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1 THESIS THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE NORM LIFE CYCLE Submitted by Teal Buckner Lowring Department of Political Science In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts Colorado State University Fort Collins, Colorado Summer 2013 Master s Committee: Advisor: Michele Betsill Ursula Daxecker Mark Fiege

2 ABSTRACT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE NORM LIFE CYCLE In the last few decades the study of norms coupled with a constructivist approach has brought new insights into the area of international relations. The UNGA is the premier global IGO making it an important and interesting topic of study in terms of global legislation. This research fills a gap in the literature, which does not sufficiently cover the relationship between norms and the UNGA. The case studies here yield individual and comparative results which may help to answer broader questions dealing with both global governance and international relations. This research finds that the UNGA is able to play an influential role in the norm life cycle, which is expanded from Finnemore and Sikkink s (1998) iteration. The type of issue, the type of promoting state, and the type of state benefiting from the norm all seem to play a role in the level of UNGA participation as well as how and when the UNGA participates in the norm life cycle. ii

3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to sincerely thank my advisor, Dr. Michele Betsill for her role in this process, without her assistance and direction this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my other committee members Drs. Ursula Daxecker and Mark Fiege for their time, effort, and commitment. Last, but certainly not least I would like to thank my family and friends, especially my loving and supportive husband, Jacob Lowring, for reminding me why I set out on this path and for their persistent encouragement. iii

5 I. Introduction/Argument The governance of the international community is a complex and multifaceted problem for international relations scholars. Governance takes place on many different levels and is influenced by many actors, both state and non-state. The United Nations is perhaps one of the most well-known and able international governance providing bodies. Thus, the study of the roles that the United Nations, specifically it s most inclusive body, the General Assembly; play in global governance is interesting as well as important in understanding the dynamics of international governance. One of the more common ways for international governance to manifest itself is through norms. Norms have more than one definition (Kazetstein 1996, Raymond 1997, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 and 2001, Sills 2004), but the definition I use here is that norms tell actors (states in this research) how they should act (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms are not generally able to attain immediate acceptance and thus follow several steps to reach internalization in the international community. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) define three steps/phases toward norm acceptance; emergence, cascade, and internalization. In this research I have expanded that life cycle to include five distinct steps/phases on the path toward normative internalization. The first step is entrepreneurship, in which an actor decides that a certain norm should be introduced to the community and attempts to promote the norm in ways that push it forward. The second stage is the organizational foothold, in which an organization includes the norm on their agenda. The third stage is that of the tipping point; during which actors begin to accept the norm. This is followed by the fourth stage, the cascade, in which most actors adopt the norm, at least rhetorically, often due to peer pressure and/ or citizen pressure. The final stage is that of internalization; the completion of this stage requires that actors absorb the norm into their identity and rarely, if ever, question it. New norms may eventually be introduced which threaten the existing norm, beginning the process over again. These steps are termed a life cycle by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as shown in Figure 1 below: 1

6 Figure1: Life Cycle Diagram: Detailed Description This research wishes to combine the governance provided by norms and the roles played by the United Nations General Assembly to discover how they interact. The General Assembly may play a role in each phase of the norm life cycle as shown below in Figure 2. 2

7 Figure 2: Life Cycle Diagram: UNGA Involvement Since norm arguments are usually not empirically testable, or are at least difficult to test empirically, (Eyre and Suchman 1996) my goal is to offer propositions centered on norm and institutional claims. I propose that the role of the UNGA may be influenced by the type of state (great power or non-great) and the type of issue (i.e.; environmental or weapons) involved in the norm. The juxtaposition of these factors may help to tell a story of when and why the UNGA participates in the norm life cycle. I expect that the involvement of great powers, due to their desire and ability to act unilaterally and/or with forceful persuasion, would decrease the level of participation from the UNGA while norms that benefit nongreats/ developing countries would show increased participation since these states often rely on public 3

