OVER-ALL CONSPIRACY
THIRD STAGE
THE PREPARATION OF JAPAN FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR INTERNALLY AND BY ALLIANCE WITH THE AXIS POWERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION OF THE NATION FOR WAR
* * *

RAGE FEELING

Coming to establish the charge of Conspiracy, the prosecution began with section 6 of the Appendix which speaks of “the organization of Japanese politics and public opinion for war.”

Mr. Hammack who opened the case in this section of the Appendix submitted that the evidence he would adduce would tend “to prove a criminal conspiracy on the part of the defendants as charged, beginning about the year 1928, and even prior thereto, to prepare the people of Japan, for illegal wars of aggression upon peace-loving peoples of other nations.

It must have been observed that section 6 itself contains two distinct categories of matters, namely, (l) The organization of Japanese politics for war, (2) The organization of Japanese public opinion for war.

As regards THE ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC OPINION for war, the particulars are given thus : “The educational system, civil, military and naval, were used to inculcate a spirit of totalitarianism, aggression, desire for war, cruelty and hatred of potential enemies.” It was further stated that during this period a vigorous campaign of incitement to expansion was carried on; free speech and writing by opponents of the policy were stamped out, Mr. Hammack in presenting this phase of the case, after describing the conspiracy alleged in the indictment, stated that the evidence will tend to prove that “in the execution of this conspiracy to attain such objective, they (the accused) purposely, systematically, and intelligently used the educational system of Japan, censorship, propaganda, police coercion, political organizations, assassinations and threats and political devices to obtain control of the Government of Japan itself. To attain their ends they used to the fullest possible extent the agencies of the government, laws, religion and old established customs.”

In its summation the prosecution named this as “psychological preparation of the nation for war” and placed the evidence under the three following heads, namely,—(a) militarization of education, (b) control and dissemination of propaganda and (c) mobilization of the people for war. It then summed up by saying : “ to enable the programs for economic, and military and naval preparations to be satisfactorily and adequately carried out and to be effectively used in accordance with the plans of the conspirators, it was necessary to prepare the Japanese people psychologically for war, so that they might feel it to be necessary and even come to desire it. This mission was accomplished through instruction in the schools, through use and control of all known media of propaganda, and through the mobilization of the people into a single organization for purposes of propaganda and control.

Much was sought to be made of what was characterized as A CHANGE IN THE JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL POLICY whereby it was designed to create in every youthful mind a feeling of RACIAL SUPERIORITY.

I believe this is a failing common to all nations. Every nation is under a delusion that its race is superior to all others, and, so long as racial difference will be maintained in international life, this delusion is indeed a defensive weapon. The leaders of any particular nation may bona fide believe that it protects the nation from the evil effects of any inferiority complex, and that
the western racial behaviour necessitates this feeling as a measure of self-protection. This might simply mean encouraging self-expression and preparing the new generation to promote and defend their national self-interest in a competitive world. The ideal of asceticism and self-repression has not as yet been adopted by any of the modern civilized nations.

Professor Toynbee in his “Study of History” points out how in the Western World of our day racial explanations of social phenomena are much in vogue and how racial differences in human physique, regarded as immutable in themselves and as bearing witness to likewise immutable racial differences in the human psyche, are put forward by them as accounting for the difference which we observe empirically between the fortunes and achievements of different human societies. The learned Professor further says;

“In the Eighteenth Century of our era, the competition between the peoples of Western Europe for the command of the overseas world ended in the victory of the English-speaking Protestants, who secured for themselves the lion’ s share of those overseas countries, inhabited by primitive peoples, that were suitable for settlement by Europeans, as well as the lion’s share of the countries inhabited by adherents of the living non-western civilizations who were incapable at the time of resisting western conquest and domination. The outcome of the Seven Years’ War decided that the whole of North America, from the Arctic Circle to the Rio Grande, should be populated by new nations of European origin whose cultural background was the Western Civilization in its English Protestant version, and that a Government instituted by English Protestants and informed with their ideas should become paramount over the whole of Continental India. Thus the race-feeling engendered by the English Protestant version of our western culture became the determining factor in the development of race-feeling in our Western Society as a whole.”

This has indeed been a misfortune for mankind.

According to the learned Professor:

“The ‘Bible Christian’ of European origin and race who has settled among peoples of non-European race overseas has inevitably identified himself with Israel obeying the will of Jehovah and doing the Lord’s Work by taking possession of the Promised Land, while he has identified the non-Europeans who have crossed his path with the Canaanites whom the Lord has delivered unto the hand of His CHOSEN PEOPLE to be destroyed or subjugated.”

“Race-feeling” has indeed been a dangerous weapon in the hands of the designing people from the earliest days of human history. Right-thinking men have always condemned this feeling and have announced that the so-called racial explanation of differences in human performance and achievement is either an ineptitude or a fraud; but their counsel has never been accepted by the world. Plato, in a famous passage of “The Republic”, while propounding “a noble lie” drove home the truth that “the racial explanation of differences in human ability and achievement cannot be put forward by any rational mind except as a deliberate and cold-blooded piece of deception, in which the differentiating effects of upbringing and education are mendaciously ascribed to pre-existing differences of a racial order—and this with the calculated object
of producing certain effects in the practical field of social and political action.”

This, however, never deterred anybody who designed to exploit this racial feeling. Professor Toynbee points out how this exploitation has gone on. He says;

“When we Westerners call people 'Natives' we implicitly take the cultural colour out of our perceptions of them. We see them as trees walking, or as wild animals infesting the country in which we happen to come across them. In fact, we see them as part of the local flora and fauna, and not as men of like passions with ourselves; and, seeing them thus as something infrahuman, we feel entitled to treat them as though they did not possess ordinary human rights. They are merely natives of the lands which they occupy; and no term of occupancy can be long enough to confer any prescriptive right. All this is implicit in the word “Natives”, as we have come to use it in the English language in our time. Evidently the word is not a scientific term but an instrument of action: an a priori justification for a plan of campaign. It belongs to the realm of Western practice and not of Western theory;”

That this Western race-feeling has not as yet been mere matter of history will appear from what is reported to have happened at the time of the drafting of the League Convention after the first World War.

I would only quote a few lines from an account of what happened at the meeting of the committee drafting resolutions for the establishment of the League. The account runs thus:

“Grave as were her (Japan’s) economic preoccupations, something else, graver still, was on her mind. She was haunted by the problem of RACE RELATIONS. For four centuries, the white man, by his mastery of the arts of power, had been hammering into the mind and spirit of the non-white peoples the conviction that they were his natural inferiors. The Russo-Japanese War had indeed demonstrated that this supremacy could be challenged in the fields of battle. But the stigma still remained. Habits and attitudes were slow to change. Now the moment seemed to have come, at the turning of a new page in the world’s history, for lifting this question on to a higher plane and settling race relations once and for all on a basis of equality. This was to be the Japanese contribution to the Covenant.

“But the occasion would lose more than half of its grace if the initiative were publicly taken by those whose status was to be vindicated. Thus the task of the Japanese delegates, Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda was a delicate one. They came with a national demand which they hoped that they would find others to voice. It was in this mood that, on February 4, they sought out Colonel House." 'On July 8’, they told him, 'you expressed to Viscount Ishii sentiments which pleased the Japanese Government; therefore we look upon you as a friend and we have come to ask for your advice.’ Then followed a drafting and redrafting of resolutions.

“At this point Colonel House and the Japanese found that the British Empire Delegation blocked their path. It was not Great Britain which stood in the way, but principally Australia, or rather it was a single Australian, Mr. William Morris Hughes, the then Premier of the Commonwealth, who constituted himself Champion of the cause of White Supremacy.” On February 9, Colonel House records: “Every solution which the Japanese and I have proposed, Mr. Hughes of the British Delegation objected to;” and the British Delegation apparently were unwilling to override his objections. By February 12 Viscount Chinda had decided in disgust to present a resolution himself. ...”

The resolution which Viscount Chinda of Japan had drafted was for the insertion of a new clause; the text was as follows:

“The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations the High Contracting Parties agreed to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of states members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or fact, on account of their race and nationality. . . . ”

It was moved by Baron Makino of Japan as an additional paragraph to the religious equality article . . . Baron Makino’s speech, which was read, is given in full in the minutes. It is an earnest, dignified, courteous and moderate statement of his case. He pointed out that the Covenant was creating a system of mutual obligations between states “comprising all kinds of races” and asked that “the principle at least of equality among men should be admitted and be made the basis of future intercourse”. At the same time he admitted that deeplying prejudices were involved and therefore he did not expect an immediate practical realization of the principle that he was putting forward. He would be content to “leave the working out of it in the hands of the responsible leaders of the states members of the League, who will not neglect the state of public opinion.”

“When he had finished, Lord Robert Cecil said that this was “ ‘a matter of a highly controversial character’ ”; and “raised extremely serious problems within the British Empire! ” “ In spite of the nobility of thought which inspired Baron Makino, he thought that it would be wiser for the moment to postpone its discussion. . . ”

“The postponed discussion on racial equality took place at the Fifteenth and last meeting of the committee. . . The Japanese now no longer pleaded for a special article. All they asked for was the insertion of a sentence in the Preamble, the relevant part of which would then read as follows:

“By the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations;
“By the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals;
“By the firm establishment of the principles of international law, etc.
“Baron Makino was again studiously moderate in his presentation. His a- mendment, he claimed, did no more than lay down a general principle. This was indeed clear from the fact that it would have taken its place in the Preamble, with no substantive article to follow it up ... Lord Robert Cecil refused to accept the amendment and stood on his refusal, acting, he said, under instructions from his government. .. . After making his statement Cecil sat with
his eyes fixed on the table and took no part in the subsequent debate.

The Japanese pressed for a vote. Eleven of the nineteen members of the commission voted in favour of the amendment. Two were absent. No negative vote was taken. President Wilson then ruled that, in view of the SERIOUS OBJECTIONS on the part of some of us, the amendment was not carried.”

On that occasion Baron Makino, who was studiously moderate in his presentation of the case, uttered an ominous note of warning. “Pride”, he said, “is one of the most forceful and sometimes uncontrollable causes of human action. I state in all seriousness that, although at this particular centre of international life the practical bearing of such a dangerous development of the question may not at this moment be properly realized, I, for one, entertain much anxiety about the possible future outcome of this question. ”

Baron Makino raised the matter again at the plenary meeting of the Peace Conference on April 28. He ended his speech there with the following words :

“In closing, I feel it my duty to declare clearly on this occasion that the Japanese Government and people feel poignant regret at the failure of the Commission to approve of their just demand for laying down a principle aiming at the adjustment of this long-standing grievance, a demand that is based on a deep-rooted national conviction. They will continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League in future.”

Neither the League nor any other international organization ever could get rid of this race-feeling.

Add to this the actual application of this feeling in the movement on the part of the white nations on the Pacific rim to exclude Asiatics on economic and racial grounds.

If this exclusion movement indicated anything it was an index of the rising tide of national and racial consciousness. In its initial stages the movement on the part of the white nations fringing the Pacific to exclude Orientals was of a purely local character. Gradually, however, the movement everywhere assumed a national form characterized by national.legislation and national machinery for enforcement. This exclusion sentiment went on unabated after the First World War and the trend of emphasis gradually passed from economic to cultural and biological arguments for restriction and exclusion. I may refer only to the American Acts of 1917 and 1924. In their exclusion movements the white nations did not show any consideration for the national sensibilities of the excluded nations including the Japanese, and it may not be denied that thèse exclusion laws did not foster any ideal human relations organized on the basis of humanity.

Dr. Schwarzenberger in his "Power-Politics" says: “Underneath the surface questions of formal equality and the disposal of the spoils of the war, the more fundamental issue of the alleged superiority of the white race and the over-emphasis on Europe compared with the rest of the world are problems which have accompanied the League throughout the years. True, Japan, as one of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, had been accorded a permanent seat on the League Council, and it received its share in the distribution of the mandates. There was, however, another question for which the
proposed League did not seem to provide a remedy: Japan’s over population. As Colonel House pointed out to Mr. Balfour, who expressed ‘a great deal of sympathy with this view, ‘the world said that they could not go to Africa; they could not go to any white country; they could not go to China, and they could not go to Siberia; and yet they were a growing nation, having a country where all land was tilled; but they had to go somewhere.’ Even when the Japanese delegates in the Drafting Commission toned down their original suggestions to a proposal which merely asked for an insertion into the Preamble of the Covenant of a clause endorsing the principle of the equality of nations, and the just treatment of their nationals, a minority of the commission prevented its acceptance.” According to him this move on the part of the Peace Conference was “partially responsible for the inculcation of an inferiority complex into Japan.”

In view of what I have pointed out above to be the actual operations of this feeling I cannot condemn those of the Japanese leaders who might have thought of protecting their race by inculcating their racial superiority in the youthful mind. I might mention here in passing that like the Western people the Japanese also were mostly worshippers of “a god of the chosen people”.

I am not sure if the fear which the white world was entertaining from this rising racial feeling in the East might not be ascribable to what Professor Toynbee refers to as the third of the elements in “the situation which go far towards accounting for the strength and virulence of Western race-feeling in our time.”

