The Royal Regression and the Question of the Democratic
Republic

Baburam Bhattarai

In his famous work ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte’, Karl Marx had said: ‘Hegel observes somewhere that all great
incidents and individuals of world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot
to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.’ It was while drawing a
parallel between the coup of 1851 by Napoleon’s nephew Louis Bonaparte, who had
then crowned himself as Napoleon III, and the original Napoleonic coup of 1799.
Of course, this was in a satirical sense.

A similar law of Hegelian dialectics seems to be in operation
in the history of Nepal, too. While the father, King Mahendra, had staged a
military coup on December 16, 1960 against the first parliamentary democracy
established after 1950 to centralise all power in himself, now the son, King
Gyanendra, has staged another military coup on February 1, 2005 against the
second parliamentary democracy restored after 1990 and centralised all state
power in himself. However, for the politically enlightened ones, it is not
difficult to see beneath the surface that this episode of February 1 is merely a
continuation or culmination of the episode of June 1, 2001, when the relatively
more weak or liberal King Birendra, along with his entire family, was butchered
and a new dynasty ushered in by Gyanendra. This way, the ‘First February’ of the
Nepalese history seems to be a carbon copy of the ‘Eighteenth Brumaire’ of the
French history; but it is yet to be seen whether it will be more ‘tragic’ or
more ‘farcical’.

The Essence of the Royal Regression

In his every public utterance after the coup, including the
‘royal proclamation’ of February 1, Gyanendra has laboured hard to sell the
theory that his present move is designed to restore ‘peace’ and consolidate
‘multi-party democracy’ by exorcising the ghost of ‘terrorism’ [i.e. the ongoing
revolutionary People’s War led by the CPN (Maoist)], and this is meant only for a
definite time-frame of coming three years. While talking to a group of selected
media persons on February 24, he has particularly taken pains to project himself
as the real Messiah of ‘democracy’ and the exorcist of ‘terrorism’ and has
demanded of the parliamentary political parties and the entire members of the
international community to cooperate with him in this grand venture against
‘terrorism’. Thus, he has sought to project himself as the true follower of the
US President George W. Bush in the international crusade against ‘terrorism’ and
begged everybody to grant legitimacy to his autocratic military regime at least
on that count. Of course, he seems to have learnt a few lessons from General Musharraf of Pakistan.

However, Gyanendra’s such political gimmicks are not cutting
much ice among the masses, as he has a tainted image as the hardliner autocrat
even within the palace since his father’s and brother’s days and is particularly
hated among the public as the real fratricidal and regicidal culprit in the
palace massacre of June 1, 2001. Particularly after his induction of the old
palace stooges of known anti-democratic persuasions like Tulsi Giri and Kirti
Nidhi Bista as his principal political associates and his abduction of all
fundamental and democratic rights of the people with the countrywide declaration
of emergency, the essential nature of his despotic military rule has been
thoroughly unmasked. Despite his incessant parroting about his commitments
towards ‘multi-party democracy’ and ‘constitutional monarchy’, all his real
practices so far including the crackdown on political parties and their leaders,
free media and human rights activists and blatant trampling upon the limited
democratic provisions of the old constitution, leave one in no doubt that the
supine parliamentary democratic system has been snuffed out and the autocratic
monarchy restored in the country.

Hence the questions arise: How could the limited bourgeois
democratic system established after 1990 be abolished and the autocratic
monarchy restored so smoothly? Should not the wheel of history move forward
rather than backward? For the correct answers to these questions, one has to
grasp the laws of social development in a scientific and objective manner and to
correctly evaluate the weaknesses and limitations of the chronically infirm
parliamentary system after 1990.

Firstly, it should be acknowledged that struggle between
social classes provides the basic motive forces of societal development. The
present Nepalese society in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial stage is a
multi-class society, and the principal struggle there is among the feudal, the
bourgeois and the proletarian classes. All the three principle contending
classes have their allies, too. The traditionally dominant feudal class has the
comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie with it; the small and weak bourgeois
class has a section of the rural and urban petty-bourgeois class with it; and
the proletariat has the vast number of poor peasants and semi-proletariat with
it. This basically triangular class contention is increasingly turning into a
bi-polar contention after the initiation and development of revolutionary
People’s War under the leadership of the proletariat since 1996. In other words,
according to the law of class struggle and social development, the parasitic
reactionary classes are polarised on one side under the leadership of the most
capable and strong class among themselves, and on the other side are rallied the
working and the progressive classes under the leadership of the most advanced
class, the proletariat. As the monarchy representing the feudal and comprador
and bureaucratic bourgeois classes is historically the strongest representative
of the reactionary classes in Nepal, the parasitic classes most adversely
affected by the revolutionary People’s War have been increasingly rallying under
the leadership of the monarchy. This is the rationale and essence of the current
royal regression or the restoration of autocratic monarchy in the social class
terms. The regressive march of the reactionary classes in opposition to the
progressive march of the working classes is perfectly in keeping with the
dialectical law of social development.

