Five years have passed since several Arab countries revolted against their repressive regimes, and peace and stability are nowhere in sight. The unraveling of their political systems pushed these countries into challenging transition processes where violence is always a serious possibility. Yemen and Libya’s civil wars present blunt examples of failed transitions, raising concerns about protracted political instability, not only in those two countries, but potentially in neighboring ones as well. Tunisia theoretically managed to complete its transition successfully. It ratified a new constitution, addressing the need for a new social contract, and held two rounds of elections. Tunisia also passed a transitional justice law to provide a framework for adjudicating both victims’ grievances and perpetrators’ crimes of the past political era. Nonetheless, Tunisia finds its stability challenged by increasing levels of polarization between its various societal segments.

The fact of the matter is that political transitions take a long time—years if not decades—and transitioning countries face the risk of violence. Arab Spring societies are unlikely to transition to sustainable peace and stability as long as they are wracked by deep divisions. Therefore, national reconciliation is paramount to reducing the societal polarization that currently cripples Libya and Yemen and threatens Tunisia’s progress. To attain enduring peace and stability, post-revolution states must engage in inclusive national reconciliation processes, including a national dialogue, a truth-seeking effort, the reparation of victims’ past injuries, dealing with the former regime, and institutional reform. Women, civil society, and tribes, among other social forces, can support the transition process. Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia have each taken specific approaches to trying to reconcile their post-revolution societies, raising or diminishing the chances of civil war or a healthy transition.

An inclusive national dialogue is the starting point of a comprehensive national reconciliation process. It gives transitioning societies an opportunity to develop a vision and theoretical framework for their futures, gives legitimacy to transition processes, and encourages negotiation and compromise. Tunisia held a homegrown national dialogue driven mainly by civil society organizations and Yemen completed an eight-month, U.N.-assisted national dialogue conference. Libya’s engagement in U.N.-led negotiations raised questions over whether all parties had representation.

As each society suffered decades of repression and has a number of unanswered questions, investigating—and dealing with—the truth about the past is also essential. Relatedly, determining how to handle former regime elements has profound implications for post-revolution transitions. While Libya opted to purge all those who served in Muammar Qaddafi’s regime through adopting its “Political Isolation Law,” Yemen chose to grant President Ali Abdullah Saleh immunity from prosecution in return for his abdication—sacrificing justice to preserve peace. However, Saleh later returned to politics, allying with the Houthis to take over the state, meaning Yemen ultimately achieved neither justice nor peace. Tunisia, on the other hand, has adopted a transitional justice law that mandates, among other measures, the investigation and prosecution of the state’s crimes since 1955. While the resulting Truth and Dignity Commission has received thousands of complaints from victims of past abuses, progress has otherwise been slow, as the body has struggled to establish an effective organizational structure or execute a clearly defined work plan. Controversy over the selection of commissioners and an overall lack of publicity has also hindered the truth-seeking process.

Reparations are another important part of the pursuit of justice and healing. Done correctly, they can bring previously marginalized and abused segments of society back into the mainstream, where they can make positive contributions to the development of the country. Yemen and Tunisia experienced extensive human rights violations during the decades-long reigns of Saleh and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, while lacking the resources to engage in meaningful and comprehensive rehabilitation of victims of past abuses. This left the two countries’ transition processes struggling with a major component—the victims—feeling further marginalization added to their past traumas. Libya, however, who has the resources to fund a process of thorough rehabilitation of victims of its dictatorship, slid into civil war that prevented the proper addressing of past wounds.

Even if these societies overcome their polarization at the personal level, however, they will not accomplish successful transitions unless their healing is accompanied by institutional reforms. “Regime renovation” rather than “regime change” in Yemen presented a serious obstacle to deep reforms of state institutions, eventually leading to some segments of security units taking part in Saleh-Houthi coup against the transitional government. After the collapse of the Qaddafi regime, revolutionaries and militias demanded a purge as a method of institutional reform—similar to de-Baathification in Iraq. The purge contributed to the outbreak of a civil war. Tunisia, on the other hand, approached institutional reform from a different angle and succeeded in putting together a sound formula, but it is facing serious challenges to implementation.

Ultimately, a variety of actors have played key roles in Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia’s national reconciliation processes. In all three countries, women have been integral to bringing about change, and must continue to be involved in reshaping their countries. As agents of change, women helped to initiate the uprisings in Yemen and Libya, and have already proven to be effective agents of reconciliation. In Yemen and Libya, tribes are key stakeholders that must be incorporated after decades of manipulation and marginalization. Depending on the way they become involved, tribes could play key role in either stabilizing or destabilizing transitions. Domestic civil society groups have been essential to Tunisia’s progress so far, and are fast developing in Yemen and Libya. Their continued involvement—and assistance from international groups—will go a long way toward consolidating new states that honor human and civil rights.

The processes of national dialogue, truth seeking, reparation, accountability, and institutional reform, especially if supported by key agents of reconciliation, including women, civil society, and tribes, can combine to create the momentum needed to bridge divides and help post-Arab Spring societies move toward sustainable peace, stability, and development.

Authors

Five years have passed since several Arab countries revolted against their repressive regimes, and peace and stability are nowhere in sight. The unraveling of their political systems pushed these countries into challenging transition processes where violence is always a serious possibility. Yemen and Libya’s civil wars present blunt examples of failed transitions, raising concerns about protracted political instability, not only in those two countries, but potentially in neighboring ones as well. Tunisia theoretically managed to complete its transition successfully. It ratified a new constitution, addressing the need for a new social contract, and held two rounds of elections. Tunisia also passed a transitional justice law to provide a framework for adjudicating both victims’ grievances and perpetrators’ crimes of the past political era. Nonetheless, Tunisia finds its stability challenged by increasing levels of polarization between its various societal segments.

The fact of the matter is that political transitions take a long time—years if not decades—and transitioning countries face the risk of violence. Arab Spring societies are unlikely to transition to sustainable peace and stability as long as they are wracked by deep divisions. Therefore, national reconciliation is paramount to reducing the societal polarization that currently cripples Libya and Yemen and threatens Tunisia’s progress. To attain enduring peace and stability, post-revolution states must engage in inclusive national reconciliation processes, including a national dialogue, a truth-seeking effort, the reparation of victims’ past injuries, dealing with the former regime, and institutional reform. Women, civil society, and tribes, among other social forces, can support the transition process. Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia have each taken specific approaches to trying to reconcile their post-revolution societies, raising or diminishing the chances of civil war or a healthy transition.

An inclusive national dialogue is the starting point of a comprehensive national reconciliation process. It gives transitioning societies an opportunity to develop a vision and theoretical framework for their futures, gives legitimacy to transition processes, and encourages negotiation and compromise. Tunisia held a homegrown national dialogue driven mainly by civil society organizations and Yemen completed an eight-month, U.N.-assisted national dialogue conference. Libya’s engagement in U.N.-led negotiations raised questions over whether all parties had representation.

As each society suffered decades of repression and has a number of unanswered questions, investigating—and dealing with—the truth about the past is also essential. Relatedly, determining how to handle former regime elements has profound implications for post-revolution transitions. While Libya opted to purge all those who served in Muammar Qaddafi’s regime through adopting its “Political Isolation Law,” Yemen chose to grant President Ali Abdullah Saleh immunity from prosecution in return for his abdication—sacrificing justice to preserve peace. However, Saleh later returned to politics, allying with the Houthis to take over the state, meaning Yemen ultimately achieved neither justice nor peace. Tunisia, on the other hand, has adopted a transitional justice law that mandates, among other measures, the investigation and prosecution of the state’s crimes since 1955. While the resulting Truth and Dignity Commission has received thousands of complaints from victims of past abuses, progress has otherwise been slow, as the body has struggled to establish an effective organizational structure or execute a clearly defined work plan. Controversy over the selection of commissioners and an overall lack of publicity has also hindered the truth-seeking process.

Reparations are another important part of the pursuit of justice and healing. Done correctly, they can bring previously marginalized and abused segments of society back into the mainstream, where they can make positive contributions to the development of the country. Yemen and Tunisia experienced extensive human rights violations during the decades-long reigns of Saleh and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, while lacking the resources to engage in meaningful and comprehensive rehabilitation of victims of past abuses. This left the two countries’ transition processes struggling with a major component—the victims—feeling further marginalization added to their past traumas. Libya, however, who has the resources to fund a process of thorough rehabilitation of victims of its dictatorship, slid into civil war that prevented the proper addressing of past wounds.

Even if these societies overcome their polarization at the personal level, however, they will not accomplish successful transitions unless their healing is accompanied by institutional reforms. “Regime renovation” rather than “regime change” in Yemen presented a serious obstacle to deep reforms of state institutions, eventually leading to some segments of security units taking part in Saleh-Houthi coup against the transitional government. After the collapse of the Qaddafi regime, revolutionaries and militias demanded a purge as a method of institutional reform—similar to de-Baathification in Iraq. The purge contributed to the outbreak of a civil war. Tunisia, on the other hand, approached institutional reform from a different angle and succeeded in putting together a sound formula, but it is facing serious challenges to implementation.

Ultimately, a variety of actors have played key roles in Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia’s national reconciliation processes. In all three countries, women have been integral to bringing about change, and must continue to be involved in reshaping their countries. As agents of change, women helped to initiate the uprisings in Yemen and Libya, and have already proven to be effective agents of reconciliation. In Yemen and Libya, tribes are key stakeholders that must be incorporated after decades of manipulation and marginalization. Depending on the way they become involved, tribes could play key role in either stabilizing or destabilizing transitions. Domestic civil society groups have been essential to Tunisia’s progress so far, and are fast developing in Yemen and Libya. Their continued involvement—and assistance from international groups—will go a long way toward consolidating new states that honor human and civil rights.

The processes of national dialogue, truth seeking, reparation, accountability, and institutional reform, especially if supported by key agents of reconciliation, including women, civil society, and tribes, can combine to create the momentum needed to bridge divides and help post-Arab Spring societies move toward sustainable peace, stability, and development.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/04/26-conflict-resolution-yemen-barakat?rssid=yemen{69A9984F-7A01-4DD7-886E-216B1BC5A74B}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/151383374/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~Is-there-a-path-to-peace-in-YemenIs there a path to peace in Yemen?

Editors’ Note: The conflict in Yemen has become a mutually hurting stalemate, writes Sultan Barakat. Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement. This post originally appeared on Al Jazeera.

After a year of the Saudi-led coalition's war in Yemen, parties to the conflict have been meeting in Kuwait this week, in the latest effort to resolve the conflict. Despite sporadic violations, a fragile truce brokered by United Nations envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed that went into effect on April 10 seems to be holding.

This is good news for Yemenis and the region, as it seems there is a growing appreciation that maintaining violence as the means to achieve political goals in Yemen is simply not feasible.

Despite the lack of progress, the fact that talks are taking place outside Riyadh is in itself a positive compromise and an important step by the Saudis. For the talks to be effective, Saudi Arabia needs to revisit its overall strategy now that its year-long military campaign has not solved Yemen's protracted crisis.

Furthermore, to improve upon the failed ceasefires of July and December 2015, the delegations should consider the following factors, which may provide a degree of common ground on which to build a lasting peace in Yemen.

Mutually hurting stalemate

First, the conflict has become a mutually hurting stalemate. Yemen is facing a humanitarian catastrophe that will haunt the region for years to come.

In addition to the 6,000 people killed and 30,000 wounded, more than 2.5 million people remain internally displaced and 14.4 million are affected by food insecurity, with many of the country's governorates on the verge of famine.

Most Yemenis lack access to clean water and proper sanitation. Meanwhile, with the military campaign costing an estimated $200 million a day, the coalition supporting President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi against the Houthis will find it increasingly difficult to afford as a result of the falling price of oil.

Furthermore, having announced its developmental Vision 2030, it is in Saudi Arabia's interest to put an end to its war in Yemen as soon as possible.

Second, it will be almost impossible to advance a peace agreement in Yemen without an innovative form of inclusive local power sharing that addresses the concerns of all parties.

Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen's war is actually a multifaceted predicament.

Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen's war is actually a multifaceted predicament involving a volatile combination of local, regional, and international actors, all of them armed and having major and competing interests in the country's future.

The political transition process set out by the Gulf Cooperation Council back in 2011 failed to incorporate key sections of Yemeni society into the decision-making process, such as the southern separatist Hirak movement, the Houthis, and Yemeni youth and women.

As a result, Hadi’s transitional government was increasingly viewed as illegitimate and unrepresentative of the demands and concerns of the Yemeni people.

Power-sharing agreement

Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement.

Relatedly, the Houthis continue to harbor grievances against the Hadi government. They associate Hadi with the corrupt Saleh regime that exacerbated political problems in Yemen for decades. They protested the exclusive way in which he oversaw Yemen's transition process, leading to unilateral decisions on major national issues and the drafting and implementation of a new constitution.

It seems that the Saudis too, do not have full confidence in Hadi and his cabinet. According to a private conversation with a senior member of Hadi's government, the Saudis have yet to approve his proposed operational budget for governing in Aden and elsewhere.

As a compromise, the Saudis should consider working with the Houthis in order to reach an understanding on how to cease hostilities and resolve political disagreements with an open mind as to who should be in the leading seat. This may be another point of convergence that is rising fast.

Fourth, the six-region federalism plan endorsed by Hadi must be re-examined and evaluated more thoroughly if an effective power-sharing agreement is to be reached. Without proper consensus from factions such as Hirak and the Houthis, these divisions will put at risk any prospect of lasting peace in Yemen.

One of the major concerns is that federalism may exacerbate calls for secession in the future.

Among Hirak supporters, certain factions say they will accept nothing less than complete secession of the South, while others have hailed the six-federation outline as a step towards possible secession in the near future.

Access to sea

Apprehension over access to the sea and possession of natural resources has dominated debates over the regional boundaries. Ironically, this is an issue that may unite Houthis and Southern Yemenis as they both reject the federal system as currently structured.

Finally, Yemen’s war has already strengthened the presence of al-Qaida and other extremist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). Today, al-Qaida controls large swaths of territory and has penetrated the very structure of the Yemeni state, becoming a recognized partner in raising taxes locally, allocating central expenditures, and paying local salaries.

Since the enemies of al-Qaida and ISIL—the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition—are busy fighting each other, extremist organizations can now operate with impunity. It is in the interest of all parties heading to Kuwait to ensure that this situation does not continue.

The peace talks in Kuwait will provide the Saudis with an opportunity to present a strategy for ceasing hostilities in Yemen without necessarily sacrificing their political goals.

Yemen and its people deserve to have their humanitarian issues improved and find a peace settlement that encourages the formation of an inclusive political system.

Failure to do so would perpetuate moral insolvency on the part of the Saudis and their coalition partners, threaten to further destabilize Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, and enable al-Qaida and ISIL to continue to flourish.

Authors

Editors’ Note: The conflict in Yemen has become a mutually hurting stalemate, writes Sultan Barakat. Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement. This post originally appeared on Al Jazeera.

After a year of the Saudi-led coalition's war in Yemen, parties to the conflict have been meeting in Kuwait this week, in the latest effort to resolve the conflict. Despite sporadic violations, a fragile truce brokered by United Nations envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed that went into effect on April 10 seems to be holding.

This is good news for Yemenis and the region, as it seems there is a growing appreciation that maintaining violence as the means to achieve political goals in Yemen is simply not feasible.

Despite the lack of progress, the fact that talks are taking place outside Riyadh is in itself a positive compromise and an important step by the Saudis. For the talks to be effective, Saudi Arabia needs to revisit its overall strategy now that its year-long military campaign has not solved Yemen's protracted crisis.

Furthermore, to improve upon the failed ceasefires of July and December 2015, the delegations should consider the following factors, which may provide a degree of common ground on which to build a lasting peace in Yemen.

Mutually hurting stalemate

First, the conflict has become a mutually hurting stalemate. Yemen is facing a humanitarian catastrophe that will haunt the region for years to come.

In addition to the 6,000 people killed and 30,000 wounded, more than 2.5 million people remain internally displaced and 14.4 million are affected by food insecurity, with many of the country's governorates on the verge of famine.

Most Yemenis lack access to clean water and proper sanitation. Meanwhile, with the military campaign costing an estimated $200 million a day, the coalition supporting President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi against the Houthis will find it increasingly difficult to afford as a result of the falling price of oil.

Furthermore, having announced its developmental Vision 2030, it is in Saudi Arabia's interest to put an end to its war in Yemen as soon as possible.

Second, it will be almost impossible to advance a peace agreement in Yemen without an innovative form of inclusive local power sharing that addresses the concerns of all parties.

Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen's war is actually a multifaceted predicament.

Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen's war is actually a multifaceted predicament involving a volatile combination of local, regional, and international actors, all of them armed and having major and competing interests in the country's future.

The political transition process set out by the Gulf Cooperation Council back in 2011 failed to incorporate key sections of Yemeni society into the decision-making process, such as the southern separatist Hirak movement, the Houthis, and Yemeni youth and women.

As a result, Hadi’s transitional government was increasingly viewed as illegitimate and unrepresentative of the demands and concerns of the Yemeni people.

Power-sharing agreement

Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement.

Relatedly, the Houthis continue to harbor grievances against the Hadi government. They associate Hadi with the corrupt Saleh regime that exacerbated political problems in Yemen for decades. They protested the exclusive way in which he oversaw Yemen's transition process, leading to unilateral decisions on major national issues and the drafting and implementation of a new constitution.

It seems that the Saudis too, do not have full confidence in Hadi and his cabinet. According to a private conversation with a senior member of Hadi's government, the Saudis have yet to approve his proposed operational budget for governing in Aden and elsewhere.

As a compromise, the Saudis should consider working with the Houthis in order to reach an understanding on how to cease hostilities and resolve political disagreements with an open mind as to who should be in the leading seat. This may be another point of convergence that is rising fast.

Fourth, the six-region federalism plan endorsed by Hadi must be re-examined and evaluated more thoroughly if an effective power-sharing agreement is to be reached. Without proper consensus from factions such as Hirak and the Houthis, these divisions will put at risk any prospect of lasting peace in Yemen.

One of the major concerns is that federalism may exacerbate calls for secession in the future.

Among Hirak supporters, certain factions say they will accept nothing less than complete secession of the South, while others have hailed the six-federation outline as a step towards possible secession in the near future.

Access to sea

Apprehension over access to the sea and possession of natural resources has dominated debates over the regional boundaries. Ironically, this is an issue that may unite Houthis and Southern Yemenis as they both reject the federal system as currently structured.

Finally, Yemen’s war has already strengthened the presence of al-Qaida and other extremist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). Today, al-Qaida controls large swaths of territory and has penetrated the very structure of the Yemeni state, becoming a recognized partner in raising taxes locally, allocating central expenditures, and paying local salaries.

Since the enemies of al-Qaida and ISIL—the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition—are busy fighting each other, extremist organizations can now operate with impunity. It is in the interest of all parties heading to Kuwait to ensure that this situation does not continue.

The peace talks in Kuwait will provide the Saudis with an opportunity to present a strategy for ceasing hostilities in Yemen without necessarily sacrificing their political goals.

Yemen and its people deserve to have their humanitarian issues improved and find a peace settlement that encourages the formation of an inclusive political system.

