The ratcheting up of violence in Syria, including the massacres of
civilians in Houla and Qubair, is placing extraordinary pressure on the
Obama administration to match its tough anti-atrocities rhetoric with
practical action. The pending failure of the Annan peace plan, and the
former secretary-general's declaration
that the country is headed for "all-out civil war," is quickly driving
the White House toward an unenviable election-year choice: either sit
back and watch the carnage, or forge an ad hoc coalition to prevent
Syrian depredations. Senior administration officials have made it clear
that if the UN Security Council (UNSC) fails to "assume its
responsibilities," in the words
of U.S. envoy Susan E. Rice, "members of this council and members of
the international community are left with the option only of having to
consider whether they're prepared to take actions outside of the Annan
Plan and the authority of this council."

For Washington, it's put up or shut up time.

Nearly seven years ago world leaders unanimously endorsed a new
international principle, the "responsibility to protect." This would-be
norm establishes the sovereign obligation of all states to prevent
atrocities from being committed on their territories. When a regime
fails to do so (or commits atrocities itself), that responsibility
devolves to the international community, which may take a series of
escalating steps including armed intervention to protect the country's
inhabitants.

That, at least, is the theory. The deteriorating situation in Syria,
where the Assad regime's atrocities continue unabated, shows just how
challenging it is to translate this principle into practice. Indeed,
Security Council deadlock and buyer's remorse among UN member states
have led some to suggest that R2P is dead.

These obituaries are premature. But the bleak situation in Syria
underscores just how difficult it can be to vindicate the principle when
the world's great powers are deadlocked over the merits of armed
intervention.

The Syrian situation poses an excruciating--and potentially
embarrassing--quandary for the Obama administration, which only last
August declared
that "preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national
security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United
States." Seven weeks ago, the White House upped the expectations ante again,
releasing, "a comprehensive strategy and new tools to prevent and
respond to atrocities." The headline was the creation of a senior-level
Atrocities Prevention Board, charged with "help[ing] the U.S. government
identify and address atrocity threats, and oversee institutional
changes that will make us more nimble and effective." To inform its
work, the president commissioned the first ever National Intelligence
Estimate on "the global risk of mass atrocities and genocide."

Juxtaposed against the unending slaughter in Syria, these bureaucratic innovations have elicited withering criticism
from neoconservatives. Rather than rearranging deck chairs, they argue,
the administration ought to be arming and training the Syrian
opposition and even preparing for military intervention, just like what
President Bill Clinton did in Kosovo.

The R2P principle is a political and ethical rather than legal
obligation. Any leader, including President Obama, must weigh
humanitarian imperatives against other considerations of statecraft.
Given the inherent risks and uncertainties, any military intervention
should meet certain prudential criteria.
First, the depredations must meet the threshold of atrocity crimes.
Second, the intervention must be undertaken with "right intent", with
its primary motivation protecting innocent lives. Third, it should
generally be a last resort, after more peaceable alternatives have been
exhausted (or when delay would have fatal humanitarian consequences).
Fourth, the response should be proportional to the crimes being
committed. Fifth, the consequences of the intervention should do more
good than harm. Finally, the intervention should be taken under "right
authority", ideally with the imprimatur of the UN Security Council.

In the case of the NATO-led, UN-authorized intervention in Libya,
these stars were at least temporarily aligned. Thanks to a few critical
abstentions (by China, Russia, India, and Germany) the United States,
France and the United Kingdom (the so-called P3) were able to secure
Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing "all necessary means" to
protect civilians. But misgivings soon rose among UN member states, as
the Western powers dismissed regional mediation efforts and the goal of
regime change became increasingly apparent.

Despite such complications, intervention in Libya was a proverbial
"cakewalk" for liberal interventionists: The Qaddafi regime had no major
power allies, lacked major strategic importance or significant military
capabilities, and had a small, concentrated population-not to mention
congenial terrain.

Syria, though, possesses a capable military, is located at the heart
of the Arab world, is adjacent to the tinderboxes of Lebanon and Iraq,
is rife with sectarian divisions, and enjoys the active sponsorship of
P-5 member Russia, as well as Iran. As such, it presents extraordinary
risks.

When it comes to Syria, how do the prudential criteria for intervention stack up?

1) Atrocity Threshold. Certainly, the regime's depredations more
than meet threshold-11,000 dead and counting, including innocent woman
and children.

2) Right Intent. A problem here is that many international
observers will see this just as another effort at regime change and a
U.S. effort to eliminate Iran's last major regional ally--and given US
rhetoric, it may be impossible to avoid.

3) Last Resort. Despite the assortment of UN and regional
condemnations of Syria's actions, the UN Security Council has yet to
pass a resolution invoking specifically Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
which refers addresses threats to "international peace and security."
Other than military action, this could include the imposition of tough,
cross-cutting sanctions. There are rumors of another alternative
diplomatic route--involving reaching out to Russia and Iran--but this
seems impractical given the geopolitics involved.

4) Proportionality. Supporters of military intervention may point to recent reports
that NATO's intervention in Libya killed less than one hundred
civilians. While even one civilian death is noteworthy, it still must be
weighed against the daily killings and massacres taking place in Syria.

5) Consequences of intervention. This is the huge uncertainty.
Armed intervention could be regionally explosive, as Syria's various
communities appeal to diasporas and co-religionists across borders.
Moreover, Syrian rebels are only beginning to coalesce, lack a clear
stronghold, have had shaky leadership, and may not be able to capitalize
on the benefits of an R2P intervention. Still, the status quo is
getting pretty close to meeting--if not exceeding--the potential risks of
an intervention.

6) "Right Authority." Without UNSC endorsement, any collective
intervention mobilized by the United States would be technically illegal
but--as in Kosovo--arguably legitimate. High-level UN officials,
including the UN secretary general, have accused the Assad regime of
potential crimes against humanity, and the Arab League has repeatedly
called for additional action. But who would join a collective military
effort remains unclear.

For the Obama administration--which has warned that the Assad regime may be planning a third
massacre--crunch time has arrived. It either needs to come up with a
credible plan to work with international partners to end the killings in
Syria--whether by arming the opposition or by mobilizing a coalition of
the willing--or it needs to drop its high-minded rhetoric and let R2P and
the Syrian victims rest in peace.

This article originally appeared at CFR.org, an Atlantic partner site.