On appeal, defendant asserts three arguments, which are different from the
arguments he asserted below. First, he contends that plaintiff did not prove that it has any
corporate existence, that its actions were lawfully authorized by a proper resolution of its
board of directors or otherwise, or that it authorized Montgomery to file this proceeding
on its behalf. He asserts that plaintiff's corporate status was revoked "beyond appeal" in
New Mexico.

Second, defendant argues that, because the time for executing on the
bankruptcy judgment in New Mexico has expired, that judgment is not entitled to full
faith and credit and thus was not a proper judgment to file under the UEFJA. He further
contends that, as a corporation whose corporate status has been "revoked," plaintiff could
not lawfully take action to revive, and thereafter enforce, the bankruptcy judgment.

As we discuss in some detail, we do not consider defendant's first two
arguments because he did not preserve them below. We also do not consider one of the
subparts of his third argument because it, too, was not preserved. As for the remaining
subparts of his third argument, we reject those because they are based on a legally
incorrect premise. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's
motion to set aside the bankruptcy court judgment.

Our assessment of preservation is driven by a concern that the trial court
must be given "a realistic opportunity to make the right decision." East County Recycling
v. Pneumatic Construction, 214 Or App 573, 578, 167 P3d 467 (2007). As the Supreme
Court explained in State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000), "a party must
provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough
to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to
consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted."

With those considerations in mind, we turn to defendant's arguments on
appeal, beginning with his first argument. Defendant did not contend below, as he does
here, that plaintiff failed to observe the corporate formalities necessary to authorize the
filing of the bankruptcy judgment in Oregon. Rather, defendant limited his corporate
authority argument to the contention that plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to file the
judgment in Oregon because the State of New Mexico had revoked its corporate status.
Further, defendant made that argument not as a separate basis for relief from the
judgment or to have that judgment set aside, but solely as part of his contention that
plaintiff had perpetrated a fraud on the court by not informing the court that its corporate
status had been revoked. Defendant renews that argument as part of his third argument
(relating to fraud) on appeal, and we address it later in this opinion. But his first
argument in this court is different--that the judgment should be set aside because plaintiff
did not prove that it has any corporate existence, that its actions were lawfully authorized
by a proper resolution of its board of directors or otherwise, or that it authorized
Montgomery to file this proceeding on its behalf.

Before discussing whether defendant preserved his second argument--that
the bankruptcy judgment expired under New Mexico law and therefore is not entitled to
full faith and credit--it is worth reviewing briefly some of the key provisions of the
UEFJA, as adopted in Oregon. Under that act, a properly authenticated "foreign
judgment" can be filed in an Oregon circuit court. ORS 24.115(1). A "foreign judgment"
is "any judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States or of any other court
which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state." ORS 24.105. Once filed, the
judgment, in effect, becomes a judgment of the court in which it is filed and "has the
same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for
reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of the circuit court in which the foreign
judgment is filed, and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner." ORS 24.115(3).
Promptly after filing the judgment, the judgment creditor must notify the judgment debtor
by mail that the judgment has been filed. ORS 24.125(2). Five days must elapse from the
time of filing the judgment before any process to execute on the judgment may begin.
ORS 24.125(3).

As mentioned above, after plaintiff filed the bankruptcy judgment and
served defendant with notice, defendant moved to set aside that judgment. In support of
his motion, defendant invoked ORCP 71 B(1)(d) and (e) and 71 C. ORCP 71 B(1)(d) and
(e) authorize the court, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just," to "relieve a party
* * * from a judgment" if "the judgment is void" or if "the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged * * *." ORCP 71 C clarifies that ORCP 71 does not limit the
inherent power of a court "to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."

Although defendant titled his motion in the trial court as a motion to set
aside the filing of the foreign judgment, the substance of the motion was that the
judgment itself should be set aside. That is clear from the first heading of his motion, in
which he characterized it as a "Motion to Set Aside Judgment," as well as his argument
relying on ORCP 71, which entitles a party to relief from a judgment under certain
circumstances.

