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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives:
September 2011:
Federal Courthouses:
Improved Collaboration Needed to Meet Demands of a Complex Security
Environment:
GAO-11-857:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-857, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Safe and accessible federal courthouses are critical to the U.S.
judicial process. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Marshals Service
(Marshals Service), within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and the General
Services Administration (GSA) are the federal stakeholders with roles
related to courthouse security. As requested, this report addresses
(1) attributes that influence courthouse security considerations and
(2) the extent to which stakeholders have collaborated in implementing
their responsibilities and using risk management. GAO analyzed laws
and documents, such as security assessments; reviewed GAO’s work on
key practices for collaboration and facility protection; visited 11
courthouse facilities, selected based on geographic dispersion, age,
size, and other criteria; and interviewed agency and judiciary
officials. While the results from site visits cannot be generalized,
they provided examples of courthouse security activities.
What GAO Found:
Various attributes influence security considerations for the nation’s
424 federal courthouses, which range from small court spaces to large
buildings in major urban areas. According to DOJ data, threats against
the courts have increased between fiscal years 2004 and 2010—from
approximately 600 to more than 1,400. The Interagency Security
Committee—an interagency group that develops standards for federal
facility security—has assigned courthouses the highest security level
because they are prominent symbols of U.S. power.
Federal stakeholders have taken steps to strengthen their
collaboration, such as establishing agency liaisons, but have faced
challenges in implementing assigned responsibilities and using risk
assessment tools.
* A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) outlines each stakeholder’s
roles and responsibilities and identifies areas requiring stakeholder
coordination. However, at 5 of the 11 courthouses GAO visited, FPS and
the Marshals Service were either performing duplicative efforts (e.g.,
both monitoring the courthouse lobby) or performing security roles
that were inconsistent with their responsibilities. The judiciary and
other stakeholders stated that having the Marshals Service and FPS
both provide security services has resulted in two lines of authority
for implementing and overseeing security services. Updating the MOA
that identifies roles and responsibilities could strengthen the
multiagency courthouse security framework by better incorporating
accountability for federal agencies’ collaborative efforts.
* In 2008, Congress authorized a pilot program, whereby the Marshals
Service would assume FPS’s responsibilities to provide perimeter
security at 7 courthouses. In October 2010, the judiciary recommended
that the pilot be expanded. AOUSC noted general consensus among
various stakeholders in support of the pilot and estimated the costs
of expanding it, but AOUSC did not obtain FPS’s views on assessing the
pilot results or on how the expansion may affect FPS’s mission.
Additional analysis on the costs and benefits of this approach and the
inclusion of all stakeholder perspectives could better position
Congress and federal stakeholders to evaluate expansion options.
* The Marshals Service has not always completed court security
facility surveys (a type of risk assessment), as required by Marshals
Service guidance. At 9 of the courthouses GAO visited, the Marshals
Service had not conducted these surveys, but Marshals Service
officials at some courthouses told us that they assessed security
needs as part of their budget development process. However, these
assessments are less comprehensive than the court security facility
surveys required by Marshals Service guidance. FPS has faced
difficulties completing its risk assessments, known as facility
security assessments, and recently halted an effort to implement a new
system for completing them. Furthermore, GAO found that the Marshals
Service and FPS did not consistently share the full results of their
risk assessments with each other and key stakeholders. Sharing risk
assessment information could better equip federal stakeholders to
assess courthouses’ security needs and make informed decisions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends DHS and DOJ update the MOA to, among other things,
clarify stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities and ensure the
completion and sharing of risk assessments; and further assess costs
and benefits of the perimeter pilot program, in terms of enhanced
security, and include all stakeholders’ views, should steps be taken
to expand the program. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO’s
recommendations.
View GAO-11-857 or key components. For more information, contact Mark
Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov or William O.
Jenkins, Jr. at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Federal Courthouses Have Several Attributes That Influence Security
Considerations:
Clarification of Roles and Responsibilities and Improved Risk
Management Could Strengthen Collaboration in Securing Courthouses:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Comments from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts:
Appendix IV: Comments from the General Services Administration:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Federal Stakeholders' Primary Courthouse Security
Responsibilities as Designated in the 1997 MOA and Reaffirmed in 2004:
Figures:
Figure 1: Increase in Potential Threats Against Court Personnel and
Those Involved in the Judicial Process Investigated by the Marshals
Service, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2010:
Figure 2: View of Antivehicle Barriers Created to Help Secure a
Courthouse:
Abbreviations:
AOUSC: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts:
CSC: Court Security Committee:
CSO: Court Security Officer:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FS: Facility Security Assessment:
FSC: Facility Security Committee:
FPS: Federal Protective Service:
GSA: General Services Administration:
IG: Inspector General:
ISC: Interagency Security Committee:
MOA: Memorandum of Agreement:
NHPA: National Historic Preservation Act:
RAMP: Risk Assessment and Management Program:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 28, 2011:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Thompson:
Since fiscal year 2004, potential threats and incidents against court
personnel and those involved in the judicial process have more than
doubled. Additionally, the January 2010 shooting at the U.S.
Courthouse in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the discovery in March 2010 of an
improvised explosive device outside the Thomas S. Foley U.S.
Courthouse in Spokane, Washington, have brought attention to the issue
of federal courthouse security. Federal courthouses--totaling 424
nationwide, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
(AOUSC)--run the gamut from small court spaces in post offices that
house courts on a part-time basis to large buildings in major urban
areas, and each presents a slightly different mix of security risks
and vulnerabilities.[Footnote 1] Effective protection for courthouses
is critical to help create a safe and accessible environment--one in
which judicial matters and activities can be conducted without the
threat of intimidation or harm to those participating in the judicial
process.
Federal courthouse security is a collaborative effort involving
various federal stakeholders from executive branch agencies and the
judiciary.[Footnote 2] This collaborative effort is formalized by a
1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the Department of Justice
(DOJ), General Services Administration (GSA), and AOUSC that
designates roles and responsibilities for each of these entities in
protecting federal courthouses and sets forth the federal framework
for securing courthouses. The MOA was reaffirmed in 2004 to
acknowledge the transfer of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) from
GSA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within the executive
branch, GSA manages federal facilities, including courthouses, and is
responsible for federal courthouse design, construction, and
maintenance. The U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service or Marshals),
a component of DOJ, has primary responsibility for protecting federal
judicial facilities and personnel. FPS is responsible for enforcing
federal laws and providing building entry and perimeter security at
GSA-owned or GSA-leased facilities (referred to as GSA-controlled),
including facilities housing federal courts.[Footnote 3] Within the
judiciary, the Judicial Conference of the United States (Judicial
Conference)--chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States--is the
principle policy-making body for administering the federal court
system, and its security committee sets security policies for federal
judges and courts. The Judicial Conference's policies are implemented
by AOUSC.
You asked us to review federal efforts to protect courthouses. This
report addresses the following questions: (1) What attributes
influence security considerations for federal courthouses? (2) To what
extent have federal stakeholders collaborated in implementing their
roles and responsibilities and in using risk management?
To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws and obtained
and analyzed documents from the federal stakeholders responsible for
courthouse security, such as memoranda of agreement, facility security
guidance, and risk assessments. We interviewed officials from the
Marshals Service; FPS; GSA; and the judiciary, particularly AOUSC
officials, federal judges, and other court officials, to obtain
information on the security environment and the federal stakeholders'
efforts to secure courthouses. We also visited 11 federal courthouse
facilities to gain firsthand knowledge and understanding of efforts to
protect them, as well as to document security risks and
vulnerabilities. We selected these facilities based on a mix of
criteria, including geographic dispersion, urban versus rural
locations, age, size, and proximity to international borders. During
the site visits, we interviewed officials from the Marshals Service,
FPS, and GSA, as well as judges and other court officials to obtain
information and their views on courthouse security efforts at those 11
courthouses.[Footnote 4] We also toured the 11 courthouses to observe
courthouse protective measures, and we relied on officials to bring
security issues to our attention at the individual courthouses.
Therefore, we could not always determine whether these issues were
present at other courthouses unless officials brought them to our
attention. Although information obtained from these site visits cannot
be generalized to all federal courthouses, they provided us with
insights into federal agencies' practices to secure courthouses and
challenges agencies face in their security efforts.[Footnote 5] We
assessed federal stakeholders' efforts to secure courthouses against
key practices we have identified for federal collaboration and
facility protection.[Footnote 6] (Appendix I contains additional
information on our scope and methodology.)
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to September
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Security at the nation's 424 federal courthouses is overseen by FPS,
the Marshals Service, GSA, and AOUSC. Federal statutes and interagency
agreements define these stakeholders' roles and responsibilities for
the protection and security of federal courthouses and persons within
courthouses. FPS is the primary federal agency responsible for
patrolling and protecting the perimeter of GSA-controlled facilities,
including facilities housing federal court functions, and for
enforcing federal laws and regulations in those facilities.[Footnote
7] Specifically, FPS has the authority to enforce federal laws and
regulations aimed at protecting federally owned and leased properties
and the persons on such property. FPS conducts its mission by
providing security services through two types of activities: (1)
physical security activities, such as conducting risk assessments of
facilities and recommending risk-based countermeasures aimed at
preventing incidents at facilities; and (2) law enforcement
activities, such as responding to incidents, conducting criminal
investigations, and exercising arrest authority. FPS charges customer
agencies, such as the judiciary and Marshals Service, fees for the
security services FPS provides. FPS charges federal agencies three
fees: (1) a basic security fee, (2) a building-specific administrative
fee, and (3) a security work authorization administrative fee. All
customer agencies in GSA-controlled properties pay the basic annual
security fee. Customer agencies in facilities for which FPS recommends
specific countermeasures pay the building-specific administrative fee,
along with the cost of the countermeasures. Customer agencies that
request additional countermeasures pay the security work authorization
administrative fee, along with the cost of the countermeasures.
