It has been over 50 years, and the Maoist movement in
India is still not showing signs of withdrawing or weakening. Undeniably, at
present, the movement is hard pressed by new challenges and it no longer
inspires the buoyant optimism it did during the 1960-70 period. Yet,
simultaneously, it is also true that the government has not been able to fine tune its strategies and
policies to effectively deal with what was described by a former Indian prime
minister as “the single biggest threat to India’s internal security.” Going forward, it is important to glean lessons from past experiences
in order to counter left wing extremism (LWE) comprehensively.

Since 2015, the Union Government has been following
the National Policy and Action Plan to tackle the
Maoist insurgency. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ (MHA)
data, the numbers of districts affected by Maoist
violence has reduced from 106
in 2017 to 90
in 2018. Similarly, the numbers of worst-affected
districts reduced to 30 in 2018 from 36 in 2017. Security forces killed 232 Maoists
in 2018 while the number was 150 in 2017. Going by those statistics there seems
to be no doubt about the success of the government’s counter-Maoist strategy.
However, while dealing with a problem like LWE one needs to look beyond the
numbers as well. Numbers are always deceptive in a conflict situation because
they only portray half the truth.

As per official data, while the numbers of attacks on security personnel
may have reduced in past few years, during the same period, Maoists also demonstrated
their ability to carry out fatal
attacks on security forces. Unfortunately
India’s counter-Maoist strategy is yet to find answers to the Maoists’ use of landmines
that cause massive damage to the life and morale of the security forces. Indeed,
a lot of coordination between state police and central paramilitary forces
operating on the ground is visible now. However, what is missing is real time
intelligence. In a conflict like LWE that India faces, it is not high tech
intelligence but human intelligence that holds the key.

Coercion or otherwise, it is local support for the Maoists that makes it difficult for the security
forces to procure accurate information about the insurgents. On the other hand, Maoists get
information on security forces’ logistics through villagers. Additionally, Maoists are extremely familiar with the topography
of the forest land and the hills. Meanwhile, security forces find it difficult to
keep pace with the Maoists as they fall short on accurate knowledge of the
terrain. Given the situation, it is time for the local police forces to
redefine their role in the counter-Maoist operations.

In 2018, Maoist penetration into India’s
urban centres emerged as the greatest challenge for the government. The Maoists
have carved the “Golden Corridor” (Pune-Mumbai-Ahmadabad), “Ganga Corridor” (Delhi-Kanpur-Patna-Kolkata),
and the “Tri-junction” (Chennai-Coimbatore-Bengaluru) for their urban
operations. Maoists have also formed urban
cells in the industrial belts of Raipur, Durg, Surat, Faridabad and Bastar. They
are making steady inroads into the many of India’s semi-urban centres. While the
Maoists seem to be preparing for the next stage of the ‘People’s War’ i.e.
encircling the cities, the government is busy counting its success from the
rural war fields.

An important development of 2018 that
could lead to a perceptible change in the course of the Maoist Movement in
India is the stepping down of Ganapathy and elevation of Baswaraj as the
general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Known to be
extremely tech-savvy and equally strong in his ideological commitment and
military craft, Baswaraj is a fervent advocate of the Tactical Counter
Offensive Campaign (TCOC) to blunt counter-insurgency measures. His experience
of leading the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) could result in a
possible escalation of violence in the coming days.

Undoubtedly, the Indian government’s multi-pronged
strategy in the areas of security, development, and community empowerment, have
begun to show results. It is also a fact that CPI (Maoist) is experiencing one
of its worst leadership crises. However, it would be useful to remember that the
Maoists have survived similar situations in the past. When several analysts
wrote off the Movement following the arrests of Charu Majumdar and Kondapalli Seetharamaiah in 1972
and in 1993 respectively, the group proved
everyone wrong with its resurgence.

At present, the government evidently
has an edge over the CPI (Maoist) but that should not lead to unrealistic
assessments. Success is not always dependent merely on numbers. And the success
of the counter-Maoist strategy depends much on winning the hearts and minds of
the people who are yet to realise their independence. It is not just to
reaffirm India’s sovereignty over its own territory; more than that, it is essential
to make people realise that the sovereign power belongs to them.

Strengthening of institutions for
proper implementation of government programmes is much more essential than
formulation of ambitious development plans and programmes. Raising new
battalions for security agencies is important but preventing youth, children
and women from joining the Maoist fold is equally important. With a new general secretary at the helm of affairs at a time when
general elections are fast approaching, and changes in state government leaderships
in various Maoist infested states, it is certain
that the CPI (Maoist) will change gears in 2019. The government of India must wake
up to the winds of change in order to prevent any future ‘Spring Thunder’, for India does not need it.