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I. Summary

Alberto Fujimori arrived in Chile on November 6, 2005, nearly five years
after he resigned from the Peruvian presidency.Wanted in Peru on
criminal charges ranging from homicide to embezzlement, Fujimori had managed to
avoid being brought to trial in Peru
by staying in Japan,
where he claimed Japanese citizenship.His surprise appearance in Chile,
a country that has a long-standing extradition treaty with Peru, sparked new hope that he would finally be
extradited to Peru
to face trial.

The Peruvian authorities are expected to present formal
requests for Fujimori's extradition within the next few days.Under Chilean law, however, the extradition
process is far from a mere formality.The extradition treaty includes standard technical requirements, such as
that the crimes with which Fujimori is charged must also be crimes under
Chilean law, with potential sentences of over one year.Also, Chilean courts have in the past gone
beyond the terms of extradition treaties to review the evidence supporting the
charges that form the basis of the extradition request.Generally, courts have required that the
evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause to bring charges, but they
do not require sufficient evidence to convict.

Fujimori has repeatedly claimed that there is no evidence
against him and that he is the victim of political persecution.He suggests that most of the charges against
him are either fabricated or involve crimes that were committed solely by his
close personal advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos.

In the Chilean extradition proceedings, Fujimori will likely
challenge the evidentiary basis of the charges against him in the hope that the
Chilean courts will deny some or all of the extradition requests.If extradited, Fujimori could be tried in Peru
only for crimes for which Chilean courts grant an extradition request, not for
crimes for which extradition is denied. Thus, whether or not Fujimori will
eventually face trial for crimes involving grave violations of human rights and
corruption will depend to a large degree on the evidence assembled now by
Peruvian authorities.

As this report documents, there is more than sufficient
evidence in several serious criminal cases currently pending against Fujimori
in Peru
to justify his extradition.Fujimori's
continued claims that there is no information linking him to the charges
against him are baseless and disingenuous.

In past Human Rights Watch reports, we have written about
the massive and systematic violations of human rights that occurred during the
Fujimori regime.The extent of these
violations has also been recently documented in detail by Peru's Truth Commission.Much has also been written about the Fujimori
government's record of having achieved a near-total concentration of power
through corruption and other criminal means, while maintaining a faade of
democracy.

Indeed, corruption and human rights violations frequently go
hand in hand.In Fujimori's Peru,
large-scale corruption not only deprived Peruvians of public resources that
could have been used to alleviate economic need, but also seriously eroded the
rule of law, which is essential to the protection of human rights.Moreover, through corruption the government
was able to fully subvert the democratic process, eliminating normal checks by
the judiciary, legislature, and the media on government abuses.

This report is not, however, a general overview of the
history of human rights violations and corruption during the Fujimori
government.Rather, this report is
focused on the specific charges and evidence that justify Fujimori's
extradition to face prosecution and trial in Peru.

In particular, this report examines five of the most serious
criminal cases currently pending against Fujimori, explaining briefly the
underlying facts and describing some of the evidence.Our analysis of these cases shows that,
contrary to Fujimori's claims, in each case there is evidence against him
sufficient to justify his extradition from Chile
to face trial in Peru:

La Cantuta/Barrios Altos Killings:Fujimori, along with fifty-seven other
individuals, including numerous former military officers and his advisor
Montesinos, is charged with responsibility for the killings of twenty-five
people in two separate events.The
killings were allegedly carried out by the Colina Group, a specialized squad of
military and intelligence officers, intentionally set up to "eliminate" suspected
terrorists.There is evidence, including
statements by Colina Group members, that Fujimori knew of the existence and
operations of the Colina Group beforehand but did nothing to stop them,
rendering himself potentially criminally liable.Nor did he take steps to punish the crimes
after they occurred.

Phone Tapping of Civil Society, Journalists,
and Politicians:There is
extensive testimony, from multiple sources, that throughout his government
Fujimori ordered that the private calls of numerous individuals be intercepted
illegally, and authorized the use of state funds to purchase phone tapping
equipment and pay the personnel who intercepted the calls.There is even evidence that phone tapping
equipment was installed, at his request, in the president's official residence
at the Palace of Government.

Diverted State Funds:There is extensive documentary and
testimonial evidence that Fujimori established a complex system to divert
millions of dollars in public funds from their official purposes to special
accounts in the National Intelligence Service ("Servicio de Inteligencia
Nacional" or "SIN").He and Montesinos
allegedly then used the diverted funds for a variety of illegal purposes,
including bribes, funding Fujimori's presidential campaigns, and personal
payments to Fujimori and his family.Former government ministers, as well as Fujimori's close adviser
Vladimiro Montesinos, have testified that Fujimori ordered substantial monthly
transfers of funds from the budgets of each branch of the armed forces to the
SIN, which Montesinos controlled.Montesinos and others have also testified that every month, Fujimori
asked that several hundred thousand dollars of the SIN funds be delivered to
him or his family.Similarly, there is
evidence that Fujimori diverted donations that Japanese persons and entities
made to Peru
through NGOs that were managed by Fujimori and his family.

Bribing Congress:It is well documented that numerous members
of Congress received bribes to switch their party affiliation and join
Fujimori's party after the 2000 elections.Fujimori's advisor Montesinos has testified that he made the payments,
which Fujimori ordered.