The Marshals Service, by law, has primary responsibility for the
security of the federal judiciary, in either primary courthouses--
where judicial and judicial-related space comprise at least 75 percent
of the building--or multitenant facilities--including the safe conduct
of court proceedings and the security of federal judges and court
personnel.[Footnote 8] The Marshals Service is divided into 94
districts (with one U.S. Marshal for each district) to correspond with
the 94 federal judicial districts. Security of federal courthouses is
administered by the Marshals Service's Judicial Security Division,
whose mission is to ensure the safe and secure conduct of judicial
proceedings and provide protection for federal judges, U.S. Attorneys,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys, jurors, and other members of the federal
court family. The Office of Courthouse Management has responsibility
for, among other things, physical security and construction of all
Marshals Service office, support, and special-purpose space.[Footnote
9] The Marshals Service receives both direct appropriations and
funding transferred from the judiciary for its courthouse security
activities. Judicial Services has oversight for programs funded by the
AOUSC court security appropriation. This funding provides for the
Court Security Officer (CSO) program, security equipment, and systems
for space occupied by the judiciary and for Marshals Service
employees.[Footnote 10]
As the federal government's landlord, GSA designs, builds, manages,
and safeguards federal buildings, including courthouses. Under the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, FPS was transferred to DHS along with
FPS's responsibility to perform law enforcement and related security
functions for GSA buildings.[Footnote 11] However, GSA retained some
responsibilities related to courthouse security. GSA continues to
provide proposed plans for new construction and renovation of court
space and for the installation of additional security systems and
other security measures, such as fencing, lighting, and locks on
doors. In response to a recommendation we made in 2005 and to enhance
coordination with FPS, GSA established in 2006 the Building Security
and Policy Division within the Public Buildings Service, where FPS
once resided, to manage its security policy and implementation
efforts, including its dealings with FPS. Additionally, GSA's Center
for Courthouse Programs is responsible for nationwide policy
formulation and general management of new federal courthouse
construction and the modernization of existing courthouses.
In the judicial branch, both the Judicial Conference, which is the
judiciary's principal policy-making body concerned with the
administration of the U.S. courts, and AOUSC, which is the central
administrative support entity for the judicial branch, play a role in
courthouse security. The Judicial Conference's Committee on Judicial
Security coordinates security issues involving the federal courts. For
example, the committee monitors the protection of court facilities and
proceedings, judicial officers, and court staff at federal court
facilities and other locations, and makes policy recommendations to
the Judicial Conference. Appropriations for security can be funded
directly to the courts or transferred to the Marshals Service, which
is responsible for administering judicial security consistent with the
standards or guidelines agreed to by the Director of AOUSC and the
Director of the Marshals Service. This represents a collaborative
effort between the federal judiciary and DOJ to assist in securing the
judicial process. Additionally, at the district level, federal judges
have responsibilities in securing courthouses. For example, the court
has the authority to, among other things, issue rules or orders
regulating, restricting, or prohibiting items within or near the
perimeter of any facility that has a courthouse.[Footnote 12]
We have previously identified key practices both for enhancing
collaboration among federal agencies and for facility protection.
[Footnote 13] Regarding collaboration, we have identified a number of
factors, such as leadership and trust and agreeing on roles and
responsibilities, which are key to facilitating an effective
collaborative relationship.[Footnote 14] We have used these practices
in our prior work to evaluate collaboration between FPS and tenants in
federal facilities and the Transportation Security Administration's
efforts to secure commercial airports, for example. We have also
identified facility protection key practices from the collective
practices of federal agencies and the private sector to provide a
framework for guiding agencies' protection efforts and addressing
challenges. We have used the key practices to evaluate, for example,
the efforts of FPS in protecting federal facilities, the Smithsonian
Institution in protecting its museums,[Footnote 15] and the National
Park Service in protecting national icons such as the Statue of
Liberty.[Footnote 16]
Federal Courthouses Have Several Attributes That Influence Security
Considerations:
Courthouses Are Symbolic Targets and Are the Hub of Judicial Business:
Courthouses--which house judicial proceedings and which many view as
symbols of democracy and openness--have faced increasing security
risks. DOJ data on potential threats against court personnel and
individuals involved in the judicial process show a steady rise in
recent years, adding to the concern of securing federal courthouses.
[Footnote 17] (See figure 1.)
Figure 1: Increase in Potential Threats Against Court Personnel and
Those Involved in the Judicial Process Investigated by the Marshals
Service, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2004;
Number of potential threats investigated: 665.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of potential threats investigated: 953.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of potential threats investigated: 1,111.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of potential threats investigated: 1,145.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of potential threats investigated: 1,278.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number of potential threats investigated: 1,390.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Number of potential threats investigated: 1,394.
Source: GAO analysis of DOJ data.
[End of figure]
AOUSC recognizes the symbolic nature of courthouses, and has stated
that access to the courts is a core value in the American system of
government and that courthouses are important symbols of the federal
government in communities across the country. The Interagency Security
Committee (ISC) ranks U.S. circuit, district, and bankruptcy
courthouses as "very high"--the highest security level--because they
are prominent symbols of U.S. power or authority.[Footnote 18]
According to ISC, symbolic targets are attractive to foreign
terrorists, as well as domestic antigovernment radicals. For example,
case-related or antigovernment protests and demonstrations can occur
outside courthouses, increasing possible security risks to the
courthouses. Among our site visits, a court official at one location
stated that, in one instance in March 2003, protesters outside the
courthouse who were trying to avoid arrest broke a window and entered
the official's office, potentially putting the official and others at
risk.
With the increased number of potential threats against courthouses in
recent years, the Marshals Service reports that threats from extremist
groups exist, particularly at courthouses in certain locations. For
example, at one courthouse we visited, FPS officials expressed concern
about the presence of antigovernment persons and groups within the
district. In part to better protect the courthouse from any person or
group that may attack the courthouse, an area of raised terrain
followed by an excavated area lined with rock which is not visible
from a distance, was constructed between the courthouse and the road.
Figure 2 illustrates the antivehicle barriers constructed to protect
the courthouse.
Figure 2: View of Antivehicle Barriers Created to Help Secure a
Courthouse:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In addition to the symbolism of courthouses, the wide variety of civil
and criminal cases that come before the federal judiciary include some
that can pose increased security risks to federal courthouses, such as
those involving domestic and international terrorism, domestic and
international organized crime, extremist groups, gangs, and drug
trafficking. At courthouses with these types of cases, federal
stakeholders have implemented additional security measures. For
example at one courthouse we visited, the Marshals Service stated that
they implemented countermeasures to increase security in preparation
for a major terrorist trial. These countermeasures included closing
streets near the courthouse during the trial, erecting additional
barriers, and having a uniformed guard presence 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week.
Locations of Courthouses Can Heighten Security Concerns:
The location of courthouses can contribute to security issues. In
particular, court officials at one courthouse located near the
Southwest border told us that they deal with a large number of
immigration cases and cases that involve drug trafficking
organizations. According to these officials, they can also have
hundreds of defendants who have not previously been involved in U.S.
court proceedings, making it difficult to obtain information on them.
One judge at the courthouse noted that the Marshals Service took
additional security measures, such as additional training and
increased CSO presence as the judge entered and left the courthouse
parking garage, to protect him after the Marshals Service received
information from an informant that a drug-trafficking organization had
threatened violence against the judge Further, according to the
judiciary, criminal cases related to immigration offenses jumped
nearly 60 percent from about 17,000 in 2006 to about 27,000 in 2010,
and the number of defendants in those cases rose by about 55 percent
over the same period to about 28,000 defendants.[Footnote 19]
According to the AOUSC, the growth in immigration cases is mostly from
filings addressing improper reentry by aliens and involving fraud and
misuse of visa or entry permits in the five federal judicial districts
located along the U.S. Southwest border.[Footnote 20] The Marshals
Service noted that defendants can be violent or have extensive
criminal histories.[Footnote 21]
According to AOUSC, courthouses can play a significant role in urban
redevelopment efforts. Because of this, courthouses can be located in
areas with higher crime rates, increasing risks at those buildings.
For example, at one courthouse we visited, Marshals Service officials
told us they had concerns about the neighborhood in which the
courthouse was located because of crime, building disrepair, and
suspicious activity occurring on properties near the courthouse.
Officials noted that after receiving a report on a suspicious
individual who could potentially be a threat to the courthouse, a CSO
identified the person of interest moving barrels into a house adjacent
to the courthouse. Marshals Service officials were concerned the
barrels contained hazardous or explosive materials and coordinated
with local law enforcement to investigate. Although the barrels were
found to contain harmless materials, Marshals Service officials
remained concerned about potential future security risks and worked
with local authorities to require the landlord to maintain the house
and yard or have the house demolished, which addressed the Marshals
Service's concerns.
Building Design and Age, Including Historic Designations, Contribute
to Security Concerns:
Security has become an important element considered by federal
stakeholders in the design and construction of new courthouses. In
addition to the life-safety and health concerns common in all
buildings, federal courthouses must adhere to numerous specific design
guidelines for aesthetics, security, interior circulation, barrier-
free access, and mechanical and electrical systems, among other
things. According to courthouse design documents, federal stakeholders
should consider security measures from the beginning of the design
process for new courthouses by, for example, integrating security
considerations with other building system controls, such as for fire
safety and air circulation. Specifically, the U.S. Courts Design Guide
notes that courthouse security is complex because of court operations
and movement patterns for different groups of individuals within
courthouses, such as prisoners, judges, court personnel, and the
public, require varying degrees of security. The guide notes that
optimal security is a fine balance between architectural solutions,
allocation of security personnel, and installation of security systems
and equipment.[Footnote 22]
Although courthouse design has evolved in the last 20 years to address
modern security needs, the infrastructure of the nation's 424
courthouses varies widely. According to GSA, 146 courthouses--about
one-third--are historic facilities.[Footnote 23] Under the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), as amended, federal agencies are to
use historic properties to the maximum extent feasible, and when
making infrastructure changes or rehabilitating a property, to retain
and preserve the historic character of the property.[Footnote 24] At
one courthouse--considered a historic facility under NHPA--Marshals
Service officials told us they identified the judge's parking lot as a
potential security vulnerability because the area has one opening for
entry or exit which could allow for an attack on a judge, and that a
new guard post should be constructed to help mitigate that
vulnerability. The security committee for the courthouse approved the
project, but could not begin the project until a consultant from the
state Architectural Board approved the design. Marshals Service
officials told us that the process took a long time, in part, because
the guard post had to be designed to blend with, and not detract from,
the historic façade and not interfere with the original gate to the
courthouse. According to the officials, the project was scheduled to
be completed 4 years after it was initially approved at an additional
cost of approximately $20,000.
Furthermore, historic or aging buildings may not be able to support,
or may make it more difficult to implement, recommended physical
security enhancements such as barriers or setbacks from the street.
