On Tue, November 6, 2007 9:07 am, Rich, Joel wrote:
: IMVHO you can't say the guy is wrong on any other basis than he is not
: recognized as one of the chachmei hamesora - it seems we have a self
: perpetuating subjective system which allows for "votes" of
: indeterminate weighting by both the poskim and the am that accepts
: them...
I am not advocating a free for all. Fuzzy logic still requires the
weightings make sense. Someone who values an obscure acharon who isn't
his own rebbe over shas as expounded by rishonim and backed by minhag
yisrael, or who dismisses eishes ish in order to solve a yerushah
problem, .... The problem is more than voting him out -- such
weighting itself can't be justified.
Also, weighting shitos is only part of it. Much more often we have to
evaluate conflicting desirata. Resolution of machloqes is actually far
more well defined (rov, nisqatnu hadoros, halakhah kevasra'i, etc...)
than applying theoretical conclusions to a case that each seems to
force a different response.
BTW, for a nice outline of some of these kelalim, see
<http://www.mucjs.org/Consensus.pdf>. I am not endorsing every last
conclusion, just having a point to start arguing from is nice. But the
citations seem solid, so far.
SheTir'u baTov!
-micha
--
Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he
micha@aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering,
http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what
Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv

> RMB
> : > The formalist's answer would depend on whether he emphasizes Shas
> : > (must) or BY (may) or MB (ought not).
me
> : No one has brought any support from any classical source for don't -
> : only that it wasn't done - but without the leap that therefore it
> : shouldn't be done.
>
> : The MB never says it shouldn't be done - he brings down that the
> : minhag is not like the gra - who requires it...
RMB
> No, but it is at this point a text that implies "ought not",
> a codification of the minhag avos argument. I did intentially write
> "ought not" rather than "can not".
Not trying to be repetitious. However, the text does not imply
"ought not" - unless one is trying to read into it. It is dangerous
to read current preconceptions and problems into the text.
The Mishna Berura is merely bringing proof that the general minhag is
not to pasken like the gra - who requires women to make zimun. If it
was the norm for many communities for women to make zimun, one
couldn't conclude whether they paskened like the gra - or it was a
reshut that they did. However, those communities who didn't say zimun
(and I think that there is agreement that that was the communal norm
in most communities (even if individual women might have said it) -
one can readily conclude that they did not hold like the gra.
However, the extra step of ought not is not there.
You are looking at it from a perspective that it seems the mishna
brura is suggesting that this is minhag avot, but one has to be
careful - because it is not at all clear what the minhag avot
actually was.
The mishna brura brings a rationale that suggests that the minhag avot
was not that women deliberately did not say zimun (ie, that there was
a minhag for them not to do it), but that given that women would have
a difficult time saying zimun, givn their lack of knowledge of Hebrew,
the minhag avot was that women did not have to - against the gra.
I would add that in cases where the mishna brura thinks that it is an
"ought not" case - even if not a "can not" - he is not shy about
saying it (eg, women saying kaddish ...) - but he doesn't here say
that one one should follow this minhag or one should not be meshane.
He even discusses as a possibility the ba'al hatanya's suggestion that
when 3 men and 3 women eat together, one may have two zimunim - the
men and the women being mezamen separately.
Meir Shinnar

RJB writes:
> But I don't see anyone saying that the *content* is tiflus.
Not strictly true. The gemora, at least in the hava mina (and arguably
in the maskana), understands the Mishna as saying the content is tiflus,
as it says on the top of 21b "tiflus salka datecha" - is it really as
though he is teaching tiflus (as Rashi clarifies, because he has just
called Torah tiflus) and answers - it is as if *kilu* he is teaching
tiflus.
> Rather, the clear sense of the mishnah, is that by teaching
> her Torah as some object, regardless of content, teaches her tiflus,
because of
> the bitter-waters protection.
>
> 1. If a father teaches his daughter, she will have Torah
> learning. 2. A woman who has learned is protected from the
> bitter waters test 3. One who is protected from the
> bitter-waters test can stray without consequences.