Transfer of U.S.$15 Million in Public Funds to
Montesinos:Shortly before the
collapse of his government, Fujimori allegedly arranged to have U.S.$15 million
in state funds given to Montesinos.Former ministers who participated in the transfer, as well as
Montesinos, have testified as to Fujimori's involvement and subsequent efforts
to cover up the transfer.

II. Background: The Fujimori Government

Former President Fujimori currently faces charges in
twenty-one criminal cases in Peru.
Most of the charges relate to corruption and the misappropriation of public
funds. The crimes charged are not isolated acts of personal enrichment, however.
Rather, they reflect a broader strategy by the government to hold and maintain
power through corruption and the manipulation of democratic institutions.

Indeed, during Fujimori's time in power, virtually all of Peru's
democratic institutions were exploited and captured by the presidency via a
combination of strong-arm tactics, extortion, and bribery.Thus, while maintaining the appearance of
legality, Fujimori's government replaced the rule of law with the rule of the
strongman.

The abuses and corruption of the Fujimori government can be
traced back to its earliest days, when then-President Fujimori, according to
witnesses, started ordering that the phone calls of politicians and others be
tapped.Shortly afterwards, in 1991, the
Colina Group, a squad of military and intelligence operatives, allegedly began
committing a series of extrajudicial killings and "disappearances" as part of a
strategy of physical elimination of suspected subversives.

On April
5, 1992, with the backing of the Peru's armed forces, Fujimori
dissolved the opposition-controlled Congress in a "self-coup" and took complete
control of the government.In the years
that followed, he drew up a new constitution and replaced much of the judiciary.At the same time, his government made
significant progress on the economic front and in fighting the Shining
Path.Thanks to these successes,
Fujimori was reelected president in 1995, obtaining a congressional majority.

After the 1995 elections, the Fujimori government respected
the formal trappings of democracy, but steadily eroded democratic
institutions.Fujimori ordered that his
close personal advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, be given de facto control over
the National Intelligence Service (SIN), and, according to witnesses, ordered
that millions of dollars be diverted to the SIN from the armed forces and
Ministries of Defense and Interior.In
turn, Montesinos used these funds, as well as other illicitly obtained cash, to
buy off politicians, co-opt judges, and wrest editorial control from media
owners.In some instances he also
obtained loyalty or silence by extortion and blackmail. The SIN and Army
Intelligence tapped the phones of journalists, civil society activists, and
politicians, kept them under observation, and engaged in undercover operations
to intimidate and threaten them.

Montesinos and Fujimori maintained an extremely close
relationship. According to various military and government officials, Fujimori
introduced Montesinos to them as his representative and the person through
which they should communicate with him, and Fujimori met with Montesinos every
night.[1]Former Commander General of the Army, Nicolas
de Bari Hermoza, has testified that during much of his government, Fujimori
actually resided in SIN headquarters, the base from where Montesinos operated.[2]

By the year 2000, through corruption, extortion, and
intimidation, the presidency had achieved near-total control not only over the
Congress, but also over the judiciary, the prosecutorial system, the electoral
monitoring bodies, the financial and tax system, and a substantial segment of
the media, especially television. To date, anti-corruption courts in Peru
have charged 1,509 people for crimes committed in this context, and
U.S.$197,628,788 of stolen money has been repatriated from foreign bank
accounts.[3]

Control of the Judiciary

Three days after the April 1992 "self-coup," President
Fujimori passed decrees firing thirteen Supreme Court justices and eighty-nine
judges across the country.[4]
Provisional appointees replaced the great majority of the judges and justices
fired. By the end of Fujimori's government nearly 80 percent of the country's
judges lacked tenure and were consequently vulnerable to political pressure. In
1995 and 1996, executive commissions headed by government appointees were
placed in charge of reorganizing the courts and the prosecutorial system,
assuming many of the powers of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General.[5]These bodies were also responsible for the
appointment of provisional judges and prosecutors.

According to a congressional committee that investigated
judicial intervention in 2002, these measures enabled Fujimori to push through
his candidacy for re-election in 2000, guarantee impunity for his actions,
harass his political opponents, and favor the interests of third parties.

The same committee also reported that immediately after the
self-coup, the SIN removed from the Palace
of Justice and the Public
Ministry large quantities of files containing evidence incriminating Fujimori's
opponents, information that could be later used for intimidation and
blackmail.Such tactics became a
hallmark of Fujimori's regime.[6]

Another common tactic was to rearrange the composition of
courts to ensure a pro-government majority in cases in which the government had
an interest.In 1997 Fujimori's party,
Change 90-New Majority, dismantled the Constitutional Court, a key guarantor of
constitutional rights.It impeached and
fired three members of the court who had ruled that a law crafted to allow Fujimori's
re-election was inapplicable.[7] One of the
justices, Delia Revoredo, came under criminal investigation by a Callao court for the
import of a car in a case which had long been closed, a typical government
tactic.After receiving repeated death
threats, Revoredo sought asylum in Costa Rica.Once the Fujimori government collapsed, the
case was closed and Revoredo was acquitted.

Control of the Press

Montesinos has testified that Fujimori authorized enormous
payments to ensure the government's control over the media, and Fujimori has
been charged accordingly.

