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The Egyptian government appears to be on the verge of further devaluing the pound. President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi met with the governor of the country’s central bank Amer last week to give political cover to the move. Beltone Financial, an Egyptian investment bank, advised that the move is imminent. The devaluation and partial flotation would be part of a wider deal with the IMF to implement economic reforms in return for a much-needed $12 billion loan to jump-start the economy.

Author

For Egyptians who are likely to see their savings devalued by up to 30 percent, there is a sense of impending doom. The people know the move is happening, but not exactly when or what to expect. While the devaluation makes good economic sense in the long term, there will be immediate negative consequences for the poor and the struggling middle class. Meanwhile, the opaqueness of the decision making process reflects badly on the economy and continues the Egyptian government’s rich tradition of keeping its population in the dark on major economic policy shifts.

1977: The World Bank, Structural Adjustment, and the “Intifada of Thieves”

Egypt’s current crisis evokes 1976-1977, when a worsening fiscal situation forced the Sadat government to negotiate with the World Bank for loans. In October 1976, the Cairo representative of the World Bank, Paul Dickey, sent a secret memorandum to the minister of economy Zaki el-Shafie arguing that Egypt needed to take bold decisions, such as devaluing the pound and reducing and eventually eliminating subsidies. Shafie and his team tried to explain that Egypt was a net importer and devaluation would exponentially increase the price of imports. Moreover, they feared the political impact of reducing or removing subsidies. It soon became clear, however, that the “suggestions” outlined in the memo were effectively the conditions for obtaining a loan.

On January 17, 1977, the Deputy Prime Minister announced that subsidies on major commodities and foodstuffs would be cut. The next day’s papers announced price increases for goods including bread, rice, pasta, gas, oil, sugar, and even cigarettes. News spread quickly, and protests started the same morning. Factory workers in the Helwan district of Cairo were the first to demonstrate against the government. Workers from the nearby military factories were quick to join, and the protests spread to factories and universities in Cairo and eventually across Egypt. Left with few options, on the evening of January 19, the government announced it was cancelling the subsidy reductions and ordered the army to maintain order and crush the protests, which Sadat labeled the “intifada of thieves.”

2003: A Managed Devaluation Hits Poor Hard

Fast forward to the early 2000s, and Egypt’s economy was facing another crisis. In 2001 the stock market had almost crashed and GDP growth had slowed to 3.3 percent. Part of the problem was that the pound was pegged to the dollar, making Egyptian exports less competitive in international markets. The government had “maintained the peg in order to maximize hard currency revenues from tourism….But the result was simply to delay the political turbulence that would follow the inevitable devaluation.”

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Devaluation was always a goal of the government, and was necessary for long-term economic growth as the pound was unnaturally overvalued. However, when the government devalued the pound in January 2003, it did so in a haphazard way with minimal societal consultation or deliberation. The devaluation increased consumer prices, especially on food, which disproportionately harmed the poorest segments of society. The government responded by increasing subsidies on basic food items as a stopgap measure, but this failed to prevent substantial short-term inflationary pressure.

2016: Back to the Future

Today Egypt faces fraught economic conditions. Sissi was elected in 2014 on a platform of improving security, stability, and jump-starting the economy, but he has yet to deliver on all fronts. There has been a focus on grandiose projects that in the short term are unlikely to deal with the festering problem of youth unemployment. Economic policymaking has entered the realm of the absurd recently when Sissi suggested funding development projects via collecting spare change.

Economic policymaking has entered the realm of the absurd.

In terms of monetary policy since 2011, the government has attempted to support the Egyptian pound against the dollar, a policy the central bank governor who was appointed in November 2015 labeled a “grave mistake.” Already Egyptians face capital controls, including limits on transferring currency abroad and the amount they can withdraw to travel overseas. Companies that import foreign components are severely affected as well, as they struggle to amass the dollars needed to continue operating their businesses. The capital controls have even adversely affected Egyptians studying abroad, putting limits on the amount of money they can withdraw from ATMs overseas to fund their study and living expenses.

By not clarifying when or how the devaluation will occur, and if it will be followed by a free float or not, the Egyptian government continues its tradition of not being forthcoming with its people. Whenever it does occur, prices are likely jump considerably, considering inflation is already at 15.5 percent, the highest level it has been at for 7 years.

As with 2003, Egypt’s poor will bear the brunt of the devaluation, where already 27 percent of the population lives under the poverty line. In the short term, the government may able to deal with the political and socio-economic ramifications of structural adjustment. However, without an overarching vision, clear direction, and sufficient societal consultation and deliberation, Egyptians will continue to wake up to haphazard economic planning that continue to impact their lives for the worse.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/egypt_currency001-e1476198620300.jpg?w=320The Egyptian government appears to be on the verge of further devaluing the pound. President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi met with the governor of the country’s central bank Amer last week to give political cover to the move. Beltone Financial, an Egyptian investment bank, advised that the move is imminent. The devaluation and partial flotation would be part of a wider deal with the IMF to implement economic reforms in return for a much-needed $12 billion loan to jump-start the economy.
Author
Adel Abdel Ghafar
Visiting Fellow - Brookings Doha Center Twitter @AdelAGhafar
For Egyptians who are likely to see their savings devalued by up to 30 percent, there is a sense of impending doom. The people know the move is happening, but not exactly when or what to expect. While the devaluation makes good economic sense in the long term, there will be immediate negative consequences for the poor and the struggling middle class. Meanwhile, the opaqueness of the decision making process reflects badly on the economy and continues the Egyptian government’s rich tradition of keeping its population in the dark on major economic policy shifts.
1977: The World Bank, Structural Adjustment, and the “Intifada of Thieves”
Egypt’s current crisis evokes 1976-1977, when a worsening fiscal situation forced the Sadat government to negotiate with the World Bank for loans. In October 1976, the Cairo representative of the World Bank, Paul Dickey, sent a secret memorandum to the minister of economy Zaki el-Shafie arguing that Egypt needed to take bold decisions, such as devaluing the pound and reducing and eventually eliminating subsidies. Shafie and his team tried to explain that Egypt was a net importer and devaluation would exponentially increase the price of imports. Moreover, they feared the political impact of reducing or removing subsidies. It soon became clear, however, that the “suggestions” outlined in the memo were effectively the conditions for obtaining a loan.
Related
- Markaz
Why Morocco's protests won’t usher in another Arab Spring Sarah Yerkes Wednesday, November 2, 2016 -
Peace Through Entrepreneurship By Steven R. Koltai; With Matthew Muspratt 2016 - Africa in focus
Figures of the week: Africa’s 2016 growth rate and 2017 predictions Mariama Sow Wednesday, December 28, 2016
On January 17, 1977, the Deputy Prime Minister announced that subsidies on major commodities and foodstuffs would be cut. The next day’s papers announced price increases for goods including bread, rice, pasta, gas, oil, sugar, and even cigarettes. News spread quickly, and protests started the same morning. Factory workers in the Helwan district of Cairo were the first to demonstrate against the government. Workers from the nearby military factories were quick to join, and the protests spread to factories and universities in Cairo and eventually across Egypt. Left with few options, on the evening of January 19, the government announced it was cancelling the subsidy reductions and ordered the army to maintain order and crush the protests, which Sadat labeled the “intifada of thieves.”
2003: A Managed Devaluation Hits Poor Hard
Fast forward to the early 2000s, and Egypt’s economy was facing another crisis. In 2001 the stock market had almost crashed and GDP growth had slowed to 3.3 percent. Part of the problem was that the pound was pegged to the dollar, making Egyptian exports less competitive in international markets. The government had “maintained the peg in order to maximize hard currency revenues from tourism….But the result was simply to delay the political turbulence that would follow the inevitable devaluation.”
Related Books
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Iran Reconsidered By Suzanne Maloney 2017 - T Upcoming
Turkey and the West By Kemal Kirişci 2017 - Upcoming
Escaping the Escape Edited by Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017
Devaluation ... The Egyptian government appears to be on the verge of further devaluing the pound. President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi met with the governor of the country’s central bank Amer last week to give political cover to the move.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/09/09/financial-inclusion-opportunities-in-africa/Financial inclusion opportunities in Africahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/194062626/0/brookingsrss/topics/egypt~Financial-inclusion-opportunities-in-Africa/
Fri, 09 Sep 2016 14:34:56 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=330606

