First, we describe a psychological experiment in which the participants were asked to determine whether sentences of first-orderlogic were true or false in finite graphs. Second, we define two proof systems for reasoning about truth and falsity in first-orderlogic. These proof systems feature explicit models of cognitive resources such as declarative memory, procedural memory, working memory, and sensory memory. Third, we describe a computer program that is used to find the smallest proofs in the (...) aforementioned proof systems when capacity limits are put on the cognitive resources. Finally, we investigate the correlation between a number of mathematical complexity measures defined on graphs and sentences and some psychological complexity measures that were recorded in the experiment. (shrink)

We consider a new fragment of first-orderlogic with two variables. This logic is defined over interval structures. It constitutes unary predicates, a binary predicate and a function symbol. Considering such a fragment of first-orderlogic is motivated by defining a general framework for event-based interval temporal logics. In this paper, we present a sound, complete and terminating decision procedure for this logic. We show that the logic is decidable, and provide a NEXPTIME (...) complexity bound for satisfiability. This result shows that even a simple decidable fragment of first-orderlogic has NEXPTIME complexity. (shrink)

An algebraization of multi-signature first-orderlogic without terms is presented. Rather than following the traditional method of choosing a type of algebras and constructing an appropriate variety, as is done in the case of cylindric and polyadic algebras, a new categorical algebraization method is used: The substitutions of formulas of one signature for relation symbols in another are treated in the object language. This enables the automatic generation via an adjunction of an algebraic theory. The algebras of this (...) theory are then used to algebraize first-orderlogic. (shrink)

Classical logic has proved inadequate in various areas of computer science, artificial intelligence, mathematics, philosopy and linguistics. This is an introduction to extensions of first-orderlogic, based on the principle that many-sorted logic (MSL) provides a unifying framework in which to place, for example, second-order logic, type theory, modal and dynamic logics and MSL itself. The aim is two fold: only one theorem-prover is needed; proofs of the metaproperties of the different existing calculi can be (...) avoided by borrowing them from MSL. To make the book accessible to readers from different disciplines, whilst maintaining precision, the author has supplied detailed step-by-step proofs, avoiding difficult arguments, and continually motivating the material with examples. Consequently this can be used as a reference, for self-teaching or for first-year graduate courses. (shrink)

In this paper we will discuss the first order multiplicative intuitionistic fragment of linear logic, MILL1, and its applications to linguistics. We give an embedding translation from formulas in the Lambek Calculus to formulas in MILL1 and show this translation is sound and complete. We then exploit the extra power of the first order fragment to give an account of a number of linguistic phenomena which have no satisfactory treatment in the Lambek Calculus.

In this paper the language of first-order modal logic is enriched with an operator @ ('actually') such that, in any model, the evaluation of a formula @A at a possible world depends on the evaluation of A at the actual world. The models have world-variable domains. All the logics that are discussed extend the classical predicate calculus, with or without identity, and conform to the philosophical principle known as serious actualism. The basic logic relies on the system (...) K, whereas others correspond to various properties that the actual world may have. All the logics are axiomatized. (shrink)

This is a companion paper to Braüner (2004b, Journal of Logic and Computation 14, 329–353) where a natural deduction system for propositional hybrid logic is given. In the present paper we generalize the system to the first-order case. Our natural deduction system for first-order hybrid logic can be extended with additional inference rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations and the quantifier domains expressed by so-called geometric theories. We prove soundness and completeness and we (...) prove a normalisation theorem. Moreover, we give an axiom system first-order hybrid logic. (shrink)

Well-written undergraduate-level introduction begins with symbolic logic and set theory, followed by presentation of statement calculus and predicate calculus. First-order theories are discussed in some detail, with special emphasis on number theory. After a discussion of truth and models, the completeness theorem is proved. "...an excellent text."—Mathematical Reviews. Exercises. Bibliography.

