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India has financial institutions which are not banks but which accept deposits and extend credit like banks. These are called Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) in India.

At end-March 2017, there were 11,522 NBFCs registered with the Reserve Bank, of which 178 were NBFCs-D and 220 were NBFCs-ND-SI. The share of NBFCs in terms of assets in total financial sector is 8.3 per cent as on 2016-17

NBFCs in India include not just the finance companies that the general public is largely familiar with; the term also entails wider group of companies that are engaged in investment business, insurance, chit fund, nidhi, merchant banking, stock broking, alternative investments, etc., as their principal business. All are though not under the regulatory purview of the Reserve Bank.

Currently, India does not have structured sentencing guidelines that have been issued either by the legislature or the judiciary. There cannot, therefore, be any uniformity. However, this Court has repeatedly held that the Courts will have to take into account certain principles while exercising their discretion in sentencing, such as proportionality, deterrence and rehabilitation. In a proportionality analysis, it is necessary to assess the seriousness of an offence in order to determine the commensurate punishment for the offender. Continue reading →

PM Modi to launch India Post Payments Bank on August 21 2018

Incorporated as a Public Sector Bank under the Department of Posts with 100% GOI equity, IPPB has launched on January 30th, 2017 in Ranchi and Raipur with the objective of being present in all corners of India by the end of the year. Continue reading →

Fake news and false stories are responsible for Mob Violence

Lynching and mob violence are creeping threats that may gradually take the shape of a Typhon-like monster as evidenced in the wake of the rising wave of incidents of recurring patterns in India by frenzied mobs across the country instigated by intolerance and misinformed by circulation of fake news and false stories. There has been an unfortunate litany of spiralling mob violence and agonized horror presenting a grim and gruesome picture that compels us to reflect whether the populace of a great Republic like India has lost the values of tolerance to sustain a diverse culture. Observing such In a writ petition Supreme Court of India issued guidelines to resolve the issue.

Supreme Court issued the following guidelines:-

Tehseen S. Poonawalla Vs. Union of India and Others

[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 754 of 2016]

Decided on July 17, 2018

A. Preventive Measures

i. The State Governments shall designate, a senior police officer, not below the rank of Superintendent of Police, as Nodal Officer in each district. Such Nodal Officer shall be assisted by one of the DSP rank officers in the district for taking measures to prevent incidents of mob violence and lynching. They shall constitute a special task force so as to procure intelligence reports about the people who are likely to commit such crimes or who are involved in spreading hate speeches, provocative statements and fake news.

ii. The State Governments shall forthwith identify Districts, Sub-Divisions and/or Villages where instances of lynching and mob violence have been reported in the recent past, say, in the last five years. The process of identification should be done within a period of three weeks from the date of this judgment, as such time period is sufficient to get the task done in today’s fast world of data collection.

iii. The Secretary, Home Department of the concerned States shall issue directives/advisories to the Nodal Officers of the concerned districts for ensuring that the Officer In-charge of the Police Stations of the identified areas are extra cautious if any instance of mob violence within their jurisdiction comes to their notice.

iv. The Nodal Officer, so designated, shall hold regular meetings (at least once a month) with the local intelligence units in the district along with all Station House Officers of the district so as to identify the existence of the tendencies of vigilantism, mob violence or lynching in the district and take steps to prohibit instances of dissemination of offensive material through different social media platforms or any other means for inciting such tendencies. The Nodal Officer shall also make efforts to eradicate hostile environment against any community or caste which is targeted in such incidents.

v. The Director General of Police/the Secretary, Home Department of the concerned States shall take regular review meetings (at least once a quarter) with all the Nodal Officers and State Police Intelligence heads. The Nodal Officers shall bring to the notice of the DGP any inter-district co-ordination issues for devising a strategy to tackle lynching and mob violence related issues at the State level.

vi. It shall be the duty of every police officer to cause a mob to disperse, by exercising his power under Section 129 of CrPC, which, in his opinion, has a tendency to cause violence or wreak the havoc of lynching in the disguise of vigilantism or otherwise.

vii. The Home Department of the Government of India must take initiative and work in co-ordination with the State Governments for sensitising the law enforcement agencies and by involving all the stake holders to identify the measures for prevention of mob violence and lynching against any caste or community and to implement the constitutional goal of social justice and the Rule of Law.

viii. The Director General of Police shall issue a circular to the Superintendents of Police with regard to police patrolling in the sensitive areas keeping in view the incidents of the past and the intelligence obtained by the office of the Director General. It singularly means that there should be seriousness in patrolling so that the anti-social elements involved in such crimes are discouraged and remain within the boundaries of law thus fearing to even think of taking the law into their own hands.

ix. The Central and the State Governments should broadcast on radio and television and other media platforms including the official websites of the Home Department and Police of the States that lynching and mob violence of any kind shall invite serious consequence under the law.

x. It shall be the duty of the Central Government as well as the State Governments to take steps to curb and stop dissemination of irresponsible and explosive messages, videos and other material on various social media platforms which have a tendency to incite mob violence and lynching of any kind.

xi. The police shall cause to register FIR under Section 153A of IPC and/or other relevant provisions of law against persons who disseminate irresponsible and explosive messages and videos having content which is likely to incite mob violence and lynching of any kind.

xii. The Central Government shall also issue appropriate directions/advisories to the State Governments which would reflect the gravity and seriousness of the situation and the measures to be taken.

B. Remedial Measures

i. Despite the preventive measures taken by the State Police, if it comes to the notice of the local police that an incident of lynching or mob violence has taken place, the jurisdictional police station shall immediately cause to lodge an FIR, without any undue delay, under the relevant provisions of IPC and/or other provisions of law.

ii. It shall be the duty of the Station House Officer, in whose police station such FIR is registered, to forthwith intimate the Nodal Officer in the district who shall, in turn, ensure that there is no further harassment of the family members of the victim(s).

iii. Investigation in such offences shall be personally monitored by the Nodal Officer who shall be duty bound to ensure that the investigation is carried out effectively and the charge-sheet in such cases is filed within the statutory period from the date of registration of the FIR or arrest of the accused, as the case may be.

iv. The State Governments shall prepare a lynching/mob violence victim compensation scheme in the light of the provisions of Section 357A of CrPC within one month from the date of this judgment. In the said scheme for computation of compensation, the State Governments shall give due regard to the nature of bodily injury, psychological injury and loss of earnings including loss of opportunities of employment and education and expenses incurred on account of legal and medical expenses. The said compensation scheme must also have a provision for interim relief to be paid to the victim(s) or to the next of kin of the deceased within a period of thirty days of the incident of mob violence/lynching.

