Panorama
was excellent in exposing the consequences of rail fragmentation. I wished they
had challenged Railtrack's Chairman on his throwaway line: "BR
culture", I have yet to meet anyone who knows what he is talking
about.Having worked for the private
sector LMS Rly & BR, there is no difference in the devotion to duty of
those in the industry who turn out in the worst weathers to resolve problems.
If he & Ministers believe that Railtrack will deliver a 100% railway, they
are in for a rude awakening - 100% reliable equipment has yet to be seen on
this planet. There is an endearing quality in Ministerial presumption that
"success of past Privatisations ensures the success of Rail
Privatisation". If past success ensured success in perpetuity, the UK
would still lead the world in a host of industrial activity, would dominate
Sports originated here. Clearly no effective business assessment has been made.
Worse, the presumption about the success of past Privatisations is illusory. My
experience include failures to keep appointments, a 9.4% pa increase for gas
equipmentmaintenance, a 4.9% pa increase
in an Electricity equipment maintenance, both against an RPI increase of 2% pa.
Despite assurances that phone boxes would not disappear, locally, two have been
inconveniently "relocated" - not to eliminate losses, but "to
increase profits".Phonecard phones
are no more reliable and BT will not replace exposed Jurassic age wiring which
has proved vulnerable to criminals seeking to prevent 999 calls.My book Blueprints for Bankruptcy shows that
BR's problems stem almost 100% from Governmental interference & their inept
policies, forecast higher fares and an end to integrated rail activity, but not
that Railtrack would run a freight train in the middle of the commuter peak!

16.10.95
Guardian (not published)

Had BR
dreamed up the concept of fragmenting itself into 80 separate companies,
Ministers would have been unable to contain criticism in the light of the
Timetable cock-up, safety warnings, staggering fare increases & axing trees
to combat 'leaves on the line'. As it arises directly from nightmarish Privatisation
plans of Ministers & their expensive consultants, there is a deathly hush.
It is the thin end of a wedge, yet to be revealed. The ridiculous, patronising
assurances of Ministers that this Privatisation will succeed because (they
claim) others were successful serves to expose the shallowness of their
expertise. If past experience was a guide, UK industry would continue to
dominate the world. Consumers will hotly dispute claims in the light of charges
for what was hitherto free (directory inquiries), prices eclipsing the RPI
& breakdown of equipment. Pious hopes & unquantified generalisations
have been used instead of costed business assessments.

18.10.95BBC – Radio 4 Letters (Not broadcast)

Why is
Railtrack trying to reinvent the wheel? Over 20 years ago, BR introduced the
concept of Mishap Controller to take complete charge of all on site activities
in an accident - Operations, Engineering, Resumption of Service, Cause. A
senior Operating Manager was always appointed to the task. The Civil Emergency
Services - Fire, Ambulance, Police - were informed & knew with whom to
liaise. BR used Contractors on Modernisation over 30 years ago, on a much
greater scale than anything facing Railtrack today. None was allowed to sign
back any track into service. Experienced & qualified Inspectors did that
after personally verifying all was
safe for traffic to resume. No crane was allowed to operate without the
protection of hand-signalmen & then only under control of an
Inspector.It cost money, but it was safe.

17.10.95
fax The Times (not published)

A Minister
recently stated BR passengers were at their lowest level for 50 years.
Ministers will sharply round on anyone who does not compare like with like, who
quotes increased Govt expenditure, without adjusting for inflation. Why, then,
do they compare chalk with cheese so far as BR is concerned? Is it another
clumsy attempt to justify the unjustifiable - viz fragmented rail
privatisation? Using basic logic, one discovers that in 1994/5, passenger miles
per route mile of track is 61% greater than in 1948. Expressed another way,
although passenger miles fell 15%, route miles were 47% less! Quite clearly, if
a bus, ferry or airline abandoned 47% of its routes, one would not be too
surprised to find a fall in actual business. There is no doubt that Ministers
would use a similar approach in any statistical analysis which presented their
policies in a favourable light.

20.12.95
Guardian (not published)

Bus
companies entering railway business will find conditions tougher than they
imagine. A typical bus company's Terms & Conditions reserve "the right
to alter, cancel or withdraw services without notice, & not liable for
loss, as a result of delay to services. Running times are approximate & the
company does not undertake that services will start or arrive at the time
specified in the timetable". They seem to be unaware that trains are
delayed & cancelled by external influences, such as buses & lorries
smashing into bridges & crossing barriers, bomb hoaxers, vandals, fires or
emission of poisonous fumes from lineside industrial premises, passengers
boarding moving trains or looking for mislaid personal property nor of a
multiplicity of other problems. Besides having to refund passengers whose
services are delayed, they will also be penalised by the Regulator for delays.
Their only hope is that they will be allowed to plead "human error",
or "circumstances beyond our control" - excuses only acceptable from
the private sector. Under BR all delays were attributed to incompetence.

