Defence Policy Review – Public Consultation Document

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Defence Policy Review – Public Consultation Document

CONTENTS
Minister’s Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
What is Defence Policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Canadian Approach to Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Defending Canada and North America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Contributing to Global Peace and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Defence Capabilities and the Future Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Defence Budget. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Key Consultation Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
How to Contribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Annex: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
CAF Operational Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Domestic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
CAF Footprint Across Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
International Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Glossary of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
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MINISTER’S MESSAGE
On behalf of the Government of Canada, I am pleased to present this public consultation
document to launch the Defence Policy Review and engage Canadians on developing a new
defence policy for Canada. Defending Canada and protecting Canadians is the Government’s
most fundamental responsibility. The Canadian Armed Forces also play a vital role in
advancing Canada’s interests and promoting Canadian values abroad.
The world has changed in the last decade, in some ways significantly. Important choices will
have to be made to ensure that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian
Armed Forces have what they need to confront new threats and challenges in the years ahead.
There will be opportunities in this process for all stakeholders, including academic experts,
non-governmental organizations, Parliamentarians, and engaged citizens to contribute. We
will also consult with allies and partners, and with other federal departments and agencies,
whose input will be essential to ensuring a coherent, coordinated approach. A credible,
realistic, and evidence-based review of defence policy will ensure that the Department of
National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces are able to deliver results for Canadians in the
years to come.
The Mandate Letter I received from the Prime Minister (http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-nationaldefence-mandate-letter) highlighted a number of themes that should underpin the review,
such as renewing Canada’s commitment to United Nations peace operations, maintaining
strong commitments to NORAD and NATO, renewing focus on the surveillance and control
of Canadian territory and approaches, particularly the Arctic, ensuring our men and women
in uniform have the equipment and support they need, and ensuring a strong link between
defence policy, foreign policy, and national security. More broadly, I am seeking input from
all interested Canadians on the roles our military should play in Canada and the world.
The Defence Policy Review public consultation process will conclude at the end of July 2016,
and will inform a new policy to be released in early 2017. I encourage you to make your voice
heard.
The Hon. Harjit S. Sajjan, PC, OMM, MSM, CD, MP
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WHAT IS
DEFENCE POLICY?
As an instrument of national power, the
Canadian military is one tool among many
that the Government of Canada may
leverage to protect Canada and Canadians,
advance national interests, and contribute to
international peace and security. Defence
policy is an expression of the priorities for
our military and a broad description of how
they will be carried out. Defence policy is
guided by foreign policy, and military
capabilities are often considered together
with diplomatic engagement, humanitarian
and development assistance, and other
measures.
Defence policy is also integral to investment
planning, not only to ensure DND and the
CAF have the resources required to meet
stated goals, but also to ensure that public
funds are managed in a responsible manner.
Canadians deserve to understand the costs
of defence and how that money is spent.
Defence policy is also critical in guiding
complex decision making within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian
Armed Forces (DND and the CAF). For
example, it helps our military and civilian
leadership plan so that the CAF are equipped,
trained, and supported for the kinds of
operations they may be called upon to
undertake. Defence policy should therefore
identify the roles and tasks the military will be
expected to carry out.
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CANADIAN APPROACH
TO DEFENCE
In order to meet the Defence mandate, DND and the CAF have taken a particular approach
to the business of defence, with the following key features:
COMPOSITION OF THE
DEFENCE TEAM BY
WORKFORCE
Civilians
24,000
Reserve Force
28,500
Regular Force
68,000
AN INTEGRATED CIVILIAN-MILITARY
DEFENCE TEAM
The Minister of National Defence leads a
team of dedicated professionals, both
members of the CAF, headed by the Chief
of the Defence Staff, and public servants,
headed by the Deputy Minister of National
Defence. The Chief of the Defence Staff has
primary responsibility for command,
control, and administration of the CAF, as
well as military strategy, plans, and requirements. On the civilian side, the Deputy
Minister has primary responsibility for the
management of resources, defence policy,
research, procurement, and international
defence relations.
Civils
24 000
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The CAF – both the Regular and Reserve
Force – execute operations at home and
around the world to ensure our security and
safeguard our values. The Reserve Force
augments and works with the Regular Force,
contributing to the defence and security of
Canada both at home and abroad. Working
alongside the CAF is a team of public
servants who perform a number of critical
enabling functions such as: intelligence;
equipment procurement and maintenance;
policy, legal, and communications support;
finance; information technology; and scientific
research and development.
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES KEY ROLES:
Defending Canada – ensuring the security of citizens
and exercising Canada’s sovereignty
Defending North America – in partnership with the
United States
A MULTI-ROLE, COMBAT-CAPABLE
FORCE
The CAF are a battle-tested, professional
force capable of significant contributions
across a wide spectrum of operations. For
decades, the CAF have undertaken three
fundamental roles: defending Canada,
partnering in the defence of North America
with the United States, and providing
meaningful contributions to international
peace and security. Given the unpredictability of the security environment, Canada has
invested in multi-role equipment and forces
that can be used to respond to a wide range
of threats and challenges. With a country as
vast as Canada, domestic operations require
a similar level of mobility as those conducted abroad. Strategic airlift such as the C-17,
for example, has resupplied the Canadian
military at the farthest reaches of the
Canadian North and supported the French
military in Western Africa, among many
other missions.
Contributing to International Peace and Security
– Canada’s prosperity and security depend on stability
abroad
EUROPE
IRAQ
HAITI
AFGHANISTAN
LIBYA
MALI
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WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT
APPROACH
The Canadian military routinely operates as
part of a “whole-of-government” approach
alongside its partners, allowing for a
comprehensive response to today’s complex
security challenges. In Afghanistan, for
example, the CAF conducted operations
alongside Canadian diplomats, development
workers, police officers, and civilian experts
in human rights, good governance, the rule
of law, and democratic development.
LEVERAGING PARTNERSHIPS
The CAF have historically been oriented to
operating with others both on the continent
with the United States through NORAD,
and deploying internationally with allies and
partners in a coalition setting.
The North American Aerospace
Defence Command (NORAD), formally
established in 1958, is a United States
and Canada bi-national organization
charged with the missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), founded in 1949, is a
political-military alliance consisting of 28
member nations whose essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its
members through political and military means.
The United Nations (UN), founded
in 1945, is the foremost global body
formed by member nations to promote
international cooperation on issues such
as peace and security, climate change, sustainable
development, human rights, disarmament, terrorism,
humanitarian and health emergencies, gender equality,
and more.