On appeal, however, defendant's argument has changed significantly. Here,
he contends that the judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit in Oregon and
therefore was not a "foreign judgment" that could be filed in Oregon under the UEFJA.
The grounds for that argument are the same as those on which his argument rested below--i.e., that the judgment was not valid and enforceable in New Mexico. Defendant does
not, however, renew on appeal his argument that he is entitled to relief from the judgment
under ORCP 71 B because the judgment is unenforceable.

We turn to defendant's final argument, that he was entitled to relief from the
bankruptcy judgment because plaintiff perpetrated "extrinsic fraud" on the trial court.
Extrinsic fraud pertains to the manner in which the judgment was procured. Johnson v.
Johnson, 302 Or 382, 389-90, 730 P2d 1221 (1986) (quoting O.-W.R. & N. Co. v. Reid,
155 Or 602, 609, 65 P2d 664 (1937)). The fraud alleged by defendant here consisted of
plaintiff's failure to inform the court of facts concerning the status of the bankruptcy
judgment, its own corporate existence, and its failure to take lawful corporate action to
authorize the filing of the judgment in Oregon. That alleged fraud does not relate to the
way that the bankruptcy judgment was procured, but rather to plaintiff's conduct in
connection with the filing of that judgment in Oregon. We need not address whether that
distinction is significant, however, because we conclude that plaintiff engaged in no
fraudulent conduct.

The first statute cited by plaintiff was construed in Galef v. Buena Vista
Dairy, 117 NM 701, 875 P2d 1132 (NM Ct App 1994). There, the court concluded that a
person seeking to domesticate a foreign judgment under New Mexico's version of the
UEFJA had 14 years from the date of the other state's judgment to do so. The court
interpreted the reference to "[a]ctions founded upon any judgment of any court of record
of any other state" in NMSA § 37-1-2 to include proceedings to domesticate a judgment
of any other state. 875 P2d at 1134-36. It further concluded that a proceeding brought
three years after domestication of the foreign judgment was brought within the applicable
New Mexico statute of limitations. Id. at 1135-36.

The statute considered in Galef applies not only to actions on judgments of
any court of record of any state but also to actions on judgments of the federal courts.
NMSA § 37-1-2. New Mexico's domestication process is the means by which New
Mexico recognizes federal court judgments. Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Ditto, 125
NM 226, 959 P2d 560 (NM Ct App 1998), cert den, 125 NM 147, 958 P2d 105 (NM
1998) (concluding that a proceeding to revive a bankruptcy judgment that was more than
seven years old could not occur until recognition of the judgment--that is, domestication--had taken place). Thus, it appears that, in New Mexico, a proceeding to domesticate a
federal bankruptcy judgment would have to precede any attempt to execute on that
judgment, regardless of the time since the judgment was rendered.

To reiterate, then, a federal judgment must be domesticated in New Mexico
before any enforcement action can occur; further, a party has 14 years to domesticate a
foreign judgment in New Mexico and then, depending on the applicable statute of
limitations, some period of time thereafter to enforce the judgment. Because the time had
not yet elapsed for plaintiff to domesticate the bankruptcy judgment in New Mexico state
court at the time plaintiff filed that judgment in Oregon, the judgment was still
enforceable in New Mexico. Accordingly, we reject defendant's assertion that the
judgment was unenforceable in New Mexico because seven years had elapsed since its
entry.

We turn to the next prong of defendant's fraud argument, that plaintiff
failed to inform the trial court of its corporate status. Although the bankruptcy judgment
remains enforceable in New Mexico, that fact does not aid plaintiff if its corporate status
prevents it from taking any enforcement action in New Mexico.

Under NMSA § 53-16-24, the fact of a corporation's dissolution does not
bar the corporation from pursuing remedies for claims or rights that existed prior to
dissolution. See Smith v. Halliburton Co., 118 NM 179, 879 P2d 1198, 1202 (NM Ct
App 1994) (New Mexico places no express time limits on survival of remedies by or
against domestic corporations after dissolution). Defendant contends, however, that
plaintiff is not simply dissolved but has had its corporate status revoked "beyond appeal"
in New Mexico. He contends that NMSA § 53-17-24 is silent about corporations with
"revoked" status and therefore does not apply to corporations such as plaintiff.