12.3.96
BBC - R4 letters (Not broadcast)

I cannot
imagine upon what John Gummer based his comment that there are now more people
on railways who want to get freight onto rail. Public Record Office files show
that railway management wanted to keep freight on rail, but Government
deliberately pursued a policy from 1920 to 1962 which, not only caused freight
to transfer from rail to road. (see Square Deal Denied & Britain’s Railways
– the Reality) bankrupting BR in the process

29.3.96
Guardian (not published)

A Labour
Govt does not need to use limited resources to re-nationalise railways. It
needs only to adapt & modify part of the 1947 Act. That Act nationalised
railways without spending a penny. Instead it issued Transport Stock, for which
redemption payments & interest were to be provided from revenue.
Unfortunately, the Act ensured that railways were not put in a position to do
so. Firstly, they were prevented from replacing war-worn assets for up to 10
years, & were then denied materials at allocated levels - hence the quality
of services suffered. This was in sharp contrast to hauliers who were allowed
to purchase new vehicles in excess of Govt allocated levels. Secondly, rail
charges, which uniquely were frozen for six years of war, were put at the mercy
of a Court of Law for the next 20 years. Fares trailed the RPI for 42
consecutive years from 1940. Thirdly, the Act imposed an objective, which
Butterworth's Legislative Service could not define: "To pay their way
taking one year with another". The Court of Law, & objectors who were
making uninhibited increases in their charges, thought that this meant in the
next century! Fourthly, whilst BR's legal submission to replace their legally
imposed 19th Century freight charges was dragging its interminable way through
the Court, competitors had been allowed total selective freedom, enabling them
to pick & choose & leave empty crates & the like to go by rail.
19th Century anti-rail pro-road legislation was not finally repealed until
1980. Fifthly, they burdened BR with 550,000 19th century wagons owned by non
railway companies, which should have been replaced 28 years earlier. As usual, UK companies
had taken the short term view, which explains why we became a net importer.

3.5.96 BBC
R4 pm letters (Not broadcast)

Yesterday
evening, a listener’s letter was broadcast which alleged that railways had been
run by rail unions. This was totally wrong. If unions had run the railways,
there would have been no closures & no replacement of manpower with
technology. BR's critics should emerge from their glass houses & consider
researched facts. BR's problems are externally driven. The Financial Times said
in 1956: “No one can run an industry subject to such interference”. The Railway
Gazette: “If Govt had not interfered, much trouble would have been avoided”.
The Guardian: “Railways were pushed into deficit for political convenience. No
activity - wages, rationalisation., fares was free from political interference
by both parties”. Rail franchisees from bus, sea & air industries will find
they cannot absolve themselves from payments for delay as they do now. They are
warned that politicians may find it hard to break habits which predate
nationalisation. If some Private Sector businesses were run by unions, they
couldn't do worse. Broken promises, no refunds, but plenty of sincere apologies
are the cornerstone of the private sector.

24.5.96 BBC
Chairman

It is my
opinion that the listening public are being given an unbalanced view of BR by
BBC Radio. On several occasions, I have phoned the Letters-line to record a
letter based on researched facts which contradict views of BBC presenters,
politicians, & listeners. The BBC does not find time to broadcast my
letters which would have contradicted unsubstantiated popular beliefs. The
latest was a response to a listener who alleged that BR was run by the unions.
Nothing is further removed from the facts. My letter of 3 May explained why.
But was not broadcast. I wrote to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission, who
advised me to write to you. I said that I had written to the BBC on previous
occasions, without achieving any change in policy. However, I do so again. (The
result was the same – no broadcast)

24.2.97
Alan Whitehouse, BBC Nth,

When reporting
on takeover of West Coast rail services, you said: "Until now, everyone
expected railways must run at a loss". BR managers had long believed BR
could be run profitably, but was prevented from doing so by Govt policies,
inequitable legislation & unending interference. It is significant that, as
privatised era is allowed to progress towards commercial freedom, they have
been given subsidies which are no less than those paid to BR. It is of
greater significance Govt is considering additional payments for attracting
commuters from road - something they expected BR to do without support whilst
interfering to hold down commuters fares - many of whom work for Govt. It is of
even greater significance that Chairman of freight company which has taken over
BR freight services addressing Inst Transport "criticised the lack of a
level playing field" - an issue covered, among many revelations from
hitherto undisclosed Public & Govt files, in my book “Blueprints for
Bankruptcy”.

12.5.98 BBC

You
reported that train performance is worse than under BR.It is worse than statistics suggest. Train Operating companies now
exclude delays & cancellations which they can attribute to Railtrack &
other Operating companies. I predicted that they would do so in my book Blueprints for Bankruptcy, published on
the eve of privatisation. It is, after all, analogous with bus practice. When I
was with BR, we did not exclude external delays, lest we be accused of creative
statistics. Evidence of exclusions may be seen on station notice boards.

