in one of the subsidiary
companies of Lord Inchcape’s far-spreading organisation
of the Peninsular and Oriental shipping lines. For eight years
I regularly attended the monthly board meetings and discharged
my duties with care. At these meetings I gradually
became aware of a very remarkable man. He presided over
thirty or forty companies, of which the one with which I was
connected was a small unit. I soon perceived that Frederick
Leathers was the central brain and controlling power of this
combination. He knew everything and commanded absolute
confidence. Year after year I watched him from my small position
at close quarters. I said to myself, “If ever there is another
war, here is a man who will play the same kind of part as the
great business leaders who served under me at the Ministry of
Munitions in 1917 and 1918.”

Leathers volunteered his services to the Ministry of Shipping
on the outbreak in 1939. We did not come much into contact
while I was at the Admiralty, because his functions were specialised
and subordinate. But now in 1941, in the stresses of the
Battle of the Atlantic, and with the need for combining the
management of our shipping with all the movements of our
supplies by rail and road from our harried ports, he came more
and more into my mind. On May 8 I turned to him. After
much discussion I remodelled the Ministries of Shipping and
Transport into one integral machine. I placed Leathers at its
head. To give him the necessary authority I created the office
of Minister of War Transport. I was always shy of bringing
people into high Ministerial positions in the House of Commons
if they had not been brought up there for a good many
years. Experienced Members out of office may badger the newcomer,
and he will always be unduly worried by the speeches he
has to prepare and deliver. I therefore made a submission to
the Crown that a peerage should be conferred upon the new
Minister.

Henceforward to the end of the war Lord Leathers remained
in complete control of the Ministry of War Transport, and his
reputation grew with every one of the four years that passed.
He won the confidence of the Chiefs of Staff and of all departments
at home, and established intimate and excellent relations
with the leading Americans in this vital sphere. With none was
he more closely in harmony than with Mr. Lewis Douglas, of
the United States Shipping Board, and later Ambassador in
London. Leathers was an immense help to me in the conduct
of the war. It was very rarely that he was unable to accomplish
the hard tasks I set. Several times when all staff and departmental
processes had failed to solve the problems of moving
an extra division or transshipping it from British to American
ships, or of meeting some other need, I made a personal appeal
to him, and the difficulties seemed to disappear as if by magic.

* * * * *

I was able to tell the House in secret session on June 25
some encouraging facts about the clearance of goods from our
ports.

I have never allowed the excuse to be pleaded of congestion at
our ports, because, in spite of all our difficulties, we are in fact only
handling and budgeting to handle about half the pre-war traffic.
Nonetheless, a great effort is being made. Inland sorting depots
which enable the goods to be got away quickly from the air-raided
quaysides into the country are recommended by the Select Committee.
Six of these are in process of construction to serve our
West Coast ports. The first will come into partial operation in
September. To get the best out of the South Wales ports we are
quadrupling the railway line from Newport to the Severn Tunnel;
part of the quadrupled line is already in operation. Some of the
transport bottlenecks are found at inland junctions on the western
side of the Island, because a greater strain is being cast upon them
than they were constructed to bear. These are being opened up.
A considerable development of overside discharge at suitable
anchorages has been organised, not only as a relief but as an
alternative in case of very heavy attack.

A large expansion in our crane facilities is on foot, both to
equip new emergency ports and to make existing port facilities
more flexible under attack. In May alone a hundred and fifty
mobile cranes were delivered from British factories and from the
United States, as compared with the previous average of fifty in the
last four months.

On all this I felt able to ask the House to approve stopping,
as already ordered, the weekly publication of our tonnage losses,
which had been of so much assistance to the enemy, but to
which the press and Parliament attached fictitious importance.
As has been mentioned, I had already given directions to this
effect in April. “I have no doubt,” I now said, “there will be
a howl, not only from the Germans, but from some well-meaning
patriots of this Island. Let them howl. We have got to
think of our sailors and merchant seamen, the lives of our
countrymen and of the life of our country, now quivering in
the balance of mortal peril.”

The House seemed greatly reassured by all this account, and
gave me a full measure of support.

If we can resist [I said] or deter actual invasion this autumn, we
ought to be able, on the present undertaking of the United States,
to come through the year 1941. In 1942 we hope to be possessed
of very definite air ascendancy, and to be able not only to carry
our offensive bombing very heavily into Germany, but to redress
to some extent the frightful strategic disadvantages we suffer from
the present German control of the Atlantic seaports of Europe. If
we can deny to the enemy or at least markedly neutralise the
enemy-held Atlantic ports and airfields, there is no reason why the
year 1942, in which the enormous American new building comes to
hand, should not present us with less anxious ordeals than those
we must now endure and come through.

I ended thus:

I will add only one other word. Let us not forget that the
enemy has difficulties of his own; that some of these difficulties are
obvious; that there may be others which are more apparent to him
than to us; and that all the great struggles of history have been
won by superior will-power wresting victory in the teeth of odds
or upon the narrowest of margins.

The total losses in the undermentioned five months in 1941 from air attack,
including Allied and neutral shipping, and the losses in Greece, are now
known to be as follows:

Month

British

Allied

Neutral

Total

February

51,865

34,243

3,197

89,305

March

70,266

36,780

5,731

112,777

April

122,503

164,006

9,909

296,418

May

115,131

21,004

125

136,260

June

39,301

18,449

3,664

61,414

-------

-------

------

-------

Totals

399,066

274,482

22,626

696,174

9Yugoslavia

Peril of Yugoslavia—The German Net Closes—Colonel Donovan’s
Mission to Belgrade, January, 1941—Pressure on the
Regent—Hitler’s Offer of February 14—Bulgaria Adheres to
the Tripartite Pact—Prince Paul at Berchtesgaden, March 5—Yugoslavian
Opposition—Attempts to Rally the Yugoslavs—Secret
Pact with Germany, March 25—My Telegram of March
26—A Bloodless Revolution in Belgrade, March 27—Prince
Paul Forced to Resign—Popular Enthusiasm—Hitler’s Rage—His
Decision to Crush Yugoslavia—Orders the Destruction
of Belgrade—His Telegram to Mussolini—Dislocation of the
German Plans—No Balkan Bloc—Hitler’s Threat to Hungary—Treachery
of the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff—Mr.
Eden’s Warning—Suicide of Count Teleki, April 2—My
Hopes for Yugoslavia—And for Turkey—My Message to
Mr. Eden, March 28—New Significance of Our Aid to Greece—My
Telegram to Australia, March 30—The Yugoslav Opportunity
in Albania—Dill’s Mission to Belgrade—Confusion and
Paralysis—Dill’s Report of April 4—My Appeal and Warning—The
Soviet Gesture—Operation “Punishment,” April 6-8—The
Uncomprehending Bear.

The murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in October,
1934, at Marseilles, which has already been mentioned,
opened a period of disintegration for the Yugoslav State, and
thereafter its independent position in Europe declined. The
political hostility of Fascist Italy and the economic advance of
Hitlerite Germany into Southeast Europe had speeded this
process. The decay of internal stability, the antagonism between
Serb and Croat, sapped the strength of this Southern
Slav State. Under the regency of Prince Paul, an amiable,
artistic personage, the prestige of the monarchy waned. Doctor
Machek, the leader of the Peasant Party of Croatia, pursued
obstinately a policy of non-co-operation with the Government
of Belgrade. Extremist Croats, protected by Italy and Hungary,
worked from bases abroad for the detachment of Croatia from
Yugoslavia. The Belgrade Government turned away from co-operation
with the Little Entente of Balkan Powers to follow
a “realist” line of understanding with the Axis. The champion
of this policy was M. Stoyadinovic, who signed the Italo-Yugoslav
Pact of March 25, 1937. This attitude seemed to be justified
by what happened at Munich the year after. Weakened
internally by an alliance between the Croat Peasant Party and
the Serb opposition, who were suspicious of the closer relations
with Italy and Germany, Stoyadinovic was defeated in the elections,
and in February, 1939, was forced to retire.

The new Prime Minister, Cvetkovic, and his Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Markovic, sought to appease the swelling Axis
power. In August, 1939, agreement with the Croats was reached
and Machek entered the Belgrade Government. In the same
month came the news of the Soviet-German Pact. In spite of
ideological differences, the Serbs had always felt drawn by Slav
instincts towards Russia. The Soviet attitude at the time of
Munich had encouraged them to hope that the unity of Eastern
Europe might still be maintained. Now the signing of the
fateful pact seemed to deliver the Balkans at a stroke into Axis
hands. The fall of France in June, 1940, deprived the Southern
Slavs of their traditional friend and protector. The Russians
revealed their intentions about Rumania and occupied Bessarabia
and Bukovina. At Vienna in August, 1940, Transylvania
was awarded to Hungary by Germany and Italy. The net
around Yugoslavia was closing. In November, 1940, Markovic
first trod in secrecy the road to Berchtesgaden. He escaped
without formally committing his country to the Axis side, but
on December 12 a pact of amity was signed with the minor
Axis partner, Hungary.

* * * * *

As these impressions grew they caused us concern. In this
atmosphere Prince Paul carried the policy of neutrality to its
limits. He feared particularly that any move by Yugoslavia or
her neighbours might provoke the Germans into a southward
advance into the Balkans.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

14 Jan. 41

The Cabinet today should consider these telegrams from Belgrade
about Prince Paul’s views. They leave me unchanged. It is
for the Greeks to say whether they want Wavell to visit Athens or
not. It is the Greeks who must be the judges of the German reactions.

Secondly, if the Germans are coming south they will not require
pretexts. They are, it would seem, already acting in pursuance of
a carefully thought-out plan which one can hardly assume will be
hurried or delayed in consequence of any minor movements of
ours. The evidence in our possession of the German movements
seems overwhelming. In the face of it Prince Paul’s attitude looks
like that of an unfortunate man in the cage with a tiger, hoping
not to provoke him while steadily dinner-time approaches.

At the end of January, 1941, in these days of growing anxiety,
Colonel Donovan, a friend of President Roosevelt, came to
Belgrade on a mission from the American Government to
sound opinion in Southeastern Europe. Fear reigned. The
Ministers and the leading politicians did not dare to speak
their minds. Prince Paul declined a proposed visit from Mr.
Eden. There was one exception. An air force general named
Simovic represented the nationalist elements among the officer
corps of the armed forces. Since December his office in the air
force headquarters across the river from Belgrade at Zemun
had become a clandestine centre of opposition to German
penetration into the Balkans and to the inertia of the Yugoslav
Government.

On February 14 Cvetkovic and Markovic obeyed a summons
to Berchtesgaden. Together they listened to Hitler’s
account of the might of victorious Germany and to his emphasis
on the close relations between Berlin and Moscow. If
Yugoslavia would adhere to the Tripartite Pact, Hitler offered,
in the event of operations against Greece, not to march through
Yugoslavia, but only to use its roads and railways for military
supplies. The Ministers returned to Belgrade in sombre mood.
To join the Axis might infuriate Serbia. To fight Germany
might cause conflict of loyalty in Croatia. Greece, the only
possible Balkan ally, was heavily engaged with Italian armies
of more than two hundred thousand men, and was under the
menace of imminent German attack. English help seemed
doubtful, and at the best symbolic. In order to help the
Yugoslav Government to reach a satisfactory decision, Hitler
proceeded with the strategic encirclement of their country.
On March 1 Bulgaria adhered to the Tripartite Pact, and the
same evening German motorised elements reached the Serbian
frontiers. Meanwhile, to avoid provocation, the Yugoslav Army
remained unmobilized. The hour of choice had now struck.

On March 4 Prince Paul left Belgrade on a secret visit to
Berchtesgaden, and under dire pressure undertook verbally
that Yugoslavia would follow the example of Bulgaria. On his
return, at a meeting of the Royal Council and in separate discussion
with political and military leaders, he found opposing
views. Debate was violent, but the German ultimatum was real.
General Simovic, when summoned to the White Palace, Prince
Paul’s residence on the hills above Belgrade, was firm against
capitulation. Serbia would not accept such a decision, and the
dynasty would be endangered. But Prince Paul had already in
effect committed his country.

* * * * *

From London I did what I could to rally the Yugoslavs
against Germany, and on March 22 I telegraphed to Doctor
Cvetkovic, the Yugoslav Premier.

22 March 41

Your Excellency: The eventual total defeat of Hitler and Mussolini
is certain. No prudent and farseeing man can doubt this in
view of the respective declared resolves of the British and American
democracies. There are only 65,000,000 malignant Huns, most
of whom are already engaged in holding down Austrians, Czechs,
Poles, and many other ancient races they now bully and pillage.
The peoples of the British Empire and of the United States number
nearly 200,000,000 in their homelands and British Dominions
alone. We possess the unchallengeable command of the oceans, and
with American help will soon obtain decisive superiority in the
air. The British Empire and the United States have more wealth
and more technical resources and they make more steel than the
whole of the rest of the world put together. They are determined
that the cause of freedom shall not be trampled down nor the tide
of world progress turned backwards by the criminal dictators, one
of whom has already been irretrievably punctured. We know that
the hearts of all true Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes beat for the freedom,
integrity, and independence of their country, and that they
share the forward outlook of the English-speaking world. If Yugoslavia
were at this time to stoop to the fate of Rumania, or commit
the crime of Bulgaria, and become accomplice in an attempted
assassination of Greece, her ruin will be certain and irreparable.
She will not escape, but only postpone, the ordeal of war, and her
brave armies will then fight alone after being surrounded and cut
off from hope and succour. On the other hand, the history of war
has seldom shown a finer opportunity than is open to the Yugoslav
armies it they seize it while time remains. If Yugoslavia and Turkey
stand together with Greece, and with all the aid which the
British Empire can give, the German curse will be stayed and final
victory will be won as surely and as decisively as it was last time.
I trust Your Excellency may rise to the height of world events.

But on the evening of March 24 Cvetkovic and Markovic
crept out of Belgrade from a suburban railway station on the
Vienna train. Unknown to public opinion and the press, they
signed the pact with Hitler at Vienna on the next day. Even
before the returned Ministers laid before the Yugoslav Cabinet
the text of the pact, three colleagues had resigned, and rumours of
imminent disaster swept through the cafés and conclaves of
Belgrade.

I now sent instructions to Mr. Campbell, our Minister in
Belgrade.

26 March 41

Do not let any gap grow up between you and Prince Paul or
Ministers. Continue to pester, nag, and bite. Demand audiences.
Don’t take NO for an answer. Cling on to them, pointing out Germans
are already taking the subjugation of the country for granted.
This is no time for reproaches or dignified farewells. Meanwhile,
at the same time, do not neglect any alternative to which we may
have to resort if we find present Government have gone beyond
recall. Greatly admire all you have done so far. Keep it up by
every means that occur to you.

* * * * *

Direct action, if the Government capitulated to Germany,
had been discussed for some months in the small circle of
officers around Simovic. A revolutionary stroke had been
carefully planned. The leader of the projected rising was
General Bora Mirkovic, commander of the Yugoslav Air Force,
aided by Major Knezevic, an army officer, and his brother, a
professor, who established political contacts through his position
in the Serb Democrat Party. Knowledge of the plan was
confined to a small number of trustworthy officers, nearly all
below the rank of colonel. The network extended from
Belgrade to the main garrisons in the country, Zagreb, Skopje,
and Sarajevo. The forces at the disposal of the conspirators in
Belgrade comprised two regiments of the Royal Guard, with
the exception of their colonels, one battalion of the Belgrade
garrison, a company of gendarmes on duty at the Royal Palace,
part of the anti-aircraft division stationed in the capital, the
air force headquarters at Zemun, where Simovic was chief, and
the cadet schools for officers and non-commissioned officers,
together with certain artillery and sapper units.

When during March 26 the news of the return from Vienna
of the Yugoslav Ministers and rumours of the pact began to
circulate in Belgrade, the conspirators decided to act. The
signal was given to seize key points in Belgrade, and the royal
residence, together with the person of the young King, Peter II,
by dawn on March 27. While troops, under the command of
resolute officers, were sealing off the Royal Palace on the outskirts
of the capital, Prince Paul, knowing nothing or too much
of what was afoot, was in the train bound for Zagreb. Few
revolutions have gone more smoothly. There was no bloodshed.
Certain senior officers were placed under arrest. Cvetkovic was
brought by the police to Simovic’s headquarters and obliged
to sign a letter of resignation. Machine guns and artillery were
placed at suitable points in the capital. Prince Paul on arrival
in Zagreb was informed that Simovic had taken over the
Government in the name of the young King, Peter II, and that
the Council of Regency had been dissolved. The military
commander of Zagreb requested the Prince to return at once
to the capital. As soon as he reached Belgrade, Prince Paul
was escorted to the office of General Simovic. Together with
the other two regents, he then signed the act of abdication. He
was allowed a few hours to collect his effects, and, together with
his family, he left the country that night for Greece.

The plan had been made and executed by a close band of
Serb nationalist officers without waiting upon public opinion.
It let loose an outburst of popular enthusiasm which may well
have surprised its authors. The streets of Belgrade were soon
thronged with Serbs, chanting, “Rather war than the pact;
rather death than slavery.” There was dancing in the squares;
English and French flags appeared everywhere; the Serb
national anthem was sung with wild defiance by valiant, helpless
multitudes. On March 28 the young King, who by climbing
down a rain-pipe had made his own escape from Regency
tutelage, took the oath in Belgrade Cathedral amid fervent
acclamation. The German Minister was publicly insulted, and
the crowd spat on his car. The military exploit had roused a
surge of national vitality. A people paralysed in action, hitherto
ill-governed and ill-led, long haunted by the sense of being
ensnared, flung their reckless, heroic defiance at the tyrant and
conqueror in the moment of his greatest power.

* * * * *

Hitler was stung to the quick. He had a burst of that convulsive
anger which momentarily blotted out thought and
sometimes impelled him on his most dire adventures. In a
cooler mood, a month later, conversing with Schulenburg, he
said, “The Yugoslav coup came suddenly out of the blue.
When the news was brought to me on the morning of the
twenty-seventh I thought it was a joke.” But now in a passion
he summoned the German High Command. Goering, Keitel,
and Jodl were present, and Ribbentrop arrived later. The
minutes of the meeting are found in the Nuremberg records.
Hitler described the Yugoslav situation after the upheaval. He
said that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in the coming
action against Greece (“Marita”), and even more in the
“Barbarossa” undertaking against Russia later on. He deemed
it fortunate that the Yugoslavs had revealed their temper before
“Barbarossa” was launched.

The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new Government, to make all preparations in
order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No
diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances
of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted
anyhow in the future, will be “taken note of.” The attack will
start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

Actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of
Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Rumania’s
main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and
Bulgarian Ambassadors have already been notified. During the
day a message will be addressed to the Duce.

Politically it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia
is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military
destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In this
way Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign
against Greece later on would be influenced in a favourable
way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when
we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later
on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should
be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions
are to be promised to these States: the Adriatic coast for
Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria. This
plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations
and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place
within the shortest time. . . . The main task of the air force is to
start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslav Air
Force ground installations and to destroy the capital, Belgrade, in
attacks by waves.

On the same day the Fuehrer signed “Directive No. 25”:

My intention is to invade Yugoslavia by powerful thrusts from
the area of Fiume and Sofia in the general direction of Belgrade
and farther to the south, with the objective of inflicting on the
Yugoslav Army a decisive defeat, as well as to cut off the southern
part of Yugoslavia from the rest of the country and to turn it into
a base for further operations of German-Italian forces against
Greece.

In detail I order the following:

(a) As soon as the concentration of sufficient forces is concluded
and meteorological conditions permit, all Yugoslav surface installations
and Belgrade must be destroyed by continuous day and night
air attacks.

(b) If possible simultaneously, but under no circumstances
sooner, Operation “Marita” must be started, with the primary
limited objective of seizing the harbour of Salonika and the Dios
Mountains.

He now telegraphed to Mussolini:

Duce, events force me to give you, by this, the quickest means,
my estimate of the situation and the consequences which may
result from it.

From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous
factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the
purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in
Thrace would not be at all justified as long as the attitude of
Yugoslavia remained ambiguous and she could threaten the left
flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front.

2. For this reason I have done everything and have honestly
endeavoured to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together
by mutual interests. Unfortunately these attempts did not
meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any
definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt of the imminent
turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.

3. I do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but
nevertheless it is a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid
any mistake if we do not want, in the end, to endanger our whole
position.

4. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake
any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few
days.

Hitler saw as clearly as we did the one chance of the Yugoslavs
to strike a deadly blow.

I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the
most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available
forces. These measures should not be considered as designed
for a long period of time, but as auxiliary measures to prevent for
at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.

I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your
forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and
with the utmost speed.

. . . If silence is maintained, Duce, on these measures I have no
doubt we shall both witness a success that will not be less than
that of Norway. This is my granite conviction.

The night was spent by the generals in drafting the operation
orders. Keitel in his evidence confirms our view that the
greatest danger to Germany was “an attack upon the Italian
Army from the rear.” Jodl testified as follows: “I worked all
night at the Reich Chancellery [which also shows the surprise
nature of the case]. At 4 A.M. on the twenty-eighth I put an
aide-mémoire into the hands of General von Rintelen, our
liaison officer with the Italian General Staff.” Keitel records:
“The decision to attack Yugoslavia meant completely upsetting
all military movements and arrangements made up to that time.
‘Marita’ had to be completely readjusted. New forces had to
be brought through Hungary from the north. All had to be
improvised.”

* * * * *

From the time of Munich, Hungary had attempted to extend
her post-1920 frontiers in the wake of the German diplomatic
victories at the expense of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, while
at the same time trying to maintain a neutral position in the
international sphere. Hungarian diplomacy sought to avoid
precise commitments to the Axis about becoming an ally in the
war. Hungary adhered at Vienna to the Tripartite Pact, but,
like Rumania, undertook no definite obligations. Neither
Hitler nor Mussolini desired a quarrel between the Balkan
countries. They hoped to get control of them all at the same
time. For this reason they had imposed a settlement upon
Hungary and Rumania about Transylvania. Mussolini’s attack
on Greece, which Hitler did not favour, brought with it the
prospect of British intervention in Southeastern Europe.
Pressure was therefore brought upon Yugoslavia to follow the
example of Hungary and Rumania in joining the Axis bloc.
When the Yugoslav Ministers had been summoned to Vienna
for this purpose everything seemed settled. The dramatic
events of March 27 in Belgrade upset all hope of a united
Balkan group adhering to the Axis.

Hungary was directly and immediately affected. Although
the main German thrust against the recalcitrant Yugoslavs
would clearly come through Rumania, all lines of communication
led through Hungarian territory. Almost the first reaction
of the German Government to the events in Belgrade was to
send the Hungarian Minister in Berlin by air to Budapest with
an urgent message to the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy:

Yugoslavia will be annihilated, for she has just renounced publicly
the policy of understanding with the Axis. The greater part
of the German armed forces must pass through Hungary. But the
principal attack will not be made on the Hungarian sector. Here
the Hungarian Army should intervene, and, in return for its co-operation,
Hungary will be able to reoccupy all those former territories
which she had been forced at one time to cede to Yugoslavia.
The matter is urgent. An immediate and affirmative reply is requested.[1]

Hungary was bound by a pact of friendship to Yugoslavia
signed only in December, 1940. But open opposition to the
German demands could only lead to the German occupation
of Hungary in the course of the imminent military operations.
There was also the temptation of reoccupying the territories
on her southern frontiers which Hungary had lost to Yugoslavia
by the Treaty of Trianon. The Hungarian Premier,
Count Teleki, had been working consistently to maintain
some liberty of action for his country. He was by no means
convinced that Germany would win the war. At the time of
signing the Tripartite Pact he had little confidence in the
independence of Italy as an Axis partner. Hitler’s ultimatum
required the breach of his own Hungarian agreement with
Yugoslavia. The initiative was, however, wrested from him by
the Hungarian General Staff, whose chief, General Werth,
himself of German origin, made his own arrangements with
the German High Command behind the back of the Hungarian
Government. Details regarding the passage of troops were
being arranged on this basis.

Teleki at once denounced Werth’s action as treasonable. On
the evening of April 2, 1941, he received a telegram from the
Hungarian Minister in London that the British Foreign Office
had stated formally to him that if Hungary took part in any
German move against Yugoslavia she must expect a declaration
of war upon her by Great Britain. Thus the choice for
Hungary was either a vain resistance to the passage of German
troops or ranging herself openly against the Allies and betraying
Yugoslavia. In this cruel position Count Teleki saw but
one means of saving his personal honour. Shortly after nine
o’clock he left the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
retired to his apartments in the Sandor Palace. There he
received a telephone call. It is believed that this message
stated that the German armies had already crossed the
Hungarian frontier. Shortly afterward he shot himself. His
suicide was a sacrifice to absolve himself and his people from
guilt in the German attack upon Yugoslavia. It clears his name
before history. It could not stop the march of the German
armies nor the consequences.

* * * * *

The news of the revolution in Belgrade naturally gave us
great satisfaction. Here at least was one tangible result of
our desperate efforts to form an Allied front in the Balkans
and prevent all falling piecemeal into Hitler’s power. I
received the earliest telegrams only half an hour before I had
to address the Conservative Central Council for the first time
as leader of the party. I ended as follows:

Here at this moment I have great news for you and the whole
country. Early this morning the Yugoslav nation found its soul.
A revolution has taken place in Belgrade, and the Ministers who
but yesterday signed away the honour and freedom of the country
are reported to be under arrest. This patriotic movement arises
from the wrath of a valiant and warlike race at the betrayal of
their country by the weakness of their rulers and the foul intrigues
of the Axis Powers.

We may, therefore, cherish the hope—I speak, of course, only on
information which has reached me—that a Yugoslav Government
will be formed worthy to defend the freedom and integrity of their
country. Such a Government in its brave endeavour will receive
from the British Empire, and, I doubt not, in its own way, from
the United States, all possible aid and succour. The British Empire
and its Allies will make common cause with the Yugoslav
nation, and we shall continue to match and strive together until
complete victory is won.

* * * * *

Mr. Eden had reached Malta on his way home, but on the
news of the Belgrade revolution I thought he should change
his plans and be upon the spot with Generals Dill and Wavell.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden

27 March 41

In view of coup d’état in Serbia it would surely be well for you
both to be on the spot in Cairo so as to concert events. Now
surely is the chance to bring in Turkey and form a joint front in
the Balkans. Can you not get a meeting in Cyprus or Athens of
all concerned? When you know the situation, ought you not to
go to Belgrade? Meanwhile we are doing all possible and carrying
on.

I telegraphed to the President of Turkey:

27 March 41

Your Excellency: The dramatic events which are occurring in
Belgrade and throughout Yugoslavia may offer the best chance of
preventing the German invasion of the Balkan Peninsula. Surely
now is the time to make a common front which Germany will
hardly dare assail. I have cabled to President Roosevelt to ask him
for American supplies to be extended to all Powers resisting German
aggression in the East. I am asking Mr. Eden and General
Dill to concert all possible measures of common safety.

During the day I drafted the following message to Mr. Eden,
who had already reached Athens.

28 March 41

Let us visualise clearly what we want in the Balkans and from
Turkey, and work towards it as events serve.

2. Together Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and ourselves have
seventy divisions mobilised in this theatre. Germans have not
yet got more than thirty. Therefore, the seventy could say to the
thirty, “If you attack any of us you will be at war with all.” The
Germans would either attack in mountainous regions and with
poor communications at heavy odds, or alternatively they would
have to bring large reinforcements from Germany. But even this
does not cure their difficulties, because, first, it will take some
months to bring the reinforcements to the theatre, and, secondly,
the theatre itself, and indeed the communications leading to it,
are not strong enough to carry much larger forces without a prolonged
process of improving the communications. Therefore, it is
very likely that a triple note by the three Balkan Powers would
lead to the maintenance of peace, or to a lengthy delay in the
German advance. Perhaps the advance could not be made for
many months, and then they miss the season. Meanwhile British
reinforcements and British and American supplies will vastly
increase resisting power of the Allied armies. There is, therefore,
a good prospect if the three Allies could be brought into line that
no invasion southwards would be tried by the enemy. Here is what
the Turks want.

3. This is Turkey’s best chance of avoiding war. For look at
the alternative. If all three remain disunited the Germans may
feel that it will be better to leave Greece and Yugoslavia alone
and turn their whole striking force rapidly against Turkey in
Thrace. There have been suggestions of this in various telegrams.
Thus, by doing nothing Turkey runs the greatest danger of having
everything concentrated upon her. One can hardly doubt that
the mass of Turkish troops gathered in Thrace would soon be
driven back in confusion upon the Chatalja [lines] and the
Bosporus, without any obligation or opportunity on the part of
Yugoslavia or Greece to take the pressure off by counter-attack,
or by lengthening the fighting front.

4. The proper order for anyone to give who had the power
would be (a) the diplomatic declaration of unity and demand to
be let alone as set forth above, and (b) a simultaneous withdrawal
of the bulk of the Turkish Army to Chatalja and the Asiatic shore,
leaving only strong covering troops and rear guards in Thrace.
Such a policy of firm, united declaration, coupled with sound
strategic withdrawal, would prevent the Germans from gaining
a decisive victory in Thrace, would not require any offensive from
Turkey, and would, unless the Germans shied off, expose them to
a stalemate front from, say, the lines of Chatalja through the
Rupel-Nestor sector right up along the northern Serbian front.
Even this could not develop for a long time. But what a dangerous
and uninviting prospect for an enemy for whom quick successes
are especially important! Surely this is the true Turkish interest,
if it can be brought about, and we ought to try to make them see
it, however unresponsive they may be. The Turks’ greatest danger
is to be taken on alone jammed up in Thrace.

5. How does this above square with British interests? If Germany,
notwithstanding the objections, attacks in the Balkans, we
must play our part there with our full available strength. If, on
the other hand, she pretends that she never wished to bring war
into the Balkans, and leaves Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey
alone, then we might turn our forces to a strong summer and
autumn campaign in the Central Mediterranean, including
Tripoli, Sicily, and the Italian toe. We should have a good pad
in our right hand to protect our Middle Eastern interests, and
take smart action on a medium scale with our left in the Central
Mediterranean.

6. Is it not possible that if a united front were formed in the
Balkan Peninsula Germany might think it better business to take
it out of Russia, observing that we have had many reports of heavy
concentrations in Poland and intrigues in Sweden and Finland?

7. Pray consider these opinions for what they are worth.

I also cabled to Mr. Fadden, the Acting Prime Minister of
the Commonwealth of Australia.

30 March 41

When a month ago we decided upon sending an army to Greece
it looked rather a blank military adventure dictated by noblesse
oblige. Thursday’s events in Belgrade show the far-reaching effects
of this and other measures we have taken on whole Balkan situation.
German plans have been upset, and we may cherish renewed
hopes of forming a Balkan front with Turkey, comprising about
seventy Allied divisions from the four Powers concerned. This
is, of course, by no means certain yet. But even now it puts
“Lustre” [the expedition to Greece] in its true setting, not as an
isolated military act, but as a prime move in a large design. Whatever
the outcome may be, everything that has happened since our
decision was taken justifies it. Delay will also enable full concentration
to be made on the Greek front instead of piecemeal
engagements of our forces. Result unknowable, but prize has
increased and risks have somewhat lessened. Am in closest touch
with Menzies. Wish I could talk it over with you.

* * * * *

It was settled that Eden should remain in Athens to deal
with Turkey and that General Dill should proceed to Belgrade.
Anyone could see that the position of Yugoslavia was
forlorn unless a common front was immediately presented by
all the Powers concerned. There was, however, open to Yugoslavia
the chance already mentioned of striking a deadly blow
at the naked rear of the disorganised Italian armies in Albania.
If they acted promptly they might bring about a major military
event, and while their own country was being ravaged from
the north might possess themselves of the masses of munitions
and equipment which would give them the power of conducting
the guerrilla in their mountains which was now their only
hope. It would have been a grand stroke, and would have
reacted upon the whole Balkan scene. In our circle in London
we all saw this together. The diagram below shows the movement
which was deemed feasible.

General Dill was now in Belgrade, and I sent him this
message:

1 April 41

A variety of details shows rapid regrouping against Yugoslavia.
To gain time against Germans is to lose it against Italians.
Nothing should stop Yugo developing full strength against latter
at earliest. By this alone can they gain far-reaching initial success
and masses of equipment in good time.

The mistakes of years cannot be remedied in hours. When
the general excitement had subsided, everyone in Belgrade
realised that disaster and death approached them and that there
was little they could do to avert their fate. The High Command
thought themselves forced to garrison Slovenia and Croatia,
to maintain a fictitious internal cohesion. They could now at
last mobilise their armies. But there was no strategic plan. Dill
found only confusion and paralysis in Belgrade. “In spite of
my best endeavours,” he reported to Mr. Eden on April 1, “I
was unable to persuade President of the Council to agree to
visit by you in the immediate future. He made it plain that
the Yugoslav Government, mainly for fear of the effect on the
internal situation, were determined to take no step which
might be considered provocative to Germany.” At this
moment all the might of Germany within reach was descending
like an avalanche upon them.

On April 4 General Dill sent a full account of his mission
to Belgrade, which shows how utterly remote from their immediate
peril were the minds of the Yugoslav Ministers. One
would have thought from their mood and outlook that they had
months in which to take their decision about peace or war with
Germany. Actually they had only seventy-two hours before
the onslaught fell upon them. Dill wrote:

Final result of Belgrade visit was disappointing in many ways,
but it was impossible to get [General] Simovic to sign any sort
of agreement. Nevertheless, I was impressed with offensive spirit
of Yugoslav leaders, who will fight if Yugoslavia is attacked or
if Germany attacks Salonika. Staff discussions today should have
useful results in exchange of views, and, I hope, in agreement on
best plans to meet various eventualities. None of these plans will
be binding on either side, but there is reasonable prospect that
when time comes Yugoslavs will be prepared to carry them out.

Fact is that Simovic, though a leader and able, is in no sense
dictator. He had difficult task in keeping Cabinet together, and
dare not propose to them any form of agreement with us. Nor
can he effect such agreement without knowledge and consent of
Cabinet. But he and War Minister Ilic, who is tougher but less
intelligent, seem determined to fight. . . .

Yugoslavs’ forces are not yet ready for war, and Simovic wants
to gain time to complete mobilisation and concentration. For
internal political reasons he cannot take first step in hostilities,
but must await German move. He expects Germany to attack
Southern Yugoslavia from Bulgaria and leave Greece alone at the
moment. . . . Yugoslavs will aid in Albania, but will not attack
even there until Germany attacks them or their vital interests.

Simultaneously with this I made the following appeal:

Prime Minister to General Simovic

4 April 41

From every quarter my information shows rapid heavy concentration
and advance towards your country by German ground
and air forces. Large movements of air forces are reported to us
from France by our agents there. Bombers have even been withdrawn
from Tripoli, according to our African Army Intelligence.
I cannot understand argument that you are gaining time. The
one supreme stroke for victory and safety is to win a decisive forestalling
victory in Albania, and collect the masses of equipment
that would fall into your hands. When the four German mountain
divisions reported by your General Staff as entraining in the
Tyrol reach Albania, a very different resistance will confront you
than could be offered by rear of the demoralised Italians. As this
is the first time I have had the honour to address Your Excellency,
I send my heartiest good wishes for the success of your Administration
and for the safety and independence of the brave nation
whose fortunes you guide.

* * * * *

We have now to chronicle the only occasion when a dash
of sentiment was allowed to mingle in the calculations of the
Kremlin oligarchy.

The national movement in Belgrade had been a spontaneous
revolt entirely divorced from the activities of the small illegal
but Soviet-sponsored Yugoslav Communist Party. After waiting
a week Stalin decided to make a gesture. His officials were
negotiating with M. Gavrilovic, the Yugoslav Minister in
Moscow, and with a mission sent from Belgrade after the
revolution. Little progress had been made. During the night
of April 5-6 the Yugoslavs were summoned abruptly to the
Kremlin. They were confronted with Stalin in person, who
presented them with a pact in draft, ready for signature. The
work was speedily done. Russia agreed to respect “the independence,
sovereign rights, and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,”
and in the event of that country being attacked Russia
would adopt an attitude of good will “based on friendly
relations.” This was at any rate an amicable grimace. Gavrilovic
stayed alone till morning discussing with Stalin the
question of military supplies. As their conversations came to an
end the Germans struck.

* * * * *

On the morning of April 6 German bombers appeared
over Belgrade. Flying in relays from occupied airfields in
Rumania, they delivered a methodical attack lasting three
days upon the Yugoslav capital. From rooftop height, without
fear of resistance, they blasted the city without mercy. This
was called Operation “Punishment.” When silence came at
last on April 8 over seventeen thousand citizens of Belgrade
lay dead in the streets or under the débris. Out of the nightmare
of smoke and fire came the maddened animals released
from their shattered cages in the zoological gardens. A stricken
stork hobbled past the main hotel, which was a mass of flames.
A bear, dazed and uncomprehending, shuffled through the
inferno with slow and awkward gait down towards the Danube.
He was not the only bear who did not understand.

10The Japanese Envoy

Disturbing News from the Far East—Question of Reinforcing
Hong Kong—Flutter in the Japanese Embassy—My Telegrams
to President Roosevelt, February 15 and 20—A Visit
from the Japanese Ambassador on February 24—And on March
4—German Anxiety Lest Japan Should Embroil Herself with
the U.S.A.—Three Decisions in Tokyo—Matsuoka’s Mission—His
Meeting with Ribbentrop, March 27—And with Hitler—“Moral
Communism”—My Letter to Matsuoka of April 2—He
Visits Rome—Tarries in Moscow—A Doom-Balance—Stalin’s
Affability—Prince Konoye’s Desire for an Understanding
with the U.S.A.—Matsuoka’s Reply to My Letter—The
Japanese War—Cabinet Decides on Compromise—Matsuoka
Resigns—Japanese Hopes of a Settlement—Three Coldly Calculating
Empires Wrong.

The New Year had brought disturbing news from the Far
East. The Japanese Navy was increasingly active off the
coasts of Southern Indo-China. Japanese warships were reported
in Saigon Harbor and the Gulf of Siam. On January 31 the
Japanese Government negotiated an armistice between the
Vichy French and Siam. Rumours spread that this settlement
of a frontier dispute in Southeast Asia was to be the prelude
to the entry of Japan into the war. The Germans were at the
same time bringing increased pressure to bear upon Japan to
attack the British at Singapore. “I tried,” said Ribbentrop at
his Nuremberg trial, “to induce Japan to attack Singapore
because it was impossible to make peace with England, and I
did not know what military measures we could take to achieve
this end—in any case, the Fuehrer directed me to do everything
I could through diplomatic channels to weaken England’s
position and thus achieve peace. We believed that this could
best be done through an attack by Japan on England’s strong
position in East Asia.”[1]

* * * * *

About this time several telegrams arrived from our Commander-in-Chief
in the Far East urging the reinforcement of
Hong Kong. I did not agree with his views.

Prime Minister to General Ismay

7 Jan. 41

This is all wrong. If Japan goes to war with us there is not the
slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most
unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of increasing
the garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolical scale.
Any trouble arising there must be dealt with at the Peace conference
after the war. We must avoid frittering away our
resources on untenable positions. Japan will think long before
declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two
or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her
choice. I wish we had fewer troops there, but to move any would
be noticeable and dangerous.

Later on it will be seen that I allowed myself to be drawn
from this position, and that two Canadian battalions were sent
as reinforcements.

* * * * *

In the second week of February I became conscious of a stir
and flutter in the Japanese Embassy and colony in London.
They were evidently in a high state of excitement, and they
chattered to one another with much indiscretion. In these days
we kept our eyes and ears open. Various reports were laid
before me which certainly gave the impression that they had
received news from home which required them to pack up

without a moment’s delay. This agitation among people usually
so reserved made me feel that a sudden act of war upon us by
Japan might be imminent, and I thought it well to impart my
misgivings to President Roosevelt.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

15 Feb. 41

Many drifting straws seem to indicate Japanese intention to
make war on us or do something that would force us to make war
on them in the next few weeks or months. I am not myself convinced
that this is not a war of nerves designed to cover Japanese
encroachments in Siam and Indo-China. However, I think I
ought to let you know that the weight of the Japanese Navy, if
thrown against us, would confront us with situations beyond the
scope of our naval resources. I do not myself think that the
Japanese would be likely to send the large military expedition
necessary to lay siege to Singapore. The Japanese would no
doubt occupy whatever strategic points and oilfields in the Dutch
East Indies and thereabouts they covet, and thus get into a far
better position for a full-scale attack on Singapore later on. They
would also raid Australian and New Zealand ports and coasts,
causing deep anxiety in those Dominions, which have already sent
all their best-trained fighting men to the Middle East. But the
attack which I fear the most would be by raiders, including
possibly battle-cruisers, upon our trade routes and communications
across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

We could by courting disaster elsewhere send a few strong ships
into these vast waters, but all the trade would have to go into
convoy and escorts would be few and far between. Not only would
this be a most grievous additional restriction and derangement of
our whole war economy, but it would bring altogether to an end
all reinforcements of the armies we had planned to build up in the
Middle East from Australian and Indian sources. Any threat of a
major invasion of Australia or New Zealand would, of course, force
us to withdraw our Fleet from the Eastern Mediterranean, with
disastrous military possibilities there, and the certainty that
Turkey would have to make some accommodation for reopening of
the German trade and oil supplies from the Black Sea.

You will therefore see, Mr. President, the awful enfeeblement
of our war effort that would result merely from the sending out
by Japan of her battle-cruisers and her twelve eight-inch-gun
cruisers into the Eastern oceans, and still more from any serious
invasion threat against the two Australian democracies in the
Southern Pacific.

Some believe that Japan in her present mood would not hesitate
to court or attempt to wage war both against Great Britain and
the United States. Personally I think the odds are definitely against
that, but no one can tell. Everything that you can do to inspire
the Japanese with the fear of a double war may avert the danger.
If, however, they come in against us and we are alone, the grave
character of the consequences cannot easily be overstated.

The agitation among the Japanese in London subsided as
quickly as it had begun. Silence and Oriental decorum reigned
once more.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

20 Feb. 41

I have better news about Japan. Apparently Matsuoka is visiting
Berlin, Rome, and Moscow in the near future. This may well be
a diplomatic sop to cover absence of action against Great Britain.
If Japanese attack which seemed imminent is now postponed, this
is largely due to fear of United States. The more these fears can
be played upon the better, but I understand thoroughly your
difficulties pending passage of [Lend-Lease] Bill on which our
hopes depend. Appreciation given in my last “Personal and
Secret” of naval consequences following Japanese aggression
against Great Britain holds good in all circumstances.

* * * * *

On February 24 Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador,
came to see me. A record was kept of the meeting.

I dwelt upon the long and friendly relations of the two countries,
my own feelings ever since the Japanese Alliance of 1902, and
the great desire that we all felt here not to sunder the relations
between the two countries. Japan could not expect us to view
with approval what was going on in China, but we had maintained
a correct attitude of neutrality, and indeed a very different
kind of neutrality to that which we had shown when we had
helped them in their war against Russia. We had not the slightest
intention of attacking Japan, and had no wish to see her other
than prosperous and peaceful, and I said what a pity it would be
if at this stage, when she already had China on her hands, she got
into a war with Great Britain and the United States.

The Ambassador said that Japan had no intention of attacking
us or the United States, and had no desire to become involved in
a war with either Power. They would not attempt to attack
Singapore or Australia, and he repeated several times that they
would not attempt to gain a footing or make encroachments in
the Dutch East Indies. The only complaint which Japan had, he
said, was our attitude to China, which was encouraging China
and adding to their difficulties. . . . I felt bound to remind him
of the Triple Pact which they had made with the Axis Powers,
and that this naturally was ever in our minds. One could not
believe that a pact so much in favour of Germany and so little in
favour of Japan had not got some secret provisions, and at any
rate Japan had left us in doubt as to what interpretation she
would put upon it in certain eventualities. The Ambassador said
they had made explanations at the time, and that their object was
to limit the conflict, etc. I told him the Axis Pact had been a
very great mistake for Japan. Nothing had done them more harm
in their relations with the United States, and nothing had brought
Great Britain and the United States closer together.

I then renewed my friendly assurances. His whole attitude
throughout was most friendly and deprecatory, and we have no
doubt where he stands in these matters.

On March 4, after he could certainly have reported to Tokyo,
I recorded in a minute a second visit from Mr. Shigemitsu.

The Japanese Ambassador called upon me today and spoke in
agreeable terms of the great desire in Japan not to be involved
in war and not to have a rupture with Great Britain. He described
the Tripartite Pact as a pact of peace, and said it arose only out
of the desire of Japan to limit the conflict. I asked him specifically
whether the pact left Japan the full right of interpreting any
given situation, and I put it to him that nothing in the pact
obliged her to go to war. He did not dissent from this; in fact,
he tacitly assented. I received all his assurances with cordiality,
and asked him to convey my thanks to the Foreign Minister of
Japan. I do not think Japan is likely to attack us unless and
until she is sure we are going to be defeated. I doubt very much
whether she would come into the war on the side of the Axis
Powers if the United States joined us. She would certainly be
very foolish to do so. It would be more sensible for her to come
in if the United States did not join us.

This was for very different reasons also the German view.
Germany and Japan were both eager to despoil and divide the
British Empire. But they approached the target from different
angles. The German High Command argued that the Japanese
ought to commit their armed forces in Malaya and the Dutch
East Indies without worrying about the American Pacific bases,
and the main fleet which lay on their flank. Throughout
February and March they urged the Japanese Government to
strike without delay at Malaya and Singapore and not to bother
about the United States. Hitler had already enough on his
shoulders without drawing them in. Indeed, we have seen how
many American actions he put up with, any one of which would
have provided ample grounds for war. Hitler and Ribbentrop
were above all things anxious that Japan should attack what
they called “England”—the name still lingers—and not on
any account embroil themselves with the United States. They
assured Tokyo that if Japan acted with vigour against Malaya
and the Dutch East Indies the Americans would not dare to
move. The Japanese naval and military leaders were by no
means convinced by this reasoning, or that it was disinterested.
In their view an operation in Southeast Asia was out of the
question unless either a prior assault was made on the American
bases or a diplomatic settlement reached with the United States.

Behind the complex political scene in Japan three decisions
seem to emerge at this time. The first was to send the Foreign
Secretary, Matsuoka, to Europe to find out for himself about
the German mastery of Europe, and especially when the invasion
of Britain was really going to begin. Were the British
forces so far tied up in naval defence that Britain could not
afford to reinforce her Eastern possessions if Japan attacked
them? Although he had been educated in the United States,
Matsuoka was bitterly anti-American. He was deeply impressed
by the Nazi movement and the might of embattled
Germany. He was under the Hitler spell. Perhaps even there
were moments when he saw himself playing a similar part in
Japan. Secondly, the Japanese Government decided that their
navy and army command should have a free hand to plan
operations against the American base at Pearl Harbour and
against the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and Malaya.
Thirdly, a “liberal” statesman, Admiral Nomura, was to be
sent to Washington to explore the chances of a general settlement
with the United States in the Pacific. This not only
served as a camouflage, but might lead to a peaceful solution.
Thus agreement between conflicting opinions was reached in
the Japanese Cabinet.

