tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-25208840114143716792017-09-09T06:05:30.780-07:00DurameAdminnoreply@blogger.comBlogger2453125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-85477957069910717912017-07-29T00:00:00.000-07:002017-07-29T00:00:01.832-07:00(ESAT Video) Latest News in Ethiopia (July 28)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; display: none; text-align: center;"><img alt="http://img.youtube.com/vi/NgBOInt8Oao/0.jpg" border="0" src="http://img.youtube.com/vi/NgBOInt8Oao/0.jpg" /></div><div style="height: 0; padding-bottom: 56.25%; position: relative;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="380" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/NgBOInt8Oao?ecver=2" style="height: 100%; left: 0; position: absolute; width: 100%;" width="100%"></iframe></div></div></div><br />Latest News in Ethiopia (July 28)</div><br /><br /></div><br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-62604618949029183332017-07-28T23:56:00.001-07:002017-07-28T23:56:07.850-07:00The Crisis of Leadership and Legitimacy within Ethiopia’s TPLF Minority Regime<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="336" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-avcpe9UxluQ/WXAdUlsja0I/AAAAAAAAYqU/MwRN_pH0ZckcomCrv7arsIcx4VDtsrr5QCK4BGAYYCw/s640/Debretsion%2BGebremichael%2B-%2BAbay%2BWoldu.jpg" width="100%" /></div></div><br /><br /><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">By <a href="https://ecadforum.com/2017/05/29/the-crisis-of-leadership-and-legitimacy-within-ethiopias-tplf-minority-regime/" target="_blank">Netsanet Bulto</a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ever since the death of the late TPLF chairman and Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has lacked a similarly dominant personality able to maintain consensus, either thru charisma, intrigue, or both. This condition has given rise within the TPLF to internal divisions and animosities. Abay Woldu, the current president of the regional state of Tigray, holds the chairmanship of the party. But he does not wield the power, nor command the respect, the late Meles held. This leadership vacuum has led to an intense, internal power struggle within the TPLF. Stories from multiple and credible sources abound to this effect.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The worst schism to emerge is between the domestic and military intelligence agencies. Fissures also have opened between the ruling party, security agencies, the military and the bureaucracy. Open and confidential sources indicate that friction within and between state organs, involving the regime’s most important personalities, has created an unprecedented crisis.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Torn between party loyalty and popular anti-government sentiment, important partners within the ruling coalition, such as the Oromo People’s Democracy Organization (OPDO), the Oromo wing of the ruling EPRDF, have begun to assert their independence from the once-omnipotent TPLF faction. The result has been the purging of thousands of mid- and low-level OPDO officials in an attempt to maintain party cohesion in the face of popular anti-government protests engulfing the Oromo region. However, sources report that new recruits and appointees meant to replace those purged are also quietly resigning. Open defiance of the regime and the so-called “Command Post” administering martial law has become widespread throughout Oromia and is openly expressed in social gatherings and in public.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While OPDO has been under organizational stress since the recent resurgence of Oromo protests, Abadula Gemeda, the speaker of parliament and former president of the Oromo region, has stepped into the breach. Abadula is a close associate of Gen. Samora Yunus, the military chief of staff, who has been calling the shots since the implementation of martial law. Samora’s position as head of the notorious Command Post is reportedly a cause of resentment within the military’s upper echelons, including his longtime rival, Lt. General Saere Mekonnen, until recently Commander of the Northern Front and currently Head of Training Main Department of the Ministry of Defense.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">A Samora loyalist, Lt. General Abraha Wodlemariam, a.k.a Quarter, the notorious war criminal responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians in the ongoing counter insurgency in the Ogadan region while in his capacity as a commander of the Eastern Front and in concert with another butcher, the President of the Ogaden region, has been appointed to a new position of Chief of Operations of Defense. This is yet another clear indication that Lt. General Seare is, once again, sidelined, and Samora’s grip and consolidation of power over the military is becoming more than clear. It has been reported that Security Chief Getachew Assefa, Abay Tesehay, Sibehat Nega, and others, including former Airforce Commander, Maj. General Aebebe Tekelehamina, aka Jobe, have been actively working behind the scenes to have Lt. Genera Seare Mekonnen replace Samora as Chief of staff of the Defense forces of the TPLF dominated military and state.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As well known, the former commander of the Airforce, Gen. Abebe, like his close friend Tasdakn Gebre Tesnay, former Chief of Staff, has made his deep frustrations public at the state of affairs in Ethiopia under the current regime. In a series of articles published by the Amharic weekly, the Reporter, in the past year, the retired General has called the current situation in Ethiopia one that is endangering the security and survival of Ethiopia , and therefore, as the most potent threat, not only to the regime, but also to the multiethnic national fabric. In his latest article, retired Maj. Gen. Abebe recounts pervasive corruption, including at the highest levels of government, absence of good governance, lack of a democratic space, human rights abuse, and the inability of the regime to respond to popular demands, lack of political will and proper mechanisms in place to make the necessary changes.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">These salient features all the more discussed as factors that would somehow converge to destabilize Ethiopia and pose the most serious security threat to Ethiopia. The former General has indeed the courage to ring the alarm bells to the otherwise deaf ears of the regime and its leaders who are in disarray. Although, one may argue that the general is off the mark as regard to the correct prognosis, which cannot be other than a transitional process towards a genuine democratic order for the country that involves all stakeholders and political forces.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The other key leaders of OPDO are Lemma Megersa, Beker Shale (until recently) and Abiye Mohammed, the former minister of science and technology, who maintains a low public profile. While close to chief of staff Samora, this coterie of OPDO’s bosses are, like their patron, Abadula, at odds with Getachew Assefa, the chief of security. Getachew, in turn, is reported to have the backing of Abay Tsehay, and Sibehat Nega, both TPLF heavyweights still wielding perhaps the greatest influence within the TPLF in the wake of the Oromo protest that rocked the region in the past eighteen months. Lemma Megersa, a onetime security official, has a firm allegiance to Abadula, who was instrumental in his rise to power as president of the Oromo region. Unlike the rocky relationships most OPDO leaders now have with those of the security services. Lemma is known to report regularly to Abdadula about communications he still maintains with security chief Getachew.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Haile Mariam Desgalegn has turned out to be a lame duck Prime Minister and a pawn in the never-ending power struggles of the TPLF power brokers. He is said to be close to General Samora’s group. One recent clue to this is his recent rebuff of a report released by Aba Tsehaye, a close supporter and ally of Getachew Assefa, concerning the incompetence permeating the executive branch’s cabinet and state ministers.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">These ministers were appointed by Haile Mariam, the prime minster during the state of emergency as part of an “in-depth renewal” promising good governance, less corruption and responsiveness to popular demands for change. But neither this much-vaunted Tilk Tehadiso, nor the change of cabinet and state ministers, has delivered or appeased public anger in the wake of the Oromo and Amhara protests. The Ethiopian people have largely perceived the Tilk Tehadeso as yet another of the regime’s gimmicks to cover up and reverse the growing illegitimacy, crisis of confidence and near-total rejection by the Ethiopian people that have plagued it in the past eighteen months and were expressed by the massive protests in the Oromo and Amhara regions.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Leadership of the regime’s Amhara coalition partner, ANDM, has also been at odds with its TPLF partner to a point of approaching open confrontation. Like the OPDO, ANDM’s ranks are rife with resentment and discontent over TPLF domination and the heavy repression that followed protests around Gondar and Gojam in the Amhara region.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The TPLF-controlled military is also suffering from low morale. Desertions and defections, especially by the Amhara and Oromo soldiers whose ethnic groups comprise most of the lower ranks, have sharply increased in the rebellious areas. The defection of entire platoons and companies has occurred on several occasions. Anxiety and confusion over such developments now afflicts nearly all military forces at all levels, including the Agazi Division, a special unit used for repression that’s widely despised since its massacre of hundreds of unarmed protesters in the aftermath of the stolen 2005 election. This trend has worsened since the most recent Oromo and Amhara protests. Recruitment quotas are unmet, chronically so in the Amhara, Oromo and, to a lesser extent, other regions. ESAT and other media outlets have recently covered the severity of this problem confronting the regime.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Another trouble that has been a chronic headache for the TPLF military and security top brass has been the emerging armed popular resistance in Northern part of Ethiopia. The military leadership had held several secret meetings on how to control the situation in Northern Ethiopia, including a discussion without reaching an agreement, about the possibility of invading Eritrea and thereby wiping out the armed resistance groups based there. This option has been objected by elements of the military and security who understand the extremely low state morale in the army, the chronic defection and desertions plaguing it, as well as with their bitter memory of the military’s tragic loss at the battle of Tsoerna in June of 2016 which the TPLF commanders ill-advisedly launched against Eritreans, resulting in total carnage , hundreds of the Ethiopian armed forces killed and several hundred others lightly and heavy wounded, crowding Mekele Hospital and other medical facilities in Tigray. One consideration related to this view on the part of those who oppose military measures against Eritrea has to do with the very fear harbored by TPLF leaders. They lack confidence because they very well know that the army is dominated by Tigrayan commanders from top to bottom, the army has a very low morale, and top it all they are very much aware that the army is fully aware of the malfeasance and massive corruption of its top brass. Thus, they surmise the armed forces as it is constituted today cannot be relied upon for a full-scale war with the tough and hardened Eritrean defense forces. In addition, the tough and rough terrain that is known to give a high advantage to defending Eritrean forces in an event of an invasion by the TPLF led Ethiopian Armed forces.</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Getachew’s National Intelligence and Security Service, known as NISS, is struggling to maintain its status and expand its turf. NISS is increasingly engaged in staving off challenges to its influence from the military intelligence service led by Maj. Gen. Gebre Dilla, a close ally of General Samora Yunus. Defense’s Military intelligence Department is said to be competing for power by overextending its tentacles and fielding agents of its own down to the kebele, or neighborhood, level and into all kinds of organizations, including religious ones, generating apprehension and visible hostility on the part of Getachew and NISS.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Recent leaks about infighting and power struggles within the ruling political elite are due in part to this development. They describe Samora and his own military intelligence chief, Gebre Dilla, using the state of emergency and the command post apparatus as a cover to widen their jurisdiction and infringe on the civilian intelligence services’ authority. This contest has added to the animosities, factionalism, and internal divisions affecting the minority regime.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Underneath these visible manifestations of discord, the demoralization infecting the military has spread to NISS as well. Intelligence sources attribute this to the repeated failure to control emerging political conditions throughout the county—viewed by many observers as a decaying political system cracking at the seams–and inability to understand the new fissures. Adding to this institutional state of anxiety is the budding armed resistance of Patriotic Ginbot 7 forces, now gaining momentum and intensity in their attacks on military, security, and regime administrative targets in several parts of the country, especially in the northern and southern Gondar areas of the Amhara region.</div><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-84031514606421035352017-07-28T23:54:00.000-07:002017-07-28T23:54:25.026-07:00Khat an Increasing Problem for Ethiopian Youth<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="426" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OHcBuymTuaA/WXT21u1Z3xI/AAAAAAAAYr8/v6JGw3aKC8ob55c7VNJ2QCWajbPzKgYAwCK4BGAYYCw/s640/khat.jpg" width="100%" /></div></div><span style="color: #999999;">A farmer collecting khat in Infranz, a village in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. The young and underemployed are increasingly chewing khat, a psychotropic leaf that has amphetaminelike effects. Credit Tiksa Negeri for The New York Times</span><br /><br /><br /><br />By <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/world/africa/ethiopia-khat-leaves.html" target="_blank">Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura</a> | NewYorkTimes<br /><br />Yeshmebet Asmamaw, 25, has made chewing the drug a ritual, repeated several times a day: She carefully lays papyrus grass on the floor of her home, brews coffee and burns fragrant frankincense to set the mood.<br /><br />Then she pinches some khat leaves, plucked from a potent shrub native to this part of Africa, into a tight ball and places them in one side of her mouth.<br /><br />“I love it!” she said, bringing her fingers to her lips with a smack.<br /><br />She even chews on the job, on the khat farm where she picks the delicate, shiny leaves off the shrubs. Emerging from a day’s work, she looked slightly wild-eyed, the amphetaminelike effects of the stimulant showing on her face as the sounds of prayer echoed from an Orthodox Christian church close by.<br /><br />Ethiopians have long chewed khat, but the practice tended to be limited to predominantly Muslim areas, where worshipers chew the leaves to help them pray for long periods, especially during the fasting times of Ramadan.<br /><br />But in recent years, officials and researchers say, khat cultivation and consumption have spread to new populations and regions like Amhara, which is mostly Orthodox Christian, and to the countryside, where young people munch without their parents’ knowledge, speaking in code to avoid detection.<br /><br />“If you’re a chewer in these parts, you’re a dead, dead man,” said Abhi, 30, who asked that his last name not be used because his family “will no longer consider me as their son.”<br /><br />Most alarming, the Ethiopian authorities say, is the number of young people in this predominantly young nation now consuming khat. About half of Ethiopia’s youth are thought to chew it. Officials consider the problem an epidemic in all but name.<br /><br />The country’s government, which rules the economy with a tight grip, is worried that the habit could derail its plans to transform Ethiopia into a middle-income country in less than a decade ― a national undertaking that will require an army of young, capable workers, it says.<br /><br />Khat is legal and remains so mainly because it is a big source of revenue for the government. But there are mounting concerns about its widespread use.<br /><br />As many as 1.2 million acres of land are thought to be devoted to khat, nearly three times more than two decades ago. And the amount of money khat generates per acre surpasses all other crops, including coffee, Ethiopia’s biggest export, said Gessesse Dessie, a researcher at the African Studies Center Leiden at Leiden University.<br /><br />That payoff, and the dwindling availability of land, has pushed thousands of farmers to switch to khat, he said. The changes have come as the government has pushed farmers off land that it has given to foreign investors in recent years.<br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iUA3U_CCWE0/WXT3txxDgFI/AAAAAAAAYsI/EA3rBGIOXyYgaP5qfZxstuDf1_0TgvKAgCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/khat%2B2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="266" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iUA3U_CCWE0/WXT3txxDgFI/AAAAAAAAYsI/EA3rBGIOXyYgaP5qfZxstuDf1_0TgvKAgCK4BGAYYCw/s400/khat%2B2.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><i><span style="font-size: x-small;">Men chewing khat near the bank of the Nile River in Bahir Dar. Khat is legal and generates more money per acre than any other crop in Ethiopia. Credit Tiksa Negeri for The New York Times</span></i><br /><br />Often associated with famine and marathon runners, Ethiopia is trying to change its global image by engineering a fast-growing economy, hoping to mimic Asian nations like China. It has poured billions of dollars into industrial parks, roads, railways, airports and other infrastructure projects, including Africa’s largest dam.<br /><br />In cities across the country, skyscrapers grow like mushrooms, and along with them, dance clubs, restaurants and luxury resorts. According to government statistics, the country’s economy has been growing at a 10 percent clip for more than a decade.<br /><br />But for all the fanfare surrounding what is often described as Ethiopia’s economic miracle, its effects are often not felt by the country’s young people, who make up about 70 percent of the nation’s 100 million people. There simply are not enough jobs, young people complain, often expressing doubt over the government’s growth figures.<br /><br />It is because of this lack of jobs, many say, that they take up khat in the first place ― to kill time.<br /><br />“It’s a huge problem,” said Shidigaf Haile, a public prosecutor in Gonder, a city in northern Ethiopia, which was rocked by violent protests last year, mainly by young people over the absence of jobs.<br /><br />More than half of the city’s youth now chew khat, Mr. Shidigaf said. Many gather in khat dens away from prying eyes.<br /><br />“It’s because there is a lack of work,” he added, saying there were numerous cases of people who were so dependent on the leaves, sold in packs, that they turned to petty crime. The government recognizes the problem, he said, but so far it has not been tackled directly.<br /><br />“It’s bad for Ethiopia’s economic development because they become lazy, unproductive, and their health will be affected,” he said.<br /><br />Khat’s effects vary depending on the amount consumed and the quality of the leaf, of which there are at least 10 varieties, according to growers. Some people turn hot and agitated. Others become concentrated on whatever is at hand to such an extent that they block out everything and reach “merkana,” a quasi-catatonic state of bliss. Chronic abuse, the American government warns, can lead to exhaustion, “manic behavior with grandiose delusions, violence, suicidal depression or schizophreniform psychosis.”<br /><br />Dependency on khat is more psychological than physical, according to Dr. Dawit Wondimagegn Gebreamlak, who heads the psychiatry department at Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia’s capital. Chewing it “is quite a complex cultural phenomenon,” he said, adding that simply banning it would be difficult, given its role in cultural rites among certain religious groups.<br /><br />Mulugeta Getahun, 32, studied architecture but works as a day laborer.<br /><br />“I chew khat when I don’t have a job,” he said. “Nothing entertains me more than khat.” Sitting in a bar here in Bahir Dar, about 340 miles from Addis Ababa, where he was coming off a high, he drank “chepsi,” a home-brewed millet wine that helps neutralize the effects of stimulation.<br /><br />A group of men sat around drinking the homemade liquor and chewing khat, an act that could be considered illegal under the current state of emergency.<br /><br />After last year’s protests, and their subsequent violent crackdown by security forces, the government prohibited communal activities because meetings were seen as a threat to public order and a potential gathering place for dissidents.<br /><br />Still, the young are defiant.<br /><br />There are “bercha-houses,” secret khat dens, where young people congregate in cramped rooms, bobbing their heads to Teddy Afro, a popular Ethiopian pop singer whose lyrics are considered veiled criticisms of the government.<br /><br />There are hide-outs on the banks of the Nile River, where young people stretch themselves out under mango and banana trees, chewing khat and throwing peanuts in their mouths.<br /><br />Even a guesthouse where Mengistu Haile Mariam, the authoritarian ruler ousted by the current governing party 26 years ago, stayed during the summers was recently overrun by young people celebrating the end of their studies, some chewing khat in one of the bleak Soviet-style rooms with the curtains drawn.<br /><br />Yared Zelalem, 17, and Yonas Asrat, 27, chewed khat on the side of a street in Addis Ababa, waiting for the odd job of washing cars to come their way. They had been chewing for five hours already, and it was still early afternoon.<br /><br />They both arrived in the capital 10 years ago looking for work, they said, after Mr. Zelalem’s parents died and Mr. Asrat’s family was kicked off its farmland to make way for a resort hotel.<br /><br />Mr. Asrat looked morose. “Nothing has changed in the past 10 years except for my physical appearance,” he said, showing his home, a beat-up taxi with a foam mattress inside. “This country is only for investors.”<br /><br />Mr. Zelalem, the 17-year-old, lives next door, in a boxlike structure with just enough space to fit his small frame. He was more determined.<br /><br />“I want to become prime minister and change the country, and give jobs to young people,” he said, the words “Never Give Up” tattooed on his arm. He opened the door to his abode, which was fashioned out of corrugated metal. A backpack hung on a nail, next to a cutout of Jesus pasted on one wall. He took out his school notebooks, full of his meticulous handwriting.<br /><br />“I want to study natural sciences, then become a doctor. Then I want to study social sciences to learn about politics,” he said, listing off his ambitions.<br /><br />“In 20 years, you’ll see,” he added. “I’ll invite you to my office.”<br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-15895872592083321872017-07-28T23:48:00.000-07:002017-07-28T23:48:17.769-07:00U.S. Passes Resolution For Targeted Sanctions Against Ethiopian Government Officials<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><img border="0" height="401" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0I1HSOthFNY/WXrVE7nbKJI/AAAAAAAAYuw/VddaYQ-MV4Y8ED2Bkw4oFSQWNZWDrV0CgCK4BGAYYCw/s640/smith%2Bnj.jpg" width="100%" /><br /><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #999999;">Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ). (Lisa Fan/Epoch Times)</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">By <a href="https://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400533" target="_blank">Chris Smith</a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Today, the full House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to advance a resolution, authored by Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ), highlighting the human rights violations of the Ethiopian government, and offering a blueprint to create a government better designed to serve the interests of the Ethiopian people.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The resolution, which passed without objection, also calls on the U.S. government to implement Magnitsky Act sanctions, targeting the individuals within the Ethiopian government who are the cause of the horrific abuses.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The State Department’s current human rights report on Ethiopia notes, “[t]he most significant human rights problems were security forces’ use of excessive force and arbitrary arrest in response to the protests, politically motivated prosecutions, and continued restrictions on activities of civil society and NGOs.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">“H. Res. 128, is like a mirror held up to the Government of Ethiopia on how others see them, and it is intended to encourage them to move on the reforms they agree they need to enact,” said Smith, Chair of the House panel on Africa. “For the past 12 years, my staff and I have visited Ethiopia, spoken with Ethiopian officials, talked to a wide variety of members of the Ethiopia Diaspora and discussed the situation in Ethiopia with advocates and victims of government human rights violations. Our efforts are not a response merely to government critics, but rather a realistic assessment of the urgent need to end very damaging and in some cases inexcusable actions by the government or those who act as their agents.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">H. Res. 128, entitled “Supporting respect for human rights and encouraging inclusive governance in Ethiopia,” condemns the human rights abuses of Ethiopia and calls on the Ethiopian government to:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><ul style="text-align: left;"><li style="text-align: justify;">lift the state of emergency;</li><li style="text-align: justify;">end the use of excessive force by security forces;</li><li style="text-align: justify;">investigate the killings and excessive use of force that took place as a result of protests in the Oromia and Amhara regions;</li><li style="text-align: justify;">release dissidents, activists, and journalists who have been imprisoned for exercising constitutional rights;</li><li style="text-align: justify;">respect the right to peaceful assembly and guarantee freedom of the press;</li><li style="text-align: justify;">engage in open consultations with citizens regarding its development strategy;</li><li style="text-align: justify;">allow a United Nations rapporteur to conduct an independent examination of the state of human rights in Ethiopia;</li><li style="text-align: justify;">address the grievances brought forward by representatives of registered opposition parties;</li><li style="text-align: justify;">hold accountable those responsible for killing, torturing and detaining innocent civilians who exercised their constitutional rights; and</li><li style="text-align: justify;">investigate and report on the circumstances surrounding the September 3, 2016, shootings and fire at Qilinto Prison, the deaths of persons in attendance at the annual Irreecha festivities at Lake Hora near Bishoftu on October 2, 2016, and the ongoing killings of civilians over several years in the Somali Regional State by police.</li></ul><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">“It is important to note that this resolution does not call for sanctions on the Government of Ethiopia, but it does call for the use of existing mechanisms to sanction individuals who torture or otherwise deny their countrymen their human and civil rights,” said Smith.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Smith has chaired three hearings on Ethiopia, the most recent of which looked into the deterioration of the human rights situation in Ethiopia and was titled “Ethiopia After Meles: The Future of Democracy and Human Rights.”<br /><br /></div></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-52581381575234967122017-07-08T23:20:00.002-07:002017-07-08T23:20:16.778-07:00(ESAT Video) Latest News in Ethiopia (July 8)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; display: none; text-align: center;"><img alt="http://img.youtube.com/vi/yg72ziHWpOI/0.jpg" border="0" src="http://img.youtube.com/vi/yg72ziHWpOI/0.jpg" /></div><div style="height: 0; padding-bottom: 56.25%; position: relative;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="380" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/yg72ziHWpOI?ecver=2" style="height: 100%; left: 0; position: absolute; width: 100%;" width="100%"></iframe></div></div><br />Latest News in Ethiopia (July 8)</div><br /><br /></div><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-78822385489261928992017-07-08T23:18:00.000-07:002017-07-08T23:18:08.040-07:00An Academic Analysis of Ethiopian Illegal Adoptions: A Sobering Roadmap<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Eyh7iQctfkI/WWHKLs1RT9I/AAAAAAAAYis/hE00wsya8cY95PDRFnit_SditnaSI7GkQCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/ethiopia-adoptions.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="486" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Eyh7iQctfkI/WWHKLs1RT9I/AAAAAAAAYis/hE00wsya8cY95PDRFnit_SditnaSI7GkQCK4BGAYYCw/s640/ethiopia-adoptions.jpg" width="100%" /></a></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #999999;">Some children arrived in the United States believing they were only visiting.</span></div><br /><br /><a href="http://ecadforum.com/2017/07/08/an-academic-analysis-of-ethiopian-illegal-adoptions-a-sobering-roadmap/" target="_blank">Light of Day Stories</a><br /><br />“Children for Families: An Ethnography of Illegal Intercountry Adoption From Ethiopia,” an article by Daniel Hailu, Ph.D., in Adoption Quarterly, provides a stunningly clear road map of how illegal adoptions have occurred in Ethiopia. His research corroborates many anecdotal experiences, discusses the impact of Ethiopian sociocultural views, and offers suggestions for reform.<br /><br />The issue of illegal adoptions from Ethiopia has been simmering for years. I don’t think anyone has statistics on how many adoptions have been legal or illegal. Families have shared stories on Facebook. Adult adoptees have learned, after search and reunion, that their adoptive parents were not told the truth about why adoption was needed. Birth/first families were deceived or coerced into placing their children in an orphanage. Blame can be focused on many people: adoption agencies, police officers, brokers, government workers, adoptive families, first/birth families, and almost anyone involved with adoption and fees.<br /><br />Adoptions from Ethiopia have declined dramatically in recent years. In May of this year, the Ethiopian government suspended adoptions, though it appears that children who were in the legal custody of their adoptive parents have been allowed to leave Ethiopia. I posted recently about the upcoming sentencing hearing of three International Adoption Guides’ officials, who have pled guilty to charges involving fraud and corruption in Ethiopia. A frequent source of debate on Facebook among adoptive families is whose adoption was fraudulent, whose adoption agency was checked out thoroughly, whose adoption was “clean.” Some prospective and new adoptive families discount the stories of families who have discovered lies and deceits in their children’s adoptions.<br /><br />Dr. Hailu’s article describes how illegal and unethical adoptions occur. He interviewed 54 “informants,” people intimately engaged in adoptions in Ethiopia. He writes:<br /><br />“At the root of illegal adoption are fabricated documentation and false testimonies that establish the legal basis for the subsequent adoption processes. Informants reported that these bases could not be established without the support and protection of local authorities, including some police officers.<br />An orphanage involved in illegal adoption perceived four major advantages in involving local authorities, as summarized by an informant:<br /><br />First, local authorities facilitate identification of brokers from within the local community where orphanages have no other trusted link.<br /><br />Second, officials in clandestine support brokers in recruiting children: The authorities identify children for potential adoption and also coax parents and guardians into giving their children away for adoption.<br /><br />Third, the official expedites issuance of a letter of testimony that the orphanage needs from the kebele (neighborhood or ward) administration or the social court in order to take the case to the First Instance Court.<br /><br />Fourth, the officials buffer the orphanage from any allegations that may be posed by any higher authority against recruiting an ineligible child.”<br /><br />No one disputes, I hope, the role that money has played and continues to play in adoption. Between 1999 and 2016, some 15,300 Ethiopian children arrived in the U.S. Using a fee of $30,000 per adoption, some $459 million went from the U.S. to Ethiopian adoptions. Granted, not all of it went to Ethiopia. Still. Millions of dollars poured into Ethiopia from adoptive families, not just to the adoption agencies, but also to the orphanages, and to others working in the network to secure children for adoption.<br /><br />Here is one matter-of-fact and chilling quote:<br /><br />“The following description of a country representative of an adoption agency regarding the relationship between adoption agencies and orphanages is shared by several other informants in the industry:<br /><br />‘Take my case as an example. I have entered adoption agreement worth millions. Neither UNICEF nor any government subsidizes me. Rather I get the money from adopting families. They expect me to give them babies. My boss expects babies. So, I expect the babies from the orphanages to whom I agreed to give part of the millions. It is a clean supply and demand relationship that exists among adopting families, adoption agencies, and orphanages. Essentially, we are providing children for families rather than finding families for children without parental care.’ ”<br /><br />And how would country representatives or brokers convince families to place their babies and children in the orphanages, and thus for adoption?<br />That method, according to Dr. Hailu’s article, is also matter-of-fact and chilling.<br /><br />“Three techniques were identified that brokers applied to coax parents and guardians into voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. The first was to appeal to the natural wish of parents for the future well-being of their children.<br /><br />An informant explained:<br /><br />As a first strategy, “Brokers would convince parents/guardians that it was better for the child to grow under better care than suffer with them: They promise that the child would be sent to [a] good school, eat well, [and] wear nice clothes and would generally live comfortable life. The brokers also give them the false promise that they would get to see the child once in a while whether the child is adopted locally or internationally.”<br /><br />These promises have generally proven false, of course. Many adoptive parents and adopted persons have encountered Ethiopian birth parents who beg them to find out about the children they lost to adoption and have never heard from, despite the “promises” they were given. One important resource is Beteseb Felega—Ethiopian Adoption Connection, which has reunited many adoptees with their Ethiopian parents. Whether the adoptive parents had made the promise or not, many Ethiopian parents were told there would be contact. I’ve heard of adoptive parents finding out that the Ethiopian parents hoped to know if their children were alive and well—and the adoptive parents refused to respond. I hope they can face their adopted children and tell them this someday, as the children will grow up and likely find out their truths.<br /><br />The second strategy of brokers to acquire children is to draw the attention of parents or guardians to their poverty and entice them with a promise of economic gain that they would potentially accrue by giving their child away for eventual adoption.<br />Another informant explained:<br /><br />“The broker calls the attention of guardians to the financial assistance and visits that some guardians who have previously given away their children may have obtained from adopting families. There may be many such stories known to the people that brokers use for their purpose. For example, adopt[ive] parents of a child had sent money to the biological parents in our area, who used it to open their own beauty salon. Some guardians have reported to have come to the orphanage for the purpose of giving their bank account number to the adopting family in anticipation of transfers.”<br /><br />The issue of how, whether, and how much adoptive families contribute to the financial support of their children’s Ethiopian families is a hot button topic. Some people feel it encourages other Ethiopian families to place their children for adoption, hoping to get a financial return, a concern borne out by Dr. Hailu’s article. Other parents feel it is their ethical right and responsibility to send their child’s siblings to school, or to buy a goat, or to wire money on a regular basis. It’s complicated. There is no question there has been an impact, in any case. I hope there will be more studies done, by the Ethiopian government or by academics, on the financial contributions to birth/first families.<br /><br />In the third strategy, the broker capitalizes on the socially constructed prestige that could be accrued out of having a child living abroad.<br /><br />“A related enticement is the social prestige that can be derived out of forging familial linkage with a ferenji (i.e., a white person). Although guardians are the main targets, these coaxing rhetorics have a stronger influence on older siblings of the child being prepared for adoption, who consider this a special opportunity presented to their younger siblings. This is due to increasing globalization that is creating an image of opportunities and affluence that may be available in the freng hager (i.e., the country of white people).<br /><br />Consequently, in addition to persuasion by brokers, siblings who are too old to be adopted put pressure on their parents to place their younger siblings in the hope that the above reported social and economic benefit may eventually trickle down to them as well.”<br /><br />Many adoptive parents have been told their children were abandoned. Dr. Hailu’s informants describe how the abandonment is staged.<br /><br />“Staged abandoning of a child takes the form of a play in the theater. The play is written and directed by the broker. He also casts the characters and assigns them roles. In this drama the parents/guardians are coaxed into leaving the child at a predetermined place and time that is out of public view.<br /><br />Soon after the child is seemingly abandoned, an assigned person reports the case to a predetermined police officer. The police officer who is ready to take on his role goes to the site and takes the child to the police station where all necessary records are made. The police officer then takes the child to the temporary custody of the orphanage on whose behalf the broker has directed the drama. The case is then taken to the First Instance Court.<br /><br />Abandoned children pose much less procedural and legal challenges for orphanages. To begin with, the strategy is, informants reported, generally applied with infants who had not yet developed verbal capacities lest the child leak information regarding his or her guardians or the staged abandoning.”<br /><br />While there is much information in this article to process, some of which is familiar to many, some of which will be eye-opening and jaw-dropping, Dr. Hailu also offers some solutions.<br /><br />A referral system could enable unparented children to benefit from NGO services, and hence avoid institutional care and intercountry adoption. Hailu writes that “In Ethiopia, there already exist thousands of NGOs that provide community-based services to children. For example, 275 NGOs that are operational in Addis Ababa in 2013 had implemented more than 291 child-focused projects investing Birr 703, 641, 865 (Hailu, 2013). But there is currently no referral system to connect the children in need to the services that could be provided.”<br /><br />Dr. Hailu also writes that “Informants reported that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, when making decisions based on the recommendations of its regional counterparts, generally does not undertake an independent investigation about the child’s social economic status. This is partly because it lacks the institutional capacity to travel to the child’s locality of origin to conduct the investigation, and partly because regional governments could construe the attempt at independent investigation by the federal government as interfering in their autonomy.”<br /><br />I believe Dr. Hailu is suggesting here that independent investigations by MOWA, if feasible and done with transparency, could provide oversight and confirmation of accuracy of reports from the regional governments.<br /><br />Changing sociocultural attitudes about adoption in Ethiopia could also, Dr. Hailu suggests, help to minimize illegal adoptions.<br /><br />In testifying that a child is an orphan or abandoned, “witnesses see their false testimony as an act of benevolence, or even socially required action, to both the child and family. If they refuse to falsely testify, they could be regarded as miqegna (literally means one who does not wish the good of others), with potential negative social repercussions. Therefore, transforming the cultural and social-psychological allure within local communities is a critical strategy to minimizing illegal intercountry adoption.<br /><br />This may involve preventive interventions of systematic and sustained public education regarding child rights, the adverse impacts of institutional care and intercountry adoption on children, and legal adoption processes. It also requires protective interventions of strict legal enforcement against participation in illegal intercountry adoption.”<br /><br />In terms of the financial incentives inherent in international adoption, Dr. Hailu writes that “criminalizing direct adoption-related transactions between adoption agencies and orphanages” could be effective. “This will require setting up a centralized agency under a relevant ministry managed by a public/private partnership. The agency may be part of a national social welfare system that may be mandated to undertake individualized assessment of each unparented child and refer the child to various alternative care options including intercountry adoption.<br /><br />As part of the welfare system, institutional care providers may be given subcontracts or grants by the centralized agency (and not by adoption agencies) to provide institutional foster care until a better placement is found for the child. Measures to ensure accountability and transparency in the operations of the agency need to be put in place in order to prevent officers of the agency from establishing corrupt relationships with adoption agencies and orphanages.”<br /><br />There are many possible ways to curb or perhaps end fraud in adoptions from Ethiopia. They require diligence, funding, infrastructure, marketing, training, and sustainable capacity. I know many people and organizations argue that ending international adoptions is the only way to end the fraud and corruption. I know others who say that adoptions should continue only for children with special needs who cannot get appropriate (life-saving) care in Ethiopia. Others argue that adoptions, not life in abject poverty in an orphanage, would be best.<br /><br />I’d argue that family preservation, orphan prevention, and in-country adoption are goals that everyone who cares about Ethiopian children should prioritize. I’ve written about the many ways to help children in Ethiopia: If Adoptions Decline, What Happens to the Children?<br /><br />I hope Dr. Hailu’s article, which is available here (a paywall), will be widely read by anyone connected with Ethiopian adoptions, or who has an interest in child welfare. Although I was familiar with much of this information anecdotally, it is quite powerful to see it set in academic terms.<br /><br />Ultimately, of course, it is Ethiopia’s decision to decide how to end fraud in Ethiopian adoptions, and how to make enact policies that best help children. I believe there are many in the adoption community who are watching the next steps carefully, and who are willing to help. I hope that, in addition to the usual government workers or international lawyers or lobbying groups, Ethiopian adoptees and birth/first families play a vibrant role in any discussions.<br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-49580204987735047222017-07-08T23:11:00.000-07:002017-07-08T23:11:08.366-07:00The Italian architecture that shaped new world heritage site Asmara<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-69EYZlLn3Sc/WWHIko9sECI/AAAAAAAAYig/wGNXmsy25HQvc5iVdR6MWXJPHp4NvshJACK4BGAYYCw/s1600/asmara.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="384" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-69EYZlLn3Sc/WWHIko9sECI/AAAAAAAAYig/wGNXmsy25HQvc5iVdR6MWXJPHp4NvshJACK4BGAYYCw/s640/asmara.JPG" width="100%" /></a></div>Asmara’s Catholic Cathedral, an example of the city’s Italian heritage Photograph: Ed Harris/Reuters<br /><br /><br />By <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/jul/08/the-italian-architecture-that-shaped-new-world-heritage-site-asmara#img-1" target="_blank">Oliver Wainwright</a>&nbsp;| TheGuardian<br /><br />Standing as a startling collection of futuristic Italian architecture from the 1930s, perched on a desert mountaintop high above the Red Sea, the Eritrean capital of Asmara has been listed as a Unesco world heritage site.<br /><br />Announced as one of a series of new “inscriptions”, which are expected to include German caves with ice-age art and the English Lake District, Asmara is the first modernist city in the world to be listed in its entirety.<br /><br />First planned in the 1910s by the Italian architect-engineer Odoardo Cavagnari, Asmara was lavishly furnished with new buildings after Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, when the sleepy colonial town was transformed into Africa’s most modern metropolis. As the “little Rome” at the centre of Italy’s planned African empire, it became a playground for Italian architects to experiment.<br /><br />“It has an unparalleled collection of buildings that show the variety of styles of the period,” said Edward Denison, a lecturer at UCL’s Bartlett School of Architecture, who has been working as an adviser to the Asmara Heritage Project, helping to put together the 1,300-page bid document, the result of two decades of research. “You get a sense that the architects were getting away with things here that they certainly wouldn’t have been able to do in Rome.”<br /><br />From the daring cantilevered wings of the Fiat Tagliero service station, modelled on a soaring aeroplane, to the sumptuous surrounds of the Impero cinema, the city is full of buildings that combine Italian futurist motifs with local methods of construction.<br /><br />Behind the sharp cubic facades stand walls of large laterite stone blocks, carefully rendered to look like modernist concrete constructions, finished in shades of ochre, brown, pale blue and green – much more colourful than their European counterparts.<br /><br />Some buildings, such as the Orthodox cathedral, have a bold hybrid style, with African “monkey head” details of wooden dowels poking through the facade, originally used to to bind horizontal layers of wood together between the blocks of stone.<br /><br />Elsewhere, there are handsome villas, stylish shops and heroic factory complexes, sampling from modernism’s broad palette, including novecento, rationalism and futurism, most of which remain in an unusually well-preserved state.<br /><br />“While other countries like Libya and Somalia were understandably keen to trash their colonial heritage,” said Denison, “Eritrea was subject to a decade of British rule and 40 years of Ethiopian rule, so the process was more gradual.”<br /><br />When independence finally came in the 1990s, a sudden rash of modern buildings made many realise the value of their colonial heritage.<br /><br />A moratorium on building in the city was established in 2001, which is now planned to be lifted with the introduction of a new conservation management plan, updating the regulations for the first time since the 1930s.<br /><br />The inscription of Asmara – along with historical centre of M’banza Kongo in Angola – goes some way to addressing the under-representation of Africa on the Unesco world heritage list. Of 814 cultural sites worldwide, only 48 are in the African continent, fewer than in Italy alone.<br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-29969453903727971602017-07-08T23:02:00.002-07:002017-07-08T23:02:45.765-07:00Fifteen Points: Thoughts on Progressivism, Patriotism and Ethnopolitics in Ethiopia<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-QGMEk-LNlRg/WWHGz4X9iSI/AAAAAAAAYiU/fV6NsV8d2bcao8n5vHUohcExYWrEzd6EQCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/Ethiopian-protesters-in-Washington-DC.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="426" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-QGMEk-LNlRg/WWHGz4X9iSI/AAAAAAAAYiU/fV6NsV8d2bcao8n5vHUohcExYWrEzd6EQCK4BGAYYCw/s640/Ethiopian-protesters-in-Washington-DC.jpg" width="100%" /></a></div><br /><br /><br />By <a href="http://www.zehabesha.com/fifteen-points-thoughts-on-progressivism-patriotism-and-ethnopolitics-in-ethiopia/" target="_blank">Tesfaye Demmellash</a><br /><br />I have in the past written about the mutual exclusions of patriotism and progressivism in the era of abyot in Ethiopia. That long era stretches from the time of the Student Movement through the blood thirsty tyranny of the Derg to the weird colonial-like dictatorship of Woyane “revolutionary democracy” over the last quarter century.<br /><br />In that seemingly interminable zemen of revolution and its aftermath, professing progressive ideas and values while at the same time being an Ethiopian patriot has proven to be difficult. Indeed, a dynamic convergence of forward looking ideas and ye-ager fikir sentiments has been well-nigh impossible. But I believe such a fusion of our commitments to these, equally vital, elements of our national life is essential if Ethiopia is to thrive, not just survive.<br /><br />If I am correct in this belief, a couple of related questions arise: how do we, as a nation, make the integration of patriotism and progressivism happen as it has never happened before? What are the conditions of its possibility at present? Or, how do we settle our intellectual and political accounts with the legacy of our “radical” progressive experience, whose continuing or residual effects are all around us today, largely in the form of divisive ethnopolitics? In this writing, I offer some critical thoughts seeking to contribute to the answers to these questions.<br /><br />For the TPLF, the integration of forward looking ideas and ye-ager fikir remains anathema, something fundamentally at odds with the Front’s reason for being. Wedded from its inception to a retrograde, neo-feudal, regionalist, tribal political project, the TPLF has never had honest progressive intention for Ethiopia as one country. Quite the contrary. The integral transformation and development of the country has never been its motivation and goal. Nor have the Woyanes ever been patriotic in good faith, though they use “Ethiopia” cynically as a strategic subterfuge, as a political cover and resource for their project of the “liberation” of Tigray or the creation of “greater” Tigray.<br /><br />The Revolution did produce many progressive patriots who sacrificed so much for the betterment of the lot of all Ethiopians regardless of ethnicity. But our culture of “teramaj” politica as a whole, including but not limited to that of the TPLF, has been inhospitable in thought and practice to the dynamic fusion of progressivism and patriotism under Ethiopian conditions. This is true, although the Woyane manifestation of the deeply problematic culture has been especially abhorrent. Admittedly, the nationally divisive partisan-tribal “revolutionary democracy” of the TPLF in particular has been the most perverse outcome or byproduct of the Ethiopian Revolution.