The following documents appear to be either stamped in or scanned in but in no way signed by any human on this earth.

This also backs up Angela Nolan deposition where she states:

Let me explain the process. This is an electronic signature, so there’s certain states that allow electronic signatures. And I believe I sent you documentation on that where we sign our name, it’s scanned into a database, then the signatures are applied electronically.

So here is some of the examples…. and do not ask me to get ALL that are there because I will need an entire year to gather them all.

Bank of America delays foreclosures in 23 states

WASHINGTON – Bank of America is delaying foreclosures in 23 states as it examines whether it rushed the foreclosure process for thousands of homeowners without reading the documents.

The move adds the nation’s largest bank to a growing list of mortgage companies whose employees signed documents in foreclosure cases without verifying the information in them.

Bank of America isn’t able to estimate how many homeowners’ cases will be affected, Dan Frahm, a spokesman for the Charlotte, N.C.-based bank, said Friday. He said the bank plans to resubmit corrected documents within several weeks.

Two other companies, Ally Financial Inc.’s GMAC Mortgage unit and JPMorgan Chase, have halted tens of thousands of foreclosure cases after similar problems became public.

The document problems could cause thousands of homeowners to contest foreclosures that are in the works or have been completed. If the problems turn up at other lenders, a foreclosure crisis that’s already likely to drag on for several more years could persist even longer. Analysts caution that most homeowners facing foreclosure are still likely to lose their homes.

State attorneys general, who enforce foreclosure laws, are stepping up pressure on the industry.

On Friday, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal asked a state court to freeze all home foreclosures for 60 days. Doing so “should stop a foreclosure steamroller based on defective documents,” he said.

And California Attorney General Jerry Brown called on JPMorgan to suspend foreclosures unless it could show it complied with a state consumer protection law. The law requires lenders to contact borrowers at risk of foreclosure to determine whether they qualify for mortgage assistance.

In Florida, the state attorney general is investigating four law firms, two with ties to GMAC, for allegedly providing fraudulent documents in foreclosure cases .The Ohio attorney general this week asked judges to review GMAC foreclosure cases.

Mark Paustenbach, a Treasury Department spokesman, said the Treasury has asked federal regulators “to look into these troubling developments.”

A document obtained Friday by the Associated Press showed a Bank of America official acknowledging in a legal proceeding that she signed up to 8,000 foreclosure documents a month and typically didn’t read them.

The official, Renee Hertzler, said in a February deposition that she signed 7,000 to 8,000 foreclosure documents a month.

“I typically don’t read them because of the volume that we sign,” Hertzler said.

She also acknowledged identifying herself as a representative of a different bank, Bank of New York Mellon, that she didn’t work for. Bank of New York Mellon served as a trustee for the investors holding the homeowner’s loan.

DECISION GRANTING SANCTIONS FOR MOTION TO LIFT STAY BASED ON FALSE CERTIFICATION

In In re Gorshstein, 285 B.R. 118 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) I granted sanctions against secured creditors in three separate cases where the secured creditors moved to vacate the automatic stay on the basis of false certifications of post-petition defaults. The Gorshstein decision was “provoked by an apparently increasing number of motions in this Court to vacate the automatic stay filed by secured creditors often based on attorney affidavits certifying material post-petition defaults where, in fact, there were no material defaults by the debtors.” 285 B.R. at 120.

The Secured Creditor’s motion to lift the stay in this case is, in the vernacular, a “poster child” for the type of abuse condemned in the Gorshstein decision. It is one of several such motions to come before me in recent months. This decision granting substantial sanctions in favor of the debtor and her attorney is published to reiterate and reinforce my strongly-held view that debtors must not be subjected to the risk of foreclosure and loss of their homes on the basis of false certifications of post-petition defaults.

Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over this contested matter under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(a) and the standing order of reference in this District dated July 10, 1984 (Acting Chief Judge Ward).

This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).

The Facts

By Notice of Motion and Application both dated June 1, 2007 Deutsche Bank Trust Company of America’s f/k/a Bankers Trust Company, as Trustee c/o Homecomings Financial, LLC (the “Secured Creditor”) moved to terminate the automatic stay with respect to the debtor’s residential real property in Stony Point, New York (the “Property”). The Secured Creditor holds by assignment a note dated October 9, 2001 in the amount of $284,750.00 secured by a mortgage on the Property. The Application recited that as of May 30, 2007 there was an unpaid principal balance on the loan of $278,043.61 with interest thereon in the amount of $20,553.51 plus late charges in the amount of $946.28, aggregating $299,543.40.

The debtor filed her petition under Chapter 13 on September 21, 2004. Thus, the debtor’s first post-petition mortgage payment was due for October 2004. Paragraph 3 of the Application states as follows:

As of the 30th day of May, 2007, the Debtor has failed to make 4 post-petition payments in the amount of $4,020.03 which represents the payments due the 1st day of February, 2007 through May, 2007 and has not cured said default.

As amplified below, this statement was false.

Annexed to the Application was an affidavit sworn to by John Cody, an Assistant Vice President of Homecomings Financial Network, sworn to April 3, 2006 in which Mr. Cody swore in paragraph 5:

As of the 31st day of March, 2006, the Debtor has failed to make 2 post-petition payments in the amount of $3,709.17 which represents the payments due the 1st day of February, 2006 through March, 2006 and has not cured said default.

The Cody affidavit was submitted in support of a motion filed by the Secured Creditor in 2006 and was erroneously annexed to the instant motion. The quoted statement from the Cody affidavit was false when made in 2006. Belatedly recognizing that the Cody affidavit applied to the Secured Creditor’s baseless 2006 motion to lift the stay, on June 8, 2007 counsel for the Secured Creditor filed an affidavit sworn to by Dory Goebel, a Bankruptcy Representative of Homecomings Financial, LLC, sworn to June 1, 2007.

In paragraph 5 of his affidavit, Mr. Goebel swore as follows:

As of the 30th day of May, 2007, the Debtor has failed to make 4 post-petition payments in the amount of $4,020.03 which represents the payments due the 1st day of February, 2007 through May, 2007 and has not cured said default.

Mr. Goebel’s sworn statement quoted above was false.

The instant motion was noticed for presentment on June 14 with a hearing date of June 20, 2007 if objections were timely served and filed. On June 6 counsel for the debtor filed the debtor’s affirmation in opposition noting that since the filing of her case she had made all post-petition payments required under the mortgage, and all such payments were cashed by the Secured Creditor.

Copies of the debtor’s payment checks were attached to the opposing affirmation. The debtor sought punitive sanctions for the “frivolous motion,” the Secured Creditor’s second such motion. The Secured
Creditor’s attorney responded with a “Reply Affirtmation [sic] in Support of Secured Creditor’s Motion
to Terminate the Automatic Stay” dated June 13, 2007 (the “Reply Affirmation”). The Reply Affirmation
noted that the initial Application incorrectly annexed the 2006 Cody affidavit and substituted the June 1, 2007 Goebel affidavit quoted above as Exhibit B. The Reply Affirmation also annexed as Exhibit C a document entitled “Post Petition Payment History for: Eileen Fagan BK Case No. 04-23460” with a notation at the bottom “ledger prepared on 06/13/07.” This “Post Petition Payment History” is one of several such documents submitted by the Secured Creditor, all of which are of central importance on this contested matter because, as explained below, they all demonstrate that the debtor was substantially current at all times post-petition. Despite Exhibit C, the Reply Affirmation concludes “that as of the Date of the Motion, the Debtor was due for the Months of February 2007 through May 2007 and the Month of June 2007 had become due.” As amplified below, Exhibit C demonstrates that this statement was false.

The debtor responded by submitting a July 10, 2007 “Sur-Reply Affirmation in Opposition and Request for Attorney Fees” signed by Linda Fagan, the debtor’s mother. The Sur-Reply Affirmation stated in relevant part as follows:

3. My daughter had a nervous breakdown aggravated by this bank about two years ago. Since then, I made each of the monthly mortgage payments to Homecomings which is the servicer for Deutsche Bank Trust Company and they have CASHED thy [sic] payments.

4. The latest submission is an outright lie, deceptive and deliberately out of order. . . .

5. Homecomings said they did not get the March 2007 payment and I immediately went to Western Union and sent them payment — which they accepted –- the day I found out about it.

6. Homecomings deliberately holds the mortgage payment checks for several weeks and then cashes them to create late fees and penalties. They also hold the checks for months, and then put two or three checks all in at once to create a bounce check situation.

7. I sent the May 2007 mortgage on or about May 14, 2007. When the check did not clear, I immediately called Homecomings when our May bank statement was received and inquired if they received the check. After being on hold for 45 minutes, they acknowledged that they received the check, but the account servicing agent did not know why it was not cashed. I called again two weeks later and they now said they never got the check. I called my attorney and he advised me to stop the check and then overnight another check on June 13, 2007. Even though they received it by OVERNIGHT courier on June 14, 2007, it was not cashed until June 27, 2007. See Exhibit “A”.

8. Incredulously [sic], they then tried to cash the May 2007 “lost check” which I stopped (they first said they received and then said they never received) and then sent me notice to me [sic] in July that the check was “returned unpaid”. See Exhibit “B”.

7. [sic] I AM CURRENT. I have not missed a payment and am paying more than I have to. . . .

It is significant that no affidavit contesting Linda Fagan’s statements was submitted by the Secured Creditor.

A hearing on the motion was held on July 17, 2007 attended by the attorneys for both sides. At the hearing the Secured Creditor submitted a revised but undated “Post Petition Payment 1 Paragraph 6 of the Supplemental Reply Affirmation states:

6. This Law Firm regrettably concedes that during the preparation of the Motion for Relief from Stay and the Bank Affidavit, it erroneously represented that the Debtor was due for the months of February through May of 2007 when in fact the Debtor was due for the months of April through May of 2007. (Emphasis in original)

History for: Eileen Fagan,” which I received in evidence as Court Exhibit 1. After hearing oral argument of counsel, I adjourned the hearing to August 22 in order to give the Secured Creditor an opportunity to make a further submission demonstrating, if it could, that the debtor was in arrears post-petition, which did not appear likely in view of the original “Post Petition Payment History” prepared on 06/13/07 and the amended “Post Petition Payment History” marked Court Exhibit 1. After oral argument at the August 22 hearing, I scheduled a final hearing for September 18.

The Secured Creditor’s attorney then submitted a “Supplimental [sic] Reply Affirtmation [sic] in Support of Secured Creditor’s Motion to Terminate the Automatic Stay” dated August 31, 2007 (“Supplemental Reply Affirmation”). The Supplemental Reply Affirmation annexes as Exhibit C a copy of the “Post Petition Payment History” which was marked as Court Exhibit 1 at the July 17 hearing. It also annexes as Exhibit B yet another “Post Petition Payment History” (undated) with numbers slightly different from the numbers contained on Exhibit C (Court Exhibit 1). The Supplemental Reply Affirmation acknowledged error in the original motion,1 but concluded that “when the Motion for Relief was filed on June 1, 2007, the Debtor was delinquent with her post-petition mortgage obligations and due for the months of April 2007 through May 2007.” Once again, as amplified below, all three versions of the Secured Creditor’s Post Petition Payment History demonstrate that the debtor has never been materially delinquent in her post-petition mortgage obligations.