* * * * *

Matsuoka set out on his mission on March 12. On the
twenty-fifth, passing through Moscow, he had a two hours’
interview with Stalin and Molotov, and he assured the German
Ambassador, Schulenburg, that he would repeat to Ribbentrop
personally all details of the conversation.

The captured documents published by the American State
Department throw a searching light on Matsuoka’s mission and
upon the whole German mood and mind. On March 27 the
Japanese envoy was cordially welcomed in Berlin as a kindred
spirit by Ribbentrop. The Reich Foreign Minister dilated
upon the might of his country.

Germany [he said] was in the final phase of her battle against
England. During the past winter the Fuehrer had made all
necessary preparations so that Germany stood completely ready
today to meet England anywhere. The Fuehrer had at his
disposal perhaps the strongest military power that had ever
existed. Germany had 240 combat divisions, of which 186 were
first-class assault divisions and 24 were Panzer divisions. The
Luftwaffe had grown greatly and had introduced new models, so
that it was not only a match for England and America in this
field, but definitely superior to them.

The German Navy at the outbreak of the war had had only a
relatively small number of battleships. Nevertheless, the battleships
under construction had been completed, so that the last of
them would shortly be put into service. In contrast to the First
World War, the German Navy this time did not stay in port, but
from the first day of the war had been employed against the foe.
Matsuoka had probably gathered from the reports of the past few
weeks that large German battle units had interrupted the supply
lines between England and America with extraordinary success.[2]

The number of submarines heretofore employed was very small.
There had been at most eight or nine boats in service against the
enemy at any one time. Nevertheless, even these few U-boats, in
conjunction with the Luftwaffe, had sunk 750,000 tons per month
in January and February, and Germany could furnish accurate
proof of this at any time. This number, moreover, did not include
the great additional losses that England had sustained through
floating and magnetic mines. At the beginning of April the
number of submarines would increase eight- to tenfold, so that
sixty to eighty U-boats could then be continually employed against
the enemy. The Fuehrer had pursued the tactics of at first
employing only a few U-boats, and using the rest to train the
personnel necessary for a larger fleet, in order then to proceed to
a knock-out blow against the enemy. Therefore, the tonnage sunk
by the German U-boats could be expected in the future greatly to
exceed what had already been accomplished. In these circumstances
the U-boat alone could be designated as absolutely deadly.

On the continent of Europe Germany had practically no foe of
any consequence other than the small British forces that remained
in Greece. Germany would fight off any attempt of England to
land on the Continent or entrench herself there. She would not,
therefore, tolerate England’s staying in Greece. The Greek question
was of secondary importance, but by the thrust towards
Greece, which would probably be necessary, dominant positions
in the Eastern Mediterranean would be won for further operations.

In Africa the Italians had had bad luck in recent months,
because the Italian troops there were not familiar with modern
tank warfare and were not prepared with anti-tank defence, so that
it was relatively easy for the British armoured divisions to capture
the not very important Italian positions. Any further advance of
the British had been definitely blocked. The Fuehrer had dispatched
one of the most able of German officers, General Rommel,
to Tripoli with sufficient German forces. The hope that General
Wavell would attack had unfortunately not been realised. The
British had come upon the Germans in some skirmishes at an
outpost, and had thereupon abandoned any further intention of
attacking. Should they by chance attempt another attack upon
Tripoli [tania] they would court annihilating defeat. Here too the
tables would be turned some day, and the British would disappear
from North Africa, perhaps even more quickly than they had come.

In the Mediterranean the German Luftwaffe had been doing
good work for two months and had inflicted heavy shipping
losses on the British, who were holding on tenaciously. The Suez
Canal had been blocked for a long time, and would be blocked
again. It was no longer any fun for the British to hold out in the
Mediterranean.

If, then, we summed up the military situation in Europe we
should come to the conclusion that in the military sphere the
Axis was completely master of Continental Europe. A huge army,
practically idle, was at Germany’s command, and could be
employed at any time and at any place the Fuehrer considered
necessary.

Leaving the military for the political scene, Ribbentrop
said:

Confidentially, he could inform Matsuoka that present relations
with Russia were correct, to be sure, but not very friendly. After
Molotov’s visit, during which accession to the Three-Power Pact
was offered, Russia had made conditions that were unacceptable.
They involved the sacrifice of German interests in Finland, the
granting of bases on the Dardanelles, and a strong [Soviet]
influence on conditions in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria.
The Fuehrer had not concurred, because he had been of the
opinion that Germany could not permanently subscribe to such a
Russian policy. Germany needed the Balkan Peninsula above all
for her own economy, and had not been inclined to let it come
under Russian domination. For this reason she had given Rumania
a guarantee. It was this latter action particularly that the Russians
had taken amiss. Germany had further been obliged to enter into
a closer relationship with Bulgaria in order to obtain a vantage-point
from which to expel the British from Greece. Germany had
had to decide on this course because this campaign would otherwise
not have been possible. This too the Russians had not liked
at all.

In these circumstances relations with Russia were externally
normal and correct. The Russians, however, had for some time
demonstrated their unfriendliness to Germany whenever they
could. The declaration made to Turkey within the last few days
was an example of this. Germany felt plainly that since Sir
Stafford Cripps became Ambassador to Moscow . . . ties between
Russia and England were being cultivated in secret and even
relatively openly. Germany was watching these proceedings
carefully.

Ribbentrop continued:

He knew Stalin personally, and did not assume that the latter
was inclined towards adventure; but it was impossible to be sure.
The German armies in the East were prepared at any time.
Should Russia some day take a stand that could be interpreted as a
threat to Germany the Fuehrer would crush Russia. Germany was
certain that a campaign against Russia would end in the absolute
victory of German arms and the total crushing of the Russian
Army and the Russian State. The Fuehrer was convinced that in
case of action against the Soviet Union there would in a few
months be no more Great Power of Russia. In any case, the
Fuehrer was not counting on the treaties with Russia alone, but
was relying first of all on his Wehrmacht.

It must also not be overlooked that the Soviet Union, in spite
of all protestations to the contrary, was still carrying on Communistic
propaganda abroad. It was attempting not only in
Germany, but also in the occupied areas of France, Holland, and
Belgium, to continue its misleading propagandist activity. For
Germany this propaganda naturally constituted no danger. But
what it had unfortunately led to in other countries Matsuoka well
knew. As an example, the Reich Foreign Minister cited the Baltic
States, in which today, one year after the occupation by the
Russians, the entire intelligentsia had been wiped out and really
terrible conditions prevailed. Germany was on guard, and would
never suffer the slightest danger from Russia.

Further, there was the fact that Germany had to be protected
in the rear for her final battle against England. She would therefore
not put up with any threat from Russia if such a threat should
some day be considered serious. Germany wanted to conquer
England as rapidly as possible, and would not let anything deter
her from doing so.

These were grave words for the Reich Foreign Minister to
use on such an occasion, and Matsuoka could certainly not
complain that he had not been kept well informed. Ribbentrop
then reiterated that

the war had already been definitely won for the Axis. It could
in any case no longer be lost. It was now only a question of time
until England would admit having lost the war. When, he could,
of course, not predict. It might be very soon. It would depend
upon events of the next three or four months. It was highly probable,
however, that England would capitulate in the course of
this year.

Finally he spoke of America.

There was no doubt that the British would long since have
abandoned the war if Roosevelt had not always given Churchill
new hope. It was difficult to say what Roosevelt’s intention was in
the long run. It would be a long time before the American aid in
munitions for England would really be effective, and even then
the quality of airplane deliveries was doubtful. A country far
from the war could not turn out the highest quality aircraft. What
the German fliers had thus far encountered they described as
“junk.”

The Three-Power Pact [he said] had above all the goal of
frightening and keeping America out of the war. The principal
enemy of the New Order was England, who was as much the enemy
of Japan as of the Axis Powers.

Ribbentrop then stated that

the Fuehrer, after careful consideration, believed that it would be
advantageous if Japan would decide as soon as possible to take an
active part in the war upon England. A quick attack upon
Singapore, for instance, would be a decisive factor in the speedy
overthrow of England. If today in a war against England Japan
were to succeed with one decisive stroke on Singapore Roosevelt
would be in a very difficult position. If he declared war upon
Japan he must expect that the Philippine question would be
resolved in favour of Japan. He would probably reflect for a long
time before incurring such a serious loss of prestige. Japan, on the
other hand, through the conquest of Singapore would gain an
absolutely dominant position in that part of East Asia. She would
in fact “cut the Gordian knot.”

* * * * *

After an interval for luncheon, Matsuoka was received by
Hitler. The Fuehrer dwelt in his own words upon German
military triumphs. Since the war began sixty Polish, six Norwegian,
eighteen Dutch, twenty-two Belgian, and one hundred
and thirty-eight French divisions had been eliminated, and
twelve or thirteen British divisions had been driven from the
Continent. Resistance to the will of the Axis Powers had
become impossible. Hitler went on to speak of the British losses
in tonnage. The real U-boat warfare was just beginning. In
the present and coming months England would be damaged to
an extent far surpassing her present rate of losses. In the air
Germany had absolute supremacy, in spite of all the claims of
the English to success. The attacks of the Luftwaffe in the
coming months would actually grow much stronger. The
effectiveness of the German blockade had made rationing more
severe in England than in Germany. Meanwhile the war would
go on in preparation for the final stroke against England.

Matsuoka listened to this harangue. He expressed his thanks
for the frankness with which he had been treated. He said that
on the whole he agreed with the view of the Fuehrer. There
were in Japan, as in other countries, certain intellectual circles
which only a powerful individual could hold firmly under
control. Japan would take action in a decisive form if she had
the feeling that otherwise she would lose a chance which could
only occur once in a thousand years. He had explained to the
two princes of the Japanese Imperial Family that preparation
could not always be complete and perfect. Risks must be run.
It was only a question of time when Japan would attack. The
hesitant politicians in Japan would always delay, and act partly
from a pro-British or pro-American attitude. Personally he
wished the attack to come as soon as possible. Unfortunately he
did not control Japan, but had to bring those who were in
control round to his point of view. He would certainly be successful
some day, but at the present moment and under these
circumstances he could make no pledge on behalf of the Japanese
Empire that it would take action. He would give his closest
attention to these matters on his return. He could make no
definite commitment, but he personally would do his utmost.
These were considerable reservations.

He then referred to his conference with Stalin when he had
passed through Moscow. He had at first wanted only to make
a courtesy call on Molotov, but the Russian Government had
proposed a meeting between him, Stalin, and Molotov. He had
conversed with Molotov, taking into account the necessary
translations, for perhaps ten minutes, and with Stalin for
twenty-five minutes. He had told Stalin that the Japanese were
moral Communists, though he did not believe in political and
economic Communism. This Japanese ideal of moral Communism
had been overthrown by the liberalism, individualism,
and egoism produced in the West. The ideological struggle in
Japan was extremely bitter, but those who were fighting for the
restoration of the old ideals were convinced they would finally
win. The Anglo-Saxons represented the greatest hindrance to
the establishment of the New Order. He had told Stalin that
after the collapse of the British Empire the differences between
Japan and Russia would be eliminated. The Anglo-Saxons were
the common foe of Japan, Germany, and Soviet Russia. After
some reflection Stalin had stated that Soviet Russia had never
got along well with Great Britain and never would.

* * * * *

The conversations in Berlin were continued throughout
March 28 and 29 without altering the essential features: first,
the Germans strove hard to persuade Japan to attack the British
Empire; secondly, they admitted that their relations with
Russia were uncertain; and, thirdly, they made it plain that
Hitler hoped earnestly to avoid a conflict with the United
States.

To neither of the important questions whether Germany still
intended, as before, to effect a landing in Britain and how
German-Soviet relations were now viewed did Matsuoka obtain
a clear answer. To his question as to whether, on his return
journey through Moscow, he should touch on political questions
lightly or go into them more deeply, Ribbentrop answered
through his interpreter: “You had better treat your visit as a
mere formality.”[3]

* * * * *

Without, of course, knowing the substance or character of
these secret Berlin parleys, but deeply impressed with their
importance, I thought I would use the Japanese Ambassador,
whom Matsuoka had summoned to meet him on the Continent,
to convey to his chief a few counter-considerations. Mr.
Shigemitsu, who, if he was hostile to Britain and the United
States and working for war against us, must have been a very
good deceiver, accepted with a courtly gesture the task of
delivering my message. In the end he did not travel, and the
letter was telegraphed to our Ambassador in Moscow, to be
given to Mr. Matsuoka on his return journey by the Siberian
Railway.

Mr. Churchill to M. Yosuke Matsuoka

2 April 41

I venture to suggest a few questions which it seems to me deserve
the attention of the Imperial Japanese Government and people.

Will Germany, without the command of the sea or the command
of the British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer
Great Britain in the spring, summer, or autumn of 1941? Will
Germany try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan
to wait until these questions have answered themselves?

2. Will the German attack on British shipping be strong enough
to prevent American aid from reaching British shores, with Great
Britain and the United States transforming their whole industry
to war purposes?

3. Did Japan’s accession to the Triple Pact make it more likely
or less likely that the United States would come into the present
war?

4. If the United States entered the war at the side of Great
Britain, and Japan ranged herself with the Axis Powers, would
not the naval superiority of the two English-speaking nations
enable them to dispose of the Axis Powers in Europe before
turning their united strength upon Japan?

5. Is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the Italian
Fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used
to be?

6. Will the British Air Force be stronger than the German Air
Force before the end of 1941, and far stronger before the end of
1942?

7. Will the many countries which are being held down by the
German Army and Gestapo learn to like the Germans more or
will they like them less as the years pass by?

8. Is it true that the production of steel in the United States
during 1941 will be 75,000,000 tons, and in Great Britain about
12,500,000, making a total of nearly 90,000,000 tons? If Germany
should happen to be defeated, as she was last time, would not the
7,000,000 tons steel production of Japan be inadequate for a single-handed
war?

From the answers to these questions may spring the avoidance
by Japan of a serious catastrophe, and a marked improvement in
the relations between Japan and the two great sea Powers of the
West.

I was rather pleased with this when I wrote it, and I don’t mind
the look of it now.

* * * * *

Matsuoka meanwhile went to Rome, where he saw Mussolini
and the Pope. We now have the German account of what
he said to Hitler on April 4, when he returned to Berlin. The
Duce, he said, had informed him about the war in Greece,
Yugoslavia, and North Africa, and of the part which Italy herself
had in these events. Finally he had spoken of Soviet Russia
and America. The Duce had said that one must have a clear
notion of the importance of one’s opponents. The enemy
Number 1 was America and Soviet Russia came only in the
second place. By these remarks the Duce had given him to
understand that America as enemy Number 1 would have to be
very carefully watched, but should not be provoked. On the
other hand one must be thoroughly prepared for all eventualities.
Matsuoka had agreed with this line of thought.

* * * * *

Before his homeward journey by the Trans-Siberian Railway
Matsuoka tarried for a week in Moscow. He had several long
conversations both with Stalin and Molotov. The only account
we have of these is from the German Ambassador Schulenburg,
who of course was only told what the Russians and
Japanese wished him to know. It seemed that all the declarations,
true or boastful, of German might had by no means convinced
the Japanese envoy. The guarded attitude of the German
leaders towards a collision with the United States had
made a dint in Matsuoka’s mind. At the same time he was
aware, from Ribbentrop’s language, of the menacing, widening
gulf between Germany and Russia. How much he told his new
hosts about this we cannot tell. But certainly, surveying the
scene with peculiar advantages, and after receiving from Sir
Stafford Cripps the telegraphed version of my letter with its
questions, it would appear that Matsuoka found himself closer
to Molotov than to Ribbentrop. In this doom-balance of mighty
nations Japan was asked by Germany to take the irrevocable
step of declaring war on Britain, and potentially on the English-speaking
world. By Russia she was only asked to mark time, to
wait and see. Evidently he did not believe that Britain was
finished. He could not be sure what would happen between
Germany and Russia. He was not inclined, or perhaps he had
not the power, to commit his country to decisive action. He
greatly preferred a neutrality pact, which at least gave time for
unpredictable events to unfold, as they must do soon.

Accordingly, when Matsuoka visited Schulenburg in Moscow
on April 13 to make his farewell call, he mentioned with incongruous
preciseness that a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact had
been arranged at the last moment, and “in all likelihood would
be signed this afternoon at 2 P.M. local time.” Both sides had
made concessions about the disputed island of Sakhalin. This
new agreement, he assured the German Ambassador, in no way
affected the Three-Power Pact. He added that the American
and English journalists who had reported that his journey to
Moscow had been a complete failure would be compelled now
to acknowledge that the Japanese policy had achieved a great
success, which could not fail to have its effect on England and
America.

Schulenburg has recorded the demonstration of unity and
comradeship arranged by Stalin at the railway station on
Matsuoka’s departure for Japan. The train was delayed for an
hour for salutes and ceremonies, apparently unexpected by
both the Japanese and Germans. Stalin and Molotov appeared,
and greeted Matsuoka and the Japanese in a remarkably
friendly manner and wished them a pleasant journey. Then
Stalin publicly asked for the German Ambassador. “And when
he found me,” said Schulenburg, “he came up and threw his
arm around my shoulder. ‘We must remain friends. You must
now do everything to that end.’ ” Later Stalin turned to the
German Military Attaché, first having made sure that he had
got the right man, and said to him, “We will remain friends
with you in any event.” “Stalin,” adds Schulenburg, “doubtless
brought about this greeting of Colonel Krebs and myself
intentionally, and thereby he consciously attracted the attention
of the numerous persons who were present.”

These embraces were a vain pretence. Stalin should surely
have known from his own reports the enormous deployment
of German strength which now began to be visible to British
Intelligence all along the Russian frontier. It was only ten
weeks before Hitler’s terrific onslaught on Russia began. It
would have been only five weeks but for the delay caused by
the fighting in Greece and Yugoslavia.

* * * * *

Matsuoka returned to Tokyo from his European visit at the
end of April. He was met at the airport by the Prime Minister,
Prince Konoye, who informed him that on that very day the
Japanese had been considering the possibilities of an understanding
in the Pacific with the United States. This was contrary
to Matsuoka’s theme. Though beset by doubts, he was
still on the whole a believer in ultimate German victory.
Backed by the prestige of the Tripartite Pact and the neutrality
treaty with Russia, he saw no special need to conciliate the
Americans, who, in his opinion, would never face simultaneous
war in the Atlantic against Germany and in the Pacific against
Japan. The Foreign Minister, therefore, found himself confronted
with a mood in Government circles widely different
from his own. In spite of his vehement protests the Japanese
resolved to continue the negotiations at Washington, and also
to conceal them from the Germans. On May 4 Matsuoka took
it upon himself to acquaint the German Ambassador with the
text of an American Note to Japan offering to reach a general
Pacific settlement, beginning with American mediation between
Japan and China. The main obstacle to this proposal
was the American requirement that Japan should first evacuate
China.

* * * * *

While in Moscow Mr. Matsuoka had received my message,
and on his return journey in the train across Siberia he wrote
a barren reply, which was dispatched on his arrival in Tokyo.

Mr. Matsuoka to Mr. Winston Churchill

22 April 1941

Your Excellency,

I have just come back from my trip, and hasten to acknowledge
the receipt of a paper handed to me at Moscow on the evening of
the twelfth instant by Sir Stafford Cripps with a remark that it
was a copy in substance of a letter addressed to me, dated London,
the second April, 1941, and forwarded to Tokyo.

I wish to express my appreciation for the facilities with which
your Government made efforts to provide our Ambassador when
he wanted to meet me on the Continent. I was deeply disappointed
when I learned that he could not come. Your Excellency may
rest assured that the foreign policy of Japan is determined upon
after an unbiased examination of all the facts and a very
careful weighing of all the elements of the situation she confronts,
always holding steadfastly in view the great racial aim and ambition
of finally bringing about the conditions envisaged in what
she calls Hakko-ichiu, the Japanese conception of a universal peace
under which there would be no conquest, no oppression, no
exploitation of any and all peoples. And, once determined, I need
hardly tell Your Excellency that it will be carried out with resolution
but with utmost circumspection, taking in every detail of
changing circumstances.

I am, believe me,

Your Excellency’s obedient servant,

Yosuke Matsuoka

* * * * *

Matsuoka and his colleagues in the Japanese Government
were soon to confront a situation which required such an “unbiased
examination.” On June 28, a week after Hitler’s invasion
of Russia, a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet and officials
of the Imperial Household was held. Matsuoka found his position
irremediably weakened. He had “lost face” because he had
not known of Hitler’s intention to attack Russia. He spoke in
favour of joining Germany, but the majority opinion was overwhelmingly
against him. The Government decided to adopt a
compromise policy. Armament preparations were to be augmented.
Article 5 of the Tripartite Pact was invoked, which
stated that the instrument was not valid against Russia. Germany
was to be informed confidentially that Japan would fight “Bolshevism
in Asia,” and the Neutrality Treaty with Russia was
cited to justify non-intervention in the German-Russian War.
On the other hand, it was agreed to go ahead in the Southern
seas and to complete the occupation of South Indo-China.
These decisions were not agreeable to Matsuoka. In order to
stir up agitation for entering the war on Germany’s side, he
had one of his speeches printed as a pamphlet for wide distribution.
The copies were suppressed by the Japanese Government.
On July 16 he disappeared from office.

But while the Japanese Cabinet were not prepared to follow
﻿in the wake of German policy, their policy did not represent
a triumph for the moderates in Japanese public life. The
strengthening of the Japanese armed forces was pressed forward,
and bases were to be established in South Indo-China. This
was a prelude to attack on the British and Dutch colonies in
Southeast Asia. It seems, from the evidence up till now available,
that the leaders of Japanese policy did not expect from the
United States or Great Britain any vigorous counter-measures
to this projected southward advance.

Thus we see as this world drama marches on how all these
three coldly calculating empires made at this moment mistakes
disastrous alike, to their ambitions and their safety. Hitler was
resolved on the war with Russia, which played a decisive part
in his ruin. Stalin remained, to Russia’s bitter cost, in ignorance
or underestimation of the blow about to fall on him.
Japan certainly missed the best chance—for what it was ever
worth—of realising her dreams.

11The Desert Flank: Rommel: Tobruk

The Vital Desert Flank—Wavell’s Dispositions—His Estimate
of the Situation of March 2—Rommel’s Arrival in Tripoli,
February 12—His Determination to Attack—A Great General—The
Gateway at Agheila—Our Inadequate Resources—Personal
Inspection by Wavell and Dill, March 17—My Telegram
to Wavell of March 26—His Reply—The Position in
Cyrenaica—Rommel’s Attack upon Agheila, March 31—Failure
of Our Armoured Forces—My Telegram of April 2—Unexpected
German Strength—Evacuation of Benghazi—Capture
of Generals Neame and O’Connor—Importance of Holding
Tobruk—Wavell’s Decision—German Mastery of the Air—My
Directive of April 14—My Telegram to President Roosevelt,
April 16—Wavell’s Explanation.

All our efforts to form a front in the Balkans were founded
upon the sure maintenance of the Desert flank in North
Africa. This might have been fixed at Tobruk; but Wavell’s
rapid westward advance and the capture of Benghazi had given
us all Cyrenaica. To this the sea corner at Agheila was the
gateway. It was common ground between all authorities in
London and Cairo that this must be held at all costs and in
priority over every other venture. The utter destruction of the
Italian forces in Cyrenaica and the long road distances to be
traversed before the enemy could gather a fresh army led
Wavell to believe that for some time to come he could afford
to hold this vital western flank with moderate forces and to
relieve his tried troops with others less well trained. The
Desert flank was the peg on which all else hung, and there was
no idea in any quarter of losing or risking that for the sake of
Greece or anything in the Balkans.

At the end of February the 7th British Armoured Division
had been withdrawn to Egypt to rest and refit. This famous
unit had rendered the highest service. Its tanks had travelled
far and were largely used up. Its numbers had shrunk by
fighting and wear and tear. Still there was a core of the most
experienced, hard-bitten, desert-worthy fighting men, the like
of whom could not be found by us. It was a pity not to keep
in being the nucleus of this unique organisation and rebuild
its strength by drafts of officers and men arriving trained, fresh,
and keen from England, and to send up to them the pick of
whatever new tanks or spare parts could be found. Thus the 7th
Armoured Division would have preserved a continuity of life
and been resuscitated in strength.

It was only after some weeks, marked by serious decisions,
that I realised that the 7th Armoured Division did not exist
as a factor in the protection of our vital Desert flank. The
place of the 7th Armoured Division was taken by an armoured
brigade and part of the support group of the 2d Armoured
Division. The 6th Australian Division was also relieved by the
9th. Neither of these new formations was fully trained, and,
to make matters worse, they were stripped of much equipment
and transport to bring up to full scale the divisions
soon to go to Greece. The shortage of transport was severely
felt and affected the dispositions of the troops and their mobility.
Because of maintenance difficulties farther forward, one
Australian brigade was held back in Tobruk, where also was a
brigade of motorised Indian cavalry recently formed and under
training.

* * * * *

Our Intelligence reports now began to cause the Chiefs of
Staff some concern. On February 27 they sent a warning telegram
to General Wavell:

In view of arrival of German armoured formations and aircraft
in Tripolitania the question of defence commitments in Egypt and
Cyrenaica has been considered here. Would be grateful if you
would telegraph a short appreciation.

This drew an important considered reply which included
the following:

2 March 41

Latest information indicates recent reinforcements to Tripolitania
comprise two Italian infantry divisions, two Italian motorised
artillery regiments, and German armoured troops estimated at
maximum of one armoured brigade group. No evidence of additional
mechanical transport landed, and enemy must still be short
of transport. Latest air reconnaissance, however, shows considerable
increase in mechanical transport on Tripoli-Sirte road.

2. Tripoli to Agheila is 471 miles and to Benghazi 646 miles.
There is only one road, and water is inadequate over 410 miles of
the distance; these factors, together with lack of transport, limit
the present enemy threat. He can probably maintain up to one
infantry division and armoured brigade along the coast road in
about three weeks, and possibly at the same time employ a second
armoured brigade, if he has one available, across the desert via
Hon and Marada against our flank.

3. He may test us at Agheila by offensive patrolling, and if he
finds us weak push on to Agedabia in order to move up his advanced
landing grounds. I do not think that with this force he
will attempt to recover Benghazi.

4. Eventually two German divisions might be employed in a
large-scale attack. This, with one or two infantry divisions, would
be the maximum maintainable via Tripoli. Shipping risks, difficulty
of communications, and the approach of hot weather make it
unlikely that such an attack could develop before the end of the
summer. Effective interference by sea with convoys and by air
with Tripoli might extend this period.

The Italian air threat to Cyrenaica is at present almost negligible.
On the other hand, the Germans are well established in Central
Mediterranean. . . . German parachute troops might be landed on
our lines of communication in combination with armoured forces.
I do not anticipate that parachutists will be used with the scale of
attack likely to be developed in near future, but they are a possible
accompaniment of a large-scale attack at later date.

* * * * *

But now a new figure sprang upon the world stage—a
German warrior who will hold his place in their military
annals. Erwin Rommel was born in Heidenheim, in Württemberg,
in November, 1891. He was a delicate boy, and was
educated at home till, at the age of nine, he joined the local
Government school, of which his father was headmaster. In
1910 he was an officer cadet in the Württemberg Regiment.
When he did his training at the military school at Danzig his
instructors reported that he was physically small, but strong.
Mentally he was not remarkable. He fought in the First World
War in the Argonne, in Rumania, and in Italy, being twice
wounded and awarded the highest classes of the Iron Cross and
of the order Pour le Mérite. Between the two wars he served
as a regimental officer and on the Staff. On the outbreak of the
Second World War he was appointed commandant of the
Fuehrer’s field headquarters in the Polish campaign, and was
then given command of the 7th Panzer Division of the Fifteenth
Corps. This division, nicknamed “the Phantoms,”
formed the spearhead of the German break-through across
the Meuse. He narrowly escaped capture when the British
counter-attacked at Arras on May 21, 1940. Thereafter he led
his division through La Bassée towards Lille. If this thrust had
had a little more success, or perhaps not been restrained by
orders from the High Command, it might have cut off a large
part of the British Army, including the 3d Division, commanded
by General Montgomery. His was the spearhead which
crossed the Somme and advanced on the Seine in the direction
of Rouen, rolling up the French left wing and capturing
numerous French and British forces around Saint-Valery. His
division was the first to reach the Channel, and entered Cherbourg
just after our final evacuation where Rommel took the
surrender of the port and thirty thousand French prisoners.

These many services and distinctions led to his appointment
early in 1941 to command the German troops sent to Libya.
On February 12 he arrived with his personal staff at Tripoli to
campaign with the ally against whom he had formerly won distinction.
At that time Italian hopes were limited to holding
Tripolitania, and Rommel took charge of the growing German
contingent under Italian command. He strove immediately to
enforce an offensive campaign. When early in April the Italian
Commander-in-Chief tried to persuade him that the German
Afrika Corps should not advance without his permission,
Rommel protested that “as a German general he had to issue
orders in accordance with what the situation demanded.” Any
reservations because of the supply problem were, he declared,
“unfounded.” He demanded and obtained complete freedom
of action.

Throughout the African campaign Rommel proved himself
a master in handling mobile formations, especially in regrouping
rapidly after an operation and following up success. He was
a splendid military gambler, dominating the problems of supply
and scornful of opposition. At first the German High Command,
having let him loose, were astonished by his successes,
and were inclined to hold him back. His ardour and daring
inflicted grievous disasters upon us, but he deserves the salute
which I made him—and not without some reproaches from the
public—in the House of Commons in January, 1942, when I
said of him, “We have a very daring and skilful opponent
against us, and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great
general.” He also deserves our respect because, although a
loyal German soldier, he came to hate Hitler and all his works,
and took part in the conspiracy of 1944 to rescue Germany by displacing
the maniac and tyrant. For this he paid the forfeit of
his life. In the sombre wars of modern democracy chivalry finds
no place. Dull butcheries on a gigantic scale and mass effects
overwhelm all detached sentiment. Still, I do not regret or
retract the tribute I paid to Rommel, unfashionable though it
was judged.

* * * * *

In London we accepted Wavell’s telegram of March 2, as the
basis of our action. The Agheila defile was the kernel of the
situation. If the enemy broke through to Agedabia, Benghazi
and everything west of Tobruk were imperilled. They could
choose between taking the good coast road to Benghazi and
beyond or using the tracks leading straight to Mechili and
Tobruk, which cut off the bulge of desert, two hundred miles
long by a hundred miles broad. Taking this latter route in February,
we had nipped and captured many thousands of Italians
retiring through Benghazi. It should not have been a matter
of surprise to us if Rommel also took the desert route to play
the same trick on us. However, so long as we held the gateway
at Agheila the enemy was denied the opportunity of bemusing
us in this fashion. There are good positions there, but partly
owing to the extra strain on transport from Tobruk, through
the port of Benghazi not being judged usable, they were not
adequately defended.

All this depended upon a knowledge not only of the ground,
but of the conditions of desert warfare. So rapid had been our
advance, so easy and complete our victories, that these strategic
facts were not effectively grasped at this stage. However, a
superiority in armour and in quality rather than numbers, and
a reasonable parity in the air, would have enabled the better
and more lively force to win in a rough-and-tumble in the
desert, even if the gateway had been lost. None of these conditions
were established by the arrangements which were made.
We were inferior in the air; and our armour, for reasons which
will be explained later, was utterly inadequate, as was also the
training and equipment of the troops west of Tobruk.

On March 17 Generals Wavell and Dill visited Cyrenaica and
made a personal inspection. They motored through Antelat to
Agheila, and Dill was immediately struck by the difficulty of
defending the large stretches of desert between Agheila and
Benghazi. In a telegram on March 18 from Cairo to his deputy
at home he said that the outstanding fact was that between the
salt-pans east of Agheila and Benghazi the desert was so open
and so suitable for armoured vehicles that, other things being
equal, the stronger fleet would win. There were no infantry
positions on which to fight. Of course, the maintenance problem
over these vast distances of desert remained and entirely
favoured defence. Wavell, he said, had this difficult defence
problem well in hand.

In a conversation with the Australian Staff of General
Morshead, whom he met on the way, the C.I.G.S. is said to have
expressed the opinion that the force looked like getting “a
bloody nose” in the near future, adding, “This will not be the
only place either.”[1] This latter opinion was not in harmony
with any statement he made to us.

* * * * *

There had been during March increasing evidence of the
arrival of German troops from Tripoli towards Agheila, and on
March 20 Wavell reported that an attack on a limited scale
seemed to be in preparation and that the situation on the
Cyrenaica frontier was causing him some anxiety. If our advanced
troops were driven from their present positions there
would be no good blocking points south of Benghazi, as the
country was dead-level plain. Administrative problems should,
however, preclude anything but a limited advance by the
enemy.

I telegraphed:

Prime Minister to General Wavell

26 March 41

We are naturally concerned at rapid German advance to
Agheila. It is their habit to push on whenever they are not resisted.
I presume you are only waiting for the tortoise to stick his
head out far enough before chopping it off. It seems extremely
important to give them an early taste of our quality. What is the
state and location of 7th Armoured Division? Pray give me your
appreciation. I cordially approve your request to General Smuts
for a brigade of 1st South African Division. Everything must be
done to accelerate movement of 2d South African Division. The
50th British Division starts twenty-second. . . .

Wavell replied to this at once as follows:

27 March 41

No evidence yet that there are many Germans at Agheila;
probably mainly Italian, with small stiffening of Germans.

2. I have to admit to having taken considerable risk in Cyrenaica
after capture of Benghazi in order to provide maximum support
for Greece. My estimate at that time was that Italians in Tripolitania
could be disregarded and that Germans were unlikely to
accept the risk of sending large bodies of armoured troops to Africa
in view of the inefficiency of the Italian Navy. I, therefore, made
arrangements to leave only small armoured force and one partly
trained Australian division in Cyrenaica.

3. After we had accepted Greek liability evidence began to
accumulate of German reinforcements to Tripoli, which were
coupled with attacks on Malta which prevented bombing of
Tripoli from there, on which I had counted. German air attacks
on Benghazi, which prevented supply ships using harbour, also
increased our difficulties.

4. Result is I am weak in Cyrenaica at present and no reinforcements
of armoured troops, which are chief requirement, are at
present available. I have one brigade of 2d Armoured Division in
Cyrenaica, one in Greece. The 7th Armoured Division is returning
[to Cairo], and as no reserve tanks were available is dependent
on repair, which takes time. Next month or two will be anxious,
but enemy has extremely difficult problem and am sure his numbers
have been much exaggerated. I cannot, however, at present
afford to use my small armoured force as boldly as I should
like.

Steps to reinforce Cyrenaica are in hand. . . . My own chief difficulty
is transport.

He added what may well remind us of his many cares:

Have just come back from Keren front. Capture was very fine
achievement by Indian divisions, and their tails are high in spite
of fairly heavy casualties. Platt will push on towards Asmara as
quickly as he can, and I have authorised Cunningham to continue
towards Addis Ababa from Harrar, which surrendered yesterday.

* * * * *

Rommel’s attack upon Agheila began on March 31. General
Neame had been ordered, if pressed, to fight a delaying action
back to near Benghazi, and to cover that port as long as possible.
He was given permission to evacuate it if necessary after
making demolitions. Our armoured division at Agheila, which
had in fact only one armoured brigade and its support group,
therefore, withdrew slowly during the next two days. In the air
the enemy proved greatly superior. The Italian Air Force still
counted for little, but there were about a hundred German
fighters and a hundred bombers and dive-bombers. On April 2
General Wavell reported that the forward troops in Cyrenaica
were being attacked by a German colonial armoured division.

Some forward posts were overrun yesterday and losses occurred.
Losses not serious at present, but the mechanical condition of the
armoured brigade is causing Neame much concern, and there seem
to be many breakdowns. As I can produce no more armoured units
for at least three or four weeks, I have warned him to keep three
brigades in being, even if it involves considerable withdrawal,
possibly even from Benghazi.

I was still under the impression, derived from Wavell’s previous
estimates, of the enemy’s limited potential strength.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

2 April 41

It seems most desirable to chop the German advance against
Cyrenaica. Any rebuff to the Germans would have far-reaching
prestige effects. It would be all right to give up ground for the
purposes of manoeuvre, but any serious withdrawal from Benghazi
would appear most melancholy. I cannot understand how the
enemy can have developed any considerable force at the end of
this long, waterless coast road, and I cannot feel that there is at this
moment a persistent weight behind his attack in Cyrenaica. If this
blob which has come forward against you could be cut off you
might have a prolonged easement. Of course, if they succeed in
wandering onward they will gradually destroy the effect of your
victories. Have you got a man like O’Connor or Creagh dealing
with this frontier problem?

On April 2 the support group of our 2d Armoured Division
was driven out of Agedabia by fifty enemy tanks, and retreated
to the Antelat area, thirty-five miles to the northeast. The
division was ordered to withdraw to the neighbourhood of
Benghazi. Our armoured forces under the German attack became
disorganised and there were serious losses. The message
ended, “Orders have been given for demolitions in Benghazi.”
General Wavell flew to the front on the third, and reported on
his return that a large part of the armoured brigade had been
overrun and disorganised by superior German armour. This
would uncover the left flank of the 9th Australian Division east
and northeast of Benghazi. “Their withdrawal may be necessary.”
In consequence of the enemy’s strength in Libya he
said the 7th Australian Division could not go to Greece, but
must move to the Western Desert instead. The 6th British
Division, still incomplete, must become the reserve. “This will
involve the postponement of the attack on Rhodes.” Thus at a
single stroke, and almost in a day, the desert flank upon which
all our decisions had depended had crumpled and the expedition
to Greece, already slender, was heavily reduced. The
seizure of Rhodes, which was an essential part of our air plans
in the Aegean, became impossible.

The evacuation of Benghazi was ordered. The support group
was sent northward to cover the withdrawal of the 9th
Australian Division, which began early on April 4. At the
same time the 3d Armoured Brigade were to move on Mechili
to block any attempt on the part of the enemy to interfere with
the withdrawal. To reinforce them there two regiments of the
Indian Motorised Cavalry Brigade were ordered up from
Tobruk.

* * * * *

I was disturbed by this new and unexpected situation, and
cabled the same day to Mr. Eden, who was still in Athens.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden

3 April 41

Evacuation Benghazi serious, as Germans, once established in
aerodromes thereabouts, will probably deny us use of Tobruk.
Find out what is strategic and tactical plan to chop the enemy. Let
me know to what point retirement is ordered. How does 9th Australian
Division get back, and how far? Remember that in his
telegram of March 2, Wavell gave many cogent arguments for
believing his western flank secure.

2. Far more important than the loss of ground is the idea that
we cannot face the Germans and that their appearance is enough
to drive us back many scores of miles. This may react most evilly
throughout Balkans and Turkey. Pray go back to Cairo and go
into all this. Sooner or later we shall have to fight the Huns. By
all means make the best plan of manoeuvre, but anyhow fight.
Can nothing be done to cut the coastal road by a seaborne descent
behind them, even if it means putting off Rhodes?

Mr. Eden replied from Cairo:

5 April 41

Dill and I arrived safely this evening, and have had full discussion
with Wavell and Tedder in Longmore’s absence in the Sudan.

The general conclusion to which we have all come is that the
Italian-German effort in Cyrenaica is a major diversion well timed
to precede the German attack in the Balkans. This judgment in
no way diminishes the seriousness of the indirect threat to Egypt,
for quite clearly the enemy must be expected to press any advantage
he gains. Unfortunately, his first moves attained a greater
measure of success than had been expected, and he is following
up his initial success. . . .

* * * * *

Wavell had gone to the Desert front with the intention of
putting O’Connor in command. That officer, who was not
well at the moment, had represented to the Commander-in-Chief
that it would be better if he did not actually take over
command from Neame in the middle of the battle, but that he
should be at hand to help him with his expert local knowledge.
Wavell agreed. The arrangement did not work well or last
long. On the night of the sixth the retreat from Benghazi was
in full progress. The 9th Australian Division was withdrawing
eastward along the coastal road, and in order to avoid the traffic
General Neame took General O’Connor in his car, and without
escort of any kind motored along a by-road. In the darkness
they were suddenly stopped, and the pistols of a German patrol
presented through the car windows left them no choice but
personal surrender. The loss of these two gallant lieutenant-generals,
Neame a V.C., and O’Connor on the whole our most
experienced and successful desert commander, was grievous.

In the afternoon of April 6, at a conference in Cairo at which
Wavell, Eden, Dill, Longmore, and Cunningham were present,
the question of where to make a stand was discussed. Wavell
decided to hold Tobruk if possible, and with his usual personal
mobility flew thither on the morning of the eighth with
the Australian General Laverack, whom he placed in temporary
command. Eden and Dill started on their homeward journey,
and the War Cabinet anxiously awaited their return with all
the knowledge they had gathered in Athens and Cairo.

Wavell reported that the withdrawal of the 9th Australian
Division seemed to be proceeding without interference though
twenty-four hundred Italian prisoners had to be left at Barce.
But later the same day he telegraphed that the position in the
Western Desert had greatly deteriorated. The enemy had
moved on Mechili by the desert route, and there were further
vehicle losses in the 2d Armoured Division by mechanical
breakdowns and air bombing. The 3d Armoured Brigade had
little or no fighting value.

Meanwhile I sent the following message to General Wavell:

7 April 41

You should surely be able to hold Tobruk, with its permanent
Italian defences, at least until or unless the enemy brings up
strong artillery forces. It seems difficult to believe that he can do
this for some weeks. He would run great risks in masking Tobruk
and advancing upon Egypt, observing that we can reinforce from
the sea and would menace his communications. Tobruk, therefore,
seems to be a place to be held to the death without thought
of retirement. I should be glad to hear of your intentions.

Wavell flew to Tobruk on April 8 and gave orders for the
defence of the fortress. He started back for Cairo as night fell.
The engine failed and they made a forced landing in the dark.
The aircraft was smashed and they stepped out onto the open
desert, they knew not where. The Commander-in-Chief decided
to burn his secret papers. After a long wait the lights of
a vehicle were seen. Fortunately it proved to be a British
patrol, who approached in menacing fashion. For six hours
the Staff in Cairo were alarmed, not without reason, at Wavell’s
disappearance.

On his return to Cairo the Commander-in-Chief replied.
After giving a detailed statement of the troop positions, he said:

Although first enemy effort seems to have exhausted itself, I do
not feel we shall have long respite and am still very anxious.
Tobruk is not good defensive position; long line of communication
behind is hardly protected at all and is unorganised.

As the last sentence of this message seemed to leave the
question of Tobruk in doubt, I drafted the following message
in conclave with the Chiefs of Staff:

Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to General Wavell

10 April 41

We await your full appreciation. Meanwhile you should know
how the problem looks to us. From here it seems unthinkable that
the fortress of Tobruk should be abandoned without offering the
most prolonged resistance. We have a secure sealine of communications.
The enemy’s line is long and should be vulnerable, provided
he is not given time to organise at leisure. So long as
Tobruk is held and its garrison includes even a few armoured
vehicles which can lick out at his communications, nothing but a
raid dare go past Tobruk. If you leave Tobruk and go 260 miles
back to Mersa Matruh may you not find yourself faced with something
like the same problem? We are convinced you should fight it
out at Tobruk.

But before the meeting broke up we learned of Wavell’s final
decision to hold Tobruk.

I propose [he said] to hold Tobruk, to place a force in Bardia-Sollum
area with as much mobility as possible to protect communications
and act against flank or rear of enemy attacking
Tobruk, and to build up old plan of defence in Mersa Matruh
area. Distribution of force so as to gain time without risking defeat
in detail will be difficult calculation. My resources are very limited,
especially of mobile and armoured troops and of anti-tank
and anti-aircraft weapons. It will be a race against time.

Our message was therefore not sent. Instead:

Prime Minister to General Wavell

10 April 41

We all cordially endorse your decision to hold Tobruk, and will
do all in our power to bring you aid.

* * * * *

The retreat to Tobruk was carried out successfully along
the coast road. But inland only the headquarters of the 2d
Armoured Division arrived at Mechili, on April 6, having lost
all touch with its subordinate formations. On April 7 this headquarters
and the two Indian motorised regiments found themselves
surrounded. Attacks were repulsed, and two ultimatums
to surrender, one signed by Rommel, were rejected. A number
of men fought their way out, bringing in a hundred German
prisoners, but the great majority were forced back into the
camp, and there surrendered. The missing 3d Armoured
Brigade, now reduced to a dozen tanks, moved on Derna, reputedly
because of shortage of petrol, and near that place was
ambushed and destroyed on the night of April 6. Throughout
the operations the German Air Force had had complete air
superiority. This contributed in no small degree to the enemy
success. On the night of the eighth the Australians reached
Tobruk, which had by then been reinforced by sea with a
brigade of the 7th Australian Division from Egypt. The enemy,
whose forward troops included parts of the 5th (Light) Panzer
Division, one Italian armoured and one infantry division, took
Bardia on April 12, but made no effort to penetrate the frontier
defences of Egypt.

The enemy pushed on very quickly round Tobruk and
towards Bardia and Sollum, with heavy armoured cars and
motorised infantry. Other troops attacked the Tobruk defences.
The garrison, consisting of the 9th Australian Division,
one brigade group of the 7th Australian Division, and a small
armoured force, beat off two attacks, destroying a number of
enemy tanks. In view of the changed situation and loss of the
generals, Wavell had to reorganise the system of command as
follows: Tobruk fortress, General Morshead; Western Desert,
General Beresford-Peirse; troops in Egypt, General Marshall-Cornwall;
Palestine, General Godwin-Austen.

If I get time [said the Commander-in-Chief] to put the above
organisation into effect we shall be back to something resembling
situation of last autumn, with additional excrescence of Tobruk.
But we shall be much harder pressed on ground, and shall not
escape with ineffective air attack that Italians made last year. I can
see no hope of being able to relieve Tobruk for at least several
months. . . . The possible attitude of Egypt is obviously going to
be matter of great anxiety. The next few months will be very difficult,
quite apart from what happens in Greece.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

13 April 41

We are, of course, going all out to fight for the Nile Valley. No
other conclusion is physically possible. We have half a million
men there or on the way and mountains of stores. All questions of
cutting the loss are ruled out. Tobruk must be held, not as a
defensive position, but as an invaluable bridgehead on the flank of
any serious by-pass advance on Egypt. Our Air and Navy must
cut or impede enemy communications across Central Mediterranean.
Matter has to be fought out, and must in any case take
some time. Enemy’s difficulties in land communication, over eight
hundred miles long, must make attack in heavy force a matter of
months. Even if Tobruk had to be evacuated from the sea, which
we command, there are other strong fighting positions already
organised. I personally feel that this situation is not only manageable,
but hopeful. Dill and Eden, who have just come back, concur.

