The question whether U.N. forces should cross the 38th Parallel became
a most difficult one as soon as the Inch'on landing succeeded and the Eighth
Army broke out from the Pusan Perimeter. As a result of long and detailed
consideration at high levels on the future course of action, the government
in Washington decided Eighth Army should cross into North Korea.

Pursuant to this decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 September
sent to General MacArthur a comprehensive directive to govern his future
actions. They stated that his first objective was to be the destruction
of the North Korean forces. He was to unite all of Korea under Syngman
Rhee if possible. But they warned him that he was not to consider the directive
final since developments might require its modification. They particularly
enjoined him to make special efforts to determine whether Soviet or Chinese
intervention appeared likely, and to report any such threat to them at
once.

Subject to these injunctions, the directive stated that MacArthur's
mission was "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces"
and authorized him to conduct military operations for that purpose north
of the 38th Parallel, provided that at the time there was no major Chinese
Communist Forces or Soviet entry into North Korea or announced intention
to enter in order to counter U.N. military operations there. The Joint
Chiefs added that in no circumstances would any of the U.N. forces cross
the Manchurian or Soviet borders of Korea and that non-Korean ground forces,
as a matter of policy, should not be used in the area along the Manchurian
border or in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union. They instructed
MacArthur to submit his plan for operations north of the 38th Parallel
to them for approval. Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington held
in their own hands final approval for any operation north of the 38th Parallel.
[1]

Upon receiving this directive MacArthur urged on the JCS removal of
the restriction requiring specific approval from the United States Government
before his forces crossed the 38th Parallel. He urged that he be allowed
to cross the Parallel and seek out and

destroy the remaining parts of the North Korean Army if North Korea
did not surrender in accordance with a proclamation he intended to issue.

Two days later Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall sent him a personal
message, marked for his eyes only, which stated that he should feel free
tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel. President
Truman himself had approved this message. [2]

It is clear that on 29 September MacArthur had authority from the United
States Government to cross the 38th Parallel. In a communication to the
Secretary of Defense on 30 September, MacArthur said, "Unless and
until the enemy capitulates, I regard all of Korea open for our military
operations." [3]

The next day, 1 October, in order to remove any obscurity that might
still exist in Washington regarding his plan, MacArthur sent a message
that was crystal clear as to his intentions. He said:

I plan to issue and make public the following general directive to all
elements of the United Nations Command at 1200 hours, Monday, 2 October,
unless I receive your instructions to the contrary. "Under the provisions
of the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 27 June, the field
of our military operations is limited only by military exigencies and the
international boundaries of Korea. The so-called 38th Parallel, accordingly,
is not a factor in the military employment of our forces. To accomplish
the enemy's complete defeat, your troops may cross the border at any time,
either in exploratory probing or exploiting local tactical conditions.
If the enemy fails to accept the terms of surrender set forth in my message
to him of I October, our forces, in due process of campaign will seek out
and destroy the enemy's armed forces in whatever part of Korea they may
be located." [4]

MacArthur stated later that the temporary U.N. halt at the 38th Parallel
that occurred in early October was due to logistical difficulties. [5]

From the Communist side certain storm signals appeared. In a speech
in Peiping on 1 October, the first anniversary of the Chinese Communist
state, Premier Chou En-lai warned that the Chinese people "will not
tolerate foreign aggression and will not stand aside should the imperialists
wantonly invade the territory of their neighbor." [6] This clearly
was a threat to intervene in the Korean War if U.N. forces crossed the
38th Parallel. In the United Nations the Soviet delegate proposed on 2
October a plan which called for a cease fire in Korea and the withdrawal
of all foreign troops. The next day Sir Benegal Rau, the Indian delegate,
stated his government's view that U.N. forces should not cross the 38th
Parallel. The Indian view was undoubtedly influenced by a report to Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru from India's Ambassador to Peiping

that China would enter the war if the U.N. forces crossed the Parallel.
[7]

Meanwhile, MacArthur on 1 October issued his demand that North Korea
surrender. He addressed his message to the Commander in Chief of the North
Korean forces. He called upon the North Koreans to lay down their arms
and cease hostilities under such military supervision as he might direct
in order that the decisions of the United Nations might be carried out
with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, and
to liberate U.N. prisoners of war and civilian internees. There was no
answer from North Korea.

