In her economic speech in New York on Monday, Hillary Clinton did what no one thought she would do—she took on the excesses of Wall Street. We couldn’t agree with her more. It is good policy and good campaign strategy.

As the American economy has struggled to regain its footing in the wake of the great recession we’ve heard many explanations for slow growth and stagnant incomes in the 21st century American economy. High on the list are globalization and the role the information technology revolution is playing in the disappearance of manufacturing jobs and, more recently, routine service sector jobs as well.

Although the decisions we make can shape their effects, these big trends are here to stay. But another set of problems is in principle more malleable. These problems arise from the “financialization” of the American economy—problems that we have written about and which Hillary, in a bold speech, has now placed square on the 2016 agenda.

In recent years, certain incentives have become so powerful and pervasive in the private sector that they have tilted corporate decision-making in the direction of short term gains. No one set out to create this myopic system, which arose piecemeal over a period of decades. But taken together, these perverse new micro-incentives have created a macroeconomic problem—the taking of short term profits at the expense of investment in long term growth. These incentives include: the proliferation of stock buybacks and dividends, the increase in non-cash compensation, the fixation on quarterly earnings and the rise of activist investors.

The proliferation of share repurchases, we argue in a recent paper, has had numerous bad effects on investments, on wages for average workers, and on the willingness of firms to adopt a long-term perspective. The surge in non-cash compensation for CEOs has intensified these problems. In the name of better aligning managers’ incentives with the interests of their companies, it has created perverse incentives to manage earnings and to report results that diverge from actual corporate performance. It diminishes incentives to seek productive investments and to make the kinds of commitments—to research and development, for example—that will show up in the bottom line five or ten years hence, not in the next quarter’s earnings.

Reverse Reagan-era regulatory changes that opened the floodgates for massive stock buy-backs

Improve disclosure practices

Strengthen sustainability standards in 10-K reporting

Toughen executive compensation rules

Reform the taxation of executive compensation

We are not against having investors make a good profit but, like many in the business community itself, we have come to believe that the incentive structure today is creating a short term mindset that is detrimental to the kind of long-term growth that produces good jobs and rising wages. To re-balance our economy we must restructure the incentives that shape the decisions of CEOs and boards of directors. By reining in stock buybacks and reducing short-term equity gains from compensation packages, we have argued, we can move significantly down this road. And we should.

This post was updated at 1:45pm.

Authors

In her economic speech in New York on Monday, Hillary Clinton did what no one thought she would do—she took on the excesses of Wall Street. We couldn’t agree with her more. It is good policy and good campaign strategy.

As the American economy has struggled to regain its footing in the wake of the great recession we’ve heard many explanations for slow growth and stagnant incomes in the 21st century American economy. High on the list are globalization and the role the information technology revolution is playing in the disappearance of manufacturing jobs and, more recently, routine service sector jobs as well.

Although the decisions we make can shape their effects, these big trends are here to stay. But another set of problems is in principle more malleable. These problems arise from the “financialization” of the American economy—problems that we have written about and which Hillary, in a bold speech, has now placed square on the 2016 agenda.

In recent years, certain incentives have become so powerful and pervasive in the private sector that they have tilted corporate decision-making in the direction of short term gains. No one set out to create this myopic system, which arose piecemeal over a period of decades. But taken together, these perverse new micro-incentives have created a macroeconomic problem—the taking of short term profits at the expense of investment in long term growth. These incentives include: the proliferation of stock buybacks and dividends, the increase in non-cash compensation, the fixation on quarterly earnings and the rise of activist investors.

The proliferation of share repurchases, we argue in a recent paper, has had numerous bad effects on investments, on wages for average workers, and on the willingness of firms to adopt a long-term perspective. The surge in non-cash compensation for CEOs has intensified these problems. In the name of better aligning managers’ incentives with the interests of their companies, it has created perverse incentives to manage earnings and to report results that diverge from actual corporate performance. It diminishes incentives to seek productive investments and to make the kinds of commitments—to research and development, for example—that will show up in the bottom line five or ten years hence, not in the next quarter’s earnings.

Reverse Reagan-era regulatory changes that opened the floodgates for massive stock buy-backs

Improve disclosure practices

Strengthen sustainability standards in 10-K reporting

Toughen executive compensation rules

Reform the taxation of executive compensation

We are not against having investors make a good profit but, like many in the business community itself, we have come to believe that the incentive structure today is creating a short term mindset that is detrimental to the kind of long-term growth that produces good jobs and rising wages. To re-balance our economy we must restructure the incentives that shape the decisions of CEOs and boards of directors. By reining in stock buybacks and reducing short-term equity gains from compensation packages, we have argued, we can move significantly down this road. And we should.

This post was updated at 1:45pm.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/07/01-growth-strategy-for-the-american-economy-galston-kamarck?rssid=galstonw{50769ECA-4E3E-4F56-AC73-B80105A30600}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/98727294/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~More-builders-and-fewer-traders-A-growth-strategy-for-the-American-economyMore builders and fewer traders: A growth strategy for the American economy

Everyone knows that there are lots of things wrong with the American economy. To name just a few problems: growth has been low and inequality high; the middle class is shrinking and not benefitting from increases in productivity; business investment is down and the financial sector is booming. There are many explanations for these problems—globalization, the rise of the information economy and the decline of unions—are but a few. But the problem with so many of the explanations that are, no doubt, true—is that there is very little that a policy maker can do about them.

In our new paper “More builders and fewer traders: a growth strategy for the American economy” we identify a handful of obscure but important shifts—in laws, regulations, and standard practices—which, taken together, have changed the incentive structure of leaders in American corporations. This set of incentives has led to short term behavior on the part of corporate leadership. These incentives are so powerful that once they became pervasive in the private sector, they began to have broad effects. No one set out to create this myopic system, which arose piecemeal over a period of decades. But taken together, these perverse new micro-incentives have created a macroeconomic problem.

There are four trends that constitute the architecture of modern short-termism: the proliferation of stock buybacks; the increase in non-cash compensation; the fixation on quarterly earnings; and the rise of activist investors. The effect of this system across the broad economy has been to reinforce short-term behavior on the part of corporate leaders. While cash distributed to shareholders as a share of cash flow has surged to a record high during the past decade, the share devoted to capital investment has fallen to a record low.

Unlike many of the broader developments that have contributed to our economic problems—these incentives can and must be changed. We recommend:

Repealing SEC Rule 10-B-18 and the 25 percent exemption

Improving disclosure practices

Strengthening sustainability standards in 10-K reporting

Toughening executive compensation rules

Reforming the taxation of executive compensation

Changes such as the ones identified above will free funds for investments in employees as well as plant, equipment, and R&D. Thus a virtuous circle becomes possible: a more satisfied and productive workforce will boost growth, which in turn will permit CEOs and boards to raise wages while offering good returns on shareholder investment. For the first time in the 21st century, we could be growing together—not apart.

Authors

Everyone knows that there are lots of things wrong with the American economy. To name just a few problems: growth has been low and inequality high; the middle class is shrinking and not benefitting from increases in productivity; business investment is down and the financial sector is booming. There are many explanations for these problems—globalization, the rise of the information economy and the decline of unions—are but a few. But the problem with so many of the explanations that are, no doubt, true—is that there is very little that a policy maker can do about them.

In our new paper “More builders and fewer traders: a growth strategy for the American economy” we identify a handful of obscure but important shifts—in laws, regulations, and standard practices—which, taken together, have changed the incentive structure of leaders in American corporations. This set of incentives has led to short term behavior on the part of corporate leadership. These incentives are so powerful that once they became pervasive in the private sector, they began to have broad effects. No one set out to create this myopic system, which arose piecemeal over a period of decades. But taken together, these perverse new micro-incentives have created a macroeconomic problem.

There are four trends that constitute the architecture of modern short-termism: the proliferation of stock buybacks; the increase in non-cash compensation; the fixation on quarterly earnings; and the rise of activist investors. The effect of this system across the broad economy has been to reinforce short-term behavior on the part of corporate leaders. While cash distributed to shareholders as a share of cash flow has surged to a record high during the past decade, the share devoted to capital investment has fallen to a record low.

Unlike many of the broader developments that have contributed to our economic problems—these incentives can and must be changed. We recommend:

Repealing SEC Rule 10-B-18 and the 25 percent exemption

Improving disclosure practices

Strengthening sustainability standards in 10-K reporting

Toughening executive compensation rules

Reforming the taxation of executive compensation

Changes such as the ones identified above will free funds for investments in employees as well as plant, equipment, and R&D. Thus a virtuous circle becomes possible: a more satisfied and productive workforce will boost growth, which in turn will permit CEOs and boards to raise wages while offering good returns on shareholder investment. For the first time in the 21st century, we could be growing together—not apart.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/06/30-american-economy-growth-strategy-galston-kamarck?rssid=galstonw{8AA40A01-AF14-4A15-A4D9-A38DE468E814}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/98567692/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~More-builders-and-fewer-traders-A-growth-strategy-for-the-American-economyMore builders and fewer traders: A growth strategy for the American economy

In a new paper, William Galston and Elaine Kamarck argue that the laws and rules that shape corporate and investor behavior today must be changed. They argue that Wall Street today is trapped in an incentive system that results in delivering quarterly profits and earnings at the expense of long-term investment.

As Galston and Kamarck see it, there’s nothing wrong with paying investors handsome returns, and a vibrant stock market is something to strive for. But when the very few can move stock prices in the short term and simultaneously reap handsome rewards for themselves, not their companies, and when this cycle becomes standard operating procedure, crowding out investments that boost productivity and wage increases that boost consumption, the long-term consequences for the economy are debilitating.

Galston and Kamarck argue that a set of incentives has evolved that favors short-term gains over long-term growth. These damaging incentives include:

The proliferation of stock buybacks and dividends

The increase in non-cash compensation

The fixation on quarterly earnings

The rise of activist Investors

These micro-incentives are so powerful that once they became pervasive in the private sector, they have broad effects, Galston and Kamarck write. Taken together, they have contributed significantly to economy-wide problems such as: (1) Rising inequality, (2) A shrinking middle class, (3) An increasing wedge between productivity & compensation, (4) Less business investment, and (5) Excessive financialization of the U.S. economy.

So what should be done? Galston and Kamarck propose reining in both share repurchases and the use of stock awards and options to compensate managers as well as refocusing corporate reporting on the long term. To this end, these scholars recommend the following policy steps:

Repeal SEC Rule 10-B-18 and the 25% exemption

Improve corporate disclosure practices

Strengthen sustainability standards in 10-K reporting

Toughen executive compensation rules

Reform the taxation of executive compensation

Galston and Kamarck state that the American economy would work better if public corporations behaved more like private and family-held firms—if they made long-term investments, retained and trained their workers, grew organically, and offered reasonable but not excessive compensation to their top managers, based on long-term performance rather than quarterly earnings. To make these significant changes happen, the incentives that shape the decisions of CEOs and board of directors must be restructured. Reining in stock buybacks, reducing short-term equity gains from compensation packages, and shifting managers’ focus toward long-term objectives, Galston and Kamarck argue, will help address the most significant challenges facing America’s workers and corporations.

Downloads

Authors

In a new paper, William Galston and Elaine Kamarck argue that the laws and rules that shape corporate and investor behavior today must be changed. They argue that Wall Street today is trapped in an incentive system that results in delivering quarterly profits and earnings at the expense of long-term investment.

As Galston and Kamarck see it, there’s nothing wrong with paying investors handsome returns, and a vibrant stock market is something to strive for. But when the very few can move stock prices in the short term and simultaneously reap handsome rewards for themselves, not their companies, and when this cycle becomes standard operating procedure, crowding out investments that boost productivity and wage increases that boost consumption, the long-term consequences for the economy are debilitating.

Galston and Kamarck argue that a set of incentives has evolved that favors short-term gains over long-term growth. These damaging incentives include:

The proliferation of stock buybacks and dividends

The increase in non-cash compensation

The fixation on quarterly earnings

The rise of activist Investors

These micro-incentives are so powerful that once they became pervasive in the private sector, they have broad effects, Galston and Kamarck write. Taken together, they have contributed significantly to economy-wide problems such as: (1) Rising inequality, (2) A shrinking middle class, (3) An increasing wedge between productivity & compensation, (4) Less business investment, and (5) Excessive financialization of the U.S. economy.

So what should be done? Galston and Kamarck propose reining in both share repurchases and the use of stock awards and options to compensate managers as well as refocusing corporate reporting on the long term. To this end, these scholars recommend the following policy steps:

Repeal SEC Rule 10-B-18 and the 25% exemption

Improve corporate disclosure practices

Strengthen sustainability standards in 10-K reporting

Toughen executive compensation rules

Reform the taxation of executive compensation

Galston and Kamarck state that the American economy would work better if public corporations behaved more like private and family-held firms—if they made long-term investments, retained and trained their workers, grew organically, and offered reasonable but not excessive compensation to their top managers, based on long-term performance rather than quarterly earnings. To make these significant changes happen, the incentives that shape the decisions of CEOs and board of directors must be restructured. Reining in stock buybacks, reducing short-term equity gains from compensation packages, and shifting managers’ focus toward long-term objectives, Galston and Kamarck argue, will help address the most significant challenges facing America’s workers and corporations.

