Ayn Rand, Objectivism’s creator and primary advocate, argued against biological determinism in favor of a view that regarded man as a free agent with real choices available to him. Her stance on free will can be summed up by the following quote:

Because man has free will, no human choice—and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice—is metaphysically necessary. In regard to any man-made fact, it is valid to claim that man has chosen thus, but it was not inherent in the nature of existence for him to have done so: he could have chosen otherwise. Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation.

She never attempted to explain what precisely she meant by this, or how it was supposed to work. Her understanding of the issue was fuzzy at best. When one further investigates her claims, obvious inconsistencies appear. The untenability of her stance is hard to miss when one considers it within the context of Objectivism as a whole.

Ayn Rand claimed she wasn’t a materialist. However, considering that she viewed all phenomena, including mental phenomena, as explicable in physical in terms - that is, in direct correspondence with the physical world - one wonders what on earth she meant by this. She rejected all forms of idealism, but held that man’s consciousness (which she often referred to as his “soul”) gave him volitional powers. She held that consciousness couldn’t exist without a brain, implying that consciousness derives its properties from the workings of the physical world. If nothing happens by chance - which she ensures us is the case- then everything happens according to fixed laws. And if everything happens according to fixed laws, then the physical substrate of consciousness i.e., the brain, behaves in fixed ways, and our “freedom” is merely an illusion...our consciousness amounts to an irrelevant sideshow compulsively played out by our deterministic brains. This insistence on determinism is precisely why Objectivism takes issue with quantum mechanics, which asserts that distributed physical laws alone cannot account for any state of the universe. Objectivism rejects any notion of “probabilistic freedom”, demanding that every state of the universe be absolutely explicable in terms of its prior state.

Ayn Rand was an advocate of compatibilism, the view that “free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.” Ayn Rand wanted to have her cake and eat it too. She wanted the universe to be free from uncertainty while at the same time wanting humans to possess a degree of freedom that was not justifiable. For how can volition be a bona fide source of causation if it is the product of consciousness which is the product of the brain - the behavior of which is the product of determinism laws? If volition cannot in any way contradict the structure of the brain from which it arises, and if the brain must behave according to its intrinsic causal nature as determined by its material configuration (which must be fixed, since A is A) then where’s the freedom? Volition would merely be the acting out - the inevitable realization - of a deterministic universe. If volition is not a material process, then what is it? A mental process? If it’s a mental process, then how does the mental process exist except as an isomorphism (one-to-one mapping) of a physical process? If physical processes can unfold in more than one way, then the Objectivist account of causality falls apart. And if they can’t unfold in more than one way, then we can choose only that which we, ultimately, must “choose.” If our will is itself determined, then calling it “free” makes little sense.

Ayn Rand defended the existence of free will with the following argument: denying the existence of free will is contradictory, since if we don’t have free will, then we can’t be certain that we haven’t been forced to think incorrectly. I suppose Ayn Rand thought this argument was very clever. However, it doesn’t work. For every thought we have, we can be certain we were not forced to think otherwise. So when we follow a valid chain of reasoned thought, we can be sure we were not destined to be irrational. Valid thinking is self-evidently valid; we needn’t be infallible to argue that X=X, since it is true by definition. Thus, there’s no way we could have been forced to think incorrectly, or have incorrect views about what is incorrect, when faced with self-evident truth. Secondly, claiming that deterministic minds cannot be certain of their own rationality is itself contradictory if we are, in fact, deterministic minds. In order for that argument to work, it must take for granted that which it attempts to prove: that we aren’t deterministic minds. Thirdly, this argument - in light of my earlier criticisms - at best establishes a paradox. I.e., we would be forced to conclude that we both do and do not possess free will. In order to resolve the paradox my opponent must defeat my earlier criticisms without appealing to the notion that denying the existence of free will is contradictory.