Paragraph 15 of the Supplemental Reply Affirmation states that “As per the most recent information received from the Secured Creditor, the Debtor has paid monies subsequent to the filing of the Motion that would bring her post-petition current.” The Affirmation notes further that the debtor has commenced a 16-count adversary proceeding complaint against the Secured Creditor which raises, inter alia, certain of the allegations of bad faith asserted by the debtor against the Secured Creditor in opposing the motion to lift the stay. Consequently, in the “Wherefore” clause “Secured Creditor respectfully requests a finding that its Motion for Relief dated June 1, 2007 was filed in good faith and said Motion be marked withdrawn with the parties to litigate the issued [sic] raised by the Debtor in her opposition in detail within the confines of the now pending Adversary Proceeding.”

At the September 18 third and final hearing on this motion to lift stay, I asked the Secured Creditor’s attorney to explain and confirm the significance of the several Post Petition Payment History computer printouts submitted by Secured Creditor in purported support of the motion. To that we now turn.

The Debtor’s Post-Petition Payment History For purposes of this analysis, I shall focus on the Post Petition Payment History which was submitted by the Secured Creditor at the July 17 hearing and marked as Court Exhibit 1, a copy of which was submitted as Exhibit C to the Secured Creditor’s Supplemental Reply Affirmation.

Since the debtor’s Chapter 13 case was filed on September 21, 2004, the first postpetition mortgage payment was due October 1, 2004, with a two-week grace period.

The following reproduces the Court Exhibit 1 version of the debtor’s Post Petition Payment History in material part:

2 The “Date” column apparently lists the dates when the Secured Creditor cashed and/or credited the debtor’s payments, not the dates when the payments were delivered to or received by the Secured Creditor. See paragraph 6 of the Linda Fagan affirmation, quoted above.

<SNIP>

Conclusion

Motions to lift the stay may be routine and inconsequential to secured creditors and their counsel. But to a debtor and his or her family, such a motion and the consequent loss of the family home may be devastating. Most creditors and counsel are conscientious. But some are callous by design or inadvertence, as exemplified by this motion and two others presented to the Court the same week. The danger here is that a debtor who does not have an attorney or the resources of intellect or spirit to defend against a baseless motion may lose his/her home despite being current on post-petition mortgage and plan payments.

I know of no way to protect against such an eventuality if no material consequence attaches to the filing of motions based upon false certifications of fact. Secured creditors and their counsel who know that filing a false motion to lift the stay will result in material sanctions if caught will undoubtedly be motivated to a higher standard of care.

LOXAHATCHEE, Fla.—Israel Machado’s foreclosure started out as a routine affair. In the summer of 2008, as the economy began to soften, Mr. Machado’s pool-cleaning business suffered and like millions of other Americans, he fell behind on his $400,000 mortgage.

But Mr. Machado’s response was unlike most other Americans’. Instead of handing his home over to the lender, IndyMac Bank FSB, he hired Ice Legal LP in nearby Royal Palm Beach to fight the foreclosure. The law firm researched the history of Mr. Machado’s loan and found two interesting facts.

First, the affidavits IndyMac used to file the foreclosure were signed by a so-called robo-signer named Erica A. Johnson-Seck, who routinely signed 6,000 documents a week related to foreclosures and bankruptcy. That volume, the court decided, meant Ms. Johnson-Seck couldn’t possibly have thoroughly reviewed the facts of Mr. Machado’s case, as required by law.

Secondly, IndyMac (now called OneWest Bank) no longer owned the loan—a group of investors in a securitized trust managed by Deutsche Bank did. Determining that IndyMac didn’t really have standing to foreclose, a judge threw out the case and ordered IndyMac to pay Mr. Machado’s $30,000 legal bill.

Mr. Machado and his lawyer, Tom Ice, say they now want to convince the owners of the mortgage to cut Mr. Machado’s loan balance to between $150,000 and $200,000—the current selling price for comparable homes in his community near West Palm Beach. “The whole intent was to get them to come to the negotiating table, to get me in a fixed-rate mortgage that worked,” Mr. Machado said.

State your full name and current position.
Provide us with your definition of a document custodian.
What is your exact job title?
What are your responsibilities?
Where are you employed?
Where does your company store original documents?
How are they stored?
If you outsource this storage, who is the outsource provider?
How do you confirm delivery to the outsource provider?
How do you retrieve original documents?
How long do you save original documents?
Do you have a written original document destruction policy?
Please explain it and produce a copy of the policy.
Do you retain images of original of all documents?
How are they retained?
Where are they retained?
How long are they retained?
What type of computer system is used for the image retention?
Do you have a Records Compliance or Management Department?
Explain how it works, who is employed there, and where it is located.
Describe all information that you store electronically.
Do you have an ESI manager?
Who, where does he or she work, what does he or she do?
What is your policy on the retention of electronically stored documents?
Do you have a written policy for ESI documents?
Do you have any automated archiving systems?
If yes, then explain how they work and how documents are achieved.
Where are the archived documents stored?
How do you save data to a file that has already been achieved?
State the name of the director or manager of your document archiving operation.
How do you store data acquired through mergers or acquisitions?
How do you retrieve historical data from the archives?
Explain the process in detail.
Do you have an organizational-wide data map or inventory of all electronically stored data?
Can you produce a copy of that map?
Do you have any litigation ready data files?
Where are they stored?
How are they created?
Who is in charge of creating these files?
Why are they created?
Is there such a file in this case?
Where is the data stored?
Do you have any electronic data stored on tapes?
Describe the data and the type of tapes?
Where are these tapes stored?
Do you maintain a disaster recovery location?
Where is it?
Do you store electronic data at this location?
How is it stored?
How long is it stored?
What types of servers are used to store the data at this location?
How long is the data stored?
Do you have a data destruction policy at the disaster location?
Please explain and produce all written protocols.
Explain how you retrieve data from the disaster location?
Explain the time and expenses involved in securing date from the disaster recovery location?
State if any data related to this case has been destroyed?
Describe the data in detail and when and under what circumstances it was destroyed.
Have you seen any notice in this case to preserve all of the ESI?
When, where and how did you see it?
Has any data related to this case been destroyed since you saw it?
Who is your Media Destruction Manager?
Where is this person located?
What are the responsibilities of this person?
Explain all of the steps your company has taken in this case to preserve ESI evidence?
Have you created a data file of ESI for this case?
When was it created?
Name all parties involved in the creation?
Where is that data filed now?
Explain all of the steps that were taken to create the ESI file for this case.
Are there any ESI that you could not find or include in the file?
If so, please explain.
If any of the data still exists, have you or anyone in your company investigated the restoration of any deleted or damaged data?
When, who did this and what did they do?
If not, then why not?
With respect to the ESI file that has been created for this case, have the documents been scrubbed for metadata?
If yes, then when, who ordered, and why?
Who was involved in the scrubbing?
Was a scrubbed metadata file created?
Who created the file and who has custody of the file?
Do you backup your data every day?
How and where is the backup data?
Who is in charge of your backup operations?
What data is backed up?
Do you back up programs and systems or just the data?
What is the difference between your backup data system and your archived data storage system?
How long is backup data retained?
What is the format for the media in the ESI file created for this case?
Did you ever stop backing up or archiving data in this case in anticipation of litigation?
If so, when, why, and who ordered such actions?
When was a litigation hold placed on the destruction of any of the ESI data related to this case?
Who issued the hold and how was it implemented?
Do you have any type of dormant document liability policy?
If so, then please explain in detail how it works?
Has any of the ESI data in this case been destroyed or deleted pursuant to a dormant document liability policy?
If so, can you identify who took such action, when it was taken, who ordered it taken, and why it was taken?
Name all parties who have access to any of the data related to this case.
Explain all security features employed by your company to prohibit the unauthorized access to any of your ESI data?
Do you keep any type of catalogue of information on tapes or other media related to historical ESI?
If so, please explain how this system works?
Where are the catalogues filed and how are they maintained?
State the names of all of the servers and the location of all such servers that contained any ESI data related to this case.
State your current policy on saving company email.
State your current archiving and backup programs with respect to email.
State all of your email format types, date ranges for retention of email, and the names of all custodians.
Please identify all types of files used by your company, the capacity of such files, the creation dates and how those dates are preserved, the modification dates and how they are recorded, and the maximum size of each file.
Does your company employ a de-duplication policy as to ESI data?
If so, please explain how it works?
Has any data in this case been subject to destruction pursuant to any such policy?
If so, identify all such ESI data.
Do any lawyers representing you in this case have access to any of your data files?
IF so, please explain the extent of such access, how it is tracked, and purpose of the same?
Have you migrated any ESI data in this case from older, disparate media sources into modern managed tools?
If so, explain in detail the older data systems, how the migration occurred, and explain the new storage media used?
Name all of the parties on the data migration team or group.
Do you have a Legal Records Management Team?
Name all of the Team members and the location?
Was the Team involved in this case?
If yes, then explain in detail the extent of their involvement.
Do you use a third-party IT vendor for ESI data capture, storage and archiving?
If so, who and how long have they been used?
Who is the on-site representative for your ESI vendor?
Does your backup vendor use DLT4, LT01 or 4MM tapes?
What type of backup software does the vendor use?
Do they use Backup Exec, NetBackup, Legato Net Worker, Trivoli Storage Manager, ArcServe, CommVault Galaxy or HP Omniback?
Describe all messaging systems used by your company.
Do you use Lotus Notes?
Do you use Novell GroupWise or any others?
How is the messaging data saved, backed up and archived?
Do you convert the messages media to any other type of media for storage?
If so, describe the media and how this is accomplished and by whom?
Explain all due diligence programs and procedures used to verify the integrity of your data?
Explain all due diligence programs and procedures used to secure and safeguard your data.
Do you maintain custody logs on the transfer of any ESI data?
What type of logs?
Who maintains and where are they located?
Do you have a “Best Practices” guide for of the operations described herein?
Can you produce it?

Documents submitted to a court are supposed to be true as submitted. As an attorney, If I file a document with a court in which I swore I personally verified that the information contained within the document is true, and I didn’t actually do that, I’d get in real trouble. It’s simple: That’s fraud in the eyes of the court.

GMAC, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America recently admitted that their employees routinely sign thousands of documents without verifying what they’re signing. Those documents are then submitted to courts as if the documents were true, to enable the banks to foreclose on delinquent properties. Wells Fargo and CitiMortgage told the New York Times their employees do not engage in similar practices. Yet new evidence shows they do.

Confusion at Wells Fargo
Herman John Kennerty of Wells Fargo has given a deposition describing the department he oversees for Wells Fargo. It’s a department dedicated to simply signing documents. Kennerty testified that he signs 50 to 150 documents a day, verifying only the date on each. What else might he want to verify? Well, in one document he signed, he supposedly transferred the mortgage from Washington Mutual Bank FA to Wells Fargo on July 12, 2010. But that’s impossible, since Washington Mutual Bank FA changed its name in 2004, and by any name WaMu ceased to exist in 2008, when the FDIC took it over. Making the document even less comprehensible, the debtor had declared bankruptcy a month earlier, according to Linda Tirelli, who represented the debtor. Why would Wells Fargo want a mortgage from someone in bankruptcy? Finally, Tirelli pointed out that the papers Wells Fargo filed included a different transfer of the mortgage dated three days before the debtor took out the loan. The documents are a mess, yet Kennerty signed them regardless.Legal Nonsense at CitiMortgage
Similarly, one M. Matthews signed a number of documents that CitiMortgage has used to try to foreclose on properties. While Matthews may or may not sign hundreds of documents a day — I have not yet found a deposition in which he swears that he does — he certainly does not verify the contents of the documents he’s signing. For example, he signed a document supposedly transferring a mortgage from Lehman Brothers to Citi in 2009. It’s hard to see how that’s possible, since Lehman had already ceased to exist. When confronted with its nonsensical filing, Citigroup decided not to foreclose. Instead, it gave the homeowner a meaningful mortgage modification–$15,000 principal reduction, plus a 30 year fixed mortgage at 3%. Tirelli, who represented the debtor in that case too, notes that she sees bad documents in the vast majority of cases, and she keeps files of “robosigned” documents.

