Domestic and International Politics in the Transatlantic Community

UN

World leaders are gathered in New York for the opening of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. This year is quite unique with a series of major unknowns and new players. The 2017 session included the recently elected American president, Donald Trump, and French president, Emmanuel Macron. In addition, the United Nations (UN) is headed by a new Secretary General, António Guterres, trying to make a name for himself. If these players matter, the geopolitical context requires a concrete and thoughtful reflection on its engaging world players on a multilateral basis. Comparing Macron and Trump’ speeches permits one to reflect on the internal forces at play and visions within the liberal order at a time of growing instabilities and complex challenges.

Unknowns Ahead of the 72nd UNGA Session

President Trump was elected in November 2016 on a nationalist platform summed up in his campaign slogan, America first. Trump’s vision of the world is dire, dark and negative, requiring the US to start defending his interests and national security on unilateral basis. Historical alliances, global governance, multilateral institutions and global trade are undermining American interests and supremacy. Trump perceives diplomacy in transactional terms, wherein only the US can win. Months later, in May 2017, on the other side of the pond, Emmanuel Macron won the french presidential race by campaigning on an agenda calling for audacity and grounded on a pro-Europe and pro-multilateralism agenda. Macron’s election was perceived as the end of the populist rise beginning with Brexit and allowing Trump to win the White House. The two leaders met on a series of occasions, the first time at a NATO summit and the second in Paris for the 14 of July. Both men could not be more different, but appear to be developing a relationship.

Ahead of the 72nd session, the future engagement of the US as part of the Paris deal (global fight against climate change), North Korea, the future of the Iranian nuclear deal, and multilateralism at large remain unknown. These four issues are at the center of the global agenda due to a shift in American foreign policy since the election of Trump. Soon in office, Trump called for the departure of the US from the Paris deal and has been more than unclear about the reality of climate change. Interestingly enough, many experts were, positively, surprised by the fact that world leaders remained committed to the Paris deal despite the departure of the US. On North Korea, Trump has escalated the rhetorics, as part of his tweeting war, threatening to unleash ‘fire and fury‘ against North Korea ensuing the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles. With regard to the nuclear deal with Iran, Trump had used this issue on the campaign trail to undermine diplomacy and multilateralism and Secretary Clinton (whom did not finalize the deal). The Iran deal is widely perceived among conservative and republican circles as a failure, which will undeniably result with Iran becoming a nuclear power. Lastly, on multilateralism, Trump has never shied away from the fact that unilateralism and transactional foreign policy serve better American interests than complex organizations like the United Nations.

In less than a year, President Trump has managed to shape a new narrative about the instability of the international order, in particular the liberal order, and the need for the US to use military might at all costs to advance its interests (i.e. the limited bombing over Syrian and the escalation of the war in Afghanistan).

Trump-Macron Ping-Pong

The speeches of both leaders could not be more at odds. If Trump sees the world and foreign policy as a transaction and through unilateralism, Macron has expressed his support towards multilateralism and global governance. Both leaders made their debut at the UN earlier today and their respective speeches confirm the prior statement.

UN Photo/Cia Pak

President Trump’s speech (here) certainly marks a breakup with his predecessor. Trump opened his address before global leaders with a campaign tone talking about domestic matters (the growing economy, the strengthening American military and American resilience). Trump emphasized at great length the concepts of sovereignty (used 21 times in total including the word sovereign), security, prosperity and power. Regarding the way he sees American foreign policy, he underlined that the US was guided by outcomes and not ideology. “We have a policy of principled realism,” he argued “rooted in shared goals, interests, and values.” Some claimed that this speech demonstrated a return to realpolitik for the US. But half way through his speech, the American president made the following statement, “The scourge of our planet today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate every principle on which the United Nations is based.” These rogue regimes were identified as North Korea and Iran.

On North Korea, Trump used the platform to directly threaten the regime in Pyongyang claiming that the US may have no other option than “to totally destroy North Korea.” The language utilized to describe the members and leader of the North Korean regime was undiplomatic to say that least. He used this part, without mentioning it, to point the finger at Beijing. Ensuing his menace, he said “That’s what the United Nations is all about; that’s what the United Nations is for. Let’s see how they do.” The use of the pronoun ‘they’ in the last clause indicates the disconnect between Washington and the rest of the world. It indicates that Washington has its strategy ready (use of military force), and now the members of the UN can try to find an alternative via diplomacy.

