Abstract

The invention comprises a server-side plug in as a security filter that processes HTTP requests before any other Web service plug-ins or applications. Using a highly customizable set of pattern rules based on regular expressions, the security filter predictably intercepts all attacks of known patterns. The set of rules is updated whenever a new pattern of attack is discovered.

Description

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

1. Field of the Invention

[0002]

The invention relates generally to Web service security technology. More particularly, the invention relates to an apparatus and method to protect Web service applications from malicious HTTP request.

[0003]

2. Description of the Prior Art

[0004]

The primary Web service security issues include protecting a Web services from unauthorized access or usage and protecting Web application from malicious request from even authorized users.

[0005]

Aiming at the first security issue, many different approaches such as firewall and packet filters have been developed. The following are some examples of these approaches.

[0006]

A firewall is a bottleneck between two networks designed to prohibit certain types of internetwork communication such as login attempts and network file system access.

[0007]

The firewall hardware typically consists of one or more computers, routers, or special-purpose machines. Computers behind the firewall are the local hosts that the firewall protects, and computers outside the firewall are the remote hosts, which are assumed to be potential attackers. TCP connections across the firewall that originate from the Internet are called inbound connections, and those that originate behind the firewall are called outbound connections; in each case, TCP permits full-duplex communications.

[0008]

U.S. Pat. No. 5,835,726 issued to Shwed, et al disclosed a system for controlling the inbound and outbound data packet flow in a computer network. By controlling the packet flow in a computer network, private networks can be secured from outside attacks in addition to controlling the flow of packets from within the private network to the outside world. A user generates a rule base which is then converted into a set of filter language instruction. Each rule in the rule base includes a source, destination, service, whether to accept or reject the packet and whether to log the event. The set of filter language instructions are installed and execute on inspection engines which are placed on computers acting as firewalls. The firewalls are positioned in the computer network such that all traffic to and from the network to be protected is forced to pass through the firewall. Thus, packets are filtered as they flow into and out of the network in accordance with the rules comprising the rule base. The inspection engine acts as a virtual packet filtering machine which determines on a packet by packet basis whether to reject or accept a packet. If a packet is rejected, it is dropped. If it is accepted, the packet may then be modified. Modification may include encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification or address translation. All modifications are performed in accordance with the contents of the rule base. Shwed teaches network and transport layers filtering, focusing on firewalls to prevent unauthorized communication attempts and attacks upon the protected network resources.

[0009]

U.S. Pat. No. 6,400,707 issued to Baum et al disclosed a method for conducting a voice communication through a hybrid network including a packet internetwork connected to a circuit switched telephone network. The packet internetwork is connected to the switched telephone network through a static filter device, a packet switch, and a telephone network controlled gateway. A control processor is connected to the packet switch and to the filter device. The filter device generates a real time copy of call set up signaling dialog between the party requesting connection and the gateway passing through or to the filter device. This duplicate of set up signaling is delivered from the filter device through the packet switch to the control processor. The control processor generates a filter device control signal specifying the filter parameters derived from the set-up signaling dialog. The filter device control signal is delivered to the filter device and reconfigures the filter device to set filter parameters which are customized to the specific communication. The filter device filters the conversation stream of packetized voice signaling to enforce conformance to automatically created filter parameters which are customized on a per-conversation basis.

[0010]

David Martin Jr. et al in their paper entitled “Blocking Java Applets at the Firewall,” IEEE, The Proceedings of the 1997 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, disclosed a method of protecting a Web site on the Internet against hostile external Java applets while allowing trusted internal applets to run.

[0011]

These approaches cannot be directly used in solving the security problems in a Web service application caused by HTML tags or script in a dynamically generated page. As an example, consider following PSP template validatePasswordForm.psp that generates a form in HTML page:

<form action=“/_cqr/login/validatePassword.psp”>

<input type=“hidden” name=“status”

value=“<%=query.status%>”>

<input type=“password” name=“pwd” value=“”>

</form>

[0012]

PSP engine substitutes <%=query.status%> substring with the value of status query parameter. A hacker can construct a link to validatePasswordForm.psp with a query parameter status equal to

“><script>I-will-send-your-cookies-to-hacker

</script><img src=”

[0013]

Consequently, PSP engine performs a substitution, and in the result HTML page dangerous JavaScript code “I-will-send-your-cookies-to-hacker” is executed (in the context of safe and secure domain my.screenname.aol.com !):

<form action=“/_cqr/login/validatePassword.psp”>

<input type=“hidden” name=“status”

value=“”><script> I-will-send-your-cookies-to-

hacker</script><img src=“”>

<input type=“password” name=“pwd” value=“”>

</form>

[0014]

To stop up this loophole, the Web service application must validate all user input data and/or generate “safe” HTML output (encode all user supplied data). However, this is a huge task that requires significant development and quality assurance resources.