The atom bomb, we are told, has destroyed all selfish racial feelings and has awakened within us the sense of unity of mankind. It may, indeed, be that the atom blasts at the close of the Second World War really succeeded in blowing away all the pre-war humbugs; or it may be that we are only dreaming. We still have men who can advance views like those contained in “Take your Choice —Separation or Mongrelization.” But in spite of this I would hope and believe with others that the Second World War has succeeded in killing this race-feeling and in humbling every mind so as to make it capable of thinking in terms of racial equality. No one, I would believe, will now be deterred from advancing the cause of such racial equality by the fear of its raising race-issue throughout the world or raising any serious problem within any particular domain. The position, however, was quite different when the Japanese leaders conceived of the measure in question. I do not find any reason to doubt their bona fides if they considered this to be a necessary measure of protection for their race.

OVER-ALL CONSPIRACY
THIRD STAGE
PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION OF - THE NATION FOR WAR
* * * * *
MILITARIZATION OF EDUCATION

Coming to “militarization of education”, the prosecution introduced both oral and documentary evidence. Putting this evidence at its highest we get at the following story:

Military training was first introduced in the schools of Japan in the name of “physical exercise”. The curriculum was based on the Rescript on Education of 1890 of the Emperor Meiji: (Ex. 139, Record page 1,022). Its original purpose was to encourage social discipline and reasonable national defense (Witness Ouchi, page 968, Kaigo, pages 905-13). After a period of slackened interest in this training after World War I, the training was revived in 1922-25 under the pressures of depression and unrest (Ouchi, 955, 968). The War and Education Ministries directed their attention toward reinstituting the military training at this time. In 1925 there was an increase in the intensity of this training, as marked by the appointment of regular army instructors in the schools (Takikawa, 990).

In order to give military training, Imperial Ordinance No. 135 of 13 April 1925, provided for the stationing of active army officers at government or public schools, and other educational institutions. It was provided that the officers so stationed, “shall obey the order and supervision of the head of the schools concerned with respect to military training. ” Such Officers might also be stationed at private schools upon request. Certain provisions were made for the inspection of the training courses (Ex. 132, Record page 1,007).

Since then, the military instructors became more and more influential until gradually the Army largely dominated the universities and the school system (Ouchi, 940; Takikawa, 990).

The “Regulations of the Youngmen’s Training Institute”, promulgated by the Education Ministry Ordinance of 20 April 1926, provided that “the hours of training at the Youngmen’s Training Institutes shall not be less than 100 hours for morals and civics, 400 hours for military training, 200 hours for the ordinary course, and 100 hours for the vocational course. ”

War Ministry Ordinance No. 19 of 27 September 1926 outlined the regulations governing the appointments of “training inspector officers, ” inspections, and reports.
The inclusion of military lectures in the curricula of the universities was made compulsory; but on the part of the students, attendance was still optional. In 1931, the accused ARAKI, then Minister of War, demanded compulsory attendance to military classes. He tried also to introduce drill with rifles but was successfully opposed (Kaigo: Takikawa, 994-1,021; Ouchi, 936-44).

In August 1935 by Imperial Ordinance, the War Minister was enabled to “order active military officers to inspect the military drill courses at youth schools”.
The subsequent regulations of the War Minister, dated 13 August 1935, stated that the purpose of the inspection was to “consider whether all students finishing the courses of such schools have the special qualifications necessary for future military service, or not, and at the same time to contribute to the development and progress of military training” (Ex. 136, 1,019).

After the China Incident in 1937, it was considered necessary further to intensify the training, and while the accused KEDO was Education Minister during this time, the school system was reorganized and more time was devoted to military subjects (Ikeshima, 1,101-2) .

In May 1938, when accused ARAKI became Minister of Education, he was able to put his ideas into effect ( Takikawa, 994-1,021; Ouchi, 936- 44). Completion of the military training course became a requirement for graduation with the added inducement that those who passed would be required to do only one year of military service, as against the usual two or three.

By 29 June 1938, prompted by the European War, the unfinished China Incident and the rapidly changing world situation, the Education Ministry urged public administrators and educational leaders to lay emphasis on patriotism, unity, and service in their teaching. The outline of the curriculum for instruction and training in Youths’ Schools of 21 August 1935 (revised in 1939 and 1941) directed teachers to uphold certain moral conceptions in their general instruction. With regard to military training: “With thorough knowledge of the essential significance of national structure, and in conformity with the true significance of universal conscription . . . students should be made to master necessary military abilities to do his part as a subject of the Imperial Empire (Ex. 138, Record page 1,020).

On 30 November 1938, the Imperial Ordinance of August 1935 (Ex. 134) was amended over the signatures of ARAKI, as Education Minister, and ITAGAKI, as War Minister, to enable the War Minister to order inspection of the “corresponding subjects” as provided for in the Youngmen’s Training Schools (Ex. 135, 1,018).
By 1939, the Education Council was deliberating inspirational changes in the textbooks. Military drill with rifles was introduced (Kaigo, 893, 889). The regulations regarding the inspection of military training at the Youth Schools were revised in April 1940 over HATA’s signature (Ex. 137, 1,021) . Professors were required to co-operate fully in teaching military ideals for the purpose of inspiring the Japanese to their duty of gaining control of the Far East and later, the world: (Ouchi, 940) . Teachers who expressed pacifistic ideas about world affairs were sometimes discharged, and sometimes penalized under the Public Peace Law (Ouchi, 945; Takikawa, 990-4).

Even if we accept the whole story, I do not see why we should take this organization as indicative of any aggressive design or preparation. The picture given is certainly one of extensive and effective military education. But I am sorry I cannot accept the prosecution characterization of this as militarization of education.

Exhibit 132 is the Imperial Ordinance of 1925 concerning stationing of officers of active status in schools. This ordinance provides that for the purpose of giving military training to all male students of all normal, middle and industrial schools and colleges, officers of active status shall be stationed at these schools. These officers shall be despatched according to agreement between the Ministries of War and Education and are to obey and be under the orders of the heads of the schools. With respect to private schools, such officers might be stationed on request from the school. By the additional provision of the Ordinance of September 27, 1926, a system of inspection of the schools and methods of reporting were set up. By War Ministry Ordinance of 30 November 1935 a system was established whereby the school training officers might examine the results of their teaching and issue certificates of military training.

Exhibit 139 is the Imperial Rescript on Education of October 30, 1897. This document sets forth the principal virtues which were expected of people in Japan. The people of Japan should be filial to parents, affectionate to family, harmonious in martial relations, be modest and moderate, be benevolent to all, to pursue learning and cultivate arts and thereby develop intellectual faculties and moral powers. They are also urged to advance the public good, to promote common interest, to respect the law, and in emergency to offer themselves courageously to the state.

I give below the gist of the testimony of the witness examined in this connection :

LT. COLONEL DONALD ROSS NUGENT (p. 821).

The witness was a teacher of English and commercial subjects in a commercial university, a commercial college, and a commercial school of middle school rank in Japan FROM MARCH 1937 TO MARCH 1941. He testifies that during the years in which he was teaching in those educational institutes in Japan there was military training as part of the curriculum of those particular institutions. The training consisted of close order drill, conditioning marches, maneuver over open terrain, nomenclature, the handling of weapons up to and including the light machine guns and military lectures.

From one and a half to five hours per week was devoted to military training in its different phases. Additional time was used for maneuvers, conditioning marches and inspections. The subjects were taught by officers of the Japanese army. Army officers assigned to the colleges were part of the faculty. The witness is the Chief of the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP (Supreme Commander of Allied Powers) and therefore, he purported to testify as an expert. He gave his opinion as to the effect of military training. He said, “IN MY OPINION, such teachings would have the effect of inculcating ultra-nationalism, aggressive militarism, a fanatical devotion to their country, a blind obedience to authority, and a belief in Japan’s mission to become dominant in the so-called “East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. ” (pp.
832-833).

In answer to a question whether or not such teaching would have the effect of impressing upon the mind of the Japanese students that the Japanese as a race were superior to all other persons the witness answered in the affirmative.

In the witness’ opinion the result upon the students of Japan of drill, lectures and field maneuvers was that such teachings did, in fact, impress upon the students of Japan a belief in the so-called divine mission of the Japanese Empire, a belief in the superiority of Japanese culture over the cultures of other countries, belief in the necessity of military aggression, if necessary to accomplish Japan ’ s so-called divine mission of leadership of Greater East Asia, and, if necessary, what was called “all the world under one roof.” (pp. 835-36).

In his cross-examination when asked to give the grounds of this opinion the witness answered by saying, “From the interviews with students, with teachers, both before and since the war, teachers who are both Japanese and foreign in nationality, and interviews, as I stated, with prisoners of war.” (p. 842).

The witness told us that for this purpose he interviewed some 300 to 350 persons including prisoners of war. The witness no doubt claims to be an expert in this matter; but I am afraid I cannot attach any importance to his opinion in this respect. I do not consider him an expert in the matter testified to by him and I, for myself, am not convinced by his reasons for ascribing the effects to the training testified to by him. Though it became necessary for the prosecution to put him forward as an expert, the witness himself, in his cross-examination by Mr. Warren, had to disown any expert knowledge (vide his deposition, p. 872 of the record of proceedings)
TOKIOMI KAIGO (P. 879).

The witness is Assistant Professor at the Imperial University, Tokyo. He has been there for ten years. He teaches educational history and specially contemporary history.

The witness says that military training in Japan began in the elementary, secondary and normal schools since the year 1886. It continued until the World War I. After World War I, it was reinforced in the year 1925 when a law was promulgated ordering the active army officers to be attached to schools as instructors and in the next year, that is, in 1926, training schools for young men were established. Instructors of military training were the officers on active duties attached to the schools. In the elementary, middle and junior colleges, military training became compulsory since 1925. In the University it became compulsory for students to attend classes where lectures on military subjects were given since 1925. It was decided in the year 1939 to introduce military drills with rifles but at that time the students were told to conduct rifle practice only on the occasion of field maneuvers, on other occasions they were to attend lectures only.

IN NOVEMBER 1941 a new curriculum
for military training was made and since then rifle drill was to be conducted even in universities. Prior to the year 1941 a wholesale renovation of the educational system in Japan was conducted. In 1937 an educational council was established whose mission was to study, investigate as a whole the educational system and its contents and methods. On being asked by the prosecution whether as a result of this study military training and lectures became more important in the Japanese school system the witness answered, “No decision as to intensifying military training was made during the Educational Council. However, in the years following 1937, AS THE CHINA INCIDENT BROKE OUT, it was necessary to intensify military training of the nation as a whole ”(p. 891).

The witness further said that the subjects discussed during the Educational Council in 1937 were the renovation of the educational system in Japan so that the educational system of Japan may serve the country. Being asked whether the textbooks relating to any subjects were changed following the renovation of the school system of 1937 the witness said, “It was after 1941 that the real changes of textbooks were made. The educational council which met in 1937 had studied for long years various programs concerning the change of the educational system. After 1941, changes were made in such subjects as ethics, history, geography, and the national language” (p. 893).

Being asked by the prosecution what was the effect of teaching beginning with 1937 the witness said, “As the policy of basing the education on the cause of serving the country was decided by the Educational Council, the education in Japan after 1937 was based upon the education to promote patriotic feeling of the nation ” (p. 894).

The next question put to the witness was “would you say, Professor, that the patriotic feeling included therein teaching
is to inculcate an ultra-nationalistic and militaristic spirit?” (p. 894) . Obviously this was a suggestive question and an objection being taken by defense the prosecution withdrew it, and then asked the witness whether or not the effect of the teaching on the students was to create in them the opinion that the Japanese were a superior race. The witness said, “As far as I can judge, it is my opinion that this kind of education, namely, that Japan was a great nation, was given to the students” (p. 897).

In cross-examination the witness said that after the World War I, there was a great social unrest in Japan and that frivolousness prevailed there. The putting into execution of military training in the year 1925-26 did a great deal to check this tendency. There is nothing in the evidence of this witness which shows anything wrong with the renovation of the educational system.

After the examination of this witness the prosecution offered to adduce in evidence the statements of the witnesses taken by it out of court producing the witness in Court for cross-examination by the defense. The Tribunal allowed the prosecution to do so.

The next witness thus examined was OUCHI HYOE (p. 936).
His statement taken by the prosecution out of court was offered as his testimony-in-chief. The statement is Exhibit No. 130 in this case.

The witness is a Professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo where he teaches economics and public finance. He has been a professor teaching these subjects for the last 27 years. The witness says:

"Military training and lectures, beginning in the elementary schools, were a part of all schools in Japan. Such training was first instituted in the elementary, secondary and normal schools about 1886 and continued thereafter.

“Following the Japanese-Chinese War about 1898 military training was conducted in the schools by regular Army officers, which system prevailed until about the time of the first World War. After World War I, there was a liberal trend in the school system, and two or three years thereafter little importance was placed upon military training and teachings. Beginning about 1922 military training and teaching was again instituted in the schools, these subjects increasingly being given more consideration in the schools until 1927 when such training became compulsory in the secondary, normal and junior college grade schools. Such training, however, was not compulsory at this time in the University.