Failure to do so would perpetuate moral insolvency on the part of the Saudis and their coalition partners, threaten to further destabilize Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, and enable al-Qaida and ISIL to continue to flourish.

“My thesis that I’ve been presenting over … the last month or so,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) at a Brookings event this week, “is that one of the underlying foundations of American policy in the Middle East is our resolute partnership and alliance with the Saudis is one of those policies that needs to be revisited as we seek to try to reshape our interests in the region.”

Senator Murphy joined Brookings Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Wittes for a discussion on the U.S.-Saudi partnership, one of America’s longest-standing relationships in the Middle East. Senator Murphy, whose committee memberships include Senate Foreign Relations, expressed his view that despite the importance of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and Saudi Arabia’s critical role in the region, “it is harder and harder to ignore the holes in the relationship.” Watch as he talks about two issues that particularly trouble him: the Saudi family’s support of Wahhabi movement and Saudi Arabia’s objectives in its war in Yemen:

Revisit U.S.-Saudi partnership

Yemen war a chance to reset U.S.-Saudi relationship

Riedel, who directs the Intelligence Project at Brookings, put the war in Yemen into stark terms, noting that 20 million Yemenis “are facing a humanitarian catastrophe.” He added that by refueling aircraft and providing ordnance, intelligence, and logistics to the Saudis, the U.S. “is a partner in this war.” He added that “if the United States of America and the United Kingdom tonight told King Salman that this war has to end, it would end tomorrow.” Watch:

U.S. a partner with Saudi Arabia in Yemen war

Riedel also spoke to legislation co-sponsored by Senator Murphy and Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) that would impose conditions on Saudi Arabia for the receipt of additional military hardware from the United States. “I think [the] legislation gives the president ammunition moving forward” to do this, Riedel said.

Riedel, who has watched and studied Saudi Arabia closely for decades, also spoke to the Saudis relationship with Wahhabism and with Iran. He noted that the Saudi alliance with the Wahhabi faith dates from 1744; it is “the fundamental bedrock on which this relationship exists.” He also noted that the current period of poor relations with Iran “is in fact a break with the past,” but that King Salman and President Obama should focus on preventing Iranian military assistance from flowing to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Watch:

On the Saudi-Wahhabi issue

Riedel added that while we should have a relationship with Saudi Arabia and especially it’s likely next king—Muhammad bin Salman, who Riedel called the “architect” of the war in Yemen—we also:

should also have a relationship in which we are prepared to say to our friends, “don’t drive drunk.” And what Saudi Arabia has been doing for the last year in Yemen is effectively driving drunk. It’s time for the United States to get out of the back seat and tell the Saudis, “let’s find a way to end this war, which is in our mutual interest.”

Sen. Murphy stressed that “resetting the relationship moving forward so that we ensure that the Saudis are fighting extremism, fighting [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], who we know has designs to attack the United States, is probably more important” than looking at past issues of contention.

Video

Authors

Fred Dews

Image Source: Paul Morigi

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Fri, 22 Apr 2016 11:26:00 -0400Fred Dews

“My thesis that I’ve been presenting over … the last month or so,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) at a Brookings event this week, “is that one of the underlying foundations of American policy in the Middle East is our resolute partnership and alliance with the Saudis is one of those policies that needs to be revisited as we seek to try to reshape our interests in the region.”

Senator Murphy joined Brookings Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Wittes for a discussion on the U.S.-Saudi partnership, one of America’s longest-standing relationships in the Middle East. Senator Murphy, whose committee memberships include Senate Foreign Relations, expressed his view that despite the importance of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and Saudi Arabia’s critical role in the region, “it is harder and harder to ignore the holes in the relationship.” Watch as he talks about two issues that particularly trouble him: the Saudi family’s support of Wahhabi movement and Saudi Arabia’s objectives in its war in Yemen:

Revisit U.S.-Saudi partnership

Yemen war a chance to reset U.S.-Saudi relationship

Riedel, who directs the Intelligence Project at Brookings, put the war in Yemen into stark terms, noting that 20 million Yemenis “are facing a humanitarian catastrophe.” He added that by refueling aircraft and providing ordnance, intelligence, and logistics to the Saudis, the U.S. “is a partner in this war.” He added that “if the United States of America and the United Kingdom tonight told King Salman that this war has to end, it would end tomorrow.” Watch:

U.S. a partner with Saudi Arabia in Yemen war

Riedel also spoke to legislation co-sponsored by Senator Murphy and Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) that would impose conditions on Saudi Arabia for the receipt of additional military hardware from the United States. “I think [the] legislation gives the president ammunition moving forward” to do this, Riedel said.

Riedel, who has watched and studied Saudi Arabia closely for decades, also spoke to the Saudis relationship with Wahhabism and with Iran. He noted that the Saudi alliance with the Wahhabi faith dates from 1744; it is “the fundamental bedrock on which this relationship exists.” He also noted that the current period of poor relations with Iran “is in fact a break with the past,” but that King Salman and President Obama should focus on preventing Iranian military assistance from flowing to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Watch:

On the Saudi-Wahhabi issue

Riedel added that while we should have a relationship with Saudi Arabia and especially it’s likely next king—Muhammad bin Salman, who Riedel called the “architect” of the war in Yemen—we also:

should also have a relationship in which we are prepared to say to our friends, “don’t drive drunk.” And what Saudi Arabia has been doing for the last year in Yemen is effectively driving drunk. It’s time for the United States to get out of the back seat and tell the Saudis, “let’s find a way to end this war, which is in our mutual interest.”

Sen. Murphy stressed that “resetting the relationship moving forward so that we ensure that the Saudis are fighting extremism, fighting [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], who we know has designs to attack the United States, is probably more important” than looking at past issues of contention.

Event Information

The United States alliance with Saudi Arabia dates back to 1943, making the U.S. relationship with the Kingdom one of America's longest-standing in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a key counterterrorism and diplomatic partner within the region, yet the alliance has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, especially in the period following the 9/11 attacks, when questions about Saudi support for extremist causes emerged. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution of the war in Yemen has added to the criticism, with many observers blaming the Kingdom for the unfolding humanitarian crisis within the Arab world's poorest state. In recent comments, President Barack Obama has been critical of Saudi policies, despite U.S. logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia’s war effort in Yemen.

On April 21, the Intelligence Project and Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted U.S. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut to discuss the U.S.-Saudi alliance with Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Cofman Wittes. Senator Murphy has urged a more rigorous approach to cooperation with Riyadh that balances U.S. counterterrorism interests, strategic imperatives, and human rights concerns, and has led efforts on Capitol Hill to debate the war in Yemen. Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Event Information

The United States alliance with Saudi Arabia dates back to 1943, making the U.S. relationship with the Kingdom one of America's longest-standing in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a key counterterrorism and diplomatic partner within the region, yet the alliance has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, especially in the period following the 9/11 attacks, when questions about Saudi support for extremist causes emerged. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution of the war in Yemen has added to the criticism, with many observers blaming the Kingdom for the unfolding humanitarian crisis within the Arab world's poorest state. In recent comments, President Barack Obama has been critical of Saudi policies, despite U.S. logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia’s war effort in Yemen.

On April 21, the Intelligence Project and Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted U.S. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut to discuss the U.S.-Saudi alliance with Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Cofman Wittes. Senator Murphy has urged a more rigorous approach to cooperation with Riyadh that balances U.S. counterterrorism interests, strategic imperatives, and human rights concerns, and has led efforts on Capitol Hill to debate the war in Yemen. Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Join the conversation on Twitter at #USSaudi.

Video

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/04/14-obama-saudi-arabia-visit-riedel?rssid=yemen{E6FA6490-EA16-4150-929E-F3F455F3C455}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/149343780/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~Mr-Obama-goes-to-Riyadh-Why-the-United-States-and-Saudi-Arabia-still-need-each-otherMr. Obama goes to Riyadh: Why the United States and Saudi Arabia still need each other

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has been deteriorating since 2000 due to serious and fundamental differences on Israel, democracy, Iran, and other issues. President Barack Obama's visit next week can help contain these differences and emphasize common interests but it won't restore the relationship to its glory days.

A long history of ups and downs

The U.S.-Saudi alliance dates to 1943, when the future Kings Faysal and Khalid visited the White House at the invitation of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The two young princes agreed to accept American security assistance in return for continued Saudi preference for American oil companies’ access to the Kingdom. The deal was formalized on Valentine’s Day 1945, when King Ibn Saud and Roosevelt met face-to-face on the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. The King and the President hit it off well, despite deep disagreement on the future of Palestine.

The next six decades had ups and downs, but the countries grew steadily closer together. Faysal would impose the 1973 oil embargo on Richard Nixon for supporting Israel in the October war, but it began Saudi-U.S. cooperation on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Khalid would partner with Jimmy Carter to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. King Fahd would turn to President George H.W. Bush to fight Saddam Hussein and liberate Kuwait. The 1980s and 1990s saw unprecedented cooperation between the two countries.

It began to go sour in 2000 when President Bill Clinton failed to get both a Syrian-Israeli peace at the Shepherdstown peace conference and a Palestinian-Israel peace at Camp David. Then Crown Prince Abdullah felt Clinton failed to push Israel hard enough to make territorial concessions. The Saudis believed a Syrian deal was especially ripe in 2000 and would have weaned Damascus away from Iran, isolated Hezbollah, and paved the way for a Palestinian deal.

Abdullah was the de facto regent by then, due to Fahd's poor health. He was bitterly disappointed when President George W. Bush sided with Ariel Sharon in 2001 during the second intifada. Abdullah read Secretary of State Colin Powell the riot act when the two meet in Paris, accusing Bush of complicity in war crimes. Abdullah refused to meet Bush or visit Washington despite the pleading of both Bush’s, father and son. Abdullah was only partially appeased when George W. Bush publicly called for a Palestinian state. In private the Saudis doubted he really meant it.

9/11 made it all worse. Americans rightly asked why 15 Saudis attacked America and why Osama bin Laden hated America. The ideology of al-Qaida has its roots in the Saudi Wahhabi framework. The Saudis were in denial about al-Qaida until it attacked the Kingdom in 2003. Only when Riyadh was attacked did the Saudis begin to take concrete action against the group.

For their part, the Saudis could not understand why after 9/11 Bush attacked Iraq. Iraq had nothing to do with bin Laden or al-Qaida. They were happy to see Saddam go, but wanted a pliable Sunni general to replace him—not a Shiite elected by majority rule. The Kingdom is an absolute monarchy, and democracy in a major Arab country is a potential existential threat to a monarchy if the democracy works. Saudis might some day want the vote.

Worse, elections in Iraq handed Baghdad to the Shiites. For the Saudis, that was the equivalent of giving Iraq to Iran. Abdullah was aghast at what he saw as Bush's naiveté, and it remains a source of Saudi distress today.

The Obama years

Obama made Riyadh his first stop on his first visit to the Middle East in 2009. The meeting with King Abdullah went poorly, but Obama promised to address the Palestinian issue. Then the Saudis believe he caved to Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Saudis felt disappointed again.

The Arab Spring made it much worse. Abdullah wanted Obama to fully back Hosni Mubarak—not abandon an old ally. Democracy in Sunni Egypt was even worse than democracy in Shiite Iraq. If Egypt could be a quasi-democracy, why not Saudi Arabia? That was a challenge to the essence of the Gulf monarchs’ existence.

If Egypt could be a quasi-democracy, why not Saudi Arabia? That was a challenge to the essence of the Gulf monarchs’ existence.

Even more difficult for the Saudis was the idea of political reform and some democracy in Bahrain. If a Sunni monarchy was threatened by a Shiite majority on the other side of the King Fahd causeway from the Kingdom's oil-rich (and Shiite-majority) Eastern Province, the source of the House of Saud's money was at stake. Washington was openly sympathetic to reform in Bahrain, so Riyadh and Abu Dhabi sent in armored personnel carriers and troops. They are still there. The counter revolution triumphed, at least for now.

Egypt was next. Riyadh knew General Abdel Fatah el-Sissi well, since he was the former military attaché of Egypt to the Kingdom. Prince Bandar, formerly ambassador to Washington but in 2013 the head of Saudi intelligence, had his candidate for the new Mubarak. When el-Sissi seized power, King Abdullah endorsed his coup in less than five minutes; now the Saudis bankroll his dictatorship.

New king not like the old

Abdullah was a fairly cautious and risk-averse leader. King Salman is much more bold and aggressive. He has snubbed Obama once, gone to war in Yemen, executed dozens of accused terrorists, and built a broad 34-nation Islamic military alliance against Iran. Salman just visited Cairo promising billions in aid and investment and a bridge linking the two countries across the Strait of Tiran.

King Salman is much more bold and aggressive.

The Wahhabi clerical establishment is pressing Salman to be even tougher on what it calls the "satanic Safavid Iranian" regime (the Safavid dynasty introduced Shiism to Iran). One hundred and forty clerics with longstanding and deep ties to the King sent a petition to the King this month urging an "ideological" struggle with Iran across the Islamic world.

In it together

Despite all these differences, Saudi Arabia and America are not getting divorced. We still need each other. Obama and Salman still have areas of common interest and agreement. Obama has sold $95 billion in arms to the Kingdom. Both are determined to fight the Islamic State and al-Qaida, and the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef is a proven good partner for security cooperation with America. The two countries should enhance cooperation to combat al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which has grown dramatically during the war in Yemen.

Washington and Riyadh can also cooperate on curbing Iranian subversive activities especially in the Gulf states. There is a serious risk that Iran will step up support to subversive activities now that it has more oil income.

Despite all these differences, Saudi Arabia and America are not getting divorced. We still need each other.

Syria is also on the agenda. The Saudis want a clear commitment to removing Bashar Assad. They believe the civil war can only be resolved by Assad's departure.

Bringing peace to Yemen should be a very high priority. Washington has been Riyadh's silent partner in this war providing critical assistance. The war has already cost the Kingdom billions. It has had a devastating humanitarian impact in Yemen and border regions of Saudi Arabia. Deputy Crown prince Muhammad bin Salman says it's time for a political process. He's right.

Muhammed bin Salman also says the Saudis want U.S. involvement in more, not less, "policing" of the region. Yemen is a good place to try joint approaches. Indeed, Washington and Riyadh have a common interest in minimizing Tehran's future influence in Sanaa which requires persuading the Zaydi Shiite Houthis that they don't need Iranian support to have a good share in politics in Yemen.

The Kingdom is in the midst of a generational change in leadership, the first in more than half a century. It's a major challenge for an absolute monarchy. There is more political activity within the royal family since 1963. Low oil prices make the changes even more complex. Obama is right to keep working the Saudi leadership despite our differences. In a Middle East in chaos, the Kingdom is a major player.

Authors

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has been deteriorating since 2000 due to serious and fundamental differences on Israel, democracy, Iran, and other issues. President Barack Obama's visit next week can help contain these differences and emphasize common interests but it won't restore the relationship to its glory days.

A long history of ups and downs

The U.S.-Saudi alliance dates to 1943, when the future Kings Faysal and Khalid visited the White House at the invitation of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The two young princes agreed to accept American security assistance in return for continued Saudi preference for American oil companies’ access to the Kingdom. The deal was formalized on Valentine’s Day 1945, when King Ibn Saud and Roosevelt met face-to-face on the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. The King and the President hit it off well, despite deep disagreement on the future of Palestine.

The next six decades had ups and downs, but the countries grew steadily closer together. Faysal would impose the 1973 oil embargo on Richard Nixon for supporting Israel in the October war, but it began Saudi-U.S. cooperation on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Khalid would partner with Jimmy Carter to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. King Fahd would turn to President George H.W. Bush to fight Saddam Hussein and liberate Kuwait. The 1980s and 1990s saw unprecedented cooperation between the two countries.

It began to go sour in 2000 when President Bill Clinton failed to get both a Syrian-Israeli peace at the Shepherdstown peace conference and a Palestinian-Israel peace at Camp David. Then Crown Prince Abdullah felt Clinton failed to push Israel hard enough to make territorial concessions. The Saudis believed a Syrian deal was especially ripe in 2000 and would have weaned Damascus away from Iran, isolated Hezbollah, and paved the way for a Palestinian deal.

Abdullah was the de facto regent by then, due to Fahd's poor health. He was bitterly disappointed when President George W. Bush sided with Ariel Sharon in 2001 during the second intifada. Abdullah read Secretary of State Colin Powell the riot act when the two meet in Paris, accusing Bush of complicity in war crimes. Abdullah refused to meet Bush or visit Washington despite the pleading of both Bush’s, father and son. Abdullah was only partially appeased when George W. Bush publicly called for a Palestinian state. In private the Saudis doubted he really meant it.

9/11 made it all worse. Americans rightly asked why 15 Saudis attacked America and why Osama bin Laden hated America. The ideology of al-Qaida has its roots in the Saudi Wahhabi framework. The Saudis were in denial about al-Qaida until it attacked the Kingdom in 2003. Only when Riyadh was attacked did the Saudis begin to take concrete action against the group.

For their part, the Saudis could not understand why after 9/11 Bush attacked Iraq. Iraq had nothing to do with bin Laden or al-Qaida. They were happy to see Saddam go, but wanted a pliable Sunni general to replace him—not a Shiite elected by majority rule. The Kingdom is an absolute monarchy, and democracy in a major Arab country is a potential existential threat to a monarchy if the democracy works. Saudis might some day want the vote.

Worse, elections in Iraq handed Baghdad to the Shiites. For the Saudis, that was the equivalent of giving Iraq to Iran. Abdullah was aghast at what he saw as Bush's naiveté, and it remains a source of Saudi distress today.

The Obama years

Obama made Riyadh his first stop on his first visit to the Middle East in 2009. The meeting with King Abdullah went poorly, but Obama promised to address the Palestinian issue. Then the Saudis believe he caved to Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Saudis felt disappointed again.

The Arab Spring made it much worse. Abdullah wanted Obama to fully back Hosni Mubarak—not abandon an old ally. Democracy in Sunni Egypt was even worse than democracy in Shiite Iraq. If Egypt could be a quasi-democracy, why not Saudi Arabia? That was a challenge to the essence of the Gulf monarchs’ existence.

If Egypt could be a quasi-democracy, why not Saudi Arabia? That was a challenge to the essence of the Gulf monarchs’ existence.

Even more difficult for the Saudis was the idea of political reform and some democracy in Bahrain. If a Sunni monarchy was threatened by a Shiite majority on the other side of the King Fahd causeway from the Kingdom's oil-rich (and Shiite-majority) Eastern Province, the source of the House of Saud's money was at stake. Washington was openly sympathetic to reform in Bahrain, so Riyadh and Abu Dhabi sent in armored personnel carriers and troops. They are still there. The counter revolution triumphed, at least for now.

Egypt was next. Riyadh knew General Abdel Fatah el-Sissi well, since he was the former military attaché of Egypt to the Kingdom. Prince Bandar, formerly ambassador to Washington but in 2013 the head of Saudi intelligence, had his candidate for the new Mubarak. When el-Sissi seized power, King Abdullah endorsed his coup in less than five minutes; now the Saudis bankroll his dictatorship.

