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Tue, 18 Dec 2018 16:26:14 +0000en-UShourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.9https://www.laquadrature.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2018/09/LOGO-LQDN3-36x36.pngLa Quadrature du Nethttps://www.laquadrature.net
3232European Parliament calls for automated and private censorship of the Web for security purposeshttps://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/12/european-parliament-calls-for-automated-and-private-censorship-of-the-web-for-security-purposes/
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/12/european-parliament-calls-for-automated-and-private-censorship-of-the-web-for-security-purposes/#respondWed, 12 Dec 2018 16:47:02 +0000https://www.laquadrature.net/?p=12731As we feared last Monday, European Parliament has just adopted a Report pushing for the outsourcing of Web censorship to Facebook and Google, using the pretext of the fight against terrorism.

This Report suggests, among numerous others recommendations, that it would be necessary to “achieve automatic detection and systematic, fast, permanent and full removal of terrorist content online” and to prevent “the re-upload of already removed content”. The text specifies that it “welcomes the Commission’s legislative proposal on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online”, “calls on the co-legislators to urgently work on the proposal” and “invites the Member States to put in place national measures if the adoption of legislation is delayed” (§47).

Three amendments would have allowed the European Parliament to stand out from the willingness of Emmanuel Macron and the European Commission to submit the whole Web to the surveillance and automated censorship tools provided by Facebook and Google, as we have denounced it with 58 others organisations.

A first amendment proposed that the censorship of “terrorist content” could not be “automatic” ; this amendment has been rejected by 311 votes against 269 (77 abstentions). A second amendment proposed that this censorship could not imply an active “detection” of content, nor a “systematic and fast” removal ; it has been rejected by 533 votes against 119 (4 abstentions). A third amendment proposed that platforms should not have an obligation “to remove [the content] fully” ; it has been rejected by 534 votes against 105 (14 abstentions).

The majority of the Members of Parliament therefore echoes the decision adopted last week by European governments to impose a mass, automated and private censorship of the Web (read our article).

The Report adopted today provides for mere “recommendations”: it is only a declaration of principle with no legal effect. However, it suggests that the European Parliament has already given up all ambitions to defend our freedoms against the security arguments that motivated the European Commission to propose its Antiterrorism Censorship Regulation, which will be debated by the European Parliament in the coming weeks.

Today’s vote is all the more worrying as it comes after yesterday’s shooting in Strasbourg, in the city where the European Parliament sits. Rather than postponing this vote the Members of European Parliaments (MEPs) decided to adopt the text immediately1Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), president of the TERR Commission, has explained that she had thought about reporting the vote following yesterday’s attack but had finally considered that this event could be a justification for the adoption of the text.. Some have even pointed yesterday’s attack to justify their willingness of more security2Among the Members having made a link between the attack of yesterday in Strasbourg and the Report adopted today, we can quote: Monika Hohlmeier (EPP), co-rapporteure on this text, who has declared after the vote : « Yesterday’s attack on the Christmas market in Strasbourg was an attack on European citizens and the common EU values and principles in the worst possible way. The incident has shown us again that we need to leave empty slogans and unrealistic measures behind and concentrate our activities on what really makes Europe safe. […] This means […] more prevention measures against radicalisation […] ». Frédérique Ries (ALDE), on Twitter. Julian King, the European Commissioner for the Security Union, has stated on Twitter : “Solidarity this morning with all those affected by the odious attack in #Strasbourg. The work we’re doing to support the authorities to tackle radicalisation, help victims and reinforce security is as relevant as ever”.. They invoke a “risk of islamist terrorism” while the perpetrator has not been arrested yet and the investigation has only just begun.

As usual, and unfortunately, the time for appeasement and reflexion, even mourning, has been neglected to carry on the forced march to security measures that our governments have been pursuing for years, by pretending to defend democracy against totalitarianism. While doing the opposite.

From now on, debates at the European Parliament will be directly about the Antiterrorism Censorship Regulation. You can read our last analysis about this text, which will be our main subject in the next months.

Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), president of the TERR Commission, has explained that she had thought about reporting the vote following yesterday’s attack but had finally considered that this event could be a justification for the adoption of the text.

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Among the Members having made a link between the attack of yesterday in Strasbourg and the Report adopted today, we can quote: Monika Hohlmeier (EPP), co-rapporteure on this text, who has declared after the vote : « Yesterday’s attack on the Christmas market in Strasbourg was an attack on European citizens and the common EU values and principles in the worst possible way. The incident has shown us again that we need to leave empty slogans and unrealistic measures behind and concentrate our activities on what really makes Europe safe. […] This means […] more prevention measures against radicalisation […] ». Frédérique Ries (ALDE), on Twitter. Julian King, the European Commissioner for the Security Union, has stated on Twitter : “Solidarity this morning with all those affected by the odious attack in #Strasbourg. The work we’re doing to support the authorities to tackle radicalisation, help victims and reinforce security is as relevant as ever”.

]]>https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/12/european-parliament-calls-for-automated-and-private-censorship-of-the-web-for-security-purposes/feed/0Will European Parliament oppose Authoritarian Censorship?https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/10/will-european-parliament-oppose-authoritarian-censorship/
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/10/will-european-parliament-oppose-authoritarian-censorship/#respondMon, 10 Dec 2018 14:34:22 +0000https://www.laquadrature.net/?p=12704On the 12 December, the European Parliament will vote on the “Report on findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Terrorism”. If adopted, this text would not be legally binding but would recommend the adoption of the measures included in the Anti-terrorism Censorship Regulation: outsourcing censorship to Internet Giants and bypassing national judges (read our last analysis).

La Quadrature du Net sends the following message to Members of the European Parliament, urging them to reject this Report:

Dear Member of the European Parliament,

Next Wednesday, 12 December, you will vote on the Report on findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Terrorism.

These recommendations push for absurd security measures which would weaken fundamental freedoms. More specifically, the report pushes for the same measures provided for the Anti-terrorism Censorship Regulation that will be debated in a few weeks: weakening encryption, outsourcing censorship to Internet Giants and allowing any European police to bypass national judges (points BD, BH, 47, 113 and 125). For these reasons, we urge you to reject this Report.

Using the pretext of the fight against online radicalisation, the measures suggested by the Report and the Censorship Regulation would impose new obligations to all actors of the Internet: services hosting websites, blogs and videos, forum and social networks, press websites, email and messaging providers…

While the European Commission and European governments do not demonstrate in a convincing way the effectiveness nor the necessity of these obligations to fight against terrorism, these obligations would force all actors of the Internet to act on content whose dangerousness have not been assessed by a judge, and in a very short period of time.

These obligations are extremely dangerous for the entire European digital ecosystem. Indeed, the economic, human and technological means required to comply with these obligations are beyond the reach of almost all the actors of the Internet: very few will be able to answer 24/7 and within one hour to removal requests issued by any Member State. In a similar way, surveillance measures and automated censorship that national authorities will be able to impose are totally impracticable.

Thereby, to comply with these new constraints, small and medium-sized economic actors will outsource the execution of these obligations to the few Web giants that, because of their financial power, will be able to support it, Google and Facebook firstly. This outsourcing will lead to an economic and technical dependence that would highly damage the whole European digital economy.

Non-profit and collaborative organisations will have no other choice but to close down their activities.

This measures will therefore dramatically reduce Europe’s digital diversity and will submit the rest to a handful of companies which are already in a near-monopolistic situation, and whose hegemony should be disputed rather than reinforced (read our last analysis).

Finally, these measures would lead to mass surveillance of our online exchanges and to private and automated censorship of information.

For these reasons, La Quadrature du Net, with 58 other actors of the digital ecosystem and defenders of fundamental liberties, have already asked Emmanuel Macron to stop pushing for the Anti-terrorism Censorship Regulation.

We urge you to reject this Report in order to stop as soon as possible this absurd willingness to outsource Internet Censorship to Internet Giants and to allow any European police to bypass national judges.

MEPs refusing to protect fundamental freedoms and the European digital ecosystem will be publicly exposed.

