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Rationalizing Public Repression: Mubarak's Self-Toppling Regime

Dr. Hussein is a lecturer in political science at Cairo University in Egypt.

This article takes as its point of departure the close interconnectedness of rivalry in the political sphere and control practiced in the public sphere. This relationship is most visible in autocracies where strict censorship is applied and severe control over the content circulated in the public sphere is maintained.1 It also builds upon Wickham's assumption that fluctuation in the level and intensity of a regime's repression is not a constant, even if the regime stays largely autocratic.2 The importance assigned to the Internet and social media as major venues for eroding regime control and potentially toppling it is borne out by relevant research.3 Yet, this article argues that the major role played by the Internet and social media in ousting Mubarak was in sparking and coordinating the protests and exposing the lack of legitimacy of a long-time dictator. These outlets would not have been able to mobilize a popular uprising if the regime had enjoyed legitimacy. It is also the argument of this article that the Mubarak regime's strategy of simultaneously rationalizing repressive practices and its own poor political and economic performance resulted in his ouster.

The case of Mubarak's Egypt falls under the umbrella of studies on the role of new media in political change. Egypt's public sphere went through drastic structural alterations after government media reform in the 1990s allowed for private and social media to be part of the country's public sphere, mainly in the 2000s. In addition, it is a regime that was toppled by a popular uprising in which social media and the Internet were clearly employed. By focusing on state censorship and examining several cases of direct and indirect harassment, it will become evident that, starting the 2000s, the regime tolerated significant verbal opposition. This was a time when government performance deteriorated sharply, and the regime's capacity to repress opposition was restrained, partly due to the exposure by international civil society of the regime's human-rights violations.

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