New king not like the old

Abdullah was a fairly cautious and risk-averse leader. King Salman is much more bold and aggressive. He has snubbed Obama once, gone to war in Yemen, executed dozens of accused terrorists, and built a broad 34-nation Islamic military alliance against Iran. Salman just visited Cairo promising billions in aid and investment and a bridge linking the two countries across the Strait of Tiran.

King Salman is much more bold and aggressive.

The Wahhabi clerical establishment is pressing Salman to be even tougher on what it calls the "satanic Safavid Iranian" regime (the Safavid dynasty introduced Shiism to Iran). One hundred and forty clerics with longstanding and deep ties to the King sent a petition to the King this month urging an "ideological" struggle with Iran across the Islamic world.

In it together

Despite all these differences, Saudi Arabia and America are not getting divorced. We still need each other. Obama and Salman still have areas of common interest and agreement. Obama has sold $95 billion in arms to the Kingdom. Both are determined to fight the Islamic State and al-Qaida, and the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef is a proven good partner for security cooperation with America. The two countries should enhance cooperation to combat al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which has grown dramatically during the war in Yemen.

Washington and Riyadh can also cooperate on curbing Iranian subversive activities especially in the Gulf states. There is a serious risk that Iran will step up support to subversive activities now that it has more oil income.

Despite all these differences, Saudi Arabia and America are not getting divorced. We still need each other.

Syria is also on the agenda. The Saudis want a clear commitment to removing Bashar Assad. They believe the civil war can only be resolved by Assad's departure.

Bringing peace to Yemen should be a very high priority. Washington has been Riyadh's silent partner in this war providing critical assistance. The war has already cost the Kingdom billions. It has had a devastating humanitarian impact in Yemen and border regions of Saudi Arabia. Deputy Crown prince Muhammad bin Salman says it's time for a political process. He's right.

Muhammed bin Salman also says the Saudis want U.S. involvement in more, not less, "policing" of the region. Yemen is a good place to try joint approaches. Indeed, Washington and Riyadh have a common interest in minimizing Tehran's future influence in Sanaa which requires persuading the Zaydi Shiite Houthis that they don't need Iranian support to have a good share in politics in Yemen.

The Kingdom is in the midst of a generational change in leadership, the first in more than half a century. It's a major challenge for an absolute monarchy. There is more political activity within the royal family since 1963. Low oil prices make the changes even more complex. Obama is right to keep working the Saudi leadership despite our differences. In a Middle East in chaos, the Kingdom is a major player.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/04/12-yemen-ceasefire-us-security-riedel?rssid=yemen{E6920D5C-5416-4320-A1D1-133E2A25F395}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/148989000/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~What-the-Yemen-ceasefire-means-for-the-Gulf-the-antiISIS-campaign-and-US-securityWhat the Yemen ceasefire means for the Gulf, the anti-ISIS campaign, and U.S. security

The fourth attempt in a year at a durable ceasefire and a political process in Yemen should get strong support from President Barack Obama when he visits Saudi Arabia later this month. The war has been a humanitarian catastrophe and a boon to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It's in our interest to end it.

The latest attempt at a ceasefire was arranged by direct negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels meeting in Riyadh with U.N. support. Political negotiations are scheduled to begin in Kuwait on April 18. If the truce fails, the Saudis are threatening their coalition will mount a major offensive to take Sanaa from the rebels.

A battle for Sanaa would make a bad situation even worse. The U.N. has said that 21 million Yemenis need immediate relief, of which seven million are "severely food insecure." The situation is particularly acute in Taiz where the Houthis have been besieging the city for months, as well as in Sa'ada (the Houthis’ home city in the north), which has been bombed repeatedly by the Royal Saudi Air Force.

A battle for Sanaa would make a bad situation even worse.

A battle for the capital will compound the tragedy enormously. Sanaa is the fastest growing capital city in the world with a population of two million people. It is also the most water-stressed. The city was projected to run out of available groundwater by 2017, before the war added new stress to the urban environment. An urban battle would be a disaster.

The biggest beneficiary of the war has been AQAP, which now controls some six hundred kilometers of the southern coastline—from just outside Aden to Mukalla, the fifth largest city in Yemen and the capital of Hadramaut province. When AQAP seized the Mukalla at the start of the war, they looted $100 million from its banks. They are now earning at least $2 million and perhaps as much as $5 million a day in smuggling oil. The group is stronger today than ever before.

The Saudi coalition largely left AQAP alone until recently. The Royal Saudi Air Force has now mounted a few missions against it but they remain firmly in control of much of the south. AQAP regularly attacks coalition forces in Aden.

The war has diverted attention and resources from the struggle with ISIS and allowed the growth of AQAP for too long.

Any enduring political settlement will require power sharing between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed Hadi government. It will also need to find a place for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his family and supporters. A massive reconstruction effort will be necessary and can only be paid for by the Saudis and Emiratis.

The United States has been quietly pushing the Saudis to end the war for several months, even as Washington provides critical intelligence and logistical aid to the coalition. Obama needs to press King Salman and his Gulf Cooperation Council counterparts to stop the fighting for good when he visits Riyadh later this month. He can assure the Saudis that Washington is opposed to an Iranian role in Yemen and note that U.S. and allied naval ships have thwarted several recent Iranian efforts to smuggle arms to the Houthis. The war has diverted attention and resources from the struggle with ISIS and allowed the growth of AQAP for too long.

Authors

The fourth attempt in a year at a durable ceasefire and a political process in Yemen should get strong support from President Barack Obama when he visits Saudi Arabia later this month. The war has been a humanitarian catastrophe and a boon to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It's in our interest to end it.

The latest attempt at a ceasefire was arranged by direct negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels meeting in Riyadh with U.N. support. Political negotiations are scheduled to begin in Kuwait on April 18. If the truce fails, the Saudis are threatening their coalition will mount a major offensive to take Sanaa from the rebels.

A battle for Sanaa would make a bad situation even worse. The U.N. has said that 21 million Yemenis need immediate relief, of which seven million are "severely food insecure." The situation is particularly acute in Taiz where the Houthis have been besieging the city for months, as well as in Sa'ada (the Houthis’ home city in the north), which has been bombed repeatedly by the Royal Saudi Air Force.

A battle for Sanaa would make a bad situation even worse.

A battle for the capital will compound the tragedy enormously. Sanaa is the fastest growing capital city in the world with a population of two million people. It is also the most water-stressed. The city was projected to run out of available groundwater by 2017, before the war added new stress to the urban environment. An urban battle would be a disaster.

The biggest beneficiary of the war has been AQAP, which now controls some six hundred kilometers of the southern coastline—from just outside Aden to Mukalla, the fifth largest city in Yemen and the capital of Hadramaut province. When AQAP seized the Mukalla at the start of the war, they looted $100 million from its banks. They are now earning at least $2 million and perhaps as much as $5 million a day in smuggling oil. The group is stronger today than ever before.

The Saudi coalition largely left AQAP alone until recently. The Royal Saudi Air Force has now mounted a few missions against it but they remain firmly in control of much of the south. AQAP regularly attacks coalition forces in Aden.

The war has diverted attention and resources from the struggle with ISIS and allowed the growth of AQAP for too long.

Any enduring political settlement will require power sharing between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed Hadi government. It will also need to find a place for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his family and supporters. A massive reconstruction effort will be necessary and can only be paid for by the Saudis and Emiratis.

The United States has been quietly pushing the Saudis to end the war for several months, even as Washington provides critical intelligence and logistical aid to the coalition. Obama needs to press King Salman and his Gulf Cooperation Council counterparts to stop the fighting for good when he visits Riyadh later this month. He can assure the Saudis that Washington is opposed to an Iranian role in Yemen and note that U.S. and allied naval ships have thwarted several recent Iranian efforts to smuggle arms to the Houthis. The war has diverted attention and resources from the struggle with ISIS and allowed the growth of AQAP for too long.

Event Information

April 7, 20165:30 PM - 7:30 PM AST

Four Seasons Hotel, Doha, Qatar

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 7, 2016, about the possibility of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The panelists included Jamal Khashoggi, General Manager, Alarab News Channel; Sayed Kazem Sajjadpour, former Deputy Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations; Khaled Al Jaber, Director, Al-Sharq Studies and Public Opinion Research Center; and Nasser Hadian, Professor of Political Science, University of Tehran. Ibrahim Fraihat, senior foreign policy fellow and deputy director of the BDC, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Fraihat introduced the event by noting the importance of Iran-Saudi relations, and explained that the discussion would focus on what steps could be taken to improve them. Khashoggi then opened by stating, “We should be able to have rapprochement… It is good for all of us.” He noted that Iran and Saudi Arabia have no direct confrontation or territorial disputes. Explaining the tensions from the Saudi perspective, Khashoggi said, “It’s all about Iranian expansionism. … If the Iranians free themselves from this expansionist policy, I’m sure we will have an excellent relationship.” Khashoggi spoke of their good relationship during the 1990s, but said it fell apart when Iran began getting involved in Iraq, as well as Syria, Lebanon, and now Yemen. He asserted that Saudi Arabia became very popular for countering Iranian expansionism by intervening in Yemen. Khashoggi argued that Iran has sided with a dictator for sectarian reasons in Syria, has hijacked Lebanon, did the Bahraini opposition a disservice in 2011, and hijacked Yemen’s political process. “What they’re doing is not acceptable,” he concluded.

Sajjadpour began by stating his intention to avoid the blame game and argued that Iranian-Saudi relations should be changed through assessment, bridges, and coexistence. Sajjadpour said that the assessment of Arab colleagues that Iran is behind every problem is not helpful, and suggested Saudi Arabia is trying to deflect attention from its domestic problems. Sajjadpour added that Saudi Arabia is acting revolutionary by seeking to change regimes and redraw borders. He said that Iran is still open to bridging the relationship and asserted that coexistence is a necessity, as neither country can relocate.

Al Jaber likened the rivalry to a snowball that is growing bigger every day. He noted that despite numerous conferences and seminars, Arabs and Iranians have been unable to adopt solutions or agreements. Al Jaber said that the GCC and Arab countries’ big problem with Iran is not about Sunnis and Shiites, but the political agenda it has pursued in recent years. Al Jaber asserted that with Iran you do not know who to speak with—the regime, the military establishment, academics—and that progress made with one part of the government is often undermined by statements from another.

Hadian observed that the misunderstandings between Iranian and Saudi elites are very deep. He explained that the Iranian regime perceives the United States and Israel as its principle threats, and that is why Iran is in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq—not to compete with Saudi Arabia. In contrast, he said, the Saudis view Iran as their number one threat, and have oriented their foreign policy accordingly. Hadian rejected sectarianism as an explanation for Iran’s foreign policy behavior, asserting that Iran allies with entities that are revolutionary and friendly, with Venezuela and Hamas being two non-Shiite examples.

When Fraihat asked what Saudi Arabia would tolerate as legitimate Iranian involvement in the region, Khashoggi argued that Iran’s intervention in Syria violates international law. He added that Saudi Arabia feels threatened because if Iran is fighting the Syrian people, they might be willing to fight the Saudis one day and justify it as opposing Israel. Khashoggi asserted that the Middle East needs to work together to fight chaos and extremism, and questioned whether Iran was helping.

Sajjadpour described Iran as being “for its security and the security of the region. … Iran’s agenda is clear, it is not hidden.” He noted that Iran is a pluralistic society where many voices are heard, including in frequent elections, but it has a clearly defined state that is bound by its legal obligations. Regarding Syria, Sajjadpour argued that Saudi Arabia is breaking all international legal frameworks by trying to overthrow a government.

Al Jaber shifted the discussion to how Iran is viewed, referencing several polls. One showed that many of Iran’s Arab and Muslim neighbors view the nation very negatively. In another, people in the region said they fear Iran first, then the Islamic State group, then Israel, all before their own governments, marking a major change from 10 years ago. Al Jaber asserted that this should concern Iran and its leaders, and that it was a result of Iran’s support of terrorism and exporting of the revolution.

Hadian then emphasized the importance of finding a way to cooperate, rather than blaming each other, to contain the flames engulfing “the house we all share.” Responding to Fraihat’s question about the American role, Hadian contended that the United States is in the mood of crisis management and that the Middle East’s significance to it has declined.

After a variety of questions from the audience, Khashoggi remarked that Iran’s version of dialogue is to talk while continuing to act militarily, as in Syria and Yemen. Noting that the discussion had devolved into a blame game, Sajjadpour said, “Let’s be frank. We have to live in this region. We cannot exclude each other.” He added that the idea of Iran being a threat is artificial, and that people are not buying it anymore. Al Jaber called for talking seriously about issues such as Bahrain, contested islands, sectarianism, and the need for development. Hadian argued that Saudi Arabia has invaded Yemen, but the Saudis do not give Iran the same right in Syria. He noted that Iran has managed to develop good relationships with Oman, Qatar, and Dubai.

Regarding what should be done, Khashoggi said Iran should leave the region militarily: “no more militias.” He added that there is no such thing as legitimate interests in Syria for Iran, or the Saudis, and that acceding to Iran’s interventionist policy would be unfair to Syrian and Yemeni peoples. Sajjadpour argued that Iran and Saudi Arabia have to understand how each other view Syria and the difficulties in the region. He recommended “de-emotionalizing” the relationship, de-escalating tensions, and deconstructing cognitive systems, and suggested focusing on the common threat of extremism, economic cooperation, and the environment.

Al Jaber noted that the Gulf hoped that Iran might enter into agreements, as it did with the West, but it now fears that Iran’s government is targeting the Gulf in a long game. As for bridges, Al Jaber replied, “We wanted them yesterday, but not according to Iran’s conditions.” Hadian called for more exchanges of scholars, elites, and youth, as well as the constructive exchange of information through media. He stressed the need for elites in both societies to recognize their own problems as a precursor to moving in the right direction.

Video

Transcript

Event Materials

Event Information

April 7, 2016
5:30 PM - 7:30 PM AST

Four Seasons Hotel, Doha, Qatar

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 7, 2016, about the possibility of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The panelists included Jamal Khashoggi, General Manager, Alarab News Channel; Sayed Kazem Sajjadpour, former Deputy Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations; Khaled Al Jaber, Director, Al-Sharq Studies and Public Opinion Research Center; and Nasser Hadian, Professor of Political Science, University of Tehran. Ibrahim Fraihat, senior foreign policy fellow and deputy director of the BDC, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Fraihat introduced the event by noting the importance of Iran-Saudi relations, and explained that the discussion would focus on what steps could be taken to improve them. Khashoggi then opened by stating, “We should be able to have rapprochement… It is good for all of us.” He noted that Iran and Saudi Arabia have no direct confrontation or territorial disputes. Explaining the tensions from the Saudi perspective, Khashoggi said, “It’s all about Iranian expansionism. … If the Iranians free themselves from this expansionist policy, I’m sure we will have an excellent relationship.” Khashoggi spoke of their good relationship during the 1990s, but said it fell apart when Iran began getting involved in Iraq, as well as Syria, Lebanon, and now Yemen. He asserted that Saudi Arabia became very popular for countering Iranian expansionism by intervening in Yemen. Khashoggi argued that Iran has sided with a dictator for sectarian reasons in Syria, has hijacked Lebanon, did the Bahraini opposition a disservice in 2011, and hijacked Yemen’s political process. “What they’re doing is not acceptable,” he concluded.

Sajjadpour began by stating his intention to avoid the blame game and argued that Iranian-Saudi relations should be changed through assessment, bridges, and coexistence. Sajjadpour said that the assessment of Arab colleagues that Iran is behind every problem is not helpful, and suggested Saudi Arabia is trying to deflect attention from its domestic problems. Sajjadpour added that Saudi Arabia is acting revolutionary by seeking to change regimes and redraw borders. He said that Iran is still open to bridging the relationship and asserted that coexistence is a necessity, as neither country can relocate.

Al Jaber likened the rivalry to a snowball that is growing bigger every day. He noted that despite numerous conferences and seminars, Arabs and Iranians have been unable to adopt solutions or agreements. Al Jaber said that the GCC and Arab countries’ big problem with Iran is not about Sunnis and Shiites, but the political agenda it has pursued in recent years. Al Jaber asserted that with Iran you do not know who to speak with—the regime, the military establishment, academics—and that progress made with one part of the government is often undermined by statements from another.

Hadian observed that the misunderstandings between Iranian and Saudi elites are very deep. He explained that the Iranian regime perceives the United States and Israel as its principle threats, and that is why Iran is in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq—not to compete with Saudi Arabia. In contrast, he said, the Saudis view Iran as their number one threat, and have oriented their foreign policy accordingly. Hadian rejected sectarianism as an explanation for Iran’s foreign policy behavior, asserting that Iran allies with entities that are revolutionary and friendly, with Venezuela and Hamas being two non-Shiite examples.

When Fraihat asked what Saudi Arabia would tolerate as legitimate Iranian involvement in the region, Khashoggi argued that Iran’s intervention in Syria violates international law. He added that Saudi Arabia feels threatened because if Iran is fighting the Syrian people, they might be willing to fight the Saudis one day and justify it as opposing Israel. Khashoggi asserted that the Middle East needs to work together to fight chaos and extremism, and questioned whether Iran was helping.

Sajjadpour described Iran as being “for its security and the security of the region. … Iran’s agenda is clear, it is not hidden.” He noted that Iran is a pluralistic society where many voices are heard, including in frequent elections, but it has a clearly defined state that is bound by its legal obligations. Regarding Syria, Sajjadpour argued that Saudi Arabia is breaking all international legal frameworks by trying to overthrow a government.

Al Jaber shifted the discussion to how Iran is viewed, referencing several polls. One showed that many of Iran’s Arab and Muslim neighbors view the nation very negatively. In another, people in the region said they fear Iran first, then the Islamic State group, then Israel, all before their own governments, marking a major change from 10 years ago. Al Jaber asserted that this should concern Iran and its leaders, and that it was a result of Iran’s support of terrorism and exporting of the revolution.

Hadian then emphasized the importance of finding a way to cooperate, rather than blaming each other, to contain the flames engulfing “the house we all share.” Responding to Fraihat’s question about the American role, Hadian contended that the United States is in the mood of crisis management and that the Middle East’s significance to it has declined.

After a variety of questions from the audience, Khashoggi remarked that Iran’s version of dialogue is to talk while continuing to act militarily, as in Syria and Yemen. Noting that the discussion had devolved into a blame game, Sajjadpour said, “Let’s be frank. We have to live in this region. We cannot exclude each other.” He added that the idea of Iran being a threat is artificial, and that people are not buying it anymore. Al Jaber called for talking seriously about issues such as Bahrain, contested islands, sectarianism, and the need for development. Hadian argued that Saudi Arabia has invaded Yemen, but the Saudis do not give Iran the same right in Syria. He noted that Iran has managed to develop good relationships with Oman, Qatar, and Dubai.

Regarding what should be done, Khashoggi said Iran should leave the region militarily: “no more militias.” He added that there is no such thing as legitimate interests in Syria for Iran, or the Saudis, and that acceding to Iran’s interventionist policy would be unfair to Syrian and Yemeni peoples. Sajjadpour argued that Iran and Saudi Arabia have to understand how each other view Syria and the difficulties in the region. He recommended “de-emotionalizing” the relationship, de-escalating tensions, and deconstructing cognitive systems, and suggested focusing on the common threat of extremism, economic cooperation, and the environment.