]]>https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/10/will-european-parliament-oppose-authoritarian-censorship/feed/0[PJMedia] Google Reveals Plans to Monitor Our Moods, Our Movements, and Our Children’s Behavior at Homehttps://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/07/pjmedia-google-reveals-plans-to-monitor-our-moods-our-movements-and-our-childrens-behavior-at-home/
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/07/pjmedia-google-reveals-plans-to-monitor-our-moods-our-movements-and-our-childrens-behavior-at-home/#respondFri, 07 Dec 2018 12:00:00 +0000https://www.laquadrature.net/?p=12537Patents recently issued to Google provide a window into their development activities. While it’s no guarantee of a future product, it is a sure indication of what’s of interest to them. What we’ve given up in privacy to Google, Facebook, and others thus far is minuscule compared to what is coming if these companies get their way.

These patents tell us that Google is developing smart-home products that are capable of eavesdropping on us throughout our home in order to learn more about us and better target us with advertising. It goes much further than the current Google Home speaker that’s promoted to answer our questions and provide useful information, and the Google-owned Nest thermostat that measures environmental conditions in our home. What the patents describe are sensors and cameras mounted in every room to follow us and analyze what we’re doing throughout our home. […]

]]>https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/07/pjmedia-google-reveals-plans-to-monitor-our-moods-our-movements-and-our-childrens-behavior-at-home/feed/0[Politico] Technical impossibility at heart of EC’s plan to stop spread of online terrorist contenthttps://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/06/politico-technical-impossibility-at-heart-of-ecs-plan-to-stop-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/06/politico-technical-impossibility-at-heart-of-ecs-plan-to-stop-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/#respondThu, 06 Dec 2018 12:00:00 +0000https://www.laquadrature.net/?p=12538With its proposed legislation to proactively monitor customer data online, and so “prevent the dissemination of terrorist content”, the European Commission is targeting the wrong players and asking Europe’s cloud infrastructure companies to do something that is flatly impossible. […]

The nature of that work means it’s not possible, in technical terms, for cloud infrastructure providers to proactively monitor, filter, access, disable and take down a specific piece of content, or otherwise play around with their customers’ data. That data is solely controlled by the customer: cloud infrastructure providers do not control what content is put up, how that content is made available to the public, or to whom it is made available by their customers. We are simply the enablers, the processors, with a business model founded on the customers’ trust that we will not access his or her data. This who we are and what we do.

After analyzing the proposals and consulting with representatives of member countries and from the various EU institutions, t’s become clear the regulation is wrongly scoped for and should therefore be targeted at social media platforms and online content sharing services. […]

]]>https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/06/politico-technical-impossibility-at-heart-of-ecs-plan-to-stop-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/feed/0European Governments agree to outsource Internet censorship to Google and Facebookhttps://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/06/european-governments-agree-to-outsource-internet-censorship-to-google-and-facebook/
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/06/european-governments-agree-to-outsource-internet-censorship-to-google-and-facebook/#respondThu, 06 Dec 2018 11:42:30 +0000https://www.laquadrature.net/?p=12630We have never seen an European Regulation adopted this quickly by European governments (less than 3 months!), despite concerns voiced by some Member States1Member States opposed to the current version of the text include Finland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Denmark.. Macron has obviously convinced them that, as European elections are getting closer, they could maintain their powers by using the everlasting terrorism pretext. Censorship and mass surveillance of the Internet will be the result.

The EU Council has just decided, right now and without any serious debate, to carry a Regulation proposal that will force all Internet actors to submit to mass surveillance and automated censorship tools provided by Facebook and Google2In 2017, the European Commission proudly announced it had been « working over the last two years with key internet platforms including under the EU Internet Forum”, mainly Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft since 2015, “to ensure the voluntary removal of online terrorist content”, notably thanks to “the internet industry-led initiative to create a ‘database of hashes’ ensures that once terrorist material is taken down on one platform, it is not uploaded on another platform”.
Already, “the aim is that internet platforms do more, notably to step up the automated detection of terrorist content, to share related technology and tools with smaller companies, and to make full use of the ‘database of hashes’., while allowing the police to order them to remove within one hour content they consider “terrorist”, without the authorisation of a judge.

