THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL
LAW
By J. J. BURLAMAQUI,
[1748]
COUNSELLOR OF STATE, AND LATE PROFESSOR OF NATURAL
AND CIVIL LAW AT GENEVA.
VOL. I.
TRANSLATED [IN 1752] INTO ENGLISH BY MR. NUGENT.
FIFTH EDITION, CORRECTED.
CAMBRIDGE,
PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS,
BY W. HILLIARD, AND SOLD AT HIS BOOKSTORE,
AND BY THE BOOKSELLERS IN BOSTON.
1807.
CONTENTS.
PART I.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT.
Sect.
Page.
CHAP. I.
OF the nature of man considered
with regard to right; of the
understanding, and whatever is
relative to this faculty.
1.
Design of this work; what is meant by
natural law.
1
2.
We must deduce the principles of this
science from the nature and state of
man.
3
3.
Definition of man; what his nature is.
3
4.
Different actions of man; which are the
object of right?
3
5.
Principal faculties of the soul.
3
6.
The understanding; truth.
4
7.
Principle. The understanding is naturally
right.
4
8.
In what manner perception, attention,
and examen, are formed.
5
9.
Evidence; probability.
5
10.
Of the senses, the imagination, and
memory.
6
11.
The perfection of the understanding
consists in the knowledge of truth. Two
obstacles to this perfection, ignorance
and error.
6
12.
Different sorts of error. 1. Error of the
law, and of the fact. 2. Voluntary and
involuntary. 3. Essential and accidental.
7
CHAP. II.
Continuation of the principles
relative to the nature of man. Of will
and liberty.
1.
The will. What happiness and good
consist in.
9
2.
Instincts, inclinations, passions.
10
3.
Liberty, in what it consists.
11
4.
Use of liberty in our judgment with
respect to truth.
12
5.
Liberty has its exercise, even in regard
to things, that are evident. Objection.
Answer.
13
6.
Use of liberty with regard to good and
evil.
14
7.
With regard to indifferent things.
15
8.
Why the exercise of liberty is restrained
to non-evident truths, and particular
goods.
15
9.
The proof of liberty drawn from our
inward sense is superior to any other.
17
10.
How comes it that liberty has been
contested.
18
11.
Actions are voluntary and involuntary;
free, necessary, and constrained.
19
12.
Our faculties help one another
reciprocally.
21
13.
Of reason and virtue.
21
14.
Causes of the diversity we observe in
the conduct of men.
22
15.
Reason has it always in her power to
remain mistress.
23
CHAP. III.
That man, thus constituted, is a
creature capable of moral direction,
and accountable for his actions.
1.
Man is capable of direction in regard to
his conduct.
23
2.
He is accountable for his actions; they
can be imputed to him.
24
3.
Principle of imputability. We must not
confound it with imputation.
24
CHAP. IV.
Further inquiry into what relates to
human nature, by considering the
different states of man.
1.
Definition. Division.
24
2.
Primitive and original states.
24
1. State of man with regard to God.
26
3.
2. State of society.
26
4.
3. State of solitude. 4. Peace, war.
27
5.
State of man with regard to the goods
of the earth.
28
6.
Adventitious states. 1. Family. 2.
Marriage.
28
7.
3. Weakness of man at his birth. 4.
Natural dependance of children on their
parents.
29
8.
The state of property.
29
9.
Civil state of government.
29
10.
The civil state and property of goods
give rise to several adventitious states.
30
11.
True idea of the natural state of man.
30
12.
Difference between original and
adventitious states.
31
CHAP. V.
That man ought to square his
conduct by rule; the method of
finding out this rule; and the
foundation of the right in general.
1.
Definition of a rule.
31
2.
It is not convenient, that man should live
without a rule.
32
3.
A rule supposes an end, an aim.
32
4.
The ultimate end of man is happiness.
33
5.
It is the system of providence.
33
6.
The desire of happiness is essential to
man, and inseparable from reason.
33
7.
Selflove is a principle, that has nothing
vicious in itself.
34
8.
Man cannot attain to happiness but by
the help of reason.
34
9.
Reason is therefore the primitive rule of
man.
35
10.
What is right in general?
36
CHAP. VI.
General rules of conduct prescribed
by reason. Of the nature and first
foundation of obligation.
1.
Reason gives us several rules of
conduct.
37
2.
First rule. To make a right distinction
between good and evil.
37
3.