Al Jaber noted that the Gulf hoped that Iran might enter into agreements, as it did with the West, but it now fears that Iran’s government is targeting the Gulf in a long game. As for bridges, Al Jaber replied, “We wanted them yesterday, but not according to Iran’s conditions.” Hadian called for more exchanges of scholars, elites, and youth, as well as the constructive exchange of information through media. He stressed the need for elites in both societies to recognize their own problems as a precursor to moving in the right direction.

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2016/02/28-persistence-poverty-abdelghafar-masri?rssid=yemen{A2B9988B-C518-4A20-A2D3-AD7A2A1B906E}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/141848570/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~The-persistence-of-poverty-in-the-Arab-worldThe persistence of poverty in the Arab world

2016 ushered in the revamped UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which built on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000. Poverty eradication is the number one developmental goal of both the MDGs and SDGs.

Over the past two decades, global efforts have been successful as the number of people living in poverty declined by more than half, from more than 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015. Despite such progress, the Arab world continues to lag in its efforts to combat poverty.

In fact, according to the UNDP, between 2010 and 2012, the percentage of the population in the region making less than $1.25 a day increased (PDF) from 4.1 percent to 7.4 percent. Previously, countries in the region had made progress in reducing poverty, but high levels of political unrest had reversed many of these improvements.

Poverty and conflict: A direct correlation

The persistence of conflict in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen remains one of the main drivers of poverty regionally. In Syria, after five years of civil war it is estimated that 80 percent of the population lives in poverty, and life expectancy has been cut by 20 years.

Almost a decade after the US-led invasion in 2003, poverty rates are on the rise in Iraq with statistics from the World Bank showing that 28 percent of Iraqi families live under the poverty line. The mass displacement from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) controlled areas, the decline in global oil prices and higher unemployment rates has meant that despite its oil wealth, the Iraqi government has failed miserably in addressing the poverty rate in the country.

Yemen's poverty rate has increased from 42 percent of the population in 2009, to an even more alarming 54.5 percent in 2012.

Despite an initial wave of optimism after the 2011 Arab uprisings, countries in North Africa continue to face economic challenges that have seen poverty rates increase in many areas.

In Egypt, the Arab world's most populous country, five years of political upheaval have taken a toll on the economy. Increased unemployment, lower tourist arrivals, dwindling foreign currency reserves, and a weaker Egyptian pound has meant that 26 percent of Egypt's 90 million people live under the poverty line.

Despite a relatively successful and ongoing political transition in Tunisia, one in every six Tunisians lives below the poverty line as well. Tunisia is one of the highest contributors of ISIL fighters per capita, and Tunisian leaders continue to make a direct correlation between poverty and terrorism.

In the Palestinian territories, a lack of employment opportunities due to restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation continues to drive rising levels of poverty (PDF). Nearly two years after the war in Gaza, reconstruction efforts have slowed to a crawl. Such efforts promised employment for thousands of Palestinians; however, the slow trickle of foreign donations and a deficiency of construction materials indicate that the situation will not improve any time soon.

Although the outlook for the West Bank appears less grim than in Gaza, high levels of poverty persist as many Palestinians hold jobs that pay a meager wage. This shortage of suitable employment forces many Palestinians to seek employment from companies operating in settlements on occupied Palestinian territory.

Even with some Palestinians performing these jobs out of necessity, per capita income in the West Bank continues to decline. In Gaza, the situation is even worse with per capita income 31 percent lower than in 1994.

One step forward, two steps back

The SDGs provide an ambitious blue print for global development that includes a focus on education, the environment, women's rights, sustainable water, and many other critical areas. While all of these issues are of importance to the region, it will become increasingly problematic to progress these goals without a renewed emphasis on poverty eradication.

Countries currently in conflict pose the greatest challenge to poverty eradication efforts, as participants in these conflicts have pushed aside humanitarian concerns in the quest for victory. The international community should make preparations for post-war reconstruction in Syria and Yemen, while also remaining wary of incomplete political settlements that raise the prospect for the resumption of hostilities in the future.

Even though in Palestine it is unlikely that the Israeli occupation will end anytime soon, however Fatah and Hamas should work toward a reconciliation to improve the system of governance in the territories. This will provide Palestinians with a united front to tackle the challenges posed by the occupation and ease the suffering felt in both Gaza and the West Bank.

Arab countries must recognise that absolute poverty is only one dimension of the problem and that redistributive policies can only go as far to address the issue. The uprisings have shown that Arab youth not only protested against economic inequality, but also against marginalisation and political disenfranchisement. Any renewed push for more economic opportunities must also provide Arab youth with a chance to shape their future.

Lower oil prices will likely affect the level of aid wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council countries give to poorer countries in the region. Nonetheless, such aid should not simply dry up. The Saudi-led coalition has destroyed a large portion of the Yemeni infrastructure, so the Kingdom and members of its coalition should bear a large part of the reconstruction effort.

Arab governments should understand that poverty also has a security and stability dimension. The 2011 uprisings have shown that Arab societies have the ability to challenge incompetent governance and corruption.

Food security remains a huge challenge for a region that imports much of its key food staples. Should poverty and food security issues not be addressed, any future protest wave may constitute a "revolution of the hungry", that is likely to be more violent than the protest wave of 2011.

Authors

2016 ushered in the revamped UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which built on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000. Poverty eradication is the number one developmental goal of both the MDGs and SDGs.

Over the past two decades, global efforts have been successful as the number of people living in poverty declined by more than half, from more than 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015. Despite such progress, the Arab world continues to lag in its efforts to combat poverty.

In fact, according to the UNDP, between 2010 and 2012, the percentage of the population in the region making less than $1.25 a day increased (PDF) from 4.1 percent to 7.4 percent. Previously, countries in the region had made progress in reducing poverty, but high levels of political unrest had reversed many of these improvements.

Poverty and conflict: A direct correlation

The persistence of conflict in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen remains one of the main drivers of poverty regionally. In Syria, after five years of civil war it is estimated that 80 percent of the population lives in poverty, and life expectancy has been cut by 20 years.

Almost a decade after the US-led invasion in 2003, poverty rates are on the rise in Iraq with statistics from the World Bank showing that 28 percent of Iraqi families live under the poverty line. The mass displacement from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) controlled areas, the decline in global oil prices and higher unemployment rates has meant that despite its oil wealth, the Iraqi government has failed miserably in addressing the poverty rate in the country.

Yemen's poverty rate has increased from 42 percent of the population in 2009, to an even more alarming 54.5 percent in 2012.

Despite an initial wave of optimism after the 2011 Arab uprisings, countries in North Africa continue to face economic challenges that have seen poverty rates increase in many areas.

In Egypt, the Arab world's most populous country, five years of political upheaval have taken a toll on the economy. Increased unemployment, lower tourist arrivals, dwindling foreign currency reserves, and a weaker Egyptian pound has meant that 26 percent of Egypt's 90 million people live under the poverty line.

Despite a relatively successful and ongoing political transition in Tunisia, one in every six Tunisians lives below the poverty line as well. Tunisia is one of the highest contributors of ISIL fighters per capita, and Tunisian leaders continue to make a direct correlation between poverty and terrorism.

In the Palestinian territories, a lack of employment opportunities due to restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation continues to drive rising levels of poverty (PDF). Nearly two years after the war in Gaza, reconstruction efforts have slowed to a crawl. Such efforts promised employment for thousands of Palestinians; however, the slow trickle of foreign donations and a deficiency of construction materials indicate that the situation will not improve any time soon.

Although the outlook for the West Bank appears less grim than in Gaza, high levels of poverty persist as many Palestinians hold jobs that pay a meager wage. This shortage of suitable employment forces many Palestinians to seek employment from companies operating in settlements on occupied Palestinian territory.

Even with some Palestinians performing these jobs out of necessity, per capita income in the West Bank continues to decline. In Gaza, the situation is even worse with per capita income 31 percent lower than in 1994.

One step forward, two steps back

The SDGs provide an ambitious blue print for global development that includes a focus on education, the environment, women's rights, sustainable water, and many other critical areas. While all of these issues are of importance to the region, it will become increasingly problematic to progress these goals without a renewed emphasis on poverty eradication.

Countries currently in conflict pose the greatest challenge to poverty eradication efforts, as participants in these conflicts have pushed aside humanitarian concerns in the quest for victory. The international community should make preparations for post-war reconstruction in Syria and Yemen, while also remaining wary of incomplete political settlements that raise the prospect for the resumption of hostilities in the future.

Even though in Palestine it is unlikely that the Israeli occupation will end anytime soon, however Fatah and Hamas should work toward a reconciliation to improve the system of governance in the territories. This will provide Palestinians with a united front to tackle the challenges posed by the occupation and ease the suffering felt in both Gaza and the West Bank.

Arab countries must recognise that absolute poverty is only one dimension of the problem and that redistributive policies can only go as far to address the issue. The uprisings have shown that Arab youth not only protested against economic inequality, but also against marginalisation and political disenfranchisement. Any renewed push for more economic opportunities must also provide Arab youth with a chance to shape their future.

Lower oil prices will likely affect the level of aid wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council countries give to poorer countries in the region. Nonetheless, such aid should not simply dry up. The Saudi-led coalition has destroyed a large portion of the Yemeni infrastructure, so the Kingdom and members of its coalition should bear a large part of the reconstruction effort.

Arab governments should understand that poverty also has a security and stability dimension. The 2011 uprisings have shown that Arab societies have the ability to challenge incompetent governance and corruption.

Food security remains a huge challenge for a region that imports much of its key food staples. Should poverty and food security issues not be addressed, any future protest wave may constitute a "revolution of the hungry", that is likely to be more violent than the protest wave of 2011.

There is no single standard of behavior for Saudi crown princes. They have been very different in how they perform their duties and how they behave publicly. Princes Faysal and Fahd outshined the kings they served. Prince Nayef, MBNs father, was ill when he came to office and was largely inactive. Prince Abdullah was effectively regent for a decade due to Fahd's stroke in 1995. But Abdullah was very careful to maintain the status of Fahd as king. Crown Prince Muqrin was only in office three months before he was removed in an unprecedented change in the line of succession last April by King Salman.

When King Salman was crown prince before Abdullah's death last year, he traveled extensively to represent the Kingdom. In just two years he visited Japan, China, India, Pakistan, the Maldives, France, and several Arab states. He was the face of the Kingdom, despite persistent rumors of poor health.

MBN has mostly stayed at home except for a visit to Camp David. Instead, Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman has visited Russia, France, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, and most recently NATO headquarters in Brussels. The king’s 30 year-old favorite son has been the Kingdom's deal maker. He has also been the face of the war in Yemen. His image is pervasive.

The king’s 30 year-old favorite son has been the Kingdom's deal maker.

Crown Prince Nayef has also been noticeably silent on some prominent events. Last week, for example the king and the deputy crown prince issued condolences and messages of support for Turkey after the major terrorist attack in Ankara, specifically invoking their religious position as the Custodian of the Holy Mosques. MBN was not listed in the messages even though counterterrorism is his portfolio. Mohammed bin Salman has given a flurry of interviews about coming reforms in the Kingdom, he rarely mentions his cousin. The Economist profiled the deputy, not the number two.

The crown prince is quite busy in his other role as Interior Minister. Last year in Beirut, his spies brilliantly nabbed the mastermind of the 1996 Khobar Iranian-sponsored attack that killed 19 American airmen. The Ministry of Interior was in charge of the mass execution of convicted terrorists on New Years. It is deeply involved in fighting both al-Qaida and the Islamic State inside the Kingdom. It was responsible for security at last year’s Hajj pilgrimage in Mecca, which was marred by accidents.

The crown prince has always been a private man like his father. He became famous in the Kingdom for surviving multiple al-Qaida assassination attempts, not for grand standing. Perhaps his low profile is simply his personality.

Nonetheless, the contrast between his quiet pursuit of his duties and his younger cousin's high profile is much commented-on in Saudi circles. Does it presage changes to come? Will Nayef go the way of Muqrin? In an absolute monarchy, that is the King’s prerogative alone—but it is the subject of universal speculation.

There is no single standard of behavior for Saudi crown princes. They have been very different in how they perform their duties and how they behave publicly. Princes Faysal and Fahd outshined the kings they served. Prince Nayef, MBNs father, was ill when he came to office and was largely inactive. Prince Abdullah was effectively regent for a decade due to Fahd's stroke in 1995. But Abdullah was very careful to maintain the status of Fahd as king. Crown Prince Muqrin was only in office three months before he was removed in an unprecedented change in the line of succession last April by King Salman.

When King Salman was crown prince before Abdullah's death last year, he traveled extensively to represent the Kingdom. In just two years he visited Japan, China, India, Pakistan, the Maldives, France, and several Arab states. He was the face of the Kingdom, despite persistent rumors of poor health.

MBN has mostly stayed at home except for a visit to Camp David. Instead, Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman has visited Russia, France, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, and most recently NATO headquarters in Brussels. The king’s 30 year-old favorite son has been the Kingdom's deal maker. He has also been the face of the war in Yemen. His image is pervasive.

The king’s 30 year-old favorite son has been the Kingdom's deal maker.

Crown Prince Nayef has also been noticeably silent on some prominent events. Last week, for example the king and the deputy crown prince issued condolences and messages of support for Turkey after the major terrorist attack in Ankara, specifically invoking their religious position as the Custodian of the Holy Mosques. MBN was not listed in the messages even though counterterrorism is his portfolio. Mohammed bin Salman has given a flurry of interviews about coming reforms in the Kingdom, he rarely mentions his cousin. The Economist profiled the deputy, not the number two.

The crown prince is quite busy in his other role as Interior Minister. Last year in Beirut, his spies brilliantly nabbed the mastermind of the 1996 Khobar Iranian-sponsored attack that killed 19 American airmen. The Ministry of Interior was in charge of the mass execution of convicted terrorists on New Years. It is deeply involved in fighting both al-Qaida and the Islamic State inside the Kingdom. It was responsible for security at last year’s Hajj pilgrimage in Mecca, which was marred by accidents.

The crown prince has always been a private man like his father. He became famous in the Kingdom for surviving multiple al-Qaida assassination attempts, not for grand standing. Perhaps his low profile is simply his personality.

Nonetheless, the contrast between his quiet pursuit of his duties and his younger cousin's high profile is much commented-on in Saudi circles. Does it presage changes to come? Will Nayef go the way of Muqrin? In an absolute monarchy, that is the King’s prerogative alone—but it is the subject of universal speculation.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2016/02/17-yemen-in-crisis?rssid=yemen{A1EFCBFF-368E-460A-AED5-91D3FF2C1B48}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/138413723/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~Yemen-in-Crisis-What-Can-Be-DoneYemen in Crisis: What Can Be Done?

Event Information

February 17, 20165:30 PM - 7:00 PM AST

Qamar meeting roomHilton Hotel DohaHilton DohaDoha

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on February 17, 2016, about the ongoing civil war in Yemen and the possible political solutions that can be achieved in the near future to resolve the conflict and save the country from further turmoil. The panelists included Mr. Rafat Al-Akhali, former Minister of Youth and Sports in Yemen; Ms. Iona Craig, the Times of London Yemen correspondent; and Rajeh Badi, a government spokesman and advisor to the prime minister of Yemen. Dr. Ibrahim Fraihat, senior foreign policy fellow and deputy director of the BDC, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Fraihat prefaced the discussion by reminding the audience that five years have passed since the outbreak of Yemen’s peaceful revolution. For the past ten months, Yemen has been plagued by a war that left 21 million people in urgent need of humanitarian aid, 2.5 million people internally displaced, and over 2,800 civilians killed. Focusing his first question on the implications of the current situation on Yemen’s future, Fraihat emphasized the importance of a constructive discussion that focuses on the future to save the country from further turmoil.

Al-Akhali pointed out that the majority of Yemen’s youth have lost hope in the future. Comparing current sentiments in Yemen to those in 2011, he said the hopeful narrative used at the onset of the revolution has been replaced by a language of extremism and sectarianism. This pessimistic discourse has made it easier to recruit into fighting helpless people, who increasingly feel that they have no opportunities for a better life; this fuels the existence of extremist groups such as al-Qaida and, increasingly, the Islamic State group (IS).

Al-Akhali pointed out that asking how to end the conflict is not the right question. Rather, he asked, “How can we improve things till the war comes to an end?” Al-Akhali emphasized the importance of reviving the economy to restore the youth’s hope in the future. Through creating temporary jobs during the conflict, finding ways to develop a war economy that facilitates the exchange of goods and services despite the war, and disseminating motivating rhetoric that reminds the people of the importance of their lives, Yemenis will rid themselves of the “war mentality.”

Craig added that the war has had a devastating effect on society at the local level. Despite months of bombing and attacks by the Saudi-led coalition in coordination with President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s government, the Houthis and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh continue to hold their ground. The ongoing conflict has had a polarizing impact on the social fabric of Yemeni society.

Craig emphasized the importance of practical solutions and the necessity of international humanitarian initiatives. With sieges and blockades on many Yemeni cities, reconciliation on the local level will be harder to achieve even if the conflict ends in the near future. Craig stated that easing the pressure on the population through humanitarian efforts and focusing international efforts on depoliticizing the food supply are the two main practical options to save Yemen from further suffering. Craig added that Yemen’s civil war is underreported in the Western media which is extremely problematic; the lacking coverage obscures the development of humanitarian initiatives and resolutions that may alleviate the effects of the conflict on the citizens.

Badi highlighted the historical context of the conflict to help better understand the current challenges facing the country. He explained that after the outbreak of the Yemeni revolution in 2011, the country was taking its first steps on the right track by negotiating a political system during the national dialogue; he stressed that the negotiations encompassed all political groups in Yemen, including the Houthis. Badi explained that the conflict in Yemen is not a civil war but a coup led by the Houthis against the legitimate power of Hadi’s government. He described the Houthis as an ideological religious movement comparable in principle and aims to IS. Therefore, the international community should not legitimize the Houthis and should contest any efforts that allow them to remain armed.

Fraihat then shifted the discussion to the current situation asking what a potential resolution would look like. In response, Badi argued that the war was imposed on Yemeni society. He criticized what he perceived as a lack of seriousness from the Houthis part to negotiate an end to the conflict. He stressed the necessity of implementing international resolutions and preventing the Houthis from owning weapons; the goal should be to reach an effective ceasefire instead of a fragile peace. Moreover, the government is helpless, as the Houthis have seized most of its national weapons during the coup. The Yemeni government, he claimed, doesn’t even have $1000 within its accounts. Given its lack of resources, the international role is imperative in saving the country.

Touching upon the Iranian role in the Yemeni conflict, Al-Akhali noted that Iran did not have any positive impact on Yemen and should not be allowed to intervene or have any future role in the conflict. Al-Akhali then shifted the discussion to answer Fraihat’s question about the evident inconsistency between the publicized pledges of humanitarian aid and the absence of humanitarian initiatives on the ground. He indicated that coordination and arrangements among the two main aid donor groups, in the Gulf region and the Western world, have to be addressed for serious humanitarian initiatives to take place.

