The Same Subject Continued

Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence

To the People of the State of New York:

Queen Anne, in her letter
of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some
observations on the importance of the union then forming
between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall
present the public with one or two extracts from it: An entire and perfect union will be the solid
foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion,
liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves,
and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It
must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union
the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all
apprehensions of different interest, will be enabled to resist
all its enemies.We most earnestly recommend to you
calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the
union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only
effectual way to secure our present and future happiness,
and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will
doubtless, on this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to
prevent or delay this union.¶

It was remarked in the preceding paper,
that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from
abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them
than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This
subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted. ¶

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we
are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful
lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the
price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common
sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation,
yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that
those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars
with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect
to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts
and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies
were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years
they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were
useful and assisting to each other. ¶

Should the people of America divide themselves into
three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not
similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead
of their being joined in affection and free
from all apprehension of different interests,
envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection,
and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the
general interests of all America, would be the only objects of
their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other
bordering nations, they would always be either involved
in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
¶

The most sanguine advocates for three or four
confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long
remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if
it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to
be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the
continuance of such equality? Independent of those local
circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part
and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the
effects of that superior policy and good management which would
probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by
which their relative equality in strength and consideration would
be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of
sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed
by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years. ¶

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen,
and happen it would, that any one of these nations or
confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance
much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those
neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions
would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might
promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them
from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her
prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to
discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not
only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a
disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally
creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct
more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid
imputations, whether expressed or implied. ¶

The North is generally the region of strength, and many
local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of
the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner
would this become evident than the northern hive would
excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of
America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor
does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might
often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and
milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors. ¶

They who well consider the history of similar divisions
and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that
those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than
as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust
one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord,
jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us
exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to
see us, viz., formidable only to each other. ¶

From these considerations it appears that those
gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances
offensive and defensive might be formed between these
confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of
wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put
and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign
enemies. ¶

When did the independent states, into which Britain
and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or
unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed
confederacies will be distinct nations. Each of them
would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct
treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different
and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be
essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create
different interests, and of course different degrees of political
attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence
it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with
whom the southern confederacy might be at war would be
the one with whom the northern confederacy would be the
most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so
contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy
to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with
perfect good faith. ¶

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in
Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite
interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found
taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it
would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger
from one another than from distant nations, and therefore that
each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others
by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign
dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not
forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our
ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade
or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and
others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did
they under the same character introduce into the governments of
those whom they pretended to protect. ¶

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of
America into any given number of independent sovereignties would
tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper
interference of foreign nations. ¶

Publius.
[John Jay]

First appeared in the Saturday, November 10, 1787 issue of the
Independent Journal.