Good news now arrived from Tobruk, where the audacious
and persistent enemy met their first definite rebuff.

General Wavell to War Office

14 April 41

Libya. Between two hundred and three hundred German p.o.w.,
captured at Tobruk morning April 14, stated they were badly
shaken by our artillery fire and were very short of food and water.
These troops wept when their attack was driven off, and their
morale is definitely low.

Perhaps it was because their morale and expectations had
been so high that they wept!

Prime Minister to General Wavell

14 April 41

Convey heartiest congratulations from War Cabinet to all engaged
in most successful fight. Bravo Tobruk! We feel it vital that
Tobruk should be regarded as sally-port and not, please, as an
“excrescence.” Can you not find good troops who are without
transport to help hold perimeter, thus freeing at least one, if not
two, Australian brigade groups to act as General Fortress Reserve
and potential striking force?

* * * * *

After considering the whole situation at this moment when
a temporary stabilisation on the Egyptian frontier and at
Tobruk seemed to have been achieved, I issued the following
to the Chiefs of Staff:

Directive by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence

The War in the Mediterranean

April 14, 1941

If the Germans can continue to nourish their invasion of Cyrenaica
and Egypt through the port of Tripoli and along the coastal
road, they can certainly bring superior armoured forces to bear
upon us, with consequences of the most serious character. If, on
the other hand, their communications from Italy and Sicily with
Tripoli are cut, and those along the coastal road between Tripoli
and Agheila constantly harassed, there is no reason why they should
not themselves sustain a major defeat.

2. It becomes the prime duty of the British Mediterranean Fleet
under Admiral Cunningham to stop all seaborne traffic between
Italy and Africa by the fullest use of surface craft, aided so far as
possible by aircraft and submarines. For this all-important objective
heavy losses in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers must if necessary
be accepted. The harbour at Tripoli must be rendered unusable
by recurrent bombardment, and/or by blocking and mining,
care being taken that the mining does not impede the blocking or
bombardments. Enemy convoys passing to and from Africa must
be attacked by our cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, aided by
the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Air Force. Every convoy which
gets through must be considered a serious naval failure. The reputation
of the Royal Navy is engaged in stopping this traffic.

3. Admiral Cunningham’s fleet must be strengthened for the
above purposes to whatever extent is necessary. The Nelson and
Rodney, with their heavily armoured decks, are especially suitable
for resisting attacks from the German dive-bombers, of which undue
fears must not be entertained. Other reinforcements of
cruisers, minelayers, and destroyers must be sent from the west
as opportunity serves. The use of the Centurion as a blockship
should be studied, but the effectual blocking of Tripoli Harbour
would be well worth a battleship upon the active list.

4. When Admiral Cunningham’s fleet has been reinforced he
should be able to form two bombarding squadrons, which may in
turn at intervals bombard the port of Tripoli, especially when
shipping or convoys are known to be in the harbour.

5. In order to control the sea communications across the Mediterranean,
sufficient suitable naval forces must be based on Malta,
and protection must be afforded to these naval forces by the air
force at Malta, which must be kept at the highest strength in fighters
of the latest and best quality that the Malta aerodromes can
contain. The duty of affording fighter protection to the naval
forces holding Malta should have priority over the use of the
aerodromes by bombers engaged in attacking Tripoli.

6. Every endeavour should be made to defend Malta Harbour
by the U.P. weapon [rockets] in its various developments, especially
by the F.A.M. [Fast Aerial Mine], fired by the improved naval
method.

7. Next in importance after the port at Tripoli comes the 400-mile
coastal road between Tripoli and Agheila. This road should
be subjected to continuous harassing attacks by forces landed from
the Glen ships in the special landing-craft. The commandos and
other forces gathered in Egypt should be freely used for this purpose.
The seizure of particular points from the sea should be
studied, and the best ones chosen for prompt action. Here again
losses must be faced, but small forces may be used in this harassing
warfare, being withdrawn, if possible, after a while. If even a few
light or medium tanks could be landed, these could rip along the
road, destroying very quickly convoys far exceeding their own
value. Every feasible method of harassing constantly this section of
the route is to be attempted, the necessary losses being faced.

8. In all the above paragraphs the urgency is extreme, because
the enemy will grow continually stronger in the air than he is now,
especially should his attack on Greece and Yugoslavia be successful,
as may be apprehended. Admiral Cunningham should not,
therefore, await the arrival of battleship reinforcements, nor should
the use of the Glen ships be withheld for the sake of Rhodes.

9. It has been decided that Tobruk is to be defended with all
possible strength. But [holding] Tobruk must not be regarded as
a defensive operation, but rather as an invaluable bridgehead or
sally-port on the communications of the enemy. It should be reinforced
as may be necessary both with infantry and by armoured
lighting vehicles, to enable active and continuous raiding of the
enemy’s flanks and rear. If part of the defences of the perimeter
can be taken over by troops unprovided with transport, this should
permit the organisation of a mobile force both for the fortress
reserve and for striking at the enemy. It would be a great advantage
should the enemy be drawn into anything like a siege of
Tobruk and compelled to transport and feed the heavy artillery
forces for that purpose.

10. It is above all necessary that General Wavell should regain
unit ascendancy over the enemy and destroy his small raiding
parties, instead of our being harassed and hunted by them. Enemy
patrols must be attacked on every occasion, and our own patrols
should be used with audacity. Small British parties in armoured
cars, or mounted on motor-cycles, or, if occasion offers, infantry,
should not hesitate to attack individual tanks with bombs and
bombards, as is planned for the defence of Britain. It is important
to engage the enemy even in small affairs in order to make him
fire off his gun ammunition, of which the supply must be very
difficult.

11. The use of the Royal Air Force against the enemy’s communications,
or concentrations of fighting vehicles, is sufficiently
obvious not to require mention.

All this was easier to say than do.

* * * * *

I kept President Roosevelt fully informed.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

16 April 41

I cannot tell what will happen in Greece, and we have never
underrated the enormous power of the German military machine
on the mainland of Europe.

I am personally not unduly anxious about the Libyan-Egyptian
position. We estimate Germans have one colonial armoured division
and perhaps the whole of one ordinary armoured division,
comprising, say, 600 to 650 tanks, of which a good many have already
been destroyed or have broken down. There are no German
infantry yet in Cyrenaica, except the few battalions comprised in
the German armoured divisions. Difficulties of supply of petrol,
food, water, and ammunition must be severe, and we know from
prisoners of the strain under which these audacious formations are
working. We are naturally trying to bring our own armoured
forces, which were largely refitting at the time of the attack, into
action, and are reinforcing Egypt from all parts of the Middle
East, where we have nearly half a million men. Tobruk I regard
as an invaluable bridgehead or sally-port. We do not feel at all
outmatched at present in the air, and are growing stronger constantly.
The whole power of the Mediterranean Fleet, which is
being strongly reinforced, will be used to cut the sea and coastal
communications. There are, of course, Italian forces besides the
Germans, and we believe the Germans are now sending, or trying
to send, a third armoured division from Sicily.

The repulse of the German attacks on Tobruk on the 14th/15th
seems to me important, as this small, fierce fight, in which
the enemy lost prisoners, killed, and tanks, together with aircraft,
out of all proportion to our losses, is the first time they have tasted
defeat, and they are working on very small margins. Meanwhile
our efforts to turn off the tap have met with a noteworthy success
in the Central Mediterranean. Four destroyers from Malta in the
early hours of this morning, sixteenth, caught a German-Italian
convoy of five large ships loaded with ammunition and mechanical
transport and escorted by three Italian destroyers. The whole
convoy and all its escort were sunk. We lost one destroyer in the
fight. We are keeping the strength of our forces secret for the
present.

* * * * *

The beating-in of our Desert flank while we were full-spread
in the Greek adventure was, however, a disaster of the first
magnitude. I was for some time completely mystified about its
cause, and as soon as there was a momentary lull I felt bound to
ask General Wavell for some explanation of what had happened.
It was not till April 24 that I burdened him with this
request.

We still await news of the actions at Agheila and Mechili which
resulted in the loss of the 3d Armoured Brigade and the best part
of a motorised cavalry brigade. Evidently there was a severe defeat,
and it is essential to our comprehension of your difficulties, as well
as of our own, that we should know broadly what happened, and
why. Were the troops outnumbered, outmanoeuvred, or outfought,
or was there some mistake, as is alleged, about premature destruction
of petrol store? Surely the reports of the survivors should
have made it possible lo give us a coherent story of this key action.
I cannot help you if you do not tell me. . . .

Wavell replied on the twenty-fifth. He pointed out that as
practically all the senior officers concerned were missing and
could give no account of their actions or motives care must be
taken not to prejudice them unfairly. Characteristically he
took the responsibility upon himself. His summary followed
the same day. In this he said that he had been aware that the
headquarters of the 2d Armoured Division and 3d Armoured
Brigade would take some time to become skilful in desert conditions
and desert warfare. He had hoped that they would
have a period of minor skirmishing on the frontier for at least a
month or so before a serious attack developed, and that this
would give them time to adapt themselves. Actually the attack
took place before they had settled down, and was launched at
least a fortnight before his Staff had calculated on a time and
space basis that it was possible, but in approximately the
strength he had anticipated. He had expected a limited advance
to Agedabia, and captured documents and prisoners’ statements
had since confirmed that this was the enemy’s intention. The
subsequent exploitation by the enemy of his initial success,
which, it is now known, came as a complete surprise to him,
was made possible only through the early and unfortunate disappearance
of the 3d Armoured Brigade as a fighting force.
There was complete evidence to prove that the enemy’s advance
from Agedabia was hastily improvised in eight small
columns consisting of both German and Italian units, several
of which outran their own maintenance and had to be supplied
by aircraft.

Our 3d Armoured Brigade was an improvised organisation
containing one regiment of cruiser tanks in poor mechanical
condition, one regiment of light tanks, and one regiment armed
with captured Italian medium tanks. In view of the state of the
armoured fighting vehicles at the end of the Cyrenaican campaign,
it was the best he could produce if any armoured force
was to accompany the troops to Greece. If it had been at full
strength and had had more time to settle down as a fighting
formation, it should have been capable of dealing with the
opposition expected.

I did not become aware till just before the German attack of the
bad mechanical state of the cruiser regiment, on which we chiefly
relied. A proportion of these tanks broke down before reaching
the front, and many others became casualties from mechanical
defects during the early fighting. The same seems to have occurred
with the other cruiser regiment of the 2d Armoured Division,
which went to Greece. Our light tank was powerless against German
tanks, which were all armed with guns. Regiment armed with
[captured] Italian tanks had not had time to get accustomed to
them.

Instructions to armoured division were to withdraw gradually
if attacked by superior strength, so as to maintain force in being
until difficulties of supply weakened enemy and gave opportunity
for counter-stroke. These were my instructions.

As matters turned out, this was mistaken policy. Immediate
counter-stroke would at least have inflicted serious losses on enemy
and delayed him considerably. It might have stopped him altogether.
As it was, 3d Armoured Brigade practically melted away
from mechanical and administrative breakdowns during the retreat,
without much fighting, while the unpractised headquarters
of the 2d Armoured Division seems to have lost control. This was
partly due to inexperience of signal personnel. . . .

When I visited the front after the first day’s action, I felt need
of a commander experienced in desert warfare, and telegraphed for
O’Connor to come and assist Neame. Both these generals were captured
during the withdrawal by patrol from the enemy column
which penetrated to Derna.

Such is the outline of disastrous episode, for which main responsibility
is mine. Obviously mistakes were made in the handling
of the headquarters 2d Armoured Division and 3d Armoured
Brigade during the withdrawal, but I hope that judgment on this
will be reserved until those mainly concerned can give full account
and reasons for actions. Their difficulties were considerable.

Fighting spirit of troops even in retreat and disorganisation
seems to have been excellent, and there were many instances of
cool and determined action.

I replied:

Prime Minister to General Wavell

28 April 41

Thank you very much for your general outline of what occurred
on the western frontier. We seem to have had rather bad luck. I
expect we shall get this back later. Every good wish.

12The Greek Campaign

Naval Victory off Matapan, March 28—Our Expedition to Greece—Disappointing
News from General Papagos—The R.A.F.
Outnumbered—The Germans Attack—Shattering Blow at the
Piraeus, April 6—Yugoslavia Overrun—And Capitulates—Danger
to Our Left Flank—General Papagos Suggests Evacuation—The
Retreat to Thermopylae—My Telegram to Wavell
of April 17—Suicide of the Greek Prime Minister—My Directive
of April 18—The Enemy Kept at Bay—Hope of a Stand
at Thermopylae—Decision to Evacuate, April 21—Final
Greek Surrender, April 24—Namsos Over Again—Disaster at
Nauplion—Achievement of the Royal Navy—Four-Fifths of
Our Forces Rescued—Greek Martial Honour Undimmed—President
Roosevelt’s Gracious Appreciation—My Reply to Him
of May 4—My Broadcast, May 3.

Towards the end of March it was evident that a major
movement of the Italian Fleet, probably towards the
Aegean, was impending. Admiral Cunningham decided temporarily
to move our convoys out of the way, and himself left
Alexandria after dark on March 27 in the Warspite with the
Valiant and Barham, the carrier Formidable, and nine destroyers.
Light forces, comprising four cruisers and four destroyers,
under Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell, then at Crete, were
ordered to join the Commander-in-Chief next day south of the
island. At dawn on the twenty-eighth an aircraft from the
Formidable reported four enemy cruisers and six destroyers on
a southeasterly course. At 7.45 A.M. these same ships were in
sight from the cruiser flagship, Orion. The Italian force included
three eight-inch-gun cruisers, whereas all the British
were six-inch-gun ships. But after half an hour’s inconclusive
action the enemy retired, and the British cruisers turned in pursuit.
Two hours later the Orion sighted an enemy battleship—the
Vittorio Veneto—which opened fire on her at a range of
sixteen miles. Once more the rôles changed, and the Orion
and her cruisers again retired towards the British battle fleet,
then approaching at full speed and about seventy miles away.
An air striking force launched by the Formidable now arrived
on the scene and attacked the Italian battleship, which at once
withdrew to the northwest.

Meanwhile our air patrols sighted another enemy force of
five cruisers and five destroyers to the northward about a hundred
miles from the advancing British fleet. After further air
attacks from the Formidable, and also from shore bases in
Greece and Crete, it became clear that the Vittorio Veneto was
damaged and could not make more than fifteen knots. In the
evening a third air attack from the Formidable found all the
enemy ships protecting the injured battleship with their A.A.
batteries. Our planes did not seek to penetrate the barrage, but
hit the heavy cruiser Pola, which was seen to haul out of line
and stop. As darkness fell, Admiral Cunningham decided to
make a destroyer attack, and also to accept the uncertainties of
a night action with his battle fleet, in the hope of destroying
the crippled battleship and cruiser before they could gain the
cover of their own shore-based aircraft. On the way in the
darkness he surprised two Italian cruisers, the eight-inch-gun
Fiume and Zara, which were going to the Pola’s aid. At close
range the Fiume was immediately overwhelmed and sunk by
fifteen-inch broadsides from the Warspite and Valiant. The
Zara, engaged by all three battleships, was soon reduced to a
blazing wreck.

Admiral Cunningham then withdrew the fleet to avoid
mistaking friends for foes, and left his destroyers to deal with
the damaged ship and with the two destroyers which had been
with her. They also found and sank the crippled Pola. In this
fortunate night encounter, with all its chances, the British fleet
suffered no loss of any kind. In the morning, as our aircraft
could not find the Vittorio Veneto, our fleet returned to Alexandria.
This timely and welcome victory off Cape Matapan
disposed of all challenge to British naval mastery in the Eastern
Mediterranean at this critical time.

* * * * *

The expedition to Greece, in its order of embarkation, comprised
the British 1st Armoured Brigade, the New Zealand
Division, and the 6th Australian Division. These were all fully
equipped at the expense of other formations in the Middle East.
They were to be followed by the Polish Brigade and the 7th
Australian Division. The movement began on March 5. The
plan was to hold the Aliakhmon line, which ran from the
mouth of the river of that name through Veria and Edessa to
the Yugoslav frontier. Our forces were to join the Greek forces
deployed on this front, namely, the 12th and 20th Greek
Divisions, each of six battalions and three or four batteries,
the 19th (Motorised) Division, weak in numbers and training,
and about six battalions from Thrace. This army, nominally
the equivalent of seven divisions, was to come under the command
of General Wilson.

The Greek troops were far less than the five good divisions
General Papagos had originally promised.[1] The great majority
of the Greek Army, about fifteen divisions, was in Albania,
facing Berat and Valona, which they had not been able to
capture. They repulsed an Italian offensive launched on
March 9. The rest of the Greek Army, three divisions and
frontier defence troops, was in Macedonia, whence Papago
declined to withdraw them, and where, after four days’ fighting,
when the Germans attacked, they ceased to be a military
force. The 19th Greek (Motorised) Division, which joined
them, was also destroyed or dispersed.

Our air force in Greece in March numbered only seven
squadrons (eighty operational aircraft), and was badly handicapped
by the scarcity of landing grounds and inadequate signal
communications. Although some small reinforcements were
sent in April, the R.A.F. were overwhelmingly outnumbered
by the enemy. Two of our squadrons fought on the Albanian
front. The remaining five, supported by two Wellington
squadrons from Egypt for night operations, had to meet all
other needs. They were matched against a German air strength
of over eight hundred operational aircraft.

The attack on Southern Yugoslavia and Greece was entrusted
to the German Twelfth Army, of fifteen divisions, of which
four were armoured. Of these, five divisions, including three
armoured, took part in the southward drive towards Athens.
The weakness of the Aliakhmon position lay on its left flank,
which could be turned by a German advance through Southern
Yugoslavia. There had been little contact with the Yugoslav
General Staff, whose plan of defence and degree of preparedness
were not known to the Greeks or ourselves. It was hoped,
however, that in the difficult country which the enemy would
have to cross the Yugoslavs would at least be able to impose
considerable delay on them. This hope was to prove ill-founded.
General Papagos did not consider that withdrawal
from Albania to meet such a turning movement was a feasible
operation. Not only would it severely affect morale, but the
Greek Army was so ill-equipped with transport and communications
were so bad that a general withdrawal in the face
of the enemy was impossible. He had certainly left the decision
till too late. It was in these circumstances that our 1st
Armoured Brigade reached the forward area on March 27,
where it was joined a few days later by the New Zealand
Division.

* * * * *

In the early morning of April 6, German armies invaded
both Greece and Yugoslavia. Intensive air attacks were at the
same time launched on the Piraeus, where our expeditionary
convoys were discharging. That night the port was almost
completely wrecked by the blowing-up of the British ship
Clan Fraser alongside the quay with two hundred tons of
T.N.T. on board. Here was a misfortune which made it
necessary to divert supplies to other and minor ports. This
attack alone cost us and the Greeks eleven ships, aggregating
forty-three thousand tons.

Henceforward the maintenance of the Allied armies by sea
continued against an increasing scale of air attack, to which no
effective counter could be made. The key to the problem at
sea was to overcome the enemy’s air bases in Rhodes, but no
adequate forces were available for such a task, and meanwhile
heavy shipping losses were certain. It was fortunate that the
recent Battle of Matapan had, as Admiral Cunningham stated
in his dispatch, taught the Italian Fleet a lesson which kept
them out of action for the rest of the year. Their active intervention
during this period would have made the Navy’s task
in Greece impossible.

Simultaneously with the ferocious bombardment of Belgrade
the converging German armies already poised on the frontiers
invaded Yugoslavia from several directions. The Yugoslav
General Staff did not attempt to strike their one deadly blow at
the Italian rear. They conceived themselves bound not to
abandon Croatia and Slovenia, and were therefore forced to
attempt the defence of the whole frontier line. The four
Yugoslav army corps in the north were rapidly and irresistibly
bent inward by the German armoured columns, supported
by Hungarian troops which crossed the Danube and by German
and Italian forces advancing towards Zagreb. The main
Yugoslav forces were thus driven in confusion southward, and
on April 13 German troops entered Belgrade. Meanwhile
General List’s Twelfth German Army, assembled in Bulgaria,
had swung into Serbia and Macedonia. They had entered
Monastir and Yannina on the tenth, and thus prevented any
contact between the Yugoslavs and Greeks and broken up the
Yugoslav forces in the south.

* * * * *

Confronted by the collapse of Yugoslav resistance. Mr.
Campbell, the British Minister in Belgrade, had left the capital
with its garrison. He now sought instructions, which I sent him
as follows:

Prime Minister to British Minister in Yugoslavia

13 April 41

It will not be possible at any time to send British surface warships,
or British or American merchant ships or transports, up the
Adriatic north of Valona. The reason for this is the air, which did
not exist effectively in the last war. The ships would only be sunk,
and that would help no one. All the aircraft we can allot to the
Yugoslav theatre is already at the service of the Yugoslav General
Staff through Air Marshal D’Albianc. There are no more at present.
You must remember Yugoslavs have given us no chance to help
them and refused to make a common plan, but there is no use in
recriminations, and you must use your own judgment how much
of this bad news you impart to them.

2. We do not see why the King or Government should leave the
country, which is vast, mountainous, and full of armed men. German
tanks can no doubt move along the roads and tracks, but to
conquer the Serbian armies they must bring up infantry. Then
will be the chance to kill them. Surely the young King and the
Ministers should play their part in this. However, if at any time
the King and a few personal attendants are forced to leave the
country and no aeroplanes can be provided, a British submarine
could be sent to Kotor or some other neighbouring place.

3. Apart from the successful defence of mountain regions, the
only way in which any portion of the Serbian Army can get in
touch with our supplies by land is through establishing contact
with Greeks in Albania and through Monastir. They could then
share in the defence of Greece and in the common pool of supplies,
and if all fails every effort will be made to evacuate as many fighting
men as possible to islands or to Egypt.

4. You should continue to do your utmost to uphold the fighting
spirit of the Yugoslav Government and Army, reminding them
how the war in Serbia ebbed and flowed back and forth last time.

But the days of the Yugoslav guerrillas were still to come.
On April 17 Yugoslavia capitulated.[2]

* * * * *

This sudden collapse destroyed the main hope of the Greeks.
It was another example of “One at a time.” We had done our
utmost to procure concerted action, but through no fault of
ours we had failed. A grim prospect now gaped upon us all.

At the moment of the German advance into Greece the 1st
British Armoured Brigade was forward on the river Vardar.
The New Zealand Division lay on the river Aliakhmon. On
their left were the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions. The leading
troops of the 6th Australian Division were also arriving.
By April 8 it was clear that Yugoslav resistance in the
south was breaking down and that the left flank of the Aliakhmon
position would shortly be threatened. To meet this an
Australian brigade group, later joined by the 1st Armoured
Brigade, was posted to block the approach from Monastir. The
enemy advance was delayed by demolitions and some effective
bombing by the Royal Air Force, but on April 10 the attack
on our flank guard began. It was arrested during two days of
stiff fighting in severe weather.

Farther west there was only one Greek cavalry division keeping
touch with the forces in Albania, and General Wilson
decided that his hard-pressed left flank must be pulled back on
Kozani and Gravena. This move was completed on April 13,
but in the process the 12th and 20th Greek Divisions began to
disintegrate, and could no longer play an effective part. Henceforward
our Expeditionary Force was alone. By April 14 the
New Zealand Division had also withdrawn to guard the important
mountain pass north of Mount Olympus. One of its
brigades was covering the main road to Larissa. The enemy
made strong attacks, which were held. But Wilson, still
menaced upon his left flank, decided to withdraw to Thermopylae.
He put this to Papagos, who approved, and who
himself at this stage suggested British evacuation from Greece.

Prime Minister to General Wilson, Athens

13 April 41

I am glad to see the movement of 20th Greek and Cavalry Division
to close the gap between the Greek western army and your
army. It is glaringly obvious that a German advance southward
through this gap will not only turn your Aliakhmon position, but
far more decisively round up the whole of the Greek Army in
Albania. It is impossible for me to understand why the Greek
western army does not make sure of its retreat into Greece. The
Chief of the Imperial General Staff states that these points have
been put vainly time after time. All good wishes to you in this
memorable hour.

I am also glad to hear that King is not leaving Greece at present.
He has a great opportunity of leaving a name in history. If, however,
he or any part of the Greek Army is forced to leave Greece
every facility will be afforded them in Cyprus, and we will do our
best to carry them there. The garrisoning of Crete by a strong
Greek force would also be highly beneficial, observing that Crete
can be fed by sea.

The next few days were decisive. Wavell telegraphed on the
sixteenth that General Wilson had had a conversation with
Papagos, who described the Greek Army as being severely
pressed and getting into administrative difficulties owing to air
action. He agreed to a withdrawal to the Thermopylae position.
The first moves were already made. Papagos also
repeated his suggestion that we should re-embark the British
troops and spare Greece from devastation. Wilson considered
that this course should commence with the occupation of the
new position and that evacuation should be arranged forthwith.
Wavell’s instructions to Wilson were to continue the fighting
in co-operation with the Greeks so long as they were able to
resist, but authorised any further withdrawal judged necessary.
Orders had been given for all ships on the way to Greece to be
turned back, for no more ships to be loaded, and for those
already loading or loaded to be emptied. He presumed that a
formal request to this effect from the Greek Government
should be obtained before our actual re-embarkation. He
assumed Crete would be held.

To this grave but not unexpected news I replied at once.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

17 April 41

We have no news from you of what has happened on Imperial
front in Greece.

2. We cannot remain in Greece against wish of Greek Commander-in-Chief,
and thus expose country to devastation. Wilson
or Palairet should obtain endorsement by Greek Government of
Papagos’s request. Consequent upon this assent, evacuation should
proceed, without, however, prejudicing any withdrawal to Thermopylae
position in co-operation with the Greek Army. You will
naturally try to save as much material as possible.

3. Crete must be held in force, and you should provide for this
in the redistribution of your forces. It is important that strong
elements of Greek Army should establish themselves in Crete, together
with King and Government. We shall aid and maintain
defence of Crete to the utmost.

On the seventeenth General Wilson motored from Thebes to
the palace at Tatoi, and there met the King, General Papagos,
and our Ambassador. It was accepted that withdrawal to the
Thermopylae line had been the only possible plan. General
Wilson was confident that he could hold that line for a while.
The main discussion was the method and order of evacuation.
The Greek Government would not leave for at least another
week.

The Greek Prime Minister, M. Korysis, has already been
mentioned. He had been chosen to fill the gap when Metaxas
died. He had no claim to public office except a blameless
private life and clear, resolute convictions. He could not survive
the ruin, as it seemed, of his country or bear longer his
own responsibilities. Like M. Teleki in Hungary, he resolved
to pay the forfeit of his life. On the eighteenth he committed
suicide. His memory should be respected.

* * * * *

It was necessary in this convulsive scene to try to assign proportions
and priorities as far as possible. Air Marshal Longmore
appealed for guidance in the use of his overstrained air
power. I therefore sent a directive to the Chiefs of Staff, which
they endorsed and telegraphed textually to the Middle East
commanders.

Chiefs of Staff to Commanders-in-Chief

18 April 41

Following directive has been issued by the P.M. and Minister of
Defence:

It is not possible to lay down precise sequence and priority
between interests none of which can be wholly ignored, but the
following may be a guide. The extrication of New Zealand, Australian,
and British troops from Greece affects the whole Empire.

2. It ought to be possible to arrange shipping in and out of
Tobruk either before or after the evacuation crisis, observing that
Tobruk has two months’ supplies.

3. You must divide between protecting evacuation and sustaining
battle in Libya. But if these clash, which may not be avoidable,
emphasis must be given to victory in Libya.

4. Don’t worry about Iraq for the present. It looks to be going
smoothly.

5. Crete will at first only be a receptacle of whatever can get
there from Greece. Its fuller defence must be organised later. In
the meanwhile all forces there must protect themselves from air
bombing by dispersion and use their bayonets against parachutists
or airborne intruders if any.

6. Subject to the above general remarks, victory in Libya counts
first, evacuation of troops from Greece second. Tobruk shipping,
unless indispensable to victory, must be fitted in as convenient.
Iraq can be ignored and Crete be worked up later.

* * * * *

The retreat to Thermopylae was a difficult manoeuvre, since,
while the enemy was kept at bay in the Tempe Gorge, the
Olympus Pass, and at other points, our whole force had to pass
through the bottleneck of Larissa. Wilson expected the most
dangerous threat on his western flank, and placed a brigade
group at Kalabaka to deal with it. But the crisis came on the
east, at the Tempe Gorge and the Olympus Pass. The pass was
sternly defended for the necessary three days by the 5th New
Zealand Brigade. The Tempe Gorge was even more critical, as
it was for the Germans the shortest approach to Larissa. It was
defended at first only by the 21st New Zealand battalion, later
reinforced by an Australian brigade. This was held for the
three days needed for all our troops to pass through the Larissa
bottleneck.

Until April 13 bad weather had prevented the full use of
the enemy’s tenfold superiority in the air, but on the fifteenth
a heavy dawn attack on the airfield near Larissa destroyed many
of our remaining aircraft. The rest were ordered back to
Athens, there being no intermediate landing grounds. The
weather was again bad on the sixteenth and seventeenth, but
then it cleared, and the German Air Force came out in strength
and harassed continually the stream of troops making for
Thermopylae. They were not unresisted, for in a raid near
Athens twenty-two of the enemy machines were brought down
for a loss of five Hurricanes.

These stubborn and skilful rear-guard actions checked the
impetuous German advance at all points, inflicting severe
losses. By April 20 the occupation of the Thermopylae position
was complete. Frontally it was strong, but with the need to
guard the coast road, to watch for possible intrusion from
Euboea, and above all to prevent a move on Delphi, our forces
were strained. But the Germans made slow progress and the
position was never severely tested. On this same day the Greek
armies on the Albania front surrendered.

I did not, however, give up hope of a final stand at Thermopylae.
The intervening ages fell away. Why not one more
undying feat of arms?

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

20 April 41

I am increasingly of the opinion that if the generals on the spot
think they can hold on in the Thermopylae position for a fortnight
or three weeks, and can keep the Greek Army fighting, or
enough of it, we should certainly support them, if the Dominions
will agree. I do not believe the difficulty of evacuation will increase
if the enemy suffers heavy losses. On the other hand, every
day the German Air Force is detained in Greece enables the Libyan
situation to be stabilised, and may enable us to bring in the extra
tanks [to Tobruk]. If this is accomplished safely and the Tobruk
position holds, we might even feel strong enough to reinforce from
Egypt. I am most reluctant to see us quit, and if the troops were
British only and the matter could be decided on military grounds
alone, I would urge Wilson to fight if he thought it possible. Anyhow,
before we commit ourselves to evacuation the case must be
put squarely to the Dominions after tomorrow’s Cabinet. Of
course, I do not know the conditions in which our retreating forces
will reach the new key position.

On the twenty-first General Wavell asked the King about the
state of the Greek Army and whether it could give immediate
and effective aid to the left flank of the Thermopylae position.
His Majesty said that time rendered it impossible for any
organised Greek force to support the British left flank before
the enemy could attack. General Wavell replied that in that
case he felt that it was his duty to take immediate steps for re-embarkation
of such portion of his army as he could extricate.
The King entirely agreed, and seemed to have expected this.
He spoke with deep regret of having been the means of placing
the British forces in such a position. General Wavell then impressed
on His Majesty the need for absolute secrecy and for
all measures to be taken that would make the re-embarkation
possible—for instance, that order should be preserved in
Athens and that the departure of the King and Government for
Crete should be delayed as long as possible; also that the Greek
army in Epirus should stand firm and prevent any chance of an
enemy advance from the west along the north shores of the
Gulf of Corinth. The King promised what help he could. But
all was vain. The final surrender of Greece to overwhelming
German might was made on April 24.

* * * * *

We were now confronted with another of those evacuations
by sea which we had endured in 1940. The organised withdrawals
of over fifty thousand men from Greece under the conditions
prevailing might well have seemed an almost hopeless task. It
was, however, accomplished by the Royal Navy under the
direction of Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell afloat and Rear-Admiral
Baillie-Grohman with Army Headquarters ashore. At
Dunkirk on the whole we had air mastery. In Greece the
Germans were in complete and undisputed control of the air
and could maintain an almost continuous attack on the ports
and on the retreating army. It was obvious that embarkation
could only take place by night, and, moreover, that troops must
avoid being seen near the beaches in daylight. This was Namsos
over again, and on ten times the scale.

Admiral Cunningham threw nearly the whole of his light
forces, including six cruisers and nineteen destroyers, into the
task. Working from the small ports and beaches in Southern
Greece, these ships, together with eleven transports and assault
ships and many smaller craft, began the work of rescue on the
night of April 24.

For five successive nights the work continued. On the
twenty-sixth the enemy captured the vital bridge over the
Corinth Canal by parachute attack, and thereafter German
troops poured into the Peloponnese, harrying our hard-pressed
soldiers as they strove to reach the southern beaches. During
the nights of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth 17,000 men
were brought out, with the loss of two transports. On the following
night about 19,500 were got away from five embarkation
points. At Nauplion there was disaster. The transport Slamat
in a gallant but misguided effort to embark the maximum
stayed too long in the anchorage. Soon after dawn, when clearing
the land, she was attacked and sunk by dive-bombers. The
destroyers Diamond and Wryneck, who rescued most of the
seven hundred men on board, were both in turn sunk by air
attack a few hours later. There were only fifty survivors from
all three ships.

On the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth efforts were made by
two cruisers and six destroyers to rescue 8000 troops and 1400
Yugoslav refugees from the beaches near Kalamata. A destroyer
sent on ahead to arrange the embarkation found the enemy in
possession of the town and large fires burning, and the main
operation had to be abandoned. Although a counter-attack
drove the Germans out of the town, only about 450 men were
rescued from beaches to the eastward by four destroyers, using
their own boats. On the same night the Ajax and three destroyers
rescued 4300 from Monemvasia.

These events marked the end of the main evacuation. Small
isolated parties were picked up in various islands or in small
craft at sea during the next two days, and 1400 officers and
men, aided by the Greeks at mortal peril, made their way back
to Egypt independently in later months.

* * * * *

The following table gives the final evacuation figures for the
Army:

Forces

In Country at Time of Attack

Evacuated to Crete

Evacuated to Crete and later to Egypt

Direct to Egypt (Including Wounded)

United Kingdom troops

19,206

5,299

3,200

4,101

Australian

17,125

6,451

2,500

5,206

New Zealand

16,720

7,100

1,300

6,054

Totals

53,051

18,850

7,000

15,361

The losses were:

Forces

Losses

Percentage of Total Losses

United Kingdom troops

6,606

55.8

Australian

2,968

25.1

New Zealand

2,266

19.1

Totals

11,840

100.0

In all 50,662 were safely brought out, including men of the
Royal Air Force and several thousand Cypriots, Palestinians,
Greeks, and Yugoslavs. This figure represented about eighty
per cent of the forces originally sent into Greece. These results
were only made possible by the determination and skill of the
seamen of the Royal and Allied Merchant Navies, who never
faltered under the enemy’s most ruthless efforts to halt their
work. From April 21 until the end of the evacuation twenty-six
ships were lost by air attack. Twenty-one of these were
Greek and included five hospital ships. The remainder were
British and Dutch. The Royal Air Force, with a fleet air arm
contingent from Crete, did what they could to relieve the
situation, but they were overwhelmed by numbers. Nevertheless,
from November onward the few squadrons sent to Greece
had done fine service. They inflicted on the enemy confirmed
losses of 231 planes and had dropped 500 tons of bombs. Their
own losses of 209 machines, of which 72 were in combat, were
severe, their record exemplary.

The small but efficient Greek Navy now passed under British
control. A cruiser, six modern destroyers, and four submarines
escaped to Alexandria, where they arrived on April 25. Thereafter
the Greek Navy was represented with distinction in many
of our operations in the Mediterranean.

* * * * *

If in telling this tale of tragedy the impression is given that
the Imperial and British forces received no effective military
assistance from their Greek allies, it must be remembered that
these three weeks of April fighting at desperate odds were for
the Greeks the culmination of the hard five months’ struggle
against Italy in which they had expended almost the whole
life-strength of their country. Attacked in October without
warning by at least twice their numbers, they had first repulsed
the invaders and then in counter-attack had beaten them back
forty miles into Albania. Throughout the bitter winter in the
mountains they had been at close grips with a more numerous
and better-equipped foe. The Greek Army of the Northwest
had neither the transport nor the roads for a rapid manoeuvre to
meet at the last moment the new overpowering German attack
cutting in behind its flank and rear. Its strength had already
been strained almost to the limit in a long and gallant defence
of the homeland.

There were no recriminations. The friendliness and aid
which the Greeks had so faithfully shown to our troops endured
nobly to the end. The people of Athens and at other points of
evacuation seemed more concerned for the safety of their
would-be rescuers than with their own fate. Greek martial
honour stands undimmed.

* * * * *

I have now set forth in narrative the outstanding facts of our
adventure in Greece. After things are over, it is easy to choose
the fine mental and moral positions which one should adopt.
In this account I have recorded events as they occurred and
action as it was taken. Later on these can be judged in the
glare of consequences; and finally, when our lives have faded,
History will pronounce its cool, detached, and shadowy verdict.

There is no doubt that the Mussolini-Hitler crime of overrunning
Greece, and our effort to stand against tyranny and
save what we could from its claws, appealed profoundly to the
people of the United States, and above all to the great man who
led them. I had at this moment a moving interchange of telegrams
with the President.

. . . My thoughts [he said] in regard to the Eastern Mediterranean
are: You have done not only heroic but very useful work
in Greece, and the territorial loss is more than compensated for
by the necessity for an enormous German concentration and resulting
enormous German losses in men and material.

Having sent all men and equipment to Greece you could possibly
spare, you have fought a wholly justified delaying action, and
will continue to do so in other parts of the Eastern Mediterranean,
including North Africa and the Near East. Furthermore, if additional
withdrawals become necessary, they will all be a part of the
plan which at this stage of the war shortens British lines, greatly
extends the Axis lines, and compels the enemy to expend great
quantities of men and equipment. I am satisfied that both here
and in Britain public opinion is growing to realise that even if
you have to withdraw farther in the Eastern Mediterranean, you
will not allow any great débâcle or surrender, and that in the last
analysis the naval control of the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic
Ocean will in time win the war.

My reply may be thought less responsive than this generous
message deserved. I felt myself held in such harsh duress by
events, and was also so conscious of the sentiment alive in the
United States, that I sought to make claims on the future.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

4 May 41

Your friendly message assures me that no temporary reverses,
however heavy, can shake your resolution to support us until we
gain the final victory. . . .

We must not be too sure that the consequences of the loss of
Egypt and the Middle East would not be grave. It would seriously
increase the hazards of the Atlantic and the Pacific, and could
hardly fail to prolong the war, with all the suffering and military
dangers that this would entail. We shall fight on whatever happens,
but please remember that the attitude of Spain, Vichy, Turkey,
and Japan may be finally determined by the outcome of the
struggle in this theatre of war. I cannot take the view that the loss
of Egypt and the Middle East would be a mere preliminary to the
successful maintenance of a prolonged oceanic war. If all Europe,
the greater part of Asia and Africa, became, either by conquest or
agreement under duress, a part of the Axis system, a war maintained
by the British Isles, United States, Canada, and Australasia
against this mighty agglomeration would be a hard, long, and
bleak proposition. Therefore, if you cannot take more advanced
positions now, or very soon, the vast balances may be tilted heavily
to our disadvantage. Mr. President, I am sure that you will not
misunderstand me if I speak to you exactly what is in my mind.
The one decisive counterweight I can see to balance the growing
pessimism in Turkey, the Near East, and in Spain would be if
United States were immediately to range herself with us as a belligerent
Power. If this were possible I have little doubt that we
could hold the situation in the Mediterranean until the weight of
your munitions gained the day.

We are determined to fight to the last inch and ounce for Egypt,
including its outposts of Tobruk and Crete. Very considerable
risks are being run by us for that, and personally I think we shall
win, in spite of the physical difficulties of reinforcing by tanks and
air. But I adjure you, Mr. President, not to underrate the gravity
of the consequences which may follow from a Middle-Eastern collapse.
In this war every post is a winning-post, and how many
more are we going to lose?

With regard to Vichy, we are more than willing that you should
take the lead, and work out how to get the best from them by
threats or favours. You alone can forestall the Germans in Morocco.[3]
If they are once installed, it will not be necessary for them
to go overland; they will soon get airborne troops to Dakar.

I shall await with deep anxiety the new broadcast which you
contemplate. It may be the supreme turning-point.

Let me thank you for the splendid help in shipping and tankers
which we owe to your action, and for all your generous and bold
assistance to us and to the common cause.

* * * * *

In my broadcast the night before I had tried not only to
express the feelings of the English-speaking world, but to state
the dominant facts which ruled our fate.

While we naturally view with sorrow and anxiety much that is
happening in Europe and in Africa, and may happen in Asia, we
must not lose our sense of proportion and thus become discouraged
or alarmed. When we face with a steady eye the difficulties
which lie before us, we may derive new confidence from remembering
those we have already overcome. Nothing that is happening
now is comparable in gravity with the dangers through which we
passed last year. Nothing that can happen in the East is comparable
with what is happening in the West.

Last time I spoke to you I quoted the lines of Longfellow which
President Roosevelt had written out for me in his hand. I have
some other lines which are less well known but which seem apt
and appropriate to our fortunes tonight, and I believe they will
be so judged wherever the English language is spoken or the flag
of freedom flies:

King Peter was evacuated from Kotor in an R.A.F. Sunderland flying-boat.
Mr. Ronald Campbell had made his way to the Adriatic coast. On April 18 he
and his staff fell into Italian hands. An attempt was made to rescue him and
his staff, and a week later the British submarine Regent was sent to the Bay
of Kotor. She found the Italians in possession. An Italian officer was taken
on board as a hostage, while an officer from the submarine parleyed with the
Italians for the release of the British diplomatic party. Meanwhile three
Stukas arrived and bombed and machine-gunned the Regent, wounding the
captain and members of the crew. She had to put to sea under fire from the
shore batteries and escape through the minefields. The British diplomats and
staff were moved to Italy and interned. In June they were repatriated to England
in accordance with international usage after negotiations with the Italian
Government.

13Tripoli and “Tiger”

From Desert Sand to Salt Water—Admiral Cunningham’s Anxieties—Our
Need to Strike at Tripoli—The Hard Alternative
to Bombardment—Drastic Proposal by the First Sea Lord—Admiral
Cunningham’s Reply—A Successful and Bloodless
Operation, April 21—Admiral Cunningham’s Strong View—Credit
for All—My Explanations to Admiral Cunningham—The
American Aid—Disquieting News from Wavell—My
Minute of April 21—The Defence Committee Agree to Send
Three Hundred Tanks Through the Mediterranean—A Severe
Comment on Tobruk, April 22—Reinforcements for Rommel—Operation
“Tiger” Arrives—A Brilliant Success—Tanks
for Crete—My Wish to Repeat Operation “Tiger”—Wavell
Does Not Press.

Disaster on our Desert flank had produced the consequences
in Africa which have been described. It also meant the
failure to take Rhodes which impaired our communications
with Greece. It severely injured that already hazardous enterprise,
though this would have foundered by itself. We must
now add to the tale of what happened in the desert sand the
simultaneous events upon salt water. Anyone can see how
great was the strain which the Greek expedition had put upon
our Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. But this was only one of the
demands made upon them at this chaotic time. As early as
April 10, Admiral Cunningham felt himself seriously affected
by the sudden leap forward of Rommel’s triumphant armoured
forces.

If [he warned us] the Germans can get sufficient forces across in
the next month, they will probably gain control up to Mersa
Matruh at least, and if they do this, it will be questionable if Alexandria
will be usable for the Fleet against attack by fighter-escorted
aircraft. The German prospects of achieving this are good unless
Tripoli is destroyed. I do not think it feasible to do this by bombardment.
It is not only a question of the risk to the battle fleet,
but of lasting effects being sufficient to make it justifiable. I feel
continuous air attack is solution. . . . I consider, therefore, that it is
essential that long-range bombers should be flown out immediately
to Egypt for this work and that nothing should stand in way of
this. It may well be a matter of days, and the results will decide
whether we are going to be able to hold the Eastern Mediterranean.
I would again emphasise the time factor, which is vital.

There could, alas, be no question of building up in Egypt
within a few weeks a long-range bomber force capable of having
any appreciable effect on Tripoli. Bombardment from the sea,
besides being far more effective and economical in effort, was
the only practical measure within our power, and I felt that the
Fleet might perhaps make a vital contribution to the defence
of Egypt in this way, notwithstanding the heavy strain it was
then bearing in the Greek campaign.

* * * * *

The need to strike at Tripoli led to vehement discussion
between the Admiralty and Admiral Cunningham, in which
the First Sea Lord, strong in the consciousness of the American
aid accorded by the President, confronted the Commander-in-Chief
in the Mediterranean with a hard alternative to risking
his fleet by a bombardment in a most dangerous area. The
incident is unusual in our naval records.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

15 April 41

It is evident that drastic measures are necessary to stabilise the
position in the Middle East. After thorough investigation it is
considered that air action alone against Tripoli will not sufficiently
interrupt the flow of reinforcements which are entering Libya
chiefly through that port.

It is essential, therefore, to do something at Tripoli which may
interrupt their communications drastically and for a considerable
time. We are of opinion that heavy and consistent mining of the
harbour and approaches would have a considerable effect, but we
cannot wait until this is proved. It is essential, therefore, to take
other measures at the earliest moment.

There are two alternatives: (a) bombardment of the harbour,
(b) attempting to block it.

Their Lordships are in agreement with you that the result of
bombardment is uncertain and could not be expected drastically to
reduce the rate of reinforcement even temporarily. It has been
decided, therefore, that an attempt must be made to carry out a
combined blocking and bombardment, the latter being carried out
by the blocking ships at point-blank range as they approach the
harbour.

After carefully considering the types of ship which can be used,
it has been decided that Barham and a “C” Class cruiser should
be used for the purpose.

The use of Barham for this purpose will no doubt fill you with
the deepest regret, but it is considered far preferable to sacrifice
one ship entirely with the chance of achieving something really
worth while than to get several ships damaged in bombardment
the result of which might be most disappointing.

This order was intended to convince the gallant Cunningham
of the scale of events as we saw them in Whitehall, and of
the almost desperate risks that should be run at this crisis.
Admiral Cunningham vehemently protested against the suggestion
that he should sacrifice a first-class battleship like the
Barham.

Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty

15 April 41

I fully realise the grave consideration which must have been
given to the matter before their Lordships and H.M. Government
came to the decision to make the sacrifice entailed by this operation,
but I would submit that such a price is only justified if first
of all success is reasonably assured, and, secondly, if, having been
successful, the result will be efficacious. I do not consider either
condition would be fulfilled. As regards success, it seems to me
doubtful if there is one chance in ten of getting this large ship into
the right position.

Even if we are successful, we shall have lost a first-class fighting
unit whose passing is liable to give an inestimable fillip to Italian
naval morale, and by this very effort shall give the enemy the
measure of how desperate we consider Cyrenaican situation to be.

