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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 003611
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT
TREASURY FOR DAS DANNY GRASER AND ANDY BAUKOL
FINCEN FOR HEATHER MOYE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS: PTEREFINTBIOPRELPINSSCULKCIPASECEAIR
PBTS, PROP, KISL, KSAC, IN, PK, BG, CE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY AND MEA HOLD PRODUCTIVE, FOCUSED CTJWG
FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN DELHI
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3473
¶B. NEW DELHI 3057
¶C. 05 NEW DELHI 6596
Classified By: Charge Robert Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (U) This is an Action Request for SCA and S/CT. Please
see Para 17.
¶2. (C) Summary: The DCM and key Embassy interlocutors on
counterterrorism issues (see Paras 21-22) on May 19 reviewed
with MEA Additional Secretary (International Organizations)
KC Singh action items that emerged from the April 19 US-India
Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) meeting in
Washington and subsequent CT-related conversations (Refs A
and B). The dialogue paved the way for further discussions
on bio-terrorism cooperation, operationalizing countering
terrorism finance, aviation security, improving USG delivery
of CT training (and a GOI offer to provide CT training to USG
personnel), improving the sharing of GOI tactical terrorist
threat information, and continuing the discussion on how most
effectively to counter extremist ideology in mass media and
on the Internet. Ambassador Singh and Joint Secretary
(Cabinet Secretariat) Sharad Kumar also shared GOI concerns
that India is becoming more central to al-Qai'da's agenda,
and that al-Qa'ida and "al-Qa'ida franchises" share close
links with the Pakistan establishment. The Indians again
were receptive to the idea of a focused effort to defeat LTTE
fund-raising and arms trafficking, but asked that this be
couched in generic terms, rather than targeting Sri Lanka
alone. End Summary.
India Now an al-Qa'ida Target
-----------------------------
¶3. (C) Singh opened by noting that India is becoming more
prominent on al-Qai'da's radar, pointing to Ayman
al-Zawahiri's April 29 video message praising "popular
jihadist movements against Indians in Kashmir" and calling
India "the best candidate for carrying out the
Zionist-Crusader scheme to humiliate, weaken, and dismember
Pakistan." He added that al-Zawahiri's recent reference to
the US-India civil nuclear agreement demonstrated that
Delhi's growing cooperation with Washington was drawing
al-Qai'da's attention.
Alleging Direct Links Between al-Qa'ida and Islamabad
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶4. (S) Singh asserted that Pakistan's ISI retains
connections to al-Qa'ida and has been privy to Usama bin
Ladin's communications. To the DCM's question of information
on operational links, Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat,
i.e. RAW) Sharad Kumar stated that Indian intelligence has
transcripts of pre-9/11 meetings between UBL and Mullah Omar
during which terrorism in J&K was discussed. He continued
that UBL had been "willing to divert $20 million" from
Central Asian programming to support Kashmir-oriented
NEW DELHI 00003611 002 OF 008
terrorism, and that UBL was quoted saying the Kashmiri
jihadis "would not run short of funds." Kumar added that
when UBL sent his bodyguard contingent to help the Taliban
fight the Northern Alliance, the temporary chief of his
security force was an unnamed individual who went on to join
Jaish-e-Mohammad. Singh ascribed al-Qa'ida's increasing
interest in India to the July 18 civil nuclear agreement.
"ISI seeks to heat things up" to interfere with growing
US-India convergence, he claimed.
¶5. (S) RAW's Kumar observed that today, "al-Qa'ida
franchises," if not al-Qa'ida proper, are and have been very
active in India. He defined "al-Qa'ida franchises" as groups
that espouse the same extremist ideology and share some
logistical and funding infrastructure even while remaining
discrete organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and
Jaish-e-Mohammad. Not all these groups or their attacks are
linked, he continued; each must be investigated individually
to locate their intersections.