It’s true that in both the WaMu and Lehman Brothers documents, the signers were officially representing an entity called MERS and acting as the “nominee” of WaMu and the “nominee” of Lehman Brothers. But that doesn’t change the fraudulent nature of the documents as filed. MERS can’t continue to be the nominee of an entity that doesn’t exist. Moreover, MERS can’t assign something it doesn’t have, and MERS itself will admit it doesn’t own the underlying note or mortgage.

Possible Sanctions for JPMorgan Chase
Wells Fargo and CitiMortgage aren’t the only big banks to misrepresent their practices in the media; JPMorgan Chase told the New York Times that it had not withdrawn any documents in a pending case. However, Chase has in fact withdrawn robosigned documents in a case Tirelli is currently defending. Chase now faces possible sanctions in the case.

Why are the big, sophisticated banks submitting such problematic documents to the courts? The key reason is that sometimes when a bank wants to foreclose, it has to prove it actually has the right to foreclose — that it owns the note and accompanying mortgage. Unfortunately for the banks, the securitization of mortgages and the changes in property ownership documentation that accompanied it make it hard for the banks to establish clean chains of title and produce original documents. Hard, that is, in an environment where a massive number of foreclosures must be started and completed in a timely manner.

JOHN KENNERTY, a/k/a HERMAN JOHN KENNERTY

JOHN KENNERTY a/k/a Herman John Kennerty has been employed for many years in the Ft. Mill, SC offices of America’s Servicing Company, a division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. He signed many different job titles on mortgage-related documents, often using different titles on the same day. He often signs as an officer of MERS (“Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.”) On many Mortgage Assignments signed by Kennerty, Wells Fargo, or the trust serviced by ASC, is shown as acquiring the mortgage weeks or even months AFTER the foreclosure action is filed.

Titles attributed to John Kennerty include the following:

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for 1st Continental Mortgage Corp.;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for American Brokers Conduit;

Asst. Secretary, MERS, as Nominee for American Enterprise Bank of Florida;

Connecticut AG seeks 60-day freeze on foreclosures

Fri Oct 1, 2010 12:09pm EDT

* Blumenthal says defective documents warrant freeze

* JPMorgan, Ally/GMAC being investigated

The attorney general, Richard Blumenthal, also said he is investigating JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N) over its foreclosure practices. He previously said he was investigating Ally Financial Inc and its GMAC Mortgage unit.

“Banks that lured consumers into loans they couldn’t afford now seek to stampede them into foreclosure,” Blumenthal said in a statement. “This freeze should stop a foreclosure steamroller based on defective documents and enable effective remedies.”

The decisions came after borrowers’ lawyers released affidavits suggesting that some lenders’ employees are submitting documentation in foreclosure proceedings without understanding the contents.

Investigators in at least six U.S. states are examining foreclosure practices at GMAC, JPMorgan or both, and calling for such practices to be defended or halted.

Blumenthal, a Democrat, is running for the U.S. Senate. (Reporting by Jonathan Stempel in New York; editing by John Wallace)

Continue to REUTERS

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Press Release

Attorney General Asks CT Courts To Freeze Home Foreclosures 60 Days Because Of Defective DocsOctober 1, 2010

Attorney General Richard Blumenthal today asked the state Judicial Department to freeze all home foreclosures for 60 days because of defective document filings and institute measures to assure the integrity of future filings.

Blumenthal made the request after a second bank, JP Morgan Chase, acknowledged filing defective foreclosure documents. Like GMAC/Ally, JP Morgan admitted that so-called “robo-signers” signed affidavits without verifying the information in them. The GMAC robo-signer said under oath that he signed 8,000 to 10,000 foreclosure affidavits a month while a robo-signer for JP Morgan testified to spending less than two minutes on each affidavit.

Blumenthal is investigating GMAC/Ally and JP Morgan, as well as whether other banks may have engaged in similar practices.

Submitting defective documents is a possible fraud upon the court, potentially undermining foreclosures and underlying mortgages.

“This freeze should stop a foreclosure steamroller based on defective documents and enable effective remedies,” Blumenthal said. “The actions of GMAC/Ally and JP Morgan are inexcusable, a possible fraud on the court undermining the integrity of the legal process and consumers’ ability to fight foreclosures. Banks that lured consumers into loans they couldn’t afford now seek to stampede them into foreclosure. We must stop this runaway foreclosure train, restoring proper procedure and property owner rights.

“The Judicial Department should take additional measures — including requiring signers to state the basis for verifying information in affidavits — to restore the integrity of foreclosure documents. This appalling practice must be stopped before it poisons the legal system and unfairly evicts families from their homes.”

This is what this site is about…”ClOUDED TITLES”! This quote below should have added that it was in 65 Million mortgages not in some. I hope you all read my NO. THERE’S NO LIFE AT MERS…I highly recommend it because it came the heart.

In some cases, mortgages were conveyed using the Reston, Virginia-based Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, designed to cover transfers among system members. Promissory notes also often were endorsed as payable to the bearer to avoid the need for multiple transfers. Both practices have been challenged in court.

Foreclosure Errors Cloud Homeownership With `Blighted Titles’

By Kathleen M. Howley – Oct 1, 2010 12:00 AM ET

U.S. courts are clogged with a record number of foreclosures. Next, they may be jammed with suits contesting property rights as procedural mistakes in those cases cloud titles establishing ownership.

“Defective documentation has created millions of blighted titles that will plague the nation for the next decade,” said Richard Kessler, an attorney in Sarasota, Florida, who conducted a study that found errors in about three-fourths of court filings related to home repossessions.

Attorneys general in at least six states are investigating borrowers’ claims that some of the nation’s largest home lenders and loan servicers are making misstatements in foreclosures. JPMorgan Chase & Co. is asking judges to postpone foreclosure rulings, while Ally Financial Inc. said Sept. 21 its GMAC Mortgage unit would halt evictions. The companies said employees may have completed affidavits without confirming their accuracy.

Such mistakes may allow former owners to challenge the repossession of homes long after the properties are resold, according to Kessler. Ownership questions may not arise until a home is under contract and the potential purchaser applies for title insurance or even decades later as one deed researcher catches errors overlooked by another. A so-called defective title means the person who paid for and moved into a house may not be the legal owner.

‘Nightmare Scenario’

“It’s a nightmare scenario,” said John Vogel, a professor at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. “There are lots of land mines related to title issues that may come to light long after we think we’ve solved the housing problem.”

Almost one-fourth of U.S. home sales in the second quarter involved properties in some stage of mortgage distress, RealtyTrac Inc. said yesterday. In August, lenders took possession of record 95,364 homes and issued foreclosure filings to 338,836 homeowners, or one out of every 381 U.S. households, according to the Irvine, California-based data seller.

The biggest deficiency in foreclosure suits is missing or improperly handled documents, Kessler found in his study of court filings in Florida’s Sarasota County. When home loans are granted, borrowers sign a promissory note outlining payment obligations and a separate mortgage that puts an encumbrance on the property in the lender’s name. If mortgages are resold, both documents must be properly conveyed to prevent competing claims.

Mortgage Bonds

Most of the document errors involved mortgages that had been bundled into securities sold to investors, Kessler said. At the end of the U.S. real estate boom in 2005 and 2006, about 70 percent of the $6.1 trillion in mortgage lending was packaged into bonds, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association in New York.

Looks like this is becoming more and more like a fabricating factory mill full of ?????????

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GetNet™ Features

A National Network of title runners retains presence in every county jurisdiction nationwide.

It was a very sad day for Floridians yesterday when the Florida Supreme Court issued a statement that it does not have authority to intercede while a fraud investigation is pending. Although we may not agree with the decision, we must respect procedures that must be followed.

Florida, do not quit what you are doing because there are many states that we must continue to focus on. Judges need to put themselves in the homeowners situation and understand we cannot make these fraudulent documents up. These documents are sworn statements, under perjury of law and notarized. As officers of the court they must be held accountable. No ifs, ands, buts or suppose here. These are not errors.

Rest assured that The Florida Bar still has many pending investigations with these foreclosure firms and they have authority overseeing the misconduct of their members.

I am your voice, America. I share your fears, read your concerns and do try my best to reach out to you.

The Florida Supreme Court said today:

The Florida Constitution and court rules did not give the Chief Justice authority to intercede in pending cases involving attorney misconduct, or to investigate allegations of fraud or misconduct in foreclosure cases. The fraud cases must first beadjudicated in trial courts.

Congressman Grayson has asked the Florida Bar to take action.

Florida Default Law Group has been added as the fourth law firm under investigation along the Law offices of David J. Stern, Shapiro & Fishman and Law Office of Marshall Watson.

I must confess, she was my first study because she signed two assignments for “one” of my properties using “two” different employers. 🙂 ‘<blush> I even created my very first youtube video in her honor (see below)!

Thanks to Judge Arthur Schack and Tom Ice from Ice Legal in Palm Beach County, we all became familiar with Erica for wearing too many corporate hats.

She is the “Robo-Signer” Judge Schack called out in three particular cases in NY and made her an instant foreclosure household name. I don’t think she ever emerged in NY soon after this. Also see the HSCB v. Yasmin case.

Excerpt of DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST v. HARRIS

The Court is perplexed as to why the assignment was not executed in Pasadena, California, at 46U Sierra Madre Villa, the alleged “principal place of business” for both the assignor and the assignee. In my January 3 1, 2008 decision (Deutsche Bank National Tr (1st Canpuny v Maraj, – Misc 3d – [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50176 [U]), I noted that Erica Johnson-Seck, claimed that she was a Vice President of MERS in her July 3,2007 INDYMAC to DEUTSCHE BANK assignment, and then in her July 3 1,2007 affidavit claimed to be a DEUTSCHE BANK Vice President. Just as in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v Maraj, at 2, the Court in the instant action, before granting itn application for an order of reference, requires an affidavit from Ms. Johnson-Seck, describing her employment history for the past three years.

Further, the Court requires an explanation from an officer of plaintiff DEUTSCHE BANK as to why, in the middle of our national subprime mortgage financial crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK would purchase a non-perferforming loan from INDYMAC, and why DEUTSCHE BANK, INDYMAC and MERS all share office space at 460 Sierra Madre Villa, Pasadena, CA 91 107.

24,000 Monthly Documents executed by her team

Now Lets move on to this below… according to this deposition her office signs 24,000 mortgage related documents out of the this figure she signed about “750” a week making it approximately 3000 mortgage documents used in foreclosure cases. Anything from Affidavits of Debt, Lost Note Affidavits, Assignment of Mortgages, Declarations pretty much anything having to deal with Bankruptcy and Foreclosures.

[GUEST POST]

Is It Time to File Quiet Title Actions on Foreclosed Homes?

THIS IS NOT Intended to Be Construed or Relied upon as COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE—it is an academic paper discussing various perceptions of evolving potential facts and law, which may differ state by state and within jurisdictions within states. Readers are urged to obtain competent legal representation to review their facts.

