Monday, March 31, 2014

The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and its Citizen’s
Alliance is attempting to move into another stage of its political career as it
prepares for this year’s parliamentary elections. The party was originally
formed in Iran to organize pro-Khomeini Iraqi forces on its side during the
Iran-Iraq War. Before the 2003 invasion it aligned itself with the United
States so that it would gain a seat in the post-Saddam government that the
Americans would put together. Afterward it argued for a Shiite region and
gained control of most of the south and Baghdad in the 2005 elections. It was
then punished in the polls in 2009 and 2010 for its poor governorship. It had
even more problems as in between those two elections its leader Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim passed away, and his son Ammar Hakim lost the support of the old
guard, which eventually led to the Badr Organization splitting away and joining
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. To the surprise of many ISCI made a comeback in
2013 in the governorate level voting. Now it is trying to build on that for
this year’s balloting. The party has tried to portray itself as a centrist and
nationalist organization that is willing to work with others to solve the
country’s deep divisions.

ISCI Leader Ammar Hakim has attempted to lead his party in a new direction in 2014 (LA Times)

This year the Supreme Council has tried to position itself
as a party committed to solving Iraq’s problems rather than creating more of
them by arguing with other lists. When the fighting in Anbar started in
December 2013 the Citizen’s Alliance first called
on the local tribes to confront the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIS), and then offered
a political plan to rebuild the province and empower local leaders. Many in
Anbar have complained that Baghdad is constantly interfering in their affairs and
ignoring their demands, so ISCI tried to address both those issues. It said
only through political compromises could the conflict be resolved in the
governorate. On the legislative front it called on lawmakers to attend sessions,
which is always a problem, so that laws can be passed to serve the public. Parliamentarians
are constantly absent, and because of the political divisions it is very
difficult to pass any meaningful laws. Ammar Hakim has met
with some governors like Basra’s Majid Nasrawi calling for better services
in the provinces. This was one thing that made the Citizen’s Alliance
successful in 2013, appealing to local concerns. It has tried to position
itself as a mediator in the conflict between the central and Kurdistan regional
governments. In March for instance, it offered an initiative
to resolve the dispute between the two over the budget and oil industry based
upon greater transparency over production and exports, while maintaining
Baghdad’s control over the latter. On this issue ISCI was taking more of a
nationalist position as it argued for the Oil Ministry to maintain the lead
over the energy field. Hakim also met
with Moqtada al-Sadr and offered to be a middleman between Maliki and Kurdistan,
and said that he was committed to working out the differences between two so
that the 2014 budget could be passed. The budget has become a political
football between the premier and his opponents. Once again, the Supreme Council
was attempting to portray itself as a list more interested in getting things
done then arguing with others. When a presidential guard killed a Radio Free
Iraq reporter in Baghdad in March it criticized other parties for
attempting to use it for their own political gain. ISCI was referring to the
prime minister here as he personally oversaw the arrest of the perpetrator in
an obvious political move just before the elections. What differentiated the
Supreme Council was that it did not directly attack Maliki. Finally, it
announced a “Citizens’
Wants” campaign to try to connect to the public claiming that it wanted to
appeal to all sects and groups in the country, while reaching
out the tribes and asking their sheikhs to turn out their followers. All
these themes make up the Supreme Council’s current election campaign. Rather
than getting caught up in partisan disputes it has offered itself up as an
honest broker with plenty of ideas to address the country’s many problems. It
has used both populist and nationalist rhetoric aligning itself with local
concerns, while also stressing the necessity for an effective central
government. This is a long ways away from the group’s original image of a
pro-Iranian Shiite party that wanted decentralization, and shows the current
transformation Hakim is attempting to orchestrate.