If operation fails or is only partially successful, these aspects will
be intensified. We shall furthermore have to replace the ship by
taking another unit away from the Battle of the Atlantic.

In return for all this at best we shall make the actual harbour
unusable, but unloading will still be possible, and alternative
French harbours are available.

Nor in these considerations have I taken into account the certain
loss of nearly a thousand officers and men from the two ships,
who will have to be sent recklessly into the operation, unaware of
what they are in for, and whom I see no prospect of being able to
bring away.[1]

Rather than send in Barham without support and with such
slender chances of success, I would prefer to attack with the whole
battle fleet and to accept the risks.

For the above reasons I have seen fit to query their Lordships’
decision, and most earnestly request that reconsideration be given
in light of these remarks.

It was not without relief that we received the news that the
Fleet would bombard Tripoli, and the Admiralty hastened to
concur and share from a distance the burden of responsibility.
At daylight on April 21, Cunningham appeared off Tripoli
with the battleships Warspite, Barham, and Valiant, the cruiser
Gloucester, and destroyers, and bombarded the town for forty
minutes. To the astonishment of all, complete surprise was
achieved; the coastal batteries did not reply for twenty minutes,
nor was there any opposition from the air. Much damage was
done to shipping in the harbour, as well as to quays and to port
installations. Large fires were started in a fuel depot and the
buildings surrounding it. The British fleet withdrew without
loss. Not a ship was even hit.

Tripoli [reported Admiral Cunningham] was bombarded for 42
minutes at 5 A.M. today, Monday, at a range of between 14,000
and 11,000 yards. To my astonishment, surprise was achieved,
probably owing to the preoccupation of the German Air Force in
the other zones. . . . My remarks on the policy of this bombardment
will follow in due course.

The Commander-in-Chief pursued this signal with another,
in which he expressed his feelings strongly.

C.-in-C. Mediterranean to Admiralty

23 April 41

We are finding our present commitments rather more than we
can deal with efficiently.

I wish to make it quite clear that I remain strongly opposed to
this policy of bombardment of Tripoli by Mediterranean Fleet.
We have got away with it once, but only because the German Air
Force were engaged elsewhere. Thus we achieved surprise. It has
taken the whole Mediterranean Fleet five days to accomplish what
a heavy flight squadron working from Egypt could probably carry
out in a few hours. The fleet has also run considerable, and in my
opinion unjustifiable, risks in this operation, which has been at
the expense of all other commitments, and at a time when these
commitments were most pressing. . . .

I cannot see how Nelson and Rodney can be spared [from the
Atlantic] to join Mediterranean Fleet.

To me it appears that the Air Ministry are trying to lay their
responsibilities on Navy’s shoulders and are not helping us out
here on naval side of the war as they should.

In my opinion this story reflects credit upon both the high
Admirals concerned, and illustrates for the benefit of future
naval readers the extraordinary pressures under which we were
all acting in this crisis. It may well be that the Admiralty, with
my cordial agreement, forced their Commander-in-Chief to run
an unnecessary risk; and the fact that no loss was sustained is
no absolute proof that they were right on the merits. On the
other hand, we at home alone could measure the proportion of
world events, and final responsibility lay with us. While
remaining wholly convinced of the vigour and correctness of
the First Sea Lord’s action, I thought it necessary to offer the
Commander-in-Chief the fullest explanation, and a wider view
of the war scene than was possible from Alexandria.

Prime Minister to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

24 April 41

There can be no departure from the principle that it is the
prime responsibility of the Mediterranean Fleet to sever all communication
between Italy and Africa.

2. I am sorry that the haze caused by the aircraft attack hampered
your firing at Tripoli. We ought to have foreseen this, but
it is no use repining, and after all results were substantial and
achieved without casualties in ships or men. Personally, I was
not surprised at this immunity, and certainly the fact that the main
batteries of the principal enemy base in Africa, although under
German control, were at twenty minutes’ notice shows that the
enemy cannot be always ready everywhere at the same time. I
suppose there is no doubt that the blocking plan would, in these
circumstances, have come off.

3. About your air support: you should obtain accurate information,
because no judgment can be formed without it. The
Chief of the Air Staff tells me that the same weight of bombs as
you fired of shells into Tripoli in 42 minutes, namely, 530 tons,
might have been dropped: (a) by one Wellington squadron from
Malta in 10½ weeks, or (b) by one Stirling squadron from Egypt
in about 30 weeks. . . .

5. The main disposition of forces between the various theatres
rests with the Defence Committee, over which I preside, and not
with the Air Ministry, who execute our decisions. Ever since
November I have tried by every method and every route to pump
aircraft into the Middle East. Great risks have been run and
sacrifices made, especially when two-thirds of one whole fighter
squadron were drowned in trying to fly to Malta, and when
Furious was taken off her Atlantic duties to make three voyages
to Takoradi. I always try hard here to sustain you in every way
and acclaim your repeated successes, and I earnestly hope you
will also believe that we at the centre try to make sound and bold
decisions amid our many difficulties. . . .

7. You wonder how I could have suggested that Nelson and
Rodney should be spared from the Atlantic to join the Mediterranean
Fleet. I thought they were specially suitable because of
their deck armour and the apprehensions entertained of the dive-bomber
attacks. Whether they could be spared or not depends
upon the situation in the Atlantic. About this, in view of your
high position, I will now inform you. I have been for a long time
in constant intimate communication with President Roosevelt.
He has now begun to take over a great part of the patrolling west
of the twenty-sixth meridian West. The whole American Atlantic
Fleet, with numerous flying-boats, entered into action in the first
phase of this plan at midnight of April 24. United States warships
will cruise along our convoy routes, shadow—or, as they call it,
“trail”—all raiders or U-boats observed, and broadcast their
positions in plain language to the world at four-hourly intervals,
or oftener if needed. It is desired that this shall not be announced
suddenly, but become apparent as it develops. The matter is,
therefore, confided to you in the highest secrecy. The easement
and advantage of it to the Admiralty is enormous, and, of course,
it may easily produce even more decisive events. Therefore, you
do not need at this moment to be unduly concerned about the
Atlantic, and can devote your resources, which we are increasing
in so many ways, to the cutting-off of enemy communication with
Africa, whether by Tripoli or Cyrenaica. On this depends the
Battle of Egypt.

8. I have taken the pains to give you this full account out of my
admiration for the successes you have achieved, your many cares,
my sympathy for you in the many risks your fleet has to run, and
because of the commanding importance of the duty you have to
discharge.

* * * * *

My supreme object continued to be a victory in the Western
Desert to destroy Rommel’s army before he became too strong
and before the dreaded new armoured division reached him in
full strength. This would at any rate save our position in Egypt
from the wreck. I must, therefore, recount an episode for which
I took a more direct measure of responsibility than usual. The
disaster which Wavell had sustained on his Desert flank had
stripped him almost entirely of his armour. On Sunday, April
20, I was spending the week-end at Ditchley and working in
bed, when I received a telegram from General Wavell to the
C.I.G.S. which disclosed his plight in all its gravity.

Though the situation in Cyrenaica has improved [he said], the
future outlook will cause anxiety for some time, owing to my
weakness in tanks, especially cruiser tanks. As you realise, this
desert warfare depends very largely upon armoured strength. . . .
The enemy has probably at least a hundred and fifty tanks, of
which about half are medium, in the fighting line in Cyrenaica.
Most of these are now in the Bardia-Sollum area, and the enemy
may be preparing further forward movements, if he can arrange
supply. I have one weak unit in Tobruk of mixed cruiser, infantry,
and light tanks, and in the Matruh area one squadron of cruisers.
. . . The best I can hope for by the end of the month is one cruiser
regiment less one squadron, and one infantry tank regiment less
one squadron, to assist defence of Matruh. During May I may
get another thirty or forty cruisers out of the workshops to make
another weak unit, and some infantry tanks which will probably
be required for the close defence of Alexandria against possible
raids. I cannot count on getting any tanks back from Greece, and
no more are in sight for some time.

He added the following:

Stop press. I have just received disquieting intelligence. I was
expecting another German colonial division, which disembarked
at Tripoli early this month, to appear in the fighting line about
the end of the month. Certain units have already been identified.
I have just been informed that latest evidence indicates this is not
a colonial but an armoured division. If so, the situation is indeed
serious, since an armoured division contains over 400 tanks.[2] of
which 138 are medium. If the enemy can arrange supply, it will
take a lot of slopping. I will cable again when I have digested
this unwelcome news.

In a separate telegram of the same date General Wavell
described his tank position in detail.

It will be seen [he said] that there are only two regiments of
cruiser tanks in sight for Egypt by the end of May, and no reserves
to replace casualties, whereas there are now in Egypt, trained, an
excellent personnel for six tank regiments. I consider the provision
of cruiser tanks vital, in addition to infantry tanks, which lack
speed and radius of action for desert operations. C.I.G.S., please
give your personal assistance.

On reading these alarming messages I resolved not to be
governed any longer by the Admiralty reluctance, but to send
a convoy through the Mediterranean direct to Alexandria
carrying all the tanks which General Wavell needed. We had
a convoy containing large armoured reinforcements starting
immediately round the Cape. I decided that the fast tank-carrying
ships in this convoy should turn off at Gibraltar and
take the short cut, thus saving nearly forty days. General Ismay,
who was staying near by, came over at noon to see me. I prepared
the following personal minute to him for the Chiefs of
Staff. I asked him to go to London with it at once and make it
clear that I attached supreme importance to this step being
taken.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for Chiefs of Staff

20 April 41

See General Wavell’s latest telegrams. The fate of the war in
the Middle East, the loss of the Suez Canal, the frustration or confusion
of the enormous forces we have built up in Egypt, the
closing of all prospects of American co-operation through the Red
Sea—all may turn on a few hundred armoured vehicles. They
must if possible be carried there at all costs.

2. I will preside at noon tomorrow (Monday), the twenty-first,
at a meeting of C.O.S. and Service Ministers, and any necessary
action or collection of information must proceed forthwith.

3. The only way in which this great purpose can be achieved is
by sending the fast mechanical transport ships of the fast section
of [Convoy] W.S. 7 through the Mediterranean. General Wavell’s
telegram shows that machines, not men, are needed. The risk of
losing the vehicles, or part of them, must be accepted. Even if
half got through, the situation would be restored. The five M.T.
ships carry 250 tanks, all but fourteen of which are “I” tanks.
Every endeavour should be made to increase the numbers of
cruiser tanks in this consignment. I am told twenty more can be
loaded at a delay of perhaps twenty-four hours—that is, M.T.
convoy would sail on the morning of April 23.

4. The personnel will go by the Cape, subject to any modifications
which the C.I.G.S. may desire.

5. I have asked the Ministry of Shipping to try to find two other
M.T. ships of equal speed, without regard to other interests, by
the date mentioned. If these are found, an additional hundred
cruiser tanks should be taken from the best armoured division at
home, assuming that they are fitted for tropical warfare, apart
altogether from the special “desert-worthy” fittings.

6. The Admiralty and Air Ministry will consider and prepare
this day a plan for carrying this vital convoy through the Mediterranean.
Of course, we must accept the risk, and no guarantee can
be expected. Malta, however, should have been reinforced by then.
The Mountbatten destroyers and other naval reinforcements
should have reached there (or else be with the convoy). The
enemy’s dive-bombers have many other objectives, and they will
not know what the convoy contains.

7. Speed is vital. Every day’s delay must be avoided. Let me
have a time-table of what is possible, observing that at sixteen
knots the distance is only about eight days—say, ten—from the
date of sailing, namely, April 23. This would give General Wavell
effective support during the first week in May. Secrecy is of the
highest importance, and no one outside the highest circles need
know of the intention to turn off at Gibraltar. Everyone on board
the convoys must think they are going round the Cape.

The Chiefs of Staff were assembled by the time Ismay reached
London, and they discussed my minute until late into the night.
Their first reactions to the proposals were unfavourable. The
chances of getting the M.T. ships through the Central Mediterranean
unscathed were not rated very high, since on the day
before entering the Narrows and on the morning after passing
Malta they would be subjected to dive-bombing attacks out of
range of our own shore-based fighters. The view was also
expressed that we were dangerously weak in tanks at home, and
that if we now suffered heavy losses in tanks abroad there would
be demands for their replacement, and consequently a further
diversion of tanks from the home forces.

However, when the Defence Committee met the next day
Admiral Pound, to my great satisfaction, stood by me and
agreed to pass the convoy through the Mediterranean. The
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Portal, said he would try
to arrange for a Beaufighter squadron to give additional protection
from Malta. I then asked the committee to consider
sending a hundred additional cruiser tanks with the convoy.
I was willing to accept two days’ delay in sailing. General Dill
opposed the dispatch of these additional tanks in view of the
shortage for home defence. Considering what he had agreed to
ten months before, when we sent half our few tanks round the
Cape to the Middle East in July, 1940, I could not feel that
this reason was at this time valid. As the reader is aware, I did
not regard invasion as a serious danger in April, 1941, since
proper preparations had been made against it. We now know
that this view was correct. It was settled that this operation,
which I called “Tiger,” should proceed, and that a sixth ship
should be added to the convoy to include sixty-seven Mark VI
(cruiser) tanks. This ship could not, however, be loaded in
time to sail with the convoy, though every effort was made.

* * * * *

I made haste to tell Wavell the good news.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

22 April 41

I have been working hard for you in the last few days, and
you will, I am sure, be glad to know that we are sending 307 of our
best tanks through the Mediterranean, hoping they will reach you
around May 10. Of these, 99 are cruisers, Mark IV and Mark VI,
with the necessary spare parts for the latter, and 180 “I” tanks.

2. In your telegram of April 18 you said you had the trained
personnel for six regiments. We are, therefore, sending only the
vehicles to you by the short cut. The men go round the Cape as
already arranged, subject to some adjustments.

3. You will receive through the regular channels (a) full details
of the tanks which are being sent and of the spare parts, which fit
in with what you have got already, and (b) directions as to various
fittings you have to make for desert service. I hope you will
immediately set to work on all preparations so that a real evolution
can be made of this job, and the famous 7th Armoured
Division, whose absence was so unexpected to us, will resume
under Creagh its victorious career.

4. On the receipt of the detailed information you should furnish
us with your plan for bringing these vehicles into action at the very
earliest moment. If this consignment gets through the hazards of
the passage, which, of course, cannot be guaranteed, the boot will
be on the other leg and no German should remain in Cyrenaica by
the end of the month of June.

5. In making your preparations for bringing these vehicles into
action you should pretend that they are coming round the Cape, as
secrecy is most important, and very few here have been told. Thus,
when you get them the chance of surprise may be offered. All
good wishes.

* * * * *

While all this was on the move Tobruk lay heavily upon
our minds. General Wavell reported on the twenty-fourth
that the air fighter situation was serious. All Hurricanes in
Greece had been lost, and as a result of recent enemy air attacks
on Tobruk a large proportion of the Hurricanes there had been
destroyed or damaged. Air Marshal Longmore considered
that any further attempt to maintain a fighter squadron inside
Tobruk would only result in heavy loss to no purpose. Thus
the enemy would have complete air superiority over Tobruk
until a fresh fighter force could be built up. However, the
garrison had beaten off an attack that morning, causing the
enemy heavy casualties and taking one hundred and fifty
prisoners.

There was much anxiety at this time, and some pessimism.
I could not refrain from a severe comment.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

22 April 41

We must not forget that the besieged are four or five times as
strong as the besiegers. There is no objection to their making
themselves comfortable, but they must be very careful not to let
themselves be ringed in by a smaller force, and consequently lose
their offensive power upon the enemy’s communications. Twenty-five
thousand men with one hundred guns and ample supplies are
expected to be able to hold a highly fortified zone against forty-five
hundred men at the end of seven hundred miles of communications,
even though those men be Germans; in this case some of
them are not. The figures which I have used are those which have
been furnished to me by the War Office. We must not put our
standards too low in relation to the enemy.

* * * * *

Soon General Wavell sent us more disquieting information
about Rommel’s approaching reinforcements. The disembarkation
of the 15th German Armoured Division, less its losses in
crossing the Mediterranean, would probably be completed by
April 21. Several units had already been identified opposite
Tobruk or in the Capuzzo area. Prisoners of war stated that
the division was still short of supply transport. From our
observation of shipping arriving in Tripoli, it seemed that
twenty-one shipments, averaging five thousand or six thousand
tons, were still required to complete the division. The question
of its maintenance eastward depended on the use of Benghazi
and other small ports in Cyrenaica. There were signs that
Benghazi was being regularly used. At least fifteen days would
be required for the gathering of supplies. On this assumption
the 15th Armoured Division, the 5th Light Motorised Division,
and the Ariete and Trento divisions would be able to move
forward after the middle of June, instead of only from July onward—an
acceleration of a fortnight upon the previous estimate.

Wavell added that he must confess that German performance
so often exceeded calculations that he was not confident that
they would not improve on his estimate of their abilities. They
had, for instance, begun an advance the previous evening from
the Sollum area which would not be justified by what was
believed to be their supply situation.

It seemed very unsatisfactory to us at home that Benghazi,
which we had failed to make a useful base, was already playing
so important a part now that it had passed into German hands.

* * * * *

During the next fortnight my keen attention and anxieties
were riveted upon the fortunes of operation “Tiger.” I did not
underrate the risks which the First Sea Lord had been willing
to accept, and I knew that there were many misgivings in the
Admiralty. The convoy, consisting of five fifteen-knot ships,
escorted by Admiral Somerville’s Force H (Renown, Malaya,
Ark Royal, and Sheffield), passed Gibraltar on May 6. With it
also were the reinforcements for the Mediterranean Fleet,
comprising the Queen Elizabeth and the cruisers Naiad and
Fiji. Air attacks on May 8 were beaten off without damage,
seven enemy aircraft being destroyed. During that night, however,
two ships of the convoy struck mines when approaching
the Narrows. One, the Empire Song, caught fire and sank after
an explosion; the other, the New Zealand Star, was able to
continue with the convoy. On reaching the entrance to the
Skerki Channel, Admiral Somerville parted company and
returned to Gibraltar. He detached six of his destroyers, with
the cruiser Gloucester, to reinforce the convoy escort. In the
afternoon of the ninth Admiral Cunningham, having seized the
opportunity to pass a convoy into Malta, met the “Tiger” convoy
with the fleet fifty miles south of Malta. All his forces then
shaped their course for Alexandria, which they reached without
further loss or damage. The opportunity was also taken during
these operations to carry out two night bombardments of
Benghazi with light naval forces on May 7 and 10.

I was delighted to learn that this vital convoy, on which my
hopes were set, had come safely through the Narrows and was
now protected by the whole strength of the reinforced Mediterranean
Fleet. While this hung in the balance, my thoughts
turned to Crete, upon which we were now sure a heavy airborne
attack impended. It seemed to me that if the Germans
could seize and use the airfields on the island, they would have
the power of reinforcing almost indefinitely, and that even a
dozen “I” tanks might play a decisive part in preventing their
doing so. I, therefore, asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider
turning one ship of “Tiger” to unload a few “I” tanks in Crete
on their way through. My expert colleagues, while agreeing
that tanks would be of special value for the purpose I had in
mind, deemed it inadvisable to endanger the rest of the ship’s
valuable cargo by such a diversion. Accordingly, I suggested
to them on May 9 that if it were “thought too dangerous to
take the Clan Lamont into Suda, she should take twelve tanks,
or some other ship should take them, immediately after she has
discharged her cargo at Alexandria.” Orders were sent accordingly.
Wavell replied on May 10 that he “had already arranged
to send six infantry tanks and fifteen light tanks to Crete,” and
that they “should arrive within next few days if all goes well.”

* * * * *

Naturally I was eager to repeat the brilliant success of
“Tiger.” I had not perhaps realised what a strain it had been
on all concerned, although clearly I had borne the main
responsibility. I considered my judgment about the dangers
of the Mediterranean passage was at last vindicated. My naval
friends, on the other hand, declared we had enjoyed a stroke
of good luck and weather which might never recur. The
Admiralty certainly did not wish to be led into a succession
of these hazardous operations, and I encountered resistance
which I found serious. I should not have been deterred from
seeking and obtaining a Cabinet decision upon the issue but
for the fact that General Wavell himself did not press the point,
and indeed took the other side. This cut the ground from
under my feet. Accordingly fifty cruiser and fifty infantry tanks
went round the Cape in a later convoy, which did not anchor
off Suez till July 15.

14The Revolt in Iraq

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930—“The Golden Square”—Reinforcements
from India—The Attack upon Habbaniya—Spirited
Assistance from the Flying School—Wavell’s Reluctance—His
Many Cares—Firm Attitude at Home—Better News from
Habbaniya—Collapse and Flight of the Iraqi Army—My Telegram
to Wavell of May 9—His Reply—Arrival of the “Habforce”—Hitler’s
Belated Directive, May 23—The Advance on
Baghdad—Flight of Rashid Ali—Iraq Effectively Occupied—The
Regent Returns to Baghdad—Serious Dangers Narrowly
Averted at Small Cost—Divergence Between London and Cairo.

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 provided that in time of
peace we should, among other things, maintain air bases
near Basra and at Habbaniya, and have the right of transit for
military forces and supplies at all times. The treaty also
provided that in war we should have all possible facilities,
including the use of railways, rivers, ports, and airfields, for the
passage of our armed forces. When war came Iraq broke off
diplomatic relations with Germany, but did not declare war;
and when Italy came into the war, the Iraq Government did not
even sever relations. Thus the Italian Legation in Baghdad
became the chief centre for Axis propaganda and for fomenting
anti-British feeling. In this they were aided by the Mufti of
Jerusalem, who had fled from Palestine shortly before the outbreak
of war and later received asylum in Baghdad.

With the collapse of France and the arrival of the Axis
Armistice Commission in Syria, British prestige sank very low
and the situation gave us much anxiety. But with our preoccupations
elsewhere military action was out of the question,
and we had to carry on as best we could. In March, 1941, there
was a turn for the worse. Rashid Ali, who was working with
the Germans, became Prime Minister, and began a conspiracy
with three prominent Iraqi officers, who were styled “the
Golden Square.” At the end of March the pro-British Regent,
Emir Abdul Ilah, fled from Baghdad.

It was now more than ever important to make sure of Basra,
the main port of Iraq on the Persian Gulf, and I minuted to
the Secretary of State for India:

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for India

8 April 41

Some time ago you suggested that you might be able to spare
another division taken from the frontier troops for the Middle
East. The situation in Iraq has turned sour. We must make sure
of Basra, as the Americans are increasingly keen on a great air
assembling base being formed there to which they could deliver
direct. This plan seems of high importance in view of the undoubted
Eastern trend of the war.

I am telling the Chiefs of Staff that you will look into these
possibilities. General Auchinleck also had ideas that an additional
force could be spared.

Mr. Amery telegraphed in this sense to the Viceroy on the
same day, and Lord Linlithgow and the Commander-in-Chief,
General Auchinleck, promptly offered to divert to Basra an
infantry brigade and a regiment of field artillery, most of which
was already on board ship for Malaya. Other troops were to
follow as quickly as possible. The brigade group disembarked
without opposition at Basra on April 18, under cover of an
airborne British battalion which had alighted at Shaiba the day
before. The Government of India was requested to follow
them up as quickly as possible with two more brigades also
assigned to Malaya.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee, and all concerned

20 April 41

Troops should be sent to Basra as fast as possible. At least the
three brigades originally promised should be hurried there.

And also:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

20 April 41

It should be made clear to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis[1] that our chief
interest in sending troops to Iraq is the covering and establishment
of a great assembly base at Basra, and that what happens
up-country, except at Habbaniya, is at the present time on an
altogether lower priority. Our rights under the treaty were
invoked to cover this disembarkation and to avoid bloodshed, but
force would have been used to the utmost limit to secure the
disembarkation, if necessary. Our position at Basra, therefore,
does not rest solely on the treaty, but also on a new event arising
out of the war. No undertakings can be given that troops will be
sent to Baghdad or moved through to Palestine, and the right
to require such undertakings should not be recognised in respect
of a Government which has in itself usurped power by a coup
d’état, or in a country where our treaty rights have so long been
frustrated in the spirit. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis should not, however,
entangle himself by explanations.

When accordingly Rashid Ali was informed by our Ambassador
that more transports would reach Basra on the thirtieth,
he said that he could not give permission for any fresh landings
until the troops already at Basra had passed through the port.
General Auchinleck was told that the landings should go forward
none the less, and Rashid Ali, who had been counting on
the assistance of German aircraft, and even of German airborne
troops, was forced into action.

His first hostile move was towards Habbaniya, our air force
training base in the Iraqi Desert. On April 29, 230 British
women and children had been flown to Habbaniya from
Baghdad. The total number in the cantonment was just over
2200 fighting men, with no fewer than 9000 civilians. The
Flying School thus became a point of grave importance. Air
Vice-Marshal Smart, who commanded there, took bold and
timely precautions to meet the mounting crisis. The Flying
School had previously held only obsolescent or training types,
but a few Gladiator fighters had arrived from Egypt, and eighty-two
aircraft of all sorts were improvised into four squadrons. A
British battalion, flown from India, had arrived on the twenty-ninth.
The ground defence of the seven miles perimeter, with
its solitary wire fence, was indeed scanty. On the thirtieth
Iraqi troops from Baghdad appeared barely a mile away on the
plateau overlooking both the airfield and the camp. They were
soon reinforced from Baghdad, until they numbered about nine
thousand men, with fifty guns. The next two days were spent
in fruitless parleys, and at dawn on May 2 fighting began.

* * * * *

From the outset of this new danger General Wavell showed
himself most reluctant to assume more burdens. He said he
would make preparations and do what he could to create the
impression of a large force being prepared for action from
Palestine, which might have some effect on the Iraqi Government.
The force he could make available would in his opinion
be both inadequate and too late. It would be at least a week
before it could start. Its departure would leave Palestine most
dangerously weak, and incitement to rebellion there was
already taking place. “I have consistently warned you,” he said,
“that no assistance could be given to Iraq from Palestine in
present circumstances, and have always advised that a commitment
in Iraq should be avoided. . . . My forces are stretched
to the limit everywhere, and I simply cannot afford to risk part
of them on what cannot produce any effect.”

In Syria resources were equally strained. The Commanders-in-Chief
Middle East had said that the maximum force that
could be spared for Syria until the Australians were re-equipped
was one mechanised cavalry brigade, one regiment of artillery,
and one infantry battalion, subject to no Iraq commitment.
This force could not be expected to deal with the number of
troops which the Germans would be able to send to Syria, and
should not be sent unless the Vichy French were actively
resisting. If it was decided to send troops into Syria it would
certainly be better to send British in the first instance and not
Free French, whose intervention would be bitterly resented.

On May 4 we sent General Wavell our decisions about Iraq:

A commitment in Iraq was inevitable. We had to establish a
base at Basra, and control that port to safeguard Persian oil in
case of need.

The line of communication to Turkey through Iraq has also
assumed greater importance owing to German air superiority in
the Aegean Sea. . . . Had we sent no forces to Basra the present
situation at Habbaniya might still have arisen under Axis direction,
and we should also have had to face an opposed landing at
Basra later on instead of being able to secure a bridgehead there
without opposition. . . . There can be no question of accepting
the Turkish offer of mediation. We can make no concessions.
The security of Egypt remains paramount. But it is essential to
do all in our power to save Habbaniya and to control the pipeline
to the Mediterranean.

General Auchinleck continued to offer reinforcements up to
five infantry brigades and ancillary troops by June 10 if
shipping could be provided. We were gratified by his forward
mood. General Wavell only obeyed under protest. “Your
message,” he said on the fifth, “takes little account of realities.
You must face facts.” He doubted whether the forces he himself
was gathering were strong enough to relieve Habbaniya, or
whether Habbaniya could hold out till they might arrive on the
twelfth. “I feel it my duty to warn you in the gravest possible
terms,” he said, “that I consider the prolongation of fighting
in Iraq will seriously endanger the defence of Palestine and
Egypt. The political repercussions will be incalculable, and
may result in what I have spent nearly two years trying to avoid,
namely, serious internal trouble in our bases. I, therefore, urge
again most strongly that a settlement should be negotiated as
early as possible.”

I was not content with this.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

6 May 41

The telegrams from Generals Wavell and Auchinleck should be
considered forthwith, and a report made to me at the House of
Commons before luncheon today.

The following points require attention: (1) Why should the
force mentioned, which seems considerable, be deemed insufficient
to deal with the Iraq Army? What do you say about this? Fancy
having kept the cavalry division in Palestine all this time without
having the rudiments of a mobile column organised! (2) Why
should the troops at Habbaniya give in before May 12? Their
losses have been nominal as so far reported. Their infantry made
a successful sortie last night, and we are told that the bombardment
stops whenever our aircraft appear. Great efforts should be
made by the air force to aid and encourage Habbaniya. Surely
some additional infantry can be flown there as reinforcements
from Egypt? The most strenuous orders should be given to the
officer commanding to hold out.

How can a settlement be negotiated, as General Wavell suggests?
Suppose the Iraqis, under German instigation, insist upon our
evacuating Basra, or moving in small detachments at their mercy
across the country to Palestine. The opinion of the senior naval
officer at Basra is that a collapse or surrender there would be
disastrous. This is also the opinion of the Government of India.
I am deeply disturbed at General Wavell’s attitude. He seems to
have been taken as much by surprise on his eastern as he was on
his western flank, and in spite of the enormous number of men at
his disposal, and the great convoys reaching him, he seems to be
hard up for battalions and companies. He gives me the impression
of being tired out.

The proposals of C.-in-C. India for reinforcing Basra seem to
deserve most favourable consideration.

* * * * *

Supported by the Chiefs of Staff, I brought all this to an
issue before the Defence Committee when it met at noon.
There was a resolute temper. The following orders were sent
at their direction:

Chiefs of Staff to General Wavell and others concerned

6 May 41

Your telegram of yesterday has been considered by Defence
Committee. Settlement by negotiation cannot be entertained
except on the basis of a climb down by Iraqis, with safeguard
against future Axis designs on Iraq. Realities of the situation are
that Rashid Ali has all along been hand-in-glove with Axis Powers,
and was merely waiting until they could support him before
exposing his hand. Our arrival at Basra forced him to go off at
half-cock before the Axis was ready. Thus there is an excellent
chance of restoring the situation by bold action, if it is not
delayed.

Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, advised Defence Committee that
they are prepared to accept responsibility for dispatch of the
force specified in your telegram at the earliest possible moment.
Defence Committee direct that Air Vice-Marshal Smart should be
informed that he will be given assistance, and that in the meanwhile
it is his duty to defend Habbaniya to the last. Subject to
the security of Egypt being maintained, maximum air support
possible should be given operations in Iraq.

* * * * *

Meanwhile at Habbaniya the squadrons of the Flying School,
together with Wellington bombers from Shaiba, at the head of
the Persian Gulf, attacked the Iraqi troops on the plateau.
They replied by shelling the cantonment, their aircraft joining
in with bombs and machine guns. Over forty of our men were
killed or wounded that day, and twenty-two aircraft destroyed
or disabled. Despite the difficulty of taking off under close
artillery fire, our airmen continued their attacks. No enemy
infantry assault developed, and gradually their batteries were
mastered. It was found that the enemy gunners would not
stand to their pieces under air attack or even if our aircraft
were to be seen overhead. Full advantage was taken of their
nervousness, and it was possible from the second day to turn a
proportion of our air effort to dealing with the Iraqi Air Force
and their bases. On the nights of May 3 and 4, offensive land
patrols from Habbaniya moved out to raid the enemy lines, and
by the fifth, after four days of attack from the Royal Air Force, the
enemy had had enough. That night they withdrew from the
plateau. They were followed up, and a very successful action
yielded four hundred prisoners, a dozen guns, sixty machine
guns, and ten armoured cars. A reinforcing column from
Falluja was caught on the road and destroyed by forty of our
aircraft dispatched from Habbaniya for the purpose. By May
7, therefore, the siege of Habbaniya was over. The defenders
had been reinforced by fighter aircraft from Egypt; British
women and children had all been evacuated by air to Basra;
the Iraqi Air Force of about sixty planes had been virtually
destroyed. This good news only reached us late and bit by bit.

Prime Minister to Air Vice-Marshal Smart

7 May 41

Your vigorous and splendid action has largely restored the
situation. We are all watching the grand fight you are making.
All possible aid will be sent. Keep it up.

* * * * *

Prime Minister to General Wavell

7 May 41

It would seem that the Habbaniya show has greatly improved,
and audacious action now against the Iraqis may crush the revolt
before the Germans arrive. They can, of course, fly there direct
in heavy bombers, but these would only have what they stand up
in and could not operate long. We must forestall the moral effect
of their arrival by a stunning blow. I presume that, if Rutba and
Habbaniya are clear, [our] column will take possession of Baghdad
or otherwise exploit success to the full. Other telegrams are being
sent to you about rousing the tribes and about Government policy.

General Wavell replied to the Chiefs of Staff direct:

8 May 41

I think you should appreciate the limits of military action in
Iraq during next few months without a favourable political
situation. Forces from India can secure Basra, but cannot, in my
opinion, advance northward unless the co-operation of the local
population and tribes is fully secured. Force from Palestine can
relieve Habbaniya and hold approaches from Baghdad to prevent
farther advance on Habbaniya; but it is not capable of entering
Baghdad against opposition or maintaining itself there. . . . In
order, therefore, to avoid a heavy military commitment in a non-vital
area, I still recommend that a political solution be sought by
all available means.

Although I realised his cares and his devotion, I continued
to press General Wavell hard.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

9 May 41

The Defence Committee have considered your telegram of May
8 about Iraq. Our information is that Rashid Ali and his partisans
are in desperate straits. However this may be, you are to fight
hard against them. The mobile column being prepared in Palestine
should advance as you propose, or earlier if possible, and
actively engage the enemy, whether at Rutba or Habbaniya.
Having joined the Habbaniya forces, you should exploit the situation
to the utmost, not hesitating to try to break into Baghdad
even with quite small forces, and running the same kind of risks as
the Germans are accustomed to run and profit by.

2. There can be no question of negotiation with Rashid Ali
unless he immediately accepts the terms in C.O.S. telegram. Such
negotiation would only lead to delay, during which the German
Air Force will arrive. We do not think that any ground forces
you may be able to divert to Iraq will affect your immediate
problem in the Western Desert. The air force must do its best to
cover both situations. Only in the event of your being actually
engaged or about to engage in an offensive in the Western Desert
should Tedder deny the necessary air support to the Iraq operations.

I tried to reassure General Wavell that we had no extensive
operation in view and were only seeking to cope with the
immediate need.

You do not need to bother too much about the long future in
Iraq. Your immediate task is to get a friendly Government set up
in Baghdad, and to beat down Rashid Ali’s forces with the utmost
vigour. We do not wish to be involved at present in any large-scale
advance up the river from Basra, nor have we prescribed
the occupation of Kirkuk or Mosul. We do not seek any change
in the independent status of Iraq, and full instructions have been
given in accordance with your own ideas upon this point. But
what matters is action; namely, the swift advance of the mobile
column to establish effective contact between Baghdad and Palestine.
Every day counts, for the Germans may not be long. We
hoped that the column would be ready to move on the tenth, and
would reach Habbaniya on the twelfth, assuming Habbaniya
could hold out, which they have done, and a good deal more. We
trust these dates have been kept, and that you will do your utmost
to accelerate movement.

Wavell responded gallantly to the many cumulative calls
made upon him.

Without waiting for “Tiger” [he reported on the thirteenth]
I ordered all available tanks to join Gott’s force and attack the
enemy in the Sollum area. . . . If things go well in the Western
Desert I will try to move additional troops to Palestine for action
towards Iraq. . . . We will try to liquidate this tiresome Iraq
business quickly. . . . I am doing my best to strengthen Crete
against impending attack. I discussed the question of Syria with
Catroux this afternoon.

* * * * *

By this time “Tiger” had begun to arrive safely at Alexandria,
and I cherished many hopes of good results in Crete,
in the Western Desert, and in Syria. Varied fortunes attended
these interrelated ventures.

Prime Minister to General Auchinleck

14 May 41

1. I am very glad you are going to meet Wavell at Basra. He
will tell you about “Tiger” and “Scorcher” [defence of Crete].
A victory in Libya would alter all values in Iraq, both in German
and Iraqi minds.

2. We are most grateful to you for the energetic efforts you
have made about Basra. The stronger the forces India can assemble
there the better. But we have not yet felt able to commit ourselves
to any advance (except with small parties when the going is good)
northward towards Baghdad, and still less to occupation in force
of Kirkuk and/or Mosul. This cannot be contemplated until we
see what happens about “Tiger” and “Scorcher.” We are, therefore,
confined at the moment to trying to get a friendly Government
installed in Baghdad and building up the largest possible
bridgehead at Basra. Even less can we attempt to dominate Syria
at the present time, though the Free French may be allowed to do
their best there. The defeat of the Germans in Libya is the commanding
event, and larger and longer views cannot be taken till
that is achieved. Everything will be much easier then.

It will be well to complete the Iraq story before the impact
of more sanguinary events, though not graver dangers, fell
upon us in Crete.

The advance guard of the relieving “Habforce,” a motorised
brigade group from Palestine, arrived at Habbaniya on May 18
to resume the attack on the enemy, now holding the bridge
across the Euphrates at Falluja. By this time the Iraqis were
not the only enemy. The first German aircraft were established
on Mosul airfield on May 13, and thenceforward our
air force had as a principal task to attack them and prevent
their being supplied by railway from Syria. The attack on
Falluja by the advance guard of “Habforce” and the land
elements of the Habbaniya garrison took place on May 19.
Inundations hampered direct approach from the west, and
small columns were, therefore, dispatched over a flying bridge
upstream from the town to cut off the retreat of the defenders;
another party made an air landing to block the road to
Baghdad. It had been expected that this action, together with
air bombardment, would make the enemy, about a brigade
strong, surrender or disperse. But in the end ground attack
was needed. A small force on the west bank whose task had
been to prevent by rifle fire the demolition of the vital bridge
was ordered to rush it; they did so successfully and without
casualties. The enemy gave way; three hundred prisoners
were taken. A counter-attack three days later was beaten off.

Some days were spent in making preparations for the final
advance on Baghdad, during which our air action against the
German Air Force on the northern airfields of Iraq finally
crushed their effort. Later an Italian fighter squadron appeared,
but accomplished nothing. The German officer charged with
co-ordinating the action of the Axis air squadrons with the
Iraqi forces, a son of Field Marshal Blomberg, landed at
Baghdad with a bullet in his head, thanks to misjudged firing
by his allies. His successor, General Felmy, though more
fortunate in his landing, could do nothing. His vigorous
instructions from Hitler were dated May 23, by which time
all chance of useful Axis intervention had passed.

Hitler’s Directive No. 30. Middle East

Field Headquarters: May 23, 1941

The Arab Freedom Movement is, in the Middle East, our
natural ally against England. In this connection the raising of
rebellion in Iraq is of special importance. Such rebellion will
extend across the Iraq frontiers to strengthen the forces which are
hostile to England in the Middle East, interrupt the British lines
of communication, and tie down both English troops and English
shipping space at the expense of other theatres of war. For these
reasons I have decided to push the development of operations in
the Middle East through the medium of going to the support of
Iraq. Whether and in what way it may later be possible to wreck
finally the English position between the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf, in conjunction with an offensive against the Suez
Canal, is still in the lap of the gods. . . .

The advance upon Baghdad began on the night of May 27,
and made slow progress, being hindered by extensive inundations
and blown-up bridges over the many irrigation waterways.
However, our forward troops reached the outskirts of
Baghdad on May 30. Although they were weak in numbers
and there was an Iraqi division in the city, their presence was
too much for Rashid Ali and his companions, who that day fled
to Persia, accompanied by other troublemakers, the German
and Italian Ministers and the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. The next
day, May 31, an armistice was signed, the Regent of Iraq was
reinstated, and a new Government took office. We soon
occupied with land and air forces all the important points in
the country.

Thus the German plan for raising rebellion in Iraq and
mastering cheaply this wide area was frustrated on a small
margin. The landing of an Indian brigade at Basra on April
18 was timely. It forced Rashid Ali into premature action.
Even so there was a race with our meagre forces against time.
The spirited defence of Habbaniya by the Flying School was
a prime factor in our success. The Germans had, of course, at
their disposal an airborne force which would have given them
at this time Syria, Iraq, and Persia, with their precious oilfields.
Hitler’s hand might have reached out very far towards India,
and beckoned to Japan. He had chosen, however, as we shall
soon see, to employ and expend his prime air organism in
another direction. We often hear military experts inculcate
the doctrine of giving priority to the decisive theatre. There
is a lot in this. But in war this principle, like all others, is
governed by facts and circumstances; otherwise strategy would
be too easy. It would become a drill-book and not an art; it
would depend upon rules and not on an instructed and fortunate
judgment of the proportions of an ever-changing scene.
Hitler certainly cast away the opportunity of taking a great
prize for little cost in the Middle East. We in Britain, although
pressed to the extreme, managed with scanty forces to save ourselves
from far-reaching or lasting injury.

It must be remembered that the revolt in Iraq was but one
small sector of the immense emergency in the Middle East,
which lapped General Wavell on all sides simultaneously.
This comprised the impending German onslaught upon Crete,
our plans to attack Rommel in the Western Desert, the campaigns
in Abyssinia and Eritrea, and the bitter need to forestall
the Germans in Syria. In the same way the whole Mediterranean
scene, as viewed from London, was but a secondary
part of our world problem, in which the invasion menace, the
U-boat war, and the attitude of Japan were dominant features.
Only the strength and cohesion of the War Cabinet, the relations
of mutual respect and harmony of outlook between
political and military chiefs, and the smooth working of our
war machine enabled us to surmount, though sorely mauled,
these trials and perils.

The reader will be conscious of the tension which grew
between the British War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff and their
overstrained but gallantly struggling Commander-in-Chief in
Cairo. The authorities at home, over whom I presided, directly
overruled from Whitehall the judgment of the man on the spot.
They took the issue out of his hands and assumed the responsibility
themselves for ordering the relief of Habbaniya and for
rejecting all ideas of negotiation with Rashid Ali or accepting
Turkish mediation, which at one time was mentioned. The
result was crowned with swift and complete success. Although
no one was more pleased and relieved than Wavell himself, the
episode could not pass without leaving impressions in his mind
and in ours. At the same time General Auchinleck’s forthcoming
attitude in sending, at our desire, and with the Viceroy’s
cordial assent, the Indian division to Basra so promptly, and the
readiness with which Indian reinforcements were supplied,
gave us the feeling of a fresh mind and a hitherto untaxed
personal energy. The consequences of these impressions will be
seen as the story unfolds.

15Crete: The Advent

The Situation in Crete—Weak and Inadequate Defences—The
Overloaded Administration in Cairo—Agreement at Home and
on the Spot About Defending Crete—Our Precise Intelligence—Wavell’s
Visit, April 30—Bernard Freyberg in Command—My
Telegram to Admiral Cunningham of May 1—Efforts to
Reinforce Our Air—Wavell and Freyberg Under No Illusions—Freyberg’s
Telegrams to Wavell and to the New Zealand
Government—Wavell’s Telegram of May 2—Anxiety in New
Zealand—My Message to Mr. Fraser, May 3—Freyberg Undaunted—German
Blockade of Crete from the Air—Our Pitiful
Air Resources—The German Plan of Attack—“Colorado”
and “Scorcher”—A Breathless Pause—Wavell’s Humour—I
Keep Smuts Informed—On the Verge.

The strategic importance of Crete in all our Mediterranean
affairs has already been explained by argument
and events. British warships based on Suda Bay or able to
refuel there could give an all-important protection to Malta.
If our base in Crete was well defended against air attack the
whole process of superior sea power would come into play and
ward off any seaborne expedition. But only a hundred miles
away lay the Italian fortress of Rhodes, with its ample airfields
and well-established installations. The capture and occupation
of Rhodes and been our aim since the beginning of the year,
and the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation, a splendid
body of men, most carefully trained and fitted together, fifty-three
hundred strong, had been sent from England either for
Rhodes or Suda Bay as circumstances might require. Besides
this the commando force, over two thousand strong, under
Colonel Laycock, had also come round the Cape, and with the
British 6th Division, which was being formed in Egypt, would
have made an assaulting force capable of taking Rhodes. The
pressure of events had forced us to postpone this enterprise,
and meanwhile Crete was vulnerable in a high degree should
German aircraft be sent to Rhodes. The Mobile Naval Defence
Organisation was kept in hand at Alexandria for emergencies
instead of helping either to take and hold Rhodes or to work
up and man the defences of Suda Bay.

Locally in Crete everything had proceeded in a halting
manner. The reader has seen my repeated injunctions to have
Suda Bay fortified. I had even used the expression “a second
Scapa.” The island had been in our possession for nearly six
months, but it would only have been possible to equip the
harbour with a more powerful outfit of anti-aircraft guns at the
expense of other still more urgent needs; nor was the Middle
East Command able to find the labour, locally or otherwise, to
develop the airfields. There could be no question of sending a
large garrison to Crete or of basing strong air forces upon its
airfields while Greece was still in Allied hands. But all should
have been in readiness to receive reinforcements should they
become available and should the need arise. There had been,
however, neither plan nor drive. Six successive commanders
were appointed in as many months. The Middle East Command
should have made a more careful study of the conditions
under which Crete might have to be defended from air or sea
attack. The need of providing if not a harbour at least landing
facilities on the southern side of the island at Sphakia or
Timbaki and the making of a road therefrom to Suda Bay and
the airfields by which Western Crete could have been reinforced
from Egypt was not foreseen. The responsibility for
the defective study of the problem and for the feeble execution
of the direction given must be shared between Cairo and
Whitehall.

It was only after the disasters had occurred in Cyrenaica, in
Crete, and in the desert that I realised how overloaded and
undersustained General Wavell’s organisation was. Wavell
tried his best; but the handling machine at his disposal was
too weak to enable him to cope with the vast mass of business
which four or five simultaneous campaigns imposed upon him.

* * * * *

With the German conquest of Greece, Crete became the last
foothold for the Greek King and Government, and an important
repository for evacuated troops of all kinds. We could
be sure that German eyes were glaring upon it. To us it seemed
a vital outpost both of Egypt and Malta. Even in this welter
of failure and wreckage in which we were now plunged there
were no disagreements between the authorities, either at home
or on the spot, about holding Crete. “I am assuming,” telegraphed
Wavell (April 16), “that Crete will be held.” And the
next day, “We are making preparations for evacuation [of
Greece] and for holding Crete.”

* * * * *

We had known for a long time the efforts Goering had made
to create and develop a powerful airborne force, capable of a
large-scale descent from the air. This had appealed to the
ardent and devoted Nazi youth of Germany. The German
Parachute Division was a corps d’élite which had played its part
in our thoughts about home defence against invasion. All such
plans, however, require at least the temporary command of the
daylight air. This the Germans had failed to gain in Britain.
Crete was a different tale. Ample and, as it seemed, long-lasting
air superiority both in the Balkans and in the Aegean Sea was
now the enemy’s master weapon.

