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The Hunt for Red Menace: - 8

The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit

For close to 250 local and state police intelligence units, the problem
of how to spy on dissidents was solved by membership in the Law Enforcement
Intelligence Unit (LEIU). As journalist David Kaplan saw it, the LEIU
was a "private, federally-funded network of computerized files." Who
was in the files? "Among the subjects catalogued in LEIU files have
been minority, labor and community organizers, many with no criminal
records," wrote Kaplan.

The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit was formed in 1956 at a San Francisco
meeting of representatives of 26 law enforcement agencies from seven
western states. LEIU was later expanded to encompass agencies from many
other states. The official purpose of the group was "to promote
the gathering, recording, and exchange of confidential information not
available through normal police channels, concerning organized crime." The
unofficial purpose was to establish a national criminal intelligence
network independent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose agents
frequently refused to share information with local law enforcement officers.<$F
This section is based in part on research provided by private investigator
Sheila O'Donnell.>

By 1962, the LEIU had clearly expanded the scope of its interest to
include nonciminal activity. That year, a regional meeting in San Francisco
included a discussion of "police intelligence units' role in securing
information concerning protest groups, demonstrations, and mob violence," according
to an FBI summary. Seventy-two persons attended that meeting, and in
addition to local and state law enforcement officials, the FBI noted
the presence of representatives from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the U.S. Department of Labor, the Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
and several military investigative units.

The evidence of LEIU's political spying surfaced in the form of hundreds
of five-by-eight-inch index cards on so-called "organized crime" figures
distributed to member police agencies. LEIU's rather novel definition
of "organized crime" was sufficiently broad to include card
dossiers reporting the lawful political activities of anti-war, Black,
tribal, community, and labor organizers. This discovery flatly contradicted
repeated claims by LEIU officers testifying before congressional committees
that their files pertained solely to criminal activities.

During politically volatile 1970, LEIU's national and regional conferences
held discussions revealing a preoccupation with monitoring dissidents.
Among the topics analyzed that year were: "national militant problems," "international
influence on current disorders," dissident and militant funding," revolution
in the streets -intelligence aspects," "viewpoints on campus
disorders," "Students for a Democratic Society," and "permissiveness."

With workshop topics such as these it is hardly surprising that local
LEIU members began submitting information on political activists to the
group's California clearing house. A 1979 investigation of LEIU by the
Detroit Board of Police Commissioners found that scores of LEIU subject
cards contained information on persons "not apparently related to
criminal activities." This conclusion is documented by the LEIU
cards found in the Chicago Red Squad files.

One LEIU card found in the Chicago files reported on California activist
Leland Lubinsky. It described him as a "recognized leader in Peace
movements [who] has operated Draft Evasion Counciling [sic] Peace Demonstrations
locally." It said that so far as was known, Lubinsky had never been
arrested. Lubinsky's card, like other LEIU cards, included a photograph,
along with information on his physical description, associates, family,
vital statistics, last known address vehicle and license numbers, hangouts,
and modus operandi. LEIU cards were cross-indexed by Social Security
number, driver's license number, and FBI number.

Professor Michael Lerner was described on an LEIU card as a "Marxist
scholar, political activist, leader with Seattle Liberation Front, present
at many demonstrations, in Seattle." Anne Braden, a long-time community
and labor organizer with the Southern Conference Educational Fund, was
listed as assisting "in organizing many radical groups and publications
in the Southern U.S." Among the "criminal" activities
listed for American Indian Movement activists Clyde and Vernon Bellecourt
was the damning news that the pair "travels extensively."

Much of the information on California activist Michael Zinzun's LEIU
card was simply inaccurate. The card failed to note that several arrests
were on charges later dismissed, and had him belonging to the Black Panther
Party well after he had left that organization. Zinzun has never heard
of the "Triad" real estate group that the LEIU card said he
was "believed to be associated with," and repeated attempts
to locate or even prove the existence of the "Triad" group
have been unsuccessful. Among Zinzun's reputed associates was one Nathan
N. Holden, a former California state senator whose only association with
Zinzun was to collect rent -Holden was once Zinzun's landlord.

The lack of accuracy and plethora of unverified reports and innuendos
in the LEIU files prompted investigations of the LEIU by local, state
and federal agencies. The federal General Accounting Office found that
only a small percent of the information recorded on the LEIU cards could
be completely documented. Responding to the mounting criticisms of the
files by the GAO and other investigative groups, LEIU in 1979 removed
145 subject cards. The cards were purged to meet new LEIU guidelines
designed to strike a balance between "the civil rights and liberties
of American civizens and the need of law enforcement to collect and disseminate
criminal intelligence," according to an LEIU memo.

High-sounding words, but as critics have pointed out, the policy could
have been re-evaluated and changed by the LEIU board as soon as the controversy
died down. Besides, LEIU will not reveal what cards were destroyed and
what cards were retained. According to Tom Parsons, a spokesperson for
the Seattle Coalition on Government Spying, there were "continuing
indications of LEIU willingness to share political information through
its bulletins and files under the guise that it is information about
'terrorism.'" Parsons feels the most crucial problem is that the "LEIU
continues to operate outside of public control or accountability." Unless
public oversight and accountability are established, said Parsons, the "positive
steps...taken by LEIU could be reversed -in secret, with no notice to
the public."

