Maintaining Momentum for Missile Defense

About the Author

Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security PolicyDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

On
May 20, 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the final
version of legislation establishing a national policy to deploy a
limited national missile defense (NMD) system as soon as
technologically possible. Adoption of this bill (H.R. 4) by the
House followed Senate approval of a companion measure, the
Cochran-Inouye National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (S. 269). It is
widely assumed that President Bill Clinton will sign H.R. 4. But
whether he signs or vetoes this bill, its approval by Congress
makes it clear that there is considerable momentum behind the idea
of deploying an NMD system.

Congress's action comes without a moment
to spare. It was driven by the realization that the ballistic
missile threat to the United States, which the Clinton
Administration previously described as distant, is in fact present
and growing. This realization was spurred by the release of a
report by the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to
the United States (the Rumsfeld Commission) on July 15,
1998.1 In this report, the
commission, which had been established by an act of Congress,
detailed how the United States could find itself facing the
imminent threat of missile attack from rogue states, such as Iran
and North Korea, with little or no warning.

The
unanimous findings of the Rumsfeld Commission were soon
validated. A week after the report was released, the
government of Iran tested a Shahab-3 intermediate-range missile,
and on August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong-1
three-stage rocket that, with modifications, could reach
intercontinental range.

Given the momentum in Congress for
deploying an NMD system, as well as the continuing expansion of the
threat, it is important to maintain this momentum and continue
progressing toward deployment of an effective NMD system to counter
limited strikes on U.S. territory. The means to do this will lie
both in specific proposals for the development of the systems
needed to provide such a defense and in surmounting the
Administration's policy of observing unilaterally the restrictions
on those systems in the now-defunct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union.2
This Administration policy effectively blocks the deployment of
even a limited NMD system for the defense of U.S. territory.

Congress must not allow the existing
momentum to dissipate. That a national missile defense is needed
now more than ever was confirmed on May 25, 1999, when the report
of the bipartisan Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China
(the so-called Cox Committee) was finally made public. This report
details how China stole classified U.S. data that enabled it to
modernize its nuclear weapons years earlier than otherwise would
have been possible, making these weapons even more of a threat to
the United States and its allies in Asia. The disturbing evidence
in the Cox Committee report, combined with that released last year
by the Rumsfeld Commission, makes it impossible for any reasonable
person to deny any longer that there is an urgent need for a
national missile defense.

PROPOSALS FOR MAINTAINING MISSILE DEFENSE
MOMENTUM

The
missile defense bill now on its way to the White House mandates the
deployment of a national missile defense system. It does not,
however, recommend the kind of system (or architecture) that should
be deployed. Rather, it implies that a full array of missile
defense systems and technologies should be considered for selection
based on effectiveness, costs, and availability.

In a
study published last March, a commission established by The
Heritage Foundation in 1998 to study missile defense proposed a
specific architecture using a combination of sea-based and
space-based systems.3 The recommendations that
follow regarding the development of specific systems or
technologies are derived from that study. They do not preclude the
eventual inclusion of other systems or technologies in the NMD
architecture. They also include means for overcoming the Clinton
Administration's policy regarding the ABM Treaty, which stands in
the way of the deployment of any effective missile defense
system.

With
these recommendations in mind, Congress should build on the general
missile defense mandates in H.R. 4 and take steps to:

Authorize the development and deployment of theater
missile defenses that are capable of meeting the threat from North
Korea.
In August 1998, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong-1 rocket over
Japan. The launch, which demonstrated North Korea's capacity to hit
U.S. territory with a ballistic missile in the very near future,
helped prompt Congress to adopt legislation establishing a policy
of deploying a national missile defense (NMD) system. In its
understandable and appropriate rush to address the rapidly emerging
threat to American territory posed by this launch, however,
Congress paid less attention to the fact that the Taepo Dong-1 also
poses a threat to U.S. forces deployed in Guam or Japan.4 A missile defense
deployed in the United States for the protection of the homeland
would not provide protection to U.S. forces stationed in Guam and
Japan in the event of war with North Korea. Congress needs to
ensure that the theater missile defense systems in development are
capable of providing defense against the Taepo Dong-1 missile in
circumstances in which American lives are at stake.