On 9 October General MacArthur issued an ultimatum calling "for
the last time" for North Korean surrender. There was no official response
from North Korea to this demand, but Kim Il Sung in a radio broadcast in
P'yongyang on the morning of 10 October, which was monitored in Tokyo,
rejected it. [8]

MacArthur'sPlanofOperationsinNorthKorea

As Eighth Army approached a junction with X Corps near Seoul, General
Walker became concerned about the future relationship of Eighth Army and
X Corps. He and his staff felt that X Corps should become part of Eighth
Army and that all U.N. forces in Korea should operate under a unified field
command. [9] It is not known with certainty whether General Walker ever
discussed with General MacArthur his own ideas about operations north of
the 38th Parallel. It appears, however, that he never submitted them to
him in writing.

So far as is known, the nearest General Walker ever came to broaching
the subject to MacArthur in writing was on 26 September when he sent a
discreetly worded message to him suggesting that he would like to be informed
of X Corps' progress and plans so that he could plan better for the approaching
juncture of the two forces. General MacArthur dashed Walker's hopes in
a reply the next day, informing him that X Corps would remain in GHQ Reserve,
in occupation of the Inch'on-Seoul area ready to undertake a GHQ-directed
operation "of which you will be apprised at an early date." [10]

When General MacArthur flew to Seoul on 29 September to return the South
Korean capital to the government of Syngman Rhee he already had formulated
in his mind plans for the next phase of Korean operations. On 26 September,
General Hickey had sent a check sheet to General Wright stating that General
MacArthur wanted plans developed for further operations in North Korea
which would employ the X Corps in an amphibious landing at Wonsan. Because
the Far East Command's Joint Strategic Plans and Opera-

tions Group had kept active its studies for amphibious operations in
areas other than Inch'on, including one for a corps-size landing in the
Wonsan-Hamhung area of the east coast, it was only a matter of a few hours
until General Wright had the outline of such a plan in MacArthur's hands.

This plan proposed that the advance into North Korea would consist of
a "main effort of Eighth Army on the west in conjunction with an amphibious
landing at Wonsan or elsewhere." [11] This was the beginning officially
of the Far East Command decision that led quickly to the establishment
of two separate field commands in Korea for the next phase of the war,
and which almost at once became the subject of controversy.

For a period prior to 26 September, it appears that General MacArthur
had intended to place X Corps under Eighth Army command once Seoul had
fallen. Generals Hickey and Wright favored this course of action, and Maj.
Gen. George L. Eberle, the Far East Command G-4, agreed with them. But
apparently they did not actively advocate it to General MacArthur. Eberle
held the view that although it would be possible to support X Corps logistically
in an amphibious operation on the east coast, it could more easily be supported
as part of Eighth Army. But if MacArthur ever had been uncertain on the
future role of the X Corps, he had decided the point in his own mind by
the last week of September. The reasoning which led General MacArthur to
decide on two commands in Korea can best be understood by reference to
the terrain map of North Korea and the problem of logistics. [12]

Above the Seoul-Wonsan corridor the northern Taebaek Range rises to
rugged heights in the east central part of the peninsula, forming an almost
trackless mountainous waste in the direction of the Manchurian border.
The principal routes of travel follow the deep mountain valleys in a generally
north-south direction. The only reasonably good lateral road from east
to west in North Korea lay just north of the 38th Parallel, connecting
P'yongyang with Wonsan, on the east coast. A rail line also crossed the
peninsula here. Any plan for a military campaign north of the P'yongyang-Wonsan
corridor in the interior of North Korea would encounter most difficult
logistical and supply problems.

In surveying the logistical problems attending any future military operations
in Korea, General MacArthur had to note the condition of transport communications
in South Korea. U.N. aerial action, together with enemy demolitions, had
destroyed nearly all the rail and highway bridges north of the Pusan Perimeter.
Weeks of concentrated work by all available Engineer troops would be required
to repair the rail lines from the Pusan Perimeter to the 38th Parallel.
Aerial action had also badly shattered the communication and transport
system of North Korea. In considering this state of affairs, General MacArthur
apparently decided that he could

not supply both Eighth Army and X Corps from Inch'on for a quick continuation
of the pursuit northward. He also wanted to get military forces behind
the North Koreans retreating from the Pusan Perimeter through the central
mountains and up the east coast. MacArthur reasoned that a landing on the
northeast coast might accomplish this. The base for operations in Korea
actually was Japan. MacArthur believed that two separate forces co-ordinated
from there could operate in Korea without impairing the effectiveness of
either.

