I. Summary

They said, "So you have refused to tell us what we need
to know." Then they took off my Muslim cap and took off all my clothes so I was
just in my underpants. They told me to lie down on the floor and then they
began beating me. They were saying to me, "Are you sure you aren't a member of
the Allied Democratic Forces? Are you sure you have no bombs?" They beat me
very badly; every part of me, and blood was coming out of me all over. Someone
was writing things down in a notebook in the room.

-Fisherman, arrested and detained for seven months by the
Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force agents in the suburb of Kololo, Kampala and
released without charge, August 10, 2008.

People here talk of a Guantanamo in Kololo. People here
do not talk of rights.

-Religious leader, August 14, 2008.

The Kampala suburb of Kololo,
filled with the luxury mansions and ambassadors' residences, is the location of
one of Uganda's most notorious illegal detention centers. It is run by, and
serves as the headquarters of, the Joint Anti-terrorism Task Force (JATT). This
report details unlawful detention, torture and enforced disappearances by JATT,
by military intelligence and other security personnel associated with JATT.

In recent years, the most serious
human rights violations in Uganda have taken place in the long northern war between
the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the government, during disarmament
initiatives in the insecure northeast and in the context of government
harassment of political opponents. Even though most of the country currently
enjoys relative stability, state-sanctioned abuses by security forces and
impunity for those responsible continue. Research by Human Rights Watch, as
well as other nongovernmental organizations, has found that torture and
prolonged illegal detention remain among the most recurrent and intractable
human rights violations in Uganda.

Human Rights Watch research
indicates that JATT has committed serious human rights violations in the course
of its operations. These include prolonged incommunicado detention of terrorism
and treason suspects at the JATT headquarters in Kololo, and the routine use of
torture during interrogations both in Kololo and at the headquarters of
military intelligence in Kitante, another Kampala suburb. In research between
August 2008 and February 2009, Human Rights Watch documented 106 cases of
illegal detention by JATT, ranging from one week to over 11 months; these had
taken place over the previous two years, the most recent in late 2008. Many of
the 106 arrests occurred in the months leading up to Uganda's hosting of the
November 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM). In more than 25
instances, detainees were also tortured or subjected to other ill-treatment.

JATT is a joint unit, formed
in 1999, that draws its personnel from the armed forces (the Uganda People's
Defense Force, UPDF), the police, and the internal and external intelligence
organizations. The intelligence branch of the armed forces, the Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence (CMI), has operational command. JATT has no codified
mandate, though the head of CMI told Human Rights Watch that JATT was
established to deal with the threat posed by the Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF), a Ugandan rebel group based in the Democratic Republic of Congo. But
individuals allegedly linked to other groups, such as Al-Qaeda, have also
suffered at the hands of JATT. Former detainees also told Human Rights Watch of
non-Ugandans held in Kololo for long periods of time, although it is unclear
why most of those individuals were detained.

Human Rights Watch found that
JATT personnel typically operate in unmarked cars, carry out arrests wearing
civilian clothes with no identifying insignia, and do not inform suspects of
the reasons for their arrest. Those taken into custody are not told they are
being taken to Kololo, and are frequently blindfolded, handcuffed, and
sometimes beaten during the journey. Detainees have no access to lawyers or
family members and only learn of their whereabouts from other detainees or by
spotting Kampala landmarks visible from the Kololo plot.

Under Ugandan law, Kololo is
not a legal detention facility because it has not been "gazetted," as required
under the Ugandan constitution. Human rights monitors and members of the
Ugandan Human Rights Commission have been denied access. According to former
detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch, JATT fails to turn suspects over
to police or bring them before a magistrate within the 48 hours required by the
constitution. Contrary to safeguards in Ugandan criminal procedure, many
detainees spend months in poor conditions.

Human Rights Watch documented
the deaths in 2006 and 2008 of three detainees from abuse sustained while in
JATT custody. According to eyewitnesses, in 2007 JATT agents shot and killed
another former detainee at his home after his release. In addition, Human
Rights Watch found that at least six individuals believed to have been detained
in mid-2008 are apparently victims of enforced disappearance-they were last
seen in the Kololo facility but have never reappeared and their whereabouts
remain unknown.

Former Kololo detainees reported
to Human Rights Watch torture and other brutal treatment carried out by JATT
and CMI personnel during interrogations. Some described being hit repeatedly
with the butt of a gun, slapped in the head and ears, or beaten with fists,
whips, canes, chairs and shoes. JATT and CMI personnel put detainees into painful
stress positions and forced red chili pepper into eyes, nose and ears, which
causes excruciating pain. Some described being shocked with electricity. They reported
watching others being beaten and tortured by JATT agents, as well as observing
other people with bruising, swelling and wounds. Many reported seeing detainees
struggling to walk, or having to be carried by fellow detainees to vehicles. One
detainee lost his leg due to infection in a wound caused by a severe beating.

According to court records
and interviews by Human Rights Watch, the majority of detainees were never
charged with any criminal offense after being suspected of ADF involvement. While
some were charged, many others were released without charge. It remains unclear
how many of the 106 detainees held by JATT of whom Human Rights Watch is aware
ultimately applied for amnesty, though amnesty is available under Ugandan law
to those who admit to taking up arms against the government. Some of those
interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that they were physically coerced by
JATT agents to apply for amnesty. Others said that long-term incommunicado
detention and a lack of legal assistance compelled them to seek amnesty despite
their insistence that they had no involvement in any rebel activity. If a
detainee seeks amnesty, the government will not prosecute, but the detainee is
stigmatized as a rebel or a terrorist, fears complaining of mistreatment by
JATT, and might be targeted in the future.

Some former detainees told
Human Rights Watch that after varying lengths of incommunicado detention in
Kololo, they were brought to the police, charged with treason or terrorism and
transferred to Luzira maximum security prison near Kampala. According to court records in Kampala, in 2008 ten individuals were charged with terrorism in three different cases, all
related to ADF-activity. Of those cases, five of the individuals sought amnesty
after having been charged and held on remand in Luzira prison. Four cases are
still pending before the high court. None have gone to trial to date.

The types of human rights
violations described in this report have periodically been raised with Ugandan
government authorities by human rights organizations, the media, and members of
parliament, but military and civilian leadership with command responsibility
over JATT have so far failed to curtail the abuses or to investigate, let alone
prosecute, those responsible. Human Rights Watch raised specific cases
documented in this report with the chief of military intelligence, Brig. James
Mugira, by letter and in person. The brigadier said that he would investigate
all allegations of mistreatment of detainees and that individuals would be held
criminally responsible for torture, but Human Rights Watch is unaware of any
action taken to date. He accepted that some detainees had been held longer than
the constitutional limit but denied that this could ever have been
incommunicado or have amounted to several months. While agreeing to continue dialogue
with Human Rights Watch, he nevertheless denied requests by Human Rights Watch to
visit the JATT headquarters in Kololo. At the time of writing, no JATT or CMI personnel
had been prosecuted for the abuses documented here.

The manner in which JATT
carries out its operations-deliberate efforts to conceal arresting officers'
identities and affiliations, disorienting suspects by blindfolding them while
in transport, failing to inform detainees of the reason for their arrest,
long-term incommunicado detention, and interrogations involving torture-reflects
what appears to be a flawed policy on alleged rebel or terrorist activity,
which includes committing serious violations of national and international law.

The
Ugandan government has a legal responsibility under international law to
investigate allegations of abuses by its forces and to hold those responsible
to account. Under the constitution, President Museveni has a duty to safeguard
the constitutional rights and welfare of his citizens. Given the many
allegations of torture by members of his security forces, he should take an
active role in curtailing those abuses and ensure that prosecutors have the
independence to investigate torture and illegal detention by JATT. The members of the National Security Council (NSC),
comprised of key government actors in the security and law enforcement sector,
such as the Ministers of Defence and Internal Affairs, should insist on an end
to violations of human rights and Uganda law committed by ad hoc security
groups like JATT, as well as accountability for past abuses. Parliament also has
a mandated duty under Ugandan law to oversee the work of the military, the
police and the intelligence organizations, including JATT. But that oversight
has not taken place, and allegations of abuse have been dismissed, down-played or
ignored by senior military commanders.

Human Rights Watch calls on
the Ugandan government to end all torture and mistreatment of detainees; to
stop arrest and interrogation by security forces, including JATT, without the
authority to do so; and to release all detainees from the JATT headquarters in
Kololo and close it as a place of detention. Any detainees in JATT custody for
whom there is a legal basis for detention should be transferred immediately to
police custody, and charged with a legally cognizable offense, if appropriate.
The government should promptly inform the relatives of each detainee of their
whereabouts, condition, and the charges against them. Those charged should be
tried before courts that meet international fair trial standards.

Donor governments to the
Ugandan security sector, such as the United States and United Kingdom, who are training and supporting Uganda's counterterrorism operations, should work to
ensure that basic rights are afforded to all suspects. These donors
should withhold counterterrorism-related funding to the Ugandan
security forces until the Ugandan government investigates abuses by JATT and
CMI and prosecutes as appropriate those found to be involved.

II. Methodology

In August 2008 and January
2009, Human Rights Watch conducted more than 80 interviews in Uganda with victims of torture and illegal detention, family members of "disappeared" or missing
people, religious leaders, parliamentarians, lawyers, human rights activists, journalists,
foreign diplomats and government officials. This includes in-depth interviews
with 25 individuals who alleged that they had been illegally detained and
tortured by JATT agents in the JATT headquarters in Kololo; their interviews
form the basis for this report. They had been held anywhere from 11 days to
more than 11 months in the Kololo location. Sixteen had been also interrogated
and tortured at CMI headquarters at Kitante, in Kampala. Interviews were
conducted over the phone with individuals inside and outside Uganda between September 2008 and March 2009.

Human Rights Watch initiated
contact with former Kololo detainees through a variety of local contacts,
including religious leaders, journalists, and local human rights organizations.
Human Rights Watch specifically sought information from former Kololo detainees
who were in Luzira maximum security prison (where terrorism and treason
suspects are held), those who had been granted amnesty, those released on bond by
police and bail by a magistrate and those who had been released and were never
charged with any crime.

The Commissioner General of
Prisons granted Human Rights Watch access to Luzira prison on six separate
days. Human Rights Watch selected detainees for interview based both on
information from other released detainees and from the prison registry, which
lists those charged with terrorism and treason. Previous research by Human
Rights Watch and other organizations indicated that those individuals charged
with terrorism and treason were most likely to have been arrested by JATT, so
Human Rights Watch sought to interview these individuals in the course of
speaking to other prisoners about prison conditions.

Not all of those approached
by Human Rights Watch agreed to be interviewed. Where people did agree, interviews
were conducted in English but some responses required translation from Luganda.
Human Rights Watch spoke to prisoners out of earshot of prison administration
officials. Most interviews were with individuals, but in two instances Human
Rights Watch spoke with more than one prisoner at the same time. Human Rights
Watch also conducted interviews by phone with former Kololo detainees who were
no longer in Uganda.

Human Rights Watch sought to
obtain information on the scale of the problem of illegal detention by JATT in
Kololo, because some incidents have been reported in the media over the last
several years, but neither human rights groups nor media have had access to the
facility. There is no registry of detainees held in the Kololo facility
available to human rights monitors and Ugandan government authorities usually
deny the presence of detainees there.

Human Rights Watch was able
to compile a list of 106 individuals detained in Kololo between 2006 and 2008,
with the vast majority held in the latter half of that period. Human Rights
Watch was able to cross-check the identities of the 106 former detainees through
a variety of sources, including other detainees, religious leaders, government
officials and news reports. If a named individual-taking into account aliases
and nicknames-was seen in Kololo by two or more independent sources, Human
Rights Watch has included the individual on its list. Frequently, multiple
interviewees described the same individuals and the injuries they had sustained
during interrogations.

Human Rights Watch received single
source information on many other individuals but because of the lack of
corroboration has not included them in this report. When Human Rights Watch was
unable to corroborate the presence of an individual in Kololo through more than
one account, or the individual was described but the name was unknown, that
individual has been omitted from the list. Given that some detainees spent
short periods of time in Kololo, and some were kept under guard and not
permitted to speak to other detainees, Human Rights Watch believes the actual number
of detainees held in Kololo from 2006 through 2008 to be higher than 106.

Former Kololo detainees
voiced serious fears of reprisals by JATT agents for having spoken to Human
Rights Watch. To protect their identities, Human Rights Watch has used
pseudonyms in the form of initials for each interviewee.

As described, Human Rights
Watch took every precaution to verify the credibility of interviewees'
statements and to corroborate their accounts with others. The Ugandan government
frequently challenges the credibility of evidence and allegations put forth by
human rights organizations detailing prolonged incommunicado detention and
torture by security agents. Human Rights Watch focused its efforts on
determining the veracity of accounts received through various detainees and
other witnesses. For example, where detainees alleged physical abuse, Human
Rights Watch asked questions to ascertain specific details. Wherever possible,
Human Rights Watch corroborated details with others who had been released from
detention and interviewed them individually and separately. In some instances
of allegations of ill-treatment, Human Rights Watch was able to witness
physical scars consistent with the implements used. In instances where the method
of torture left no marks-such as rubbing red pepper in detainees' eyes, nose
and mouth-several current and former detainees interviewed on different days
and in different locations described identical or nearly identical treatment by
JATT personnel, using the same names of those alleged to be responsible, and
describing the same physical locations for the torture.

This report builds on
research in State of Pain, published by Human Rights Watch in March 2004,
which detailed torture and illegal detention in Uganda, including in Kololo.
That report presented findings based on research conducted in 2003 with prisoners and former prisoners including victims
of torture, their relatives, attorneys, caregivers, and a wide range of people
with first-hand information about torture, ill treatment and the criminal
justice system in Uganda. State of Pain was broader in scope, as
research was conducted in several prisons and looked at the issue of illegal
detention and torture by several security agencies. This report focuses on alleged
abuses by state agents believed to work directly for JATT, under the control of
the CMI. Human Rights Watch interviewed one individual both in 2003 and in 2008
who had been rearrested in the intervening time.

Throughout the research,
Human Rights Watch has maintained dialogue with key Ugandan authorities about
its findings and sought their reactions and responses. Human Rights Watch met
with seven parliamentarians, including three current and former members of the
Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs, from both the ruling National Resistance
Movement (NRM) and opposition parties. Human Rights Watch made repeated efforts
to meet with other parliamentarians, including the current chairman of that
Committee, but such a meeting failed to take place. Many who spoke to Human
Rights Watch in the course of this research requested their names be withheld,
which was honored given the sensitivity of the subject matter.

On October 31 2008, Human
Rights Watch wrote to Brig. James Mugira, chief of military intelligence,
asking several questions, including the whereabouts of detainees Human Rights
Watch had determined to be either currently in the custody of JATT or had died in
custody. This letter and Brig. Mugira's response are in the annex of this
report. Human Rights Watch asked follow-up questions via email. On January 24,
2009, Brig. Mugira granted Human Rights Watch an in-person interview in Kampala about the activities of JATT. His responses to the allegations documented are
included in this report.

III. Recommendations

To the President and
Government of Uganda

Issue direct orders to CMI and other security agency
personnel to cease illegal detention and torture of suspects and respect
criminal procedure at each stage of any criminal investigation or
counterterrorism operation. All individuals
arrested should be brought to recognized, gazetted locations, where their
detention can be monitored.

Disband intelligence
agencies, such as JATT, that have not been created pursuant to an act of Parliament
as required by the constitution.

End impunity for human
rights violations by government security, police, armed forces, and other
security organizations such as JATT, including violations of the right to
life and fair trial; the right to be charged before a judge within 48
hours of arrest; and freedom from torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary
arrest, and prolonged arbitrary detention. All allegations of torture and
mistreatment should be fully investigated, and the perpetrators fairly and
appropriately prosecuted.

Ensure that prosecutors have the independence to
investigate torture and illegal detention by JATT. Ensure that no one
prevents or obstructs such investigations.