In the past, foreclosed homeowners and their attorneys have discussed the utility of filing quiet title actions where homes have been seized and deficiency judgments entered by various foreclosure claimants that purport to unknowingly rely on faulty documentation. There are dangers. A buyer that has acquired a foreclosed home—or the foreclosing entity itself—may bring an action against a dispossessed person seeking redress. A pro se plaintiff or an attorney that represents the wronged homeowner may be subject to sanctions for raising a spurious or improperly supported claim. Today facts appear to put a defense attorney at risk of malpractice if he does not preserve his clients’ interest—even post foreclosure—unless he apprises the client of the opportunity to regain title to the family home. Courts have notice of these defects by reason of withdrawals of support documents—beyond GMAC.

Recent disclosures and admissions by document creation groups, together with widespread newspaper reported facts open avenues to additional discovery and formulation of academic legal opinion. These will open the door for claims to set aside erroneous judgments and/or pursue damages against those servicers, Indenture Trustees and document preparers that either knowingly, negligently, or acted with willful disregard to perpetrate fraud on the courts and the hapless home-owners. Mortgage-backed securities investors may also find an interest in these activities. Failed documentation may disguise outright fraud. Attestations and sworn affidavits serve a fundamental purpose—prevention of fraud. These are not mere technicalities as propounded by some industry apologists. Certainly, homeowners with continuing duties of enforced silence may have opportunity to re-open their settlements in light of these possible fraudulent impositions and inducements.

There are at least two sets of circumstances raised to date whereby potentially void or voidable documents have been used to push homeowners into the streets and into bankruptcy;

Complaints in foreclosure supported by assignments of mortgage from purported representatives of MERS to various entities

On September 23, 2010 the Washington Post added to the furor surrounding the (majority) federal government owned [ALLY] GMAC’s revelations from earlier this week. GMAC used affidavits executed by an employee, Jeffrey Stephan, who admitted in deposition testimony in December 2009 and June 2010, that he did not actually verify the mortgage foreclosure information to which he was testifying in connection with the foreclosures of two families.

In addition, he admitted signing these “affidavits,” and passing them for later notarization in bulk, a violation of proper notary procedure. Mr. Stephan signed off on 10,000 mortgage documents per month according to his June deposition and the Post article. GMAC, in this instance, took the honest and safe course of “temporarily suspending” some foreclosure-related activities in 23 states – as reported by several large newspapers, including the New York Times, Bloomberg and The Washington Post. The “temporary suspension” allows for evaluation of the impacts of this admitted breakdown in the system, rather than blatantly defrauding foreclosure courts in judicial foreclosure states. The New York Times on the 22nd speculated that: [GMAC] “actions suggest concern about potential liability in evicting families and selling houses to which it does not have clear title.” [Emphasis added] The same article notes that; “The lender said it was also reviewing completed foreclosures where the same unnamed procedure might have been used.” [Emphasis Added]. The step referred to in these articles, preparation and filing of an affidavit in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment—along with the Motion itself –occur well into the foreclosure process.

However, there is another critical document created and filed by a claimant with the foreclosure court at the beginning of foreclosure. This document, the Assignment of Mortgage, is supposed to support the claimant’s right or legal “standing” to press the Complaint in Foreclosure. The Complaint is the basis for the foreclosure and creation of a “deficiency judgment” – the amount left owing by the homeowner after the claimant sells the house for less than the amount owed and includes added fees and charges. The claimant uses the deficiency judgment to seize the homeowner assets and future paychecks. In most instances the assignment is the only document before the court that associates the claimant with the borrower. The complaint and supporting assignment frequently surprise and confuse the homeowner by naming an entity or sham “trust” that the homeowner has never heard of before.

The Assignment of Mortgage is significantly more important than the affidavit in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, if for no other reason sheer numbers. Typically most homeowners have undergone a psychological bruising and beating from the loan servicer by the time the actual Complaint in Foreclosure is filed. Often the family has lost the pay of one, if not both, wage earners and seeks some relief from one of the high cost, predatory loans created 2003-2007. Unfortunately the servicer typically refuses to discuss modification or any relief unless the homeowner has fallen behind in payments. The servicers may rely on terms limiting its authority within the securitization documents in respect of this hard-nose approach.

The hard-nose response gives the servicer cover for actions or abuses that often characterize its subsequent conduct. At that point, the servicer transfers the loan to the default department or outsources to a “default management” operation. This is an aggrandized term for collection agency. The “department” or collection agency often calls the family up to six or more times a day demanding money—rarely the same caller twice. Typically, this will throw the family into confusion and despair. Pleas for relief fall on deaf ears unless the family meets demands to “make up late payments and added fees.” It’s just the beginning of a process that has the effect, if not the purpose, of destroying the family’s morale. The servicer may follow up with notices tacked on the homeowner’s door, a barrage of ominous if not outright threatening letters and other actions aimed at driving the homeowner to abandon the home and neglect a legal defense.

If the homeowner is either naïve enough to believe that the touted voluntary [for servicers] relief programs actually operate, or desperate to keep a roof over the family’s head, the loan modification dance begins. Under the guise of compliance with HAMP, the collection agency demands an array of homeowner financial and employment information. Irrespective of the use that the homeowner desires for that information, it will be of great help to the collection agency to locate assets and paychecks down the road to collect the looming deficiency. But today the information rarely satisfies the servicer in respect of moving towards a modification. The demanded documents are often purportedly “lost” by the servicer, or deemed inadequate—anything to drag out the nightmare and break the family’s spirits. After submitting and resubmitting documents, explanations, and hours on the telephone day after day, week after week, any false hopes that are raised are destroyed by a denial. Homeowners often will be told to try again-with the same results.

After about 3-4 months, perhaps even while the family thinks that a modification is soon to be forthcoming, the ax falls instead. An assignment is “created” and the Complaint is filed. Usually the family gives up without opposition at this point. The servicer may go so far as to place a note on the door offering to further discuss modification leaving a phone number. When the number is called by the confounded homeowner, the servicer representative may explain: “we didn’t really mean that; we just wanted to see if you have left yet!”

In some cases born of desperation, the struggling family may contact an attorney who demands $1000-$5000 just to open the case. The family has 30 days to raise the money to cause someone to simply look at the demands in the Complaint and the Assignment. In the vast majority of cases still remaining, the family gives up now, abandons the property, and no response is ever filed to the Complaint—a default judgment is entered in favor of the claimant. Most often, the family is not even aware that the demands seek more than just the home. That realization may take years to occur—when another collector knocks on the door demanding the long-forgotten deficiency. The process is aimed at breaking the family’s will, at winnowing out the homeowners. The servicer wants the home!

The articles printed prior to Sep 23, 2010 in connection with GMAC’s “unnamed procedure” did not focus upon the issue of potential forgery or related systemic fraud on the courts in connection with preparation of Assignments of Mortgage. By way of background, by reference to numerous anecdotes, it appears that often a claimant in possession of a list of homeowner loans in default provides superficial information to a default services company in respect of the borrower and property. One of the largest default service providers, by its own admission, is two-year old publicly traded Lender Processing Services (“LPS”), a spin-off from FINS. “Approximately 50 percent of all U.S. mortgages by dollar volume are serviced using LPS’ Mortgage Servicing Package (MSP)” The lender, a servicer or Indenture Trustee contracts with LPS for creation and delivery of an Assignment of Mortgage to the requesting entity. (see exhibit at end) This document is often sent directly by LPS through the mail to County Recorders to be file-stamped and recorded in the county property records. These steps lend false authenticity to the piece of paper. By the time the targeted family sees the Complaint and attached Assignment, the assignment has been file-stamped by their local County Recorder, the Clerk of Courts and probably was attached to a subpoena “served” upon them by their County Sherriff. The family is thoroughly intimidated by the Assignment of Mortgage, which has been used to convert the family’s local authorities into apparent agents and enforcers of the distant claimant. The assignment is a powerful weapon in the war of intimidation.

The Washington Post, September 23, 2010, correlated the GMAC admitted breakdown in verification of loan files and notarization process with the assignment creation process operated by LPS. LPS’ document creation division in Alpharetta, Georgia operating under LPS’ DOCX trademark, churned out thousands of assignments. The Post identified one prolific signatory, Linda Green. The article set out in its body several examples of Ms. Green’s signature—which differ dramatically one to another. The Post stated the likely observation that the signatures were made by other LPS employees in addition to Ms Green. She is but one example at one LPS office: there are others with similar handiwork including Tywanna Thomas and Korrel Harp at that office. Mr. Harp has the added dubious distinction of having been jailed for and plead guilty to “Knowingly Possessing False Identification” relating to an arrest in Oklahoma in 2008. At the age of 24, Mr. Harp was signing as Vice-President of Mortgage Electronic Services Inc., aka MERS. MERS has been nominal owner of 65 million home mortgages—and receives mortgage title to 60% of all new mortgages.

As a VP of MERS the 24 year-old Harp, like Ms. Green and Thomas, purportedly possessed the power to transfer mortgages with questionable oversight to LPS’ clients—perhaps others? Based on the signatures of Harp, Green, Thomas— and other varied, yet purportedly notarized signatures, Courts across the country have foreclosed on homes and granted deficiency judgments. One of the in house LPS notaries was only 18 years old at the time she notarized signature for Harp, Thomas and others at DOCX. Michelle Kersch, a senior vice president for Lender Processing Services, made limited explanations by email in the Post article but did not elaborate “due to the pending criminal investigation”.

Like GMACs Stephan, LPS’ stamp and sign department was a high volume operation. Powers of attorney were not consistently attached to the crucial assignments—if at all.

In the case of Linda Green, there was no power of attorney to represent MERS on an original “assignment of mortgage dated October 17, 2008 and filed on October 13, 2009”. This technicality was disclosed in a corrective filing of assignment by Florida foreclosure firm Shapiro and Fishman dated August 11, 2010 in Lee County, Florida in support of a foreclosure by servicer AHMSI. The POA status of other prolific signers such as Harp seems equally uncertain—but as Harp has emphatically stated “I’m sure everything is legal.” There seems to be little observable difference between the conduct of GMAC’s Stephan and the LPS’ high volume signers—but for the possible failure of the LPS signers to have representative capacity to sign at all.

LPS has also made admissions that GMAC seems to echo in terms of problematic “processes”. In the company’s 2009 Annual Report on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, published in March 2010, under “regulatory matters”–“Recently, during an internal review of the business processes used by our document solutions subsidiary, we identified a business process that caused an error in the notarization of certain documents, some of which were used in foreclosure proceedings in various jurisdictions around the country.”

Subsequently, April 3, 2010, the Wall St. Journal published an article regarding the issues with LPS and notary deficiencies; “US Probes Foreclosure-Data Provider”. Foreclosure activists in Florida did not let the admission pass. These persons identified and brought to light signed and notarized Assignments that actually conveyed mortgages to named entities, “Bogus Assignee” and “Bad Bene”. These clearly established undeniable proof that LPS’ internal controls were compromised and virtually any name could be inserted as a claimant in a foreclosure action.

LPS’ CEO Jeffrey Carbiener authored a Letter to the Editor of the Florida Times-Union responding to an article published May 14, 2010 referring to “bad bene” and “bogus assignee”. In his open letter admissions in the press Carbiener asserted that the bogus names were “placeholders” put in the signed and notarized assignment documents “…until the missing information [claimant name] was provided…” Carbiener noted that the forms, as well as the data inserted, were based on instructions from clients with the “placeholders” used until more data is provided. This amounts to a Nuremberg Defense.