At no moment in the war was our Intelligence so truly and
precisely informed. In the exultant confusion of their seizure
of Athens the German staffs preserved less than their usual
secrecy, and our agents in Greece were active and daring. In
the last week of April we obtained from trustworthy sources
good information about the next German stroke. The movements
and excitement of the German XIth Air Corps, and
also the frantic collection of small craft in Greek harbours,
could not be concealed from attentive eyes and ears. All
pointed to an impending attack on Crete, both by air and sea.
In no operation did I take more personal pains to study and
weigh the evidence or to make sure that the magnitude of the
impending onslaught was impressed upon the Commanders-in-Chief
and imparted to the general on the actual scene.

Our Joint Intelligence Committee in London made an appreciation
on April 28 of the scale and character of the hostile
design against Crete in which they expressed their belief that
simultaneous airborne and seaborne attack was imminent.
They thought that the enemy could gather in the Balkans for
all purposes 315 long-range bombers, 60 twin-engine fighters,
240 dive-bombers, and 270 single-engine fighters; that he might
drop 3000 to 4000 parachutists or airborne troops in the first
sortie, and that he might make two or three sorties per day from
Greece and three or four from Rhodes, all with fighter escort.
There would be heavy bombing attacks prior to the arrival of
the airborne and seaborne troops, and no lack of troops or
shipping for the seaborne attack.

This was immediately telegraphed to the Cairo headquarters,
and I emphasised it the same day by a personal message to
General Wavell.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

28 April 41

It seems clear from our information that a heavy airborne
attack by German troops and bombers will soon be made on Crete.
Let me know what forces you have in the island and what your
plans are. It ought to be a fine opportunity for killing the parachute
troops. The island must be stubbornly defended.

Although General Wavell did not at first wholly accept our
view that Crete was the target, and thought that the Germans
might be deliberately letting rumours circulate to cover their
real plans, he acted at once with his customary energy and
mobility and flew to the island. His answers show the situation.

General Wavell to Prime Minister and C.O.S.

29 April 41

Crete was warned of possibility of airborne attack on April
18. Besides original permanent garrison of three infantry battalions,
two heavy A.A. batteries, three light A.A. batteries, and
coast defence artillery, Crete now contains at least 30,000 personnel
evacuated from Greece. These are being organised for the defence
of the vital places on the island: Suda Bay, Canea, Retimo, and
Heraklion. Morale reported good. Arms mainly rifles, with low
proportion light machine guns. In addition certain units of Greek
recruits have been organised for defence of aerodromes and
[guarding] prisoners of war.

2. The Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation is due to reach
the island during first fortnight in May.

3. Propose visiting Crete tomorrow, and will report on return.

4. It is just possible that plan for attack on Crete may be cover
for attack on Syria or Cyprus, and that real plan will only be
disclosed even to [their] own troops at last moment. This would
be consistent with German practice.

I had suggested to the C.I.G.S. that General Freyberg should
be placed in command of Crete, and he proposed this to
Wavell, who had immediately agreed. Bernard Freyberg and
I had been friends for many years. When as a young volunteer
from New Zealand in the First World War he had made his
way through many difficulties to England, he had an introduction
to me, and met me one day in the Admiralty in September,
1914, and asked for a commission. I was at that time forming
the Royal Naval Division, and I soon made the necessary
recommendations. In a few days he became a sub-lieutenant in
the “Hood” Battalion. Here is no place to describe the long
succession of glorious deeds of valour by which he rose in four
years of front-line war to the command of a brigade, and in the
crisis of the German summer offensive of 1918 was placed in
command of all the troops, amounting almost to a corps, which
held the gap in front of Bailleul. The Victoria Cross and the
D.S.O. with two bars marked his unsurpassed service.

Freyberg, like his only equal, Carton de Wiart, deserved the
title with which I acclaimed them of “Salamander.” Both
thrived in the fire, and were literally shot to pieces without
being affected physically or in spirit. One day in the nineteen-twenties,
when I was staying at a country house with Bernard
Freyberg, I asked him to show me his wounds. He stripped
himself, and I counted twenty-seven separate scars and gashes.
To these he was to add in the Second World War another three.
But of course, as he explained, “You nearly always get two
wounds for every bullet or splinter, because mostly they have
to go out as well as go in.” At the outset of the new war no
man was more fitted to command the New Zealand Division,
for which he was eagerly chosen. In September, 1940, I had
toyed with the idea of giving him a far greater scope. Now at
length this decisive personal command had come to him. Freyberg
is so made that he will fight for King and Country with an
unconquerable heart anywhere he is ordered, and with whatever
forces he is given by superior authorities, and he imparts
his own invincible firmness of mind to all around him.

At home we did our utmost to help our hard-pressed commanders
and troops.

Prime Minister to Admiral Cunningham

1 May 41

We are making extreme exertions to reinforce you from the air.
It has been decided to repeat as soon as possible and on a much
larger scale the recent operations [for air reinforcement]. Ark
Royal, Argus, Furious, and Victorious will all be used to carry
up to 140 additional Hurricanes, as well as 18 Fulmars, with pilots.
We hope that 64 Hurricanes and 9 Fulmars will arrive in Middle
East by May 25. Meanwhile, 25 fighter pilots leave May 23 for
Takoradi to hasten ferrying of Hurricanes and Tomahawks.
Capacity of route to Egypt via Takoradi freed by above use of
carriers will be employed to increase the flow of Tomahawks and
Hurricanes. Greatest possible shipment of Blenheims will be made
at the same time. I may have more to signal about bomber reinforcements
later.

2. I also congratulate you upon the brilliant and highly successful
manner in which the Navy have once again succoured the
Army and brought off four-fifths of the entire force.

3. It is now necessary to fight hard for Crete, which seems soon
to be attacked heavily, and [also] for Malta as a base for flotilla
action against the enemy’s communications with Libya. Constantly
improving attitude of United States and their naval co-operation
justifies risks involved. Your plans for “Tiger” are
excellent and give good chances.

4. But above all we look to you to cut off seaborne supplies
from the Cyrenaican ports and to beat them up to the utmost.
It causes grief here whenever we learn of the arrival of precious
aviation spirit in one ship after another. This great battle for
Egypt is what the Duke of Wellington called “a close-run thing,”
but if we can reinforce you and Wavell as proposed by Operations
“Tiger” and “Jaguar” [air reinforcements], and you can cut off the
tap of inflow, our immense armies in the Middle East will soon
resume their ascendancy. All good wishes.

* * * * *

Freyberg and Wavell were under no illusions.

General Freyberg to General Wavell

1 May 41

Forces at my disposal are totally inadequate to meet attack
envisaged. Unless fighter aircraft are greatly increased and naval
forces made available to deal with seaborne attack, I cannot hope
to hold out with land forces alone, which as result of campaign
in Greece are now devoid of any artillery, have insufficient tools
for digging, very little transport, and inadequate war reserves of
equipment and ammunition. Force here can and will fight, but
without full support from Navy and air force cannot hope to
repel invasion. If for other reasons these cannot be made available
at once, urge that question of holding Crete should be reconsidered.
I feel that under terms of my charter it is my duty to
inform New Zealand Government of situation in which greater
part of my division is now placed.

He also informed his own Government:

1 May 41

Feel it is my duty to report military situation in Crete. Decision
taken in London that Crete must be held at all costs. Have received
appreciation scale of attack from War Office. In my opinion
Crete can only be held with full support from Navy and air force.
There is no evidence of naval forces capable of guaranteeing us
against seaborne invasion, and air forces in island consist of six
Hurricanes and seventeen obsolete aircraft. Troops can and will
fight, but as result of campaign in Greece are devoid of any artillery
and have insufficient tools for digging, little transport, and
inadequate war reserves of equipment and ammunition. Would
strongly represent to your Government grave situation in which
bulk of New Zealand Division is placed, and recommend you
bring pressure to bear on highest plane in London either to supply
us with sufficient means to defend island or to review decision Crete
must be held. I have, of course, made my official representation
on this matter to C.-in-C. Middle East.

General Wavell to C.I.G.S.

2 May 41

Defence of Crete will present difficult problem for all three
services, mainly on account of enemy air superiority. Ports and
aerodromes, being in north of island, involve greater exposure of
aircraft and shipping. Only good road in island (and that none
too good) runs east and west along north coast, and also exposed.

2. There are no good roads north and south or harbours on
south coast, though with time it may be possible to develop them.
There is a great shortage of transport in island.

3. Food for civil population will have to be imported in considerable
quantities. If towns heavily bombed and we are unable
to provide fighter protection we may be faced with political problem.

4. To garrison island effectively at least three brigade groups
required and considerable number of A.A. units. Present garrison
three British Regular battalions, six New Zealand battalions, one
Australian battalion, and two composite battalions of details evacuated
from Greece. Those from Greece are weak in numbers and
equipment. There is no artillery. Scale of A.A. defence inadequate,
but is being reinforced.

5. As regards air force, there are at present no modern aircraft
in island.

6. Greek troops at present are mostly untrained and unarmed.

7. Difficulties are being dealt with, and will be overcome if we
get time, but air defence will always be difficult problem.

The Government of New Zealand were not unnaturally
anxious about their division. I explained the position to them
and to Mr. Fraser, their Prime Minister, who had just arrived
in Cairo on his journey to England.

Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand

3 May 41

I am very glad that the exigencies of evacuation should have
carried the New Zealand Division, after its brilliant fighting in
Greece, in such good order to Crete. Naturally, every effort will be
made to re-equip them, and in particular artillery, in which General
Wavell is already strong, is being sent. The successful defence
of Crete is one of the most important factors in the defence of
Egypt. I am very glad that General Wavell has accepted my suggestion
to put Freyberg in command of the whole island. You may
be sure we shall sustain him in every way possible.

2. Our information points to an airborne attack being delivered
in the near future, with possibly an attempt at seaborne attack.
The Navy will certainly do their utmost to prevent the latter, and
it is unlikely to succeed on any large scale. So far as airborne
attack is concerned, this ought to suit the New Zealanders down
to the ground, for they will be able to come to close quarters, man
to man, with the enemy, who will not have the advantage of tanks
and artillery, on which he so largely relies. Should the enemy get
a landing in Crete that will be the beginning, and not the end,
of embarrassments for him. The island is mountainous and wooded,
giving peculiar scope to the qualities of your troops. We can
reinforce it far more easily than the enemy, and there are over
thirty thousand men there already.

3. It may be, however, that the enemy is only feinting at Crete,
and will be going farther east. We have to consider all contingencies
in the employment of our scanty and overpressed air force.
Why is it scanty and overpressed? Not because we do not possess
ever-growing resources and reserves here. Not because we have
not done everything in human power to reinforce the Middle East
with air. It is simply because of the physical difficulties of getting
aircraft and their servicing personnel to the spot by the various
routes and methods open to us. You may be sure we shall try our
best to reinforce our air power, and we are at this moment making
very far-reaching but hazardous efforts. The disposition between
competing needs of such air forces as are in the East must be left
to the Commanders-in-Chief. I am not without hope that things
will be better in the Middle East in a month or so.

4. Everyone here admires the dignity and stoicism of New Zealand
in enduring the agonising suspense of the evacuation. Its
successful conclusion, after inflicting so much loss upon the enemy
and paying our debt of honour to Greece, is an inexpressible relief
to the Empire.

Freyberg was undaunted. He did not readily believe the
scale of air attack would be so gigantic. His fear was of powerful
organised invasion from the sea. This we hoped the Navy
would prevent in spite of our air weakness.

General Freyberg to Prime Minister, England

5 May 41

Cannot understand nervousness; am not in the least anxious
about airborne attack; have made my dispositions and feel can
cope adequately with the troops at my disposal. Combination of
seaborne and airborne attack is different. If that comes before I
can get the guns and transport here the situation will be difficult.
Even so, provided Navy can help, trust all will be well.

When we get our equipment and transport, and with a few
extra fighter aircraft, it should be possible to hold Crete. Meanwhile
there will be a period here during which we shall be vulnerable.

Everybody in great form and most anxious to renew battle with
our enemy, whom we hammered whenever we met him in Greece.

All New Zealanders greatly and justly incensed at not being
mentioned adequately in B.B.C. and press accounts of the vital
and gallant part played by them in Greek rear-guard action.

I immediately did my best to remedy the sense of injustice
from which the New Zealanders were suffering.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

7 May 41

Please pass following to General Freyberg, unless you disagree:

Everyone in Britain has watched with gratitude and admiration
the grand fighting deeds of the New Zealand Division upon the
ever-famous battlefields of Greece. It is only gradually that we have
learned and are learning the full tale, and the more the accounts
come in the more we realise the vital part you played in a task of
honour and a deed of fame. Throughout the whole Empire and
the English-speaking world the name of New Zealand is saluted.
Our thoughts are with you now. God bless you all.

* * * * *

The geography of Crete indeed made its defence problem
difficult. There was but a single road running along the north
coast, upon which were strung all the vulnerable points of the
island. Each of these had to be self-supporting. There could
be no central reserve free to move to a threatened point once
this road was cut and firmly held by the enemy. Only tracks
unfit for motor transport ran from the south coast to the north
from Sphakia and Timbaki. As the impending danger began
to dominate directing minds strong efforts were made to carry
reinforcements and supplies of weapons, especially artillery, to
the island, but it was then too late. During the second week in
May the German Air Force from its bases in Greece and in the
Aegean established a virtual daylight blockade of Crete, and
took their toll of all traffic, especially on the northern side,
where alone the harbours lay. Out of twenty-seven thousand
tons of vital munitions sent in the first three weeks of May to
Crete, under three thousand could be landed, and the rest had
to turn back with the loss of over three thousand tons. Our
strength in A.A. weapons was sixteen heavy A.A. guns (3.7-inch
mobile), thirty-six light A.A. guns (Bofors), and twenty-four
A.A. searchlights. There were only nine part-worn infantry
tanks, distributed at the airfields, and sixteen light tanks. On
May 9 a part of the Mobile Naval Base Organisation arrived,
including one heavy and one light A.A. battery, which were
deployed for the better protection of Suda Bay. Altogether
about two thousand men of this organisation landed in Crete,
but over three thousand were held back in Egypt, though they
might have got there. Six thousand Italian prisoners of war
were an additional burden to the defence.

Our defending forces were distributed principally to protect
the landing grounds. At Heraklion were two British and three
Greek battalions; about Retimo the 19th Australian Brigade
and six Greek battalions; in the neighbourhood of Suda two
Australian and two Greek battalions; at Maleme a New Zealand
brigade near the airfield and a second brigade in support
farther east. Some parties of riflemen were added to these
garrisons, consisting of temporary units of men evacuated from
Greece. The Greek battalions were weak in numbers, armed
with a mixed assortment of rifles and little ammunition. The
total of Imperial troops that took part in the defence amounted
to about 28,600.

But of course it was only our weakness in the air that rendered
the German attack possible. The R.A.F. strength early
in May was twelve Blenheims, six Hurricanes, twelve Gladiators,
and six Fulmars and Brewsters of the Fleet air arm, of
which only one-half were serviceable. These were distributed
between the Retimo landing-strip, the Maleme airfield, for
fighters only, and the Heraklion airfield, which accepted all
types. This was but a trifle compared with the overwhelming
air forces about to be hurled upon the island. Our inferiority
in the air was fully realised by all concerned, and on May 19,
the day before the attack, all remaining aircraft were evacuated
to Egypt. It was known to the War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff,
and the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East that the only
choice lay between fighting under this fearful disadvantage or
hurrying out of the island, as might have been possible in the
early days of May. But there was no difference of opinion between
any of us about facing the attack; and when we see in the
light and knowledge of the after-time how nearly, in spite of all
our shortcomings, we won, and how far-reaching were the advantages
even of our failure, we must be well content with the
risks we ran and the price we paid.

* * * * *

We may now set out the German plan of attack, which we
have learnt since the war. It was confided to the XIth
Air Corps, comprising the 7th Air Division and the 5th Mountain
Division, with the 6th Mountain Division held in support.
Nearly sixteen thousand men, mostly paratroops, were to be
landed from the air, and seven thousand by sea. Additional air
support was to be given by the Eighth Air Corps. The number
of aircraft made available was: bombers, 280; dive-bombers, 150;
fighter (M.E.109 and M.E.110), 180; reconnaissance, 40; gliders,
100; Ju.52’s (transport aircraft), 530; total, 1280.

The seaborne troops and a quantity of supplies were to be
carried in two organised convoys of Greek caiques.[1] They had
no protection except from the German Air Force. We shall
see presently what was their fate.

The air attack was planned on three areas: in the east
Heraklion; in the centre Retimo, Suda, Canea; and of course
most important, Maleme, in the west. The immediate preparation
for the attack was in general an hour’s concentrated bombing
of the ground and anti-aircraft defences with bombs of up
to a thousand pounds weight. This was to be followed by the
arrival of the leading troops in gliders and/or by parachute
descents. These again were to be followed by reinforcements
in transport aircraft. It was vital to the whole conception that
Maleme airfield should be secured. Mere landings of parachute
troops in the countryside several miles away would not have
enabled the troop-carrying airplanes to land the 6th Mountain
Division by forties and fifties and then return for further instalments.
The Germans would have to have effective and undisturbed
possession of the airfield, not only for landing but
for taking off again. Only by repeated journeys could they
bring the numbers which were the foundation of their whole
enterprise.

* * * * *

We adopted the code name “Colorado” for Crete and
“Scorcher” for the German onslaught as we imagined it.

The breathless days slipped by. They were only rendered
endurable by other cares. The hour drew near.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

12 May 41

Will you consider whether at least another dozen “I” tanks with
skilled personnel should not go to help [against] “Scorcher.”

Prime Minister to General Wavell

14 May 41

All my information points to “Scorcher” any day after seventeenth.
Everything seems to be moving in concert for that and
with great elaboration. Hope you have got enough in “Colorado,”
and that those there have the needful in cannon, machine guns,
and armoured fighting vehicles. It may well be that in so large and
complicated a plan zero date will be delayed. Therefore, reinforcements
sent now might well arrive in time, and certainly for the
second round, should enemy gain a footing. I should particularly
welcome chance for our high-class troops to come to close grips
with those people under conditions where enemy has not got his
usual mechanical advantages, and where we can surely reinforce
much easier than he can. I suppose Admiral is with you in every
detail of this, and that you and Tedder have concerted the best
possible air plan, having regard to other tasks. All good wishes.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

15 May 41

I am increasingly impressed with the weight of the attack impending
upon “Colorado,” especially from the air. Trust all possible
reinforcements have been sent.

Wavell’s good-humour did not desert him in these moments.

General Wavell to Prime Minister

15 May 41

Have done best to equip “Colorado” against beetle pest.
Recent reinforcements include six “I” tanks, sixteen light tanks,
eighteen A.A. guns, seventeen field guns, one battalion. Am preparing
small force, one or two battalions, with some tanks, to land
south side “Colorado” as reserve. Propose also holding Polish Brigade
as possible reinforcement. But problem landing reinforcements
is difficult.

2. Cunningham, Tedder, and I discussed “Colorado” May 12,
followed by inter-Service staff meeting. We have concerted plans
as far as possible.

3 “Colorado” is not easy commitment, and German blitzes usually
take some stopping. But we have stout-hearted troops, keen
and ready to fight, under resolute commander, and I hope enemy
will find their “Scorcher” red-hot proposition.

General Wavell to Prime Minister

16 May 41

Have just received following from Freyberg:

“Have completed plan for defence of Crete and have just returned
from final tour of defences. I feel greatly encouraged by
my visit. Everywhere all ranks are fit and morale is high. All defences
have been extended, and positions wired as much as possible.
We have forty-five field guns placed, with adequate ammunition
dumped. Two infantry tanks are at each aerodrome. Carriers and
transport still being unloaded and delivered. 2nd Leicesters have
arrived, and will make Heraklion stronger. I do not wish to be
overconfident, but I feel that at least we will give excellent account
of ourselves. With help of Royal Navy I trust Crete will be held.”

Prime Minister to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean

18 May 41

Our success in “Scorcher” would, of course, affect whole world
situation. May you have God’s blessing in this memorable and
fateful operation, which will react in every theatre of the war.

Prime Minister to General Freyberg

18 May 41

We are glad to hear of the strong dispositions which you have
made, and that reinforcements have reached you. All our thoughts
are with you in these fateful days. We are sure that you and your
brave men will perform a deed of lasting fame. The Royal Navy
will do its utmost. Victory where you are would powerfully affect
world situation.

I exposed my general view at this time fully to Smuts, who
was in constant contact.

Prime Minister to General Smuts

16 May 41

I am, as usual, in close sympathy and agreement with your military
outlook. I recently had measures taken to reinforce Wavell
where he was weakest, and I have hopes that we shall be successful
in heavy offensive fighting in the Western Desert during the next
few weeks. We also expect a strong attack by the enemy on Crete
almost immediately, and have made all possible preparations for
it. If favourable decisions are obtained at these two points our
problems in Syria and Iraq should be simplified. We are also
reinforcing Middle East most powerfully from the air by every
conceivable method. I have good hopes that we shall win the campaign
in the Eastern Mediterranean this summer, and maintain
our hold upon the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal. President
Roosevelt is pushing United States supplies towards Suez to the
utmost. The South African Army will be very welcome on the
Mediterranean shore.

2. The western end of the Mediterranean is more doubtful, but
Spain has hitherto stood up well to German pressure. We shall
let Darlan know at the proper time that if Vichy aircraft bomb
Gibraltar we shall not bomb France, but the Vichy skunks wherever
they may hide out. We have not overlooked the possibility of
Gibraltar Harbour becoming unusable, and have made the best
preparations open to us. Perhaps the United States may be willing
to come more closely into the West African business, especially
at Dakar.

3. Finally, the Battle of the Atlantic is going fairly well. Instead
of Hitler reaching a climax of blockade in May as he expected, we
have just finished the best six weeks of convoys for many months.
We shall certainly get increasing American help in the Atlantic,
and personally I feel confident our position will be strengthened
in all essentials before the year is out. The Americans are making
very great provision to replace shipping losses in 1942, and I feel
they are being drawn nearer and nearer to their great decision. It
is better, however, not to count too much on this.

4. It looks as if Hitler is massing against Russia. A ceaseless
movement of troops, armoured forces, and aircraft northward from
the Balkans and eastward from France and Germany is in progress.
I should myself suppose his best chance was to attack the Ukraine
and Caucasus, thus making sure of corn and oil. Nobody can stop
him doing this, but we hope to blast the Fatherland behind him
pretty thoroughly as the year marches on. I am sure that with
God’s help we shall beat the life out of the Nazi régime.

5. The King tells me he is going to send you a special message
for your birthday on May 24, so I will send my heartfelt good
wishes now.

16Crete: The Battle

The German Air Corps—The Attack Begins, May 20—Retimo
and Heraklion Held—But Maleme Lost, May 23—The Navy
Joins In—Destruction of German Convoys—Costly Days for
the Navy, but Admiral Cunningham Throws Everything into the
Scale—Loss of the “Gloucester” and the “Fiji”—“Kelly” and
“Kashmir” Sunk—A Grave Telegram from Admiral Cunningham—And
a Serious Report from General Freyberg—All
Hope of Success Gone—We Decide to Evacuate, May 26—A
Bitter and Dismal Task—Tragedy of the Heraklion Rescue—Admiral
Cunningham’s Decision to Continue the Evacuation—German
Severities on the Island Population—The Price Paid—A
Pyrrhic Victory.

In many of its aspects at the time it was fought the Battle
of Crete[1] was unique. Nothing like it had ever been seen
before. It was the first large-scale airborne attack in the annals
of war. The German Air Corps represented the flame of the
Hitler Youth Movement and was an ardent embodiment of the
Teutonic spirit of revenge for the defeat of 1918. The flower of
German manhood was expressed in these valiant, highly trained,
and completely devoted Nazi parachute troops. To lay down
their lives on the altar of German glory and world-power was
their passionate resolve. They were destined to encounter
proud soldiers many of whom had come all the way from the
other side of the world to fight as volunteers for the Motherland
and what they deemed the cause of right and freedom.
Here was the collision of which this chapter tells the tale.

The Germans used the whole strength they could command.
This was to be Goering’s prodigious air achievement. It might
have been launched upon England in 1940 if British air power
had been broken. But this expectation had not been fulfilled.
It might have fallen on Malta. But this stroke was spared us.
The German Air Corps had waited for more than seven months
to strike their blow and prove their mettle. Now at length
Goering could give them the long-awaited signal. When the
battle joined we did not know what were the total resources
of Germany in parachute troops. The XIth Air Corps
might have been only one of half a dozen such units. It was not
till many months afterwards that we were sure it was the only
one. It was in fact the spear-point of the German lance. And
this is the story of how it triumphed and was broken.

* * * * *

The battle began on the morning of May 20, and never was a
more reckless, ruthless attack launched by the Germans. Their
first and main aim was the Maleme airfield. For an hour the
surrounding positions were subjected to the heaviest bombing
and machine-gunning hitherto experienced from the air. The
bulk of our A.A. artillery was put out of action practically at
once. Before the bombardment was over, gliders began to
land west of the airfield. At 8 A.M. parachutists were dropped
in large numbers from heights varying from three hundred to
six hundred feet, in the area between Maleme and Canea. One
German regiment of four battalions in the morning, and a
second in the afternoon, were thrown in by a continuous stream
of aircraft, utterly regardless of losses to men and machines.
They were resolutely encountered on and near the airfield by
a battalion of the 5th New Zealand Brigade, with the rest of
the brigade in support to the eastward. Wherever our troops
were noticed, they were subjected to tremendous bombardment,
bombs of five hundred and even a thousand pounds
being used in profusion. Counter-attacks were impossible in
daylight. A counter-attack with only two “I” tanks proved a
failure. Gliders or troop-carriers landed or crashed on the
beaches and in the scrub or on the fireswept airfield. In all,
around and between Maleme and Canea over five thousand Germans
reached the ground on the first day. They suffered very
heavy losses from the fire and fierce hand-to-hand fighting of
the New Zealanders. In our defended area practically all who
alighted were accounted for, most being killed. At the end of
the day we were still in possession of the airfield, but that evening
the few who were left of the battalion fell back on its supports.
Two companies sent up to reinforce were too late to
make a counter-attack for the airfield, which was still, however,
under our artillery fire.

Retimo and Heraklion were both treated to a heavy air bombardment
on that morning, followed by parachute drops in the
afternoon of two and four battalions respectively. Heavy fighting
followed, but at nightfall we remained in firm possession of
both airfields. At Retimo and Heraklion there were also descents
on a smaller scale, with hard fighting and heavy German
casualties. The result of this first day’s fighting was, therefore,
fairly satisfactory, except at Maleme; but in every sector bands
of well-armed men were now at large. The strength of the
attacks far exceeded the expectations of the British command,
and the fury of our resistance astonished the enemy.

This was the report we got:

General Freyberg to General Wavell

20 May 41

Today has been a hard one. We have been hard pressed. So
far, I believe, we hold aerodromes at Retimo, Heraklion, and
Maleme, and the two harbours. Margin by which we hold them
is a bare one, and it would be wrong of me to paint optimistic
picture. Fighting has been heavy and we have killed large numbers
of Germans. Communications are most difficult. Scale of air
attacks upon Canea has been severe. Everybody here realises vital
issue and we will fight it out.

The onslaught continued on the second day, when troop-carrying
aircraft again appeared. Although Maleme airfield
remained under our close artillery and mortar fire,
troop-carriers continued to land upon it and in the rough
ground to the west. The German High Command seemed
indifferent to losses, and at least a hundred planes were wrecked
by crash-landing in this area. Nevertheless, the build-up continued.
A counter-attack made that night reached the edge of
the airfield, but with daylight the German Air Force reappeared
and the gains could not be held.

On the third day Maleme became an effective operational
airfield for the enemy. Troop-carriers continued to arrive at
a rate of more than twenty an hour. Even more decisive was
the fact that they could also return for reinforcements. Altogether
it was estimated that in these and the ensuing days
more than six hundred troop-carriers landed or crashed more
or less successfully on the airfield. Under the increasing
pressure of these growing forces the plan for a major counter-attack
had finally to be abandoned, and the 5th New Zealand
Brigade gradually gave way until they were nearly ten miles
from Maleme. At Canea and Suda there was no change, and at
Retimo the situation was well in hand. At Heraklion the
enemy were landing east of the airfield, and an effective hostile
lodgment there began and grew. After the opening attacks on
May 20 the German High Command switched off Retimo and
Heraklion and concentrated mainly on the Suda Bay area.

* * * * *

Air reconnaissance having reported the presence of caiques
in the Aegean, Admiral Cunningham had on the twentieth
dispatched a light force to the northwest of Crete. It consisted
of the cruisers Naiad and Perth, and the destroyers Kandahar,
Nubian, Kingston, and Juno, under the command of Rear-Admiral
King.

A powerful force under Rear-Admiral Rawlings, consisting
of the battleships Warspite and Valiant, screened by eight destroyers,
lay to the west of Crete on the lookout for the expected
intervention by the Italian Fleet. Throughout the twenty-first
our ships were subjected to heavy air attacks. The destroyer
Juno was hit, and sank in two minutes with heavy loss of life.
The cruisers Ajax and Orion were also damaged, but continued
in action.

That night our weary troops saw to the northward the whole
skyline alive with flashes and knew the Royal Navy was at
work. The first German seaborne convoy had started on its
desperate mission. In the afternoon groups of small craft were
reported approaching Crete, and Admiral Cunningham ordered
his light forces into the Aegean to prevent landings during the
darkness. At 11.30 P.M., eighteen miles north of Canea, Rear-Admiral
Glennie, with the cruisers Dido, Orion, and Ajax and
four destroyers, caught the German troop convoy, composed
chiefly of caiques escorted by torpedo boats. For two and a half
hours the British ships hunted their prey, sinking not less than
a dozen caiques and three steamers, all crowded with German
troops. It was estimated that about four thousand men were
drowned that night.

* * * * *

Meanwhile Rear-Admiral King, with the cruisers Naiad,
Perth, Calcutta, and Carlisle and three destroyers, spent the
night of the twenty-first patrolling off Heraklion, and at daylight
on the twenty-second began to sweep northward. A single
caique loaded with troops was destroyed, and by ten o’clock the
squadron was approaching the island of Melos. A few minutes
later an enemy destroyer with five small craft was sighted to the
northward, and was at once engaged. Another destroyer was
then seen laying a smoke-screen, and behind the smoke were a
large number of caiques. We had in fact intercepted another
important convoy crammed with soldiers. Our air reconnaissance
had reported this fact to Admiral Cunningham, but it
took more than an hour for this news to be confirmed to Rear-Admiral
King. His ships had been under incessant air attack
since daylight, and although they had hitherto suffered no
damage all were running short of A.A. ammunition. Their
combine speed was also reduced, as the Carlisle could steam
no more than twenty-one knots. The Rear-Admiral, not fully
realising the prize which was almost within his grasp, felt that to
go farther north would jeopardise his whole force, and ordered
a withdrawal to the west. As soon as this signal was read by the
Commander-in-Chief, he sent the following order:

Stick it out. Keep in visual signalling touch. Must not let Army
down in Crete. It is essential no seaborne enemy force land in
Crete.

* * * * *

It was now too late to destroy the convoy, which had turned
back and scattered in all directions among the numerous
islands. Thus at least five thousand German soldiers escaped
the fate of their comrades. The audacity of the German
authorities in ordering these practically defenceless convoys
of troops across waters of which they did not possess the naval
command as well as that of the air is a sample of what might
have happened on a gigantic scale in the North Sea and the
English Channel in September, 1940. It shows the German
lack of comprehension of sea power against invading forces,
and also the price which may be exacted in human life as the
penalty for this kind of ignorance.

* * * * *

The Rear-Admiral’s retirement did not save his squadron
from the air attack. He probably suffered as much loss in his
withdrawal as he would have done in destroying the convoy.
For the next three and a half hours his ships were bombed
continuously. His flagship, the Naiad, and the Carlisle, whose
commander, Captain T. C. Hampton, was killed, were both
damaged. At 1.10 P.M. they were met by the battleships
Warspite and Valiant, with the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji and
seven destroyers under Rear-Admiral Rawlings, who were
hastening through the Cythera Strait from the westward to
support them. Almost at the moment when the Warspite
arrived, she was hit by a bomb which wrecked her starboard
four-inch and six-inch batteries and reduced her speed, and as
the enemy had now escaped, the combined British squadrons
drew off to the southwestward. Inflexibly resolved, whatever
the cost, to destroy all seaborne invaders. Admiral Cunningham
had indeed thrown everything into the scale. It is clear
that throughout these operations he did not hesitate for this
purpose to hazard not only his most precious ships, but the
whole naval command of the Eastern Mediterranean. His conduct
on this issue was highly approved by the Admiralty. In
this grim battle the German command was not alone in playing
the highest stakes. The events of these forty-eight hours of sea-fighting
convinced the enemy, and no further attempts at seaborne
landings were attempted until the fate of Crete had been
decided.

* * * * *

May 22 and 23 were costly days for the Navy. The destroyer
Greyhound in Rear-Admiral Rawlings’s squadron was bombed
and sunk. Rear-Admiral King, senior officer of the now combined
forces, ordered two other destroyers to rescue survivors
and the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji to protect them against
air attack, which was incessant and increasing. This delayed
the whole fleet and greatly prolonged the air attack upon them.
At 2.57 P.M. on the twenty-second, Rear-Admiral King, informed
that their A.A. ammunition was running short, told the
two cruisers to withdraw at discretion. At 3.30 P.M. the
Gloucester and Fiji were reported approaching the fleet from
astern at high speed under heavy aircraft attack. Twenty
minutes later the Gloucester, hit by several bombs, was brought
to a full stop, badly on fire, and with her upper deck a shambles.
The Fiji had no choice but to leave her, and, having lost contact
with the Fleet and being short of fuel, she steered more
directly towards Alexandria with her two destroyers. Three
hours later, after surviving nearly twenty attacks by formations
of bombers and having fired all her heavy A.A. ammunition,
she fell a victim to an M.E.109 which approached unseen
through the clouds. There was a heavy explosion. The ship
took a list, but still made seventeen knots, until another attack
came and three more bombs struck home. At 8.15 P.M. she
capsized and sank, but 523 out of her company of 780 were
picked up from the water by her two destroyers, which returned
after dark.

* * * * *

Meanwhile the Fleet, twenty miles to the westward, had
been subjected to recurrent air attacks, during which the
Valiant was hit, but not seriously damaged. At 4 P.M. Captain
Lord Louis Mountbatten, in the Kelly, with four other destroyers
of the latest type, with which flotilla we had just reinforced
the Central Mediterranean, arrived from Malta and joined the
Fleet. After dark his destroyers were sent back to search for
survivors from the Gloucester and Fiji. But this work of mercy
was brushed aside by the Commander-in-Chief in favour of
patrolling the north coast of Crete during the dark hours. Here
again was a right decision, however painful. All the night of the
twenty-second Mountbatten’s destroyers patrolled off Canea,
while Captain Mack in the Jervis and three others scoured the
approaches to Heraklion. One caique crowded with troops fell
to the Kelly, another was set on fire, and at dawn the destroyers
withdrew to the southward.

During the night Admiral Cunningham learned the general
situation and of the loss of the Gloucester and Fiji. Owing to
a clerical error in the signal distribution office at Alexandria it
appeared to him as if not only the cruisers, but the battleships
also, had expended nearly all their A.A. ammunition. At 4 A.M.,
therefore, he ordered all forces to retire to the eastward. In
fact the battleships had ample ammunition, and Cunningham
has stated since that had he known this he would not have
withdrawn them. Their presence the following morning might
possibly have prevented another disaster which must now be
recorded.

At dawn on the twenty-third the Kelly and Kashmir were
retiring at full speed round the west of Crete. After surviving
two heavy air attacks they were overtaken at 7.55 A.M. by a
formation of twenty-four dive bombers. Both ships were quickly
sunk, with a loss of 210 lives. Fortunately the destroyer Kipling
was near by, and, despite continuous bombing, rescued from
the sea 279 officers and men, including Lord Louis Mountbatten,
while she herself remained unscathed. Next morning,
while still fifty miles away from Alexandria, and crowded from
stem to stern with men, she ran completely out of fuel, but was
safely met and towed in.

* * * * *

Thus, in the fighting of May 22 and 23 the Navy had lost
two cruisers and three destroyers sunk, one battleship, the
Warspite, put out of action for a long time, and the Valiant
and many other units considerably damaged. Nevertheless, the
sea-guard of Crete had been maintained. The Navy had not
failed. Not a single German landed in Crete from the sea until
the battle for the island was ended.

The Commander-in-Chief did not know as yet how well he
had succeeded.

The operations of the last four days [he signalled on the twenty-third]
have been nothing short of a trial of strength between the
Mediterranean Fleet and the German Air Force. . . . I am afraid
that in the coastal area we have to admit defeat and accept the fact
that losses are too great to justify us in trying to prevent seaborne
attacks on Crete. This is a melancholy conclusion, but it must
be faced. As I have always feared, enemy command of air, unchallenged
by our own air force, and in these restricted waters, with
Mediterranean weather, is too great odds for us to take on except
by seizing opportunities of surprise and using utmost circumspection. . . .

It is perhaps fortunate that H.M.S. Formidable [aircraft-carrier]
was immobilised, as I doubt if she would now be afloat.

To this the Admiralty replied at once:

If it were only a duel between the Mediterranean Fleet and the
German Air Force, it would probably be necessary to accept the
restrictions on the movements of the Fleet which you suggest.
There is, however, in addition the battle for Crete. If the Fleet can
prevent seaborne reinforcements and supplies reaching the enemy
until the Army has had time to deal successfully with all airborne
troops, the Army may then be able to deal with seaborne attacks.
It is vitally important therefore to prevent a seaborne expedition
reaching the island during the next day or two, even if this results
in further losses to the Fleet. Their Lordships most fully appreciate
the heavy strain under which your fleet is working.

As the agony in Crete approached its climax, I telegraphed
to President Roosevelt:

23 May 41

Battle in Crete is severe, because, having no airfields within
effective range, we cannot bring any air force into action either
to aid the defence or protect our patrolling squadrons. Two of our
cruisers and two destroyers were sunk today. We are destroying
many of the highest class German troops, and have sunk at least
one convoy.

And to Wavell:

23 May 41

Crete battle must be won. Even if enemy secure good lodgments
fighting must be maintained indefinitely in the island, thus keeping
enemy main striking force tied down to the task. This will at
least give you time to mobilise “Tiger Cubs” and dominate situation
Western Desert. While it lasts it also protects Cyprus. Hope
you will reinforce Crete every night to fullest extent. Is it not
possible to send more tanks and thus reconquer any captured aerodrome?
Enemy’s exertions and losses in highest class troops must
be very severe. He cannot keep it up for ever. Following for General
Freyberg from me: “The whole world is watching your splendid
battle, on which great events turn.”

The Chiefs of Staff were in full accord, and telegraphed to
the Commanders-in-Chief:

24 May 41

Our difficulties in Crete are great, but from all the information
we have so are those of enemy. If we stick it out enemy’s effort may
peter out. It seems to us imperative that reinforcements in greatest
strength possible should be sent as soon as possible to island to
ensure the destruction of the enemy already landed before they
can be seriously reinforced. The vital importance of this battle is
well known to you, and great risks must be accepted to ensure our
success.

Admiral Cunningham replied to the Admiralty message of
the twenty-third:

C.-in-C. Mediterranean to Admiralty

26 May 41

Their Lordships may rest assured that determining factor in
operating in Aegean is not fear of sustaining losses, but need to
avoid loss which, without commensurate advantage to ourselves,
will cripple Fleet out here. So far as I am aware, enemy has not
yet succeeded in getting any considerable reinforcements to Crete
by sea, if indeed he has sent any at all, though I agree this may
soon be appreciable.

2. Surely we have already sufficient experience of what losses are
likely to be. In three days two cruisers and four destroyers were
sunk, one battleship is out of action for several months, and two
other cruisers and four destroyers sustained considerable damage.
We cannot afford another such experience and retain sea control
in Eastern Mediterranean.

3. In point of fact, supply by sea has not yet come much into
picture, as, despite loss and turning back of his convoys, enemy is
so prolific in air that for the moment he is able to reinforce and
keep his forces supplied by air at will. This process is quite unchecked
by air action on our part, and sight of constant unhindered
procession of Ju. 52’s flying into Crete is among factors
likely to affect morale of our forces.

4. I feel that their Lordships should know that effect of recent
operations on personnel is cumulative. Our light craft, officers,
men, and machinery alike are nearing exhaustion. Since “Lustre”
[Greece] started, at end of February, they have been kept running
almost to limit of endurance, and now, when work is redoubled,
they are faced with an air concentration beside which, I am assured,
that in Norway was child’s play. It is inadvisable to drive
men beyond a certain point.

5. I have been able to do rather more than was foreshadowed.
Each night destroyers and cruisers sweep north coast of Crete, we
have bombarded Maleme, and this morning attacked Scarpanto.
Melos is also receiving attention from a submarine. . . . I have not,
however, yet received reinforcements of reconnaissance aircraft
which I so earnestly requested.

6. Since writing above I learn H.M.S. Formidable and H.M.S.
Nubian have been hit by bombs and are returning to harbour. I
have no details.

Still heavier trials lay before this resolute Commander-in-Chief,
to which he proved himself more than equal.

* * * * *

But now late on the twenty-sixth grave news reached Wavell
from Freyberg.

I regret to have to report [said Freyberg] that in my opinion the
limit of endurance has been reached by the troops under my command
here at Suda Bay. No matter what decision is taken by the
Commanders-in-Chief from a military point of view, our position
here is hopeless. A small ill-equipped and immobile force such
as ours cannot stand up against the concentrated bombing that we
have been faced with during the last seven days. I feel I should
tell you that from an administrative point of view the difficulties
of extricating this force in full are insuperable. Provided a decision
is reached at once, a certain proportion of the force might be
embarked. Once this section has been reduced the reduction of
Retimo and Heraklion by the same methods will only be a matter
of time. The troops we have, with the exception of the Welsh
Regiment and the commandos, are past any offensive action. If
you decide, in view of the whole Middle-East position, that hours
will help we will carry on. I would have to consider how this
would be best achieved. Suda Bay may be under fire within twenty-four
hours. Further casualties have been heavy, and we have
lost the majority of our immobile guns.

To Freyberg I telegraphed:

27 May 41

Your glorious defence commands admiration in every land. We
know enemy is hard pressed. All aid in our power is being sent.

Prime Minister to Commanders-in-Chief Middle East

27 May 41

Victory in Crete essential at this turning-point in the war. Keep
hurling in all aid you can.

* * * * *

But that night we learned that all hope of success was gone.

General Wavell to Prime Minister

27 May 41

Fear that situation in Crete most serious. Canea front has collapsed
and Suda Bay only likely to be covered for another twenty-four
hours, if as long. There is no possibility of hurling in reinforcements. . . .

2. On the island itself our troops, majority of whom had most
severe trial in Greece from overwhelming air attack, have been
subjected to same conditions on steadily increasing scale in Crete.
Such continuous and unopposed air attack must drive stoutest
troops from positions sooner or later and makes administration
practically impossible.

3. Telegram just received from Freyberg states only chance of
survival of force in Suda area is to withdraw to beaches in south of
island, hiding by day and moving by night. Force at Retimo reported
cut off and short of supplies. Force at Heraklion also
apparently almost surrounded.

4. Fear we must recognise that Crete is no longer tenable and
that troops must be withdrawn as far as possible. It has been impossible
to withstand weight of enemy air attack, which has been
on unprecedented scale and has been through force of circumstances
practically unopposed.

* * * * *

On the fourth day of the land battle General Freyberg had
formed a new line in the Maleme-Canea sector. Thanks to
the free use of the airfield, the Germans’ strength grew continually.
May 26 was the decisive day. Our troops forced back
in the neighbourhood of Canea had been under ever-growing
pressure for six days. Finally they could stand it no more. The
front was broken on the landward side and the enemy reached
Suda Bay. Communication with Freyberg’s headquarters failed,
and retirement southward across the island to Sphakia began
on his delegated authority. Late that night the decision to
evacuate Crete was taken. There was much confusion on the
trek across the mountains. Fortunately two commandos, about
seven hundred and fifty men, under Colonel Laycock, had been
landed at Suda by the minelayer Abdiel on the night of the
twenty-sixth. These comparatively fresh forces, with the remains
of the 5th New Zealand Brigade and the 7th and 8th
Australian battalions, fought a strong rear-guard action, which
enabled almost the whole of our forces in the Suda-Canea-Maleme
area that still survived to make their way to the
southern shore.

At Retimo the position was firmly held, although the troops
were completely surrounded on the landward side and food
and ammunition ran low. They received some rations by
motor craft, but no orders to break for the south coast could
reach them. Steadily the enemy closed in, until on the thirtieth,
with their food exhausted, the survivors surrendered, having
killed at least three hundred Germans. About one hundred
and forty individuals contrived their escape.

At Heraklion the German strength east of the airfield grew
daily. The garrison had been reinforced by part of the Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders, who had landed at Timbaki and
fought their way through to join them. The Navy now came
to the rescue, just in time.

* * * * *

We had to face once again the bitter and dismal task of an
evacuation and the certainty of heavy losses. The harassed,
overstrained Fleet had to undertake the embarking of about
twenty-two thousand men, mostly from the open beach at
Sphakia, across three hundred and fifty miles of sea dominated
by hostile air forces. The Royal Air Force had done their best
from Egypt with the few aircraft which had the necessary range.
The principal target was the enemy-held Maleme airfield,
which received a number of bombing attacks both by day and
night. While these operations threw a heavy strain on the
crews, their necessarily small scale could not have any appreciable
effect. Air Marshal Tedder promised to provide some
fighter cover for the ships, but this, he warned us, would be
meagre and spasmodic. Sphakia, a small fishing village on the
south coast, lies at the foot of a steep cliff five hundred feet high
traversed only by a precipitous goat track. It was necessary for
the troops to hide near the edge until called forward for embarkation.
Four destroyers, under Captain Arliss, arrived on
the night of the twenty-eighth and embarked seven hundred
men, besides bringing food for the very large numbers now
gathering. Fighter protection was available for the return
voyage, which was made with only minor damage to one
destroyer. At least fifteen thousand men lay concealed in the
broken ground near Sphakia, and Freyberg’s rear guard was
in constant action.

