Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to reverse the April 12, 2002 Decision[1] and
July 23, 2002 Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68277 dismissing the petition for certiorari[3]
of herein petitioner Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada (petitioner) and denying her
motion for reconsideration,[4]
respectively.

Petitioners father Emiliano Cortez (Cortez) filed on August 21,
1953 a Free Patent Application with the Bureau of Lands (Bureau) covering two
parcels of land identified as Lot 4602 with an area of 4.467 hectares and Lot
4603 with an area of 6.3809 hectares, both of Cadastre No. 210, situated at
Libertad, Echague, Isabela. The application was approved on December 5, 1955
by the Bureau which issued Cortez Free Patent No. V-17515.

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-9148 covering the
subject properties was subsequently issued in Cortezs name by the local
Register of Deeds.

On November 6, 1956, Domingo Samut (Samut), represented by
Antonia Samut, filed before the Bureau a Protest[5]
alleging that he has since the Second World War been in possession of the
properties which he converted into a flourishing rice, tobacco and corn field
and introduced other improvements thereon such as a residential house, a well
and rice paddies.

Acting on Samuts claim that Cortez obtained the patent and title
over the properties through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in violation of
the Public Land Law, the Legal Division of the Bureau directed the District
Land Officer of Ilagan, Isabela to conduct an investigation on the grant of
Cortezs patent and title.

After the demise of Cortez, OCT No. P-9148 was on July 2, 1969
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-42959 was issued in the
name of his widow, Antonia Cortez (Antonia).

Antonia subsequently died intestate and is survived by her
children including herein petitioner.

By Order[6] of
January 6, 1997, Regional Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat of the Bureau
recommended that

. . . proper steps be now taken in court for the cancellation
of Patent No. V-17515 and the corresponding Original Certificate No. P-9148,
now Transfer Certifiate (sic) Title No. T-42959 and for the reversion of
the land covered thereby to the state. After the cancellation of said patent and
title of Emiliano Cortez, the heirs of Domingo Samut are hereby directed to
file the appropriate public land application covering Lot Nos. 4602 and
4603, Cad. 240 situated at Libertad, Echague, Isabela.[7]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In arriving at his recommendation, the Regional Executive
Director ratiocinated:

Evidence shows that the herein claimants-protestants are the
actual occupants over the land in dispute. They have introduced
considerable improvements, established their respective houses with strong
materials which serves (sic) as their family residence since the outbreak of
World War II. This Office will not give credence with (sic) the view of the
herein respondent that . . . claimants-protestants [were mere] tenants by
virtue of a contract of lease executed by Emiliano Cortez as lessor, and
Joaquin Samut as lessee whose validity is doubtful considering that Joaquin
Samut denied having executed such contract. It appears also that his (lessee)
signature appearing in the contract is not his signature as compared to his
genuine signature given by him during the investigation, hence, it is a forged
signature. (Exhibit J for the protestant and Exhibit 2 for the
respondent.) Besides, Joaquin Samut, the alleged lessee has no authority to
enter into said contract in behalf of Domingo Samut, the original possessor
over the lot in dispute because nowhere (sic) in the records would show that he
was authorized to enter into said contract.

Granting arguendo for the sake of arguments (sic), that herein
claimants-protestants are merely tenants of the respondent. It holds no weight
in favor of herein respondent, instead it is an admission on his part that
he is not the actual occupants (sic) over the lots in dispute, contrary to
the narration of facts stated in his patent application which led for (sic) the
approval of said application. Hence, aclearmisrepresentationoffactsandinblatantviolationofthePublicLandLaw. Had he disclosed the true
facts, the then Director of Lands, Zoilo Castrillo was not (sic) misled in
approving the application.

Presidential Decree No. 152 categorically prohibits the
employment or use of share tenants in complying with the requirements of law
regarding entry, occupation, improvement and cultivation [of] public lands,
ammending (sic) for the purpose certain provisions of Commonwealth Act as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Section 2 of said law is
clear and unequivocal:

Section 2. The employment or use of share tenants in whatever
form for purposes of complying with the requirements of the Public Land Act
regarding entry, occupation, improvements, and cultivation is hereby
prohibited. Any violation hereof shall constitute a ground for the denial of
the application, cancellation of the grant and forfeiture of improvements on
the land in favor of the government.

