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ROME 0764; (E) 05 ROME 1451; AND (F) 05 ROME 2555
1. Summary: On July 21, an informal desert locusts donors'
meeting was hosted by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
of the United Nations. Chaired by FAO Director-General (DG)
Jacques Diouf, the meeting was well represented by donors and
affected countries. The meeting provided information on the 1)
current situation in and forecast for the Sahel, Maghreb and
Eastern Africa; 2) FAO assistance provided during the 2003-2005
upsurge; and 3) FAO assistance being provided for summer 2005
survey and control activities. Despite the late start in 2004,
FAO believes it made up for lost time by playing a central
coordinating role to pre-position equipment, pesticides, and
other resources. It hosted or co-hosted a series of meetings and
workshops to build local, national and regional capacity.
Currently, financial resources are sufficient for even a worst-
case scenario, which is most unlikely. Although small-scale
infestations are in progress in Chad and Sudan, where the
possibility of an outbreak looms, and limited locust activities
are being reported in Niger and Mali, FAO believes that the
threat of the desert locust situation in Northwest Africa will
continue to diminish, becoming insignificant this year. Due to
appropriate preparatory efforts, including extensive surveying,
forecasting and control operations by Northwest African countries
and pre-positioning of resources and provision of expertise to
the Sahelian countries, FAO states that the outlook is quite good
and it is well situated to handle this summer's potential control
operations. To further support its preparatory efforts, FAO also
stated it will begin consultations promptly on the external
desert locust evaluation jointly being led by the United States,
the Netherlands, and the World Bank. End Summary.
------------------
Funding Status
------------------
2. DG Diouf thanked FAO member countries for their contribution
to the desert locust campaign, noting a rather late but positive
response to the $100 million appeal launched in August 2004. To
date, FAO mobilized $73.9 million from 27 donors, and $6.3
million from its technical cooperation program (TCP) funds, for a
total of $80.2 million. Of this, $66.5 million covered regional
measures while $13.7 million focused on national activities. All
66 projects operated by FAO were coordinated by FAO's Emergency
Center for Locust Operations (ECLO).
3. As of July 21, 2005, $45.5 million was spent on providing
assistance (pesticides, aircraft hiring, spray and communication
equipment, vehicles, technical expertise and training, etc.) to
18 affected countries, including Mauritania ($14.84 million);
Senegal ($6.99); Niger ($5.25); Mali ($3.90); Morocco ($3.39);
and Chad ($2.52). The remaining balance of $34.7 million has
been allocated as follows:
-- Most probable-case scenario in seven Sahelian countries: $15.2
million (of which Mauritania $4.04 million; Mali $2.98; Chad
$2.47; Niger $2.61; and Senegal $2.82)
-- Maghreb: $2 million
-- Worst-case scenario in the Sahel and outbreaks in other
countries: $17.5 million
FAO is working with donors to determine their ability to redirect
excess funds to establish a Desert Locust Emergency Fund, which
would mobilize early funding for a locust outbreak.
----------------------
African Solidarity
----------------------
4. Diouf noted that over and above contributions by donors was
the significant coordinated activity by African nations, which
fostered continental solidarity for the cause. Algeria, Morocco,
Libya and Nigeria provided logistical support, equipment,
experts, planes and pesticides to neighboring countries in the
Sahel that were affected by the desert locust. Algeria in
particular provided experts and logistics, and has recently sent
planes to treat pockets of desert locusts in Mali, Niger and
possibly Chad. (Note: Assistance provided by the Northwest
African countries to their neighbors in the Sahel accounted for
tens of millions of dollars without which the locust situation
could have gotten worse and caused more damage in the latter. End
note)
------------------------------
FAO Preparatory Efforts
------------------------------
5. Diouf stated FAO played an important coordinating role,
delivering 60 percent of the pesticides and providing 50 vehicles
for the campaign. The combined efforts of FAO and other nations
resulted in the treatment of an unprecedented 13 million hectares
since October 2003, of which some three million were in the Sahel
alone.