My opponent is correct – to Rand, everything has a cause. The problem he is having is that he is assuming that causality is caused by actions rather than by entities. It is not the reaction of two detached “motions” that causes billiard balls to move after colliding – it is the result of the two billiard balls colliding. Causality is a direct implication of the Law of Identity, and it is this law that allows causality to exist. In other words, it is the identities of things which cause things to happen. Identities are primary and causality does not make sense apart from them.

With this being so, there is no contradiction in supposing that, say, a rock being thrown through a window will always break it while a consciousness can be tasked with deciding between two alternatives – the window is broken because of the interaction of the identities of the rock and the window, and the consciousness is able to choose because the nature of consciousness is volitional. If consciousness is volitional, it can still be causal ­­- it is merely causal in the way that its nature requires, and the nature of the soul is to be able to choose what it will do and what its exact identity is. In this way, the soul can choose its cause, keeping intact causality because nothing is uncaused while supporting free will by means of the choice. The choice itself isn’t uncaused, either – it is caused by the nature of the soul. Everything does operate according to a fixed law – the law of identity – and this law demands that consciousness follows its identity and is volitional. There is no contradiction here.

Quoting Peikoff from Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand: The principle of causality does not apply to consciousness, however, in the same way that it applies to matter. In regard to matter, there is no issue of choice; to be caused is to be necessitated. In regard to the (higher-level)actions of a volitional consciousness, however, “to be caused” does not mean “to be necessitated”If the soul exists in the way Rand describes, it is what it is. Nothing you can describe about neural connections or anything else can dispute the fact that the sum of them creates an entity with volition.

My opponent asks, foolishly, the following question: “If volition cannot in any way contradict the structure of the brain from which it arises, and if the brain must behave according to its intrinsic causal nature as determined by its material configuration (which must be fixed, since A is A) then where’s the freedom?” The correct response is that it doesn’t matter that the parts of the mind are of a certain kind if, when combined, they produce an entity with an identity that has the characteristic of being volitional in nature. My opponent might as well ask “If a tapestry cannot in any way be different from the threads from which it arises, and if the individual threads must be of single colors according to their intrinsic colorful nature as determined by their material configuration (which must be fixed, since A is A) then where’s the rainbow pattern coming from?” It’s absurd to say that, since the individual parts of something don’t have quality x, the whole won’t either, and my opponent goes a step further by saying that even if the whole had quality x it would be somehow “contradicting” the parts!

The only reason why epistemology is applicable to humans at all is that we have the ability to choose between alternative means of attempting to gain knowledge. The most basic of these choices is whether to evade reality or to face it head-on. Without this choice, there is no basis for the field – if you are determined to follow certain methods or to think certain things, there is no grounds for the study of superlative methods. This is the force behind Rand’s argument – if epistemology is not applicable, then there is no way of pursuing truth, and, if this is so, there would be no way of validating any conclusions. If we cannot choose between evasion and the recognition of reality, then we have no way of knowing if we are right or wrong in our conclusions – we have no way of forming and proving accurate conceptions about anything, including determinism. Men are fallible if they choose to be and infallible if they choose to be. Determinism, however, destroys this choice and replaces it with solely a string of perceptual information and concepts formed from these percepts – there is nothing that guarantees infallibility over fallibility without the ability to choose between the two. In this way, free will is an axiom and any attempt to deny it refutes itself by means of undercutting any means to verify itself.

Dylan: “For every thought we have, we can be certain we were not forced to think otherwise. So when we follow a valid chain of reasoned thought, we can be sure we were not destined to be irrational. Valid thinking is self-evidently valid; we needn’t be infallible to argue that X=X, since it is true by definition. Thus, there’s no way we could have been forced to think incorrectly, or have incorrect views about what is incorrect, when faced with self-evident truth.”