8 international venues to promote their agendas. I also expect that weapons issues and environmental issues will show different levels of involvement, related to the type of state interested in each issue type. Therefore I would expect to see less UNGA participation in the life cycle of weapons norms, often promoted by great powers, and more UNGA participation in the life cycle of environmental norms which often benefit developing countries. Through these propositions I argue for an important role for norms, the General Assembly, and state types in international governance. Furthermore, the relationship between these factors is important. Though no set formula exists to determine the success or failure of norms at the international level, practitioners may be able to use this information to determine more efficient modes of approach while scholars may use it to understand further the puzzle of international or global governance. The literature suggests the need for this research and the possibility for these types of connections. This thesis follows a relatively standard format. I first introduce a review of the relevant literature and situate my research within it, as well as develop a conceptual framework within the rest of the thesis rests. The literature review covers bodies of literature such as norms, international organizations, and international law. The second chapter covers the methods I have used in this thesis. It introduces the method of process tracing, explaining why it is an appropriate choice for the type of questions I ask here, as well as explaining how process tracing actually works, and the limitations it has. Furthermore the methods section covers case selection and the issues associated with it. The next two sections are the meat of the thesis, where the process method is actually applied to cases in the weapons and environmental arenas. Three norms (cases) appear in each section. As process tracing is applied I begin to relate the information learned to my propositions to start making tentative conclusions. The final section is conclusions in which all of the cases are brought together and compared and a final assessment of proposition validity is made. 4

9 II. The UNGA and the Norm Life Cycle The subject matter related to this research and the propositions above cover several separate but related bodies of literature. There are good bodies of literature on norms, international organizations, both hard and soft law, international regimes, international and customary law, international governance, and the United Nations, all well established and frequently studied areas of international relations and governance. Perhaps most important to this research are the three areas of norms, the United Nations, and international organizations. What are Norms: A Definition and a Look at the Life Cycle of Norms Norms have several definitions but they all encompass accepted standards that apply to behavior (in this case behavior of states) (Goertz 2003). According to Katzenstein (1996), norms may be defined as appropriate standards of behavior for certain groups of actors (Risse-Kappen 1996), imply what ought to be, and often have attached moral assessments (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms may define what something is, pressure states to act in particular ways, or dis-allow states to act in particular ways (Jepperson et al 1996, Katzenstein 1996, Price and Tannenwald 1996, Raymond 1997, Goertz 2003). International politics is a social activity and takes place within a certain framework which is defined by norms and guidelines (Byers 2008). This means that norms are not born into a vacuum and, when they emerge, must contend with existing acceptable terms of behavior; because of this norms go through a process Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) term a life cycle (see Figures 1 and 2 above). First, norms emerge and are promoted by norm entrepreneurs, who wish the new norm to be successful, through use of language and framing (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Payne 2001, Acharya 2004, Santa-Cruz 2005, Okerake 2008). Scandinavian countries frequently act as these entrepreneurs (Ingebritsen 2002) and during this first stage persuasion is the entrepreneur s main, if not only, way to push the norm forward and onto the agenda (Elgstrom 2000). The norm can then gain an organizational foothold which allows it to be put on the agenda and strengthens the norm itself (Kingdon 1995, Finnemore 1996). If norm promoters are successful then norms can reach a tipping 5