Two theater missile defense systems are
now in development under the Administration's Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (BMDO): the Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) system and
the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Both systems, when
deployed, could be positioned on or near Guam and Japan to provide
protection for U.S. forces against certain kinds of missiles. Under
the current development plans, however, both systems will be
incapable of countering the Taepo Dong-1. The key characteristic of
missiles that these defense systems are incapable of downing is
their speed: The Taepo Dong-1 has a maximum speed of between 5
kilometers and 8 kilometers per second, depending on the size of
the payload. Neither the NTW nor the THAAD system has been tested
against a target missile with a speed exceeding 5 kilometers per
second; nor are there plans to test either system against a target
missile with a speed exceeding 5 kilometers per second at any time
in the future.

This limitation is shortsighted, and
Congress should demand a change in the test program for these two
systems. Congress can require that both systems be tested against
target missiles with speeds of no less than 7 kilometers per
second. Further, it should establish a deadline; it should require
that each system be tested against a target missile with the
designated speed no later than the end of FY 2001 and that the BMDO
take the necessary steps now to meet this deadline. Finally,
Congress needs to ensure that both systems have the best
opportunity to intercept the faster missiles in the designated
tests. This can be done by requiring that timely modifications to
both systems be made in the course of development. At a minimum,
two modifications to either the NTW or THAAD system should be
made:

The speed of the interceptors should be increased so that it is
well above 3 kilometers per second. In the case of the NTW system,
this means restoring the speed of its interceptor to 4.5 kilometers
per second, the assumed speed of its interceptor in the system's
original concept outline.

The interceptors should be allowed to receive targeting data
during the designated tests from a variety of sensor systems that
are external to those built into each system, including shipboard
radar, ground-based radar, airborne sensors, and satellite
sensors.

Demanding such capabilities and technology
would ensure that the BMDO does everything in its power to see that
U.S. forces deployed in Guam and Japan, as well as the people of
Guam and Japan, are not left naked before the threat of a Taepo
Dong-1 missile attack in the event of war with North Korea.

Authorize the development and deployment of missile
defenses that are capable of meeting the threat from
China.
As the Cox Committee report made clear, China's acquisition of
advanced U.S. satellite technology through commercial ventures and
U.S. nuclear secrets through espionage may enable its missile
program essentially to skip a generation of development. China now
is building weapons that could threaten the United States and its
allies in Asia. Congress, therefore, should require tests of
missile defenses, similar to those described above, against a
target modern intercontinental ballistic missile. The tests should
account for enhancements made possible by stolen U.S. technology to
increase the missile's accuracy and to enable it to deliver
multiple warheads.

Authorize a resumption of the Defense and Space Talks
with Russia and perhaps other nations.
During the House and Senate floor debate on H.R. 4 and the
Cochran-Inouye bill, Members of Congress expressed their desire
that the United States establish a cooperative approach with Russia
in the area of missile defense through negotiations.5 Such negotiations had
been underway when the Clinton Administration took office; the
Administration walked out of the Defense and Space Talks in
1993.

Congress can remedy this shortsighted
mistake by authorizing a resumption of the Defense and Space Talks
with Russia. Additional states could be included in these talks if
that is deemed appropriate. But Congress needs to be clear about
the appropriate venue for such negotiations, needs to define their
purpose, and needs to ensure that the Senate's prerogatives are
protected.

Congress should make clear that the
Administration is to resume the Defense and Space Talks. This would
ensure that the talks do not take place at the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC), a body established by the ABM Treaty
with the Soviet Union to oversee the implementation of that treaty,
address compliance issues, and consider amendments. The ABM Treaty
is no longer legally binding.6
Neither Russia nor any other foreign state qualifies as a party to
the ABM Treaty. Thus, the SCC itself lacks legal standing, and no
state other than the United States may participate fully in SCC
proceedings.