Secondly, viewing from a further political angle, it should
be acknowledged that the inherent defects and weaknesses of the bourgeois
parliamentary democracy established after 1990 and the general infirmity and
incapacity of the middle strata and forces also provided an objective basis for
the ultimate feudal autocratic regression. Historically, the major parliamentary
political forces, viz. the Nepali Congress and later the revisionist UML, enjoy
no independent class base of their own, and tend to represent a hodge-podge of
class forces ranging from the feudals and comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie
to the petty-bourgeoisie and constantly take vacillating and conciliatory
political positions. Contrary to this, the monarchy traditionally draws its
strength from the prevailing feudal property and cultural relations, and
principally, from its monopoly hold over the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). To be more
specific, the political change and the Constitution of 1990 did not properly
settle the question of ‘state sovereignty’ traditionally claimed by the monarchy
and left the final ‘state authority’ and strategic control over the RNA in the
hands of the monarchy. This ‘historical blunder’ (to paraphrase Jyoti Basu from
India!) paved the way for the monarchy to gradually gobble up the parliament and
the Constitution and consummate the current royal regression. Moreover, the
parliamentary forces during their twelve years long rule in between did nothing
to bring about a progressive transformation in the traditionally feudal and
increasingly comprador and bureaucratic capitalist socio-economic and cultural
base of the society. In the later period, particularly along with the rapid
development of the revolutionary People’s War, their class and political base
got further eroded. As a result, the upper strata of the society which had
backed the parliamentary forces after the political change of 1990 gradually
returned back to the fold of the monarchy and the lower and a section of the
middle strata naturally got polarised around the revolutionary People’s War.
This dilemma of the reformist parliamentary forces has been summed up in
Chairman Com. Prachanda’s recent People’s War Anniversary statement thus:
‘Ultimately, the so-called royal proclamation of February 1 has not only exposed
the irrelevance of reformism in the Nepalese politics, but also shattered the
collective lethargy of the parliamentary political forces'.

Thirdly, from a military point of view, this action of total
centralisation of the old state authority in the absolute monarchy can be seen
as an attempt of the moribund reactionary classes to wage a final battle with
the revolutionary forces in the ever mounting class war in the country. In view
of the recent declaration of the CPN (Maoist) to lead the nine-year old
revolutionary People’s War into the final and decisive stage of strategic
offensive, it is not unnatural, though foolish, for the frightened reactionary
classes to attempt to wage a final battle of life and death under the direct
leadership of the monarchy, which has assumed supreme commandership of the RNA
since its inception. In the recent past the pathetic showing of the RNA in
almost every real battle with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been blamed
by certain quarters on the contradictions of de jure political leadership
of the parliamentary forces and de facto leadership of the monarchy over
the RNA, Also, it is not hard to understand the super military ambitions of
Gyanendra, who has grabbed the throne by butchering the entire family of his
brother, Birendra, to project himself as the great saviour of his tottering
feudal and comprador-bureaucratic bourgeois class. Nevertheless, as any common
student of military science would know, the victory or defeat of a particular
army ultimately depends more on its social class base and the political goal
rather than on the leadership prowess of its commander, and in that sense the
ultimate defeat of the reactionary RNA should be a foregone conclusion and
Gyanendra’s dream would be mere chimera.

Role of the International Forces

In the present day world of imperialist globalisation any
internal political event has more international ramifications than ever before.
Hence the February 1 royal regression has generated worldwide reactions, and all
major world and regional powers and organisations, including the UN, the USA,
the UK, the EU, India, China and others have issued public statements on the
question. Surprisingly none of the major international players have supported
Gyanendra’s regressive steps so far. Not only that the major powers like the
USA, the UK, the EU and India, which have been the principal props for the
reactionary regimes in Nepal in the past, have publicly opposed the current
developments, and others like China, Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh etc. have
commented upon the events as ‘internal affairs of Nepal’. The most significant
international development has been the suspension of military aid by India and
the UK (the USA also appears to be toeing the same line) and suspension of
‘development aid’ by a number of EU countries. International human rights
organisations such as the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc., have
publicly denounced the royal regime for its rampant violations of human and
democratic rights of the people. Thus the autocratic royal regime has been
totally isolated from the international community so far, which is a good omen
for the democratic movement.

