See Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 38 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.
1999). These elements of a defamation claim in New York are similar to the
elements discussed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following exceptions:

Public and Private Figures

New York courts rely heavily on the "vortex" notion of a
limited-purpose public figure. See James v. Gannett Co., Inc., 40
N.Y.2d 415 (N.Y. 1976) ("The essential element underlying the category
of public figures is that the publicized person has taken an
affirmative step to attract public attention."). The definition of a
limited-purpose public figure is covered in the general Actual Malice and Negligence
section of this guide under the limited-purpose public figures
discussion (scroll down to the topic heading "limited-purpose public
figures"). The guide states a person becomes a limited-purpose public
figure only if he voluntarily "draw[s] attention to himself" or uses
his position in the controversy "as a fulcrum to create public
discussion." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,
443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979). He must, therefore, "thrust himself into the
vortex of [the] public issue [and] engage the public's attention in an
attempt to influence its outcome." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974). In New York, such figures have included
candidates for public office, restaurants (for the purpose of food
reviews), and religious groups.

Actual Malice and Negligence

When the plaintiff in a defamation lawsuit is a private figure and
the allegedly defamatory statements relate to a matter of legitimate
public concern, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted "in a
grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the
standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily
followed by responsible parties." Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch,
38 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199 (N.Y. 1975). This standard, which is a higher bar
than negligence but lower than actual malice,
focuses on an objective evaluation of the defendant's actions rather
than looking at the defendant's state of mind at the time of
publication.

At least one court has found that the same standard of fault
applies to citizen or non-media defendants where the allegedly
defamatory statements relate to a matter of legitimate public concern.
See Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 107 A.D.2d 10 (N.Y.A.D. 2d
Dep't 1985), aff'd 67 N.Y.2d 778 (N.Y. 1986) (no liability for letter
to the editor unless writer was "grossly irresponsible").

In cases brought by private figure plaintiffs involving
statements not related to a matter of legitimate public concern, New
York courts apply a negligence standard.

To determine whether statements relate to a matter of legitimate
public concern, New York courts view the allegedly defamatory
statements in context of the writing as a whole. They ask whether the
matter can be "fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern of the community" and distinguish
this broad category of newsworthy matters from "mere gossip and
prurient interest." Overall, the test is deferential to the reporter's
judgment about whether a matter is of legitimate public concern. See
Huggins v. Moore, 94 N.Y.2d 296, 302-03 (N.Y. 1999).

Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. The fair report privilege is the exception to this rule; it cannot be defeated by a showing of actual malice.

Fair Report Privilege

New York has codified the fair report privilege into law. N.Y. Civ. Rights § 74.
Under the statute, speakers cannot be held liable for giving a "fair
and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or
other official proceeding." A report is "fair and true" if it is
substantially accurate.

Wire Service Defense

New York recognizes a privilege that is similar to the wire service defense
but explicitly extends protection to content originating from other
sources in addition to wire services. Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23
F.Supp.2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Under the privilege, courts will not
hold republishers liable for reproducing defamatory content unless the
republisher had or should have had "substantial reasons" to question
the content's accuracy or the original speaker's good faith and
reporting practices. See Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531
(N.Y. 1980). Because courts applying these principles have dealt
exclusively with traditional media entities such as newspapers and book
publishers -- both as publishers and republishers -- it is not clear
whether this privilege would apply to online speakers such as bloggers
and citizen media websites.

Neutral Reportage Privilege

The status of the neutral reportage privilege
in New York is not settled. The New York Court of Appeals has neither
recognized nor rejected the privilege, and the lower courts disagree on
whether it is part of New York law.

Statute of Limitations for Defamation

New York has adopted the single publication rule. See Gregoire
v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119 (1948). For a definition of the
"single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.

The single publication rule applies to the Internet in New York,
with the statute of limitations running from the time the defamatory
content first appears online. "Republication" of the allegedly
defamatory content will restart the statute of limitations. A
"republication" occurs upon "a separate aggregate publication from the
original, on a different occasion, which is not merely 'a delayed
circulation of the original edition.'" Firth v. State,
775 N.E.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. 2002). The New York Court of appeals has
indicated that altering the allegedly defamatory content may trigger
republication, and a lower court has held that moving web content to a
different web address triggered republication. See Firth v. State, 306
A.D.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).

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