We conclude that the New Mexico statute's silence concerning dissolved
corporations whose corporate status was revoked demonstrates no legislative intent to
treat that class of corporations differently. On its face, NMSA § 53-16-24 applies to the
dissolution of all corporations, without making an exception for corporations whose
status has been revoked. Although defendant would have us read such an exception into
New Mexico's statute, he cites no New Mexico authority authorizing us to do so. This
court does not read exceptions into Oregon statutes, ORS 174.010; Wheaton v. Kulongoski, 209 Or App 355, 363-64, 147 P3d 1163 (2006); we decline to do so for the
statutes of other states. Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument that plaintiff
perpetrated a fraud by not informing the court of its revoked corporate status; that status
did not prevent it from filing the judgment under the UEFJA.

We do not address defendant's final argument, that plaintiff perpetrated a
fraud on the court by not informing it of facts demonstrating that it failed to take "lawful
corporate action" to file the bankruptcy judgment in Oregon. Again, even assuming that
such a failure would amount to fraud as contemplated by ORCP 71 C, defendant failed to
make the argument below. Instead, he contended only that plaintiff perpetrated a fraud on
the court by failing to inform it that its corporate status had been revoked.

Affirmed.

EDMONDS, J., concurring.

I concur with the majority opinion in this case and write separately only to
discuss why I believe that the preservation issue regarding defendant's ORS 12.070
argument is not controlled by the Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Water Wonderland
Imp. District, 326 Or 306, 951 P2d 720 (1998).

Defendant filed his motion to stay the enforcement of a foreign judgment
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico registered by
plaintiff in Oregon pursuant to ORS 24.105 to 24.1175, otherwise known as the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. ORS 24.135(2) provides the grounds upon
which enforcement of a registered foreign judgment can be stayed, including "any ground
upon which enforcement of a judgment of any court of any county of this state would be
stayed[.]" One potential ground for staying the enforcement of a foreign judgment is
found in ORS 12.070(1), which provides that "[a]n action upon a judgment or decree of
any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States * * *
shall be commenced within 10 years." The foreign judgment in this case originated in
March 1994; it was not registered in Oregon until 2005, more than ten years later.
However, defendant's motion in the trial court did not rely on ORS 12.070. Rather, he
argued that the Oregon court should set aside the judgment "because it is no longer a
valid and enforceable judgment in the jurisdiction in which it originated," relying on a
New Mexico statute providing for a seven-year period of viability after entry.

On appeal, defendant makes a single assignment of error in which he
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion, and, for the first time, he relies
on ORS 12.070, arguing that even if the judgment is enforceable in New Mexico, it is not
enforceable in Oregon because it was not registered within the 10-year period of time
permitted by that statute. The majority correctly holds that defendant failed to comply
with the preservation requirements of ORAP 5.45 with regard to the issue of whether
ORS 12.070 operates to stay the enforcement of the judgment.

However, because the issue on appeal involves a potentially applicable
statute, the Supreme Court's decision in Miller lurks in the background. In Miller, the
court held that a particular statute, raised for the first time on review, governed the issue
on appeal even though the statute was never pleaded or argued in any manner in the trial
court or this court. The court reasoned, "[T]he parties may not prevent a court from
noticing and invoking an applicable statute by relying only on other sources of law." 326
Or at 309 n 3. Arguably, the rule of Miller could apply here, where ORS 12.070,
although not raised by defendant in the trial court, appears to stay the enforcement of a
registered foreign judgment if the action on the judgment in Oregon is not commenced
within 10 years from the entry of the judgment in the foreign jurisdiction.