[Footnote 25] For example, in order to reduce the risk of a car bomb
exploding close to the two historic courthouses we visited, the
Marshals Service had restricted street parking and only allowed the
Marshals Service or other court personnel to park alongside the
building. Making security changes to an historic or aging building
itself can also be challenging. For example, Marshals Service
officials at one historic courthouse stated that judges, prisoners,
and the public currently use the same hallways. Marshals Service
officials stated that there is a need for a dedicated judges' elevator
and secured prisoner hallways to move prisoners through separate
areas. The U.S. Courts Design Guide notes that an essential element of
security design is the physical separation of public, restricted, and
secure circulation systems and that trial participants should not meet
until they are in the courtroom during formal court proceedings.
[Footnote 26]
Marshals Service officials stated that the most effective way to
address this vulnerability would be to add another elevator to the
building solely for transporting prisoners, but doing so would be
difficult given the building's age and historic designation. A
Marshals Service official stated that retrofitting the building with
more substantial permanent barriers would be difficult and expensive
in order to comply with NHPA.
Courthouses Often House Other Federal Tenants, Requiring Additional
Security Coordination:
Of the nation's 424 federal courthouses, AOUSC reports that 201 share
a building with other federal agencies which, together, occupy more
than 25 percent of the building. According to AOUSC, the other 223
courthouses are considered primary courthouses, meaning court space
comprises at least 75 percent of the building.[Footnote 27] AOUSC
officials stated that they designate facilities as primary courthouses
for the purpose of security management. Officials from sites we
visited told us it is generally the chief judges who make security
related decisions, and the judiciary pays for enhancements. In the
case of the 201 courthouses located in multitenant facilities,
courthouses operate along with the other agencies in the building
(e.g., the Internal Revenue Service, Department of Health and Human
Services, Department of Agriculture) and face additional challenges
not encountered by primary courthouses, since they must coordinate
their security operations with the other federal tenants.
Clarification of Roles and Responsibilities and Improved Risk
Management Could Strengthen Collaboration in Securing Courthouses:
Federal stakeholders, including FPS and the Marshals Service, have
taken steps to strengthen their collaboration for securing
courthouses. However, stakeholders have faced challenges related to
fragmented implementation of roles and responsibilities, the use or
participation in existing collaboration mechanisms, and lack of
clarity regarding GSA's roles and responsibilities for courthouse
security. Further, while federal stakeholders have taken steps to
assess risks facing federal courthouses, they have not completed risk
assessments as required by their own guidance and consistent with key
practices for facility security.
Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Improve Courthouse Security, but Face
Challenges Implementing Their Roles and Responsibilities:
Interagency Agreements and Mechanisms for Identifying and Coordinating
Roles and Responsibilities:
Various interagency agreements designate courthouse security roles and
responsibilities for federal stakeholders, including FPS, the Marshals
Service, GSA, and the judiciary. Our work on effective interagency
collaboration has shown that collaborating agencies should work
together to define and agree on their respective roles and
responsibilities, including how the collaborative effort should be
led.[Footnote 28] This allows agencies to clarify who will do what,
organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision
making. One mechanism for doing so is an interagency agreement. The
key interagency agreement for courthouse security is a 1997 MOA
between the Marshals Service, GSA, and AOUSC. The MOA designates
specific roles and responsibilities for each of these entities with
regard to protecting federal courthouses and sets forth the federal
framework for securing courthouses. This MOA was reaffirmed in 2004 to
acknowledge the transfer of FPS from GSA to DHS, with DHS assuming
those responsibilities in the MOA that FPS formerly performed under
GSA. Table 1 summarizes each federal stakeholder's primary security
responsibilities, as designated in the MOA.
Table 1: Federal Stakeholders' Primary Courthouse Security
Responsibilities as Designated in the 1997 MOA and Reaffirmed in 2004:
Federal stakeholder: FPS;
Primary security responsibilities:
* Provide general facility security and perimeter protection for GSA-
controlled facilities housing judicial officers;
* Conduct recurring facility physical security surveys (facility
security assessments);
* Respond to and investigate all reported criminal incidents and life-
threatening events in all GSA-controlled facilities housing judicial
officers;
* Participate in court security surveys;
* Participate in court security committees and facility security
committees;
* Provide additional protective personnel to respond to emergencies.
Federal stakeholder: Marshals Service;
Primary security responsibilities:
* Develop a nationwide court security program;
* Conduct court security surveys of all judicial facilities in
cooperation with representatives of the federal judiciary and FPS;
* Establish a court security committee in each district;
* Contract for the installation and maintenance of judicial security
systems and hiring of court security officers;
* Provide perimeter access control for buildings occupied by judicial
personnel;
* Determine and provide the appropriate level of building access
control.
Federal stakeholder: GSA;
Primary security responsibilities:
* Provide security fixtures such as bollards and bullet-resistant
glass;
* Provide timely review of proposed plans provided by Marshals Service
for new construction, renovations, and leased space projects;
* Participate in court security surveys;
* Participate in court security committees and facility security
committees;
* Provide proposed plans for new construction and renovation of court
space in a timely manner for review and comment.
Federal stakeholder: AOUSC;
Primary security responsibilities:
* Represent the policies and decisions of the Judicial Conference;
* Transfer appropriated funds to the Marshals Service;
* Monitor the effectiveness of security programs and use of
appropriated funds;
* Coordinate the review of plans for physical security, as needed.
Source: GAO analysis of MOA.
[End of table]
In addition to identifying specific roles and responsibilities for
each federal stakeholder in protecting federal courthouses, the MOA
recognizes areas in which the Marshals Service, FPS, and AOUSC
stakeholders are to coordinate their security efforts. For example,
the Marshals Service is to coordinate its activities to control access
to space housing judicial personnel with FPS, and is to report to FPS
and cooperate in FPS investigations of crimes committed in GSA-
controlled facilities housing federal courts. FPS is to coordinate
occupant emergency plans with the judiciary and Marshals Service and
provide review of any Marshals Service proposed plans for new
construction or renovation projects to determine facility perimeter
security needs. Further, AOUSC is to provide the Marshals Service with
space acquisition requests for the judiciary to ensure security
systems are included in plans.
In recent years, federal stakeholders have taken various actions to
strengthen their collaborative efforts to secure courthouses. For
example, at the headquarters level, FPS established a position in 2007
to liaise between FPS and the Marshals Service on court security
issues. This liaison serves as the focal point for FPS and the
Marshals Service to raise and resolve issues with each other.
According to Marshals Service and FPS officials, the liaison has
helped to strengthen coordination and communication between the two
agencies on court security. Also, at the headquarters level, the
Judicial Conference's security committee meets twice a year with the
Marshals Service Director and usually several additional times per
year, as needed, with Marshals Service executive staff to, among other
things, discuss threats to courthouse security. GSA also sponsors
events three or four times a year where all federal tenants discuss
portfoliowide issues--one of which is security. According to GSA
officials, FPS, the Marshals Service, the judiciary, and other
stakeholders, such as the U.S. Attorney's Office, are invited to
attend.[Footnote 29] ISC also holds quarterly meetings, which include
representatives from FPS, the Marshals Service, judiciary, and GSA.
According to GSA officials, they use these meetings to coordinate and
address court security issues.
At the courthouse level, federal stakeholders have established
committees for coordinating their security activities. These
committees include Court Security Committees (CSC) and Facility
Security Committees (FSC). According to the 1997 MOA, the Marshals
Service is to establish a CSC in each judicial district comprised of
representatives from the Marshals Service, clerk of the court, the
U.S. Attorney, chief judge, FPS, and GSA, as appropriate. FSCs
typically exist at multitenant facilities, where the courts are one of
various federal tenants.[Footnote 30] FSCs consist of a representative
from each of the tenant agencies in the facility, and are responsible
for addressing security issues at their respective facility and
approving the implementation of security countermeasures. Depending on
the district or individual courthouse, there can be either a CSC, an
FSC, or both. In addition to these committees, coordination occurs at
individual courthouses, as stakeholders implement their security roles
and responsibilities. For example, officials told us that they
typically coordinate on an as needed basis with each other on cases or
demonstrations that draw large crowds.
Challenges Related to Roles and Responsibilities Have Hindered Federal
Stakeholders' Efforts:
Collaborating with FPS in Assessing the Perimeter Pilot Security
Program Could Better Inform Decision Making about Whether It Should Be
Expanded:
Although federal stakeholders have defined their courthouse security
roles and responsibilities and taken steps to strengthen their
coordination, various challenges have affected stakeholders' efforts
to secure courthouses. Specifically, we identified three main
challenges federal stakeholders face in securing courthouses: (1)
fragmentation in stakeholders' efforts to implement their security
roles and responsibilities; (2) limitations in the use of or
participation in existing collaboration mechanisms; and (3) lack of
clarity on GSA's roles and responsibilities for courthouse security.
Our prior work on interagency collaboration has shown that when
multiple agencies are working to address aspects of the same problem,
there is a risk that overlap or fragmentation among programs can waste
scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers or stakeholders,
and limit overall program effectiveness.
Fragmented Efforts to Implement Security Roles and Responsibilities:
Federal stakeholders' efforts to implement their security roles and
responsibilities at courthouses have been subject to fragmentation, as
shown by stakeholders' dissatisfaction with the dual approach to
security and, at select courthouses, duplication in security efforts
or stakeholders' performance of security roles inconsistent with their
responsibilities identified under the MOA. First, according to AOUSC
and other stakeholders, the federal government's approach to
courthouse security in which the Marshals Service and FPS both provide
security services has resulted in a bifurcated security environment
with two lines of authority for implementation and oversight of
security services. Additionally, the chair of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Judicial Security has stated that the current approach to
court security has resulted in two separate lines of authority, or
chains of command, which in his view, diminishes the effective command
and control over all components of the security program. Further, a
key GSA management official involved with courthouse security told us
that having one clear line of authority for courthouse security would
have the advantage of reducing coordination challenges between FPS and
the Marshals Service. FPS officials also told us that having multiple
agencies responsible for courthouse security can be problematic
because of overlapping jurisdiction, and that there is a need for
clear lines of authority.