The Carbiener comments attempt to place the onus of error in naming mortgage claimants on his clients—but for the obvious so-called placeholders. However, Carbiener’s comments have great significance beyond LPS role. This explanation is an admission that assignments were prepared in blank based on client information. According to Carbiener, it would appear thatthe named claimant was subsequently determined by the client and inserted. This process allows substantial opportunity for abuse, suggesting that a servicer determined that a loan was in default, and then someone engaged in a separate process to identify a claimant to whom the proceeds of foreclosure would be awarded.

The difficulties, or opportunities, for a servicer and his client Indenture Trustees to shift the benefits among potential investor beneficiaries are more apparent when one reviews the SEC filings of now bankrupt mortgage note originators such as American Home Mortgage group (“AHM”) and Option One.

Both originated loans that were supposedly stuffed into trusts. On paper the trusts supposedlyissued mortgage-backed securities to trusting investors. However, purported trust-sponsors AHM and Option One and the Indenture Trustees were at best haphazard in meeting basic commitments and representations that were plainly stated in the securitization documents they themselves filed. The trust documents clearly state that the lists of loans included in the trusts were filed with the SEC and the appropriate Secretary of State (UCC). The securitization documents provided detailed descriptions of the information to be included in the filed list. This information was sufficient that a homeowner could determine if the trust owned his/her loan and was the proper party to receive his payments. Investors in the trust MBS could look to the list to determine the principal amount of the loans that “backed” the investment, as well as loan to value ratios and other relevant information that would indicate the value of the loans—and provide information adequate to determine if the same loan was placed in multiple trusts. However, for AHM, 7 of the 12 investment trusts filed with SEC lacked the lists. The schedule stated, “manually filed”, but the manual filing was not made in many instances. The actual manual filings made are identified on the SEC dockets for the trusts as “SE” for “scanned exhibit.” Under the “SE” docket entry, the list would be found in specificity. One such example of a trust with a proper loan list was American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2.

In motion practice in connection with a homeowner’s motion to dismiss a naked claim by one of Korrel Harp’s or Linda Green’s appointed mortgage assignment beneficiary trusts, one could note that the trust lacked a loan list and ownership of the loan could not be independently verified by reference to government records as intended. In so doing, it was possible to refer the court to the properly filed loan lists to note the clear distinction and value of the list. It was possible to prove that the lists were not intentionally missing due to some overriding concern for homeowner privacy—a common speculation. It was also useful to prove that missing loan lists were not customary “industry practice”. The filed list was a government record freely accessible to the public online. That changed between July 21, 2010 and September 02, 2010. Loan lists that had been on file and available for investors and homeowners to view online on the SE site were unceremoniously deleted. The lists are no longer freely accessible. A demand is now necessary under Freedom of Information Act—the proper loan lists can no longer be referenced in motions to dismiss. The effect was equivalent to, if not the same as, intentional destruction of evidence by the SEC. It is of interest that on the same day as the Washington Post detailed the LPS similarity to GMAC in terms of uncertain document authenticity, the WSJ also ran a front-page article detailing questionable actions taken in recent months by SEC. Washington Post, September 22, 2010, SEC Blasted on Goldman.

In summary, SEC failed to require actual filing of loan lists by the trust sponsors and the Indenture Trustees. This failing has lead to LPS and GMAC transfers of claims to unverifiable beneficiaries. This the Times suggests, creates a cloud on the title of the new home buyers of foreclosed properties. Then to complete the injury and remove opportunity for homeowners to defend unsupported claims, SEC destroys evidence that could be useful to homeowners being foreclosed and investors seeking to prove fraud. The mortgage fiasco has roots in SEC failure to regulate and its continuation and concealment of potential fraud is an abuse of discretion by SEC, which is supposed to support disclosure of information—not hide it.

Do what is right and protect these families. This involves children that do not understand what is going on. I lost my home to this fraud and they do not have to go through my stressful experience. You set new rules and these foreclosure mills continued to ignore you. What is it going to take?

Creed of Professionalism

I revere the law, the judicial system, and the legal profession and will at all times in my professional
and private lives uphold the dignity and esteem of each.
I will further my profession’s devotion to public service and to the public good.
I will strictly adhere to the spirit as well as the letter of my profession’s code of ethics, to the extent
that the law permits and will at all times be guided by a fundamental sense of honor, integrity, and fair
play.I will not knowingly misstate, distort, or improperly exaggerate any fact or opinion and will not
improperly permit my silence or inaction to mislead anyone.
I will conduct myself to assure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
resolution of every controversy.
I will abstain from all rude, disruptive, disrespectful, and abusive behavior and will at all times act
with dignity, decency, and courtesy.
I will respect the time and commitments of others.
I will be diligent and punctual in communicating with others and in fulfilling commitments.I will exercise independent judgment and will not be governed by a client’s ill will or deceit.
My word is my bond.

Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar

The general principles which should ever control the lawyer in the practice of the legal profession
are clearly set forth in the following oath of admission to the Bar, which the lawyer is sworn on
admission to obey and for the willful violation to which disbarment may be had.
“I do solemnly swear:
“I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Florida;
“I will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;
“I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceedings which shall appear to me to be unjust, nor
any defense except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land;
“I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
“I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my clients, and will accept no
compensation in connection with their business except from them or with their knowledge and approval;
“I will abstain from all offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged;
“I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed, or delay anyone’s cause for lucre or malice. So help me God.”

This should send a powerful message to each and every Foreclosure Mill out there! You are NEXT!

We are disturbed by the increasing reports of predatory ‘foreclosure mills’ in Florida working for Fannie Mae servicers. Foreclosure mills are law firms representing lenders that specialize in speeding up the foreclosure process, often without regard to process, substance, or legal propriety. According to the New York Times, four of these mills are both among the busiest of the firms and are under investigation by the Attorney General of Florida for fraud. The firms have been accused of fabricating or backdating documents, as well as lying to conceal the true owner of a note.

Several of the busiest of these mills show up as members of Fannie Mae’s Retained Attorney Network, a set of legal contractors on whom Fannie relies to represent its interests as a note-holder. The network also serves as a pool of legal talent that represents Fannie in its pre-filing mediation program, a program designed to facilitate communication between borrowers and servicers prior to foreclosure. In other words, Fannie Mae seems to specifically delegate its foreclosure avoidance obligations out to lawyers who specialize in kicking people out of their homes.

The legal pressure to foreclose at all costs is leading to a situation where servicers are foreclosing on properties on which they do not even own the note. This practice is blessed by a legal system overwhelmed with foreclosure cases and unable to sort out murky legal details, and a set of law firms who mass produce filings to move foreclosures as quickly as possible. At the very least, we would encourage you to remove foreclosure mills under investigation for document fraud from the Fannie Mae’s Retained Attorney Network. We also believe that Fannie should have guidelines allowing servicers to proceed on a foreclosure only when its legal entitlement to foreclose is clearly documented. In addition, these charges raise a number of questions for us about the foreclosure process as it pertains to Fannie Mae’s holdings.

Why is Fannie Mae using lawyers that are accused of regularly engaging in fraud to kick people out of their homes? Given that Fannie Mae is at this point a government entity, and it is the policy of the government that foreclosures are a costly situation best avoided if there are any lower cost alternatives, what steps is Fannie Mae taking to avoid the use of foreclosure mills? What additional steps is Fannie Mae going to take to ensure that foreclosures are done only when necessary and only in accordance with recognized law? How do your servicer guidelines take into account the incentives for fraud in the fee structure of foreclosure attorneys and others engage in the foreclosure process? What mechanisms do you employ to monitor legal outsourcing?

We look forward to your responses and to understanding more about these disturbing dynamics in future hearings.

The nation’s overburdened foreclosure system is riddled with faked documents, forged signatures and lenders who take shortcuts reviewing borrower’s files, according to court documents and interviews with attorneys, housing advocates and company officials.

I am disturbed by the increasing reports of predatory ‘foreclosure mills’ in Florida. The New York Times and Mother Jones have both recently reported on the rampant and widespread practices of document fraud and forgery involved in mortgage assignments. My staff has spoken with multiple foreclosure specialists and attorneys in Florida who confirm these reports.

Three foreclosure mills – the Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, Shapiro & Fishman, and the Law Offices of David J. Stern – constitute roughly 80% of all foreclosure proceedings in the state of Florida. All are under investigation by Attorney General Bill McCollum. If the reports I am hearing are true, the illegal foreclosures taking place represent the largest seizure of private property ever attempted by banks and government entities. This is lawlessness.

I respectfully request that you abate all foreclosures involving these firms until the Attorney General of the state of Florida has finished his investigations of those firms for document fraud.

I have included a court order, in which Chase, WAMU, and Shapiro and Fishman are excoriated by a judge for document fraud on the court. In this case, Chase attempted to foreclose on a home, when the mortgage note was actually owned by Fannie Mae.

Taking someone’s home should not be done lightly. And it should certainly be done in accordance with the law.

I go through hundreds of cases each week and I have been saving this one for a rainy day. We’ll it’s raining today.

SUPREME COURT – STATE OF NEW YORK I.A.S. PART XXXVI SUFFOLK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. PAUL J. BAISLEY, JR., J.S.C.

DATED: MAY 10. 2010

The Court is at a loss to understand how a purported “correcting assignment” can be executed eight days before the assignment it is purporting to correct. Moreover, the Court is at a loss as to the identity of the true holder of the mortgage at the time of the commencement of the action (irrespective of any arguments regarding the validity of the purported assignment(s) by MERS as nominee of the original mortgagee; see, for example, US Bank, N.A. II Collymore, 200 NY Slip Op 09019 [2d Dept 2009]), While it is well established that any issues as to a plaintiff’s standing to commence a foreclosure action are waived by the defendant-mortgagor’s failure to appear and answer (HSBC Bank v Dammond, 59 A03d 679 l2d Sept 2009]), the contradictory and conflicting submissions on this motion implicate far more than the more issue of “standing.” Indeed, the submissions appear to have been drafted with utter disregard for the facts, or for counsel’s responsibilities as an officer of the Court, and border on the fraudulent.

In the the circumstances, the motion, which is unsupported either factually or legally, is denied in all respects. Moreover, in light of the failure of the movant to establish that any party was in fact the holder of the mortgage (and the underlying note, see KLuge v Fugm:y, 145 AD2d [2d Sept 1988J) at the time of the commencement of this action – an omission that in the circumstances may not be corrected by mere amendment — the Court, on its own motion, hereby directs the plaintiff to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed; and further directs Steven J. Baum, P.c. and Heather A. Johnson, Esq., the attorney of record for the plaintiff in this action and the scrivener of the affirmation referred to above, to appear before the undersigned on June 24, 2010 at II :00 a.m. to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on plaintiff and/or its attorney(s) for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1 (c).

Michael Burry, the former head of Scion Capital LLC who predicted the housing market’s plunge, talks with Bloomberg’s Jon Erlichman about his investments in agricultural land, real estate and gold.

Michael Lewis made him famous in his book “The Big Short”.

(This is an excerpt. Source: Bloomberg)

“I believe that agricultural land, productive agricultural land with water on site, will be very valuable in the future. And I’ve put a good amount of money into that. So I’m investing in alternative investments as well as stocks.”

“I think there is some value in real estate. You have to buy it right. It’s not in general, that’s the problem. I think that there are an awful lot of people out there looking to buy these distressed properties out there and so you need to find special situations. That is how I’ve invested from the beginning. I’m looking for these special situations, these unique ideas and that’s true in real estate too.”