(P.D. 152 Section 2)

There is no dispute that the herein respondent clearly violated the
aforecited provision of law which will be a ground for the cancellation of his
patent and title over the land in dispute. He misrepresented facts in his
application thru deceit and fraud by stating on said application that he is the
actual occupants (sic), to the damage and prejudice of the true occupants,
herein claimants-protestants who have already acquired vested rights over the
land in dispute by virtue of their occupations (sic) over said land for more
than 30 years. Well settled is the rule that occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title
on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals 235 SCRA 567).

Since misrepresentation and fraud w[ere] clearly established
on the part of the respondent which led to the approval of his patent
application and with (sic) the issuance of corresponding title over the lot in
dispute, it is but proper that said patent and title be cancelled under Section
91, Commonwealth Act 141, before ordinary court of competent jurisdiction over
the land in question.[8]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

No appeal from the above Order of Director Paat was filed.

The State, represented by the Director of Lands, later filed a
complaint dated January 3, 2000,[9] for
Reversion of Land to Public Domain, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Echague, Isabela, docketed as Civil Case No. 533, praying that judgment be
rendered: (1) declaring null and void Cortezs Free Patent and his OCT No.
P-9148 which had been cancelled by TCT No. T-42959 in the name of his wife
Antonia; (2) ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel Antonias TCT No.
T-42959; and (3) ordering the reversion of the properties to the State.[10]

The complaint alleged that Cortez deliberately made fraudulent
representations in his free patent application, hence, the patent and title
granted to him should ipso facto be cancelled pursuant to Section 91 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.[11]

In her Answer with Third Party Complaint,[12]
petitioner averred that herein respondent Samut cannot legally acquire the properties
by possessory rights despite the alleged period of occupation, for Cortez and
Joaquin Samut (Joaquin), son of Domingo Samut, executed a Contract of Lease
dated June 21, 1961 under which Joaquin, as lessee, agreed to plant
agricultural crops on the properties and deliver to Cortez, as lessor, twenty
(20%) percent of the crops harvested every year.

Petitioner likewise averred that upon investigation, she
discovered that a portion (63,000 square meters) of the property was sold by
the heirs of Samut to herein respondent Chito Singson who subsequently
introduced improvements thereon, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Cortez.

Additionally, petitioner claimed that the investigation conducted
by the Bureau is illegal and without legal force and effect as the same was
conducted 18 years after the issuance of OCT No. P-9148 and that the right of
reversion had already prescribed, the case for the purpose having been filed by
the State more than 40 years after the grant of patent to Cortez.

Petitioner then prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent
respondents Samut and Singson from selling or cultivating the properties or
introducing any improvements thereon.

By Order[13] of
July 10, 2001, Branch 24 of the Isabela RTC to which the case was raffled
denied petitioners plea for injunctive relief, reasoning as follows:

Going over the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint and the
Answer thereto filed by defendant Chito Singson, the Court believes that it
would be better to maintain status quo. The reason for the ruling is that before
the issue of ownership is determined in the light of the evidence presented,
justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status quo so
that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other (Calo
vs. Ortega, et al., L-4673, Jan. 25, 1952, cited in Moran Rules of Court, Vol.
3, 1973 Ed.).[14]
(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[15]
of the July 10, 2001 Order was denied by the trial court in this wise:

The third party defendants were admittedly in possession
of the land in question prior to the filing of this case and
therefore status quo should be maintained while the case is pending or before
the issue of ownership is determined. Thus, the writ of injunction is
not, as a general rule, proper where its purpose is to take property out of the
possession or control of one personand place the same in the
hands of another, whose title has not clearly been established by law (pp. 77
& 78, Moran, comments on The Rules of Court, vol. 3, 1970 Ed.).[16]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner, as surviving heir and with authority given to her by
[her siblings], thereupon filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA, praying that: a) a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the
RTC from conducting trial on the reversion case filed by the State and enjoining
respondents Samut and Singson from selling the properties or cultivating and
harvesting the produce therefrom and b) after due hearing, the temporary
restraining order against private respondents be made permanent.[17]

Before the appellate court, petitioner posited that to allow
respondents Samut et al. to enjoy possession of the properties before the RTC
can decide the validity of OCT No. P-9148 violates the value and integrity of
the title without due process of law, hence, the denial by the RTC of her
prayer for injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion causing
great injustice and irreparable damage to her and her co-heirs.

