Tuesday, December 29, 2015

Even though Swansea City’s form has not been great, it still
came as something of a surprise when manager Garry Monk was sacked this month,
not least because the customary smooth succession to a capable replacement
seems to have foundered. There have reportedly been talks with former Argentina
and Chile coach Marcelo Bielsa, but coach Alan Curtis remains in charge for the
time being.

With the Swans hovering close to the relegation zone, this
feels like it might be the first genuine setback since the club’s steady
recovery from near insolvency, when their financial difficulties inevitably
spilled onto the pitch and they only avoided demotion to the Conference in 2003
by the skin of their teeth.

Since those trying times Swansea have become somewhat of a
model club, surging up the leagues until they secured promotion to the Premier
League in 2011. They are owned by a consortium of local businessmen and fans
with a 21% share being held by the Supporters’ Trust. Furthermore, they have
moved from the ramshackle, run-down Vetch Field to a spanking new stadium.

"Williams, it was really nothing"

People noted this success and started to talk of the
“Swansea Way”, partly due to the way that the club has been run, but also
referring to an attractive, passing style of play. They have been prudent,
spending their funds wisely, as they are acutely aware of the problems off the
pitch in their recent past.

The approach was summarised by chairman Huw Jenkins thus:
“We don’t have dramatic changes. We make sure managers are comfortable and take
on board our philosophy and stick to it. We run a common sense business and
when clubs change their playing squads to suit a new manager, it seems
completely wrong to us.”

The fruits of their labour have been clear for all to see,
as Swansea won the Capital One Cup in 2012/13, thus qualifying for the Europa
League. There was a series of encouraging mid-table finishes, culminating in
what Jenkins described as “the best season in the club’s history” in 2014/15,
as Swansea registered their highest Premier League finish of 8th (the second
best of all time in the top flight) with their highest ever total of 56 points.

"Don't bet against the Fed"

However, things can quickly change and there has been a
marked dip this season following an indifferent summer recruitment campaign.
Portuguese international Eder has been ineffective, while French defender
Franck Tabanou has been virtually non-existent and the new strike force of
Andre Ayew and Bafetimbi Gomis has mainly flattered to deceive.

This led to Monk’s departure with the club clearly worried
about the implications of dropping down to the Championship. As Jenkins
explained, “With the recent uncertainty surrounding the club, the decision has
been made in the best interests of Swansea City and its supporters.”

The riches available in the Premier League can be seen in
Swansea’s accounts for the 2014/15 season, as the club broke through the £100
million revenue barrier for the first time. Despite this feat, profit after tax
was £0.6 million lower at £1.1 million, though profit before tax actually rose
£0.4 million to £1.7 million, as the latest accounts had a tax charge of £0.6
million, while the previous year benefited from a £0.4 million tax credit.

Importantly, Swansea changed their financial year-end from May
to July in order to be more aligned to the football season, so the 2014/15
accounts cover 14 months. This means that costs are a fair bit higher than a
normal year, as these are incurred over the whole period, while revenue is only
slightly higher, as there is no additional match day or broadcasting income in
June and July.

This helped contribute to wages increasing by £19 million
(31%) to £83 million and other expenses rising £6 million (51%) to £19 million.
Player amortisation and depreciation were also £2 million higher, though player
impairment was reduced by £4 million.

Revenue rose by £5 million (5%), largely due to broadcasting
income increasing by £4.5 million (6%) to £85 million, but there was also
growth in commercial income, up £1.7 million (21%) to £10 million, and player
loans, up £0.5 million to £1 million. On the other hand, match income was down
£1.5 million (16%) to £7.7 million, mainly due to the lack of Europa League
games.

All this meant that Swansea’s operating profit fell £18
million, though this was offset by the £19 million increase in profits from
player sales, mainly due to Wilfried Bony’s transfer to Manchester City.

The expenses growth reflected the cost of playing in “the
best league in the world”, as Swansea’s finance director Don Keefe observed,
“These latest financial results continue to reveal the club’s desire to
maintain investment to improve performance standards and, in particular, to
compete successfully in the Premier League.”

Given the cost impact of a 14-month accounting period,
making any sort of profit is not to be sniffed at, though it has become less of
a rarity in the Premier League these days. In fact, no fewer than 15 of the 20
clubs in the top flight made money in 2013/14 (the last season for which all clubs
have published their accounts).

Swansea’s achievement is even more impressive if you
consider that half of the eight Premier League clubs to have published their
2014/15 results have reported worse figures, namely Everton, Manchester United,
Southampton and West Ham. This is fairly typical in the years when there is not
a new TV deal, as there is relatively little revenue growth, while wages keeps
going up.

Nevertheless, Swansea’s annual profits in the last couple of
years are among the lowest in the Premier League. For example, in the prior
season their profit of £1 million was way behind Tottenham Hotspur £80 million,
Manchester United £41 million, Southampton £29 million and Everton £28 million.

To an extent, this merely highlights the major impact that
once-off player sales can have on a football club’s profitability. To reinforce
this point, in 2014/15 Southampton made £44 million from player sales, mainly
due to the transfers of Adam Lallana and Dejan Lovren to Liverpool plus Calum
Chambers to Arsenal, while the previous season saw Tottenham Hotspur make an
amazing £104 million (largely from the mega sale of Gareth Bale to Real Madrid)
and Chelsea £65 million (David Luiz to Paris Saint-Germain).

In stark contrast, Swansea were the fourth worst in the
Premier League at making money from this activity in 2013/14, generating just
£5k. Fortunately, this significantly improved in 2014/15, when they made £19
million from player sales. Most of this was from Bony’s record move to City,
but there were also gains from the sales of Michel Vorm to Tottenham and Chico
Flores to Lekhwiya in Qatar.

Swansea’s focus on the bottom line is evidenced by them
being consistently profitable over the last four seasons, making a total of £41
million profits before tax since promotion to the Premier League. Most
impressively, Swansea had profits of £17 million and £21 million in 2012 and
2013 respectively. Indeed the latter profit was the highest achieved in the top
tier that particular season.

The last time that Swansea made a loss was £11 million in
2011, which could ironically be considered as the price of success, because
promotion triggered hefty bonus payments to the players and management staff
plus additional transfer fees.

As we have seen, when football clubs make large profits it
is often down to major player sales. This was certainly the case for Swansea in
2013, when the £21 million profit was essentially due to transfers, mainly Joe
Allen to Liverpool, Scott Sinclair to Manchester City and Danny Graham to Sunderland.

