چکیده انگلیسی

The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker [Econ. Philos. 12 (1996) 133–163] and Battigalli and Siniscalchi [J. Econ. Theory 88 (1999) 188–230], and used to analyze rational play in extensive form games. But while the properties of Aumann structures are well understood, without a formal language in which belief and belief revision statements can be expressed, it is unclear exactly what are the properties of these dynamic models. Here we investigate this question by defining such a language. A semantics and syntax are presented, with soundness and completeness theorems linking the two.

مقدمه انگلیسی

It is well established both theoretically and empirically that strategic reasoning requires
agents to form not just conjectures about each other’s actions, but also about each other’s
knowledge and beliefs, which can then be used to infer what actions they might take. In
particular, the implications of common knowledge of rationality, where all the agents are
rational, all know they are all rational, all know that they know, and so on, have been
extensively analyzed. More recently, epistemic foundations have been provided for game
theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995).Comprehensive surveys of work in this area are provided by Dekel and Gul (1997) and
Battigalli and Bonanno (1999).
Much of this work is based around the Aumann structure model (see Aumann, 1976),
in which each agent’s knowledge is represented by an information partition over a set
of states, or possible worlds. For the purposes of the game theorist, however, Aumann
structures have several important limitations. First, they describe a very strong concept
of knowledge. An implication of modeling agents’ epistemic states with information
partitions is that everything they know is true, and that they have complete introspective
access to this knowledge, i.e. they know everything they know (positive introspection), and
they know everything they do not know (negative introspection). Negative introspection in
particular has widely been considered inappropriate. More generally, it has been thought
important to analyze agents’ beliefs as well as their knowledge. And beliefs, unlike
knowledge, can be false. These issues can be dealt with be replacing the information
partitions with possibility correspondences (see e.g. Samet, 1990). Beliefs modeled by
possibility correspondences at their most general do not satisfy any of the properties
described above. By imposing certain restrictions on the correspondences we can recover
these properties one by one.
The second problem with using Aumann structures to model rational play in games
is that they are essentially static: the epistemic states that they model are fixed, while in
dynamic games1 agents have a chance to change their beliefs as the game progresses.
In particular, conjectures about what strategies one’s opponents might be playing can be
revised as moves are observed. A stark illustration of the importance of such revisions
is given by Reny (1993), who shows that once the possibility of belief change is
taken into account, the game-theoretic wisdom that common knowledge of rationality
implies backward induction in games of perfect information is undermined. As long
as the information that an agent learns is consistent with what she already knew or
believed, this problem can be handled in the existing framework. The agent’s partition (or
possibility correspondence) can be refined, in a manner analogous to Bayesian updating of
probabilities, to take account of the new information. But, like Bayes rule, this process is
not well defined when the information learned is incompatible with the agent’s previous
beliefs, i.e. she is surprised. And modeling the response to such surprises is crucial: to
evaluate the rationality of strategies in a dynamic game, we must have a theory about what
the players would believe at every node in the game, even though some of these nodes will
typically be ruled out by the players on the basis of the information they possess at the
beginning of the game.
Models of dynamic interactive reasoning have thus been developed. Stalnaker (1996)
replaces the information partitions of the Aumann structure with plausibility orderings on
the set of possible worlds, which encode information not just about each agent’s current
beliefs, but also about how these beliefs will be revised as new information is learned, even
if this new information is a surprise (e.g. it takes the form of an unexpected move made
by one’s opponent). This seems to be a satisfactory resolution to the problem, and models of this kind have been used by Stalnaker and others to analyze rational play in dynamic
games.
From a philosophical point of view, however, there is something unsatisfactory about the
Aumann structure model and all its extensions, as identified by Aumann (1999) himself:
“. . . the whole idea of ‘state of the world,’ and of a partition structure that reflects the
players’ knowledge about the other players’ knowledge, is not transparent. What are the
states? Can they be explicitly described? Where do they come from?” (p. 264). Fagin et
al. (1999) elaborate further: “If we think of a state as a complete description of the world,
then it must capture all of the agents’ knowledge. Since the agents’ knowledge is defined
in terms of the partitions, the state must include a description of the partitions. This seems
to lead to circularity, since the partitions are defined over the states, but the states contain
a description of the partitions” (p. 332).
