Dear All,
We will have the following seminar by Joana Pais, from the Department
of Economics of ISEG, on January 11th.
Title: Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice:
Theory and Experiment
Date: 2018-Jan-11 Time: 15:00
Room: DEI/IST 0.17
Abstract:
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior
and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in
the student proposing or receiving deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism,
participants make decisions dynamically, going through the steps
of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary
to theory, (a) in the dynamic student proposing DA mechanism,
participants propose to schools respecting the order of their true
preferences slightly more often than in its static version while,
(b) in the dynamic student receiving DA mechanism, participants
react to proposals by always respecting the order and not accepting
schools in the tail of their true preferences more often than in
the corresponding static version. As a consequence, for most problems
we test, no significant differences exist between the two versions
of the student proposing DA mechanisms in what stability and average
payoffs are concerned, but the dynamic version of the student
receiving DA mechanism delivers a clear improvement over its static
counterpart in both dimensions. In fact, in the aggregate, the
dynamic school proposing DA mechanism is the best performing
mechanism.
Short Biography:
Joana Pais is an Associate Professor at the Department of Economics
of ISEG, a coordinator of the Master in Economics, and of the Ph.D
in Economics. Her research interests include matching theory, market
design, and experimental economics. Ph.D in Economics, University
Autònoma de Barcelona.
Best regards,
Alexandre Francisco