The Choice for U.S. Policy in South Africa: Reform or Vengeance

I 527 July 25, 1986 THE CHOICE FOR US. POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA
REFORM OR VENGEANCE INTRODUCTION Ronald Reagan this week outlined
in.detai1 the objectives of his policy towards S outh Africa. His
speech challenged many of the prevailing assumptions concerning
South Africa that increasingly have dominated discussion of
sanctions in the United States Congress. At the same time, the
President took some important initial steps to enga g e the U.S.
more deeply in a search for a durable political accommodation in
South Africa. While the President avoided any new catchword to
characterize his policy, he nonetheless stated forcefully that a
broad moral and political argument can be made agai n st' both
sanctions and apartheid. By virtue of his personal involvement in
the issue, the President has now aligned himself with British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher in defining and defending a common
policy of promoting reform in South Africa and rej e cting
arbitrary punitive sanctions which have the sole virtue of
vengeance for Pretoria's racist sins critics in Congress derives
from precipitous new sanctions legislation approved by the House of
Representatives in June. The legislation provided for bro a d
mandatory prohibitions on trade with South Africa and complete
disinvestment of American companies as a means of pressuring
Pretoria to dismantle apartheid. The measures, passed in haste,
without even a recorded vote, properly face a critical examinatio n
in the Senate The confrontation that now looms between the
President and his If reform in South Africa genuinely is sought,
sanctions legislation and discussions of South Africa should move
from debates over symbolic actions to serious examination of the i
r potential consequences. In fact, countries other than South
Africa may be the most serious victims of sanctions. Indeed,
Pretoria indicates that it is considering its own retaliatory
sanctions against its neighbors. I I I The attempt to find a
reasonabl e accommodation in South Africa that benefits everyone
seems to be slipping further away as sanctions and
counter-sanctions dominate discussions. Over the past several years
the South African government has pursued reforms designed to
eliminate discriminat ion in the country, particularly to improve
opportunities for blacks and include participation in government.

Pretoria, for example, has repealed pass laws and influx control
opened downtown areas to businesses of all races, granted South
African citizensh ip to all blacks previously defined as
lltemporaryll residents, abolished the Mixed Marriage and
Immorality Acts, extended the rights of property ownership to
blacks, and created a mechanism for including blacks in a system of
representative government.

O nly the active engagement by the U.S. and other Western nations
can speed these changes. The House legislation, by contrast, seeks
only retaliation and punishment of South Africa for having embraced
a system of apartheid that is now being rapidly dismantl e d
mechanism for escaping sanctions, the House legislation forces a
confrontation between Washington and Pretoria With no The
alternative to this is to support genuine reforms Africa that will
dismantle apartheid and avoid igniting all Southern Africa in a
great conflagration in South of These reforms include expanded
American investment to promote the growth of racially integrated
business with job opportunities for blacks. The growth of free
enterprise with a free labor market has a corrosive effect upon e
xisting social practices of discrimination in South Africa. Thus
existing restrictions on economic activity in South Africa should
be rescinded if the activities do not directly support remaining
institutions of apartheid. This means that Export-Import Ba n k,
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and International Monetary
Fund financial benefits should be made available in South Africa
for businesses and projects conducted on a nondiscriminatory basis.
State disinvestment laws should be challenged in U. S. courts as
violating interstate commerce.

Existing U.S. programs to aid the disadvantaged in South Africa
specifically should promote the reform process by such things as
directly assisting the upgrading of black education, including more
scholarships fo r blacks to integrated universities and ending
discrimination against students in so-called tribal homelands.
Black businesses' attempts to exercise new rights to operate in
white areas should receive assistance under programs such as the
National Endowme nt for Democracy, as should labor unions operating
under new labor laws. To build a true representative government in
South Africa, the institutions to underpin such a government must
be built.

The U.S. has a vital national interest in preventing a further
escalation of violence, confrontation, and economic impoverishment
in 2Southern Africa. If sanctions on investment and trade with
South Africa are broadly supported in the Western world, they could
trigger catastrophic consequences for the eighty million people in
the seven African countries dependent on South-Africa for food,
trade routes electricity, and other necessities. In short,
sanctions policies that promote further disorder in South Africa
could have a profound residual impact of causing the Ethi
opianization of all of southern Africa.

THE LEGISLATIVE SANCTIONS On May 21, 1985, the House of
Representatives passed the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985; the United
States Senate later passed similar legislation. Both bills were
derailed by a series of sancti ons imposed by Ronald Reagan in an
Executive Order in September.

