Pursuant to order made earlier today, the taking of the deferred recorded divisions on the report stage of Bill C-2 stand deferred until Wednesday, June 21, at the expiry of the time provided for oral questions.

Rob MooreConservativeParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce debate on referral of Bill C-17, an act to amend the Judges Act and certain other acts in relation to courts, to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights before second reading.

The bill was tabled by our government on May 31. It would fully implement all but two of the recommendations contained in the May 2004 report of the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission. The remaining two recommendations would be implemented in modified form.

There are a number of constitutional principles which guide governments in establishing judicial compensation, both from Supreme Court case law and the Constitution itself. Section 100 of the Constitution specifically provides that it is the role of Parliament to set judicial salaries and benefits, a responsibility accomplished through amendments to the Judges Act.

As well, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that independent, objective and effective commissions must be established to examine and make recommendations on judicial compensation. These commissions support the constitutional imperative of judicial independence by replacing the need for face to face negotiations between judges and governments.

All members should be aware that the integrity of this constitutionally mandated commission process depends on governments and legislators to act with due diligence and reasonable dispatch in relation to the recommendations of the commission.

At the federal level, the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission is part of the constitutionally mandated process for the establishment of judicial compensation and benefits. The most recent commission reported in May 2004 following a nine month inquiry in which the commission considered extensive written submissions, expert reports from compensation professionals and verbal representations delivered over the course of two days of public hearings.

If the constitutional purpose of the commission's process is to be realized, then both governments and legislators must take the process seriously. In particular, it is incumbent upon those responsible for responding to and implementing commission recommendations to proceed as expeditiously as reasonably possible.

The issue of judicial compensation is an outstanding matter that our government inherited from the previous administration. Some members will recall that the previous government responded to the 2003 commission report on November 30, 2004. However, Bill C-51, which would have implemented all but one of the commission recommendations, was not introduced until six months later on May 20, 2005, and then the previous government did nothing to move that bill forward. Bill C-51 sat in the House from its date of introduction to the date the bill died on the order paper on November 29, 2005, when the federal election was called.

The actions of this government, on the other hand, demonstrate firm commitment to the integrity of the judicial compensation process. Within a period of approximately four months after assuming office, this government reviewed the commission report, issued a public response to the recommendations and tabled legislation.

Moreover, this government has moved expeditiously in light of a highly charged legislative agenda, including ensuring the timely appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court of Canada within three weeks of our assuming office.

More than two years have passed since the commission report was delivered. Now is the time to act when the integrity of the process and public confidence in the independence of our judiciary could be undermined.

This government has taken all the steps within its control to support and advance the constitutional process for the establishment of judicial compensation. Now it is Parliament's turn. The introduction of Bill C-17 is that step.

Today the government calls upon all members to initiate the final step by voting to immediately refer this bill to committee prior to second reading. As I said earlier, Parliament has a critical role to play in the establishment of judicial salaries and benefits. The Constitution requires Parliament to fix the salary, pension and other benefits of the federally appointed judiciary.

I am sure I do not need to remind the hon. members of this House that consideration by committee is a key element in the parliamentary process.

Members of the committee play a critical role in informing and guiding all parliamentarians in fulfilling their constitutional responsibility under the Constitution. They do so by conducting a principled in-depth review of the bill and the considerations which inform it.

The committee's work will be aided in a number of ways. First, the committee will have the benefit of the commission's comprehensive and detailed report which sets out each of its 16 recommendations.

Second, the committee can call witnesses, including the commissioners themselves, all highly respected professionals in their respective fields. These witnesses will be able to elaborate on any of the evidence, methodologies and other considerations that informed their recommendations.

Third, the committee will have available to it the detailed analysis provided in the government's public response which was released on May 29.

The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly acknowledged, indeed underscored, that decisions about the allocation of public resources ultimately belong to legislatures and governments. The court has clarified in the 2005 decision known as Bodner that governments can reject or modify recommendations of the independent commissions, provided that they provide a legitimate reason for doing so, supported by a proper, factual foundation.

The government response to the commission's report addresses the substance of the commission's recommendations fully, fairly and objectively. It is consistent with promoting the effectiveness of the commission process, depoliticizing the establishment of judicial salaries and preserving judicial independence.