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With about half of the top-10 scoring countries featured in the 2016 Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report located in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is evident that many African countries have made significant strides toward advancing financial inclusion. The rapid proliferation of digital financial platforms and services, particularly mobile money, has been a key driver of financial inclusion progress across the region.

Yet there is considerable room for growth in terms of mobile capacity across many countries in Africa, as demonstrated by the fact that only one of the FDIP countries in Africa tied for the highest mobile capacity score on this year’s FDIP scorecard. Recent projections indicate that regional growth with respect to the mobile sector will indeed be substantial. For example, according to estimates by the GSMA, about 168 million people will become connected by mobile services across Africa over the next five years.

Among the eight markets that will account for the majority of this growth, three FDIP countries—Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Tanzania—are expected to contribute more than a third of new mobile subscribers. We anticipate that future build-outs of mobile infrastructure, combined with increased mobile phone ownership, will significantly strengthen the foundation for enhanced mobile money adoption in Africa.

Below, we examine highlights pertaining to financial inclusion achievements and challenges across five of the FDIP countries in Africa, in descending order by overall score.

UGANDA

With an overall score of 78 percent on the 2016 FDIP scorecard, Uganda tied with South Africa as the second-highest scoring FDIP country in Africa. As noted in a February 2016 report by research group InterMedia, Uganda has experienced robust growth in terms of access to and usage of registered formal financial accounts. Moreover, bank and mobile money customers are engaging to a greater extent with “advanced” services (e.g., savings and bill payment products) than they have in previous years.

As with many countries in Africa, mobile money has been the predominant driving force for the expansion of financial inclusion in Uganda. However, mobile money takeup is far from ubiquitous. Among those familiar with mobile money, barriers to using mobile money services include factors such as limited mobile phone ownership (only about 55 percent of adults in Uganda owned a mobile phone as of 2015), as well as a lack of understanding surrounding mobile money.

In terms of recent regulatory developments related to financial inclusion, one of the key regulatory changes in Uganda since the publication of the first annual FDIP report in 2015 was the approval of a bill amending the 2004 Financial Institutions Act. The Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act was published in the Uganda Gazette in February 2016.

This legislation formalized a legal basis for the regulation of agent banking, which should open up opportunities for banks to partner with non-bank entities that can serve as financial access points for underserved populations. Additionally, the Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act enabled Uganda’s central bank to establish more than one credit reference bureau, which could foster greater competition with the sector and possibly lead to lower costs for consumers.

Moving forward, enhancing clarity with respect to the regulatory framework for agent banking could help encourage the participation of financial institutions and non-bank entities in branchless banking arrangements. Another effort that could strengthen Uganda’s regulatory environment for branchless banking services would be to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for mobile money services, to supplement the 2013 Mobile Money Guidelines.

TANZANIA

Tanzania’s strong country commitment to advancing financial inclusion and robust regulatory environment for digital financial services, which helped propel the country to a score of 68 percent, have supported the expansion of financial inclusion in recent years. Indeed, as of February 2016 Tanzania updated its national financial inclusion target for 2017, given that the country had already surpassed its initial target of enabling 50 percent of adults to access formal financial services by 2016, as identified in the National Financial Inclusion Framework.

While adoption levels in Tanzania were low as of 2014 compared with many of the other FDIP countries in Africa, we anticipate that the strong foundation for digital financial services fostered by public and private sector financial inclusion stakeholders in Tanzania will continue to help scale mobile money and other formal financial services among low-income and other underserved populations.

One recent development within Tanzania’s increasingly robust mobile ecosystem may contribute to enhanced adoption of formal financial services. In February 2016, Vodacom Tanzania joined Airtel, Tigo, and Zantel in a mobile money interoperability agreement across their mobile networks. Given that all four operators in Tanzania are now interoperable, this arrangement is expected to facilitate greater convenience and utility for consumers engaging with the operators’ different services.

Tanzania has been lauded for the diverse suite of mobile financial services within its market, including products pertaining to savings and credit. Moving forward, ensuring that consumers are aware of these products and understand how to select and leverage formal financial services in ways that contribute to their financial health will be key components of promoting sustainable financial inclusion.

To further the objective of sustainable financial inclusion, in February 2016 a National Financial Education Framework was launched by the Bank of Tanzania and the Financial Sector Deepening Trust. Efficient implementation of the financial education and capability initiatives referenced in this new framework should help foster engagement with formal financial services among those at the margins of, or outside of, the formal financial ecosystem.

ZAMBIA

As noted in the 2015 FinScope survey implemented by the Bank of Zambia (in partnership with Financial Sector Deepening Zambia and with advisory support from FinMark Trust), Zambia has made considerable strides in advancing financial inclusion. The percentage of adults who are considered formally included (defined in this instance as “individuals 16 years or older who have/use financial services provided by a financial service provider that is regulated or officially supervised”) increased by about 15 percentage points between 2009 and 2015.

