Some wage and hour decisions have broad implications. Others, no so much. Here, in Stoetzl v. Department of Human Resources (July 1, 2019), the California Supreme Court issued a decision that falls decidedly into the later category. Stoetzl concerns a trial on the issue of unpaid wages for what the Court calls “entry-exit walk time” and “duty-integrated walk time.” Sounds like we are about to get a decision about a California equivalent to preliminary and post-liminary time, right? Not so much. Stoetzl is really about whether the relevant Wage Order (Wage Order 4) or the California Pay Scale Manual issued by CalHR (read about CalHR here) controls pay obligations for “entry-exit walk time” and “duty-integrated walk time” for represented and unrepresented state employees working in prisons.

Don’t get the wrong idea. Stoetzl might impact lots of employees; California has a metric <BLEEP> ton of employees. But that’s really the only group impacted by this decision, since the tension arises as a result of the conflict between the Pay Scale Manual’s express adoption of FLSA provisions and the Wage Order’s use of California’s differing and more protective standards. On top of all that, the represented state employees are bound by a collective bargaining agreement that controls certain pay obligations.

If you want to find something of broader note in Stoetzl, it again demonstrates that less protective FLSA provisions do no displace more protective California laws and regulations unless there is an express statement of an intent to do so. Here, in this 5-2 decision, a majority of the Court concluded that the Legislature properly empowered CalHR to define state employee pay provisions, and CalHR chose to expressly adopt FLSA rules that governed such things as walk time.

The minority opinion, written by Justice Liu, with Justice Cuellar concurring, found particular fault with the majority’s discussion of the minimum wage pay issue for the unrepresented class of employees.

In what might be a significant decision, Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. was argued to the California Supreme Court on May 8, 2019. The issue presented for review is as follows: “Must a plaintiff seeking class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 or the Consumer Legal Remedies Act demonstrate that records exist permitting the identification of class members?” While California appeared to have settled this question decisively many decades ago, the question arose when the First Appellate District (Division Four) opined that such identification was required. A decision may issue any time in the next couple of weeks. This is not likely to be an issue for wage and hour cases — where employer records are basically always available as a source of identification information — but is may be an issue in consumer class actions, where specific class members identification may not be possible.

The standard of review governing certification orders is effectively unique to class actions. As the Supreme Court explained in Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. 59 Cal.4th 522 (2014): “We review the trial court’s actual reasons for granting or denying certification; if they are erroneous, we must reverse, whether or not other reasons not relied upon might have supported the ruling.” Id., at 530. In other words, only the stated reasons are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. And if a stated reason includes a legally erroneous provision, that, by definition, constitutes and abuse of discretion. The record is not searched for an alternative basis to affirm.

In Myers v. Rayey’s (March 12, 2019), the Court of appeal (Third Appellate District) [Yolo!] concluded that one paragraph of substance was insufficient to permit review, since, without a statement of reasoning and analysis, there is no way to meaningfully review what is simply an ultimate conclusion:

To turn to the record to concoct some basis for the trial court’s denial of certification is to abolish the relevant standard of review, ignore the trial court’s reasoning, and apply ordinary appellate review contrary to the legion of cases that prohibit appellate revisionism. This we cannot do.

Slip op., at 15. As part of its discussion of the insufficiency of a “perfunctory” order, the Court explicitly disagreed with Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 214 Cal. App. 4th 974 (2013), which had affirmed an exceedingly terse certification denial order.

This hits close to home, as I was unsuccessful on an appeal of a certification order with about as much (or little) in the way of analysis. If I had been in front of this panel…. And if it weren’t for those meddling kids!

I also get the feeling when reading the statement of facts that the Court had a strong opinion about how things should turn out after round two but couldn’t actually say how things should turn out.

For years I've heard grumbling about Civil Local Rule 23-3 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. I may have been been responsible for some of that grumbling myself. If you haven't run into this rule, Local Rule 23-3 requires the filing of a class certification motion within 90 days of the commencement of the action. While many judges would accept stipulations to waive the rule, some did not. In ABS Entertainment Inc. v. CBS Corp. (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018), the Ninth Circuit finally addressed this Local Rule in a published opinion (I believe there was commentary in an unpublished opinion a number of years ago):

Central District of California Local Rule 23-3 sets a strict 90-day time frame from the filing of a complaint to the motion for class action certification. This bright line rule is in direct contrast to the flexibility of the Federal Rule, which calls for a determination on class certification “[a]t an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). That flexible approach makes sense. The class action determination can only be decided after the district court undertakes a “rigorous analysis” of the prerequisites for certification. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tele. Co. of SW v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). To undertake that analysis may require discovery. Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir.1975) (“The propriety of a class action cannot be determined in some cases without discovery;” “To deny discovery in [such cases] would be an abuse of discretion.”).

The district court’s actions here demonstrate the impracticability of the 90-day limit, particularly in combination with the district court’s summary and unexplained denial of the parties’ joint stipulation to extend the 90-day deadline based on the need for pre-certification discovery. See Barbara J. Rothstein & Thomas E. Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges 9 (3d ed. 2010) (“Considering [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)], you should feel free to ignore local rules calling for specific time limits; such local rules appear to be inconsistent with the federal rules and, as such, obsolete.”); Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 21.133 (“Some local rules specify a short period within which the plaintiff must file a motion to certify a class action. Such rules, however, may be inconsistent with Rule 23(c)(1)(A)’s emphasis on the parties’ obligation to present the court with sufficient information to support an informed decision on certification. Parties need sufficient time to develop an adequate record.”).

Although the district court’s application and interpretation of its Local Rules is entitled to “a large measure of discretion,” Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1970), Local Rules cannot be incompatible with Federal Rules. Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1). We conclude that the bright-line of Local Rule 23-3 is incompatible with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Slip op., at 49-50. I only wonder whether the inclusion of this discussion at the end of a massive copyright opinion will give it more attention -- perhaps enough to lead to a repeal of Local Rule 23-3 entirely -- or less because it will get lost at the end of this unusually long opinion.

