CLEARANCE CHECKS OVERLOAD SYSTEM

With the recent disclosure of Americans linked to purported foreign spy rings, questions are being raised about the system of protecting our national secrets.

The irony is that President Reagan's commitment to bolster the nation's defense may be having the opposite effect on the protection of national secrets, which are necessary to the nation's defense.

The reason is that spending more on defense means more defense-related jobs, which means more people needing security clearance. But the supply of quality investigators has not been able to meet the demand for security clearance investigations.

Secrets are classified in ascending order: "Confidential," "Secret," or "Top Secret," depending on the degree of significance to national security. If information disclosed could damage national security, it is classified Confidential. If disclosure could cause "serious" damage, it is classified Secret. And if disclosure could cause "exceptionally grave damage," it is classified Top Secret.

Although the executive order authorizing the classification of Top Secret information and material cautions "utmost restraint" in assigning this category, there are now about 600,000 Americans holding Top Secret clearance, and the number of such documents in the Executive Branch is well into the tens of thousands.

In considering the number of classified documents stored by the government and in the safes of private contractors, one also must remember that not only the original document must be safeguarded but also many working and file copies, all of which are available to file clerks and low-level employees. They have to have clearances, too, resulting in a massive logistical problem contributing to unintentional breaches of security as well as to willful violations.

It is estimated that there are 4.3 million people in the government and private industry who have access to classified information. All have to be cleared through background investigations conducted by a myriad of agencies ranging from the FBI, the IRS and the Civil Service Commission to the investigative agencies of the departments of State and Defense, the CIA and many others.

There are two levels of investigation -- the agency check limited to a search of FBI and local law enforcement files, and the comprehensive "full field background."

Usually an agency check suffices for access to confidential information, but for higher classifications a full field background check is necessary. While the agency check can be done in a matter of a week or so and costs about $100, the full field investigation can take from 90 days to six months, and sometimes longer. The cost can run into thousands of dollars.

A full field background involves an in-depth search of an individual's private and family connections, his or her character with respect to personal integrity, credit standing, financial status and lifestyle.

The upsurge in defense programs has meant an upsurge in requests for security clearances. Last year there were only about 1,400 investigators in the Defense Department to process 206,790 applications for security clearance, according to Britt Snider, the Defense Department's director of counterintelligence and security policy.

The demand for more investigators has reduced their quality. Agents used to be trained for six months to a year; now it's more like one or two months. Agents used to start at age 25 or 30 and had some investigative experience; now they're often recruited fresh out of high school or college. New agents used to be paired with experienced investigators until they became seasoned; now they're sent out on their own. And their pay is low compared with the civilian sector.

There are two bad things that tend to happen when investigators aren't up to snuff. The first is that the reputation of the person being investigated is damaged. A background check that includes interviews with family, friends, neighbors and business associates is a highly sensitive process that must be handled expertly.

The second, and even worse bad thing that can happen, is an incomplete investigation that results in a person getting clearance who should not have it.

And it isn't just new clearances that are affected. Someone who has received clearance in the past is supposed to be rechecked periodically -- two years for those with Confidential clearance, five years for Secret and Top Secret clearance.

But in practice the overwhelming number of investigations makes this schedule impossible. Since the early 1970s the five-year recheck period for Secret and Top Secret classifications has increased to the point where some are going as long as 17 years between rechecks.

The security clearance program is inadequate to clear people and safeguard classified material. It suffers from inconsistent, outmoded and erratic procedures.

It should be thoroughly overhauled with a view to reducing the number of classified documents, particularly the number of additional file copies. And the people having access also should be limited to the principals and their immediate subordinates on a strict need-to-know basis.