Improve safeguards in
police custody, including guaranteeing the right to an effective defense
lawyer from the outset of detention and presence of counsel during all
interrogations.

Immediately release or
charge with a cognizable criminal offense before a civilian court all
those currently held without charge in Kololo or any other locations-gazetted
or ungazetted. Release those who have been on remand where no steps have
been taken to bring the case to trial.

Ensure that the Uganda
Human Rights Commission has full and unhindered access to the Kololo
facility and any other location where there are allegations of unlawful
detention, and ensure they can conduct such investigations and visits
without prior notice.

Undertake a prompt and comprehensive
review of national legislation governing treason, terrorism, and other
public order charges to ensure compliance with international human rights
standards.

Ratify the Optional
Protocol to the Convention against Torture, which would allow visits to Uganda by the protocol's Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture.

Abolish the death penalty
and ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.

To the Parliament of Uganda

Ensure oversight of the
operations by JATT and CMI by Parliament, specifically the Committee on
Defence and Internal Affairs and the Committee on Presidential Affairs. Publish
or encourage the publication of reports of any Committee's investigations
into safehouses, torture, and related abuses.

To the Judiciary

Use judicial powers to
appoint a judicial agent to visit, without prior notice, the JATT facility
in Kololo, the offices of CMI, prisons, police stations, military
garrisons and barracks, and any other facility where persons are alleged
to be held or treated in violation of their rights by state security
forces.

Ensure that confessions
made under duress are not used as evidence in trials, as required by the
Evidence Act.

To the Uganda Human Rights Commission

Actively pursue investigations
and visits to any location in Uganda, including the JATT facility at Kololo,
where there are credible allegations of unlawful detention. If denied
access to detainees, raise the issue publicly.

To the United States, the United Kingdom and other concerned governments, especially development partners
in the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS)

Urge the government of Uganda to investigate
human rights abuses by JATT and hold fair and credible trials for anyone
suspected of criminal acts, such as torture.

Promote legislative and
judicial oversight of the Ugandan intelligence and military services.

Closely monitor any
military, police, security, and anti-terrorism assistance to the Ugandan
government to ensure that human rights standards are strictly observed by
JATT, CMI, police and intelligence agents.

Withhold
any counterterrorism-related funding from the Ugandan security forces
until the Ugandan government investigates abuses by JATT and CMI and
prosecutes those found to be responsible.

If any training of military,
police, and security forces occurs, ensure that human rights training is
an integral component of all capacity building and training projects. Such
training should include a strong component designed to stop the use of torture
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as an interrogation
technique or punishment.

To the United Nations Human Rights Council and the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights

The UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture and the AU Special
Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa should request permission to visit
Uganda and prepare a report on illegal detention and torture, with
recommendations to the government of Uganda. The Kololo facility should be
among the detention centers visited.

IV. Background

The Use of "Safehouses" in Uganda

The 1995 Ugandan
constitution explicitly prohibits holding individuals in unacknowledged or
"ungazetted" places of detention, i.e. those not published in the official
gazette.[1] Police stations are gazetted facilities. UPDF barracks, JATT and
CMI offices and residential homes are not gazetted. Illegal or irregular places of detention-in Uganda often referred to as "safehouses"-are frequently cited by victims as the location
where torture is meted out by state agents.

In 2002, the Chairperson of
the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs said the Minister
of State Security Muruli Mukasa had
reported that in 1997 and 1998 safehouses had been used "due to the widespread
wave of terrorism" but that they had been phased out when personnel were
trained to manage terrorism cases.[2] When questioned about this in parliament, State
Minister Mukasa said that, "safe houses, as places of detention, no
longer exist, but safe houses as places of work for the security agencies do
exist.These houses or premises, which
have been mentioned, CMI on Kitante Road . . . are not safe houses. Those are
places of work. They are offices run by the various security organisations and
they are known." He denied that individuals are detained in those "places of
work."[3] In response, some
parliamentarians said that they believed safehouses were still in use.[4]

In 2005, Defense Minister Amama Mbabazi echoed the statement of Mukasa. He told Human Rights
Watch that although safehouses were used by agencies for intelligence work and
that suspects may be interrogated there, they were not used as places of
detention-detainees were transferred to the regular prisons after arrest.[5]

In May 2005, Ugandan
officials responded to concerns from the UN Committee against Torture after Uganda submitted a state party report, as required under the Convention against Torture.[6] At that time, Capt. John Sonko, head of the
UPDF's human rights desk, admitted that
safehouses had been used to combat terror until 2000: "[I]t had not been
possible to place the perpetrators in the same cells as ordinary offenders; the
security agencies had designated places known as safehouses where they could be held in isolation with
provision for additional security measures."[7]

However, incidents
revealing the ongoing use of safehouses continued to be reported in the media. In March 2006, the Daily Monitor newspaper reported
that Ronald Kasekende, a Makerere University student, had been detained since
the previous October in various illegal locations, including a safehouse on
Mutongo Hill.[8] He was eventually transferred to the JATT compound,
and later jumped over the perimeter wall while attempting to escape.
Kasekende-who had allegedly been tortured for several months-landed in the next
door residential compound of the Danish ambassador. According to the Daily
Monitor, soldiers pursued Kasekende and removed him by force from the
ambassador's garden.[9] In September 2006, parliamentarian Beti Kamya
Turwomwe said that she had intervened in the case of Paul Kalemba who had been
arrested by JATT in July and could not be located. She said she had contacted
then Minister of Internal Affairs Ruhakana Rugunda, after which "it was
discovered that Paul had been taken by JATT, and held in a "safe house."[10]

According to a 2006 report by
a Ugandan human rights organization, Foundation for Human Rights Initiative
(FHRI), public criticism of safehouses had some impact on reducing the number
of suspects held in ungazetted locations.[11] The report noted that despite the reduction,
safehouses were "still in use and suspects alleged that they were arrested
usually in the night by plain clothed armed men, who confiscated their property
and personal effects and took them to a safehouse, tortured them and forced
them to sign confessions."[12]

Structure of Security Organizations in Uganda

Under the constitution, the
police are mandated to preserve law and order and to prevent and detect crime,
but in reality, law enforcement in Uganda is also carried out by agencies and
taskforces with varied and conflicting command hierarchies and very limited effective
civilian oversight. In the past decade, there has been a proliferation of ad hoc
security organizations working within the law enforcement and intelligence
communities without mandates codified in law, some comprised of multiple organs
of the state.

One
of these groups is the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT), but others include the Popular Intelligence Network
(PIN), the Kalangala Action Plan (KAP), the Black Mambas, Operation Wembley, and its successor, the Violent
Crime Crack Unit (VCCU), and its subsequent successor the Rapid Response Unit
(RRU). These groups have all been accused at various times of human rights
abuses. Some, such as PIN–a loose network of civilians collaborating with the
military to unearth collaborators of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in 1996[13]–and KAP, an
armed group launched by President Museveni in the run-up to the elections of
2001[14]–were relatively very short-lived. KAP drew its
membership from loyalists of President Museveni's National Resistance Movement
(NRM) and was described by the president as a "political action group for
disturbed areas."[15]

Operation
Wembley, a joint operation of the police, Internal Security Organization (ISO)
and military intelligence and other unofficial volunteers, operated for several
months. It was established in 2002 to fight violent crime in urban areas and a spate of killings in the business community.[16] Though it was reported that crime levels decreased,
the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) noted that "methods of arrest and illegal detention were a point
of concern, as well as the shoot-to-kill policy, which put lives at risk and
disregarded the presumption of innocence of suspects."[17]Operation
Wembley eventually turned into VCCU, and then the RRU, which is still in
operation. Both the VCCU and the RRU have frequently been accused of abuses by
human rights groups and the Uganda Human Rights Commission.[18] In November 2005 and March 2007, the Black Mamba Hit
Squad, which according to experts is part of military intelligence,[19] surrounded the High Court to prevent the
court-ordered release of presidential hopeful Kizza Besigye.[20]

Contrary to the constitution,
these ad hoc groups were not founded by acts of parliament, though the units have
frequently carried out intelligence work as well as arrests and detention in
excess of the constitutional time limits, and are reported to have mistreated and
tortured suspects. The UN Committee Against Torture noted with concern "the
wide array of security forces and agencies in Uganda," and in 2005 recommended
that the government "[m]inimize the number of security forces and agencies with
the power to arrest, detain and investigate and ensure that the police remains
the primary law enforcement agency."[21]

Analysts who spoke to Human
Rights Watch voiced concern about the integrity of the police as the primary
law enforcement organ and its independence from the military in the face of the
proliferation of joint ad hoc security and intelligence groups.[22] One observer called the current situation the "the
hijacking of the police" by the army.[23]These joint
ad hoc units comprised of police, military, intelligence personnel, and
sometimes other unofficial forces established to address particular security
challenges, blur the boundaries between the codified mandates and roles of the
military and civilian law enforcement.[24] These groups also illustrate, according to one
in-depth study, a tendency in Uganda of bypassing statutory actors and
processes when addressing security problems.[25] Not only are these groups unconstitutional, but
reporting lines may be confused by having members of the police report to the
military and vice-versa. In that situation, accountability for abuses may be
less likely, given the lack of clear hierarchy and oversight roles. State power
is then centralized in the hands of a few individuals, mostly high-ranking
members of the military.

V. Applicable National
Law

Uganda does not specifically criminalize torture in its
national law, but there are references to the prohibition of torture in various
laws, such as in the constitution and the Anti-Terrorism Act.[26] According to Director of Public Prosecutions Richard
Buteera, perpetrators of torture can be charged with grievous bodily harm or
assault as defined in the Penal Code.[27] In 2005, the UN Committee against Torture recommended
that the government amend domestic criminal law in accordance with the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Convention against Torture), but the law reform commission and
parliament have not done so.[28] There is no indication from the ruling National
Resistance Movement party (NRM) that a bill criminalizing torture by state
actors is under serious consideration. However, a coalition of national and
international NGOs are working to draft an appropriate bill and hope to have a
final draft by mid-2009.[29] The bill will require substantial and steadfast
support from parliamentarians from the ruling party in order to be passed and
enforced.

Uganda's constitution and recent decisions by the courts
guarantee a person who is arrested and detained a series of rights. Many of
these basic constitutional rights are violated by JATT during arrests and
detentions. For example, under the Ugandan constitution, a criminal suspect
must be kept in a place that is authorized by law.[30] The accused person has a right to be free from
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[31] The accused must be informed of the reason for
arrest, restriction and detention, and of the right to a lawyer.[32] Within 48 hours of arrest or detention, a suspect
must be brought before a court to be charged with a crime.[33] For offenses that carry the death penalty or
imprisonment for life, the state must provide legal representation, though it
is not specifically stipulated when.[34] In practice, attorneys are not provided until the
case is at trial before the High Court, despite the fact that a person usually
has spent well over six months in legal detention by that time.

A detainee's family must be
informed of the detention at the request of the person in custody.[35] Detainees are also entitled to access to family
members, a lawyer, and a personal doctor and medical treatment.[36]

Capital crimes, such as
terrorism and treason, can be brought only in the High Court. Magistrates'
courts, which are responsible for lesser offenses, do not have jurisdiction to
try these cases, receive a plea or grant bail. However, all civilians should be
charged in the magistrates' court, and at that point the accused should be
transferred from the custody of the police to prison. If there is a case
against the accused, then the charges are presented to the High Court, the
defendant enters a plea, and the case is set for trial by the High Court.

In capital cases, the accused
may be held up to 180 days (from the time of arrest) before the case is sent to
the High Court for trial. This is intended to give the prosecution time to investigate.
If an arrested person charged with a capital crime has been in custody for over
180 days, the court must grant bail on reasonable conditions.[37]There are no
limits on the time the case may wait for trial.

VI. The Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT)

Mandate and Relation to Other Security Bodies

JATT was created on May 13,
1999, specifically to "handle and quell" the outbreak of bombings in Kampala in 1998 that had allegedly been carried out by the rebel Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF). The director of counter-terrorism, who is the head of JATT, is a senior
officer of the UPDF and reports to the chief of military intelligence who is
the "overall operations coordinator."[38]The serving chief of military intelligence is Brig.
James Mugira, who replaced Col. Leopold Kyanda in August 2008.

According to Brig. Mugira, JATT
is "an amalgamation of elements from various security organisations that have
individual legal status under Ugandan law."[39]These include
CMI-the intelligence arm of the Ugandan military-the police, the Internal
Security Organisation (ISO) and the External Security Organisation (ESO).
Because JATT was established without an act of parliament or official publicly
available directive, it has no official legally specified powers or law
enforcement mandate.

Historically, JATT has been
the source of some friction between security organizations skirmishing over
resources and power. A knowledgeable official from the Ministry of Internal
Affairs told Human Rights Watch that it has an operating budget of 100 million shillings per month (50,227 USD).[40] The official told Human Rights Watch that CMI's
control of JATT was not the foreseen hierarchy when JATT was first established
in 1999, nor has JATT played its foreseen role in the intelligence community in
Uganda, which was to gather and cross-check intelligence information, keep
track of certain individuals or criminal suspects and recommend necessary next
steps to combat terrorism, especially in the wake of the bombings at the US
embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. According to this official, JATT was
originally to have been under the command and control of the Inspector General
of Police. However, over time, some took the view that the police were not
adequately managing JATT, and a decision was made to put the task force under
the control of CMI.[41]

During a debate in parliament
in 2002, this friction between security organizations related to JATT came to
light, but was discounted publicly by then-head of CMI, the late Brig. Noble
Mayombo. Opposition parliamentarian Reagan Okumu declared at the time that
there was a "fight where CMI was involved, ISO was involved, and the Police
were . . . involved. The fight amongst these people was, 'who controls the
resources,' and at that time we were told that CMI took over control of these
resources and, therefore, they took the lead.In other words, the police
who were directly responsible were looked at as a department, which never
heavily contributed and yet they did not have enough resources."[42]

Mayombo responded to this
statement indicating that operating jointly saves resources, such as training
and "the little fuel for the vehicles available." "This joint anti-terrorism
task force," Mayombo said, "which is only led by Military Intelligence, did not
take resources away from the Police.Whenever the Police have a project to
run, they have access to those resources; whenever internal security has a
project to run, they have access to those resources.We have a very
harmonious joint anti-terrorism task force.It is doing a fantastic job in
terms of bringing security in the country."[43]

According to the official
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the initial plan for JATT did not
include any powers of arrest or detention, but that since the mandate was not
specified in law, activities of JATT-and abuses committed by JATT-have varied
as the leadership has changed over the years. The official also stated that
JATT has become increasingly reliant on paid informers who may not be telling
the truth or who may, at times, be settling private scores. In the official's
opinion, "JATT has become powerful but ungovernable."[44]

Both the non-governmental Foundation
for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) and the state Uganda Human Rights Commission
(UHRC) have reported publicly that there has been a disturbing trend of
creating "special holding places" within different police stations which are
outside the direct control of police.[45] In 2007, the UHRC reported that it was not given
access to some detainees, even when they were held in police stations. The
report notes, "The UHRC encountered resistance at the Central Police Station, Kampala,
where we were denied access to certain detention cells suspected to have been
holding suspects brought in by other security organizations, such as the
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, the Internal Security Organization and
the Joint Anti Terrorism Task Force (JATT). These 'special inmates' can stay in
police detention as long as the detaining authority wishes."[46]

Individuals Targeted by JATT

Human Rights Watch found that
of the 25 detainees interviewed about their detention in JATT's facility in
Kololo, none were brought before a magistrate at any time while in JATT
custody. They also reported that co-detainees were never removed from the
facility to appear before a magistrate. Among the 25, some eventually were
charged with terrorism or treason while others were released without charge.
Human Rights Watch has previously documented the Ugandan government's tendency
to use the charge of treason to silence political opponents and those critical
of the government.[47] For this report, Human Rights Watch interviewed two
people who had been held in Kololo and then were charged with treason. However,
these cases do not appear to be the focus of JATT's work. Rather, it would
appear that suspected terrorism cases predominate.