Downloads

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/06/19-israel-economy-bogged-down?rssid=galstonw{C5AF4577-FBF7-41E6-BD74-79BEA4975B15}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/96773650/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~Bureacracy-and-a-boggeddown-Israeli-economy-How-the-government-is-respondingBureacracy and a bogged-down Israeli economy: How the government is responding

Two weeks ago, I published a column in the Wall Street Journal arguing that Israel’s economy was lagging behind well behind developed world standards and that its somnolent, often obstructionist bureaucracy was the most importance hindrance to economic vitality. Some days later, I received a call from Amit Lang, the director-general of the Israeli Ministry of the Economy, and we talked for quite some time.

To my surprise, Lang did not challenge either my thesis or the evidence I cited, but he was in no way defensive about it. Instead, he laid out the steps that are being taken to address the problem. The new government, he said, was committed to improving the metrics of performance by 25 percent over the next 5 years. To accomplish this, each ministry would be required to submit a detailed plan covering all the bureaucratic and regulatory matters within its sphere of jurisdiction. A special unit within the prime minister’s office would coordinate these plans and oversee their enforcement.

In response, I pointed out that a 25 percent improvement would leave many key indicators far short of international benchmarks. For example, it takes on average 6 working days in the U.S. to start a new business. The OECD average is 13 days. In Israel, it takes 34 days. So a 25 percent improvement would bring Israel down to 26 days, still twice as long as the OECD and four times as long as the U.S. Even worse, completing the process of obtaining construction permits takes on average 11 years in Israel, compared to just months or even weeks throughout other western countries. The necessary changes could not be incremental; they had to be structural.

Lang did not contest the point. Instead, he gave exactly the answer I would have given when I was serving in the Clinton White House: We have to start somewhere, and besides, the 25 percent is a floor, not a ceiling. Ministries are free to go father, and they will be encouraged to do so.

Lang went on to say that the government was also concerned about the obstacles to economic growth and living standards created by Israel’s import barriers and that a committee had been created to address this problem. Within a year, non-tariff barriers will be reduced or even abolished outright, and Israel’s import regime will be harmonized with US and OECD norms.

A report issued on June 18 by the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, “A Picture of the Nation 2015,” underscores the urgency of this effort. Since 2005, the Center finds, the difference in food prices between Israel and the OECD has soared. Meat, poultry, fish, and bread are all more than 20 percent more expensive than the OECD average. Dairy and eggs are 51 percent higher; beverages, 56 percent.

The Center is blunt about the reasons for this huge gap: “The food industry in Israel is quite monopolistic, and most of the food that is sold is produced by a small number of companies.” The industry has used import barriers to protect its monopoly, with the result that imported food represents only 16 percent of household food expenditures, compared to 40 percent for furniture and nearly 70 percent for shoes and clothing. The import share of the most widely consumed food groups is especially low, reducing competition and contributing to the high cost of food in Israel.

The link between government policy and the well-being of average Israeli households could not be clearer, and it will be interesting to see whether the new government is up to the task of uprooting these long-entrenched monopolies.

Authors

Two weeks ago, I published a column in the Wall Street Journal arguing that Israel’s economy was lagging behind well behind developed world standards and that its somnolent, often obstructionist bureaucracy was the most importance hindrance to economic vitality. Some days later, I received a call from Amit Lang, the director-general of the Israeli Ministry of the Economy, and we talked for quite some time.

To my surprise, Lang did not challenge either my thesis or the evidence I cited, but he was in no way defensive about it. Instead, he laid out the steps that are being taken to address the problem. The new government, he said, was committed to improving the metrics of performance by 25 percent over the next 5 years. To accomplish this, each ministry would be required to submit a detailed plan covering all the bureaucratic and regulatory matters within its sphere of jurisdiction. A special unit within the prime minister’s office would coordinate these plans and oversee their enforcement.

In response, I pointed out that a 25 percent improvement would leave many key indicators far short of international benchmarks. For example, it takes on average 6 working days in the U.S. to start a new business. The OECD average is 13 days. In Israel, it takes 34 days. So a 25 percent improvement would bring Israel down to 26 days, still twice as long as the OECD and four times as long as the U.S. Even worse, completing the process of obtaining construction permits takes on average 11 years in Israel, compared to just months or even weeks throughout other western countries. The necessary changes could not be incremental; they had to be structural.

Lang did not contest the point. Instead, he gave exactly the answer I would have given when I was serving in the Clinton White House: We have to start somewhere, and besides, the 25 percent is a floor, not a ceiling. Ministries are free to go father, and they will be encouraged to do so.

Lang went on to say that the government was also concerned about the obstacles to economic growth and living standards created by Israel’s import barriers and that a committee had been created to address this problem. Within a year, non-tariff barriers will be reduced or even abolished outright, and Israel’s import regime will be harmonized with US and OECD norms.

A report issued on June 18 by the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, “A Picture of the Nation 2015,” underscores the urgency of this effort. Since 2005, the Center finds, the difference in food prices between Israel and the OECD has soared. Meat, poultry, fish, and bread are all more than 20 percent more expensive than the OECD average. Dairy and eggs are 51 percent higher; beverages, 56 percent.

The Center is blunt about the reasons for this huge gap: “The food industry in Israel is quite monopolistic, and most of the food that is sold is produced by a small number of companies.” The industry has used import barriers to protect its monopoly, with the result that imported food represents only 16 percent of household food expenditures, compared to 40 percent for furniture and nearly 70 percent for shoes and clothing. The import share of the most widely consumed food groups is especially low, reducing competition and contributing to the high cost of food in Israel.

The link between government policy and the well-being of average Israeli households could not be clearer, and it will be interesting to see whether the new government is up to the task of uprooting these long-entrenched monopolies.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/06/09-lapid-multilateral-talks-iran-bds-peace-coalition?rssid=galstonw{5E8ABBAE-5C32-4B47-8511-830D2F7865F4}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/95062925/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~Yair-Lapid-on-Israels-regional-challenges-Thinking-beyond-the-current-governmentYair Lapid on Israel's regional challenges: Thinking beyond the current government

In a wide-ranging 90-minute session at Brookings earlier today, Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid offered a number of observations that the U.S. government would do well to ponder.

Three concerns about the possible deal are key to Israeli sentiments. If Iranian nuclear installations are not fully open to international observation, including surprise inspections, Israelis would regard the deal as essentially unverifiable. Second, Israelis believe that sanctions should be lifted at most gradually, in response to verified Iranian compliance, and that the mechanism for restoring them in response to noncompliance should be straightforward—not subject to veto by any party or parties to the agreement.

Third, Lapid dwelled on his doubts about the Obama administration’s willingness to act on Iranian violations between now and the 2016 presidential election. What would happen, he asked, if Israel came to the U.S. government six months after the deal is inked with clear evidence of cheating by Teheran? His prediction: the administration would downplay the seriousness of the violation and stall for time. Even worse than an inadequate deal, he suggested, would be the unwillingness of the United States to enforce it.

Another central area of concern, predictably, was the stalled negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians. In Lapid’s view, these bilateral talks have hit a wall and cannot succeed: “The maximum Israel can offer is less than the Palestinians can accept.” His proposed alternative is a regional summit hosted by Egypt. To get there, Israel should declare its acceptance of the Saudi Peace Initiative as a framework for negotiation toward a two-state solution.

This raises a question: why should a change of format and venue produce a different result? Lapid’s answer: Palestinians will be more willing to reach an agreement if they know that they have the support of key Arab states on charged issues such as the final status of Jerusalem, and Israel will have a greater incentive to make hard choices—especially about settlements—if it can gain otherwise unavailable advantages such as access to regional economic markets.

Though largely unknown outside a small circle of Washington experts, this proposal has been widely discussed in Israel. It has been endorsed by officials such as President Reuven Rivlin and Interior Minister Silvan Shalom, Lapid said, citing survey data showing that 71 percent of Israelis support it as well.

Changing circumstances in the region are making Arab states more open to a summit along these lines, Lapid asserted. For decades, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians was the central Arab concern, but now they “want to get rid of the . . . problem” to focus on growing chaos in the region and the mounting Iranian threat. “They are more preoccupied,” said Lapid, “with other things—things that Israel is good at,” ranging from anti-terrorist intelligence to advanced water technology. Less fraught relations with Israel could also improve relations between Arab states and the U.S. Lapid insisted that these states know they must now choose between two of their long-term adversaries—Israel and Iran—and that they regard Israel as by far the lesser threat.

Lapid has discussed his proposal for regionalizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a large number of U.S. officials, including Vice President Joe Biden, garnering expressions of interest that the Yesh Atid leader regards as more than perfunctory. He has been less successful with his own prime minister, whom he characterizes as reluctant to enter into any room without knowing what will emerge from it.

But Lapid is thinking beyond the current government, which rests on the narrowest possible majority of 61 Knesset members. “I see no way for this coalition to last more than one budget,” he said, because “they have in front of them a series of bills they cannot pass.” He cited one example with obvious relish—the new coalition’s pledge to undo legislation (which Lapid had pushed during the previous government) establishing “equality of burdens” between ultra-Orthodox Israelis and the rest of the population in areas such as military service. He promised to unleash a citizen army to picket MKs who had previously supported this legislation and other measures the new coalition opposes.

If and when this government falls, Lapid wants to be ready—with a fleshed out domestic and foreign policy agenda that rests on a solid elite “infrastructure” and widespread public support.

Three concerns about the possible deal are key to Israeli sentiments. If Iranian nuclear installations are not fully open to international observation, including surprise inspections, Israelis would regard the deal as essentially unverifiable. Second, Israelis believe that sanctions should be lifted at most gradually, in response to verified Iranian compliance, and that the mechanism for restoring them in response to noncompliance should be straightforward—not subject to veto by any party or parties to the agreement.

Third, Lapid dwelled on his doubts about the Obama administration’s willingness to act on Iranian violations between now and the 2016 presidential election. What would happen, he asked, if Israel came to the U.S. government six months after the deal is inked with clear evidence of cheating by Teheran? His prediction: the administration would downplay the seriousness of the violation and stall for time. Even worse than an inadequate deal, he suggested, would be the unwillingness of the United States to enforce it.

Another central area of concern, predictably, was the stalled negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians. In Lapid’s view, these bilateral talks have hit a wall and cannot succeed: “The maximum Israel can offer is less than the Palestinians can accept.” His proposed alternative is a regional summit hosted by Egypt. To get there, Israel should declare its acceptance of the Saudi Peace Initiative as a framework for negotiation toward a two-state solution.

This raises a question: why should a change of format and venue produce a different result? Lapid’s answer: Palestinians will be more willing to reach an agreement if they know that they have the support of key Arab states on charged issues such as the final status of Jerusalem, and Israel will have a greater incentive to make hard choices—especially about settlements—if it can gain otherwise unavailable advantages such as access to regional economic markets.

Though largely unknown outside a small circle of Washington experts, this proposal has been widely discussed in Israel. It has been endorsed by officials such as President Reuven Rivlin and Interior Minister Silvan Shalom, Lapid said, citing survey data showing that 71 percent of Israelis support it as well.

Changing circumstances in the region are making Arab states more open to a summit along these lines, Lapid asserted. For decades, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians was the central Arab concern, but now they “want to get rid of the . . . problem” to focus on growing chaos in the region and the mounting Iranian threat. “They are more preoccupied,” said Lapid, “with other things—things that Israel is good at,” ranging from anti-terrorist intelligence to advanced water technology. Less fraught relations with Israel could also improve relations between Arab states and the U.S. Lapid insisted that these states know they must now choose between two of their long-term adversaries—Israel and Iran—and that they regard Israel as by far the lesser threat.

Lapid has discussed his proposal for regionalizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a large number of U.S. officials, including Vice President Joe Biden, garnering expressions of interest that the Yesh Atid leader regards as more than perfunctory. He has been less successful with his own prime minister, whom he characterizes as reluctant to enter into any room without knowing what will emerge from it.

But Lapid is thinking beyond the current government, which rests on the narrowest possible majority of 61 Knesset members. “I see no way for this coalition to last more than one budget,” he said, because “they have in front of them a series of bills they cannot pass.” He cited one example with obvious relish—the new coalition’s pledge to undo legislation (which Lapid had pushed during the previous government) establishing “equality of burdens” between ultra-Orthodox Israelis and the rest of the population in areas such as military service. He promised to unleash a citizen army to picket MKs who had previously supported this legislation and other measures the new coalition opposes.

If and when this government falls, Lapid wants to be ready—with a fleshed out domestic and foreign policy agenda that rests on a solid elite “infrastructure” and widespread public support.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/06/03-iowa-bloomberg-galston?rssid=galstonw{F59D58AF-043B-4363-8977-D1202E76B380}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/94079561/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~Republicans-and-Democrats-divided-on-important-issues-for-a-presidential-nomineeRepublicans and Democrats divided on important issues for a presidential nominee

This post has been updated.