Exactly one year after the original House action, new legislation
was introduced. What eventually passed.the House on June 18 1986,
went far beyond the sanctions proposed in 19

85. These ne w sanctions would prohibit trade and other economic
relations with South Africa and would mandate complete U.S.
disinvestment from South Africa 180 days after the date of
enactment. Specifically they require that 1) all trade be
terminated except for stra t egic materials which the President
certifies are for military purposes and not available elsewhere 2)
no U.S. person may, directly or through another person, make or
hold any investment in South Africa; and 3) the air landing rights
of South United States and South Africa, be terminated African
Airways, the only airline with direct service between the Unlike
the sanctions imposed by Reagan on September 9, 1985, the House
legislation erases any distinction between sanctions against the
government of South A frica and U.S. companies operating in South
Africa, regardless of how progressive their racial policies may be.

Africa can avoid sanctions, the two other legislative proposals
before the Senate contain such provisions To avoid imposition of
the sanctions, both the original Kennedy-Weicker bill S. 2498) and
the Kassebaum bill S. 2636) require specific actions be taken by
Pretoria. These include freeing from prison ItNelson Mandela and
all political prisonersll and entering "into good faith
negotiations with truly representative leaders of the black
majority for a new political system.1v As an alternative way to
avoid the sanctions, Pretoria could ensure that it "has totally
dismantled the apartheid system.ll While the.House legislation
provides no means by w h ich South Thus the legislation mandates
that Nelson Mandela, former President of the African National
Congress, be freed from prison whether or not he disavows violent
action to overthrow the South African government. Moreover,
proponents of the legislati o n have clearly defined "truly
representative leaders of the black majoritytm 3as specifically
including the African National Congress. Not only does the ANC
refuse to forswear violence, but a majority of this group's
executive committee are members of the Communist Party of South
Africa.

Clearly the intention of the legislation is to create as much
economic disruption as possible in South Africa and isolate the
South African government. Within South Africa, extremists on both
sides support such sanctions v ision can be promoted by isolating
South Africa and increasing hardships for its people They
apparently believe their own apocalyptic I THE REFORM PROCESS IN
SOUTH AFRICA This January, in his annual address to the South
African Parliament, Prime Minister P .W. Botha declared that "South
Africa has outgrown apartheidol# Indeed, in the past seven years
the ruling National Party in South Africa has begun to eliminate
the apartheid policy of racial segregation. The government
integrated many hotels restaurants, and some transportation
facilities, and lifted the prohibition on mixed marriages and
sexual relations between the races. Higher education has been
integrated.

Prohibitions against multi-racial political parties have been
abolished unions and membership has grown dramatically to over five
million by 19

85. Through a constitutional amendment South Africa ended the
whites-only parliament and representation was extended to Asians
and coloreds (persons of mixed races) who elected their own members
in nationwi de elections. The South African government also
acknowledged that blacks within South Africa would be regarded as
citizens of South Africa and no longer assigned citizenship to
their ''tribal homeland."

In the past several months, Pretoria has taken three key steps to
remove some of the remaining most significant elements of apartheid
and to provide a mechanism for peacefully resolving the most
divisive problem of black political participation in the government
actions extended the right of property owner s hip; repealed the
pass laws; and created a National Statutory Council designed to
ensure a government representative of all racial groups in South
Africa Blacks and other groups have been able to form trade These
The reforms of recent years indicate that t he predominant majority
of the ruling National Party are conscientiously trying to work
themselves away from a legacy that they readily acknowledge as
awful. Indeed, it is precisely due to the abandonment of apartheid
that the National Party split in 1982 , with the new Conservative
Party of South Africa adamantly clinging to the banner of apartheid
I I 4Thus the question is no longer whether South Africa will
maintain a system of apartheid, but whether the remnants of
apartheid can be dismantled in a way t o prevent both reaction and
revolution.