Of the 106 named individuals detained
by JATT documented by Human Rights Watch, all but two were Muslim. One detainee
told Human Rights Watch, "When I entered the garage [in the Kololo facility], I
saw about 15 people. I think that three of them were not Muslims."[48] Muslims make up about 12 percent of the population
in Uganda; the rest are predominantly Christian.[49]

Allied Democratic
Forces Suspects

As the chief of military intelligence
wrote to Human Rights Watch in his November 3 letter, the rebel Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF) are currently the focus of JATT's work. The ADF is a
Ugandan rebel movement based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Grand
Nord area of North Kivu and Ituri.[50]According to research carried
out by Human Rights Watch in 1998, the ADF is comprised of an alliance between
the nationalist National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), and
disgruntled elements within the Islamist Tabliq sect, who aim to establish an
Islamic state in Uganda.[51]

The ADF were responsible for
a series of killings and abductions of civilians, especially in schools, from
the Ruwenzori mountain region in western Uganda.[52]The ADF
were also reported to be responsible for several bomb explosions in Kampala from 1997 to 1999. In 1999, UPDF forces
conducted Operation Mountain Sweep and claimed to have killed between 1,500 and
2,000 rebels.[53] By 2001, it was believed that only a few hundred
rebels remained, and that the movement had ceased to be a threat to the Ugandan
government. The ADF was furthered weakened by a large joint Congolese army-MONUC
operation in 2005 that destroyed most of the ADF/NALU camps.[54]

These actions failed to
eliminate the rebel movement completely. According to Ugandan army reports,
occasional skirmishes occurred between the ADF and the UPDF in 2007 in which
scores of ADF rebels were killed.[55] The coordinator of intelligence services, Gen. David
Tinyefuza, stated to the media that a spate of recent fires in schoolhouses was
linked to ADF activity.[56]

Between 2000 and January 19,
2009, 1,904 supposed ADF combatants were granted amnesty under the terms of the
2000 Amnesty Act (see below).[57] In November 2008, the ADF reportedly agreed to formal
peace negotiations with the Ugandan government.[58]

The Commonwealth Heads
of Government Meeting

From November 23 to 25, 2007,
Uganda hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Security
around the capital was increased as police and military forces worked to ensure
the safety of the many presidents, prime ministers and royalty who visited the
country. On December 1, 2007, the independent newspaper The Daily Monitor
newspaper reported that security agencies claimed to have "foiled plans by suspected
terrorists with links to Al-Qaeda to lob bombs" into various venues used for
the meeting.[59] A few weeks later, the same newspaper reported that
the army had captured a speedboat "loaded with arms and homemade bombs that
were reportedly to be used by the rebel ADF to disrupt" CHOGM.[60] Seven people were reported to be in custody of
"intelligence agents" at that time. No names of suspects were released and they
were being held in an "undisclosed location."[61]

In May 2008, the media
reported that these suspects and others were in the custody of the Ugandan
state, and still had not appeared in court, despite having been arrested five
months before. UPDF spokesman Paddy Ankunda told The Daily Monitor, "We
arrested a number of ADF rebel suspects some of whom have been released after
they were found innocent. Some have been taken to police and others are still
with us." According to the article, Ankunda declined to say how long the
suspects would be kept in detention or which charges they would be likely to
face should they be produced in court.[62]

When Human Rights Watch wrote
on October 20, 2008 to CMI to ask about the whereabouts of certain individuals
allegedly being held by JATT, Brigadier Mugira replied that two of them, Adinan
Zubair and Abbas Karule, had been arrested in November 2007 for "conspiring to
assassinate Kampala CHOGM VIPs." He said both had received amnesty in October
2008. He did not say where the men were physically located, nor where they had
been detained between November 2007 and December 2008. Human Rights Watch
research indicates that both men were held without charge in Kololo during that
time period. Former detainees told Human Rights Watch that they had met Karule
for the first time in Kololo in December 2007 and that he had been tortured.[63]

In December 2008, Karule was
among a group of alleged ADF combatants who was granted amnesty by the Amnesty
Commission and then paraded in front of journalists. According to the government-run
New Vision newspaper, Karule admitted to the authorities to be acting "as an
emissary, relaying information between the ADF rebels in the bush and those
operating in Kampala."[64] There was no mention of his involvement in the
alleged CHOGM bombing attempt, and no mention of where he had been held for
over a year.

Arrests of alleged
Al-Qaeda suspects

JATT has been involved in the
arrest and detention of individuals suspected of involvement with Al-Qaeda.[65] In late 2008, media reports indicated that the
Ugandan police were warning of imminent attacks by groups connected to Al-Qaeda.[66] Ugandan authorities told the media that six terrorism
suspects had been held by JATT for over a week.[67]

On August 18, 2008, two South
Africans citizens, Mufti Hussain Bhayat and Haroon Saley, were arrested at
Entebbe Airport and brought to the JATT facility in Kololo.[68] According to Bhayat's account of the events, three
Ugandan men in civilian clothes questioned him at length about his affiliations
with various groups, including some groups listed by the United States and the United Nations as terrorist entities.[69]Bhayat
enquired as to who the men were, but they declined to identify themselves
either by name or organization.[70] In one session, questions were read from a roll of
fax paper from an unknown source. According to Bhayat, he and Saley were held
separately from the male Ugandan detainees, but were once able to communicate
with one female who they believed was Somali, and saw some male detainees
lining up to receive food.[71]

Despite the considerable news
coverage their detention received, both in Uganda and South Africa, Bhayat and Saley were held in Kololo for 11 days without charge.[72] They were deported from Uganda the day that their
lawyer had secured a habeas corpus hearing, on August 29, 2008.[73]

No alleged Al-Qaeda suspect
has ever been charged with terrorism in Uganda.

Detention of Foreigners

Former Kololo detainees
interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that they saw foreigners, such as
Somalis, Rwandans, Eritreans and Congolese, in the JATT compound. The presence
of foreigners was documented notably in July 2006 when, during a meeting of the
Parliamentary Committee of Internal Affairs and Defence, parliamentarian and shadow
Minister of Internal Affairs and Human Rights Kyanjo Hussein stated that JATT
was holding 30 Rwandan and Congolese detainees.[74] The committee did not investigate Kyanjo's
allegations of illegal detention by JATT. The whereabouts of the 30 men is
unknown, though it is believed that they were eventually released.[75] Former Kololo detainees also told Human Rights Watch
that they believed foreigners were held by JATT for failing to possess
authentic travel documents.

Detention in the Kololo Compound

The JATT compound in Kololo,
an upmarket suburb of Kampala where many embassies and ambassadors' residences
are located, is at the top of Kololo Hill Lane. The plot has been notorious for
illegal detention and torture for well over a decade. Supreme Court Justice
George Kanyeihamba told Human Rights Watch that in 1994, in his role as Senior
Presidential Adviser on International and Human Rights Affairs, he directly
informed President Museveni that he had reports of torture at the location,
that people heard screams of agony from the facility, and that the government
should conduct an inquiry.[76] Nonetheless, the government has not investigated
allegations of torture and illegal detention at Kololo to date. In 2005, the
government admitted that this location contained JATT offices to the UN
Committee against Torture (while denying that the offices were used for
detention.)[77]

The use of the Kololo site as
a safehouse came to light most vividly in March 2006 when the Daily Monitor
newspaper reported the incident discussed previously in which Ronald Kasekende
fled into the compound of the Danish Ambassador's residence. More recently, two
diplomats who reside in the area told Human Rights Watch that they had been
concerned about the use of the Kololo site for both torture and unlawful detention,
because they had heard screams of pain from the location. In spite of this
situation, they have not taken any action to urge the government to investigate
abuses there.[78]

JATT agents frequently
attempt to conceal the location of the detention site to detainees. During
transport to the site, some detainees reported to Human Rights Watch that they
were told to keep their heads down or they would be hit with the butt of a gun.[79] Others were blindfolded while transported, and
sometimes for long periods of time after arrival at the compound, to keep them
disoriented.[80]

The property is close to the
top of Kololo Hill, near the Summit View military area which was a notorious
torture and detention center before 1986. It comprises a residential house with
a reception room and offices on the top floors. According to former detainees,
male detainees were held most frequently in the garage space under the house,
referred to by former detainees as "the go-down," though some were held for
short periods of time upstairs in various rooms of the house.[81] Some women were kept on the porch of the house, or in
the rooms of the house. A water point for detainees to share exists, as well as
a small separate building with toilet facilities. Former detainees reported to
Human Rights Watch that detainees were occasionally held in the toilet area as
well.[82]

Detainees-especially those
held for very long periods of time and for whom security became slightly more
lax-also described to Human Rights Watch being able to see specific sites from
beyond the compound wall. Some remarked seeing the television and radio
antennae located on the summit of Kololo Hill, towering over the suburb. Some
also described being able to see the flags of the embassies in the area.[83]

Most detainees told Human
Rights Watch that they eventually came to understand that they were in Kololo
in the custody of JATT, either via other detainees or by overhearing the place
referred to by their captors. Some saw written evidence of who was detaining
them. One woman, who was arrested in 2008 because her husband was suspected of
rebel involvement, told Human Rights Watch:

Men grabbed me and pushed me
into the car after they blindfolded me. . . I couldn't see very much but I
could hear. We went somewhere and then they took me out of the car. The man who
took me out went up some steps into a house and I was left outside all night.
It wasn't until 4 p.m. the next day that they took off the blindfold. They were
kicking me and slapping me and tightening the blindfold. I could hear other
people around. When they brought me inside the next day I was put in a room
where it said, 'No one is allowed to use this office but JATT' on a piece of
paper on the wall.[84]

In some instances, the
military has indicated publicly that individuals were being held in the JATT
facility in Kololo for long periods of time without charge, despite its
illegality as a place of detention and the constitutional requirement to be
brought before a judge after 48 hours. For example, on October 27, 2007, UPDF
spokesman Maj. Felix Kulayigye told the media that Hanifa Nalukwago had been
arrested and was being held by JATT, pending further investigations, for
alleged involvement with the ADF.[85] On December 20, 2007, Kulayigye stated that Nalukwago
had not been charged in court and that she was still in detention at JATT
headquarters in Kololo at that time.[86] She was eventually released on February 24, 2008,
without charge.[87]

Arrests by JATT

Arrests by JATT documented by
Human Rights Watch violate Ugandan criminal procedure at several stages. It is
unclear if those carrying out these arrests are members of the police,
military, or intelligence agencies or are paid informants. Under all
circumstances, Ugandan law requires that certain procedural safeguards be
respected, including when someone is arrested pursuant to a lawful warrantless
arrest. For example, a police officer may carry out an arrest without a warrant
if in his or her view the person is reasonably suspected of having committed certain
cognizable offenses.[88]Police must then bring a person arrested without a
warrant in front of a magistrate "as soon as is practicable."[89]

Among the 25 former detainees
interviewed by Human Rights Watch, none were shown arrest or search warrants,
and none were handed over to police or brought in front of a magistrate until
months after their arrest.

Ugandan criminal procedure
law allows for some blurring in the boundaries between the military and police
functions. Although the Ugandan armed forces and the Uganda Police Force are
independent bodies under the Ugandan constitution and governed by different
acts of parliament,[90] UPDF "officers and militants" enjoy the "powers and
duties" of police officers in assisting civil authorities where a "riot or
other disturbance of the peace is likely to be beyond the powers of the civil
authorities to suppress or prevent."[91] Given that the vast majority of arrests documented in
this report took place not in civil disturbances or combat situations, but
instead when individuals were at their homes or places of work, members of armed
forces acting for JATT could not be said to be acting under this legal
provision. However, even assuming that the armed forces could be understood to
be assisting the civil authorities during JATT operations, its personnel would
be bound by the same procedural safeguards attached to searches, arrests, and
detentions by police officers. Human Rights Watch has previously documented
abuses by members of the Ugandan military carrying out law enforcement
operations.[92]

The terms of the UPDF Act
appear ordinarily to limit the armed forces' power of arrest to service
members.[93] As far as Human Rights Watch is aware, Ugandan law
does not set out specific procedural safeguards that must be followed in the
authorization of searches, arrests, and detentions by armed forces or CMI
personnel and it is unclear under the UPDF Act to what extent the military may
undertake searches, arrests, and detentions of civilians or civilian property.[94]

In the incidents researched
by Human Rights Watch, those carrying out searches, arrests, detention and
interrogation in Kololo and at CMI did not identify themselves, either by name
or by official affiliation, according to multiple sources.[95] Arresting agents did not display an identity card, as
is usual practice according to CMI statements to the media.[96] One former detainee told Human Rights Watch that when
he asked the individuals who were arresting him who they were, they said they
were "not the police and not the military, but in between."[97]

Cars and pickup trucks used
during arrests are also typically unmarked.

One former detainee described
her arrest to Human Rights Watch:

Suddenly six men came in
where I was renting a room. They entered the house and said they were looking
for me . . . They came in plain clothes and they didn't say where they were
from. I had no option but to agree to what they said. They searched my house
and they turned everything upside down. My two young children were there. There
was a vehicle waiting outside. . . . They put me in the car, near a man with a
gun, an AK-47 [assault rifle]. There was also a driver and a man with another
gun. I was put in the back. The one in the front had a pistol. The one in the
back, sitting next to me, said that I would eventually tell them everything. We
drove up Entebbe road, past Africana hotel, and then we branched off to Kololo.
I saw a sign for Kololo and then we reached a house; they hooted the car horn
and the gate opened. A man in a UPDF uniform opened. . . . I wasn't blindfolded
while we drove there. They tried to force my head behind the seat but I could
still see a bit.[98]

Detainees reported that they frequently
did not understand what exactly was happening to them and spoke of feeling
traumatized by what had occurred during the arrest. One former detainee, who
broke into tears when recounting his arrest to Human Rights Watch, said that he
was on the road toward eastern Uganda when several men grabbed him off the
street and threw him into a waiting minibus. The men sat on him and beat him
repeatedly. He could not see where he was being taken. He eventually spent four
months in Kololo and another safehouse, where he alleged that he was beaten and
tortured and eventually charged with terrorism.[99]

Distinctions between JATT and
CMI agents were not apparent to detainees and they often used "JATT" and
"Kololo" interchangeably to refer to where they were held. Local sources with
knowledge of the situation also indicated that other informal government security
groups may occasionally detain individuals at the Kololo facility, particularly
the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), which is run by the police and has a detention
facility in Kireka, Kampala.[100]

Human Rights Watch research
found that the Ugandan armed forces play a central role in the daily work of
JATT. Former detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that there was
a constant presence of men in military uniform inside the Kololo plot, guarding
the gate, guarding detainees and carrying out some interrogations. Detainees
also stated that they were often shuttled between the JATT compound in Kololo
and the CMI offices in Kitante, Kampala, and that interrogation and severe
beatings took place in both locations, frequently by the same men.

Despite officially being part
of JATT, police were generally absent from detainees' descriptions of their
detention. No detainee interviewed by Human Rights Watch could recall ever
having seen an individual in police uniform or having met someone who
identified themselves as a member of the police on any occasion during their
detention in Kololo.[101]

Detainees reported learning
the names of their interrogators and torturers when mentioned by others during
informal communications. Occasionally, a detainee recognized a JATT agent as
someone he or she knew from their local community.

Some detainees saw JATT
agents in uniforms. One man told Human Rights Watch that he saw men wearing all
black clothes inside the CMI compound when he was taken there for questioning.
All-black uniforms are the trademark of the Black Mamba Hit Squad, a unit thought
to be part of the military intelligence that gained notoriety during the
storming of the high court at the case of Dr. Kizza Besigye in 2007.[102]

According to the head of CMI,
the police, military, and intelligence personnel working for JATT are acting
under the laws of their respective security forces. Police participating in
JATT actions are therefore acting under the Police Act; members of CMI, as
members of the army, are acting under the UPDF Act, and members of the
intelligence organizations act under those respective laws.[103] Brig. Mugira told Human Rights Watch, "JATT/CMI
personnel suspected of committing violations of the law are tried by both civil
and military courts depending on the type of offence and the nature of the
suspects."[104] He did not respond to Human Rights Watch's queries
about any pending cases in which JATT personnel or affiliates had been
prosecuted for human rights violations, but agreed that individual criminal
liability for abuses such as those documented in this report is important.

