I will be teaching another class on the Fundamentals of Occupational Safety & Health starting late January. I have come up with several questions to spark conversations and thought in the open Discussion portion of the class. I always enjoy the comments and feedback from the forum specific to ES and Safety. These specific discussions are not graded but for review and sharing individual experiences and insight.

This is not specific to CAP or any other organization, just generalized questions.

Here are the proposed questions for the class.

1) From a Cultural Perspective do you feel that the Safety Manager or Leader should report to the senior leader for the facility?

2) If the Safety Leader or Manager does not report to the senior leader would the perception of safety be less or more important from a workforce perspective?

3) As a workforce member would you rather have a “yes man” or “advocate” as a safety manager / leader?

I will be teaching another class on the Fundamentals of Occupational Safety & Health starting late January. I have come up with several questions to spark conversations and thought in the open Discussion portion of the class. I always enjoy the comments and feedback from the forum specific to ES and Safety. These specific discussions are not graded but for review and sharing individual experiences and insight.

This is not specific to CAP or any other organization, just generalized questions.

Here are the proposed questions for the class.

1) From a Cultural Perspective do you feel that the Safety Manager or Leader should report to the senior leader for the facility?

2) If the Safety Leader or Manager does not report to the senior leader would the perception of safety be less or more important from a workforce perspective?

3) As a workforce member would you rather have a “yes man” or “advocate” as a safety manager / leader?

4) What is the role of members of an organization's "safety committee"?

5) How important is it for members of a "safety committee" to walk the talk... even when no one is watching? Why?

Last month the NTSB released its findings on the sinking of the SS El Faro, a 790 feet long freighter which sailed into Category 4 hurricane Joaquin in 2015, with the loss of the 33 person crew and ship. It was the worst US maritime accident in 40 years. The headline of the NTSB's press release reads "Captain’s Decisions, Shipping Company’s Poor Safety Oversight Led to Sinking, NTSB Says."

There were 81 findings including these:41. The concepts of bridge resource management were not implemented on board El Faro.

43. The company’s safety management system was inadequate and did not provide the officers and crew with the necessary procedures to ensure safe passage, watertight integrity, heavy-weather preparations, and emergency response during heavy-weather conditions.

51. The company failed to assess the risk posed by Hurricane Joaquin to El Faro.

52. The company’s lack of oversight in critical aspects of safety management, including gaps in training for shipboard operations in severe weather, denoted a weak safety culture in the company and contributed to the sinking of El Faro.

Under Probable Cause of the sinking:Contributing to the sinking was ineffective bridge resource management on board El Faro, which included the captain’s failure to adequately consider officers’ suggestions. Also contributing to the sinking was the inadequacy of both TOTE’s [the ship's owner] oversight and its safety management system.

One of the 53 recommendations is:49. Conduct an external audit, independent of your organization or class society, of your entire safety management system to ensure compliance with the International Safety Management (ISM) code and correct noted deficiencies.

I was looking at the accident from the general, not maritime, SAR perspective (because there was misinterpretation of ship position coordinates) so didn't look at all the company management and safety documents. There are 516 documents, totaling thousands of pages, posted to the NTSB docket, linked from the investigation's homepage: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/2015_elfaro_jax.aspx

Attached is the summary with the specific safety items highlighted. There are plenty of other safety related items not highlighted.

Forgot to include answers to the OP's questions addressed in the NTSB report.

The Manager of Safety and Operations reported to the Director, Safety & Services, who reported to the President & CEO of TOTE. All three of these people were interviewed by the NTSB and the Coast Guard's Marine Board of Investigation. Transcripts of the interviews and testimony of the three are included in the docket.

The manager was a Designated Person Ashore (DPA) and Qualified Individual (QI) who the El Faro's captain contacted directly by sat phone, per policy, before setting off all the ship's electronic distress equipment. The DPA, not the captain, then contacted the Coast Guard.

1) From a Cultural Perspective do you feel that the Safety Manager or Leader should report to the senior leader for the facility?

Yes. The "safety leader" still has a line of authority. Only one person can be "in charge" with the ultimate decision making powers of an operation. This is where accountability comes in.