This opinion is like Christmas and Hanukkah, sitting in an Easter Basket filled with Valentine's Day treats. And I overlooked it for two weeks! In Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corporation, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) gets deep into the wage and hour weeds in 50-page opinion that is overflowing with interesting bits. Here's the summary of how the matter ended up before the Court of Appeal:

I don't have time to try and summarize this monster opinion at the moment, but it is a must read. The Court spends a lot of time explaining why Wal-Mart is not applicable to wage and hour certification questions, notes that the Supreme Court, which decided Wal-Mart, held this year in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016) that statistical evidence is appropriately used in class actions, spends a substantial amount of time applying Brinker and the cases that followed to explain that variations in rates of missed meal and rest breaks, when certified based on an unlawful policy or procedure, is a damages issue, not a predominance question, and lots, lots, more!

While getting a class certified is often a serious fight, defeating class allegations at the demurrer stage is generally rare. But never say never. In Schermer v. Tatum (March 18, 2016), the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed a trial court ruling sustaining a demurrer to class allegations in the plaintiffs' second amended complaint (SAC). The plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of residents who live in the 18 mobilehome parks. The plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to uniform unconscionable lease agreements and leasing practices by a collection of related defendants. The SAC involved 18 mobilehome parks allegedly owned and/or operated by two defendants (Tatums and Kaplan), and were managed through defendant Mobile Community Management Company (MCM). The plaintiffs also named as defendants the 18 "single-purpose" business entities that are each described as the owners of one of the mobilehome park in California.

The Court of Appeal began by summarizing the first amended complaint, the demurrer hearing related to it, and the SAC. And that summary is all you need to read to know where things are headed. The Court described the "highlights" of the FAC as follows:

In the FAC, plaintiffs again alleged defendants Tatum and Kaplan, through MCM, engaged in unlawful conduct at each of the 18 mobilehome parks. Specifically, they alleged defendants "charg[ed] excessive rent, pursu[ed] arbitrary evictions, and implement[ed] unreasonable polices." Plaintiffs further alleged in their FAC that defendants Tatum and Kaplan took "advantage of vulnerable prospective and current residents" including "non-[E]nglish speaking and elderly residents" who, plaintiffs claimed, were "especially susceptible" to defendants' unlawful business practices. Plaintiffs alleged defendants "most egregious practice" was the use of a "one-sided, standardized lease" agreement. Plaintiffs provided 32 examples of lease clauses that allegedly violated California's Mobilehome Residency Law (Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.; MRL).

Plaintiffs' FAC also set forth about 11 "factors" that plaintiffs alleged showed procedural unconscionability between plaintiffs and the putative class, on the one hand, and defendants, on the other. Such factors included among others "residents' poor socio-economic background" and defendants' "knowledge of residents' vulnerability to oppression." Plaintiffs also listed about 17 examples of substantive unconscionability in their FAC in connection with defendants' use of the standardized lease agreement in the 18 mobilehome parks. As before, plaintiffs' class action allegations included any person who had an ownership interest in a mobilehome in any of the 18 parks, and a senior citizen and non-English-speaking subclass.

Slip op., at 3-4. Then, discussing the hearing on the demurrer to the FAC, the Court said, "At the demurrer hearing, plaintiffs' counsel agreed with the court that plaintiffs' FAC was 'a mess' and counsel admitted they 'did a horrible job in succinctly and systematically putting forth facts that show what the [FAC] -- what the case is about and how it shows a pattern of conduct that is deserving of being treated in a class action.' " Slip op., at 4. Not looking good.

Describing the subsequently issued Order on the demurrer to the FAC, the Court set forth key parts of the trial court's ruling:

"Plaintiffs allege multiple causes of action, all of which related in some way to the Lease Agreements utilized at the Defendants['] parks. Based upon the allegations in the [FAC], it appears that some of the claims involved the alleged unconscionability of the contracts themselves, while others involve each Defendant's alleged actions in executing or enforcing the individual contracts as to individual Plaintiffs. [¶] The Court finds that multiple factual allegations predominate. Plaintiffs['] measure of damages will be unique to each park. The proposed class does not all reside at the same location or under the same circumstances. Each putative class member is/was a resident at one of the eighteen separate mobilehome parks located throughout the State of California, giving rise to individualized factual questions related to causation, liability, and damages.

"Example of the individualized issues include the remedy (determining excess rents paid at each space requires a factual showing of fair market values for rents in a particular area [at] a particular time and park-by[-]park appraisal). Further, there appear to be multiple lease agreements. Although Plaintiffs allege Defendants used a 'standardized' Lease Agreement, they attach at least five different variations of the Lease Agreement and/or Amendments to the Lease Agreement. (See Exhibits 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' 'D,' and 'E,' attached to the [FAC].)

Slip op., at 5. The trial court went on to identify additional issues, including the fact that many class members would not be able to state certain claims if they had not attempted to sell their homes, and there were no putative class representative plaintiffs for many of the mobilehome parks.

The SAC filed by the plaintiffs attempted to address many of the trial court's concerns, but a number of its allegations were found by the trial court to be conclusory assertions about defendants, and not allegations of fact. The SAC did not address damage issues that would arise, which included the fact that several of the mobilehome parks were in cities with their own rent control ordinances. The trial court was particularly concerned by the fact that each agreement at each park with each potential class member was individually negotiated and by the fact that a unique damage calculation would be required for each park and each person at each park. Moreover, the trial court took notice of the fact that many individuals were involved in their own litigation with their own park.