Identifying Perpetrators Affiliated with JATT and CMI

Human Rights Watch passed on
to the CMI chief the names and aliases of nine people whom its research
indicated had carried out arrests that led to detention in Kololo, as well as
some incidents of alleged torture. Of the nine people, Brig. Mugira confirmed
that six of them are JATT operatives or agents.[105]In a further
meeting, he confirmed that another of those nine worked for CMI.[106]

The names of those carrying out arrests and torture in
Kololo and CMI emerged repeatedly during interviews with former detainees.
Several cited Pvt. Mushabe, Lt. John Mwesigwa, Lt. Asiimwe, also known as
"Semakula", Abdul Aziz Mucunguzi, and a man referred to as "Opio" with a large
stature as having tortured them, and having tortured others in front of them.[107]Mwesigwa, Asiimwe and Mucunguzi were
allegedly involved in one particularly long and brutal episode reported to
Human Rights Watch, in which four detainees were taken to CMI, were beaten, and
had chili pepper paste rubbed into their eyes, nose and mouth. Two detainees also
cited Mwesigwa as having used electricity to torture them during
interrogations.

VII. Abuses by JATT

Human Rights Watch has
obtained information on several cases in which JATT personnel have been
implicated in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. An
extrajudicial killing is a deliberate unlawful killing by the security forces.
Under the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, an
enforced disappearance occurs when a person is deprived of his or her liberty,
whether under arrest, detention, or otherwise, by state authorities, and this
is followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the detained person.[108]The
practices of extrajudicial killings and "disappearances" violate
basic human rights, including the right to life, the right to liberty and
security of the person, the right to a fair and public trial, as well as the
prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment.

Abusive behavior by security
forces persists when perpetrators are not held accountable for their actions.
Rooting out abusive actions requires more than new policies and commitments to
reform; it requires that would-be perpetrators know that if they order or
participate in abuses such as torture, "disappearances" and extrajudicial killings,
they will go to prison and their careers will come to an end. In addition,
individuals with command control over JATT personnel may also be responsible
for abuses carried out by their forces under the doctrine of command
responsibility. Commanders and civilian leaders may be
prosecuted for crimes in violation of international law as a matter of command
responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission of the
crimes and took insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those
responsible.

Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances

Saidi Lutaaya

JATT arrested Saidi Lutaaya
around November 22, 2007, from the Old Taxi Park in Kampala where he worked as
a hawker.[109] Witnesses recalled his arrest as coinciding with the
visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Kampala for the CHOGM.[110] Two days later, the Voice of Africa radio program
broadcast that the body of Saidi Lutaaya was at the mortuary at Mulago hospital
in Kampala. A nurse from the hospital recognized Lutaaya and wanted to make
sure his family was informed, so she phoned the radio station.[111] According to eyewitnesses, those who attempted to
collect his body were told that soldiers had come and taken the body away.
Nurses informed family that Lutaaya had been brought to the hospital early in
the morning by soldiers. One said that the man had "a hole in his foot and the
bone of his lower leg was out, and that he was hit in the head with a hammer,
blood was oozing out of his body." He was still alive. He had been registered
as Sergeant Lutaaya and was wearing an army jacket. Soldiers told the nurses to
call the soldiers who brought him to the hospital if and when he died, which
they did later that night.[112]

Friends and family continued
to search for news of the whereabouts of Lutaaya's body. Eventually, a friend
was approached by men he knew to be informers for JATT. He was told to tell
Lutaaya's wife not to give money to anyone who approached claiming to know
Lutaaya's whereabouts. "He said that Saidi was dead. People will come to her
and say that they can help her but they cannot. He is dead."[113]

Two detainees who were in
Kololo at the time of Lutaaya's detention remember seeing him there. One told
Human Rights Watch that Lutaaya was held in a room, referred to as Number 7,
which was next to a small building where the toilets are located. It is
separate from the main house in the compound.[114]

Because Lutaaya was not held
with other male detainees in the garage of the main house, details of his
detention and the manner of his death remain unclear. One detainee who knew
Lutaaya from his neighborhood told Human Rights Watch that he saw Lutaaya
trying to stand up and falling over repeatedly while guards told him he would
be beaten for pretending to be injured.[115] Then, three co-detainees were ordered to put
Lutaaya's injured body in a pickup truck and he was taken to the hospital.
Several detainees who were brought to Kololo after Lutaaya's death remarked
that soldiers there occasionally mentioned Lutaaya's beating as having been
very severe.[116]

Lutaaya's friends and family
members have sought information from government authorities about is
whereabouts. They have to date received no information.[117] On March 9 2009, hospital administrators gave
Lutaaya's family his death certificate, which noted that he had been brought
into the hospital on November 23 2007, comatose, and that his cause of death
had not been ascertained. The section of the certificate which asks for details
of the "morbid conditions" giving rise to the cause of death was not completed.[118]

In a response to Human Rights
Watch, CMI denied any knowledge of the case of Saidi Lutaaya.[119]

Tayebwa Yasin alias Hamza Kaifa

Tayebwa Yasin had been
formally charged with terrorism and sent in Luzira prison on April 2008,
accused with others of involvement with the ADF. The prison registry notes that
"Tayebwa Yasin, alias Hamza Kaifa" died on June 9, 2008, age 20, at Mulago
hospital.[120]There is no
mention in the registry of the cause of his death, but four former detainees
from Kololo reported to Human Rights Watch that Yasin had been beaten very
badly by JATT personnel while detained in Kololo. They said that he had been
beaten repeatedly and punched in the chest, and as a result, could not walk.[121]Human Rights Watch was unable to confirm the
official cause of his death.

Isa "Drago" Kiggundu

Ugandan authorities told
journalists that Isa Kiggundu was arrested on May 15, 2000, for allegedly
carrying out bombings in Kampala in 1998.[122] He was paraded in front of journalists at the
Makindye Military Police barracks on June 24, 2000. Media reports at the that
time indicated that he "confessed that he killed 35 people and injured 148 in
addition to destroying millions worth of property."[123] He was subsequently charged with terrorism, and
received an amnesty in 2001.[124] However, he spent one and half years in Mbuya
barracks, and was then sent to Kigo prison, where he spent another three years,
before being released in 2006.[125] His history in the courts is difficult to follow, but
those familiar with the case claimed that he was arrested several times,
received amnesty twice and was tortured several times.[126]In early 2007,
Kiggundu was released on bail.

Eyewitnesses told Human
Rights Watch that on October 18, 2007, Isa Kiggundu was home with his family
when four cars of men in plain clothes came to the house.[127] A man with an AK-47 assault rifle approached the
house and began to fire into the house. Family members tried to run, but there
were children in the house and adults hesitated to leave them unassisted.
Kiggundu emerged from the house holding his several-month-old baby daughter; he
was shot and killed in the hail of bullets, but his baby daughter survived the
attack.[128]After the
gunfire died down, witnesses saw the assailants call the police, who arrived on
the scene. The men then told the crowd that they were very lucky because they
had just eliminated a notorious thief.

On October 18, 2007, the Ugandan armed forces announced that JATT had been
responsible for what they deemed to be a lawful killing.[129] The UPDF website posted a press release with the
headline "ADF terrorist put out of action." The press release notes that, "An
ADF terrorist, Drago Kiggundu, alias 'Moses,' 'Muhammed,' 'Dan' was this
afternoon of 18th October 2007 put out of action by the UPDF Joint Anti
Terrorism troops in Wakiso Town, Wakiso District. Drago was responsible for
twenty incidents of bomb attacks in and around Kampala between March 1997 and
February 2007 in which at least 36 innocent people were killed and over 100
others injured. . . . Upon release, Drago was again found responsible for the
bomb attack at Natete Junction on February 16, 2007 in which 5 people were
killed and two others injured. At the time of his death, he was still planning
more terrorist activities."[130]

Human Rights Watch could not
find evidence that Kiggundu was charged with any crime in 2007, nor any
evidence that his killing has been investigated by authorities. At the time he
was gunned down, he was on bail for terrorism, so if the authorities believed
he was responsible for a bombing in 2007, they could have prosecuted him under
proper legal procedures for that alleged crime.

Abdu Semugenyi

In July 2006 Human
Rights Watch wrote to the Minister of Internal Affairs about the alleged
electrocution and death of Abdu Semugenyi,
a detainee in JATT custody. He
was among others arrested on suspicion of being associated with the ADF rebels.
Unknown security agents detained him in the village of Ntoroko in April 2006
and then Karugutu army barracks in western Uganda. From there he was taken to
the JATT compound in Kololo. Individuals
interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that they witnessed him being tortured
in the Kololo facility run by JATT.[131]

One woman who was
held in Kololo for over a week told Human Rights Watch:

I saw Abdu Semugenyi before
he died. One night, [JATT agents] brought two men outside near where I was tied
to a tree. They asked me if I knew one of them. I said I had never seen him. He
was in a terrible condition. He couldn't speak and there was a lot of blood.
They tied the other man to a tree nearby. The soldiers lifted the man in
terrible condition into the car and I never saw him again. Later I saw the man
who had been tied to the tree in the Central Police Station before I was sent
to Luzira. He told me that man in the terrible state was named Semugenyi. I
remember him well.[132]

One eyewitness told
Human Rights Watch that Semugenyi was
electrocuted to death.[133] While the authorities first denied his detention, they later claimed
that Semugenyi escaped.[134]The
authorities have never handed over his body to his family. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture brought
the case to the attention of the Uganda authorities on August 8, 2006 and asked
for information and investigations into the case. The government of Uganda did not respond to the rapporteur's inquiry.[135]

Cases of Torture during Interrogations by JATT

For most detainees
interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the focus of interrogation by JATT revolved
around knowledge of ADF activities. However, some were told that if they agreed
to work with JATT as informants, they would be released from their detention and
not charged with any crime. The use of former ADF as paid agents does not
appear to be uncommon. Indeed, the head of CMI told Human Rights Watch that
several current JATT personnel were former rebels.[136]

JATT also questioned suspects
about what they had heard being preached in local mosques, or were told to stop
preaching in mosques. Some detainees were asked about the whereabouts of
individuals who reside in their neighborhoods, pray in their mosque or send
their children to the same school. Foreigners were asked about affiliations and
business interaction with various groups including those listed as terrorist
organizations by the United States government.[137]

Torture

Kololo detainees were
questioned by interrogators both inside the residential compound run by JATT
and by interrogators in various buildings inside the CMI compound in Kitante.
Sixteen were shuttled back and forth between the two locations for
interrogation and torture.[138]

Former detainees reported
that they were tortured in sessions lasting several hours, repeatedly over a
few days, by the same men, in front of other detainees who were also being mistreated.
JATT personnel beat detainees with various objects including batons, pistols, a
cricket bat, whips, shoes, and chairs. Several were beaten until they lost
consciousness for periods of time. One man described to Human Rights Watch
having blood coming from his ears after having been beaten on the head and ears
for several days.[139]Another told
Human Rights Watch that he urinated blood for weeks after his interrogation.[140]A third said
that after three days of beatings lasting four or five hours per day, he could
not walk, his legs were swollen and that due to extreme pain in his joints, he
could only crawl for several days after his interrogation.[141]

One detainee was held for
seven months in Kololo and then released without charge. During his time in
Kololo, he was beaten during interrogations several times. He told Human Rights
Watch:

They asked me, "What do you
people do in that mosque? Why do you pray there and what are you planning? Are
there certain things that you are trying to organize? What are you planning?" I
said I didn't know what they were talking about to all the questions. Three men
were asking me these questions, a boss man and two others. One of them told me
that if I didn't answer the questions, I would be beaten. When I continued to
deny knowing anything, they opened up a cupboard in the room and took out a
black whip. They slashed me with it six times. . . They said, "So you have
refused to tell us what we need to know." Then they took off my Muslim cap and
took off all my clothes so I was just in my underpants. They told me to lie
down on the floor and then they began beating me. They were saying to me, "Are
you sure you aren't ADF? Are you sure you have no bombs?" They beat me very
badly; every part of me and blood was coming out of me all over. Someone was
writing things down in a notebook in the room.[142]

Registration procedures for
detainees entering Luzira prison require guards to note the physical condition
of new arrivals in the prison registry. These prison guards were in a position
to observe the well-being of those detainees recently transferred from Kololo.
However, Human Rights Watch is not aware that prison officials knew which
detainees had previously been held by JATT in Kololo or any other safehouse run
by JATT. Luzira prison officials permitted Human Rights Watch researchers to
read through the registry. One entry, for a prisoner charged with terrorism,
noted he had "marks of sticks as a result of torture from a safe house."[143]

Human Rights Watch found that
during CHOGM in November 2007, five detainees who had been interrogated at CMI
were brought by JATT agents to another safehouse in a residential area, thought
to be in Kisaasi north of Kololo.[144] One of the five could not walk and required help to
move because of injuries to his lower leg. One of his co-detainees interviewed
by Human Rights Watch recognized the man as someone he knew from his community
and knew his name.[145]

Three of the detainees who
had been held in this safehouse were interviewed by Human Rights Watch in three
separate interviews. Each described the suffering of this individual while they
were held in detention together. They witnessed him in extreme pain, crying all
the time, and saw that his leg was very swollen. He recounted to his
co-detainees that JATT interrogators had hit him over and over again in the
same place on his leg and that he could no longer support his own weight.
During their detention, other detainees were required to help the man around,
drain pus and infection from his leg, and try to comfort him as much as they
could with no medical equipment.

In early December 2007, JATT
agents took the man away from the house. About six weeks later he returned.
Detainees told Human Rights Watch that he recounted being transported to Mbuya
military hospital where his leg was amputated at the knee and then brought to
Bombo barracks to recuperate. He was later reportedly released without charge.

Electric Shock

Six detainees detailed three
different interrogations where they endured electric shock during questioning
at CMI and witnessed other detainees being given electric shock at the same
time.[146]Two detainees
described their interrogators removing a small machine about the size of a
flashlight from a box. The machine was plugged into the wall and it had small
green lights on it and would make a shrill sound when turned on. One victim
told Human Rights Watch, "They put [the machine] on my head many times and on
my back and shoulders. The pain would last for a few seconds each time and it
would make you feel paralyzed."[147]

According to one detainee,
JATT personnel when talking between themselves, referred to this treatment
saying, abadde yetaagamu e kipindi kiri, meaning literally that she needed
to be treated in "that other way."[148]

Four detainees said that,
JATT and CMI personnel used a metal implement attached to a battery to shock
them on the joints during interrogations. One former detainee showed Human
Rights Watch researchers large keloid burns on his shoulders that he said were
the result of electric shock during his interrogations.

"Invisible torture"

Non-governmental
organizations and media outlets have documented the use of "invisible torture"
in Uganda, described as "ingenious torture methods that leave no physical marks
on victims but are as severe and brutalising."[149]Doctors
and social workers at the African Center for Victims of Torture told a reporter
in Uganda in 2007 that they had been seeing a number of patients who had been
tortured "as a result of what we call invisible torture or systematic torture;
infliction of maximum harm leaving no traces behind like scars of bodily
bruises."[150]

Human Rights Watch also
documented recent instances of "invisible torture" carried out by JATT and CMI
agents on detainees who had been held in Kololo. Techniques include forcing
detainees to sit in stress positions, rubbing chili pepper into the eyes, nose
and mouth, repeatedly pouring jerry cans of water over detainees or forcing
them to sit in water for prolonged periods of time.