Very little will come Swansea’s way from player sales in
2015/16, unless they make sales in the January window, as they have only earned
around half a million to date from Jazz Richards’ transfer to Fulham.

Profits can also be boosted by other exceptional items. In
Swansea’s case, they have made £7 million in compensation fees for management
“transfers” in the last few years: £5 million from Liverpool in 2012 for
Brendan Rodgers and his staff; £2 million from Wigan Athletic for Roberto
Martinez in 2010. In contrast, next year’s books will have to absorb a £3
million severance payment to Monk.

As transfers can have such a major impact on reported
profits, it is worth exploring how football clubs account for these deals. Even
though this is fairly technical, the fundamental point is that when a club
purchases a player the costs are spread over a few years, but any profit made
from selling players is immediately booked to the accounts.

So, when a club buys a player, it does not show the full
transfer fee in the accounts in that year, but writes-down the cost (evenly)
over the length of the player’s contract. Therefore, if Swansea were to spend
£15 million on a new player with a 5-year contract, the annual expense would be
only £3 million (£15 million divided by 5 years) in player amortisation (on top
of wages).

However, when that player is sold, the club will straight
away report the profit, which is basically the sales proceeds less any
remaining value in the accounts. In our example, if the player were to be sold
3 years later for £18 million, the cash profit would be £3 million (£18 million
less £15 million), but the accounting profit would be much higher at £12
million, as the club would have already booked £9 million of amortisation (3
years at £3 million).

Notwithstanding the accounting treatment, essentially the
more that a club spends, the higher its player amortisation. Thus, Swansea’s
player amortisation has shot up from just £1 million in 2011 to an £18 million
peak in 2015, reflecting the years of higher spending in the transfer market
since promotion to the Premier League.

However, Swansea’s financial results have also been
influenced by the £7 million of impairment charges they have booked since 2011,
most notably £4.7 million in 2014. This happens when the directors assess a
player’s achievable sales price as less than the value in the accounts.

Going back to our example, if the player’s value were
assessed as £4 million after 3 years instead of the £6 million in the accounts,
then they would book an impairment charge of £2 million. Impairment could thus
be considered as accelerated player amortisation. It also has the effect of
reducing the annual player amortisation going forward.

In any case, Swansea’s player amortisation is still one of
the lowest in the Premier League and is obviously miles behind the really big
spenders like Manchester United (£100 million), Chelsea (£72 million) and
Manchester City (£70 million).

Despite the use of impairment charges, the higher spending
means that player values on the balance sheet have increased from just £3
million in 2011 to £50 million in 2015. Moreover, this accounting treatment
actually understates the value of Swansea’s squad, as it does not fully reflect
the real market value of its players.

Given all the accounting complexities arising from player
trading, clubs often looks at EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxation,
Depreciation and Amortisation). Admittedly, this is a horrible acronym, but it
simply shows how profitable a club is from its core business.

On the face of it, the steep decline in Swansea’s EBITDA
from £23 million to £3 million in 2015 should be a little concerning, but this
is partly due to the 14 month accounting period last year, which includes more
costs. In reality, EBITDA has been solidly positive at Swansea since promotion
with last year’s increase driven by the new TV deal in 2014.

That said, this also outlines the challenge for clubs like
Swansea, as the EBITDA is significantly higher at the leading clubs, even though
they have much larger wage bills: Manchester United £120 million, Manchester
City £83 million, Arsenal £64 million, Liverpool £53 million and Chelsea £51
million.

Swansea’s massive revenue growth from £12 million in 2011 to
£103 million in 2015 has been very largely due to the club’s elevation to the
top flight, which the accounts noted, “amply demonstrates the rewards of
gaining promotion.”

In effect, there have been two revenue uplifts: first, from
£12 million to £65 million in 2012, which highlights the enormous disparity in
TV money between England’s top two leagues; second, the increase from £67
million to £99 million in 2014, thanks to the new TV deal commencing that
season.

In fact, virtually all of the £39 million revenue growth
since the first season back in the top flight is from TV (£36 million), even
though commercial income has nearly doubled from £5.2 million to £10.0 million
and match income is up a third from £5.8 million to £7.7 million.

Swansea’s achievement in finishing 8th in the Premier League
is really put into perspective when you compare their revenue to other clubs:
in 2013/14 their revenue of £99 million was only the 13th highest in the top
tier.

It should be a similar story in 2014/15, as their revenue
growth of £5 million is in line with many of the clubs that have reported to
date (Southampton £8 million, West Ham £6 million, Manchester City £5 million
and Everton £5 million), though Arsenal’s new commercial deals resulted in a
hefty £31 million increase.

Either way, the fact remains that their revenue of £103
million is overshadowed by the elite clubs. At the top of the pile, Manchester
United’s revenue of £395 million (reduced in 2014/15, due to not qualifying for
Europe) is around four times as much as Swansea, while significant sums are
also generated by Manchester City £352 million, Arsenal £329 million and
Chelsea £320 million.

More encouragingly, Swansea now have the 29th highest
revenue in the world, according to the Deloitte Money League, which allows them
to pay higher wages than famous clubs such as Ajax and Lazio. They are within
striking distance of European thoroughbreds such as Hamburg £101 million,
Benfica £105 million, Roma £107 million and Marseille £109 million.

The problem is that these additional riches do not help
Swansea much domestically, as there are no fewer than 14 Premier League clubs
in the world’s top 30 clubs by revenue (and all of them are in the top 40).

What is striking is that no club in that top 30 has a higher
reliance on TV money than Swansea, where a staggering 82% of their total
revenue comes from broadcasting. That leaves only 11% from commercial
activities and just 7% from match day income.

Unsurprisingly, only Crystal Palace (also 82%) are more dependent on TV for their revenue, but in fairness the majority of Premier League clubs are also heavily reliant on this revenue stream. In fact, all but the top six clubs get at least 60% of their income from broadcasting.

In 2014/15 Swansea’s share of the Premier League TV money
rose 9% from £74 million to £81 million. The distribution of these funds is
based on a fairly equitable methodology with the top club (Chelsea) receiving
£99 million, while the bottom club (QPR) got £65 million.

Most of the money is allocated equally to each club, which
means 50% of the domestic rights (£22.0 million in 2014/15), 100% of the
overseas rights (£27.8 million) and 100% of the commercial revenue (£4.4
million). However, merit payments (25% of domestic rights) are worth £1.2
million per place in the league table and facility fees (25% of domestic
rights) depend on how many times each club is broadcast live.