"In 1927 the War Ministry demanded that a special course in military lectures be given in the University of Tokyo, this demand being refused, but again made later. On the second occasion demand was made that military lectures and military training be given, as a result of which the university compromised by consenting that military lectures be given, these lectures being given by Army officers assigned from the War Ministry who became part of the faculty. At first the military lectures were not compulsory and most of the students did not attend them. For this reason a rule was put in effect by the military instructors that a roll-call be taken. Further pressure was made upon the students by the rule that if the students did not attend the lectures, following their graduation when they were called into Army service they did not receive credit for any military training while in school. This was important for the reason that students who participated in military training and lectures while in college had one year’s service only to do in the Army on completion of their education, while those who had not attended military lectures and training were required to do their full time of two or three year’s military service.

“Upon the insistence of the War Ministry, military training became a part of all universities, including private universities, such training becoming compulsory in 1938 when General ARAKI became Minister of Education. Previous to this time, in 1931, when General ARAKI was War Minister he had demanded that the Imperial University of Tokyo have military training and lectures as a part of its curriculum, which demand was refused by the University officials, thus postponing such training in the University for a few years. Later General ARAKI as Minister of Education ordered compulsory military training and lectures in all universities ” (pp. 940-43).

Then follows the following passage in the statement of the witness, “The
military training and lectures were conducted in schools of all grades by regular Army officers, the officers conducting the courses making every effort by lectures, training and propaganda to inspire a militaristic and ultranational - istic spirit in the students. It was taught by the military instructors that the Japanese were a superior race, that war was productive, and it was Japan's destiny to rule the Far East, and thereafter the whole world, and that the progress of the nation required the students to be prepared for aggressive warfare in the future to accomplish these ends.

“The foundation of the effort to inspire a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic spirit in the students was based upon a rescript of Emperor Meiji on education, published in 1890, which rescript provided that the most important duty of a subject was to the country and the Emperor, together with a rescript issued by the Emperor to military and naval officers, soldiers and sailors on their duties. These rescripts, together with the textbooks, lectures, military training and teachings, were used by the military instructors to teach and inculcate in the students a belief in the great glory of Japan, and the duty of the Japanese to aid and further the Holy Mission of Japan to gain control of and rule the Far East, and thereafter the world, and that in the accomplishing of this Holy Mission the greatest glory of all for a Japanese was a privilege of dying in the service of the Emperor.

“That beginning in 1931 domination by the military of the universities and schools increasingly became more apparent, such domination having reached such proportions in 1937 FOLLOWING THE CHINA INCIDENT that professors and teachers were required to co-operate fully and wholeheartedly in the program of inculcating in the students a fanatical militaristic and ultra-nationalistic spirit. Failure to co-operate fully in this program would bring punishment by dismissal from the school or imprisonment, all expressions of thought in favour of the ideals of peace or in opposition to the policy of preparation for aggressive warfare being rigidly suppressed in the schools, this suppression being directed to students as well as teachers and professors ” (pp. 943-44).

The statement concludes with the following passage: “As an educator in the universities for the past 27 years and from my own personal experience as a student in the various grade schools in Japan, it is my opinion that the military training, lectures and teaching given to students in all grade schools and universities had the effect of creating in the students a militaristic and ultra- nationalistic spirit, a belief that the Japanese as a race were superior to all other peoples, glorification of war, that wars were productive and necessary for the future welfare of Japan, and had the effect of preparing the students for future wars of aggression” (p. 946).

By way of illustration of his statement that the failure to co-operate fully in this program would bring punishment by dismissal or imprisonment, the witness mentioned the instances of Professor YANIHARA, of the witness himself as also of the three professors of Tokyo Imperial University. Professor YANIHARA, the witness says, wrote an article on “peace and the ideals of the State in 1936”. Marquis KIDO on becoming Minister of Education in
1937 demanded that the professor should be dismissed. The professor, however, was asked by the University authorities to submit his resignation which he did.

As regards himself he was arrested by the police charged under the public peace law and was kept confined for nearly 18 months without trial and was ultimately found not guilty on trial.

As to the other three professors from Tokyo they were also arrested by the police under the public peace law in 1937. In cross-examination it transpired that all these persons wrote some articles which were considered offensive . As REGARDS HIS OPINION as to the effect of military education the witness in cross-examination says that the statement is made on the basis of the facts which were brought to his attention by his students. The witness himself never heard any lecture. He heard from the students the contents of the lectures. The students told the witness that they were inculcated with a desire to gain control of the Far East and thereafter the world. He could not name any student.

I am not satisfied that this witness was competent to give the opinion which he expressed in this statement. His evidence does not disclose any materials on which such opinion could be founded.

TAKIKAWA YUKITOKI (p. 988)

The statement of this witness taken out of court by the prosecution is Exhibit No. 131 in this case and is offered in evidence as his examination-inchief. He is Dean of Law at Kyoto University. The witness says: “Military training, beginning in the elementary schools, was a part of the curriculum of all schools in Japan. Beginning about 1925 more attention was given to military lectures and training in Kyoto University, there being on the staff teaching military subjects one colonel and three captains, these officers became more dominant in the schools and they increasingly had more to say in the manner in which the university should be operated. When they first came to the college they did not have a great deal of influence but gradually following the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the China Incident in 1937 they gained more and more influence, with the result that the university eventually was completely under the control of the military” (pp. 990-91).

The witness says: “ I am familiar with the form of education that prevailed generally in the Japanese school system up to the present time and it was a very bad form of education, It completely omitted free thought and liberal ideas and was devoted to justifying Japanese aggressive warfare in Manchuria and China and was intended to teach the students that war was glorious, that war was necessary, that war was productive, that the future greatness and destiny of Japan was dependent upon aggressive warfare and had the effect of inculcating in the minds of the students a contempt for other races and peoples, a hatred for potential enemies and prepared them for future wars of aggression” (pp. 992-93).

The witness was discharged from the University in 1933. According to the witness this happened because of his article in opposition to the Manchuri
an Incident and another article in opposition to the Nazi form of Government. In his cross-examination the witness admits that education itself is not his speciality. It further transpired that witness's criticism of court procedure or trials in his book called “Keiho Tokuhon” developed into some affair between him and the then Minister of Education HATOYAMA Ichiro and he was ultimately dismissed for that book. Excepting his own opinion the witness does not give us any material from which we can draw any inference as to the effect given by the witness in his opinion.

MAEDATAMON (p. 1, 024 & p. 3,122)

His statement taken by the prosecution out of court is Exhibit No. 140 in this case and this is offered as his testimony-in-chief. During the years 1928- 38 he was an editorial writer on the “Tokyo Asahi Shimbun”. He became Minister of Education on August 18, 1945.

In his PREPARED STATEMENT the witness stated that after being Minister of Education he ordered textbooks to be destroyed for the reasons that they were used to teach the students, first, that Japan was a country superior to all other countries, that was most objectionable; another was the confusion of facts with mystery and legend; too much admiration of military action and warfare; too much admiration and homage to military officers and the idea of absolute subjection of the individual in favour of the state. The witness then says: “In addition to the textbooks which I ordered to be destroyed for the reasons stated, there was also issued by the Ministry of Education to be widely read by teachers, students and citizens at large, a book entitled ‘Fundamental Principles of the National Polity1, published in May 1937, and ‘The Way of National Subjects’ which was published in March 1941. Upon becoming Minister of Education in 1945, a survey of the Japanese school system as it had existed previously established that before the China Incident the military took over control of all schools by placing in the schools Army officers who supervised the military teaching and training, this control FOLLOWING THE CHINA INCIDENT becoming so absolute that such officers instructed the principals of the schools as to how the courses and administration of the school system should be conducted” (pp. 1,037-38).

The offensive book named by the witness is “Way of a Subject” which seems to have been published on 31ST MARCH 1941. (p. 1, 047). This book is Exhibit No. 141 in this case. The witness said that the book was published by the Department of Education. It was published for the purpose of being read not only by the teachers and students but also by the people at large. The OFFENDING PASSAGES were read into the proceedings at pages 1,047 to 1,065 and 3, 124 to 3, 126. In substance these passages emphasize:

1. that the Imperial throne is coeval with Heaven and Earth, and that the way of a subject originates in the fundamental character of the empire and is in the guarding and maintaining the prosperity of the Imperial throne;
2. that this is not an abstract form but a historical standard set down;
firmly for the daily life and conduct; the peoples' entire lives and activities solely point toward the enhancing of the Imperial foundation;
3. (a) that with the introduction of occidental civilization, the Japanese people have come to be influenced by individualism, liberalism, utilitarianism, materialism and others and have fallen often into the error of running counter to their time-honoured national character;
(b) that the urgent need of the hour is to discard the ideas of individualism and utilitarianism and to live up to the duty of the Imperial subject;
4.
(a) that the world penetration by the European nations was mainly prompted by insatiable materialistic desires;
(b) that they slaughtered the aborigines, or enslaved them or dispossessed them of their lands, making it their colonies;
(c) that natural resources were taken to their homelands in great quantities and enormous profits were gained through trade;
(d) that in their invasions all the world over, they dared to commit atrocities which neither heaven nor man could tolerate;
(e) that the American Indians, the African blacks and the people of the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere were all equally treated—they were rounded up as white men’s slaves;
5.
(a) that the World War I had undoubtedly a great deal to do
with the long standing hostile relations between Germany and France, but the primary cause lay in the Anglo-German Strife for maritime and economic supremacy;
(b) that basic factors of occidental civilization became cause and effect reducing the whole world into veritable shambles and finally brought about the self-destruction of World War I.
6. As a result of that war, fear of the possible downfall of the western civilization occupied every mind;
(a) Britain, France and America became engrossed in their effort
to maintain the status quo;
(b) a formidable movement for social revolution by class wars
based on thorough-going materialism was intensified in communism;
(c) Nazism and Fascism were being ushered into the world: the
doctrine of racialism and totalitarianism in Germany and Italy was the eliminating and reforming of the will occasioned by Individualism and Liberalism;
7.
(a) that the Manchurian incident was an outburst of the Japanese
suppressed national life;
(6) that this incident with China signifies Japan’s step towards the creation of a moral world and the establishment of a new order in the eyes of the Powers;
8.
(a) that the amazingly brilliant national development and expansion of Japan gave rise to envy and jealousy on the part of the European and American nations; whose aspiration was to annex East Asia, and they, as a counter measure tried to check the ever-enhancing national strength by laying e- conomic pressure on Japan or scheming political disturbance, or planning Japan’s international isolation;
(b) that with the increasingly strained situation on the Pacific, Japan’s position in East Asia confronts serious condition.
9. That Japan must politically assist the countries with the coprosperity sphere of Greater East Asia which have been colonized as the result of the Westerner’s aggression in the East.
10.
(a) That a group of liberal democratic nations—ardent supporters of maintaining the status quo—are co-operating together to baffle Japanese undertakings and the colonies are still entrapped in the illusion that they have to rely on the Europeans and the Americans for their subsistence;
(b) that to reach the set goal Japan has long way to go yet and the path is by no means a broad level highway.
11. That the brilliant success that the Germans are achieving in the present war is not due only to their highly developed mechanized forces but to the vigorous nationalistic spirit and to the fervent popular co-operation in national defense;
12.
(a) that the guarding and maintaining of the prosperity of the imperial Throne is the true object of strengthening the national total war system;
(b) that the Japanese people ventured to look upto the people of Imperial household as their head family and are enjoying the privilege of leading one nation one family life;
(c) that to be united in one body in serving the Emperor who
loves his people tenderly is the essential qualities of the subjects;
(d) that in Japan loyalty comes before filial piety. Loyalty is the the great principle. . . . Loyalty and filial piety are one and inseparable;
(e) Imperial subjects in this new era must strengthen themselves as subjects of this empire; that is to say, by fully understanding the significance of the Japanese nationality, living on strength faith as subjects of the empire adhering fidelity, excelling in clear sightedness, straining strong will and prime physical strength, cultivating practical ability the Japanese must stride forward for the attainment of historical mission of this empire;
(f) that training for Imperial subject should be directed at the cultivation of the spirit to push forward with decision and bravery;
13. (a) that great importance should be attached to discipline which
constitutes one of the characteristic features of the Japanese education;
(6) that the subjects of the empire have been entrusted with the grave responsibility of supporting Imperial prosperity eternally ever since the foundation of the empire;
(c) that what is commonly called private life lies in the performance of the duty of the subjects: it is not permissible for any one to indulge in self-will, thinking that one’s private life has nothing to do with the state;
14. that home is a training place of the Imperial subjects: that there the noble national spirit, sturdy yet affectionate, is trained and developed, and loyal subjects that are capable of successfully enhancing and supporting prosperity of the Imperial Throne are brought up;
15. that in Japan “one’s occupation was originally the duty they owed to perform for the sake of the emperors, each in his assigned part of the State affairs . . . “The underlying meaning of occupations in our country was not in the making of profits, but in the production itself, and they were preserved in the custom of respecting labour for labour’s sake.”