Second, officials at 5 of the 11 courthouses we visited brought to our
attention examples of fragmentation--either duplication of command and
control or stakeholders' performance of security roles inconsistent
with responsibilities identified under the MOA.[Footnote 31] With
regard to duplication, at one courthouse we visited, for example, both
FPS and the Marshals Service had cameras pointed at the courthouse
lobby. Marshals Service, FPS, and judiciary officials told us they
considered this redundant. Marshals Service officials said that they
installed cameras in the courthouse lobby because of past experience
in which FPS cameras broke and took months to repair or replace,
creating security vulnerabilities. At two other courthouses we
visited, FPS and Marshals Service stakeholders each had their own
staffed control rooms to monitor their cameras and alarms, and in some
cases, each other's cameras. At one of these courthouses, the Marshals
Service reported that having two control rooms was redundant. Further,
at two other courthouses, stakeholders noted that the Marshals Service
was performing duties ascribed to FPS in the 1997 MOA without written
agreements documenting these changes, as specified below:
* FPS and Marshals Service officials from one of the courthouses we
visited told us that while FPS conducted perimeter security for the
facility, the Marshals Service provided security at one checkpoint--a
delivery ramp--which FPS did not staff. Neither Marshals Service nor
FPS officials identified a specific reason why the Marshals Service
performed these exterior perimeter security activities rather than
FPS. A Marshals Service official told us this situation was of concern
to them because the Marshals Service had to move staff from another
courthouse in the area to provide staff for the delivery ramp, which
the Marshals Service viewed as being a higher priority than security
needs at the other courthouse.[Footnote 32] However, this movement of
staff resulted in the other courthouse having fewer staff than the
authorized staffing level, and a Marshals Service security review
identified this as a critical concern. The officials told us they were
in the process of developing an MOA to address this issue.
* Marshals Service officials at another courthouse we visited
monitored FPS's five cameras at the courthouse, and the perimeter
security functions FPS performed were occasional patrols around the
exterior of the courthouse. Marshals Service officials told us that it
did not make sense for FPS to have responsibility for the perimeter
cameras because there was no regular FPS presence at the building and
that the Marshals Service could monitor, repair, and replace those
cameras more quickly as a result. Both FPS and Marshals Service
officials told us that they had proposed that the Marshals Service
take over responsibility for all perimeter cameras, but FPS
headquarters denied this request.
FPS headquarters officials stated that the Marshals Service carries
out the same types of duties as FPS at selected courthouses, but the
officials did not provide a rationale or guidelines for when this
arrangement would be appropriate. In situations like these, if a
transfer of responsibilities is agreed to by FPS and the Marshals
Service, having a local MOA outlining these responsibilities could
help ensure greater accountability, clarity, and transparency. In
discussing the prospect of developing a local MOA outlining FPS and
Marshals Service responsibilities, Marshals Service officials at one
courthouse brought to our attention that another district, which was
not one of our visited locations, had an MOA addressing these
responsibilities. This local MOA outlined changes in responsibilities
for perimeter security. Specifically, the Marshals Service agreed to
be responsible for perimeter security at this federal building and
courthouse, and FPS agreed to reimburse the Marshals Service for
security services.
Limited Use of or Participation in Existing Collaboration Mechanisms:
In addition to fragmentation of roles and responsibilities, federal
stakeholders have not always used or participated in existing
collaboration mechanisms, particularly security committees. We have
previously reported that information sharing and coordination among
organizations is crucial to addressing threats, and having a process
in place to obtain and share information can help agencies better
understand risk and more effectively determine what preventative
measures should be implemented. CSCs and FSCs are intended to provide
a means for federal stakeholders to discuss and coordinate their court
security activities at the local level.[Footnote 33] CSCs are also
responsible for addressing security countermeasures recommended by the
Marshals Service or FPS, and FSCs are responsible for addressing
security countermeasures recommended by FPS. At 4 of the 11
courthouses we visited, officials noted one of the federal agencies on
the CSCs or FSCs did not regularly participate in meetings.[Footnote
34] Specifically, at 3 of the courthouses, FPS did not regularly
participate in CSC meetings, though FPS was designated as a member of
the committees and was responsible for perimeter security at these
courthouses. FPS officials told us they had not been notified about
CSC meetings and, as a result, did not participate in the meetings. In
1 courthouse, GSA did not regularly participate in CSC meetings,
though GSA was designated as a member of the committee. In these
locations GSA officials told us that they believed that issues
discussed at the CSC meetings did not apply to them and, thus, did not
attend. Without attending these meetings, agencies may be missing
opportunities to share information and coordinate with stakeholders so
that security risks are better understood and addressed. Information
sharing and coordination are key practices in facility protection that
we have identified, and these committees are intended to serve this
purpose in the courthouse security area.
DOJ's Office of Inspector General (IG) also found participation
problems related to the security committees. In November 2010, the IG
reported that among six judicial districts visited, one did not have a
CSC and another was not holding regular meetings.[Footnote 35] The
Chief Judge in the latter district stated that the CSC was generally
not holding meetings due to poor communication between the Marshals
Service and the judiciary. The DOJ IG recommended that the Marshals
Service ensure all its district offices assign a principal coordinator
to the district security committee and encourage the local judiciary
to lead regular meetings. The Marshals Service concurred with the
recommendation and stated they would emphasize the requirement and
noted that existing policy directs the Marshals Service to serve as
principal coordinator for CSC meetings and for Marshals Service
judicial security inspectors to attend and participate in CSCs.
In August 2010 we identified lack of participation and other
challenges associated with FSCs, which raised questions about their
effectiveness as a collaboration mechanism.[Footnote 36] We reported
that FSCs have operated since 1995 without procedures that outline how
they should operate or make decisions or that establish
accountability. Further, we identified instances in which tenant
agency representatives to the FSC generally did not have any security
knowledge or experience but were expected to make security decisions
for their respective agencies. We also reported that many FSC tenant
agency representatives did not have the authority to commit their
respective organizations to fund security countermeasures. This issue
was brought to our attention at two of the courthouses we visited. In
one location, the chair of the FSC said that FPS made a request for
various security enhancements to the building, which were the first
infrastructure enhancements in at least 12 years. However, none of the
tenants had the authority to approve the increased costs.
Additionally, court officials at another location we visited said the
FSC works through a vote system, and each tenant agency gets the
opportunity to hear the issue and to voice their vote. However, the
officials said that tenant agencies could not commit to financial
decisions at that level. ISC developed procedures for FSCs to use when
presented with security issues that affect the entire facility.
[Footnote 37] These standards, which are being tested for a 1 year
period, note that FSC members may or may not have the authority to
obligate their respective organizations to a financial commitment, and
FSC members are responsible for seeking guidance from their respective
funding authority.
Lack of Clarity on GSA's Role in Security:
According to Marshals Service, GSA, and FPS officials, GSA's
courthouse security responsibilities have not been clearly defined
since the transfer of FPS to DHS in 2003. The 1997 MOA identifies
individual stakeholders' roles and responsibilities, as well as areas
requiring collaboration, in securing federal courthouses, and was
signed by DOJ, GSA (of which FPS was a part), and AOUSC. However, the
2004 reaffirmation was signed by DOJ, DHS, and AOUSC; GSA was not a
signatory, and according to GSA officials, they were not invited by
the other agencies to participate in the reaffirmation. The 2004
reaffirmation updated the 1997 MOA by acknowledging the transfer of
FPS from GSA to DHS; it did not make any other modifications to the
MOA. However, the reaffirmation did not clearly articulate which
security responsibilities GSA--which has responsibility for managing
all federal courthouses--retained and which specific responsibilities
were transferred to DHS. GSA officials told us that this lack of
clarity leads to confusion about which stakeholder is ultimately
responsible for taking action. GSA officials told us that there have
been instances in which they are consulted about security issues for
which they do not have responsibility or they are excluded from
security discussions where they have responsibilities. For example,
the officials noted it is not uncommon for a U.S. Marshal or chief
judge who is unfamiliar with the court security framework to approach
GSA and expect them to take action to address security concerns, even
though it may be FPS's responsibility.[Footnote 38] Further, GSA
officials noted instances in which GSA has security responsibilities,
such as installing bollards, barriers, and other physical changes to
the building, but GSA was not always included in the security
decisions. Lack of clarity in these types of situations can cause
confusion, lead to implementation delays, and lengthen the amount of
time needed to address vulnerabilities, according to GSA officials.
Further, Marshals Service officials told us that there is a lack of
clarity about GSA's roles and responsibilities, including the extent
of GSA's participation in CSCs and FSCs. These officials also told us
that updating the MOA would help address this issue and noted that
there have been preliminary discussions between the stakeholders about
doing so.
GSA headquarters officials also told us that they should have been a
signatory to the reaffirmation because in addition to their security
responsibilities, GSA is the landlord for all federal facilities that
house judicial personnel. In June 2005 we reported on GSA's role in
facility protection since September 11, 2001.[Footnote 39] Prior to
the creation of DHS, we reported that if DHS was given the
responsibility for securing facilities, the role of integrating
security with other real-property functions would be an important
consideration. We later noted that it would be critical that GSA be
well-equipped to engage in security related matters given that it is
still the owner and landlord of federal facilities. According to GSA,
permanent security enhancements, such as installing bollards and
altering buildings to improve circulation patterns, are GSA's
responsibility and cannot be implemented without GSA's involvement.
Also in 2005, we recommended that GSA should establish a mechanism--
such as a chief security officer position or formal point of contact--
that could serve in a liaison role to address the challenges GSA faces
related to security in buildings it owns and leases, and enable GSA to
define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS to DHS
so it would be better equipped to address security related matters
related to its federal building portfolio. GSA subsequently
established such a position.
Furthermore, related to GSA's role, GSA and DHS have yet to complete a
revised agreement of their own on security fees and protection
responsibilities for all GSA buildings, including courthouses. DHS and
GSA signed an MOA in 2006 that outlines the roles, responsibilities,
and operational relationships between DHS and GSA, but progress has
been slow in updating the document. DHS and GSA are renegotiating the
2006 MOA to, among other things, address communication and information-
sharing issues and address service concerns by tenants. However, DHS
and GSA have been working to update the MOA for more than 3 years. A
number of issues remain to be worked out, including outlining what the
basic security fee covers and the sharing of security assessments; GSA
and DHS have a goal of completing the MOA by the end of fiscal year
2011.
These three challenges--fragmentation in implementation of roles and
responsibilities, limitations in the use of existing collaboration
mechanisms, and lack of clarity about GSA's security roles and
responsibilities--have affected stakeholders' efforts to secure
courthouses. It is difficult to directly link these challenges to
specific security vulnerabilities, but further clarifying roles and
responsibilities at the national and local levels, including GSA's
security roles and participation in security committees, could help
strengthen accountability, transparency, and coordination on
courthouse security efforts among federal stakeholders. It could also
help provide opportunities for federal stakeholders to identify and
address any potential gaps or unnecessary overlaps in their security
efforts and activities. In so doing, federal stakeholders may be
better equipped to address security vulnerabilities that may arise.
