About Rationally Speaking

Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

On the difference between science and philosophy

Attentive readers of this blog may have noticed that those who post comments to my entries often show two interesting and complementary attitudes: a fundamental distrust of (if not downright contempt for) philosophy, coupled with an overly enthusiastic endorsement of science. Take, for instance, my recurring argument that some (but not all!) of the “new atheists” engage in scientistic attitudes by overplaying the epistemological power of science while downplaying (or even simply negating) the notion that science fundamentally depends on non-empirical (i.e., philosophical) assumptions to even get started. Since my personal career, first as a scientist for 27 years, now as a philosopher, has been marked by experience in both fields, and moreover by a strong belief that the two enterprises are complementary and not adversarial, I feel it is time to make some extended comment on this general issue.

It is perhaps appropriate to tackle the problem at the end of 2009, the year that marks not just the 150th anniversary of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species (and the 150th anniversary of the publication of the arguably even more momentous On Liberty by John Stuart Mill), but also the 50th anniversary of C.P. Snow’s famous essay “on the two cultures,” on the intellectual divide between the sciences and the humanities.

In his essay, Snow (rightly) chastised what he saw as an unjustifiable attitude of intellectual superiority on the part of people from the humanities’ side of the divide: “A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people who, by the standards of the traditional culture, are thought highly educated and who have with considerable gusto been expressing their incredulity at the illiteracy of scientists. Once or twice I have been provoked and have asked the company how many of them could describe the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The response was cold: it was also negative. Yet I was asking something which is the scientific equivalent of: Have you read a work of Shakespeare's?” Indeed, it ought to be indefensible that someone is considered ignorant for not having read Shakespeare, and yet the same charge is unthinkable when it comes to fundamental scientific concepts, like the second principle of thermodynamics.

But the problem cuts equally deeply on the other side, just consider the following quote from physicist Steven Weinberg (in his Dreams of a Final Theory): “The insights of philosophers have occasionally benefited physicists, but generally in a negative fashion—by protecting them from the preconceptions of other philosophers ... Philosophy of science at its best seems to me a pleasing gloss on the history and discoveries of science.” Here Weinberg makes the all-too common mistake of thinking of philosophy as of an activity whose entire worth is measured by how useful it is to solve scientific problems. But why should that be so? We already have science to help us solve scientific problems, philosophy does something else by using different tools, so why compare apples and oranges? By the same token, why not ask why art critics don’t produce paintings, for instance, or editors write books?

For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that most people have at least some idea of what science is, if not of the intricacies of the epistemological and metaphysical problems inherent in the practice of science (and there are many: as Daniel Dennett put it in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, “There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.”) Science, broadly speaking, deals with the study and understanding of natural phenomena, and is concerned with empirically (i.e., either observationally or experimentally) testable hypotheses advanced to account for those phenomena.

Philosophy, on the other hand, is much harder to define. Broadly speaking, it can be thought of as an activity that uses reason to explore issues that include the nature of reality (metaphysics), the structure of rational thinking (logic), the limits of our understanding (epistemology), the meaning implied by our thoughts (philosophy of language), the nature of the moral good (ethics), the nature of beauty (aesthetics), and the inner workings of other disciplines (philosophy of science, philosophy of history, and a variety of other “philosophies of”). Philosophy does this by methods of analysis and questioning that include dialectics and logical argumentation.

Now, it seems to me obvious, but apparently it needs to be stated that: a) philosophy and science are two distinct activities (at least nowadays, since science did start as a branch of philosophy called natural philosophy); b) they work by different methods (empirically-based hypothesis testing vs. reason-based logical analysis); and c) they inform each other in an inter-dependent fashion (science depends on philosophical assumptions that are outside the scope of empirical validation, but philosophical investigations should be informed by the best science available in a range of situations, from metaphysics to ethics and philosophy of mind).

So when some commentators for instance defend the Dawkins- and Coyne-style (scientistic) take on atheism, i.e., that science can mount an attack on all religious beliefs, they are granting too much to science and too little to philosophy. Yes, science can empirically test specific religious claims (intercessory prayer, age of the earth, etc.), but the best objections against the concept of, say, an omnibenevolent and onmnipowerful god, are philosophical in nature (e.g., the argument from evil). Why, then, not admit that by far the most effective way to reject religious nonsense is by combining science and philosophy, rather than trying to arrogate to either more epistemological power than each separate discipline actually possesses?

Another common misconception is that philosophy, unlike science, doesn’t make progress. This is simply not true, unless one measures progress by the (scientific) standard of empirical discovery. But that would be like accusing the New York Yankees of never having won an NBA title: they can’t, they ain’t playing the same game. Philosophy makes progress because dialectical analysis generates compelling objections to a given position, which lead to either an improvement or the abandonment of said position, which is followed by more critical analysis of either the revised position or of the new one, and so on. For instance, ethical theories (moral philosophy), or theories about consciousness (philosophy of mind), or about the nature of science (philosophy of science), have steadily progressed so that no contemporary professional philosopher would consider herself a utilitarian in the original sense intended by Jeremy Bentham, or a Cartesian dualist, or a Popperian falsificationist — just in the same way in which no scientist today would defend Newtonian mechanics, or the original version of Darwin’s theory.It is also interesting to note that the process I just described may never reach and end result, but neither does science! Scientific theories are always tentative, and they are always either improved upon or abandoned in favor of new ones. So how come we are willing to live with uncertainty and constant revision in science, but demand some sort of definitive truth from philosophy?

Now why is it that so many people take sides on a debate that doesn’t make much sense, rather than rejoice in what the human mind can achieve through the joint efforts of two of its most illustrious intellectual traditions? I think the answer here is no different from the one available to Snow fifty years ago: people in the humanities are afraid of cultural colonization (which is actually the expressed agenda of scientistic thinkers like E.O. Wilson, see his Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge), while scientists have been made arrogant by their recently acquired prestige and enhanced financial resources, so that they don't think they need to bother with activities that don’t bring in millions of dollars in funding every year.

It’s a rather sad, and indeed positively irritating, state of affairs, which is being fought by a handful of activities (usually, though not always, initiated by philosophers), like my own “sci-phi” effort, or like the Permanent Observatory on Integration between the Human and Natural Sciences in Italy. It’s an uphill battle, especially in an era of ever increasing academic specialization, not to mention the ease with which people can now customize their intellectual experiences online, reading only the sort of things they are already interested in, or authors with whose positions they already agree. Which is actually one of the things that make this particular forum somewhat unusual and, to me at least, stimulating. So fire away your opinions, let the sci-phi discussion begin!

I study English and History and have an interest in philosophy, and I definitely feel the science/humanities divide in my own university. In the year and a half I've been there, I've spoken to a science student once. Ever. The two groups just don't mingle. Worse, some of my lecturers have demonstrated fairly shocking ignorance of basic scientific ideas (like, of course, evolution). It's a sad state of affairs, and I'm sure it's probably mirrored in the science departments - there seems to be this assumption that science and not-science just can't mix.

I've also always been annoyed at what I'd call a sort of scientific chauvinism when it comes to philosophy. There does seem to be this idea among some atheists that philosophy is only one step up from theology, and that its only real use (if it has any) lies in a few limited and 'practical' applications. I've never understood that mindset; I'm interested in both, and have no problem deploying either mode of thinking wherever they're best suited. Neither constitute some sort of exclusive club that bans membership from the other.

A really nice article, thanks! It is difficult not to agree with your arguments, but there is something you wrote that makes me wonder: is progress in philosophy mostly driven by sciences or is it largely thanks to introspection?I am asking because it seems that some of the examples you give (i.e. dualism) have been solved thanks to empirical analysis.

I had a question similar to Norman's: does philosophy "advance" through some process of refinement? Or is it more a matter of borrowing from science mixed with simple changes in fashion?

Also, science undeniably depends on philosophical foundations like positivism and empiricism, but don't those philosophical traditions own much of their recognized validity to the success of science?

I agree we can't make blanket statements about philosophy, but what's the standard of truth that's going to keep the field honest? We can write a depressingly long list of silly philosophical traditions. As I'm sure Sean Wills can coroborate, English departments to this day are under the sway of (post) structuralism and various other forms of discursive determinism.

Hi Massimo, this is a good post/article. Speaking from personal experience/observation I think some of the antipathy that comes from science-y (not scientistic) people against philosophy really ought to be more targeted at that part of philosophy that denies science outright. There are philosophers or those who dub themselves philosophers who argue things like: every cause has an effect is a metaphysical truth when we know that uncaused events happen all the time, or that the mind cannot be material in origin when any immaterial entity would violate the first law of thermodynamics and personalities change with brain damage. Apart from it never being explained how something immaterial can interact with something material in any way that makes sense.

I think these types of denials of the last few centuries of science, and it's almost always by theistic philosophers/apologists, that lead to a big frustration or disdain of philosophy. Also, I've read supposedly knowledgeable types say its philosophers of science that decide what is or isn't science. This is laughable as scientists do the science and don't go back to the philosophers of science to check if they've done science or not. Science went on well before Popper or Kuhn published work on the philosophy of science. Though there works are useful in the epistemology of science.

Science doesn't have to be confined to the natural world either. If there ever was something supernatural demonstrated and it lead to discoveries about reality it would be integrated into science. We could have methodological supernaturalism. If only the supernaturalists would give us evidence of the supernatural and a method that gave reliable knowledge of that area in some intersubjective manner. I think any reasonable person should say, well, we've no evidence or convincing arguments for the existence of the supernatural, so as a working hypothesis, we'll say there is not supernatural until convincing evidence or arguments come along. That seems to be consistent with both science and philosophy.

Anyway, inspite of what the above might suggest, I'm a big fan of philosophy. I think every person who aspires to think about or understand reality should get some basic philosophy. To me science and philosophy are all part of (but not necessarily exhaustive of) the rational methods of understanding reality. How can you argue for science or truth if you don't know how arguments work and how people make mistakes or mislead with them?

When someone then asks you how you justify reason or science, you can use philosophy to point out that reason is presupposed in that very question....

To piggyback on what Brian said, I suspect that the hostility/dismissal of philosophy by scientifically oriented people has a lot to do with the perception that philosophers have no dependable meterstick with which to determine if what they say is true. On that view, all arguments by philosophers then become moot. For instance, my brother often says that some position "is philosophy" by which he seems to mean "mere philosophy."

It reminds me of the joke about a college president who is complaining to the head of the science department about all the money science requires for equipment and supplies. "Why can't you be more like Math? All they need is a blackboard and a trash can. Or better yet, Philosophy. All they need is a blackboard."

I don't think that progress in philosophy is driven by either science or introspection. It is the result of dialectic logical analysis, i.e. of people within the community analyzing and criticizing each other's positions, until a given position is either abandoned because untenable or modified, then the process starts again.

Dennis,

positivism, empiricism and so on do not depend on science, because they are theories of how science works. Their status within philosophy is not the result of empirical advances on the part of science.

The standard that keeps people honest is the same as in science: peer review. And by the way, we can write an equally depressing and fairly long history of science's blunders (eugenics, phrenology, caloric theory, flogiston, etc.).

UnBeguiled,

some non-empirical assumptions of science include the existence of a real world outside of us, the use of induction as a major tool, the assumption that natural laws are actually laws (i.e., that they are universal and invariant in time), the practical use of concepts whose content is rather vague (like that of causality), and so on.

Brian,

people should most definitely react against the most extreme forms of post-modernism. However, in the first place that's only a tiny minority of philosophical thought; second, even postmodernists do have good points: science is a social enterprise, and as such there is a lot of power issues, gender discrimination, ethnic discrimination, and so on that the scientific community ought to take a bit more seriously in policing itself.

Philosophers do not and cannot dictate to scientists what to do or not to do, but some philosophy of science does have interesting things to say on the distinctions among science, quasi-science and pseudoscience, and scientists should be paying attention to those distinctions and how they are made.

In my opinion science is confined to the natural world, but you can dig into some recent posts and commentaries on this blog to find my articulations of this point.

BaldApe,

philosophers have internal "metersticks" as I pointed out above, which is why some philosophical theories are no longer considered tenable by contemporary philosophers. I think it is a scientist's ignorance of philosophy that leads to the denial of this fact. Moreover, how do scientists themselves know that their theories describe the way the world really is, as opposed to be merely empirically adequate? The two are not the same at all, and there is quite a bit of intricate philosophical literature to disentangle them (the debate between realism and anti-realism).

well, to begin with, just because we all make certain assumptions in everyday life that doesn't mean that those are not *also* assumptions that science makes. Second, I doubt that living organisms other than humans make assumptions at all, because they don't consciously think about what they are doing. Third, some of those assumptions aren't really relevant to everyday life (the universality of natural laws, or the exact meaning of causality).

I'm a philosophy undergraduate, and I have considered pursuing philosophy at the graduate level, but now I'm having second thoughts. While I have been exposed to the misunderstandings you've mentioned (and I appreciate your article), I find that most attacks on philosophy by those outside of philosophy (particularly the sciences), are well-founded, if a bit naive.

As a philosophy student I have been increasingly distraught by the attraction to Continental Philosophy (CP), most of which is complete and utter garbage. I'm specifically referring to the anti-theoretical movements of CP that have been influenced by Wittgenstein, i.e., therapeutic philosophy. I'm aware that analytic philosophy is still dominant, but I'm not pleased by how it has changed, turned away from analytic realism, etc.

I think that when philosophy is attacked or mocked, it is CP that they have in mind.

I'm one of Massimo's inattentive readers who doesn't notice any particular scientistic bias in his general readership. Instead, I see a separation of deduction and induction into two activities in the main posts, which Massimo calls "Philosophy" and "Science", respectively. Massimo phrases the issue in terms of "empirically-based hypothesis testing vs. reason-based logical analysis".

It just isn't so, because Science naturally combines logical and empirical techniques to analyze the real world. Philosophy uses only the former.

This is why Sam Harris, despite being the most annoying intellectual I have ever encountered, is at least sort of respectable in acting like Analytic Philosophy and Science are one big blob of rational thought. This idea ought to be very well refined - something you can't count on Harris to work on, because he's not interested in rigorous thought - but it nevertheless is worth examining. Let me state it clearly for examination:

Ritchie's First Sci-Phi Conjecture: Since Science, broadly speaking, is the use of empirical testing and logical deduction to analyze the world, whereas Analytic Philosophy is the use of only logical deduction to analyze the world, Analytic Philosophy and Science bleed into each other. The degree to which an argument is scientific (rather than simply philosophical) is simply the degree to which it rests on real-world data.

I decided to be modest and call it a "conjecture" for now. I'll upgrade it to a "theorem" when Massimo responds and I ignore his rebuttal while believing that I have refuted it. Wait, what I meant was...

You wrote, “Science doesn't have to be confined to the natural world either. If there ever was something supernatural demonstrated and it lead to discoveries about reality it would be integrated into science. We could have methodological supernaturalism. If only the supernaturalists would give us evidence of the supernatural…”

I think that there is far more scientific evidence for supernaturalism than for naturalism. Actually, we have no evidence whatsoever for the existence of natural, unintelligent laws, although we all agree that phenomena act in formulaic and consequently predictable ways. It’s more likely that these laws find their origin and sustenance within the Mind of God. Oddly, philosophical naturalism has commandeered the sciences.

Let’s be fair – what discoveries have been peculiar to naturalism apart from Darwinism, if we can call this theory a “discovery” at all?

I'd argue that, "the best objections against the concept of an omnibenevolent and onmnipowerful god" are just as much, if not more, based on science rather than philosophy. Science:1. Makes observations: tsunamis, earthquakes, malaria, cancers, Hitlers, etc, etc, etc, exist. 2.Considers hypotheses: an omnibenevolent god loves us, an onmnipowerful god protects us, god is a projection of human desires, etc, etc, etc.3.Selects the hypothesis that most closely fits the data: god is a projection of human desires.

Shall we call this formulation science or philosophy? Perhaps the discussion was long ago initiated by philosophers, but (to me at least) it now seems closer to our present-day view of "what science does" rather than "what philosophy does". Of course that is partly due to the tremendous increase in the breadth of our awareness of the known "universe of events affecting humans" (courtesy of science).

Which leaves me with the question, "What are those domains which are most UNIQUELY addressed by present-day Philosophy?

Thanks Massimo, I'll have to dig up your comments. I think that if the supernatural became evident in some fashion we could detect or have knowledge of (I'm not saying what or how that would be) then it would be possible to rationally study it. That would then mean science would study it as well. If the supernatural is forever excluded from being studied (perhaps to exclude it from rational study and preserve the mystery, then its indistinguishable from fantasy. Even if it is logically coherent. IMO.

