I am doing a brief research on the history and reactions regarding Carl Popper's political philosophy (Open Society and It's Enemies, The Poverty of Historicism) and Fascism in Italy for my Iranian university's weblog. Niccolo referred me to you about the resources. The reactions concerning Popper's political philosophy within the context of his philosophy of science is what I am looking for. There is a huge debate over Carl Popper in Iran. Mainly for political reasons, some philosophers admire him and some others rebuke him. In order to reject Popper's political philosophy and philosophy of History (his criticism of historicism), some anti-Popper philosophers of science criticise his philosophy of science, appealing to Kuhn and Feyerabend. Do you think is there a necessary link between Popper's philosophy of science and his criticism of Historicism (or his political philosophy as a whole)?

استفانو در پاسخ به سئوالات فوق نگارنده در ایمیل اول چنین نوشت:

I have a friend in Teheran:Amir Karbasizadeh: do you know him? We were both in Bristol for our doctoral studies.

On the relationship between Popper's philosophy of science and hispolitical thought, you may want to refer to my books: "Karl Popper'sPhilosophy of Science" (Routledge, London 2009) and "Introduzione aPopper" (Laterza, Roma-bari 2008). Also, you may find interesting the short essay Marcello Pera published ina book titled "La sfida di Popper", published by Armando Armando Editore....

I would not call it "a necessary link", but there is a "very close" relationship between Popper's criticism of historicism and his views in the philosophy of science, especially his criticism of induction. You may find a lot about it in my books.

من در ادامه ایمیل اول پرسیده بودم:

It seems to me that most parts of Popper's philosophy of history can be admitted even by logical positivist, Kuhnians, Feyerabend, etc. Is it true?

استفانو در جواب این قسمت از سئوال من نوشت:

I am not sure it is, but this is debatable.

What is sure, is that there is a radical difference between Popper and Kuhn (and Lakatos): their different views of the idea of truth forbids any attempt to reconcile their philosophies. It is their general outlook and philosophical approach that is different at roots. More about this in my Routledge book, mentioned above, and in my book on Kuhn: "Thomas Kuhn's 'Linguistic Turn' and the Legacy of LogicalPositivism", Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. (I am sorry to keep mentioning mybooks, but I worked on these topics extensively, as Niccolò knows.)

Regarding Popper's political philosophy and philosophy of science, some pro-state and Ahmadinejadian philosophers in Iran try to attack Popper's philosophy of science by using Kuhn's philosophy in order to condemn liberalism. (it is my interpretation of their deep hostility with Popper). So I wanted to argue that even if some body rejects Popper's philosophy of science based on Kuhn's philosophy, still Popper's criticisms of religious or scientific historicism would stay valid.

استفانو در پاسخ به ایمیل دوم نگارنده در ابتدا نوشت:

This is very interesting.

I can tell you that it is quite easy to show that Kuhn's model is mistaken, and therefore all criticisms of Popper's philosophy based onKuhn are erroneous.

If I may say, Ahmadinejadian philosophers tend to dislike Popper because he is the philosophers of liberty and responsibility, and tend to like Kuhn because he is the philosopher of dogmatism and propaganda.

But - and this is the key point - you need not reject Popper's vierws onthe basis of Kuhn's criticism, for his criticism of Popper is entirely mistaken.

Kuhn has many important things to say, but what he says on Popper is dead wrong: compared with Popper's, Kuhn's philosophy is a step back into therigidity of logical positivism. I wrote extensively on this in both my (English) books, the one on Popperand the other on Kuhn, I mentioned in my previous email, if you are interested.

I'd be more than happy to discuss these issues with you whenever we find the chance to meet.