By AAT staff

The African expansion saga of Japanese paint manufacturer Kansai continues, albeit not in Southern Africa (after having travailed through a hostile takeover of South African paint company Freeworld Coatings and obtaining a majority stake in Zimbabwean competitor Astra Industries in 2010 and 2013, respectively): the current Kansai-related antitrust story is a COMESA one, which comes to us from East Africa.

As was reported back in 2013 in industry publication CoatingsWorld, Kansai had set its sights on expanding into Eastern Africa as well, focussing on the Sadolin brand (formerly owned by AkzoNobel and since its private equity buy-out produced under a continuing AkzoNobel licence and under the parent label Crown Paints).

This has now changed, says competition attorney Andreas Stargard with Primerio Ltd.: “Recently, the COMESA Competition Commission had become aware of press reports that AkzoNobel had withdrawn its Kansai/Sadolin licence in Uganda (a COMESA member state) and effectively entered into — or planned to enter into — a new agreement with an unnamed ‘local producer’.”

Mr. Stargard, who practices competition law with a focus on African companies and jurisdictions, points out that the COMESA merger-notification regime requires a mandatory filing under certain conditions, such as those affecting 2 or more member states and involving businesses with at least $10m in combined regional revenues.

“Whilst the COMESA review is non-suspensory (meaning the parties must notify, but can go ahead and implement the transaction prior to the termination of the CCC’s antitrust review), the notification itself is mandatory. A failure-to-file can result in significant fines of up to 10% of combined turnover, as well as the regional annulment of the merger within the COMESA countries.

This is what has now happened with Mr. Lipimile’s Sept. 19th letter to AkzoNobel: the CCC chief warned the company that it would risk voiding any contracts if it failed to make a ‘curative’ retroactive filing by yesterday, Monday, 25 September 2017.”

The CCC’s letter to the Dutch paint giant reads in relevant part: “Kindly be informed that the COMESA competition commission has become aware through the media that Akzo Nobel Powder Coatings has entered into sales, manufacturing and distribution agreements with a local paint manufacturer in Uganda. I wish to inform you that, mergers and any other forms of agreements between competitors are required to be notified to the Commission….without such notification, and subsequent approval by the Commission, such transactions are null and void ab initio and no rights or obligations imposed on the participating parties shall be legally enforceable in the Common Market.”

As to the likelihood of any notification having been made — or at least made satisfactorily and completely — Andreas Stargard observes that:

“By any antitrust lawyer’s standards, scrambling to make a filing within less than a week, as seems to be required by George’s letter here, is a tall order — merger notifications usually require significant preparatory work, including data analysis, document collection, and interviews with the business people to advance to a final ‘filing’ stage. To do so in 6 calendar days is extremely difficult.”

He concludes that, “as COMESA is still a relatively young regime in terms of merger filings — with few resources at hand to manage notifications in and of themselves, much less enforcement actions — we expect that the CCC and the parties will somehow arrive at an amicable settlement in this matter.”

Since our June 2017 Edition of the African WRAP, we highlight below the key competition law related topics, cases, regulatory developments and political sentiment across the continent which has taken place across the continent in the past three months. Developments in the following jurisdictions are particularly noteworthy: Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania and South Africa.

[AAT is indebted to the continuous support of its regular contributors and the assistance of Primerio’s directors in sharing their insights and expertise on various African antitrust matters. To contact a Primerio representative, please visit Primerio’s website]

Botswana: Proposed Legislative Amendments

Introduction of Criminal Liability

The amendments to the Competition Act will also introduce criminal liability for officers or directors of a company who causes the firm to engage in cartel conduct. The maximum sanctions include a fine capped at P100 000 (approx. US$10 000) and/or a maximum five year prison sentence.

Fines for Prior Implementation

Once finalised, the legislative amendments will also introduce a maximum administrative penalty of up to 10% of the merging parties’ turnover for implementing a merger in contravention of the Act. This would include ‘gun-jumping’ or non-compliance with any conditions imposed on the merger approval.

Restructuring of the Authorities

Proposed legislative amendments to the Botswana Competition Act will likely result in the Competition Commission’s responsibilities being broadened to include the enforcement of consumer protection laws in addition to antitrust conduct.

Furthermore, there is a significant restructuring of the competition agencies on the cards in an effort to ensure that the Competition Authority – which will become the Competition and Consumer Authority (CCA) – is independently governed from the Competition Commission. Currently, the Competition Commission governs the CA but the CA is also the adjudicative body in cases referred to the Commission by the CA.

