ARMED CONFLICT IN CASE YOM KIPPUR WAR

Introduction

In strategic studies there is a main narration said “ There has always been war and there will always be war”. And pointing to that main narration and kinds of conceptual level from war typology, war assumptions and peace, factors which can cause war and aspects which used to create peace. For the comphrehensif analisis about armed conflict and peace,the writer will take the Yom Kippur war for the case in International relations.

There is a dominant approach to strategic studies in armed conflicts cases which is realism ,where security is derivative of power ,and so realism became the tradition of intellectual.Military is a base instrument for creating the international security and peace.so prepare the war, for the peace. there are some assumptions about war ,where they are could be learned, as a part of culture behavior .why and how state come to the conclusion that war is best way to handle the situation facing it.and resulr from a long process. Another assumption is war a product of tension,it may be seen as resulting from series of interaction which is produced by dual structure.war is also a way to making political decisions and to achieve goals. There are a variety factors and causes of war that can bring about war,make a war as a multicultural phenomenon.lets see for the armed conflict cases in Israel.

For the cases of armed conflict is Yom Kippur war,the war was part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an ongoing dispute which has included many battles and wars since 1948 when the state of Israel was formed. During the Six-Day War of 1967, the Israelis had captured Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula all the way up to the Suez Canal, which had become the cease-fire line, and roughly half of Syria’s Golan Heights.

Cases of armed conflict

The war was so called Yom kippur because it started on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement on October 6th, 19731. It came almost as a complete surprise and warning notice was given too late for an orderly call-up of the reserves before zero hour. The Egyptians and the Syrians made some significant initial gains: the former crossed the Suez Canal and established themselves along its entire length on the east bank; the latter overran the Golan Heights and came within sight of the Sea of Galilee. However, the wheel turned very quickly. Counterattacking swiftly, sometimes even foolhardily, within a few days the IDF was on the west bank of the Suez Canal, at a distance of 100 kms from the Egyptian capital, Cairo, and within artillery range of the airfields around the Syrian capital, Damascus. Egypt, which at first had refused a cease-fire, now accepted it avidly, as did Syria. Considering the adverse initial circumstances, the speed and the thoroughness with which the IDF had been able to reverse its fortunes was remarkable. Yet the Yom Kippur War went down in Israel’s history as a qualified failure.The surprise rankled; and the cost was heavy: 2,688 soldiers fell.2

Intelligence was faulted for failing to sound the alarm in time – the Chief of Staff, David (Dado) Elazar and his Chief of Intelligence had to resign. Too many airplanes were lost to Russian-made SAM-missiles. Some experts reached the sweeping conclusion that the tank had seen its day, in view of its vulnerability to Sagger missiles and infantry-operated RPGs. Of 265 Israeli tanks in the first echelon, only 100 survived.3

Analysis

In typology of the war,the background of Yom Kippur war can be categorized in Irredentist war where Israel do zionism by claiming territory that is controlled by another state,but Yom Kippur war it self include in Inequality war,because of the unequal military capability which actually born in the Proxy war,where there are a grand states play a role, as indirectly .or there is a chance to war. from the factors which can cause armed conflict the Yom kippur war,in sufficient cause,where Israel hated by Arabs,and neccesary also because the existency of armament which push to war.

Peace aspects in related to conflict factors can be created in 2 ways perspective(John A vasquez) in systemic and interaction,where peace is not simply the absence of war,but it also involves political rule to setle diagreements.

The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 was a terrible surprise, which put Israel’s security are in danger. By the end of the war, Israel had turned the tables and both Cairo and Damascus were under threat. But that did not diminish the sense of shock which shook the nation in the aftermath of the war. Israel was supposed to be nearly “invincible”, in the minds of many of her military and political leaders. That sense of confidence deflated quickly in the aftermath of the war. Much of the blame fell on the shoulders of the Intelligence community, which was blamed for not accurately assessing clear information that Egypt and Syria planned to go to war on October 6, 1973.

Israel’s victory in 1967 extended her borders to all of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. Israel set up electronic eavesdropping and early warning stations in the Jordan Valley along the border with Jordan, on Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights, looking into Syria, and along the East Bank of the Suez Canal, which enabled Israel to observe Egyptian forces on the other side.The Soviets used their MiGs to cover the Egyptian troops along the Suez Canal – as well as to move up their SAM batteries as close to the Israeli side as possible4. At first Israel refrained from engaging the Soviet-piloted MIGs. That changed in July 1970, however – when in a clash, the IAF shot down 4 or 5 Soviet MiGs in a dogfight off of the Suez Canal.

With the Soviets deeply involved in the defense of Egypt – even to the point of clashing with Israel – the Americans became concerned about a strategic conflagration and negotiated a cease-fire in the form of the Rogers Plan that went into effect on August 7, 1970. This plan called for a freeze of Egyptian and Israeli deployments as of August 7, 1970.5 The Egyptians broke that part of the agreement the next day, moving their Soviet anti-aircraft batteries close to the banks of the Suez Canal. The Soviets and Egyptians gambled that Israel would not respond so soon after the cease-fire went into effect – and they were right. Israel did nothing. This would have telling effect three years later, when Egyptian anti-aircraft batteries along the Suez Canal pounded the IAF in the first days of the October 1973 War.6

By mid-1973 Israeli military intelligence was almost completely aware of Arab war plans. They knew that the Egyptian Second and Third Armies would attempt to cross the Suez Canal to a depth of about ten kilometers inside the Israeli side of Sinai. Following the infantry assault, Egyptian armored divisions would then attempt to cross the Suez Canal and advance all the way to the Mitla and Gidi Passes – strategic crossing-points for any army in the Sinai. Naval units and paratroopers would then attempt to capture Sharm el-Sheikh at the southern end of the Sinai. Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence) was also aware of many details of the Syrian war plan.But Israeli analysts did not believe the Arabs were serious about going to war. Even when all the signs indicated that the Arabs were prepared for war, Israeli analysts continued to believe they would not – almost until the day the war broke out.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a concept took hold that the Arabs were unwilling to go to war against Israel. The concept was based on the idea that the 1967 War was such an overwhelming victory that the Arabs would not be able to overcome Israel for the time being.7 Thus even when it appeared clear that the Arabs had aggressive intentions, Israeli analysts refused to believe that the Arabs would actually follow through with them.

By September and October of 1973, when Egypt really was preparing for war, it was believed that he really was not, because there had been false alarms in the past. Egyptian ministers held talks expressing their peaceful intentions to Western Governments throughout much of 1973. Egyptian military deception was even more effective. Reports were given instructing cadets in military colleges to resume their courses on October 9, and officers were allowed to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca.8

All of these reports and actions were monitored by Aman – as they were intended to be – and they utterly fooled Israeli Military Intelligence.Even more than that, the Egyptians and Syrians were very careful about who knew of the impending war plans in advance of October 6. It appears that while the Egyptians engaged in deception, they didn’t put much stock in completely fooling Israel’s Intelligence services. Egyptian intelligence in fact assessed that Israel would have a ‘three-to-fifteen day concrete warning ‘ of the impending attack. They expected an Israeli counter-attack 6-8 hours after the start of the Egyptian assault, with 24 hours being the best-case scenario.9 The Egyptians were wrong about that; Israel was far slower to know about the attack than the Egyptians anticipated, and the Israeli counter-attack did not begin for a full two days after the beginning of the Egyptian assault code-named Operation Badr.

As early as April and May 1973, a full six months before the actual combined Egyptian and Syrian attack on the Sinai and Golan fronts, Israeli Intelligence had been picking up clear signals of Egypt’s intentions for war.10 It was recognized that Sadat had the necessary divisions prepared to cross the Suez Canal, he had the bridging equipment to facilitate his army’s crossing, and he had SAMs to protect his own divisional crossings from the penetrating raids of the Israeli Air Force.Military Intelligence’s prognosis that war would not break out was correct in the spring and summer of 1973. Therefore, they were believed again in the fall, with catastrophic results.

On April 7, 1967, two months before the outbreak of the Six-Day War of June 1967, Israel had shot down six Syrian planes to no Israeli losses in a dogfight above the Golan. On September 13, 1973, Israel shot down 12 Syrian aircraft to1 Israeli loss when IAF jets were attacked during a reconnaissance mission over Syrian territory11. This naturally reinforced the military belief that the Arabs would not attack due to Israel’s once-again proven air capability.At the same time, Israel had not yet experienced the effectiveness of the Arab Surface-to Air missile defenses.A few days later, after the September 13 air battle, Aman Chief Eli Zeira argued that the Arabs would not contemplate even a war of attrition before the end of 1975.12

Egyptian build-ups continued to be explained away as a practice exercise without harmful intentions. But Syrian deployments were more worrying. Even after the battle of September 13,13 Syrian reinforcements were sent to the Golan accompanied by the cancellation of leaves as well as a simultaneous call-up of Syrian reserves accompanied by a state of alert. All of these developments were worrying, especially to Northern Command. But because “the concept” still held that Syria would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt was not planning to go to war, that meant that Syrian intentions could not really be aggressive in nature. This view held even after US Intelligence in late September sent an assessment that a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack was possible. Israel responded that it was not something to worry about.