According to Montesinos' bookkeeper at the SIN, by 2002 the
SIN handled a monthly budget of close to U.S.$9 million.[8]
In the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections much of this money went toward
controlling the country's television stations. Presidential advisor Montesinos
gave millions of dollars to the owners of Channel 4 /America, Channel 5 /Panamericana,
and Canal 9/Andina, in exchange for editorial control over their broadcasts. He
bought Channel 10/Cable News outright for $2 million. Each of these
transactions was recorded on videotape.[9]

Particularly notorious was the case of Channel 2 /Frecuencia
Latina, whose majority owner, Israeli-born Baruch Ivcher, was stripped of his
Peruvian citizenship in July 1997, which violated his rights under the
Constitution and barred him from owing a television station. Minority
shareholders beholden to the government took over the station and its editorial
line changed accordingly.A criminal investigation
was also initiated against Ivcher and his family; like Revoredo, Ivcher was
acquitted after the Fujimori government's collapse.

Montesinos also handed over money regularly to the owners of
yellow press tabloids in exchange for front page headlines ridiculing and
insulting opposition politicians and journalists.

III. Five Cases and the Evidence

1. La Cantuta/Barrios Altos

Fujimori, along with fifty-seven other individuals, has been
charged with the killings of fifteen people, including one child, in the
Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima in November
1991, and of nine students and one professor at the University
of La Cantuta, in the outskirts of Lima, in July 1992.Both sets of killings were allegedly carried
out by a special squad of military and intelligence officers known as the
Colina Group.Fujimori advisor Vladimiro
Montesinos, former SIN Director Julio Salazar Monroe, and numerous alleged
members of the Colina Group are currently on trial for these crimes and for
other assassinations and "disappearances" from the early 1990s that have been
attributed to the Colina Group.[10]

The available evidence indicates that the Colina Group was
set up intentionally within the military and intelligence systems to conduct
operations of "elimination" of suspected subversives, with the knowledge and
approval of high-level officials.

In interviews that were broadcast on national television in
2003 and incorporated into Fujimori's criminal case, Army Major Santiago Martin
Rivas, who has been charged as being Colina's chief of operations, stated that
in 1991 Fujimori ordered the implementation of a counter-terrorism policy
handbook that Martin Rivas himself drafted, which established a state policy of
physical elimination of subversives.Since that time Martin Rivas (now facing criminal charges for his
membership in the Colina Group) has recanted the statements he made implicating
Fujimori, claiming that the recordings of them were fabricated.He now claims he was never a member of the
Colina Group, and has even gone so far as to deny the Colina Group's existence.

According to Martin Rivas' original statements, in June
1991, the high command of the army held a meeting to discuss their new strategy
to combat terrorism.[11]Martin Rivas had drafted a policy handbook
outlining the new strategy, and he presented it at the meeting.Martin Rivas claimed that the policy's basic
principle was that of combating terrorism through "low-intensity warfare,"
which he described as including military operations of "reply" to each
subversive attack, as well as the physical "elimination" of terrorists.[12]Martin Rivas claimed that at the meeting the
army decided to adopt this approach to its fight against Shining Path, and
submitted the policy to Fujimori for his approval.According to Martin Rivas's 2003 claims, it
was on this basis that Fujimori ordered that the plan be followed.[13]

Martin Rivas asserted that it was as a result of his and
others' work on the counter-terrorism policy that on June 25, 1991, Fujimori sent a memo
to the Minister of Defense, in which he asked that several individuals receive
special recognition for their services.Fujimori followed up on July 30 with another memo in which he stated
that to "stimulate" these individuals, and because of their successful special
intelligence operations, he wished to issue a special recognition of their
services for purposes of promotions.Both memos listed, among others, several individuals who have
subsequently been linked to the Colina Group.[14]

Undermining claims that the Colina Group did not exist or
was not part of the military structure, numerous official documents that have
been found in army intelligence records specifically refer to the "Destacamento
Colina."Such records also include 1991
orders that various alleged Colina members, as well as weapons and equipment,
be placed at the disposal of lieutenant colonel Fernando Rodriguez Sabalbeascoa
(criminally charged with being the head of Colina).[15]These records strongly support the view that
the Colina Group, far from being a separate paramilitary group, was an integral
part of the army intelligence structure, and that its members, all with
military rank, were assigned, transferred, tasked, and disciplined on the
orders of top military intelligence officials.[16]

Indeed, most of the people charged as members of the Colina
Group were in fact military officers who were part of the Army Intelligence
Service, under the command of Army Intelligence Director Juan Rivero Lazo, who
is currently under prosecution for the crimes attributed to Colina.At the same time, Montesinos has been charged
for having coordinated, from within the SIN, the activities of the Colina Group
with Rivero Lazo.[17]Former members of the Colina Group have
testified that for several months in 1991, the group actually operated from SIN
offices and met with Montesinos there.[18]Army Technician Marco Flores Alvn, who has
been charged with being a member of the Colina Group, has also stated that
sometime in 1991 there was an "official inauguration" of the Colina Group at
the SIN, at which Rivero Lazo and the head of the SIN, General Julio Salazar
Monroe, were present, along with Martin Rivas and others.[19]