10 point at which international pressures serve to cause states to adopt the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This can lead to a norm cascade in which more and more states adopt the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and the norm can be said to have reached prescriptive status (Risse and Ropp 1999). When the norm is then used frequently, and is integrated into bureaucratic language, it becomes more firmly established (Risse-Kappen 1996, Santa-Cruz 2005) through repetition and socialization (Payne 2001). Finally, if the norm is successful, it becomes internalized by states until a new norm comes along to challenge it (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Byers 2008, Gilligan and Nesbitt 2009) The UN General Assembly can act as a reflection of state acceptance and internalization (Petersen 2007) and may also act as an organizational foothold, among other roles depending on the needs of entrepreneurs/ promoters. These steps grant a good lens through which to review important points of norm development and help determine when and how the UNGA is participating in norm development through the life cycle process. Goertz generally agrees with this type of life cycle and stresses its non-linearity (Goertz 2003). Norms clearly can and do change (Finnemore 1996, Sills 2004), often shocks are the cause of normative change and, according to Goertz s punctuated equilibrium model, norms do not receive much attention for most of their life spans (after the internalization stage). There are many reasons norms come into being; goals or problems arise, which may be solved by both adopting new norms at the international level (Goertz 2003) and instituting new regimes to support the new norms (Sills 2004). Problems may be constructed by hegemons, epistemic communities, and other groups or individuals leading to the entrepreneurship stage of the life cycle. Norms, therefore, can be chosen in a self-interested manner (Goertz 2003, Herrell 2007) but can still change the way states view their interests over time (Herman 1996, Risse and Sikkink 1999). This shows that norms are a viable area of study and occur as a regular phenomenon when global changes transpire and new legislation is desired. It makes sense, therefore, that states would attempt to influence the resulting new norms in their favor, perhaps using international institutions as a venue of influence. Prohibitionary, or proscriptive, norms and regimes may come about for a variety of reasons but almost always have a moral component. Global prohibitions regimes exist which have institutionalized the proscriptive norms studied here and may or may not be conditional (Nadelmann 1990). Proscriptive 6

11 norms are a good choice for this thesis because proscriptive norms, while less numerous than prescriptive norms, are stronger and less often conditional. This indicates that the internalization phase of the norm life cycle must be more complete because violations are clearer and less justifiable. Furthermore, the link between those ascribing to proscriptive norms is more intense, making for a stronger connection (Jasso and Opp 1997, Shannon 2000). Now that an understanding of norms has been presented the importance of norms may be discussed. Norm Importance: According to Risse-Kappen norms are causally consequential in international relations (p. 365, 1996). Norms describe the boundaries of what can and should be done in various situations and how states should behave (Kowert and Legro 1996, Risse-Kappen 1996, Breitmeier et al. 2006, Hurrell 2007, Byers 2008, Hurd 2008, Lake 2008). State actions influence institutions and norms, which then influence the creation of new institutions and norms, which influence state actions. This is a mutually constitutive process which helps to create state identities and the interpretation of identities and interests (Finnemore 1996, Katzenstein 1996, Price and Tannenwald 1996, Adler 2007, Hurd 2008). It is even suggested that norms help to constitute states themselves to some degree (Jepperson et al. 1996). In this sense proscriptive norms help to create identities and define meanings as well as confining state behavior (Price 1995, Herman 1996, Risse-Kappen 1996, Risse and Sikkink 1999, Adler 2007). However, norms do accept the influence of power and self-interest but once internalized are able to influence the behavior of both strong and weak states (Santa-Cruz 2005). This is reflected in the propositions, where a differentiation of power is a key component. Furthermore, states learn about what their appropriate behavior should be from international organizations, as well as other actors, (Shannon 2000) through the emulation of institutional norms and also by means of socialization (Adler 2007). Without an understanding of state identities state behavior is difficult to predict (Berger 1996). Since norms help to constitute state identities a study of them is warranted if predicting state behavior is desirable. The importance of norms is clear and an understanding of the adoption process is now necessary. 7