Working with like-minded partners has
given Canada a stronger voice on the
international stage and has maximized
Canadian contributions to global stability.
With that in mind, Canada has accepted
that it does not need every capability
available to modern militaries. Instead, we
have opted to maintain a multi-purpose
capability that allows Canada to contribute
across the spectrum of operations, in
concert with our allies.
The defence policy review will seek to test
the current approach, verify whether it is
still right for the years ahead, consider
innovative ideas, and make adjustments as
necessary.
For more information and a list of current
operations, please see the annex.
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THE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
Canada faces an uncertain, complex and
fluid security environment. It consists of a
multi-faceted array of threats and challenges, both traditional and unconventional.
While conditions in Eastern Europe and the
Middle East are currently of significant
interest, a number of other trends will also
need to be considered in determining how
best to prepare the CAF. As Russian
aggression in Ukraine has made clear,
threats from state actors – which often blend
traditional and unconventional tactics –
persist in the international security environment. Geopolitical rivalries and disputes in
the Asia-Pacific region, and weapons
proliferation and ballistic missile tests in
places like North Korea, are of growing
concern. A number of regional flashpoints
in the Middle East and Africa could flare up
quickly and have serious consequences for
regional and international stability, potentially leading to mass migration and refugee
flows. In this review, we must consider
seriously the impact of instability abroad on
Canadian security, and what role the CAF
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should play in working to achieve stability in
conflicts far from home.
Ongoing challenges linked to fragile states –
such as poor governance, weak and noninclusive political institutions, ethnic strife,
porous borders, and religious extremism –
persist and threats from non-state actors also
continue to pose genuine dangers. What tools
should the CAF develop to deal with these
challenges as part of a wider Government of
Canada effort to reinforce security and build
stability internationally?
Canada continues to support coalition efforts
to degrade the so-called Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) through Operation
IMPACT, and remains concerned about
other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and
Boko Haram. Preventing the rise of terrorism
in ungoverned spaces will continue to be a
challenge, as violent extremist organizations
increase their geographic reach. How should
Canada fight terrorism, which finds its roots
deep in the regional historical, economic,
social, religious, ethnic, and demographic
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conditions? How can the Canadian military
be most effective against terrorism? What
tools do the CAF need?
Cyber and space are increasingly prominent
among the security and defence challenges
facing Canada and its allies. The CAF
depend heavily on the cyber environment,
and space-based capabilities are becoming
an increasingly critical component of
military operations (e.g., communications,
GPS, situational awareness). Threats in
these domains are of significant concern.
Canada must also deal with rising international interest in the Arctic and the challenges related to the changing environment
and increased accessibility of our Northern
waterways. Recent Russian activity in the
Arctic has only added to this challenge.
Defence and security concerns such as
disaster response, illegal dumping, and
espionage will likely increase as the level of
activity in the North grows. Beyond the
Arctic, the CAF are occasionally called
upon to assist other government departments with recurring issues such as illicit
trafficking and illegal fishing. With the
growing frequency and severity of natural
disasters in Canada, the military is increasingly called on to help provide relief to
Canadians impacted by these events.
Additionally, the threat of terrorism on
North American soil continues to exist. On
request National Defence routinely collaborates with and provides support to Canadian
security authorities to meet these challenges.
QUESTION RELATING TO THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:
1. Are there any threats to Canada’s security that are not being addressed adequately?
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DEFENDING CANADA
AND NORTH AMERICA
The Government has no higher obligation
than ensuring the safety and security of
Canadians and safeguarding national sovereignty. The CAF play a vital role in this
effort and do so primarily through domestic
operations and in collaboration with the
United States to protect the continent.
work closely with domestic security partners, including the Canadian Coast Guard,
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the
Canada Border Services Agency, and
Transport Canada, routinely providing
assistance on request in support of their
respective mandates.
The domestic role for the military is multifaceted and includes daily responsibilities
such as search and rescue and the monitoring and surveillance of Canadian air and sea
approaches, including in the Arctic. The
CAF must be aware of activities within and
approaching Canadian territory in order to
detect, identify, and track potential threats
to Canada. Naval vessels, surveillance
aircraft, and ground and space-based assets
are just some of the tools that enable the
CAF to carry out these tasks. The CAF also
In the domestic environment, the CAF must
also be prepared to support law enforcement
agencies during high profile events in Canada
(such as the Vancouver 2010 Olympics or the
upcoming G7 Summit in 2018) and be poised
to respond to crises we hope will never occur,
but must nevertheless stand ready to address
– from the effects of potentially devastating
natural and manmade disasters to terrorist
attacks. The National Defence Act outlines
the CAF role in supporting civilian authorities
when requested.
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DOMESTIC DEFENCE
Canada’s Arctic– Protecting Our Northern
Frontier
From a defence perspective, the increase in
human activity and growing international
interest in the Arctic have generated greater
demand for a CAF presence in the North,
including through persistent surveillance
and monitoring, increased preparedness to
conduct operations in the region, and rising
demands for emergency response.
The Canadian Arctic is an extreme environment at a strategic international crossroads.
The CAF have unique capabilities to handle
the harsh conditions; however, military
activity in the North comes at exceptional
cost. Furthermore, the Arctic is often
characterized as a region where cooperation
– not confrontation – should be prioritized.
We must therefore ask
– what type of military
presence does Canada
require in the North?
The CAF also face
certain operational
limitations in the North,
including the lack of
dedicated satellite
coverage above
65 degrees latitude,
which hinders the CAF’s
ability for command
and control of military
assets in the North and to transmit data in
real time. Do the nature and severity of
current and future defence and security
challenges in the Arctic justify significant
new investments? Can Canada afford to
maintain or decrease its military presence in
the region, particularly at a time when the
strategic environment there is shifting as
international interest grows?
CIRCUMPOLAR ARCTIC
Arc
tic
Ci
rc
le
Alaska
(U.S.)
CANADA
NORTH
POLE
Siberia
(RUSSIA)
Greenland
(DENMARK)
NORWAY
ICELAND
FINLAND
SWEDEN
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coordination of maritime search and rescue
alongside the Canadian Coast Guard, the
CAF respond to over 9,000 search and
rescue calls annually, approximately 1,000 of
which require the launching of search and
rescue air assets.
