In it, I reflect on the EU’s trackrecord in contributing to peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly through its involvement in security sector reform, justice initiatives and peace mediation. The DRC is, after all, one of the few places where the EU has had a foreign policy, one which has been largely based on an accurate conflict analysis (with the glaring exception of the extreme structural and physical violence men mete out on women across the country).

The EU has made considerable investment in both innovative and tried-and-tested approaches to peacebuilding. The approach has had its flaws: for example, a stronger commitment to the Treaty values, particularly on human rights and women’s rights, might have given the EU both more clout and more impact. Greater political engagement, rather than a ‘technical’ approach, re-conceptualising the CSDP SSR missions as multiyear instruments and measuring their impact could have strengthened the EU’s contribution to peacebuilding in the DRC and the region.

The months leading up to the DRC’s (potentially) first democratic change of head of state – the presidential elections are scheduled for November 2016- are likely to be rocky. The EU, like many other democratic donors, is in an invidious position regarding the elections. There is a strong case that the EU should not have to finance the third democratic elections in the country and that, by now, these should be a sovereign affair. It is a difficult decision to take: if the ‘international community’ does fund the elections, donors are likely to face criticism at home and accusations of interference in Congo; if they do not, they are likely to be blamed for a sliding electoral calendar. Whatever the EU and its member states decide to do, clear communication on the decision and its reasons will be necessary. The EU should also clearly communicate its position, grounded firmly in the Treaty values, on how the elections should be run and, in particular, how the government and security services should behave. It should fund credible research into the links between armed groups and politicians, as well as civil society monitoring projects, follow closely what happens to human rights defenders and actively promote women’s empowerment.

This book analyses how the European Union translates its principles of peace and justice into policy and puts them into practice, particularly in societies in or emerging from violent conflict.

The European Union treaty states that in its relations with the wider world, the EU is to promote peace, security, the protection of human rights, and the strict observance and the development of international law. The EU is active in peace processes around the world, yet its role in international peace mediation is largely ignored.

This article, published in European Security (2014), assesses whether the EU contributes to long-term positive change in societies emerging from violent conflict, helping them ‘mend’ or whether it simply encourages societies to ‘make do’ with the status quo. To do so, the article focuses on two of the principles found in the EU Treaty, peace and justice for human rights violations. It examines how the EU translates the principles of peace and justice into policy and puts them into practice by analyzing EU engagement in peace mediation, transitional justice, and security sector reform in general and through in-depth examination of EU engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In the article, I question the prevailing discourse that greater inter-institutional coherence would improve EU security provision and considers whether and how the EU prioritizes between peace and justice. I find that principles may be translated into policy and put into practice, and practice is often ahead of policy. But this is uneven within as well as across the institutions. Greater coherence between principle, policy, and practice, rather than between institutions, would improve EU security provision and enable prioritization. If the EU settles for making do, it undermines its considerable potential to contribute to long-term solutions to complex conflicts.

This briefing paper for the Oslo Forum Africa Mediators Retreat 2013 aims to stimulate discussion within the mediation community about the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in peace processes. In a brief overview of the peace-versus-justice debate to date, it lays out the main arguments for and against the Court. The paper then argues that the ICC has become a ‘straw man’ in the peace and justice debate, being misrepresented sometimes. It is one actor among many in the complex fields of justice and peacemaking – equating the ICC with justice oversimplifies the complexity of justice in (post-) conflict situations. The paper closes with suggestions for greater synergies between peace and justice, including the Court. There are many options on the spectrum between ICC indictments and amnesty that are yet to be explored, and which could advance a pro-justice and pro-peace agenda.

The Global Accord (2002) ended the Congo War, contributed to the creation of the Third Republic and influenced subsequent peace agreements. This article (in the International Journal of Human Rights, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 2, 289–306) analyses how justice for human rights violations was included in the Global Accord and later peace deals. It assesses how the power-sharing aspects of these agreements affected the pursuit of accountability, and finds they undermined transitional justice efforts and contributed to continued abuse. It concludes that free-wheeling power-sharing within the security institutions is the biggest challenge to both accountability and peace: post-conflict security arrangements are therefore the crucial nexus between peacebuilding and accountability for human rights violations.

The EU’s Nobel Peace Prize is well-deserved. The EU has transformed most of Europe from a continent of war to one of peace, as the committee said. It has done so by supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law, building interdependent economies and institutions. Far from the spotlight of high-level peace negotiations, this is the slow slog of peacebuilding. Peace by bureaucratisation, as Catherine Woollard calls it.