Bill C-17 reflects the government response. The bottom line is that this government is prepared to accept all the commission's recommendations, with two modifications. First is the recommended salary increase. Second is the proposal on legal costs for the judicial organizations. On that issue the government's bill takes the same approach as former Bill C-51.

The government has decided to depart from the commission's recommendation of a 10.8% salary increase. Instead, the government is prepared to support a salary increase of 7.25%, or $15,700 per year, retroactive to April 1, 2004, plus an annual cost of living increment. The reasons why we believe 7.25% is an appropriate increase are fully explained in the government's response, which as I mentioned was presented on May 29.

Statements by members of at least two of the opposition parties following the tabling of this bill indicate that they take issue with the government's modified salary proposal. Although they did not expressly say so, they call for the implementation of the commission's salary recommendation for a 10.8% increase. They say that to do otherwise would undermine the important constitutional principles involved in the process.

Those who make this assertion have clearly failed to read or at least to fully understand the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Bodner case, as I already referred to, or in the P.E.I. judges case. As I have indicated, the Supreme Court has made it clear that governments are not bound by commission recommendations, provided that any modification is rational and the integrity of the process is respected.

As or more importantly in these circumstances, when more than two years have passed since the commission report, the process requires us to move as quickly as possible. Yet the opposition parties, while exhorting the importance of the principles, are obstructing the expeditious consideration and resolution of the bill by Parliament. They are doing it right now by insisting on a debate on referral rather than agreeing to have the committee take this up immediately.

The former Liberal government allowed Bill C-51 to languish in the House. Now in opposition the Liberals are continuing to obstruct speedy consideration of the merits of the commission report and recommendations. While the New Democratic Party has called on the government to fully and immediately implement the commission recommendations, it has insisted on this five hour debate rather than see the bill immediately referred to committee.

It is difficult to tell whether members are arguing for no salary increase for judges or for us to simply hand over all of our parliamentary duties to the commission. If opposition parties wish to propose amendments whether to increase the salary proposal to 10.8% or to restrict it to the cost of living, referral before second reading provides the greatest scope. We have clearly stated in our response that it will be for parliamentarians to decide whether the increase should be 7.25%, 10.8%, or some other number, once they have fully considered the matter.

If the opposition parties truly recognize the importance of the constitutional framework governing judicial compensation, they, like the government, will want to fully discharge their parliamentary responsibilities under section 100 of the Constitution.

Under our Constitution it is the government which establishes judicial compensation. That is our job. Therefore, we call on parliamentarians to carefully discharge their important constitutional responsibilities in an informed and respectful fashion in light of the constitutional and statutory principles that are engaged.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member represents the great county of Albert from which Viscount Bennett, a great jurist and pretty good Conservative prime minister came.

Of course judicial independence is as important to this side as any of the five priorities of that side. For the parliamentary secretary to say that we do not understand the jurisprudence is false. We say to the parliamentary secretary that in fact we do, and we understand that Parliament can override the commission in this case, but it has to do it in the framework of fiscal prudence. Left with an $80 billion surplus and not respecting the independence of the commission are two good reasons that the government is in error in this respect.

On the aspect of delay, the parliamentary secretary who has a hand in this through government will know that Bill C-9 and Bill C-10 precede this bill. They are both fairly weighty justice bills that will be considered by the justice committee. Does he think that there will be speedy passage as this bill will fall in behind them, or does he see another way around the issue of the delay since 2003 of the salaries that should be awarded, other than the gracious opening he made toward amendments at second reading? Does he see a speedier way given that the justice committee is going to be bogged down, in essence, by his other priorities?

Mr. Speaker, I know that the member for Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe understands this issue and is interested in it. I welcome his question especially since we share a town in New Brunswick. The town of Riverview is privileged to have two members of Parliament; he is one and I am the other.

Ultimately the committee is going to do its work. The fastest way we can let the committee do its work is to get this bill to committee. As I already mentioned, former Bill C-51 was the previous government's attempt at legislation on this issue and it languished on the order paper. It did not move forward at all. Now within four months of forming government we have this bill in the House. We have tabled a bill that adopts all of the commission's recommendations, save two, and we are prepared to move that forward.

