Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland Research Workshttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/7566

2016-12-08T05:15:32ZQualitative and Quantitative Assessment of the 'Dangerous Activities' Categories Defined by the CISSM Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Projecthttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/15994
Qualitative and Quantitative Assessment of the 'Dangerous Activities' Categories Defined by the CISSM Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project
Kuhn, Jens
The Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) outlines a prototype oversight system for ongoing microbiological research to control its possible misapplication. This so-called Biological Research Security System (BRSS) foresees the creation of regional, national, and international oversight bodies that review, approve, or reject those proposed microbiological research projects that would fit three BRSS-defined categories: Potentially Dangerous Activities (PDA), Moderately Dangerous Activities (MDA), and Extremely Dangerous Activities (EDA). It is the objective of this working paper to assess these categories qualitatively and quantitatively. To do so, published US research of the years 2000-present (early- to mid-2005) will be screened for science reports that would have fallen under the proposed oversight system had it existed already. Qualitatively, these selective reports will be sorted according to the subcategories of each individual Dangerous Activity, broken down by microbiological agent, and year. Quantitatively, institutes and researchers, which conducted research that would have fallen under review by BRSS, will be listed according to category and year. Taken together, the results of this survey will give an overview of the number of research projects, institutes, and researchers that would have been affected had the new proposed system existed, and thus should allow estimating the potential impact of BRSS on US microbiological academic and industrial research in the future. Furthermore, this working paper might aid refining the proposed system.
2005-07-01T00:00:00ZSatellites, Security, and Scandal: Understanding the Politics of Export Controlhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/15993
Satellites, Security, and Scandal: Understanding the Politics of Export Control
Lamb, Robert D.
In the pre-dawn hours of 15 February 1996, a Chinese rocket carrying an Intelsat communications satellite tilted off its launch tower during take-off, flew into a hillside village a few miles from Xichang, China, and exploded with a force comparable to 20 tons of TNT. The surviving villagers, jolted out of their sleep by the explosion, soon discovered that more than a hundred of their neighbors had been killed or injured, and that much of their village was destroyed. The People's Republic of China (PRC) tried to cover up the extent of the tragedy, initially claiming that only six people had died. The world learned the truth soon enough. But in the United States, at least, the villagers were quickly forgotten, bit players in a scandal that would soon take the spotlight: An American satellite was destroyed in that blast, and Space Systems/Loral, the company that had built it, was accused of damaging U.S. national security by cooperating illegally with China's launch-failure investigators assistance, some Americans claimed, that the PRC could use to improve its spy satellites and nuclear missiles.
It wasn't the first such accusation. Chinese Long March rockets carrying American-made commercial satellites had exploded twice before, in 1992 and 1995; in both of those cases, the satellites had been manufactured by Hughes Space & Communications. In all three launch failures, the satellite makers investigated the causes and, at the urging of the launch-insurance industry, shared technical information with Chinese engineers to help them correct the problems so future launches could be insured. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Loral, Hughes, and Boeing Space Systems (whose parent company, Boeing, acquired Hughes's satellite business in 2000) were investigated by U.S. export officials, found to have shared their engineers' expertise in missile-launch technology with the PRC, and fined tens of millions of dollars for providing unlicensed defense services in violation of U.S. ex-port control laws (see Appendix A: Company backgrounds). During this same period, Boeing was charged with similar violations related to Sea Launch, its satellite-launch joint venture with Russian, Ukrainian, and Norwegian companies.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZAnticipating Climate Mitigation: The Role of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)http://hdl.handle.net/1903/15992
Anticipating Climate Mitigation: The Role of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)
Steinbruner, John
Global warming is likely to force assertive redirection of global energy markets in order to achieve a prudent standard of mitigation; the resulting process of energy transformation will fundamentally alter prevailing policies and institutional relationships. Efficiency gains and renewable technologies—wind, solar, and biomass—will presumably make substantial contributions, as will carbon sequestration to some extent. But at the moment it seems quite apparent that global mitigation cannot be achieved without a very substantial expansion of nuclear power generation. While current light water reactor technology will likely play a role, this paper argues that smaller modular reactors (SMRs) of innovative design, with innovative institutional arrangements, could contribute to meeting energy demands in a more safe and secure manner. Though many SMR designs are currently being developed, it is doubtful that any of them will be brought to the point of serial production by their current developers under currently projected market conditions. Completed prototype development would almost certainly have to be a public sector initiative undertaken in support of eventual mitigation. This paper explores the potential of developing international structures whereby multiple states and entities could develop several SMR prototypes and serial manufacturing hubs. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor development process could prove to be a useful analogue to the arrangements necessary to support such large-scale SMR development and deployment.
2014-07-01T00:00:00ZChallenges to Developing a Global Satellite Climate Monitoring Systemhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/15991
Challenges to Developing a Global Satellite Climate Monitoring System
Borowitz, Mariel
Satellites are critical to the ability to understand and address climate change, due to their unique ability to provide comprehensive global monitoring of the environment. More than 30 nations have been involved in satellite Earth observations, with more than 200 satellite instruments operating in 2014 alone. However, gaps remain in the ability to adequately monitor global climate change, due in part to a lack of international consensus on the definition of an adequate monitoring system.
This paper examines ongoing international efforts to identify the requirements of a global satellite climate monitoring system, including high-level efforts by the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the Committee on Earth Observing Satellites (CEOS), as well as efforts to define more detailed technical requirements being undertaken by GCOS, WMO, and the European Space Agency (ESA). Comparing the distinct processes and interim results of these groups highlights the lack of international consensus on the definition of an adequate global climate monitoring system. Developing such a system is a complex, multifaceted challenge, which requires expert technical knowledge of climate science and satellite capabilities as well as attention to political concerns for sovereignty and long-term international cooperation.
The paper examines the adequacy of the current satellite monitoring capabilities by developing a comprehensive dataset including all unclassified Earth observation satellites operating or planned between 1990 and 2020. This analysis shows that within each international effort, gaps in the type of data collected are present. Even when some data is collected on a particular variable, it is not necessarily done in a way that meets technical requirements for climate assessment and forecasting. A lack of free and open data sharing compounds this challenge, further decreasing the amount of data contributing to international climate monitoring efforts. The lack of consensus on the requirements of a global climate monitoring system makes it difficult for nations to use international coordination mechanisms to plan and prioritize future satellite systems.
The paper concludes by providing a series of recommended steps to improve harmonization among international efforts. This includes coordinating the bottom-up method used within GCOS with the top-down method used at WMO to identify concrete recommendations that will allow nations to prioritize investments that improve climate monitoring and/or improve the efficiency of the existing system. It recommends consolidating international efforts to define technical requirements to avoid duplication and facilitate prioritization among user groups with regard to which variables should be collected and what technical requirements must be met. A more systematic and integrated approach to system definition will make it possible for nations to shift and/or increase investments in satellite technology to better address agreed-upon needs and priorities.
2014-07-01T00:00:00Z