The past two decades have witnessed a gradually changing paradigm
in academic and policy debates regarding the questions of the normative
basis of world order and possibilities for tackling imminent threats to
security and peace (i.e. intra-state armed conflicts, failed states,
terrorism, poverty, and deepening inequality) at different levels. The
introduction of concepts such as "human security" and
"the right to humanitarian intervention/responsibility to protect
(R2P)" as well as critical examinations of peace-, nation-, and
state-building missions (PNSB) have led to a relativist tendency of
state sovereignty and a changing attitude to address the intersection of
security, development, and human rights (UNDP, 1994; Brahimi Report,
2000; the UN Millennium Declaration, 2000; the World Summit Declaration,
2005; UN core documents, 2004 and 2005). Actors involved are
increasingly aware that these three policy fields are interdependent and
that they should form an integral part of any comprehensive conflict
resolution and sustainable development strategy.

To date, three cross-cutting debates in security studies;
International Relations (IR) research; development, and human rights
research; and policy-field analyses have begun to consider this
intersection. First, the changing nature and scope of PNSB from a
top-down approach to mutual commitment has upheld the importance of
local ownership and questioned the assumption of the Western liberal
democratic model of states in relation to international stability
(Barnett, 2006; Johnston/Slyomovic, 2008; Valenca, 2011). State- and
nation-building historically constitute the efforts of (imperial)
external actors to build effective and legitimate domestic institutions
in young nation states in order to assure the great powers' spheres
of influence there (Rubin, 2005: 94-95). State-building focuses on the
establishment of political institutions and the creation of favorable
economic circumstances. With the emergence of failed states, civil armed
conflicts, and terrorism as top international concerns, (post-conflict)
nation-building in the post-Cold War era has become more comprehensive
and complex. It includes efforts to establish democratic institutions,
institute security sectors reforms (SSR), facilitate economic and
societal reconstruction, and encourage reparation and reconciliation.
Without question, the interplay of security, development, human rights,
justice, and peace issues has gained weight in international
commitments. (2) In particular, in view of the limitations of and
lessons learned from the past UN peace missions, the introduction and
institutionalization of post-conflict peacebuilding (i.e. the
establishment of the UN peacebuilding commission in 2005) has underlined
the necessity of developing a more comprehensive approach in pursuit of
different policy objectives. Post-conflict peace-building (PCPB)
involves a multi-dimensional peace endeavour (ranging from state and
nation-building, economic reconstruction, and development to
socio-cultural and historical reparation and reconciliation etc.), where
both the top-down and bottom-up approaches are needed for constructive
and inclusive commitments between international and local actors. (3)
Even though practitioners, regional and international organizations, and
states might have conceptualized and operationalized their mandates
differently (Barnett et al., 2007), the success of such peacebuilding
work still hinges on whether or not a given approach has delivered a
positive impact upon people's lives (Street et al,. 2008). The
tensions and dilemmas of PNSB have engendered a reflection and learning
process, leading to the questioning of the appropriateness of external
intervention. Academic conjecture has called for the adoptionon of a
different perspective (Slim, 1995; Leaning/Arie, 2000; McRae, 2001;
Khagram/Clark/Raad, 2003; Nelson/Dorsey, 2003; Ramcharan, 2004;
Krause/Jutersonke, 2005; Grimm, 2005; Duffield, 2006; Paris/Sisk, 2009;
Dayton/Kriesberg, 2009). Such a different perspective would, for
example, incorporate another dimension of peace, namely, social justice
by creating a social environment where egalitarian conditions exist and
human rights and human dignity are respected, regardless of the
existence of the Western state model and values (Johnston/Slyomovic,
2008; Valenca, 2011: 644).

Second, the introduction of "human security" (HS) as a
concept and agenda in foreign policy and international politics has
prompted controversial debates and challenged the state-centric
understanding of how to preserve security (with such efforts being
termed "national security," "cooperative security"
and "comprehensive security"). However, the conventional
notion of "national security" neglects the human element. In
contrast, HS is about security of individuals and people. The 1994 UNDP
report has explored the link between pervasive threats (such as poverty,
terrorism, disease, and an unequal world order) and the lack of the
human dimension of security. Specifically, the report identified seven
realms of security that must be ensured and protected by any PNSB
efforts: personal security, economic security, food security, health
security, environmental security, political security, and community
security (UNDP, 1994). The content of the report can be traced back to
the ideas of human rights and a more humanitarian agenda. In spite of
the critiques of its conceptual and analytical weaknesses, possible
connections with masked ideologies, as well as the question of its
applicability (Suhrke, 1999; Richmond, 2001; Paris, 2001; Stewart, 2004;
de Larrinaga/Doucet, 2007; Chandler, 2008), such a human security
paradigm or framework has gained relevance in the elaboration of policy
options and scientific endeavors. For example, in recognizing the
insufficiency of national security to protect people's security,
some middle powers (notably Canada, Norway, and Japan) have incorporated
the idea of HS into their foreign policy agendas. (4) Similarly,
inspired by the concept of HS, the European Union (EU) has endorsed a
new combination of military and civilian tools for establishing its
security capabilities (EU 2003; Flechtner, 2006: 158; Kaldor/Glasius,
2004, 2005). Also, the potential of HS in uncovering the link between
development, gender equality, specific regional experience of
insecurity, and governance and developing further concepts and
strategies for the delivery of sustainable development and peace cannot
be underestimated. (5)

Third, against the backdrop of the polarized debates surrounding
the concept of HS as an increasingly important element in international
law, academics and practitioners have provided insights into the
overlapping dimensions of these policy fields. While they note the
limits of international human rights and development programs in
addressing the question of gender inequality in developing countries
(Nyamu, 2000), they acknowledge an emerging right of humanitarian
assistance through military enforcement to restore democracy, to protect
human rights and to promote human security (Fielding, 1994, 1995;
Bruderlein, 2000). This new right has found full elaboration in the R2P
doctrine as a basis for collective action to rescue populations in grave
danger and, henceforth, as a part of a progressive foreign policy agenda
(Banda, 2007). To be sure, the presentation of the doctrine
"R2P" in establishing the foundations for a new normative and
operational consensus on the role of military intervention has been a
breakthrough in addressing the controversies of humanitarian
intervention (HI). (6) The very notion of R2P encapsulates the growing
necessity for "non-intervention" for "national
security" to yield to the principle of international responsibility
(i.e. to protect foreign populations under threat of mass killings and
ethnic cleansing if and when the governments of such populations are
either complicit or ineffectual. (7) Meanwhile, despite the introduction
of the guiding principles and rules for military enforcement relevant to
different actors, critics find that the R2P doctrine remains embedded in
a vision of international rescue coming from outside, often driven by
the logic of classical realism without appropriately including the needs
and interests of local actors (Hamilton, 2006; Stahn, 2007; Megret,
2009).

The debates mentioned above have demonstrated a meaningful change
in international commitments to addressing the overlap between security,
development, and human rights through the introduction of new norms and
policy options. Still, uncertainties remain regarding the following
question: How have the concepts and agendas of security, development,
and human rights been redefined, conceptualized, and put into practice
prompting consensus, conversion, or conflict within the policy networks
involved? The existing literature has so far failed to provide
satisfactory systematic answers to this question. This is the case for
both IR research and for the policy fields' research communities.

Supported by an institutional network governance framework, this
article analyzes a new policy approach (civil and military cooperation)
and tries to find some first hints in addressing remaining questions.
(8) Taking the US and German provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in
Afghanistan as case studies, the study examines the overlapping
complexity of policy fields between security, development, and human
rights. It aims to explore the evolving character of interrelated
conceptual frameworks in security, development, and human rights and the
intersection thereof. Through the analysis of case studies, this paper
also aims to understand how these frameworks have been put into practice
(programming, strategies, options and consequences) and what the
implications of doing so have been.

My arguments are as follows: First, new issue networks have emerged
and penetrated the existing policy paradigms following the perception of
new threats, the redefinition of problem formulation, and the
elaboration of new policy discourses. Second, an integrated conceptual
approach between security, development, and human rights has facilitated
the redefinition of policy goals, principles, the mobilization of
resources, and implementation. Both consensus/conversion and conflict
over policies have prompted the necessity of cultivating the capacity of
agencies involved to go beyond the norms of each policy frame in the
pursuit of positive results. At stake are issues of flexibility and
adaptability in the evaluation of policy development. At the same time,
civil and military cooperation, as demonstrated in the multifunctional
work of PRTs, has been permanently caught in an ongoing tension between
the war on terror and short-term stability operation on the one hand and
long-term durable peace and development on the other. The
misunderstanding of multi-agency PRT as interim stability operation
paving the way for long-term reconstruction and development work, the
blurring of policy boundaries with conflicting priorities of agendas,
patchwork-like development projects and security initiatives accompanied
by civilian causalities, inadequate use of resources, insufficient
knowledge of local institutional settings, as well as the elusive role
of local actors (notably political elites, the warlords, and the
Taliban) are all responsible for such development.

