IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
STEPHEN CAVANAUGH,
Plaintiff,

4:14-CV-3183

vs.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RANDY BARTELT, et al.,
Defendants.
The plaintiff, Stephen Cavanaugh, is a prisoner in the Nebraska State
Penitentiary. Cavanaugh says he is a "Pastafarian," i.e., a believer in the
divine "Flying Spaghetti Monster" who practices the religion of "FSMism." He
is suing the defendants, who are all prison officials, because of their refusal to
accommodate his religious requests. Filing 1. The defendants move to dismiss
his claims. Filing 20.
The Court finds that FSMism is not a "religion" within the meaning of
the relevant federal statutes and constitutional jurisprudence. It is, rather, a
parody, intended to advance an argument about science, the evolution of life,
and the place of religion in public education. Those are important issues, and
FSMism contains a serious argument—but that does not mean that the
trappings of the satire used to make that argument are entitled to protection
as a "religion." Nor, the Court finds, has Cavanaugh sufficiently alleged how
the exercise of his "religion" has been substantially burdened. The Court will
grant the defendants' motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Cavanaugh's complaint actually contains very little detail on FSMism
or its purported requirements—perhaps because the deliberate absurdity of
its provisions would undermine his argument. So, before addressing
Cavanaugh's specific allegations, it will be helpful to examine FSMism in
more detail.
1. FSMISM
FSMism can only be understood in the context in which it arose: as a
response to the theory that the origins of life on Earth can be found in
"intelligent design." See generally Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F.
Supp. 2d 707 (2005).

The religious movement known as Fundamentalism began in
nineteenth century America as a response to social changes, new
religious thought and Darwinism. Religiously motivated groups
pushed state legislatures to adopt laws prohibiting public schools
from teaching evolution, culminating in the Scopes "monkey
trial" of 1925.
In 1968, a radical change occurred in the legal landscape
when in Epperson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court struck down
Arkansas's statutory prohibition against teaching evolution.
Religious proponents of evolution thereafter championed
"balanced treatment" statutes requiring public-school teachers
who taught evolution to devote equal time to teaching the biblical
view of creation; however, courts realized this tactic to be another
attempt to establish the Biblical version of the creation of man.
Fundamentalist opponents of evolution responded with a
new tactic . . . which was ultimately found to be unconstitutional
under the First Amendment, namely, to utilize scientificsounding language to describe religious beliefs and then to
require that schools teach the resulting "creation science" or
"scientific creationism" as an alternative to evolution.
In Edwards v. Aguillard, . . . the Supreme Court held that
a requirement that public schools teach "creation science" along
with evolution violated the Establishment Clause. The import of
Edwards is that the Supreme Court turned the proscription
against teaching creation science in the public school system into
a national prohibition.
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12 (citations omitted). The concept of
"intelligent design" was then promoted; generally described, it maintains that
Earth's ecosystem displays complexity suggesting intelligent design by a
"master intellect." Id. at 718. But unlike its predecessors, the "official
position" of intelligent design is that the designer is not expressly identified
as a deity. Id. at 718-19.
FSMism is a riposte to intelligent design that began with a letter to the
Kansas State Board of Education when it was considering intelligent design.
See, Bobby Henderson, The Gospel of the Flying Spaghetti Monster 111-13
(2006) (FSM Gospel). The primary criticism of intelligent design—and the
basis for excluding it from school science classes—is that although it purports
to be "scientific," it is actually "an interesting theological argument" but "not
science." Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 745-46. The conceit of FSMism is that,
because intelligent design does not identify the designer, its "master
-2-