12 Norm Adoption: Norms may be viewed on a spectrum from more binding treaties to broad goals (Sills 2004) and also on a scale from strong to weak (easily viewed as more or less internalized) (Jepperson et al 1996, Kowert and Legro 1996). Norms attain legal status and legitimacy when they are internalized by those which are expected to follow them (effected states) (Koh 1997, Sills 2004), this is the customary part of international law (Risse and Sikkink 1999). Norms play a crucial role in international law (Peterson 2007) because of their relation to customary law which is an important source for determining the rules of international relations. If customary law is the root of international law as Kerwin discusses, General Assembly resolutions can boost the creation of custom (Schwebel 1979, Joyner 1981, Kerwin 1983). In several areas, especially in the environmental and human rights realms, the General Assembly has provided non-binding resolutions which expand customary international law (Sills 2004). Treaties are a major source of international humanitarian law Another important source is custom (p. 276 Thakur and Maley 1999). This quote shows the importance of both treaty law and customary law in the propagation of international norms. Although customary law and treaty law are certainly different things, treaties may sometimes be able to act as customary law or be a part of a body of custom supporting a specific norm, even for states that have not signed, ratified, or participated in the treaty. This is because if a large enough consensus of important enough states exists, other nations are compelled to act in certain fashions to maintain their constructed images (Bunn 1999). All of the norms below have been encapsulated within a treaty but also have strong customary and moral components backing them up. Arms control is actually an act of cooperation between two or more entities, such as states, which could be enemies under some future circumstances and usually share some interests (Thakur and Maley 1999). However, to be accepted and effective, norms should be generated using an accepted and appropriate formation process (the middle steps of the norm life cycle) and be logically linked to the goals of regimes (Dworkin 1986), which are essential since regimes encompass bodies organized to enforce norms in a particular issue area (Sills 2004). Impartial and inclusive decision making, which encourages participation, lends legitimacy to 8

13 norm creation and enforcement (Tyler 1990, Payne 2001). International organizations provide authority through which legitimate power can reach states (Herman 1996, Byers 2008, Hurd 2008), offering an explanation as to how regimes and international organizations are able to act as efficient norm dispersers (Breitmeier et al. 2006, Adler 2007) and explaining why they are targeted at the organizational foothold stage and do the most work for the norm in the tipping point and cascade phases of the life cycle. The UN is noted as one such body (Hurd 2008). In fact, it has been suggested that UN General Assembly declarations should be binding due to the UNGA s inclusive nature (Peterson 2007). This is an excellent reason to make the focus of my research an international organization, such as the UN, that is able to provide legitimacy. Many factors can influence norm adoption. Some of the main factors that influence the adoption of a norm are the legitimacy of that norm (where/who did it come from), the forcefulness of its promotion (first four stages of the life cycle), and the general moral temper of the potentially adopting states (Okereke 2008). However, even with a relatively high moral temper norms must still be promoted in a convincing manner for adoption to occur (Lake 2008, Okereke 2008). Furthermore, acceptance may depend upon the issue area in which the norm falls; this is the reason for studying both weapons and environmental issues in this thesis. Adoption may be operationalized by measuring degree of internalization, determined by the social density of the norm i.e.; the number of institutional devices in which it is called upon, as discussed by Bernstein(2001, Okereke 2008) and the frequency of violations. Okerake also discusses the differentiation between substantive legitimacy (what the norm proposes) and procedural legitimacy (who created and who may interpret). The process of norm adoption now being understood, an exploration of norms and other entities is required. Norms, Regimes, States, Power and Agenda Setting: Norm Building and Dispersal Norms are able to provide order, even without the presence of more formal institutions and rules (Raymond 1997). However, the presence of regimes helps to strengthen norms and order international relations. Regimes are sets of norms, and other directive entities such as rules and procedures, which are 9

14 influenced by power and act as points of convergence for actors expectations (Krasner 1983, 2, Katzenstein 1996). Regimes are noted as being distinct from other international phenomena due to their normative element. In fact, when norms change, a change of regimes and institutions also occurs (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, Goertz 2003). Regimes have been conceived as central elements to governance, in which states commit to comply with legally binding rules and norms (Breitmeier et al. 2006). International organizations are able to strengthen regimes by enhancing the normatively stabilized meanings at their base (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986), further IOs importance as norm distributors and agents. For these reasons I choose two regimes, weapons and environmental, instead of individual norms scattered over different regimes. Nadelmann (1990) predicted that different types of weapons; nuclear, chemical, etc., and environmental issues; including pollution, species protection, etc. would be some of the future regimes; it appears that his prediction was accurate. Norms are operational on a range of levels from individual to global (Price and Tannenwald 1996). However, the norms discussed in this thesis are targeted to the state level, meaning that they are adopted on a state by state basis. States are often placed at the center of international relations theories and it is at the state level that treaties, environmental agreements, etc. are accepted or denied (Lake 2008). Social norms at the international level are dependent upon the actions of individual states (Goertz 2003). No matter how large, active, or persuasive nongovernmental organizations may be they are able only to represent their members and lack the power to force others to action (Lake 2008). Why the UNGA? According to Katharina Coleman (2011) destination venues, such as conferences with and without UN support, independent commissions, and the UNGA, are often targeted by those who desire to push a norm forward in the life cycle process. Clearly norm entrepreneurs may choose to act in venues other than the UNGA; the WTO, IMF, and other United Nations bodies are all possible avenues, as are regional and local venues, depending on what the entrepreneur wants to achieve. Therefore, it is important to explore why and when entrepreneurs choose to use the UNGA as the venue. Entrepreneurs may choose the UNGA because its resolutions are non-binding, an incentive for state participation. Although this is less 10

