In recent months, the major foreign policy issue of
the 2000 presidential election campaign has been military
readiness, with Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W.
Bush each addressing the subject. Governor Bush has accused the
Clinton Administration of military neglect, referring to the U.S.
armed forces as "a military in decline."1 Vice President
Gore, on the other hand, has countered that "Our military is the
strongest and the best in the entire world."2

While there are clear signs that readiness is a
problem for the U.S. military, Al Gore is factually correct when he
contends that the U.S. armed forces stand far above any other
military force. He is missing a more important point, however. The
United States, as the most powerful nation in the world, has
responsibilities and national security concerns far beyond those of
any other nation.

U.S. military readiness cannot be gauged by
comparing America's armed forces with other nations' militaries.
Instead, the capability of U.S. forces to support America's
national security requirements should be the measure of U.S.
military readiness. Such a standard is necessary because America
may confront threats from many different nations at once.

America's national security requirements dictate
that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of
adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining
superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its
interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation,
these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing
readiness on American military superiority over any single nation
has little saliency.

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces
are not ready to support America's national security requirements.
Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of
enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National
Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security
objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have
the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat
large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in
overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the
military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States
cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General
James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson,
and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all
expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability
to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently
retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George
Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to
conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf
War.6

Military readiness is vital because declines in
America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that
the United States is not prepared to defend its interests.
Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash
out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to
U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is
more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting
aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby
preserving peace.

Readiness Defined. Readiness measures the
ability of a military unit, such as an Army division or a carrier
battle group, to accomplish its assigned mission. Logistics,
available spare parts, training, equipment, and morale all
contribute to readiness. The military recognizes four grades of
readiness.7 At the highest level, a unit is prepared to
move into position and accomplish its mission. At the lowest level,
a unit requires further manpower, training, equipment, and/or
logistics to accomplish its mission.

There is evidence of a widespread lack of readiness
within the U.S. armed forces. Recently leaked Army documents report
that 12 of the 20 schools training soldiers in skills such as field
artillery, infantry, and aviation have received the lowest
readiness rating. They also disclose that over half of the Army's
combat and support training centers are rated at the lowest
readiness grade.8 As recently as last November, two of
the Army's 10 active divisions were rated at the lowest readiness
level, and none were rated at the highest.9 Every
division required additional manpower, equipment, or training
before it would be prepared for combat, due largely to the units'
commitments to operations in the Balkans.10 And 23
percent of the Army's Chinook cargo helicopters, 19 percent of its
Blackhawk helicopters, and 16 percent of its Apaches are not
"mission-capable."11 In other words, they are not
ready.

The Facts about Military Readiness

The reduction in forces of the U.S. armed forces
began in the early 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the Bush
Administration began to reduce the size of the military so that it
would be consistent with post-Cold War threats.12 Under
the Clinton Administration, however, that reduction in forces
escalated too rapidly at the same time that U.S. forces were
deployed too often with too little funding. The result was
decreased readiness as personnel, equipment, training, and location
suffered.

Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S.
military has been deployed on over 50 peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement operations.13 Yet the resources
available to fund these missions have steadily decreased: The
number of total active personnel has decreased nearly 30 percent,
and funding for the armed services has decreased 16 percent. The
strain on the armed forces shows clearly now as the reduced forces
deploy for too long with insufficient and antiquated equipment. The
result is indisputable: Readiness is in decline.

Because the security of the United States is at
stake, it is imperative to present the facts about military
readiness:

FACT #1. The size of the U.S. military has
been cut drastically in the past decade.

Between 1992 and 2000, the Clinton Administration
cut national defense by more than half a million personnel and $50
billion in inflation-adjusted dollars.14 (See Table 1.)
The Army alone has lost four active divisions and two Reserve
divisions. Because of such cuts, the Army has lost more than
205,000 soldiers, or 30 percent of its staff, although its missions
have increased significantly throughout the 1990s.

In 1992, the U.S. Air Force consisted of 57
tactical squadrons and 270 bombers. Today the Air Force has 52
squadrons and 178 bombers. The total number of active personnel has
decreased by nearly 30 percent. In the Navy, the total number of
ships has decreased significantly as well. In 1992, there were
around 393 ships in the fleet, while today there are only 316, a
decrease of 20 percent. The number of Navy personnel has fallen by
over 30 percent.

In 1992, the Marine Corps consisted of three
divisions. The Corps still has three divisions, but since 1992, it
has lost 22,000 active duty personnel, or 11 percent of its total.
The Clinton Administration also cut the Marine Corps to 39,000
reserve personnel from 42,300 in 1992.

Effect on
Readiness. In spite of these drastic force reductions,
missions and operations tempo have increased, resulting in
decreased military readiness. Because every mission affects far
greater numbers of servicemen than those directly involved, most
operations other than warfare, such as peacekeeping, have a
significant negative impact on readiness.

For each serviceman who participates in a military
operation, two others are involved in the mission: one who is
preparing to take the participant's place, and another who is
recovering from having participated and retraining. Therefore, if
10,000 troops are on peace operations in the Balkans, 30,000 troops
are actually being taken away from preparing for combat. Ten
thousand are actively participating, while 10,000 are recovering,
and 10,000 are preparing to go. Coupled with declining personnel,
increased tempo has a devastating effect on readiness. Morale
problems stemming from prolonged deployments, equipment that wears
out too quickly, and decreased combat training levels heighten when
troops are committed to non-combat operations.

Further exacerbating the military's declining
readiness is the tendency to take troops with special skills from
non-deployed units. Thus, a mission may affect non-deployed units
as well because they will not be able to train properly. The
soldiers integral to the non-deployed mission are not present, and
there is no one to take their place. A mission's spillover effects
are clearly illustrated by a July 2000 report by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) on the U.S. commitments in the Balkans:

In January 2000 ... four active divisions and one
Guard division were affected by these operations [in the Balkans].
Among the active divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division was recovering
from a 1-year deployment in Bosnia, the 10th Mountain Division was
deployed there, and elements of the Guard's 49th Armored Division
were preparing to deploy there. At the same time, the
European-based 1st Infantry Division was deployed to Kosovo, and
the 1st Armored Division was preparing to deploy there. Although
none of these divisions deployed in its entirety, deployment of key
components--especially headquarters--makes these divisions
unavailable for deployment elsewhere in case of a major
war.15

Simultaneously, the military's budget has
continuously decreased over the past eight years; and, thus, the
services are being forced to choose between funding quality of life
improvements, procurement, training, and other essential spending.
Consequently, none is adequately funded. For example, the Army is
short by thousands of night vision goggles, binoculars, global
positioning systems and hundreds of generator sets, battery
chargers, and chemical agent monitors. (See Table 2.) According to
the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, these
shortages are due to "recent increases in requirements," "slowed
procurement funding," and "use of operations and maintenance funds
for higher priorities."16

Furthermore, when smaller forces deploy for more
missions, the result is increased wear-and-tear on equipment and
longer deployments for servicemen. Coupled with too little money,
the result is a military weakened by aging equipment, low morale,
and poor training.

FACT #2. Military deployments have increased
dramatically throughout the 1990s.

The pace of deployments has increased 16-fold since
the end of the Cold War.17 According to Representative
Curt Weldon (R-PA), the Clinton Administration has deployed U.S.
forces 34 times in less than eight years. During the entire 40-year
period of the Cold War, the military was committed to comparable
deployments just 10 times.18

Between 1960 and 1991, the Army conducted 10
operations outside of normal training and alliance commitments, but
between 1992 and 1998, the Army conducted 26 such operations.
Similarly, the Marines conducted 15 contingency operations between
1982 and 1989, and 62 since 1989.19 During the 1990s,
U.S. forces of 20,000 or more troops were engaged in
non-warfighting missions in Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia
(1996), and Iraq and Kuwait (1998).20

In 1998, before U.S. interventions in Kosovo and
East Timor, General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, warned, "In the past four years we've conducted some four
dozen major operations. And today, in support of our national
strategy, we have more than 50,000 troops deployed in 12 major
operations--and, I might add, many smaller ones--in dozens of
countries around the world." Today the Army has 144,716 soldiers in
126 countries.21

Throughout the 1990s, U.S. taxpayers spent an
average of $3 billion per year on peace operations.22 In
1990, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) spent around $200
million on peace operations. Today that amount has ballooned to
$3.6 billion.23 The 78-day Kosovo campaign in 1999 cost
around $5 billion, not including the ongoing peace
mission.24 Operations Southern and North Watch in Iraq
cost $1.1 billion per year; the Haiti operation cost a total of
$2.4 billion; and to date, the Balkans have cost over $15
billion.25 (See Table 3.)

Effect on
Readiness. This dramatic increase in the use of America's
armed forces has had a detrimental effect on overall combat
readiness. According to General Shelton, "our experience in the
Balkans underscores the reality that multiple, persistent
commitments place a significant strain on our people and can erode
warfighting readiness."26

Both people and equipment wear out faster under
frequent use. For example, units deployed in Somalia took 10 months
to restore their equipment to predeployment readiness
levels.27 According to a Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) survey of Army leaders who participated in peace missions,
almost two-thirds said that their units' training readiness had
declined.28

Training is a key component of readiness, and
frequent missions cause the armed forces to reduce training
schedules. For example, Operation Allied Force caused 22 joint
exercises to be cancelled in 1999. Joint training exercises were
reduced from 277 in fiscal year (FY) 1996 to 189 in FY 2000.