The Supreme Council has shown the ability to learn and adapt
to its past mistakes. After its devastating losses in the 2009 and 2010
elections it completely reformed its message. It is stressing its Iraqiness and
commitment to Baghdad as the center that can resolve the country’s many
problems with the periphery. Unlike the vast majority of other political
parties, ISCI has largely refrained from attacking others directly. Since it is
largely competing for the Shiite vote this sets it apart from the Prime
Minister’s State of Law (SOL) and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc. Sadr has tried
to appropriate some of these same themes, but has increasingly moved towards
attacking the Prime Minister leading to a war of words between the two. SOL has
also consistently attacked its rivals, blaming both its domestic and foreign
opponents for all the country’s ills. With its success in the 2013 provincial
vote the Supreme Council is hoping to do just as well or better this year. How
many seats it gains is actually not as important as what direction it takes
after all the ballots are counted. Whatever the breakdown the Shiite parties
will still have the majority. It is now clear that Sadr is going to challenge a
third term for Maliki. That means which side the Supreme Council takes will
have the greatest chance to lead the country. Right now ISCI is trying to
benefit from the disputes between those two, but it will eventually have to
decide to align with one or another, and that might be the turning point in the
government formation process that will be a long and difficult one.

SOURCES

AIN, “Hakim urges for heavily
participation in next elections,” 3/27/14

Thursday, March 27, 2014

One of the ways that the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS) has been able to rebuild itself has been through attacks
on prisons to release their commanders and hardened fighters. For the last
few years these operations have repeatedly occurred throughout central and
northern Iraq with great success leading to the escape of hundreds of
insurgents. ISIS actually failed twice to break out its members from Badush
prison in Ninewa, but that was not for a lack of trying.

For almost a year ISIS targeted prison guards at Badush in
order to facilitate an escape. That started in 2013, and resulted in 200
guards quitting in December after facing threats and assassinations. Those
attacks continued for those remaining on duty into 2014. On January
7 for example, one guard was shot down in Mosul. The point of these
operations was to soften up the prison for an attack, which was launched on February
6. ISIS fired
mortars at the facility while prisoners inside started a riot. The assault
was repelled, but not before 1
guard and three prisoners were killed, and 14 others wounded. The Islamic
State didn’t give up however. On February
9 it bombed a house of a guard. February
20 it kidnapped and killed a worker at the prison. February
23 it set off an improvised explosive device (IED) that killed another
guard. March
2 it shot a guard, and another
the next day. Again these were preparatory operations before another attempt to
break into Badush. That finally happened on March 22, but again the militants were
beaten off. In the aftermath the director of the prison was
replaced and put under investigation for possible links to the insurgents. This
was one of the few times that the Islamic State failed to break into a prison
and free its compatriots. It did reveal some of the organizations tradecraft.
It collected intelligence on where the guards lived and travelled to and from
work and hit them over and over for months. It also either bribed or threatened
the head of the prison to gain inside information about the prison population
and security practices. While this careful planning didn’t work in the case of
Badush it has at other prisons such as Abu Ghraib and Kadhimiya that were hit
last year.

While ISIS has been able to draw upon new recruits from
Syria and other countries, it has relied upon prison breaks in part to rebuild
its leadership. It has launched a number of attacks upon detention facilities
with varying degrees of success. While it failed to get its people out of
Badush it did severely weaken the facility’s staff through attacks,
intimidation, and likely bribery. Its months of preparation didn’t work in its
two attacks upon Badush, but it won’t stop from trying again either there or
upon another prison in another part of Iraq in the future.

Wednesday, March 26, 2014

After a slight dip in operations the Iraqi insurgency came
back with a vengeance in the third week of March 2014. While the total number
of attacks was within the range of previous weeks of 2014, the casualties were
the highest of the year so far. This was largely the result of a large number
of car bombings by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), which are
used in mass casualty attacks.

The number of reported attacks in the third week of March was
only a few more than the previous week but the resulting deaths and wounded
were the highest of the year. The press recorded 217 security incidents from
March 15 to 21. That was up from 206 from March 8 to 14, and down from 253 seen
in March 1 to 7. The insurgency has been averaging over 200 attacks per week in
2014, so this was well within the annual range. However for the week there was
423 fatalities and 738 wounded, both the highest marks so far, surpassing 412
deaths seen in the first week of March, and 736 injured in the first week of
January.