To elaborate these arguments, chapter two adopts an institutional
network governance framework with a focus on the consensus and conflict
dimensions of policy networks at institutional and interactions levels
and the complex interplay between security, development, and human
rights. Based on this institutional network governance framework,
chapter three detects the emergence of the concepts of CIMIC and PRTs as
an overlap issue and examines the US and German military missions in
Afghanistan. Chapter four then assesses the interplay found in the
practice of PRTs and implications of such interplay for policy networks.

Contrary to the relatively clear division between high politics
(within which security issues enjoy high priority) and low politics
(within which development and human rights issues are regarded as
secondary) in foreign policy arenas during the Cold War, the past two
decades have seen the increasing importance of development and human
rights issues in relation to national and global security issues. While
a widening and deepening sense of "security" has begun to
include a people-centered approach (making the nexus between
development, security, and peace crucial in development thinking and
practice) (Uvin, 2002), epistemic and NGOs communities have also
elaborated new strategies to address the nexus of security, development,
and human rights (Nelson/Dorsey, 2003; Painter, 2004). The relationship
between pervasive human rights violations, the lack of access to
education and resources, and the root causes of conflict and insecurity
are clear. (9) How has this linkage between security, development, and
human rights been approached? To what extent has this linkage prompted
framework conflicts and a paradigm change of each policy area?

The study of governance networks involves the discovery of
non-hierarchical forms of governance based on negotiated interaction
between a plurality of public, semi- public, and private actors
(Sorensen/Torfing, 2007a: 3). It argues that policy, defined as a
desired outcome, is a result of governing processes. These processes are
no longer fully controlled by the government but are increasingly
subject to a variety of actors whose interactions give rise to a
relatively stable pattern of policy-making that constitutes a specific
form of regulation or mode ofpluricentric coordination (Mayntz, 1993).
Correspondingly, the term "network" seems to have become a new
paradigm of fragmentation, complexity, and new social dynamics
(Sorensen/Torfing, 2007a: 5; Borzel, 1998) in which structures for
communication and interaction between a variety of actors emerge and
become stable. Besides formally institutionalized decision-makers,
networks include many interconnected actors, each of which draw on
particular resources to influence the way public and private policies
are formulated and implemented (Marin/Mayntz, 1991). In this sense, a
governance network involves a relatively stable horizontal articulation
of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors. These actors
interact through negotiations, which take place within a regulative,
normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework. This framework is
self-regulating within limits set by external agencies and contributes
to the production of public purpose (Sorensen /Torfing, 2007a: 9). In
particular, as Sorensen/Torfing argue, governance networks as a
distinctive mechanism of governance distinguish themselves from the
hierarchical control of the state and the competitive regulation of the
market, in which a reflexive rationality often dominates decision-making
and the question of compliance through the generation of generalized
trust and political obligation over time becomes sustained by
self-constituted rules and norms (Sorensen/Torfing, 2007a: 11-12).

At the same time, the role of the institutional setting and
processualism as a part of the broader conditions for the functioning of
governance networks cannot be ignored. For one thing, as argued by
Maynard-Moody/Herbert, administrative policy making is a separate,
distinguishable process, not a stage or component of legislative
policy-making. The institutional setting has a major influence on policy
ideas, choices, and actions. Administrative agencies form a distinct
institutional setting for policy politics and setting influences for
policy outcomes (Maynard-Moody/Herbert, 1989). The subservient role of
administrative agencies in the terminology of implementation is
therefore conceptually flawed. The institutionalization process is
circular: Agencies and programs are created to implement specific
policies. Once established, they develop their own norms, rules, and
procedures that become difficult to change or redirect
(Maynard-Moody/Herbert, 1989: 140). Furthermore, the idea of
institutional processualism pertains to the capacity of institutions to
elicit reasons for public policy that form the appropriate grounds for
those policies (Barzelay/Gallego, 2006; Zeisberg, 2010). Such a
processualism can serve as a praxis concept for the evaluation of the
legitimacy of governmental processes; it can also open constitutional
theory to empirical investigation regarding the extent to which
institutions can and do foster the processualist ideal. Meanwhile, the
institutional setting and processualism as praxis concepts may encounter
their limits, where new policy options are created and a strong degree
of adaptability and efficient coordination work among administrative
agencies is highly desirable. In particular, as Sutton points out, a
"linear model" of policy-making, characterized by objective
analysis of options and separation of policy from implementation, is
inadequate. Instead, policy-process and policy implementation are best
understood as a "chaos of purposes and accidents." (10)

The adoption of governance networks from an institutionalist
perspective is supposed to examine whether and how consensus building
and the development of their own logic of appropriateness to tackle
complex, uncertain, and conflict-ridden policy problems and to reduce
the risk of implementation resistance are on the right track
(March/Olsen 1995: 27). At the same time, disturbances such as
fluctuations in the composition of network actors, the presence of
unresolved tensions and conflicts, weak and ineffective leadership, and
frustration over the lack of clear results can reduce the possibilities
of optimizing the functioning of governance networks on all dimensions
(Klijn/Koppenjan, 2004; Scharpf, 1993). In addition, governance networks
may increasingly be a challenge to governability, as they become
autonomous and resist central guidance (Rhodes, 1996).

In view of the existence of different opinions with regard to the
essential characteristics of the policy network phenomenon, one may need
to re-assesses the concepts of "issue networks,"
"arenas" and "policy networks", address problems
across networks, and explore the implications of consensus and conflict
in policy networks at institutional and interaction levels. (11) Due to
the specific issues at stake, the characteristics of the wider policy
area or the particular historical development of interaction processes,
"policy networks" may be conceived and develop differently.
Lowi uses the term "arenas" and argues that depending on the
nature and intensity of conflict or the clash of interests between a set
of actors, a specific configuration of actors or "arena"
develops. Some arenas have a more pluralist (open) character; others
tend toward a more elitist (exclusive) structure (Lowi, 1963). In case
problems cut across networks, interaction is possibly hampered by the
presence of a variety of frames, paradigms, or policy cores firmly
anchored in the networks of which the various representatives are a
part. In that case, fundamental policy controversies may develop in
which parties question each other's policy cores. Frame conflicts
may also emerge when parties dispute whose frames are to be applied
(Rein/Schon, 1986). Finally, a lack of joint values, shared language,
and common rules may result in a "dialogue of the deaf," which
blocks the realization of joint solutions and the tackling of societal
problems (Klijn/Koopenjan, 2004; Koopenjan, 2007:146).

The overlapping dimension between policy networks may prompt the
development of consensus-building, policy integration or conversion, or
conflict in varying degrees. Koppenjan notes that while both consensus
and conflict perform important positive functions in policy networks,
too much or too little consensus or conflict may make governance
networks dysfunctional (Koopenjan, 2007:150). At the institutional
level, consensus is an expression of the degree to which actors within
the network have learned to interact. Conversion, in which inter-agency
coordination among different policy networks is deemed to be
institutionalized and the question of policy coherence becomes crucial,
may emerge on the one hand. On the other hand, excessive consensus leads
to a systematic oppression of problems, interests; and parties; too
little consensus means that an institutionalized practice hardly exists.
At the process level, consensus is a necessary precondition for
interaction in situations of interdependency. However, too much
consensus at this level means a lack of participation, options, and
variety; too little consensus may lead to the escalation of conflicts.

At the institutional level, the presence of conflict indicates that
the network is neither completely closed nor static, as the
institutionalized values, norms, frames and rules are questioned.
Excessive conflict means that a network may disintegrate; too little
conflict leads to insufficient articulation of interests and inadequate
allocation of resources and use of capacities within the network. At the
interaction level, conflict may contribute to the articulation of
formerly underrepresented interests, trigger the mobilization of new
resources, information and research, and promote the transparency of
processes. However, excessive conflict at this level may lead to the
stagnation of problem-solving; too little conflict within interactions
may lead to the exclusion of important insights, interests, and options.

The implications of consensus and conflict within policy networks
at both institutional and interaction levels are summarized in the table
2.1. It yields some important insights into good network governance.
Instead of emphasizing consensus building and conflict regulation,
efforts should be made to prevent and reverse overinvestment in
consensus building and to pursue a healthy degree of conflict
(Koppenjan, 2007: 149-50).

Changing Paradigms? The Interplay between "Security,"
"Development," and "Human Rights" from the
Perspective of Network Governance

Security issues networks are traditionally rooted in a neorealist
understanding of security, which primarily focuses on the state as both
the subject as well as the object of security policy (Waltz, 1979). The
state is conceptualized as the only legitimate provider of security.
Only the state possesses the capabilities which are necessary to ensure
sovereignty, national security, and territorial integrity against
competing states within an anarchic international system. Therefore,
military security and material capabilities are emphasized. Similarly,
the neoinstitutionalist understanding of security considers the state to
be the main subject and object of security policy (Krasner, 1983).
Moreover, the merits of international institutions in general and
international regimes more specifically as the most promising means for
ensuring the provision of security for a state (Keohane/Nye, 1977) can
be considered on two levels. First, security regimes, i. e.
"principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actor expectation converge" (Krasner, 1983: 1) in the
security area might mitigate concrete conflicts among their participants
and prevent violent conflict management. Secondly, international regimes
in the policy fields of environment or human rights might serve as
arenas in which states can practice non-violent mechanisms of conflict
settlement. This practice might later on spill over into issue areas
more directly related to security policy and thus contribute to the
amelioration of conflicts through collective efforts.

In addition to traditional military threats studies, a variety of
broadening understandings of security emerge in critical security
studies (Tickner, 1995; Ullmann, 1983; Buzan et al., 1997; Waever, 1997,
2000; Burgess, 2007). A broadened understanding of security considers
non-military threats from outside and inside a state, such as
environmental scarcity and degradation, spread of diseases, mass refugee
movements, terrorism, or nuclear catastrophes. Ullman suggests a similar
broadening of national security, without considering its deepening
(Ullman, 1983: 133-135). The state is still in the center of such a
broadening understanding of security, where terms such as economic
security, environmental security, social security, or military security
only indicate different forms (and not fundamentally different concepts)
of security (Ullman, 1983: 152; Baldwin, 1997: 23). In comparison, the
emergence of the concept of "human security" (HS) in the 1990s
as a response to two changing dimensions of the international
order--referred to as globalization and the end of the Cold War--
entails both a deepened as well as broadened understanding of security.
To date, these political and economic transformations have increased the
risk of internal conflict and shifted the locus of
"insecurity" from the nation state and its allies to the
individual and the community. This shift has led to the recognition that
to protect and promote human development in the future, donors will
first have to address the issue of human security--the question of
security in people's daily lives (Leaning/Ari, 2000), which
involves four distinctive features: a focus on the individual, a concern
with values of personal safety and freedom, the consideration of
indirect threats, and an emphasis on non-coercive means (Bajpai, 2000).

In particular, coupled with the introduction of R2P, HS as a new
security framework has fundamentally challenged the core frames of
traditional security policy and offered new perspectives in connection
with both development and human rights policies. The objective of human
security is to safeguard the vital cores of all human lives from
critical, pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long-term
human fulfilment. (12) In other words, the security agenda from a
broadening and deepening perspective is supposed not only to address
those critical pervasive threats that cut into the core activities and
functions of human lives in large scale but also pursue the goal of
human fulfilment, with the focus on a limited core of individual
activities and abilities (i.e. on a fundamental subset of human
development and human rights). Lack of human security, for example, has
adverse consequences on economic growth and poverty and thereby on
development. Also, the lack of development, or imbalanced development
that involves sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important cause of
conflict with consequences of human rights violations (Stewart, 2004:
1). The widening and deepening understanding of security with two
referent objects (state- and human-/people- centered) thus constitutes
an evolving dialectic relation that offers a promising way to address
the contemporary security agenda of state, trans-state, and intra-state
security issues and the connections between them (Kerr, 2003).
Furthermore, the HS framework enables a description of the realities of
state failure and pervasive insecurity, therefore helping elaborate
strategies in a state and taking into account agency, interests, and
incentives on the part of various local, national, regional and
international actors (Boas, 2005).

The identification and fight against critical and pervasive threats
and the pursuit of human fulfillment (Alkire, 2003) illustrates the
intersection of security, development, and human rights and provides new
perspectives for each policy network. Figure 2.1 illustrates this
overlap between security, development, and human rights.

[FIGURE 2.1 OMITTED]

Area B demonstrates the convergence of the global development and
security agendas. At the normative and conceptual levels, one may find
that there are three types of connections between the two. First, there
exist immediate impacts of security/insecurity on well-being and,
consequently, on development achievements. The second type of connection
involves the way in which insecurity affects (non-security) elements of
development and economic growth (i. e. the ways in which it involves the
instrumental role of security). Thirdly, one needs to explore the ways
that development affects security, or the instrumental role of
development (Stewart, 2004). Based on this conceptual convergence, the
interconnectedness between security and development at policy and
implementation levels can no longer be ignored. Security policies may
become one part of development policy because insofar as they enhance
security, they will contribute to development. Policies towards
development may become part of security policies because enhanced
development increases security. Hence, these connections suggest a quite
radical revision of both security and development policies and their
multiple roles. Following this revision, security is considered an
intrinsic aspect of development and vice versa. Also, the development
costs of insecurity and the ways in which development (underdevelopment
and inequalities) affects security have increasingly gained attention in
the process of policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation
(Stewart, 2004: 11ff).

To date, both the security and development policy communities have
begun to respond to this interplay between security and development. On
the part of the foreign and security policy community, the European
Union (EU) for example, proclaims security as a precondition for
development in its European Security Strategy (ESS). It views the
tackling of poverty as one of the main challenges for European security.
It also adopts avenues opened up for the notion of security and pleads
to make multilateralism work through the consideration of the concerns
of developing countries (EU, 2003). Therefore, European policy-makers
emphasize a two-way link between development and security to be an
increasingly core tenet of EU foreign policy (Youngs, 2007). (13) On the
part of the development enterprise, a typology with a new focus on food
and health (in)security and several useful post-development approaches
have been deliberated that put forward the notions of
"ownership," "help to self- help," and "equal
partnership." These alternative views have undoubtedly challenged
the dominance of the neo liberal development approach that emphasizes
economic growth, privatization, and deregulation (Hopp/Kloke-Lesch,
2004, 2005; IHRN, 2008). Efforts have also been made to understand the
intersection of development, violence, and conflict resolution practice.
This task involves the deliberation of a comprehensive policy mix for
both short and long term that covers the methodologies (conflict
vulnerability assessments; conflict impact assessments etc.),
post-conflict agenda (reconciliation; security sector reform;
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration etc.), and context
(political economy of peacebuilding; role of corporations; relations
with the military). (14)

Area C involves the intersection between human rights and security.
A variety of studies have explored this controversial relationship at
different levels (for example Vincent, 1986; Forsythe, 2000). For one
thing, the protection of human rights by military means will directly
challenge a state's sovereignty and its territorial integrity. The
normative tension of international relations rooted in the UN Charter,
namely, national sovereignty and the forbidden use of force versus human
rights protection via military intervention, has found some release
through the introduction of the R2P doctrine. Still, R2P hinges directly
on the political will of a community of states to bring it into
practice, particularly in terms of the availability and consumption of
military resources (Bellamy, 2006: 145; Macfarlane et al., 2004).
Secondly, there exists a strong interdependence between human rights
violations and intractable conflicts at local, national, regional, and
global levels: Abuse of human rights often leads to conflicts that
threaten national and regional security, and conflict typically results
in human rights violations. Thus, human rights and security issues in
foreign policy have often been treated either as incompatible or
assigned a narrow instrumental role to fulfil their political functions.
Finally, the introduction of the R2P doctrine and the emphasis on
military action has raised broader questions about the relationship
between humanitarian action, development efforts, and military
intervention in the post-intervention phase. (15) Meanwhile, the notion
of HS seems to offer an alternative perspective, as the state is
expected to elaborate concepts, strategies, and measures that will
address critical and pervasive threats effectively and ensure both
national security and human fulfillment. Finally, the HS framework can
give new impulses for the conceptualization of international human
rights, as it embodies the security concerns of societies and unravels
insecurity issues where the most vulnerable can articulate their
security and human rights in their own terms, without being excluded and
alienated (Aballero-Anthony, 2004).

Area D involves the intersection between human rights and
development. To be sure, human rights as internationally recognized
standards constitute a basis for the accountability of governments,
corporations, and NGOs. Human rights have become not only a new source
of influence for NGOs' advocacy, but they have also challenged the
market-dominated view of development that has prevailed since the 1980s.
Development policy-makers and practitioners have recognized that
international development agencies (IDAs), both multilateral and
bilateral, must promote and protect international human rights when (in
collaboration with the national and local governments) they engage in
"development projects" that affect directly the basic needs
and interests of local populations (Paul, 1988-89: 67). In this spirit,
the UNDP's 2000 Human Development Report forcefully argues that
development strategies must be anchored in human rights reasoning and
must be influenced very early: in their conception and implementation.
Ramcharan also underlines the change of UN work by mainstreaming human
rights, which is critical for a successful development strategy
(Ramcharan, 2004: 41-42). In particular, both human rights and
development NGOs communities have adopted the following new approaches
to address this intersection that have already had important
implications for donor agencies and governments: a human rights-based
approach (HRBA) to development, joint advocacy work, and expanded
attention to economic and social rights among human rights groups
(Nelson/Dorsey, 2003). (16)

Finally, Area A deals with the overlap of security, development,
and human rights, which embodies new threats and insecurities (e.g. new
forms of nationalism, ethnic conflicts and civil war, information
technology, biological and chemical warfare, resource conflicts,
pandemics, mass migrations, transnational terrorism, and environmental
dangers). Many of the significant risks arising from human and natural
interactions do not emerge at global or local levels, but at
intermediate scales. Therefore, concepts like "sustainable
security," "sustainable development," and
"HRBA" have become crucial in the examination of both
opportunities as well as threats to security in order to offer
implications for possible agenda of action, including interconnected
frameworks, coalitions for change, interlocking institutional
arrangements and disaggregated goals and indicators (Khagram et al.,
2003). As material sufficiency lies at the core of human security,
problems of poverty and deepening inequality that manifest structural
human rights abuses are central concerns in both the security and
development policy agendas (Thomas, 2001). In particular, recognizing
the usefulness of the HS framework as it extends the understanding of
security beyond state borders, the UN has called for a more holistic
approach, focusing on people and their protection and empowerment so
that natural and man- made disasters, such as hunger, disease, and
socio-economic inequality can be effectively tackled. Thus, a consensus
gradually emerges in the international community regarding the
responsibility of the state to care not only for the wellbeing of its
citizens, but also for people that may be threatened wherever they may
be (UN GA, 2007).

In short, in view of the interconnectedness and interdependence
between security, development and human rights, their interplay has been
addressed not only in form of a critical conceptual assessment but also
in policy design and implementation, both from a widening and deepening
perspective in each policy field involved. It follows that the
embracement of new concepts, discourses and approaches such as "the
HS framework" (supported by the method of the assessment of
pervasive threats and insecurity), "sustainable security,"
"sustainable development," and "a HRBA to
development" has challenged existing core values and principles in
each policy frame. The extent to which the formation and functioning of
policy networks can healthily and effectively work for the pursuit of
the proclaimed objectives has thus become crucial.

This chapter has elaborated an institutional network governance
framework that highlights both the dimensions of policy
consensus/conversion or conflict and the interplay of security,
development, and human rights. To what extent this framework can help
explain the complexity of policy networks is to be tested in the
following analysis of the work of CIMIC/PRTs.

Policy Networks in Practice: The US and German Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan

Since the US-led invasion in the fall of 2001 that toppled the
Taliban regime, Afghanistan (its government, economy, and infrastructure
and society) has been reshaped in the midst of the global anti-terror
war and state- und nation-building processes, supported by major
military and political involvement of outside powers, including the US,
the UN and NATO. Whereas the 2001 Bonn Agreement set up the blueprint of
a new Afghanistan with democratic structure and institutions, the
five-year Compact adopted in 2006 in London (in the context of its
Interim National Development Strategy) marked a new phase of partnership
between Afghanistan and the international community, directed toward
long-term capacity building (Jalali, 2007: 39). In particular, the year
2011 witnessed a meaningful change in international commitments: a
considerable reduction of the military components, the strengthening of
capacity-building and training mission in the areas of governance and
security (17) and the preparation for The Transformation Decade of
2015-2024 after withdrawal of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF)-troops on December 31, 2014 (Bundesregierung, 2010 and
2011; International Afghanistan Conference, 2011).

To date, governance in Afghanistan has involved not only in a
polycentric networking system with several major communicative circles
(Bothe/Fischer-Lescano, 2002), it is also characterized by a high degree
of intensity and complexity of policy networks, as security,
development, humanitarian, and human rights issues become increasingly
intertwined in the nation-building and peacebuilding processes. How have
international, national, and local actors addressed the interplay of
security, development, and human rights? This section first identifies
the actors involved and their focus of policy engagement. It then
explores the emergence, purpose, and development of civil and military
cooperation (CIMIC) in the form of provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs). Through the examination of US and German PRTs, some first hints
of policy conversion or conflicts between security, development, and
human rights will be demonstrated.

Derived from a socio-cultural and -political agent-based model, the
power structure in Afghanistan can be described as having two core
elements: (1) patron-client and affiliations relationships and (2)
accumulation and re-distribution of resources between elite and
non-elite agents (Geller/Alam, 2010: 14-15). There are six communicative
circles that include international and Afghan actors. They involve
hierarchical and horizontal networking forms with diverse or/and
conflicting motivations, policy foci, and interests. First, legitimized
by UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and by the self-defense
in the sense of the Art. 51 of the UN-Charter, Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) pursues the goal to fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban
with the participation of military forces from Australia, Great Britain,
France, Canada, and Germany under US-command. OEF's policy focus is
then the pursuit of national, regional, and military security. Second,
regional actors and neighbors in the form a group of six plus two (Iran,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China and Turkmenistan, plus the USA
and Russia) have played a significant role in the fight against
transnational terrorism. Still, the role of Pakistan as a strategic
partner remains controversial. On the one hand, some observe that
Pakistan has changed its approach from a double-edged strategy to that
of close cooperation with the US counterterrorism efforts (Ghosh, 2010).
On the other hand, Pakistan continues to provide sanctuary support to
the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, the Hekmatyar group and Al Qaeda.
Key Afghan policy-makers have asked for more clarity with regard to the
question of who are friends and foes in the midst of the global
anti-terror war (Spanta, 2010). The policy focus of regional actors then
involves military and political security issues and the maintenance of
spheres of influence (Pakistan in particular).

Third, there exists the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA),
established by the UN General Assembly in December 1993 to seek the
views of a broad spectrum of Afghanistan's political leadership on
how the UN could assist the country to bring about national
reconstruction. Its Special Representative for Afghanistan has a mandate
to manage peacemaking activities involving the warring parties and
others concerned, with a view to facilitating the establishment of a
fully representative multi-ethnic and broad- based government. The
UNSMA's major concerns involve political stability and development
issues. Fourth, there are warlords, the Taliban, the Afghan National
Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Afghan central
government. Though Afghan warlords--without Taliban
participation--signed the 2001 Bonn Agreement that settled the
provisional arrangements for the re-establishment of permanent
government institutions, many Afghan local leaders have held and still
hold a skeptical and resistant attitude toward the Bonn Agreement, which
designs a model of central democracy. A strong central democratic
government would threaten their power spheres at the local level.
Therefore, many such groups are ready to adopt militant methods
(including the support of Islamic fundamentalists, terrorists,
insurgents, and criminals) to defend their political, economic, and
tribal interests. (18) It follows that the major concern of Afghan local
and national leaders largely diverges. On the one hand, local warlords
focus on the question of ethnic political representation and narrow
tribal and economic concerns. Despite its limited coercive capacity, the
Afghan central government has to fulfill its political role as mediator
among divergent local interests and also as a reliable partner toward
the international donors and actors. On the other hand, ANA and the ANP
are trained to take over the task of the provision of national and
political security. (19)

Fifth, based on resolution 1386 of December 2001, the Security
Council (SC) followed up on its security assistance pledge and
authorized the member states participating in the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) to "take all necessary measures to fulfill
its mandate." The SC has clearly stated that the ISAF is under the
US Central Command, so there is no interference to the successful
completion of OEF (UN document S/2001/1217). Normally, OEF has focused
on the ongoing search for Al Qaeda and fighting remnants of the Taliban
in the southern and eastern areas, although reconstruction activities
are also a key part of the military strategy. The ISAF has focused on
consolidating security in Kabul and its environs. Since 2003, the ISAF
under NATO command has embarked on a phased expansion, scheduled to
cover the whole country by November 2006. In other words, ISAF's
policy focus prioritizes the provision of military security, which
serves as a prerequisite for the carrying out of reconstruction and
development projects.

Finally, there are civil actors, both internationals and Afghans
themselves. The UN and donor states, for example, have focused on
supporting the political stabilization and building of new Afghan
political institutions, reconstruction, and economic recovery. Bilateral
aid for reconstruction and development has come from dozens of
countries, with USAID being the largest contributor. International NGOs
have also been involved in providing relief, rehabilitation,
reconstruction, development, and peacebuilding assistance. For example,
supported by international NGOs, an Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF)
was established in December 2001 with the aim of integrating the Afghan
civil society into peacebuilding and reconstruction processes
(Goeschel/Schnabel, 2005: 10). Moreover, a surge of private security
contractors (PSC) with foreign and local employees has marked the
flourishing of the outsourcing strategy of the military to save money
and time for the provision of security for its facilities. The security
operations of these contractors are designed to protect traveling
convoys and guard U.S. bases in troubled southern provinces such as
those located in Helmand and Kandahar. At the same time, serious
questions have arisen as to how these private forces are managed, when
they can legally use deadly force, and what happens if they break the
rules. (20)

The Emergence of the CIMIC and PRTs Concepts

The idea of the CIMIC is itself a tactical doctrine, which NATO
formulated in its Directive MC 411/1 in July 2001 and later
substantialized in its Allied Joint Publication (AJP9) in June 2003. In
it, CIMIC is defined as "the co-ordination and co-operation, in
support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors,
including national population and local authorities, as well as
international, national and non-governmental organizations and
agencies" (AJP, 2003). The primary function of CIMIC is to support
the military mission. Therefore, a networking relationship between
military and civil actors shall be maintained for information, personnel
and equipments exchanges so that successful military missions can be
ensured. In other words, the implementation of the idea of CIMIC means
that soldiers will take over humanitarian and development work in
war-torn/conflict situations over a specific period, for which they are
not trained. However, the logic standing behind this new concept is that
as social and development activities will boost the acceptance of local
populations toward the military and thus reduce the danger of attacks,
the new role of soldiers is designed to fulfill their military
assignment and to protect military forces (Burghardt/Pietz, 2006).

The PRT concept was launched by the US in November 2002, as
coalition commanders began to prepare the transition of OEF from its war
fighting phases to its stabilization and reconstruction phases. The
overall idea was to use small joint civil-military teams to expand the
legitimacy of the central government to the regions and enhance security
by supporting security sector reform and facilitating the reconstruction
process. Important elements of the PRT concept include: (1) the
integration of civil and military components for the generation of
synergy effects in the stabilization and reconstruction processes
(Schmuck, 2008: 117) and (2) the insurance of force protection through
improved military security measures and through civil measures so that
the presence of foreign personnel can be recognized by the local
communities (Brandstetter, 2005; Hofman, 2008: 31). This multinational
program has been characterized by an emphasis on flexibility, a
proliferation of national models, and an ad hoc approach to security and
development (Perito, 2005).

The first three PRTs were deployed by the US between December 2002
and March 2003, and the PRT Working Principles issued in February 2003
identified three areas of activity: security, reconstruction, and
central government support (Perito, 2005; Hett, 2005). In addition, the
principles also stated that the PRTs would engage in relief operations
in certain circumstances. The US invited other countries to establish
similar teams. By November 2009, a total of 26 PRTs had been established
with the participation of 14 nations whose personnel came from 40
nations (VENRO, 2009). Twelve PRTs have been managed by the US-led
Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) conducting OEF, and the
remaining 14 have been led by ISAF. Although the PRTs differ in size,
composition, and operational style, a number of common features stand
out: They are joint teams of civilian and military personnel consisting
of 50-300 personnel. They are generally made up by military personnel
(90-95 per cent of total), political advisors, and development experts.
The level of civil- military integration varies, and each team has been
tailored to ensure that they have the capabilities suited to mission
requirements in their respective regions through different mixes of
resources but with common components of defense, diplomatic, and
development staffs (the so-called 3D structure).

This 3-D structure is represented in all cases but with varying
emphasis on the D's (Irvine, 2011: 49). A PRT is typically composed
of military and civilian members with interagency and possibly
multinational attachments. It will have a Headquarter (HQ) and
Civil-Military Affairs (CA)/Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) sections,
a civilian-led reconstruction team, engineers, security and military
observer teams, linguists and interpreters, and a medical team
(Jacobsen, 2005; Brandstetter, 2005). PRTs have a broad mandate that
covers the following areas: (1) They engage key government, military,
tribal, village, and religious leaders in the provinces while monitoring
and reporting on important political, military, and reconstruction
developments; (2) they work with Afghan authorities to provide security,
including support for key events such as the Constitutional Loya Jirga,
presidential and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of militia forces; (3) they assist in
the deployment and mentoring of Afghan national army and police units
assigned to the provinces; (4) PRTs work closely together with the
Afghan Government, the UN, other donors, and NGOs to provide needed
development and humanitarian assistance.

In view of the structure of leadership, one can divide PRT into two
categories: light PRT, with a hierarchical military leadership (the US,
United Kingdom and New Zealand variants) and heavy PRT, with a double
civil-military leadership (the German model). With the full spectrum of
headquarter functions and the capability to maintain situational
awareness over an extended time period, a heavy PRT guarantees a
systematic and integral approach in identifying development
requirements, decision making, and planning, as well as evaluating
progress. In contrast, a light PRT addresses security issues with a
light footprint approach and is forced to concentrate these efforts and
development tasks i a few persons, dealing with numerous roles and
functions simultaneously (Brandstetter, 2005: 13; Ishizuka, 2007).

The US PRTs

The US drafted the idea of PRTs, but the American way of
formulating and implementing this concept differs greatly from other
nations' PRTs. For the US, PRTs have been convenient political
instruments to contribute to their respective exit strategies by getting
its allies into the country and pull its forces out (Irvine, 2011: 27).
The US approach is based on the traditional strategies of
counter-insurgency and winning hearts and minds, which the US military
has adopted for almost one decade in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Civil
actors in the PRTs are subordinated under military leadership. They all
pursue the goals formulated in OEF, namely, the uprooting of
transnational terrorism (Al Qaeda and the Taliban) and the pursuit of
sustainable stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

At the institutional level, the entire PRT program is designed to
benefit from an agreed upon concept of operations and an effective
central coordinating authority. Its model features a complement of
approximately 50 to 100 members (most of them from the military and
three civilian government representatives from the State Department, the
Agency for International Development (USAID) and from the Department of
Agriculture (USDA)). There is also usually an Afghan representative from
the Ministry of the Interior on the PRT. To be sure, the US PRTs profit
from interagency delimitation of civilian and military roles and
improved civilian agency staffing, funding, and administrative support
(Perito, 2005). They focus on issues of governance, force protection,
and quick impact development projects. Of great importance in each PRT
is the Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC), which coordinates the
work of PRTs with humanitarian organizations. Civil Affairs Teams and
civil experts are responsible for the deliverance of services in less
secure or underserved areas of Afghanistan. For example, USAID's
field program officers monitor all US reconstruction and development
efforts. They work to build relationships with local leaders, identify
local needs, and report on significant developments.

While most US PRTs have retained the original PRT model (that
emphasizes hierarchical military leadership), efforts have also been
made to adopt the German model of the PRT: a double civil-military
leadership (Schmunk, 2008: 117). The PRT for Panjshir-Tal has been led
by both the US military and a representative from the State Department,
Tom Kelsey. As Kelsey noted, a visit made by the US and Afghan leaders
in June 2009 highlighted the success Panjshir has achieved with the
assistance of the PRT in security, governance, and development, which
"has become a model for the rest of Afghanistan." (21)

In particular, the US PRTs in Regional-Command-East have
demonstrated how the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
elements (from training, fielding, and funding, to partnership with
maneuver units in the field) can be brought together to create the
desired stabilizing effects in a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) effort
(McCaffrey, 2009). They have been required to adjust their mindset to
think about kinetic and non- kinetic operations, serving both as a
security and development agency at the same time. (22) For example, as
officers and soldiers carry out a mission to reopen a school in
Afghanistan, it fits rightly into the Army's counterinsurgency
doctrine (COIN): protect the people, provide them with security and
government services, and they will turn away from insurgency (Klein,
2010a). (23) The question at stake is no longer how the enemy can be
engaged, but how the local district governor can be engaged. This
counterinsurgency doctrine has already found positive resonance among
Afghan and Pakistani leaders.

Meanwhile, the effects of the rules of engagement remain limited,
as soldiers involved in PRTs often find themselves trapped by the
dilemma of self-protection and prohibition to harm a civilian.
Frustrations and uncertainties emerge when PRT efforts appear to be in
vain and when "winning over" the local people does not produce
concrete results. (24) In particular, critics find that reconstruction
projects have suffered from a lack of coordination and oversight.
Military involvement in development brought criticism from relief
agencies that claimed such tactics put development experts at risk by
blurring the distinction between combatants and humanitarian workers
(VENRO, 2009). Worse, in view of the surge of international and local
PSCs, the local population in urban and rural areas alike had
difficulties in clearly differentiating between PSCs and the existing
international military establishment (including the PRTs), which
appeared to further reduce the likelihood of PRTs' success in
winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people (Swisspeace, 2007:
28). Even though US PRTs have striven to refine their medial cultural
program in the south and east, where Pashtuns are the majority ethnic
group, the work of PRTs remains largely limited, as the PRT might have
become a means of serving the provider rather than the customer. (25)
Finally, continuing differences and divisions between civilian
representatives and military commanders regarding COIN have had negative
consequences including poor coordination and deteriorating relations
with the Afghan central government (WP, 2010; DeYoung, 2010).

The German PRTs

Germany's involvement in Afghanistan can be attributed to its
commitment to the NATO alliance against the backdrop of the global
anti-terror war rather than to important strategic interests (Runge,
2008). The German model is distinctive from the U.S. model in that it is
much larger, has dual military and civilian leadership, a large force
protection component, and a clear separation of the military,
diplomatic, and development parts.

There are currently two German PRTs in Afghanistan, which are
stationed mainly in the northern provinces (Kunduz & Fayzabad). In
October 2003, the Bundeswehr (German federal armed forces) took over a
US PRT and since then has developed a third model of PRT (besides the US
and the UK models), which emerged as the first PRT in the context of
ISAF and under NATO's command. In the largest German PRT, in
Kunduz, there are approximately 500-600 German soldiers with civil
representatives from the Federal Foreign Ministry (AA) and the Federal
Ministry of the Interior (BMI). Unlike US and UK PRTs, which are
involved mainly with military engagement and are led by the military,
the German PRTs are characterized by a double civil and military
leadership, namely led by both the AA and the Federal Ministry of the
Defense (BMVg). Besides this distinction, both the BMI and the Federal
Ministry of Development Cooperation (BMZ) have participated in the
implementation of the German PRT concept. At the institutional level,
coordination and cooperation work among four ministries is deemed to be
of great advantage for a more effective result, as their cooperation
should constitute an integrative modus operandi, conceptual and
operational (Bundesregierung, 2008; Paul, 2008: 16). The
responsibilities of each ministry are clearly defined. For example,
whereas the AA is responsible for the coordination of the civil aspects
of PRTs and the contact with local and international decision makers,
the BMZ coordinates development projects and allocates project contracts
(Hett, 2005).

Though the German PRTs differ from the US and UK models, they
don't carry out development projects with a large scale but rather
tackle those so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), which are deemed to
produce short term results and also protect armed forces. The CIMIC
projects are generally financed by the AA, BMZ, and private actors. The
QIPs have been mainly financed by the Provincial Development Funds
(PDF). Still, in comparison with the German operations in the Balkans,
its PRTs engagement remains proportionally insufficient in Afghanistan.

The content of German PRT work consists of three aspects. First,
PRT officers establish civil and military relationships with local
actors, representatives of the UNAMA, and international and local NGOs.
Second, PRTs are to support local reconstruction projects so that the
armed forces can be well accepted and recognized by the local population
and so that force protection can better be achieved. Third, PRTs are
supposed to support the armed forces through the information about the
area picture, local military and civil actors, as well as social,
economic, medical and ethnic situations in the region involved.

In particular, ISAF pursues a long term goal, in which the
principle of "self- responsibility" is the core and in which
the capabilities of the ANA should be strengthened (Deutsche Bundestag,
2005, 2007). Therefore, the German PRTs have developed a local
peacebuilding approach, working together with local authorities and
population (Nachtwei, 2008). They have for example, established a
permanent Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) to widen the areas of
engagement, where PRTs are not present (in the Provinces Takhar, Jawsan,
Sar-e Pol and Samangan). Also, the consulting teams are supposed to
fulfill this function, too. As of 2009, German PRTs have changed the
focus of their involvement toward more training work with civilian
elements in the fields of security, governance, reconstruction and
institution building, so that the Afghan counterparts can profit from
this strategic partnering cooperation and take charge in the provision
of security and stability by their own in the near future. Consequently,
the transfer of German PRTs' tasks to local counterparts has run
more smoothly than other PRTs models, where the restructuring process
from military to civil elements has taken much more time and incurred
greater costs. (26)

The German PRTs have so far received positive feedback among Afghan
military and political leaders. Based on a study conducted by the BMVg,
experts note that CIMICs have grown up with gathered experience. The
German government also observed that international commitments including
German efforts in Afghanistan have achieved significant results during
the past decade. Still many things remain to be done. (27) The concept
of CIMIC/PRT has become an important tool for the safeguarding of
effective operations, particularly in such fluid security situations as
in Afghanistan. However, PRTs' work covering security, good
governance, and development issues have challenged the perceptions,
capacity, and behavior of involved soldiers and officers of the
Bundeswehr, which have a traditionally rigid structure and organization.
Not only do soldiers and officers have to adapt to the new complex
situations in trying to cultivate their intercultural competence, they
also have to refine their military capacity in the midst of the internal
restructuring process of the Bundeswehr (Seiffert, 2012: 79-85). The
Kunduz accident in September 2009 in particular has made the issue of
juridical status and security of soldiers in international criminal law
more visible, as there exists a strong degree of ambivalence about the
rules of engagement in such contested areas as in Afghanistan. (28)

Furthermore, critics express their frustrations and disappointments
in several points. First, financial, human/personnel, material resources
remain insufficient. Field personnel daily confront an impossible
mission--to build a state without the culture of a nation state (Paul,
2008). Secondly, there are claims that these efforts are missing a
coherent strategy, which is expected in the framework of successful
state- and nation-building processes (Hett, 2005). Furthermore, the
cooperation with local warlords, including the recruitment of former
militiamen as PSCs for the protection of armed forces, has also been
under attack. Finally, NGOs consider the incorporation of civil elements
in the military operations to be inappropriate, as the proportion of the
mixture between the civil and military elements have threatened the
neutrality of NGOs and henceforth their acceptance in the population.

The idea and formation of PRTs arose in the context of changing
understandings of security (in both the widening and deepening sense)
and a relativist tendency of national sovereignty, in the merging of
development and security discourse and policy, in the bid for coherence
in development and humanitarianism, and in the increasing politicization
and instrumentalization of aid. These factors have changed the basis for
action by international actors responding to global threats and have led
to new modes of intervention (Sidell, 2008). From an institutionalist
network governance perspective and based on the interplay shown in the
figure 2.1, the following paragraphs present some first hints of the
interplay of issues between security, development, and human rights
through the PRT work.

The overlap between security and development

In pursuing security, good governance and development in the state-
and nationbuilding in Afghanistan, PRTs now are considered as the most
appropriate policy option in a mid-range intensity of violence where
instability still precludes heavy NGO involvement but where violence is
not so acute that combat operations predominate. Different institutional
arrangements, a constellation of resources and modes of interactions
have led to different types of coordination and cooperation work between
security and development agencies, IOs and NGOs. At the institutional
level, as observed by an interagency team, US PRT military commanders
need to incorporate civilian representatives into PRT strategy
development and decision making (Feickert, 2006: 10). Civilian agencies
also are asked to assign personnel with appropriate training and
experience to PRTs in order to better fill key US PRT positions. In this
sense, both military and civilian actors have to well tailor their
resource commitment in order to facilitate policy coherence for the
pursuit of policy goals. At the interactional level, whereas German PRT
experience has demonstrated a constructive relationship with some
development NGOs, (29) there are some NGOs that, from the very
beginning, choose to distance themselves from any cooperation work with
governmental agencies. They still have been able to obtain funds from
Europe and establish local tribal support to carry out of their projects
even in the regions under the US command. (30) Furthermore, as OED does
not subordinate under a UN mandate, its PRTs work often has been viewed
as part of anti-terror operations rather than as reconstruction
activities. The soldiers are assigned to do COIN, for which they are not
trained. This has led to a mixture between anti-terror operation and
reconstruction work (Hett, 2005: 10 ff). For Afghan local communities,
the question "who is doing what" has led to some kind of
confusion and misunderstanding toward PRTs (their role and mandate)
(Roberts, 2007).

The overlap between development and human rights

Though human rights and its promotion as a normative policy goal
have not been officially incorporated in the PRT work, at the
interactional level, some development projects with educational agenda
to promote the rights of girls to education and the efforts of some
human rights NGOs to promote gender issues within the PRTs can be viewed
as creating some synergistic effects for the promotion of human rights
(Roberts, 2007). For example, one lesson learned from a US PRT is that
PRTs should always promote Afghan women's attendance at all
provincial and district level meetings where possible. (31) At the same
time, the PRT work has often prompted unrealistic expectations among the
local population. As the discrepancy between expected results and
reality has led to frustration and loss of trust, this loss of trust in
the local population has in turn hindered the humanitarian and
development work. In particular, as the NGO sector booms and NGO
communities have spent up to 60 percent of their available funds alone
for their administration and personnel costs, the Afghan government has
begun to address the issue of NGOs' wasted funds and corruption in
Afghanistan (Mayr, 2010; Goodhand / Sedra, 2006).

The overlap between security and human rights

At the interactional level, PRTs have confronted a cluster of
contentious issues that arise in combat and non-permissive environments
to cloud not only the relationship between international civilian
assistance providers and international military forces but also the
relationship between international military forces, the Afghan
government and local communities. For one thing, the contentious issues
surrounding the relationship between the international civilian
assistance and the military include: the preservation of the
humanitarian space that NGOs and IOs require to operate, the role of
PRTs in promoting a secure environment, the use of military personnel to
provide assistance, and information sharing and coordination. For
example, there exist fundamental differences in the way the civilian
assistance communities and military leaders conceive of a secure
environment. (32) Also, the US and some of its NATO allies are engaged
in their PRTs' work often to the point of merging security and
assistance objectives, which has at times put their civilian
counterparts in an inappropriate situation (Minear/Donini, 2006: 3).
With regard to the relationship between the military and local
communities, despite the strict counterinsurgency rules to minimize
civilian deaths, the number of unintended collateral civilian deaths in
the midst of counterinsurgency operation, as shown in NATO airstrike in
September 2009, has highlighted the intrinsic tension between the
maintenance of security and the protection of civilians in contested
areas. In particular, as the US attempted to boost the number of
alternative security forces, Human Rights Watch has documented alarming
levels of abuse by the Afghan Local Police, a force created by the US in
remote areas. (33)

The overlap between security, development and human rights

Has the practice of PRTs been able to ensure their proclaimed
synergy effects in effectively addressing the interplay of security,
development and human rights? Policy consensus and/or conflict can be
recorded to be functional in the form of heavy PRTs (the German model),
which means a relatively healthy degree of transparency, coordination
work, policy evaluation, and trust at the institutional and interaction
levels can be observed. In comparison, US PRTs in the form of light PRTs
often fall short of adequate resources commitment and considering local
needs (see the table 3.2). Still, the effects and success of a PRT
remain highly contingent and depend on a variety of factors: the
formulation of the strategic goal, mission requirement, demand of the
host (local) government, and particularly the acceptance of the local
population toward the stationed PRT. As long as PRTs are regarded as a
part of the military, which has often prompted the recurrence of the
collective memory of the past war experience and foreign invasion in
Afghanistan, the credibility and success of PRTs will remain largely
limited. In particular, NGOs have paid a considerably high price for
such an alignment with the military in the framework of PRT work.
Confronting an increasing number of aid workers (international and
local) being victims of insurgencies, Donini considers this interplay of
different issue networks to be a threat of the universality and
neutrality of humanitarian action. (34) Hence, the functions of
governance networks reflected in the work of PRTs can be considered as
instrumental, where dominant security interests have striven to achieve
their goals and the aligned civilian actors are often confronted with
the challenges of the externality of their aid and development
enterprise and the accompanied collateral damages and difficulties in
carrying out their projects.