Miller, however, in my view, is distinguishable. In Miller, the plaintiff
filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to inspect and copy records of a water district
corporation established under ORS chapter 554. In the trial court, the plaintiff argued
that his right to inspect the records arose under the Public Records Act, ORS 192.410 to
192.505. The trial court held that the defendant was not a "public body" for purposes of
ORS 192.410(3), because it was a nonprofit public corporation created pursuant to ORS
chapter 554, rather than a "special district" under ORS 192.410(3). We affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, characterizing the only issue before us as whether the plaintiff
had a right to inspect the records under the Public Records Act. Miller v. Water
Wonderland Improvement District, 141 Or App 403, 407, 918 P2d 849 (1995). The
Supreme Court's majority opinion, however, framed the issue differently, focusing on the
issue as it had been pleaded under ORS chapter 554.

This case differs from Miller in that defendant never sought to stay
enforcement of the judgment pursuant to Oregon law in his motion filed in the trial court.
Rather, as described above, defendant relied entirely on the assertion that the judgment
was unenforceable under a New Mexico statute. That difference brings into play the
distinctions drawn for preservation purposes by courts between an issue, the identification
of a source of law for a claimed position, and the making of a particular argument. Those
distinctions were first drawn by the Supreme Court in State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188-89,
766 P2d 373 (1988), and in Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or 358, 369 n 12,
723 P2d 298 (1986) (explaining that raising an issue is essential to preservation, and that
identifying a source for a claimed position and making a particular argument are less so).
In Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77, 948 P2d 722 (1997), the court applied the rule in order to
allow the plaintiff to raise an argument concerning the proper construction of a statute for
the first time on appeal where the broader legal issue--the meaning of the statute--had
been preserved below.

Regardless, I am persuaded that, under either calculus, defendant did not
preserve the issue of whether the New Mexico judgment is enforceable under ORS
12.070. Clearly, under the Wyatt test, the trial court had no opportunity to rule on that
issue. If the Hitz test is applied, then, I would hold that the broader legal issue raised by
defendant's motion in the trial court (whether the judgment is enforceable under New
Mexico law) is not the same issue that he raises on appeal (whether defendant is entitled
to have the enforcement of the New Mexico judgment stayed under ORS 12.070).

I concur.

1. The trial court followed its order with the entry of a "limited judgment" that
"ordered and adjudged that Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Foreign Judgment is denied * * *."
Because the order denying defendant's motion is appealable, Montoya v. Housing Authority of
Portland, 192 Or App 408, 417, 86 P3d 80 (2004), and defendant timely appealed from that
order, we need not decide whether the "limited judgment" also was proper or appealable.

2. Defendant also asserts that the earlier lawsuit brought by attorney Montgomery
resulted in satisfaction of "at least 40% of the judgment sought to be registered" and that portion
of the judgment may no longer be subject to enforcement by plaintiff. Beyond making that
assertion, however, defendant does not develop that argument or explain how plaintiff's failure to
bring that partial satisfaction to the court's attention amounts to extrinsic fraud sufficient to set
aside the bankruptcy judgment. See Geranghadr v. Entagh, 189 Or App 567, 571-72, 77 P3d
323 (2003), rev den, 336 Or 509 (2004) (filing an allegedly incorrect translation of an arbitration
award might be intrinsic fraud, which pertains to the merits of the case, but it was not extrinsic
fraud, which prevents a full trial of the matter, and so was not a basis for setting aside the
judgment). Accordingly, we do not consider that argument any further.

3. It appears that defendant is a former director of plaintiff. Neither party raises any
argument or points to anything in the record suggesting that defendant is not among those
authorized to challenge plaintiff's capacity or power to act. See ORS 60.084 (limiting
circumstances in which a corporation's power to act may be challenged); NMSA § 53-11-6
(same). Accordingly, we do not consider that issue.

4. One such consideration is whether "full faith and credit" is an appropriate
requirement for the filing of a federal judgment under the UEFJA. "Full faith and credit," at least
as a matter of federal constitutional and statutory law, refers to the effect to be given to foreign
state court, not federal court, judgments. See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 US
497, 507, 121 S Ct 1021, 149 L Ed 2d 32 (2001) (observing that the Article IV, section 1, of the
federal constitution and 28 USC section 1738, "[b]y their terms[,] * * * govern the effects to be
given only to state-court judgments (and, in the case of the statute, to judgments by courts of
territories and possessions).").