15 desirable than an arena where both binding decisions and high state participation exist, both may be difficult, if not impossible, to attain simultaneously and the UNGA may be a good launching platform, or place for a venue change when norms stall or fail in other venues depending on how close the norm is to its tipping point (Busch 2007, Coleman 2011). The UNGA also offers high levels of international socialization and issue linkages due to its inclusive nature and wide variety of issues covered also known as a broad venue mandate (Bearce and Bondanella 2007, Coleman 2011). The relative centralization and independence (neutrality) of IOs is also a draw for norm entrepreneurs. The UNGA strives for both of these factors, making it an appealing forum for norm promotion since state interactions may be facilitated along with a reduction of transaction costs. Representation and voting rules, both big parts of the UNGA, are important to states, allowing for balance between states with uneven power levels (Abbott and Snidal 1998). Venues are also selected depending on the entrepreneurs primary goal(s); persuasion and negotiation are often both important processes at the beginning of the norm life cycle. Small, consensus and deliberation grounded, institutions are generally better for persuasion; while the complexity of norm negotiation lends itself more toward larger institutions, often with different voting procedures. The UNGA is clearly more geared toward the negotiation side of this coin, but also offers a large audience of states which may be persuaded. Legitimacy is likewise a factor when choosing a venue, and established venues certainly take precedence over new ones; this is also linked to the legally or politically binding nature of the agreements reached by a particular forum and the costs of going back on an agreement reached there. The UNGA has a high level of legitimacy, making it a more desirable venue (Coleman 2011). These factors indicate that the UNGA would be an appropriate venue choice when high levels of state participation, negotiation, and legitimacy are desired. I believe that both environmental and weapons issue area norms often require these assets in a venue to successfully promote new norms due to their often contentious nature. Furthermore, the UNGA could be desirable when issue linkages increase the chances of norm adoption. This literature also indicates that UNGA participation could be expected to occur starting in the second, or organizational foothold phase, of the norm life cycle but may enter later in the 11

16 life cycle when a venue change is effected by entrepreneurs or as a bandwagon member. Institutions, such, as the UNGA serve to create a stable environment so that expected results follow interactions between actors (Goertz 2003). State Type and Norms: Persuasion, socialization, incentives, threats, and force are all mechanisms used by states to promote norm acceptance, the choice of promotional mechanism is influenced by the relationship of the promoter and the promotee. DeNevers (2007) argues that great powers attempt to coerce weaker states (sometimes with force) and persuade stronger states when promoting new norms. This shows the influence that great powers may have on the norm acceptance process for other states (Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Great powers have superior ability to promote norms because of their ability to agenda set in international forums (Nadelmann 1990, Florini 1996, Ingebritson 2002, Barnett and Duvall 2005). Their influence is often instrumental in the success of new norms (Schmitz 1999) and can help norms gain a foothold in the United Nations (Ropp and Sikkink 1999) although not necessarily required (Jetschke 1999, Risse and Ropp 1999). Great powers have long had exceptional influence in the international political arena due to material abilities and prestige granted them by other nations (Lake 2008). Indeed, the United States is notorious for pushing its policy goals in the UN (Imber 1985). Nonetheless, great states may also be pressured or shamed into accepting new norms or pressuring smaller states to follow norms by non-state actors (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999) such as the United Nations. This may not always occur due to power based exceptions to norms, in which those with large amounts of power are exempted from at least some of the consequences of norm breaking (Goertz 2003). However, transboundary issues are often more likely to become part of a regime. This explains the need to delineate between norms promoted by great and non-great powers, giving reason to study the influence of each on the norm life cycle. There is difficulty in determining why nations conform to norms; whether due to belief, pressure or state interests (Nadelmann 1990). Normative elements are held by constructivists to be so strong that they have the potential to keep any state from continually objecting to or disregarding customary international 12

