The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.

From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."

Friday, October 5, 2012

This photo, taken by an
individual not employed by the Associated Press and obtained by the AP
outside Iran shows protesters near a garbage can that was set on fire in
Tehran on Wednesday.

|

Photo credit: AP

Iranian authorities took aggressive measures
on Wednesday in an attempt to stabilize the country's plummeting
currency, making arrests, vowing to stamp out sidewalk money changers
and warning merchants against fueling the mounting public anger over the
economy.

There were unconfirmed reports of sporadic
violence. Associated Press photos showed riot police blocking a street
with the charred hulks of a garbage can and a motorcycle that had been
set on fire. Smoke was rising from the area in central Tehran near the
main bazaar.

The sweeping responses to the freefall of
Iran's rial – which has lost more than a third of its value in a week –
underscored the worries for Iranian leaders after months of dismissing
the West's economic squeeze seeking to rein in Tehran's nuclear program.
A declining currency causes shifts in an economy such as making
imported goods more expensive.

Although the currency crisis is blamed on a
combination of factors – including internal government policies – the
rush to dump rials appears to reflect an underlying perception that
international sanctions have deepened problems such as runaway inflation
and soaring prices for imports and that the only safe hedge is to grab
dollars or euros.

If the economic turmoil intensifies, it could
boost pressure on the ruling system before elections next June to pick
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's successor. That has the potential to
hinder nuclear talks with the West until after the elections.

Protesters aimed much of their anger at
Ahmadinjad, chanting slogans such as "Mahmoud the traitor," while
voicing their discontent at their government's support of the Syrian
regime, yelling "Forget Syria, help us."

One of Ahmadinejad's main critics, parliament
speaker Ali Larijani, has led the calls to blame the currency crisis
mostly on allegedly misguided government monetary policies.

In reply, Ahmadinejad warned that he could consider resigning if his government is put under too much pressure.

"Now is not the time for anybody to settle
accounts," Ahmadinejad said Tuesday as the rial hit a record low. "If my
presence is a burden on you, (the solution is for me to) write one line
to say goodbye."

Tuesday's rate of 35,500 rials against the
U.S. dollar compared with 24,000 a week ago on the unofficial street
trading rate, which is widely followed in Iran. It was close to 10,000
rials for $1 as recently as early 2011.

Exchange houses were closed Wednesday, and currency websites were blocked from providing updates on the latest rates.

Public grumbling has grown steadily louder
over the punishing combination of a falling currency and rising prices,
which have put some staples such as chicken and lamb out of reach of
many low-income Iranians. Earlier this week, a petition signed by about
10,000 workers was sent to the labor minister to complain that even
paying rents has become a struggle.

The owner of a furniture showroom said he
hasn't made a sale in 10 days while his workshop rent has been increased
by 30 percent. He said one of his workers bought a can of tuna for
lunch Saturday for 35,000 rials, or about 98 cents at the current
exchange rate. The next day it was 45,000 rials, or $1.26, said Hamid,
who gave only his first name because of warnings by Iranian officials
not to discuss the economic situation with the media.

"Even Afghan workers are going home since it
doesn't make sense to work in Iran with a currency that's worth less and
less," he said.

At Tehran's bazaar – the traditional business
hub in Iran's capital – merchants appeared to stage widespread closures
to protest the stumbling economy. The sprawling bazaar has played a
critical role in charting Iran's political course – leading a revolt
that wrung pro-democratic concession from the ruling monarchy more than a
century ago and siding with the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

The semiofficial Mehr news agency quoted
police Col. Khalili Helali as saying the bazaar was not officially
closed and that authorities will take action against many merchants who
have shuttered their shops.

"Police will deal with the guilds that have closed their shops to cause (economic) disruption," Mehr quoted Helali as saying.

Iran's economy minister vowed to break the
black market, which effectively sets the exchange rates. The unofficial
market will be "rounded up," Shamseddin Hosseini was quoted as saying by
Mehr.

The news agency also reported that some
arrests were made for attempts to "disrupt the economy" and that at
least two "foreigners" were detained for trying to "gather information"
about the police action.

There were no further details. Iran has placed
broad restrictions on foreign media that severely limit the ability for
firsthand reporting on the streets.

In Washington, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Iran's leaders deserve responsibility for what is going on.

"They have made their own government
decisions, having nothing to do with the sanctions, that have had an
impact on the economic conditions inside the country," Clinton told
reporters. She said the sanctions have had an impact as well, but that
they could be quickly remedied if the Iranian government was willing to
work with the international community "in a sincere manner."

The causes for the rial's fall draw from many roots.

The Western sanctions include blocking Iran
from the main international banking networks, which made it difficult
for Iranian businesses to borrow money and forced many firms to pay with
cash for imports.

At the same time, Iran's Central Bank began
facing increasing troubles meeting demands for dollars. Sanctions on
Iran's oil exports have cut into its foreign currency revenue, and banks
in Dubai and elsewhere closed off transactions with Iran.

Critics of Ahmadinejad also say his government
added to the frenzy to dump rials with policies such as limiting bank
interest rates, which led depositors to pull their cash in fear it
wouldn't keep pace with inflation.

But the intangible elements – the idea that
even leaner days are ahead – appeared to kick in this week with consumer
prices continuing to rise and rumors abounding that banks would limit
withdrawals from dollar accounts.

In a sign of the multi-layered theories
swirling in Iran, some economists and experts have accused the
government of trying to devalue its currency in order to meet its own
budget deficit.

The government earns more than 90 percent of
Iran's overall foreign exchange revenues as a result of oil sales.
Higher dollar rates bring more rials into the treasury to pay salaries
and fund state programs, such as guarantee stipends to compensate for
the withdrawal of fuel and food subsidies last year.

Hosseini, the economy minister, challenged the government's critics to provide more than just claims.

"We are not for devaluating the rial," the
semi-official Fars news agency quoted Hosseini as saying. "Those who
make such claims better offer evidence."

Ayatollah Khamenei said Wednesday that the
“The Iranian nation has never bowed to pressure and never will, and this
is the cause of enemy’s fury,” state-owned Press TV reported.

“The thought that the cause of the arrogant
front’s enmity towards Iran is adopting certain stances or making
certain decisions is wrong. The cause of all these pressures is the
Iranian nation’s independent position and not bowing to the hegemonic
system,” he added.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran has faced a
range of pressures including political, security, military, economic as
well as sanctions, though the Iranian nation has not only neutralized
these pressures through resistance, but has become stronger,” Khamenei
said.

Meanwhile, cyber attackers have apparently
targeted Iranian infrastructure and communications companies, disrupting
the Internet across the country a state official was quoted as saying
on Wednesday.

"Yesterday we had a heavy attack against the
country's infrastructure and communications companies which has forced
us to limit the Internet," Mehdi Akhavan Behabadi, secretary of the High
Council of Cyberspace, told the Iranian Labor News Agency.

"Presently we have constant cyber attacks in
the country. Yesterday an attack with traffic of several gigabytes hit
the Internet infrastructure, which caused an unwanted slowness in the
country's Internet," he said.

"All of these attacks have been organized. And they have in mind the country's nuclear, oil, and information networks."

Roni Bahar, a cyber attack expert for Avnet Information
Security Consulting, said that based on reports out of Iran the cyber
attack was especially massive and was meant to damage the country's
Internet infrastructure by directly infiltrating Internet providers and
other critical systems. The purpose of the attack, apparently, was to
create a diversion for an attack on the internal computer networks used
to serve the country's critical infrastructure. Bahar went on to explain
that while there was normally no connection between external and
internal networks, various computer worms and viruses, such as Stuxnet,
have succeeded in the past to bypass obstacles and reach their target.

Presidential candidate Mitt Romney and Republican congressional leaders
have vowed to repeal Obamacare if they win the White House and retake
the Senate.

Nick Tate

Tate explains who will be the big winners and big losers if and when this healthcare reform is implemented.

“Clearly, the big winners are people who now don’t have insurance. That’s 37 million Americans.

“A series of programs will push people into Medicaid, and new healthcare
exchanges will allow individuals who are not employed or who are
self-employed, or independent contractors who don’t qualify for Medicare
or Medicaid, to pick low-cost, high-quality affordable care programs
through these exchanges.

“If you don’t have insurance now, you’re going to be a winner. If you’re
self-employed and you don’t have an employer who’s paying your
insurance, you’re going to benefit from this program as well."

But the costs of the new coverage will be enormous.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates there will be close to a
trillion dollars in new federal spending to sustain the massive health
coverage.
In addition to this, insurance companies are also free to pass on their
new costs of covering claimants with pre-existing conditions and family
members covered by their parents’ policies until age 26.

Premiums for those insured have already begun to spike, and the law has yet to be fully implemented.

“I will also point out that for individual households, last year, health
insurance premiums rose by 9 percent, which is the greatest jump since
2004, according to the nonpartisan Kaiser Family Foundation. That was
the year after this legislation was passed,” Tate says.

“So the hopes that Obamacare would somehow address the cost issue have not yet proven to be true.”

The law does provide new demands on businesses. Some small businesses
will get tax benefits that could be seen as a winning arrangement, but
there are significant qualifications for such credits, the “ObamaCare
Survival Guide” reveals.

