NASA accepts damning shuttle report

NASA immediately accepted the findings of the damning Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report on Tuesday. The report said that the failings of NASA's managerial culture were as much to blame for the loss of the shuttle as the falling foam that fatally damaged Columbia's wing.

In a statement, NASA chief Sean O'Keefe said: "The findings and recommendations of the CAIB will serve as NASA's blueprint. We have accepted the findings and will comply with the recommendations to the best of our ability." He will respond to the report in greater detail at a press conference on Wednesday.

Hal Gehman, the CAIB chairman, said: "We've had nothing but cooperation from NASA - we've heard all the right words" about their intention to implement the changes. He added that he has no reason to believe the present leadership could not do the job. However, the CAIB report itself makes it clear that while there will be an inevitable period of extreme vigilance and care, the real question is what happens after that, in a year or two.

Enforcement mechanisms

A safety board that was set up in the wake of the Challenger report, the CAIB found, has not had adequate personnel, money or power. If the US human space program is to have any real future, the CAIB recommends creating a new powerful and well-funded organisation to oversee safety.

But ensuring the failings that caused the loss of Columbia are not repeated may not depend only on NASA, but also on the US Congress and the Bush administration. These, as Gehman pointed out, are the only bodies that have the power to control what NASA does. "Therefore the enforcement mechanisms have to come from those two branches," he said.

As with the investigation into the 1986 Challenger shuttle disaster, the CAIB found that NASA had become complacent. But the CAIB spent nearly twice as much time on its investigation, ordered far more detailed testing, and dug deeper into the organisational issues.

The changes needed are profound. And yet, the key points are disturbingly similar to the findings of the Challenger investigation, suggesting that making permanent changes to the way NASA operates the shuttle could be difficult.

If you would like to reuse any content from New Scientist, either in print or online, please contact the syndication department first for permission. New Scientist does not own rights to photos, but there are a variety of licensing options available for use of articles and graphics we own the copyright to.