“In my situation I’d rather go long on housing itself, real estate itself. Depending on how you structure it, in the real market, in the physical market, you can get some pretty good deals and I’ve done some of that too.”

“Paulson is big in gold and that is something is interesting to me and given how I see the world playing out. Other than that, I’m just saying, other than gold I haven’t really bought into the other…

OPINION

FAIN, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Indenture Trustee for the Registered Noteholders of Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1 (HSBC), appeals from a judgment of the trial court, which rendered summary judgment and dismissed HSBC’s complaint for foreclosure, without prejudice. HSBC contends that the trial court improperly treated the date the assignment of mortgage was executed as dispositive of the claims before it. HSBC further contends that the trial court’s decision is erroneous, because it is premised on the court’s having improperly struck the affidavit of Chomie Neil, and having failed to consider Neil’s restated affidavit.

{¶ 2} Two briefs of amicus curiae have been filed in support of the position of defendants-appellees Jamie W. Thompson, Administratrix of the Estate of the Estate of Howard W. Turner, and Jamie W. Thompson (collectively Thompson). One brief was filed by the Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray (Cordray). The other brief was filed by the following groups: Advocates for Basic Legal Equality; Equal Justice Foundation; Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio; Northeast Ohio Legal Aid Services; Ohio Poverty Law Center; and Pro Seniors, Inc. (collectively Legal Advocates). We have considered those briefs, all of which have been helpful, in deciding this appeal.

{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Neil’s affidavit, because of defects in the affidavit. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider Neil’s restated affidavit, in the course of deciding objections to the magistrate’s decision, because HSBC failed to indicate why it could not have properly submitted the evidence, with reasonable diligence, before the magistrate had rendered a decision in the matter. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment against HSBC, and dismissing the foreclosure action for lack of standing. HSBC failed to establish that it was the holder of a promissory note secured by a mortgage. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.

I

{¶ 4} On January 27, 2007, Howard Turner borrowed $85,000 from Fidelity Mortgage, a division of Delta Funding Corporation (respectively, Fidelity and Delta). Turner signed a note promising to repay Fidelity in monthly payments of $786.44 for a period of thirty years. The loan number on the note is 0103303640, and the property listed on the note is 417 Cushing Avenue, Dayton, Ohio, 45429.

{¶ 5} In order to secure the loan, Turner signed a mortgage agreement, which names Fidelity as the “Lender,” and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as a nominee for Fidelity and Fidelity’s successors and assigns. The mortgage states that Turner, as borrower, “does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, the following described property in the County of Montgomery, * * * which currently has the address of 417 Cushing Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45429.” The mortgage was recorded with the Montgomery County Recorder on February 20, 2007, as MORT-07-014366.

{¶ 6} The entire amount of the loan proceeds was not disbursed. Fidelity placed $5,000 in escrow after closing, until certain repairs (roofing and heating) were made to the house. The required deposit agreement indicated that Turner had three months to make the repairs, and that if the items were not satisfactorily cleared, Fidelity had the option of satisfying the items from the funds held, of extending the time to cure, or of taking any other steps Fidelity felt necessary to protect the mortgage property, including but not limited to, paying down the principal of the loan with the deposit.

{¶ 7} Turner made timely payments through June 2007. However, he died in late July 2007, and no further payments were made. HSBC filed a foreclosure action on November 8, 2007, alleging that it was the owner and holder of Turner’s promissory note and mortgage deed and that default had occurred. HBSC sued Thompson, as administratrix of her father’s estate, and individually, based on her interest in the estate.

{¶ 8} HSBC attached purported copies of the note and mortgage agreement to the complaint. The note attached to the complaint is also accompanied by two documents that are each entitled “Allonge.” The first allonge states “Pay to the Order of _________ without recourse,” and is signed on behalf of Delta Funding Corporation by Carol Hollman, Vice-President. The second allonge states “Pay to the Order of Delta Funding Corporation” and is signed by Darryl King, as “authorized signatory” for Fidelity Mortgage.

{¶ 9} In January 2008, Thompson filed an answer, raising, among other defenses, the fact that the action was not being prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. HSBC subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in February 2007, supported by the affidavit of an officer of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen), which was a servicing agent for HSBC.

{¶ 10} Thompson filed a response to the summary judgment motion, pointing out various deficiencies in the affidavit and documents. Thompson further contended that HSBC was not the holder of the mortgage and note, and was not the real party in interest. In addition, Thompson filed an amended answer and counterclaim, contending that HSBC was not the real party in interest, and that HSBC had made false, deceptive, and misleading representations in connection with collecting a debt, in violation of Section 1692, Title 15, U.S. Code (the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or FDCPA).

{¶ 11} HSBC withdrew its motion for summary judgment in March 2008. In November 2008, the trial court vacated the trial date and referred the matter to a magistrate. HSBC then filed another motion for summary judgment in January 2009. This motion was supported by the affidavit of Chomie Neil, who was employed by Ocwen as a manager of trial preparation and discovery. Neil averred in the affidavit that he had executed it in Palm Beach, Florida. However, the notation at the top of the first page of the affidavit and the jurat both state that the affidavit was sworn to and subscribed to in New Jersey, before a notary public.

{¶ 12} Thompson moved to strike the affidavit, contending that it was filled with inadmissible hearsay, contained legal conclusions, and purported to authenticate documents, when no proper documentation had been offered. Thompson also questioned when the affidavit was executed, and whether it had been properly acknowledged, due to the irregularities in execution and acknowledgment. In addition, Thompson responded to the summary judgment motion, contending that HSBC was not the real party in interest and was not the holder of the note, because HSBC’s name was not on the note, and HSBC had failed to provide evidence that it was in possession of the note. In responding to the motion to strike, HSBC contended that the defects in the affidavit were the result of a scrivener’s error. HSBC did not attempt to correct the affidavit.

{¶ 13} In late March 2009, Thompson filed a motion for partial summary judgment against HSBC. The motion was based on the fact that under the allonges, Delta Funding Corporation was the payee of the note. Thompson also noted that MERS failed to assign the mortgage note to HSBC before the action was commenced. Thompson contended that HSBC was not the real party in interest when it filed the lawsuit, and lacked standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.

{¶ 14} In May 2009, the magistrate granted Thompson’s motion to strike the affidavit, because the affidavit stated that it had been sworn to in New Jersey, and the affiant declared that the affidavit was executed in Florida. The magistrate also overruled HSBC’s motion for summary judgment, and granted Thompson’s partial motion for summary judgment. The magistrate concluded that HSBC lacked standing because it was not a mortgagee when the suit was filed and could not cure its lack of standing by subsequently obtaining an interest in the mortgage. The magistrate further concluded that there was no evidence properly before the court that would indicate that HSBC was the holder of the promissory note originally executed by Turner. Accordingly, the magistrate held that HSBC’s foreclosure claim should be dismissed without prejudice. Due to factual issues regarding Thompson’s FDCPA counterclaim, HSBC’s motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim was denied.

{¶ 15} HSBC filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, and attached the “restated” affidavit of Neil. The affidavit was identical to what was previously submitted, except that the first page indicated that the affidavit was being signed in Palm Beach County, Florida. The jurat is signed by a notary who appears to be from Florida, although the notary seals on the original and copy that were submitted are not very clear. HSBC did not offer any explanation for the mistake in the original affidavit.

{¶ 16} In November 2009, the trial court overruled HSBC’s objections to the magistrate’s report. The court concluded that the errors in the affidavit were more than format errors. The court further noted that the document became an unsworn statement and could not be used for summary judgment purposes, because the statements were sworn to a notary in a state outside the notary’s jurisdiction. The court also held that, absent Neil’s affidavit, HSBC had failed to provide support for its summary judgment motion. Finally, the court concluded that HSBC failed to provide evidence that it was in possession of the note prior to the filing of the lawsuit, because the Neil affidavit had been struck, and a prior affidavit only verified the mortgage and note as true copies; it did not verify the undated allonges. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed HSBC’s action with prejudice, and entered a Civ. R. 54(B) determination of no just cause for delay.

{¶ 17} HSBC appeals from the judgment dismissing its action without prejudice.

II

{¶ 18} We will address HSBC’s assignments of error in reverse order. HSBC’s Second Assignment of Error is as follows:

{¶ 20} Under this assignment of error, HSBC contends that the errors in Neil’s affidavit were scrivener’s errors that have no bearing on the content of the affidavit. HSBC contends, therefore, that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the affidavit.

{¶ 21} The error, as noted, is that Neil averred that he signed the affidavit in Florida, while the first page and the jurat indicate that the affidavit was executed before a notary public in New Jersey.

{¶ 22} Thompson, Cordray, and Legal Advocates argue that the defect is not merely one of form, because the errors transform the affidavit into an unsworn statement that cannot be used to support summary judgment. The trial court agreed with this argument.

{¶ 23} Legal Advocates also stresses that HSBC was notified of problems with Neil’s affidavit, but made no attempt to cure the defect until after the magistrate had issued an unfavorable ruling. In addition, Cordray notes that the integrity of evidence in foreclosure cases is critical, due to the imbalance between access to legal representation of banks and homeowners. Thompson, Cordray, and Legal Advocates further contend that even if Neil’s affidavit could be considered, it is replete with inadmissible hearsay and legal conclusions, and is devoid of evidentiary value.

{¶ 25} “Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with the affidavit. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further affidavits. * * *”

{¶ 26} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “An affidavit must appear, on its face, to have been taken before the proper officer and in compliance with all legal requisites. A paper purporting to be an affidavit, but not to have been sworn to before an officer, is not an affidavit.” In re Disqualification of Pokorny (1992), 74 Ohio St.3d 1238 (citation omitted). Accord, Pollock v. Brigano (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 505, 509.

{¶ 27} The affidavit submitted to the magistrate contains irreconcilable conflicts, because the affiant, Neil, states that he executed the affidavit in Florida. In contrast, the jurat, as well as the first page of the affidavit, indicate that the affidavit was signed in New Jersey.

{¶ 28} In Stern v. Board of Elections of Cuyahoga Cty. (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 175, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that in common use, a jurat “is employed to designate the certificate of a competent administering officer that a writing was sworn to by the person who signed it. It is no part of the oath, but is merely evidence of the fact that the oath was properly taken before the duly authorized officer.” Id. at 181 (citations omitted).

{¶ 29} In light of the inconsistencies, Neil’s oath could not have been properly taken before a duly authorized officer. Under New Jersey law, a notary public commissioned in New Jersey may perform duties only throughout the state of New Jersey. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:7-15. Therefore, a New Jersey notary public could not properly have administered the oath in Florida. A New Jersey notary public also could not properly have certified that the writing was sworn to, when the person signed it in another jurisdiction.

{¶ 30} As support for admission of Neil’s affidavit, HSBC cites various cases that have overlooked technical defects in affidavits. See, e.g., State v. Johnson (Oct. 24, 1997), Darke App. No. 96CA1427 (holding that a “scrivener’s error” was inconsequential and did not invalidate an affidavit), and Chase Manhattan Mtg. Corp. v. Locker, Montgomery App. No. 19904, 2003-Ohio-6665, ¶ 26 (holding that omission of specific date of month on which affidavit was signed was “scrivener’s error” and did not invalidate affidavit, because notary public did include the month and year).

{¶ 31} In Johnson, the error involved a discrepancy between the preamble and the jurat.