v. The cases of lynching and mob violence shall be specifically tried by designated court/Fast Track Courts earmarked for that purpose in each district. Such courts shall hold trial of the case on a day to day basis. The trial shall preferably be concluded within six months from the date of taking cognizance. We may hasten to add that this direction shall apply to even pending cases. The District Judge shall assign those cases as far as possible to one jurisdictional court so as to ensure expeditious disposal thereof. It shall be the duty of the State Governments and the Nodal Officers in particular to see that the prosecuting agency strictly carries out its role in appropriate furtherance of the trial.

vi. To set a stern example in cases of mob violence and lynching, upon conviction of the accused person(s), the trial court must ordinarily award maximum sentence as provided for various offences under the provisions of the IPC.

vii. The courts trying the cases of mob violence and lynching may, on application by a witness or by the public prosecutor in 42 relation to such witness or on its own motion, take such measures, as it deems fit, for protection and for concealing the identity and address of the witness.

viii. The victim(s) or the next of kin of the deceased in cases of mob violence and lynching shall be given timely notice of any court proceedings and he/she shall be entitled to be heard at the trial in respect of applications such as bail, discharge, release and parole filed by the accused persons. They shall also have the right to file written submissions on conviction, acquittal or sentencing.

ix. The victim(s) or the next of kin of the deceased in cases of mob violence and lynching shall receive free legal aid if he or she so chooses and engage any advocate of his/her choice from amongst those enrolled in the legal aid panel under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

C. Punitive Measures

i. Wherever it is found that a police officer or an officer of the district administration has failed to comply with the aforesaid directions in order to prevent and/or investigate and/or facilitate expeditious trial of any crime of mob violence and lynching, the same shall be considered as an act of deliberate negligence and/or misconduct for which appropriate action must be taken against him/her and not limited to departmental action under the service rules. The departmental action shall be taken to its logical conclusion preferably within six months by the authority of the first instance.

ii. In terms of the ruling of this Court in Arumugam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu21, the States are directed to take disciplinary action against the concerned officials if it is found that (i) such official(s) did not prevent the incident, despite having prior knowledge of it, or (ii) where the incident has already occurred, such official(s) did not promptly apprehend and institute criminal proceedings against the culprits.

41. The measures that are directed to be taken have to be carried out within four weeks by the Central and the State Governments. Reports of compliance be filed within the said period before the Registry of this Court.

42. We may emphatically note that it is axiomatic that it is the duty of the State to ensure that the machinery of law and order functions efficiently and effectively in maintaining peace so as to preserve our quintessentially secular ethos and pluralistic social fabric in a democratic set-up governed by rule of law. In times of chaos and anarchy, the State has to act positively and responsibly to safeguard and secure the constitutional promises to its citizens.

The horrendous acts of mobocracy cannot be permitted to inundate the law of the land. Earnest action and concrete steps have to be taken to protect the citizens from the recurrent pattern of violence which cannot be allowed to become “the new normal”. The State cannot turn a deaf ear to the growing rumblings of its People, since its concern, to quote Woodrow Wilson, “must ring with the voices of the people.” The exigencies of the situation require us to sound a clarion call for earnest action to strengthen our inclusive and all-embracing social order which would, in turn, reaffirm the constitutional faith. We expect nothing more and nothing less.

43. Apart from the directions we have given hereinbefore and what we have expressed, we think it appropriate to recommend to the legislature, that is, the Parliament, to create a separate offence for lynching and provide adequate punishment for the same. We have said so as a special law in this field would instill a sense of fear for law amongst the people who involve themselves in such kinds of activities. There can be no trace of doubt that fear of law and veneration for the command of law constitute the foundation of a civilized society.

44. Let the matters be listed on 20th August, 2018 for further directions.

Section 153A in The Indian Penal Code

157 [153A. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.—
(1) Whoever—
(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different reli­gious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communi­ties, or
(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, 2[or] 2[(c) organizes any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the partici­pants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community and such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community,] shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Offence committed in place of worship, etc.—(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious wor­ship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.]

ACTS: Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of PakistanSection 12(2)(f), 19(f) of the Representation of People Act, 1976

JUDGMENT

Ejaz Afzal Khan J.

This judgment is in continuation of our judgments dated 20.04.2017 in Constitution Petitions No. 29, 30 of 2016 and Constitution Petition No. 03 of 2017 which ended up in the following order of the Court :

“By a majority of 3 to 2 (Asif Saeed Khan Khosa and Gulzar Ahmed, JJ) dissenting, who have given separate declarations and directions, we hold that the questions how did Gulf Steel Mill come into being; what led to its sale; what happened to its liabilities; where did its sale proceeds end up; how did they reach Jeddah, Qatar and the U.K.; whether respondents No. 7 and 8 in view of their tender ages had the means in the early nineties to possess and purchase the flats; whether sudden appearance of the letters of Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber Al-Thani is a myth or a reality; how bearer shares crystallized into the flats; who, in fact, is the real and beneficial owner of M/s Nielsen Enterprises Limited and Nescoll Limited, how did Hill Metal Establishment come into existence; where did the money for Flagship Investment Limited and other companies set up/taken over by respondent No. 8 come from, and where did the Working Capital for such companies come from and where do the huge sums running into millions gifted by respondent No. 7 to respondent No. 1 drop in from, which go to the heart of the matter and need to be answered. Therefore, a thorough investigation in this behalf is required.

In normal circumstances, such exercise could be conducted by the NAB but when its Chairman appears to be indifferent and even unwilling to perform his part, we are constrained to look elsewhere and therefore, constitute a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) comprising of the following members :
i) a senior Officer of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), not below the rank of Additional Director General who shall head the team having firsthand experience of investigation of white collar crime and related matters;

ii) a representative of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB);

iii) a nominee of the Security & Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) familiar with the issues of money laundering and white collar crimes;

iv) a nominee of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP);

v) a seasoned Officer of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) nominated by its Director General; and

vi) a seasoned Officer of Military Intelligence (M.I.) nominated by its Director General.

The Heads of the aforesaid departments/ institutions shall recommend the names of their nominees for the JIT within seven days from today which shall be placed before us in chambers for nomination and approval. The JIT shall investigate the case and collect evidence, if any, showing that respondent No. 1 or any of his dependents or benamidars owns, possesses or has acquired assets or any interest therein disproportionate to his known means of income. Respondents No. 1, 7 and 8 are directed to appear and associate themselves with the JIT as and when required.
The JIT may also examine the evidence and material, if any, already available with the FIA and NAB relating to or having any nexus with the possession or acquisition of the aforesaid flats or any other assets or pecuniary resources and their origin. The JIT shall submit its periodical reports every two weeks before a Bench of this Court constituted in this behalf. The JIT shall complete the investigation and submit its final report before the said Bench within a period of sixty days from the date of its constitution.