In these hyper-polarized times, it is no longer surprising when political partisans disagree vehemently about public policy issues. But in the early weeks of the race for the Democratic and Republican presidential nominations, another dimension of polarization is coming into view: the parties don’t even agree about which issues matter most.

Consider the findings of a recent Bloomberg/Des Moines Register poll exploring the policy stances of Republican and Democratic Iowans who are registered voters and likely to attend their party’s caucuses early next year. “For each of the following issues,” a key question reads, “please tell me whether this is something you want candidates to spend a lot of time talking about or not.” Of the 20 issues on the survey list, seven received an affirmative answer from at least four out of five Republicans. Democrats also endorsed seven issues by this margin.

Here are the responses by party:

Only two issues appeared on both lists: immigration and job creation. Recent history suggests that these issues will be subject to the classic dynamic of polarization when the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees square off in 2016, with the candidates advocating radically different approaches. Each candidate is likely to use his or her party’s other five top issues more as vehicles for mobilizing core supporters than as focal points of debate with the other candidate.

Two issues—climate change and income inequality—stand out from the rest in that the gap of interest and concern between the parties is especially wide. 90 percent of Democrats want their nominee to focus on income inequality, compared to only 36 percent of Republicans. In the same vein, 81 percent of Democrats want their nominee to focus on climate change; only 18 percent of Republicans agree.

At this early stage of the presidential contest, we have no way of knowing whether the election will be close enough for genuinely undecided voters to tip the balance. (There is good reason to believe that their share of the electorate will be smaller in 2016 than was typically the case a generation ago.) But if the margin in the closing weeks of the campaign is narrow, swing voters will have to decide not only what they think about contested issues, but also which party’s top policy concerns more closely mirror their own.

Update, 6/3/2015 4:30pm:

A CNN/ORC national survey released today (June 3) largely tracks the Iowa findings, although the poll question—name the single most important issue—and the list—8 items rather than 20—differs significantly from Bloomberg/DMR.

Compared to Republicans, Democrats are significantly more likely to name education, energy/environment, and health care as top concerns and significantly less likely to select terrorism, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, immigration, and the budget deficit.

CNN/ORC provides ideological as well as partisan breakdowns. These probably offer more insight into primary voters, who tend to be more liberal than Democrats generally and more conservative than typical Republicans. By 16 percentage points, liberals are more likely than conservatives to choose education as their top issue; the margin for energy and the environment is 10 points. By smaller margins of 5 to 6 points, they are less likely to select terrorism,

Because conservatives are more dominant in the Republican Party than are liberals in the Democratic Party, the differences between liberals and Democrats as a whole are more pronounced than between conservatives and Republicans generally. Indeed, CNN/ORC data show, liberals are significantly more likely to care about education than are Democrats as a whole, and significantly less likely to choose health care as their top concern. This reflects, in part, the fact that young adults tend to be more liberal than are older cohorts and therefore constitute a greater share of liberals than the raw numbers would suggest. Young adults tend to care more about education and less about health care than do middle-aged and elderly Americans. By contrast, there are no significant differences between Republicans as a whole and conservatives.

Authors

In these hyper-polarized times, it is no longer surprising when political partisans disagree vehemently about public policy issues. But in the early weeks of the race for the Democratic and Republican presidential nominations, another dimension of polarization is coming into view: the parties don’t even agree about which issues matter most.

Consider the findings of a recent Bloomberg/Des Moines Register poll exploring the policy stances of Republican and Democratic Iowans who are registered voters and likely to attend their party’s caucuses early next year. “For each of the following issues,” a key question reads, “please tell me whether this is something you want candidates to spend a lot of time talking about or not.” Of the 20 issues on the survey list, seven received an affirmative answer from at least four out of five Republicans. Democrats also endorsed seven issues by this margin.

Here are the responses by party:

Only two issues appeared on both lists: immigration and job creation. Recent history suggests that these issues will be subject to the classic dynamic of polarization when the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees square off in 2016, with the candidates advocating radically different approaches. Each candidate is likely to use his or her party’s other five top issues more as vehicles for mobilizing core supporters than as focal points of debate with the other candidate.

Two issues—climate change and income inequality—stand out from the rest in that the gap of interest and concern between the parties is especially wide. 90 percent of Democrats want their nominee to focus on income inequality, compared to only 36 percent of Republicans. In the same vein, 81 percent of Democrats want their nominee to focus on climate change; only 18 percent of Republicans agree.

At this early stage of the presidential contest, we have no way of knowing whether the election will be close enough for genuinely undecided voters to tip the balance. (There is good reason to believe that their share of the electorate will be smaller in 2016 than was typically the case a generation ago.) But if the margin in the closing weeks of the campaign is narrow, swing voters will have to decide not only what they think about contested issues, but also which party’s top policy concerns more closely mirror their own.

Update, 6/3/2015 4:30pm:

A CNN/ORC national survey released today (June 3) largely tracks the Iowa findings, although the poll question—name the single most important issue—and the list—8 items rather than 20—differs significantly from Bloomberg/DMR.

Compared to Republicans, Democrats are significantly more likely to name education, energy/environment, and health care as top concerns and significantly less likely to select terrorism, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, immigration, and the budget deficit.

CNN/ORC provides ideological as well as partisan breakdowns. These probably offer more insight into primary voters, who tend to be more liberal than Democrats generally and more conservative than typical Republicans. By 16 percentage points, liberals are more likely than conservatives to choose education as their top issue; the margin for energy and the environment is 10 points. By smaller margins of 5 to 6 points, they are less likely to select terrorism,

Because conservatives are more dominant in the Republican Party than are liberals in the Democratic Party, the differences between liberals and Democrats as a whole are more pronounced than between conservatives and Republicans generally. Indeed, CNN/ORC data show, liberals are significantly more likely to care about education than are Democrats as a whole, and significantly less likely to choose health care as their top concern. This reflects, in part, the fact that young adults tend to be more liberal than are older cohorts and therefore constitute a greater share of liberals than the raw numbers would suggest. Young adults tend to care more about education and less about health care than do middle-aged and elderly Americans. By contrast, there are no significant differences between Republicans as a whole and conservatives.

Well before last week’s elections in the UK, it was clear that the Scottish National Party was surging. Facing massive losses in its traditional northern bastion, Labour pinned its hopes on winning dozens of seats in England and Wales, some from the collapsing Liberal Democrats, and even more from the Conservatives in head-to-head competition.

From a variety of sources, I have compiled a list of three dozen seats that Labour hoped to snatch from the Tories and where their prospects appeared promising, in many cases just days before the vote. The results indicate that this strategy failed. Of the 36 contested Conservative seats, Labour won only 5. Compared to the outcome of the previous general election in 2010, the Conservatives increased their vote share in 31 of these constituencies, compared to only 20 for Labour.

I managed to locate constituency-level polls taken in 2014 for 23 of these seats, and they tell a revealing story. If the election had been held in the summer or fall of last year, Labour would have won a majority of the contested seats, many by substantial margins. The story since then is not one of Labour losses but rather of Conservative gains. Between mid-2014 and last week’s election, Labour maintained its support but increased it outside the margin of error in only 1 of the 23 constituencies, compared to 22 for the Tories. The Conservative gain in these constituencies averaged 11 percentage points, compared to a 1 point average loss for Labour.

It is hard to resist the conclusion that Labour’s left-leaning campaign solidified its base but persuaded few voters beyond that core, a result likely to influence the selection of its next leader. As veteran UK political advisor and commentator Patrick Diamond observes, Labour’s strategy “dragged the party even further away from the vital centre-ground of British politics. The leadership mistakenly assumed that, following the financial crisis, the country had moved radically to the left. But voters were as wary of government as they were of the market, making it essential for Labour to be the party of economic competence and the party of aspiration. Labour fought the election on policies that would never command an electoral majority or build a dynamic centre-left coalition.”

By contrast, the Conservatives managed to expand their support in contested areas, compared not only to their nadir last year but even to 2010. Which voters contributed to the Conservative surge? Between the summer of 2014 and the 2015 election, support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) declined by an average of 5 points in these crucial constituencies. The LibDems lost an average of 3 points; decisions by previously uncommitted voters netted the Tories an additional 3 points.

The Conservatives must now contend with the Scottish nationalist challenge to the unity of the UK as well as the English nationalist challenge to Britain’s membership in the European Union. Meanwhile, Labour must figure out how to get back in the game. The reversion to Old Labour backfired. So now what?

Authors

Well before last week’s elections in the UK, it was clear that the Scottish National Party was surging. Facing massive losses in its traditional northern bastion, Labour pinned its hopes on winning dozens of seats in England and Wales, some from the collapsing Liberal Democrats, and even more from the Conservatives in head-to-head competition.

From a variety of sources, I have compiled a list of three dozen seats that Labour hoped to snatch from the Tories and where their prospects appeared promising, in many cases just days before the vote. The results indicate that this strategy failed. Of the 36 contested Conservative seats, Labour won only 5. Compared to the outcome of the previous general election in 2010, the Conservatives increased their vote share in 31 of these constituencies, compared to only 20 for Labour.

I managed to locate constituency-level polls taken in 2014 for 23 of these seats, and they tell a revealing story. If the election had been held in the summer or fall of last year, Labour would have won a majority of the contested seats, many by substantial margins. The story since then is not one of Labour losses but rather of Conservative gains. Between mid-2014 and last week’s election, Labour maintained its support but increased it outside the margin of error in only 1 of the 23 constituencies, compared to 22 for the Tories. The Conservative gain in these constituencies averaged 11 percentage points, compared to a 1 point average loss for Labour.

It is hard to resist the conclusion that Labour’s left-leaning campaign solidified its base but persuaded few voters beyond that core, a result likely to influence the selection of its next leader. As veteran UK political advisor and commentator Patrick Diamond observes, Labour’s strategy “dragged the party even further away from the vital centre-ground of British politics. The leadership mistakenly assumed that, following the financial crisis, the country had moved radically to the left. But voters were as wary of government as they were of the market, making it essential for Labour to be the party of economic competence and the party of aspiration. Labour fought the election on policies that would never command an electoral majority or build a dynamic centre-left coalition.”

By contrast, the Conservatives managed to expand their support in contested areas, compared not only to their nadir last year but even to 2010. Which voters contributed to the Conservative surge? Between the summer of 2014 and the 2015 election, support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) declined by an average of 5 points in these crucial constituencies. The LibDems lost an average of 3 points; decisions by previously uncommitted voters netted the Tories an additional 3 points.

The Conservatives must now contend with the Scottish nationalist challenge to the unity of the UK as well as the English nationalist challenge to Britain’s membership in the European Union. Meanwhile, Labour must figure out how to get back in the game. The reversion to Old Labour backfired. So now what?

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/05/08-liberal-democrats-uk-election-galston?rssid=galstonw{544D6998-44AA-4DD9-A009-8917CAC79344}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/91437938/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~UK-elections-Where-did-support-for-the-Liberal-Democrats-goUK elections: Where did support for the Liberal Democrats go?

The UK’s Liberal Democrats are the lineal descendants of the Liberal Party, which held power under leaders such as Gladstone, Asquith, and Lloyd George and led the country for much of the half-century preceding World War One. After the rise of the Labour Party in the 1920s, the Liberals kept the flame alive as a third party that enjoyed more affection than popular support—and more popular support by far than seats in parliament.

After joining forces with a breakaway Labour faction, the Liberals saw their share of the popular vote rise to 25% in 1983, although Britain’s first-past-the-post district system gave them less than 5% of the total seats. By 2005, however, they had tripled their representation in Parliament to 62 seats. And after holding their gains in the 2010 general election, they entered into a coalition government with the Conservatives, who had received the most votes but had fallen well short of a parliamentary majority.

For reasons that my colleague Richard Reeves explored in his FixGov post earlier today, this alliance worked out poorly for the Liberal Democrats. In yesterday’s general election, their share of the popular vote fell by nearly two-thirds from 23.1% to only 7.9%, and their parliamentary caucus collapsed from 57 seats to only 8. The LibDems lost 37 of their 43 seats in England, 10 of 11 in Scotland, and 2 out of 3 in Wales. Their long-time leader Nick Clegg held his seat but resigned his leadership post this morning.

Where did the vanished support for the LibDems go? The answer points to the structural implications of the 2015 elections.

Overall, only a small share of the LibDems’ 15- point popular vote loss ended up in the hands of the major parties: Labour’s share increased by only 1.5 points, the Conservatives’ by a scant 0.8 points. Most of the gains accrued to the principal minor parties: taken together, the vote share of the Scottish National Party (SNP), the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), and the Green Party rose from 5.7% in 2010 to 21.1% today. Although the Conservatives did manage to gain a slim majority of the seats in parliament, the vote share of the two major parties is continuing its downward course, shifting British politics ever closer to the multi-party European model.

