Wilkins, Justice, heard the arguments but resigned before the
opinion was filed.

MAUGHAN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff, a tenant in an apartment owned by defendants, brought
this action to recover for personal injuries sustained when
he endeavored to open a window which had been painted shut
and upon doing so fell through the window, thereby causing the
injury. Specifically, plaintiff entered into a written lease agreement
with defendants in August of 1976. The apartment had been recently
remodeled and during the remodeling the windows had apparently
been painted shut. Plaintiff claims that he thrice requested
defendants to open the windows and they agreed to do so. Defendants
on the other hand deny any such
communications.1

Plaintiff alleges that because the windows were stuck, the apartment
became hot and stuffy due to the lack of ventilation. In order
to remedy the situation, plaintiff managed, without incident,
to unstick on of the four windows. Subsequently, in June of 1977,
plaintiff sustained the injuries involved herein when he
undertook to open the remaining windows. In order to reach the
windows, he constructed a "platform" consisting of an
overturned garbage can with two 2" x 4" boards placed across
the can. Barefooted, he climbed atop this platform and began
hammering the window sill. As he was so doing, he lost his
footing, fell through the can, tipped over and sustained the
injuries alleged herein when his arm and hand went through the
window pane.

Upon the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the court concluded
that the plaintiff's injuries were not a foreseeable result of
defendants' actions and further that such actions were not
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries but rather that the
proximate cause was solely that of plaintiff's negligence
and accordingly granted defendants' Motion. We affirm the Court's
order.

Upon the factual situation set forth herein we note that while
there may have been negligence on the part of the defendants, such
negligence does not automatically render them liable. One who
is aware of a potentially dangerous condition and fails to
take appropriate evasive action or, as here, affirmatively
acts in a manner that activates or aggravates the otherwise latent
negligence of the defendant cannot later be heard to complaint
against that
negligence.2

Further, and again assuming defendants' negligence, we concur
with the trial court that the landlords' failure to
unstick a window could not reasonably be calculated to result
in the injury incurred herein. Rather, this injury was
caused by the independent and intervenery action of the plaintiff.
When there exist two possible causes for an injury,
and these causes are independent of each other, the later and
intervening cause is generally to be viewed as the proximate
cause of the
accident.3
The trial court found that the cause in this matter consisted
of plaintiff's ill-advised construction of and climbing onto
the garbage can structure and we find no basis for disturbing
that decision. No costs awarded.

WE CONCUR: Gordon R. Hall, Justice, I. Daniel Stewart, Justice.

Chief Justice Crockett concurred in this case before his retirement,
January 5, 1981.

Wilkins, Justice, heard the arguments but resigned before the
opinion was filed.

Footnotes:

1.
In reviewing summary judgments, this Court will review conflicting
contentions in a light most favorable to the party against whom
the judgment is entered.
Controlled Receivables v. Harman,
17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966).
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