In this way, Swansea were helped by their attractive style
of football, as they were broadcast live 12 times, which was more than, say,
Stoke City (9 times) and so was worth an additional £1.5 million (£10.3 million
less £8.8 million). Each place in the league table is worth around £1.2
million, so Swansea’s 8th place merited £16.2 million, compared to receiving
£11.1 million the previous season for coming 12th.

The blockbuster new TV deal starting in 2016/17 only
reinforces the need to stay in the Premier League. My estimates suggest that
Swansea would receive an additional £37 million under the new contract for
finishing in the same position as 2014/15, increasing the total received to an
incredible £117 million.

This is based on the contracted 70% increase in the domestic
deal and an assumed 30% increase in the overseas deals (though this looks to be
on the conservative side, given some of the deals announced to date). Of
course, if they were to finish lower in the league table, they would earn a bit
less.

Given the figures, it is obvious why Swansea are so scared
of relegation and why they felt they had to sacrifice Monk. If they were to
drop down, they would get around £38 million in the Championship, including a
£35 million parachute payment and £2 million distribution from the Football
League, compared to at least £92 million in the Premier League.

Of course, this would be considerably higher than those
Championship clubs without parachute payments, who receive only £5 million, but
it’s still a considerable reduction in revenue that would require major cuts in
the wage bill, i.e. selling the club’s better players.

As the club’s accounts stated, “The major risk continues to
be relegation from The Barclays Premier League and the adverse effect it would
have on liquidity, operational activity and our ability to realise future
plans.”

Swansea’s 2013/14 figures had been boosted by their Europa
League adventures, but only to the tune of €4 million, even though they got out
of their group, memorably defeating Valencia in the Mestalla Stadium, before
being eliminated by Napoli in the last 32.

Match day revenue fell 16% (£1.5 million) from £9.2 million
to £7.7 million, due to the lack of Europa League competition (six home games)
in 2014/15. This revenue stream peaked at £9.9 million in the 2012/13 season,
largely thanks to progress in the domestic cups, including three home matches
in the run to Wembley for the Capital One Cup triumph against Bradford City.

Swansea’s match day income is significantly lower than many
other Premier League clubs. At the other end of the spectrum, Manchester United
and Arsenal earn around £100 million match day income or more than ten times as
much as Swansea. Put another way, they earn more in three matches than Swansea
do in an entire season.

In fairness, Swansea should be commended for their ticket
pricing strategy, as they have not raised prices in the five years they have
been in the Premier League. In fact, they cut season ticket prices by £10 for
the 2015/16 season and have announced a price freeze for the 2016/17 season.
According to the BBC’s Price of Football survey, Swansea have the second
cheapest “most expensive” season tickets in the Premier League.

Vice-chairman Leigh Dineen explained the thinking: “We will
continue to work hard on reducing the price of football for our supporters
wherever and whenever we can. Our supporters will always remain the lifeblood
of this club and the Board of Directors believe these season ticket prices
remain exceptional value for money to watch quality football at the Liberty
Stadium.”

Furthermore, the club also agreed to subsidise the price of
tickets purchased through the Jack Army membership scheme for away fixtures, so
that no adult would pay more than £22 for a game.

Swansea’s advancement through the leagues has been matched
with increases in attendances, facilitated by the move to the Liberty Stadium
in the summer of 2005. Last season’s average attendance of 20,555, slightly
higher than the previous year, is more than 12,000 higher than the last season
at the old Vetch.

However, this was still one of the lowest attendance in the
Premier League, only ahead of Burnley and QPR in 2014/15. The problem is that
the Liberty Stadium is too small to satisfy demand with around 98% of the
capacity being sold and a lengthy waiting list for season tickets.

Therefore, the club has started negotiations with the local
council to buy the Liberty, as it would not want to invest in a facility where
it is only a tenant. It currently shares the stadium with rugby union side Ospreys on a 50-year lease.

Although planning permission has been granted for a stadium
expansion to increase the capacity from just under 21,000 to 33,000, there is
still much to agree with the local council before any development.

"I could be happy"

As finance director explained: “Any plans for an expansion
of the East Stand at the Liberty Stadium cannot go ahead until we have
negotiated a fair and equitable deal with the City and County of Swansea which
is in the best interests of the club and not to the detriment of our available
resources.”

The potential purchase price has been reported as £20-25
million, but the club would want a long-term payment schedule (over 15-20
years) to reduce their risk, especially if they were to be relegated.

Jenkins emphasised that any stadium expansion should not
damage the playing squad, “so the club is not held back financially when it
comes to the No. 1 priority of putting a team on the pitch and making sure we
remain competitive in the Premier League.”

Commercial income was up an encouraging 21% (1.7 million)
from £8.3 million to £10.0 million, but this was still one of the lowest in the
Premier League, only above Crystal Palace and Hull City in 2013/14. To place
this into context, the top five earners here are Manchester United £196
million, Manchester City £173 million, Chelsea £109 million, Liverpool £104
million and Arsenal £103 million. No wonder that Jenkins has admitted that the
club is “miles behind” rivals commercially.

However, there are some signs of improvement, as the shirt
sponsorship with Chinese financial services firm Goldenway (with their GWFX
brand adorning the shirt) doubled from £2 million to £4 million a season when
it was extended by two years until the end of the 2015/16 season – “the largest
agreement in the club’s proud 102-year history”.

Similarly, the kit supplier deal originally signed with
adidas in 2011 was extended in 2014. No financial details were divulged, but it
is estimated to be worth £1.5 million per season.

The reported wage bill shot up 31% (£19 million) from £63
million to £83 million, thus increasing the wages to turnover ratio from 64% to
79%, but this is misleading, as the figures include 14 months of wages, while
revenue is effectively only 12 months (match day and broadcasting are
unchanged).

If we were to pro-rate the wage bill for 12 months, then it
would be a more respectable £71 million with a wages to turnover ratio of 69%.
That would still represent a 12% (£8 million) increase in wages, but that would
be altogether more reasonable.

Even so, this would still be one of the highest wages to
turnover ratios in the Premier League with only West Brom, Fulham and
Sunderland reporting worse ratios (in the previous season). In fairness,
Swansea have significantly improved from a horrific 149% in 2011 (though the
wage bill was inflated that season by bonus payments linked to promotion).

Interestingly, the wages in Swansea’s first season back in
the big time were amazingly low at £35 million – unsurprisingly the smallest
wage bill in the Premier League in 2011/12.

