The EU is faced with an immense migration pressure. A deficient preparedness to control its external borders, together with an unequal division of the immigrant flows between the EU member states, has challenged the Schengen system. The implementation of the key decisions taken by the EU to protect its free movement of citizens and to secure its external borders has faced significant difficulties. The intensifying war in Syria does not give much hope when it comes to the EUís ability to address the root causes of the current migration flow. How to reinforce the Schengen system and a borderless Europe? Why is it so difficult to secure the EUís external borders? How to address the worsening security outlook of the EUís southern neighbourhood?

Welcoming remarks:Teija Tiilikainen, Director, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Opening words:Kare Halonen, State Secretary for EU Affairs at the Prime Ministerís Office and Chair of the Board of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs

In her
opening remarks, Teija Tiilikainen outlined
the recent activities of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Last
year, the Institute's experts published seven academic books and 32 peer-reviewed journal
articles, as well as 58 inhouse publications. Publication downloads from the
FIIA website grew 42 percent from the previous year. The Instituteís magazine
Ulkopolitiikka (the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs) is currently shortlisted
for two journalism awards. Dr Tiilikainen thanked all colleagues and partners,
saying the Institute is well recognised, skillful and highly international. She
also underscoredthe topicality of
the seminar. According to her, there is no other topic more timely in European
politics at the moment than Europeís borders and the migration crisis. The
changes in European security have understandably affected the Instituteís
research interests, with much attention paid to Russiaís actions and the
sanctions regime, the migration crisis and the EUís new global strategy, as
well as the US elections, to name a few topics.

In his
remarks, Kare Halonen posed four
questions to the speakers of the seminar. First, addressing the root causes of
the migration crisis: whether the member states are ready to give much more
financial assistance to tackle the questions in the countries of origin and
pursue a much more influential common foreign policy to tackle the crisis.
Second, the future of European values: whether EU citizens are ready to accept
the refugeesí international rights, to carry the ensuing costs, and whether
politicians are ready to defend European values despite the risk of losing
elections. Third, the implementation of common policies and rules: last year
revealed that many common rules have not been followed, decisions not
implemented, and the overall record is very weak, so the question is whether
member states are ready to set up more effective border control, registration
of migrants and really start complying with the common rules. And fourth, Mr.
Halonen posed the question of burden sharing: as the crisis affects different countries
differently and attitudes vary in different member states, is it possible to
give up unilateral national measures and to have a borderless Europe if
everyone is not ready to follow the common rules.

In his remarks, Edouard Schmidt said that the Commissionís migration agenda, launched
in May 2015, was built on four pillars: 1) To reduce incentive for irregular
migration 2) To save lives and secure external borders 3) To develop policy for
EU migration and to attract the workers the EU needs 4) To strengthen the
common European asylum system based on solidarity. While many actions have been
taken by the Commission together with the member states to better manage the
current situation, the conclusions are, of course, not very positive 10 months
since the implementation of the migration agenda. Relocation is not working
very well yet: only 640 migrants have so far been relocated (140 of whom to
Finland, which is a good example to other member states), and only 3,400 migrants
have been resettled from third countries to Europe. More pressingly, the
limitation of entry in the Balkan route has triggered a domino effect which
shows that any unilateral action will not solve the crisis but a solution must
be found together.

The Schengen agreement offers the possibility
to reintroduce border control temporarily for six months if internal security
is threatened: many countries have done this. In a paradoxical way, the
Schengen system is working: the member states are following the provisions
concerning the time limits for temporary border control. The biggest problem is
the EU-Turkey external border, and the Commissionís solution is the
establishment of a common border and coastal guard before the end of this year.
Currently, the pressure is on the frontline member states, and burden sharing
is needed. The aim is to revise the Dublin regulations to add solidarity and
burden sharing in the coming weeks. A system of defining areas as hotspots is
used to assist member states (Italy and Greece) who are facing a disproportionate
pressure on the external border. The hotspots represent an integrated response
by all relevant EU agencies to help pressure at the entry point. The system is
flexible with many modules and it can be implemented based on the needs of the
member states. For example, Finland could have some hotspot modules implemented
on its territory to help manage the migrant flows coming through the Nordic
routes, with the EU agencies helping Finland to identify migrants entering Finland.
While Finland is not facing excessive migration pressure right now, migration
routes change so quickly that the situation might alter and the Commission is
constantly monitoring the situation. While the Commissionís migration agenda
has not yet had the maximum effect, much has been achieved with hotspots in
little time. This goes to show that a European response is still valid to the
migrant and border crisis, at a time when European values are threatened in
many ways, Mr. Schmidt concluded.

