Conservative Philosopher John Kekes Answers redditors’ Questions

Conservative author and political philosopher John Kekes generously answered the top questions from [philosophy]. Prof. Kekes wanted to clarify a few points before diving into the Q & A.Before answering the questions, I want to make some things clear. By conservatism (C. from here on) I mean my version of it, but there of course many other versions. My version is skeptical and fallibilist (not metaphysical or fideist); pluralist about values (not monist or relativist); traditionalist (not communitarian orindividualist); and realistic about our basic ambivalence toward rationality and morality (not optimistic or pessimistic). C. is committed to no particular view about religion, economics, or sexual practices. C. is fundamentally opposed to all forms left orright-wing ideology. By ideology I mean the combination of a metaphysical view about the nature of reality, an anthropocentric view about the place of human beings in reality, a system of values in which one or a small number of values are regarded as overriding, a diagnosis of why the existing state of affairs falls so far short of what according to the system of values it should be, and a policy of action intended to close the gap between how society presently is and how it ought to be. The full statement of C. is in my The Case for Conservatism (Cornell, 1998). – John Kekes

Many thanks to John Kekes for his time and insight, and thanks to interviewers from [philosophy] for the great questions. If you are interested in learning more, check out Keke’s books here. And now the Q&A:

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Q #1: How does your philosophy deal with the problems of the Tragedy of the Commons, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and similar issues?

Put more generally, game theory suggests that actions which individuals “should” take for their own benefit can actually end up negatively impacting themselves to a much greater extent than they would see had they not done so. (As a recent real-world example, banks
that pushed for deregulation so they could make more money ended up losing money in part because of the impact of deregulation on the other banks.) How can libertarian / conservative government successfully deal with this sort of problem? – TheCidJohn Kekes: this question is much too general for me to know how to answer it. What particular part of C. is called into question by what particular game theoretical problem? The question needs to be made concrete before I could give a sensible answer to it. Furthermore, I cannot accept the “libertarian/conservative” assumption. C. has no connection with libertarianism, nor with the kind of game theoretical problems that theories with economic commitments must contend with.

Q #2: How does conservatism deal with socially transformative technological innovations for which there are not yet any established traditions? – AbouBenAdhem

JK:The best way of trying to cope with such innovations is to extend existing traditions to cover them. A good example is how the invention of living wills has managed to cope with the problem of how to think about the possibilities created by new life-extending medical technologies. I accept that this s not always possible, that there are genuinely new things under the sun. In order to cope with such novelties, all political theories have to scramble and do as well as possible.
Q #3: In your essay, “What is Conservatism,” you list a number of values that the pluralistic conservative will be committed to, noting that such commitments “ought to protect the universal and objective conditions that must be met by all good lives.” I wonder if you could expound upon “good lives” and what it means to be a “reasonable external observer” in evaluating “good lives?” The Mafioso, for example, certainly might judge that he is indeed living a good life and properly fulfilling the roles he has in his tradition. To him, being a Mafioso (or Viking, or Inquisitor, or whatever) is what he takes to be constitutive of his self. Given the historical variety in conceptions of morality, the good life, and the important virtues,
what does a reasonable external observer look like? Since we aren’t thinking of people as radically disembodied, pre-social, tradition-less, reasoners, how is an external observer able to ever “get outside” his traditions and make “tradition-independent” judgments that should be taken seriously, regardless of one’s tradition?

You note that certain traditions can be vicious and need to be altered, but how does one come to such a conclusion? Slavery, after all, worked quite well for the majority of humanity’s reign. And, since many slavery-practicing societies couldn’t have eliminated it without largely eliminating the society itself, wouldn’t the pluralistic conservative resist having, say, a (lesser heeded or even non-extant) value of equality override the practice of slavery in such situations? In a related manner, my worry is that if an agent is “before his time,” so to speak, and he advocates for abolition far before the society is historically “ready” for it, then such a person is just wrong in his advocacy; so I’m worried that normativity becomes a function of historical practicality. And, if that’s the case, then I’m worried about stagnation, and how a society might never be “ready” to abolish slavery so long as it is always quick to silence the
occasional and errant (and morally wrong?) abolitionist before his views can ever get traction with a larger following. – drinka40tonight

JK: This is a searching and important question that must be answered by anyone trying to defend a view like C. My answer to it is in the central chapters (3-7) of The Case for Conservatism. I cannot here explain and give my reasons for the answer I have there given, because it would take much too long, but I can indicate the type of answer it is. I think that morality has objective standards and that values can be rationally justified or criticized. As I see it, morality has three levels: universal, social, and individual. The values on the universal level concern the minimum physiological and psychological requirements of human well-being, e.g. sufficient nutrition and the absence of terror. Whether these requirements are met is a question of fact. The values on the social level are the possibilities of life that the traditions of a society provide for those who live in it. The justification of these traditions is that they conform to universal values, endure for a prolonged period (counted in decades, not in months), people voluntarily participate in the traditions (they could choose of not to participate in any of the traditions, and they conceive of the goodness of their own lives partly in terms of the possibilities these traditions provide. On the individual level, people select some of the usually numerous possibilities of life the traditions provide. The justification of individual values is whether the individual in whose conception of a good life the values have central importance are satisfied with their lives (whether they could honestly say that they like the way their life is going, they do not regret major decisions they have made, they are not lastingly angry, resentful, envious, and so forth). I realize that this answer raises many questions. I try to meet them in the chapters to which I refer above.
Q #4: Would you agree that the skepticism and pluralism outlined in your essay “What is Conservatism” are as much a cornerstone of thoughtful liberalism as they are of thoughtful conservatism. And the only real difference between the two lies in the extent to which one believes that traditions are better left to grow and thrive on their own? – Cole___

JK: I certainly agree that there may be a considerable overlap between some versions of liberalism and C. There are two main differences, as far as I can see, between all versions of liberalism and C. One is that all versions of liberalism suppose that some one value (or a very small number of them) overrides all other values when they conflict, whereas C. thinks that there are no values thatalways or even regularly override other values that may conflict with them. For instance, according to C., liberty, equality, justice, rights are not overriding values. What matters from the point of view of C. is to defend the system of values that have been traditionally and voluntarily valued by people in a society. For what those values are, see my answer to the last question above. The other difference is that C. takes very seriously the human ambivalence toward rationality and morality, whereas liberals suppose that if people are not corrupted by bad political conditions, then they will act rationally and morally. C. is realistic (not pessimistic) about human nature, whereas liberals are optimistic about it.

Q #5: Why do American conservatives no longer hold pragmatism in any conspicuous regard? – fuzzo

JK: I cannot think of other American conservatives, with many of whom I have basic disagreements. As for myself, I am very sympathetic to pragmatism. This should be obvious from The Case for Conservatism, as well as from the answers I give above.

Q #6: I was just watching a movie on Hulu about the evils of Monsanato – their greed and the killing of diversity in plant species. I was talking to a co-worker about the movie and he shared a story about his friend who made a farming commercial for Monsanto. He makes 500 US every time the commercial airs anywhere and he also got a credit card with unlimited spending for two weeks in Florida for a big convention.

My point is – Despite the fact that Monsanto is all that is greedy and wrong within my value system, I still wanted to be in the farmer’s shoes with a commercial for Monsanto making the money – especially after the hard day I put in in my crappy job with minimum pay.

Do you think that maybe this is where evil starts? Do you think that if we all hold good values and stick to them, even if it means we will not have everything our heart desires, our world would be a better place? If I could not be strong enough to refuse to do the commercial
if I had the opportunity, what right do I have to expect other people not to be greedy at other people’s expense?

These were just some random thoughts that I was pondering today, in a simple and basic process of self-awareness – You can move onto the next question and leave this be if it does not interest you. Thanks! –cindymaywho

JK: I completely agree that the ultimate answers to political questions hinge on the psychological condition of human beings. I think that political conditions ultimately reflect the motivation of those who live under those conditions. It is not corporations or whatever other institutions that corrupt people, but that corporations or whatever other institutions reflect the corruption of people who create and maintain them. Human motivation is basic, human institutions are derivative. If the institutions are bad, it is because people who create or maintain them are bad.

Q #7: In your essay you state that conservatives don’t want to “formulate a general theory that provides a blueprint for a good society.” Yet you admit that traditionalism is a central component of conservatism. Can you see the problem between claiming tradition and claiming to avoid a blueprint? In this way, can you see the irony in portraying liberalism or socialism as less skeptical of society and with an “illusion of human perfectibility?”

JK: What I have in mind in opposing blueprints is my rejection of all ideological approaches to politics. (See my opening remarks as an explanation of what I mean by ideology). A blueprint contains a basic and specific value or principle designed to resolve conflicts between values, principles, and interests. I deny that there is such a basic and specific value, principle, or interest. This is precisely the point of the combination of pluralism and skepticism that is an essential part of C. Liberals do not accept this kind of pluralism. Rawls thinks his two principles are overriding; Dworkin thinks that equality is the overriding value; Berlin thinks that rights are absolute; Mill in On Liberty thinks that it is liberty; Nozick thinks that it is rights; and so forth. If there are liberals who accept my kind of pluralism, then my disagreement with them is reduced to disagreement between their optimistic and my realistic view of human nature.

Q #8: Do you side with Leo Strauss in that historicism, simply put, is one of the greatest threats to our American culture? Why/why not? –lolracistsnothx

JK: If by historicism is meant relativism, then I certainly agree that it is a very serious threat, because it is committed to regarding all values as arbitrary. The result is that it denies that there is a rational way of coping with conflicts among values. By denying it, it denies one of the fundamental conditions of civilized life.

Q #9: Would you say you believe in the existence of evil on scientific grounds? – cometparty

JK: I don’t know what you mean by “scientific grounds”. If you mean to ask whether I believe that it is a fact that there are evil people and actions, my answer is certainly yes.

Q #10: Professor Kekes, I appreciate this opportunity to pose a question on conservatism.

I am particularly puzzled how one can judge whether something is morally allowable according to conservatism. You did state in your essay,“What is Conservatism?”, how one may solve various problem refering to history and tradition with moderate skepticism. However, there are cases where abhorent things are held to be morally good in some society. And if not morally good, it is at least allowable. How can a conservative in that society know that the conduct that is held to be morally good in his society is actually bad.

JK: This is the same question as #3 above, and my answer to it is the same. I agree that this is perhaps the most important question C. must face and answer.

**To all who posed the questions: thank you for taking the time and trouble. I hope you find my answer satisfying. If not, tell me (jonkekes AT nycap DOT rr DOT com) and I will endeavor to do better.**