While Zambia has made substantial progress toward its financial inclusion goals, a significant percentage of the population remains excluded from the formal financial ecosystem, and notable disparities remain in terms of access to formal financial services, including among low-income individuals and rural residents. Limited awareness of digital financial services is one factor that has impeded the acceleration of financial inclusion, as noted by the Helix Institute of Digital Finance. Amplifying marketing and financial education efforts could increase familiarity with these services and consequently contribute to enhanced adoption levels.

A number of recent developments may help accelerate progress toward financial inclusion in Zambia. For example, in November 2015, the Bank of Zambia and Zambia’s ministry of finance (in conjunction with the World Bank) formally launched the Financial Inclusion Support Framework. One of the objectives of this partnership is to develop a comprehensive national financial inclusion strategy, complete with “ambitious financial inclusion targets.” This strategy should help enhance coordination among key financial inclusion stakeholders as they work toward the country’s financial inclusion goals.

As noted in the 2015 FinScope survey, the cost of extending financial access points into low-income communities is another reason for the low level of financial inclusion in Zambia. Moving forward, finalizing and issuing branchless banking regulations could help foster greater regulatory clarity and encourage financial service providers to extend their reach into underserved areas.

Finally, investing in information and communications technologies and infrastructure should be a key priority in the drive to advance financial inclusion. Augmenting digital infrastructure would help support build-outs of branchless financial access points (e.g., banking agent outlets) that are often more cost-effective to maintain than traditional brick-and-mortar branches.

MALAWI

As one of the lowest-income countries among the FDIP sample, Malawi faces a number of economic and infrastructural constraints that contribute to its low levels of financial inclusion. Still, Malawi has demonstrated strong commitment to advancing access to and usage of formal financial services among underserved groups, including through its membership in the Better Than Cash Alliance and as a signatory to the Maya Declaration on Financial Inclusion.

Moreover, Malawi has been recognized for its commitment to improving gender equity with respect to financial inclusion. As of 2014, there was about an eight percentage point gap in terms of financial account ownership between men and women in Malawi, with women disproportionately excluded from the formal financial ecosystem. In recognition of gender disparities across the financial ecosystem and the need to address those disparities, Malawi has developed a specific quantifiable financial inclusion target for women that is featured within its national financial inclusion strategy.

Moving forward, amplifying the coordination of various financial literacy initiatives could help drive greater engagement with formal financial services. Additionally, finalizing and issuing the country’s draft electronic money regulations could provide greater clarity to financial service providers and encourage the participation of a diverse array of bank and non-bank entities within the digital financial ecosystem. Finally, including tiered know-your-customer provisions within the regulations could also reduce barriers to financial access among underserved customers.

EGYPT

Egypt was added to the FDIP focus countries for 2016, broadening the geographic diversity of the FDIP sample to include North Africa. Overall, Egypt received the lowest score among the FDIP countries, at 49 percent. Low levels of engagement with formal financial services—particularly among often-underserved groups such as low-income populations and women—combined with fairly low scores on the country commitment, mobile capacity, and regulatory environment dimensions, limited Egypt’s performance on the scorecard.

With that said, Egypt has engaged in a number of efforts to advance adoption of digital financial services. For example, a government salary program spearheaded by Visa, in cooperation with the Egyptian Banking Institute, the National Bank of Egypt, and Banque Misr, is intended to raise awareness and usage of payroll cards, which should help augment consumer engagement with the digital payments ecosystem.

While Egypt’s mobile subscribership level is considerable—Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa accounted for about a third of Africa’s total mobile subscriber base at the end of 2015, according to the GSMA—the mobile money aspects of Egypt’s mobile capacity score could be further strengthened. For example, broadening the diversity of mobile financial service offerings could support enhanced adoption of digital financial services by providing more options to consumers.

Finally, amplifying the country’s participation in multinational financial inclusion-oriented organizations could accelerate Egypt’s financial inclusion trajectory. For example, establishing specific commitments (e.g., the development of a financial inclusion strategy and formalization of a financial inclusion body charged with implementing the strategy) under the Maya Declaration could help Egypt identify specific policy priorities and provide the country’s financial inclusion stakeholders with greater support in reaching their objectives.

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With about half of the top-10 scoring countries featured in the 2016 Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report located in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is evident that many African countries have made significant strides toward advancing financial inclusion. The rapid proliferation of digital financial platforms and services, particularly mobile money, has been a key driver of financial inclusion progress across the region.
Yet there is considerable room for growth in terms of mobile capacity across many countries in Africa, as demonstrated by the fact that only one of the FDIP countries in Africa tied for the highest mobile capacity score on this year’s FDIP scorecard. Recent projections indicate that regional growth with respect to the mobile sector will indeed be substantial. For example, according to estimates by the GSMA, about 168 million people will become connected by mobile services across Africa over the next five years.
Among the eight markets that will account for the majority of this growth, three FDIP countries—Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Tanzania—are expected to contribute more than a third of new mobile subscribers. We anticipate that future build-outs of mobile infrastructure, combined with increased mobile phone ownership, will significantly strengthen the foundation for enhanced mobile money adoption in Africa.
Below, we examine highlights pertaining to financial inclusion achievements and challenges across five of the FDIP countries in Africa, in descending order by overall score.
UGANDA
With an overall score of 78 percent on the 2016 FDIP scorecard, Uganda tied with South Africa as the second-highest scoring FDIP country in Africa. As noted in a February 2016 report by research group InterMedia, Uganda has experienced robust growth in terms of access to and usage of registered formal financial accounts. Moreover, bank and mobile money customers are engaging to a greater extent with “advanced” services (e.g., savings and bill payment products) than they have in previous years.
As with many countries in Africa, mobile money has been the predominant driving force for the expansion of financial inclusion in Uganda. However, mobile money takeup is far from ubiquitous. Among those familiar with mobile money, barriers to using mobile money services include factors such as limited mobile phone ownership (only about 55 percent of adults in Uganda owned a mobile phone as of 2015), as well as a lack of understanding surrounding mobile money.
In terms of recent regulatory developments related to financial inclusion, one of the key regulatory changes in Uganda since the publication of the first annual FDIP report in 2015 was the approval of a bill amending the 2004 Financial Institutions Act. The Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act was published in the Uganda Gazette in February 2016.
This legislation formalized a legal basis for the regulation of agent banking, which should open up opportunities for banks to partner with non-bank entities that can serve as financial access points for underserved populations. Additionally, the Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act enabled Uganda’s central bank to establish more than one credit reference bureau, which could foster greater competition with the sector and possibly lead to lower costs for consumers.
Moving forward, enhancing clarity with respect to the regulatory framework for agent banking could help encourage the participation of financial institutions and non-bank entities in branchless banking arrangements. Another effort that could strengthen Uganda’s regulatory environment for branchless banking services would be to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for mobile money services, to supplement the 2013 Mobile Money Guidelines.
TANZANIA
Tanzania’s strong country commitment to advancing financial inclusion and robust regulatory environment for digital financial ... With about half of the top-10 scoring countries featured in the 2016 Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report located in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is evident that many African countries have made significant strides toward ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/09/07/how-israel-ignored-its-most-valuable-spy/How Israel ignored its most valuable spyhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/193007904/0/brookingsrss/topics/egypt~How-Israel-ignored-its-most-valuable-spy/
Wed, 07 Sep 2016 17:37:06 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=330371

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He was the best spy ever recruited by the Mossad. Too bad the Israelis didn’t listen to him. Even worse, the quarrel over why the spy was ignored inside Israel led to his death. But the Israelis were not his only clients; this asset also sold his services to Saudi Arabia.

