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Happiness and Luck (NE I and X.6–8)

Happiness and Luck (NE I and X.6–8)

Chapter:

(p.388)
18 Happiness and Luck (NE I and X.6–8)

Source:

Aristotle and the Virtues

Author(s):

Howard J. Curzer

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693726.003.0018

An enormous amount has been written about Aristotle’s account of happiness, almost all of it focused on the question of whether the supremely happy life of X.6–8 is a contemplative life or a contemplative/ethical blend. Each interpretation faces serious problems. This chapter goes between the horns by taking Aristotle to be advocating a life of thoughtful, morally virtuous activity. Since the activity of reflection is what makes the agent happy, this life is rightly called contemplative. But since reflection can be performed along with almost all morally virtuous activity, contemplators need not strive to minimize their morally virtuous activity in order to maximize their contemplation.

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 January 2019