Shortly after the Barrios Altos killings occurred on November 3, 1991, there
were media reports that the killers were linked to the government.[20]The reports cited evidence that intelligence
operatives had been conducting surveillance of the house where the killings
happened.[21]Colina Group members have also stated that
immediately after the killings, Rodriguez Sabalbeascoa, along with Martin Rivas
and another Colina Group leader, Carlos Pichilingue, met with Presidential
advisor Montesinos at the SIN.[22]

In November 1991, Fujimori signed Legislative Decree No.
746, which greatly broadened the functions of the SIN and provided that the SIN
would report directly to the President (previously, it had also been required
to report to the Prime Minister).[23]

After Fujimori's April 1992 "self-coup," he exerted complete
control over the government for several months, until January of 1993, when a
constituent assembly took office to draft a new Constitution and act as a
temporary legislative power.Nonetheless, the Colina Group apparently remained intact and operational.

During the period immediately after the coup, the Colina
Group allegedly caused the "disappearances" of several peasants in May 1992,
and of journalist Pedro Yauri in June 1992.[24]On July 18, 1992, the Colina Group is believed to have
committed the infamous Cantuta massacre, entering the student dormitories of
the University of
La Cantuta in the middle
of the night, abducting nine students and a professor, and executing all of
them.Martin Rivas has stated that the
massacre was the government's "response" to the Shining Path's bombing, only a
few days before the massacre, of Tarata
Street, in a residential district of Lima.[25]

In the aftermath of the Cantuta killings, there were
increasing reports of the existence of a military death squad that was
responsible for the killings in La Cantuta and Barrios Altos.[26]Within a few months, the students' remains
were found, and criminal investigations were started.

The Fujimori government came under significant international
pressure in 1993 to fully investigate the Cantuta killings.[27]In early 1994, Major Martin Rivas and several
other Colina Group members were convicted by a military tribunal for the
Cantuta killings.[28]However, they were released on July 15, 1995,
as a result of an amnesty law signed by Fujimori.[29]Journalist Gilberto Hume later said that
Martin Rivas told Hume that he agreed to go before the military tribunals at
Fujimori's request because Fujimori offered to give him an amnesty later.[30]

It is extremely doubtful that the existence of this group
would have been unknown to Fujimori, who even before the Cantuta massacre, had
conducted a successful coup with the support of the armed forces, was
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and to whom the SIN answered directly.Indeed, Major Martin Rivas has stated that
Fujimori knew and authorized what the group was doing.[31]And two years before Martin Rivas's
statements were made public, another Colina Group member, Army Technician Julio
Chuqui Aguirre, had testified that, immediately before the Barrios Altos and
Cantuta killings, Martin Rivas had told him and all the Colina Group members
that they had "a free pass" to carry out the actions in La Cantuta and Barrios
Altos because "Fujimori had knowledge and had authorized them."[32]Similar statements have been made by other
army intelligence officers.[33]

2. Phone Tapping

Early on in Fujimori's first term, the government started
tapping the phones of a large number of Peruvian citizens, including
journalists, members of civil society, and politicians.Sophisticated phone tapping equipment was set
up in various buildings rented throughout the city of Lima, and specialized personnel were assigned
to start intercepting and transcribing calls.Such large-scale interception of private calls not only subverted the
rule of law, but facilitated the Fujimori government's concentration of power
and erosion of democratic institutions.

Fujimori has been charged before Peruvian courts with
planning and implementing, in conjunction with Montesinos and others, the
illegal phone tapping scheme.He has
also been charged with using state resources for the purchase of the phone
tapping equipment and to pay the personnel who conducted the tapping.

There is strong evidence pointing to Fujimori's direct
involvement in the scheme.Montesinos,
for example, has testified as to his participation in the scheme, stating that
it was all ordered by Fujimori.[34]He has also stated that the equipment was
purchased and the personnel were paid with funds from each of the armed forces,
as well as the SIN, with Fujimori's authorization.[35]These statements have been corroborated by
Matilde Pinchi Pinchi, Montesinos's former assistant and accountant, who has
testified that on numerous occasions she saw Fujimori order Montesinos to
intercept specific phones of congressmen, journalists, and others.She has also testified that Montesinos kept
Fujimori informed about the transcripts of the intercepted calls.[36]

Other witnesses have testified that one phone tapping center
was even set up in the Palace
of Government, following
Fujimori's direct orders.[37]Army Brigade General Gerardo Luis Prez del guila,
who served as the head of the Military House outside of the Palace of
Government, has testified that when he discovered the equipment's presence in
the Palace, he ordered that it be disconnected, but then received specific
orders from Fujimori to reinstall the equipment.[38]

Numerous technicians who conducted the tapping have
testified as to their activities, giving specific names of politicians and
journalists whose calls they intercepted.[39]Equipment used to conduct the tapping has
also been recovered and identified.[40]

3. Diverting State Funds

Fujimori has been charged with diverting, throughout much of
his presidency, millions of dollars in public funds for his own and his relatives'
benefit.The bulk of the funds were
diverted through a complex scheme by which funds were secretly transferred from
various government entities to secret accounts of the SIN, which in accordance
with Fujimori's instructions, were managed by his close advisor
Montesinos.In this manner, Fujimori
allegedly was able to obtain large sums of money, which he used to increase his
monthly personal income and to fund the bribery, extortion, and concentration
of power that so damaged Peru's
democratic institutions during his government.