Ashraf Marwan was the son-in-law of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He became a crucial adviser to Nasser’s successor Anwar el-Sadat. In 1970 he called the Israeli embassy in London and offered to work for the Israeli intelligence service. The Mossad ran him as its best asset ever, with then head of the service Zvi Zamir often meeting him face-to-face to debrief him.

A new book by veteran Israeli intelligence expert Uri Bar-Joseph tells the story of the Angel, Marwan’s code name, in detail. This is a tale of espionage at the highest level. The Angel provided Israel with Egypt’s entire order of battle for its armed forces and Egypt’s war plans for attacking Israel across the Suez Canal. He provided details of Sadat’s meetings with the Soviet leaders and up-to-the-minute reports on Soviet arms deliveries to Cairo.

But the Israeli military intelligence experts in the Directorate of Military Intelligence, which was solely responsible for producing the national intelligence estimates on whether Egypt would go to war, were convinced Sadat would not take the risk. The DMI had a concept of war planning. In the concept, Egypt could not beat Israel because of Israel’s overwhelming air superiority, which Egypt’s leaders knew made war suicidal. Thus Sadat wouldn’t attack.

But the Angel reported in 1972 that Sadat believed he had no choice but to go to war because Israel was blocking every avenue for diplomacy. Moreover, Sadat was planning a limited war to break the stalemate, not a full scale conflict. The concept was irrelevant.

Then, in August 1973, Marwan told Zamir that Sadat had traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Faisal. Sadat told Faisal, in a meeting with only Sadat, Faisal and Marwan in the room, that he would attack Israel with Syria that fall. Faisal promised Sadat that the kingdom would impose an oil embargo on America if it resupplied Israel. The oil embargo was the Arabs’ ultimate weapon.

It was also America’s nightmare. According to this account, the Israelis shared the substance of the Angel’s reports with the Nixon administration. Apparently Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ignored the warning that the oil weapon was being readied for use. Other reports have shown it wasn’t the only warning Kissinger ignored.

Meanwhile, the Israeli generals refused to abandon their concept. When war clouds gathered in October 1973, the DMI insisted that there was nothing to worry about. They convinced Defense Minister Moshe Dayan that war was not imminent. Even when the Russians began an urgent mass evacuation of their civilian advisers from Egypt and Syria, DMI chief Eli Zeira said that there was no reason to expect war.

The day before Sadat attacked, the Angel urgently summoned Zamir to London, to tell him the attack was coming on October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur in Israel. Only the next morning did Israel begin to mobilize. If the army had listened to Marwan in the months before October, it would have been far better prepared. As it was the last minute, the warning from London probably saved Israel from losing the Golan Heights and an even worse disaster than what actually happened to the country.

Why did he do it? Why would a twenty-nine-year-old Egyptian in 1973, married to the daughter of his country’s greatest hero, betray his country to its great foe? Money was part of the story. The Mossad paid him over a million dollars, helping Marwan become a very rich man. Ego was a part, too. As the Angel, Marwan was the central player in the world’s most dangerous conflict. And he enjoyed the thrill of it all.

If wars between spies are deadly, the wars between ex-spies over the blame game are even more deadly.

Bar-Joseph’s captivating account also makes clear that the Mossad was not alone in paying Marwan. The Saudi intelligence service saw him as a useful agent of influence in Cairo. Faisal’s intelligence chief and son-in-law, Kamal Adham, probably paid Marwan even more than the Mossad in lucrative contracts and other deals. His presence at the crucial August summit was a reflection of Saudi Arabia’s confidence in Ashraf Marwan. They, of course, had no idea he was an Israeli agent. But the Israelis had an asset with access to the royal family, a significant coup.

After the war, the Israeli spy agencies engaged in another war over who should be blamed for the debacle of the warning failure in October 1973. If wars between spies are deadly, the wars between ex-spies over the blame game are even more deadly. Zeira desperately tried to smear the Angel as a clever double agent in his retirement, to absolve the DMI of its gross negligence. Gradually, he released details about the Mossad’s greatest agent to the media, which would point the finger at Ashraf Marwan. Zamir even tried to stop him from going to court.

By 2007 it was too late. Marwan fell, or was pushed, to his death from the balcony of his London home. The investigation by Scotland Yard was perfunctory. They concluded it was either suicide or murder by sources unknown.

For the Mossad, the unveiling of the organization’s best-ever source by a fellow Israeli intelligence officer is a disaster that won’t go away. Any future potential walk-in will have to think long and hard about whether the Mossad can keep a secret.