17 law (Risse and Sikkink 1999, Byers 2008); this explains why states spend so much effort on influencing institutions (Goertz 2003). It also means that less powerful states are able to use international organizations to unify and magnify their voice, while great states are able to use their power to agenda set within those same institutions. In fact, the group of 77 specifically targeted the General Assembly as a way to influence norms to improve equitable distribution of resources (Joyner 1981). Not much investigation has occurred which looks into how power and persuasion may be strategically used to construct norms (Byers 2008) but the relationship between the two seems to be complex (Finnemore 1996). Regardless, general norm based prescriptions and proscriptions are more likely to be well received than specific rules (Okereke 2008). Furthermore, the type of political system within the state may influence how norms are decided upon and/or incorporated (Lake 2008). International law, organizations and institutions also influence the norm life cycle. International Law, International Organizations, Institutions and Norms: Due to constant normative change international lawmaking is a perpetual process. International law governs many aspects of daily relations between nations and the citizens of nations. Treaties, customs, and precedents define how states and their citizens should act and are often embodied in regimes and international organizations such as the United Nations (Byers 2008).The study of international organizations attempts, in part, to answer how the international sphere is governed. The answer to this question has gone through a lengthy process beginning with the study of formal institutions, followed by a focus on institutional processes, and more recently regimes became the focus of international organization studies (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). This research incorporates international organizations by looking at a central United Nations body. Institution creation is policy formation at the international level (Goertz p ). When states agree to policies which provide regulation an institution is created. Institutions provide services and goods to those that allow their existence (states in this case) (Goertz 2003). Institutions serve to make monitoring easier, decrease uncertainty, increase transparency, and provide more information to policy 13

18 makers (Katzenstein 1996). The relationship between norms and institutions is undeniable; according to Goertz (2003) norms are necessary for institutions to exist (he views institutions as structures of norms) and reside in the realm of social context (Finnemore 1996). If regimes are accepted as collections of institutions, or the same as institutions (Goertz 2003), the three are intrinsically linked. This study truly takes into account norm development and the effect of norms and institutions on state behavior. If the development of the norm is not strong enough the norm may not be functional since states will not feel as much pressure or desire to consent (Sills 2004), however; even weak norms may be promoted and accepted if strong international organizations such as the UN are involved. It is impossible to separate international law from international relations since it is a reflection of social practices which produce norms, rules, and procedures (Byers 2008). Essentially norms are social prescriptions which are reflected in laws and customs and in forming international laws which influence international relations and vice versa (Kowert and Legro 1996, Hurrell 2007). International organizations play a role in international law as arbitrators and forums of discussion (Byers 2008). Organizations offer structure and clarity, institutions can produce norms of varying strength which apply to varying situations, or universally. Organizational actions can be understood as making decisions based upon norms. Organizations can be conceived of as unitary actors; although there may not be total agreement in decisions, organizations do make clear choices about which norms/ policies they adopt and utilize (Goertz 2003). Thus the power that organizations such as the UN have is comparatively large, this can be seen when states first resist a norm or law by taking surface action and using rhetoric about integration and acceptance to retain or rise in status internationally, then later concede due to pressure from an international organization and truly internalizing norms (Black 1999, Byers 2008). International institutions are sets of norms followed by states wishing to be included in the set of civilized states (Goertz 2003) one example is the differentiation between states willing to use chemical weapons (uncivilized) and those unwilling to do so (civilized) (Nadelmann 1990, Price and Tannenwald 1996) another is the way states treat their citizens (Herman 1996). Standing may be vulnerable if actors are accused of disregarding norms important to the community (Barnett 1996). Because the community in 14