>
> Therefore, if a father teaches his daughter Torah, he gives
> her the tools to allow her to stray without consequences.
> Not that learning "when it says min hatzon, it means tzon
> that have not been used for mishkav beheimah" or "elu metzios
> shelo elu chayav lehachriz" is specifically tiflusdic
> content, but the fact of the teaching indirectly allows her
> to stray without consequences.
Well that is one way of understanding it, but there are at least two
other possibilities:
A) that by teaching her Torah, she will end up learning at some point
the fact that learning protects from the bitter waters, and armed with
that bit of knowledge, she will be tempted to stray. That is - it is a
bit like the small minded people who only do not speed because they are
afraid they might be caught and punished and not because they understand
the wider picture that the government has legislated against speeding to
protect society. If you teach them how to avoid being caught (eg where
the speed cameras are) then all you are doing is encouraging them to
speed.
B) that teaching her Torah will sharpen her mind and make her cleverer.
And if somebody's natural tendency is towards immorality anyway, then
making them cleverer just makes them better at achieving that goal -
just as if somebody has a tendency towards the criminal, teaching them
skills of espionage is likely to make them a better criminal should they
choose that direction.
Now interpretation A) fits better with the simple language of the
Mishna, because the reason given by Ben Azai for why a father is
*obligated* to teach his daughter Torah is because "if she were to drink
[the bitter waters] she would know that that it was her merits that
achieved the suspension for her" - that is, if she gets caught and
drinks, she does not totally lose her faith in the system when she
doesn't die. It would then follow that when Rabbi Eliezer follows and
says that anyone who teaches his daughter Torah teaches her tiflus, is
saying - well if you teach her that, it is not just that she will know
after she has drunk, but she will know before she drinks, and that will
make her more likely to stray.
However B) seems more consonant with the gemora and the rishonim.
Because the gemora goes on to explain various bits of this mishna on 21b
- including, as referred to above, "kilu lumda tiflus" and Rashi there
explains this to mean - because from its content she will understand
cleverness (perhaps craftiness or cunning would be a better translation
of arumomis - think of the nachash) and so she will do her [by
implication immoral] deeds undetected. And the the gemora goes on Amar
Rabbi Abahu, what is the source of Rabbi Eliezer? Ans: as it is written
in [Mishlei 8:12] I am wisdom that dwells with craftiness.
> That's what I see as part of the usual diyuk, perhaps it's
> only used in the post-Bais-Yaakov era, but it seems to be the
> plain sense of the mishnah, without the mishnah being reused to ban
all women's
> Torah learning.
>
> And it seems that this diyuk would NOT distinguish between
> the father and the third party as teacher. Nor would it
> actually be operative since 300 BCE or whatever, when the
> bitter-waters test stopped working.
Neither would explanation A) be operative post bitter waters - but you
see B) would.
And you see, you further need to learn not just the mishna and the
gemora, but at the very least tosphos as well to understand how this is
being understood throughout the ages. Because Tosphos there on 21b
brings the Yerushalmi that I referred to at
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol23/v23n164.shtml#10 - where Rabbi
Eliezer refuses to answer a quite lamdishe question on the chet haegel,
despite the fact that by not answering this one question he lost his son
a significant parnassa (she no longer gave him 300 kor of ma'aseh a
year) and where Rabbi Eliezer's response to his son was that it is
better to be burned that to give over divrei torah to women. That is,
once you understand that we appear to posken like Rabbi Eliezer, it is
not illogical to use Rabbi Eliezer's other statements, as found in the
Yerushalmi, to understand his position in the Bavli - and that would
seem to mitigate against both your understanding and understanding A)
above.
And further the meforshim (see eg the Beis Yosef and the Bach) discuss
where the Rambam gets his distinction between Torah shebaal peh and
Torah shebichtav from (because he says that while lechatchila one should
not teach a woman Torah shebichtav, if he does, then it is not as if he
teaches tiflus). And they answer that this comes from the discussion
regarding Hakel at the beginning of Chaggiga, which states that the men
come to learn torah and the women to listen - so if the women come to
listen, and are obligated to come to listen to the reading of the Torah,
how could it be tiflus - or rather, if it was tiflus, it would be assur
for women to learn even by way of listening and derech arai, and hence
the answer is it isn't tiflus and therefore Rabbi Eliezer must have been
referring to Torah she baal peh - but nevertheless, while it is OK to
have women listen to Torah in the context of a mitzva, in the words of
the Bach "avel limud derech kavuah l'chatchila lo".