]]>
He was the best spy ever recruited by the Mossad. Too bad the Israelis didn’t listen to him. Even worse, the quarrel over why the spy was ignored inside Israel led to his death. But the Israelis were not his only clients; this asset also sold his services to Saudi Arabia.
Ashraf Marwan was the son-in-law of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He became a crucial adviser to Nasser’s successor Anwar el-Sadat. In 1970 he called the Israeli embassy in London and offered to work for the Israeli intelligence service. The Mossad ran him as its best asset ever, with then head of the service Zvi Zamir often meeting him face-to-face to debrief him.
A new book by veteran Israeli intelligence expert Uri Bar-Joseph tells the story of the Angel, Marwan’s code name, in detail. This is a tale of espionage at the highest level. The Angel provided Israel with Egypt’s entire order of battle for its armed forces and Egypt’s war plans for attacking Israel across the Suez Canal. He provided details of Sadat’s meetings with the Soviet leaders and up-to-the-minute reports on Soviet arms deliveries to Cairo.
But the Israeli military intelligence experts in the Directorate of Military Intelligence, which was solely responsible for producing the national intelligence estimates on whether Egypt would go to war, were convinced Sadat would not take the risk. The DMI had a concept of war planning. In the concept, Egypt could not beat Israel because of Israel’s overwhelming air superiority, which Egypt’s leaders knew made war suicidal. Thus Sadat wouldn’t attack.
But the Angel reported in 1972 that Sadat believed he had no choice but to go to war because Israel was blocking every avenue for diplomacy. Moreover, Sadat was planning a limited war to break the stalemate, not a full scale conflict. The concept was irrelevant.
Then, in August 1973, Marwan told Zamir that Sadat had traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Faisal. Sadat told Faisal, in a meeting with only Sadat, Faisal and Marwan in the room, that he would attack Israel with Syria that fall. Faisal promised Sadat that the kingdom would impose an oil embargo on America if it resupplied Israel. The oil embargo was the Arabs’ ultimate weapon.
It was also America’s nightmare. According to this account, the Israelis shared the substance of the Angel’s reports with the Nixon administration. Apparently Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ignored the warning that the oil weapon was being readied for use. Other reports have shown it wasn’t the only warning Kissinger ignored.
Meanwhile, the Israeli generals refused to abandon their concept. When war clouds gathered in October 1973, the DMI insisted that there was nothing to worry about. They convinced Defense Minister Moshe Dayan that war was not imminent. Even when the Russians began an urgent mass evacuation of their civilian advisers from Egypt and Syria, DMI chief Eli Zeira said that there was no reason to expect war.
The day before Sadat attacked, the Angel urgently summoned Zamir to London, to tell him the attack was coming on October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur in Israel. Only the next morning did Israel begin to mobilize. If the army had listened to Marwan in the months before October, it would have been far better prepared. As it was the last minute, the warning from London probably saved Israel from losing the Golan Heights and an even worse disaster than what actually happened to the country.
Why did he do it? Why would a twenty-nine-year-old Egyptian in 1973, married to the daughter of his country’s greatest hero, betray his country to its great foe? Money was part of the story. The Mossad paid him over a million dollars, helping Marwan become a very rich man. Ego was a part, too. As the Angel, Marwan was the central player in the world’s most dangerous conflict. And he enjoyed the thrill of it all.
If wars ... He was the best spy ever recruited by the Mossad. Too bad the Israelis didn’t listen to him. Even worse, the quarrel over why the spy was ignored inside Israel led to his death. But the Israelis were not his only clients;https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/29/youth-unemployment-in-egypt-a-ticking-time-bomb/Youth unemployment in Egypt: A ticking time bombhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/181021828/0/brookingsrss/topics/egypt~Youth-unemployment-in-Egypt-A-ticking-time-bomb/
Fri, 29 Jul 2016 21:41:25 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=181342

Another post shows a video of Karam, a simple man from upper Egypt, revealing his secret to getting a favorable exchange rate for converting Egyptian pounds to dollars. Karam simply lays the Egyptian pound notes out, covers them with his scarf, and sings nationalistic songs to them—afterwards, he reveals a pile of fresh $1 notes. The video has since made it to mainstream media, with a news presenter sarcastically suggesting that Karam be appointed minister of finance.

These posts—just two recent examples of many—reflect the Egyptians’ pessimism about worsening economic conditions. With the resurgent authoritarianism under Sissi, it seems now the only way they can respond is with satire.

Big promises meet reality

In a classic authoritarian bargain, President Sissi came to power two years ago promising security, stability, and economic prosperity in exchange for near-total political control. Now, that bargain is in the process of breaking down, since he’s failed to deliver on all three fronts.

The ISIS-inspired insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula continues to fester, and since 2013, terror attacks have struck several Egyptian cities. The downing of the Russian jet in the Sinai Peninsula has brought down tourist arrivals. The murder of Italian PhD student Giulio Regenihas delivered a blow to Egypt’s relations with Italy and the EU. Protests erupted when the government suddenly transferred the sovereignty of two islands to Saudi Arabia this April. The government responded by locking people up, and many remain in jail to date on the charge of “spreading rumors about the disputed Red Sea islands Tiran and Sanafir.” In addition, incidents of sectarian violence continue to flare up. To many, Egypt seems to be moving backward, not forward.

On the economic front, too, Sissi has over-promised and under-delivered. The Egyptian pound continues to lose value, and unemployment remains high. Since Sissi came to power, overall unemployment has fallen slightly from 13.3 percent to 12.7 percent in the first quarter of 2016—but youth unemployment remains high, at 31.3 percent. In a new policy published yesterday titled “Educated but Unemployed: The Challenge Facing Egypt’s Youth,” I argue that if the Egyptian government does not deal with the specific problem of youth unemployment soon, it will likely face instability—and perhaps another uprising—in the years to come.

Hyper-nationalism, anyone?

In spite of this situation, the Sissi government continues to obsess over ultra-nationalistic and grandiose projects that will create desperately needed jobs in the short term—but likely not enough.

Egypt embarked on a major project to widen the Suez Canal, for example. The head of the Suez Canal Authority once predicted that the larger canal would generate $100 billion in one year. Egypt spent $8 billion on the project, and Sissi (dressed in full military regalia) opened it last year with a spectacle involving cruising in King Farouk’s yacht, al Mahrousa, in front of international dignitaries. A year later, the number of container ships passing through the canal is down by 3 percent, due to lower oil prices and preferences for the cheaper (but longer) route around the Cape of Good Hope.

The government also announced flashy plans to build a new capital, adjacent to Cairo, at the Sharm el Shiekh investment conference in 2015. One year later, the project has stalled over disagreements between the government and one of the main Emirati developers. There’s considerable debate over whether the new capital is even needed, or whether Egypt would be better served by improving Cairo’s existing infrastructure and directing resources to education and health care.

Egyptian air force planes parade in front of a cargo container ship crossing the new section of the Suez Canal after the opening ceremony of the new Suez Canal, in Ismailia, Egypt, August 6, 2015. Egypt staged a show of international support on Thursday as it inaugurated a major extension of the Suez Canal which President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi hopes will power an economic turnaround in the Arab world’s most populous country. REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh.

The joblessness problem

As these political spectacles continue to unfold, the problem of youth unemployment continues to fester. The policy brief analyses some of the root causes of the youth unemployment problem in Egypt. In particular, it sheds light on ongoing problems in the Egyptian higher education system: although public universities churn out thousands of graduates every year, many are unlikely to find employment in their respective fields.

The brief also highlights the growing youth bulge. Demographic pressures mean that the Egyptian labor market is increasingly unable to cope with the number of new job seekers. The size of the youth population (ages 15 to 29) has increased from 13.3 million in 1988 to 17.4 million in 1998 and 22.2 million in 2006.

In the brief, I make four key policy recommendations: reform the higher education sector and its funding model; invest further in vocational training; increase the emphasis on entrepreneurship; and take steps to increase the participation of women in the work force.

There is no silver bullet for dealing with youth unemployment, in Egypt or elsewhere. For these recommendations to have a chance at succeeding, they must be implemented within the context of an overall economic development policy that puts job creation at its center. Some policy changes may yield results at a faster pace, while others—such as reform of the tertiary sector—will take years.

