Nationalism is often dismissed today as an irrational political creed with disastrous consequences. Yet most people regard their national identity as a significant aspect of themselves, see ...
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Nationalism is often dismissed today as an irrational political creed with disastrous consequences. Yet most people regard their national identity as a significant aspect of themselves, see themselves as having special obligations to their compatriots, and value their nation's political independence. This book defends these beliefs, and shows that nationality, defined in these terms, serves valuable goals, including social justice, democracy, and the protection of culture. National identities need not be illiberal, and they do not exclude other sources of personal identity, such as ethnicity or religion. An ethics that gives weight to special relationships is more effective in motivating people to pursue justice and other values because it connects peoples’ duties to their identity; but this is consistent with recognizing some universal values, such as human rights. There are strong reasons for making the boundaries of states and nations coincide wherever possible, but in other cases, nations can achieve forms of self‐determination that fall short of full sovereignty. Multicultural arguments in favour of identity politics and special rights for minority groups ignore the benefits that such groups derive from participating in a shared national identity and the kind of democratic politics that such an identity makes possible. Although national identities are often said to be in decline in an increasingly globalized world, they serve such important purposes that our aim should be to rebuild them in a form that makes them more accessible to excluded cultural minorities.Less

On Nationality

David Miller

Published in print: 1997-10-09

Nationalism is often dismissed today as an irrational political creed with disastrous consequences. Yet most people regard their national identity as a significant aspect of themselves, see themselves as having special obligations to their compatriots, and value their nation's political independence. This book defends these beliefs, and shows that nationality, defined in these terms, serves valuable goals, including social justice, democracy, and the protection of culture. National identities need not be illiberal, and they do not exclude other sources of personal identity, such as ethnicity or religion. An ethics that gives weight to special relationships is more effective in motivating people to pursue justice and other values because it connects peoples’ duties to their identity; but this is consistent with recognizing some universal values, such as human rights. There are strong reasons for making the boundaries of states and nations coincide wherever possible, but in other cases, nations can achieve forms of self‐determination that fall short of full sovereignty. Multicultural arguments in favour of identity politics and special rights for minority groups ignore the benefits that such groups derive from participating in a shared national identity and the kind of democratic politics that such an identity makes possible. Although national identities are often said to be in decline in an increasingly globalized world, they serve such important purposes that our aim should be to rebuild them in a form that makes them more accessible to excluded cultural minorities.

Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or ...
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Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.Less

What Are We? : A Study in Personal Ontology

Eric T. Olson

Published in print: 2007-11-01

Discussions of personal identity commonly ignore the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. This book is a general study of this question. It begins by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines critically the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature. The book does not endorse any particular account but argues that the matter turns on issues in the ontology of material objects. If composition is universal–if any material things whatever make up something bigger–then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then either we are simples–perhaps the immaterial souls of Descartes–or we do not exist at all. If some things compose bigger things and others do not, we are organisms.

This is a book on welfare and its importance for distributive justice. Part I is concerned with prudence; more precisely, with what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for having a ...
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This is a book on welfare and its importance for distributive justice. Part I is concerned with prudence; more precisely, with what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for having a self‐interest in a particular benefit. It includes discussions of the extent to which self‐interest depends on preferences, personal identity, and what matters in survival. It also considers the issue of whether it can benefit (or harm) a person to come into existence and what the implications are for our theory of self‐interest. A ‘Prudential View’ is defended, according to which a person has a present self‐interest in a future benefit if and only if she stands in a relation of continuous physical realization of (appropriate) psychology to the beneficiary, where the strength of the self‐interest depends both on the size of the benefit and on the strength of this relation. Part II concerns distributive justice and so how to distribute welfare or self‐interest fulfilment over individuals. It includes discussions of welfarism, egalitarianism and prioritarianism, population ethics, the importance of personal identity and what matters for distributive justice, and the importance of all these issues for various topics in applied ethics, including the badness of death. Here, a version of prioritarianism is defended, according to which, roughly, the moral value of a benefit to an individual at one time depends on both the size of the benefit and on the individual's self‐interest, at that time, in the other benefits that accrue to her at this and other times.Less