The proposed amendments, therefore, seek to introduce a Consumer and Competition Tribunal to fulfil the adjudicative functions while an independent Consumer and Competition Board will take over the governance responsibilities of the ‘to be formed’ CCA.

SouthAfrica

Information Exchange Guidelines

The Competition Commission has published draft Guidelines on Information Exchanges (Guidelines). The Guidelines provide some indication as to the nature, scope and frequency of information exchanges which the Commission generally views as problematic. The principles set out in the Guidelines are largely based, however, on case precedent and international best practice.

The fact that the Commission has sought to publish formal guidelines for information exchanges affirms the importance of ensuring that competitors who attend industry association meetings or similar forums must be acutely aware of the limitations to information exchanges to ensure that they do not fall foul of the per se cartel conduct prohibitions of the Competition Act.

Market Inquiry into Data Costs

The Competition Commission has formally initiated a market inquiry into the data services sector. This inquiry will run parallel with the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa’s market inquiry into the telecommunications sector more broadly.

Although the terms of reference are relatively broad, the Competition Commission’s inquiry will cover all parties in the value chain in respect of any form of data services (both fixed line and mobile). In particular, the objectives of the inquiry include, inter alia, an assessment of the competition at each of the supply chain levels, with respect to:

The strategic behaviour of by large fixed and mobile incumbents;

Current arrangements for sharing of network infrastructure; and

Access to infrastructure.

There are also a number of additional objectives such as benchmarking the standard and pricing of data services in South Africa against other countries and assessing the adequacy of the regulatory environment in South Africa.

Mauritius

Amnesty re Resale Price Maintenance

The Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) has, for a limited period of four months only, granted amnesty to firms who have engaged in Resale Price Maintenance. The amnesty expires on 7 October 2017. Parties who take advantage of the amnesty will receive immunity from the imposition of a 10% administrative penalty for engaging in RPM in contravention of the Mauritius Competition Act.

The amnesty policy followed shortly after the CCM concluded its first successful prosecution in relation to Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), which is precluded in terms of Section 43 of the Mauritius Competition Act 25 of 2007 (Competition Act).

The CCM held that Panagora Marketing Company Ltd (Panagora) engaged in prohibited vertical practices by imposing a minimum resale price on its downstream dealers and consequently fined Panagora Rs 29 932 132.00 (US$ 849,138.51) on a ‘per contravention’ basis. In this regard, the CMM held that Panagora had engaged in three separate instances of RPM and accordingly the total penalty paid by Pangora was Rs 3 656 473.00, Rs 22 198 549.00 and 4 007 110.00 respectively for each contravention.

Please see AAT’s featured article here for further information on Resale Price Maintenance under Mauritian law

Tanzania

Merger and Acquisition Threshold Notification

The Fair Competition Commission has published revised merger thresholds for the determination of mandatorily notifiable thresholds. The amendments, which were brought into effect by the Fair Competition (Threshold for notification of Merger) (Amendment) Order published on 2 June 2017, increases the threshold for notification of a merger in Tanzania from TZS 800 000 000 (approx.. US$ 355 000) to TZS 3 500 000 000 (approx.. US$ 15 600 000) calculated on the combined ‘world-wide’ turnover or asset value of the merging parties.

Kenya

Concurrent Jurisdiction in the Telecommunications Sector

In June 2017, Kenya’s High Court struck down legislative amendments which regulated the concurrent jurisdiction between the Kenya Communications Authority and the Competition Authority Kenya in respect of anti-competitive conduct in the telecommunications sector.

In terms of the Miscellaneous Amendments Act 2015, the Communications Authority was obliged to consult with the Competition Authority and the relevant government Minister in relation to any alleged anti-competitive conduct within the telecommunications sector, prior to imposing a sanction on a market player for engaging in such anti-competitive conduct.

The High Court, however, ruled that the Communications Authority is independent and that in terms of the powers bestowed on the Communications Authority by way of the Kenya Communications Act, the Communications Authority may independently make determinations against market participants regarding antic-competitive conduct, particularly in relation to complex matters such as alleged abuse of dominance cases.

Establishment of a Competition Tribunal

The Kenyan Competition Tribunal has now been established and the chairperson and three members were sworn in early June. The Tribunal will become the adjudicative body in relation to decisions and/or taken by the Competition Authority of Kenya.

The Operational Rules of the Tribunal have not yet been published but are expected to be gazetted soon.