We deal with a lot of this with work in performing root cause analyses and developing corrective action plans. Who is the responsible manager? Being the safety adviser/consultant may give you a different line of communication in who you access to assist in decision making, but it does not necessarily give you the powers to change the activity/operation. This ties into the concept of "accepted risk"---What are those with decision making powers willing to accept in regard to the safe conduct of an operation?

Legally, we, as an airline, must have a system for identifying hazards and correcting them. But, within that system, we recognize that not every hazard can be reasonably eliminated due to cost, manpower, or operational performance, plus unintended consequences of introducing new procedures (fixing one hazard opens up another). In our company, we have a risk matrix of different safety categories with a process for determining who may accept certain levels of risk (e.g., a Yellow-rated risk requires a department director to sign off on any procedural changes with the acceptance of the risks those procedures residually carry; an Orange-rated risk requires a department vice president's sign-off).

The same logic needs to apply to any workforce: someone has to be in charge, and be held accountable. A safety leader separated from the remaining chain of authority, but reporting to the person directly in charge, can provide the least amount of bias in the organization with the greatest amount of influence on the operation through the leadership.

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2) If the Safety Leader or Manager does not report to the senior leader would the perception of safety be less or more important from a workforce perspective?

The Safety Leader does not need to report to the senior leadership. They can report to a subordinate that the senior leader has delegated as the point of contact.

But I do not agree with the Safety Leader being "equal" to the senior leader. The Safety Leader cannot step in to say "No, you're not doing this; I forbid it." That's a break down of the chain of authority and decision making powers.

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3) As a workforce member would you rather have a “yes man” or “advocate” as a safety manager / leader?

I'm not really understanding this question, so apologies if I'm way off here.

Most safety leaders are in the understanding that their role is not to prevent operations but to prevent adverse occurrences during operations. They look at the operation in a different perspective (whether through comparison of legal restrictions, or risk assessments to determine potential outcomes) in order to advise the senior leader on the consequences (including costs, injuries, and public imagery). If anything, most safety leaders are the ones "holding up" the operation rather than facilitating it at full speed. So it's not about yes/no but more so why/why not.

What you really need to look for is the senior leader who respects the advice of their safety manager, even if they don't always agree and follow it. They need to at least consider it and weigh it as part of their decision making. The "yes man" leadership will be a problem because safety can be so ignored, just as the "no man" leadership will result in so many restrictions that you'll never be able to accomplish tasks. Senior leaders need to balance between advocating ("everyone is a safety officer") and being practical.

Great discussion topic. Tonight is Safety Education at the home unit; I might include some of this and get a better dialogue going with the squadron this evening.

I'm not really understanding this question, so apologies if I'm way off here.

Most safety leaders are in the understanding that their role is not to prevent operations but to prevent adverse occurrences during operations. They look at the operation in a different perspective (whether through comparison of legal restrictions, or risk assessments to determine potential outcomes) in order to advise the senior leader on the consequences (including costs, injuries, and public imagery). If anything, most safety leaders are the ones "holding up" the operation rather than facilitating it at full speed. So it's not about yes/no but more so why/why not.

What you really need to look for is the senior leader who respects the advice of their safety manager, even if they don't always agree and follow it. They need to at least consider it and weigh it as part of their decision making. The "yes man" leadership will be a problem because safety can be so ignored, just as the "no man" leadership will result in so many restrictions that you'll never be able to accomplish tasks. Senior leaders need to balance between advocating ("everyone is a safety officer") and being practical.

Great discussion topic. Tonight is Safety Education at the home unit; I might include some of this and get a better dialogue going with the squadron this evening.

I'm not really understanding this question, so apologies if I'm way off here.

Most safety leaders are in the understanding that their role is not to prevent operations but to prevent adverse occurrences during operations. They look at the operation in a different perspective (whether through comparison of legal restrictions, or risk assessments to determine potential outcomes) in order to advise the senior leader on the consequences (including costs, injuries, and public imagery). If anything, most safety leaders are the ones "holding up" the operation rather than facilitating it at full speed. So it's not about yes/no but more so why/why not.

