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Wednesday, July 29, 2015

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This second lecture given by Prof. Etienne Rynne
in 1994 to his class of Diploma students covered illuminated manuscripts. As
before, I’ve included an approximate timeline through the lecture with notes on
some of the major topics mentioned and his various anecdotes and interactions
with the audience.

9:36 ‘and the art is totally Celtic in so far as
there are spirals and curvilinear. There is no interlace! Forget
interlace is Celtic! Interlace art came later! … the earliest interlace we have
in Ireland is probably about 630 to 650’

11:20 ‘and he [Columbanus] got up into Burgundy
here where he met a lot of trouble … ask yourselves … like any good detective
of fiction writer … why do you meet trouble? What do you do? The answer is Cherchez la femme’

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

Some time ago (December
2014) I was casually surfing the internet when it suddenly occurred to me to
Google the name of my favourite Fermanagh crannog. I will admit to a certain
degree of trepidation in finding that one page bore the distinctly suspect title
of ‘Recent Releases - February 2013’, but was reassured to discover that it
emanated from the Department of Regional Development
and not something more affiliated with an Onanistic teen. The document is full of
fascinating questions and their official replies. For example, someone
requested a copy of the DRD alternative route analysis/strategy associated with
the Belfast on the Move initiative (DRD/2013-0052). Someone else was looking
for details of the numbers of collisions at a junction in Lurgan over the
previous six years (DRD/2013-0048). Someone even wanted details of DRD staff in
legally recognised relationships (marriage or in civil partnerships)
(DRD/2013-0042) … why, we can only guess …

In amongst this
cornucopia of questions and answers is the linguistic equivalent of an iceberg
… or maybe a Claymore mine … above the surface is a simple – one sentence –
question requesting: ‘Information relating to the archaeological dig on a
crannog in Enniskillen beginning in 2012’ (DRD/2013-0038). Of course, the
explosive charge is contained in the paragraph beneath the surface … a tightly
worded list of 13 questions, several with detailed sub-questions. I’m going to
go out on a limb here and suggest that, given the timing of the request
(February 6th 2013) it was most likely submitted by Prof Gabriel
Cooney as part of his research for the report
commissioned by Alex Attwood in July 2012. Even if these questions were not
submitted by Prof Cooney, they display an in-depth knowledge of the site and
its broad planning and excavation history. So, somebody was asking the right questions. Unless stated otherwise
stated, all quotes are from this set of questions and replies (replies are
dated the 6th of March 2013). The answers given by DRD surprised and distressed
me and I have wanted to both write a rebuttal and ask further questions about
it ever since. However, I felt it was better to hold fire until Prof Cooney’sreport on the site was published. Now that the report is available and I have
offered a detailed response and analysis to it, I thought it was appropriate to
turn my attention back in this direction.

You, dear reader, will
be grateful to know that I have no intention of going through the whole thing
in depth and commenting on each point at length. Instead, I merely intend to
pick out a few key points worthy, in my opinion, of further comment, analysis,
and investigation.

In the context of my
review of Cooney’s report, I’ve already commented on part of question 1d,
regarding the awarding of the excavation licence. From the DRD response, it is
clear that Declan Hurl was the sole licenced archaeologist for the first phase
of the project, becoming jointly responsible with Dr Nora Bermingham on July
30th 2012. This much we knew. What was less clear (and is not covered in
Cooney’s report) is when and why Declan Hurl subsequently left the project.
This is a key question in understanding his roles and responsibilities, along
with how he was treated by Amey, his direct employers. The salient detail that
this response adds is that ‘1 An extension was granted to Dr Bermingham’s
license on 29 January 2013, (Mr Hurl being no longer involved in the
excavation).’ Thus, at the very least, Declan Hurl appears to have left the
project by that date.

The answer to Question
1f is revealing. The question centres on whether or not there was consultation
between Roads Service, Amey, and DOE Planning. The answer notes that: ‘Roads
Service consulted with NIEA Built Heritage, which advised the proposed road
alignment ran close to a number of known archaeological sites.’ On the surface
this looks completely kosher … Roads Service were totally on the ball and doing
their job and all that. Except … not really. It’s true that there was
contact between Roads Service & NIEA about the Drumclay crannog. However,
it’s only in Cooney’s report, where he carefully dissects the timelines of
events, that it becomes clear that although Roads Service had files on the
project going back to July 2004 the NIEA were only contacted in January 2008 …
a full 42 months after the project kicked off. By this stage, all the important
decisions about route selection along with perceived notions of the impact to
the archaeological resource were pretty much firmly established. To put it in a
bit of context, it’s like saying that you had a wonderful dinner when in
reality you turned up late and only helped clear the dishes from the table and do the washing up. Cooney
identifies this exceptional lag in reaching out to NIEA as a significant
contributing factor to the planning fiasco that ensued.

Question 2 asks for
‘Details of how the archaeologist was unaware of the crannog, despite being
recorded.’ DRD’s response is that Declan Hurl inspected the site, but was
unable to confirm the location of the site, partly due to changes in the
landscape such as the infilling of the little lake and related watercourses.
The answer clearly claims that ‘The possible crannog site was identified during
September 2009, when further borehole investigations identified an area of
firmer ground’. However, Cooney demonstrates that Roads Service were advised on
this in the ‘Cultural Heritage’ section of the Environmental Statement report (September 2007). The document was
prepared by John Cronin and Associates and explicitly states that the crannog ‘is
located along the proposed route ... The
site will be directly impacted on by the proposed link road’ (Emphasis
mine). The same report states this again in a later section: ‘The proposed
Cherrymount Link Road will directly
impact a recorded archaeological site at the junction of three townlands:
FERM 211:061, a crannog and location of a dugout canoe’ (Emphasis mine). I
would ask the DRD if it is not now time to admit that their answer was
incorrect and to publish a retraction?

It’s probably only a
minor point, but the DRD’s list of published questions doesn’t contain a 4f …
yet they still provide an answer to it … ‘4)(f) Roads Service, its advisors
(Amey) and NIEA have been in frequent consultation at site level for the
duration of the dig. Towards the end of
July 2012, upon recognition of the unprecedented significance of the site, NIEA
co-opted Dr Bermingham to co-direct the dig’. Another minor point is that where
Question 5 asks for ‘The identity of the owners of the archaeological
consultancy contracted to supply the excavation crew’ the DRD response
misspells it. Their answer is ‘Farrimund MacManus’ when it should be ‘FarrimondMacManus.’
As I say, these are minor points, but (I believe) should be corrected in the
interests of clarity and completeness.

Question 9 is really
important … to me, personally, as much as to the general conduct of the public
advocacy campaign. The question asks DRD to give an ‘Explanation for the public
criticism of the Director for being inexperienced and unprepared by his crew
members and by Robert Chapple, another archaeologist.’ I think that the best
thing to do here is give the full DRD answer and then attempt to unpack the
important bits in the context of Prof Cooney’s report:

‘The original Director
of the dig was tasked with establishing what resource and time would be
required to resolve the crannog. In
discussion with NIEA, focus was placed on excavating the “habitation layers”,
with less importance placed on the underlying “construction layers”. On this premise, the Director indicated he
needed 12 diggers and approximately 6 weeks to excavate the crannog. The unprecedented nature of the monument
could not have been foreseen. As
evidenced by NIEA’s subsequent report and recommendation (assisted by Dr
Bermingham), wherein, it states that 20 archaeologists and a further 8 weeks
was required to resolve the site. The
dig is currently in its 38th week which includes the Christmas break. The criticism levelled at the original
Director of the dig was unwarranted, unprofessional and took no cognisance of
the emerging and unprecedented nature of the features and artefacts being
uncovered. Mr Chapple never visited the
site, despite NIEA inviting him to do so, and had no first-hand knowledge of
the site or the excavation;’

So … where to start? …
Let’s go with the nature of the crannog itself. The DRD reply notes that ‘focus
was placed on excavating the “habitation layers”, with less importance placed
on the underlying “construction layers”. They also claim that ‘The
unprecedented nature of the monument could not have been foreseen’ and again
they mention the ‘emerging and unprecedented nature of the features and
artefacts being uncovered.’ Cooney’s report throws crucial light on these
statements that clearly demonstrates them to be either wholly false or
strategically misleading. While it may be true to say that discussions with
NIEA focused on “habitation layers” over “construction layers”. The statement
carries the implication that Declan Hurl and NIEA were in agreement on this
issue, when Cooney’s report explicitly states that ‘In discussion between the
excavation director and NIEA: Built Heritage the question of what were
occupation layers and what were construction layers was consistently raised’.
The report maintains that:

‘As the excavation
proceeded it became apparent that the depth and complexity of the stratigraphy
was much greater than the excavation director had anticipated.’

and

‘The excavation
director maintained the view that the occupation level was shallow, focused on
the Late Medieval period in date and that construction levels were being
exposed’

and (crucially)

‘The investigative
excavations carried out on the crannog were limited both in area and depth. It
was assumed that there was limited, very shallow Late Medieval occupation of
the crannog and that the site was constructed in this period. This view is not supported either by the
archaeological literature on the nature and dating of crannogs, nor by the
geotechnical drawings of the crannog FERM 211:061 which were submitted as part
of the discussion over a mitigation strategy. These clearly indicate a
realisation on the part of RS/Amey that the crannog had a considerable depth’
(Emphasis mine).

Cooney’s criticisms of
Declan Hurl’s excavation include the following:

‘It is clear that the conduct of the excavation
did not meet the standards set out in NIEA’s Excavation Standards Manual (ESM)
or the standards set by professional archaeological bodies such as the Institute for Archaeologists (IfA) or
the Institute of Archaeologists of
Ireland (IAI).’

and

‘It is clear that there
was no effective environmental strategy for the site’

Just in case there’s
any doubt, Cooney unequivocally spells it out:

‘The central issue was
the non-professional standard of the
conduct of the excavation under the site director’ (Emphasis mine)

And yet … the DRD
response to the criticism of Declan Hurl’s direction of the site by both myself
and a number of the excavation crew is to characterise it as ‘unwarranted,
unprofessional and took no cognisance of the emerging and unprecedented nature
of the features and artefacts being uncovered.’ Considering Cooney’s findings – that Declan Hurl’s understanding of
the site bore little resemblance to the current state of knowledge of crannogs
and that his management of the excavation was clearly non-professional – I
believe it is time to challenge the DRD’s statement. For this reason, I call on
the DRD to retract their statement as it is plainly counterfactual and issue an
unreserved apology to myself and the various members of the excavation crew who
brought this situation to wider public and professional attention.

The final point that
the DRD answer gives is that I never visited the site, even though I’d been
invited to, and thus I had no first-hank knowledge of anything. I’m going to
beg the reader’s indulgence here as I am going to take a bit of time to analyse
and rebut this point. I would start by saying that DRD are perfectly correct in
their statement … I hadn’t visited the site during the Phase 1 excavation, I
was given the opportunity to do so but declined, and yes, I had no first-hand
knowledge of the site. When stated in this way, it just happens to look
remarkably favourable to the particular light that the DRD are attempting to
cast upon it. However, there is a ‘But’ … and it’s even larger than anything
enjoyed by Sir Mix-a-Lot
… the truth of the matter is that I did not need to visit the site and,
although it may have been desirable, I did not need first-hand experience of
the situation. As I have stated publicly since I first assisted in bringing
this situation to wider attention, I had been approached by a number of
experienced and trusted archaeologists from the excavation crew who were
consistent and credible in their criticisms of Declan Hurl’s mismanagement of
the site. It was only after several conversations with these individuals,
independently detailing the escalating crisis, and asking that I use what
influence I have, did I reluctantly get involved. Over the first, crucial, handful
of days the loosely-affiliated advocacy group raised significant professional
and media interest in the site. Despite initial statements from NIEA and Roads
Service that everything was in order and the excavation was running smoothly,
the group succeeded in raising sufficient political interest to have the then
Minister, Alex Attwood, visit the site. The rest, as they say in France, is L'Histoire
…

This only leaves the
issue of my invitation to visit the site that I refused. Once again, the DRD
response is deceptively straightforward … the opportunity was offered to me,
but I refused. What it leaves out … whether by accident or design … is the
context of my refusal. The meeting was scheduled for the Friday the 27th of
July 2012 and it was clear from the list of expected attendees that the
discussion would focus on the future of the crannog, not the set of
circumstances that led to that point. I felt then – as I do now – that I would
have little to bring to such a discussion. While I may be relatively well read
on the excavated archaeology of crannogs and early medieval Ireland generally,
I am expert in neither wetland nor environmental archaeology. At that time it
was those voices that needed to be heard, not mine. After consultation with a number of members of the advocacy group, I outlined my reasons to
John O’Keeffe in an email on July 25th 2012:

‘I fear that my
presence on the site may be distracting to the important discussion that must
happen now. Having been instrumental in bringing this issue to wider public
attention, I do not wish the debate to get derailed in that direction. I merely
hold a number of opinions on the site, and I believe that I should withdraw to
allow acknowledged experts on wetland excavation to be heard.’

Obviously, Dr
O’Keeffe passed on, at least, knowledge of the existence of my disinclination
to attend, if not the actual context for that refusal. In the light of this
broader context, I would call on the DRD to either retract or rephrase their
statement as to my physical presence on the site, my degree of knowledge of the
mismanagement of the excavation, and my reasons for refusal of the invitation
to attend. I would also appreciate an official acceptance and acknowledgment
that the phrasing of the original answer was – either through design or genuine
error – misleading and disingenuous.

The final question I’d
have for DRD is who exactly crafted their response to the original set of
questions? There are several instances in their answers where there is what may
be interpreted as a studied reluctance to be completely honest and transparent.
I would inquire whether the Department would consider reviewing this
individual’s work with greater care in future to ensure that such traits are
eliminated and eradicated?

Based on the analysis
of their responses to DRD/2013-0038 and the findings of Cooney’s report, I have
prepared a list of questions for the Minister responsible for DRD, Danny
Kennedy MLA. Should I receive any useful responses, I’ll be sure to post them
here!

NoteThe title of this post is two fold ... essentially, I couldn't make up my mind between the two choices ... so I just used both. The first part is, of course, derived from Robert Frost's much over used 'The Road Not Taken', and I can only offer my most sincere apologies to the poet and his estate. The second portion is a lyric from the song 'Lord, I'm discouraged' by the rather wonderful The Hold Steady. To them I offer no apology, merely acknowledgement of their general awesomeness.

Friday, July 17, 2015

I’ve written
before about how a simple, unattributed
blog post … just 178 words long … kicked off an advocacy campaign to ensure the
correct management and archaeological excavation of a crannog at Drumclay, Co.
Fermanagh. I’d had reports from trusted, experienced colleagues that the site
was poorly run and equipped. Worse than that, the excavation appeared to be in
imminent danger of hitting its arbitrarily allotted time limit, declared
‘complete’, and whatever else remained allowed to be destroyed … all so the
road could continue. Well, we weren’t going to stand for that and, a large
number of archaeologists and concerned members of the public banded together to
cause a fuss. We were joined by a significant number of professional organisations, including
the Chartered Institute for Archaeologists, the Institute of
Archaeologists of Ireland, and the BAJR Federation. We set up a Facebook page,
we ended up on radio and television talking about it, we eventually presented a
paper at the Institute of
Archaeologists of Ireland conference in Belfast, and even wrote pieces
about it for Archaeology Ireland magazine [here
& here].
The initial reaction of the relevant government departments was to close ranks
and claim that they were satisfied with the conduct of the excavation and that
everything was running according to plan. When that failed, it was claimed that
they were aware of the issues and were already working hard behind the scenes
to resolve them. The significant breakthrough came when then Minister for the
Environment, Alex Attwood,
visited the crannog, was convinced of its importance and subsequently ordered
an exclusion zone around the site, along with instituting a competent regime of
excavation and management. To paraphrase Hunter S Thompson’s obituary
of Nixon: ‘That is Drumclay, in a nut, for people with seriously diminished
attention spans.’

In the spree of open
days, public
outreach conferences, lectures,
and the apparently endless cascade of amazingly
well-preserved artefacts and structures that followed, it was easy to forget
that Minister Attwood also commissioned Prof Gabriel
Cooney to investigate the causes of this archaeological and planning
catastrophe, and to produce a report on it. On the 31st of July 2012 The
Impartial Reporter quoted the Minister as saying ‘I will appoint an
independent person or persons to review the full story of this site, including
how the current situation developed. Indeed, with major road developments in
the pipeline, how known and unknown heritage sites are protected is an issue
that I will be robustly interrogating.’ While the report was completed and
submitted to the new Minister, Mark H Durkan, on 21st
of October 2013 it was not (despite repeated efforts) made public until the
25th June 2015. The Minister’s statement and Action Plan, along with Prof
Cooney’s original report are available here: Lessons
learnt from Drumclay Crannóg Excavation.

Officially, it’s called Review of the context of the excavation of a crannog in Drumclay
townland Co. Fermanagh on the route of the Cherrymount Link Road … but in
my head I’ve called it The Report on the
Drumclay Crannog for as long as I’ve known Prof Cooney had been
commissioned to write it!

Stone-lined, rectangular hearth inside house (Source)

Sooooooo … now that we have it, what does it say?

I’m going to take the headings of each of the
eight terms of reference of the report and attempt to summarise the main points,
findings, and recommendations. Although I’ve included comments and questions
along the way, I’ve saved the majority of my remarks and analysis for the final
‘My Review of Cooney’s Review’ section (all quotes, unless stated otherwise,
are from the report):

1. The
relationships and balance therein between the Department of Regional
Development (DRD), Roads Service (RS), the Department of the Environment (DOE)
and the Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA)

Even Cooney’s initial comment on the archives of
documentation is revealing. The files held by Roads Service on the Cherrymount
Link Road go back as far as July 2004, while those curated by NIEA: Built
Heritage on the Drumclay crannog only begin in January 2008. That’s 42 months –
nearly three-and-a-half-years – where NIEA were not in the loop about Roads
Service’s plans for the route. In particular, they were not given the
opportunity to consult on the Preferred
Route Options Report (2007). Thus, by the time NIEA even became involved in
the project, it was already well established and important decisions were
locked down with little or no flexibility or willingness available to change or
revisit. The archaeological consultants engaged by Roads Service at that time, John Cronin and Associates, were clear in
their advice that NIEA would have to be engaged and provide approval. As Cooney
notes: ‘But critically EHS [now NIEA] does not appear to have been consulted on the choice
of route, the weighing up of the environmental impact of the two route options
or indeed on the Environmental Statement for the scheme.’ Despite this lack of
appropriate engagement with NIEA at the genesis of the project, it is clear
that soon after they were initially consulted NIEA were consistent in
promoting the message that ‘the proposed line of the route would disturb or
destroy the archaeological remains of the crannog, that policy dictated the
avoidance of known archaeological sites and the need to clearly identify the
location and extent of the site on the ground.’ They also emphasised the
archaeological significance of the site and the extreme costs of excavating it.
Nonetheless, this message appears not to have been sufficiently well put to
(and taken up by) Roads Service and Amey Consulting (the designer for the road
scheme) as they appear to have been convinced that the chosen route option
would not encounter the crannog.

While Cooney points to issues with discontinuities
of staff – both within NIEA and, more particularly, with the change of
archaeological consultant from John Cronin and Associates to Amey’s own Declan Hurl – he sees a greater
issue in the disparities in the seniority and authority of those on both sides
of the negotiating table. He cites examples of meetings where the interests of
Roads Service, Amey et al. were
represented by a Principal Professional and Technical Officer and a Senior
Professional Officer, while NIEA was represented by two Senior Inspectors and
one Archaeological Inspector. Dr John O’Keeffe (Principal Inspector), NIEA:
Built Heritage is clearly criticised for his lack of involvement in the project
prior to the crucial public campaign in July 2012. Similarly, there is no
evidence of the early involvement of either the Built Heritage Director or the
NIEA Board, even at a time when it was becoming clear that the Drumclay was
emerging as a significant strategic issue. Cooney also cites an example from
April 2012 where Maybelline Gormley (Senior Inspector) was the sole NIEA
representative – in a meeting of nine key people – to discuss the implications
of a partial collapse of the crannog owing to engineering works at the site.

2. Why was
the road identified as necessary (as outlined in publicly-available documents concerned
with the Roads Order for this project) and were there issues that could have been
anticipated and addressed?

As noted above, Roads Service et al. appeared to be convinced that their chosen route option
would not pass through the Drumclay site. Cooney states that this
misapprehension was due to their mistaken belief that the green dot on the map
they’d been supplied was an exact
location, not a general one. The ‘Cultural
Heritage’ section of the Environmental
Statement report (September 2007) – prepared by John Cronin and Associates
– clearly states that the crannog ‘is located along the proposed route ... The site will be directly impacted on by the
proposed link road’ (Emphasis mine). The same report states this again in a
later section: ‘The proposed Cherrymount Link Road will directly impact a recorded archaeological site at the junction of
three townlands: FERM 211:061, a crannog and location of a dugout canoe’
(Emphasis mine). The Notice of Intention
to Proceed with the Cherrymount Link Road (June 2007) explicitly states
that the new road ‘will directly impact
on two recorded archaeological sites; a crannog and a dug-out canoe. The
location of the crannog has been subject to intensive drainage works in the
past since it was originally situated on a lough. The crannog is indicated as an island on 1835 and 1860 editions of the
OS mapping. The dugout canoe associated with the crannog was subsequently
reburied and lost in this area’ (Emphasis mine).

Cooney rightly believes that the choice of route was a
decision of paramount importance and one that could have been greatly
influenced by a clear understanding of where the crannog lay. He notes that ‘this
locational information would have been a more serious adverse factor in
assessing the environmental impact of the preferred route.’ Simply put, if the
mark on the map had been more accurately placed, or the understanding of the
degree of error surrounding that location had been effectively communicated,
much of the following saga would never have unfolded as it did. The key thing
to note here is that NIEA – the people best placed to discuss this data and its
potential errors – were not consulted in September 2007 when the Environmental Statement was submitted … it would be a further
four crucial months before their first formal record of NIEA involvement in the
site even begins!

Phase I:
Up to the end of November 2010. Up to this point John Cronin and Associates
were the archaeological consultants for the scheme.

Phase II:
December 2010-8 June 2012. This covers the period from Declan Hurl’s (Amey)
appointment as the Roads Service senior archaeologist on the scheme.

Phase III:
11 June 2012-27 July 2012. The seven weeks that formed the initial phase of the
excavation of the crannog directed by Declan Hurl.

Phase IV:
From 30 July 2012 when a revised archaeological and environmental strategy to
resolve the excavations of the crannog were established by NIEA and led to the
appointment of Dr Nora Bermingham to co-direct the excavation.

4. The
decision-making process concerning the treatment of archaeological remains prior
to July 2012

Having set out the Phasing of the timeline above,
Cooney here fills in the documentary detail from his various sources,
essentially creating a ‘who said what to whom … and when’ breakdown of events
for Phases I and II.

The first thing that’s obvious here is that
although the Preferred Options Report
(June 2007) incorrectly states that 'no recorded archaeological sites are
directly impacted on by the proposed scheme', this had been corrected by
September 2007, when the Environmental
Statement was submitted. This shows that Roads Service statements in July
2012 that they did not know the location of the crannog and that the whole
thing was a big surprise to them were disingenuous.

A key point here is that NIEA received a ‘Crannog
Trenching Report’ authored by Declan Hurl on the 20th of February 2012. NIEA
are to be complimented on their swift response (28th February) indicating that
‘the trenches dug with a machine had not been excavated archaeologically, that
Declan Hurl did not direct the work (as licensed), nor was he even present. The
work carried out was unauthorised and in
contravention of the Historic Monuments and Archaeological Objects (NI) Order
1995. [¶] At a site meeting on the 29 February Amey agreed that the trenches had been dug without archaeological
supervision. The Amey archaeologist had pointed out the illegality of the
action but had not said this in the
report which he had written for Amey to submit to NIEA’ (Emphasis mine). At
no point does the report make clear exactly how
NIEA came to this conclusion or what evidence was available to them in this
matter. But more on this later …

In April 2012, mechanical excavation of an area of
soft ground, to the north-west of the crannog, by contractors McLaughlin and
Harvey-P.T. McWilliams J.V. (MHPT JV) in lowering the water table led directly
to the partial collapse of the northern portion of the crannog. Again, more on this later ...

5.
Shortcomings in that process and in the process around archaeology generally

Cooney argues that 'A key shortcoming in the
process was that EHS (as it was then)[NIEA] does not appear to have been
consulted either on the Scheme Assessment Report Stage 2: Preferred Options
Report (June 2007) or on the Environmental Statement (September 2007)'. Had
Roads Service et al. reached out to
NIEA at this early stage, I believe that the events that this report covers
would simply not have occurred. Confusions over the location of the site would
conceivable have been quickly resolved and a more appropriate route selected.

He also notes that John Cronin and Associates had
advised on a strategy of test trenching in July 2008 (after outreach to NIEA in
January 2008), but by December 2010 (17 months later) no physical investigation
had actually been undertaken. In fact, no excavation work in the crannog would
take place until February 2011, a full 31 months after the initial
recommendation. Cooney concludes that ‘It is hard to understand why this
critical fieldwork to inform the decision-making process was delayed for over
two and a half years while in the interim road construction work had begun on
the route’. I’m genuinely surprised that Prof Cooney’s report is not littered
with expletives at this point. Road construction had begun and Roads Service,
Amey, and MHPT JV were all happily trundling along thinking that this crannog –
that they’ve been repeatedly been told by NIEA is a major issue – will simply
disappear in … what? … a cloud of fairy dust? Really? In a sentence showing a superb
mastery of understatement, Cooney concludes that ‘It does not appear that
RS/Amey and from late 2011 MHPT JV had a coherent or consistent strategy to
mitigate the impact of the road on the crannog’. But what are NIEA doing while
all this is going on? Cooney notes that they reiterated ‘the high cost of
excavating a crannog and the inherent difficulties of piling/rafting over the
crannog’, but at a management level, this blossoming crisis is not being escalated
and passed back up the chain of command.

By the 30th of January 2012 Amey were telling NIEA
that the contractor (MHPT JV) ‘was not properly considering how to deal with
the crannog. MHPT JV were considering digging out the bog as an engineering
solution, including the crannog area’. Why was this contractor allowed to run
out of control? Why were they not being reined in by either Roads Service or
Amey?

The amazingly skilled wood worker was part of a living history display at the The life and times of a Fermanagh lake-dwelling conference (Source)

Cooney states quite bluntly that: ‘Under the terms
of Article 41 of the Historic Monuments and Archaeological Objects (Northern
Ireland) Order 1995 Amey acted illegally
in undertaking mechanical excavation of trenches on FERM 211:061 in
February 2012 and presenting this under
the auspices of an archaeological excavation license, AE/10/199’ (Emphasis
mine). My understanding is that there are two illegal acts here, the first in
carrying out the illegal trenching, and the second in trying to pass it off as
having occurred under the excavation license. No action was taken by NIEA to escalate
this to their legal department. Again, swift and decisive action at this point
by NIEA could have, if not wholly averted the crisis, then ameliorated the
worst fallout of what was to come. Instead, Roads Service, Amey, and MHPT JV
were allowed to continue unchecked. Rather than seeing any lessons learned and
a mending of their ways, MHPT JV conducted further trenching to the west of the
crannog. Cooney concludes that ‘… instead of the preventive measure of a rock
bund being placed to the west of the crannog to protect it, this work appears to have destroyed
archaeological deposits around the entire perimeter, particularly on the
western part of the crannog where a substantial part of the site was removed’
(Emphasis mine). He credits NIEA with providing a consistent message that the
full extents of the crannog would need to be ascertained, that the costs of complete
excavation would be vastly expensive, and that there was a need to re-examine
the possibility of rerouting the road. Nonetheless, there appears to have been
a catastrophic failure of leadership within the NIEA when no action was taken
at either of these two potentially illegal acts of unlicensed destruction and
attempted concealment. It is worth taking the time to read Cooney’s comment in
depth:

‘It is very difficult to understand why NIEA:
Built Heritage did not act more strongly when the ‘Crannog Trenching Report’
was submitted under the excavation license (AE/10/199) issued to Declan Hurl in
February 2012. The work carried out was
unauthorised and in direct contravention of Article 41 of the Historic
Monuments and Archaeological Objects (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, caused
damage to the site and could have
constituted a prosecutable offence. Amey’s admission of breach of license
was, as stated by NIEA officials, admission
of an illegal act (parallel to a breach of listed building consent). Yet
there is no file reference to further
action – such as referral to senior management for advice in relation to
this breach, consideration of referral to Departmental Solicitors, or
revocation of the license to excavate. NIEA: Built Heritage took no further action and indeed renewed the license so that Declan Hurl
could undertake excavation of the site in June 2012’ (Emphasis mine).

Cooney notes that his examination of the
correspondence between NIEA and Roads Service et al. there is ‘a nuanced difference in approach between the two
NIEA: Built Heritage, HMU Senior Inspectors [i.e. Claire Foley & Maybelline Gormley] involved in the
decision-making process.’ While not a critical failing, he sees that ‘This
difference would not have helped in demonstrating a clear NIEA position in
relation to the decision-making process.’ With regard to the general conduct of
Declan Hurl’s excavation he has this to say:

‘The investigative excavations carried out on the
crannog were limited both in area and depth. It was assumed that there was
limited, very shallow Late Medieval occupation of the crannog and that the site
was constructed in this period. This view
is not supported either by the archaeological literature on the nature and
dating of crannogs, nor by the geotechnical drawings of the crannog FERM
211:061 which were submitted as part of the discussion over a mitigation
strategy. These clearly indicate a realisation on the part of RS/Amey that
the crannog had a considerable depth’ (Emphasis mine).

Archaeologist Cathy Moore displaying one of the excavated vessels (Source)

6. The
conduct of the excavation up to early August 2012

This portion deals with Phase III of the timeline,
from the 11th of June to the 27th of July 2012. In terms of the advocacy of key
professional and private stakeholders, this is a crucial juncture in the events
surrounding the mismanagement of the Drumclay fiasco. Please excuse me for
cutting and pasting three paragraphs of text from the report, but this is worth
reading in detail to understand how incredibly poorly the Phase 1 excavation
was being run:

‘It is clear that the conduct of the excavation
did not meet the standards set out in NIEA’s Excavation Standards Manual (ESM)
or the standards set by professional archaeological bodies such as the Institute for Archaeologists (IfA) or
the Institute of Archaeologists of
Ireland (IAI).

‘It appears that the excavation director was the
only one who could assign context numbers. There was no photographic register
(a single camera was used to take about 1,000 unlogged photographs). Surveying
equipment and a surveyor were available only sporadically from Amey and there
were very limited storage facilities and recording of artefacts. It is clear
that there was no effective environmental strategy for the site. The site
director maintained his own site notebook as an aide memoire, as his own intellectual property and not part of the
formal excavation archive. Over the course of phase 1 of the excavation the
site supervisors appear to have improvised and created their own registers and
devised an environmental strategy. The site director funded the supply of finds
bags, pens and other basic requirements out of his own pocket.

‘As the excavation proceeded it became apparent
that the depth and complexity of the stratigraphy was much greater than the
excavation director had anticipated. In discussion between the excavation
director and NIEA: Built Heritage the question of what were occupation layers
and what were construction layers was consistently raised. The excavation
director maintained the view that the occupation level was shallow, focused on
the Late Medieval period in date and that construction levels were being
exposed. The concern of NIEA was such that on 17 July Dr John O’Keeffe,
Assistant Director, HMU, Built Heritage requested Maybelline Gormley (Senior
Inspector) to remain on site to provide a full assessment of the conduct of the
excavation. NIEA insisted on not setting a time limit for the work until there
was clear definition of the level of archaeological material on the site.’

It is hard to escape the conclusion that in every
material way, Declan Hurl’s excavation of the site was deeply flawed, under
resourced, and highly unprofessional. To pick out just one sentence from the
foregoing: ‘site supervisors appear to have improvised and created their own
registers and devised an environmental strategy’ … how bad do things have to be
when the site supervisors are essentially attempting to record the excavation
in spite of the Site Director? Think about this for a minute! Let it sink in! Other points to take from this include the fact
that Cooney’s timeline clearly demonstrates that Declan Hurl submitted his Crannog
Excavation Methodology NIEA on the 1st of June 2012. Excavation began on the
11th of June and an extension of the archaeological license was issued by NIEA
on the 14th of June 2012. Obviously, despite their knowledge of potentially
actionable breaches of the legislation, and an attempt to conceal one of those
actions, NIEA were happy to allow the excavation to proceed. It is a little
more than a month after the excavation licence was extended that John O’Keeffe
demonstrated the first evidence of effective leadership from the NIEA in
mandating Maybelline Gormley to be present at the excavation to assess its
conduct. This is absolutely crucial because it happened on the 17th of July
2012 … the very same day as I published the anonymous ‘Urgent!’
post. I would presume that Dr O’Keeffe gave his order during business hours,
while the post on my blog did not make it to publication until 9:59 PM
that night. So, as it has been claimed, action was already being taken by NIEA
and attempts to bring the issue to wider public and professional attention must
have been seen as unwelcome and frustrating. However, there is nothing in Prof
Cooney’s report that in any way suggests that this late intervention by John
O’Keeffe was going to bring about a successful resolution when all gross
failures and infractions up to that point had been allowed to go unchecked. O'Keeffe,
in a briefing to the Minister on the 23rd of July 2012 (just six days later)
noted that:

‘1. NIEA has monitored the progress of the excavation as it has
progressed and is content with how the site has been excavated and recorded’
and ‘4. All occupation levels have been excavated and fully recorded’.

On the
14th of December 2012 O’Keeffe added a handwritten note to the file to clarify
his position:

‘I wrote this prior to my own inspection of the site, based on information to hand at the time.
Para 12, sentences 1 and 4 [i.e. the
two sentences quoted above] are not correct, though this is what I understood at the time. From my own
inspection of the site on 26/7/12 it was
evident that the excavation to that date was not complete, not satisfactory and
not of the standard required’ (Emphasis mine).

I feel that there is
something that needs to be carefully unpacked here. On Tuesday the 17th of July
he is sufficiently concerned about the quality of the site’s excavation that he
sends Gormley to investigate. Yet, the following Monday (23rd) he’s confidently
telling the Minister that he’s satisfied with the way in which the site is
being excavated and that all the ‘occupation levels’ have been fully excavated.
He only finds out that this is grotesquely inaccurate when he visits the site
on the Thursday (July 26th). The logical conclusion is that his erroneous
beliefs, based on ‘information to hand at the time,’ were from a single source:
his representative at the excavation: the NIEA Senior Inspector. This
revelation can only bring into sharp focus numerous questions as to the
competency and professionalism of this individual, along with the degree of trust that appears to have been placed there.

Cooney notes that even at this advanced stage ‘It
would seem that the RS/Amey non-archaeological staff did not appreciate the archaeological importance of the site or the
excavation and wanted a definitive completion date’ (Emphasis mine). Understandably,
Declan Hurl as both Site Director and direct employee of Amey was ‘under
considerable personal and professional pressure.’ In this I have the utmost
sympathy for him. Having directed excavations in the commercial sector under
extremely trying conditions, I can acknowledge that these can be incredibly
stressful situations. Nonetheless, this is the job you signed up for and
negotiation, communication, the management of expectations, and – yes, pressure
– is part of that role. Cooney, quite rightly, acknowledges that in such
situations communications between staff and Site Director can be strained. For
all that, it must be emphasised that ‘The central issue was the non-professional standard of the conduct of
the excavation under the site director’ (Emphasis mine).

The crunch day was Friday the 27th of July 2012 when an on-site meeting was arranged between NIEA, Roads Service et al., and a number of key stakeholders. I
had been invited to attend that meeting, but declined. It was clear from the
list of invitees that the discussion would centre on the future of the
excavation, not on how it had arrived at that position. I set out my reasons to
John O’Keeffe in an email on Wednesday the 25th:

‘I fear that my presence on
the site may be distracting to the important discussion that must happen now.
Having been instrumental in bringing this issue to wider public attention, I do
not wish the debate to get derailed in that direction. I merely hold a number
of opinions on the site, and I believe that I should withdraw to allow
acknowledged experts on wetland excavation to be heard.’

This is the meeting
where, as Cooney states, it was agreed ‘that a Senior Environmental
Archaeologist should be employed immediately to devise and implement a
scientific, environmental archaeological sampling strategy and obtain maximum
value from the excavation’ and would act as co-director with Declan Hurl.

This period concerns Phase IV of the timeline (the
‘Phase 2’ excavations), from Monday the 30th of July 2012, with Dr Nora Bermingham’s
appointment as co-director of excavations. In assessing the archaeological and
cultural value of this excavation, Cooney states that ‘The excavation yielded
an enormous volume of artefacts, structures and datasets that will transform our understanding of crannogs and inform wider
discussion of early medieval Ireland’ (Emphasis mine). In addressing the
effectiveness of stepping in and restructuring the excavation, he could not be
clearer: ‘The remedy was effective.
It delivered a rescue excavation carried out to a very high professional
standard and to an integrated research design in a highly pressurised
environment. It is a landmark excavation
and has provided a wealth of data which will transform our understanding of
early medieval Ireland’ (Emphasis mine).

The report makes six recommendations. You can read
them in full either in the report itself, or in Minister Durkan’s Action Plan
as they’ve been simply lifted verbatim. In brief, these recommendations are
that:

1) There should be a defined protocol/code of
practice for archaeological work that provides ‘a clear, consistent and
transparent framework for the conduct of archaeological work on road schemes’.

2) There should be a defined protocol/code of
practice for all archaeological contractors carrying out work on road schemes.

3) Where archaeological excavation is deemed
necessary, it is carried out well in advance of road construction work.

4) A review of the process of licensing
archaeological excavations must be made a priority for NIEA, along with the
policy for the long term curation of excavated artefacts.

5) If ‘a firmer approach had been taken’ by the
NIEA, the number and severity of issues that eventually developed would have
either been easier to tackle or would not have occurred at all. As staffing
levels have been addressed, a review of the organisation’s operational
structure must be a priority ‘to assess whether it is fit for purpose or
whether a revised structure would improve the capacity and performance of the
unit in the management of archaeological licensing.’

6) It is recommended that Board-level meetings
between NIEA and other government agencies be restarted and not relegated to
operational level, as they had been in the past. Cooney notes that ‘Such a
strategic, Board-level engagement would certainly have been beneficial in the
context of the Drumclay crannog and its excavation’.

In all cases the recommendations have been
accepted unconditionally by NIEA. The Action Plan goes so far as to list the Action
Arising and Timescale for completion of each recommendation.

Your humble narrator & a Chapple Minor at the February 2013 Open Day

My Review
of Cooney’s Review

First of all, I must say that this is a
spectacularly open, honest document that pulls no punches. It is clear,
concise, and unflinching in its assessment of the whole Drumclay planning and
excavation saga and clearly documents how an unmitigated omnishambles was
transformed into, arguably, the finest and most important excavation of our
generation. Professor Cooney – not that you need my approval, but I salute you! I also salute the then Minister,
Alex Attwood, for his foresight and vision – it can’t have been easy for him to
choose the long-term value of the archaeological site over the short term
benefit of completing the road. The current Minister, Mark H Durkan, and the
staff of the NIEA are also to be congratulated for taking these recommendations
on board and being committed to bringing them to implementation. At a personal
level, it completely vindicates the position taken by the Cherrymount Crannog Crisis group and all the people and
organisations that recognised themselves as stakeholders in this process and
stood together to say ‘this is wrong!’. Even more importantly, it vindicates
all of those professional archaeologists on the ‘Phase 1’ excavation who either
communicated with me, or attempted to bring about change directly with NIEA –
they were right! The quality of the excavation fell hugely below all reasonable
standards and they were right to kick against the pricks!

Well done everyone! It’s time to move on to a
fresh tomorrow with confidence and harmony … right? The music swells … it’s
some combination of a children’s choir and lushly-produced strings …
crepuscular rays stream through the clouds … freeze-frame on archaeologists
marching off hand-in-hand … fade to black … roll credits … right?

Well … no … actually …

There are still significant questions that require
both answers and solutions. In fairness to Prof Cooney, these are largely
beyond the remit of his report and beyond the scope of what he could hope to
investigate. In the first instance, I’d have a minor quibble with some of
Cooney’s recommendations. The final three have broad application across the
entire practice of commercial archaeological excavation in Northern Ireland –
and that is to be welcomed. However, the first three only apply to road
construction. Of course, this report only deals with road construction, but if
Cooney felt he had the power to make recommendations 4-6 ‘universal’, then
recommendations 1-3 should be the same and applied to all forms of
archaeological excavation, not just the road schemes.

As has been noted earlier, the initial response of the various state bodies was to claim that there was no issue with the excavation. There was a clear and concerted emphasis on discrediting their critics. Even as late as Summer 2013, when the paper 'Drumclay: A Most Surprising Crannog' was published (Archaeology Ireland 27.2, pp. 37-40), J. D. J. O'Keeffe added a postscript that included the line: 'Opinion and speculative articles, including many inaccuracies, have been published' (Emphasis mine). If memory serves, similar comments were made by Dr O'Keeffe when a number of us gave a presentation at the IAI conference in Belfast [here]. At that time the findings of Cooney's report were not available and no informed rebuttal could be presented. However, now that the report is published and the preliminary findings of the excavation are known, it is clear that while there may have been inaccuracies in the reporting of the situation they were pretty much insignificant. If anything, the public reporting of the situation during the planning process and the Phase 1 excavation significantly underplayed the full extent of the incompetence and mismanagement by Declan Hurl, NIEA, & Roads Service et al. Nothing in Cooney's report may be taken to suggest that those who publicly advocated for the site were in any way inaccurate, incorrect, or unprofessional. I think it would be appropriate at this point, with no mysterious unpublished report to hide behind, that Dr O'Keeffe offer a full and unreserved apology to all for his statements. You can be damned sure that, had Cooney's report found differently, apologies would be demanded of us!

Although I know that the archaeologists involved
in the ‘Phase 1’ excavation were solicited for statements about the conduct of
the excavation, an analysis of their treatment appears to have been beyond the scope of the
report. That does not mean that is not a point of continuing pain and
humiliation for those involved – both the crew interrogated by Declan Hurl to
discover who had spoken to me for this blog, and the archaeologist summarily
dismissed for admitting to having been one of the ‘whistle-blowers’ and
providing photographic evidence of the quality and quantity of materials being
discovered. This latter individual, distressed at the way the crew was being treated by Declan Hurl during this interrogation, took sole responsibility for speaking to me. In doing so, they shielded the other members of the crew that had either spoken to me or directly to the NIEA from further verbal assault and anger. At the very least, this person is owed a grovelling apology by Mr
Hurl, if not compensation from Amey, his employers. Even if no recognition is forthcoming from these quarters, this person should be recognised as one of the true heroes of his affair and (even anonymously) hailed as one of the few who acted with real courage and leadership during the Phase 1 excavations.Related to this must be the actions of

FarrimondMacManus, the consultancy contracted to provide the archaeological staff to the excavation. Despite having failed to protect the rights and interests of their employees in the face of Declan Hurl's actions, they retained their contract to provide staff throughout the excavation. Although it may be argued that their actions fell far below any acceptable level of employer care and responsibility, they received no word of reproach from Cooney. In so far as can be established, they were acutely aware of the poor quality of the excavation and all of its attendant failures, but appear to have stood by and allowed the situation to continue unchecked. Of all the parties in this case, they appear to have been the only one to make a significant financial profit from it. This can be demonstrated in the clear increases in, to take just one example, their Cash at Bank skyrocketing from a mere £4,643 in 2012 to £85,858 in 2013 [here]. On currently available data, they would appear to be the most profitable archaeological consultancy in Northern Ireland, and it may be reasonably suggested that a large proportion of this is due to their involvement in the Drumclay project.

I would have welcomed some clarity and
quantification around the amount of damage inflicted on the site. Cooney gives
broad outlines about trenching by both Amey and McLaughlin and Harvey-P.T.
McWilliams J.V., along with the large slippage that occurred as a result of
work to dig out a portion of the bog by the latter. However, there is no clear
indication as to the volume of material – either as cubic metres, or a percentage
of the site – that was impacted in this way. Simply put, it would be good to
know how much of the site we have lost as a result of illegal activities and
incompetence. It’s probably well beyond the scope of Cooney’s remit, but it is
still worthy of mention that there have been a number of comments about the
contractor claiming compensation for the archaeology-related delay. It is
mentioned in an article by The Impartial
Reporter from the 22nd
of November 2012 that states ‘The joint contractors, P. T. McWilliams and
McLaughlin and Harvey, are to be paid compensation for the additional work and
delay caused by the archaeological dig.’ This is echoed in an update on Wesley
Johnson’s roads blog from the
following day. (However, I’ve not been able to find any official
confirmation of compensation being paid). In light of Cooney’s statement that ‘Mechanical
excavation work by the contractors (MHPT JV) in the northwest of the bog ...
resulted in a lowering of the water table and a collapse of part of the
northern part of the crannog’ it would appear that there is a demonstrable link
between their actions and damage to the crannog. In this context, might it not
be better to dismiss talk of ‘compensation’ and instead turn to an
investigation of these acts, with a view towards prosecution? With regard to damage to the site, Cooney's report appears to be largely silent on the question of the destruction caused by

‘machine-dug sondage’ agreed to by NIEA. Ostensibly, this was to ‘establish the nature of the deposits and to inform a timeframe for the excavation.’ The reality of the situation was that a significant portion of the south-western quadrant of the site was hastily machined away. Although it is presented as a reasonable and necessary act, the simple fact is that it was already known that the site was of the utmost importance and survived to a considerable depth, containing a vast array of well-preserved organic artifacts. From Cooney's remarks elsewhere in the report, it is clear that Amey's geotechnical drawings of the crannog had already determined the true depth of the site. In such a context, this intervention can only be regarded, at best, as misguided and unprofessional.

One recommendation that was not made, but that I
believe deserves notice is the quality of locational data in the NI SMR. It
appears that a large part of the confusion that initiated this debacle was the
unfortunately positioned dot on the map. It is not hyperbole to suggest that
had this been correctly positioned at the junction of the three Townlands, none
of this whole process would ever have occurred. Obviously, this leaves aside
egregious failings by Roads Service in not reaching out to NIEA at an appropriate
time and the written description of the location having been ignored.
Nonetheless, it is well known within the Northern Ireland archaeological
community that SMR data for non-upstanding sites can be a bit hit and miss. It
is also well known that the NI SMR has been underfunded and neglected for
years. Would this not be the perfect opportunity to leverage extra funding to
update and augment the resource? But that would expensive, you say … more
expensive than fully excavating, conserving, and publishing a remarkably
well-preserved crannog? … you decide …

I would have thought that this report would have
been the perfect opportunity to address the question about the advisability of
allowing engineering firms to supply their own archaeological professionals.
Cooney fails to address the question, though (I feel) it is a significant
contributory factor to the events as they unfolded. Hiring archaeological
professionals as independent subcontractors, rather than having them as
internal employees toeing the company line, would allow a much needed degree of
separation and allow a robustness in the archaeological advice that may
otherwise be lacking. Cooney appears to tangentially touch on this when he
notes that ‘It would seem that the RS/Amey non-archaeological staff did not
appreciate the archaeological importance of the site or the excavation and
wanted a definitive completion date. In this context the site director, Declan
Hurl, who was employed by Amey, was under
considerable personal and professional pressure’ (Emphasis mine). However,
he fails to follow through with any further analysis of the point. Although not
directly addressed by Cooney, would this not be the perfect opportunity for
NIEA to issue robust guidance on this point?

Again firmly outside the scope of the report, but
of vital importance nonetheless, we need to see the publication of a clear
roadmap for the successful analysis, write-up, and formal publication of the
site. Detail on this aspect of the site is something we, as committed
stakeholders, need to vigorously pursue in the coming months and years.

In my opinion, a major strategic failing of
Cooney’s report is the excision of all but veiled and tangential references to
the critical mass of professional and public advocacy for the competent and
well-resourced excavation of the site. He mentions ‘times when there was
significant time pressure and public and
media attention on the excavation’ and (when discussing professional
working relationships during the Phase 2 excavation) ‘This was achieved in a
pressurised environment, with widespread
public interest and reportage’ (Emphasis mine). Reading Cooney’s narrative
of events it comes across as a tale of initial failures by Roads Service et al. to engage NIEA, followed by a
series of failures by NIEA to adequately manage the situation or show suitable
leadership. If this were a movie there would be a breakthrough moment of
clarity at NIEA, followed by an intense montage scene (presumably to the 1982
hit Eye of the Tiger by Survivor). As dawn
breaks on the 17th of July 2012 NIEA’s Principal Inspector emerges as a one-man
leadership machine and instructs the Senior Inspector to go to Drumclay as silent
guardian, a watchful protector ... a dark knight. It was hard work, but just 10
days later the knockout punch is delivered when a meeting of experts is
convened on the site and everything is put on a safe trajectory … crisis
averted, NIEA save the day. There are cries of ‘Adriaaaan’, declarations of
undying love, and a freeze-frame on an emotional embrace before credits roll.
Sounds farfetched? Based on Cooney’s recounting of events, you could easily
interpolate in the story as I’ve given above. What you wouldn’t naturally
apprehend is the existence of the Cherrymount
Crannog Crisis group and the host of advocate stakeholders that sprung up
in response to the emerging scale of the problem. It is hardly believable that
this collection of organisations (including the Chartered Institute for Archaeologists, the Institute of Archaeologists of Ireland, the Northern Ireland Archaeological Forum, and the BAJR Federation), a significant number of prominent academics (acting
both openly and behind the scenes), a collection of conspicuous articles in
both print and online media (Past Horizons, Archaeology Ireland, British
Archaeology, and Current Archaeology), along with a groundswell of the great and
the good within both the public and commercial archaeology spheres have been so easily relegated to a position
of zero influence. I’m sure that some parties would be happy to believe that it
was their own internal responses to the Drumclay situation that saved the day.
They would cheerfully promulgate the notion that they alone were wholly and
solely responsible for bringing the excavation to a safe conclusion. This is, I
believe, a deeply disingenuous position. Stuart Rathbone’s review of this and
other recent advocacy campaigns in ‘How to dig holes and alienate people.
Archaeological protest in early 21st century Ireland’ (written while
the Drumclay excavation was still in progress) states that it was ‘Spontaneously formed
as a response to an urgent crisis, it established realistic goals and appears to have achieved them’ and that ‘The
group can claim to have made enough
impact that repeated extensions have been granted to the excavation team’
(Emphasis mine). It is clear to all involved that this effort was a genuine and
powerful catalyst for change. What is also clear is that it was the concerted
actions of these groups and individuals that actually created the public
awareness and political will to act. And yet, it appears that all this effort
to bring to light the long term mismanagement of the site and create sufficient
awareness and concern to force action is left unacknowledged and unrecognised.
If it wasn’t for the fact that I received a letter from Dr John O’Keeffe
stating that ‘I
appreciate that you have a close interest in this site’, I’d be hard
pressed to believe that I or anyone else had anything to do with it! I don’t
wish to seem unduly harsh on Prof Cooney – he does appear to have been
restricted in the scope of his enquiries to the archived files kept by NIEA
(Report Appendix 1) and Roads Service (Report Appendix 2). As neither
organisation seems to have kept and curated any material relating to the
escalating pressure created by the CCC
group and other interested parties, it fails to get appropriate mention. Thus,
it is effectively stricken from the record. Although no one involved in the
advocacy campaign for Drumclay did so for the possibility of reward or
recognition, it would be an appropriate measure that some acknowledgment of
their paramount importance in the process given. While it may, arguably, have
been beyond the scope of Prof Cooney’s investigation, would it not be appropriate
for the Minister and the NIEA to do so now?

