The Doctrine of Strategic Sufficiency

Our policy remains, as I explained last year, to maintain strategic
sufficiency. The concept of sufficiency is not based solely on debatable
calculations and assumptions regarding possible scenarios of how a
war might occur and be conducted. It is in part a political concept,
and it involves judgments whether the existing and foreseeable military
environment endangers our legitimate interests and aspirations.

Specifically, sufficiency has two meanings. In its narrow military
sense, it means enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential
aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking. Sole reliance on a
"launch-on-warning" strategy, sometimes suggested by those who
would give less weight to the protection of our forces, would force us
to live at the edge of a precipice and deny us the flexibility we wish
to preserve.

In its broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of
forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus
the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet
Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital
security interests will not be underestimated. I must not band my
successors must not -limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction
of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges. This
is especially so when that response involves the likelihood of triggering
nuclear attacks on our own population. It would be inconsistent
with the political meaning of sufficiency to base our force planning
solely on some finite --and theoretical-- capacity to inflict casualties
presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.
But sufficiency also means numbers, characteristics, and deployments
of our forces which the Soviet Union cannot reasonably interpret as
being intended to threaten a disarming attack. Our purpose,
reflected both in our strategic programs and in our SALT proposals,
is to maintain a balance, and thereby reduce the likelihood of nuclear
war. Insofar as we can do so by unilateral decisions, we seek to obviate
the need for costly, wasteful and dangerous cycles of strategic arms
deployment.

Defensive in its essence, the decision to pursue a policy of strategic
sufficiency rather than strategic superiority does not represent any
lessening of our resolve not to permit our interests to be infringed. The
doctrine of sufficiency represents, rather, an explicit recognition of the
changed circumstances we face with regard to strategic forces. The
United States and the Soviet Union have now reached a point where
small numerical advantages in strategic forces have little military
relevance. The attempt to obtain large advantages would spark an
arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless. For both sides
would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a
balance. We have deliberately chosen to tailor our policy to fit these
realities. But we are also taking measures in other categories of military
power to prevent a gap from developing in our military posture.

We hope that the Soviet Union will likewise recognize these realities,
and that its force buildups are ending. It should be under no
illusion that we will not respond to major quantitative and qualitative
improvements which threaten to upset the strategic balance.

In pursuing our policy we have started a number of studies within
the NSC framework to refine further our understanding of the strategic
relationship and the number and type of forces required to maintain
sufficiency. These continuing studies are important because even
with numbers held constant, the relative strategic position can change
through modernization and technological advances and through differing
concepts for employment. In the past year, we have, therefore,
examined with particular care three aspects of our strategic force
which are central to the concept of sufficiency-the survivability, the
flexibility and the mix of our existing forces.

The Survivability of Our Forces. Our strategic forces must be such
that the Soviet Union knows that even an all-out surprise attack will
involve unacceptable costs. The survivability of our retaliatory forces
is therefore essential. Without it the Soviet Union, in some future
crisis, might be tempted to strike first, or to use military or political
pressure in the belief that we were effectively deterred.

Survivability of our retaliatory forces can be assured in a number
of different ways: by increasing the number of offensive forces to
insure that a sufficient number will survive a surprise attack; by
defending ICBMs and bombers with air and missile defenses; by
hardening our existing missile silos; by increasing the mobile portion
of our strategic forces; by adding multiple independently targetable
warheads to missiles to allow each surviving missile to attack more
targets and hence not be defeated by a single ABM interceptor.

In seeking to improve the survivability of our forces, we have
deliberately adopted measures designed to demonstrate our defensive
intent. For example, because proliferating our offensive forces risks an
increase in Soviet forces and a new phase in the arms race, we have
not increased the number of our missiles and bombers. Instead we
have relied on alternatives such as hardening missile silos and deploying
missile defenses. Our deployment of MIRVs serves the same
purpose. They do not have the combination of numbers, accuracy
and warhead yield to pose a threat to the Soviet land-based ICBM
force.

With the programs we have undertaken, the bulk of our retaliatory
forces are currently secure from attack and should remain so in the
near future. However, continuing Soviet deployments and improvements
-in particular the large 55-9 missile with accurate independently
targetable multiple warheads- could threaten the survivability
of the land-based portion of our forces. That would not, of course, be
an acceptable situation. We will, therefore, keep this matter under
close review. We will, as a matter of the highest priority, take whatever steps become necessary to maintain the assured survivability of
our retaliatory capabilities.

Flexibility--the Responses Available to Us. We have reviewed our
concepts for responses to various possible contingencies. We must
insure that we have the forces and procedures that provide us with
alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation.
This means having the plans and command and control capabilities
necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response
without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction.

The Mix of Forces. For several years we have maintained three
types of strategic forces --land-based ICBMs, bombers and submarine-launched
missiles. Each is capable of inflicting a high level of
damage in response to a nuclear first strike. Taken together they have
an unquestioned capability of inflicting an unacceptable level of damage.
This concept takes advantage of the unique characteristics of
each delivery system. It provides insurance against surprise enemy
technological breakthroughs or unforeseen operational failures and
complicates the task of planning attacks on us. it complicates even
more the longer-range planning of the levels and composition of the
opposing forces. If the effectiveness and survivability of one element
were eroded, the Soviet Union could choose to concentrate its resources
on eroding the effectiveness and survivability of the others.
This would confront us with serious new decisions, and we will therefore
continue to review our forces in the light of changing threats and
technology to ensure that we have the best possible mix to meet the
requirements of sufficiency.

While this review of the sufficiency of our strategic posture has
taken place, we have also continued to seek agreement on a strategic
balance with the U.S.S.R. at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT). I will discuss in greater detail elsewhere in this report the
progress of those talks.