Former Cia Official Defends Gates` Actions

Senator Questions Iraq Dealings

September 21, 1991|By New York Times News Service.

WASHINGTON — Bobby Ray Inman, a former deputy CIA director, gave the Senate Intelligence Committee on Friday a spirited endorsement of Robert Gates to head the agency, but one senator continued to press the issue of whether the CIA violated the law in 1986 by sharing intelligence with Iraq in its war with Iran.

Inman, a retired Navy admiral, who served for 18 months as deputy director of central intelligence, the same job that Gates later held, told the committee that Gates might have been insulated from important facets of the Iran-contra affair.

He said that the late William Casey, who at the time was CIA director, might have withheld information from Gates to protect his protege`s career.

``We will never know what motivated Mr. Casey,`` said Inman, one of Gates` most vocal supporters. ``But I remain persuaded that it is entirely plausible that he made a conscious decision to keep Bob Gates out of areas that he thought might be troublesome to protect him for the prospect of his future progress.``

Senators from both parties continued Friday to raise questions about Gates` knowledge of the arms sales to Iran and the efforts to supply arms to the Nicaraguan rebels.

But after four days of confirmation hearings, several senators on the committee and their aides said Gates appears to have largely weathered the criticism that he failed to respond aggressively to early warnings of the affair.

Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), who has led the attack on Gates` nomination and who earlier in the week sharply questioned him about the intelligence-sharing operation with Iraq, pursued the issue Friday.

In the mid-1980s, the CIA provided information to Iraq, including satellite intelligence, on Iranian troop concentrations in return for information about Iran.

Bradley implied Friday that the exchange had a broader purpose of influencing the Iraqis politically or militarily.

Bradley has suggested that Gates might have violated the law by undertaking such a project without a presidential authorization, formally known as a finding. This legal order is required before the CIA can engage in a covert operation.

Gates acknowledged Monday that he assumed responsibility for carrying out the intelligence operation when he took over as the administration`s second-ranking intelligence official in the spring of 1986, but he said the law on the subject was vague and defended the agency`s actions as lawful.

Without mentioning Iraq in his questions, Bradley bored in on Inman, who seemed unaware that the senator was referring to the intelligence operation with Iraq.

Bradley asked repeatedly whether a finding would be required if the agency was not merely exchanging intelligence information, but attempting to influence a foreign government.

``If the effort to get intelligence was at the same time a part of larger effort to influence a country`s policy, whether its military policy or political policy, that raises some questions?`` Bradley asked.

After a brief exchange between the two men, Inman replied, ``If there was a quid pro quo that in return for the intelligence exchange the country that we were going to exchange with was going to do something that we wanted them to do, then in my view, that would clearly require a finding.``

In assessing Gates` record, Inman excused Gates` inability, in his past testimony, to recall important meetings and events of the Iran-contra period, describing the deputy`s job as a high-pressure blur of hurried meetings, brief telephone calls and foot-thick stacks of memos exchanged in a tightly compartmentalized environment of secrecy.

Inman said that Casey promoted Gates too quickly for his own good in a swift career rise that chafed some veteran intelligence officials.

``In retrospect that was probably not a good service for Bob Gates, in that he was thrown into management responsibilities . . . and there were clearly bruised feelings,`` Inman said.