The distribution of the seat gains and losses was even more significant, as Table 1 below shows:

In theory, the shift of Scottish LibDems seats to the left-wing SNP could have accrued to Labour’s advantage—if Labour had made a strong enough showing in England. On the eve of the election, the polls suggested that Labour was in a good position to challenge the Conservatives’ grip on at least two dozen English seats. In the event, however, Labour netted almost no Conservative seats: of Labour’s 15-seat gain in England, fully 12 came from LibDem constituencies. If Labour cannot narrow the huge edge that the Conservatives enjoy among English voters, its chances of regaining power anytime soon are remote. And if Labour continues its leftward shift, it is hard to see how it can expand its support.

The ability of the Conservative to surmount the surge of support for the anti-immigrant, anti-Europe UKIP was impressive. It is as though the Republicans had maintained their majority in the House of Representatives despite the decision of its Tea Party faction to form an independent party. But the Conservatives have promised to hold an in-or-out referendum on its membership in the European Union by 2017, a pledge its leader, the once and future Prime Minister David Cameron, repeated in his victory speech this morning.

Within Mr. Cameron’s next and final 5-year term, then, Britain will make two fateful decisions—one about dealing with the upsurge of Scottish nationalism, which will require a substantial measure of devolution and new constitutional arrangements, the other about the upsurge of English nationalism, which could lead to its exit from Europe. The election debate this year may have been petty and dull; its aftermath will be anything but.

Authors

The UK’s Liberal Democrats are the lineal descendants of the Liberal Party, which held power under leaders such as Gladstone, Asquith, and Lloyd George and led the country for much of the half-century preceding World War One. After the rise of the Labour Party in the 1920s, the Liberals kept the flame alive as a third party that enjoyed more affection than popular support—and more popular support by far than seats in parliament.

After joining forces with a breakaway Labour faction, the Liberals saw their share of the popular vote rise to 25% in 1983, although Britain’s first-past-the-post district system gave them less than 5% of the total seats. By 2005, however, they had tripled their representation in Parliament to 62 seats. And after holding their gains in the 2010 general election, they entered into a coalition government with the Conservatives, who had received the most votes but had fallen well short of a parliamentary majority.

For reasons that my colleague Richard Reeves explored in his FixGov post earlier today, this alliance worked out poorly for the Liberal Democrats. In yesterday’s general election, their share of the popular vote fell by nearly two-thirds from 23.1% to only 7.9%, and their parliamentary caucus collapsed from 57 seats to only 8. The LibDems lost 37 of their 43 seats in England, 10 of 11 in Scotland, and 2 out of 3 in Wales. Their long-time leader Nick Clegg held his seat but resigned his leadership post this morning.

Where did the vanished support for the LibDems go? The answer points to the structural implications of the 2015 elections.

Overall, only a small share of the LibDems’ 15- point popular vote loss ended up in the hands of the major parties: Labour’s share increased by only 1.5 points, the Conservatives’ by a scant 0.8 points. Most of the gains accrued to the principal minor parties: taken together, the vote share of the Scottish National Party (SNP), the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), and the Green Party rose from 5.7% in 2010 to 21.1% today. Although the Conservatives did manage to gain a slim majority of the seats in parliament, the vote share of the two major parties is continuing its downward course, shifting British politics ever closer to the multi-party European model.

The distribution of the seat gains and losses was even more significant, as Table 1 below shows:

In theory, the shift of Scottish LibDems seats to the left-wing SNP could have accrued to Labour’s advantage—if Labour had made a strong enough showing in England. On the eve of the election, the polls suggested that Labour was in a good position to challenge the Conservatives’ grip on at least two dozen English seats. In the event, however, Labour netted almost no Conservative seats: of Labour’s 15-seat gain in England, fully 12 came from LibDem constituencies. If Labour cannot narrow the huge edge that the Conservatives enjoy among English voters, its chances of regaining power anytime soon are remote. And if Labour continues its leftward shift, it is hard to see how it can expand its support.

The ability of the Conservative to surmount the surge of support for the anti-immigrant, anti-Europe UKIP was impressive. It is as though the Republicans had maintained their majority in the House of Representatives despite the decision of its Tea Party faction to form an independent party. But the Conservatives have promised to hold an in-or-out referendum on its membership in the European Union by 2017, a pledge its leader, the once and future Prime Minister David Cameron, repeated in his victory speech this morning.

Within Mr. Cameron’s next and final 5-year term, then, Britain will make two fateful decisions—one about dealing with the upsurge of Scottish nationalism, which will require a substantial measure of devolution and new constitutional arrangements, the other about the upsurge of English nationalism, which could lead to its exit from Europe. The election debate this year may have been petty and dull; its aftermath will be anything but.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/04/22-institutional-innovation-galston-mcelvein?rssid=galstonw{79FF8203-9B80-4DE5-8A9A-0BB1379D22AF}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/89825899/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~Institutional-innovation-How-it-happens-and-why-it-mattersInstitutional innovation: How it happens and why it matters

Summarizing the lessons learned from the five-year Brookings Project on Institutional Reform, this paper explores how governmental institutional innovation takes place and why such change is important to public policy and democracy. The principal focus of this report is on the kind of change that leads to the creation of new institutions rather than to the reform of existing ones.

First, William Galston and Elizabeth McElvein initially examine the nature of institutions and why reforming them is so difficult. They then analyze how institutional innovation can happen, honing in on “acute” vs. “incubated” innovations. Acute innovations, they write, tend to occur quickly; they are dominated by individuals who are close to the locus of decision-making; the generation of alternatives takes place within the decision-making process, not prior to it; and the level of partisan conflict is relatively low. Incubated innovations take place slowly, frequently over many years. Because of this long march from private research to public visibility, these innovations tend to get caught up in partisan politics.

Galston and McElvein examine the following case studies of institutional reform:

The creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a classic example of institutional innovation undertaken under extreme pressure—the threatened collapse of the nation’s entire banking system.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) represents a good example of “acute” institutional innovation undertaken in the shadow of catastrophe.

The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) represents an incubated institutional innovation.

The founding of the Congressional Budget Office.

The creation of Federal Reserve System (FRS) is an intermediate case that stands between the rapid, crisis-driven, consensual adoption of the FDIC and the much slower, bottom-up process that preceded the EPA.

The National Security Act of 1947 – that established the post-war institutional architecture for intelligence, the military services, and national security policy-making—responded to persistent problems.

There is no single road to success for acute government innovations, Galston and McElvein conclude. Some reforms respond to acute problems at moments of crisis, while others seize windows of opportunity to address persistent problems. Some reflect the pressure of public opinion, while others are driven by consortia of insider experts and elected officials. And while every reform requires leadership, the locus of that leadership varies widely, from social movements and the private sector to the executive branch and Congress. Despite these variations, one fact remains immutable: the default setting of every form of government—and especially a constitutional republic with divided powers—is the status quo. Overcoming resistance and simple inertia is hard, all the more so because what is exists is real and familiar while the proposed change is imagined and novel, unfamiliar and therefore threatening. Although the details vary, it always takes energy and sustained commitment to move the status quo.

There is much variation for incubated institutional change, they find. Some new institutions—such as the CBO and the EPA— function well because their founding leaders define their mission and mode of operations in ways that make sense internally while building trust externally. Some succeed because their relatively narrow original mission persists unchanged for decades, as was the case with the FDIC. Other successful innovations begin with broader, vaguer missions but are flexible enough to shift with changes of leadership and circumstances. In its early decades, for example, the NSC reflected the differing operating styles of successive presidents as well as varying levels of presidential trust in the departments of State and Defense and in the intelligence agencies.

As these case studies show, Galston and McElvein argue, governing by crisis is expensive. Our inability to preempt failures of intelligence and financial oversight imposed costs measured in trillions of dollars for which we and future generations will pay. Looking forward, if we cannot figure out how to finance the maintenance and modernization of our infrastructure, efficiency and productivity will slow, and bridge and dam collapses will become increasingly regular.

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Authors

Summarizing the lessons learned from the five-year Brookings Project on Institutional Reform, this paper explores how governmental institutional innovation takes place and why such change is important to public policy and democracy. The principal focus of this report is on the kind of change that leads to the creation of new institutions rather than to the reform of existing ones.

First, William Galston and Elizabeth McElvein initially examine the nature of institutions and why reforming them is so difficult. They then analyze how institutional innovation can happen, honing in on “acute” vs. “incubated” innovations. Acute innovations, they write, tend to occur quickly; they are dominated by individuals who are close to the locus of decision-making; the generation of alternatives takes place within the decision-making process, not prior to it; and the level of partisan conflict is relatively low. Incubated innovations take place slowly, frequently over many years. Because of this long march from private research to public visibility, these innovations tend to get caught up in partisan politics.

Galston and McElvein examine the following case studies of institutional reform:

The creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a classic example of institutional innovation undertaken under extreme pressure—the threatened collapse of the nation’s entire banking system.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) represents a good example of “acute” institutional innovation undertaken in the shadow of catastrophe.

The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) represents an incubated institutional innovation.

The founding of the Congressional Budget Office.

The creation of Federal Reserve System (FRS) is an intermediate case that stands between the rapid, crisis-driven, consensual adoption of the FDIC and the much slower, bottom-up process that preceded the EPA.

The National Security Act of 1947 – that established the post-war institutional architecture for intelligence, the military services, and national security policy-making—responded to persistent problems.

There is no single road to success for acute government innovations, Galston and McElvein conclude. Some reforms respond to acute problems at moments of crisis, while others seize windows of opportunity to address persistent problems. Some reflect the pressure of public opinion, while others are driven by consortia of insider experts and elected officials. And while every reform requires leadership, the locus of that leadership varies widely, from social movements and the private sector to the executive branch and Congress. Despite these variations, one fact remains immutable: the default setting of every form of government—and especially a constitutional republic with divided powers—is the status quo. Overcoming resistance and simple inertia is hard, all the more so because what is exists is real and familiar while the proposed change is imagined and novel, unfamiliar and therefore threatening. Although the details vary, it always takes energy and sustained commitment to move the status quo.

There is much variation for incubated institutional change, they find. Some new institutions—such as the CBO and the EPA— function well because their founding leaders define their mission and mode of operations in ways that make sense internally while building trust externally. Some succeed because their relatively narrow original mission persists unchanged for decades, as was the case with the FDIC. Other successful innovations begin with broader, vaguer missions but are flexible enough to shift with changes of leadership and circumstances. In its early decades, for example, the NSC reflected the differing operating styles of successive presidents as well as varying levels of presidential trust in the departments of State and Defense and in the intelligence agencies.

As these case studies show, Galston and McElvein argue, governing by crisis is expensive. Our inability to preempt failures of intelligence and financial oversight imposed costs measured in trillions of dollars for which we and future generations will pay. Looking forward, if we cannot figure out how to finance the maintenance and modernization of our infrastructure, efficiency and productivity will slow, and bridge and dam collapses will become increasingly regular.

When the head of the world’s largest investment fund raises fundamental questions about U.S. corporations, we should all pay attention.

In a letter earlier this week to the Fortune 500 CEOs, BlackRock Chairman Larry Fink criticized the short-term orientation that he believes shapes too much of today’s corporate behavior. “It concerns us,” he declared, that “in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away from investing in the future growth of their companies. Too many have cut capital expenditure and even increased debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks.” And he concluded, “When done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment, [returning cash to shareholders] can jeopardize a company’s ability to generate sustainable long-term returns.”

Fink is correct on all counts. In a new Brookings paper out today, University of Massachusetts economist William Lazonick states that the 454 companies listed continuously in the S&P 500 index between 2004 and 2013 used 51 percent of their earnings to buy back their own stock, almost all through purchases on the open market. An additional 35 percent went to dividends. “Buybacks represent a withdrawal of internally controlled finance that could be used to support investment in the company’s productive capabilities,” he said.

This is bad for the economy in two ways. As the growth of the U.S. workforce slows dramatically, economic growth will depend increasingly on improved productivity, must of which comes from raising capital investment per worker. Failing to make productivity-enhancing capital investments will doom our economy to a new normal of slow growth.

Many business leaders say that they are reluctant to make long-term investments without reasonable expectations of growing demand for their products. That brings us to the second way in which corporate short-termism is bad for the economy. Most consumer demand comes from wages. If employers refuse to share gains with their employees, growth in demand is bound to be anemic.

Although he clearly cares about his country, Fink is also acting as the steward of $4.8 trillion in investments. In an article published by McKinzie earlier this month, he warns that although the return of cash to shareholders is juicing equity markets right now, investors “will pay for it later when the ability to generate revenue in the long term dries up because of the lack of investment in the future.”

Unlike most other corporate leaders who express concerns about these developments, Fink is unwilling to rely on moral suasion alone. Because current incentives are so perverse, he argued, “It is hard for even the most dedicated CEO to buck this trend.” The constant pressure to produce quarterly results forces executives to go along—or risk losing their jobs. That pressure comes from investors who are, in Fink’s words, “renters, not owners, who are going to trade your stock as soon as they can pocket a quick gain.”

This logic leads BlackRock’s chairman to propose changing the tax code by lengthening to three years the the period needed to qualify for capital gains treatment while taxing trading gains at an even higher rate than ordinary income for investment held less than six months. To encourage truly patient capital, the capital gains rate would be stepped down to zero over a period of ten years.

We can argue the merits of this idea, and we should. But the main point should be beyond argument. We need more builders and fewer traders, more Warren Buffetts and fewer Carl Icahns. And to get them, we’re going to have to change the laws governing corporate and investor behavior. Fink has opened up a crucial debate, and it’s time for Congress and presidential aspirants to join it.

Authors

When the head of the world’s largest investment fund raises fundamental questions about U.S. corporations, we should all pay attention.

In a letter earlier this week to the Fortune 500 CEOs, BlackRock Chairman Larry Fink criticized the short-term orientation that he believes shapes too much of today’s corporate behavior. “It concerns us,” he declared, that “in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away from investing in the future growth of their companies. Too many have cut capital expenditure and even increased debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks.” And he concluded, “When done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment, [returning cash to shareholders] can jeopardize a company’s ability to generate sustainable long-term returns.”

Fink is correct on all counts. In a new Brookings paper out today, University of Massachusetts economist William Lazonick states that the 454 companies listed continuously in the S&P 500 index between 2004 and 2013 used 51 percent of their earnings to buy back their own stock, almost all through purchases on the open market. An additional 35 percent went to dividends. “Buybacks represent a withdrawal of internally controlled finance that could be used to support investment in the company’s productive capabilities,” he said.

This is bad for the economy in two ways. As the growth of the U.S. workforce slows dramatically, economic growth will depend increasingly on improved productivity, must of which comes from raising capital investment per worker. Failing to make productivity-enhancing capital investments will doom our economy to a new normal of slow growth.

Many business leaders say that they are reluctant to make long-term investments without reasonable expectations of growing demand for their products. That brings us to the second way in which corporate short-termism is bad for the economy. Most consumer demand comes from wages. If employers refuse to share gains with their employees, growth in demand is bound to be anemic.

Although he clearly cares about his country, Fink is also acting as the steward of $4.8 trillion in investments. In an article published by McKinzie earlier this month, he warns that although the return of cash to shareholders is juicing equity markets right now, investors “will pay for it later when the ability to generate revenue in the long term dries up because of the lack of investment in the future.”

Unlike most other corporate leaders who express concerns about these developments, Fink is unwilling to rely on moral suasion alone. Because current incentives are so perverse, he argued, “It is hard for even the most dedicated CEO to buck this trend.” The constant pressure to produce quarterly results forces executives to go along—or risk losing their jobs. That pressure comes from investors who are, in Fink’s words, “renters, not owners, who are going to trade your stock as soon as they can pocket a quick gain.”

This logic leads BlackRock’s chairman to propose changing the tax code by lengthening to three years the the period needed to qualify for capital gains treatment while taxing trading gains at an even higher rate than ordinary income for investment held less than six months. To encourage truly patient capital, the capital gains rate would be stepped down to zero over a period of ten years.

We can argue the merits of this idea, and we should. But the main point should be beyond argument. We need more builders and fewer traders, more Warren Buffetts and fewer Carl Icahns. And to get them, we’re going to have to change the laws governing corporate and investor behavior. Fink has opened up a crucial debate, and it’s time for Congress and presidential aspirants to join it.

On April 1, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion on the progress of talks between Iran and six world powers, including the United States, on a comprehensive nuclear agreement. After an introduction by Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, Senior Fellows Robert Einhorn, Suzanne Maloney, William Galston, and Daniel Byman provided an overview of the state of play of the negotiations, identified key factors that have complicated the formulation of a preliminary political framework, and evaluated prospects for a final deal by the official deadline of June 30.

Einhorn opened with an overview of the latest round of talks, which were intended to produce a political framework by March 31. Iranians, including nuclear negotiator Abbas Araghchi, have said that they expect a press statement on the talks, but not a concrete agreement. Meanwhile, U.S. officials have advocated against a vague statement, saying that they support a detailed statement which identifies key areas of progress in talks.

The U.S. objectives remain unchanged, said Einhorn. First, the U.S. seeks to put in place rigorous verification measures which could detect covert noncompliance with any agreement. Second, the U.S. would like to lengthen to one year the time it would take Iran to “break out” to produce enough nuclear material for a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so. Third, U.S. negotiators have pushed for an agreement which would remain in force for at least 10-15 years, with incremental sanctions relief occurring as Iran fulfills its obligations. According to Einhorn, the U.S. may want to ensure permanent monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities under the IAEA Additional Protocol.

Einhorn identified a number of unresolved issues that have complicated talks. These include: the timing of sanctions relief, including the easing of U.N. Security Council sanctions; Iran’s ability to conduct research and development of advanced centrifuges; the duration of any agreement; the handling of Iran’s stocks of gaseous enriched uranium; and the possible military dimensions of Iran’s past nuclear activities, which the IAEA has said it must clarify to have confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

Negotiations have failed primarily because the Iranians have taken a rigid approach, said Einhorn. This lack of flexibility could be a tactical decision, designed to extract further concessions from the U.S. even as pressure builds in the U.S. Congress. It could also be a sign that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has laid out clear red lines for the negotiating team, and that the Iranian negotiators are not yet willing to push back against those guidelines.

In her remarks, Maloney focused on Iran’s domestic dynamics. She emphasized that, despite internal disagreement on the specific elements of a potential deal, there is a strong political consensus in favor of the negotiations themselves. However, Maloney also stressed that negotiators must adhere to the relatively inflexible terms for an agreement articulated by Khamenei. She identified his stance as the primary obstacle to progress toward a final deal.

Finally, Maloney emphasized the significance of the sanctions as a challenge in devising a mutually acceptable agreement. The implementation of the Joint Plan of Action has shown the Iranians that simply signing a deal has not reinvigorated their economy, or significantly trade and investment, Maloney said. Tehran mistrusts the Obama administration’s capacity to implement sanctions relief and is seeking to maximize the immediate benefits it enjoys from any long-term bargain.

Galston engaged the discussion through the lens of American public opinion, which has grown increasingly hawkish on foreign policy in the past months. Citing a Quinnipiac University poll released April 1, Galston noted that voters in Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania, three critical swing states, favor a diplomatic settlement to military intervention by a margin of four to one. And yet, by a similarly strong margin, Americans are skeptical that Iran will negotiate in good faith. This, Galston said, indicates a contradiction at the heart of American public opinion.

Galston believes the March 31st soft deadline to be less consequential than April 13, the date Congress reconvenes in Washington. Several proposals to establish a greater legislative presence in the negotiations process have already gained bipartisan momentum, notably legislation introduced by Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) and by Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL). Although the course of congressional action remains unclear, Galston concluded that increased legislative involvement will loosen the Obama administration’s already tenuous grasp on the negotiations process.

Authors

On April 1, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion on the progress of talks between Iran and six world powers, including the United States, on a comprehensive nuclear agreement. After an introduction by Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, Senior Fellows Robert Einhorn, Suzanne Maloney, William Galston, and Daniel Byman provided an overview of the state of play of the negotiations, identified key factors that have complicated the formulation of a preliminary political framework, and evaluated prospects for a final deal by the official deadline of June 30.

Einhorn opened with an overview of the latest round of talks, which were intended to produce a political framework by March 31. Iranians, including nuclear negotiator Abbas Araghchi, have said that they expect a press statement on the talks, but not a concrete agreement. Meanwhile, U.S. officials have advocated against a vague statement, saying that they support a detailed statement which identifies key areas of progress in talks.

The U.S. objectives remain unchanged, said Einhorn. First, the U.S. seeks to put in place rigorous verification measures which could detect covert noncompliance with any agreement. Second, the U.S. would like to lengthen to one year the time it would take Iran to “break out” to produce enough nuclear material for a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so. Third, U.S. negotiators have pushed for an agreement which would remain in force for at least 10-15 years, with incremental sanctions relief occurring as Iran fulfills its obligations. According to Einhorn, the U.S. may want to ensure permanent monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities under the IAEA Additional Protocol.

Einhorn identified a number of unresolved issues that have complicated talks. These include: the timing of sanctions relief, including the easing of U.N. Security Council sanctions; Iran’s ability to conduct research and development of advanced centrifuges; the duration of any agreement; the handling of Iran’s stocks of gaseous enriched uranium; and the possible military dimensions of Iran’s past nuclear activities, which the IAEA has said it must clarify to have confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

Negotiations have failed primarily because the Iranians have taken a rigid approach, said Einhorn. This lack of flexibility could be a tactical decision, designed to extract further concessions from the U.S. even as pressure builds in the U.S. Congress. It could also be a sign that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has laid out clear red lines for the negotiating team, and that the Iranian negotiators are not yet willing to push back against those guidelines.

In her remarks, Maloney focused on Iran’s domestic dynamics. She emphasized that, despite internal disagreement on the specific elements of a potential deal, there is a strong political consensus in favor of the negotiations themselves. However, Maloney also stressed that negotiators must adhere to the relatively inflexible terms for an agreement articulated by Khamenei. She identified his stance as the primary obstacle to progress toward a final deal.

Finally, Maloney emphasized the significance of the sanctions as a challenge in devising a mutually acceptable agreement. The implementation of the Joint Plan of Action has shown the Iranians that simply signing a deal has not reinvigorated their economy, or significantly trade and investment, Maloney said. Tehran mistrusts the Obama administration’s capacity to implement sanctions relief and is seeking to maximize the immediate benefits it enjoys from any long-term bargain.

Galston engaged the discussion through the lens of American public opinion, which has grown increasingly hawkish on foreign policy in the past months. Citing a Quinnipiac University poll released April 1, Galston noted that voters in Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania, three critical swing states, favor a diplomatic settlement to military intervention by a margin of four to one. And yet, by a similarly strong margin, Americans are skeptical that Iran will negotiate in good faith. This, Galston said, indicates a contradiction at the heart of American public opinion.

Galston believes the March 31st soft deadline to be less consequential than April 13, the date Congress reconvenes in Washington. Several proposals to establish a greater legislative presence in the negotiations process have already gained bipartisan momentum, notably legislation introduced by Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) and by Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL). Although the course of congressional action remains unclear, Galston concluded that increased legislative involvement will loosen the Obama administration’s already tenuous grasp on the negotiations process.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/04/01-iran-nuclear-negotiations?rssid=galstonw{0C062740-2473-4046-BB49-5A4ED50F5E45}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/88047719/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~Deal-or-no-deal-Negotiating-with-IranDeal or no deal? Negotiating with Iran

Event Information

Talks aimed at producing a political framework to resolve the Iran nuclear issue are likely to come down to the wire before the deadline at the end of March, but already leaders in the United States and Iran are facing an intense debate among key constituencies at home. Iranian hardliners have criticized potential regime concessions, while opponents of a deal in the U.S. Congress are advancing legislation that could undermine the Obama administration's ability to implement an agreement.

On April 1, the Brookings' Center for Middle East Policy and the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative hosted a discussion examining diplomatic progress to date, the components of a credible deal, Iran's objectives and concerns, and the politics in the United States.

Event Information

Talks aimed at producing a political framework to resolve the Iran nuclear issue are likely to come down to the wire before the deadline at the end of March, but already leaders in the United States and Iran are facing an intense debate among key constituencies at home. Iranian hardliners have criticized potential regime concessions, while opponents of a deal in the U.S. Congress are advancing legislation that could undermine the Obama administration's ability to implement an agreement.

On April 1, the Brookings' Center for Middle East Policy and the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative hosted a discussion examining diplomatic progress to date, the components of a credible deal, Iran's objectives and concerns, and the politics in the United States.

For months, the American people have been signaling their willingness to enter into a nuclear deal with Iran—and their skepticism that the deal will work. In recent days, two new opinion surveys show that these sentiments have persisted as the negotiations with Iran have dragged on.

The Washington Post-ABC News poll finds that 59 percent of Americans continue to support an agreement along the lines now been discussed, while 31 percent opposed it. This total includes majorities of most sub-groups as well as a 47 percent plurality of Republicans. But 59 percent of Americans also doubt that the deal would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Only 4 percent are “very confident” that the deal would work, while 34 percent express a complete lack of confidence.

The Pew Research Center finds a smaller 49 percent plurality in favor of direct negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue—62 percent of Democrats, only 36 percent of Republicans, and a country-mirroring 49 percent of Independent. At the same time, fully 63 percent say that the Iranians are “not serious” about addressing our concerns. Only 15 percent of Republicans, 28 percent of Independents, and 39 percent of Democrats express a more optimistic view of Iranian intentions.

Not surprisingly, the Pew results show a link between attitudes toward negotiations and assessment of Iran’s intentions. Two-thirds of those who think Iran is serious favor direct negotiations with the Islamic Republic; half of those who think that Iran is not serious oppose the negotiations.

Notably, 42 percent of Americans who doubt the Iranians’ seriousness nonetheless favor negotiations with them. This is consistent with prior survey research showing that most Americans do not want to use military force against Iran until every alternative to war has been exhausted. Opponents of the current negotiations have not made their case that there is a third alternative—a negotiated deal significantly better than the current talks are likely to produce.