After discussing the procedural background, the Court made sure to note that it is undisputed that class allegations can be decided on demurrer:

It is beyond dispute that trial courts are permitted to decide the issue of class certification on demurrer. (Tucker, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 212; see Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 440 [noting the issue is "settled" that courts are authorized to "weed[] out" legally meritless class action suits prior to certification by demurrer or pretrial motion].) A trial court may sustain a demurrer to class action allegations where " 'it concludes as a matter of law that, assuming the truth of the factual allegations in the complaint, there is no reasonable possibility that the requirements for class certification will be satisfied. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Tucker, at p. 211, italics added; see Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [noting that when the "invalidity of the class allegations is revealed on the face of the complaint, and/or by matters subject to judicial notice, the class issue may be properly disposed of by demurrer or motion to strike," and noting that "[i]n such circumstances, there is no need to incur the expense of an evidentiary hearing or class-related discovery"].)

Slip op., at 14. Much of the discussion that follows is unsurprising, given the discussion of the trial court's analysis. The Court did wade into the murky waters of attempting to categorize an allegation as either an "ultimate fact" or a "conclusion":

We conclude plaintiffs' allegations in their SAC—which were noticeably absent from their original complaint—that defendants implemented a uniform policy and procedure in each and every lease transaction with plaintiffs and the putative class members over a four-year period (i.e., the proposed class period), in each of the 18 mobilehome parks owned and/or operated by Tatum and Kaplan, are not properly admitted for purposes of demurrer because such allegations are not ultimate facts but rather merely contentions and/or improper factual conclusions.

Slip op., at 17-18. In my experience, this is very much an eye-of-the-beholder call that deserves a clarifying opinion with more objective guidance as to how to distinguish between the two.

In any event, the Court agreed with the trial court's assessments, finding, in particular, that the individual nature of the transactions was such that each course of dealing is unique, and damages, because of different circumstances, park locations, and local ordinances, are also unique to each potential class member. The Court declined to grant leave to amend to the plaintiffs, agreeing with the trial court that the problems were insurmountable. The lesson here is that overreach can be fatal. It might have been more workable to describe uniform leasing practices at one mobilehome park and seek class relief for the aspects of the transaction that were common to all of the residents, while, at the same time, addressing how damages will be calculated and distributed.

The "separate location" argument seems better suited to this sort of consumer circumstance than it is in the wage & hour context, where defendants nevertheless try the "each of our stores is unique and different" argument, as if they have no uniform policies regulating employees and allow each store to run their own affairs like the wild West. Hey, at least this Court cited Brinker (but it felt like an ironic cite to me).

I frequently contemplate things without any real expectation that I will get an answer. One thing I wonder about in the practice of law is whether California Courts of Appeal develop cultures as an institution (i.e., whether each Appellate District has a significant impact on its constituent members over time), or whether the tendencies are happenstance of the appointments (i.e., whether the tendencies of each Appellate District -- and Division therein -- is just the sum of random events like the preferences of the appointing administration and the timing of open seats). An application of this pondering occurred to me mere moments ago, when I read Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (March 14, 2016), in which the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that named party status is required to appeal a class action judgment. Jinkies!

In Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, a bench trial resulted in a class recovery of up to $36,412,350. The class representatives requested fees of $9,103,087.50 (25 percent of the total maximum fund). Francesca Muller, a class members, requested that the court order notice of the fee motion be sent to all class members. The court denied the request, awarded the fees, and entered judgment. Muller filed a notice of appeal. Class representative Hernandez substantively opposed the appeal but argued that Muller lacked standing to appeal at all. The Court of Appeal addressed the threshold issue of whether Muller had standing to appeal.

Recognizing that only an aggrieved party has standing to appeal, the Court began by recognizing the distinction between names class representatives and absent class members:

Indeed, "[t]he structure of the class action does not allow absent class members to become active parties, since 'to the extent the absent class members are compelled to participate in the trial of the lawsuit, the effectiveness of the class action device is destroyed.' " (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Although unnamed class members may be deemed "parties" for the limited purposes of discovery (Southern California Edison Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 832, 840), unnamed class members are not otherwise considered "parties" to the litigation. (Cf. National Solar Equipment Owners' Assn. v. Grumman Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1282 ["unnamed class members do not 'stand on the same footing as named parties' "].)

Slip op., at 9. The Court then began its analysis by considering Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 199 (1942), which considered the same issues presented here. Concluding that Eggert was factually almost identical, theCourt concluded that Eggert required dismissal of the action:

Eggert appears to be on "all fours" with the present action: both involved a class action; both involved a matter litigated to judgment; both involved a challenge to the postjudgment attorney fee award to the counsel for the named plaintiff; both involved appellants who were members of the class, but not named parties, and who had appeared through counsel to object to the attorney fee award; and both involved members who took no steps to be added as named plaintiffs. Accordingly, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, we must adhere to Eggert and dismiss the appeal.

Slip op., at 11. The Court then commented on several decisions from Courts of Appeal that permitted appeals by non-party class members:

Muller also cites several cases in which California appellate courts stated a class member who was not a party to the action obtains appellate standing to challenge the judgment merely by interposing an objection to the judgment below. However, neither of the cases cited by Muller, Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 387 and Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, made any effort to reconcile their conclusions with Eggert, and instead rooted their conclusions in the analysis contained in Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 134 (Trotsky). (See Wershba, at pp. 235-236 [citing only Trotsky on issue of standing]; Consumer Cause, at pp. 395-396 [citing Trotsky and Wershba on issue of standing].) Accordingly, we examine Trotsky.