What you really need to look for is the senior leader who respects the advice of their safety manager, even if they don't always agree and follow it. They need to at least consider it and weigh it as part of their decision making. The "yes man" leadership will be a problem because safety can be so ignored, just as the "no man" leadership will result in so many restrictions that you'll never be able to accomplish tasks. Senior leaders need to balance between advocating ("everyone is a safety officer") and being practical.

Great discussion topic. Tonight is Safety Education at the home unit; I might include some of this and get a better dialogue going with the squadron this evening.

Your response is spot on to the question.

SkyHornet's analysis is very good.

A question that occurs to me from my read of his analysis: What might be appropriate actions for the safety leader/manager if, based upon their intimate knowledge of the situation/plan/schedule and back story information, that person believes the likely adverse consequences of the project managers decision to proceed as planned (on schedule, no or minimal changes in design, no personnel changes, etc.) would be well outside the 'norm' for acceptable risk? Examples abound in every field.

I'm not really understanding this question, so apologies if I'm way off here.

Most safety leaders are in the understanding that their role is not to prevent operations but to prevent adverse occurrences during operations. They look at the operation in a different perspective (whether through comparison of legal restrictions, or risk assessments to determine potential outcomes) in order to advise the senior leader on the consequences (including costs, injuries, and public imagery). If anything, most safety leaders are the ones "holding up" the operation rather than facilitating it at full speed. So it's not about yes/no but more so why/why not.

What you really need to look for is the senior leader who respects the advice of their safety manager, even if they don't always agree and follow it. They need to at least consider it and weigh it as part of their decision making. The "yes man" leadership will be a problem because safety can be so ignored, just as the "no man" leadership will result in so many restrictions that you'll never be able to accomplish tasks. Senior leaders need to balance between advocating ("everyone is a safety officer") and being practical.

Great discussion topic. Tonight is Safety Education at the home unit; I might include some of this and get a better dialogue going with the squadron this evening.

Your response is spot on to the question.

SkyHornet's analysis is very good.

A question that occurs to me from my read of his analysis: What might be appropriate actions for the safety leader/manager if, based upon their intimate knowledge of the situation/plan/schedule and back story information, that person believes the likely adverse consequences of the project managers decision to proceed as planned (on schedule, no or minimal changes in design, no personnel changes, etc.) would be well outside the 'norm' for acceptable risk? Examples abound in every field.

Terms and conditions, really.

Does the Safety Manager have the responsibility to bring hazards to the attention of the Leader? Absolutely. Does the Safety Manager have the authority to halt operations? Generally, no. But they usually have other avenues to traverse if it comes to that. It really depends on the size and scope of an organization.

In our industry (airline):

The CEO is the Accountable Executive, meaning he has the ultimate authority and responsibility for the safe conduct of all operations. The COO reports to the CEO and assists in a delegated capacity. The Director of Safety reports to the COO and has the legal responsibility for the development and implementation of the safety program.

If the Director of Safety has an issue, he goes to the COO and reports it. If the COO says "Don't worry about it," the Director of Safety can go to the CEO and say "Here's the report. You need to address it." The CEO says "Nope, don't bother me again." The CEO, as the AE, has assumed all liabilities for that hazard now. He accepts the risk of fines, operating restrictions, and civil matters on behalf of the company.

So, let's look at CAP (and this is in no way nearly as regulated as the airline industry, nor is it always a clear cut way of running an operation---there is flexibility in structure and design):

You have a Safety Officer who reports directly to the Squadron Commander. The unit is hosting a field training exercise. During the FTX, the Safety Officer realizes there is an issue in the plan that disregarded a CAP safety protocol. He tells the Squadron Commander. The Squadron Commander says "Don't worry about it." The Safety Officer can take that and report it to Group or Wing, or he can fill out a report on SIMS. There are options to have it addressed. But that also means understanding that you can't fix everything, and sometimes you just don't have the authority.

There is a balance required of Safety Officers in trying to make the safest possible condition while respecting that you need to still conduct operations (we'd all be safe if we didn't fly airplanes, but then our air mission wouldn't be accomplished). And you also need to respect that your system won't be perfectly designed either; strive for continuous improvement but know that you'll never achieve perfection (SMART goals, anyone?). Most importantly---remove personal investment. Recognize that it's not about who is at fault when an incident occurs but that you need to determine why something happened to prevent it in the future (that doesn't absolve the need for punishment/reprimand; that's part of the corrective action process). I see quite a bit of safety representatives that take is personal when their ideas are tabled or sometimes questioned. You have to let it go.

There's no right way to implement a safety program so long as it meets regulatory requirements. Unfortunately, there is a wrong way, though, and you usually don't know until something bad happens.

Does the Safety Manager have the responsibility to bring hazards to the attention of the Leader? Absolutely. Does the Safety Manager have the authority to halt operations? Generally, no.

Generally I agree with both of these statements/questions.

Specific to halting operations I would say .....it depends.

If I go out to a worksite or area of operations and see an immediate concern such an IDLH then I will stop the activity until it is resolved.

An IDLH is an event or activity that is "Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health".

For example:

Electrician put a 10 foot A Frame Ladder on top of a vent hood for a kitchen. He was wearing a harness and tied of to a piece of conduit overhead. The vent hood cannot support that type of weight and it was about 15 feet in the air.

In a situation like that I stop the work and have several conversations with the workers, their supervisors, my maintenance people, and decide if they can stay at the facility and work.

It is a rare occasion if I do that, generally I will find the supervisor and correct any outages before I leave.

Does the Safety Manager have the responsibility to bring hazards to the attention of the Leader? Absolutely. Does the Safety Manager have the authority to halt operations? Generally, no.

Generally I agree with both of these statements/questions.

Specific to halting operations I would say .....it depends.

If I go out to a worksite or area of operations and see an immediate concern such an IDLH then I will stop the activity until it is resolved.

An IDLH is an event or activity that is "Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health".

For example:

Electrician put a 10 foot A Frame Ladder on top of a vent hood for a kitchen. He was wearing a harness and tied of to a piece of conduit overhead. The vent hood cannot support that type of weight and it was about 15 feet in the air.

In a situation like that I stop the work and have several conversations with the workers, their supervisors, my maintenance people, and decide if they can stay at the facility and work.

It is a rare occasion if I do that, generally I will find the supervisor and correct any outages before I leave.

Noting that there is an immediate safety issue that can be life-threatening or damaging to property is different from implementing an operational plan and deciding to not authorize operations.

That's virtually anyone's responsibility on-site. If you see a hazard, you call it out. I don't think that's what the topic was getting at.

That's virtually anyone's responsibility on-site. If you see a hazard, you call it out. I don't think that's what the topic was getting at.

I am not looking for a specific answer on the questions. They are only intended to get people to think about the questions as related to their workplace. Your responses do that and that is the intention of the general question.

A work, they've been trying for years to make safety a regular part of the job. Believe it or not, it worked. Injury rates went down. Incident rates went down. Problems were being handled at low levels since fixing them became a routine part of the job. Awesome work. After seeing this trend, some brain child comes with a "Blue card for Safety" plan. Whenever you found or fixed a safety issue, you were supposed to send in a blue card with the details.

A year later, and they weren't getting enough blue cards turned in (so they thought), so they made turning blue cards part of the annual employee review - first year, you had to turn in 1. Next time you had to turn in 3. So now safety is no longer part of the job, but a separate thing that now had to be reported. I had a chance to talk to the Health and Safety Director and told her what a crock of manure the blue card program was. They completely reversed the integration of safety into the normal work flow and people quit worrying about it after they turned in the required cards since they had met the safety requirements.

She actually did (or had someone do) the research and found I was correct. So a change was implemented - blue cards are no longer required. Which resulted in far fewer being turned in, but those that were showed actual safety issues/concerns/suggestions rather than "cleaned up water on floor" items. Stats are resumed going the right way.

A work, they've been trying for years to make safety a regular part of the job. Believe it or not, it worked. Injury rates went down. Incident rates went down. Problems were being handled at low levels since fixing them became a routine part of the job. Awesome work. After seeing this trend, some brain child comes with a "Blue card for Safety" plan. Whenever you found or fixed a safety issue, you were supposed to send in a blue card with the details.