Macron’ speech (here in French) had a totally different tone. His opening sentences emphasized the core ideas, values and norms encompassed by the UN and the desire to design a new system putting human rights at its center (with a natural

UN Photo/Cia Pak

reference to René Cassin). The issues laid out by the french leader consisted of Syria, terrorism (Iraq), Mali (G5 Sahel and MINUSMA), protection of refugees, climate change, nuclear proliferation, multilateralism, and the reform of the UN (less bureaucratic and more active).

On climate change, President Macron directly responded to President Trump by expressing absolute opposition to renegotiating the Paris deal. On nuclear proliferation, Macron expressed deep concerns with the way North Korea behaves on the international stage, but rejected Trump’s reference of the Iranian deal as a bad one.

If Trump’s narrative was centered around the theme of sovereignty, the structure of Macron’s address was organized on the idea of France’s ability to hear the voices of the weakest and defending their rights and empowering them by speaking for them. Through the emphasis of voices, Macron presented France as a guardian of the weakest with French national interest being directly intertwined with global security. In reading and analyzing Macron’ speeches (for instance with his recent speech in Athens), one can identify a series of commonality: bringing France into the sphere of superpower (at least in rhetorics); similitude with an Obamaesque style of narration; deep reference and understanding of history; and a bold and global call for audacity. This style certainly breaks with the recent past of addresses of French presidents (in particular Sarkozy and Hollande) and re-unites France, for better or worst, with its gaullo-mitterrandist heritage.

Concluding with Secretary General Guterres’s comments seems appropriate. “We are a world in pieces. We need to be a world at peace.” The antipodal addresses of the American and French leaders illustrates a clear split within the West about framing critical menaces, developing a cohesive strategy, and ultimately shaping world affairs. The transition from rhetorics to actions, if any, will be fascinating to observe.

(COPYRIGHT 2017 BY POLITIPOND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THIS MATERIAL MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCAST, REWRITTEN OR REDISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION).

With the death of 600 migrants in April, the EU and its Member States have been working on finding a solution to a serious and pressing regional crisis. In a matter of a month several proposals, with diverging philosophical orientation, have been drafted. On the one hand, the Juncker’s proposal, initiated by the European Commission, seeks in deepening the integration process through an harmonization and homogenization of EU immigration and asylum policies. While on the other hand, the Council of the EU agreed on the creation of a military CSDP naval mission, EU Naval Force in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR-Med), in order to disrupt smugglers. Even thought the Juncker’s proposal addresses a long-term need, it fosters opposition in most EU Member States, while EUNAVFOR only provides a quick and superficial fix to the problem of mass migrations. So far the EU and its Member States have not found the proper answer to this crucial regional crisis.

The Juncker’s Proposal: European Agenda on Migration

The European Commission presented its European Agenda on Migration on May 13th in order to contain and solve the current crisis taking place in the Mediterranean sea. The publication of the Commission’s agenda is a reaction of the massive influx of migrants and refugees coming from Libya, a transit country (read here a previous analysis on the migration crisis). Ensuing the largest human tragedy causing the death of 600 migrants in mid-April and an extraordinary European summit meeting leading to no real lasting solutions, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Commission, declared on announcing its Agenda that “We will be ambitious. We will be bold.”

The Agenda produced by the Commission laid out several policies. The first one consists in finding solutions through immediate actions:

Tripling the capacities and assets for the Frontex joint operations Triton (off the coasts of Italy) and Poseidon (off the coasts of Greece) in order to save lives;

destroying criminal smuggling networks through a possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle traffickers’ networks and fight smuggling of people. Federica Mogherini, EU foreign policy chief, was at the UN Security Council on May 11th seeking for a UNSC resolution allowing EU Member States “to deploy military force to seize and destroy smugglers’ ships before they take on their human cargo”;

Relocation of migrants;

an EU-wide resettlement scheme to offer 20,000 placesdistributed in all Member States. The EU budget will dedicate an additional €50 million in 2015/16 to solve this problem;

Working with third countries in order to solve the root causes of migrations;

The infogram produced by EurActiv (see above) illustrates which EU Member States are the largest recipients of migrants and refugees and the main destinations. No surprise in finding Germany, France, Sweden and Italy as the main destination for migrants and refugees.