Involved also in his decision was the idea of encirclement of the North
Korean capital. While Eighth Army attacked north from the Seoul area toward
P'yongyang, MacArthur's plan called for the X Corps, upon landing at Wonsan,
to drive west along the P'yongyang corridor and to take the city from the
flank and rear.

The first outline of the operational plan for the projected movement
into North Korea set the target date for the Wonsan assault, for planning
purposes, at twelve days after Eighth Army passed through the X Corps in
the Seoul-Inch'on area. It was thought that Eighth Army could initiate
its attack three to seven days before the X Corps amphibious assault on
Wonsan. General MacArthur approved this plan on 29 September. [13]

After the GHQ plan to move the X Corps by water to Wonsan became known
to Eighth Army, Colonel Dabney, Eighth Army G-3, prepared a message to
GHQ setting forth a concept to replace it. This plan would have assigned
X Corps to Eighth Army and provided for early movement against P'yongyang
and Wonsan overland. The Eighth Army staff felt that the GHQ plan to outload
X Corps would unnecessarily delay pursuit of the defeated North Korean
Army and would impede the advance of Eighth Army northward. It also believed
that the ROK advance on the east coast would capture Wonsan before the
X Corps could be landed there. Dabney took the message to General Walker
who read it and said that he agreed with the plan, but that it was not
to be sent to GHQ. According to Dabney, Walker said he had already made
his views known and had received contrary orders. In connection with the
possible escape into North Korea of large numbers of enemy soldiers from
the Pusan Perimeter, Eighth Army earlier had requested X Corps to block
the central mountain route through Wonju and Ch'unch'on with at least a
regiment, but X Corps had replied that it could not extend "the anvil"
to that point. [14] On 11 October a radio message from General MacArthur
shattered any remaining hope Walker may have had of directing future operations
in the east. It informed him that MacArthur intended to use Wonsan Airfield
for land-based aircraft under X Corps control and that the ROK I Corps
in the east, then under Eighth Army control, would come under X Corps command
as soon as that corps landed. [15]

It appears that General Walker believed that X Corps, after the fall
of Seoul, should continue the attack north to P'yongyang under Eighth Army
command, with Eighth Army moving up behind it. He reasoned that this should
save a lot of time as X Corps was already in position for continuing the
attack in the west, and Eighth Army was not. In such an attack the corps
could continue to be supplied from Inch'on. General Walker and most Eighth
Army senior officers felt that not to continue the pursuit at once-to halt
for a period of almost two weeks while X Corps loaded out at Inch'on and
Eighth Army moved into position below the 38th Parallel-would permit the
escape of a large part of the remaining North Korean forces retreating
northward which might otherwise be destroyed or captured.

In Walker's view, once the X Corps reached P'yongyang, with or without
Eighth Army help as the case might be, Eighth Army could then move laterally
along the P'yongyang-Wonsan corridor to the east coast where it would join
the ROK I Corps already there and advancing northward. This plan contemplated
the X Corps continuing the attack in the west from P'yongyang toward the
Yalu. An alternate course would be for the X Corps to cross to the east
coast by the P'yongyang-Wonsan corridor, while Eighth Army attacked north
from P'yongyang. The operations of both forces would be co-ordinated under
Walker's command, and both would be supplied from Inch'on and Pusan and
by airlift until Wonsan fell. Then the force operating in the east could
be supplied largely by sea through that port and Hungnam farther to the
north. Generals Hickey, Wright, and Eberle of MacArthur's staff favored
such a plan of operations. [16]

Admiral Joy, Commander, NAVFE, and key members of his staff, had objected
to the Wonsan amphibious operation as being unnecessary, holding the view
that X Corps could march overland from Seoul to Wonsan much faster than
it could be lifted and landed there by water. General Smith, commanding
the 1st Marine Division, had many reservations about the proposed operations
of his division in northeast Korea. [17]

The prediction of the Eighth Army commander and staff that Wonsan would
fall to the ROK I Corps before the X Corps could land there became a fact
on 10 October. And their view that the North Korean capital of P'yongyang
would also fall to Eighth Army attack before the X Corps could move west
from Wonsan also proved to be correct. General MacArthur officially acknowledged
this fact by issuing on 17 October a new United Nations Command Operations
Order which drew a boundary between Eighth Army and X Corps. This boundary,
starting at the 38th Parallel, followed generally the watershed of the
high Taebaek Range that extended through the eastern part of Korea up to
the Yalu River. [18]

