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Expanding U.S.-Russia Competition

Released on 2012-10-19 08:00 GMT

Email-ID

1341406

Date

2010-04-02 13:01:34

From

noreply@stratfor.com

To

allstratfor@stratfor.com

[IMG]

Friday, April 2, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives

Expanding U.S.-Russia Competition

I

T APPEARS TO STRATFOR THAT THE RELATIONSHIP between Moscow and
Washington is - despite public successes of the START negotiations -
becoming increasingly complex. The latest developments see both powers
making moves in each other's backyard, or at least what each capital
considers their backyard. Not only is Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin traveling to Venezuela on Friday, but reports emerged Thursday
that U.S. President Barack Obama will be holding a group meeting with
Central European leaders next week, on April 8 - the same day he will
sign the new START treaty with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev.

On the European side of the pond, Obama has plans to meet with Hungarian
Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk,
Romanian President Traian Basescu and possibly also the leaders of the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia and the Baltic
States - all on the sidelines of the official ceremony accompanying the
signing of the new START treaty. That the American president is choosing
to meet with the Central and Eastern European leadership en masse in the
same venue that is supposed to be dedicated to the pomp and circumstance
of the signing of the new START treaty will not please Moscow. This is
particularly true since Russia had originally planned for the signing of
the treaty to be a minor stop on Medvedev's own tour of the region, and
because the event was designed to highlight Russia's status as a
superpower worthy of the United States' undivided attention.

The time and place of the meeting is therefore not accidental. It is
supposed to signal to Russia that the United States is still very much
involved in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also sending the same
message to the beleaguered Central Europeans who these days feel
threatened more than they expected they would when they joined the
European Union and NATO alliances in the last decade. Estonian President
Handrik Ilves summarized it well on Thursday when he noted that the
ultimate question for Europe really comes down to "how much you trust
the Russians." He also peppered the interview with references to the
EU's abandonment of Ukraine and Georgia, and the general European
lackadaisical attitude regarding Moscow's resurgence in the region.

"That the American president is choosing to meet with the Central and
Eastern European leadership en masse in the same venue that is supposed
to be dedicated to the pomp and circumstance of the signing of the new
START treaty will not please Moscow."

From the perspective of Estonians and other Central and Eastern
Europeans, the Russian resurgence is going largely unchecked, by both
the United States and Europe. The Obama administration did not endear
itself to the region with some early indications that it was
"abandoning" the ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans - plans that have
since changed. It is the EU attitude as a whole, however, that
ultimately worries the Central and Eastern Europeans. For Berlin and
Paris, economic and domestic interests come before Central European
security interests. Germany is beginning to act more and more like a
"normal country" - as German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble
recently mentioned in an interview - which to Central and Eastern
Europeans means a lot of things, none pleasant. The point is not that
Poland and its neighbors expect to see the Wehrmacht on the horizon any
time soon, but rather that they remember how a "normal" Germany
repeatedly sold out Central and Eastern Europe's security for its own
national interests.

In that calculation, Central Europe's economic interests - which are
firmly tied to their EU membership - begin to diverge with their
security interests, which are fundamentally about the region's alliance
with the United States. This is why the United States can find eager
allies in a region Russia sees as a vital buffer from the rest of
Western Europe, and exert considerable pressure on Moscow by nurturing
its relationship with Central Europe.

In the other hemisphere, Putin is scheduled to grace the near abroad of
the United States with a visit to Venezuela for a meeting with President
Hugo Chavez.

Putin's visit will come at the end of a week of Easter holidays, during
which Venezuelan businesses will have shut down in an attempt to
conserve electricity. The presidential holiday declaration indicates the
desperation felt by the Venezuelan government in the face of the
country's deteriorating electricity sector. The country does not expect
much relief in the wake of the holiday, as more severe rationing is
expected to commence on Monday.

Russia has long dabbled in Latin America as a way to make the United
States nervous - particularly during the Cold War. In more recent
memory, Russian government officials have made semi-regular visits to
Venezuela to pressure the United States in its own backyard, similar to
how Russia has felt pressured in its near abroad. Although Venezuela
would love to be able to take advantage of the Eurasian attention,
Russia has yet to make a clear commitment regarding how it would be
willing to help. Venezuela is, after all, a notoriously unstable
petro-state halfway around the world from where Russia's priorities lie.

But the Putin-Chavez visit comes at a particularly interesting time.
Venezuela's fundamentally unstable domestic situation raises a number of
very interesting questions in the lead-up to Putin's visit. So far the
reports on the visit - which was preceded by a visit from Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Igor Sechin - have mostly focused on arms deals,
tentative oil agreements and the establishment of a joint bank. But the
most important kind of help that Venezuela could receive from Russia at
this point is something (anything) to assist with Venezuela's dire
electricity situation. There also remains the possibility that
Venezuelans are not looking to the Russians for help in the short term.
They may instead seek to tap Russian expertise in strict domestic
political controls to help the Chavez regime survive the aftermath of a
possible electricity sector meltdown. It is known that the Cubans have
been helping Chavez to solidify personal control over the domestic
situation. Perhaps the Russians could lend a hand, too.

Ultimately, however, Russia is not there to solve Venezuela's problems.
As long as Russia can raise the hackles of the United States by making
high profile visits to South America, it will. But any serious
partnerships or investments that might cost Russian time or treasure are
unlikely.

Nevertheless, Russia appreciates the opportunity to meddle in the
Western Hemisphere just as the United States is using the opportunity in
Central and Eastern Europe to exert influence in Russia's near abroad.