The paper focuses on extending to the first order case the semantical program for modalities first introduced by Dana Scott and Richard Montague. We focus on the study of neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer in the first part of the paper a series of new completeness results for salient classical systems of first order modal logic. Among other results we show that it is possible to prove strong completeness results for normal systems without the Barcan Formula (...) (like FOL + K)in terms of neighborhood frames with constant domains. The first order models we present permit the study of many epistemic modalities recently proposed in computer science as well as the development of adequate models for monadic operators of high probability. Models of this type are either difficult of impossible to build in terms of relational Kripkean semantics [40].We conclude by introducing general first order neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer a general completeness result for the entire family of classical first order modal systems in terms of them, circumventing some well-known problems of propositional and first order neighborhood semantics (mainly the fact that many classical modal logics are incomplete with respect to an unmodified version of either neighborhood or relational frames). We argue that the semantical program that thus arises offers the first complete semantic unification of the family of classical first order modal logics. (shrink)

Within a weak system \({{{\sf WKVS}}}\) of intuitionistic analysis one may prove, using the Weak Fan Theorem as an additional axiom, a completeness theorem for intuitionistic first-order predicate logic relative to validity in generalized Beth models as well as a completeness theorem for classical first-order predicate logic relative to validity in intuitionistic structures. Conversely, each of these theorems implies over \({{{\sf WKVS}}}\) the Weak Fan Theorem.

In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggregation procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we give a complete axiomatisation (...) for this class, without having the number of individuals or alternatives specified in the language. We are able to express classical axiomatic requirements in our first-order language, giving formal axioms for three classical theorems of preference aggregation by Arrow, by Sen, and by Kirman and Sondermann. We explore to what extent such theorems can be formally derived from our axiomatisations, obtaining positive results for Sen’s Theorem and the Kirman-Sondermann Theorem. For the case of Arrow’s Theorem, which does not apply in the case of infinite societies, we have to resort to fixing the number of individuals with an additional axiom. In the long run, we hope that our approach to formalisation can serve as the basis for a fully automated proof of classical and new theorems in social choice theory. (shrink)

We introduce a Gentzen-style modal predicate logic and prove the cut-elimination theorem for it. This sequent calculus of cut-free proofs is chosen as a proxy to develop the proof-theory of the logics introduced in [14, 15, 4]. We present syntactic proofs for all the metatheoretical results that were proved model-theoretically in loc. cit. and moreover prove that the form of weak reflection proved in these papers is as strong as possible.

We study the class of Sperner spaces, a generalized version of affine spaces, as defined in the language of pointline incidence and line parallelity. We show that, although the class of Sperner spaces is a pseudo-elementary class, it is not elementary nor even ℒ∞ω-axiomatizable. We also axiomatize the first-order theory of this class.

This paper investigates the claim that the second-order consequence relation is intractable because of the incompleteness result for SOL. The opponents’ claim is that SOL cannot be proper logic since it does not have a complete deductive system. I argue that the lack of a completeness theorem, despite being an interesting result, cannot be held against the status of SOL as a proper logic.

In [10] it is claimed that the set of predicate tautologies of all complete BL-chains and the set of all standard tautologies coincide. As noticed in [11], this claim is wrong. In this paper we show that a complete BL-chain B satisfies all standard BL-tautologies iff for any transfinite sequence of elements of B, the condition ∧i ∈ I = 2 holds in B.

This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-orderlogic (CIFOL; Belnap and Müller (2013)). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events (extending all the way into the future) that (...) that moment is part of. This framework allows us to define the familiar Ockhamist temporal/modal connectives, most notably for past, future, and settledness. The novelty of our framework becomes visible in our discussion of substances in branching histories, i.e., in its first-order part. That discussion shows how the basic idea of tracing an individual thing from case to case via an absolute property is applicable in a branching histories framework. We stress the importance of keeping apart extensionality and moment-definiteness, and give a formal account of how the specification of natural sortals and natural qualities turns out to be a coordination task in BH-CIFOL. We also provide a detailed answer to Lewis’s well-known argument against branching histories, exposing the fallacy in that argument. (shrink)

What is the philosophical significance of the soundness and completeness theorems for first-orderlogic? In the first section of this paper I raise this question, which is closely tied to current debate over the nature of logical consequence. Following many contemporary authors' dissatisfaction with the view that these theorems ground deductive validity in model-theoretic validity, I turn to measurement theory as a source for an alternative view. For this purpose I present in the second section several of the (...) key ideas of measurement theory, and in the third and central section of the paper I use these ideas in an account of the relation between model theory, formal deduction, and our logical intuitions. (shrink)

We present a compositional semantics for first-orderlogic with imperfect information that is equivalent to Sevenster and Sandu’s equilibrium semantics (under which the truth value of a sentence in a finite model is equal to the minimax value of its semantic game). Our semantics is a generalization of an earlier semantics developed by the first author that was based on behavioral strategies, rather than mixed strategies.

We provide a simple translation of the satisfiability problem for regular grammar logics with converse into GF2, which is the intersection of the guarded fragment and the 2-variable fragment of first-orderlogic. The translation is theoretically interesting because it translates modal logics with certain frame conditions into first-orderlogic, without explicitly expressing the frame conditions. It is practically relevant because it makes it possible to use a decision procedure for the guarded fragment in order to decide (...) regular grammar logics with converse. The class of regular grammar logics includes numerous logics from various application domains. A consequence of the translation is that the general satisfiability problem for every regular grammar logics with converse is in EXPTIME. This extends a previous result of the first author for grammar logics without converse. Other logics that can be translated into GF2 include nominal tense logics and intuitionistic logic. In our view, the results in this paper show that the natural first-order fragment corresponding to regular grammar logics is simply GF2 without extra machinery such as fixed-point operators. (shrink)

This article studies the mathematical properties of two systems that model Aristotle's original syllogistic and the relationship obtaining between them. These systems are Corcoran's natural deduction syllogistic and ?ukasiewicz's axiomatization of the syllogistic. We show that by translating the former into a first-order theory, which we call T RD, we can establish a precise relationship between the two systems. We prove within the framework of first-orderlogic a number of logical properties about T RD that bear upon (...) the same properties of the natural deduction counterpart ? that is, Corcoran's system. Moreover, the first-orderlogic framework that we work with allows us to understand how complicated the semantics of the syllogistic is in providing us with examples of bizarre, unexpected interpretations of the syllogistic rules. Finally, we provide a first attempt at finding the structure of that semantics, reducing the search to the characterization of the class of models of T RD. (shrink)

What has been the historical relationship between set theory and logic? On the one hand, Zermelo and other mathematicians developed set theory as a Hilbert-style axiomatic system. On the other hand, set theory influenced logic by suggesting to Schröder, Löwenheim and others the use of infinitely long expressions. The questions of which logic was appropriate for set theory - first-orderlogic, second-order logic, or an infinitary logic - culminated in a vigorous exchange between (...) Zermelo and Gödel around 1930. (shrink)

This paper presents a formulation and completeness proof of the resolution-type calculi for the first order fragment of Girard's linear logic by a general method which provides the general scheme of transforming a cutfree Gentzen-type system into a resolution type system, preserving the structure of derivations. This is a direct extension of the method introduced by Maslov for classical predicate logic. Ideas of the author and Zamov are used to avoid skolomization. Completeness of strategies is first established for (...) the Gentzen-type system, and then transferred to resolution. The propositional resolution system was implemented by T. Tammet. (shrink)

We present an adaptation of continuous first order logic to unbounded metric structures. This has the advantage of being closer in spirit to C. Ward Henson's logic for Banach space structures than the unit ball approach (which has been the common approach so far to Banach space structures in continuous logic), as well as of applying in situations where the unit ball approach does not apply (i.e., when the unit ball is not a definable set). We also (...) introduce the process of single point emph{emboundment} (closely related to the topological single point compactification), allowing to bring unbounded structures back into the setting of bounded continuous first order logic. Together with results from cite{BenYaacov:Perturbations} regarding perturbations of bounded metric structures, we prove a Ryll-Nardzewski style characterisation of theories of Banach spaces which are separably categorical up to small perturbation of the norm. This last result is motivated by an unpublished result of Henson. (shrink)

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein advocates two major notational innovations in logic. First, identity is to be expressed by identity of the sign only, not by a sign for identity. Secondly, only one logical operator, called by Wittgenstein, should be employed in the construction of compound formulas. We show that, despite claims to the contrary in the literature, both of these proposals can be realized, severally and jointly, in expressively complete systems of first-orderlogic. Building on early work (...) of Hintikkas, for one of these as Wittgenstein’s envisaged method. With respect to the second Tractarian proposal, we discuss how Wittgenstein distinguished between general and non-general propositions and argue that, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, an expressively adequate N-operator notation is implicit in the Tractatus when taken in its intellectual environment. We finally introduce a variety of sound and complete tableau calculi for first-order logics formulated in a Wittgensteinian notation. The first of these is based on the contemporary notion of logical truth as truth in all structures. The others take into account the Tractarian notion of logical truth as truth in all structures over one fixed universe of objects. Here the appropriate tableau rules depend on whether this universe is infinite or finite in size, and in the latter case on its exact finite cardinality. (shrink)

Van Lambalgen (1990) proposed a translation from a language containing a generalized quantifierQ into a first-order language enriched with a family of predicatesR i, for every arityi (or an infinitary predicateR) which takesQxg(x, y1,..., yn) to x(R(x, y1,..., y1) (x,y1,...,yn)) (y 1,...,yn are precisely the free variables ofQx). The logic ofQ (without ordinary quantifiers) corresponds therefore to the fragment of first-orderlogic which contains only specially restricted quantification. We prove that it is decidable using the method (...) of analytic tableaux. Related results were obtained by Andréka and Németi (1994) using the methods of algebraic logic. (shrink)

There are properties of finite structures that are expressible with the use of Hilbert's ε-operator in a manner that does not depend on the actual interpretation for ε-terms, but not expressible in plain first-order. This observation strengthens a corresponding result of Gurevich, concerning the invariant use of an auxiliary ordering in first-orderlogic over finite structures. The present result also implies that certain non-deterministic choice constructs, which have been considered in database theory, properly enhance the expressive power (...) of first-orderlogic even as far as deterministic queries are concerned, thereby answering a question raised by Abiteboul and Vianu. (shrink)

We identify the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem for FO 2 , the fragment of first-orderlogic consisting of all relational first-order sentences with at most two distinct variables. Although this fragment was shown to be decidable a long time ago, the computational complexity of its decision problem has not been pinpointed so far. In 1975 Mortimer proved that FO 2 has the finite-model property, which means that if an FO 2 -sentence is satisfiable, then it (...) has a finite model. Moreover, Mortimer showed that every satisfiable FO 2 -sentence has a model whose size is at most doubly exponential in the size of the sentence. In this paper, we improve Mortimer's bound by one exponential and show that every satisfiable FO 2 -sentence has a model whose size is at most exponential in the size of the sentence. As a consequence, we establish that the satisfiability problem for FO 2 is NEXPTIME-complete. (shrink)

We study first-orderlogic with two variables FO² and establish a small substructure property. Similar to the small model property for FO² we obtain an exponential size bound on embedded substructures, relative to a fixed surrounding structure that may be infinite. We apply this technique to analyse the satisfiability problem for FO² under constraints that require several binary relations to be interpreted as equivalence relations. With a single equivalence relation, FO² has the finite model property and is complete (...) for non-deterministic exponential time, just as for plain FO² With two equivalence relations, FO² does not have the finite model property, but is shown to be decidable via a construction of regular models that admit finite descriptions even though they may necessarily be infinite. For three or more equivalence relations, FO² is undecidable. (shrink)

The satisfiability problem for the two-variable fragment of first-orderlogic is investigated over finite and infinite linearly ordered, respectively wellordered domains, as well as over finite and infinite domains in which one or several designated binary predicates are interpreted as arbitrary wellfounded relations. It is shown that FO 2 over ordered, respectively wellordered, domains or in the presence of one well-founded relation, is decidable for satisfiability as well as for finite satisfiability. Actually the complexity of these decision problems (...) is essentially the same as for plain unconstrained FO 2 , namely non-deterministic exponential time. In contrast FO 2 becomes undecidable for satisfiability and for finite satisfiability, if a sufficiently large number of predicates are required to be interpreted as orderings, wellorderings, or as arbitrary wellfounded relations. This undecidability result also entails the undecidability of the natural common extension of FO 2 and computation tree logic CTL. (shrink)

The algebraic recursive structure of countable languages of classical first-orderlogic with equality is analysed. all languages of finite undecidable similarity type are shown to be algebraically and recursively equivalent in the following sense: their boolean algebras of formulas are, after trivial factors involving the one element models of the languages have been excepted, recursively isomorphic by a map which preserves the degree of recursiveness of their models.

We present Property Theory with Curry Typing (PTCT), an intensional first-orderlogic for natural language semantics. PTCT permits fine-grained specifications of meaning. It also supports polymorphic types and separation types. We develop an intensional number theory within PTCT in order to represent proportional generalized quantifiers like âmost.â We use the type system and our treatment of generalized quantifiers in natural language to construct a type-theoretic approach to pronominal anaphora that avoids some of the difficulties that undermine previous type-theoretic (...) analyses of this phenomenon. (shrink)

Continuous first-orderlogic has found interest among model theorists who wish to extend the classical analysis of "algebraic" structures (such as fields, group, and graphs) to various natural classes of complete metric structures (such as probability algebras, Hilbert spaces, and Banach spaces). With research in continuous first-orderlogic preoccupied with studying the model theory of this framework, we find a natural question calls for attention. Is there an interesting set of axioms yielding a completeness result? The (...) primary purpose of this article is to show that a certain, interesting set of axioms does indeed yield a completeness result for continuous first-orderlogic. In particular, we show that in continuous first-orderlogic a set of formulae is (completely) satisfiable if (and only if) it is consistent. From this result it follows that continuous first-orderlogic also satisfies an approximated form of strong completeness, whereby $\Sigma \vDash \varphi $ (if and) only if $\Sigma \vdash \varphi \overset \cdot \to{-}2^{-n}$ for all n < ω. This approximated form of strong completeness asserts that if $\Sigma \vDash \varphi $ , then proofs from Σ, being finite, can provide arbitrarily better approximations of the truth of φ. Additionally, we consider a different kind of question traditionally arising in model theory—that of decidability. When is the set of all consequences of a theory (in a countable, recursive language) recursive? Say that a complete theory T is decidable if for every sentence φ, the value φ T is a recursive real, and moreover, uniformly computable from φ. If T is incomplete, we say it is decidable if for every sentence φ the real number $\varphi _{T}^{\circ}$ is uniformly recursive from φ, where $\varphi _{T}^{\circ}$ is the maximal value of φ consistent with T. As in classical first-orderlogic, it follows from the completeness theorem of continuous first-orderlogic that if a complete theory admits a recursive (or even recursively enumerable) axiomatization then it is decidable. (shrink)

The typical rules for truth-trees for first-orderlogic without functions can fail to generate finite branches for formulas that have finite models–the rule set fails to have the finite tree property. In 1984 Boolos showed that a new rule set proposed by Burgess does have this property. In this paper we address a similar problem with the typical rule set for first-orderlogic with identity and functions, proposing a new rule set that does have the finite (...) tree property. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give a new proof for the decidability and finite model property of first-orderlogic with two variables (without function symbols), using a combinatorial theorem due to Herwig. The results are proved in the framework of polyadic equality set algebras of dimension two (Pse 2 ). The new proof also shows the known results that the universal theory of Pse 2 is decidable and that every finite Pse 2 can be represented on (...) a finite base. Since the class Cs 2 of cylindric set algebras of dimension 2 forms a reduct of Pse 2 , these results extend to Cs 2 as well. (shrink)

We prove an Omitting Types Theorem for certain algebraizable extensions of first order logic without equality studied in [SAI 00] and [SAY 04]. This is done by proving a representation theorem preserving given countable sets of infinite meets for certain reducts of ?- dimensional polyadic algebras, the so-called G polyadic algebras (Theorem 5). Here G is a special subsemigroup of (?, ? o) that specifies the signature of the algebras in question. We state and prove an independence result connecting (...) our representation theorem to Martin's axiom (Theorem 6). Also we show that the countable atomic G polyadic algebras are completely representable (Corollary 16) contrasting results on cylindric algebras. Several related results are surveyed. (shrink)

Applying first-orderlogic to derive the consequences of laws that are only approximately true of empirical phenomena involves idealization of a kind that is akin to applying arithmetic to calculate the area of a rectangular surface from approximate measures of the lengths of its sides. Errors in the data, in the exactness of the lengths in one case and in the exactness of the laws in the other, are in some measure transmitted to the consequences deduced from them, (...) and the aim of a theory of idealization is to describe this process. The present paper makes a start on this in the case of applied first-orderlogic, and relates it to Plato's picture of a world or model of 'appearances' in which laws are only approximately true, but which to some extent resembles an ideal world or model in which they are exactly true. (shrink)

Continuous first-orderlogic has found interest among model theorists who wish to extend the classical analysis of “algebraic” structures (such as fields, group, and graphs) to various natural classes of complete metric structures (such as probability algebras, Hilbert spaces, and Banach spaces). With research in continuous first-orderlogic preoccupied with studying the model theory of this framework, we find a natural question calls for attention. Is there an interesting set of axioms yielding a completeness result? The (...) primary purpose of this article is to show that a certain, interesting set of axioms does indeed yield a completeness result for continuous first-orderlogic. In particular, we show that in continuous first-orderlogic a set of formulae is (completely) satisfiable if (and only if) it is consistent. From this result it follows that continuous first-orderlogic also satisfies an approximated form of strong completeness, whereby Σ⊨φ (if and) only if Σ⊢φ∸ 2-n for all n < ω. This approximated form of strong completeness asserts that if Σ⊨φ, then proofs from Σ, being finite, can provide arbitrarily better approximations of the truth of φ. Additionally, we consider a different kind of question traditionally arising in model theory—that of decidability. When is the set of all consequences of a theory (in a countable, recursive language) recursive? Say that a complete theory T is decidable if for every sentence φ, the value φT is a recursive real, and moreover, uniformly computable from φ. If T is incomplete, we say it is decidable if for every sentence φ the real number φT∘ is uniformly recursive from φ, where φT∘ is the maximal value of φ consistent with T. As in classical first-orderlogic, it follows from the completeness theorem of continuous first-orderlogic that if a complete theory admits a recursive (or even recursively enumerable) axiomatization then it is decidable. (shrink)

‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged that standard (...)first-orderlogic cannot adequately deal with some such existentials. The article defends the view that it can. (shrink)

This is Part I of a two-part essay introducing case-intensional first-orderlogic (CIFOL), an easy-to-use, uniform, powerful, and useful combination of first order logic with modal logic resulting from philosophical and technical modifications of Bressan’s General interpreted modal calculus (Yale University Press 1972). CIFOL starts with a set of cases; each expression has an extension in each case and an intension, which is the function from the cases to the respective case-relative extensions. Predication is intensional; identity (...) is extensional. Definite descriptions are context-independent terms, and lambda-predicates and -operators can be introduced without constraints. These logical resources allow one to define, within CIFOL, important properties of properties, viz., extensionality (whether the property applies, depends only on an extension in one case) and absoluteness, Bressan’s chief innovation that allows tracing an individual across cases without recourse to any notion of “rigid designation” or “trans-world identity.” Thereby CIFOL abstains from incorporating any metaphysical principles into the quantificational machinery, unlike extant frameworks of quantified modal logic. We claim that this neutrality makes CIFOL a useful tool for discussing both metaphysical and scientific arguments involving modality and quantification, and we illustrate by discussing in diagrammatic detail a number of such arguments involving the extensional identification of individuals via absolute (substance) properties, essential properties, de re vs. de dicto, and the results of possible tests. (shrink)

We show that the loosely guarded and packed fragments of first-orderlogic have the finite model property. We use a construction of Herwig and Hrushovski. We point out some consequences in temporal predicate logic and algebraic logic.

This paper deals with the translation of first order formulas to predicate S5 formulas. This translation does not bring the first order formula itself to a modal system, but modal interpretation of the first order formula can be given by the translation. Every formula can be translated, and the additional condition such as formula's having only one variable, or having both world domain and individual domain is not required. I introduce an indexical predicate 'E' for the translation. The meaning that (...) 'E(a)' is true is 'this world is 'a' '. Because of this meaning, I call 'E' an indexical predicate. 'E' plays an important role for the translation. In addition that the modal formulas can be translated into first order formulas, we can conclude that the first order logic and modal predicate logic isintertranslatable. (shrink)

Priest (2009) formulates a propositional logic which, by employing the worldsemantics for intuitionist logic, has the same positive part but dualises the negation, to produce a paraconsistent logic which it calls 'Da Costa Logic'. This paper extends matters to the first-order case. The paper establishes various connections between first order da Costa logic, da Costa's own Cω, and classical logic. Tableau and natural deductions systems are provided and proved sound and complete.

As McKinsey and Tarski showed, the Stone representation theorem for Boolean algebras extends to algebras with operators to give topological semantics for (classical) propositional modal logic, in which the operation is modeled by taking the interior of an arbitrary subset of a topological space. In this article, the topological interpretation is extended in a natural way to arbitrary theories of full first-orderlogic. The resulting system of S4 first-order modal logic is complete with respect to (...) such topological semantics. (shrink)