The important step, now, is for the Egyptian government to acknowledge the urgency of the challenges it faces. If youth unemployment in Egypt is not addressed head-on (and soon), the government might as well start printing Sissi dollars and appoint Karam as minister of finance, as it seems nothing else is really working.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/egypt_protest_youth001.jpg?w=215Earlier this week, a satirical Facebook post announced that the Egyptian Army engineers have developed an Egyptian dollar to combat the continued rise of the U.S. dollar. The new and improved $100 note features Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi’s photo instead of Benjamin Franklin’s.
Another post shows a video of Karam, a simple man from upper Egypt, revealing his secret to getting a favorable exchange rate for converting Egyptian pounds to dollars. Karam simply lays the Egyptian pound notes out, covers them with his scarf, and sings nationalistic songs to them—afterwards, he reveals a pile of fresh $1 notes. The video has since made it to mainstream media, with a news presenter sarcastically suggesting that Karam be appointed minister of finance.
These posts—just two recent examples of many—reflect the Egyptians’ pessimism about worsening economic conditions. With the resurgent authoritarianism under Sissi, it seems now the only way they can respond is with satire.
Big promises meet reality
In a classic authoritarian bargain, President Sissi came to power two years ago promising security, stability, and economic prosperity in exchange for near-total political control. Now, that bargain is in the process of breaking down, since he’s failed to deliver on all three fronts.
The ISIS-inspired insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula continues to fester, and since 2013, terror attacks have struck several Egyptian cities. The downing of the Russian jet in the Sinai Peninsula has brought down tourist arrivals. The murder of Italian PhD student Giulio Regenihas delivered a blow to Egypt’s relations with Italy and the EU. Protests erupted when the government suddenly transferred the sovereignty of two islands to Saudi Arabia this April. The government responded by locking people up, and many remain in jail to date on the charge of spreading rumors about the disputed Red Sea islands Tiran and Sanafir.” In addition, incidents of sectarian violence continue to flare up. To many, Egypt seems to be moving backward, not forward.
On the economic front, too, Sissi has over-promised and under-delivered. The Egyptian pound continues to lose value, and unemployment remains high. Since Sissi came to power, overall unemployment has fallen slightly from 13.3 percent to 12.7 percent in the first quarter of 2016—but youth unemployment remains high, at 31.3 percent. In a new policy published yesterday titled “Educated but Unemployed: The Challenge Facing Egypt’s Youth,” I argue that if the Egyptian government does not deal with the specific problem of youth unemployment soon, it will likely face instability—and perhaps another uprising—in the years to come.
Hyper-nationalism, anyone?
In spite of this situation, the Sissi government continues to obsess over ultra-nationalistic and grandiose projects that will create desperately needed jobs in the short term—but likely not enough.
Egypt embarked on a major project to widen the Suez Canal, for example. The head of the Suez Canal Authority once predicted that the larger canal would generate $100 billion in one year. Egypt spent $8 billion on the project, and Sissi (dressed in full military regalia) opened it last year with a spectacle involving cruising in King Farouk’s yacht, al Mahrousa, in front of international dignitaries. A year later, the number of container ships passing through the canal is down by 3 percent, due to lower oil prices and preferences for the cheaper (but longer) route around the Cape of Good Hope.
The government also announced flashy plans to build a new capital, adjacent to Cairo, at the Sharm el Shiekh investment conference in 2015. One year later, the project has stalled over disagreements between the government ... Earlier this week, a satirical Facebook post announced that the Egyptian Army engineers have developed an Egyptian dollar to combat the continued rise of the U.S. dollar. The new and improved $100 note features Egyptian President ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/educated-but-unemployed-the-challenge-facing-egypts-youth/Educated but unemployed: The challenge facing Egypt’s youthhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171797740/0/brookingsrss/topics/egypt~Educated-but-unemployed-The-challenge-facing-Egypt%e2%80%99s-youth/
Wed, 27 Jul 2016 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=158778&post_type=research&preview_id=158778In this policy briefing, Adel Abdel Ghafar analyzes the roots of Egypt’s youth unemployment crisis, starting with the structural issues plaguing the country’s educational system. He then examines other contributing factors including neoliberal economic reforms, gender inequality, and the lack of entrepreneurship. Abdel Ghafar warns that failing to address the unemployment issue will increase the likelihood of another uprising.

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Millions of Egyptians took to the streets in January 2011 chanting “‘ish, hurriyya, ‘adalah ijtima‘iyya,” or bread, freedom, and social justice. This simple chant captured protestors’ desire for a new Egypt defined by economic, political, and social change. Five years later, however, the attainment of those demands seems more elusive than ever. In the economic sphere, Egypt still faces the major challenge of high unemployment, particularly among educated youth. Why do so many of Egypt’s young university graduates struggle to find employment?

In this policy briefing, Adel Abdel Ghafar analyzes the roots of Egypt’s youth unemployment crisis, starting with the structural issues plaguing the country’s educational system. He then examines other contributing factors including neoliberal economic reforms, gender inequality, and the lack of entrepreneurship. Abdel Ghafar warns that failing to address the unemployment issue will increase the likelihood of another uprising.

Abdel Ghafar thus argues that the Egyptian government must urgently undertake reforms and devote extensive resources to dealing with youth unemployment. Specifically, he recommends ways in which Egypt can revamp public university funding, promote vocational training, stimulate entrepreneurship, and increase the participation of women in the workforce.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/egypt_unemplyment002_16x9.jpg?w=320
Millions of Egyptians took to the streets in January 2011 chanting “‘ish, hurriyya, ‘adalah ijtima‘iyya,” or bread, freedom, and social justice. This simple chant captured protestors’ desire for a new Egypt defined by economic, political, and social change. Five years later, however, the attainment of those demands seems more elusive than ever. In the economic sphere, Egypt still faces the major challenge of high unemployment, particularly among educated youth. Why do so many of Egypt’s young university graduates struggle to find employment?
Read “Educated but unemployed: The challenge facing Egypt’s youth“
In this policy briefing, Adel Abdel Ghafar analyzes the roots of Egypt’s youth unemployment crisis, starting with the structural issues plaguing the country’s educational system. He then examines other contributing factors including neoliberal economic reforms, gender inequality, and the lack of entrepreneurship. Abdel Ghafar warns that failing to address the unemployment issue will increase the likelihood of another uprising.
Abdel Ghafar thus argues that the Egyptian government must urgently undertake reforms and devote extensive resources to dealing with youth unemployment. Specifically, he recommends ways in which Egypt can revamp public university funding, promote vocational training, stimulate entrepreneurship, and increase the participation of women in the workforce.
Millions of Egyptians took to the streets in January 2011 chanting “‘ish, hurriyya, ‘adalah ijtima‘iyya,” or bread, freedom, and social justice. This simple chant captured protestors’https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/26/was-saudi-king-salman-too-sick-to-attend-this-weeks-arab-league-summit/Was Saudi King Salman too sick to attend this week’s Arab League summit?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/181024786/0/brookingsrss/topics/egypt~Was-Saudi-King-Salman-too-sick-to-attend-this-weeks-Arab-League-summit/
http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/181024786/0/brookingsrss/topics/egypt~Was-Saudi-King-Salman-too-sick-to-attend-this-weeks-Arab-League-summit/#respondMon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=160500&preview_id=160500King Salman failed to show at the Arab League summit this week in Mauritania, allegedly for health reasons. The king’s health has been a question since his accession to the throne last year.