Persons, Interests, and Justice

Nils Holtug

Published in print: 2010-04-01

This is a book on welfare and its importance for distributive justice. Part I is concerned with prudence; more precisely, with what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for having a self‐interest in a particular benefit. It includes discussions of the extent to which self‐interest depends on preferences, personal identity, and what matters in survival. It also considers the issue of whether it can benefit (or harm) a person to come into existence and what the implications are for our theory of self‐interest. A ‘Prudential View’ is defended, according to which a person has a present self‐interest in a future benefit if and only if she stands in a relation of continuous physical realization of (appropriate) psychology to the beneficiary, where the strength of the self‐interest depends both on the size of the benefit and on the strength of this relation. Part II concerns distributive justice and so how to distribute welfare or self‐interest fulfilment over individuals. It includes discussions of welfarism, egalitarianism and prioritarianism, population ethics, the importance of personal identity and what matters for distributive justice, and the importance of all these issues for various topics in applied ethics, including the badness of death. Here, a version of prioritarianism is defended, according to which, roughly, the moral value of a benefit to an individual at one time depends on both the size of the benefit and on the individual's self‐interest, at that time, in the other benefits that accrue to her at this and other times.

Jerry L. Walls

Published in print:

2002

Published Online:

November 2003

ISBN:

9780195113020

eISBN:

9780199834815

Item type:

book

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

DOI:

10.1093/0195113020.001.0001

Subject:

Religion, Theology

The Christian doctrine of heaven has been a moral source of enormous power in Western culture. It has provided a striking account of the ultimate good in life and has for two millennia animated the ...
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The Christian doctrine of heaven has been a moral source of enormous power in Western culture. It has provided a striking account of the ultimate good in life and has for two millennia animated the hope that our lives can be fully meaningful. Recently, however, the doctrine of heaven has lost much of its grip on the Western imagination and has become a vague and largely ignored part of the Christian creed. Not only have our hopes been redefined as a result, but also our very identity as human beings has been altered. In this book, Jerry L. Walls argues that the doctrine of heaven is ripe for serious reconsideration. He contends not only that the orthodox view of heaven can be defended from objections commonly raised against it, but also that heaven is a powerful resource for addressing persistent philosophical problems, not the least of which concern the ground of morality and the meaning of life. Walls shows how heaven is integrally related to central Christian doctrines, particularly those concerning salvation, and tackles the difficult problem of why faith in Christ is necessary to save us from our sins. In addition, heaven is shown to illumine thorny problems of personal identity, and to be an essential component of a satisfactory theodicy. Walls goes on to examine data from near‐death experiences from the standpoint of some important recent work in epistemology, and argues that they offer positive evidence for heaven. He concludes that we profoundly need to recover the hope of heaven in order to recover our very humanity.Less

Heaven : The Logic of Eternal Joy

Jerry L. Walls

Published in print: 2002-08-29

The Christian doctrine of heaven has been a moral source of enormous power in Western culture. It has provided a striking account of the ultimate good in life and has for two millennia animated the hope that our lives can be fully meaningful. Recently, however, the doctrine of heaven has lost much of its grip on the Western imagination and has become a vague and largely ignored part of the Christian creed. Not only have our hopes been redefined as a result, but also our very identity as human beings has been altered. In this book, Jerry L. Walls argues that the doctrine of heaven is ripe for serious reconsideration. He contends not only that the orthodox view of heaven can be defended from objections commonly raised against it, but also that heaven is a powerful resource for addressing persistent philosophical problems, not the least of which concern the ground of morality and the meaning of life. Walls shows how heaven is integrally related to central Christian doctrines, particularly those concerning salvation, and tackles the difficult problem of why faith in Christ is necessary to save us from our sins. In addition, heaven is shown to illumine thorny problems of personal identity, and to be an essential component of a satisfactory theodicy. Walls goes on to examine data from near‐death experiences from the standpoint of some important recent work in epistemology, and argues that they offer positive evidence for heaven. He concludes that we profoundly need to recover the hope of heaven in order to recover our very humanity.

This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. ...
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This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. Temporary disembodiment, which is the theory of life after death and the interim state held by most theologians, is discussed. The nature of the disembodied interim state, the reunification of body and soul at the Parousia, and the nature of the gloried body are also explored. It is argued that contrary to certain philosophers, this overall picture of the general resurrection is coherent. Christian theologians differ on whether the new glorified body consists of the same matter as the pre-mortem body, but both theories are possible. John Perry’s arguments against survival of death are answered.Less

The Resurrection of the Dead

Stephen T. Davis

Published in print: 2006-03-01

This chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. Temporary disembodiment, which is the theory of life after death and the interim state held by most theologians, is discussed. The nature of the disembodied interim state, the reunification of body and soul at the Parousia, and the nature of the gloried body are also explored. It is argued that contrary to certain philosophers, this overall picture of the general resurrection is coherent. Christian theologians differ on whether the new glorified body consists of the same matter as the pre-mortem body, but both theories are possible. John Perry’s arguments against survival of death are answered.