The LEIU gets away with hiding its activities from public scrutiny because
it claims to be a private organization -despite the fact that it is composed
of law enforcement agencies that use tax dollars to pay dues and fees.
The LEIU is shielded from federal and state laws governing the conduct
of intelligence gathering and dissemination, and escapes the probing
eye of the federal Freedom of Information Act.

Given the flawed quality of the LEIU's data, it is perhaps surprising
the federal government spent close to two million dollars on a scheme
to computerize it. The General Accounting Office found that the federal
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a now-terminated program to
supply federal funds to beef up local police forces, awarded eight grants
totaling over $1.7 million to research and establish the Interstate Organized
Crime Index (IOCI). The Index was a partial computerization of the LEIU
cards and public record information that could be used only by LEIU members,
who requested searches by calling a toll-free number at a computer facility
in Sacramento, California.

The IOCI computer could also keep track of which police units submitted
data, so that requesting police agencies could be directed to the source
of the information to trade details totally outside the data bank. The
General Accounting Office was bothered by the lack of safeguards regarding
the verification of the computerized data and the security of the information
dissemination. "We believe intelligence-gathering projects, because
they are secretive and sensitive, need to be closely scrutinized. IOCI
was not," concluded the GAO study. GAO investigators were particularly
concerned that "in many cases, contributing member agencies did
not provide public record support for entries in the index, although
a special condition of the (LEAA) grants required entries to be based
on such information."

Some LEIU critics charge that the whole LEIU/IOCI scheme was an intentional
attempt to circumvent congressional mandates prohibiting the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration from establishing a federally funded national
police network and centralized dossier system. One of these critics is
Sheila O'Donnell, a private investigator who specializes in political
surveillance cases. O'Donnell points to a 1974 meeting between officials
of the FBI and LEAA. On that occasion, according to an FBI memo, LEAA
assistant administrator Richard Velde tried to establish a "joint
FBI-LEIU operation" to create a "national communication network" for
dissemination of information about "terrorists and extremists" during
the Bicentennial.

The FBI rejected the plan because it was "questionable from a legal
standpoint" and not feasible because of the "political climate." Another
FBI memo, written a month later, reports strained relations between the
LEAA and the FBI, with the LEAA threatening to withhold funds from FBI
related projects.

Within the next few months the LEAA awarded almost half a million dollars
in grants to evaluate and implement an on-line computer system for the
IOCI. One grant, for $324,000, had to be rewritten so as not to be in
violation of pending federal legislation "dealing with privacy and
security," according to the General Accounting Office. That same
year, Velde co-signed an LEAA grant for $77,000 that in effect transferred
some of the support services for the IOCI computer index from a Califonia
law-enforcement foundation to a newly incorporated private company called
Search Group, Inc. Search Group itself was originally a "consortium
of representatives from each state, appointed by their respective governors," the
GAO found. SEARCH stood for "System for Electronic Analysis and
Retrieval of Criminal Histories."

The $77,000 LEAA grant was administered by Paul K. Wormeli, who three
years later, in 1977, was deputy administrator for administration of
the LEAA and in that capacity cosigned (along with Richard Velde) a grant
for $299,999 to continue and update the manual IOCI system and also fund
the "acquisition, installation, and operation of the minicomputer
system." As a Detroit Police Board investigator remarked concerning
the merry-go-round of funders and fundees involved in the LEIU-IOCI network. "It
is difficult to discern where one agency begins and the other one ends."

The maze got thicker. Search Group, Inc. was given over $3 million in
LEAA funds during the three-year period ending June 30, 1977. Search
Group's revised bylaws of 1977 state that its corporate membership consists
of "one representative of each state...appointed by the chief executive
thereof and four representatives appointed by the administrator of the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration." In 1976 and 1977, LEAA's
administrator was Richard Velde.

The report of the Detroit investigation noted that "while registered
as a 'private agency,' there are indications that the LEIU interfaces
in a unique manner with public agencies....The LEIU appears to operate
as a pubic agency, but one which is not subject to governmental oversight
or control."

Even the FBI was worried about the LEIU's computerized intelligence
network. one FBI memo remarks of an incident involving LEIU's information
system, "This is indeed an outstanding example of one of the worst
features of any kind of a national clearinghouse as such for criminal
information. It would also seem to be an indictment of the LEIU and the
high-sounding purposes promoted for this organization...." Of course,
one must remember that the FBI and the LEAA were feuding over who should
control the electronic spy empire.

Once the LEIU data base was computerized, another LEAA grantee was funded
to help speed along the information among LEIU members and beyond. The
National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) is, according
to its corporate charter, a nonprofit corporation established to facilitate
the exchange of operational and administrative data among police departments.
In June 1973, LEAA approved a grant of $1.2 million to NLETS to improve
the speed of the NLETS Teletype system and make it available to more
police forces.