This government is acting in an expeditious manner. We understand this is important. A lot of due consideration went into the government's response to the commission's report. I think it will be seen that when it is studied, in keeping with the raises that our constituents are getting year to year, the government's proposal is much more in line with the reality that Canadians are faced with today.

Mr. Speaker, the Bloc Québécois agrees with the idea of referring the bill to committee as soon as possible, although we are close to adding amendments.

However, we do not agree with the bill. I was in this House in 1999. Despite my youth, I have been here since 1993. There was a mechanism that linked judges' salaries to MP's salaries. According to what was suggested in 1999, the Prime Minister had to earn the same salary as the chief justice of the Supreme Court, ministers had to earn three quarters of the salary of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and members of Parliament, half.

If we passed the Conservative's bill, the Prime Minister would earn less than the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Does he think this is a message to send, in terms of democratic legitimacy?

Mr. Speaker, the member is right. At one time the salaries of judges and members of Parliament were linked. For various reasons, in a Parliament before my time as an elected member of Parliament, the decision was made to delink them.

We have seen the commission's recommendations for a 10.8% raise, which would amount to a $52,600 raise retroactive to 2004. I want to remind hon. members and make a point in mentioning that raise that according to Statistics Canada the median family income in 2004 was $54,100.

As parliamentarians, it is our constitutional authority and our constitutional responsibility to ultimately control the public purse. We have heard the commission's recommendations. We have adopted all but two of them. We have modified the recommendation for a 10.8%--

Mr. Speaker, section 100 of the Constitution Act of 1867 requires that the salaries and allowances of the federally appointed judiciary be established by Parliament. In the last Parliament, on May 20, 2005, Bill C-51, an act to amend the Judges Act, the Federal Courts Act and other acts, was introduced into the House of Commons by the former minister of justice.

This former Bill C-51 died on the order paper last fall when three opposition parties brought down the former government on a non-confidence vote. Bill C-51 included a number of court-related reforms as well as the expansion of the unified family courts across the country. The judicial salaries and benefits of the former government's response set out in Bill C-51 was essentially an implementation of the McLennan Commission's recommendations.

Bill C-17, being discussed today, came to be since the new government tabled a different response to the same McLennan Commission. The new Conservative government chose to remove some of the policy sections regarding the unified family court section that were of great interest to some provinces including Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Ontario. Also, inclusion of the section relating to prothonotaries, officers of the court who exercise judicial and quasi-judicial functions, were deleted.

This is the prerogative of the government. It can choose not to deal with these pressing issues at this time, but hopefully it will deal with them shortly.

The establishment of judicial compensation is governed by constitutional principles. These principles are designed to ensure public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Supreme Court of Canada in the “Reference re Remunerations of Judges of the Provincial Court, P.E.I.” has established a constitutional requirement for an independent, objective and effective commission whose purpose it is to depoliticize the process of judicial remuneration and thereby preserve judicial independence.

In essence, the judicial compensation commission makes non-binding recommendations to government and within a reasonable period of time the government must respond publicly. Any government which rejects or modifies a recommendation must provide a justification for the departure that meets the standard of rationality. What is this test of rationality?

In Bodner v. Alberta, the court stated that governments may modify or reject commission recommendations provided that the following questions are addressed:

(1) Has the government articulated a legitimate reason for departing from the commission’s recommendations?

(2) Do the government’s reasons rely upon a reasonable factual foundation? and

(3) Viewed globally, has the commission process been respected and have the purposes of the commission — preserving judicial independence and depoliticizing the setting of judicial remuneration — been achieved?

In 1998 the Judges Act was amended to provide for a Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission. This was set up so that every four years we could look at the adequacy of judicial compensation and benefits.

The express criteria which are to govern not only the commission's consideration, but also that of the government and Parliament who ultimately make the final determination are: a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living and the overall economic and financial position of the federal government; b) the role of financial security of the judiciary in ensuring judicial independence; c) the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary; and d) any other objective criteria that the commission considers relevant.

The independent commission is intended to remove decisions concerning the amount of judges' remuneration from the political sphere and to avoid confrontation between governments and our judiciary.