This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing ...
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This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity and dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science.Less

Real People : Personal Identity without Thought Experiments

Kathleen V. Wilkes

Published in print: 1993-11-18

This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of a person — a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity and dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science.

This book is about the world of parenting and parenthood in the Georgian era. It navigates recent ‘turns’ towards emotions, subjectivity, memory, the body and materiality. This approach reveals the ...
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This book is about the world of parenting and parenthood in the Georgian era. It navigates recent ‘turns’ towards emotions, subjectivity, memory, the body and materiality. This approach reveals the profound emotions provoked by motherhood and fatherhood and the labour and hard work it entailed. Such parental investment meant that the experience was fundamental to the forging of national, family and personal identities. Society called upon parents to transmit prized values across generations and this study explores how this was achieved. All in all, raising children needed more than two parents. At all levels of society, household and kinship ties were drawn upon to lighten the labours of parenting and this book reveals how crucial grandparents, aunts, uncles and servants were to raising children. It also discusses the ways in which parenting adapted across the life‐course, changed by the transitions of ageing, marriage and family, adversity and crisis, and death and memory.Less

Parenting in England 1760-1830 : Emotion, Identity, and Generation

Joanne Bailey

Published in print: 2012-04-05

This book is about the world of parenting and parenthood in the Georgian era. It navigates recent ‘turns’ towards emotions, subjectivity, memory, the body and materiality. This approach reveals the profound emotions provoked by motherhood and fatherhood and the labour and hard work it entailed. Such parental investment meant that the experience was fundamental to the forging of national, family and personal identities. Society called upon parents to transmit prized values across generations and this study explores how this was achieved. All in all, raising children needed more than two parents. At all levels of society, household and kinship ties were drawn upon to lighten the labours of parenting and this book reveals how crucial grandparents, aunts, uncles and servants were to raising children. It also discusses the ways in which parenting adapted across the life‐course, changed by the transitions of ageing, marriage and family, adversity and crisis, and death and memory.

Kenneth Strike’s essay on pluralism, personal identity, and freedom of conscience, takes up the concept of identity, and contrasts cultural and religious pluralism. He argues that the issues of ...
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Kenneth Strike’s essay on pluralism, personal identity, and freedom of conscience, takes up the concept of identity, and contrasts cultural and religious pluralism. He argues that the issues of affiliational obligation and recognition are often different in these two types of pluralism, and that religious groups are often asking for something very different from cultural groups. Strike makes a case for a more fluid conception of the idea of identity and against its essentialist form; he holds, e.g. that some of his affiliations are stronger than others and more tied to his sense of a larger self, but it is questionable, he argues, whether any of these affiliations could not be re-evaluated without loss of the larger idea of the self. Strike does allow that members of groups more oppressed than his might certainly rally around the attributes that they hold in common, and he is sympathetic to this strategic function of identity. Nevertheless, he wants to hold onto the individualized and phenomenological conception of identity: identity is whatever the agent feels it to be.Less

PLURALISM, PERSONAL IDENTITY, AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

Kenneth A. Strike

Published in print: 2003-08-28

Kenneth Strike’s essay on pluralism, personal identity, and freedom of conscience, takes up the concept of identity, and contrasts cultural and religious pluralism. He argues that the issues of affiliational obligation and recognition are often different in these two types of pluralism, and that religious groups are often asking for something very different from cultural groups. Strike makes a case for a more fluid conception of the idea of identity and against its essentialist form; he holds, e.g. that some of his affiliations are stronger than others and more tied to his sense of a larger self, but it is questionable, he argues, whether any of these affiliations could not be re-evaluated without loss of the larger idea of the self. Strike does allow that members of groups more oppressed than his might certainly rally around the attributes that they hold in common, and he is sympathetic to this strategic function of identity. Nevertheless, he wants to hold onto the individualized and phenomenological conception of identity: identity is whatever the agent feels it to be.

