In contrast with the frequent changes in leadership of OSHA in its
first six years, in which three assistant secretaries served, during the
four year administration of President Jimmy Carter only one person — Eula
Bingham — served as head of the agency. Unlike her predecessors, Bingham had
time to follow through on policies that she introduced and actions that she
began. For the next four years OSHA could follow a less episodic, more
continuous course.

Shortly after Carter's inauguration in January 1977, he visited the
Labor Department's cavernous headquarters. He told a crowd of employees that
OSHA's program had the best prospect of improving workers' lives of any recent
social legislation and he called for strong enforcement of the Act. He also
stressed the importance of reducing excess federal rules and red tape and said
that OSHA should be run with a minimum number of regulations and with a maximum
amount of "common sense."57 Carter
drew applause when he announced to the crowd that he intended to appoint a
woman to head OSHA.

Soon after that he announced the nomination of Eula Bingham, an
occupational health scientist at the University of Cincinnati. After earning a
doctorate in zoology at the University, Bingham did research there in the
department of environmental health with a group studying the causes of cancer.
She was inspired by seminars given by the head of the department who, she
recalled, used to "charge us up" about workers' health problems. Bingham became
an authority on occupational disease and on cancer causing substances and she
served on numerous national advisory committees. She acquired experience in
dealing with OSHA when she served on the committees that developed the coke
oven emissions standard and the generic carcinogens proposal.58

While Bingham had never worked directly for organized labor, her
vigorous efforts to protect workers' health made her a natural ally. Through
professional organizations and activities she had gotten to know several
high ranking officials of the UAW, which had given key support to Carter's
campaign. She was also high on the AFL-CIO's list and was recommended by the
National Organization of Women.59

Around New Year's of 1977 the Carter transition team contacted Bingham
and asked if she was interested in heading OSHA. She somewhat reluctantly
agreed to meet with Ray Marshall, Carter's choice for Secretary of Labor.
Bingham went to the meeting fully intending to refuse the job, but found
instead that she and Marshall had a real "meeting of the minds" and came away
seriously interested. Bingham then acquired the unusual distinction for a
sub-Cabinet appointee of being personally interviewed by the President. During
the election campaign Carter had heard OSHA issues raised repeatedly around the
country and he had decided he would interview the person who would head that
agency. A few days after Bingham's interview with Marshall, the two of them
were summoned to the White House. Carter told Bingham at that meeting that he
was sure that she would do a good job as head of OSHA. She felt that she would
have strong backing from Carter and accepted a few days later.60

Even before Bingham assumed her duties as head of OSHA, the elements of
the policy that would define her tenure there began to fall into place. While
Bingham had her own approach to workers' safety and health, she was well aware
of past OSHA issues and of Morton Corn's efforts at the agency. In fact, in
some ways Corn set the agenda for the new leadership at OSHA and Bingham
followed along many of the lines that he projected.

This hold over agenda took concrete form in a briefing paper Corn's
deputy, Bert Concklin, prepared in February for the new leadership before his
own departure. In it he outlined Corn's goals and accomplishments and discussed
the main problems that would face the new head of OSHA. The major goals that
Concklin stressed were: to eliminate serious health hazards; and to make more
effective use of OSHA's resources. Among the measures of Corn's that the paper
cited were revision of consensus standards, concentration of inspections in the
most hazardous industries, more citations for serious violations, and the
recent reorganization of OSHA that resulted in the creation of special
divisions for safety standards, for health standards, and for technical
support. The proportion of inspectors specializing in health as opposed to
safety had jumped sharply in 1976 but they were still in a distinct majority.
OSHA had started revising about a fourth of the consensus safety standards and
Concklin's memo called for additional revisions. To aid voluntary efforts by
industry to comply, OSHA had produced training and educational materials for
courses given by the National Safety Council and others, and Corn had planned
to beef up training efforts. Corn was well aware of the special dangers women
of child bearing age faced in the workplace and of the potential conflict
between health protections and equal rights on the job for women and was
looking into formation of a special task force on woman workers. One of the key
problems Corn had faced was OSHA's reputation as either a bumbling ogre or a
fumbling nitpicker. Concklin argued that was partly because it had been inept
in communicating and explaining its programs and policies. A fundamental
message of Concklin's briefing was that because OSHA had been through years of
unstable leadership, "trauma and demoralization" were rampant.61