By Decision of April 12, 2001, the appellate court found
petitioners petition dismissible for procedural infirmity, she having failed
to append her Affidavit in support of her plea for injunctive relief and the
Contract of Lease purportedly executed by Joaquin and Cortez, in
contravention of Section 1 of Rule 65[18] in
relation to Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.[19]

On the merits of the petition, the appellate court found the
petition dismissible just the same, ratiocinating as follows:

. . . In the present recourse, the statusquoantelitem of the Petitioners and the Private Respondents, vis--vis
the subject property, before the Petitioners filed their Third-Party
Complaint against the Private Respondents, was that: (a) the Private
Respondents were in actual possession of the property; (b) they cultivated the
property and reaped the produce therefrom; (c) the Petitioners were not in
actual and physical possession of the property; (d) by their own admission, the
Petitioners [were] not given, by the Private Respondents, any share in the
produce from the property. The Petitioners sought, before the Respondent Court
to alter or change the status quo of the parties by praying that
the Private Respondents, via an injunctive writ, be ousted from
their possession of the property and enjoined from cultivating the same and
reaping the produce therefrom and that, consequently, the Petitioners be placed
in actual and physical possession of the property. What the Petitioners
sought, from the Respondent Court, was both a preliminary prohibitory
injunction and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and, consequently,
the alteration of the status quo of the parties before trial was
terminated.

x x x

More, while it may be true that Original Certificate of Title No.
9148 was issued to and under the name of Emiliano Cortez and, by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42959, under the name of Antonia Cortez, however, it
cannot thereby be found and declared that the Petitioners were entitled, as a
matter of right, to injunctive relief. In the light of the Order of the
Regional Executive Director, the FreePatent executed in
favor of Emiliano Cortez and said title issued to and under his name were
placed, attheveryleast,
in doubt. Aside from the Private Respondents asserting ownership
over the property, the State, likewise, sought the reversion of the property
to the State.

It bears stressing that the threshold issue before the Respondent
Court was the validity/nullity of the Free Patent executed in favor of
Emiliano Cortez and of Original Certificate of Title No. 9148 issued to and
under the name of Emiliano Cortez. For the Respondent Court to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction, he would, in effect, be resolving the merits of the
very issue before the Respondent Court. . . .

x x x

It was thus imperative for the Respondent Court to maintain the status
quo of the parties, ante litem, pending resolution of the
contrasting stance of the parties, including the Republic of the Philippines,
on the ownership over the property.[20]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution of July 23, 2002, she filed the present petition
faulting said court as follows:

I

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED
THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP IN THE RTC OF ECHAGUE,
ISABELA, BRANCH 24, WITHOUT OBSERVING THE RULES OF PROCEDURE ON THE ORDER OF
TRIAL PROVIDED BY THE NEW RULES OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS THAT DENIED THE
PETITIONER OF DUE PROCESS.

III

PETITIONERS DECEASED PARENTS HAVE A VALID
OCT NO. P-9148 AND TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE GRANTED.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABSUSE (sic) OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SAMUT
HEIRS AND CHITO SINGSON ARE THE RIGHTFUL OWNERS AND POSSESSORS OF THE LOT IN
QUESTION.[21]

The issue posed by petitioner before the appellate court was
whether the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in denying her plea for injunctive relief.

Since petitioners petition for certiorari was originally
filed in the Court of Appeals, Rule 46 applies, the pertinent provisions of
which read:

SECTION 1. Title of cases. In all cases originally
filed in the Court of Appeals, the party instituting the action shall be called
the petitioner and the opposing party the respondent.

SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. This Rule shall
apply to originalactions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quowarranto.

Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment
shall be governed by Rule 47, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
by Rule 65, and for quowarranto by Rule 66.

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of
non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full
names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the
grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate
the material dates showing when the notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with
proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for
the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the
record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk
of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of
the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly representative.
The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by
clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Under the facts and circumstances of the
case, and the issue raised by petitioner, it was necessary for the appellate court
to peruse the above-said Affidavit and Contract of Lease. The dismissal in
light of the failure of petitioner to submit such material documents was thus
in order.

Procedural infirmity aside, on the merits, the petition is partly
meritorious.

Petitioners argument that the appellate court prematurely
resolved the issues of ownership and possession in the main case pending with
the RTC by declaring that private respondents are the rightful owners and
possessors of the subject parcels of land is bereft of merit. The appellate
court Decision merely resolved the propriety of the trial courts denial of
petitioners application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction. It did not adjudicate the principal action
raising as basic issue the ownership of the properties which the trial court
has still to determine.

Respecting petitioners prayer before this Court that a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Samut and Singson from cultivating
and harvesting the produce therefrom issue, she contends that her [p]arents,
being the registered landowner . . . as evidenced by OCT No. P-9148 and TCT
No. T-42959, [she] has the right to occupy and exclude third parties like . . .
Samut and Singson from its possession and use thereof. Petitioners
contention fails.