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King Salman failed to show at the Arab League summit this week in Mauritania, allegedly for health reasons. The king’s health has been a question since his accession to the throne last year.

The Saudi press and the Royal Court had promised the king would attend the summit as late as Sunday. He is currently on vacation in Tangiers, Morocco—a short plane ride from Nouakchott. He travels with his own medical facilities. But Nouakchott offers few additional medical facilities and no luxury hotels, the summit was held in a special large tent. No explanation has yet been officially provided for his absence.

Salman, 80, has suffered from pre-dementia for several years, according to some sources. He has taken on a full schedule as monarch, however, and traveled extensively. In his absence while in Morocco, Crown Prince Muhammed bin Nayef is running the Kingdom’s business. Deputy Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman visited Washington last week for the ministerial meeting on fighting the Islamic State. The king’s ill health will fuel the rumors of tension between the two princes.

The king’s ill health will fuel the rumors of tension between the two princes.

The king was expected to stay in Tangiers through August and attend a wedding of one of his sons there. Long vacations are normal for Saudi monarchs.

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http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/181024786/0/brookingsrss/topics/egypt~Was-Saudi-King-Salman-too-sick-to-attend-this-weeks-Arab-League-summit/feed/0UncategorizedKing Salman failed to show at the Arab League summit this week in Mauritania, allegedly for health reasons. The king’s health has been a question since his accession to the throne last year.
The Saudi press and the Royal Court had promised the king would attend the summit as late as Sunday. He is currently on vacation in Tangiers, Morocco—a short plane ride from Nouakchott. He travels with his own medical facilities. But Nouakchott offers few additional medical facilities and no luxury hotels, the summit was held in a special large tent. No explanation has yet been officially provided for his absence.
Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi was also expected to attend the summit but did not show. Egyptian authorities say he was too occupied by business at home. Some press reports claim Sissi was afraid of a possible assassination plot.
Salman, 80, has suffered from pre-dementia for several years, according to some sources. He has taken on a full schedule as monarch, however, and traveled extensively. In his absence while in Morocco, Crown Prince Muhammed bin Nayef is running the Kingdom's business. Deputy Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman visited Washington last week for the ministerial meeting on fighting the Islamic State. The king’s ill health will fuel the rumors of tension between the two princes.
The king’s ill health will fuel the rumors of tension between the two princes.
The king was expected to stay in Tangiers through August and attend a wedding of one of his sons there. Long vacations are normal for Saudi monarchs.
Aside from the no-shows, the summit had no surprises on substance. It condemned terrorism and called for unity, as well as endorsed the Arab peace proposal originally drafted by Salman's predecessor, King Abdullah. King Salman failed to show at the Arab League summit this week in Mauritania, allegedly for health reasons. The king’s health has been a question since his accession to the throne last year.
The Saudi press and the Royal Court had promised ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/06/20/what-egypt-under-sissi-is-really-like-for-coptic-christians/What Egypt under Sissi is really like for Coptic Christianshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/181023060/0/brookingsrss/topics/egypt~What-Egypt-under-Sissi-is-really-like-for-Coptic-Christians/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=96354&preview_id=96354The status of Coptic Christians in Egypt has for the most part remained unchanged since Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970. Today, there is little Christian representation in government, and sectarian violence is all but commonplace. But many have suggested that President Sissi is more respectful of minority rights than his predecessors, and many Christians supported Sissi’s rise to power.

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Last month in Minya, Egypt, a 70-year-old Christian woman was beaten and dragged through the streets naked by a mob because her son was suspected of having an affair with a Muslim woman. Horrors like these have renewed fears of religious discord in Egypt. President Abdel-Fatah el-Sissi and his government regularly describe Egypt as unified and have worked hard—publicly—to reduce Muslim-Christian tension. But the Minya event has once again demonstrated the relative impunity of the Egyptian police, who failed to respond to earlier warnings of a violent, religiously-motivated attack and took hours to appear on the scene.

The status of Coptic Christians in Egypt has for the most part remained unchanged since Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970. Today, there is little Christian representation in government, and sectarian violence is all but commonplace. But many have suggested that President Sissi is more respectful of minority rights than his predecessors, and many Christians supported Sissi’s rise to power.

Rights on paper versus rights on the street

For Egypt’s minorities, there is a large gap between de jure and de facto rights—what exists under the law versus what exists in practice. On paper, Egyptians enjoy “absolute” freedom of religion guaranteed by the 2014 constitution. But, the constitution also decrees Islam to be the state religion, and conversion to any religion other than Islam is prohibited. Blasphemy is also punishable with harsh penalties and several high-profile blasphemy cases have been prosecuted under the Sissi government.

In practice, President Sissi has based his legitimacy, in part, on the idea of Egyptian unity. For example, he regularly states in public speeches: “we are all Egyptians.” But while Egyptians experienced real unity during the early days of the Egyptian revolution, the past five years have seen even worse sectarian discord than prior to the revolution.

President Sissi has been outwardly supportive of Egyptian Copts. This is something that wins him praise from international bodies and the media. One of the most poignant examples of this support is his attendance for the past two years at a Christmas Eve Mass. He is first Egyptian president to attend such an event. But at last year’s mass, he made telling remarks in his address to the congregation: “It is important that the whole world watch us, the Egyptians…You noticed that I am not using another word than Egyptians…we are the Egyptians.”

You can read his remarks two ways. On the positive side, his insistence that Copts, Muslims, and other Egyptians are all one sends a loud and clear message to Egypt’s minorities that he will not tolerate discrimination—and that Egyptian nationalism and unity supersedes religious differences.

[D]espite de jure protections, Sissi himself fails to acknowledge the de facto discrimination against Copts.

But, his insistence on inclusion also has negative implications. First, despite de jure protections, Sissi himself fails to acknowledge the de facto discrimination against Copts. This is most evident in the disproportionately low level of Christian representation in government, particularly within the influential security establishment.