It may seem like a minor point, but the report
does not address Declan Hurl’s post 30th of July 2012 history on the site. He
had been sole Site Director up to that point, but took on a joint directorship
duties at that time. He was nowhere in evidence at the open day I attended in
February 2013. When Nora Bermingham addressed the prestigious Ulster
Archaeological Society in December 2013 it was in a solo capacity, not
a joint presenter with Mr Hurl. Similarly, at The life and times of a Fermanagh lake-dwelling conference, hosted
by Dr O’Keeffe in September 2014, there was no presentation by Declan Hurl, nor
does he appear to have been in the audience. I’m given to understand that
sometime after his appointment as co-Director he stopped coming to site on a
regular basis. I think it would be important to know the detail of this. Was he
moved to other duties? Was he disciplined by his employers? How were his
actions and mismanagement of the excavation, and the impacts that led from it
greeted by Amey? What exactly happened there? There is a tantalising clue to be
found, not in Cooney’s report, but in a published response to a EIR Request to
the Department of Regional Development (received on the 6th of February
2013)[Reference: DRD/2013-0038].
Their response to the question about ‘details of the licence, including
awarding authority’ includes the statement: ‘An extension was granted to Dr
Bermingham’s license on 29 January 2013, (Mr
Hurl being no longer involved in the excavation)’ (Emphasis mine). What exactly happened there?

This is an important consideration as the report
states that Declan Hurl appears to have tried to pass off the illegal trenching
of the site, carried out by his employers Amey, as having been done in a
controlled and archaeologically responsible manner when in reality it was no
such thing. Instead, he was not even on the site at the time. I find it
difficult to summon up the words to adequately express my revulsion and disgust
at this – it not just breaks the law, it besmirches every single aspect of what
being a ‘professional’ archaeologist is or should mean. Fair play to NIEA –
they appear to have deduced the deception and gotten a confession of guilt.
However, no action was taken. And this ... THIS … is where the VERY important
questions begin! We need answers to questions like – who from NIEA attended the
meetings where Declan Hurl was confronted with these allegations and to whom
were these minutes passed? Who made the decision not to pass the evidence to
the Departmental legal personnel or to the PSNI? And why was this decision not
challenged by other individuals within NIEA? At this point it should be an
imperative that the NIEA’s legal advisors re-examine the evidence to, even
belatedly, undertake prosecutions against Mr Hurl, Amey, and McLaughlin and Harvey-P.T.
McWilliams J.V. Added to this there should be a strong, public commitment to
pursuing vigorous disciplinary measures against senior NIEA personnel who
failed to act in a manner befitting their positions. A key question in the
latter case must be to untangle the words and actions of the two Senior
Inspectors. Were they acting in a manner designed to shield their actions from
senior management, or acting without adequate managerial support and
supervision? The understaffing of the NIEA has long been a known crisis point
and has been identified by Cooney as a contributory factor in this case. Even
if vacant positions have been filled, and the NIEA is in the process of
transitioning to a new organisation structure, would it not be a valuable
recommendation that all senior staff involved in the Drumclay case participate
in dynamic retraining and reskilling to enforce the lessons learned and embed
their roles and responsibilities? At the very least, should all concerned not
be subject to some form of robust internal mentorship where all actions and
decisions are critically reviewed at regular intervals? If these methods fail
to produce appropriate results, would it not be appropriate to consider either
transitioning these individuals to less responsible and onerous roles, or out
of the NIEA entirely?

Even if the NIEA fail to undertake a series of
prosecutions against the individuals and companies involved in this case, the prima facie evidence presented in
Cooney’s report should be sufficient to convince Roads Service to ask some
serious questions of their own. I would envision that chief among these would
include: Should Roads Service bar itself from engaging either Amey or McLaughlin
and Harvey-P.T. McWilliams J.V. in any capacity in the future? Similarly, the
onus must now be on NIEA, as part of its review into their licencing
procedures, to enquire whether or not Declan Hurl ever again holds a position
of power on any archaeological excavation in Northern Ireland? Going beyond
that, I also believe that it is now incumbent on the Institute of Archaeologists of Ireland (and all other relevant
professional bodies) to review the findings of this report. In my opinion, it behooves them to compare Prof Cooney’s statements of wrongdoing by Mr Hurl and
others to their internal Codes of
Conduct and decide whether or not they are compatible with his continued Membership of the Institute.

It is only then – when accountability is
established at the organisational as well as personal level, with appropriate
punishments meted out and reparations made – that we can genuinely believe that
sufficient safeguards are in place and that another Drumclay-style disaster
isn’t waiting for us on the next road scheme, or the one after that. That’s
when I’ll cue the music and we can happily ride off into the sunset with the
melodious sounds of John Williams playing …

While I’m in little doubt that all departments of
the Northern Ireland government scan this blog on a regular basis to see if
there’s anything they need to respond to, they do seem to prefer it if you
write to them directly. Thus, I have prepared detailed emails requesting
comment and clarification from Ministers Danny Kennedy, MLA and Mark H Durkan, MLA
along with Mr Mel Ewell, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director, Amey
plc. If and when I receive responses from these individuals, I will post them
on this blog.

While many people exerted their influence as part of the advocacy campaign for the excavation, a number of 'the great and the good' deserve special mention for their efforts: Mike Pitts of British Archaeology Magazine, David Connolly of BAJR, Maggie Struckmeier of Past Horizons, and Phil Flannagan, MLA. There still remain a small number of people who, even now, cannot be named publicly. This in no way diminishes the importance of the assistance they gave, the risks they took, or the hardships they endured. While their names may not be known to many, their actions will have long-lasting consequences and everyone who cares for archaeology on this island should thank them!

The first part of the title was suggested by Dr James
O'Neill of UCC and is used with permission. Thank you, sir! You Rock!Updates17/07/2015Details of repeated questions in Stormont by Phil Flanagan on when the Drumclay report would be published: here, here, and here