9.12.98
Christopher Wayne, News Centre

Having
heard reports by you on railways in the present environment, may I draw your
attention to my book Blueprints for
Bankruptcy, which shows very clearly the different & totally
restrictive ground rules under which BR worked. May I point out that in making
comparisons of performance, current statistics cannot be compared with those
produced by BR.
The new boys exclude "circumstances beyond our control" on a fairly
liberal basis as their own posters on stations reveal. Under BR there were no
such exclusions, & yet precisely the same causes of delays &
cancellations occurred. They claim that the increased number of complaints is
attributable to "invited feedback", & that BR "never replied to complaints".
"Invited feedback" was invented by Transport Users Consultative
Committees in 1951, & made effective by their fixed notices on stations
& brochures which BR staff were obliged to hand out. I have foundthat the new boys reply to letters of unambiguous complaint by thanking the
writer for their "observations" & "comments".I claim to have carried out more basic
research into BR complaints than anyone else has done, as my book reveals, &
from that can say that there is no evidence that BR "never replied to
complaints".Indeed, had there been
any such failure, the Users Committees (statutory watchdogs) wd have focused on
them in their Annual Reports, & MP's wd have been active also.There is no record in Annual Reports of such
an allegation.

26.2.99
Simon Montague, Transport Correspondent, BBC Radio

On BBC
Radio 4's Today programme, you said that "the improved complaints
procedure has resulted in more complaints". You have been misinformed. The
new boys would like the public to accept that excuse rather than admit that
running real railways is more difficult than model railways.One line they have been pushing is that they
have taken steps which create more "feedback". This is a euphemism
for complaints- a word which they shun
in replying to unambiguous complaints, preferring to translate complaints to
"comments", "views" or "observations". They claim
that they get more "feedback" (alias complaints) because they have
notices on trains drawing attention to addresses for complaints, when in fact,
those notices invite "comments".
The TUCC's, established under the 1947 Transport Act invented feedback. They
had notices placed on every station & brochure dispensers, both of which
set out the procedure & addresses for complaints. A notice on a train is valueless
to passengers left on stations when a train was cancelled. They claim that
complaints are about 1% of journeys. In my book Blueprints for Bankruptcy, I show that complaints made to BR were
0.01%. They will not reply fully. Recently, I had to repeat a letter three
times before getting a partial & very selective reply - my letters were
sent recorded delivery. They did not deny receipt of earlier copies. They claim
to be carrying more passengers but will not supply data so that one can ensure
that they are not multiple counting, by, for instance, counting one passenger
from the Isle of Wight to Aberdeen as four or five journeys (which was one
under BR) , depending on the number of companies with which the passenger
travels. They will not supply data on fares to enable one to see the basis for
their claim that fares are lower. Their method of calculating performance
allows them to leave out trains delayed or cancelled due to "circumstances
beyond our control" - which was not allowed under BR. Trains miss out
scheduled stops to recover lost time. In 40 years with the LMS & BR, I
never heard of such a practice.

29.6.01 Fax
Financial Times.(not published)

Ref report
that “rail companies employ people to argue between themselves”, I prophesied
this in "Blueprints for Bankruptcy",
the first edition of which was published before privatisation & said it
would "ensure a rewarding future for
railway accountants & lawyers". It prophesied fragmentation would
cause the very problems now being experienced, so discounting claims of
ex-ministers that problems can "only
be seen with the benefit of hindsight". Arguments as to causes of
delays under BR were rare, since delays did not precipitate cash transfers, as
now applies.The original objective of
privatisation was to end the "subsidy" paid for unremunerative
services.It is now apparent, that new
boys want to have their cake & eat it - having subsidy but getting rid of
unavoidably uneconomic. Worse, they were paid subsidies for services which
under BR were profitable. Ministers claimed that, whilst subsidy paid in first
yr or two would be higher than to BR, over 7-15 year franchise, average would
be less. This naive forecast overlooked several factors:decline in value of money (£1 paid now is
worth more than in 15 yrs time); a coy may go bankrupt;it may be unable to fulfil its contract
without being bailed out; or may find ingenious (or ingenuous) reasons for
being given more cash. It is now claimed there was no investment for 40 yrs.
BR's audited accounts prove otherwise. GNER, whose route & trains were
modernised only a short time before privatisation, is but one example.
Railtrack seems to including maintenance expenditure as investment, which
invalidates comparisons with BR investment, which accounted for maintenance
separately. Moreover, for a fair comparison, it is necessary to deduct profit
margins of contractors carrying out work previously done in-house. Claims RS
was decrepit & hence causing all problems only serve to ask why the buyer
did not "beware" & warn before
take-over that delays wd occur instead of boasting that punctuality wd improve
- some said "by getting drivers to drive faster". A claim that
carrying more passengers warrants a higher rather a lower subsidy is straight
from "Alice
in Wonderland".Last Oct, Railtrack
claimed "1998 was first year since
1902 when there was not a single passenger fatality".Annual Report of BRB for 1977 states: "For second year running ..... not a single passenger was killed in train
accident".That was never challenged
nor repudiated. There may have been other yrs in nationalised era with no
passenger fatalities, but I have not yet been able to check Reports for other
yrs. Railtrack boasted of having implemented the most comprehensive check of
track - BR engineers did that on a continual basis, & had to acct to BRB
regularly thereon. (Received card: The editor thanks you for your recent
letter, & is sorry that on this occasion it has not been possible to find
space for publication)

27.7.01 BBC
Radio 4 Today

Transport
Correspondent Roger Harrabin said this morning that “the SRA had recalculated
punctuality figures for current rail operating companies on the same basis as used by BR". I wonder if you could
clarify for me the methodology used. I would also be grateful for a sight of
the figures - indicating the periods concerned - which shows that performance
was 3% higher than BR before Hatfield, but is now 3% lower than BR figures. (Mr
Harrabin phoned to say that they had made a comparison based on the Passengers Charter).