The Bench thereupon may pass appropriate orders in exercise of its powers under Articles 184(3), 187(2) and 190 of the Constitution including an order for filing a reference against respondent No. 1 and any other person having nexus with the crime if justified on the basis of the material thus brought on the record before it.

It is further held that upon receipt of the reports, periodic or final of the JIT, as the case may be, the matter of disqualification of respondent No. 1 shall be considered. If found necessary for passing an appropriate order in this behalf, respondent No. 1 or any other person may be summoned and examined.

We would request the Hon’ble Chief Justice to constitute a Special Bench to ensure implementation of this judgment so that the investigation into the allegations may not be left in a blind alley.”

The JIT undertook the task thus assigned and submitted a complete investigation report on 10.07.2017. Parties to the proceedings were provided the report of the JIT and a weeks’ time to go through it. Khawaja Harris Ahmed, learned Sr. ASC appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 submitted a CMA expressing his reservations about the report. Dr. Tariq Hassan, learned ASC for respondent No. 10 also filed a CMA expressing his reservations about the report. Learned ASC appearing for petitioner in Const. P. No. 29 of 2016, Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, petitioner appearing in person in Const. P. No. 30 of 2016 and learned ASC appearing for the petitioner in Const. P. No. 03 of 2017, by picking up the thread from where they left off, sought to canvass at the bar that the JIT has collected sufficient evidence proving that respondent No. 1, his dependents and benamidars own, possess and have acquired assets which are disproportionate to their known sources of income; that neither respondent No. 1 nor any of his dependents or benamidars before or during the course of investigation could account for these assets, therefore, he has become disqualified to be a Member of Parliament.

They further stated that certified copies of the correspondence between Mr. Errol George, Director Financial Investigating Agency and the Anti-Money Laundering Officer of Mossack Fonseca & Co. (B.V.I.) Limited collected through Mutual Legal Assistance prove that respondent No. 6 is the beneficial owner of the Avenfield apartments, therefore, the document showing her as trustee is a fabrication on the face of it for which she is liable to be proceeded against for forgery and using forged documents; that use of Calibri Font, which became commercially available in 2007, in the preparation of the trust deed in February 2006 is another circumstance leading to the inference that it was forged and fabricated; that narrative of Tariq Shafi vis-à-vis receipt of AED 12 million from sale of 25% shares of Ahli Steel Mills formerly known as Gulf Steel Mills is false on the face of it which has been confirmed by the JIT in its report; that whatever has been stated in Qatri letters remained unsubstantiated as the Qatri Prince neither appeared before the JIT nor ever stated his point of view through any other legally recognizable means; that respondents were given ample opportunities to provide the trail of money and answer the questions asked in the order of the Court dated 20.04.2017 but they throughout have been evasive; that the discrepancies between the first Qatri letter and affidavit of Mr. Tariq Shafi show that neither of them is credible; that the spreadsheet attached with the second Qatri letter too is of no help to the respondents as it is neither signed nor supported by any documentary evidence; that the entire story about trail of money is seriously marred by inconsistencies surfacing in the statements of the respondents recorded by the JIT; that story of transporting machinery from Dubai to Jeddah and thereby establishing Azizia Steel Company Limited still awaits proof; that how the entire amount running to SAR 63.10 million could be utilized by respondent No. 7 notwithstanding he was entitled to only 1/3rd finds no explanation therefor, the sources establishing Hill Metal Establishment have not been proved; that failure of respondent No. 1 to disclose his assets deposited in his account on account of his being Chairman of Capital FZE would also call for his disqualification, as it being an asset for all legal and practical purposes was required to be disclosed under Section 12(2)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976; that the respondent denied withdrawal of salary, but payment of salaries to all employees electronically, through the Wage Protection System, under Ministerial Resolution No. (788) for 2009 on Wage Protection used by United Arab Emirates Ministry of Labour and Rules 11(6) and 11(7) of the Jebel Ali Free Zone Rules, would belie his stance; that the assets of respondents No. 7 and 8 have surprisingly grown manifold overnight notwithstanding all of their business enterprises run in loss; that the facts and figures showing inflow and outflow of Hill Metals Establishment also appear to be fudged and fabricated when seen in the light of the material collected during the course of investigation by the JIT; that material already brought on the record and collected through the JIT leave no doubt that the assets of respondent No. 1, his children and benamidars are disproportionate to their known sources of income and that their failure to satisfactorily account for them would inevitably entail disqualification of respondent No. 1 in terms of Section 9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999.

Learned Sr. ASC appearing for Respondent No. 1 contended that JIT overstepped its mandate by reopening the case of Hudabiya Paper Mills when it was not so directed by the Court; that another investigation or inquiry shall also be barred by the principle of double jeopardy when the Reference relating to the said Mills was quashed in the case of Hudabiya Paper Mills Limited. Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2016 Lahore 667); that no evidence has been collected by the JIT showing respondent No.1 to have any nexus with the Avenfield apartments, Hill Metals Establishment, Flagship Investment Limited or any other business concern run by respondent no. 7 and 8; that all the material collected and finding given by the JIT do not deserve any consideration inasmuch as they are beyond the scope of investigation authorized by the order of this Court; that the investigation conducted by the JIT cannot be said to be fair and just when none of the respondents was questioned about or confronted with any of the documents tending to incriminate them and that the JIT exceeded its authority while obtaining documents from abroad by engaging the firm of the persons happening to be their near and dear.
Such exercise, the learned Sr. ASC added, cannot be termed as Mutual Legal Assistance by any interpretation nor can the documents thus obtained be vested with any sanctity in terms of Section 21(g) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. He next contended that no weight could be given to the finding of the JIT when it is not supported by any authentic document. An investigation of this type, the learned Sr. ASC added, which is a farce and a breach of due process cannot form basis of any adverse verdict against respondent No. 1. The learned Sr. ASC to support his contention placed reliance on the cases of Khalid Aziz. Vs. The State (2011 SCMR 136) and Muhammad Arshad and others. Vs. The State and others (PLD 2011 SC 350).

Learned ASC appearing on behalf of respondents No. 6, 7, 8 and 9 contended that Avenfield apartments are owned and possessed by respondent No. 7, and that the trail of money and the way it has culminated in the acquisition of the Avenfield apartments stand explained by Qatri letters; that respondent No. 6 besides being a trustee of the apartments at some stage of time has not been their beneficial owner, therefore, the correspondence between Errol George, Director FIA and Mossack Fonseca & Co. (B.V.I.) Limited or the certified copies thereof obtained through an MLA request cannot be relied upon unless proved in accordance with law and that the JIT report and the material collected by it during the course of investigation per se cannot form basis of a judgment in a proceeding under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Learned ASC appearing on behalf of respondent No. 10 contended that assets of respondent No. 10 have been audited and examined from time to time but no irregularity was ever found in any of them; that the respondent has accounted for whatever assets he owns, possesses or has acquired; that his assets were also subject matter of Reference No. 5 of 2000 which was quashed in the case of Hudabiya Paper Mills Limited. Vs. Federation of Pakistan (supra); that another criminal proceeding cannot be initiated when everything has been accounted for down to the rupee.