Delhi Interest in Bio-Terror Rising
-----------------------------------
¶6. (C) Turning to the subject of counter-bio-terrorism
cooperation, Singh reported that Indian intelligence is
picking up chatter indicating jihadi groups are interested in
bio-terrorism, for example seeking out like-minded PhD's in
biology and bio-technology. He compared the prospects for
nuclear terrorism ("still in the realm of the imaginary") to
bio-terrorism ("an ideal weapon for terrorism ... anthrax
could pose a serious problem ...it is no longer an academic
exercise for us.") and indicated conceptual support for a
joint bio-terrorism exercise. Singh stated that the text of
the 1997 HHS/Ministry of Health Joint Statement included
provisions for modeling bio-terrorism attacks, which could be
used as a mechanism to support a joint exercise. (NOTE:
Embassy HHS Attache reviewed the 1997 and 2005 HHS/MoH
agreements and found no such mention of modeling
bio-terrorism. End Note.) He concluded that although other
relevant Ministries "work at their own pace," MEA would
confer with them to secure their buy-in. Embassy will pursue
the matter with MEA and other GOI interlocutors with an eye
to conducting a joint and multi-agency bio-terrorism tabletop
exercise by late 2006.
Operationalizing Anti-Terrorism Finance
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Noting that both sides have identical interests in
combating terrorist groups but no practical experience in
joint operations with each other, the DCM revisited the
suggestion to create a contact group of experts -- with the
MEA as the hub but including the Indian Finance Ministry and
the nascent Financial Intelligence Unit as well as the
Embassy Economics Section -- to focus on squeezing LTTE
finances (Refs A and B). The DCM and Singh agreed that to
keep the operation out of the spotlight it could adopt an
innocuous name such as the "Subgroup on Terror Finance."
NEW DELHI 00003611 003 OF 008
PolCouns underscored the importance of moving from exchanging
data on terrorist finances to shutting down money flows,
particularly in light of the LTTE's wealth (i.e. it's ability
to fund both a navy and an air force) and its recent
egregiously violent attacks. J/S Kumar was tasked to develop
ideas about modalities of the group's operations; he observed
that although a cooperative effort is the most effective way
forward, "most of our people are cagey regarding cooperation
and joint operations," and "do not even trust others in their
own government"; however, he added, their buy-in will be
required. The DCM reassured Kumar that these operations
would be kept in secure channels and well away from the
media. Please see Action Request in Para 17.
Aviation Security
-----------------
¶8. (C) Taking note of the increase in aviation links between
the US and India under the Open Skies agreement, including
twice-daily non-stop flights, the DCM requested an official
briefing on the GOI's anti-hijacking policy (Ref C) --
specifically, a full briefing to relevant Embassy elements
(RSO, ECON, POL, etc.) plus advice on how Embassy can best
brief US airlines on how they are affected by the GOI policy.
Singh agreed to arrange the briefing. RSO added that
Continental particularly had asked the Civil Aviation
Ministry for this information but was only informed of the
existence of a policy (and not the elements of that policy).
(NOTE: A GOI Civil Aviation representative was slated to
brief the CTJWG but was unable to travel to Washington to
attend the meeting. End Note.) Before turning to a broader
review of CT training opportunities, RSO noted that, pending
a June 1 approval deadline, a DS/ATA Airport Security
Consultation is slated for June 26-30.
Making CT Training Smarter
--------------------------
¶9. (C) After RSO provided an update on ATA courses for India
currently in the pipeline (Para 18), Singh passed to the DCM
a GOI "wish-list" of ATA courses (Para 19) and a list of
courses the GOI could offer to USG law enforcement/military
officers (Para 20). RSO pointed out that the Airport
Security Consultation could be used to bootstrap other
related training, such as on travel document authentication.
¶10. (C) Moving forward, RSO asked for points of contact
among GOI subject-matter experts to identify course
objectives ahead of time, to allow USG training providers to
modify courses (where possible) to meet GOI objectives. RSO
noted the broad spectrum of USG elements that would benefit
by having this information.
India "Can't Afford to Lag Behind" on Bio-Metrics
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶11. (C) Singh raised the issue of bio-metrics cooperation,
in which the GOI "can't afford to lag behind," he said. The
NEW DELHI 00003611 004 OF 008
MEA's Consular/Passports/Visas Division coordinates with the
Home Ministry in this area. He underlined the role of
document authentication in disrupting terrorist (and other
illicit) travel and the transit of weapons and other
contraband shipments. Singh and the DCM agreed on the
importance of harmonizing document standards. The DCM
reminded Singh that one problem the USG has in repatriating
Indian nationals is the difficulty in verifying their
identities; the Embassy's Consular Section works with the
Home Ministry but bio-metrics may offer a solution.