Former detainees reported
that JATT personnel used chili pepper or kamulali rubbed into the eyes
as a form of torture that leaves no trace. The red chili pepper would be ground
up, mixed with water, and then smeared into the eyes, nose and mouths of
detainees.[151]

One detainee told Human
Rights Watch:

Asiimwe, also known as
Semakula, went out of the room and came back with a small plastic container
which had pepper in it. They started stuffing pepper in our eyes and Mucunguzi
was holding the upper part of my eye while Semakula held down the lower lid,
picked pepper from the container and pushed it into my eyes. I was the last to
suffer this so I saw very well what these guys were doing to my fellow
detainees. Semakula had wrapped his hand with a polythene paper to avoid direct
contact with the pepper in the plastic container as he stuffed it in our eyes.
The pain was too much and at this point I could not see anything. Then they
resumed the beating and I cannot tell now who was beating who.[152]

Detainees recounted to Human
Rights Watch being forced into physically demanding "stress positions" while
being interrogated. Some were forced to hold a large rock above their heads for
long periods of time, and would be beaten if they allowed the rock to fall to
the ground.[153]According to
one man, "they would make us do push ups and beat us while we did them. Or make
us do push ups on our knuckles and beat us. Then, they would make us sit with
our legs stretched wide apart."[154]

One former detainee told
Human Rights Watch that JATT personnel placed the legs of a chair on his toes
and then stood on the chair for the duration of the interrogation. He later
lost the nails of those toes due to the injury sustained.[155] Two recounted having glass soda bottles forced into
their mouths.

Another technique involved
striking detainees once very hard to knock the breath out of them. One former
detainee described this practice as being "hit very hard on the back with the
flat of a palm. It felt like my heart would burst out of my chest. They called
that 'stamping.'"[156]

In one instance described to
Human Rights Watch, detainees were stripped naked and jerry cans of water were
poured over them for several hours. One of the detainees, who had pre-existing
health problems, was left in a tub of water overnight.[157]

Forced Confessions

Many former detainees at
Kololo alleged that they had been forced to admit crimes or sign statements
under duress, while being beaten, or by threat of physical violence.

"They even had a system for
how it worked," one former female detainee who had been arrested in Hoima and
taken to Kololo told Human Rights Watch,

One pointed a gun at me and said that I was an ADF rebel.
He asked me which part of the bush I had been in. The one pointing the gun at
me made me lie down on the floor of the sitting room. One stepped on my head
and another was beating me and stepping on my ankles and slapping me around the
ears. They kept stepping on my head and beating me over and over again in the
knees and ankles. One would ask me questions and another one would write down
what he said, even if I didn't answer the questions, one man told the other man
what to write for my answers.[158]

Detainees reported that they
were sometimes suffocated for short periods of time while being questioned. In
one case, JATT agents tied a cloth around a detainee's nose and mouth so she
couldn't speak and had trouble breathing. "After they beat me for two or three
hours, I tried to communicate to them that I would talk," she said. "They took
the cloth off and I said, 'What should I say?' My body was swelling, everything
hurt. I was lying on a wood parquet floor of the house. When I said I would
agree to whatever they wanted me to say, they left me alone."[159]

Other detainees were
threatened with physical violence if they didn't sign statements prepared by
JATT agents. "The man called Mwesigwa and others told him I wouldn't sign. He
said, I give you three minutes to sign or we will beat you again. So, I was
tired of beatings and I agreed to sign."[160]

In some instances, detainees
were eventually brought to a police station or the Criminal Investigations
Division where their cases were officially processed. Statements signed under
duress while at JATT or CMI would appear in their files at that time. One
detainee told Human Rights Watch,

The policeman asked us how long we had been in the
safehouse, and I said from September 29, 2007 to February, 2008. He said to me,
I arrested you today. You are charged with terrorism. I said that I wanted to
make my statement and deny the charges, but he said I didn't have to do
anything because they already had my statement from before. I told him that we
had been forced to sign those and that they weren't real. He said no.[161]

Uganda's Responsibility to Investigate Allegations of
Torture

Uganda is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)[162] and the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's
Rights,[163] both of which set out prohibitions on arbitrary detention
and the use of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Uganda is
also a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture), which obliges
states to prohibit and take appropriate action to prevent and sanction acts of
torture, and also acts of inhuman and degrading treatment.[164]

Many of the cases documented
in this report rise to the level of torture, in that they involved the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering for the purpose of obtaining
a confession or extracting information, or punishing the victim for his or her
own or a relative's perceived wrongdoing.

The Convention against
Torture requires states to undertake a prompt and impartial investigation
wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been
committed.[165]Further, the
UN Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2001) provides that
"[e]ven in the absence of an express complaint, an investigation should be
undertaken if there are other reasons to believe that torture or ill-treatment
might have occurred."[166]

Given the long history of
allegations of detention and torture at the Kololo facility, impartial investigations
should be immediately undertaken.

Collective Punishment

Human Rights Watch spoke to
several women who were unlawfully detained and ill-treated by JATT to compel
them to provide information on their husbands or other male relatives with
alleged ADF involvement. Such "collective punishment"-punishing someone as a
means of harming a third party-compounds the otherwise unlawful treatment meted
out.

A woman whose husband had
spent time in Kololo in JATT detention years earlier told Human Rights Watch
that afterwards he had become mentally unwell and never rejoined the family. In
early 2007, armed JATT agents came to her place of business and arrested her.Although she
had not seen her husband in years, JATT agents repeatedly asked about his
whereabouts. When she said she did not know, she was put into a car and taken
to the JATT offices in Kololo. After being searched, she was brought before
then-director of counter-terrorism, Dominic Twesigomwe, who also asked her about
the whereabouts of her husband. She said she didn't know where he was. According
to the woman:

They got annoyed when I said
I didn't know where my husband was and they started beating me. They slapped me
in the head many times. I started to lose awareness of what was happening
because they kept hitting me all over. It seemed like it lasted over one hour.[167]

The woman was locked for six
months in a small room on the compound of the JATT offices, where she was given
a bucket to use as a toilet. Several men questioned her almost daily about the
whereabouts of her husband. She was eventually brought to the police station
and charged with treason. After spending one month in Luzira maximum security
prison, she was released on bail.[168]

Another woman told Human
Rights Watch of similar treatment by JATT agents in 2006. Her husband had been
suspected of ADF involvement, but had fled Uganda and died in exile in Nairobi. She was arrested in 2006, brought to JATT and interrogated about her husband's
whereabouts. She describes her treatment:

They
removed my veil. They brought a piece of cloth and tied it around my mouth and
nose and ears very tightly. One of them got a glass soda bottle and began
hitting me with it. And others were kicking and slapping me on both my ears at
the same time, they were slamming my head. One man hit me with a cable on the
back and it cut through me.[169]

Another woman who spent four
months in JATT told Human Rights Watch that she was questioned about the
whereabouts of her brother who had been suspected of ADF involvement and had
previously been arrested by the military.[170]

Some former detainees
interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported seeing very small children who were
being held along with their mothers for months inside the Kololo compound. At
one point in January 2008, a detainee saw three children she believed to be under
two years old.[171]

Theft of Money and Personal Items

Theft during searches and
after arrest was a common occurrence, according to detainees. Items of value
were taken and not returned to the detainees, even in instances where they were
released without charge. One detainee was brought to the JATT offices in Kololo
and was searched by a male JATT employee who did not identify himself. He found
80,000 shillings (37 USD) and a telephone in the detainee's pockets. He kept
both the money and the telephone. Later, the detainee was brought to her home
by three JATT personnel where they conducted a search. "They didn't find
anything, except our money. We had 1.2million shillings (610 USD) in the house
and they took it with them. They had a paper with them and they wrote down that
they found 300,000 Shillings (150 USD) but they took much more than that. There
was a police man there and he said we must report all the money, but the men
from JATT said no."[172]

In another instance, a
detainee's car was impounded by JATT personnel after his arrest. Once he was
released without charge, he was told that he had to pay 2.5 million shillings
(1160 USD) to have the car returned to him. He did so and the car was returned.[173]

One detainee told Human
Rights Watch that JATT personnel gave her money back upon her release. "They
said that they wanted to help me so I should help them. They gave me a phone
number to call if my husband, who they were looking for, came home. Then they
gave me 25,000 Shillings and told me to go back home. They had stolen 60,000
shillings when they searched the house so they were just giving me back part of
what they stole."[174]

Incommunicado Detention

Incommunicado detention is
generally understood as a situation of detention in which an individual is
denied access to family members, an attorney, or an independent physician. Incommunicado
detention is contrary to general principles of international human rights law,
specifically the right to communicate with legal counsel, to be free from
arbitrary interference with family correspondence, and to be treated humanely.[175]

According to the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, "[a]n untried prisoner shall be
allowed to inform immediately his family of his detention and shall be given
all reasonable facilities for communicating with his family and friends, and
for receiving visits from them," subject to reasonable security restrictions.[176]

The right of all persons
accused of a crime to the assistance of a lawyer is a fundamental procedural
guarantee. Article 14 of the ICCPR states that everyone charged with a criminal
offense has the right "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing" or to be assigned free legal assistance if necessary. The
Human Rights Committee has considered these provisions applicable to periods
before trial, including the period in police custody.[177]The UN Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers provides that "all arrested, detained or
imprisoned persons shall be provided with adequate opportunities, time and
facilities to be visited by and to communicate and consult with a lawyer,
without delay, interception or censorship and in full confidentiality. Such consultations
may be within sight, but not within the hearing, of law enforcement officials."[178]

United Nations human rights
bodies have found that incommunicado detention can give rise to serious human
rights violations and should be prohibited.[179] The UN Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly
reaffirmed this position, most recently in a 2003 resolution, holding the view
that "prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate the perpetration of
torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or even torture."[180]

Former detainees interviewed
by Human Rights Watch held in Kololo anywhere from one week to more than 11
months without charge, said detention was always incommunicado. The one
exception among those interviewed by Human Rights Watch occurred in December
2008, when religious leader Sheikh Murshid Mwemba was permitted access to a detainee.[181]

Not one detainee interviewed
by Human Rights Watch reported being permitted to contact family members. Human
Rights Watch also spoke with family members who had looked in police jails for
a missing relative, only to learn informally from others in the community or
recently released detainees that the person was in Kololo.[182]

In one instance, a man who
had spent five months in Kololo before being charged with terrorism and
imprisoned in Luzira prison asked Human Rights Watch to inform his relatives of
his whereabouts. It had been a year since his arrest, and he had no news of his
wife or children. He didn't know where they were or if they were being cared
for. When Human Rights Watch contacted the family members, they said they had
no idea what had happened to him and that they believed he had been killed.[183]

None of the detainees
interviewed by Human Rights Watch were granted permission to speak with lawyers
during their detention in Kololo. Many detainees did not know they had the
right to demand a lawyer from the moment of their arrest. However, even in one
case where Human Rights Watch knows a detainee was informed of this right he
was prevented from doing so. In this instance, a representative of an embassy
conducted a consular visit to a dual national held in the Kololo compound.[184]Though the dual national was handed a list of
lawyers by the embassy representative, it was immediately taken from him by
JATT agents when the representative departed.[185]

VIII. Release or Transfer from JATT

Charged with Terrorism or Treason

Some former detainees held by
JATT were eventually brought to police stations and charged with terrorism or
treason.

At police stations, detainees
often found that the statements they had been forced to sign were already in
their files. One detainee told Human Rights Watch, "I told [the police] that I
wanted to make my statement and that I had been forced to sign that paper. He
said no, took our pictures and fingerprints and sent us to the [magistrate]."
It was the first time the man had been in front of a magistrate since his
arrest by JATT five months before.[186]

Those who are charged and
transferred to the prison have spent prolonged time on remand. In one instance,
two women who were charged with terrorism for involvement with the ADF spent
seven years in prison awaiting trial. They were arrested in 1999, charged with
terrorism before the magistrates' court in August 2000, and the case was
committed to the High Court. They were eventually released on September 15,
2006 by a judge who noted that the state had violated their constitutional
rights by keeping them on remand for that long.[187]

The long remand times for defendants
are not particular to former-Kololo detainees. Prison officials have complained
that the Ugandan courts are inefficient at disposing of cases.[188] However, because their alleged crimes are usually
eligible for amnesty, the long remand times tend to discourage defendants from
having their day in court, and cause them to apply for amnesty, even if they have
not been involved in acts of rebellion.

Release by JATT without Charge

Some detainees reported that
they were released without any charges ever brought against them after months
in detention. JATT never gave them any documents to indicate how much time they
had spent in JATT custody or to clear them of further arrest or interrogation.
One former detainee told Human Rights Watch that he,

(…) was in the garage in JATT and they called us up … and
said, 'Do you have people you could call who could come and collect you?' We
were taken to the Criminal Investigations Department in Kibuli. They took our
fingerprints and our photos . . . They didn't give us any documents to show
that we had been released formally without charge. They told us that we
shouldn't join bad people. But they didn't give us any money for transport and
no release papers.[189]

Police Bond

In other instances, detainees
who had been held by JATT for long periods were brought to police headquarters
and then released on police bond, despite being accused of very serious crimes.
Under the terms of the bond, they were required to report to the Criminal
Investigations Department to answer further questions. For example, Dr. Ismail
Kalule was arrested on November 14, 2008 by two men known as Lt. Sendi Yahaya
and Kamada, who Kalule knew to be JATT agents. He was held in Kololo and then
was released on December 18 on a police bond for terrorism.[190]He is
required to report to the police every two weeks.

It is unclear if police are
in fact pursuing investigations in all of the cases in which people are free on
bond. One criminal lawyer pointed out to Human Rights Watch that bond allows
the police to keep track of certain individuals, even when they are not under
active investigation and to keep them under surveillance.[191]

The Amnesty Process

Some detainees, during their
prolonged illegal detention or while on remand, apply for amnesty. Former
detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that they believed this
was their only way out to return to their families. Those who professed
innocence said that awaiting a trial would take too long and the financial toll
on their families would be too great without the breadwinner.[192] Others reported that JATT agents took them to the
amnesty commission and forced them to seek amnesty against their will.[193]

The Amnesty Law

In 2000, parliament passed the
Amnesty Act, which established the Amnesty Commission and procedures for the
granting amnesty to "Ugandans involved in acts of a war-like nature in various
parts of the country" who complied with specified requirements stipulated in
the Act.[194] The Act
provides that, "An Amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at any
time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or
armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda by actual
participation in combat; collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or
armed rebellion; committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or
armed rebellion; or assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war
or armed rebellion."[195]

Requirements of those seeking
amnesty include reporting to a local government or religious leader, renouncing
and abandoning involvement in the war or armed rebellion and surrendering all
weapons. At that point, the individual seeking amnesty is issued a "Certificate
of Amnesty" and given a reinsertion package.[196] The amnesty depends on individual application to the
authorities for the "certificate."

If the individual is in
"lawful detention" for one of the eligible crimes, he or she can report to a
prison officer, or a judge or magistrate to declare intention to apply for
amnesty. However, for these individuals, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)
must also certify that the applicant meets the requirements of the Act, but the
state has no choice, according to current DPP Richard Buteera, but to grant the
amnesty.[197]If an
individual in or out of custody meets the requirements of the Act, he or she
can not be prosecuted or punished for their alleged crimes in any way.[198] Amnesty petitions are generally available in the
prisons and prisoners-including those charged with treason or terrorism-may
fill them out and send them to the authorities without a lawyer.

The Amnesty Commission,
chaired by a judge, has responsibility only for overseeing the demobilization
and reintegration of those applying for amnesty, and for ensuring the criteria
for amnesty have been met. However, the Commission has no discretion to deny
amnesty to any applicant who meets the basic criteria. So far, 22,995 people
have been granted amnesty under this law, more than half of whom are combatants
of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).[199]

Varied Paths to Amnesty

In practice, routes to
amnesty for those in custody are confusing and varied. Some are granted amnesty
fairly quickly and released, while others are released on bail and wait months
for the final grant of amnesty. In the meantime, they are not brought to trial.