Second rule. True happiness cannot
consist in things inconsistent with the
nature and state of man.
39
4.
Third rule. To compare the present and
future together.
39
Fourth rule.
40
Fifth rule.
40
5.
Sixth rule. To give the goods, that excel
most, the preference.
40
6.
Seventh rule. In some cases possibility
only, and for a much stronger reason
probability, ought to determine us.
41
7.
Eighth rule. To have a relish for true
goods.
42
8.
Our mind acquiesces naturally in those
maxims, and they ought to influence our
conduct.
42
9.
Of obligation generally considered.
43
10.
Obligation may be more or less strong.
44
11.
Dr. Clark's opinion on the nature and
origin of obligation.
44
12.
Monsieur Barbeyrac's opinion
concerning this subject.
45
13.
Two sorts of obligations, internal and
external.
46
CHAP. VII.
Of right considered as a faculty, and
of the obligation thereto
corresponding.
1.
The word right is taken in several
particular senses, which are all derived
from the general notion.
47
2.
Definition of right considered as a
faculty.
48
3.
We must take care to distinguish
between a simple power and right.
48
4.
General foundation of the rights of man.
49
5.
Right produces obligation.
49
6.
Right and obligation are two relative
terms.
50
7.
At what time man is susceptible of right
and obligation.
50
8.
Several sorts of right and obligations.
51
CHAP. VIII.
Of law in general.
1.
As man by nature is a dependant being,
the law ought to be the rule of his
actions.
54
2.
Definition of law.
55
3.
Why law is defined a rule prescribed.
55
4.
What is understood by sovereign,
sovereignty, and the right of
commanding.
56
CHAP. IX.
Of the foundation of sovereignty, or
the right of commanding.
1.
First remark. The question is in regard
to a necessary sovereignty.
57
2.
Second remark. There is neither
sovereignty nor necessary dependance
between beings perfectly equal.
58
3.
Different opinions on the origin and
foundation of sovereignty.
58
4.
Examen of those opinions. 1. The sole
superiority of power is insufficient to
found a right of commanding.
59
5.
2. Nor the sole excellence or superiority
of nature.
61
6.
3. Nor the sole quality of Creator.
61
7.
True foundation of sovereignty; power,
wisdom, and goodness, joined
together.
63
8.
Explication of our opinion.
63
9.
We must not separate the qualities,
which form the right of sovereignty.
65
10.
Definition of subjection. Foundation of
dependance.
66
11.
The obligation produced by law is the
most perfect, that can be imagined.
67
12.
Obligation is internal and external at the
same time.
68
CHAP. X.
Of the end of laws; of their
character, differences, &c.
1.
Of the end of laws, either in regard to
the subject, or in respect to the
sovereign.
69
2.
The end of laws is not to lay a restraint
upon liberty, but to direct it in a proper
manner.
70
3.
Examen of what Puffendorf says
concerning this subject.
70
4.
Of the distinction of law into obligatory,
and that of simple permission.
71
5.
The opinion of Grotius and Puffendorf
upon this subject.
71
6.
The rights, which men enjoy in society,
are founded on this permission.
72
7.
The matter of laws.
72
8.
Internal conditions of a law, that it be
possible, useful, and just.
73
9.
External conditions of a law; that it be
made known, and accompanied with a
sanction.
73
10.
Whether the promise of recompense is
equally capable, as the commination of
punishment, to constitute the sanction of
law.
75
11.
Who those are, whom the law obliges.
Of dispensation.
75
12.
Of the duration of laws, and how they
are established.
76
13.
How many sorts of laws.
77
CHAP. XI.
Of the morality of human actions.
1.
In what the morality of actions consists.
78
2.
Actions are, 1. either commanded, or
forbidden, or permitted.
78
3.
Remarks on permitted actions.
79
4.
2. Actions are good or just, bad or
unjust, and indifferent.
79
5.
Conditions requisite to render an action
morally good.
80
6.
Of the nature of bad or unjust actions.
81
7.
All just actions are equally just; but
unjust actions are more or less unjust.
81
8.
Essential character of unjust actions.
82
9.
Of indifferent actions.
82
10.
Division of good and bad actions.
83
11.
Of justice and its different kinds.
83
12.
Of the relative estimations of moral
actions.
84
13.
Morality is applicable to persons, as
well as actions.
85
PART II
OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
Sect.
Page.
CHAP. I.
IN what the law of nature consists,
and that there is such a thing. First
considerations drawn from the
existence of God and his authority
over us.
1.
Subject of this second part.
87
2.
Whether there are any natural laws.
88
3.
Of the existence of God.
88
4.
First proof. The necessity of a self
existent and intelligent being.
88
5.
We must not seek for this being in this
material world.
89
6.
Second proof. The necessity of a first
mover.
90
7.
Third proof. The structure, order, and
beauty of the universe.
91
8.
The world is not the effect of chance.
92
9.
It is not eternal.
92
10.
God has a right to prescribe laws to
man.
93
11.
This is a consequence of his power,
wisdom, and goodness.
93
CHAP. II.
That God, inconsequence of his
authority over us, has actually
thought proper to prescribe to us
laws or rules of conduct.
1.
God exercises his authority over us, by
prescribing laws to us.
95
2.
First proof drawn from the very
relations, of which we have been
speaking.
96
3.
Second proof drawn from the end,
which God proposed to himself with
respect to man, and from the necessity
of moral laws, to accomplish this end.
96
4.
Confirmation of the preceding proofs.
97
5.
Third proof, drawn from the goodness
of God.
98
6.
Fourth proof, drawn from the principles
of conduct, which we actually find
within ourselves.
100
7.
These principles are obligatory of
themselves.
100
8.
They are obligatory by the divine will,
and thus become real laws.
100
CHAP. III.
Of the means, by which we discern
what is just and unjust, or what is
dictated by natural law; namely, 1.
moral instinct, and 2. reason.
1.
First means of discerning moral good
and evil, namely, instinct or inward
sense.
101
2.
Examples.
102
3.
Whence these sensations proceed.
102
4.
Of what use they are to us.
103
5.
Objection; these sensations are not
found in all men. Answer;
1. We find some traces of them among
the most savage people.
103
6.
2. We must distinguish between the
natural state of man, and that of his
depravation.
104
7.
3. If there be any monsters in the moral
order, they are very rare, and no
consequence can be drawn from them.
104
8.
Second means of discerning moral good
and evil; which is reason.
105
9.
First advantage of reason in respect to
instinct; it serves to verify it.
105
10.
Second advantage; it unfolds the
principles, and thence infers proper
consequences.
106
11.
Third advantage; reason is an universal
means, and applicable to all cases.
106
CHAP. IV.
Of the principles, whence reason may
deduce the law of nature.
1.
From whence are we to deduce the
principles of the law of nature?
107
2.
Preliminary remarks. What we
understand by principles of natural law.
107
3.
Character of these principles.
108
4.
Whether we ought to reduce the whole
to one single principle.
109
5.
Man cannot attain to the knowledge of
natural laws, but by examining his
nature, constitution, and state.
109
6.
Three states of man.
110
7.
Religion; principle of the natural laws,
that have God for their object.
110
8.
Consequences of this principle.
111
9.
Self-love; the principle of those natural
laws, which concern ourselves.
112
10.
Natural laws derived from this principle.
113
11.
Man is made for society.
114
12.
1. Society is absolutely necessary for
man.
114
13.
2. Man by his constitution is very fit for
society.
116
14.
3. Our natural inclinations prompt us to
look out for society.
116
15.
Sociability. Principles of natural laws
relative to other men.
117
16.
Natural laws, which flow from
sociability.
117
1. The public good ought always to be
the supreme rule.
117
2. The spirit of sociability ought to be
universal.
117
3. To observe a natural equality.
117
4. To preserve a benevolence even
towards our enemies. Self-defence is
permitted, revenge is not.
119
17.
Particular consequences.
119
18.
These three principles have all the
requisite characters.
121
19.
Remarks on Puffendorf's system.
121
20.
The critics have carried their censures
too far against him in this respect.
121
21
Of the connexion between our natural
duties.
122
22.
Of the opposition, that sometimes
happens between these very duties.
123
23.
Natural law obligatory, and natural law
of simple permission. General principle
of the law of permission.
124
24.
Two species of natural law; one
primitive, the other secondary.
125
CHAP. V.
That natural laws have been
sufficiently notified; of their proper
characteristics, the obligation they
produce, &c.
1.
God has sufficiently notified the laws of
nature to man.
126
2.
Men may assist one another in this
respect.
126
3.
The manner, in which the principles of
the laws of nature have been
established, is a fresh proof of the
reality of those laws.
127
4.
Natural laws are the effect of the divine
goodness.
127
5.
The laws of nature do not depend on
arbitrary institution.
128
6.
Our opinion is not very wide from that
of Grotius.
129
7.
The effect of the laws of nature is an
obligation of conforming our conduct to
them.
129
8.
Natural laws are obligatory in respect to
all men.
130
9.
Grotius's opinion with regard to divine,
positive, and universal law.
130
10.
Natural laws are immutable, and admit
of no dispensation.
132
11.
Of the eternity of natural laws.
132
CHAP. VI.
Of the laws of nations.
1.
How civil societies are formed.
134
2.
The civil state does not destroy, but
improve the state of nature.
134
3.
True ideas of civil society.
135
4.
States are considered under the notion
of moral persons.
135
5.
What is the law of nations.
135
6.
Certainty of this law.
136
7.
General principle of the law of nations;
what polity consists in.
136
8.
Inquiry into Grotius's opinion
concerning the law of nations.
137
9.
Two sorts of law of nations; one of
necessity and obligatory by itself; the
other arbitrary and conventional.
138
10.
Use of the foregoing remarks.
139
CHAP. VII.
Whether there is any morality of
action, any obligation or duty,
antecedent to the law of nature, and
independent of the idea of a
legislator.
1.
Different opinions of ethic writers with
respect to the first principle of morality.
140
2.
Principles relating to this question.
141
3.
Three rules of human actions. 1. Moral
sense. 2. Reason. 3. The divine will.
142
4.
These three principles ought to be
united.
143
5.
Of the primitive cause of obligation.
143
6.
All rules are of themselves obligatory.
143
7.
Obligation may be more or less strong.
144
8.
Reason alone is sufficient to impose
some obligation on man.
145
9.
Objection. Nobody can oblige himself.
146
10.
Answer.
146
11.
A fresh objection.
147
12.
Duty may be taken in a loose or strict
sense.
148
13.
Result of what has been hitherto said.
149
14.
This manner of establishing morality
does not weaken the system of natural
law.
150
15.
Grotius's opinion examined.
151
16.
In order to have a perfect system of
morality, we should join it with religion.
151
CHAP. VIII.
Consequences of the preceding
chapter; reflections on the
distinctions of justice, honesty, and
utility.
1.
There is a great deal of ambiguity and
mistake concerning this subject.
152
2.
Of justice, honesty, utility, order, and
fitness.
152
3.
Justice, honesty, and utility, are distinct
things, and must not be confounded.
153
4.
But though they are distinct, yet they are
naturally connected.
153
5.
Whether an action is just, because God
commands it?
154
6.
In what the beauty of virtue and the
perfection of man consist.
155
CHAP. IX.
Of the application of natural laws to
human actions; and first of
conscience.
1.
What is meant by applying the laws to
human actions.
156
2.
What is conscience.
156
3.
Conscience supposes a knowledge of
the law.
157
4.
First rule.
157
5.
Second and third rules.
158
6.
Antecedent and subsequent conscience.
Fourth rule.
159
7.
Subsequent conscience is either quiet,
or uneasy.
160
8.
Decisive and dubious conscience. Fifth,
sixth, and seventh rules.
161
9.
Scrupulous conscience. Eighth rule.
162
10.
Right and erroneous conscience. Ninth
rule.
162
11.
Demonstrative and probable
conscience. Tenth rule.
163
CHAP. X.
Of the writ and demerit of human
actions; and of their imputation
relative to the laws of nature.
1.
Distinction of imputability and
imputation. Of the nature of a moral
cause.
165
2.
Of the imputation. It supposes a
knowledge of the law, as well as of the
fact.
165
3.
Examples.
166
4.
Principles. 1. We ought to infer actual
imputation from imputability only.
167
5.
2. Imputation supposes some connexion
between the action and its
consequences.
167
6.
3. Foundation of merit and demerit.
168
7.
In what merit and demerit consist.
169
8.
4. Merit and demerit have their degrees;
and so has imputation.
169
9.
5. Imputation is either simple or
efficacious.
170
10.
6. Effects of one and the other.
170
11.
7. If all those, who are concerned, do
not impute an action, it is supposed not
to have been committed.
171
12.
8. Difference between the imputation of
good and bad actions.
171
CHAP. XI.
Application of those principles to
different species of actions, in order
to judge in what manner they ought
to be imputed.
1.
What actions are actually imputed?
