Essential Reading

How President Ahmadinejad’s words were mistranslated and deliberately distorted. So that the term “wiped off the map” has now become synonymous with the Iranian leader’s attitude to Israel – even though he never uttered those words

Fact or fantasy? Admiral Richard B. Byrd’s account of his flight over the North Pole and discovery of a “land beyond the poles” is legend. For those still unfamiliar with it we present his classic account and leave you to decide

Using legal injunctions, Dov Zakheim’s lawyers forced this website to remove an article we posted with the same title; which tells us he may have something to hide. Seems like others also think so as this video indicates. Watch it while you still can

Jack Bernstein was a rarity, an American Zionist who ‘returned’ to Israel, not for a holiday but to live and die in Israel building a Jewish nation. What makes him almost one of a kind, however, was his ability to see through the sham of Zionism

The evidence is in and it’s irrefutable: scientists have discovered traces of hi-tech explosives in the WTC debris. Which means the UK/US/Israel will have to stage another event on the scale of 9/11 to counter the brushfire this report will ignite

“Looking at some of the negative comments about me on Google does my heart good. Consider the sources! Anyway, the objection has been made that I spend too much time on “trivia” such as the Gannon/Bush union or “gossip” about pending military actions against Iran. I went through files here in the Monkey Palace and culled out some interesting CIA material. This deals with how to snitch on your fellow government workers and I am sending a digest of this on for the public to look at. This has become a polarized country with the rabid right foaming at the chops like a rabid hog and the disorganized liberals struggling to regroup. You know, I wouldn’t recommend that your Brian Harring ever go to Washington. I have it on the best authority that Fat Karl Rove, the Eunuch, is planning to come up behind Harring and knock him down with his purse and then stomp on him with his stiletto-heels. Enjoy! More “silly gossip” next time.”

‘The Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards lists (Annex E, 6 [a] – [m]) several general categories of behavior that are reportable if observed in the workplace. These are similar to the adjudicative guidelines (in the DoD Directive 5200.2-R) except that they do not include the brief behavioral descriptions that appear in the adjudicative guidelines. The categories, which—like the adjudicative guidelines—mix CI, security and reliability issues, are listed below. Only two—(b) and (c)—are strictly related to CI issues.

(a) Involvement in activities or sympathetic association with persons which/who unlawfully practice or advocate the overthrow or alteration of the United States Government by unconstitutional means.

(d) Sexual behavior that is criminal or reflects a lack of judgment or discretion.

(e) Unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations or to cooperate with security processing.

(f) Unexplained affluence or excessive indebtedness.

(g) Alcohol abuse.

(h) Illegal or improper drug use/involvement.

(i) Apparent mental or emotional disorder(s).

(j) Criminal conduct.

(k) Noncompliance with security requirements.

(l) Engagement in outside activities that could cause a conflict of interest.

(m) Misuse of information technology systems.

(a) Any attempt to expand access to classified information by volunteering for assignments or duties beyond the normal scope of responsibilities or attempting to obtain information for which the person has no authorized access or need to know.

(b) Unauthorized removed of classified materials from work area.

(c) Extensive use of copy, FAX or computer equipment to reproduce or transmit classified material that may exceed job requirements.

(g) Unexplained or undue affluence, including sudden purchases of high-value items where no logical income source exists. Attempts to explain wealth by reference to inheritance, luck in gambling, or some successful business venture..

(h) Opening several bank accounts containing substantial sums of money where no logical income source exists.

(j) Sudden reversal of financial situation or sudden repayment of large debts or loans.

(k) Correspondence with persons in countries of special concern.

(l) Unreported contact with officials of countries of special concern.

(m) Frequent or unexplained trips of short duration to foreign countries.

(n) Attempts to offer extra income from an outside endeavor to personnel with sensitive jobs or to entice them into criminal situations that could lead to blackmail.

(o) Homesteading or repeatedly requesting extensions to tours of duty in one assignment or location, especially when the assignment offers significant access to sensitive information or the job is not desirable.

(p) Repeated involvement in security violations.

(q) Joking or bragging about working for a foreign intelligence service.

(r) Visits to a foreign embassy, consulate, trade, or press office.

