Category Archives: H2020

Looking for the geographical dimensions of Framework Programmes
The EU Framework Programme (FP) is by far the most important European intervention for research and technological development (RTD). While this policy has been repeatedly reformed, the FP has also shaped European research since 1984. The largest part of the FP aims to promote transnational RTD projects granting funds for ‘excellent research’ (the so-called ‘FP-Cooperation’, which covers about two thirds of the whole budget), irrespective of their geographical localisation. However, as our study on the geographical distribution of FP participation shows, ‘excellent’ research is also unevenly spread across Europe.

Why is important to study the geographical distribution of FP participations? There are two major reasons. First, in the political debate there are claims for an equal distribution of funds across member states, implicitly claiming for a correction on the criteria of ‘scientific excellence’ that is considered to be biased in favour of most advanced countries. Second, in the scientific literature, research has been largely recognised as a fundamental input for ‘regional systems of innovation’ (RSI) (Cooke et al., 1997; Iammarino, 2005; Moulaert and Sekia, 2003). Since 1990s, RSIs were identified as good practices for a transition through a ‘knowledge-based economy’ based on synergies among universities, firms and governments (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). In this perspective, the understanding of where ‘excellent research’ is carried out contributes to identify the ‘research competitiveness’ of European territories, and then how this support regional innovation capacities.

Our research aims to identify what characterises the spatial distribution of FP participations, despite a policy rationale driven only by ‘scientific excellence’ regardless geographical dimensions. Our analysis reveals the existence of two driving forces:
1. Research is cumulative: once a district was able to carry out ‘excellent research’, they are more likely to keep this dominant position. Research is a process based on cumulative experiences, and it takes time for newcomers to reach the level of already advanced experts in a certain specialised field.
2. The FP has a competitive rationale based on open calls for funding. This implies that a ‘leading position’ cannot be taken for granted and newcomers have space to increase their rate of FP participation.

These two forces are combined and they interact to shape European research geography. We define the resulting geography as an ‘open polycentrism’ where there are multiple centres with high rates of FP participation, but these rates change and in turn determine the rise of newcomers and the decline of those unable to keep their ‘competitiveness’. The concept of ‘open polycentrism’ is articulated in three different features:
a. There are ‘centres’ where most of the ‘research’ is carried out meaning that ‘excellent’ RTD projects tend to be highly concentrated in few areas;
b. There are ‘multiple’ centres, and not a single core taking most of the FP projects;
c. The competitive nature of FP calls for projects makes possible significant changes in the rate of FP participation over time.

Beyond network analysis, towards a geographical perspective
Where is ‘excellent research’ carried out? If FP projects are selected only for their ‘scientific excellence’, the distribution of FP participants can be assumed as indicator for where excellent research is. For this purpose, the EU Commission’s database named CORDIS was largely used by scholars to analyse participations providing a large literature on how scientific communities are structured around Europe (Autant-Bernard and Chalaye, 2013; Autant-Bernard et al., 2007; Barber and Scherngell, 2013; Barber et al., 2011; Heller-Schuh et al., 2011; Wanzenböck et al., forthcoming). These analyses were very useful to understand partnerships’ networks that show the progressive integration of national research communities towards a ‘European Research Area’, however, little is said on the geographical dimensions and long-term evolutions due to significant limitations in available data.

An innovative database, developed in the context of the ‘Geography of Research in Europe And Territorial Policy Innovations’ GREATPI project, allows for a very detailed analysis. First, each FP participant has been associated with its geographical district (NUTS3), providing a better focus in comparison to previous analyses that considered just the regional level (NUTS2). Second, a long process of data cleaning allows long-term analysis during last decade from FP5 (1999-2002) to FP7 (2007-2010 ). For the purpose of our analysis, we have selected three FP-Cooperation’s themes: biotechnologies (KBBE), energy and environment. These FP themes represent about one fifth of the whole FP-Cooperation and were selected because they represent some of the societal challenges and are fully comparable across FP periods, while other themes changed.

Something more than just a core-periphery system
In the field of geography, the ‘core-periphery’ theory is well known: high-quality functions (in this case the ‘excellent research activities’) tend to be concentrated in the core leaving the periphery with only secondary functions. This concentration was already identified by several authors also in the case of FP participation (Autant-Bernard and Chalaye, 2013; Barber and Scherngell, 2013; Barber et al., 2011; Heller-Schuh et al., 2011), however, what was missing was the dynamic perspective of how this ‘core’ evolves. To test the hypothesis of an ‘open polycentrism’, we extracted the top-5 percentile of districts in terms of FP participations from FP5 (1999-2002) to FP7 (2007-2010) in the three selected themes (Biotechnologies – KBBE, Environment and Energy), and plotted them as shown in Figure 1. By this simple comparison, it is possible to understand how the performance of top-performing districts changed over time. Before entering into the discussion, a general observation is necessary: the sample includes the entire EU as well as Associated Countries, such as Turkey, Switzerland and Norway among others, that participate in the FP with the same funding and rights as EU member states. Furthermore, the selected period corresponds with the full integration of new member states, which were already fully involved in the FP policy since 1999.

In Figure 1, there are three major findings. First, there are several observations with always high and stable rates of FP participation (the ‘core’). This is the effect of the cumulative nature of research because those that were the most advanced research centres are more likely to keep on being on the frontier of research, also thanks to FP providing extra funding to further advance. Second, in this core there are multiple districts with comparable performance and just one (Paris, on the top-right), which is decreasing its leading position. Third, looking to districts with lower performances there is a significant dynamism with many observations far from the diagonal, implying that their performances significantly changed from FP5 to FP7. This is the case for both districts able to increase their rate of FP participations and for those reducing it; nonetheless, it should be noticed that observations joining the ‘core’ does not come from zero participation, and this further confirms the cumulative nature of research. On the other hand, this dynamism is determined by the open competition of FP calls.

Figure 1. Evolution of FP participation in top-performing districts

How is this possible? There are two main reasons to explain this ‘open polycentrism’. First, Europe is a large space with several ‘centres’ and the open calls for FP funding allow all the research centres to participate and compete for those funds. Second, the FP is just one of the RTD policies active in Europe: member states have their own national and regional policies to support their own research centres. This support implicitly affects the rate of FP participations because member states can develop internally their own research centres, and then improve their ‘European competitiveness’ in FP calls.

Policy Implications
What are the lessons that can be derived from this exercise for the EU Horizon 2020 programme?

First, the FP is really a competitive mechanism. The criteria for ‘scientific excellence’ is really open and offer opportunity for newcomers to increase their rate of participation without any guarantees for those who won in previous calls. The claim that funds go always to the same research centre is, in fact, false or, more precisely, there is space for newcomers to increase their rate of FP participation. It should be highlighted, moreover, that the FP-Cooperation programme does not aim to increase the research capacities, but only to fund ‘excellent research’. While the EU has had only minor programmes to support research capacities, member states are the main actors responsible for these investments.

Second, ‘excellent research’ is not for everybody, but this does not mean that second-level districts should give up their RTD investments. If the FP participation is an indicator of research competitiveness, this shows space for those investing in RTD to reach the level of ‘European excellence’, although it should be recognised that FP is not the only programme funding ‘excellence’ and other sources are available. This should be seen as good opportunities because it provides a return for districts investing in their research competitiveness that can be measured in terms of FP participation.

Third, an open issue exist regarding synergies with Structural Funds (SF), which are often used to promote RTD investments. The EU regional policy aims to support lagging regions promoting territorial convergence; however, not any region benefiting from SF is in the FP (an open polycentric) core. While this can be seen as a contradiction, it comes with no surprise. If the FP aims to support ‘scientific excellence’ at the European level, lagging regions are expected to have a long-way before joining the frontier of research; otherwise, they would not be ‘lagging’ and would appear as part of the core at certain periods of time. Bearing in mind that the FP is only about 7.5% of the public funds spent in Europe for RTD, there are other possibilities to increase research competitiveness of regions/districts, but these would rely on the member states.

Conclusions
This analysis identified the forces explaining the spatial distribution of FP participations. Findings show how competitive and dynamic the European research geography is in terms of FP participations; however, this mechanism is open for those already having RTD capacities that are able to reach the top performing core starting from mid-level performances. Indeed, there is an open issue regarding territories without ‘excellent’ RTD actors. The availability of a new and geographically detailed database will allow for further and more specific analysis of the European research geography.Dr. Nicola Francesco Dotti is post-doc in economic geography at Cosmopolis, centre for urban research of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). Prof.Dr.Bas Van Heur is assistant professor in social geography and director of Cosmopolis (VUB). Dr. André Spithoven works at the Belgian Science Policy Office (BELSPO) and the Universiteit Gent (UGent).
This blog post is based on an ongoing research which will be presented at the ERA CRN workshop ‘Governance of the Europe of Knowledge’ Cambridge University, 10-11 April 2014.

Education and research policy have developed at the European level over recent decades. In particular the Bologna Process and the Lisbon/Europe 2020 Strategy have played a significant role.[i] If one, however, examines the actual competences to create legislation for these policy matters at EU level, one finds that these are limited. The EU has only a complementary competence for education which means that the EU essentially can only enact programmes supporting the Member States.[ii]For the policy area of research, the EU and the Member States share competences since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon allowing the EU to pass legislation beyond the Framework Programmes/Horizon2020 in order to achieve the European Research Area.[iii] Prior to that, the EU also only had a supporting role to play and, even since, there has been no significant harmonisation of national research policies. The Member States are, therefore, still mainly responsible for research and higher education policies affecting universities. However, universities can be affected by EU law in other areas, for example, by EU competition law.

Increased competition with private sector

The Member States, potentially encouraged by developments at the EU level,[iv] have increasingly brought market elements such as fees, research for the private sector and business style management into their universities. Universities now engage in intellectual property right exploitation, set up spin-offs and conduct more applied research or research with impact thereby competing increasingly with private sector entities. Public research funding is equally increasingly distributed in a competitive fashion.[v] Also, the financial crisis has left its mark with some Member States increasing and others significantly cutting funding for universities;[vi] the latter of which requires universities even more to look for alternative income. The boundaries between the private and the public as regards universities have therefore become less clear.

These developments might have a side-effect, though. If universities become more commercial, they might fall under the more commercial provisions of EU law and, if they would breach them, this might require universities to change their behaviour. As an example, we shall look at the provisions on competition law (Article 101-109 TFEU) here.[vii] Competition law regulates the conduct of companies when competing with each other in the Internal Market. However, the entities captured by competition law, are indeed broader than just companies, as Article 101 TFEU refers to ‘undertakings’. The Court has defined such an ‘undertaking’ as ‘every entity engaged in an economic activity’.[viii] An economic activity consists of ‘offering goods or services on a market’.[ix]Therefore, if universities are offering goods or services on a market, they would equally conduct an economic activity and thus be an ‘undertaking’ at least for those activities. For example, higher education ‘sold’ for high tuition fees or contract research could amount to an economic activity. Therefore, the more commercial universities become in their activities, the likelier it gets that they are ‘undertakings’.

Potential consequences of EU competition law for universities

If universities fall under competition law, this might create problems for them.[x] For example, if universities agree on common tuition fees or common overhead rates for research contracts, they might be seen as being engaged in price fixing, the behaviour of accreditation agencies or bodies distributing study places could potentially amount to market foreclosure or the coordination of activities along subject lines could constitute market division. All of this is behaviour prohibited by Article 101 (1) TFEU which aim it is to prevent collusions (cartels). Article 102 TFEU only applies to dominant ‘undertakings’ prohibiting them to abuse their dominance. A university would therefore have to have a certain economic strength in an area to be considered dominant.[xi]This might be possible, in particular in rarer subjects. If a university is a dominant undertaking and offers research or education for a very low price, it might be accused of predatory pricing, student number controls could be regarded as a limitation of outputs or cooperation only with certain partners to the exclusion of others could equally amount to an abuse of the university’s dominance captured by Article 102 TFEU.

Finally, Article 107 (1) prohibits state aid. Universities might get into conflict with this provisions if, in an area of economic activity, they do not charge full costs plus profit for their activities,[xii] as they could otherwise be regarded as providing or receiving state aid. If the state is ‘contracting’ universities to conduct teaching or research services, in an area of economic activity, one might even wonder if this needs to be commissioned through a public procurement procedure in which private and foreign providers could equally tender in order to avoid infringing Article 107 (1) TFEU.

Should universities come into conflict with competition law as described above, there is, of course, the possibility that they could utilise the exemptions provided in Article 101 (3) TFEU, 107 (2), (3) TFEU and secondary legislation. Furthermore, Article 106 (2) TFEU provides exemptions for services of general economic interest. It would depend on the individual case in how far universities could make use of these exemptions. If none of them applies, the universities might be required to change their behaviour or they might even be subject to fines. EU competition law effects could therefore be an ‘accidental’ consequence of the less clear boundaries between the public and the private as regards universities which universities should be aware of.[xiii]

Andrea Gideon is a research assistant for the Jean Monnet Action ‘Economic and Social Integration in the EU and Beyond – Interdisciplinary Perspectives’, Teaching Assistant and PhD Researcher at the School of Law, University of Leeds, UK.

E De Weert, ‘Organised Contradictions of Teaching and Research: Reshaping the Academic Profession’ in J Enders and E de Weert (eds), The changing face of academic life (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke/New York 2009)

Å Gornitzka, ‘Bologna in Context: a horizontal perspective on the dynamics of governance sites for a Europe of Knowledge’ (2010) 45 European Journal of Education 535

P Maassen and C Musselin, ‘European Integration and the Europeanisation of Higher Education’ in A Amaral et al (eds), European Integration and the Governance of Higher Education and Research (Springer, Dordrecht/London 2009)

[iv] The aim of the Europe2020 Strategy is, inter alia, ‘to promote knowledge partnerships and strengthen links between education, business, research and innovation […] and to promote entrepreneurship’ (Communication from the Commission ‘Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ COM(2010) 2020 final). See also the blog entry by Diana Beech ‘The European Research Area: Beyond Market Politics‘ (Europe of Knowledge 2013) 5th October 2013.

[v] See further, in these developments, for example, Connell H, ‘The growing significance of the research mission to higher education institutions’ in Connell H (ed), University Research Management (OECD 2004) p. 17 seq, 21 seq, Deiaco E, Holmen M and McKelvey M, ‘From social institution to knowledge business’ in McKelvey M and Holmen M (eds), Learning to compete in European Universities (Edward Elgar 2009), Wissema JG, Towards the Third Generation University (Edward Elgar 2009) p. 17 seq, 34 seq, Maassen P and Musselin C, ‘European Integration and the Europeanisation of Higher Education’ in Amaral A et al (ed), European Integration and the Governance of Higher Education and Research (Springer 2009), Palfreyman D and Tapper T, ‘What is an ‘Elite’ or ‘Leading Global’ University?’ in Palfreyman D and Tapper T (eds), Structuring Mass Higher Education (Routledge 2009), De Weert E, ‘Organised Contradictions of Teaching and Research: Reshaping the Academic Profession’ in Enders J and de Weert E (eds), The changing face of academic life (Palgrave Macmillan 2009).

As the year 2014 gets underway, the Europe of Knowledge also begins a new phase with the launch of Horizon 2020. Now that the budget wrangling is over and the calls for the first grant proposals have been published, we will finally begin to discover what Horizon 2020 does to reshape the research environment in Europe. While we do have clear statements (Commission 2011c) about its bringing together the instruments for research and innovation funding under a single umbrella which covers the complete innovation cycle; simplifying and unifying many of the administrative rules and procedures; and seeking to promote the competiveness of the EU with a strong linguistic flavoring from the Innovation Union discourse; still, there are far more questions than answers.

From Framework Programmes to Horizon 2020: ‘A Break from the Past’?

The first question has to be whether it is deserving of its unique name? Rather than continue with the sequential numbering of framework programmes that has been in place for the past 30 years and which provided continuity for what became a deeply institutionalized EU policy instrument (see Banchoff 2002 for an interesting discussion of how the power of this instrument may have harmed other efforts at common research policy and initiatives), the eighth framework program provides in the commission’s words, ‘a break from the past.’ But what kind of a break does it mark? And why do we need this break at all when the framework programme is generally considered to be one of the ongoing successes of European policy? Banchoff’s argument might suggest that the framework programs as an institution had grown too powerful, but weakening the institution does not appear to be the aim of changing the name, rather, the hope is to strengthen it further.

Horizon 2020 includes more tools and covers a broader set of policy problems than before, but there is still significant continuity. In a recent conference paper (Young 2013), I argued that the fundamental change is one of policy narrative. I compared the policy documents, proposals, impact assessments and green paper process to see how different types of policy narrative were used in Horizon 2020 in comparison with the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). My conclusion was that Horizon 2020 marks a shift toward a New Public Management (NPM) narrative for structuring research policy. NPM involves making public administration more business-like by adopting private sector management practices within a competitive market context with the aims of increasing performance, efficiency and outputs (Hood 1991, Barlezay 2001, Power 2005, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). While there is a complex layering process at work in Horizon 2020 which still includes elements of other public administration narratives, the balance has moved towards quantitatively measureable outputs and the efficiency of excellence rather than inputs or processes as a means of judging success and steering performance.

In a very basic sense, we can say that FP7 was developed in the optimistic climate of post-millennial globalization, whereas Horizon 2020 was developed in the climate of economic crisis. This shift is visible in looking at how the Commission frames the challenges which the EU faces in its Impact Analyses for FP7 and Horizon 2020. In 2005, the Commission produced this broad statement to contextualize FP7: ‘Our time is one of high uncertainty. It is rich with threats and challenges as well as opportunities. The bipolar world has come and gone and with increasing globalization new trends are emerging: the supremacy of the United States, the rise or awakening of Asian giants, but also the persistence of underdevelopment and the growing inequalities between – and within – the nations of the world’ (Commission 2005, annex p.1). The document goes on to say that Europe is not adapting well to these external challenges. By 2011, the tenor has changed, and the Commission writes: ‘The key challenge is to stabilise the financial and economic system in the short term while also taking measures to create the economic opportunities of tomorrow’ (Commission 2011, p.2). The financial crisis steers policy in a more inward-looking direction and narrows the language of opportunities to focus on economically oriented ones.

More spending on research and innovation?

The headline objective at the time of FP7 was increasing spending on research and innovation, the so called Barcelona target of spending three percent of GDP in this area, which became one of the five key indicators for the Lisbon Strategy. Relatively little progress has been made towards this target, though it continues to feature as one of headline targets of the Europe 2020 strategy. We might therefore anticipate that Horizon 2020 would attempt to influence and promote national spending. Instead, direct references to input based spending targets are downplayed in Horizon 2020. Austerity arguments coupled with ideas of increasing efficiency in order to compensate for fewer funds predominate. The lack of input-side increases in the member states is also playing out on the European level, where stabilization is considered success.

While Horizon 2020 is generously funded, and does represent a significant increase in overall funding in comparison with FP7, that increase is still not enough to stabilize the funding level from the final year of FP7. The first two years of Horizon 2020 together have 15 billion, whereas FP7 had nearly 11 billion in 2013 not including the funding for the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) which is now part of Horizon 2020. It is worth asking why a more aggressive approach was not taken? What does this tell us about the politicians trust in the rhetoric of research and innovation being the drivers of competitiveness? In other words, why was austerity chosen as the preferred solution to the Euro crisis?

Regardless of whether there are overall increases or not, European research policy provides only a very small amount (about 10%) (Commission 2011a) of the overall funding for research and innovation compared to national sources, but its policy objectives are targeted at affecting the entire European research environment. For that it needs leverage, which can take many forms, including co-ordination, co-option, being given control over parts of what was previously a national competence, and also modeling so-called ‘good practices’ and policy ideas. Some of the ways this is happening are described below. At the same time, the level of competition for European funds is increasing. If the commission’s expectations are correct, success rates in Horizon 2020 will drop to 15% from the 22% success rate of FP7. Competition is seen as a way to increase quality, but is there a point at which too much of it becomes counterproductive?

EU research policy – a blueprint for member states?

In his recent blog post on research policy in Austria, Thomas König describes how Horizon 2020 was used by the Austrian government in legitimizing changes in their research policy, particularly in bringing it under the purview of the ministry for economic affairs. Austria is not the first country to do this; it follows the UK and Spain, and likely others will follow in placing research under the jurisdiction of economic policy rather than with higher education. But the consequences of these structural changes may create dramatic changes in terms of how research is conducted. While the EU has pragmatic reasons for depicting research as an economic activity as this is what gives it grounds to act in what otherwise might be a national activity, its strong propagation of the economic justification for research can now be seen at work in national policymaking as a blueprint for policy and governmental design. Of course there are also many other actors which promote this position, but as we can see, the EU plays an important role.

Another major area of leverage is the growing trend for countries to piggyback on the European Research Council (ERC) evaluation process. There are now reportedly 12 member states that provide national funding to researchers who reach the second stage of the ERC funding process but whose projects are not retained for funding (European Research Council 2013). This encourages researchers to apply for ERC funding, which is time consuming and has a low success rate. It also demonstrates national confidence in the European system of evaluation and maybe a willingness to relinquish more control over research to the EU. There is a clear desire in seeing more such initiatives; one of the targets for Horizon 2020 named in the Commission’s proposal is ‘Number of institutional policy and national/regional policy measures inspired by ERC funding’ (Commission 2011c, p.96). Further details are not provided, but this is something to watch.

Growing divide in European research

The public consultation for Horizon 2020 which was conducted in 2011 (Commission 2011a), shows broad support for the EU’s initiatives and ideas on how to update the Seventh Framework Programme. While there are some critical contributions, for the most part, there are supportive statements from those nearly 2000 governments, universities, organizations, corporations and individuals that participated. However, we should note that levels of participation in the green paper process followed closely both the levels of national investment in research and development as well as scores on the 2013 Innovation Union Scoreboard. This is indicative of the growing divide in European research: the leading research countries are separating quickly from the rest, introducing the danger of a European geography where serious research only happens in select pockets.

The EU is quite aware of this, and the so called ‘widening debate’ for research is on the agenda. How to best address this issue is less clear. In the earlier framework projects, having partners in the EU-10 countries (new member states which join in 2004) was legislated into the program, and brought about quite a bit of well-deserved criticism. In Horizon 2020 excellence-only evaluation became nearly taken-for-granted and was employed in debates as something of a code word for not engaging distributive justice issues. The commission tried to move these issues, which it referred to as the ‘stairway to excellence’, off to the cohesion and structural funds and out of Horizon 2020.

In the end, the widening debate does have a small presence in Horizon 2020 with a section devoted to reducing the innovation divide in Europe (e.g. Teaming initiative). It is not, however, incorporated into any of the other instruments; is a standalone area which will be used to fund partnerships between research leaders and participants in countries which fall below 70% of EU average on the “Composite indicator of Research Excellence” (Horizon 2020 Work Program 2014-2015). This is a new measure that is based on four variables which purports to define research excellence. This quantification of excellence is yet another sign of the encroachment of a New Public Management narrative.

Chasing horizons

What this means for researchers remains to be seen. Pointing out the influence of neo-liberal thinking in Horizon 2020 allows us to consider how it is likely to steer outcomes. In many countries a similar shift has already taken place, so the EU is not breaking new ground, but by grounding its narrative in these ideas, the EU does strengthen the foundation for further changes. Will these changes make Europe the world leader in research as hoped? Are the indicators and benchmarks up to that task? Is a more concentrated system of research universities, like that found in the US, the way to achieve this? Which countries will be most effective in obtaining funds, and which researchers will get them? Will the new rules and conditions lead their projects be groundbreaking and risky or more conservative?

What kind of pursuit is Horizon 2020? I am reminded of this short poem by Stephen Crane:

I saw a man pursuing the horizon;

Round and round they sped.

I was disturbed at this;

I accosted the man.

“It is futile,” I said,

“You can never —”

“You lie,” he cried,

And ran on.

Chasing horizons in hopes of catching them is likely futile, but we may still find great value in the process of seeking to get there.

Mitchell Young works at Charles University in Prague (Czech Republic) in the Department of West European Studies where he is conducting his doctoral research on the implementation of research policy and issues related to European Higher Education and Research Area.

Commission of the European Communities (2011a) Green Paper on a Common Strategic Framework for EU Research and Innovation Funding: Analysis of public consultation, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union

Commission of the European Communities (2011b) Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Communication from the Commission ‘Horizon 2020 – The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation,’ SEC(2011) 1427, Brussels.

Commission of the European Communities (2011c) Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council establishing Horizon 2020 – The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020),COM(2011) 809, Brussels.

European Research Council (2013) Ideas 2 (June), Brussels: European Research Council.

Hood, C. (1991) ‘A Public Management for All Seasons?’, Public Administration, 69/1: 3-19.

Young, M. (2013) ‘Shifting Policy Discourses in FP 7 and Horizon 2020’, paper presented at the panel “Constructing the European Research Area in Times of Crisis”, 7th ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, 4-7 September.

The New Year of 2014 in European research policy comes with a couple of high profile events: launch of Horizon 2020 – one of the largest research funding programmes worldwide and envisaged completion of the European Research Area – so far the most comprehensive initiative in transnational knowledge governance. These major events involve a lot of activities at the organisational, national and global levels to facilitate effectiveness of research organisations and funding, to promote mobility and to support collaboration.

The year 2014 also marks a number of interesting anniversaries in the European research integration. It is the 60th anniversary of CERN, the European Organisation for Nuclear Research where among other things 25 years ago World Wide Web was invented. Moreover, 30 years ago the first European Framework Programme providing funding for research and development was launched. These events provide an opportunity to reflect on why and how transnational governance in the field of research has evolved and what kind of benefits has it delivered.

Context: why does transnational knowledge governance matter?

Research is a unique area of transnational governance because at the micro-level of the scientific community and research practice it has a long-tradition of internationalisation. Already in the Middle Ages learned institutions of the time – universities and monasteries – were linked by religious institutions having a broad pan-European scope (Crawford et al. 1993). Major university cities such as Paris, Bologna, Padua, Oxford and Toledo attracted faculty and students from all over Europe. During early professionalization of science in the 17th and 18th centuries researchers exchanged information in self-organising networks known as “invisible colleges” (Crane 1972; Price & Beaver 1966; Wagner 2008) and co-authored publications (Beaver & Rosen 1978). The late 19th century and the early 20th century witnessed active formation of international science associations (Crawford et al. 1993). Scientific community has developed a worldwide system of journals, associations, conferences, and personal and institutional networks. Some disciplines such as natural sciences have longer and stronger traditions of international interaction than others, e.g. social sciences and humanities. Thus, the scientific community already historically has been more internationally connected than most of the other professions. International links have facilitated scientific discoveries by ensuring circulation of knowledge and bringing together necessary expertise.

In the recent decades international collaboration among scientists have increased as shown for example by the growth of internationally co-authored publications (Adams 2013) due to a number of scientific and other reasons such as increased specialisation in science, growth of interdisciplinary research, need for complex instrumentation, growth of information and communication technologies, globalisation of industry, policies supporting internationalisation and easier travel (Katz & Martin 1997). Recently, focus on the need for research to solve the so-called grand challenges – major socio-economic problems of global scope in areas such as health, environment and energy (Cagnin et al. 2012) – provides an additional push towards international collaboration.

In parallel to trans-national research networks and practices, science is also characterised by diverse national systems and strong national interests. Most of the research funding is allocated nationally. Nedeva (2013) conceptualises relationship between internationalised research community and predominantly national research funding as a “tension between inherently global research fields and largely localised research spaces”. According to her, transnational research governance is emerging as an attempt to alleviate this tension. Important steps in the development of trans-national research governance started in the aftermath of World War II. These include intergovernmental initiatives in developing large-scale research infrastructures, gradual development of EU level research policy and global initiatives such as recent establishment of the Global Research Council.

Some milestones in transnational research governance

One of the major intergovernmental international science initiatives started in 1954 with the establishment of CERN, the biggest particle physics laboratory in the world. Established by 12 European countries and strong involvement of the United States (Krige 2006) it has grown to 20 member states, many collaborating countries and some 10 000 scientists from more than 100 countries doing research there. Large-scale scientific infrastructure at CERN has enabled complex experiments such as observation of the Higgs boson in 2012 confirming the theory for which the Nobel prize in physics was awarded in 2013. Unexpectedly, in 1989 a major breakthrough far from the field of particle physics took place at CERN when in order to connect CERN’s internationally mobile staff Tim Berners-Lee invented World Wide Web; it was made freely available and lead to fast growth of the web. During its history CERN has experienced tensions between collaborative needs and national interests of its member states, which are present also in ongoing efforts to build a large scale scientific infrastructure such as the European Spallation Source (Hallonsten 2012).

In the gradual development of EU research policy, the launch of the First Framework Programme in 1984 was one of the major milestones. Initially, the Framework Programme mainly brought together existing initiatives such as the Joint Research Centre budget and the ESPRIT funding program for IT (Peterson & Sharp 1998). Moreover, increased involvement of the European Community in research experienced strong opposition from the major member states such as Germany and the UK. However, during 30 years the Framework Programme (with the Eighth Framework Programme known as Horizon 2020 starting in 2014) have expanded considerably, gained support from diverse stakeholder groups and experienced considerable shift in priorities, e.g. if the First Framework Programme was heavily dominated by funding for energy (50% of the budget) and ICT (25%) then in subsequent programmes funding for aims such as human capital and mobility experienced sharp increase.

The Framework Programme has facilitated cross-border collaborations and developed innovative research funding modes. However, a significant question is whether EU research policy can move beyond narrow focus mainly on EU level funding programmes (Banchoff 2003). The Framework Programmes/Horizon 2020 alone cannot address all the important issues in European research governance; having a more comprehensive mix of policy initiatives is important.

Completing the European Research Area in 2014: a realistic target?

The European Research Area initiative launched by the European Commission in 2000 is so far the most comprehensive initiative in developing transnational research governance (Edler et al. 2003; Delanghe et al. 2009). The key priorities for the ERA in which “researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely” are more effective national research systems, optimal transnational co-operation and competition, an open labour market for researchers, gender equality and circulation of scientific knowledge via digital ERA. The aim of ERA is to make European research more efficient, competitive and better able to address major socio-economic problems.

To achieve ERA aims, a number of revised and new funding and “soft” governance instruments are used. Funding instruments include not only new instruments within the Framework Programme (e.g. Networks of Excellence, Joint Technology Initiatives) but also joint research programmes among the member states and opening up of national programmes for international participation (Lepori et al. 2014).

Additionally, the ERA is developed by using “soft modes” of governance, i.e. the so-called Open Method of Coordination OMC which involves setting joint targets, monitoring how they are implemented in national policies and ensuring mutual learning. Such method of coordination is deemed to be appropriate to accommodate diversity of national research policies and heterogeneity of involved institutions; however its efficiency has been questioned (De Ruiter 2010; Kaiser & Prange 2004; McGuinness & O’Carroll 2010). The task of overseeing ERA-related OMC activities has been assigned to the European Research Area and Innovation Committee (ERAC) consisting of the EU Member States’ representatives. As the ERAC was formerly known as the CREST, Scientific and Technical Research Committee – advisory committee of national representatives established in 1974, an interesting question is if there is continuity of accumulating experience of mutual learning in EU research policy over 40 years.

While there have been considerable efforts to strengthen ERA governance as a partnership between the member states, stakeholders and the Commission, an important leadership function is undertaken by the Commission. For example, the Commission has undertaken the leading role in monitoring the ERA by publishing the first comprehensive ERA progress report in 2013; it remains to be seen if the monitoring exercises will enhance mutual learning and deliberation among the member states and stakeholders or will be seen merely as an additional reporting burden.

An important question remains about the usefulness of legal instruments in achieving the ERA aims. While the legally binding instruments can facilitate specific ERA priorities such as open labour market for researchers, it is less clear how much they can help in achieving “effective national research systems”. In 2013, new proposals (including the manifesto “A Maastricht for Research” by two members of the European Parliament) for legally binding measures to implement ERA were put forward. A possibility to make decisions in 2014 about the need for specific legal measures has been mentioned.

The year 2014 is a deadline for completing the ERA, as set out by a number of EU documents including the Innovation Union flagship. This deadline has been widely criticised by experts and stakeholders either as being set too early or as unnecessary for a very broad long-term agenda of ERA. As stated in the Science Europe Roadmap, ERA “is a long-term project, and to strive for its ‘completion’ would be to lack ambition”. Thus, in 2014 it is important to look beyond predictable headlines of “missed target” on how a comprehensive agenda of ERA can be implemented in a sustainable way.

Trends to watch in multi-level knowledge governance in 2014

Globalisation: some interesting ongoing developments at global level include an emerging worldwide network of research universities as well as activities dedicated to research integrity and open access by the Global Research Council – a voluntary cooperation among about 70 national and regional research councils established in 2012. At the times when new players (e.g. emerging economies like BRICS, MINTs[i], Asia) are shifting the balance of power in global science and higher education, it is interesting to observe new patterns of international collaboration and competition and Europe’s changing role and place, e.g. in Global University Rankings.

EU level: 2014 comes with important institutional and leadership changes in EU research governance. DG Research and Innovation is undergoing major reorganisation and will have a new structure. In May a new European Parliament will be elected and the Euroscience is planning to use the momentum to organise debates to raise the profile of science in Europe. The new Commission will come with a new Commissioner for Research and a new Commission’s president. In 2014 the European Research Council has a new president Jean-Pierre Bourguignon. It remains to be seen if new leaders and new EU presidencies – Greece (January-June) and Italy (July-December) – bring new priorities to research policy.

National level: a number of events in 2013 led to questions about how much national governments and society value research. Austerity measures hit science in countries such as Greece and Spain, while new cabinets in Austria and Australia omitted dedicated science minister portfolios. In 2014 one of occasions prompting debates about value and evaluation of research at national level could be the completion of the Research Excellence Framework in the UK.

Stakeholders: in 2013 a number of European stakeholder organisations such as Euroscience, Eurodoc, Voice of the Researchers and others continued to raise their voices on core issues such as research careers, mobility and doctoral training. Further debates can be expected at one of the major biennial stakeholder events this year, i.e. ESOF 2014 Euroscience Open Forum.

Research organizations: last but not least – how universities and research institutes will be affected by and respond to the changes at global, European and national level and how are they going to use their autonomy to participate in and shape them?

These ongoing developments in trans-national and multi-level governance of knowledge lead to a number of scholarly and policy relevant questions, for example: the ERA is presented as a Single Market for research but is the market model relevant for organising research systems (Georghiou 2006) and scientific community (Hagstrom 1965)? What are the underlying ideas and values in the European knowledge governance? How research policy priorities of “excellent science” and “societal challenges” are defined and implemented? How multi-level research governance interacts with governance in related policy areas such as higher education, innovation, environment, regional development and economy?

In 2014, UACES’s ERA CRN will address these and other questions in a number of workshops and publications. We look forward to engaging with other scholars and practitioners interested in the multi-level knowledge governance.

Dr.Inga Ulnicane is a political scientist and European studies scholar specializing in multi-level governance and policy of science, technology, innovation and higher education.

To paraphrase one of my colleagues: for all intents and purposes European integration in higher education should not exist. This is not a normative position, but rather an observation of what seems to be somewhat of a puzzle: the European Union has very limited formal competences with regards to education in general, or higher education in particular, but there nevertheless are several European initiatives in higher education that have emerged in the recent (and not so recent) years, like the Bologna Process or the Lisbon Strategy and its successor the Europe 2020 Strategy, that seem to have had significant impact on higher education systems and institutions.

Essentially, there are three dimensions to this phenomenon: (1) new initiatives (or a new governance layer, if you will) forming at the European level, (2) these initiatives having an impact on higher education in countries that are EU members or in some other ways are considered to be part of “Europe” and (3) European initiatives having an impact on developments well outside Europe (e.g. Latin America, US, or Asia-Pacific region). I will briefly discuss each of these dimensions, to provide the basis for the claim that studying the European governance layer in higher education in more detail can contribute not only to better understanding of higher education dynamics but also to better understanding of the dynamics of European integration, its causes and consequences.

Emergence of the European governance layer in higher education

Origins of the European governance layer in higher education were traced by Anne Corbett back to the early ages of the European Union; a number of key policy entrepreneurs and events that lead to what eventually became the Erasmus programme have been identified (Corbett 2005), which in turn lead to the question whether the Bologna Process is as novel as many claim it is (Corbett 2006). Furthermore, an issue of research interest is also how what essentially started as a voluntary process with an unclear governance structure grew into monitored coordination and a consolidated governance arrangement (Ravinet 2008), as well as what are the linkages between the pan-European Bologna Process and the EU Lisbon Strategy (Gornitzka 2010; Keeling 2006). In addition, the focus has also been on the strengthening of the European Commission position in the Bologna follow-up structures (despite initial attempts to exclude it) which adds a supranational element to an otherwise primarily intergovernmental arrangement (Corbett 2011) as well as on the increasing involvement of European stakeholder organizations, such as the European University Association EUA, European Students’ Union ESU, Education International EI, European Association of Institutions in Higher Education EURASHE, whose presence adds a transnational flavour (Elken and Vukasovic forthcoming).

Essentially, what can be observed is the emergence of a Europe of Knowledge based on two main pillars – Lisbon (and its successor Europe 2020) and Bologna – the first firmly grounded in the EU institutions and perhaps more focused on research (in which EU has more significant competences than in higher education), and the other having a more pan-European focus and focusing primarily on higher education (Elken et al. 2011; Maassen and Musselin 2009). Such complex governance arrangement, in which supranational, intergovernmental and transnational dynamics overlap and interact is by no means unique to higher education, given that within the EU, regardless of the sector in focus, similar complexity can be observed (Börzel 2010).

What is distinctive is the existence of both EU and pan-European elements in the European governance layer and how they interact. So far, this interaction served primarily to consolidate and legitimize both processes, but with the further enlargement of the EU (even if only in terms of awarding candidate status to more countries) and the somewhat slowed down tempo of the Bologna Process (ministerial summits now taking place every three instead of two years) it will be interesting to see whether the interaction will lead to fading out of the Bologna element of the European governance layer in higher education or those involved in the process (who also may have some vested interests in keeping it alive) will find a way to re-invent it.

Furthermore, European integration in higher education (and research) is of importance for other sectors as well, given that higher education is being exported as a policy solution to sectors such as social policy, economic competitiveness, environment and security, i.e. higher education is expected to provide solutions to problems identified in other policy sectors. So it could be argued that European integration efforts in these sectors, many of which are at the core of the EU project, will be shaped also by how integration in the area of higher education proceeds in the long run.

Similar to Europeanization in other sectors (see e.g. Cowles et al. 2001; Falkner and Treib 2008), the impact of the European governance layer on higher education systems and institutions is notable, though it varies across countries and issues (EACEA 2012; Westerheijden et al. 2010). This variety is partly related to the characteristics of the European governance layer as such (see below) but also to the differences in the domestic contexts, primarily in terms path-dependencies when it comes to policy formation and implementation (what Falkner and Treib call “worlds of compliance”). Thus, it would be interesting to explore whether the changes primarily amount to what Vaira (2004) has labelled to be an allomorphism – convergence on the surface, diversity underneath. Furthermore, even if there is significant diversity underneath, that does not necessarily imply a weak impact of the European governance layer, but rather points to the ambiguity of some of its preferences (e.g. the social dimension highlighted in the Bologna Process) and the consequent diversity in domestic interpretations both in the process of policy formation and in the process of policy implementation.

As a knowledge intensive sector, higher education is marked by several types of autonomy – universities from the state, constituent departments in relation to their universities, professional autonomy of members of academic staff in relation to their institutions – leading to complex organizational arrangements which provide ample opportunities for translation, use and abuse of the preferences promoted in European initiatives in higher education. Moreover, the European governance layer is not the only source of external influence on higher education policy (and by extension higher education institutions). There are also more diffuse yet not necessarily less powerful global scripts (Meyer 2000) which interact in various ways with the European governance layer and with the domestic contexts.

Here lies another potential contribution of research on higher education to European studies. As Gornitzka and Maassen (2011) demonstrate with a study on autonomy and funding reforms in Denmark, Finland and Norway, even amongst the systems which can be seen to belong to the same “world of compliance”, i.e. even amongst the systems in which significant convergence can be expected, there can be differences in how the same global scripts and European preferences are interpreted and implemented. Thus, studying the different interactions between the global, European, national and local in higher education may be a fruitful exercise for understanding better the key characteristics of each of these layers of governance, and the scope of change that may come as a result of their interaction.

Impact beyond Europe

The relationship between the global scripts and the European preferences provides a good entry point to the discussion of the third dimension of interest – the impact the developments in Europe have on other areas of the world, or how European preferences may become global scripts. This is perhaps the dimension that has been least studied so far. There is some evidence of this impact in higher education, judging by the focus on the external dimension of the Bologna Process (Zgaga 2011) and the establishment of the Bologna Policy Forum taking place in parallel to the Bologna Ministerial Summit, which in 2012 in Bucharest was attended by 23 non-European countries.

Furthermore, there is evidence that the European experience has been an inspiration for other regions of the world. Chinese higher education master plan for 2020 focuses on degree structures, while 52 countries from the Asia-Pacific region in 2006 adopted the Brisbane Communiqué and developed a follow-up governance structure similar to that of Bologna. The experiences from the so-called Tuning project have been exported to Latin America, the US, Russia and Africa with active (financial) support from the European Commission though with different outcomes (in Latin America it seems not to have taken off completely) and the US has increased recognition of the three year bachelor degrees in order to facilitate mobility from Europe to the US (Westerheijden et al. 2010). While the underlying mechanisms of such developments have not been identified in sufficient detail and while there is little data on how these initiatives develop over time, a good starting point could be to analyse whether such developments can be interpreted primarily as the voluntary lesson-drawing by the countries and regions outside of Europe because of Europe’s normative power (Birchfield 2013; Hyde-Price 2006; Manners 2002; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007) or whether Europe actually plays an active role in these processes for strategic reasons.

In sum, it appears that research on higher education dynamics, either within Europe or beyond, is less and less possible without taking into account multi-level and multi-actor governance arrangements of which the European governance layer is a significant part of. Moreover, research on “all things European” could benefit from focusing more on an area which may be seen as less likely case of European integration and Europeanization, but in which significant developments involving the European governance layer nevertheless abound.

Martina Vukasovic is currently working within the Odysseus project on higher education governance at the Department of Sociology, Ghent University, Belgium. Until November 2013 she was a member of the Higher Education: Institutional Dynamics and Knowledge Cultures Research Group at the Department of Education, University of Oslo, Norway. Her PhD thesis, recently submitted for evaluation, focuses on higher education change in the several countries of the former Yugoslavia and the role the European initiatives have had in these processes.

Capano, G., and Piattoni, S. (2011). “From Bologna to Lisbon: the political uses of the Lisbon ‘script’ in European higher education policy.” Journal of European Public Policy, 18(4), 584-606.

Cerna, L., and Chou, M.-H. (2013). “The regional dimension in the global competition for talent: Lessons from framing the European Scientific Visa and Blue Card.” Journal of European Public Policy, 1-20.

Elken, M., Gornitzka, Å., Maassen, P., and Vukasović, M. (2011). European integration and the transformation of higher education, Oslo: University of Oslo.

Elken, M., and Vukasovic, M. (forthcoming). “Dynamics of voluntary policy coordination: the case of Bologna Process”, in M.-H. Chou and Å. Gornitzka, (eds.), The Europe of Knowledge: Comparing Dynamics of Integration in Higher Education and Research Policies Edward Elgar.

Falkner, G., and Treib, O. (2008). “Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to New Member States*.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(2), 293-313.

Gornitzka, Å. (2006). “What is the use of Bologna in national reform? The case of Norwegian Quality Reform in higher education”, in V. Tomusk, (ed.), Creating the European Higher Education Area: Voices from the Periphery. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 19-41.

Gornitzka, Å. (2010). “Bologna in Context: a horizontal perspective on the dynamics of governance sites for a Europe of Knowledge.” European Journal of Education, 45(4), 535-548.

Musselin, C. (2009). “The Side Effects of the Bologna Process on National Institutional Settings: the Case of France”, in A. Amaral, G. Neave, C. Musselin, and P. Maassen, (eds.), European Integration and the Governance of Higher Education and Research. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 181-205.

After the election on 29 September 2013, Austria is facing another five years of the same coalition government under the Social Democrat Werner Faymann (SPÖ) and his junior partner, the conservative Christian People’s Party (ÖVP). While the Austrian media is almost unison in attesting this renewed government a sense of gridlock, one decision has caused an outcry and stirred even demonstrations: there will be no independent ministry for science and research anymore. Instead, the conservative Reinhold Mitterlehner will add the science and higher education agenda under the wings of his Ministry of Economy.

Among the many critics, some (the author included) have argued that this may constitute an opportunity, since the minister is a heavyweight within the government (unlike his hapless predecessor, Minister Töchterle). The majority however holds that the move is a simple sign of further economisation of the higher education sector. Almost no one outside of the government believes that the decision follows a distinct political strategy; judging on ground of the past five years, we know that the two parties in power are hardly interested in science and research at all. In the concrete context of forging the government, it seems as if science had to yield to a separate portfolio for family affairs (the number of ministries should not be extended, and family affairs is deemed more necessary by the heads of the government).

Austria: Innovation Leader or Follower?

Dismantling the ministry of science and research has a distinctive European angle. According to the European Commission’s Innovation Union Scoreboard, assessing the research and innovation performance of the EU27 Member States, in 2013 Austria is still an “Innovation Follower” – despite being one of the wealthiest and most productive economies in the Union. In 2011, the previous Austrian government (with the same chancellor, the same Vice-chancellor, and the same minister for economic affairs) has adopted the so-called FTI-Strategy (Forschung-Technologie-Innovation, Research-Technology-Innovation), which boldly proclaims to make Austria an “Innovation Leader”.

The goal to become an “Innovation Leader” is ambitious, although probably not too ambitious for a country that is faring quite well during the last years. Austria, however, has embarked on a Sonderweg, particularly in comparison with other European countries of similar size: unlike Israel, Denmark, Switzerland, or Sweden, the Austrian government is devoting more than 2/3 of public R&D money to industry-related research. The contributions for basic research and universities are far lower than in the countries just mentioned.

The problems of the basic research-funding agency, FWF, and also of the universities (that have made world media coverage in 2009/10 when #unibrennt movement against restrictions to the access to higher education spread from Vienna), can be found in this rather unique and, some would suggest, quite unfair balancing of taxpayers’ money. In any case: private industry already benefits from the expansion of investment more than the public institutions such as universities. Against this backdrop, the integration of science and research into the ministry of economy could be interpreted as another blow for the scientific community in Austria.

Looking to Europe

It is, however, noteworthy to take a closer look at the various justifications for the integration (or merger?) given by the new minister Mitterlehner early this week. Interestingly, they also refer to European issues of science policy.

The first justification by Mitterlehner for integrating the science and research agenda into the ministry for economic affairs referred to European good practice models: countries like UK or Spain had done a similar merger, so the minister. It is true that in both countries, the universities, research, and science in general belong to a larger ministry (or department). In UK, however, the institutional set-up of the executive branch is too different for easy comparison. Also, with David Willets, there is a dedicated Minister of State for Science and Universities. By and large, the Spanish solution resembles what is happening in Austria right now. If that were true, the future is bleak: for the moment at least, we can only hope that the brutally hard and ignorant path of the Spanish government towards science will not serve as a template for the Austrian government.

The other justification is about synergy effects: by bringing together two branches of the national administration, policy instruments should be better coordinated in the future. Mitterlehner even mentioned that his ministry would now cover the entire innovation chain (in this written statement, this was quietly exchanged to the more appropriate notion of the innovation cycle). In the same context, the minister explicitly refers to the new European research-funding programme. The ministry would now basically mirror the different facets and pillars of Horizon 2020.

It is true that the Austrian innovation and research system requires better coordination (like many other national innovation systems do). However, it is not true that the Ministry of Economy now covers all instruments, from funding basic research to industry-support. Most of the instruments directed at applied research are actually located in the Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (bmvit). And anyhow, even if all instruments were to be located under the roof of one ministry, it is doubtful that this would result in better coordination – or at least, historically, it did not, as we learned in the early 2000s, when the bmvit was actually the only principal of almost all various agents.

Merger or subordination?

Still, the reference to Horizon 2020 is quite interesting. It is a signal that this programme has become the point of reference of research policy in EU Member States. It is also an interesting remark because it may indicate that the new leadership will be more outward looking, and will focus more on the political agenda of the European Research Area. If that were the case, the new minister may indeed start to appreciate basic research as a value on its own; and, maybe as important, he may build up more pressure on the universities to reform, something that is dearly missing so far.

So, what do we learn from this trip into the narrow world of Austrian science policy? Firstly, that the Austrian Sonderweg is probably to continue, even though the institutional integration of two ministries also holds the (unlikely) promise of strengthening all ties of the innovation cycle (and particularly the weak basic research). Secondly, we come to realize that the justifications mentioned above either do not hold, or have to be seen as signs of worse to come. And thirdly, we learn that the European research policy agenda, and “Horizon 2020” in particular, has become the point of reference for science policy in a European Union member state like Austria. Is the latter good news? Much will depend whether Minister Mitterlehner will interpret the enlargement of his portfolio as a merger of two ministries, or as the subordination of science and research under the Ministry of Economy. For that, and for concrete results of this development, we will have to wait and see.

Dr.Thomas König is currently on parental leave. In 2014, he will be a Fulbright Scholar at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University.

A high-level round table of important players in the European Research Area took place earlier this month to discuss the ethics and values that should lie at the heart of the forthcoming Horizon 2020 programme. At stake is the future of European research.

The European Research Area, or ERA, is bracing itself for a major change on the ‘horizon’. On 1 January 2014, the way the European Union (EU) selects and supports science projects will be superseded by the ‘Horizon 2020’ framework programme.

Equipped with a long-range budget of over €70 billion, Horizon 2020 can already lay claim to being Europe’s largest research programme.

With ‘Excellent Science’ clearly earmarked as one of its three priority areas, Horizon 2020 specifically seeks to raise the level of excellence in Europe’s science base and to foster a steady stream of world-class research, primarily to create new jobs and growth in Europe, and to secure the EU’s long-term competitiveness.

Over the course of the next seven years, then, hundreds of thousands of researchers and entrepreneurs in the EU – together with their partners across the globe – will receive funding to carry out frontier research of the highest quality in both academia and industry.

The intention is to open up new and promising fields of innovation, while working to overcome many of the world’s ‘grand challenges’ such as pandemics, climate change, security threats, and food and energy shortages.

Values and ethics

The strategic importance of science to the EU’s political agenda is clear.

Yet, while European officials and stakeholders in the research area are busily counting down to the launch of Horizon 2020, has anybody spared sufficient thought for what the role and place of values and ethics will be in the EU’s new research programme?

Until now, the focus of policy discussions has been firmly fixed on the potential of the new framework programme to break down barriers to create a genuine single European market for knowledge. Little thought has been given to defining and maintaining the ethical boundaries of European research that are so vital to its future flourishing and success.

A select group of leaders in Europe’s research and innovation community are, however, beginning to change all this and put attention back on the ‘big’ questions inherent to European science.

As recently as 5 November, some 30 ‘big names’ in the ERA got together in a high-level roundtable – the first of its kind dedicated to discussing the most pressing questions of values and ethics in the construction of ERA policy.

Forming part of a wider research project run by the Faraday Institute for Science and Religion in Cambridge, in the UK, the workshop was generously hosted by the Norwegian Mission to the EU under the auspices of Science Business.

The purpose of the day was to bring together leading figures from academia and industry, with members of the European parliament and scientific advisors, to reflect on the core values that are needed to drive European innovation in the ‘right’ direction for the future – and, ultimately, to draft an ethical charter for European research.

ERA’s moral purpose

Acknowledging the fact that Europe’s larger pot of public funding for research brings with it an increased number of ethical quandaries, participants were asked to think seriously about what sort of projects the EU should be funding, under what terms, and for whose benefits. At issue in the debate were the broader values of European science, and not merely its economic or social value.

As such, discussions brought to the fore some of the biggest questions surrounding the nature of Europe’s growing ‘knowledge economy’, as participants grappled to define the moral purpose of the ERA: Where is it going? Where should it be going? And what is needed to keep it on the ‘right’ track for the future?

Specific questions were asked about Horizon 2020 funds. In particular, participants debated whether the money should be used to support excellent research wherever it may be in the EU, or whether it should be distributed among the EU-28 and its respective research communities according to shared principles of fairness and equality.

Questions were also raised about the wider purpose of the money – specifically whether it should be used to promote research that generated ‘pure’ knowledge, or to support only those projects that clearly demonstrated European ‘added value’ such as the creation of new jobs, products and services.

Central to all of these issue clusters were questions of responsibility. For example, what responsibility, if any, do ERA policy-makers have to ensure that Europe’s research outputs are used for the good of the wider society?

To what extent do researchers receiving EU funds, and their institutions, share this responsibility? And how do we ensure a basic level of scientific integrity, particularly in the light of Horizon 2020’s emphasis on collaborations across borders, disciplines and sectors?

The detailed results of the round table are due to be published in an official report by Science Business at the end of this month. The results will form the basis of a new charter for European research that seeks to ensure the aims of Europe’s new framework programme remain as holistic as its intended approach.

The future and success of European science policy is about much more than science itself. It stems from a rich post-war history of scientific diplomacy continually bringing people together for purposes of peace and prosperity and the common good.

To move effectively into the future, then, Horizon 2020 needs to embrace this value-driven approach, not simply developing Europe’s science, but developing Europe’s con-science as well.

* Dr Diana Jane Beech is a research associate at the Faraday Institute for Science and Religion in Cambridge, UK, where she is currently working on a project exploring the role and relevance of values in the European Research Area, or ERA. She is also an active member of the ‘Voice of the Researchers’ multipliers group and the communications coordinator of a collaborative research network dedicated to the study of the ERA.