21.8.01 to
Mr. Harrabin, BBC

Thank you
for phoning in response to my letter of 27th July to tell me comparison of
punctuality with BR's standards was based on the Passenger's Charter. It is an
invalid comparison, as they have no means of adjusting for changes of practice
which facilitates a higher level of punctuality.

·Firstly,
Railtrack severely cut back on track renewals, leaving spare time in the
schedules, enabling Operators to recover from delays. Railway World, (April
1996, page 22): "Track renewal in
the current Railtrack ten year plan is reduced to 0.8% of the network each
year, suggesting that the rails have a life of 125 yrs - clearly a nonsense. In
the BR period, the comparable figure was 2.1%, the European figure was 2.7%".

·Secondly,
TOCs ceased to hold trains for connections or make special stops in lieu of
cancelled trains. BR did not hold all trains to make connections, contrary to
the belief expressed by a Minister, but many trains were held after booked
departure time for 5, or in some cases 10, minutes - if an incoming train would
arrive within that time. Except for some last trains of the day, none are held
for connection by a different company today - exactly as I forecast as one of
many consequences of fragmentation in a book first published in 1993. This book
also demolishes the pathetic plea by another politician that the consequences
of fragmentation can "only be seen with the benefit of
hindsight".Incidentally, libraries
of both Houses have copies of this book, & its second edition.

·Thirdly,
some late running trains miss out scheduled stops in order to recover time. In
40 yrs with pre-1948 & post-1948 rlys, I never encountered such a practice.
As a manager with wide responsibilities for operations, I wd have taken
disciplinary action against anyone who adopted or condoned this malpractice.

He replied
on 7th September: "Thank you for your letter about my item on the 'Today'
programme on trains. I accept that all comparisons are odious - but people ask
the questions, so we did what we could!"

28.8.03
Independent (not published)

Re your
report regarding stations. I have been trawling public records to find fact
& figure to compare public & private sectors railways. The reality is
that BR had been continually modernising, assets were not decrepit, business
was expanding - until the recession - & fares had trailed inflation since
1948. With rare skill & timing, Govt privatised railways just as the
recession was ending. The reality is that BR was safer, more reliable, replaced
track more frequently & had a better complaints record than their private
sector successors. The reality is that - as is now reluctantly admitted by
newcomers - BR was not inefficient. The reality is that no meaningful
comparison was ever made with the rump of UK's decimated industry to
determine its relative efficiency as a benchmark. The reality is that BR
received less subsidy than privatised railways. BR was subsidised to run rural
& secondary routes. InterCity had been profitable for years, & Network
SouthEast achieved viability just before privatisation. Now it is advocated
that subsidies for rural routes be diverted to InterCity routes. If BR managers
could run InterCity profitably, the private sector should have been capable of
paying a premium from Day One, but were given large subsidies.

5.2.04 fax
Guardian (not published)

It is again
being erroneously claimed that EC Directive 91/440 required UK rail
infrastructure to be physically split from operations. It merely required accounts
to be split - not ownership. Splitting accounts without fragmentation, is no
different to the structure of conglomerates that publish group & subsidiary
company accounts. The Directive was not blamed in the Debates on privatisation.
John MacGregor said on 2.2.93: "Full vertical integration was neither
practical nor desirable across the bulk of the network. In a limited number of
cases, particular features may suggest it is right to allow a degree of
vertical integration. I have decided the Isle of Wight
can be offered as a vertically integrated franchise". Robt Adley, Tory
chairman of the Transport Select Committee said: "Vertical franchising is
the demand of the private sector & of almost all companies which came
before the Select Committee. Proposals are a recipe for muddle, indecision
& conflict". On 12.2.93 Roger Freeman said: "I confirm we do not
rule out the possibility of vertical franchising". On 25.5.93, John
MacGregor, referring to recommendations in the Select Committee report, stated:
"We disagree with some of them: the crucial one relates to vertical
integration. I cannot go into it now, but there are good arguments on both
sides". (I cannot find if he did “go into it”). On 2.11.93, Tory MP Tim
Rathbone said: "I remain concerned that the franchising director must
submit to the Secretary of State for approval, any proposal to offer vertically
integrated franchises wherever those seem appropriate even though any such
proposal can be made only with Railtrack's agreement". Clearly disintegration
was not required by Brussels.
Sweden's
rail infrastructure is still controlled by state owned railways, as are 97% of
franchises. The Directive did not require infrastructure maintenance &
renewals to be contracted out among sundry firms lacking experience of 125 mph
railways. Neither did it require rolling stock to be handed over at a fraction
of its value, then leased back to operators, only to see demands for Govt to
fund new rolling stock, & operators being given more subsidy to fund new
coaches

24.2.04 fax
The Times (not published)

I am
pleased to note that railways are re-introducing joined-up Control
organisations as called for in my book "Britain's Railways - The
Reality". If they act on a few other recommendations, the industry might
begin to cut subsidies below those given to BR, whilst offering a standard of
punctuality and safety that approaches the higher standards which, my research
proved, was experienced under BR. I wrote: "The keystone of BR operations
was its Control Office organisation. A Control received a constant stream of
reports from yards, collieries, signalboxes, stations, depots, traincrew
supervisors, engineers, etc., together with automatic computer data from
various sources. Within a defined area, it controlled locos, crews and trains
and was required to disseminate to all concerned, instructions and reports
affecting accidents, safety, train running, connections, diversions, to
organise short notice special trains for passenger or freight, and road
transport in place of delayed or cancelled trains. It would be informed
immediately of all unusual incidents which may affect services or safety and of
an accident blocking a line. It would then initiate an established
"call-out" procedure which would bring experienced operating managers,
engineers, breakdown trains and men, quickly to an accident site, and set up
diversions to maintain a service. Over the years, the Control organisation was
streamlined in consequence of the development of modern signalling,, real time
computers, new technology and communications and economy measures. Train
reports from modern power signalboxes were automatically input to Controls, and
also to others for general use. After 1994, Control was fragmented for the
worse. There must be changes. Fragmented Control organisations for signalling,
maintenance, train operations, etc., must be re-integrated to avoid cock-ups
with accidents and expedite the introduction of alternative services when lines
are blocked by accident or other causes".

13.6.04 fax
Guardian (not published)

The
punctuality comparison between the current train companies and British Rail is,
in fact, worse than twice as bad. Current operators do not hold a train for
connection with another company’s train, and worse, instruct drivers of many
late running trains not to stop at certain stations in order to recover lost
time. The arrogance of operators to do as they please to avoid penalty payments
was clearly exposed when, in January 2002, North West Trains failed to stop at
Gatley and overcarried a student to Stockport station, “claiming that they had
the right to do so to make up time”. The student missed an examination.

26.7.04 fax
The Times (not published)

I refer to
your report on the increase of rail subsidies (22 July). The philosophy of
privatisation was investment would be from the private sector. There was no
intention to increase subsidies to introduce new trains. The fact is the new
boys came in believing that BR managers had been sitting on their hands, only
to find - in the words of GNER chief executive, Chris Garnett - "it was
bloody efficient". Likewise Railtrack should not have had handouts to
modernise. Dr. Mawhinney told the Select Committee on Transport in 1994 that
only train operating companies would get subsidies. In BR's last year, Govt
arbitrarily doubled the subsidy because the successful Business Sector
organisation was being fragmented to enable operations to be sold or
franchised. Hence, in reality, the subsidy has quadrupled. Without doubt, if BR
managers had argued that they needed the subsidy - which had been progressively
falling - to double, as they planned to fragment the industry "to improve
it" - they would have received a very caustic answer. Had such a proposal
been accepted and funded, one can only speculate on the language that would
have followed the avoidable accidents, increased complaints, worse performance
and pleas for yet more money! Some companies boast now of paying a premium to
Govt. All - except Gatwick Express, which was profitable under BR - received a
subsidy for the first few years. When they have repaid those subsidies - plus
interest - will be the time to boast of paying a premium. BR received a subsidy
to operate rural and secondary lines. InterCity received no subsidy since 1988,
& NetworkSouthEast had reached equilibrium in the year before
privatisation.

3.9.04
e-mail Daily Telegraph (not published)

The
vilification of BR by politicians did not focus on Clapham (Gerald Corbett, 3
September) because Chairman Sir Robert Reid publicly admitted culpability
immediately. Moreover, that accident was not due to failure to replace track,
which should have been replaced months earlier, as occurred at Hatfield, due to
the hands-off control of maintenance Railtrack had unwisely introduced. BR did
all its track maintenance in house, as had its predecessors in the private
sector. Some minor railways used outside contractors in early 19th century
& soon discovered it was a case of penny wise, £ foolish, & brought
work in house. Deferment to avoid delays was never contemplated by BR, but was
applied in period up to Hatfield. In the BR era, if track maintenance staff had
discovered such a situation, at worst, a TSR (temporary speed restriction)
would have been imposed immediately & renewal arranged for next weekend. It
is a matter of record Railtrack inherited track in a safe condition, with very
few TSRs due to track needing replacement, & these were planned for action
within 2 weeks. Under Railtrack, track renewal dates were extended, those in
Severn Tunnel by 50% - leading to the first cracked rails for 20 years - &
elsewhere for much longer. Ultrasonic testing equipment had been in use by BR
for decades, Hatfield did not lead to its invention. The regime under Railtrack
was not safer. Records published in a recent book "Britain’s Railways
–the Reality" comparing Railtrack
& BR track faults & fatalities clearly show the former was worse. The
book disproves claims, made in 2000, by Mr. Corbett "that 1998 was the
first year since 1902 when there was not a single passenger fatality".
Moreover, there were passenger fatalities in 1998. BR management realised you
do not tell passengers how safe railway was two years ago, when you have just
had a major accident, which went on to cause unprecedented shutdown. On one
occasion, Corbett said "punctuality & safety were their No
1 priority". These are two priorities which, invariably, are mutually
incompatible. On the subject of denial of investment funds from Government,
Railtrack was not supposed to get any from Government, as Dr. Mawhinney clearly
explained, in March 1995, to the Select Committee!