The learned ASC by producing the income tax returns from 2007 to 2016, wealth tax returns from 1981-1982 to 2000-2001 and from 2009 to 2016 contended that every asset is property vouched and documented; that the finding of the JIT has no legal or factual basis; that no conclusion much less sweeping can be drawn on the basis of such report; that 91 times increase in his assets from 1992-1993 to 2008-2009 shown in the JIT’s report is based on miscalculation; that the respondent cannot be impaled on the same charge by imputing a wrongdoing without any tangible evidence; that failure on the part of the FBR to provide the relevant record cannot be construed to the detriment of the respondent when it has been with the NAB Authorities throughout and that with this background in view, it would be rather unjust to thrust the respondent in another treadmill of tiresome trial before the Accountability Court.

We have carefully gone through the record, the report submitted by the JIT and considered the submissions of the learned ASCs, Sr. ASC of the parties as well as the learned Additional Attorney General for Pakistan.

We have already dealt with the background of the case and detailed submissions of the learned ASCs for the parties in paras 1 to 12 of the majority judgment authored by one of us (Ejaz Afzal Khan, J) and notes written by my learned brothers Mr. Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed and Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan. What necessitated the constitution of JIT has been highlighted in para 19 of the judgment which reads as under :-

“19. Yes, the officers at the peak of NAB and FIA may not cast their prying eyes on the misdeeds and lay their arresting hands on the shoulders of the elites on account of their being amenable to the influence of the latter or because of their being beholden to the persons calling the shots in the matters of their appointment posting and transfer.

But it does not mean that this Court should exercise a jurisdiction not conferred on it and act in derogation of the provisions of the Constitution and the law regulating trichotomy of power and conferment of jurisdiction on the courts of law. Any deviation from the recognized course would be a recipe for chaos. Having seen a deviation of such type, tomorrow, an Accountability Court could exercise jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution and a trigger happy investigation officer while investigating the case could do away with the life of an accused if convinced that the latter is guilty of a heinous crime and that his trial in the Court of competent jurisdiction might result in delay or denial of justice. Courts of law decide the cases on the basis of the facts admitted or established on the record. Surmises and speculations have no place in the administration of justice.

Any departure from such course, however well-intentioned it may be, would be a precursor of doom and disaster for the society. It as such would not be a solution to the problem nor would it be a step forward. It would indeed be a giant stride nay a long leap backward. The solution lies not in bypassing but in activating the institutions by having recourse to Article 190 of the Constitution. Political excitement, political adventure or even popular sentiments real or contrived may drive any or many to an aberrant course but we have to go by the Law and the Book. Let us stay and Act within the parameters of the Constitution and the Law as they stand till the time they are changed or altered through an amendment therein.”

“Any liability arising out of these Sections has its own trappings. Any allegation leveled against a holder of public office under these provisions of law requires an investigation and collection of evidence showing that he or any of his dependents or benamidars owns, possesses or has acquired assets etc disproportionate to his known means of income. Such investigation is followed by a full-fledged trial before an Accountability Court for determination of such liability. But where neither the Investigation Agency investigated the case, nor any of the witnesses has been examined and cross-examined in an Accountability Court nor any of the documents incriminating the person accused has been produced and proved in accordance with the requirements of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, nor any oral or documentary pieces of evidence incriminating the person accused has been sifted, no verdict disqualifying a holder of public office could be given by this Court in a proceeding under Article 184(3) of the Constitution on the basis of a record which is yet to be authenticated.

We must draw a line of distinction between the scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution and that of the Accountability Court under the Ordinance and between the disqualifications envisioned by Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution and Section 99 of the ROPA and the criminal liabilities envisioned by Sections 9, 10 and 15 of the Ordinance lest we condemn any member of Parliament on assumptions by defying the requirements of a fair trial and due process.

We cannot make a hotchpotch of the Constitution and the law by reading Sections 9 and 15 of the Ordinance in Articles 62, 63 of the Constitution and Section 99 of the Act and pass a judgment in a proceeding under Article 184(3) of the Constitution which could well be passed by an Accountability Court after a full-fledged trial. Nor could we lift Sections 9 and 15 of the Ordinance, graft them onto Article 63 of the Constitution, construe them disqualifications and proceed to declare that the member of Parliament so proceeded against is not honest and ameen and as such is liable to be disqualified. A verdict of this nature would not only be unjust but coram non judice for want of jurisdiction and lawful authority. If a person is sought to be proceeded against under Section 9(a)(v) and 15 of the NAB Ordinance resort could be had to the mode, mechanism and machinery provided thereunder. Let the law, the Investigation Agency and the Accountability Court and other Courts in the hierarchy take their own course.

Let respondent No. 1 go through all the phases of investigation, trial and appeal. We would not leap over such phases in gross violation of Article 25 of the Constitution which is the heart and the soul of the rule of law. We also don’t feel inclined to arrogate to ourselves a power or exercise a jurisdiction which has not been conferred on us by any of the acts of the Parliament or even by Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Who does not know that making of a statement on oath in a trial lends it an element of solemnity; cross-examination provides safeguards against insinuation of falsehood in the testimony; provisions of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order regulate relevancy of facts, admissibility of evidence and mode of proof through oral and documentary evidence and thus ensure due process of law. We for an individual case would not dispense with due process and thereby undo, obliterate and annihilate our jurisprudence which we built up in centuries in our sweat, in our toil, in our blood.”

The same theme was reiterated by my learned brother Mr. Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed by holding as under :-
“22. It is evident from a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions that the prosecution must establish that a person or his spouse or dependent or benamidar owns or possesses a property. If the aforesaid allegation is proved then the accused must give an explanation as to the source of legal funds for acquiring such property and upon his failure to do so, he becomes liable for punishment under the aforesaid law. Such punishment not only includes fine and imprisonment but also disqualification from holding a public Office, including that of Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora for a period of 10 years under Section 15 of the NAB Ordinance, 1999. Reference, in this behalf, can be made to the judgments, reported as (1) Iqbal Ahmed Turabi and others v. The State (PLD 2004 SC 830), (2) Ghani-ur-Rehman v. National Accountability Bureau and others (PLD 2011 SC 1144), (3) Abdul Aziz Memon and others v. The State and others (PLD 2013 SC 594), (4) The State through Prosecutor General Accountability, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad v. Misbahuddin Farid (2003 SCMR 150), (5) Syed Zahir Shah and others v. National Accountability Bureau and another (2010 SCMR 713), (6) Muhammad Hashim Babar v. The State and another (2010 SCMR 1697) and (7) Khalid Aziz v. The State (2011 SCMR 136).