172
2.
Actions of such, as have not the use of
reason.
172
3.
Of what is done in drunkenness.
172
2. Of things impossible. Of the want of
opportunity.
172
3. Of natural qualities.
173
4.
Of events produced by external causes.
173
5.
Of what is done through ignorance or
error.
173
6.
Of the effect of temperament, habits, or
passions.
174
7.
Of forced actions.
174
8.
Forced actions are in themselves either
good, bad, or indifferent.
175
9.
Why a bad action, though forced, may
be imputed.
177
10.
Puffendorf's opinion.
178
11.
Of actions, in which more persons than
one are concerned.
179
12.
Three sorts of moral causes; principal,
subaltern, and collateral.
180
13.
Application of these distinctions.
183
CHAP. XII.
Of the authority and sanction of
natural laws; and 1. of the good and
evil, that naturally and generally
follow from virtue and vice.
1.
What is meant by the authority of
natural laws.
184
2.
The observance of natural laws forms
the happiness of man and society.
185
3.
Explications on the state of the question.
185
4.
Proof of the abovementioned truth, by
reason.
186
5.
Proofs by experience. 1. Virtue is of
itself the principle of inward satisfaction;
and vice a principle of disquiet and
trouble.
186
6.
Of external goods and evils, which are
the consequence of virtue and vice.
187
7.
These different effects of virtue and vice
are still greater among those, who are
invested with power and authority.
188
8.
Confirmation of this truth by the
confession of all nations.
188
9.
Confirmation of the same truth by the
absurdity of the contrary.
189
10.
Answer to some particular objections.
189
11.
The advantage always ranges itself on
the side of virtue; and this is the first
sanction of the laws of nature.
190
12.
General difficulty drawn from the
exceptions, which render this first
sanction insufficient.
190
The goods and evils of nature and
fortune are distributed unequally, and
not according to each person's merit.
190
The evils produced by injustice fall as
well upon the innocent as the guilty.
192
Sometimes even virtue itself is the cause
of persecution.
192
13.
The means, which human prudence
employs to remedy those disorders, are
likewise insufficient.
192
14.
The difficulty proposed is of great
consequence.
194
CHAP. XIII.
Proof of the immortality of the soul.
That there is a sanction properly so
called in respect to natural laws.
1.
State of the question.
194
2.
Divisions of opinions. How it is possible
to know the will of God in respect to
this point.
195
3.
Whether the soul is immortal?
195
4.
First proof. The nature of the soul
seems intirely distinct from that of the
body.
195
5.
Death does not therefore necessarily
imply the annihilation of the soul.
196
6.
Objection. Answer.
197
7.
Confirmation of the preceding truth.
Nothing in nature is annihilated.
197
8.
Second proof. The excellency of the
soul.
198
9.
Confirmations. Our faculties are always
susceptible of a greater degree of
perfection.
198
10.
Objection. Answer.
199
11.
Third proof, drawn from our natural
dispositions and desires.
199
12.
The sanction of natural laws will show
itself in a future life.
201
13.
First proof, drawn from the nature of
man considered on the moral side.
201
14.
Second proof, drawn from the
perfections of God.
202
15.
The objection drawn from the present
stage of things serves to prove the
sentiment it opposes.
205
16.
The belief of a future state has been
received by all nations.
205
CHAP. XIV.
That the proofs we ham alleged have
such a probability and fitness, at
render them sufficient to fix our
belief, and to determine our conduct.
1.
The proofs we have given of the
sanction of natural laws are sufficient.
206
2.
Objection. These proofs contain no
more than a probability of fitness.
General answer.
206
3.
What is meant by a probability of
fitness.
207
4.
General foundation of this manner of
reasoning.
207
5.
This kind of fitness is very strong in
respect to natural law.
208
6.
This fitness has different degrees.
Principles to judge of it.
208
7.
Application of these principles to our
subject.
209
8.
Comparison of the two opposite
systems.
209
9.
The system of the sanction of natural
laws is far preferable to the opposite
system.
210
10.
Objection. Answer.
211
11.
Of the influence, which those proofs
ought to have over our conduct.
211
12.
It is a necessary consequence of our
nature and state.
212
13.
Reason lays us under an obligation of so
doing.
213
14.
It is a duty, which God himself imposes
on us.
213
15.
Conclusion.
214
16.
That, which is already probable by
reason only, is set in full evidence by
revelation.
214