Mr. Hammack then read out the following passages from pages 84 and 89 of the book;

“You can never consider those that dare to evade law or sacrifice others for the purpose of profit, or those that neglect others in adversity if no profit is involved and solely aim at profit making, as loyal to the country by being true to their jobs. At the present time, especially the small and medium traders and manufacturers are in a wretched plight, but nevertheless we must think over the conditions prevailing at home and abroad and devote ourselves to our true duty, positively engaging in commerce and, thereby, perform our duty to the country.

“To fulfil our respective roles with a clear understanding of what part of the national activity each of us is charged with, no matter what work we may be engaged in, and by dropping all ideas of personal interests and profits reviving the old custom of our forefathers who did their best to serve the state, is truly the cardinal point for the way of the subject.

“The China Incident is indeed the very sacred undertaking for the purpose of diffusing the idea with which the foundation of our Empire was originally purported, not only in Asia, but to all parts of the world, and the responsibilities shouldered by the 10,000,000 people of Japan cannot by any means be slighted. We have a long way to go before we
can hope to achieve the Empire’s mission and succeed in setting up a new order, and we must, of course, be prepared to face a good many obstacles yet ” (p. 3, 126).

I have quoted here the entire portions read out by the prosecution for fear of unwittingly omitting any vital offending word, sentence or sense.

I do not see that a book like this published as it was in MARCH 1941 when Japan was involved in serious hostilities would go any way in the direction of establishing any criminal responsibility on the part of anybody or organization connected with its publication at that time. Mr. MAEDA who, after the war, considered this book to be so pernicious as not to brook its existence in Japanese soil gave his own reason for ordering its destruction and it would be better to have that reason from his testimony. The witness in his cross-examination gave the following reason for destroying the book:

1. Its general tendency or underlying philosophy was very objectionable.

(a) The book pointed out or indicated that Japan was greater than other countries and by mixing legend, myth and facts it tried to show that Japan was a country especially selected and blessed by Providence.
(b) It greatly emphasized the Imperial Way—it placed the state above truth and justice.
2. That it placed the main emphasis on the way of the people or way of the nation or the way of subjects—the way of humanity was entirely neglected; such a thought entirely negates the idea of building a cultural state.

Mr. MAEDA had many other books destroyed after the war and those books, he admitted, had existed since a long time past. His reason for destroying them was that in this era such books should not be permitted to exist.

I need not question his prudence in this respect. But this condemnation by him does not necessarily make the book condemnable. However unpleasant its contents might appear to us, they were perhaps not devoid of truth. Items 4, 6, 7 (a) and 8 of the above analysis of the contents of the condemned book substantially correspond with the opinions of authors of very high authority. I have already dealt with the question of prevalence of race-feeling in international life. As to the fear of the possible downfall of the Western civilization, one is simply to refer to the Survey of the International Affairs for 1931 by the Royal Institute of London. I would have occasion to refer to its contents later on. The Survey for 1920-23, 1925 and 1926 by the same high authority would go a great way in supporting the opinion expressed in items 7 (a) and 8. Item 3 is, of course, a matter of opinion and I do not think the author committed any grave error in emphasizing the fundamental differences between the Eastern and the Western civilizations and saying a word of warning against blind imitation. The meeting of East and West has been inevitable and unavoidable. At the same time this meeting has given rise to some basic problems which must be clearly understood and thoroughly grasped before we
can find out a happy and workable solution. Many will advocate adoption of the one by the other; many will advocate adaptation and many again will advocate rejection. The most healthy attitude towards such diverse opinions would be to follow the principles of free-thought and opinion, “not free thought for those ones who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. ”

Whatever that be, facts disclosed in the evidence of this witness do not in the least advance this phase of the prosecution case. What was said or done, was done at a time when Japan was in the midst of a global war and was done only as a part of the strategy of the war. This cannot in the least lead us to any inference of the kind of design alleged in the indictment.

ITO NOBUFUMI (p. 1,077)

The statement of this witness taken out of court by the prosecution was offered in evidence in lieu of his examination-in-chief. This statement is Exhibit No. 142 in this case.

The witness speaks of ORGANIZATION OF PROPAGANDA by the Government since 1936. IN 1940 the witness became Chairman of the Bureau of Information which was later dissolved as the result of the establishment of the Board of Information of which the witness became the first President. Censorship power was given to this Board. In JANUARY 1941 all publishers in Japan were organzied into the ‘Japanese Publisher’s Association’, all book distributors were organized into the ‘Japanese Book and Magazine Distributors Corporation’ , and all newspapers into the ‘Japanese Newspaper League’ . The establishment of these organizations resulted in complete government control of all information media included within the respective groups, (p. 1,081)

The witness states that the War Ministry disseminated propaganda prejudicing the people of Japan against POTENTIAL ENEMIES such as the United States and Great Britain from May or June 1941.

IKESHIMA SHIGENOBU (P. 1, 099)

In the case of this witness also his statement taken out of court by the prosecution was accepted in evidence in lieu of his examination-in-chief. The witness is a Professor at Hosei University and teaches cultural politics. This witness also speaks of the military training in Japanese educational institutes. The witness says that upto 1925 this military training “did not require much school time of the students”, that since 1925 such training began “to absorb more school time upto and until the Manchurian Incident, ” that following the Manchurian Incident “time devoted by the students to military training and teaching dropped a little until 1936 when this subject again became important and more time of students was being devoted to this subject.”

According to this witness “AFTER the China Incident because of the pressure from the War Ministry, ULTRA-NATIONALISTIC and MILITARISTIC THOUGHTS were inculcated in the students under the supervision of the military in the schools.” .... Beginning in the early part of 1941, the students were taught
that the failure of the Japanese Army to conquer China was because of the assistance which the United States and Great Britain were rendering China, the students being impressed with the idea that for this reason the great enemy of Japan was not China but United States and Great Britain. ” (pp. 1,012-13).

The witness also speaks of Government control of Japan Broadcasting Corporation and censorship of news.

We do not know what is ‘ultra-nationalistic thought1 according to this witness. However debased and distorted its present manifestations may be, nationalism is an organic and not necessarily evil development of the political life of man.

As has been pointed out by Dr. Schwarzenberger “even if Europeans and Americans who have drunk too deeply from this dangerous cup might now be inclined to disagree with this opinion, those countries now just passing through those stages through which the western people have gone during past centuries will feel that they cannot overleap this essential and formative stage. ” In the words of Sun Yat-Sen ‘we, the wronged races, must first recover our position of national freedom and equality before we are fit to discuss cosmopolitanism. We must understand that cosmopolitanism grows out of nationalism; if we want to extend cosmopolitanism, we must, first, establish strongly our own nationalism. It may be that ‘ if nationalism is to fulfil really positive functions from the standpoint of the international community as a whole, it would have to undergo a process of rather far-reaching self-limitations. ’ According to Dr. Schwarzenberger, for this purpose “in the first place, nationalist would have to realize that the nation, though a reality and a high value, only represents a relative value. Secondly, it may be easy to perceive differences between nations, but so far nobody has succeeded in establishing a just hierarchy between them. ” “judgments based, in a matter-of- course way, on our own civilization”, says Dr. Schwarzenberger, “are only one of the many hypocrisies of which the West has become guilty, particularly regarding the Far East” SAKIAKIO (p. 1, 116).

His statement is Exhibit 144 in this case. He comes to prove propaganda. He is President of Nihon Kami Shibai Association. His company manufactures what the witness calls ‘paper theatre productions’. The witness speaks about such propaganda during the period FOLLOWING the China Incident
OGATA TAKETORA (p. 1,148).

The statement of this witness is Exhibit No. 146 in this case. The witness was formerly Vice-President of the ‘Asahi Shimboon’ newspaper. The witness says: “I have been in the newspaper business for 35 years, During all the time that I have been in the newspaper business, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS in Japan has been limited by government censorship. Censorship became particularly noticeable immediately preceding the Manchurian Incident.

After the
Manchurian Incident, newspapers were not permitted to write on military matters unless such material was properly approved by the censorship Section of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry. Immediately preceding the Manchurian Incident all newspapers were required to submit a copy of their papers to the Home Ministry for censorship before such paper could be released on the stands. In 1939 censorship became so strict that it was found necessary to place a censorship Section within our own plant, for the reason that so many press bans were coming in from the Home Ministry. Upon numerous occasions prior to DECEMBER 1941 my newspaper received telegrams from the various theatres of war wherein the Japanese troops were fighting. Such telegrams would instruct us as to how we should treat specific military information” (pp. 1,153-54)
NAKAIKIMBEI (p. 1,156).

The statement of this witness is Exhibit 147 in this case. The witness speaks of his connection with the moving picture industry. His evidence also is directed to propaganda in justification of war. The witness speaks of such propaganda since 1929 SUZUKI TOMIN (p. 1,217).

The statement of this witness is Exhibit 150 in this case. This witness is an editorial writer and has been employed since 1935 by the newspaper ' Youmiuri Shimbun’.

The witness speaks of censorship. The witness says:

“Newspapers and publications in Japan since 1935 have been subjected to strict censorship directed by the government and put in practice by the Home Ministry. Newspapers were not permitted to print anything on political matters except such news items as were issued by the various ministries of the government, with the result that newspapers published little besides propaganda tending to justify Japanese militaristic and aggressive warfare objectives. In addition to the various censorship laws in existence, it was the practice for the government through the Home Ministry, to issue press bans on news items, which officials of the government decided should be withheld from the Japanese public. The various ministries of the government directed newspapers in relation to the manner in which news items should be treated, and in addition thereto, it was the practice particularly of the Navy Press Bureau, Army Press Bureau and Foreign Office Press Bureau to call individual writers and journalists to their officer periodically and issue instructions to them as to the material which could be published and the manner in which such material must be published. That newspapers and publications in Japan from 1935 until the termination of the Pacific War were completely under the control and domination of the Japanese Government, and during these years there was no such thing as the semblance of a free press in Japan” (pp. 1,219-20) GORO KOIZUMI (p. 1,259).

The statement of this witness is Exhibit No. 152 in this case. The witness was CHIEF OF POLICE in various prefectures from 1935 to 1940. The witness speaks of the enforcement of censorship over newspapers, publications, writings, books, moving pictures, plays and other forms of entertainments, public speeches, public gatherings etc. The witness says: “in 1928 there was organized on a national basis from the Police Department a section called the High Police, the duties of which were primarily to watch over the activities of extreme leftists and extreme rightists, and in addition whose duties were to watch over the activities of anyone who was opposed to the policy of the Japanese Government as it existed from 1931 to December 7, 1941.

For illustration, FOLLOWING THE CHINESE-JAPANESE INCIDENT OF 1937, no one in Japan was permitted to express opposition to the war with China. If they did so, they would be arrested under the Preservation of Peace Law and imprisoned, (pp. 1, 264-65). The witness also says that, “That from ancient times in Japan, there was the family group movement throughout Japan. In ancient times these groups were banded together for the purpose of preventing and reporting crime and for mutual aid. That in the latter part of 1940, the family or neighbourhood group movement was revived for the purpose of educating the Japanese people on governmental policy and to make the people war conscious as well as for mutual aid, and to make them co-operate with the government, these families or neighbourhood groups being under the local administration” (pp. 1,265-66).

THE DEFENSE WITNESS Mr. YOSHIDA who from March 1930 to December 1935 served as an officer in charge of School Training and from August 1937 to March 1941 served in a section of the Personal Affairs Bureau and then in a section of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry and was in charge of School Training, gave us the reason why the system of school training and youth training in question was adapted by Japan. His evidence is Exhibit No. 2, 377 in this case. The witness says ¡“National training especially the training of youths, which had been carried out by leading powers since the close .of World War I had characteristics and developments of their own according to their respective internal conditions. Those countries had striven for the realization of a common ideal towards the development of these trainings, based on the lessons they had learned from World War I. On the other hand, Japan was the only country that did not have such systems and institutions. Not only had the young men and boys of the labouring class of Japan who formed the greater part of the youths, no definite educational institution after finishing compulsory education, but they were left to be infected with the evil ways of the world in pre-war and post-war times. Such being the case, men of intelligence feared that this might cast a gloomy shadow over the future of the state. The investigation of youth training which had been carried out by leading powers showed that, if let alone, Japan alone would be far behind tKe progress of leading powers. In short, this world-wide tendency especially national training, which was being carried out assiduously by the other powers, compared with that of Japan, made the Japanese Government and people awake to the necessity of carrying out this training. After all, the deficiency of civic training revealed at the time of the great EARTHQUAKE IN
1923, prompted Japan to adopt the system of school training in 1925 and subsequently the system of youth training in 1926.

A large section of public
opinion was for the adoption of these systems in those days and the bill was carried unanimously in both houses of parliament. ” The witness continues, “We believed that it would be most simple and effective to adopt military drill as a course of the school in order to foster the spirit of fortitude, and to cultivate the habit of observing discipline and decorum, valuing labour, as well as to develop physical education and thus to elevate the nation’s character. The military authorities had not the slightest intention of forcing this military training to be adopted.”

