J. P. Moreland, in "Complementarity,
Agency Theory, and God of the Gaps" (PSCF, March 1997, pp. 2-14), has
problems at several points. In the first place, he claims that the
complementarity view makes the theological level emerge from the sociological
level, which in turn emerges from the psychological level, and on down
ultimately to the level of energy, the lowest level of the physical universe. He
further claims that complementarity eliminates personal identity and libertarian
freedom. What he claims holds of philosophical naturalism, a view akin to
materialism. Believing that all reality is open to scientific study, the
adherents to naturalism require that "science" swallow up whatever remnants are
allowed of theology and philosophy. But this cannot apply to the view that
scientific disciplines and religious interpretations complement each
other, for complements are externally related.

Is it not curious that Moreland begins
with the complementarian views of Christians (pp. 3-7), switches to
compatibilism (pp.7 - 10), and then introduces "complementarian compatibilists"
(p. 11), immediately following this last with statements from naturalistic
philosophers to support his analysis? Does this look like reasoned discourse, or
like the familiar propaganda ploy, guilt by association? Is he massaging the
terms to make them fit the desired outcome?

Determinism, Indeterminism, and
Freedom

To correct the errors Moreland claims
complementarians make, he wants science to include such concepts as "libertarian
freedom," which have no possible empirical consequences. Consider a strict
determinist who claims that every human action is part of an inexorable causal
chain, that the feeling everyone has of choosing is merely an illusion. How does
one prove that the person could have acted differently? The person cannot return
to the situation S in which one claims to have freely chosen action A, and this
time choose B. The best would be a similar situation S' different from S, at
least in having the S-A sequence in its past. No matter what the situation
addressed, neither viewpoint can predict a different outcome. Both strict
determinism and free will are philosophical assumptions, unproved and unprovable,
made by human beings.

There is, however, a curious bit of
evidence for human freedom: it is in fact tacitly assumed by strict
determinists. They consistently try to persuade others that they should accept
determinism when, on their view, one cannot help what he believes. Reduced to
its ultimate essentials, this is "Do what you cannot do," a most curious
command.

According to Moreland, the sole
alternatives are strict determinism and his version of libertarian freedom. The
agency which this freedom provides involves "gaps in the fabric of the natural
world" (p. 3). This clearly implies indeterminism, the absence of cause.
Unfortunately, indeterminism requires that there be no control, a state beyond
even deterministic chaos and chance. Instead of indeterminism, human free will
requires a type of determinism, self-determination. Strict determinism holds
that every human act, like other events, is merely part of an unalterable causal
chain. We expect this of all inanimate objects, quantum effects notwithstanding,
but not of persons. Nevertheless, human beings are not outside causal chains,
despite what Moreland claims. Formulating the matter precisely is exceedingly
difficult. Arguably, more nonsense has been written about determinism,
indeterminism, and free will than any other set of topics in philosophy.
However, we may say that a person can nudge the causal sequence into alternate
paths, for our powers do not extend beyond a choice. This is the freedom which
is assumed by at least the majority of compatibilists, whose view is caricatured
by Moreland.

In this connection, it appears that
Moreland keeps his theology and religion rigidly separated from his philosophy.
The person who wrote, "I do not do the good I want to do. On the contrary, I
keep doing the evil I don't want to do,"1 did not
recognize his "libertarian freedom," which Moreland's philosophical construction
requires him to have. Realistically evaluated, only God has the libertarian
freedom which Moreland ascribes to created persons.

"Complete" vs. Complement

Moreland wrote about "complete"
physical descriptions as if they must be all-encompassing, excluding all other
possible considerations (pp. 10f). If there exist dogmatically reductionistic
materialists, they may hold such a view. But even they may acknowledge other
explanations. Consider a personal computer, booted, a program operating. I press
a key. In principle, a computer super-engineer could describe the entire
sequence, from the key-code produced and its transmission; the sequence of
transistors turned on or off in the CPU, auxiliary chips, memory chips, video
board chips; the electrons produced by the CRT gun, accelerated, swept and
modulated by electrostatic and magnetic fields, and how the required control is
achieved; the specific pixels energized by these electrons, as well as the
electrons that hit the mask, etc. - a great mass of information. While this
would describe the physics in excessive detail, it tells us nothing about the
purpose of the key press or the meaning of what appeared on the screen, yet
these go to form the reason why we use computers. "What are the physical
parameters and events?" and "What is it good for?" are complementary questions.
Neither precludes the other.