The second dimension of the Commission’s Agenda is about managing migration better on the long run.

first, the EU wants to address the root causes of migrations, crack down on smugglers and traffickers, and provide clarity in return policies;

second, develop better border management capabilities and increasing the power of Frontex;

third, develop a common asylum policy at the EU level. The Commission wants to create a Common European Asylum System;

fourth, a new policy on legal migration in order to attract skilled workers to the EU. The Commission wants to solidify a Europe-wide scheme, called the Blue Card Directive;

Source: European Commission

National Oppositions to the Juncker’s Proposal

All the EU Member States are not welcoming these new directives. For instance, the United Kingdom has announced that it would not participate in any quota scheme to distribute refugees across EU. In the case of Britain and Ireland, both countries have an ‘opt out clause’ allowing them to decide to participate or not on a specific program of this nature. The Home Office of the UK already released a statement saying that “We [Britain] will not participate in any legislation imposing a mandatory system of resettlement or relocation.” For Denmark, the country has an opt-out right where they do not participate at all. “The exemptions granted to the three countries are making it difficult for the commission to impose binding quotas on the 25 remaining EU member states, EU sources told AFP.”

The position of several EU Member States challenges the concept of European solidarity. “The European Council clearly stated that we need to find European solutions,” said First Vice-President Frans Timmermans “based on internal solidarity and the realisation that we have a common responsibility to create an effective migration policy.” Dimitris Avramopoulos, Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Commissioner, underscored the same message when saying that “In a spirit of greater solidarity, we are determined to implement a comprehensive approach that will improve significantly the management of migration in Europe.”

France already announced over the weekend that it was against the provision (read here a piece by Politico on France’s position). In case the quotas were to be implemented, “France would be asked to accept 14.17 percent of all those who reach the EU, while Germany would receive 18.42 percent, Italy 11.84 percent, and Spain 9 percent.” Instead France would be in favor to increase the number of asylum seekers. “Asylum is a right, attributed according to international criteria …” said French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, “That is why the number of its beneficiaries cannot be subject to quotas, one is an asylum seeker or not.” The Commission’s plan was rejected by seven other EU Member States, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Poland. These ought to be added to the three EU Member States with opt-out rights like Britain, Ireland and Denmark.

The difference between the quota system and the current asylum rules is quite simple. By implementing a quota system, the Commission seeks in helping frontline states, like Greece, Italy and Spain, and sharing the burden across the EU. While the current system of asylum, established under the Dublin II, stipulates that the asylum seekers ought to ask for asylum in the country of arrival. The Commission’s plan is in fact a strategy in order to avoid frontline countries to be overflow by migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in case of an explosion of migrating flux as predicated for 2015 and the coming years.

This agenda produced by the Commission is unlikely to be adopted as such. The foreign ministers discussed the agenda on May 18th, and will be preparing for the final plan for the June 25 EU leaders meeting.

The Military Option – EUNAVFOR to Combat Migration

Photo: Lynsey Addario for The New York Times

Ensuing the May 18th meeting between European foreign and defense ministers, the EU agreed on the launch of a CSDP naval mission in order to stop and disrupt smugglers in the Mediterranean. In the conclusions of the meeting, the Council argued that “This [global security environment] calls for a stronger Europe, with a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).”

The EU naval force – EUNAVFOR Med – will be based in Rome and headed by Italian Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino. EUNAVFOR Med will cover the Southern Central Mediterranean road and work in partnership with Libyan authorities. It will receive an initial 12 month mandate and a budget of €11.82 million for the first phase. As per HR Mogherini, EUNAVFOR will follow a specific progression: first stage, planning and assessment of smuggling networks; second stage, searching, seizing and disruption of assets of smugglers within the framework of international law.

However, in order to launch the naval mission, several crucial aspects will need to be discussed and agreed on. First, the EU will need more talks, and then reach an agreement on a resolution, under Chapter VII, from the United Nations Security Council. So far, it is yet unclear if the UNSC will be granting a resolution to the EU for such type of operation off the coast of Libya as it could establish a precedent for other maritime migration routes throughout the world. Additionally, Russia has already expressed its opposition to the use of jets and helicopters for the mission. Second, the EU Member States will have to agree on whom will be providing the required military capabilities and forces. It was already a problem with the Frontex’s operation Triton, so it may be another difficult negotiations for this one.