[0015]

What is desired is a flexible, easily-tunable mechanism to block known types of attack without re-writing the Web service application from the scratch.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

[0016]

The invention provides a server-side plug-in as a security filter that processes HTTP requests before any other Web service plug-ins or applications. Using a highly customizable set of pattern rules based on regular expressions, the security filter predictably intercepts all attacks of known patterns. The set of rules is updated whenever a new pattern of attack is discovered.

[0017]

Although this solution does not guarantee that the application is shielded from new, undiscovered attack pattern, it empowers a Web service provider to block all attacks of pattern known up to date and keep the pattern list updated when new attacks are found.

[0018]

The advantage of this solution is that the Web service provider does not need to modify the application to be protected.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0019]

[0019]FIG. 1 is schematic block diagram illustrating a network wherein an HTTP request is processed by a security filter before it reaches the Web service application according to the invention; and

[0020]

[0020]FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating the basic steps to intercept malicious HTTP request according to the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0021]

No matter how a Web system is designed, hackers can almost always find a loophole in it and crack it. Therefore, it is almost impossible to create a hundred percent guaranteed secure system. A high secure system means a well-designed flexible enough system plus permanent monitoring. Known types of attack usually fall in some patterns which rarely appear in regular user input. For example, the dangerous value of status query parameter includes <script> substring. This invention focuses on a server-side standalone filter (NSAPI plug-in), which is used to block the requests that match specified patterns.

[0022]

[0022]FIG. 1 is schematic block diagram illustrating a network wherein an HTTP request is processed by a security filter before it reaches the Web service application. A user who validly signs in the network via a client 101 coupled to the Internet sends an HTTP request to the Web server 102. The security filter 103 is tuned to specifically protect the Web service application 104. The filter 103 parse the HTTP requests into five categories of objects and inspects the objects category by category. The five categories of objects are:

[0023]

path

[0024]

query

[0025]

headers (other than cookies)

[0026]

cookies

[0027]

body

[0028]

[0028]FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating a method to intercept malicious HTTP request according to the invention. The method includes the following steps:

[0029]

Step 201: Loading a group of predefined pattern rules;

[0030]

Step 202: Parse an incoming HTTP request according to the objects;

[0031]

Step 203: Apply the predefined group of pattern rules to said objects; and

[0032]

Step 204: Check whether any substring included in the objects matches any of the pattern rules; and

[0033]

Step 205: Take a rule action. For example, accept the request or reject the request because it has been determined as a bad request.

[0034]

Each object in the HTTP request corresponds to a separate list of pattern rules. The pattern rules in the list are executed sequentially until an object data matches a rule pattern or all rules in the list are completely checked. If an object data matched a rule pattern, then one of the following actions is taken:

[0035]

accept—stop validating the request and pass it to the Web service application 104;

[0036]

log—log an error message and continue;

[0037]

ignore—continue and ignore the matched substring for following checks;

[0038]

redirect—stop validating the request, log an error message and redirect to a static error page;

[0039]

return-error—stop validating the request, log an error message and return a given HTTP error code.

[0040]

If none of the HTTP request objects matches any rule pattern from the pattern lists, then the request is passed to the Web server 102 for further processing. The pattern rules could be applied to plain text HTTP object data, URL decoded data or both. The rule patterns are defined using standard UNIX regular expression and could be case sensitive or not. Table 1 shows the initial list of rule patterns (all patterns are matched ignoring case and to plain and URL decoded data).

TABLE 1

#

What do we want to block?

Pattern

1

javascript:

javascript[

\t\r\n]*:

2

&{

\&[ \t\r\n]*\{

3

form event handlers: onSubmit,

onSubmit[

onReset, etc.

\t\r\n]*=

4

text/mouse input event handlers:

onBlur[

onBlur, onChange, onFocus,

\t\r\n]*=

onSelect, onMouseClick, etc.

5

action=

action[

\t\r\n]*=

6

<script

<[

\t\r\n]*script

7

<frame

<[ \t\r\n]*frame

8

<iframe

<[

\t\r\n]*iframe

[0041]

As stated above, it is substantially impossible to provide a 100% guaranteed, seamless, secure system. To reduce bad user experiences when the filter rejects a valid user input, the following can be done:

[0042]

Perform client-side validation for all user input data from JavaScript and show a friendly error message if the user data could be rejected by the filter described above; and

[0043]

Make friendly error page to redirect to in the case of error. For example, the error page may include: “To protect your security and privacy . . . Please press Back button and validated your input . . . ”.

[0044]

The Table 2 shows the average size and maximum size in each object category of the HTTP requests to be processed by the filter.

TABLE 2

Average size in

Maximum size in

Object Category

bytes

bytes

Query

70

1150

Headers (w/o cookies)

480

1420

Cookies

1105

5124

Request body (145 out

300

1154

of 14377 requests)

Total

˜2000

˜8000

[0045]

To check regexp performance, the following benchmark test is executed:

the regexec ( ) function was called given number of times and total execution time was reported.

[0049]

Table 3 shows the tests executed on 1 CPU Sun Ultra 2 box. Each test was executed 5 times and all results were very close (around 10% difference).

TABLE 3

# of

regexec

File

calls

Average

size

per

time

Pattern

File

(bytes)

test

(seconds)

<script>

/usr/include/stdio.h

16383

10000

4

<script>

/u/aleksey/dev/ureg/ui/

14375

10000

5

generic/en/

WelcomeLetter.html

<( +)script

/usr/include/stdio.h

16383

10000

5

(+)>(.*)</( +)

script

(+)>|<

(+)script

(+)/>

<( +)script

/u/aleksey/dev/ureg/ui/

14375

10000

24

(+)>(.*)</( +)

generic/en/

script

WelcomeLetter.html

(+)>|<

(+)script

(+)/>

({circumflex over ( )}|[{circumflex over ( )}a-zA-Z0-

/usr/include/stdio.h

16383

10000

11

9])the([{circumflex over ( )}a-zA-

Z0-9]|$)

({circumflex over ( )}|[{circumflex over ( )}a-zA-Z0-

/u/aleksey/dev/ureg/ui/

14375

10000

125

9])the([{circumflex over ( )}a-zA-

generic/en/

Z0-9]|$)

WelcomeLetter.html

,?([{circumflex over ( )}=]+)=\“(

/usr/include/stdio.h

16383

10

83

[{circumflex over ( )}\”]+)\“

,?([{circumflex over ( )}=]+)=\“(

/u/aleksey/dev/ureg/ui/

14375

10

20

[{circumflex over ( )}\”]+)\“

generic/en/

WelcomeLetter.html

[0050]

These tests indicate that simple pattern rules with small number of matches provide acceptable performance.

[0051]

The security filter configuration file has an XML-like syntax. The following file describes a simple rule-set that blocks all requests with “Bad JavaScript” string inside query, cookies or HTTP header “SAFE-HEADER”:

<!-- This is a simple rules set --!>

<SetDefault name=“HttpErrorRule/error” value=“500” />

<DefineList name=“block-bad-script”>

<HttpErrorRule pattern=“Bad +JavaScript” />

</DefineList>

<!-- Apply rules list “block-bad-script ” to HTTP query

string --!>

<ProtectObject type=“query”>

<IncludeList name=“block-bad-script ”/>

</ProtectObject>

<!-- Apply rules list “block-bad-script ” to HTTP cookies

string --!>

<ProtectObject type=“cookies”>

<IncludeList name=“block-bad-script ”/>

</ProtectObject>

<!-- Apply rules list “block-bad-script ” to SAFE-HEADER

string --!>

<ProtectObject type=“header” name=“SAFE-HEADER”>

<IncludeList name=“block-bad-script ”/>

</ProtectObject>

[0052]

Table 4 illustrates the tags used for the filter.

TABLE 4

Tag

Parent tag

Description

Parameters

Body

<!-- . . . --!>

none

Comment tag

—

—

allows to include

human readable

comments into the

rules file. This tag

has pseudo XML

syntax.

<SetDefault>

none

Sets default

name - the

If the value

values for some

full tag

parameter is

<*Rule> tags

parameter

not specified

parameters.

name in the

then the body

form:

of this tag is

tag-

used instead.

name/tag-

parameter-

name

value - the

value of the

parameter

<IncludeFile>

none

Includes the rules

name - the

—

from specified file

include file

in the current file.

name

<DefineList>

none

Defines the rules

—

The body of

list and assigns a

this tag

name to it. Each

contains one

rules list name

or more

must be unique in

<*Rule> tags

current context

or

(otherwise and

<IncludeList>.

error is

generated).

