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"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay againstMobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist ofabout twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. Thecavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg.It, with the available cavalry already in that section, willmove from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood's army has beenterribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it inTennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now bythe withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it alarge portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is soasserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebelCongress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of ithad been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) Thisbeing true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement willattract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advancefrom your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore,that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would bethreefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force aspossible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy theenemy's line of communications and military resources; third, todestroy or capture their forces brought into the field.Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct theexpedition against. This, however, would not be so important asthe mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretionshould be left to the officer commanding the expedition to gowhere, according to the information he may receive, he will bestsecure the objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not knowwhat number of men you can put into the field. If not more thanfive thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will besufficient. It is not desirable that you should start thisexpedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three orfour days out, or even a week. I do not know when it willstart, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. Ifyou should hear through other sources before hearing from me,you can act on the information received.

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as littlewagon-train as possible, relying upon the country forsupplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery,or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the gunstaken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eighthorses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what forceyou think you will be able to send under these directions.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soonafter the 20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movementof the armies operating against Richmond, that allcommunications with the city, north of James River, should becut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force fromthe Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sentfrom Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable,whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of theenemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which,if successful. would accomplish the first at least, and possiblythe latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed GeneralSheridan as follows:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.

"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you willhave no difficulty about reaching Lychburg with a cavalry forcealone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal inevery direction, so as to be of no further use to therebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to lookafter Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you mightget there would justify it, you will strike south, heading thestreams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on andjoin General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now aboutstarting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four orgive thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven oreight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, thenthousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eightthousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa,Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating outthe vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted toleave mothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would adviseyou to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charlestonwas evacuated on Tuesday 1st.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan,inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give himdefinite information as to the points he might be expected tomove on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer, thefollowing telegram was sent him:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount ofopposition he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed,he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fitout for a new start. I think, however, all danger for thenecessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he haspassed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way toGoldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guidedin your after movements by the information you obtain. Beforeyou could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find himmoving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemystrongly posted at one or the other of these places, withrailroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington orNew Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February,with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousandeach. On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which theenemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of theShenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d,the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed onto Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in anintrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping tomake a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, theposition was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, elevenpieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, twohundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeenbattle-flags, were captured. The prisoners, under an escort offifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence hemarched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroadand bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Herehe remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmondand Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the northand south forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival ofhis trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the ideaof capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing hisforce into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence itmarched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying everylock, and in many places the bank of the canal. From here aforce was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, toobtain possession of the bridge across the James River at thatplace, but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. Theenemy also burned the bridge across the river atHardwicksville. The other column moved down the railroadtowards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House,sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, unitingwith the column at New Market. The river being very high, hispontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy havingdestroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the riverand get on the South Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroyit to Appomattox Court House, the only thing left for him was toreturn to Winchester or strike a base at the White House.Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market he took uphis line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks whereverpracticable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland,concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here herested one day, and sent through by scouts information of hiswhereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet himat White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. Aninfantry force was immediately sent to get possession of WhiteHouse, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in adirection to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, hecrossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridgesand many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank ofthe Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to GeneralThomas:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repairthe railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up toBull's Gap and fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville couldalways be got forward as required. With Bull's Gap fortified,you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and beprepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to makea campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do notthink Stoneman should break the road until he gets intoVirginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that maybe caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby wasmoving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defendingit under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two largeand well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from MiddleTennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy'svital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, underMajor-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and assembling theremainder of his available forces, preparatory to commenceoffensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan'scavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and Jameswere confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences ofRichmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies,reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro';General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaignagainst the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of theMississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force inthe vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasionor to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winterroads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. Atthis time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fearthat the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg andRichmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, and before hewas driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make aneffectual pursuit. On the 24th of March, General Sheridan movedfrom White House, crossed the James River at Jones's Landing, andformed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front ofPetersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sentforces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a generalmovement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating againstRichmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose ofturning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg,and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan,which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach anddestroy the South Side and Danville railroads. Two corps of theArmy of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, takingthe two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the presentline held by us strikes that stream, both moving towardsDinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division nowunder General Davies, will move at the same time by the WeldonRoad and the Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latterbefore crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole columnbefore reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then moveindependently, under other instructions which will be givenhim. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of thePotomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle MilitaryDivision not required for guarding property belonging to theirarm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to beadded to the defences of City Point. Major-General Parke willbe left in command of all the army left for holding the linesabout Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to ordersfrom the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The 9th armycorps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works solong as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however,the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then theleft of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy theposition held by the army prior to the capture of the WeldonRoad. All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held inreadiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may bedesignated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and onecolored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his presentlines, and march for the present left of the Army of thePotomac. In the absence of further orders, or until furtherorders are given, the white divisions will follow the leftcolumn of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division theright column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel will beleft in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Armyof the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commenceon the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behindthe minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in theabsence of the main army. A cavalry expedition, from GeneralOrd's command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave thereon Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for thepurpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, ifaccomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore fromthree to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should,however, be supported by all the infantry that can be sparedfrom Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalrycrosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be atUniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the WeldonRoad, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to thetriangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. Therailroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage ofcarriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulationof supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke.All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacksand eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling aspossible, and to give the Army of the James the same number ofdays' supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord willdirect his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficientsupplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up inpassing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken inwagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand willcarry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. Thedensely wooded country in which the army has to operate makingthe use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken withthe army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division,at the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions intooperation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9thcorps should be massed as much as possible. While I would notnow order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them,they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemyweakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. Incase they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps couldfollow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of thearmy. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rationsissued to them, same as the balance of the army. GeneralWeitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found atall practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. Asuccess north of the James should be followed up with greatpromptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is foundthat the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may beregarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their localreserves principally for the defence of Richmond. Preparationsmay be made for abandoning all the line north of the James,except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after abreak is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operatingagainst Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may,as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, inthe hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurleverything against the moving column, and return. It cannot beimpressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in thetrenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage ofit. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he doesso, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such aweakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoinedupon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy,those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commandingofficer of the army to which they belong, but that they will movepromptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would alsoenjoin the same action on the part of division commanders whenother parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I wouldurge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our linesin front of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox Rivertowards our left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of theline to the right and left of it, established themselves andturned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on eitherflank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, whenthe enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed andwounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. Our loss wassixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, andfive hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered theother corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respectivefronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy'sstrongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6thcorps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The enemymade desperate attempts to retake this line, but withoutsuccess. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eighthundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and sevenmissing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp aboutGoldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to themperfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, andstated that he would be ready to move, as he had previouslywritten me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationedfor twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring hiscommand to bear against Lee's army, in co-operation with ourforces in front of Richmond and Petersburg. General Shermanproposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, byturning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston orthereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond andDanville Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville,or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might bedeemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into execution,if he received no further directions in the meantime. Iexplained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirelysuccessful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroythe Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive theenemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapidconcentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring thereport that the enemy had retreated the night before. I wasfirmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would bethe signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, along, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of thesummer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put thearmy in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by thedestruction of the Danville Road, retard the concentration of thetwo armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandonmuch material that he might otherwise save. I thereforedetermined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisionsof the 24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and onedivision of the 25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding,and MacKenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuanceof the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assignedhim near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28ththe following instructions were given to General Sheridan:

"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road atthree A.M. to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M.,having but about three miles to march to reach the pointdesignated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, afterthe latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House. Move your cavalry atas early an hour as you can, and without being confined to anyparticular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roadsin rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near toor through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy assoon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy inhis intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible.Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can beattacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, andwith the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, ascircumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and willprobably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so,and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenchedline, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If youfind it practicable, I would like you to cross the South SideRoad, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to someextent. I would not advise much detention, however, until youreach the Danville Road, which I would like you to strike asnear to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction onthat road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to theSouth Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in likemanner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads,which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you mayreturn to this army, selecting your road further south, or youmay go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Shouldyou select the latter course, get the information to me as earlyas possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night thecavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of ourinfantry line extended to the Quaker Road, near its intersectionwith the Boydton Plank Road. The position of the troops fromleft to right was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord,Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and thecapture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort wasmade. I therefore addressed the following communication toGeneral Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not tocut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until hereceived notice from me to do so:

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox toDinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all, from theJerusalem Plank Road to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces canbe used advantageously. After getting into line south ofHatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position.General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker Roadintersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturingabout one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and waspushing on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so,before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut looseand go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning pusharound the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. Themovements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify youraction. We will act all together as one army here, until it isseen what can be done with the enemy. The signal-officer atCobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a cavalrycolumn had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rainfell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeledvehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them.During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court Housetowards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force.General Warren advanced and extended his line across the BoydtonPlank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of gettingacross the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his frontand extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where hewas, and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from hisfront into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills.Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in theirfronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy'slines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confrontingus as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, Iconceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetratedif my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforceGeneral Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable himto cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with theother corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of theoffensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaultedFort Stedman, particularly favored this. The enemy'sintrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw thelines occupied by the belligerents so close together at somepoints that it was but a moment's run from one to the other.Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys'scorps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of theroads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 31st,General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of theWhite Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this,he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, whichwas attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back onthe 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn,forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. Adivision of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, theenemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the WhiteOak Road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of hiscavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, afterthe affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry,defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towardsDinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed greatgeneralship. Instead of retreating with his whole command onthe main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered,he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enoughto take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy todeploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and madehis progress slow. At this juncture he dispatched to me what hadtaken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on DinwiddieCourt House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one division ofthe 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soonafter receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys couldhold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other twodivisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were soordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitatedthe sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead ofHumphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intendedmovements. On the morning of the 1st of April, GeneralSheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back onFive Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carriedhis strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery andbetween five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General CharlesGriffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5thcorps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Someapprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert hislines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridanbefore assistance could reach him, drive him from his positionand open the way for retreat. To guard against this, GeneralMiles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock inthe morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy'slines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps,sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher'sRun, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He wasclosely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command,until he met the other division of General Ord's that hadsucceeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run.Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, andclosed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg,while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions andjoined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded incarrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners,but was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan beingadvised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles tohis proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediatelysurrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, bya most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--themost salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materiallyshortening the line of investment necessary for taking in thecity. The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward toSutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles'sdivision. A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both hisright and left flanks were threatened by the approach of GeneralSheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station towards Petersburg,and a division sent by General Meade from the front ofPetersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving inour hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated bythe main road along the Appomattox River. During the night ofthe 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, andretreated towards Danville. On the morning of the 3d pursuitwas commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville Road,keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, alongthe South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along that roadbehind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the DanvilleRoad near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at AmeliaCourt House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited thearrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day.General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman thefollowing communication:

"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt toreach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who wasup with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot,and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope toreduce this number one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville,and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days gothere. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are,and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's andJohnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strikefor Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better ableto judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the onlystrategic points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee wasmoving west of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridanmoved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned toGeneral Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank,followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressedhard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons andseveral pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced fromBurkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantryand a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-GeneralTheodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advancemet the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroicallyattacked and detained until General Read was killed and his smallforce overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements,and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of hisforce, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenchedhimself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan struck the enemysouth of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artilleryand about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6thcorps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry wasmade, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousandprisoners, among whom were many general officers. The movementsof the 2d corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly tothe day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry,except one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward'sCourt House; the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and onedivision of cavalry, on Farmville; and the 2d corps by the HighBridge Road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed tothe north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit,that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at HighBridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediatelycrossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossedat Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterlyhopeless, I addressed him the following communication fromFarmville:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of thehopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army ofNorthern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, andregard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility ofany further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender ofthat portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army ofNorthern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received atFarmville the following:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though notentertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness offurther resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia,I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, andtherefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms youwill offer on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General."LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

To this I immediately replied:

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of samedate, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrenderof the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, Iwould say, that peace being my great desire, there is but onecondition I would insist upon--namely, That the men and officerssurrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms againagainst the Government of the United States until properlyexchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meetany officers you may name for the same purpose, at any pointagreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely theterms upon which the surrender of the Army of the NorthernVirginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. GeneralMeade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan,with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for AppomattoxStation, followed by General Ord's command and the 5th corps.During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fightingwith the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a generalengagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck therailroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, andcaptured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, andfour trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. Duringthis day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnightreceived the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. Inmine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender ofthe Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of yourproposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency hasarisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as therestoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desiredto know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot,therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army ofNorthern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect theConfederate States forces under my command, and tend to therestoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at tenA.M. to-morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between thepicket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General."LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer asfollows, and immediately started to join the column south of theAppomattox:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received. I have noauthority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposedfor ten A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state,however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace withyourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. Theterms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By theSouth laying down their arms they will hasten that mostdesirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds ofmillions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping thatall our difficulties may be settled without the loss of anotherlife, I subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."GENERAL R. E. LEE."

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5thcorps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making adesperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry wasat once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received,requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations fora surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received thefollowing from General Lee:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on thepicket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertaindefinitely what terms were embraced in your proposal ofyesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I nowask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in yourletter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General."LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result ofwhich is set forth in the following correspondence:

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to youof the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of theArmy of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rollsof all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy tobe given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to beretained by such officer or officers as you may designate. Theofficers to give their individual paroles not to take up armsagainst the Government of the United States until properlyexchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a likeparole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, andpublic property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to theofficers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embracethe side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses orbaggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed toreturn to his home, not to be disturbed by United Statesauthority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws inforce where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."GENERAL R. E. LEE."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containingthe terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia asproposed by you. As they are substantially the same as thoseexpressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they areaccepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers tocarry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General."LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps underGriffin, and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain atAppomattox Court-House until the paroling of the surrenderedarmy was completed, and to take charge of the public property.The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinityof Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South causedhis example to be followed, and to-day the result is that thearmies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiringpeace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnanceofficers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moveddirectly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on andthrough Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on themorning of the 13th. The day preceding, news of the surrenderof General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Shermanand General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreementfor a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis forpeace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreementwas disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval,together with your instructions, was communicated to GeneralSherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh,North Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at oncegiven by him to General Johnston for the termination of the trucethat had been entered into. On the 25th another meeting betweenthem was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, whichterminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's armyupon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee gotoff on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, NorthCarolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg,and Big Lick. The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on towithin a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the importantbridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed itbetween New River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro',on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and destroyedthe bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and betweenGreensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of suppliesalong it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury heattacked and defeated a force of the enemy under GeneralGardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and onethousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyedlarge amounts of army stores. At this place he destroyedfifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to makepreparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile andthe interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th ofMarch. The 16th corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding,moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the 13th corps,under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan andjoined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving thence onSpanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-GeneralSteele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leadingfrom Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, andpartially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment ofSpanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th ofApril. During the night the enemy evacuated the fort. FortBlakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisonerscaptured; our loss was considerable. These successespractically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us toapproach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th thecity was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces onthe morning of the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson,consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, wasdelayed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw,Alabama. On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered theenemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him inconfusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, anddestroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba River. On the 2dhe attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defendedby Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops,vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousandprisoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. Onthe 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sendinginformation of his operations to General Canby, marched onMontgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemyhaving abandoned it. At this place many stores and fivesteamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched directon Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which placeswere assaulted and captured on the 16th. At the former place wegot one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns,destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, manyfactories, and much other public property. At the latter placewe got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyednineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the 20th hetook possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, onethousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered byGeneral Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Daviswas trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit andsucceeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered toGeneral Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of theMississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemyunder Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately putin motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated forits immediate command; but on the 26th day of May, and beforethey reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrenderedhis entire command to Major-General Canby. This surrender didnot take place, however, until after the capture of the rebelPresident and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited offirst disbanding most of his army and permitting anindiscriminate plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms againstthe government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico,carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the UnitedStates, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among themsome of the leaders who had surrendered in person and thedisturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders fortroops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, andmovements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, mostof them reflecting great credit on our arms, and whichcontributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have notmentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in thereports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and briefdispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, havenot as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I wouldrespectfully refer to the reports of the commanders ofdepartments in which they have occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West andthe East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know thereis no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it waspossible for men to do in battle they have done. The Westernarmies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, andreceived the final surrender of the remnant of the principalarmy opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of the Eastcommenced their battles on the river from which the Army of thePotomac derived its name, and received the final surrender oftheir old antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. Thesplendid achievements of each have nationalized our victoriesremoved all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunatelyexperienced too much), and the cause of crimination andrecrimination that might have followed had either section failedin its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can wellcongratulate themselves and each other for having done theirfull share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot ofterritory belonging to the United States. Let them hope forperpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood,however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds ofvalor.