<br /><br />Still, long before the rise of the TPLF, championing universal ideas like freedom, democracy, and equality in the course of the Student Movement had already been marked by indifference, and often outright hostility, toward our national tradition. The mutual exclusion of sensuous Ethiopian experience rooted in history and culturally arid intellectual socialization based on abstract ideology has its origins in that seminal social movement. The rest, as we know painfully well, is disappointing revolutionary history, made mainly by the successive dictatorships of the Derg and the Woyanes. This persistent condition has created and perpetuated Ethiopia’s long national crisis over the last several decades.<br /><br />We should be careful, however, not to regard the Ethiopian experience, specifically our struggle today for national redemption, as necessarily incongruent with progressive values and commitments as such. We should not equate progressivism as a whole with its perverse partisan features or defective ethnic variants. That would be a mistake, not only in conceptual thought or in principle but also in strategic and practical terms related to the present struggle for our national salvation.<br /><br />For there are alternative ways of embracing forward looking ideas. They range from the least reflective, most formulaic and nationally rootless, “globalized” ideological constructs that have had wide currency within the Ethiopian revolutionary tradition, to historically better informed, more thoughtful and enlightened approaches that have greater accommodative democratic resonance with our national values and experience.<br /><br />I see possibilities of a fruitful symbiosis today between a big, hopeful patriotic heart and a skeptical, questioning, progressive mind. I imagine a politically productive dynamic between our feelings and thoughts which will figure centrally in Ethiopia’s rise and renewal. I envision the heat of patriotic passion being productively harnessed and given sustainable form and direction by the light of cool, strategic, progressive reason.<br /><br />It is departing from this hopeful vision that I present the following fifteen critical notes on patriotism, progressivism, and ethnopolitics in Ethiopia today. I offer the notes as a spur to further thought and discussion in the Ethiopian opposition to TPLF tyranny. They are also intended to help prepare the political ground in the country for broad-based national consensus on the direction and strategies of Ethiopian renewal.<br /><br />1. Ethiopia/Ethiopiawinnet is not simply a repository of historic agerawi heritage and civilization but also a vital site of contemporary national growth and development. Having already undergone a revolution, it has the potential to evolve further and better, accommodating anew progressive change while enduring as the unique national entity that it is and has been for millennia.<br /><br />Consequently, any Ethiopian patriot who wants to promote systemic political change in the country today and actively participate in such change must regard reconstructed progressivism as a crucial intellectual and political ally, a vital source of enlightened vision of national freedom and development.<br /><br />What drives the contemporary Ethiopian movement for freedom and renewal is neither simply abstract political thought (centered on, say, “democracy,”) nor merely historical-cultural sources of nationality. Rather, it is an integral national experience which can absorb into itself new forward looking ideas and values. In the present Ethiopian struggle for change, there is significant conceptual and strategic innovation to be gained through a renewed convergence of patriotism and progressivism.<br /><br />2. However, a dynamic coming together of these two strands of our shared national life has not been possible in the course of the Revolution and its aftermath to-date. This is so largely because, given as they have been to “radical” excesses of social and ethnic engineering, revolutionary leaders, parties, and regimes lacked the intellectual disposition and resources for thinking broadly through the tension between progressivism and patriotism. Instead, they professed “progressivism” in grossly one-sided, abstract, formulaic and dogmatic terms, doing so in effect, if not always in intent, outside and against the Ethiopian national experience.<br /><br />Under these circumstances, promoters and practitioners of teramaj politica in the country could make neither the Ethiopian national tradition nor progressivism itself the ground and object of their critical thought. Putting their blind, unreflective faith in such modernist idols as “revolution,” “science,” “democracy,” and “national self-determination,” they not only excluded ideas from our historic national sensibility and experience but also severely restricted the free flow and development of forward looking thought in Ethiopian politics and society.<br /><br />The resulting nationally nihilistic, depthless radicalism has had significant implications for the articulation of progressivism, patriotism, and ethnopolitics in the Ethiopian context, as I note in the following critical theses.<br /><br />3. Progressive ideas have made themselves felt in our country largely as the simple negation or reverse of the sentiments and experience of Ethiopiawinnet. Practitioners of supposedly radical politics in the country generally tended to devalue Ethiopian nationhood as inauthentic or “fake” relative to the “nationality” of ethnic groups.<br /><br />But, for all their “radicalism,” the ideas of the ultra-left in particular could not have been actually transformative of our national culture. This was because the ideas, such as they were, represented an approach to Ethiopian national culture that was grossly and summarily rejectionist, characterizing the culture as the sum of its limitations and problems, a “prison of nations,” nothing more or different.<br /><br />Thus, an entire paradigm of leftist thought, whose offshoot TPLF/OLF ethnonationalist ideology is, imagined historic Ethiopia out of existence, telling us that real and valid national being lies only in articulated ideas of democracy and ethnonational “self-determination” or “liberation,” simply as a contemporary political project. In a boldfaced Orwellian reversal, an actually existent, though imperfect, nation-state is wished out of being while a merely aspirational ethnocentric “nationality” is declared to have real existence.<br /><br />4. Ethiopian progressive thought has been entangled in a web of contradictions: it has generally privileged ideology over history, promoting the overriding authoritarian power of sectarian and tribal ideologues over everyone else; yet, it has been bereft of relatively autonomous ideational content. Instead, as “radical” progressives, we have often passed our inert dogmatism off as commitment to high-minded principle.<br /><br />Ethiopian progressives sought to enlighten and move “the broad masses” through ideas, but they didn’t allow the ideas they professed to convey logos or knowledge in their own terms, i.e. beyond the limits of narrow, exclusively partisan sense and meaning. The ideal purpose of Ethiopian progressivism was to cast the light of reason on our politics, to advance freedom and democracy in Ethiopia; in actuality, however, progressivism itself became a force of darkness, a means of rationalization of partisan-tribal repression and dictatorship.<br /><br />The upshot is that notions like “democracy,” “equality,” “national self-determination,” “constitution,” and “federalism” under the Derg and/or Woyane regimes have had no reference to anything that has meaningful conceptual content and institutional reality. They are normatively empty rhetorical conceits of dictatorship.<br /><br />5. For a lot of patriotic Ethiopians, the historical and cultural sources of Ethiopiawinnet may loom larger than its contemporary ideas and validity, while for the nation’s many other citizens and some political entities Ethiopian nationality may be more significant as a contemporary civic and political achievement than as a structure of past events, deeds, accomplishments and cultural sources of identity.<br /><br />However, neither aspect of our national tradition in and of itself adequately captures the meaning and realities of Ethiopian patriotism today. What is significant is not one or the other strand of our shared nationality taken singly, but the synergy produced by the fusion of both streams of Ethiopian national consciousness. History is not simply a record of our past achievements as a people; it is a vital constitutive part of contemporary Ethiopian national being and consciousness.<br /><br />6. As a structure of historical events, facts, deeds, accomplishments, and patriotic narratives, Ethiopiawinnet has had its native critics and objectors like other national cultures and civilizations. Here, we should distinguish between two types of objectors.<br /><br />Namely, on one side are patriotic and progressive Ethiopian dissidents of various ethnic backgrounds who have sought in good faith, though not effectively, to engage our national tradition, seeking to bring about its integral transformation and development. And, on the other, we have protagonists of more or less separatist identity politics that have willfully and “radically” alienated themselves from Ethiopian nationhood, which they have wanted to undo.<br /><br />The latter (we may characterize them as ethnopolitical “others”) are bent on undermining our shared nationality or, failing that, only accept Ethiopiawinnet grudgingly as nothing more than a collection of tribal kilils. The TPLF, the current “ruling” party (if one can call it that), belongs in this category of extremist objectors that are resentful and hostile toward Ethiopian multiethnic national culture. So do unreconstructed separatist factions or remnants of the OLF.<br /><br />This distinction has strategic implications for the resistance in terms of building national consensus and coalitions toward post-communist and post-tribal Ethiopian transformation. Broad-based agerawi agreement can be built among patriots and reconstructed progressives of diverse ethnicities who operate in good faith within the parameters of commonly shared Ethiopian nationality and citizenship even as they disagree on matters of politics and policy.<br /><br />But it is impossible to accommodate within such consensus ethnonationalist elements obsessed with separatist identity politics. The alliance of patriotic-progressive resistance forces has no choice but to do battle with these “others” on various fields of engagement and by various means in the most critical and systematic way it can.<br /><br />7. Love of country has its own challenges and drawbacks. Modes of patriotic concern and the ways in which patriotism is valued or approached differ with different parties, regimes, and interests. For example, the Woyanes have their own exclusively partisan sense of, and identification with, Ethiopia and Ethiopiawinnet. National sentiments and values can take liberal-democratic form or repressive-authoritarian shape. They can assume broadly trans-ethnic, civic mold or narrowly tribal pattern; and they can be expressed with honest or dishonest intention. Also, patriotism may be used by regimes and politicians to distract the attention of citizens from policy failures or limitations and internal problems.<br /><br />Among individuals and groups motivated by honest nationalist intention, patriotism can be emotionally overcharged and at times impervious to reason and strategic intelligence. At a time today of challenging Ethiopian struggle for national survival against an enemy at once cunning and brutal, giving free rein to unthinking patriotic passion can be politically counterproductive, even if it seems psychologically compelling or satisfying.<br /><br />This holds true, by the way, for ethnicism or identity politics too. Including, that is, current movements of some “activist” groups that overethnicize Amarannet even as they make good faith effort to protect the Amara people from brazen and insidious Woyane genocidal aggression.<br /><br />That said, we should not forget that love of country is potentially a motive force of our struggle for national salvation, a source of uplifting energy, commitment, and action. If we shy away from reaffirming our national heritage and solidarity, doing so perhaps out of a misguided progressive conceit of “multiculturalism” or “political correctness,” we disable ourselves as a people and a nation. We lose our national élan. If we suppress or neutralize our patriotism, we lose the spirit, vitality and power of integral Ethiopiawinnet.<br /><br />We thereby allow our shared nationality to be subjected to the nefarious machinations of hostile forces like the TPLF, Shabiya and their internal proxies and external allies or backers. We enable such forces to parasitize on Ethiopia, to hollow out from within her national life and spirit, to devalue her unique historical heritage, and to squander her material and cultural resources and strategic assets, all to the detriment of the interests of her citizens and distinct cultural communities.<br /><br />8. In coming to terms with and valuing who or what we are as a historic nation, we carry within our national being and consciousness contemporary ideas and values of freedom, equality, political pluralism, democracy, and cultural diversity. Yet, as a nation, we move forward integrally, not divided along ethnic lines into so many exclusive, island-like “nationalities” or “peoples,” with insular territorial kilils or enclaves to match.<br /><br />Such entities are unreal, lacking as they do actually free or autonomous social-political agency. They are only passed off as “facts on the ground.” The reality claimed for them is just that, a claim. As such, it is contestable and potentially open to discussion, negotiation and transformation.<br /><br />9. There is little prospect of existing or emergent patriotic-progressive Ethiopian forces engaging unreconstructed partisans of separatist ethnic politics in principled dialogue and exchange of thoughts and views. One of the main reasons for this is that the “progressive” ideas such exclusive partisans formally profess cannot be opened for informed critical debate and discussion, since they are seized upon and deployed instrumentally as blunt ideological and rhetorical weapons in identity wars.<br />Universal, forward looking ideas professed under these circumstances have no function other than as mechanisms for projecting an imagined ethnocentric “nationality,” as devices for making aspirational claims of biherawi selfhood. In this way, broad-based ideas have been narrowed down to, or conflated with, exclusively sectarian assertions and constructs of identity politics.<br /><br />For example, TPLF notions of “democracy” and “federalism” have no principled content or practical significance beyond the narrow, exclusive, authoritarian interpretation the Front gives them to suit its self-serving partisan and tribal purposes. Utterly meaningless and without value for Ethiopian politics, government and society generally, these notions constitute nothing but counterfeit ideological currency.<br /><br />What this means is that, for TPLF partisans and other practitioners of identity politics, it is not the philosophical or historical contents of notions like “democracy” and “self-determination” that are important but the party or ethnic group which rhetorically and tactically “identifies” itself with such notions. Thus the overriding concern has been about who (or which group/tribe) expresses the idea of “democracy,” not what the idea itself signifies, either in principle and conceptual thought or in the Ethiopian national context.<br /><br />Consequently, it has been hard to reason with such exclusively partisan ideological self-representations. How can an ethnic party or group that simply and immediately lays claim to the notion of “democracy” in framing its selfhood or in its self-identification be expected to let others question its view of that very notion? Wouldn’t that mean allowing its imagined “nationality” or “identity” to be questioned? Herein lie the underlying ideational and political limitations of ethnonationist “progressivism” in Ethiopia from the era of the Student Movement to the present.<br /><br />Put differently, the problem has been that identity as politically imagined and wished for subjectivity or a construct of generic “revolutionary” ideology is confused with historically constituted social category, namely, with actual Ethiopian ethnic-cultural communities and their commonly shared as well as distinctive forms of self-identification. And the mix up of ideological and social categories has generally made the ideology at issue closed to enlightened debate, discussion, and reconstruction.<br /><br />10. Dissociating ethnocentrism as a category or system of ideas (particularly the residual Leninist-Stalinist constructs of ethnic partisans and elites) from the felt and lived self-identifications of actual Ethiopian cultural communities is imperative both as a matter of principle and in the struggle to save and renew Ethiopia.<br /><br />The nation’s diverse, yet intersecting and overlapping communities can be identified locally and nationally in various ways, including shared history, common socio-economic interests, and trans-ethnic popular culture and spiritual life. Making all these sources and forms of community self-hood in Ethiopia extensions and objects of exclusive partisan or state ethnicism is not only undemocratic but also a gross contravention of the relative autonomy of the nation’s regions and localities and of the communities that dwell in them.<br /><br />The old and still residually operative habit of “revolutionary” thought and practice in Ethiopia has resulted in the overpoliticization of ethnicity or in the overethnicization of local and regional identity. This deeply flawed yet predominant pattern of identity work should be deconstructed through a new progressive-patriotic ethos marked by what I would call ethnoscepticism.<br /><br />In coining the term “ethnoscepticism,” I have in mind the all-round questioning and critique of ethnocentrism. I value and embrace ethnic-cultural diversity as constitutive of the Ethiopian national experience. But I regard the tradition of identity politics characteristic of such parties as the TPLF and the OLF (or what is left of it) not only wrong in its substantive views and arguments but fundamentally misconceived in equating an exclusively partisan ethnopolitical ideology simply and straightaway with national life, with the form, substance, and horizon of nationhood as such. In this, it is deeply mistaken.<br /><br />11. Part of the allure and absurdity of ethnocentrism in Ethiopia is thus its aspiration to maximize tribal identity out of all historical proportion, common sense, and socio-economic context or rationality. Its appeal, particularly to those engaged in exclusively partisan identity work aimed at creating petty tribal states, is related to the overpoliticization of ethnicity as separatist “nationality.”<br />The attractiveness of ethnonationalism is related to the conflation of aspirational identity constructed ideologically with the subjectivities of actually existing Ethiopian cultural communities. We see this (intended or unwitting) confusion in its most graphic form in the practically meaningless Stalinist dogma of “the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-determination up to and including secession.” This old and tired dogma has, for decades, made itself felt in Ethiopian politics through mind-numbing high rhetorical frequency, but it has never had the sense and feel of authenticity or reality.<br /><br />Instead, the dogma signifies nothing but political fiction; the “rights” of which it speaks have always been unreal. Nor should we take the generic Leninist-Stalinist terms, “nations, nationalities, and peoples” at face value as social referents, as if they pick out or represent particular Ethiopian cultural communities in any descriptive or political sense. We know that the terms generally encode and rationalize single-party, authoritarian rule centered on ethnic identity, real and/or imagined.<br /><br />It is worth stressing here that the overvaluation of ethnicity (as “nation”) in Ethiopia since the era of the Student Movement has not been an outcome simply of the identity work of tribal elites or partisans. Instead, it has more broadly been a mark of leftist political fashion in the country. The phenomenon is symptomatic of our troubled tradition of teramaj politica as a whole.<br /><br />In effect, if not by design, the inordinate currency we have given in our progressive discourse to the ideological categories of “nations,” “nationalities,” and “peoples” can be said to represent within that discourse a conceptually inert formulaic “radicalism” aimed at delegitimizing trans-ethnic Ethiopian nationality. It signified a global, generic, fundamentalist progressivism divorced from historically informed and grounded Ethiopian political thought.<br /><br />That said, we cannot deny that the tendency of old school “revolutionary” partisans of the TPLF and remnants of the OLF today to overvalue ethnicity politically has to do with wounded cultural pride, often reflecting a felt or perceived sense of being devalued or treated as inferior in one’s distinct culture and identity. Whether its sources and bases are historically real or mainly politically constructed, this feeling cannot be discounted.<br /><br />12. Yet we should recognize that the sentiment is connected to the perception (by unreconstructed practitioners of identity politics) of Tigres and Oromos as passive victims in the formation of the modern Ethiopian state, which is simply and falsely equated with “Amhara expansion.” What is conveniently denied or overlooked in this overdrawn ethnocentric narrative of victimhood is the active participation of heroic figures from the Tigre and Oromo communities in the making of modern Ethiopia as well as the fact of the multi-ethnic heritage of great Ethiopian national leaders, particularly Emperor Menelik II.<br /><br />The fundamental problem here is that identity issues and problems, and the solutions proposed for them, are dissociated from broader social-structural contexts of movement, contact, and interaction of communities. This is particularly true of Amharas and Oromos. The intersections, interpenetrations, and cultural exchanges of these two great communities are profoundly constitutive of historic and contemporary Ethiopia as a whole and of distinct regions and cultural identities within the country.<br /><br />Contrary to these historical conditions of our shared nationality, supposedly revolutionary narratives of “self-determination” or “liberation” have constructed disparate island-like ethnic “selves” as focal points of partisan domination, identity work, and wished for tribal state formation. The TPLF has become master of ethnocraft in this sense, adept at engineering cultural identities in Ethiopia today, particularly targeting the Oromo and Amhara communities. The possible solidarity of these two intersecting Ethiopian communities constitutes a mortal danger to the partisan-tribal dictatorship of the Woyane party, and the Woyanes know it. And they will do everything they can to prevent its realization.<br /><br />13. In this connection, Amara distinctness is worth noting in particular. Woyane Tigres dream of reducing Amaras to just one among many other tribal groups in the country; they have sought to force Amarannet and Ethiopiawinnet But, if there is a distinct Ethiopian cultural community whose national identity or nationalism cannot be defined simply by ethnicity, it is the Amara people.<br />We as a community certainly have a right to defend ourselves by all means necessary against existential threats the TPLF and its proxies pose, and we should not hesitate to exercise that right whenever and wherever the need arises. But the continued survival and flourishing of Amaras (and of other cultural communities in the country) has a lot to do with maintaining cultural distinctness while strengthening civic unity and political solidarity with others through Ethiopiawinnet. Ultimately, we rise or fall together as Ethiopians. In the long run, the salvation of the Amara people will be achieved not in isolation from, or on the margins of, the Ethiopian experience but as integral and central to that experience. Ethiopiawinnet is deeply constitutive of Amara maninnet.<br /><br />Even as we defend ourselves as a distinct community from TPLF predatory tribal aggression, we rely on Ethiopiawinnet for building patriotic-progressive coalitions and for cultivating needed allies and supporters near and far in the resistance against Woyane tyranny. As a vital part of Ethiopian national life, Amaras everywhere in the country confront a vengeful, scheming tribal enemy that harbors ill will towards us. It oppresses us not only by means state power, but through a network of local, national, regional, and global partners and allies. In doing so, it uses a wide range of ways and means, including coercion, espionage, political pressure, programs and projects of economic “development,” cyber tools, media, and propaganda.<br /><br />Against an enemy operating on such networked terrain, the Amara community cannot effectively engage even in self-defense by practicing identity tegadlo pure and simple, disregarding or ignoring its vital historic and contemporary ties with other Ethiopian communities. Instead, in struggling to neutralize, turn aside or unravel the TPLF network of domination, the Amara resistance should take full advantage of its broader Ethiopian heritage of standing up to enemies, foreign and domestic.<br /><br />This means in part leveraging the values, resources and capabilities of Ethiopiawinnet existent in diverse communities and localities of the country. More broadly, it means building a strong coalition of patriotic and progressive forces linked to a countervailing network of regional and global sources of support.<br /><br />But this cannot be done merely or primarily by practicing identity politics. The nation’s struggle against Woyane tyranny, at the center of which is the resistance of the Amara people, will require a renewed Ethiopian national vision, enlightened intellectual, political and moral leadership, a keen understanding of possibilities of trans-ethnic Ethiopian national consensus and solidarity, and strategic direction and resourcefulness.<br /><br />14. TPLF ethnocentrism is caught in a net of paradoxes: generally, it is marked by a contradictory assertion of egalitarian ideals and dictatorial power. Its ethnic “federalism” represents an imposition of centralized state power by a small party, locally based in a minority ethnic community, over much larger Ethiopian cultural communities.<br /><br />Under these conditions, “national self-determination” as an egalitarian value or ideal is neutralized by its treatment as an object of tactical maneuvers and manipulations by the Woyane power hierarchy. We see here the paradox of distinct Ethiopian local communities being subjected to dictatorial power in their supposed act of self-determination. We witness the rhetorical or formal promotion of cultural identity and difference facilitating the pre-emptive suppression of actual diversity and local self-government brought about by the homogenizing effects of TPLF state ethnicism.<br /><br />Formally, the Woyane regime obsesses about, and gives excessive attention to, ideologically pre-cooked ethnic identity. Yet, whatever distinct cultural community (say, the Amara, Oromo, Tigre or Gurage) is addressed in this way gets little or no attention in its own, actual, self-identification. It has little or no agency either in its bona fide autonomy or in its historic and contemporary ties and intersections with other Ethiopian communities.<br /><br />As such, the TPLF state is a squanderer of Ethiopian social capital and national power. In fostering tribal division, it undermines both the national solidarity and cultural diversity of the Ethiopian people, for there is really no meaningful diversity to speak of without robust national unity. In its self-serving instrumentalization of ethnic identities, the Woyane dictatorship is socially and nationally wasteful in a double sense. The regime not only hinders the country’s diverse communities from gaining true local self-government, but also severely limits their capacity to benefit fully from larger material and cultural values the Ethiopian national experience affords.<br /><br />Moreover, officially sanctioned tribal fragmentation of the country has created a fertile ground for economic inefficiencies, corruption, and uneven development against the interests of all citizens and cultural communities in the country. And most outrageously, aging TPLF tyrants preside over the subjection particularly of Amhara communities in various parts of Ethiopia to destructive ethnic cleansing and genocide or the threat of genocide.<br /><br />Consequently, the institutionalized tribalism of the Woyane regime should be clearly distinguished from the actual ethnic and cultural practices of real Ethiopian communities. The identity politics of TPLF dictatorship is not a part of us as citizens and local communities. It is not our lived experience as Amaras, Oromos, Tigres, Gurages, Afars, and so on.<br /><br />On the contrary, it is imposed on us, making us all its objects and extensions. Woyane bureaucratic tribalism has its own colonially inspired divide-and-dominate rationale, interests, institutions, and practices. All of these elements and features of TPLF state ethnicism have taken shape and come into play against the multiethnic Ethiopian national experience. Insofar as Woyane political ethnicism has continued to be ideologically connected to the Stalinist legacy, it has been dictatorial. And, as such, it remains a major enemy of democracy in Ethiopia.<br /><br />Under these circumstances, political institutions and practices of the Woyane regime such as federalism, constitution, parliament, elections, democracy, and development are not simply instruments the regime uses to pursue and protect its partisan-tribal interests. They are authoritarian tools the Woyanes use to undermine Ethiopian national culture, to negate fundamentally what Ethiopia means to its citizens and diverse local and cultural communities.<br /><br />In this regard, an issue that is worth exploring but often suppressed or ignored in narratives and practices of identity politics in Ethiopia is this: what has been the role or function of external factors or influences, colonial and post-colonial, in the formation of “local” ethnic identities in Ethiopia? What has been the impact of global and regional forces on the inflated political currency of ethnicism in the country in more recent decades? Broad and involved, these questions deserve close, critical study and analysis. Here, it is enough to make a few concluding observations by way of a fifteenth, and last, set of critical notes.<br /><br />15. Ethnic identities are commonly recognized by such relatively static or spontaneous markers as language, religion, cultural practice, physical appearance, and locality or place of dwelling. But, in a political-historical context, they are better understood dynamically as products of contacts and relations of native populations or localities with larger intervening forces. Forms of ethnicity or ethnicism can be seen as links in, and outcomes of, a long chain of local, national, regional, and global interactions, influences, and activities.<br /><br />In this light, we can trace connections between, for example, the separatist identity politics of the OLF and the work of colonial and post-colonial era German missionaries and of other agents of European interests, notably, Baron Roman Prochazka of Austria, an anti-Ethiopia and anti-Amara Nazi figure who reportedly was the first to have spoken of the “self-determination of tribes in Abyssinia.” The dubious intentions of the seemingly OLF-supporting Shabiya dictatorship toward Ethiopia make up another major link in the chain.<br /><br />We can further include here the connection between the Shabiya regime and Arab states’ goals in the Red Sea region and in the Horn of Africa, goals which have also generally contravened Ethiopian national interest. Western Marxist revolutionary ideology (specifically the Leninist-Stalinist dogma of “national self-determination”) also deserves mention as a significant link in the chain of locality-forming or identity-shaping external forces that have in more recent decades made themselves felt in Ethiopia.<br /><br />This series of connections, which generally has tended to work at cross-purposes with Ethiopian national integration, thus represents more than the immediacies of OLF (or TPLF) partisans’ narratives of ethnic victimhood and related schemes of ethnocentric “national” self-definition and self-assertion. Instead, the links signify the overdetermination of OLF/TPLF ethnocentrism by various regional and global interests and influences. They point to a more complex and problematic political quality that has shaped the seemingly simple identity politics of both ethnic parties.<br /><br />Not a brute empirical datum or a “reality on the ground” given naturally, then, “identity” or “locality” here is a political construct that has varying phenomenological character. That is to say, it can be variously perceived, defined, valued, and “realized” by competing or cooperating interests and forces. Different interests may have differing locality/identity-shaping purposes, programs, and capabilities. Varying projects of ethnocentrism, say, those of the TPLF and the OLF, may use varying tactics and techniques of valorization or “nationalization” of ethnicity.<br /><br />Among the ways and means of identity work the Woyane regime in particular employs are: demographic tactics (depopulation and resettlement schemes, ethnic cleansing, and so on); cultural politics, for example, interventions in the internal affairs of the nation’s religious communities; economic policies and instruments (“development” projects); gross ethnic corruption in education and professional training; and similarly wholesale tribal favoritism in appointments to positions of power and in the staffing and use of the institutions of the “federal” state, namely, its fiscal, financial, bureaucratic, intelligence, police, and military agencies.<br /><br />All these factors add up to an onerous task for the Ethiopian opposition to Woyane tyranny. They pose difficult challenges for the articulation of the form and direction of the Ethiopian patriotic-progressive resistance against TPLF dictatorship, which is at once insidious and blatantly oppressive. Gaining an enlightened strategic grasp as well as a practical understanding of the challenges involved is a critical first step in waging a successful struggle toward Ethiopian freedom and renewal.<br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-91981259331138801702017-07-06T23:06:00.003-07:002017-07-08T23:27:34.905-07:00Video: Seattle Hosts Best Ever ESFNA Festival 2017<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; display: none; text-align: center;"><img alt="http://img.youtube.com/vi/eSSs2FB1ib0/0.jpg" border="0" src="http://img.youtube.com/vi/eSSs2FB1ib0/0.jpg" /></div><div style="height: 0; padding-bottom: 56.25%; position: relative;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="380" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/eSSs2FB1ib0?ecver=2" style="height: 100%; left: 0; position: absolute; width: 100%;" width="100%"></iframe></div><br /><br />Written by Ethiomedia,<br /><br />SEATTLE - If you have missed ESFNA Festival 2017, you have missed what could have probably been one of the happiest moments in your life. ESFNA 2017 cultural and sports festival has attracted tens of thousands Ethiopians from around the world, and the success for the very well organized event is due to ESFNA leaders. They truly deserve our thanks. Seattle - Always the Best!<br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-45092758507363362432017-07-06T23:00:00.001-07:002017-07-06T23:00:27.522-07:00Officials in Nigeria questions Ethiopian Airlines, flight delays and Nigerians stranded in Saudi Arabia<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="340" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-yh92706dVeU/WV8SjwuO98I/AAAAAAAAYhA/S8qT__QKR4Aw1UvRUoVRtbQ7aBMn4p42gCK4BGAYYCw/s640/Nigerians-stranded.jpg" width="100%" /></div></div><br /><br />By <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2017/07/06/officials-in-nigeria-questions-ethiopian-airlines-flight-delays-and-nigerians-stranded-in-saudi-arabia/" target="_blank">The Nation</a><br /><br />The House of Representatives Wednesday mandated its committee on Aviation to invite the Minister of Aviation, Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) and Ethiopian Airlines to appear before and give reasons for the excessive delays in bringing back Nigerians stranded in Saudi Arabia.<br /><br />The Green Chamber flayed the airline for the recent long delays and disrespectful behavior towards Nigerians and other nationals from Saudi Arabia to Nigeria by the Airlines and said flight delay compensation be paid to them according to global aviation rules.<br /><br />The resolution of the House was sequel to the adoption of the prayers of a motion by Hon. Zakari Mohammed on complaints against Ethiopian Airlines.<br /><br />The lawmaker while moving the motion noted that Ethiopian Airlines due to the backlog of delays have left Nigerians stranded in Jeddah for over one week with most running out of funds to survive.<br /><br />He said the airline’s refusal to offer a reasonable explanation for the delay was worrisome, and also in violation of Article 2 of Ethiopian Airlines passenger commitment.<br /><br />According to him, it made reservations for three persons to occupy one hotel room in overnight delays again, in violation of Article 11 of the Ethiopian Airlines passenger commitment published on their website.<br /><br />He said passengers had to incur more expenses by making hotel reservations for themselves. due to the inconveniences caused by the airline,<br /><br />Mohammed also said over one thousand Nigerians who were due to be back in the country on 27 June, 2017 were stranded in Jeddah for 4-5 days.<br /><br />The House thereafter mandated its committee on Aviation to invite the Minister of Aviation, Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) and Ethiopian Airlines to appear before and give reasons for the excessive delays.<br /><br />The House also resolved that Ethiopian Airlines should apologize through two national dailies, to the affected passengers.</div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-67091047048941356382017-07-06T23:00:00.000-07:002017-07-06T23:00:30.031-07:00Ethiopia’s ingenious video pirates<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="360" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9TQhN3LtRu4/WV8P0-IWeOI/AAAAAAAAYg0/Vd4oAdtPF6cubznjgZxsE3-1OGV65GMbQCK4BGAYYCw/s640/ethipia%2Bpirates.jpg" width="100%" /></div></div><br /><br /><br />By <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21724852-not-even-slow-internet-can-stop-bootleggers-addis-ababa-ethiopias" target="_blank">Economist</a><br /><br />DOWNLOADING a movie, legally or not, is prohibitively slow in Ethiopia, thanks to glacial internet speeds. Bootleg DVDs are everywhere, but even so it can be hard to find a reasonable-quality version of the latest Hollywood blockbuster. Only one cinema in Addis Ababa, the capital, screens foreign hits. Resourceful pirates spy an opportunity.<br /><br />Last year yellow ATM-style kiosks began to spring up around Addis Ababa. The brainchild of three Ethiopian science graduates and their software company, Swift Media, the Chinese-built kiosks allow customers to transfer any of 6,000 pirated foreign movies or 500 music albums onto a USB stick they insert for as little as 10 cents per file. The kiosks are located in large malls in full view of authorities, who show no interest in shutting them down.<br /><br />This is just one manifestation of a general disregard for foreign intellectual-property (IP) rights in Ethiopia. Swift Media is breaking no local laws by selling plundered foreign films. Ethiopia is not a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Indeed, it is the largest country that has not yet signed any of the big international treaties governing IP, according to Seble Baraki, a local lawyer. Foreign trademarks are infringed with impunity. Kaldi’s, the country’s biggest coffee chain, has a logo suspiciously similar to that of Starbucks. Intercontinental Hotels Group, a British-owned hotel company, is suing a large hotel in central Addis Ababa with the same name. In-N-Out Burger, an American fast-food franchise, has a popular equivalent in Ethiopia that the American firm only learned about when tourists complained to it about poor standards.<br /><br />In an effort to shift attitudes the authorities burned half a million pirated CDs and DVDs in the centre of the capital in 2008. But the thieves are undeterred. Only a handful of records are released each year. In 2010 Ethiopia’s Audiovisual Producers Association, a film and music producers guild, stopped releasing albums for several months in protest over the Supreme Court’s decision to drop charges against a record-shop owner accused of copyright infringement.<br /><br />In the hope of attracting more foreign investment the Ethiopian government has been trying to bring its IP laws into line with international standards. But Ms Baraki doubts that her country is about to change. Ethiopia is poor and has a desperate shortage of foreign currency. “How would we pay?” she asks.</div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-69584736306540219142017-07-04T23:05:00.000-07:002017-07-04T23:05:07.325-07:00Top Ethiopian UNDP Official Faces Corruption Charges <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-A9_V-hi8voU/WVs_J1X0cAI/AAAAAAAAYdo/4u2gBJ-IMUAZmBGK4OgtYLeC-7nM2-CfQCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/undp-rba-gettu-1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="425" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-A9_V-hi8voU/WVs_J1X0cAI/AAAAAAAAYdo/4u2gBJ-IMUAZmBGK4OgtYLeC-7nM2-CfQCK4BGAYYCw/s640/undp-rba-gettu-1.jpg" width="100%" /></a></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #999999;">Tegegnework Gettu, regional director of UNDP&nbsp;</span></div><br /><br />By <a href="http://ethiomedia.com/top-ethiopian-undp-official-faces-corruption-charges/" target="_blank">Ethiomedia</a><br /><br />An Ethiopian UNDP official faces corruption charges by employing the daughter of Ambassador Berhane Gebre Kristos, a key figure in the Ethiopian government, without any ‘competitive employment process.’<br /><br />Tegegnework Gettu, the regional director of UNDP for Africa, hired Sallem Gebre Kristos in 2013 without any public notice nor without the presence of an opening for a job. Sallem has enjoyed successive promotions ever since, the report shows.<br /><br />“Mr. Tegegnework Gettu, who has a very close relationship with. Mr.Gebre-Kristos, gave instruction to his staff to secure her recruitment,” the Inner City Report disclosed.<br /><br />Ambassador Berhane, who was a very close confidante of the late tyrant Meles Zenawi, is widely seen as incompetent and corrupt like the rest of his peers in the inner circle of the ruling party in Ethiopia. Observers Ethiomedia talked to were not shocked but surprised that the individuals have been spreading corruption beyond Ethiopia and into the UN system.<br /><br /><b>Following is the <a href="http://www.innercitypress.com/un2retaliationundp061317.html" target="_blank">full report</a> by Inner City Press:</b><br /><br /><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5_RL5S5ZGlA/WVtAUwcAPgI/AAAAAAAAYd4/uDJF7UodY_Q4YZzxkeqRTDNoHErWs8jkACK4BGAYYCw/s1600/berhane_gebre-christos.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="146" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5_RL5S5ZGlA/WVtAUwcAPgI/AAAAAAAAYd4/uDJF7UodY_Q4YZzxkeqRTDNoHErWs8jkACK4BGAYYCw/s200/berhane_gebre-christos.jpg" width="200" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Berhane Gebre-Christos</td></tr></tbody></table>“UNITED NATIONS, June 13 – While some claim there have been substantive changes in the UN Secretariat and UN Development Program, these are by no means clear. In 2014 and again in 2016 Inner City Press reported on UNDP, and now in 2017 staff there, fearing retaliation, have written: “Secretary General, UNDP staff do not believe that competency plays a role in the hiring process.<br /><br />“Managers select their staff based on color, nationality, and nepotism, and not on educational qualifications or work experience. As you may already know, nearly $1,000,000 (USD) has been spent on the UNDP’s Structural Review process. In 2014, these funds were channeled to consultants and other activities, yet UNDP’s leadership never provided a cost benefit analysis.<br /><br />“We feel duty-bound to inform you of this which require your immediate attention: 1. Ms. Sallem Berhane joined UNDP RBA in 2013 as an Individual Contract (IC) holder without ever participating in a competitive selection process. It must be noted that Ms. Berhane is the daughter of a very powerful Ethiopian Deputy Prim- Minister Berhane Gebre-Kristos. The Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) Mr. Tegegnework Gettu, has a very close relationship with. Mr.Gebre-Kristos gave instruction to his staff to secure her recruitment. During Structural Review, it was necessary to move Ms. Berhane to BPPS, following her supervisor Mr. Pedro Conceicao. In late 2016, again with no competitive recruitment process, Ms. Berhane was moved from BPPS to HQ/EXO with the same IC contract status. Then, in 2017, she was offered P3 Fixed Term contract without due process, as no vacancy was advertised and none of the organizational recruitment processes were observed. Reasonably, for bringing this information to light, staff-members are afraid of retaliatory discrimination from the Associate Administrator. He has rendered a service to his Government Official (who has supported his career advancement) and treats inquiries with a lack of respect, often responding with the attitude of a bully.” What will Guterres do? His top two spokesman not only didn’t answer anyof Inner City Press’ formal questions on June 12 – they didn’t even provide the requested confirmation of receipt. This is today’s UN.<br /><br />“Inner City Press in 2014 reported on then-head of the UN Department of General Assembly and Conference Management <a href="http://www.innercitypress.com/dgacm1uncovered073114.html" target="_blank">Tegegnework Gettu calling female critics “emotional,” here</a>, whistleblowers afraid of Gallach-like retaliation tell Inner City Press that Gettu has continued his “shenanigans” at UNDP.<br /><br />“Inner City Press has exclusively publishedinternal UNDP (“Atlas”) travel vouchers leaked to it by scared whistleblowers, reflecting among other things Gettu coincidentally putting in for $11,000 travel expenses.”</div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-53954118870872852782017-07-04T23:02:00.000-07:002017-07-04T23:02:00.508-07:00‘Destroy Addis Ababa – Adios Ethiopia’ <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="340" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/--rqMrFwBkQQ/WVwwYHE14SI/AAAAAAAAYeg/AmMDKl30m4U4FhV5Tj8BR5qZgJHm8cSkACK4BGAYYCw/s640/View-Addis-Ababa.jpg" width="100%" /></div></div><br /><br /><br />By <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2017/07/02/destroy-addis-ababa-adios-ethiopia-kebour-ghenna/" target="_blank">Kebour Ghenna</a><br /><br />Very soon, I will be celebrating my sixtieth birthday in Addis Ababa. My son was born in Addis Ababa. I was born in Addis Ababa. My father was born in Addis Ababa. My grandfather also!<br /><br />Last week’s EPRDF arbitrary edict, offering Addis Ababa an absurd affirmative action model has come as a surprise and shock to me… I am sure to many others too. This decree reinforces further the attempt of the government to divide of Addis Ababians according to ethnic lines, and disenfranchises a huge number of residents.<br /><br />It’s a foolish edict of injustice that is discriminatory and contrary to the fundamental principles of the Constitution.<br /><br />Yes, EPRDF may have done this to address the grievance of Oromia, but why do it in a way that undermines and weakens the nation. Why chose to create new problems faster than solving old ones? No doubt the legitimate concerns of Oromia should be addressed through open dialogue and negotiation between all the antagonists, and not through some arbitrary edicts prescribed from, we don’t know where.<br /><br />Only a democratic political system could create effective governance in Ethiopia and earn Oromos and other ethnic groups trust in the state. In today’s Ethiopia, for political reform to succeed, declaring the ‘right’ policies is not enough, creating an enabling environment that lead to the debate and implementation of that policy is no less important.<br /><br />The monumental blunder of this edict will likely lead this peaceful city to unprecedented ethnic discord, division and conflict. At best, it will open the door for a whopping corruption. At worst it will start us down a costly, intellectually draining, dead-end path into a world of overwhelming unknowns. More important, it will waste time and influence that otherwise could be devoted to repairing the politics of the nation to which we are inevitably tied.<br /><br />It’s plain sad to see politicians care only for themselves, as opposed to everyone’s interest. Yet even EPRDF can’t ignore reality forever! How can it proclaim such absurdities: ‘Oromo residents of the city shall be entitled to the right to self-determination’ or ‘Oromo residents shall be entitled to 25% of the city council, besides to their representation as residents of the city’ or ‘Afaan Oromo shall become “the working and official language” of Addis Ababa [Now, why not of Ethiopia?!!] along with Amharic’ … and many more similar incredible array of stipulations.<br /><br />Why this trail of blunders? Is this the best EPRDF can come up with on the status of Addis Ababa?<br />Where are we heading with this?<br /><br />Actually, I’m not sure if it’s incompetence… or sheer complacency. But frankly, it really doesn’t matter. What matters is that EPRDF opted to damage the state to gain popular support and thus further strengthen its political power by dividing people along ethnic lines. What is new is that even the ordinary person is beginning to see the scam.<br /><br />My point today is not to moralize, but to point out the practical implications of this decree on Addis Ababa. This policy will destroy the social cohesion that made the trade mark of the city; a city with no distinct ethnic enclave. It will wreck the existing community bonds and shared sentiments that are visible all across the city. More importantly, it will obstruct the assimilation of ethnics, and inhibit the creation of a closer bond between the people and the federal government.<br /><br />Indeed, it’s necessary for the Federal government to negotiate with Oromia the status of Addis Ababa and its relations with neighboring woredas, but make no mistake the final outcome should be an independent and democratic city, with clear boundaries and with no favoritism to any ethnic group. A capital city for all! Period.<br /><br />If we want an Addis Ababa that is democratic and prosperous, if we want Double A to become the beacon of Africa, for the sake of the nation, and the preservation of its polity.It’s high time to ensure the state government is for every citizen alike, otherwise the problems will ruin not just Addis Ababa, but also the entire nation.<br />____<br /><i>The post Destroy Addis Ababa – Adios Ethiopia (By Kebour Ghenna) appeared first on Borkena Ethiopian News.</i></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-54345625445334867682017-07-04T23:01:00.000-07:002017-07-04T23:01:01.509-07:00Ethiopia’s debt reaches a whooping 23B USD<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="415" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-GlBSM16vlRg/WVw1qalPJCI/AAAAAAAAYe4/DR4AjNhnV24skLZm7knU0ahP5cfTVl20wCK4BGAYYCw/s640/ethiopian-birr-922x614.jpg" width="100%" /></div></div><br /><br />By <a href="https://ethsat.com/2017/07/ethiopias-debt-reaches-whooping-23b-usd/" target="_blank">ESAT</a><br /><br />Ethiopia’s debt has reached a whooping $23 billion while export earnings is in downward spiral coupled with the increase in payments to loans.<br /><br />In an article published in Addis Admas, a weekly local Amharic published in Addis Ababa, the writer Yohannes S. also indicates that the country’s payment to interest on loans is skyrocketing.<br /><br />The country’s debt, which was 2.8 billion in 2008 has reached 23 billion this year. Payment to the country’s debt shot to 1.18 billion in 2017, compared to 89 million in 2008. The article says the country pays 400 million dollars a year towards its debt.<br /><br />The writer said earnings from export trade has stagnate and remains the same since 2009 owing to the crisis in currency exchange, which in turn encourages contraband and other illegal businesses.<br /><br />The writer says millions of dollars is being wasted and misappropriated in government mega projects such as sugar development and advises the regime to desist from engaging in business. The article recommends that government owned businesses be transferred to private investors.<br /><br />The article also said the unfettered printing of Ethiopia’s currency notes has contributed immensely to the economic crises.</div><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-21718850416953616012017-07-04T23:00:00.001-07:002017-07-04T23:00:06.670-07:00Ethiopia: Shengo’s Press Statement on TPLF’s Divisive Proclamation<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br /><br /><b>Why the TPLF Ploy Won’t Work This Time</b><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Ethiopian People’s Congress for United Struggle (SHENGO) rejects the latest ploy by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its cronies to grant “preferential treatment and special privileges” to the Oromo people. This latest policy is intended to strengthen ethnic, social and political division and prolong TPLF hegemony.The Ethiopian People's Congress for United Struggle (SHENGO)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-evMhAQf2qsA/WVwymq07k2I/AAAAAAAAYes/xZ9rXXfzMdUP2nEo_ZaCl19M_Za-pIVuQCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/shengo.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-evMhAQf2qsA/WVwymq07k2I/AAAAAAAAYes/xZ9rXXfzMdUP2nEo_ZaCl19M_Za-pIVuQCK4BGAYYCw/s400/shengo.png" /></a>For 27 years, the TPLF has managed to pit one ethnic group against another, all for its own narrow benefits. It has managed to persuade the global community that, without its political and economic hegemony, Ethiopia will balkanize and genocide would ensue. This ploy to crush freedom, justice, the rule of law and inclusive governance has enabled this group to survive, extract rent and amass wealth beyond imagination. The glitz that is Addis Ababa mirrors this wanton robbery by a small clique at the expense of the vast majority of Ethiopians.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Central to this ploy of divide and rule is the deliberate and systematic animosity, lack of mutual confidence and suspicion the TPLF and its ethnic elite allies continue to create between the two largest ethnic groups, the Amhara and Oromo. Since early 2015, millions of Oromo and Amhara nationals showed fierce and bold determination to free themselves from the ill-conceived ethnic “tumor,” to use Professor Paulos Milkias’s term, conceived, developed and propagated by the TPLF. These political machinations and the constant assessment (ግምገማ) carried out by the ruling party squandering enormous amounts of public resources have done little to nothing in alleviating the root causes of abject poverty, hunger, disease, disempowerment, displacement, institutional corruption, human capital flight, massive illicit outflow of funds and the worst form of repressive governance. The Amhara, especially youth in Gondar and Oromia reciprocated a spirit of brotherhood, sisterhood and commonality and challenged the TPLF-grip to its core.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo contends that 27 years later, the TPLF is still a “front.” This “front” is still wedded to an anti-Ethiopia strategy of diminishing national unity with diversity. This “front” is used to governing and extracting wealth and riches without any form of competition. In response to the 2015-2016 uprising, the TPLF saw no other option but to come up with a new instrument of divide and rule by reverting to constitutional provisions that have made the entire federal government inept and dysfunctional. In the northern part of the country, it amassed a huge army supported by tanks, helicopter gunships and other heavy weapons with the sole purpose of “disarming” and crushing the indigenous population and forcing it into submission.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The core problem is not the evolution and identity of Addis Ababa where close to 5 million Ethiopians from all ethnic and religious groups live side by side. To our knowledge, the Oromo people who sacrificed their lives in defense of Ethiopia never asked for special preferential treatment. Addis Ababa is their city too. Addis Ababa belongs to all Ethiopians. The 5 million people who live in this city have enormous stake in its future. Sadly, no one asked them to have a say in the policy and decision-making that affect their lives.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">We conclude from this that the decision is political.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo believes that, in the same manner as all other Ethiopian citizens, the Oromo people demand and deserve justice, fair treatment and unfettered equality of opportunity under the law and genuine democracy. It goes without saying that respect of Oromo ethnic identity, history, traditions, cultures, socioeconomic and political rights and the use of their language is in the interest of all Ethiopians. These fundamental human and civil rights of the Oromo people should never be subject to negotiation. The TPLF and its narrow band of beneficiaries do not have the moral authority to grant or to deny these rights.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The sinister and cunning proclamation of “preferential treatment and special zones” for the Oromo population that is being propagated and imposed by the TPLF is simply a ploy to placate and to appease the population, defuse the popular outrage and resistance against the regime. In offering “preferential treatment and special zones” to the Oromo people, the TPLF schemes to create antagonism against the very people it purports to support. This is why this latest move is sinister (ተንኮል) that all Ethiopians must reject and condemn.</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>The deconstruction of Addis Ababa</b></div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In Shengo’s view, the deconstruction of Addis Ababa is a recipe for disaster for all ethnic groups and for Ethiopia. All capital cities in the world are a mosaic of people. Common attributes of such cities include “the right to private property” enshrined in Article 40 (1) of the 1994 Constitution. “Every Ethiopian citizen has the right to the ownership of private property. Unless prescribed otherwise by law on account of public interest, this right shall include the right to acquire, to use and, in a manner compatible with the rights of other citizens, to dispose of such property by sale or bequest or to transfer it otherwise.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo wishes to draw the reader’s attention to the fundamental principle that urbanization is a powerful and unstoppable trend. It breaks barriers and creates greater commonality and solidarity among citizens. Addis Ababa is such a mosaic and diverse. Its future prosperity depends on mobility and innovation. Article 49 (1) recognizes that “Addis Ababa shall be the capital city of the Federal State.” As such, it belongs to all Ethiopians. Article 49 (2) recognizes the city’s autonomy. “The residents of Addis Ababa shall have a full measure of self-government. Particulars shall be determined by law.” This provision is however circumscribed by Article 49 (3). “The Administration of Addis Ababa shall be responsible to the Federal Government.” It is the TPLF-dominated federal government that dictates policy and decision-making including the allocation of lands.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In theory, the TPLF reverts to Article 49 (5) and argues that its proclamation is consistent with the Constitution that specifies the special interests of the Oromia region with regard to Addis Ababa and its environs. “The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected….Particulars shall be determined by law.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">From the start, this constitutional provision is flawed and has been abused and misused by the TPLF to grab lands anywhere in the country. History tells us that Addis Ababa is located in the old province of Shoa. The ethnicization of the city was strengthened deliberately after the TPLF dominated EPRDF took power in 1991. The policy and structural problems that emerged are therefore a consequence ethnic-federalism that alienates citizens and bestows special rights and privileges on ethnic elites. It therefore behooves all Ethiopians to ask the fundamental question of whether or not any special consideration and privilege granted by the ruling party aggravates ethnic hatred and division, establishes precedents that the regime cannot control, diminishes cohesion and synergy that are vital for a modern metropolis; and undermines socioeconomic, political and environmental sustainability for all? Ethiopians should challenge the TPLF and its ethic allies and hold them accountable for the dire consequences.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In Shengo’s view, the unintended consequences of this sinister proclamation by the TPLF and its ethnic elite cronies are immense and consequential. The TPLF has utilized different tools for different occasions. Ethiopians would recall what the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said in ensuring his party’s longevity and perpetuity. “It is possible to reduce your population as well as your land.” TPLF commandeered security forces murdered more than 1,000 innocent Oromo and Amhara nationals and imprisoned tens of thousands. The TPLF grabbed lands from Gondar and Wollo and incorporated them into Tigray. The TPLF transferred huge tracts of land to the Sudan. The TPLF made Ethiopia land locked. The TPLF is waging war against its own people in Gondar, Wollo, Gojjam and other localities. No one knows the number of civilians killed or being killed each day.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All told, the TPLF is determined to prolong its rule by eliminating others and by placating and appeasing Oromo citizens without addressing the root causes of defiance and protest, instability and massive human displacement. Repressive measures undermine mutual tolerance, peaceful coexistence, diversity and the evolution of a multiethnic and multi-religious democratic society that Ethiopia and Ethiopians deserve.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo is enormously gratified that members of civil society, political organizations and prominent persons within the Oromo community have rejected the TPLF proclamation as “divisive,” evil and sinister. We share the views expressed that the proclamation fails to address the legitimate demands and grievances of the Oromo and other Ethiopians who continue to suffer under a brutal dictatorship. The proclamation ignores and fails to address the root and systemic causes that led to the popular revolt. Our response should be greater solidarity and unity; not submission.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>A regime in panic</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo believes that the timing of the proclamation is self-serving and is intended to detract the Ethiopian people from the hard work of mobilizing themselves against one of the most repressive and cruel regimes on the planet today. Ethiopia is now ruled by the discredited TPLF security, special units and defense establishment. The emergency proclamation has failed to enforce submission. On the contrary, Ethiopians express their anger, frustration, rejection and revulsion openly and without fear. The new proclamation is therefore a camouflage to divide the Oromo people from other Ethiopians.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo therefore calls on Oromo and other Ethiopian opposition groups, civil society as well as prominent individuals that have been consistent in their condemnation of extrajudicial killings to unify their resources and advance the change and democratization process in our country. We are convinced that, together, we can save Ethiopia from balkanization and civil conflict.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo notes with dismay that, having brought the country under a state of emergency, the regime is “relaunching” state terrorism in two fronts: one against the Amhara, most notably the people of Gondar and the other against the Oromo people. It does the later through a cunning scheme modernization and empowerment. The proclamation provides policy guidance for the expansion of “transportation and health services, rapid economic development, and proper compensation” for those whose lands have been grabbed or annexed. Despite this appeasement both ethnic groups and the rest of Ethiopia share a common cause, a brutal and inhumane regime that will continue to kill and jail. The way out is not division but greater solidarity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo notes that, time and time again, the TPLF-led regime responds with cunning and manipulative tools whenever popular will threatens its existence. Since the Oromo uprising in 2015 followed by a similar resistance by the Amhara population, the vast majority of Ethiopians have demanded and continue to demand fundamental and not cosmetic change. We are gratified this outcry for change is widely shared by the world community, by individuals within the EPRDF and by several think tanks such as the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and the Fund for Peace.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Shengo concludes from this that the TPLF tactic of divide and rule has outlived its utility function.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Last but not least, Shengo genuinely believes that fundamental democratic change is inevitable in Ethiopia.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">We therefore call on all Ethiopian civic, religious, political and professional groups as well as prominent individuals within and outside the country to set aside minor differences and collaborate to dislodge the repressive and divisive regime.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Long Live Ethiopia!</div></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-85345229611312666732017-07-04T23:00:00.000-07:002017-07-04T23:00:24.639-07:00A Fire under Ashes: The Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights in Ethiopia<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3_5QW1JGBNw/WVfYbdBmPCI/AAAAAAAAYbc/5R60AQfrVPkJm-J6IVUKdMzVIJtbgmHbACK4BGAYYCw/s1600/feyisa%2Blilesa.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3_5QW1JGBNw/WVfYbdBmPCI/AAAAAAAAYbc/5R60AQfrVPkJm-J6IVUKdMzVIJtbgmHbACK4BGAYYCw/s640/feyisa%2Blilesa.jpg" width="100%" /></a></div><span style="color: #999999;">A poster of Olympic silver medallist Feyisa Lilesa at a protest in Oakland, California. Making the crossed arm gesture is now a criminal offense under Ethiopia’s state of emergency. Credit: Elizabeth Fraser.</span><br /><br /><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">By&nbsp;<a href="https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/blog/ongoing-struggle-human-rights-ethiopia" target="_blank">Elizabeth Fraser</a>&nbsp;|&nbsp;OaklandInstitute<br /><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As massive protests swept across Ethiopia last year, the dire human rights situation in the country made headlines around the world. The Financial Times described it as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/753f033c-8f9e-11e6-8df8-d3778b55a923" target="_blank">Ethiopia’s “Tiananmen Square moment</a>,” and then-US Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Tom Malinowski called the government’s crackdowns on dissent “<a href="https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/blog/ethiopia-protests-bring-country-tipping-point" target="_blank">self-defeating tactics</a>.”<br /><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The protests that brought this unprecedented attention to the country were rooted in land grabs. Starting in November 2015, Ethiopians took to the streets to oppose a “Master Plan” to expand the borders of Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, which would have displaced Oromian farmers from their homes and land. The plan was eventually <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35300471" target="_blank">canceled</a>, but the protests struck a nerve and became more widespread, calling for human rights and democracy in the country.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">After failed attempts to quell the increasing dissent with force, the Ethiopian government imposed a country-wide state of emergency in October 2016. Since then, the news out of Ethiopia has waned, but problems remain.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>The State of Emergency: A Veil to Hide Political Turmoil</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In late July 2016, as protests spread from Oromia to the Amhara region, the country’s two largest ethnic groups – who together make up over 60 percent of the population – joined together. Despite being faced with violence from the security forces, citizens refused to back down and took to innovative means, like <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopians-shave-heads-to-mourn-fallen-in-oromia-and-amhara/3485277.html" target="_blank">shaving their heads</a> in solidarity with political prisoner Bekele Gerba and launching city-wide <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/ethiopian-anti-government-protests-set-to-continue/a-19485101" target="_blank">stay-at-home protests</a>. In August, when Olympic silver medallist <a href="https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/blog/feyisa-lilesa-crossing-line-ethiopia" target="_blank">Feyisa Lilesa</a> crossed his hands above his head in solidarity with the protests as he crossed the finish line at the Rio Olympics, the plight of his people was brought to the TV screens of millions around the world. And in October, the political situation in Ethiopia further unravelled as dozens if not hundreds were killed at an <a href="https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/irreechaa-tragedy-us-must-take-action" target="_blank">annual Irreechaa celebration</a> in Oromia, when the police response to protests triggered a stampede.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To curb this mounting dissent, a state of emergency was imposed in October 2016, including a long list of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37679165" target="_blank">draconian measures</a> curtailing freedoms across the country. Security forces were given greater powers, social media and diaspora news outlets were banned, curfews and travel restrictions were imposed, and more. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/despite-outward-calm-ethiopia-extends-state-of-emergency/2017/03/30/b5544098-1529-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.9116a516a072" target="_blank">Over 26,000</a> people were arrested, most of whom were sent to “rehabilitation camps,” where detainees <a href="http://addisstandard.com/memoirs-detention-awash-7-tales-indoctrination-laughter-unknown/?_sm_au_=iVV2S8WTrsW0q8sR" target="_blank">reportedly endured</a> physical violence, degrading conditions, and were forced to take part in a training program to ensure allegiance to the ruling party.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In March 2017, while some of the restrictions were lifted, the state of emergency was extended for another four months.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>The Need for an Independent Investigation</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Hundreds, if not more, lost their lives to Ethiopia’s security forces during last year’s protests, causing <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20663" target="_blank">international human rights experts</a> and civil society organizations to call for an international investigation. The government has rejected these calls, claiming that the investigation should be led by national institutions.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">An oral report from one internal investigation, provided by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in April 2017, concluded that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/report-669-killed-ethiopia-violence-august-170418164259637.html" target="_blank">nearly 670 people</a> lost their lives in last year’s violence, over 600 of whom were civilians. The commission, however, went on to blame much of the violence on opposition groups, as well as diaspora-based media outlets such as the Oromo Media Network and the television station ESAT. Worse still, the commission deemed that the use of force by security officials in many instances was “proportionate.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/21/fear-investigation-what-does-ethiopias-government-have-hide" target="_blank">Several observers</a> have challenged these findings and question the EHRC’s independence. The Commission is both funded and overseen by the parliament and is led by Dr. Addisu Gebregziabher, who took the appointment after finishing his term as deputy chairman of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia – the agency under which the current government won 100 percent of the seats in parliament in the last election.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">A few weeks after the EHRC’s oral report was heard, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein traveled to Ethiopia where he met with numerous government officials, as well as political prisoners at the notorious Kilinto jail.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In a press conference, High Commissioner Zeid brought attention to several issues plaguing Ethiopia, including the need for more “substantive, stable and open democratic space.” Zeid also noted that laws such as the Anti-Terrorism and Charities of Societies Proclamations are not aligned with international legal norms. High Commissioner Zeid did not, however, corroborate the EHRC’s findings, as his delegation was not granted permission to travel to areas affected by recent protests. Calls for an international investigation thus remain.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b><br /></b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Simmering Discontent</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b><br /></b></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While the state of emergency may have taken Ethiopia out of the international spotlight, it has failed to address the issues that fueled protests.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Political dissent continues to be a criminal offense. For instance, in a “further blow to press freedom in the country,” the editor of the newspaper Negere Ethiopia, Getachew Shifteraw, was sentenced to <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-26/ethiopia-gives-journalist-18-month-jail-term-for-subversion" target="_blank">18 months in prison</a> for “inciting subversion.” Yonatan Tesfaye – the former spokesperson for the opposition “Blue Party” – was found guilty of encouraging “terrorism” because of his Facebook posts and sentenced to six-and-a-half years in prison. And indigenous land rights defender, Mr. Okello Akway Ochalla, is serving a nine-year sentence for speaking out about human rights abuses in his home region of Gambella.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Opposition party members likewise continue to be detained. Bekele Gerba, deputy chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) has been in jail <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/09/dispatches-using-courts-crush-dissent-ethiopia" target="_blank">since December 2015</a>. The evidence used against Gerba includes a video in which he advocates for non-violent struggle. Merera Gudina, the chairman of the OFC, was arrested after returning from a trip to Brussels in November 2016, where he spoke to the European parliament about the current state of emergency.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The government’s second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) continues to advocate for foreign investment in large-scale commercial farming operations, which raises concerns about further land grabbing, forced displacement, and loss of livelihoods.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Unsurprisingly, given these circumstances, many expect that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/despite-outward-calm-ethiopia-extends-state-of-emergency/2017/03/30/b5544098-1529-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.35c237314ca5" target="_blank">protests will resume</a> once the emergency measures are lifted, with one Oromo-based judge calling the situation a “fire under ashes.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b><br /></b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>International Complacency</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">At the same time, the international community has been complacent about ongoing crisis in Ethiopia. Sure, after the state of emergency was enacted, visits by some foreign dignitaries took place, including calls for democracy and fundamental freedoms. And yes, the EU recently passed a resolution on the situation in the country. But Ethiopia continues to be celebrated for its economic growth and enjoys extensive financial backing from Western and non-Western donors alike. This includes billions of dollars in <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia" target="_blank">multilateral</a> and bilateral funding, as well as significant foreign investments from countries like India and China.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While millions of Ethiopians continue to be denied basic human rights, this international support sends the message that the Ethiopian government can continue its crack down on democracy and people without consequences. International complacency towards the regime may well stem from concerns around maintaining stability in an unstable region. But this short-sighted approach ignores the fact that continued repression could lead to more loss of lives and a region spiralling out of control.</div></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-21573586240268517742017-06-24T23:06:00.000-07:002017-06-24T23:06:09.279-07:00(Video) Eritrea Tabled UN Draft Resolution to Investigate Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; display: none; text-align: center;"><img alt="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-kKPnv-sx7K0/WU4bqA4rgqI/AAAAAAAAYYI/z6bFJNsG3sQpXLsm004ZPgtCaUbsl4jQwCLcBGAs/s1600/Eritrea%2Bat%2Bthe%2Bun.jpg" border="0" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-kKPnv-sx7K0/WU4bqA4rgqI/AAAAAAAAYYI/z6bFJNsG3sQpXLsm004ZPgtCaUbsl4jQwCLcBGAs/s1600/Eritrea%2Bat%2Bthe%2Bun.jpg" /></div><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="380" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/jiJHJ7aD6Ec?start=354&amp;amp" width="100%"></iframe><br /><br /><br />By <a href="http://www.madote.com/2017/06/video-eritrea-tabled-un-draft.html" target="_blank">Madote</a><br /><br />Eritrea introduced Resolution L38 at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva calling for a Country Specific Mandate to investigate Human Rights violations and abuses in Ethiopia.<br /><br />The following is Resolution L38:<br /><br />__________<br /><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">Human Rights Council</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Thirty-fifth session</div><div style="text-align: justify;">6–23 June 2017</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Agenda item 2</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner</b></div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the </b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>High Commissioner and the Secretary-General</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Eritrea:* draft resolution</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>35/… Situation of human rights in Ethiopia</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Human Rights Council,</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments,</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Reaffirming that all Member States have an obligation to promote and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their citizens and to fulfil their obligations under international human rights conventions,</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Recalling the press statement of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 2 September 2016 on the human rights situation in Ethiopia as well as its resolution ACHPR/Res. 356(LIX) of 4 November 2016 on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Expressing grave concern</i> about the alarming situation in Ethiopia, the increase in persistent, widespread and systematic human rights violations and abuses, including killings and excessive use of force by the Ethiopian authorities against civilians and peaceful protesters as well as the arbitrary detention and torture of tens of thousands of Ethiopians,</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Expressing grave concern also</i> about the state of emergency that the Ethiopian authorities declared in October 2016 and renewed in April 2017, the provisions of which suspend all civic and political rights, prohibit public gatherings, further limit freedom of expression, criminalize accessing the Internet, impose dusk-to-dawn curfews and declare large areas of the country “red zones”, where military and security forces can take all necessary measures, including shooting to kill, against citizens whose presence in those zones during curfew hours is not “authorized” by the authorities,</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Recognizing</i> that the current political situation in Ethiopia, the political and economic marginalization of the country’s largest ethnic groups and the brutal repression of peaceful assembly and expression of grievances and demands is causing serious risk to security and stability in the country,</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Recognizing also</i> that the international community can play a critical role in preventing the further deterioration of the human rights situation in Ethiopia and the risk of further insecurity in the country and the region by highlighting the human rights violations by the Government and abuses and the risk of escalation of the civil strife,</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Recalling</i> the appeals made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights and a number of thematic special procedure mandate holders for the Ethiopian authorities to provide unhindered access to the country for independent international observers to assess the alarming human rights situation,</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Noting</i> the recent visit of the High Commissioner to Ethiopia, in which he expressed concern at the lack of the rule of law and renewed his call to the Government of Ethiopia for access to affected areas,</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Mindful</i> that Ethiopia is a State party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and recalling the statement of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights calling upon the Government of Ethiopia to allow the African Commission and other international and regional human rights mechanisms unimpeded access to the concerned areas in order to carry out prompt and impartial investigations,</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Deeply concerned</i> by the dire human rights and security situation and the lack of accountability and impunity in regard to widespread and persistent violations of fundamental freedoms in Ethiopia,</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">1. <i>Strongly condemns:</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(a) The ongoing persistent, widespread and systematic violations and abuses of fundamental rights in Ethiopia by the Government, particularly the excessive use of force by the security forces against peaceful demonstrators and other civilians, arbitrary mass detention of protesters, students and political and business leaders, as well as acts of torture and ill-treatment of detainees and extrajudicial killings;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(b) The prohibition of the freedom of peaceful assembly and all expressions and symbols of political aspiration, as well as the right to ask for leave and resign from a job;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(c) The repeated abuse of the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and Charities and Societies Proclamation and the utilization of the October 2016 state of emergency to suspend basic freedoms and rights and to employ force to crush all independent political expression;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(d) The forcible transfer of populations and massive land grab that violates the social and cultural rights of indigenous groups;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(e) The refusal by the Ethiopian authorities to cooperate with international and regional mechanisms to allow an independent, transparent and impartial investigation, which is warranted by the alarming human rights and security situation in the country;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(f) The extrajudicial killing and forced disappearances committed by the Government;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(g) The lack of cooperation with regional and international human rights mechanisms;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">2. <i>Calls upon</i> the Ethiopian authorities, without delay:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(a) To lift the state of emergency decree, restore civic and political rights, respect the right to peaceful assembly and protests and respond to the demands of the Ethiopian people;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(b) To account for and release all arbitrarily detained political prisoners and peaceful protesters;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(c) To cooperate fully with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, by, inter alia, allowing access to a mission by the Office of the High Commissioner, the African Commission and other regional and international human rights treaty bodies;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(d) To end the use of arbitrary detention of Ethiopian citizens and to end the use of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment and punishment;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(e) To immediately repeal the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and the Charities and Societies Proclamation used by the Government of Ethiopia to restrict freedoms, silencing dissent, and release immediately those detained under these laws;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">3. <i>Requests</i> the Office of the High Commissioner to urgently organize and dispatch a mission of independent experts to Ethiopia, inter alia:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(a) To undertake an investigation into the violations of fundamental freedoms and widespread abuses committed against peaceful protestors and the civilian population in the Amhara and Oromia regions;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(b) To make recommendations on ways to end impunity and ensure accountability for abuses and crimes, including by identifying perpetrators and compensation for victims;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(c) To submit a written report to, and engage in dialogue with, the Human Rights Council at its thirty-eighth session and present an oral update to the Council at its thirty-seventh session and the General Assembly at its seventy-third session;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">4. <i>Calls upon</i> the Government of Ethiopia to cooperate fully with the mission of independent experts, to permit access to visit the country and to provide the information necessary for the fulfilment of the mandate of the mission;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">5. <i>Requests</i> the Secretary-General to provide the mission of independent experts with all information and resources necessary to fulfil its mandate;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">6. <i>Decides</i> to remain seized of the matter.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">GE.17-10041(E)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">*1710041*</div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="display: block; font-family: &quot;helvetica&quot; , &quot;arial&quot; , sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 12px auto 6px auto;"><a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/352152556/Eritrea-introduced-Resolution-L38#from_embed" style="text-decoration: underline;" title="View Eritrea introduced Resolution L38 on Scribd">Eritrea introduced Resolution L38</a> by <a href="https://www.scribd.com/user/350334970/madote#from_embed" style="text-decoration: underline;" title="View madote's profile on Scribd">madote</a> on Scribd</div><iframe class="scribd_iframe_embed" data-aspect-ratio="0.7068965517241379" data-auto-height="false" frameborder="0" height="600" id="doc_72939" scrolling="no" src="https://www.scribd.com/embeds/352152556/content?start_page=1&amp;view_mode=scroll&amp;access_key=key-xBmzzfpnvaCDidqQUOCy&amp;show_recommendations=true" width="100%"></iframe><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-19321516036925289052017-06-24T23:05:00.000-07:002017-06-24T23:05:20.945-07:00Former President Mubarak considered using Tu-160 to destroy Ethiopian dam<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-hz31q5HlDB0/WU79yczYLLI/AAAAAAAAYZk/iVKttg1vtzYZfRT0F95_yZJnQsgRCN-qACK4BGAYYCw/s1600/mubarak.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-hz31q5HlDB0/WU79yczYLLI/AAAAAAAAYZk/iVKttg1vtzYZfRT0F95_yZJnQsgRCN-qACK4BGAYYCw/s640/mubarak.jpg" width="100%" /></a></div><br /><br /><br />By <a href="http://www.egyptindependent.com/former-president-mubarak-considered-destroy-ethiopia-dam/" target="_blank">EgyptIndependent</a><br /><br />An unverified voice recording attributed to Egypt’s Former President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak has generated great controversy among Egyptian social media users.<br /><br />The recording, which surfaced on a Facebook page titled ‘Ana Asef Ya Rais’ [‘I’m sorry Mr. President’], featured statements from Mubarak on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ‘GERD’.<br /><br />Mubarak relinquished power in 2011 following the 25 January Revolution and has been subjected to judicial trials since.<br /><br />In the unverified voice clip, Mubarak said that Ethiopia did not dare to establish GERD during his era, adding that he had the ability to destroy it with Russian-made Tupolev<br /><br />Mubarak also asserted in the recording that Egypt is currently considered a weak country, unlike in the past when the world saw it as powerful one.<br /><br />Egypt Independent made several attempts to reach administrators of the Facebook page that broadcast the voice recording of Mubarak.</div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-10797024680012639912017-06-24T23:04:00.000-07:002017-06-24T23:04:18.151-07:00Death at home and dehumanization abroad - The endless plight of Ethiopian migrant workers<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-yHHt0K80p_8/WU77F5dnKlI/AAAAAAAAYZM/_hSYNggZJE01U0o-NhhMSLm1NmJzm4n1wCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/anti-saudi-protests.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="406" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-yHHt0K80p_8/WU77F5dnKlI/AAAAAAAAYZM/_hSYNggZJE01U0o-NhhMSLm1NmJzm4n1wCK4BGAYYCw/s640/anti-saudi-protests.jpg" width="100%" /></a></div><br /><br />By <a href="http://ethiomedia.com/death-at-home-and-dehumanization-abroad-the-endless-plight-of-ethiopian-migrant-workers/" target="_blank">Aklog Birara (Dr)</a><br /><br />Barely three years after more than 160,000 Ethiopian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia were expelled from the Kingdom, an estimated 400,000-750,000 Ethiopian migrant workers face a dire situation again. No one really knows the exact number involved; but it is in the hundreds of thousands. The eminent nature of these mass deportations reveal two intractable and interrelated fundamental human rights issues in international and domestic policy.<br /><br />First and foremost is the inability of the Ethiopian government to meet the hopes and aspirations of its bulging youth. Those under the age of 35 constitute 70 percent of Ethiopia’s 104 million people. Experts estimate that Ethiopia needs to create more than 2.5 million jobs each year. Compounding this lack of opportunity is a crushing and debilitating system of government that crushes all forms of dissent, rejects the right to demand services and to hold government officials accountable for crimes against extrajudicial killings, forcible disappearances, evictions, displacements, jailing and torture.<br /><br />Despite its constant rhetoric that it has embarked upon a period of unprecedented “renaissance” for its large population, Ethiopia’s police state is incapable of creating work opportunities or providing basic services. Instead, the regime resorts to all forms of cruel and inhumane treatments including encouraging hundreds of thousands to leave Ethiopia. The exodus of people is unprecedented in Ethiopian history. The regime continues to believe that this exodus generates foreign exchange and is therefore worth the sacrifice of tens of thousands of lives and the dignity of Ethiopians.<br /><br />Hence, the allure of a better life abroad and the push from cruel and inhumane treatment constitute the key divers of indescribable flight and brain drain from Ethiopia. Ordinary Ethiopians prefer to take risks and leave their homeland in droves than to suffer from humiliation, recurrent assaults and slow deaths at home. The government of Ethiopia is incapable of removing the root causes that led millions of peaceful citizens in Oromia, Amhara, Konso and other locations to revolt against this crushing system barely one year ago. More than 1,000 innocent people were murdered; and no one has been held accountable for these atrocities. Unwilling to respond to the popular revolt, the regime declared a State of Emergency for six months that it has now extended by 4 more months. For practical purposes, political, social and spiritual space is totally closed. A closed society cannot create jobs or establish an environment in which citizens would have a fighting chance to make a living in their homeland.<br /><br />If the regime has failed to match the East Asian Miracle of growth and development over the past 27 years, do not expect that it can match them in the next 30 or 50 years. The fundamentals are broken and cannot be fixed by the same crowd that enriched themselves over a quarter century!! The tragedy in exclusionary and repressive governance shrouded under the developmental state is that, the regime’s leaders refuse to compare their contributions with the best of the best in the East and South Asia, Latin America, North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, they keep telling the Ethiopian people that the regime is doing better than the Imperial regime and the Dergue, both of which are long gone and history. Why not dare to compare Ethiopia’s growth with current success stories such as Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia and increasingly Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda etc.? Ethiopia’s per capita income is a third of Sub-Saharan Africa.<br /><br />The regime has failed miserably in meeting the demands and needs of Ethiopian youth. They leaves in droves because the system is both hostile and disempowering. Any regime incapable of responding to its youthful population is at the same time incapable of serving the country and all of its citizens. Immigrants suffer from this vicious and cruel system.<br /><br />Second, even in better times, Saudi Arabia is not known for humane treatment of migrant workers. Migrant workers do not have human rights; they are treated as disposable modern “slaves.” Therefore, the Saudi Arabia’s “Saudization” or indigenization program comes at the worst time for Ethiopian migrant workers. Millions of Ethiopians suffer from one of the worst cases of drought famine. A 2017 assessment of fragile states by the Fund for Peace identifies Ethiopia among the 15 most fragile countries in the world. The report underscores the fact that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that dominates the government exercises total monopoly over political, economic, security and other policy and decision-making institutions. “The TPLF control is self-evident. The military establishment is Tigrean.” Group grievances are common and are left un-addressed. Ethiopia’s middle class is in shambles. Wealth is concentrated in a few hands, mostly Tigreans. The TPLF controls almost all natural resources.<br /><br />In a similar vein the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace opined that “The EPRDF position of power remains fundamentally fragile, owning primarily to the internal contradictions of the EPRDF regime.” Consequently, the regime is incapable and unable to meet the basic needs of citizens.<br /><br />Against these dire conditions, migrant workers face enormous problems in Ethiopia. History is likely to repeat itself. Three years ago, those who returned to Ethiopia from Saudi Arabia found themselves in a worst condition and thus returned to Saudi Arabia and other countries in droves. At the time, Human Rights Watch and other human rights groups reported degrading conditions, indescribable human rights abuses by police and gangs in Saudi detention camps. The current deportation order might be far worse than the last. Because the numbers are far greater and the decision is not reversible or flexible. On 19 March, 2017, the Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia issued a national campaign under the title of ‘A Nation Without Violations’ and gave “illegal migrants” 90 days from March 29, 2017 to leave the country without paying penalties. According to the edict, “illegal migrants” who fail to leave within the time frame will be evicted forcibly or face other punishments.<br /><br />What is the responsibility of the government of Ethiopia?<br /><br />First and foremost is for the Ethiopian government to express outrage against this cruel and unusual punishment and to defend the human rights of Ethiopian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. It is to urge the government of Saudi Arabia to treat Ethiopians with respect and dignity and to negotiate a reasonable, honorable and safe exit for all Ethiopians regardless of age, gender, religion, ethnicity, health condition, income level and marital status. On this score, Ethiopian officials are consistently numb and show zero interest for Ethiopian lives either at home or abroad.<br /><br />The decision by Saudi authorities to “revive the economies of companies and establishments and protect small businesses and projects from illegal expats, while also reducing unemployment rates and creating a safe economic and social environment” might seem reasonable on the surface. After all, all nations serve their national interests first. Currently, Saudi society depends on an estimated 9-12 million foreigners to support the economy, especially services. The Middle East Monitor estimates that a third of Saudi’s population is composed of foreigners from a broad spectrum of countries including Ethiopia. These foreigners claim that they are “unpaid, underpaid and ill-treated” by their employers. Worse off among these are migrant workers and illegal immigrants. Those who protest for decent wages and decent treatment are often “flogged and jailed.” They are treated worse than “dogs.”<br /><br />The world community and callous governments such as Ethiopia’s show minimal interest. Ethiopian officials are much keener to benefit from remittances migrant workers send to Ethiopia more than they show an ounce of empathy for their ill treatment. The Ethiopian Embassy is literally closed for business when it comes to migrant workers.<br /><br />It is true that in 2013, international pressure and especially vigorous and worldwide campaign spearheaded by Ethiopian Diaspora groups, most notably by the Global Alliance for the Rights of Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia and now the Global Alliance for the Rights of Ethiopians (GARE) did a terrific job persuading both the Saudis and Ethiopian authorities to repatriate more than 160,000 Ethiopians.<br /><br />Given the magnitude of the problem and the intractable root causes that push Ethiopians out of their homeland, Diaspora fund mobilization and support to repatriate more than 400,000 Ethiopians is virtually untenable.<br /><br />The cost of repatriation must therefore be borne primarily by the government of Ethiopia. It is unreasonable to expect poor migrants who borrowed and used all family savings to migrate to Saudi Arabia to pay for their transportation to the country they left in the first place. The government ought to also entertain the notion of “regularization or legalization” of migrant workers whose skill sets are in demand within Saudi Arabia. It is inevitable that given lack of opportunities in Ethiopia, many thousands will renter Saudi Arabia, making the administrative costs of repeated reentry and expulsion prohibitive for the Saudis while tarnishing their public image perpetually and irreparably.<br /><br />Further, the government of Ethiopia owes it to Ethiopian families of migrants to demand that the government of Saudi Arabia stop its barbaric treatment and abusive treatment of Ethiopian migrant workers. In 2013 Human Rights Watch and the Regional Mixed Migration Screening (RMMS) reported that returnees told them that “they were detained for weeks by Saudi authorities in appalling conditions with severe overcrowding, lack of access to air and daylight, sweltering heat and limited medical assistance.<br /><br />Further Ethiopians suffered from “theft of migrants’ belongings, beatings, sexual abuses, rapes, maiming, flogging and killings.” Sadly, the government of Ethiopia never voiced concern let alone outrage. Given this negligence by Ethiopian officials, the international media did not report the atrocities.<br /><br />Ethiopians should therefore conclude from this that similar atrocities will persist. If they cannot count on the government to deal with the root causes for their flight, it is unlikely that it will take a different position this time around. Yet, the situation in 2017 is even more ominous and much more urgent. In 2013/2014 165,000 Ethiopians were deported over the course of only 4 months. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDSA) estimates that at least 260,000 Ethiopian migrant workers returned to Saudi Arabia in 2016 alone.” UNDSA maintains a data base on the number of legal or regular Ethiopian migrants to Saudi Arabia, which in 2016 numbered 124,000. It does not have an accurate count of irregular or illegal migrants estimated at more than 4 times this number. Sadly, Ethiopians continue to migrate through Yemen and other locations, often risking their lives and human rights. Expulsions alone have done little to nothing to contain the tide.<br /><br />Reports indicate that the government of Ethiopia has granted 50,000-80,000 entry visas to Ethiopians. At least twenty thousand have returned to Ethiopia. Depending on which source you believe, hundreds of thousands are in limbo and desperate. Reports indicate that Saudi authorities have begun to arrest thousands. These prisoners are housed in concentration camps where they face the prospect of communicable diseases, hunger and ill-treatment.<br /><br />This humanitarian crisis requires urgent and concerted response from the global community in general and human rights groups such as UNHCR, Red Crescent, the International Red Cross, the International Office for Migration (IOM) and other non-governmental organizations. IOM is best prepared and equipped to facilitate the deportation process while providing sustenance to those in detention centers as it did in Yemen in 2013. It is IOM that quotes the much higher figure of 750,000 Ethiopian migrants in limbo and facing deportation immediately.<br /><br />The sheer number of these migrants makes it virtually impossible for the government of Ethiopia to repatriate all of them at the same time. Far worse, Ethiopia does not have the economic and infrastructural capacity to accommodate returnees and to restore their lives. This is the reason why the government requested IOM to raise global awareness, mobilize funds, spearhead the repatriation effort, provide post-arrival assistance and assist in the reintegration process.<br /><br />However, IOM cannot negotiate the terms of treatment of Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia or defend and safeguard that their fundamental human rights and human dignity. It cannot negotiate a longer grace period and time frame. Only Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Prime Minister, Hailemariam Dessalegn can do these.<br /><br />At minimum, the Prime Minister should make an official visit to Saudi Arabia and make a personal plea to the highest officials of the Kingdom. The Prime Minister should also call on his own government to establish a high level Commission of Experts to look into the root causes of the problem; and come up with long term solutions for this recurring tragedy. Ethiopia should change its national shame image by offering solutions to social ills rather than punish dissent and crush human rights.<br /><br />In the meantime, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister should commit his government to repatriate all those willing to leave Saudi Arabia free of charge. The safe return of Ethiopians cannot be left to the government of Saudi Arabia that wants them out. Nor can it be left to a third non-governmental organization whose primary role is facilitation.<br /><br />The government of Ethiopia can no longer mask the problem. It is a national disgrace. It should be honest and bold enough to tell the Saudis and the global community that it cannot accommodate this enormous demand without global funding, including funding from the World Bank.<br /><br />The large Ethiopian Diaspora has a vital role to play.<br /><br />It should carry out a concerted global effort by seeking international media coverage by renowned entities such as CNN, BBC and Al-Jazeera.<br /><br />It should initiate a letter campaign to draw attention to human rights groups.<br /><br />Last but not least, the Diaspora should muster the courage to alert the global community that the deteriorating human rights situation in Ethiopia is the root cause of the problem; and that the global community should stop shoring up one of the most corrupt, inept and repressive regimes in the world.<br />In this connection, Human Rights Watch’s report “<b>Detained, Beaten, Deported</b>: Saudi Abuses against Migrants during Mass Expulsions” depicts the structural problems deportees face. “Many arrived back in their countries destitute, unable to buy food or pay for transportation to their home areas, in some cases because Saudi officials arbitrarily confiscated their personal property. Many of the hundreds of thousands of migrants Saudi Arabia has deported in the last year and a half have been sent back to places where their safety is threatened.”<br /><br />Evidence shows that Ethiopians won’t be safe at home when they return. By all measurements, the condition in Ethiopia is more suffocating, hostile and unwelcoming than it was three years ago.<br /><br />What should we urge the government of Saudi Arabia to do?<br /><br />Consider relaxing the departure date<br />Stop beating, flogging, torturing and abusing Ethiopian migrants; and bring those responsible for injustice including rapes to justice; and treat migrants with due process of international law. In 2013 in a neighborhood of southern Riyadh, where the majority of residents are Ethiopians, at least three Ethiopian workers were killed and numerous maimed and beaten.”<br /><br />Improve conditions of detention centers for migrants, provide proper shelters, safe drinking water, adequate sanitation and food; and<br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-41883167161544019812017-06-24T23:01:00.000-07:002017-06-24T23:01:12.947-07:00The wall TPLF had carefully erected to isolate Eritrea has crumbled.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-PkC67PUCUZA/WUrN5hUX9vI/AAAAAAAAYSM/Fyh2JCwXV_suyyJoG1aOTYl9QpHpqhyWwCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/Eritrean%2Bmilitary%2Basmara%2Bparade.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="331" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-PkC67PUCUZA/WUrN5hUX9vI/AAAAAAAAYSM/Fyh2JCwXV_suyyJoG1aOTYl9QpHpqhyWwCK4BGAYYCw/s640/Eritrean%2Bmilitary%2Basmara%2Bparade.jpg" width="100%" /></a></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #999999;">Eritrean military parade in Asmara</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">By <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/21/africas-most-isolated-dictatorship-is-suddenly-very-popular-eritrea-comes-in-from-the-cold/" target="_blank">Tom Gardner</a> | Foerign Policy&nbsp;</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Two recent and seemingly incongruous events may one day be seen as symbolic turning points for Eritrea, an authoritarian, one-party state often referred to as Africa’s hermit kingdom. The first was a bloody clash on Eritrea’s border with Ethiopia in June 2016, which left hundreds of people dead and brought back memories of the devastating 1998-2000 war between the two archenemies. The second was an academic conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara in July, the first of its kind in 15 years. Visiting academics were shocked by the relative freedom for debate — on everything from women’s rights to foreign policy — in the notoriously repressive state.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">“It was as much a political event as an academic event,” said Harry Verhoeven, an assistant professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar who attended the conference. “It was remarkable<b> </b>— by regional standards and certainly by Eritrean standards.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">These apparently contradictory episodes were in fact both subplots of the same story: Eritrea’s gradual emergence from more than a decade of international isolation and the uncertain attempts to come to terms with that shift by its rival neighbor, Ethiopia. The conference indicated that the Eritrean government is coming tentatively in from the cold; the border war showed that Ethiopia is worried that a rehabilitated Eritrea could threaten its regional dominance. Together, the two events demonstrated that the 17-year-old status quo of “no peace, no war” is coming undone.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In April, Ethiopia announced that it is working on a new policy toward its Red Sea neighbor. The details are still emerging, but one thing is clear: The government recognizes that its strategy of containment, imposed on Eritrea after the end of the border war in 2000 and ratcheted up with a U.N. arms embargo in 2009, has failed. For the first time in years, there is serious talk of a change of course in Addis Ababa.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The U.N. sanctions regime is dependent on support from the international community, which is gradually eroding. The sanctions were always controversial for singling out Eritrea as a uniquely bad actor in a region of bad actors. Now there is growing consensus at the United Nations that the main justification for the sanctions no longer applies: There is no evidence that Eritrea is still supporting al-Shabab militants in Somalia, and though it continues to support armed opposition groups in the region — notably in Ethiopia — its neighbors do as well.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ethiopia may be able to stave off a softening — or lifting — of the sanctions until the end of 2018, when its term as a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council is slated to end. Tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti, which have spiked in the past week following Qatar’s decision to remove its peacekeepers from the troubled border between the two countries, may well strengthen Ethiopia’s case in the short term. But in the long run it will struggle to persuade other members to continue the status quo without the backing of the United States, which now that President Barack Obama — and in particular his national security advisor, Susan Rice, who was seen as implacably hostile to the Eritrean regime — has departed may be less inclined to keep Asmara in the penalty box.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">“They didn’t have an inch of space when she was there,” Bronwyn Bruton, the deputy director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., said of Rice. Now that Donald Trump is in office, “all the African strongmen are rejoicing,” she added.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Wider winds are blowing in Eritrea’s favor, too. The war in Yemen, which is less than 70 miles away across the Red Sea, has sparked a rush on Eritrean coastal real estate by Gulf states looking to base their troops there. For example, the United Arab Emirates has been leasing the port of Assab since 2015 and is reportedly building a military base there. Meanwhile, some 400 Eritrean troops are reportedly fighting as part of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, in return for which Asmara has received fuel and finance.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">“The Gulf countries have repositioned Eritrea in the geopolitical context of the Horn in quite a remarkable way,” said Kjetil Tronvoll, a senior partner at the International Law and Policy Institute in Norway.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile, the migration crisis has spurred renewed engagement by the European Union, which is desperate to stem the flow of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean. Eritrea was Africa’s largest single source of refugees to Europe from 2014 to 2016, a distinction that won President Isaias Afwerki, who has been in power since 1993, an additional source of income. In 2015, the EU approved a 200 million euro aid package for Eritrea, though it has yet to disburse all the funds. This came on top of promises of training for the judiciary and security services designed to combat trafficking.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Individual European countries and humanitarian agencies are also stepping up engagement. Germany has resumed technical assistance programs while Britain’s Department for International Development is planning to open an office in Asmara. U.S. State Department officials, who long avoided the country, have started visiting again. “The wall that the Ethiopians had carefully erected has frankly crumbled,” said Martin Plaut, the author of Understanding Eritrea. “Everybody seems to be queuing up to love them.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Most unnervingly from the Ethiopian perspective is Eritrea’s strengthening relationship with Egypt, Ethiopia’s historic rival and now the closest thing Eritrea has to a regional ally. Addis Ababa accuses Cairo of working with Eritrea to support armed groups that have attempted to sabotage the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the continent’s largest hydroelectric project, which Egypt regards as an existential threat because of its dependence on the Nile River’s downstream waters.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">High-level exchanges between Asmara and Cairo have intensified in recent months. Afwerki traveled to Egypt in November to meet President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Eritrea’s foreign minister held talks with his Egyptian counterpart in May. Multiple Egyptian delegations have descended on Asmara, fueling rumors of a potential Egyptian air base in Eritrea. Such a provocation is highly unlikely, analysts say, but not impossible: Egypt has not ruled out the possibility of airstrikes against the dam.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile, Eritrea has made its own efforts to rid itself of pariah status. It has begun courting foreign investors, especially in the mining sector. Three new mines are expected to be operational by 2018, joining the majority-Canadian-owned Bisha gold, copper, and zinc mine, which opened in 2011 and generated nearly $2 billion in revenues in its first four years of operation. (The mine has been dogged by allegations of forced labor and dangerous working conditions.) The government also created a free trade zone in the port of Massawa in an effort to attract more investors.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This comes on top of small but symbolically significant measures by the government to improve its terrible reputation on human rights. According to the Atlantic Council, some 50 foreign journalists were permitted to enter and report on the country between May 2015 and May 2016, and the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was recently permitted to tour a prison.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Much of this is worrying to Ethiopia, which dislikes the prospect of Eritrea projecting its influence over the Red Sea littoral — a deep-seated anxiety tied to its own landlocked status. Addis Ababa also worries that Afwerki will use his growing financial resources to step up support for armed opposition in Ethiopia at a time when the country is already under a state of emergency following months of unrest. Above all, Ethiopia fears encirclement by hostile regimes.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But so far it has struggled to craft a coherent response to Eritrea’s rapidly changing circumstances. “Ethiopia was completely blindsided by what happened in Yemen<b>,</b>” said Cedric Barnes, the director of research and communications at the Rift Valley Institute. “They seem to have lost their way diplomatically.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Unlike Eritrea, Ethiopia has only distant relations with the Gulf states, and its efforts to dissuade the UAE and Saudi Arabia from engaging with Asmara have apparently been unsuccessful. As a result, it has resorted to displays of military strength, including bombing the Bisha mine in 2015. In private, government officials in Asmara claim that scores of similar provocations have occurred in recent years.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Analysts are unsure what a new Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea might entail. Some suggest it will amount to little more than a rearticulation of its existing approach, setting firm red lines and spelling out exactly what sort of military action their breach might warrant. Others wonder if the government is considering secret bilateral talks, perhaps including the offer of withdrawal from the border town of Badme, which Ethiopian troops have occupied illegally for the past 15 years. But war — to bring about regime change in Asmara — is not out of the question either, though military overstretch and fear of full-blown state collapse north of the border make this unlikely.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The problem is that domestic politics in Ethiopia makes bold thinking difficult. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front is deeply divided, and the prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, lacks the authority to make a bold move toward resetting relations with Eritrea. Whatever happens, hawks in the military and intelligence agencies will need to be brought onside, which will mean avoiding anything that looks like a humiliating climb down from the country’s aggressive stance.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Eritrea may have earned the title of Africa’s North Korea, but it has no patron like China that can force it to the table. Afwerki still benefits from the status quo, which justifies keeping the country on a permanent war footing. Reports that Eritrean troops have occupied disputed territory following the withdrawal of Qatari peacekeepers from the Djibouti border last week serve as reminder that Eritrea can still play the part of regional spoiler. And though it’s now less isolated, Asmara remains much weaker than Addis Ababa. In the end, movement must come from the Ethiopian side. “It’s a high-risk, high-reward situation,” Verhoeven said. “But I’m cautiously optimistic.”<br /><br /></div></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-47394500966067435262017-06-24T23:00:00.001-07:002017-06-24T23:00:06.023-07:00Dangote Cement to Quit Ethiopia Over Mining Dispute<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-IBG2abQDBmM/WU78itX73gI/AAAAAAAAYZY/cCzJz5oeEukfVSpcETB4GRd7S89uW5fJwCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/Dangote-Cement-Ethiopia.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="224" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-IBG2abQDBmM/WU78itX73gI/AAAAAAAAYZY/cCzJz5oeEukfVSpcETB4GRd7S89uW5fJwCK4BGAYYCw/s640/Dangote-Cement-Ethiopia.png" width="100%" /></a></div><br /><br /><br />By&nbsp;<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-21/dangote-cement-may-shut-ethiopian-plant-over-mining-disputes" target="_blank">Emele Onu and Nizar Manek</a><br /><br />Dangote Cement Plc, controlled by Africa’s richest man, Aliko Dangote, said it may shut its operations in Ethiopia if authorities in the central state of Oromia don’t reverse an order to cement makers to hand over control of some parts of their businesses to local young people.<br /><br />Oromia state’s East Shewa Zone administration wants the Nigerian company to outsource its pumice, sand and clay mines to youth groups or be responsible for “any problems” that may arise, according to a letter from the authority to Dangote that was seen by Bloomberg and verified with a representative of East Shewa’s administration. The regional government sees the transfer of jobs in pumice production as a way to ease youth unemployment and quell unrest, according to the document.<br /><br />Any mismanagement of mining infrastructure including buildings and excavators could “lead to total breakdown of our business,” Dangote Executive Director Edwin Devakumar said in an interview at the company’s headquarters in Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial hub, last week. The cement maker will write to the federal government this week to ask it to intervene and will consider shutting the plant in Mugher, about 90 kilometers (56 miles) north of Addis Ababa, as a “last option” if this fails, he said. The company listed Ethiopia as one of its three “key” markets, along with Nigeria and South Africa, in a presentation in May.<br /><br />There’s “no intention to displace any investment,” so long as Dangote is “working by the laws and regulations in our region and country,” Tekele Uma, head of Oromia’s transport authority, said by phone. “If anyone’s complaining about Oromia regional state, we’re ready to talk with them. Any investment can come. Any investment can go.”<br /><br />Motuma Mekassa, Ethiopia’s minister of mining, petroleum and natural gas, said by phone he wasn’t aware of an attempt by Dangote to reach his office. An official at the federal ministry said Dangote should make an approach through “appropriate channels,” as opposed to through the media, asking for his name to be withheld, citing the sensitivity of the issue.<br /><br />The Ethiopian government is searching for ways to reduce youth unemployment after violent protests by Oromo communities over alleged land dispossession, political marginalization and repression led the government to declare a state of emergency last year. Dangote Cement was among several businesses attacked during the unrest. The protests triggered a 20 percent slump in foreign investment to $1.2 billion in the six months through December compared with the same period a year earlier, according to the government.<br /><br />Foreign Investment in Ethiopia Slumps After Business Attacks<br /><br />The order to outsource mining is “a violation of our rights because the government has given us a mining license,’’ said Devakumar, who was Dangote Cement’s chief executive officer until 2015. “If I don’t have limestone and additives my cement plant is useless.”<br /><br />Although the disputes haven’t forced Nigeria’s biggest listed company to halt production, it will miss targets if the impasse isn’t broken, the executive director said. Disruption in pumice flows will reduce output and trigger job cuts, Devakumar said. Dangote employs about 1,500 workers directly in the country, while an estimated 15,000 people earn a living indirectly through the firm’s cement and mining facilities, he said.<br /><br />The disagreement is also hampering Dangote’s Ethiopian expansion plans. The company has stopped an advance payment on a contract to double production capacity of the 2.5 million metric-ton per year plant after signing an agreement, Devakumar said.<br /><br />The company has spent more than $700 million in the country and is “discouraged from investing more,” he said.<br /><br />Ethiopia’s government said in February it’s only likely to attract $3.2 billion of foreign direct investment this year, compared with a target of $3.5 billion.<br /><br />Dangote Cement, which has a market value of $11.1 billion, has expanded rapidly across Africa since 2014 and now operates in 9 countries aside from Nigeria. The shares were little changed in Lagos on Thursday.<br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-88017305627495436252017-06-24T23:00:00.000-07:002017-06-24T23:00:09.924-07:00Ethiopia: TPLF’s economic argument and its opportunity cost<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-q6lTAFx8Xrw/WU7xyeX0jTI/AAAAAAAAYY8/qVL5sCIq1oIYslL-n3vWY0VBQa_4JLAUQCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/Ethiopia-Double-digit-growth5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="340" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-q6lTAFx8Xrw/WU7xyeX0jTI/AAAAAAAAYY8/qVL5sCIq1oIYslL-n3vWY0VBQa_4JLAUQCK4BGAYYCw/s640/Ethiopia-Double-digit-growth5.jpg" width="100%" /></a></div><br /><br />By <a href="http://ecadforum.com/2017/06/21/ethiopia-tplfs-economic-argument-and-its-opportunity-cost/" target="_blank">Shiferaw Abebe</a><br /><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><span class="firstcharacter">A</span>s incredible as it may seem, Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) – the entity that has ruled Ethiopia for 26 years to date – has the international community in its bag with its claim of achieving a year-to-year double-digit economic growth and phenomenal poverty reduction for longer than a decade now. This dubious claim is one of the two atonements with which TPLF appeases the powers that be for the horrific human right sins it commits year round.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The powers that be – the U.S. and Europe in particular – have time and again accepted this claim as a worthy offering and looked the other way as TPLF kills, jails, tortures and dehumanizes its political opponents, journalists, human right activists, and peaceful protesters. If, from time to time, these major funders of the regime condemn its atrocities, they do it in the mildest form possible. Worse still, they undermine any effect their condemnation may have by, with the same breath, lauding the regime for its economic achievements and contribution to the war on terrorism, the other ploy with which the regime fools the world.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Very few Ethiopians fall for the regime’s anti-terrorism posturing, but sadly a significant number of them appear to be willing to give the regime the benefit of the doubt on its economic claims. A slice of them goes to the extent of consciously overlooking or downplaying the regime’s human right violations altogether.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">No amount of economic growth can justify the death, arrest or torture of a single individual. Those who think Ethiopians should endure abject injustice, lack of freedom, routine indignity and dehumanization in exchange for economic wellbeing are either associated with the regime, are in some way profiting under the current system, or lack empathy to those who suffered and are suffering the brunt of the regime’s unjust imprisonment, torture, and killings.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">That aside, the economic achievement the regime claims to have materialized because of its policies and actions has to be challenged in its own right because the claim, far from being accurate, is a work of deliberate exaggerations and deceptions. More importantly, this alleged growth, even if true, comes at a much higher opportunity cost as will be discussed later.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To begin with, no one can deny that there has been some economic growth in Ethiopia particularly in the last decade. Anyone visiting the country will immediately notice the buzzing construction activity in Addis and other major cities. The life style of some has also changed, for example with more Ethiopians owning a family car, a house or condominium. How much one would be impressed with these and other changes depends on their reference point. For many Ethiopians, their reference point is the Ethiopia they knew decades ago, which naturally magnifies the change they see now. If, however, one uses the rest of the world as the reference point, one would most likely have a much lower excitement if not disappointment about the economic progress in Ethiopia.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Comparative analysis – comparing Ethiopia’s economic performance with others – is important because it will tell us what Ethiopians have potentially missed for what they have gotten under the TPLF regime. But let’s first start with the basic claim the TPLF regime makes in its economic argument, namely Ethiopia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown annually by more than ten per cent for more than ten years. As the Economist, citing prominent international economic experts pointed out, this claim is partly a hoax; Ethiopia’s GDP growth at best is half what the regime claims it to be. One need not to believe the statistics, but make note of the several real life indicators, including the very high unemployment rate the regime itself has come to admit in recent times. Given Ethiopia’s population growth rate at around 2.5 percent, had the economy grown by double-digits for over a decade, there would be a much lower level of unemployment in the country today given also the fact that the few key areas of current economic activity such as agriculture, services and public infrastructure are labor intensive.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In Asia and elsewhere, a double-digit economic growth has uniformly generated expanding and well-rewarding jobs for the younger and better-educated generation in particular. Those opportunities almost universally created a great and infectious sense of optimism and confidence about the future of their country. What has happened in Ethiopia since TPLF took power – more so in the last ten years – is quite the opposite. Seeing little opportunity in the hyped domestic economy, tens of thousands of youth are forced to leave their country each year for a precarious life in the Middle East and neighboring Africa countries. The dissatisfaction and discontentment of those who stayed behind meanwhile boiled to the surface, escalating into a widespread popular uprising in the last one-year and a half and panicking the regime into declaring a Martial Law, which is still in place eight months later.