Messing Up the Mullahs: Dubya's Covert Action Plan

About the Author

Peter BrookesSenior Fellow, National Security AffairsDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

There are but two powers in the world, the
sword and the mind. In the long run, the sword is always beaten by
the mind.

- Napoleon Bonaparte

According to a news account supposedly based on a leak from
inside the government, President Bush recently signed off on a
classified intelligence "finding," authorizing the CIA to undertake
a non-lethal covert-action program to destabilize Iran's nearly
out-of-control government. If true, it's about
time.

The target is Iran's nuclear-weapons program - which, according
to a new International Atomic Energy Agency report, might be able
to produce a bomb in the next two or three years, if unchecked.

All the diplomatic begging and pleading - including some very
stern letters from the United Nations and the
European Union - haven't deterred the maniacal mullahs one iota in
their aspirations to make Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei into an
atomic ayatollah.

The covert-action program is also supposed to stem Iran's
support for the various and sundry Iraqi insurgents. No doubt
Tehran's very likely assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan
should be added to the list, too.

A covert bid to pressure - or topple - the Iranian regime isn't
without merit. But it faces at least two problems.

First, it's not a secret anymore. So long as the leaker remains
nameless, we can't know the motive for sure - though the goal was
likely to kill the project altogether. Best guess: A mullah-hugging
government bureaucrat, more interested in appeasing Iran than in
protecting U.S. interests. But, on the other hand, it could also be
someone trying to scuttle this week's U.S.-Iran talks in Baghdad .
. . ah, the intrigue of it all.

Second, it's probably too little, too late. Such a program
likely lacks the "juice" needed to get Iran to throttle back on
nukes (or its support of insurgents). That's more likely going to
require economic sanctions that truly hurt - or a military
strike.

Sanctions are tough to get - we'd need to convince the
Europeans, and probably the Russians and Chinese, to go along for
them to work. Some reports indicate Europe has actually increased
investment in Iran since the nuclear crisis.

The mullahs should know the military option is still active.
Last week's unannounced exercises of two aircraft carrier strike
groups, kicking off the navy's largest war games in the Persian
Gulf since 2003, should send a clear signal.

But an armed attack risks strengthening the regime. Many,
perhaps most, Iranians are deeply alienated from their rulers now -
but a surge of patriotism could ease those rifts.

Unfortunately, a "blown" covert-action program runs that risk,
too. Indeed, the CIA played a key role in putting the shah into
power in 1953 - so any sign that its meddling again could be
poisonous.

But even the loss of secrecy doesn't mean the program can't go
ahead and even have some positive effect. It would have to remain
"covert" - that is, with specific actions not attributable to the
U.S. government.

A well-executed operation could upset things for the mullahs,
increasing social pressure from below - and shake the senior
clerics into backing off on their nefarious games.

The regime is increasingly paranoid - harassing and detaining
liberals and dissidents, and creating new opponents with things
like a dress-code crackdown on women. The mullahs are now holding
at least four Americans - journalists, academics and peaceniks - on
trumped-up charges of every cleric's worst nightmare:
counter-revolution.

The leak claims the covert-action program would include
propaganda, disinformation and economic attacks - efforts to weaken
Iran's currency and manipulate financial transactions.

It's not hard to envision at least some tactics:

Iran's economy is certainly vulnerable. It just started
rationing gasoline - and relies on imports for 40 percent of its
needs. We might look at getting key suppliers, like the United Arab
Emirates and India, to cut back.

Another option is to target the government's economic
mismanagement: Buy up and flood the international market with
Iranian rials, devaluing the currency and sending already high
inflation and unemployment further skyward.

The nuclear program could be slowed by devising ways to sell
defective - or destructive - parts to the Iranian front companies
buying supplies off the black market.

The regime's fundamentalist legitimacy is also vulnerable. Why
not use the foreign media to expose corruption (moral or financial)
among the ruling elite? Officials who've socked away billions in
foreign banks deserve to pay some price . . . .

Hard-hitting, clandestine "surrogate" broadcasts could be
beamed into Iran 24/7, highlighting human-rights abuses,
corruption, civil strife and the unnecessary political and economic
hardships of the Iranian people.

Iran is only slightly more than half Persian. Could ethnic
minorities like the Azeris (24 percent) and Kurds (7 percent),
already unhappy with their second-class status, be empowered to do
something about it?

A bolder, riskier approach would be to start aiding armed
anti-government elements to operate in Iran. Unfortunately, it's a
double-edged sword: You'd put significant pressure on the regime,
but an ugly backlash might await perceived sympathizers - complicit
or not.

Sure, a heavy-handed crackdown could increase internal support
for regime change. That's a good thing. But if U.S. interference is
exposed, the "blowback" could easily be another anti-American
regime. Plus, in the end, none of the currently organized, armed
anti-regime groups are ones you'd want to see running Iran.

A covert program is unlikely to bring the Iranian regime to
its knees. But it could throw Tehran off balance just enough to
distract it from nukes and foreign adventurism - making such an
operation well worth the good ole Company - er, college - try.

Peter Brookesis a senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation and the author of
"A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States."

About the Author

Peter BrookesSenior Fellow, National Security AffairsDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy