My sense from the totality of Fed communications – from both hawks and doves – is that they will stick to their original timetable and then pause. At that point they have to decide whether to mop up the excess reserves. If the economy is OK, they will start to sell Treasuries. If the economy is too fragile they will simply do nothing and wait. If the economy really sucks, the QE3 speculation can begin. The timetable depends entirely on the economy, of course. And Bernanke has said so. Bottom line: we are a long way away from either QE3 or raising rates. Over the near term, it’s a question of what to do after QE2 is over.

Unfortunately, the US economy has weakened somewhat since that time and so the speculation about QE3 has gathered apace. Let me say a few words on this topic here. But, before I do so, let’s review How Quantitative Easing Really Works.

Quantitative easing is simply large scale asset purchases (LSAP) by the central bank. The central bank is permitted by law to purchase a wide range of assets including but not limited to Treasury securities, mortgage-backed securities, or municipal bonds.

In QE1, the Fed purchased nearly $1.75 trillion of Treasury, agency, and agency mortgage-backed securities through the LSAP programs.

The second round of quantitative easing was concentrated on purchases of medium-maturity Treasury securities only, meaning the Fed bought these securities in exchange for reserve deposits it had created expressly for that purpose.

In engaging in quantitative easing, the Fed has not intended to perform a lender of last resort role. Rather, as both Brian Sack and Janet Yellen have attested, the Fed’s intention has been to artificially suppress risk premia to support economic activity.

Therefore, all QE2 does is drain the real economy of interest income by swapping an interest-bearing government liability for an essentially non-interest bearing government liability, offset by changing interest rate expectations, which alter private portfolio preferences, and lower risk premia, leading to credit growth, leverage and speculation, forces which should pump up the real economy.

So, what about QE3? My sense is that political pressures to remove both fiscal and monetary stimulus are too much to bear – both from politicians as well as from internal Fed dissent. In late March when the Fed hawks were trying to grab the bully pulpit to disabuse us of the possibility of QE3, I said pressure from the hawks would anchor the debate on QE such that QE2 would end as anticipated, followed by economic weakness without an immediate QE3. We are now experiencing that weakness. But I expect the economy would have to be in or near recession before the Fed acts with more QE.

Now, I parsed part of this speech in December of last year. My conclusion was this:

Judging from Bernanke’s previous writing, he seems to think a combination of fiscal and monetary stimulus are what are needed to prevent debt deflation from becoming entrenched in a way that turns cyclical unemployment into structural unemployment. Based on Bernanke’s commentary on 60 Minutes last night, I believe he will continue to prescribe more cowbell, "nonstandard means of injecting money", unless political forces or internal dissent stop him.

Here’s the part Invictus focuses on that I did not. I have underlined the part relevant to QE3:

So what then might the Fed do if its target interest rate, the overnight federal funds rate, fell to zero? One relatively straightforward extension of current procedures would be to try to stimulate spending by lowering rates further out along the Treasury term structure–that is, rates on government bonds of longer maturities. There are at least two ways of bringing down longer-term rates, which are complementary and could be employed separately or in combination. One approach, similar to an action taken in the past couple of years by the Bank of Japan, would be for the Fed to commit to holding the overnight rate at zero for some specified period. Because long-term interest rates represent averages of current and expected future short-term rates, plus a term premium, a commitment to keep short-term rates at zero for some time–if it were credible–would induce a decline in longer-term rates. A more direct method, which I personally prefer, would be for the Fed to begin announcing explicit ceilings for yields on longer-maturity Treasury debt (say, bonds maturing within the next two years). The Fed could enforce these interest-rate ceilings by committing to make unlimited purchases of securities up to two years from maturity at prices consistent with the targeted yields. If this program were successful, not only would yields on medium-term Treasury securities fall, but (because of links operating through expectations of future interest rates) yields on longer-term public and private debt (such as mortgages) would likely fall as well.

You should recognize much of this argument from Randy Wray’s post highlighting the fact that QE2 was the equivalent of issuing treasury bills. However, if you recall I mentioned in November that the FOMC considered offering unlimited quantitative easing to target long-term interest rates. Ultimately, one can influence the price or the quantity of something, but not both. And the Fed decided to influence quantity when its stated aim during QE2 was to influence price. Ostensibly this was because of political pressure. Read the Invictus piece because it is clear from Bernanke’s writing there that he really thinks fiscal policy is more effective than quantitative easing to the degree you want to add stimulus. And it is also clear that the US has the same political problems regarding budget deficits and fiscal policy as the Japanese.

But, of course, Bernanke has no input into fiscal policy and right now fiscal policy is a dead issue in Washington. Interest rates are already zero percent. So, Bernanke has decided to fall back on the only thing he has left and print money.

