By John F. Copper

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s Strong Headwinds

Earlier
this year, on January 16 to be precise, the chairwoman of the then opposition
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) — and also its presidential candidate — Tsai
Ing-wen, won a momentous election victory in Taiwan. She prevailed easily over
her Nationalist Party (KMT) contender and another candidate — getting more
votes than the two combined. At the same time, her party grabbed a majority in
the legislative body of government — for the first time ever.

Most
observers perceived President Tsai had acquired a virtually unchallengeable
mandate to govern and would do so with ease and with purpose. Furthermore,
Taiwan would change for the better. Her supporters’ celebrations after the
election were electric. Most observers judged the event as historic, and that
the impact would be far-reaching. It was clearly not an ordinary time.

But
soon reality set in as pundits came to perceive that President Tsai faced
full-sized difficulties. In fact, to some observers, Tsai and her party were
challenged by problems of such a scope and magnitude that the future did not
look good. In other words, the headwinds seem almost insurmountable, and Tsai’s
fate did not appear to be a happy one. She might not win reelection and future
historians may judge her harshly.

Or
might this latter judgment be premature?

Looking
at the predicaments Tsai currently faces may tell the story.

First,
President Tsai has a seriously troubled economy on her hands. Growth as
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) is below 1 percent. Analysts talk
about a recession or of one being just around the corner. The projections are
for the bad economic times to continue next year. Since prosperity will be a
top issue for voters in Taiwan, the situation doesn’t look promising for the
DPP in the mid-term (local) elections in 2018. (A setback in 2014 signaled the
KMT’s election defeat this year.)

Furthermore,
according to a recent Economist Intelligence Unit report, Taiwan’s GDP
expansion leading up to 2020, when Tsai will seek reelection, will be below 2
percent. Growth will lag the rest of the world and, perhaps more importantly,
will trail South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the benchmarks by which
Taiwan’s residents will judge President Tsai’s economic policies.

During
the election campaign, Tsai pitched an “innovative economy” (as opposed to an
export one that had given Taiwan healthy growth for 40 years) and the expansion
of economic ties with Southeast Asia (instead of China that had been the main
source of Taiwan’s growth for some time). Now her policies don’t look very
promising and may need to be downplayed or supplanted by some new ones; yet
economic stimulus from expanding trade with the US, Europe, or Japan does not
seem likely since there is little hope for good growth in any of them.

There
is still more evidence to generate pessimism. At least half of Taiwan’s richest
and most dynamic business people are involved with China. They are not faring
well due to an economic slowdown in China, but also owing to China’s
unfriendliness over Tsai’s election victory. It is also the reason why foreign
investment in Taiwan has dropped. This situation is likely to get worse.

Tsai’s
second big issue is Taiwan’s political relations with China. During the
campaign, Tsai won voter support coming from the prevalent and quite intense
fear that China is an existential threat to Taiwan’s democracy and sovereignty.
Yet China is the “elephant in the room” for virtually all of Taiwan’s neighbors
and many others around the world. The only difference is that China claims
Taiwan to be its territory.

Tsai
will have to come to grips with the reality that she cannot avoid China (as
many of her supporters and voters want) and the relationship with China will
overwhelm her and her party if not handled adroitly, simply because China is so
important and its foreign policy is effective and challenging.

Bringing
this reality front and center is the fact that the current focus of China’s
foreign policy is building all over the world, highlighted by its new Silk Road
and a maritime belt to compliment it. The scope of it is gargantuan: 900
projects are now underway and projected spending will reach USD 4 trillion.
(America’s post-World War II Marshall Plan that financed the recovery of Europe
was something over USD 100 billion in today’s dollars.)

China’s
plan is to take advantage of a period of “strategic opportunity” leading up to
2020 (coincidentally the year President Tsai will seek reelection), fulfill the
“China dream” and transform the metric of world trade into a merging of the
Atlantic and Asian blocs into one dominated by Beijing. Can Taiwan be left out?
China has thoughts of integrating Taiwan further into its economic plans. One
is building a “Chunnel” under the Taiwan Strait. Many in Tsai’s party have
expressed opposition to the idea. While this project may be grandiose, China
has much more to offer and Taiwan cannot wisely adopt a rejection mode.

Not sure of victory, Tsai encouraged the formation of new
parties. These parties are now playing a role in Taiwan’s politics — not
exactly in sync with the DPP.