The Defense and Space Talks were not
established under the legal authority of the ABM Treaty. Further,
the SCC, during most of the period of the Defense and Space Talks,
was limited to considering ABM Treaty implementation and compliance
issues, not issues related to the development and deployment of
missile defenses. Compliance issues were a particularly important
consideration for the SCC at that time, because the Soviets were
undertaking a variety of activities in violation of their ABM
Treaty obligations.7 Resumption of the
Defense and Space Talks, therefore, would not be hampered by the
legal problems or serious political problems associated with the
SCC.

Congress needs to define the essential
purpose of the resumed Defense and Space Talks. First, any
proposals to revive the ABM Treaty, either through a new agreement
establishing state succession under the treaty or by otherwise
amending the treaty, should be excluded from these talks under a
mandate imposed by means of funding limitations. The prohibition in
this mandate is appropriate for three reasons:

The ABM Treaty is no longer valid,
and it is inappropriate to engage in negotiations to amend a treaty
that has no legal standing;

Russia is not a party to the ABM
Treaty today, and it is inappropriate for the United States to
consider proposals for amending a treaty with a state that is not a
party to it; and

The SCC, not the Defense and Space
Talks, would be the appropriate forum for consideration of ABM
Treaty amendments if the treaty were valid.

The appropriate subject for the Defense
and Space Talks, therefore, is to explore the means for cooperation
between the United States and Russia during their transitions to
the deployment of missile defense systems. This would include such
measures as the sharing of information on system development in
order to prevent surprise, cooperation in addressing shared missile
threats, and even sharing the benefits of missile defense
capabilities. This is entirely consistent with the legislation
adopted by Congress establishing a policy of deploying a national
missile defense system. Indeed, such talks would be a tangible
expression of this policy. Consistent with this mandate, these
talks should not involve the development of proposals that would
impose any limits whatsoever on the development, testing, and
deployment of missile defense systems.

Finally, Congress needs to ensure that the
Clinton Administration cannot interpret its mandate for resuming
the Defense and Space Talks as prior approval of any agreement it
may sign as a result of these talks. Congress should do this by
requiring that any agreement reached in these talks must take the
form of a treaty document, which is subject to the Senate's advice
and consent before ratification.

Authorize new management for the
Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low) program.
Any effective missile defense system will require a constellation
of sensor satellites capable of detecting missiles, tracking them
in flight, and providing targeting data to anti-missile
interceptors. The satellite constellation now in development for
doing this is called SBIRS-Low.

Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration
has been weakening the SBIRS-Low program and the Air Force has been
mismanaging it. In its February 1, 1999, budget presentation for FY
2000, the Administration cut the much-needed funding for the
program. The Administration announced at the time that it is
deferring the first launch of a SBIRS-Low satellite for two years
(from 2004 to 2006). This means that the full operational
capability for these satellites will not be obtained until 2010.
The Air Force imprudently reduced the number of contractors working
on the system from two to one in 1996, thereby eliminating the
benefits of a competitive environment. Then, recognizing its
mistake, the Air Force brought back the second contractor in 1997.
The Air Force announced on February 5, 1999, that it is canceling
two near-term experimental flights that were designed to prove the
viability of the
system and reduce technical risk.8
Absent the specific congressional directions made during hearings
and floor debate to further this vital program, it is all but
certain that even the limited progress that has been made thus far
would not have been realized.

Congress, therefore, needs to be even more
aggressive in making sure that its goals for the SBIRS-Low program
are realized. It can do so by directing that the program be
transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. Further, Congress
should designate SBIRS-Low as a top national priority and direct
that a streamlined management approach, similar to the approach
used to develop the Polaris missile, be adopted. Achieving
streamlined management would require directing the Navy to
establish a special program office whose director would have
authority to hire and fire people, spend money, and direct
engineering. Congress also should make it clear that it expects
this new office to require that the Naval Research Laboratory
manage prototype development and that the Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory have direct involvement in the project.
Congress should sharply limit the oversight authority of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. Finally, in addition to restoring
funding to the SBIRS-Low program, Congress should direct the Navy
to seek to begin placing these satellites in orbit by the end of
2003.