Nations must be clearly distinguished from states on the one hand and ethnic groups on the other. A nation is a community (1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in ...
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Nations must be clearly distinguished from states on the one hand and ethnic groups on the other. A nation is a community (1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture. The modern idea of nationality is distinguished from older beliefs about cultural differences between peoples by its emphasis on collective self‐determination. Although national identities involve elements of myth, this does not show that it is irrational to embrace them. Nor do they prevent individuals making their own choices about how to live.Less

National Identity

David Miller

Published in print: 1997-10-09

Nations must be clearly distinguished from states on the one hand and ethnic groups on the other. A nation is a community (1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture. The modern idea of nationality is distinguished from older beliefs about cultural differences between peoples by its emphasis on collective self‐determination. Although national identities involve elements of myth, this does not show that it is irrational to embrace them. Nor do they prevent individuals making their own choices about how to live.

This chapter continues the analysis of Spinozism. It focuses on Schleiermacher's long discussion of personal identity, which is extremely significant for Schleiermacher's later understanding of ...
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This chapter continues the analysis of Spinozism. It focuses on Schleiermacher's long discussion of personal identity, which is extremely significant for Schleiermacher's later understanding of reflective self-consciousness. In it Schleiermacher reveals himself to be intimately acquainted with both Kant's transcendental deduction as well as Kant's chapter on the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Schleiermacher argues, in agreement with Kant, that we have no access to a substantial noumenal self. Rather, identity of the subject is cognizable only in and through the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. The only reflective access we have to self is through the products of its transcendental activity; the transcendental activity itself, however, cannot become an object for consciousness but is only given in immediacy. The philosophical position Schleiermacher develops here is key to gaining an understanding of the position he develops in the Monologen.Less

Personal Identity

Jacqueline Mariña

Published in print: 2008-04-01

This chapter continues the analysis of Spinozism. It focuses on Schleiermacher's long discussion of personal identity, which is extremely significant for Schleiermacher's later understanding of reflective self-consciousness. In it Schleiermacher reveals himself to be intimately acquainted with both Kant's transcendental deduction as well as Kant's chapter on the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Schleiermacher argues, in agreement with Kant, that we have no access to a substantial noumenal self. Rather, identity of the subject is cognizable only in and through the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. The only reflective access we have to self is through the products of its transcendental activity; the transcendental activity itself, however, cannot become an object for consciousness but is only given in immediacy. The philosophical position Schleiermacher develops here is key to gaining an understanding of the position he develops in the Monologen.

This book is a philosophical and theological exploration and defense of the doctrine of purgatory. After a historical overview of the development of the doctrine, it examines Protestant objections to ...
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This book is a philosophical and theological exploration and defense of the doctrine of purgatory. After a historical overview of the development of the doctrine, it examines Protestant objections to the doctrine as well as Protestant accounts of how believers are purged of their imperfections and made ready for heaven. It goes on to show that the doctrine of purgatory has been construed in different ways, and that some of these are compatible with Protestant theology. Next, it shows that purgatory assumes not only continuity of personal identity but also conscious survival between death and resurrection. Such continuity of identity also arguably requires gradual moral development over time, which also supports a doctrine of purgatory. The traditional doctrine of purgatory is not understood as a second chance for salvation, but rather, only as a matter of perfecting persons who die in a state of grace. It is argued that the doctrine of purgatory should be modified to allow for postmortem repentance and conversion. The final long chapter of the book shows that popular writer C. S. Lewis not only believed in purgatory, but proposed a version of the doctrine that may appeal to Christians on both sides of the Reformation divide.Less

Purgatory : The Logic of Total Transformation

Jerry L. Walls

Published in print: 2011-12-01

This book is a philosophical and theological exploration and defense of the doctrine of purgatory. After a historical overview of the development of the doctrine, it examines Protestant objections to the doctrine as well as Protestant accounts of how believers are purged of their imperfections and made ready for heaven. It goes on to show that the doctrine of purgatory has been construed in different ways, and that some of these are compatible with Protestant theology. Next, it shows that purgatory assumes not only continuity of personal identity but also conscious survival between death and resurrection. Such continuity of identity also arguably requires gradual moral development over time, which also supports a doctrine of purgatory. The traditional doctrine of purgatory is not understood as a second chance for salvation, but rather, only as a matter of perfecting persons who die in a state of grace. It is argued that the doctrine of purgatory should be modified to allow for postmortem repentance and conversion. The final long chapter of the book shows that popular writer C. S. Lewis not only believed in purgatory, but proposed a version of the doctrine that may appeal to Christians on both sides of the Reformation divide.