Answering questions from the audience about the feasibility of working on development during the times of war, Al-Akhali emphasized the importance of developing a “war economy” that provides jobs and fills some temporary gaps in demand, he noted that that does not entail serious reconstruction projects or city planning but simple initiatives that meet needs during a war that may take years. He further stressed the importance of devising development plans to prepare for the future to be able to start reconstruction as soon as the war ends. Craig stated that there are youth workshops and artists trying to repair the divisions among the society; however, their role is very limited and their impact is restricted to small circles living in cities.

Al-Akhali, in a final remark, added that despite the current challenges facing Yemeni society, Yemen is a country with a rich history and civilization that is full of aspiration and hope to restore its stability, cohesion, and place in the world.

Video

Transcript

Event Materials

Event Information

February 17, 2016
5:30 PM - 7:00 PM AST

Qamar meeting room
Hilton Hotel Doha
Hilton Doha
Doha

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on February 17, 2016, about the ongoing civil war in Yemen and the possible political solutions that can be achieved in the near future to resolve the conflict and save the country from further turmoil. The panelists included Mr. Rafat Al-Akhali, former Minister of Youth and Sports in Yemen; Ms. Iona Craig, the Times of London Yemen correspondent; and Rajeh Badi, a government spokesman and advisor to the prime minister of Yemen. Dr. Ibrahim Fraihat, senior foreign policy fellow and deputy director of the BDC, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Fraihat prefaced the discussion by reminding the audience that five years have passed since the outbreak of Yemen’s peaceful revolution. For the past ten months, Yemen has been plagued by a war that left 21 million people in urgent need of humanitarian aid, 2.5 million people internally displaced, and over 2,800 civilians killed. Focusing his first question on the implications of the current situation on Yemen’s future, Fraihat emphasized the importance of a constructive discussion that focuses on the future to save the country from further turmoil.

Al-Akhali pointed out that the majority of Yemen’s youth have lost hope in the future. Comparing current sentiments in Yemen to those in 2011, he said the hopeful narrative used at the onset of the revolution has been replaced by a language of extremism and sectarianism. This pessimistic discourse has made it easier to recruit into fighting helpless people, who increasingly feel that they have no opportunities for a better life; this fuels the existence of extremist groups such as al-Qaida and, increasingly, the Islamic State group (IS).

Al-Akhali pointed out that asking how to end the conflict is not the right question. Rather, he asked, “How can we improve things till the war comes to an end?” Al-Akhali emphasized the importance of reviving the economy to restore the youth’s hope in the future. Through creating temporary jobs during the conflict, finding ways to develop a war economy that facilitates the exchange of goods and services despite the war, and disseminating motivating rhetoric that reminds the people of the importance of their lives, Yemenis will rid themselves of the “war mentality.”

Craig added that the war has had a devastating effect on society at the local level. Despite months of bombing and attacks by the Saudi-led coalition in coordination with President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s government, the Houthis and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh continue to hold their ground. The ongoing conflict has had a polarizing impact on the social fabric of Yemeni society.

Craig emphasized the importance of practical solutions and the necessity of international humanitarian initiatives. With sieges and blockades on many Yemeni cities, reconciliation on the local level will be harder to achieve even if the conflict ends in the near future. Craig stated that easing the pressure on the population through humanitarian efforts and focusing international efforts on depoliticizing the food supply are the two main practical options to save Yemen from further suffering. Craig added that Yemen’s civil war is underreported in the Western media which is extremely problematic; the lacking coverage obscures the development of humanitarian initiatives and resolutions that may alleviate the effects of the conflict on the citizens.

Badi highlighted the historical context of the conflict to help better understand the current challenges facing the country. He explained that after the outbreak of the Yemeni revolution in 2011, the country was taking its first steps on the right track by negotiating a political system during the national dialogue; he stressed that the negotiations encompassed all political groups in Yemen, including the Houthis. Badi explained that the conflict in Yemen is not a civil war but a coup led by the Houthis against the legitimate power of Hadi’s government. He described the Houthis as an ideological religious movement comparable in principle and aims to IS. Therefore, the international community should not legitimize the Houthis and should contest any efforts that allow them to remain armed.

Fraihat then shifted the discussion to the current situation asking what a potential resolution would look like. In response, Badi argued that the war was imposed on Yemeni society. He criticized what he perceived as a lack of seriousness from the Houthis part to negotiate an end to the conflict. He stressed the necessity of implementing international resolutions and preventing the Houthis from owning weapons; the goal should be to reach an effective ceasefire instead of a fragile peace. Moreover, the government is helpless, as the Houthis have seized most of its national weapons during the coup. The Yemeni government, he claimed, doesn’t even have $1000 within its accounts. Given its lack of resources, the international role is imperative in saving the country.

Touching upon the Iranian role in the Yemeni conflict, Al-Akhali noted that Iran did not have any positive impact on Yemen and should not be allowed to intervene or have any future role in the conflict. Al-Akhali then shifted the discussion to answer Fraihat’s question about the evident inconsistency between the publicized pledges of humanitarian aid and the absence of humanitarian initiatives on the ground. He indicated that coordination and arrangements among the two main aid donor groups, in the Gulf region and the Western world, have to be addressed for serious humanitarian initiatives to take place.

Answering questions from the audience about the feasibility of working on development during the times of war, Al-Akhali emphasized the importance of developing a “war economy” that provides jobs and fills some temporary gaps in demand, he noted that that does not entail serious reconstruction projects or city planning but simple initiatives that meet needs during a war that may take years. He further stressed the importance of devising development plans to prepare for the future to be able to start reconstruction as soon as the war ends. Craig stated that there are youth workshops and artists trying to repair the divisions among the society; however, their role is very limited and their impact is restricted to small circles living in cities.

Al-Akhali, in a final remark, added that despite the current challenges facing Yemeni society, Yemen is a country with a rich history and civilization that is full of aspiration and hope to restore its stability, cohesion, and place in the world.

Video

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/02/16-americas-choice-in-middle-east-pollack?rssid=yemen{89391FC4-7D0D-4594-80F1-416884ECFBCE}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/138336107/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~Fight-or-flight-America%e2%80%99s-choice-in-the-Middle-EastFight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East

Editors' Note: The modern Middle East has rarely been tranquil, but it has never been this bad, writes Ken Pollack. The next U.S. president is going to face a choice in the Middle East: do much more to stabilize it, or disengage from it much more. This piece was originally published in Foreign Affairs.

The modern Middle East has rarely been tranquil, but it has never been this bad. Full-blown civil wars rage in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Nascent conflicts simmer in Egypt, South Sudan, and Turkey. Various forms of spillover from these civil wars threaten the stability of Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia have risen to new heights, raising the specter of a region-wide religious war. Israel and the Palestinians have experienced a resurgence of low-level violence. Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have weathered the storm so far, but even they are terrified of what is going on around them. Not since the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century has the Middle East seen so much chaos.

Moreover, it is unlikely to abate anytime soon. No matter how many times Americans insist that the people of the Middle East will come to their senses and resolve their differences if left to their own devices, they never do. Absent external involvement, the region’s leaders consistently opt for strategies that exacerbate conflict and feed perpetual instability. Civil wars are particularly stubborn problems, and without decisive outside intervention, they usually last decades. The Congolese civil war is entering its 22nd year, the Peruvian its 36th, and the Afghan its 37th. There is no reason to expect the Middle East’s conflicts to burn out on their own either.

As a consequence, the next U.S. president is going to face a choice in the Middle East: do much more to stabilize it, or disengage from it much more. But given how tempestuous the region has become, both options—stepping up and stepping back—will cost the United States far more than is typically imagined. Stabilizing the region would almost certainly require more resources, energy, attention, and political capital than most advocates of a forward-leaning U.S. posture recognize. Similarly, giving up more control and abandoning more commitments in the region would require accepting much greater risks than most in this camp acknowledge. The costs of stepping up are more manageable than the risks of stepping back, but either option would be better than muddling through.

Man, the state, and civil war

Grasping the real choices that the United States faces in the Middle East requires an honest understanding of what is going on there. Although it is fashionable to blame the region’s travails on ancient hatreds or the poor cartography of Mr. Sykes and Monsieur Picot, the real problems began with the modern Arab state system. After World War II, the Arab states came into their own. Most shed their European colonial masters, and all adopted more modern political systems, whether secular republics (read: dictatorships) or new monarchies.

None of these states worked very well. For one thing, their economies depended heavily on oil, either directly, by pumping it themselves, or indirectly, via trade, aid, and worker remittances. These rentier economies produced too few jobs and too much wealth that their civilian populations neither controlled nor generated, encouraging the ruling elites to treat their citizenries as (mostly unwanted) dependents. The oil money bred massive corruption, along with bloated public sectors uninterested in the needs or aspirations of the wider populace. To make matters worse, the Arab states had emerged from Ottoman and European colonialism with their traditional socio-cultural systems intact, which oil wealth and autocracy made it possible to preserve and even indulge.

This model clunked along for several decades, before it started falling apart in the late twentieth century. The oil market became more volatile, with long periods of low prices, which created economic hardship even in oil-rich states such as Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Globalization brought to the region new ideas about the relationship between government and the governed, as well as foreign cultural influences. Arabs (and Iranians, for that matter) increasingly demanded that their governments help fix their problems. But all they got in response was malign neglect.

The Middle East’s travails began with the modern Arab state system.

By the 1990s, popular discontent had risen throughout the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood and its many franchises grew quickly as a political opposition to the regimes. Others turned to violence—rioters in the Nejd region of Saudi Arabia, Islamist insurgents in Egypt, and various terrorist groups elsewhere—all seeking to overthrow their governments. Eventually, some of these groups would decide that they first had to drive away the foreign backers of those governments, starting with the United States.

The pent-up frustrations and desire for political change finally exploded in the Arab Spring of 2011, with large-scale protests breaking out in nearly all Arab countries and the toppling or crippling of the regime in five of them. But revolutions are always tricky things to get right. That has proved especially true in the Arab world, where the autocrats in each country had done a superb job of eliminating any charismatic opposition leader who might have unified the country after the fall of the regime and where there were no popular alternative ideas about how to organize a new Arab state. And so in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the result has been state failure, a security vacuum, and civil war.

If the first-order problem of the Middle East is the failure of the postwar Arab state system, the outbreak of civil wars has become an equally important second-order problem. These conflicts have taken on lives of their own, becoming engines of instability that now pose the greatest immediate threat to both the people of the region and the rest of the world.

For one thing, civil wars have a bad habit of spilling over into their neighbors. Vast numbers of refugees cross borders, as do smaller, but no less problematic, numbers of terrorists and other armed combatants. So do ideas promoting militancy, revolution, and secession. In this way, neighboring states can themselves succumb to instability or even internal conflict. Indeed, scholars have found that the strongest predictor that a state will experience a civil war is whether it borders a country already embroiled in one.

Civil wars also have a bad habit of sucking in neighboring countries. Seeking to protect their interests and prevent spillover, states typically choose particular combatants to back. But that brings them into conflict with other neighboring states that have picked their own favorites. Even if this competition remains a proxy fight, it can still be economically and politically draining, even ruinous. At worst, the conflict can lead to a regional war, when a state, convinced its proxy is not doing the job, sends in its own armed forces. For evidence of this dynamic, one need look no further than the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, or Iranian and Russian military operations in Iraq and Syria.

Withdrawal symptoms

As if the failure of the postwar Arab state system and the outbreak of four civil wars weren’t bad enough, in the midst of all of this, the United States has distanced itself from the region. The Middle East has not been without a great-power overseer of one kind or another since the Ottoman conquests of the sixteenth century. This is not to suggest that the external hegemon was always an unalloyed good; it wasn’t. But it often played the constructive role of mitigating conflict. Good or bad, the states of the region have grown accustomed to interacting with one another with a dominating third party in the room, figuratively and often literally.

Disengagement has been most damaging in Iraq. The U.S. withdrawal from the country was the most important of a range of factors that pulled it back into civil war. Scholars have long recognized that shepherding a nation out of a civil war requires some internal or external peacekeeper to guarantee the terms of a new power-sharing arrangement among the warring parties. Over time, that role can become increasingly symbolic, as was the case with NATO in Bosnia. The alliance’s presence there dwindled to a militarily insignificant force within about five years, but it still played a crucial political and psychological role in reassuring the rival factions that none of them would return to violence. In the case of Iraq, the United States played that role, and its disengagement in 2010 and 2011 led to exactly what history predicted.

This phenomenon has played out more broadly across the Middle East. The withdrawal of the United States has forced governments there to interact in a novel way, without the hope that Washington will provide a cooperative path out of the security dilemmas that litter the region. U.S. disengagement has made many states fear that others will become more aggressive without the United States to restrain them. That fear has caused them to act more aggressively themselves, which in turn has sparked more severe counter-moves, again in the expectation that the United States will not check either the original move or the riposte. This dynamic has grown most acute between Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose tit-for-tat exchange is growing ever more vituperative and violent. The Saudis have taken the stunning step of directly intervening in Yemen’s civil war against the country’s Houthi minority, which they consider to be an Iranian proxy that threatens their southern flank.

Even as the Middle East careens out of control, help is not on the way. The Obama administration’s policies toward the region are not designed to mitigate, let alone end, its real problems. That is why the region has gotten worse since President Barack Obama entered office, and why there is no reason to believe that it will get any better before he leaves office.

In his 2009 speech in Cairo, Obama did claim that the United States would try to help the region shift to a new Arab state system, but he never backed his speech up with an actual policy, let alone resources. Then, in 2011, the administration failed to put in place a coherent strategy to deal with the Arab Spring, one that might have assisted a transition to more stable, pluralistic systems of government. Having missed its best opportunities, Washington now barely pays lip service to the need for gradual, long-term reform.

As for the civil wars, the administration has focused on addressing only their symptoms—trying to contain the spillover—by attacking the Islamic State, or ISIS; accepting some refugees; and working to prevent terrorist attacks back home. But the history of civil wars demonstrates that it is extremely hard to contain the spillover, and the Middle East today is proving no exception. Spillover from Syria helped push Iraq back into civil war. In turn, spillover from the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars has generated a low-level civil war in Turkey and threatens to do the same in Jordan and Lebanon. Spillover from Libya is destabilizing Egypt, Mali, and Tunisia. The Iraqi, Syrian, and Yemeni civil wars have sucked Iran and the Gulf states into a vicious proxy war fought across all three battlefields. And refugees, terrorists, and radicalization spilling over from all these wars have created new dilemmas for Europe and North America.

In fact, it is effectively impossible to eradicate the symptoms of civil wars without treating the underlying maladies. No matter how many thousands of refugees the West accepts, as long as the civil wars grind on, millions more will flee. And no matter how many terrorists the United States kills, without an end to the civil wars, more young men will keep turning to terrorism. Over the past 15 years, the threat from Salafi jihadism has grown by orders of magnitude despite the damage that the United States has inflicted on al-Qaida’s core in Afghanistan. In places racked by civil war, the group’s offshoots, including ISIS, are finding new recruits, new sanctuaries, and new fields of jihad. But where order prevails, they dissipate. Neither al-Qaida nor ISIS has found much purchase in any of the remaining strong states of the region. And when the United States brought stability to Iraq beginning in 2007, al-Qaida’s franchise there was pushed to the brink of extinction, only to find salvation in 2011, when civil war broke out next door in Syria.

Even as the Middle East careens out of control, help is not on the way.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, moreover, it is possible for a third party to settle a civil war long before it might end on its own. Scholars of civil wars have found that in about 20 percent of the cases since 1945, and roughly 40 percent of the cases since 1995, an external actor was able to engineer just such an outcome. Doing so is not easy, of course, but it need not be as ruinously expensive as the United States’ painful experience in Iraq.

Ending a civil war requires the intervening power to accomplish three objectives. First, it must change the military dynamics such that none of the warring parties believes that it can win a military victory and none fears that its fighters will be slaughtered once they lay down their arms. Second, it must forge a power-sharing agreement among the various groups so that they all have an equitable stake in a new government. And third, it must put in place institutions that reassure all the parties that the first two conditions will endure. To some extent unknowingly, that is precisely the path NATO followed in Bosnia in 1994–95 and the United States followed in Iraq in 2007–10.

History also shows that when outside powers stray from this approach or commit inadequate resources to it, their interventions inevitably fail and typically make the conflicts bloodier, longer, and less contained. No wonder U.S. policy toward Iraq and Syria (let alone Libya and Yemen) has failed since 2011. And as long as the United States continues to avoid pursuing the one approach that can work, there is no reason to expect anything else. At most, the U.S. military’s current campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria will engineer the same outcome as its earlier one against al-Qaida in Afghanistan: the United States may badly damage ISIS, but unless it ends the conflicts that sustain it, the group will morph and spread and eventually be succeeded by the son of ISIS, just as ISIS is the son of al-Qaida.

Stepping up

Stabilizing the Middle East will require a new approach—one that attacks the root causes of the region’s troubles and is backed up by adequate resources. The first priority should be to shut down the current civil wars. In every case, that will require first changing the battlefield dynamics to convince all the warring factions that military victory is impossible. In an ideal world, that would entail sending at least small numbers of U.S. combat forces to Iraq (perhaps 10,000) and potentially Syria. But if the political will for even a modest commitment of forces does not exist, then more advisers, airpower, intelligence sharing, and logistical support could suffice, albeit with a lower likelihood of success.

Regardless, the United States and its allies will also have to build new indigenous militaries able to first defeat the terrorists, militias, and extremists and then serve as the foundation for a new state. In Iraq, that means retraining and reforming the Iraqi security forces to a much greater degree than current U.S. policy envisions. In Libya, Syria, and Yemen, it would mean creating new indigenous, conventional militaries that (with considerable American support) would be able to defeat any potential rival, secure the civilian populaces, and enforce the terms of permanent cease-fires.

In all four civil wars, the United States and its allies will also have to undertake major political efforts aimed at forging equitable power-sharing arrangements. In Iraq, the United States should take the lead in defining both the minimal needs and the potential areas of agreement among the various Shiite and Sunni factions, just as Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq in 2007–9, and his team accomplished as part of the U.S. surge strategy. That, plus giving material resources to various moderate Iraqi political leaders and their constituencies among both the Shiites and the Sunnis, should allow the United States to hammer out a new power-sharing deal. Such an arrangement should end the alienation of the Sunni population, which lies at the heart of Iraq’s current problems. This, in turn, would make it much easier for the Abadi government and the United States to stand up Sunni military formations to help liberate the Sunni-majority areas of the country from ISIS and help diminish the power of the Iranian-backed Shiite militias.

In Syria, the ongoing peace talks in Vienna provide a starting point for a political solution. But they offer little more than that, because the military conditions are not conducive to a real political compromise, let alone a permanent cessation of hostilities. Neither the Assad regime nor the Western-backed opposition believes that it can afford to stop fighting, and each of the three strongest rebel groups—Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS—remains convinced that it can achieve total victory. So until the reality on the battlefield shifts, little can be achieved at the negotiating table. If the military situation changes, then Western diplomats should help Syria’s communities fashion an arrangement that distributes political power and economic benefits equitably. The deal would have to include the Alawites, but not necessarily President Bashar al-Assad himself, and it would need to assure each faction that the new government would not oppress it, the way the Alawite minority oppressed the Sunni majority in the past.

