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Saturday, May 21, 2016

Kurdish Objectives in Iraq’s Political Crisis

by: Emily Anagnostos with Patrick Martin

Key Takeaway: Iraqi politics are deadlocked. Several
political parties and blocs boycotted the Council of Representatives (CoR)
following the Sadrist protesters’ first breach of the Green Zone on April 30.
The Kurdish Alliance, a bloc that consisted of nearly one-fifth of the CoR,
withdrew on May 5. The bloc has now split, and two of its component political
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, formally reunited
on May 14 to create a new bloc. The PUK
and Gorran were incentivized by the urgent need for financial assistance to the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and likely by Iranian urging. A loan from
the IMF in which Baghdad and the KRG will have a share proved decisive in
incentivizing their cohesion. The PUK-Gorran Alliance will therefore likely
strengthen ties between Baghdad and Arbil. Their rival, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), retains ambitions of regional independence and a
stranglehold on political power in the KRG. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
will either have to reintegrate or seek new political partners. The PUK and
Gorran will likely eventually return to the CoR. Although they are still
negotiating with the KDP, Kurdish parties are unlikely to return the CoR as one
entity, ending what had been a significant, cohesive bloc. The new political
alliance will nevertheless shift the power dynamics of both Baghdad and Arbil.

Introduction

The Kurdistan Alliance has been the framework under which
Kurdish political parties have formed a consensus agenda in the Iraqi
Parliament since 2005 elections. The Kurdistan Alliance since 2014 elections had
been comprised of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and Kurdistan
Islamic Group (KIG), the five of which constituted the entirety of Kurdish
representation in the Iraqi parliament and are the five largest parties in the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). These five political parties are
answerable to both the politics of Baghdad and those of the Kurdistan Regional
Government. The Kurdistan Alliance has primarily aimed to maintain Kurdish
influence within the Iraqi Government in order to guarantee financial and
budgetary assistance for the KRG.

The Kurdistan Alliance persistently blocked Prime Minister
Haidar al-Abadi’s attempt to create a technocratic government through his
cabinet reshuffle, proposed first on February 9, 2015. The bloc has insisted on
retaining the ethnic and sectarian quotas that ensure Kurdish representation
within the government, preserve Kurdish control over ministries, and ensure
that the Iraqi Presidency remains in Kurdish hands. The bloc’s goal in the
reforms was retaining positions for Kurdish leaders, such as Minister of
Finance Hoshyar Zebari, a member of the KDP. PM Abadi’s reform plans, however,
seek to end the quota system on principle which threatens guaranteed Kurdish
representation and may lead to a decrease in Kurdish representation.

The Kurdish parties had presented a unified bloc in Baghdad
until May 1, while within the KRG they have been fractious and struggling with
one another for power. KRG President Masoud Barzani has retained his office
past when his term limit ended in 2013 when the legal council in the KRG
parliament twice granted him a two year extension, first in August 2013 and
then in August 2015,
granting him full powers until the 2017 parliamentary elections. His rivals in
the Gorran Party, the second largest party in the KRG, and the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) denounced this extension, calling for new
presidential elections and even for a new form of government. The political crisis split the KRG on October 12, 2015 when the
KDP blamed Gorran for the large-scale anti-KDP demonstrations which erupted in Sulaimaniyah
Province over unpaid salaries. The KDP expelled Gorran from the KRG, demanding
that Gorran not return to the government until they had replaced several Gorran members whom the KDP blamed for the political
tensions. The split in the KRG has continued since then without resolution. The
KDP and Gorran have yet to reconcile and Gorran has not returned to the Kurdish
Government in Arbil. The PUK attempted to act as a mediator between the five
main political parties in the KRG in early 2016 in order to restore Gorran to
the KRG. All five Kurdish parties met on February 3 for the first time since
October 2015. They were scheduled to meet again on February 7 in the presence
of Masoud Barzani, but the KDP “indefinitely
delayed”
these negotiations for reconciliation. These divisions have created incentives
for Gorran and PUK to try to thwart Barzani’s consolidation of power, and even
to seek recourse in Baghdad to achieve those gains.

