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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32235

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DC Field

Value

Language

dc.contributor.author

Hellwig, Martin

en_US

dc.date.accessioned

2009-08-03

en_US

dc.date.accessioned

2010-05-14T12:02:07Z

-

dc.date.available

2010-05-14T12:02:07Z

-

dc.date.issued

2009

en_US

dc.identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32235

-

dc.description.abstract

This paper studies the design of optimal utilitarian mechanisms for an excludable public good. Excludability provides a basis for making people pay for admissions; the payments can be used for redistribution and/or funding. Whereas previous work assumed that admissions are governed by the payment or nonpayment of a price, this paper allows for arbitrary admission rules. With sufficient inequality aversion, nondegenerate randomization in admissions is shown to be desirable for certain model specifications, with and without participation constraints. The paper also gives a sufficient condition on the distribution of preferences under which randomization is undesirable.

en_US

dc.language.iso

eng

en_US

dc.publisher

|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonn

en_US

dc.relation.ispartofseries

|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,12