Economists have developed an alternative model of interactive beliefs which seems to
avoid this circularity. The hierarchical approach (Mertens and Zamir, 1985; Brandenburger
and Dekel, 1993) takes as its starting point a set of states of nature, which describe facts
of interest about the physical world, such as which strategy profile will be played. Each
agent’s beliefs about the state of nature is represented by a probability distribution over the
set of states of nature; their beliefs about these beliefs are then represented by a probability
distribution over these distributions and the set of states of nature; and so on. In this way,
we build up an infinite hierarchy of beliefs for each player, called her type (after Harsanyi,
1968). In contrast to the Aumann structure approach,where the infinite hierarchy of beliefs
is generated implicitly by partitions over obscure states of the world, here it is explicitly
constructed from levels of probability distributions over clearly defined states of nature.
The question remains, however, as to whether a state of nature together with a description
of each agent’s type provides a satisfactory description of a state of the world. For
it is not clear that an agent’s type gives a complete description of her beliefs. Her type
specifies what she believes about all the finite-level beliefs of her opponents, but does it
actually describe what she believes about their types, what she believes about what they
believe about her type, and so on? It turns out that as long as the types satisfy certain
coherency conditions, we can answer this question in the affirmative. These coherency
conditions amount to assuming that the agents satisfy positive and negative introspection,
and guarantee that the belief hierarchies are closed.
Furthermore, the hierarchical model can be extended to deal with the problem of
belief revision. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) have shown how to construct hierarchies
of conditional probability systems; the level-0 probability systems describe each agent’s
(probabilistic) beliefs about the physical world as before, but they also encode information
about how these beliefs are revised. The level-1 systems represent the agents’ beliefs over
these level-0 systems, and so on. Again, as long as the appropriate coherency conditions
are satisfied, these hierarchies are closed and each agent’s type describes all of her beliefs.
Any extra clarity these hierarchical constructions might bring, however, is paid for at
a price of greatly-increased complexity. The complexity of these models may well be self
defeating: Aumann (1999) describes them as “cumbersome and far from transparent. . .
In fact, the hierarchy construction is so convoluted that we present it here with some
diffidence” (pp. 265, 295). In addition, two more specific problems arise. The first concerns
the coherency conditions that are required for closure of the hierarchies. As we have already discussed, it may not always be appropriate to assume that agents have complete
introspective access to their epistemic states; this remains true even if we are dealing
with belief rather than knowledge. In the case of conditional probability systems, the
coherency assumption becomes even stronger: here it is assumed that agents have complete
introspective access to their belief revision schemes as well. Ideally we would like to have a
system that is flexible enough to work with or without positive and negative introspection.
The second problem arises when we consider the non-probabilistic analogue of these
belief hierarchies, where each level in the hierarchy describes simply which members
of the previous level the agent considers possible, rather than assigning probabilities to
each (the former is not generally derivable from the latter: a world may be considered
possible even if it is assigned zero probability). In this case it turns out that, even
with the appropriate coherency conditions, the infinite hierarchy does not in general
provide a complete description of an agent’s uncertainty; that is, it does not tell us which
types of her opponents she considers possible (Fagin, 1994; Heifetz and Samet, 1998;
Brandenburger and Keisler, 1999).
Thankfully there is a path between this Scylla and Charybdis, between the obscurity of
Aumann structures and the complexity of belief hierarchies. Epistemic logic is based on
a formal language which can express statements about the world and what agents believe
about the world and about each other. The language is built up from a set of primitive
formulas by means of an inductive rule. The primitive formulas and each step of the
inductive process are entirely transparent. Hintikka (1962) showed how Kripke structures
(Kripke, 1963) can be used be provide a semantics for this language, i.e. a set of rules for
determining the truth or falsity of every sentence or formula in the language. Hence there is
no issue about whether or not these structures provide a complete description of the agents’
uncertainty: the language itself defines the limits of what we can and cannot say about the
agents’ beliefs.
There is a very close connection between Kripke structures and Aumann structures: the
former are a general version of the latter, where the information partitions are replaced
by possibility correspondences (traditionally referred to as accessibility relations), plus
the addition of an interpretation which assigns truth values to the primitive formulas.
Kripke structures are general enough to model knowledge or belief, with or without the
introspection assumptions. Certain properties of Kripke structures correspond to various
axioms and rules governing the behavior of formulas in the language: these axioms and
rules, jointly referred to as an axiom system, give us a precise characterization of sets of
formulas which are true in different types of Kripke structure, and hence an elucidation of
the particular concept of knowledge or belief that is being modeled. The axiom system and
language form a syntax for the logic.
But there is a gap still to be filled. In order to extend the results just described to
structures such as Stalnaker’s, we must develop a language that is richer than that of
epistemic logic. In Section 2 of this paper, we define such a language by adding revised
belief operators to the standard language. Thus, if Biφ is a formula of the language, then
so is B
φ
i ψ, to be interpreted “i believes that ψ on learning that φ.” We then present
a semantics for this language consisting of belief revision structures, which look much
like a generalized version of Stalnaker’s structures. A theorem links these structures to
an axiom system which describes how these revised belief operators, and the rest of the language, behave. This axiom system is essentially the most basic axiom system of
epistemic logic augmented by additional axioms and rules that correspond to some of the
AGM axioms of belief revision (Alchourrón et al., 1985). These axioms are reproduced in
Appendix A. Several extensions to the model, including the introduction of introspection
and consistency axioms, and common belief operators, are developed in Section 3, and
Section 4 comments on some issues which are not treated by our formalism.
Before we start, however, we should comment more carefully on the relevance of this
work for game theory. The importance of higher-order beliefs in strategic reasoning is
well understood,2 and in the dynamic setting it is essential to model how these beliefs
change as agents learn new information. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) have used their
hierarchical models of belief revision to provide an analysis of forward-induction reasoning
in its various guises (including the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps, 1987), as well as
an epistemic characterization of backward induction. The logical approach adopted here,
although less direct in application than the hierarchies of Battigalli and Siniscalchi, forms
the basis of an alternative, complementary, framework for analyzing dynamic games, and
offers simplicity at the same time as transparency. The simplicity comes from the semantic
structures that are used to provide truth conditions for formulas of the formal language:
these structures are easily adapted to provide epistemic models of games (see Section 5
for an example). Unlike the constructions of Battigalli and Siniscalchi, which are infinite
by definition, these models can be very small. And the axiom system and the language
itself, which provide the syntax of the logic, are straightforward to interpret and give us
transparency. This syntax lays out the “rules of argument” and allows nothing to be hidden
in the formalism. Soundness and completeness theorems establish equivalence between
what is true in every structure and what can be proved in the axiom system: the notoriously
tricky task of proving that a formula can be derived from a given set of axioms and rules is
thus reduced to the mathematical problem of checking that our structures have a particular
property. This methodology is adopted by Board (2002a) in a companion paper. Other
papers which adopt the logical approach to analyze dynamic games include Clausing
(2001) and Feinberg (2001); we discuss the logical components of those papers, along
with other related literature, in Section 6.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

The aim of this paper has been to develop a dynamic model of interactive reasoning
which combines analytical simplicity with clarity of interpretation. Belief revision
structures are similar to the models used very successfully by Stalnaker to analyze
rational play in extensive form games (Stalnaker, 1996), and to shed light on the forward
and backward induction procedures (Stalnaker, 1998). These structures provide truth
conditions for a formal language. Soundness and completeness theorems establish tight
connections between the formulas that are true in various classes of belief revision
structure, and those that are provable in certain axiom systems, thereby giving us a precise
understanding of what the structures mean.