Nations Command Operations Order 2, dated 2 October, Eighth Army the
next day issued an operations order to implement its part in the plan for
the attack into North Korea. The army order called for the U.S. I Corps
to seize a line west of the Imjin River with not less than a division,
and to concentrate the corps in an assembly area there as rapidly as IX
Corps could relieve it. The U.S. I Corps was then to conduct operations
northward on army orders, making the main effort with the 1st Cavalry Division
leading the attack. The 24th Division and the ROK 1st Division were to
protect the corps flanks and form a reserve. [19]

In addition to relieving the U.S. I Corps in its zone, the U.S. IX Corps
was to protect the line of communications, Seoul-Suwon-Taejon-Taegu-Pusan
and, together with ROK police, destroy the remaining enemy forces in South
Korea.

The ROK Army was directed to move its II Corps, consisting of the 6th,
7th, and 8th Divisions, to the area between Ch'unch'on and Uijongbu in
central Korea, and its I Corps, composed of the Capital and 3d Divisions,
to the area between Yongp'o and Chumunjin-up on the east coast, all prepared
to attack northward. The ROK Army was also to provide a new division (the
11th) by 5 October to help IX Corps in the rear areas of South Korea.

Pursuant to orders, the 1st Cavalry

[19] EUSAK Opn Ord 103, 3 Oct 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 3 and 4 Oct 50.

Page 614 SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU

Division on 5 October advanced north of Seoul for the purpose of securing
the U.S. I Corps assembly area near the 38th Parallel. Led by I Company,
the 5th Cavalry Regiment in the evening crossed to the north side of the
Imjin River at Munsan-ni.

At noon on the 7th, the 16th Reconnaissance Company entered Kaesong,
and that evening elements of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, arrived
there. By evening of 8 October the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments of the
1st Cavalry Division had secured the I Corps assembly area in the vicinity
of Kaesong. Some of the troops were within small arms range of the 38th
Parallel. Behind the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Division concentrated
in the Seoul area. [20]

At this juncture a new military organization appeared in Korea, and
it also concentrated near Seoul. The 3d Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment,
commanded by 30-year-old Lt. Col. Charles H. Green, a veteran of World
War II, arrived at Pusan on 28 September. It joined the British 27th Brigade
at Kumch'on on 3 October, which was then renamed the 27th British Commonwealth
Brigade. Two days later the bulk of the brigade moved by air to Kimpo Airfield
as part of the I Corps concentration near the 38th Parallel. [21]

With its I Corps concentrated to the north of Seoul, Eighth Army took
over control of the Inch'on-Seoul area from X Corps at 1200, 7 October.
The command posts of both Eighth Army and the ROK Army moved from Taegu
and opened in Seoul on 12 October. [22]

Earlier, on 4 October, the Far East Air Forces and the Fifth Air Force,
acting on a directive of 8 July, had assumed control of the Marine squadrons
at Kimpo. This was highly displeasing to X Corps, and particularly so to
the marines. But the change in control actually made little difference
in air operations since FEAF directed that the 1st Marine Air Wing continue
to support X Corps. The Fifth Air Force headquarters moved to Seoul on
15 October. As a result of the September victories, the Japan-based fighters
and fighter-bombers of the Fifth Air Force moved to Korean bases. This
permitted an increase in their armament load, more time over target and
combat area, and lengthened flight ranges into North Korea. [23]

TheROKICorpsCapturesWonsanandHungnam

Regardless of whether the U.N. forces did or did not cross the 38th
Parallel, there was always the strong probability that the ROK troops would.
Syngman Rhee had often stated his intention of halting the South Korean
Army only at the Yalu. Speaking at a mass meeting at Pusan on 19 September
he said, "We have to advance as far as the Manchurian border until
not a single enemy soldier is left in our country." He said that he
did not expect the U.N. forces to stop at the 38th Parallel, but if they

did, he continued, "we will not allow ourselves to stop."
[24] And stop the ROK troops did not.