15.10.04
Financial Times (not published)

The claim
by Party leaders that union motion to re-nationalise railways would cost £220bn
is complete nonsense. When Labour government nationalised railways in 1948 they
did not lay out one penny of
taxpayers’ money. Assets were acquired at an arbitrary price by issue of IOUs,
viz: British Transport Loan Stock. Interest on the Loan, and redemption of
Capital were to be paid from income: fares and freight revenue. For first few
yrs these payments were made, as published accts reveal. However, Labour Party
imposed a court of law to determine level of fares & freight charges &
succeeded in holding them well below inflation, contrary to current popular
opinion. Fares trailed inflation by up to 41 points, whilst industry - reacting
to labour problems by higher wages, instead of productivity, stoked up
inflation. The Tory Party claimed to give BR commercial freedom in 1953, then
1962 - but it was an illusion. Public Records reveal they had no intention of
doing so, despite media pressure to do so. Despite belated - judiciously
restrained - “freedom” to decide prices, by the time of privatisation, this
policy had cost BR an aggregate £11.6bn in fares alone by fares held below inflation. Given freedom from Day
One, there would have been no problem in repaying entire cost of nationalised
assets - & modernising into bargain. Facts are there for all who want to
see, but not, of course, for those with biased minds: “Don’t confuse me with
the facts, my mind is made up”, “Don’t let the truth get in the way of a good
story”. Aside from fact that railways could be re-nationalised without using
taxpayers’ cash, there would be reductions in subsidy. It is an unarguable fact
that subsidy had been falling under BR, that it was doubled specifically to
cater for fragmentation & has continued to rise ever since. There would be
no dividends; wage costs would be better controlled as a unified system would
reintroduce common wage rates, thereby ending wage leap-frogging. Training
costs would fall as there would be no leakage from one company to another to
secure higher wages. Claims that passengers have increased as a direct
consequence of privatisation need to be treated with a very large dose of salt.
Firstly, privatisation was nicely timed to benefit from an end of recession,
which has always restored volume. Secondly, there is now an element of multiple
counting of journeys.A unified system
would avoid costly waste of new rolling stock which is confined to sidings
because lack of liaison overlooked need to improve power supplies or modify
platforms. Connections would be improved. BR would surely be allowed to lease
rolling stock where advantageous - as they did in 1970s until Treasury stepped
in. Safety will once again become No1 Priority
- not as Gerald Corbett stated Joint
No1 with punctuality. In fact these two
objectives are invariably mutually incompatible. These & many more facts
which reveal BR achievements, including productivity economies - despite all
handicaps placed in their way by both political parties - together with some
interesting comparisons with industry & private sector railways are set out
in my recent book “Britain’s Railways - The Reality”.

17.1.06
e-mail Daily Telegraph (not published)

Re railway
timetables: The laid back attitude displayed by the Dept for Transport (Jan 17)
that railway problems are not insurmountable & can be rectified quickly
would not have been expressed in State owned days even for lesser problems

19.4.06 fax
The Times (not published)

The report
(Times, April 18) on controlling tracks, is a reversion to BR practice. The BR
Operating Dept ensured that possessions of the line by engineers were confined
to pre-arranged periods, which excluded bank holidays, whose travellers are now
routinely disrupted. Neither was it necessary to disrupt commuters. The photo
in the report depicts a well known scene of a training session on the use of
new track maintenance machinery. BR purchased its first labour-saving track
machine in 1948 - its first year of existence, followed by 1000s more over
following years. Neither these nor the introduction of labour-saving work study
techniques in 1956, were opposed by industrial action, which was the common
consequence of half-hearted attempts in UK industry. The claimed punctuality
figures - poor though they are in comparison with BR’s - are improved on the
reality, by excluding 1000s of trains replaced by buses. All this, and much
more of what BR achieved, is revealed in Britain’s Railways - The Reality.

