This conservative strategy may work for Germany — which does not
necessarily need quantitative easing (Germany's growth is slow,
but unemployment is at a record low) — but it does not bode well
for more troubled economies in places like Spain, Italy, and
Greece.

The problem is, because all the eurozone countries are bound by a
single currency, the euro, they all have to subscribe to the same
policies.

The ECB was modelled on the German Bundesbank. As a result, it is
one of the world’s most politically independent central banks;
its mandate is focused narrowly on price stability; it does not
take broader economic goals like unemployment into account in the
way other central banks, such as the Fed, do; and it is de facto
more restricted than other central banks, since controversial
measures can lead to complex political and legal struggles,
involving 18 (soon to be 19) countries. Its setup and philosophy
are therefore 'German,' that is, conservative and cautious.

It's hard not to feel bad for Germany, which didn't even want the
euro in the first place. Through most of the 1990s, before the
euro was introduced, German opinion polls did not support the new
currency. The euro was officially adopted in 1999, without the
approval from European citizens through a referendum. Only
Denmark and Sweden held votes. Both countries rejected it.

In the chart below, you can see that German support for the euro
(gray line) remains below support from Europe as a whole (black
line) between 1990 and 2011, with the exception of 2007.

Ultimately, Germany is trapped in a pretty grim position: It's
the only country capable of pulling Europe out of its funk, but
most Germans never asked for — and don't seem to want — that
responsibility.