A message dropped by a KMAG G-3 officer from a light plane at Samch'ok
and delivered to Colonel Emmerich at Kangnung on the afternoon of 29 September
ordered the ROK 3d Division to cross the 38th Parallel and proceed to Wonsan
as soon as possible. Advanced patrols of the ROK 3d Division crossed the
parallel on 30 September. The next day just before noon two rifle companies
crossed the border and came under fire from enemy troops in old fixed positions
north of the Parallel. On 2 October the ROK 3d and Capital Divisions established
their command posts in Yangyang, eight miles north of the parallel. Although
General MacArthur made the first official public announcement of forces
under U.N. command crossing the 38th Parallel on 3 October, the American
press had reported the incident the day before. Anticipating that ROK forces
would cross the Parallel, newspaper correspondents flew to Kangnung, just
south of the border on the east coast, to get the news. [25]

Now began a remarkable phase of the pursuit. The ROK 3d Division traveled
northward night and day, on foot and by vehicle, out of communication most
of the time with higher headquarters, without flank protection to the west,
and bypassing many enemy groups which often attacked their supply points
in the rear. There were some costly fire fights on the road north. The
N.K. 5thDivision with about 2,400 survivors, retreating
as best it could ahead of the ROK's, kept the pursuing advanced elements
under mortar and 76-mm. antitank fire. The road was heavily mined and lead
vehicles had many casualties. From fortified positions, including connecting
trenches, caves, and dug-in gun positions, North Koreans tried to stop
or slow the ROK advance. The 3d Division averaged about fifteen miles a
day. Many of its men had no shoes and large numbers trudged ever northward
on bloody feet.

The Capital Division followed the 3d, and at intervals sent some of
its units inland into the Diamond Mountains, the lofty and beautiful Kumgang-san,
which crowded close upon the coast line. In happier days these mountains
had been the vacation grounds of people from all parts of Korea.

In central Korea, troops of the ROK II Corps crossed into North Korea
later than did the troops of the I Corps on the coast. On 6 October the
ROK 6th Division crossed the parallel from the vicinity of Ch'unch'on and
advanced on Hwach'on. For three days it fought two regiments of the N.K.
9thDivision which stubbornly defended that town. Late on
the afternoon of 8 October the division entered Hwach'on, driving two enemy
battalions northwest.

The 8th Division crossed the 38th Parallel on 7 October. On its right,
the 7th Division crossed a day or two later. Both divisions headed for
the Iron Triangle. ROK troops arrived at the Iron Triangle on 10 October.
There in the

Ch'orwon area a large force of North Koreans attacked the ROK 16th Regiment
during the day but was repulsed and forced to withdraw. Elements of the
8th Division then entered Ch'orwon.

The Iron Triangle, a place whose name became famous later in the Korean
War, was an area of relatively flat terrain, shaped like an equilateral
triangle, in the mountains of east central North Korea. It is situated
20 to 30 miles above the 38th Parallel, halfway across the peninsula, and
50 air miles northeast of Seoul. It is bounded at its three corners by
the towns of Ch'orwon at its western base, Kumhwa at its eastern base,
and P'yonggang at its northern apex. The Iron Triangle is an important
North Korean rail and road communication center, linking east and west
coastal areas with each other, and in turn connecting them with the communication
net leading south through central South Korea.

On 11 October the ROK 8th Division and the 7th Regiment of the 6th Division
converged on P'yonggang. On 13 October the 7th Division arrived there by
way of Kumhwa.

All the ROK divisions, except the 1st, which was part of the U.S. I
Corps and accordingly under direct American command, were across the Parallel
before any of the American divisions crossed. [26]

On 9 October, the ROK 3d and Capital Divisions were at the south edge
of Wonsan, 110 air miles up the coast above the 38th Parallel. That day
the Capital Division on the Wonsan-Iron Triangle road south of the city
captured 6 tanks, 4 artillery pieces, 10 82-mm. mortars, 1 120-mm. mortar,
30 heavy machine guns, 500 submachine guns, 5,000 Russian rifles, 1 boxcar
of medical supplies, and another of miscellaneous supplies. The bulk of
the ROK 3d Division arrived in front of Wonsan by the coastal road. The
N.K. 24thMechanizedArtilleryBrigade, the
945thRegiment (naval amphibious troops), and other units
subordinate to the naval headquarters at Wonsan defended the city. Enemy
artillery pieces emplaced behind dikes just south of it delivered direct
fire against the ROK's. [27]

