72 Johnny Appleseed's Snowflake ", Jacket \ Wind-proof, cold-proof, a topper for town or country, sport or casual wear . . . where- ever you require warmth with- out weight. Made of two layers of Nylon with 5 oz. Dac- ron Polyester fiberfill insula- tion between. Car-coat length (34") has side vents, brass buttons, slash pockets. o YSTER, NAVY PEPPER RED, or WINE. S (10-12) M (14- 1 6) l (1 8) Xl (20-22).. . $30.00 ppd. ,J . " \( -;:. q:; , '. + ., -1 ! 0 .' \ .,- IJ::' "" l' .. \' t \", J : . :.. r:... t ! , 'I - ...: > -L Free Catalog for Spring 1975 32 pages in full color from Johnny Appleseed's, the family store. Fine clothing for men and women; unique gifts for all occasions. 6 : s:' ::': :1 American Express Mastercharge, and BankAmeri- card honored Retail shops;n Beverly and Concord. G D l iscover a apagos Forthe discriminating traveler who wishes to visit the unique Galapagos Islands at leisure, the only way is on our two-week cruises aboard the motor yachts Cath- char and Laura Mana, with a naturalist guide. B Ð l i sc over elze The British-owned 12-passengerschooner Golden Cachalot with its dedicated crew has moved to the little-known waters of the Gulf of Honduras, and operates two- week voyages of discovery, touching at landing places in Belize, Guatemala and Honduras, with visits to the barrier reefs and cays and forays inland; for natural- ists, archaeologists and others of en- quiring minds. Both these cruises operate all year round and departures are scheduled until the end of 1975. Brochures on both programs are available from: HANNS EBENSTEN TRAVEL, INC 55 WEST 42 STREET, NEW YORK NY 10036 TELEPHONE (212) 354-6634 NUMBER SIXTEEN An unique, luxury "pension". Central private and informal. It's for those who prefer not to pay "Grand Hotel" prices. 16 SUMNER PLACE LO NDO N L3i D Telephone 01-589-5232 ltA 11 lijl, -; , ! \ ....þ, ,.... ( and sixty million In November. But, aside from offshore oi] exploration, there is virtually no new investment, and inventories are piling up. In the year since I was last here, the shops and restaurants In the downtown Sai- gon area have become almost empty, and the number of beggars on the streets has increased noticeably. Even in Cholon, the relatively prosperous Chinese section of the capital, the vol- ume of business has declined. The Vietnamese have had one recent stroke of luck: Early in November, one of the American-backed explor- ation teams struck oil in the South China Sea, with a promised output of fifteen hundred barrels of oil a day, plus a large amount of nat- ural gas. It will take perhaps another year to determine whether the general area be- ing explored is big enough for a hoped-for production of fifty thousand barrels of oil a day within five years This and other fac- tors could eventually produce an up- turn, but in the meantime the at- mosphere of stagnation is pervasive. T HIS increasingly serious social- economic situation is undoubtedly one reason that the Communists are carefully weighing their options. If they press their military attacks now, while they negotiate, or prior to ac- ceptIng another ceasefire, they wil1 be in a more advantageous position later, as negotiations come to fruition. In the northern half of South Vietnam, the Comm unists have almost finished building a new series of connecting roads, which, given their current dis- position of forces, all but cuts the coun- try in two from the Laotian border to the Central Highlands and then di- agonally northward to the coast of Quang Nam Province They have finished paving the old Ho Chi Minh T rail, using limestone and packed dirt, and have built an oil pipeline that runs all the wav from North Vietnam to .I Quang Duc Province, northeast of Saigon, with refuelling stations along the way. Except in really wet weath- er, they can now bring in fresh sup- plies and men from North Vietnam to the III Corps area, just north of SaI- gon, in three to four weeks instead of the two and a half months it used to take them when the Trail was a web of dirt roads subject to constant Amer- ican bombardment. In recent weeks, they have made a heavy buildup of supplies to be moved South. In the northern and central parts of South Vietnam, the Communists are effec- JANUARY (" 1975 tively interdicting the lateral network of government highways; threatening the government's pacIfication program, which has been made more difficult by the forcing of some two hundred thou- sand new refugees from the areas they had been resettled in following the 1972 Communist offensive; recaptur- ing most of the lightly populated terri- tor) they lost after the ] 973 ceasefire; and forcing the governn1ent to surren- der many of its lightly manned out- posts. Particularly in the northernmost tier of the country, where the best Communist forces have tied down the best government troops, the North Vietnam- ese have consolidated their hold. In the crucial III Corps region, the Commu- nists are opening up new in- filtration routes, and they are doing the same thing in the Delta while consolidating their substantial hold on the five southernmost provinces and dis- rupting pacification efforts there. Thus, despite the decrease over the past year in the figures for population under their control, they are obviously prepared to regain control not only over more peo- ple-perhaps more than ever before- but over more land. In the past year or so, thev have colonized areas in the northern part of the country, sending in sixty thousand men, women, and children from the North, including both Southern families who went North in 1954 and new Northern ones, and their aim is to send down several hundred thousand such colonists in the next few years At the same time, they have directed selective artil- lery barrages against government-con- trolled vIllage areas to create more refugees, and have stepped up their kidnappings of peasants, of whom eighty-five hundred have been forcibly removed to Communist areas since the ceasefire. The Communist regular forces of two hundred and twenty-five thou- sand, which comprise fourteen divisions and numerous autonomous regiments, backed up by six additional divisions in North. VIetnam, are confronted by three hundred and seventy-two thou- sand regular South Vietnamese Army men, plus four hundred and fifty thou- sand territorials of the Regional and Popular Forces, and four hundred thousand armed People's Self-Defense Forces in tht villages and hamlets. However, as many as a quarter of the regular Army men and about that fraction of the territorials are either so- called "phantom soldiers" (who do not in fact exist and are simply carried on