In 2008 Congress authorized the Marshals Service, in consultation with
the AOUSC, to implement a Perimeter Pilot Security Program for the
Marshals Service to assume FPS's responsibilities to provide perimeter
security at selected courthouses participating in the
program.[Footnote 40] The purpose of the pilot program was to
determine the feasibility of the Marshals Service providing perimeter
security services at selected primary courthouses--federal facilities
in which judiciary and judiciary related offices occupy at least 75
percent of rentable space. According to Marshals Service officials,
the pilot program's goal was to eliminate duplication and system
incompatibilities, streamline guard services and post orders, and
provide clearer accountability for court security.
Beginning in January 2009, the Marshals Service began providing
perimeter security at seven courthouses. Prior to initiation of the
pilot program, the Marshals Service and FPS signed an MOA in 2008
defining the conditions of the pilot program and noting that the
Marshals Service would conduct periodic reviews of the status and
effectiveness of the program and share written status reports with
FPS. At these courthouses the Marshals Service conducted on-site
assessments to inspect the existing perimeter security systems and
equipment to determine if they could be used "as is" or needed to be
repaired, modified, or replaced to meet its standards. It also
assessed the security guard requirements and proposed a plan that it
thought would provide optimal security coverage. The Marshals Service
assumed control of physical security of each courthouse in the pilot
program with the understanding that it would be responsible for
inspecting, adjusting, repairing, and replacing all FPS-owned
surveillance cameras and associated equipment.
In October 2010, the judiciary issued its final evaluation report to
Congress on the implementation and operation of the pilot program,
recommending that the pilot program be expanded to all primary
courthouses. The report noted that the general consensus of opinions
expressed by judges, court officials, and district Marshals Service
was in support of the pilot program. Specifically, the report noted
that program participants had positive views about Marshals Service's
consolidation of command and control over all aspects of physical
security at the pilot sites, which they believed resulted in improved
protection for both people and buildings. Participants stated that the
benefits of the program included, among other things, improved quality
of security services, security coverage, communication, stewardship
and monitoring of security equipment, as well as unified command and
control over courthouse physical security. Additionally, in November
2009, the Marshals Service conducted a survey at 5 of the 7
courthouses participating in the pilot program. Representatives at 4
of these courthouses stated that the pilot program was effective and
supported the concept for wider implementation.[Footnote 41]
Subsequent to completing this survey, Marshals Service officials at
the fifth courthouse told us they endorse the program. Among the 11
courthouses we visited, 2 were participating in the pilot program.
Marshals Service and court officials we spoke with at both courthouses
generally expressed satisfaction with the pilot program.
The judiciary and Marshals Service conducted their evaluation of the
pilot program by collecting information from the chief district judge,
the district U.S. Marshal, and other court and Marshals Service staff
at the seven courthouses participating in the program. The Marshals
Service also inspected, adjusted, repaired, or replaced all FPS-owned
security equipment, and at some sites additional equipment was added
to enhance security.[Footnote 42] Further, AOUSC estimated additional
costs that would occur if the pilot program was expanded to other
primary courthouses, based on various options. In particular, the
report estimated additional annual costs ranging from more than $1.5
million for expanding the program to selected, large courthouses
(i.e., primary courthouses with 11 to 20 judges each) and extra large
courthouses (primary courthouses with 21 or more judges each) to about
$200 million for expanding the program to all primary courthouses.
According to AOUSC, the initial pilot program was implemented in a
cost-neutral manner, but stated that cost neutrality would not be
possible if the Marshals Service were to assume responsibility at
primary courthouses nationwide.[Footnote 43]
Although AOUSC has recommended expansion of the pilot program on the
basis of its evaluation, additional analysis of the benefits and costs
of this approach could better position the federal stakeholders and
Congress to consider and determine whether to expand the pilot. Pilot
programs can be one way to identify innovative efforts to improve
performance, as they allow for experiences to be rigorously evaluated,
shared systematically with others, and for new procedures to be
adjusted, as appropriate, before they receive wider application. Key
practices in assessing the results of pilot programs include a range
of standards, such as having a clearly articulated methodology, a
strategy for comparing results with other efforts, and a cost-
effectiveness analysis to ensure that the program produces sufficient
benefits in relation to its costs.[Footnote 44] Additionally, having a
process in place to obtain and share information can help agencies
more effectively make decisions and would be consistent with key
practices in facility protection that we have identified. Expanding
the pilot program and shifting to an approach for all primary
courthouses in which the Marshals Service would be solely responsible
for building security would fundamentally alter how courthouse
security is managed, as FPS has significant courthouse security
responsibilities. FPS management officials told us that AOUSC and the
Marshals Service did not consult with them in evaluating the pilot,
nor would AOUSC provide FPS with a copy of the completed evaluation
when it was requested. These FPS officials also raised concerns that
FPS's views were not discussed in the evaluation, including the
protection of other federal tenants in these courthouses. They noted
that FPS continues to have statutory responsibilities for providing
security to those tenants not involved with court business. The
officials also noted that the Marshals Service did not provide the
required quarterly statistics on security incidents in a majority of
regions where pilot program facilities were located. Furthermore, GSA
officials told us that, as the building owner, they should have been
involved in discussions on any expansion of the pilot program.
Additionally, FPS and GSA are in the process of renegotiating the
basic security fee structure all tenants pay to FPS.[Footnote 45] By
further assessing possible costs for expanding the pilot program and
consulting with other stakeholders, such as GSA and FPS, the Marshals
Service and federal stakeholders could consider additional information
to help them better evaluate whether to expand the program and
communicate this information to Congress.
FPS and the Marshals Service Have Risk Management Tools, but
Significant Improvement Is Needed in This Area:
FPS and the Marshals Service Have Developed Tools for Assessing Risks
to Courthouses:
Both the Marshals Service and FPS have developed tools, particularly
risk assessments, to help identify security vulnerabilities and manage
risk. The Marshals Service is required to conduct an annual security
survey in each judicial district and develop security plans for every
judicial facility.[Footnote 46] FPS is supposed to conduct facility
security assessments (FSA) to identify security vulnerabilities and
make recommendations. FSAs are to be conducted on a regular schedule,
and during this process FPS is required to conduct an on-site physical
security analysis.[Footnote 47] FPS assessments generally focus on
building systems and perimeter and entry issues (e.g., emergency power
systems; heating, air conditioning, and air intake systems; bollards
and barriers, and building setbacks), while Marshals Service
assessments generally focus on security issues within the court
portions of the building and are supposed to include detailed
information on courtrooms, judge's chambers and clerks offices, and
prisoner movement. We have previously reported that allocating
resources using risk management is a facility protection key
practice.[Footnote 48] More specifically, risk management involves a
systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a
threat will endanger an asset (structure, individual, or function) and
identify, evaluate, select, and implement actions that reduce the risk
or mitigate the consequences of an event. Although applying risk
management principles to facility protection can take various forms,
our past work showed that most risk management approaches generally
involve identifying potential threats, assessing vulnerabilities,
identifying the assets that are most critical to protect in terms of
mission and significance, and evaluating mitigation alternatives for
their likely effect on risk and their cost. As such, using risk
assessments for decision making serves as the backbone to a
comprehensive facility protection program.
The Marshals Service and FPS Have Faced Difficulties in Assessing
Risks to Courthouses:
The Marshals Service and FPS have not always conducted risk
assessments of courthouses, as required by their respective guidance
and directives. With regard to the Marshals Service, in 9 of the 11
courthouses we visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted risk
assessments--what the Marshals refer to as court security facility
surveys--for their judicial facilities. Marshals Service officials at
6 courthouses told us they assess security needs as part of the budget
process. According to Marshals Service officials, each courthouse
conducts an annual nationwide budget call to determine each court's
current and future requirements for CSOs. Although the budget process
requires information about projected guard, security systems, and
equipment needs, the Marshals Service Judicial Security Directive
requires each court to have a completed court security facility survey
based on a specific format outlined in the policy.[Footnote 49] This
format is more comprehensive and includes detailed questions on the
types of weapons guards carry, the agency responsible for overall
building security, and who monitors cameras--information which goes
beyond what is required as part of the budget formulation process.
Similar to our findings, a November 2010 DOJ IG report[Footnote 50]
found that although court security facility surveys are required
annually and the results are to be used to develop or update judicial
security plans, these plans were not always updated as required, and
in one instance had not been updated since 1983. The DOJ IG found that
Marshals Service officials were not completing court security facility
surveys in three of the six districts it examined. The DOJ IG
recommended that the Marshals Service ensure all district offices
regularly update their plans and ensure that court security facility
surveys are performed at each district and judicial security plans are
updated as required. The Marshals Service agreed with the
recommendation and noted it will emphasize the requirements to ensure
it is a component of the district audit program and the annual
district self assessment.
FPS has also faced difficulties in preparing FSAs. For example, we
have previously reported that FPS's assessments are vulnerable to
subjectivity because they lack a vigorous risk assessment methodology,
and inspectors' compliance with policies and procedures in conducting
assessments is inconsistent.[Footnote 51] FPS initially tried to
address these issues by implementing a new risk management program
that was to incorporate a less subjective and time-consuming
assessment tool. However the program, known as the Risk Assessment
Management Program, experienced considerable delays, and FPS recently
halted implementation.[Footnote 52]
Moreover, federal stakeholders have experienced disagreements about
the sharing of completed security surveys and FSAs. We have reported
that information sharing among organizations is crucial to producing
comprehensive and practical approaches and solutions to address
terrorist threats directed at federal facilities. Our work showed that
by having a process in place to obtain and share information on
potential threats to federal facilities, agencies can better
understand the risk they face and more effectively determine what
preventive measures should be implemented. At the two courthouses
where the Marshals Service had completed risk assessments, the
Marshals Service did not provide other stakeholders, including FPS,
with a copy. Further, prior to fiscal year 2010 FPS officials told us
that they shared the executive summaries of their FSAs, rather than
the full FSAs, with other members of security committees because the
FSAs were law-enforcement sensitive. At the courthouses we visited,
FPS completed the FSA at each courthouse prior to fiscal year 2010.
Marshals Service, GSA, and court officials told us that they did not
consistently receive full FSAs from FPS at the courthouses we visited.
