Sunday, February 24, 2013

Unclear

Oche, who raised me to love the English language though it was not his native tongue, had a pithy dismissal: "Unclear on the Concept."

That is all I can say when I read Ron Huisken's latest posting to the East Asian Forum, “North Korea's nuclear test." (Link)

Huisken identifies regime security as the DPRK's goal in its nuclear test program. He then suggests that what the other five members of the Six Party Talks should not do is offer the North Koreans regime security.

Huh?

This would be the course of action if the goal were the confusion of the North Koreans.

Would it not be better to get the North Koreans to understand something, namely that

1) they can continue to pursue the goal of a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile, only

2) it is pointless, as no one in the region has a desire to topple the DPRK regime and

3) if they continue their pursuit of this goal, they will end up utterly cut off from the rest of humankind?

The decision as to whether the Stalinist Kim dynastic state lingers on or is replaced should be left up to the North Koreans, based upon their own calculations of national and personal interest.

18 comments:

Anonymous
said...

[Would it not be better to get the North Koreans to understand something...]

I disagree.

You wrongly assume that they care about what you think they ought to care about. Half a century should be enough time for people to realize they do not and never will care about what other people think they ought to care about.

Thinking that you can influence them with "reason" to change their behavior when they have consistently shown that they are quite content with and prefer their own methods only results in biases toward ineffectual and foolish policies on our part.

The Kim regime has never shown that they care about peace. What they prefer is to be left isolated except for when they would like you to give them bribes.

Right now, the most pressing concern for the Kim regime is not the threat of US attack, but the fact that the new jefe is talentless and generally lacking in credibility. I doubt the regime "fears" the US at all, considering they are backed by the second most powerful nation and economically the most important nation on earth.

I would support any effort to make life more difficult for North Korea, though China will go out of its way to make sure that does not happen.

When I say they want to be isolated, I mean they want their masses untainted genetically and ideologically. Otherwise, of course, the governement would like to earn your hard currency, legally or illegally.

It may be comforting to think the behavior of the North Koreans to be beyond our modest means of thinking. However, it is unhelpful. If one steels oneself against caring about what their interests are, one has nothing in one's quiver except unrelenting antagonism -- which is what North Korean ideology expects from the outside world.

If there is a point upon which we can agree, it is that the decisions of the North Koreans will not fall along the lines of "self-interest" as we understand them. Faced with a certain set of circumstances, they cannot and will not act like American, Japanese, Chinese or even South Koreans.

What we should not do is misinterpret this different course as being an "irrational" one or one without internal calculations of personal benefit.

[What we should not do is misinterpret this different course as being an "irrational" one or one without internal calculations of personal benefit.]

I do not recall saying NK is irrational. Their behavior is rational if you understand their aims, which they have been quite forthcoming about for half a century. And if you are not interested in what they have to say, then you ought to at least take at face value the ultimate meaning of their belligerence. Antagonism is the sole and entire basis of the legitimacy of the Kim regime. This is the consequence of its failure to provide prosperity for the nation, while being bordered by a significantly more competent rival government with just as much legitimacy to rule the north.

Frankly, the Kim regime prefers increased antagonism to peace. They need it. Without antagonism, there is no point to the north. Whenever there is an appearance of peace, either they are being heavily bribed by the US or the peninsular neighbors or you ought to be expecting trouble from them.

There never was anything in the US's quiver. And pretending that the US might have some magic wand hidden away which they may wave around to influence the north is fantasy. Pretending that offering peace would somehow make anything better is nonsense. NK's neighbors have been offering peace since the end of the war. Even China has tried to nudge the Kim regime towards reconciliation. None of this matters.

There is only one true end game to the peninsular standoff--the collapse of the DPRK state. There can never be an SK and NK that can co-exist in peace. The only reason NK survives is because both South Korea and China do not want to see it end--at this time. The former fears the cost of reconstruction and the latter thinks NK is useful protection against the US. In this circumstance, the US can neither increase pressure substantially nor decrease it.

Why would you think the US could have? Developing a domestic nuclear weapons/missile program was a long term Kim Il Sung project. Kim Jong Il's primary "legacy" (other than the destruction of the domestic economy and human capital) to the state is the nuke/missile program. Kim Jong Un's only claim to legitimacy (other than the fact that he is Kim Jong Un's favored son) is completing the nuke/missile program.