For example, one woman
interviewed by Human Rights Watch had been abducted by ADF rebels as a girl in
2000. She was wounded during an exchange of fire between the Ugandan army and
the rebels and was captured by the army. After her wounds healed, she was
brought to Kololo and detained for 10 days. Eventually she was transferred to
the Central Police Station in Kampala where she spent another month in custody
before being charged with treason and misprision of treason. In August 2007 she
was transferred to Luzira prison. She applied for amnesty in September 2007,
but was released on bail in May 2008. She was required to report to the
magistrate every month as a condition of her bail and she has never been
officially granted amnesty.[200]She has also
never had a trial. While awaiting amnesty, the prosecutors dropped the charges
in her case after further perusal of the file.[201] This case shows that there are instances in which the
case against the individual is very weak and yet the person applies for amnesty
in an attempt to extricate themselves from lengthy legal proceedings.

Some detainees told Human
Rights Watch that they had been forced to apply for amnesty by JATT personnel
or that they were aware of other former detainees who had been forced to apply
for amnesty. For example, one man said that after many months in illegal
detention in Kololo, he was brought up from the garage detention area to an
office in October 2008. There, a member of JATT told him to write out an
apology:

I . . . wrote that if the government has no case against
me, I request to be released and go back home. When I gave it to [the JATT
member] he read through it and looked at me and he told me to go back
downstairs. I was called again back to his office the following day . . . and
he gave me another statement he had already typed saying that I was an ADF
rebel and I have repented and would never join the rebels again and I am
seeking for amnesty. He told me 'What you wrote was rejected." He told me to
rewrite the statement he had typed in my handwriting and sign both the typed
copy and the hand written one, which I did."[202]

Another former detainee told
Human Rights Watch that JATT personnel told him he had two choices-admit his
offense and take amnesty or hang. Later during his detention, a police officer
at the Criminal Investigations Department told him that if he tried to pursue
his case through the courts, he might be acquitted but JATT would re-arrest him
anyway. Amnesty was the only choice.[203]

One former detainee told
Human Rights Watch, "One day, [JATT agent] John Mwesigwa came and told us, 'we
are taking you to the Amnesty Commission. We have released you.' He then took
me aside and said you are going to meet the press but you must tell them that
we have treated you very well and you have not been beaten."[204]

No safeguards exist in
Ugandan law to prevent security agencies from forcing individuals to apply for
amnesty despite the state having no or little evidence of their alleged illegal
activity. According to one criminal lawyer in Uganda, abuses of the amnesty
process exist, because it allows the state to claim the high moral ground of
forgiveness, while potentially covering up for poor criminal investigations and
lack of evidence against certain individuals.[205] In this way, the security agencies also achieve the
objective of intimidating people from coming forward about their mistreatment
while in custody and stigmatizing them as rebels in their community. Brig.
Mugira demurred when asked by Human Rights Watch that anyone is forced or
compelled to apply for amnesty by his officers.[206]

The Amnesty Commission has no
formal relationship with JATT or other security agencies.[207] According to commission chairman Justice Peter Onega,
if someone has been in custody and mistreated or held for long periods of time,
that could very well compel them to apply for amnesty, but the commission has
never investigated what prompts applicants to a seek amnesty and it does not
share statistics on how or from which location individuals apply.[208] Justice Onega told Human Rights Watch that he cannot
rule out some individuals may have been coerced to seek amnesty by members of
the security organizations, but said that the commission was not a party to
that activity in any way.[209]According to the International Organization of
Migration (IOM), the Amnesty Commission has referred 14 amnestied individuals
who were previously in JATT custody to IOM for reception and reinsertion
assistance.[210] It is unclear how many of them were brought to the
Commission against their will.

Still other applicants for
amnesty remain in prison for long periods of time, despite applications for
amnesty pending and no conviction for their alleged crimes. According to the
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative, nine individuals who had been charged
with treason in relation to participation in various armed groups on October 3,
2003 are currently held in Luzira Upper Prison.[211] The media reported in December 2006 that "Luzira
Prisons Spokesman, Baker Asinja, confirmed the group has been on remand for the
last three years, despite the constant reminders to the Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence (CMI) to withdraw the charges against the suspects."[212] On April 4, 2006, the General Courts Martial (GCM)
dropped charges and discontinued proceedings against the nine, but General Elly
Tumwine, president of the GCM, ruled that their release was contingent on
clearance from CMI.[213]

On October 12, 2006, a CMI
legal officer responded to a letter from a Uganda Human Rights Commission
officer who had asked CMI why the nine had not been granted amnesty. In that
letter, CMI accepts that the GCM referred the amnesty application of the nine
to CMI, but stated that "the 9 applicants have to date not been cleared for
amnesty by the superior authority of the UPDF."[214] There is no mention in law of the role of CMI in the
amnesty process, so it remains unclear why the armed forces would be involved
in their release at all.

The nine have now been in
custody for more than five years. They have never had a trial or been convicted
of any crimes. When asked about this case, Brig. Mugira professed no knowledge
of the nine, but agreed that CMI has no role to play in the amnesty process.[215]

The case of the nine casts a
long shadow over prisoners in Luzira. Human Rights Watch interviewed five of
the nine men in Luzira prison.[216] Some were considering submitting habeus corpus petitions
but were struggling to afford the necessary legal assistance. As one, who had
formerly been detained by JATT in Kololo said, "The government created all of
the information against us. But, we don't want to stay here for years so we
sign for amnesty, but then sometimes you don't even get out once you do have
amnesty. You can just be forgotten here."[217]

IX. CMI response to reports of torture and detention by
JATT

Human Rights Watch maintained
dialogue with chief of military intelligence Brig. James Mugira throughout the
research for this report, in letters, email and in an in-person interview.[218]The brigadier
said that, since taking over the role of chief of the Chieftaincy
of Military Intelligence (CMI) in August 2008, he has implemented a new process
of "screening" the arrest and detentions of people by JATT. He said he receives
regular reports of who is arrested, by whom and when, especially because of the
"financial implications." He said that JATT's focus will remain on terrorism
and treason cases, but that JATT is not a court of law and that if he intends
that someone be prosecuted, the person will be passed on to the police. He
reported that he intends to "polish up" JATT operations, but didn't specify
what changes would take place.

Mugira said that JATT was
necessary because of the threat posed by the ADF and by Al-Qaeda, which no
single agency could deal with. These groups, he argued, "change tactics, call
for jihad, mobilize in the mosques and move between Kampala and Congo." This demanded that the police, the military, ISO and ESO work together.[219]

Human Rights Watch raised the
substance of this report with the brigadier. He acknowledged that suspects were
being detained longer than the legal maximum 48 hour period, arguing that the
48-hour time frame in which an individual can be held without charge under the
Ugandan constitution is not realistic. He said that "trained rebels" needed to
be interrogated longer than 48 hours.[220] He also referred to efforts in Britain to extend the time in which terrorism suspects can be held without charge, as an example of
another country having the same problem.[221]

When asked about one specific
recent set of arrests in which five people were held by JATT for several weeks
without charge, he said that though the suspects were not initially
cooperative, "after some time, they talked." He acknowledged that some suspects
are held longer than the constitutional limit, but said that he believed the
time frame was more like one week and that several months was "too long."
Regarding the detention in ungazetted locations, specifically the JATT facility
in Kololo, the brigadier said that "high profile" people are brought to Kololo
and that these people must be separated from common criminals and that there
should be a special detention place for them. He said that those JATT is still
holding are people that they are "still interested in." However, he maintained
that Kololo was not "outside the law."

The CMI chief rejected
outright that some detainees had been held in incommunicado detention in Kololo.
He said that family members who want to see someone detained in Kololo should
come to see him via an appointment made with his military assistant or they
should contact their parliamentarian. He said that visits could take place, but
only with his staff present. However, family members of former Kololo detainees
interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that military and civilian authorities
had refused to provide information regarding the whereabouts of missing members
of their family.[222] None of the twenty-five former detainees said that
they had a visit from a family member while in detention.

Mugira also said that the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had had access to the Kololo
facility, but according to ICRC, it did not visit detainees in Kololo in 2007
or 2008.[223]

The brigadier said that he
would investigate all allegations of mistreatment of detainees by his staff and
that there would be individual criminal responsibility for torture. He acknowledged
that interrogations could be "harsh, such as denying sleep" but said that
torture did not take place. When asked about deaths in custody by JATT, he said
that "nobody can torture someone to death under this government." However, when
queried about the well-known case of Patrick Mamenero who died in CMI custody in
2002, Brig. Mugira did say he was aware of that case.[224]

The CMI chief said that the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel provide training for his staff both overseas and in Uganda. He reported, for example, that Maj. Benson Mande, the current director of
counter-terrorism at JATT, had been trained by the United States and South Africa.[225]

Brig. Mugira denied Human Rights Watch's request to visit
JATT in Kololo, but agreed to continue dialogue on allegations of abuse. He
said that it might be possible to close Kololo and referenced that the United States had recently announced the closing of the detention facilities at Guantanamo.

Human Rights Watch provided the
chief with the names of five people who we believe are currently in JATT
custody and have been held for over six months. Though Mugira had stated in a
November 3, 2008 letter that these individuals were in police custody, Human
Rights Watch has been unable to locate them there. Mugira promised to follow up
on the exact whereabouts of these individuals but his office has not responded
to attempts to secure this information to date. Those individuals whose
whereabouts are still unknown are:

1.Hamuza Mwebe
– detained on or around May 28, 2008.

2.Abdurahmann
Kijjambu – detained on or around July 12, 2008.

3.Ismail
Kambaale – detained on or around July 13, 2008.

4.Sekulima
Muhammad – detained on or around May 8, 2008.

5.Abdul Hamiid
Mugera – first detained by the military in Kisaasi for three to six months and
transferred to JATT in March 2008.

Human Rights Watch considers
these individuals to be victims of enforced disappearance.

X. Responsibilities to
Monitor and Oversee JATT

Role of the Executive

The president of Uganda has a critical role to play in
curtailing abuses and ensuring that the manner in which law enforcement and counterterrorism
operations are conducted does not violate international and national law. Under
the constitution, the president has a duty to safeguard the constitution and the
laws of Uganda and to promote the welfare of the citizens.[226]
The abuses documented in this report illustrate serious violations of the
constitutional right to be free from torture as well violations of Ugandan
criminal procedure.

As Commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has
a direct role to play regarding abuses perpetrated by the army, such as
military intelligence personnel operating under JATT. Under the UPDF Act, he
holds the power to appoint the Chief of Defence
Forces who is responsible for the command, control and administration of the
armed forces.[227]President Museveni has taken swift action to suspend
members of the armed forces suspected of embezzlement on two occasions.[228]

The president has the power
to influence how the types of abuses documented in this report are addressed. The
president should issue direct orders to JATT and CMI personnel to cease illegal
detention and torture of suspects. He should order that Ugandan law be
respected at each stage of any criminal investigation or counterterrorism
operation. Human rights monitors and the Uganda Human Rights Commission should
be granted access to detainees in any detention facility, including those in Kololo.
Prosecutors should have the independence in which to investigate torture and
illegal detention by JATT. Those found to be responsible for abuses should have
their active service to the state terminated and should be held to account. The
president should ensure that no one prevents or obstructs such investigations.

Role of National
Security Council and Key Ministries

The National
Security Council (NSC), chaired by the president, is also a vital government
organ which should insist on an end to violations of human rights and Uganda law committed by ad hoc security groups like JATT, and on accountability for those
abuses.[229]The
NSC is comprised of all the key government actors in the security and law
enforcement sector, including the Ministers of Internal Affairs, Foreign
Affairs, Defence, Security, Finance and the Attorney General as well as the
heads of the military, the police, External Security Organisation, Internal
Security Organisation, Special Branch, Military Intelligence, the Criminal
Investigation Department and the Prisons Commissioner.[230]

The Council has a
mandate to advise the president on matters relating to national security and to
coordinate and advise the president on policy matters related to intelligence and
security.[231]
In this capacity, all NSC members should ensure that intelligence is gathered
while adhering to international and Ugandan law, and that human rights are
respected in the course of any security or intelligence operations. When abuses
by state actors are reported, NSC members should encourage accountability by
fair and credible trials for those accused of any wrongdoing.

The Role of the Justice
Law and Order Sector (JLOS)

In 2001, Uganda
established a sector-wide approach to improve service
delivery and coordination in the administration of justice and maintenance of
law and order, known as JLOS. The sector comprises ten government
institutions which "collectively implement reforms that
have been drawn from a single policy and expenditure plan, under the leadership
of the Government of Uganda."[232] JLOS is
supported by a consortium of donor countries which act as development partners.

The sector's objectives
include promoting of rule of law and due process and "fostering human rights
culture across all sector institutions" as well as improving access to justice.[233]The sector has had some success, increasing
institutional and personnel capacity in the justice sector, working to
decongest prisons and trying to reduce the backlog of legal cases pending
before the courts.

According to the
June 2007 JLOS annual report, the sector "will have to focus on . . . increasing respect for the suspects'
rights to freedom from torture and other forms of ill treatment."[234]This focus should include ungazetted places of
detention, such as Kololo, and encouraging victims to report abuses by JATT.

Though the armed
forces are not part of JLOS, the sector provides an important forum in which
the abuses documented in this report should be addressed. The police, the
Directorate of Public Prosecutions and the judiciary may work from evidence
collected by JATT personnel, and human rights abuses committed during JATT
investigations directly impacts the ability of the sector to attain its objectives.

The Role of Parliament

The Uganda Parliament
has a crucial role to play in overseeing the activities of intelligence and law
enforcement operations. Because JATT is a joint operation between four agencies,
two parliamentary committees have oversight powers: the Committee on Defence
and Internal Affairs (PCDIA), which covers the Ministry of Defence (and the
UPDF and CMI) and the police, and the Committee on Presidential Affairs, which
covers both the Internal and External Security Organizations. According to the
rules of procedure for Parliament, these committees are mandated to examine and comment on policy matters affecting the
ministries covered by them, as well as to evaluate relevant programs, make
appropriate recommendations, monitor the performance in their respective areas
and to ensure government compliance with approved activities.[235] The committees are both "sessional," meaning that
their membership, chairmanship, and agenda can change year to year.[236]

In the past, the
PCDIA has responded to concerns about torture and illegal detention, albeit not
apparently with the rigor or transparency that meaningful oversight involves.
For example, in 2002 the PCDIA formed an ad hoc select committee to undertake a
study of torture, and safehouses and other places of ungazetted detention.[237]Parliamentarians
visited five locations run by security organizations, including the JATT
offices in Kololo accompanied by then head of CMI, Col. Noble Mayombo. The
committee concluded that it could find no traces of torture in any of the five
locations. Some parliamentarians questioned the report's findings, saying in
the press that it was an "open secret that state security agencies torture
suspects in detention centres."[238] According to one member of that committee, that
report was never made public and its recommendations, if there were any, were
never implemented.[239]

Since then, Parliament
and its committees with specified oversight functions have not addressed the
specific human rights violations committed by JATT documented in this report. A former chairperson of the committee member
interviewed by Human Rights Watch believed that the PCDIA had the power to
summon CMI or officials from JATT and require them to provide information about
their activities, but that they had not done this.[240]

According to some members of
parliament (MPs), Parliament's oversight of the military and any of activities
involving the army has been historically weak because the military are
represented in Parliament, serve as members of various committees including the
PCDIA,and have, at
times, chaired the PCDIA.[241] This meant that the military could effectively carry
out oversight of itself. Under the current Rules of Parliament, passed in 2006,
active members of the military can not serve in committee leadership. The PCDIA
has, therefore, had civilian parliamentarians as chairpersons, but other
obstacles have prevented the committee from having serious impact on reining in
the ad hoc security services such as JATT. Several MPs interviewed by Human
Rights Watch noted that because the committee members change regularly, the
lack of continuity makes it difficult to track abuses or see patterns of abuse
by the security sector.[242] As one MP on the PCDIA stated, "When the year lapses,
what wasn't completed tends to die a natural death."[243]

One current member of the
committee voiced a desire to do sufficient research to have pertinent facts and
make serious recommendations that could have long-term impact, but claimed that
without more resources and staff with relevant technical expertise, the
committees could not perform their mandated activities.[244] One parliamentarian, a member of the National
Resistance Movement party, told Human Rights Watch: "We come from different
backgrounds and with a huge variety of knowledge of defense issues. Without a
better understanding of how to engage with the military, committee members
often sit there like listening posts and take no action."[245]

MPs from both the opposition
and ruling parties suggested other, fundamentally political, considerations
that prevent parliamentary committees providing effective oversight of defense
and intelligence work in Uganda. One stated that because the ruling NRM
constitutes the majority on each committee, the committee members would find it
very difficult to find fault with the actions of the security organizations,
especially the military, no matter what resources are made available.[246] Another MP said that the intelligence agencies provide
misleading information to parliament members and the public.[247] Another said that because of the history of military
leadership in Uganda, Parliament has problems separating concerns for national
security from how operations are conducted: "There are simply issues,
especially related to how security operations are carried out, that we cannot
discuss."[248]

Parliament and specifically
the mandated committees have an important role to play in curtailing abuses by
JATT and other ad hoc agencies. One parliamentarian noted that there should be
a standing committee on human rights that could sustain pressure on
intelligence, military and law enforcement to respond to allegations of abuse.[249] Without more efforts by parliament to oversee how
JATT operates, who carries out arrests and how persons arrested are treated
while in custody, JATT will continue to receive a classified budget without
anyone from the elected government or the public questioning its conduct and
abuses will likely continue.