<ProtectObject>

none

Defines the list of

name - the

The body of

rules that will be

full name of

this tag

applied to

the object*)

contains one

specified HTTP

or more

request item

<*Rule> tags

(path, query,

or

body, cookie

<IncludeList>.

value or header

value).

<IncludeList>

<DefineList> or

Includes the rules

name - the

If the name

<ProtectObject>

from list with given

name of the

parameter is

name into parent

list defined

not specified

rules list.

with

then the body

<DefineList>

of this tag is

before

used instead.

<IgnoreRule>

<DefineList> or

Defines the rule

pattern - the

If the pattern

<ProtectObject>

that will exclude

rule pattern

parameter is

matched substring

to be

not specified

from followed

matched

then the body

rules match.

flags**) -

of this tag is

(optional) the

used instead.

pattern flags

for regcomp

(see below)

encoding**) -

(optional) the

data

encoding to

which the

rule should

be applied

<RemoveRule>

<DefineList> or

Defines the rule

pattern - the

If the pattern

<ProtectObject>

that will remove

rule pattern

parameter is

matched substring

to be

not specified

from the current

matched

then the body

item.

flags**) -

of this tag is

ATTENTION:

(optional) the

used instead.

These rules

pattern flags

must be listed

for regcomp

before any other

(see below)

rules.

encoding**) -

These rules

(optional) the

usually takes

data

much more time

encoding to

than any other

which the

rules because

rule should

after successful

be applied

match we are

restarting the

current item

validation from the

beginning.

The rule applies

only to plain

encoding.

If you are using

NES server and

NSAPI security

filter then you

should know that

applying

<RemoveRule> to

the body of HTTP

request means

using a “hacking”

implementation. I

could not promise

that it'll work with

all NES versions

on all platforms.

You are warned!

<AcceptRule>

<DefineList> or

Defines the rule

pattern - the

If the pattern

<ProtectObject>

that will stop all

rule pattern

parameter is

further request

to be

not specified

validation if the

matched

then the body

pattern will be

flags**) -

of this tag is

matched.

(optional) the

used instead.

pattern flags

for regcomp

(see below)

encoding**) -

(optional) the

data

encoding to

which the

rule should

be applied

<AcceptItemRule>

<DefineList> or

Defines the rule

pattern - the

If the pattern

<ProtectObject>

that will stop all

rule pattern

parameter is

further request

to be

not specified

item validation if

matched

then the body

the pattern will be

flags**) -

of this tag is

matched. The

(optional) the

used instead.

validation will

pattern flags

continue on next***)

for regcomp

request item.

(see below)

encoding**) -

(optional) the

data

encoding to

which the

rule should

be applied

<LogRule>

<DefineList> or

Defines a rule that

pattern - the

If the pattern

<ProtectObject>

will write a

rule pattern

parameter is

message into the

to be

not specified

log if the pattern

matched

then the body

will be matched.

flags**) -

of this tag is

(optional) the

used instead.

pattern flags

for regcomp

(see below)

encoding**) -

(optional) the

data

encoding to

which the

rule should

be applied

message**) -

the message

to be written

into the log

level**) -

(optional) the

message log

level (not

supported

yet)

<RedirectRule>

<DefineList> or

Defines a rule that

pattern - the

If the pattern

<ProtectObject>

will redirect user

rule pattern

parameter is

to specified URL if

to be

not specified

the pattern will be

matched

then the body

matched.

flags**) -

of this tag is

(optional) the

used instead.

pattern flags

for regcomp

(see below)

encoding**) -

(optional) the

data

encoding to

which the

rule should

be applied

url**) - the url

to redirect to

<HttpErrorRule>

<DefineList> or

Defines a rule that

pattern - the

If the pattern

<ProtectObject>

will return an

rule pattern

parameter is

HTTP error code if

to be

not specified

the pattern will be

matched

then the body

matched.

flags**) -

of this tag is

(optional) the

used instead.

pattern flags

for regcomp

(see below)

encoding**) -

(optional) the

data

encoding to

which the

rule should

be applied

error**) - the

http error

code to

return to user

message**) -

(optional) the

message the

user will see

[0053]

The common <*Rule> tags parameters include pattern, flags, and encoding.

[0054]

The “pattern” is a pattern for C regexp ( ) function.