17.4.07
Scotsman (not published)

It is a
delightful experience for a prophet to be proved right, as I have been now that
Railways in Scotland are to be returned to public ownership. It is, however,
unfortunate that so much taxpayers' money has been wasted in the 14 years since
I warned of the impending catastrophe that would mark privatisation. My book
published on the eve of the privatisation Act set out to tabulate the problems
faced by nationalised Railways by government policies & legislation, &
identified the adverse consequences that wd follow privatisation. Regrettably,
government seemed to be relying too much on gut instinct & Hornby-Dublo
experience, when addressing "the Railway problem".They laboured under an illusion that there
was one UK industry that ought to be 100% reliable, & have no complaints,
with prices below inflation. Because they did not study the facts, they
believed that Railway fares were high - by inference, in comparison with other
UK prices. They believed that BR was overmanned, an illusion rapidly shattered
when the new boys came in & made cuts which led to cancellations on an
unprecedented scale. The chief executive of GNER stated that "BR was
bloody efficient & had cost control down to a fine art".Comparative statistics in my recent book
demonstrate the degree of efficiency achieved. Had ministers instituted
research, they would have found that Railway fares had underperformed
industry-fuelled inflation for 40 years. At privatisation, BR would have been
better off by £11 billions plus interest, had fares been pegged only 1% below
inflation - the margin originally promised under privatisation, but long
abandoned. When Railways were about to be privatised, & the five business
sectors split into 100 companies, the annual subsidywas doubled by government to fund them as
separate companies & to provide an "administrative profit". The
current level of subsidy is, therefore, six times - not three times that paid
to an integrated BR. It is not the
only distortion in comparisons that have been made.

21.6.07 fax
Independent (not published)

I refer to
your excellent editorial opinion (29 May) in which you mention the ‘pivotal
question’. There was another unasked - and, therefore, unanswered question:
‘How it will be determined if privatisation is a success.’ What the Tory
government failed to do was to set down its criteria for successful
privatisation. This required the establishment of a series of measurable
benchmarks. There was anecdote a-plenty, and much vague wishful thinking, but
of measurable benchmarks - nothing at all. In my book: Blueprints for
Bankruptcy, published on the eve of privatisation, I set out a list. It was the
comparative data on all the main criteria which government should have
examined. It is a sorry picture - revealing all too clearly that British
Railways achieved far more than they were credited, and that privatised
railways falls far short of British Railways’ standards. Can we have more attention
to facts and less to anecdote?

7.1.08
e-mail Daily Telegraph (not published)

I read,
with great interest, Jeff Randall’s leader in the Daily Telegraph. The Tory
Government privatised Railways without researching what could realistically be
changed or achieved. It was an ideologically driven change. They had no real
statistical data to compare UK Railway standards with those of UK industry,
which BR was supposed to emulate. Unlike BR, UK industry prudently disclosed no
self-incriminating data to compare with BR’s published data. No other
comparison has any validity, and the Reality is that political beliefs were
based on anecdote. After their botched scheme went predictably pear shaped,
ex-ministers grudgingly admitted that the basis was wrong, but sought to blame
the EU, or attribute it to hindsight. During years of parliamentary debate on
privatisation, the EU Directive was not mentioned once. Moreover, anyone who
looks at that Directive will see that it merely called for the finances of the
infrastructure to be separated from train operations, which could easily be
done without physical separation. It need be no different from the structure of
hundreds of holding companies. As to hindsight, there was plenty of foresight,
based on many decades of practical experience. You may be interested in my
response to that lame excuse, in my article published in Focus – the journal of
the Chartered Institute of Transport, entitled: With the benefit of foresight. Those
with the foresight either took redundancy pay-offs or left under other
circumstances. Many were later re-hired as costly consultants when the
newcomers discovered that big Railways are totally unlike Hornby-Dublo. The
obsession that one UK industry should be capable of being 100% reliable, when
the rest of UK industry in its centrally heated or roofed over premises cannot
achieve 100%, defies rational belief. But it is the underlying belief of many
politicians & journalists. I set out to research real documented facts about
BR, what it achieved & what its shortcomings were. I had to draw from
sources untapped by politicians or other authors. The results are set out in my
book: Britain’s Railways – the Reality, which also compares – for the first
time – BR standards with those of UK private sector industry, & with
privatised UK Railways. It also lays some old – & new - myths to rest.

29.1.08
e-mail Daily Telegraph (not published)

Government
involvement in new carriages (Letters, February 29) was not supposed to happen.
Under privatisation, responsibility & ownership of carriages was
transferred to Rolling Stock Companies which made huge profits from their
under-valued purchase. Train companies were to decide their requirements, &
lease carriages as required. They realised immediately that by reducing the
number leased, pushing up fares & tolerating standing – which was forecast
to disappear under private ownership – that bigger profits could be made. They
also realised that new carriages would be more costly, & opted to carry on
using old stock. Some companies had subsidies increased to cover the cost of
leasing new carriages. Their profits were further enhanced when Government
–desperate to privatise quickly – doled out large subsidies to hitherto
profitable InterCity routes & to zero-subsidy Network SouthEast. John
McGregor told MPs that subsidies would continue to preserve socially necessary
services & that Railtrack would get no subsidy. It proved unable to manage
without subsidy.