6. Diouf ran down the timeline of preparatory and extraordinary
meetings, which FAO hosted either solely or jointly, including:
--Aerial Operations Workshop, Rome, Italy, February/March 2005,
which resulted in contract flexibility for deploying aircraft to
individual countries and regionally. For the summer campaign,
FAO will deploy one helicopter each to Chad, Mali, Mauritania and
Niger from July 23-27. In addition, stand-by contracts for fixed-
wing spray aircraft are available should the need arise.
--Train-the-Trainers Workshop, Niamey, Niger, March 2005, at
which 21 persons from 10 Sahelian countries and Djibouti were
trained as national master trainers. Each carried out three
training sessions in their own countries, resulting in the
training of 600 crop protection staff regionally.
--Joint FAO/World Meterological Organization (WMO) Regional
Workshop on Meteorological Information for Locust Forecasting,
Monitoring and Control, Niamey, Niger, April 2005, which was held
to improve the availability of meteorological data for locust
early warning activity.
--FAO/World Bank Contingency Planning Workshop, Bamako, Mali,
April/May, at which seven Sahelian countries developed plans for
best-case, most probable-case and worst-case locust infestation
scenarios.
--FAO/World Bank Donors' Meeting, Bamako, Mali, May 2005, at
which existing resources at that time ($30 million) were
considered sufficient for the most probable-case scenario and
close to sufficient for the worst-case scenario.
--Continued Dialogue with Donors, June/July 2005: Donor meetings
were held in Dakar, Senegal, and Nouakchott, Mauritania, while
weekly telephone conferences are held with the World Bank.
7. Diouf noted that FAO is now on top of the pesticides situation
with its pesticides monitoring matrix. A stock of over 2 million
liters is available in the Sahelian countries to cover more than
a worst-case scenario. Repeatedly, Diouf stated that the
coordination of pesticides delivery was harder than expected at
the beginning due to numerous bilateral donations. If excess
stocks cannot be used, or solutions for their long-term storage
cannot be found, Diouf indicated that some bilateral donations
may be returned.
8. FAO is working with donors to modify budget lines from
`pesticides purchases' to `pesticides storage construction'. In
addition, FAO is in the process of operationalizing pesticides
drum crushers in various countries, and is deploying special
teams to monitor the health of workers using pesticides. In
addition, it is working on long-term pesticides storage
solutions.
9. Diouf emphasized the importance of carrying out lessons
learned evaluations with both donors and affected countries. He
indicated that FAO agreed via formal communication to the
Government of the Netherlands to participate in the desert locust
evaluation [being spearheaded jointly by the Netherlands, the
United States and the World Bank] beginning September/October
2005.
10. For the moment, Diouf concluded that existing resources are
sufficient to cover even a worst-case scenario. ECLO is
providing resources for a most probable-case scenario, ensuring
that frontline countries such as Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad
are well equipped and prepared. The desert locust component of
FAO's Emergency Prevention System for Trans-boundary Animal and
Plant Pests and Diseases (EMPRES), which establishes a rapid
reaction capability and research facility, is assisting in this
effort. FAO has two EMPRES programs, one in the central region
and another in the western region. It hopes to include more Red
Sea area countries in EMPRES by May 2006.
--------------------
Locust Forecast
--------------------
11. Diouf noted that currently traditional breeding grounds in
Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco are nearly locust free. However,
he cautioned that there are small infestations in Sudan and
elsewhere and the desert locust breeding cycle is not yet over.
FAO does not believe the situation will become critical.
Extensive forecasting and deployment of resources will allow FAO
to handle the situation effectively.
12. FAO's Locust Forecasting Officer stated that due to the
unusually cold weather and as a result of aggressive control
operations carried out in the summer and fall of 2004, only
limited breeding occurred in spring 2005 in Northwest Africa.
Consequently, there has been a dramatic decline in control
operations during the last six months in 2005 in the region and
only 3,000 hectares were treated so far. Overall, the locust
situation is relatively calm in southern Mauritania, northern
Mali and Niger, and small-scale breeding has occurred in central
Niger, eastern Chad and western Sudan. These were the result of
the swarms that over-seasoned in mountains of Guinea and started
moving eastwards in late April through Burkina and Mali and
reached southern Niger and later on progressed to eastern Chad
and western Sudan. Some reached eastern Sudan and northwestern
Ethiopia and began laying eggs. FAO is concerned about the
locust situation in eastern Chad and western Sudan where access
is severely hampered due to recent flooding, poor infrastructure
and the security situation. Chad and Sudan face a risky
situation, which could develop into an outbreak. Later this
month, some adult swarms may form in both Chad and Sudan and
these swarms could move to the Red Sea coastal areas.
13. FAO estimates between 45,000 and 225,000 hectares may need to
be treated in the most probable-case scenario as follows: between
10,000 and 50,0000 hectares in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger,
and between 5,000 and 25,000 hectares in Senegal. FAO is
deploying a number of survey teams increasingly in the areas
where rains will occur. So far, only limited ground control
operations have been needed.
---------------------
Sudan and Chad
---------------------
14. In a side meeting with FAO's Locust Forecasting Officer,
USUN/Rome learned that the current strategy is to wait and see
which direction the locusts travel, for example, if they travel
east to the Red Sea area (during the week of July 25, FAO staff
will travel to Sudan to hold an EMPRES briefing with Red Sea area
countries). FAO's Chad-based consultant believes he is getting
reliable and objective information from the Government of Sudan's
Plant Protection Department (PPD). The PPD was restructured and
given a more centralized role recently, and has been in contact
with FAO since the end of May when news broke on locust sightings
in Darfur. A couple swarms crossed into Ethiopia while at least
six swarms made it to Darfur where they laid eggs, which have
hatched. The PPD has sent resources from Khartoum to government-
controlled areas, but is having a hard time locating hatched eggs
because of the lack of infrastructure. Various nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) offered to provide helicopters for air
surveys, while the United Nations Security Coordinator guaranteed
the return of vehicles in non-government controlled areas if an
international observer is on board. FAO is hesitant to accept
this guarantee, as summer breeding areas are vast (equivalent to
the western United States) and monitoring is difficult even if
security is good.
15. The locust situation in Chad is also difficult to monitor due
to washed out roads and security risks to staff, for example, two
weeks ago, a brand new, radio-equipped FAO vehicle was taken by
two armed men in broad daylight in the provincial capital of
Abeche. However, small-scale breeding is occurring, with
unconfirmed reports of eggs in central Chad. Chad has been on
the periphery of an emergency over the last 18 months and donor
resources may have to be reallocated toward most affected areas.
Due to Chad's limited supply of vehicles, FAO is supplementing
control operations with fixed-wing aircraft for aerial activities
commencing the week of August 4.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
Donors and Affected Countries, including Niger, Respond
--------------------------------------------- ------------
16. Sudan stated it was in an excellent situation during last
year's upsurge, thanks to Saudi Arabia and FAO coordination, and
stressed the importance of being prepared in time for an outbreak
this year, especially in Darfur.
17. France stressed the importance of providing information back
to donors, noting it had only received two ill-prepared reports
from FAO on its contributions; and asked for more information on
the involvement of national services. Due to contractual
obligations, France stated that any leftover amounts cannot be
redirected to the emergency fund.
18. Niger spoke twice, once on desert locusts and once on the
current humanitarian emergency. Niger thanked donors and FAO for
the past and current efforts to combat locusts, noting that teams
were in the field to monitor harvest and that Niger has a good
supply of pesticides. Niger asked FAO and donors to think about
the in-between seasons and develop programs on crops with river
populations in mind. On the humanitarian emergency, Niger stated
that more than three million people were at risk for famine and
that funding for the international appeal has not been very
forthcoming. [Comment. In side meetings with FAO staff,
USUN/Rome learned that UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs Jan Egeland sent a letter to FAO DG Diouf during the week
of July 11, requesting that leftover desert locust funds be
redirected to the crisis in Niger. Diouf responded that certain
donors are precluded from redirecting funds. For example, the
European Commission informed FAO that funds for Niger cannot come
from the excess locusts funds, as the European Commission's
Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) has funds set aside for Niger.
Thus far, only Sweden has given $650,000 to FAO's appeal for
Niger, while FAO contributed $400,000 from its TCP funds. End
Comment.]