(s) Business dealings with nationals or firms of countries of concern.

In summary, DoD Instruction 5240.6, flowing from higher-level policies such as a Presidential Decision Directive and an Executive Order, lays out the basic requirement for CI awareness and briefing programs in the DoD. Air Force and Navy wrote instructions that closely parallel the DoD instruction; the Army elaborated on the instruction, providing more details and specifics. Requirements vary somewhat from one entity to another. PERSEREC staff decided that a short, succinct list of reportable behaviors is needed rather than having supervisors, coworkers, and agencies deal with the plethora of different approaches and degrees of specificity found in the different policies..

· E2.1.9.1. Espionage is the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent or reason to believe that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. The offense of espionage applies during war or peace.

· E2.1.9.2. Reference makes it an offense to gather, with the requisite intent or belief, national defense information, by going on, entering, flying over, or obtaining access by any means to any installation or place used by the United States for national defense. The method of gathering that information is immaterial.

· E2.1.9.3. Anyone who lawfully or unlawfully is entrusted with or otherwise has possession of, access to, or control over information about national defense, which he or she has reason to believe could be used against the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, and willfully communicates or transmits, or attempts to communicate or transmit, such information to any person not entitled to receive it may be punished under reference .

· E2.1.9.4. Anyone entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of information about national defense, who through gross negligence permits the same to be lost, stolen, abstracted, destroyed, removed from its proper place of custody, or delivered to anyone in violation of that trust may be punished under reference .

· E2.1.9.5. If two or more persons conspire to commit and one of them commits an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy, all members of the conspiracy may be punished for violation of reference .

· E2.1.15. Sabotage. An act or acts with the intent to injure or interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring, destroying, or attempting to destroy any national defense or war materiel, premises or utilities to include human or natural resources, under reference .

· E2.1.16. Spying. During wartime, any person who is found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, vessel or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction of any of the Armed Forces or in or about any shipyard, any manufacturing or industrial plant, or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid of the prosecution of the war by the United States, or elsewhere.

· E2.1.17. Subversion. An act or acts inciting military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt military activities with the willful intent thereby to interfere with, or impair the loyalty, morale, of discipline, of the Military Forces of the United States.

· E2.1.18. Terrorism. The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

· E2.1.19. Treason. Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason (see Section 2831 of title 18, U.S. Code,

· E2.1.20. Unauthorized Disclosure. A communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient..DODI 5240.6, August 7, 2004

· E3.1.18. Unexplained or undue affluence, including sudden purchases of high value items (i.e., real estate, stocks, vehicles, or vacations) where no logical income source exists. Attempts to explain wealth by reference to inheritance, luck in gambling, or some successful business venture.

· E3.1.19. Sudden reversal of a bad financial situation or repayment of large debts. E3.1.20. Attempts to entice DoD personnel into situations that could place them in acompromising position.

· E3.1.21. Attempts to place DoD personnel under obligation through special treatment, favors, gifts, money or other means.E3.1.22. Short trips to foreign countries or travel within the United States to cities with foreign diplomatic activities for reasons that appear unusual or inconsistent with a person’s interests or financial means..A-18.B-1

Appendix B

RECRUITMENT

Foreign intelligence entities are on the lookout for people who can be solicited to commit espionage against the U.S. At the same time, willing would-be spies often approach foreign intelligence operatives on their own initiative, thus volunteering for recruitment. It is a major task of counterintelligence to intercept these relationships. The recruitment cycle requires, first, that contact be established between the foreign intelligence agency and the potential spy, whether by direct recruitment or by volunteering. While the recruitment relationship almost always involves contacts with foreigners, an already-committed U.S. spy may approach you or a colleague on the job for recruitment into espionage.
Reportable Behaviors

· you become aware of a colleague having contact with an individual who is known to be, or is suspected of being, associated with a foreign intelligence, security, or terrorist organization.

· you discover that a colleague has not reported an offer of financial assistance by a foreign national other than close family.

· you find out that a colleague has failed to report a request for classified or unclassified information outside official channels to a foreign national or anyone without authorization or need to know.

· you become aware of a colleague engaging in illegal activity or if a colleague asks you to engage in any illegal activity.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

REPORTING ESSENTIALS (CORE)

If you become aware of any of the following behaviors or activities, you should report them to your security officer or supervisor. These behaviors are derived from the DoD Instruction 5240.6 Counterintelligence Awareness, Briefing, and Reporting Programs..B-7

INFORMATION COLLECTION

Before classified or other kinds of sensitive materials can be passed to a foreign intelligence agency, they must be collected. They can simply be stolen (e.g., paper placed in a briefcase and taken out of the office), photographed, collected via computers, or obtained through eavesdropping or other surveillance devices. The computer age, with its e-mail and database capabilities, has offered new opportunities to potential spies for collecting data. While technical countermeasures can control some situations, it is up to coworkers to watch for and, if possible, identify breaches in the system that allow classified and sensitive information to be collected for espionage purposes.
Reportable Behaviors

· a colleague asks you to obtain classified or other protected information in any format to which the person does not have authorized access.

· a colleague asks you to witness signatures for destruction of classified information when you did not observe the destruction.

· you observe a colleague operating unauthorized cameras, recording devices, computers, or modems in areas where classified data are stored, discussed, or processed.

· you become aware of the existence of any listening or surveillance devices in sensitive or secure areas.

· you find out that a colleagues has been keeping classified material at home or any other unauthorized place.

· you discover a colleague acquiring access to classified or unclassified automated information systems without authorization.

In former days the transmittal of classified or sensitive information took the form of stealing documents and physically handing them to the foreign intelligence agent. In addition, spies could photocopy paper materials, smuggle materials out in briefcases, even illicitly take photographs in the workplace. Nowadays, there are many more opportunities to transmit information. With the advent of e-mail, faxes, and other technological capabilities, it is possible to transmit large quantities of information without being immediately caught. Coworkers must be aware of this problem and, if an illicit transmission is detected, report it directly and immediately to the designated cognizant counterintelligence or security authorities. Once a relationship with a foreign intelligence agent is established and information begins to flow, illicit trips abroad by the recruited spy usually follow (meetings are easier to arrange abroad than in the U.S.). These journeys are often concealed by the person and the foreign contact is not reported. If you learn of such journeys or contacts, you should report.

Reportable Behaviors

· you see someone removing classified material from the work area without appropriate authorization, either by physically taking it home or on travel, or by e-mailing or faxing it out of the office. The same rule applies for other protected materials, such as export-controlled or proprietary items.

· you observe a colleague using unclassified FAX or computer to transmit classified material.

· you observe a person improperly removing the classification markings from documents.

· you hear a colleague discussing classified information on a nonsecure telephone.

· you become aware that people with TS/SCI or contractors with a reporting requirement have attempted to conceal any work-related foreign travel and any personal foreign travel..

SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIORS

The new DoD Instruction 5240.6, Counterintelligence (CI) Awareness, Briefing, and Reporting Programs (August 7, 2004) lists an additional series of eight items that, while not exactly clear-cut violations, have been traditionally considered behaviors that may well be connected to counterintelligence and security problems. These behaviors do require some degree of judgment before reporting. Often you might not know about them directly but only by hearsay. Often they may easily carry plausible alternative explanations. They are included here with the caveat that they do require a judgment call before reporting. If you are at all uncertain, it is better to report the behavior than to make no report at all.

· Attempts to expand access to classified information by repeatedly volunteering for assignments or duties beyond the normal scope of responsibilities.

· Extensive use of copy, facsimile, or computer equipment to reproduce or transmit classified material that may exceed job requirements.

· Unexplained or undue affluence, including sudden purchases of high value items (e.g., real estate, stocks, vehicles, or vacations) where no logical income source exists. Attempt to explain wealth by reference to inheritance, luck in gambling, or some successful business venture.

· Sudden reversal of financial situation or sudden repayment of large debts or loans.

· Attempts to entice DoD personnel into situations that could place them in a compromising position.

· Attempts to place DoD personnel under obligation through special treatment, favors, gifts, money, or other means.

· Short trips to foreign countries or travel within the United States to cities with foreign diplomatic activities for reasons that appear unusual or inconsistent with a person’s interests or financial means.
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