“As for people on the other side who are going to be hit a little
harder, big businesses are going to take a hit. They’re going to pay a
penalty, if they don’t [provide] health insurance for people, of about
$2,000 per person," Tate said.

Some companies may opt to pay the fine rather than give full coverage, the book notes.

According to the “ObamaCare Survival Guide,” seniors on Medicare may suffer the most.

To pay for the newly covered, the Obama law envisions cuts of between $500 billion to $700 billion to the Medicare program.

Additionally, the law requires that doctors and medical practitioners
offering Medicaid services be paid the same amount as practitioners
being paid by Medicare.

Experts believe this will mean a reduction in care for the elderly to cover the millions of Medicaid users added to the system.

Some critics have argued that Obamacare’s creation of an Independent
Advisory Board — dubbed by critics as a "death panel" — will control
Medicare costs by cutting services and rationing care.

Obamacare will affect single American, and the “ObamaCare Survival
Guide” is of vital interest to them all, in particular to the insured,
the employed, the uninsured, seniors and Medicare users, young adults,
business owners, prescription drug users, medical professionals,
Medicaid recipients, doctors, and union members.

The book details how taxpayers will foot the bill for nearly half of
Obamacare’s funding in the form of new taxes and fees, and individual
and employer penalties.

It also reveals:

How currently insured Americans will be affected by rising premium costs and other factors.

New rules and funding cuts for Medicare

New protections for the uninsured

Hidden fees and levies

New taxes for the affluent

New requirements and tax credits for small businesses

New fees for prescription drug users

Essential benefits insurance companies must provide

Individuals’ responsibilities and penalties under the new laws

How to maximize your healthcare dollar on the new plan

The costs to consumers

The Guide features chapters on a range of issues related to Obamacare,
including the timetable for implementation of its provisions, the
individual mandate, the expansion of Medicaid, health insurance
exchanges, long-term care, and the price tag for Obamacare, and answers
this key question: Why did insurance companies support Obamacare?

The book also explores five ways Obamacare may undermine your healthcare
— and most importantly, how to protect yourself against Obamacare.

Newsmax says: “The ‘ObamaCare Survival Guide’ is the first and best road
map for you to understand the new law. Every American is affected by
Obamacare — making this book essential to you and your family.”

Nick Tate is an award-winning journalist and editor who has written
extensively about health and consumer affairs issues. After a fellowship
at the Harvard School of Public Health, he authored “The Sick Building
Syndrome.” His work has also appeared in the Miami Herald, Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, Boston Herald, and other publications.

In
2011, Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority (PA), failed to
win U.N. acceptance of Palestine as an independent state1.
This year, he lowered the bar to upgraded status within the U.N. In the
intervening year, Palestinian finances have collapsed, Palestinians
have taken to the street to denounce PA corruption rather than Israel,
and Hamas in Gaza has begun a new relationship with Muslim
Brotherhood-led Egypt. By going the "more than territory but less than
statehood" route, Abbas has essentially slipped the bonds of the Oslo
Accords.

It's about time.

The
Oslo Accords, negotiated without U.S. participation and signed in 1993,
were founded on the mistaken belief that Palestinians and Israelis were
trying to solve the same problem -- namely, how to fit "two states for
two people" in the space between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean
Sea. The Israelis, joined by the Americans, based their participation
in the process on three mistaken principles:

•
That Palestinian nationalism was the mirror-image of Jewish
nationalism. Statehood had ameliorated many of the difficulties of the
Jews in diaspora and would do the same for the Palestinians.

•
That Palestinian nationalism could find its full expression in a split
rump state -- the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- squeezed between Israel
and Jordan, rather than requiring that the state be formed in its
entirety; and

•
That there was a price Israel (and the U.S.) could pay to the
Palestinians that would overcome any remaining Palestinian objection to
Jewish sovereignty in the region.

The
Palestinians, anxious for the legitimacy any conversation would bring,
didn't correct them. Palestinian nationalism, however, is based not on
historical statelessness, but rather on the idea that their land was
taken by the international community and given to Israel -- not in 1967,
but in 1948. The Palestinian "refugee problem" was created in 1948,
and it is the original problem -- called the Naqba (catastrophe) and
observed on Israel's Independence Day -- that in their view needs to be
corrected. That's why people still talk about having to induce Arabs to
accept Israel's "right to exist"2.

President
Obama perpetuates the error when he exhorts Arabs to stop denying the
Holocaust. The problem isn't primarily Holocaust-denial; even most
radical Arabs agree that the Holocaust happened. The problem is that
the Arabs also believe that the Europeans expiated their Holocaust guilt
by foisting the remaining Jews off on the Middle East. They do not
accept the historical relationship of Jews to the land, and the
president has failed to ask for that acceptance.

The Real End of Oslo

While
Abbas's speech (to be followed by his resignation?) was the formal
death knell of Oslo, the process actually ended with Yasser Arafat's
so-called Second Intifada, the Palestinian war against Israel that
killed more than 1,000 Israelis3 and injured several thousand more between October 2000 and 2004.

The
war ended with the IDF in full security control of the West Bank.
Intelligence and the IDF presence since then have largely prevented the
coalescence of groups and cells that could organize large-scale
terrorist operations. It hasn't always worked smoothly, but since 2005,
there has been economic advancement amid relative quiet under the PA,
including during the potentially disruptive 2008/9 Gaza war; the
U.S.-Israel dust up over settlement construction; the May 2011 "Naqba
Day" riots that took place largely in Lebanon and Syria, not on the West
Bank; Abbas's U.N. speech; and the sweep of the Arab Revolution.

In
Gaza, a different process unfolded at the end of the Second Intifada.
Israel removed both its civilian and military presence in 2005, allowing
Hamas unimpeded time and space to arm and train. Hamas's political
victory in legislative election was followed by the short and brutal
Palestinian civil war, the ousting of Abbas's Fatah government from Gaza
(although the PA still pays most of the bills), and the continuing
encroachment of Hamas in the West Bank to undermine Fatah's authority
there. Hamas's burgeoning missile capability has required both active
and passive Israeli intervention.

2012 - Bad News Ahead

On
the West Bank, a relatively stable situation is deteriorating. The IDF
cannot protect the PA from ongoing and increasing protests by its own
people, and if Abbas is serious about separating from Israel, the IDF
will be less able and willing to protect him from his Hamas
adversaries. Abbas's resignation might offer younger Palestinians a way
forward, but it might also empower radical groups as the demise of
dictatorships did in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.

Jordan is the unmentioned player here, the "fourth state" in the so-called "two-state solution"4.
King Abdullah -- whose Hashemite family hails from the Arabian
Peninsula -- is trying to balance the interests of his Palestinian and
Bedouin populations, separate them from West Bank Palestinians, and
maintain his throne under increasing pressure from all sides. The
government insists that "Palestine" be established solely west of the
Jordan River, but there are Palestinians in Jordan and on the West Bank
who believe that the eastern border of Palestine is Iraq as much as they
believe that the western border is the Mediterranean.

Israel
has long been committed to the monarchy and receives support for
security in the West Bank in return. Their shared interests could
founder if the king is unable to quell unrest that is primarily the
result of limitations on free speech, government accountability, and the
media -- coupled with economic stress and rising tribal/ethnic tension.

In
that context, it is a mistake for the U.S. to continue to enhance the
security capabilities of the Palestinian security services or provide
them with "counterterrorism" resources that could be turned against
either Israel or Jordan. It was a mistake also for President Obama to promise the Palestinians "permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt" without having discussed it with Jordan.

Gaza
is a different sort of problem. While Hamas has been funded and
trained by Iran, to the consternation of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
government no less than its predecessor, it is, in fact, the Palestinian
branch of the Brotherhood. That being the case, Egyptian and Hamas
leadership have begun a delicate dance about how close they may become.
"Tunnel traffic," the smuggling of goods into Gaza from Egypt, has
already fallen by about 90% as open trade passes through the
Egyptian-controlled crossing points. While Egypt presently rejects the
notion of a Gaza-Egypt free trade zone, the fact that it has been floated is noteworthy.

The
Gaza Strip in coordination with Egypt makes historic, ethnic, and
economic sense. However, it will likely leave Israel with a festering
security problem. Egypt may find that Hamas attacks on Israel while
Cairo disclaims responsibility can work the way Hezb'allah did for
Syria. For decades, the Golan Heights was quiet while Hezb'allah
attacked Israel with both Syrian and Iranian complicity. Israel was
unwilling to hold Syria responsible for the activities of its surrogate
for fear of war with the better-armed state. Using Hamas as a surrogate
could enable Egypt to harass Israel without having to formally break
the Israel-Egypt peace treaty that serves as the basis of U.S. foreign
aid.

Conclusion

While
Oslo may have died, support for the "Two-State Solution" appears alive
in Washington. But American support for Palestinian independence was
predicated by both the Bush and Obama administrations on political
decisions Palestinians would take, whether it was "new leaders, new
institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbors" (President Bush)
or having Hamas "recognize the right of Israel to exist, to renounce
violence and to accept previous agreements negotiated by the Fatah
government" (President Obama).