Last but not least, some wonders about the usefulness of such military operation. For instance, “Military operations in the Mediterranean are only really likely to have any impact” said Elizabeth Collett, the director of the Migration Policy Institute Europe, to the New York Times, “as one very small piece in a far more comprehensive strategy to address smuggling.”

Another Lost Opportunity?

The migration crisis illustrates once again a central problem for the EU and its Member States, the Member States. How to solve a global crisis requiring greater cooperation and integration without deepening the EU? In other words, more Europe is necessary in order to address a crisis as a bloc, but some Member States are either calling for less Europe or are cheery-picking. The challenge of the Juncker Commission and other EU institutions is how to advance the interests of the Union when most Member States are not willing to deepen and increase cooperation at the EU level.

Picking the Juncker’s proposal would allow the EU and its Member States to harmonize their immigration policies at the EU level. Choosing the Member States’ route of military action will only be a quick and temporary fix. In any case, both proposals do not address the root causes of the problems of mass migrations from MENA and Central Africa. If the EU and its Member States want to be a ‘security provider,’ they will have to do more than a naval mission in the middle of the Mediterranean sea.

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

US ambassador William J. Burns recently retired from his 33 years in office at the Department of State. After being one of the top US diplomats for decades, he recently became the president of the prestigious think tank The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. William Burns is only the second career diplomat to rise to the position of Deputy-Secretary at the Department of State. Secretary Kerry compared William Burns to George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen, and claimed that M. Burns has “earned his place on a very short list of American diplomatic legends.” Thanks to his new position, Amb. Burns enjoys, as he mentioned, his newly acquired freedom of opinion and discussed his view of the state of the world with Tom Gjelten, guest host at the Diane Rehm Show, in an excellent hour long interview (listen here the interview).

The tour of horizon was broad, complete and nicely framed. Starting with a comparison of the state of the world from three decades ago to today, he affirms that the world may be as complex like never before but remains as lethal as during the Cold War. The core distinction is, as he argues, that power is much more diffuse than ever before. He certainly admits that the complexity of the state of the world is due to several aspects:

From bipolar to multipolar world order – the rise of new powers like China and India has affected the global dynamics and forces. The balance of power is not as clear as once during the Cold War between two superpowers locked against one another with their large nuclear arsenals;

new security threats – during the Cold War, the threats were nuclear proliferation and destruction as well as other traditional geopolitical tensions (proxy wars). Today states face other types of threats such as terrorism (principally radical islamism), cyberthreats, environmental problems and so forth;

the range of actors – the Cold War was about states and their ideologies at least two of them. The world was divided between two nuclear superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, followed by mid-sized powers. Today states ought to deal with more actors than ever before like international organizations and non-state actors ranging from benign ones – NGOs and Transnational Corporations – to malign non-state actors like radical islamist groups – Boko Haram, Islamic State (IS) – and others.

Unfortunately, the discussion was mainly centered around the recent international events, namely the nuclear negotiations with Iran (which he led secretly back in 2013 telling his Iranian counterpart that the US could accept a deal seeing Iran maintaining nuclear power for civilian and peaceful purpose); the threat of the IS and combating it through filling the regional void and implementing a political solution to solving IS; Russia (as he was Ambassador from 2005 to 2008); the opening of US policy towards Cuba; and the role of diplomacy in American foreign policy. On the making of American diplomacy, William J. Burns indicates the complexity in balancing american power in order to advance American interests. Certainly, American power is too often being perceived based on its hard power – military power and economic sanctions -, rather than its soft power.

One dimension that was missing in the discussion was the relationship with American allies and partners. Such missing element is representative of the American debate on foreign policy. Partnership and cooperation with allies seem to always be on the second row for Americans. There are two reasons for such rational: first, American hard power is the most predominant in world affairs – for example the US is the only country with 10 aircraft carriers in service followed by Italy and India with two active carriers – allowing autonomous action throughout the world; second, a large dimension of American foreign policy is informed on the premise of american exceptionalism (this does not appear in Burns’ narratives). In Europe, cooperation and multilateralism are core component of European foreign policy. The EU for instance is always seeking for deepening its strategic partnerships with relevant powers. As opposed to the US, the EU and its Member States see the role of international organizations, like the UN and NATO, as vital dimension of their making of foreign policy.

As the ninth president of The Carnegie, William J. Burns is not stepping down as he will continue to promote American power and interests and shape the debates in American foreign policy.