Slip op., at 12. That examination of Trotsky was not flattering, and the Court quickly concluded that Trotsky had failed to consider the "party" element of section 902:

Trotsky focused primarily on whether an objector to a settlement was "aggrieved" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 902, concluding objectors were aggrieved because " '[i]t is possible that, within a class, a group of small claimants might be unfavorably treated by the terms of a proposed settlement. For them, the option to join is in reality no option at all,' " and reasoning that because those claimants might be forced to choose between "equally unpalatable alternatives"—of accepting either nothing or an unfair settlement—those parties were sufficiently aggrieved for purposes of the right to appeal. (Trotsky, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at pp. 139-140.) However, Trotsky did not examine the distinct "party" element of Code of Civil Procedure section 902, nor make any effort to reconcile its conclusion with Eggert's holding that unnamed class members whose only appearance was to object to the attorneys' fees had no standing to appeal because they were not "parties" and did not avail themselves of the "ample opportunity . . . to become parties of record . . . ." (Eggert, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 201.) Because Eggert teaches the "party" requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 902 is not met merely because the "aggrieved" requirement of section 902 might also be satisfied as to a nonparty class member, we conclude Trotsky's analysis of standing is flawed and that Trotsky and its progeny (which includes both Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 387 and Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 224) should not be followed.

Slip op., at 13-14. Well now. That's....interesting. The Court went on to point out that federal courts handle this differently, but California courts aren't federal courts, and there is no requirement that California follow the federal approach. You have to at least respect the cut of this Court's jib to state that they are bound to follow a factually similar 1942 decision and reject much more recent decisions for failing to address the California Supreme Court's Eggert decision. That said, of the many things I ponder, one is whether this case case more than 90 days of shelf life.

In Luckey v. Superior Court (July 22, 2014), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Three), the Court considered a writ following the denial of a stipulation to utilize a temporary judge to handle a class settlement approval.Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging violation of FACTA arising from printing “more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date” on an electronically printed receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the transaction. (15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g).) The operative complaint alleged causes of action for violation of FACTA, negligence, and declaratory relief.Plaintiff defined the putative class as “All individuals who purchased merchandise using a personal credit card or personal debit card at any retail store operated by Defendant within the United States during the Class Period2 who: [¶] Subclass A: Were issued an electronically printed receipt that reflected more than the last five digits of the card; and/or [¶] Subclass B: Were issued an electronically printed receipt that reflected the card's expiration date....” Plaintiff sought, on behalf of the class, damages of between $100 and $1000 for each receipt which violated FACTA (with separate damages for each violation), punitive damages, and reasonable attorney fees. Plaintiff also sought an order declaring that Cotton On's credit and debit card receipt practices violate FACTA and an order enjoining Cotton On from continuing to do so.No responsive pleading was filed. The only other documents filed in this case consisted of stipulations for continuance of the initial status conference, and the stipulation for appointment of a temporary judge which is at issue in this writ proceeding. Plaintiff represented that, from the time the complaint was filed, the parties engaged in “informal discovery and exchanged information” in preparation for a mediation.

The mediation was held before a retired superior court judge. A class action settlement was reached at the mediation, and memorialized in a written settlement agreement. It is a class settlement, defining the settlement class as “all individuals who purchased merchandise using a personal credit card or personal debit card at any retail store operated by Cotton On within the United States since May 9, 2008, who were issued an electronically printed receipt that reflected more than the last five digits of the card and/or were issued an electronically printed receipt that reflected the card's expiration date.” It excludes persons who validly opt out of the class.

Under the terms of the settlement, the class was to receive compensation in the form of “Merchandise Credits,” which was really a $5 credit on any transaction at or exceeding $25 at one of Cotton On's retail stores, during one pre-selected week. Notice was to be provided to the class by means of e-mail notice to be provided “to all [Cotton On]'s customers in the United States for whom [Cotton On] possesses a valid e-mail address.” Notice would also be given on Cotton On's website and near each of its retail stores' cash registers.

Cotton On agreed to fund the settlement in the amount of $1,000,000. Of that amount, the parties agreed that Luckey's counsel could seek an award of attorney's fees and costs in an amount of $302,000. The parties also agreed that Luckey himself could receive a payment of $5,000 as class representative, and that $135,000 would be allocated to the administrative costs of the settlement.

In sum the settlement provided as for: (1) $5,000 paid to Luckey (whereas each class member would receive, at most, a merchandise credit for one one-thousandth of that amount); (2) $302,000 paid to Luckey's counsel (for work which, to that point, consisted of filing a complaint and amended complaint, and preparing for and attending a one-day mediation); and (3) a one-week $5 off $25 sale, of which Cotton On would send notice to its e-mail customer list.

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties stipulated for appointment of a temporary judge to hear the matter “until final determination thereof.” Specifically, the parties intended to submit to the temporary judge the issues related to preliminary and final approval of the class action settlement. The same retired judge who had served as the mediator in this matter was identified by the parties as the proposed temporary judge. The temporary judge would be privately compensated by the parties.

The stipulation was presented to the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division, as required by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Local Rules, rule 2.24(a)(1). On June 2, 2014, the court issued a minute order declining to approve the stipulation. The court's analysis explained that, although plaintiff’s counsel could stipulate to the appointment of the temporary judge on behalf of the plaintiff, the “submitted papers do not demonstrate that the named plaintiffs or the attorneys are authorized to speak for all class members.” Without the stipulation of all putative class members, the case could not be transferred to a temporary judge.The plaintiff filed a petition for a writ to compel appointment of the temporary judge. The Court of Appeal issued an Order to Show cause.