Require the President to certify that
Russia is not a State Party to the ABM Treaty.
The Clinton Administration's policy of honoring the 1972 ABM
Treaty with the former Soviet Union is the single most important
obstacle to the deployment of an effective missile defense system.
The ABM Treaty barred either state from deploying a missile defense
system to protect its national territory. It even barred the
development and testing of certain kinds of anti-missile
systems.

In pursuing this policy, the
Administration has asserted that the treaty remains legally
binding, despite the fact that the Soviet Union no longer exists.
In a May 1998 letter to Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) and
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), the President stated that Russia, in
lieu of the Soviet Union, is a party to the treaty.9 This statement, in turn,
provides the foundation for its assertion that the ABM Treaty
remains in force. But this statement is not true. Indeed, the
Administration referred to Russia and other states participating in
an October 1998 treaty review meeting as "sides participating in
the ABM Treaty review," as a way to avoid designating any of them
as parties to the treaty.10

The Administration's misleading claim is
having a negative impact in the Senate and House of Representatives
on the matter of proceeding quickly with deployment of a missile
defense system. Some Members of Congress see such deployment as
breaking a treaty commitment.11
Indeed, it would entail breaking a U.S. commitment to the Soviet
Union if the Soviet Union were still in existence and had not
violated the treaty, which it did in a variety of ways,12 but there is no such
treaty commitment with Russia or any other country. Thus,
deployment of a national missile defense system will not entail
breaking any U.S. treaty obligation to any foreign state.

Congress needs to clarify the fact that
the United States has no ABM Treaty obligation with Russia by
requiring the President to certify that Russia is not a party to
the treaty. Such certification would serve to change the political
dynamic in the debate over deploying a national missile defense
system. The charge that deploying NMD would break a U.S. treaty
obligation with Russia would no longer be credible.

Allocate no less than $70 million of
the funds made available for national missile defense to the Navy
Theater-Wide (NTW) system.
Reports on a classified study drafted by the BMDO indicate that the
Administration now recognizes that the NTW system can be adapted to
defend U.S. territory against missile attack.13 The Missile Defense
Study Team brought together by The Heritage Foundation has proposed
adapting the NTW system to the national missile defense mission
since 1995.14 The wisdom of this
approach was reaffirmed in a more recent study by the Heritage
Commission on Missile Defense.15

One of the critical needs that must be met
for this approach to work, however, is adequate funding for NTW.
The Administration has requested $330 million for development of
the Navy Theater-Wide system in FY 2000. The 1999 Heritage
Commission on Missile Defense study recommended providing $400
million to this program in FY 2000.16
At the same time, the Administration is proposing that almost $837
million be committed to national missile defense development in FY
2000.

Given that the Administration now
recognizes a potential role for a modified Navy Theater-Wide system
in national missile defense, it is appropriate that $70 million of
the funds allocated for missile defense development be earmarked
for the Navy Theater-Wide program. This earmark should be
accompanied by a direction instructing the Administration to put
these funds into technologies that will make a national missile
defense system capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles.
Such technologies include those for increasing the speed of the NTW
interceptor missile and refining the lightweight advanced
exoatmospheric projectile (LEAP) kill vehicle. (The "kill vehicle"
is the critical component of the system that actually rams into an
attacking missile and destroys it.)

Finally, the Navy Theater-Wide system must
have access to and be able to use targeting information from
external sensors, including shipboard radar aboard Navy vessels, in
addition to the one on the ship that is used to launch the
interceptor, as well as airborne sensors, ground-based radar, and
sensor satellites.

Halt funding for the enforcement of
the ABM Treaty.The restrictions of the ABM Treaty prevent the United
States from deploying a missile defense system that is capable of
protecting all U.S. territory against missile attack. They also bar
the testing, development, and deployment of sea-based and
space-based strategic missile defense systems.