Under the parliamentary procedural rule the government has utilized today, Bill C-17 will go to committee before second reading. Thus there is more latitude. The committee then can study and call witnesses on the bill. It is important to note here that only the government can provide the necessary royal recommendation which would be required to increase any financial aspect of the bill. Amendments increasing financial parts of the bill are thus ineffective without the government action on a royal recommendation and that is important.

The Conservative government in Bill C-17 decreased the amount of compensation from that recommended by the independent commission. The government says that it has taken the overall financial and economic position of the government into account.

Canadians understand that the government, unlike many new governments in the past in this country, was left with a very healthy surplus. We still have a good economy as is the pay of private practice and other lawyers who can be called to the bench. That was utilized as a part of the reasoning.

The judiciary is doing its work for all Canadians. It deserves our support. Compensation for any sector of our population is a difficult area to discuss. Negotiations on judicial remuneration between the judiciary and the executive and legislature are not allowed. That is, judges cannot directly negotiate with the government. For the judiciary to engage in salary negotiations would undermine public confidence in the impartiality and the independence of the judiciary.

The three commissioners did hard work on behalf of all Canadians to set the appropriate rate. They received numerous submissions, including the public, organizations and different levels of government.

This commission advertised in 48 newspapers in Canada, having national, regional and local coverage, inviting written submissions from Canadians. The commissioners held two days of public hearings. They also retained their own consultants to assist in their deliberations. We must thank the commissioners for their very hard work. They covered not only areas of pay but other subjects like the division of the judicial annuity when a judge's conjugal relationship breaks down.

The Canadian public does understand that we need an independent judiciary. The respect with which we accord our judiciary is a key factor in the strength and stability of our nation. Our tradition of judicial independence is not only an important element in this country's democratic framework, it alone provides a model from which others can take hope and from which they can learn. Other countries look at our judiciary and justice system as a model.

An independent judiciary is a fundamental part of the Canadian democracy. Its independence must be respected and we look forward to some progress being made on this file by the government.

Our party feels it is highly inappropriate to attack the independence of the Canadian judiciary. Since the government has come to power, there seems to be a pattern that challenges the judiciary. Judges exercise their discretion and judgment every day across Canada. They take the law provided by this Parliament, hear the facts, and apply the law. Increasingly and rapidly the government is introducing legislation that seeks to limit judicial discretion.

In this Parliament, we have heard members opposite make comments, even regarding the Supreme Court Chief Justice, which ultimately caused a member his post as chair of the standing committee on aboriginal affairs.

Most suprisingly for us on this side of the House was the silence of the Attorney General of Canada, who normally would defend these judges who cannot speak for themselves. In fact, it is becoming common for the minister to make comments in public speeches which do not accord the judiciary the respect it deserves. This is different from the norm in Canada, certainly from the post of the highest law officer in the land.

Many people form impressions of individual cases from media reports without hearing all the facts. They often never hear of the appeals of decisions that occur when one side wishes to challenge the outcome. That appeal court story is often not written.

The system of justice in our country has excellent checks and balances that have been developed over years. We should never confuse our motives for one thing to attack another unrelated situation.

Today we debate a bill that will have impact on those in the judiciary. This has been long awaited. I trust that in our discussion we will remember that judicial independence is important to our society. In the context of financial security, courts must not only be free, but also appear to be free from political interference through economic manipulation.

Thus we end where I started, referring to the role of the judicial compensation commissions, a role interposed between the judiciary and the other branches of government. We now wait to see how the government responds to this challenge. We will be here later tonight when the bill, I understand, will go to committee before second reading.

With that in mind, I listened to the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice. He knows very well, as I have explained it to him in the past, my concerns about the need for a royal recommendation with respect to amendments in committee. I hope that he can make that clear over the course of our debate in the future. We will be respectful in this process.

Mr. Speaker, the member referred to a judge's limits regarding ability, freedom and range. I am wondering if the hon. member would want to elaborate further on that.

In both Bill C-9 and Bill C-10, the lower range of sentencing has been limited and discretion has been taken away. Judges have less discretion to impose non-jail type sentences and minimum sentences. It would take away a judge's discretion in the lower ranges of sentencing, but judges would still have all the discretion in the world for the severest of penalties.