Conclusions

Supported by an institutionalist network governance framework, this
article addresses the intersection of security, development, and human
rights through the analysis of CIMIC/PRT as a new policy approach in the
complex nationbuilding in Afghanistan.

The analysis of the work of US and German PRTs shows that PRT model
as an interagency and integrated policy approach has been able to fill
the security- development gap (Uesugi, 2007) and prompted the
redefinition of the norms and rules of each policy frame involved and
called for more adaptability and widening capacity of each
institution/agency involved to understand norms and rules of other
policy counterparts. The PRTs have helped extend the authority of the
Afghan government beyond Kabul. They have also facilitated
reconstruction and dampened violence. At the same time, human rights
issues have become elusive in the stability operation work of PRTs. Even
while PRTs have helped pave the way from the transition toward the
transformation period, where Afghan actors through strengthened capacity
building can later take responsibility to guarantee the provision of
security and development of their own country, PRTs fall short of
addressing the underlying causes of insecurity in Afghanistan (the
Taliban and Al Qaida, ethnic and regional rivalry, the infighting
between warlords, increased lawlessness and banditry, and booming opium
poppy cultivation and drug trade). In particular, due to the strong
variation among different national models, the PRT model has had
difficulties in measuring the effects of ongoing operations and
determining whether the mission was on the right track. The methodology
for assessment of progress was underdeveloped, and the participants had
different appreciations of where the main challenges lay (Marklund,
2011). Thus, experts have suggested that the PRT should develop
appropriate more mechanisms for the measurement of its progress and
adopt a comprehensive strategy with an integrated sticks-and-carrots
approach. (35) In particular, as some NGOs have successfully worked with
local structures not only for the provision of security but also for the
strengthening of the Afghan ownership in their development projects, the
method of local embeddedness with the strong participation of local
actors can surely provide innovative ideas for the modification of the
PRT concept, which may efficiently address the drawbacks of the current
PRT work (Schmeidl, 2006: 4). (36)

In view of the continuing weakness of the Afghan central
government, whose political power has been mainly limited to the Kabul
area and is still crippled by problems of corruption, many have become
disillusioned about the feasibility of a Western model of presidential
democracy in Afghanistan anchored in the 2001 Bonn Agreement (Baker,
2011). As noted by Biddle/Christia/Thier, the development of current
politics unravels a tendency towards more decentralization--either in
the form of a decentralized democracy (with federal states) or a less
demanding model of mixed sovereignty--where local warlords would have
more power even without democratic election and transparency. With this
recognition in mind, for the US, NATO, the UN, international donors and
NGOs, their major task is to work out an acceptable solution that would
help put Afghanistan toward more security and sufficient stability in
the near and long-term future (Biddle/Christia/Their, 2010).

Finally, as the dominance of security interests in the integral
policy approach of PRT has often intruded into and challenged the policy
frames of development activities and human rights work, the introduction
of the Human Security discourse, it seems, has yet fundamentally
transformed the traditional security paradigm. The questions of policy
consensus/conversion and conflict and how they have been addressed have
still been mainly caught in the (neo)realist mindset. Therefore, a
possible research agenda to deepen our understanding of the nexus
between security, development, and human rights may be twofold: First, a
systematic uncovering of the functions of diverse horizontal
interactions (cooperation, coordination, conflict and resistance)
reflected in the governance networks will be needed. Second, the
phenomenon of how different understandings of security, development, and
human rights in different socio-cultural contexts have interacted with
what paradigm conflicts and with what effects on the policy networks
involved deserves more clarification.

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Ishizuka, K. (2007). Security issues facing peacebuilding in
Afghanistan: Is a light-footprint approach a panasea? Paper presented in
the 19th Annual Meeting. The Academic Council on the United Nations
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Kline, S. (2006). "The 'Responsibility to Protect'
as the New Doctrine of Intervention for the Ecumenical Movement?"
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Christian Ethics, Wadham College, Oxford University.

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Afghanistan's most Vulnerable Population. Prepared for the
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University School of Public Health.

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(1) An early version of this article was presented at the 10th
International CISS Millennium Conference "Global Cooperation:
Alliances, Institutions, and International Relations," July 4-5,
2010, Venice, Italy. I thank Edward R. McMahon, Gavin Mount, and
anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments.

(2) As noted by Barnett, what once was a unilateral activity
monopolized by powerful states has increasingly become a multilateral
project (Barnett 2002).

(3) PCPB is defined as "action to identify and support
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to
avoid relapse into conflict" (Butros-Ghali 1992).

(4) For them, security between states remains a necessary condition
for people's security. However, they notice that national security
is insufficient to protect people's security. Canada for example
has identified peacebuilding, peacekeeping, disarmament, the protection
of the rights of children and economic development through rule-based
trade as key areas of the HS endeavor (the so-called Ottawa/Canada
approach). See Bajpai 2000: 17-20.

(6) Elaborated by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) and adopted by the member states of the UN at
the 2005 World Summit, this concept can be viewed as an attempt to make
state boundaries more permeable (Broughton 2007: 3). Details about the
controversies surrounding humanitarian intervention and regional
responses see Macfarlane et al. 2004.

(7) The ideas of the R2P contain the more general principles of
"sovereignty as responsibility," the responsibility to prevent
conflict, to react, and to rebuild peace. The doctrine has particularly
listed the more specific threshold criteria and operational and
cautionary principles--right authority and due process--to ensure the
ethical legitimacy of intervention. See ICISS 2001; Thakur 2002.

(8) The article is mainly based on desk research with sources from
official documents, academic and agency papers, added by two expert
interviews conducted respectively in September 2010 and March 2012.

(9) USAID finds for example that the deprivation of land rights
constitutes one of root causes of food insecurity in the Greater Horn of
Africa. See USAID 1994. Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President
Clinton's Initiative on the Horn of Africa. Building A Foundation
for Food Security and Crisis Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa: A
Concept Paper for Discussion. Nov.
<http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/ghai/cycle/causes.html>.
Similarly, Womankind Worldwide, a UK-based development charity, argues
that gender inequality is a root cause of poverty and insecurity in many
developing countries. See Womankind Worldwide 2005. Submission to the
International Development Committee Session on Development and Conflict.
<www.womankind.org.uk>.

(10) Thus, a combination of concepts and tools from different
disciplines can be deployed to put some order into the chaos, including
policy narratives, policy communities, discourse analysis, regime
theory, change management, and the role of street-level bureaucrats in
implementation (Sutton 1999).

(11) Issue networks can be considered as arenas in complex policy
processes. They are also occasionally an advocacy coalition where a set
of actors negotiating with one another about the way to solve a specific
problem or realize (or block) a particular project (Koppenjan 2007:
144-45).

(12) The action of "safeguard" means that HS is
deliberately protective. One should develop strategies providing HS,
identify the threats and then seek to prevent threats from
materializing, mitigate harmful effects for those that eventuate, and
help victims cope. In this sense, the vital cores of HS pertain to
survival, to livelihood, and to basic dignity (Alkire 2003).

(13) At the same time, there exist some fundamental drawbacks in
the ESS. It obviously omits that development is also a precondition for
security. In some ways, the ESS is simply an exposition of European
threat assessment and underlying principles to guide subsequent actions,
rather than a genuine strategy--with agreed targets and objectives and
detailed action plans for their achievement (Pullinger 2007).

(14) Against this background, some important concepts and
approaches have been presented. For example, the "Do Not Harm"
approach that strives to minimize the negative impact of humanitarian
and development assistance under conditions of conflict; the concept of
human security; the "global system reform" movement that
infuses concerns with development and conflict nexus in all North-South
relations of trade, investment, and consumption (Uvin 2002).

(15) As Kline points out, R2P raises serious challenges for relief
agencies and humanitarian organizations concerned that their
humanitarian work will become even more associated with military actions
(Kline 2006).

(16) In a more concrete manner, the concept of HRBA to development
(including the fight against poverty) is contained in five legal
principles, namely: 1) application of the international human rights
framework; 2) empowerment of rights holders; 3) participation in
one's own development (as of right and not just as best practice);
4) non-discrimination and prioritization of vulnerable groups; as well
as 5) accountability of duty-bearers to rights-holders (for process and
impact). See IHRN 2008.

(17) Information obtained through a background information
interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of the Defense
(BMVg) on March 6, 2012.

(19) As planned, some 352,000 (ANA) will be ready to defend the
country the day most US army leaves. Still, troop quality is poor due to
the large quotas to fill and time pressure for training. Moreover, ANA
has troubles with the problems of Taliban infiltration, drug use and
desertion (Baker 2011: 28).