Therefore, as I stated at the end of the recent post on Raghuram Rajan’s views on monetary policy, if the economy swoons the Fed will be forced to take more drastic action and that means targeting rates with an unlimited supply of QE as well as other measures.

In the November post on the FOMC considering offering unlimited quantitative easing to target long-term interest rates, I further commented the following:

the Federal Reserve understands it could have done more but is actually only committed to QE-lite as I have called this round of QE. Likely, political constraints or internal dissent explains why the Fed took this route. Here is what the Fed could have done:

Set an interest-rate target. As authors here have indicated (see here), the Fed has absolute control over the full spectrum of rates if it is willing to offer unlimited supply of liquidity to target those rates. This is what is meant when the Fed says "participants also noted potentially large risks, including the risk that the Federal Reserve might find itself buying undesirably large amounts."

Buy only the longest duration Treasury assets. The Fed could have targeted long-lived assets like 10- and 30-year paper. This would have had the largest impact on mortgage rates.

QE3 is still a pretty long way off. But these are the types of policy moves one could expect, something to keep in mind if the economy weakens further.

Edward Harrison is the founder of Credit Writedowns and a former career diplomat, investment banker and technology executive with over twenty years of business experience. He is also a regular economic and financial commentator on BBC World News, CNBC Television, Business News Network, CBC, Fox Television and RT Television. He speaks six languages and reads another five, skills he uses to provide a more global perspective. Edward holds an MBA in Finance from Columbia University and a BA in Economics from Dartmouth College. Edward also writes a premium financial newsletter. Sign up here for a free trial.

10 Comments

Great post. Question for you. If/when QE3 does arrive and takes the forms you mentioned, what kind of effects will it have on the economy? Would another surge in commodity prices be almost a certainty? As well as another big drop in value of the USD? Or would these be more limited in QE3 due to the thought I had below.

I’m far from an expert on these matters, but if Japan is any example – the more QE that is done, the less effective it seems to become over time. Sort of a bit like medicine – take too much of it over time and the potency of the medicine is gradually reduced as the body gets “used to it.” QE1 was quite successful in boosting the stock market, among other things I imagine (like being a nice trash bin for stuff that banks didn’t want). QE2 doesn’t seem to have done much beyond cause a drop in the value of the USD (which is good for exporters, so there’s a winner somewhere), playing some role in keeping low mortgage rates and a surge in commodity/input prices and the inevitable rise in inflation that follows.

Also, perhaps this is just a unjustified worry, but if QE3 (and perhaps further QE’s) are done, doesn’t that just further distort the economy – making the pullback from QE (whenever that might occur) all the more difficult and painful? As Japan’s experience kind of shows, once QE starts, it does seem to be difficult to get away from it, let alone undo the effects of past QE’s.

We can’t know what will happen in response to QE3 but if the Fed did target rates, the one thing sure to happen is rates would fall. That would both keep mortgage rates low and decrease interest rates for speculative investments and investing.

Even the 10 year bond is significantly below the inflation rate, do you really think that lowering rates even more would have any measurable effect to the economy? (The 10 year bond in japan is yielding at 1%, if it doesn’t have any effect there, why would it be different in the USA?)

Great post. Question for you. If/when QE3 does arrive and takes the forms you mentioned, what kind of effects will it have on the economy? Would another surge in commodity prices be almost a certainty? As well as another big drop in value of the USD? Or would these be more limited in QE3 due to the thought I had below.

I’m far from an expert on these matters, but if Japan is any example – the more QE that is done, the less effective it seems to become over time. Sort of a bit like medicine – take too much of it over time and the potency of the medicine is gradually reduced as the body gets “used to it.” QE1 was quite successful in boosting the stock market, among other things I imagine (like being a nice trash bin for stuff that banks didn’t want). QE2 doesn’t seem to have done much beyond cause a drop in the value of the USD (which is good for exporters, so there’s a winner somewhere), playing some role in keeping low mortgage rates and a surge in commodity/input prices and the inevitable rise in inflation that follows.

Also, perhaps this is just a unjustified worry, but if QE3 (and perhaps further QE’s) are done, doesn’t that just further distort the economy – making the pullback from QE (whenever that might occur) all the more difficult and painful? As Japan’s experience kind of shows, once QE starts, it does seem to be difficult to get away from it, let alone undo the effects of past QE’s.