Earlier RMB wrote:
> RJJB and I are making very different diyuqim.
>
> "Chakhamim tzivu" is far from common, when compared to
> "chayav" or "assur", and even less common than "tiqnu". I
> therefore do not make RnCL's assumption that there is an
> actual lav deRabbanan involved in a father teaching his
> daughters Torah. Otherwise, why the rare language?
And then
> : Now, I struggle to see "tzivu Chazal" as anything but an issur....
>
> I struggle to see why Maran BY wouldn't then say "assur",
> like he does tens of thousands of other times. Or gezeirah,
> or taqanah, or any of the usual idioms. In the case of an odd
> turn of phrase that seems to be a synonym, you're assuming
> it's synonymous and I'm assuming the phrase is used bedavka
> because there is a different connotation. I'm not sure either
> of us are working with more than personal assumption, though.
>
Well the language is not Maran's, but rather that of the Rambam ("tzivu
Chachamim"). It is relatively unusual though, compared to assur - so I
did a Bar Ilan search on the term (both tzivu Chazal and tzivu
Chachamim) in the Rambam and BY/Tur/Shulchan Aruch (because here is
really where Bar Ilan comes into its own).
But before I get to the results of that, the reason why I tended to
understand tzivu Chazal as being a synonym is because it is hard to
understand it any other way when the Beis Yosef is saying that we posken
like Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna, and Tosphos is bringing Rabbi Eliezer
in the Yerushalmi as being willing to be burnt rather than give over
torah to women (and a discussion about the three types of death in the
chet haegel no less, the sort of thing that a good Beis Ya'akov girl
might well be learning). If anything, the language of the Rambam is
extremely mild in that context.
Anyhow, back to Bar Ilan. Tzivu Chazal did not turn up much, but tzivu
Chachamim, while turning up only four references in the Shulchan Aruch,
came up 29 times in the Rambam.
The four in the Shulchan Aruch were:
- Yoreh Deah siman 255 si'if 1: v'chen tzivu Chachamim - oseh
shabbatecha chol v'al titztarech l'brios (hmm, I think that one is
honoured in the breach quite a lot)
-- Yoreh Deah Siman 394 s'if 6: kol me sheano misavel k'mo shetzivu
Chachamim harei zeh achsarei
- Even Haezer siman 58 si'if 1: to give at least something from his
possessions to his daughter (to marry her off)
- Even Haezer siman 76 si'if 7: that a man should not marry more than
four wives, even if he has lots of money, so that he can give them onah
at least once a month
Now these four are amongst those of the Rambam, but to give you a
flavour of the remaining ones (without going through the full list).
The first ten are in hilchos deos - and include things like tzivu
Chachamim b'derech eretz shelo ochel adam basar ela teavon and kol
ma'asav yhiu lshem shamayim. Two are in hilchos sanhedrin and are
warnings to the judges about how to judge. One is about being careful in
nitilas yadayim. One is about distancing oneself from a bad neighbour.
One is about a woman being tzanua within her house, one is about a
husband being mechabed his wife (and another other is vice versa).
Ie they all seem about interpersonal relations, proper conduct and
derech eretz - and actually an awful lot of them strike one as being
honoured in the breach (don't eat too much etc), although not having
more than four wives does seem to me to be something closer to a proper
gezera (remember the Aruch l'Ner's use of this in my discussion on
should one person do a vadai mitzvah). But even so, you actually may be
on to something, it is a completely fascinating read, and I recommend
you do the search yourself, as the cumulative effect is quite
impressive. I would also I note that other rishonim (eg the Ramban)
turned up in my search did tend to use tzivu Chachamim in the way I
understood it, as a synonym for a gezera of Chazal, so, to the extent
that this is not completely synonomous, it seems to be a peculiarity of
the Rambam.