Neither
indicated what would happen if the conditions were not met, but the
consequences should probably include abandoning forums dedicated to
Palestinian independence: the Roadmap, the Quartet, and the committees
of the U.N. dedicated to "Palestine" -- of which there are at least
five. Palestinian diplomatic status, which was offered prematurely,
should be revoked. If, in the future, the Palestinians hold elections
that produce leadership "not compromised by terror," (President Bush) we can reinstate our support. If they don't, they don't.

What the U.S. should do and what it will
do are likely different, but in any event, Washington would be
well-advised to limit its support for the establishment of independent
Palestinian dictatorships in either the West Bank or Gaza.1The
move was mischaracterized as seeking to "create" a state in The U.N.
"Palestine" was unilaterally declared independent in 1998, and the U.N.
does not create countries; it only sets conditions for their
recognition.2An
offensive phrase -- Israel was established through internationally
accepted mechanisms. There is no ex post facto discussion of any one
else's "right to exist." The fact that this remains an unfulfilled
demand is a reminder that the problem emanates from 1948, not 1967.3The American population equivalent would have been 49,000 in 2000.4Gaza, separately governed, is the third.

Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of The Jewish Policy Center.Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/10/rethinking_palestine_2012.htmlCopyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Israel won a rare media victory this week when the UK’s nongovernmental press regulator ruled that the Guardian
was wrong to call Tel Aviv Israel’s capital. The ruling by the UK Press
Complaints Commission, according to Honest Reporting, “set a precedent
on British coverage of Israel, effectively barring all British
publications from referring to Tel Aviv as Israel’s capital.”

The commission also did the Guardian, and the British press
in general, a favor. Since Jerusalem is, in point of fact, Israel’s
capital, and since a large part of Jerusalem is uncontested, the refusal
to put embassies there or to refer to Jerusalem as the capital has
always been an assault not only on the Jewish state’s sovereignty but
also on basic logic. However, calling Tel Aviv the capital is
inexplicable. Whatever Israel’s opponents think of Jerusalem, how could
anyone possibly justify inventing a new capital for the Jewish state? No
newspaper that refers to Tel Aviv as Israel’s capital could possibly
retain any credibility. The Times of Israel reports:

In Monday’s decision, the PCC concluded
that “the unequivocal statement that Tel Aviv is the capital of Israel
had the potential to mislead readers and raised a breach of… the
Editors’ Code of Practice.”

The editor’s code states that the press “must take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted information.”

The same article also pointed out the effect that making up the news
can have on reporting in general: it can encourage other newspapers to
make things up out of whole cloth as well. The paper notes a truly sad
correction issued by the Daily Mail:

A Comment article on 23 August mistakenly suggested that
Israel’s government was in Tel Aviv when it is, of course, in Jerusalem.

Of course. But you can almost begin to understand how such a mistake happens. If newspapers like the Guardian
are unchallenged in their assertion that Israel’s capital is Tel Aviv,
it would follow that they had done so because the buildings housing
Israel’s government are in Tel Aviv. But they are not; they are in
Jerusalem. Swindled by the Guardian, the Daily Mail
invented government-related accommodations that didn’t exist, as if
reporting on Israel is basically just playing a game of Sim City.

The Jewish people’s physical and spiritual connection to Jerusalem is
such that it animates an overwhelming amount of Jewish ritual, from
prayer to weddings to holiday traditions. As such, it’s easy to
understand why Israel’s antagonists focus on the city. The denial of
Jewish rights in Jerusalem takes many forms, including the Guardian’s shameful behavior.

After driving through the serene woodlands of Canada, Winston
Churchill once turned to his son and said: “Fancy cutting down those
beautiful trees we saw this afternoon to make pulp for those bloody
newspapers, and calling it civilization.” Hard to argue with the
sentiment while reading papers like the Guardian.Seth MandelSource: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/10/04/uk-press-commission-to-media-stop-lying-about-israels-capital/Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

When outgoing GOP Senator Richard Lugar lost his
primary election to Richard Mourdock earlier this year, there was an
unusual amount of disingenuous garment rending over the supposed death
of bipartisanship due to the increasingly conservative nature of the
Republican Party.

Yet there will be no sad songs for outgoing Democratic Congressman
Heath Shuler. While the media was focused on the dwindling of moderate
Republicans, they missed the fact that pro-life Democrats and moderate
Democrats virtually disappeared completely. Yet Shuler’s retirement from
Congress is notable in that he was the last remaining Democrat willing
to challenge Nancy Pelosi. And his defeat at the hands of
my-way-or-the-highway liberalism should have been a far bigger story—if
the media’s concerns were at all honest—than the defeat of an
eighty-year-old officeholder.Politico reports that on his way out the door, Shuler shows actual concern for bipartisanship:

“I was hoping I’d see more
of the ‘We are America’ team. What I’ve seen instead is divisiveness.
It’s an us vs. them mentality, Democrat vs. Republican, liberals vs.
conservatives. And I would really have liked to [have] seen more of an
‘about America’ mind-set,’” he said. “So often up here, I feel like a
kindergarten teacher separating two children from fighting over crayons.
It’s because the maturity level is on that level sometimes.”

Shuler’s remedy to get over the bickering: Make members live in
Washington, eat dinner together and spend more time getting to know one
another.

Since Pelosi and President Obama famously dislike even talking to
Republicans, and since Harry Reid has chosen to bring Senate business to
a halt rather than let Republicans take part in the democratic process,
that’s probably not going to happen. Nor is it likely that the media
will mourn a dissenting Democratic voice, which they generally view as a
nuisance.

But Shuler’s quiet retirement is a good opportunity for conservatives
to realize that if they thought the Pelosi-Reid Democrats were hostile
to working with them when Shuler and Joe Lieberman were still in office,
they’ve probably only witnessed the beginning of the Democrats’
relentless partisanship.Seth MandelSource: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/10/04/moderate-dems-keep-quietly-disappearing/Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Four members of the Republican leadership of the Senate Budget
Committee are furious with the Obama administration, claiming that both
the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
are stalling in providing data on federal Visa approval for immigrants
with a strong likelihood of government dependency.

The whole controversy got started when staffers noticed that the
answer to a Q-and-A section on the website of the US Citizens and
Immigration Services (USCIS) agency in regard to Visa approval suggested
that people with a high probability of winding up on certain forms of
public assistance were now being considered for Visa approval.

The four Republicans — Orrin Hatch, Chuck Grassley, Pat Roberts, and
Jeff Sessions — fired off a letter asking for clarification in August
both to State and DHS, because each have some form of oversight over
Visas. Following a number of missed deadlines for response, the four
sent out a press release on October 2, 2012.

“Basic annual data on visa applications is easily and readily
producible. But yesterday, the Department of Homeland Security missed
yet another deadline to provide this info as requested by four Senate
committees. DHS, along with the State Department, has also refused to
explain why departmental guidelines effectively waive the legal
requirement that individuals are ineligible for entry into the United
States if they are likely to become reliant on welfare,” said Jeff
Sessions, Ranking Member of the Senate Budget Committee.

He continued, “Our initial assessment of State Department data on
‘public charge’ denials further indicates that eligibility standards are
being waived. Given what we already know, and the otherwise
inexplicable refusal for DHS to reply to such a simple inquiry, it
necessarily suggests that the executive branch is trying to prevent the
public from discovering its failure to follow U.S. immigration and
welfare law.”

In early August, Senate Budget Committee staffers noticed that USCIS
was using a new interpretation of something called a “public charge.”
“Public charge” is a catch-all category of welfare programs. Visa
approval is supposed to be done strictly to exclude anyone that has a
chance of winding up on public welfare doles.

At issue was the answer to a question on the Q-and-A section of USCIS
website. The answer to, “What publicly funded benefits may not be
considered for public charge purposes?”seemed to indicate that things like food stamps were no longer considered public welfare benefits.

As such, people with a high probability of winding up on programs
like food stamps might no longer be automatically denied Visas by USCIS.
It was following this revelation that the four Republican members of
the Senate Budget Committee — Sessions, Orrin Hatch, Pat Roberts, and
Chuck Grassley — fired off a letter on August 6, 2012, asking for
clarification from both DHS and Department of State. They wrote:

We write to express our concern with agencies’
interpretation of section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) regarding inadmissible aliens. It was recently brought to our
attention that the U.S. Department of Agriculture welfare programs.It is our understanding that the materials distributed by the
consular offices assure those being recruited that reliance on SNAP
benefits, or food stamps, will not be taken into account when
considering the merits of an application for a visa or adjustment of
status.

Further review of Department of State and Department of Homeland
Security protocols indicate that this policy applies to dozens of other
welfare programs as well.“ Read the beginning of the letter.

So far, two deadlines set up by the four members of the Senate Budget
Committee have been ignored by DHS and State. The second missed
deadline on October 1, 2012 caused the most recent press release.

The presence of USCIS is itself disconcerting. USCIS, the DHS agency
at the center of this storm, is normally an obscure agency in DHS. It
has already been put in the spotlight because it’s been given a leading
role in implementing the President’s very controversial deferred-action
program (essentially administrative implementation of the DREAM Act, an
amnesty program), first announced in the Rose Garden June 15, 2012.

