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Friday, March 3, 2017

Al Qaeda Resumes Offensive Operations in Syria

Jennifer Cafarella

Al
Qaeda in Syria has resumed offensive operations against the Syrian regime in northern Syria after
the fall of Aleppo City. The recapture
of Aleppo City by Syrian president Bashar al Assad and his external backers
was a
turning point in the Syrian civil war, but it did not seal Assad’s victory.
It was instead a victory for Al Qaeda because it defeated Al Qaeda’s main
competitors in northern Syria. Al Qaeda consolidated its strength and resumed
offensive operations against pro-Assad forces in February 2017. Pro-Assad
forces could begin to lose terrain to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda will increasingly pose
a threat to the West as its strength in northern Syria grows. The contest
between Al Qaeda and pro-Assad forces, which include Iran and Russia, will
increasingly challenge U.S. policy options in Syria.

Al
Qaeda won a victory in Aleppo in two important ways. First, it won favor with
opposition groups in August and October 2016 by launching two offensives
to break
the regime’s siege of opposition held neighborhoods of the city, the first of
which temporarily
succeeded. Al Qaeda’s effort – and temporary success – demonstrated
its value to the Syrian opposition and its commitment to defending populations in
opposition-held areas. Al Qaeda did not test whether it was strong enough to
prevent Aleppo from falling after failing to keep the siege broken. Assad and
his external backers used horrifying
tactics to recapture Aleppo City, which Al Qaeda exploited to recruit. The
fall of Aleppo City also neutralized opposition groups that had constrained Al
Qaeda’s influence in northern Syria. Al Qaeda meanwhile preserved its own
military strength and resources for future operations.

Al Qaeda took steps to advance its goal of merging all northern
opposition groups under its leadership after the battle for Aleppo. Al Qaeda attacked numerous U.S.-backed
groups in Idlib in January and February 2017 and forced them and other
independent groups to merge
under Ahrar al Sham on January 26. Prior to the merger, Ahrar al Sham’s leader reaffirmed the group's ideology and
goals, which align with Al Qaeda. The statement served as a guarantee that the
absorption of moderates would not dilute Ahrar al Sham. Al Qaeda’s formal affiliate in
Syria, Jabhat Fatah al Sham (JFS), then absorbed four smaller, allied
opposition groups and siphoned off hundreds of fighters from Ahrar al Sham on January
28 and rebranded itself into Hayyat Tahrir Al-Sham
(HTS). The creation of HTS involved a full merger of all military forces
into a single fighting force, according to the statement announcing the formation.
Al Qaeda intends to demonstrate how a full merger can increase the combat
effectiveness of the whole. HTS will now lead a major offensive
campaign in order to revive the opposition’s war effort after the fall of
Aleppo City.

Al
Qaeda obfuscated the success of its merger by appointing a veteran Al Qaeda
commander formerly within Ahrar al Sham named Hashim
Al-Sheikh to command HTS. Al Qaeda likely chose to elevate Hashim Al Sheikh
because of his reputation as an effective military commander and because the
U.S. has not listed him as a specially designated terrorist. Al Qaeda continues
to prioritize staying below the threshold of American policy as it proceeds
with its program to transform the Syrian opposition in Syria into a global
Salafi-Jihadi base. Hashim al Sheikh is also likely viewed more favorably by
Syrian opposition elements that remain hesitant to merge fully with Al Qaeda.
Former JFS leader Abu Mohammad al Joulani meanwhile took control of HTS military forces in order to build
his reputation as an effective anti-Assad commander.

HTS
resumed offensive operations against pro-Assad forces in late February 2017.
HTS launched a complex,
coordinated
attack against two regime military installations in Homs City on February 25.
Five HTS sleeper cell members detonated Suicide Vests (SVESTs) outside the State
Security and Military Intelligence Offices in the al-Mahatta and al-Ghouta
Districts of Homs City. The attack killed dozens of regime soldiers including
two high-ranking generals. It set conditions for follow-on military operations
by disrupting the regime’s command and control and possibly fixing pro-regime
forces in Homs City. HTS’ most likely operational objective is to attack Hama
City, which has symbolic resonance for the Salafi Jihadi movement because of
the 1982 massacre conducted by former Syrian president Hafez Al Assad against
the Muslim Brotherhood and its alleged supporters. HTS may alternately launch
an offensive against the regime’s coastal stronghold in order to shake the
regime’s confidence and possibly to threaten Russia’s military bases in Latakia
and Tartous.

A
major HTS-led campaign against pro-Assad forces would require Assad and his
external backers to dedicate significant resources to defense. It would likely
deny them the ability to launch clearing operations in Idlib Province after
consolidating in Aleppo City. It may force Russia and Iran to dedicate more
resources to the Syrian theater in order to defend key regime-held terrain. HTS
could degrade the regime’s defenses enough to create opportunities for ISIS to
advance after the regime’s recapture of Palmyra. ISIS has conducted regular
attacks deep into Homs City, indicating that it is positioned to exploit regime
vulnerabilities that HTS may inflict and vice versa. It is also possible,
although less likely, that HTS and ISIS will coordinate tactically against the
regime in the Homs-Hama corridor. Most dangerous possibilities include
simultaneous and possibly coordinated Al Qaeda and ISIS offensives that overmatch
the Syrian regime’s defenses north of Damascus. Russia and Iran are taking
steps to bolster the regime’s ability to defend terrain against major
offensives, but it is unclear how rapidly they can respond or how many
positions they can defend at once.

President
Trump will face a decision point on how to respond to the resumption of
large-scale violence in western Syria. Russia will attempt to draw the U.S.
into a counterterrorism partnership in Syria in reaction to HTS’ upcoming offensive.
President Trump must avoid ceding more power to Russia in Syria in return for a
counterterrorism partnership that would only radicalize Syria’s population
further. Al
Qaeda’s continued rise demonstrates that a counterterrorism strategy is
inappropriate, furthermore. The U.S. will not destroy Al Qaeda’s army in Syria
through precision airstrikes against individual high profile Al Qaeda
operatives. President Trump must instead adopt a new long-term strategy that
integrates American efforts against Al Qaeda and ISIS to destroy both armies
while depriving them of local support.