One of the major problems that beset the traditional conception of democracy, marked by a mere political contention of interests or preferences, is the absence of a due appraisal of political outcomes. Contrarily, the idea of deliberative democracy intends inter alia to provide an epistemic account so far as it goes beyond procedural values in order to find good reasons for a public choice. It claims a public justification by way of a public reasoning among all those concerned. This account reveals, however, shortcomings for being either too idealist if its deliberative procedures mean a public discussion whose aim is consensus or too vague whether one considers those procedures as epistemic standards. I sustain otherwise that appropriate criteria for public justification can be found in a political conception of justice supported by John Rawls political liberalism. This account is to be shown in opposition to common objections - as encouraging democracy and not inimical to democratic deliberation.

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