The claimant applied for disability insurance benefits, contending that
he was unable to work because of low back pain, dizziness, and seizures
and/or blackouts. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
determined that the claimant was not disabled and denied his application.
The ALJ determined that while the claimant's back injury alone prevented
him from performing his past work as a commercial fisherman, the claimant
could perform other work which exists in the national economy; that the
claimant's subjective complaints of seizures and blackouts were
exaggerated and not adequately supported by the record as a whole; and
that the blackouts, if occurring at all, did not happen with such
frequency or severity as to preclude the claimant from performing light
exertional work not involving heights or working near moving machinery. On
appeal the district court found that inconsistencies in the claimant's
statements and complaints supported the ALJ's determination that the
claimant was not wholly credible. The court noted that the ALJ''s finding
that the claimant could engage in light work not involving moving
machinery or heights, took into consideration the claimant's subjective
complaints and credibility, the lack of objective findings supporting the
alleged afflications, the conflicting and inconclusive medical reports, as
well as expert vocational testimony. The court further noted that the
ALJ's finding presumed that the claimant experienced back trouble and some
passing out periods, but not to the degree alleged. The district court
observed that "[w]here evidence is susceptible of more than one rational
interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion which must be upheld" and that
"in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences
logically flowing from the evidence." Furthermore, the court observed that
an ALJ may disregard a claimant's self-serving statements if they are
insufficiently supported by objective findings, and that the ALJ is not
bound by even uncontroverted medical opinion on the issue of disability
where there is a convincing reason for rejecting it. Finally, the court
found that while the ALJ had relied in part on the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines (the grid regulations) in determining whether jobs existed in
the national economy that the claimant could perform, the ALJ had used
them only as framework and in conjunction with the testimony of a
vocational expert, since the ALJ had correctly noted that reliance upon
the grid regulations alone in determining the existence of such jobs was
precluded by the claimant's particular combination of complaints.
Accordingly, the district court held that substantial evidence
supported the Secretary's determination that the claimant was not
disabled.

ENRIGHT, District Judge:

Introduction

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) after the Social
Security Administration denied his application for disability benefits. He
is a 36 year old male of strong build. He has not worked since December
17, 1981. On that date while working on an American fishing vessel, he was
struck on the head 100 pound fish which had slipped through a net twenty
to thirty feet above. Mr. Rodrigues was knocked unconscious, but revived
shortly thereafter and was helped below deck. He had been wearing a
hard-hat. He was not evacuated to the United States until four days later
when the vessel put into port at Acapulco, Mexico. Upon his return to the
states he was admitted to Sharp Cabrillo Hospital for ten days of
treatment and observation.

On May 6, 1986, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff's two paragraph brief, however, cites no authority and no facts
from the record. On June 23, 1986, the government filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. Both motions are before the court for resolution.

Discussion

The burden of proving disability is on the claimant. However, once he
establishes a prima facie case of disability by showing that an impairment
prevents his engaging in his previous occupation, the burden of going
forward with evidence shifts to the Secretary. The Secretary then has the
burden of proving that the claimant can engage in other types of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. Gonzalez
v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1986); Hall v. Heckler,
602 F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979.)

Rodrigues' claimed disability comprises complaints of low back pain,
recurring dizziness, and seizures and/or blackouts. The ALJ determined
that plaintiff established a prima facie case of disability. His back
injury alone precludes his returning to work as a fisherman which requires
heavy bending and stooping, and lifting 100 pound loads. The ALJ further
determined, however, that plaintiff's subjective complaints of seizures
and blackouts were exaggerated, and not adequately supported by medically
acceptable objective clinical findings. The ALJ concluded that the
blackouts, if occurring at all, did not happen with such frequency or
severity as to preclude plaintiff's performing light exertional work,
limited with respect to restrictions upon working at heights or around
moving machinery.

Disposition of this appeal turns on two primary considerations: whether
the Secretary has made sufficient specific findings to the credibility of
plaintiff's subjective complaints, see e.g., Swanson v. Heckler,
763 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985); Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d
499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1983); and whether the Secretary has "come forward
with specific findings that the claimant has the physical and mental
capacity to perform specified jobs, taking into consideration the
requirements of the job as well as the claimant's age, education, and
background." Gonzalez v. Heckler, 784 F.2d at 1419.

The Secretary's determination of plaintiff's residual capacity relied, in
part on application of Rule 202.17 of the Medical Vocational grids. The
Ninth Circuit has determined that the guidelines describe only "major
functional and vocational patterns," and that if the guidelines" 'fail
accurately to describe a claimant's particular limitations, the Secretary
may not rely on them alone to show the availability of jobs for that
claimant.'" Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456-57 (9th Cir.
1984).

