Unformatted Document Text:
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
Draft
Leimenrode 29, 60322 Frankfurt, Germany,
## email not listed ##
In all societies violence is differentiated according to varying grades of
legitimacy – dependent on the aims to which it is employed, to the persons
employing violence, to they type and severity of its use and so forth. There exists
no society, in which violence is not an accepted means of social control,
however, each society circumscribes its use with respect to space, time, agents
and forms.
3
Out of this process results the category of legitimate violence, which,
however, need not be connected to the state. Max Weber argues, that the state is
based on a non­reducible end in itself:
“Upholding (or reorganization) of the domestic and external distribution of violence and power. […] The appeal to the naked violence of the means of coercion towards the outside, but also towards the inside is absolutely essential to any political association. … the ‘state’ is that association, which claims the monopoly of legitimate violence – it can’t be defined otherwise” (Weber 1973, 453; emphasis in original)
4
Webers argument does not mean that the state actually holds a monopoly, but,
that he claims the monopoly. Actually the idea of the state implies, that there can
be no other agent, who legitimizes the use of force/violence. Agents of legitimate
violence may be private ones, however, their legitimacy derives from the state.
We argue, that in many countries of the world this very idea of the superior
rule­making state is not accepted unequivocally, but has to compete with
different understandings, which accord a significant lower place to the state.
They do not necessarily believe in the fiction that their legitimacy for rule­setting
and rule­enforcement might be dependent on the state.
Likewise the state might claim the monopoly of legitimate violence, however,
in many states, the claim differs sharply from observable practice insofar as
violent social control is very often practiced by non­state actors. Beyond this gulf
between theoretical claim to supremacy and empirical reality there is another one
between the claim and competing counter­claims, which deny the validity of the
3
There need not be unanimity on the legitimacy of various forms, agents or uses of social control
violence. Most often there is a broad agreement on the largest part, however, there is definitely always disagreement on specific aspects. The degree and specifics of agreement and dissent with respect to the legitimate uses of violence for purposes of social control is an important empirical one, as it pertains to the normative homogeneity vs. fragmentation of a given society and the relative structuration of the state­society divide.
4
My translation. The original goes: „... der Erhaltung (oder Umgestaltung) der inneren und äußeren
Gewaltverteilung. [...] Der Appell an die nackte Gewaltsamkeit der Zwangsmittel nach außen nicht nur, sondern auch nach innen ist jedem politischen Verband schlechthin wesentlich. [...] der ‚Staat’ ist derjenige Verband, der das Monopol legitimer Gewaltsamkeit in Anspruch nimmt – anders ist er nicht zu definieren.“ (Max Weber (1973).Richtungen und Stufen religiöser Weltablehnung. In: ders.. Soziologie, Universalgeschichtliche Analysen, Politik, Stuttgart (Kröner), 441­483, citation: 453.
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Authors: Kreuzer, Peter.

Page 7 of 39

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Draft

Leimenrode 29, 60322 Frankfurt, Germany,

## email not listed ##

In all societies violence is differentiated according to varying grades of

legitimacy – dependent on the aims to which it is employed, to the persons

employing violence, to they type and severity of its use and so forth. There exists

no society, in which violence is not an accepted means of social control,

however, each society circumscribes its use with respect to space, time, agents

Out of this process results the category of legitimate violence, which,

however, need not be connected to the state. Max Weber argues, that the state is

based on a non­reducible end in itself:

“Upholding (or reorganization) of the domestic and external distribution of violence and power. […] The appeal to the naked violence of the means of coercion towards the outside, but also towards the inside is absolutely essential to any political association. … the ‘state’ is that association, which claims the monopoly of legitimate violence – it can’t be defined otherwise” (Weber 1973, 453; emphasis in original)

Webers argument does not mean that the state actually holds a monopoly, but,

that he claims the monopoly. Actually the idea of the state implies, that there can

be no other agent, who legitimizes the use of force/violence. Agents of legitimate

violence may be private ones, however, their legitimacy derives from the state.

We argue, that in many countries of the world this very idea of the superior

rule­making state is not accepted unequivocally, but has to compete with

different understandings, which accord a significant lower place to the state.

They do not necessarily believe in the fiction that their legitimacy for rule­setting

and rule­enforcement might be dependent on the state.

Likewise the state might claim the monopoly of legitimate violence, however,

in many states, the claim differs sharply from observable practice insofar as

violent social control is very often practiced by non­state actors. Beyond this gulf

between theoretical claim to supremacy and empirical reality there is another one

between the claim and competing counter­claims, which deny the validity of the

3

There need not be unanimity on the legitimacy of various forms, agents or uses of social control

violence. Most often there is a broad agreement on the largest part, however, there is definitely always disagreement on specific aspects. The degree and specifics of agreement and dissent with respect to the legitimate uses of violence for purposes of social control is an important empirical one, as it pertains to the normative homogeneity vs. fragmentation of a given society and the relative structuration of the state­society divide.