Egypt’s current parliament, which has been lauded for its “unprecedented” representation of minorities, has just 36 Christians out of 596 total members, an improvement over the past few parliaments, but still disproportionately low. Additionally, two thirds of the Christian parliamentarians (24) were elected due to Egypt’s first religiously-based quota system. On balance, an improvement in numbers of Christians in parliament is a good thing, but there is still a long way to go to reach real representation in numbers and power.

The second problem with Sissi’s rhetoric is that by refusing to acknowledge the differences between Christians and Muslims, he does not see Copts as a minority in need of protection and is therefore not willing to extend the necessary measures to proactively protect against or respond to attacks.

Third, this attitude has also impeded the ability of scholars and policymakers to collect data related to Egyptian demographics—for example, Egyptian authorities prevent surveyors from asking a participant’s religion when doing research. This harms our collective understanding of the size and make-up of Egypt’s minority communities.

Most troubling, the Sissi government has done little to end anti-Coptic violence. In addition to last month’s attack in Minya, those who were involved in the October 2011 Maspero massacre, when 27 were killed and 31 jailed for protesting the SCAF’s complicity with violence against Christians, have yet to be brought to justice. And little progress has been made on the reconstruction of churches that were damaged in the wave of sectarian attacks in 2013, despite government promises to do so.

A pessimistic outlook

Two trends in Egypt spell trouble for Christians and other minorities. The first is a clear and explicit crackdown on freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. The past few months have witnessed a dramatic expansion of regime targets to include anyone perceived to be regime critic. Shortly after the removal of Mohamed Morsi from power, the government started cracking down on members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies or affiliates. Next, they set their sights on human rights NGOs and Egyptian journalists that publicly criticized the regime. Third, organizations that receive foreign funding as well as foreign journalists were arrested and prevented from doing their jobs. Now, the Sissi government is targeting pretty much all of civil society, including some development organizations with no clear political aims.

The second trend is a dangerous escalation of the level of attack. This began with shuttering of NGOs or sanctioning activists or journalists and quickly escalated to forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings—things that were rare, if not absent under Mubarak.

[T]here is a sense that the Sissi regime is operating without any map or compass. There are no clear redlines and anyone or anything can be a target at any time.

These trends are worrying on multiple levels. First, for society as whole, there is a sense that the Sissi regime is operating without any map or compass. There are no clear redlines and anyone or anything can be a target at any time. Second, this is problematic for minority rights groups who have traditionally enjoyed a sort of “protected” status. These groups are protected by deep connections, both financial and rhetorical, to large and powerful international organizations and diasporas that have, in the past, afforded them the ability circumvent official channels rather than trying to cooperate with the regime. That protection appears to have lost its influence. Third, these trends are damaging to Egypt. This crackdown has led to tremendous self-censorship—both by journalists and activists. We are also seeing higher levels of emigration and brain drain than ever before. And Egypt is seeing its reputation increasingly tarnished within the international community.

A brighter future?

While I am generally pessimistic, there are a few signs of hope. President Sissi’s public statements, while they may be hollow, mean something in that they make it easier for civil society and advocacy organizations to hold the Egyptian government accountable to protect religious freedom. Additionally, 2015 saw a slight decline in the number of religiously motivated attacks, which is clearly a good thing. But, this latest attack in Minya shows that the severity of attacks has not decreased and Egypt still faces a clear problem of religiously motivated violence that it would be wise to address rather than ignore.

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UncategorizedLast month in Minya, Egypt, a 70-year-old Christian woman was beaten and dragged through the streets naked by a mob because her son was suspected of having an affair with a Muslim woman. Horrors like these have renewed fears of religious discord in Egypt. President Abdel-Fatah el-Sissi and his government regularly describe Egypt as unified and have worked hard—publicly—to reduce Muslim-Christian tension. But the Minya event has once again demonstrated the relative impunity of the Egyptian police, who failed to respond to earlier warnings of a violent, religiously-motivated attack and took hours to appear on the scene.
The status of Coptic Christians in Egypt has for the most part remained unchanged since Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970. Today, there is little Christian representation in government, and sectarian violence is all but commonplace. But many have suggested that President Sissi is more respectful of minority rights than his predecessors, and many Christians supported Sissi’s rise to power.
Rights on paper versus rights on the street
For Egypt’s minorities, there is a large gap between de jure and de facto rights—what exists under the law versus what exists in practice. On paper, Egyptians enjoy “absolute” freedom of religion guaranteed by the 2014 constitution. But, the constitution also decrees Islam to be the state religion, and conversion to any religion other than Islam is prohibited. Blasphemy is also punishable with harsh penalties and several high-profile blasphemy cases have been prosecuted under the Sissi government.
In practice, President Sissi has based his legitimacy, in part, on the idea of Egyptian unity. For example, he regularly states in public speeches: “we are all Egyptians.” But while Egyptians experienced real unity during the early days of the Egyptian revolution, the past five years have seen even worse sectarian discord than prior to the revolution.
President Sissi has been outwardly supportive of Egyptian Copts. This is something that wins him praise from international bodies and the media. One of the most poignant examples of this support is his attendance for the past two years at a Christmas Eve Mass. He is first Egyptian president to attend such an event. But at last year’s mass, he made telling remarks in his address to the congregation: “It is important that the whole world watch us, the Egyptians…You noticed that I am not using another word than Egyptians…we are the Egyptians.”
You can read his remarks two ways. On the positive side, his insistence that Copts, Muslims, and other Egyptians are all one sends a loud and clear message to Egypt’s minorities that he will not tolerate discrimination—and that Egyptian nationalism and unity supersedes religious differences.
[D]espite de jure protections, Sissi himself fails to acknowledge the de facto discrimination against Copts.
But, his insistence on inclusion also has negative implications. First, despite de jure protections, Sissi himself fails to acknowledge the de facto discrimination against Copts. This is most evident in the disproportionately low level of Christian representation in government, particularly within the influential security establishment.
Egypt’s current parliament, which has been lauded for its “unprecedented” representation of minorities, has just 36 Christians out of 596 total members, an improvement over the past few parliaments, but still disproportionately low. Additionally, two thirds of the Christian parliamentarians (24) were elected due to Egypt’s first religiously-based quota system. On balance, an improvement in numbers of Christians in parliament is a good thing, but there is still a long way to go to reach real representation in numbers and power.
The second problem with Sissi’s rhetoric is that by ... Last month in Minya, Egypt, a 70-year-old Christian woman was beaten and dragged through the streets naked by a mob because her son was suspected of having an affair with a Muslim woman. Horrors like these have renewed fears of religious discord in ...