Swansea’s wages, heavily based on performance-related
contracts, are among the lowest in the top tier, though they have been steadily
increasing, so in 2013/14 they had the 13th highest wage bill. This is partly
due to the increase in staff numbers, e.g. football headcount rose from 167 to
222 in 2014/15.

Clearly, they still managed to over-achieve by finishing 8th
last season, but Jenkins does not like to use that argument as an excuse:
“We’ve never accepted that because of the money, we should be grateful and
happy where we are. There is always the challenge to compete and you’ve got to
find ways of doing that.”

That is more important than ever when you see how the wage
bills of the mid-term clubs are converging around the £70 million level, e.g.
West Ham £73 million, Southampton £72 million, Swansea £71 million, Stoke City
£67 million.

It is only recently that Swansea’s directors started
receiving payment for their efforts, but it is worth noting that the highest
paid director (presumably Jenkins) earned £517k in 2014/15, down from £550k in
2013/14, though that included a £275k bonus for retention of Premier League
status. Both payments are significantly up from the £250k earned in 2012/13.

The promotion effect can also be seen in the club’s
activities in the transfer market. In the six seasons before promotion to the
Premier League, there was hardly any gross spend, but this has now increased to
average annual expenditure of around £16 million, including the signings of
Wilfried Bony, Federico Fernandez, Ki Sung-Yeung, Pablo, Kyle Naughton, Jonjo
Shelvey, Eder and Jefferson Montero.

However, even with this increase, Swansea are hardly
recklessly extravagant, as big money sales have produced a very low net spend.
Their approach was summarised in the accounts thus: “we will continue year on
year to improve our playing squad, but in a sensible and cost effective
manner.” It should therefore be no surprise that Swansea are among the lowest
spenders in the Premier League.

In the last two years Swansea actually had net sales of £3
million, one of only two clubs with a surplus in the transfer market (Southampton
being the other one). As might be expected, the spending league table is lead
by Manchester City and Manchester United, but Swansea have also been
comfortably outspent by the likes of Crystal Palace, Leicester City,
Sunderland, Bournemouth and Watford.

Swansea have made their strategy very clear: “The secret is
to balance spending to maintain and improve performance on the pitch so we
remain in the Premier League, and spending on new projects considered important
to the wellbeing of the club going forward.” It’s a tricky balance that has
worked well for the club, though they might come to regret the lack of quality
recruitment this summer if they don’t avoid the dreaded drop.

After three years of enjoying net funds (cash higher than
debt), Swansea returned to a net debt position of £22 million in 2014/15,
comprising gross debt of £25 million less £3 million cash. Gross debt comprised
a £15 million overdraft, £8 million of other loans, £1 million owed to group
undertakings plus £0.6 million of hire purchase contracts.

It should be noted that total creditors have been rising and
increased £37 million in 2014/15 alone to a hefty £73 million. In addition,
Swansea have contingent liabilities of £6 million (up from £3 million) for
potential future transfer payments, dependent on player appearances and club
success, and a possible £19 million of additional signing-on fees
(significantly up from £2 million).

Although Swansea’s debt is still one of the smallest in the
Premier League (with five clubs having debt above £100 million), this situation
is one that will need careful monitoring following last season’s increase and
potential future commitments.

To be fair, Swansea have been investing in the club
infrastructure, specifically on new training bases at Fairwood (first team) and
Landore (academy), including £3 million in 2014/15 and £6.9 million in 2013/14.
This will be of long-term benefit to the club, but cash is tight, as noted by
the finance director: “we recognise that we need further injection of funds before
we can commit to any more significant capital investment programmes.”

This is highlighted by last season’s cash flow statement.
Although Swansea generated £6 million from operating activities, further
boosted by a new £8 million loan, they spent £24 million on players, £3 million
capital expenditure and £1 million on dividends, thus requiring a £15 million
overdraft.

Since promotion, Swansea have had £76 million of available
funds, largely driven by £57 million cash from operating activities, supplemented
by a £13 million increase in the overdraft plus a net £6 million increase in
net loans. They have spent £53 million (70%) on bringing in new players and
invested £18 million on infrastructure plus £4 million in dividends.

Interestingly, the player investment in the cash flow
statement is a lot higher than the net spend reported in the press, which could
be due to a number of reasons, such as the timing of stage/conditional payments
for player sales or high agent and signing-on fees (not included in transfer
figures).

There has been some noise about the dividends paid to
Swansea’s directors, but most fans seem to think that this is fair reward for
all their efforts in first saving and then running the club so well.

Swansea’s unique ownership structure, with 21% held by the
Supporters Trust and a fan elected on the board, has been described by the
Premier League’s chief executive, Richard Scudamore as “ideal”, but the need
for outside investment is clear, especially when you compare their cash balance
with their Premier League rivals: Swansea have less than £3 million, while 11
clubs have more than £20 million.

Indeed, last season they held discussions with American
businessmen John Jay Moores and Charles Noell, the former owners of Major
League baseball team the San Diego Padres, who were reportedly seeking to
acquire an initial 30% stake (rising to 66% in a few years), but these came to
nothing and they seem to have moved their interest to Everton.

"You're gonna hear me roar"

The club is keen to focus on developing its academy and is
hopeful that its investments will help secure the Category One status. The good
news is that the Premier League has already promoted Swansea’s U21 and U18
teams to the higher level this season, pending an audit of its facilities. As
academy manager Nigel Rees said, “It means the boys will be competing against
some of the very best players and teams at their age level. It’s all part of
their development by creating a clear pathway towards the first team.”

Swansea’s recovery from near disaster at the turn of the
Millennium is a fabulous story (“Jack to a King”), as a fading, provincial club
climbed back up the leagues, all the time playing entertaining football and
running the club in the right way.

However, football can be a harsh mistress, so no club can
afford to rest on its laurels. To continue their impressive progress, Swansea
will need to appoint the right man to manage the team in order to retain their
Premier League status. There will be many hoping that they can do it.

Tuesday, December 8, 2015

“Good
old Sussex by the sea, Good old Sussex by the sea, Oh we’re going up….”

Brighton and Hove Albion’s famous song goes on to refer to
winning the cup, but these days the Seagulls are firmly focused on going up to
the Premier League. The club has transformed itself from relegation candidates
in a “disappointing” 2014/15 to viable promotion contenders this season.

Indeed, the Albion currently sit proudly on top of the table
and after 19 games are the only remaining unbeaten side among the 92 Football
League clubs. As chairman Tony Bloom commented, this represents “a tremendous
improvement and progress in the past 12 months.”

