Post navigation

Plans for an external military intervention in war-torn Mali are gathering momentum. Mali’s interim government has agreed to allow the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to base a 3,000-strong force in Bamako. The European Union is “considering requests to support West African-led military intervention in Mali and to restructure the country’s beleaguered army.” France and the United States have urged the United Nations Security Council to approve ECOWAS’ plans, and France and the African Union have said they will support ECOWAS logistically. Even Algeria “may have to accept the deployment of West African troops in its crisis-hit neighbour Mali contrary to its traditional stance against foreign intervention and focus on internal security, analysts say.”

As Reuters points out, uncertainty about who really rules in Bamako – coup leader Captain Amadou Sanogo, civilian President Dioncounda Traore, or Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra – could efforts to retake Mali’s Islamist-held north. But many powerful actors are pushing for a military campaign of some kind.

These developments have not gone unnoticed in the north. The Malian press has transcribed a phone interview with Oumar Ould Hamaha, a commander within the Islamist coalition that rules northern Mali. I have not been able to find an in-depth profile on Hamaha, but this comment on him from AFP is notable:

Malian national Omar Hamaha, one of the main Islamist commanders in the north, is a case study in the bridges between [Ansar al Din, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, the main players in the Islamist coalition].

He is known as the second-in-command to the AQIM boss in charge of Gao. But during the seizure of Timbuktu in April, he referred to himself as the chief-of-staff of Ansar Dine, and now says he holds the same position in MUJAO.

“Remember, we are all mujahedeen. Whether a fighter is from MUJAO, Ansar Dine or AQIM, it’s the same thing,” he told AFP.

“We have the same ambition, the application of sharia. Whenever there’s an attack on one of us, it’s an attack on everyone.”

Hamaha is frequently quoted as a spokesman for the coalition in local and international media (see here, for example), where his rhetoric often emphasizes the coalition’s embrace of violence in the service of its determination to impose shari’a across Mali. In the aftermath of the Malian army’s killing of sixteen Muslim preachers earlier this month, Hamaha expressed the Islamist coalition’s rejection of mediation efforts and its objective of capturing Bamako:

He warned that the Islamists would one day attack the south. ‘‘We will plant the black flag of the Islamists at Koulouba,’’ he said, naming the hill on which Mali’s presidential palace sits.

Hamaha reiterated these messages in his recent phone interview (French), in which he expresses defiance regarding the possibility of an external intervention. My translation:

I was contacted last Saturday by the Minister of Defense for discussions. I told him that we are open to dialogue if the government is ready to submit itself to the shari’a. Plainly speaking, if the authorities are ready to apply the sharia. I was surprised that the Minister of Defense spoke to me of secularism (laicite). That impedes all dialogue with them. We are jihadists…We are ready to take the lead and to defeat all armies by the sword, whether they be from ECOWAS or even NATO…Nothing will be able to stop our advance on Bamako and the rest of Mali because we have chosen to die for the religion.

The statement leaves me wondering how seriously to take the threat of the Islamist coalition’s southern advance. The Islamists’ capture of the town of Douentza (map) on September 1 certainly raised some eyebrows, and their repeated references to a southern advance indicates that the threat is not just an offhand comment. On the other hand, advancing into southern areas could stretch the Islamists thin, exacerbate the political backlash they sometimes face, and hand them military defeats. Whatever happens, ECOWAS and other external forces can expect stiff resistance from the Islamist coalition, and external forces may even find themselves initially working not just to retake territory, but to repel new attacks.

I seriously doubt that they would and could advance south. It’s one thing to take part of a nation that’s already not that loyal to a corrupt southern government, it’s quite another to advance into territory that hasn’t openly revolted and that would definitely trigger a military response by the international community.
Of course the south has the problem of the lack of a real government. Without that I seriously doubt any military action could result in a stable united nation.

Baobab has a look at Sudan’s deal. Mostly things that are already known but I hadn’t heard of new evidence about supplies to South Sudanese rebels.

I fully agree with Gyre. I just came back from Koro, which is not too far from Douentza. The Islamist Jihadists won’t be able to advance because they do not have the capacity. I was talking to staff and I was told that they came to Douentza in 9 pickup trucks. They are not staying overnight in town because they are fearing that the Malian Army would attack. If they could do it, they would have done it by now. I met several junior officers from the Malian Army, and the assured me that they would start pushing forward. What I saw there makes me doubt about the capacity, discipline and willingness of the Malian Army. They are just not ready without any external support, which they are secretly starting getting. A lieutenant told me that he was leading a convoy with US high rank officers going to Burkina Faso.

People seem to exaggerated the strength of the Islamist fighters. They are seen as good because the Malian Army is so bad and incompetent.

Invading the south is nothing but a bluff against foreign intervention and shouldn’t be taken seriously, although sporadic attacks are a possiblity. Either option is the quickest path to accelerating ECOWAS/UN military operations, so the Islamists are far better served fortifying the territory that they control. At the same time, ECOWAS and the UN are still blowing hot air into Mali’s interim government. Will they wait until April 2013‘s proposed election or attempt to conclude an intervention by this date? Both plans have their advantages and disadvantages.

“People seem to exaggerated the strength of the Islamist fighters. They are seen as good because the Malian Army is so bad and incompetent.”