On March 11, 1977, the day that Bingham was nominated to head the
agency, Secretary Marshall held a press conference at which he stated his
position on OSHA and its problems. Marshall incorporated virtually all the
views in the Concklin briefing memorandum and went on to blame OSHA's problems
on the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Marshall stressed that, outside of
reducing unemployment, his most important responsibility was to guarantee to
the American worker an environment that is safe and healthful while assuring
businessmen of even handed treatment by government. Marshall said he would
consult closely with all concerned groups in setting OSHA's new policy. He also
said that in order to experience OSHA's operations first hand, he planned to
spend a day as an inspector (which he did two weeks later).62

Bingham and Marshall soon had developed a good idea of the themes that
would be the basis of their OSHA policy. One of the initial concerns that
Bingham had expressed was that "OSHA was about some silly things" and was
widely perceived as being preoccupied with "frivolous, irrelevant rules and
regulations." President Carter and Ray Marshall shared this concern, and all
three knew that OSHA was in deep trouble with Congress, with the small business
community, and with organized labor. Carter had spoken about the need for
"common sense" about OSHA. In an early conversation, Marshall told Bingham how
former Texas Senator Ralph Yarborough had said that one of the things wrong
with OSHA was that it should be about "whales" — the serious health problems
— instead of "minnows".63

These ideas formed the basis of a bold public relations stroke
engineered by Bingham's public affairs officer Frank Greer which tied together
OSHA's new programs and policies under the rubric of "common sense." At a press
conference on May 19, 1977, Marshall and Bingham announced with great fanfare
that OSHA was being redirected to follow new "Common Sense Priorities" and that
from now on it would focus its energies on the really serious problems of the
workplace. There were three main parts to the program: to "get serious about
serious dangers"; to help the small businesses comply with OSHA rules; and to
clarify and simplify safety rules. Marshall noted at the press conference that
now OSHA was "indeed going after whales instead of the minnows." To further
publicize the new program, that same day the Department released a lavishly
illustrated 50 page booklet titled "The Shift to Common Sense Priorities," with
an introduction by President Carter.64

Under the first priority, Bingham said, OSHA was launching "an all out
effort to combat occupational illnesses and disease." During 1977 the agency
would redirect its resources so that 95 percent of its inspections would be in
the industry groups with the most serious health and safety problems. It would
sharply accelerate the glacially slow process of adopting new health standards.
OSHA also would augment the size and expertise of its health inspection staff
so that it could increase the number and quality of its health inspections.

OSHA's second "Common Sense" goal, Bingham said, was "to make life
safer for employees, not to make life harder for employers." She announced a
number of steps to help the small employers. She noted that, since small
businesses were concentrated in the less risky industries such as wholesale and
retail trade and service industries, they would be much less likely to be
inspected, because the new system targeted inspections to the most hazardous
industries, such as manufacturing, mining and transportation, where large firms
predominate. When small businesses are inspected, Bingham promised, the
inspectors would try to be as helpful as possible. She promised also that she
would hire a special assistant who would oversee OSHA's small business program.
In addition, she pledged that OSHA would increase its support for consultations
and for programs to educate employers and workers alike. "The keystone of a
successful...program," Bingham said, "is knowledgeable workers and employers
who can find and solve their own health and safety problems."

Under its third priority — simplifying safety rules — OSHA had
already begun combing through over a thousand consensus standards to revise
unclear ones and eliminate unnecessary or irrelevant ones. As we have seen,
this was a revival of a long standing effort at OSHA. To provide immediate
relief, Bingham ordered inspectors to ignore violations of regulations
unrelated to safety or health.