Under the guidance of manager Chris Hughton, who replaced
Sami Hyypia on New Year’s Eve after the Finn had finally been “binned”,
Brighton are once again playing some effective football.

The proverbial “safe pair of hands”, the knowledgeable Hughton
first ensured that Brighton stayed up and has since “reshaped the squad into
one capable of competing at the top end of the Championship.” As Hughton said,
“We knew it was going to be a big recruitment summer. We lost nine players and
knew we had to bring in nine, which is really too many.”

"Marching orders"

Nevertheless, they have recruited well, signing a good blend
of experience and youth including Liam Rosenior, Jamie Murphy, Uwe Hünemeier,
Gaetan Bong, Tomer Hemed, Niki Mäenpää, Elvis Manu and Connor Goldson. They
also captured James Harper, the promising “kid from Madrid”, and delivered the
icing on the cake in the form of returning hero Bobby Zamora.

Last season was particularly frustrating after the club’s
development over the past few years. Following promotion from League One in
2011, Brighton had qualified for the Championship play-offs two years in
succession in 2013 and 2014.

The recent success tastes all the sweeter when the many
years of adversity are considered. In the early 90s the Goldstone Ground was
sold to property developers, ostensibly to pay off the club’s debts, though the
vast majority of fans considered this to be a blatant act of asset-stripping by
the reviled chairman, Bill Archer, and his partner-in-crime, chief executive
David Bellotti.

In 1997 Brighton avoided relegation out of the Football
League to the Conference by the skin of their teeth, as a 1-1 draw at Hereford
United condemned their opponents to the dreaded drop, but there then followed
years of struggle, exacerbated by the problems of finding a suitable ground.

"Let's get serious"

First came exile to Kent, where a ground share with
Gillingham meant a 140-mile round-trip for Albion fans to attend their “home”
games. After two long years the club made its weary way back to Brighton in
1999, but the destination was Withdean, an old council-owned athletics stadium
where the facilities were far from ideal. Largely open to the elements, the
“theatre of trees” was arguably the worst stadium in the whole of the Football
League with totally inadequate facilities, but at least chairman Dick Knight
had brought the club back home.

It took 12 years, but finally Brighton moved to the
magnificent new Amex stadium in Falmer. The major investment required to build
the stadium (and indeed a superb new training centre) was financed by Tony
Bloom, a lifelong fan who became chairman with Knight taking the role of life
president.

It is now a realistic aspiration for Brighton to seek
promotion. Although the club has never been in the Premier League, it did play
in the old First Division, which was then the top tier of English football, for
four seasons between 1979 and 1983, when they also came within a kick of
beating the mighty Manchester United in the 1983 FA Cup Final (“and Smith must
score”).

So the club has made great strides off the pitch in the past
few years, but the financial results for the 2014/15 season “reflected a
difficult season”, though the £10.4 million loss was a slight improvement on
the previous year’s £10.6 million.

There was a small decrease in turnover of £0.3 million (1%)
from £24.0 million to £23.7 million. Although there was solid growth of £0.7
million (8%) in commercial income to £8.9 million, as a result of the
sponsorship of the American Express Elite Football Performance Centre and the
Academy grant increasing from £0.5 million to £0.9 million for Category 1 status,
the other revenue streams fell.

Gate receipts were £0.6 million (5%) lower in line with the
fall in attendances, while broadcasting income dropped £0.5 million (9%), as
the club featured less on live TV.

On top of that, all cost lines were higher. Wages rose £0.3
million (2%) to £20.6 million, while other expenses surged £2.3 million (19%)
to £15.0 million. There were also increases in the non-cash expenses, as
depreciation was up £1.4 million (41%) and player amortisation rose £0.3
million (14%) to £2.4 million.

The deterioration in ongoing revenue and costs was
compensated by a significant £4.9 million increase in profits on player sales
from £3.8 million to £8.7 million, largely due to the sales of Leo Ulloa to
Leicester City and Will Buckley to Sunderland.

To be fair to Brighton, almost all clubs in the Championship
lose money and are reliant on owners’ funding. In 2013/14, the last season when
all clubs have published their accounts, losses were reported by 21 of the 24
clubs – in stark contrast to the Premier League where the new TV deal, allied
with wage controls, has led to a surge in profitability. The only clubs to make
money in the Championship were Blackpool (and their model is not one to be
recommended), Wigan Athletic and Yeovil Town.

As Bloom noted, “Any Championship club wishing to compete
for promotion will inevitably make significant losses, so it remains a delicate
balancing act for the board, recruitment team and manager as we strive to
achieve our ultimate aim.”

That said, Brighton’s loss of £11 million in 2013/14 was one
of the highest in the league, only surpassed by six clubs: Blackburn Rovers £42
million, Nottingham Forest £23 million, Leicester City £21 million,
Middlesbrough £20 million, Leeds United £20 million and Millwall £12 million.

This was despite Brighton making a fair amount from profits
on player sales with only three clubs generating more money from this activity
in 2013/14. Again, Championship clubs rarely sell players for big bucks, at
least compared to the Premier League, but this has become increasingly
important to Brighton, rising from £3.8 million to £8.7 million in 2014/15.

It is believed that Brighton have received additional
payments of around £2 million for Ulloa and Buckley helping their clubs stay
up. Although it is not completely clear whether these payments were included in
the 2014/15 accounts, the contingent receivables on transfers have fallen from
£4.3 million to £2.1 million, so it is a reasonable assumption that they have
been booked.

Of course, losses are nothing new for Brighton. The last
time that they made a profit was back in 2007/08 – and that was less than £1
million and only arose because of a £3.6 million exceptional credit, due to a
change in the accounting for the Falmer stadium expenses incurred to date.

Since then, the club has made cumulative losses of £62
million. In fact, their losses have increased as the stakes have got higher,
i.e. targeting promotion to England’s top flight, where the financial rewards
are enormous. This has produced £46 million of losses in the four years since
promotion to the Championship, averaging more than £11 million a season. As
Tony Bloom put it, “most Championship clubs are currently loss-making as a
means of supporting their own ambitions.”

As we have seen, the 2014/15 figures were flattered by hefty
profits on player sales. Traditionally Brighton have made very little from the
transfer market until 2013/14 when the club sold Liam Bridcutt to Sunderland
and Ashley Barnes to Burnley.

Next year’s accounts will be interesting, as no major sales
were made this summer. In fact, Brighton demonstrated their ambition by
resisting Fulham’s offer of £4-5 million for central defender Lewis Dunk, who
is not even guaranteed a starting place.