Still, Americans are unwilling to leave the outcome fully in the Obama administration’s hands. Fully 62 percent want Congress to have the final authority for approving any US-Iran nuclear agreement. This super-majority includes not only four out of five Republicans but also two-thirds of Independents and even 42 percent of Democrats.

If the current negotiating deadline fails to produce a framework agreement, Congress is poised to act when it reconvenes after its Easter/Passover break. Tennessee’s Bob Corker, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is offering a straightforward approach: President Obama should transmit the eventual agreement (if there is one) to Congress, which would have 60 days to act. During that period, the President would be prohibited from relaxing or waiving any existing sanctions. And if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval within 60 days, the President would be debarred from doing so, presumably until the legislative branch changes its mind.

The White House has suggested that the President would veto any such bill. Even if he were to make good on this threat, however, it is not clear that he could mobilize enough Democrats to prevent his veto from being overridden. In the end, he could well be forced to accept congressional involvement.

Authors

For months, the American people have been signaling their willingness to enter into a nuclear deal with Iran—and their skepticism that the deal will work. In recent days, two new opinion surveys show that these sentiments have persisted as the negotiations with Iran have dragged on.

The Washington Post-ABC News poll finds that 59 percent of Americans continue to support an agreement along the lines now been discussed, while 31 percent opposed it. This total includes majorities of most sub-groups as well as a 47 percent plurality of Republicans. But 59 percent of Americans also doubt that the deal would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Only 4 percent are “very confident” that the deal would work, while 34 percent express a complete lack of confidence.

The Pew Research Center finds a smaller 49 percent plurality in favor of direct negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue—62 percent of Democrats, only 36 percent of Republicans, and a country-mirroring 49 percent of Independent. At the same time, fully 63 percent say that the Iranians are “not serious” about addressing our concerns. Only 15 percent of Republicans, 28 percent of Independents, and 39 percent of Democrats express a more optimistic view of Iranian intentions.

Not surprisingly, the Pew results show a link between attitudes toward negotiations and assessment of Iran’s intentions. Two-thirds of those who think Iran is serious favor direct negotiations with the Islamic Republic; half of those who think that Iran is not serious oppose the negotiations.

Notably, 42 percent of Americans who doubt the Iranians’ seriousness nonetheless favor negotiations with them. This is consistent with prior survey research showing that most Americans do not want to use military force against Iran until every alternative to war has been exhausted. Opponents of the current negotiations have not made their case that there is a third alternative—a negotiated deal significantly better than the current talks are likely to produce.

Still, Americans are unwilling to leave the outcome fully in the Obama administration’s hands. Fully 62 percent want Congress to have the final authority for approving any US-Iran nuclear agreement. This super-majority includes not only four out of five Republicans but also two-thirds of Independents and even 42 percent of Democrats.

If the current negotiating deadline fails to produce a framework agreement, Congress is poised to act when it reconvenes after its Easter/Passover break. Tennessee’s Bob Corker, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is offering a straightforward approach: President Obama should transmit the eventual agreement (if there is one) to Congress, which would have 60 days to act. During that period, the President would be prohibited from relaxing or waiving any existing sanctions. And if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval within 60 days, the President would be debarred from doing so, presumably until the legislative branch changes its mind.

The White House has suggested that the President would veto any such bill. Even if he were to make good on this threat, however, it is not clear that he could mobilize enough Democrats to prevent his veto from being overridden. In the end, he could well be forced to accept congressional involvement.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/03/24-bipartisan-letter-obama-iran-politics-galston?rssid=galstonw{F2DF37E4-CC6F-4866-BF20-BA95A419F729}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/87598919/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~The-politics-of-the-bipartisan-letter-to-President-Obama-on-the-Iran-negotiationsThe politics of the bipartisan letter to President Obama on the Iran negotiations

On March 20, a bipartisan group of House members dispatched a cautionary letter to President Obama about the content of the emerging nuclear deal with Iran. These representatives wrote, they explained, to underscore the “grave and urgent issues that have arisen in these negotiations.”

Their letter made three key points. First, any acceptable final agreement “must constrain Iran’s nuclear infrastructure so that Iran has no pathway to a bomb, and that agreement must be long-lasting.” Second, Iran’s record of clandestine activity, lack of cooperation with international inspectors, and outright intransigence “prevents any trust” in the Islamic Republic. “Given Iran’s decades of deception,” the signatories insisted, “negotiators must obtain maximum commitments to transparency.” And finally, despite the understandable focus on the Iranian nuclear threat, it is critical that we also consider “Iran’s destabilizing role in the region.”

Although the tone of the letter was respectful and cooperative, it represented a clear warning shot across the administration’s bow. Congress has the right to evaluate any agreement, the letter stated, to “determine its long-term impact on the United States and our allies,” Unless the terms of a proposed final agreement definitively foreclose any Iranian pathway to a bomb, Congress will not be able to consider permanent sanctions relief.

The letter was signed by 367 members, more than 80 percent of the body, and far more than the two thirds needed to override a presidential veto. Only 7 Republicans refrained from signing on, and one of them, Aaron Schock, has since announced his resignation.

Although two thirds of House Democrats also signed, 59 did not, and the composition of the hold-outs is intriguing. Although Minority Whip Steny Hoyer affixed his signature to the letter, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi did not. Most of her leadership team followed suit, including Assistant Leader Jim Clyburn, Caucus Chair Xavier Becerra, and Steering and Policy Committee co-chairs Rosa DeLauro and Donna Edwards. Led by co-chairs Raul Grijalva and Keith Ellison, substantial numbers of the Congressional Progressive Caucus also refrained from participating.

Chris Van Hollen, who is running for the Democratic senatorial nomination to replace Maryland’s retiring Barbara Mikulski, did sign the letter, setting up a contrast with Edwards, who is also running. This is the foreign policy face of a broader contest between self-styled progressives and more traditional liberals and moderates to define the future of the Democratic Party. This competition has already shaped mayoral races in New York and Chicago, and progressives would like to see a similar dynamic in the 2016 presidential primary. If a strong progressive candidate does not emerge to challenge Hillary Clinton, Maryland could be ground zero for the intra-party foreign policy debate.

The author wishes to acknowledge the rapid and meticulous research of Alexander Snowdon, without whose prodigious efforts this piece could not have been written.

Authors

On March 20, a bipartisan group of House members dispatched a cautionary letter to President Obama about the content of the emerging nuclear deal with Iran. These representatives wrote, they explained, to underscore the “grave and urgent issues that have arisen in these negotiations.”

Their letter made three key points. First, any acceptable final agreement “must constrain Iran’s nuclear infrastructure so that Iran has no pathway to a bomb, and that agreement must be long-lasting.” Second, Iran’s record of clandestine activity, lack of cooperation with international inspectors, and outright intransigence “prevents any trust” in the Islamic Republic. “Given Iran’s decades of deception,” the signatories insisted, “negotiators must obtain maximum commitments to transparency.” And finally, despite the understandable focus on the Iranian nuclear threat, it is critical that we also consider “Iran’s destabilizing role in the region.”

Although the tone of the letter was respectful and cooperative, it represented a clear warning shot across the administration’s bow. Congress has the right to evaluate any agreement, the letter stated, to “determine its long-term impact on the United States and our allies,” Unless the terms of a proposed final agreement definitively foreclose any Iranian pathway to a bomb, Congress will not be able to consider permanent sanctions relief.

The letter was signed by 367 members, more than 80 percent of the body, and far more than the two thirds needed to override a presidential veto. Only 7 Republicans refrained from signing on, and one of them, Aaron Schock, has since announced his resignation.

Although two thirds of House Democrats also signed, 59 did not, and the composition of the hold-outs is intriguing. Although Minority Whip Steny Hoyer affixed his signature to the letter, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi did not. Most of her leadership team followed suit, including Assistant Leader Jim Clyburn, Caucus Chair Xavier Becerra, and Steering and Policy Committee co-chairs Rosa DeLauro and Donna Edwards. Led by co-chairs Raul Grijalva and Keith Ellison, substantial numbers of the Congressional Progressive Caucus also refrained from participating.

Chris Van Hollen, who is running for the Democratic senatorial nomination to replace Maryland’s retiring Barbara Mikulski, did sign the letter, setting up a contrast with Edwards, who is also running. This is the foreign policy face of a broader contest between self-styled progressives and more traditional liberals and moderates to define the future of the Democratic Party. This competition has already shaped mayoral races in New York and Chicago, and progressives would like to see a similar dynamic in the 2016 presidential primary. If a strong progressive candidate does not emerge to challenge Hillary Clinton, Maryland could be ground zero for the intra-party foreign policy debate.

The author wishes to acknowledge the rapid and meticulous research of Alexander Snowdon, without whose prodigious efforts this piece could not have been written.

The most salient and instructive fact about the recent Israeli election is that every part of the conventional wisdom turned out to be wrong. The election was a referendum on Netanyahu, and the people were tired of him. So he would lose. Wrong. Unlike previous elections, this one would revolve around widespread economic discontent, where Likud was weak, rather than security concerns, where it was dominant. Wrong. Netanyahu’s aggressive turn to the right—his confrontation with Obama over Iran, his repudiation of the two-state solution, his “us or them” attack on Arab Israeli voters—smacked of desperation and would surely backfire. Wrong. A new political center of (to quote Bernard Avishai) “younger, more cosmopolitan voters” had emerged. Not enough to make a difference. Given legal prohibitions against surveys in the closing days of the campaign, it is understandable that pollsters missed that late surge for Likud. But even the exit polls were wrong.

What happened?

From one standpoint, barely anything “happened” at all. These elections were some of the most unnecessary in Israeli history, with no major event triggering a fracture in the government and necessitating new elections. And in the absence of any such events, almost identical numbers of voters stayed in the same camps as two years ago. The center-left block of parties that included Labor, Meretz and Tzipi Livni’s party went from 27 seats to 28 while the right-wing block that included HaBayit HaYehudi, Yisrael Beytenu, and Netanyahu’s Likud gained a single seat as well, moving from 43 seats to 44. The socio-economically-oriented center, composed in the last election of Yair Lapid’s extremely successful Yesh Atid and tiny Kadima was simply replaced by a more even distribution between Yesh Atid and Moshe Kahlon’s new Kulanu party. In both elections, this block won 21 seats. In fact, the only real change in block strength is among the Arab and ultraorthodox parties, with the latter losing 5 seats and the former parties gaining 3.

The security-oriented right-left divisions are apparently more entrenched, and Israeli voters less migratory, than pundits had predicted—particularly in the absence of any major intervening events. It is the relative strength of the parties within the blocks on the right and the center that makes yesterday’s result such a sweeping victory for Netanyahu.

Within the right-wing block, and likely among those socio-economic and religious voters who want a right-wing government, Netanyahu’s tactics seem to have worked quite well. By framing the election as a two-party race that his party was losing, Netanyahu refocused voters on the basic right-left divide that separates his Likud party from the Zionist Camp of Isaac Herzog and ignited a panic on his side of that divide. Based on a late surge in the exit polls, that panic appeared produced real results, especially late on election day.

Pundits hoping for a major shift in Israeli politics also undervalued fundamentals. In recent years, the Israeli left has become a Tel Aviv-centric force, largely ceding the smaller, more working-class and less-cosmopolitan cities to the right and the religious. In Tel Aviv, the Zionist 34 percent trounced Likud’s 18 percent, with an even bigger margin between the left and right blocks. But aside from a close race in the coastal city of Haifa, Likud won every other of Israel’s ten largest cities—and mostly by wide margins. Until the center-left mounts a serious challenge to Likud dominance in so much of the country outside Tel Aviv, it will have a hard time assembling a governing majority.

If so much remained essentially unchanged, why has the 2015 election produced such a stir? Three explanations strike us as plausible. First, commentators are reacting, not against the previous political baseline, but rather to pre-election expectations of a significant political shift that failed to occur. If the polls had predicted what actually happened, the post-election conversation would be very different.

Second, this election took place against the backdrop of a confrontation between the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration. Although serious Israeli-U.S. confrontations have occurred in the past—during the Eisenhower and George H. W. Bush administrations, for example—the choreography of this one is unusually dramatic.

And finally, the results of this election matter—more than most.

Peter Berkowitz, a thoughtful conservative, disagrees. He argues that there is less to this election than meets the eye, because the foreign and defense policy differences between the Zionist Union and are Likud more tonal than substantive. Besides, says Berkowitz, Netanyahu didn’t really repudiate the two-state solution but merely said that it was impractical in current circumstances.

We are not so sure. A coalition led by the Zionist Union at least would have tried to reopen talks with the Palestinians and (as Berkowitz acknowledges) would have scaled back or outright frozen settlement activity beyond the Green Line. Because Netanyahu’s new stance rules out meaningful talks, the Palestinians will focus their efforts even more on the United Nations and other international bodies, threatening the further diplomatic isolation of Israel and unending headaches for American diplomats. Herzog would have worked to repair relations with the Obama administration, which Netanyahu’s reelection all but rules out. And American Jews, who remain mainly liberal in their outlook, would have been less torn than they have been during the Netanyahu era.

Make no mistake: this was a consequential election. Israelis understood that, which is why they turned out to vote in such large numbers. Now they—and we—must live with the consequences of their choice.

Authors

The most salient and instructive fact about the recent Israeli election is that every part of the conventional wisdom turned out to be wrong. The election was a referendum on Netanyahu, and the people were tired of him. So he would lose. Wrong. Unlike previous elections, this one would revolve around widespread economic discontent, where Likud was weak, rather than security concerns, where it was dominant. Wrong. Netanyahu’s aggressive turn to the right—his confrontation with Obama over Iran, his repudiation of the two-state solution, his “us or them” attack on Arab Israeli voters—smacked of desperation and would surely backfire. Wrong. A new political center of (to quote Bernard Avishai) “younger, more cosmopolitan voters” had emerged. Not enough to make a difference. Given legal prohibitions against surveys in the closing days of the campaign, it is understandable that pollsters missed that late surge for Likud. But even the exit polls were wrong.

What happened?

From one standpoint, barely anything “happened” at all. These elections were some of the most unnecessary in Israeli history, with no major event triggering a fracture in the government and necessitating new elections. And in the absence of any such events, almost identical numbers of voters stayed in the same camps as two years ago. The center-left block of parties that included Labor, Meretz and Tzipi Livni’s party went from 27 seats to 28 while the right-wing block that included HaBayit HaYehudi, Yisrael Beytenu, and Netanyahu’s Likud gained a single seat as well, moving from 43 seats to 44. The socio-economically-oriented center, composed in the last election of Yair Lapid’s extremely successful Yesh Atid and tiny Kadima was simply replaced by a more even distribution between Yesh Atid and Moshe Kahlon’s new Kulanu party. In both elections, this block won 21 seats. In fact, the only real change in block strength is among the Arab and ultraorthodox parties, with the latter losing 5 seats and the former parties gaining 3.

The security-oriented right-left divisions are apparently more entrenched, and Israeli voters less migratory, than pundits had predicted—particularly in the absence of any major intervening events. It is the relative strength of the parties within the blocks on the right and the center that makes yesterday’s result such a sweeping victory for Netanyahu.

Within the right-wing block, and likely among those socio-economic and religious voters who want a right-wing government, Netanyahu’s tactics seem to have worked quite well. By framing the election as a two-party race that his party was losing, Netanyahu refocused voters on the basic right-left divide that separates his Likud party from the Zionist Camp of Isaac Herzog and ignited a panic on his side of that divide. Based on a late surge in the exit polls, that panic appeared produced real results, especially late on election day.

Pundits hoping for a major shift in Israeli politics also undervalued fundamentals. In recent years, the Israeli left has become a Tel Aviv-centric force, largely ceding the smaller, more working-class and less-cosmopolitan cities to the right and the religious. In Tel Aviv, the Zionist 34 percent trounced Likud’s 18 percent, with an even bigger margin between the left and right blocks. But aside from a close race in the coastal city of Haifa, Likud won every other of Israel’s ten largest cities—and mostly by wide margins. Until the center-left mounts a serious challenge to Likud dominance in so much of the country outside Tel Aviv, it will have a hard time assembling a governing majority.

If so much remained essentially unchanged, why has the 2015 election produced such a stir? Three explanations strike us as plausible. First, commentators are reacting, not against the previous political baseline, but rather to pre-election expectations of a significant political shift that failed to occur. If the polls had predicted what actually happened, the post-election conversation would be very different.

Second, this election took place against the backdrop of a confrontation between the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration. Although serious Israeli-U.S. confrontations have occurred in the past—during the Eisenhower and George H. W. Bush administrations, for example—the choreography of this one is unusually dramatic.

And finally, the results of this election matter—more than most.

Peter Berkowitz, a thoughtful conservative, disagrees. He argues that there is less to this election than meets the eye, because the foreign and defense policy differences between the Zionist Union and are Likud more tonal than substantive. Besides, says Berkowitz, Netanyahu didn’t really repudiate the two-state solution but merely said that it was impractical in current circumstances.

We are not so sure. A coalition led by the Zionist Union at least would have tried to reopen talks with the Palestinians and (as Berkowitz acknowledges) would have scaled back or outright frozen settlement activity beyond the Green Line. Because Netanyahu’s new stance rules out meaningful talks, the Palestinians will focus their efforts even more on the United Nations and other international bodies, threatening the further diplomatic isolation of Israel and unending headaches for American diplomats. Herzog would have worked to repair relations with the Obama administration, which Netanyahu’s reelection all but rules out. And American Jews, who remain mainly liberal in their outlook, would have been less torn than they have been during the Netanyahu era.

Make no mistake: this was a consequential election. Israelis understood that, which is why they turned out to vote in such large numbers. Now they—and we—must live with the consequences of their choice.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/03/11-national-security-technology-wittes-galston?rssid=galstonw{6BF6F0CF-F739-401E-A11F-0896D0BDF475}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86789690/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~Confronting-national-security-threats-in-the-technology-ageConfronting national security threats in the technology age

Event Information

Cutting-edge technology has led to medical breakthroughs, the information age, and space exploration, among many other innovations. The growing ubiquity of advanced technology, however, means that almost anyone can harness its power to threaten national, international, and individual security. In their new book, The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones—Confronting a New Age of Threat (Basic Books, 2015), Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum explore the potential dangers of modern technology when acquired by hostile groups or individuals.

On March 11, Governance Studies at Brookings hosted a book event to discuss the new threats to national security and the developing framework for confronting the technology-enabled threats of the 21st century. In order to manage the challenges and risks associated with advanced technology, governments, organizations, and citizens must reconsider the intersection of security, privacy, and liberty. What does this mean for domestic and international surveillance? How will the government protect its citizens in an age of technology proliferation?

Event Information

Cutting-edge technology has led to medical breakthroughs, the information age, and space exploration, among many other innovations. The growing ubiquity of advanced technology, however, means that almost anyone can harness its power to threaten national, international, and individual security. In their new book, The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones—Confronting a New Age of Threat (Basic Books, 2015), Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum explore the potential dangers of modern technology when acquired by hostile groups or individuals.

On March 11, Governance Studies at Brookings hosted a book event to discuss the new threats to national security and the developing framework for confronting the technology-enabled threats of the 21st century. In order to manage the challenges and risks associated with advanced technology, governments, organizations, and citizens must reconsider the intersection of security, privacy, and liberty. What does this mean for domestic and international surveillance? How will the government protect its citizens in an age of technology proliferation?

After the program, panelists will take audience questions.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/03/11-data-driven-government-omalley?rssid=galstonw{0F61E520-59FC-4478-9F14-C948107DD900}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86789691/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~Datadriven-government-A-new-approach-to-governingData-driven government: A new approach to governing

Event Information

As mayor of Baltimore and later as Maryland’s chief executive, Governor Martin O'Malley pioneered data-driven decision-making in government. Through programs like CitiStat in Baltimore and StateStat in Maryland, O'Malley implemented a new approach toward governing: using data to drive policy decisions, set goals, measure performance, and increase government transparency.

On March 11, the Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings hosted a discussion with Governor Martin O’Malley to explore how data-driven decision-making, open data, and performance measurement can positively impact government policy and effectiveness. This forum centered on ways in which these tools could improve the performance of the federal government–and perhaps begin the process of restoring public trust in the federal government.

Event Information

As mayor of Baltimore and later as Maryland’s chief executive, Governor Martin O'Malley pioneered data-driven decision-making in government. Through programs like CitiStat in Baltimore and StateStat in Maryland, O'Malley implemented a new approach toward governing: using data to drive policy decisions, set goals, measure performance, and increase government transparency.

On March 11, the Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings hosted a discussion with Governor Martin O’Malley to explore how data-driven decision-making, open data, and performance measurement can positively impact government policy and effectiveness. This forum centered on ways in which these tools could improve the performance of the federal government–and perhaps begin the process of restoring public trust in the federal government.

As economic worries gradually subside, concern about terrorism is on the rise. The survey finds that terrorism now trails only the economy on the list of top public priorities. 67 percent of the people regard ISIS as a “major threat” to the security of the United States.

The public is not satisfied with the Obama administration’s response to this threat. Only 39 percent approve of the president’s handling of terrorism, down from 52 percent a year ago, while 54 percent disapprove. And when it comes to ISIS, the public’s view is even more negative: only 35 percent approve of the president’s approach; 55 percent disapprove.

These sentiments translate into broad support for much more assertive policies. The Quinnipiac survey found that by a stunning margin of 62 to 30 percent, the American people now support sending U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria. That figure includes majorities of Democrats and Independents as well as Republicans, women as well as men, and young adults as well as seniors. And 68 percent are “very confident” or “somewhat confident” that the United States and its allies can defeat ISIS.

Although the American people are aware of the risks, they have reached a judgment about where the greater risk lies. 53 percent are concerned that the U.S. response “will not go far enough” in stopping ISIS, versus only 39 percent who fear that we will go too far.

The public is less united on this point than on sending ground troops, however. Women are more concerned than men about the possibility of overreaching; Americans under age 35 are more concerned than those over 35; and by a margin of 58 to 32 percent, Democrats are afraid of going too far.

Still, neither the congress nor the president can afford to ignore the rising public demand for a tougher response to ISIS. Despite divisions among elected officials about the precise terms of a new authorization to use military force, members of congress would be well advised to hold hearings as soon as possible and resolve their disagreements expeditiously. As for the president, Mr. Obama could be one beheading or immolation away from having his hand forced by a public that has grown increasingly impatient with halfway measures.

Those of us who lived through the 1973-1979 epoch, bookended by our evacuation from Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have seen this movie before, and it ended badly for doves. It’s not 2009 anymore. Welcome to the post-post-Iraq era.

As economic worries gradually subside, concern about terrorism is on the rise. The survey finds that terrorism now trails only the economy on the list of top public priorities. 67 percent of the people regard ISIS as a “major threat” to the security of the United States.

The public is not satisfied with the Obama administration’s response to this threat. Only 39 percent approve of the president’s handling of terrorism, down from 52 percent a year ago, while 54 percent disapprove. And when it comes to ISIS, the public’s view is even more negative: only 35 percent approve of the president’s approach; 55 percent disapprove.

These sentiments translate into broad support for much more assertive policies. The Quinnipiac survey found that by a stunning margin of 62 to 30 percent, the American people now support sending U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria. That figure includes majorities of Democrats and Independents as well as Republicans, women as well as men, and young adults as well as seniors. And 68 percent are “very confident” or “somewhat confident” that the United States and its allies can defeat ISIS.

Although the American people are aware of the risks, they have reached a judgment about where the greater risk lies. 53 percent are concerned that the U.S. response “will not go far enough” in stopping ISIS, versus only 39 percent who fear that we will go too far.

The public is less united on this point than on sending ground troops, however. Women are more concerned than men about the possibility of overreaching; Americans under age 35 are more concerned than those over 35; and by a margin of 58 to 32 percent, Democrats are afraid of going too far.

Still, neither the congress nor the president can afford to ignore the rising public demand for a tougher response to ISIS. Despite divisions among elected officials about the precise terms of a new authorization to use military force, members of congress would be well advised to hold hearings as soon as possible and resolve their disagreements expeditiously. As for the president, Mr. Obama could be one beheading or immolation away from having his hand forced by a public that has grown increasingly impatient with halfway measures.

Those of us who lived through the 1973-1979 epoch, bookended by our evacuation from Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have seen this movie before, and it ended badly for doves. It’s not 2009 anymore. Welcome to the post-post-Iraq era.

The Washington Monthly and the Institute for American Values have published “Marriage Opportunity: The Moment for National Action,” a statement by more than 100 scholars, activists, and leaders—conservative and liberal, Democratic and Republican, gay and straight. Two of the signers and organizers, Brookings’s William A. Galston and Jonathan Rauch, sat down to talk about why they think the time is right for a new national conversation about marriage and family.

Jonathan Rauch: Bill, it’s great to have a minute to talk about this, because we’ve reached this spot from very different roads. I’m coming to marriage opportunity as an openly gay supporter of same-sex marriage. You’re coming to marriage opportunity as an openly straight proponent of strengthening traditional marriage. In the 1980s, you started telling your fellow liberal Democrats that marriage and family structure matter, and you have some scars to show for it.

William Galston: I do. For many years, “family values” was a wedge issue that liberals viewed as a way to condemn single mothers, gays, and others. But the same-sex marriage movement has focused attention on marriage’s importance for social inclusion and equality. And a growing number of people on the left as well as the right are recognizing a worrisome trend: a “marriage gap.” Marriage is thriving among Americans with four-year college degrees or more, and they’re passing huge advantages on to their kids. But for less-educated and working-class Americans, marriage is increasingly slipping out of reach. We risk turning what is supposed to be the land of opportunity into a society permanently divided along lines of family structure. That’s making inequality, poverty, and social immobility even bigger challenges. And I sense that a growing number of progressives are ready to tackle the family dimension of the problems about which they care so passionately.

JR: Of course, the reasons for the marriage gap are complicated. It’s a combination of social and economic factors. We gay folks were excluded from marriage by law. Nothing was complicated about that: it’s a sentence of statute. In most states, that’s no longer true, and the Supreme Court may bring in the other states this summer.