Moreland has produced a straw man, but
one with a curious consequence. If, as he claims, physics is not self-contained,
that is, if there are nonphysical causes of physical phenomena, where does he
draw the line? Psychokinesis? Energy vortexes, like those claimed to exist near
Sedona, AZ? Crystals? Pyramidology? Alien intelligences exerting forces we
cannot detect or measure? Astral influences? Despite being debunked as far back
as the fourth century by Augustine of Hippo, today there are many more
astrologers than astronomers. So how does one, who accepts Moreland's view
objectively, separate the bogus claims from relevant considerations and secure
adoption only of the latter?

The Hubris of God-of-the-gaps

Moreland argues explicitly for a
God-of-the-gaps (pp. 6f). An unrecognized underlying assumption of this view has
been noted.2 Does he really want to claim that he
knows the limits of the principles the Creator could have imposed when in the
beginning he created heaven and earth (Gen. 1:1)? He mentions "the direct
creation of first life and the various kinds of life" (p. 12). Is he then
revising the inspired record, which does not include br' (or bara')
in the appearance of life on the third day (Gen. 1:11 - ¿13)? Should the
inspired author have applied br' more than once in the description of
what happened the sixth day (vv. 24-31)?

We must grant that Moreland may back
away from rewriting Genesis. We may further grant that the absence of br'
in connection with plant life does not prove that life originally came into
being purely by natural processes. But we must also insist that science does not
demonstrate that life cannot be produced by inorganic processes. There are
computations that claim to prove the impossibility. But I recall that it was
impossible to produce anything but racemic mixtures by inorganic processes. Now
they have found an excess of levorotary amino acids in a meteorite.3
L-amino acids are those found in all living things on earth. Do we want to opt
for life forms in outer space?

This is perhaps the most recent in a
series of discoveries that have narrowed the gaps. Perhaps the earliest was the
synthesis of urea by Wohler in 1828, although it was "impossible" for anything
but life to produce organic compounds. This last was one claim of vitalism,
which insisted that life is a substance. Despite setbacks, vitalism continued
into the twentieth century.4 As it became clear that
the doctrine could be draped over any pile of data whatsoever and that it made
no testable prediction at all, it was abandoned by biologists. We still use the
vitalists' term, "protoplasm." But it no longer refers to the substance which
makes material things alive. When I was in college, I recall the professor
discussing embryological development, the multitude of seemingly chaotic changes
occurring as cells divided and redivided. How did it all come out right? "God,"
he said. Now I read, among other reports of discoveries, that chemical gradients
control the development of legs and wings, whether vertebrate or arthropod.
Sometimes we can extract or synthesize a chemical and observe its effect on
cultured cells. Other times we can knock out a gene or trigger either excess
production or its appearance at an abnormal time. The gaps which were once
filled by appeals to "life" or to God are fewer and smaller. Moreland flatly
discounts and dismisses such considerations. However, extrapolation from
observable trends indicates that this is a rearguard action in imminent danger
of being surrounded and overwhelmed - except that "true believers" never
recognize defeat. Like Giordano Bruno and Michael Servetus, they are
intransigent heretics. Moreland will proclaim a revived vitalism. He will
continue to claim that almost every genus and even many species are the products
of uncounted individual creative acts. He will further distort the evidence and
the views of his opponents to fit his position. But no one has to believe him.

What the Proof Covers

Moreland and his associates do not seem
to realize what has been proved about the "design" concept. Gaining a clear
understanding of its relevance will be helped by a bit of history.

Logical positivists, also known as
logical empiricists, dominated philosophy in the United States for part of this
century. One of their major projects was the elimination of "metaphysical"5
terms. Included were all valuational and ethical terms, along with all theology
and most traditional philosophy. They laid down the dictum that every acceptable
term had to be strictly definable in terms of observables.6
They soon discovered that theoretical terms like "atoms" and "ions," and even
disposition terms like "soluble," could not be so defined. So they loosened the
stricture to allow terms which could be connected to observables. Carnap
formalized this new criterion in reduction sentences, like: "If a galvanometer
is in a circuit, a direct current is flowing in the circuit if, and only if, the
galvanometer needle is deflected."7 However, he
later discovered that science cannot function within the strictures of reduction
sentences.8 Stephen C. Meyer has essentially
extended what Carnap discovered, showing that no a priori strictures can
be placed on the vocabulary and techniques of science.9

Moreland wants to turn this around from
"you cannot limit...." to "you must include...." This is inconsistent with the
demonstration that no strictures can be placed. "Abandon methodological
naturalism" is another useless and contradictory stricture.

