While the operations of intelligence departments involve a great deal of both adventure and wit, and although these may be attributed to certain functions, such activity is likely to find itself ...
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While the operations of intelligence departments involve a great deal of both adventure and wit, and although these may be attributed to certain functions, such activity is likely to find itself diverted from the political purpose it supposedly serves. As such, this notion can evidently be applied to the intelligence services of the two parties involved during the Second World War. The chiefs of such services had reason to believe that they were one way or another involved in a certain ‘war behind the war’. This chapter observes how Sir Stewart Menzies, the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, General William J. Donovan, the American OSS’s director, and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, or the chief of the Abwehr, were all involved in a relatively deadly venture in which they still treated each other with a certain degree of respect.Less

The Vision and the Mirage

Klemens von Klemperer

Published in print: 1994-10-13

While the operations of intelligence departments involve a great deal of both adventure and wit, and although these may be attributed to certain functions, such activity is likely to find itself diverted from the political purpose it supposedly serves. As such, this notion can evidently be applied to the intelligence services of the two parties involved during the Second World War. The chiefs of such services had reason to believe that they were one way or another involved in a certain ‘war behind the war’. This chapter observes how Sir Stewart Menzies, the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, General William J. Donovan, the American OSS’s director, and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, or the chief of the Abwehr, were all involved in a relatively deadly venture in which they still treated each other with a certain degree of respect.

This chapter reviews the place of intelligence in post-Second World War Official Histories (and some analogous productions) and the current ‘state of the art’, as represented by the recent Official ...
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This chapter reviews the place of intelligence in post-Second World War Official Histories (and some analogous productions) and the current ‘state of the art’, as represented by the recent Official (or ‘authorised’) Histories of the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). It concludes that Official Histories should only be a starting point, a kind of brush-clearing exercise, upon which others can build and which others can use to apply more sophisticated (and less theoretically impoverished) analyses of the matters concerned.Less

Intelligence and ‘Official History’

Christopher BaxterKeith Jeffery

Published in print: 2013-03-31

This chapter reviews the place of intelligence in post-Second World War Official Histories (and some analogous productions) and the current ‘state of the art’, as represented by the recent Official (or ‘authorised’) Histories of the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). It concludes that Official Histories should only be a starting point, a kind of brush-clearing exercise, upon which others can build and which others can use to apply more sophisticated (and less theoretically impoverished) analyses of the matters concerned.

Winston Churchill was exceptional among British statesmen of his time for his familiarity with intelligence and his consuming interest in it. This familiarity began before the First World War. Having ...
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Winston Churchill was exceptional among British statesmen of his time for his familiarity with intelligence and his consuming interest in it. This familiarity began before the First World War. Having served as First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915 and as Secretary of State for War and Air from 1918 to 1921, Churchill had been involved in the creation of the British intelligence system in its modern form from 1909 and in its reorganization between 1919 and 1921. Special intelligence played a major role for Britain by throwing some light on Germany's intentions, establishing at the end of 1940 that the country was extending its infiltration of the Balkans to Bulgaria. The British Cabinet had already authorized an attempt to bring Turkey into the war on the British side before the decrypts confirmed rumours from the embassies and the Secret Intelligence Service that Adolf Hitler planned a considerable offensive through Bulgaria to Greece.Less

Churchill and the Use of Special Intelligence

F. H. Hinsley

Published in print: 1996-02-29

Winston Churchill was exceptional among British statesmen of his time for his familiarity with intelligence and his consuming interest in it. This familiarity began before the First World War. Having served as First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915 and as Secretary of State for War and Air from 1918 to 1921, Churchill had been involved in the creation of the British intelligence system in its modern form from 1909 and in its reorganization between 1919 and 1921. Special intelligence played a major role for Britain by throwing some light on Germany's intentions, establishing at the end of 1940 that the country was extending its infiltration of the Balkans to Bulgaria. The British Cabinet had already authorized an attempt to bring Turkey into the war on the British side before the decrypts confirmed rumours from the embassies and the Secret Intelligence Service that Adolf Hitler planned a considerable offensive through Bulgaria to Greece.

Chapter Two looks at Ministerial use of, and attitude towards, intelligence after Labour’s 1945 Election victory, drawing on the papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). While it has been ...
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Chapter Two looks at Ministerial use of, and attitude towards, intelligence after Labour’s 1945 Election victory, drawing on the papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). While it has been argued that Attlee, a committed internationalist, was opposed to any hostility towards the Soviet Union, the chapter shows that he was kept fully aware of Soviet interests and intentions despite his commitment to renewed Anglo-Soviet relations. In addition to highlighting the role of intelligence in early Cold War crises, particularly the Berlin Blockade, it also looks at Ministerial doubts about the intelligence community, particularly those of Attlee himself. By 1949, he had grown increasingly critical of the intelligence services and, a year later, ordered a review of the intelligence community by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, which is explored here for the first time.Less

Lacking intelligence? British intelligence, ministers and the Soviet Union

Daniel W. B. Lomas

Published in print: 2017-01-23

Chapter Two looks at Ministerial use of, and attitude towards, intelligence after Labour’s 1945 Election victory, drawing on the papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). While it has been argued that Attlee, a committed internationalist, was opposed to any hostility towards the Soviet Union, the chapter shows that he was kept fully aware of Soviet interests and intentions despite his commitment to renewed Anglo-Soviet relations. In addition to highlighting the role of intelligence in early Cold War crises, particularly the Berlin Blockade, it also looks at Ministerial doubts about the intelligence community, particularly those of Attlee himself. By 1949, he had grown increasingly critical of the intelligence services and, a year later, ordered a review of the intelligence community by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, which is explored here for the first time.