Third
on President Tsai’s agenda of challenges is her relationship with the United
States. She handled this skillfully during the campaign and even got Washington
to tentatively support her (as it had refused to do before). But looking at
cycles in America’s posture towards China, anti-China sentiment in Washington
is normally part of an election campaign and often spills over for a while
after. But as the new administration realizes it must cultivate good relations
with China to manage the global economy and deal with nuclear proliferation,
global climate change, and a host of other problems, and, in short, run the
world, relations will become more cordial.

Thus,
during the election campaign, Taiwan was, and is now, advantaged by strained
US-China relations. But this is unlikely to be so next year. America may well
see Taiwan less as its protectorate or responsibility in 2017 simply because of
this “reliable” trend. Furthermore, this cycle will probably be more pronounced
because US-China ties have been more hostile during the latter years of the
Obama administration than during any time since before Richard Nixon became
president. So the wind next year coming from the United States, the
prognosticators say, will not be so favorable.

A
fourth matter is President Tsai’s military/strategic policy and her
relationship with her defense establishment. During the campaign Tsai pledged
to spend more on defense, but also to increase welfare to help the poor. She
will find it hard to do both, perhaps either, due to Taiwan’s sagging economic
growth. She said she wanted to allocate 3 percent to the military, but there is
now hedging about this.

Tsai
also has difficulties with her generals. They mostly support the KMT, and many
are male chauvinists. Thus the relationship is not exactly a happy one for
Taiwan’s first female president. It did not help that a Taiwan naval vessel recently
fired a missile in China’s direction accidentally, upsetting the tranquility in
the Taiwan Strait. Neither did Tsai’s appointments of advisors to her security
team who had little or no experience on the subject of national defense.

A
fifth “bucket” of concerns involves Taiwan’s third parties, civil and human
rights, minorities, women’s matters, education, pensions, and more. They were
all groups or issues that favored Tsai to win the election. During the campaign,
Tsai and her party campaigned in opposition to the KMT’s elite governance and
against its insider, exclusivist nature. Not sure of victory, she encouraged
the formation of new parties. These parties are now playing a role in Taiwan’s
politics — not exactly in sync with the DPP. Worse they are making special
demands that do not accord with President Tsai’s agenda.

Meanwhile,
the Aborigines have staged public demonstrations for better treatment. Rights
organizations are in some ways more active than ever. Women complain that President
Tsai’s cabinet is nearly all men. Retirees want to keep their pensions even
though this is a big financial burden to the government. Some local governments
want their debts forgiven. All of these demands are in the way and take money,
energy and time away from serious matters.

Sixth
is the matter of the KMT. The DPP smashed the KMT in the election. It now has
little voice. Some even say it will never recover. But that is not likely. It
has bounced back before. It has talent, money, and other resources. One reason
for its election defeat was that the party was badly split before and during
the campaign. This problem can be fixed. Some members said they looked forward
to being in the opposition again. Others opine that the nature of Taiwan’s
politics now means a frequent rotation of parties (the pendulum theory of
elections) due to politicians overpromising and voters over-expecting; thus
they would be back in power again soon.

President
Tsai needs a loyal (at least cooperative) opposition. The KMT still can help
Tsai; it can also seriously obstruct. On dealing with China, a huge problem for
Tsai, she can use the KMT’s assistance. Recall that the KMT to a large degree managed
relations with China during the end of the Chen administration.

Last,
but certainly not least, is President Tsai’s relationship with the DPP base. In
fact, one might suggest that this is at the top of the list of her stresses.
Arguably it underlies, or is fundamental to, every other subject discussed here
regarding her ability to lead and govern. A significant part of Tsai’s base
hates China and wants to part company, even economically. Many delude
themselves that the United States will protect Taiwan no matter what. Most of
Tsai’s foreign supporters in Taiwan encourage Taiwan’s independence, yet they
don’t have any influence with their home governments (which in almost all cases
play no role anyway) and will not help Tsai in the event of China threatening
the use of force.

Tsai
Ing-wen won the election based on her unifying a polyglot of special interest
groups, harnessing growing populism in Taiwan, and exploiting the KMT’s
misfortunes and bad brand. These assets don’t apply to her successful
governing. In fact, they are liabilities.

How
can President Tsai govern successfully? Tsai is certainly not a fan of
populism; she has said so. She is not charismatic. She is a good strategist.
She has shown determination and persistence. Can she be a realist? Can she be
flexible (or ruthless some would say) and turn away from those ideas and people
that got her where she is, but are a hindrance now? Those latter qualities are
needed for her to deal with her powerful headwinds.

About The Author

John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies (emeritus) at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. He is the author of more than thirty books on China, Taiwan and US Asia policy.