19. Mauritania thanked Diouf for personally visiting last year to
get a first hand view of the situation; and appealed for a review
and build-up of spare parts for desert locust equipment.
20. The Netherlands stressed the urgency of the external desert
locust evaluation, which would lead to better preparedness on the
part of FAO, and expressed hope for a September start date, with
final recommendations issued by December. It called for FAO's
utmost cooperation. As a participating member of the evaluation,
the United States echoed these comments. Diouf replied that FAO
would not wait until September but would begin consultations
immediately with interested parties.
21. Saudi Arabia thanked FAO for the early warning last year on
Sudan, which permitted it to take the necessary precautions in
concert with the Sudanese authorities; and asked for further
consultations with donors on the proposed emergency fund.
22. Mali noted that its plant protection center was restructured
to gear up for future desert locust scourges; emphasized the need
for an emergency fund; and expressed support for improving
functionality of FAO through an evaluation.
23. Yemen stated that although it was not included in the 2004
emergency, it is subjected annually to desert locust, and this
year's rainfall activity indicates locust activity in Yemen may
be on the rise. It supported an external evaluation.
24. Japan noted the difficulty it faced to contribute $3 million
to FAO's desert locust campaign because of sensitivities related
to pesticides; stated there was a gap between theory and reality
in terms of FAO effectiveness during the campaign; and echoed
Mali's concerns on improving FAO's effectiveness, either through
the evaluation or after.
24. Algeria noted that the responsibility to fight desert locusts
rests first and foremost with each affected state.
25. Eritrea stated that so far, no desert locust control had been
made except for management control and requested more information
on FAO's biological/chemical research.
25. Minimize considered.
Hall
NNNN
2005ROME02560 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Raw content

UNCLAS ROME 002560
SIPDIS
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME
STATE FOR IO/EDA, AF/W, NEA/ENA, OES/ENV; PASS EPA
USAID FOR DCHA, OFDA GOTTLIEB AND AFR LAVELLE
USDA FOR FAS HUGHES
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH/USAID
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, SENV, XI, XY, UN, FAO
SUBJECT: DESERT LOCUSTS: JULY 21 FAO DONORS' MEETING
REF: (A) 04 ROME 0722; (B) 04 ROME 3979; (C) 04 ROME 3581; (D) 05
ROME 0764; (E) 05 ROME 1451; AND (F) 05 ROME 2555
1. Summary: On July 21, an informal desert locusts donors'
meeting was hosted by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
of the United Nations. Chaired by FAO Director-General (DG)
Jacques Diouf, the meeting was well represented by donors and
affected countries. The meeting provided information on the 1)
current situation in and forecast for the Sahel, Maghreb and
Eastern Africa; 2) FAO assistance provided during the 2003-2005
upsurge; and 3) FAO assistance being provided for summer 2005
survey and control activities. Despite the late start in 2004,
FAO believes it made up for lost time by playing a central
coordinating role to pre-position equipment, pesticides, and
other resources. It hosted or co-hosted a series of meetings and
workshops to build local, national and regional capacity.
Currently, financial resources are sufficient for even a worst-
case scenario, which is most unlikely. Although small-scale
infestations are in progress in Chad and Sudan, where the
possibility of an outbreak looms, and limited locust activities
are being reported in Niger and Mali, FAO believes that the
threat of the desert locust situation in Northwest Africa will
continue to diminish, becoming insignificant this year. Due to
appropriate preparatory efforts, including extensive surveying,
forecasting and control operations by Northwest African countries
and pre-positioning of resources and provision of expertise to
the Sahelian countries, FAO states that the outlook is quite good
and it is well situated to handle this summer's potential control
operations. To further support its preparatory efforts, FAO also
stated it will begin consultations promptly on the external
desert locust evaluation jointly being led by the United States,
the Netherlands, and the World Bank. End Summary.