This chapter focuses on Kim Philby's role in the British Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS) campaign against communism as well as his contribution to the struggle against Axis espionage. It ...
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This chapter focuses on Kim Philby's role in the British Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS) campaign against communism as well as his contribution to the struggle against Axis espionage. It considers Philby's dealings with Frank Roberts, head of the Central Department of Britain's Foreign Office, on such matters as German ships in the harbours of Spain. The chapter also looks at the SIS practice of withholding ISOS (Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey) to protect the security of its codes or agents. Furthermore, it analyses the defection of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher officer at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, to Canada with documents on the Soviet Union's espionage in the country. Finally, the chapter assesses Philby's treachery during his time as head of anti-communist and counter-intelligence sections in SIS.Less

Philby and Secret Intelligence Service Anti-Communism

Edward Harrison

Published in print: 2012-10-15

This chapter focuses on Kim Philby's role in the British Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS) campaign against communism as well as his contribution to the struggle against Axis espionage. It considers Philby's dealings with Frank Roberts, head of the Central Department of Britain's Foreign Office, on such matters as German ships in the harbours of Spain. The chapter also looks at the SIS practice of withholding ISOS (Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey) to protect the security of its codes or agents. Furthermore, it analyses the defection of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher officer at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, to Canada with documents on the Soviet Union's espionage in the country. Finally, the chapter assesses Philby's treachery during his time as head of anti-communist and counter-intelligence sections in SIS.

This chapter examines how Kim Philby turned from a secret agent for the Soviet Union into a British intelligence officer. Before discussing how Philby infiltrated the British Secret Intelligence ...
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This chapter examines how Kim Philby turned from a secret agent for the Soviet Union into a British intelligence officer. Before discussing how Philby infiltrated the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), it first describes the agency and some of its most influential figures, including Brigadier Stewart Menzies and intelligence officer Claude Dansey. The chapter then considers Dansey's derision for counter-espionage and the importance of the German Enigma encoding machine known as Ultra. It also analyses Philby's work at SIS, including teaching subversive propaganda and devising propaganda techniques for Britain, and Soviet intelligence's resumption of contact with Philby from December 1940 after a break of nearly a year. Finally, the chapter looks at the incarceration in, and eventual deportation from, India of Philby's father Harry St John Bridger Philby and how it helped Kim's career as a spy.Less

From Soviet Agent to British Intelligence Officer

Edward Harrison

Published in print: 2012-10-15

This chapter examines how Kim Philby turned from a secret agent for the Soviet Union into a British intelligence officer. Before discussing how Philby infiltrated the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), it first describes the agency and some of its most influential figures, including Brigadier Stewart Menzies and intelligence officer Claude Dansey. The chapter then considers Dansey's derision for counter-espionage and the importance of the German Enigma encoding machine known as Ultra. It also analyses Philby's work at SIS, including teaching subversive propaganda and devising propaganda techniques for Britain, and Soviet intelligence's resumption of contact with Philby from December 1940 after a break of nearly a year. Finally, the chapter looks at the incarceration in, and eventual deportation from, India of Philby's father Harry St John Bridger Philby and how it helped Kim's career as a spy.

This chapter focuses on Section V of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and its task of obtaining counter-espionage information from the Iberian peninsula. It first considers the expansion ...
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This chapter focuses on Section V of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and its task of obtaining counter-espionage information from the Iberian peninsula. It first considers the expansion of Section V and the role of Kim Philby in helping it provide more intelligence on Axis spies in Spain and Portugal. The chapter then examines Philby's appointment as head of a SIS sub-section that formed part of Section V, as well as his responsibility for counter-espionage in Portuguese East Africa or Mozambique and his work against the extensive German espionage networks in Portugal. It also describes the three main Axis espionage agencies in Lisbon: Italian intelligence, the intelligence service of the Nazi Party, and the Kriegs Organisation Portugal of the Abwehr. Finally, the chapter discusses Philby's role in channelling the results of Britain's counterintelligence concerning Portugal to the Foreign Office.Less

Section V of the Secret Intelligence Service

Edward Harrison

Published in print: 2012-10-15

This chapter focuses on Section V of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and its task of obtaining counter-espionage information from the Iberian peninsula. It first considers the expansion of Section V and the role of Kim Philby in helping it provide more intelligence on Axis spies in Spain and Portugal. The chapter then examines Philby's appointment as head of a SIS sub-section that formed part of Section V, as well as his responsibility for counter-espionage in Portuguese East Africa or Mozambique and his work against the extensive German espionage networks in Portugal. It also describes the three main Axis espionage agencies in Lisbon: Italian intelligence, the intelligence service of the Nazi Party, and the Kriegs Organisation Portugal of the Abwehr. Finally, the chapter discusses Philby's role in channelling the results of Britain's counterintelligence concerning Portugal to the Foreign Office.