There is substantial evidence that from 1992 to 2000,
Fujimori colluded with Montesinos, as well as with various ministers of
economy, defense, and interior, to divert public funds to the SIN.[41]To this end, the Ministry of Economy
regularly assigned "extra-budgetary" funds to the Ministries of Defense and
Interior, as well as to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.[42]In turn, allegedly following Fujimori's
orders, the ministers of defense and interior would order that some of these
funds be delivered in cash or check every month to Montesinos at the SIN. [43]

The funds were then allocated to two SIN budgets for
"reserved actions" which were supposed to be used for intelligence operations
in emergency zones.[44]According to testimony by the SIN's official
leadership, Fujimori ordered them to give Montesinos complete control of the
funds in two SIN budgets for "reserved" actions.[45]

Case files include documents showing the movements of the
funds.And there is substantial evidence
of Fujimori's direct involvement in the transfers.For example, a former minister of interior,
Army General Csar Saucedo Snchez, has testified that Fujimori specifically
told him to request that extrabudgetary funds be assigned to the ministry, and
that Fujimori ordered him to deliver those funds to the SIN.[46]Montesinos, too, has testified in detail
about the funds transfers, and has stated that Fujimori was not only aware of
the transfers, but approved of them.[47]

There is no record whatsoever of the funds diverted to the
SIN being used for official purposes.And contrary to standard practice, the SIN kept no records concerning
the use to which the funds were put.[48]Fujimori apparently approved the spending of
the funds through monthly Supreme Resolutions, which were classified as secret
and did not specify how the funds were spent.[49]

According to Montesinos' testimony, the SIN funds were used,
with Fujimori's knowledge, for a variety of purposes, including making payments
to congressmen for their loyalty.[50]

In addition, Montesinos has testified that every month
Fujimori asked him to deliver a sum of money, drawn from SIN accounts, to
Fujimori himself or his family.[51]Montesinos' testimony has been corroborated
by that of his former secretary Maria Angelica Arce Guerrero, and by that of
Matilde Pinchi.Both have testified that
they handled money that was set aside for regular deliveries to Fujimori.[52]Also, Army Colonel Luis Rodriguez Silva, who
was one of Fujimori's escorts for four years and later became sub-director of
the SIN, has testified that he personally delivered envelopes of money from the
SIN to Fujimori at the Palace
of Government.[53]In some cases, Arce and Pinchi have
testified, money was also transferred to Fujimori's relatives, such as his
sister Rosa Fujimori and his brother-in-law, former Peruvian Ambassador to
Japan Victor Aritomi, who allegedly picked up substantial sums of money during
their visits to Peru from Japan.[54]

Based on the testimony of Montesinos and Pinchi, the Office
of the Comptroller General of Peru
has estimated that Fujimori received between U.S.$43.2 million and U.S.$59.4
million in transfers from the SIN between 1992 and 2000.[55]

In light of these transactions, it is not surprising that
financial analyses show a substantial imbalance between Fujimori's assets and
official income as president and university professor, and his expenses
(including payment for his four children's college educations and expenses in
the United States).[56]

Other charges against Fujimori are based on his management
of millions of dollars in donations that Japanese persons and entities made to Peru through
various organizations and accounts set up by Fujimori and his family.There is documentary evidence, for example,
that enormous donations were made to Peru
via the organization Apenkai, which was established and managed by the Fujimori
family from within the Palace
of Government.[57]However, Apenkai's financial records contain
serious inconsistencies and do not explain the use to which the funds were put.[58]Recent reports indicate U.S.$4.5 million from
Japanese donations were diverted to personal accounts of Fujimori's sister
Rosa, his brother-in-law Victor Aritomi, and his mother Mutsue Inamoto.[59]And there is evidence that Rosa
gave Fujimori three checks of approximately $175,000 each, drawn from these
accounts, between 1996 and 1997.[60]

4. Bribes for Loyalty: Destroying the Separation of Powers

Fujimori's party, "Peru 2000," did not obtain a
parliamentary majority in the 2000 elections.Fujimori has been charged with planning and putting into effect, in
conjunction with Montesinos, a scheme to pay bribes to congressional
representatives from opposition parties so that they would switch and join Peru
2000.In this manner, Fujimori could
ensure that he would have full congressional support during his third
term.The plan completely undermined the
principle of separation of powers.

As a result of the bribes, Fujimori's party went from
controlling only 42.6 percent of the seats in Congress, to controlling 58
percent of the seats, thus gaining a parliamentary majority.[61]According to Montesinos and Matilde Pinchi,
the payments were made with funds from the SIN's "reserved actions" budget, and
with funds that had been diverted from the budgets of the Ministries of Defense
and Interior and the Armed Forces.[62]

Montesinos has confirmed that he and Fujimori planned the
strategy together, and he has given detailed testimony about the various
payments.In at least one instance, a
former congressman who switched parties testified that after an initial meeting
with Montesinos at which Montesinos proposed that he change his party
affiliation, he had a second meeting with Fujimori, in which Fujimori asked him
about the matter, and in which the congressman agreed to the switch.[63]