Inadequate training has resulted in the Air Force
exceeding its annual deployment goals for Airborne Warning and
Control Systems (AWACS) crews. Thirteen of the Air Force's 40 AWACS
crews were inadequately trained, forcing the 27 remaining crews to
carry the workload of all 40. For U-2 pilots, the situation is
equally bad. Because only 40 of the Air Force's 54 authorized U-2
pilots are fully trained, many experienced crewmembers leave the
force due to an excessive workload.29

The frequent deployments also take funding away
from ongoing expenses. The Department of Defense funds about 80
percent of the cost for operations other than warfare from its
"operations and maintenance" accounts,30 although the
funds in the account are supposed to pay for training, fuel, and
supplies to forward-deployed troops--all of which are
readiness-related. Every dollar spent in Kosovo or Somalia takes 80
cents away from training America's troops for war, buying spare
parts for aging equipment, or providing a high quality of life for
troops in foreign lands protecting America's interests abroad. The
remaining funding for operations other than warfare comes from
personnel accounts.31 This 20 percent is money that
could be used to pay pilots or computer programmers.

The stress of frequent and often unexpected
deployments is detrimental to the morale of troops and jeopardizes
the military's ability to retain high-quality people. Already
understaffed units undertake more missions that last longer. (See
Table 4.) Some 58 percent of U.S. troops are married, and long
deployments often result in strains in family life, leading many to
leave the service. The Center for Strategic and International
Studies recently concluded that the high tempo of operations had
had a significant, negative effect on morale.32 More
recently, the General Accounting Office concluded, "long
deployments can adversely affect morale and
retention."33 Increased missions have clearly worn out
equipment, reduced training, and decreased morale--all resulting in
decreased readiness.

FACT #3. America's military is aging
rapidly.

Most of the equipment that the U.S. military uses
today, such as Abrams tanks, Apache helicopters, Bradley fighting
vehicles, surface ships, submarines, bombers, and tactical
aircraft, are aging much faster than they are being replaced. Due
to a shortsighted modernization strategy, some systems are not even
being replaced. Lack of funding coupled with increased tempo and
reduced forces has again strained the U.S. military's ability to
defend vital U.S. interests.

For example, between 1991 and 1999, according to a
GAO study, the percentage of mission-capable Air Force fighter
aircraft has decreased from 85 percent to 75 percent.34
Jacques Gansler, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, points out that "we now have an average age of our
fighters in the Air Force of about 20 years. These were designed
for a 15-year life."35 The U.S. bomber force consists of
B-52s,36 B-1s, and B-2s, none of which are being
produced today. In fact, the Air Force has claimed that it does not
want a new bomber until 2037, by which time the B-52 will be nearly
90 years old. Although the B-2 is a new bomber, the United States
has only produced 21 of these planes.

The Navy's equipment has begun to age rapidly as
well. Amphibious ships, for example, are on average over 27 years
old, while the service life of these ships is only 30-35
years.37 Currently, the shipbuilding accounts are
inadequate to maintain current force structure. The Navy is being
forced to cut its ship building accounts from 8.7 per year--the
number needed to maintain a 300-ship Navy--to 6.5 per
year.38

Effect on
Readiness. The effects of old equipment are being felt
across the services. As weapons age, they become less reliable and
more expensive to maintain. The services have attempted to provide
for their higher maintenance costs by reallocating funds, but they
often take the funds from procurement accounts, effectively
removing the money from modernization programs.

Shortages of parts and aging equipment are already
affecting readiness, and the effects are expected to worsen. On
August 4, 2000, Kenneth Bacon, the DOD Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs, told reporters that spare parts are so scarce that
the Air Force is made to "cannibalize" perfectly good aircraft for
spare parts.39 In April, 40 percent of the Army's
helicopters were assessed as being either unable or at high risk of
being unable to perform their mission.40 The impact this
has on America's readiness to fight wars is immense. For example,
by day 60 of a two-war scenario, 44 percent of the Army's Apache
helicopters and 52 percent of its Kiowa helicopters will not be
available due to shortages in spare parts.41

In June, a study released by the Pentagon reported
that over half of its gas masks had critical defects that rendered
them useless against chemical or biological attack.42 In
late August, 413 Marine aircraft were grounded due to safety
concerns. These included the Super Stallion helicopter, the
Vietnam-era Cobra attack helicopter, and the new MV-22
Osprey.43 This is in addition to the 76 Harrier "jump"
jets that have remained grounded since July.44

According to General John Coburn, Commander, U.S.
Army Materiel Command, "One of the most serious issues the Army
faces is aging equipment. This issue is so serious that, if not
properly addressed and corrected, it will inevitably result in
degradation of the Army's ability to maintain its
readiness."45 The consequence of poor readiness
resulting from an aging force was described starkly by Admiral
James M. Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard, "Lack of readiness may
already be costing us lives."46

FACT #4. Morale is on the decline in the U.S.
armed forces.

