It is an
article of faith among strategists that wars are won by logistics. One of the
several strengths attributed to Dwight Eisenhower when he served as Supreme Commander in Europe was his recognition that without the beans and
bullets, the warfighters would not be able to accomplish their mission. Late
historian Stephen Ambrose attributes Ike’s success in repelling Germany’s winter Ardennes
offensive to his logistical acumen, by which he had put processes and
infrastructure in place to move men and equipment quickly before their need was
critical.

In our
present war in Iraq
methodologies have changed but basic principles remain. Lacking funding,
acquisition, distribution, and maintenance of supplies and equipment, tactical
units are frozen in place -- unable to accomplish their missions. If a unit
commander knows that by taking his vehicles on the road he will exhaust his
fuel supply and be unable to replenish critical items like ammunition, food,
and water, he will be reluctant to take initiative against the enemy.

These are
the essential issues which challenge Colonel Lars Braun, a member of the
Ministry of Interior transition team working out of Phoenix Base in Iraq’s Green
Zone. Braun, a 24-year veteran, has mastered the US military’s logistical system in
war and peace. His problem now, he said with a laugh, “is to forget everything
I’ve learned. We can’t effectively use our processes here. ‘Our way’ gets in
the way.”

The most
important lesson he has learned in Iraq is that there are “significant
differences” in the way our two countries and cultures do business. In America we
focus ideally on what Braun calls “repeatable processes.” By contrast, Iraqi
leaders prefer to consolidate decision making into their own hands and make
decisions on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. In our managerial mind-set, the
ability of the system of function independent of the personality of the leader
is critical to success. From the Iraqi point of view, the man and his network
of informal, personal relationships forms the backbone of any organization.

So how do we
convince our Iraqi counterparts to change or modify their outlook? If we want
to succeed here, we shouldn’t try to do that. We attempted it before, Braun
noted, and it didn’t work. “We were playing on the same board, on the same
ground,” he said, “but one had a set of checkers, the other chess pieces. We
were playing different games.” And managerial frustration was the result.

The
consensus among US and Coalition staff is that we, as advisers, must have the
confidence – and patience – to let the Iraqis try things their way. If we try
to jam our methodology down their throats they may put up with that in the
short term. On the other hand, if we are seeking positive, long-term change
then the best approach is to give them advice and suggestions that are
culturally compatible.

“They may
have to fail a few times,” said BG Christian Schmidt, a Danish officer advising
the MOI. “We have to be wise enough to allow that to happen.” While
philosophically easy to do, it is culturally difficult for Americans and
Europeans to stand by and let that happen. “We get very impatient,” Schmidt
said with a grin. “We are all in a hurry to get things accomplished and sometimes
want to push them aside and do it for them. That would be a mistake.”

“They are
conducting peacekeeping, fighting terrorism, and trying to reduce corruption
all at the same time,” Braun concluded. “If we’re going to really help them
maybe the best thing we can do is to understand their system, their way of
operating, and offer suggestions within that paradigm rather than trying to
make them into our image.”

Ultimate
success will happen down the line. However it results, the contributions of
these US
and Coalition officers and non-commissioned officers – while unknown to most of
the American public – are having a significant effect on improving the chances
for the Iraqi people to win their freedom.

Life In Iraq

Several
times daily, especially when the sand storms get bad, insurgent rockets and
mortars impact inside the Green Zone. In military parlance this is called IDF
or indirect fire. While casualties and damage are thankfully low, people are
occasionally killed or wounded.

The people
living inside the Zone take it very seriously.

When
incoming IDF is detected – usually by rather sophisticated sensor devices – a
warning siren sounds the alert. A recorded voice shouts “Take cover, take
cover, take cover! All hands seek hardened shelter!”

This is a
signal for us to don body armor and Kevlar headgear. The first time it happened
it was faintly amusing to continue to go about your business all “geared up.”
After doing it frequently enough you don’t notice.

One
afternoon while my potential interview candidates had a meeting of their own, I
sat outside in the smoking area puffing on a cigar and taking a break. Sure
enough the siren sounded, the alert “Take cover!” was shouted, and I joined
three other smokers in a sprint for the “duck and cover” shelter. These are
concrete and steel shelters liberally scattered about to enable those outside
and away from their gear to get out of the line of fire.

As I
scrambled for the shelter I watched a small mortar round hit about 50 meters
away. While, thankfully, no one was harmed, it added a new meaning to the
phrase “smoking can be hazardous to your health.

Lt. Col. Gordon Cucullu has been an Army Green Beret lieutenant colonel, as well as a writer, popular speaker, business executive and farmer. His most recent book is Separated at Birth, about North and South Korea. He returned recently from an embed with soldiers in Iraq and has launched a web site called Support American Soldiers to assist traveling soldiers.

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