{¶ 32} The preamble said the site of the oath was in a particular county, but the notary swore in the jurat that the affidavit had been signed in a different county. The trial court concluded that this was a typographical error, and we agreed. This is consistent with the fact that in Ohio, a notary public may administer oaths throughout the state. See R.C. 147.07. Therefore, even if a discrepancy exists between the location listed in the preamble and the notary’s location, the official status of the affidavit is not affected. In contrast, the affiant in the case before us stated that he signed the affidavit in a different state, where the notary did not have the power to administer oaths. The difference is not simply one of form.

{¶ 33} HSBC contends that the trial court should have accepted the “restated” affidavit that it attached to HSBC’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court did not specifically discuss the restated affidavit when it overruled HSBC’s objections. We assume, therefore, that the court rejected the affidavit. See, e.g., Maguire v. Natl. City Bank, Montgomery App. No. 23140, 2009-Ohio-4405, ¶ 16, and Takacs v. Baldwin (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 196, 209 (holding that where a trial court fails to rule on a motion, an appellate court assumes that the matter was overruled or rejected).

{¶ 34} The trial court was not required to consider the restated affidavit, because HSBC failed to explain why the affidavit could not have been properly produced for the magistrate. In this regard, Civ. R. Rule 53(D)(4)(d) provides that:

{¶ 35} “If one or more objections to a magistrate’s decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that evidence for consideration by the magistrate.”

{¶ 36} Well before the magistrate ruled, HSBC was aware that objections had been raised to the affidavit. HSBC made no attempt to submit a corrected document to the magistrate, nor did it provide the trial court with an explanation for the cause of the problem. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the original or restated affidavit. See Hillstreet Fund III, L.P. v. Bloom, Montgomery App. No. 23394, 2010-Ohio-2267, ¶ 49 [noting that trial courts have discretion to accept or refuse additional evidence under Civ. R. 53(D)(4)(d).]

{¶ 37} Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the Neil affidavits, we need not consider whether the contents of the affidavits are inadmissible.

{¶ 38} HSBC’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.

III

{¶ 39} HSBC’s First Assignment of Error is as follows:

{¶ 40} “THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IMPROPERLY TREATED THE DATE THE ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE WAS EXECUTED AS DISPOSITIVE OF THE CLAIMS BEFORE IT.”

{¶ 41} Under this assignment of error, HSBC contends that the trial court committed reversible error by disregarding the ruling in State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 1998-Ohio-275, that defects in standing may be cured at any time before judgment is entered. According to HSBC, an assignment of mortgage recorded with the Montgomery County Recorder establishes that HSBC is the current holder of the mortgage interest, because the interest was transferred about one week after the action against Thomson was filed. HSBC further contends that the trial court improperly disregarded evidence that HSBC legally owned the note before its complaint was filed. Before addressing the standing issue, we note that the case before us was resolved by way of summary judgment. “A trial court may grant a moving party summary judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 56 if there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” Smith v. Five Rivers MetroParks (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 754, 760. “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, which means that we apply the same standards as the trial court.” GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 172 Ohio App.3d 127, 2007-Ohio-2722, ¶ 16.

{¶ 42} To decide the real-party-in-interest issue, we first turn to Civ. R. Rule 17(A), which states that:

{¶ 43} “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. * * * * No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest. Such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.”

{¶ 44} “Standing is a threshold question for the court to decide in order for it to proceed to adjudicate the action.” Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d at 77. The issue of lack of standing “challenges the capacity of a party to bring an action, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” Id. To decide whether the requirement has been satisfied that an action be brought by the real party in interest, “courts must look to the substantive law creating the right being sued upon to see if the action has been instituted by the party possessing the substantive right to relief.” Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 25.

{¶ 45} “In foreclosure actions, the real party in interest is the current holder of the note and mortgage.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sessley, Franklin App. No. 09AP-178, 2010-Ohio-2902, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). Promissory notes are negotiable, and may be transferred to someone other than the issuer. That person then becomes the holder of the instrument. R.C. 1303.21(A). R.C. 1303.21(B) provides, however, that:

{¶ 46} “Except for negotiation by a remitter, if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder. If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”

{¶ 47} R.C, 1301.01(T)(1) also states that a holder with regard to a negotiable instrument means either of the following:

{¶ 48} “(a) If the instrument is payable to bearer, a person who is in possession of the instrument;

{¶ 49} “(b) If the instrument is payable to an identified person, the identified person when in possession of the instrument.”

{¶ 50} In the case before us, the promissory note identifies Fidelity as the holder. The note, therefore, could have been negotiated only by Fidelity, through transfer of possession, and by either endorsing the note to a specific person, or endorsing the note to “bearer.”

{¶ 51} HSBC contends that it is the legal holder of the promissory note, and is entitled to enforce it, because it obtained the note as a bearer. A “bearer” is “the person in possession of an instrument, document of title, or certificated security payable to bearer or endorsed in blank.” R.C. 1301.01(E). HSBC’s claim that it is the bearer of the note is based on the “allonges” that were included as part of the exhibits to the complaint.

{¶ 52} The rejected affidavits of Neil do not refer to the allonges, nor were any allonges included with the promissory note that was attached to Neil’s affidavit. During oral argument, HSBC referred frequently to the Jiminez-Reyes affidavit, which was attached to a February 2008 summary judgment motion filed by HSBC. Jiminez-Reyes identified the exhibits attached to the complaint, but did not refer to the allonges. HSBC withdrew the summary judgment motion in March 2008, after Thompson had identified various deficiencies in the affidavit, including the fact that Jiminez-Reyes had incorrectly identified Thompson as the account holder. Since the motion was withdrawn, it is questionable whether the attached affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes was properly before the trial court. Byers v. Robinson, Franklin App. No. 08AP-204, 2008-Ohio-4833, ¶ 16 (effect of withdrawing motion is to leave the record as it stood before the motion was filed).

{¶ 53} Nonetheless, shortly after the complaint was filed, and prior to its first summary judgment motion, HSBC filed an affidavit of Jessica Dybas, who is identified in the affidavit as an “agent” of HSBC. The exact status of Dybas’s agency or connection to HSBC is not explained in the affidavit.

{¶ 54} Dybas states in the affidavit that she has personal knowledge of the history of the loan, that she is the custodian of records pertaining to the loan and mortgage, and that the records have been maintained in the ordinary course of business. See “Exhibit A attached to Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing of Loan Status, Military, Minor and Incompetent Affidavit and Loan History,” which was filed with the trial court in February 2008. Dybas’s affidavit also identifies Exhibits A and B of the complaint as true and accurate copies of the originals. Exhibit A to the complaint includes a copy of the promissory note of the decedent, Howard Turner, made payable to Fidelity, and a copy of two documents entitled “Allonge,” that are placed at the end of the promissory note. Exhibit B is a copy of the mortgage agreement, which names Fidelity as the “Lender” and MERS as “nominee” for Fidelity and its assigns. Dybas’s affidavit does not specifically mention the allonges. Like the affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes, Dybas’s affidavit incorrectly identifies Thompson as the borrower on the note. Thompson was not the borrower; she is the administratrix of the estate of the borrower, Howard Turner.

{¶ 55} Assuming for the sake of argument that Dybas’s affidavit is sufficient, or that the affidavit of Jiminez-Reyes was properly before the court, we note that Ohio requires endorsements to be “on” an instrument, or in papers affixed to the instrument. See R.C. 1303.24(A)(1) and (2), which state that “For the purpose of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the instrument is a part of the instrument.”

{¶ 56} “The use of an allonge to add indorsements to an instrument when there is no room for them on the instrument itself dates from early common law.” Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson (Tex. 1997), 964 S.W.2d 262, 263. “An allonge is defined as `[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements.'” Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere (2010), 119 Conn.App. 570, 577, 989 A.2d 606, quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

{¶ 57} In Watson, a note and allonge produced at trial were taped together and had several staple holes. The president of the noteholder testified that when his company received the note, “the allonge was stapled to it and may also have been clipped and taped, but that the note and allonge had been separated and reattached five or six times for photocopying.” 964 S.W.2d at 263. The lower courts agreed with a jury that the allonge was not so firmly affixed as to be part of the note. But the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed.

{¶ 58} The Supreme Court of Texas recounted the history of allonges throughout various versions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court noted that an early provision had provided that an endorsement must be written on the note or on a paper attached thereto. Id., citing Section 31 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Under this law, an allonge could be attached by a staple. Id (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Texas also noted that:

{¶ 59} “When the UCC changed the requirement from `attached thereto’ to `so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof’, * * * the drafters of the new provision specifically contemplated that an allonge could be attached to a note by staples. American Law Institute, Comments & Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1-Article III 114 (1946), reprinted in 2 Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 311, 424 (1984) (`The indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or on an allonge, which, as defined in Section ___, is a strip of paper so firmly pasted, stapled or otherwise affixed to the instrument as to become part of it.’).” Id. at 263-64 (citation omitted).

{¶ 60} The Supreme Court of Texas further observed that:

{¶ 61} “The attachment requirement has been said to serve two purposes: preventing fraud and preserving the chain of title to an instrument. * * * * Still, the requirement has been relaxed in the current code from `firmly affixed’ to simply `affixed’. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 3.204(a). As the Commercial Code Committee of the Section of Business Law of the State Bar of Texas concluded in recommending adoption of the provision, `the efficiencies and benefits achieved by permitting indorsements by allonge outweigh[] the possible problems raised by easily detachable allonges.'” Id. at 264 (citations omitted).

{¶ 62} The Supreme Court of Texas, therefore, concluded that a stapled allonge is “firmly affixed” to an instrument, and that the allonge in the case before it was properly affixed. In this regard, the court relied on the following evidence:

{¶ 63} “In the present case, Southwestern’s president testified that the allonge was stapled, taped, and clipped to the note when Southwestern received it. There was no evidence to the contrary. The fact that the documents had been detached for photocopying does not raise a fact issue for the jury about whether the documents were firmly affixed. If it did, the validity of an allonge would always be a question of the finder of fact, since no allonge can be affixed so firmly that it cannot be detached. One simply cannot infer that two documents were never attached from the fact that they can be, and have been, detached. Nor could the jury infer from the staple holes in the two papers, as the court of appeals suggested, that the two documents had not been attached. This would be pure conjecture.” Id. at 264.

{¶ 64} Like Texas, Ohio has adopted the pertinent revisions to the UCC. In All American Finance Co. v. Pugh Shows, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 130, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that under UCC 3-302, “a purported indorsement on a mortgage or other separate paper pinned or clipped to an instrument is not sufficient for negotiation.” Id. at 132, n. 3. At that time, R.C. 1303.23 was the analogous Ohio statute to UCC 3-202, which required endorsements to be firmly affixed.

{¶ 65} Ohio subsequently adopted the revisions to the UCC. R.C. 1303.24(A)(2) now requires that a paper be affixed to an instrument in order for a signature to be considered part of the instrument. R.C. 1303.24 is the analogous Ohio statute to UCC. 3-204. The 1990 official comments for UCC 3-204 state that this requirement is “based on subsection (2) of former Section 3-202. An indorsement on an allonge is valid even though there is sufficient space on the instrument for an indorsement.” This latter comment addresses the fact that prior to the 1990 changes to the UCC, the majority view was that allonges could be used only if the note itself contained insufficient space for further endorsements. See, e.g., Pribus v. Bush (1981), 118 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1008, 173 Cal.Rptr. 747. See, also, All American Finance, 30 Ohio St.3d at 132, n.3 (indicating that while the court did not need to reach the issue for purposes of deciding the case, several jurisdictions “hold that indorsement by allonge is permitted only where there is no longer room on the instrument itself due to previous indorsements.”)

