TURKEY:
The Little Known World of the Military Hierarchy

Huseyin
Kivrikoglu is not a name any but the keenest observers
of Turkish politics will be familiar with. Yet according
to protocol, Kivrikoglu ranks only fifth in the Turkish
state's hierarchy, behind the President of the Republic,
the president of the constitutional council, the president
of the national assembly and the Prime Minister. In
fact, this general, because he is a general, is the
"J-1", the chief of general staff, arguably the most
powerful man in Turkey, in charge of an armed force
of 800,000 men and 35,000 officers.

His predecessors have orchestrated
three coups in the last 40 years (in 1960, 1971 and
1980); and also staged a 'blank coup' in February
1997 when they called for the resignation of Necmettin
Erbakan, the prime minister, an Islamist but also
an official nominated by the president of the Republic
and a man who had gained a vote of confidence from
the Assembly.

Last June, during the monthly
meeting of the "National Security Council", the chief
of staff and his colleagues shook the power of Bulent
Ecevit, the new prime minister, by requesting that
he bring to an end the activities of Fethullah Gulen,
the head of an Islamic network with many powerful
financial connections.

At
NATO's supreme council meetings, the Turkish chief
of staff does not sit behind his defence minister,
but at his side - clearly illustrating that he is
not his subordinate but at least his equal. Unlike
the other NATO armed forces the Turkish army does
not give the impression of being in the nation's service;
in a strange way it seems to govern it, almost dictating
its will.

How can this Turkish exception
be explained? Paradoxically, there are few studies
on the army which has played such a vital role in
Turkey's political history. Turkish generals, even
when retired, avoid meeting journalists. The few Turkish
academics who do research on this subject are satisfied
with generalities. The only exception is Mehmet Ali
Birand, a Turkish writer who published Shirts of Steel,
a book full of revealing details on the working ofthe Turkish armed force.

From the beginning of their career,
when they enter a military school at the age of 14-15,
for a period of four years, or a military academy,
at age 18-19, also for four years, the future Turkish
officers are instilled with the idea that they form
an elite, living in a world apart, with a special
mission.

To
be admitted to these military schools and academies
an applicant must fulfil all the conditions required
from a student who applies to an elite school anywhere
in the world: good marks, especially in sciences,
good looks, good general attitude - and something
a little more unusual - a rigorous investigation not
only of the candidate's personality but also that
of his family, including his parents' profession their
political activities. Their entire history is extensively
researched, and the existence of even a distant relative
suspected of being a militant, a member of a leftist
or Islamist party, or any organisation sympathetic
to the Kurds, is enough to disqualify the candidate.

Personal investigation of the
candidate's personality, background and personal circumstances
continue throughout his career with rigorous examinations
conducted at regular intervals and particularly before
any promotion is considered.

Destined to play an exceptional
role, the cadet lives in a special world: the quality
of life in Turkey's military schools and academies
has nothing to do with the often lamentable conditions
prevailing in most of the country's high schools and
universities: clean and comfortable classrooms, good
food, good libraries, modern laboratories, computers,
exceptional sports facilities, and especially well
trained professors.

Throughout his academic career
each student has a file, stored in a computerised
system which records every mark, examination result,
good conduct mark or disciplinary action. This allows
Turkish military chiefs to assess the career and progress
of any given recruit in seconds.

The programme of the military
schools follows the basic study programme of Turkish
high schools but with additions: intensive physical
training, a basic military training, and a course
of political education, including special attention
to the study of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder
of the Turkish Republic. Ataturkism fills about 20
per cent of the teaching given in Turkish military
academies: exactly 160 hours out of a total of 960
hours in a year.

It is studied in several programmes
- covering Ataturk's role in Turkish history, an analysis
of his political doctrines, and the laws of the armed
forces -

which are based on his writings.

After eight years of such indoctrination,
the new Turkish officer considers himself an exceptional
human being and one responsible for preventing any
new decline of Turkey. He is now a state appointed
guardian of the Republic, assigned with the task of
protecting it against all internal (Islamist or communist,
subversion, or Kurdish separatism) and external (formerly
Soviet, more recently Greek, Syrian or Iranian,) threats.
And he also has the deepest contempt for the Turkish
politicians, who he considers manipulate ignorant
masses for their own ends.

He displays for his uniform and
his flag an endless admiration: regularly, cadets,
seized by an uncontrollable emotion, faint while saluting
the flag, as they must do every morning.

Slowly ascending the hierarchy
according to scheduled promotions - determined by
his behaviour, his ideas, his marks - the Turkish
officer is already deeply entrenched in a world apart,
isolated from ordinary civilians, both physically
and socially. While his pay differs little from the
salary of a civil servant of a comparable rank, the
Turkish officer enjoys many material privileges -
he lives in superior housing, clean and well maintained,
with gardens,

guarded day and night by sentinels,
for which he pays a subsidised rent (six to eight
times less than normal market rates). All his life
unfolds in a special setting, from the American-inspired
PX supermarket offering a wide range of goods at cheap
prices, to the military hospital, where officers and
their families are treated totally free of charge.
But the more ostensible symbol of the officer's unique
status is the "officers house", be it in Istanbul
or in Diyarbekir, in Izmir or Van. Where he meets
his colleagues and their families in a pleasant place,
surrounded by greenery, and again at a price defying
competition. Civilians are not admitted, except for
the direct members of the officers' families, and
the generals' guests. It is not unusual for members
of the military - in a variety of countries - to enjoy
special privileges but the treatment of officers in
Turkey is exceptional.

Separated physically and socially
from the wider population, the officers are also separated
morally from the civilian society at large. This separation
exacerbates the lack of understanding of a world the
military hierarchy considers largely undisciplined,
ignorant, ruled by money and without ideals, values
and patriotism.

There are about 300 generals
- the 'pashas' - and admirals in the Turkish armed
forces. Promotion to this lofty rank finally arrives
after some 30 postings in different places, of which
several will have been "East of the Euphrates" (in
Kurdistan).

Successful candidates are nominated
by the Supreme Military Council, a body of 18 members
set up after the 1971 coup which usually meets in
August. The prime minister and the minister of defence
are members of the council, but they are not allowed
to speak during its meetings. It is the chief of general
staff who selects, with the chiefs of the different
services (land, air, navy and gendarmerie), the names
of the 30 to 50 colonels who are promoted each

year, after long investigations
more meticulous than all the previous ones. This decision,
eminently political - some generals in Turkey exert
a power comparable to the power of many heads of small
states - is totally outside the control of any civilian
power.

President Suleiman Demirel, who
was overthrown twice while he was prime minister by
the Turkish army (in 1971 and 1980), is well aware
of the exceptional power of this army-and it is clear
that, whatever directives might come out of Europe,
if a man by the name of Huseyin Kivrikoglu decides
in favour of carrying out Abdulla Ocalan's death sentence,
he is going to yield.

(The Middle East
magazine, February 2000; LEvènement,
8 Juillet 1999)