As a public relations gesture, the "Priorities" announcement was
immediately successful. Labor unions backed the plan strongly, although they
had some misgivings about eliminating safety rules that they favored. The
United Steelworkers spokesman John Sheehan said OSHA was now "out of the
woods." More critical to OSHA's success was the generally positive response
that the Chamber of Commerce reported to the business community. Small
businessmen strongly supported OSHA's plans to have inspectors be more
courteous and helpful and to simplify standards. Mike McKevitt, representing
the National Federation of Independent Businesses, said Eula Bingham was "off
to a good start." The new approach won needed breathing space in Congress.
Moves to cut OSHA's budget were defeated and attempts to limit its powers lost
support. The President praised OSHA and told Secretary Marshall that few things
the Carter Administration had done had been as well received as the "Common
Sense Priorities." The Washington Post praised Marshall and Bingham for
giving OSHA "more focus and force" but warned prophetically that, if carried
out with determination, their plan would take the agency "farther into areas
full of scientific uncertainty and political strain."65

The actual policies and programs that Eula Bingham instituted in her
four years at OSHA were more militantly pro worker than the "Priorities"
announcement seemed to portend. OSHA did follow through on the two priorities
that were designed to please business, but it devoted the bulk of its energies
to the first priority — getting serious about the major workplace hazards.
This meant that inspectors began to look harder for serious safety or health
hazards and levied much stiffer fines for violations. Bingham vividly expressed
her feelings on enforcement in 1978 after standing outside a grain elevator
that had exploded and talking with a worker waiting to see if his son would
come out alive. During an interview later she said this kind of incident made
her want to go "full speed ahead" and she punctuated her remark with a fist
thrown into the air. The 1978 "Barlow" decision of the Supreme Court, which
stipulated that employers could require search warrants from OSHA inspectors,
threatened to inhibit this "get tough" policy, but in reality it had little
effect. Nowhere did Bingham pursue "whales" with more fervor than in her
efforts to set stringent standards for carcinogens and other health hazards. In
her first two years OSHA set new standards for cotton dust, lead, benzene and
three other industrial chemicals. In addition, Bingham formally proposed a
revised version of the generic cancer policy developed by Morton Corn and
stated that she was "not known for being hesitant about deciding whether or not
a substance is cancer causing."66

Repeatedly during Bingham's tenure, OSHA came into conflict with the
Carter Administration and with Capitol Hill over regulatory philosophy and
methods. Conflicts with the White House in 1977 and 1978 centered around
economic analysis of OSHA standards and the possibility of alternative methods
of regulation. Legislative attempts to limit OSHA mounted steadily and peaked
in 1980. While OSHA won some of its battles with the White House and Congress,
continual resistance to Bingham's policies took much of the steam out of her
effort to go "full speed ahead."

Early in 1977 Carter's Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was mulling
over how to balance cold economic statistics against compassionate regulation.
President Ford had allowed his order requiring Inflationary Impact Statements
to die at the end of 1976 so that the new Administration could make up its own
mind about such studies. The Council decided that, while economic impact
analysis should not be used to decide whether a particular goal of a regulation
is desirable, it could serve to help compare the costs of different regulatory
approaches to that goal. In the past, the Council pointed out, agencies had
failed to accurately gauge the burdens their rules placed on industry.67 In March the Council tentatively
recommended that federal agencies continue to conduct economic studies of
proposed regulations, to be completed eight weeks before formal proposal. Twice
yearly, agencies would publish lists of subjects on which they planned to set
standards. A special review group would examine particular rules in regard to
their economic impact on industry, although the decision whether to issue the
rule would remain with the agency.