These two delusional and unprecedent measures will force the entire digital European ecosystem to submit to a handful of giants that the EU cynically pretends to fight (read our analysis), while putting at risk the confidentiality of our exchanges3The situation has a bit evolved since our last analysis on how the Regulation may weaken the confidentiality of our communications. In the version adopted today by the Council, Recital 10 of the Regulation has been amended in a way which looks like an attempt to put private communications out of the text’s scope: “Interpersonal communication services that enable direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information between a finite number of persons, whereby the persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s), are not in scope”.
However, this amendment is a mess and fails to secure anything. Firstly, this modification is not reproduced in Article 2, which defines how the notions of the text. Above all, this modification lacks consistency: “Interpersonal communication services” are already defined in the European Electronic Communications Code (Article 2 and Recital 17) as able to cover some kind of cloud services (typically where a limited number of users use it to exchange documents). But the version of the Regulation adopted today explicitly put cloud services within its scope, while pretending to put interpersonal communications out, leading to a massive confusion.… All this despite the fact that neither the European Commission nor the governments have been able to demonstrate how this text may be of any use against terrorism4In 2017, UNESCO published a report analysing 550 studies on online radicalisation. The report found that “the current state of evidence on the link between Internet, social media and violent radicalization is very limited and still inconclusive” and that “there is insufficient evidence to conclude that there is a causal link between extremist propaganda or recruitment on social networks and the violent radicalization of young people”. The report underlined that “attempts to prevent Internet dimensions of the violent radicalization of youth do not have proven efficacy, but on the other hand it is clear that they can damage online freedoms, especially freedom of expression”..

Debates on this text will continue before the European Parliament. Next Wednesday, the 12th of December, the Parliament will vote on a report about anti-terrorism, which, even if not a proper legislation, promotes nearly the same absurd measures that the ones provided by the Anti-terrorism Censorship Regulation, which will be debated by the Parliament in the coming weeks.

This first vote on Wednesday will be an opportunity for each Member of the European Parliament to reveal its position on the totalitarian project of Emmanuel Macron. As the electoral campaign for the European elections of 2019 is getting underway, they will be held accountable for this vote.

Member States opposed to the current version of the text include Finland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Denmark.

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In 2017, the European Commission proudly announced it had been « working over the last two years with key internet platforms including under the EU Internet Forum”, mainly Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft since 2015, “to ensure the voluntary removal of online terrorist content”, notably thanks to “the internet industry-led initiative to create a ‘database of hashes’ ensures that once terrorist material is taken down on one platform, it is not uploaded on another platform”.
Already, “the aim is that internet platforms do more, notably to step up the automated detection of terrorist content, to share related technology and tools with smaller companies, and to make full use of the ‘database of hashes’.

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The situation has a bit evolved since our last analysis on how the Regulation may weaken the confidentiality of our communications. In the version adopted today by the Council, Recital 10 of the Regulation has been amended in a way which looks like an attempt to put private communications out of the text’s scope: “Interpersonal communication services that enable direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information between a finite number of persons, whereby the persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s), are not in scope”.
However, this amendment is a mess and fails to secure anything. Firstly, this modification is not reproduced in Article 2, which defines how the notions of the text. Above all, this modification lacks consistency: “Interpersonal communication services” are already defined in the European Electronic Communications Code (Article 2 and Recital 17) as able to cover some kind of cloud services (typically where a limited number of users use it to exchange documents). But the version of the Regulation adopted today explicitly put cloud services within its scope, while pretending to put interpersonal communications out, leading to a massive confusion.

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In 2017, UNESCO published a report analysing 550 studies on online radicalisation. The report found that “the current state of evidence on the link between Internet, social media and violent radicalization is very limited and still inconclusive” and that “there is insufficient evidence to conclude that there is a causal link between extremist propaganda or recruitment on social networks and the violent radicalization of young people”. The report underlined that “attempts to prevent Internet dimensions of the violent radicalization of youth do not have proven efficacy, but on the other hand it is clear that they can damage online freedoms, especially freedom of expression”.