Date

Security

Incidents

Killed

Wounded

Jan 1-7

245

363

736

Jan 8-14

267

372

683

Jan 15-21

202

358

597

Jan 22-28

240

308

624

Jan 29-31

58

93

227

JAN TOTAL

1,012

1,379

2,634

Feb 1-7

204

296

700

Feb 8-14

226

258

505

Feb 15-21

264

347

703

Feb 22-28

251

374

618

FEB TOTAL

945

1,275

2,526

Mar 1-7

253

412

702

Mar 8-14

206

324

607

Mar 15-21

217

423

738

MAR TOTAL

676

1,159

2,047

The main reason why casualties were up was due to 29 car
bombings in the third week of March. March 15 saw six of them used in Baghdad’s
Amin,
Hurriya, Shula, Sadr City, Qahira,
and Amil
costing 33 lives and wounding another 95. There were three more on March 18 in Dora,
Mahmudiya
and Ghaziliya
leaving 7 dead and 23 injured. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
launches these types of attacks in waves across the capital. This was just the
tale end of the latest one that started on March 13. There were also 4 car
bombings in Anbar, 3 in Babil, 2 in Diyala, 4 in Ninewa, 5 in Salahaddin, and 2
in Kirkuk that cost the lives of 57 people and wounded another 148. Just as
important, on March 18 there were coordinated vehicle delivered explosives in Karbala
and twolocations
in Wasit. On February 3
there was a car bombing in Wasit, and another on March 6,
but before that there had not been any since November 2013. That marked the end
of an eleven month campaign by ISIS to attack the south each month. After that
the group appeared to be focusing upon other areas such as Anbar and
Salahaddin, but now it has marked its return to the south once again showing
that it is the only insurgent group with the network and personnel that can
carry out attacks in every part of the country.

Province

Attacks

Dead

Wounded

Anbar

42

88

168

Babil

13

24

43

Baghdad

52

106

269

Basra

2

2

0

Diyala

18

29

24

Karbala

1

4

15

Kirkuk

10

5

38

Maysan

1

1

0

Ninewa

43

42

34

Salahaddin

33

115

134

Wasit

2

7

13

Salahaddin again led the nation in casualties during the
week. There were 33 reported security incidents leading to 115 killed and 134
wounded. That was the second most fatalities in one week for the year and tied
for the most injured. Attacks were spread out across the province with 7 in
Shirqat, 6 in Tikrit, 5 in Samarra, 4 in Tuz Kharmato, and 3 each in Baiji and
Ishaqi, along with several other towns. The worst day was March 21, which was
topped off by a car bombing
and then an IED
in Tuz Kharmato that killed 8 and wounded 21, an attack
upon a police
station outside of Samarra that resulted in the deaths of 8 police
and wounding another 13, and an attempt to storm the
town of Sarha
with a suicide truck bomb that left 27 fatalities. Usually Baghdad receives the
most casualties but Salahaddin has become more violent in recent weeks since
the fighting in Anbar started. The province is the home to several
insurgent groups including Ansar al-Sunna, Jaish Rijal al-Tariqat
al-Naqshibandi, and the Islamic State.

Baghdad had the most attacks for the week. There were 52
total with 106 killed and 269 wounded. Along with the 9 car bombs that struck
the governorate there were also 21 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 9
sticky bombs and one suicide bombing. Abu Ghraib has become a base for ISIS and
saw 7 attacks followed by 4 in Sadr City, 3 in Dora, 3 in Madain, and 3 in
Tarmiya along with various other neighborhoods.

Fighting in Anbar continued as well. There were 42 incidents
there with 88 killed and 168 wounded. Ramadi again saw the most violence with
18 violent acts. Clashes with insurgents continued in the same neighborhoods
such as Malab and 60th Street, which have been contested since the city was
taken over at the end of December 2013. Indiscriminate government shelling
resulted in the deaths of 36 and 108 injured in Fallujah.

In Ninewa attacks by insurgents have remained relatively stable. There were 43
reported attacks with 34 of them being in Mosul. That led to 42 killed and 34
wounded. Most violence was targeted consisting of IEDs and shootings.