On a slightly tangential tack, this seems to bring out the divide in philosophy between the platonist/idealist/rationalist conception of philosophy and the empiricist/scientific side of philosophy.

Some philosophers have an idea of philosophy that we have access to some deeper absolute truth and thus we can know things with absolute certainty (Plato and his cave. Descartes and his cogito, etc.) and reject science unless it can be formulated on some "deep" metaphysical principle. Plato rejected science or empirical knowledge because it was of the world and not of the forms I think. I think, and this is just an empirical observation so can't be self-refuting, that that's bunk.

Actually, we have no evidence whatsoever for the existence of natural, unintelligent laws, although we all agree that phenomena act in formulaic and consequently predictable ways.

There's so much confusion in this that I don't know where to start. The laws of physics are based on observation of nature. They are not prescriptive laws handed down by a god or legislature. They are not based on observations of the supernatural so they must be natural.

Well, it seems like the scientistic comments have started to pour in, for anyone who had doubts about my readership... :-)

Jonathan,

I urge you to reconsider, philosophy needs people like you more than science does. But of course, it's your life!

Ritchie,

of course science uses logic and rationality, but it does not *investigate* them (which philosophy does), it uses them as tools, which are justified (to the extent that they are) by philosophical analysis. Moreover, it is the *methods* that are different: there is nothing in science like the type of critical analysis that philosophers use. Now you can ignore me while being convinced of having refuted me... :-)

Mann'sWord,

as usual, you must have been reading something else. I said the exact opposite of what you quote, you just copy/pasted someone else's comments. I'm not even going to address your comment on Darwinism/naturalism, you ought to know better.

Markus,

well, obviously I failed. Chalk it up to my clumsy style and muddled thought. Thanks for trying.

jerseyguy,

what you are describing is philosophy (we don't call them observations, we call them facts about the world), not science. The reason is that a theologian could immediately come back to you and bring up the free will defense, at which point you need a philosopher to figure out what free will is and why it doesn't help the apologist.

I don't have to assume that natural laws are the same in all possible worlds in order to do science in this universe. So far, the universe seems to behave the same wherever and whenever we look. Where is the assumption? Nor do I have to posses the exact meaning of causality in order to do science.

"Second, I doubt that living organisms other than humans make assumptions at all, because they don't consciously think about what they are doing."

Since when is conscious thought part of the definition of assumption? It seems to me most human beings assume the future will be like the past, without ever being consciously aware of this assumption. And so with non-human animals.

"just because we all make certain assumptions in everyday life that doesn't mean that those are not *also* assumptions that science makes"

Right. So let me clarify my original question: What assumptions are unique to science? What assumptions do scientists make that other living organism do not?

Going back to where we started. You said:

"that science fundamentally depends on non-empirical (i.e., philosophical) assumptions to even get started."

I think that is bullshit. It seems to me I must certainly be wrong, given your background and my ignorance about such matters. But so far you give me no reason to think otherwise.

Science "gets started" the same way my border collies get started every day. They open their eyes and start sniffing around.

Massimo, this just shows my ignorance. Go Kant! But I didn't mean rationalism itself, I meant the psychology behind it and platonism, etc. There seems to be a line of thought that this world we observe is deceptive, and our senses can never reveal the truth (even aided by all our technology) and so we must use introspection and flights of imagination/speculation that cannot be tested.

I'm sure I've read philosophers, perhaps they were Thomists or religious apologists, who still use arguments that hark back to that style of absolute truth/ground of being/metaphysics over science trope. Perhaps it's not the philosophers in Academe who do this. Where do Plantinga, Swinburne, Lane Craig and similars fit into the picture?

I hardly feel qualified to comment on your blog, but I think this is a very even handed article.

While I agree science should not ignore philosophy I'm unsure how much would be needed for the "atheist movement". For instance would a scientist armed with some philosophy do better than a philosopher armed with some science? But then issues like this largely depend on the rhetorical skill of the individuals as well.

It seems to me that Dawkins et. al suffer from the same syndrome as religious fundamentalists. They want absolute certainty or truth.

And just like some people believe they can find this in religion, so do these atheist believe all answers lay in science. Both groups are clearly pushing the boundaries of what science/faith can answer way out of the ballpark all the while really trying to establish the same thing - absolutism. Good luck...

Hi Helten, can you give me some quotes from Dawkins where he suggests science gives absolute truth? I've read some of his work and that's not the impression he gives at all. In fact, he doesn't say he's absolutely certain there is no god. Just very unlikely.

I know much less about the practice of philosophy than I do about that of science (well, just biology really), but I think your post makes sense. One observation I've had when reading or hearing philosophers of biology is that their work might often be better addressed using a mathematical model. Are some philosophers of science just theoreticians who didn't learn math? (excuse the hyperbole, but I think you get my point) Obviously, there are philosophers who do math, especially in statistics I believe, but I'm wondering how much gray area there is between philosophy and theoretical sciences. My own opinion is that they overlap a lot, since the theorist is often the one clarifying concepts, explaining what can and can't be known from data, exposing unstated assumptions, etc. This sounds a lot like your description of a philosopher.

Even though Helten appears to have used unclear wording, you're asking the wrong question. They are not saying Dawkins suggests science gives absolute truth.

You also said:

~"I think that if the supernatural became evident in some fashion we could detect or have knowledge of (I'm not saying what or how that would be) then it would be possible to rationally study it. That would then mean science would study it as well."

This is extremely vague, though a very popular argument these days. "Became evident in some fashion", I've seen Coyne talk about his 900 foot Jesus (Falwell inspired), and other ideas, like I think yours on Blackford's sight on what is "natural" etc.

Even though it's basically meaningless, we are to then say, oh yes, science could study the "supernatural" then.

What's fascinating to me is the idea of knowing we have detected the "superantural"/ God as defined as an omnipotent and omniscient creator of everything and then claim science could study it. It would appear either crazy (which to me these arguments are), or one may have to accept an idea of science drastically different from what we understand it to be today (it wouldn't be science as we know would seem a reasonable assumption).

In fact, if we knew we were detecting the "supernatural" God for instance, what we understand of reality would need to change, and drastically (we would know there is the all knowing etc.). To say the 900 foot Jesus would allow tentative acceptance of the "supernatural" God as Coyne has, is simply meaningless.

These are actually fairly settled arguments and it's an embarrassment to see "atheist" make claims like these unthinkingly. For example as I've seen pointed out many times though ignored by many "atheist" is something like Shermer's last law: "Any sufficiently advanced ETI is indistinguishable from God."

We would certainly end up, to say the least, to not be able to tell the difference from relative and absolute omniscience. The onus of the claims you guys make is on you to say how science could "study the supernatural", it is you making the claim. Making arguments based on fairy tales, like detecting a 900 foot Jesus just doesn't cut it.

Luke, it's not up to me. If someone comes along with some phenomena and says it's supernatural. If that pans out, why can't that be studied? If prayer studies had have shown a significant effect, and there were no natural explanations then it would be dogmatic in the extreme for scientists or reasonable people to declare that there wasn't something there and it wasn't evidence for some supernatural event. That would then come under some form of scientific study of the supernatural. This would completely change how we view reality I agree, that's why I think given the success of science and rational methods, belief in the supernatural is unreasonable until we have some paradigm shifting results.

You keep mentioning Coyne's 900 foot god. I can only presume you do this to poison the well. I didn't specify what might be a supernatural event because I didn't wish to rule in or out something that I (or anybody else) hasn't thought of. I'm not infallible, and I doubt you are either, so it might be best to say that up to this point we no evidence of the supernatural interacting with the natural, but that doesn't mean that on that basis alone it's logically impossible, just bloody unlikely. Of course, if you have a logical argument that begins from premises all of us share and is valid....go for it.

The "free will defense" would only apply to "evil" humans, right? Not to the earthquakes, etc., that also argue against there being a god who loves us.

Or, will you now claim science needs philosophy to counter the "need to repent for the sin of Adam & Eve" defense?

I'd argue that science has no need for philosophy's answer to the free will defense for the same reason science has no need to prove there's a porcelain teapot orbiting the Earth: "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence".

As some may notice, I often put "atheist" is quotations, for a few reasons. Personally, I have no problem identifying as an "atheist", though understanding these types of labels are limited and can be limiting in ways. Most of the commonly understood terms I personally relate to, such as secular humanist, skeptic, agnostic, rationalist, reasonist, freethinker, Bright.

As to Sam Harris' and others idea of not using any of these terms, well, I say that's up to them. I'm not convinced of any real harm done, even though I fully acknowledge how labels can't always convey how one thinks on issues.

I actually don't have to much of a problem with Pantheism or a Stuart Kauffman type ideal as he outlined in his book, Reinventing the Sacred. The only problem I do have with pantheism type ideas is really only based in terminology and the concern over confusion it may cause.

As some may notice, I often put "atheist" is quotations, for a few reasons. Personally, I have no problem identifying as an "atheist", though understanding these types of labels are limited and can be limiting in ways. Most of the commonly understood terms I personally relate to, such as secular humanist, skeptic, agnostic, rationalist, reasonist, freethinker, Bright.

As to Sam Harris' and others idea of not using any of these terms, well, I say that's up to them. I'm not convinced of any real harm done, even though I fully acknowledge how labels can't always convey how one thinks on issues.

I actually don't have to much of a problem with Pantheism or a Stuart Kauffman type ideal as he outlined in his book, Reinventing the Sacred. The only problem I do have with pantheism type ideas is really only based in terminology and the concern over confusion it may cause.

Thinking about this again. Perhaps how an immaterial substance could interact with a material substance might be rearranged into a logical argument against the interaction of supernatural with natural and thus against scientific study of supernatural. It wouldn't rule out the existence of the supernatural of course. I'll have to think more on this.

First, I apologize for the double post. Massimo, is it possible to delete one, please?

Brian,

First, I do mention Coyne's 900 foot Jesus (Falwell inspired insanity) to "poison the well", I am mocking it. It is nothing more than a fairy tale to make an argument about science and the "supernatural".

You say:

~ "If someone comes along with some phenomena and says it's supernatural. If that pans out, why can't that be studied?"

Again, meaningless. You are talking about the *claim* that something is "supernatural", someone claiming a phenomena is "supernatural" does not mean we are studying the "supernatural". What we would be doing with science is studying what is natural.

We can study claims of the "supernatural", but we would use science and understand they are claims. To discover the "supernatural", like God, as you agree would be something drastic and changing in our understanding of reality, which I don't see that you fully grasp.

If prayer studies showed an effect, we have no idea what it could be. It is not scientifically reasonable to assume we are studying the "supernatural". And here's the problem with these type arguments, is they have no real meaning, it's a lot of "what if" and creating fairly tales to fit into science to make some point about how "science can study the supernatural".

Finally, it is you making the claim that "science can study the supernatural", and at least you admit to being vague, that's a problem, a big problem, which many who use your type arguments don't want to face. It's time to give up some good arguments with relevant meaning, or drop the fairy tale making.

In my opinion, it works quite the opposite of what you appear to hold, it actually is disrespectful to our understandings of science, reason and the natural environment.

Luke, how it is disrespectful to anything to say that it's really unlikely, but not impossible? I'm sorry, but your whole argument wasn't convincing and came off dogmatic.

I'm open about it. I think the supernatural at first blush incoherent. I don't think we can study it given how I understand it. I don't think it'll ever happen either, but I can't rule it out logically, which is what you need to do if you're gonna make an absolute statement like you have. You say you can't see it, therefore it isn't. At least that's what you seem to say. That seems to be an argument from ignorance or incredulity. Which I don't find convincing.

The thing is, we both agree on the end result. I'm just 99.99% sure, you're 100% sure. That's probably related to psychology more than philosophy.

To bad for you, and you really shouldn't speak for others (especially unidentified others to attempt to bolster your claim).

Tell me how the "supernatural" is touchable and knowable? (plus see below)

My guess is you are not understanding my argument, or care to.

Brian,

Find where I said that the "supernatural" or a God can't exist?

What I am saying is disrespectful is this nonsense about creating fairy tales and meaningless "what if" thinking to fit an argument that "science can study the supernatural".

Now, to make it even better you say: "I don't think we can study it [the "supernatural"] given how I understand it." Well, that's nice. Can we create any more vagueness around the issue to hold on to the idea that "science can study the supernatural" or as I've been told on Dawkins' site; "science can falsify the supernatural"?

My argument is only as dogmatic as science is, which it is not.

Both of you could consult your philosophical mentor, Russell Blackford, and have him fall back on Deism and complain people don't give him enough credit for making a "nuanced" argument and how I have people I worship.

Fair enough Luke. I guess my position isn't to your liking. It's odd that all I'm doing is stating that I don't know if the supernatural its study are impossible and don't want to commit to something that statement. That seems to me to be reasonable. But perhaps it isn't.

Your ad-homs or whatever they are about Russell Blackford are interesting. You've nicely misrepresented his position. Anyway, I like Russell, and don't find much I disagree with regarding philosophy as far as I understand it. What's wrong with that? If that makes him a mentor, then so be it. Though I just think of him as being in the same position as Massimo. An authority who puts their views out there and is good enough to agree or disagree with you based on arguments. Meh. Whatever. Peace.

Uh, guys, if science could verify the "supernatural", it would cease to be supernatural, and simply enter the natural world. As such, science can of course study it. "Supernatural" is hence something science cannot study, for purely axiomatic reasons, and the whole argument is dicking around with the semantics between the common and your own world views.

Psychologists experimentally investigate how humans reason, so the idea that scientists don't investigate rationality is wrong.

Philosophers investigate the validity of rational thinking, which is a different sort of inquiry. It is the investigation of the validity of rationality that I find rather bothersome.

On the deductive side, rationality is just Math. In this sense, Mathematics is the fundamental foundational discipline.

On the inductive side, you have philosophers debating things like "can we induce the non-existence of beings for which there is no evidence?" This is, in fact, interesting to me. But do I think that philosophers tend to make progress on these issues? No, I don't. Are these questions largely irrelevant to science? I think so, yes.

And I also think that they're just not nearly as interesting as the sorts of questions actually asked by scientists. It is hard for me to grasp why somebody would consider questions like "what is the fundamental nature of science?" as interesting as questions like "how early did pandas break off from other bear species?" But to each their own.

Another complaint I have about Philosophy is that I do not see most of the areas as being very similar. Consider these areas and what they are:

- Logic is just Set Theory, which is a branch of Mathematics studied in Math departments.- Moral Philosophy is the question of which actions are right or wrong. - Philosophy of Mind asks questions about how thoughts are formulated and whether consciousness can exist.

I feel free to have totally different opinions about each of these, because, to me, they may as well be totally different fields. Mathematics is the study of pure deduction, and so Logic is naturally a rigorous area of research. Philosophy of Mind can illuminate problems in Cognitive Science, so long as the philosophers in question actually understand the scientific data that they're working with. Moral Philosophy is mostly incoherent, unrigorous discourse that has been exposed under Moral Error Theory by John Mackie et al.

Even if my positions on all three fields were reversed, the fact would remain that questions like "what good is Philosophy?" really ask the questioned person to group a bunch of disparate judgments and combine them in a rather ad hoc manner.

The caricature of philosophy (mere philosophy) and its identification with theistic Christian apology is not uncommon at all.

Pharyngula -an insightuf blog nevertheless- recently posted an entry that just shows the scientific chauvinism and scientistic prejudice against philosophy Massimo refers to, a propos the airy verbage he encounters in one particular "philosopher".

The post was about the philosophical use of biological evolution for cultural evolution. When I pointed in my comment that the idea of order emerging without design was philosophical (i.e. Hume and A. Smith on spontaneous social order) in the first place and prior to Darwin I got some very hostile reactions. Apparently, anything that wasn't based on their rather crude and anti-intelectual notions of empiricism was dismissible: as if scientific theories sprang spontaneously from labs without any guiding intellectual effort. So presumibly are maths and geometry pointles because they aren't based on evidence.

Massimo: don't know if you are going to read something so far down, but I think your whole argument here and in the previous post is based on making arbitrary definitions, and maybe even on completely imagined conflicts. When you cite the "Dawkins- and Coyne-style (scientistic) take on atheism, that science can mount an attack on all religious beliefs", you are building a strawman, nothing else. None of the "new atheists" says that science is able to rule out a shadow god or last thursdayism. Did you read their relevant books? Nearly all of them discuss that case explicitly! However, they are completely justified in concentrating on the gods that science can attack because those are the gods that people actually believe in. As I wrote in the other discussion, the only god that science cannot and does not reject is one that is no use whatsoever to a religious person. Any god that is useful for humans is subject to scientific enquiry because its usefulness lies in the interaction with humans (prayer, afterlife, creation) that can, at least in principle, be measured, examined, tested, etc. The "new atheists" all explicitly spell that line of reasoning out, too. Be it Dawkins, Myers, Coyne, Stenger, they all admit that there are possible gods that cannot be ruled out empirically, and then go on to say that these are not the ones they bother about. What the heck are you going on about?