Mr. YOSHIDA then explains why the officers on the active list came to be attached to the schools and says: “Military drill which had been adopted as a school course as early as 1886 by MORI, the then Minister of Education, became existent in name only since the end of the Meiji era. The main reason why it had no beneficial effect on the discipline of the students was that the students ceased to place confidence in the retired officers in charge of this training. In view of this fact, we concluded that, if school training was to be developed, officers on the active list had to be attached to the schools. Therefore, the military authorities believed that physical and mental discipline of the students through training in schools and youth training would result in the strengthening of national defense.”

AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF CHINA INCIDENT IN 1937 greater importance was attached to this training. The witness gives us the training curriculum adopted, the hours of drill in a week and days of field exercise in a year. His evidence in this respect is to be found in the record of proceedings pages 18, 454 to 18, 460. I for myself find nothing unusual in this training and I do not see why this should lead us to infer a preparation for any aggressive act.

Military training does not necessarily mean preparation for any aggressive design. Even in a peaceful world such training may be considered advisable. At least in a world still controlled by Power-Politics such training is deemed essential by every power. Elsewhere I have dealt with why the Powers failed in their disarmament move. For the same reason the Powers would advocate military training of their youth. Dr. Schwarzenberger in his Power- Politics while dealing with the essential problem involved in the disarmament question, says: What was lacking was the political agreement between the governments, without which disarmament was not feasible. While the Governments were approaching this problem in a spirit of competition and power-politics, the function of their service experts could not be to transform themselves into peace doves. It was their job to protect the special interests of their country and to see that the relative position and strength of their own country in the balance of the contending forces are not injuriously affected. So long as there is this Power-Politics in the world organization and so long as the hierarchy of States is there, every nation would try to occupy a position in that hierarchy where it can command respect and would therefore lay emphasis on that which the world has elected to value as respectable.

Remembering that the Peace Conference after the First World War did its best for “the inculcation of an inferiority complex into Japan by its rejection of the Japanese demands to recognize the principle of racial equality as one of the fundamentals of the new community system” and remembering also that in International society “ a Greater Power is a country which has at its disposal more than an average amount of powers (military, political, economic and financial) and, furthermore, is willing to use this power in order to maintain or improve its own position in international society”. I do not see why this change in the educational policy of Japan would indicate anything beyond this legitimate ambition in the minds of its statesmen and politicians. They knew that in the International Society in which their nation was to live and function, strength counts for much and such “Strength is measured not only by reference to past trials, but also by forecasting the likely display of energy in potential strife.”

Excluding the expressions of opinion of some of the witnesses there is nothing in the evidence to indicate any aggressive preparation in the steps taken by the then authorities toward reorganization of the military education of the Japanese youth. The very fact that the prosecution had to introduce evidence of this character in its attempt to set up a case of an over-all conspiracy indicates its hopeless character. It may be noticed here that the prosecution case of conspiracy did not extend to bringing within its net the Japanese Government itself as it existed prior to the Manchurian Incident of 1931. One or two members of the Government might have been alleged as being in it. But in the main the conspiracy alleged was of persons outside the Government. The educational policy in evidence here is however the policy of the then Government. I do not know if members of any government in any country in the world would be safe, if its policies, actions and utterrances be subjected to this sort of scrutiny. To read into this evidence the alleged incriminating fact will indeed require a mind already provided with its theories in this respect and ingenious enough, to over-reach and mislead itself, to supply the links that are wanting and to take for granted facts supporting its preconceived theories. There is always the danger in a case like the present that conjecture or suspicion would take the place of legal proof. This is certainly a case where one must be on one’s guard against approaching the same with prejudice or conscious bias.

The censorship measures adverted to by some of the witnesses have nothing to do with the matter under our consideration here.

This evidence has been introduced with a view to establish the allegation that “ during this period free Parliamentary institutions were gradually stamped out and a system similar to the Fascist or Nazi model introduced”.

But I am afraid that evidence does not carry us far in this direction. The evidence substantially relates to a period subsequent to the outbreak of the Chinese hostility. On the outbreak of such hostilities almost in every civilized country legislation is enacted or automatically invoked giving to the executive broad powers to adapt rules for the conduct of the war and the regulation of
the civilian scene. These measures are recognized everywhere as the inevitable corollary of modern warfare; the need for quick and flexible administrative action leads to a policy of judicial abnegation. The development by the enemy of propaganda as a scientific weapon of modern warfare to break down the all important morale of civilians and soldiers makes necessary the countermeasures of suppressing by, punishment and censorship, utterances and statements which may reasonably have this effect and which would probably be made to achieve this end. It is not unlikely that during such a period of war there would be indiscriminate prosecution in this respect, the natural result of which would be the feeling that the authorities are punishing all expressions of dissatisfaction and criticism. It may also look like unnecessary encroachment upon fundamental liberties of the people and such encroachment may appear to be far from the reasons suggested for the adoption of such measures, namely, prevention of systematic or wilful attempts to create disunity and lower morale, But this happens almost in every country involved in modern warfare, and I see no reason why such measures adopted by Japan would lead us to an inference that all these were being devised as measures for some future aggressive war. Japan imposed restrictions on freedom of written opinion and of speech during this period but the reason again is obvious. During modern warfare every government feels the need of preventing the publication of information useful to the enemy and of limiting expression of criticism and opinion calculated to undermine a national unity. With the extension of the field of modern war to include civilian and the domestic scene, matter which may be directly or indirectly useful to any enemy is probably included in every issue of newspaper. Censorship and suppression of publications may therefore extend very far and precautions may legitimately be taken in respect of publication of all documents, pictorial representations, photographs or cinematograph films. It may be that in the actual application of these restrictive regulations the administrators did not limit their operation where the danger to the peace and safety of the state was imminent and certain, but extended them even where such danger was merely speculative and remote. We are not concerned here with the justice or otherwise of these measures. The restrictive laws might have been misapplied and it may be possible for us now to show the frequent absurdity of the pretention that the imminence of the evils was in any way increased by the words of any war-time defendant. These are matters which would not change the character of the measures adapted and would, at the worst, indicate their occasional abuses. I need not enter into the details of the evidence adduced in this phase of the case. All that I need say is that the evidence does not necessarily lead to the inference that Japan was preparing for aggressive war or that the heads of the various departments of the Japanese Government were conspiring to wage any aggressive war.

Though in democratic countries and in peace-time, the political control of the free press and like other forces at work in the international society “is not so strong as not to allow them a radius of their own in which they can display their own influence and acquire a considerable amount of nuisance value, ” yet the very possibility of their last named 'acquisition’ may lead any
particular country at any particular moment of its life to take to some controlling measures with relentless severity. But such steps would not necessarily lead to the inference that the country is entertaining any aggressive international design.

Some evidence has been given showing repressive measures against communists. This again indicates nothing for our present purposes. This might have been the result of fear almost common with every nation. Almost every nation seems even now to entertain a fear that its domestic communists will overthrow the government by internal violence. Every nation seems also to be worried that its traditional way of life will be undermined by the infection of public opinion. There are many responsible persons who believe that though there may be no clear and present danger of violent revolution, the threat of diseased morale is immediate. Such belief may or may not be justifiable and, in most cases, it is not. Yet if in any country persons responsible for the working of their constitutions entertain this belief and behave accordingly, I do not see how we can draw any inference therefrom beyond the fact that such administrators entertained such fear.

I would deal with the case of “control and dissemination of propaganda” and “mobilization of the people for war” in connection with the question of seizure and control of political powers.

THE PREPARATION OF JAPAN FOR
AGGRESSIVE WAR
INTERNALLY AND BY ALLIANCE
WITH
THE AXIS POWERS
***
SEIZURE OF POLITICAL POWER

I should next take up what is named, in the indictment, as “the organization of politics”, and, at the presentation of the case, as “the seizure and control of the governmental power”. In giving the particulars in the indictment it is stated:

1. That the provisions in the Japanese Constitution gave to the militarists the opportunity of gaining control over the Governments.
(a) The first such provision:
(i) Afforded the Chief of Staff and any other leaders of the Army and Navy direct access to the Emperor;
(ii) Enabled them to appoint and withdraw the War and Navy Ministers;
(iii) In May 1936, this power was further increased by a regulation that the Army and Navy Ministers must be senior officers on the active list;
(iv) These powers enabled them either to prevent a government from being formed or to bring about its fall after it was formed.
(b) The second provision was that although the Diet had the right to reject a budget, this did not give them any real control, as in case of such a rejection by the Diet, the budget of the preceding year remained in force.
(c) During this period free Parliamentary Institutions were gradually stamped out and a system similar to the Fascist or Nazi model introduced.

The statement itself, in my opinion, is not much convincing.

Mr. Keenan in his opening statement gave an account of this organization of politics or seizure of power. Item 4 in my analysis of his opening statement given above may be referred to in this connection. It will perhaps be convenient if I repeat it here. Mr. Keenan said:

“4.
(a) That the waging of aggressive warfare against China was aided and facilitated by military groups acting in concert with civilians in securing control of governmental departments and agencies;
(b) That the power involved in the Imperial Ordinance of 1936 providing that the Minister of War must be a General or Lt. General on the active list and that the Minister of Navy must be an admiral or vice-admiral on the active list, was utilized by the Army in obtaining domination and control of the Government and promoting Japan’s policy of expansion by force;
(c) That taking advantage of the express provisions of the Japanese Constitution making a sharp distinction between matters of general affairs of state and matters pertaining to the Supreme Command under the Army and Navy, the conspirators, throughout the life of the conspiracy, constantly
tended to enlarge the scope of matters contained within the concept of Supreme Command at the expense of matters belonging to general affairs of state;
(d)
(i) That militaristic cliques and ultra-nationalistic secret societies resorted to rule by assassination and thereby exercised great influence in favour of military aggression;
(ii) That assassinations and threats of revolt enabled the military branch more and more to dominate the civil government until on October 1941, the military acquired complete and full control of all branches of the Government, both civil and military;
(iii) That the military hierarchy caused the fall of the Yonai Cabinet in 1940, in order to advance aggressive object.”

Before proceeding further with this matter, it will be better to have a clear grasp of the prosecution case in this respect. The prosecution finally presents its case in the following clear and distinct stages:
1. In the first stage, the conspirators, whoever they be, are completely outside the governing body and have no inufluence with that body.
2. In the second stage, the conspirators are still outside the governing body, but are having more and more influence with that body.
3. In the third stage, the conspirators are gradually coming into the governing body.
4. In the fourth or the final stage, there has been complete seizure of the government by the conspirators.

The prosecution does not seem to be sure of its attitude towards the TANAKA Cabinet. It is absolutely clear that it has no complaint against any earlier cabinet and its policy towards China. As a matter of fact, at least before the TANAKA Cabinet, the Japanese Government had been studiously and persistently pursuing a “genuine policy of peace in harmony with the spirit of a deliberately Pacific World Order. ” “Japan, in this phase of her history, gave impressive evidence of her will to peace in a number of practical ways: In her acquiescence in the lapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; in her decision to withdraw her troops from the Vladivostok and from Tsingtao; in her dignified self-restraint in face of the provocative American immigration (exclusion) clause of 1924; and, not least, in her deliberate practice of her nonretaliation to Chinese provocation on certain notable occasions; for instance, on the occasion of the Nanking outrages of 1927, when the Japanese were decidedly less militant in their own self-defense than either the American or the British.”

The TANAKA Cabinet came into office on the 20th April 1927. According to the Prosecution, the Cabinet adopted a policy towards China which was fundamentally different from the preceding “friendship policy” of SHIDE-HARA. TANAKA' s policy is given the name 'positive policy'. At one place
we had the idea as if the prosecution was starting its case of aggression from the adoption of this policy. The prosecution says: “During the period from April 1927 to July 1929, under the Ministry of Prime Minister TANAKA, Japan followed the ‘positive policy’ which rested upon military forces with respect to Manchuria. This ‘positive policy’ placed great emphasis on the necessity for regarding Manchuria as distinct from the rest of China and contained a declaration that if disturbances spread to Manchuria and Mongolia, thus menacing Japan’ s special position, Japan would defend them. The TANAKA policy asserted that Japan herself would undertake to preserve peace and order in Manchuria in contrast with the friendship policy which limited the objective to the protection of Japanese interests. ”ln another place, however, the policy of TANAKA is characterized as one of “obtaining Japan’s desire in Manchuria by peaceful means.

Evidence regarding this policy is to be found in documents like Exhibits 171, 172, 173, 174, 175 and Exhibit 57, page 41.

This evidence shows that the Japanese Government under TANAKA, while respecting the sovereignty of China over Manchuria and doing everything for the preservation of the “open door and equal opportunity policy”, was fully determined to see that no state of affairs arose in Manchuria which would disturb the local tranquillity and put Japan ’ s vital interests in jeopardy. TANAKA often declared that the Japanese Government attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria and was prepared to do all it could to prevent occurrences of a state of affairs which would disturb that peace and order. He further declared that if the disturbances developed menacing the peace and order of Manchuria, Japan might be constrained to take appropriate steps for the maintenance of peace and order.

The defense offered evidence to show the then internal state of China in order to explain this apparent change in policy. Unfortunately we rejected this evidence as irrelevant. I have already expressed my opinion about this ruling in that part of my judgment where I have dealt with the Rules of Evidence and Procedure followed by the Tribunal. We allowed the prosecution to bring in evidence regarding the TANAKA policy. I believe, if this policy was a relevant fact, any fact explaining its development, and thus indicating its true character, was equally relevant,
In order to appraise the TANAKA policy we may, with profit, refer to an account of the events happening in China at the time given by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The Survey says:

‘During the years 1925 and 1926, when the storm-centre of the Chinese Revolution had hovered over the southern littoral and the Yangtse Basin, and when Russian Communist influence had been in the ascendant in the Counsels of the Kuomintang, the campaign against foreign encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty had been directed first and foremost against Great Britain and British nationals. In the course of the year 1927, however, the situation underwent radical changes, for Russian Communist influence, after reaching its zenith in January, declined to its final fall in December; and at the same time the storm-centre of the Revolution travelled forward again from the Yangtse Basin, where the predominant foreign interests were British, towards the North-Eastern provinces, where the predominant foreign interests were Japanese. In response to this double change in the situation, the Chinese movement against foreign ‘imperialism’ took a new direction, and its brunt began to fall upon the Japanese, while the British in China experienced a certain relaxation of pressure.

“As soon as Chiang Kai-shek’s troops crossed the southern boundary of Shantung in the 1927 campaign of the civil war between Kuomintang and Ankuochun, Japanese interests in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway were placed in jeopardy; and the Japanese Government acted as the British Government had recently done, in somewhat similar circumstances at Shanghai, by sending a defense force to the spot. This measure was repeated when, in the spring of 1928, Shantung became one theatre of the final and conclusive campaign of the Chinese civil war; and this time there was a violent collision between the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalist forces.

“The risk of such a clash war inherent in the policy; and though that rise had been run with impunity by the British Defense Force at Shanghai and by the Japanese Defense Force which had been despatched to Shantung and then withdrawn again in the preceding year, it must be remembered that Shantung was a particularly dangerous field for the despatch of a Defense Force by Japan, of all Powers. From 1915 to 1922, the Japanese Government’s attempt to step into the German Government’s shoes in this Chinese Province had been the burning question in China’s foreign relations: and the feeling aroused throughout China by this foreign encroachment upon the homeland of Confucious had done more than anything else to awaken a national consciousness in the Chinese people. Accordingly, Japanese policy in Shantung had become ‘the acid test’ of Sino-Japanese relations. The Signature of the Bi-partite Shantung Treaty at Washington on the 4th February 1922, and the withdrawal of the last Japanese troops from Shantung on the 17th December of that year, had been followed by a Sino-Japanese detente; but the painful memories which the settlement of 1922 had begun to efface in Chinese minds were sharply recalled when Japanese troops reappeared at Tsingtao and Tsi- nanfu in 1927 and again in 1928; and these memories revived some of the animus which the Japanese policy of 1915-22 had evoked at the time.”

“Tsingtao was a maritime ‘treaty port’ in a territory which China had been compelled to lease to a foreign Power in 1898; and this territory had only been brought back under Chinese administration in 1922 by certain effects of the General War of 1914-18 and of the Washington Conference of 1921-22 upon which the Chinese could not have reckoned. ” Tsinanfu was an inland city which had been opened to foreign trade by a unilateral decree of the Imperial Chinese Government in 1904. It was a provincial capital and a railway junction. The two railways which met at Tsinanfu were the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu line and the Tientsin-Pukow line. The Tsingtao-Tsinanfu line was owned by Japan. “On the 1st January, 1923, in pursuance of the Sino-Japanese treaty signed at Washington on the 4th February, 1922, the Tsingtao-Tsi-nanfu Railway had been formally transferred to the Chinese by the Japanese Government—subject only to the retention of a Japanese traffic-manager and a Japanese joint-accountant until China’s purchase of the railway from Japan had been completed. In the neighbourhood of the railway junction, and outside the walls of the Chinese city, a trading centre had been laid out in 1906 on the Chinese Government’s initiative; and this new quarter attracted the foreign residents and foreign business concerns to whom Tsinanfu had been thrown open in 1904.”

“At the beginning of 1927 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Tokyo was still occupied by Baron SHIDEHARA, who had represented Japan at the Washington Conference in 1921-22 and pursued a studiously moderate and conciliatory policy since taking office in June 1924. From January 1927 onwards some pressure was put upon Baron SHIDEHARA at home to take precautionary measures in China in case the militant movement against foreign privileges, the brunt of which was then being borne by the British in the Yangtse Valley, might travel further north and come to the directed against the Japanese (as eventually happened).”

“On the 16th April 1927, the Government of which Baron SHIDEHARA was a member resigned and were succeeded on the 19 th by a new Government in which General Baron TANAKA . . . combined the offices of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. On the 28th May, 1927, Baron TANAKA’s Government announced that, in view of the situation created by the advance of the Kuomintang Forces and the contingent threat to Japanese interests in Shantung, they had decided to despatch to Tsingtao two battalions, with the necessary ancillary troops, for the protection of Japanese interests in the province. They added that, while they regarded this action as an indispensable measure of defense, they had no intention of keeping the troops in Chinese soil for a prolonged period and would withdraw them immediately when the fear of danger to Japanese residents ceased to exist. The troops landed at Tsingtao on the 31st May; and on the 8 th July they moved up the railway and occupied various points on it, including Tsinanfu itself, while 500 naval ratings were landed at Tsingtao for local defense and 200 more troops, with artillery, arrived there on the 12th July from Dairen. ”. . . .

There was, however, no clash between the Chinese and the Japanese troops. Before the end of July 1927, the Chinese troops began to fall back southwards towards Pukow. “On the 29th August Baron TANAKA announced that it had been decided to withdraw all Japanese troops from Shantung in the immediate future; and the withdrawal was duly completed by the 8th September.”

“The original landing at Tsingtao at the end of May 1927 and the advance to Tsinanfu in July evoked popular protests in China; and during July an anti-Japanese boycott, tentatively supported by the Nanking-Kuomintang Government, was partially enforced in the Lower Yangtse Basin and at Canton. In Shantung itself, however, the Japanese Defense Force came and went without falling into any violent collision either with Chinese troops or with the Chinese civil population; and thus, in the first experiment, Baron
TANAKA’s policy might seem to have been justified by its fruits. Accordingly, in his announcement of the 29th August, the following intimation appeared:

“In case peace and order are disturbed in future not only in Shantung, but in any part of China where many Japanese reside, and it is feared that their safety may be affected, the Japanese Government may be constrained to take such self-defense steps as circumstances require. We remain firmly confirmed that the timely despatch of troops certainly accounts for the fact that, notwithstanding serious disturbances, we have been able to protect our residents satisfactorily and to prevent the occurrence of any untoward event.

Here is then and account of the development of TANAKA policy.

Even on this account of the development it might be difficult to say that the policy adopted was without justification. At any rate its development would be sufficiently and satisfactorily explained without a conspiracy of the kind alleged by the prosecution.

Whatever that be, in its final summation of the case, the prosecution does not condemn the TANAKA Cabinet as having any connection or sympathy with the alleged conspiracy. In fact the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet is said to be the result of “the first overt act by the army to project itself into the formulation of the government policy. ” The government and its policy were till then hostile to the aims of the conspirators, though “the army was already strongly enough entrenched so as to be able to defy the Government. ” It might defy the government but was not yet in a position to influence that body.

According to the prosecution case, then up to the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet on 2 July 1929, the alleged conspiracy was outside the government and was in the
army. The evidence limits it to “some young officers’ of the Kwantung Army. ”

The prosecution case is that the murder of Chang Tso-lin was the first overt act by the conspirators to project the army into the formulation of the government policy. There is some difficulty in understanding this case of “projection into the formulation of policy. ” It is, however, clear in one respect that this “projection” did not mean any SEIZURE OF POLITICAL POWER by the conspirators themselves. At least there is absolutely no evidence of any such attempt on the part of any body. I have already discussed this matter while examining the case of Chang Tso-lin’s murder.

The TANAKA Cabinet fell in July 1929 and was succeeded by the HAM- AGUCHI Cabinet, with Baron SHIDEHARA as Foreign Minister and INOUE, as Finance Minister. The friendship policy was again resumed by this Cabinet and this policy continued to be followed by the succeeding WAKATSUKI Cabinet at least until September 1931. This is the prosecution case, and, up until then, though the army might have been in a position “to defy the government”, it failed to influence this policy in any way SHIDEHARA and INOUE continued to be the Foreign and Finance Ministers respectively in this Cabinet also and accused MINAMI was its War Minister.

I have
already given my reason why I could not accept the prosecution case of General MINAMl’s participation or sympathy with the alleged conspiracy.
The statesmanship of a SHfDEHARA and an INOUE was considered exemplary of “the intelligent management of which human nature is capable”. In this phase of her history Japan was not only pursuing, but was also recognized by her neighbours as pursuing a genuine policy of peace.

The second stage of the conspiracy in this respect is alleged to have been reached with the accession of the INUKAI Cabinet on 13 December 1931, with ARAKI as the War Minister. According to the prosecution, “immediately upon ARAKI ’ s succession to office, there was an apparent change in the attitude of the government and in the co-operation between it and the Kwan- tung Army in furtherance of the conspiracy. A device was found, which, while it permitted the government to piously assert that it was carrying out the policy of the previous government of non-enlargement of the incident, enabled it to render the aid needed by the Kwantung Army in effectuating the conspiracy. ”

This, however, is only an assertion on the part of the prosecution. No evidence could be adduced in support of this “co-operation between the government and the Kwantung Army in effectuating the conspiracy”.

There is no suggestion against any other member of this Cabinet and there is absolutely no evidence against them. If the policy of the government was really changing at that time, it is absurd to ascribe such a change to the entry of ARAKI in the Cabinet. As I have already pointed out from the Lyt- ton Report itself, several factors were operating in order to prepare the way for the abandonment of the SHIDEHARA Policy of conciliation. The Lytton Report says:

“Certain internal, economic and political factors had undoubtedly for some time been preparing the Japanese people for a resumption of the “positive policy” in Manchuria. The dissatisfaction of the army; the financial policy of the Government; the appearance of a new political force emanating from the army, the country districts and the nationalist youth, which expressed dissatisfaction with all political parties, which despised the compromise methods of Western civilization and relied on the virtues of Old Japan and which included in its condemnation the self-seeking methods whether of financiers or politicians; the fall in commodity prices, which inclined the primary producer to look to an adventurous foreign policy for the alleviation of his lot; the trade depression, which caused the industrial and commercial community to believe that better business would result from a more vigorous foreign policy. All these factors were preparing the way for the abandonment of the SHIDEHARA “policy of conciliation” with China which seemed to have achieved such meagre results.”

These and perhaps several other factors operated in wrenching the direction of Japanese foreign policy out of a course which it had been following for a decade since the time of the Washington Conference. “The intelligent management of which human nature is capable, as exemplified in the statesmanship of a SHIDEHARA and an INOUYE, had been frustrated by the play of
collective social forces which were operating in a world-wide field on so vast a scale that they had the effect of blind impersonal movements against which the utmost efforts of national statemanship seemed of no avail.” “Racked by the remorseless turning of the economic screw in the long drawn-out course of the world depression”, the Japanese people at last felt disillusioned with the policy hitherto followed in their enterprise of sustained industrial and commercial expansion. Rightly or wrongly, “they despaired of continuing the attempt to win their national livelihood in the eonomic field”, pursuing the hitherto followed policy which “seemed doomed to frustration by inhuman forces beyond human control, ”as also by human forces beyond Japanese control. Perhaps by this time they came to feel that after the Anglo-American e- conomic world order no scope was left for the realization of their hope of providing for “Japan’s rankly growing population by acquiring for Japan an increasing share in an increasing aggregate turnover of international trade”. Their disillusionment in this respect perhaps impelled them to a course which only indicated their “ignorant improvidence.”

But certainly it did not indicate any attempt at effectuating any conspiracy.

The “device” referred to in the above extract is the prosecution characterization of the Japanese reservation in accepting the League Council resolution of December 10, 1931. When accepting that resolution the Japanese delegate at Geneva stated that his acceptance “was based on the understanding that this paragraph (No. 2) was not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as might be necessary to provide directly for protection of lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activity of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria”. That the menace was a real one would appear from item 17 of my analysis of the Lytton Report itself. The Lytton Report observed that “having made their reservation at Geneva, the Japanese continued to deal with the situation in Manchuria according to their plans”. This might have been according to the plan of the Kwantung Army or of a group of officers of that army. But as yet there is no evidence that the government was any party to that plan. The reservation certainly was made in view of a real menace.

Though MINAMI and ARAKI, the War Ministers in the WAKATSUKI and the INUKAI Cabinets, are also classed as conspirators, the real third stage of conspiracy is alleged to have commenced with the HIROTA Cabinet which took office on March 9, 1936.

