Nate Otto: Here's some text I put together as we were chatting, you may consider -- or it may be quite a bit off where you want to go with it: "There is no standard data format and vocabulary that may currently be used to make claims about entities and the properties attributable to them in a way that is compatible across industries, carries verifiable digital signatures, and protects the privacy and agency of the individuals and organizations that are the subjects of these claims." ✪

David Ezell: Mike Champion and I have worked together for years. No one has a crystal ball. Some objections might be about making a complicated set of udner constructions standards. ✪

... it is kind of a thin argument. None of the activities may be adequate. The group has tried looking at things that are already in progress.

... I know MS cares about ISO and X9. I know that the people involved from the Petro and Payments side are pretty disenchanted as they apply to payments. even if you look at the ISO/X9 way of doing things there are things missing.

... it may come up that the WG that is being proposed will develop the data model, but then step back and give the requiremetns to the speciality groups to create the PKI structure or whatever.

... I would like to talk with you, Manu, before my meeting with Mike.

Manu Sporny: We are actively working the problem. Trying to find common ground. ✪

Christopher Allen: MS is doing a variety of things relating to blockchain. Daniel Duchner is working with the block stack people on bringing that tech into MS related work ✪

... as I understand it they are working with other groups. I know that blockstack is planning on using verified credentials and JSON-LD and other things.

... so there is work in this space ongoing at MS. They put a lot of importance into BC.

... whoever is talking to them might remind MS that internally they are already interested.

Manu Sporny: There are three touchpoints. dezell is speaking to the AC rep. Manu is speaking with the identity contact. And then Kim Cameron - identity czar at MS ✪

... Mike doesn't have a position as far as I know. Anthony doesn't seem as opposed. Kim's group is already actively looking at VC.

... there isn't one opinion at MS. They are coming up to speed.

... It is migrating to "let it run its course" or "let's get more involved".

Manu Sporny: We are saying that we are enabling it. Privacy has a lot to do with the idenitifiers that are used. If an identifier is long lived and ties everything together it is NOT privacy enhancing. If you have one that is generated on each transaction... ✪

... let's not do this in 1.0. we can do it in 2.0 as long as we are very aware of the limitations.

Christopher Allen: In many cases it is not even the data. I didn't know if moving things forward causes thigns to be unclear. We just want flexibility for the future. ✪

Dave Longley: I'd like to see any of this be heavily use case driven ✪

... not clear. But regardless it demonstrates how flexible linked data signatures are.

Manu Sporny: If the goal is to make sure that the receiver of the information cannot misuse it... well, that's not possible. Once an inspector has the information, they can do anything with the data. ✪

Nate Otto: To be clear: any information that an individual has may be shared with others. I posit that there is a significant difference between a verifiable claim and an unverifiable claim (a claim with a signature that cannot be verified by the holder). ✪

Christopher Allen: (You can make it such that forwarded it doesn't validate) ✪

Christopher Allen: You can't prevent someone from taking the claim information and passing it on, but you CAN make it such that the signature is not valid when you pass it on. ✪

Nate Otto: +1 To ChristopherA. I think this subtle distinction may be significant in the long run. At least enough that I may be interested in implementing this behavior. ✪

... if you are only relying upon VC as being valid, then it will work.

David Chadwick: The issue is about trust. You use the signature so that you know who sent it. If I cannot check the signature but I get it from someone else who says "I chedked it" and I trust them, then I have a trust chain and it holds up. ✪

Manu Sporny: That all folds into whether the information remains trustworthy. If you want to restrict forwarding of VALID data there are ways to do that. ✪

Christopher Allen: (It is even possible to link those two, such that the sign fails untill the countersign is made) ✪

Manu Sporny: In case people are not aware, the current protocol has the subject countersign the claim when it is handed over. One is from the original issuer, and one from the subject that indicates "I was in control when I handed it over to you, inspector". ✪

Nate Otto: +1 To David. A chain of trust is a valid use case for this. This is not designed to prevent an inspector who has verified the signature from telling others about that information in a technical sense. That is actually a valuable use case as well. I doubt that all implementers of VCs will want to implement this extra complicated behavior, but there are some valuable use cases I think for some people implementing this. ✪

Manu Sporny: Even that mechanism does not prevent the misuse of information. ✪

Nate Otto: Sounds like my task will be to define a better set of use cases. Thanks for bringing this to the floor, manu. ✪