The scheme involved the "purchase" of the loyalty of a group
of representatives.In exchange for
various payments, usually of thousands of dollars that Montesinos paid to them
in cash in the offices of the SIN, these congressional representatives agreed
to change their party affiliations.As
part of the agreement, the representatives signed three documents: first, a
letter of "resignation from their party of origin;" second, a letter of
affiliation to the party of the government or a "commitment to support the
regime of Fujimori Fujimori"; and third, a "receipt for money delivered"
(copies of these papers have been incorporated into criminal records).Many of the transactions were actually
recorded on videotape by Montesinos, and several of these recordings were
subsequently recovered by authorities.[64]

5. Transfer of U.S.$15 Million in Public Funds to Montesinos and Cover-up

On September
14, 2000, a videotape in which Montesinos appeared to be bribing a
Peruvian Congressman was leaked to the media and made public.The tape sparked an enormous scandal that
eventually resulted in the collapse of the Fujimori government.

In the weeks after the tape's release, Fujimori publicly
denounced Montesinos, and announced an investigation and nationwide manhunt for
him.Yet at the same time, Fujimori was
apparently frantically trying to cover up the criminal and corrupt activities
through which his government had concentrated power and avoided real democratic
oversight.Fujimori has subsequently
been charged with assisting Montesinos's escape, and conducting illegal
searches of Montesinos' home.Indeed,
Montesinos fled the country and, as evidence mounted against Fujimori, Fujimori
himself flew to Japan,
from where he resigned the presidency by fax.

Perhaps the most serious criminal charge against Fujimori
arising from his activities during this period is that, shortly after the
tape's release, Fujimori arranged to have U.S.$15 million in state funds
delivered to Montesinos.According to
Montesinos's testimony, as a result of the videotape's release, Fujimori held a
meeting with him, in which Fujimori decided to give him U.S.$15 million.[65]The payment was supposed to be Montesinos's
"compensation for services rendered."[66]

The transfer took place through an elaborate scheme.On September 19, shortly after the
videotape's release, Fujimori and three of his ministers signed Emergency
Decree 081-2000.The decree increased a
portion of the Defense Sector budget by 69,597,810 new soles (approximately
U.S.$19 million). Formally, the decree was issued in response to an August 25
request by the Army for a budgetary increase to implement the "Sovereignty
Plan" (Plan Soberana) to protect the Peruvian border from intrusions by
Colombian guerrillas.However, there is
strong evidence that such a plan never existed.[67]And there is no record of the decree
being discussed by the full Council of Ministers as would ordinarily be
required under Peruvian law.[68]

Carlos Boloa, the former minister of the economy who signed
the Emergency Decree, confessed during his criminal prosecution that he "knew
the money that was being transferred to the Ministry of Defense in accordance
with the Decree was going to be used to solve the problem of governance that was
created with the release of the sadly famous Kouri-Montesinos videotape, as President Fujimori told me so when he
asked me to urgently handle the Defense Sector's request."[69]

On the basis of the Emergency Decree, Defense Minister
Carlos Bergamino filed a formal request for 52,500,000 new soles to be placed
in the bank account of the Ministry of Defense's General Administration
Office.The request was immediately
approved by the Ministry of Economy.Bergamino then sent a formal request to the bank, asking that the full
amount be converted to U.S. dollars and turned over to Brigade General Luis
Muente, the head of the Ministry of Defense's General Administration Office.

On September 22, Muente picked up the money, which in
dollars added up to U.S.$15 million.He
has testified that, following Bergamino's orders, he drove the $15 million to
the SIN on September 22, and personally met with Montesinos to deliver the
money.He has also testified that
throughout that day, Montesinos called him repeatedly to ask about the
money.In those calls, Muente says that
Montesinos explained his insistence by stating that he was acting on a direct
order from Fujimori.[70]

Montesinos has testified that he had a meeting that same
night with James Stone Cohen and Swi Sudit Wasserman, who frequently handled
foreign deposits and transactions for Montesinos, at the SIN.[71]Montesinos claims that he gave the money to
Stone and Sudit for them to deposit it in a Swiss bank account, but that they
kept the money instead.[72]Three days later, Montesinos fled Peru. Both Stone and Sudit are currently under
prosecution for their participation in this scheme.

On November 2, Fujimori allegedly tried to cover up the
illegal withdrawal by depositing another $15 million back in government accounts.According to Bergamino's testimony, Fujimori
called a meeting at which Fujimori gave him four suitcases containing $15
million.Following Fujimori's
instructions, Bergamino gave the money to the Treasury and drafted a memo
stating that the "Sovereignty Plan" had been postponed until the following
year.[73]The next day, the sum was deposited in the
bank.

However, there is very strong evidence that the money that
was withdrawn on September 22 was not the same money that was returned to the
Treasury on November 3.In particular, currency
conversion receipts for the money that was withdrawn and the money that was
returned show that the bills withdrawn were different from the ones returned.[74]Also, Henry David Tunanaa, an army
economist who says he accompanied Muente during the withdrawal of the $15
million, has testified that the money they withdrew included $50 and $20
bills.He also participated in the
November 3 "replacement" of the $15 million, and testifies that the money that
was returned consisted exclusively of $100 bills and thus could not be the same
money that had been withdrawn.[75]The origin of the $15 million that was
deposited in the account on November 3 remains unknown.Both Boloa and Bergamino have been convicted
for their participation in this scheme; their convictions are currently on
appeal.