I wonder if the hon. member could comment on what seems like an anomalous restricting of a judge's ability and authority at the lower level of sentencing, but allowing judges total authority in the stricter levels of sentencing. Judges are the ones who hear all the evidence. They are trained in sentencing. They are the experts. They can look at all the conditions in the history of a case and then, based on that, are given a full spectrum of sentences. That is the theory in Canada and the modern judicial theory.

Mr. Speaker, there were a couple of places in my remarks where I talked about the inability of judges to express themselves. One of those is when people read cases in a newspaper, the judges speak from their judgments and decisions. They do not explain their decisions afterward. They do not discuss them or give interviews or anything like that. Therefore, the work of judges is inside the law, based on the facts, and utilizing their discretion on the facts.

What the member is referring to, which was in another part of my speech, is the fact that there seems to be legislation coming forward that limits the ability of judges to exercise discretion, for instance, on conditional sentencing, or takes away the option of the judicial tool that is currently before them with certain offences that are listed. This will go to committee and we will deal with that through amendment, hopefully.

Specifically, the member talked about the mandatory minimums. Mandatory minimum sentences are where Parliament has provided in the Criminal Code a floor that it expects the judge in a case to start from in the sentencing. The floor is not a maximum. It is not a ceiling. It is a minimum.

Therefore, historically, mandatory minimums in the Criminal Code, and there are currently about 42 of them, have been used with restraint in both the volume inside the Criminal Code. However, in the courtrooms, judges have used that floor. They have the discretion, based on both extenuating circumstances and mitigating factors, to go up or down from that floor. That is how judges act in a courtroom. They use that discretion.

What these two bills do is limit the discretion. It is more like setting up a grid system. For x offence, there is a mandatory minimum. Some of the mandatory minimums in Bill C-10, for example, are 10 years and so the floor is supposed to be 10 years. Yet we know in this country that the Supreme Court of Canada, on certain offences, has ruled seven year mandatory minimums unconstitutional.

There is a real concern about those types of bills coming forward, but in Bill C-17 we should really focus on the judicial compensation and getting through this in an orderly and professional manner in the House without negative political interference.

Mr. Speaker, you can imagine how pleasant it is to be here at 8 p.m. talking about Bill C-17, which goes to the heart of our democracy because many countries all over the world look upon the Quebec and Canadian legal system with considerable envy. It has been extremely well tested, is recognized for its impartiality and is based on the merit principle.

Since I was elected in 1993, I have always been interested in the appointment of judges, and especially in how law is generated. We could ask ourselves the following question as parliamentarians: what are the skills needed to be a good judge?

I just heard the hon. member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles refer to events that occurred prior to this Parliament. I know that he certainly wanted to underscore how proud his government is to have introduced the transparency bill.

That being said, the judges in a system like ours, in a parliamentary democracy, must have three characteristics. They must be totally impartial and well paid to be shielded from any attempts to corrupt them or any desire for financial gain. In addition to being properly paid, they must be totally independent and have security of tenure. In other words, we cannot have a system where a government that is unhappy with a judge’s decision can decide to move him or refuse to renew his term.

It has certainly happened that certain Conservative members with major responsibilities, whose names shall go unmentioned, have said that some judges in our political system engage in judicial activism. I have even heard the Prime Minister say that judges should not interpret the charter in a way that fails to respect the will of Parliament since its members are elected by the people.

There is a certain truth to that. Clearly, Parliament has the most legitimacy. However, it is wrong think that our judges engage in judicial activism.

It is extremely rare in our political system to see laws overturned. Of all the legislation brought before the Supreme Court since 1982, only about 8% has been overturned. I do not know whether the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities shares my view, but in general, legislation is not overturned. There is very little judicial activism, although that does not mean that there is none.

For educational purposes, I point to the example of the decision in the Grant case, where Alberta was forced to add sexual orientation to its human rights code as a prohibited ground for discrimination.

That being said, the Bloc Québécois commends the government’s commitment to refer the bill as quickly as possible to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, but we do not acknowledge the substance of the bill. The Bloc Québécois will thus make substantial amendments to this bill.

