Abstract: We update our global evidence on the long-term realized equity risk premium, relative to both bills and bonds, in 19 different countries. Our study now runs from 1900 to the start of 2011. While there is considerable variation across countries, the realized equity risk premium was substantial everywhere. For our 19-country World index, over the entire 111 years, geometric mean real returns were an annualized 5.5%; the equity premium relative to Treasury bills was an annualized 4.5%; and the equity premium relative to long-term government bonds was an annualized 3.8%. The expected equity premium is lower, around 3% to 3½% on an annualized basis.

Abstract
What is the main limitation of much modern macro-economic theory, among the failings pointed out by William R. White at the 2010 Mayekawa Lecture? We argue that the main deficiency is a failure to incorporate the possibility of default, including that of banks, into the core of the analysis. With default assumed away, there can be no role for financial intermediaries, for financial disturbances, or even for money. Models incorporating defaults are, however, harder to construct, in part because the representative agent fiction must be abandoned. Moreover, financial crises are hard to predict and to resolve. All of the previously available alternatives for handling failing systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are problematical. We end by discussing a variety of current proposals for improving the resolution of failed SIFIs.

Abstract
We study a new data set of prices of traded dividends with maturities up to 10 years across three world regions: the US, Europe, and Japan. We use these asset prices to construct equity yields, analogous to bond yields. We decompose these yields to obtain a term structure of expected dividend growth rates and a term structure of risk premia, which allows us to decompose the equity risk premium by maturity. We find that both expected dividend growth rates and risk premia exhibit substantial variation over time, particularly for short maturities. In addition to predicting dividend growth, equity yields help predict other measures of economic growth such as consumption growth. We relate the dynamics of growth expectations to recent events such as the financial crisis and the earthquake in Japan.

Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the remaining “opportunistic” traders yields value-weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. The most informed opportunistic traders are local, non-executive insiders from geographically concentrated, poorly governed firms. Opportunistic traders are significantly more likely to have SEC enforcement action taken against them, and reduce trading following waves of SEC insider trading enforcement.

The fund (Eaton Vance) began the regulatory process to approve five non-transparent actively managed bond ETFs in March 2010, based on highly technical patented processes. In April this year, the Securities and Exchange Commission finally granted the fund manager’s request.

So how did they do the impossible?

In a nutshell, their success lies in the intellectual property they came up with, their patented processes for non-transparent trading.