Here, the ALJ noted that the particular combination of complaints
precluded reliance upon the grids alone; he used them only a frame work
and in conjunction with the testimony of a vocational expert.

Addressing the specific complaints, the record reflects that upon
discharge from Sharp Cabrillo Hospital on January 8, 1982, treating
physician Chandler diagnosed, "(1) Cerebral concussion [and] (2) Cervical
and lumbar strain syndrome." He reported that x-rays of the cervical and
lumbar spine were normal except for mild "slipping" at the "L1-2 level." A
bone scan of the entire spine showed no abnormalities. By letter dated
February 3, 1982, Dr. Chandler reported that plaintiff's "most prominent
and aggravating symptoms consist of dizziness and blackout spells." Dr.
Chandler, at plaintiff's request, referred him to Dr. Ford for
neurological consultation, noting that it was both his and treating
physician Renaudin's impression "that there has been some exaggeration of
symptomology with this patient," suggesting that if this opinion was
shared by Dr. Ford, psychiatric consultations would be appropriate.

Dr. Ford's letters following examinations in February 1982 relate
plaintiff's description of his blackout spells, but note "no evidence of
any organic neurological deficit." He reports a normal EEG, and opines
that the spells described "could represent seizure disorder, but that [he]
doubted it."

By March 25, 1983, however, faced with plaintiff's continued complaints
of headaches and blackout spells, Dr. Ford stated in a letter to
plaintiff's counsel that he could "only assume that they represent a post
concussive syndrome." Despite a normal EEG, he began treating plaintiff
for post traumatic seizure disorder, prescribing two anticonvulsant
medications, Dilantin and Tegritol. Because plaintiff was complaining of
three blackout spells per month, Dr. Ford opined that he could not return
to work as a fisherman.

Treating physician John Cleary, a neurological surgeon, followed
plaintiff's progress from 1982 to 1984, treating him for low back pain. By
letter dated June 27, 1983, he described plaintiff's symptoms as mild, low
back pain increasing with activity. A CT scan of the lumbar spine dated
October 5, 1982 showed only minor bulging of the annulus at the 5th-8th
lumbar disc. It was Dr. Cleary's opinion that plaintiff's back condition
precluded only heavy lifting or stooping, but that the alleged blackout
spells being treated by Dr. Ford precluded his returning to work.

None of the treating or consulting physicians ever witnessed one of these
blackout spells, and plaintiff never sought medical assistance immediately
after one of his alleged seizures.

Dr. Byron King, in his letter dated May 4, 1983, states, "It is my
opinion that regarding the lower back problem alone, the patient would be
able to return to work as a commercial fisherman, but would have to be
careful about objects that he lifts. . . ."

Dr. Ford in late 1983 referred plaintiff to Dr. Lefebvre, a psychiatrist,
who referred him to Dr. Shaddick, a psychologist and neuropsychologist.
His six and one-half page report diagnosed. "Axis I: Epilepsy by history.
Axis II: Deferred to Dr. Lefebvre. Axis III: Mild left cerebral cortical
damage with primary temporoparietal involvement. The left temporal lobe
appears to be most affected. Axis IV: Psychosocial stresses (unemployment,
inability to function effectively on a daily basis, severity 4-moderate).
Axis V: Highest level of adaptive functioning past year, 5-poor." He felt
that plaintiff's disability as a result of these deficits was moderate.

On April 26, 1984, Dr. Freedman, a neurological surgeon, opined that the
type of injury plaintiff sustained should not lead to a post-traumatic
seizure disorder. He also questioned the consistency of plaintiff's
presentation: "The 'seizures' as described by the patient have apparently
changed so that he is giving quite a different history than he did
originally do Drs. Renaudin and Ford." It was Dr. Freedman's opinion that,
in all likelihood, the blackouts are "functional rather than organic [in]
origin," but that if he was blacking out he would be precluded from
driving a car and "totally disabled from returning to his usual work as a
commercial fisherman."

At hearing, plaintiff complained of two or three seizures per month, each
requiring two to three days of recovery. He also claimed to pass out four
or five times per week, an ailment different from the seizures. He
indicated that he, his wife and three children collect $700 per month in
welfare, $150 per month in food stamps, and $360 per month in seaman's
maintenance and cure. At the time of his hearing, he had a Jones Act claim
pending against Pan-Pacific Fisheries. He has a fourth grade Portuguese
education, and displays modest skills in English and Spanish.