This is not a technocratic exercise. Far from it. The belief in the EU as a peace project is alive and well – and much debated (as at the recent EPLO event). The European project was driven by the conviction that the contintent must never be devastated by war and genocide again. It is a profoundly political project. When driven by politics (Enlargement), the project is successful. When passed off as a technocratic exercise (the Euro), less so.

In this letter to the European Voice (published 11 October 2012), I argue that the EU has the instruments to build peace but tends not to use them effectively.

Any future European Institute of Peace should harness the wealth of experience and expertise in the EU institutions and in think-tanks, NGOs and academia, to strengthen the European External Action Service. It should not add yet another layer of bureaucracy or undermine the EEAS or existing practitioners.

The EU has become increasingly engaged in peace processes, which is welcome. This engagement has often been through the European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs), and has tended to be ad hoc. In this Security Policy Brief for Egmont, the Royal Institute for Foreign Affairs I argue that the External Action Service (EAS) should address the role the EU could and should play early on in peace processes. It is not a role that can develop organically anymore; it is time for strategic decision-making. Ten years on, the review of the Gothenburg programme on conflict prevention has been shelved, and the direction of the so-called ‘horizontal’ issues – like peace mediation – in the EAS are still under consideration.. This presents an ideal opportunity to assess what EU diplomats should be contributing to peace processes, and for making the necessary support available to them. After all, interventions of this kind affect not only the EU’s external action and its intended beneficiaries, but also the Union’s identity on the world stage.

What is the ideal transitional justice scenario in Ivory Coast? the Belgian newspaper De Morgen asked me this week in an interview published on Thursday. It is always impossible to predict these types of questions, but there are some trends we can see from other places, which might help the Ivoriens build peace – in the aftermath of so much violence.

Attention at the moment is focussed on prosecuting former President Laurent Gbabgo, his wife and senior aides. Ideally these trials should take place in Ivory Coast, but in many post-conflict situations, the justice system is unable to guarantee fair trials. If this is the case, the International Criminal Court could step in. But the ICC is a court of last resort – and there are disadvantages to pursuing alleged human rights violators through it. In DR Congo, for example, the Court is often portrayed as ‘foreign justice’. And when trials take place in The Hague, so far from where the violations have occurred it is difficult for the victims and affected communities to access proceedings.

Between national trials and the ICC, there are other options. In the past, the UN has set up ‘hybrid’ courts, like the Special Court for Sierra Leone and ad hoc tribunals, like the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). But although these courts have made invaluable contributions to combatting impunity for the worst crimes, they are expensive, and slow. There is little appetite amongst the donors for funding more such courts in the future. But there are alternatives, such as providing international support for trials within national systems – as in Bosnia. A ‘mixed’ court along these lines is currently in development in DR Congo.

For justice to prevail, it is important not to lose sight of the bigger picture. The President of the UN Human Rights Council has appointed an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights violations committed in Ivory Coast, identify those responsible, and bring them to justice. If the Commission identifies perpetrators who have been loyal to President Ouattara, they must also be prosecuted. The International Community should support the Commission in its work, ensure it has the access it needs in Ivory Coast to conduct a thorough investigation, and follow up on its recommendations.

And justice is not limited to prosecutions. There have been President Outtara has promised to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Ivory Coast, which could be a useful complement to (but not a replacement for ) criminal prosecutions. Where truth commissions have been most successful, there have been widespread popular consultations to determine their purpose, mandate and composition. At best, truth commissions can contribute to building a peaceful society; at worst they can be a whitewash and leave the roots of the conflict unaddressed.

Finally, a lesson we can learn from countries like Afghanistan and DRC is that failing to reform public institutions – and particularly the armed forces, police and judiciary – and remove those responsible for human rights violations from public service stores up more problems for later. Fair vetting processes, which remove human rights abusers, install discipline and civilian oversight can make a vital contribution to democracy-building.

Prosecutions alone can’t deliver justice; but combined with truth-seeking , vetting and reform of the public institutions and reparations for victims, they may be able to help address the root causes of the conflict and prevent its recurrence. The Commission of Inquiry is potentially a good start in this direction; engaging the Ivoriens, especially the marginalised, will be crucial in making any of these processes succeed.