Babil, Diyala, and Kirkuk were at the same levels as
previous weeks. The security forces recently attempted to storm Jurf al-Sakhr
in northern Babil, but were repulsed by ISIS. It has been carrying out
retaliatory attacks since then. There were a total of 13 incidents there with
24 killed and 43 wounded. In Diyala there were 18 attacks, 29 killed, and 24
wounded. Most of those were shootings aimed at the security forces. The
governorate was far more violent in 2013, but it appears that militants have
shifted resources to other areas this year. In Kirkuk there were only 10
incidents leading to just 5 deaths and 38 wounded. That province is another
area that has seen a large reduction in insurgent activity since this year
started.

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Two Iraqi newspapers, New Sabah and Iraq Times recently
disclosed new details on how insurgent groups are funding themselves in Ninewa
province. They mentioned traditional means such as charging businesses
protection money and kidnappings, but added information on stealing salaries
from the security forces and charging money for imports. The governorate
capital Mosul is an infamous urban base for the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS), but also includes other militant groups such as Ansar al-Sunna,
and the Baathist Jaish Rijal al-Tariqat al-Naqshibandi. Their financial
networks in Ninewa show the close convergence between the insurgency and criminal
organizations.

In March 2014 the Iraq
Times reported on the theft of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi dinars from
the security forces (ISF) in Ninewa. It reported that Interior Ministry forces
in the province were supposed to receive 500,000 dinars a month starting in
October 2013, but only got 250,000. It went on to say that some traffic police
did not receive their full pay until March 2014, and that they sent a letter to
the Finance Ministry demanding an investigation into their missing pay. Three
days later New
Sabah ran an article saying that insurgent groups were receiving these
missing funds by threatening members of the ISF. Militants in the province were
involved in a wide variety of other criminal activity to earn money to carry
out their operations. These included charging royalties on the importation of
electrical goods and food, demanding protection money from businesses that win
contracts to work on projects in dangerous areas of the governorate, extorting money from electrical generator operators and small firms, and
kidnapping people and holding them for ransom. New Sabah claimed that militants
were making up to $8 million a month from these protection rackets. These later
activities are all well known, and have been talked about for years. Niqash for example, ran a
piece in November 2013 about the mafia like tactics ISIS was employing in
Ninewa. This included demanding money not only from businesses, but schools,
mosques, real estate agencies, and universities. Many times when people refused
to pay up they were bombed. New Sabah added that it wasn’t just the Islamic
State that was involved in these activities, but other insurgent groups as
well. These are likely Ansar
al-Sunna and the Naqshibandi that operate in the province.

As the insurgency was beaten back during the Surge and
afterward, many militants moved into criminal activity since they lacked other
skills and were not ready to join regular society. Now that the militants have
made a come back, it’s obvious that these same operatives have expanded their
mafia style techniques into more and more fields in Ninewa to fund their
increased attacks not only there, but in surrounding areas as well. The
government is fully aware of these acts, but has done nothing to stop them.
That’s likely because the insurgents are so embedded in Mosul and the
surrounding areas, and can operate with such impunity that no one dares stand
up to them or face being killed. That’s why the main focus of attacks in the
province is upon the security forces, local officials and businesses to keep
them intimidated so that these extortion rings can continue uninterrupted. It’s
likely that these operations will continue long after the insurgency, because
they are so lucrative.

SOURCES

Iraq Times, “Corruption of
hundreds of millions of dinars in salaries of employees of the local police and
traffic in the province of Nineveh,” 3/12/14

New Sabah, “Armed groups earn
money from imported food..and “royalties” on hot spots up to 8 million dollars
a month,” 3/15/14

Monday, March 24, 2014

The United Nations recently released a new set of official
unemployment statistics for Iraq. The national rate was at 11.3%. Just over
half the country’s eighteen provinces had a lower jobless rate than that. A
bigger problem was that less than half the population was involved in the work
force. This was especially true for women who are still handicapped by cultural
and religious mores that have kept the vast majority of them at home. Another
issue is that services are the largest job type meaning that Iraq is not
producing much. With such a large and young population Iraq needs to develop
its economy more, so that it can find meaningful employment for all.

(Wikipedia)

According to the U.N. most of Iraq’s 18 provinces were doing
quite well when it came to joblessness. The official rate for the country was
11.3%. Ten provinces had a lower figure starting with Kirkuk,
which was at the bottom with 2.5%, followed by Irbil 7.3%,
Ninewa
7.3%, Dohuk
8.8%, Babil
9.5%, Karbala
9.6%, Baghdad
9.7%, Wasit
9.7%, Basra
10.3%, and Najaf
10.4%. The ones that were not doing so well were Salahaddin
with 13.5%, Qadisiayh
13.7%, Muthanna
14.5%, Diyala
15.0%, Sulaymaniya
15.0%, Maysan
15.4%, Anbar
18.1%, and Dhi
Qar 19.4%. What was interesting about these numbers was that there were no
regional trends. Kurdistan for example had two of the best governorates in
Irbil and Dohuk with single figure unemployment numbers, but then Sulaymaniya
was the fourth worst. Likewise the south had Karbala and Wasit at 9% each, but
then Maysan and Dhi Qar with two of the highest numbers.

Unemployment By
Province

Iraq 11.3%

Kirkuk 2.5%

Irbil 7.3%

Ninewa 7.3%

Dohuk 8.8%

Babil 9.5%

Karbala 9.6%

Baghdad 9.7%

Wasit 9.7%

Basra 10.3%

Najaf 10.4%

Salahaddin 13.5%

Qadisiyah 13.7%

Muthanna 14.5%

Diyala 15.0%

Sulaymaniya 15.0%

Maysan 15.4%

Anbar 18.1%

Dhi Qar 19.4%

One major cause for provinces to do so badly was the high
unemployment rate for women. Only three provinces had jobless numbers for
females below the national level. Those were Kirkuk, 3.4%, Salahaddin, 7.4%,
and Wasit 9.9%. The other 13 were in double digits starting with Babil, 13.2%,
Basra 13.2%, Anbar 15.1%, Ninewa 15.7%, Maysan 16.1%, Muthanna 16.1%, Dohuk
16.4%, Irbil 19.6%, Qadisiyah 21.2%, Najaf 23.4%, Baghdad 24.9%, Dhi Qar 24.4%,
Diyala 33.3%, Karbala 34.1%, Sulaymaniya 37.5%. Here there was some correlation
with Dhi Qar, Sulaymaniya, and Diyala being in the bottom for both overall and
female unemployment.

Female Unemployment

Kirkuk 3.4%

Salahaddin 7.4%

Wasit 9.9%

Babil 13.2%

Basra 13.2%

Anbar 15.1%

Ninewa 15.7%

Maysan 16.1%

Muthanna 16.1%

Dohuk 16.4%

Irbil 19.6%

Qadisiyah 21.2%

Najaf 23.4%

Baghdad 24.9%

Dhi Qar 24.4%

Diyala 33.3%

Karbala 34.1%

Sulaymaniya 37.5%

As could be expected Iraqi men found it much easier to find
work. 11 governorates had male unemployment below the national rate. Kirkuk was
at 2.3%, Irbil at 4.1%, Karbala had 6.1%, Ninewa 6.2%, Baghdad 6.3%, Najaf
7.2%, Dohuk 7.6%, Babil 8.6%, Sulaymaniya 8.8%, Wasit 9.6%, and Basra 9.9%.
Those at the other end were Diyala 11.9%, Qadisiyah 12.3%, Salahaddin 13.5%,
Muthanna 14.3%, Maysan 15.3%, Dhi Qar 18.7%, Anbar 18.8%. Diyala, Salahaddin
and Anbar not only saw major fighting, but displacement and disruption of their
local economies, which could account for their high joblessness. The south is
underdeveloped, especially for provinces with little to no oil or religious
sites like Qadisiyah and Muthanna. Petroleum is not labor intensive however
meaning if a governorate doesn’t have other industries there is little work,
which accounts for Maysan being towards the bottom.