But of course the Rambam is very, very precise, and a slight shift in
language is likely to be significant for him, and the diyuk you noticed
may well have been fully intended by him. However, even if that is what
the Rambam intended, and because it is the Rambam's language, that is
what came across into the Shulchan Aruch, I really struggle to see that
the meforshim, with their general comments bringing Rabbi Eliezer in the
Yerushalmi, understood it that way. It is a gem though, really very
very interesting and I am not sure how far it extends and quite what it
means. It is also the sort of thing that unless you were completely
baki in the entirety of Shas Poskim, you would have struggled to turn
this up as clearly and with any certainty prior to the existence of Bar
Ilan.
> So then why "tzivu"? Because they commanded us dads not to do
> something stupid. Not qua "vetzivanu" (via proxy) but as
> simply out of concern for the girl.
> SheTir'u baTov!
> -micha
Regards
Chana

Is it reasonable to suggest a Kal VeChomer from the following? Reb Moshe was
asked about a Paroches that opened and closed from and to the centre. The
shoel thought there may have been a problem on Shabbos of Kosev and Mochek
with the writing on the Paroches. Reb Moshe though considered the entire
Paroches to be an unacceptable change from the ancient traditions and
instructed that the Paroches must be altered to the traditional single
curtain.
Is this in Igros Moshe? Do you have a Mareh Makom?
KT,
MYG
Igros Moshe O"Ch 4.41.22

R' Meir Rabi:
<SNIP> Reb Moshe was asked about a Paroches that opened and closed from and
to the centre. The shoel thought there may have been a problem on Shabbos of
Kosev and Mochek with the writing on the Paroches. Reb Moshe though
considered the entire Paroches to be an unacceptable change from the ancient
traditions and instructed that the Paroches must be altered to the
traditional single curtain.
A quibble: R' Moshe (which I was informed off-list is in OC IV, 40:22) says
that as a Lechatchilah. I'm not sure if in his final words on the matter he
is instructing the Sho'el to attach the two sides, or he is saying that
Lechatchilah one should attach them.
This, though, raises the question as to what is a Shinui and what is not.
(R' Moshe calls this, "K'ein Shinui M'minhah Yisrael She'mei'olam Hayu Osin
Paroches Achas Al Kol Rochev Habinyan.") Here's an example: I remember
reading that in various European cities one went "down" literally, before
the Teivah, in which the Chazzan's Amud was lowered. I remember that in R'
Heinamann's shul in Baltimore I saw this, and one can argue that the
standard "Young Israel style" Shul (with a sloping, auditorium style floor)
is like this, but the vast majority of Shuls that I've attended are not like
this.
Another example: All the new-fangled Segulos (forty days Perek
Shirah/Kneading Challah/Shir Hashirim/etc.).
Another example: All the Hanhagos (both active and passive) based on Sefer
HaZohar, that (I presume) were not practiced until the Zohar spread. Would
R' MF, had he lived at that time, Paskened against them?
Another example: What about the safes that many Aron Kodesh's now have in
them? They detract from the aesthetic and add enormously to the cost.
Mei'olam Lo Shamanu Mei'hem!
I'm sure that the listmembers can come up with more examples.
As an aside, I davened this Shabbos in the YI of Staten Island (whose Rav
was quoted in the article someone just posted on Areivim re: the Kosher
Dunkin' Donuts) and they have a very interesting Aron Kodesh. Here, the Aron
is covered by two wooden Luchos, which - on Shabbos - are slid apart
horizontally (with the effect of framing the Aron). Behind them there is
some sort of velvet/satin covered barrier (for fire purposes?). Behind
_that_ is a (standard, one piece) Paroches. What would R' MF say to that?
Also, I remember being told about a Shul in Wesley Hills (near Monsey, NY)
that had some sort of innovative Aron Kodesh. I didn't see it in action, but
IIRC, the entire Aron rotated to open, I guess sort of like a Lazy Susan
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lazy_susan).
