In so far as events and dates occurring before the 9th day of
June 1944 are concerned, accuracy and detail must necessarily be sacrificed in
order to produce this history. On the date mentioned, all records, both historical and
administrative, at that time in possession of the company were lost in a disaster which
occurred in the English
Channel, the details of which will be covered later in this same document. From such
records as may be available and from questioning of men who were present with the
organization during the period prior to the channel disaster a fairly accurate
presentation of the facts has been obtained as set forth herein. All dates represented are
correct and in instances where it has been impossible to determine the exact date, the
date is not given.

The company was activated on the 25th July, 1942 at Camp Bowie,
Texas with a cadre taken from the 115th Ord. MM. Co.; cadre consisting of one (1) officer,
2nt Lt. Huell E. Hutchinson, and thirty (30) enlisted men.

The remaining six months of the year were spent in accomplishing administrative duties
incident to the keeping together of an organization of one officer and thirty enlisted men
and in worrying about the maintenance of a motor pool of five vehicles. The organization
grew very little during this period, the chief growth being the addition of a full
compliment of officers. On Sept. 1, 1942, 2nd Lt. Huell E.
Hutchinson, commanding officer was promoted to 1st Lt.. In Nov. 1, 1942, Capt.. F.F. Poppenburg was assigned to the company as commanding
officer and remained with the company for a period of nearly two years.

During December of 1942 and January of 1943 the company was filled to T/O strength of
enlisted men and commenced the business of training for the job to be done at some time in
the future. The men attended service schools of the various types from clerical to
mechanical located in all parts of the country, designed to mold the organization into
what we of the organization feel was one of the finest Ordnance companies in the Army.
Until late summer of 1943 men and officers continued to go to schools, to perform the
inspections which we later came to regard as routine work but which at the time were
regarded as assignment of opportunity and interest, which in fact they were. The men of
the command had adequate opportunity to go on furlough several times and without
exception, all men took advantage of one or more of these opportunities.

We homesteaded the place. From activation until departure for POE the company never
left Camp Bowie. Primary mission during this period was the maintenance and service of the
6th Tank Group and its three (3) Tank Battalions.

Late in November the company departed Camp Bowie for duty overseas.
Processing was done at Camp Shanks,
N.Y. for the POE. Destination we later discovered was England.

Entering England by rail after disembarking at Firth of Clyde, Scotland, December
11, 1943, we proceeded at once to Letcombe Regis, Berkshire where the
company entrenched itself firmly in a sprawling series of horse stables. Christmas dinner
here, not bad either; we had turkey with trimmings. Here also we became accustomed to the
dark English nights that settle so early, the fog, the fuel shortage, the pubs of warm
beer, the blackout. Among the adult villagers we made friends, dispensed good will, among
the children we made friends, dispensed gum.

December 28th was the last day at Letcombe Regis. The company moved to a
place called Grimsditch
Camp, 6 miles south of Salisbury in
Wiltshire. Here we finished the business which we had begun a week or two earlier of
drawing our equipment.

Among the first official papers we received after arrival in England was one assigning
us to First United StatesArmy which assignment remained in effect
throughout the war in Europe. The company again was furloughed, to various places in the
United Kingdom and the men were given frequent passes to Salisbury and to Bourmemouth on the southern coast of England.

We commenced the regular and systematic contacting of
organizations for which we were designated their source of maintenance. It was valuable
experience and later, during the campaign, paid off in the form of close cooperation when
we supplied service to those same units with which we had become acquainted in England.
The most noteworthy accomplishment during this period was the equipping of the 103rd AAA
Battalion with a special sight designed and perfected by Lt. Col.
Pecca. Our service section worked night and day for an extended period during this
operation manufacturing and assembling the sight to the satisfaction of all concerned. At
this time the company was attached to the 6th Ordnance Battalion.

Chief personal concern of the men, it would seem, was the procuring of
fresh eggs. We practically became egg worshipers after prolonged exposure to this powdered
stuff the Army puts out. (Apologies to such kitchen personnel reading this as might pride
themselves on their special recipe for treatment of the powdered variety.)

The impending invasion about this time became progressively a more and
more important topic for a drop-of-the-hat discussion. In this company as everywhere,
anxiety as to when and speculation as to where were in evidence.

About the middle of March we were joined by a detachment of ten (10)
and a technical truck from the 175thSignal Repair Company which remained
with us until after the war in Europe.

The first long move made by the organization was made on March
31, 1944 to a secret training area located Slapton Ley and Torcross, beach towns in
Southern Devonshire. Coincident with this move and at about the same date was a transfer
to the 177th Ordnance Battalion. We established ourselves in a large mansion on a
country estate known as Widdecombe House, one mile from Torcross. The mansion was large
enough to accommodate all but a small portion of the company and housed both and C.P. for
the next month and a half until feverish preparation for the big show engaged in service
and maintenance of secret equipment in the hands of troops in training.

About this time definite information was given us as to the part which we
would play in the invasion in Europe, and accordingly we set about organizing the company
into two parts, the first to be known as Detachment "A", and the second
as Detachment "B".

Det. 'A' was to be composed of five officers and 100 enlisted men,
plus the Signal Detachment was with us. The detachment was to land with V-Corps assault
force taking with it all technical truck and supply parts and equipment including combat
vehicle replacements sufficient to last until being joined by Det. 'B' several days later.

Organized on this basis, Det. 'A' left Widdecombe House the 16th
of May for the marshaling area where final preparations were completed during the
ensuing 15 days before loading aboard ship. Loading was accomplished June 1st
from the southern tip of England and the vessel, a Landing Ship
Tank, then proceeded to a quiet harbor where we awaited what was to come.

June 6th found us wallowing in the channel in company
with a lot of other vessels of all descriptions stretching ahead and behind as far as you
could see. News of the big event reached us and spread like fire but we had to wait for
particulars regarding the progress of the beachhead. Arriving off of the shore of the Normandy coast the evening of the 6th we
sweated and waited all that night, all day the seventh and about the midnight of the
seventh commenced loading the equipment into landing barges. landing with the first barge
load during the night. The need for other types of troops was evidently a little greater
than for Ordnance at that stage so the remainder of the company waited all day June
8th before making the landing the night of the eight. Intense concentration of
anti-aircraft rendered quite ineffective all attempts by the enemy to offer resistance.
The shower of anti-aircraft tracers sent into the sky toward the enemy night raiding
planes reminded the writer of salt and pepper. A remarkable spectacle, a most intense
concentration--it was worth seeing and will be remembered a long time.

Those landing with the second barge soon located the first group to
land and after completing de-waterproofing operations, the detachment proceeded to a
location that had been selected as the site for our first shop. Omaha Beach was
behind us.

Ordnance operations were commenced June 9th and we soon
found that with the great quantity of wrecked and disabled equipment at our disposal, many
repairs were effected by cannibalization, particularly on armored equipment since the
beach was littered with it.

Ordnance service was dispensed freely to anyone and everyone looking
for it. The service section was kept particularly busy producing parts which were not in
the stock of emergency supplies which we had brought with us or which had since been used
up.

The first Ordnance ashore equipped for repair of combat vehicles, we
had more than enough work to match the best efforts of a superman. The men worked hard
accomplishing an unbelievably great volume of work. It was common to have crews working
far into the night or all night wherever blackout conditions would permit.

The morning of June 10th the area was visited by the
Army Ordnance Officer who informed us that the entire Detachment 'B' had been lost
at sea and that we should proceed accordingly and requisition replacements on that basis,
both men and equipment.

It became evident the following morning that the information reaching
us with regard to the channel disaster was in error. Detachment 'B' had been
split further into two parts and loaded onto two vessels, only one of which had been
torpedoed. Part of the detachment had landed the evening of the 10th and rejoined
Detachment 'A' June 11th amid considerable rejoicing.

At this point I digress to record the activities of Detachment 'B'
from the time of the departure of Detachment 'A' for the marshaling area. On June
6th, having spent the intervening 20 days in stocking a greater supply of parts
and preparing the number of combat vehicle replacements for the landing by making
mechanical repairs and accomplishing the necessary waterproofing, the detachment departed
for the marshaling area and on the morning of the 8th loaded aboard two
vessels (Landing Ship Tanks) for the crossing.

Disaster struck at 0300 hours 9 June when one of the vessels was
struck by a torpedo believed to have been launched by a German 'E' Boat. Two
officers and eleven enlisted men were rescued by a British destroyer and returned to
England. Twenty-seven (27) enlisted men perished at sea. (Appendix # 1)

Two days after being joined by those of Detachment 'B' who made the
landing, the company moved the shop to a location which was to be home until after the big
breakthrough at St.
Lo some weeks later. It was a rather muddy, musty place identified on the map by a
patch of green and designated as "Foret de Cerrisy". In Cerrisy Forrest
we received personnel replacements which restored us to T/O strength. We were still short
the equipment lost in the channel sinking.

From the time of the landing until moving to Cerrisy Forrest only one
man had been wounded as a result of enemy action.. T/5 John
MacDonald was wounded in the neck by a sniper while returning from a contact party.
He was hospitalized.

Life in the Forrest was quite routine and no great amount of repair
work was required for a number of weeks while troops continued to pour ashore and the army
was built up in preparation for the subsequent breakthrough at St. Lo late in July.
Interest was supplied by such incidents as our salvage disposal export, bespectacled T/5 Aaron 'Moe' Landres, who happened to be without his specks at
the time gravely seeking road directions from one of the many stone statues around the
Normandy countryside.

The Normandy hedgerows were giving the Tankers as well as the
doughfeet a lot of trouble and it was about this time that some ingenious man, driven by
necessity devised a gadget which after having been demonstrated, was promptly dubbed a 'hedge
row cutter' and ordered to be mass produced by every Ordnance company which had a
welding outfit that could be spared for the job. During this period, our welders worked
all night producing and installing the device on as many tanks as could be equipped with
it before the St. Lo breakthrough. It was not a sensation but was reasonably successful
and undoubtedly helped in solving the hedgerow problem.

On July 5th, 2nd Lt. W.C. Youens,
one of the officers who had survived the channel disaster, and 95 enlisted men assigned to
the 526th Ord. Co. landed in Normandy and joined. Considerable confusion concerning the
details of the sinking existed both on the continent and in England with result that
replacement of personnel losses were duplicated from both ends. Lt. Youens brought another
officer to replace the second officer rescued from the channel since it was impossible to
locate him after landing in England. He also brought with him complete equipment as
original included in that with which Detachment 'B' had embarked since it was believed in
England that both ships had been torpedoed.

Then followed several days of transferring men and disposing of excess
equipment to restore the organization to its T/O strength once more. The replacement who
landed with Lt. Youens was retained on the rolls as an
overage and placed on DS to another company of the same battalion.

In an operation at the long and fast drive across France,
service units such as ours become strangled with a gruesome collection of wrecks and road
losses that never quite permit it to catch up with the war until the war slows down some
what. From Normandy to Luxemburg it was a long
trail of muddy fox holes with rain, long move, traffic jam, hornets (thousands of them,
remember them?), long move, try and get some gas, move again. It was not uncommon to have
mechanics 200 miles behind engaged in cleaning up work that the company had been forced to
leave. We wrestled with tons and tons of track of all types and descriptions, trying to
keep the combat outfits moving on rubber. We performed inspections on as many units as the
manpower situation would permit, installing engines, transmissions, final drives, making
smaller repairs, and always that track in ten-block strips, tons of it.

At Paris we caught up with
the war briefly and settled down for a few days in a suburb called Billiers le Bacle,
moving our shop into an area formerly occupied by a Luftwaffe
repair outfit. The grounds were strewn with a miscellaneous collection of sabotaged
airplanes and countless spare parts, some of them new. Here most of the men had a chance
to go out through Paris on a brief sight seeing tour. Our stay was cut too short thought
and we had to commence to move and pick up the wrecks again while the army pushed toward
Belgium and the Siegfried Line.

About the time our combat forces struck the German border, we came to
rest in a patch of pine trees in Luxemburg. It was September 20th.
This place was the realization of all that an Ordnance man wants to forget. We had rain,
cold, mold, and mud-we had mud that was classic. In order to move equipment through the
area, it was necessary to use a grouser equipped tank as a prime mover. News Week
magazine featured picture taken in our area while we had about two feet of mud. It was
represented as "Tanks moving up toward the front along the Luxemburg border".

On October 5th we moved the company into a railroad
station near Weywertz, Belgium
in Kreis Malmedy, remaining there until December 15. Like everyone else at
the time, we had time on our hands. We procured a projector and had regular movies, when
the projector operated properly. The men sang-the company had a quartet that practiced
regularly and performed before movies. Everyone griped about the chow at that time and
quite understandably so for all we could procure at the ration dump was "C"
ration stew or "C" ration hash, take your choice. Did you ever try this sort of
thing for three weeks?

Early in the winter a campaign got under way which
commenced with an assault on a key village known as Schmidt, located twenty miles SW of Aachen.
Terrific losses were sustained by the supporting armor, both tanks and tank destroyers,
and the better part of our efforts for several weeks were focused on this campaign. We
were operating at great distance from the units which we were supporting and it was
necessary to send out parties of repair to remain with the units for several days at a
time.

On October 6thT/3 Charles Specklemire
was awarded the Bronze Star Medal per par 3 GO # 62, Hq. FUSA dated 26 September 1944 for
meritorious service in connection with military operations against the enemy from 9 June
1944 to 5 July 1944 in England and in France. T/3 Specklemire
was one of the survivors of the English Channel disaster.

On November 29th while still at Weywertz, a Germanflying bomb struck in the center of the area demolishing a great part of the railroad
station and causing a number of casualties. One man, T/5 Frank W.
Polcyn was killed instantly. Two men, S/Sgt Elmer A. Wolfgram
and T/4 Earl R. Brister died of wounds received. Fifteen men
were hospitalized, seriously wounded and two slightly wounded. Twenty-seven were treated
for slight wounds, not hospitalized. (Appendix# 2)

While at Weywertz several more men received Bronze Star Medals in
connection with military operations against the enemy during the period immediately
following the Normandy assault. These men were: Capt.. W.E. Anderson
(1st Lt. during period covered by citation) and Capt. F.F.
Poppenburg (former commanding officer) per par III GO # 69, Hq. FUSA, dated 16
October 1944; T/3 Harry J. Field, T/3
George Ponzar, T/# Casimer I. Zaremba. T/4 Harold Backs, per par III GO # 77, Hq. FUSA. A total of five
enlisted men and two officers have received the Bronze Star Medal award for service
performed while assigned to this company.

On December 15th, shortly before the start of the German
winter offensive, the company moved to Eupen, about fifteen miles north of Weywertz. We
had not yet finished moving our supplies from the old location at Weywertz when the German
forces over ran that section of Belgium and it became impossible to finish the job of
moving until some weeks later when we again had control of the area. The area in question
lay for several weeks between American and German lines.

The rest of the winter was spent in Verviers, a fair sized Belgium
city apparently out of reach of the battle but not out of reach of their artillery and
flying bombs for we had hardly set down our duffel bags here when another flying bomb
struck within 100 yards of the C.P., demolishing it and causing considerable damage in the
shop area. As a result of this incident thirteen (13) men were treated for wounds, one of
them hospitalized. Most casualties were caused by flying glass. (Appendix # 3)

On January 1st, T/4 Nowostawski and T/5 Routt shot down two German planes in the vicinity of St.
Tround, Belgium, using caliber 50 anti-aircraft mounts.

About the time of arrival in Verviers, the city was
subjected to fire from what was believed to be German V-2 bombs. None of them fell in the
immediate area, however on the day after the move to Verviers, one bomb was dropped in the
area which had been vacated in Eupen and which was still occupied by a number of
parts and supply men and automotive mechanics who had been left behind to clean up
unfinished work.

Late in the winter, February 12, 1945, we again moved to the
area which we had previously occupied in Eupen. The stay here was short and concerned
mostly with preparing the combat units for the drive across Germany which commenced the
first part of March.

On the 7th of March we moved to Hofen, in Germany
near Monchau, the pivot of Runstedt's winter offensive. We were approximately six miles
from Weywertz to which town we had moved on October 5, 1944, five months
earlier. From Hofen we jumped off on the long succession of moves that took us across
Germany to the war's end. We again started the familiar business of picking up wrecks and
leaving the repair crews down the length of the Ahr Riber to where it empties into
the Rhine a short distance above Remagen, famed as the initial bridgehead across
the Rhine. For a few days the shop was set up in Altenahr, on the Ahr Riber from
which we completed a refitting operation commenced before leaving Belgium, and performed
another as further preparation for the drive across Germany.

We now had with us a detachment of two officers and approximately thirty
enlisted men of a Belgium FusilierBattalion, detached as a security guard
while in Germany. It was still necessary to post our own sentries at points such as the
main entrance to the shop area but the main responsibility of security guard was handled
by the Belgium security detachment.

March 27th the company crossed the Rhine River at
the V-Corps bridge located a few miles above the Ramagen Bridge.

We made moves during the rest of the sweep across Germany of as great a
distance as was consistent with vehicle operating range, the problem of keeping in contact
with the supply depot, the necessity of leaving crews behind to finish work in each area
and to move remaining supplies. We were still struggling with the truck loads of track
mentioned preciously in the narrative as an item ranking with fuel in keeping armored
equipment rolling over long distances.

We moved as rapidly as possible, performing as much maintenance as
possible, a large part of which consisted of collecting the tanks lost by the moving
armored units and by ourselves. The long road marches such as were being made provided
more engine, power train, and suspension system maintenance than we could cope with and
after four or five hundred miles the shop remained almost hopelessly full until the end of
the war which found us in Weiden near the Czechoslovakian border, having swung
south into the Third Army after the Russian-American linkup east of Leipzig.

Our transfer to the Third Army became effective May 6th,
one day before the official end of the war in Europe. At Weiden the signal detachment
which had been with us for more than a year left to return to their own organization. On May
12th the company moved into Holysov, Czechoslovakia, having postponed the
move several days since the end of the war.

At Holysov the Belgium Fusiliers which had accompanied us through
Germany departed for Belgium.

We took a vacation and worked a working man's hours for a change. To
assume that there would be any appreciable decrease in the amount of repair work finding
it's way into the shop after the war had ended was a mistake. It was several weeks before
things slowed to where we could loaf a little, however night work was discontinued and the
men had a rest that had been a year coming. We opened a movie theater. We organized a
dance band and installed it in a club fostered by the company. We swam. We read. We laid
in the sun and acquired a tan. We made acquaintances among the local residents and found
them pleasant people to know.

Redeployment began to have its effect on the company and some strange
new business about points began to fill conversation. Men counted their Purple Hearts in
terms of five instead of one; they began to worry about battle stars and when it was all
settled-found that the organization had earned five of them. As sidelight on the battle
star question-those who had made the Normandy landing with Detachment "A"
were entitled to wear the Bronze Arrowhead along with the battle stars on their theater
service ribbon.

Redeployment took more men than it gave so it was considerably
understrength that we made the move from Czechoslovakia to Nurnburg, Germany on July
21st, 1945.

Settled in Nurnburg, we found we had tanks again, thousands of them. With
this move we broke up our association with the 177th Ordnance Battalion to which we had
been attached since the first part of April 1944 and were now attached to
the 317th Ordnance Battalion, the mission of which was the operation of the Third
Army combat vehicle redeployment pool. Our chief concern now was storage and preservation
of combat vehicles turned in by redeployment units.

Following on the heels of a host of rumors came an order dated Sept.
9th ordering the company to the AssemblyArea Command, Camp
Baltimore, 25 miles SE of Rheims, France on the first leg of the long trip back to the
United States where it will be disbanded.

The work that the 526th Ordnance Tank Maintenance Company was organized to
do was done and at this writing it seems fitting to draw the history to a close. The
redeployment shuffling of personnel has resulted in such a complete turnover that we now
have only three officers and fifty three men left of those who entered the war with the
company during the first weeks of Normandy.

THE END

** **

APPENDIX NUMBER ONE (1)

The following names of men of this organization are the men who died at sea June 9,
1944.

The invasion to liberate northwest Europe began on June 6, 1944. The Normandy beaches
were chosen by planners because they lay within range of our air cover and were less
heavily defended than the obvious objective of the Pas de Calais, the shortest distance
between Great Britain and the Continent. Airborne drops at both ends of the beachheads
were to protect the flanks, as well as open up roadways to the interior. Six divisions
were to land on the first day; three

U.S., two
British and one Canadian. Two more British and one U.S. division were to follow up after
the assault division had cleared the way through the beach defenses.

Logistical and organizational difficulties were enormous; problems getting troops
loaded onto ships and then getting them from the ships onto the beaches, the transition
from zero combat power to full combat power, subsequent restructuring of units to get them
out of the beachhead to operate as standard land combat forces, as well as the vital task
of regulating traffic flow from the beach exits inland-- all these were major obstacles to
be overcome by the allied staffs. Lack of a suitable port was provided for in the form of "mulberries,"
large artificial harbors constructed in England and floated to Normandy. Until the
nearest major port (Cherbourg) was captured, all follow-on supplies and divisions would
have to enter through the mulberries.

Disorganization, confusion, incomplete or faulty implementation of plans characterized
the initial phases of the landings. This was especially true of the airborne landings
which were badly scattered, as well as the first wave units landing on the assault
beaches. Most of the troops were able to adapt to the disorganization, but at some point
they would have to stop and reorganize to continue effective operations.

The physical geography of the beaches was important and a large part determined the
type of troops that would be assigned to each objective. An example would be the cliffs at
Pointe du Hoc. The 2d and 5th (U.S.) Ranger Battalions trained for months to take this
objective and were able to achieve their goals in spite of the almost total collapse of
their operations plan.

UTAH BEACH

UTAH BEACH was added to the initial invasion plan almost as an afterthought. The allies
needed a major port as soon as possible, and UTAH BEACH would put VII (U.S.) Corps within
60 kilometers of Cherbourg at the outset. The major obstacles in this sector were not so
much the beach defenses, but the flooded and rough terrain that blocked the way north.

OMAHA BEACH

OMAHA BEACH linked the U.S. and British beaches. It was a critical link between the
Contentin Peninsula and the flat plain in front of Caen Omaha was also the most restricted
and heavily defended beach and for this reason at least one veteran U.S. Division (1st)
was tasked to land there. The terrain was difficult. Omaha beach was unlike any of the
other assault beaches in Normandy. Its crescent curve and unusual assortment of bluffs,
cliffs and draws were immediately recognizable from the sea. It was the most defensible
beach chosen for D-Day; in fact, many planners did not believe it a likely place for a
major landing. The high ground commanded all approaches to the beach from the sea and
tidal flats. Moreover, any advance made by U.S. troops from the beach would be limited to
narrow passages between the bluffs. Advances directly up the steep bluffs were difficult
in the extreme. German strongpoints were arranged to command all the approaches and
pillboxes were set in the draws to fire east and west, thereby protecting troops while
remaining concealed from bombarding warships. These pillboxes had to be taken out by
direct assault. Compounding this problem was the allied intelligence failure to identify a
nearly full-strength infantry division, the 352d, directly behind the beach. It was
believed to be no further forward than St. Lo and Caumont, 20 miles inland.

V(U.S.) Corps was assigned to this sector. The objective was to obtain a lodgement
area between Port-en-Bessin and the Vire River and ultimately push forward to St. Lo and
Caumont in order to cut German communications (St. Lo was a major road junction).
Allocated to the task were 1st and 29th (U.S.) Divisions, supported by the 5th Ranger
Battalion and 5th Engineer Special Brigade.

GOLD BEACH

GOLD BEACH was the objective of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division of the British 2d
Army. Its primary task was to seize Arrolnanches (future site of a Mulberry) and drive
inland to seize the road junction at Bayeux, as well as contact U.S. forces on their right
and Canadians on their left. The initial opposition was fierce, but the British invasion
forces broke through with relatively light casualties and were able to reach their
objectives in this sector. A major factor in their success was the British assault forces
were lavishly equipped with armor and l!Funniesll of the 79th Armored Division. The
"~unnies

VY were the specialist
vehicles, armed with 290mm mortars, designed for tasks such as clearing obstacles or
minefields and destruction of large fixed fortifications. Perhaps the most famous is he 1'Flail11
tank, which was a Sherman equipped with a large roller to which was attached lengths of
chain. These tanks were designed to clear terrain to their front, and detonate mine fields
and other booby traps without danger to the tanks or infantry following. The U.S. reluctance to use any of these vehicles at their landing sites (they
relied solely on combat engineers) was in large part responsible for the massive disaster
that ensued on OMAHA BEACH.

JUNO BEACH

JUNO BEACH was the landing area for 3d Canadian Division. The Canadians were very
concerned about their role in the invasion (as were most of the planning staff) as the
memory of 2d Canadian Division1 5 destruction at Dieppe was still fresh. But
many lessons had been learned, and the 3d Canadian Division, in spite of heavy opposition
at Courselles-sur-Mer, broke through and advanced nearly to their objective, the
airfield at Carpiquet, west of Caen. The Canadians made the deepest penetration of any
land forces on June 6th, again with moderate casualties.

SWORD BEACH

SWORD BEACH was the objective of 3d (British) Infantry Division. They were to advance
inland as far as Caen, and line up with British Airborne forces east of the Orne
River/Caen Canal. The Orne River bridges had been seized in late at night on the 5th of
June by a glider-borne reinforced company commanded by Major John Howard. As at the other
beaches, British forces penetrated quite a ways inland after breaking the opposition at
water's edge. Unfortunately, the objective of Caen was probably asking too much of a
single infantry division, especially given the traffic jams and resistance encountered
further inland. 1st Special Service (Commando) brigade commanded by Lord Lovat, linked up
in the morning with Howard's force at Pegasus bridge on the British left. Fierce
opposition from the 21st Panzer and later the 12th SS Panzer division prevented the
British from reaching Caen on the 6th. Indeed, Caen was not taken until late June.

OPPOSITION8(1196

UTAH BEACH: The defense here consisted of a single outnumbered strong point called W5
which had been pulverized by the pre-landing bombardment. Lieutenant Arthur Jalinke,
commander of Strongpoint W5, surrendered when their only effective gun (dug-in 88mm)
malfunctioned as a result of shrapnel' damage.

OMAHA BEACH: One of the biggest problems was not only the restricted terrain and the
dug in pillboxes, but the fact that allied intelligence had overlooked the 352d Infantry
Division, right behind the beaches. This unit, like the others in Normandy, was spread out
but was an experienced unit that had served in Russia. It more than doubled the
effectiveness of the coastal defenses, thus resulting in excessive U.S. losses. This unit
was attached to the 84th German Corps, which had responsibility for the entire Normandy
region. In addition, elements of the 3d Sturm-Flak Korps were spread out from Carentan to
Bayeux. They contributed a large number of 20, 37 and 88mm guns to the defense, but the
unit was badly disrupted by the pre-invasion air

attack.

GOLD BEACH: Most of the opposition here consisted of "Ost" troops,
Russian and Polish conscripts/prisoners fighting in the German Army, and men from the
746th Infantry Division, a second rate static unit with a large frontage (Caen Bayeux)

JUNO BEACH: The Canadians faced the same troops as were positioned behind GOLD, plus
the 440th Ost Battalion dug-in at Courselles-sur-Mer. Later in the day they faced
elements of 21st Panzer and 12th 55 Panzer Division, both deployed too far in the rear to
hinder the actual landings.

SWORD BEACH: The 3d (British) Infantry Division faced, as the other beaches, well
dug-in but overextended elements of 16th Infantry Division. The British also faced
counter-attacks from 12th SS and 21st Panzer later in the day and into the night.

ALLIED AIRDROPS

The drops took place on both flanks of the invasion area in the late hours of June 5th
and early on the morning of the 6th. British 6th Airborne dropped on the eastern flank to
secure the bridges over the Orne and Dives rivers. The drops took place in clear weather,
but were scattered over a large expanse of countryside. In spite of this, the British met
most of their D-Day objectives, including the daring glider assault on the Orne River/Caen
Canal bridges. The drop also confused the German defenders, thus buying time for the
invasion troops.

The U.S. drops were completely scattered, with the exception of
one regiment. This was a result of thick cloud cover and in some cases the inexperience of
the pilots. As a result, the drop serials of 101st and 82d were scattered over a wide area
of the Cotentin Peninsula, some troops ending up 40 kms from their planned drop zones. The
Germans had also flooded large areas of the Cotentin, including several drop zones. Scores
of paratroopers drowned upon landing. Despite heavy localized resistance, some of which
was encountered on the way to the ground, all U.S. units were able to gain their
objectives to some extent with the forces available. Additionally, the scattered nature of
the drop served to confuse and paralyze defending German units. The German commander of
the 91st Luftiande Division, one of the best formations in the Cotentin, was ambushed and
killed by troops of the 101st. As with the British drop, these events served to buy time
forby the sea--borne invaders.

ANALYSIS

It had been a grim fight. Six weeks of battle had left the Germans disheartened and
susceptible to any further blow the Allies might deliver. "It was casualty reports,
casualty reports, casualty reports wherever you went," Rommel told his son Manfred
from his sickbed. " I have never fought with such losses.. .And the worst of it is
that it was all without sense or purpose." Indeed, Rommel continued, on some days the
equivalent of a regiment of his men had fallen in Normandy more than in a whole summer of
fighting in Africa during 1942.

The days had been filled with mud, heartache, and pain for the Allies as well. From the
very beginning, little had seemed to go right. The airborne assault on the night before
the landing had sown confusion among the enemy and had provided an important diversion,
but too many of the men had landed too far from their targets. As a result, the effort had
only a marginal effect on the developing battle. Over the days that followed, rather than
withdrawing beyond the Seine as Allied planners had expected, the Germans had hung on
tenaciously, taking brutal losses but inflicting them upon the Allies as well. Meanwhile,
Montgomery's careful plan for the attack had begun to unravel on D-Day itself. His forces
failed to take Caen, the key to further operationsin the open country to the south.
Attacking time and again as the campaign developed, they had nonetheless held the cream of
the German force in place, absorbing pressure that would almost inevitably have fallen
upon Bradley's forces in the Bocage.

As for the Americans, the landing on OMAHA Beach had been a near-disaster averted only
by the courage of unsung sailors and soldiers. When air attacks and naval gunfire had
failed to silence German guns and the momentum of the assault had begun to lag, those heroes had pushed their frail landing craft to shore despite the traps "Soldiers Resting
on OMAHA Beach" by Manuel Bromberg.

(Army Art Collection) and obstacles blocking their way. Rallying to the directions of their commanders,
they had then climbed the bluffs overlooking the beach and advanced inland, often at the
cost of their own lives. In the same way, although Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins' VII Corps
captured the port of Cherbourg on 29 June, the American advance bogged down in the
hedgerows. Bradley's First Army absorbed forty thousand casualties while slowly advancing
twenty miles to St. Lo.

Even so, enough went well for the campaign to succeed. Roosevelt, Marshall, Eisenhower,
Churchill, and Montgomery were master communicators who bonded an unwieldy coalition into
an extraordinary fighting machine. The plan they and their staffs devised failed to
foresee every circumstance that would occur on the battlefield, particularly the
difficulties Bradley's forces would encounter in the Bocage, but it was still a
masterpiece of innovation that provided ample means for Allied commanders to prevail.
Cunning deceptions kept the Germans transfixed on the Pas de Calais until long after the
real invasion had occurred; Allied airmen swept the skies clean of the enemy fighters and
bombers that might have imposed a heavy toll upon the landing force; and the effort to
build up the stocks of supplies and munitions necessary for an effective attack succeeded
beyond the most optimistic expectation. In the end, notwithstanding, it was the heroism of
infantrymen such as Major Howie, who rose day and night to the challenge despite almost
overwhelming fear and fatigue, that afforded the critical margin for success.

A barely failed assassination attempt upon Hitler's life, implicating Rommel himself,
brought about a purge of officers in Germany that would, for a time, strengthen Hitler1s
control over his armed forces. Although the Germans would fight on with resilience and
determination for another ten months, their line in France would soon break, Patton's army
would swing clear, Paris would fall, and Allied forces would approach the Rhine. The loss
of France would deprive Germany not only of a major source of food, raw resources, and
labor but also of seaports that had long sheltered its U-boats and of radar sites that had
afforded early warning of Allied bomber attacks. More important, it would provide the
Allies with the secure base they needed to launch their final offensive against the German
heartland. As Rommel told his son, the future was clear and inevitable. The end of
Hitler's Reich was at hand: "There is no longer anything we can do."