Talk about aims and plans. North Korea had a long range aim. They carried out a plan to achieve it.

What was the US's aims this last quarter century? To stop NK from developing these technologies. What was their plan? To alternately bribe/sanction NK. Why has the US policy been ineffectual? Because there never was a plausible plan to go with their aim.

The lack of a plan is the impetus of the Obama strategic patience plan. This is an actual existing working plan with no plausible aim. Obama, Lee Myung Bak, and the Chinese have tried to engage the North covertly these last few years. Of course, none of it mattered, because NK had an actual aim which they could accomplish by virtue of it being actionable, unlike the Chinese, South Koreans, Japanese, and the Americans.

So here we are. The North has a nuke program. They intend to carry out a few more nuke tests, publicly embarrassing the Chinese. The Americans are so concerned about nuclear proliferation that they do not care about Korean human rights issues. Candidate Park Geun Hye said that she wanted to engage the North. Now, could she? Probably not for a few years.

My guess is more strategic patience/more attempts at covert engagement/more attempts at deeper sanctions/more attempts to bribe is the US's next "plan." Same as the last.

There is no "plan" that would actually work in dealing with NK. No "plans" could arise until after the Chinese have decided that propping up their ally in no longer defensible, an unlikely scenario at this time. Until then, there is no plausible plan to do anything. The US is like a merchant and the DPRK is like a customer who knows that what he wants is exactly what the US cannot sell. You can pretend that the US can come up with a "plan" to hook NK with a sale. But you are unlikely to profit.

Personally, I think the Communist Party of China will lose its grip on power some time over the next two decades by virtue of the growing middle class in the state. My belief is that China is politically fractured in deeply pathological ways, much more like in South Korea or the US and much less like in Russia or Cuba. I think then we will see some circumstances start to change.

You are seem to be of the opinion that the DPRK regime has no right to resist. Since telling the North Koreans "You have no right to be here" would tend to limit their desire to meet you, how then would you go about restraining their nuclear weapons and missile development programs?

You also are of the opinion that the PRC's ruling regime likely faces demise in the not so distant future. If so, why worry about the DPRK? When the CCP loses power, the Kim Dynasty loses its one protector.

I do not recall saying I was worried. The only ones who really worry are the US security types who fear nuke tech proliferation. Almost no one thinks NK itself will ever use it--not even the US security types.

It's a tiny percentage of people on earth who worry about NK.

I have Korean family. The elders have 1st cousins they will never be able to meet. I think about them.

Supporting increased pressure on NK in actuality is not mutually exclusive with thinking about a hypothetical future China. Governance in China will change, I believe. But I think it implausible that the CCP will disband. There is no reason why the CCP would collapse just because a rising middle class will demand more say and more accountability. The party is too competent and has done a marvelous job in transforming the country for the better.

That does not mean that I think this change will herald the end of the DPRK. So long as China and the US feel uncomfortable with each other, the DPRK will stand. You misunderstand me. I think that circumstances will change. But the US/SK/Japan cannot ever have leverage against NK without China/NK allowing it. The people of China seem generally annoyed with and insulted by NK. But how a future China's disatisfaction with its ally would affect its future national security priorities is utterly pointless to think about now.

[You are seem to be of the opinion that the DPRK regime has no right to resist.]

I do not recall saying they had or did not have a right to exist. That is a moot point.

[...how then would you go about restraining their nuclear weapons and missile development programs?]

This is my entire point! I am wondering why you think the US could offer anything that would restrain the NK nuke/missile programs considering that these programs are the most important priorities for the NK regime. These programs are the very things that legitimize the Kim regime. It certainly is not economic prosperity that legitimizes the government. The national ideology that is in actual practice is "Military First," not communism or the so-called "juche."

If you were the US president, in brief, what would your policy sort of in general look like? And how do you think NK would respond to your policy? And what would be the ultimate goal of the US in negotiations? And what do you think is the ultimate goal of NK antagonism?

You talk about the North Koreans as if they were unswerving. But swerve they do, engaging the outside world when they see an avenue, pulling back when they seek to consolidate the Kim dynasty's rule. That they oscillate within a limited set of parameters unhelpful to outsiders who have to answer to the demands of legislators is neither their fault nor their problem.

The ultimate goal for U.S. policy makers is a stable and prosperous North East Asia.