That said, Bloom admitted, “It would be ridiculous for me or
any owner to say that a player is never for sale. There’s always a price for
any player.” In particular, Brighton have a number of players that could
attract tempting bids from bigger clubs, e.g. Solly March, Dale Stephens, Beram
Kayal and that man Dunk.

Brighton’s strategy is more clearly seen by the club’s
alternative presentation of the profit and loss account, which highlights the
increase in the football budget last season, funded by making the
administrative and operational costs more efficient plus improvements in player
trading.

This has been driven by chief executive Paul Barber, who
explained the approach in this way, “I’m obsessive about reducing our
operational costs, cutting waste, getting better supplier deals, and making the
club more efficient, because it's the only way that we can maintain a
competitive playing budget without breaking Financial Fair Play (FFP)
regulations.”

Finance director David Jones added, “We have continued to
increase our investment in football, and in particular player wages, in order
to give ourselves the best possible chance of success on the pitch.” This
enabled Brighton to invest an additional £3 million in the club’s football
budget in 2014/15.

In fact, Brighton’s managers have benefited from a
significant increase in this football budget of around 80% since 2012, as it
has grown from £13.1 million to £23.7 million.

This was a notable achievement, especially in a season that
Barber described as “unexpectedly difficult”. He added, “Ticket sales fell,
merchandising sales fell and, on top of that, our Football League income fell
too. Against such a backdrop, keeping our turnover ticking over was the first
priority. Give or take, we managed to keep our overall income static, despite
reductions in key areas.”

To put this into perspective, Brighton’s revenue has grown
by almost 500% since 2009, surging from £4 million to £24 million, largely due
to what can de described as the "Amex effect", though the promotion
from League One to the Championship in 2011 has obviously also helped.
Following the move from Withdean, gate receipts are more than fourtime higher, increasing from £2.3
million to £9.8 million.

In addition, the new stadium has brought more commercial
opportunities, leading to income climbing from £3.1 million to £8.9 million.
The club could negotiate better deals with sponsors in the higher division (up
from £0.8 million to £5.6 million), increase retail sales, e.g. from the
stadium megastore (up from £0.5 million to £1.2 million) and make more from
catering, i.e. pies and the famous Harveys beer (up from £35k to £1.0 million).

In 2013/14 Brighton’s revenue of £24 million was the 8th
highest in the Championship, but the clubs with the three highest revenues
(QPR, Reading and Wigan Athletic) were more than 50% higher with £37-39
million.

Money often talks in football, so it is no surprise that two
of the four clubs with the highest revenue were promoted that season: QPR and
Leicester City. The exception to the rule was Burnley, who had the 11th largest
revenue, £4 million less than Brighton, so it is still possible to get out of
the Championship on a modest budget.

Of course, these revenue figures are distorted by the
parachute payments made to those clubs relegated from the Premier League, e.g.
in 2013/14 the first year of relegation was worth £24 million. If we were to
exclude this “disparity” (as Barber calls it), then Brighton’s revenue would
have been the 3rd highest in the Championship, only behind Leicester City and
Leeds United.

As Barber observed, “Championship clubs need to be spending
the sort of money we are spending to be competitive, but it is certainly easier
to do this if you have higher incomes supported by parachute payments.”

Following last season’s movements, the club’s revenue mix
has also changed, though the majority (41%) still comes from gate receipts
(down from 43%). Commercial income’s share has increased from 34% to 38%, while
broadcasting has reduced from 23% to 21%. This is a not untypical mix for
Championship clubs, as opposed to the Premier League where TV is by far the
largest source of income – up to 80% for some clubs.

Clearly, Brighton are more reliant on match day income than
most clubs. In fact, in 2013/14 only two clubs were more dependent on this
revenue stream: Charlton Athletic 50% and Nottingham Forest 44%.

However, Brighton’s gate receipts fell 5% (£0.6 million)
from £10.4 million to £9.8 million in 2014/15, driven by a decrease in average
attendance from 27,110 to 25,649 and one less cup game being staged at the
Amex. Despite the reduction, this is still likely to be the highest match day
revenue in the Championship, as they were far ahead of the closest challengers
the previous season (Leeds United £8.6 million and Nottingham Forest £7.2
million), partly due to the transport levy paid to rail and bus companies.

After having the highest attendances in the Championship for
two seasons in a row, Brighton fell back to 3rd place in 2014/15, behind Derby
County 29,232 and Norwich City 26,343.

Since the move to the Amex, attendances had been steadily
rising from the 7,352 at Withdean, as the new stadium finally met latent local
demand for tickets. Capacity has been increased twice since the original move:
in July 2012 it grew from 22,500 to 27,444 after the Upper tier of the East
Stand was extended; and in March 2013 there was a further increase to 30,750
after all four corners were completed.

Although the reduction in attendances must be of concern,
Brighton’s potential was highlighted by a new record crowd of 30,278 being set
in the FA Cup 4th round tie against Arsenal in January 2015.

Ticket prices are among the highest in the Championship.
According to the BBC’s Price of Football survey, Brighton have the second
highest cheapest season ticket (only below Hull City) and the fifth highest
most expensive season ticket (behind Fulham, Ipswich, Sheffield Wednesday and
QPR).

However, Barber argued: “Once the cost of travel is
deducted, our average ticket price is very much in line with the Championship
and wider Football League average prices.” He also pointed to the magnificent
facilities that are second to none, including free wifi and VIP padded seats,

In 2014/15 Barber “kept season ticket prices as low as
possible”, which meant an average increase of 3%, though there was a price
freeze for juniors. The good news is that in 2015/16 the club froze season
ticket prices, extended the subsidised travel zone and introduced a new age
bracket for fans under 21.

Brighton’s broadcasting revenue fell from £5.4 million to
£4.9 million in 2014/15, which was attributed to the club being shown less on
live TV, but was also due to not appearing in the play-offs. In the
Championship most clubs receive the same annual sum for TV, regardless of where
they finish in the league, amounting to just £4 million of central
distributions: £1.7 million from the Football League pool and a £2.3 million
solidarity payment from the Premier League.

However, the clear importance of parachute payments is once
again highlighted in this revenue stream, greatly influencing the top eight
earners, though it should be noted that clubs receiving parachute payments do
not also receive solidarity payments.