However, the despotic regime is desperately seeking to
exploit two issues to gain international support for itself. The first is the
‘anti-terrorism’ card, and the second, the ‘geo-political’ card. The hackneyed
‘anti-terrorism’ card, much exploited after September Eleven by all and sundry
petty dictators and reactionary regimes of the world, has already lost much of
its original steam and is yet to be seen how it will fare in Gyanendra’s case.
But one can be fairly certain that the enlightened world public opinion won’t be
easily hoodwinked by the ‘anti-terrorism’ claims of a person of Gyanendra’s ilk,
whose hands are blood-stained in the infamous palace massacre and who has now
launched a countryside reign of military terror against the people by suspending
all political and fundamental rights. Nevertheless, as all the values and norms
in a class-divided society are governed by class interests, it won’t be
surprising if some of the reactionary rulers of the world would ultimately back
the regressive royal regime, overtly or covertly.

As far as the ‘geo-political’ card of the country’s strategic
positioning between the two super-states of China and India is concerned,
Gyanendra’s attempts to repeat the skilful diplomatic manoeuvring of playing one
neighbour against the other as practiced by his father, Mahendra, in the
specific cold-war context of the last century cannot be expected to bear much
fruit in the changed situation of international balance of forces in general and
the India-China relations in particular. The recent coming together of the USA
and India and their coordinated policy against royal regression may tempt
Gyanendra to play the China card. He has given enough hints of this by
appointing the old royalist Kirti Nidhi Bista with a known pro-China tilt as one
of his principle associates in the government. Similarly, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, with traditional contradictions with India, may provide some
breathing space for the royal regime; some indications of this have already
come from the Pakistani ambassador in Kathmandu. However, given the extremely
shaky position and uncertain future of Gyanendra himself, it is hard to believe
that any of the neighbours will go beyond diplomatic niceties to extend him any
substantial material help. Similarly, on the part of the proletarian
revolutionaries they should be prudent enough to practice strategic firmness and
tactical flexibility in the matters of diplomatic relations particularly with
the immediate neighbours.

Another noteworthy factor in recent days is the indication of
some positive change in the attitude of major international and regional powers
towards the revolutionary forces in Nepal. Due to their own distorted class
outlook and interests, these major powers in the past used to regard the
monarchy and the parliamentary forces as the so-called ‘two pillars of
stability’, and they were seen working hard to bring about a grand alliance
between the two against the revolutionary democratic forces. Now they seem to be
increasingly veering round a ‘three pillar’ theory, including the revolutionary
forces; which is, of course, a step forward. But the historical necessity and
the new objective reality of the country is that the new ‘two pillars’ of
parliamentary and revolutionary democratic forces join hands to uproot the
outdated and rotten third ‘pillar’ of monarchy. The CPN (Maoist) has already made
a policy decision to this effect, which is reflected in the recent Anniversary
statement issued by Chairman Com. Prachanda.

The Question of Democratic Republic

After the royal regression of February 1, there are seen some
important developments in the internal political situation. Whereas earlier the
national politics was divided into three streams of monarchy, parliamentary
democracy and revolutionary people’s democracy, now it is gradually getting
polarised into two broad streams of monarchy and democracy. Particularly, the
leaders, cadres and supporters of parliamentary democracy have now seen through
the anti-democracy manoeuvring and divide-and-rule policy of the monarchy in the
past and their collective ire against the monarchy has sharpened more than ever
before. Though there are sponsored public rallies and statements in favour of
the autocratic monarchy on a daily basis, none of the known political parties or
their leaders have openly endorsed the royal move so far. While the royal regime
has laboured hard to propagate that the harsh autocratic measures are directed
only against the ‘terrorists’ (i.e. Maoist revolutionaries), the people have
increasingly realized that they are against all the democratic forces.
Similarly, almost all the members of ‘civil society’, media persons, human
rights organizations, professional organizations, etc. have openly come out
against the royal coup. This is obviously a good sign for the future of
democracy in the country.