[0055]

The “flags” is a comma separated list of flags for regcomp ( ) function as shown in Table 5:

TABLE 5

default

Default value used if this parameter is not specified;

equal to “extended, icase”.

extended

Use Extended Regular Expressions (REG_EXTENDED

flag for regcomp( ) function).

icase

Ignore case in match (REG_ICASE flag for

regcomp( ) function).

nosub

Report only success/fail (REG_NOSUB flag

for regcomp( ) function).

newline

Change the handling of NEWLINE characters

(REG_NEWLINE flag for regcomp( ) function).

none or an

Pass 0 to regcomp

empty string

[0056]

The “encoding” is a comma separated list of encodings to which this rule will be applied as shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6

default

Default value used if this parameter is not specified;

equal to “plain, url-decode”.

plain

Apply the rule to the clear string as it is in the request.

url-decode

URL decodes the data string and applies the rule.

none or an

The rule will never be matched.

empty string

[0057]

The following is exemplary configuration file used for the security filter:

<!-- Example NSAPI security filter plugin configuration

file to reject some known

“malicious HTML tags or script in a dynamically generated

page” attacks --!>

<SetDefault name=“RedirectRule/url”>

/error.html

</SetDefault>

<!--

Files access rules:

- we do not want to check requests to *.html, *.gif,

*.css, *.htm, *.js, *.jpg files

- we do want to protect *.psp and *.tmpl files

- nobody should be able to access other files (*.dwt,

*.pdf, *.pl, *.props, *.psd, *.txt, *.xml, etc)

--!>

<DefineList name=“allowed-files”>

<AcceptRule name=“allow-html” encoding=“plain”

pattern=“\.html$” />

<AcceptRule name=“allow-gif” encoding=“plain”

pattern=“\.gif$” />

<AcceptRule name=“allow-css” encoding=“plain”

pattern=“\.css$” />

<AcceptRule name=“allow-htm” encoding=“plain”

pattern=“\.htm$” />

<AcceptRule name=“allow-js” encoding=“plain”

pattern=“\.js$” />

<AcceptRule name=“allow-jpg” encoding=“plain”

pattern=“\.jpg$” />

</DefineList>

<DefineList name=“protected-files”>

<AcceptItemRule name=“protect-psp” encoding=“plain”

pattern=“\.psp$” />

<AcceptItemRule name=“protect-tmpl” encoding=“plain”

pattern=“\.tmpl$” />

</DefineList>

<ProtectObject name=“path”>

<IncludeList name=“protected-files”/>

<IncludeList name=“allowed-files”/>

</ProtectObject>

<!--

The list of dangerouse HTML code that can start

JavaScript, VBScript, etc. In all cases we will redirect

to the same static error page defined in obj.conf

--!>

<DefineList name=“block-scripts”>

<RedirectRule name=“block-scripts1” pattern=“\&[

\t\r\n]*\{” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-javascript1”

pattern=“javascript[ \t\r\n]*:” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-script” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*script” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-javascript2” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*javascript” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-vbscript” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*vbscript” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-livescript” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*livescript” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-mochascript” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*mochascript” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-mocha” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*mocha” />

</DefineList>

<!--

Block different kind of form event handlers (as usual

redirect to the same static error page defined in

obj.conf).

The list is not complete!!! Check

http://msdn.microsoft.com/workshop/browser/mshtml/reference/

events/events.asp

and get full list of events before applying to

production.

--!>

<DefineList name=“block-form-events”>

<RedirectRule name=“block-action” pattern=“action[

\t\r\n]*=” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-onSubmit”

pattern=“onSubmit[ \t\r\n]*=” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-onReset” pattern=“onReset[

\t\r\n]*=” />

</DefineList>

<!--

Block different kind of keyboard/mouse event handlers (as

usual redirect to the same static error page defined in

obj.conf).

The list is not complete!!! Check

http://msdn.microsoft.com/workshop/browser/mshtml/reference/

events/events.asp

and get full list of events before applying to

production.

--!>

<DefineList name=“block-input-events”>

<RedirectRule name=“block-onBlur” pattern=“onBlur[

\t\r\n]*=” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-onChange”

pattern=“onChange[ \t\r\n]*=” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-onFocus” pattern=“onFocus[

\t\r\n]*=” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-onSelect”

pattern=“onSelect[ \t\r\n]*=” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-onMouseClick”

pattern=“onMouseClick[ \t\r\n]*=” />

</DefineList>

<!--

Block frames (as usual redirect to the same static error

page defined in obj.conf).