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may
resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during
the pendency of an action.[22] Its
sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard fully.[23]

Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful,
and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy,[24]
that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case.[25]
Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive power to alter
such status.

To entitle a petitioner to the grant of a writ of preliminary
injunction, he must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of
the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[26]

When the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, he
does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive
relief is not improper[27] and
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[28]

. . . [T]he party applying for its issuance must show a clear right
thereto the violation of which is so recent as to make its vindication an
urgent one. In Locsin v. Climaco, We made the pronouncement that the
applicants right or title must be clear and unquestioned, for equity, as a
rule, will not take cognizance of suits to establish title, and will not lend
its preventive aid by injunction where the applicants title or right is
doubtful or disputed. So that if a writ of preliminary injunction is issued
despite applicants doubtful title to the property in controversy or lack of
interest therein, the Court is justified in dissolving the writ. xxx[29]

Sine dubio the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary
injunction in a pending case rests in the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case[30] since
the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of
facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination.[31]
Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters
must not be interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion.[32]

Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[33]

The records before this Court fail to reveal a clear and
unmistakable right on the part of petitioner that would entitle her and her
co-heirs to the protection of an injunctive writ to be placed in possession of
the properties.

On the other hand, it is undisputed that private respondents have
been in possession of the properties prior to and during the institution of the
complaint. They have long occupied, cultivated and otherwise exercised control
over the properties. Thus the appellate court held:

The Private Respondents Heirs of Domingo Samut and Chito Singson,
on the other hand, insist that Domingo Samut and his heirs had been in
possession of the subject property even before Emiliano Cortez filed his
application for a Free Patent, with the Bureau of Lands, and
had been tilling and cultivating the property and reaping the produce therefrom
and that they constructed their houses with strong materials on the subject
property. Such was the statusquoantelitem
of the parties which must be preserved until final decision of the action on
its merits. If the Court granted injunctive relief to the Petitioners, the statusquoantelitem will thereby be altered which is
anathema to and subversive of the purpose of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction.[34]
(Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

To grant petitioners prayer for injunctive relief, upon her
contention that her parents being the registered owners of the properties she
and her co-heirs have the right to occupy the same, would virtually hand over
control over the properties to her and her co-heirs. Such control, however,
pertains to the rightful possessor of the properties ante litem,
the determination of ownership of which the central issue of the case has
yet to be resolved by the trial court only upon completion of trial on the
merits.

A court should then avoid issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction which would effectively dispose of the main case without trial.[35]

If the status quo is to be maintained in the present case,
it is the status quobefore or at the commencement of Civil Case
No. 533, that is, the properties were in the possession of respondents. The
trial courts prima facie evaluation of the evidence proffered by the
contending parties led it to hold that justice and equity would be better
served if the status quo is preserved pending final determination of the
merits of the main case. This Court finds that there is no showing that such
evaluation was whimsical, arbitrary or capricious.

In fine, a prayer for injunctive relief should not be granted for
the purpose of taking the property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out
of the possession of one person and putting it into the hands of another before
the right of ownership is determined.[36] The
reason for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is determined in
light of the evidence presented, justice and equity demand that the parties be
maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one
to the prejudice of the other.[37]

It is with respect to petitioners prayer that respondents be
restrained from selling the properties or portions thereof that the
present petition assumes merit. For pending the final determination of the
ownership of the properties, private respondents can not exercise the attribute
of ownership of jus disponendi. For only the owner can transfer his
ownership to another.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification in
light of the foregoing discussion. Let a writ of preliminary injunction then
issue enjoining respondents from selling or disposing Lots 4602 and 4603 of
Cadastre No. 210 situated at Libertad, Echague, Isabela or any portions
thereof.

[11] Sec.
91. xxx The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential
conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of
such application, and any false statement thereon or omission of facts
altering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in
such statements and any subsequent modification, alteration or change of the
material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted.

[18]
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified
true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46.

[19] SEC.
3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied
upon for the relief prayed for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition
shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment
or (final) order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial
thereof was received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible
copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the
original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and
shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such
material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents
relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the
proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the
proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly
authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the
petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents
attached to the original.

The petitioner shall also submit together with
the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any
other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if
there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same;
and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof
within five (5) days therefrom.

The petitioner shall pay the corresponding
docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of
P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any
of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.