Nevertheless, Syrian deployments below the Golan Heights were worrying enough for Israel to send more infantry and tanks to the Golan at the end of September. These reinforcements, slight as they were, were to make all the difference between holding the line and utter defeat and an invasion of Northern Israel on the first day of the war. Even these reinforcements were not easy to authorize.14 Mossad Chief Zamir continued to express his concern over the Syrian build-up in contradistinction to Aman Chief Eli Zeira’s tranquilizing assessment of the situation on October 3. “Zamir apparently tried to alert Golda Meir to the situation, but the prime minister told him to talk to Dayan.” Dayan was influenced by his own optimistic assessments as well as those of Military Intelligence, and was slow to call up reserves.15

Israel fought a tenacious battle on the Golan and turned near-defeat on October 6 to a recapture of almost all of the Golan by the evening of October 7. But Syria’s rapid advance towards the Sea of Galilee and Israel’s northern settlements unleashed a fear that has been hard for Israel to ever forget.On the Sinai front, Egypt nearly had the Mitla and Gidi passes open to them before sufficient Israeli reserves arrived to defend Israel’s southern borders16. Military Intelligence had seriously underestimated the lethal effectiveness of the Soviet-made Sagger anti-tank missiles, which the Egyptian infantry used to devastating effect against Israeli armor, as well as the Surface-to-Air Missiles, which both the Egyptians and Syrians used to devastating effect against the Israeli Air Force.17

Intelligence did pick up on certain changes that had occurred on the battlefield during the war, but it was mainly the courage, ingenuity, and leadership of the armed forces on Israel’s southern and northern fronts that enabled Israel to turn the tide of battle. Within two days, the tide had turned on the Golan front. It took more than a week, but by the middle of October Israel had turned the tide in the Sinai, pummeling Egyptian armor, and had crossed the Suez Canal to destroy Egypt’s defenses from the rear.18 By late October, both Cairo and Damascus were exposed to an Israeli advance, and only dire Soviet threats and Superpower intervention put an end to the hostilities and certain and complete Egyptian and Syrian defeat.

While the tide turned, the failure of Intelligence has never been forgotten in Israel. Many lessons were learned, and many people in the Intelligence community were fired.The Israeli Intelligence community has historically been one of the most aggressive and successful intelligence networks in the world. With the aforementioned having world consensus, how were the Arabs able to launch a surprise attack against Israel on 6 October 1973. Since 1967, the Arabs had been busy planning and preparing for an attack on Israel. Additionally, the Arabs had incorporated the fine use of deception, denial, and disinformation to disguise their deadly intent. In contrast, Israel had been lulled into a sense of security and laxity. Much of the Israeli hierarchy believed that the Arabs were not prepared for war and if they did foolishly attack, Israel could quickly defeat them as was the case in the 1967, Six Day War. Additionally, Israel’s focus on their future adversary was distracted due to internal problems in the intelligence community, funding cutbacks, and an immediate need to respond to terrorists activities.

Although numerous indicators outlined the Arabs intentions, it was only hours before the actual invasion that Prime Minister Mier agreed to a partial mobilization of the Israeli Defense Force. The surprise attack was a result of actions from both sides.19 The Arab’s intense preparation and keen use of deception, denial, and disinformation were certainly factors in their initial success. The Israelis were able to be surprised because of widespread problems in the intelligence community, the lack of perception in identifying the Arab’s intentions, the allowance for distractors to take them away from their real enemy, and the high regard for their own military ability. In the complex world of the international intelligence, it seems nearly impossible that one country could be so deadly surprised by an attack and subsequent invasion of a neighboring country.20 The long term preparation and deception by one country coupled with the blinding self-confidence that permeated the intelligence network and military hierarchy of the other, ideally set the stage for the October 6, 1973, war between the Arabs and the Israelis.

The Arabs were able to surprise the Israeli Intelligence community as a result of actions from both sides. The Arabs’ keen preparation and fine use of deception, denial and disinformation were certainly major factors in their success. The surprise of the Israelis was due to their obsession with The Concept, their internal intelligence problems, their inability to key on the numerous indicators as the Arab intention, their allowance for distractors to take them away from their real enemy and their high regard for their own military ability.The Yom Kippur War was followed by a series of Separation-of-Forces Agreements with Egypt and Syria. These envisaged a strip of territory in which no troops would be allowed, backed by another strip, where the presence of troops was carefully restricted.

Conclusion

The agreement with Syria is still in force and UNDOF, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, is still there to supervise its implementation. The agreement with Egypt has been replaced – after lengthy negotiations which began with the dramatic visit to Jerusalem of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (November 1977) – by the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979, the first to be signed between Israel and one, the most important, of its Arab neighbors. It was based on the withdrawal of Israel from the whole of the Sinai peninsula and its demilitarization in return for full recognition of Israel by Egypt and establishment of embassies and full trade and tourist relations.

“There has always been war and there will always be war”. in this armed conflict ,Yom Kippur war are really proved where the war just a revenge action and just little part in Arab-Israeli war.where the states in conflict must prove and pay the honour.

References

John Baylis et al (2002).Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies

Robin may schott (2008):Hypatia: Just War and problem of evil

EJIL(2006)vol17 no.5:Carsten stahn: Rethinking the conception of the law of armed Force