------------------
Funding Status
------------------
2. DG Diouf thanked FAO member countries for their contribution
to the desert locust campaign, noting a rather late but positive
response to the $100 million appeal launched in August 2004. To
date, FAO mobilized $73.9 million from 27 donors, and $6.3
million from its technical cooperation program (TCP) funds, for a
total of $80.2 million. Of this, $66.5 million covered regional
measures while $13.7 million focused on national activities. All
66 projects operated by FAO were coordinated by FAO's Emergency
Center for Locust Operations (ECLO).
3. As of July 21, 2005, $45.5 million was spent on providing
assistance (pesticides, aircraft hiring, spray and communication
equipment, vehicles, technical expertise and training, etc.) to
18 affected countries, including Mauritania ($14.84 million);
Senegal ($6.99); Niger ($5.25); Mali ($3.90); Morocco ($3.39);
and Chad ($2.52). The remaining balance of $34.7 million has
been allocated as follows:
-- Most probable-case scenario in seven Sahelian countries: $15.2
million (of which Mauritania $4.04 million; Mali $2.98; Chad
$2.47; Niger $2.61; and Senegal $2.82)
-- Maghreb: $2 million
-- Worst-case scenario in the Sahel and outbreaks in other
countries: $17.5 million
FAO is working with donors to determine their ability to redirect
excess funds to establish a Desert Locust Emergency Fund, which
would mobilize early funding for a locust outbreak.
----------------------
African Solidarity
----------------------
4. Diouf noted that over and above contributions by donors was
the significant coordinated activity by African nations, which
fostered continental solidarity for the cause. Algeria, Morocco,
Libya and Nigeria provided logistical support, equipment,
experts, planes and pesticides to neighboring countries in the
Sahel that were affected by the desert locust. Algeria in
particular provided experts and logistics, and has recently sent
planes to treat pockets of desert locusts in Mali, Niger and
possibly Chad. (Note: Assistance provided by the Northwest
African countries to their neighbors in the Sahel accounted for
tens of millions of dollars without which the locust situation
could have gotten worse and caused more damage in the latter. End
note)
------------------------------
FAO Preparatory Efforts
------------------------------
5. Diouf stated FAO played an important coordinating role,
delivering 60 percent of the pesticides and providing 50 vehicles
for the campaign. The combined efforts of FAO and other nations
resulted in the treatment of an unprecedented 13 million hectares
since October 2003, of which some three million were in the Sahel
alone.
6. Diouf ran down the timeline of preparatory and extraordinary
meetings, which FAO hosted either solely or jointly, including:
--Aerial Operations Workshop, Rome, Italy, February/March 2005,
which resulted in contract flexibility for deploying aircraft to
individual countries and regionally. For the summer campaign,
FAO will deploy one helicopter each to Chad, Mali, Mauritania and
Niger from July 23-27. In addition, stand-by contracts for fixed-
wing spray aircraft are available should the need arise.
--Train-the-Trainers Workshop, Niamey, Niger, March 2005, at
which 21 persons from 10 Sahelian countries and Djibouti were
trained as national master trainers. Each carried out three
training sessions in their own countries, resulting in the
training of 600 crop protection staff regionally.
--Joint FAO/World Meterological Organization (WMO) Regional
Workshop on Meteorological Information for Locust Forecasting,
Monitoring and Control, Niamey, Niger, April 2005, which was held
to improve the availability of meteorological data for locust
early warning activity.
--FAO/World Bank Contingency Planning Workshop, Bamako, Mali,
April/May, at which seven Sahelian countries developed plans for
best-case, most probable-case and worst-case locust infestation
scenarios.
--FAO/World Bank Donors' Meeting, Bamako, Mali, May 2005, at
which existing resources at that time ($30 million) were
considered sufficient for the most probable-case scenario and
close to sufficient for the worst-case scenario.
--Continued Dialogue with Donors, June/July 2005: Donor meetings
were held in Dakar, Senegal, and Nouakchott, Mauritania, while
weekly telephone conferences are held with the World Bank.
7. Diouf noted that FAO is now on top of the pesticides situation
with its pesticides monitoring matrix. A stock of over 2 million
liters is available in the Sahelian countries to cover more than
a worst-case scenario. Repeatedly, Diouf stated that the
coordination of pesticides delivery was harder than expected at
the beginning due to numerous bilateral donations. If excess
stocks cannot be used, or solutions for their long-term storage
cannot be found, Diouf indicated that some bilateral donations
may be returned.