Looking at the television distributions in the top flight,
the massive financial disparity between England’s top two leagues becomes
evident with Premier League clubs receiving between £65 million and £99
million, compared to the £4 million in the Championship. In other words, it
would take a Championship club more than 15 years to earn the same amount as
the bottom placed club in the Premier League.

As we have seen, parachute payments make a significant
difference to a club’s revenue and therefore its spending power in the
Championship. Up to now, these have been worth £65 million over four years:
year 1 £25 million, year 2 £20 million and £10 million in each of years 3 and
4.

However, the Premier League has recently announced changes
to this structure, whereby from 2016/17 clubs will only receive parachute
payments for three seasons after relegation, although the amounts will be
higher (my estimate is £75 million, based on the advised percentages of the
equal share paid to Premier League clubs: year 1 55%, year 2 45% and year 3
20%).

There are some arguments in favour of these payments, namely
that it encourages clubs promoted to the Premier League to invest to compete,
safe in the knowledge that if the worst happens and they do end up relegated at
the end of the season, then there is a safety net. However, they do undoubtedly
create a significant revenue advantage compared to clubs like Brighton.

If Brighton were to gain promotion, the financial prize for
returning to the Premier League would be immense, exacerbated by the recent
blockbuster Premier League deal that starts in 2016/17, which Barber described
as “astonishing”. I have estimated this be worth an additional £30-50 million
for Premier League clubs, depending on where they finish in the table, though
my assumption for overseas deals may prove to be a little conservative.

Even if a team were to finish last in their first season and
go straight back down, their TV revenue would increase by an amazing £87
million (£92 million less £5 million) and they would also receive a further £64
million in parachute payments (restricted for clubs only in the Premier League
for one season), giving additional funds of around £150 million. The size of
the prize helps explain the loss-making behaviour of many Championship clubs.

Of course, Brighton would also have to spend more to improve
their playing squad, but the net impact on the club’s finances would
undoubtedly be positive, as evidenced by the clubs promoted in the past few
seasons.

Commercial income was the most impressive revenue performer
in 2014/15, rising 8% (£0.7 million) from £8.2 million to £8.9 million,
comprising commercial sponsorship and advertising £5.6 million, retail £1.2
million, catering and events £0.9 million and academy grant £0.9 million.

In the new world of FFP, Bloom said that the club “had to
adapt and move quickly to establish a sharper commercial focus. We had to focus
on the inherent value of our brand.” The club’s success in this area is
reflected by Brighton having the 3rd highest commercial revenue in the
Championship, only behind Leicester City (boosted by a “friendly” marketing
deal with Trestellar Limited) and Leeds United, as befitting their fine
history.

This is despite the fact that Brighton now only report the
net catering commission in revenue, whereas in previous seasons all the gross
revenue was included in revenue with the expenses shown in costs.

"Tell me when my light turns green"

What has been particularly impressive is the increase in
sponsorship. American Express are not only shirt sponsors, but also naming
rights partner for the stadium and the training ground. This multi-year
agreement, signed in March 2013, was described by Barber as “the biggest in the
club’s history.”

Interestingly, the club has applied for planning permission
for a 150 room hotel alongside the stadium through its subsidiary, The
Community Stadium Ltd, with a planned opening in summer 2017. This would enable
the club to host more events like the two rugby World Cup matches in September.

Brighton’s total wage bill rose by 2% (£0.3 million) from
£20.3 million to £20.6 million, though this was still lower then the 2013 peak
of £21.1 million. It is worth noting that since 2012, the first year back in
the Championship, the wage bill has grown by £6 million (41%), while revenue
has only increased by £1.5 million (7%).

Furthermore, given the significant reduction in
administrative and operational expenses, it is likely that the players wage
bill has increased by a healthy amount.

Despite this growth, Brighton’s wage bill is still only the
8th highest in the Championship, thus outside the top six, as noted by Hughton,
so promotion would indeed be a fine achievement. It was significantly lower
than the likes of Leicester City, Reading, Blackburn Rovers and Wigan Athletic,
whose wages were all above £30 million. QPR were even higher at £75 million,
but that was simply ridiculous in the second tier.

The remuneration for the highest paid director, who is not
named, but is surely Paul Barber, has decreased from £652k to £558k, almost
certainly due to the previous season including a large bonus for the chief
executive’s success in cutting operational expenses and renegotiating many of
the sponsorships.

Although Brighton’s wages to turnover ratio increased from
85% to 87%, which is not exactly great, it is by no means one of the highest in
the Championship. No fewer than 10 clubs “boasted” a wages to turnover ratio
above 100% in 2013/14 with the worst offenders being QPR 195%, Bournemouth 172%
and Nottingham Forest 165%.

The (relatively) prudent approach is evidently the one that
Brighton want to follow, especially in a FFP world, as noted by Bloom: “While
we do want to play at the highest level, we cannot simply open our cheque book
and start spending without care or attention.”

Other expenses rose by 19% (£2.3 million) from £12.6 million
to £15.0 million, which are the 2nd highest in the Championship, only behind
Leeds United. These represent the other side of the coin of moving to the Amex,
as the club noted: “The operational and administrative costs of running a state
of the art stadium are significant.”

Depreciation increased by 41% (£1.4 million) from £3.5
million to £4.9 million, which is by far the most in the Championship, the next
highest being Derby County £2.1 million. This represents the annual charge of
writing-off the cost of the stadium and (for the first time in 2014/15) the
training ground. These are depreciated over 50 years, i.e. 2% of cost per
annum.

Player amortisation was 14% (£0.3 million) higher at £2.4
million, but this is strictly mid-table in the Championship. To put this into
perspective, the highest player amortisation in 2013/14 was at QPR £16.6 million,
Blackburn Rovers £7.2 million, Wigan Athletic £6.8 million and Nottingham
Forest £5.7 million.

The way that football clubs account for player trading can
be confusing, but the fundamental point is that when a club purchases a player
the costs are spread over a few years, but any profit made from selling players
is immediately booked to the accounts.

So, when a club buys a player, it does not show the full
transfer fee in the accounts in that year, but writes-down the cost (evenly)
over the length of the player’s contract. Therefore, if Brighton were to spend
£10 million (if only) on a new player with a 5-year contract, the annual
expense would be only £2 million (£10 million divided by 5 years) in player
amortisation (on top of wages).

However, when that player is sold, the club reports the
profit on player sales straight away. This essentially equals sales proceeds
less any remaining value in the accounts. In our example, if the player were to
be sold 3 years later for £13 million, the cash profit would be £3 million (£13
million less £10 million), but the accounting profit would be higher at £9
million, as the club would have already booked £6 million of amortisation (3
years at £2 million).