The turmoil in Libya mirrors that in Syria, except that it is receiving far less international attention. Thus, the first step there is for the United States to convince its partners to take on a more constructive role. If the United States should lead in Iraq and Syria, then Europe needs to lead in Libya. By dint of its economic ties and proximity to Europe, Libya threatens European interests far more directly than it does American ones, and NATO’s role in the 2011 intervention in Libya can serve as a precedent for European leadership. Of course, the Europeans will not take on the challenge if they are not convinced that the United States intends to do its part to quell the Middle East’s civil wars, further underscoring the importance of a coherent, properly resourced U.S. strategy. To aid Europe’s fight in Libya, Washington will undoubtedly have to commit assistance related to logistics, command and control, and intelligence, and possibly even combat advisers.

In Yemen, the Gulf states’ air campaign has achieved little, but the intervention by a small ground force led by the United Arab Emirates has set back the rebel coalition, creating a real opportunity to negotiate an end to the conflict. Unfortunately, the Gulf states seem unwilling to offer Yemen’s opposition terms that would equitably divide political power and economic benefits, and they seem equally unwilling to offer security guarantees. To draw the conflict to a close, the United States and its allies will have to encourage their partners in the Gulf to make meaningful concessions. If that doesn’t work, then the most useful thing they can do is try to convince the Gulf states to minimize their involvement in Yemen before the strain of intervention threatens their own internal cohesion.

If the next U.S. president is unwilling to commit to stepping up to stabilize the Middle East, the only real alternative is to step back.

After ending the current civil wars, the next priority of a stepped-up U.S. strategy in the Middle East will be to shore up the states in the greatest danger of sliding into future civil wars: Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey. It is state failure—not external attack by ISIS, al-Qaida, or Iranian proxies—that represents the true source of the conflicts roiling the Middle East today. These four at-risk countries are all badly in need of economic assistance and infrastructure development. But above all, they need political reform to avoid state failure. Consequently, the United States and its allies should offer a range of trade benefits, financial incentives, and economic aid in return for gradual but concrete steps toward political reform. Here, the aim need not be democratization per se (although Tunisia should be strongly encouraged to continue down that path), but it should be good governance, in the form of justice and the rule of law, transparency, and a fair distribution of public goods and services.

The final piece of the puzzle is to press for reform more broadly across the Middle East—economic, social, and political. Even if the United States and its allies succeed in resolving today’s civil wars, unless a new state system takes the place of the failed postwar one, the same old problems will recur. Reform will be a hard sell for the region’s leaders, who have long resisted it out of a fear that it would strip them of their power and positions. Paradoxically, however, the civil wars may furnish a solution to this conundrum. All the states of the region are terrified of the spillover from these conflicts, and they are desperate for U.S. help in eliminating the threat. In particular, many of the United States’ Arab allies have grown frustrated by the gains that Iran has made by exploiting power vacuums. Just as the United States and its allies should offer the region’s fragile states economic assistance in return for reform, so they should condition their efforts to end the civil wars on the willingness of the region’s stronger states to embrace similar reforms.

Stepping back

If the next U.S. president is unwilling to commit to stepping up to stabilize the Middle East, the only real alternative is to step back from it. Because civil wars do not lend themselves to anything but the right strategy with the right resources, trying the wrong one means throwing U.S. resources away on a lost cause. It probably also means making the situation worse, not better. Under a policy of real disengagement, the United States would abstain from involvement in the civil wars altogether. It would instead try to contain their spillover, difficult as that is, and if that were to fail, it would fall back on defending only core U.S. interests in the Middle East.

The Obama administration has done a creditable job of bolstering Jordan against chaos from Iraq and Syria so far, and stepping back from the region could still entail beefing up U.S. support to Jordan and other at-risk neighbors of the civil wars, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey. All these countries want and need Western economic, diplomatic, technical, and military assistance. But because spillover has historically proved so difficult to contain, there is a high risk that one or more of them could still slide into civil war themselves, generating yet more spillover.

For that reason, stepping back would also require Washington to make a ruthless assessment of what is the least the United States can do to secure its vital interests in the Middle East. And although it may be a gross exaggeration to say so, in large part, U.S. interests in the region do ultimately come down to Israel, terrorism, and oil.

As poll after poll has found, a majority of Americans continue to see the safety of Israel as important to them and to the United States. Yet Israel today is as safe as the United States can make it. Israeli forces can defeat any conventional foe and deter any deterrable unconventional threat. The United States has defended Israel diplomatically and militarily countless times, including implicitly threatening the Soviet Union with nuclear war during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The United States has even taken an Iranian nuclear threat off the table for at least the next decade, thanks to the deal it brokered last year. The only threat the United States cannot save Israel from is its own chronic civil war with the Palestinians, but the best solution to that conflict is a peace settlement that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians have demonstrated much interest in. In short, there is little more that Israel needs from the United States for its own direct security, and what it does need (such as arms sales) the United States could easily provide even if it stepped back from the Middle East.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of a reduced U.S. presence in the Middle East is that it should mitigate the threat from terrorism. Terrorists from the region attack Americans largely because they feel aggrieved by U.S. policies, just as they attack France and the United Kingdom because those countries are staunch U.S. allies (and former colonial powers) and have started to attack Russia because it has intervened in Syria. The less the United States is involved in the Middle East, the less its people are likely to be attacked by terrorists from the region. It is no accident that Switzerland does not suffer from Middle Eastern terrorism.

Of course, even if Washington disengaged from the region as much as possible, Americans would not be entirely immune from Middle Eastern terrorism. The region’s conspiracy-mongers endlessly blame the United States for things it didn’t do, as well as for what it did, and so terrorists could still find reasons to target Americans. Besides, even under this minimalist approach, the United States would maintain its support for Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which a range of terrorist groups detest.

If U.S. interests concerning Israel and terrorism would largely take care of themselves in the event that Washington further diminished its role in the Middle East, the same cannot be said for the flow of oil. The idea that fracking has granted the United States energy independence is a myth; as long as the global economy relies on fossil fuels, the United States will be vulnerable to major disruptions in the supply of oil, regardless of how much it produces. Since neither global dependence on oil nor the Middle East’s contribution to the share of global production is expected to abate over the next 25 years, the United States will continue to have a critical interest in keeping Middle Eastern oil flowing.

Yet the United States need not defend every last barrel of oil in the region. The question is, how much is enough? This is where things get complicated. Many countries possess strategic reserves of oil that can mitigate a sudden, unexpected drop in production. And some, particularly Saudi Arabia, have enough excess capacity to pump and export more oil if need be. Fracking, likewise, allows North American producers of shale oil to partly compensate for shortfalls. Even though oil production in Libya has dropped by over 80 percent since 2011 as a result of its civil war, other producers have been able to make up for the loss.

Saudi Arabia, however, is in a category of its own. The country produces over ten percent of all the oil used in the world and contains the vast majority of excess capacity; even if every country emptied its strategic oil reserves and fracked like crazy, that would still not compensate for the loss of Saudi oil production. Thus, the United States will have to continue to protect its Saudi allies. But against what? No Middle Eastern state (even Iran) has the capacity to conquer Saudi Arabia, and the modest U.S. air and naval force currently in the Persian Gulf is more than adequate to defeat an Iranian attack on the country’s oil infrastructure.

The kingdom’s principal threats are internal. Although no one has ever made money betting against the House of Saud, the monarchy rules over a quintessentially dysfunctional postwar Arab state, one that faces daunting political, economic, and social stresses. The Shiites who make up the majority of Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province have rioted and resisted government oppression for decades, and their unhappiness has grown with the widening Shiite-Sunni rift across the region. The kingdom skated through the Arab Spring primarily thanks to the far-reaching (if gradual) reform program of King Abdullah, coupled with massive cash payoffs to the people. But Abdullah died in January 2015, and his successor, King Salman, has yet to demonstrate a similar commitment to reform. Even as oil prices remain low, Salman is spending profligately at home and abroad (including on the expensive intervention in Yemen), burning through the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund at $12–$14 billion per month. At that rate, the fund will be empty in about four years, but the king will probably face domestic challenges long before then.

How can the United States protect Saudi Arabia from itself? It is impossible to imagine any U.S. president deploying troops there to suppress a popular revolution or to hold together a failing monarchy. Moreover, the longer that civil wars burn on Saudi Arabia’s northern border, in Iraq, and southern border, in Yemen, the more likely these conflicts will destabilize the kingdom—to say nothing of the possibility of a Jordanian civil war. But a strategy of stepping back from the region means the United States will not try to shut down the nearby civil wars, and Washington has little leverage it can use to convince the Saudis to reform. It would have especially little leverage if it swore off the only thing that the Saudis truly want: greater U.S. involvement to end the civil wars and prevent Iran from exploiting them. In these circumstances, the United States would have virtually no ability to save Saudi Arabia from itself if its rulers were to insist on following a ruinous path. Yet in the context of greater U.S. disengagement, that is the most likely course the Saudis would take.

No exit

Ultimately, the greatest challenge for the United States if it steps back from the Middle East is this: figuring out how to defend U.S. interests when they are threatened by problems the United States is ill equipped to solve. Because containing the spillover from civil wars is so difficult, stepping back means risking the near-term collapse of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey. Although none of these countries produces much oil itself, their instability could spread to the oil producers, too, over the longer term. The world might be able to survive the loss of Iranian, Iraqi, Kuwaiti, or Algerian oil production, but at a certain point, the instability would affect Saudi Arabia. And even if it never does, it is not clear that the world can afford to lose several lesser oil producers, either.

Stepping back from the Middle East means risking the near-term collapse of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The great benefit of a policy of stepping back is that it would drastically reduce the burden that the United States would have to bear to stabilize the Middle East. The great danger, however, is that it would entail enormous risks. Once the United States started writing off countries—shortening the list of those it would defend against threats—it is unclear where it would be able to stop, and retreat could turn into rout. If Jordan or Kuwait slid into civil war, would the United States deploy 100,000 troops to occupy and stabilize either country to protect Saudi Arabia (and in the case of civil war in Jordan, to protect Israel)? Could the United States do so in time to prevent the spillover from destabilizing the kingdom? If not, are there other ways to keep the kingdom itself from falling? Given all these uncertainties, the most prudent course is for Americans to steel themselves against the costs and step up to stabilize the region.

That said, what the United States should certainly not do is refuse to choose between stepping up and stepping back and instead waffle somewhere in the middle, committing enough resources to enlarge its burden without increasing the likelihood that its moves will make anything better. Civil wars do not lend themselves to half measures. An outside power has to do the right thing and pay the attendant costs, or else its intervention will only make the situation worse for everyone involved, including itself. The tragedy is that given the U.S. political system’s tendency to avoid decisive moves, the next administration will almost inevitably opt to muddle through. Given the extent of the chaos in the Middle East today, refusing to choose would likely prove to be the worst choice of all.

Authors

Editors' Note: The modern Middle East has rarely been tranquil, but it has never been this bad, writes Ken Pollack. The next U.S. president is going to face a choice in the Middle East: do much more to stabilize it, or disengage from it much more. This piece was originally published in Foreign Affairs.

The modern Middle East has rarely been tranquil, but it has never been this bad. Full-blown civil wars rage in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Nascent conflicts simmer in Egypt, South Sudan, and Turkey. Various forms of spillover from these civil wars threaten the stability of Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia have risen to new heights, raising the specter of a region-wide religious war. Israel and the Palestinians have experienced a resurgence of low-level violence. Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have weathered the storm so far, but even they are terrified of what is going on around them. Not since the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century has the Middle East seen so much chaos.

Moreover, it is unlikely to abate anytime soon. No matter how many times Americans insist that the people of the Middle East will come to their senses and resolve their differences if left to their own devices, they never do. Absent external involvement, the region’s leaders consistently opt for strategies that exacerbate conflict and feed perpetual instability. Civil wars are particularly stubborn problems, and without decisive outside intervention, they usually last decades. The Congolese civil war is entering its 22nd year, the Peruvian its 36th, and the Afghan its 37th. There is no reason to expect the Middle East’s conflicts to burn out on their own either.

As a consequence, the next U.S. president is going to face a choice in the Middle East: do much more to stabilize it, or disengage from it much more. But given how tempestuous the region has become, both options—stepping up and stepping back—will cost the United States far more than is typically imagined. Stabilizing the region would almost certainly require more resources, energy, attention, and political capital than most advocates of a forward-leaning U.S. posture recognize. Similarly, giving up more control and abandoning more commitments in the region would require accepting much greater risks than most in this camp acknowledge. The costs of stepping up are more manageable than the risks of stepping back, but either option would be better than muddling through.

Man, the state, and civil war

Grasping the real choices that the United States faces in the Middle East requires an honest understanding of what is going on there. Although it is fashionable to blame the region’s travails on ancient hatreds or the poor cartography of Mr. Sykes and Monsieur Picot, the real problems began with the modern Arab state system. After World War II, the Arab states came into their own. Most shed their European colonial masters, and all adopted more modern political systems, whether secular republics (read: dictatorships) or new monarchies.

None of these states worked very well. For one thing, their economies depended heavily on oil, either directly, by pumping it themselves, or indirectly, via trade, aid, and worker remittances. These rentier economies produced too few jobs and too much wealth that their civilian populations neither controlled nor generated, encouraging the ruling elites to treat their citizenries as (mostly unwanted) dependents. The oil money bred massive corruption, along with bloated public sectors uninterested in the needs or aspirations of the wider populace. To make matters worse, the Arab states had emerged from Ottoman and European colonialism with their traditional socio-cultural systems intact, which oil wealth and autocracy made it possible to preserve and even indulge.

This model clunked along for several decades, before it started falling apart in the late twentieth century. The oil market became more volatile, with long periods of low prices, which created economic hardship even in oil-rich states such as Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Globalization brought to the region new ideas about the relationship between government and the governed, as well as foreign cultural influences. Arabs (and Iranians, for that matter) increasingly demanded that their governments help fix their problems. But all they got in response was malign neglect.

The Middle East’s travails began with the modern Arab state system.

By the 1990s, popular discontent had risen throughout the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood and its many franchises grew quickly as a political opposition to the regimes. Others turned to violence—rioters in the Nejd region of Saudi Arabia, Islamist insurgents in Egypt, and various terrorist groups elsewhere—all seeking to overthrow their governments. Eventually, some of these groups would decide that they first had to drive away the foreign backers of those governments, starting with the United States.

The pent-up frustrations and desire for political change finally exploded in the Arab Spring of 2011, with large-scale protests breaking out in nearly all Arab countries and the toppling or crippling of the regime in five of them. But revolutions are always tricky things to get right. That has proved especially true in the Arab world, where the autocrats in each country had done a superb job of eliminating any charismatic opposition leader who might have unified the country after the fall of the regime and where there were no popular alternative ideas about how to organize a new Arab state. And so in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the result has been state failure, a security vacuum, and civil war.

If the first-order problem of the Middle East is the failure of the postwar Arab state system, the outbreak of civil wars has become an equally important second-order problem. These conflicts have taken on lives of their own, becoming engines of instability that now pose the greatest immediate threat to both the people of the region and the rest of the world.

For one thing, civil wars have a bad habit of spilling over into their neighbors. Vast numbers of refugees cross borders, as do smaller, but no less problematic, numbers of terrorists and other armed combatants. So do ideas promoting militancy, revolution, and secession. In this way, neighboring states can themselves succumb to instability or even internal conflict. Indeed, scholars have found that the strongest predictor that a state will experience a civil war is whether it borders a country already embroiled in one.

Civil wars also have a bad habit of sucking in neighboring countries. Seeking to protect their interests and prevent spillover, states typically choose particular combatants to back. But that brings them into conflict with other neighboring states that have picked their own favorites. Even if this competition remains a proxy fight, it can still be economically and politically draining, even ruinous. At worst, the conflict can lead to a regional war, when a state, convinced its proxy is not doing the job, sends in its own armed forces. For evidence of this dynamic, one need look no further than the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, or Iranian and Russian military operations in Iraq and Syria.

Withdrawal symptoms

As if the failure of the postwar Arab state system and the outbreak of four civil wars weren’t bad enough, in the midst of all of this, the United States has distanced itself from the region. The Middle East has not been without a great-power overseer of one kind or another since the Ottoman conquests of the sixteenth century. This is not to suggest that the external hegemon was always an unalloyed good; it wasn’t. But it often played the constructive role of mitigating conflict. Good or bad, the states of the region have grown accustomed to interacting with one another with a dominating third party in the room, figuratively and often literally.

Disengagement has been most damaging in Iraq. The U.S. withdrawal from the country was the most important of a range of factors that pulled it back into civil war. Scholars have long recognized that shepherding a nation out of a civil war requires some internal or external peacekeeper to guarantee the terms of a new power-sharing arrangement among the warring parties. Over time, that role can become increasingly symbolic, as was the case with NATO in Bosnia. The alliance’s presence there dwindled to a militarily insignificant force within about five years, but it still played a crucial political and psychological role in reassuring the rival factions that none of them would return to violence. In the case of Iraq, the United States played that role, and its disengagement in 2010 and 2011 led to exactly what history predicted.

This phenomenon has played out more broadly across the Middle East. The withdrawal of the United States has forced governments there to interact in a novel way, without the hope that Washington will provide a cooperative path out of the security dilemmas that litter the region. U.S. disengagement has made many states fear that others will become more aggressive without the United States to restrain them. That fear has caused them to act more aggressively themselves, which in turn has sparked more severe counter-moves, again in the expectation that the United States will not check either the original move or the riposte. This dynamic has grown most acute between Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose tit-for-tat exchange is growing ever more vituperative and violent. The Saudis have taken the stunning step of directly intervening in Yemen’s civil war against the country’s Houthi minority, which they consider to be an Iranian proxy that threatens their southern flank.

Even as the Middle East careens out of control, help is not on the way. The Obama administration’s policies toward the region are not designed to mitigate, let alone end, its real problems. That is why the region has gotten worse since President Barack Obama entered office, and why there is no reason to believe that it will get any better before he leaves office.

In his 2009 speech in Cairo, Obama did claim that the United States would try to help the region shift to a new Arab state system, but he never backed his speech up with an actual policy, let alone resources. Then, in 2011, the administration failed to put in place a coherent strategy to deal with the Arab Spring, one that might have assisted a transition to more stable, pluralistic systems of government. Having missed its best opportunities, Washington now barely pays lip service to the need for gradual, long-term reform.

As for the civil wars, the administration has focused on addressing only their symptoms—trying to contain the spillover—by attacking the Islamic State, or ISIS; accepting some refugees; and working to prevent terrorist attacks back home. But the history of civil wars demonstrates that it is extremely hard to contain the spillover, and the Middle East today is proving no exception. Spillover from Syria helped push Iraq back into civil war. In turn, spillover from the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars has generated a low-level civil war in Turkey and threatens to do the same in Jordan and Lebanon. Spillover from Libya is destabilizing Egypt, Mali, and Tunisia. The Iraqi, Syrian, and Yemeni civil wars have sucked Iran and the Gulf states into a vicious proxy war fought across all three battlefields. And refugees, terrorists, and radicalization spilling over from all these wars have created new dilemmas for Europe and North America.