In none of the aforesaid cases was any person convicted without a definitive finding that the assets were in fact owned or possessed by the accused, his spouse, his dependents or benamidars. And thereafter, the accused had failed to account for the source of funds for acquiring the said property and if the explanation was found unsatisfactory, conviction followed.”
Almost the same view was expressed by my learned brother Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan in the words which reads as under:-

“58. Where there is an allegation that a holder of public office or any of his dependents or benamidars owns or possesses any assets or pecuniary resources which are disproportionate to his known sources of income which he cannot reasonably account for he can be convicted of an offence of corruption and corrupt practices and upon such conviction, penal consequences would follow.

However, such conviction can only be recorded by an Accountability Court under the NAO, after a proper trial, recording evidence and granting due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused. To transplant the powers of the Accountability Court and to attach such powers to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution has neither been prayed for by the petitioners nor can it be, in our opinion, done without stretching the letter of the law and the scheme of the Constitution. Further, such course of action would be violative of the principles enshrined in Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution, which guarantee to every citizen the right to be dealt with in accordance with law, equality before law and entitlement to equal protection of law. Adopting any other mode would set a bad precedent and amount to a constitutional Court following an unconstitutional course. This, we are not willing to do, in the interest of upholding the rule of law and our unflinching and firm belief in adherence and fidelity to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.”

The argument that the JIT overstepped its authority by reopening the case of Hudabiya Paper Mills when Reference No. 5 was quashed by the High Court does not appear to be correct as the JIT has simply made recommendations in this behalf which can better be dealt with by this Court if and when an appeal, before this Court, as has been undertaken by Special Prosecutor NAB, is filed and a view to the contrary is taken by this Court.

The next question emerging for the consideration of this Court is whether respondent No. 1 as a Chairman of the Board of Capital FZE is entitled to salaries and whether the salaries if not withdrawn being receivable as such constitute assets which require disclosure in terms of Section 12(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and whether his failure to disclose them would entail his disqualification? The word asset has not been defined in the Representation of the People Act, 1976, (“ROPA”), therefore, its ordinary meaning has to be considered for the purposes of this case. The word asset as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary means and contemplates “an asset can be (i) something physical such as cash, machinery, inventory, land and building (ii) an enforceable claim against others such as accounts receivable (iii) rights such as copyright, patent trademark etc (iv) an assumption such as goodwill”.

The definition of the word receivable as used in the above mentioned definition as given in the Black’s Law Dictionary is also relevant which means and contemplates “any collectible whether or not it is currently due. That which is due and owing a person or company. In book keeping, the name of an account which reflects a debt due. Accounts receivable a claim against a debtor usually arising from sales or services rendered”. The word ‘receivable’ also has similar ring and connotation according to Business Dictionary which reads as under:-

“Accounting term for amount due from a customer, employee, supplier (as a rebate or refund) or any other party. Receivables are classified as accounts receivable, notes receivable etc and represent an asset of the firm”.

The definitions reproduced above leave no doubt that a salary not withdrawn would nevertheless be receivable and as such would constitute an asset for all legal and practical purposes. When it is an asset for all legal and practical purposes, it was required to be disclosed by respondent No. 1 in his nomination papers in terms of Section 12(2) of the ROPA. When we confronted, the learned Sr. ASC for respondent No. 1, whether the said respondent has ever acquired work permit (Iqama) in Dubai, remained Chairman of the Board of Capital FZE and was entitled to salary as such, his reply was in the affirmative with the only addition that respondent No. 1 never withdrew any salary.

This admission was reiterated in more categorical terms in the written arguments filed by the learned Sr. ASC for respondent No. 1 in the words as under:-

“So far as the designation of Respondent No. 1 as Chairman of the Board is concerned, this was only a ceremonial office acquired in 2007 when the respondent No. 1 was in exile, and had nothing to do with the running of the Company or supervising its affairs. Similarly, the respondent No. 1 did not withdraw the salary of AED 10,000. Thus, the salary shown in the Employment Contract in effect never constituted an “asset” for the respondent No. 1.”

It has not been denied that respondent No. 1 being Chairman of the Board of Capital FZE was entitled to salary, therefore, the statement that he did not withdraw the salary would not prevent the un-withdrawn salary from being receivable, hence an asset. When the un-withdrawn salary as being receivable is an asset it was required to be disclosed by respondent No. 1 in his nomination papers for the Elections of 2013 in terms of Section 12(2)(f) of the ROPA. Where respondent No. 1 did not disclose his aforesaid assets, it would amount to furnishing a false declaration on solemn affirmation in violation of the law mentioned above, therefore, he is not honest in terms of Section 99(1)(f) of the ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

As a sequel to what has been discussed in paragraphs 7 to 11 the following directions are made:-
i) The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) shall within six weeks from the date of this judgment prepare and file before the Accountability Court, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, the following References, on the basis of the material collected and referred to by the Joint Investigating Team (JIT) in its report and such other material as may be available with the Federal Investigating Agency (FIA) and NAB having any nexus with the assets or which may subsequently become available including material that may come before it pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance requests sent by the JIT to different jurisdictions:-

d) Reference against respondent No. 10 for possessing assets and funds beyond his known sources of income, as discussed in paragraph 9 above;

e) NAB shall also include in the proceedings all other persons including Sheikh Saeed, Musa Ghani, Kashif Masood Qazi, Javaid Kiyani and Saeed Ahmed, who have any direct or indirect nexus or connection with the actions of respondents No. 1, 6, 7, 8 and 10 leading to acquisition of assets and funds beyond their known sources of income;

f) NAB may file supplementary Reference(s) if and when any other asset, which is not prima facie reasonably accounted for, is discovered;

g) The Accountability Court shall proceed with and decide the aforesaid References within a period of six months from the date of filing such References; and

h) In case the Accountability Court finds any deed, document or affidavit filed by or on behalf of the respondent(s) or any other person to be fake, false, forged or fabricated, it shall take appropriate action against the concerned person(s) in accordance with law.

As a sequel to what has been discussed in paragraphs 13 above, the following declaration and direction is issued:-
i) It is hereby declared that having failed to disclose his un-withdrawn receivables constituting assets from Capital FZE, Jebel Ali, UAE in his nomination papers filed for the General Elections held in 2013 in terms of Section 12(2)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (ROPA), and having furnished a false declaration under solemn affirmation respondent No. 1 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif is not honest in terms of Section 99(f) of ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, therefore, he is disqualified to be a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament);

ii) The Election Commission of Pakistan shall issue a notification disqualifying respondent No. 1 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif from being a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) with immediate effect, whereafter he shall cease to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan; and

iii) The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is required to take all necessary steps under the Constitution to ensure continuation of the democratic process.