Now it is true that science is based on some philosophical assumptions, methods or tools, on assumptions that cannot be proven with science itself. Well, it could be argued that all the justification science needs is that it works, but I will at least for current purposes grant you the limitation of science as such. But then: so what? Biology leans heavily on mathematics, chemistry and physics, for example when a zoologist is studying enzyme kinetics. Would you then say that a biologist is overconfident in her enzyme study if she does not shut up and let a fully trained physicist do her job? Or should she just tell everybody on a daily basis that she not doing pure biology at the moment, whatever that is, just so that they do not get a wrong impression? In the same manner, a scientists can use tools from philosophy like logic without having to do penance for that constantly.

So in summary, I wholeheartedly agree with your rhethorical question: "now why is it that so many people take sides on a debate that doesn’t make much sense?" I just feel that you are the one who does take a side against some people who never did anything to deserve being criticized for.

Never quite managed to grasp what that is. Nature by definition everything that exists out there to be measured or observed. Either the supernatural can be measured (such as the efficacy of prayer) or observed (such as a ghostly apparition), which automatically makes it part of nature. Or it cannot, in which case how do you know about it at all, and why bother? That leaves the category of supernatural empty except for concepts that do not have any use, effect or influence whatsoever - because if they had, they would be part of nature -, i.e. phantasms.

The whole category is just a cop-out, a label to put on irrational beliefs that says, in effect, that you are not allowed to subject this particular belief to the same critical assessment and empiricism that you subject everything else to.

A thought experiment about the efficacy of prayer is not meaningless at all, it forces us to think about the epistemic reach and methodology of science. It is even a philosophical argument! As you say, even if these experiments were to give positive results, we would not be "studying the supernatural" per se, but we would have circumstantial empirical evidence for its existence (by studying its effects in our material universe). Of course all this is rather silly, in the sense that we all agree it is very unlikely to happen, but that doesn't make it meaningless.By the way, you did not give an argument for equating 'supernatural' with an omniscient and omnipotent God, so in this context your point about the incoherency of these terms is largely irrelevant (though I agree with you).

@ Brian

Maybe it is possible to give an airtight philosophical argument against supernatural interventions, in fact the problem is similar to Descartes' dualism and his idea of the pineal gland as the locus of interaction. For the sake of the argument, I think you can allow that supernatural causation is at least logically possible, and that there's no a priori reason why it would not be empirically detectable. By the way, I agree with most of the things you said in this discussion.

@ Alexander Johannesen

"Uh, guys, if science could verify the "supernatural", it would cease to be supernatural, and simply enter the natural world. As such, science can of course study it."

That depends on your definition. If you conceive of the 'supernatural' as "anything that's beyond the reach of science", than of course the discussion is settled by analytic definition (it's the position of Eugenie Scott and Barbara Forrest). There's nothing wrong with that per se, it's just not a very interesting definition. By contrast, if you define 'supernatural' as anything that is outside the realm of matter and energy and outside space-time, the point is not so obvious.

@ Massimo,All things considered, I don't think your position is very different from Dawkins and Coyne, and this is largely a semantic discussion. As I see it, Coyne is rightly annoyed by the popular accomodationist claim that atheism is "mere philosophy" or "mere metaphysics", which downplays the epistemic status of philosophy (and atheism) and makes it look as if it's a matter of personal taste. Coyne and Dawkins are not so naive to think that atheism can be "proven" scientifically, they just think that many religious claims are scientifically testable and have failed (barring immunizing strategies of the faithful). Now what is the difference with you position?1) you already agree that there is no such thing as philosophy-free science (you quoted Dennett approvingly), so nothing can be a "purely scientific" fact in any case2) you agree that atheism is informed by science, although you claim that the best arguments are philosophical (seems reasonable to me)3) you agree that at least some supernatural claims are scientifically testable

Coyne and Dawkins are involved with philosophical arguments in any case, they are just reluctant to face it (and Dawkins' contempt for philosophers is annoying, true enough). That's unfortunate, but also understandable, in light of the above-mentioned accomodationist strategies and misconceptions about philosophy. Bearing in mind your definitions of science and philosophy, I'm happy to agree that atheism is a philosophical position. But if you insist on it having nothing to do with science, your argument can be read as a means for safeguarding religion from science (à la Kenneth Miller), which I know is not your intention at all. If you agree that philosophy and science are overlapping and mutually interdependent, and that they share the virtues of rationality, critical thinking and empirical knowledge, I don't see any reason to insist that atheism is either a purely "scientific" or "philosophical" position.

Well, well, obviously a stimulating discussion. Too many posts (and several ad hominems) for me to answer everyone, so I'll pick on Maarten, who I know well and who is thoughtful in his criticisms of my positions.

I never said that science has nothing to do with atheism. I see atheism as a science-informed philosophical position. My annoyance with Dawkins, Coyne etc. derives from their refusal to accept that they are drawing heavily on philosophy, because science qua science cannot disprove any kind of god at all. All science can do is to reject specific factual claims (intercessory prayer, young earth, etc.), as I wrote repeatedly, but religionists always have what someone referred to as the "last Thursday" defense, which is entirely and completely unassailable on empirical grounds. But it carries huge philosophical/theological consequences that are really hard to defend. (Incidentally, theologians like Swinburne extend the free will defense to natural evil. And it took a heavy philosophical gun like Mackie to rebuke them.)

More broadly, even though I agree with Dawkins' and Coyne's ultimate positions (we are all atheists in Coyne's "weak sense"), it is their intellectual arrogance which I find hard to bear, and I do think they are doing a great disservice to science, and not much of a favor to atheism either.

This is either semantics or wrong. The god of Catholicism, for example, is one that comes with several specific factual claims. They are rejected, thus the god is rejected.

What you can say is that science qua science cannot rule out all possible gods, but it can disprove most of them. More importantly, it can disprove all gods that anybody with the exception of a handful of sophisticated theologians actually believes in.

My thoughts on this post are very removed from the discussion at hand, but I'll share anyway.

In his definition of philosophy, Massimo broke it down into several, more easily handled issues, including ethics. Here I think that science is constantly looking to philosophy for cues on how to proceed. Experimentation requires manipulation from the natural state, and when we are talking about subjects of experimentation, whatever species of life that is used, scientists get quickly embroiled in controversy, among themselves and with society at large. Modern biology has its roots in "natural philosophers" whose means of studying nature was to kill it and bring it home. Obviously, our techniques have changed dramatically, not just in favor of more sophisticated and effective means, but also caused by a shift in our ethical views of how science should proceed. In this case, I think science relies heavily on philosophical solutions.

What I am saying is meaningless is jumping over the edge without reason, then creating fairy tales like Coyne's 900 foot Jesus (Falwell inspired of course) and "what if" stories that miss the point.

You say:

~"As you say, even if these experiments were to give positive results, we would not be "studying the supernatural" per se, but we would have circumstantial empirical evidence for its existence (by studying its effects in our material universe)."

Nope, you went to far. I said we don't know what we would be studying ["If prayer studies showed an effect, we have no idea what it could be"], it would be still considered a natural phenomena. I'm tired of going back over this. We have no way of knowing and of course all you're doing is keeping it extremely vague to make a claim (by putting words in my mouth no less). These impossibly vague ideas (you can if you want say precisely what these prayer studies consist of and begin a thought experiment if you wish) have no real meaning.

Brian already offered an idea that we've exhausted naturalistic explanation (in the "thought experiment"), oh really, that's nice and how do we know that (there's a thought experiment). The best that comes out of this is where Coyne finally landed with is well wouldn't we offer tentative support that we are detecting the "supernatural". That's a long, long way off of arguing what would get him to believe in God, which was the same 900 foot Jesus.

Of course what we are seeing now is this claim the arguments were and are now "nuanced", yea right (but of course the complaints originally went unheeded and dismissed - Brain appears to maintain I've misrepresented Blackford, the same person who claimed I called him a creationist to all his faithful to denounce exactly what I've said here, I only added what he was doing is much like what IDer's actually do do. Or even better, Steve Zara openly on Dawkins' site saying my argument was racism - of course not calling me racist).

Even if one does assign logic to mathematics (which, I'm sure many philosophers wouldn't agree with too much), I don't think I'd boil it down to just set theory. Pretty much any set theory you choose, after all, will be presented as a theory in first-order predicate logic. So the whole situation gets a bit (meta-)circular at that point, as you may be able to conduct proof theory in set theory, but set theory is presented in an object that would be studied in proof theory.

But, I don't think (off the top of my head) you'd find that the majority of set theorists study logics in-depth, as otherwise they'd probably be proof theorists, or perhaps computer scientists (as logics have a lot of applications in computing; that's one of my particular areas of interest). Proof theory only "is just set theory" inasmuch as everything in mathematics is, in that you can express it in terms of sets and operations thereon. But that's not a particularly compelling point, as you can have foundational axiom systems that are not, strictly speaking, "set theories" (type theory and category theory are two choices), and you can in most cases build any one inside the others if you so choose.

Of course, similarly to you, I personally find the sorts of questions about logics that pertain to mathematics and computer science much more interesting than the ones that are typically classified as philosophy. For instance, modal logics can be used to reason about computations with implicit mutable state, on the computer science end. In philosophy, some folks ask whether when I make modal statements, their truth depends on the existence of actual alternate universes (modal realism). And some philosophers say that, yes, every (propositionally) alternate universe really exists, and that's why our counter-factual statements are true, which all seems like a rather ridiculous flight of fancy compared to what computer scientists discuss with regard to modal logic.

But that's just me. I've read some philosophers that I think are pretty decent. Perhaps I'd judge most philosophers that way (I haven't gone out looking that much), and it's just that the Chalmers (for example) of the group get a lot more wide attention for some reason; I don't really know. If that's the case, then it's a shame.

And of course, I can't expect everyone to find mathematical logic interesting, and philosophy less so, like I do.

Massimo, you complain about ad hominems and you are arrogant enough to suggest that Dawkins and Coyne don't understand their own arguments - and then you say something like this:

"More broadly, even though I agree with Dawkins' and Coyne's ultimate positions (we are all atheists in Coyne's "weak sense"), it is their intellectual arrogance which I find hard to bear, and I do think they are doing a great disservice to science, and not much of a favor to atheism either."

Talk about shooting yourself in the foot!

Bye the way, as I see it, the fact that even the present discussion cannot be settled by philosophy in itself demonstrates its impotence.

Luke, I don't understand that animus. Perhaps you and Russell have really gotten stuck into it. Let's leave it hey? I don't see much value. In the end we don't have much disagreement I think.

Massimo, I get your position on Dawkins and Coyne. I've seen him talk favorably about Dan Dennett as his go to philosopher so he's not totally blind to the siren song of philosophy. He'll come around to the dark side. :)

If I'm a thorough going empiricist and naturalist, does that make me scientistic by definition?

The bottom line to my philosophical outlook is, "there is no proposition that I currently hold to be true, that I would not abandon if the evidence so demanded." I always thought that made me fairly open minded, but if that makes me guilty of scientism, I guess so be it.

Lots said, but no mention of Weinberg, so I'll encourage everyone to read his whole essay, "Against Philosophy." I think most will find it anything but making all-to-common mistakes. And it certainly deserves a full post - if you're still reading Massimo.

I just find any drawn out discussion about the distinction between science and philosophy to be a contrivance and, ultimately, inconsequential. Nothing could demonstrate more clearly to me that the problem is not one of perception, but of preconception, than the existence of long, rambling conversations such as this, which attempt to clearly delineate the difference between the two but ultimately end up chasing their own tails.

Massimo stated that science and philosophy are complementary, not adversarial. This is both true and untrue. In fact, they are the same beast - the rational mind - engaging in abstractions for different purposes that are, in the end, the same purpose: to better understand our experience of the universe. Either that or to get laid. I forget which.

Broadly speaking, scientists are interested in data about the nature of the universe we experience; philosophers in metadata about the nature of our experience of the universe. But which is which just depends on how you ask your questions.

When you operate on the premise that science and philosophy actually represent two distinct, separate categories of thinking that nevertheless use exactly the same faculties of reason, you set yourself up for an argument - one that can never be resolved unless you withdraw that premise.

"Nope, you went to far. I said we don't know what we would be studying ["If prayer studies showed an effect, we have no idea what it could be"], it would be still considered a natural phenomena. I'm tired of going back over this. We have no way of knowing and of course all you're doing is keeping it extremely vague to make a claim (by putting words in my mouth no less). These impossibly vague ideas (you can if you want say precisely what these prayer studies consist of and begin a thought experiment if you wish) have no real meaning."

The part of my sentence about circumstantial evidence for the supernatural referred to MY opinion, not yours, so I don't put words in your mouth at all (read it again, there was a "but" there). I don't see what is "impossibly vague" about an experiment for the efficacy of intercessory prayer. As you may know, real studies have been published on that (a waste of money, but it illustrates my point)

"The best that comes out of this is where Coyne finally landed with is well wouldn't we offer tentative support that we are detecting the "supernatural". That's a long, long way off of arguing what would get him to believe in God, which was the same 900 foot Jesus."

Tentative support is what science is all about. I think you made a straw man out of Coyne's argument and are now surprised to find out it doesn't correspond to what he actually meant. What you go on to say about Steven Zara and Blackford is muddled and irrelevant.

@MassimoThat's right, you never said that atheism "has nothing to do with science", you agree that it's informed by science. But then, are you sure you are on the side of Eugenie Scott? Her position is that "science is agnostic toward the supernatural – it neither confirms nor rejects it.” I think that is a bridge too far.

actually, I think it is mathematics that is a branch (or an offshoot) of logic, not the other way around...

J,

yes, empiricism and naturalism are philosophical positions. You would be scientistic if you claimed that science can somehow prove either of them.

Scientism does not mean that one thinks science is the only way to knowledge (though your counterexamples of music and literature don't cut it, since they are not really "ways to knowledge"). Dawkins and Coyne are excellent examples because they claim too much epistemological power for science, which is what scientism is.

Norwegian Shooter,

I have written an essay in the Quarterly Review of Biology where I go in more detail about Weinberg's essay: Pigliucci, M. 2008. The borderlands between science and philosophy: an introduction. Q Rev Biol 83(1):7-15. There is also something about it in my forthcoming book:

~ "The part of my sentence about circumstantial evidence for the supernatural referred to MY opinion, not yours.."

That's a good thing to clarify. It read the way I interpreted.

~ "As you may know, real studies have been published on that (a waste of money, but it illustrates my point)."

The study you point to is the Templeton Foundation funded study, along with the Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp.

Even though one may consider this a "real study", there has been in fact criticism on the science, including how to do controls and if they properly did control.

What I'm saying is impossibly vague hasn't changed, we don't just jump to the conclusion we are detecting something the work of a "supernatural" God.

As many, including Dawkins and Shermer have made light of was the some of the results of the STEP study pointing to negative affects in patients knowing they were being prayed for (59% vs. 52% not knowing). In fact, one of the two parameters for the study was to test for "the knowledge of receiving it [prayer]". No one that I've seen has pointed to those negative results to something "supernatural" (and thus worthy of further study of "supernaturalism" - or is the "supernatural" only "good"(?)), why not? There has been naturalistic explanations, like the "stress effect".

My other point was in what Brian said next, which we would exhaust naturalistic explanation. My question, how would you know you have done that? Why are the negative results of STEP, which were in fact part of the protocol not a possible "supernatural" effect and maybe we should look closer.

As far as "thought experiments" that came out of this study, it was all basically a joke, and I doubt any serious thinker would want to see university or public funding from the NIH used in these studies (in fact I have offered my voice in shutting down the NCCM part of NIH. Since prayer is listed as a CAM, perhaps we have even more to be concerned with having Dr. Collins as head of NIH - what do you think?)

I'll gladly talk more about this. But, I wish to make a final point on it now. I see no real movement by "atheist" to do a better controlled study on prayer, what I do see is a great deal of criticism by "atheist" towards the Templeton Foundation for overlapping science and faith. What is your feeling on Templeton?