Over the years, Brighton have not been a big player in the
transfer market, often registering net sales, though they have increased their
gross spend recently, averaging £4.4 million in the last two seasons, compared
to just £0.5 million over the previous eight seasons.

However, it is apparent that Brighton have not gone
overboard in terms of spending, especially compared to some of their principal
rivals who are really “going for it”. To illustrate this, in the last two
seasons Brighton had net sales of £2 million, while four clubs had net spend
above £10 million: Middlesbrough £15 million, Burnley £14 million, Derby County
£14 million and Hull City £12 million.

To be fair, this comparison has to be treated with some
caution, as the figures are distorted by clubs that were in the Premier League
the previous season, either because of high spend when they were in the top
flight or large sales following their relegation. Furthermore, many deals are
“undisclosed” in the Championship, so might have no reported value.

That said, it is clear that Brighton have been comfortably
outspent by many other clubs. As Hughton observed, “There are big spenders in
the Championship. We aimed to put ourselves in a challenge for the play-off
positions – no-one would have put us as favourites. But let's keep surprising
people.”

Therefore, Brighton have to box clever. They have made
extensive use of the loan system, although arguably too much, as at one stage
last season they had six loanees, one more than the maximum permitted in a
match day squad – and who could forget Leon Best, the most inappropriately
named player since Dennis Wise.

Fortunately, this season’s loan signings looks more
promising, especially the talented James Wilson from Manchester United, while
Barber has said money is available for permanent transfers: “we have some funds
to invest in January – but as ever we will do it in the right way, for the
right player, at the right price.”

Brighton’s net debt rose by £14 million from £127 million to
£141 million with the £17 million increase in gross debt to £147 million
slightly offset by cash also rising by £3 million to £7 million. Debt has been
rising over the past few years, but it is almost entirely owed to Bloom and can
be regarded as the friendliest of debt, being interest-free and repayable after
more than one year.

This means that Brighton have one of the largest debts in
the Championship, though it is still not as high as Bolton’s £195 million in
2013/14. The other difference is that Brighton’s borrowings can be considered
as “good” debt, having been largely used to fund the new stadium and training
ground, as opposed to other clubs, whose debt is more to fund over-spending on
players and agents.

Brighton also have £2.3 million of contingent liabilities in
regard of transfers, which could be payable if certain defined performance
criteria are met, e.g. number of appearances.

Although Brighton’s finances are pretty robust (for the
Championship), the support of Tony Bloom remains incredibly important, as
Barber acknowledged: “In football, people talk about spending – or losing –
millions of pounds almost flippantly. It's still very important to remember
that Tony Bloom is covering our annual losses of £10.4 million – and as a
result we are not under pressure to sell players. Tony has incredibly deep
pockets but we don’t ever take his incredible generosity towards our club for
granted.”

As well as the £17 million increase in his loans, Bloom also
invested a further £11 million in shares subsequent to the year-end. It is not
clear whether this is new capital or equity conversion, but it does not detract
from the fundamental point, which is that Bloom has put in a massive amount of
funding.

As at the 2014/15 accounts, I estimate that this amounts to
£217 million, split between the current £147 million of debt, £11 million
converted to equity and £58 million of share capital. That may not be the
precise figure, but, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, we don’t need to know the price
of everything, as the value of the owner’s contribution is crystal clear.

Looking at how Brighton have used these funds since Bloom
took charge, the majority (£153 million, or 72%) has gone on investment into
infrastructure (including £103 million on the stadium and £32 million on the
training centre), while £45 million (21%) has been used to cover operating
losses. Any spending on new players has essentially been self-funded in this
period by player sales.

Being so dependent on one individual can be a concern, but
Bloom comes from a family of Brighton supporters: “I have absolutely no
intention of selling. I think I will be here for many years to come.”

He continued: “Our ambition remains for the club’s teams,
both men and women, to play at the highest level possible – and as chairman
(and a lifelong supporter of the club) I will do everything I possibly can to
achieve that and I remain fully committed to that goal.”

"Smooth operator"

Bloom is seriously wealthy from his property and investment
portfolio (plus money earned from poker and other forms of gambling), but he would
not be able to simply buy success, even if he wanted to, as Brighton will need
to continue to comply with the Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations. Under the
previous rules, clubs were only allowed a maximum annual loss of £8 million
(assuming that any losses in excess of £3 million are covered by injecting
equity).

It should be noted that FFP losses are not the same as the
published accounts, as clubs are permitted to exclude some costs, such as youth
development, community schemes, promotion-related bonuses and depreciation on
fixed assets. In any case, Brighton have complied with FFP for the 2014/15
season.

"One better Dale"

The current rules will continue to apply for the 2014/15 and
2015/16 seasons (though the maximum allowed loss is increased to £13 million
from the second season), but will change from the 2016/17 season to be more
aligned with the Premier League’s regulations, e.g. the losses will be
calculated over a three-year period up to a maximum of £39 million.

Although Bloom said that the club was “not entirely happy”
with the increase, he did concede that the change “does provide us with greater
flexibility and the option to compete with those clubs benefiting from
parachute payments.”

FFP encourages clubs to invest in youth development, which
is an area of focus for Brighton. The splendid new training centre (“the best
I’ve ever worked in”, according to Hughton) has resulted in the awarding of the
important Category 1 academy status and will ultimately help develop players
that can push for the first team.

"Long may you run"

Brighton can only be applauded for their efforts off the
pitch, which have produced a remarkable transformation. As Hughton said, “There
is no doubt that in the ambition the club have shown in the infrastructure, the
stadium and the training ground, this can be a Premier League club.”

However, he pointed out that the Championship is “an
incredibly demanding division”, so it was good to see that the owner is also
acutely aware of this fact: “We have had a very good start to the current
season, but we all know how competitive and tough the Championship is year
after year, so it’s important we do not become complacent.”

Are Brighton Premier League ready? Absolutely, but they
still have to do it on the pitch and there’s a long way to go yet. Nobody on
the South coast is counting their chickens before they’ve hatched, but the
Albion have put themselves in a great position to realise Bloom’s dream.

Praise for The Swiss Ramble

"Blogger of the Year 2013 - It’s testament to the effect that Kieron has had on the blogosphere that so many fans take his word as gospel. Putting to use his career in the world of finance, his insights into balance sheets and simple explanations of complex ideas appeal to the hardcore financial whizz and casual fan alike." - The Football Supporters' Federation