Troops of both the ROK 3d and Capital Divisions entered Wonsan on 10
October, with the 3d Division on the coastal road making the greater effort.
About two miles long and of irregular, narrow width, the city is shaped
by the 450-foot-high hills that rise abruptly from the narrow coastal strip.
In order to settle rival claims as to which division entered the city first,
the corps commander, Brig. Gen. Kim Baik Yil decreed that both divisions
got there simultaneously at 0600 and that both secured it at 1000. But
the city was not secured then. Colonel Emmerich, KMAG senior adviser with
the 3d Division, entered the city with the front line troops of the ROK
23d Regiment just after noon. The North Koreans had maintained a heavy
artillery fire from the city until almost noon. Then, after withdrawing
most of their guns from Wonsan, they fired into the city all after-

noon from its northwest sector and the hills behind it. That afternoon
the 3d Division captured the heavily mined airfield on the peninsula east
of the city. At nightfall both ROK divisions were still engaged in street
fighting within the city. During the night an enemy armored task force,
including about ten 76-mm. self-propelled antitank guns, returned to the
airfield and did a good job of shooting it up, burning out most of the
buildings and hangars. [28]

The next day, 11 October, the ROK 3d Division fought through Wonsan
against enemy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. It secured the city,
and by evening had troops one mile north of it. The Capital Division helped
clear the city and occupied the airfield. Generals Walker and Partridge
flew into the Wonsan Airfield on the 11th. Finding it in good condition,
General Partridge had twenty-two planes of the Combat Cargo Command fly
in 131 tons of supplies for the ROK troops the next day. [29]

In the week after the capture of Wonsan the ROK 3d Division remained
in the vicinity, securing the area for the expected landing of X Corps.
The Capital Division meanwhile moved on

north fifty air miles up the coast, and, against light resistance, secured
both Hamhung and its port, Hungnam, on October. [30]

During its great success in advancing northward into North Korea the
ROK Army expanded and reorganized. On 8 October it reactivated the 5th
Division at Taegu and once again counted eight divisions, the same number
that it had when the war began. Simultaneously, the ROK Army activated
the 1st Guerrilla Group of five battalions (1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th). Eight
days later, on 16 October, it activated the ROK III Corps. This new corps,
to which the 5th and 11th Divisions were attached, was to assume responsibility
for the ROK Army zone south of the Seoul-Ch'unch'on-Inje-Yangyang axis,
and destroy remaining enemy troops and guerrillas in that part of Korea.
[31]

TheXCorpsPreparesToMoveAmphibiouslytoNortheastKorea

About the time the ROK I Corps crossed the 38th Parallel and started
north toward Wonsan, General Almond and Admiral Struble received on 1 October
preliminary instructions from GHQ, Far East Command, for the projected
landing at Wonsan. Joint Task Force 7 had been re-established to land the
X Corps at Wonsan, and Admiral Struble had been named to command it. He
received from Admiral Joy the mis-

sion of JTF 7. This was (1) to maintain a naval blockade of the east
coast of Korea south from Ch'ongjin; (2) to load and transport X Corps
to the Wonsan area and provide cover and support en route; (3) to conduct
pre-D-day naval operations as required; (4) on D-day to seize by amphibious
assault, occupy, and defend a beachhead in the Wonsan area; (5) to provide
naval gunfire, air, and initial logistic support to X Corps in the Wonsan
area. [32]

General MacArthur on 2 October formalized in his United Nations Operation
Order 2 instructions for U.N. military operations north of the 38th Parallel,
and set forth therein the plan of movement and the mission of X Corps.
The X Corps was to revert to GHQ Reserve when Eighth Army passed through
it in the Seoul area. The 1st Marine Division and X Corps headquarters
were to load at Inch'on while the 7th Infantry Division and most of the
X Corps troops moved to Pusan for loading. The problem of outloading X
Corps at Inch'on in adverse tidal conditions with the limited amount of
amphibious craft available, concurrently with the expected partial use
of the port by Eighth Army, was so complicated and difficult that MacArthur
decided that part of the force would have to outload at Pusan if the entire
corps was to be loaded within two weeks. [33]