Male Unemployment

Kirkuk 2.3%

Irbil 4.1%

Karbala 6.1%

Ninewa 6.2%

Baghdad 6.3%

Najaf 7.2%

Dohuk 7.6%

Babil 8.6%

Sulaymaniya 8.8%

Wasit 9.6%

Basra 9.9%

Diyala 11.9%

Qadisiyah 12.3%

Salahaddin 13.5%

Muthanna 14.3%

Maysan 15.3%

Dhi Qar 18.7%

Anbar 18.8%

Iraq has one of the youngest and fastest growing populations
in the Middle East and North Africa. That offers both opportunities and
problems for the country. Finding jobs for the young in an oil dependent
country is very difficult, and Iraq is failing in this effort. Kirkuk was the
only province that was doing well at 6.0%. All the others were in double
digits. Ninewa was at 12.0%, Irbil 12.4%, Wasit 13.6%, Dohuk 13.9%, Karbala
14.0%, Najaf 14.6%, Babil 15.2%, Baghdad 17.1%, Salahaddin 18.8%, Sulaymaniya
19.5%, Muthanna 20.8%, Basra 21.9%, Diyala 22.3%, Qadisiyah 22.6%, Maysan
25.2%, Anbar 29.9%, and Dhi Qar 32.8%. These figures are another reason why
some governorates are struggling. Again, Maysan, Anbar, and Dhi Qar were in the
bottom three for both overall and youth unemployment. Iraq lacks a diversified
economy. The vast majority of its money comes from the energy field that only
employs 1% of the population. That means that country can’t produce enough jobs
annually to keep up with the population growth. As a result these statistics will
likely get worse with time unless a real move is made at economic reform. Unfortunately
there is little political will to do so though since the ruling elite benefit
from the current system since it makes them independent of the public.

Youth Unemployment
(15-29)

Kirkuk 6.0%

Ninewa 12.0%

Irbil 12.4%

Wasit 13.6%

Dohuk 13.9%

Karbala 14.0%

Najaf 14.6%

Babil 15.2%

Baghdad 17.1%

Salahaddin 18.8%

Sulaymaniya 19.5%

Muthanna 20.8%

Basra 21.9%

Diyala 22.3%

Qadisiyah 22.6%

Maysan 25.2%

Anbar 29.9%

Dhi Qar 32.8%

Another sign of the lack of a healthy economy is the fact
that less than half the population participates in the labor force, meaning people
that are either working or looking for a job. Anbar does the best at 48.0%, but
the fact that it has the second highest jobless level means that many of those
people are searching for work. At the bottom is Dohuk at 37.6%. That is the
least developed of the three provinces in Kurdistan. After that are the
southern provinces of Muthanna 40.6%, Qadisiyah 41.8%, and Maysan 42.0%. The
remainders are Ninewa 42.1%, Diyala 42.3%, Kirkuk 42.8%, Irbil 42.9%,
Salahaddin 43.1%, Karbala 43.2%, Basra 43.6%, Baghdad 44.7%, Sulaymaniya 45.4%,
Babil 45.8%, Wasit 46.8%, and Najaf 47.8%. Again there are huge gender
disparities. For male labor force participation Dohuk again starts the list at
65.6%, then Irbil 69.4%, Sulaymaniya 70.5%, Diyala 71.1%, Dhi Qar 71.1%,
Salahaddin 71.8%, Qadisiyah 71.9%, Kirkuk, 73.4%, Babil 73.6%, Baghdad 73.8%,
Ninewa 74.2%, Basra 74.6%, Wasit 74.6%, Anbar 75.1%, Karbala 75.5%, Muthanna
75.8%, Maysan 76.1%, and Najaf 76.1%. Those compared to women at only 7.2% in
Muthanna, 9.7% in Ninewa, 10.0% in Dhi Qar, 10.1% in Basra, 10.8% in Karbala,
11.6% in Dohuk, 11.9% in Maysan, 12.6% in Diyala, 12.6% in Kirkuk, 12.6% in
Qadisiyah, 15.3% in Salahaddin, 16.3% in Baghdad, 17.4% in Irbil, 18.4% in
Babil, 19.2% in Najaf, 19.3% in Wasit, 19.8% in Sulaymaniya, and 20.4% in
Anbar. Even the best province only had one fifth of their women at work or
searching for employment, and again that was in an area with horrible job
prospects. The turn towards conservatism following the 2003 invasion, and
widespread violence were two major reasons why women have such low numbers.
This decline has been going on for decades however beginning with the
demobilization following the Iran-Iraq War. Before that the Baath Party had
actively sought to bring women into the work force first as part of its
modernization program, and then to fill the openings left by men joining the
army. Afterward however as men left the armed forces the government started
talking about women returning to the home.