"NLETS provides police departments in each state with direct access
to a teletype system that can be used to collect and compare information
in both the FBI and LEIU computer files," said the O'Donnell. "Agencies
at all levels of government can now be tied into a nationwide intelligence
network of dossiers on political dissidents." NLETS, following the
pattern of Project Search, has incorporated itself as a private firm. "What
has happened is that the federal government has spent millions of dollars
to fund an old boys network of political spies who want to circumvent
the Constitution and federal regulations," charges O'Donnell.

Tax Dollars at Work

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funded several other California
projects during Ronald Reagan's governorship that fit into the puzzle
of the public/private political spy network, including the Western Regional
Organized Crime Training Institute (WROTCI) and the California Specialized
Training Institute (CSTI).

Since 1971, WROTCI has taught over 4,000 police such techniques as electronic
surveillance, infiltration and informant development, but organized crime
is not the only target. One police official in California admitted the
Institute taught his men how to conduct surveillance on unions and anti-nuclear
activists as well. WROTCI was operated by the same California state agency
that administered the LEAA-funded LEIU/OICI computerized dossier system.
Two other training centers similar to WROTCI were established in Florida
and Ohio.

The California Specialized Training Institute has graduated thousands
of state military, police and national guard personnel; and its Officer
Survival and Internal Security Course is taught by a staff which "includes
men with a considerable background in the areas of insurgency and counter-insurgency,
social factors and urban unrest, political systems, terrorism, internal
defense and security, and intelligence systems," bragged the Commandant
of the Institute in a letter to LEAA. The letter noted a carbon copy
being sent to then-governor Ronald Reagan's Executive Assistant, Edwin
Meese III. Much of the LEAA funding of political surveillance networks
in California occurred when Reagan was Governor. Meese later became a
top Reagan aide and then was appointed Attorney General. He had a reputation
as a hard-liner on domestic intelligence issues, and spoke favorably
of a Heritage Foundation study calling for increased cooperation between
public and private security agencies.

One of the most unique private outfits linked to LEIU is the California-based
Anacapa Sciences Incorporated. Anacapa Sciences is a Santa Barbara consulting
firm that establishes political intelligence operations. It helped computerize
the LEIU files, and designed the urban terrorism course for California's
Western Regional Organized Crime Training Institute. The course clearly
includes training on how to monitor the lawful political activity of
dissenters. San Francisco Bay area reporter Bill Wallace found that Anacapa's
founder and corporate director, Douglas Harris, assisted in developing
criminal intelligence courses for California, Michigan, Texas, Canada
and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Graduates of Anacapa's political intelligence courses have already established
an impressive track record of trampling on the constitutional rights
of persons challenging the status quo. After Anacapa set up a program
for the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Department was accused
of amassing files on the Dallas anti-nuclear group Citizens' Association
for Safe Energy. California graduates of Anacapa-spawned courses infiltrated
and assisted in the arrest of members of the non-violent anti-nuclear
Abalone Alliance during a demonstration at California's Diablo Canyon
nuclear reactor. The Abalone infiltrators were part of a police unit
set up by Anacapa with a $30,000 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration report, reported Wallace.

"Anacapa Sciences Incorporated appears to be a new and significant
variation of the hybrid spy firms," said Wallace, "a company
that doesn't engage in spying, but teaches other how to do it." Wallace
has identified similar firms around the country, including systems Sciences
Associates, Profitect, Inc., Systems Development Corporation, and the
now-defunct National Intelligence Academy.

The ACLU Lawsuit Against LEIU and IOCI

Fearing the potential for abuse, the American Civil Liberties Union
of Northern California sought copies of the LEIU cards and computer printouts
from the IOCI data base under the terms of the California Public Records
Act. A lower court ordered the material provided, but the case was appealed.

The California Supreme Court recognized that the California's Public
Records Act's "intelligence information" exemption "severly
limits the information subject to disclosure," yet it did "not
entirely protect the index cards and printouts." The California
Supreme Court ruled that while certain information from the IOCI print-outs
should be provided to the ACLU, the burden and cost of segmenting out
exempt information from the cards was sufficient to bar the release of
that information.

In a lengthy dissent, California Supreme Court Chief Justice Bird discussed
the issue of maintenance of law enforcement records that has significance
to all law regarding those records and how they are maintained:

=== "Simple logic and experience dictate that the public's right
to know not be overriden by claims of bureaucratic inconvenience. === "The
bureaucracy -rather than the Legislature, the courts, or the people
-will [now] be empowered to determine what records will be revealed.
It is the bureaucracy that decides in what form and where to keep its
records. By commingling exempt and nonexempt information and spreading
out responsiblity for the compilation and storage of records, the agency
can be assured of a tenable claim of exemption [from being forced to
provide records]. === "At the very least, already wary agencies
are discourged from creating internal procedures that will assure that
disclosable information can be easily separated from what is exempt.