Elvie K. Burke filed a suit against Planters Electric Membership
Corporation in the Superior Court of Jenkins County to recover
for the negligent homicide of her son. The petition when
amended showed: that petitioner is the mother of Ronald Burke,
a minor, 13 years of age, who was killed as a result of the
negligence of the defendant; that the deceased was not
survived by either wife or children; Planters Electric Membership
Corporation, the defendant, is a corporation chartered under
the laws of the State of Georgia, with its principal place
of business in Millen, Jenkins County, Georgia; the corporation
engages in the transmission and distribution of electrical energy
in Jenkins County, Georgia, and is subject to the
jurisdiction of this court; the occurrence described occurred
in Jenkins County, Georgia, on July 3, 1957, on improved
property owned by the petitioner; this property is
located on the west side of the Waynesboro-Millen highway, U.S.
25, one mile, more or less, north of Millen, Georgia; petitioner's
house stands at a distance of 140 feet, from the highway, and
there is a farm road which runs from the highway to the house
at a slightly northeast-southwest angle with the highway; this
farm road passes to the north of the dwelling house and ends
in a backyard between the dwelling house and a barn and smokehouse
located on the property; the barn and the smokehouse are enclosed
by wire fences; behind the dwelling house is an open space or
yard, 39 feet wide, more or less, which extends from the farm
road coming in from the highway, which is on the north of the
dwelling house, in a southerly direction to the southern wall
of the dwelling house; a wire fence is located 39 feet, more
or less, west of the dwelling house; this fence runs parallel
to the rear wall of the dwelling house and encloses two yards,
which are again divided by another wire fence running perpendicular
to the rear wall of the dwelling house; one yard contains a barn
and the other contains a wooden smokehouse with a metal roof;
the dwelling house, yards, barn and smokehouse were located as
described above at the time of the happening of the occurrence
complained of, and for several years prior to that time; the
defendant erected, maintained and operated a certain high voltage
electric line, consisting of two wires, which ran over and upon
this property; these lines crossed petitioner's property in a
slightly northeasterly direction, passing directly across the
yard between the dwelling house and the wire fence surrounding
the barnyard; at the point where these lines passed in front
of the smokehouse, and at a point where they passed to the north
of the northern wall of the dwelling house, they were 27 feet,
more or less, west of the rear wall of the dwelling house and
12 feet more or less, east of the wire fence surrounding the
barnyard; the top wire of the two wires, which ran over petitioner's
property, and which are here involved, was a main transmission
line, and it carried 6,900 volts at the time of the occurrence
herein complained of; the bottom wire is what is known as a common
ground or neutral wire and carried no voltage; the top wire heretofore
referred to was at a height of 12 feet above petitioner's property
at the point on the ground where the incident occurred; the bottom
wire was 2 feet below the top wire, and, therefore, was at a
height of 10 feet above the ground at that point; neither the
top wire, which carried 6,900 volts of electricity, nor the ground
wire, were insulated; there were no warning signs posted by the
defendant on either of the two roads, or the poles, or on the
property itself which would serve to warn petitioner's deceased
son of the presence of an instrumentality so insidiously deadly
as low-hanging, uninsulated high-tension electric power lines;
furthermore, petitioner's deceased son was never informed by
the defendant, or anyone else, of the amount of voltage present
in the lines or of the inherent dangers therein and the possibility
of injury or death in connection therewith; petitioner's deceased
son was a child of tender years, inexperienced in matters pertaining
to the transmission of electrical energy, and he had no means
of knowing whether the defendant's wires were carrying a deadly
current or were harmless; that the defendant strung the electric
lines described herein over and upon petitioner's property without
her prior knowledge or consent, either written or oral, and at
a time when petitioner was away from her property, on a date
and at a time which is presently unknown to petitioner, but,
on a date and at a time which either is, or should be, within
the knowledge of the defendant who strung said line; the dwelling
house, yards and barn were located at the place described herein
at the time that the defendant strung said wires over and upon
petitioner's property; petitioner has been receiving electrical
service from the defendant for approximately 12 years, and was
receiving such service before the electrical lines described
herein were strung over and upon petitioner's property; petitioner's
electrical service comes from a transformer upon a pole of the
defendant, which pole and transformer were in place before the
electric lines herein complained of were strung over and upon
petitioner's property, and the service line to petitioner's residence
came from said pole and transformer before the electric line
of the defendant herein complained of was strung, and still comes
from said pole and transformer, and not from the electric line
of the defendant herein complained of; a windstorm occurring
on or about June 26, 1957, blew petitioner's television aerial
down and it came to rest upon the roof of the dwelling house.
Petitioner's son-in-law removed the aerial from atop the house
and stood it up by the fence enclosing the barnyard; the aerial
measured approximately 10 feet 7 inches in length; one of the
parts of this aerial was a connection called a rotor, which permitted
the top portion of the aerial to revolve so as to point in various
directions; petitioner's twin sons, Ronald and Donald,
were given permission by their father, Ivin Burke, to take the
rotor off the aerial and sell it; on July 3, 1957, it rained
at petitioner's residence until about 12 noon, and the ground
remained very wet from the rain; about 12:50 p.m. on July 3,
1957, while the ground was still very wet, the two boys, Ronald
and Donald, who were barefooted, went out in the yard and took
the aerial from where it stood by the barnyard fence, in an
effort to lay it down on the ground in the yard between
the residence and the lot so that they could remove the
rotor; as they removed this aerial from the fence to
lay it down, the aerial came into contact with the defendant's
high tension electric wires and the electric current contained
in said wires ran through the aerial and into the bodies of petitioner's
sons; petitioner's son, Ronald, was struck dead immediately by
the electricity.

The petition also contained an averment "In maintaining and operating
power lines herein described over and upon the petitioner's property,
at a height lower than that specified for this type of installation
in the National Safety Code, said code being promulgated by the
National Bureau of Standards of the United States Department
of Commerce and containing safety rules for the installation
and maintenance of electrical supply and communication lines
which are generally accepted and are generally used throughout
the United States and the State of Georgia", which was stricken
on demurrer.

The defendant filed a general demurrer and several special demurrers
to the petition as amended.

The trial Judge overruled the general demurrer and all of the
special demurrers except that directed to the averment of the
petition last quoted which he sustained.

The defendant filed a direct bill of exceptions assigning the
judgment overruling its general and special demurrers as error.

To the judgment of the court sustaining the demurrer to the averment
that the power lines were constructed at a lower level than that
provided by the National Safety Code the plaintiff excepted by
way of cross-bill.

1. The defendant contends that the petition does not set forth
a cause of action because its averments show no breach of duty
by the defendant owed to the plaintiff's son. In support of this
contention the defendant cites
Smith v. Ga. Power Co.,
43 Ga. App. 210 (158 S.E. 371);
Bridges v. Ga. Power Co.,
39 Ga. App. 400 (147 S.E. 589),
and foreign authority. In the two cases cited
the deceased child came in contact with electric wires which
were insulated originally, but from which the insulation had
worn, by climbing a tree on the property of another. Under the
facts of those cases it was held that defendant power company
had breached no duty it owed the injured child. The facts
of the cases are dissimilar to those of this case, except
that in those cases as in this case a child was injured
by contact with an electric wire. The foreign authority is not
persuasive because not in harmony with the holdings of the appellate
courts of this State.

The allegations of the petition clearly allege the breach of a
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff's son.
Welch v. City of Camilla,
86 Ga. App. 609 (72 S.E.2d 83);
Lamar Electric Membership Corp. v. Carroll,
89 Ga. App. 440 (79 S.E.2d 832).
These cases thoroughly discuss the duty of those erecting
power lines across the premises of another, and their
liability for constructing the lines in such a manner
that there is probability that others will come in
contact with them and be injured.

The defendant recognizes in the brief presented to this court
that general allegations are sufficient as against a general
demurrer. It insists that in this case the general allegations
are mere Conclusions of the pleader and insufficient against
special demurrer. The court's attention is called to the special
demurrers that attack certain allegations of the petition charging
negligence on the part of the defendant. The principle is
recognized but is not applicable here. The petition set forth
the evidential facts upon which each act of negligence
imputed to the defendant is based, and the facts alleged, if
true, constitute negligence. The petitioner's averments show
causal connection between the acts of negligence charged and
the fatal injury of plaintiff's son. Thus the petition
sufficiently shows the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the boy's death. The defendant by
way of protesting the insufficiency of the petition insists that
one who maintains a power line is not an insurer of the safety
of others who may come in contact with it. As authority for the
position, the holding in
Darden v. Mayor &c; of Washington,
35 Ga. App. 777 (1) (134 S.E. 813)
is cited:
"That upon the trial of an action in tort for personal injuries
received in coming in contact with a wire charged with a high
voltage of electricity, which it was alleged hung down from a
pole in a dangerous situation as a result of the defendant's
negligence, the court did not err in submitting to the jury,
as an issue of fact, whether or not the defendant was guilty of
negligence as alleged."
Nothing in that case is contrary to this opinion.

The defendant takes the position in the brief filed here that,
the plaintiff's own contributory negligence proximately contributing
to the death of her child, her right of recovery for the
child's death is barred.

There is authority for the contention that where a parent permits
the child to be exposed to imminent danger, or fails when the
child is in the parent's presence to warn him of an obvious impending
peril a recovery for the death of the child may be barred.

In
Atlanta & Charlotte Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Gravitt,
93 Ga. 369 (3) (20 S.E. 550, 26 L.R.A. 553, 44 Am. St. R. 145),
it is held that, "Where a father entrusts his minor son, a youth
of tender years, to the care and custody of another, such person
becomes the legal representative and agent of the father in
discharging the duty which the law imposes upon the latter, of
guarding and shielding the child from injury.
Accordingly, if the child, by reason of the gross negligence
of his custodian in taking him upon a high and dangerous trestle,
is run over by a passenger-train and killed, such negligent
conduct is, in law, imputable to the father himself. Such custodian
could not, however, properly be regarded as likewise the representative
or agent of the child's mother. By express statute, in this State,
the father is vested with the control of his minor child, and
the mother is not accountable for the conduct of a custodian
for him chosen by the father. Nor, in a suit by the mother in
her own right, as authorized by special statute, is she chargeable
with the negligence of the father, merely because of
the conjugal relation existing between them."

A similar principle is pronounced in
Stamps v. Newton County,
8 Ga. App. 229 (2) (68 S.E. 947)
as follows: "While a mother who is compelled to earn
her own living by her labor may not be required, in the
exercise of due diligence, to be present at all
times and personally overlook the care of her children,
still she is responsible for the exercise of ordinary care for

These cases are not applicable here. The petition that we now
consider does not reveal that the child was in the plaintiff
mother's presence or was of such tender age as to ordinarily
require her constant care.

There is no allegation from which it can be fairly inferred that
the mother was aware that the child intended to come in close
proximity to the wires or would be in danger of coming in contact
with them. Nor can it be inferred from the averments of the petition
that the mother was chargeable with knowledge of the high voltage
of the wires and the consequent danger that lurked in them. She
did not necessarily know of the dangerous character of the wires
simply because they were uninsulated. As a general rule a person
of ordinary intelligence, a layman in the field of electricity
is not credited with information concerning the dangerous character
of wire placed in a position or strung at heights which indicate
the wire is harmless.

The very fact that the defendant power company strung the wires
in an uninsulated state, one within 10 feet and the other 12
feet of the ground across the barnyard of another indicated that
the wires were harmless.

The court held in
Lamar Electric Membership Corp. v. Carroll,
89 Ga. App. 440, 453,
supra,
that "there is nothing in the petition to indicate
that the plaintiff was aware that the wires were
not insulated, or that they were of high voltage, or could apprehend
for any other reason, that, if one of the pipes which he employed
in his work should come in contact with them, he would be
injured. It is a matter of common knowledge that a great
many wires used, for instance, in telephonic communication are
not charged with electric current of such voltage as would inflict
injury upon a person in like circumstance. Merely seeing the
wires strung over the property would not put the plaintiff on
notice of a dangerous condition."

The same pronouncement is found in
Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard,
187 Ga. 608, 615 (1 S.E.2d 579):
"This defendant's tower, on the other hand, was
a picture of innocence to the uninformed. Properly insulated,
it was utterly harmless, and this court cannot
impute to this plaintiff knowledge of the physical laws which
govern the tremendous force conveyed over it. His conduct placed
him in a position of danger not inherent or apparent in the position
which he occupied, but dangerous only because the defendant's
equipment was not fully insulated. His act was one which would
have resulted in no injury otherwise . . . This tower, from the
very subtlety of the danger, was more dangerous than a score
of trains. Its death-dealing power was not discoverable by
exercising the senses of sight, hearing, or smell. Imperceptively
and noiselessly it struck its victim and left him mutilated
and burned before he had the slightest warning of what
was at hand. We do not mean that plaintiff's conduct showed
that care and foresight which might be expected
of one familiar with the force which passed along these wires;
but this court cannot impute to him such knowledge or hold him
accountable therefor as a matter of law, and therefore barred
of the privilege of submitting his case for consideration and
determination by a jury in the light of all the circumstances."

Exception is taken to the trial court's overruling certain special
demurrers. The only argument made in this court concerning these
grounds is, "Much of the contention above has application to
the special demurrers; therefore, in order to avoid repetition,
we are submitting the special demurrers on the basis of their
context, without further argument, yet expressly not abandoning
them."

A careful examination of the special demurrers overruled by the
court reveals that the trial court's ruling in respect to them
was correct.

2. The trial Judge did not err in sustaining the demurrer directed
to the averment alleging that the defendant was
negligent in "maintaining and operating the power lines described
in the petition at a height lower than that specified for this type
of installation in the National Safety Code."

In the 1958 supplement of 18 Am. Jur., p. 68, § 113, it is
stated, "The general rule that safety codes or rules promulgated
by government departments or voluntary associations for their
informative value do not have the force of law and are not admissible
in evidence upon the subjects to which they relate, applies to
bar the admission of such codes or rules on the issue of
negligence in the installation and maintenance of electrical
equipment. Safety rules issued by the Bureau of Standards of
the Department of Commerce fall within this rule. In one state,
however, the general rule is rejected and such authority is
admitted. Thus safety rules of the Bureau of Standards are admitted
as evidence of negligent installation of charged wires over
the roof of a building. The fact that such authority is not
sworn to, is met in this jurisdiction by the sworn evidence
of an expert witness that such authority is esteemed by
the professions as good authority on the subject."

There is no law or rule of any commission of this State empowered
to formulate rules controlling the installation and maintenance
of power lines requiring the installation of power lines in conformity
with the National Safety Code. Thus the code does not prescribe
a standard of prudence recognized by the laws of this State.
A failure to comply with the code does not constitute
negligence per se.

The code did not furnish a standard of ordinary care because it
merely represents the opinions of witnesses not sworn in the
cause. To permit it to be pleaded and admitted in evidence would
preclude the exercise of the valuable right of cross-examination
of the witnesses who compiled the code.

What is written here is not to be construed as a pronouncement
that an expert witness may not predicate his opinion upon information
gained from authentic and authoritative books as well as upon
his own experience in the field of science and endeavor to which
his testimony relates.