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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 001743
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, T, VCI, ISN, ISN/NESS (BURKART), EAP/MTS,
EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
DEPT PLS PASS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
DEPT PLS PASS NATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/APSA (WALTON)
NSC FOR E.PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018
TAGS: PRELPARMTRGYENGYPGOVID
SUBJECT: CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: AMB. WOLCOTT'S
DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI
JAKARTA 00001743 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 21-22, Ambassador Jackie Wolcott
led an interagency delegation to discuss civil nuclear
cooperation with officials from the GOI's key nuclear-related
agencies plus the Foreign Ministry and the principal national
nuclear laboratory. All meetings indicated that Indonesia
still aspires to operating its first nuclear plant around
2017 and that its level of technical competence is
impressive. However, a firm commitment to nuclear power has
eluded Indonesia since the late 1970s and will be further
postponed until after a series of 2009 elections. Public
opposition to nuclear power was repeatedly raised as a
concern.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): Wolcott urged Indonesia to ratify
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage (CSC, which it has already signed), along with other
key safety and security conventions, and to participate in
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI), and the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). END SUMMARY.
VISIT OVERVIEW
¶3. (SBU) On August 21-22, Special Envoy for Nuclear
Nonproliferation, Ambassador Jackie Wolcott, and an
interagency delegation composed of policy officials and
technical experts from the State Department and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) met with senior Indonesian
officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU), the
Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN), and the Nuclear
Energy Agency (BATAN). The principal Indonesian
interlocutors for these three meetings were Director General
for Multilateral Affairs Rezlan Ishar Jenie, Chairman As
Natio Lasman, and Chairman Hudi Hastowo, respectively. In
addition, the delegation visited the largest of Indonesia's
three nuclear research reactors, operated by BATAN and
located at the Science and Technology Research Project Center
(PUSPITEK) in Serpong, a western suburb of Jakarta. Wolcott
and delegation also discussed nuclear energy with a range of
nuclear, energy and research officials and legislators over
dinner at Ambassador Hume's residence.
¶4. (C) In each meeting, Wolcott explained that she was
visiting to implement the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Energy
and Nonproliferation, a Presidential initiative aimed at
increasing access to responsible nuclear energy programs in
countries pursuing their first nuclear power plant (NPP).
Wolcott noted that around thirty countries were in the
process of moving to nuclear energy and that the United
States was experiencing a "nuclear renaissance" of its own.
In order to help Indonesia develop the highest standards of
safety, security and nonproliferation, the United States was
interested in offering a diverse array of infrastructure
development assistance, as needed. DEPLU would study the
Joint Declaration, Jenie said, in line with Indonesia's other
international commitments.
INDONESIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANS
¶5. (C) BAPETEN's Lasman explained that Indonesia had long
been considering nuclear power. Previous interest in nuclear
power had been thwarted by the Three Mile Island accident
(1979), the Chernobyl accident (1986) and the Asian economic
crisis of the late 1990's. Although interest in nuclear
power had waxed and waned over several decades, Indonesia had
JAKARTA 00001743 002.2 OF 005
steadily built up a significant nuclear research capacity
across three institutions operating three research reactors.
DEPLU's Jenie explained that, as a result of a severe energy
shortage and rising future demand, Indonesia was again
considering the development of nuclear power. This was one
of the options that Indonesia was seriously considering,
along with coal, geothermal, solar, and tidal energy.
¶6. (C) Lasman stated that Indonesia was now aiming to
operate its first nuclear power plant around 2017, with a
total of 4,000 MW of nuclear generation (equivalent to 2% of
the country's electricity) by 2025. A preliminary site for
the first NPP had been chosen on the Muria Peninsula in
Central Java. A firm commitment could not be made, however,
until after a series of legislative and presidential
elections in 2009. For its first plant, Indonesia would seek
a standard reactor design, with a minimum of three years'
proven operation and a capacity factor exceeding 75 percent.
BATAN's Hastowo noted that the development of a nuclear power
program in Indonesia would fall under the authority of the
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.
¶7. (C) Jenie commented that a major concern with nuclear
power was safety given Indonesia's high incidence of
earthquakes. Also, the country's largest Islamic
organization, Nadhlatul Ulama, had issued a statement
opposing the proposed site in Central Java for the future
nuclear power plant. For this reason, Lasman explained,
BATAN was considering looking for another site. In addition,
the State Ministry for Research and Technology had
established a committee for public outreach to broaden public
acceptance of nuclear power.
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
¶8. (C) Jenie said Indonesia had consistently defended the
principles of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and
would be fully transparent in developing nuclear power.
Indonesia was not on the Board of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), but Indonesia was considering
participating in the IAEA's planned multilateral fuel bank, a
concept that Foreign Minister Wirajuda had endorsed.
¶9. (C) BATAN officials noted the importance to energy
security of reliable long-term fuel supply contracts and said
this would be an important consideration in Indonesia's
choice of a reactor vendor. Noting that a discussion was
underway at the IAEA to develop an assurance mechanism to
bolster the international fuel market, Alex Burkart of the
State Department's International Security and
Nonproliferation Bureau encouraged Indonesia to make its
views on this known in Vienna. Until now, he commented,
there had been little discussion on what recipient countries
were looking for.
¶10. (C) In all meetings, Wolcott raised the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP), noting that one of GNEP's chief
aspects was the reliable provision of fuel services. When
Jenie asked if membership under GNEP would require Indonesia
to forgo its "right" to uranium enrichment, Burkart replied
that GNEP made no mention of rights. Although countries
might have the right to enrichment for peaceful purposes, he
added, it might not be in their best interest to exercise
that right. Wolcott noted that Indonesia had recently been
invited to join GNEP and encouraged Indonesia to attend the
October 1 Ministerial meeting in Paris. DEPLU and BATAN
officials both expressed interest in attending. (Note:
JAKARTA 00001743 003.2 OF 005
DEPLU will coordinate the interagency decision as to whether
Indonesia should attend and which agencies should be
represented.)
¶11. (C) BATAN's Hastowo noted that Indonesia had opted for
an open nuclear fuel cycle and had no plans to develop the
capacity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. He expressed
concern, however, about the inability of most fuel supplier
states to repatriate the subsequent spent fuel. Burkart said
the United States could assist Indonesia with the development
of interim storage facilities. He noted that a solution to
spent-fuel disposition--as, for example, through a
multilateral arrangement--was a long-term objective of GNEP.
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND REGULATION
¶12. (C) When meeting with BAPETEN officials, Burkart praised
Indonesia for its development of very high-quality nuclear
research and radioisotope production facilities. He asked
whether Indonesia planned to strengthen this good start with
the development of an appropriate safety culture for a
nuclear power program. Lasman replied that Indonesia was a
member of the ASEAN Nuclear Safety Network and the Forum on
Nuclear Safety in Asia and was a party to the Convention on
Nuclear Safety. Through its association with these
organizations, Indonesia was steadily improving its
knowledge. Burkart encouraged Indonesia to ratify, in
addition, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
(which Indonesia has signed).
¶13. (C) Lasman said that, if Indonesia made a firm decision
to pursue nuclear power and chose a U.S. reactor, BAPETEN
would want to send a technical delegation to the United
States for "on-the-job" training. Steve Burns of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission noted that this type of exchange, as
well as one aimed at regulatory framework development, could
be facilitated by the existing NRC-BAPETEN Information
Exchange Arrangement. This arrangement was currently up for
renewal.
¶14. (C) Lasman noted that an updated draft was under
consideration. Other areas of regulatory cooperation, Burns
added, included the NRC Foreign Assignee Program in which
Indonesia had participated in the late 1990's and the
Multinational Design Evaluation Program under which
regulators shared experiences with reactor designs with
foreign counterparts. Donald Kovacic of the National Nuclear
Safety Administration (NNSA) noted in the meeting with
BAPETEN that NNSA had signed a technical cooperation
agreement with BAPETEN in 2004 and that action sheets had
been prepared outlining work in regulatory and operator
training. He noted that NNSA was also interested in
establishing a relationship with BATAN, perhaps in the area
of safeguards implementation.
CONVENTION ON SUPPLEMENTARY COMPENSATION
¶15. (C) Noting that Indonesia had signed the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), Wolcott
urged that Indonesia ratify the convention as it moved
towards a nuclear power program. Since numerous countries
could not be a party to existing liability conventions
because of national laws, this regime was designed for
universal adherence that would benefit both suppliers and
recipients of nuclear exports. Wolcott noted that the United
States had signed the CSC and had deposited its instrument of
JAKARTA 00001743 004.2 OF 005
ratification in Vienna in May. U.S. suppliers would be
hesitant to supply fuel or reactors to countries that did not
have the CSC in force, she added. DEPLU's Jenie agreed to
raise the CSC with BATAN and BAPETEN officials.
NUCLEAR POWER FINANCE
¶16. (C) BATAN's Hastowo cited NPP financing as a key concern
and one that had been the cause of popular opposition in the
past. Since the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
currently had policies against nuclear power financing,
financial resources were very limited. He stressed that
financial help would be very attractive to aspiring nuclear
energy states. Wolcott responded that the World Bank was
considering a study to analyze the cost competitiveness of
nuclear power. Since a favorable assessment could pave the
way for other multilateral development banks to begin
offering nuclear financing options, Wolcott encouraged
Indonesia to support this study. She pointed out that some
financial options were available via export credits though
these could not be applied to an entire NPP.
GLOBAL INITIATIVE AND PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
¶17. (C) Wolcott noted that participation in the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) and the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was voluntary and
consisted of practical measures that constituted best
practices. The United States urged Indonesia to join these
initiatives as part of its broader cooperation against
terrorism. Jenie said Indonesia was reviewing GI and had
ratified six of 13 existing counter-terrorism conventions.
¶18. (C) Several aspects of PSI caused problems for
Indonesia, Jenie asserted. Interdiction on the high seas was
particularly problematic, as it appeared to interfere with
freedom of navigation. Weapons of Mass Destruction were
controlled by several other conventions. Further, the
purpose of shipments of dual-use items was difficult, if not
impossible, to determine. Indonesia could be liable to
damages and compensation if nothing were found or a search
was inconclusive. Indonesia was also concerned, Jenie
stressed, that PSI be linked to disarmament. Wolcott noted
that interdiction had played a major role in intercepting
Libyan proliferation and that Libya had ended its
proliferation because interdiction had been effective.
BATAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES
¶19. (C) The delegation toured five nuclear facilities at
BATAN's research center located at the Science and Technology
Research Project Center (PUSPITEK) in Serpong, a western
suburb of Jakarta. The five included the 30 MW German-origin
research reactor, the spent fuel storage pool, the
radioisotope production facility, the radiometallurgical
facility and the fuel fabrication facility. While Indonesia
previously acquired enriched uranium for research reactor
fuel from the United States, Indonesia currently obtains
enriched uranium from the international market (namely,
Europe). While the IAEA lists the radiometallurgical
facility as an "R&D facility and location associated with
reprocessing technology," the facility consists of a number
of large hot cells with a dearth of equipment and a mission
apparently limited to post-irradiation examination of
(non-U.S. origin) spent fuel. The delegation saw no
equipment associated with reprocessing.
JAKARTA 00001743 005.2 OF 005
TIMETABLE LIKELY TO SLIP
¶20. (C) Indonesia's level of technical competence is
impressive, and Indonesia still aspires to put its first
nuclear plant into operation around 2017. However, a firm
commitment to nuclear power has eluded Indonesia since the
late 1970s, and the approval of the project will be further
postponed at least until after a series of legislative and
presidential elections in 2009. This would make it
practically impossible to hold to the current timetable.
Public reservations about nuclear power, reflecting
uncertainty about safety and financing, was cited as a
concern.
¶21. (U) This message was approved by Ambassador Wolcott.
HUME