Why are we not in agreement? First, as was pointed out by the member for Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean, one of the best parliamentarians in this House, whose talents as an orator are recognized and admired by all, a man known for his great self-control, it is important to have an independent mechanism for setting judges’ salaries. We would not like to end up in a situation where parliamentarians had to negotiate directly with judges. Imagine the situation that would place Parliament in. Furthermore, in 1999, a balance had been reached. I should specify, for the sake of historical truth, that the Liberals upset this balance.

I have to say that, unfortunately, the Liberals played some cheap political games. They upset a balance that had been the wish of many. This balance was that the prime minister received the same salary as the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Obviously, in a democratic system, the person who is the authorized spokesperson of Canadians, who is elected by the will of the people, should not have less legitimacy than the chief justice.

We also know that ministers have great responsibilities. Under the 1999 scenario, they received three quarters of the salary of the chief justice of the Supreme Court. The members, servants of the people if ever there were, received 50% of the salary of the chief justice of the Supreme Court.

This balance was upset. I must say that the former prime minister of Canada made it into a partisan issue, and a deliberate choice was made to break with what was proposed by an independent commission in 1999.

I am not proud of the fact that the Conservative government is perpetuating this tradition. That is why the Bloc Québécois has to present some amendments. I do not understand why the Conservative government does not go back to the recommendations made by the independent commission.

Once one begins to question this principle, it removes the impartiality from a principle that should be totally and absolutely impartial. If the bill were adopted, the chief justice would earn $298,500 and the prime minister of Canada would earn $295,400. Admittedly this not exactly below the poverty line, but nevertheless the prime minister would be less well paid than the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Canada.

Once again, where judges’ pay is being decided, we have to be guided by some principles. In the Bloc Québécois, we believe in the independence of the judiciary. The former member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles is a man who has served this House well. Richard Marceau, a bright mind, a brilliant jurist, a seasoned parliamentarian, a man known for his keen judgment, who has had only one loyalty, namely the people of Charlesbourg, has suggested to the justice committee that a subcommittee be formed to study the appointment of judges. Imagine our surprise, not to say our indignation, when we heard the former president of the Liberal Party of Quebec say during the Gomery commission hearings that, if you want to be a judge in Canada, you have to have your Liberal Party membership card. Imagine our indignation. Imagine our consternation. There was a sort of collective disgust.

The former president of the Quebec wing of the Liberal Party of Canada—pardon me if that was not what I said—stated right there in the Gomery commission hearings that to be appointed to the bench in Canada, one had to be a card-carrying Liberal. Obviously, I would like to think that this could not be farther from the truth.

That said, Richard Marceau, the former member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, who served well in this House, introduced a motion to strike a subcommittee to study the judicial appointment process. The Bloc Québécois considers reforming the appointment process for Supreme Court justices a priority.

Mr. Speaker, it seems that my time has expired. How time flies. I hope the members will have some questions for me.

Mr. Speaker, I enjoyed working with the member on the justice committee. Also, I agree with his comments on Mr. Marceau.

The member mentioned independence of the judiciary. Since we are talking about pay scales, I would like him to comment on whether the two possible mechanisms for setting judges' salaries are independent. This is what we are talking about tonight. The Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission is one option. The other is an amount chosen by the justice minister.

Could the hon. member describe the independence of both of these options? Does he believe they are both independent methods for determining judges' salaries?

Mr. Speaker, the Bloc Québécois has stated its position on this issue several times, as did my colleague from Roberval a few years ago. Our position is unchanged. In view of the Supreme Court's ruling and referral concerning judges in Prince Edward Island, we hope that the commission will be totally independent of Parliament, and that it will consider a number of totally independent criteria, including the state of the economy and the ability to pay. We also hope that judges' and members' salaries will be linked.

As I said earlier, we were comfortable with the scenario proposed in 1999. The Prime Minister earns the same salary as the Chief Justice. Ministers earn three quarters of that and members earn half.

We do not understand why the Liberals and the Conservatives chose to sever that link. In the end, they chose to intervene by arbitrarily setting judges' salaries. We do not think this is the right thing to do.