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

The French are back in Africa, and apparently ready to stay. With the recent agreement announced, Operation Barkhane will began early August and take over the precedent French mission in Mali, Operation Serval. Operation Barkhane, named after a crescent-shaped dune in the Sahara desert, is to become the french pillar of counterterrorism in the Sahel region. French will use and deploy a 3,000-strong counterterrorism forces over five countries, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The purpose of Operation Barkhane seeks at ‘regionalizing‘ the counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel.

It all started with the Libyan intervention in 2011. With the collapse of the Qaddafi regime, the Libyan borders became so porous that a large number of criminal and terrorist networks were able to spread across the region. The French intervened in emergency in 2012 in Mali in order to stop the jihadist incursion from Northern Mali to the Malian capital. Operation Barkhane will bring Operation Serval, in charge of fighting jihadists in Mali, to an end. President Hollande has argued that Operation Barkhane seeks to assist and help Africans to enforce their own security. In other words, French defense minister underscored (see in the video) that France assures its own security, Europe’ security and ultimately France is becoming the leader in fighting radical islamic terrorism.

President Hollande of France promised the French a quick Malian adventures and now France is looking at a long-term fight against terrorism in the Sahel region. The reason is that “there still is a major risk” announced French defense minister, Jean-Yves le Drian, “that jihadists develop in the area that runs from the Horn of Africa to Guinea-Bissau.” He added that the “aim [of the Operation] is to prevent what I call the highway of all forms of traffics to become a place of permanent passage, where jihadist groups between Libya and the Atlantic Ocean can rebuild themselves, which would lead to serious consequences for our security.”

In order to fight jihadists in this vast region, Operation Barkhane shall be seen as a reorganization of the forces already present in the region. It will be composed in terms of military and human capabilities of 3,000 military personnel, six fighter jets, 20 helicopters, 200 armored vehicles, 10 transport aircrafts, and three drones (as described by AllAfrica.com and RFI). Considering the number of countries the division of labor will be organized as such:

headquarters and air force in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena under the leadership of French Général Palasset;

a regional base in Gao, north Mali, with at least 1,000 men;

a special forces base in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou;

an intelligence base in Niger’s capital, Niamey, with over 300 men;

aside from the four permanent bases, several temporary bases will be created with an average of 30-50 men where required.

Several points shall be underlined concerning the success rate of such wide counterterrorist mission. First, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Mali, without a solid state, composed of territorial-polity-society package (to retake the terms of Barry Buzan), the long-term success of any counterterrorist operation will be difficult. The fighting aspect of this mission could go endlessly without the inclusion and implementation of statebuilding dimension in the each country of the Sahel region. Who will undertake the lengthy, costly and complex task of statebuilding? the EU? the UN? the French? Enforcing security in the region with boots on the ground in order to assure the protection of the European homeland may only be a one dimensional strategy.

Second, in term of costs, how much is France willing to invest in this wide counterterrorist operation? The domestic economic situation of France is worrisome considering its slow economic and industrial engine. The French Defense minister confirmed that France has the required economic resources to lead this counterterrorist endeavor. It appears that the French President is giving the economic resources to the military in order to lead the mission to its end. Nevertheless, with a continuous inward looking public opinion and middle class hurt by the Eurozone crisis, it looks like a real political gamble for President Hollande. How will the French respond to such operation? The answer to such question may be easy. Considering the extremely low media coverage on the implementation of Operation Barkhane, the French government is doing it quietly in this period of holiday.

Third, aside from African cooperation, will the US and the EU contribute to the military efforts? After the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American public opinion has grown war-tired. A large majority of Americans are opposed to the idea that the US should play the role of the global policeman. Thus, President Obama has been in the business of bringing back troops, precise targeting and pivoting to Asia. The US may remain on the sideline, eventually providing some intelligence to the French. When it comes to the EU, the Union has already deployed some forces on the ground through one military CSDP mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) and two civilian CSDP missions (EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger). These CSDP missions may provide some assistance in training armed forces – police and army – of these countries in addressing counterterrorism tactics and strategies. The EU may additionally provide some aids to Sahel countries.