The Kurdistan Alliance Withdraws from
Baghdad Politics

The Kurdistan Alliance withdrew from Iraq’s
Council of Representatives in Baghdad, outraged over the failure of security
forces to secure the CoR building during the April 30 protests, when Sadrist
Trend-driven protesters stormed the Green Zone and the parliamentary building
and physically assaulted Kurdish CoR members. Those assaulted included PUK
senior member Ala Talabani, niece
of PUK founder Jalal Talabani, and Deputy CoR Speaker Aram Sheikh Muhammad. The
Kurdish parties left for Iraqi Kurdistan
on May 1 after escaping the Green Zone and announced that they would not return
to Baghdad until their physical safety was guaranteed. One Kurdish CoR member
stated that there was “no hope in the current government” to contain the crisis, and called CoR Speaker Salim Juburi’s
efforts to resolve the crisis as temporary and incapable of being
implemented. The Kurdish parties on May
5 refused to come back to the CoR for
the next session, originally scheduled for 10 May.

The Kurdistan Alliance’s withdrawal from Baghdad
represents a major inflection point in the Iraqi political crisis because the
Kurdish parties control a significant proportion of the CoR and have the
ability to help determine a quorum as well as advance and dismiss legislation.
Their unified walk-out gave the Kurds a new source of leverage over the CoR, as
Iraq’s political process remains paralyzed without their participation.

The Kurdistan Alliance’s Demands

President Masoum met with senior ISCI member
Adil Abdul-Mahdi on May 6 to
discuss the political crisis and future plans in the Ministry of Oil,
especially regarding the mission of self-sufficiency in the oil industry. The
Kurdish demands regarding oil and gas laws were likely a central focus of this
conversation as a solution to resume the political process in Baghdad. Kurdish
demands also included
addressing Article 140 in the Constitution regarding the disputed status of
Kirkuk Province, a highly controversial topic which will not be resolved in
these negotiations. President Masoum
continued to meet with other political parties with significant clout in the
Iraqi Government, including meetings with ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim,
National Alliance leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and
SLA leader Nouri al-Maliki all
individually on May 9, where Masoum likely acted as mediator between political
parties in order to relay the financial prerequisites of the Kurdish CoR
members’ return and hear the negotiating terms from these three Shi’a political
leaders. These negotiations were not decisive and failed to draw the Kurdish
political parties back to Baghdad.

Most Kurdish demands of Baghdad were driven by
money rather than security. Initially,
the Kurds maintained that the primary condition of their return to Baghdad was
a guarantee that the events of April 30 would not repeat, calling
it a “black day” in
Iraqi political history. But the Kurdish political bloc continued to pursue its
enduring demands for legislation in Baghdad on the core issues of revenue
sharing, budget relief, and the status of the disputed internal boundaries
(DIBs) that it wishes to incorporate into the Kurdish region. The KRG currently
struggles to pay the salaries of both its government employees and its
Peshmerga forces and, like Baghdad, is burdened with falling global oil prices.
The Kurdish Alliance thus replaced the blustering of the previous days in order
to demand more tangible financial concessions from Baghdad. These demands include the payment of government and
Peshmerga salaries and implementation of oil and gas laws which would help the
KRG’s floundering economic situation. They were relayed between various
political parties by Iraqi President Fuad Masoum, a senior member of the PUK
who also speaks on behalf of the Kurdish parties in Baghdad’s power politics.

The Kurds also issued a set of demands which
were both unreasonable and unattainable. The walk out on May 1 was coupled with
the publication of an op-ed by Masrour Barzani, nephew of KRG President Masoud
Barzani, calling for an “amicable divorce” from Baghdad on May 5. The KDP thereby added the threat of
declaring independence to the list of demands. Masoud Barzani announced back on January 26 that he would seek to hold a referendum before
the U.S. 2016 presidential elections, likely using the upcoming U.S. elections
as a tangible deadline to foster a sense of imminent change.

Baghdad Vies for Kurds to Return

The threat that Kurdish parties would withdraw
indefinitely, and possibly permanently, from Baghdad changed the ongoing
negotiations among Iraqi Government leaders who immediately prioritized
negotiations for the Kurdistan Alliance’s return. But because Baghdad’s leaders
were themselves fractured over Abadi’s reforms among other issues, several political
groups within Baghdad will vie for the Kurds’ return to the CoR and into new
political agreements. The emerging Reform Front, created from the rump
parliament session on April 27, seeks
Kurdish membership in its efforts to reach a quorum. Abadi hopes to court the
Kurds back into the political process in order to resume his reform legislation
and to block the Reform Front’s efforts to changing the status quo.

CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi was among the first
to visit some Kurdish parties in order to secure their return to the political
process in Baghdad, but he went to Sulaimaniyah, the headquarters of the PUK,
rather than the Iraqi Kurdistan capital of Arbil where the KDP prevails. Juburi’s
outreach to Kurdish leaders on May
8 appeared to be relegated to the
Kurdish opposition parties of the PUK and Gorran, with Juburi visiting recently-returned
Gorran leader Nushirwan Mustafa, who had returned to the Kurdistan Region on April 28 after seven months in London
seeking medical treatment. The timing of his return is not coincidental. Juburi
also met with Gorran Deputy CoR Speaker Aram Sheikh Muhammad and PUK leader Ala
Talabani. Gorran and the PUK stand to lose from continued political absence and
are less committed ideologically to an independent Kurdish Region as the KDP.
They also have stakes in removing the political stranglehold of President
Barzani over KRG politics.

The international community, led by Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq Jan Kubis, finally achieved
a breakthrough that softened some Kurdish parliamentarians’ hardline stance
against their return to the CoR by appealing to financial interests. Kubis
carried out a series of meetings in both Sulaimaniyah, the headquarters of the PUK, and Arbil, the headquarters of the KDP, on May 8, where he reminded the
Kurdish parties that they would have access to the much needed International
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan only if they participated in the government in
Baghdad. Iraq stands to gain significant financial support from a proposed $15
billion loan from the IMF over the next three years. The KRG, as a part of Iraq,
would stand to inherit a portion of that fund, which, if approved, is slated to
release the first of three installments in June 2016. The prospect of massive
financial support through the IMF loan is further enticement for Kurdish
parties to remain active in the Baghdad government.

The Kurdish Alliance Fractures

The Kurdistan Alliance has formally fractured
over these financial incentives. The threat of no international financial
assistance has motivated several Kurdish CoR members to walk away from
stringent Kurdish demands of independence and from the KDP. The Iraqi
Government has continued to court Kurdish opposition parties, who are the most
likely to soften at prospects of the IMF loan, as Prime Minister Abadi
personally sent a delegation to
Sulaimaniyah on May 12 to meet with PUK member Ala Talabani and Gorran Second
Deputy CoR Speaker Aram Sheikh Muhammad. The IMF loan was the weight needed to
break apart the Kurdistan Alliance. Gorran and the PUK announced on May 14 that
they had ratified a new political alliance. The two announced that
they would run on the same list in 2017 elections and would coordinate in
political efforts in the KRG, in the CoR, and in provincial governments.

The new PUK-Gorran Alliance will seek
alternative demands and negotiations for participation in Baghdad and will be
more willing to cooperate with the federal government than the KDP in order to
achieve their financial demands. A Reform Front member made an unconfirmed
report on May 13 that suggested that
the PUK-Gorran Alliance and Baghdad plan to carry out significant financial
negotiations including handing over oil sales to Baghdad in exchange for
Baghdad providing salaries for Kurdish employees in Sulaimaniyah, Kirkuk, and
Arbil provinces.The PUK and Gorran are not in favor of declaring independence
of Iraqi Kurdistan at this time, and a senior PUK official, Mulla Bakhtiar,
noted during Juburi’s May 8 visit that “we
are still a part of Iraq.” Deputy
Prime Minister of the KRG and PUK member Qubad Talabani later stated on May 15 that now was not the
time for Kurdish independence, pointing specifically to the KRG’s weak economy
and infrastructure. The KRG, with the PUK-Gorran Alliance in charge, would
remain a part of Iraq and would seek negotiations with Baghdad.

The PUK and Gorran together have 29 CoR members
(originally 30; one Gorran member has joined the Reform Front) to the KDP’s 25.
Currently 216 of 328 CoR members are assessed to be boycotting CoR sessions,
the possible return of the new PUK-Gorran Alliance would likely influence other
blocs, notably the Sunni Etihad bloc with roughly 40 active members, to return
as well. (The current size of Etihad is unclear, as some members have joined
the Reform Front, but Etihad likely retains a sizeable number of members.)
These additions could put the CoR in range of meeting quorum and resuming
sessions. The KIU and KIG may also be persuaded to follow the PUK-Gorran lead
and return their seven CoR members to Baghdad. The Reform Front will try to
court the PUK-Gorran Alliance to join their bloc in order to sway the CoR
majority in their favor. Nouri al-Maliki praised the new PUK-Gorran Alliance on May 18 as an “important step” to
overcoming divisions within the Kurdistan Region and “an overall understanding
with Baghdad.” The Reform Front will likely increase relations with the new
alliance in the coming days in order to persuade the PUK-Gorran Alliance to
considering rejoining the CoR as a part of the Reform Front.