This chapter presents a general approach to the development of personal identity, exploring the ways in which various group identities may be incorporated into the emerging personal identity of an ...
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This chapter presents a general approach to the development of personal identity, exploring the ways in which various group identities may be incorporated into the emerging personal identity of an individual. The approach is based on a conceptual model developed for the analysis of social influence and extended to the analysis of personal involvement in social systems. This model is not specifically addressed to identity formation, but it has some relevance to the development of identity both at the level of the individual and at that of the group — that is, both to personal and to national or ethnic identity. The chapter explores the implications of this model for identity formation at these two levels, with special reference to Jewish identity.Less

The Place of Ethnic Identity in the Development of Personal Identity: A Challenge for the Jewish Family

Peter Y. Medding

Published in print: 1999-05-06

This chapter presents a general approach to the development of personal identity, exploring the ways in which various group identities may be incorporated into the emerging personal identity of an individual. The approach is based on a conceptual model developed for the analysis of social influence and extended to the analysis of personal involvement in social systems. This model is not specifically addressed to identity formation, but it has some relevance to the development of identity both at the level of the individual and at that of the group — that is, both to personal and to national or ethnic identity. The chapter explores the implications of this model for identity formation at these two levels, with special reference to Jewish identity.

When a memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer, the veridicality constraint on memory demands that the rememberer is numerically the same as the one who had the original ...
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When a memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer, the veridicality constraint on memory demands that the rememberer is numerically the same as the one who had the original experience/representation. This chapter investigates how the notion of personal identity is related to the notion of memory. It starts out by discussing the circularity objection to the psychological continuity theory of personal identity. Shoemaker and Parfit suggest solving the circularity objection by substituting the concept of quasi‐memory for the concept of memory. For the concept of quasi‐memory to provide a solution to the circularity objection quasi‐memory must be conceptually independent both from genuine memory and ostensible memory. The conceptual independence of quasi‐memory has come under attack: there are objections from constitutive holism, from the causal theory of memory, and from the immunity to error through misidentification. This chapter argues that the notion of quasi‐memory is indeed coherent and is not a derivative from the concept of memory. The dependence of memory on personal identity of a contingent rather than a logical nature. This chapter also discusses Wollheim's and Schechtman's narrative self‐constitution view of personal identity.Less

Personal Identity and Memory

Sven Bernecker

Published in print: 2009-12-24

When a memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer, the veridicality constraint on memory demands that the rememberer is numerically the same as the one who had the original experience/representation. This chapter investigates how the notion of personal identity is related to the notion of memory. It starts out by discussing the circularity objection to the psychological continuity theory of personal identity. Shoemaker and Parfit suggest solving the circularity objection by substituting the concept of quasi‐memory for the concept of memory. For the concept of quasi‐memory to provide a solution to the circularity objection quasi‐memory must be conceptually independent both from genuine memory and ostensible memory. The conceptual independence of quasi‐memory has come under attack: there are objections from constitutive holism, from the causal theory of memory, and from the immunity to error through misidentification. This chapter argues that the notion of quasi‐memory is indeed coherent and is not a derivative from the concept of memory. The dependence of memory on personal identity of a contingent rather than a logical nature. This chapter also discusses Wollheim's and Schechtman's narrative self‐constitution view of personal identity.

According to the Identity View, in order for an individual to have a self‐interest in a future benefit, she must be identical to the beneficiary. Therefore, the exact implications of the Identity ...
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According to the Identity View, in order for an individual to have a self‐interest in a future benefit, she must be identical to the beneficiary. Therefore, the exact implications of the Identity View depend on the particular theory of personal identity assumed. However, it is argued that identity is only seen as a plausible condition for self‐interests if we assume that identity is what matters in survival, that is, if we assume that identity is what gives each of us the basis for special concern for our (own) future. If we do not make this assumption, the Identity View will not have the prudential significance it usually is thought to have and which generates our concern with self‐interests in the first place. Parfit's argument for why identity is in fact not what matters in survival is then presented and defended against a number of objections, further implying that the Identity View should be rejected.Less

Personal Identity

Nils Holtug

Published in print: 2010-04-01

According to the Identity View, in order for an individual to have a self‐interest in a future benefit, she must be identical to the beneficiary. Therefore, the exact implications of the Identity View depend on the particular theory of personal identity assumed. However, it is argued that identity is only seen as a plausible condition for self‐interests if we assume that identity is what matters in survival, that is, if we assume that identity is what gives each of us the basis for special concern for our (own) future. If we do not make this assumption, the Identity View will not have the prudential significance it usually is thought to have and which generates our concern with self‐interests in the first place. Parfit's argument for why identity is in fact not what matters in survival is then presented and defended against a number of objections, further implying that the Identity View should be rejected.

This chapter is concerned with the three different bases of identities that are present in groups, persons, and roles. It discusses the idea that there are more bases for identities than roles. The ...
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This chapter is concerned with the three different bases of identities that are present in groups, persons, and roles. It discusses the idea that there are more bases for identities than roles. The first section introduces role identities, followed by sections on social and personal identities. It then shows how all these three bases of identities can be combined.Less

Bases of Identities: Role, Group, and Person

Peter J. BurkeJan E. Stets

Published in print: 2009-08-18

This chapter is concerned with the three different bases of identities that are present in groups, persons, and roles. It discusses the idea that there are more bases for identities than roles. The first section introduces role identities, followed by sections on social and personal identities. It then shows how all these three bases of identities can be combined.

The most discussed eighteenth-century account of personal identity is that of David Hume who influenced both Sulzer and Mérian. This chapter begins with a close analysis of the relevant sections in ...
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The most discussed eighteenth-century account of personal identity is that of David Hume who influenced both Sulzer and Mérian. This chapter begins with a close analysis of the relevant sections in Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature and Hume’s famous second thoughts on identity in the Appendix to Book III. Hume’s account is also explained by reference to earlier theories such as those of Locke, Collins and Butler, as well as Shaftesbury and Buffier. The question Hume attempts to answer in Book I is not metaphysical but, rather, psychological: how does it come about that we ascribe identity “to the mind of man”. Also, Hume does not reject the whole Book I account in the Appendix. Instead, what he says there about the self as a bundle of perceptions, the “natural propension” to ascribe identity to the self, and the notion of a fiction, remains unchallenged. The chapter ends by arguing that Hume distinguishes between consciousness and reflection; a distinction relevant to the interpretation of his account of personal identity.Less

Hume and the belief in personal identity

Udo Thiel

Published in print: 2011-09-29

The most discussed eighteenth-century account of personal identity is that of David Hume who influenced both Sulzer and Mérian. This chapter begins with a close analysis of the relevant sections in Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature and Hume’s famous second thoughts on identity in the Appendix to Book III. Hume’s account is also explained by reference to earlier theories such as those of Locke, Collins and Butler, as well as Shaftesbury and Buffier. The question Hume attempts to answer in Book I is not metaphysical but, rather, psychological: how does it come about that we ascribe identity “to the mind of man”. Also, Hume does not reject the whole Book I account in the Appendix. Instead, what he says there about the self as a bundle of perceptions, the “natural propension” to ascribe identity to the self, and the notion of a fiction, remains unchallenged. The chapter ends by arguing that Hume distinguishes between consciousness and reflection; a distinction relevant to the interpretation of his account of personal identity.

In the Third Paralogism, Immanuel Kant either addresses directly or gives hints of his views on personal identity, on the moral implications of such identity, and on the problem of other minds. This ...
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In the Third Paralogism, Immanuel Kant either addresses directly or gives hints of his views on personal identity, on the moral implications of such identity, and on the problem of other minds. This chapter examines how the argument may fit into Kant's general account of the paralogistic reasoning of rational psychology. It demonstrates that, construed outside the context of this account, Kant's remarks on the Third Paralogism are misleading to the point of unintelligibility. To see the actual structure of the Third Paralogism, Kant's definition of a transcendental paralogism is considered. What Kant invokes is the thesis, taken from the Transcendental Aesthetic, that time is the form of inner sense. It seems reasonable to conclude that in the Third Paralogism Kant is attempting to refute the thesis that self-consciousness of personal identity can be known by empirical observation.Less

Kant on Self-Identity: The Third Paralogism

C. Thomas Powell

Published in print: 1990-08-16

In the Third Paralogism, Immanuel Kant either addresses directly or gives hints of his views on personal identity, on the moral implications of such identity, and on the problem of other minds. This chapter examines how the argument may fit into Kant's general account of the paralogistic reasoning of rational psychology. It demonstrates that, construed outside the context of this account, Kant's remarks on the Third Paralogism are misleading to the point of unintelligibility. To see the actual structure of the Third Paralogism, Kant's definition of a transcendental paralogism is considered. What Kant invokes is the thesis, taken from the Transcendental Aesthetic, that time is the form of inner sense. It seems reasonable to conclude that in the Third Paralogism Kant is attempting to refute the thesis that self-consciousness of personal identity can be known by empirical observation.

This chapter turns to Locke's account of personal identity itself, taking up the discussion of the fundamental notions that are relevant in this account from the previous chapter. Contrary to what ...
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This chapter turns to Locke's account of personal identity itself, taking up the discussion of the fundamental notions that are relevant in this account from the previous chapter. Contrary to what some commentators hold, Locke distinguishes between consciousness and memory, and he ascribes to both an essential role in the constitution of personal identity. Linked to the notion of consciousness is that of self-concern: its main function for personal identity is that through it the subject relates to its own future; it also connects cognitive features (consciousness and memory) with the moral and legal features of personal identity. In this context the question of the ontological status of Lockean persons re-emerges (chapter 3). Readings that take Lockean persons to be substances are mistaken: Rather, Locke, following Pufendorf, allows that we talk of persons in analogy to substances, as if they were substances, but they are essentially, as in Pufendorf, modal entities. The chapter next examines the theological aspects of Locke's account of personal identity and its connection with Locke's view of the doctrine of original sin and the resurrection, including the controversy with Stillingfleet. A question is raised of whether Locke's account is compatible with genuine repentance. The theological aspects are connected to the thinking matter issue. Locke's materialist followers, Collins, Voltaire, Cuenz see a constructive role for a Lockean account of personal identity within a materialist metaphysics. Although Locke does not endorse materialism, his own theory would in principle fit as well into a materialist as into an immaterialist theory of the mindLess

Locke on personal identity: consciousness, memory, and self-concern

Udo Thiel

Published in print: 2011-09-29

This chapter turns to Locke's account of personal identity itself, taking up the discussion of the fundamental notions that are relevant in this account from the previous chapter. Contrary to what some commentators hold, Locke distinguishes between consciousness and memory, and he ascribes to both an essential role in the constitution of personal identity. Linked to the notion of consciousness is that of self-concern: its main function for personal identity is that through it the subject relates to its own future; it also connects cognitive features (consciousness and memory) with the moral and legal features of personal identity. In this context the question of the ontological status of Lockean persons re-emerges (chapter 3). Readings that take Lockean persons to be substances are mistaken: Rather, Locke, following Pufendorf, allows that we talk of persons in analogy to substances, as if they were substances, but they are essentially, as in Pufendorf, modal entities. The chapter next examines the theological aspects of Locke's account of personal identity and its connection with Locke's view of the doctrine of original sin and the resurrection, including the controversy with Stillingfleet. A question is raised of whether Locke's account is compatible with genuine repentance. The theological aspects are connected to the thinking matter issue. Locke's materialist followers, Collins, Voltaire, Cuenz see a constructive role for a Lockean account of personal identity within a materialist metaphysics. Although Locke does not endorse materialism, his own theory would in principle fit as well into a materialist as into an immaterialist theory of the mind

This chapter deals with the views and arguments of thinkers who treat the issues of personal identity and self-consciousness from the perspective of an immaterialist theory of the mind. Standard ...
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This chapter deals with the views and arguments of thinkers who treat the issues of personal identity and self-consciousness from the perspective of an immaterialist theory of the mind. Standard arguments in support of the immaterial nature of the mind or soul appeal to the unity of the soul and consciousness, and to the diachronic identity of the soul required for the afterlife. Neither unity nor diachronic identity is said to be compatible with the extension of matter and with a multiplicity of material particles. Personal identity on this view requires an immaterial core of the self that is not subject to change. There is, however, a considerable variety of views about personal identity from within immaterialist positions on the nature of the mind. This chapter focuses on British thinkers in the first half of the eighteenth century, examining the Cartesian position of Thomas Emes, Samuel Clarke and Henry Grove, as well as Isaac Watts with his rather modern emphasis on language for dealing with this issue. Shaftesbury, the last thinker considered in this chapter, links the unity of the human soul to that of a universal or world soul, appealing to neo-Platonist metaphysics.Less

The soul: human and universal

Udo Thiel

Published in print: 2011-09-29

This chapter deals with the views and arguments of thinkers who treat the issues of personal identity and self-consciousness from the perspective of an immaterialist theory of the mind. Standard arguments in support of the immaterial nature of the mind or soul appeal to the unity of the soul and consciousness, and to the diachronic identity of the soul required for the afterlife. Neither unity nor diachronic identity is said to be compatible with the extension of matter and with a multiplicity of material particles. Personal identity on this view requires an immaterial core of the self that is not subject to change. There is, however, a considerable variety of views about personal identity from within immaterialist positions on the nature of the mind. This chapter focuses on British thinkers in the first half of the eighteenth century, examining the Cartesian position of Thomas Emes, Samuel Clarke and Henry Grove, as well as Isaac Watts with his rather modern emphasis on language for dealing with this issue. Shaftesbury, the last thinker considered in this chapter, links the unity of the human soul to that of a universal or world soul, appealing to neo-Platonist metaphysics.

This chapter continues with British accounts of an immaterialist view of the mind, but it does so with a different focus: 1) Consciousness, 2) the notion of identity. It begins by examining the way ...
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This chapter continues with British accounts of an immaterialist view of the mind, but it does so with a different focus: 1) Consciousness, 2) the notion of identity. It begins by examining the way in which philosophers such as John Norris, Peter Browne and Berkeley argue, apparently following Malebranche, that we know our own souls only through consciousness, understood as an immediate relating to our own selves, and not through the mediation of ideas. Special consideration is then given to the first extensive early modern treatment of consciousness as such, the Essay on Consciousness, published anonymously in 1728. While the author's ideas of the human soul are for the most part traditional, he does contribute the idea of a mutual dependence and interaction between the consciousness of objects and self-consciousness. Berkeley's account of the person is examined: he accounts for the person as “the concrete will and understanding”, but argues thatr personal identity is provided by the immaterial nature of the soul. The American philosopher Jonathan Edwards links the personal identity issue to the theological issue of original sin. This chapter discusses his contribution along with recent commentary on it in terms of the present-day theory of temporal parts. Joseph Butler, although mostly known for his arguments against Locke, also provides his own account. For Butler the theological issue is the afterlife and the notion of identity. Central to Butler is the old distinction between a strict and a “lose and popular” sense of identity. He also has an intuitive notion of identity whereby identity is held to be unanalysable and thus not definable. Lastly, the anonymous Essay on Personal Identity is examined. It is critical of Locke, but does provide its own positive account in terms of what the author calls “pure thought”. Abraham Tucker's critique of this essay is discussed, noting that Tucker's own contributions are not without problems of their own. Tucker's speculations insist that personal identity consists in the identity of substance.Less

Relating to the soul, pure thought, original sin, and the afterlife

Udo Thiel

Published in print: 2011-09-29

This chapter continues with British accounts of an immaterialist view of the mind, but it does so with a different focus: 1) Consciousness, 2) the notion of identity. It begins by examining the way in which philosophers such as John Norris, Peter Browne and Berkeley argue, apparently following Malebranche, that we know our own souls only through consciousness, understood as an immediate relating to our own selves, and not through the mediation of ideas. Special consideration is then given to the first extensive early modern treatment of consciousness as such, the Essay on Consciousness, published anonymously in 1728. While the author's ideas of the human soul are for the most part traditional, he does contribute the idea of a mutual dependence and interaction between the consciousness of objects and self-consciousness. Berkeley's account of the person is examined: he accounts for the person as “the concrete will and understanding”, but argues thatr personal identity is provided by the immaterial nature of the soul. The American philosopher Jonathan Edwards links the personal identity issue to the theological issue of original sin. This chapter discusses his contribution along with recent commentary on it in terms of the present-day theory of temporal parts. Joseph Butler, although mostly known for his arguments against Locke, also provides his own account. For Butler the theological issue is the afterlife and the notion of identity. Central to Butler is the old distinction between a strict and a “lose and popular” sense of identity. He also has an intuitive notion of identity whereby identity is held to be unanalysable and thus not definable. Lastly, the anonymous Essay on Personal Identity is examined. It is critical of Locke, but does provide its own positive account in terms of what the author calls “pure thought”. Abraham Tucker's critique of this essay is discussed, noting that Tucker's own contributions are not without problems of their own. Tucker's speculations insist that personal identity consists in the identity of substance.