5. Although ORS 24.115(3) provides that a judgment, once filed, is "subject to the
same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of
the circuit court in which the foreign judgment is filed," the UEFJA contains no provision by
which the filing of the foreign judgment can be set aside. A contention that the filing of a foreign
judgment was improper does not fit within the context of a motion for relief from a judgment
under ORCP 71 B. That rule does not address challenges to the filing of a judgment but asks
only whether the judgment debtor is entitled to relief from the judgment itself. The full faith and
credit question involves whether the judgment was a proper subject for filing under the UEFJA
in the first place--that is, whether it was a "foreign judgment" as defined in ORS 24.105. A
challenge to the filing itself, an act performed by the circuit court clerk, arguably would more
appropriately be brought by means of a writ of review proceeding, ORS 34.010 to 34.100, a
declaratory judgment proceeding, ORS 28.010 to 28.160, or a writ of mandamus proceeding,
ORS 34.105 to 34.240, depending on whether the nature of the clerk's action is quasi-judicial
(writ of review), ministerial or clerical (declaratory judgment), or non-discretionary
governmental action for which there is no adequate and speedy remedy available at law
(mandamus). See generally, e.g., State ex rel School Dist. 13 v. Columbia Co., 66 Or App 237,
241-44, 674 P2d 608 (1983), rev den, 296 Or 829 (1984) (discussing respective roles of writ of
review and declaratory judgment proceedings). As discussed in the text, however, we need not
resolve that question, as defendant's challenge to the filing of the judgment was not raised in the
trial court.

6. For purposes of this discussion only, we accept defendant's assertion that the
enforceability in New Mexico of a judgment from a federal court sitting in New Mexico is a
prerequisite to filing that judgment in Oregon under the UEFJA. FRCP 69(a) allows judgment
creditors to execute on federal judgments in accordance with the practices and procedures for
executing judgements issued by courts of the state in which the district court sits. Peacock v.
Thomas, 516 US 349, 359 n 7, 116 S Ct 862, 133 L Ed 2d 817 (1996). However, the parties have
not pointed us to any authority suggesting that a federal judgment involving the exercise of
federal subject matter jurisdiction is unenforceable in other states unless it is enforceable in the
state in which the district court sits.

"Actions founded upon any judgment of any court of the
state may be brought within fourteen years from the date of the
judgment, and not afterward. Actions founded upon any judgment
of any court of record of any other state or territory of the United
States, or of the federal courts, may be brought within the
applicable period of limitation within that jurisdiction, not to
exceed fourteen years from the date of the judgment, and not
afterward."

"The dissolution of a corporation does not take away or
impair any remedy available to or against the corporation, its
directors, officers or shareholders, for any right or claim existing,
or any liability incurred, prior to the dissolution and any such
action or proceeding by or against the corporation may be
prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name.
The shareholders, directors and officers may take such corporate or
other action as appropriate to protect the remedy, right or claim."

"On application made within the time allowed for bringing
an action on a foreign judgment in this state, any person entitled to
bring such action may have a foreign judgment registered in any
court of this state having jurisdiction of such an action."

11. We express no opinion regarding whether, in a proceeding to domesticate a
foreign judgment under ORS 24.105 to 24.175, the filing of the judgment could be set aside
because any enforcement action would be time barred under Oregon law. We are aware that in
Hatch v. Hatch, 247 Or 588, 590-91, 431 P2d 832 (1967), the court stated that a statute of
limitations defense could be raised as a defense in a proceeding to register a foreign judgment.
However, Hatch involved a prior version of the UEFJA, which specifically provided that "[a]ny
defense which under the law of this state may be asserted by the defendant in an action on the
foreign judgment may be presented by appropriate pleadings * * *." See former ORS 24.080
(1967), repealed by Or Laws 1979, ch 577, § 8.