In fact, it is effectively impossible to eradicate the symptoms of civil wars without treating the underlying maladies. No matter how many thousands of refugees the West accepts, as long as the civil wars grind on, millions more will flee. And no matter how many terrorists the United States kills, without an end to the civil wars, more young men will keep turning to terrorism. Over the past 15 years, the threat from Salafi jihadism has grown by orders of magnitude despite the damage that the United States has inflicted on al-Qaida’s core in Afghanistan. In places racked by civil war, the group’s offshoots, including ISIS, are finding new recruits, new sanctuaries, and new fields of jihad. But where order prevails, they dissipate. Neither al-Qaida nor ISIS has found much purchase in any of the remaining strong states of the region. And when the United States brought stability to Iraq beginning in 2007, al-Qaida’s franchise there was pushed to the brink of extinction, only to find salvation in 2011, when civil war broke out next door in Syria.

Even as the Middle East careens out of control, help is not on the way.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, moreover, it is possible for a third party to settle a civil war long before it might end on its own. Scholars of civil wars have found that in about 20 percent of the cases since 1945, and roughly 40 percent of the cases since 1995, an external actor was able to engineer just such an outcome. Doing so is not easy, of course, but it need not be as ruinously expensive as the United States’ painful experience in Iraq.

Ending a civil war requires the intervening power to accomplish three objectives. First, it must change the military dynamics such that none of the warring parties believes that it can win a military victory and none fears that its fighters will be slaughtered once they lay down their arms. Second, it must forge a power-sharing agreement among the various groups so that they all have an equitable stake in a new government. And third, it must put in place institutions that reassure all the parties that the first two conditions will endure. To some extent unknowingly, that is precisely the path NATO followed in Bosnia in 1994–95 and the United States followed in Iraq in 2007–10.

History also shows that when outside powers stray from this approach or commit inadequate resources to it, their interventions inevitably fail and typically make the conflicts bloodier, longer, and less contained. No wonder U.S. policy toward Iraq and Syria (let alone Libya and Yemen) has failed since 2011. And as long as the United States continues to avoid pursuing the one approach that can work, there is no reason to expect anything else. At most, the U.S. military’s current campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria will engineer the same outcome as its earlier one against al-Qaida in Afghanistan: the United States may badly damage ISIS, but unless it ends the conflicts that sustain it, the group will morph and spread and eventually be succeeded by the son of ISIS, just as ISIS is the son of al-Qaida.

Stepping up

Stabilizing the Middle East will require a new approach—one that attacks the root causes of the region’s troubles and is backed up by adequate resources. The first priority should be to shut down the current civil wars. In every case, that will require first changing the battlefield dynamics to convince all the warring factions that military victory is impossible. In an ideal world, that would entail sending at least small numbers of U.S. combat forces to Iraq (perhaps 10,000) and potentially Syria. But if the political will for even a modest commitment of forces does not exist, then more advisers, airpower, intelligence sharing, and logistical support could suffice, albeit with a lower likelihood of success.

Regardless, the United States and its allies will also have to build new indigenous militaries able to first defeat the terrorists, militias, and extremists and then serve as the foundation for a new state. In Iraq, that means retraining and reforming the Iraqi security forces to a much greater degree than current U.S. policy envisions. In Libya, Syria, and Yemen, it would mean creating new indigenous, conventional militaries that (with considerable American support) would be able to defeat any potential rival, secure the civilian populaces, and enforce the terms of permanent cease-fires.

In all four civil wars, the United States and its allies will also have to undertake major political efforts aimed at forging equitable power-sharing arrangements. In Iraq, the United States should take the lead in defining both the minimal needs and the potential areas of agreement among the various Shiite and Sunni factions, just as Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq in 2007–9, and his team accomplished as part of the U.S. surge strategy. That, plus giving material resources to various moderate Iraqi political leaders and their constituencies among both the Shiites and the Sunnis, should allow the United States to hammer out a new power-sharing deal. Such an arrangement should end the alienation of the Sunni population, which lies at the heart of Iraq’s current problems. This, in turn, would make it much easier for the Abadi government and the United States to stand up Sunni military formations to help liberate the Sunni-majority areas of the country from ISIS and help diminish the power of the Iranian-backed Shiite militias.

In Syria, the ongoing peace talks in Vienna provide a starting point for a political solution. But they offer little more than that, because the military conditions are not conducive to a real political compromise, let alone a permanent cessation of hostilities. Neither the Assad regime nor the Western-backed opposition believes that it can afford to stop fighting, and each of the three strongest rebel groups—Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS—remains convinced that it can achieve total victory. So until the reality on the battlefield shifts, little can be achieved at the negotiating table. If the military situation changes, then Western diplomats should help Syria’s communities fashion an arrangement that distributes political power and economic benefits equitably. The deal would have to include the Alawites, but not necessarily President Bashar al-Assad himself, and it would need to assure each faction that the new government would not oppress it, the way the Alawite minority oppressed the Sunni majority in the past.

The turmoil in Libya mirrors that in Syria, except that it is receiving far less international attention. Thus, the first step there is for the United States to convince its partners to take on a more constructive role. If the United States should lead in Iraq and Syria, then Europe needs to lead in Libya. By dint of its economic ties and proximity to Europe, Libya threatens European interests far more directly than it does American ones, and NATO’s role in the 2011 intervention in Libya can serve as a precedent for European leadership. Of course, the Europeans will not take on the challenge if they are not convinced that the United States intends to do its part to quell the Middle East’s civil wars, further underscoring the importance of a coherent, properly resourced U.S. strategy. To aid Europe’s fight in Libya, Washington will undoubtedly have to commit assistance related to logistics, command and control, and intelligence, and possibly even combat advisers.

In Yemen, the Gulf states’ air campaign has achieved little, but the intervention by a small ground force led by the United Arab Emirates has set back the rebel coalition, creating a real opportunity to negotiate an end to the conflict. Unfortunately, the Gulf states seem unwilling to offer Yemen’s opposition terms that would equitably divide political power and economic benefits, and they seem equally unwilling to offer security guarantees. To draw the conflict to a close, the United States and its allies will have to encourage their partners in the Gulf to make meaningful concessions. If that doesn’t work, then the most useful thing they can do is try to convince the Gulf states to minimize their involvement in Yemen before the strain of intervention threatens their own internal cohesion.

If the next U.S. president is unwilling to commit to stepping up to stabilize the Middle East, the only real alternative is to step back.

After ending the current civil wars, the next priority of a stepped-up U.S. strategy in the Middle East will be to shore up the states in the greatest danger of sliding into future civil wars: Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey. It is state failure—not external attack by ISIS, al-Qaida, or Iranian proxies—that represents the true source of the conflicts roiling the Middle East today. These four at-risk countries are all badly in need of economic assistance and infrastructure development. But above all, they need political reform to avoid state failure. Consequently, the United States and its allies should offer a range of trade benefits, financial incentives, and economic aid in return for gradual but concrete steps toward political reform. Here, the aim need not be democratization per se (although Tunisia should be strongly encouraged to continue down that path), but it should be good governance, in the form of justice and the rule of law, transparency, and a fair distribution of public goods and services.

The final piece of the puzzle is to press for reform more broadly across the Middle East—economic, social, and political. Even if the United States and its allies succeed in resolving today’s civil wars, unless a new state system takes the place of the failed postwar one, the same old problems will recur. Reform will be a hard sell for the region’s leaders, who have long resisted it out of a fear that it would strip them of their power and positions. Paradoxically, however, the civil wars may furnish a solution to this conundrum. All the states of the region are terrified of the spillover from these conflicts, and they are desperate for U.S. help in eliminating the threat. In particular, many of the United States’ Arab allies have grown frustrated by the gains that Iran has made by exploiting power vacuums. Just as the United States and its allies should offer the region’s fragile states economic assistance in return for reform, so they should condition their efforts to end the civil wars on the willingness of the region’s stronger states to embrace similar reforms.

Stepping back

If the next U.S. president is unwilling to commit to stepping up to stabilize the Middle East, the only real alternative is to step back from it. Because civil wars do not lend themselves to anything but the right strategy with the right resources, trying the wrong one means throwing U.S. resources away on a lost cause. It probably also means making the situation worse, not better. Under a policy of real disengagement, the United States would abstain from involvement in the civil wars altogether. It would instead try to contain their spillover, difficult as that is, and if that were to fail, it would fall back on defending only core U.S. interests in the Middle East.

The Obama administration has done a creditable job of bolstering Jordan against chaos from Iraq and Syria so far, and stepping back from the region could still entail beefing up U.S. support to Jordan and other at-risk neighbors of the civil wars, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey. All these countries want and need Western economic, diplomatic, technical, and military assistance. But because spillover has historically proved so difficult to contain, there is a high risk that one or more of them could still slide into civil war themselves, generating yet more spillover.

For that reason, stepping back would also require Washington to make a ruthless assessment of what is the least the United States can do to secure its vital interests in the Middle East. And although it may be a gross exaggeration to say so, in large part, U.S. interests in the region do ultimately come down to Israel, terrorism, and oil.

As poll after poll has found, a majority of Americans continue to see the safety of Israel as important to them and to the United States. Yet Israel today is as safe as the United States can make it. Israeli forces can defeat any conventional foe and deter any deterrable unconventional threat. The United States has defended Israel diplomatically and militarily countless times, including implicitly threatening the Soviet Union with nuclear war during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The United States has even taken an Iranian nuclear threat off the table for at least the next decade, thanks to the deal it brokered last year. The only threat the United States cannot save Israel from is its own chronic civil war with the Palestinians, but the best solution to that conflict is a peace settlement that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians have demonstrated much interest in. In short, there is little more that Israel needs from the United States for its own direct security, and what it does need (such as arms sales) the United States could easily provide even if it stepped back from the Middle East.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of a reduced U.S. presence in the Middle East is that it should mitigate the threat from terrorism. Terrorists from the region attack Americans largely because they feel aggrieved by U.S. policies, just as they attack France and the United Kingdom because those countries are staunch U.S. allies (and former colonial powers) and have started to attack Russia because it has intervened in Syria. The less the United States is involved in the Middle East, the less its people are likely to be attacked by terrorists from the region. It is no accident that Switzerland does not suffer from Middle Eastern terrorism.

Of course, even if Washington disengaged from the region as much as possible, Americans would not be entirely immune from Middle Eastern terrorism. The region’s conspiracy-mongers endlessly blame the United States for things it didn’t do, as well as for what it did, and so terrorists could still find reasons to target Americans. Besides, even under this minimalist approach, the United States would maintain its support for Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which a range of terrorist groups detest.

If U.S. interests concerning Israel and terrorism would largely take care of themselves in the event that Washington further diminished its role in the Middle East, the same cannot be said for the flow of oil. The idea that fracking has granted the United States energy independence is a myth; as long as the global economy relies on fossil fuels, the United States will be vulnerable to major disruptions in the supply of oil, regardless of how much it produces. Since neither global dependence on oil nor the Middle East’s contribution to the share of global production is expected to abate over the next 25 years, the United States will continue to have a critical interest in keeping Middle Eastern oil flowing.

Yet the United States need not defend every last barrel of oil in the region. The question is, how much is enough? This is where things get complicated. Many countries possess strategic reserves of oil that can mitigate a sudden, unexpected drop in production. And some, particularly Saudi Arabia, have enough excess capacity to pump and export more oil if need be. Fracking, likewise, allows North American producers of shale oil to partly compensate for shortfalls. Even though oil production in Libya has dropped by over 80 percent since 2011 as a result of its civil war, other producers have been able to make up for the loss.

Saudi Arabia, however, is in a category of its own. The country produces over ten percent of all the oil used in the world and contains the vast majority of excess capacity; even if every country emptied its strategic oil reserves and fracked like crazy, that would still not compensate for the loss of Saudi oil production. Thus, the United States will have to continue to protect its Saudi allies. But against what? No Middle Eastern state (even Iran) has the capacity to conquer Saudi Arabia, and the modest U.S. air and naval force currently in the Persian Gulf is more than adequate to defeat an Iranian attack on the country’s oil infrastructure.

The kingdom’s principal threats are internal. Although no one has ever made money betting against the House of Saud, the monarchy rules over a quintessentially dysfunctional postwar Arab state, one that faces daunting political, economic, and social stresses. The Shiites who make up the majority of Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province have rioted and resisted government oppression for decades, and their unhappiness has grown with the widening Shiite-Sunni rift across the region. The kingdom skated through the Arab Spring primarily thanks to the far-reaching (if gradual) reform program of King Abdullah, coupled with massive cash payoffs to the people. But Abdullah died in January 2015, and his successor, King Salman, has yet to demonstrate a similar commitment to reform. Even as oil prices remain low, Salman is spending profligately at home and abroad (including on the expensive intervention in Yemen), burning through the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund at $12–$14 billion per month. At that rate, the fund will be empty in about four years, but the king will probably face domestic challenges long before then.

How can the United States protect Saudi Arabia from itself? It is impossible to imagine any U.S. president deploying troops there to suppress a popular revolution or to hold together a failing monarchy. Moreover, the longer that civil wars burn on Saudi Arabia’s northern border, in Iraq, and southern border, in Yemen, the more likely these conflicts will destabilize the kingdom—to say nothing of the possibility of a Jordanian civil war. But a strategy of stepping back from the region means the United States will not try to shut down the nearby civil wars, and Washington has little leverage it can use to convince the Saudis to reform. It would have especially little leverage if it swore off the only thing that the Saudis truly want: greater U.S. involvement to end the civil wars and prevent Iran from exploiting them. In these circumstances, the United States would have virtually no ability to save Saudi Arabia from itself if its rulers were to insist on following a ruinous path. Yet in the context of greater U.S. disengagement, that is the most likely course the Saudis would take.

No exit

Ultimately, the greatest challenge for the United States if it steps back from the Middle East is this: figuring out how to defend U.S. interests when they are threatened by problems the United States is ill equipped to solve. Because containing the spillover from civil wars is so difficult, stepping back means risking the near-term collapse of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey. Although none of these countries produces much oil itself, their instability could spread to the oil producers, too, over the longer term. The world might be able to survive the loss of Iranian, Iraqi, Kuwaiti, or Algerian oil production, but at a certain point, the instability would affect Saudi Arabia. And even if it never does, it is not clear that the world can afford to lose several lesser oil producers, either.

Stepping back from the Middle East means risking the near-term collapse of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The great benefit of a policy of stepping back is that it would drastically reduce the burden that the United States would have to bear to stabilize the Middle East. The great danger, however, is that it would entail enormous risks. Once the United States started writing off countries—shortening the list of those it would defend against threats—it is unclear where it would be able to stop, and retreat could turn into rout. If Jordan or Kuwait slid into civil war, would the United States deploy 100,000 troops to occupy and stabilize either country to protect Saudi Arabia (and in the case of civil war in Jordan, to protect Israel)? Could the United States do so in time to prevent the spillover from destabilizing the kingdom? If not, are there other ways to keep the kingdom itself from falling? Given all these uncertainties, the most prudent course is for Americans to steel themselves against the costs and step up to stabilize the region.

That said, what the United States should certainly not do is refuse to choose between stepping up and stepping back and instead waffle somewhere in the middle, committing enough resources to enlarge its burden without increasing the likelihood that its moves will make anything better. Civil wars do not lend themselves to half measures. An outside power has to do the right thing and pay the attendant costs, or else its intervention will only make the situation worse for everyone involved, including itself. The tragedy is that given the U.S. political system’s tendency to avoid decisive moves, the next administration will almost inevitably opt to muddle through. Given the extent of the chaos in the Middle East today, refusing to choose would likely prove to be the worst choice of all.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/01/05-fallout-of-saudi-iran-split-pollack?rssid=yemen{41E8E60B-14FF-40CF-8188-CC710F542C66}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/131559999/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~Perils-of-prediction-Why-it%e2%80%99s-so-hard-to-guess-the-fallout-of-the-SaudiIran-splitPerils of prediction: Why it’s so hard to guess the fallout of the Saudi-Iran split

I want to sound a note of warning about recent developments between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is the typical analytic tendency to predict that tomorrow will be essentially the same as yesterday and today. That’s because it is correct in the vast majority of cases.

But that is also why it is often difficult for even the best analysts to recognize—let alone predict—discontinuous change. Major events often catch the finest experts by surprise. I fear that the Middle East has entered a period where major, discontinuous change has become far more possible, even probable.

I see this week’s events in Saudi Arabia and Iran as evidence of just that. Five years ago, the Saudis might not have felt the need to execute Nimr al-Nimr because they did not feel as threatened by a wider Shiite threat (both internal and external), exaggerated though we may believe it to be. Five years ago, the Iranians would probably have settled with a perfunctory verbal condemnation and left it at that. And five years ago, the Saudis probably would have brushed aside any Iranian criticism. The last few days have demonstrated that today is not five years ago.

A fearful new Middle East

The problem is that the context has changed dramatically. Today there are all-out civil wars burning in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, and would-be civil wars simmering in Egypt, Turkey, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan. Bahrain, Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia all face dangerous internal discord. Iran and Saudi Arabia now lead rival coalitions waging proxy wars—figuratively across the region, and literally across Syria, Yemen, and (to a lesser extent) Iraq.

The civil wars generate their usual destabilizing spillover in the form of refugees, terrorism, economic problems, secessionism, and radicalization. They both destabilize neighboring states and suck them into their vortices. Fear of further state failure, radicalization from civil wars, and a deepening sectarian divide that is now increasingly an ordering principal in the region have conjured a wider Sunni-Shiite rift. When King Abdullah II of Jordan first warned of this 12 years ago, it seemed highly unlikely. Today, the perception that it is a reality is widespread, and that perception is making it a reality as various countries take actions based on the perception.

And rightly or wrongly, many of the states of the region feel abandoned by the United States, their traditional protector and mediator.

Up the escalator

I look at this context and worry that the conditions in the Middle East are such that the unlikely and the unexpected seem far more likely. This is not to suggest that we should expect the worst from every situation, but that we should be more careful about predicting that events will occur as they typically would have in a different, more peaceful and stable set of circumstances.

Do I think that Saudi Arabia and Iran will come to direct blows over this incident? Almost certainly not, at least not yet. But I absolutely see this is part of a dangerous spiral of escalation between them. The Saudis are frightened of American disengagement and ascribe most of the problems of the region (including many of the civil wars) to deliberate Iranian subversion.

[W]e should be more careful about predicting that events will occur as they typically would have in a different, more peaceful and stable set of circumstances.

As always, their modus operandi in such circumstances is to confront Iran, only they are doing so far more aggressively and boldly than they ever have in the past—something I also attribute to their sense that the region is spinning out of control and therefore they need to assert themselves more than they ever have before to stabilize it. But their actions are highly provocative to Iran, which in turn arrogantly ignores how its own activities (and it has been part of the problems of the region, including the civil wars, even if not to the extent the Saudis believe) frighten and anger the Sunni states. They similarly overlook how their reactions drive the Saudis and their Sunni allies into further paroxysms of frustration and fear.

Consequently, I suspect that there will be subsequent actions on both of their parts, either as a further escalation of this incident, or as the next incident in what has become an increasingly reckless and regular tit-for-tat.

Some of my most insightful colleagues have suggested that these will play out in the civil wars themselves—in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. That is certainly possible, but in some ways, that might actually be a good response. There are so many bad things happening in those places already that Saudi and Iranian reprisals might seem less provocative in that context. Perhaps the worst they can do (and almost certainly will) is to further dig in their heels against negotiating an end to those conflicts on terms acceptable to the other. However, there is already so little likelihood that either would be willing to make meaningful concessions to the other any time soon that again this might not be much of an escalation.

That is why I worry that the Saudis and/or Iranians will act next somewhere else. Somewhere where their action will stand out and so cannot be missed as a riposte to the other. I don’t know where that might be or in what circumstances, but the region and their rivalry strikes me as having entered that phase. And if they do so, that will push them and the region further into the vicious cycle it seems to have already entered.

Authors

I want to sound a note of warning about recent developments between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is the typical analytic tendency to predict that tomorrow will be essentially the same as yesterday and today. That’s because it is correct in the vast majority of cases.

But that is also why it is often difficult for even the best analysts to recognize—let alone predict—discontinuous change. Major events often catch the finest experts by surprise. I fear that the Middle East has entered a period where major, discontinuous change has become far more possible, even probable.

I see this week’s events in Saudi Arabia and Iran as evidence of just that. Five years ago, the Saudis might not have felt the need to execute Nimr al-Nimr because they did not feel as threatened by a wider Shiite threat (both internal and external), exaggerated though we may believe it to be. Five years ago, the Iranians would probably have settled with a perfunctory verbal condemnation and left it at that. And five years ago, the Saudis probably would have brushed aside any Iranian criticism. The last few days have demonstrated that today is not five years ago.

A fearful new Middle East

The problem is that the context has changed dramatically. Today there are all-out civil wars burning in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, and would-be civil wars simmering in Egypt, Turkey, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan. Bahrain, Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia all face dangerous internal discord. Iran and Saudi Arabia now lead rival coalitions waging proxy wars—figuratively across the region, and literally across Syria, Yemen, and (to a lesser extent) Iraq.

The civil wars generate their usual destabilizing spillover in the form of refugees, terrorism, economic problems, secessionism, and radicalization. They both destabilize neighboring states and suck them into their vortices. Fear of further state failure, radicalization from civil wars, and a deepening sectarian divide that is now increasingly an ordering principal in the region have conjured a wider Sunni-Shiite rift. When King Abdullah II of Jordan first warned of this 12 years ago, it seemed highly unlikely. Today, the perception that it is a reality is widespread, and that perception is making it a reality as various countries take actions based on the perception.

And rightly or wrongly, many of the states of the region feel abandoned by the United States, their traditional protector and mediator.

Up the escalator

I look at this context and worry that the conditions in the Middle East are such that the unlikely and the unexpected seem far more likely. This is not to suggest that we should expect the worst from every situation, but that we should be more careful about predicting that events will occur as they typically would have in a different, more peaceful and stable set of circumstances.

Do I think that Saudi Arabia and Iran will come to direct blows over this incident? Almost certainly not, at least not yet. But I absolutely see this is part of a dangerous spiral of escalation between them. The Saudis are frightened of American disengagement and ascribe most of the problems of the region (including many of the civil wars) to deliberate Iranian subversion.

[W]e should be more careful about predicting that events will occur as they typically would have in a different, more peaceful and stable set of circumstances.

As always, their modus operandi in such circumstances is to confront Iran, only they are doing so far more aggressively and boldly than they ever have in the past—something I also attribute to their sense that the region is spinning out of control and therefore they need to assert themselves more than they ever have before to stabilize it. But their actions are highly provocative to Iran, which in turn arrogantly ignores how its own activities (and it has been part of the problems of the region, including the civil wars, even if not to the extent the Saudis believe) frighten and anger the Sunni states. They similarly overlook how their reactions drive the Saudis and their Sunni allies into further paroxysms of frustration and fear.

Consequently, I suspect that there will be subsequent actions on both of their parts, either as a further escalation of this incident, or as the next incident in what has become an increasingly reckless and regular tit-for-tat.

Some of my most insightful colleagues have suggested that these will play out in the civil wars themselves—in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. That is certainly possible, but in some ways, that might actually be a good response. There are so many bad things happening in those places already that Saudi and Iranian reprisals might seem less provocative in that context. Perhaps the worst they can do (and almost certainly will) is to further dig in their heels against negotiating an end to those conflicts on terms acceptable to the other. However, there is already so little likelihood that either would be willing to make meaningful concessions to the other any time soon that again this might not be much of an escalation.

That is why I worry that the Saudis and/or Iranians will act next somewhere else. Somewhere where their action will stand out and so cannot be missed as a riposte to the other. I don’t know where that might be or in what circumstances, but the region and their rivalry strikes me as having entered that phase. And if they do so, that will push them and the region further into the vicious cycle it seems to have already entered.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/12/30-biggest-mena-stories-of-2015-borden?rssid=yemen{3D4D5985-8CBD-41CF-879F-D16D0D9B4624}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/130753989/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~What-Brookings-experts-had-to-say-about-the-biggest-Middle-East-stories-ofWhat Brookings experts had to say about the biggest Middle East stories of 2015

It’s been another tumultuous year in the Middle East, marked by historic breakthroughs and bouts of brutal violence. Here’s what Brookings experts had to say about the biggest regional stories of 2015:

Deal or no deal: The JCPOA, its regional effects, and the U.S. response

A week before the signing of a historic nuclear accord with Iran, Suzanne Maloney explored five core issues at stake: the timeline for nuclear “breakout,” easing economic sanctions, regional implications, Iran’s evolution, and the effects on U.S. domestic politics. Even after the deal was signed and as “Implementation Day” approaches, these issues remain flashpoints for the debate over U.S. policy toward Tehran.

In September, the Hajj tragedy posed another challenge to the Kingdom. As Riedel wrote, the collapse of a crane in Mecca and the Hajj stampede challenged King Salman’s prestige and legitimacy, which largely depends on the Saudi claim to be the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

Overall, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, which in the past avoided the international spotlight, became much more assertive this year. As Riedel wrote, the country is in some ways both the problem and solution to global jihad. Many major funders of terrorist groups are Saudi; and at the same time, a more concerted and transparent dialogue between Washington and Riyadh is important to the fight against global jihad.

Responding to reports of public concerns that Syrian refugees might pose a terrorism threat, Dan Byman wrote that fears are exaggerated, at least for now. But if European countries fail to integrate refugees into their societies, relations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities could become dangerously tense.

Syrians try to cross the border from the Syrian town of Ras al-Ain to the Turkish border town of Ceylanpinar after an air strike December 3, 2012. Credit: Reuters/Laszlo Balogh.

While attention was diverted: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the future of Tunisia

Although tensions continued to brew among Israelis and Palestinians, this conflict tended to fall off the front pages of American newspapers this year. Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks at the 2015 Saban Forum effectively acknowledged that the United States now places the onus for progress toward peace onto the Israelis and Palestinians.

Authors

Emma Borden

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Wed, 30 Dec 2015 11:07:00 -0500Emma Borden

It’s been another tumultuous year in the Middle East, marked by historic breakthroughs and bouts of brutal violence. Here’s what Brookings experts had to say about the biggest regional stories of 2015:

Deal or no deal: The JCPOA, its regional effects, and the U.S. response

A week before the signing of a historic nuclear accord with Iran, Suzanne Maloney explored five core issues at stake: the timeline for nuclear “breakout,” easing economic sanctions, regional implications, Iran’s evolution, and the effects on U.S. domestic politics. Even after the deal was signed and as “Implementation Day” approaches, these issues remain flashpoints for the debate over U.S. policy toward Tehran.

In September, the Hajj tragedy posed another challenge to the Kingdom. As Riedel wrote, the collapse of a crane in Mecca and the Hajj stampede challenged King Salman’s prestige and legitimacy, which largely depends on the Saudi claim to be the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

Overall, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, which in the past avoided the international spotlight, became much more assertive this year. As Riedel wrote, the country is in some ways both the problem and solution to global jihad. Many major funders of terrorist groups are Saudi; and at the same time, a more concerted and transparent dialogue between Washington and Riyadh is important to the fight against global jihad.

Responding to reports of public concerns that Syrian refugees might pose a terrorism threat, Dan Byman wrote that fears are exaggerated, at least for now. But if European countries fail to integrate refugees into their societies, relations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities could become dangerously tense.

Syrians try to cross the border from the Syrian town of Ras al-Ain to the Turkish border town of Ceylanpinar after an air strike December 3, 2012. Credit: Reuters/Laszlo Balogh.

While attention was diverted: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the future of Tunisia

Although tensions continued to brew among Israelis and Palestinians, this conflict tended to fall off the front pages of American newspapers this year. Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks at the 2015 Saban Forum effectively acknowledged that the United States now places the onus for progress toward peace onto the Israelis and Palestinians.

Authors

Emma Borden

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/12/29-addressing-fault-lines-in-saudi-coalition-barakat?rssid=yemen{2681148E-B5E1-400C-B0D0-6356628039C0}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/130617495/0/brookingsrss/topics/yemen~Could-the-Saudiled-coalition-in-Yemen-be-fracturingCould the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen be fracturing?

Editors’ Note: Outside the Gulf, coalition members have been finding it increasingly difficult to garner public support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, writes Sultan Barakat. This makes the deployment of coordinated and organized troops particularly challenging. This post originally appeared on Al Jazeera.

As the week-long truce in Yemen coincides with the wrapping up of the scheduled peace talks, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition should take a moment to examine emerging fault-lines within its ranks, which have become particularly evident in the most recent offensive on Taiz.

Outside the Gulf, coalition members have been finding it increasingly difficult to garner public support for the war, making the deployment of coordinated and organized troops particularly challenging.

Additionally, serious consideration should be given to the attitudes of some coalition partners, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, towards the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)—represented in Yemen by the al-Islah party.

Symbolic value

Taiz city is highly symbolic. It was the first city in Yemen to rise against Ali Abdullah Saleh during the Arab Spring, with the city's "Freedom Square" becoming an emblem of the revolution.

After the coalition redeemed Aden during the war, the Houthis quickly tightened their grip on Taiz, considering the city a symbol of their continued power in the south. This resulted in what the International Committee of Red Cross called a "catastrophic siege" that symbolized the brutality of the war, with the city's hilltops and outskirts in the hands of the Houthis, its center in the grip of al-Islah-led militias, and its 200,000 civilians facing severe shortages in water, food, electricity, and medical care.

Today, the city serves yet another symbolic role—as a proving ground for the unity of the Saudi-led coalition, testing the pragmatism of the anti-MB crackdown launched by Saudi and the UAE after the Arab Spring.

With its Sunni majority population, the city is known as an al-Islah stronghold. In fact, it was al-Islah member Hamoud Saeed al-Mikhlafi who rose to prominence in the early days of the uprising and led the popular resistance committees that drove Saleh out of Taiz.

Shortcomings on the ground

As it stands, the coalition is vulnerable to division along more than one internal fault-line. Those fault-lines challenge its ability to win the war—along with moral questions—and, more importantly, to cultivate peace.

First, although many countries willingly joined the coalition in its early days, few have been eager to contribute the troops necessary for the operations on the ground. In fact, the majority (outside the Gulf) are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain domestic support for the war.

Nine months after the war began, a growing number of people in countries such as Jordan, Morocco, and even Egypt consider the conflict a distant war that is not theirs to fight. Given its growing tension with Iran, even Saudi may hesitate to invest further in Yemen as events unfold in Syria and Iraq.

Secondly, the few non-Gulf countries contributing soldiers, such as Sudan, and allegedly Mauritania and Senegal, have not worked together before under united command, which makes coordination potentially difficult.

The protection of civilians will prove particularly challenging given some coalition partners' history of disregard for the laws of war. This raises questions about the "price Yemeni civilians might pay in the course of these military operations".

In fact, the coalition has allegedly turned to hiring private security firms to supply personnel, furthering civilian protection concerns as conflicting motives and objectives creep into the mission.

Finally, and most importantly, the coalition is split over its vision for Yemen's political future and, in particular, over the place of al-Islah and individuals such as al-Mikhlafi in any political outcome.

Before embarking on peace negotiations, the coalition should agree on how to deal with al-Islah and its political ambition. Al-Islah's influence in Yemen is obvious. Al-Mikhlafi remained prominent and even after Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed Shawki Hayel Saeed as governor, he continued to act as arbitrator in local disputes and his militias remained relatively powerful.

In his two-year term, Saeed, a former chief financial officer assigned by Hadi in an attempt to make governance in Taiz "apolitical" and "technocratic", tried to resign from his role three times out of frustration with al-Islah's tactics.

Varying interests

Yet today, despite their role in keeping Taiz out of the control of the Houthis, al-Islah has been accused of "betrayal", with the UAE minister of foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, tweeting: "Had it not been for the failure of al-Islah and the [MB] to act, [Taiz would have already been] liberated."

While Saudi Arabia considerably softened its anti-MB stance since the arrival of King Salman—partly in response to its escalating rivalry with Iran and partly owing to its historical support for al-Islah religious-tribal leaders since the 1960s—two important members of the coalition, the UAE and Egypt, have, if anything, renewed their animosity towards the movement.

Today, UAE senior officials appear to see their war not just against "groups supporting a sectarian Iranian scheme" but also against those "adopting the ideology of the [MB]".

Similarly, Egypt's Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's government is fervently anti-MB and is, therefore, often perceived to be coordinating with the UAE.

Conversely, Qatar was traditionally supportive of al-Islah until it recently adopted what some are characterizing as a less active foreign policy in the region. It is therefore inclined to side with Saudi, if the latter adopts more pragmatic policies towards the group.

Other key coalition members, such as Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait, are also likely to approach al-Islah pragmatically. Despite some imprisonments and restrictions imposed on local MB sympathizers, all three countries have learned to tolerate the group domestically.

Still, given the key role assumed by the UAE in Yemen, where they are increasingly perceived as "the ones in charge," the Saudis cannot afford to alienate them.

Riyadh needs to find a way to include al-Islah in its attempts to end the conflict and assuage fears in Abu Dhabi and Cairo concerning the MB's long-term agenda. A "managed" alliance with al-Islah could bring security to the Gulf, both in Yemen and elsewhere, as the rivalry between Iran and Saudi continues to grow.

Authors

Editors’ Note: Outside the Gulf, coalition members have been finding it increasingly difficult to garner public support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, writes Sultan Barakat. This makes the deployment of coordinated and organized troops particularly challenging. This post originally appeared on Al Jazeera.

As the week-long truce in Yemen coincides with the wrapping up of the scheduled peace talks, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition should take a moment to examine emerging fault-lines within its ranks, which have become particularly evident in the most recent offensive on Taiz.

Outside the Gulf, coalition members have been finding it increasingly difficult to garner public support for the war, making the deployment of coordinated and organized troops particularly challenging.

Additionally, serious consideration should be given to the attitudes of some coalition partners, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, towards the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)—represented in Yemen by the al-Islah party.

Symbolic value

Taiz city is highly symbolic. It was the first city in Yemen to rise against Ali Abdullah Saleh during the Arab Spring, with the city's "Freedom Square" becoming an emblem of the revolution.

After the coalition redeemed Aden during the war, the Houthis quickly tightened their grip on Taiz, considering the city a symbol of their continued power in the south. This resulted in what the International Committee of Red Cross called a "catastrophic siege" that symbolized the brutality of the war, with the city's hilltops and outskirts in the hands of the Houthis, its center in the grip of al-Islah-led militias, and its 200,000 civilians facing severe shortages in water, food, electricity, and medical care.

Today, the city serves yet another symbolic role—as a proving ground for the unity of the Saudi-led coalition, testing the pragmatism of the anti-MB crackdown launched by Saudi and the UAE after the Arab Spring.

With its Sunni majority population, the city is known as an al-Islah stronghold. In fact, it was al-Islah member Hamoud Saeed al-Mikhlafi who rose to prominence in the early days of the uprising and led the popular resistance committees that drove Saleh out of Taiz.

Shortcomings on the ground

As it stands, the coalition is vulnerable to division along more than one internal fault-line. Those fault-lines challenge its ability to win the war—along with moral questions—and, more importantly, to cultivate peace.

First, although many countries willingly joined the coalition in its early days, few have been eager to contribute the troops necessary for the operations on the ground. In fact, the majority (outside the Gulf) are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain domestic support for the war.

Nine months after the war began, a growing number of people in countries such as Jordan, Morocco, and even Egypt consider the conflict a distant war that is not theirs to fight. Given its growing tension with Iran, even Saudi may hesitate to invest further in Yemen as events unfold in Syria and Iraq.

Secondly, the few non-Gulf countries contributing soldiers, such as Sudan, and allegedly Mauritania and Senegal, have not worked together before under united command, which makes coordination potentially difficult.

The protection of civilians will prove particularly challenging given some coalition partners' history of disregard for the laws of war. This raises questions about the "price Yemeni civilians might pay in the course of these military operations".

In fact, the coalition has allegedly turned to hiring private security firms to supply personnel, furthering civilian protection concerns as conflicting motives and objectives creep into the mission.

Finally, and most importantly, the coalition is split over its vision for Yemen's political future and, in particular, over the place of al-Islah and individuals such as al-Mikhlafi in any political outcome.

Before embarking on peace negotiations, the coalition should agree on how to deal with al-Islah and its political ambition. Al-Islah's influence in Yemen is obvious. Al-Mikhlafi remained prominent and even after Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed Shawki Hayel Saeed as governor, he continued to act as arbitrator in local disputes and his militias remained relatively powerful.

In his two-year term, Saeed, a former chief financial officer assigned by Hadi in an attempt to make governance in Taiz "apolitical" and "technocratic", tried to resign from his role three times out of frustration with al-Islah's tactics.

Varying interests

Yet today, despite their role in keeping Taiz out of the control of the Houthis, al-Islah has been accused of "betrayal", with the UAE minister of foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, tweeting: "Had it not been for the failure of al-Islah and the [MB] to act, [Taiz would have already been] liberated."

While Saudi Arabia considerably softened its anti-MB stance since the arrival of King Salman—partly in response to its escalating rivalry with Iran and partly owing to its historical support for al-Islah religious-tribal leaders since the 1960s—two important members of the coalition, the UAE and Egypt, have, if anything, renewed their animosity towards the movement.

Today, UAE senior officials appear to see their war not just against "groups supporting a sectarian Iranian scheme" but also against those "adopting the ideology of the [MB]".

Similarly, Egypt's Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's government is fervently anti-MB and is, therefore, often perceived to be coordinating with the UAE.

Conversely, Qatar was traditionally supportive of al-Islah until it recently adopted what some are characterizing as a less active foreign policy in the region. It is therefore inclined to side with Saudi, if the latter adopts more pragmatic policies towards the group.

Other key coalition members, such as Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait, are also likely to approach al-Islah pragmatically. Despite some imprisonments and restrictions imposed on local MB sympathizers, all three countries have learned to tolerate the group domestically.

Still, given the key role assumed by the UAE in Yemen, where they are increasingly perceived as "the ones in charge," the Saudis cannot afford to alienate them.

Riyadh needs to find a way to include al-Islah in its attempts to end the conflict and assuage fears in Abu Dhabi and Cairo concerning the MB's long-term agenda. A "managed" alliance with al-Islah could bring security to the Gulf, both in Yemen and elsewhere, as the rivalry between Iran and Saudi continues to grow.