Introduction of a Corporate Leniency Policy

The Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) has finalised its Leniency Policy Guidelines, which provide immunity to whistle-blowers from both criminal and administrative liability. The Guidelines specifically extend leniency to the firm’s directors and employees as well as the firm itself.

Only the “first through the door” may qualify for immunity in respect of criminal liability, but second or third responds would be eligible for a 50% and 30% reduction of the administrative penalty respectively, provided that provide the CAK with new material evidence.

It should be noted, however, that receiving immunity from criminal prosecution is subject to obtaining consent from the Director of Public Prosecution as well. As per the procedure set out in the Policy Guidelines, the Director pf Public Prosecutions will only be consulted once a leniency applicant has already disclosed its involvement in the cartel and provided the CAK with sufficient evidence to prosecute the other respondents.

It is not clear what powers the Director of Public Prosecutions would have, particular in relation to the evidence which has been provided by the leniency applicant, should either the CAK or the Director refuse to grant immunity from criminal prosecution.

Namibia

Medical aid schemes

In a landmark judgment, the Namibian Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision in favour of the Namibian Association of Medical Aid Funds (NAMAF) and Medical Aid Funds (the respondents) finding that the respondents did not fall within the definition of an “undertaking” for the purpose of the Namibian Competition.

Despite the substantial similarities between the Namibian and the South African Competition Act, Namibia’s highest court took a very different interpretative stance to its South African counter-part and held that because the respondents did not “operate for gain or reward” they could not be prosecuted for allegedly having engaged in collusive behaviour in relation to their ‘tariff setting’ activities in terms of which the respondents collectively determined and published recommended bench-marking tariffs for reimbursement to patients in respect of their medical costs.

COMESA Chief Warns of Delayed Implementation of Leniency Policy

George Lipimile, Director, COMESA Competition Commission

In an interview with Concurrences, CCC Director George Lipimile stated cautiously that, while the agency had engaged a consultant to help it craft a regional leniency programme, it still had to “be discussed in detail with Member States. Given the different legal systems and the feedback coming from the consultations with Member States so far, this may take some time.”

Thus, “while there is no amnesty programme visible on the near-term horizon, the CCC’s novel cartel enforcement push poses particular concerns for undertakings operating in the COMESA region,” says Andreas Stargard, attorney with Africa advisory firm Pr1merio. “Director Lipimile has expressed his agency’s plan — jointly with the World Bank organisation — to launch a project designed to combat cartel activity. They propose to do so first, it seems, by piggy-backing off of other enforcers’ previous investigations, such as the South African Competition Commission’s cartel cases, and analysing whether those instances of foreign collusion could have harmful effects on the COMESA economies.”

Competition Law conference provides most in-depth look at the state of Cameroonian antitrust law

Event organised by Dr. Patricia Kipiani and Prof. Tchapga of Primerio & CEMAC, the Cameroon school of business and its competition law section

What follows is an article that appeared in French in the Le Droit journal, written by Stéphane Ngoh, reprinted here with permission. An English translation is below. An interview with Dr. Kipiani related to the conference can be found here. In it, she discusses the planned creation of a “Competition Observatory” for the country.

For our English readers, below is a Google Translate version in English of the article:

The international firm Primerio organized an awareness seminar on issues of law and competition policy in Cameroon and in the CEMAC zone.The event launched by the Minister of Trade, Luc Magloire Mbarga Atangana Mr. took place July 7, 2016 at the headquarters of GICAM in Douala.

Introduce competition as a “common good” to the community and “strengthen the teaching of competition in its legal and political dimensions” — such are the watchwords of the first “meeting competition” in Cameroon and driven CEMAC by the consultancy firm Primerio International and under the theme “from the law and competition policy in Cameroon and in the CEMAC.”As if to emphasize the importance, the trade minister of Cameroon, Luc Magloire Atangana Mbarga, made the trip from the economic capital with a view to chair the official launch.The Doctor of Law and lawyer at the Brussels Bar, Patricia Kipiani, who represented the firm Primerio International for the occasion explained how this first edition of “appointments of competition”, was meant seriously.Anything that justified the association both academics of all stripes, the inter-group employers of Cameroon (Gicam) that the Cameroonian public authorities.The researchers from the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in France and specialists from the competition law, the University Professor Martine Behar-Touchais and Laurent Vidal teacher-researcher made the trip from Gicam.

