At the outbreak of the war our operations in the Atlantic Oceanconsisted chiefly of escorting convoys to Great Britain,
and to Russianand Near East ports (also West Indian
and South American ports) and oftraining. Concurrently,
with these operations, it was necessary todispose
the heavy units of our Atlantic Fleet so that they would beavailable immediately in case ships of the German Fleet, basing atvarious ports in Germany, Norway, and France, attacked
our shipping.From time to time, in order to maintain
a satisfactory distribution ofAllied strength, as
insurance against such a breakout by units of theGerman
Navy, certain of our ships operated with the British Fleet.

By agreement with the British, emphasized at the Casablanca conferenceand at each subsequent conference, the maintenance of the
war-makingcapacity of the British Isles has been a
continuing commitment of theUnited States. Obviously,
such a commitment requires, as a prerequisiteto the
furnishing of the necessary support the maintenance of overseaslines of communication, so that the safe passage of lend leaseshipments, supplies to our own forces, and troop convoys
can beaccomplished.

The responsibility for those naval operations required to keep open notonly those lines of communications, but, as well, all lines
ofcommunications in the Atlantic Ocean, has rested
with Admiral R. E.Ingersoll, the Commander in Chief
of the Atlantic Fleet. Faced with thethreat of the
u-boat fleet (the methods taken to combat and overcomethat
menace are covered elsewhere in this report) and with thepossibility of attack by other enemy units, escort of convoy operationswas of paramount importance.

Early in the war the attempts of the enemy to interrupt our lines ofcommunications, while not successful, nevertheless were
a matter ofconsiderable concern. By judicious use
of escorts, however, and by othermeans, our convoys
continued to go through. The magnitude of thoseescort
operations, which have been continuous, is not likely to beoverestimated, as we have expended tremendous effort in providing
theships and training them, and in the execution of
their duties. Therecord of safe overseas transportation
of troops and material speaks foritself, in so far
as the efficiency of those operations is concerned.

Direct support of units of the British Fleet in any operation requiringcombined effort has been another Atlantic Fleet activity
calling forcareful planning and execution.

In addition, Admiral Ingersoll has had the responsibility for thedefense of the Western Hemisphere by our naval forces.
That has involvedthe stationing of air and surface
forces at various points in North andSouth America
and in certain islands in the Atlantic Ocean, and, ofcourse,
such changes in their disposition as might be warranted by thesituation. The South Atlantic Force, under the command of Vice Admiral(now Admiral) J. H. Ingram, whose headquarters are in Brazil,
hasoperated in harmony and close combination with
forces of the BrazilianNavy in contributing to our
control of the South Atlantic.

In order to facilitate the passage of convoys to Russia and GreatBritain, and in order to provide a base for our heavy surface
forces,considerable use has been made of Iceland,
where we originallyestablished a base for forces engaged
in escorting lend-lease convoys.All of the bases acquired
from Great Britain in exchange for the 50destroyers
have been in constant use, and of great value.

Except for antisubmarine actions and for occasional aircraft attacks,units of the Atlantic Fleet have not been in any extensive
combat in theAtlantic Ocean. As covering and supporting
forces, however, they haveaccompanied our expeditions
which landed in North Africa, and later inSicily and
Italy, and in the case of the landings in North Africa, therewere some engagements in the Atlantic Ocean. The details of thoseexpeditions are covered separately in this report.

For the purpose of training the large number of newly commissioned shipson the east coast, which report to the Commander in Chief,
United StatesAtlantic Fleet as soon as they are completed,
a training command, underRear Admiral D. B. Beary,
was established as a part of the AtlanticFleet. That
command took over all ships (except submarines) as soon asthey were ready for sea, and conducted such operational training
as wasnecessary to fit each ship for duty in the fleet
to which assigned. Inaddition to that type of operational
training, the Commander in Chief,United States Atlantic
Fleet was charged with extensive amphibioustraining.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the Commander in Chief, UnitedStates Atlantic Fleet has had a wide variety of responsibilities
whichhave been contributory to the success of the
multiplicity of operations,some of which were carried
out by the Atlantic Fleet and some by otherfleets.
Because of the situation, there has been a continuous shift inthe strength and disposition of the Atlantic Fleet, in which connectionits flexibility and the manner in which adjustments and
readjustmentswere made have been of tremendous assistance
to the Navy as a whole.