Because no foreign states are currently
recognized as State Parties to the ABM Treaty, the treaty lacks
legal standing. There can be no ABM treaty relationship if no
states other than the United States are recognized as parties. This
fact, however, has not prevented the Administration either from
asserting that the treaty remains in force or from effectively
enforcing ABM Treaty restrictions on a unilateral basis.

To halt the Administration's policy of
unilateral observance and enforcement of ABM Treaty restrictions,
Congress should bar the expenditure of any funds for the purpose of
continuing the enforcement of the ABM Treaty. Currently, the
Administration executes its unilateral observance of the ABM Treaty
through the expenditure of funds for this purpose. An office called
the Compliance Review Group handles the bulk of these enforcement
activities. For example, the BMDO must obtain the approval of the
Compliance Review Group before it conducts a test of a missile
defense system. If the Compliance Review Group finds that a certain
test is not consistent with the Administration's policy of
observing ABM Treaty restrictions, the test may not be conducted.
These kinds of enforcement activities should be denied funds.

The same kind of restrictions should apply
to any attempt by the Administration to implement a new treaty with
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine before ratification of
that new agreement. This agreement, signed by a U.S. representative
in New York in September 1997,17
would impose many of the same restrictions found in the ABM Treaty.
But before it is implemented, it will require the advice and
consent of the Senate prior to ratification. The Administration has
yet to send the treaty to the Senate for its consideration.

Representative David McIntosh (R-IN) has
circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter inviting House members to
co-sponsor a bill that would prohibit funding for the
Administration's ABM Treaty enforcement activities and for the
enforcement of the provisions of the new multilateral
agreement.18 The funding prohibition
that would be established by this measure is comprehensive and
strict. Under its terms, no enforcement activities could take place
regarding either treaty. Thus, this legislation attempts to clear
away the artificial legal impediments to the development and
deployment of an effective and affordable missile defense system
for the United States.

CONCLUSION

The
speedy development and deployment of an effective missile defense
system is among the highest U.S. national security priorities. The
evidence marshaled in the Cox Committee and Rumsfeld Commission
reports confirms that the threat of ballistic missile attack on
U.S. territory is both present and growing. Now, with Congress's
adoption of legislation establishing deployment of a missile
defense system as U.S. national policy, the political momentum for
accomplishing this vital objective is at hand.

The
American people cannot afford to see this momentum lost. Either
Congress will maintain the existing momentum and an effective
missile defense will be deployed prior to an attack, or such a
system will be deployed only after an attack is launched against
U.S. territory. Taking concrete steps toward deployment means that
Members of Congress must put forth proposals that accelerate
critical missile defense programs and reverse the Administration's
policy of observing the restrictions of the defunct 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

One
thing is certain: The threat of missile attack will not wait for
Washington to act.

Baker
Spring is Senior Defense Policy Analyst in the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.

Endnotes

1.Executive Summary,
Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States, published pursuant to Public Law No.
201, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 15, 1998.

2.David B. Rivkin, Jr.,
Lee A. Casey, and Darin R. Bartram, "The Collapse of the Soviet
Union and the End of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: A
Memorandum of Law," prepared for The Heritage Foundation by Hunton
and Williams, Washington, D.C., June 15, 1998.

4.The importance of Guam
to U.S. combat operations in the Pacific is frequently overlooked.
According to the Navy's Command for the Pacific Fleet, "Central to
the Pacific Fleet strategy is our ability to supply and maintain
our forces. Although there are other facilities throughout the
Pacific which help accomplish this goal, Guam remains the
centerpiece in its execution." See
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/cpffacts/cmdbrief/cb012599/sld022.htm.

6.See Rivkin et
al., "The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty."

7.For a detailed
description of the numerous Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty,
see William T. Lee, The ABM Treaty Charade: A Study in Elite
Illusion and Delusion (Washington, D.C.: Council for Social
and Economic Studies, 1997).

10.The White House,
"Report to Congress on the Memorandum of Understanding Relating to
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialists Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems of May 26, 1972," February 9, 1999, p. 4.

17."Memorandum of
Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972,"
September 26, 1997.