19 this research is state focused, it is appropriate to select an international organization rather than one at lower levels such as local or regional. International organizations have a mutually constitutive relationship with state (and actor) preferences. From this statement the conclusion may be drawn that norms move both from states to institutions and from institutions to states (Keohane 1998), an essential part of my argument. This is because ideal institutional function occurs when states follow the institutional norms and receive benefits; when norms are not followed sanctions are often put into place (Goertz 2003). This relationship acts like a conversation between states and institutions. The UN is important in many of the areas discussed above, the further discussion of its involvement is beneficial for this thesis. United Nations General Assembly Contributions: The very existence of the UN proves the existence of international society (Byers 2008), a society from which norms may be constructed and emerge to affect state behavior. The United Nations makes an optimal case study for looking at the relationship between international organizations and norms. One reason for this is that the UN is possibly the only universal body that is able to set norms which are accepted globally (Sills 2004) another is that the UNGA embodies the idea of international diplomacy, due to its global town hall meeting atmosphere, (Keohane 1998) and diplomatic activities often center around, and are influenced by norms. The UN has many options available when it comes to influencing and dispersing norms; it can support new norms by acting as an organizational foothold, tinker with existing ones, and expand regimes supporting norms (Sills 2004). The difficulty of creating global norms is clear (due, in part, to the influence of individual cultures on norms) putting the UN in a unique position (Sills 2004). Furthermore, the UN is known to assist in lowering transaction costs and making difficult agreements possible (Keohane 1998), this is an important element since weapons and environmental issues are notoriously contentious. It is for these reasons that Joyner (1981) states that the General Assembly has directly influenced international law, in part because states are able to meet and discuss international issues (Joyner 1981, Sills 2004). Also, several norms have been shown to get their push to 15

20 acceptance in the General Assembly (Joyner 1981), reflecting the tipping point and cascade phases of the norm life cycle. The General Assembly has a special place in norm creation, the importance of and level of participation in this body indicates that its decisions should be taken as guidelines for state behavior and interaction, even though the resolutions are nonbinding (Sills 2004). Early in international relations studies it was determined that United Nations is activity involved the establishment of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Although the UN has had a hand in the formation and signing of many international treaties its influence goes beyond that (Sills 2004), United Nations General Assembly resolutions can serve as a sort of normative international law (Schwebel 1979). In the sixty years after the Second World War the United Nations initiated over 500 multilateral agreements, often dealing with newly recognized and increasingly global problems such as the environment and terrorism (Sills 2004). General Assembly resolutions particularly offer hope in areas that are more difficult to deal with as they offer a soft law option which, although not legally binding, may become internalized (Kerwin 1983). The UN also holds global conferences which bring leaders together to discuss world issues. These conferences can increase the salience of an issue by bringing media attention, and can produce strong norms (Sills 2004). Perhaps these conferences work in tandem with the General Assembly to strengthen and disperse new or struggling norms. The UN is also able to act as a legitimate norm originator because it is seen as a relatively authoritative and impartial body (Ropp and Sikkink 1999, Okerake 2008), factors which enhance norm legitimacy (Franck 1988). Also, the UN may sometimes be seen as more legitimate than other norm promoting actors including other international governmental organizations (IGO s) (Jetschke 1999). This explains why resolutions often lead to conventions and treaties which are more binding (Sills 2004). The UN has the unique body of the International Law Commission (ILC), which is charged with the creation of draft treaties in subject areas deemed important by the UNGA or the ILC. When draft treaties are completed the General Assembly convenes member states to sign the treaty. Several treaties and conventions which were once General Assembly resolutions have come into being, some examples include; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, treaties covering the use of outer space and the sea bed, and nuclear non- 16

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