A tragedy awaited the simultaneous expedition by Rear-Admiral
Rawlings, which, with the cruisers Orion, Ajax, and Dido
and six destroyers, went to rescue the Heraklion garrison. His
force was under severe air attack from Scarpanto from 5 P.M. till
dark.The Ajax and the destroyer Imperial were near-missed,
and the former had to return. Arriving at Heraklion before
midnight, the destroyers ferried the troops to the cruisers waiting
outside. By 3.20 A.M. the work was complete. Four
thousand men had been embarked and the return voyage
began. Half an hour later the steering gear of the damaged
Imperial suddenly failed, and collision with the cruisers was
narrowly averted. It was imperative that the whole force should
be as far as possible to the south by daylight. Rear-Admiral
Rawlings nevertheless decided to order the destroyer Hotspur
to return, take off all the Imperial’s troops and crew, and sink
her. He himself reduced speed to fifteen knots, and the
Hotspur, carrying nine hundred soldiers, rejoined him just
before daylight. He was now an hour and a half late on his
time-table, and it was not until sunrise that he turned south to
pass through the Kaso Strait. Fighter protection had been
arranged, but partly through the change in times the aircraft
did not find the ships. The dreaded bombing began at 6 A.M.,
and continued until 3 P.M., when the squadron was within a
hundred miles of Alexandria.

The Hereward was the first casualty. At 6.25 A.M. she was
hit by a bomb and could no longer keep up with the convoy.
The Admiral rightly decided that he must leave the stricken
ship to her fate. She was last seen approaching the coast of
Crete. The majority of those on board survived, though as
prisoners of war. Worse was to follow. During the next four
hours the cruisers Dido and Orion and the destroyer Decoy
were all hit. The speed of the squadron fell to twenty-one
knots, but all kept their southerly course in company. In the
Orion conditions were appalling. Besides her own crew, she
had 1100 troops on board. On her crowded mess-decks about
260 men were killed and 280 wounded by a bomb which penetrated
the bridge. Her commander, Captain G. R. B. Back,
was also killed, the ship heavily damaged and set on fire. At
noon two Fulmars of the Fleet air arm appeared, and thereafter
afforded a measure of relief. The fighters of the Royal Air
Force, despite all efforts, could not find the tortured squadron,
though they fought several engagements and destroyed at least
two aircraft. When the squadron reached Alexandria at 8 P.M.
on the twenty-ninth it was found that one-fifth of the garrison
rescued from Heraklion had been killed, wounded, or captured.

* * * * *

We have seen how hard the Commanders-in-Chief in Cairo
were pressed from home both by the political and military
authorities, and much of this pressure was passed on to our
forces in contact with the enemy, who responded nobly. But
after the experiences of the twenty-ninth, General Wavell and
his colleagues had to decide how far the effort to bring our
troops off from Crete should be pursued. The Army was in
mortal peril, the Air could do little, and again the task fell
upon the wearied and bomb-torn Navy. To Admiral Cunningham
it was against all tradition to abandon the Army in such
a crisis. He declared, “It takes the Navy three years to build a
new ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new
tradition. The evacuation [that is, rescue] will continue.” But
it was only after much heart-searching and after consultation
both with the Admiralty and General Wavell that the decision
was taken to persevere. By the morning of the twenty-ninth
nearly five thousand men had been brought off, but very large
numbers were holding out and sheltering on all the approaches
to Sphakia, and were bombed whenever they showed themselves
by day. The decision to risk unlimited further naval
losses was justified, not only in its impulse but by the results.

On the evening of the twenty-eighth, Rear-Admiral King had
sailed, with the Phoebe, Perth, Calcutta, Coventry, the assault-ship
Glengyle, and three destroyers, for Sphakia. On the night
of the twenty-ninth about six thousand men were embarked
there without interference, the Glengyle's landing-craft greatly
helping the work. By 3.20 A.M. the whole body was on its way
back, and, though attacked three times during the thirtieth,
reached Alexandria safely. Only the cruiser Perth was
damaged, by a hit in a boiler-room. This good luck was due to
the R.A.F. fighters, who, few though they were, broke up more
than one attack before they struck home. It was thought that
the night of the twenty-ninth-thirtieth would be the last for
trying, but during the twenty-ninth it was felt that the situation
was less desperate than it had seemed. Accordingly, on the
morning of the thirtieth, Captain Arliss once more sailed for
Sphakia, with four destroyers. Two of these had to return, but
he continued with the Napier and Nizam (a destroyer given to
us by the Prince and people of Hyderabad), and successfully
embarked over fifteen hundred troops. Both ships were
damaged by near-misses on the return voyage, but reached
Alexandria safely. The King of Greece, after many perils, had
been brought off with the British Minister a few days earlier.
That night also General Freyberg was evacuated by air on instructions
from the Commanders-in-Chief.

On May 30 a final effort was ordered to bring out the remaining
troops. It was thought that the numbers at Sphakia did not
now exceed three thousand men, but later information showed
that there were more than double that number. Rear-Admiral
King sailed again on the morning of the thirty-first, with the
Phoebe, Abdiel, and three destroyers. They could not hope to
carry all, but Admiral Cunningham ordered the ships to be
filled to the utmost. At the same time the Admiralty were told
that this would be the last night of evacuation. The embarkation
went well, and the ships sailed again at 3 A.M. on June 1,
carrying nearly four thousand troops safely to Alexandria. The
cruiser Calcutta, sent out to help them in, was bombed and
sunk within a hundred miles of Alexandria.

Upward of five thousand British and Imperial troops were
left somewhere in Crete, and were authorised by General
Wavell to capitulate. Many individuals, however, dispersed in
the mountainous island, which is a hundred and sixty miles
long. They and the Greek soldiers were succoured by the
villagers and country folk, who were mercilessly punished
whenever detected. Barbarous reprisals were made upon innocent
or valiant peasants, who were shot by twenties and thirties.
It was for this reason that I proposed to the Supreme War
Council three years later, in 1944, that local crimes should be
locally judged, and the accused persons sent back for trial on
the spot. This principle was accepted, and some of the outstanding
debts were paid.

* * * * *

Sixteen thousand five hundred men were brought safely back
to Egypt. These were almost entirely British and Imperial
troops. Nearly a thousand more were helped to escape later by
various commando enterprises. Our losses were about thirteen
thousand killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. To these must
be added nearly two thousand naval casualties. Since the war
more than four thousand German graves have been counted in
the area of Maleme and Suda Bay; another thousand at Retimo
and Heraklion. Besides these were the very large but unknown
numbers drowned at sea, and those who later died of wounds in
Greece. In all, the enemy must have suffered casualties in
killed and wounded of well over fifteen thousand. About a
hundred and seventy troop-carrying aircraft were lost or heavily
damaged. But the price they paid for their victory cannot be
measured by the slaughter.

* * * * *

The Battle of Crete is an example of the decisive results that
may emerge from hard and well-sustained fighting apart from
manoeuvring for strategic positions. We did not know how
many parachute divisions the Germans had. Indeed, as the
result of what happened in Crete, we made preparations, as will
presently be described, for home defence against four or five
of these audacious airborne divisions; and later still we and
the Americans reproduced them ourselves on an even larger
scale. But in fact the 7th Airborne Division was the only one
which Goering had. This division was destroyed in the Battle
of Crete. Upward of five thousand of his bravest men were
killed, and the whole structure of this organisation was irretrievably
broken. It never appeared again in any effective form.
The New Zealanders and other British, Imperial, and Greek
troops who fought in the confused, disheartening, and vain
struggle for Crete may feel that they played a definite part in
an event which brought us far-reaching relief at a hingeing
moment.

The German losses of their highest class fighting men removed
a formidable air and parachute weapon from all further
part in immediate events in the Middle East. Goering gained
only a Pyrrhic victory in Crete; for the forces he expended
there might easily have given him Cyprus, Iraq, Syria, and even
perhaps Persia. These troops were the very kind needed to
overrun large wavering regions where no serious resistance
would have been encountered. He was foolish to cast away such
almost measureless opportunities and irreplaceable forces in a
mortal struggle, often hand-to-hand, with the warriors of the
British Empire.

We now have in our possession the “battle report” of the
XIth Air Corps, of which the 7th Airborne Division was
a part. When we recall the severe criticism and self-criticism to
which our arrangements were subjected, it is interesting to read
the other side.

British land forces in Crete [said the Germans] were about three
times the strength which had been assumed. The area of operations
on the island had been prepared for defence with the greatest
care and by every possible means. . . . All works were camouflaged
with great skill. . . . The failure, owing to lack of information, to
appreciate correctly the enemy situation endangered the attack of
the XIth Air Corps and resulted in exceptionally high and bloody
losses.

In the German report of their examination of our prisoners
of war the following note occurs, which, in my gratitude to
those unknown friends, I venture to quote:

As regards the spirit and morale of the British troops, it is worth
mentioning that in spite of the many setbacks to the conduct of
the war there remains, generally, absolute confidence in Churchill.

* * * * *

The naval position in the Mediterranean was, on paper at
least, gravely affected by our losses in the battle and evacuation
of Crete. The Battle of Matapan on March 28 had for the time
being driven the Italian Fleet into its harbours. But now new,
heavy losses had fallen upon our Fleet. On the morrow of
Crete Admiral Cunningham had ready for service only two
battleships, three cruisers, and seventeen destroyers. Nine other
cruisers and destroyers were under repair in Egypt, but the
battleships Warspite and Barham and his only aircraft-carrier,
the Formidable, besides several other vessels, would have to
leave Alexandria for repair elsewhere. Three cruisers and six
destroyers had been lost. Reinforcements must be sent without
delay to restore the balance. But, as will presently be recorded,
still further misfortunes were in store. The period which we
now had to face offered to the Italians their best chance of
challenging our dubious control of the Eastern Mediterranean,
with all that this involved. We could not tell they would not
seize it.

17The Fate of the “Bismarck”

Danger in the Atlantic—The “Bismarck” and “Prinz Eugen” at
Sea, May 20—The Denmark Strait—The Destruction of the
“Hood,” May 24—The “Bismarck” Turns South—Suspense
at Chequers—The “Prinz Eugen” Escapes—Torpedo Hit on
“Bismarck” at Midnight—Contact Lost on May 25—But Regained
on the Twenty-Sixth—Shortage of Fuel—The “Sheffield”
and the “Ark Royal”—The “Bismarck” Out of Control—Captain
Vian’s Destroyers—“Rodney” Strikes, May 27—My
Report to the House—Credit for All—My Telegram to
President Roosevelt.

After the Greek collapse, while all was uncertain in the
Western Desert, and the desperate battle in Crete was
turning heavily against us, a naval episode of the highest consequence
supervened in the Atlantic.

Besides the constant struggle with the U-boats, surface raiders
had already cost us over three-quarters of a million tons of shipping.
The two enemy battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau and the cruiser Hipper remained poised at Brest
under the protection of their powerful A.A. batteries, and no
one could tell when they would again molest our trade routes.
By the middle of May there were signs that the new battleship
Bismarck, possibly accompanied by the new eight-inch-gun
cruiser Prinz Eugen, would soon be thrown into the fight. A
combination of all these fast, powerful vessels in the great
spaces of the Atlantic Ocean would subject our naval strength
to a trial of the first magnitude. The Bismarck, mounting
eight fifteen-inch guns, and built regardless of treaty limitations,
was the most heavily armoured ship afloat. Her displacement
exceeded that of our newest battleships by nearly ten
thousand tons, and she was at least their equal in speed. “You
are the pride of the Navy,” said Hitler when he visited her in
May.

To meet this impending menace the Commander-in-Chief,
Admiral Tovey, had at Scapa our new battleships, King George
V and Prince of Wales, and the battle-cruiser Hood. At
Gibraltar lay Admiral Somerville with the Renown and Ark
Royal. The Repulse and the new carrier Victorious were at
this moment about to sail with a convoy of more than twenty
thousand men for the Middle East. The Rodney and Ramillies,
which the Bismarck could probably have sunk had she met
either of them singly, were on convoy escort in the Atlantic, and
the Revenge was at Halifax ready to sail. In all at this time
eleven convoys, including a precious troop convoy, with its risk
of fearful loss of life, were at sea or about to sail. Cruiser patrols
covered the exits from the North Sea and vigilant air reconnaissance
watched the Norwegian coast. The naval situation
was both obscure and tense, and the Admiralty, with whom I
was in constant touch, became conscious of something coming,
and also, acutely, of our full-spread target of merchant shipping.

In the early hours of May 21 we learned that two large warships
had been seen leaving the Kattegat with a strong escort,
and later the same day both the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen
were identified in Bergen Fiord. Clearly some important operation
impended, and instantly our whole Atlantic control apparatus
flashed into intense activity. The Admiralty pursued
the sound and orthodox principle of concentrating upon the
raiders and running risks with the convoys, including even the
troop convoy. The Hood, with the Prince of Wales and six
destroyers, left Scapa soon after midnight on the twenty-second
to cover the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, already on patrol in
the dreary, icebound stretch of water between Greenland and
Iceland known as the Denmark Strait. The cruisers Manchester
and Birmingham were ordered to guard the channel between
Iceland and the Faroes. The Repulse and Victorious were
placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, and the
troop convoy was allowed to sail naked, except for destroyer
escorts, from the Clyde.

Thursday, May 22, was a day of uncertainty and suspense.
In the North Sea all was unbroken cloud and rain. In spite of
these conditions a naval aircraft from Hatston (Orkney) penetrated
into Bergen Fiord and forced home a determined reconnaissance
in the teeth of heavy fire. The two enemy warships
were no longer there! When at 8 P.M. this news reached Admiral
Tovey he at once set forth in the King George V, with the
Victorious, four cruisers, and seven destroyers, to take up a
central position to the westward so as to support his cruiser
patrols whichever side of Iceland the enemy might choose. The
Repulse joined him at sea the following morning. The Admiralty
judged it probable that the enemy would pass through the
Denmark Strait. That evening, within a few minutes of
receiving the report, I telegraphed to President Roosevelt:

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

23 May 41

Yesterday, twenty-first, Bismarck, Prinz Eugen, and eight merchant
ships located in Bergen. Low clouds prevented air attack.
Tonight [we find] they have sailed. We have reason to believe that
a formidable Atlantic raid is intended. Should we fail to catch
them going out, your Navy should surely be able to mark them
down for us. King George V, Prince of Wales, Hood, Repulse, and
aircraft-carrier Victorious, with ancillary vessels, will be on their
track. Give us the news and we will finish the job.

The Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen had in fact left Bergen
nearly twenty-four hours before, and were now to the northeast
of Iceland, heading for the Denmark Strait. Here the pack-ice
had narrowed the strait to only eighty miles, mostly
shrouded in dense mist. Towards evening on the twenty-third
first the Suffolk and then the Norfolk sighted two ships
approaching from the north, skirting the edge of the ice in a
patch of clear weather. The Norfolk’s sighting report was
received first in the Admiralty, and was at once broadcast in
secret code to all concerned. The hunt was on; the quarry was
in view; and all our forces moved accordingly. The Commander-in-Chief
turned to the westward and increased his
speed. The Hood and the Prince of Wales shaped their course
to intercept the enemy at daylight the next morning west of
Iceland. The Admiralty called Admiral Somerville, with Force
H (Renown, Ark Royal, and the cruiser Sheffield), northward
at high speed to protect the troop convoy, now more than
halfway down the Irish coast, or join in the battle. Admiral
Somerville’s ships, already under steam, left Gibraltar at 2 A.M.
on the twenty-fourth. They carried with them, as it turned out,
the Bismarck’s fate.

* * * * *

I went to Chequers on Friday afternoon (May 23). Averell
Harriman and Generals Ismay and Pownall were to be with me
till Monday. With the Battle of Crete at its height it was likely
to be an anxious week-end. I had, of course, a most complete
service of secretaries in the house, and also direct telephone
connections with the duty captain at the Admiralty and other
key departments. The Admiralty expected the Bismarck and
the Prinz Eugen to come through the Denmark Strait in the
early dawn, and that the Prince of Wales and the Hood, with
two or three cruisers, would bring them to battle. All our ships
were moving towards the scene in accordance with the general
plan. We spent an anxious evening, and did not go to bed
until two or three o’clock.

At about seven I was awakened to hear formidable news.
The Hood, our largest and also our fastest capital ship, had
blown up. Although somewhat lightly constructed, she carried
eight fifteen-inch guns, and was one of our most cherished
naval possessions. Her loss was a bitter grief, but knowing of
all the ships that were converging towards the Bismarck I felt
sure we should get her before long, unless she turned north and
went home. I went straight to Harriman’s room at the
end of the corridor, and, according to him, said, “The
Hood has blown up, but we have got the Bismarck for certain.”
I then returned to my room, and was so well tired out that I
went to sleep again. At about half-past eight my principal
private secretary, Martin, came into the room in his dressing-gown
with a strained look on his ascetic, clear-cut face. “Have
we got her?” I asked. “No, and the Prince of Wales has broken
off the action.” This was a sharp disappointment. Had then
the Bismarck turned north and gone home? Here was my
great fear. We now know what happened.

* * * * *

All that night (May 23-24), amidst driving rain and snow,
the Norfolk and Suffolk with great skill shadowed the enemy,
despite the weather and his efforts to shake them off, and all
through the night their signals showed the exact positions of
friend and foe. As the Arctic twilight grew into day the
Bismarck could be seen twelve miles to the south on a southerly
course. Soon there was smoke on the Norfolk’s port bow. The
Hood and Prince of Wales were in sight, and mortal conflict
was at hand. In the Hood as day was dawning the enemy was
discerned seventeen miles to the northwest. The British ships
turned to engage, and the Hood opened fire at 5.52 A.M. at a
range of about twenty-five thousand yards. The Bismarck
replied, and almost at once the Hood suffered a hit which
started a fire in the four-inch battery. The fire spread with
alarming speed, until it engulfed the whole midship part. All
the ships were now in full action, and the Bismarck too was hit.
Suddenly came disaster. At 6 o’clock, after the Bismarck had
fired her fifth salvo, the Hood was rent in twain by a mighty
explosion. A few minutes later she had vanished beneath the
waves amidst a vast pall of smoke. All but three of her valiant
company, more than fifteen hundred men, including Vice-Admiral
Lancelot Holland and Captain Ralph Kerr, perished.

The Prince of Wales quickly altered her course to avoid the
wreckage of the Hood and continued the now unequal fight.
Very soon the Bismarck’s fire began to tell upon her. Within a
few minutes she received four hits from fifteen-inch shells, one
of which wrecked the bridge, killing or wounding nearly all
upon it. At the same time the ship was holed underwater aft.
Captain Leach, one of the few survivors from the bridge,
decided to break off the action for the moment and turned away
under a smoke-screen. He had, however, inflicted damage on
the Bismarck which reduced her speed. She had in fact been
struck underwater by two heavy shells, one of which pierced
an oil tank, resulting in serious and continuing loss of oil which
later had important consequences. The German commander
persisted on his course to the southwest, leaving behind a
marked oil trace.

The command now passed to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker
on his bridge in the cruiser Norfolk. It was for him to decide
whether to renew the fight at once or hold on to the enemy till
the Commander-in-Chief should arrive with the King George V
and the aircraft-carrier Victorious. A dominant factor was the
state of the Prince of Wales. This ship had only recently been
commissioned, and scarcely a week had passed since Captain
Leach had been able to report her “fit for battle.” She had been
severely mauled, and two of her ten fourteen-inch guns were
unserviceable. It was highly doubtful whether in this condition
she was a match for the Bismarck. Admiral Wake-Walker,
therefore, decided not to renew the action, but to hold the
enemy under observation. In this he was indisputably right.

* * * * *

The Bismarck would indeed have been wise to rest content
with what amounted by itself to a resounding triumph. She had
destroyed in a few minutes one of the finest ships in the Royal
Navy, and could go home to Germany with a major success. Her
prestige and potential striking power would rise immensely,
in circumstances difficult for us to measure or explain.

Moreover, as we now know, she had been seriously injured
by the Prince of Wales, and oil was leaking from her heavily.
How then could she hope to discharge her mission of commerce
destruction in the Atlantic? She had the choice of returning
home victorious, with all the options of further enterprises
open, or of going to almost, certain destruction. Only the
extreme exaltation of her Admiral or the imperious orders by
which he was bound can explain the desperate decision which
he took. When I saw my American friend at about ten o’clock,
I had already learned that the Bismarck was steaming southward,
and I was, therefore, able to speak with renewed confidence
about the final result.

I had to read for very long hours each day to keep abreast
of the ceaseless flow of military, Foreign Office, and Secret
Service telegrams, which streamed in by private telephone and
dispatch-riders. This was a great comfort, because as long as
one is doing something the mind is saturated and cannot worry.
Nevertheless, only one scene riveted my background thoughts:
this tremendous Bismarck, forty-five thousand tons, perhaps
almost invulnerable to gunfire, rushing southward towards our
convoys, with the Prinz Eugen as her scout. Then I thought
of these convoys. Their battleships had left during the hunt.
There was the troop convoy, with all its precious men on board,
now well to the south of Ireland, with Admiral Somerville
closing it at full speed, and presently to be between it and peril.
I questioned the duty captain about times and distances. His
reports were reassuring. Although the convoy only made about
twelve knots and the Bismarck could, so far as we knew, do
twenty-five, there was a lot of salt water between them. Besides,
as long as we could hold fast to the Bismarck we could dog her to
her doom. But what if we lost touch in the night? Which way
would she go? She had a wide choice, and we were vulnerable
almost everywhere.

The House of Commons, too, might be in no good temper
when we met on Tuesday. They had been blown out of their
Chamber on May 10 and were now crammed into the Church
House, not far away. This was indeed a port in a storm, but
there were no conveniences. Writing-rooms, smoking-rooms,
dining-rooms, all the customary facilities, were improvised and
primitive. The air-raid alarms were frequent and means for
Members getting about scarce. How would they like to be told
on Tuesday when they met that the Hood was unavenged, that
several of our convoys had been cut up or even massacred, and
that the Bismarck had got home to Germany or to a French-occupied
port, that Crete was lost, and evacuation without
heavy casualties doubtful? I had great confidence in their pluck
and fidelity if once they could be convinced that their business
was not being muddled. But could they be? My American
guest thought I was gay, but it costs nothing to grin.

* * * * *

All through the twenty-fourth the British cruisers and the
Prince of Wales continued to dog the Bismarck and her consort.
Admiral Tovey, in the King George V, was still a long way off,
but signalled that he hoped to engage by 9 A.M. on the twenty-fifth.
The Admiralty summoned all forces. The Rodney, five
hundred miles away to the southeast, was ordered to steer a
closing course. The Ramillies was ordered to quit her homeward-bound
convoy and place herself to the westward of the
enemy; and the Revenge, from Halifax, was also directed to
the scene. Cruisers were posted to guard against a break-back
by the enemy to the north and east, while all the time Admiral
Somerville’s force was pressing northward from Gibraltar. Subject
to all the uncertainties of the sea, the net was drawing
tighter.

That evening about 6.40 the Bismarck suddenly turned to
engage her pursuers, and there was a brief encounter. We now
know that this movement was made to cover the escape of the
Prinz Eugen, which then made off at high speed to the south,
and after refuelling at sea reached Brest unchallenged ten days
later. Admiral Tovey had sent the Victorious ahead to make
an air attack in the hope of reducing the enemy’s speed. The
Victorious was newly commissioned, and some of her air crews
had little fighting experience. At 10 P.M., covered by four
cruisers, she released her nine Swordfish torpedo-aircraft on a
hundred-and-twenty-mile flight against a strong head wind with
rain and low cloud. Led by Lieutenant-Commander Esmonde
and guided by the Norfolk’s wireless, the aircraft two hours
later[1] found the Bismarck, and attacked with great gallantry
against intense fire. They scored a torpedo hit under the bridge.
On board the Victorious the question of the recovery of the air
squadron was causing acute anxiety. By now it was pitch-dark,
with a high wind and blinding showers of rain, and the pilots
had had little practice in deck-landing even in daylight.
Furthermore, the homing beacon, by which alone they could
be safely guided to the ship, had failed. Despite any prowling
U-boats, searchlights and signal lamps were used to help the
pilots in their approach. It is pleasant to record that their
splendid efforts were rewarded. All succeeded in landing safely
in the darkness amidst general rejoicing and relief.

Once more everything seemed to be set for a morning climax,
and once more the Admiralty hopes were dashed. Soon after
3 A.M. on the twenty-fifth the Suffolk suddenly and unexpectedly
lost contact with the Bismarck. She had been shadowing by
radar with skill from a position on the enemy’s port quarter.
All ships were now zigzagging as they moved south into waters
infested by U-boats, and it was this which brought about the
misfortune. At the end of each outward leg of her zigzag course
the Suffolk lost radar contact, but regained it on the inward
leg. Perhaps she was overconfident after such prolonged and
successful shadowing. But now when she turned once more to
the westward the enemy was no longer on the presumed course.
Had he turned west or doubled back to the north and east?
This caused the utmost anxiety and rendered all concentration
futile. After making a cast to the westward at daylight the
King George V turned eastward in the belief that the Bismarck
was making towards the North Sea, and the whole British
pursuit now trended in this direction. At the Admiralty there
was a growing opinion that the Bismarck was steering for Brest,
but it was not until six o’clock that this hardened. The
Admiralty forthwith deflected all our forces towards the more
southerly route. But meanwhile the confusion and delay arising
from the loss of contact had enabled the Bismarck to slip
through the cordon and gain a commanding lead in her race
for safety. By 11 P.M. she was already well to the eastward of
the British flagship. She was short of oil through the leakage.
The Rodney, with her sixteen-inch guns, still lay between her
and home, but she too was moving to the northeastward and
crossed ahead of the Bismarck during the afternoon. The day
which had begun so full of promise ended in disappointment
and frustration. Happily, from the south, breasting the heavy
Atlantic seas, the Renown, the Ark Royal, and the cruiser
Sheffield were steadily approaching on an intercepting course.

By the morning of May 26 the problem of fuel for all our
widely scattered ships, which had now been steaming hard for
four days, began to clamour for attention. Already several of
the pursuers had had to reduce speed. It was clear that in
these wide expanses all our efforts might soon be vain. However,
at 10.30 A.M., just as hopes were beginning to fade, the
Bismarck was found again. The Admiralty and Coastal
Command were searching with Catalina aircraft working from
Lough Erne in Ireland. One of these now located the fugitive
steering towards Brest and still about seven hundred miles
from home. The Bismarck damaged the aircraft and contact
was lost. But within an hour two Swordfish from the Ark
Royal spotted her once more. She was still well to the westward
of the Renown and not yet within the German air cover
radiating powerfully from Brest. The Renown, however, could
not face her single-handed. It was necessary to await the arrival
of the King George V and Rodney, both still far behind the
chase. But now Captain Vian, of Altmark fame, still in the
Cossack, with four other destroyers which had been escorting
the troop convoy and had been ordered to leave it, received a
signal from a Catalina aircraft which gave him the Bismarck’s
position. Without waiting for further orders he at once turned
towards the enemy.

Further confusion was in store in this clutching and grabbing
scene. Admiral Somerville, hastening northward, sent on the
Sheffield to close and shadow the enemy. The Ark Royal was
not informed of this movement, and when she launched her air
striking force their radar led them to the Sheffield, which they
attacked but did not hit. The Sheffield, understanding the mistake,
dodged successfully and did not fire.[2] The airplanes,
penitent, returned to the Ark Royal, and the Sheffield gained
contact with the Bismarck and henceforth held her for sure.
Fifteen Swordfish again left the Ark Royal a little after 7 P.M.
The enemy was now less than forty miles away, and this time
there was no mistake. Directed on their prey by the forgiving
Sheffield, they pressed home their attack with determination.
By 9.30 their work was done. Two torpedoes had certainly hit,
and possibly a third. A shadowing aircraft reported that the
Bismarck had been seen to make two complete circles, and it
seemed she was out of control. Captain Vian’s destroyers were
now approaching, and throughout the night they surrounded
the stricken ship, attacking with torpedoes whenever the chance
came.

* * * * *

On this Monday night I went to the Admiralty and watched
the scene on the charts in the War Room, where the news
streamed in every few minutes. “What are you doing here?”
I said to the Controller, Admiral Fraser. “I am waiting to see
what I have got to repair,” he said. Four hours passed quickly
away, and when I left I could see that Admiral Pound and his
select company of experts were sure the Bismarck was doomed.

The German commander, Admiral Lutjens, had no illusions.
Shortly before midnight he reported, “Ship unmanoeuvrable.
We shall fight to the last shell. Long live the Fuehrer!” The
Bismarck was still four hundred miles from Brest, and no
longer even able to steer thither. Strong German bomber forces
were now sent forward to the rescue, and U-boats hastened to
the scene, one of which, having already expended her torpedoes,
reported that the Ark Royal had passed her within easy striking
distance. Meanwhile the King George V and the Rodney were
drawing near. Fuel was a grave anxiety, and Admiral Tovey
had decided that unless the Bismarck’s speed could be greatly
reduced he would have to abandon the chase at midnight. At my
suggestion the First Sea Lord told him to go on even if he had
to be towed home. But by now it was known that the Bismarck
was actually steaming in the wrong direction. Her main
armament was uninjured, and Admiral Tovey decided to bring
her to battle in the morning.

A northwesterly gale was blowing when daylight came on the
twenty-seventh. The Rodney opened fire at 8.47 A.M., followed
a minute later by the King George V. The British ships quickly
began to hit, and after a pause the Bismarck too opened fire.
For a short time her shooting was good, although the crew,
after four gruelling days, were utterly exhausted and falling
asleep at their posts. With her third salvo she straddled the
Rodney, but thereafter the weight of the British attack was
overwhelming, and within half an hour most of her guns were
silent. A fire was blazing amidships, and she had a heavy list
to port. The Rodney now turned across her bow, pouring in a
heavy fire from a range of no more than four thousand yards.
By 10.15 all the Bismarck’s guns were silent and her mast was
shot away. The ship lay wallowing in the heavy seas, a flaming
and smoking ruin; yet even then she did not sink.

* * * * *

At eleven o’clock I had to report to the House of Commons,
meeting in the Church House, both about the battle in Crete
and the drama of the Bismarck.

This morning [I said], shortly after daylight the Bismarck, virtually
at a standstill, far from help, was attacked by the British pursuing
battleships. I do not know what were the results of the
bombardment. It appears, however, that the Bismarck was not
sunk by gunfire, and she will now be dispatched by torpedo. It is
thought that this is now proceeding, and it is also thought that
there cannot be any lengthy delay in disposing of this vessel. Great
as is our loss in the Hood, the Bismarck must be regarded as the
most powerful, as she is the newest, battleship in the world.

I had just sat down when a slip of paper was passed to me which
led me to rise again. I asked the indulgence of the House and
said, “I have just received news that the Bismarck is sunk.”
They seemed content.

It was the cruiser Dorsetshire that delivered the final blow
with torpedoes, and at 10.40 the great ship turned over and
foundered. With her perished nearly two thousand Germans
and their Fleet Commander, Admiral Lutjens. One hundred
and ten survivors, exhausted but sullen, were rescued by us.
The work of mercy was interrupted by the appearance of a
U-boat and the British ships were compelled to withdraw. Five
other Germans were picked up by a U-boat and a ship engaged
in weather reporting, but the Spanish cruiser Canarias, which
arrived on the scene later, found only floating bodies.

* * * * *

This episode brings into relief many important points
relating to sea warfare, and illustrates both the enormous
structural strength of the German ship and the immense difficulties
and dangers with which her sortie had confronted our
very numerous forces. Had she escaped, the moral effects of
her continuing existence as much as the material damage she
might have inflicted on our shipping would have been calamitous.
Many misgivings would have arisen regarding our
capacity to control the oceans, and these would have been
trumpeted round the world to our great detriment and discomfort.
All branches rightly claimed their share in the
successful outcome. The pursuit began with the cruisers, which
led to the first disastrous action. Then when the enemy was
lost it was aircraft that found him and guided the cruisers back
to the chase. Thereafter it was a cruiser which directed the
seaborne aircraft who struck the decisive blows, and finally it
was the destroyers who harassed and held him through a long
night and led the battleships to the last scene of destruction.
While credit is due to all, we must not forget that the long-drawn
battle turned on the first injury inflicted on the Bismarck
by the guns of the Prince of Wales. Thus the battleship and
the gun were dominant both at the beginning and at the end.

The traffic in the Atlantic continued unmolested.

To President Roosevelt I telegraphed on the twenty-eighth:

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

28 May 41

I will send you later the inside story of the fighting with the
Bismarck. She was a terrific ship, and a masterpiece of naval construction.
Her removal eases our battleship situation, as we should
have had to keep King George V, Prince of Wales, and the two
Nelsons practically tied to Scapa Flow to guard against a sortie of
Bismarck and Tirpitz, as they could choose their moment and we
should have to allow for one of our ships refitting. Now it is a
different story. The effect upon the Japanese will be highly beneficial.
I expect they are doing all their sums again.

The British ships were keeping double British Summer Time (two hours
in advance of Greenwich). Furthermore, they were by now a long way to the
west of the meridian of Greenwich, and therefore their clock time was about
four hours ahead of the sun. Thus the attack took place about 8 P.M. by sun
time.

18Syria

Danger in Syria—German Agents and Aircraft Arrive—Reactions
on Egypt and Turkey—Admiral Darlan Negotiates with
the Germans—Our Strained Resources—My Minute to the
Chiefs of Staff of May 8—Telegram to Wavell of May 9—Wavell
and the Free French—Misunderstanding Between General
Wavell and the Chiefs of Staff—Wavell’s Preparations and
Doubts—Operation “Exporter”—The Defence Committee
Approve Wavell’s Plan—My Telegram to General de Gaulle of
June 6—Telegram to President Roosevelt of June 7—The Advance
Begins—Reinforcements Needed and Forthcoming—Capture
of Damascus—General Dentz Requests Armistice, July
12—Important Results of the Syrian Campaign.

Syria was one of the many overseas territories of the French
Empire which on the collapse of France considered themselves
bound by the surrender of the French Government, and
the Vichy authorities did their utmost to prevent anybody in
the French Army of the Levant from crossing into Palestine
to join us. The Polish Brigade marched over, but very few
Frenchmen. In August, 1940, the Italian Armistice Commission
appeared, and German agents, who had been interned on
the outbreak of war, were released and became active. By the
end of the year many more Germans had arrived, and, with
ample funds, proceeded to arouse anti-British and anti-Zionist
feeling among the Arab peoples of the Levant. By the end of
March, 1941, Syria forced itself on our attention. The Luftwaffe
were already attacking the Suez Canal from bases in the
Dodecanese, and they could obviously, if they chose, operate
against Syria, especially with airborne troops. With the
Germans in control of Syria, Egypt, the vital Canal Zone, and
the oil refineries at Abadan would come under the direct threat
of continuous air attack. Our land communications between
Palestine and Iraq would be in danger. There might well be
political repercussions in Egypt, and our diplomatic position in
Turkey and throughout the Middle East would be gravely
weakened.

On May 2, Rashid Ali appealed to the Fuehrer for armed
support against us in Iraq, and the following day the German
Embassy in Paris was instructed to obtain permission from the
French Government for the transit of planes and war materials
across Syria to Rashid Ali’s forces. Admiral Darlan negotiated
a preliminary agreement with the Germans on May 5 and 6 by
which three-quarters of the war material assembled in Syria
under the control of the Italian Armistice Commission was to be
transported to Iraq and the German Air Force granted landing
facilities in Syria. General Dentz, the Vichy High Commissioner
and Commander-in-Chief, received instructions to this
effect, and between May 9 and the end of the month about a
hundred German and twenty Italian aircraft landed on Syrian
airfields.

At this time, as we have seen, the Middle East Command
was strained to the limit. The defence of Egypt was dominant;
Greece had been evacuated; Crete had to be defended; Malta
pleaded for reinforcement; the conquest of Abyssinia was not
yet complete; troops had to be provided for Iraq. All that was
available for the defence of Palestine from the north was the
1st Cavalry Division, of excellent quality, but stripped for other
needs of its artillery and ancillary services. General de Gaulle
pressed for prompt military action by the Free French forces,
if necessary unsupported by British troops. But, with the
experience of Dakar behind us, it was felt, both by General
Wavell on the spot and by all of us in London, that it was inadvisable
to use the Free French alone, even to resist a German
advance through Syria. It might, however, be inevitable.

Nevertheless, we could not let Syria go without doing our
utmost with anything that could be scraped up. Reluctant as
we were to add to Wavell’s burdens, it was necessary to press
him to do what he could to help the Free French. On April 28
he replied that all he could manage was a single brigade group.
On this telegram I minuted: “It seems most necessary that
General Wavell should prepare the brigade group and mobile
group [he mentions] as far as he can, and have it in readiness on
the Palestine border.” Accordingly the Chiefs of Staff sent
instructions to Wavell that no definite offer of help should be
made to General Dentz, but that if he resisted a German landing,
by sea or air, all available British help would be given to
him at once. General Wavell was also told that immediate air
action should be taken against any German descent.

The outlook was threatening, and on May 8 I minuted to
the Chiefs of Staff:

General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee

I must have the advice of the Staffs upon the Syrian business
available for Cabinet this morning. A supreme effort must be
made to prevent the Germans getting a footing in Syria with small
forces and then using Syria as a jumping-off ground for the air
domination of Iraq and Persia. It is no use General Wavell being
vexed at this disturbance on his eastern flanks. . . . We ought to
help in every way without minding what happens at Vichy.

I shall be most grateful if the Staff will see what is the most that
can be done.

On May 9, with the approval of the Defence Committee, I
telegraphed to General Wavell:

You will no doubt realise the grievous danger of Syria being
captured by a few thousand Germans transported by air. Our information
leads us to believe that Admiral Darlan has probably
made some bargain to help the Germans to get in there. In face
of your evident feeling of lack of resources we can see no other
course open than to furnish General Catroux with the necessary
transport and let him and his Free French do their best at the
moment they deem suitable, the R.A.F acting against German
landings. Any improvement you can make on this would be welcome.

On May 14 the Royal Air Force was authorised to act against
German aircraft in Syria and on French airfields. On the
seventeenth General Wavell telegraphed that in view of the
dispatch of troops from Palestine to Iraq the Syrian affair would
involve either using Free French alone or bringing troops from
Egypt. He felt strongly that the Free French would be ineffective
and likely to aggravate the situation; and he concluded by
saying that he hoped he would not be burdened with a Syrian
commitment unless it was absolutely essential. The Chiefs of
Staff replied that there was no option but to improvise the
largest force that he could provide without prejudice to the
security of the Western Desert, and that he should prepare
himself to move into Syria at the earliest possible date. The
composition of that force would be left to him.

On May 21—at the moment of the German attack on Crete—Wavell
ordered the 7th Australian Division, less the brigade
at Tobruk, to be ready to move to Palestine, and instructed
General Maitland Wilson, who early in the month on his
return from Greece had assumed command of Palestine and
Transjordan, to prepare a plan for an advance into Syria.

* * * * *

At this time a misunderstanding arose between us at home
and General Wavell, through his deriving the impression from
a telegram of the Chiefs of Staff that we were relying on the
advice of the Free French leaders rather than upon his own.
He, therefore, telegraphed to the C.I.G.S. that if this was so
he would prefer to be relieved of his command. I hastened to
reassure him on the point, but at the same time I felt it
necessary to make it clear that we were determined upon the
Syrian adventure and to assume the full burden of responsibility
for what was, after all, hardly a military proposition.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

21 May 41

Nothing in Syria must detract at this moment from winning the
Battle of Crete or in the Western Desert. . . .

There is no objection to your mingling British troops with the
Free French who are to enter Syria; but, as you have clearly shown,
you have not the means to mount a regular military operation,
and, as you were instructed yesterday, all that can be done at
present is to give the best possible chance to the kind of armed
political inroad described in Chiefs of Staff message of twentieth.

You are wrong in supposing that policy described in this message
arose out of any representations made by the Free French leaders.
It arises entirely from the view taken here by those who have the
supreme direction of war and policy in all theatres. Our view is
that if the Germans can pick up Syria and Iraq with petty air
forces, tourists, and local revolts, we must not shrink from running
equal small-scale military risks and facing the possible aggravation
of political dangers from failure. For this decision we, of course,
take full responsibility, and should you find yourself unwilling to
give effect to it arrangements will be made to meet any wish you
may express to be relieved of your command.

Wavell showed by his reply that he fully understood. He
explained that the proved inaccuracy of Free French information
about the position in Syria made him unwilling to commit
himself to military action at a time when Crete, Iraq, and the
Western Desert required all available resources.

General Wavell to Prime Minister

22 May 41

This Syrian business is disquieting, since German Air Force
established in Syria are closer to the Canal and Suez than they
would be at Mersa Matruh. The [Vichy] French seem now wholly
committed to the Germans. I am moving reinforcements to Palestine,
after full discussion with Cunningham, Tedder, and Blamey,
because we feel we must be prepared for action against Syria, and
weak action is useless. The whole position in Middle East is at
present governed mainly by air power and air bases. Enemy air
bases in Greece make our hold of Crete precarious, and enemy air
bases in Cyrenaica, Crete, Cyprus, and Syria would make our hold
on Egypt difficult. The object of the Army must be to force the
enemy in Cyrenaica as far west as possible, to try to keep him
from establishing himself in Syria, and to hang on to Crete and
Cyprus. It will not be so easy, with our resources and those of the
air force. I know you realise all this and are making every effort
to provide requirements, and we are doing our best to secure
Middle East. We have some difficult months ahead, but will not
lose heart.

I replied on the following day:

Prime Minister to General Wavell

23 May 41

Many thanks for your telegram. These are very hard times, and
we must all do our best to help each other. . . .

Syria. It is your views that weigh with us, and not those of Free
French. You had better have de Gaulle close to you. Let me
know if I can help you with him. We cannot have Crete battle
spoiled for the sake of Syria. Therefore, interior methods may be
the only ones open at the moment. . . .

As the hopes of holding Crete diminished, the possible
German threat to Syria commanded increasing attention. On
May 25 General Wavell telegraphed his outline plan for
“Exporter,” the code name now allotted to the Syrian operation.
General Wilson was preparing to advance northward
with a force consisting of the 7th Australian Division, the Free
French troops, part of the 1st Cavalry Division, now motorised,
and certain other units. Wavell estimated that the earliest date
by which he could move would be the first week of June.
Although the danger of the establishment of German air bases
in the Levant was most serious in its possible consequences,
particularly if it synchronised with German land operations
through Turkey—a possibility which could not be ignored—priority
must be given to the attempt to obtain a successful
military decision in the Western Desert Operation “Battleaxe.”

On the night of May 27 the Defence Committee of the
Cabinet was summoned to consider the general situation
throughout the Middle East, and I embodied their conclusions
in a telegram to General Wavell.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

28 May 41

. . . Our immediate action in the Middle East is dictated by the
following facts: (1) Possession of Crete will enable enemy to establish
direct line of communication to Cyrenaica via west coast of
Greece and Crete. Unless we can establish air forces in Cyrenaica
we can neither interrupt this line nor can we easily maintain
Malta and continue interruption of Tripoli line of communication.
(2) Attack through Turkey and/or through Syria cannot
develop in real strength for a good many weeks.

Our first object must be to gain a decisive military success in the
Western Desert and to destroy the enemy armed forces in a battle
fought with our whole available strength.

Meanwhile, it is important to establish ourselves in Syria before
the Germans have recovered from the immense drain on their
air power which the vigorous resistance of Freyberg’s army has
produced. Accordingly, the general plan outlined in your telegram
of May 25 is approved.

Preparations for the occupation of Syria, therefore, went
forward amid anxieties about the fall of Crete and prior concentration
on the Western Desert.

On June 3 I telegraphed to General Wavell:

Prime Minister to General Wavell

3 June 41

Please telegraph exactly what ground and air forces you are
using for Syria. What are you doing with the Poles? It seems important
to use and demonstrate as much air power as possible at
the very outset, and even the older machines may play their part,
as they did so well in Iraq.

2. There is a storm of criticism about Crete, and I am being
pressed for explanations on many points. Do not worry about
this at all now. Simply keep your eye on Syria, and above all
“Battleaxe.” These alone can supply the answers to criticisms,
just or unjust. The air superiority available for “Battleaxe” far exceeds
anything you are likely to have for many months. As Napoleon
said, “La bataille répondra.” All good wishes.

Wavell replied on the fifth informing us of the forces he
would use. Fighting would be avoided as far as possible, progress
being at first by propaganda, leaflets, and display of force.
If resistance was encountered, the utmost force would be used.
He said he had always estimated the strength required for the
occupation of Syria as two divisions and one armoured division,
or at least [some] armoured brigades. He must, therefore,
regard success as at least problematical, and dependent on the
attitude of the French garrison and local population.

* * * * *

Remembering the baffling and confused nature of the problems
which confronted de Gaulle, I now sent on the eve of our
joint expedition into Syria the following telegram of good will:

Prime Minister to General de Gaulle

6 June 41

I wish to send you my best wishes for success of our joint enterprise
in the Levant. I hope you are satisfied that everything possible
is being done to provide support to the arms of Free France.
You will, I am sure, agree that this action, and indeed our whole
future policy in the Middle East, must be conceived in terms of
mutual trust and collaboration. Our policies towards the Arabs
must run on parallel lines. You know that we have sought no
special advantages in the French Empire, and have no intention
of exploiting the tragic position of France for our own gain.

I welcome, therefore, your decision to promise independence to
Syria and the Lebanon, and, as you know, I think it essential that
we should lend to this promise the full weight of our guarantee.
I agree that we must not in any settlement of the Syrian question
endanger the stability of the Middle East. But subject to this we
must both do everything possible to meet Arab aspirations and
susceptibilities. You will, I am sure, bear in mind the importance
of this.

All our thoughts are with you and the soldiers of Free France.
At this hour, when Vichy touches fresh depths of ignominy, the
loyalty and courage of the Free French save the glory of France.

I must ask you in this grave hour not to insist on declaring
Catroux High Commissioner for Syria.

As usual, I kept President Roosevelt fully informed.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

7 June 41

We enter Syria in some force tomorrow morning in order to
prevent further German penetration. Success depends largely upon
attitude of local French troops. De Gaulle’s Free French outfit
will be prominent, but not in the van. He is issuing a proclamation
to the Arabs offering in the name of France complete independence
and opportunity to form either three or one or three-in-one
free Arab States. Relations of these States with France will
be fixed by treaty safeguarding established interests somewhat on
the Anglo-Egyptian model. General Catroux is not to be called
High Commissioner, but French Delegate and Plenipotentiary.

2. I cannot tell how Vichy will react to what may happen. I do
not myself think they will do much worse than they are now
doing, but of course they may retaliate on Gibraltar or Freetown.
I should be most grateful if you would keep up your pressure
upon them. We have no political interests at all in Syria except to
win the war.

* * * * *

All Wavell could muster for the advance was the 7th
Australian Division, part of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 5th
Indian Infantry Brigade, recently returned from Eritrea, and
the Free French force under General Le Gentilhomme, comprising
six battalions, one battery, and a company of tanks. Air
support was limited at first to about seventy aircraft in all. The
Crete battle had priority with both sides. Two cruisers and ten
destroyers, besides smaller craft, were spared for the Syrian
effort. The Vichy forces, under General Dentz, comprised
eighteen battalions, with a hundred and twenty guns and ninety
tanks, thirty-five thousand men in all, an air force amounting
to ninety aircraft, and a naval force of two destroyers and three
submarines based on Beirut.

