THE PAPERS | Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State by Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder

Islamic State
relies heavily on the recruitment of foreign fighters. We examine this
recruitment from an organizational perspective. We analyze how the process of
recruitment of foreigners shapes the adverse selection problem affecting the
dissident groups that they join. We also examine the different mechanisms used
to maintain the allegiance and compliance of foreigners as opposed to
indigenous recruits. More broadly, we analyze how the recruitment of foreign
fighters affects the organization. Foreign fighters and local recruits exhibit
significant differences in recruitment patterns and motivations for joining IS.
This could create problems for the organization. Evidence of such strife,
however, is not discernible. Given the information at hand, IS appears to be
effectively managing the mix of foreign and local recruits.

Keywords:
Jihadism, ISIS, foreign fighters, recruitment

Recent reports
indicate that over 20,000 foreign fighters have joined militant Sunni
organizations in the Iraq/Syria conflict.[1] Most of them have joined the
Islamic State (IS). The majority of the foreign fighters are Arabs coming from
neighboring countries or the Maghreb. An increasing number of recruits are now
coming from the Chechnya and Dagestan regions of Russia with estimates of 2,000
recruits.[2] Around 20% of the foreign fighters are from the West.[3]

Research on
foreign fighters or transnational insurgents has tended to focus on the
phenomenon in general or as it relates to global jihad. Scholars have focused
on trends and numbers, individual decisions and motivations to join an
insurgent movement abroad, or security implications.[4] Indeed, most analysis
of IS recruitment has focused on processes of radicalization, featuring the
individual being recruited. Such analysis is typically framed as a societal
problem or a security problem. Few studies have examined how foreign fighters
have affected insurgency movements.[5] We frame our analysis as an
organizational problem, not as a societal problem or as a (Western) security
problem. We limit our analysis to IS in Iraq and Syria, the primary operating
environments of the organization.[6] Our focus is on how Islamic State as an
organization employs these thousands of foreign fighters and what it means for
the organization. How does IS effectively use local recruits from Syria and
Iraq and the diverse set of foreign fighters? How does the recruitment of so
many foreign fighters affect the organization?

Foreign fighters
and IS

David Malet
defines foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states who join
insurgencies during civil conflicts.”[7] Thomas Hegghammer builds on this
formulation in the following ways: “an agent who (1) has joined, operated
within the confines of an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict
state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an
official military organization, and (4) is unpaid.”[8] This definition serves
to exclude mercenaries, the troops of intervening armies, and “refugee
warriors” (i.e. individuals who are connected to the civil conflict but reside
in another country).[9] Hegghammer notes at least seventeen instances of
jihadist foreign fighter participation in major conflicts since the 1980s.[10]

Transnational
insurgents potentially serve to strengthen insurgent groups by contributing
resources, fighters, and know-how. However, they can also introduce new ideas
and affect the nature and direction of the conflict. This is because foreign
fighters differ from local rebels in two important respects. First, they are
selected for ideological commitment (since going abroad to fight is entirely
voluntary) and second, they have fewer personal stakes in the conflict (no
personal grievances, no land, assets, relatives, or prospects of political
office, for example). Indeed, it is this combination of ideological motivation,
non-parochialism, and detachment from local politics that can sometimes make
foreign recruits attractive for the host group. But foreign fighters can also
create a clash of preferences and interests within the organization.[11]

As a rebel
organization at war, IS seeks military victory. Unlike many other jihadist
groups, such as the Taliban, who seek to hold and govern territory (but within
a confined space), IS is the only group that combines rebel governance with
expansionist territorial ambitions – to create an Islamic Caliphate. The name
of the group belies its ambitions to establish an Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria unified by the rule of a Caliph. These territorial ambitions do not
involve secession from an existing state, but the eradication of two existing
states. Indeed, one of their slogans is “this Khilafa [Caliphate] will have no
borders, inshallah, only fronts.”[12] To achieve this goal, the harassing
techniques of guerrilla warfare and occasional terrorist acts are inadequate.
Holding territory is paramount. And to do that conventional warfare is
required, thus IS needs extensive manpower and military equipment. Indeed, the
strategic and tactical implications of IS’s goal are significant, as the nature
of the insurgency is indelibly affected by such ambitions.

IS is not just
engaged in conflict with the governments of Syria and Iraq, it is also in
competition with other Syrian rebel groups. And even more relevant to IS, it is
in competition with other jihadist groups. For example, it is in the process of
cannibalizing the al-Qaeda linked Nusra Front and other small jihadist groups.
The “moderate” opposition organized in the Syrian National Council/ Army is
marginalized and of little military consequence – especially on the critical
Northern front. The Nusra Front competes with IS over recruitment, and though
allied at the beginning of the conflict in Syria, they began fighting one another
in 2014. The competition is global. In this regard foreign fighters constitute
an integral aspect of what IS is, and what it desires to be – the global
jihadist group. Recruitment from the Middle East and North Africa as well as
from the West, reifies the notion of the organization representing—if not
constituting—global jihad.

The other issue
here is of access. The ease of access into the Syrian warzone is similar to
that of the early days of the Bosnian war according to observers. Western youth
have travelled into northern Syria via Turkey, flying into Istanbul and
transferring to domestic commercial flights or buses for the trip to the
border, where they cross through legally or through smuggler routes.[13] This
ease of access was due to a number of reasons, including the pre-war
integration of the southern Turkish and northern Syrian economies and the
complicated border policing task resulting from enormous refugee flows.
However, Turkish authorities also displayed a certain leniency toward transiting
foreign fighters, at least during the early years of the conflict. This lenient
approach was informed by the calculation that such an influx of fighters would
help accelerate the fall of the Assad regime. In retrospect, it has proved to
be a miscalculation on Turkey’s part, and Turkey has tightened up its border
policing arrangements considerably over time.[14]

Apart from the
issue of access, popular support for the insurgency in Syria has been strong in
the Sunni Muslim world, where mainstream clerics such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi have
been allowed by their governments to publicly urge people to go and fight in
Syria.[15] Therefore, we must recognize that the foreign fighter phenomenon is
linked to broader political dynamics and not simply Jihad or radicalization via
social media and virtual propaganda.

The local
dimensions of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, however, should not be
neglected. Systematic repression and exclusion of the Sunni community by both
governments has provided fertile grounds for local recruitment to IS. These
local and global aspects of IS work together and compete. Local recruits join
for one set of reasons and foreign fighters for another. How does IS address
this issue and how does it affect the organization? Moreover, how does remotely
facilitated recruitment through the use of social media affect the
organizational stability of IS with respect to both local and foreign recruits?

Social media and
the recruitment of foreign fighters

IS has developed
an effective virtual propaganda machinery.[16] Its media arm Al Hayat has been
releasing videos showing different sides of the militant group. On the one hand
is its face of cold terror such as of children holding decapitated heads; on
the other are more Western friendly videos of IS militants posing with Nutella
jars to demonstrate familiarity with Western lifestyles. More significant, as
Zelin shows,[17] is that the majority of propaganda products are about IS
providing governance, justice, and new construction. The theme of legitimacy is
significant. This propaganda shares a number of key attributes: It tends to use
video rather than text, takes full advantage of the linguistic skills of
members (sometimes translating statements and videos into European languages),
and makes good use of music—all of which appears to resonate with western youth
culture. In addition to this, the importance of the ideological call to action
cannot be underestimated: it highlights the wrongdoings of the enemy and the
good deeds of Islamic State, and also stresses the inadequacies and sins of
those that don’t go and the qualities and rewards of those who do. While the
online propaganda is increasingly important, offline traditional recruitment
methods such as writing letters to prisoners and organizing at or around
mosques are also being used, often hand in hand with social media
campaigns.[18] Finally, the declaration of a caliphate in itself appears to
have boosted recruitment further by making the organization seem stronger and
more viable.[19]

The vast global
social media presence of IS is sustained by significant manpower. Linguistic
and technical skills are clearly evident. Obviously some effort is being made
not only to recruit foot soldiers, but also to enlist technically proficient
and talented users of social media to sustain the machinery of recruitment.
Back office managers are often wives and young female supporters.[20]

The profile of
foreign fighters is diverse, and can range from ignorant novices who view
joining as a rite of passage to diehard militants looking for combat and
martyrdom, while individuals that go for humanitarian reasons are often
kidnapped or forced to fight.[21] The motivations informing the decision to
leave are numerous and they vary and interact in complex ways we probably do not
yet fully understand. Motivations may include the prospect of adventure, a
desire to impress the local community or opposite sex, a search for identity,
feelings of revenge, the search for camaraderie, the desire to make history,
and much more. Some also appear motivated by the millennial-apocalyptic
promises of IS, as well as by the opportunity to die as a martyr and go to
heaven.

While some
western born recruits are alienated and disaffected youth, many are not.[22] As
a group, European foreign fighters do tend to be socio-economic underperformers
– a study of 378 German foreign fighters, for example, found that only a
quarter had finished high school and a third had criminal convictions – but
there are many exceptions, especially in the UK, where foreign fighters for
some reason come from somewhat more affluent backgrounds than their comrades in
other European countries.[23]

Fresh recruits:
Employing foreign and local fighters

Once the foreign
recruit has arrived in Syria or Iraq, IS as a military and political
organization must determine how to most effectively employ the new personnel.
One of the main advantages of recruiting foreign fighters is having another
pair of boots on the ground. Foreign fighters also bring a diverse set of
linguistic skills to the organization further enabling their social media
recruitment tactics. Western recruits also seem to be playing a special role in
handling non-Arab hostages and collecting ransom money. Moreover, some recruits
will turn out to be effective soldiers and even leaders. Given IS’s goal of
establishing a new Caliphate and the conventional warfare that such a goal
entails, the needs for manpower are considerable.

Recruitment
patterns from within territory controlled by IS are different. Direct evidence
of local recruitment processes is scarce, but indirect evidence and the
experiences of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), al Shabaab in Somalia, and jihadis in
Chechnya show that the typical recruit from the IS controlled areas exhibit a
different profile than the regional foreign fighters, who in turn, display very
different characteristics from the Western volunteers.[24] Foreign fighters
from Central Asia are battle-tested and highly regarded soldiers. Inexperienced
recruits from the West, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries among other sources
can be trained to be excellent combatants, but many will be given tasks that
match their skills. Native recruits from Syria and Iraq seem to exhibit
stronger anti-Shiite attitudes than the foreign fighters. The global appeal is
for Islam and jihad in general, while the local context emphasizes sectarian
conflict and threat from the “other”. The nature of “what one is fighting for”
undoubtedly varies between those recruited from abroad and those recruited from
Iraq or Syria. For the foreign fighters, the motivations will be more universal
while the natives will be motivated by grievances and a personal history of
exclusion. For some native recruits, they might not have joined unless pressed
to do so.

Foreign fighters
may serve IS by helping to achieve its main goal, to establish the Caliphate.
Local recruits have preferences shaped by the Syrian and Iraqi governments as
well as by local social networks. Local fighters are more inclined to settle
grievances and work to achieve particularistic goals. Foreign fighters are to a
greater extent motivated by more ideological goals. These differences could
create a rift in the organization as was the case with Al Qaeda in Iraq. AQI
failed to accommodate the two cultures. Iraqi Sunnis were critical of AQI for
the foreign presence in its leadership and fighting forces and for its attempts
to impose its own radical brand of Islam on Iraqis, and its use of extreme
violence.[25] So far, IS seems to be managing this potential area of conflict better.
In sum, the use of foreign fighters presents an opportunity for IS’s
leadership. If well integrated into the organization, they can serve to
mitigate particularistic motivations and personal vendettas, which run counter
to the goals of the organization’s leadership.

How IS deals
with potential problems with recruits

The recruitment
of foreign fighters affords a number of advantages to an organization, but
exposing an insurgent movement to outsiders presents a number of potential
problems that must be addressed by the leaders of a rebel group. Two
information problems are inherently linked to hierarchical relations in any
organization: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection refers to
information about the agent’s type. The problem is recruiting the wrong type.
Given the very nature of being a foreign fighter, IS will know less about these
individuals than about local recruits.

In a rebel
organization such as IS with a broad-based global recruitment policy, adverse
selection is significant. He might be incompetent. Indeed, a number of foreign
recruits have never held a gun in their lives. Many volunteers from the West
may actually be a liability in the battlefield. Significant numbers of foreign
recruits have no military skills, no familiarity with the terrain, poor
language aptitude, and are prone to sickness and unused to harsh
conditions.[26]

A recruit could
also be a spy or infiltrator. Given the large numbers of foreign fighters, some
of whom who are largely ignorant of Islam (the purported Islam for Dummies
types) or do not know Arabic, an infiltrator could join with ease. This
presents a significant problem for IS. How does the organization determine
whether a new recruit is a spy or genuine?

The recruitment
of psychopaths or over-zealous recruits is another potential problem. The Arab
contingency in Bosnia committed such excesses that they became a political
liability.[27] A decade ago, the excesses of al Qaeda in Iraq resulted in a
Sunni backlash.[28] Despite the extreme violence committed by IS, the
organization does not want to employ an uncontrollable psychopath. Such an
individual would pose a threat to his fellow combatants and could create
serious rifts in the organization. Clearly crazy types will be identified
early, but detecting latent human time-bombs is more difficult.

To mitigate
these potential problems, fresh recruits are brought to separate training
facilities, segregating foreign fighters and natives. At theses training
facilities Islamic State recruiters also determine whether a recruit has
special skills such as computer engineering, or other social media skills, or
whether he is more suited for combat.[29] After the initial vetting, the
recruit is assigned a specific job.

IS also uses
this time to assess whether a foreign recruit is a spy or not. The problem is
how to do so. Given the demands for recruits and the large number of foreign
volunteers, the danger of infiltration is not insignificant. Other
organizations vet by soliciting costly signs of an individual’s complete
dedication,[30] and there is plenty of circumstantial evidence that IS does so
too. It is reasonable to assume, for example, that one of the reasons IS gets
foreign fighters to commit egregious acts (like decapitation), is that it is an
effective discriminating sign (since Western intelligence operatives are not allowed
to kill on the job in that way). Like many other groups, IS also tries to deter
infiltrators by inflicting horrific punishments on suspected spies.

Foreign fighters
and native recruits tend to receive different assignments. Reports from
officials engaged in battle with IS in Syria state: “The ones actively fighting
in the first wave of the attacks, they are mostly using central Asian members”
while “Local Arab forces are used to shore up defensive positions,”[31] General
Ali al-Wazir Shamary of the Iraqi army recounts similar experience in his
battles against Islamic State forces in Diyala Province: “We often see the
foreign fighters in the first wave of attacks and then the Arab fighters will
come in after an area is cleared.”[32] Suicide bombers, who play a critical
role in IS attacks appear to be dominated by foreign fighters.[33] Given these
tactics, foreign fighters probably suffer disproportionate casualties.[34]

IS has
successfully deployed suicide tactics involving special armored bulldozers,
armored Humvees, and VBEIDs (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices), in
conjunction with sniper protection and extensive infantry combat. Such tactics
have the added advantage of helping to manage human resources. Someone
suspected of being insane only need to conduct the one suicide mission and no
longer serves as a threat to other soldiers. Someone regarded as incompetent in
combat can be put behind the steering wheel and drive the bomb into the enemy.
Similar tactics can be used to test the commitment of suspected spies and
infiltrators. IS is thereby able to address the adverse selection problem and
successfully employ an effective military tactic.

The following
account of recent combat in Ramadi demonstrates how IS tactics succeed:

On May 5, Islamic
State launched an attack on Ramadi’s city center, but Iraqi helicopters and the
Golden Division repulsed the advance, Iraqi state media reported. Running
battles along the bridges across the Euphrates River separating Ramadi’s
southwestern Islamic State-held neighborhoods from the city center continued
for days, with Iraqi forces holding their lines. By May 13, Islamic State had
established a team of snipers closer to where Iraqi police and army units were
based . . . The next day, Islamic State launched its surge by sending a single
armored bulldozer to the concrete barriers on the outskirts of the government
lines. The bulldozer worked unimpeded for close to an hour, removing concrete
walls, Iraqi officials said. Once the road was cleared, Islamic State fighters
drove about six VBIEDs, including an armored Humvee and armored dump truck,
into the government complex … Over the next 72 hours, the terrorist group set
off at least another 20 VBIED and suicide bombs.[35]

While adverse
selection is a significant problem affecting the recruitment of foreign
fighters, moral hazard is the bigger problem for native recruits. Moral hazard
is about the problem of latent opportunism. In hierarchical relationships the
agent will often be presented with the opportunities to shirk his duties. A
superior in such a hierarchy will be unable to monitor all activities of
subordinates. Rewards alone will not be enough to get around the problem.
Punishment certainly can create an incentive, but it depends on being able to
monitor the actions of subordinates. The problem is that there is no way that a
military organization such as IS would be able to monitor all activities of all
members. Bureaucracy alone will never solve the moral hazard problem.[36]

Internalized
beliefs can serve as a powerful motivation to not subvert the goals of the
organization as a whole. Having been recruited from the local environment, more
will be known about these individuals. The information problem for the
organization in recruiting locally is not one of adverse selection (i.e. not
knowing an actor’s type), but one of moral hazard (hidden actions). In this
regard, indigenous fighters are much more likely to engage in actions
subverting the goals of IS’s leadership, given the temptations to engage in
vindictive violence, personal vendettas, or selfish gain. The leadership of any
organization lacks the resources to adequately monitor the actions of all
subordinates. This is especially true of a military organization, where the
flow of information is inherently limited through the proverbial fog of war.
Hierarchy, bureaucratic oversight, and standard operating procedures are
institutional mechanisms whereby an organization attempts to limit the problem
of latent opportunism.[37] Indeed, IS is developing an extensive bureaucracy to
at least define what counts as insubordination.

In an
organization dependent on solidarity and camaraderie, exclusion can serve as an
effective mechanism. Humiliation and loss of honor can be powerful punishments.
By recruiting large numbers of zealots, these values pervade IS, serving to
limit defection and other forms of misbehavior. Indeed, organizations drawing
on extremist ideologies exhibit strong patterns of allegiance with little
defection or desertion.[38]

Clash between
local and global interests

The presence of
these ultra-zealous values held mainly by a minority of soldiers, however,
could potentially create serious problems within the organization. A clash of
organizational cultures can emerge. As was witnessed earlier in Bosnia and
Chechnya, the foreign fighter presence in IS has undermined the indigenous
population.[39] Foreign fighters in IS are largely pursuing goals framed within
a religious conflict narrative and show little solidarity with the native Iraqi
and Syrian’s grievances against the government and the sectarian nature of the
conflict.[40] Moreover, the superior capacity of some foreign fighters and
their better access to weapons, funding, and skills present another manner in
which resentment and differences can be magnified. The very qualities that make
those foreign fighters attractive to IS could sow the seeds of factionalism.
Strong command structure, devout ideology, and the inculcation of a fierce
allegiance to IS by all are ways to address these problems and maintain
organizational unity. Military victories also serve as strong unifiers, bonding
soldiers towards a common goal of creating the new Islamic Caliphate.

Conversely,
losses can sow dissent. In the wake of the Kobani campaign, tension among the
ranks of the IS emerged. In-fighting between Uzbek and Chenyans is reported to
have killed at least two senior IS officials. The clashes only ended with the
intervention of Omar al-Shishani, a prominent Chechen IS commander.[41]
Frustration over battlefield setbacks led to this internecine strife among the
elite forces of IS.

There are no
such reports of native Iraqi/Syrian – foreign fighter (mostly non-native Arabs)
conflict within IS yet. The lack of evidence may be because access to insider
testimonies and organizational documents is limited at present. Signs of
disillusionment among foreign fighters are evident, nonetheless. Richard
Barrett suggests that “most foreign fighters arrive with good intentions and
often recoil when they witness wrongdoing or brutal tactics by the groups they
join. This can spur them to join other groups or simply to return to their home
countries disenchanted.”[42] Leaving is a risky strategy. If anyone is caught
trying to escape they will be imprisoned or killed. IS has imposed nighttime
curfews and erected roadblocks to curb desertions. From September 2014 to
February 2015, more than 120 foreign fighters hoping to return home were reportedly
killed by IS as reported in a Lebanese news daily.[43] Indeed, some foreign
recruits have become disillusioned but to some degree this seems unsurprising
given the utopian apocalyptic appeal of the recruitment process. The reality of
war certainly isn’t going to be like the virtual world sold by the recruiters
and imagined by the recruits.

The potential
for warlordism or parochial insubordination by native troops is a real
possibility in IS. There are plenty of stories of harsh rule under IS authority,
where sanctions against proscribed behaviors are severe. Such behavior is
consistent with the organizational goals of IS. We should expect some degree of
selective violence and personal vendetta, but that is not what is reported from
the towns under IS rule. Reports of warlordism tend to be vague or discussions
of its possibility. Information flow from these territories is limited, but we
see little significant evidence of widespread conflict between native soldiers
and foreign fighters.

Conclusion

In contrast to
most rebel military organizations engaged in armed conflict, IS uses
conventional military tactics to secure and hold territory. State-building is
the central objective. Hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla warfare or terrorism
are inadequate. In order for IS to achieve its expansionist territorial goal,
it requires tremendous manpower. Boots on the ground are not enough. IS needs a
dedicated fighting force willing to engage in self-sacrifice. Foreign fighters
serve this role. IS draws on the military experience and prowess of Central
Asians forming the bulk of the front-line of attacking forces and snipers. Less
experienced foreign recruits are used as suicide bombers driving heavily armed
Humvees and VBIEDs.

To recruit these
foreign fighters, IS has developed an extensive social media recruitment
machine. Drawing on linguistic and technological talent, the recruitment net is
cast around the globe. The declaration of the new Caliphate and military
victories serve to enhance the effectiveness of IS’s recruitment efforts.
Foreign fighters are given the more dangerous roles in the organization, but to
a large extent this is a role they want. Worse would be to be left out of the
fight.

IS’s reliance on
foreign fighters has fundamentally altered the organization. Yet, there are few
signs thus far that IS has been weakened by a clash of interests between
foreign fighters and native recruits. There is, however, a potential for
internal conflict to emerge between native IS soldiers and foreign fighters. So
far though, IS has maintained the establishment of the Caliphate as the
ultimate goal, which serves the interests of all parties, the Syrians fighting
Assad’s regime, the Iraqis motivated by sectarian cleavages, and foreign
zealots.

About the
Authors:

Scott Gates is Research Professor at Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO) and Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.

Sukanya Podder is Lecturer at CISR, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of
the United Kingdom, Shrivenham. The authors thank Thomas Hegghammer for
organizing the workshop where this article was first presented.

They thank the
participants at the workshop, but want to thank in particular: Thomas
Hegghammer, Ane Mannsåker Roald, Stathis Kalyvas, and Lars Erslev Andersen for
their comments. Scott thanks the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trends
in Conflict Project for financial support. Sukanya thanks Cranfield University,
in particular Laura Cleary for supporting this research.

[٥] See in
particular Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty “Foreign Fighters and the Case of
Chechnya: A Critical Assessment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31(2008):
412-433; Bakke, “Copying and Learning from Outsiders?” and Bakke “Help wanted?”

[6] We do not
consider the growing number of associated organizations – those calling
themselves IS, operating in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
other countries, or those formally allied with IS, such as Boko Haram in
Nigeria.

[22] Daan
Weggemans, Edwin Bakker and Peter Grol, ”Who are they and Why do they go? The
Radicalisation and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Fighters,”
Perspectives on Terrorism 8 no. 4 (2014): 104.

[23] “Germany’s
jihadists: Young, male, losers”, TheLocal.de, 11 September 2014. Similarly, a
federal investigation in Australia showed that 96% (55 of 57) of the
Australians who went to fight Syria before October 2014 were on welfare
benefits at the time of departure; see Simon Benson, “Aussie jihadists were on
the dole”, DailyTelegraph.com.au, 21 February 2015.

[33] Mohammed
Hafez documents the same for AQI/ISI in mid-2000s Iraq. See Mohammed M. Hafez,
Suicide bombers in Iraq: The strategy and ideology of martyrdom. (Washington,
DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

[34] An analogous
situation arises in dangerous industries employing foreign workers, who suffer
a disproportionate share of accidents. See Choi, Youngjin, “High-risk work,
cultural conflicts and labor mobility: The experiences of foreign workers in
the shipyard industry on the Korean East Coast,” International Area Studies
Review 17, no. 1 (2014): 57-74.