The problem is that there is no way to validate that a truth is self-evident if you cannot choose to do so. If you hold that determinism is true, then you hold that you can hold that things are true, and to do so you have to either choose to validate statements or infallibly reach the conclusion via things outside of your control. If you do not have control of your mind, though, and your mind is fallible, then all attempts at thinking and justification are, by definition, fallible. If your justifications are fallible, then the justification for determinism is also fallible, and, if this is so, determinism is self-defeating since it provides no solid ground for its own validity. Even the self-evident truths you speak of will be subject to this fallibility since you have no choice over whether or not to recognize that they’re self-evident or not. No matter if it’s true by definition or not, you have no way of knowing that for certain unless you’re able to justify your beliefs, and you cannot do that if you are forced into a fallible framework like determinism.

Dylan: “Secondly, claiming that deterministic minds cannot be certain of their own rationality is itself contradictory if we are, in fact, deterministic minds. In order for that argument to work, it must take for granted that which it attempts to prove: that we aren’t deterministic minds“

My opponent claims that, in this respect, Objectivism begs the question. I suppose that Dylan thought this argument was very clever. However, it doesn’t work. It refutes itself because it does not hold the Law of Identity as a primary axiom. If arguments from the Law of Identity work, they work no matter what – by definition, there are no possible circumstances under which A is not A. Therefore, any argument from axioms cannot be refuted by potentials, since there are no potentials which make sense without first accepting that reasoning from axioms is correct. As such, if Rand’s arguments from axioms holds true, there is no possibility that we are deterministic minds. The supremacy of the Law of Identity trumps that possibility and rules it out at the very start, so that any attempt to use that possibility to refute the Law of Identity are cut short long before they can do any damage.

My opponent’s argument can be summed up as follows: “1 + 1 = 2, you say – but this assumes that 1 + 1 = 2! What if 1 + 1 = 3?!?­ Anyone who says that 1 + 1 = 2 is begging the question because it takes for granted that 1 + 1 isn’t 3, and, if 1 + 1 does = 3, then their positions fall apart.”

As you can see, the argument is useless, since it assumes that impossible things are possible and that they can have any bearing on what is logical.

Dylan: “Thirdly, this argument - in light of my earlier criticisms - at best establishes a paradox. I.e., we would be forced to conclude that we both do and do not possess free will. In order to resolve the paradox my opponent must defeat my earlier criticisms without appealing to the notion that denying the existence of free will is contradictory.”

I must do no such thing and my opponent offers no reason for me to believe that I do. Reason, considering my opponent is trying to use rationally-based arguments, is axiomatic – you cannot deny the Law of Identity. If this is so, paradoxes cannot exist, and, since it is the acceptance of determinism and not the acceptance of free will that causes the so-called paradox, determinism must be abandoned. Free will alone does not create a paradox – determinism does, since determinism, by its nature, conflicts with rationality via conflicting with epistemology via conflicting with free will. Reason, as already stated, is primary, so it cannot be discarded before or simultaneously with determinism, and, if determinism is thrown out first, no problems remain.

1. If consciousness is volitional, it can still be causal ­­- it is merely causal in the way that its nature requires, and the nature of the soul is to be able to choose what it will do and what its exact identity is. In this way, the soul can choose its cause, keeping intact causality because nothing is uncaused while supporting free will by means of the choice. The choice itself isn’t uncaused, either – it is caused by the nature of the soul. Everything does operate according to a fixed law – the law of identity – and this law demands that consciousness follows its identity and is volitional. There is no contradiction here.

My opponent contends that it is in the nature of the soul to be free. However, he has not provided a sensible mechanism by which a soul's identity could lend itself to many different behaviors. If everything behaves according to it intrinsic nature, then two identical brains would have to behave identically. If my opponent appeals to the free nature of the soul to explain the difference, then my opponent must explain how the soul (and its nature) are not emergent through the brain, since the soul could not meaningfully determine the behavior of the brain if it were itself determined by the brain. If two physically identical brains produce different results, then the physical world is inadequate to explain all physical phenomena, in which case it is unwarranted to claim that wishes and whims cannot affect the physical universe, as Rand so often asserts is the case. If two identical souls choose different paths, then what could have accounted for it? If nothing accounted for it, then there is no reason that one choose one path and the other choose a different path, in which case their choice was random, and free will is out the window. If something accounts for it, then the situations are not identical, in which case we are not talking about identical minds - and since our minds are identical to our minds, it would be irrelevant to our situation as conscious beings.

2. Quoting Peikoff from Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand: The principle of causality does not apply to consciousness, however, in the same way that it applies to matter. In regard to matter, there is no issue of choice; to be caused is to be necessitated. In regard to the (higher-level)actions of a volitional consciousness, however, “to be caused” does not mean “to be necessitated” If the soul exists in the way Rand describes, it is what it is. Nothing you can describe about neural connections or anything else can dispute the fact that the sum of them creates an entity with volition.

This provision is unjustifiable, given that according to Rand, consciousness is the product of the brain, which is made of matter. An awareness that does not have to answer to the deterministic nature of its brain is a ghost, which, in keeping with its view of the relation between mind and matter, Objectivism would have to reject.

3. My opponent asks, foolishly, the following question: “If volition cannot in any way contradict the structure of the brain from which it arises, and if the brain must behave according to its intrinsic causal nature as determined by its material configuration (which must be fixed, since A is A) then where’s the freedom?” The correct response is that it doesn’t matter that the parts of the mind are of a certain kind if, when combined, they produce an entity with an identity that has the characteristic of being volitional in nature.

It’s not only the parts that are deterministic. Their interaction and configuration are regulated and determined by physical laws over which humans have no control. If the overall nature of an entity cannot contradict its individual parts, and if the parts are entirely deterministic, then obviously a volitional being is restricted to only those behaviors which are consistent with the deterministic parts in question.

4. My opponent might as well ask “If a tapestry cannot in any way be different from the threads from which it arises, and if the individual threads must be of single colors according to their intrinsic colorful nature as determined by their material configuration (which must be fixed, since A is A) then where’s the rainbow pattern coming from?” It’s absurd to say that, since the individual parts of something don’t have quality x, the whole won’t either, and my opponent goes a step further by saying that even if the whole had quality x it would be somehow “contradicting” the parts!

That’s not analogous to my criticism. A correct analogy would sound like: if a tapestry cannot in any way contradict its individual parts, and if all the parts are of a different color, then how could the whole tapestry be of one color?

5. If we cannot choose between evasion and the recognition of reality, then we have no way of knowing if we are right or wrong in our conclusions – we have no way of forming and proving accurate conceptions about anything, including determinism. Men are fallible if they choose to be and infallible if they choose to be. Determinism, however, destroys this choice and replaces it with solely a string of perceptual information and concepts formed from these percepts – there is nothing that guarantees infallibility over fallibility without the ability to choose between the two.

This amounts to the assertion that all errors of cognition are consciously chosen i.e., that a person with false beliefs must know that they are evading reality. That’s obviously ridiculous. People make honest mistakes all the time - according to Bossy, I must be consciously aware that my position is false. I know no such thing, and I consider it rude of him to even suggest it. Infallibility is not necessary for certainty. We can be wrong, but not about things that are true by definition - things which help to define "wrong" in the first place. If determinism is true, then we are constantly uncovering what nature has in store for us. When we can logically justify our beliefs, we don't have to worry about being forced to think incorrectly, since obviously nature did not intend us to. Even if we are deterministic minds, we can be certain about our thinking when we use truth as our standard - logic is defined as the set of rules which preserve the fact that truth is true. I argue that truth contains within itself the rule for its justification; properly, logic is totally self-contained. My opponent claims “If we cannot choose between evasion and the recognition of reality, then we have no way of knowing if we are right or wrong in our conclusions.” Since logic is self-evident, there is no way that we could be wrong about it, because it describes the standard for judging truth by definition. If someone thinks they know self-evident truth, but it turns out that they are wrong, then they were more or less obviously not justified in believing it - and that fact was implicit in their belief.

According to this view, there can be no such thing as an honest conceptual error; everything is either deliberate evasion or a valid recognition of reality.

6. The problem is that there is no way to validate that a truth is self-evident if you cannot choose to do so. If you hold that determinism is true, then you hold that you can hold that things are true, and to do so you have to either choose to validate statements or infallibly reach the conclusion via things outside of your control. If you do not have control of your mind, though, and your mind is fallible, then all attempts at thinking and justification are, by definition, fallible. If your justifications are fallible, then the justification for determinism is also fallible, and, if this is so, determinism is self-defeating since it provides no solid ground for its own validity. Even the self-evident truths you speak of will be subject to this fallibility since you have no choice over whether or not to recognize that they’re self-evident or not. No matter if it’s true by definition or not, you have no way of knowing that for certain unless you’re able to justify your beliefs, and you cannot do that if you are forced into a fallible framework like determinism.

Self-evident truth is self-evidently self-evident. If determinism is true, ultimately we don’t have control over whether we come up with self-evident truth. However, when we do come up with self-evident truth, all else is irrelevant; the truth of the proposition is given by its definition, and we are faced with a proposition which, if denied, would lead to contradictions.

7. My opponent claims that, in this respect, Objectivism begs the question. I suppose that Dylan thought this argument was very clever. However, it doesn’t work. It refutes itself because it does not hold the Law of Identity as a primary axiom. If arguments from the Law of Identity work, they work no matter what – by definition, there are no possible circumstances under which A is not A. Therefore, any argument from axioms cannot be refuted by potentials, since there are no potentials which make sense without first accepting that reasoning from axioms is correct. As such, if Rand’s arguments from axioms holds true, there is no possibility that we are deterministic minds. The supremacy of the Law of Identity trumps that possibility and rules it out at the very start, so that any attempt to use that possibility to refute the Law of Identity are cut short long before they can do any damage.

The argument is only justifiably circular if it is logically impossible that we are deterministic minds. In that case, no argumentation from bossy is needed, and my opponent might as well keep his mouth shut for the remainder of the debate. There's no sense in providing arguments if deep down inside everyone know's he's right, but wants to evade reality. How can it be logically impossible for a consciousness to be aware of a fixed train of thought? If we attempted to construct such an awareness, would we be magically prevented from doing so? That seems silly to me.

My opponent says that I have “not provided a sensible mechanism by which a soul’s identity could lend itself to many different behaviors.” I do not recognize that I have to provide a “mechanism” by which the soul has the identity it has any more than I would have to provide a “mechanism” by which a tree is a tree or by which an atom is an atom. I have shown that the free soul is, and nothing else is relevant. If it is necessarily true that free will exists, my opponent’s claims that such free will cannot arise from physical matter are baseless (and, in fact, he has merely asserted that the physical brain cannot produce a free soul – he has not backed this up with anything).

“If two physically identical brains produce different results, then the physical world is inadequate to explain all physical phenomena”

This statement is blatantly false – if it is the physical nature of an entity to choose its own cause, then its doing so is explained directly by its nature. There is not any more contradiction here than there is in saying that “if a tree sways in the wind, then the physical world is inadequate to explain all physical phenomena”. The tree sways because of the nature of the tree, and the soul chooses because of the nature of the soul. Each is explained by its own qualities, and, if these qualities do exist, there can be no argument that they are “unexplainable” – they are, and that is all that matters.

My opponent continuously implies that a free soul somehow “goes against” a deterministic brain, but he does not recognize that, if the result of deterministic processes is an entity capable of volition, then the result not being free would be the true contradiction. He accepts as a given that free will cannot arise from deterministic entities for no real reason and ignores the fact that free will must exist (and, by extension, his stance must be baseless), and yet he continues to argue his position as if it has any validity.