Minister of Commerce, which acts as a public authority supervising the sector to competition, has insisted that the appointment of the competition could not get better in a community and Cameroonian context located “on the eve of the entry into force of the economic partnership agreements ‘EPAs’, between the ACP countries and the EU which Cameroon is a party “, these agreements which involve opening up the economy therefore require that a certain emphasis on law and the competition policy.Moreover, the representative of the State of Cameroon to this appointment held to reaffirm the place reserved far in the competition, “our conviction has -t he explained, is that the trade needs a healthy environment and that is why an arsenal of legislative and regulatory texts exist in Cameroon and it demonstrates the willingness of the state to regulate the sector. “In support of its contention, Luc Magloire Atangana Mbarga argued that the will and determination of Cameroon to the competition law of a weight issue, resulting in years.To be welcomed, he stressed that the first framework for competition ambitions date back to the 1990’s and that so many laws created the National Competition Commission (CNC) as decrees have laid the organizational and structural contours.The president said Leopold Commission Boumsong, who was later in the MINCOMMERCE, was called to present the national aspects of competition and specifically the role of the National Competition Commission.This role, as insisted the minister, must strive to “prosecute and punish anti-competitive practices, based on texts dating and new like the law under protection on consumption, the new law on the organization of business and the foreign trade Act. “

THREE MAJOR ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES

The president of the CNC said against business leaders who filled the room Gicam there summarily 3 types of practices which have “the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting significantly, the year of competition in the internal market “under law No. 98/013 of 14 July 1998 on competition.This is abuse of a company or group of companies in a dominant market position, mergers and acquisitions as well as anti-competitive agreements.One the other, it appeared that anti-competitive practices in Cameroon are recorded in minutes drawn up by the Commission of the members following the investigations following a complaint from a natural or legal person or those initiated by them -Same.

Thereafter, the multilateral aspects of competition were discussed through the presentation of the role of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in support for competition policy.The economist of UNCTAD, Yves Kenfack discovered the UNCTAD code of competition which he praised the relevance while regretting that it was not binding on the signatory states.

Another moment of trade covered the Crusaders aspects between the views of the economist and that of the lawyer about the competition.It was Mr. Flavien Tchapga, economist, consultant also to Primerio International and associate professor at the Senghor University of Alexandria, which it is harnessed facing the audience of the Gicam conference room.The intervention of the latter can be reduced to a strong suggestion in response to the following question: “can we succeed awareness on competition if it does not take into account the specificities of the local environment?“.Response, in fact, in a context where 9 out of 10 companies are individual, beware formulas lawyers who are often larger and more complex to the nearest economists ground.

During the appointment of the competition, a panel discussion was opened to establish the educational dimension of the encounter.The debates and issues were under the leadership of Mr. Martin Abega, corporate director, former member of the National Competition Commission and Honorary Consul of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Cameroon.

Ultimately, the practical experiences of regulations and competition policies in Europe and Cameroon have clearly been crossed through Martine Behar-Touchais and Laurent Vidal one hand and Mr. Abdul Bagui other.It being understood that in Cameroon, regulation is broken by sector.

These are all practical difficulties related to the free exercise of competition that were screened.Smuggling, the persistence of monopolies in certain areas or counterfeiting within these pitfalls peeled for the service of international and local experts like the representatives of UNCTAD, CEMAC, OHADA and especially Cameroonian companies.Dr. Patricia Kipiani said it was important that “the reflections and exchanges back on the difficulties firms face, the difficulties related to unfair competition, their impact on the informal sector and other informal activities formal businesses.And also that an emphasis on regulation and economic policies that promote our economic space. “

Parties Start Discussing Business Practices with COMESA’s CCC

As AAT reported recently — see “Growing Pains: From One-Trick Pony to Full-Fledged Enforcer?” — the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) has begun to move from being a pure merger-control administrator to becoming a full-fledged antitrust enforcer. The CCC issued a Notice calling on firms to notify the CCC of any agreements (both historic and forward-looking) that may be anti-competitive, for the purpose of having such agreements ‘authorised’ or ‘exempted’ under Article 20 of the COMESA Competition Regulations. (More details on that regime are in our June article, referenced above.)

Eveready products (sample)

AAT has now learned that several companies have taken the agency up on its Exemption proposal: Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio Ltd. observes that the CCC’s announced “leniency ‘window’ to incentivise firms to come forward and obtain an exemption” has closed at this point in time, although he expressed doubt that the relatively short one-month period was sufficient and will likely be extended. Says Stargard: “We are seeing several parties, both global & local companies, who are beginning to take the CCC’s non-merger enforcement seriously. These undertakings are considering to obtain advance clearance of their business practices under the Commission’s Notice procedure.” One such example, he adds, is Kenya’s financially embattled Eveready East Africa: it has reportedly sought CCC approval of its agreements with international manufacturers for the importation and distribution within the COMESA common market of their diverse products, ranging from batteries to fountain pens to Clorox-brand chemicals. The Commission has invited “general public and stakeholders” for comments according to its formal statement.

In light of these developments, Stargard advises that:

“multi-national firms operating within COMESA or jointly with a COMESA-based importer or other domestic business partner should consider engaging counsel to evaluate their practices, and if they may fall within Article 16 of the Regulations, consider approaching the CCC for an authorisation letter.”

Merger filings still dither, but YTD numbers now tentatively promise to exceed FY2015

Making sense of the COMESA Competition Commission’s merger notification site is no easy undertaking. The perplexing nature of its case-numbering system mirrors perhaps only the level of confusion surrounding the CCC’s original merger threshold and notification-fee guidelines (e.g., see here on that topic).

As we pointed out here, the merger statistics (as they had been released as of January 2016) for 2015 were disappointingly low. In today’s post, please note that we are upgrading those numbers, however, to reflect additional material now made available on the official CCC web resource, reflecting 3 additional filings, bringing the year-end total for FY2015 to 18. Three of those were “Phase 2” cases. In addition, according to the CCC, there were 3 supplemental cases in which “Comfort Letters” were issued to the parties.

For year-to-date 2016 statistics, the numbers look analogous, albeit somewhat higher than the 2015 slump — that is to say, still diminished from the 2013-2014 height of COMESA ‘mergermania’, during which (mostly international) counsel took the confusion surrounding the CCC notification thresholds to heart and erred on the side of caution (and more fees), advising clients to notify rather than not to (65 in the 2 years), or to seek Comfort Letters, which also were issued in record numbers (19 total for the 2-year period)… With that said, the agency is now up to 16 merger cases, with 2 Second-Phase matters on deck.

Number of merger notifications based on CCC-published notices (using educated inferences where the original CCC case numbers, dates and/or descriptions lack intelligibility; note that 2013-14 statistics only reflect actual filings made available online and not the official statistics issued by the CCC of 21 and 43, respectively) (c) AfricanAntitrust.com

CCC Seeks Information on “Potentially” Anti-Competitive Agreements

By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie.

Breaking News: The COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) has issued a notice (the “Notice”) calling on firms to notify the CCC of any agreements (both historic and forward looking) that may be anti-competitive, for the purpose of having such agreements ‘authorised’ or ‘exempted’ in terms of Article 20 of the COMESA Competition Regulations (the “Regulations”).

In terms of Article 20 of the Regulations, agreements which are anticompetitive may be exempted by the CCC if such an ‘anticompetitive agreement’ contributes positively to the ‘public interest’ to the extent that the public interest benefit outweighs the anti-competitive effect.

In terms of the CCC’s notice 1/2013, the following agreements may well be considered to be in the public interest when evaluating whether an anti-competitive agreement or concerted practice should be exempted:

Joint research and development ventures;

Specialisation agreements; and

Franchising agreements

As to the agreements or concerted practices which may be anti-competitive, the Notice refers specifically to the restrictive business practices listed in Article 16 of the Regulations which states that:

“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market:

all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which:

(a) may affect trade between Member States; and

(b) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market.”

It should be noted that Article 16 is deliberately drafted broadly so as to prohibit conduct which has as its “object” the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Certain conduct, such as price fixing, fixing of trading terms or conditions, allocating suppliers or markets or collusive tendering may be considered as having as its ‘object’ the distortion or restriction of competition in the market. Accordingly, firms who have engaged in this type of conduct may be held liable in the absence of any evidence of an anti-competitive effect (whether actual or potential).

Says Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio Ltd., “[t]he CCC’s notice is a clear sign that the agency is gathering momentum in its efforts to detect and prosecute anticompetitive practices within the member states — and is going beyond its ‘one-trick pony’ status as a pure merger-control gatekeeper. We anticipate a more active role by the CCC in conduct investigations and presumptively also enforcement actions, as opposed to its previous rubber-stamping activity of approving transactions with a COMESA community dimension (and concomitant collection of vast filing fees).”

The web of MoU’s recently concluded, which have as their primary objectives the facilitation of information exchanges and cooperation between competition agencies, is certainly a significant stride made to assist the authorities, including the CCC, in detecting and prosecuting anticompetitive practices which may be taking place across the African continent.

A further indication of the CCC’s growing appetite and confidence to identify anticompetitive practices is that the CCC has announced that it is conducting a market enquiry into the grocery retail sector. This is the first market inquiry to be conducted by the CCC.

In terms of the CCC’s Notice, firms who have not yet notified the CCC of agreements which may be anticompetitive, have approximately one month to do so. In other words, the CC has offered a leniency ‘window’ to incentivise firms to come forward and obtain an exemption in respect of agreements already implemented which may be in contravention of Article 16 of the Regulations.

We recently wrote about the landmark enactment of the new South African competition legislation that makes hard-core price-fixing a criminal offence, subjecting cartelists to up to 10 years imprisonment. Nigeria is usually not on the radar of antitrust practitioners, however, and certainly not in the criminal sense, either. As regular readers of AAT know, the Republic of Nigeria has featured occasionally in our posts despite not having a functioning antitrust regime, yet. As editor and Pr1merio director Andreas Stargard wrote in an article entitled “Nigerian antitrust?“, scholars and political activists alike have promoted the idea of establishing an antitrust regime in West Africa’s dominant economy: ‘Today, AfricanAntitrust adds its voice to the steady, though infrequent, discussion surrounding the possibility of a Nigerian competition-law regime. In our opinion, it is not a question of “if” but “when”, and perhaps more importantly, “how“?’

Today, contributing author Bob Enofe adds his voice to the mix, and we are publishing one of his articles that originally appeared on Robert Connolly’s cartel capers blog.

Criminal Antitrust in Nigeria?

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is currently in the process of enacting a competition law, including to criminalise cartel activity amongst competitors. While such is in line with moves made by various other jurisdictions and theories of ‘rational actor’, sanction and deterrence, on ground realities suggest that criminalisation where transplanted might be seriously flawed.

From the late 1990s, and particularly in the year 2000, the Federal Government of Nigeria commenced moves to enact a Competition Law. Under such law, business cartel activity defined as agreements between competitors, aimed at distorting the process of competition and generating monopolistic rents, would be criminalised. The ‘Federal Competition Bill, 2002’, an executive bill drafted by the Nigerian Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), was titled: “a Bill for an Act to provide necessary conditions for market competition and to stimulate creative business activities, protect consumers, and promote the balanced development of the natural economy, by prohibiting restrictive contracts and business practices that substantially lessened competition”. It was also to be a Bill to regulate “possible abuses of dominant positions by businesses, and anti-competitive combines, and to establish the Federal Competition Commission, for effective implementation and enforcement of all the provisions of the bill”. According to relevant sections of the bill, cartel agreements amongst competitors, including price fixing, bid rigging and market division, were also to be expressly criminalised. Clearly a robust and comprehensive bill, 16 years after introduction to the Nigerian National Assembly, the bill remains to be passed into law. Several amendments have since been presented, together with other bills presented by lawmakers. In every case, such bills have either stalled at first reading stage, or in certain cases disappeared from the legislative process. In one of such instances, an amendment of the above bill (The Federal Trade and Competition Commission Bill, 2006) was “vehemently” objected to by distinguished Senators, prompting governmental withdrawal. Amongst reasons advanced for the reception accorded the bill included that there was no need for a distinct ‘competition commission’, in the face of an already existent consumer protection council in Nigeria; other legislators simply complained about a proliferation of “too many commissions” in the country. Commentators have alluded to overt ignorance and lack of particular inclination for the subject, on the part of Nigerian Senators, as in reality underlining the reception accorded the bill.

In a paper recently presented at the #SLSA2016, ‘Developing Countries, Nigeria, and Cartel Criminalisation: of Transplantation and Desirability’ I had outlined how Nigeria’s attempt to introduce a competition law, and in particular criminalise cartel activity, reveals a (marked) lack of societal inclination towards competition law and prior poor advocacy on the part of government. Social norms are crucial to the effectiveness of law reform. Desirable social norms ensures amongst other things that prohibited conduct will be reported and discovered, even without direct enforcement or investigative intervention, thereby complementing stretched law enforcement efforts.[1] Such also imply that prosecutors will be willing to enforce and vigorously police provisions of the law where passed, and in the case of the judiciary, stringent sentences will also be applied—or at least not deliberately avoided—so as to facilitate the deterrence potential of the applicable law. Perhaps most crucially for Nigeria, existence of such norms also mean that law makers are incentivised to support reform efforts, while the chances of ‘hijack’ by private interests will be slim. Absent such norms the chances of Nigeria’s competition and cartel criminalisation law, even when passed, could be (remarkably) marginal.

Heightened advocacy, together with a careful selection of test cases once the law is enacted is advanced as capable of remedying the above situation. In the face of sub-par institutions characteristic of the Nigerian context however (including severe limitations in the operation of the rule of law), abilities to so ‘guide’ social norms will be in reality seriously limited. An online petition regarding corruption amongst Nigerian senators, for example, reflect in part difficulties that could frustrate transplantation of cartel criminalisation, absent independent, effective, anti-corruption reforms in the country.

Neoliberal theories of rational actors, sanction and deterrence, imply to large extents a similar existence of contexts as have underlined effectiveness in western societies. In many cases, on the ground realities suggest that theories where transplanted, could be seriously flawed.

As I have argued in another paper currently under review (details to be communicated soon, hopefully!), one size cannot fit all- with developing countries and cartel criminalisation, the point gains extra force. To the extent that fines and other administrative means of enforcement are limited in ability to effectively curtail cartel practices, suggests a need for continuation of relevant research. Criminalisation hardly represents the ‘Golden Fleece’.

Footnote:

[1] See Stephan, Andreas, ‘Cartel laws undermined: Corruption, social norms, and collectivist business cultures’ (2010) Journal of Law and Society 345-367, See Maher, Imelda, The Institutional Structure of Competition Law, in Dowdle, Gillespie and Maher (eds) Asian Capitalism and the Regulation of Competition: Towards a Regulatory Geography of Global Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 55, See Gal, Michal ‘The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries.’ (2004) Competition, Competitiveness and Development 20-38.

Landlocked and Oil-Rich South Sudan Joins Free-Trade Zone

As South Sudan was officially admitted to the East African Community (EAC) as its sixth member in Arusha (Tanzania), on Wednesday, March 2, the beleaguered nation joined a free-trade zone that will allow it to benefit from more open labour movement, less restrictions on capital flows and other increased economic integration. The other member states are Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. After integration with S. Sudan — the youngest nation on Earth — the region will have a population of an estimated 163 million.

John Oxenham, of Pr1merio Africa advisors, says: “South Sudan’s former institutional weaknesses were (apparently, despite the ongoing civil strife in the country) sufficiently remedied that the EAC governing body saw fit to grant the application for admission that had been pending since 2011. Basic governance principles must be met for EAC membership, and we are not even talking competition-law here…”

As the EAC charter provides, all members must demonstrate and strive to achieve “good governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.” (EAC Treaty, Chapter 2 Article 6 (d)).

Setting aside civil-rights concerns or worries about political instability, the integration of an oil-rich nation may ultimately benefit its neighbouring fellow EAC members, such as Kenya and Uganda. It remains to be seen whether integrating a less-than-stable country into the EAC zone will harm the competition legislation the region enacted in 2006. As AAT author Elizabeth Sisendapointed out recently, the organisation “has been setting up the mechanisms for its enforcement to-date through capacity building and mobilizing resources. In 2010, the EAC subsequently enacted competition regulations to assist in implementing the Act. One of the main challenges that has been encountered in the EAC with regards to the implementation of competition law and policy has been the unique economic and market structure of the member states. The majority of the EAC member states are economies that are transitioning from state-regulation to liberalization.”

We note that S. Sudan’s northern neighbour, the Republic of [the] Sudan, is currently a COMESA member state and thereby subject to the COMESA competition-law regulations and related merger-notification regime. South Sudan has, since at least the 2012 talks in Uganda, likewise been in negotiations with the COMESA governing bodies to discuss accession to that free-trade zone.

Emerging markets or developing economies only recently adopted competition law and policy as an exclusive legal and economic tool for regulating markets. In previous years, restrictive trade practices were mostly handled under government price control departments or monopolies commissions. Most of the competition legislation and regulations in developing economies were promulgated within the last decade.

The EAC, in particular, enacted its competition legislation in 2006 and has been setting up the mechanisms for its enforcement to-date through capacity building and mobilizing resources. In 2010, the EAC subsequently enacted competition regulations to assist in implementing the Act. One of the main challenges that has been encountered in the EAC with regards to the implementation of competition law and policy has been the unique economic and market structure of the member states.

The majority of the EAC member states are economies that are transitioning from state-regulation to liberalization. Consequently, several key sectors of these economies are still under quasi-governmental regulation by independent agencies established by the legislature, or explicitly protected by executive policy or subsidiary legislation.

As a result of the progressive liberalization of EAC economies, private entities have been building capacity to supply sectors of the economy where the government once had a monopolistic stake. These private firms, both local and multinational, have faced several challenges in meeting market requirements in terms of capacity. Consequently, the governments of these economies have sometimes adopted a protectionist approach for key sectors of their economies in the public interest. As much as this has often contributed to the substantial lessening of competition in the affected sectors to the detriment of consumers, these regulatory measures have been upheld by the respective governments on the grounds of national interest. The EAC, however, has been very cautious in its provisions for exemptions within the common market that could contribute to the substantial lessening of competition.

The EAC exemptions

Section 6 (3) of the EAC Competition Act provides that the Competition Authority may exempt a category of concerted practices by firms or parties, provided the concerted practice is limited to objectives which lead to an improvement of production or distribution, and whose beneficial effects, in the opinion of the Authority, outweigh its negative effects on competition. However, any exemptions granted by the Authority under this sub-section shall be applicable only if the combined market share of the parties involved in the concerted practice does not exceed 20% of the relevant market, and the agreement relating to the concerted practice does not contain any restrictive trade practice expressly prohibited under the Act. Thus, it may be contended that this exemption does not contribute to the substantial lessening of competition because it only applies to small or medium firms without any hint of market power, having a maximum market share of 10% each. Furthermore, the net effect of the concerted practice is beneficial to consumer welfare by improving access to goods or services. It also gives leeway for small producers to produce more efficiently, thus improving market conditions.

Low shares = more permissible conduct

The Authority under section 6 (1) further allows competitors whose combined market share does not exceed 10% of the relevant market to apply quantitative restraints on investment or input, output or sales, and engage in concerted practices that restrict the movement of goods within the common market. However, such conduct is expressly forbidden by the Act in the case of firms with larger market share. It may be contended that this particular provision is aimed at enabling small and medium enterprises to have a strategic opportunity to operate in an otherwise large and well-exploited market. It also does not limit competition because the firms in question have very little market share. Instead this exemption aims at protecting the competitiveness of the market by ensuring that smaller firms are not driven out of the market by larger, more efficient firms.

R&D and so on

Under section 6 (2) of the Act, the Authority also exempts 3 categories of conduct, namely: joint research and development, specialization of production or distribution and standardization of products or services, by firms whose combined market share does not exceed 20% of the relevant market. This exemption requires that the agreement relating to these categories of concerted practices should not contain any of the expressly prohibited anti-competitive practices under the Act. The Authority may contend that this exemption promotes consumer welfare by enabling smaller firms to collaborate in improving the quality of products or services in the relevant market through standardization and specialization efforts. It also enables smaller firms to participate in innovation through a collaborative effort. Most firms with this extent of combined market share would lack the resources or capacity on their own to engage in these activities that promote consumer welfare and efficiency in the relevant market.

Get permission first!

According to section 7 of the Act, any firm or person must first apply to the Authority, in accordance with the Regulations, for clearance to engage in any concerted practice. The Authority shall thereafter communicate its decision to the applicant within 45 days of receipt of the application. However, if the Authority does not communicate its decision in the specified duration, then the permission for the concerted practice shall be deemed to have been granted. Under the same section, it is an offence, punishable by a fine of not more than $10 000, to omit to seek the permission of the Authority to engage in a concerted practice. The Regulations under section 16 further provide that the undertaking seeking an exemption must pay the prescribed fees, and provide a detailed statement setting out the reasons why the concerted practice should be permitted for consideration to the Authority.

Conclusion

The EAC exemptions are therefore permitted in the common market to exercise a form of economic regulation for the purpose of ensuring that small and medium enterprises can effectively compete in a liberalized market without being driven out by firms with larger market share. In this way, the public interest is promoted to ensure that national or regional interests such as employment, allocative efficiency, specialization agreements and international competitiveness of domestic firms are taken into account. Applying exemptions does not necessarily imply the weakening of competition law enforcement. National economic policy considerations such as the maintenance and promotion of exports, changing productive capacity to stop decline in a particular industry, or maintaining stability in a particular industry are some of the policy considerations that motivate the application of exemptions. However, exemptions must be applied with caution because their application in one sector can perpetuate or induce distortions that can affect economic efficiency.