Murder
and Violence in Mexico and its Security Dilemma

By Alejandro Garcia de la Garza

Why is Mexico mired
in organized, drug-related murder? In an extreme case of security dilemmas increasingly familiar elsewhere, the state has
ceded its monopoly of legitimate force to irregular security companies—and is now considering legitimizing vigilante
groups.

Is the government losing its authority? All around the world, little by little, the state has been transferring security
functions to private firms, which have presented themselves as experts providing specialized services in intelligence, training
and analysis.

In Mexico, with cartel violence and corruption running rampant, security has come to be conceived as best handled
by professionals outside the authorities, with bodyguards ensuring the safety of their patrons.

With
only one police officer for every 996 Mexicans, private security has boomed. Since 2008 the industry has been growing by a steady 20 per cent per year and by 2012 there were more than 8,000 firms.
Over three quarters operate irregularly or even illegally, to avoid taxes or having to pay for permits and certificates. They
profit by exploiting the deteriorating situation rather than providing a reliable service. They have filled their ranks with
ex-cops and people with little education, who find in this industry a job opportunity with few requirements.

Industries and the affluent have turned to private security for armored cars and escorts, most of them armed, patrolling
neighborhoods. For an ever increasing portion of the population, private security has become the only security. But what for
those who can’t afford it?

Near
impunity

The people of Michoacan, in the south west of Mexico, have experienced over a decade of increasing violence from
the cartel that controls the region, the Knights Templar. Suffering assault, extortion, kidnapping and rape by cartel members—who
operate with near impunity—civilians have organized themselves in grupos
de autodefensas (self-defense groups). Unlike a revolutionary movement, these have no ideological agenda, no plans
to replace the government.

Such vigilante groups do not enjoy the legitimacy private
security has acquired: they have arisen from extreme necessity. Paradoxically, the Knights Templar themselves emerged in just
this way.

The government has sought to disarm the self-defense group in Michoacan by mounting a large army operation. This
has led to accusations that it is merely protecting the Knights Templar or its own image of legitimacy and authority—not
public safety. The vigilantes say they would be happy to disarm, if the government captures or kills key figures among the
Knights Templar. Indeed, they have furnished the names and aliases of alleged leaders, whom they claim are operating in plain
sight.

Michoacan is of strategic value to any cartel, thanks in particular to its coastline and harsh terrain. The geography
allows the cultivation of drugs and the maintenance of meth labs—and facilitates the disposal of bodies.

The self-defense groups claim that they are being sponsored by local businessmen and the general public, and that
their arms come from cartel members whom they have killed. Yet some officials, and even the Knights Templar themselves, suspect
that competing cartels may be providing the high-caliber weapons.

Complications

These vigilante groups are not only growing but have started to spread
to other states, leading the government to attempt their “regularization”, giving them the legitimacy they were
lacking. This has divided experts and the public alike—with some claiming that it is a quick solution which, like many
such strategies, may lead to long-term complications much more difficult to resolve.

Arguably,
the government is trapped between continuing the ineffectual “war on drugs”, which would allow the cartels to
carry out their activities and violence with the near impunity they have enjoyed, or risking unprofessional paramilitary groups
abusing authority under the mantle of acquired legitimacy. Those against the legalization of the self-defense groups cite
Peru, Colombia and Guatemala as countries that adopted similar strategies—resulting in paramilitary groups committing
crimes without repercussions or turning into the very insurgency groups they were combating.

The
fact remains that as long as violence runs rampant in Mexico, and elsewhere, if the state is unable to provide security someone
else will fill the vacuum—most likely with less accountability and much more ruthlessness.

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This
article, "Murder and Mexico’s security dilemma," by Alejandro Garcia de la Garza, was first published on Feb.
5, 2014 at openDemocracy.net, under a Creative Commons license. Alejandro Garcia de la Garza has a MA in Conflict, Security and Development from the
University of Sussex, and is an associate area specialist for the Intelligence, Security and International Affairs section
of CIMBRE, the Centre for Interdisciplinary Mexican-British Research think tank.