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Secondly, the much touted double-digit growth</b>, even if it were true, amounts to much less when measured in per capita terms. For a poor country like Ethiopia, a GDP growth that is not measured in per capita terms is quite deceptive because it does not tell how much it amounts to when divided into one hundred million parts. That is why a recent media coverage about Ethiopia overtaking Kenya to become the largest economy in East Africa is pretty much meaningless. For all that matters, Kenya’s GDP, which when divided among its population is double that of Ethiopia, affords Kenyans a much better living standard financially, with better access to education, healthcare, clean water and reliable electricity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Likewise, the nominal GDP the TPLF regime reports, even if true, is much less in terms of real goods and services because Ethiopia’s inflation for most part of the last decade and longer has been in double-digits. So much so that the livelihood of salaried people, for example, has not changed much, if at all, despite the pay raises they might have received over the years. The vast majority of the Ethiopian poor and fixed income earners such as retirees actually fare worse today than ten years ago because their purchasing power has declined with the rise in the prices of goods and services. Families that receive remittances from relatives abroad may have weathered the brunt of the inflation, but their relative wellbeing has nothing to do with the alleged domestic economic growth.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Thirdly, one also has to remember</b> that, whatever growth there is, it is mainly financed by other people’s money. The country’s main production sectors – agriculture, manufacturing, and mining are nowhere near generating the level of real economic value and tax base to finance the infrastructure development that is behind much of the GDP growth. The public infrastructure projects – dams, roads, health and education facilities, waste management, you name it – are therefore largely funded by donations and borrowed money. As of March 2016, the TPLF regime had borrowed $21.7 billion (or over 30 percent of the country’s GDP) from external lenders. Including domestic borrowing, this figure rises to close to $40 billion (or over 54 percent of GDP). Ethiopia is one of 36 poor countries whose international debts reached unmanageable and unsustainable levels that the World Bank, IMF, and other lenders had to put together a debt reduction program under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>If the swelling debt is worrisome,</b> corruption is a bigger problem in Ethiopia today. The absence of transparency, independent audit, and accountability means a good portion of the borrowed and donated money is siphoned off directly or indirectly by the endemic corruption and thievery at the top level of the TPLF regime. According to the UN’s Global Financial Integrity, an average of $2-$3 billion is leaked out of the country each year through various forms of illicit financial flows. The total amount illicitly leaked out of the national economy estimated to be $30 billion is equal to the total donations the regime received from the United States since it came to power.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Corruption is a common phenomenon anywhere there is a lack of democracy and rule of law, but TPLF has elevated it into a politically sanctioned crime. Ccorruption and rent-seeking activities are systematically instituted to result in an inequitable distribution of income and wealth in a manner that reinforces TPLF’s political hegemony. There is no clearer indicator of this than the fact that Ethiopia is perhaps the only country where a ruling party owns a business empire as big as the so-called Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). Started with stolen and robbed resources from TPLF’s rebel days and later boosted by hundreds of millions of uncollectable loans from Ethiopia’s commercial and development banks, this conglomerate currently owns two dozen companies collectively worth over $3 billion. If this is not enough, TPLF also runs the Tigray Development Association (TDA) and Relief Society of Tigray (REST) each of which owns several thriving business companies.</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Fourthly, whatever growth has been achieved</b>, it has not moved the needle, so to speak. Ethiopia is still one of the poorest countries in the world, 172nd in GDP per capita, only ahead of 13 largely war ravaged African countries. It fares worse on the multidimensional poverty index that measures the percentage of people impacted by an array of poverty factors. It is at the bottom of a list of 102 developing countries only besting Niger, South Sudan and Chad. In 2014, a third of Ethiopians lived under the global poverty line, i.e., with under $1.25 a day.</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">To this day, Ethiopia relies on global donations to feed millions of starved people (about 8 million this year; 10 million the previous year). At the best of times, a third of Ethiopians are malnourished. TPLF brags about improving the logistics of begging and distributing international food aid, forgetting most every other nation on the globe is either food self-sufficient or has the economic and financial capacity to procure food from anywhere in the world to meet domestic needs and demands without much fanfare.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While such is the grim reality, the TPLF regime sells the promise of moving the country into the middle-income group by 2025, something that amounts to not much even if it were genuine. Currently there are only 31 countries in the entire world, which the World Bank categorizes as low income. The rest of 181 countries are either middle (102) or high-income (79) countries.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Moving out of the low-income category is not therefore something to brag about not only because the vast majority of the countries in the world don’t belong there anyway, but also many of the lower-middle-income countries are themselves poor. The middle-income category is so wide (ranging from $1026 to $12, 475 GNI per capita) that one has to move into the upper middle-income category to be out of abject poverty in a decisive way. Ethiopia will have to almost double its current GNI per capita ($590) to barely reach the threshold of the lower-middle income group – a tall feat for a corrupt and inept regime like TPLF to deliver – let alone reach middle of the way in that income bracket.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Finally, as a minority repressive regime</b>, TPLF will never guarantee political stability, which is a necessary condition for economic security that is in turn a prerequisite for a sustained growth. There more economic insecurity today than at any time in the past. A small segment of the population, who are ethnically and politically connected to the regime, are doing fantastically well. However, since the regime cannot guarantee the security of their economic fortunes, they fear they can lose it all as fast as they gained it. This is a reasonable fear because any wealth or asset built through political favoritism can be an easy target for destruction during a popular uprising or nationalization when a new political system is established. This fear will exacerbate the capital flight that has already begun and is bound to slow down investment and growth in the country.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>The opportunity cost of TPLF’s alleged growth</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>To argue that TPLF’s economic growth</b> is exaggerated, inequitable, debt-ridden, etc., is to tell only half the economic story. The other half that needs more attention is the opportunity cost of this alleged growth. In economics, the opportunity cost of a given choice or action is defined as the value or the benefit that could be had if the resources committed to that choice or action were used to accomplish the best alternative choice or action there is. In other words, opportunity cost is the best alternative we gave up in order to pursue a given choice or action.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Given the rampant corruption, political favoritism, and economic incompetence and mismanagement under the TPLF regime, it will not be hard to find examples of major public projects where the opportunity costs were higher than the benefits from those projects. A good example could be the Abay hydro dam which TPLF hopes to use as a source of foreign exchange by selling the electricity generated to neighboring countries. In the absence of accountability and the entrenched corruption and thievery within this regime, there is a justifiable fear that the full amount of the proceeds from the export of electricity will not accrue to the public coffer.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Even if the country were to capture the full benefit of the Abay dam, a better alternative would be to invest the resources now committed to the Abay Dam for generating a stable and affordable electricity supply for the tens of millions of Ethiopian households who currently live in the dark and the countless small and medium size manufacturing businesses whose production capacity is hamstrung by the endemic power shortage. Access to electricity, like access to education, clean water, and healthcare would be a great equalizer across economic, social and political classes. The combined social, environmental, and economic benefit of this alternative would far outweigh the uncertain benefit of the Abay Dam.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>At a macro (national) level</b>, the aggregate opportunity cost of TPLF’s economic performance can be assessed indirectly and roughly by comparing Ethiopia’s key economic indicators with those of comparable countries in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Twenty-six years later, TPLF is often heard measuring itself against the Derg, which is an idiotic comparison, not only because the times and the circumstances are far apart, but also because the Derg, far from being the best alternative, is one of the worst regimes in Ethiopia’s history. Even then, if one had to compare the two regimes, TPLF would likely not be a clear winner; in fact, one could argue the Derg would have done better had it have the massive international financial support and relative political stability TPLF has enjoyed. Anyhow, this is not a point to dwell on here.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Instead, in what follows TPLF’s performance is compared with that of other contemporary regimes. First, Ethiopia’s GDP per capita is contrasted with five other comparable (low and lower-middle income) African countries (Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya) using World Bank data. None of these countries make frequent economic headlines as Ethiopia does, yet, except for Uganda – incidentally a country that is ruled by longstanding tyrannical regime akin to TPLF – the other four countries outperform Ethiopia, not just in absolute terms but in their year-to-year GDP per capita growth too. This is evident from the widening gaps between Ethiopia’s GDP per capita and those of the other four countries as one moves from 1993 – when TPLF took total state control in Ethiopia – to 2015.</div><br /><b>GDP per capita, PPP (Constant 2011 International $)</b><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BoazosYgsQg/WUy-5LugNZI/AAAAAAAAYWY/NjpEjudTopoc0Wv5KD5EbxZjzDS5YXgiQCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/GDP-per-capita.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="222" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BoazosYgsQg/WUy-5LugNZI/AAAAAAAAYWY/NjpEjudTopoc0Wv5KD5EbxZjzDS5YXgiQCK4BGAYYCw/s400/GDP-per-capita.png" width="400" /></a></div><b></b><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">TPLF’s mediocre economic performance is more revealing when one compares Ethiopia’s GDP per capita growth with five developing Asian countries whose economic performance is seldom a headline, not as much as that of Ethiopia anyway. Ethiopia’s GDP per capita growth trails those of these countries by a widening margin over TPLF’s reign.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>GDP per capita, PPP (Constant 2011 International $)</b></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BYPNUT6cRNg/WUy_H5UDNgI/AAAAAAAAYWg/pIMbhJ2214Yb0UMgcM5updKiWe1D1ksWACK4BGAYYCw/s1600/GDP-per-capita1.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="266" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BYPNUT6cRNg/WUy_H5UDNgI/AAAAAAAAYWg/pIMbhJ2214Yb0UMgcM5updKiWe1D1ksWACK4BGAYYCw/s400/GDP-per-capita1.png" width="400" /></a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is important to note that almost all of the above African and Asian countries were able to achieve higher economic growth, some of them moving to the middle-income category, in less time frame than TPLF has been in power.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Finally, Ethiopia’ is one of 48 countries the United Nations labels as Least Developed. Ethiopia is also one of 60-plus countries whose lack creditworthiness only makes them eligible for concessional credits and grants from the International Development Association (IDA). As mentioned above, Ethiopia is also one of three dozen, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Comparing Ethiopia’s GDP per capita growth with these groups and Sub-Sahara Africa reveals the same story. Not only is Ethiopia’s GDP per capita significantly lower than the average for anyone of the four groups, except for the HIPC group, Ethiopia is not catching up with the economic performance of the other three groups over time. In fact, the gaps are wider in 2015 than they were in 1993, a resounding verdict for TPLF’s poor performance.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b><br /></b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>GDP per capita, PPP (Constant 2011 International $)</b></div><b><br /></b> <br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-y9HJ7XUqI38/WUy_aVWH6qI/AAAAAAAAYWo/PBpDxHzVwrkjnbETnw2XWQiUiERRDfizgCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/GDP-per-capita2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="233" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-y9HJ7XUqI38/WUy_aVWH6qI/AAAAAAAAYWo/PBpDxHzVwrkjnbETnw2XWQiUiERRDfizgCK4BGAYYCw/s400/GDP-per-capita2.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>A political solution for a poor economic performance</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Politics and economics are intertwined in any organized society. In Ethiopia, today, the two are almost inseparable on so many levels: The TPLF regime controls all the real estate in the country, urban and rural land included; it is the largest employer; the largest procurer and the largest borrower. TPLF owns many of the biggest corporations that are major players in the national economy. Contrary to its pretense, the regime is fundamentally anti free enterprise. Politics rules every inch of economics.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The regime uses its political power to punish its opponents economically – individuals, groups, regions alike. It discriminates against regions that put up political resistance or support opposition parties in the allocations of public infrastructure; systematically undermining investments by certain private businesses in certain areas; and even by withholding medical and humanitarian support to “unfriendly” regions.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The ethnic political system has created a lack of security to private property, severely limiting inter-regional investment, trade, and tourism, hence also inter-regional transfer of entrepreneurial skills and business knowhow, all of which are essential for a sustained national economic growth. These economic opportunities have been lost over the past 26 years because they do not fit TPLF’s divide and conquer political paradigm.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Worse, the economic consequences of TPLF’s politics will outlast its life span. For example, the best resource any nation can have for economic growth is its human capital, a resource that is lost the fastest in a political system that stifles freedom of thought, creativity, entrepreneurship, and human development. Under TPLF’s tenure, Ethiopia has lost and continues to lose the cream of its educated and skilled manpower in all disciplines without exception. TPLF has systematically robbed Ethiopians the pride, security, and ownership of their country and have turned them into migrants and exiles. One cannot put enough economic value to this massive brain drain that will take a very long time to turn around.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">There are bigger socio-political damages TPLF has inflicted on Ethiopia and Ethiopians. Their costs are incalculable. But on economic grounds alone, TPLF is not qualified to rule Ethiopia for a single day. Fundamentally, Ethiopia cannot prosper economically under a regime that is anti-Ethiopian politically. The solution is to remove it from power. Ideally, this would take place peacefully through the free will of the people, something TPLF will not allow to happen. The Ethiopian people are hence left with the only other choice – to remove it forcefully.</div><br /><i>The writer can be reached at shiferawabebe1@gmail.com</i><br /><i><br /></i></div><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-26081541926790977262017-05-02T23:05:00.000-07:002017-05-02T23:05:18.541-07:00(ESAT Video) Latest News in Ethiopia (May 2)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; display: none; text-align: center;"><img alt="http://img.youtube.com/vi/vPGfO8I3PQo/0.jpg" border="0" src="http://img.youtube.com/vi/vPGfO8I3PQo/0.jpg" /></div><div style="height: 0; padding-bottom: 75.0%; position: relative;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="380" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/vPGfO8I3PQo?ecver=2" style="height: 100%; left: 0; position: absolute; width: 100%;" width="100%"></iframe></div></div><br />Latest News in Ethiopia (May 2)</div><br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-64103835138898683692017-05-02T23:03:00.000-07:002017-05-02T23:03:10.755-07:00Who owns Addis Ababa ? <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br />By <a href="http://www.zehabesha.com/who-owns-addis-ababa-by-veronica-melaku/" target="_blank">Veronica Melaku</a><br /><br /><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-T1d8DY700Vg/WQjFiBikDWI/AAAAAAAAX0w/ViOA4ayMW7YbL5T4wkK9ri9v2SIp_LrvwCK4B/s1600/Addis-Ababa-768x576.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-T1d8DY700Vg/WQjFiBikDWI/AAAAAAAAX0w/ViOA4ayMW7YbL5T4wkK9ri9v2SIp_LrvwCK4B/s400/Addis-Ababa-768x576.jpg" width="400" /></a>The status of Addis Ababa remains one of the most vexed and volatile sticking points for Ethiopians.<br />The bill that will realize Oromia’s constitutional right over the city of Adiss Ababa released from Oromia Regional state. This new bill is based on the unfair privilege guaranteed nearly 20 years ago for Oromia when a proclamation stablishing the constitution was ratified.<br />…<br />In this short article, I will primarily reflect my position about the city of Adiss Ababa.<br />…<br /><b>1~ The Best-Case Scenario</b><br />…<br />All political forces particularlly Woyanie itself needs to get a better grip on reality, and understand that Addis Ababa is and will be remain under the controll of All Ethiopian.<br /><br />Addis Ababa belongs to all Ethiopian . If special priviilage is ncessary over the city that privilege should be given to people of Amaras, who make up over half the population.<br /><br />25 years ago People of Amhara were very much mystified by the evil and hidden ajendas of TPLF and OLF.<br /><br />There are more Gurages in Addis than tigres and Oromos combined, who only make up a combined 15%. of the population.<br />…<br /><b>2~ Second Best-Case Scenario</b><br /><b><br /></b>Let the Oromo establish their capital city somwhere else as the Amhara moved to Bahridar. Addis Ababa should be the capital city of all Ethiopians and African counties. Oromo should not be allowed to make their capital city in Addis Ababa .<br />…<br />Historicall Back ground <br />…..<br />Historically, the whloe Shewa area was the seat of famous Abyssinians kings like Emperor Amdetsion, Emperor Dawit ,king zereayakob and others.<br /><br />When we go back 300 years earlier the whole shoa and Arisi area was home to Amhara kingdoms &amp; Muslim sultanates which were part Abysinia. Old rock hewn churches like Adadi mariam in South Shewa &amp; other old churches in Gurage areas dating back over 500 years are evidence of chrstianity presence before oromo expansion.<br />…<br />Among others Gafat, Argobba, Chebo, Gurage, Zay, Aymallal &amp; worjie were semetic tribes inhabiting these area which joins northern semetic people all the way south to Gurage-Silti-Zay land. Their kingdomes were Damot, Ganz, Waj, Ifat &amp; Shewa sultanate in which all of these located in todays Shoa Oromo &amp; East wollega area. Northerners were weakened because of Gragn mohamed’s wars so as result they couldn’t help these small minority tribes from oromo invasion. Each having small population they couldn’t be able to resist oromo conquerors who are expanding their population size at a very fast rate whenever they raid into new territories.<br /><br />Historians gives facts with time stamp, you and politicians responsibility is to read and make your own conclusion. I read this book and make my own conclusion. All rational conscious oromos and Ethiopians should read this book themselves and make their own conclusion. It’s better to be a rational readers and a follower at the same time rather than just be a follower.<br /><br />In politics you can negotiate by saying you give me this and I will give you this in return but in the question of identity &amp; history you cannot negotiate by saying I will not preach this fact or false history if you give me this.<br />…<br />I trusted this book because it is written by a foreigner who doesnot take sides between north &amp; south and furthermore it uses a varied sources from 12th-18th centuary historians &amp; travelers from portugese, arabs, turkishs, harar muslims &amp; northern chrstian historians.<br /><br /></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2520884011414371679.post-1455959421463456062017-05-02T23:02:00.000-07:002017-05-02T23:02:02.762-07:00Ethiopia should export pork not donkeys<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-JI6zpAJl9OU/WQjiIOhd4lI/AAAAAAAAX1Q/AOCmPFL39BMlkbX45BO5lUSYn9LnKJ4QQCK4B/s1600/donkey.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="360" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-JI6zpAJl9OU/WQjiIOhd4lI/AAAAAAAAX1Q/AOCmPFL39BMlkbX45BO5lUSYn9LnKJ4QQCK4B/s640/donkey.jpg" width="100%" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A donkey owner gives his animals healthier food in Ethiopia, where an estimated seven million donkeys are used for transporting water, wood, building materials and people.</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br />By <a href="https://www.nazret.com/2017/04/29/ethiopia-should-export-pork-not-donkeys/" target="_blank">Daniel Teferra</a><br /><br />Ethiopia’s rulers, under pressure from the public, recently ordered the slaughterhouse for donkeys in Bishoftu be closed. The meat was to be exported to Vietnam and the skin to China.<br /><br />Trade can be mutually beneficial, but not when a country slaughters its farm assets; or exports its natural resources. All these are needed to create goods and services for domestic consumption and exports.<br /><br />The current rulers do not seem to know or care much about that. Their only goal is to earn foreign exchange. For instance, they sell electric power to neighboring countries while the domestic demand goes unmet. The idea of exporting water to Djibouti is also being floated.<br /><br />In the first place, the whole idea of slaughtering donkeys is culturally insensitive. In accordance with the teachings of the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia, Christians are not allowed to slaughter animals that do not have split hoofs. This should not have been lost by the Church leadership.<br /><br />Furthermore for Christians in Ethiopia, the donkey is a peaceful animal. Based on Christian teachings, Jesus entered the capital city of Jerusalem to celebrate Passover on a donkey, an animal that demonstrated his peaceful intentions.<br /><br />Traditionally, In Ethiopia, the donkey (ahya) is a tireless servant of the poor. “You don’t harm a friend that good,” we were told, growing up in Ethiopia. The donkey accompanied the soldier to the battle field carrying his ration. Mothers mention the service of the donkey in lullaby songs. As they sing, carrying their babies on their backs, they say, for a baby girl:<br /><br /><i>“እሽሩሩ ማሜ፣ እሽሩሩ ማሜ<br />የማሚቱ እናት ቶሎ ነይላት<br />ዳቦውን <b>ባህያ</b>፣ ወተቱን በጉያ፣ ቶሎ ነይላት!<br /><br />And for a baby boy, they say:<br /><br />“እሽሩሩ ማሞ፣ እሽሩሩ ማሞ<br />የማሙዬ እናት፣ ቶሎ ነይለት<br />ዳቦውን <b>ባህያ</b>፣ ወተቱን በጉያ፣ ቶሎ ነይለት!</i><br /><br />The cultural ramifications aside, it does not make economic sense for Ethiopia to slaughter or export its donkeys. Ethiopia’s peasants, most of them dirt poor, rely mainly on the donkey for packing and riding.<br /><br />Slaughtering donkeys not only reduces their supply drastically, but it will also decimate the mule population. Mules are off-springs of male donkeys and mares (female horses). Donkeys and mules are both hardy and versatile animals. Furthermore, mules have a reputation for their disproportionate strength and excellent hoofs. They also live longer than horses.<br /><br />In Ethiopia, farming is still done by hand with the help of machete, hoe and burning. Oxen-drawn plow is not widely known. There is also a critical shortage of oxen. Therefore, the significance of donkeys, mules and horses for Ethiopia’s agriculture cannot be understated.<br /><br />For example, if the traditional plow could be improved, farming with mules and horses could work efficiently well on Ethiopia’s small scale farms. In addition, farming with draft animals is sound ecologically.<br /><br />Ethiopia’s trade relation with the outside world will be beneficial if Ethiopia can transform its peasant farming first. That will enable Ethiopia to produce a diverse group of agricultural products for exports. Ethiopia is still stuck with its traditional exports of coffee, hides and skins and oilseeds.<br /><br />For instance, Ethiopia could export pork to China. According to USDA, domestic consumption of pork in China has increased five-fold since 1980. Unable to keep up with the ever-rising demand, China has been importing pork in large quantities.<br /><br />Thus, in order to take advantage of the massive Chinese market, Ethiopia could introduce pig farms instead of establishing slaughterhouses for donkeys. If that is possible, Ethiopia’s peasant farmers will be able to improve their incomes, and the government will be able to reap tax revenues and foreign exchange. Then Ethiopia will not have to engage in a destructive trade relationship and impoverish itself further.<br /><i><br />*Emeritus Professor of Economics.</i></div>Adminnoreply@blogger.com