THE REGIONAL CONSEQUENC ES OF SANCTIONS Economic data demonstrate
the importance and power of South Africa and the potential impact
of sanctions on the region. Of the eleven countries in southern
Africa, South Africa is the most populous Africa's GNP is generated
by the economy o f South Africa. With just under 29 percent of the
region's population, South Africa produces 77 percent of the
electricity, 97 percent of the coal, 98 percent of the iron ore 82
percent of the chrome, 70 percent of the corn, 87 percent of the
wheat, 67 pe r cent of the sugar cane, 80 percent of the sheep and
39 percent of the cattle stock. South Africa also contains 80
percent of the motor vehicles in the area, 63 percent of the tarred
roads, 84 percent of the telephones, and 60 percent of the railways
and h arbors. and dominant economically. An estimated 75 percent of
southern What this means, of course, is that South Africa's
neishbors are nearly totally dependent on it for transportation and
commu&ation. p>
Any serious disruption of the South African economy can have
profound consequences for many of the over 80 million
other-Africans in the region.

If South Africa were subjected to sanctions denying it important
commodities from overseas, it is difficult to imagine that Pretoria
would continue to allow the tr ansit of these.products through
South Africa to precisely those neighboring nations which had
demanded that sanctions be imposed. South Africa either could
continue to receive via Ilopposingll neighboring countries all the
goods previously received from t h e Western world or South Africa
could impose its own sanctions that would close corridors of trade
in southern Africa. This could trigger a political and economic
crisis of enormous magnitude. With so many of the nations in the
region on the edge of subsi s tence, any additional economic
dislocations could prove catastrophic sanctions on South Africa
could impose Ethiopianization on the entire area Forcing Pretoria
also could impose a kind of military sanction on its neighbors By
increasing what so far has b e en only minimal aid to indigenous
national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe,
Pretoria could threaten, perhaps fatally, the one-party Marxist
regimes that run these countries 5THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND
REVOLUTION The integra l role played by communists in the African
National Congress (ANC) has been well known for years. There are
now at least 18 communists on the ANCIS 30-member executive
committee. Most important, the armed wing of the ANC the Spear of
the Nation," is led by a prominent white communist, Joe Slovo from
Lithuania, who joined the Communist Party in 19

40. Other communists holding ranking ANC executive committee
positions include the Secretary-General Alfred Nzo;
Treasurer-General Thomas Mkobi; Publicity Secretar y Thabo Mbeki;
the editor of ANCIS publication Sechaba, Frances Meli; and Mzawi
Piliso, special aide to ANC leader Oliver Tambo. At the Soviet
Union's 27th Communist' Party Congress earlier this year, the ~LNC
delegation was accorded the same status as a c ommunist party calls
for radicalism and violence monitored by the BBC the ANC proclaimed
that In its radio broadcasts into South Africa from Ethiopia, the
ANC In a broadcast late last year The [other] campaign that must
continue to escalate is the one'of extending the theater of war
into white residential areas...we must attack them in their homes
and holiday resorts just as we have been attacking black
boot-lickers at their homes white colleagues.

This must now happen to their Even the Executive Director of the
ANC, Oliver Tambo, himself not a communist, stated in a broadcast
We cannot and should not allow a situation of relative peace and
tranquility to obtain in the white areas of the country while black
townships are in flames. We must take the struggl e into the white
areas of South Africa And in the most open admission of the ANCIS
role in terrorism, Winnie Mandela pledged to a crowd at Munsieville
on April 13 that "with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we
shall liberate the c~untry The proclaim e d ANC goal is Itto make
South Africa ungovernableIg through violent disorders against
blacks who do not agree with them the ANC called upon supporters
"to identify collaborators and enemy agents and deal with them The
brutal assassination of other blacks i n South Africa through
so-called necklacing (the practice of burning people' to death with
ignited tires around their necks) has nothing to ANC terrorism thus
has been directed In another radio message 1. For an examination of
how the'work of the ANC coin c ides with Soviet foreign policy
goals in the region, see: William W. Pascoe, 111, "Moscow~s
Strategy in Southern Africa: A Country by Country Review Heritage
Foundation Backnrounder No. 525, July 21, 1986 6do with apartheid.
It is estimated that over 600 b lacks have been murdered by rival
black groups. Most of those killed have been moderates persecuted
by radical ANC supporters who charge them with being collaborators
of the South African Government. In fact anyone who does not agree
with the radical prog ram of the ANC is being labeled a traitor.

It is clear that the African National Congress supports a
revolutionary transformation of South African society support for
disinvestment, opposition to broad-based aid to those suffering in
the black community, a nd promotion of terrorism are actions
calculated to cause the situation in South Africa to deteriorate
and precipitate the total unravelling of society into civil war As
such its AN EFFECTIVE U.S. POLICY: ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT The
complicated, but realistic , achievement of durable and meaningful
changes in South Africa must come throQgh peaceful accommodations
between all groups in the country. An integral aspect of this is
the engagement rather than disengagement of the Western world with
South Africa. Remo val of Western influence precisely at the time
of positive changes in South Africa can only retard such change.

Few deny that foreign investment has been a force for positive
change in South Africa or that the greater integration of South
Africa into the w orld community has had a beneficial effect upon
traditionally isolated South Africans who grew up with a narrow and
unrealistic view of the world. To be sure, increased foreign
investment alone will not solve the problems of South Africa;
indeed 90 percen t of all investment in South Africa is internally
generated.

But as part of broader program of effective engagement in South
Africa, investment can contribute to a solution by establishing
racially integrated companies pursue a strategy of Ilinvestment lev
erage. This means To spur change in South Africa, the Reagan
Administration should 1) Instead of disinvestment, increased
American participation in the South African economy should be
encouraged 2. Stuart M. Butler An Investment Strategy to Undermine
Apar theid in South Africa,"

Heritage Foundation Backnroundec No. 427, April 30, 1985 72) The
U.S. government should provide special assistance through American
companies to upgrade the educational and management skills of black
South Africans and help them for m businesses of their own 3)
Assistance should be given to American trade unionists to train
black union organizers 4) Technical assistance and encouragement
should be given to speed the recent decision by the South African
government to return to the pri v ate sector key segments of the
nationalized economy, thus taking control from Afrikaner
bureaucrats To foster continued economic interaction with South
Africa. the Reagan Administration should review existing policies
that are incompatible with this objec t ive should Specifically the
Administration 1) Modify Eximbank, OPIC and IMF restrictions.
Institutions supporting apartheid should not receive Eximbank
financing of sales to South Africa, or Overseas Private Investment
Corporation gurantees and Internatio n al Monetary Fund credits.
But other institutions should be authorized to receive such aid
provided they observe nondiscriminatory policies 2) Rescind
restrictions on the sale of gold Krugerrand coins. Such sales
cannot .be considered supporting instrument s of apartheid with
South Africa.

Banning them is an unjustifiable restraint on trade On the other
hand, any further disinvestment and a cessation of trade with South
Africa will be counterproductive uncertainty in South Africa,
coupled with moves in Congr ess to require economic disinvestment,
already have prompted some American firms to withdraw from South
Africa. Such withdrawal only enhances the role of those South
Africans and foreign firms not as committed to integration as are
American companies. Sou th Africa needs foreign investment for its
economy to grow sufficiently to cope with the rising demand for
jobs in South Africa, especially among the black population.

Moreover, as President Reagan asserted in his speech on South
Africa on July 22, Western businessmen are the Itstrongest alliesll
of blacks in South Africa because they "bring to South Africa ideas
of justice from their own countries Existing The United States can
play a positive role in the reform process by encouraging the
acceleration and expansion of programs specifically aimed' at
assisting the most disadvantaged in South Africa. With
disinvestment, American influence on the situation in South Africa
will diminish, as will the capacity of the South African government
to continue with imp o rtant reforms that have recently been
initiated 8U.S. POLICY AND POLITICAL REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA Beyond
encouraging continued and expanded economic interaction with the
private sector in South Africa, the United States should indicate
its willingness to w ork closely with the South African government
in the implementation of the reforms it has announced in various
important areas 1) Education. The South African government's
efforts to upgrade black education in the country could be
supplemented by American advice and assistance in constructing
programs designed especially for disadvanced students. The U.S.
could widen its scholarship program in South Africa to include
blacks wherever they live in the country including those now
disqualified because they leg a lly reside in the so-called tribal
homelands in South Africa, more U.S. assistance should be provided
for college education.for disadvantaged groups in South Africa.
This could be accomplished by using the 30 million now spent for
several hundred South Af r ican students studying in the United
States to provide educations for several times that number in South
Africa. Also in recognition of the changes in higher education, the
U.S. Information Agency should create a bi-national commission in
South Africa to o versee the existing Fulbright exchange program
with South Africa and thereby work more closely with the integrated
South African universities With the integration of higher education
2) Discrimination. The South African government has indicated its
intent i on of abolishing all forms of discrimination. The U.S. can
provide legal assistance to victims of discrimination in South
Africa who attempt, through peaceful judicial challenges, to assert
their rights under changes in South African law. Some support for
them has already been provided through the Human Rights Fund at the
Agency for International Development 3) Institution buildinq. The
National Endowment for Democracy NED1 should become more actively
enqased in the process of broaden the infrastructure of
representative government beyond the white community in South
Africa. While leaving it up to South Africans to decide their
political future, NED can provide guidance and support the
institutions necessary for any open political society ing to 4)
Black bu s iness. The Center for International Private Enterprise
at NED should be encouraged to work with black businesses in former
white areas of South African cities. The Entrepreneurial Training
Project of the Agency for International Development should emphasi
z e this in its programs in South Africa. The congressionally
funded African Development Foundation should expand its work into
South Africa by providing assistance to black entrepreneurs I 95)
Labor Unions. Experts from the U.S. labor movement should broad e n
their engagement in the process of reform in labor relations in
South Africa to guarantee nondiscriminatory employment practices 6)
Political ~artici~ation. The U.S. should encourage talks concerning
political reform between representative leaders of th e non-white
communities in South Africa who renounce violence and the South
African government.