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Note: ISW has tracked Iraq’s building political crisis since early February, following political reforms proposed by Prime Minister Abadi and the challenges to them. The Council of Representatives (CoR) has also faced challenges from an increasingly fractious set of parties some of which have attempted to break off from the CoR and form a “rump” Parliament that later morphed into a new opposition bloc, the Reform Front, composed of members from various parties. As with all political maneuvering, ISW has relied on media reporting as well as our own assessment of likely political coordination, cooperation, and alignment among and between individuals and parties. We are currently re-examining our methodology in light of recent maneuvers and statements leading up to the CoR Ramadan break and will update our CoR graphic when that analysis is completed.

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Iran and the New PUK-Gorran Alliance

Iran has used its
historic relationship with the PUK in order to facilitate this Kurdish
political reorganization consistent with their interests: preventing Kurdish independence,
marginalizing Barzani, and returning to a stability in Baghdad consistent with
the status quo prior to protests. Iranian representatives therefore conducted a
series of meetings with the PUK after the April 30 protests, likely in an
effort to steer them politically and guide their demands. Iranian Ambassador to
Iraq Hassan Danaifar met with KRG Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani on May 3 to discuss the political crisis. Danaifar met on May
4 with Second Deputy Secretary General of the PUK Barham Salih in an
unpublicized meeting that did not reach vetted media. Iranian Intelligence
Minister Mahmoud Alavi likewise visited both PM Nechirvan Barzani and President Masoud Barzani in Arbil on May 15, the latter
of whom Alavi invited to visit Tehran. Alavi then with Barham Salih and First
Deputy Secretary General of the PUK Kusrat Rasul Ali in another unpublicized meeting in Sulaimaniyah on May 15.
Iran likely has their own requests of the PUK and Gorran, including the return
of the Kurdish political parties to Baghdad in order to restore stability in
the Iraqi government. The Iranians have likewise used their relationship with
the PUK to corral President Masoud Barzani’s move towards independence and
attempts to monopolize power.

The KDP Reacts

The new PUK-Gorran Alliance is also large
enough to be a formidable rival to the KDP in KRG. The PUK became the third
largest party within the KRG after the 2013 parliamentary elections when Gorran
split from its ranks and formed its own party, seizing 24 seats in the KRG
parliament and reducing the size of the PUK from 29 seats in 2009 to 18 seats
in 2013. The KDP remains the largest party with 38 seats. As 2017 elections in
the KRG approach and as President Barzani continues to remain as president
beyond his term limit, the re-merger between the PUK and Gorran, which at
current numbers would boast a combined 42 seats in the KRG parliament, could
pose a significant political driver and perhaps a threat to Barzani, who has
occupied his office since since 2005. The KDP unsurprisingly denounced the new
alliance as “deepening internal
issues” within the KRG on May 18.

The KDP is now fracturing internally. Some members
still call for independence. One KDP CoR
member stated on May
10 that the “partnership between Baghdad and Arbil has collapsed.” President
Masoud Barzani’s speech on the
centenary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement on May 16 called for recognition that
the Sykes-Picot had “ended” and to treat Iraq as a “brother and neighbor” and no
longer a partner. These strong condemnations of continued contact with Baghdad
contradict actions and statements made by other ranking KDP members.

Other KDP members would prefer to remain in
Baghdad politics. KDP member and Finance
Minister Hoshyar Zebari met with President Fuad Masoum on May 11 about
the impending IMF loan. KRG Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani stated on May 12 that “as long as we are part of
Iraq, we should not be cut off from the political process,” calling for the
Kurdish CoR members to return to Baghdad. Nechirvan Barzani’s statement echoes
sentiments closer to PUK official Mulla Bakhtiar than to KDP associates and
family members. Some KDP members may therefore
return to the CoR on their own accord.