JR: Well, for one thing, we gay folks care about inequality, poverty, and the welfare of children. That’s why we’re seeing leading gay thinkers embracing marriage opportunity. But I feel there’s a political opportunity here, too—political in the non-partisan sense. Gay marriage is by far the country’s most successful pro-family movement. It sends a powerful message that everyone—adults, kids, communities, the country—is better off when everyone has the opportunity to marry. We have a shot now at ending forever the conflict between gay rights and family values, weaving gay and straight marriage into a conversation about strengthening marriage and family for all Americans. That’s going to be hugely beneficial to gay families and kids.

WG: And to straight families and kids, too, potentially. When I say “potentially,” it’s because, even among signers of marriage opportunity, there’s disagreement about how much the needle can be moved and what kinds of policy tools to use. The statement offers some general ideas: economic, cultural, and public policy measures to close the marriage gap; initiatives to build on the success of gay and lesbian families; and new, inclusive research into factors that make marriage work—among other things. And we know it won’t quell all doubts—for example, that marriage may not always be a good option for lower-income women looking at an array of men without stable employment. But it’s really intended as a starting point.

JR: So I could ask you a version of the question you asked me. You’re a busy guy. You’ve done more than your share of pro-family advocacy. You accept that solutions aren’t necessarily obvious. Why start down this long road now?

WG: You know, it’s not every day you get the chance to build a new left-right, gay-straight coalition around family values and marriage. It’s not every day you get the chance to depolarize a fraught public-policy conversation of major importance. I think there’s a real chance that what’s happening with, for example, the issue of incarceration—a left-right convergence—is ready to happen with marriage. There’s growing agreement on the idea that strengthening family and increasing job prospects and enhancing opportunity go hand in hand.

JR: And you—

WG: Wait, I’m not done. There’s also growing bipartisan support for workforce-based education programs like apprenticeships, expansion of wage subsidies for young adults without kids, and other measures that can support family formation and marriage. I’m not saying there are magic bullets. But remember: the denominator here is enormous. Even improving marriage opportunity on the margins will help hundreds of thousands of adults and kids.

JR: I’d add one more thing. Cultural messages matter. Just getting people focused on a problem can make a difference. We’ve seen that with fatherhood and teen pregnancy in the recent past. With same-sex marriage, I’ve seen a cultural transformation in gay America, which once was deeply skeptical of marriage and now embraces it. Right now we’re at a cultural moment when, with a bit of enterprise, we can build on the pro-family message of same-sex marriage to bring old antagonists together around the idea of making marriage achievable for all who seek it, regardless of sexual orientation or social class. The names attached to the marriage opportunity statement, I think, attest to that. It’s an unprecedented coalition.

WG: I know you’ll join me in hoping that people will read the statement and decide for themselves.

Authors

The Washington Monthly and the Institute for American Values have published “Marriage Opportunity: The Moment for National Action,” a statement by more than 100 scholars, activists, and leaders—conservative and liberal, Democratic and Republican, gay and straight. Two of the signers and organizers, Brookings’s William A. Galston and Jonathan Rauch, sat down to talk about why they think the time is right for a new national conversation about marriage and family.

Jonathan Rauch: Bill, it’s great to have a minute to talk about this, because we’ve reached this spot from very different roads. I’m coming to marriage opportunity as an openly gay supporter of same-sex marriage. You’re coming to marriage opportunity as an openly straight proponent of strengthening traditional marriage. In the 1980s, you started telling your fellow liberal Democrats that marriage and family structure matter, and you have some scars to show for it.

William Galston: I do. For many years, “family values” was a wedge issue that liberals viewed as a way to condemn single mothers, gays, and others. But the same-sex marriage movement has focused attention on marriage’s importance for social inclusion and equality. And a growing number of people on the left as well as the right are recognizing a worrisome trend: a “marriage gap.” Marriage is thriving among Americans with four-year college degrees or more, and they’re passing huge advantages on to their kids. But for less-educated and working-class Americans, marriage is increasingly slipping out of reach. We risk turning what is supposed to be the land of opportunity into a society permanently divided along lines of family structure. That’s making inequality, poverty, and social immobility even bigger challenges. And I sense that a growing number of progressives are ready to tackle the family dimension of the problems about which they care so passionately.

JR: Of course, the reasons for the marriage gap are complicated. It’s a combination of social and economic factors. We gay folks were excluded from marriage by law. Nothing was complicated about that: it’s a sentence of statute. In most states, that’s no longer true, and the Supreme Court may bring in the other states this summer.

JR: Well, for one thing, we gay folks care about inequality, poverty, and the welfare of children. That’s why we’re seeing leading gay thinkers embracing marriage opportunity. But I feel there’s a political opportunity here, too—political in the non-partisan sense. Gay marriage is by far the country’s most successful pro-family movement. It sends a powerful message that everyone—adults, kids, communities, the country—is better off when everyone has the opportunity to marry. We have a shot now at ending forever the conflict between gay rights and family values, weaving gay and straight marriage into a conversation about strengthening marriage and family for all Americans. That’s going to be hugely beneficial to gay families and kids.

WG: And to straight families and kids, too, potentially. When I say “potentially,” it’s because, even among signers of marriage opportunity, there’s disagreement about how much the needle can be moved and what kinds of policy tools to use. The statement offers some general ideas: economic, cultural, and public policy measures to close the marriage gap; initiatives to build on the success of gay and lesbian families; and new, inclusive research into factors that make marriage work—among other things. And we know it won’t quell all doubts—for example, that marriage may not always be a good option for lower-income women looking at an array of men without stable employment. But it’s really intended as a starting point.

JR: So I could ask you a version of the question you asked me. You’re a busy guy. You’ve done more than your share of pro-family advocacy. You accept that solutions aren’t necessarily obvious. Why start down this long road now?

WG: You know, it’s not every day you get the chance to build a new left-right, gay-straight coalition around family values and marriage. It’s not every day you get the chance to depolarize a fraught public-policy conversation of major importance. I think there’s a real chance that what’s happening with, for example, the issue of incarceration—a left-right convergence—is ready to happen with marriage. There’s growing agreement on the idea that strengthening family and increasing job prospects and enhancing opportunity go hand in hand.

JR: And you—

WG: Wait, I’m not done. There’s also growing bipartisan support for workforce-based education programs like apprenticeships, expansion of wage subsidies for young adults without kids, and other measures that can support family formation and marriage. I’m not saying there are magic bullets. But remember: the denominator here is enormous. Even improving marriage opportunity on the margins will help hundreds of thousands of adults and kids.

JR: I’d add one more thing. Cultural messages matter. Just getting people focused on a problem can make a difference. We’ve seen that with fatherhood and teen pregnancy in the recent past. With same-sex marriage, I’ve seen a cultural transformation in gay America, which once was deeply skeptical of marriage and now embraces it. Right now we’re at a cultural moment when, with a bit of enterprise, we can build on the pro-family message of same-sex marriage to bring old antagonists together around the idea of making marriage achievable for all who seek it, regardless of sexual orientation or social class. The names attached to the marriage opportunity statement, I think, attest to that. It’s an unprecedented coalition.

WG: I know you’ll join me in hoping that people will read the statement and decide for themselves.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/02/20-isis-national-defense-galston?rssid=galstonw{7B7BFEF0-3FE7-49F6-90FC-B78464B620BE}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85653236/0/brookingsrss/experts/galstonw~The-American-people-to-its-leaders-Ground-troops-against-ISIS-and-a-stronger-national-defenseThe American people to its leaders: Ground troops against ISIS and a stronger national defense

This post was updated on February 23, 2015 to reflect additional survey data.

Since the war in Iraq, the American people have shied away from major commitments of ground troops in global hot spots, and they have been lukewarm at best about the level of spending needed to sustain our military forces.

Two surveys released today suggest the public sentiment is shifting in ways that could affect both future policy decisions and the 2016 presidential campaign.

The guiding principle of the Obama administration’s policy may be summed up simply: No boots on the ground. Advisors and Special Forces as needed, but no large and long-term deployments of ground forces. That principle has shaped the administration’s response to events in Libya and, more recently, to the rise of ISIS.

But according to today’s CBS Poll, the American people have shifted away from their former caution and favor the use of American ground forces to combat ISIS. As recently as last September, only 39% favored that course, while 55% were opposed. Today, 57% favor ground forces; only 39% remain opposed.

This change takes on added significance against the backdrop of what has not changed. Last fall, fully 64% of the people already believed that ground troops would be necessary to remove the threat of ISIS. (A statistically identical 65% think so today.) But now, far fewer Americans are content with a strategy that they don’t think will get the job done. ISIS’ horrible torture and execution of innocent civilians in full view of the world has increased Americans’ sense of urgency about confronting this threat.

Will we have the means to combat ISIS and meet other security challenges around the world, including an increasingly aggressive Russia? A Gallup survey released today indicates rising public concern that we won’t. As recently as 2012, 54% of Americans were confident that the strength of our national defense was about right, compared to 32% who worried that it wasn’t strong enough. But today, 44% believe that our defense isn’t strong enough, versus 42% who continue to think that it is.

This shifting assessment has direct consequences for policy. Today, 34% of the people say that we are spending too little on national defense—the highest since 2001. The increase in support for higher defense spending is broad-based—up 14 points among Republicans since 2012, 11 points among Independents, and 7 points among Democrats.

Still, polarization continues. 56% of Republicans think we need to spend more on defense; only 17% of Democrats agree.

Nonetheless, the widespread sense that chaos is overcoming order around the world in ways that directly threaten the American people appears to be reshaping public sentiment in the direction of a more muscular foreign and defense policy than the Obama administration has pursued up to now. Republicans are already positioned to respond. For her part, former Secretary of State and likely Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton will have to decide how she can reconcile shifting public sentiments and the ardent convictions of the Democratic base with each other and with her own views.

Update 2/23/15: A Pew Research Center survey released on Monday, February 23 provides additional evidence for a shift in U.S. public sentiment toward more hawkish views. Pew finds that support for sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government in Kiev has risen by 11 percentage points since last April. Although not a majority, 41 percent of the people now favor such a course, up from just 30 percent ten months ago. 49 percent now support U.S. training for Ukrainian troops, and 60 percent (up from 53 percent last April) endorse tougher sanctions against Russia.

Authors

This post was updated on February 23, 2015 to reflect additional survey data.

Since the war in Iraq, the American people have shied away from major commitments of ground troops in global hot spots, and they have been lukewarm at best about the level of spending needed to sustain our military forces.

Two surveys released today suggest the public sentiment is shifting in ways that could affect both future policy decisions and the 2016 presidential campaign.

The guiding principle of the Obama administration’s policy may be summed up simply: No boots on the ground. Advisors and Special Forces as needed, but no large and long-term deployments of ground forces. That principle has shaped the administration’s response to events in Libya and, more recently, to the rise of ISIS.

But according to today’s CBS Poll, the American people have shifted away from their former caution and favor the use of American ground forces to combat ISIS. As recently as last September, only 39% favored that course, while 55% were opposed. Today, 57% favor ground forces; only 39% remain opposed.

This change takes on added significance against the backdrop of what has not changed. Last fall, fully 64% of the people already believed that ground troops would be necessary to remove the threat of ISIS. (A statistically identical 65% think so today.) But now, far fewer Americans are content with a strategy that they don’t think will get the job done. ISIS’ horrible torture and execution of innocent civilians in full view of the world has increased Americans’ sense of urgency about confronting this threat.

Will we have the means to combat ISIS and meet other security challenges around the world, including an increasingly aggressive Russia? A Gallup survey released today indicates rising public concern that we won’t. As recently as 2012, 54% of Americans were confident that the strength of our national defense was about right, compared to 32% who worried that it wasn’t strong enough. But today, 44% believe that our defense isn’t strong enough, versus 42% who continue to think that it is.

This shifting assessment has direct consequences for policy. Today, 34% of the people say that we are spending too little on national defense—the highest since 2001. The increase in support for higher defense spending is broad-based—up 14 points among Republicans since 2012, 11 points among Independents, and 7 points among Democrats.

Still, polarization continues. 56% of Republicans think we need to spend more on defense; only 17% of Democrats agree.

Nonetheless, the widespread sense that chaos is overcoming order around the world in ways that directly threaten the American people appears to be reshaping public sentiment in the direction of a more muscular foreign and defense policy than the Obama administration has pursued up to now. Republicans are already positioned to respond. For her part, former Secretary of State and likely Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton will have to decide how she can reconcile shifting public sentiments and the ardent convictions of the Democratic base with each other and with her own views.

Update 2/23/15: A Pew Research Center survey released on Monday, February 23 provides additional evidence for a shift in U.S. public sentiment toward more hawkish views. Pew finds that support for sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government in Kiev has risen by 11 percentage points since last April. Although not a majority, 41 percent of the people now favor such a course, up from just 30 percent ten months ago. 49 percent now support U.S. training for Ukrainian troops, and 60 percent (up from 53 percent last April) endorse tougher sanctions against Russia.