A year later, and they weren't getting enough blue cards turned in (so they thought), so they made turning blue cards part of the annual employee review - first year, you had to turn in 1. Next time you had to turn in 3. So now safety is no longer part of the job, but a separate thing that now had to be reported. I had a chance to talk to the Health and Safety Director and told her what a crock of manure the blue card program was. They completely reversed the integration of safety into the normal work flow and people quit worrying about it after they turned in the required cards since they had met the safety requirements.

She actually did (or had someone do) the research and found I was correct. So a change was implemented - blue cards are no longer required. Which resulted in far fewer being turned in, but those that were showed actual safety issues/concerns/suggestions rather than "cleaned up water on floor" items. Stats are resumed going the right way.

I have seen cases like this that use "turn key" or "canned" safety processes. It takes away from the interactions of the individuals and the work environment and turns it into a cards for concerns mentality. Very often these same safety programs are making tons of money off the proprietary programs and people stop paying attention.

I personally call it the "flavor of the month".

One of the course questions for one of my classes is the "concepts of safety incentives programs" for or against.

A work, they've been trying for years to make safety a regular part of the job. Believe it or not, it worked. Injury rates went down. Incident rates went down. Problems were being handled at low levels since fixing them became a routine part of the job. Awesome work. After seeing this trend, some brain child comes with a "Blue card for Safety" plan. Whenever you found or fixed a safety issue, you were supposed to send in a blue card with the details.

A year later, and they weren't getting enough blue cards turned in (so they thought), so they made turning blue cards part of the annual employee review - first year, you had to turn in 1. Next time you had to turn in 3. So now safety is no longer part of the job, but a separate thing that now had to be reported. I had a chance to talk to the Health and Safety Director and told her what a crock of manure the blue card program was. They completely reversed the integration of safety into the normal work flow and people quit worrying about it after they turned in the required cards since they had met the safety requirements.

She actually did (or had someone do) the research and found I was correct. So a change was implemented - blue cards are no longer required. Which resulted in far fewer being turned in, but those that were showed actual safety issues/concerns/suggestions rather than "cleaned up water on floor" items. Stats are resumed going the right way.

I have seen cases like this that use "turn key" or "canned" safety processes. It takes away from the interactions of the individuals and the work environment and turns it into a cards for concerns mentality. Very often these same safety programs are making tons of money off the proprietary programs and people stop paying attention.

I personally call it the "flavor of the month".

One of the course questions for one of my classes is the "concepts of safety incentives programs" for or against.

That one gets all kinds of responses.

I know of an employer, a city agency, that borrowed a safety incentive program from private industry.

Everyone was issued a personalized safety coffee mug. Supervisors also received a personalized coaster tile.

The deal was - if you committed a safety violation, your supervisor would take your mug away for some arbitrary time period. “Sorry, Jack, but I’ve got to hold your mug for 24 hours.” Then you’ll talk about safety.

Nobody put any thought into this beyond the old-fashioned charm of it. It might have been a great program for the Consolidated Flange plant. But...

It was meaningless, because the safety geniuses forgot to take into account the fact that a huge percentage of city employees worked in the field. No desks. No coffee rooms. The mugs were meaningless. “Sure, boss. Keep it for a month if you want.”

Then came bosses asking “And where am I supposed to store these things?”

But the capper was “Suspension for that preventable traffic colision? I don’t think so. I’ve already been disciplined. Yeah, Ralph took my mug away for three days, I served my time.” (And, yes, it stuck).

For many companies and orgs, isn't that the goal? By constantly changing and trying new things, it looks great on paper, showing compliance and how they stay up with current methods. If they're still using a 10 year old system, it looks bad. Whether it worked or not. OSHA, other gov't agencies, and the company's lawyers love ever changing systems. Looks like progress.

Insurance will pay for any accident claims. More important is not having any Federal fines to pay.

For many companies and orgs, isn't that the goal? By constantly changing and trying new things, it looks great on paper, showing compliance and how they stay up with current methods. If they're still using a 10 year old system, it looks bad. Whether it worked or not. OSHA, other gov't agencies, and the company's lawyers love ever changing systems. Looks like progress.

Insurance will pay for any accident claims. More important is not having any Federal fines to pay.

Safety is a great goal. But when it comes down to safety people scratching their heads and searching for gimmicks, the goal changes to...finding gimmicks.