NOTE: Where it is feasible, a
syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in
connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader.See United States
v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,
337.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 036821. Argued March 29, 2004Decided May 24,
2004

Three days before his scheduled execution by
lethal injection, petitioner filed a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action against respondent Alabama prison officials,
alleging that the use of a cut-down procedure
requiring an incision into his arm or leg to access his
severely compromised veins constituted cruel and unusual
punishment and deliberate indifference to his medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Petitioner, who had already filed an unsuccessful federal
habeas application, sought a permanent injunction against the
cut-downs use, a temporary stay of execution so the
District Court could consider his claims merits, and
orders requiring respondents to furnish a copy of the protocol
on the medical procedures for venous access and directing them
to promulgate a venous access protocol that comports with
contemporary standards. Respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint for want of jurisdiction on the grounds that the
§1983 claim and stay request were the equivalent of a
second or successive habeas application subject to 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)s gatekeeping requirements. Agreeing, the
District Court dismissed the complaint because petitioner had
not obtained authorization to file such an application. In
affirming, the Eleventh Circuit held that method-of-execution
challenges necessarily sound in habeas, and that it would have
denied a habeas authorization request.

(a) Section 1983
must yield to the federal habeas statute where an inmate seeks
injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the
duration of his sentence. Such claims fall within the core of
habeas. By contrast, constitutional claims challenging
confinement conditions fall outside of that core and may be
brought under §1983 in the first instance. The Court need
not reach here the difficult question of how
method-of-execution claims should be classified generally.
Respondents have conceded that §1983 would be the
appropriate vehicle for an inmate who is not facing execution
to bring a deliberate indifference challenge to the
cut-down procedures constitutionality if used to gain
venous access for medical treatment. There is no reason on the
complaints face to treat petitioners claim
differently solely because he has been condemned to die.
Respondents claim that because the cut-down is part of the
execution procedure, petitioner is actually challenging the
fact of his execution. However, that venous access is a
necessary prerequisite to execution does not imply that a
particular means of gaining such access is likewise necessary.
Petitioner has argued throughout the proceedings that the
cut-down and the wardens refusal to provide reliable
information on the cut-down protocol are wholly
unnecessary to gaining venous access. If, after an
evidentiary hearing, the District Court finds the cut-down
necessary, it will need to address the broader
method-of-execution question left open here. The instant
holding is consistent with this Courts approach to civil
rights damages actions, which also fall at the margins of
habeas. Pp. 59.

(b) If a
permanent injunction request does not sound in habeas, it
follows that the lesser-included request for a temporary stay
(or preliminary injunction) does not either. Here, a fair
reading of the complaint leaves no doubt that petitioner sought
to enjoin the cut-down, not his execution by lethal injection.
However, his stay request asked to stay his execution,
seemingly without regard to whether the State did or did not
resort to the cut-down. The execution warrant has now expired.
If the State reschedules the execution while this case is
pending on remand and petitioner seeks another similarly broad
stay, the District Court will need to address the question
whether a request to enjoin the execution, rather than merely
to enjoin an allegedly unnecessary precursor medical procedure,
properly sounds in habeas. Pp. 911.

(c) Respondents are incorrect that
a reversal here would open the floodgates to all manner of
method-of-execution challenges and last-minute stay requests.
Because this Court does not here resolve the question of how to
treat method-of-execution claims generally, the instant holding
is extremely limited. Moreover, merely stating a cognizable
§1983 claim does not warrant a stay as a matter of right.
A court may consider a stay applications last-minute
nature in deciding whether to grant such equitable relief. And
the ability to bring a §1983 claim does not free inmates
from the substantive or procedural limitations ofthe
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Pp. 1113.