Taking the stage after Mr. Schmidt, Ilkka Laitinen stressed that the border
itself is not at the heart of the current crisis: it is of course part of the
problem, but not the most pressing one. Illegal border crossings are easily
detected, that is not the problem. But after the crossing, we have trouble
registering and identifying migrants. There are not enough places to put up the
migrants when the asylum process is started, and the migrants often continue to
other countries inside the Schengen area and begin the process anew. Everyone
is doing something but no one is carrying out the process properly. If we want
to stop this from happening, we need to prevent migrants from exiting member
states. But what is the legislation concerning this, are there lawful means to
prevent exit? We need to respect European laws and human rights commitments
although that might make controlling the situation more difficult.

Operationally, the EU and the member states
have a good situational understanding of what is happening. But if we donít
have sufficient infrastructure and logistics in place to make the hotspot
system work with the current migrant volumes, the whole system will collapse.
There is a set of conclusions, statements, action plans etc. as regards the
tasks the EU needs to undertake. But the bulk of actions is taken by the member
states and not as a result of joint European activities. This is where we need
to shape up and get the member states to boost their activity.

Summing up, the problem is not at the border,
and neither is the solution. We cannot solve this problem by increasing
personnel or surveillance at the border. The big problems are on the outside
and on the inside: what happens before and after the external border crossing. The
critical problem concerns infrastructure and logistics in Europe. Because we
cannot keep the migrants in one place until we are able to find out who they
are and what they are doing here, everything always starts from scratch all
over again, Mr. Laitinen concluded.

The final
speaker to take the stage, Marc Pierini reminded
the audience that the trigger of the migration crisis, the Syrian war, is
currently entering its sixth year. During last year we witnessed a quick
escalation: ISIS grew stronger and the Syrian army almost collapsed. The Russian
intervention was done to rescue the regime, to help it regain territory and to
signify to the West that it is not alone in shaping the international settlement
to the war in Syria. A critical turning point was that a US intervention did
not happen. This made Moscow draw the conclusion that the US is unwilling to
intervene, and it has taken advantage of this both in Ukraine and in Syria.

One of the
EUís roles could have to do with combatting organized crime in the context of
the migration crisis. The networks that smuggle migrants are like water, they
will go where there is a passage. They are extremely well organized and operate
through social media, satellites etc., this means that their reach is very
wide. A message needs to be sent to criminal networks in Turkey: youíre not
allowed to carry on. This is important to the EU and to Turkey. There is a
parallel economy developing in Turkey, with fishermen using their boats to
smuggle migrants as it is more profitable, Mr Pierini said.

When it
comes to receiving migrants in Europe, Germany is in the best position to do
this as regards the economy and population. But public estimates of the number
of arriving migrants should be made carefully. The smugglers in Beirut, Kabul
and elsewhere use these often exaggerated statements in their marketing so the
estimates end up being an incentive.

The
EU-Turkey negotiations on the migration crisis can be called bazaar diplomacy. The
EU is paying Turkey irrespective of previous promises by Brussels to Turkey on
accession and visas, and with no regard to the problems with freedom of
expression in Turkey. There is no attention paid to EU foreign policy or the
Turkish domestic situation, but itís just money for keeping migrants in Turkey,
Mr. Pierini concluded.

Commenting on the speakersí remarks, Leena Malkki wanted to offer an academic perspective instead of a
policy-oriented one.She contemplated the future of European studies: How will the history of
European integration be taught to students 20 years from now? Will this be seen
as another crisis that led to further integration, or the start of
disintegration in Europe? As integration is not benefiting EU citizens as
obviously as before, will the European project find legitimacy among the citizens
and among the member states, Dr. Malkki asked. Are intergovernmentalists
getting the last say in the dynamics of European integration? We might also say
that the response to globalization has revealed the limits of the EU: the EU
has dealt with economic globalization, but not with humanitarian and social
globalization. Therefore, the situation calls for redefining the European
project. On a more positive note, this might also be the moment when the EU
developed a global role for itself, widening its scope from a European peace
project to a global one, Dr. Malkki concluded.