8. FAO is working with donors to modify budget lines from
`pesticides purchases' to `pesticides storage construction'. In
addition, FAO is in the process of operationalizing pesticides
drum crushers in various countries, and is deploying special
teams to monitor the health of workers using pesticides. In
addition, it is working on long-term pesticides storage
solutions.
9. Diouf emphasized the importance of carrying out lessons
learned evaluations with both donors and affected countries. He
indicated that FAO agreed via formal communication to the
Government of the Netherlands to participate in the desert locust
evaluation [being spearheaded jointly by the Netherlands, the
United States and the World Bank] beginning September/October
2005.
10. For the moment, Diouf concluded that existing resources are
sufficient to cover even a worst-case scenario. ECLO is
providing resources for a most probable-case scenario, ensuring
that frontline countries such as Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad
are well equipped and prepared. The desert locust component of
FAO's Emergency Prevention System for Trans-boundary Animal and
Plant Pests and Diseases (EMPRES), which establishes a rapid
reaction capability and research facility, is assisting in this
effort. FAO has two EMPRES programs, one in the central region
and another in the western region. It hopes to include more Red
Sea area countries in EMPRES by May 2006.
--------------------
Locust Forecast
--------------------
11. Diouf noted that currently traditional breeding grounds in
Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco are nearly locust free. However,
he cautioned that there are small infestations in Sudan and
elsewhere and the desert locust breeding cycle is not yet over.
FAO does not believe the situation will become critical.
Extensive forecasting and deployment of resources will allow FAO
to handle the situation effectively.
12. FAO's Locust Forecasting Officer stated that due to the
unusually cold weather and as a result of aggressive control
operations carried out in the summer and fall of 2004, only
limited breeding occurred in spring 2005 in Northwest Africa.
Consequently, there has been a dramatic decline in control
operations during the last six months in 2005 in the region and
only 3,000 hectares were treated so far. Overall, the locust
situation is relatively calm in southern Mauritania, northern
Mali and Niger, and small-scale breeding has occurred in central
Niger, eastern Chad and western Sudan. These were the result of
the swarms that over-seasoned in mountains of Guinea and started
moving eastwards in late April through Burkina and Mali and
reached southern Niger and later on progressed to eastern Chad
and western Sudan. Some reached eastern Sudan and northwestern
Ethiopia and began laying eggs. FAO is concerned about the
locust situation in eastern Chad and western Sudan where access
is severely hampered due to recent flooding, poor infrastructure
and the security situation. Chad and Sudan face a risky
situation, which could develop into an outbreak. Later this
month, some adult swarms may form in both Chad and Sudan and
these swarms could move to the Red Sea coastal areas.
13. FAO estimates between 45,000 and 225,000 hectares may need to
be treated in the most probable-case scenario as follows: between
10,000 and 50,0000 hectares in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger,
and between 5,000 and 25,000 hectares in Senegal. FAO is
deploying a number of survey teams increasingly in the areas
where rains will occur. So far, only limited ground control
operations have been needed.
---------------------
Sudan and Chad
---------------------
14. In a side meeting with FAO's Locust Forecasting Officer,
USUN/Rome learned that the current strategy is to wait and see
which direction the locusts travel, for example, if they travel
east to the Red Sea area (during the week of July 25, FAO staff
will travel to Sudan to hold an EMPRES briefing with Red Sea area
countries). FAO's Chad-based consultant believes he is getting
reliable and objective information from the Government of Sudan's
Plant Protection Department (PPD). The PPD was restructured and
given a more centralized role recently, and has been in contact
with FAO since the end of May when news broke on locust sightings
in Darfur. A couple swarms crossed into Ethiopia while at least
six swarms made it to Darfur where they laid eggs, which have
hatched. The PPD has sent resources from Khartoum to government-
controlled areas, but is having a hard time locating hatched eggs
because of the lack of infrastructure. Various nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) offered to provide helicopters for air
surveys, while the United Nations Security Coordinator guaranteed
the return of vehicles in non-government controlled areas if an
international observer is on board. FAO is hesitant to accept
this guarantee, as summer breeding areas are vast (equivalent to
the western United States) and monitoring is difficult even if
security is good.