Bingham urged Secretary Marshall to oppose the CEA's idea. She feared
that the proposal would interfere with OSHA's rule making process and produce
delays and distortions. On top of that, Bingham argued, the proposal violated
the OSH Act because it would shift control of the timing and contents of
standards outside of the Labor Department. Bingham conceded that some kind of
economic impact analysis would be useful in evaluating industry estimates of
the costs of proposed standards and in determining the time period allowed
before a given standard would go into effect. She indicated that she could
support a flexible process if it avoided delays and outside interference.
However, her fundamental position was that economics should not be a paramount
consideration in setting safety and health standards.68

In early May the CEA partially reversed itself and announced a less
restrictive proposal. Instead of having each agency prepare an elaborate
economic study to be submitted a full eight weeks before proposing a
regulation, they would only prepare a rough analysis which they could submit
any time before proposal. These impact statements would also include analysis
of alternatives to the proposed rule.69

Dissatisfied with this compromise, Marshall broke with the
Administration and challenged the proposal. He said he too was concerned about
costs and inflation but he had a "standing declaration that nobody can make a
cost benefit study that I couldn't demolish." Marshall feared that even under
this proposal, needed regulations could be blocked. Marshall won his point and
this plan too was withdrawn.70
Later in 1977, Carter introduced a watered down version of it as part of a
regulatory reform plan. Under it, OSHA and the other regulatory agencies would
publish semiannual lists of upcoming regulations and would certify that each
major rule that they set followed the least economically burdensome approach
possible.71

No sooner was the question of economic analysis laid to rest when a
group of President Carter's advisers proposed that the government seek
alternatives to mandatory safety and health standards. In a memo dated May 27,
1977, Council of Economic Advisers chairman Charles Schultze and two other
presidential advisers called OSHA "the leading national symbol of over
regulation" and urged that serious consideration should be given to replacing
safety (but not health) regulations with a system of economic incentives, such
as a revised workmen's compensation program. The adoption of economic
incentives to eliminate safety hazards, they argued, would permit OSHA to
concentrate its resources on health problems and would show the business
community that the Administration was committed to regulatory reform.72

Organized labor rose in emphatic opposition to this proposal. The
AFL-CIO called it "an attempt to gut OSHA." UAW president Douglas Fraser
telegramed Secretary Marshall that the proposal would "license death and injury
in the workplace." The presidents of other major unions sent similar
messages.73

In August Carter announced the establishment of an Interagency Task
Force on Occupational Safety and Health to follow up on the Schultze
memorandum. In deference to labor opposition, however, Carter directed the
group to explore ways to supplement, not replace, safety rules, such as
educational and information services as well as some use of incentives. The
Task Force was also to examine the administration of all federal laws on
workers' safety and health, watching for duplication and gaps in coverage. The
group, which included Secretary Marshall, delivered a report with many
recommendations but without anything concrete on economic incentives.74

Paralleling the support within the Administration for deregulation was
the appearance of a number of academic studies critical of the methods and
impact of OSHA and other regulatory agencies. In the fall of 1977 two Harvard
political scientists published a critique of the agency that was based on a
report they did for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs as part of its
two year Study on Federal Regulation.75 They charged that OSHA had failed to
achieve significant safety and health gains, largely because it had shunned
consideration of economic factors and adopted instead a "missionary" approach.
As OSHA shifted its emphasis to health problems, the authors foresaw
ever higher costs of compliance unless Congress intervened. The Brookings
Institution published a study by economist Edward Denison in January 1978 on
factors that had inhibited the growth of productivity in the economy.76 Denison estimated that job safety and
health laws cut measurably into productivity growth. Two months later,
economist Murray Weidenbaum (later chairman of the CEA during the Reagan
Administration) from St. Louis University prepared a report for the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress in which he estimated the cost to business of
all government regulations at $65 billion in 1976. By 1979, Weidenbaum
predicted, that price tag would exceed $100 billion.77

Studies such as these provided the Administration with an intellectual
rationale for reducing the economic burden of OSHA, but inflation provided a
strong political motivation. After prices declined in 1976, they climbed
moderately in 1977 and then suddenly turned sharply upward in early 1978. This
alarmed President Carter and he embarked on an anti inflation campaign,
beginning in April. Regulatory reform played an important role by emphasizing
reduction of costs of compliance with federal rules. The program had little
effect on prices but a dramatic one on OSHA. After 1978 only one more
occupational health regulation came out under Eula Bingham.