At the end of the day, France is starting a lengthy and risky military endeavor in a vast region with no end in sight. The question that has not be answered is quite simple: what is the endgame? When does France consider the mission accomplished? Fighting terrorism has become the Western windmills.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

After several years of absence, politipond is back in business. The world, and especially European politics, hasn’t stopped. To many the European continent was perceived as a stable, to some degree boring, region of the world. Well, since 2007 and the collapse of the financial markets, Europe has re-become a central region of the world; a key piece of the global chessboard. With the current shifts of regional and global balances of power, the existence of the Union is questioned on daily basis. For instance, Britain under conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, is calling for a return of power from Brussels to the Member States. The eventual British referendum on the future of Britain’s EU membership will be an interesting event to monitor in the coming years. So far, European integration and enlargement have only been about horizontal and vertical deepening, not the other way around.

On the international scale, the US under President Obama has shifted its attention towards Asia, known as the pivot. Additionally, the American grand strategy is in period of retrenchment, requiring European allies to take on the lead and some of the burden in stabilizing their neighborhoods and acting as regional power. At the exception of France, no other powerful EU Member State has answered the call. Britain has cut its defense spending, Germany has been a reluctant foreign policy actor, and Southern European Member States are more concerned about their economic recoveries and structural reforms than foreign affairs. Such inward looking by European Member States is a worrisome trend as the neighborhoods require more attention and actions. The EU cannot let its neighborhoods in flame as the consequences – terrorism, illegal migration, illegal drug, human and arms traffickings – could become heavy, costly and dangerous for the stability of the Member States and the EU. The concept of Fortress Europe is only a constructed idea; threats and problems do not stop at European borders. Last but not least, despite the recent visit of President Obama for the 70th anniversary of the débarquement in Normandy, the transatlantic relations have been under severe strains caused by the Snowden’s leaks, difficult negotiations around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and other strategic, economic and financial disagreements.

Politipond will be analyzing, reflecting and commenting on a broad range of issues as illustrated below:

European neighborhoods are in absolute shamble: East with Ukraine and Russia; South with a changing Egypt and rise of instabilities in Libya; South-East with the continuation of the violent and vicious war in Syria; and Middle-East with the massive instabilities created by the terrorist network ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)

The political climate in Europe is turning towards radical political movements and becoming extremely vicious and euro-skeptic. For instance, several EU Member States have seen the rise and influence of extreme right-wing movements such as the Front National in France winning the latest European elections in France, and in other countries like the UK, Denmark and Austria. Others have seen the solidification of the extreme left parties like Syriza in Greece. The domestic rise of populism in most EU Member States is certainly affecting the quality of democracy and political debates in Europe. Their consequences and impacts on the political agendas are already visible.

Then, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is facing serious challenges: lack of willingness and commitment of EU Member States; lack of strategic vision; limited relevance. Once seen has a very positive European endeavor soon after its creation in 1998, the CSDP has been one of the main victims of the Eurozone crisis. The latest CSDP mission in Central African Republic (CAR) does not show the CSDP under a positive light. It instead underscores the lack of interest by most EU Member States to the CSDP and to some degree the rise of European isolationism. The upcoming book, Debating European Security and Defense Policy. Understanding the Complexity, looks in depth at the transformation of the CSDP since its creation and evaluates the CSDP over time.

Now that the European elections are over, the European game of thrones has already began with the behind the doors’ discussions around the selections of high level officials: the President of the Commission; the President of the European Council; and the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission.

The economic outlook of the Eurozone and the EU is not very bright. Many experts are talking of an eventual lost decade for the EU, the same way the 1990s were for Japan. The consequences of such dark economic prospects are causing serious challenges for the future of the Union: rise of inequalities; high level unemployment for European youths; rise of populism; lack of structural reforms; perpetual blame of Brussels for domestic and European problems/failures.

In the US, the debate on privacy and power of the government in assuring security to the homeland has been raging since the massive Snowden’s leaks a year ago. The debate over transparency in national security and foreign policy has only taken place in D.C. President Obama has expressed at several occasion his commitments to transparency, but policies haven’t followed, just yet.

Last but not least, the transfer of power from the West to the Rest seems to be happening faster than expected. The liberal order, created and enforced by the US since the end of World War two, incorporating core values – democracy, individual and collective freedoms –, an economic model – capitalism, even though there are several variants –, multilateral institutions – the UN systems, NATO, OSCE, WTO, Council of Europe –, seems to be under serious challenges. The Americans and Europeans have had some difficulty in first assessing the risks of the shift of global order, and second, in adjusting the liberal order in accordance with the new global realities and forces.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.)