KT,
MYG

On Nov 6, 2007 6:50 PM, Meir Shinnar <chidekel@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> Not trying to be repetitious. However, the text does not imply
> "ought not" - unless one is trying to read into it. It is dangerous
> to read current preconceptions and problems into the text.
>
> Meir Shinnar
>
However. if you accept a heuirstic POV of how to decide matters pasken
then you are ALWAYS [at least potentially] bringing your own spin into
any text! Objectivity gets trumped by subjectivity!
Shitas Dr. Meir Shinnar: let the text speak for itself - do not READ
INTO IT, do NOT bring one's prejudices into it. Do not presume one's
shitos MATCH the text, etc.
Shitas R. Micha Berger: View any text with one's learned
pre-conceived notions and see it through THAT prism
e.g. Mamleches kohanim via the prism of Mussar school is then about
self-perfection and NOT about a Preistly Kingdom!
There is no way to havea meeting of minds with these two contrary
pre-suppositions. There would probably be disagreement about text
90%+ of the time.
-
Kol Tuv / Best Regards,
RabbiRichWolpoe@Gmail.com
Please Visit:
http://nishmablog.blogspot.com/

From: "Micha Berger" _micha@aishdas.org_ (mailto:micha@aishdas.org)
> SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge
> for himself, if he is only asked questions?
> MENO: Yes.
> SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is
> recollection?
> MENO: True.
> SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either
> have acquired or always possessed?
> MENO: Yes.
> SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then
> he must have had and learned it at some other time?.....
> SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul,
> then the soul is immortal. ....
--end quote--
>>And so, Plato has Socrates prove that the real unchanging Platonic
Truths are learned before birth, and "learning is recollection".
Given this context, I think the chiddush isn't that we're prepared
knowing Torah in order to make Torah learning easier. Rather, Chazal's
point is that those Truths aren't limited to geometry or the
rigorously provable, but are/include Torah.<<
>>>>>
I think this quoted dialogue has more to do with math than with Torah. It
has to do with the question of whether mathematics is "discovered" or
"invented" -- with Socrates' line of thought seeming to weigh in more on the side of
"discovered" -- i.e., when mathematicians created their system of
mathematics, step by step, at each step it was intuitively obvious to them that this
step was "true."
I don't know if this type of innate knowledge -- that when one is confronted
with step-by-step logic one intuitively sees that it is true, even though
one didn't know it before one took tenth grade geometry -- this type of innate
knowledge hints at but certainly does not prove the existence of a soul.
It is in any case a different kind of knowledge than the knowledge of Torah.
Torah really does have to be taught and cannot be "discovered" or
reconstructed by logic. In fact all the recent discussion on Avodah of whether there
are "Torah rules of discovery" bears on this. It seems there are not such
clear rules, not clear like mathematics.
BTW aren't the Japanese working on computers that excel at "fuzzy logic"
which can solve problems that step-by-step straight logic cannot solve? "Fuzzy
logic" doesn't mean "illogical thinking" (or "typical female way of thinking"
-- as the subject line here might suggest.) It means that a number of
different kinds of rules all operate at the same time, and that there is always a
range of possibilities rather than One Right Answer.
--Toby Katz
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From: Sarah Green _sarahyarok@yahoo.com_ (mailto:sarahyarok@yahoo.com)
However, there was one part I never understood - on 'ka'asher avadti
ovodti"....
However, in my adult mind it still seems to me that if you go to request an
audience to speak to a king, he is sitting in a public throne room or
reception room surrounded by courtiers and advisors.
So why on earth, when Esther went to invite him the party, would we need to
assume that anything private or personal would take place? <<
>>>>>
The way I always understood that was that, prior to this moment, she /never/
went to the king voluntarily for /anything/ -- always had to be taken
against her will -- thus making it clear that to her it was no marriage and she was
in the palace under duress, an unwilling captive.
Once she went to the king voluntarily -- for /anything/ -- she was no longer
a captive but a willing actor. She was now acting as a wife rather than a
kidnap victim.