Legislative attempts to limit OSHA's powers in various ways had been an
almost constant feature of its history, but all during the Carter
Administration these efforts accumulated support, culminating in a major
legislative battle in 1980. In 1978 the Senate passed an amendment to an
appropriations bill exempting workplaces with ten or fewer employees from
safety inspections, provided that they had good safety records. The House,
however, refused to pass this amendment. The idea, however, was revived in 1979
and, with several mitigating provisions added on, it was successful. Enacted as
an amendment to the Labor Department's appropriation bill, the exemption was in
effect for one year only, ending in September 1980. Sponsored by Senator
Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania, the bill exempted employers with ten or
fewer employees from OSHA safety regulations if they were in an industry that averaged less than eight injuries a year per
hundred employees. OSHA was still free to conduct health inspections, however,
and it could respond to workers' complaints about health conditions,
investigate accidents and even conduct safety inspections of highly hazardous
plants within exempted industries.78

Encouraged by this success, Senator Schweiker now sought to build a
permanent exemption into the OSH Act itself. He introduced a bill late in 1979
amending the Act to exempt from safety inspections all employers, large or
small, who had established a good safety record, regardless of what industry
they were in. The "Schweiker bill" shifted the focus from industry groups to
individual firms. Employers would be expected to conform to all OSHA
regulations and would still be subject to health inspections. Schweiker, an
original supporter of the Act, believed Congress had made a mistake in casting
the Labor Department as a "policeman" for all the nation's workplaces. Through
this legislation he hoped to concentrate enforcement on the five to ten percent
of all workplaces where it was necessary and stimulate cooperation and
voluntary compliance in the rest.79

The Schweiker bill set off the fiercest legislative confrontation over
OSHA since its creation. It provoked strong opposition from labor and the Labor
Department and acquired unlikely support in the Senate. Schweiker lined up a
bipartisan coalition of sponsors. Included were several liberal Democrats,
Harrison Williams among them. Williams maintained that OSHA reform was
inevitable and that it was better to have his committee, rather than some
other, deal with it.80

Organized labor prevailed against the Schweiker bill, despite its
bipartisan support. In March 1980 a Philadelphia labor group accused Schweiker
of a conflict of interest because just before he introduced his bill, OSHA had
cited a company with which he was financially involved for a serious violation.
Schweiker countered that he had begun working on his bill before the company
was even inspected. While this charge was basically propaganda it helped drum
up opposition to the bill among the rank and file. Business, on the other hand,
was only lukewarm in support of a bill which many from that camp felt did not
place strong enough restriction on OSHA. Several liberal Senate sponsors backed
away from the bill and it generated little support in the heavily Democratic
House. The bill finally died in Williams' committee. Attempts in the summer of
1980 to revive Schweiker's amendments led to passage of reform bills, but no
permanent restrictions on OSHA were enacted.81

After this legislative battle, Bingham planned a full slate of new
regulations and other activities for the rest of 1980. The agenda, however,
reflected a sharp change that had occurred in OSHA policy since 1978. Except
for a proposal to require labels on containers to identify toxic substances, no
health standards came out. On the other hand, OSHA issued, proposed or revised
a number of safety regulations. For example, it revised and abridged its
voluminous rules on fire and electrical safety, as it had for general rules in
the Standards Deletion project. To protect about 40,000 roofing workers it
promulgated a new standard for safety on low pitched roofs. It proposed a
special code of safety rules for dockworkers handling marine cargoes and began
development of a standard for safe shut down of electrically powered
equipment.82 The defeat of
President Carter's bid for reelection in November spurred the agency on in a
rush to beat the inaugural "gun" and finish as many projects as it could before
January 20, 1981. Bingham's disappointment must have been eased when she
received the Rockefeller public service award.83

As she prepared to leave OSHA, Bingham was hopeful about the future of
workers' safety and health in the U.S. and philosophical about her experiences
at the agency. Asked if she had anticipated strong criticism at OSHA she said,
"Of course....I never expected to run a popularity contest." She was more
impressed, however, with the support she got from labor, academe, and safety
and health professionals working in industry. She maintained that, through
grass roots pressure, occupational safety and health in the next decade would
inevitably "become part of our lives."84