Labor Force
Participation

Dohuk 37.6%

Dhi Qar 40.5%

Muthanna 40.6%

Qadisiyah 41.8%

Maysan 42.0%

Ninewa 42.1%

Diyala 42.3%

Kirkuk 42.8%

Irbil 42.9%

Salahaddin 43.1%

Karbala 43.2%

Basra 43.6%

Baghdad 44.7%

Sulaymaniya 45.4%

Babil 45.8%

Wasit 46.8%

Najaf 47.8%

Anbar 48.0%

Male Labor Force
Participation

Dohuk 65.6%

Irbil 69.4%

Sulaymaniya 70.5%

Diyala 71.0%

Dhi Qar 71.1%

Salahaddin 71.8%

Qadisiyah 71.9%

Kirkuk 73.4%

Babil 73.6%

Baghdad 73.8%

Ninewa 74.2%

Basra 74.6%

Wasit 74.6%

Anbar 75.1%

Karbala 75.5%

Muthanna 75.8%

Maysan 76.1%

Najaf 76.1%

Female Labor Force
Participation

Muthanna 7.2%

Ninewa 9.7%

Dhi Qar 10.0%

Basra 10.1%

Karbala 10.8%

Dohuk 11.6%

Maysan 11.9%

Diyala 12.6%

Kirkuk 12.6%

Qadisiyah 12.6%

Salahaddin 15.3%

Baghdad 16.3%

Irbil 17.4%

Babil 18.4%

Najaf 19.2%

Wasit 19.3%

Sulaymaniya 19.8%

Anbar 20.4%

The final mark of Iraq’s problems was shown by the
domination of services as the main form of work. The country has become more
oil dependent with the passage of time. That was partly due to the closing of many
industries and state owned enterprises by the United States and the opening of
the borders to trade following the 2003 invasion, which allowed cheap imports
in and put a lot of Iraqi businesses out of work. Now economic policy is
focused upon increasing the role of energy even more. Those are all major
reasons why service jobs are so prominent. Najaf had the lowest rate at 28% in
services, followed by 30% in Ninewa, 30.5% in Babil, 34% in Karbala, 34.5% in
Kirkuk, 38% in Baghdad, 38.6% in Basra, 39% in Qadisiyah, 39.1% in Muthanna,
40% in Maysan, 40.5% in Diyala, 41% in Dhi Qar, 42.9% in Sulaymaniya, 50.4% in
Dohuk, and a whopping 79.2% in Irbil. Wasit and Salahaddin were the only
exceptions where farming, 31.4%, and mining/manufacturing 32.6%, were in the
lead. Even then 31% of workers were in services in Wasit. Agriculture could be
an industry that would offer growth, unemployment, and needed products for
domestic consumption, but it has been in decline since 2003. While 13 provinces
still had sizeable farming sectors, for most of them they were a very small
fraction of the work available. Those were Irbil, 5.9%, Dohuk, 7%, Sulaymaniya,
7%, Diyala, 10%, Ninewa, 13.8%, Dhi Qar, 14%, Kirkuk, 15.1%, Najaf, 18%,
Qadisiyah, 18%, Maysan, 20%, Babil, 24.5%, Salahaddin, 30.9%, and Wasit, 31.4%.
The United States, Baghdad, and Irbil have all talked about developing farming,
and some policies have been implemented, but they have not been that effective.

The major problem with the official unemployment rate is
that there are plenty of others that claim the actual figures are much higher.
Not only that there is massive underemployment. The government for example is
the largest employer yet many workers are hired as family and political
supporters in patronage networks and are never meant to really work. They show
up for their jobs and do very little and often serve only a few hours a day.
That is even more reason why economic reform is desperately needed in Iraq to
find futures for the ever growing populace. The industrial and agricultural
sectors of most provinces are squandering away, while ineffective and
lackadaisical planning is not helping. Instead both Baghdad and Irbil are set
not only on building rentier states, but increasing their dependence upon oil.
That’s the reason why both the central and regional governments main solution
to the unemployment dilemma is to simply hire more government workers rather
than diversify and deal with the root problems of the country’s economy.

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com