The head of USCIS, Alejandro Mayorkas, appears to be a far-left
ideologue who is also tied to one of the most controversial pardons by
Bill Clinton at the end of his presidential term. He’s been head of
USCIS since April 2009.

Mayorkas is no stranger to being in the middle of controversies. In
August 2009, his deputies, acting on his orders, drafted a memo that
seemed to suggest that the Obama administration would be implementing
some form of comprehensive immigration reform internally through
executive action. The title of this memo was “Administrative
Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Reform.”

It listed all sorts of categories of potential illegal aliens and
enumerated ways in which the Obama administration could act unilaterally
and make them effectively legal. Included in this memo was the
administrative amnesty Obama implemented in June 2012.

The USCIS was also the subject of an award-winning investigative
series by the Daily, in which that publication exposed how pressure from
higher ups was forcing the rubber stamping of thousands of Visa
applications.

Mayorkas was a very successful bundler for President Obama in 2008, leading the way to his appointment to head USCIS.

Mayorkas also gained notoriety in the late 1990s, when as an
Assistant United States Attorney, he found himself in the middle of the
controversial commutation of Carlos Vignali. Vignali was a convicted
drug dealer whose sentence was commuted in Clinton’s last days after
only serving seven years of a fourteen-year sentence.

Mayorkas, as Assistant US Attorney, was one of those that recommended the commutation to President Clinton.

The House Committee of Government Reform cited Mayorkas, among
several individuals, following an investigation of the pardon. The
investigation found that Vignali’s dad, Horacio Vignali, had funneled
several hundred thousand dollars to a number of California-area
politicians prior to the pardon.

The four Republican members of the Senate Budget Committee believe
that in their role as overseers as laid out in the Constitution they are
entitled to an explanation. Christopher Bentley, a spokesperson for
USCIS, said, “USCIS wasn’t able discuss the issues raised by the
Senators.” The State Department has previously responded that they
believed most of the questions fell under the purview of DHS. The Obama
administration will likely continue this game of feigned ignorance until
the public demands that it be held accountable.

Forget all the pre-debate handicapping and advice about what Mitt
Romney needed to do or what Barack Obama had to avoid. Last night’s
debate clarified the stark choice facing American voters on November 6.
On the one hand, we heard a candidate who endorses the limited
government, individual rights and freedom, free market economic
policies, and personal self-reliance and autonomy that the Constitution
was created to protect. On the other hand, we heard a candidate who
endorses big government, group rights, redistributionist economic
policies, and the progressive ideal that limits freedom and empowers
elites to run people’s lives. In this first debate, Romney and the
Constitution clearly won, as the weeping, wailing, and gnashing of teeth
emanating from the mainstream media prove.

First, many Americans were seeing the real Romney for the first time.
Contrary to the fatcat caricature the Obama campaign and its media
enablers have been peddling for months, Romney was warm and jocular, and
sensitive to the plight of real people who have suffered under Obama’s
policies. He easily had the best laugh lines: “Mr. President, you’re
entitled to your own airplane and your own house, but not your own
facts.” When Obama lied about lowering taxes for the rich, Romney
answered, “I have five boys, and I’m used to people saying things over
and over, thinking if they repeat it enough it will be true.” He slyly
reminded everybody of Joe Biden’s gaffe that the “middle class has been
buried the last four years” when he said, “Middle income Americans have
been buried.” Romney responded to Obama’s complaint about $3 billion tax
breaks for oil companies by contrasting it to the $90 billion for green
energy, landing another punch with, “You don’t pick winners and losers,
you just pick the losers.” When Romney was asked about spending cuts,
he said he’d eliminate programs that are not “important enough to borrow
money from China” to pay for them, like PBS, with an apology to
moderator Jim Lehrer. And his early jab, “trickle down government,”
should enter the political lexicon.

Second, Romney was obviously much more confident, prepared, and
knowledgeable than Obama. He had a greater command of the facts, and
often turned them against Obama’s claims. When Obama crowed about the
federal government’s support for job training, Romney snapped back that
it was spread over 47 training programs and 8 agencies. Obama’s
accusation that Romney would cut funding for teachers was met with a
devastating riposte: that $90 billion that went for “clean energy,” much
of it, Romney reminded us, going to Obama’s supporters and friends,
could have paid for 2 million more teachers. Romney’s reminder that 4
million seniors would lose their Advantage Medicare supplemental
insurance demolished the President’s spin that his $716 billion in
Medicare cuts was achieved by reducing “overpayments” to providers.
Obama’s call for raising taxes on the “rich” was met with Romney’s
reminder that Obama himself said you don’t raise taxes in a slow
economy––and the economy is growing more slowly now than it was when
Obama said it back in 2010. As for Obama, he just repeated campaign
slogans that a few minutes of scrutiny could explode, like touting
“investing” in more people going to college at a time when millions of
college students can’t find work, or repeating the Independent Tax
Policy Institute claim that Romney would raise taxes on the middle
class, an analysis the ITP no longer stands behind, or taking credit for
increased oil and natural gas production, when that in fact occurred in
spite of, not because of his policies, as Romney pointed out when he
reminded us that permits for oil development on federal lands have been
reduced by half under Obama.

Third, the demeanor of the two men was starkly different. Obama
looked sour most of the time, scowling and smirking, and refusing to
look at Romney when he spoke, and often looking down when Romney was
talking, like a child who is being chastised. Romney was confident,
eager, obviously charged up by the debate. Obama looked like he was in
the dentist’s chair. The split-screen shots were particularly
devastating, Obama looking old and tired, Romney actually looking much
younger and more vigorous. Obama simply couldn’t handle his first
formidable adversary, which should have been obvious from the start of
his political career. His whole life he’s just had to show up and take a
bow. The mainstream media, which have been his shills for four years,
have worsened this arrogance. Obama is like a football team that is
unbeaten during the exhibition season, but having grown flabby and
complacent, is wiped out when the regular season starts. That’s why, as
Charles Krauthammer said, Romney won by two touchdowns. Obama’s sorry
performance should explode the media’s fairytale about Obama’s
oratorical skills, intelligence, and likability, none of which was
evident during the debate.

Finally, the difference between the political philosophies of the two
candidates was made crystal clear in the question regarding the role of
government. Romney asserted a limited role for the federal government,
which exists to protect the inalienable rights with which we have been
endowed by our creator, and which are codified in the Constitution. But
power resides with the people that government is supposed to serve, and
whose freedom to pursue happiness the government is supposed to protect.
Obama believes, as Romney said, “government can do a better job than
people pursuing their dreams.” Technocratic elites and bureaucracies
should have the power to “solve problems” and achieve dubious “social
welfare” goals such as income redistribution or egalitarianism. This is
the progressive ideology, which is very different from the ideals that
created our government.

Romney won this debate not because of optics, or even a greater
command of the facts. He won because he has the better argument: free
individuals and their work, initiative, and creativity are better than
government at managing their lives, pursuing their happiness, and
creating prosperity.

Abu Assad al-Almani asks Muslims in Germany to attack any German citizen who supports the film by "cutting their heads from their bodies and capturing it on film so that it is accessible to the public, so that the whole of Germany, and even the whole of Europe, knows that their criminal games will be thwarted by the sword of Islam."

Muslim protests over an American-made anti-Islamic YouTube film, Innocence of Muslims, have spread to more European cities. Muslim rioters had initially clashed with police in Belgium, Britain and France, but since then, protests have spread to Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.

In Germany, while thousands of Muslims took to the streets in various cities, the biggest demonstration took place in the Dortmund, where 1,500 Muslims holding Turkish flags marched through the city center on September 22. In Hanover, protests involved about 1,000 Muslims on September 23. In Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony police reported protests involving 1,600 people. Protests were also reported in Bergisch Gladbach, Cuxhaven, Münster, Freiburg and Karlsruhe.

A radical Islamist, Abu Assad al-Almani, has called for bombings and assassinations in Germany after it emerged that the actor who plays Mohammed in the anti-Islam movie was allegedly German. In an 8-page document, entitled "Settling Scores with Germany," and posted on the Internet on September 25, Abu Assad states: "In addition to the ugly cartoons, now the Americans have produced a film in which those pigs poke fun at our dear prophet and insult him."

Abu Assad continues: "The one who played our noble Messenger was a German;" he then calls for revenge attacks. He asks Muslims in Germany to attack any German citizen who supports the film by "cutting their heads from their bodies and capturing it on film so that it is accessible to the public, so that the whole of Germany, and even the whole of Europe, knows that their criminal games will be thwarted by the sword of Islam."

The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) says the document has been produced by a group called the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), the European propaganda arm which supports Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic organizations. The BKA says it is taking the threat "very seriously."

In Berlin, Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich has postponed at the last minute a poster campaign aimed at countering radical Islam for fear it might have incited violence by extremists. The posters had been due to go up as of September 21in German cities with large immigrant populations. The posters were aimed at those who suspected that a friend or family member might be drifting towards radical Islam.