--!>

<DefineList name=“block-frames”>

<RedirectRule name=“block-frame” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*frame” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-frameset” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*frameset” />

<RedirectRule name=“block-iframe” pattern=“<[

\t\r\n]*iframe” />

</DefineList>

<!--

We do not want to check some query parameters (password

and siteState)

which we think are safe

--!>

<DefineList name=“ignore-query-params”>

<IgnoreRule name=“ignore-password1”

pattern=“{circumflex over ( )}password=.*&” />

<IgnoreRule name=“ignore-password2”

pattern=“&password=.*&” />

<IgnoreRule name=“ignore-password3”

pattern=“&password=.*$” />

<IgnoreRule name=“ignore-siteState1”

pattern=“{circumflex over ( )}siteState=.*&” />

<IgnoreRule name=“ignore-siteState2”

pattern=“&siteState=.*&” />

<IgnoreRule name=“ignore-siteState3”

pattern=“&siteState=.*$” />

</DefineList>

<!--

List all things we want to block

--!>

<DefineList name=“block-list”>

<IncludeList name=“block-scripts” />

<IncludeList name=“block-form-events” />

<IncludeList name=“block-input-events” />

<IncludeList name=“block-frames” />

</DefineList>

<!--

Define rules to process query string: ignore some query

params and do all other checks

--!>

<ProtectObject name=“query”>

<IncludeList name=“ignore-query-params” />

<IncludeList name=“block-list” />

</ProtectObject>

<!--

Define rules to process body (same as query string):

ignore some query params and do all other checks

--!>

<ProtectObject name=“body”>

<IncludeList name=“ignore-query-params” />

<IncludeList name=“block-list” />

</ProtectObject>

<!--

We are going to check only cookies we use

--!>

<ProtectObject name=“cookie/WA_TMCJ_S”>

<IncludeList name=“block-list” />

</ProtectObject>

<ProtectObject name=“cookie/WA_TMCJ_ESK”>

<IncludeList name=“block-list” />

</ProtectObject>

<!--

Do we want to check something else? If not then we are

done

--!>

[0058]

Although the invention is described herein with reference to the preferred embodiment, one skilled in the art will readily appreciate that other applications may be substituted for those set forth herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

[0059]

Accordingly, the invention should only be limited by the Claims included below.

Claims (17)

1. In an HTTP based network, a security filter for shielding a Web service application from malicious HTTP requests, comprising:

a plurality of pattern rules categorized by object types;

means for parsing an incoming request into objects of said object types;

means for applying said pattern rules to said objects; and

means for taking actions on said incoming request when any substring in said objects matches any of said pattern rules.

3. The security filter of claim 1, wherein lists of said pattern rules corresponding to object types are executed sequentially.

4. The security filter of claims 1, wherein said actions comprise any of:

stop validating said incoming request and pass it to said Web service application;

log an error message and continue;

continue and ignore said matched substring for subsequent checks;

stop validating said incoming request, log an error message and redirect to a static error page; and

stop validating said incoming request, log an error message and return a given HTTP error code.

5. The security filter of claim 1, wherein said pattern rules can be applied to any of:

plain text HTTP object; and

URL decoded data.

6. A method for protecting a Web service application from a malicious HTTP request, comprising the steps of:

parsing an incoming HTTP request into objects;

applying a predefined group of pattern rules to said objects; and

taking an action when any substring included in said objects matches any of said pattern rules;

7. The method of claim 6, wherein said group pattern rules are categorized by object types, each object type corresponding to a list of pattern rules and said object types comprising:

path;

query;

body;

headers; and

cookie.

8. The method of claim 6, wherein lists of said pattern rules corresponding to object types are executed sequentially.

9. The method of claim 6, wherein said pattern rules can be applied to any of:

plain text HTTP object; and

URL decoded data.

10. The method of claim 6, wherein said action comprises:

pass said incoming request to said Web service application; and

reject said incoming request.

11. The method of claim 6, wherein said action comprises any of:

stop validating said incoming request and pass it to said Web service application;

log an error message and continue;

continue and ignore said matched substring for subsequent checks;

stop validating said incoming request, log an error message and redirect to a static error page; and

stop validating said incoming request, log an error message and return a given HTTP error code.

12. A computer readable storage medium containing a computer readable code for operating a computer system to perform a method for protecting a Web service application from malicious HTTP requests, said method comprising the steps of:

parsing an incoming HTTP request into objects;

applying a predefined group of pattern rules to said objects; and

taking an action when any substring included in said objects matches any of said pattern rules;

13. The computer readable storage medium of claim 12, wherein said group pattern rules are categorized by object types, each object type corresponding to a list of pattern rules and said object types comprising: