Security

ip journal

The Ukraine conflict has changed the European security architecture

The Ukraine crisis has substantially and perhaps permanently altered Europe’s security structure. Europe is now much less secure, and its security architecture altogether less stable, more confrontational, and less predictable. Individual states, along with NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, must now address the deficiencies in this new order. At the same time, Europe has a better chance to exist peacefully if it succeeds in binding Russia into a cooperative order – as demanding as that will be.

ip journal

Western – and especially German – intelligence services could use improvement, both in terms of algorithms and agents

The terrorist attacks in Paris have demonstrated once more: intelligence services around the world are confronted with developments that hamper their performance or in fact question their usefulness. More resources are required, and if Germany really wants to play a bigger role on the world stage, the country has no choice but to beef up its intelligence work.

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Before decisions on the regulation of the Internet and prevailing universal norms are made on a global level, Europeans must develop a common Internet strategy. Such an EU strategy, however, cannot pit security against freedom or the interests of the state against individual liberties and fundamental rights.

As traditional security policy is superseded by economic and energy interests, we must begin to discuss the “economization of security policy” – the implications of which go far beyond the current global financial crisis and its effects on the security policy of the West. One voice inside NATO describes what needs to be done to ensure that this commercialization of security will still allow the friendly member countries of NATO and the EU to avoid 21st century conflicts and to continue to act collectively.

The debt crisis and efforts to save the euro are overshadowing necessary reforms to Europe’s energy policy and the further expansion of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, the EU’s credibility in terms of its ability to take effective action depends on the coherent coordination of monetary, energy, and security policy issues.

Recent statistics are showing that workers from crisis-stricken countries on Europe's periphery are making their way in greater numbers to more stable Germany. But the increasing labor migration doesn't necessarily need to be cause for alarm.

Forty years ago, the games in Munich became host to a terrorist attack that ended in disaster. As the world watches London this month, newly released documents reveal ignored warnings and coordinated whitewashing. This, as even the subject of memorializing the Munich victims stirs up fresh controversy.

Germany is currently the world's third-largest exporter of weapons, some of which find their way into the hands of regimes like Saudi Arabia's. Regular debates pop up as to how a country with Germany's history can export so many weapons of war, but few ask the question of how effective German controls on arms exports actually are.

The liberation of Kuwait in 1991 and the planned withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 mark the beginning and end points of Western global governance. The “unipolar moment” is a thing of the past; states are returning to their central role—in a fundamentally changed world order. German security policy must be redefined.

A newer, more aggressive light has been cast upon the dilemma that a nuclear Iran presents the world; now, however, is no time to attack. There is much doubt regarding the efficacy of missile strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. The United States and Israel should “speak softly” and let sanctions, and their military capabilities, do the talking.

Contrary to what many in Germany think, the United States does not seek to overthrow the regime in Iran. Instead, the US and its allies will seek tougher sanctions and limited military actions to further weaken the government in Teheran. German policy should get behind this international effort and realize that Iran is the problem, not the United States.

The next Nuclear Security Summit will be held in South Korea in 2012. As with the previous summit in April 2010, it will bring together many heads of state to discuss how to secure nuclear materials. US President Barack Obama will once again warn of the dangers of nuclear terrorism and promote greater nuclear transparency. Ultimately, however, this huge event is likely to end just as inconclusively as last year’s summit in Washington.

Is there a security role for the European Union on the Korean Peninsula?

01/09/2010

With the Six-Party Talks at a stalemate, the European Union may need to step in with soft diplomacy. As the security environment on the Korean Peninsula deteriorates, more active engagement from the European Union could contribute to the long-term stability of the peninsula.

The cold war’s non-proliferation regime is in disarray due to questions about civilian nuclear energy, doubts about verification, problems with states outside the NPT and the consequences of 9/11. A review of individual clauses of the treaty will not restore the integrity of the old system. Is the image of the NPT as a set of norms that transcend national interests really just a myth?

This summer, for the first time, all five members of the UN Security Council—including Russia and China—recognized the necessity of considering sanctions against Iran. Despite their very different interests, they agreed upon a common strategy for the first time. Many European actors and other international organizations are working together too—an encouraging example of global multilateralism. European foreign policy, especially, could profit were it successful.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may pose a greater danger than those of Iran or North Korea. President Musharraf’s weak administration has increased the possibility that new anti-Western leaders or non-state actors could seize the country’s arms. Strenghtening US and NATO nuclear deterrence capabilities is irrelevant—only a sustained program of support for Musharraf’s regime can mitigate these dangers.

In spring 2005 the United States and Europe squared off over lifting the post-Tiananmen ban on military sales to China. Some argued that this dispute was evidence of a deteriorating transatlantic relationship. But the arms embargo debate is symptomatic of a broader and more fundamental set of challenges, including the rise of China and India, posed by globalization’s acceleration and how it has reshaped global security over the past 15 years.

Back when Lord Robertson was Secretary General of NATO he could accurately say that his priorities were “capabilities, capabilities, capabilities.” That no longer suffices. Enough interoperability to fight together on the battlefield is necessary. But so is a much broader strategic debate that goes beyond seeing NATO as just an instrumental provider of troops to give allies a chance to address fundamental questions.

Why has the mood in Germany turned so vehemently against the United States? The usual answer is George W. Bush. On closer examination, however, this does not fly. Opposing Bush’s war plans in Iraq did not require siding with France in an outright showdown with the US.

The 1921 trial in Berlin of Mehmet Talaat’s Armenian assassin, Soghomon Tehlirian, sent reverberations around the world. Two young law students at the time would go on, respectively, to become the assistant prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal and to give a name to the wholesale Nazi murders–“genocide.” The trigger to Raphael Lemkin’s development of the legal concept of genocide was the Armenian massacre.