A total of 35 people left the compound during the stand-off. Twenty-one children were released

from the compound beginning on February 28, 1993, but no children were released after March 5,

1993. Thus, all of the children were released in the first 6 days of the 51-day stand-off. A total of

14 adults exited the compound during the standoff. Two adults entered the compound during the

stand-off. Both exited before April 19. No Davidian members exited the compound after March

23, 1993 until April 19.

After the fire an independent arson investigation determined that the fire had been started

deliberately by persons inside the compound. The medical examiner found the remains of

seventy five individuals in the debris. Thirteen adult bodies had fatal gunshot wounds. Most

of these wounds were gunshot wounds to the head. Several adults died of gunshot wounds

to the chest and face. Two adults were fatally shot in the back. Three young children were

shot to death and one three year old boy was fatally stabbed in the chest. Two other minors

suffered fatal blows to the head. Koresh died of a gunshot to the mid-forehead. Schneider

died of a gunshot wound of the mouth. The bodies of Koresh and Schneider were found in the

communication room of the compound.

EVALUATION

A. COULD THE FBI HAVE PREVENTED THE DEATHS OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS?

1. The Fire

An examination of the burned ruins of the compound by independent arson experts concluded

that the fire was deliberately set from within the compound. It is not clear whether the decision to set

the fire was a unanimous decision of the entire group, or whether some people were held hostage or

were shot to prevent their escape from the fire. A number of children were shot to death.

The Arson Report states:

This fire was caused by the intentional act(s) of a person or persons inside the compound. Fires were set in three separate areas of the structure identified as points of origin 1, 2 and 3. This investigation establishes that these fires occurred in areas significantly distant from each other and in a time frame that precludes any assumption of a single ignition source or accidental cause....Investigative findings further confirm that flammable liquids were used to accelerate the spread and intensity of the fire.

The Arson Report notes that in addition to the multiple origin points and flammable accelerants,

the spread of the fire was enhanced because the compound was constructed with no consideration

for fire safety, the strong wind from the south intensified the spread and the building contained highly

combustible materials, such as baled hay.

There is also evidence from the Davidians who survived the fire suggesting that the fire was

deliberately set. In a statement given to the Texas Rangers on April 20, 1993 a Davidian stated

that the fire was started with Coleman fuel which had been distributed throughout the compound

in specific locations. Another surviving Davidian was interviewed by the Texas Rangers on April

19, 1993 and stated that he was in the chapel with several other people when the armored

vehicle drove through the front door and he heard the word passed to "start the fires" or

The Davidians also purchased hundreds of grenades and 39 "full auto sears" devices used to

convert semi-automatic weapons into automatic weapons. On February 28 shots were fired

from over forty different positions within the compound. The Davidians were trained in the use

of these weapons. Moreover, there was concern that the Davidians had dug tunnels fanning

out from the compound and planned to place explosives in the tunnels under FBI positions.

There is no evidence of any shots being fired at the compound by law enforcement officers

after the cease fire on February 28, 1993.12 We have reviewed the statements of the agents who

participated in the tear gas assault on April 19, 1993 and none of them claim to have fired their

weapons on April 19. SAC Jamar and ASAC Rogers both state that the FBI did not fire on

the compound that day. However, rounds were being fired from the compound at the FBI on

April 19th. Also, agents reported hearing gunfire within the compound.

The FBI demonstrated admirable restraint in not firing back on April 19 and thereby avoided

being provoked into a gun battle with the Davidians. Outside agencies present on April 19 praised

the FBI's professionalism in their execution of the gas assault.

4. Contingency Planning

The risk of a mass suicide was considered as a possibility during the planning and approval

of the final assault. For example, cyanide poisoning was thought to be a major risk and there-

fore cyanide antidote kits were available on the scene along with an emergency medical facility.

The Attorney General asked about the possibility of a mass suicide.

The evidence of a possible intention to commit mass suicide was contradictory. In a memo

dated March 8 FBI behavioral scientists reported:

KORESH always talks about the "end", suggesting to his followers that "it is closer thanyou think". If KORESH dies before his followers, the women are to kill themselves and the children. If the women are unable, the men are to help them. KORESH teaches his followers that they must follow him to the "end", even if that means killing themselves.... KORESH realizes that in an environment outside of the compound, without his controlover the followers, he would lose his status as the Messiah, thus a mass suicide ordered by KORESH cannot be discounted. His order for a mass suicide would be his effort tomaintain the ultimate control over his group, in the event of his death.