In responding to the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff challenged the Superior Court’s standing to oppose the writ petition:

In this case, Luckey suggests that the Superior Court lacked standing to oppose his writ petition because the Superior Court “has presented no evidence that the issues presented impact the operations or procedures of the Court or that the decision will impose any financial obligations on the court's operations.” The argument is puzzling given the arguments Luckey makes in support of his petition. First, Luckey argues that he is, in fact, challenging a procedure of the court, not merely an isolated ruling. Luckey represents that the Superior Court previously “routinely issued orders appointing temporary judges to preside over class action matters,” but, “in or around November 2013,” the court “stopped” approving those stipulations and began denying them. Second, Luckey argues at length, although without evidentiary basis, that the court's financial obligations are, in fact, at issue. Luckey argues that lengthy delays are now the reality in class action litigation, and that parties should be permitted to avoid these delays by the use of temporary judges—a procedure which, according to Luckey, would “alleviate[ ] space for other litigants” at Superior Court. Indeed, Luckey represents that the Superior Court previously appointed temporary judges to serve in class action matters “in part[ ] due to congested and backlogged dockets.” As the Superior Court's procedures and financial obligations are at issue, the Superior Court has a right to appear.

Slip op., at 15-16.The Court then examined whether the trial court erred when it denied the stipulation of the parties to use a “temporary judge” to decide the fairness of the class settlement.The Court began by examining the complex question of whether absent putative class members are “parties” for purposes of the stipulation at issue.The Court concluded they were not:

[W]hile Luckey and Cotton On were the only “parties litigant” at the time of the stipulation to the temporary judge, they were also the only parties who could be bound by such a stipulation.As the conceded purpose of the stipulation was to bind all putative class members to the stipulation, and they could not be bound until they had been given notice and an opportunity to appear, the stipulation was ineffective.The state Constitution provides that, for a stipulation to a temporary judge to be effective, that stipulation must be made by the parties litigant. In a pre-certification class action, the parties litigant have not yet been identified; thus, no such stipulation can be effectively made.

Slip op., at 22-23.Next, the Court concluded that the Rules of Court directed the same conclusion, because of the right of objectors to intervene:

Our consideration of the applicable rules of court leads us to the same conclusion. California Rules of Court, rule 2.835(b) governs requests to intervene in matters pending before temporary judges. It states, in pertinent part, “A motion for leave to file a complaint for intervention in a case pending before a temporary judge requested by the parties must be filed with the court and served on all parties and the temporary judge. The motion must be heard by the trial court judge to whom the case is assigned or, if the case has not been assigned, by the presiding judge or his or her designee. If intervention is allowed, the case must be returned to the trial court docket unless all parties stipulate ... to proceed before the temporary judge.” In other words, when a party seeks to intervene in a matter pending before a temporary judge, that party's right to intervene must be determined by the trial court, not the temporary judge. Furthermore, if intervention is permitted, the case must be returned to trial court unless the intervenor also agrees to the temporary judge.

Slip op., at 23-24.Finally, the Court observed that public policy concerns weighed against the procedure advocated by the petitioner, having earlier observed: “A class member objecting to the settlement as unfair will certainly believe he or she is facing an uphill battle in convincing the temporary judge of the merits of the objection; the temporary judge clearly believed in the propriety of the settlement when acting as a mediator.This could well raise a question of an appearance of impropriety.”

As I fill the backlog, we have yet another big decision from the California Supreme Court. In Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, 59 Cal. 4th 522 (June 30, 2014), the Supreme Court examined how the question of certification should be answered in the context of misclassification of independent contractors. Newspaper carriers, classified as independent contractors, filed suit to obtain remedies available to employees under California’s wage & hour laws.Plaintiffs moved for class certification.The trial court concluded the case could not proceed as a class action, holding that on the critical question whether plaintiffs and the class were employees, plaintiffs had not shown common questions predominate.The trial court held that to determine employee status for the class would necessitate numerous unmanageable individual inquiries into the extent to which each carrier was afforded discretion in his or her work.The Court of Appeal disagreed in part, holding that the trial court had misunderstood the nature of the inquiries called for, and remanded for reconsideration of the class certification motion as to five of the complaint’s claims.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal.Beginning with the test for employee status as the key issue for evaluating the commonality issue, the Court said:

We begin by identifying the principal legal issues and examining the substantive law that will govern. In doing so, we do not seek to resolve those issues. Rather, the question at this stage is whether the operative legal principles, as applied to the facts of the case, render the claims susceptible to resolution on a common basis. (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1025, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d 513; Sav–On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 906, 96 P.3d 194 [the focus “is on what type of questions—common or individual—are likely to arise in the action, rather than on the merits of the case”].)

The trial court and Court of Appeal correctly recognized as the central legal issue whether putative class members are employees for purposes of the provisions under which they sue. If they are employees, Antelope Valley owes them various duties that it may not have fulfilled; if they are not, no liability can attach. In turn, whether putative class members' employee status can be commonly resolved hinges on the governing test for employment.

Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 530 (2014).The Court observed that the test relied upon in the Courts below was the Borello common law test. After considering the need to examine other employment tests, the Court concluded that the case could be resolved by focusing on the common law test exclusively.The Court then restated the essentials of the common law test for employment:

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531.The Court added an additional, significant observation to this formulation, observing, “The worker's corresponding right to leave is similarly relevant: “ ‘An employee may quit, but an independent contractor is legally obligated to complete his contract.’ ” (Perguica v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 29 Cal.2d 857, 860, 179 P.2d 812.)”Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531 n. 2.The Court then listed the secondary factors that a court may consider, including: (a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.

Next the Court turned to the question of whether certification should have been granted in this matter. Before doing so, however, the Court framed the core question, right to control, at issue in the case:

Significantly, what matters under the common law is not how much control a hirer exercises, but how much control the hirer retains the right to exercise. (Perguica v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 859–860, 179 P.2d 812 [“The existence of such right of control, and not the extent of its exercise, gives rise to the employer-employee relationship.”]; Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp. Com., supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 43, 168 P.2d 686 [“If the employer has the authority to exercise complete control, whether or not that right is exercised with respect to all details, an employer-employee relationship exists.”]; Industrial Ind. Exch. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 130, 135, 156 P.2d 926 [“The right to control and direct the activities of the alleged employee or the manner and method in which the work is performed, whether exercised or not, gives rise to the employment relationship.”]; S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 411, 414, 110 P.2d 377 [“the right to control, rather than the amount of control which was exercised, is the determinative factor”]; Hillen v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1926) 199 Cal. 577, 581–582, 250 P. 570 [“It is not a question of interference, or non-interference, not a question of whether there have been suggestions, or even orders, as to the conduct of the work; but a question of the right to act, as distinguished from the act itself or the failure to act.”].) Whether a right of control exists may be measured by asking “ ‘ “whether or not, if instructions were given, they would have to be obeyed” ’ ” on pain of at-will “ ‘ “discharge[ ] for disobedience.” ’ ” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 875, 269 Cal.Rptr. 647.)

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 533.Applying this test to the case before it, the Court observed that:

at the certification stage, the relevant inquiry is not what degree of control Antelope Valley retained over the manner and means of its papers' delivery. It is, instead, a question one step further removed: Is Antelope Valley's right of control over its carriers, whether great or small, sufficiently uniform to permit classwide assessment? That is, is there a common way to show Antelope Valley possessed essentially the same legal right of control with respect to each of its carriers? Alternatively, did its rights vary substantially, such that it might subject some carriers to extensive control as to how they delivered, subject to firing at will, while as to others it had few rights and could not have directed their manner of delivery even had it wanted, with no common proof able to capture these differences?

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 533-34.The Court concluded that the trial court lost sight of these questions in its analysis:

The trial court lost sight of this question. Its order reveals the denial of certification ultimately rested on two related determinations: (1) the record reflected considerable variation in the degree to which Antelope Valley exercised control over its carriers; and (2) the putative class as a whole was not subject to pervasive control as to the manner and means of delivering papers. Neither of these considerations resolves the relevant inquiry. Whether Antelope Valley varied in how it exercised control does not answer whether there were variations in its underlying right to exercise that control that could not be managed by the trial court. Likewise, the scope of Antelope Valley's right to control the work does not in itself determine whether that right is amenable to common proof.

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 534.The Court discussed briefly the evidence available to the Court, focusing heavily on the contract between the newspaper carriers and the defendant.The Court found that even variations in the actual degree of control over different carriers was likely irrelevant if the right to control them all was effectively identical:

[T]he existence of variations in the extent to which a hirer exercises control does not necessarily show variation in the extent to which the hirer possesses a right of control, or that the trial court would find any such variation unmanageable. That a hirer may monitor one hiree closely and another less so, or enforce unevenly a contractual right to dictate the containers in which its product is delivered, does not necessarily demonstrate that the hirer could not, if it chose, monitor or control the work of all its hirees equally. (See Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1, 13–14, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 [recognizing that how a hirer exercised control over a particular hiree might show, not the hirer's differential control of that hiree, but the extent of its common right to control all its hirees].) For class certification under the common law test, the key question is whether there is evidence a hirer possessed different rights to control with regard to its various hirees, such that individual mini-trials would be required. Did Antelope Valley, notwithstanding the form contract it entered with all carriers, actually have different rights with respect to each that would necessitate mini-trials?

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 535-36.The Court then explained the frequent error made in the certification analysis of claims based on independent contractor misclassification:

Certification of class claims based on the misclassification of common law employees as independent contractors generally does not depend upon deciding the actual scope of a hirer's right of control over its hirees. The relevant question is whether the scope of the right of control, whatever it might be, is susceptible to classwide proof. Bypassing that question, the trial court instead proceeded to the merits. In so doing, the court made the same mistake others have when deciding whether to certify claims predicated on common law employee status, “focus[ing] too much on the substantive issue of the defendant's right to control its newspaper deliverers, instead of whether that question could be decided using common proof.” (Dalton v. Lee Publications, supra, 270 F.R.D. at p. 564.) Moreover, by purporting to resolve on a classwide basis the scope of Antelope Valley's right to control its carriers, the trial court contradicted its own conclusion, that classwide assessment of Antelope Valley's right to control is infeasible.

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 537.The Court concluded by noting that many of the secondary factors must also be evaluated correctly to determine if common proof will adequately determine the secondary factor in question:

Preliminarily, we caution that courts assessing these secondary factors should take care to correctly identify the relevant considerations. Here, for example, the trial court noted variation in the “place of work.” The inquiry that sheds light on a hiree's common law employee status, however, is into who provides the place of work, the hirer or hiree (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 351, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399; Rest.3d Agency, § 7.07, com. f, p. 211; Rest.2d Agency, § 220, subd. (2)(e)), and thus the relevant inquiry is whether there is variation in who provides facilities. That carriers could pick up papers at any of several Antelope Valley warehouses or drop locations, as Antelope Valley argued, does not show variation in the underlying secondary factor.

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 538.

The Court remanded with instructions to consider the certification question in light of the Court’s guidance.

It is a bit belated, but I'm getting some write-ups of the big cases up for your reading pleasure (or agony). First up is Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association (May 29, 2014). Loan officers for U.S. Bank National Association (USB) sued for unpaid overtime, claiming they had been misclassified as exempt employees under the outside salesperson exemption.Plaintiffs moved to certify the case as a class action.Plaintiffs provided declarations from 34 current and former putative class members, all stating that they worked overtime hours and spent less than half of their workday engaged in sales-related activities outside their branch office.USB argued that plaintiffs could not establish a predominance of common issues or that the class action device was superior to other methods of adjudication.USB filed declarations from 83 putative class members, 75 of whom said they usually spent more than 50 percent of their workday engaged in outside sales.USB also submitted deposition testimony from the four former class representatives stating that they regularly worked more than half the day outside the office. The Court certified the class of 260 individuals.

The trial court then devised a plan to determine the extent of USB’s liability to all class members by extrapolating from a random sample. After considering competing proposals, the court expressed concern about the potential for biased survey results and proposed an alternative of its own devising.The court opted to select a random sample of 20 class members to testify at trial. A decertification motion was denied. The court later ruled on a key motion in limine, denying USB the ability to introduce any testimony or declarations from class members or other loan officers not in the random sample group.

Phase one of the bench trial lasted 40 court days.The two named plaintiffs and 19 of the 20 other RWG members testified.USB called several corporate witnesses and the direct supervisors of some of the RWG witnesses.

In anticipation of phase two, plaintiffs moved to amend the declaration of their expert, Jon Krosnick, to permit trial testimony about the results of a telephone survey Krosnick had conducted of class members’ work hours.The court allowed the amendment. USB moved to exclude the survey evidence.In opposition, plaintiffs filed a declaration from their statistics expert, Richard Drogin, whon opined that phase one findings of liability and average weekly hours of unpaid overtime could be “reliably projected to the whole class” because they were based on a random sample.Drogin calculated a weighted average of overtime for the RWG at 11.87 hours per week, with a margin of error of plus or minus 5.14 hours at a 95 percent confidence interval.The relative margin of error for the overtime estimate was plus or minus 43.3 percent.The Court then concluded USB did not carry its burden of proof on the outside salesperson exemption.Based primarily on testimony from RWG witnesses, the court ruled that the entire class employed by USB was misclassified as exempt, and all class members were owed overtime in amounts to be determined in phase two of the trial.

During the damages phase, USB’s statistician testified that it was statistically possible that 13 percent of the class was properly classified as exempt.He calculated that up to 14 percent of the class, or 36 members, could have been properly classified as exempt.

Nevertheless, the court calculated the total amount of overtime restitution owed to the class at $8,953,832.With prejudgment interest, the total award as of May 15, 2009, came to $14,959,565.The impact of a 14 percent error on the judgment total would have been approximately $2 million.On appeal, the Court of appeal ordered the class decertified and reversed the judgment. A petition for review was then granted.

The Supreme Court began its discussion by reviewing the outside sales person exemption and how the exemption test interacts with class proof:

We have observed that some common questions about the exemption “are likely to prove susceptible of common proof” in a class action. (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 337.) Job requirements and employer expectations of how duties are to be performed may often be established by evidence relating to a group as a whole. (Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 802.) But litigation of the outside salesperson exemption has the obvious potential to generate individual issues because the primary considerations are how and where the employee actually spends his or her workday. (Sav-On, at pp. 336-337; Ramirez, at p. 802.) Of course, the questions of actual performance and employer expectations can be intertwined.

Slip op., at 21.The Court noted that, while predominance “requires a determination that group, rather than individual, issues predominate,” that does not “preclude the consideration of individual issues at trial when those issues legitimately touch upon relevant aspects of the case being litigated.” Slip op., at 22.The Court then scrutinized the unique manageability issues inherent in the affirmative defenses likely to arise in misclassification cases:

In her concurring opinion in Brinker, Justice Werdegar drew an instructive distinction between the types of affirmative defenses that can undermine manageability: “For purposes of class action manageability, a defense that hinges liability vel non on consideration of numerous intricately detailed factual questions, as is sometimes the case in misclassification suits, is different from a defense that raises only one or a few questions and that operates not to extinguish the defendant’s liability but only to diminish the amount of a given plaintiff’s recovery.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1054 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.), fn. omitted.) Defenses that raise individual questions about the calculation of damages generally do not defeat certification. (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334.) However, a defense in which liability itself is predicated on factual questions specific to individual claimants poses a much greater challenge to manageability.

Slip op., at 25. The Court then observed that many courts have been reluctant to certify misclassification cases unless uniform policies or practices violate wage and hour laws:

However, individual issues will not necessarily overwhelm common issues when a case involves exemptions premised on how employees spend the workday.In Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th 319, for example, we upheld certification of an overtime class action based on a showing that all plaintiffs performed jobs that were highly standardized.As a result, class members performed essentially the same tasks, most of which were nonexempt as a matter of law.(Id. at pp. 327-328.)Further, the defendant’s corporate policy required all class members to work overtime.(Id. at p. 327.)Where standardized job duties or other policies result in employees uniformly spending most of their time on nonexempt work, class treatment may be appropriate even if the case involves an exemption that typically entails fact-specific individual inquiries.

Slip op., at 25-26.In this matter, the Court concluded that the trial court did not adequately manage individual issues when it essentially precluded litigation of individual issues:

The primary consideration in a misclassification case pertains to “the realistic requirements of the job.”(Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 802.)The trial court ultimately made detailed findings to the effect that the BBO position was essentially a telemarketing job, most easily performed in the office.However, at the certification stage, it should have been apparent that litigation of the outside salesperson defense would also involve significant inquiry into how each of the class’s 260 members “actually spen[t] his or her time.”(Ibid.)

Slip op., at 28. Thus, it was the failure to manage individualized issues, rather than the predominance of common issues that the Court found to be a fatal flaw in the management of the case:

USB’s exemption defense raised a host of individual issues.While common issues among class members may have been sufficient to satisfy the predominance prong for certification, the trial court also had to determine that these individual issues could be effectively managed in the ensuing litigation.(See Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1054 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334.)Here, the certification order was necessarily provisional in that it was subject to development of a trial plan that would manage the individual issues surrounding the outside salesperson exemption.

In general, when a trial plan incorporates representative testimony and random sampling, a preliminary assessment should be done to determine the level of variability in the class.(See post, at p. 40.)If the variability is too great, individual issues are more likely to swamp common ones and render the class action unmanageable.No such assessment was done here.

Slip op., at 28.When considering the impact of Duran, it is imperative to emphasize that the Court did not overturn the predominance finding at the time of certification. Rather, the Court found that the subsequent trial plan was an inadequate method of managing individualized issues. Related to that finding, the Court held that the trial management inappropriately abridged the right to assert affirmative defenses:

While class action defendants may not have an unfettered right to present individualized evidence in support of a defense, our precedents make clear that a class action trial management plan may not foreclose the litigation of relevant affirmative defenses, even when these defenses turn on individual questions.

Slip op., at 30.Here, too, plaintiffs must be alert to overreach in the characterization of Duran by defendants. Duran does not promise an unfettered right to force the trial of every affirmative defense as to every class member. The trial decision in Duran, however, simply cannot be supported with any conviction:

The court’s decision to extrapolate classwide liability from a small sample, and its refusal to permit any inquiries or evidence about the work habits of BBOs outside the sample group, deprived USB of the ability to litigate its exemption defense.USB repeatedly submitted sworn declarations from 75 class members stating that they worked more than half their time outside the office.This evidence suggested that work habits among BBOs were not uniform and that nearly one-third of the class may have been properly classified as exempt and lacking any valid claim against USB.

Slip op., at 31.The Court rejected analogies to disparate treatment discrimination cases, where individual treatment is of little relevance and aggregate group treatment is the singular question.

The Court did not foreclose class proof in misclassification cases, saying only that it would be appropriate in instances where common proof of treatment or practices is compelling:

This is not to say that an employer’s liability for misclassification may never be decided on a classwide basis.A class action trial may determine that an employer is liable to an entire class for misclassification if it is shown that the employer had a consistently applied policy or uniform job requirements and expectations contrary to a Labor Code exemption, or if it knowingly encouraged a uniform de facto practice inconsistent with the exemption.(See, e.g., Bell, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 743.)In such a case, the evidence for uniformity among class members would be strong, and common proof would be sufficient to call for the employer to defend its claimed exemption.

Slip op., at 34-35.Next, the Court discussed statistical evidence. It began by noting, “Questions about the use of statistical evidence to prove classwide liability and damages are far from settled.” Slip op., at 35. The Court recognized the widely divergent opinions on the use of statistical evidence:

It is an open question, hotly contested among the parties and amici curiae, whether statistical sampling can legitimately be used to prove a defendant’s liability to absent class members.The question has arisen in numerous contexts, ranging from mass torts (e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (5th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 297, 319-320) to employment discrimination (e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, supra, 564 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 2560-2561]).In the wage and hour context, recent decisions from federal district courts have disagreed about whether statistical sampling may be used to prove liability.

Slip op., at 36-37. The Court then discussed Bell, noting that the “statistical evidence in Bell was heard only after classwide liability had been established.” Slip op. at 37.The Court concluded its general assessment of statistical models for proof of liability by noting that no general rule is necessary:

We need not reach a sweeping conclusion as to whether or when sampling should be available as a tool for proving liability in a class action.It suffices to note that any class action trial plan, including those involving statistical methods of proof, must allow the defendant to litigate its affirmative defenses.If a defense depends upon questions individual to each class member, the statistical model must be designed to accommodate these case-specific deviations.

Slip op., at 38.The Court expressly noted that the Mt. Clemens use of statistical evidence to calculate damages in overtime pay cases, while well accepted by courts, did not provide a sound rationale for accepting too much error in the liability phase of a misclassification case.

The Court then discussed errors in the Court’s statistical methodology, noting that (1) the sample size was too small, (2) the sample was not random, suffering from non-response bias and self-selection bias, (3) the 43 percent margin of error was far too large, (4) the response rate was poor, (5) measurement errors were likely, and (6) the methodology differed significantly from Bell, where two experts worked together to determine a reliable sampling methodology.

Concurring in the opinion, Justice Liu authored a concurrence that agreed with the conclusion that the trial court’s statistical approach was hopelessly flawed but questioned whether enough guidance had been provided for future misclassification class actions.First, with respect to the outside sales exemption in California, Justice Liu said:

[I]n recognizing that California’s definition of an outside salesperson is quantitative in nature, Ramirez did not say that the test boils down to whether a particular employee actually spends more than 50 percent of his or her working hours on outside sales.Instead, the ultimate question is:what are “the realistic requirements of the job”?

Slip op. conc., at 4. Justice Liu then explained how both aggregate evidence and individualized evidence should be considered to address the misclassification question:

[N]either an aggregate method of proof (like sampling or representative witness testimony) nor individualized evidence (like a declaration) is necessarily dispositive when the ultimate issue at trial is to determine “the employer’s realistic expectations” or “the realistic requirements of the job.”(Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 802.)The two types of evidence must be considered and weighed alongside each other, and more broadly, they must be considered and weighed together with the full range of evidence bearing on the ultimate issue, including the employer’s job description, company policies, industry customs, and testimony of supervisors or managers who monitored, evaluated, or otherwise set expectations for employees in the class.We entrust our trial courts with the task of weighing such multidimensional evidence, and their judgments will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence.

Slip op. conc., at 10. Justice Liu concluded by observing that the trial court was correct as to how it framed the certification question:

Today’s opinion properly identifies the shortcomings of the representative witness group in this case and the trial court’s failure to give due consideration to the individualized evidence that U.S. Bank National Association (USB) sought to introduce in its defense.But it is important to note that the trial court focused on the right question on the merits:What werethe realistic requirements of the BBO position?

Slip op. conc., at 11.There is little doubt that Duran will be oversold as a bar on all forms of aggregate proof in class actions. The only remedy will be to present a thorough analysis of what Duran does and does not stand for in misclassification cases and the greater class certification context.

The Complex Litigator

The Complex Litigator reports on developments in related areas of class action and complex litigation. It is a resource for legal professionals to use as a tool for examining different viewpoints related to changing legal precedent. H. Scott Leviant is the editor-in-chief and primary author of The Complex Litigator.