The selection of Wonsan as the site of the projected X Corps landing
in northeast Korea had been based on a number of factors. Situated at the
southwest side of a large bay which bulges inland from the Japan Sea, Wonsan
is the principal port on the east coast of Korea; it is the eastern terminus
of the easiest route across North Korea; and it is a road and rail communications
center. In 1950 when the war started the city had a population of approximately
150,000. The Japanese had developed Wonsan as a naval base, and the North
Koreans had continued to use it for the same purpose. It was the principal
port of entry for Russian supplies and military equipment received by sea
from the Vladivostok area, and it was a key point on the rail line running
southwest into Korea from the Soviet Vladivostok base. It was the petroleum
refining capital of Korea. From Wonsan a military force could move inland
and west across the peninsula to P'yongyang, or north to the Hamhung-Hungnam
area, fifty air miles away, the most important industrial area of all Korea.
[34]

On 30 September General Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division,
was first informed of the projected X Corps landing at Wonsan. The next
day he was requested to submit loading plans by 3 October with a proposed
D-day at Wonsan of 15 October. Since ships for the lift had not yet been
designated it was impossible to meet these dates. On 7 October, Admiral
Doyle, in command of the Attack Force, recommended 20 October as the earliest

D-day which the amphibious assault forces could meet. Admirals Struble
and Joy concurred and forwarded this recommendation to General MacArthur.
He accepted it as a tentative D-day but indicated that every effort should
be made to achieve an earlier one. Two days later Admiral Struble published
his operation plan outlining the task force organization. JTF 7 was organized
as follows:

On 10 October General MacArthur ordered U.N. Operations Plan 2 put into
effect, thereby canceling all other tentative plans. [35]

General MacArthur's Operation Plan 9-50 of 29 September assigned priority
of outloading at Inch'on to the 1st Marine Division, the amphibious assault
element of X Corps. On 3 October, X Corps ordered the Marine division to
initiate movement to an assembly area in Inch'on. On 4 October, General
Almond issued a corps order for the projected operations at Wonsan. The
1st Marine Division had the mission of seizing a corps base of operations
while the 7th Infantry Division was to start an attack west to join with
Eighth Army in front of P'yongyang. By 6 October the 1st, 5th, and 11th
Marines had virtually completed their movement to Inch'on; the next day
the 7th Marines began its movement from Uijongbu to the Inch'on assembly
area. As it assembled at Inch'on for outloading, the 1st Marine Division
numbered 23,591 men, with 40 U.S. Army troops and 4,516 Korean marines
attached, for a total of 28,147. [36]

At noon on 6 October the 3d Logistical Command assumed responsibility
for all unloading at Inch'on. During the day the X Corps requested it to
halt all unloading activities not directly concerned with the corps, because
otherwise X Corps outloading would be delayed for an estimated six to twenty
days. X Corps reverted to GHQ Reserve at noon on 7 October when Eighth
Army assumed responsibility for the Inch'on-Seoul area.

The 31-foot tides and the great mud banks at low tide made the outloading
exceedingly difficult and required carefully co-ordinated schedules in
moving troops and supplies. There were only seven berths where LST's or
landing craft could beach at Inch'on and these could be used only at high
tide. Moreover, there was no adequate staging area. There was only one
small pier from which vehicles could be loaded into an LCM, and then only
at high tide. Vehicles were loaded on the top decks of LST's and ferried
out to the ships in the harbor, and there lifted by crane from the LST's
to the APA's and AKA's. The tidal basin was used to outload all bulk cargo
for ferrying to the ships in the harbor. This unexpectedly developed into
a major and difficult task. The 1st Marine Division had been informed that
the 1st Logistical Command would bottom load all the shipping dispatched
to Inch'on to outload the division with 10 days' level of supply, Classes
I, III, and V. But this was not done, and it resulted in the necessity
of unloading from ships in the harbor and reloading on others, and also
of reloading on X Corps shipping considerable supplies from the dumps ashore
that otherwise could have been left for Eighth Army. From Japan by air
came 32,000 assault rations and 100,000 C rations to Kimpo Airfield, and
from there they were taken to the port for outloading.

Troops began loading at Inch'on on the 9th. The 1st and 3d Battalions,
1st Marines, went aboard their LST's on 10 October, and were in these cramped
quarters for sixteen days before they again got ashore. On 11 October the
X Corps command post closed ashore and opened aboard the Mt. McKinley.
Bulk loading of cargo began on 8 October and continued to 16 October when
all X Corps loading at Inch'on was completed. Already the U.S. Eighth Army
had crossed the Parallel in the west and was fighting its way north.