This chapter analyses the effects on economic growth of the basic characteristics of scientific research
such as its organization, its reward structure and the social interactions
among researchers. It is assumed that a scientist, according to the priority
rule, is rewarded not for his effort, but for his achievement. In this sense the
race for priority can be compared to the patent race where the winner takes
all and the outcome is uncertain. The productivity of researchers depends not
Introduction xxi
only on personal effort but also on the effort of other researchers with whom
a researcher interacts. Finally, academic research is chiefly financed by the
state due to the public good nature of academic knowledge. The chapter
shows that the social interactions between scientists may have an ambiguous
effect on effort in the research activity carried out by a single scientist: it may
be positive when group size is not too large and it may become negative
beyond a critical size. Moreover, an increase in the fixed component of the
salary reduces the possibility of the emergence of a no growth trap, where no
research activity occurs, but it reduces the effort of a single individual in the
research activity; the opposite effect emerges when the priority-based reward
is increased. The reward of prestige always has a positive effect on effort and
the probability of success.

This chapter analyses the effects on economic growth of the basic characteristics of scientific research
such as its organization, its reward structure and the social interactions
among researchers. It is assumed that a scientist, according to the priority
rule, is rewarded not for his effort, but for his achievement. In this sense the
race for priority can be compared to the patent race where the winner takes
all and the outcome is uncertain. The productivity of researchers depends not
Introduction xxi
only on personal effort but also on the effort of other researchers with whom
a researcher interacts. Finally, academic research is chiefly financed by the
state due to the public good nature of academic knowledge. The chapter
shows that the social interactions between scientists may have an ambiguous
effect on effort in the research activity carried out by a single scientist: it may
be positive when group size is not too large and it may become negative
beyond a critical size. Moreover, an increase in the fixed component of the
salary reduces the possibility of the emergence of a no growth trap, where no
research activity occurs, but it reduces the effort of a single individual in the
research activity; the opposite effect emerges when the priority-based reward
is increased. The reward of prestige always has a positive effect on effort and
the probability of success.