The task assigned to the Allied army was to capture Damascus,
Rayak, and Beirut as a preliminary to the occupation of
the whole country. The advance began on June 8, and at first
met little opposition. No one could tell how much Vichy would
fight. Although our attack could hardly achieve a surprise, it
was thought by some that the enemy would offer only a token
resistance. But when the enemy realised how weak we were
they took heart and reacted vigorously, if only for the honour
of their arms. The Free French were held ten miles short of
Damascus, and a counter-movement round their eastern flank
threatened their line of communications. The Australians, on
the coast road, made slow progress over difficult ground. A
British battalion was overwhelmed at Kuneitra by a counter-attack
of two battalions with tanks. At sea contact was made
with the Vichy destroyers, but they fled with superior speed.
On the ninth a brief encounter took place at sea, in which the
destroyer Janus was severely hit. On the fifteenth, while bombarding
Sidon, two British destroyers were damaged by air
attack, but a Vichy destroyer approaching the coast from the
west was sunk by the Fleet air arm.

As a result of the first week’s fighting, it was clear to Wavell
that reinforcements were necessary. He was able to collect
transport for one brigade of the 6th British Division, which was
now partly formed, followed at the end of June by a second
brigade. He also arranged for a brigade group of the 1st
Cavalry Division, “Habforce,” which had taken part in the
capture of Baghdad, to advance on Palmyra through the deserts
from the south; and two brigades of the 10th Indian Division
in Iraq were ordered to move up the Euphrates on Aleppo.
This enlargement of the campaign began to take effect from
June 20. Damascus was captured by the Australians on the
twenty-first, after three days of severe fighting. Their advance
was aided by a daring raid by Number 11 Commando, which
was landed from the sea behind the enemy lines. In this devoted
stroke the Commando lost their leader, Colonel Pedder,
and all its other officers were either killed or wounded, together
with nearly a hundred and twenty other ranks, or one quarter
of its total strength.

The operations of the first week of July brought the Vichy
collapse into sight. General Dentz realised that his limit was
reached. He still had about 24,000 men, but he could not
hope to offer continued resistance. Barely one-fifth of his air
force remained. At 8.30 A.M. on July 12, Vichy envoys arrived
to sue for an armistice. This was granted, a convention was
signed, and Syria passed into Allied occupation. Our casualties
in killed and wounded were over 4600; those of the enemy
about 6500. One distasteful incident remained. British prisoners
taken during the fighting had been hurriedly shipped off
to Vichy France, whence they would certainly have passed into
German keeping. When this was discovered and no redress was
offered, General Dentz and other highly placed officers were
taken into custody as hostages. This had the desired effect, and
our men were returned.

* * * * *

The successful campaign in Syria greatly improved our
strategical position in the Middle East. It closed the door to
any further attempt at enemy penetration eastward from the
Mediterranean, moved our defence of the Suez Canal northward
by two hundred and fifty miles, and relieved Turkey of
anxiety for her southern frontier. She could now be assured of
aid from a friendly Power if she were attacked. Although, for
the sake of the narrative, it has been necessary to divide the
four sets of operations in Iraq, Crete, Syria, and the Western
Desert from one another, it must not be forgotten that they
were all running together, and reacted upon each other to
produce a sensation of crisis and complexity combined. Nevertheless,
it may be claimed that the final result constituted in
effect, though not in appearance, an undoubted and important
victory for the British and Imperial armies in the Middle East,
the credit of which may be shared between our authorities in
London and Cairo.

The battle in Crete, which cost us so dear, ruined the striking
power of the German airborne corps. The Iraq revolt was
finally crushed, and with pitifully small and improvised forces
we regained mastery of the wide regions involved. The occupation
and conquest of Syria, which was undertaken to meet a
desperate need, ended, as it proved for ever, the German
advance towards the Persian Gulf and India. If under all the
temptations of prudence, the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff
had not made every post a winning-post, and imposed their will
on all commanders, we should have been left only with the
losses sustained in Crete, without gathering the rewards which
followed from the hard and glorious fighting there. If General
Wavell, though exhausted, had broken under the intense strain
to which he was subjected by events and by our orders, the
whole future of the war and of Turkey might have been fatefully
altered. There is always much to be said for not attempting
more than you can do and for making a certainty of what
you try. But this principle, like others in life and war, has its
exceptions.

One more operation, the battle in the Western Desert, which
ranked first with me and the Chiefs of Staff, has still to be
described. And this, though denied success, brought Rommel
to a standstill for nearly five months.

19General Wavell’s Final Effort: “Battleaxe”

The Need to Defeat Rommel—Wavell’s Determination—The
Attack on Sollum and Capuzzo, May 15-16—A Limited Success—“Tiger
Cubs’ ” Teething Troubles—Arrival of the Fifteenth
Panzer Division—Halfaya Lost, May 26—Preparations for
“Battleaxe”—Enemy Strength Underestimated—Our Attack
Starts, June 15—All Goes Wrong, June 17—Rommel Does
Not Pursue—The Willing Horse—My Telegrams of June
21—General Auchinleck Relieves General Wavell—Need for
Devolution at Cairo—An Intendant-General—A Telegram—Captain
Oliver Lyttelton—His Appointment as Minister of
State in the Middle East—My Telegram to President Roosevelt
of July 4.

All our hearts at home had throughout been set on
beating Rommel in the Western Desert. There was no
difference of any kind between us, soldiers or civilians, in the
supreme consequence we assigned to this. The tragedy of the
evacuation of Greece, the distractions in Iraq and Syria, the
dire struggle in Crete, all paled before the gleam of hope which
we attached, and rightly, to victory in the Western Desert. One
did not have to argue this matter in London.

Wavell, of course, had all the other troubles leaping upon
him from day to day. He was, however, firmly with us in
thought that the crushing of Rommel’s venturous offensive
and the consequent relief of Tobruk would make amends for
all. Moreover, he realised what risks we had run to give him
back the armour which he had lost when the desert flank
crumpled. He had loyalty to Operation “Tiger.” He knew
what this effort of sending nearly three hundred tanks to him
through the Mediterranean had meant. His spirit was buoyant,
and he did not overlook the broad principle that in war as in
life everything is relative. Our united strategic conception
may be claimed to be correct. At this time we had a spy in
close touch with Rommel’s headquarters, who gave us accurate
information of the fearful difficulties of Rommel’s assertive but
precarious position. We knew how narrow was the margin on
which he hoped to maintain himself, and also the strong and
strict injunctions of the German High Command that he was
not to cast away his victories by asking too much of fortune.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

7 May 41

You and your generals alone can judge the tactical possibilities
whether at Sollum or Tobruk. But if “Tiger” comes through it
will be a moment to do and dare. I am asking for a rapid transfer
from Malta of Hurricanes to your command once the “Tiger’s”
tail is clear. Those Hun people are far less dangerous once they
lose the initiative. All our thoughts are with you.

Wavell, who had all our information, tried on his own
initiative, even in the imminent advent of Crete, to claw down
Rommel before the dreaded 15th Panzer Division arrived in
full strength over the long road from Tripoli, and before
Benghazi was effectively opened as a short cut for enemy supply.
He, therefore, wished to strike at Rommel’s force even before
the tanks delivered by “Tiger”—“Tiger Cubs,” as Wavell and
I called them in our correspondence—could be brought into
action. The armoured force in the Western Desert at the
beginning of May consisted of only two squadrons of cruisers
and two squadrons of infantry tanks, stationed southeast of
Matruh. Wavell hoped to build this up into an adequate
striking force by early June. He thought he saw an opportunity
for a blow before the Tiger Cubs could be ready. He hoped to
catch the enemy unawares before they could be reinforced by
the 15th Panzer Division.

General Wavell to Prime Minister

9 May 41

I have ordered all available tanks to be placed at disposal of
Gott’s force for offensive action in Sollum area. This is now in
active preparation and should take place soon. I shall only cancel
it if complete disaster overtakes “Tiger.” . . .

General Wavell to Prime Minister

13 May 41

Without waiting for “Tiger” I ordered available tanks to join
Gott’s force to attack enemy Sollum area. Action should take
place in next day or two, and I think Gott should be able to deal
with forward enemy troops. If successful, will consider immediate
combined action by Gott’s force and Tobruk garrison to drive
enemy west of Tobruk. It may be necessary to wait for some of
“Tiger” to do this, but am anxious to act as quickly as possible
before enemy can be reinforced.

I had full and active agreement from the Chiefs of Staff.
What a relief it was to have no differences at home!

Chief of the Air Staff to Air Marshal Tedder

14 May 41

After Chiefs of Staff had today expressed general agreement
with your appreciation the Prime Minister discussed it fully with
me. He was much pleased with the general layout, and felt glad
that you had the handling of the important and complicated air
operations impending.

2. Following general observations on time-table and relative
emphasis may assist without fettering your freedom of action.

3. Victory in Libya comes first in time and importance. Results
would dominate Iraq situation in German and Iraqi minds.

4. Our object in Iraq is to get back a friendly Government in
Baghdad, and you should do all you can to help in this, but
nothing must prejudice victory in Western Desert.

5. From here it seems probable that “Scorcher” [the attack on
Crete] will happen after smaller operations in Libya, and before
larger, which depend on “Tiger Cubs.” You should allow for,
but not rely on, “Colorado” [Crete] being attacked later than expected
owing to complexity of operations.

6. One clear-cut result is worth a dozen wise precautions. Longer
views about Iraq, Syria, and preparations in Palestine can be taken
later. Prime importance of Desert operations would justify accepting
necessary risks elsewhere.

* * * * *

A force under General Gott, consisting of the 7th Armoured
Brigade, mustering about fifty-five tanks, and the 22d Guards
Brigade, now advanced northwestward along the top of the
escarpment, and on May 15 captured Sollum and Capuzzo,
the armoured brigade on the left moving on to Sidi Azeiz.
The enemy were quick to counter-attack, and retook Capuzzo
the same afternoon, inflicting heavy casualties on the Durham
Light Infantry, who had taken it. This enforced the withdrawal
of the 7th Armoured Brigade from Sidi Azeiz. The
enemy, employing about seventy tanks, showed greater strength
than had been expected. Although we still held Sollum that
night, it was decided to withdraw the whole force next day,
the 16th, leaving garrisons on the pass over the escarpment at
Halfaya and at Sidi Suleiman.

Wavell’s report of this action was not sanguine. He said
that after a preliminary advance which cleared the enemy from
the Sollum-Bardia area, an enemy counter-attack with tanks
had forced our troops back to Halfaya. We were able to maintain
forward posts in Sollum, and a sortie by the Tobruk
garrison achieved a local success. We had inflicted significant
casualties. At home we were pleased.

Prime Minister to General Wavell

17 May 41

Results of action seem to us satisfactory. Without using Tiger
Cubs, you have taken the offensive, have advanced thirty miles,
have captured Halfaya and Sollum, have taken five hundred German
prisoners, and inflicted heavy losses in men and tanks upon
the enemy. For this twenty “I” tanks and one thousand or one
thousand five hundred casualties do not seem to be at all too
heavy a cost.

2. News from Tobruk is also good, especially as enemy’s loss
is greater than ours. Enemy is certainly anxious about Tobruk,
and reports with apparent satisfaction when it is quiet. It seems
of the utmost importance to keep on fighting at Tobruk.

3. Enemy is bringing up reinforcements and is seeking to re-establish
the situation. We should surely welcome this, as he may
not be in a condition to stand severe continuous fighting. Dill and
I both feel confident of good results of sustained pressure, because
the extremely worried state of the enemy is known to us. We feel
sure you should keep at it both at Sollum and Tobruk. He cannot
possibly fill the gap as you can. Presume you are using your powerful
mechanised field artillery to the full at both places, compelling
him to fire off ammunition, of which we know he is short.
We should also be grateful if, without burdening yourself personally,
you could have some officer on your staff send a fuller report
of the events and position as known at your headquarters each
evening. This is all the more desirable when operations of such
outstanding importance for the world situation as those of the
Western Desert are in progress.

4. What are your dates for bringing Tiger Cubs into action?

General Wavell to Prime Minister

18 May 41

Enemy proved rather stronger than we thought, and has forced
us back on defensive till Tiger Cubs come into action. This will
not be before end of month, and it would be better if they could
be given more time to settle down, but this must depend on situation.
Enemy is collecting strength in forward area and may try
further advance.

You will have heard of Aosta’s surrender, which practically completes
East African campaign.

* * * * *

On May 20 Wavell reported that a tank battalion of the
15th Panzer Division was believed to have arrived in the forward
area. Thus the opportunity of defeating Rommel before
he could be reinforced had passed. Despite preparations made
in advance, the delays in unloading, refitting, and making
desert-worthy the Tiger Cubs proved severe. The mechanical
condition of many of the “I” tanks was found on arrival to be
indifferent.

General Wavell to Prime Minister

25 May 41

Many thanks for your message. We realise that our burdens and
responsibilities here, though heavy, are nothing to those you shoulder
so gallantly. . . .

Weaning of Tiger Cubs proceeding satisfactorily, but even
tigers have teething troubles.

“I remember,” says my wife, “terrible anxiety and even anger
at Chequers on several Sundays because the newly arrived tanks
could only come into action so slowly.”

* * * * *

But trouble soon descended. During the ensuing week considerable
movement of enemy armoured vehicles was observed.
From documents captured later it was learnt that Rommel was
expecting a serious attack to relieve Tobruk, and was determined
to recapture and hold Halfaya in order to make such
an attempt more difficult. He deployed the greater part of
the newly arrived 15th Panzer Division, which, except for a
small reconnaissance force thrown out to the south, he concentrated
on the frontier between Capuzzo and Sidi Omar. Halfaya
was held by a battalion group composed of the 3d Battalion
Coldstream Guards, a regiment of field artillery, and two squadrons
of tanks. The remainder of our frontier troops, except for
observation patrols to the south, had been withdrawn considerable
distances to the rear. The enemy advanced on Halfaya on
May 26, and that evening captured a feature north of the pass
which gave good observation over the whole position held by
the Coldstream. A counter-attack to regain the feature was
unsuccessful, and next morning after heavy shelling a concerted
attack by at least two battalions and sixty tanks placed our
small force in great jeopardy. Reserves were too distant to be
able to intervene, and it remained only to extricate the force
without more ado. This was accomplished, but losses were
severe; only two of our tanks remained effective, and the Coldstream
Guards lost eight officers and a hundred and sixty-five
men. The enemy had gained his objective, and proceeded to
install himself firmly at Halfaya. As he had hoped, his occupation
of this position was to prove a considerable hindrance to
us three weeks later.

* * * * *

Preparations for “Battleaxe” continued actively; but there
was a darker side.

General Wavell to C.I.G.S.

28 May 41

All available armoured strength, which will be deciding factor,
is being put into “Battleaxe.” Various difficulties are delaying
reconstitution 7th Armoured Division. Earliest date for beginning
of forward move from Matruh will be June 7, and may be
later.

2. I think it right to inform you that the measure of success
which will attend this operation is in my opinion doubtful. I
hope that it will succeed in driving enemy west of Tobruk and re-establishing
land communications with Tobruk. If possible we will
exploit success further. But recent operations have disclosed some
disquieting features. Our armoured cars are too lightly armoured
to resist the fire of enemy fighter aircraft, and, having no gun, are
powerless against the German eight-wheeled armoured cars, which
have guns and are faster. This makes reconnaissance difficult. Our
infantry tanks are really too slow for a battle in the desert, and
have been suffering considerable casualties from the fire of the
powerful enemy anti-tank guns. Our cruisers have little advantage
in power or speed over German medium tanks. Technical breakdowns
are still too numerous. We shall not be able to accept battle
with perfect confidence in spite of numerical inferiority, as we
could against Italians. Above factors may limit our success. They
also make it imperative that adequate flow of armoured reinforcements
and reserves should be maintained.

On May 31 General Wavell reported the technical difficulties
which he was having with the re-formation of the 7th
Armoured Division. The earliest date at which he was able
to launch “Battleaxe” would be June 15. While he realised
the dangers of postponement, with the risk of enemy air reinforcements
and a heavy attack on Tobruk, he felt that, as the
forthcoming battle would be primarily a tank engagement, he
must give the armoured division every chance, and the extra
days gained by waiting should “double the possibilities of
success.”

I now awaited in keen hope and fear our attack in the Desert,
from which results might be gained which might change in our
favour the whole course of the campaign. The extra fortnight
that had passed before the Tiger Cubs could be assimilated by
the 7th Armoured Division made me fear that the 15th Panzers
would all have reached Rommel.

According to our Intelligence there were now known to be
in, or approaching, Eastern Cyrenaica the German 5th (Light)
Panzer and the 15th Panzer Divisions, with the Italian Ariete
Armoured Division, the Trento Motorised Division, and the
Brescia Infantry Division. Another Italian infantry division
was in reserve at Derna. In disquieting contrast with our own
performances earlier in the year, the Germans had brought
Benghazi rapidly into use, and the bulk of their forces was
probably already being maintained to a large extent through
that port.

In his dispatch Wavell states that the bulk of the enemy lay
before Tobruk with about one hundred and thirty medium
and seventy light tanks. In the forward area it was estimated
that there were only one hundred medium tanks, with the
equivalent of seven German and nine Italian battalions. Two-thirds
of the enemy’s tank strength was, therefore, believed to
be seventy miles back from the frontier. If Tobruk by a sortie
could hold for a while the enemy around it, we should have at
the outset a superiority in armour on the frontier of one hundred
and eighty to one hundred tanks. Wavell comments that
these estimates were wrong. So far as now can be established,
Italian tanks were not used at all in the frontier battle. The
Germans had succeeded in concentrating forward a large part
of their own armour without our becoming aware of it.
Actually they brought rather more than two hundred tanks into
action against our one hundred and eighty.

* * * * *

“Battleaxe” started early on June 15. General Creagh commanded
our armour, and General Messervy the 4th Indian
Division and the 22d Guards Brigade. The whole force, comprising
about twenty-five thousand men, was under General
Beresford-Peirse. At first things went reasonably well. Although
the enemy defence about Halfaya held out against the
combined attack from north and south, the Guards Brigade
took Capuzzo in the afternoon with several hundred prisoners.
A part of this brigade also moved on against the western
defences of Sollum, but there they were stopped. The 7th
Armoured Brigade, moving in protection of the outer flank,
reached a position west of Capuzzo without encountering
enemy tanks. On June 16 no progress was made. Halfaya and
Sollum held firm against us, and in the afternoon strong forces
of enemy tanks appeared, moving with the clear intention of
outflanking our attack from the west. The 7th Armoured
Division, both the brigade and the support group, moved to
deal with this threat. They engaged the enemy near Sidi Omar,
but were outnumbered and forced to withdraw. The flank of
the main attack, which it was their task to protect, was thereby
imperilled.

Next day, June 17, everything went wrong. In the morning
the Guards Brigade were still in Capuzzo and facing Sollum.
Capuzzo was taken from them by a considerable force, with
tanks reported to be one hundred strong. The 7th Armoured
Brigade, with only about twenty cruiser tanks now in action,
had spent the night near Sidi Suleiman. The enemy force,
which had forced them back overnight from Sidi Omar, made
towards Halfaya and threatened to cut off the Guards Brigade.
To deal with this threat Creagh proposed an attack with the
7th Armoured Brigade from the south, while the 4th Armoured
Brigade, to be relieved of its task of co-operating with the
Guards Brigade, attacked from the north. But as soon as the
4th Brigade started to move off yet another enemy armoured
column coming in from the west threatened the Guards’ flank.
The armoured brigade held this attack off, but the enemy
pressure continued, and Messervy informed Creagh that he
could not part with the brigade lest his infantry be cut off.

At this decisive moment General Wavell flew to General
Beresford-Peirse’s battle headquarters. He still hoped to turn
the scale by Creagh’s armoured attack. He got into his airplane
and flew to the 7th Armoured Division. He had no sooner
reached it than he learned that General Messervy had independently
decided that with the double threat against his flank
and rear, which he now estimated as at least two hundred tanks,
he must immediately retreat to avoid being surrounded. He
had given orders accordingly. Wavell, out on the desert flank
with Creagh, was confronted with this fact and concurred in
the decision. Our stroke had failed. The withdrawal of the
whole force was carried out in good order, protected by our
fighter aircraft. The enemy did not press the pursuit, partly
no doubt because his armour was heavily attacked by R.A.F.
bombers. There was probably, however, another reason. As
we now know, Rommel’s orders were to act purely on the
defensive and to build up resources for operations in the
autumn. To have embroiled himself in a strong pursuit across
the frontier, and suffered losses thereby, would have been in
direct contravention of orders.

The policy of close protection of our troops by fighter aircraft,
though effective, led to dispersion and a relatively high
rate of air casualties. When, on the second day, the enemy air
effort intensified, it was decided to modify the policy and, while
continuing a degree of protection, to operate offensively in
large units and farther afield. When the withdrawal began, on
the seventeenth, our fighters not only fended off three out of
four considerable air attacks on our troops, but also co-operated
with the bombers, often at low level, against enemy columns.
These attacks undoubtedly impeded the enemy’s movement
and inflicted considerable casualties. Our airmen rendered good
service to the withdrawing troops, but they were hampered
by the difficulty of distinguishing between our own and enemy
forces.

Our casualties in the three days’ battle were just over one
thousand, of which a hundred and fifty were killed and two
hundred and fifty missing. Twenty-nine cruisers and fifty-eight
“I” tanks were lost, the cruisers mainly from enemy action. A
considerable portion of the losses in “I” tanks were due to
mechanical breakdowns, there being no transporters to bring
them back. The best part of one hundred enemy tanks were
claimed as accounted for; five hundred and seventy prisoners
were taken and many enemy corpses buried.

* * * * *

Although this action may seem small compared with the scale
of the Mediterranean war in all its various campaigns, its
failure was to me a most bitter blow. Success in the Desert
would have meant the destruction of Rommel’s audacious force.
Tobruk would have been relieved, and the enemy’s retreat
might well have carried him back beyond Benghazi as fast as he
had come. It was for this supreme object, as I judged it, that
all the perils of “Tiger” had been dared. No news had readied
me of the events of the seventeenth, and, knowing that the
result must soon come in, I went down to Chartwell, which was
all shut up, wishing to be alone. Here I got the reports of what
had happened. I wandered about the valley disconsolately for
some hours.

* * * * *

The reader who has followed the exchange of telegrams
between General Wavell and me and with the Chiefs of Staff
will be prepared in his mind for the decision which I took in
the last ten days of June, 1941. At home we had the feeling
that Wavell was a tired man. It might well be said that we had
ridden the willing horse to a standstill. The extraordinary
convergence of five or six different theatres, with their ups and
downs, especially downs, upon a single Commander-in-Chief
constituted a strain to which few soldiers have been subjected.
I was discontented with Wavell’s provision for the defence of
Crete, and especially that a few more tanks had not been sent.
The Chiefs of Staff had overruled him in favour of the small
but most fortunate plunge into Iraq which had resulted in the
relief of Habbaniya and complete local success. One of their
telegrams had provoked from him an offer of resignation which
was not pressed, but which I did not refuse. Finally, there was
“Battleaxe,” which Wavell had undertaken in loyalty to the
risks I had successfully run in sending out the Tiger Cubs. I
was dissatisfied with the arrangements made by the Middle
East Headquarters Staff for the reception of the Tiger Cubs,
carried to his aid through the deadly Mediterranean at so much
hazard and with so much luck. I admired the spirit with which
he had fought this small battle, which might have been so important,
and his extreme disregard of all personal risks in
flying to and fro on the wide, confused field of fighting. But, as
has been described, the operation seemed ill-concerted, especially
from the failure to make a sortie from the Tobruk sally-port
as an indispensable preliminary and concomitant.

Above all this there hung the fact of the beating-in of the
desert flank by Rommel, which had undermined and overthrown
all the Greek projects on which we had embarked, with
all their sullen dangers and glittering prizes in what was for us
the supreme sphere of the Balkan War. General Ismay, who
was so close to me every day, has recorded the following: “All of
us at the centre, including Wavell’s particular friends and
advisers, got the impression that he had been tremendously
affected by the breach of his desert flank. His Intelligence had
been at fault, and the sudden pounce came as a complete surprise.
I seem to remember Eden saying that Wavell had ‘aged
ten years in the night.’ ” I am reminded of having commented:
“Rommel has torn the new-won laurels from Wavell’s brow
and thrown them in the sand.” This was not a true thought,
but only a passing pang. Judgment upon all this can only be
made in relation to the authentic documents written at the
time which this volume contains, and no doubt also upon much
other valuable evidence which time will disclose. The fact
remains that after “Battleaxe” I came to the conclusion that
there should be a change.

General Auchinleck was now Commander-in-Chief in India.
I had not altogether liked his attitude in the Norwegian campaign
at Narvik. He had seemed to be inclined to play too
much for safety and certainty, neither of which exists in war,
and to be content to subordinate everything to the satisfaction
of what he estimated as minimum requirements. However, I
had been much impressed with his personal qualities, his
presence and high character. When after Narvik he had taken
over the Southern Command I received from many quarters,
official and private, testimony to the vigour and structure which
he had given to that important region. His appointment as
Commander-in-Chief in India had been generally acclaimed.
We have seen how forthcoming he had been about sending the
Indian forces to Basra, and the ardour with which he had
addressed himself to the suppression of the revolt in Iraq. I had
the conviction that in Auchinleck I should bring a new, fresh
figure to bear the multiple strains of the Middle East, and that
Wavell, on the other hand, would find in the great Indian
command time to regain his strength before the new but
impending challenges and opportunities arrived. I found that
these views of mine encountered no resistance in our Ministerial
and military circles in London. The reader must not
forget that I never wielded autocratic powers, and always had to
move with and focus political and professional opinion. Accordingly
I sent the following telegrams:

Prime Minister to General Wavell

21 June 41

I have come to the conclusion that the public interest will best
be served by the appointment of General Auchinleck to relieve
you in the command of the armies of the Middle East. I have
greatly admired your command and conduct of these armies both
in success and adversity, and the victories which are associated with
your name will be famous in the story of the British Army, and
are an important contribution to our final success in this obstinate
war. I feel, however, that after the long strain you have borne a
new eye and a new hand are required in this most seriously menaced
theatre. I am sure that you are incomparably the best man
and most distinguished officer to fill the vacancy of Commander-in-Chief
in India. I have consulted the Viceroy upon the subject, and
he assures me that your assumption of this great office and task
will be warmly welcomed in India, and adds that he himself will
be proud to work with one who bears, in his own words, “so
shining a record.” I propose, therefore, to submit your name to
His Majesty accordingly.

2. General Auchinleck is being ordered to proceed at once to
Cairo, where you will make him acquainted with the whole situation
and concert with him the future measures which you and he
will take in common to meet the German drive to the East now
clearly impending. I trust he may arrive by air within the next
four or five days at latest. After you have settled everything up
with him you should proceed at your earliest convenience to India.
No announcement will be made, and the matter must be kept
strictly secret until you are both at your posts.

Prime Minister to Viceroy of India

21 June 41

Will you kindly convey the following to General Auchinleck.
I have already telegraphed to General Wavell.

After very careful consideration of all the circumstances I have
decided to submit your name to the King for the command of His
Majesty’s armies in the Middle East. You should proceed forthwith
to Cairo and relieve General Wavell. General Wavell will
succeed you as Commander-in-Chief in India. You should confer
with him upon the whole situation, and should also concert with
him the measures you will take in common to arrest the eastward
movement of the German armies which is clearly impending. Pray
let me know when you will arrive. The change is to be kept absolutely
secret until you are installed in your new post.

Wavell received the decision with poise and dignity. He was
at that time about to undertake a flight to Abyssinia which
proved extremely dangerous. His biographer records that on
reading my message he said, “The Prime Minister is quite
right. There ought to be a new eye and a new hand in this
theatre.” In regard to the new command, he placed himself
entirely at the disposal of His Majesty’s Government.

* * * * *

I had for several months past been extremely distressed by
the apparent inadequacy of the Cairo Staff, and I increasingly
realised the undue burdens of so many different kinds cast
upon our struggling Commander-in-Chief. He had himself,
together with the other Commanders-in-Chief, as early as April
18 asked for some relief and assistance. His view was endorsed
by his two professional colleagues. “We consider it necessary
for some authority to be established here to deal, inside the
broad lines of policy laid down by His Majesty’s Government,
with the political aspects of issues affecting more than one
department or territory. This will, of course, entail his being
directly responsible to the War Cabinet and not to any one
department.” The Commanders-in-Chief had felt the convenience
of having high political authority close at hand during
Mr. Eden’s visit. They were conscious of a vacuum after his
departure.

I had already by June 4 appointed General Haining to the
unusual office, which I created, of “Intendant-General.” This
officer had deputised for the C.I.G.S. during his absence abroad,
and was consequently familiar with War Cabinet procedure
and the wider aspects of the war. I hoped he would be able to
relieve Wavell of all the business of supply and technical
administration. I meant him to overhaul the whole rearward
administrative machine, paying particular attention to the great
tank and aircraft repairing establishments, as well as to the ever-growing
railway, road, and port development which was now in
progress. Thus the commanders would be freed from a mass of
detail, and need think only of the fighting.

My son Randolph, who had gone out with the commandos,
now to some extent dispersed, was at this time serving in the
Desert. He was a Member of Parliament and had considerable
contacts. I did not hear much or often from him, but on June
7 I had received through the Foreign Office the following telegram
which he had sent from Cairo with the knowledge and
encouragement of our Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson:

Personal and Secret. From Randolph Churchill to Prime Minister

Do not see how we can start winning war out here until we have
a competent civilian on the spot to provide day-to-day political and
strategic direction. Why not send a member of the War Cabinet
here to preside over whole war effort? Apart from small personal
staff, he would need two outstanding men to co-ordinate supply
and direct censorship, intelligence, and propaganda. Most thoughtful
people here realise need for radical reform along these lines.
No mere shunting of personnel will suffice, and the present time
seems particularly ripe and favourable for a change of system.
Please forgive me troubling you, but consider present situation
deplorable and urgent action vital to any prospects of success.

It is the fact that this clinched matters in my mind. “I have
been thinking,” I replied to him a fortnight later, “a good deal
for some time on the lines of your helpful and well-conceived
telegram.” And thereupon I took action.

I had brought Captain Oliver Lyttelton into the Government
as President of the Board of Trade in October, 1940. I
had known him from his childhood. His father, Alfred Lyttelton,
had been Mr. Balfour’s Secretary of State for the Colonies
in 1904, and had before the Home Rule split been a youthful
private secretary to Mr. Gladstone. He was for many years a
distinguished member of the House of Commons. His son was
thus brought up in a political atmosphere. He served in the
Grenadiers through the hardest fighting of the First World
War, being wounded and decorated several times. I remember
going to see him in hospital in 1918 after he had had the good
luck to be wounded by a poison-gas shell, which burst at his
feet and burned him all over, instead of being killed, as he
would have been, by a more orthodox and humane high-explosive
projectile. After leaving the Army he had entered
business and made and lost and made again a fortune. Knowing
his remarkable personal qualities, I did not hesitate to bring
him into Parliament and high office. As President of the Board
of Trade his administration had won respect from all parties in
our National Government. I had not liked his proposals of
1941 for clothing coupons, but I found these were received with
favour by the Cabinet and the House of Commons, and there is
no doubt they were necessary at the time. My unusual choice
had been vindicated by the results, although he had still much
to learn as a newcomer in the House of Commons. He was an
all-round man of action, and I now felt that he was in every way
fitted for this new and novel post of a War Cabinet Minister
resident in the Middle East. This would take another large
slice of business off the shoulders of the military chiefs. I found
this idea most readily acceptable to my colleagues of all parties.
Accordingly:

Prime Minister to General Wavell

29 June 41

The King has been pleased to appoint Captain Oliver Lyttelton,
formerly President of the Board of Trade, to be Minister of State
in the War Cabinet, vice Lord Beaverbrook, who becomes Minister
of Supply. Captain Lyttelton leaves by air on the thirtieth, and
should reach Cairo July 3, with a small nucleus secretariat. He
will represent the War Cabinet in the Middle East, and his prime
duty will be to relieve the High Command of all extraneous burdens,
and to settle promptly on the spot in accordance with the
policy of H.M.G. many questions affecting several departments or
authorities which hitherto have required reference home. This
is largely in accordance with your telegram of April 18, but goes
a good deal further. The instructions I am giving to Captain
Lyttelton follow in my next.

Please inform General Auchinleck when he arrives and Sir Miles
Lampson. Complete secrecy should be observed about Captain
Lyttelton’s journey and mission till he has arrived.

* * * * *

All these new arrangements, with their consequential administerial
reactions, fitted in with, and were appropriate to, the
change in the command in the Middle East. I cannot better
sum them up than by the telegram which I sent to President
Roosevelt, who was now giving us most important material aid
in this theatre.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

4 July 41

Following are considerations which weighed with us in deciding
upon change in command in the Middle East. Wavell has a glorious
record, having completely destroyed the Italian Army and
conquered the Italian Empire in Africa. He has also borne up
well against German attacks and has conducted war and policy in
three or four directions simultaneously since the beginning of the
struggle. I must regard him as our most distinguished General.
Nevertheless, though this should not be stated publicly, we felt
that, after the long strain he had borne, he was tired, and a fresh
eye and an unstrained hand were needed in this most seriously
menaced theatre. Incomparably the best and most distinguished
officer to take his place was General Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief
in India. We feel sure that Auchinleck will infuse a new
energy and precision into the defence of the Nile Valley, while
Wavell will make an admirable Commander-in-Chief in India who
will aid him in the whole of the great sphere which India is now
assuming, as our flank moves eastward. As Commander-in-Chief
India Wavell will have operations in Iraq under his control.

Wavell has accepted this decision gracefully, saying that he
thinks us wise to make the change and get new ideas and action
on the many problems in the Middle East. The Viceroy has assured
me that his shining achievements will secure him a very warm
welcome in India from the Army and public opinion.

The present lull in the German offensive in the Middle East has
provided a convenient opportunity for change-over. It coincides
also with the appointment of Oliver Lyttelton as Minister of State
to represent the War Cabinet in that theatre and relieve the Commanders-in-Chief
of many non-operational functions which have
hitherto greatly increased their burdens, such as relations with the
Free French, relations with the Emperor of Abyssinia, the administration
of occupied enemy territory, propaganda, and economic
warfare. The Minister of State will also exercise general supervision
over the activities of the Intendant-General (another innovation),
including all matters locally connected with supplies from
the United States.

The Intendant-General (General Haining) will relieve the Army
Commander-in-Chief of detailed control of rearward administrative
services and supply arrangements.

All these changes will, I hope, result in a greatly increased
vigour and drive in our effort in the Middle East, and ensure that
the fullest use is made of the formidable resources steadily accumulating
there from the United Kingdom, the overseas Empire, and
the United States. Harriman will doubtless be reporting upon
them. He is being asked to await Lyttelton’s arrival in Cairo (now
expected on July 5), so as to pool all information and settle arrangements
for the reception of American supplies.

20The Soviet Nemesis

Soviet Miscalculations—The German Deployment in the East—A
Prospect Too Good to be True—Views of the Joint Intelligence
Committee—Warning of the Chiefs of Staff, May 31—A
Lightning Flash—My Personal Warning to Stalin, April 3—A
Vexatious Delay—Hitler Twice Postpones “Barbarossa”—The
Three Army Groups—Attempts to Restrain Hitler and
Ribbentrop—My Telegram to General Smuts of May 16—Stalin’s
Illusions—The Tass Broadcast of June 14—A Fateful
Telegram from Ribbentrop, June 21—War Declared, June 22—Schulenburg—Hitler’s
Policy of Ruthlessness—A Week
End at Chequers—President Roosevelt’s Assurance—The German
Attack—My Broadcast of June 22.

Nemesis personifies “the Goddess of Retribution, who
brings down all immoderate good fortune, checks the
presumption that attends it . . . and is the punisher of extraordinary
crimes.”[1] We must now lay bare the error and vanity
of cold-blooded calculation of the Soviet Government and
enormous Communist machine, and their amazing ignorance
about where they stood themselves. They had shown a total
indifference to the fate of the Western Powers, although this
meant the destruction of that “Second Front” for which they
were soon to clamour. They seemed to have no inkling that
Hitler had for more than six months resolved to destroy them.
If their Intelligence Service informed them of the vast German
deployment towards the East, which was now increasing every
day, they omitted many needful steps to meet it. Thus they had
allowed the whole of the Balkans to be overrun by Germany.
They hated and despised the democracies of the West; but the
four countries, Turkey, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia,
which were of vital interest to them and their own safety, could
all have been combined by the Soviet Government in January
with active British aid to form a Balkan front against Hitler.
They let them all break into confusion, and all but Turkey
were mopped up one by one. War is mainly a catalogue of
blunders, but it may be doubted whether any mistake in history
has equalled that of which Stalin and the Communist chiefs
were guilty when they cast away all possibilities in the Balkans
and supinely awaited, or were incapable of realising, the fearful
onslaught which impended upon Russia. We have hitherto
rated them as selfish calculators. In this period they were
proved simpletons as well. The force, the mass, the bravery and
endurance of Mother Russia had still to be thrown into the
scales. But so far as strategy, policy, foresight, competence are
arbiters, Stalin and his commissars showed themselves at this
moment the most completely outwitted bunglers of the Second
World War.

* * * * *

Hitler’s “Barbarossa” directive of December 18, 1940, had
laid down the general grouping and primary tasks of the forces
to be concentrated against Russia. At that date the total
German strength on the Eastern Front was thirty-four divisions.
To multiply that figure more than thrice was an immense
process both of planning and preparation, and it fully occupied
the early months of 1941. In January and February the Balkan
adventure into which the Fuehrer allowed himself to be drawn
caused a drain-away from the East to the South of five divisions,
of which three were armoured. In May the German deployment
in the East grew to eighty-seven divisions, and there were
no less than twenty-five of their divisions absorbed in the
Balkans. Considering the magnitude and hazard of the invasion
of Russia, it was improvident to disturb the concentration to
the East by so serious a diversion. We shall now see how a delay
of five weeks was imposed upon the supreme operation as the
result of our resistance in the Balkans, and especially of the
Yugoslav revolution. No one can measure exactly what consequences
this had before winter set in upon the fortunes of the
German-Russian campaign. It is reasonable to believe that
Moscow was saved thereby. During May and the beginning of
June many of the best-trained German divisions and all the
armour were moved from the Balkans to the Eastern Front, and
at the moment of their assault the Germans attacked with a
hundred and twenty divisions, seventeen of which were
armoured and twelve motorised. Six Rumanian divisions were
also included in their Southern Army Group. In general reserve
a further twenty-six divisions were assembled or assembling;
so that by early June the German High Command could
count on at least a hundred and fifty divisions, supported by
the main striking power of their air force, about twenty-seven
hundred aircraft.

* * * * *

Up till the end of March I was not convinced that Hitler
was resolved upon mortal war with Russia, nor how near it was.
Our Intelligence reports revealed in much detail the extensive
German troop movements towards and into the Balkan States
which had marked the first three months of 1941. Our agents
could move with a good deal of freedom in these quasi-neutral
countries, and were able to keep us accurately posted about
the heavy German forces gathering by rail and road to the
southeast. But none of these necessarily involved the invasion
of Russia, and all were readily explainable by German interests
and policy in Rumania and Bulgaria, by her designs on Greece
and arrangements with Yugoslavia and Hungary. Our information
about the immense movement taking place through Germany
towards the main Russian front, stretching from Rumania
to the Baltic, was far more difficult to acquire. That Germany
should at this stage, and before clearing the Balkan scene, open
another major war with Russia seemed to me too good to be
true.

We did not know the tenor of the conversations of November,
1940, between Molotov, Hitler, and Ribbentrop at Berlin,
nor of the negotiations and proposed pacts which had followed
them. There was no sign of lessening German strength opposite
us across the Channel. The German air raids on Britain
continued with intensity. The manner in which the German
troop concentrations in Rumania and Bulgaria had been glazed
over and apparently accepted by the Soviet Government, the
evidence we had of large and invaluable supplies being sent to
Germany from Russia, the obvious community of interest between
the two countries in overrunning and dividing the
British Empire in the East, all made it seem more likely that
Hitler and Stalin would make a bargain at our expense rather
than a war upon each other. This bargain we now know was
within wide limits Stalin’s aim.

These impressions were shared by our Joint Intelligence
Committee. On April 7 they stated that there were a number
of reports circulating in Europe of a German plan to attack
Russia. Although Germany, they said, had considerable forces
available in the East, and expected to fight Russia some time
or other, it was unlikely that she would choose to make another
major war front yet. Her main object in 1941 would, according
to them, remain the defeat of the United Kingdom. As late as
May 23 this committee from the three services reported that
rumors of impending attack on Russia had died down, and
that there were reports that a new agreement between the two
countries was impending. This they considered likely, since
German economy would require strengthening to meet the
needs of a long war. The necessary assistance could be obtained
by Germany from Russia either by force or agreement.
They thought the latter would be the German choice, although
a threat of force would help to bring it about. This threat was
now building up. There was plenty of evidence of the construction
of roads and railway sidings in German Poland, of the
preparation of aerodromes and of large-scale troop concentrations,
including troops and air units from the Balkans.

Our Chiefs of Staff were ahead of their advisers; and more
definite. “We have firm indications,” they warned the Middle
East Command on May 31, “that the Germans are now concentrating
large army and air forces against Russia. Under this
threat they will probably demand concessions most injurious to
us. If the Russians refuse, the Germans will march.”

It was not till June 5 that the Joint Intelligence Committee
reported that the scale of German military preparations in Eastern
Europe seemed to indicate that an issue more vital than an
economic agreement was at stake. It was possible that Germany
desired to remove from her eastern frontier the potential threat
of increasingly powerful Soviet forces. They considered it as
yet impossible to say whether war or agreement would result.
On June 10 they stated, “The latter half of June will see either
war or agreement.” And finally on June 12 they reported,
“Fresh evidence is now at hand that Hitler has made up his
mind to have done with Soviet obstruction, and to attack.”

* * * * *

I had not been content with this form of collective wisdom,
and preferred to see the originals myself. I had arranged, therefore,
as far back as the summer of 1940, for Major Desmond
Morton to make a daily selection of titbits, which I always read,
thus forming my own opinion, sometimes at much earlier
dates.[2]

It was thus with relief and excitement that towards the end
of March, 1941, I read an Intelligence report from one of our
most trusted sources of the movement and counter-movement
of German armour on the railway from Bucharest to Cracow.
This showed that as soon as the Yugoslav Ministers made
their submission in Vienna, on March 18, three out of the
five Panzer divisions which had moved through Rumania southward
towards Greece and Yugoslavia had been sent northward
to Cracow, and secondly, that the whole of this transportation
had been reversed after the Belgrade revolution and the three
Panzer divisions sent back to Rumania. This shuffling and reversal
of about sixty trains could not be concealed from our
agents on the spot.

To me it illuminated the whole Eastern scene like a lightning
flash. The sudden movement to Cracow of so much armour
needed in the Balkan sphere could only mean Hitler’s intention
to invade Russia in May. This seemed to me henceforward
certainly his major purpose. The fact that the Belgrade revolution
had required their return to Rumania involved perhaps
a delay from May to June. I sent the momentous news at once
to Mr. Eden in Athens.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden, Athens

30 March 41

My reading of the Intelligence is that the bad man concentrated
very large armoured forces, etc., to overawe Yugoslavia and Greece,
and hoped to get former or both without fighting. The moment
he was sure Yugoslavia was in the Axis he moved three of the five
Panzers towards the Bear, believing that what was left would be
enough to finish the Greek affair. However, the Belgrade revolution
upset this picture and caused the northward move to be
arrested in transit. This can only mean, in my opinion, the intention
to attack Yugoslavia at earliest, or alternatively [to] act against
the Turk. It looks as if heavy forces will be used in Balkan Peninsula
and that Bear will be kept waiting a bit. Furthermore, these
orders and counter-orders in their relation to the Belgrade coup
seem to reveal magnitude of design both towards southeast and
east. This is the clearest indication we have had so far. Let me
know in guarded terms whether you and Dill agree with my impressions.

I also cast about for some means of warning Stalin, and, by
arousing him to his danger, establishing contacts with him like
those I had made with President Roosevelt. I made the message
short and cryptic, hoping that this very fact, and that it was the
first message I had sent him since my formal telegram of June
25, 1940, commending Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador,
would arrest his attention and make him ponder.

Prime Minister to Sir Stafford Cripps

3 April 41

Following from me to M. Stalin, provided it can be personally
delivered by you:

I have sure information from a trusted agent that when the Germans
thought they had got Yugoslavia in the net—that is to say,
after March 20—they began to move three out of the five Panzer
divisions from Rumania to Southern Poland. The moment they
heard of the Serbian revolution this movement was countermanded.
Your Excellency will readily appreciate the significance of these
facts.

The Foreign Secretary, who had by this time returned from
Cairo, added some comments:

If your reception gives you opportunity of developing the argument,
you might point out that this change in German military
dispositions surely implies that Hitler, through the action of Yugoslavia,
has now postponed his previous plans for threatening Soviet
Government. If so, it should be possible for Soviet Government
to use this opportunity to strengthen their own position. This
delay shows that the enemy forces are not unlimited, and illustrates
the advantage that will follow anything like a united front.

2. Obvious way of Soviet Government strengthening its own
position would be to furnish material help to Turkey and Greece,
and through latter to Yugoslavia. This help might so increase
German difficulties in Balkans as still further to delay the German
attack on Soviet Union, of which there are so many signs. If, however,
opportunity is not now taken to put every possible spoke in
the German wheel danger might revive in a few months’ time.

3. You would not, of course, imply that we ourselves required
any assistance from Soviet Government or that they would be acting
in any interests but their own. What we want them to realise,
however, is that Hitler intends to attack them sooner or later if
he can; that the fact that he is in conflict with us is not in itself
sufficient to prevent him doing so if he is not also involved in some
special embarrassment, such as now confronts him in Balkans, and
that it is consequently in Soviet interests to take every possible step
to ensure that he does not settle his Balkan problem in the way
he wants.

The British Ambassador did not reply till April 12, when he
said that just before my telegram had been received he had himself
addressed to Vyshinsky a long personal letter reviewing the
succession of failures of the Soviet Government to counteract
German encroachments in the Balkans, and urging in the
strongest terms that the U.S.S.R. in her own interest must now
decide on an immediate vigorous policy of co-operation with
countries still opposing the Axis in that area if she was not to
miss the last chance of defending her own frontiers in alliance
with others.

Were I now [he said] to convey through Molotov the Prime Minister’s
message, which expresses the same thesis in very much
shorter and less emphatic form, I fear that the only effect would be
probably to weaken impression already made by my letter to Vyshinsky.
Soviet Government would not, I feel sure, understand
why so short and fragmentary a commentary on facts of which
they are certainly well aware, without any definite request for explanation
of Soviet Government’s attitude or suggestion for action
by them, should be conveyed in so formal a manner.