HIROTA came in as foreign minister in the SAITO Cabinet on 14 September 1933, the Cabinet itself having been formed on 26 May 1932 on the fall of the INUKAI Cabinet as a result of the May incident of 1932. The strongest evidence against him comprises the records of his China policy. These are Exhibits 216 and 935 in this case. I shall presently consider this policy and see how far it leads to the prosecution case of the conspiracy and of HIROTA’s participation in it.
The fourth stage is said to the reached with the TOJO Cabinet on 18 October 1941.

The first definite attempt at the seizure of political power is traced to the
March Incident of 1931. We are then given the October Incident of 1931, the May Incident of 1932 and the February Incident of 1936.

Before proceeding further with the matter, I would like to clarify the correct approach to the question under consideration. We must be careful not to be led by the mere sinister character of any such incident. We must keep in view the following distinct questions and see which of them the evidence can be said to have established:

1. Whether the incident was designed for the overthrow of the government or whether the overthrow took place merely as a result of the incident.
2. Whether the incident was designed for
(a) the mere overthrow of a particular government, party or individual minister;
or
(b) the overthrow of a particular government, party or individual minister, and the installation of any other particular government, or individual minister.
3. Whether the overthrow was designed for the advancement of the conspiratorial object or for any other reason.
4. How is the incident or the design connected with the conspiratorial group.

The following witnesses were examined to give some account of this alleged gradual seizure of power by the conspirators.

Of these FUJITA and DONOHUE gave nothing on this point. I give below the gist of the evidence of the rest.

Kijuro SHIDEHARA: Affidavit, Exhibit 156.

Baron SHIDEHARA is the present Minister of the State. He is a Minister without Portfolio now. Prior to this he was Prime Minister. In 1931 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had been Minister of Foreign Affaris since 1925.

His evidence is:

Premier Hamaguchi approved and recommended reductions in the Army
and Navy Budgets. He pushed through the ratification of the London Naval Treaty and in doing so created strong opposition by the military. HAMAGUGHI was shot by a silly young man named Sagoya. The motive of this assassination was found to be dissatisfaction with the Naval Disarmament, with the military clique or with the people in the Government.

Hamaguchi Cabinet was formed in 1929. In 1930 it was followed by Wakatsuki Cabinet.

The Foreign Policy of this Cabinet was definitely conciliatory and co-operative so far as international affairs were concerned. It came to be called the Friendship Policy of the Shidehara Diplomacy. A great strain was put on this foreign policy in September 1931 by the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

The witness says: “Shortly before the Manchurian Incident, as Foreign Minister, I received confidential reports—rumours—and information that the Kwantung Army was engaged in amassing troops and bringing up ammunition and material for some military purpose, and knew from such reports that action of some kind was contemplated by the military clique. ” In cross-examination the witness said this was based on mere rumour. He had no report official or non-official. He talked about this with the Premier Wakatsuki and the then War Minister, General Minami. General Minami co-operated with him fully in the matter.

Before introducing his affidavit the witness made it clear that this military clique was different from the Kwantung Army . The War Minister, General Minami, certainly was not in that clique. In cross-examination he says some young officers of the Army formed this clique but he could not give their names.

The witness said that after the Incident the Cabinet and himself, as Foreign Minister, made every effort to control the Army and prevent further territorial expansion but were unable to do so. The ultra-nationalists and the militarists were clamouring for a “positive policy” in Manchuria.

This Cabinet was forced to resign as a result of the inability of the Cabinet to control the Army and suppress their expansion. In cross-examination he explained what actually happened. A coalition ministry to take measures to overcome depression was considered advisable. The fall of the Cabinet was due to internal dissension.

The causes of the fall of the Cabinet were:

1. The financial policy adopted by the Finance Minister Inouye.
2. Trouble regarding the maintenance of the gold standard in Japan.
3. Adaptation of certain deflationary measures including the measures in decreasing the salary of government employees.

The Manchurian Incident aggravated the situation.

It was not through any action of General Minami that the Cabinet fell.

In the Hamaguchi Cabinet General Ugaki was the War Minister. He fully co-operated with the Cabinet in making armament reductions.
General Minami became the War Minister in the Wakatsuki Cabinet. The same political party controlled both the Hamaguchi and the Wakatsuki
Cabinets.

The Cabinet had no direct control of the action of the Army as it was not in their jurisdiction. The Cabinet had no direct voide in Army affairs. It could not directly interfere with the Army, but might convery to the Army through the War Minister what the Government thought of any action the Army might take, so that by this means, to a certain extent, the Government was able to have a say to control Army Policy. The government under the Constitution had no authority, no power directly to interfere with the Army. The Privy Council of the Japanese Government had even less control over the Army.

It was THE UNANIMOUS DECISION OF THE CABINET that the Manchurian Incident was in self-defense.

On 26 September the Cabinet adopted a resolution that Japan had no territorial ambition and on the next day this was intimated to the United States through Ambassador Debuchi. All these were sincere and honest. All that time the Government entertained no intention or idea of territorial expansion.

Anti-Japanese movements in China were frequent.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang’s Government oppressed and exploited Japanese industries and economical enterprises in Manchuria in spite of the protests by the Japanese residents. He referred to several incidents including the Wan Po Shan Incident in which several hundred Koreans were massacred, and the murder of Captain Shintaro NAKAMURA.

Konosuke SHIMIZU: Affidavit, Exhibit 157.

The witness claimes to have been an associate of Dr. Shumei OKAWA, being introduced to him by one KITA whom he became acquainted with at Shanghai in 1919.

The witness speaks of a plot planned by Dr. OKAWA in March 1931 and drags in Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO of the Army General Staff in the plot.
The plot was planning a revolution for the purpose of renovating the Japanese Government”. His part in the plot was arranged to be “to throw some bombs outside the Diet Building during a demonstration of Dr. OKAWA1s followers. It was arranged that thereupon Dr. OKAWA would lead the mob into the Diet and proceed to take over the Government. Colonel HASHIMOTO was to procure bombs from the Army for the purpose. Three hundred bombs came to the witness. He, however, did not say by whom these were brought. The plan failed and the incident never took place. The witness incidentally drags in General UGAKI, the then War Minister, General KOISO, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and Lt. Colonel NEMOTO, his assistant.

The most curious part of the evidence of this witness is the following statement:

“After the failure of the aforesaid March Incident I continued to see the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA from time to time at the Kinryutei Inn. On one of
these occasions in August when the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA WAS DRUNK with sake he told me that he and a certain Colonel KOMOTO Daisaku and a certain Colonel AMAKASU of the Kempetai, together with Colonel ITAGAKI, Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, would bring about an incident in Mukden sometime later on.

“After the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident in September, I was arrested and spent three months in jail. When I got out of jail in December 1932 I saw the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA several times. He was very busy at this period organizing Jimmu Kai, au ultra-nationalistic, rightist society, the aims of which were to bring about a renovation in the Japanese Government with the ultimate purpose of expelling the white race from Asia and the liberation of Asiatic people under the leadership of Japan. During one of our meetings sometime in March 1932 the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA told me that he was interested in a plot with a certain TACHIBANA Kozaburuo. who was the leader of the farmers group and certain young naval officers who were dissatisfied with the weak Japanese Government at that time. I told the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA that any such movement was contrary to public opinion and could not succeed and that I culd not participate in any further attempts with him. ”

No connection whatsoever has been established between the alleged plot and the present war. The witness denied that there was any such connection. The bombs were nothing but Firecrackers.

In his corss-examination the witness said that his arrest and imprisonment after the Mukden Incident had nothing to do with the Incident. If so, it is difficult to see why such misleading statement was taken in the affidavit at all.

The import of the March plot was given out by him to be purely domestic.

Yoshichika TOKUGAWA: Affidavit, Exhibit 158.

This witness is introduced to supplement the story of the previous witness regarding the abortive plot of March 1931. He comes in because SHIMIZU delayed in returning the bombs to General KOISO. SHIMIZU however was not asked a single word about his delay and difficulty caused thereby to General KOISO.

The witness was approached by General KOISO also to request him to exert his influence on Dr. OKAWA to abandon this plot. But we are not told what hold this witness had on Dr. OKAWA, how he was connected with him and how General KOISO knew of this. He was not known to General KOISO before. He did not know about the plot either.

Ken INUKAI: Affidavit, Exhibit 161.

The witness is at present a member of the Diet. He is the son of Premier INUKAI and was his secretary in 1931 and 1932. On May 15, 1932 his father was shot at his official residence by some Naval Officer.

His knowledge is derived from his reading, as secretary to his father, of the minutes of discussions held in the Cabinet meetings. He also claims to have discussed all matters before the Cabinet with his father, the Prime Minister. He also kept his father’s papers and records and handled his correspondence.

He stated that during his father’s tenure of office as Prime Minister he was opposed to the extension of the Manchurian Incident and was in favour of having the Japanese Army withdrawn from Manchuria. Several months after the Manchurian Incident his father decided to recommend to the Emperor that the Army be withdrawn. He had an audience with the Emperor but was not successful. Another policy of his father was to oppose the recognition of the Puppet State of Manchuria as he considered such a recognition to be the violation of the sovereignty of China.

In an effort to settle the Manchurian problem his father sent a secret delegate to Nanking to talk with General Chiang Kai-shek. This effort failed as the military intercepted the secret code used between the delegate and the Premier.

General ARAKI was war Minister in that Cabinet. He too tried his best to check the spreading of the unfortunate incident. But it was beyond his power to control the younger officers of the Army who were the motivating force to spread incidents in Manchuria.

Kajushige UGAKI: Affidavit, Exhibit 163.

The witness was War Minister in the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet.

He speaks about his coming to know injanuary or February 1931 of Dr. OKAWA’s planning some kind of demonstration around the Diet Building, and his being scheduled to become the head of the Government to be set up if the plot succeeded. He ordered the plot to be stopped. He resigned with HAMAGUCHI Cabinet on April 13, 1931 and voluntarily retired from the Army.

In 1937 after the fall of the HIROTA Cabinet he was invited to form a cabinet but he failed to do so because of the opposition of the military.

Exhibit 163, part 2, a letter written by Dr. OKAWA to the witness was proved by him in support of his statement regarding OKAWA’s plot.

He too asserts that this plot did not relate to any affairs outside Japan.

In his cross-examination the witness explained what he meant by military opposition of 1937. He referred to only those of the military personnel in active service who meddled with politics.

WAKATSUKI Reijiro i (Exhibit 162, p. 1,553)

The witness was Prime Minister of Japan from April to December 1931. It was the policy of the Government to put into effect the budget prepared by the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet and the effect of this budget was to reduce the money allotted to the Army. When the Mukden Incident broke out on September 18, 1931, the first time the Cabinet knew it was on the 19th
(Doc. 108).

The witness stated that he tried everything in an effort to control the situation but without success. His last move was to try to form a coalition Cabinet with the Seiyukai, hoping that through the combined strength of both parties he would be able to control the Army in Manchuria, but various Cabinet members were unwilling to form the coalition, so the measure failed. At that time the situation stood as follows: The policy of the Cabinet had never varied on the question. They had unanimously opposed any expansion by the Army and day after day had been unceasing in its efforts to terminate aggressive operations. MINAMI had failed to control the Army in Manchuria and had not carried out the unanimous policy of the Cabinet. Therefore, the witness resigned as Premier. (Doc. 109)

In his cross-examination the witness stated that he had heard the story that MINAMI had ordered the Kempei-Tai or gendarmery to arrest younger officers in the middle of October. This was told to him not at a Cabinet meeting but on October 17th at a ceremony performed at the Imperial Palace. While he did not recall the matter exactly, the reason for the arrest was that the younger officers had contemplated an attempt on the witness's life and the Kempei-Tai had stopped this. The witness stated he had not heard of any reason why these younger officers intended to harm him. (Dig. 112)

The witness also stated that despite the Cabinet’s policy the Manchurian Incident had spread and expanded; that this was a sad truth, but it was the truth and since it was his desire to bring the Manchurian Incident to a close as soon as possible, he exerted every effort. Various things were tried—one of them being a coalition Cabinet which he hoped would be able to stop the action of the Army. This did not materialize, and the Cabinet resigned.

The coalition Cabinet idea was the witness’ only hope but he could not say that if such a Cabinet had come about, it would have been possible to have attained the idea hoped for. He tried various steps but without result and he thereupon came to the conclusion that if a coalition Cabinet was formed it would show that the people as a whole were opposed to the spreading of the Manchurian Incident and the Army would naturally be controlled. This was his idea and he didn’ t know whether it was right or wrong.

Finally, coming to the conclusion that the government as at the time constituted—that is, only by the Minseito party—was too weak and it would be necessary to include the Seiyukai party in order to show that it was the people’s wish that the Incident be stopped and thus cause the Army to self-re- flect, he asked ADACHI Home Minister, who well knew the political situation, to ascertain whether the Seiyukai were willing to join his Cabinet, and if so, how this should be accomplished. If such a Cabinet was to be formed it would be necessary to change a few Ministers, so while asking ADACHI to ask the opinions of the Seiyukai, the witness contacted one or two of his fellow Ministers and told them of his idea.

They replied that such a coalition Cabinet should be formed only after much deliberation because if the composition of the Cabinet was changed the diplomatic and financial policies would necessarily have to change and this
would not be good for Japan.