The most significant factor regarding any level of QE remains its relative ineffectiveness on the real economy.
This impotence of all monetary policy initiatives manifests in the result that they end up in the commercial banks’ excess reserves rather than in the M-1 an M-2 part of the broad national economy where we all live and work.
The only solution to that problem is contained in Congressman Dennis Kucinich’s NEED Act of 2010, which ends the era of debt-based and so-called bank-credit monies, with a replacement by a permanent government-issued money system, and fully reserved banking.http://www.economicstability.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/NEED_ACT-12.20101.pdf

The most significant factor regarding any level of QE remains its relative ineffectiveness on the real economy.
This impotence of all monetary policy initiatives manifests in the result that they end up in the commercial banks’ excess reserves rather than in the M-1 an M-2 part of the broad national economy where we all live and work.
The only solution to that problem is contained in Congressman Dennis Kucinich’s NEED Act of 2010, which ends the era of debt-based and so-called bank-credit monies, with a replacement by a permanent government-issued money system, and fully reserved banking.http://www.economicstability.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/NEED_ACT-12.20101.pdf

“Read the Invictus piece because it is clear from Bernanke’s writing there that he really thinks fiscal policy is more effective than quantitative easing to the degree you want to add stimulus.”

I’d suggest that people be very careful about what they derive from Bernanke’s writ. He seems to have a very idiosyncratic view of what the term ‘fiscal policy’ means — at least, to me it’s very idiosyncratic. I’m not saying it’s wrong, but let’s just say that, like that of a good lawyer, Bernanke’s use of language has a certain flexibility.

“Read the Invictus piece because it is clear from Bernanke’s writing there that he really thinks fiscal policy is more effective than quantitative easing to the degree you want to add stimulus.”

I’d suggest that people be very careful about what they derive from Bernanke’s writ. He seems to have a very idiosyncratic view of what the term ‘fiscal policy’ means — at least, to me it’s very idiosyncratic. I’m not saying it’s wrong, but let’s just say that, like that of a good lawyer, Bernanke’s use of language has a certain flexibility.

IOeRs are not the equivalent of short-term t-bills. IOeRs are the functional equivalent of required reserves (because the remuneration rate is the Central Bank’s policy rate – and it floats). What’s absolutely alarming is that IOeRs are not only contractionary, but they are decidedly deflationary. Why hasn’t anyone thought this through?

The BOG’s new policy tool, IORs, are not just a contractionary open market device for conducting monetary policy within the CB banking system; IOeRs exert a profoundly deflationary force (a cessation of the circuit income & transactions velocity of funds), in highly interdependent domestic and global economies.

The money market is differentiated by its position on the yield curve (i.e., short-term borrowing & lending with original maturities from one year or less). Domestic liquidity funding in the money market is benchmarked internationally (by the London interbank market LIBOR indexes & foreign exchange swaps).

IOeRs flatten out the yield curve. They reduce the spread, or net interest rate margin between borrowing short & lending long (between the weighted-average interest earned on loans, securities, and other interest-earning assets, & the weighted-average interest paid on deposits and other interest-bearing liabilities). A flatter yield curve and/or lower rates shrinks bank profit margins.

IOeRs remunerated @.25% encompass the short-end of the yield curve, & QE2’s LSAP’s effect is distributed on the other portion of the yield curve. The FED’s flattening yield curve policy reduces profit opportunities & discourages the extension of new loans or the purchase of new investments.

IOeRs reduce the supply of loan-funds, increase the cost of loan-funds, and absorb existing savings (stopping a vast stock of savings in the private sector from being matched with real investment).I.e., the Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates show the 1 year rate is now @.19% Thus we (or Bernanke), shoot ourselves in the foot again.

IOeRs are not the equivalent of short-term t-bills. IOeRs are the functional equivalent of required reserves (because the remuneration rate is the Central Bank’s policy rate – and it floats). What’s absolutely alarming is that IOeRs are not only contractionary, but they are decidedly deflationary. Why hasn’t anyone thought this through?

The BOG’s new policy tool, IORs, are not just a contractionary open market device for conducting monetary policy within the CB banking system; IOeRs exert a profoundly deflationary force (a cessation of the circuit income & transactions velocity of funds), in highly interdependent domestic and global economies.

The money market is differentiated by its position on the yield curve (i.e., short-term borrowing & lending with original maturities from one year or less). Domestic liquidity funding in the money market is benchmarked internationally (by the London interbank market LIBOR indexes & foreign exchange swaps).

IOeRs flatten out the yield curve. They reduce the spread, or net interest rate margin between borrowing short & lending long (between the weighted-average interest earned on loans, securities, and other interest-earning assets, & the weighted-average interest paid on deposits and other interest-bearing liabilities). A flatter yield curve and/or lower rates shrinks bank profit margins.

IOeRs remunerated @.25% encompass the short-end of the yield curve, & QE2’s LSAP’s effect is distributed on the other portion of the yield curve. The FED’s flattening yield curve policy reduces profit opportunities & discourages the extension of new loans or the purchase of new investments.

IOeRs reduce the supply of loan-funds, increase the cost of loan-funds, and absorb existing savings (stopping a vast stock of savings in the private sector from being matched with real investment).I.e., the Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates show the 1 year rate is now @.19% Thus we (or Bernanke), shoot ourselves in the foot again.

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