I have felt bound to put these considerations before you, as I
greatly fear that delivery of Prime Minister’s message would be not
merely ineffectual but a serious tactical mistake. If, however, you
are unable to share this view, I will, of course, endeavour to arrange
urgently for an interview with Molotov.

On this the Foreign Secretary minuted to me:

In this new situation I think there may be some force in Sir
Stafford Cripps’ arguments against the delivery of your message.
If you agree I would propose to tell him that he need not now
deliver the message, but that if Vyshinsky responds favourably to
his letter he should give the latter the facts contained in your
message. Meanwhile I should ask him to telegraph to us as soon
as possible a summary of the letter which he has sent to Vyshinsky
and to send us the text by the next opportunity.

I was vexed at this and at the delay which had occurred. This
was the only message before the attack that I sent Stalin direct.
Its brevity, the exceptional character of the communication,
the fact that it came from the head of the Government and was
to be delivered personally to the head of the Russian Government
by the Ambassador, were all intended to give it special
significance and arrest Stalin’s attention.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

16 April 41

I set special importance on the delivery of this personal message
from me to Stalin. I cannot understand why it should be resisted.
The Ambassador is not alive to the military significance of the
facts. Pray oblige me.

And again:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

18 April 41

Has Sir Stafford Cripps yet delivered my personal message of
warning about the German danger to Stalin? I am very much surprised
that so much delay should have occurred, considering the
importance I attach to this extremely pregnant piece of information.

The Foreign Secretary, therefore, telegraphed on the eighteenth
to the Ambassador instructing him to deliver my message.
As no answer was received from Sir Stafford, I asked what had
happened.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

30 April 41

When did Sir Stafford Cripps deliver my message to Mr. Stalin?
Will you very kindly ask him to report.

Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister

30 April 41

Sir Stafford Cripps sent the message to M. Vyshinsky on April
19, and M. Vyshinsky informed him in writing on April 23 that it
had been conveyed to M. Stalin.

I very much regret that, owing to an error, the telegrams reporting
this were not sent to you at the time. I attach copies.

These were the enclosures:

Sir Stafford Cripps, Moscow, to Foreign Secretary

19 April 41

I have today sent text of message to Vyshinsky, asking him to
convey it to Stalin. It was not clear from your telegram whether
commentary was to be incorporated in message or added as from
myself, and consequently, in view of my letter to Vyshinsky of
April 11 and my interview with him yesterday, I felt it preferable
to abstain from adding any commentary, which could only have
been repetition.

Sir Stafford Cripps, Moscow, to Foreign Secretary

22 April 41

Vyshinsky informed me in writing today that message had been
conveyed to Stalin.

I cannot form any final judgment upon whether my message,
if delivered with all the promptness and ceremony prescribed,
would have altered the course of events. Nevertheless, I still
regret that my instructions were not carried out effectively. If
I had had any direct contact with Stalin I might perhaps have
prevented him from having so much of his air force destroyed
on the ground.

* * * * *

We know now that Hitler’s directive of December 18 had
prescribed May 15 as the date for invading Russia, and that in
his fury at the revolution in Belgrade this date had on March
27 been postponed for a month, and later till June 22. Until
the middle of March the troop movements in the north on the
main Russian front were not of a character to require special
German measures of concealment. On March 13, however,
orders were issued by Berlin to terminate the work of the Russian
commissions working in German territory and to send
them home. The presence of Russians in this part of Germany
could only be permitted up to March 25. In the northern sector
strong German formations were already being assembled.
From March 20 onward an even heavier massing would take
place.[3]

On April 22 the Soviet complained to the German Foreign
Office about continuing and increasing violations of the
U.S.S.R. boundary by German planes. From March 27 to April
18 eighty such cases had occurred. “It is very likely,” added
the Russian note, “that serious incidents are to be expected if
German planes continue to fly across the Soviet border.”

The German reply was a series of counter-complaints against
Soviet planes.

* * * * *

During this time the one hundred and twenty German divisions
of the highest quality were assembling in their three army
groups along the Russian front. The Southern Group, under
Rundstedt, was, for the reasons explained, far from well found
in armour. Its Panzer divisions had only recently returned
from Greece and Yugoslavia. Despite the postponement of the
date till June 22, they badly needed rest and overhaul after
their mechanical wear and tear in the Balkans.

On April 13 Schulenburg came from Moscow to Berlin. Hitler
received him on April 28, and treated his Ambassador to a
tirade on the Russian gesture towards Yugoslavia. Schulenburg,
according to his minute of this conversation, strove to excuse
the Soviet behavior. He related that “Russia was alarmed
by the rumours predicting a German attack. He could not believe
that Russia would ever attack Germany. Hitler said that
he had been forewarned by events in Serbia. What had happened
there was to him an example of the political unreliability
of states.” But Schulenburg adhered to the theme which had
governed all his reports from Moscow. “I am convinced that
Stalin is prepared to make even further concessions to us. It
has already been indicated to our economic negotiators that (if
we applied in due time) Russia could supply us with up to five
million tons of grain a year.”[4]

Schulenburg returned to Moscow on April 30, profoundly
disillusioned by his interview with Hitler. He had a clear impression
that Hitler was bent on war. It seems that he had even
tried to warn the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, Dekanosov, in
this sense. And he fought persistently in the last hours of his
policy of Russo-German understanding.

Weizsäcker, the official head of the German Foreign Office,
was a highly competent civil servant of the type to be found in
the Government departments of many countries. He was not a
politician with executive power, and would not, according to

British custom, be held accountable for State policy. He is now
undergoing seven years’ penal servitude by the decree of the
courts set up by the conquerors. Although he is, therefore, classified
as a war criminal, he certainly wrote good advice to his
superiors, which we may be glad they did not take. He commented
as follows upon this interview:

Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop

Berlin, April 28, 1941

I can summarise in one sentence my views on a German-Russian
conflict. If every Russian city reduced to ashes were as valuable
to us as a sunken British warship, I should advocate the German-Russian
war for this summer; but I believe that we should be victors
over Russia only in a military sense, and should, on the other
hand, lose in an economic sense.

It might perhaps be considered an alluring prospect to give the
Communist system its death-blow, and it might also be said that it
was inherent in the logic of things to muster the Eurasian continent
against Anglo-Saxondom and its following. But the sole
decisive factor is whether this project will hasten the fall of
England.

We must distinguish between two possibilities:

(a) England is close to collapse. If we accept this assumption
we shall encourage England by taking on a new opponent. Russia
is no potential ally of the English. England can expect nothing
good from Russia. Hope in Russia is not postponing England’s
collapse. With Russia we do not destroy any English hopes.

(b) If we do not believe in the imminent collapse of England,
then the thought might suggest itself that by the use of force we
must feed ourselves from Soviet territory. I take it as a matter of
course that we shall advance victoriously to Moscow and beyond
that. I doubt very much, however, whether we shall be able to
turn to account what we have won in the face of the well-known
passive resistance of the Slavs. I do not see in the Russian State
any effective opposition capable of succeeding the Communist
system and uniting with us and being of service to us. We should,
therefore, probably have to reckon with a continuation of the
Stalin system in Eastern Russia and in Siberia and with a renewed
outbreak of hostilities in the spring of 1942. The window to the
Pacific Ocean would remain shut.

A German attack on Russia would only give the British new
moral strength. It would be interpreted there as German uncertainty
about the success of our fight against England. We
should thereby not only be admitting that the war was going to
last a long time yet, but we might actually prolong it in this way,
instead of shortening it.

On May 7 Schulenburg hopefully reported that Stalin had
taken over the chairmanship of the Council of People’s Commissars
in place of Molotov, and had thereby become head of
the Government of the Soviet Union.

The reason for this may be sought in the recent mistakes in
foreign policy which led to a cooling-off of the cordiality of German-Soviet
relations, for the creation and preservation of which
Stalin had consciously striven.

In his new capacity Stalin assumes responsibility for all acts of
the Government, in both the domestic and foreign fields. . . . I
am convinced that Stalin will use his new position in order to take
part personally in the maintenance and development of good relations
between the Soviets and Germany.

The German Naval Attaché, reporting from Moscow, expressed
the same point in these words: “Stalin is the pivot of
German-Soviet collaboration.” Examples of Russian appeasement
of Germany increased. On May 3 Russia had officially
recognised the pro-German Government of Rashid Ali in Iraq.
On May 7 the diplomatic representatives of Belgium and Norway
were expelled from Russia. Even the Yugoslav Minister
was flung out. At the beginning of June the Greek Legation
was banished from Moscow. As General Thomas, the head of
the economic section of the German War Ministry, later wrote
in his paper on the war economy of the Reich: “The Russians
executed their deliveries up to the eve of the attack, and in the
last days the transport of rubber from the Far East was expedited
by express trains.”

We had not, of course, full information about the Moscow
moods, but the German purpose seemed plain and comprehensible.
On May 16 I cabled to General Smuts: “It looks
as if Hitler is massing against Russia. A ceaseless movement of
troops, armoured forces, and aircraft northward from the
Balkans and eastward from France and Germany is in progress.”
Stalin must have tried very hard to preserve his illusions about
Hitler’s policy. After another month of intense German troop
movement and deployment, Schulenburg could telegraph to
the German Foreign Office on June 13:

People’s Commissar Molotov has just given me the following
text of a Tass dispatch which will be broadcast tonight and published
in the papers tomorrow:

Even before the return of the English Ambassador Cripps to
London, but especially since his return, there have been widespread
rumours of an impending war between the U.S.S.R. and
Germany in the English and foreign press. These allege:

That Germany supposedly has made various territorial and
economic demands on the U.S.S.R., and negotiations are impending
between Germany and the U.S.S.R. for a new and closer agreement.

2. That the Soviet Union is supposed to have declined these
demands, and that as a result Germany has begun to concentrate
her troops on the frontier of the Soviet Union in order to attack
the Soviet Union.

3. That on its side the Soviet Union is supposed to have begun
intensive preparations for war with Germany and to have concentrated
its troops on the German border.

Despite the obvious absurdity of these rumours, responsible
circles in Moscow have thought it necessary to state that they are
a clumsy propaganda manoeuvre of the forces arrayed against the
Soviet Union and Germany, which are interested in a spread and
intensification of the war.

Hitler had every right to be content with the success of his
measures of deception and concealment, and with his victim’s
state of mind.

Molotov’s final fatuity is worth recording.

Schulenburg to the German Foreign Office

Moscow, June 22, 1941, 1.17 A.M.

Molotov summoned me to his office this evening at 9.30 P.M.
After he had mentioned the alleged repeated border violations by
German aircraft, with the remark that Dekanosov had been instructed
to call on the Reich Foreign Minister in this matter,
Molotov stated as follows:

There were a number of indications that the German Government
was dissatisfied with the Soviet Government. Rumours were
even current that a war was impending between Germany and the
Soviet Union. They found sustenance in the fact that there was no
reaction whatsoever on the part of Germany to the Tass report of
June 15; that it was not even published in Germany. The Soviet
Government was unable to understand the reasons for Germany’s
dissatisfaction. If the Yugoslav question had at the time given rise
to such dissatisfaction, he—Molotov—believed that by means of
his earlier communications he had cleared up this question, which,
moreover, was a thing of the past. He would appreciate it if I
could tell him what had brought about the present situation in
German-Soviet Russian relations.

I replied that I could not answer his question, as I lacked the
pertinent information; that I would, however, transmit his communication
to Berlin.

* * * * *

But the hour had now struck.

Ribbentrop to Schulenburg

Berlin, June 21, 1941

Upon receipt of this telegram all of the cipher material still
there is to be destroyed. The radio set is to be put out of commission.

2. Please inform Herr Molotov at once that you have an urgent
communication to make to him and would, therefore, like to call
on him immediately. Then please make the following declaration
to him:

“. . . The Government of the Reich declares that the Soviet Government,
contrary to the obligations it assumed, (1) has not only
continued, but even intensified, its attempts to undermine Germany
and Europe; (2) has adopted a more and more anti-German
foreign policy; (3) has concentrated all its forces in readiness at
the German border.

“Thereby the Soviet Government has broken its treaties with
Germany and is about to attack Germany from the rear, in its
struggle for life. The Fuehrer has, therefore, ordered the German
armed forces to oppose this threat with all the means at their
disposal.”

Please do not enter into any discussion of this communication.
It is incumbent upon the Government of Soviet Russia to safeguard
the security of the Embassy personnel.

At 4 A.M. on June 22 Ribbentrop delivered a formal declaration
of war to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin. At daybreak
Schulenburg presented himself to Molotov in the Kremlin. The
latter listened in silence to the statement read by the German
Ambassador, and then commented, “It is war. Your aircraft
have just bombarded some ten open villages. Do you believe
that we deserved that?”[5]

In the face of the Tass broadcast it had been vain for us to
add to the various warnings which Eden had given to the Soviet
Ambassador in London or for me to make a renewed personal
effort to arouse Stalin to his peril. Even more precise information
had been constantly sent to the Soviet Government by the
United States. Nothing that any of us could do pierced the
purblind prejudice and fixed ideas which Stalin had raised between
himself and the terrible truth. Although on German
estimates 186 Russian divisions were massed behind the Soviet
boundaries, of which 119 faced the German front, the Russian
armies to a large extent were taken by surprise. The Germans
found no signs of offensive preparations in the forward zone,
and the Russian covering troops were swiftly overpowered.
Something like the disaster which had befallen the Polish Air
Force on September 1, 1939, was now to be repeated on a far
larger scale on the Russian airfields, and many hundreds of Russian
planes were caught at daybreak and destroyed before they
could get into the air. Thus the ravings of hatred against Britain
and the United States which the Soviet propaganda machine
cast upon the midnight air were overwhelmed at dawn by the
German cannonade. The wicked are not always clever, nor are
dictators always right.

* * * * *

It is impossible to complete this account without referring to
a terrible decision of policy adopted by Hitler towards his new
foes, and enforced under all the pressure of the mortal struggle
in vast barren or ruined lands and winter horrors. Verbal orders
were given by him at a conference on June 14, 1941, which
to a large extent governed the conduct of the German Army
towards the Russian troops and people, and led to many ruthless
and barbarous deeds. According to the Nuremberg documents,
General Halder testified:

Prior to the attack on Russia the Fuehrer called a conference of
all the commanders and persons connected with the Supreme Command
on the question of the forthcoming attack on Russia. I cannot
recall the exact date of this conference. . . . At this conference
the Fuehrer stated that the methods used in the war against the
Russians would have to be different from those used against the
West. . . . He said that the struggle between Russia and Germany
was a Russian struggle. He stated that since the Russians were not
signatories of the Hague Convention the treatment of their prisoners
of war did not have to follow the Articles of the Convention. . . .
He [also] said that the so-called Commissars should not
be considered prisoners of war.[6]

And according to Keitel:

Hitler’s main theme was that this was the decisive battle between
the two ideologies and that this fact made it impossible
to use in this war [with Russia] methods, as we soldiers knew them,
which were considered to be the only correct ones under international
law.[7]

* * * * *

On the evening of Friday, June 20, I drove down to Chequers
alone. I knew that the German onslaught upon Russia was a
matter of days, or it might be hours. I had arranged to deliver
a broadcast on Saturday night dealing with this event. It would,
of course, have to be in guarded terms. Moreover, at this time
the Soviet Government, at once haughty and purblind, regarded
every warning we gave as a mere attempt of beaten men to drag
others into ruin. As the result of my reflections in the car,
I put off the broadcast till Sunday night, when I thought all
would be clear. Thus Saturday passed with its usual toil.

Five days earlier, on the fifteenth, I had cabled to President
Roosevelt as follows:

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

15 June 41

From every source at my disposal, including some most trustworthy,
it looks as if a vast German onslaught on Russia was imminent.
Not only are the main German armies deployed from
Finland to Rumania, but the final arrivals of air and armoured
forces are being completed. The pocket-battleship Lutzow, which
put her nose out of the Skaggerak yesterday and was promptly
torpedoed by our coastal aircraft, was very likely going north to
give naval strength on the Arctic flank. Should this new war break
out, we shall, of course, give all encouragement and any help we
can spare to the Russians, following the principle that Hitler is
the foe we have to beat. I do not expect any class political reactions
here, and trust a German-Russian conflict will not cause you
any embarrassment.

The American Ambassador, who was my guest at the week-end,
brought me the President’s answer to my message. He
promised that if the Germans struck at Russia he would immediately
support publicly “any announcement that the Prime
Minister might make welcoming Russia as an ally.” Mr. Winant
delivered this important reassurance verbally.

* * * * *

When I awoke on the morning of Sunday, June 22,
the news was brought to me of Hitler’s invasion of Russia.
This changed conviction into certainty. I had not the slightest
doubt where our duty and our policy lay. Nor indeed what to
say. There only remained the task of composing it. I asked that
notice should immediately be given that I would broadcast at
nine o’clock that night. Presently General Dill, who had
hastened down from London, came into my bedroom with
detailed news. The Germans had invaded Russia on an enormous
front, had surprised a large portion of the Soviet Air Force
grounded on the airfields, and seemed to be driving forward
with great rapidity and violence. The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff added, “I suppose they will be rounded up in
hordes.”

I spent the day composing my statement. There was not time
to consult the War Cabinet; nor was it necessary. I knew that
we all felt the same on this issue. Mr. Eden, Lord Beaverbrook,
and Sir Stafford Cripps—he had left Moscow on the tenth—were
also with me during the day.

* * * * *

The following account of this Sunday at Chequers by my
private secretary, Mr. Colville, who was on duty this week-end,
may be of interest:

On Saturday, June 21, I went down to Chequers just before dinner.
Mr. and Mrs. Winant, Mr. and Mrs. Eden, and Edward
Bridges were staying. During dinner Mr. Churchill said that a
German attack on Russia was now certain, and he thought that
Hitler was counting on enlisting capitalist and Right Wing sympathies
in this country and the U.S.A. Hitler was, however, wrong
and we should go all out to help Russia. Winant said the same
would be true of the U.S.A.

After dinner, when I was walking on the croquet lawn with Mr.
Churchill, he reverted to this theme, and I asked whether for him,
the arch anti-Communist, this was [not] bowing down in the House
of Rimmon. Mr. Churchill replied, “Not at all. I have only one
purpose, the destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified
thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable
reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”

2. I was awoken at 4 A.M. the following morning by a telephone
message from the F.O. to the effect that Germany had attacked
Russia. The P.M. had always said that he was never to be
woken up for anything but invasion [of England]. I therefore
postponed telling him till 8 A.M. His only comment was, “Tell
the B.B.C. I will broadcast at nine tonight.” He began to prepare
the speech at 11 A.M., and except for luncheon, at which Sir Stafford
Cripps, Lord Cranborne, and Lord Beaverbrook were present,
he devoted the whole day to it. . . . The speech was only ready at
twenty minutes to nine.

In this broadcast I said:

The Nazi régime is indistinguishable from the worst features of
Communism. It is devoid of all theme and principle except appetite
and racial domination. It excels all forms of human wickedness
in the efficiency of its cruelty and ferocious aggression. No
one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I
have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no word that I
have spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle
which is now unfolding. The past, with its crimes, its follies, and
its tragedies, flashes away. I see the Russian soldiers standing on
the threshold of their native land, guarding the fields which their
fathers have tilled from time immemorial. I see them guarding
their homes where mothers and wives pray—ah, yes, for there are
times when all pray—for the safety of their loved ones, the return
of the bread-winner, of their champion, of their protector. I see
the ten thousand villages of Russia where the means of existence
is wrung so hardly from the soil, but where there are still primordial
human joys, where maidens laugh and children play. I
see advancing upon all this in hideous onslaught the Nazi war
machine, with its clanking, heel-clicking, dandified Prussian officers,
its crafty expert agents fresh from the cowing and tying-down
of a dozen countries. I see also the dull, drilled, docile, brutish
masses of the Hun soldiery plodding on like a swarm of crawling
locusts. I see the German bombers and fighters in the sky, still
smarting from many a British whipping, delighted to find what
they believe is an easier and a safer prey.

Behind all this glare, behind all this storm, I see that small
group of villainous men who plan, organise, and launch this cataract
of horrors upon mankind. . . .

I have to declare the decision of His Majesty’s Government—and
I feel sure it is a decision in which the great Dominions will
in due course concur—for we must speak out now at once, without
a day’s delay. I have to make the declaration, but can you
doubt what our policy will be? We have but one aim and one
single, irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and
every vestige of the Nazi régime. From this nothing will turn us—nothing.
We will never parley, we will never negotiate with
Hitler or any of his gang. We shall fight him by land, we shall
fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the air, until, with God’s
help, we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its
peoples from his yoke. Any man or state who fights on against
Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with
Hitler is our foe. . . . That is our policy and that is our declaration.
It follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we
can to Russia and the Russian people. We shall appeal to all our
friends and allies in every part of the world to take the same course
and pursue it, as we shall faithfully and steadfastly to the end. . . .

This is no class war, but a war in which the whole British Empire
and Commonwealth of Nations is engaged, without distinction
of race, creed, or party. It is not for me to speak of the action
of the United States, but this I will say, if Hitler imagines that his
attack on Soviet Russia will cause the slightest divergence of aims
or slackening of effort in the great democracies who are resolved
upon his doom, he is woefully mistaken. On the contrary, we
shall be fortified and encouraged in our efforts to rescue mankind
from his tyranny. We shall be strengthened and not weakened in
determination and in resources.

This is no time to moralise on the follies of countries and Governments
which have allowed themselves to be struck down one
by one, when by united action they could have saved themselves
and saved the world from this catastrophe. But when I spoke a
few minutes ago of Hitler’s blood-lust and the hateful appetites
which have impelled or lured him on his Russian adventure, I said
there was one deeper motive behind his outrage. He wishes to
destroy the Russian power because he hopes that if he succeeds
in this he will be able to bring back the main strength of his
army and air force from the East and hurl it upon this island,
which he knows he must conquer or suffer the penalty of his
crimes. His invasion of Russia is no more than a prelude to an
attempted invasion of the British Isles. He hopes, no doubt, that
all this may be accomplished before the winter comes, and that he
can overwhelm Great Britain before the Fleet and air power of the
United States may intervene. He hopes that he may once again
repeat, upon a greater scale than ever before, that process of destroying
his enemies one by one by which he has so long thrived
and prospered, and that then the scene will be clear for the final
act, without which all his conquests would be in vain—namely,
the subjugation of the Western Hemisphere to his will and to his
system.

The Russian danger is, therefore, our danger, and the danger
of the United States, just as the cause of any Russian fighting for
his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in
every quarter of the globe. Let us learn the lessons already taught
by such cruel experience. Let us redouble our exertions, and strike
with united strength while life and power remain.

I do not wish such reports as are received to be sifted and digested by the
various Intelligence authorities. For the present Major Morton will inspect
them for me and submit what he considers of major importance. He is to be
shown everything, and submit authentic documents to me in their original
form.

This was the last act of Count Schulenburg’s diplomatic career. Late in
1943 his name appears in the secret circles of conspiracy against Hitler in Germany
as possible Foreign Minister of a Government to succeed the Nazi régime
in view of his special qualifications to negotiate a separate peace with Stalin.
He was arrested by the Nazis after the attempted assassination of Hitler in
July, 1944, and imprisoned in the Gestapo cells. On November 10 he was
executed.

1Our Soviet Ally

Hitler’s Plan for the Invasion of Russia—Soviet Demands on
Britain—“Second Front Now”—Russian Ignorance of Amphibious
War—I Address Stalin—A Military Mission Goes to
Moscow—Naval Contacts—A War Alliance Proposed—Stalin
Presses for the Second Front—Our Reasoned Reply—Our
Efforts to Supply the Russian Army—Ten Thousand Tons of
Rubber—Fruitless Attempts to Establish Friendly Relations
with Stalin—The German Attack Develops—Russia’s Attitude
to Poland—Our View—Russia a Burden upon Us at First.

Hitler’s invasion of Russia altered the values and relationships
of the war. The Soviet prejudices had blinded
them to many of the steps which comprehension and prudence
would have dictated for their own safety. On the other hand,
by indifference to the fate of others they had gained time, and
when their hour of trial struck, on June 22, 1941, they were far
stronger than Hitler imagined. Perhaps not only he but his
generals had been misled by their poor performance against the
Finns. Nevertheless, it was the Russians who were taken by
surprise, and tremendous initial disasters fell upon them. It
will not be possible in this account to do more than place before
the reader the salient features of the new colossal struggle of
armies and populations which now began.

The German line of battle was drawn up along the whole
frontier from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Northern Army
Group, under von Leeb, with twenty-nine divisions, including
three armoured and three motorised, was to advance from
East Prussia upon Leningrad. The Central Army Group, under
von Bock, consisting of fifty divisions, including nine armoured
and six motorised, was to move from Northern Poland on
Smolensk. The Southern Army Group of von Rundstedt,
with forty-one divisions, including five armoured and three
motorised, was to drive from Southern Poland to the lower
Dnieper. A further twenty-six divisions were held, or would
shortly be available, as the General Reserve. Over twenty-seven
hundred aircraft supported the attack. In the North twelve
Finnish divisions were to advance on Leningrad to support the
main attack. In the South eleven divisions of the Rumanian
Army were to stand on the defensive along the river Pruth, and
six to join in the advance of Army Group South. In all one
hundred and sixty-four divisions rolled eastward.

The invaders, according to the best accounts available, were
confronted by a hundred and nineteen Russian divisions and
at least five thousand aircraft. Sixty-seven more divisions were
available in Finland, the Caucasus, and in Central Russia.
Although nearly equal in numbers to the German armies, the
Russians were at once swept back by deep-plunging armoured
thrusts, and their air force suffered severe losses. Other countries
had been surprised and overrun. Only vast Russia had
the supreme advantage of depth; and this was once again to
prove her salvation. In the first month the Germans bit and
tore their way three hundred miles into Russia. Smolensk was
taken after stern fighting in which the Russians had counter-attacked
heavily. But Leningrad was not attained, and Kiev
was still in Russian hands.

* * * * *

Up to the moment when the Soviet Government was set upon
by Hitler they seemed to care for no one but themselves.
Afterwards this mood naturally became more marked. Hitherto
they had watched with stony composure the destruction of the
front in France in 1940, and our vain efforts in 1941 to create
a front in the Balkans. They had given important economic aid
to Nazi Germany and had helped them in more minor ways.
Now, having been deceived and taken by surprise, they were
themselves under the flaming German sword. Their first impulse
and lasting policy was to demand all possible succour
from Great Britain and her Empire, the possible partition of
which between Stalin and Hitler had for the last eight months
beguiled Soviet minds from the progress of German concentration
in the East. They did not hesitate to appeal in urgent
and strident terms to harassed and struggling Britain to send
them the munitions of which her armies were so short. They
urged the United States to divert to them the largest quantities
of the supplies on which we were counting, and above all, even
in the summer of 1941 they clamoured for British landings in
Europe, regardless of risk and cost, to establish a second front.
The British Communists, who had hitherto done their worst,
which was not much, in our factories, and had denounced “the
capitalist and imperialist war,” turned about again overnight
and began to scrawl the slogan, “Second Front Now,” upon the
walls and hoardings.

We did not allow these somewhat sorry and ignominious facts
to disturb our thought, and fixed our gaze upon the heroic
sacrifices of the Russian people under the calamities which their
Government had brought upon them, and their passionate
defence of their native soil. This, while the struggle lasted,
made amends for all.

* * * * *

The Russians never understood in the smallest degree the
nature of the amphibious operation necessary to disembark and
maintain a great army upon a well-defended hostile coast.
Even the Americans were at this time largely unaware of the
difficulties. Not only sea but air superiority at the invasion
point was indispensable. Moreover, there was a third vital
factor. A vast armada of specially constructed landing-craft,
above all tank landing-craft in numerous varieties, was the
foundation of any successful heavily opposed landing. For the
creation of this armada, as has been and will be seen, I had
long done my best. It could not be ready even on a minor scale
before the summer of 1943, and its power, as is now widely
recognised, could not be developed on a sufficient scale till
1944. At the period we have now reached, in the autumn of
1941, we had no mastery of the enemy air over Europe, except
in the Pas de Calais, where the strongest German fortifications
existed. The landing-craft were only a-building. We had not
even got an army in Britain as large, as well trained, as well
equipped, as the one we should have to meet on French soil.
Yet Niagaras of folly and misstatement still pour out on this
question of the Second Front. There was certainly no hope
of convincing the Soviet Government at this or any other time.
Stalin even suggested to me on one occasion later on that if the
British were afraid he would be willing to send round three
or four Russian army corps to do the job. It was not in my
power, through lack of shipping and other physical facts, to
take him at his word.

* * * * *

There was no response from the Soviet Government to my
broadcast to Russia and the world on the day of the German
attack, except that parts of it were printed in Pravda and other
Russian Government organs, and that we were asked to receive
a Russian Military Mission. The silence on the top level was
oppressive, and I thought it my duty to break the ice. I quite
understood that they might feel shy, considering all that had
passed since the outbreak of the war between the Soviets and
the Western Allies, and remembering what had happened
twenty years before between me and the Bolshevik Revolutionary
Government. I therefore addressed myself to Stalin
and expressed our intention to bring all aid in our power to
the Russian people.

Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin

7 July 41

We are all very glad here that the Russian armies are making
such strong and spirited resistance to the utterly unprovoked and
merciless invasion of the Nazis. There is general admiration of
the bravery and tenacity of the soldiers and people. We shall do
everything to help you that time, geography, and our growing resources
allow. The longer the war lasts, the more help we can give.
We are making very heavy attacks both by day and night with our
air force upon all German-occupied territory and all Germany
within our reach. About four hundred daylight sorties were made
overseas yesterday. On Saturday night over two hundred heavy
bombers attacked German towns, some carrying three tons apiece,
and last night nearly two hundred and fifty heavy bombers were
operating. This will go on. Thus we hope to force Hitler to bring
back some of his air power to the West and gradually take some of
the strain off you. Besides this the Admiralty have at my desire
prepared a serious operation to come off in the near future in the
Arctic, after which I hope contact will be established between the
British and Russian Navies. Meanwhile by sweeps along the Norwegian
coast we have intercepted various supply ships which were
moving north against you.

We welcome arrival of Russian Military Mission in order to
concert future plans.

We have only got to go on fighting to beat the life out of these
villains.

The first step was clearly to make such contact as was
permitted by the Soviet authorities with the Russian Military
Command. Accordingly, after obtaining the necessary consent
from our new allies, a powerful Military Mission was at once
dispatched to Moscow. It was also urgent to create relations
between the two navies. On July 10 I sent the following minute
to the Admiralty:

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord

10 July 41

It seems absolutely necessary to send a small mixed squadron
of British ships to the Arctic to form contact and operate with the
Russian naval forces. This should be done in advance of the particular
operation we have in hand. The effect upon the Russian
Navy and upon the general resistance of the Russian Army of the
arrival of what would be called a British fleet in the Arctic might
be of enormous value and spare a lot of English blood.

The advantage we should reap if the Russians could keep the
field and go on with the war, at any rate until the winter closes in,
is measureless. A premature peace by Russia would be a terrible
disappointment to great masses of people in our country. As long
as they go on it does not matter so much where the front lies.
These people have shown themselves worth backing, and we must
make sacrifices and take risks, even at inconvenience, which I
realise, to maintain their morale. . . . The squadron would no
doubt go to Archangel.

Pray let me know about this at your earliest.

* * * * *

We also hoped at this early stage to establish the general
basis of a war alliance between the two countries.

Ambassador Cripps having reported his talk with you and having
stated the terms of a proposed Anglo-Russian agreed declaration
under two heads, namely, (1) mutual help without any precision
as to quantity or quality, and (2) neither country to conclude a
separate peace, I have immediately convened the War Cabinet, including
Mr. Fraser, Prime Minister of the Dominion of New Zealand,
who is with us now. It will be necessary for us to consult
with the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and South Africa, but
in the meanwhile I should like to assure you that we are wholly
in favour of the agreed declaration you propose. We think it
should be signed as soon as we have heard from the Dominions,
and published to the world immediately thereafter.

2. For your own information, what we have in mind is a declaration
in the following terms: H.M. Government in the United
Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.S.R. have agreed and
declare as follows: (1) The two Governments mutually undertake
to render each other assistance of all kinds in the present war
against Germany. (2) They further undertake that during this
war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty
of peace except by mutual agreement.

3. As Dominions Governments have to be consulted, you should
not yet communicate actual text to Stalin. But it will help to
show you what we mean and to give him any explanations he may
require.

Official communications passed between the two Foreign
Offices, but it was not until July 19 that I received the first
direct communication from M. Stalin. On that day M. Maisky,
the Soviet Ambassador in London, called on me to deliver the
following message:

M. Stalin to the Prime Minister

18 July 41

Let me express my gratitude for the two personal messages which
you have addressed to me.

Your messages were the starting-point of developments which
subsequently resulted in agreement between our two Governments.
Now, as you said with full justification, the Soviet Union and
Great Britain have become fighting allies in the struggle against
Hitlerite Germany. I have no doubt that in spite of the difficulties
our two States will be strong enough to crush our common enemy.

Perhaps it is not out of place to mention that the position of the
Soviet forces at the front remains tense. The consequences of the
unexpected breach of the Non-Aggression Pact by Hitler, as well
as of the sudden attack against the Soviet Union—both facts
bringing advantages to the German troops—still remain to be felt
by the Soviet armies.

It is easy to imagine that the position of the German forces
would have been many times more favourable had the Soviet
troops had to face the attack of the German forces, not in the
regions of Kishinev, Lwow, Brest, Kaunas, and Viborg, but in the
region of Odessa, Kamenets Podolski, Minsk, and the environs of
Leningrad.

It seems to me therefore that the military situation of the Soviet
Union, as well as of Great Britain, would be considerably improved
if there could be established a front against Hitler in the West—Northern
France, and in the North—the Arctic.

A front in Northern France could not only divert Hitler’s forces
from the East, but at the same time would make it impossible for
Hitler to invade Great Britain. The establishment of the front just
mentioned would be popular with the British Army, as well as
with the whole population of Southern England.

I fully realise the difficulties involved in the establishment of
such a front. I believe however that in spite of the difficulties it
should be formed, not only in the interests of our common cause,
but also in the interests of Great Britain herself. This is the most
propitious moment for the establishment of such a front, because
now Hitler’s forces are diverted to the East and he has not yet had
the chance to consolidate the position occupied by him in the East.

It is still easier to establish a front in the North. Here, on the
part of Great Britain, would be necessary only naval and air operations,
without the landing of troops or artillery. The Soviet military,
naval, and air forces would take part in such an operation.
We would welcome it if Great Britain could transfer to this theatre
of war something like one light division or more of the Norwegian
volunteers, who could be used in Northern Norway to organise
rebellion against the Germans.

Thus the Russian pressure for the establishment of a Second
Front was initiated at the very beginning of our correspondence,
and this theme was to recur throughout our subsequent relations
with monotonous disregard, except in the Far North, for
physical facts. This, my first telegram from Stalin, contained
the only sign of compunction I ever perceived in the Soviet
attitude. In this he volunteered a defence of the Soviet change
of side, and of his agreement with Hitler before the outbreak of
the war, and dwelt, as I have already done in my first volume,
on the Russians’ strategic need to hold a German deployment
as far as possible to the west in Poland in order to gain time for
the fullest development of Russian far-drawn military strength.
I have never underrated this argument, and could well afford
to reply in comprehending terms upon it.

Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin

20 July 41

I am very glad to get your message, and to learn from many
sources of the valiant fight and the many vigorous counter-attacks
with which the Russian armies are defending their native soil. I
fully realise the military advantage you have gained by forcing
the enemy to deploy and engage on a forward westerly front, thus
exhausting some of the force of his initial effort.

2. Anything sensible and effective that we can do to help will
be done. I beg you however to realise limitations imposed upon
us by our resources and geographical position. From the first day
of the German attack upon Russia we have examined possibilities
of attacking Occupied France and the Low Countries. The Chiefs
of Staff do not see any way of doing anything on a scale likely to
be of the slightest use to you. The Germans have forty divisions in
France alone, and the whole coast has been fortified with German
diligence for more than a year, and bristles with cannon, wire, pillboxes,
and beach-mines. The only part where we could have even
temporary air superiority and air-fighter protection is from Dunkirk
to Boulogne. This is one mass of fortifications, with scores of
heavy guns commanding the sea approaches, many of which can
fire right across the Straits. There is less than five hours’ darkness,
and even then the whole area is illuminated by searchlights. To
attempt a landing in force would be to encounter a bloody repulse,
and petty raids would only lead to fiascos doing far more harm
than good to both of us. It would all be over without their having
to move or before they could move a single unit from your front.

3. You must remember that we have been fighting alone for
more than a year, and that, though our resources are growing and
will grow fast from now on, we are at the utmost strain both at
home and in the Middle East by land and air, and also that the
Battle of the Atlantic, on which our life depends, and the movement
of all our convoys in the teeth of the U-boat and Focke-Wulf
blockade, strains our naval resources, great though they be, to the
utmost limit.

4. It is therefore to the North we must look for any speedy help
we can give. The Naval Staff have been preparing for three weeks
past an operation by seaborne aircraft upon German shipping in
the north of Norway and Finland, hoping thereby to destroy enemy
power of transporting troops by sea to attack your Arctic flank.
We have asked your Staffs to keep a certain area clear of Russian
vessels between July 28 and August 2, when we shall hope to strike.
Secondly, we are sending forthwith some cruisers and destroyers to
Spitzbergen, whence they will be able to raid enemy shipping in
concert with your naval forces. Thirdly, we are sending a flotilla
of submarines to intercept German traffic on the Arctic coast, although
owing to perpetual daylight this service is particularly
dangerous. Fourthly, we are sending a minelayer with various supplies
to Archangel.

This is the most we can do at the moment. I wish it were more.
Pray let the most extreme secrecy be kept until the moment when
we tell you publicity will not be harmful.

5. There is no Norwegian Light Division in existence, and it
would be impossible to land troops, either British or Russian, on
German-occupied territory in perpetual daylight without having
first obtained reasonable fighter air cover. We had bitter experiences
at Namsos last year, and in Crete this year, of trying such
enterprises.

6. We are also studying as a further development the basing of
some British fighter air squadrons on Murmansk. This would
require first of all a consignment of anti-aircraft guns, then the
arrival of the aircraft, some of which could be flown off carriers
and others crated. When these were established our Spitsbergen
squadron could come to Murmansk and act with your naval forces.
We have reason to believe that the Germans have sent a strong
group of dive-bombers, which they are keeping for our benefit
should we arrive, and it is therefore necessary to proceed step by
step. All this however will take weeks.

7. Do not hesitate to suggest anything else that occurs to you,
and we will also be searching earnestly for other ways of striking
at the common foe.

* * * * *

From the first moment I did my utmost to help with munitions
and supplies, both by consenting to severe diversions from
the United States and by direct British sacrifices. Early in
September the equivalent of two Hurricane squadrons were
dispatched in H.M.S. Argus to Murmansk, to assist in the
defence of the naval base and to co-operate with Russian forces
in that area. By September 11 the squadrons were in action,
and they fought valiantly for three months. I was well aware
that in the early days of our alliance there was little we could
do, and I tried to fill the void by civilities.

Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin

25 July 41

I am glad to inform you that the War Cabinet have decided, in
spite of the fact that this will seriously deplete our fighter aircraft
resources, to send to Russia as soon as possible two hundred Tomahawk
fighter airplanes. One hundred and forty of these will be
sent from here to Archangel, and sixty from our supplies in the
United States of America. Details as to spare parts and American
personnel to erect the machines have still to be arranged with the
American Government.

2. Up to two to three million pairs of ankle boots should shortly
be available in this country for shipment. We are also arranging
to provide during the present year large quantities of rubber, tin,
wool and woollen cloth, jute, lead, and shellac. All your other
requirements from raw materials are receiving careful consideration.
Where supplies are impossible or limited from here, we are
discussing with the United States of America.

Details will of course be communicated to the usual official
channels.

3. We are watching with admiration and emotion Russia’s magnificent
fight, and all our information shows the heavy losses and
concern of the enemy. Our air attack on Germany will continue
with increasing strength.

Rubber was scarce and precious, and the Russian demand
for it was on the largest scale. I even broke into our modest
reserves.

Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin

28 July 41

Rubber. We will deliver the goods from here or United States
by the best and quickest route. Please say exactly what kind of
rubber, and which way you wish it to come. Preliminary orders
are already given. . . .

3. The grand resistance of the Russian Army in defence of their
soil unites us all. A terrible winter of bombing lies before Germany.
No one has yet had what they are going to get. The naval
operations mentioned in my last telegram to you are in progress.
Thank you very much for your comprehension in the midst of your
great fight of our difficulties in doing more. We will do our utmost.

Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin

31 July 41

Following my personal intervention, arrangements are now complete
for the dispatch of ten thousand tons of rubber from this
country to one of your northern ports.

In view of the urgency of your requirements, we are taking the
risk of depleting to this extent our metropolitan stocks, which are
none too large and will take time to replace. British ships carrying
this rubber, and certain other supplies, will be loaded within a
week, or at most ten days, and will sail to one of your northern
ports as soon as the Admiralty can arrange convoy. This new
amount of ten thousand tons is additional to the ten thousand
tons of rubber already allotted from Malaya.

* * * * *

I tried my best to build up by frequent personal telegrams
the same kind of happy relations which I had developed with
President Roosevelt. In this long Moscow series I received
many rebuffs and only rarely a kind word. In many cases the
telegrams were left unanswered altogether or for many days.

The Soviet Government had the impression that they were
conferring a great favour on us by fighting in their own country
for their own lives. The more they fought, the heavier our debt
became. This was not a balanced view. Two or three times
in this long correspondence I had to protest in blunt language,
but especially against the ill-usage of our sailors, who carried
at so much peril the supplies to Murmansk and Archangel.
Almost invariably however I bore hectoring and reproaches
with “a patient shrug; for sufferance is the badge” of all who
have to deal with the Kremlin. Moreover, I made constant
allowances for the pressures under which Stalin and his dauntless
Russian nation lay.

* * * * *

The German armies in Russia had driven deep into the
country, but at the end of July there arose a fundamental clash
of opinion between Hitler and Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief.
Brauchitsch held that Timoshenko’s Army Group,
which lay in front of Moscow, constituted the main Russian
strength and must first be defeated. This was orthodox doctrine.
Thereafter, Brauchitsch contended, Moscow, the main
military, political, and industrial nerve centre of all Russia,
should be taken. Hitler forcefully disagreed. He wished to gain
territory and destroy Russian armies on the broadest front. In
the North he demanded the capture of Leningrad, and in the
South of the industrial Donetz Basin, the Crimea, and the entry
to Russia’s Caucasian oil supplies. Meanwhile Moscow could
wait.

After vehement discussion Hitler overruled his Army chiefs.
The Northern Army Group, reinforced from the centre, was
ordered to press operations against Leningrad. The German
Centre Group was relegated to the defensive. They were
directed to send a Panzer group southward to take in flank the
Russians who were being pursued across the Dnieper by
Rundstedt. In this action the Germans prospered. By early
September a vast pocket of Russian forces was forming in the
triangle Konotop-Kremenchug-Kiev, and over half a million
men were killed or captured in the desperate fighting which
lasted all that month. In the North no such success could be
claimed. Leningrad was encircled but not taken. Hitler’s
decision had not been right. He now turned his mind and
will-power back to the centre. The besiegers of Leningrad
were ordered to detach mobile forces and part of their supporting
air force to reinforce a renewed drive on Moscow. The
Panzer group which had been sent south to von Rundstedt
came back again to join in the assault. At the end of September
the stage was reset for the formerly discarded central thrust,
while the southern armies drove on eastward to the lower Don,
whence the Caucasus would lie open to them.

* * * * *

The attitude of Russia to Poland lay at the root of our early
relations with the Soviets.

The German attack on Russia did not come as a surprise to
Polish circles abroad. Since March, 1941, reports from the
Polish underground upon German troop concentrations on the
western frontiers of Russia had been reaching their Government
in London. In the event of war a fundamental change in the
relations between Soviet Russia and the Polish Government
in exile would be inevitable. The first problem would be how
far the provisions of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August, 1939, relating
to Poland could be reversed without endangering the
unity of a combined Anglo-Russian war alliance. When the
news of the German attack on Russia broke upon the world,
the re-establishment of Polish-Russian relations, which had
been broken off in 1939, became important. The conversations
between the two Governments began in London under British
auspices on July 5. Poland was represented by the Prime
Minister of her exiled Government, General Sikorski, and
Russia by the Soviet Ambassador, M. Maisky. The Poles had
two aims—the recognition by the Soviet Government that the
partition of Poland agreed to by Germany and Russia in 1939
was now null and void, and the liberation by Russia of all
Polish prisoners of war and civilians deported to the Soviet
Union after the Russian occupation of the eastern areas of
Poland.

Throughout the month of July these negotiations continued
in a frigid atmosphere. The Russians were obstinate in their
refusal to make any precise commitment in conformity with
Polish wishes. Russia regarded the question of her western
frontiers as not open to discussion. Could she be trusted to
behave fairly in this matter in the possibly distant future,
when hostilities would come to an end in Europe? The British
Government were in a dilemma from the beginning. We had
gone to war with Germany as the direct result of our guarantee
to Poland. We had a strong obligation to support the interest
of our first ally. At this stage in the struggle we could not
admit the legality of the Russian occupation of Polish territory
in 1939. In this summer of 1941, less than two weeks after the
appearance of Russia on our side in the struggle against
Germany, we could not force our new and sorely threatened
ally to abandon, even on paper, regions on her frontiers which
she had regarded for generations as vital to her security. There
was no way out. The issue of the territorial future of Poland
must be postponed until easier times. We had the invidious
responsibility of recommending General Sikorski to rely on
Soviet good faith in the future settlement of Russian-Polish
relations, and not to insist at this moment on any written
guarantees for the future. I sincerely hoped for my part that
with the deepening experience of comradeship in arms against
Hitler the major Allies would be able to resolve the territorial
problems in amicable discussion at the conference table. In the
clash of battle at this vital point in the war, all must be subordinated
to strengthening the common military effort. And in
this struggle a resurgent Polish army based on the many
thousands of Poles now held in Russia would play a noble
part. On this point the Russians were prepared to agree in a
guarded fashion.

On July 30, after many bitter discussions, agreement was
reached between the Polish and Russian Governments. Diplomatic
relations were restored, and a Polish army was to be
formed on Russian soil and subordinated to the supreme command
of the Soviet Government. There was no mention of
frontiers, except a general statement that the Soviet-German
treaties of 1939 about territorial changes in Poland “have lost
their validity.” In an official Note of July 30 to the Polish
Government the Foreign Secretary stated our view:

On the occasion of the signature of the Soviet-Polish Agreement
of today I desire to take this opportunity of informing you that in
conformity with the provisions of the agreement for mutual assistance
between the United Kingdom and Poland of the 25th of
August, 1939, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
have entered into no undertaking towards the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics which affects the relations between that country
and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majest