So are U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the Persian Gulf, on hair-trigger
alert, and ready to be launched against Iran at a moment's notice?

I posed the question in December, arguing that every other
element needed for a nuclear strike on Iran was "deployed" and ready. On Feb.
3, 2006, an answer was kindly provided by the Chief of Naval Operations in the
form of
OPNAVINST 5721.1F [.pdf], which states:

"Military members and civilian employees of the Department of the Navy
shall not reveal, purport to reveal, or cause to be revealed any information,
rumor, or speculation with respect to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons
or components on board any specific ship, station or aircraft, either on their
own initiative or in response, direct or indirect, to any inquiry."

Oh well then, we don't know for sure, and there is no way to know. Really?

However, neither the media nor Congress are bringing up the inconvenient little
fact that the military option will necessarily lead to the use of nuclear weapons against
Iran. And they are unwilling to weigh the fact that using nuclear weapons against
a non-nuclear country like Iran will likely have disastrous consequences for the U.S. and the rest of the
world.

The Navy instruction OPNAVINST 5721.1F [.pdf] just released concerning "the release
of information about nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces"
is an update of the earlier 1993 version [.pdf] with some changes. One is this added
paragraph:

"The current NCND [neither confirming nor denying] policy mirrors the original
policy taking into account employment and program policy changes. In general,
it is U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, naval
aircraft, attack submarines, or guided missile submarines."

Note the "in general" wording, which clearly allows for exceptions. That phrasing
was conspicuously absent in the 1993 version, which instead stated "It is general
US policy not to deploy nuclear weapons…." Note also that the new
statement explicitly mentions that it is issued in view of "employment and program
policy changes," which presumably refers to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the associated "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations," which envision the
U.S. use of tactical nuclear weapons in vastly expanded circumstances.

The policy's purported rationale is that

"Uncertainty as to the location of nuclear weapons complicates an adversary's
military planning and reduces his chances of successful attack thereby increasing
the deterrent value of our forces and the security of the weapons."

Perhaps. But it also serves the clear function of allowing preparations for
a tactical nuclear strike against Iran without raising public
alarm. The same considerations that were being made back in 1948 – "The novel nature of atomic war nevertheless
made it advisable to refrain from openly declaring an American atomic strategy,
because that would alarm the American public, triggering a moral debate…"
– apply today. Americans would vehemently oppose the deployment of tactical
nuclear weapons to be used against Iran if such action was publicly disclosed.

Blaming the Military

The principal responsibility for what is about
to happen will be assigned to the military. Linton Brooks, the National Nuclear
Security Administration director, stated that "recently funded research into earth-penetrating
bombs came at the request of military leaders who have seen potential uses for
them against rogue states that hide sensitive sites deep underground."
The weapons that will be used are B61-11 nuclear earth penetrators, in the U.S. nuclear stockpile
since 2001 [.pdf].

The Pentagon draft document "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" provides "guidance
for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces" and states, "Geographic combatant
commanders may request presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons for
a variety of conditions," then proceeds to list several conditions that will undoubtedly apply in a military
confrontation with Iran:

"An adversary using or intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational,
or alliance forces or civilian populations"

"To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter
adversary use of WMD."

Bush and Rumsfeld often emphasize that their decisions on military operations
in Iraq rely on recommendations of military commanders on the ground. As Bush
recently put it,

"The people don't want me making decisions based upon politics; they want
me to make decisions based upon the recommendation from our generals on the
ground. And that's exactly who I'll be listening to."

When Rumsfeld was accused of overruling advice from Gen. Tommy Franks on preparations
for the war on Iraq, the BBC reported that he "flatly denied overriding military
commanders," instead stating,

"You will find, if you ask anyone who has been involved in the process
in the central command, that every single thing that they [military commanders]
have requested has, in fact, happened."

This shameful approach of shifting responsibility from the policymakers to
the commanders on the ground will be an essential element in the nuking of Iran.
The motivation is transparent: the administration's hope that the strong American
inclination to "support the troops" will blunt criticism of the political
decision to nuke Iran.

The mere possibility that Iranian missiles targeting U.S. troops could carry
chemical warheads, suggested by faulty or even true intelligence and already
assumed by U.S. officials, could prompt a geographic commander
to request authorization from the president to use low-yield nuclear weapons
against Iran, particularly if such weapons are already deployed in the theater.
Or such a request could be prompted by "intelligence" that chemical weapons hidden in underground facilities in Iran
will be supplied to terrorists to be used against Americans, and can only be destroyed by
nuclear bunker-busters. It is obviously unconscionable to demand that a military
commander, whose prime concern is the safety of the troops under command, take
into account the long-term consequences for America of crossing the nuclear
threshold.

Iran advocates a political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict; it does not threaten the use of force against Israel. The
U.S. may not agree with Iran's advocated political solution (elimination of
the state of Israel), but that does not give the U.S. the right to attack
Iran, just as the Spanish claim over Gibraltar does not entitle Britain to
attack Spain.

Iran has never attacked nor threatened to attack another state in modern
times.

The U.S. has just declared that it will
defend Israel militarily against Iran if needed. Presumably this includes a
scenario where Israel would initiate hostilities by unprovoked bombing of Iranian
facilities, as it did with Iraq's Osirak, and Iran would respond with missiles
targeting Israel. The U.S. intervention is likely to be further bombing of Iran's
facilities, including underground installations that can only be destroyed with
low-yield nuclear bunker-busters. Such nuclear weapons may cause low casualties,
perhaps only in the hundreds [.pdf], but the nuclear threshold
will have been crossed.

Iran's reaction to a U.S. attack with nuclear weapons, no matter how small,
cannot be predicted with certainty. U.S. planners may hope that it will deter
Iran from responding, thus saving lives. However, just as the U.S. forces in
Iraq were not greeted with flowers, it is likely that such an attack would provoke
a violent reaction from Iran and lead to the severe escalation of hostilities,
which in turn would lead to the use of larger nuclear weapons by the U.S. and
potential casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Witness the current uproar
over cartoons and try to imagine the resulting upheaval
in the Muslim world after the U.S. nukes Iran.

The Military's Moral Dilemma

Men and women in the military forces, including
civilian employees, may be facing a difficult moral choice at this very moment
and in the coming weeks, akin to the moral choices faced by Colin Powell and
Dan Ellsberg. The paths these two men followed were radically different.

Colin Powell was an American hero, widely respected and admired at the time
he was appointed secretary of state in 2001. In February 2003, he chose to follow
orders despite his own serious misgivings, and delivered the pivotal UN address
that paved the way for the U.S. invasion of Iraq the following
month. Today, most Americans believe the Iraq invasion was wrong, and Colin
Powell is disgraced, his future destroyed, and his great past achievements
forgotten.

The Navy has just reminded [.pdf] its members and civilian employees
what the consequences are of violating provisions concerning the release of
information about the nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces. Why right now, for
the first time in 12 years? Because it is well aware of moral
choices that its members may face, and it hopes to deter certain actions. But
courageous men and women are not easily deterred.

The Nuremberg Tribunal, which the United States helped to create,
established that "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his government
or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him."

To follow orders or to disobey orders, to keep information secret or to leak
it, are choices for each individual to make – extremely difficult choices
that have consequences. But not choosing is not an option.

America's Collective Responsibility

Blaming the administration or the military for
crossing the nuclear threshold is easy, but responsibility will be shared by
all Americans.

The media will carry a heavy burden of responsibility. The mainstream media
could have effectively raised public awareness of the possibility that the U.S.
would use nuclear weapons against Iran. So far, they have chosen to almost completely hide the issue, which is being increasingly
addressed in non-mainstream media.

Members of Congress could have raised the question forcefully, calling for
public hearings, demanding public discussion of the administration's plans,
and passing new laws or resolutions. So far they have failed to do so and are derelict
in their responsibility to their constituents. Letters to the president from
some in Congress [1], [2] are a start, but are not likely to elicit a meaningful
response or a change in plans and are a far cry from forceful action.

Scientific organizations and organizations dealing with arms control and nuclear
weapons could have warned of the dangers associated with the Iran situation.
So far, they have not done so ([1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]).

The United States is preparing to enter a new
era: an era in which it will enforce nuclear nonproliferation by the threat
and use of nuclear weapons. The use of tactical nuclear weapons against Iran
will usher in a new world order. The ultimate goal is that no nation other than
the U.S. should have a nuclear weapons arsenal.

It is not impossible that the U.S. will succeed in its goal. But it is utterly
improbable. This is a big world. Once the U.S. crosses the nuclear threshold
against a non-nuclear country, many more countries will strive to acquire nuclear
weapons, and many will succeed.

The nuclear abyss may turn out to be a steep precipice or a
gentle slope. Either way, it will be a one-way downhill slide toward a bottomless
pit. We will have entered a path of no return, leading in a few months or a
few decades to global nuclear war and unimaginable destruction.

But there are still choices to be made. Up to the moment the first U.S. nuclear
bomb explodes, the fall into the abyss can be averted by choices made by each and every one of us. We may never know
which choices prevented it if it doesn't happen. But if we make the wrong choices,
we will know what they were. And so will future generations, even in a world
where wars are fought with sticks and stones.