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The State, Federalism, non-state actors, and conflict : the Mexican drug war

Crane, Shawn R. (2013-03)

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.

Bibliography

ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This research study analyzes the Mexican drug war’s impact on the state’s federal
political system of shared sovereignty. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) such
as drug cartels have grown in strength due to shifting dynamics of the global drug trade.
This growth in power, both in relation to the use of physical force and the influence over
Mexican society, has challenged the state’s authority and monopoly of violence. After the
inauguration of President Felipe Calderón in 2006, the government launched an all-in
offensive, dedicating the entire state system to ridding the country of the drug cartels.
Results of the offensive have been mixed and vary from area to area. However, trends
indicate that the offensive has caused power vacuums and increased rivalry among the
drug cartels. National homicide statistics show the government offensive has distorted the
balance of power among the drug cartels, causing increased competition in an already
hypercompetitive market.
The majority of Mexico’s modern history consists of the era of single-party
dominance, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated the political
system on both vertical and horizontal levels. The recent growth of federal executive
power during Calderón’s administration has caused concern about whether the democratic
progress made during the last decade could be reversed – returning the country back to
former autocratic practices of governance. This reversal also involves the concentration of
power in the center. For the last few decades, the country has been decentralizing its
political system in accordance to federal principles laid down by its Constitution. The
involvement of the military, a federal instrument of security that has in some cases taken
over jurisdiction from state and local authorities, has been causing debate on whether the
executive power is violating its constitutional limits of power. With this, the primary
research question of this study uses theoretical concepts and is formulated thusly: How do
violent non-state actors (VNSAs) impact federalism in Mexico? Mexico was chosen as a case study because of its growing struggle against the
drug cartels, a sub-branch of non-state actors (NSAs). The Westphalian state order has changed dramatically with globalization, changing realities with regard to the use of
physical violence. This is especially the case in reference to VNSAs, where the use of
violence maintains an informal system of order. With the rise of the powerful drug cartels,
a direct result of the global drug trade that hides in the shadows of globalization, Mexico’s
case is not unique. Colombia struggled with a similar scenario during the 1980s and
1990s. However, the security situation in Mexico has proven to be constantly evolving and
very intense during a time of political transition.
This study shows that the federal executive branch of the Mexican government has
not violated its constitutional limits of the use of power, although the Mexican
Constitution of 1917 has proven to be vague in reference to the use of the military in
peacetime. This vagueness could undermine regional sovereignty and federal principles
laid down by the Constitution. The study also indicates that the increasing levels of
violence are affecting the functionality of regional governance, as well as freedom of the
press. Homicide statistics show that since the government launched its offensive in 2006,
there has been a significant increase in assassinations targeting both mayors and
journalists. Overall, there is no indication that the drug war has influenced federalism in
Mexico. Rather, the drug war has exposed institutional weaknesses, causing increased
demand for and investment in professionalizing state institutions.