According to a recently retired Marine colonel who
wishes to remain unnamed, in the armed forces "quality of life is
paid lip service.... We need tough, realistic and challenging
training. But we don't need low pay, no medical benefits and ghetto
housing."47 The poor living conditions for soldiers,
sailors, and airmen impair the services' ability to recruit the
best young people to fill their ranks and their power to retain
highly skilled servicemen. Representative Joel Hefley (R-CO)
described the condition succinctly: "The pay is lousy, the
retirement is lousy, the living conditions are lousy. The op tempo
is lousy. The ability to do their job, because of lack of spare
parts and that kind of thing, is lousy."48

Military payroll comes out of the military
personnel account. Current outlays project that this account will
remain relatively unchanged at around $75 billion in
inflation-adjusted dollars through FY 2005.49 Given that
over 5,100 military families are currently on food stamps, and that
some of the military's brightest and most talented servicemen are
leaving to find higher-paying jobs in the private sector, military
payroll clearly needs increased funding. The "pay gap" between the
military and the private sector for similar jobs is currently at
over 13 percent.50

Furthermore, according to an August 1999 GAO
review, more than half of the officers and enlisted personnel
surveyed "were dissatisfied and intended to leave the military
after their current obligation or term of enlistment was up." The
"lack of equipment and materials" was a primary
reason.51 Inadequate training is also a concern for
military personnel.52 Army officials, for example, have
blamed a reduction in training at the Army schools for shortages in
skilled workers such as mechanics.53 Due to inadequate
training, only three of the Army's 15 reserve brigades can report
that their platoons meet the requirements for tasks such as
attacking enemy positions or defending against attacks. And only 42
percent of the Army's 24 reserve mechanized battalions met training
standards for firing at stationary and moving
targets.54

Substandard housing is another problem for morale
because it has an immediate impact on servicemen and their
families. According to General Shelton, almost two-thirds of all
military housing, or approximately 180,000 units, are
inadequate.55 While there are plans to alleviate housing
problems,56 the funding is inadequate. The military is
continually forced to divert funds that could be used to update
housing to pay for the costs associated with peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement operations.

Effect on Readiness. Because U.S. servicemen
are the military's greatest asset, a ready United States military
requires bright, well-trained, and highly motivated active and
reserve personnel. Unfortunately, due largely to low morale, the
services are finding it difficult to recruit and retain servicemen.
The Army and the Air Force fell short of their 1999 recruiting
goals by 6,300 and 1,700 recruits, respectively.57 The
U.S. Navy was forced to change its recruiting standards in 1999 to
make up for the nearly 7,000 sailors it lacked in 1998. That year,
many Navy ships deployed with too few sailors
onboard.58

Retention is also a problem. With the exception of
the Marines, the military is facing a severe manpower shortage.
Although the Army is generally retaining enough soldiers, it is
falling short on personnel with occupational specialties. For
example, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division was short on
Bradley fighting vehicle turret mechanics, Abrams tank mechanics,
and motor transport operators by 75 percent, 50 percent, and 36
percent, respectively.59

In 1999, the Air Force missed its retention goals
in all enlisted categories, causing it to fall short by 5,000
airmen.60 The Air Force expects to be short 1,500 pilots
by the end of 2002.61 The Navy also missed its retention
goals in 1999.62 Even the Marines, who historically do
not suffer from recruiting or retention problems, have begun to
have retention problems. Due largely to a high operations tempo,
the Corps lost Marines at a rate 10 percent greater than expected
in the first half of 2000.63

Reserve and National Guard units are playing an
increasingly important role in national military strategy, and
their importance is likely to increase in the future. They, too,
must maintain consistent recruiting and retention numbers. But like
the active Army, Navy, and Air Force, Reserve units are also
insufficiently staffed. In 1999, the Army Reserves fell short by
10,300; the Navy Selected Reserve, by 4,740; the Air Force Reserve,
by 3,723; and the Air National Guard, by 122.64