In another sign that German officialdom is coming unhinged by political correctness, the ruling Christian Democrats (CDU) lashed out at Baden-Württemberg's Integration Minister, Bilkay Öney, for stating what many Germans believe is obvious, namely that "Islam tolerates no criticism." She also said it was easier to dialogue with Muslims in Germany because they are relatively well educated. "In other parts of the world," she said, "some take to the streets and set fire to embassies."CDU regional director Thomas Strobl rebuked Öney, a Turkish-born German politician, saying: "What Mrs. Öney says is surprising and shocking. Such remarks are unacceptable, as they emphasize what divides us, instead of linking and integrating." Strobl wondered how Öney, who is a Muslim, could hold such politically incorrect views about Islam.

Elsewhere in Germany, more signs emerged that the threat of Muslim violence is endangering free speech in Germany. Development Minister Dirk Niebel (FDP) called for a ban on broadcasting the anti-Islam video in Germany. "Such a film should not be shown. We should not be adding fuel to the fire," he told the newspaper, Bild. "The person who demands limitless freedom of expression has no idea what conflicts can be provoked by it," Niebel said. His comments follow similar statements by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich.

In Greece, the center of Athens (recently dubbed the "New Kabul") turned into a war zone (videos here) on September 23, when more than 1,000 Muslims -- mostly immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh -- hurled bottles and other objects at police, who were trying to prevent the rioters from descending on the American Embassy.

Protesting Muslims, chanting "All we have is Mohammed," gathered in Omonia Square holding banners reading, "We demand an immediate punishment for those who tried to mock our Prophet Mohammad." Shouting "Allah is Greater," they then assaulted police with stones, bottles and slabs of marble they broke from the sidewalks.

When Greek riot police used tear gas to control the protesters and protect the security zone they had established around the embassy, infuriated Muslims responded by vandalizing streets and buildings in downtown Athens, as well as by setting fires to trash bins, smashing shops and display windows and vandalizing automobiles. Around 30 Muslims were arrested.

Also in Athens, Muslim inmates at the Korydallos prison (Greece's main prison, in which an estimated 70% of the inmates are Muslim) went on a rampage and protested the anti-Islam video by burning mattresses, sheets and clothing. Security officials at the prison brought the situation under control after using teargas to force the rioting inmates to return to their cells.

In Austria, some 700 Muslims descended on the American Embassy in the Alsergrund district in downtown Vienna on September 22. They carried banners and shouted slogans of protest against the film, and called for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. The protests were well organized: some Muslims wearing orange vests were waiting at the nearby metro station to guide protestors toward the embassy. According to the Austrian newspaper Tageszeitung Österreich, one young woman wearing a headscarf said, "The film has triggered such a rage in me, I had tears in my eyes." Other protesters wondered how it was possible that the film portrayed "our beloved prophet as a child molester and misogynist."

In Norway, in front of the American Embassy in Oslo on September 21, more than 150 radical Islamists gathered, shouting, "This world needs another Osama." Separately, hundreds more Muslims gathered at Youngstorget Square in central Oslo to protest the anti-Islam film. Oslo's imams were joined in the protest by the city's Conservative Mayor Fabian Stang, as well as Lutheran Bishop Ole Christian Kvarme, who said in a speech: "With this peaceful protest we want to maintain and strengthen our unity. As believers we understand each other."

In Italy, the Interior Ministry announced on September 25 that it had expelled two Libyan jihadists who were urging attacks against Western targets in revenge for the film denigrating Mohammed. Police said the Libyans, aged 26 and 28, had been in a hotel in Rome for several months, receiving medical care after being injured during the Libyan conflict. Police said they were expelled after they "began activities of proselytizing and propaganda to jihad within the Libyan community."

In Serbia, several thousand fans from a local football club in the country's Muslim-majority Sandzak region protested against the film on September 21. Defying a ban on political slogans at the march, supporters of Torcida Sandzak football club waved banners reading, "The Prophet is in my heart" and "Freedom for Palestine, Afghanistan and Libya." There was a heavy police presence at the march, where protesters also waved the flags of Turkey and Bosnia.

In Spain, the Islamic Commission, a Muslim umbrella group, has sent a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon demanding the enactment of an international law that would outlaw blasphemy "so that no attack against religious sentiment will go unpunished."Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute. He is also Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group. Follow him on Facebook

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3379/muslim-riots-europeCopyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Because terrorism works: The
death of a U.S. Ambassador in Libya, after all, seemed sufficient to
convince many Americans that they should flee the entire Islamic world.

Although so far India's Maoists have shown little interest in
attracting global attention by attacking international targets,
journalists who study their insurgency reckon that they need only be
patient: The Naxals will figure it out soon enough. Then the
journalists' careers as International Naxal Experts will be assured.

Why do the journalists reckon this? Because terrorism works: The
death of a U.S. Ambassador in Libya, after all, seemed sufficient to
convince many Americans that they should flee the entire Islamic world.

The problem is not that America has insufficient intelligence;
America has insufficient patience and insufficient curiosity. One look
at the map below should be sufficient to suggest to you that a Maoist
insurgency covering a third of the territory of the world's second-most
populated country should receive attention from the media. Why doesn't
it? Because it is far away. The insurgency is very well-covered
in India -- in the English-language press, at that -- but Americans do
not read the Indian press. The Indian government is not keen to
encourage foreign journalists to report on the insurgency; no one can
blame them: the antidote to the insurgency is to gain state control over
the Naxal-infested areas. To do this, India needs foreign investment --
a lot of it, fast. Investors would not like the sound of this
insurgency if they knew about it.

That many Americans have never heard of a story so manifestly
important is evidence that America is, if it continues to slide-line
itself, in the terminal phase of imperial decline, which, one is tempted
to conclude, seems exactly what the current administration wants: to
deliver the world to despots.

Britain lost its empire because it was obsessed with preventing the
1857 mutiny -- which had already happened, so there was no point in
preventing it. Focusing on the threat of violent seditious activity,
colonial authorities underestimated the threat of non-violent sedition.
They thus lost access to Indian society precisely when they needed it
most. As Britain's intelligence bureaucracy grew ever more elaborate,
the scope of its security efforts narrowed -- even as the scale of the
secessionist threat grew. Britain's imperial policy suffered from a
chronically poor sense of timing. Moderate nationalist leaders were
marginalized, militant ones strengthened. Over time, the militants
gained respectability. The British authorities had detailed knowledge of
secessionist plans, but failed to prevent them from from being
realized. They did not understand these plans, and relied upon
analytical models that were out of date. Crucially, British India lost
the ability to recognize gaps in its own coverage. Precisely as the need
for information about secessionist activities increased, its interest
in this information decreased. As militant nationalism made inroads,
sources of intelligence to the colonial Government dried up. As the
popular base of the secessionist movement widened, the Government's
response narrowed -- it focused only on containing the violence. The
information in its possession was evaluated from an excessively narrow,
binary perspective: Did it suggest an imminent threat to British life
and property? Authorities were incapable of asking themselves the larger
question -- was the entire British empire at threat?

British authorities failed to grasp the larger picture. Cultural
barriers distorted threat perception and led to misdirected countering
action. This distortion did not occur for want of information: Britain's
vast bureaucratic apparatus ensured an abundance of it. But the British
did not recognize its strategic value until it was too late.
Information was plentiful; insight was scarce.

Brave posturing and stentorian denunciations in the wake of the
latest terrorist outrage are no substitute for insight. For insight,
look at that map.

S.K. Bhattacharya is a private defense and security analyst, working to help democratic governments.

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3373/india-terrorism-naxalitesCopyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

by Alexander H. JoffeThe Palestinian refugee problem lies at the heart of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. But since the 1960s, the international institution charged
with aiding the refugees, the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), has resisted their resettlement in
the Arab host countries. It has done so by shifting to an educational
mission, devising expansive redefinitions of who a refugee is, and
expanding its legal mandates to "protect" and represent refugees. As a
result, a well-intended international relief effort has been
progressively undone by the vagueness of its mandate, which allowed
UNRWA to bend to the will of the U.N. General Assembly and be taken over
by its own charges and by the bureaucratic imperative of institutional
survival.

Reintegration: A Short History

The late Yasser Arafat (right) and
South Africa's Nelson Mandela join hands in solidarity. U.N. General
Assembly resolution 2649 of November 1970 took "inalienable rights" to
another level and specifically named the "peoples of southern Africa and
Palestine" as partners in a legitimate struggle for self-determination.
UNRWA's activities cannot be viewed in isolation from an institutional
environment that has linked the Palestinian issue to decolonization,
regardless of its applicability.

The idea of resettlement was implicitly encoded into UNRWA through U.N.
General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, which
stated that "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at
peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property
of those choosing not to return."[1]
Those choosing not to return would presumably be resettled, and the
resolution took care to ensure "the repatriation, resettlement and
economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of
compensation."[2]
The language and stipulations of resolution 194 have been used by the
Palestinians and their international champions as proof of a
U.N.-sanctioned "right of return."[3] But UNRWA was founded "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III),"[4]
and during its early stages, attempted to avoid the appearance of
prejudice toward either repatriation or compensation and resettlement.
But as prevailing interpretations of resolution 194 have changed, so too
has UNRWA.

The overwhelming majority of the Palestinian refugees have not
returned. Nor have they been "reintegrated." This novel term was
introduced by UNGA resolution 393 (V) of December 2, 1950, which stated
that "the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the
Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential in
preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer
available, and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability
in the area."[5]The formal articulation of repatriation and resettlement
notwithstanding, as early as 1951, reintegration was understood in
diplomatic circles exclusively as resettlement.[6]
Refugees shared that assessment, and, along with Arab host countries,
resisted it in a variety of ways, so much so that by the late 1950s,
reintegration, resettlement, and rehabilitation had reached a dead end.
In the words of the 1957 UNRWA director's report:

in spite of the fact that many are establishing themselves in new
lives, the refugees collectively remain opposed to certain types of
self-support projects which they consider would mean permanent
resettlement and the abandonment of hope of repatriation. They are, in
general, supported in this stand by the Arab host Governments. On the
other hand, the Government of Israel has taken no affirmative action in
the matter of repatriation and compensation. It remains the Director's
opinion that, unless the refugees are given the choice between
repatriation and compensation provided for in resolution 194 (III), or
unless some other solution acceptable to all parties is found, it would
be unrealistic for the General Assembly to believe that decisive
progress can be accomplished by UNRWA towards the "reintegration of the
refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation
or resettlement" in line with General Assembly resolution 393 (V) of 2
December 1950.[7]

Shift to Education

In his report for 1959, incoming UNRWA director John Davis noted that
"the execution of the 'long-term task' of assisting refugees to become
self-supporting requires certain conditions which so far have not
prevailed." He added:

It is no exaggeration to state that every aspect of life and human
endeavour in the Near East is conditioned and complicated by the
Palestine refugee problem. Its psychological, political, and social
repercussions are of no less significance than its economic and
humanitarian aspects. Any solution of the Palestine refugee problem must
take these aspects into account.[8]

Davis's remarkable statement contrasted with his immediate
predecessor's upbeat assessment that "the picture is not entirely
black."[9]
To be sure, by placing the refugee crisis at the heart of everything in
the Middle East, Davis did not reject the notion of resettlement per
se; yet he implied that until the refugees themselves were satisfied,
their plight would remain at the center of regional affairs. As such,
his portentous assertion, an essential part of the Palestinian
narrative, was perhaps the first high level official indication of
UNRWA's intention to keep the refugees, and itself, at the center of
Middle Eastern affairs.Davis argued that UNRWA's mandate should be extended beyond June 30,
1960, when it was due to expire, calling for a reorientation of the
agency's mission and an expanded emphasis on "providing general
education, both elementary and secondary … teaching vocational skills,
and awarding university scholarships; and … offering small loans and
grants to individual refugees who have skills and want to become
self-employed."[10]
This was a shrewd and successful adaptation and a fateful turning point
in UNRWA's relationship with the refugees and the idea of resettlement.[11]

Providing primary, secondary, and vocational training vastly expanded
the agency's contact with refugees. In 1950, UNRWA operated sixty-four
schools with 41,000 elementary pupils, employing approximately 800
teachers. By 1960, this had expanded to 382 schools, almost 124,000
pupils, and 3,500 teachers. By 1980, over 54 percent of UNRWA's
resources were dedicated to education.[12]
In 2011-12, across its five fields of operation, UNRWA's education
program comprised 699 schools, 19,217 educational staff, and 486,754
enrolled pupils.[13]
Increasing access to education and raising educational levels are
inherently unobjectionable, a fact that UNRWA has traded on since the
1950s. More controversial has been the content of that education.Educational materials used in UNRWA schools come from the host
countries but are taught by Palestinian teachers, many of whom are
graduates of UNRWA schools. During the 1960s and 1970s, teaching
Palestinian nationalism was a specific goal of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). Schools, teachers' unions, and youth organizations
were targets for the PLO and its competitors such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, which completely politicized these spaces. UNRWA and
national governments also made funds available for scholarship for
higher education, which took place in both Western and Soviet bloc
institutions.[14]
Indeed, UNRWA's defenders praise the agency's position as a Palestinian
national institution and emphasize the role of education.[15]UNRWA's educational emphasis during the 1970s coincided with the
PLO's 1974 adoption of the "phased approach" for Israel's destruction,
which included a commitment to the right of return[16]—a
euphemism for Israel's demographic subversion—as well as with the
creation of the U.N. resolutions and infrastructure to support the
"inalienable rights" of the Palestinian people. With the passage of
time, textbooks in UNRWA, and later Palestinian Authority (PA) schools,
have come under scathing criticism for articulating anti-Israel,
anti-Semitic, anti-Western, and anti-peace themes, alongside advocacy of
the right of return.[17]UNRWA's educational turn also had unanticipated and ironic
consequences. The Palestinians' educational advantage aided their entry
into the professional classes of Arab states, which should have
facilitated their reintegration and resettlement. But these educational
advantages were mitigated by growing Arab investments in their own
educational systems. Rising educational standards in some Arab states,
and the PLO's support for Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, also
resulted in Palestinian marginalization and mass expulsion. Educated
Palestinians returning to the West Bank and Gaza relied yet again on
UNRWA's relief services.[18]
During and after the years following the Oslo accords, UNRWA and
UNRWA-educated Palestinians took the lead in opposing the PLO's
negotiations with Israel under the aegis of the "rights-based approach"
and preserving the right of return.

Who Is a Refugee?

One significant means of UNRWA's permanent institutionalization and
resistance to resettlement has been the expansion of its client base
through redefinitions of who is a refugee.The agency's founding resolution 302 (IV) used the term refugee without offering any definition. But the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
that established the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) began to set parameters for the Palestine Arab refugees and for
UNRWA: "This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection and
assistance."[19]The politics behind this decision were a result of pressure from both
Western and Arab states. France, for example, had moved to exclude the
Palestinian refugees from the UNHCR mandate on the grounds that a number
of U.N. organizations were already active in that arena. Arab delegates
supported the exclusion, arguing that a universal definition of
refugees would "submerge in the general mass of refugees of certain
groups which were the particular concern of the General Assembly and the
right of which to repatriation had been recognized by General Assembly
resolutions."[20]Without a formal definition set by a supervisory body, UNRWA
established its own series of operational definitions for refugees. In
1950, the following definition was offered:

For working purposes, the Agency has decided that a refugee is a
needy person, who, as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his
home and his means of livelihood. … In some circumstances, a family may
have lost part or all of its land from which its living was secured, but
it may still have a house to live in. Others may have lived on one side
of the boundary but worked in what is now Israel most of the year.
Others, such as Bedouins, normally moved from one area of the country to
another, and some escaped with part or all of their goods but cannot
return to the area where they formerly resided the greater part of the
time.[21]

In 1954 a temporal qualification was introduced:

The definition of a person eligible for relief, as used by the Agency
for some years, is one whose normal residence was Palestine for a
minimum period of two years preceding the outbreak of the conflict in
1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home and
means of livelihood.[22]

The 1955 report of the UNRWA commissioner-general introduced an
informal rationale for including other claimants, namely Palestine Arabs
who were not displaced in 1948 but who lost some or all of their
livelihoods:

There is only a difference of degree between, on the one hand, the
situation of the man whose home was on the Jordan side of the
demarcation line but whose land is now cut off in Israel, or who worked
in what is now Israel[i] Jerusalem, or who sold his produce in the
coastal towns or exported it through Palestinian ports, and, on the
other hand, the situation of the man who has lost his home as well as
his means of livelihood. All of these have lost, in varying degrees, a
place in which to work and a way of life. They have that in common. Yet
in some cases, the family which continues to reside in its former home,
but whose nearby fields are no longer in its possession, may be in a
more serious plight. The very proximity of its former possessions—the
situation in which the original inhabitants must watch newcomers till
their former fields and harvest crops from their former groves—increases
the tensions and the psychological strain.[23]

This decision followed up on observations made since 1948 regarding
the impoverished state of those claimants. It also acknowledged the
difficulty of both distinguishing them from true refugees as well as the
moral and practical difficulties in refusing aid. Incorporating border
villages into UNRWA's purview expanded its economic role in Gaza and
Jordan and articulated a sociopsychological or therapeutic element that
would become an important part of UNRWA's mission in the coming decades.

Throughout the 1950s, efforts were made to rectify refugee roles.
Fraud, duplicate enrollments, non-counting of deaths, and the holding of
ration cards by merchants were all well-known by UNRWA and the Western
governments from 1949 onward, but little was or could be done. Riots by
refugees, threats by merchants, and lack of cooperation from host
countries, who were economically dependent on UNRWA, undermined efforts
to reduce refugee rolls. Threats to reduce U.S. contributions to UNRWA
amounted to little.[24]In 1965, the definition was again revised:

Recently a new problem of eligibility has arisen with the appearance
of a third generation of refugees (i.e., the children of persons who
were themselves born after 14 May 1948). On a literal interpretation of
the definition of eligibility as it now stands, there may be some doubt
whether these persons are eligible for UNRWA assistance. Under the
proposals set out … they would clearly be eligible … subject to their
being in need, and this would apply to subsequent generations also.[25]

This new, expansive definition, which extended UNRWA's services to a
third generation of refugees, was apparently offered as part of a deal
between UNRWA director Laurence Michelmore and the Arab states, in
exchange for new refugee surveys that mollified Western pressures.[26]The 1967 Six-Day War and the influx of more refugees into the UNRWA
system from the West Bank offered the opportunity to establish a new
baseline, and by 1971, the refugee definition had been expanded again
with specifications regarding the inheritability of refugee status:

A Palestine refugee, by UNRWA's working definition, is a person whose
normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the
conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his
home and means of livelihood and took refuge, in 1948, in one of the
countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition
or the children or grandchildren of such refugees are eligible for
agency assistance if they are (a) registered with UNRWA, (b) living in
the area of UNRWA's operations, and (c) in need.[27]

By 1994, this operational definition had been further extended:

Under UNRWA's operational definition, Palestine refugees are people
whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May
1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of
the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.[28]

This version is still operative today. There are no qualifications
regarding a refugee having been displaced to a country where UNRWA
operates or whether they have obtained another nationality. Nor does
UNRWA require individual applicants to have either endured all three
criteria (residence, loss of homes, and loss of livelihood), or provide
documentation of these statuses. UNRWA requires only a self-declaration
from applicants.[29]
The mandate is effectively global and the agency views itself as the
"global advocate for the protection and care of Palestine refugees."[30] This generates a total client base of almost 5 million.

Mandates and the Question of Protections

Concurrent with the expansion of the definition of a Palestine
refugee has been the vast expansion of UNRWA's mandate from the
original, concise role of "direct relief and works programmes" to the
ambitious endeavor

to contribute to the human development of Palestine refugees in the
Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab Republic
until a durable and just solution is found to the refugee issue. … The
Agency's vision is for every Palestine refugee to enjoy the best
possible standards of human development, including attaining his or her
full potential individually and as a family and community member; being
an active and productive participant in socioeconomic and cultural life;
and feeling assured that his or her rights are being defended,
protected, and preserved.[31]

The agency's imperative to maintain this standard of living
indefinitely for an ever-expanding client base is perhaps the single
greatest self-imposed impediment to resettlement.Another form of mission creep has been the use of international law
to expand organizational mandates to such fields as "education, health
and relief, and social services, microfinance, infrastructure and camp
improvement, and emergency assistance including food aid."[32] Moreover, by the early 1980s, UNRWA's mandate had expanded to include protection of the refugees' legal and human rights.[33]
In December 1982, for example, U.N. Secretary-general Javier Pérez de
Cuéllar asked UNRWA to consider "measures to guarantee the safety and
security and the legal and human rights of the Palestinian refugees in
the [Israeli] occupied territories."[34]

Six years later he explicitly articulated these guarantees:

(a) "Protection" can mean physical protection, i.e., the provision of
armed forces to deter, and if necessary fight, any threats to the
safety of the protected persons;(b) "Protection" can mean legal protection, i.e., intervention with
the security and judicial authorities, as well as the political
instances, of the occupying Power, by an outside agency, in order to
ensure just treatment of an individual or group of individuals;(c) "Protection" can also take a less well-defined form, called in
this report "general assistance," in which an outside agency intervenes
with the authorities of the occupying Power to help individuals or
groups of individuals to resist violations of their rights (e.g., land
confiscations) and to cope with the day-to-day difficulties of life
under occupation, such as security restrictions, curfews, harassment,
bureaucratic difficulties and so on;(d) Finally, there is the somewhat intangible "protection" afforded
by outside agencies, including especially the international media, whose
mere presence and readiness to publish what they observe may have a
beneficial effect for all concerned; in this report this type of
protection is called "protection by publicity."[35]

UNRWA's protection mandate was amplified in 2007 by the General
Assembly, which stated that it was aware "of the valuable work done by
the Agency in providing protection to the Palestinian people, in
particular Palestine refugees."[36]
This was further extended in 2008 with a General Assembly direction to
UNRWA regarding the rights of women and children. Likewise, in 2007, the
General Assembly approved the commissioner-general's report that
included the assertion that "UNRWA is a global advocate for the
protection and care of Palestine refugees," and the organization
established a senior protection policy advisor position.[37]
The influential 2008 "Morris report," compiled by a retired UNHCR staff
member, also recommended that it use the U.N.'s human rights system to
expand UNRWA's protection for refugees and that the agency's operations
support officers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip act as "roving
international protection officers."[38]The scope of protections is potentially limitless as illustrated by
the demand that the refugees be given a voice in the quest for "a just
and durable solution" and be protected from the use of "disproportionate
force" during this process.[39]
Indeed, the "Morris report" recommended that the commissioner-general
"should engage with those drawing up negotiating papers and proposing
positions and policies in order to ensure to the extent possible that
these take proper account of the rights and interests of the refugees
and of UNRWA's experience and knowledge."[40]
That is: UNRWA should be directly involved in the political process as
representative of the Palestinian refugees, their rights, interests and
desires, in direct competition with other Palestinian entities—hardly an
inducement to resettlement.

Decolonization and Radicalization of the General Assembly

An important but largely overlooked factor regarding UNRWA is the
context within which it operates at the General Assembly where a string
of resolutions on decolonization and political independence for colonial
peoples and countries set the stage for many specific resolutions
dealing with the Palestinians. These also established a huge U.N.
infrastructure outside UNRWA that supports the Palestinian national
cause to the detriment of resettlement.Decolonization: The General Context. A partial list of
relevant General Assembly resolutions begins with resolution 1514 (XV),
the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples" of December 14, 1960.[41]
Among other things, the resolution stated that "subjection of peoples
to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial
of fundamental human rights" and that "all peoples have the right to
self-determination," demanding an end to "all armed action or repressive
measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples." This was
followed a day later by Resolution 1515 (XV), which established the
sovereign right of states to dispose of their own natural resources and
wealth.By the late 1960s and early 1970s, U.N. resolutions took a more
strident tone. Resolution 2588 (XXV) of December 15, 1969, followed up
on the 1968 International Conference on Human Rights and reaffirmed "the
right of all peoples under colonial and foreign rule to liberation and
self-determination."[42]
It also expressed support for "liberation movements in southern Africa
and elsewhere in their legitimate struggle for freedom and
independence." Resolution 2649 (XXV) of November 30, 1970, took
inalienable rights to another level and specifically named the "peoples
of southern Africa and Palestine," noting the "legitimacy of the
struggle of peoples under colonial and alien domination recognized as
being entitled to the right of self-determination to restore to
themselves that right by any means at their disposal."[43] This resolution stands at the beginning of the apartheid charge against Israel.The "Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People." The 1970s
saw the "question of Palestine" become a singular preoccupation of the
United Nations. This in turn influenced UNRWA and its approach to
resettlement.In 1969, General Assembly resolution 2535 (XXIV) stated that it was
"[d]esirous of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight
of the displaced persons and the refugees" before reaffirming "the
inalienable rights of the people of Palestine."[44]
The following year General Assembly resolution 2672 stated that "the
problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of
their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights."[45]The "Question of Palestine" was added to the agenda of the
twenty-ninth session of the U.N. in 1974 and has remained there ever
since. Resolution 3210 (XXIX) invited the PLO to participate in General
Assembly deliberations. Resolution 3236 (XXIX) recognized the
"inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people" and reaffirmed
"the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and
property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for
their return."[46]
This further codified repatriation—not resettlement—as the goal of the
General Assembly and gave implicit instructions to UNRWA to oppose
resettlement.Support for the Palestinian national project also became an explicit
U.N. goal. In 1975, General Assembly resolution 3375 recognized the PLO
as the "representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in all
efforts, deliberations, and conferences on the Middle East which are
held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with
other parties."[47]
The same day, resolution 3376 created the "Committee on the Exercise of
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People" to oversee "a
programme of implementation to enable the Palestinian people to exercise
the rights" articulated in resolution 3236, empowering it to "establish
contact with, and to receive suggestions and proposals from, any State
and intergovernmental regional organization and the Palestine Liberation
Organization."[48]
Also passing that day was the infamous resolution 3379, which among
other things, "Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial
discrimination."[49]U.N. Institutions in Support of the Palestinians. As if to add
insult to injury, the U.N. committed a full range of institutional
resources to the Palestinian national cause and against Israel. Led by
the Palestinians, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, and abetted by an array of nongovernmental organizations
(NGO) and government-organized NGOs, the U.N. system has become the
foremost international setting for the delegitimization of Israel and
the advancement of a "one state" solution (i.e., an Arab state in the
whole of mandatory Palestine in which Jews would be reduced to a
minority). UNRWA activities and statements cannot be viewed in isolation
from this institutional and cultural environment. One prominent result
has been the misrepresentation of resolution 194 as solely aimed at
repatriation and compensation to the total exclusion of resettlement.In 1977, General Assembly resolution 3240 created the Special Unit on
Palestinian Rights within the U.N. Secretariat with the goal of the
"greatest possible dissemination of information on the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people and on the efforts of the United
Nations to promote the attainment of those rights."[50]
Later renamed the Division of Palestinian Rights, this unit provides
support to the "Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of
the Palestinian People," including international meetings, liaison with
NGOs, creating and disseminating studies and bulletins, and training
programs for the Palestinian Authority.Beyond the Division of Palestinian Rights, the Palestinian refugee
problem has been addressed by the General Assembly's Fourth Committee,
or the Special Political and Decolonization Committee, which deals with
"a variety of subjects which include those related to decolonization,
Palestinian refugees and human rights, peacekeeping, mine action, outer
space, public information, atomic radiation, and University for Peace."[51] At least half of the Fourth Committee's agenda relates to the Palestinian refugees.Support for the Palestinian cause is also given through other U.N.
organs, such as the United Nations Development Programme, and through
specialized agencies such as UNESCO, which has served as an especially
important arena for anti-Israeli activities, as well as the World Health
Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Other U.N.
entities have taken direct interest in the refugees and the conflict,
including UNICEF, which was active in refugee relief from 1948 onward.
The Economic and Social Council admitted the PLO as an observer in 1975,
and in 1977, made "assistance to the Palestinian people" a part of its
mandate, along with human rights, and the rights of women and children.
There is also the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process,
the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, the various
disengagement observer and truce forces, the Human Rights Committee and
the Human Rights Council, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, the Committee on Jerusalem, the Register of Damage
caused by the Construction of the Wall, the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices, the Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and others—
more than fifty in all, including the Conciliation Commission for
Palestine, which, in its sixty-fifth report to the General Assembly in
2010 "observes that it has nothing new to report."[52]

UNRWA and the Right of Return

At the beginning of the 1960s, UNRWA's view of resolution 194 and the
right of return was clear. In his report for 1961, Director John Davis
stated that it was not "surprising that the refugees still strongly
demand the right of choice between repatriation and compensation held
out to them by the United Nations under paragraph 11 of the General
Assembly resolution 194 (III)—a right which has never been implemented."[53] This juxtaposition is significant; resolution 194 gave refugees a clear choice between repatriation and compensation.

By 1962, however, Davis had changed both his tone and approach. In
his report, he noted that UNRWA had been frustrated "in sponsoring works
projects to settle refugees" adding that

these undertakings have failed because they have been unacceptable to
the people (refugee and non-refugee) indigenous to the region and to
the Governments which represent them. It is the considered opinion of
the Commissioner-General that these feelings of the Arab people run as
deep today as at any time in the past, and therefore that, at least for
as long as there is no substantial progress towards the implementation
of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), UNRWA should
not again attempt works projects designed to settle the refugees. From
this experience one should not conclude that economic development is not
wanted by the people of the region. On the contrary, it is wanted and
at an accelerated rate but not in the context of refugee resettlement.[54]

Davis acknowledged that resettlement failed because of opposition
from "the Arab people," presumably the Arab states, but pointed to their
frustration over non-implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194
as the cause. This likely refers to the lack of repatriation. On this
basis then, and with UNRWA's reorientation toward education underway,
Davis ended works projects as a means of resettlement.In the late 1960s, resolution 242 joined resolution 194 as one of
UNRWA's touchstones. Also critical was Security Council resolution 237,
which followed the 1967 Six-Day War and "[c]alls upon the Government of
Israel to ensure the safety, welfare, and security of the inhabitants of
the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate
the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the
outbreak of hostilities."[55] This demand for 1967 refugees to be allowed to return was repeated in General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V)[56]
while resolution 2443 established a "Special Committee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the
Occupied Territories" and also pointed to the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights regarding the right of everyone to return to his own
country."[57]
Though this refers only to refugees who fled in 1967, it would become
another foundation for the right of return for all refugees.Indeed, during the 1970s, the concept of inalienable rights and the
right of return began to influence UNRWA. One of the first appearances
of the latter phrase is in the 1977 report by Commissioner-General
Thomas McElhiney, who stated that since "1948, the General Assembly has
annually recommended the return of the refugees to their original homes
or the receipt of compensation in lieu thereof. The political
significance of the mass displacement of human beings is obvious,
particularly when the right of return and the right to restoration of
their property are acknowledged by the international community."[58]In the space of two sentences, McElhiney acknowledged the dichotomous
meaning of resolution 194 and then discarded it. In his report for the
following year, he omitted reference to resolution 194 altogether and
stated: "The General Assembly annually recommends the return of the
refugees to their original homes or the receipt of compensation in lieu
thereof. The political significance of the mass displacement of human
beings, particularly when the right of return and the right to
restoration of their property are acknowledged by the international
community, is obvious."[59] Curiously, the phrase never reappears in any commissioner-general report.The right of return has been largely sustained by Palestinian and Western intellectuals since the late 1970s.[60]
During the Oslo accords process, the PLO initially sought to
deemphasize the concept as a means of strengthening its international
standing, but it was dramatically reemphasized after 2000.[61]
This coincided with the deliberate shift within UNRWA from top-down
management to strategies of refugee consultation, participation, and
political empowerment.[62]
During this period, UNRWA also facilitated grassroots refugee
committees, in opposition to the PLO, which pursued complete
repatriation in place of a negotiated settlement.[63]
In conjunction with the work of a new generation of Palestinian
intellectuals, especially lawyers, operating outside the region, the
right of return was placed at the center of the new, rights-based
political agenda. UNRWA's policy of stakeholder participation and
expanding mandates meshed perfectly with the spread of the rights-based
approach. This, in turn, has influenced the agency itself, in terms of
policy and rhetoric.

In structural terms as well, stakeholder participation and
decentralization of planning, decision-making, and responsibility, along
with the reality of some 30,000 Palestinian employees and a half
billion dollar annual budget funded by the West, makes resettlement an
unlikely prospect.[64] UNRWA appears inextricably rooted in Palestinian society.Small wonder, therefore, that in the first decade of the twenty-first
century, the right of return has become an integral part of UNRWA
doctrine. In a 2008 press release, for example, Volker Schimmel, UNRWA
project officer for the Neirab Rehabilitation Project in Syria, stated,
"We want to allow Palestinians to live in dignity … Choosing not to live
in misery does not mean that they will forfeit their right of return."[65]
Filippo Grandi, UNRWA's deputy commissioner-general, was equally blunt
when, with regard to the same housing project, he stated at a conference
at Bir Zeit University: "The project has broken many traditional
taboos: For the first time all stakeholders have agreed that improving
living conditions did not compromise the right of return."[66]In a 2011 interview, UNRWA spokesman Chris Gunness made the same
point: "Established principles and practice—as well as realities on the
ground—clearly refute the argument that the right of return of Palestine
refugees would disappear or be abandoned if UNHCR were responsible for
these refugees."[67] The expression is also used in the UNRWA medium term strategy document.[68]
Leila Hilal, former legal advisor to the Palestinian Negotiations
Department and the Palestinian negotiations team at Annapolis and
subsequently senior policy advisor to the UNRWA commissioner-general
(now on the staff of the New America Foundation), opined that the right
of return and the "principle of refugee choice" are absolute
prerequisites, even if situated within a "menu of permanent destination
choices" as envisioned by U.S. president Bill Clinton in a 2000 proposal
to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.[69]These and similar statements are significant; at one level, they
reach the press and grassroots, reassuring the refugees of UNRWA's
commitment to the right of return.[70]
At another, they reach Palestinian and Arab intellectuals who carry on
the nationalist project through education, NGO action, and in
international settings. Pressure on UNRWA from groups such as the Global
Palestine Right of Return Coalition[71]
also put demands on the agency from the rights-based legal paradigm, as
well as the right of return and boycott, divestment, and sanctions
paradigms.UNRWA's senior leadership has been coyer, if no less committed. In a
2008 lecture at Oxford University, Commissioner-General Karen Koning
AbuZayd claimed that on "questions such as the right of return, for
example, there is fear that the preference, if left to refugees, would
be for a return en masse. From my own experience with other groups of
refugees, I can say that refugees often surprise us with the wisdom of
their choices—if, that is, we enable and empower them to choose." Yet
her assertion that "for sixty years, Palestine refugees have been in
exile from their ancestral lands" can only be interpreted as an
endorsement of the right of return, whether in a broad or limited sense.[72]Commissioner-general Peter Hansen was less equivocal when he argued
in a 2004 lecture, regarding the return of refugees to their homes in
other conflict zones: "Rightly or wrongly, the Palestine refugees view
this difference in approach as a double standard in the application of
international law. This perception of a double standard must end if
international law is to retain its meaning and relevance in the Middle
East as a whole."[73]

Conclusions

UNRWA's ever-expanding mandates, operations and responsibilities,
rhetoric, and institutional culture all work against resettlement. As a
result, the right of return has been inculcated as part of UNRWA's
culture at all levels and has been rationalized through the rights-based
approach.

UNRWA can thus be expected to oppose any negotiated
settlement that does not contain the right of return in some explicit
form, not least since only its parent organization, the General
Assembly, has "a permanent responsibility towards the question of
Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects in a
satisfactory manner in accordance with international legitimacy."[74]
This arrogation represents another impediment to the question of UNRWA
and the fate of the Palestine Arab refugees as well as to peace as a
whole.Alex Joffe is a Shillman/Ginsburg Writing Fellow at the Middle
East Forum and a New York-based writer on history and international
affairs. His website is www.alexanderjoffe.net.