(20) As of March 2010, there were 112,092 Department of Defense
(DOD) contractors in Afghanistan, compared to approximately 79,100
uniformed personnel. In other words, contractors made up 59% of
DOD's workforce in Afghanistan. The DOD established an office to
oversee them. See Schwartz 2010 and Anne Flaherty 2009. "In
Afghanistan, US military's 'Help Wanted' sign,"
Associated Press (AP), March 23.

(21) Statement made by the US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. See
"ISAF: NATO forces in Afghanistan: US and Afghan Leaders visit PRT
Panjshir," by Air Force Capt. Stacie N. Shafran and Army Sgt. Sean
Finch Provincial Reconstruction Team Panjshir Public Affairs Office,
June 15, 2009, <http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=89929864839>

(22) Soldiers are trained to act in a kinetic environment (that is
Army code for a place where the likelihood of attack is great and that
the military force will be called upon to employ weapons and tactics to
defeat an armed enemy). Non-kinetic operations are those tasks that
soldiers are asked to do that involve anything other than combat related
tasks. The distribution of humanitarian aid, mentoring local officials
to plan and build local infrastructure and governance capacity, and
assisting in facilitating development work are all non- kinetic tasks
for military forces working in a PRT setting. See Irvine 2011: 54.

(23) The COIN doctrine introduced by the former ISAF commander
Stanley McChrystal has considerably changed the earlier
counter-terrorism strategy of training soldiers as storm troopers to
find, fix and finish the enemy.

(24) "They (the people) are sitting on the fence, waiting to
see which side is stronger." (Lieutenant Reed Peeples, Dog Company,
cited in Klein 2010a: 20).

(25) "You cannot reach the Pashtun people with such programs
presented (Monday 'Mother Teresa' and Tuesday
'Rambo'!" Information gained via an email correspondence
with the president of a German NGO "German Aid for Afghan
Children" Dr. med. Reinhard Eroes, on Sept. 6, 2010. See also
Jalali 2007: 37.

(26) Information obtained through a background information
interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of the Defense
(BMVg) on March 6, 2012.

(27) Cited in VENRO 2009. See also Bundesregierung 2010 and 2011.

(28) A deadly coalition airstrike near the city of Kunduz in
northern Afghanistan has killed civilians (with an overall death toll
estimated as high as 70). According to NATO, the airstrike targeted
militants who had stolen two fuel tankers the day before. It said that
most of those killed were Taliban. On the other side, Afghan authorities
said that civilians who had flocked to collect free fuel at the behest
of insurgents died among them. Despite the vague details, it was
supposed to be the deadliest attacks on civilians, since the
introduction of strict counterinsurgency rules to minimize civilian
deaths. The attack has prompted deep military consequences as well as
political ramifications in Germany. Oberst Klein who commanded the
airstrike resigned and has been accused of violating norms of
international criminal law. The Federal Court later has decided not to
pursue further judicial procedures against Oberst Klein, issued on April
16, 2010. See Generalanstalt des Bundesgerichtshof 2010; Pietsch 2012:
116-117.

(29) Information obtained through a background information
interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of the Defense
(BMVg) on March 6, 2012.

(30) In times of unrest and protests, where anti-Americanism
resentments re- emerge (for example, following the accidental burning
Korans in February 2012), these NGOs prove to be in a safer situation
than their counterparts and IOs who work with governmental agencies. See
newsletter from a German NGO "Kinderhilfe-Afghanistan", issued
on Feb. 25, 2012.

(31) Lesson Learned by US PRT, as reported by US DoS, Afghanistan
Desk, August 2007.

(32) The military emphasizes national security, public order,
stability and force protection--all of which are enhanced by assertively
addressing and reducing the sources of threat. On the other hand,
civilian assistance providers equate security with ensuring that the
belligerents do not perceive them as a threat (Dziedzic/Seidl 2005).

(33) These militias have been accused of rape, murder, extortion,
armed land grabs and human rights violations. Cited in Baker 2011: 32.

(34) "... the externality of the aid enterprise and the
baggage that comes with it--values, lifestyle, attitude, and behavior of
aid workers--challenge the purported universality of humanitarian
action. The coherence agenda, exemplified both by the integration of
humanitarian and human rights concerns within the UNAMA and by the
pressures on NGOs to be part of the Coalition's 'combat
team,' colors the operating environment of the aid community. And
the heavy toll inflicted by insurgents and criminal elements on the
security of aid workers, both Afghan and international, cuts across the
three other themes and deeply affects staff morale and the ability to
address critical humanitarian need" (Donini 2006: 2-3).

(35) These mechanisms may include well managed relationship with
relevant actors, an agreement between these actors on the operational
objectives, a systematic and structured approach to the assessment of
all lines of operations, a reinforced link between planning and
assessment, and adapted staff skills (Marklund 2011). A comprehensive
strategy should couple the deployment of more PRTs by NATO with
determined action against those causes of insecurity (Jacobsen 2005;
Biddle 2010; Kissinger 2010).

(36) The development and educational work of a German NGO
"German Aid for Afghan Children" in the east of Afghanistan
proves to be successful, as it has gained full support from the local
population, where for example two girl schools have been established
even during the Taliban regime. Information acquired through a speech
given by Reinhard Eroes, president of this NGO, Sept. 2, 2010, Akademie
Franz- Hitze-Haus, Muenster, Germany. Details see
www.aid-for-afghan-children.com

Table 2.1: Consensus/Conversion and Conflict/Division at
institutional and interaction levels within policy
networks (a modified version based on Koppenjan 2007: 151)
Institutional level Interaction level
Consensus/ Too much Systematic Exclusion or
Conversion exclusion of ignorance of problem
interests and perceptions,
parties; information,
non-transparency; alternatives and
merging of policy innovation
paradigms, clear
policy priorities
and preferences
Functional Offers certainty Simplifies and
in uncertain facilitates policy
setting; moderate formation and
conflict through implementation,
enduring relations, problem-solving;
adoption of reduces
cross-over policy transaction costs
perspectives
Too little No sustainable lack of trust;
institutional interaction is not
arrangements or brought about or
solutions reaches deadlock
Conflict/ Too much Hinders process; mistrust;
Division network competition for
disintegrates resources; high
transaction costs;
solutions are not
brought about or
are ineffective;
with negative
consequences for
relations
Functional Prevents closeness; has mobilizing and
does justice to accelerating
pluriformity; effects;
promotes contributes to
transparency, information
conflict provision, variety,
management, quality and
fruitful policy innovation
evaluation
Too little Insufficient Lack of commitment
articulation of and variety;
interests; centralized or
inadequate planning little mobilization
and allocation of of resources
resources and use
of capacities
Table 3.1: US and German PRTs in comparison
A comparison between the US and German PRTs is summarized in
the table 3. 1.
Structure Actors
US PRTs Hierarchy; military Department of
leadership; Defense (DOD); the
subordination State Department;
under the global USAID; the
anti-terrorism war Department of
Agriculture (USDA);
private security
contractors; Afghan
political elites;
international/US
human rights and
humanitarian
organizations
German Inter-ministerial Federal Ministry of
PRTs (interagency) Defense; Federal
structure; Ministry of Interiors;
horizontal Federal Ministry of
coordination Foreign Affairs;
networks Federal Ministry of
Development and
Cooperation; German
Technical
Cooperation (GTZ);
German civil
contractors;
international/German
human rights and
humanitarian
organizations
Fields of
Goals, Principles engagements
and Rules and strategies
US PRTs Global anti-terror Winning
war; force hearts-and-minds-
protection; the strategy;
pursuit of counter-terrorism;
sustainable counterinsurgenc
stability and y (COIN);
reconstruction in integrated
Afghanistan sticks-and-carrots
approach
German To achieve PDF; PAT
PRTs sustainable
security and
stability;
Assurance of
democratization
process; Afghan
ownership in the
nation-building
process;
Strengthening of
the legitimacy of
the Afghan central
government in
Kabul; Acceptance
and recognition
among the local
population
Table 3.2: Consensus/Conversion and Conflict/Division at
institutional and interaction levels within policy networks
Institutional level Interaction level
US PRTs Consensus/Conversion Consensus/Conversion
(Light PRTs)
* Too much: clear policy * Functional:
priorities and preferences coordination and personnel
(global anti-terror war; arrangement problem
force protection) between civilian and
military actors
Conflict Conflict
* Too little: civilian * Too little: Dependency
embeddedness in the on the breadth of
military structure; capabilities of a small
organizational fluctuation number of personnel;
due to short time lack of consideration of
engagement the local mindset and
needs
German PRTs Consensus/Conversion Consensus/Conversion
(Heavy PRTs)
* Functional: Inter-agency * Functional: facilitates
structure fosters mutual cooperation and interfaces
trust with civilian
organizations (UN
agencies and NGOs)
Conflict Conflict
* Functional: Each * Functional: has
ministry maintains its mobilizing and
resources planning accelerating effects;
authority; conflict contributes to
management; fruitful information provision
policy evaluation; (OI: operational
however certain information)
disadvantages in the
command structure

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