Streamlining Flow of Tactical Threat Information
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶12. (C) The DCM underlined the importance of the Embassy
(through the RSO) being able promptly to inform US businesses
with equities in India of "the ground truth" on terrorist
threat information and terrorist attacks, including hoaxes.
Stories periodically appear in the Indian press that
sensationalize alleged threats against American interests.
While these stories are often based on faulty information,
they do serve to increase security concerns in the American
corporate community in particular. The DCM explained the USG
"No Double Standard" and offered that GOI sources and methods
could still be protected under that policy. When Singh asked
how such incidents are handled in Washington, RSO informed
him the DS Protective Liaison Division keeps close contact
with the diplomatic community. One DS Agent typically
services several diplomatic missions -- and is able to share
tactical terrorist threat information on a real-time basis.
Singh concurred that such a service in India is necessary
beyond what state police agencies may provide, and suggested
the MEA, with inputs from the state police and Home Ministry,
would be the likely information provider. The DCM then
explained the function of the Embassy's EAC to evaluate
imminent threat information and decide on an appropriate
response, indicating how reliable real-time GOI terrorist
threat information would fit into the Embassy's
decision-making process. Singh agreed in principle to create
a real-time response mechanism to disseminate GOI terrorist
threat information, with RSO as the Embassy's POC. He saw
this as important both to the diplomatic community and
India's growing pool of expatriate businesses.
"No Complaints" on Intel Sharing
--------------------------------
¶13. (S) Singh reported that there were "no complaints" from
Delhi on US-India intelligence sharing overall, and
introduced J/S Kumar as a key contact for intel sharing. The
DCM concurred n the positive state of intelligence
cooperation. He conveyed his understanding that earlier US
concerns in this area have largely been resolved.
Continuing the Ideological Discussion
-------------------------------------
¶14. (S) The DCM and Singh revisited the CTJWG discussion on
NEW DELHI 00003611 005 OF 008
combating extremist ideology particularly through the
Internet without leaving a USG fingerprint. They agreed to
schedule separate meetings to pursue this issue and explore
how much can be accomplished and how best to do so.
Future Meetings Planned
-----------------------
¶15. (C) In addition to issue-specific Embassy-GOI meetings
to be held over the summer, Singh said that he planned to
meet S/CT Ambassador Crumpton in September on the fringes of
the UNGA. The DCM noted that Undersecretary Nick Burns plans
to visit India in late summer, which would offer an interim
opportunity to review CT progress, among other issues.
Comment: Encouraging Signs Continue
-----------------------------------
¶16. (C) We are encouraged by the MEA's continued receptivity
to engage with us more deeply than in recent history on CT
issues. Barriers appear to be dissolving even regarding very
sensitive issues, such as intelligence sharing and
bio-terrorism preparedness. As far as the US-India CT
dialogue is concerned, Ambassador Singh embodies the adage
that "the right man in the right place at the right time can
turn the tide." He has yet to ensure the other actionable
parts of the Indian bureaucracy march in the same direction
and to the same tune, but it is clear he is serious about
making practical CT cooperation work and serious about
working with us to do so.
Action Request for SCA and S/CT
-------------------------------
¶17. (C) Given the GOI's expressed interest in "doing more"
on the LTTE (Refs A and B and Para 7), Embassy requests
further guidance from SCA and S/CT on moving in coordination
with Delhi against LTTE finances and arms flows. We expect
also to be queried about what steps the USG is prepared to
take against LTTE fund-raising in the US.
ATA Courses In Train for India 2006
-----------------------------------
¶18. (SBU) Begin list of ATA courses for India 2006:
-- ATA-5345 Executive Course on Cyber-Terrorism
Duration: June 12-14
Location: Hyderabad
Status: Offer accepted
-- ATA-2994 Post-Blast Investigation
Duration: July 17-August 4
Location: Baton Rouge
Status: Offer accepted
-- ATA-5062 India Senior Crisis Management Course
Duration: August 21-26
NEW DELHI 00003611 006 OF 008
Location: Washington
Status: Pending GOI approval
-- ATA-5956 Airport Security Consultation
Duration: June 26-30
Location: New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Jaipur
Status: Requested by the GOI. Pending formal approval
-- ATA-5737 India VIP Protection Course
Duration: August 7-25
Location: Baton Rouge
Status: Pending GOI approval
GOI "Wish List" for CT Courses
---------------------------------
¶19. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document "ATA
Training Courses - Requirements of Indian Police:
Methodology and equipment for countering suicide bombing and
fidayeen attacks.