For example, at five courthouses we visited, court officials stated
that they did not receive executive summaries or full FSAs from FPS.
At three courthouses we visited, Marshals Service officials told us
that they also did not receive copies of FPS's full FSAs. In those
cases when officials received copies of the executive summaries, they
noted that the information contained in them was inadequate to inform
security decision making. For example, one official told us that the
executive summaries did not contain sufficient evidence on which to
base decisions. Moreover, we have previously found that GSA officials
at all levels cite limitations with the executive summaries of FPS's
FSAs saying, for example, that the summaries do not contain enough
contextual information on threats and vulnerabilities to support
countermeasure recommendations and to justify the expenses that would
be incurred by installing additional countermeasures.[Footnote 53]
According to FPS officials, they began providing full versions of the
assessments completed in fiscal year 2010 and after to security
committee members, and they plan to document FPS's commitment to share
full FSAs specifically with GSA in the update to the DHS and GSA 2006
MOA, which DHS and GSA plan to complete by the end of fiscal year
2011. GSA officials stated they have received some full FSAs from FPS
among those completed. While these are positive steps, FPS has
completed a small number of FSAs since fiscal year 2010 in part
because of challenges faced by FPS in moving toward a new risk
assessment and management system. For example, in July 2011 we
reported that FPS's Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP)
tool, which FPS was to launch in 2009 as a web-based risk assessment
and guard management system, was behind schedule, over budget, and
could not be used to complete FSAs. Among other things, we recommended
that FPS develop interim solutions for completing FSAs. FPS concurred
with this recommendation and reported that it is revalidating RAMP
requirements with its stakeholders to strengthen future RAMP
investments and assessing alternative programs.
Given the current challenges faced by the Marshals Service and FPS in
conducting and sharing risk assessments, federal stakeholders lack the
information needed to comprehensively assess and understand security
risks both to individual courthouses and across the entire portfolio
of courthouses. Without a comprehensive picture of risks, federal
stakeholders face difficulties in prioritizing risks in light of
available resources and in determining appropriate measures to
mitigate those risks. We have reported that the capability to gauge
risk across a portfolio of facilities and make resource allocation
decisions accordingly represents an advanced use of risk management.
The ability to compare risks across buildings is important because it
could allow stakeholders to comprehensively identify and prioritize
risks and countermeasure recommendations at a national level and
direct resources toward alleviating them. One possible mechanism for
addressing these challenges could be for FPS and the Marshals Service
to conduct joint security assessments, according to one FPS regional
director. We have previously reported that in situations where
agencies conduct similar but fragmented functions and provide results
to the same recipients, agencies coordinating and integrating their
efforts have the potential to achieve greater efficiencies. By
ensuring that security surveys and assessments are completed and
shared, FPS and the Marshals Service could strengthen their efforts to
identify security vulnerabilities at courthouses, determine measures
to help address or mitigate those vulnerabilities, and communicate
information on vulnerabilities and security needs to relevant
stakeholders, as appropriate.
Conclusions:
Given the nature of judicial business and increased potential threats
to federal courts, securing courthouses requires collaboration and
coordination among the various federal stakeholders responsible for
security and tenant agencies present in facilities that house federal
courts. Federal stakeholders have taken action to define and implement
their roles and responsibilities for securing courthouses and to
mitigate threats and vulnerabilities. However, updating the MOA that
identifies these roles and responsibilities to better incorporate
accountability for federal agencies' collaborative efforts could
strengthen the multiagency courthouse security framework. In
particular, clarifying stakeholder roles and responsibilities,
participation in security committees, and the parameters under which
deviating from roles and responsibilities is agreeable to the
stakeholders and would benefit from location-specific agreements,
would strengthen the MOA. Furthermore, clarifying GSA's role in the
current security framework and instilling greater accountability for
security committee participation could be addressed in an MOA update.
In addition to these areas of collaboration, risk assessments that are
to be conducted by the Marshals Service and FPS are the primary tools
for identifying and addressing security vulnerabilities at
courthouses. As such, updating the MOA to help ensure that these
assessments, referred to by the Marshals Service as court security
facility surveys and by FPS as FSAs, are completed in a timely manner
and the results shared with the other federal agencies responsible for
courthouse security, could better equip federal stakeholders to assess
courthouses' security needs and gaps and make informed decisions.
The pilot program, whereby the Marshals Service has assumed
responsibility for security at a limited number of primary
courthouses, explores a fundamental change in how courthouse security
is managed. Although AOUSC has recommended expanding this program to
other primary courthouses, additional information on the costs and
views of other stakeholders, such as FPS and GSA, on expansion of the
program could better position the federal stakeholders and Congress to
evaluate expansion options.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Attorney General. Recognizing that there are several
stakeholders involved in courthouse security, we are addressing these
recommendations to the Secretary and Attorney General because their
departments have primary responsibility for courthouse security.
However, as indicated below, implementation of these recommendations
includes consultation and agreement with the judiciary and GSA.
First, we recommend that the Secretary and Attorney General instruct
the Director of FPS, and the Director of the Marshals Service,
respectively, to jointly lead an effort, in consultation and agreement
with the judiciary and GSA, to update the MOA on courthouse security
to address the challenges discussed in this report. Specifically, in
this update to the MOA stakeholders should:
(1) clarify federal stakeholders' roles and responsibilities
including, but not limited to, the conditions under which stakeholders
may assume each other's responsibilities and whether such agreements
should be documented; and define GSA's responsibilities and determine
whether GSA should be included as a signatory to the updated MOA;
(2) outline how they will ensure greater participation of relevant
stakeholders in court or facility security committees; and:
(3) specify how they will complete required risk assessments for
courthouses, referred to by the Marshals Service as court security
facility surveys and by FPS as FSAs, and ensure that the results of
those assessments are shared with relevant stakeholders, as
appropriate.
Second, to the extent that steps are taken to expand the perimeter
pilot program, we recommend that the Secretary and Attorney General
instruct the Director of FPS, and the Director of the Marshals
Service, respectively, to work collaboratively, in consultation and
agreement with the judiciary and GSA, to further assess costs and
benefits, in terms of enhanced security, of expanding the pilot
program to other primary courthouses, and assess all stakeholders'
views about the pilot program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ, DHS, AOUSC, and GSA for
their review and comment. In an email from DOJ's Acting Assistant
Director for the Audit Liaison Group dated September 15, 2011, DOJ
indicated that the Marshals Service concurred with the recommendations
and would not be providing written comments. We received written
comments from DHS, AOUSC, and GSA, which are reproduced in full in
appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively. DHS also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS concurred with our recommendations. With regard to the first
recommendation, that FPS and the Marshals Service jointly lead an
effort to update the MOA on courthouse security, DHS stated that it
agrees that the current MOA should be reviewed and revised. DHS noted
that it is committed to working collaboratively with all parties to
further determine the conditions under which stakeholders may assume
multiple and overlapping responsibilities. With regard to the second
recommendation that FPS and the Marshals Service work collaboratively
to further assess costs and benefits of expanding the pilot program,
DHS agreed that continued collaboration and further review of pilot
program results would enhance security at federal courts. DHS also
noted that it did not agree with any suggested expansion of the pilot
program to include additional facilities. We did not recommend or
suggest that the pilot project should be expanded in this report.
Rather, this report notes that further assessment of the costs and
benefits of the project and further consultation with stakeholders
could provide additional information to help better evaluate whether
to expand the program.
During the comment period, AOUSC requested that we clarify the
judiciary's role related to the recommendations. Specifically, AOUSC
requested that the recommendations explicitly state that the Marshals
Service and FPS should seek the judiciary's agreement when
implementing them. We concluded that this change would help to clarify
the recommendations, and we modified the recommendations to state that
the Marshals Service and FPS should seek the agreement of both the
judiciary and GSA as key stakeholders in implementing our recommended
actions. In its written comments, AOUSC expressed appreciation for our
recognition of the judiciary's role in courthouse security.
GSA expressed similar concerns, during the comment period, about the
first recommendation that the Marshals Service and FPS jointly lead an
effort, in direct consultation with other federal stakeholders, to
update the MOA on courthouse security. We informed GSA of our
clarifications to the recommendations that the Marshals Service and
FPS should seek agreement with the judiciary and GSA in implementing
the recommendations. In its written comments, GSA requested that we
revise the first recommendation to ensure that all stakeholders be
involved in updating the MOA and that all stakeholders be included as
signatories. We did not make further modifications to the
recommendations in response to GSA's written comments for two reasons.
First, the recommendation calls for the Marshals Service and FPS to
jointly lead an effort to update the MOA on courthouse security in
direct consultation and agreement with other federal stakeholders,
specifically the judiciary and GSA. As such, we believe that this
recommendation already ensures that stakeholders, including the
judiciary and GSA, would be involved in the effort to update the MOA.
Second, in our view, having the judiciary, Marshals Service, FPS, and
GSA reach agreement on GSA's role, as a part of updating the MOA,
would be a more cooperative approach to resolving this issue and would
reflect key practices in interagency collaboration that call for
federal agencies to work together to define and agree on their
respective roles and responsibilities, including how the collaborative
effort should be led. The recommendation states that the Marshals
Service and FPS would need to seek GSA's consultation and agreement on
whether GSA should be a signatory.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies
of this report to the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland
Security, Administrator of the General Services Administration,
Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, selected
congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-6670 or goldsteinm@gao.gov, or
William Jenkins at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in
appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Mark L. Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Signed by:
William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify the attributes of federal courthouses contributing to
concerns about their security, we examined U.S. Marshals Service
(Marshals Service) and Federal Protective Service (FPS) documentation
of courthouse security challenges and vulnerabilities, such as
security assessments and surveys of federal courthouses. We also
visited 11 federal courthouses in 10 U.S. locations. We selected these
courthouses based on a mix of criteria that included (1) geographic
location, including courthouses in various U.S. Court regions, near
U.S. borders, and in cities of different sizes; (2) age of
courthouses, including historic courthouses; (3) size of courthouses;
and (4) tenancy in facilities with courthouses, including courthouses
located in multitenant and primary courthouse facilities; and (5)
courthouses participating in the perimeter security pilot program. At
each courthouse, we toured the facility and observed security gaps or
vulnerabilities as well as countermeasures. We also obtained federal
officials' information and views on the courthouses' security
vulnerabilities by interviewing officials from the Marshals Service,
FPS, the General Services Administration (GSA), and the courts,
including court clerks and federal judges. The information we obtained
from observing security activities at these locations and interviewing
officials cannot be generalized across all federal courthouses in the
United States. However, because we selected these courthouses based on
a variety of factors, they provided us with an overview of security at
federal courthouses, examples of security vulnerabilities, and
challenges in protecting courthouses.