{¶ 66} The current version of the UCC, codified as R.C. 1303.24(A)(2), allows allonges even where room exists on the note for further endorsements. However, the paper must be affixed to the instrument in order for the signature to be considered part of the instrument. As the Supreme Court of Texas noted in Watson, the requirement has changed from being “firmly affixed” to “affixed.” However, even the earlier version, which specified that the allonge be “attached thereto,” was interpreted as requiring that the allonge be stapled. Watson, 964 S.W.2d at 263.

{¶ 67} In contrast to Watson, no evidence was presented in the case before us to indicate that the allonges were ever attached or affixed to the promissory note. Instead, the allonges have been presented as separate, loose sheets of paper, with no explanation as to how they may have been attached. Compare In re Weisband, (Bkrtcy. D. Ariz., 2010), 427 B.R. 13, 19 (concluding that GMAC was not a “holder” and did not have ability to enforce a note, where GMAC failed to demonstrate that an allonge endorsement to GMAC was affixed to a note. The bankruptcy court noted that the endorsement in question “is on a separate sheet of paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the Note.”)

{¶ 68} It is possible that the allonges in the case before us were stapled to the note at one time and were separated for photocopying. But unlike the alleged creditor in Watson, HSBC offered no evidence to that effect. Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that the allonges were properly “affixed,” the order of the allonges does not permit HSBC to claim that it is the possessor of a note made payable to bearer or endorsed in blank.

{¶ 69} The first allonge is endorsed from Delta to “blank,” and the second allonge is endorsed from Fidelity to Delta. If the endorsement in blank were intended to be effective, the endorsement from Fidelity to Delta should have preceded the endorsement from Delta to “blank,” because the original promissory note is made payable to Fidelity, not to Delta. Delta would have had no power to endorse the note before receiving the note and an endorsement from Fidelity.

{¶ 70} HSBC contends that the order of the allonges is immaterial, while Thompson claims that the order is critical. At the oral argument of this appeal, HSBC appeared to be arguing that the order of allonges would never be material. This is easily refuted by the example of two allonges, one containing an assignment from the original holder of the note to A, and the other containing an assignment from the original holder of the note to B. Whichever allonge was first would determine whether the note had been effectively assigned to A, or to B.

{¶ 71} Thompson contends that because the last-named endorsement is made to Delta, Delta was the proper holder of the note when this action was filed, since the prior, first-named endorsement was from an entity other than the current holder of the note. In Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc. (C.A.3, 1988), 853 F.2d 163, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stressed that from the maker’s standpoint:

{¶ 72} “it becomes essential to establish that the person who demands payment of a negotiable note, or to whom payment is made, is the duly qualified holder. Otherwise, the obligor is exposed to the risk of double payment, or at least to the expense of litigation incurred to prevent duplicative satisfaction of the instrument. These risks provide makers with a recognizable interest in demanding proof of the chain of title.” Id. At 168.

{¶ 73} The Third Circuit Court of Appeals further observed that:

{¶ 74} “Financial institutions, noted for insisting on their customers’ compliance with numerous ritualistic formalities, are not sympathetic petitioners in urging relaxation of an elementary business practice. It is a tenet of commercial law that `[h]oldership and the potential for becoming holders in due course should only be accorded to transferees that observe the historic protocol.'” 853 F.2d at 169 (citation omitted).

{¶ 76} Because the last allonge endorses the note to Delta, and no further endorsement to HSBC was provided, the trial court did not err in concluding that HSBC was not the holder of the note when the litigation was commenced against Thompson.

{¶ 77} As an alternative position, HSBC contended at oral argument that it had standing to prosecute the action, because assignment of the mortgage alone is sufficient. In this regard, HSBC notes that the mortgage was transferred to HSBC by MERS on November 14, 2007. This was about one week after HSBC commenced the mortgage foreclosure action.

{¶ 78} HSBC did not argue this position in its briefs, and did not provide supporting authority for its position at oral argument. In fact, HSBC relied in its brief on the contrary position that HSBC “was the legal holder of the note and, accordingly, entitled to enforce the mortgage loan regardless of the date the Mortgage was assigned, and under Marcino,even if the Mortgage had never been separately assigned to HSBC.” Brief of Appellant HSBC Bank USA, N.A., pp. 15-16 (bolding in original).

{¶ 79} The Marcino case referred to by HSBC states as follows:

{¶ 80} “For nearly a century, Ohio courts have held that whenever a promissory note is secured by a mortgage, the note constitutes the evidence of the debt and the mortgage is a mere incident to the obligation. Edgar v. Haines (1923), 109 Ohio St. 159, 164, 141 N.E. 837. Therefore, the negotiation of a note operates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage, even though the mortgage is not assigned or delivered.” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 2009-Ohio-1178, ¶ 52.

{¶ 81} Even if HSBC had provided support for the proposition that ownership of the note is not required, the evidence about the assignment is not properly before us. The alleged mortgage assignment is attached to the rejected affidavits of Neil. Furthermore, even if we were to consider this “evidence,” the mortgage assignment from MERS to HSBC indicates that the assignment was prepared by Ocwen for MERS, and that Ocwen is located at the same Palm Beach, Florida address mentioned in Charlevagne and Antrobus. See Exhibit 3 attached to the affidavit of Chomie Neil. In addition, Scott Anderson, who signed the assignment, as Vice-President of MERS, appears to be the same individual who claimed to be both Vice-President of MERS and Vice-President of Ocwen. See Antrobus, 2008 WL 2928553, * 4, and Charlevagne, 2008 WL 2954767, * 1.

{¶ 82} In support of its argument that a subsequent mortgage assignment can confer standing on a noteholder, HSBC cites some Ohio cases in which “courts have rejected claims that the execution of an assignment subsequent to the filing of a complaint necessarily precludes a party from prosecuting a foreclosure action as the real party in interest.” Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Cassens, Franklin App. No. 09-AP-865, 2010-Ohio-2851, ¶ 17. Accordingly, at least in the view of some districts in Ohio, if the note had been properly negotiated to HSBC, HSBC may have been able to claim standing, based on equitable assignment of the mortgage, supplemented by the actual transfer of the mortgage after the complaint was filed.

{¶ 83} In contrast to the Seventh District, other districts take a more rigid view. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Jordan, Cuyahoga App. No. 91675, 2009-Ohio-1092 (holding that Civ. R. 17(A) does not apply unless a plaintiff has standing in the first place to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Accordingly, a bank that is not a mortgagee when suit is filed is not the real party in interest on the date the complaint is filed, and cannot cure its lack of standing by subsequently obtaining an interest in the mortgage). Accord Bank of New York v. Gindele, Hamilton App. No. C-090251, 2010-Ohio-542.

{¶ 84} In Gindele, the First District Court of Appeals commented as follows:

{¶ 85} “We likewise reject Bank of New York’s argument that the real party in interest when the lawsuit was filed was later joined by the Gindeles. We are convinced that the later joinder of the real party in interest could not have cured the Bank of New York’s lack of standing when it filed its foreclosure complaint. This narrow reading of Civ.R. 17 comports with the intent of the rule. As other state and federal courts have noted, Civ.R. 17 generally allows ratification, joinder, and substitution of parties `to avoid forfeiture and injustice when an understandable mistake has been made in selecting the parties in whose name the action should be brought.’ * * * * `While a literal interpretation of * * * Rule 17(a) would make it applicable to every case in which an inappropriate plaintiff was named, the Advisory Committee’s Notes make it clear that this provision is intended to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made. When determination of the correct party to bring the action was not difficult and when no excusable mistake was made, the last sentence of Rule 17(a) is inapplicable and the action should be dismissed.'” Id. at ¶ 4 (footnotes omitted).

{¶ 86} We need not decide which approach is correct, because the alleged assignment of mortgage is attached to Neil’s rejected affidavits. Since the trial court’s disregard of the affidavits was not an abuse of discretion, there is currently no evidence of a mortgage “assignment” to consider. Moreover, we would reject HSBC’s position even if we considered the alleged assignment, because HSBC failed to establish that it was the holder of the note. Therefore, no “equitable assignment” of the mortgage would have arisen. All that HSBC might have established is that the mortgage was assigned to it after the action was filed. However, as we noted, the matters pertaining to that fact were submitted with an affidavit that the trial court rejected, within its discretion.

{¶ 87} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action without prejudice, based on HSBC’s failure to prove that it had standing to sue.

{¶ 88} HSBC’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.

IV

{¶ 89} The final matter to be addressed is Thompson’s motion to dismiss the part of HSBC’s appeal which assigns error in the trial court’s denial of HSBC’s motion for summary judgment. HSBC filed a motion for summary judgment on Thompson’s counterclaim, which alleged violations of the Fair Debt Practices Collection Act. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and filed a Civ. R. 54(B) certification regarding the summary judgment that had been rendered in Thompson’s favor.

{¶ 90} Thompson contends that denial of summary judgment is not a final appealable order, and that HSBC’s argument regarding the FDCPA should not be considered on appeal. In response, HSBC maintains that it is not appealing the denial of its motion for summary judgment. HSBC argues instead, that if we reverse the trial court order granting Thompson’s motion to strike the affidavit of Neil, or if we reverse the order dismissing HSBC’s foreclosure complaint, we would then be entitled under App. R. 12(B) to enter a judgment dismissing the FDCPA claims.

{¶ 91} App. R. 12(B) provides that:

{¶ 92} “When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed no error prejudicial to the appellant in any of the particulars assigned and argued in appellant’s brief and that the appellee is entitled to have the judgment or final order of the trial court affirmed as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall enter judgment accordingly. When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed error prejudicial to the appellant and that the appellant is entitled to have judgment or final order rendered in his favor as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall reverse the judgment or final order of the trial court and render the judgment or final order that the trial court should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court with instructions to render such judgment or final order. In all other cases where the court of appeals determines that the judgment or final order of the trial court should be modified as a matter of law it shall enter its judgment accordingly.”

{¶ 93} App. R. 12(B) does not apply, because the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to HSBC. Furthermore, HSBC admits that it is not appealing the denial of its summary judgment motion. Accordingly, Thompson’s motion to dismiss is without merit and is overruled.

V

{¶ 94} All of HSBC’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed. Thompson’s motion to dismiss part of HSBC’s appeal is overruled.

A doctrine of law which disregards the principle of limited liability enjoyed by a corporate entity when it is proven that, in fact, no separate identity of the individual and corporation exists. The alter ego principle may also apply to relationships between corporate entities and their subsidiaries.

Litigants often invoke the alter ego doctrine but are rarely successful. Still, under the proper circumstances, it can be a powerful and effective equitable device for litigants before and after judgment.

Where the Creditor Directs Management of an Affiliated Transferee. Where the borrower has transferred title to a different entity controlled by the lender (or lenders, as the use of such entities at foreclosure is common in the participation setting), liability for an (unanticipated) uninsured loss often flows upward to the controlling parties anyway. Lender liability, alter-ego and other theories may be applied. See § (K)(1), infra (use of affiliates and environmental liability). For a discussion of the liability of the affiliated secured lender, see Talley, § XIII(A)(3), supra.

Piercing the corporate veil in business is when a corporation performs an act through their officers or board of directors in good faith, so the company isn’t doing the deed themselves. In other words piercing the corporate veil has to do with the corporation through it’s officers and through the board of directors NOT acting in compliance with the corporation articles of incorporation and corporate bylaws require. And when they do that, they do that at the peril of the officers and the board of directors.