African government for a National Council to discuss serious
political reform should be pursued Specificallx-the proposals of,
the South Through active support for reforms in South Africa, the
U.S either can help guarantee their success or be aware of their
failings In short, the reform process should be given a chance to
develop as an element of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in
South Africa.

More broadl y, the United States should declare forthrightly its
support for the construction of a political order in South Africa
based on a representative form of government which would include
all people indicate that it will disassociate itself with any group
or i ndividual who promotes violent change in South Africa At the
same time the UlS. should denounce violence and Therefore, the U.S.
government should maintain a minimal level of contact with the
African National Congress until it renounces violence and endor s
es a representative pluralistic society. As the House of
Representatives voted 365 .to 49 on June 18th, the United States
should provide no economic assistance to the ANC until'it removes
all communists from its executive committee. Terrorism by the ANC s
hould be officially condemned by the U.S. government.

The U.S. should work with, and encourage the South African
government to work with, all leaders in the black community who
advocate peaceful change. For example, the U.S. should work more
closely with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Zulu moveme
n t in South Africa. The U.S. should support efforts to create
multi-racial governments within South Africa, such as in a new
Kwa-Natal political consolidation. Existing U.S. assistance
programs to blacks in South Africa have given too much support to
radic al black factions and unfairly discriminate against blacks
living in the tribal llhomelands.ll The U.S. should cease
advocating the release of Nelson Mandela until he forswears violent
change in South Africa.

CONCLUSION As an effective reform process proce eds in South Africa
and the government seeks to negotiate changes in the political
system to I I 10 - guarantee universal participation in government,
the United States should promote that process the constructive
engagement currently being pursued. Const r uctive engagement
became a largely reactive policy, which allowed forces of
revolutionary change in South Africa to gain prestige and momentum
while those seeking peaceful change in the black community have
been largely ignored. Thus those promoting a vio l ent,
revolutionary change in South Africa now dominate Washington's
attention. A dynamic alternative o,f effective engagement .in
South.&frica is; necessary to avoid potential further
polarization into reaction and revolution both of which would
create mu ch greater hardships on the people of South Africa than
they thus far have endured To do this, Washington must move beyond
Only by continuing to invest, trade, and conduct other economic
activity in South Africa can the U.S. encourage the reform process.

E xisting policies that restrain economic activity thus directly
support institutions of apartheid. In his address on July 22,
Reagan outlined the dire consequences of sanctions as well as the
positive role played by Western businesses in South Africa U.S.
assistance in South Africa should be tailored to the prescriptions
of the President and become more directly engaged in both the
economic advancement and political reform of South Africa.

While the U.S. government has had beneficial programs involving
supp ort for expanded educational opportunities and for the growth
of labor unions and.black businesses, such programs now need to be
integrally related to the opportunities afforded for change by
reform processes proclaimed by the South African government. In
conjunction with the building of the institutional infrastructure
of a representative form of government in South Africa, a large and
challenging role exists for the National Endowment of Democracy.

Finally, in the difficult political situation confrontin g South
Africa, the U.S. should provide more positive support for moderate
proponents of peaceful accommodation in South Africa and
forthrightly condemn all forces of terrorism and intimidation that
appear determined to create revolutionary upheaval.

The process of transforming a complex, multi-racial society such as
South Africa into a durable representative form of government
remains an arduous task the black, white, and other communities can
accomplish such a task in a climate of stability, prosperity, and
good will. The United States must continue to be a catalyst in that
critical process Only the combined forces of moderation in Jeffrey
B. Gayner Counselor for International Affairs 11