Countermeasures against improvised explosive devices and land
mines used against transport vehicles
Terrorist communications systems
Channels of terrorist financing - Modus Operandi and
countermeasures
Building personal profile of terrorists/criminals: How to
build the profile (including modus operandi) of terrorists
and criminals associated with organized crime
Database development:
-- What databases are available to investigators in the US?
-- How have these databases been built/developed?
-- What are the laws associated with the creation and access
to these databases?
Experience Sharing: The most valuable input to agencies
charged with the task of maintaining security is the
experience of other such agencies. At the moment US security
forces are dealing with "rural" militancy in Afghanistan and
"urban" militancy in Iraq. It is not necessary to send a
large number of officers from India. US officers with
appropriate experience could come to India for 2-3 day
sessions with Indian officers. This idea is an extension of
the cooperation between the defense forces of the two
countries. We would thus suggest the following:
Experience Sharing/Afghanistan:
-- What were the problems faced in Afghanistan at the
strategic level; at the tactical level?
-- What strategies evolved to resolve the problems?
-- How successful were the strategies and what were/are the
problems faced in implementing the strategies?
-- What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the
NEW DELHI 00003611 007 OF 008
security forces?
-- In retrospect, what else could have been done?
Experience Sharing/Iraq:
-- What were the problems faced in Iraq at the strategic
level; at the tactical level?
-- What strategies evolved to resolve the problems?
-- How successful were the strategies and what were/are the
problems faced in implementing the strategies?
-- What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the
security forces?
-- In retrospect, what else could have been done?
General policing as related to terrorism:
-- Forged documentation and travel documents
-- Money counterfeiting
-- Money laundering
Security Management:
-- Airport security
-- VIP protection
Intelligence gathering techniques including practical
demonstration of the techniques
Illegal immigration management including border patrolling
techniques
Forensics medicine: new methodology and tools available to
assist investigations
Forensic science:
-- DNA fingerprinting
-- Other special techniques such as use of polygraph
-- Use of voice prints and other biometric measures
End Text.
GOI Offer of CT Courses for USG Personnel
-----------------------------------------
¶20. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document
"Counterterrorism Courses for US Forces Personnel in India":
-- Money Laundering at CBI Academy, Ghaziabad
-- Counter-Insurgency and Commando Course at Border Security
Forces Training Center & School, Hazaribagh.
-- Weapons & Tactics Course at Central School of Weapons and
Tactics, BSF Training Center & School, Indore.
-- Bomb Disposal Course at NSG Training Center, Manesar.
(NOTE: NSG is the National Security Group, whose mandate
includes VIP protection and response to major acts of
terrorism occurring at diplomatic and GOI facilities. End
Note.)
NEW DELHI 00003611 008 OF 008
-- Young Officer-Leg. II (Integrated) Course at BSF Academy,
Tekanpur
-- Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare Course at Assam
Rifles Training Center & School, Dimphu (Nagaland)
-- Training at Greyhounds Regional Training Center, Hyderabad
(NOTE: The Greyhounds is a GOI security force targeting
India's Naxalites/Maoists. End Note.)
End Text.
USG Delegation
--------------
¶21. (U) DCM Robert Blake
PolCouns Geoff Pyatt
RSO George Lambert
D/PolCouns Atul Keshap
D/ORA Joe Massingill
ESTHOff Connie Johnson
Poloff Howard Madnick (notetaker)
GOI Delegation
--------------
¶22. (U) MEA Additional Secretary (International
Organizations) Ambassador KC Singh
Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat/RAW) Sharad Kumar
MEA Brigadier (Disarmament/International Security) Anil Nandal
MEA Director (Americas) Gaitri Kumar
¶23. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
BLAKE