IV. Legal Standards on Extradition from Chile

Extradition to Peru
from Chile
is governed by the 1932 Treaty on Extradition between the two countries.[76]The treaty provides that Peru and Chile agree to extradite persons to
one another to face criminal charges provided the following standard
requirements are met: first, the crimes charged must also be crimes that carry
sentences of a year or more in the country from which extradition is requested.[77]Second, the crimes charged must not be
considered political crimes under the law of the country from which extradition
is requested.[78]Third, the crimes charged must not be crimes
for which the statute of limitations would have run in the country from which
extradition is requested.[79]
And fourth, the requested individual must not have been convicted or acquitted,
or be under trial or prosecution, for the same facts in the country from which
extradition is requested as in the requesting country.[80]

Chilean courts also have the practice, in extradition cases, of
applying additional requirements drawn from Chilean law on criminal procedure.[81]In particular, courts have in the past looked
at the evidence supporting the charges for which extradition was requested, to
determine whether the evidence would have justified bringing charges in Chile
had the crime been committed there.[82]In other words, if the courts consider
that there would not have been probable cause to indict in Chile under
similar circumstances, then they do not extradite. However, it is important to note that the
standard of review the courts have applied is not that the evidence must be
sufficient to convict: the evidence need only be sufficient to justify an
indictment.

In accordance with the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure, extradition
requests are decided by a member of the Supreme Court.In the event that extradition is granted, the
individual who is the subject of the extradition request may appeal the
decision to a panel of the same court.[83]Once the court's decision is final, the
individual is placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, so
that he may be handed over to the country that requested his extradition.[84]

V. Conclusion

Each of the five cases described in this report includes
evidence linking former President Fujimori to serious crimes. The
evidence includes the testimony of various witnesses and, in several cases,
extensive documentation. It dramatically undercuts Fujimori's repeated
public assertions that there is no evidence implicating him in crimes.

Nor do the cases against Fujimori involve minor infractions
or mere self enrichment. Rather, they involve crimes that harmed Peruvian
democracy and violated the fundamental rights of Peruvian citizens.
Justice requires that Fujimori finally be extradited to Peru to respond to the serious
charges against him.

[2]
See Testimony of former Commander General of the Army Nicolas de Bari Hermoza
Rios before Supreme Court Justice Jose Luis Lecaros, September 19, 2001 (noting that
Fujimori slept at the SIN and often conducted his work from SIN headquarters).

[5]
Law No. 26546 of November 1995 created the Executive Commission of the
Judiciary, headed by a former navy captain, Jos Dellepiane. The Fujimori
majority in the legislature appointed the commission's members.

[6]
Informe de la Comisin Investigadora de la influencia irregular ejercida
durante el gobierno de Alberto Fujimori Fujimori (1990-2000) sobre el Poder
Judicial, Ministerio Publico y otros poderes e instituciones del Estado
vinculados a la administracin de la justicia, June 17, 2002, p. 6, 15,
http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/apoycomisiones/informes.nsf/0F1683791EB39A2005256AFF00789023/9EF2F044A4E2761B05256C0E007A7478
(retrieved December 12, 2005).The
Peruvian Congress has also transcribed videos of meetings between presidential
advisor Vladimiro Montesinos and Supreme Court justices in which he orders them
to appoint and transfer judges. A congressional subcommittee investigating
impeachment charges against Supreme Court Justice Alipio Montes de Oca found
that Montesinos had offered him a bonus of $10,000 and free trip to Colombia
if he agreed to be president of the National Electoral Board in the 2000
elections. Congress of the Republic, Transcription of video 889. The justices
at the meeting were Alipio Montes de Oca, Luis Serpa Segura, and Chief Justice
Vctor Ral Castillo.

[7] Article 112 of the
constitution does not permit a second re-election, but the impugned law had interpreted
the article as excluding terms of office prior to the promulgation of the
constitution in 1993.

[9] Transcripts are available on
the website of the Peruvian Congress. Congress of the Republic,
Comisin Investigadora de la Gestin Presidencial de Alberto Fujimori, Informe Final, June 15, 2002,
http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/apoycomisiones/informes.nsf/0F1683791EB39A2005256AFF00789023/B0930CDC9F8E189505256BFE0060AAA6
(retrieved December 9, 2005).

[14]
Memorandum from Alberto Fujimori, President of the Republic of Peru to the
Minister of Defense, June 25, 1991; Memorandum from Alberto Fujimori, President
of the Republic of Peru to the Minister of Defense, July 30, 1991.

[15]
These records were recovered on April 1 and 12, 2002, when Judge Luz Victoria
Snchez of the fifth special anti-corruption criminal court and provincial
prosecutor Richard Saavedra conducted a search of army intelligence records on
the assignments of the Colina group in 1990-1992.See Diligencia de Exhibicin de Documentos
Realizada en las Instalaciones del Cuartel General del Ejrcito, April 1, 2002, Fs. 14057 a
14070, Expediente Barrios Altos.

[16]The documents found by
Judge Snchez in army records included a transcription of personal congratulations
from President Fujimori in August 1991 to members of the Colina group for
"providing efficient services on national security and defense of the highest
values of democracy."Other records
showed that members of the group had been decorated in July 1994 for services
to "national pacification."Ibid.

