“Buy-It-Now" or “Sell-It-Now" auctions: Effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms

Grebe, Tim

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta

Kröger, Sabine

We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms that other the possibility to trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller offers a price prior to the auction; whereas in the "Sell-It-Now" format, it is the buyer. Both formats are extensively used in online and offine markets. Despite very different strategic implications for buyers and sellers, results from our experiment suggest no effects of bargaining power on aggregate outcomes. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity within sellers. Sellers who neglect the adverse selection effect of their own price other in the BIN format could benefit from giving up bargaining power by using the "Sell-It-Now" format.