Internal and External Language

O'Connor speaks relevantly of the
utility of methodological naturalism.10 We may
expand his argument in a different direction. "Mass" is obviously an important
scientific term, from Newton's [f = ma] to Einstein's
[E = mc2]. This does not mean
that I can insist that it be applied by psychologists to determine the mass of
anger when someone loses his temper. Conversely, I cannot ask how angry a
uranium nucleus is when it spalls. Each scientific discipline restricts itself
to the terms it finds useful, amenable to its approach to reality. Since no
aspect of anger and other emotions can be measured in grams, meters, ergs, or
most of the other units used by physicists, it cannot be incorporated into their
science. Occasionally, someone will discover a new connection and extend a
science. Rumford, for example, connected work and heat, overturning the view
that heat is a substance; Carnot connected work and caloric (later changed to
energy), introducing entropy. But such extensions seem either to develop from
within or to result from combining disciplines. They are not the products of
dicta.11

Where measurement is difficult and
indirect, the precision of formulas like those in the physical sciences is
obviously not possible. For example, one may not be certain of a diagnosis,
whether depression, stenosis, Alzheimer's disease, an iatrogenic problem, or
some different syndrome. However, with the evidence available at an autopsy, the
diagnosis becomes more definite, even if sometimes disputable. But always, given
a specific state of medical knowledge, the possible diagnoses are fairly clear,
even if a specific practitioner may admit, "I never thought of that."12

There are many terms relevant to the
practice of science that are not scientific: grant, licensed, unlicensed,
approved, unapproved, legal, illegal, informed consent, etc. All these have some
type of paper test - a document which may be framed, an entry in a file, a
prohibition in a legislative enactment or judicial interpretation, or a lack of
such. There may be disputes about some of these matters: lawyers want a good
living. But the problems are more easily resolved than those of ethics. How far,
for example, in the absence of legal enactments or contractual stipulations, may
one go with biological or chemical controls for weeds and pests, bioengineered
plants and animals, experiments with human embryos, new treatments for diseases?
Opinions vary widely. None of these matters is amenable to scientific
investigation, except in the trivial sense that one may develop a sociological
profile of the community's value system. One cannot determine right from wrong
by a head count, nor by an experiment.

What we need to recognize is that,
however important ethical, valuational, legal, and other types of terms may be,
they do not enter into what scientists qua scientists test for. This is
the point of Laplace's response when asked why he had not included mention of
the deity in his monumental Mechanique celeste: "Je n'ai pas besoin de cette
hypothosize." He was not flip, merely correct scientifically, in contrast to
Newton who thought he had to depend on God from time to time to keep the solar
system from crashing. "Design" is similar. It has no place in scientific
contexts. It belongs to philosophical discussion.

Rational "Design"

"Design
science" is one of the latest attempts to prove that there is a God. Whereas
most earlier approaches tend to be philosophical, it calls on what has been more
esteemed during the current century. But the attempt must fail. True, "the
heavens declare the glory of God."13 But they do
not convince all.14 Indeed, there is biblical
evidence that the attempt to show God's existence is misguided. "To approach
God, one must believe that he is and that he rewards those who seek him."15Were there demonstration, it would no longer be belief. This does not
eliminate natural theology, but it clearly limits it.

Meyer's work has relevance within
natural theology and apologetics. He has shown that design and creation cannot
be disproved by any scientific discipline. This clears away the common
misconception that science supports materialism. Therefore, it should be better
known.

1Rom. 7:19,
my translation. The key to interpreting this chapter, I think, is the tense of
the verbs. The first verses are past, Paul's pre-Damascus life. Verses 14 - 23
are present, his status as he wrote. The next verse is future, the culmination
of salvation, what I John 3:2 tells us. Many people object to this, for they do
not identify with Paul's declaration of sinning. I believe that, if they were as
sensitive to sin as Paul, they would echo his statement. I recall that a
color-blind man reported that there were no brilliant red hibiscuses when the
bushes were covered with them. He could not see what was there. Will not the "sin-blind"
react analogously?

4nterestingly,
Moreland's suggestion that a human being is a substance (pp. 4f, 7, 10) is
vitalistic. "... if one discovered that living systems are discontinuous with
nonliving systems" (p. 12) expresses his vitalistic expectation.

5This is not
the metaphysics and occult of bookstore shelves, which mainly involve spiritism
and related religious views. In philosophy, metaphysics covers such abstruse
topics as being qua being. Positivists used "metaphysics" as their
ultimate term of opprobrium.

6They
ignored, indeed denied, the theoretical content of descriptive terms. But this
is a problem which cannot be discussed here.

8Ibid., "The
Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts," in Herbert Feigl and Michael
Scriven, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science I (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1956), 38-76.

9This also
slams the door on any attempt to argue that science can rule out theism or prove
materialism.