The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan is requested to nominate an Hon’ble Judge of this Court to supervise and monitor implementation of this judgment in letter and spirit and oversee the proceedings conducted by the NAB and the Accountability Court in the above matters.

This Court commends and appreciates the hard work and efforts made by Members of the JIT and their support and ancillary staff in preparing and filing a comprehensive and detailed Report as per our orders. Their tenure of service shall be safeguarded and protected and no adverse action of any nature including transfer and posting shall be taken against them without informing the monitoring Judge of this Court nominated by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan.

Final order of the court
The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) shall within six weeks from the date of this judgment prepare and file before the Accountability Court, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, the following References, on the basis of the material collected and referred to by the Joint Investigating Team (JIT) in its report and such other material as may be available with the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and NAB having any nexus with assets mentioned below or which may subsequently become available including material that may come before it pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance requests sent by the JIT to different jurisdictions:-

e) NAB shall also include in the proceedings all other persons including Sheikh Saeed, Musa Ghani, Kashif Masood Qazi, Javaid Kiyani and Saeed Ahmed, who have any direct or indirect nexus or connection with the actions of respondents No. 1, 6, 7, 8 and 10 leading to acquisition of assets and funds beyond their known sources of income;

f) NAB may file supplementary Reference(s) if and when any other asset, which is not prima facie reasonably accounted for, is discovered;

g) The Accountability Court shall proceed with and decide the aforesaid References within a period of six months from the date of filing such References; and

h) In case the Accountability Court finds any deed, document or affidavit filed by or on behalf of the respondent(s) or any other person(s) to be fake, false, forged or fabricated, it shall take appropriate action against the concerned person in accordance with law.

It is hereby declared that having failed to disclose his un-withdrawn receivables constituting assets from Capital FZE Jebel Ali, UAE in his nomination papers filed for the General Elections held in 2013 in terms of Section 12(2)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (ROPA), and having furnished a false declaration under solemn affirmation respondent No. 1 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif is not honest in terms of Section 99(f) of ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and therefore he is disqualified to be a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament).

The Election Commission of Pakistan shall issue a notification disqualifying respondent No. 1 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif from being a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) with immediate effect, whereafter he shall cease to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan;

The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is required to take all necessary steps under the Constitution to ensure continuation of the democratic process.

The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan is requested to nominate an Hon’ble Judge of this Court to supervise and monitor implementation of this judgment in letter and spirit and oversee the proceedings conducted by NAB and the Accountability Court in the above mentioned matters.

This Court commends and appreciates the hard work and efforts made by Members of the JIT and their support and ancillary staff in preparing and filing a comprehensive and detailed Report as per our orders. Their tenure of service shall be safeguarded and protected and no adverse action of any nature including transfer and posting shall be taken against them without informing the monitoring Judge of this Court nominated by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan.

Directions issued bySupreme Court in form of mandamus to all police stations’

“2. While we propose to consider this matter on merits after service of notice to the respondent-accused, we feel acutely concerned as to why the Union of India should not take initiative and steps to evolve a procedure for fast-track justice to be adopted by the investigating agencies and the Fast Track Courts by proposing amendments to CrPC for speedy justice to the victim.

3. Fast Track Courts no doubt are being constituted for expeditious disposal of cases involving the charge of rape at the trial stage, but we are perturbed and anguished to notice that although there are Fast Track Courts for disposal of such cases, we do not yet have a fast-track procedure for dealing with cases of rape and gang rape lodged under Section 376 IPC with the result that such heinous offences are repeated incessantly.

4. We are of the considered opinion that there is pressing need to introduce drastic amendments to CrPC in the nature of fast-track procedure for Fast Track Courts and here is an occasion where we deem it just and appropriate to issue notice and call upon the Union of India to file its response as to why it should not take initiative and sincere steps for introducing necessary amendment into CrPC, 1973 involving trial for the charge of “rape” by directing that all the witnesses who are examined in relation to the offence and incident of rape cases should be straightaway produced before the Magistrate for recording their statement to be kept in sealed cover and thereafter the same be treated as evidence at the stage of trial which may be put to test by subjecting it to cross-examination.

We are further of the view that the statement of victim should as far as possible be recorded before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC skipping over the recording of statement by the police under Section 161 CrPC which in any case is inadmissible except for contradiction so that the statement of the accused thereafter be recorded under Section 313 CrPC. The accused then can be committed to the appropriate court for trial whereby the trial court can straightaway allow cross-examination of the witnesses whose evidence were recorded earlier before the Magistrate.

5. What we wish to emphasise is that the recording of evidence of the victim and other witnesses multiple times ought to be put to an end which is the primary reason for delay of the trial. We are of the view that if the evidence is recorded for the first time itself before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC and the same be kept in sealed cover to be treated as deposition of the witnesses and hence admissible at the stage of trial with liberty to the defence to cross-examine them with further liberty to the accused to lead his defence witnesses and other evidence with a right to cross-examination by the prosecution, it can surely cut short and curtail the protracted trial if it is introduced at least for trial of rape cases which is bound to reduce the duration of trial and thus offer a speedy remedy by way of a fast-track procedure to the Fast Track Court to resort to.

6. Considering the consistent recurrence of the heinous crime of rape and gang rape all over the country including the metropolitan cities, we are of the view that it is high time such measures of reform in CrPC be introduced after due deliberation and debate by the legal fraternity as also all concerned. We, therefore, deem it just and appropriate to issue notice to the Union of India through the Attorney General which the counsel for the petitioner is directed to serve by way of dasti summons. The matter be posted again on 3-9-2013 for further consideration.”

19. In continuation of the above, further order dated 25th April, 2014 [(2014) 8 SCC 913] was passed as follows :

“10.1. Upon receipt of information relating to the commission of offence of rape, the investigating officer shall make immediate steps to take the victim to any Metropolitan/preferably Judicial Magistrate for the purpose of recording her statement under Section 164 CrPC. A copy of the statement under Section 164 CrPC should be handed over to the investigating officer immediately with a specific direction that the contents of such statement under Section 164 CrPC should not be disclosed to any person till charge- sheet/report under Section 173 CrPC is filed.

10.2. The investigating officer shall as far as possible take the victim to the nearest Lady Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate.

10.3. The investigating officer shall record specifically the date and the time at which he learnt about the commission of the offence of rape and the date and time at which he took the victim to the Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate as aforesaid.