In view of this opposing opinion, the witness was forced to give his own judgment on the matter. He weighed the advantages and disadvantages and finally came to the conclusion that it would not be good for Japan and therefore asked ADACHI to stop his negotiations. Notwithstanding this ADACHI continued to negotiate and rumours went around to the effect that the Cabinet was not united. The witness asked ADACHI to stop the negotiations, but yet he continued such negotiations. As this gave rise to all kinds of rumours, the witness decided that all Cabinet Ministers should convey to the Home Minister that they were against continued negotiations, and ask him to attend a Cabinet meeting. The Home Minister refused to come to the meeting. He was then asked to resign. The Home Minister’s reply was that he would not resign unless the Cabinet resigned as a whole. At this point the Cabinet showed complete disunity and the government could not continue. Therefore, a resignation of entire Cabinet was submitted. The witness stated that he had not called for the resignation of War Minister MINAMI.

The direct cause of the collapse of the Cabinet was the action of Home Minister ADACHI.

Since MIN AMI always came to Cabinet meetings and never raised any objection to Cabinet policy, the witness believed that he did nothing in opposition to the policy of the Cabinet.

GOTO FUMIO (Exhibit 166, p. 1,638).

The witness was Minister for Home Affairs in the OKADA Cabinet in 1934 and during that time the Army rebellion of 1936 occurred and an attempt was made to assassinate Prime Minister OKADA. The witness acted as Prime Minister for three days while OKADA was besieged. OKADA and his Cabinet experienced difficulties with the Army. The highest officers in the Army at that time were General KAWASHIMA, Minister of War; Prince KANIN, Chief of the Army General Staff, who was not very active; General SUGIYAMA, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, General WATANABE, Inspector General of Military Education, General INAI, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, General MINAMI, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, General ITAGAKI, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

In 1940 when Premier KONOYE decided to set up the I. R. A. A. he asked for the witness to advise him with respect to forming the plans of the organization. The witness made many attempts with the preparatory committee of which HASHIMOTO was a member. He later occupied a position in the General Affairs Committee and participated in the affairs of that organization.

After the formation of the I. R. A. A. no other important organizations existed. The result was to create the important public organization which was controlled in its entirety by government officers who occupied high positions. It was subsidized by government funds to the extent of 8 million yen a year. It reached to every prefecture, ward and street.

In his cross-examination the witness stated he took part in the formulation of the I. R. A. A. —its practical policy and also of its movement policy. He was one of the Directors of the I. R. A. A. and although he does not remember the exact number of the members of the Committee it was somewhere between thirty and forty. The organization was founded on October 10 , 1940, and was dissolved during the SUZUKI Cabinet in 1945. By the words in the platform of the I. R. A. A. that “We shall become the moral leaders of the world” it meant that they endeavoured to raise the moral standard of the nation and gain respect from other countries.

As to the words in the second Article of the platform “ that the Society shall strive for the establishment of a new world order”, the witness stated that the Society had no time to do it and fortunately never gained enough power to do it.

The witness stated that the object of the I. R. A. A. was nothing less than this “that the entire nation shall be one and shall fulfil their duties each in his own sphere, and establishing such an organization shall work in order that this organization shall function smoothly and in this way strive to fulfil their duties as subjects”. There is not included in the purpose the idea of being the moral leader of the world and to work for the establishment of a new world order. By calling it a public organization he meant it as one which is not a political organization. He stated that the organization was controlled by the government and not that the organization controlled the people. The sum of 8 million yen received from the government was used to operate the Association so that the people might carry out their duties as subjects.

By carrying out the duties of subjects, he meant that the Japanese nation carried out duties which are incumbent upon the people of Japan, including duties of miliary service, payment of taxes and other legal and moral duties.

The I.R.A. A. was not formed to prepare the people for inhumane and illegal war against Great Britain and America.

The witness further said that political parties were not dissolved as a result of the establishment of the I. R. A. A. Parliamentary political parties were dissolved before the Preparatory Committee had been assembled. There was a prevailing opinion that KONOYE was about to form one great political party and the witness believes that the leaders of the various parties were dissolving their parties with the idea of joining this one joint party. He might be mistaken, but the political parties were dissolved. KONOYE abandoned his original plan of forming one party; at the same time the trend of public opinion was that such an idea was not in accordance with Japanese national structure. In this atmosphere the Preparatory Committee met.

KONOYE’s ideal thus was to form an organization in which all strata of the Japanese people could be in agreement, even though they would have different political ideologies and political opinions. It was not one great political party with a definite platform and the ability to push it, but an organization in which all kinds of people of all kinds of opinions and trends could agree and operate. For those persons who had desired a strong party, the Association was a disappointment. They had dissolved their parties so they could join the I. R. A. A. but they were greatly dissatisfied with its lack of political power.

The politicians felt the need of establishing a new political party which would have power, so they resigned from the I. R. A. A. and formed the I. R. A. P. S. It was at this time that the KONOYE Cabinet declared in the Diet that I.R.A.A. was a public organization, not a political one.

The I. R. A. A. carried on mainly movement of a spiritual kind, as to what their duties should be. It was mainly concerned with domestic movements; for instance, the increase in the production and the regulation of national living. After the formation of I. R. A. P. S. there was not much change in the functions; it continued its functions whereas the I. R. A. P. S. indulged in parliamentary activities and the assertion of a political platform (R. P, 1, 664-72).

The witness was brought to depose in this case from the Sugamo jail.

I would also refer to the evidence of Keisuke OKADA (affidavits, Exhibits 175 and 176) already noticed by me while considering the Mukden Incident, as also Exhibit 2, 177-A the testimony of Dr. OKAWA given before the Tokyo Court of Appeal in 1934, also already noted by me.

In his cross-examination the witness said:

1. TANAKA’s positive policy in Manchuria was not to be by force but was to be made peacefully.
2. The national policy of Japan was to advance peacefully into the Chinese country. This policy was forced upon Japan as a result of the fact that peaceful advance elsewhere was stopped by the Gentleman’s Agreement. At that time Japan was greatly overpopulated, and if it did not expand somewhere the situation would have been terrible.

TANAKA Ryukichi was also requisitioned by the prosecution for the present purpose.

The witness spoke of;

1. The murder of Chang Tso-Lin on June 4, 1928:

(a) In 1942 he saw the report regarding the murder. That report is lost (Exhibit 180). He gives its contents from memory. (&) The killing was planned by Senior Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, COLONEL KAWAMOTO.

(c) The commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army had no connection with it.
(d) The plan was by Colonel KAWAMOTO and ten others. The
plan was the Colonel’s own alone. Captain Ozaki’s part was to follow his order. He had nothing to do with the explosion .
(e) (i) The witness was told by Colonel KAWAMOTO of this incident in 1935.
(ii) The purpose of the plot was also to be—setting up of an
independent government.
(f) The witness heard from Captain Ozaki in 1929.
2. Attitude of the Army toward Manchuria in 1930 and 1931:
(a) Names the officers—General TATEKAWA; Kingoro HASHÍ- MOTO; Captain CHO Isamu; Colonel ITAGAKI; Lt. Colonel ISHIHARA.
3. Sakura-kai Organization of 1931 (spring):
(a) The meeting of 1 December 1930 was called by Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO.
(b) The objectives were: (1) to carry out internal renovation; (2)
to settle Manchurian problem.
4. Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931:
(a) Planned incident.
(b) Leading Japanese people involved: Major General TATEKAWA, Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Shumei OKAWA, Captain Isamu CHO. According to what Captain Cho and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO told me the leaders in the Kwantung Army were: The Chief of Staff, Colonel ITAGAKI, and Deputy Chief, Colonel ISHIHARA.

(c) The plan was to find a solution of the internal and Manchurian situations.

It was the intent of those who were in Manchuria to destroy the Chinese warlords then in Manchuria, to set up a new country based on the kingly way and a country maintaining peace, tranquillity and order, a country under the control of Japan, so that close co-operation and co-ordination may be made in the economic exploitation of this area and thereby to stabilize the Japanese conditions at home, as well as to make of Japan a stabilizing factor in East Asia.

(d) The witnes was told in 1934 by HASHIMOTO:
(i) That the Manchurian Incident was planned by the Kwantung Army.
(ii) That the ultimate object was to make of Manchuria a base from which to bring about the revival of Asia.
(iii) The desire before the Incident and after the Incident. This witness was giving the detailed plan and on Saturday could say that TATEKAWA told him that this Incident was being planned by the Kwantung Army (vide proceedings 2,010). On the previous day in spite of the repeated efforts made by the Prosecution the witnesss could not be made to say this (vide proceedings pages 1,966, 1,975, 1,983, 1,987, 2,003 and 2,086).

As I have already noticed, the alleged statement has absolutely no guarantee of trustworthiness. It has not even the usual guarantee of trustworthiness of a confessional statement. HASHIMOTO, in making this alleged statement to the witness, was not making any confession. He could not then have been prompted by any motive to confess guilt; he cannot be credited with any consciousness of guilt, for the simple reason that it is not the case of anybody
that at that time any one in Japan was considering the act as criminal. At that time the incident had produced some result then considered advantageous to Japan, and a claim to its authorship might very well have been motived by false pride or bragging. In my opinion it would be dangerous to rely on a hearsay evidence of this character in order to fix any responsibility on any of the persons alleged to have been named by HASHIMOTO as his associate in the act.

It has been shown that since 1928, eleven different cabinets rose and fell in Japan till the formation of the Tojo Cabinet,
ACCORDING TO THE DEFENSE many of them fell because of purely domestic reasons, unrelated to any international situation. Among the reasons for their termination are the following: The TANAKA Cabinet fell on July 1, 1929 because of internal dissension in the Cabinet. The HAMAGUCHI Cabinet’s fall on April 13, 1931 was due to the illness of the Prime Minister. The 2nd WAKATSUKI Cabinet fell on December 12, 1931 because of a difference of opinion between WAKATSUKI and ADACHI, Minister of Home Affairs, with regard as to whether or not the Cabinet should be a coalition form of Government.

The INUKAI Cabinet fell on May 25, 1932 when INUKAI was assassinated by some young officers over a domestic political issue. The SAITO Cabinet fell on July 7, 1934 because of a public scandal which compromised some of the ministers and high officers of the government. The OKADA Cabinet’s fall on March 8, 1936 was the result of the February 26th Incident. The fall of the HIROTA Cabinet on February 1, 1937 was occasioned by a difference of opinion between HIROTA and TERAUCHI, Minister of War, on the issue of whether the House of Representatives should be dissolved. The HAYASHI Cabinet fell on June 3, 1937 when HAYASHI dissolved the Diet. The new Diet which was elected was opposed to HAYASHI’ s domestic policies.

The 1st KONOYE Cabinet fell on January 4, 1939 due to a difference of opinion a- mong Cabinet members with regard to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The HIRANUMA Cabinet’s fall on August 29, 1939 was due to internal dissension and the sudden and unexpected conclusion of the nonaggression pact between Germany and Russia. The ABE Cabinet fell on January 15, 1940 because of the domestic price commodity policy and the question of whether or not the Trade Ministry should be established. The YONAI Cabinet fell on July 21, 1940 because of differences of opinion concerning the formation of a new political party. The 2nd KONOYE Cabinet’s fall on July 17, 1941 was brought about by KONOYE’s difference of opinion with MATSUOKA, Minister of Foreign Affairs, as to foreign negotiations. The 3rd KONOYE Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941 because of KONOYE’s differences with TOJO with respect to American policy.

Unlike Hitler, no one in Japan was in a continuous position of control in these cabinets or in the military during the period of time covered in the indictment. In three of these cabinets—The TANAKA Cabinet, April 20, 1927 to July 1, 1929; the HAMAGUGHI Cabinet, July 2, 1929 to April 13, 1931 and the HAYASHI Cabinet, February 2, 1937 to June 3, 1937 not one of the
accused was even a member nor were any of them Chief of the Army General Staff or Navy General Staff during those times.

The several sinister incidents brought out by the evidence adduced in this connection are the following:

1. The fall of the TANAKA Cabinet in July 1929 as a result of the murder of Chang Tso-lin on 4 June 1928.
2. The March Incident of 1931 during the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet.
3. The murder of HAMAGUCHI and the consequent fall of his Cabinet on 14 April 1931.
(a) The accession of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet on 14 April 1931 with accused MINAMI as War Minister.
(b) The Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931.
(c) The October Incident of 1931.
(d) The fall of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet and the accession of INUKAI Cabinet on 13 December 1931, with accused ARA- KI as War Minister.
4. The May Incident of 1932: The murder of INUKAI on May 15, 1932 and the consequent fall of his cabinet.
5. The accession of the SAITO Cabinet on 26 May 1932 with accused ARAKI as War Minister.
(a) Accused HIROTA comes in as Foreign Minister.
6. The fall of the SAITO Cabinet and accession of the OKADA Cabinet with accused HIROTA remaining the Foreign Minister on 8 July 1934.
(a) The army rebellion of 1936.
7. The fall of the OKADA Cabinet and the accession of the HIROTA Cabinet on 9 March 1936.