]]>https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/06/european-governments-agree-to-outsource-internet-censorship-to-google-and-facebook/feed/0[NewScientist] Exclusive: UK police wants AI to stop violent crime before it happenshttps://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/05/newscientist-exclusive-uk-police-wants-ai-to-stop-violent-crime-before-it-happens/
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/05/newscientist-exclusive-uk-police-wants-ai-to-stop-violent-crime-before-it-happens/#respondWed, 05 Dec 2018 12:00:00 +0000https://www.laquadrature.net/?p=12539Police in the UK want to predict serious violent crime using artificial intelligence, New Scientist can reveal. The idea is that individuals flagged by the system will be offered interventions, such as counselling, to avert potential criminal behaviour. […]

The system, called the National Data Analytics Solution (NDAS), uses a combination of AI and statistics to try to assess the risk of someone committing or becoming a victim of gun or knife crime, as well as the likelihood of someone falling victim to modern slavery.

West Midlands Police is leading the project and has until the end of March 2019 to produce a prototype. Eight other police forces, including London’s Metropolitan Police and Greater Manchester Police, are also involved. NDAS is being designed so that every police force in the UK could eventually use it. […]

That’s according to a report out this month [PDF] that was commissioned by the Dutch government into how information handled by 300,000 of its workers was processed by Microsoft’s Office ProPlus suite. This software is installed on PCs and connects to Office 365 servers.

The dossier’s authors found that the Windows goliath was collecting telemetry and other content from its Office applications, including email titles and sentences where translation or spellchecker was used, and secretly storing the data on systems in the United States. That’s a no-no. […]

European governments will meet on the 6th of December to find a common position on this text. This Regulation will use the fear of terrorism to silence all of the Internet. It will do nothing but reinforce Google and Facebook (read our article) and threaten the confidentiality of our exchanges online (read our article).

Using the pretext of the fight against online radicalisation, you are supporting a proposition from the European Commission for a Regulation imposing new obligations to all actors of the Internet: services hosting websites, blogs and videos, forum and social networks, press websites, email and messaging providers…

While the European Commission and your government do not demonstrate in a convincing way the effectiveness nor the necessity of these obligations to fight against terrorism, you wish to force all actors of the Internet to act on content whose dangerousness have not been assessed by a judge, and in a very short period of time.

These obligations are extremely dangerous for the entire European digital ecosystem. Indeed, the economic, human and technological means required to comply with these obligations are beyond the reach of almost all the actors of the Internet: very few will be able to answer 24/7 and within one hour to removal requests issued by any Member State. In a similar way, surveillance measures and automated censorship that national authorities will be able to impose are totally impracticable. Thereby, to comply with these new constraints, small and medium-sized economic actors will outsource the execution of these obligations to the few Web giants that, because of their financial power, will be able to support it, Google and Facebook firstly. This outsourcing will lead to an economic and technical dependence that would highly damage the whole European digital economy.

Non-profit and collaborative organisations will have no other choice but to close down their activities.

This Regulation will therefore dramatically reduce Europe’s digital diversity and will submit the rest to a handful of companies which are already in a near-monopolistic situation, and whose hegemony should be disputed rather than reinforced.

Finally, this Regulation would lead to mass surveillance of our online exchanges and to private and automated censorship of information, contrary to the humanist project that you intend to promote at the European level.

We, actors of this ecosystem and defenders of fundamental liberties, ask you to renounce to this project.

Parliament has used its legal powers to seize internal Facebook documents in an extraordinary attempt to hold the US social media giant to account after chief executive Mark Zuckerberg repeatedly refused to answer MPs’ questions.