10.4. If there is any delay exceeding 24 hours in taking the victim to the Magistrate, the investigating officer should record the reasons for the same in the case diary and hand over a copy of the same to the Magistrate.

10.5. Medical examination of the victim: Section 164-A CrPC inserted by Act 25 of 2005 in CrPC imposes an obligation on the part of investigating officer to get the victim of the rape immediately medically examined. A copy of the report of such medical examination should be immediately handed over to the Magistrate who records the statement of the victim under Section 164 CrPC.

11. A copy of this order thus be circulated to all the Directors General of Police of all the States/Commissioners of Police in Metropolitan cities/Commissioners of Police of Union Territories who are then directed to send a copy of this order to all the Police Stations-in-Charge in their States/Union Territories for its compliance in cases which are registered on or after the receipt of a copy of these directions. Necessary instructions by the DGPs/Commissioners of Police be also issued to all the Police Stations-in-Charge by the DGPs/Commissioners of Police incorporating the directions issued by us and recorded hereinbefore.”

The De-Facto complainant filed an application under Section 193 of the Code in the Sessions Trial complaining therein that the names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 – Ashish Meena and Vimal Meena though figured prominently in all the material documents filed along with the charge-sheet, yet for no justifiable reasons, their names were deleted from the charge-sheet whereas only the names of two accused, i.e., Vimlesh and Janak Singh were retained to face the trial.

Complainant[De-Facto] as a necessary party had a right of hearing in the Revision because the order impugned in the Revision was passed by the Session Judge on his application.

No superior Court in hierarchical jurisdiction can issue direction/mandamus to any subordinate Court commanding them to pass a particular order on any application filed by any party. The judicial independence of every Court in passing the orders in cases is well settled. It cannot be interfered with by any Court including superior Court.

When an order is passed, it can be questioned by the aggrieved party in appeal or revision, as the case may be, to the superior Court. It is then for the Appellate/Revisionery Court to decide as to what orders need to be passed in exercise of its Appellate/Revisionery jurisdiction. Even while remanding the case to the subordinate Court, the Superior Court cannot issue a direction to the subordinate Court to either “allow” the case or “reject” it. If any such directions are issued, it would amount to usurping the powers of that Court and would amount to interfering in the discretionary powers of the subordinate Court.

ACT:- Section 193 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 AND Sections 120-B, 363, 366, 368, 370 (4) and 376 of the Indian Penal Code AND Section 3/4 and 16/17 of POCSO Act-

2. This appeal is filed by the Complainant against the final judgment and order dated 28.04.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.477 of 2017 whereby the High Court partly allowed the criminal revision petition filed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein and set aside that part of the order dated 19.11.2016 passed by the Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur in Session Trial No.44/2016 whereby the Session Judge while allowing the application filed under Section 193 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) by the appellant (Complainant) issued non-bailable warrants against respondent Nos. 2 & 3 for their arrest.

3. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass so also the issue involved in the appeal is short. They, however, need mention infra.

4. Two accused, namely, Vimlesh Kumar and Janak Singh are facing trial for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 363, 366, 368, 370 (4) and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) read with Section 3/4 and 16/17 of POCSO Act, in Sessions Trial No.44/2016. It is pending in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur. The Sessions trial began pursuant to FIR No.110/2014 filed by the complainant-Madan Mohan (appellant herein) in Police Station, Piloda. A charge sheet has since been filed against two accused mentioned above.

5. The appellant filed an application under Section 193 of the Code in the Sessions Trial complaining therein that the names of respondent Nos.2 and 3 – Ashish Meena and Vimal Meena though figured prominently in all the material documents filed along with the charge-sheet, yet for no justifiable reasons, their names were deleted from the charge-sheet whereas only the names of two accused, i.e., Vimlesh and Janak Singh were retained to face the trial.

6. The appellant, therefore, prayed that respondent Nos.2 and 3 be summoned for being arrayed as accused persons along with Vimlesh Kumar and Janak Singh to face the trial because, according to him, respondent Nos.2 and 3 are also involved in the commission of the offence along with other two accused.

7. The Sessions Judge, by order dated 19.11.2016, allowed the application finding prima facie case against respondent Nos.2 and 3 and accordingly summoned both by issuing non-bailable warrant of arrest against them.

8. Respondent Nos.2 and 3 felt aggrieved and filed Criminal Revision under Section 397 of the Code in the High Court at Rajasthan out of which this appeal arises. The complainant-appellant herein at whose instance the order was passed by the Sessions Judge was, however, not impleaded as party in the revision.

9. By impugned order, the Single Judge allowed the revision in part and set aside that portion of the order of the Sessions Judge which had directed issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest of respondent Nos.2 and 3 while summoning them. The High Court then proceeded to issue further direction to respondent 4 Nos.2 and 3 to surrender before the Trial Court and move the application for their regular bail, which would be considered and allowed by that Court on the same day on which it is moved. A further liberty was granted to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to raise the contentions at the time of framing of the charges.

10. It is apposite to quote in verbatim the impugned order:

“1. Heard learned counsel for the accused/petitioners.

2. This Criminal Revision Petition has been preferred on behalf of the accused/petitioners against the order dated 19.11.2016 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur whereby the application filed under Section 193 Cr.P.C. by the complainant-Madan Mohan Meena has been allowed and the cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 363 & IPC and Section 5/6 POCSO Act in the alternative Section 376(2)(g) IPC has been taken against the petitioners, Ashish Meena & Vimal Meena, and they have been called through non-bailable warrants.

3. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners restricts his prayer to the extent that the order summoning the accused/petitioners through non-bailable warrants may be quashed.

4. This fact is undisputed that after thorough investigation made by the Police, charge-sheet for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 368, 370(4), 376, 120-B IPC and Section 3/4 and 16/17 of the POCSO Act was filed only against Vimlesh Kumar and Janak Singh. Accused/petitioners, Ashish Meena and Vimal Meena, were not charge-sheeted. Vide order impugned dated 19.11.2016, petitioners have been summoned through non-bailable warrants for the offences mentioned above.

5. Taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration in totality, it appears that the order to the extent of summoning the petitioners, Ashish Meena and Vimal Meena, through non-bailable warrants does not appear justified and is liable to be quashed and set aside. However, the petitioners, Ashish Meena and Vimal Meena, are directed to surrender before the learned trial Court and to move application for their regular bail, which will be considered and allowed by that Court on the same day on which it is moved.

6. It is also made clear that the accused/petitioners will be at liberty to raise the contentions raised before this Court at the time of framing of charges before the learned trial Court.

7. The Criminal Revision Petition stands disposed off accordingly.”

(Emphasis supplied)

11. Against the impugned order of the High Court, the complainant has felt aggrieved and after obtaining the leave has filed this appeal by way of special leave in this Court.

12. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal and set aside the order to the extent mentioned below.

14. In our considered opinion, the Single Judge seemed to have passed the impugned order without application of judicial mind inasmuch as he committed two glaring errors while passing the order. First, he failed to see that the complainant at whose instance the Sessions Judge had passed the order and had allowed his application under Section 193 of the Code was a necessary party to the criminal revision along with the State. Therefore, he should have been impleaded as respondent along with the State in the revision. In other words, the Complainant also had a right of hearing in the Revision because the order impugned in the Revision was passed by the Session Judge on his application. This aspect of the case was, however, not noticed by the Single Judge.

15. Second and more importantly was that the Single Judge grossly erred in giving direction to the Sessions Judge to consider the bail application of respondent Nos.2 and 3 and “allow” it on the “same day”.

16. In our considered opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Sessions Judge to “allow” the application for grant of bail. Indeed, once such direction had been issued by the High Court then what was left for the Sessions Judge to decide except to follow the directions of the High Court and grant bail to respondent Nos. 2 and 3. In other words, in compliance to the mandatory directions issued by the High Court, the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to reject the bail application but to allow it.

17. No superior Court in hierarchical jurisdiction can issue such direction/mandamus to any subordinate Court commanding them to pass a particular order on any application filed by any party.The judicial independence of every Court in passing the orders in cases is well settled. It cannot be interfered with by any Court including superior Court.

18. When an order is passed, it can be questioned by the aggrieved party in appeal or revision, as the case may be, to the superior Court. It is then for the Appellate/Revisionery Court to decide as to what orders need to be passed in exercise of its Appellate/Revisionery jurisdiction. Even while remanding the case to the subordinate Court, the Superior Court cannot issue a direction to the subordinate Court to either “allow” the case or “reject” it. If any such directions are issued, it would amount to usurping the powers of that Court and would amount to interfering in the discretionary powers of the subordinate Court. Such order is, therefore, not legally sustainable.

19. It is the sole discretion of the Sessions Judge to find out while hearing the bail application as to whether any case on facts is made out for grant of bail by the accused or not. If made out then to grant the bail and if not made out, to reject the bail. In either case, i.e., to grant or reject, the Sessions Judge has to apply his independent judicial mind and accordingly pass appropriate reasoned order keeping in view the facts involved in the case and the legal principles applicable for grant/rejection of the bail. In this case, the Single Judge failed to keep in his mind this legal principle.

20. It is for this reason, in our view, such directions were wholly uncalled for and should not have been given. This Court cannot countenance issuing of such direction by the High Court.

21. In our view, at best, the High Court could have made an observation to the effect that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 (accused persons) are at liberty to approach the Sessions Judge for grant of bail and, if any application is filed, it would be decided by the Sessions Judge on its merits and in accordance with law expeditiously but not beyond it.

22. We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the direction given by the High Court to the Sessions Judge to “consider and allow” the bail application made by respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in Sessions Trial Case No.44/2016 on the same day on which it was moved.

23. So far as the direction by which cognizance of the case against respondent Nos.2 and 3 was taken by the Sessions Judge, the Single Judge has upheld it. It is not questioned here. In the light of this, the respondent Nos.2 and 3 have to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge and raise the pleas which are available to them in law.

24. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order to the extent indicated above is set aside. The Session Judge would now decide the application for bail, if made by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, on its merits and in accordance with law, if not so far decided.

Cicero : “We are all servants of the laws in order that we may be free.”[Omnes legum servi sumus ut liberi esse possumus]

Socrates: “Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially.”

Justice is administered by human institutions; they can be fallible, but they should never be perverse.

The fundamental concept of judicial independence came into being in England and Wales in 1701 with the enactment of the Act of Settlement.

Indian Constitution : Indian Constitution does not speak about standards of integrity, propriety, competence, independence, etc. as qualifications essential for judicial selection. Collegium System is an extra Constitutional Body accepted by the president of India .

Bharatiya Sanskriti : Dharma and Sathya , two pillars of Justice System

United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the role of lawyers[1985 and 1990]

Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct [2003]

Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA region [1995]

The Latimer House Principles[1998]

The International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace produced the Mt. Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence between 2007 and 2012.

“An independent, impartial judiciary; the presumption of innocence; the right to a fair and public trial without undue delay; a rational and proportionate approach to punishment; a strong and independent legal profession; strict protection of confidential communications between lawyer and client; equality of all before the law; these are all fundamental principles of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, arbitrary arrests; secret trials; indefinite detention without trial; cruel or degrading treatment or punishment; intimidation or corruption in the electoral process, are all unacceptable. The Rule of Law is the foundation of a civilised society. It establishes a transparent process accessible and equal to all. It ensures adherence to principles that both liberate and protect. The IBA calls upon all countries to respect these fundamental principles. It also calls upon its members to speak out in support of the Rule of Law within their respective communities”[International Bar Association 2009 ]

“More than a matter of due process, the rule of law is an enabler of justice and development. The three notions are interdependent; when realized, they are mutually reinforcing. For IDLO, as much as a question of laws and procedure, the rule of law is a culture and daily practice. It is inseparable from equality, from access to justice and education, from access to health and the protection of the most vulnerable. It is crucial for the viability of communities and nations, and for the environment that sustains them”. [International Development Law Organization (IDLO)]

From rule of law to democratic institutions

Saving the Court from a Judge

Judicial Power in India

How the judiciary is governed

Accountable judiciary

Judicial appointments

Judiciary in India

Judicial review

All India Judicial Service

“An independent judiciary may also make it harder for the government to respond quickly and flexibly to changing circumstances or national crises“

Litigants in Person – need for practice guidelines in India

Indian Concept of Dharma and Dharma Tradition

Judicial oath in in England

“I, _________ , do swear by Almighty God that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady Queen Elizabeth the Second in the office of ________ , and I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm, without fear or favour, affection or ill will.”

Legal Provisions and Standards

Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 [UK]

American President is free to appoint any person to the federal bench, yet typically he consults with the American Bar Association, whose Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary rates each nominee “Well Qualified,” “Qualified” or “Not Qualified.”

Stare decisis is a maxim among … lawyers, that whatever has been done before may legally be done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind.
— Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels.

“WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE LEGISLATURE HAD INTENDED BUT SURELY WE KNOW THE ENACTMENT “

“To treat precedents as superior to constitutional enactments is to introduce contradictions into the law, and in any system of logical propositions, acceptance of a single contradiction accepts all contradictions, rendering every proposition logically undecidable”

“By treating court opinions as though they are general law, and not just law for a particular case, we become accomplices in delegating legislative powers to judicial officials, which is forbidden by Art. I Sec. 1 of the U.S.”