15. The locust situation in Chad is also difficult to monitor due
to washed out roads and security risks to staff, for example, two
weeks ago, a brand new, radio-equipped FAO vehicle was taken by
two armed men in broad daylight in the provincial capital of
Abeche. However, small-scale breeding is occurring, with
unconfirmed reports of eggs in central Chad. Chad has been on
the periphery of an emergency over the last 18 months and donor
resources may have to be reallocated toward most affected areas.
Due to Chad's limited supply of vehicles, FAO is supplementing
control operations with fixed-wing aircraft for aerial activities
commencing the week of August 4.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
Donors and Affected Countries, including Niger, Respond
--------------------------------------------- ------------
16. Sudan stated it was in an excellent situation during last
year's upsurge, thanks to Saudi Arabia and FAO coordination, and
stressed the importance of being prepared in time for an outbreak
this year, especially in Darfur.
17. France stressed the importance of providing information back
to donors, noting it had only received two ill-prepared reports
from FAO on its contributions; and asked for more information on
the involvement of national services. Due to contractual
obligations, France stated that any leftover amounts cannot be
redirected to the emergency fund.
18. Niger spoke twice, once on desert locusts and once on the
current humanitarian emergency. Niger thanked donors and FAO for
the past and current efforts to combat locusts, noting that teams
were in the field to monitor harvest and that Niger has a good
supply of pesticides. Niger asked FAO and donors to think about
the in-between seasons and develop programs on crops with river
populations in mind. On the humanitarian emergency, Niger stated
that more than three million people were at risk for famine and
that funding for the international appeal has not been very
forthcoming. [Comment. In side meetings with FAO staff,
USUN/Rome learned that UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs Jan Egeland sent a letter to FAO DG Diouf during the week
of July 11, requesting that leftover desert locust funds be
redirected to the crisis in Niger. Diouf responded that certain
donors are precluded from redirecting funds. For example, the
European Commission informed FAO that funds for Niger cannot come
from the excess locusts funds, as the European Commission's
Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) has funds set aside for Niger.
Thus far, only Sweden has given $650,000 to FAO's appeal for
Niger, while FAO contributed $400,000 from its TCP funds. End
Comment.]
19. Mauritania thanked Diouf for personally visiting last year to
get a first hand view of the situation; and appealed for a review
and build-up of spare parts for desert locust equipment.
20. The Netherlands stressed the urgency of the external desert
locust evaluation, which would lead to better preparedness on the
part of FAO, and expressed hope for a September start date, with
final recommendations issued by December. It called for FAO's
utmost cooperation. As a participating member of the evaluation,
the United States echoed these comments. Diouf replied that FAO
would not wait until September but would begin consultations
immediately with interested parties.
21. Saudi Arabia thanked FAO for the early warning last year on
Sudan, which permitted it to take the necessary precautions in
concert with the Sudanese authorities; and asked for further
consultations with donors on the proposed emergency fund.
22. Mali noted that its plant protection center was restructured
to gear up for future desert locust scourges; emphasized the need
for an emergency fund; and expressed support for improving
functionality of FAO through an evaluation.
23. Yemen stated that although it was not included in the 2004
emergency, it is subjected annually to desert locust, and this
year's rainfall activity indicates locust activity in Yemen may
be on the rise. It supported an external evaluation.
24. Japan noted the difficulty it faced to contribute $3 million
to FAO's desert locust campaign because of sensitivities related
to pesticides; stated there was a gap between theory and reality
in terms of FAO effectiveness during the campaign; and echoed
Mali's concerns on improving FAO's effectiveness, either through
the evaluation or after.
24. Algeria noted that the responsibility to fight desert locusts
rests first and foremost with each affected state.
25. Eritrea stated that so far, no desert locust control had been
made except for management control and requested more information
on FAO's biological/chemical research.
25. Minimize considered.
Hall
NNNN
2005ROME02560 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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