To assess the extent to which federal stakeholders have collaborated
and used risk management practices to protect federal courthouses, we
examined relevant statutes; and documentation from the Marshals
Service, FPS, GSA, and the judiciary, including plans, reports,
guidance, security assessments, and surveys.[Footnote 54] In
particular, we reviewed federal laws that set forth roles and
responsibilities for protecting federal courthouses. Additionally, we
reviewed documents such as memoranda of agreement and agency-specific
guidance, such as Marshals Service and FPS memorandums and security
directives. We observed federal stakeholders' implementation of these
roles and responsibilities at the 11 federal courthouses we visited,
and obtained views from Marshals Service, FPS, GSA, and judiciary
officials at these locations and headquarters. At two courthouses, FPS
regional officials with responsibility for protection of other
courthouses in their regions provided us with examples of security
arrangements at those other courthouses. We relied on officials to
bring security issues to our attention at the individual courthouses.
Therefore, we could not always determine whether these issues were
present at other courthouses unless officials brought them to our
attention. Further, we analyzed federal stakeholders' processes for
conducting security assessments and surveys at federal courthouses and
for coordinating courthouse security decision making and activities
examining documentation of these processes and interviewing federal
stakeholders at headquarters and our site visit locations. The
information we obtained from our site visits cannot be generalized
across all U.S. federal courthouses, but because we selected the
courthouses based on a mix of criteria, they provided us with examples
of federal stakeholders' implementation of courthouse security
activities. We compared federal stakeholders' efforts to secure
courthouses to criteria in our prior work on effective interagency
collaboration and results-oriented government, key practices for
facility protection, and key practices for assessing pilot
programs.[Footnote 55] We also compared the implementation of federal
stakeholders' security roles and responsibilities with those
designated in the 1997 courthouse security MOA as reaffirmed in 2004.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to September
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
September 26, 2011:
Mark L. Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: Draft Report GAO-11-857, "Federal Courthouses: Improved
Collaboration Needed to Meet the Needs of a Complex Security
Environment"
Dear Mr. Goldstein:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and
conducting its review and issuing this report.
The Department is pleased to note GAO's positive acknowledgment of the
Federal Protective Services' (FPS's) collaboration efforts with the
United States Marshals Service (USMS) to secure courthouses. For
example, since 2007, FPS has had a full-time liaison with USMS to
identify and resolve courthouse security issues of mutual interest,
which both agencies agree has improved communication and coordination.
The draft report contained two recommendations directed at DHS, with
which the Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General:
Recommendation 1: Instruct the Director of FPS and the Director of the
Marshals Service, respectively, to jointly lead an effort, in direct
consultation with other federal stakeholders, to update the MOA on
courthouse security to security to address the challenges discussed in
the draft report. Specifically, in this update to the MOA stakeholders
should:
1. clarify federal stakeholders roles and responsibilities, including,
but not limited to, the conditions under which stakeholders may assume
each other's responsibilities and whether such agreements should be
documented; and defining the GSA responsibilities and determining
whether GSA should be included as a signatory to the updated MOA;
2. outline how they will ensure greater participation of relevant
stakeholders in court or facility security committees; and;
3. specify how they will complete required risk assessments for
courthouses, referred to by the Marshals as court security facility
surveys and by FPS as FSAs and ensure that the results of those
assessments are shared with relevant stakeholders, as appropriate.
Response: Concur. DHS agrees that the current memorandum of agreement
(MOA) among FPS, USMS, and the Administrative Office of United States
Courts (AUOSC) should be reviewed and revised to clarify roles and
responsibilities of all parties; to ensure greater participation of
all parties in both the Court Security Committee and Facility Security
Committee; and to outline responsibilities for completion of required
assessments for courthouse security, as well as the appropriate
mechanism for sharing assessments. DHS is committed to working
collaboratively with all parties to further determine the conditions
under which stakeholders may assume multiple and overlapping
responsibilities.
Recommendation 2: To the extent that steps are taken to expand the
perimeter pilot project, instruct the Director of FPS, and the
Director of the Marshals Service, respectively, to work
collaboratively, in direct consultation with other stakeholders
including the judiciary and GSA, to further assess costs and benefits,
in terms of enhanced security, of expanding the pilot project to other
primary courthouses, and assess all stakeholders' views about the pilot
program.
Response: Concur. We agree that continued collaboration and further
review of pilot program results will enhance security at federal
courts. However, we do not agree with any suggested expansion of the
pilot program to include additional facilities.
The protection of the people in the buildings and on the grounds of
property owned, occupied, or secured by the Federal Government is an
authority provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. FPS is the primary federal agency
responsible for patrolling and protecting the perimeter of General
Services Administration-(GSA-)controlled facilities, including
facilities housing federal court functions and judicial officers, as
well as enforcing federal laws and regulations. FPS exercises the
Secretary's authority and is responsible for the safety of more than 1
million people and for the security of more than 9,000 facilities
nationwide each day, including, of course, courthouses.
The transfer of FPS into the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) unified the Department's efforts to ensure security
of the federal facilities sector within the Directorate, enabling DHS
to provide a comprehensive infrastructure protection program under the
guidance provided by, and in collaboration with, the Interagency
Security Committee (ISC). In addition to those synergies, NPPD/FPS
plans to leverage guidance from the ISC, which issued an interim
standard in July 2011 titled, Facility Security Committees: An
Interagency Security Committee Standard. This guidance will improve
upon existing internal management of facility protection at federal
courts among NPPD/FPS, USMS, and AOUSC. NPPD/FPS will continue to work
closely with USMS, AOUSC, and GSA to ensure cost-effective law
enforcement and security services are provided at all U.S. courthouses.
NPPD/FPS will likewise continue its efforts to ensure improvement with
coordination of command and control, security roles and
responsibilities, and meaningful participation in security committees.
Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comment on this
draft report. Extensive technical comments were previously provided
under separate cover. We look forward to working with you on future
Homeland Security related issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jim H. Crumpacker:
Director:
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts:
Administrative Office Of The United States Courts:
James C. Duff, Director:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544:
September 14, 2011:
Mr. Mark L. Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Mr. William 0. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Goldstein and Mr. Jenkins:
I write on behalf of the Federal Judiciary to thank you for the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft report entitled
Federal Courthouses: Improved Collaboration Needed to Meet the Needs
of a Complex Security Environment (GAO-11-857). We appreciate GAO's
work in assessing the manner in which the security of federal
courthouses is provided. The Judiciary takes seriously its obligation
to be open and accessible to the public, while providing a safe and
secure environment that protects judges, witnesses, defendants,
employees, and visitors to courthouses. To fulfill this obligation,
the Judiciary collaborates extensively with the United States Marshals
Service (USMS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS), and the General
Services Administration (GSA), all three of which provide courthouse
security services. As you know, the funding for these services comes
from the Judiciary's budget. In fiscal year 2012, these services will
cost the Judiciary approximately $500 million.
The Judiciary and the USMS have had a long-standing partnership on
court security matters. Following recommendations made by the 1982
Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Court Security and the
endorsement of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
Judiciary provides funds for the Judicial Facility Security Program.
The USMS administers the program, which provides security systems,
equipment, and Court Security Officers (contracted guards) at
courthouses. The Judiciary is satisfied that the public is well served
by this arrangement.
We appreciate that GAO recognizes the Judiciary as an equal partner in
courthouse security. It is our understanding that the final version of
the report will ensure that all stakeholders, including the Judiciary,
must be consulted with and agree to terms that will be memorialized in
future Memoranda of Agreement.
We look forward to working closely with the other government entities
to ensure the safety and security of our federal courthouses.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James C. Duff:
Director:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the General Services Administration:
U.S. General Services Administration:
GSA Administrator:
1275 First Street, NE:
Washington, DC 25117:
[hyperlink, http://www/gsa.gov]
September 21, 2011:
The Honorable Gene L. Dodaro:
Comptroller General of the United States:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Dodaro:
The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) appreciates the
opportunity to comment on the draft U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report titled, Federal Courthouses: Improved
Collaboration Needed to Meet the Needs of a Complex Security
Environment (GAO-11-857).
GSA believes in the importance of U.S. Courthouses and their security.
As the Federal Government landlord, it is our responsibility to ensure
our buildings are safe and secure, while at the same time welcoming
for all tenants and visitors. This requires a comprehensive
understanding of the threats facing our facilities, the accurate and
timely identification of vulnerabilities, and a clear understanding of
the tools available to us to overcome the vulnerabilities and counter
the threats. GSA works closely with the Judiciary, U.S. Marshals
Service (USMS), and Federal Protective Service (FPS) to develop and
implement policies and procedures to achieve this goal.
In this draft report, GAO recommends that the Secretary and Attorney
General instruct the Director of FPS and the Director of USMS to
update the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on courthouse security to
address the challenges discussed in this draft report. GAO further
recommends that FPS and USMS clarify Federal stakeholders' roles and
responsibilities in this MOA.
Due to the importance of collaboration needed between FPS. USMS, the
Judiciary, and GSA for effective courthouse security, GSA recommends
that GAO revise this first recommendation to ensure that all of these
critical stakeholders be involved in revising the MOA and included as
a signatory. These relevant parties need to be included in the MOA
decision making process and implementation to ensure success in
achieving optimal courthouse security.
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to
contact me. Staff inquiries may be directed to Mr. Robert A. Peck,
Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, at (202) 501-1100 or Mr. Larry
Melton, Assistant Commissioner, Facilities Management and Services
Program, at (202) 501-3677.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Martha Johnson:
Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-6670, goldsteinm@gao.gov:
William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512-8777, jenkinswo@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant
Director; David Sausville, Assistant Director; Aaron Kaminsky, analyst-
in-charge; R. Rochelle Burns; Andy Clinton; Ray Griffith; Brian
Hartman; Delwen Jones; Susan Michal-Smith; and Sara Ann Moessbauer
made significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] These 424 courthouses include federal district, appellate, and
bankruptcy courthouses. The General Services Administration (GSA)
reported to us that the agency counts 413 federal courthouses. GSA and
AOUSC count courthouses differently because of how each defines what
constitutes a courthouse. For example, GSA told us the agency counts a
building as a courthouse if it contains a courtroom, and not if it
includes other court-related functions. AOUSC officials told us they
count buildings in a complex or campus setting as one courthouse. The
federal courthouse system is divided into 94 judicial districts, which
consist of district and bankruptcy courts. Those 94 judicial districts
are organized into 12 regional circuits, each of which has a United
States court of appeals. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion
throughout this report refers to federal district courts, which are
the judiciary's "trial courts."
