Although the arrest warrants will be a legal step with solid foundations, the ICC's decision has an inherent political dimension that goes far beyond the jurisdictional scope. When the UNSC referred the Libyan Crisis to the ICC, it simultaneously approved a series of other measures including imposing an arms embargo on the country, banning travel rights for 16 Libyan leaders and freezing the assets of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his family. In other words, it was a decision clearly intended to increase pressure over the Libyan regime, more than punish human rights violations. This distinctive political dimension becomes even more obvious if one bears in mind the evolution of the Libyan crisis, particularly with regard to the stance taken by the international community. These arrest warrants are, perhaps, an attempt by the international community to end a marathon whose finish line, despite the distance already traveled, has been difficult to see.

The main idea underpinning this policy brief is the suggestion that Cape Verde should present its availability to be nominated for a second term as non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The country's development and its position in international affairs appear to be favorable to a new candidature, perhaps in the 2014/2015 biennium. Starting from Cape Verde's democratic credentials and its unique features suited to occupying this position in the UNSC, this policy brief will show that Cape Verde assembles all the necessary preconditions to not only be nominated, but also to assure high quality representation and intervention in the UNSC.

Stewart Patrick's article about Brazil's diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Iran and the implications regarding Brasília's chances for a permanent UN Security Council seat should be read carefully. His main argument is that Brazil's "unpredictable behavior" and "anti-Americanism" might have diminished Brasília's support in the US. And he warns -- a sort of threat -- that "Washington must be confident that any new permanent members will behave as responsible stakeholders". In others words, as it was pointed out by Marcelo Valença (see pp. 2-3), it seems that choices will have to be made, sooner or later.

In other words, choices will have to be made by Brazil, but the US can continue avoiding any commitment regarding a timetable towards the UN reform. Some players must choose a specific diplomatic path, while others are exempt of doing so. Thucydides comes to mind: "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must".

Of course, Brazil must conquer US support in order to guarantee a seat in the Security Council. However, US support must not be used as a blackmail device in order to impose diplomatic obedience at all cost.

Moreover, like Mark Twain, "the news of my death has been greatly exaggerated". Stewart Patrick, as well as others, does not need to worry. Brazil's stance towards Iran did no harm as far as its chances for a UN Security Council seat are concerned.