The Role of the Uganda Human Rights Commission

The constitutionally
enshrined Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) was established to investigate
human rights violations and to have access to and monitor detention conditions.[250] The commission, which is a standing body with
judicial powers, is empowered to subpoena any witness or document, order the
release of any detained person, and recommend payment or compensation, or any
other legal remedy after it finds the existence of a human rights abuse.[251] The agency of government found responsible for torture
or other illegal conduct by the commission may appeal the decision to the High
Court. In some cases the commission has awarded damages for torture. Many such
cases are pending before it.

Since 1997, the UHRC has
investigated 3,155 torture complaints, and the UHRC tribunal has held hearings on
some of those cases. In 2007, the Uganda Police Force, the Ugandan military and
the Violent Crimes Crack Unit had the most complaints lodged against them,
although there were also complaints against others, including military
intelligence, JATT, and local government.[252] More than 60 percent of the 2007 complaints resolved
involved allegations of torture.

Though the UHRC has the
mandate to visit places of detention, investigators from the commission have
rarely been granted access to the Kololo facility and have never been permitted
to enter the safehouse-the garage where many victims report being held. In one
instance in which UHRC staff was granted access, they found individuals who were
dressed in army uniforms, allegedly members of the armed forces who had
committed offenses such as being AWOL and some minor offenses. The military
claimed that they had no civilians in custody.[253]

The government frequently
fails to pay compensation for torture, as decided by the UHRC.[254] According to the Commission, "the implication [of
monetary compensation] is that torture cases are costly, causing a taxpayer to
lose money. . . . The trends in the violation of the right to freedom from
torture have been consistent for the last consecutive three years and
government has to find a solution to this problem."[255] The Commission has frequently complained that when
awards are made, however, compensation is not paid out rapidly or with great
frequency.[256]The UHRC has
pointed out that "there is lack of political will to prevent torture that is
further reflected in government's failure to honour compensations awarded by
the UHRC."[257]

A disadvantage of the UHRC as
an avenue for recourse in cases of torture is that its awards are not as
generous as a victim might receive by retaining an attorney to take the case to
the High Court. Another weakness is that decisions by the UHRC do not hold
individual state officials or their superiors criminally responsible for their
actions. While victims of abuse in custody are able to obtain some measure of
compensation, those responsible for the abuse continue to benefit from the
prevailing climate of impunity.

X. Role of Uganda's Foreign Partners in the Military
and Security Sector

Uganda's foreign partners have largely failed to
address serious human rights violations by security forces in Uganda, including its counterterrorism forces. The Ugandan government's use of unlawful detention
and torture against terrorism and treason suspects violates domestic and
international human rights law. And its unwillingness to take action against
those responsible, particularly in JATT, is a dereliction of the government's international
legal obligations.

Foreign governments who
provide training and collaborate with the Ugandan military and police on
counterterrorism, national security and justice issues have a substantial responsibility
to use their influence with the Ugandan government to stop unlawful detention and
torture of suspects in the Kololo facility (and any other detention location
illegal or otherwise.) These governments should also urgently call on Uganda to grant detainees access to family members, legal representation and medical
attention, and investigate and prosecute abuses by members of the security
forces.

In his response to Human
Rights Watch, Brig. Mugira explained a series of trainings that JATT agents had
received from "partners in the war against terrorism," but did not give any
detail about the content of the courses.[258]In an
in-person meeting, Mugira told Human Rights Watch that the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel have all provided training to his forces.[259]

The United States

A US military official
confirmed that at least two former JATT directors had received training from
the United States and that the courses included a human rights component.[260]Media
reports, including those from US military sources, indicate that the US has
carried out multiple trainings on counterterrorism for Ugandan military forces
in Uganda, in a range of topics including "urban terrorism and
counter-insurgency" most recently in December 2008.[261] It is unclear if all members of JATT-including police
and intelligence officers-have participated in the US-taught courses.

To receive this US-training,
under the terms of the so-called Leahy amendment these individuals had to be
vetted for involvement in human rights abuses by the US and passed, because, in
principle, the United States prohibits military assistance to gross human
rights abusers under this provision.[262] The Leahy Amendment is a binding provision of the
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act that must be renewed every year. It
prohibits aid and training to units of foreign security forces if there is
credible evidence that the unit has committed gross human rights abuses. To
comply with the Leahy amendment, embassy personnel must actively monitor the
human rights behavior of military units that benefit from US security
assistance.

State Department officials
contacted by Human Rights Watch said that they monitor the situation of human
rights violations by Ugandan military and law enforcement closely and are in
touch with Ugandan human rights organizations.[263] Given the often-cited allegations of torture and
illegal detention by JATT and CMI by local and international human rights
organizations, and by the Uganda Human Rights Commission, it is unclear how
these individuals could have been eligible for US funded training.

The US congressional budget request for financial year 2009 for Uganda was 4.75 million USD for peace
and security operations including 150,000 USD for counter-terrorism activities.
The written explanation of the allocation states: "Funds will . . . be used to continue to restore
professionalism in Uganda's military . . . . Due to Uganda's strategic location
and porous borders, additional funds will be provided to deny terrorist
sponsorship and sanctuary."[264]

In 2005, Uganda also began using the US-funded Terrorist Interdiction Program at border points and the
international airport in Entebbe. According to media reports, the program is
"designed to collect and analyse data of passport holders" and allows "Ugandan
immigration officials to identify and intercept individuals of interest."[265] Given the prolonged illegal detention of the two
South Africans who were arrested at Entebbe Airport, the United States should ensure that the rights of any individual identified through the use of the
system are protected and that those individuals are not held beyond the
constitutional limits.

The United Kingdom

Historically, the United Kingdom has been one of Uganda's largest bilateral donors. In 2007, the UK signed a 10-year £700 million (1.1
billion USD) development plan to help the country rebuild after decades of
civil conflict.[266]Half of the £70 million (101 million USD) for
2006-2007 was in the form of direct budget support; the other portion was for
reconstruction of the war-ravaged north.[267]According to news reports, "the
Ugandan government has agreed to a focus on poverty reduction, financial
accountability and respecting human rights."[268]

Between December 2001 and December 2005, the UK provided Uganda with £500,000 (1 million USD) to carry out
its first strategic Defence Review. According to Hilary Benn, former UK Secretary of State for International Development, "the
aim of the Defence Review [was] to make the Uganda People's Defence Force more
professional and accountable within the resources available for defence
expenditure."[269] Britain has, at times, suspended or delayed aid to Uganda when the president sought to increase
spending on the defense sector.[270]

Given the ties between the UK and Ugandan militaries, the UK has a particular responsibility to raise human rights concerns directly with the Ugandan
government, especially the Ministry of Defence and senior commanders in the
Ugandan armed forces, to ensure that abuses by JATT and CMI agents are
investigated and prosecuted.

XI. Uganda's Anti-Terrorism Act

The criminal offense
of terrorism is set out in both the Ugandan Penal Code and the 2002 Anti-Terrorism
Act (ATA), which was passed in the wake of the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. The ATA lays out legal
procedures required when state authorities are conducting counterterrorism
investigations, defines the crime of "terrorism" in much greater detail than
the Penal Code and gives specific regulations for surveillance and interception
of communications by terrorism suspects. There is no specific mention of JATT
and its role to combat terror in the ATA.

Under the ATA, four groups
are labeled as terrorist organizations. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the
Lord's Resistance Movement (LRM), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Al-Qaeda.[271] Human Rights Watch is not aware of detentions in
Kololo of LRA or LRM suspects, though there have been several instances in
which LRA combatants have been held in CMI custody in ungazetted locations.[272]

The crime of terrorism, as
defined in the ATA, is overly broad, consisting of any act that involves
serious violence against a person or serious damage to property, endangers a
person's life (but not just the life of the person committing the act), or
creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public. Any such act must
be "designed to influence the Government or to intimidate the public or a
section of the public," and to advance a "political, religious, social or
economic aim" indiscriminately.[273]The
minister of internal affairs has the sole power to declare an organization
"terrorist" without challenge in court and without any
substantive requirements.[274]

Critics have pointed out other problematic aspects of the
ATA.[275] For
example, it does not precisely define "influencing the Government" and
"intimidating the public or a section of the public," potentially implicating
those who hold opposing views from the government. Journalists in particular
could be prosecuted for reporting on the activities of rebels during a war. The
ATA "subjects political activities to criminal sanctions, even when there has
been no criminal activity."[276]There is also no indication of the level of
damage that would render an act a crime of terrorism. According to two critics
"without clear definition of terms used, acts that should be punishable under
regular criminal law would under this law be punishable as acts of 'terrorism',
therefore attracting much higher sentences that are grossly unfair."[277]

Critics have also noted that the ATA for certain offenses
violates the right to be presumed innocent, which is explicitly guaranteed
under international human rights law.[278]
The ATA imposes up to five years of imprisonment for destroying material
likely to be relevant to an investigation, "unless the accused persons can
prove that they had no intention of concealing any information contained in
the material in question from the person carrying out the investigation"
(emphasis added).[279]
According to the International Commission of Jurists, "If a disproportionate
burden is placed on the accused to prove facts, or to prove a lack of criminal
intention, the [right to be presumed innocent] is effectively set aside.[280]

According to court
records, in 2008, there were ten individuals charged with "terrorism" in three
different cases, all related to ADF activity.[281] Of those cases, five of the individuals
received amnesty, one died after arriving at Luzira prison,[282] and four have cases still pending before the
high court. None have gone to trial. All of these individuals were initially
arrested by JATT and spent long periods of time in detention in Kololo and
other safehouses. It is unclear if these individuals were charged under the
Penal Code or the ATA. Prison and court records seen by Human Rights Watch both
indicate that all of the individuals were charged under the Penal Code, but
according to Director of Public Prosecutions Buteera, this is an error and all
are charged under the ATA.[283]

XIII. Annex

Letter from Human Rights Watch
to CMI

Brigadier James Mugira

Chieftaincy
of Military Intelligence

Kitante Road

Kampala

Uganda

October 20,
2008

Dear Brigadier
Mugira,

We are
writing to follow up on your recent meeting with our colleague Anneke Van
Woudenberg on September 3. As you know, Human Rights Watch and the late
Brigadier Noble Mayombo met and corresponded regularly while he was at the
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) and we look forward to establishing
such a dialogue with you as well. We seek a response to the queries in this
letter so that your views can be reflected in a forthcoming Human Rights Watch
report on detention issues in Uganda.

Human Rights
Watch has documented numerous cases of arbitrary detention by government
security forces, including CMI and the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT).
According to accounts we have gathered over several years, individuals have
been detained in army barracks in different parts of the country and at CMI
headquarters, and most frequently ending up in a residential compound that
serves as the headquarters of JATT in Kololo. Detainees have been held beyond
the time permitted under the constitution and often in overcrowded, unsanitary
cells. Some former detainees report having been beaten and tortured during
interrogations. According to many accounts, the members of these security
forces wear civilian clothes with no identifying insignia.

Your
response to the following inquiries would be greatly appreciated.

I. Please
provide us with information about the legal status of JATT, its command
structure, mandate, legal powers and its relation to the CMI, the police and
any other security forces in Uganda.

II. Please
provide documentation of any JATT or CMI personnel who have been tried by any
Ugandan courts or administratively sanctioned for violations of Ugandan law.
Are JATT personnel suspected of committing violations of the law tried by the civilian
courts or by courts martial?

III. Please
provide us with information regarding training provided to CMI and JATT
personnel on interrogation methods, including the provider and funder of such
trainings.

IV. Please
provide us with information as to trainings that CMI and JATT personnel have
received on intelligence and interrogations techniques, the content of those
trainings and who funded and conducted those trainings.

V. Our
recent research indicates that certain specified persons were present when
detainees were mistreated. Please confirm which of the following individuals
are employed by JATT or CMI, their unit if any, and the superior officer to
whom they report:

1.Lt. John Mwesigwa

2.Private Mushabe

3.Lt. Assimwe Semakula

4.2nd Lt Barigye alias Cool Namara

5.Robert Namara

6.Mucunguzi Abdul Azziz Alias Mucunguzi Deo

7.Lt. Sendi Yahya

8.Sankara Alias Amiir

9.Kigoonya Siraje

IV.According
to our information as of September 10, 2008, the following 16 people were last
seen in the custody of JATT or CMI officers. Their current whereabouts are
unknown. None are known to have been taken to a police station or charged with
any crime. According to our information, some of these individuals were being
held in the JATT offices on Kololo Hill Road.

Please
provide us information on the whereabouts, legal status and health of these
persons:

1.Higenyi Sadala - arrested in 2006 in Mubende and kept in a military
barracks for one year and nine months. He was transferred to JATT in Kololo on
May 28, 2008.

2.Hamuza Mwebe – arrested on or around May 28, 2008 and held at JATT in
Kololo.

3.Tezitta Moses – arrested in June 2008 and allegedly very badly beaten at
CMI offices on Kitante Rd.

4.Adamdini Byekwaso from Iganga – brought to JATT on or around April 4,
2008.

5. Jamiiru Bomboka – detained by JATT on or around June 30, 2008.

6.Abdurahmann Kijjambu – detained on or around July 12, 2008. He was
allegedly tortured very badly and needs medical treatment urgently.

7.Ismail Kambaale – detained on or around July 13, 2008.

8.Sekulima Muhammad – detained on or around May 8, 2008.

9.Adinaan Zubair – spent between three to six months in a house in Kisaasi
and was transferred to JATT in July or August 2008.

10.Abbas Karule – detained on or around December 6, 2007.

11.Abdul Hamiid Mugera – first detained in Kisaasi for three to six months
and was transferred to JATT in March 2008.

12.Adamdiin Mukalazi – detained at JATT since June 2008.

13.Kuluthum (female) – from Naalya, Kabembe, detained at JATT since July
2008.

14.Saidi Lutaaya – arrested on November 21, 2007 and detained at JATT.

15.Siraje Nshimiirwe – arrested in March 2008.

16.Irumba (last name unknown) – arrested in January 2008 and detained at
JATT.

We hope to
hear back from you by November 5, 2008, so that we can include your perspective
in our forthcoming report. Please email any response to burnetm@hrw.org or via fax to +44 (0)20 7713 1800.

Human Rights Watch would like
to thank our many international and local colleagues who provided us with
valuable insights and information. In particular, we would like to thank the
witnesses, victims, and others who agreed to speak to us about their
experiences. Due to the sensitivity of our research, we regret that we have to
withhold the names of those whose assistance we greatly appreciated.

We are also grateful to the
Commissioner General of Prisons, Dr. Johnson Byabashaija and the staff of the
Prison Administration for providing Human Rights Watch access to Luzira Prison
and to Chief of Military Intelligence, Brig. James Mugira, and his staff for
their time throughout the research of this report. Human Rights Watch looks
forward to continued dialogue with CMI and the government of Uganda.

Human Rights Watch gratefully
acknowledges the generous support of The Bridgeway Foundation for this work.

[1]
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, art. 23(2) states: "A person
arrested, restricted or detained shall be kept in a place authorised by law."
The minister of internal affairs must publish in the Ugandan gazette the
location of detention places.

[13]
Sabiiti Mutengesa and Dylan Hendrickson, State Responsiveness to Public
Security Needs: The Politics of Security Decision-Making, Uganda Country Study, No. 16, June 2008.

[14]
"Museveni 'Leader' of Kalangala Action Plan," The DailyMonitor,
March 7, 2002. See also Sabiiti Mutengesa and Dylan Hendrickson, State
Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: The Politics of Security
Decision-Making, Uganda Country Study, No. 16, June 2008.

[25]
See Sabiiti Mutengesa and Dylan Hendrickson, State Responsiveness to Public
Security Needs: The Politics of Security Decision-Making, Uganda Country Study, No. 16, June 2008, p. 67.

[26]Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, art. 24. The Anti-terrorism Act specifically states that an
officer "who engages in torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, illegal
detention or intentionally causes harm or loss to property, commits an offence
and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding five years or a
fine … or both." Anti-terrorism Act, art. 17 (4). Human Rights Watch is not
aware of any prosecutions of individuals under this article of the Act.

[37]Article
23(6) as amended by the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Amendment) Act
11/2005 provides:

(6) where a person is arrested in respect of a
criminal offence –

(a) the person is entitled to apply to the
court to be released on bail and the court may grant that person bail on such
conditions as the court considers reasonable;

(b) in the case of an offence which is triable by the
High Court as well as by a subordinate court, if that person has been remanded
in custody in respect of the offence for sixty days before trial, that
person shall be released on bail on such conditions as the court
considers reasonable

(c) in the case of an offence triable only by the High
Court, if that person has been remanded in custody for one hundred and
eighty days before the case is committed to the High Court, that person shall
be released on bail on such conditions as the court considers reasonable.

Before the constitutional amendment, (b) and (c)
stated 120 and 360 respectively as the number of days that must pass before a
person is entitled to bail. See alsoUganda v. Besigye,
Constitutional Court of Uganda at Kampala, Constitutional Reference No. 20 of
2005, September 25, 2006.

[42]The Daily Hansard of the Parliament of Uganda, March 19, 2002.
http://www.parliament.go.ug/hansard/hans_view_date.jsp?dateYYYY=2002&dateMM=03&dateDD=19.
At that time, Mayombo was one of the UPDF representatives in Parliament as well
as head of CMI.

[47]See
Human Rights Watch, Hostile to Democracy, (New York: Human Rights Watch,
1999)p. 131-133. "While
the charge [of treason] is brought in cases of suspected involvement in one of
Uganda's several armed rebel groups, treason charges have also provided the
basis for the detention of non-violent political dissidents." and Human Rights
Watch, "Uganda: Respect Opposition Right to Campaign," December 18, 2005. www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/19/uganda12321.htm.

[49]
U.S. State Department report, Bureau of African Affairs, Uganda country profile, February 2009.

[50]Hans
Romkema, "Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation
Of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo – The Case of the:
FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU," June 2007. http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_DRC_COFS_Study.pdf.
p.83.

[65]Eleven
days after September 11, 2001, the New Vision newspaper reported that JATT
arrested six Pakistanis and a Zambian because of their suspected links to Osama
Bin-Ladin. See "Seven Bin-Ladin suspects arrested at airport," The New
Vision October 2, 2001. They were freed on October 26, 2001 when the judge
hearing a petition for habeas corpus ruled that the state "admitted that it has
no lawful grounds to keep them in custody.""Uganda frees six Pakistanis," AFP, October 26, 2001.

[87]Human Rights Watch interview with former
detainee, January 19, 2009.

[88]Criminal Procedure
Code Act of Uganda, Art. 10. Arrest without a warrant can also occur for
offense such as breaching the peace, obstructing a police officer from
performing his or her duty, escaping lawful custody deserting the armed forces,
or offenses defined in Chapter XVI of the Penal Code which defines Nuisances
and Offences against Health and Convenience.

[93]UPDF Act, section 185 (authorizing the arrest
of "a person" suspected of committing an offense under the UPDF Act, but
referring to the arrest of such a persons by his commanding officer). However,
the UPDF Act does provide for the appointment of special personnel to "detain
or arrest without warrant any person subject to military law [who] is suspected
of having committed a service offence" and to "exercise such other powers as
may be prescribed for the enforcement of military law. UPDF Act, section 187.

[94]The
military has long argued that the General Courts Marital has the power to
prosecute civilians for unlawful possession of firearms, terrorism and other
"service offences" under the UPDF Act, "since the equipments and means of
terrorist activities are carried out using unlawful weapons which are the
monopoly of the UPDF." The Supreme Court in January 2009 ruled against this
argument, stating "[f]or an offence under an act other than the UPDF Act to be
within the jurisdiction of the General Courts Martial, it must have been
committed by a person subject to military law." Supreme Court of Uganda, Attorney General vs. Uganda Law Society, Constitutional Appeal 1 of 2006, Decision January
20, 2009. pp. 7-10.

[95]Human
Rights Watch interviews with former detainees, August 2008 and January 2009.

[96]This
practice of CMI identity cards for employees came to light recently when a man
claiming to work for CMI was arrested for involvement in a murder. In response
to a reporter's queries about the man's affiliation, Lt. Col. Dominic Twesigome
said, "He is not our staff. We don't know him. He is not on our roll. . . . We
are not concerned. If he claims to be our staff, let him produce our identity
card." See Zurah Nakabugo & A. Wesaka, "Medic held over murder of patient,"
The Daily Monitor, December 17, 2008.

[101]Some
detainees were eventually taken to Criminal Investigations Department for
processing. They were charged and brought to Luzira prison.

[102]There
are various reports of security personnel donning black uniforms. See Human
Rights Watch, "Uganda: Government Gunmen Storm High Court Again, Security
Forces Used to Intimidate Judiciary in Case of 'PRA Suspects,'" March 4, 2007.
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/03/04/uganda-government-gunmen-storm-high-court-again.
See also Sabiiti Mutengesa and Dylan Hendrickson, State Responsiveness to
Public Security Needs: The Politics of Security Decision-Making, Uganda
Country Study, No. 16, June 2008.
http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/Publications/psdm/Uganda.pdf, p. 56

[108]The
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 20, 2006,
signed on February 6, 2007, provides in art. 2 'For the purposes of this
Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law'.The
treaty will enter into force 30 days after 20 states have ratified it;
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, G.A.
res. 47/133, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992).

[109]
The Luganda newspaper Bukedde published an article which noted that
Lutaaya and another man, Sabiti Kateregga, had been taken from the Old Taxi Park in a suspicious manner, raising concern among those working there. See Siraje
Kizito, "Okubuzaawo abasuubuzi mu Kampala kuzzemu," "Kidnapping of business
people in Kampala resumes," Bukedde, December 2, 2007.

[133]
See Human Rights Watch letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs, "Torture and
extrajudicial execution of detainees." July 24, 2006.
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/07/24/letter-ugandan-minister-internal-affairs.

[134]"Uganda denies Human Rights Watch torture claim," BBC July 26, 2008. UPDF spokesman Major Felix
Kulayigye told the BBC that "[Semugeyni] had gone to show us where they operate
from in Kibaale District [western Uganda]. In the process of tracing the
hideouts, he escaped from the soldiers guarding him. We don't know where he is
or what happened thereafter."

[144]Detainees
were told to keep their heads down and were unable to identify where this house
was located. They were held in rooms in the house for five months. One detainee
was able to see a bill which came to the house. The address was located in
Kisaasi, Butuukirwa zone. Human Rights Watch interviews with former detainees
P.N., August 19, 2008 and O.V., August 28, 2008 and C.B., September 19, 2008.

[147]Human Rights Watch
interview with former detainee, C.N., August 10, 2008. Experts consulted by
Human Rights Watch indicated there are at least two known devices that could
match this description. One is believed to have been used during interrogations
by police in Chicago in the 1970s and early 1980s.

into force June 26, 1987, art. 1.
Torture under the convention is defined as "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person […] when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting
in an official capacity."

[166]Manual
on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Punishment ("Istanbul Protocol"), August 9, 1999. The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 55/89 of February
22, 2001, drew the attention of governments to the Principles on the Effective
Investigation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of
Punishment (Istanbul Principles) emanating from the Istanbul Protocol.

[177]The
Human Rights Committee held that the provision of the UK's Terrorism Act 2000 allowing suspects to be detained for 48 hours without access to a
lawyer was of "suspect compatibility" with Article 9 and 14 of the ICCPR.
CCPR/CO/73/UK, para. 13 (2001).

[178]Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted at the Eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana 27 August to 7 September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990), Number
8.

[179]The UN
Human Rights Committee, charged with monitoring the implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, issued an authoritative
statement on the interpretation of the ICCPR's article 7 on the prohibition of
torture. In General Comment No. 20, adopted in 1992, the Committee recommends
that provisions be taken against incommunicado detention. UN Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 20, para. 11.

[198]Under
a 2006 amendment to the amnesty law, the Minister of Internal Affairs can
declare an individual ineligible if the parliament agrees, but this provision
has never been invoked.

[199]Statistics
provided by the Amnesty Commission, Kampala, January 19, 2009. Between January
1, 2000 and January 19, 2009 12,503 former LRA combatants, 4,319 former West
Nile Bank Front combatants, 3,114 Uganda National Rescue Front II combatants
and 1,904 ADF have received amnesty.

[211]Human
Rights Watch visit to Luzira Upper Prison, August 19, 2008 and Letter to
Brigadier Leo Kyanda, Chief of Military Intelligence, Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence, from FHRI re: The Status of Clearance of ADF, UNDA, UNRFII
Suspected Rebels. February 28, 2008. On file with Human Rights Watch.

[212]Tom
Malaba, "Nine Treason Suspects in Jail for 3 Years without Trial," Uganda Radio Network, December 20, 2006.

[213]Letter
to Brigadier Leo Kyanda, Chief of Military Intelligence, Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence, from FHRI re: The Status of Clearance of ADF, UNDA,
UNRFII Suspected Rebels. February 28, 2008. On file with Human Rights Watch.

[214]Letter
from Major Timothy Kanyogonya, Legal Officer CMI to the Chairperson of the Uganda Human Rights Commission. October 12, 2006. On file with Human Rights Watch.

[220]This echoes recent statements
by the Inspector General of Police, Maj. Gen. Kale Kayihura, who in February
2009 argued before Parliament to extend the 48-hour limit. He claimed that 48
hours is not enough for the police to carry out meaningful investigations and
be able to arraign a suspect before court. According to parliament records,
this issue has been debated several times. For example, in 2002,
then-Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs
Adolf Mwesige said that he "would not recommend that we should extend the
48-hour rule to 96 hours, because originally it used to be 24 hours…. [The time
period was] doubled to 48 hours, but the question of detaining people illegally
beyond 48 hours has remained. So, increasing the hours may not solve the
problem. I think Government needs to impress it upon the bodies responsible for
implementing this rule to honour it. Uganda is not the only jurisdiction which
is following this rule. There are many common law jurisdictions where this rule
applies, like in Zambia and other countries. People are really charged in court
within these hours in many countries, and I think we can do it." See The Daily
Hansard of the Parliament of Uganda, December 11, 2002.

[221]For an
analysis of the problematic counterterrorism policies in the UK, see Human Rights Watch, "Hearts and Minds: Putting Human Rights at the Center of United Kingdom Counterterrorism Policy" June 20, 2007. Available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/uk0607/.

[241]Ibid. Rule
of Procedure (2006), 160 (6) states that "The Party or Organization in Government
shall designate the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of each Sessional
Committee provided that no active Member of the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces
shall be designated Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of the Committee on Defence
and Internal Affairs."

[250]
The UHRC was established under articles 51 to 59 of the 1995 constitution.

[251]Uganda
Constitution, article 53 (1). The court powers include the issuance of summons
and the power to compel testimony, on pain of contempt of court; however, the UHRC cannot investigate any matters pending before a
court of law. The powers, functions, and structure of the UHRC are implemented
in greater detail by the Uganda Human Rights Commission Act passed by parliament
in 1997. Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders: Government Human
Rights Commissions in Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/africa/index.html.

[260]Human
Rights Watch telephone interview with U.S. military official, November 14,
2008.

[261]"Anti-Terrorism
Force graduates," December 3, 2008, The New Vision. According to this
report, 630 soldiers have been trained in counter-terrorism over the last two
years. In May 2008 200 UPDF soldiers given a 16-week counter-terrorism course
taught by members of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).
http://www.hoa.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2108.
Another 160 received training in August 2007. "Old guard graduates 160 in
Ugandan Counterterrorism course," http://www.mdw.army.mil/content/anmviewer.asp?a=1952&z=1.
The US has also been involved planning with the Ugandan army the recent
military operation against Lord's Resistance Army rebels in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. See Jeffery Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Military Helped Plan and Pay for Attack on Ugandan Rebels," The New York Times,
February 7, 2009.

[262]This
policy is contained in two legislative instruments, Section 502b of the Foreign
Assistance Act and a provision known as the "Leahy Amendment" (named after its
sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont). The Leahy Amendment prohibits US government assistance to units of foreign militaries that are implicated in "gross
violations of human rights" unless the governments concerned take appropriate
action to address the abuses. The full text of the law (separate versions for
State Department and Defense Department assistance) is available online at: http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/humanrights/law.html.
The Leahy law does not prescribe specific actions State Department and Defense
Department officials must undertake to gather the information they need to
determine whether specific military units have been implicated in gross human
rights abuses. But the law has little meaning unless policymakers undertake
proactive measures to gather such information. In its annual country reports on
human rights, the US State Department has noted several times that security
agents have been suspected of torture, abuse of suspects and unlawful killings.
See 2008 report, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119030.htm; 2007
report, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100510.htm.
2006 report available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78763.htm.

[263]
Human Rights Watch interview with US State Department official, August 27,
2008.

[271]2002
Anti-Terrorism Act, Second Schedule. Section 10 (5) of the Act gives the
Minister power to make a statutory instrument declaring any terrorist
organization dissolved or providing for the sending up of the terrorist
organization and providing for the forfeiture to the state of the property and
assets of the terrorist organization.

[272]Human
Rights Watch interview with member of Ugandan military, January 28, 2009.

[275]
See Judge S. B. Bossa and Titus Mulindwa, The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002
(Uganda): Human Rights Concerns and Implications, a paper presented on
September 15, 2004 to the International Commission of Jurists, p. 8, http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/Paper_Bossa.pdf; Amnesty
International, Uganda: Amnesty International Concerns on the Regulation of
Interception of Communications Bill, 2007, AFR 59/005/2008, 2008. Amnesty
argues that since neither the Regulation of Interception of Communications
(RIC) Bill nor the Anti-Terrorism Act "provide more precise formulations of the
specific circumstances and purposes for which interception of communication is
permitted," there is the possibility of broad interpretation and abuse "in
relation to authorizing interception of communications and conduct of
surveillance which may lead to significant human rights violations." The RIC
Bill seeks to expand the purpose of interception and surveillance beyond those
stated in the Anti-Terrorism Act to include "the prevention of crime and
protection of public safety, national security or national economic interest."

[281]Court
computer records are not necessarily accurate repositories of information.
Human Rights Watch found at least one instance in which someone charged with
treason was not in the computer system. Paper files are available though
aggregating data from the paper sources is very challenging. The magistrate
courts report to the Director of Public Prosecutions at the end of each month,
stating how many cases of various offenses are at various stages in the legal
process. Because of changes in way in which this information was reported in
2008, total numbers of specific cases have been very difficult to ascertain. A
computer search indicated that between 1999 and 2009 there have been 21 cases
of treason in Kampala, though the true number is likely higher.