However I also always understood the "ka'asher avadti avadti" to mean, not
that she would automatically be chayav kares for going to the throne room, but
that by going to the king's throne room voluntarily she was greatly
increasing the chances that he would remember her, think of her and want her -- that
night? -- in his private room, whereupon she might /then/ be chayav kares.
So she wasn't saying, "I will go to the king's throne room even if going
there makes me chayav kares." She was saying, "I will go to the king's throne
room even if going there will increase the odds that I will shortly thereafter
be put in a position where I will be chayav kares."
--Toby Katz
=============
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In a message dated 10/29/2007 10:17:34 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
T613K@aol.com writes:
Was Esther somehow slipping away from the palace at night, or was she
smuggling Mordechai in? She lived in a harem guarded by eunuchs, I wonder how
either of these scenarios would have been possible.
According to some Medroshim and Mforshim Daniel was in charge of Esther, as
well as having 7 Jewish girls, as well as Heigai helping her out. In addition
that according to the Zohar there was no problem at all.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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In a message dated 10/30/2007 10:52:21 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
yadmoshe@012.net.il writes:
It would also seem that since the Zohar states that there was no
physical relationship between Esther and Achashveros he was the son of
Esther and Mordechai.
Lav Davka, See Sefer Medrosh Talpiyos (which I faxed, and hopefully R'
Micha will assign a URL for it and notify us), (also see Chasam Sofer Y"D 172).
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In a message dated 10/31/2007 11:09:51 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
menu@inter.net.il writes:
There is a view (Esther Rabba) that "vatitchalchal hamlka meod" refers to
her miscarrying. Also see a fuller discussion of this in the Yalkut Shimoni
there.
Yes! however the proof is from the fact that Rav had no problem saying that
she became Niddah even though that would mean that she had relationship with
Achasverosh during her Niddus.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a message dated 11/5/2007 7:34:36 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
salman@videotron.ca writes:
A couple of points:
1) In addition to the points raised by R'nTK, I assume that Achashverosh (an
absolute monarch) would consider any of his wifes found with another man as
not merely adultery (from his perspective) but even worse as treason - so
there was a very real risk of sakonas nefoshos to both Esther and Mordechai.
How were they permitted to risk their lives in order to be together for these
short periods? Futhermore, Esther's potential downfall under charges of
treason could not only endanger M&E but could also put her nation at risk again and
incur the renewed anger of Achashverosh against the Jews of his empire.
See above in answer to R'n TK.
2) How did all the sources cited by RDE KNOW exactly who was the father of
Esther's child? If you will answer that they knew with ruach hakodesh - then
why are their answers not in agreement? I assume that they should have come up
with a single consistent answer from a revelation by ruach hakodesh.
Based on the texts and the Pirush of Shimsha Bmuch (see Tos. Megilla 13b)
and Chasam Sofer Y"D 172, Medrosh Talpiyos, and many other Seforim, also on
when she became pregnant with Daryovesh see Maharsha that it was after Kasher
Ovadity Ovodity (at which point there was no more need for Much).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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In a message dated 11/6/2007 3:57:49 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
sarahyarok@yahoo.com writes:
However, there was one part I never understood - on 'ka'asher avadti
ovodti". Possibly because we tend to have pictures in our minds of what we learned
as children, and we find it hard to switch to another view.
Perhaps!
1) See Medrosh Talpiyos, hence since here it was not an Oneis but Brotzon
the separation could not be accomplished.
2) The Meforshim say that the Zohar does not argue with the Gemara, and the
reason the Gemara asks how was Esther permitted, is only because M&E would
not do something that would appear Ossur, the same could apply here.
However, in my adult mind it still seems to me that if you go to request an
audience to speak to a king, he is sitting in a public throne room or
reception room surrounded by courtiers and advisors.
So why on earth, when Esther went to invite him the party, would we need to
assume that anything private or personal would take place? If Chazal say so
there must be some tradition or source for it, but it seems hard for me to
grasp.
As she was hoping that her Chein would save her from death, she was at least
prepared that it could lead to something.
Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind
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