Alternatively, the lack of cohesion in rhetoric
may be a way for the KDP to maintain its political leverage. President Masoud
Barzani’s continued rhetoric requires political negotiators in Baghdad – whether
it is Abadi or the Reform Front – to likewise increase their bids for the KDP’s
return. Meanwhile, PM Nechirvan Barzani and key KDP officials like Zebari
continue to soothe Baghdad’s concerns that their bids are unreceived and provide
continued physical contact between the KDP and Baghdad. The KDP will not
relinquish power easily, whether in Baghdad or Arbil, and will play all its
cards in order to make Baghdad cater to its demands..

Baghdad Sweetens the Deal

President Fuad Masoum arrived in Arbil on May
16 and May 17, meeting with President Masoud Barzani and
later with Vice President Qubad Talabani to
stress the importance of political solutions. Masoum also met with PUK founder
Jalal Talabani and
with Gorran leader Nushirwan Mustafa in
Sulaimaniyah on May 19 to congratulate the new PUK-Gorran Alliance and discuss
the return to Baghdad. Masoum seeks to bring the Kurds back to Baghdad while
maintaining the cohesion in the Kurdish bloc.

On May 17, the Iraqi Central Bank, managed by
Ali al-Alaaq, announced that it will open a branch in the Kurdistan Region as
the result of talks between the “federal government” and KRG Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani. Alaaq, a prominent member of the Dawa Party, was part of the
delegation personally sent
by PM Abadi to meet with PUK and Gorran officials in Sulaimaniyah on May 12.
The opening of a banking establishment in Arbil that is directly and inherently
connected to Baghdad suggests long-term coordination between Baghdad and Arbil
and an intent to establish continued relations. The opening also underscores
that the Kurdistan Region will not move for independence any time soon and
instead will continue negotiations that allow for long-term financial support
from the Iraqi Government in return for the Kurdish parties’ return to the CoR.
Additionally, the announcement on May 19 that the IMF has a $5.4 billion standby agreement to Iraq, with
the ability to receive up to $15 billion from international aid over three
years, and the rumor that the Kurds would receive 17% of
this loan, adds further pressure and enticement for the Kurds to remain active
in the Baghdad political process. The personal visit of Oil Minister Adil
Abdul-Mahdi to visit President Masoud Barzani in Arbil on May
19 also suggests that the KRG and
Baghdad will continue to conduct financial agreements. These signs of the KRG’s
continued financial dependence on Baghdad indicates that all Kurdish parties
will return to the CoR, however it is unclear when they will return and if they
return as a cohesive bloc or separate entities.

Will the Kurds Return to Parliament?

The fracture of the Kurdistan Alliance will
force the Kurdish parties to reevaluate their positions in both Baghdad and
Arbil. It is unlikely that the Kurdistan Alliance as it existed before April 30
will remain. The new PUK-Gorran Alliance will shift the power dynamics within the
Kurdish political parties. The PUK and Gorran are likely to return to the CoR
as negotiations, primarily over the IMF loan, continue. The KDP may return as
well, but it is unclear if it will return within the framework of the
PUK-Gorran Alliance or outside of it. The new PUK-Gorran Alliance will likely work
more closely with the Abadi government in Baghdad.

PM Abadi may find the Kurdish parties with the
PUK-Gorran Alliance at the helm a more malleable and open-minded political ally
that can help him retain his control over the government and keep pro-Maliki
political forces at bay. The PUK and Gorran will likely soften their position
on Baghdad’s oversight in northern Iraq if Baghdad can guarantee substantial
financial support to the alliance’s primary support base in Sulaimaniyah and
Kirkuk provinces. The PUK-Gorran Alliance’s current disinclination towards
Kurdish independence will also ease the concerns of Abadi, Iran, and the U.S.
which seek a unitary Iraq.

The KDP may seek new partners within the CoR in
order to maintain its relevance as the PUK-Gorran bloc moves ahead. Maliki’s
Reform Front is trying to entice it, a dangerous course of action because it
could empower the Abadi government’s main challenger. But the PUK-Gorran
alliance itself is also negotiating for the KDP’s return, and it can offer a
combination of concessions in Arbil and Baghdad that help stabilize both, a
tremendous boon for an Iraqi government on the verge of collapse.