Relations with North Korea

Nordpolitik's final destination--P'yongyang--has proved difficult to
reach. After nearly two decades, inter-Korean relations had not improved
measurably. In fact, it may be argued that political leaders in Seoul
and P'yongyang have skillfully used the perceived mutual threat to
maintain and justify their political legitimacy. Their postures may seem
reasonable, given that until the precarious 1953 armistice agreement is
replaced by a permanent peace treaty, the Korean War cannot be
considered completely over. Nevertheless, Seoul and P'yongyang have been
increasing their contacts across and around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
in a gradual and uneven fashion. These expanding contacts appear quite
natural because there are an estimated 10 million separated family
members. Moreover, South Korean business leaders have been keenly aware
of potential economic benefits in improved relations with North Korea.
As inter-Korean contacts are gradually becoming a "growth
industry," their prospects appear promising.

Inter-Korean relations may be divided into four periods. The first
stage was between 1972 and 1973; the second stage was P'yongyang's
delivery of relief goods to South Korea after a typhoon caused
devastating floods in 1984; and the third stage was the exchange of home
visits and performing artists in 1985. The fourth stage, activated by
Nordpolitik under Roh, was represented by expanding public and private
contacts between the two Koreas. These working-level contacts have
included Red Cross talks aimed at exchanging home visits by divided
families and performing artists; sports talks aimed at establishing a
unified team for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games; economic trade at the
level of premiers; preliminary talks for joint parliamentary meetings;
and expanded academic and religious exchanges.

The Nordpolitik blueprint--Roh's declaration of July 7, 1988-- opened
a new chapter in inter-Korean dialogue. Calling for the building of a
single "national commonwealth," Roh solicited the assistance
of Washington and Tokyo to improve Seoul's relations with Moscow and
Beijing. At the same time, he encouraged Washington and Tokyo to improve
relations with P'yongyang and expanded inter-Korean exchanges. Roh urged
a positive response from P'yongyang, but North Korea's reaction was not
positive.

P'yongyang issued an immediate and detailed statement on July 11,
1988. The CPRF dismissed Roh's proposal as old wine in a new bottle,
claiming that only the 1972 three basic principles for Korean
reunification--reunification by peaceful means, by transcending
ideological differences (nationalism), and without external interference
(self-determination)--could be the basis to improve inter-Korean
dialogue. Seen from P'yongyang's perspective, Roh's July 7 proposal was
nothing more than a political ploy to cope with increasing radical
student agitation that opposed Seoul's hosting of the Olympics without
P'yongyang's participation. Consequently, Roh's statement angered rather
than mollified P'yongyang's posture, which was based on Kim Il Song's
proposal to establish a Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea.

Meanwhile, Seoul began to speak more openly about the rising level of
direct and indirect inter-Korean trade, much to the displeasure of
P'yongyang. P'yongyang claimed that Seoul had fabricated these trade
stories. By 1988, however, Seoul began to reduce tariffs and other
duties to liberalize trade with P'yongyang. Trade statistics provided by
Seoul and P'yongyang on north-south trade were largely unreliable as
each government had its own reasons for reporting high or low figures.
Much of the trade was conducted through third parties.

P'yongyang's response to Seoul consisted of three points-- asking for
the repeal of the National Security Act, which designated P'yongyang an
enemy, making a declaration of nonaggression, and establishing a
"Peaceful Reunification Committee." Over the next few months,
Roh's government attempted to make progress toward satisfying each of
these requirements. In his October 18, 1988, United Nations speech, Roh
advocated convening a six-nation consultative conference to achieve a
permanent peace settlement in Korea and called for establishing a
partnership with P'yongyang. In his 1989 New Year's address, Kim Il Song
extended an invitation to the presidents of the major South Korean
political parties and religious leaders, including Cardinal Kim Soo
Hwan, Reverend Mun Ik-hwan, and Reverend Paek Ki-wan, for a
leadership-level inter-Korean reunification meeting to be held in
P'yongyang. However, any meaningful inter-Korean dialogue bogged down at
P'yongyang's objections to the annual United States-South Korean Team
Spirit military exercises.

Economic relations have demonstrated more promise. An authorized
public visit to North Korea by Chong Chu-yong, honorary chairman of the
Hyundai Group, in early 1989 (in technical violation of South Korea's
National Security Act) was a remarkable breakthrough. After years of
behind-the-scene efforts, through a South Korean intermediary in Japan,
Chong was invited by P'yongyang and fulfilled his long-cherished dream
to see his relatives at his native village, near scenic Kumgang-san.
Chong was received in P'yongyang by Ho Tam, Chairman of the Committee
for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, and by business
leaders eager to discuss large-scale economic cooperation, such as joint
ventures and development of the tourist industry. Chong's visit caused
euphoric expectations and also engendered other visits.

Many of Chong's expected business dealings, however, suffered
temporary setbacks after his return to South Korea. These setbacks were
primarily caused by the unauthorized visits to North Korea of Reverend
Mun Ik-hwan (March-April 1989), South Korean lawmaker So Kyong-won (who
had secretly visited P'yongyang in August 1988, was accused of this June
28, 1989, and sentenced in December 1989 to fifteen years in prison),
and dissident South Korean student representative, Im Su-kyong, also
later sentenced to a prison term for attending the thirteenth World
Youth and Student Festival, July 1-8, 1989, in P'yongyang. The
government's harsh handling of these visits clearly showed its intention
of keeping the initiative in dealings with North Korea, but it also
appeared to some Koreans to contradict Roh's July 7 statement
encouraging free inter-Korean contacts at various levels. That Roh's
statement itself seemed to disregard the National Security Act added
momentum to dissident calls for the law's abrogation or revision.