intellect" could just as easily be a "Flying Spaghetti Monster" as any JudeoChristian deity—and, in fact, that there is as much scientific evidence for a
Flying Spaghetti Monster as any other creator. See FSM Gospel at 3-4.1 As
the FSM Gospel explains, "[w]e are entering into an exciting time, when no
longer will science be limited to natural explanations. . . . Propelled by
popular opinion and local government, science is quickly becoming receptive
to all logical theories, natural and supernatural alike." Id. at 11.
Consider the theory of Evolution. To their credit,
Intelligent Design advocates have successfully argued that their
alternative theory deserves as much attention as Evolution, since
neither can be considered fact. This is a valid point, but Evolution
is hardly the only theory in trouble.
It seems strange that Evolution is singled out as "just a
theory" when there are so many basic ideas in science that
remain unproven, yet are still taught as fact. The objections to
teaching Evolution have only illustrated this point further:
Alternative theories must be taught in order to give our young
students' minds a broad foundation. The Intelligent Design
proponents make a compelling, and totally legitimate, argument
that if a theory has not been proven, then one suggested theory is
just as good as another.
Take gravity, for example: the force of attraction between
massive particles. We know a great deal about the properties of
gravity, yet we know nothing about the cause of the force itself.
Why are particles attracted to one other? If we review the
literature, we find a lot of material dealing with the properties of
gravity, but very little dealing with the underlying cause of this
attraction. Until we have a proven answer to this question, it
seems irresponsible to instruct students in what is, ultimately,
just a theory. However, if we must discuss the theory of gravity
at all, then it's reasonable that all suggested theories should be
The Court has considered whether it is appropriate to consider this text, given the
procedural posture of this case. But the Court finds that it is judicially noticeable—the
contents of the book are capable of certain verification, see Fed. R. Evid. 201, and
Cavanaugh's complaint expressly refers to the text as a basis for his claims. Filing 1 at 8.
Given Cavanaugh's reliance on the book, the Court views judicial notice of it as effectively
the same as taking judicial notice of the Bible. See Nevius v. Africa Inland Mission Int'l,
511 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D.D.C. 2007). In fact, if the Court had not considered the text,
Cavanaugh's claims would fail for a more mundane reason: he would not have stated a
claim for relief because, from his complaint, it would be impossible to tell what he had
actually asked for, or why, or anything about his purported beliefs other than their name.
1

given equal time, since none have been proven or disproven.
Therefore, I formally submit that the Flying Spaghetti Monster is
behind this strange and often misunderstood force.
What if it is He, pushing us down with His Noodly
Appendages, that causes this force? He is invisible, remember,
and is undetectable by current instruments, so in theory it is
possible. And the fact that the gravitational powers of the
Spaghetti Monster haven't been disproven makes it all the more
likely to be true. We can only guess as to His motives, but it's
logical to assume that if He is going to such trouble, there is a
good reason. It could be that He doesn't want us floating off earth
into space, or maybe just that He enjoys touching us—we may
never know.
And while it's true that we don't have any empirical
evidence to back up this theory, keep in mind the precedent set
by Intelligent Design proponents. Not only is observable,
repeatable evidence not required to get an alternative theory
included in the curriculum, but simply poking holes in
established theory may be enough. In this case, the established
theory of gravity makes no mention as to the cause of the force; it
merely presents the properties of it. I fully expect, then, that this
FSM theory of gravity will be admitted into accepted science with
a minimum of apparently unnecessary bureaucratic nonsense,
including the peer-review process.
....
No one is saying that the FSM theory of gravity is
necessarily true, but at the very least, it's based on sound science,
sound enough to be included in the curriculum with the other
nonproven theories. Until the currently taught theory of gravity,
known as Newtonism, is proven as fact, alternatives should be
taught as well.
Id. at 3-5 (emphasis in original). FSMism is, then, a comedic extrapolation of
the philosophical argument known as "Russell's Teapot": it rejects the idea
that a hypothesis can be proved by an absence of evidence disproving it.2
2

British philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote:
Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to
disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of
course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars
there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody
would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that

But the FSM Gospel does not stop there: it sets forth—or, at least,
follows the form of—a catechism of FSMism. Id., passim. The blurb on back of
the FSM Gospel conveys the flavor:
Can I get a "Ramen" from the congregation?!
Behold the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM),
today's fastest-growing carbohydrate-based religion. According to
church founder Bobby Henderson, the universe and all life within
it were created by a mystical and divine being: the Flying
Spaghetti Monster. What drives the FSM's devout followers, aka
Pastafarians? Some say it's the assuring touch from the FSM's
Noodly Appendage. There are those who love the worship service,
which is conducted in Pirate-Speak and attended by congregants
in dashing buccaneer garb. Still others are drawn to the Church's
flimsy moral standards, religious holidays every Friday, and the
fact that Pastafarian Heaven is way cooler. Does your Heaven
have a Stripper Factory and a Beer Volcano? Intelligent Design
has finally met its match—and it has nothing to do with apes or
the Olive Garden of Eden.
Within these pages, Bobby Henderson outlines the true
facts—dispelling such malicious myths as Evolution ("only a
theory"), science ("only a lot of theories"), and whether we're
really descended from apes (fact: Humans share 95 percent of
their DNA with chimpanzees, but they share 99.9 percent with
Pirates!).
2. CAVANAUGH'S CLAIMS
Cavanaugh alleges that he is a Pastafarian: that he has "openly
declared his beliefs for many years" and "has several tattoos proclaiming his
faith." Filing 1 at 8. He began requesting that prison officials afford his
"faith" the same rights and privileges as religious groups, including "the
ability to order and wear religious clothing and pendants, the right to meet

the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes.
But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is
intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should
rightly be thought to be talking nonsense.
Bertrand Russell, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 11: Last Philosophical
Testament 547-48 (John G. Slater, ed., Routledge 1997) (1952).

for weekly worship services and classes and the right to receive communion." 3
Filing 1 at 8. His requests were rejected, because prison officials determined
that FSMism was a parody religion. Filing 1 at 8-9. Cavanaugh says he was
insulted by this conclusion. Filing 1 at 8. He has sued several prison officials
in their official and individual capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
seeking injunctive relief and money damages. See, filing 1; filing 10; filing 11.
Cavanaugh's complaint invokes the religious freedom provisions of the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and art I, § 4 of the Nebraska
constitution, as well as the Equal Protection provisions of the U.S.
Constitution and art. I, § 3 of the Nebraska constitution. Filing 1 at 9-10. And
the Court has also construed Cavanaugh's complaint as raising a claim under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Filing 8.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must set forth a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more
than an unadorned accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but must provide
more than labels and conclusions; and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not suffice. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss a court must take all of
the factual allegations in the complaint as true, but is not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Id.
And to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint must also contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will require the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The facts alleged must
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to
substantiate the necessary elements of the plaintiff’s claim. See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 545. The court must assume the truth of the plaintiff’s factual
allegations, and a well-pleaded complaint may proceed, even if it strikes a

Although Cavanaugh does not explain this in detail, it is clear from the FSM Gospel that
"religious clothing" means a pirate costume and "communion" is, not surprisingly, "a large
portion of spaghetti and meatballs." FSM Gospel at 38, 160.
3

savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery
is very remote and unlikely. Id. at 556.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court will begin with RLUIPA, because its protections are broader
than those of the Constitution, and the resulting analysis will provide the
basis for addressing Cavanaugh's other claims. See Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581
F.3d 639, 658 (8th Cir. 2009).
1. RLUIPA
RLUIPA provides that in a program that receives federal financial
assistance,4
[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). A "'religious exercise' includes any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). The statute is to be "construed in favor of a
broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent" permitted by
the statute and the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).
But, of course, a prisoner's request for an accommodation must be
sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation. Holt v.
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). In other words, the prisoner must show
that the government's conduct "imposes (1) a substantial burden (2) on a
religious exercise." Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742, 749
(8th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). And those are two discrete burdens, see
id., that the Court will consider separately.
(a) Religious Exercise
Courts must not presume to determine the plausibility of a religious
claim. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014).
Every State accepts federal funding for state prisons. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
716 n.4 (2005).
4

Prison officials may, however, appropriately question whether a prisoner's
religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic.
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13. Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a
particular belief or practice is central to a prisoner's religion, it does not
preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner's professed religiosity. Id. The
"truth" of a belief is not open to question; rather, the question is whether the
objector's beliefs are truly held. Id.; see Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
But that principle must have a limit, as courts have found when
confronted with cultural beliefs; secular philosophies such as scientism,
evolutionism, and objectivism; and institutions like the "Church of
Cognizance" or "Church of Marijuana." See, e.g., Daniel Chapter One v. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, 405 F. App'x 505, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Peloza v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Zielinski,
No. 1:11-cr-533, 2013 WL 2636104, at *13-15 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013);
Harrison v. Watts, 609 F. Supp. 2d 561, 572-73 (E.D. Va. 2009); United States
v. Quaintance, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1161 (D.N.M. 2006), aff'd, 608 F.3d 717
(10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1508 (D. Wyo.
1995); aff'd, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996). "Because RLUIPA is a guarantor
of sincerely held religious beliefs, it may not be invoked simply to protect any
'way of life, however virtuous and admirable, if it is based on purely secular
considerations.'" Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)). And "'an asserted belief might
be so bizarre, so clearly non-religious in motivation, as not to be entitled to
protection.'" Zielinski, 2013 WL 2636104, at *13 (quoting Frazee v. Ill. Dep't
of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2 (1989)). In such instances, the initial
inquiry is whether the belief at issue is genuinely "religious."
The Court is well-aware of the risks of such an endeavor: it might be
too restrictive, and unduly exclusive of new religions that do not fit the
criteria derived from known religious beliefs. See Meyers, 906 F. Supp. at
1509. But that risk is inherent in the statute (and for that matter in the First
Amendment): RLUIPA's scope is defined in terms of "religious" belief, so the
term must have meaning. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S.
202, 209 (1997) (statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word
some operative effect).
Courts have taken different approaches to such inquiries. However, the
Court can start with these indicia:
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions
having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a
religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system

as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be
recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs.
Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Africa v.
Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3rd Cir. 1981)); accord Meyers, 95 F.3d at
1483. Such "deep and imponderable matters" may include existential
matters, such as humankind's sense of being; teleological matters, such as
humankind's purpose in life; and cosmological matters, such as humankind's
place in the universe. Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1483; accord Quaintance, 471 F.
Supp. 2d at 1156; see also Zielinski, 2013 WL 2636104, at *13 (citing Patrick
v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1984)). But that is not a rigid test for
defining a religion, and flexibility and careful consideration of each belief
system are needed. Love, 216 F.3d at 687.
This case is difficult because FSMism, as a parody, is designed to look
very much like a religion. Candidly, propositions from existing caselaw are
not particularly well-suited for such a situation, because they developed to
address more ad hoc creeds, not a comprehensive but plainly satirical
doctrine. Nonetheless, it is evident to the Court that FSMism is not a belief
system addressing "deep and imponderable" matters: it is, as explained
above, a satirical rejoinder to a certain strain of religious argument. Nor,
however, does FSMism advocate for humanism or atheism, which the Court
acknowledges have been found to be "religious" for similar purposes. See,
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005); Jackson v.
Crawford, No. 12-4018, 2015 WL 506233, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2015); Am.
Humanist Ass'n v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1283 (D. Or. 2014).
Those belief systems, although not theistic, still deal with issues of "ultimate
concern" and take a position "on religion, the existence and importance of a
supreme being, and a code of ethics." See Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 681-82
(quotations omitted). FSMism takes no such position: the only position it
takes is that others' religious beliefs should not be presented as "science."
Despite touching upon religion, that is a secular argument.5 "[W]hile the
belief in a divine creator of the universe is a religious belief, the scientific
theory that higher forms of life evolved from lower forms is not." Peloza, 37
F.3d at 521 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)).
It is not clear from Cavanaugh's complaint whether his professed
adherence to FSMism is grounded in that argument, or in a literal reading of
the FSM Gospel. But to read the FSM Gospel literally would be to

The Court recognizes that secular and religious beliefs may overlap, and that religious
beliefs are still entitled to protection where the secular and religious coincide. See Meyers,
906 F. Supp. at 1508. This is not such a case.
5

misrepresent it—and, indeed, to do it a disservice in the process. That would
present the FSM Gospel as precisely the sort of Fundamentalist dogma that
it was meant to rebut.
It bears emphasizing that the Court is not engaged in—and has been
careful to avoid—questioning the validity of Cavanaugh's beliefs. The Court
is well aware that it "should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because
the believer admits that he is struggling with his position or because his
beliefs are not articulated with clarity and precision that a more
sophisticated person might employ." United States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 705, 710
(8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Love, 216 F.3d at 688) (citations and quotations
omitted). It is worth noting, however, that aside from identifying the FSM
Gospel, Cavanaugh has not alleged anything about what it is that he actually
believes—leaving the Court to read the book. And it is no more tenable to
read the FSM Gospel as proselytizing for supernatural spaghetti than to read
Jonathan Swift's "Modest Proposal" as advocating cannibalism. Compare
Jonathan Swift, A Modest Proposal, in Ireland in the Days of Dean Swift 193,
194-203 (J. Bowles Daly ed., 1887) (1729).
This is not a question of theology: it is a matter of basic reading
comprehension. The FSM Gospel is plainly a work of satire, meant to
entertain while making a pointed political statement. To read it as religious
doctrine would be little different from grounding a "religious exercise" on any
other work of fiction. A prisoner could just as easily read the works of
Vonnegut or Heinlein and claim it as his holy book, and demand
accommodation of Bokononism or the Church of All Worlds.6 See, Kurt
Vonnegut, Cat's Cradle (Dell Publishing 1988) (1963); Robert A. Heinlein,
Stranger in a Strange Land (Putnam Publ'g Grp. 1961). Of course, there are
those who contend—and Cavanaugh is probably among them—that the Bible
or the Koran are just as fictional as those books. It is not always an easy line
to draw. But there must be a line beyond which a practice is not "religious"
simply because a plaintiff labels it as such. The Court concludes that FSMism
is on the far side of that line.
Because FSMism is not a "religion" for RLUIPA purposes, Cavanaugh
has failed to allege a "religious exercise" was burdened.
(b) Substantial Burden
A prisoner also bears the burden, under RLUIPA, of establishing that a
government practice puts a "substantial burden" on his exercise of a religious
Not that such a thing would be impossible: Heinlein's fictional church, at least, inspired
foundation of a pagan church of the same name. See Church of All Worlds,
http://www.caw.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). But Cavanaugh does not allege allegiance to
any comparable organization—he simply relies on the FSM Gospel, taken at face value.
6

practice. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862; Native Am. Council, 750 F.3d at 749; Van
Wyhe, 581 F.3d at 657; Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 2009).
Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.,
[i]n order for a government practice to substantially burden a
religious exercise, it must significantly inhibit or constrain
conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a
person's individual religious beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a
person's ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must
deny a person reasonable opportunities to engage in those
activities that are fundamental to a person's religion.
Native Am. Council, 750 F.3d at 749 (citations and quotation omitted). But
although this definition may be applied in the RLUIPA context, the Court
must be mindful that RLUIPA's broad protection of "religious exercise" may
protect beliefs that are not be "central" or "fundamental" to the prisoner's
faith because RLUIPA extends even to religious practices are not "compelled
by, or central to" a certain belief system. Van Wyhe, 581 F.3d at 656; Patel v.
U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 814 n.7 (8th Cir. 2008).
The primary focus of Cavanaugh's complaint, however, is that he is
being discriminated against—that FSMism is not being treated the same as
other faiths. He says very little about how his exercise of FSMism has been
significantly burdened by that alleged discrimination. The closest he comes is
alleging that the "wearing of special religious clothing is particularly
important in FSMism" because, according to Cavanaugh, the FSM Gospel
says that the Flying Spaghetti Monster "becomes angry if we don't." Filing 1
at 8-9. Cavanaugh does not, however, identify that religious clothing: a pirate
costume. FSM Gospel at xiii. The passage relied upon by Cavanaugh
originally comes from Bobby Henderson's initial letter to the Kansas Board of
Education, found between a claim that scientific measurements are skewed
by the Flying Spaghetti Monster "changing the results with His Noodly
Appendage" and correlative data suggesting that global warming is caused by
the decreasing number of pirates on the high seas. FSM Gospel at 108-09.
The FSM Gospel states:
I'm sure you now realize how important it is that your
students are taught this alternate theory. It is absolutely
imperative that they realize that observable evidence is at the
discretion of the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
Furthermore, it is disrespectful to teach our beliefs without
wearing His chosen outfit, which of course is full Pirate regalia. I

cannot stress the importance of this enough, and unfortunately
cannot describe in detail why this must be done as I fear this
letter is already becoming too long. The concise explanation is
that He becomes angry if we don't.
FSM Gospel at 112. So, this began as an attempt to vex the Kansas Board of
Education by demanding, not only that students be taught about a Flying
Spaghetti Monster, but that teachers dress as pirates to do so. In other
words, it is a joke, at the expense of proponents of intelligent design.
Cavanaugh's contention seems to be that denying him a pirate outfit
prevents him from evangelizing about FSMism.7 But it is not clear to the
Court how such a limitation significantly burdens Cavanaugh's practice of
his "religion," as opposed to constraining his ability to preach to others.
Cavanaugh does not specifically identify the other "religious" practices he
seeks; they would presumably include such things as grog, a parrot, a
seaworthy vessel, a "Colander of Goodness," and to take off every Friday as a
"religious holiday." See id. at 67-68, 74, 110, 124-25, 170. But even if denying
those accommodations would make it more difficult for Cavanaugh to practice
FSMism, it would not make him effectively unable to do so, or coerce him into
acting contrary to his beliefs. See, Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 699 (7th
Cir. 2013); Lagar v. Tegels, 94 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1008-09 (W.D. Wisc. 2015);
LaPlante v. Mass. Dep't of Corrs., 89 F. Supp. 3d 235, 251 (D. Mass. 2015); see
also Oklevueha Native Am. Church v. Lynch, No. 14-15143, slip op. at 11 (9th
Cir. Apr. 6, 2016). A "burden" is not enough—that burden must be
"substantial." See Van Wyhe, 581 F.3d at 657. And even at the pleading stage,
the Court finds that Cavanaugh has not alleged sufficient facts to suggest
that his ability to practice FSMism—whatever that means—is substantially
burdened. See, Williams v. City of St. Louis, 626 F. App'x 197, 198-99 (8th
Cir. 2015); Sanchez v. Earls, 534 F. App'x 577, 578-79 (8th Cir. 2013). His
claims are simply not facially plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
(c) Immunity Defenses
Because Cavanaugh has alleged neither a "religious" exercise, nor a
"substantial burden" upon it, his RLUIPA claim will be dismissed. However,
Although the Court does not ultimately address whether Cavanaugh's beliefs are sincere,
it bears noting that his pleading strategy is not entirely consistent with authentic religious
convictions. Cavanaugh's claims, as will be seen below, hinge primarily on his desire to
proselytize his purported faith, and yet in neither his complaint nor his briefing does he
bring himself to explain even its most basic tenets. His vagueness looks less like
inadvertent omission and more like an attempt to prevent the Court from recognizing
FSMism for what it is.
7

it is still important to address how that claim affects each of the official- and
individual-capacity defendants, in order to be clear about the grounds for
each dismissal.
Cavanaugh's claims may only be asserted against the official-capacity
defendants to the extent that Cavanaugh is seeking prospective injunctive
relief. See, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson,
638 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2011); Treleven v. Univ. of Minn., 73 F.3d 816, 819
(8th Cir. 1996). Under RLUIPA and § 1983, there is no cause of action for
money damages against state officials acting in their official capacities.
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011); Zajrael v. Harmon, 677 F.3d
353, 355 (8th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Cavanaugh's claim for money damages
against the defendants in their official capacities is barred by sovereign
immunity. And obviously, because Cavanaugh failed to state a claim for
relief, injunctive relief will not be forthcoming either.
The disposition of Cavanaugh's claims against the individual
defendants is even clearer, because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields public officials performing discretionary functions
from liability for conduct that does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Parker
v. Chard, 777 F.3d 977, 979 (8th Cir. 2015); see, Messerschmidt v. Millender,
132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly, and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. It gives officials
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal
questions and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law. Parker, 777 F.3d at 979-80.
In determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity,
the Court asks (1) whether the facts alleged establish a violation of a
constitutional or statutory right and (2) whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable official
would have known that his actions were unlawful. Johnson v. Phillips, 664
F.3d 232, 236 (8th Cir. 2011); see Parker, 777 F.3d at 980. Whether an official
protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an
allegedly unlawful official action turns on the objective legal reasonableness
of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established
at the time it was taken. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245; Pearson, 555
U.S. at 244. The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of
whether the official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake
based on mixed questions of law and fact. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245.
- 13 -

For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right. Parker, 777 F.3d at 980. Clearly established law is
not defined at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial
question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular
circumstances that he or she faced. Id. Essentially, the law must be certain
enough to give a "fair and clear warning." Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637,
643 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271
(1997)). If a plaintiff can show relevant case law in the jurisdiction at the
time of the incident that should have put the government employee on notice,
qualified immunity is improper. Id. But to conclude that official conduct
violates clearly established rights, the Court must find some factual
correspondence with precedent, which requires a fact-intensive inquiry that
must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case. Mountain
Pure, LLC v. Roberts, 814 F.3d 928, 935 (8th Cir. 2016).
The Court has little difficulty in finding that the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity in this case. The facts alleged in Cavanaugh's
complaint are, to say the least, unique. Even if RLUIPA were to provide some
protection to FSMism, the Court can find no authority that would have put
the defendants on notice of that possibility. "Officials are not liable for bad
guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines." Luckert
v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2012). A prisoner claiming
accommodation for a religious parody is at worst a gray area, and nothing in
the law clearly establishes the rights that Cavanaugh is claiming. In addition
to lacking merit, Cavanaugh's RLUIPA claim against the individual-capacity
defendants is barred by qualified immunity.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Cavanaugh's allegations also implicate the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause. Filing 8. He also specifically raises certain provisions of the Nebraska
constitution. Filing 1 at 4. Each of those claims is without merit.
(a) First Amendment
To begin with, where an inmate has not met his burden under RLUIPA
to demonstrate a substantial burden on his religious exercise, his claim fails
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as well. Van Wyhe,
581 F.3d at 657-58. And Cavanaugh lacks standing to raise an Establishment
Clause claim. Such standing may be found where the plaintiff is a taxpayer—
which Cavanaugh does not allege—or where the plaintiff alleges an injury of
"direct and unwelcome personal contact with the alleged establishment of

religion." Patel, 515 F.3d at 816 (quotation omitted). Prisoners may establish
an injury if they allege they altered their behavior and had direct, offensive,
and alienating contact with a government-funded religious program. Id. at
817. Cavanaugh's complaint reflects only his "affirmative request that the
prison accommodate his religious beliefs." See id. He does not allege that he
altered his behavior or had direct, offensive, and alienating contact as a
result of any accommodation given to another professed religion. See id.
Absent an alleged injury, he does not have standing for an Establishment
Clause claim. See id.
(b) Equal Protection Clause
In order to establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must show
that he is treated differently from similarly situated inmates and that the
different treatment is based upon either a suspect classification or a
fundamental right. Id. at 815. Based on its discussion of FSMism above, the
Court finds that Cavanaugh is not similarly situated to other inmates who
profess a religious faith. And the allegations set forth in Cavanaugh's
complaint to not suggest invidious discrimination: rather, they establish that
prison officials considered Cavanaugh's request in good faith and concluded,
reasonably, that FSMism was satirical and required no accommodation.
(c) State Constitutional Claims
Cavanaugh's complaint also relies upon art. I, §§ 3 and 4 of the
Nebraska constitution. But Nebraska law does not permit a direct cause of
action for violation of a state constitutional provision. See McKenna v. Julian,
763 N.W.2d 384, 391 (Neb. 2009). And in any event, the relied-upon state
constitutional provisions have been held to be coextensive with their federal
counterparts. See, In re Interest of Anaya, 758 N.W.2d 10, 18-19 (Neb. 2008);
Citizens of Decatur for Equal Educ. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 739 N.W.2d
742, 762 (Neb. 2007); see also State v. Bjorklund, 604 N.W.2d 169, 221 (Neb.
2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229 (Neb.
2008). Cavanaugh's state constitutional claims will be dismissed as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes Cavanaugh has failed to state a claim under
RLUIPA or under the state or federal constitution that is plausible on its
face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Specifically, he has failed to allege facts
showing that the defendants have substantially burdened a religious
exercise, or that the defendants' conduct violated his constitutional rights.
And Cavanaugh's claims for money damages are barred by sovereign or
qualified immunity. Cavanaugh's complaint will be dismissed.

The Court has considered whether Cavanaugh should be given leave to
amend his complaint, but Cavanaugh has not requested such leave, and the
Court's conclusion that FSMism is not a "religion" is, in the Court's view, an
insuperable bar to relief for each of Cavanaugh's claims. Accordingly, the
Court will enter a final judgment.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.