Beyond duty: an examination and defence of supererogation

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Abstract

Many accept that there are some acts that are ‘supererogatory’ or
‘beyond the call of duty’. Risking one’s life to save others or
dedicating one’s life to helping the needy are often thought to be
examples of such acts. Accepting the possibility of acts of this sort
raises interesting problems for moral philosophy, as many moral
theories appear to leave no room for the supererogatory. While
these problems are increasingly recognized in moral philosophy,
there remain a number of debates that have failed to pay sufficient
attention to the existence of acts of this sort. In this thesis I
investigate the implications of accepting the possibility of
supererogation for three of these debates.
The first issue I investigate is the relationship between morality
and self-interest. One popular view is that supererogatory acts are
those that demand too much sacrifice from those who could
perform them. However, I argue that looking at self-reported
accounts and empirical psychological studies of moral exemplars
gives us good reason to reject this view, as it has the implausible
implication that those with less developed moral consciences are
excused from obligations that apply to those with more developed
moral sensibilities. We should accept, then, that performing an act
of supererogation may be in line with an agent's self-interest.
The next debate I examine concerns the connection between moral
judgements and motivation. Motivational judgement internalists
claim that there is a necessary connection between moral
judgements and motivation. However, it is often unclear which
moral judgements this view is supposed to cover. The claim is
made about judgements of 'moral goodness', 'moral rightness' and
'moral requirement'. I argue that internalists need to restrict their
claim to moral obligation judgements.
I then examine how to give an account of the relationship between
moral obligations and reasons for action. It is often claimed that
moral reasons are overriding. A related view is moral rationalism,
which holds that agents have most reason to act in line with their
moral requirements. I start by examining the differences between
these two views before looking at what form of either view it is
plausible to hold if we accept the existence of supererogation.
I finish by looking at whether accepting the existence of
supererogatory acts goes far enough or whether there is a need to
make room for additional deontic categories, such as
suberogation, quasi-supererogation or forced supererogation. I
will argue that none of the arguments put forward in defence of
these claims show that there is a need to make room for these
additional categories.