[2] Throughout this report, we refer to federal agencies and the
judiciary, which have responsibilities related to courthouse security,
as federal stakeholders.
[3] For the purposes of this report, we refer to property that is
owned by the federal government and under the control and custody of
GSA as GSA-owned property.
[4] At two courthouses, FPS regional officials with responsibility for
protection of other courthouses in their regions provided us with
examples of security arrangements at those other courthouses.
[5] For the purposes of this report "courthouses" refers to federal
district courthouses. We focused on district courthouses unless
otherwise noted--not other judiciary facilities like courts of appeals
or leased space--because district courthouses make up the largest
portion of judiciary facilities, have been a significant focus of
security efforts, and are the busiest in terms of judiciary business
and public access.
[6] GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate
Federal Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key
Practices, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004), and Results- Oriented Government:
Practices That Can Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal
Agencies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
[7] 40 U.S.C. § 1315.
[8] 28 U.S.C. § 566. According to 28 U.S.C. § 566(i), the Director of
the Marshals Service shall consult with the Judicial Conference on a
continuing basis regarding the security requirements for the judicial
branch of the United States Government, to ensure that the views of
the Judicial Conference regarding the security requirements for the
judicial branch of the federal government are taken into account when
determining staffing levels, setting priorities for programs regarding
judicial security, and allocating judicial security resources. The
term judicial security includes the security of buildings housing the
judiciary, the personal security of judicial officers, the assessment
of threats made to judicial officers, and the protection of all other
judicial personnel. The Marshals Service retains final authority
regarding security requirements for the judicial branch of the federal
government.
[9] According to the Marshals Service, special-purpose and support
space include detention cellblocks, secure prisoner circulation
corridors, courtroom holding cells, prisoner/attorney interview rooms,
prisoner elevators, and vehicle sally ports.
[10] CSOs assist deputy marshals with building security. CSOs are
employed by private security companies under contract to the Marshals
Service. Although not federal employees, CSOs are deputized as Special
Deputy U.S. Marshals. Their duties include: monitoring security
systems; responding to duress alarms; screening visitors at building
entrances; controlling access to garages; providing perimeter security
in areas not patrolled by FPS; and screening mail and packages.
[11] 6 U.S.C. § 203(3); 6 U.S.C. § 232.
[12] 18 U.S.C. § 930.
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49].
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[15] GAO, Smithsonian Institution: Funding Challenges Affect
Facilities' Conditions and Security, Endangering Collections,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1127] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 28, 2007).
[16] GAO, Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Security
Practices at National Icons and Parks, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-983] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 28,
2009).
[17] DOJ defines a potential threat as any explicit or implied
communication with intent to assault, intimidate, or interfere with
the judicial process, which includes threats against judges,
prosecutors, witnesses, jurors, court staff, or their families.
[18] ISC was created to enhance the quality and effectiveness of
security in, and protection of, nonmilitary buildings occupied by
federal employees in the United States. ISC has representation from
all federal cabinet-level departments and other agencies and key
offices, including GSA and FPS. AOUSC is a nonvoting associate member.
AOUSC staffs and chairs working groups and hosts ISC's quarterly
meetings.
[19] Information is based on the period ending March 31, 2006, through
March 31, 2010.
[20] The five federal judicial districts along the southwest border
are: the District of Arizona; the Southern District of California; the
District of New Mexico; the Southern District of Texas; and the
Western District of Texas.
[21] U.S. Department of Justice, United States Marshals Service FY
2011 Performance Budget Congressional Submission Salaries & Expenses
and Construction Appropriations (Washington, D.C.: January 2010).
[22] Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. Courts Design
Guide (Washington D.C.: 2007). AOUSC officials noted that the Design
Guide does not require retrofitting of existing courthouses to meet
controlled circulation guidelines.
[23] According to GSA, nearly one-fourth of the space in GSA's owned
inventory is in historic buildings, which include federal courthouses.
[24] 40 U.S.C. § 470h-2; 36 C.F.R. § 68.3.
[25] Setback refers to the distance between a structure requiring
protection and another building, the curb, a vehicle, or another
object.
[26] The U.S. Courts Design Guide states that judges should have a
means to move from a restricted parking area to chambers, as well as
to move between chambers, courtrooms, and other spaces through
restricted corridors. The guide also states that jurors must be able
to move between floors on restricted-access elevators without crossing
public spaces or secure prisoner corridors and that the Marshals
Service has a means to move prisoners without passing or entering
public or restricted spaces.
[27] Primary courthouses may have noncourt tenants.
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[29] The 1997 MOA established an informal collaboration and oversight
mechanism at the regional level. Specifically, the directors of the
three key federal stakeholders are responsible for directing their
security officials "to sponsor periodic regional meetings to share
ideas and resolve key issues."
[30] DOJ's 1995 Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities
guidelines directed GSA to establish an FSC in each federal facility
under its control.
[31] The examples of duplication and varying roles and
responsibilities were brought to our attention by officials at the
courthouses. We relied on these officials to identify such examples
and therefore cannot conclude that similar conditions either were or
were not prevalent at other locations.
[32] The Marshals Service initiated an MOA to define the conditions
under which FPS and the Marshals Service will share the
responsibilities in securing the courthouse perimeter. This MOA would
address the fact that the Marshals Service had assumed some FPS
responsibilities sometime after 1995 but that no MOA was initiated or
signed. Marshals Service officials told us the MOA had undergone a
final review in October 2010, but that as of July 2011, the MOA has
not been completed and signed.
[33] DOJ outlined basic requirements for security committees in 1995
because specific security needs will inevitably vary from location to
location, even among those at the same security level, due to local
conditions and changing circumstances. However, DOJ stated that basic
security requirements must be addressed at each facility and there
must be a formal mechanism for ensuring that this occurs.
[34] These examples were brought to our attention by officials at the
courthouses. We relied on these officials to identify such examples
and therefore cannot conclude that similar conditions either were or
were not prevalent at other locations.
[35] DOJ Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the U.S. Marshals
Service's Oversight of its Judicial Facilities Security Program, Audit
Report 11-02 (Washington D.C.: November 2010).
[36] GAO, Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility
Security Committees Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901] (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 5, 2010).
[37] ISC, Facility Security Committees: An Interagency Security
Committee Standard (Washington D.C.: July 6, 2011).
[38] The 1997 MOA states that GSA is responsible for providing general
security and law enforcement functions, including all exterior
perimeter security requirements, but does not distinguish between GSA
and FPS responsibilities since FPS was formerly part of GSA.
[39] GAO, Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Better Protect National
Icons and Federal Office Buildings from Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-790] (Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2005).
[40] Under the pilot program, the Marshals Service is authorized to
provide all of FPS's security services set forth in 40 U.S.C. § 1315,
except for those services specified in 40 U.S.C. §1315(b)(2)(E). Thus,
under the pilot program, the Marshals Service would not be authorized
to conduct investigations of offenses that may have been committed
against courthouses or against persons in the courthouses. See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 307,
Division D, Title III, 121 Stat. 1844, 1990 (2007); Omnibus
Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 306, Division D, Title
III, 123 Stat. 524, 648 (2009); and Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2010, § 306, Division C, Title III, 123 Stat. 3034, 3177 (2009).
[41] In the fifth courthouse, Marshals Service district officials did
not endorse the pilot program due to two main concerns. The first
concern was that a 24-hour screening post that was previously
maintained by FPS prior to the pilot project was no longer manned.
Marshals Service officials contended that the post is essential and
should remain because it prevents unauthorized access. Second, they
expressed that an additional 24-hour post should also be established
in the lobby area to monitor individuals entering the courthouse after
hours. According to Marshals Service officials, staff were later
assigned to this post.
[42] For example, the Marshals Service reported that under the pilot,
it was able to repair or replace broken security equipment and to
maintain and control all security systems and equipment at the pilot
locations. Because the equipment that was repaired or replaced by the
Marshals Service became Marshals Service property and was added to its
equipment inventory, it was covered by its existing national security
vendor contract, ensuring that the equipment would be maintained and
repaired, if needed, on a timely basis. The report also stated that
the Marshals Service provided consistent monitoring of the
surveillance cameras, thus avoiding the lack of communication and
miscommunication issues that occurred when FPS failed to inform the
Marshals Service of incidents that FPS observed through the cameras.
[43] The AOUSC report stated that cost neutrality occurred because the
FPS contracted guard rate and the scope of services provided at each
pilot program site varied, with the net result among the limited pilot
program sites being that the cost savings from one location offset
additional costs at other locations.
[44] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Strengthen Its Approach for
Evaluating SRFMI Data-Sharing Pilot Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-45] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7,
2008).
[45] In July 2011 we reported that FPS has not reviewed its fees to
develop an informed, deliberate fee design and we recommended that FPS
evaluate whether its use of a fee-based system or an alternative
funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund the agency.
We also recommended that such an analysis include the examination of
both alternative fee structures and a combination of fees and
appropriations as well as the options and tradeoffs discussed in our
report. GAO, Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains
a Challenge for the Department of Homeland Security's Federal
Protective Service, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-813T] (Washington, D.C.: July 13,
2011).
[46] Marshals Service Directive 10.1, Judicial Security Directive.
[47] DHS standards require that FPS complete FSAs every 2-4 years
depending on the security level of the building.
[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49].
[49] According to the Marshals Service, the budget process represents
the districts' opportunity to request security equipment and CSO
resources. Marshals Service officials told us that as part of this
process, they meet with court personnel and physically inspect the
security needs of each courthouse. The results of this review are used
to inform a budget request that is submitted to the AOUSC for review
and approval.
[50] DOJ Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the U.S. Marshals
Service's Oversight of its Judicial Facilities Security Program, Audit
Report 11-02 (Washington D.C.: November 2010).
[51] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142].
[52] GAO, Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Resolve Delays
and Inadequate Oversight Issues with FPS' Risk Assessment and
Management Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-705] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15,
2011).
[53] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142].
[54] We did not assess the reliability of the information obtained
from the Marshals Service on potential threats since we obtained
additional corroborating information on threats at federal courthouses
during our site visits.
[55] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-49], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15], and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-45].
[End of section]
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