Like I said, we can do prayer studies, and scientifically test *claims* to the supernatural, but we have no reason to go jumping over a cliff and argue we would be studying the "supernatural" and dismiss we may discover yet other natural phenomena (and *no*, it makes no sense to define the "supernatural" as what hasn't been discovered yet, that is the same co-op as religionist use).

As to the Coyne 900 foot Jesus. You appear to miss the point, again. Creating fairy tales to offer an argument for science possibly discovering the "supernatural" is ridiculous, it's very familiar to what ID proponents do. We would have no reason at this point to claim we would be able to offer our tentative support for the existence of the "supernatural" via a prayer study and I can only talk about his 900 foot Jesus (Falwell inspired insanity) as a *joke*, it is a *joke*.

Coyne's original argument was about what would convince him that a "supernatural" force or God exist (went so far as to quote Darwin, but ignored the real meaning of the last line in the quote, "But this is childish writing."). What would get him to be convinced would be for him to prove, it simply wouldn't matter in a scientific sense what Jerry Coyne believes about the existence of God (this is more important than one may first recognize, he only appears to set the bar high, though doesn't really explain how science has discovered the "supernatural" God).

That's part of the problem with these helplessly vague ideas, it is Coyne and others making the positive claims and not backing them up, a undefined demarcation has been crossed from the natural to the "supernatural" with no real reason given except to argue what would be convincing (again, more important then Coyne seems to realize, even with the problem of having a a universe at all many of us don't hold a belief in a God as the creator - we accept we don't know and offer naturalistic explanations - the universe as we know today is much more incredible than most miracle claims). There's nothing here to say we would offer our tentative support for the existence of the "supernatural", it may sound scientific, but has yet to be shown to be.

I'm not making a straw man out of anything considering Coyne's argument, he has made the argument very openly and I've stated exactly how he's represented it. It is on the record. Coyne's 900 foot Jesus is a fairy tale that tells us *nothing* about science. Just because he mentions tentative support, does not mean his story is scientifically meaningful! I'm not setting his argument up, it is just vague inventions of the mind then used to make a claim about the "supernatural" being within the realm of science - that's important.

What I say about Blackford and Zara, is far from muddled, it is also on the record and it concerns what I was talking about, which was the dismissivness of arguments and concerns.

Blackford consistently was arguing about "science having something to say about the supernatural". His main argument, repeated ad nauseum, was the claim of the earth being 6,000 years old. He would frame it as "a claim of a supernatural event" that was falsified (though he was cautious enough to say we can't falsify and idea like the earth is made to look billions of years old - a point Massimo also made). I just would say, what science is doing has to do with the age of the earth. It has said nothing about the event being "supernatural", that is only a claim.

This type of problem persist. The reason Steve Zara claimed my argument was racism is because it is interpreted that "science can not say anything about the supernatural" and thus we can't test claims to the supernatural. This is held even if I repeat constantly that we can test claims, if they are indeed testable, and it doesn't matter if the claimant believes them to be "supernatural" or they themselves are causing it or it is as of yet an unknown force.

The argument that I am being dogmatic, made again by Brian, is simply idiotic, period.

NewEnglandBob is who you are responding to when you say the below: (not J., though the first part does respond to J.)

~ "Scientism does not mean that one thinks science is the only way to knowledge (though your counterexamples of music and literature don't cut it, since they are not really "ways to knowledge"). Dawkins and Coyne are excellent examples because they claim too much epistemological power for science, which is what scientism is."

So, it seems that both Coyne and Dawkins do not believe that anything like the orthodoxly conceived god of classical theism exists. Also, they would claim that they reached this conclusion based on various scientific discoveries about the universe.

(For example, the Earth is not the center of the universe, humans are animals, disease is caused by germs not demons, and so forth.)

It seems to me the conclusion is justified, but neither Coyne or Dawkins would claim certainty on the issue. But I guess Massimo wants to argue that atheism is not a scientific conclusion but strictly a philosophical conclusion.

But I don't get the distinction. The demarcation line is blurry. So I'm at a loss. I don't understand Massimo's criticism.

So my question is what specific arguments do Coyne or Dawkins make which they are asserting as scientific claims, but Pigliucci thinks are philosophical.

The line of demarcation between science and philosophy is blurry because it's a contrivance. It's like using a riverbed to denote a political boundary. It may be useful for certain purposes, but it's unsatisfactorily arbitrary for others. And what happens when the river moves?

Massimo's argument that philosophy and science are different and should be regarded as such appears primarily to be a defense against the disdainful attitude that some scientists take toward philosophy. And to be fair he also addresses disdain that flows the other way. But establishing a boundary along the riverbank in order to defend it is not a productive step toward resolving the conflict. Rather, it feeds it by focusing attention on the arbitrary contrivance instead of on, say, the commonplace manner in which ordinary, non-polarized people cross the imaginary line routinely without consequence.

My thought was that it may be a good idea for Massimo to reply since you seem to have some fundamental misunderstandings, yet came back in a lecturing way with "Yet, Massimo Pigliucci maintains...". Then appear to actually be asking for and expecting a response.

I don't have a lot of patience for this stuff and Massimo is extremely patient. You say it's bullshit, I suggest doing some research before such dismissivness and you turn around and say, oh sure, now tell me where to look. It's likely I was wrong to bring it back up.

Just in case Massimo doesn't want to repeat, again (a few times now on two somewhat related blogpost threads), let me give this a try.

You say:

~ "But I guess Massimo wants to argue that atheism is not a scientific conclusion but strictly a philosophical conclusion."

Massimo's answer may be as he has said:

~ "I never said that science has nothing to do with atheism. I see atheism as a science-informed philosophical position."

I want to say, I've spent a bit of time checking out your blog, it's pretty good. You have a lot of links. I didn't keep track, but there is a virtual truck load of philosophy there on "atheism", religious argument and other topics.

just because the demarcation is not sharp it doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. How much hair on your head has to be left for you to be considered bald? Surely there is no clear demarcation number there, and yet "X is bald" is a perfectly understandable statement.

To refer to one of your earlier comments (the "bullshit" one), science doesn't get started "the same way your border collie does" because science is about rationally analyzing the weight of empirical evidence as it speaks to general theories of nature. Unless you have a really really smart border collie...

Mike,

are you seriously arguing that there is *no* difference between science and philosophy? Really? You mean that countless science and philosophy departments around the world are separated from each other because of an imaginary line made up by philosophers to defend themselves from the encroaching of science?

I would say that there is a difference between science and philosophy because we say there is. We invent the conceptual frameworks; we establish their rules and boundaries. To the extent that we advance arguments about where exactly those boundaries lie, we generally do so in reference to some overarching point we wish to address. In this instance, the exact demarcation only matters because there is some perceived incompatibility between either the two frameworks or certain of their advocates.

I certainly don't think I offered a view that implies anything so sweeping as the idea that science and philosophy departments the world over are separated to protect philosophers from the encroaching of science. The historical basis for that idea, if any, is outside the scope of my comments. What I said is that such encroachment is clearly a matter of concern to you personally, and that your discussion of the difference between the two appears to predicate upon this concern. So in short, to me it seems that your point that there is a difference is in service to a larger point: that advocates of either discipline should respect the other as well.

I agree with this larger point. Mutual respect is, in my view, better than one discipline running roughshod over the other. I just don't think the tactic of emphasizing the boundary between them is an effective way of achieving this, as it tends to be perceived as a defensive move, encouraging a "good offense" (dare I say strident?) defense on the other party's part. Proprietary sensibilities on both sides tend to become inflamed, and something as minor as a faux pas can become the seed of a multigenerational feud.

Nothing will stop scientists from using reason-based logical analysis to help them form predictive hypotheses about things they have not yet observed, or appropriating any number of other philosophical tools in service to their discipline. Nor will philosophers eschew incorporating empirically-derived information in service to their own. If a boundary exists, it is a very porous one, and nobody really "owns" the goods on either side.

To me, it makes better sense to smile at those who come traipsing through the riparian zone to poach on the other side of the river, and welcome them to have their fill. If they later host a banquet where they extol the virtues of their own domain for providing the ingredients of the feast without also crediting the territory they poached from, one might simply and politely suggest to them and all others present that, in their prowess, they may have been so focused on the hunt that they sometimes lost track of which side of the river they were on when they executed the kill.

Me: "No, actually, they don't. They all explicitly discuss that and then concentrate on the gods that science can reject."

Massimo: "Oops, I cannot respond to all posts here..."

See here, for example:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124597314928257169.html

This shows the entire rationale - to cite the perhaps most relevant part:

Haldane, an evolutionary biologist and a founder of population genetics, understood that science is by necessity an atheistic discipline. As Haldane so aptly described it, one cannot proceed with the process of scientific discovery if one assumes a "god, angel, or devil" will interfere with one's experiments. God is, of necessity, irrelevant in science.

Faced with the remarkable success of science to explain the workings of the physical world, many, indeed probably most, scientists understandably react as Haldane did. Namely, they extrapolate the atheism of science to a more general atheism.

While such a leap may not be unimpeachable it is certainly rational, as Mr. McGinn pointed out at the World Science Festival. Though the scientific process may be compatible with the vague idea of some relaxed deity who merely established the universe and let it proceed from there, it is in fact rationally incompatible with the detailed tenets of most of the world's organized religions.

You can still insists that there is philosophy in that. Fine, but then me leaving the building and going to work because I have taken the leap of faith to believe my own sense that there is a world to work in is also doing philosophy. Silly, seen that way, isn't it?

Dawkins clearly states that he thinks science can reject the broadest possible version of "the god hypothesis" (which in itself is a misnomer, since god is not an hypothesis in any meaningful sense of the term "hypothesis"). Of course than in practice he has to retreat to actual factual religious claims, which I have said over and over I agree can in fact be rejected by science - but that rejection does *not* and cannot amount to a rejection of the concept of god.

As for Haldane, bright guy, one of my favorite evo biologists, but he was philosophically naive in claiming that science is necessarily atheistic. (He was also a Marxist, do you accept his political views as well?) Science is methodologically atheistic, not philosophically so.

After you leave the building, the only silly thing is the outright dismissal of an entire discipline about which you don't seem to have read much.

Mike,

nobody has ever suggested that we should stop scientists from using reason-based logical analysis, but what you mean here is not the same as philosophical analysis. Scientists do not usually use "logic" in the same formal sense as philosophers do.

There are profound differences in method, style and type of problems between science and philosophy, and frankly I think that people who deny or minimize this simply have not taken their time to read any philosophy, or they would immediately see how bizarre it is to deny the difference.

More broadly, I am having a really hard time understanding the agenda of people here who wish at all costs to dismiss philosophy or absorb it into science. Why are you so bent on arrogating more epistemological power to science than it possesses? Why is it not good enough to say that science is by far the best approach we have devised to understand the natural world, but that there are problems that lie outside of it and other disciplines that are better quipped to address those problems?

In a way it's enjoyable to read your post. It appears to me you're working diligently to tell Massimo; Yes, here is the demarcation, but it is of little importance, at least not enough to actually highlight. Then you further seem to declare, since it is of little importance, there can only be a personal reason to highlight the demarcation and point to its importance (though you don't really clarify this - just that he's reacting to disdain).

In the end, it appears that you are offended somehow. You actually appear to be arguing that Massimo should stay silent on this issue. That instead of clarifying and bringing greater understanding to the issues, you want none of that and instead go gentle because staying ignorant and pretending the demarcation is a meaningless contrivance is good, at least good for you and what ever reason you hold to argue as you do.

god is not an hypothesis in any meaningful sense [...] but that rejection does *not* and cannot amount to a rejection of the concept of god. That is a remarkable sleight of hand here - the people you criticize explicitly reject real-life influential god models/hypotheses that do come with their baggage of factual claims, and you pretend that they claim to have disproved a philosophical god concept nobody actually believes in. But that is simply not what they do. Your whole controversy is invented.

I do not dismiss philosophy (although admittedly I am much less interested in it than in empirical science personally. If you jump off a 20 storey building you go splat, no matter how much you philosophize about our ability to draw conclusions about the fundamental nature of the universe in general and the law of gravity in particular).

Whether Haldane was a Marxist or a Libertarian is also besides the point, as is whether I see science as fundamentally atheist. I do not, in fact, as I think that if there were a god that has created the universe and we could see the signature of that creation in the universe, then studying the nature of that god would automatically become part of science. As would the nature of souls, if they actually existed and could be studied, etc. The point of that article is not that it is completely correct in all details, but that it shows that the people you are shelling against are, in contrast to your claims, very aware of the inability of science to reject all imaginable gods.

Of course no sensible person thinks that the Benson study justifies further research into the ‘supernatural’ (neither did I), that’s because the results were completely negative (surprise, surprise). It’s a waste of money just as experiments in parapsychology are a waste of money, but at least they constitute an attempt to confront a religious claim head on.

Once again about the 900 foot Jesus. Of course it’s a fairy tale, it’s a bloody thought experiment, that’s the whole point. When Darwin wrote that all this is “childish writing”, as far I can see he just meant that the chances of it happening were extremely small, so it wasn’t worth much thought. Asa Gray asked him what would convince him of design. Darwin didn’t respond “nothing, because that is beyond the reach of science”, but he invented a fairy tale. Guess what, just like Coyne did!

@ Mintman & Massimo

In defense of Haldane: he didn’t think the assumption of non-interference by God or the devil in science was "necessary". He explicitly wrote that “this assumption has been justified by such success as I have achieved in my professional career.” Seems more like a pragmatic assumption based on past successes.

Massimo, I agree that the God hypothesis “as such” – but who decides the meaning of the term anyway – cannot be rejected by science, but for many people God’s existence and his actions in the world are matters of fact just like anything else (see the study by Harrs et al. you referred to). The problem is not confined to the term God. For example, has the Benson study falsified the efficacy of “prayer”? Well, it depends, not if the faithful retreat to a form of undetectable “spiritual healing”.

Right, as I pointed out (almost exactly how you present it now), Coyne argued what would convince him of the existence of a God or "supernatural force". As you may have noticed, his set up for this argument is that "supernatural phenomena are not completely beyond the realm of science."

My point is what he is saying tells us nothing about science. It is "childish writing", our concept of science would likely have to be very different (our understanding of reality and sciences ability to reveal what we would hold as provisional truths would probably be drastically altered), that's part of the importance of understanding Darwin's amusing remarks.

It only appears Coyne sets the bar high, but what would convince Coyne of the existence of a "supernatural force"/God is not a statement about the reach of science. You can create all the "childish writing" in the world (or just look to religion) and conduct the thought experiment, but that doesn't support a claim that puts "supernatural phenomena is in the realm of science". It is in the end, meaningless.

Again, it appears you're just jumping blindly to think the alternative is to say; "“nothing, because that is beyond the reach of science”.

I have two questions related to what has been brought up on this thread and you elude to.

1.)Tell me how the "supernatural" is touchable and knowable?

2.)How do you know you've exhausted all natural explanations?

My point about further research into that Templeton Foundation funded, along with the Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp., is a thought experiment. Part of the what they tested for was for "the knowledge of receiving it [prayer]". It turned out those knowing they were being prayed for had a higher rate of negative outcomes then those that didn't know. My question is how do we know this isn't a "supernatural" effect? If we kept studying and found the same correlation, could we then surmise it's a "supernatural force" at play? Does this "thought experiment" point to a bias to think that the "supernatural force" can only be for "good" outcomes? Just because outcomes may be different then the testable hypothesis doesn't mean something else is not able to be detected.

Massimo said "Why is it not good enough to say that science is by far the best approach we have devised to understand the natural world, but that there are problems that lie outside of it and other disciplines that are better quipped to address those problems?"

--Thanks for that statement, I think that sentence articulates the question I so often have about the current desire to expand science. You sum it up my muddled ideas eloquently. I wish more of us had the resources and time to study Philosophy in conjunction with the sciences.

I said that in this case there seems to be a personal reason for highlighting the demarcation. I'm not saying that there could only ever be a personal reason. And far from belittling the personal reason as a motive, I even went as far as to agree with what I think is Massimo's overarching point about the need for mutual respect between the disciplines. I wouldn't dream of suggesting that Massimo should stay silent, and I'm certainly not offended by his views. (Nor am I offended by your speculations about my motive. By all means, carry on. I'm happy to respond.)

Massimo,

There are certainly profound differences between "pure" philosophy and "pure" science, and I agree that it would be bizarre to deny the difference. Clearly identifiable pinnacles of thought exist on either side of the valley between them. I don't deny or minimize those pinnacles, nor am I attempting to redraw the boundary to arrogate those of one side to the other. Rather, since it seems that the valley where their waters co-mingle is where the contention is seated, this is the area that I'm discussing. The pinnacles on either side are really only incidental to my comments.

It's interesting to me that you seem to have perceived my comments as oppositional to philosophy and supportive of science. You suggest that I am among those who "wish at all costs to dismiss philosophy or absorb it into science," and asked outright why I am "bent on arrogating more epistemological power to science than it possesses." I see this as an example of what happens when people get polarized around an issue: a mentality of conflict becomes fixed in their minds, and shades of territorialism begin to emerge: "You're either with us or against us."

It appears that if I don't pay tribute to the importance of defending the boundary between science and philosophy, you feel I must be supporting the "other" side over the one you have chosen. This is not so. The boundary is a valley that exists as a consequence of the separate-but-connected conceptual frameworks of science and philosophy, and it is defined and supported in situ by the slopes on both sides. The valley exists whether or not it is formally recognized, and not by virtue of a line of demarcation we attempt to draw after the fact. And it requires no defense.

To the extent that the discussion is focused on attempts to clearly pin down exactly where one crosses from one side of the valley to the other, I am calling such a line a contrivance. To the extent that the conflict is seated along this line, I am calling the conflict itself a contrivance. I don't suggest that you have created this conflict. However, you do appear to have bought into it to some degree by accepting lines in the sand that others have drawn as legitimate lines of contention - meaning, your argument seems not to be with the presence of a line, but with where it is drawn.

In my view, if certain scientists or philosophers wish to annex parts of each others' disciplines and thereby diminish the remainder, so be it. Those individuals' thinking may be flawed, but the integrity of philosophy and science as bodies of knowledge are unaffected. On the other hand, if, due to the audience that the upstarts enjoy, the issue goes to funding (as I suspect it does), then I think a much more effective response would be not to stage a battle over the location of the line, but to take advantage of the opportunity that having so many eyes trained on that line presents by stepping up to it and reminding them that the true boundary is a resource and a trafficking route for ideas, not a barrier to them - and calmly erasing the contrivance.

Thank you. It's quite clear from your last post that I was indeed on target. You've gone one further to make another charge which is that Massimo is engaged in a "You're either with us or against us" mentality.

The feeling you got that you must "pay tribute" is of your making, it is you arguing that the difference in domains in there only because we say it's there, it is invented, therefore you keep saying the demarcation is a contrivance. Putting quotation marks around the word "pure" does not strengthen your argument or appear less accepting of actual differences.

You are in fact; "arrogating more epistemological power to science than it possesses."

You have, several times, injected an idea of Massimo's motives, then make claims about why what he has done is wrong - but you have yet to spell out in a reasonable an argument to support your position.

In a funny way one may confuse your writing with a postmodernist, you are throwing words around and creating analogies that only appear to have real meaning, what Dan Dennett may call "Deepity".

Your argument appears clearly to be Massimo should shut about this because he is inventing a problem.

Somehow you have misconstrued my comments and arrived at wholly erroneous conclusions as a result.

Please set aside your conclusions for the moment, if possible, and consider what I say without prejudgment.

Regardless of whether you agree with or how you feel about my comments, they were about the premises of the argument as a whole, not the merits of the opposing positions. I've said nothing whatsoever in support of either side of it. Nevertheless, Massimo very clearly and specifically attributed a pro-science bias to me. That's why I believe I saw shades of "You're either with us or against us" territorialism in his response. You clearly agree with his conclusion, and as a result I'm inclined to see the same shades of motivation in yours. Maybe I'm wrong in this assessment. If so, please show me. How do my comments offer support to the science side of this argument in a manner that is withheld from the philosophy side? If they don't, what motivated this response on your parts if not territorialism? If you're going to level charges at me for a view I've expressed, at least be decent enough to open-mindedly examine the substance I've brought to the table to support that view.

I'll concede that when I originally said, "There is a difference between science and philosophy because we say there is," I didn't really articulate the concept clearly enough to give it any credibility, so I certainly don't mind that nobody rushed to embrace it. I elaborated on it a bit in my last post when I said, "The boundary is a valley that exists as a consequence of the separate-but-connected conceptual frameworks of science and philosophy," and substantiated the idea that the boundary is not a sharp line, but a wider region, with examples of instances in which ideas from both disciplines traverse from one side to the other. You may agree with me or not, believe I'm a nutjob, or even that I'm an ignorant chump, but I'm utterly at a loss to see how you or Massimo construe this as a pro-science view.

I'd be happy to justify my placing of quotes around "pure" (there actually was a reason), substantiate the validity of the allegory I'm using, etc., but I'd like to know we're operating in the same universe first. At the moment, somebody is incorrect about whether or not I have expressed a pro-science bias. Since that sticking point utterly curtails any chance that my views might be afforded even any provisional validity, it makes no sense at all to move on to other things before we get to the heart of that disagreement and resolve it.

Like I said in a response elsewhere on this thread, I don't have a lot of patience for this kind of stuff. However, I will try to calmly see if I can be of help.

If you feel that now you can't move forward unless this "territorialism" is resolved then fine. However, as far as I can tell that is of your invention.

Perhaps you are reading past what Massimo has said?

Lets put it this way. You have consistently claimed a demarcation is an arbitrary contrivance. By the manner on which you have approached this issue it seems perfectly reasonable to assume you mean this in a pejorative sense.

This interpretation is reinforced by statements such as:

~ "the distinction between science and philosophy to be a contrivance and, ultimately, inconsequential."

~ "The line of demarcation between science and philosophy is blurry because it's a contrivance."

~ "I would say that there is a difference between science and philosophy because we say there is. We invent the conceptual frameworks; we establish their rules and boundaries."

~ "Massimo's argument that philosophy and science are different and should be regarded as such appears primarily to be a defense against the disdainful attitude"

This goes along with your idea of advocating not emphasizing a boundary. This is done while appearing to recognize there are differences but the place in which Massimo argues from is somehow wrong. You have not really said why or how it is wrong, only that it's a contrivance and then pointing to possible motives. Now, we are faced with the charge of territorialism.

The argument that you appear to be "arrogating more epistemological power to science than it possesses." is perfectly reasonable because even though you claim to know the difference between science and philosophy, you also claim to emphasize the demarcation is wrong because there is no significant boundary. To say there is no real boundary, that this is a contrivance, that the difference is an invention, that it is wrong to show the difference then you are in essence claiming to much for science. This doesn't create and "us v. them", or you anti or pro anything, it is only an observation that follows reasonably from your own comments.

This all follows your idea that Massimo is somehow wanting you to "pay tribute", then into "You're either with us or against us", now your charge of "territorialism". That it is pointed out that you are arguing no real difference, repeating that saying there is a difference is a contrivance etc., with the charges and postulating motivations (all done without offering any real argument), then maybe that is why you interpret a simple statement to being inappropriately "pro-science".

That in itself should tell you something because obviously Massimo is *pro science*.

I will say again, it appears very much like you want Massimo to stay silent on the differences, I say this with greater conviction now since you still have not offered an actual argument.

I want to attempt clarify a point I made in my last post because it appears to be some kind of sticking point.

I wrote:

~ "To say there is no real boundary, that this is a contrivance, that the difference is an invention, that it is wrong to show the difference then you are in essence claiming to much for science."

A potential incorrect response to this may be to say the opposite could also be true, that to much is claimed for philosophy since no real boundary is claimed. However, what that misses is the point that science does in fact have limitations (philosophy is not going to do science). To say there is no real boundary, an invention stemming from us saying there is one, is to possibly ask of science what it can not do.

To then speak of "pure" difference or simply acknowledge difference without explaining why and how the demarcation is an arbitrary contrivance doesn't reveal a knowledge of the potential limitations of science.

Also, as to your claims of motivation, which appear to partly rely on the examples used by Massimo. The examples and the reference to comments often made on this blog are useful to frame the discussion and clarification. They in fact point to the importance of such an exercise. To simply dismiss the entire point with nothing more than claiming emphasizing the differences is wrong, the motivation is not legitimate, the boundary is an arbitrary contrivance and so forth without so much as a properly formed argument for these claims seems you want them accepted without reason.

It's nice to say be nice, but I don't see that Massimo is being inappropriately combative in any sense (thus why I thought you to be offended, and still do to a certain degree).

I of course accept I could be wrong about much of this, though I don't see why at the moment. However, I see little reason to continue the discussion, so please accept my final comment and respond as you feel necessary. After all, your real complaint is with Massimo and I fear I've overstepped my boundaries, perhaps an arbitrary one.

when you say that Dawkins and Coyne do not want to reject the broadest version of the god hypothesis (I never said "all imaginable gods"), have you actually read them? It doesn't appear so.

The fact that you are more interested in science than in philosophy is your prerogative, but obviously irrelevant to any argument. And the fact that you see science as "fundamentally atheistic" means that you don't have a good grasp of philosophy of science.

Mike,

if I misunderstood your statements I apologize, but please do not accuse me of polarizing the issue. The whole point of my post was a rejection of the us vs. them antithesis between science and philosophy. I'm not sure why you insist in wanting to pinn down "exactly" the point where one crosses the valley between science and philosophy: the fact that the demarcation line is fuzzy does not negate that there is a demarcation, and yes I was thrown off precisely by your statements that there is a demarcation"because we say there is," which seemed to me a denial of the demarcation itself.

I think you guys should just do what good intellectuals do: redefine your terms so that your position has some semblance of coherence, affix devious motives to your images of your intellectual enemies, and act as though the fields you're not that familiar with don't really have anything to offer anyway.

Massimo, to me, is just some New Yorker-reading latte-sipping La Sapienza graduate who thinks he knows something because he has three PhDs (or two, if you don't count a Dottorato di Ricerca). The point of Philosophy of Science is to take people like Richard Dawkins and Steven Pinker and make them seem like they're not real scientists. And Philosophy of Science is pointless even further because it won't help people like Rodney Brooks make COG incrementally better at holding a 4/4 time signature with its metallic hands.

Well, hell, gosh, shuck's y'all. I had a lengthy, comprehensive, point-by-point response all ready to go but luckily I checked for new posts before submitting it, and now it's completely (and perhaps mercifully, to the readership) unnecessary. :)

I kinda want to post it anyway, just because it's amusing how apropos your most recent comments are to what I was going to say, but I'll satisfy myself with a few comments.

First of all, I'm glad the misunderstanding appears to be on the wane almost as quickly as it flared up.

Massimo,

I enjoy your blog, learn a lot by following it, and tend to agree with most of the views you present - at least, the ones I'm informed enough about to actually have an opinion.

Thanks for your last comment. I always respect the sincere acknowledgment of an "oops". Also, I don't think you are actively polarizing the issue, but in all honesty I have to say that I do think you are perhaps a bit polarized by it. (Note the active/passive difference.) And at the same time I am well aware that I didn't really present my views clearly enough to avoid getting caught in a bit of crossfire.

It's curious to me that you seem to see me as wanting to pin down an exact line. In fact, quite the contrary. The very aspect of the discussion that I find inconsequential is the part where scientistic-minded people cook up their intellectual claims and explain how they never crossed any lines, and philosophistic-minded (can I make that word? I think I just did!) people take pains to explain that their stew isn't pure because some of the ingredients came from their side of the river.

That's not to say that I never engage in such byplay myself. But when I do, I usually make stone soup and let others furnish most of the ingredients. And it is inconsequential.

Luke,

I think the quality of self-reflection you have that leads you to reconsider what you've said, and then often brings you back to correct and clarify your views even before anyone has addressed them, speaks very highly of your character. I've seen you do that a lot, and I think it's pretty cool.

Nevertheless, I just can't let this one slide:

[[A potential incorrect response to this may be to say the opposite could also be true, that to much is claimed for philosophy since no real boundary is claimed. However, what that misses is the point that science does in fact have limitations (philosophy is not going to do science). To say there is no real boundary, an invention stemming from us saying there is one, is to possibly ask of science what it can not do.]]

Such a response would only be incorrect in the context you've just presented. It would be wholly correct in the original context of territorialism.

Hopefully you can take this in the good-natured manner that it is intended.

Ritchie the Bear,

Cute. I like you. You're fuzzy and prickly at the same time. Would you care for a bowl of soup?

when you say that Dawkins and Coyne do not want to reject the broadest version of the god hypothesis (I never said "all imaginable gods"), have you actually read them? It doesn't appear so.

Maybe there is something that I have overlooked, but Dawkins makes a point in his God Delusion book to clarify which kinds of god he is concerned with before even starting on the meat of his discussion. Stenger spends an entire chapter at the end of God: The Failed Hypothesis listing gods that cannot be ruled out by his scientific approach. PZ Myers, Ophelia Benson and others repeatedly have addressed the objection that this or that remote deistic god cannot be rejected by pointing out that they are concerned with the gods that people actually believe in, and that those gods are not deist. Coyne, I do not know so much. I read his blog from time to time, but none of his books so far.

The fact that you are more interested in science than in philosophy is your prerogative, but obviously irrelevant to any argument.

I agree. It was merely tangential to my argument that you can use a bit of philosophy as a scientist without constantly screaming "look, I am using some philosophy" or "help, I need a fully qualified philosopher to do my work or me" at the top of your lungs, just as a biologist can use some mathematics in their work but still remain a biologist. Using your approach, a mathematician would have to start blogging about those arrogant biologists who are calculating the significance level of a weight difference between two subspecies of birds without explicitly acknowledging that they are not doing biology at the moment, oh no sir.

And the fact that you see science as "fundamentally atheistic" means that you don't have a good grasp of philosophy of science.

Did you read my post? It said: I do not, in fact, as I think that if there were a god that has created the universe and we could see the signature of that creation in the universe, then studying the nature of that god would automatically become part of science. This is quite the opposite of thinking that science is necessarily atheistic, although my reasoning may not be philosophical enough here.

thanks for your thoughtful comments. Again, apologies if I misread your position on atheism and science, I was commenting in between breaks from a highly enjoyable but grilling trip in Atlanta (six talks in two and a half days...).

As for the most important point: yes, Dawkins, Stenger, PZ, and Coyne all acknowledge that science cannot rule out a deistic god. That's a no brainer. My contention is that it cannot rule out *any* god, only specific factual claims made in the name of a particular religion. Those two are not at all the same thing, because of a variety of issues, including the "last Thursday" defense, the free will defense, and the simple fact that most Christians, for instance, pick and choose which parts of the bible they take literally and which they don't. All of this makes it impossible for science by itself to reject any god at all.

As for philosophy and science, no I don't want scientists to turn into philosophers (despite the fact that that's what I did!). But when they talk about science without apparently understanding its own epistemic limits, they really ought to study a bit of philosophy - or keep silent, which apparently they compulsorily simply cannot do. Coyne, Dawkins etc. do *not* do the kind of science in their daily lives that they deploy when they talk about religion (Dawkins, in fact, as I pointed out before, doesn't do any science at all, and hasn't for three decades, but that's another story).

Perhaps how an immaterial substance could interact with a material substance might be rearranged into a logical argument against the interaction of supernatural with natural and thus against scientific study of supernatural. It wouldn't rule out the existence of the supernatural of course. I'll have to think more on this.

How much energy is required to impart information? We have sensors that can detect quantum events and amplify them to the macroscopic level. What’s more, the energy in quantum events is proportional to frequency or inversely proportional to wavelength. And since there is no upper limit to the wavelength of, for instance, electromagnetic radiation, there is no lower limit to the energy required to impart information. In the limit, a designer could therefore impart information into the universe without inputting any energy at all.

Thanks, it seems I misunderstood your point of view at least partly. On the other hand, your view of "any god" still does not sit well with me. Last Thursdayism is simply not what a lot of people believe - some believers only retreat to that position once the god they really believe in has been demonstrated to be unfeasible based on the evidence. That means that the specific god that they actually want to believe in is rejected by science. Apparently the difference is mostly that you have a much wider definition of "one god", divesting one specific god model of all the factual claims that make it this specific god model in my eyes (and in Stenger's, for example).

Again, if believers restricted themselves to the kind of deities that science cannot but philosophy can address, then atheism would be superfluous - or let us say, it would be a purely, yes, philosophical exercise -, because these deities do not lend themselves to using them to influence politics or dictating others how they should live: if all you can say about your god is that it cannot be known, how do you know that it disapproves of gay marriage? Conversely, you do not need a philosopher, only a historian, to demonstrate that there is no evidence for a lot of the stories giving the bible and thus its homophobia authority in the eyes of Christians, except maybe in the sense that science rests on certain philosophical assumptions to get off the ground.

Ok, I see where you're heading. Probably 'science' would be unrecognizable if one of Coyne's fairy tales were to come true, and it would no longer deserve that name. On the other hand, there have been metaphysical revisions before (think about the demise of classical determinism through quantum mechanics). I appreciate your point, but once again I'm inclined to see it as a semantic discussion. What Coyne wants to say - admittedly without much philosophical sophistication - is that many religious claims are eminently testable by means of the methods currently employed in science (e.g. RCT trial for prayer). To answer your short questions:

1. "Tell me how the "supernatural" is touchable and knowable?"I think I answered that one, it depends on what you mean by 'knowable'. I can imagine a situation - in the sense that I don't see any logical contradiction - of a supernatural force that is knowable through its empirical effects in our material world. It's what any theist believes.

2. "How do you know you've exhausted all natural explanations?"You don't. But the example you keep referring to (the negative effect of awareness of being prayed for) is a red herring, because obviously in that case the natural explanations are far from exhausted. If there would be a persistent positive effect, despite all attempts to rule out natural explanations, I think tentative assent would be the rational thing to do. But I'm as much an atheist as you are, and I will happily chop off my own arm if prayers were found to be efficacious.

@ Massimo & Mintman

Last Thursdayism is intrinsically untestable, like any global conspiracy theory is, supernatural or otherwise. But most people abhor the idea of a deceptive God (for parochial theological reasons), so this is mainly of philosophical interest. I would say that's the reason why Dawkins does not devote too much attention to it. His express goal was to tackle the kinds of religious beliefs that were most pervasive.

ok, but how many people do believe in last Thursdaysm is irrelevant to my point: there is no scientific way of attacking the notion.

Moreover, you (and Maarten) did not address my other examples of religious doctrines about which science has nothing to say: the free will defense, for instance, and let's add to them the crazy Catholic notion of transsubstantiation, etc.

Again: science can refute specific empirical claims made by religionists, but not the doctrine behind them.

Maarten,

I actually think that Luke's problem with Coyne's example is perfectly on target: think of A.C. Clarke's "third law," the one that says that "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."

The 900-ft Jesus, intercessory prayer, and so on, could be the result of either unknown natural phenomena or of extraterrestrial interference. Either way, no self-respecting scientist (and most certainly *not* Dawkins, Coyne, etc.) will ever give up searching for a naturalistic explanation of apparently religious phenomena, no matter how well established. And they would be right, because science cannot disprove religion... :-)

Massimo's "science can only debunk particular claims made by particular religions" strategy is evasive, because those particular claims are often the backbone of the religions in question. The god conservative Baptists believe in is a god that created mankind as he exists today out of nothing. Can science reject that god? Yes - what Massimo is missing is that, if certain real-world claims are rejected, certain types of deities are also rejected. The quality "created mankind out of nothing" is a non-negotiable attribute of the conservative Christian notion of God. Science can reject that particular god.

I think the marginality of Last Thursdayism is relevant when the question at hand is what science says about the notion of God as conceived by the majority of people. If not, I could as well say that science that cannot reject the Loch Ness monster "as such", because it is possible to conceive of it as an invisible creature capable of telekinesis. Although philosophically correct, the idea is not relevant unless some people really believe that Nessie is invisible (please tell me they don't). But apart from that, I agree with you that you need philosophy to attack Last Thursdayism.

About the persistence in searching for natural explanations. I appreciate your and Luke's point (and Hume's by the way, so you're in good company) and I know this a difficulty with my position, but I don't like the alternative either. What is the point of skeptical investigations of the paranormal if you know beforehand that there's no conceivable way to convince you of their existence? That doesn't sound very scientific. It reminds me of the village skeptic in bad horror movies who stubbornly refuses to believe anything in the face of the most blatant evidence (the skeptic always comes off badly in these movies). Not that I accuse you of being the village skeptic of course, but I think there's a point at which even you would be convinced that 'there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy'. But of course there isn't, ha! :-)

Maybe you can never exclude the hypothesis of superadvanced technology (some aliens playing a joke on us by mimicking the efficacy of prayer for example) but that doesn't mean that the balance cannot tip in either direction. There's a lot of things you will never be able to exclude (the Matrix etc.). Has anyone quoted Norwood Russell Hanson here in this context?

"God exists" could in principle be established for all factually — it just happens not to be, certainly not for everyone! Suppose, however, that next Tuesday morning, just after breakfast, all of us in this one world are knocked to our knees by a percussive and ear-shattering thunderclap. Snow swirls; leaves drop from the trees; the earth heaves and buckles; buildings topple and towers tumble; the sky is ablaze with an eerie, silvery light. Just then, as all the people of this world look up, the heavens open — the clouds pull apart ‚ revealing an unbelievably immense and radiant-like Zeus figure, towering above us like a hundred Everests. He frowns darkly as lightening plays across the features of his Michelangeloid face. He then points down — at me! — and explains, for every man and child to hear: "I have had quite enough of your too-clever logic-chopping and word-watching in matters of theology. Be assured, N.R. Hanson, that I most certainly do exist.

Two more things: I'm not familiar with the discussion about the free will defense, that's why I didn't respond to it. As far as I can see, at best it works for human-inflicted evil, but if I'm wrong, enlighten me! And of course the best arguments may well be philosophical, once again!

There's no reason to keep going over this. It's more than a semantic discussion.

To attempt to show how far off we are let me quote you:

~ "is that many religious claims are eminently testable by means of the methods currently employed in science."

I never once said they weren't. In fact, I have said repeatedly (doubly in fact I said that I have repeatedly said) that we can test claims to the "supernatural". Coyne is simply going further than you claim or apparently think as I've pointed out several times.

If it is a case of being philosophically naive on the part of Coyne, then greater the reason for a blogpost such as Massimo's. But, as we saw from Coyne's reaction to Massimo's other blogpost and others dealing directly with his claim that "supernatural phenomena" are within the realm of science, he's not backing off a bit and could care less about where he is philosophically wrong.

Again, it doesn't matter if the theist believes the "supernatural"/God is interacting with nature or created nature etc. Science can refute the claims to nature made by the religionist (they then either must accept the scientific finding or reject and accept a falsehood), but we can not assume the opposite is true, because people believe a "supernatural force"/God acts within nature doesn't tell us that science can detect and study the "supernatural"/God. We have absolutely nothing to make a positive claim that science can study the "supernatural"/God. I can make the positive claim that science studies what is generally understood as being natural. That assumption is a large part of what has made science so successful, it gives us confidence in our scientific beliefs.

It also appears, again, that you misunderstood my point on the prayer study and interpreting the negative effects of those that knew they were prayed for as "supernatural". It is separate from the question I asked. Though, you do seem to recognize the difficulty with the question.

There are numerous studies pointing to a positive effect of praying and something like meditation with regards to illness and well being (I'm not endorsing any, just making a point). So, perhaps keep your arms to strike the right pose.

Anyway, like I said on the Massimo picks thread, I have to take a break from commenting. I apologize I didn't dig further into your points in this post, but quite frankly I see little point. So, please accept this as my last post and respond as you feel necessary.

~ "What is the point of skeptical investigations of the paranormal if you know beforehand that there's no conceivable way to convince you of their existence? That doesn't sound very scientific."

It's like several points I've made. Just because someone believes a phenomena is "supernatural" or paranormal (or paranatural), doesn't mean there's nothing there. We have no reason to assume the "force" is what one claims it to be, but that doesn't stop us from possibly detecting something else. Besides that point, the more we test the more natural explanations we can offer for claimed phenomena.

It has actually been through testing bogus claims that has given us some great insight into our belief engine. We are getting nearer and nearer to a vast array of naturalistic explanations for a huge variety of belief systems and through understanding the belief claims helps us on our way.

Not only that, but providing this insight we are *hopefully* helping others. But, we are faced with the "rubber duck* problem of bogus claims and beliefs. Like creationism, they keep popping up either very much the same, never really going anywhere, or simply shifting claims a little to give the appearance of legitimacy to the claims.

Like I said, I am taking a break. I wasn't planning on commenting today, but unfortunately did so hurriedly and in a bit of a frustrated mood which left my last couple comments less than well written (even with the bar set as low as I have it already). I apologize, and most of the points have been explained throughout my comments.

Thanks for mentioning it, I did not know that Coyne had written a reply. Unfortunately, I find the reply completely convincing; it shows that his interpretation is the same as mine, i.e. that no atheist scientist actually holds the position that I understand Massimo Pigliucci to claim that they (or should I say, we?) have. There is no need for conflict here as all scientists already know that they cannot reject gods divested of all factual claims, but they also do not care about those.

Apart from that, Ritchie the Bear seems to be able to put my own position on the reject-ability of gods into more concise words than I ever could. Kudos!

And again (Luke): supernatural does not exist. It is an empty category. Either something is measurable and observable, then it is by necessity part of nature and thus subject to study by science, even if it were a god, or it is not, like for example "justice" or "beauty", and then it is a human-invented concept in the realm of this or that sub-discipline of the humanities.

when we investigate the paranormal, we assume that it is "para" in the sense that we don't understand it within the current scientific framework, but that we could - hence our scientific investigations of it.

This does not and cannot apply to the supernatural for the reasons I have already given. That the conclusion that there cannot in principle be any scientific evidence that would convince an atheist makes you uncomfortable is understandable, but it's the other side of the epistemological coin that says that there are limits to science - unless you think there are no limits to science, which I know you don't!

Ritchie, Mintman,

you keep confusing science's ability to reject specific factual claims made by religionists (which has never been an issue) with rejecting "the god hypothesis" (in any form). That's because, like Dawkins and Coyne, you insist in thinking of gods as hypotheses, which they aren't.

I don't confuse the two. I, and Dawkins, and Coyne, and everybody is saying that we do not care about the generalized factual-claim-empty concept of god, just as we shouldn't, as scientists. The point is that you seem to think

"Christian God with bodily risen Jesus and answered prayers is identical to remote, deist, unchallengeable god that a Christian theologian retreats to when cornered by a well-informed skeptic."

and

"Pagan gods personally throwing thunderbolts and wheeling the sun over the firmament is identical to remote, deist, unchallengeable god that a pagan theologian retreats to when cornered by a well-informed skeptic."

I, on the other hand, would put a firm is completely different from between the elements of these pairs and think more along the lines of

"Remote, deist, unchallengeable god of a desperate Christian apologist is identical to remote, deist, unchallengeable of any other religion...

...and is also completely irrelevant to me and useless for their actual congregations." This is the one that is not really a hypothesis. It is empty, ad-hoc cop-out, nothing more. All the others are individually refutable hypotheses, and I do not see Coyne et al claim anything more, quite the contrary, the more I read through them.

Something general, by the way, although I guess that you must tire of this discussion by now. I have for some time now started to wonder about the fetishization of the concept "science" that has taken place in western society. In a positive sense, I see it in the people who have a near-blind confidence in scientific expertise as something absolutely special and better than all other areas of cognitive endeavor, in extreme cases taking the form of arrogance of natural scientists towards colleagues from the humanities. In the negative sense, I see it in part of the US public's anti-intellectualism or a friend's recent claim that the traditional beliefs of some Amazonian shaman were just as valid as our "western" science-based views, even if he believes in demons possessing an epileptic. I wonder if your desire to find a stricter demarcation between science and philosophy is not also influenced by this fetishization, seeing science as this kind of special enterprise with specially developed rules that differ from everything else.

Point is, the more I think about it, the less special science seems to me. Yes, as scientists we use a very formalized set of rules and procedures that nobody else does, but only because we are professionals in understanding the world and therefore need to do it as thoroughly and objectively as possible, not because the underlying principle is so much different from what everybody else does. The underlying principle is still the same: empiricism with a small helping of parsimony. We simply assume (1) that there is a material world out there to be understood, (2) that it is in principle understandable, (3) that the best way to understand it is to try something out, see if it fits/works/leads to the expected result, and if not, try something different, and (4) that it does not make sense to accept a claim that cannot be tested. That is already science, I would say. All else, like the careful formulation of Null hypotheses or sophisticated model selection, is very nice and valuable, but basically only an elaboration of this fundamental approach. But this fundamental approach (and that is the interesting thing here) is nothing particularly special, nothing hallowed, nothing that needs to be given a special place and carefully put either onto a pedestal or into a cage lest it invade other faculties - it is in essence the same approach my four month old daughter uses now that she first explores her surroundings, the same approach we instinctively use in our daily lives when we want to know how to operate a new tool without having the manual, the same approach we would use if we were to strand on an empty island and had to reinvent living on our wits. There is not much to philosophize about to justify it. The leap of faith to get started is minimal and it is rewarded by the fact that empiricism works, continually and consistently. Neither is there a special lab-coat egghead way of thinking that is in principle inaccessible to the layman, as could easily be pointed out to most reasonable non-scientists by demonstrating that they would usually also think empirically (one could even say, hypothesis-driven) when hunting for lost keys instead of, say, imagining that goblins must have stolen them. In fact I do not think that science has found a special, better way of learning about the world, but that many people simply find superstition and escapism easier than honestly, boldly and laboriously extending their tried and proven empiricism from practical every-day life to the rest of their worldview....

...Related to that, I also think that the terminology in Anglo-Saxon countries is unhelpful. Where you speak of "sciences" and "humanities", as if the latter were something completely different, we Germans speak of "Naturwissenschaften" = sciences of nature and "Geisteswissenschaften" = sciences of the mind. Of course, I do not think that every university department deals with science even in the way I understand it - theology (once called the study of something that simply does not exist) and the fine arts come to mind. And yes, pure philosophy does not deal with empirical facts. And yes, there are surely questions that science cannot possibly answer, such as the famous "how many angels fit onto a needle's tip?" or "what is the sound of green?". But conversely, I think that the scope of science as I understand it is everything that can be presumed to exist, be it historical documents, the moon's surface, or gods.

That was about as cogent an explanation of science as I think anybody has ever posted here. I'm with you all the way on it. I think I even felt my brain smile when I read it. I tried to express this naturalistic understanding of science (or something extremely similar to it) in the discussion around Massimo's recent article, "On the scope of skeptical inquiry". I was actually responding to you at the time, too, and I never got back with you after your last response. We were splitting hairs, or at least I was, but I've always felt we fundamentally agree.

I still think the basic process of science is an emergent one, requiring no leap of faith at all - or at least no conscious one. In essence, from day one on planet Earth, if not before, we start with trust. We do not need to think about our experiences, we just experience. Early on, even when our trust in something that matters to us doesn't pan out, we don't think - we just react. But over time our brains organize themselves such that when this occurs we begin reflecting, conceptualizing, comparing our expectations with our experiences, and seeking to reconcile the two. Just as with our experiences, we don't need to think about whether to trust this process; we just do it. There are a lot of blind alleys at first, but after a few hundred thousand iterations the basic semblance of a logic that suffices to get one from cradle to adulthood in a primitive world emerges. The only fundamental thing that science has in addition to this is the parsimony you mentioned, and that's just the result of more iterations. After enough problems are resolved by recognized and then dismissing previously unquestioned assumptions, that becomes a guiding principle. So that's essentially it; that's how science gets started. It's as natural as rain.

I would also say philosophy gets started similarly - reflection, conceptualization, comparison...wash, rinse, repeat. It differs from science in only one trivial, yet ultimately crucial, aspect: it begins with the recognition of concepts as distinct phenomena in their own right. Thus, philosophy gets started by working with the raw stuff of thought itself, whereas science just grabs hold of thoughts and uses them.

Of course, there is no natural law we're aware of that distinguishes between the mind analyzing its sensory experiences and the mind analyzing its own thoughts. But by the same token, the fact that we perceive a conceptual difference in the targets of the analysis makes the distinction convenient to us, in much the same way that we distinguish between our physical form and the image of that form we see in a mirror. It seems almost inconceivable to think that we wouldn't make such a distinction - yet our broader understanding provides us with a context that explains both with a single model.

But like any rules of convenience, we ignore them whenever it makes sense to do so. When we shave, floss our teeth, or put on makeup, we treat the images in the mirror as extensions of ourselves. When we have a real-world problem we wish to solve, as pragmatists we need make no distinction between information gleaned from the senses, memory, self-reflection, or any other source at hand. Whether or not it helps us solve the problem is all that matters. Only that self-reflective quality, the seed of philosophy, discerns a difference. And that's what makes it different.

Thanks for the kind words. Was expecting mostly fundamental disagreement, I must say.

I remember your post from the other thread and it was probably also part of what nudged me to write this here. Maybe some of the conflicts seen here come down to how you define science and philosophy, and definitions can of course never be resolved if people are not in principle willing to find agreement. I just wanted to sketch what definition of science I find helpful and why; and part of the why is that seen this way, so-called "scientism" is perhaps less of a red rag to some.

(Note that this is not saying that arrogance and over-confidence on the part of some natural scientists do not exist. Because I am a biologist myself, the incarnation of this that annoys me most is "biologism", e.g. of the we-found-this-behaviour-in-young-female-chimpanzees,-therefore-women-belong-into-the-kitchen variety or similar.)

I also think that the terminology in Anglo-Saxon countries is unhelpful. Where you speak of "sciences" and "humanities", as if the latter were something completely different, we Germans speak of "Naturwissenschaften" = sciences of nature and "Geisteswissenschaften" = sciences of the mind.

But see this excerpt from the Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Geisteswissenschaften:

... toward the end of the twentieth century, the social sciences have come to be generally grouped together under the heading of "Sozialwissenschaften" or "Gesellschaftswissenschaften," two different German words for "social sciences," as they have increasingly adopted the quantitative methodologies associated with the natural sciences. From the outset, questions about the status of psychology as a scientific discipline have played a pivotal role in the discussion of the nature and limits of the Geisteswissenschaften. At the end of the twentieth century, however, it too was increasingly grouped together with social sciences based on shared quantitative research methods; the notion of the Geisteswissenschaften became closer once again to what in English would be called the humanities. Law, economics, and the social sciences are becoming less commonly subsumed under the heading of the Geisteswissenschaften and an increasing number of departments concentrating on history, literature, art, and related fields often choose to refer to themselves as Kulturwissenschaften instead of as Geisteswissenschaften as they combine methodologies from both the humanities and the social sciences into their studies.

I think that the distinction between science and philosophy (as well as other scholarly fields such as the study of literature) is an important one.

Now that is an interesting discussion, as long as mutual animosity between natural sciences and humanities could be kept to a minimum. Please note that the following is not thought through very carefully, as I should really concentrate on work at the moment:

I think it depends on the approach taken and the questions asked by the specific researchers. Where I did my PhD, for example, psychology was part of the biological faculty and (or because) the psychologists worked very quantitatively. Elsewhere they are in the humanities and work on a more discursive level.

Similarly, if you are studying a previously unknown 400 year old book, you will probably use an approach that does not differ fundamentally from that taken by a natural scientist to find out when it was written and in what context. Only when you start asking questions like what the author wanted to achieve by writing this text does the comparison become a bit more difficult, but that is only part of the research area.

And there is a lot of stuff in the humanities that is very practically or at least in principle accessible to quantitative methods: some linguists studying the "evolution" of languages use similar tools as evolutionary biologists use to study biological evolution. In principle you could even do hypothesis testing in sociology, economics and suchlike, only it is practically difficult and would probably in most cases be considered unethical (think erecting dictatorships in twenty countries so that you can test a new economic system in ten of them while using the rest as a control group...).

So what I want say is that the study of everything that exists or can be hypothesized to do so, be it a quark, a novel or a government, can be studied with the same empirical approach as that of the natural sciences, and a lot of people in the humanities actually do so. Of course, you can also refrain from doing so and operate on a purely discursive level where nothing can ever be decided even on a probability basis, and the question of how much merit that has is most of the ideological divide between the cliché arrogant, materialistic natural scientist and the cliché postmodernist scholar of the humanities.

Of course, a philosopher would say that it does not only have merit but is fundamentally important. I would like to learn more about philosophy (when I find the time) but instinctively my reaction is the same as Dawkins', as he expressed it when discussing philosophical proofs of god: I would be deeply distrustful of any grand conclusion that is reached without feeding in a bit of data or evidence. But that probably only shows that I was trained as a natural scientist.

Well, that still leaves those areas of scholarship that deal with things that do not exist "out there" but are complete human inventions or concepts, like beauty or justice. But there are relatively few that come to mind - and even beauty is, in a way, a perception in the brain that could be examined by a neurologist or quantified in a representative survey. Hm.

Oh, and I should say that I obviously do not doubt that a philosopher works differently than a natural scientist. Perhaps this expresses my thoughts more clearly: it is not science that is a very special restricted endeavor, rather it has grown logically out of the way to learn about the world out there that emerged as useful to us in all imaginable areas. And because science is about everything, it does not seem to make sense to me to tell a scientist that he is not qualified to comment on something, even if this something can also be addressed in a non-scientific, e.g. philosophical approach.

I appreciate the thoughtful dialogue of the last several exchanges, but the following quote caught my attention:

> my reaction is the same as Dawkins', as he expressed it when discussing philosophical proofs of god: I would be deeply distrustful of any grand conclusion that is reached without feeding in a bit of data or evidence. <

So Dawkins' would reject mathematics and abstract logic, since they reach sweeping conclusions without any input from empirical data whatsoever.

I understand that's not what you meant, obviously, but that's a nice example of a huge field of human knowledge that is based on "armchair speculation" and no data, and yet...

Okay, firstly, I think that the kind of conclusion reached by a mathematician without using any empirical data is on a very different level than the conclusion that a guiding intelligence is behind the universe or not.

Secondly, and correct me if I am wrong, because I will be the first to admit that I may know even less about theoretical mathematics than about pure philosophy, as far as I understood some outreach writings by a mathematician I once read, math is not really about the nature and the characteristics of our particular universe that have to be discovered by us because they could be this or that way, but the idea is that math can only be the way it is because nothing else would be logically consistent. And that is, if so much is true, where I then do not know enough about philosophy to gauge if philosophy makes the same claim. As philosophy seems to be very heterogeneous field, at least some of the field probably cannot make that claim, I would guess.

More to the point here, is the specific question of the existence of gods a question that cannot be decided based on (lack of) empirical evidence, as you postulate, or is it a question that cannot be decided based on thinking about it alone, as Dawkins proposes? The "New Atheists" in general say that it is a factual claim about the nature of the universe, that we have good reasons and a working tradition to trust empiricism / science to address these kinds of claims, that we have good reasons and a working tradition to disallow empty claims comparable to last thursdayism, and that therefore it is only logical and intellectually honest to extend the same approach to the god question. This has convinced me so far - also because I have never seen it to mean that we can rule out last thursdayism definitely. Completely unbased ad-hoc rationalizations are not taken seriously anywhere else, the logic simply goes, so why grant theists a singular exception?

my analogy with math was not to claim that philosophy works exactly like it, but only that to say that one cannot gain knowledge unless there is empirical evidence is simply not true.

That said, one can indeed think of math as a branch of logic, and logic is a branch of philosophy...

The reason philosophers do not reach the rigour of mathematicians (or logicians) is because their problems are more heterogeneous and not amenable to the same kind of treatment, but my broader point remains.

As for the difference between Dawkins and me, remember that I never said that philosophy can settle the issue by itself, I said that it has to be a science-informed philosophical debate, I'm trying to capture the best of both worlds here, as opposed to Dawkins' dismissive attitude toward a field about which he frankly does not know anything.

This was a really interesting post. My reaction is probably out of place in the thread at the moment. I have a more direct reaction to Massimo’s original post at Moral Bytes. I just wanted to make the point that, there is a difference between science and philosophy for all the commonality they share, and that this difference does matter.

Regarding mathematics, I think it's important to point out that many different self-consistent maths have been developed, some of which pertain to the world as we observe it, and others that don't. To a mathematician, as long as they are self-consistent, they are perfectly valid. The only ones that are useful to science, though, are the ones that produce results that match up to empirical observations.

For example, the math of quantum dynamics, in which it takes 720 of rotation to complete a revolution, is entirely self-consistent and could in theory have been developed entirely without a need for it. Maybe it even was. I'm not really knowledgeable of the historicity of this. But suffice to say, without an empirical application, it doesn't help us understand anything directly - it just helps the individuals who develop and work with it hone their logical thinking skills (which is locally useful in its own right).

There are other examples from the history of mathematics in which certain logics actually have been developed prior to any perceived need for them, and were imported into standard scientific practice after the fact. Many elements of matrix math, for example, meet this description. And currently we have the mathematics of M-theory, involving 11 dimensions of space-time. Little by little, M-theory is incrementally getting nudged toward the status of a full-blown scientific theory (which it cannot be before someone figures out how to test it). It may eventually be incorporated into accepted scientific theory.

But while many mathematician-philosophers delight in working with logics unencumbered by the need to match them to observable reality (which, by the way, I love to do too, so I say this without an iota of disparagement), it's safe to say that in general advances in mathematics take place in response to the problem of describing observable phenomena - Newtonian laws of motion and calculus being obvious examples.

Massimo, at one point during the discussion around your "On the Scope of Skeptical Inquiry" article, you said to me, "I don't believe that 2+2=4 because of empirical evidence." I don't think I addressed that statement directly at the time, but in light of the fact that a different mathematics might come up with an entirely different yet completely valid answer, I think it's clear that you know that precisely and specifically because of empirical evidence. You could just as appropriately know that other answer to be true, too, so long as you also knew the context

In the context of the utility of philosophy, which some "new atheists" apparently reject, spotlighting specific historical instances in which philosophy actually operated as the vanguard in assimilating new frontiers of knowledge would be much more effective than trying to defend against the encroachment that results from the frankly petty "fetishization", as Mintman so aptly put it, of science.

The bottom line is, the closer we examine the relationship between philosophy and science, the more we see that they exchange information all the time, routinely, and without regard for the fact that they are, in fact, different. If it weren't for philosophy, we wouldn't think about thinking, and consequently we wouldn't learn new ways to think. If it weren't for science, we wouldn't have anything practical to think about.

So all Massimo is basically saying is that the debate over religion is a science-informed philosophical debate, a mix of science and philosophy. Except it's a philosophical issue, not a scientific one.

I couldn't quite bring back my prior learning about the history of matrix math, so I went a-hunting. Turns out it's joined at the hip to the 720-degree circle in quantum mechanics. Using the HitchHiker's Guide...er, I mean, Google, I came up with this:

1925 - When Werner Heisenberg was a student developing quantum mechanics in 1925, he spent a sleepless night inventing a new system of computation to describe the motion of electrons in atoms. His professor Max Born noticed that the "new" math was merely matrix multiplication, a 19th-century invention. Why should these mathematical methods, invented out of thin air by mathematicians long before physicists had any interest, describe nature so accurately? Nobody really knows.

The full article available by purchase, but I'm sure there are better sources out there somewhere. Probably at least one excellent book.

To have chosen two so closely related concepts as examples in my previous post, I think I must've known that at one point, and forgotten. Hooray for the subconscious mind, for providing a whole 'nother other form of rational thought! (As I like to say, "My brain is smarter than I am.")

Massimo, revisiting the "2+2=4" item just very briefly, in case it wasn't clear, I do recognize that the mathematical truth of the statement does not rely on empirical evidence. But the overall truth of it is most certainly related to our empirical understandings. Similarly, try convincing a layman there are 720 degrees in a circle; he'll likely think you're nuts, because while the statement is just as true in the appropriate mathematical context, that context does not overlap with our direct experience of the universe. So context matters. A lot.

Going one step further, I would even say that the logics a mathematician works with are no less real to his brain than the external universe is to the average shmoe. It's all abstracted anyway, since our minds must assemble a "sensical" understanding of the universe from raw stimuli to begin with. The brain can mostly distinguish between sensical and self-generated phenomena, but once we start working with mental concepts of real things, we've already abstracted that sensical understanding - abstract in the first place - one step further. So the closer we examine empiricality as a distinguishing attribute between science and philosophy, the more literally non-sensical that demarcation becomes.

"god" is not a hypothesis because it isn't testable, per se (though, as I keep pointing out, specific factual claims made by religionists are in fact falsifiable by science).

Philosophy addresses last thursdaysm or the free will defense better than science because it draws out the logical and theological consequences of these notions, about which science says nothing.

perspicio,

I appreciate your points, but I still maintain that empirical context is not necessary to the belief that 1+1=2, or of any other mathematical truth.

I would also question your statement that it is safe to say that advances in math take place in response to problems describing observable phenomena. There is a huge field of non-applied, highly esoteric, math that as far as we know has nothing to do with empirical reality, and is certainly not being developed with any relation to empirical facts. Same, of course, for formal logic.

Massimo's last point is exactly right. Richard Borcherds won the Fields Medal for proving the Moonshine Conjecture. You'll be pressed to come up with an application of the Moonshine Conjecture to a so-called "real world" problem.

Broadly speaking, [philosophy] can be thought of as an activity that uses reason to explore issues that include [list of topics provided].

Massimo, this is not broad enough to my mind. There is also, necessarily, a pre-rational visionary component to philosophy. Before we analyze we must have something to analyze, and if philosophers could not produce new metaphysical models, it would not have progressed much since the Milesians.

It seems you make the same reductionist mistake here as the scientistic writers, just one tier upward, perhaps because you desire to protect rationality from something (seemingly) antagonistic to it.

"I do recognize that the mathematical truth of the statement does not rely on empirical evidence."

You said:

"I still maintain that empirical context is not necessary to the belief that 1+1=2, or of any other mathematical truth."

I don't think we disagree on that. If you like the way you said it better, that's fine with me. I'm only suggesting that the fact that you chose a mathematical truth that does reliably map onto the empirically known universe (2+2=4) as an example is probably not inconsequential, and suggests that, no matter how free-standing they may be, you are not altogether aloof from the real-world significance of philosophical truths. After all, one of the main subtexts of your article is that philosophy has such applications. (You don't argue with the New Atheists' conclusions, just with their assertion that they are derived without philosophical input.)

On the other point about advances in math being largely in response to problems involving observable phenomena...well, yeah, I did overstate that. And I'm disinclined to duck behind my other statement, that "the logics a mathematician works with are no less real to his brain than the external universe is to the average shmoe" for cover, as much as I enjoy arguing from the third side of the coin. ;)

As usual, we pretty much agree on the big stuff, and our quibbles are the exceptions that prove the rule.

I read the QRofB 2008 piece. I still don't see how philosophy helps science. A couple of points:

1. On Dennett's statement, couldn't you say "There is no such thing as philosophy-free _______, there is only ________ whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination" (p.8) and put anything into the blank? What does this statement mean? Not much if "philosophical baggage" can be things like assuming naturalism. Later you state "any activity that violates methodological naturalism is by philosophical definition not science." (p.12) I know the philosophers really like definitions, but do they need to claim this as one of theirs? Doesn't it mean the same thing if "philosophical" is left out?

2. "A philosopher would approach the same problem differently. In particular, she would focus on the broad picture, on the validity of background assumptions, and on the internal coherence of the claims under investigation." (p.11) For these two items, science has to call in the philosophers to figure these out? You also contrast "verifiable details (science)" to "internally incoherent (philosophy)" (p.12). Isn't that logic, not philosophy? You call logic philosophy again later on that page, "This is another philosophical argument, as contrived dualism is a logical fallacy".

3. I'm not a consilience fan either, but you don't have to be to see that science is taking over philosophical turf, "cognitive science and evolutionary biology have been contributing significantly to understanding questions typically debated in philosophy of mind and ethics," (p.13) while the reverse is not happening.

you can probably say something like Dennett's quote for many (though not necessarily all) fields, not just science. That doesn't invalidate the point.

It's not just naturalism, it's causality, induction, deduction, physical reality, and then we get to more specific background assumptions that are field-specific. The point isn't that scientists should be concerned with those, but that one cannot claim that science is independent of them.

Logic *is* a branch of philosophy.

As for ethics being informed by science, yes of course, I made that point. But the fact remains that facts about the human mind will not tell you what is right or wrong, you'll have to come up with arguments that do not depend on empirical contingencies -- i.e., you have to do philosophy.

Mintman said: "If you jump off a 20 storey building you go splat, no matter how much you philosophize about our ability to draw conclusions about the fundamental nature of the universe in general and the law of gravity in particular."

I've always wondered why people think of this as an argument in favor of science. Do you really need science to know that you "go splat" when you jump out a 20th-floor window? Quite the contrary.

To me, comments like these suggest that for many people, scientific knowledge is superfluous.

That is strange. I see it as a possible argument for the vacuousness of certain kinds of postmodernist and armchair-philosophical stances. You know, the kind that a sociologist acquaintance shows when telling me that all my natural science is just an arbitrary ideology, and that there really is no objectively understandable world out there, only opinions, and by the way yours is imperialistic-western because you believe in reason.

You-go-splat-no-matter-what-your-opinion is, I think, an adequate rejoinder to that kind of nonsense, not because you need a natural scientist to understand it, but because it is an easy to grasp example of the kind of thing for which science would be able to converge on a best model. You could also say, for example, "if you pump megatons of pesticides into the landscape you are going to kill the pollinators we need for our crops, no matter how much you philosophize about about our ability to draw conclusions about the fundamental nature of the universe in general and insect ecology in particular."

Even though I criticize forms of 'alternative medicine' for falsely claiming what is hugely not science as science-based on the grounds of evidence, I think it is their poor THINKING / philosophizing that leads to their false empirical claims by way of what I'll call 'epistemic muddle'.

I can't separate the two [science, philosophy], e.g. when I wrote "The Epistemic Conflation of a School of Thought Claiming to be Scientific."

Anyway, by the way, I'm a 1994 Lehman College PBK SCL graduate.

If you bump into Gary Schwartz in your activities there, he may remember me, Rob Cullen.

no idea what you are complaining about. How don't see what a third culture (which one is that?) has to do with my view that philosophy and science are different intellectual enterprises.

As for the Italian Observatory, I certainly didn't pick the name (indeed, I have nothing to do with the group), but it is run by interesting people who wish to contribute to a broader concept of human knowledge. Again, what on earth is wrong with that??

Massimo, the 3rd culture is huge and is exactly what you are discussing (the 2 cultures). You will find Dawkins, Dennett, Pinker, Minsky, Susskind, E. O. Wilson there. Please check www.edge.orghttp://www.edge.org/about_edge.html

3rd culture posits that science through neuroscience and complex systems science will encompass the humanities as we know it and render it toothless and obsolete.

I must say there is a certain attraction to this movement and it is quite liberating intellectually.

What is wrong with a "broader concept of human knowledge" is that BS will creep in and just the term above reeks of languagism. The larger your house, the more dirt will accumulate, and the more energy you have to spend to keep it coherent and in shape.

When rules are hard to come by in philosophy, and they are, then it is best to be in ship-shape than to go for a broader approach.

Look how philosophy has gone astray throughout the ages.

Idealistic yearnings to cross bridges and establish multi-disciplinary dialogs are superfluous in most cases and misleading IMO.

In any case, the revolution is coming - mind sciences are here and emergent systems theory have a lot to explain. Humanities - get ready as you will be swept aside. CP Snow will no longer have to fret in august literary company - as most literature will be exposed as intrinsically BS! The real question as you know is - would a naturalistic world view by society at large be an improvement or a deadly turn?

Don't know if I should take your posting as satire or confused ramblings, but the latter seems more plausible, unfortunately. Humanities - get ready as you will be swept aside? Seriously? I would have thought I was one of those arrogant, "scientistic" natural scientists who do not think much of most sociology, economics and philology, but you definitely take the cake. Do you honestly think that questions like "why did Shakespeare cite Aristotle here in Act IV", "what is a fair salary", "to what degree did the civilian Germans know of the holocaust" and "is the death penalty just" can be answered by the natural sciences if you just give them enough computers and tomographs, or do you simply consider these questions BS, to use your own words? If the former, then you need to get your head checked, if the latter, you need to grow up.

I'm not surprised that the group you mention wishes to "encompass the humanities" and absorb them into science. The amount of hubris is incredible, not to mention their intellectual naiveté. The only name that surprises me there is Dennett, who is usually more sophisticated than the rest of the bunch.

Wow, this party still has some life? Sweeeeet. This has been one of my favorite discussions at this blog so far.

I am curious to hear Massimo's and Mintman's response to an earlier idea I tossed out onto the floor....

"Philosophy differs from science in only one trivial, yet ultimately crucial, aspect: it begins with the recognition of concepts as distinct phenomena in their own right. Thus, philosophy gets started by working with the raw stuff of thought itself, whereas science just grabs hold of thoughts and uses them."

Do you feel that that's a fair statement? Does the overall sense of the difference between the two disciplines ring true? Is it too restrictive to say that identifying and analyzing thoughts as distinct phenomena is the fundamental difference between philosophy and science?

Well, by "trivial" I mean that in treating them as valid objects for analytical purposes, the reasoning faculties of our minds (presumably) make no innate distinction between a concept derived directly from sensory stimuli and one generated through, say, imagination, memory, self-reflection, etc. The only real distinction I can perceive is how many degrees of abstraction are involved in generating each kind (and therefore how neatly and reliably each maps onto our sensory experience of the universe). Looking at that distinction in isolation (i.e. temporarily ignoring all of the knowledge we already have about its implications), it certainly appears fairly trivial.

By "crucial" I mean that not making a distinction between these two kinds of concepts for analytical purposes can be credited with giving rise to the vast and glorious realms of abstract thought, which we know as philosophy.

By way of analogy, we could observe that the fact that water expands when it freezes is, by itself, a trivial fact - but of course we know that this fact is crucial for the existence of life as we know it.

Massimo, I got to be running - but will come back. I trace the source of our disagreement to that you put Philosophy squarely in the Humanities, while I put it ABOVE humanities. Philosophy is NOT humanities and has nothing to do with society.

The correct dichotomy is not nature vs. humans (as humans are after all part of nature), but empiricism vs. rationalism.

Science is empiricism. Philosophy is rationalism. And humanities is well, irrationalism or over-rationalism - essentially BS.

And I disagree with your video on Philosophy. There are 6 parts to philosophy IMO - Logic/mathematics, epistemology, ontology, and ethics (or value systems). These have NOTHING to do with society of humans. They apply to ANY society - such as ants or robots.

The crappy part of philosophy, metaphysics/theology, and aesthetics (subsumed and decimated by recent discoveries in neuro-mind science) is jettisoned to the underworld of the humanities. Political philosophy is really a question of ethics and systems science, and most of that belongs to PoliSci anyways.

So you see the 3rd culture has a very high regard for Philosophy and relinquishes the kingdom of rationalism to it. However, I can smell social-centrism in most of what you write - this is unfortunate because value systems (ethics) is essentially arbitrary and essentially nothing to do with humans.

Unfortunately for philosophers quantum physics has proven that rationalism breaks down in the microworld (you cannot deduce that a particle is here, until you see it). On this basis Science is the top dog. But philosophy properly reconstituted is essential for the advancement of society, whatever "advancement" means.

Sorry, sounds garbled again, or at least to me. Just because you redefine faculty borders and "kingdoms" (of rationalism? Huh?) to accommodate your conclusions these redefinitions do not become useful to others.

To me, science and rational inquiry are about everything that can be supposed to exist - that is why I say that people like Dawkins should not shut their mouth about gods, but are eminently qualified to discuss the question. But there are useful questions (about all these things that science can deal with in its own way) that cannot be addressed with the tools of sciences sensu stricto. You can quantify the average perception of beauty scientifically but that does not mean that what science has to say on the matter of beauty is already all that humans can and should say about it. Simply throwing all the humanities you do not like out of the window is very immature and ultimately a terribly dreary outlook.

Oh, and of course you had to pull the quantum card. Argh. Also, what does that have to do with anything? I doubt that you can deduce anything to exist without somehow providing at least circumstantial evidence for its existence, but that is completely besides the point. Are you operating under the impression that philosophy is about deducing if there is a tree on the other side of the house without seeing it or what?

I've found this post only now through a long twitter chain: I mostly agree with what you say and I would like to address you to a recent post of mine where I touch precisely the same topic, in particulare dealing with the 'speculative' dimension of both science and philosophy [http://hypertiling.wordpress.com/2009/10/17/speculative-science-and-speculative-philosophy/] Cheers, Fabio

~ "The only name that surprises me there is Dennett, who is usually more sophisticated than the rest of the bunch."

That's wildly dissapointing, taking the absurd description by Glass, this is the person it would surprise to find to want to do that? What about E.O. Wilson, the person who wrote the book, Consilience? Dennet has offered idea about bridging the Humanities with science in much the same way as David Sloan Wilson and Mike Shermer (who offers the idea that history can be scientific, and I agree).

I really don't understand what's going on these days. The idea here is to bridge the humanities with more proven scientific approaches etc., not to make the humanities "toothless", quite the contrary! And yes, Philosophy is in the Humanities dept, as well as Law, Literature and many others. Of course Pinker wants to bridge Humanities, given is interest in Language and using a scientific evolutionary approach - Massimo, surely you know this.

Unless I'm misreading people here, I'm really taken by surprise.

I'll respond more if someone responds to be setting me straight on this. Clearly we can bring a more scientific approach to music, but I'll be fucking damned if the quest here by whack-jobs is to argue to make it "toothless" and "obsolete".

My understanding of E.O.Wilson's, Pinker's and Dennett's as well as David Sloan Wilson, Shermer and others is to bridge the cultures which will enhance both the sciences and the Humanities.

Massimo, you've been arguing for a scientifically informed ideal, including with Philosophy, surely you're not abandoning that in the face of some crazy talk?

One last note, this is the kind of thing I've been referring to on many sites. There are people who are either generally new and heavily influenced by a few newer books by "new atheist" or are older and can't let go of obscene biases that are talking huge amounts of uninformed, "group think", bad propaganda, bullshit.

I apologize for my poorly written comment above, and for my choice of certain words.

Massimo,

In your essay from Skeptical Inquirer (SI); Toward A Consilience of Sciences and Humanities, you take E.O. Wilson to task for what you consider his scientistic attitude, in deed, to the point of arguing it is in part responsible for the popularity of the postmodernist movement (Something you offer no evidence for by the way). So, therefore we have the two extremes of where science supposedly lies to these sides.

It's true what you say about the difficulty between the two cultures, science and the humanities. However, it appears you may be pushing E.O. Wilson a bit to far to one side (while blaming him for the other) by saying how he is misrepresenting Whewell's "consilience" (one example of course). Wouldn't be easier to just recognize E.O. was creating a framework from which to work from and there is no need for devout literalism here?

I think you're overstating as much as Glass has. Your article, which I just dug up from my stack of SI's, reminds me also that you should do a blog on morality and science.

I think we are all saying the same thing and emphasis appears to be clouding judgment and that goes for both sides. The problem of emphasis has been around in many scientific discussion, especially between the sciences and the humanities.

Take for instance the bloated debates between Stephen J. Gould and Dennett/Dawkins. Dennett was so confused by Gould's argument in Wonderful Life that he mislabeled the argument in the title of his own essay in reply, ""Tinker to Evers to Chance", of course missing that it's not about chance per se and contingency is not taking over. Or even Pinker confusing Gould's skepticism of EP, even recently (on edge.org strangely enough) he stated Gould would not accept EP at any level, this is not true and Gould, in the same way he stated repeatedly that when he said replay the tape a million times and we won't get Homo Sapiens and still Dennett got it wrong, he also said EP showed great potential and would most likely bare fruit.

Again, what it appears to be happening in these debates, or whatever they are, is manly based on emphasis, but that is not to say both sides are right. It only recognizes how easily it can be to overlook the obvious when beliefs are challenged.

I noticed in a blog from around the time of you SI essay had mentioned David Sloan Wilson (made sure you noted he wasn't E.O. - BTW, link is broken in that blogpost). However, David Wilson has been talking a great deal about bridging the humanities and science. Take a look at his Evos program and his treating religion as a natural phenomena, that's exactly what Dennett is basically saying. You paint E.O. Wilson as holding religion as purely biological (reducing everything to biology), and you of course recognize it must be for the most part given everything is, but you don't really argue that E.O. is off base. What you do do is lead into a discussion of morality and finish saying that it's wrong to hold that biology can give us a "satisifactory account of the panoply of current and historical ethical norms across societies".

However, that quote above may make a good reply to a Sam Harris type scientism, but I fail to see E.O. Wilson goes that far, and in fact, E.O. and David Wilson seem very much on the same page in this regard.

Here's a quote from David's Evos web site:

~ "BU’s Evolutionary Studies Program is the first of its kind to teach evolution in a truly integrated fashion, beginning with core principles and extending in all directions, from the biological sciences to all aspects of humanity, including the nature of religion"

I'll return to this topic later once I get some replies in so I know what the hell is going on.

I like Edge, always have. I was a major advocate of the site. However, I have changed my opinion of Edge considerably. First thing I notice is the in-group mentality has taken over to a disturbing point. Here, I am mostly irritated by the lack of scope brought to scientific understandings and has been greatly replaced with a core ideal that reflects Brockman's and a few others agenda. In this way I find it a potential force against free and open inquiry. At times I will want to shout that what was started as a wonderful contribution is nothing more than an elitist club that is horribly naive in scope and forethought.

To many scientific sites are slowly falling into the trap of bias while both neglecting to outline that bias and offerings are limited to either confirmational information gathering or outlets to scorn opposing scientific views (of course I am *not* arguing bias is inherently bad). I have come to the conclusion a contributing factor to my observation is an agenda of an atheistic belief system which wishes to maintain a certain protocol, or agenda.

I would add that I am an "atheist", and in no way can be pigeon holed into an "atheist, but..." argument or anything of the sort.

Hey, the J up there wasn't me. Just to clarify. Damn, I gotta get a more unique handle...

I like this "last Thursdayism" thing, if it is what I suppose it is (world created last Thursday, and set up to look like it was very old, fabricated memories and all?). I think I'll convert to that. After all, no one can prove me wrong... :-P

I stand by my column and general commentary on E.O. Wilson, and I certainly don't like Pinker's take an iota more. Again, I think Dennett is more nuanced about it.

It seems to me that these people's ideas of "consilience" is a thinly veiled scientistic reduction of the humanities (including philosophy, which I actually see as hovering between humanities and sciences) into the sciences, particularly the biological ones. (And yes, this is not at all what Whewell had in mind.)

Pinker's misunderstanding of Gould would be comical, if it weren't for the fact that Pinker is one of the most influential scientist-intellectuals at the moment, not a comedian.

As for D.S. Wilson, he co-wrote a paper for the Quarterly Review of Biology recently, for which I was the editor, in which he brought E.O. much closer to sanity (then again, I don't really know how much of the paper E.O. contributed to). Still, I have my own disagreements about D.S.'s over-emphasis on what Dawkins (ironically!) would call "universal Darwinism." I'm going to give a seminar at Binghamton next week, and I'll spend a lot of time with D.S.

Professor, you said that no professional philosopher considers himself/herself a Cartesian dualist anymore. But a recent survey by conducted David Chalmers showed that 27% of professional philosophers selected "non-physicalism" when asked about the mind. Granted that non-physicalism is probably technically not the same as Cartesian dualism, but 1. 27% is a very large number. 2. non-physicalism is still very close to dualism. Doesn't it demonstrate that the progress of philosophy, if at all, is very very slow?

I am a fan of EO Wilson's idea of consilience, so I was surprised first to read of him in Massimo's post as a proponent of scientism, then to see a "defense" of his ideas by somebody who sees them as a club to hit the arts faculty with.

Inevitably, we hit upon the cardinal sin of "reductionism"... I wanted, though, to ask seriously if there is a more in-depth critique of Wilson's programme somewhere that I ought to read.

Frankly, though, I don't see any real critique in it, besides what seems to be a misunderstanding of Wilson. But I suppose it is a second-generation source. I'll look into Midgley further if she's worth it.

There must be something wrong with philosophy when the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin is cause for debate. Why angels? Why not Teletubbies?

Science, on the other hand, relies on demonstrable data, logic, and reasoning. Unlike philosophy, it contributes many wonderful inventions to the world. You don't even need to study philosophy to think logically or choose between good and evil. Science makes things work, whereas philosophy is very often just intellectual masturbation. Instead of wasting four years in a university poring over long-winded drivel and obfuscating paragraphs, why not devote your time to becoming an engineer or a doctor? Wouldn't that be more productive?

I think Sam Harris is trying to close the gap between Science and Morality. And he is doing a nice job at it.By defining that morality means as a landscape over which the humanity moves, he illustrates that there are right and wrong answers for moral questions.

This advancement would not have come if Sam Harris would not have background in Philosophy. He has brought the morality debate into purview of science.

scadza, my point is that Harris has done no such thing at all because moral questions are not the sort of questions that can be decided on empirical grounds. Science can help us making decisions about specific courses of action, but what kind of action we want to take depends on our values.

"Scientific theories are always tentative ..." If you believe this, try to convince physicists that the -1/2 in the standard form of Einstein's field equations should be replaced by -1/2 + dark-matter-compensation-constant, where dark-matter-compensation-constant is approximately sqrt((60±10)/4) * 10^-5 . It is like trying to convince the Pope that Judaism is better than Catholicism.

The certainty that people feel a theory has does not make that theory more than tentative.

The last clause is fitting; there is a dogmatic streak in any enterprise in which human self-esteem is at stake. That is why it is important that the institutions of science are open to all criticism, even if individuals aren't.