[27]
See Nathaniel C. Nash, "Grisly Find in Peru
Puts Army in Deep Shadow," The New York Times, August 13, 1993; James Brooke, "Lima Journal: Dictator?
President? Or General Manager of Peru?," The New York Times,
November 25, 1993; Human Rights Watch, "Anatomy of a Cover-Up: The
Disappearances at La Cantuta," A Human
Rights Watch Report, Vol. 5, No. 9, September 1993.

[28]
Criminal investigations were started within the civilian and military justice
systems almost simultaneously.After the
Supreme Court was unable to reach a quorum to decide the jurisdictional
conflict, Fujimori signed, on February
9, 1994, Law No. 26291.That
law allowed only three, instead of four, members of the Supreme Court to decide
jurisdictional conflicts between the military and civilian tribunals
(previously, the Court would have had to bring in an additional judge to reach
a quorum).The Supreme Court then ruled
in favor of the military justice system. See Acusacin Constitucional Contra el
Ex Presidente de la Republica, Ingeniero Alberto Fujimori Fujimori por la
presunta comisin de los delitos de homicidio calificado, desaparicin forzada
y Lesiones Graves, por los casos denominados "La Cantuta" y "Barrios Altos,"
August 27, 2001.

[33]
Chuqui's testimony is consistent with the statements of "Witness 1," a former
Army intelligence officer who claimed, in testimony to the Congress, that friends
of his who were members of the Colina group had said that Martin Rivas would
tell them that their orders came from Fujimori.See Comisin Investigadora sobre la Actuacin, el Origen, Movimiento y
Destino de los Recursos Financieros de Vladimiro Montesinos Torres y su
Evidente Relacin con el ex Presidente Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Sesin on
Monday February 11, 2002. Leonor La Rosa, an Army intelligence operative, has
testified that she personally saw Fujimori in meetings with members of the
Colina Group and Montesinos.See
Testimony of Leonor La Rosa, August 1, 2002,
Expediente 19-2001 A.V.

[42] In the case of the Ministry
of Defense and the Armed Forces, these funds were consistently assigned to a
budget line for "Emergency Zones," which would ordinarily have been used for
social assistance.Ibid.

[59]
Fujimori's mother, despite being very elderly, is registered as having
withdrawn $1 million in cash from these accounts in Peru.See ngel Paez, "Mam de Fujimori retir $1
milln," La Republica, December 1, 2005.

[64]
Transcripts of some of the "Vladivideos" are available on the website of Peru's
Congress, at
http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/SICR/diariodebates/audiovideos.NSF/indice?OpenView&Start=1
(retrieved December 8, 2005).

[67]
Montesinos has testified that the request was in fact drafted after September
14, when the first videotape of Montesinos making payments to a Congressman was
made public.Ibid.The Ministry of Defense has certified that
the Sovereignty Plan does not appear in any of its files.See
Oficio No. 4369-SGMD-C/4, August 19, 2002, referenced in Vocala Suprema de
Instruccin, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.

[68]
According to testimony by the General Secretary of the Presidency at the time,
Fujimori delivered the decree directly to him so that it would be taken to the
Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to be sealed and numbered, and then
immediately returned to Fujimori.He
also testified that because the decree was labeled "secret," Congress was not
informed of it.See Testimony of Jose Kamiya Teruya, described in
Vocala Suprema de Instruccin, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001
A.V., March 24, 2003.

[71]
Swi Sudit Wasserman has also testified that he met with Montesinos and that
they discussed the money, but he claims that he did not receive the money.See
Testimony of Swi Sudit Wasserman, described in Vocala Suprema de Instruccin,
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe
Final, Expediente Nro,: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.

[72] See Testimony of Vladimiro Montesinos,
described in Vocala Suprema de Instruccin, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Republica, Informe Final, Expediente
No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.Army
Captain Mario Rafael Ruiz Aguero, who worked at the SIN, has stated that on the
night of September 22 Montesinos instructed him to put four or five bags into
the trunk of Stone's car.See Testimony of Mario Rafael Ruiz Aguero,
described in Vocala Suprema de Instruccin, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Republica, Informe Final, Expediente
No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.

[78]
Ibid., Art. III.The treaty notes that
extradition will be granted even if the defendant claims that he had a
political motivation, so long as the crime charged is a common crime such as
homicide.

[79]
Ibid., Art. V.The statute of
limitations period in Chile
can be for five, ten, or fifteen years, depending on the crime.See Cdigo
Penal de Chile, Art. 94However, each
time the defendant commits a new crime, the statute of limitations starts
running again on the earlier crimes.Ibid., Art. 96.Also, if the
defendant is outside the country, the period of the statute of limitations is
doubled.Ibid., Art. 100.

[80]See Treaty on
Extradition between Chile
and Peru,
November 5, 1932, Art. VIII, available online at http://www.oas.org/juridico/MLA/sp/traites/sp_traites-ext-chl-per.pdf
(retrieved December 14, 2005).

[81]Chile
currently has two different codes of criminal procedure, with slightly
different standards on extradition.Which code is applied in a given case usually depends on the date on
which the crime was committed.There is
currently some controversy over how to determine which code applies to
extradition requests.