THE ATLANTIC SUBMARINE WAR

The submarine war-particularly the Atlantic phase of it-has been amatter of primary concern since the outbreak of hostilities.
Maintenanceof the flow of ocean traffic has been,
and continues to be, a vitalelement of all war plans.

Operating on exterior lines of communication on almost every front, theUnited Nations have been dependent largely upon maritime
transportation.The success of overseas operations,
landing attacks, the maintenance oftroops abroad and
the delivery of war materials to Russia and otherAllies
concerned primarily with land operations has depended to a largeextent upon the availability of shipping and the ability to keep
itmoving. Shipping potentialities have been the major
factor-often thecontrolling factor-in most of the
problems with which the Allied HighCommand has had
to deal.

The principal menace to shipping has been the large fleet of submarinesmaintained by Germany. Our enemies have employed the submarine
on aworld-wide scale, but the area of greatest intensity
has always been theAtlantic Ocean where the bulk of
German U-Boats have operated.

The German U-boat campaign is a logical extension of the submarinestrategy of World War I which almost succeeded in starving
Great Britaininto submission. Unable to build up a
powerful surface fleet inpreparation for World War
II, Germany planned to repeat her submarinecampaign
on a greater scale and to this end produced a U-boat fleet ofhuge size. The primary mission of this underwater navy was to cut
thesea routes to the British Isles, and the enemy
undersea forces went towork on this task promptly
and vigorously.

The United States became involved in the matter before we were formallyat war, because our vessels were being sunk in the trans-Atlantictraffic routes. Consequently, in 1941, we took measures
to assist theRoyal Navy to protect our shipping. As
stated in more detail elsewherein this report these
measures included the transfer of 50 old destroyersto
the British, and-in the latter part of 1941-the assignment of our ownnaval vessels to escort our merchant shipping on threatened
trans-Atlantic routes.

The submarine situation was improving as 1941 drew toward a close.Escort operations on threatened convoy routes were becoming
more andmore effective. British aviation had become
a potent factor, by directaction against the U-Boats,
and also by bringing under control theGerman over-water
air effort that had augmented the submarine offensive.Our
resources were stretched, however, and we could not, for a time,deal effectively with the change in the situation brought about by
ourentry into the war on 7 December 1941. Our whole
merchant marine thenbecame a legitimate target, and
the U-Boats, still maintaining fullpressure on the
trans-Atlantic routes had sufficient numbers to spreadtheir
depredations into wide areas hitherto immune. Our difficulty wasthat such part of the Atlantic Fleet as was not already engaged inescort duty was called upon to protect the troop movements
that beganwith our entry into the war, leaving no
adequate force to cover the manymaritime traffic areas
newly exposed to possible U-boat activity.The Germans
were none too quick in taking advantage of theiropportunity.

It was not until more than a month after the declaration of war that
U-Boats began to expand their areas of operation. The first move took theform of an incursion into our coastal waters in January
1942. We hadprepared for this by gathering on our
eastern seaboard our scantresources in coastal antisubmarine
vessels and aircraft consistingchiefly of a number
of yachts and miscellaneous small craft taken overby
the Navy in 1940 and 1941. To reinforce this group the Navyaccelerated its program of acquiring such fishing boats and pleasurecraft as could be used and supplied them with such armaments
as theycould carry. For patrol purposes we employed
all available aircraft-Armyas well as Navy. The help
of the Civil Air Patrol was gratefullyaccepted. This
heterogeneous force was useful in keeping lookout and inrescuing
survivors of sunken ships. It may have interfered, too, to someextent with the freedom of U-boat movement, but the heavy losses
wesuffered in coastal waters during the early months
of 1942 gave abundantproof of the already well known
fact that stout hearts in little boatscan not handle
an opponent as tough as the submarine.

The Navy was deeply grateful for the assistance so eagerly volunteeredby the men who courageously risked their lives in order
to make the bestof available means, but there had
to be better means, and to providethem no effort was
spared to build up an antisubmarine force of adequatetypes.
Submarine chasers, construction of which had been initiatedbefore the war, began to come into service early in 1942. The Britishand Canadian Navies were able to assign some antisubmarine
vessels towork with our coastal forces. Ocean escorts
were robbed to reinforcecoastal areas. These measures
made it possible to establish a coastalconvoy system
in the middle of May 1942. Antisubmarine aviation hadconcurrently
improved in quality and material and training of personnel.The Army Air Force had volunteered the services of the First BomberCommand which was especially trained and outfitted for
anti-submarinewarfare.

The effect of these measures was quickly felt in the Eastern SeaFrontier (the coastal waters from Canada to Jacksonville)
where theywere first applied. With the establishment
of the initial coastal convoy(under the command of
Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, Commander of theEastern
Sea Frontier) in the middle of May 1942, sinkings in the vitaltraffic lanes of the Eastern Sea Frontier dropped off nearly to zero
andhave so remained. While it has not been possible
to clear those routescompletely-there is evidence
that nearly always one or more U-Boatshaunt our Atlantic
Coast-submarines in that area long ago ceased to be aserious
problem.

When the Eastern Sea Frontier became "too hot," the U-Boats
began tospread farther afield. The coastal convoy
system was extended as rapidlyas possible to meet
them in the Gulf of Mexico (under the command ofRear
Admiral J. L. Kauffman, Commander Gulf Sea Frontier), the CaribbeanSea, (under the command of Vice Admiral J. H. Hoover, CommanderCaribbean Sea Frontier), and along the Atlantic Coast of
South America.The undersea craft made a last bitter
stand in the Trinidad area in thefall of 1942. Since
then coastal waters have been relatively safe.

The problem was more difficult to meet in the open sea. The submarinechasers that do well enough in coastal waters are too small
for oceanescort duty. Destroyers and other ocean escort
types could not beproduced as rapidly as the smaller
craft. Aircraft capable of longoverseas patrol were
not plentiful, nor were aircraft carriers.

In consequence, protection of ocean shipping lagged to some extent. Bythe end of 942 however, this matter began to come under
control, as ourforces slowly increased, and there
has been a steady improvement eversince.

The Atlantic antisubmarine campaign has been a closely integratedinternational operation. In the early phases of our participation,
therewas a considerable mixture of forces, as the
needs of the situation weremet as best they could
be. For a time some British and Canadian vesselsoperated
in our coastal escorts, while our destroyers were brigaded withBritish groups in the Atlantic and even occasionally as far afield
asnorth Russian waters. As Allied strength improved
in power and balance,it became possible to establish
certain areas of national responsibilitywherein the
forces are predominantly of one nation. This simplifies theproblem of administration and operation, but there still are-andprobably always will be-some areas where forces of two
or more nationswork together in a single command,
and always there is closecoordination in deploying
the forces of the several Allies.

There is a constant interchange of information between the largeorganizations maintained in the Admiralty and in the United
States FleetHeadquarters (in the form of the Tenth
Fleet which coordinates UnitedStates anti-u-boat activities
in the Atlantic) to deal with the problemsof control
and protection of shipping. These organizations, also, keepin intimate touch with the War Shipping Administration in the UnitedStates and with the corresponding agency in Great Britain.

Command of antisubmarine forces-air and surface-that protect shipping
inthe coastwise sea lanes of the United States and
within the CaribbeanSea and Gulf of Mexico is exercised
by sea frontier commanders, eachassigned to a prescribed
area. The command is naval except in the Panamaarea
where the naval sea frontier commander is under the CommandingGeneral at Panama.

Since aircraft and surface combatant ships are most effective whenworking as a closely knit team, it is the policy-in antisubmarine
aswell as other naval operations-to weld together
air and surface forcesin a single command in each
area.

In the Atlantic Ocean, beyond the coastal area, antisubmarine forces-airand surface-are part of the Atlantic Fleet under the command
of AdmiralIngersoll. One of the units of Admiral Ingersoll's
fleet is the SouthAtlantic Force (Vice Admiral Ingram
commanding) which guards shipping inthe coastal waters
south of the Equator and throughout the United Statesarea
of the South Atlantic. Vice Admiral Ingrams command includeshighly efficient surface and air units of Brazil, which country haswholeheartedly joined our team of submarine hunters. This
team,incidentally turns its guns on surface raiders
and other bigger gamewhen the enemy provides the opportunity.

It is appropriate to express here appreciation of the services ofNetherlands antisubmarine vessels which have operated with
exemplaryefficiency as part of the United States Naval
Caribbean Force ever sincewe entered the war.

Antisubmarine warfare is primarily a naval function, but, in accordancewith the general policy of working together, Army and Navy
forces thatare available, turn to together on the
enemy when need arises. Thus ithappens that there
are instances in which Army aircraft join in thesubmarine
hunt. The assistance of the Army Air Force has been of greatvalue, particularly in the early phases of the war, when naval resources
were inadequate. An example of this is theformation
of the Army Air Force Anti-Submarine Command in the spring of1942, which was given the equipment and training necessary to make
itsmembers antisubmarine specialists. It operated,
under the command ofBrigadier General (now Major General)
T. W. Larson, in the United Statesand abroad until
last November, when the Navy obtained enough equipmentto
take over the tasks so well performed by this command.

It is regretted that it is not possible at this time to go into thedetails of our antisubmarine operations in this report.
It would be agreat pleasure to recount the many praiseworthy
exploits of ourantisubmarine forces, but to do so
now would jeopardize the success offuture operations.
The U-boat war has been a war of wits. The submarineis
a weapon of stealth, and naturally enough the German operations havebeen shrouded in secrecy. It has been of equal importance
to keep ourcounter measures from becoming known to
the enemy. There is a constantinterplay of new devices
and new tactics on the part of forces workingagainst
the submarines as well as on the part of the submarinesthemselves,
and an important element of our success has been the abilityto keep the enemy from knowing what we are doing and what we are
likelyto do in the future. It is, also, of the utmost
importance to keep ourenemies from learning our antisubmarine
technique, lest they turn it totheir own advantage
in operations against our submarines.

Submarines have not been driven from the seas, but they have changedstatus from menace to problem.

The Mediterranean Theater

LANDINGS IN NORTH AFRICA

In July 1942, after several months of discussions and study by theCombined Chiefs of Staff, it was decided to effect landings
in force inNorth Africa and there establish our troops
in opposition to the Germanforces. The strategic significance
of that move since has becomeapparent, in that the
troops which were transported and landed in NorthAfrica
subsequently moved through Sicily to Italy, and there engagedenemy land forces.

The invasion of North Africa was a complicated operation. In the firstplace, in view of the uncertainty of the relationships
existing betweenthe French forces in that area and
the Vichy government, the politicalsituation in North
Africa required the most careful and diplomatichandling.
Obviously it was to our advantage to effect unopposedlandings,
and the problem therefore was to persuade the French forcesnot to resist. We could not afford, however, to take any chances
inrevealing our own plans, and the dealings with the
French authoritieshad to be undertaken with utmost
discretion. As it turned out, theFrench forces resisted
initially, but within a few days agreed to anarmistice.

In addition to the foregoing difficulty, it was agreed that the forcesparticipating in the operations would consist of British
and Americanunits. Furthermore, the nature of the
operations was such that theAmerican units had to
be both Army and Navy. Command relationships wereworked
out accordingly, and Lieutenant General (now General of the Army)D. D. Eisenhower, USA, was appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied
force. His principal naval subordinate was AdmiralSir
Andrew

The plan agreed upon called for three points of attack: Oran andAlgiers, both Algerian seaports on the Mediterranean, and
Casablanca onthe Atlantic coast of French Morocco.
The attack forces assigned toeffect landings at Oran
and Algiers consisted of United States Army troops supported by British
naval units(with a few exceptions). The Casablanca
attack force was composedentirely of United States
forces. This report deals chiefly with thepart played
by United States naval forces in the operation.

Rear Admiral (now Admiral) H. K. Hewitt, who was placed in command ofthe United States naval forces designated to support the
Casablancaattack [Major General (later General) George
S. Patton (now deceased)commanded the Army troops
in this attack] left the United States on 24October
and the movement overseas proceeded without untoward incident.On 7 November the forces separated and the three attack groups, thecovering force (under the command of Rear Admiral Giffen)
and the airgroups proceeded independently to their
assigned positions for thelanding attacks.

Operations in French Morocco

Operations in French Morocco were conducted by United States forcesunder the unified command of Rear Admiral Hewitt until
General Patton'sheadquarters were established on shore
and he was ready to assumecommand. The plan called
for a main landing at Fedala, 14 miles north ofCasablanca,
and secondary landings at Port Lyautey, 65 miles north ofCasablanca, and Safi, 125 miles south of Casablanca. The object of
themain landing was to capture Casablanca from the
land side. The principalobjective at Port Lyautey
was the airfield nearby, and the objective ofSafi
was to capture the port by direct assault and then to assist in thereduction of Casablanca.

Early in the morning of 8 November, shortly after our troops had beenlanded, shore batteries opened fire on the naval forces
supporting thelandings at Fedala. These shore batteries
were engaged at intervalsduring that morning by AUGUSTA,
BROOKLYN, and accompanying destroyers.Early in the
afternoon the shore batteries on Point Fedala werecaptured.

Several naval actions took place between Fedala and Casablanca on 8November. Shortly after daylight, eight submarines left
Casablanca.Three others were sunk at their moorings.
Early in the forenoon, twoFrench destroyer-leaders
and five destroyers sortied and stood towardFedala.
They were taken under fire and forced to retire. Shortlyafterward
the French light cruiser PRIMAGUET sortied and joined theFrench destroyers outside the harbor. The group, which stood towardFedala, was promptly engaged by AUGUSTA and BROOKLYN, and
vessels of thecovering force. With the exception of
one transport, which managed toget back to the harbor,
all French ships were either sunk or beached.Meanwhile,
the covering force, consisting of MASSACHUSETTS, WICHITA,TUSCALOOSA, and four destroyers, exchanged fire with the shore batteriesat El Hank, and the French battleship JEAN BART, which
was moored in theharbor, and with the French forces
that had sortied from Casablanca.

Another action took place on 10 November. Late in the forenoon the enemyvessels took up a position outside of the harbor at Casablanca
andopened fire on our troops ashore, whereupon AUGUSTA
and four destroyersstood toward Casablanca and engaged
the two enemy vessels. While in thatposition, AUGUSTA
was fired upon by JEAN BART. AUGUSTA and accompanyingdestroyers
immediately retired. Sometime between 8 November and 10 November JEAN BART
was sunk at hermoorings, but the water was shallow
and she was able to continue tofire.

Thanks to the elimination of the French forces at Casablanca thelandings at Fedala were successfully completed, but the
aftermath wascostly. On 11 November the transport
JOSEPH HEWES, the oiler WINOOSKIand the destroyer
HAMBLETON were torpedoed. The HEWES sank in an hour,and
the other two ships were later taken to Casablanca for repairs. On12 November the transports HUGH L. SCOTT and EDWARD RUTLEDGE
weretorpedoed and immediately caught fire and burned.
All these attacks wereassumed to be from Axis submarines.

The attack on Safi was made principally by two destroyers, BERNADOU andCOLE, which were supported by gunfire from a covering group
under thecommand of Rear Admiral L. A. Davidson, consisting
of the battleship NEWYORK, the cruiser PHILADELPHIA
and the destroyer MERVINE, BERNADOU,carrying Army
troops, and MERVINE, with naval personnel, made a daringentry
into the harbor early in the morning of the 8th, and there landedtheir troops without serious difficulty.

The landings at Port Lyautey were made with comparatively littledifficulty. Stiff resistance was later encountered south
of the mouth ofthe Oued Sebou River, and shore batteries
were not silenced until 9November. Ships furnishing
naval gunfire and naval aircraft supportincluded TEXAS,
SAVANNAH, and a number of destroyers under the commandof
Rear Admiral Monroe Kelly.

The Oran Operation

The naval support for the landings at Oran was furnished by the Britishnaval forces. In order to facilitate the capture of Oran,
however, itwas decided to seize the harbor of Arzeu,
about 25 miles east of Oran,and by a daring and well
executed assault, a small raiding party, underCaptain
Walter Ansel, captured the harbor early in the morning of 8November.

Also assigned to assist British naval forces was a small United Statesnaval unit commanded by Lieutenant Commander (now Captain)
George D.Dickey. This unit, together with army units,
was embarked in two Britishships, HMS WALNEY and HARTLAND
both of which were formerly United StatesCoast Guard
cutters. Upon entering the harbor early in the morning of 8November, both ships were discovered and sunk.

The Algiers Operation

Included in the naval task force assigned to assist in the Algierslandings was a division of four American transports. These
vessels hadproceeded from Great Britain in time to
arrive on the Algerian coastsimultaneously with the
forces arriving on the Moroccan coast from theUnited
States. Late in the afternoon of 7 November the transport THOMASSTONE was torpedoed. Her troops thereupon were put in landing boatsabout 160 miles from Algiers. After a hazardous trip, during
which anumber Of the landing craft were lost, they
succeeded in reaching theAlgerian coast, but by that
time hostilities had ceased.

The transport LEEDSTOWN was attacked by German aircraft on the eveningof 8 November and again on the following afternoon, and
was sunk bytorpedoes. The loss of personnel was light.

With the successful negotiation of the armistice on 11 November,resistance from the French forces ceased, and in so far
as the immediateparticipation of United States naval
forces was concerned, the operationended. Meanwhile,
however, a naval unit on the east coast of FrenchMorocco
was established as a Sea Frontier under the command of RearAdmiral John L. Hall, Jr., and a Naval Operating Base at Oran, under
thecommand of Rear Admiral A. C. Bennett, was also
established.

The United States naval forces participating in these operations weretaken from the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

LANDINGS IN SICILY

By May 1943, German forces had been driven from Tunisia, and by thattime our fighting strength was such that we were able to
make definiteplans for a major offensive move against
the enemy in his own territory.Sicily was selected
as the immediate objective, and an amphibiousoperation
on the largest scale yet undertaken was planned. Generallyspeaking, one part of the operation was to be a ship-to-shore movementin which our troops were to be taken to the scene of the
landing intransports and there embarked for the actual
landing in small boats. Thesecond part was a shore-to-shore
movement, the troops being transporteddirectly to
the landing beaches from the point of embarkation.

Like the North African operation, the landings in Sicily were to becombined British and American. General Eisenhower was given
command ofthe expeditionary force and Admiral Cunningham
was given command of allnaval forces participating.
Under these officers were three task forces,one of
which was (with the usual provisions for change-over in command)under the command of Vice Admiral Hewitt, and Lieutenant General
Patton.Army air forces were under the command of Brigadier
General (nowGeneral) Carl Spaatz. Under the plan agreed
upon, landings were to bemade at five places on the
island of Sicily. Three of those objectives,namely
Scoglitti, Gela, and Licata, on the south coast of Sicily, wereto be attacked by the American task force.

This report concerns itself primarily with the activities of theAmerican naval forces in the operation.

In anticipation of the operation, transports, cruisers and destroyerswere assembled at Oran and Algiers. Various types of landing
craft wereassembled at Tunis and Bizerte. There were
some exceptions to thatarrangement. On 5 July the
largest ships of the Scoglitti force leftOran and
on the following day they were joined by the ships of the Gelaforce from Algiers. As the force passed Tunis and Bizerte they werejoined by the small craft.

Scoglitti

The landing at Scoglitti, early in the morning of July 10, which waspreceded by bombardment of shore batteries and beach positions
by ournaval units, was accomplished with comparatively
little opposition, as the Italian troopsabandoned
their positions at the first attack. Landings at Scoglittiwere both ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore operations, and by earlyforenoon all troops were on the beach.

Gela

The landings at Gela were more of a shore-to-shore undertaking thanthose at Scoglitti. Troops landed on schedule, and the
first waveencountered slight opposition, but the second
wave met stiff resistanceand suffered heavy casualties
until the shore batteries were silenced bythe naval
gunfire from the light cruisers SAVANNAH and BOISE.

Licata

The landing at Licata was almost entirely a shore-to-shore operation,practically all troops being transported in small craft.
Aftercomparatively heavy opposition was encountered,
all beaches werecaptured by early forenoon and the
unloading of supplies begun. We lostthe destroyer
MADDOX and the minesweeper SENTINEL in the operation, bothbeing sunk by bombs.

After the Licata landing had been accomplished, the participating forceswere subjected to intense enemy air attack which lasted
three days.During that three-day period, also, the
enemy launched a counterattackwith tanks, which took
up a position from which they could fire on thebeaches
and at the ships standing by. When this tank attack developed,our cruisers and destroyers moved inshore and opened fire on them,pending the establishment of anti-tank fire on the beach.
So effectivewas naval gunfire on this occasion that
the tanks were successfullyrepulsed at a most opportune
time. Had there been no naval gunfiresupport, or had
it been less effective, our landing force in allprobability
would have been driven into the sea.

By the 13th, most of our ships had completed unloading and left thearea.

As our troops advanced inland and along the coasts from their landingpoints, their advance was supported from time to time by
naval gunfire.During the period 12-14 July our cruisers
and destroyers bombarded PortoEmpedocle and Agrigento,
this bombardment being one of the factors whichcontributed
to the capture of those towns on 17 July. This bombardmentwas followed by a short lull, in so far as naval participation wasconcerned (a second contingent of transports had already
arrived) and itwas not until the end of the month
that our forces were again employeddirectly in the
attacks. On 31 July fresh troops were transported toPalermo.
These transports were attacked by German air forces when inPalermo harbor, but were effectively protected by our destroyers.

Throughout the month of August the Navy supported the movements of landforces as they closed in on Messina. Naval gunfire destroyed
shorebatteries, roads, bridges, and other objectives,
and on 17 August a taskforce of cruisers and destroyers
proceeded against southern Italy.

LANDINGS IN ITALY

Landings in Italy were in logical sequence to the occupation of Sicily.Shortly after the Sicilian operation was completed, British
forces begancrossing the Straits of Messina, and in
order to assist these forces intheir progress up the
Italian Peninsula, a combined Anglo-Americanattack
was undertaken some distance in the rear of Axis troops opposingthe British. The general region chosen was that portion of the Italiancoast extending from Cape Circeo to the southern headland
to the Gulf ofPolicastro and containing the important
harbors of Naples, Gaeta, andSalerno. The particular
part of the coast selected for the initialassault
was the Bay of Salerno, which offered a number of beachessuitable for troop landings.

Although the troops employed in the landings were exclusively British
orAmerican, the naval forces supporting them were
mixed. The latter wereplaced under the command of
Vice Admiral Hewitt and divided into twoparts, one
of which was predominantly American and the otherpredominantly
British. The American (southern) attack force was assignedcoverage for the landings at Salerno.

The principal American convoy assembled at Oran, and British forcesformed up at Tripoli, Palermo, Termini (in Sicily) and
Bizerte, and fromtime to time, beginning 5 September,
sailed from the points of assembly.

The landings were made on the morning of 9 September, and, althoughsuccessfully accomplished, met immediate resistance from
the Germans,who delivered a series of air attacks
for the next two days. Also, enemyfire on the ground
was intense, exceeding anything previouslyexperienced
and proving considerably more troublesome than had beenanticipated.
In spite of the resistance, however, (which includedcounterattacks,
some of which were broken up most opportunely, as atLicata,
by fire of naval vessels) the port of Salerno was captured bythe 10th, and after heavy fighting on the 11th and 12th in the vicinityof Salerno, the town of Battipaglia was captured.

On the 13th and 14th, the enemy succeeded in retaking some of the groundpreviously gained by our troops. Our naval units, however,
continued tolend reinforcements and supplies, and
Allied warships, includingbattleships, cruisers, and
destroyers, bombarded enemy positions. Duringthe remainder
of the operation, our naval forces kept up a steady flowof
supplies to the various beaches, bombarded shore objectives, helpedto repel air raids, and finally on 1 October took the city
of Naplesunder bombardment.

For several months our naval forces continued to operate in theMediterranean area chiefly in supplying our troops in that
theater andin keeping open the lines of supply.

On 22 January 1944, a joint force landed at Anzio, Italy, and thereestablished a beach head. The amphibious task force participating
wasunder the command of Rear Admiral F. J. Lowry.
Gunfire support for theoperation was furnished by
cruisers and destroyers.