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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000061
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TAGS AND SIGNER)
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, S/CT, INR
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/OCS/EUR
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: PRELPTERPGOVKINFKISLPINRNL
SUBJECT: DUTCH PREPARED TO BE PROACTIVE ON RELEASE OF
WILDERS FILM ON THE KORAN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 58
¶B. 11/29/07 GARRO - SMITH E-MAIL
¶C. 07 THE HAGUE 314
THE HAGUE 00000061 001.3 OF 004
¶1. (C) Summary. The Dutch government and major
municipalities are preparing contingency plans to respond to
the anticipated release in early February of a short film
expected to be critical of the Koran and of Islam made by
Dutch Parliamentarian Geert Wilders. Extensive Dutch and
international press reporting on the film has indicated that
the film is likely to be inflammatory, and possibly include
comparisons between the Koran and Mein Kampf, as well as
scenes of the Koran being burned or ripped up. Wilders,
whose right-wing populist Freedom Party (PVV) has an
anti-immigration platform, has made statements in the past
year that the Koran is a "fascist and violent" book that
should be banned in the Netherlands. Officials from the MFA
and Office of the National Counter Terrorism Coordinator have
told Emboffs that the Dutch government is concerned about the
potential for violent reaction to the film, especially in the
Muslim world, and will be proactive in addressing the film,
both to disassociate the government from Wilders' views and
to ensure public safety at home. The city governments of
Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which have large Dutch Muslim
populations, are actively engaged in planning to act swiftly
to prevent, and if necessary, suppress violence following the
film's release. End Summary.
---------------- -----------------------------
-----------------------------------------
----------------------
APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DANISH CARTOON CRISIS
-----------------------
--------------------------------------
------------------------------------ -----------
¶2. (C) Andre van Wiggen, Deputy Director of the MFA's
Terrorism and New Threats Department, told Emboffs January 16
that the Dutch government has been discussing strategies for
responding to an event similar to the release of the Wilders
film "since the Danish cartoon crisis." He said that the
interagency security steering group established to ensure
that the Dutch government would be adequately prepared to
respond to threats to Dutch interests at home or abroad had
been meeting "intensively" since the government first got
word in mid-October of Wilders' intent to make a film on the
Koran. Van Wiggen said that Wilders had told National
Counter Terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) Tjibbe Joustra that he
would not release the film before early February, and had
committed to notifying NCTb 24 hours in advance of its
release. Separately, a contact at NCTb confirmed to RSO that
Wilders had commited to providing NCTb 24 hours notice, and
an opportunity to review the tape, prior to release. Van
Wiggen expressed confidence that Wilders would abide by this
commitment. He requested that this information be kept very
close hold within the USG. The security steering group is
chaired by the Deputy National Counter Terrorism Coordinator
and includes representatives from the Interior, Justice, and
Foreign Ministries and the AIVD intelligence service.
¶3. (C) Van Wiggen stated that the government was prepared to
be proactive in responding to the film and reactions to it
once it was released, but did not provide specifics. He said
that the planning group had an idea of the film's content,
and anticipated the film would cite certain verses from the
Koran and end with a "symbolic act." He did not indicate
whether government officials had seen any portion of the
film. He said the GONL anticipated a "stronger" reaction to
the film abroad, in particular in the Muslim world, than in
the Netherlands, where he said many were already displaying
"Wilders fatigue," which might blunt violent reactions. He
said the security group's scenarios predicted that reactions
abroad could be more widespread and violent than the
reactions to the Danish cartoons. He did not rule out the
potential for violent protests in the Netherlands, adding
that a police and public safety coordinating group had also
THE HAGUE 00000061 002.2 OF 004
been established to develop contingency plans for maintaining
public order, especially in the four largest cities.
Ensuring adequate protection for foreign missions in The
Netherlands, he said, was an essential component of the
group's planning process. An official in NCTb's Surveilance
and Protection Department told RSO in a separate conversation
that NCTb and The Hague police meet at least bi-weekly to
review security measures in the city, in particular with
regard to high value buildings, including the U.S. Embassy.
¶4. (C) Van Wiggen stressed that while the government was
prepared to be proactive, they also wanted to ensure that
they took "the right measures at the right time." In
particular, he said, it was critical to avoid a
self-fulfilling prophesy by overreacting, or appearing to
predict violence, especially before the film was released.
He also stated it was critical to avoid the appearance that
the Dutch government would try to censor the film. He said
that the Foreign Minister as well as both the Justice and
Interior Ministers had met with Wilders in November to
caution him about the potential negative repercussions of
releasing the film, but had no intention of censoring it. He
said that FM Verhagen had met in Madrid on the margins of the
Alliance for Civilizations meeting with the Chair of the
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) to discuss the
situation. The meeting was at the request of the OIC, which
had contacted MFA to ask the government to take steps to
suppress the film. The Foreign Minister, he said, had
explained that any attempt to violate Wilders' freedom of
expression was out of the question; the government could not
prevent the film from being made or released. Van Wiggen
added that subsequent to its release, the content of the film
would be evaluated to determine if it violated any criminal
statutes in the Netherlands.
¶5. (C) Asked whether the government had reached out to
governments or religious leaders in the Muslim world or to
Western allies to request information on anticipated
reactions among local populations or support in constraining
violence in the wake of the film's release, van Wiggen said
no. This was due to Dutch government reluctance to involve
other countries in what was still a domestic issue. He said
that the MFA had alerted Dutch embassies abroad to the
potential for violent reactions to the film, but had not sent
specific instructions for approaching host governments or
elevating their security posture. It was up to each embassy
to ensure that its security contingency plans were adequate
and up to date. Van Wiggen noted that the MFA and embassies
had received a large number of information requests about the
situation from other governments, to which they were trying
to be responsive. He noted that the government would welcome
any information the USG might gather through its channels
about potential reactions abroad to the film's release.
¶6. (C) Van Wiggen's comments track closely with Counter
Terrorism Coordinator Joustra's comments to Representative
Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) during his November 29 visit to The
Hague (Ref B). Joustra indicated then that the Dutch
government had serious concerns about the potential for a
violent reaction to the film, at home and abroad. He said
the Dutch had learned from the Danish cartoon crisis, and
that it would have a proactive communications strategy in
place to disassociate the government from the views which he
anticipated would be expressed in the film. At the same
time, Joustra said, they did not want to elevate the
potential negative impact of the film by overreacting. He
noted that the Dutch were more exposed in many Middle Eastern
capitals than the Danes, due to their high-visibility fixed
investments in the region. Joustra told Hoekstra that NCTb
would closely monitor developments in the run-up to the
release of the film (which at that time was believed to be
mid-January) to determine whether it would be appropriate to
raise the national threat assessment level, which is
currently set at "limited." He added that Wilders has
repeatedly made inflammatory comments about Islam and the
Koran in the past year, attributing the relatively mild
THE HAGUE 00000061 003.2 OF 004
reactions from Dutch Muslims to the fact that they are
becoming accustomed to "outrageous statements" from Wilders
(Ref C).
-----------------------------------
--------------------------------
PREPARING TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SECURITY
-----------------------
--------------------------------------------
AT THE NATIONAL....
-------------------------------
¶7. (C) A contact from the Dutch National Police (KLPD)
Counter Terrorism squad (UCTA) confirmed to Legatt Ofice
January 16 the anticipated early February release date. He
said it was their understanding is that the film has not yet
been completed. He said that UCTA was preparing a summary of
national and local law enforcement preparations for the
release of the film; that summary is expected to be completed
and shared with foreign police liaison officers through the
KLPD's International Police Liaison Office (DINPOL) by
January 18.
... AND LOCAL LEVELS
-----------------------------------
¶8. (SBU) A senior Amsterdam regional police official told
the Consul General January 16 that the police force has plans
in place to respond effectively to any incidents of violence
in the wake of the film's release. He acknowledged the
possibility that there could be "opportunistic" or
spontaneous outbreaks of violence in the city, but stressed
that the municipal government would not tolerate any violence
or criminal acts. He said that the police Community Liaison
Officers had been in close touch with community groups and
imams, to assess possible reactions and to urge calm. He
noted that imams at several mosques in the city had already
begun to call in their Friday sermons for calm in response to
press reports about the film's anticipated content. He
assured the CG that the police would be prepared to provide
adequate protection to the Consulate General should any
demonstrations approach the vicinity of the consulate.
Similarly, an official from The Hague regional police assured
RSO that they have plans in place to respond should violent
incidents take place in the vicinity of the Embassy, which is
two blocks from the Parliament buildings.
¶9. (U) Over the January 12-13 weekend, the Amsterdam police
detained eight anti-Wilders protesters associated with the
International Socialists who displayed placards with a photo
of Wilders above a caption stating, "Extremist - can
seriously damage you and society" in a take-off of health
warnings on cigarette packets. Wilders stated that the
protesters' allegation that he was an extremist was "too
disgusting for words," but defended their right to protest
since they did not make threats against him. He said the
police should have "let them get on with it." Amsterdam
Mayor Job Cohen also expressed surprise, and requested an
explanation of why the police had detained the protestors.
¶10. (SBU) The director of the Rotterdam municipal government
anti radicalization program told a visiting staff delegation
from the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs
committee on January 10 that the city's public security
department was concerned about the potential for violence in
the city following release of the Wilders film. He said that
the city would work closely with community liaison officers
to monitor community responses and to urge calm. In a
separate conversation, a policy officer for the Platform for
Islamic Organizations in the Rijnmond Region (SPIOR), an
umbrella organization of 60 Islamic associations in the
Rotterdam area, told the staffdel that SPIOR is working
closely with its membership and the city to urge calm when
the film is released. She said that the potential for
violent reactions could not be ruled out, adding that there
THE HAGUE 00000061 004.2 OF 004
was a sense among many younger Muslims in particular that
Islam has been repeatedly denigrated and the Wilders film
would be a "step too far." She expressed appreciation for
the open communication between her group and the city
government.
¶11. (U) According to press reports, Interior Minister Ter
Horst, who overseas the national police and the domestic
intelligence service, wrote to every mayor in the Netherlands
in November to request that they be alert to tensions between
Muslims and non-Muslims upon release of the Wilders film.
The Ministry offered assistance, which several towns
reportedly have accepted, in preparing contingency plans.
The Minister's letter was leaked to the press on January 16.
-----------------
COMMENT
-----------------
¶12. (C) The Dutch at the national and local levels have been
open with us in acknowledging their concerns about the
prospect for violence at home and abroad in the wake of the
release of Wilder's film. The government appears prepared to
respond swiftly to get out a message that will stress the
importance of respect for freedom of expression while
disassociating the Dutch government from Wilder's views on
the Koran and calling for calm among key population groups at
home and abroad. Mission elements will maintain close
contact with national and local public safety officials to
ensure mission security posture is appropriate. Results of
January 16 EAC meeting reported Ref A.
Gallagher