Disaster Response – Supporting Civilian
Authorities in Times of Crisis
The CAF devote approximately 950 personnel to deliver search and rescue services
24 hours a day, 365 days a year, with air
assets distributed across Canada to ensure
the most timely and effective response when
crises hit. The CAF take their role in search
and rescue very seriously and remains
focused on continuous improvement. Yet,
given the range of other actors engaged in
The growing frequency and severity of
natural disasters, particularly an increase
in fires and floods, has brought with it a
growing need for support from the CAF.
In the past ten years, the CAF have been
called in to support civil authorities during
numerous crises, as disasters often outstripped local capacity to respond. CAF
personnel are proud to support their fellow
Canadians in this way and they maintain
higher readiness levels during peak disaster
seasons to allow for rapid response. However, important questions can be asked
about the optimal use of defence resources.
Are the CAF adequately resourced if this
task continues on an upward trend? Are
there alternatives to using the military for
these types of tasks?
Search and Rescue – Providing Support for
the Safety of Canadians
Search and rescue is a shared responsibility
across all levels of government and is
delivered with the support of the private
sector and thousands of volunteers. Canada
has one of the world’s largest areas of
responsibility for search and rescue, covering
18 million square kilometres of land and
water, more than 243,800 kilometres of
coastline, three oceans, three million lakes,
as well as the St. Lawrence River and the
Great Lakes system. Responsible for
aeronautical search and rescue and the
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this activity and the small proportion of
rescues that require CAF assets, a valid
question is: What role should the CAF have
in search and rescue? Are there models for
alternative service delivery that could be
explored? What would the implications of
alternative service delivery be for search and
rescue across Canada, including in the North?
Counter-Terrorism – Managing the Defence
Security Nexus
The persistence of the terrorist threat around
the world is a key feature of the current
security environment and the military plays a
vital role in addressing this threat before it
reaches our shores. In the domestic context,
the military stands ready to support law
enforcement, upon request, in responding to
terrorist activity on our soil. Indeed, the
primary mission of Canada’s Special
Operations Forces is counter-terrorism.
The elite Joint Task Force 2 has held this
responsibility since 1993 and is trained to
the highest state of readiness in the CAF.
As the terrorist threat
evolves and homegrown terrorism
continues to pose
challenges to law
enforcement, and
while the presence of
foreign fighters
continues to complicate counter-terrorism
operations abroad, the
interplay between the domestic and international dimensions of terrorism requires
careful consideration.
CONTINENTAL DEFENCE
Working in Partnership with the United
States
The United States is Canada’s most important defence partner. Both nations have
chosen to work together to defend the
continent and have, as a result, built a
unique and mutually beneficial partnership.
This special relationship is anchored in the
bi-national North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is
responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in
defence of North America. NORAD is
unique in the world in that its commander is
appointed by – and responsible equally to
– both the President of the United States
and the Prime Minister of Canada. Canadians
and Americans serve side-by-side in
NORAD.
We must consider ways in which NORAD
may need to evolve and modernize to
remain relevant into the future, and what
arrangements or investments may be
required to make this happen. Strengthening
NORAD may include a re-evaluation of its
current roles and expansion beyond the air
and maritime domains. Russia’s growing
presence in the Arctic, coupled with its
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assertive behaviour in Eastern Europe,
as well as the proliferation of weapons by
states such as North Korea, may underline
the need for upgrading NORAD capabilities.
The extent of Canada-United States cooperation is further reflected in a wide variety
of bilateral institutions, arrangements and
agreements beyond NORAD, notably the
Permanent Joint Board on Defence – a
consultative and advisory body on continental defence policy – and the Military
Cooperation Committee, which fosters
cooperation between the two militaries. At
any given time, there are over 700 Canadian
military members serving with the United
States military. Through various agreements
like the Combined Defence Plan and the
Civil Assistance Plan, Canada and the
United States have committed to close
cooperation to address a range of threats.
Moving such a solid relationship into the
future will raise vital questions: How
integrated should the CAF be with the
American military in the defence of North
America? What are the most important
shared threats to Canada and the United
States? How can we best serve our national
interests in the relationship? How can
Canada keep pace with and complement
American technological advancement?
One issue that has not been considered by
Canada for over a decade concerns ballistic
missile defence. Given the increase in the
number of countries with access to ballistic
missile technology and their potential to
reach North America, this threat is expected
to endure and grow more sophisticated in
the coming decades. In response to this
change in the security environment, many of
Canada’s partners and allies are working
closely together to develop ballistic missile
defence capabilities.
In accordance with its 2005 decision,
Canada does not participate in the United
States ballistic missile defence system for the
defence of North America. Should this
decision be revisited given changing technologies and threats? Would a shift in policy
in this area enhance Canadian national
security and offer an avenue for greater
continental cooperation? Or are there more
effective areas in which to invest to better
protect the North American continent?
Mexico – A North American Partner
Canada also enjoys a close relationship with
Mexico. Mexico’s continued desire to
establish stronger ties with its North
American partners has led to significant
progress in defence engagement. DND and
the CAF have steadily increased defence ties
with Mexico bilaterally, as well as trilaterally
with the United States. Canada views
trilateral collaboration with the United
States and Mexico as paramount in addressing regional security challenges, such as
transnational criminal organizations,
narcotrafficking, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. Additionally, Canada has begun to support Mexico’s
recent commitment to contribute to UN
peace support operations.
QUESTIONS RELATING TO DEFENDING CANADA AND NORTH AMERICA:
2. What roles should the Canadian Armed Forces play domestically, including in support
of civilian authorities?
3. How should Canada-United States cooperation on defence of North America evolve
in the coming years?
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CONTRIBUTING TO
GLOBAL PEACE
AND SECURITY
Canada has a strong interest in contributing
to global peace and security given our
geography, our reliance on international
trade, our international treaty obligations,
and our commitment to projecting Canadian
values. We are also keenly aware that our
national security is closely connected to
international security. The CAF contribute
to international peace and security in a
variety of ways. Recent and current examples include: contributing to combat operations in Afghanistan; conducting air operations, training, and intelligence gathering
operations against ISIL in Iraq; providing
combat-capable forces to coalition efforts in
regional security operations such as NATO
assurance measures in Central and Eastern
Europe; contributing to peace-support and
stabilization operations, with the UN or
other partners (participation in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai
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Peninsula of Egypt); engaging in training,
advisory, and capacity building
operations (Operation UNIFIER in
Ukraine and Operation IMPACT in Iraq);
assisting in humanitarian operations (Haiti
in 2010, Nepal earthquake in 2015); and
helping with non-combatant evacuation
operations (Lebanon in 2006) as needed.
COALITION OPERATIONS AND
COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
International peace and security depend on
effective multinational cooperation. Canada
has always been committed to collective
defence, as strong alliances and partnerships
are required to address global threats. As a
combat-capable, multi-role force trained to
conduct a full-spectrum of operations, the
CAF give the Government a broad range of
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
options when responding to international
crises. However, alliances, coalitions and
partnerships increase the influence, flexibility,
and reach of the CAF. Our ability to
participate in coalitions is dependent on
effective information-sharing and interoperability, and the CAF strives for this when
working with other nations.
THE TRANS-ATLANTIC LINK
As part of its commitment to collective
security, Canada deploys routinely but not
exclusively through NATO. Since its inception in 1949, NATO has been a central pillar
of Trans-Atlantic defence and a cornerstone
of Canadian defence and security policy.
NATO is both a military and political
alliance, predicated on a set of shared
principles and values. The Alliance has a
global approach to defence, with activities
ranging from peace support operations in
Kosovo, to counter-terrorism operations in
the Mediterranean, to security operations
and the training of security forces in
Afghanistan. Of note, the CAF have
contributed to almost every NATO operation since its founding, providing modern,
deployable capabilities to allied missions and
highly trained personnel to its command
structure. At the core of NATO lies the
collective defence commitment found in
Article V of the Washington Treaty – that an
attack against one is an attack against all.
How should Canada contribute to NATO
and its evolving role in global security in the
years ahead?
A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO
PEACE OPERATIONS
Canada has a longstanding history of
contributing both military and civilian
capabilities to UN peace operations. This is
a legacy of which Canadians are proud, and
the Government is committed to renewing
Canada’s contribution to peace operations.
UN peace operations have evolved in
response to the changing nature of threats to
international peace and security. Peace
support missions are increasingly deployed
to hostile environments where violence is
systemic and there is a desperate need to end
violations of human rights. Unlike ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions of the past,
most current missions operate where there is
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no clear peace accord to be monitored, the
contested terrain is ever-changing, and the
combatants rarely represent formal armies
of recognized states. Contemporary mission
mandates are heavily focused on protection
of civilians, including support for the
international agenda on women, peace, and
security. They are complex and multidimensional in nature, and they are most often
authorized under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, thereby allowing use of force.
Canada is one of the top ten contributors to
the UN peacekeeping budget, also contributing modestly to capacity building by
training other forces to increase their
effectiveness, and is active in UN efforts to
modernize and reform UN peacekeeping.
How should the CAF help increase Canada’s
contribution to peace operations? What role,
if any, can the CAF play in conflict prevention, mediation, and/or post-conflict
reconstruction in support of wider
Government of Canada efforts?
DEFENCE CAPACITY BUILDING
The CAF regularly
participate in defence
capacity building, often
with other government
partners and allies. As
part of these training
and advisory operations, the CAF contribute task-tailored
military contingents to
international efforts to
help partner nations
build professional capacity in their security
forces. This usually consists of activities such
as training, mentoring, partnering, monitoring, and enabling. OP UNIFIER in Ukraine
is an example of the CAF’s contribution to
capacity building, in this case in coordination
with the United States and other countries
providing similar training assistance.
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Capacity building can help to stop the
spread of instability and conflict by enabling
countries to better deal with crises as they
emerge, thereby reducing the likelihood of
higher-intensity conflicts that require
international military intervention.
What role, if any, should the CAF play in
working to achieve stability in these conflicts, including supporting allied or coalition efforts? Should the Government of
Canada prioritize capacity building as a way
to prevent conflict from breaking out in the
first place? If so, what role should the CAF
play? What kinds of capabilities and
approaches would this require? Can Canadian intelligence capabilities and expertise
contribute to a deeper understanding of the
origins of conflict, the best ways to prevent
it, and the locations where capacity building
will have the greatest impact?
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
DISASTER RESPONSE
Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance
remain a priority for the Government of
Canada and the CAF stand ready to assist
populations who are suffering the effects of
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
natural and man-made disasters. For
example, the Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) is uniquely poised to respond
to a variety of contingencies, acting to meet
immediate needs until regular services are
restored to affected areas when requested by
the host country or an international organization such as the UN. This team works
alongside other government partners, local
authorities, and international organizations
and agencies – complementing their work
and filling gaps as needed. Given the
increasing frequency and severity of natural
disasters around the world, should more
defence resources be devoted to disaster
response capabilities?
DEFENCE DIPLOMACY
Maintaining our security and place in the
world involves steadfast and deliberate
relationship building. This careful work,
known as defence diplomacy, helps Canada
to achieve its defence objectives while also
contributing to broader Government of
Canada priorities, including building our
prosperity; promoting core values of
democracy, respect for human rights and
diversity, and the rule of law; and enhancing
global stability.
DND and the CAF carry out this activity in
close cooperation with government partners,
most notably Global Affairs Canada and
the Department of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness.
As the international landscape continues to
shift, Canada will need to assess the scope
and depth of its international partnerships
and the role of international institutions. In
addition to large multinational organizations
such as NATO and the UN, as well as
established relationships such as those with
the United States and the Five Eyes network
of partners (Canada, United States, United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand),
Canada could stand to benefit from building
new partnerships around the world. Which
nations and organizations are best placed to
partner with Canada on defence issues and
why? The defence policy review process
marks an opportunity to articulate the
importance of ongoing partnerships while
potentially charting a path for developing
new defence relationships.
Members of the DND and the CAF ably
represent Canada and Canadian interests
around the world – conducting exercises and
operations with allies and partners, engaging
in political-military dialogues, and building
the capacity of partner militaries and
defence ministries. These efforts contribute
to a safer world and a strong Canada.
QUESTIONS RELATING TO CONTRIBUTING TO GLOBAL PEACE
AND SECURITY:
4. What form should the CAF contribution to peace support operations take?
Is there a role for the CAF in helping to prevent conflict before it occurs?
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
17
DEFENCE CAPABILITIES
AND THE FUTURE FORCE
OUR PEOPLE
UNDERSTANDING THE “ENVIRONMENTS”
DND and the CAF’s most valuable capability is its integrated workforce. Fulfillment of
the defence mandate depends on a highlyskilled team of men and women in uniform,
supported by dedicated and professional
public servants.
The Royal Canadian Navy consists of approximately
8,600 personnel. The Canadian fleet, divided between the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts, is composed of 29 warships,
submarines, and coastal defence vessels – plus many
more auxiliary and support vessels.
The CAF are made up of both the Regular
Force – full-time members who have made
military service their career, who number
68,000 – and the Reserve Force, or part-time
members, who number 28,500 (by end of
2019).
While Regular Force members are enrolled
for a specified term of service, members of
the Reserve Force are enrolled for an indefinite period and as such volunteer to keep
themselves ready for duty if and when
necessary. This robust and well-trained force
is critical to the success of CAF operations.
18
The Canadian Army, at approximately 22,600 strong, is
based in four regions across Canada. Canada’s land forces operate a range of land combat vehicles, including the
Light Armoured Vehicle and Leopard II tanks. They also
leverage a range of integrated communications tools to
support networked operations.
The Royal Canadian Air Force, with approximately 13,200
personnel, is located in 13 locations across Canada and
operates fighter aircraft, transport aircraft, and search and
rescue aircraft – in addition to operating a fleet of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft.
The balance of 23,600 makes up the forces allocated to
Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM), Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC),
Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM),
Chief of Military Personnel (CMP), Canadian Forces Health
Services Group (CFHSG), and various other organizations
that provide operational support.
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
The experience of Afghanistan has reinforced
the fact that the Reserve Force fulfills a
critical role for the CAF. What should the
future role of the reserves be? Should they
play a bigger role? Should the way the
reserves are recruited, utilised, and integrated
into the force be changed?
Within the unified CAF are three environmental commands: the Royal Canadian Navy,
Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air
Force – each with its own traditions and
history – working together to serve Canada as
an integrated joint force. When these forces
are deployed on operations, whether at home
or abroad, they take their orders from the
Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). CJOC directs these
operations from their earliest planning stages
through to mission closeout, and ensures that
national strategic goals are achieved. Canada
also has a Special Operations Force Command, which provides the Government of
Canada with agile, high-readiness Special
Operations Forces capable of conducting
special operations across the spectrum of
conflict at home and abroad. The Commander
of Military Personnel Command, in cooperation with the environmental commanders, is
responsible for recruitment, training, development, care, and support of military personnel
– ensuring that the CAF have the right people,
at the right time, with the right competencies
to perform their duties. Finally, the newest
command, the Canadian Forces Intelligence
Command, is responsible for the provision of
strategic intelligence advice and the force
generation of specialist intelligence personnel
and capabilities for CAF operations.
coordinated with other government departments and key allies. The public servant skill
set is well-suited to this work and ensures
that military personnel are available to be
employed in military trades on the front lines.
Public servants on bases, wings, and in other
facilities across the country provide a number
of core functions – from managing equipment fleets and infrastructure holdings, to
providing care and support to CAF personnel
and their families.
DND and the CAF are guided by a code of
values and ethics, and maintain the fundamental principle of respect for all persons in
all of their activities. The CAF strive to
reflect the society they serve and value
diversity in their ranks.
OPERATION HONOUR
In 2015, the Chief of the Defence Staff announced
Operation HONOUR – the CAF’s mission to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour –
and in February 2016, the first progress report was
released. Among other efforts, a Sexual Misconduct
Response Centre was established to provide CAF
members with an additional, and unique, victim support option. Additionally, an extensive review of policies and programs has been completed to assess the
effectiveness of current resources related to harmful
and inappropriate sexual behaviour. This is forming
the basis of definitions, policy, and program changes,
and an updated curriculum that will be implemented
starting in the spring of 2016. The CAF continue to
focus efforts on a positive cultural shift to ensure a
healthy, respectful, and professional environment for
all members.
Public servants advise the Minister of
National Defence and engage with other
departments and allies on the Minister’s
behalf, often in concert with whole-ofgovernment partners and international allies.
Deploying on operations involves careful
input on the part of civilian advisors to
ensure military plans adhere to government
policy, reflect the social and political realities
of the operating environment, and are
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
19
The unpredictable nature of national and
international security will drive the requirement for an agile and adaptable force that can
support a range of operational tasks. This
requires well-selected, educated, and trained
personnel who are physically and psychologically fit, and resilient to meet the ever-changing
defence requirements of Canada.
DND and the CAF have made progress in
understanding and minimizing the environmental footprint of military operations and
facilities. These objectives will be even more
important in the coming years.
HEALTH AND WELLNESS
The CAF maintain a separate, full spectrum
health system which supports CAF members
at home and on operations, through programs for prevention, promotion, protection,
and primary care, as well as care for more
serious medical conditions and injuries,
whether combat related or otherwise.
The CAF have a wide variety of mental
health services and programs available to
members, which are delivered through
Mental Health Clinics at bases across
20
Canada, providing a full range of care. The
CAF also have Operational Trauma and
Stress Support Centres, which provide
support in areas such as Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder and Operational Stress
Injury.
DND and the CAF aim to provide expert care
to members and their families, and have
started to build on the significant recent efforts
already undertaken in the area of physical and
mental health and well-being. The health of
military members and their families will
always be a top priority for the CAF.
While Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) is
primarily responsible for the care, treatment,
and transition to civilian life of Canada’s
veterans, DND and the CAF are working to
strengthen the relationship with VAC and
ensure efficient service delivery for those who
have served our country.
THE FUTURE DEFENCE FORCE
Looking to the future, the CAF will continue
to rely on longstanding, proven capabilities
to carry out the defence mandate. Considerable investment has already been made to
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
recapitalize existing fleets. The program to
replace the Navy’s aging maritime fleet is an
example of Canada’s effort to maintain an
agile and combat-capable force. The requirement for such traditional capabilities has not
diminished.
However, the world is changing and the
emergence of new capabilities is shifting the
way militaries operate. With this evolution
comes the need to adapt, both in terms of
capability requirements and the necessary
skill sets to support the future force. Is
Canada’s general purpose, multi-role
approach serving us well? As the CAF
continue to modernize their equipment and
their workforce, key questions will need to be
answered about the balance between recapitalizing existing fleets and investing in new
technologies and approaches. Could Canada’s interests be better served by focusing on
specific areas of capability? Should the CAF
specialize in high-end capabilities that add
value to coalition operations but which could
limit our ability to act independently? What
are the risks of forgoing certain capabilities?
Sophisticated intelligence is key to understanding threats and gaining knowledge of
dynamics on the ground before any type of
action is undertaken. Can the CAF take
greater advantage of its intelligence capabilities, or build on them, to prevent or contain
conflicts and counter threats?
CYBER
Connectivity and dependence on information
technology have become central to the military.
Progressively, modern militaries have become
more and more reliant on cyber networks to
operate essential platforms in areas such as
communications, intelligence, and weapons,
and to better manage and integrate them.
While cyber technology has resulted in significant advantages – including for the CAF and
other Western militaries – it also generates
vulnerabilities, and potential adversaries are
developing capabilities to exploit them.
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
The rapid evolution of cyber technology and
the diversity of cyber-capable actors make it
extremely challenging to keep pace with the
threat. There has been a steady increase in
the number of countries and non-state actors
(e.g., terrorists, criminals, hackers) with the
capability to conduct disruptive cyber
operations and a willingness to target
Western interests. This has been coupled with
the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated
cyber tools and techniques that can be used
to achieve a range of effects (e.g., espionage,
theft, sabotage) with relatively little financial
investment. This is a highly complex threat
environment that poses significant challenges
for the CAF and for Canada as a whole.
Cyber capabilities can be used to disrupt
threats at their source, and can offer alternative options that can be utilized with less risk
to personnel and that are potentially reversible and less destructive than traditional uses
of force to achieve military objectives. Some
of our key allies, such as the US and the UK,
have stated that they are developing cyber
capabilities to potentially conduct both
defensive and offensive military activities in
cyberspace. We must consider how to best
position the Canadian military to operate
effectively in this domain.
SPACE
Space technology is increasingly critical for
Canada’s economy and society. For example,
satellites are necessary for the functioning of
ATMs and stock exchanges, the coordination
of air traffic control and ‘just-in-time’
delivery, the monitoring of crops and oil
spills, and the provision of valued services
like cell phones and satellite TV.
Space is also essential to national security
and defence. The CAF depend on the
precision provided by GPS to enhance the
manoeuvrability of forces and to accurately
strike targets and limit civilian casualties.
21
Satellite communications are essential for the
command and control of military operations,
especially in remote regions in Canada and
around the world. Space-based search and
rescue capabilities allow the CAF to respond
more quickly to Canadians in distress. And
reconnaissance satellites provide incredibly
detailed images of otherwise inaccessible
areas, including Canada’s maritime
approaches. Canada has one of the most
sophisticated space programs within the
5-Eyes community. DND and the CAF are
particularly strong at space-based maritime
domain awareness, where we use Canada’s
RADARSAT-2 for ship detection, and are
also adept at space situational awareness,
where we use DND and the CAF’s Sapphire
satellite to track objects in orbit. Canada is
a leader in remote sensing technology, and
has been an active participant in the space
domain for over fifty years, and remains a
strong advocate on the international stage
for responsible behaviour in space.
While space used to be the domain of a few
advanced states, an ever-increasing number
are developing space capabilities for military
purposes. Further, commercial companies
offer highly advanced space capabilities on the
open market such as satellite communications
and radar, and optical data, which can be used
for both civil and military purposes. Moreover,
certain states are purportedly developing
a range of counter-space or anti-satellite
weapons that threaten our collective access to
and use of space. Such weapons join environmental issues, man-made hazards, and a
growing amount of space debris in posing a
threat to allied space assets.
In light of the importance of – and threats to
– outer space, should Canada develop the
means to protect its satellites and space
capabilities, and those of allies, from attack?
UNMANNED SYSTEMS
Unmanned Systems have become integral
to modern military operations. From
Unmanned Ground Vehicles used as bomb
disposal robots to Unmanned Maritime
Vehicles used for naval mine countermeasures, and potentially anti-submarine
warfare, such systems represent only a few of
the possibilities inherent in military robotics.
Of course, Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) have been deployed to great effect in
numerous military operations, including by
Canada. UAS offer several advantages that
manned aircraft cannot provide.
However, the use of unmanned systems has
not been without controversy, as many have
criticized the use of this type of capability.
The international community is studying the
complex legal, strategic, and moral questions
related to emerging technologies in the area
of lethal autonomous weapons systems.
Canada must consider the appropriate use of
unmanned systems and, over the longer term,
determine the appropriate relationship
between humans and machines.
Modernization of capabilities will also require
a modernization of skills. There will be an
increasing need for employees with special
skill sets in these emerging domains. Consideration will need to be given to how these
shortages are best filled. Is there a need for
new trades within the CAF? Can the reserves
be leveraged to capitalize on expertise in the
private sector? Can public servants or contractors take on some of these roles?
22
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
PROCUREMENT
An effective defence procurement process
and a strong and vibrant Canadian defence
industrial base are important to Canada’s
security and economy – not only for reasons
of economic prosperity – but also to ensure a
range of capabilities available to provide
Canada with an operational and technological
edge. It is imperative that the CAF have the
tools they need to carry out their day-to-day
duties at home and abroad. While DND has
undoubtedly faced challenges in delivering
some large and complex defence procurement
projects, a vast majority of defence contracts
proceed on time and on budget. Of note,
DND has let over 40,000 contracts a year for
both services and goods since 2009, with an
upward trend to 60,000 in the last two fiscal
years.
DND has been working diligently with other
government departments who maintain
responsibility for key elements of the
procurement process – Public Services and
Procurement and Innovation, Science and
Economic Development Canada – to
improve defence procurement under various
initiatives such as the recapitalization of
naval fleets and the Defence Procurement
Strategy. This has resulted in some improvements such as earlier and ongoing industry
engagement – as demonstrated by the
publication of an annual Defence Acquisition Guide – independent third-party
validation of military requirements related to
large procurements, through the establishment of an Independent Review Panel for
Defence Acquisition, and an ongoing effort
to better leverage procurements to maximize
job creation. Work is underway to further
streamline defence procurement to ensure
that the CAF gets the equipment it needs in a
timely and transparent manner. However,
there are undoubtedly other ways to improve
this process.
QUESTIONS RELATING TO DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AND
THE FUTURE FORCE:
5. Should the size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Forces change
from what they are today?
6. How can DND and the CAF improve the way they support the health and wellness of
military members? In what areas should more be done?
7. Should Canada strive to maintain military capability across the full spectrum of operations? Are there specific niche areas of capability in which Canada should specialize?
8. What type of investments should Canada make in space, cyber, and unmanned systems? To what extent should Canada strive to keep pace and be interoperable with
key allies in these domains?
9. What additional measures could DND undertake, along with partner departments,
to improve defence procurement?
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
23
DEFENCE BUDGET
FUNDING CANADA’S DEFENCE NEEDS
The defence policy review will be critical to
defining the missions, roles, and future
capabilities Canada requires of its armed
forces. This new vision for defence must be
affordable. What level of resources will be
required to meet Canada’s defence needs?
The Canadian military, while experiencing
fluctuations in funding over time, has been
resourced at around 1% of Canadian Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) for the past
decade. At the 2014 NATO Summit in
Wales, Heads of State and Government
from all 28 NATO members agreed to a
Defence Investment Pledge that Allies
should aim to move toward spending 2% of
GDP on defence. While percentage of GDP
is a questionable measure of what a nation
24
can achieve with its defence spending, this
aspirational guideline drives debate among
our allies. It is also important to recognize
that there is considerable variation in how
countries calculate their defence budget.
National Defence comprises one of the
largest portions of the Canadian Government’s overall budget, with 6.6 percent of
total spending and 20 percent of program
expenditures in 2015-16. Canada assesses its
defence spending in terms of the level of
resources required to support an effective
and capable CAF. Ultimately, the level of
ambition we define for the CAF must be
properly resourced, which will require clear
priorities and strategic decisions about how
to invest limited resources with maximum
impact. What should be the priorities for
investment and what are the corresponding
trade-offs?
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
2016-17 MAIN ESTIMATES OF $18.64 BILLION
Grants &
Contributions
$0.2B
1%
Statutory
$1.3B
7%
Personnel: Expenditures associated with salaries and wages of
employees
Operations & Maintenance:
Expenditures associated with the
upkeep of facilities and equipment
Capital: Expenditures associated
with the construction and acquisition of assets
Capital
$3.4B
18%
Personnel
$7.5B
40%
Operations &
Maintenance
$6.2B
34%
Statutory: Contributions to
employee benefit plans such as
pensions
Grant: a type of transfer payment
by government that is not subject
to audit and that is restricted by
Parliament as to amount, recipient,
and often purpose, through the
relevant Supply Bill.
Contribution: a type of transfer
payment by government that is
conditional, subject to audit, and
with fewer restrictions than grants.
Source: 2016-17
main estimates
QUESTIONS RELATING TO CONTRIBUTING TO DEFENCE BUDGET:
10. What resources will the CAF require to meet Canada’s defence needs?
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25
CONCLUSION
The CAF remain focused on defending
Canada and North America and contributing to a wide spectrum of operations globally. However, the security environment has
shifted and the time is right to reflect on the
CAF’s role domestically, on the continent,
and globally, as well as on how the CAF
should be resourced and equipped.
26
Canadian expectations of their military,
both at home and abroad, should substantially inform this process. Having considered
this paper and the questions posed within
it, we invite Canadians to participate in the
defence policy review and help develop a
comprehensive new policy that will guide
DND and the CAF into the future.
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
KEY CONSULTATION
QUESTIONS
1.
Are there any threats to Canada’s security that are not being addressed
adequately?
2.
What roles should the Canadian Armed Forces play domestically, including in
support of civilian authorities?
3.
How should Canada-United States cooperation on defence of North America
evolve in the coming years?
4.
What form should the CAF contribution to peace support operations take?
Is there a role for the CAF in helping to prevent conflict before it occurs?
5.
Should the size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Forces
change from what they are today?
6.
How can DND and the CAF improve the way they support the health and wellness of military members? In what areas should more be done?
7.
Should Canada strive to maintain military capability across the full spectrum of
operations? Are there specific niche areas of capability in which Canada should
specialize?
8.
What type of investments should Canada make in space, cyber, and unmanned
systems? To what extent should Canada strive to keep pace and be interoperable
with key allies in these domains?
9.
What additional measures could the DND undertake, along with partner
departments, to improve defence procurement?
10. What resources will the CAF require to meet Canada’s defence needs?
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE
We would like to hear your views on the defence policy Canada needs to advance our interests
at home and abroad. We invite all Canadians to get involved in this important process by
submitting their feedback by July 31, 2016 online at Canada.ca/defence-consultations or
in writing to:
Defence Policy Consultations
c/o IPSOS
1 Nicholas St. Suite 1400
Ottawa, ON
K1N 7B7
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
27
ANNEX
CAF OPERATIONAL FORCES
ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY
Canadian Fleet Atlantic
7 Halifax Class Frigates
1 Iroquois Class Destroyer
6 Kingston Class Maritime Coastal
Defence Vessels
2 Victoria Class Long Range Patrol
Submarines
Fleet Diving Unit
Canadian Fleet Pacific
5 Halifax Class Frigates
6 Kingston Class Maritime Coastal
Defence Vessels
2 Victoria Class Long Range Patrol
Submarines
Fleet Diving Unit
CANADIAN ARMY
3 Mechanized Brigade Groups
Each consisting of:
3 Infantry Battalions
(approx. 575 personnel);
equipped with LAV and TAPV
Armoured Regiment
(approx. 550 personnel);
equipped with Leopard II tanks and
reconnaissance vehicles
Artillery Regiment
(approx. 550 personnel);
equipped with M-777 towed Howitzer guns
Engineer Regiment
(approx. 510 personnel);
equipped with various engineer vehicles
Service Battalion
(approx. 1000 personnel);
equipped mainly with heavy support vehicles
115 Army Primary Reserve Units
Organized into 10 Brigade Groups
Maritime Tactical Operations Group –
Enhanced Boarding Team
5 Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups
With approx. 5000 personnel
28
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
CAF OPERATIONAL FORCES
ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
4 Tactical Fighter Squadrons
Special Operations Units
CF-188 Hornet
5 Tactical Helicopter Squadrons
4 with CH-146 Griffon
1 with CH-147 Chinook
5 Transport Squadrons
Joint Task Force 2
Canadian Special Operations Regiment
Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit
Special Operations Aviation Squadron
JOINT
CC-144 Challenger
1st Canadian Division Headquarters
CC-177 Globemaster III
Joint Support Regiment
CC-130J Hercules
Joint Support Group
CC-150 Polaris
4th Engineer Support Regiment
CC-138 Twin Otter
4th Artillery Regiment
(General Support)
5 Search and Rescue Squadrons
21st Electronic Warfare Regiment
CC-130 Hercules
CC-115 Buffalo
CH-149 Cormorant
CH-146 Griffon
2 Maritime Helicopter Squadrons
CH-124 Sea King transitioning to
CH-148 Cyclone
3 Long-Range Patrol Squadrons
CP-140 Aurora
1 Aerospace Control and Warning Squadron (NORAD)
Not to scale
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29
ANNEX
FACTS AND FIGURES
COMPOSITION OF THE CAF BY SERVICE
RCN
12%
Other
35%
RCAF
20%
CA
33%
Note: The “other” category represents
CANSOFCOM, CJOC, CFINTCOM,
CMP, CFHSG, and operational support.
DEFENCE EXPENDITURES HISTORICAL TREND
25
CONSTANT
DOLLARS
2015–16
MRC
12 %
20
BILLIONS
Autres
35 %
NOMINAL
DOLLARS
ARC
20 %
AC
33 %
15
10
00-01
01-02
02-03
03-04
04-05
05-06
06-07
07-08
08-09
9-10
10-11
11-12
12-13
13-14
14-15 15-16* 16-17ˆ
Sources: Public Accounts Vol III” “Departmental Final Authorities ($ billions), Public Accounts Vol II” “Departmental Actual Expenditures ($ billions)”
*2015–16 Main and Supplementary Estimates A, B
ˆ2016–17 Main Estimates
30
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
ANNEX
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
2
3
1
15
3
3
14
14
3 8 9 10 11 12
6
15
14
13
6
6
6
4
7
6
6
Arctic Communications
Op NEVUS
CFS Alert Resupply
Op BOXTOP
Arctic Sovereignty
Op NANAPUT / NANALIVUT
Op NANOOK & 1 CRPG Patrols
Support to DFO
Op DRIFTNET
1
2
3
4
Avalanche Control
Op PALACI
Search and Rescue
Aeronautical and Maritime
Support to RCMP / CBSA
Irregular Immigrant Vessel
Op POSEIDON
Support to RCMP
Counter Narcotic Efforts
5
6
7
8
Nat’l Surv & Presence
Op LIMPID / QIMMIQ
Resp to Dom Air Threat
CFICC support to
Op NOBLE EAGLE
SJS ACV Obs Flights
CFICC support to
Op OPEN / TRANSIT SKIES
9
10
11
15
7
Support to GC OGDs
Explosive Ordinance
Disposal
Support to GC OGDs
Op LENTUS — Flooding
Support to GC OGDs
FISHPATS
Support to RCMP
Naval Vessel Escort
12
13
14
15
Not all operations depicted are currently active, but reflect missions the CAF is prepared to undertake when requested.
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
31
ANNEX
CAF FOOTPRINT ACROSS CANADA
CAF BASES, WINGS, AND SELECTED INSTALLATIONS AND SITES ACROSS CANADA
Canadians can rest assured that the Canadian Armed Forces maintain a vast footprint across Canada – from coast to coast to coast
– and sustain a continuous watch over Canada’s land mass and air
and sea approaches, an area of more than 10 million square kilometres, to ensure timely and effective response to crises and to take
action against threats before they reach our shores.
Eureka
Resolute
Inuvik
Rankin Inlet
Yellowknife
Whitehorse
Cold Lake
Edmonton
Wainwright
Suffield
Comox
Esquimalt
32
Moose Jaw
Shilo
Winnipeg
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
Alert
Iqaluit
Bagotville
Petawawa
Ottawa-Gatineau
Goose Bay
Gander
St-John’s
Gagetown
Aldershot
Halifax
Greenwood
Shearwater
Valcartier
Quebec
Montreal
North Bay
Meaford
Toronto
Trenton
Borden
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
Kingston
33
ANNEX
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
Op KOBOLD
Op UNIFIER
TF PRISTINA
KFOR HQ (NATO) - Kosovo: 5
Ukraine: 161
Op REASSURANCE
HMCS Fredericton
and Land Component: 472
Op CARIBBE
Caribbean Sea and
Eastern Pacific: 151
Op HAMLET
TF Port-au-Prince,
MINUSTAH: 5
34
Op CROCODILE
Op SOPRANO
TF DRC
MONUC - DRC: 9
TF SOUTH SUDAN
UNMISS - South Sudan: 12
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
Op SNOWGOOSE
Op JADE
Op PROTEUS
TF CYPRUS
UNFICYP - Cyprus: 1
TF MIDDLE EAST
UNTSO - Middle East: 4
TF JERUSALEM
USSC - Jerusalem: 21
Op ADDENDA
TF KABUL: 19
Op IMPACT
JTF Iraq: 395
OTHER OPS
(zero-manned)
Op GLADIUS
UNDOF – Golan Heights
15
1345
TOTAL NUMBER
OF MISSIONS
TOTAL NO
OF PERS
The number of personnel is
approximate and does not
include Relief in Place surges,
periodic Technical Assistance
Visits, other visits, Special
Operations Forces, personnel
posted to Outside Canada
positions, or other CAF
personnel employed
temporarily in locations
outside of Canada for training
or support purposes.
Deployed personnel on leave,
temporary duty, or for other
reasons temporarily out of the
country they are working in,
are counted as if they were in
the country.
Op CALUMET
TF EL GORAH
MFO - Sinai, Egypt: 70
Op FOUNDATION
Op ARTEMIS
Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan: 13
Arabian Sea: 7
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016
For more information on ongoing
operations, please consult our website:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations/
current.page
35
ANNEX
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
ACV
CA
CAF
CANSOFCOM
CBSA
CFHSG
CFICC
CFINTCOM
CFS
CJOC
CMP
CRPG
DFO
DND
GDP
GPS
ISIL
KFOR
MFO
MINUSTAH
MONUSCO
NATO
NGO
NORAD
OGD
RCAF
RCMP
RCN
SJS
TF
UK
UN
UNFICYP
UNMISS
UNTSO
US
USSC
VAC
36
Arms Control Verification
Canadian Army
Canadian Armed Forces
Canadian Special Operations Force Command
Canada Border Services Agency
Canadian Forces Health Services Group
Canadian Forces Integrated Command Centre
Canadian Forces Intelligence Command
Canadian Forces Station
Canadian Joint Operations Command
Chief of Military Personnel
Canadian Ranger Patrol Group
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Department of National Defence
Gross Domestic Product
Global Positioning System
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
NATO Kosovo Force
Multinational Force and Observers
UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Non-Governmental Organization
North American Aerospace Defence Command
Other Government Department
Royal Canadian Air Force
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Royal Canadian Navy
Strategic Joint Staff
Task Force
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
United Nations Mission in South Sudan
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
United States
United States Security Coordinator
Veterans Affairs Canada
DGM-19216-2NJ
DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW — Public Consultation Document — 2016