If, as you indicate, North Korea will never use its nuclear weapons in warfare, then North Korea's continued existence is an annoyance, not an existential threat. As with most annoyances North Korea should be either ignored or dealt with in the least energetic way possible.

It takes a long time for poorly organized states to die, much longer than most careers last. What is required, then, is a consensus modus vivendi -- accepting what the outside world cannot change (the DPRK's pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missile capability) while fighting for what it can change (the North Koreans selling their hands-on-knowledge or products to anyone).

That you have relatives being held hostage in a horror state is unfortunate. That you have such an emotionally charged relationship with the DPRK should be cause for your recusing yourself from offering suggestions as to policy direction or options. International relations should not be the scaling up of interpersonal relations.

Actually, this happens to be Obama's policy. People call it "strategic patience." Leftists complain about it all the time.

["What we've seen is this constant demand for attention.. And maybe it's the mother in me or the experience that I've had with small children and unruly teenagers and people who are demanding attention--don't give it to them, they don't deserve it, they are acting out."]--interview with SoS Clinton on ABC News during a trip to New Delhi, 2009

[You talk about the North Koreans as if they were unswerving. But swerve they do, engaging the outside world when they see an avenue, pulling back when they seek to consolidate the Kim dynasty's rule.]

This is true in a superficial way. In practice, it is false. The most famous sign of thaw was paid for with bribes worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

Other times, the efforts are for propaganda points scoring with no meaningful followup.

[It takes a long time for poorly organized states to die]

Without change in circumstance, there is no reason why the DPRK should collapse. South Korea and China invest serious money into NK to prop up the DPRK. Supplemented with narcotics and counterfeiting earnings and with a flow through China of luxury goods for the elites, the Kim regime has enough money and resources to sustain the police state. They just do not have enough to go to war or to provide food and energy for most of the people. The long standing goal of South Korea is to keep from reunifying until North Korean income significantly rises, even if this is impossibile under the Kim dynasty. China sees NK as both a buffer state against the US and a potential security vacuum should the DPRK collapse.

[International relations should not be the scaling up of interpersonal relations.]

[...while fighting for what it can change (the North Koreans selling their hands-on-knowledge or products to anyone).]

[The ultimate goal for U.S. policy makers is a stable and prosperous North East Asia.]

Strange comments. And unproductive. You are no doubt aware of State's proud tradition of dispassionate failures.

I asked what makes you think the US has any leverage with the NK to influence the DPRK. You do not answer. This is because you cannot offer me an answer. You have nothing more in mind than some vague and foggy notions of fruitful strategic dialogue. Instead, you fault me for not being dispassionate, when I have not shown myself to be overwrought. And you mention some US policy aims for which no accompanying actionable plans exist.

You ought to rethink the value of NK talks.

The only method of gaining leverage on NK is not to give in to impractical NK demands, which are the cause of the failure of talks, but to gain leverage on the CCP, the ultimate holder of NK leverage. The Chinese officially claim they have no leverage. This is absolutely and obviously false to even the average Chinese. In fact, they have "no leverage" only because they do not want to exercise it. They fear a unified Korea under the rule of a US ally and they fear a refugee crisis post-collapse.

And to gain leverage on the CCP, you need to first persuade the Chinese people that NK is bad for them, bad for the region, bad for the world, and just inherently bad. To do this, you need to emphasize the human rights issues, not just focus on the proliferation issues. It is the former that creates righteous pressure, not the latter. You have to let the indignation grow over time. The Chinese are already unhappy with the North. You need to increase their disatisfaction. No government can credibly do this. Only people to people contact can. Chinese talking among themselves, outsiders talking among themselves, and Chinese and outsiders talking with each other about NK human rights issues.

What the US can do is increase the good will among the Chinese elites--especially among those who study here. I do not think this would be difficult. Among the well educated, the Americans and the Chinese like each other very much. But these are the future elites. This is the best we can do against NK.

You seem to believe that two sets of humans exist, North Koreans and everybody else. North Koreans do not respond to incentives and opportunities. We, and in this we I see you include Chinese elites, do.

I am fully aware of the history of bribery in the case of North-South summits. However, who was at fault and in a hurry, the North that took the bribes or the South that offered them?

All states ultimately fail. Some do so more quickly, some more slowly. We can be fairly sure that the DPRK will fail long before any of its neighbors.