Low morale among the Junior Officer Corps is also a
problem in the force. In the fall of 1999, the Navy surveyed its
junior officers to gauge morale. They expected a 15 percent
response rate, but, to their surprise, over 55 percent of those
surveyed responded. Of these responses, 82 percent responded
negatively. Citing poor leadership, inadequate pay and
compensation, and insufficient spare parts and equipment, only
one-third said they planned to reenlist.65

The Army conducted a similar survey this year to
find out why it is having difficulties retaining captains. Between
1989 and 1999, the number of captains who voluntarily left the
service rose 58 percent--from 6.7 percent to 10.6 percent. The Army
Chief of Staff commissioned a survey of 760 officers at the Command
and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, the base at which
the Army trains its brightest and most promising future leaders.
The results were startling. Junior officers had clear reasons for
leaving the service, citing sensitivity training, the pace and type
of operations, micromanagment from superiors, the risk-averse
environment created by generals who view even small errors as
career-threatening, and superiors who lied about military
readiness.66

At the same time, soldiers in the field hear the
Administration blithely stating that everything is fine in the
military--that the force is adequate, and that readiness is not an
issue. This further degrades morale and readiness. Because morale
inherently affects military readiness, low morale among servicemen
is a real indicator of the U.S. military's declining readiness.

CONCLUSION

The Clinton Administration has damaged the U.S
military with a dangerous combination of reduced budgets,
diminished forces, and increased missions. The result has been a
steep decline in readiness and an overall decline in U.S. military
strength. Nearly a decade of misdirected policy coupled with a
myopic modernization strategy has rendered America's armed forces
years away from top form.

To deny that the United States military has
readiness problems is to deny the men and women in uniform the
respect they deserve. America's military prowess can be restored.
To do so, America's leaders must first admit there is a problem.
Only then can the President reestablish America's military
readiness.

Jack
Spencer is Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security
in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

Endnotes

1.Remarks by Texas
Governor George W. Bush at the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW)
national convention, August 21, 2000.

2.Remarks by Vice
President Al Gore at VFW national convention, August 22, 2000.

3.The National Security
Strategy is a comprehensive statement of national objectives. The
document, which is produced by the National Security Council and
signed by the President, is required by the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The principal
function of the National Security Strategy is to lay out the
specific political, diplomatic, economic, social, and military
objectives that must be pursued in order to achieve the nation's
objectives and specify how they will be integrated and
coordinated.

4.The White House, "A
National Security Strategy for a New Century," December 1999, p.
19.

9.The Army divisions'
grade has risen since the Pentagon report came out in November
1999; however, there is still a significant problem. The higher
rating resulted from a shift in resources rather than an increase
in resources. The extra people, money, and equipment came largely
from support units--hence, the poor rating of the Army training
facilities. This readiness shell game creates the illusion of
readiness while actually exacerbating the readiness problem. It
takes soldiers out of combat training and puts them into peace
operations. Simultaneously, it takes the resources away from the
units training for combat to pay for the missions. The divisions
participating in peace missions will be unprepared to fight if war
erupts, and the units that will have to replace them will be
unprepared as well.

10.Bradley Graham "Two
Army Divisions Unfit for Major War: Both Flunk Ratings of
Preparedness," The Washington Post, November 10, 1999, p.
A1.

11.U.S. General Accounting
Office, Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a
Clear Assessment of Army Equipment, GAO/NSIAD-99-119, June
1999, p. 12.

12.The cuts made by the
Clinton-Gore Administration are beyond those envisioned by
President George Bush in the early 1990s. His plan, known as the
"Base Force," would have cut U.S. forces by 25 percent and the
defense budget by 20 percent over a five-year period. Base Force
would have reduced active and reserve Army divisions from 26 to 18;
Navy ships to 450; active and reserve tactical fighter wings from
34 to 26; and active duty personnel to 1.6 million.

36.The B-52 was designed
in the late 1940s and first deployed in 1954. The Air Forces plans
to maintain its fleet of B-52s well into the 21st century.

37.Prepared Statement of
The Honorable H. Lee Buchanan III, Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Research, Development and Acquisition and Vice Admiral James F.
Amerault, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics, before the
House Armed Services Committee, Military Procurement Subcommittee,
February 24, 1999.

51.U.S. General Accounting
Office, Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service
Members in Retention Critical Specialties, GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR,
August 1999, p. 2-3.

52.The Center for
Strategic and International Studies, American Military Culture
in the 21st Century, p. 6.

53.They also attribute to
the problem the burden of peacekeeping operations and the
assignment of personnel to tasks beyond their military specialties.
See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Military
Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of
Army Equipment, p. 19.

61.Prepared Statement of
General Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Concerning
Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st. Session, October 21,
1999.