He says things like “[i]f the overall nature of an entity cannot contradict its individual parts, and if the parts are entirely deterministic, then obviously a volitional being is restricted to only those behaviors which are consistent with the deterministic parts in question”, which, while perfectly agreeable at face value, imply that free will is not “consistent with the deterministic parts in question”. He offers nothing in defence of these assertions other that it is “obviously” the case.

If it is the nature of matter to, when configured in a certain way, produce a volitional entity, there is no grounds for calling such an entity “inconsistent”. It is, by definition, the only thing that can be consistent with reality, considering that it is the result of those deterministic processes.

My opponent attacks my tapestry analogy – his changes, though, don’t make a difference. If the colors of the individual threads, when combined, produce one singular color, then there is no contradiction. I do not have to explain why, just that it is the case. My opponent’s entire argument just assumes that such a result “isn’t possible”, which is directly contradicted by the axiomatic nature of free will.

“People make honest mistakes all the time - according to Bossy, I must be consciously aware that my position is false. I know no such thing, and I consider it rude of him to even suggest it.”

You may not know that this particular position is false, but you chose (and you know that you chose) to evade reality at some point leading to its acceptance. That is the primary choice – to evade or not – and it is just that – a choice.

Validation requires the choice to validate – without such a choice, there is no basis for belief. If one chooses to validate a belief, if one does not equivocate, he, by definition, must validate said belief. There is nothing fallible in this process for, if there was an error, it would be a different process entirely (a process not of validation but of evasion) and could not be called by the same name. This entirely applies to self-evident truths – how can you validate that they are self-evident if you cannot choose to do so? My opponent surely wouldn’t say that it’s impossible to be wrong about a statement such as “2 + 2 = 4” – for instance, look at the case of the young child first learning math who subtracts instead of adds. If nature makes him believe that it is “self-evident” that 2 + 2 = 0, he has no way to know that his position is false. Yes, he was not justified in holding his belief since it was truly not a self-evident proposition. However, he had no way of knowing that. To him, it was as valid as things could be, yet he still was wrong because he was unable to avoid evasion. He was completely at the whim of nature and cannot know anything for certain, as the very process necessary for knowledge is not for him to pursue. Knowledge of even self-evident knowledge requires the choice to validate such knowledge, and determinism does not offer this choice.

“According to this view, there can be no such thing as an honest conceptual error; everything is either deliberate evasion or a valid recognition of reality.”

“Self-evident truth is self-evidently self-evident. If determinism is true, ultimately we don’t have control over whether we come up with self-evident truth. However, when we do come up with self-evident truth, all else is irrelevant; the truth of the proposition is given by its definition, and we are faced with a proposition which, if denied, would lead to contradictions.”

And what if you were just determined to think this? What if contradictions can exist but you’re hardwired to believe that they cannot? How can you justify any beliefs, even those necessary for belief in general? You cannot without free will, and this is the downfall of determinism.

“The argument is only justifiably circular if it is logically impossible that we are deterministic minds. In that case, no argumentation from bossy is needed, and my opponent might as well keep his mouth shut for the remainder of the debate.”

I agree – it is logically impossible that we are deterministic minds, and I thank my opponent for pointing out the point of my entire case. I proved my case by choosing to write the first word. Leaving it at that isn’t any fun, though, which is the only reason that I continue to debate the topic.

“How can it be logically impossible for a consciousness to be aware of a fixed train of thought? If we attempted to construct such an awareness, would we be magically prevented from doing so? That seems silly to me.”

If the consciousness was “aware” in the sense my opponent is describing, this does not solve the problem – for for it to be aware of the fixed train of thought, it would have to have a train of thought which governed it being aware, and if it were aware of this train of thought another would be necessary, and so on to infinity. It is obviously absurd that such an entity would both exist and be able to validate its thoughts.

My argument for free will being axiomatic stands, and, as such, my opponents arguments necessarily fall. He will need to show that free will is not axiomatic, else he will be logically unable to fulfill his BOP even to the slightest degree.