As for strategic dialogue, I have made clear it is only for the purpose of removing any doubts the North Koreans might have over why they are pariahs...and that there are ways out of pariah status. Beyond that there should always be a door open for North Koreans wanting to talk about walking away from their country's nuclear and missile ambitions. One should not have much hope in a North Korean walking through that door. Nevertheless the door should stay propped open.

[Beyond that there should always be a door open for North Koreans wanting to talk about walking away from their country's nuclear and missile ambitions. One should not have much hope in a North Korean walking through that door. Nevertheless the door should stay propped open.]

Agreed. And this is a standing offer anyway. Neither I nor the piece by Ron Huisken criticizes this. This is a different point than your criticism on increasing pressure on NK.

What I dislike is the kind of ritualized Kabuki nonsense of the Six-Party Talks engagement series in which only an idiot thinks anything will come of it and only the idiot comes away disappointed by expectations.

The same causes that make the SPT unviable and now defunct also make official direct talks unviable. Basically, Japan, SK, and the US have red lines, but NK's ambition is to go somewhere way past them. In fact, they are already way past them and they have much further to go. And as there is no mechanism or plausible incentive to stop what is quite obviously the #1 national priority, the whole purpose of talks is questionable.

[You seem to believe that two sets of humans exist, North Koreans and everybody else. North Koreans do not respond to incentives and opportunities.]

[However, who was at fault and in a hurry, the North that took the bribes or the South that offered them?]

There is no need to find fault. It is what it is. Sunshine Policy with NK only happened because of expensive bribes. The purpose is not to blame. The purpose is to show that NK's swerves are illusions.

I asked the simple question, what can the US offer, which NK needs to have so much that they would be willing to swerve their policy course to obtain it.

Aye, with your last comment you have emphasized a serious belief that every man can be incentivized with the same stuff as everyone else--not just the same kind of stuff. You are correct in that Kim Jong Un probably would like to feel liked. But you are incorrect to assume that he wants to be liked by the same kind of people whom you would like to be liked by.

The DPRK is more of a Non-Aligned Movement type of government. If you were to read your and my comments on this post from a NAM perspective, you might think we were missing the point. In fact, you would critize us for blaming the wrong parties in this.

It is not that I think there are the two types of people as you ungenerously framed it--it is that I think any two people can have mutually exclusive desires.

[Abe assumed the new policy would be welcomed in Washington.

That was not the case. The Pentagon, of course, would welcome the defense planning and operational flexibility that would come from Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense. But US officials were concerned that a demonstration of support for such an initiative by Abe could be misinterpreted as endorsement of the prime minister’s broader domestic agenda, including revision of the Constitution, which could unnecessarily anger Beijing. Instead, US officials pressed to keep discussions during the summit to specific means to enhance deterrence and regional stability, including better US-Japan combined intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and training of Japanese Self-Defense Force marine capabilities.]--Peter Ennis, from "Obama to embrace Japan, not Abe"

In this excellent post, Peter Ennis lays out how Obama is likely to influence or partly control Japan's domestic and foreign policy. You smirk at Abe's troubles because you dislike his policies and maybe him personally. But so does China, albeit for a different reason. This is the kind of thing that makes people think that the Japanese government is a US stooge/puppet. This is exactly what the NAM types loathe. The DPRK's antagonism is seen as a righteous struggle against an imperial power and its puppets in Korea and Japan.

Seen in this light, it is hard to imagine why the DPRK would need the US to improve its global brand image.

As I said, the Chinese people are the new interesting x-factor. Recently, we saw Chinese netizens pleading with fury with the government to not deport Korean refugees back to North Korea. Many Chinese reacted to the nuke tests with indignation, anxiety, and resentment. Now we have more Chinese scholars and lay folk wondering whether keeping North Korea around is in their interest. The major pushback against these criticisms have come not from the people who fear a refugee crisis post-collapse but from the people who see the North as their brothers in arms who act as a useful buffer against any possible US invasion. It is these security and humanitarian concerns we ought to be addressing--to pursuade the Chinese that it would be ok and in their interest to use their leverage with NK.

[We can be fairly sure that the DPRK will fail long before any of its neighbors.]

Yes, but it is a moot point. The DPRK is already sort of collapsed in its economy and in its ability to provide public services nationally. Yet, practically, it can survive as now for a very long time.