However, it is a matter of serious concern that even after
more than a mouth since the coup the democratic forces have not been able to
come up with an effective and coordinated plan, programme or mechanism of
resistance against the autocratic monarchy. The CPN (Maoist) attempted to
provide initial tempo to the resistance movement by organizing a three-day
‘Nepal Bandh’ (shut-down) and a fifteen-day transportation blockade in February,
and is planning further mass-mobilisation and military-action programmes in
coming months. The parliamentary forces did organize some propaganda activities
from India and symbolic public rallies within the country, and are planning
peaceful mass-arrest programmes for the future. But the desired sharp attacks
against the monarchy in a unified manner, firstly, amongst the parliamentary
forces and, secondly, between the parliamentary and revolutionary democratic
forces, has not materialised so far. Whereas the Nepali Congress has come out
more sharply against the monarchy, the so-called ‘leftist’ UML has made a
relatively muted response against the royal coup. This has naturally raised some
apprehensions among the masses whether a new ‘Rayamajhi’ trend (i.e. the
capitulation of the then general secretary of the CPN, Keshar Jang Rayamajhi, to
the monarchy in the 1960s) is in the offing. However, after so much blood-bath
the situation has undergone a sea change since then. Hence, even if a few
Rayamajhis from the left camp and a few Tulsi Giris from the Nepali Congress
camp may arise, the overwhelming majorities of the leaders and cadres of the
political parties and the general masses of the people are likely to fight till
the end against the autocratic monarchy. Moreover, with the presence of the
revolutionary PLA to take on the monarchist RNA, and the more favourable
international situation than ever to fight against the absolute monarchy, a new
objective ground is prepared for the democratic political forces to mount a
unified assault against the monarchy so as to sweep it away for ever.

Precisely in this context the question of anti-monarchy
common minimum programme and slogan acceptable to all the democratic forces,
including the parliamentary and revolutionary democratic forces and the
international community, has become pertinent. It has been the considered view
of the CPN (Maoist) that the programme of election to a representative
Constituent Assembly and institutionalisation of the democratic republic is best
suited for the purpose. The old slogan of restoration of the parliament or
re-activisation and amendment of 1990 Constitution, advanced by the
parliamentary forces and the international community, has been totally outdated
and inadequate in the new context. A brief recapitulation of the incessant
struggle between the monarchy and democracy since the 1950s in the country
should leave no one in doubt that without the complete abolition of the archaic
institution of feudal monarchy and its puppet RNA no form of democracy can be
secure and institutional in Nepal. It has been proved time and again that the
so-called ‘constitutional monarchy’ seen in operation in some of the highly
developed capitalist countries cannot be replicated in a semi-feudal and
semi-colonial society. Hence any attempt on the part of the parliamentary
political parties and the international forces to preserve the thoroughly rotten
and discredited institution of monarchy, in this or that pretext, does not
correspond with the historical necessity and ground reality of balance of forces
in the country, and the agenda of ‘democratic republic’ has entered the Nepalese
politics.

As far as the sincere commitment of the revolutionary
democratic forces, who aspire to reach socialism and communism via a new
democratic republic, towards a bourgeois democratic republic is concerned, the CPN (Maoist) has time and again clarified its principled position towards the
historical necessity of passing through a sub-stage of democratic republic in
the specificities of Nepal. Particularly, in ‘An Executive Summary of the
Proposal Put Forward by CPN (Maoist) for the Negotiations’ presented during the
negotiations in April 2003 [See, Some Important Documents of Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist), 2004] the minimum content and the process of realisation of this
democratic republic through a Constituent Assembly has been expressed in
concrete terms. The fact that the democratic republic is envisaged to be
institutionalised through a freely elected Constituent Assembly, should cast
away any illusions about the democratic credentials of the revolutionary forces.
Further concrete issues like the creation of a new national army after the
dissolution of the royal mercenary RNA can be discussed during the process of
negotiations.

The need of the hour is unity of all democratic forces of the
country on the common minimum programme of a democratic republic. If anything is
lacking so far it is the real democratic vision and will power on the part of
the leadership of major political parties. Also, it is the time to win
confidence of the masses of the people through a correct projection of the
democratic credentials of political parties, and for this the correct practice
of inner-party democracy would be a significant component.

In the end, it may be useful to recollect Engels to
understand why a proletarian party needs to uphold the programme of a bourgeois
republic in the particular historical specificities of a country like
present-day Nepal. Lambasting the Bakuninist anarchists who had opposed the
immediate programme of a republic in nineteenth-century Spain, Engels had said:

‘When the Republic was proclaimed in February 1873, the
Spanish members of the Alliance [i.e. Bakuninist ‘International’] found
themselves in a quandary. Spain is such a backward country industrially that
there can be no question there of immediate complete emancipation of the working
class. Spain will first have to pass through various preliminary stages of
development and remove quite a number of obstacles from its path. The Republic
offered a chance of going through these stages in the shortest possible time and
quickly surmounting the obstacles. But this chance be taken only if the Spanish
working class played an active political role.’ [From ‘The Bakuninists at Work’]