A vocation expert testified that if plaintiff experienced seizure
episodes with the frequency he claimed, and of the character claimed --
i.e., entailing muscle weakness and blurred vision for upward of four
hours after each episode--he was not employable. However, if he
experienced two or three blackouts as opposed to seizures per month, there
would be approximately 20,000 jobs in San Diego County which he could
perform in light, unskilled, sedentary positions such as a wrapper,
packer/sorter, and hand assembly not involving moving machinery or
heights.

Because of the lack of acceptable clinical evidence supporting a
neurological deficit, the ALJ indicated that plaintiff's credibility
assumed paramount importance. The court notes that "[w]here evidence is
susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's
conclusion which must be upheld," and "in reaching his findings, the ALJ
is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence."
Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d at 1453. The ALJ may disregard a
claimant's self-serving statements if they are insufficiently supported by
objective findings, id., at 1455, and he is not bound by even
uncontroverted medical opinion on the issue of disability where there is a
convincing reason for rejecting it. Id. at 1454.

The ALF found plaintiff's complaints to be less than wholly credible,
concluding that if plaintiff experienced blackouts and/or seizures, their
frequency and debilitating character were exaggerated. In reaching this
conclusion, he relied first on the lack of neurological deficit reflected
in the record, and on the doubts to the existence of a seizure disorder
expressed by Dr. Ford in February 1982, and again in May 1983 when he
ordered psychiatric evaluation after plaintiff continued to complain of
blackouts despite anticonvulsant treatment and continued negative clinical
findings. While Dr. Ford's treatment presumed the presence of blackouts,
and while Dr. Lefebvre accepted plaintiff's allegations in this regard in
finding no significant psychiatric impairment, Dr. Freedman in April 1984
questioned the consistency of the history reported in plaintiff,
indicating that plaintiff's problem was likely "functional rather than
organic.'

The ALJ then noted that because of the pendency of Jones Act litigation,
plaintiff had little motivation to work, relying heavily on
inconsistencies and contradictions in the record which tended to erode
plaintiff's credibility by documenting a tendency to exaggerate.

For instance, plaintiff told Dr. Lefebvre that since the age of 27 he had
been a nautical navigator. When questioned about this at hearing he stated
that she must have misunderstood him; he had only been engaged as an
ordinary fisherman.

In April and May 1983 plaintiff claimed he had only a fourth grade
Portuguese education. He told Dr. Shaddick in November 1983, however, that
he had an "American high school" education. He repeated this same
allegation to Dr. Lefebvre, adding that he had attended a university in
Mexico. At hearing he denied ever having claimed to have an education
beyond the fourth grade.

He also claimed at hearing that he had not driven since the shipboard
accident. On January 25, 1983, however, he told Dr. John Cleary that
subsequent to his accident he had "two passing out spells while
driving."

The ALJ was not alone in noticing inconsistencies in plaintiff's stated
history. Dr. Shaddick's report refers to inconsistencies between
claimant's statements and "information available in other medical
reports."

The court notes an inconsistency concerning the severity of plaintiff's
initial trauma. In December 1981, he told the attending physicians at
Sharp Memorial Hospital that other crewmembers had told him that he had
been unconscious for fifteen minutes after being struck by the fish.
Months later he told Dr. Ford that he had been unconscious for twenty
minutes. By September 20, 1982, he had stated to attending physicians that
he had been unconscious for three-quarters of an hour. And, by May 1983,
he had told consulting physicians that he had been unconscious for
approximately three hours.

Where, as here, medical reports are inconclusive. "questions of
credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions
solely of the Secretary." Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642
(9th Cir. 1982). The inconsistencies in plaintiff's statements and
complaints support the ALJ's determination that he is not wholly credible.
The ALJ's finding that plaintiff can engage in light sedentary work not
involving moving machinery or height takes into consideration plaintiff's
subjective complaints and credibility, the lack of objective findings
supporting the alleged inflictions, the conflicting and inconclusive
medical reports, as well as expert vocational testimony. It presumes that
plaintiff experiences back trouble and some passing out episodes, but not
to the degree claimed. Additionally, plaintiff's depression is attributed
to an adjustment disorder associated, in part, with his dependence upon
his wife and lack of employment. His obtaining work would mitigate, not
enhance, any psychological impairment.

Under these circumstances, the court finds substantial evidence
supporting the Secretary's determination that claimant is not disabled.
The ALJ's determination that claimant complaints are not wholly credible
must "be given great weight." See, Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528,
531, (9th Cir. 1985).

Conclusion

Upon due consideration of the parties' memoranda and exhibits, and for
the reasons set forth herein, the court denies plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, and grants the Secretary's cross-motion for summary
judgment.

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