11.2.08
e-mail Sunday Telegraph (not published)

The long
standing problem of “bridge-bashing” (Sunday Telegraph, 10 February), is caused
by drivers of high lorries & double deck buses who do not know the height
of their vehicle. Network Rail’s plan to have the location of low bridges built
in to Sat-Nav will not solve the problem, because unless the driver is fully
aware of the height of the vehicle, the Sat-Nav data will be valueless.
Transport Dept Inquiries into such collisions reveal that the driver did not
know the height of the vehicle – even when it was displayed within the vehicle
as applies on some – but not all vehicles. There will be a problem when a road
indicated by Sat-Nav is blocked by accident or road works, as diversion signs
do not usually mention low bridges. The plan will not solve the problem of
motorists turning onto tracks at level crossings. Moreover, there are low
bridges not owned by Railways. Maps were published showing recommended routes
for high vehicles many years ago, but with little effect. Lorries & double
deck vehicles should be fitted with radar beams that will emit an ear splitting
noise when a vehicle approaches a bridge which is too low for their vehicle.
Network Rail will incur costs to overcome the incompetence of hauliers, as
Railways were required to incur costs to increase bridge strength, because
hauliers ignored the weight restrictions of bridges built for the horse &
cart.

25.4.08
e-mail Daily Telegraph (not published)

Kelvin
Mackenzie (Daily Telegraph 24 April) should count himself lucky to be paying £5
for car parking now. The Railway owned car park at Crewe introduced £5 daily
parking about eight years ago. Last year, they raised it to £6 per day. It was
only £1 in the “bad old (BR) days”.

12.8.08
e-mail Daily Telegraph (not published)

Even Tory
ex-ministers have admitted that the privatised fragmentation of Railways was a
mistake, i.e. ‘half-baked’. It was not, as frequently claimed, due to an EC
ruling, which readers will see if they click onto the EC website or check
Hansard. Your reader, James Strachan, hasn’t studied the facts. Rail freight
increased because Government has made a few cautious steps to correct the
inequity they have maintained between rail & road for 90 years. Road
transport is being gently prodded to obey the law on drivers’ hours (bringing
them down towards levels Government imposed on Railways in 1919), and on
vehicle safety, overloading, speeding etc. The long expected oil crisis has
brought the long forecast transfer of traffic to rail. The Chunnel is
benefiting – as forecast long ago – from transfer from the short air & sea
routes. Passenger growth benefits from fragmentation because one journey under
BR (e.g. Isle of Wight to Inverness) becomes four. This is further muddied by
through trains being broken (bus fashion) into three or four parts, so each is
a different journey. City Congestion & parking charges influence cost
comparisons. Both freight & passenger have increased because taxpayers’
money has been thrown at the private sector, which should have had nil after 12
years, if one believed the 1990s claims of Ministers. On top of that, the new
boys have been given freedom to do what they like, with no political pressures
to hold fares below inflation in their constituencies. The mess Railtrack made
of the infrastructure – now being redressed at vast cost - almost defies belief

16.1.09
e-mail The Times (not published)

The argument that bonuses are essential to get
executives to improve their companies is astonishing. When I worked in the
public sector, we were told that, in the private sector, executives who did not
improve their company were fired! Has it escaped everyone else’s attention that
company executives always take credit for higher share prices and expansion,
but blame international markets for declining prices and market share? An
analogous attitude is noticeable in political circles.

15.5.09
Posted on Daily Telegraph web-site

Brussels
cannot be blamed for chaos. Their Directive did not require physical
fragmentation, merely separation of accounts for infrastructure & train
services. Any Holding Company can do this. The Directive was not mentioned in
privatisation debates.

9.7.09
e-mail Daily Telegraph (not published)

David
Pearson (letters 9 July), claims BR’s East Coast service was “unreliable” but
quotes no facts. May I help with researched facts? The ever critical Transport
Users Committees stated in 1991: “We are pleased with the [East Coast] electric
service”. It was praised by foreign manage­ments and technical media. BR’s last
full year – 1993/4 - showed InterCity 91% punctuality, compared – on the same
basis - to SRA’s 2001/2 Report 77%. Passengers excuse delays caused by
infrastructure defects “which are the fault of Railtrack or Network Rail”.
Under BR, infrastructure defects were the main cause of delay, but there
were no outsiders to blame. In the magazine “Rail” (No. 466), GNER Chief
Executive, Chris Garnett said “Railtrack and train companies made the mistake
of assuming BR had been inefficient, but found it was bloody efficient and had
it down to a fine art”. David Pearson doesn’t mention BR fares which were
significantly lower than GNER and probably caused the overcrowding. Transport
Minister John McGregor told the Scottish Transport Committee the East
Coast line made £40m profit pa, but a franchisee would require £50m annual
subsidy for at least seven years. InterCity had had no subsidy since 1988.
Rolling stock should be funded by the private sector, but is funded by
government. If BR had had a fraction of the money poured into railways since
privatisation, we would have had a system second to none, and on a comparable
basis with the modernised east coast line.

PS –
Hopefully, you will find space for this letter which is the same as David
Pearson’s. (NB – to keep down the length of the letter, I left out references
to the fact that connections are routinely broken, whereas they were maintained
on a wide – but not total basis. I also left out mentioning that an analysis of
those Committee’s annual reports contained no criticism of performance).