Chapter Four considers Ministerial attitudes towards special operations and the development of covert warfare against the Eastern Bloc. By looking at the example of Operation Valuable, SIS’s abortive ...
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Chapter Four considers Ministerial attitudes towards special operations and the development of covert warfare against the Eastern Bloc. By looking at the example of Operation Valuable, SIS’s abortive scheme to detach Albania from the Soviet Orbit, it explores why Bevin, initially opposed to any activities beyond propaganda, endorsed offensive measures. The chapter also examines the development of Britain’s Cold War machinery by looking at the formation and early discussions of the Committee on Communism (Overseas), formed in 1949. It shows that by late 1951 Ministers had endorsed proposals for subversion inside the Soviet Bloc with the aim of undermining Soviet rule. The chapter also details Ministerial discussions on the development of stay behind networks in Europe.Less

Daniel W. B. Lomas

Published in print: 2017-01-23

Chapter Four considers Ministerial attitudes towards special operations and the development of covert warfare against the Eastern Bloc. By looking at the example of Operation Valuable, SIS’s abortive scheme to detach Albania from the Soviet Orbit, it explores why Bevin, initially opposed to any activities beyond propaganda, endorsed offensive measures. The chapter also examines the development of Britain’s Cold War machinery by looking at the formation and early discussions of the Committee on Communism (Overseas), formed in 1949. It shows that by late 1951 Ministers had endorsed proposals for subversion inside the Soviet Bloc with the aim of undermining Soviet rule. The chapter also details Ministerial discussions on the development of stay behind networks in Europe.

This chapter analyses two series which aimed to present a more authentic portrayal of intelligence activity, embracing a new ‘realism’ grounded in documentary detail and procedure. Special Branch ...
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This chapter analyses two series which aimed to present a more authentic portrayal of intelligence activity, embracing a new ‘realism’ grounded in documentary detail and procedure. Special Branch (ITV, 1969-74) focused on the Metropolitan Police unit of the name whose remit centred on issues of national security, the series incorporating the thematic interests of the spy genre into the less heightened generic trains of the police procedural. This chapter explores how this focus converged with a concurrent trend in single plays towards increased location filming on ‘gritty’ 16mm film, with Special Branch’s adoption of this style from its 1973 revamp by Euston Films enhancing to a new narrative interest in international terrorism. This is contrasted with The Sandbaggers (ITV, 1978-80), a series focused on the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) which made an alternative claim to ‘realism’ through mounting an unprecedented examination of the bureaucracies underpinning intelligence activity.Less

‘A professional’s contest’: procedure and bureaucracy in Special Branch (ITV, 1969–74) and The Sandbaggers (ITV, 1978–80)

Joseph Oldham

Published in print: 2017-07-30

This chapter analyses two series which aimed to present a more authentic portrayal of intelligence activity, embracing a new ‘realism’ grounded in documentary detail and procedure. Special Branch (ITV, 1969-74) focused on the Metropolitan Police unit of the name whose remit centred on issues of national security, the series incorporating the thematic interests of the spy genre into the less heightened generic trains of the police procedural. This chapter explores how this focus converged with a concurrent trend in single plays towards increased location filming on ‘gritty’ 16mm film, with Special Branch’s adoption of this style from its 1973 revamp by Euston Films enhancing to a new narrative interest in international terrorism. This is contrasted with The Sandbaggers (ITV, 1978-80), a series focused on the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) which made an alternative claim to ‘realism’ through mounting an unprecedented examination of the bureaucracies underpinning intelligence activity.

This chapter first considers the odd relationship between the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its successor, the Central Intelligence ...
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This chapter first considers the odd relationship between the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), during the waning days of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. In addition to surveying a number of pertinent memoirs and biographies, it examines fictional accounts of espionage, focusing on John le Carré's classic espionage novel Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974). The chapter then looks at the Cold War cooperation between the US and UK intelligence services, as the CIA took the lead in combating Soviet subversion and espionage in Europe and around the world. Finally, it introduces the two most damaging American spies of the Cold War era, Aldrich Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI.Less

The Reality is Stranger than Fiction : Anglo–American Intelligence Cooperation from World War II Through the Cold War

Frederick P. Hitz

Published in print: 2013-03-31

This chapter first considers the odd relationship between the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), during the waning days of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. In addition to surveying a number of pertinent memoirs and biographies, it examines fictional accounts of espionage, focusing on John le Carré's classic espionage novel Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974). The chapter then looks at the Cold War cooperation between the US and UK intelligence services, as the CIA took the lead in combating Soviet subversion and espionage in Europe and around the world. Finally, it introduces the two most damaging American spies of the Cold War era, Aldrich Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI.