In overclassification, what's hidden is the cost

Jun 16, 1997

This system has enormous hidden cost in dollars and excessive secrecy. Every once in a while, someone takes a close look at classification policy and practice.

For example, in March 1997, the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy issued a report. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), sponsor of the 1994 legislation that created the temporary study commission, served as chairman. Other members of the commission included Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Reps. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) and Larry Combest (R-Texas).

The political leanings of the congressional members covered the spectrum from right to left. Public members were drawn mostly from the national security establishment. Given this cast of characters, it is not surprising that the report is bland, reeks of political compromise and contains no sweeping recommendations for reform.

No one disputes the need to classify some information, but most agree that too much information is classified. Those who distrust the national security agencies conclude that overclassification is done to avoid accountability and hide embarrassing information. The opposite point of view is that national security is still needed in a dangerous world.

This is a fertile area for debate among policy-makers. The end of the Cold War provided a great rallying cry for those who want less secrecy. That is the origin of the secrecy commission.

The commission recommended new legislation, new classification standards and other relatively familiar mechanisms aimed both at classification and declassification. Even if the recommendations are implemented, however, it is hard to see how anything will change much.

A major problem with classification is controlling the front end of the process. While policy debates drone on, those who classify information do as they please. Tons of documents are classified annually. No one is interested in spending the time, energy or money to oversee the process document by document. The result? Agency workers classify while intellectuals write reports.

Still, I found two noteworthy ideas in the report. The first is its explanation of lifecycle costs for classification. It may be easy to stamp a document top secret, but significant fiscal consequences are hidden. The document must be protected, people who read it need security clearances, and someone will have to review it from time to time until it is declassified.

When classifying a document, the question is not simply whether the information is sensitive. Classifiers should also ask if the secrecy is worth the cost. Some years ago, the Defense Department stopped classifying its space shuttle missions because the huge cost wasn't worth the marginal increase in security. Much of the information leaked out anyway.

The second good idea was only mentioned in passing. The report described how the National Security Council prevents personnel from sending electronic mail until they have certified whether classification is needed.

This requirement reduces unnecessary classification. Software formalizes the classification process, documents the decision and holds the decision-maker accountable. The computer provides the front-end control that neither policy-makers nor administrators have the ability to provide. This technology has promise, but the report did not explore it sufficiently.

I have my own simple proposal to control overclassification. Anyone who classifies a newspaper article or other published document should be fired immediately.

Admittedly, this isn't a comprehensive solution, but it offers a clear line. You only have to fire one person to make the point. So whatever you do, don't classify this column.

Steve Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists is the best public interest observer of classification policy and practice. Read his Secrecy and Government Bulletin. I highly recommend it.

Robert Gellman, former chief counsel to the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture, is a Washington privacy and information policy consultant. His e-mail address is rgellman@cais.com.