The cache of documents is alleged to contain significant revelations about Facebook decisions on data and privacy controls that led to the Cambridge Analytica scandal. It is claimed they include confidential emails between senior executives, and correspondence with Zuckerberg. […]

]]>https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/12/03/the-guardian-parliament-seizes-cache-of-facebook-internal-papers/feed/0Will the anti-terrorist Regulation destroy Signal, Telegram and ProtonMail?https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/11/28/will-the-anti-terrorist-regulation-destroy-signal-telegram-and-protonmail/
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2018/11/28/will-the-anti-terrorist-regulation-destroy-signal-telegram-and-protonmail/#respondWed, 28 Nov 2018 15:40:59 +0000https://www.laquadrature.net/?p=12505Two weeks ago, we gave an update on the proposition of the European Regulation on anti-terrorism censorship. As a reminder, this text will impose on all actors of the Internet unrealistic censorship obligations: removal within one hour of content reported by the police, surveillance of all content leading to automatic censorship…

Today, we focus on another danger of this text: as it targets not only content disseminated to the public, but also those which are exchanged privately (such as emails and instant messaging), this text could bring an end to the possibility of protecting our exchanges through end-to-end encryption.

A careful reading of the Regulation reveals that this text is indeed not limited to content disseminated to the public.

Article 2 states that the actors subject to these censorship obligations are the “providers of information society services consisting in the storage of information provided by and at the request of the content provider and in making the information stored available to third parties“. Recital 10 of the same text gives, as an example, besides social media, “video, image and audio sharing services, file sharing and other cloud services to the extent they make the information available to third parties (…)”.

This notion of “available to third parties” is very different from the more usual notion of “available to the public“. Furthermore, the content stored in “cloud-based services” (which we understand to refer to services such as Nextcloud or Dropbox) are not generally made “available to the public” but accessible uniquely through a restricted number of users. However, they are included in this new European Regulation.

If the Regulation is not limited to content disseminated to the public, but includes those which are made available to any third party, that means that it can be applied to services for electronic messaging, including emails and instant messaging (WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram…). These services, at least up until the message is read, store content supplied by a user in order to make it available to a third partySee for example the terms of service of Signal, which indicates that it stores messages in its servers for delivery to devices that are temporarily offline..

They will, then, like any other actors of the Internet (forums, social networks, blogs…) be subject to the obligations of automatic removal and censorship imposed by the Regulation.

Obligations incompatible with end-to-end encryption

However, some of these services are protecting our private exchanges through end-to-end encryption technologies, “where only the communicating users can read the messages”, the objective being to prevent ” potential eavesdroppers – including telecom providers, Internet providers, and even the provider of the communication service – from being able to access the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt the conversation”.

As we had explained in our common position with the Observatoire des Libertés et du Numérique (Freedoms and Digital Observatory), “the capability of encrypting digital communication and data is mandatory in order to preserve fundamental rights and liberties. Encryption remains one of the last barrier against arbitrary and illegal intrusions, either from States, the private sector or criminals”.

How emails and instant messaging services that provide this type of protection (Signal, ProtonMail…) will be able to comply with the obligations of surveillance and censorship if stored content is encrypted and thus unavailable to them?

The silence of the Regulation make us fear the worst: end-to-end encryption, that is to say the protection of our private exchanges, could be contrary to the obligations provided in the text and would have no other choice but to disappear.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how these services, as every other actors of the Internet, will be able to survive to these new obligations: it is unlikely that they accept to abandon end-to-end encryption and to outsource the surveillance of their service to a Web giant – which is the solution that the French government seems to hope for, at least, content made available to the public.

About Facebook, it is surprising that they overlooked this text without seeing or understanding its danger for its messaging service Whatsapp, which is also protected by encryption. The worst case scenario would be that Facebook is slowly renouncing to this technology to team up with governments for mass surveillance of our exchanges, private or public. A few weeks ago, Mark Zuckeberg explained that encryption was making automated censorship more complicated.

With this text, the government may have found a way to win a fight he’s been leading for a long time and that particularly frustrates him: the fight against the encryption of our conversations.

The Regulation, as it is being examinated by the European Parliament, would endanger an essential right to guarantee our liberties against arbitrary State powers and private mass surveillance.

Again, we ask for its rejection.

Let’s remind that deadlines are extremely short: the European governments (particularly, France) want this text adopted as soon as possible, at the expense of a democratic debate. The Council of EU has a meeting in Brussels the 6th of December to have a common position.