I have the honor to be,Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

THE END

__________FOOTNOTES

(*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.

(*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back toGeneral Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, tothe effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must havemore sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. Deeming thereturn dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered hisservices, which were accepted.--PUBLISHERS.

(*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland andGeneral Worth.--PUBLISHERS.

(*4) NOTE.--It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for agreat many years before the Mexican war to have established inthe United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something ofthe kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. Herecommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in hisannual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got anyhearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he madeassessments upon the different large towns and cities occupiedby our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, andappointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sumthus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelledthe fund to a total of about $220,000. Portions of this fundwere distributed among the rank and file, given to the woundedin hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After thewar was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied tohave this money, which had never been turned into the Treasuryof the United States, expended in establishing such homes as hehad previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of theSoldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,Kentucky.

The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it neverhad many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.

(*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that highoffice. It made also governors of States, members of thecabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank bothin state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war ina single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexicanwar in two years, has not been so fruitful of political resultsto those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the sideof the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sortwhatever, either in the state or in the nation, was aConfederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from thefact that the South was a military camp, and there were very fewpeople of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

(*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.

(*7) NOTE.--Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed inthe first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter fromGeneral Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. Atthe date of this letter it was well known that the Confederateshad troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump'slanding and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting nearShiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew.Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that mighthappen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and hisposition, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sendsit over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburglanding and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a milewest of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where ourright rested. In this letter General Lew. Wallace advisesGeneral W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and hisletter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letterwas dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, andsuggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending acompany back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry atthe two landings familiarize themselves with the road so thatthey could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to andfrom the different camps."

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what hasbeen said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace atthe battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no moreexperience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,would take the particular road that he did start upon in theabsence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparentdilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he foundthat the firing, which would be at first directly to his frontand then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got verymuch in rear of the position of his advance. This falling backhad taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move upto Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow theroad nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staffofficer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I amnot competent to say just what order the General actuallyreceived.

General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade atCrump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two anda half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallaceearly ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on theSecond. If the position of our front had not changed, the roadwhich Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our rightthan the River road.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.

(*8) NOTE: In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrotefor the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed someunwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, becauseof the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history,also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justiceto General McCook and his command, I must say that they left apoint twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and thepassage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deepin mud, which made marching slow. The division had not onlymarched through this mud the day before, but it had been in therain all night without rest. It was engaged in the battle ofthe second day and did as good service as its positionallowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform aconspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highestcommendation from division commanders in the Army of theTennessee. General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makesmention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a familywhich furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to thesecircumstances with minuteness because I did General McCookinjustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extentone would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to doany one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, Iam always willing to make the fullest admission.

(*9) NOTE.--For gallantry in the various engagements, from thetime I was left in command down to 26th of October and on myrecommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton werepromoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20thIllinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, andJohn E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.

(*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederatebattery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon hisvessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blewher up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, theNew Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulfand reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.

(*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockadeon February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.

(*12) NOTE.--On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, ofIllinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompaniedme to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and thatof some of the State officers who accompanied him.

(*13) NOTE.--When General Sherman first learned of the move Iproposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollectthat I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the riverto a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seatedon the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Shermancame up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he wouldlike to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shutthe door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the moveI had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a positionvoluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--ora long time--to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country,with a large river behind me and the enemy holding pointsstrongly fortified above and below. He said that it was anaxiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against anenemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they wouldguard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed outall the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaignproposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign tomake. This was, in substance, to go back until high groundcould be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify thereand establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, beingalways prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. Isaid this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said thatwas the very place he would go to, and would move by railroadfrom Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. Tothis I replied, the country is already disheartened over thelack of success on the part of our armies; the last electionwent against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntaryenlistments had ceased throughout most of the North andconscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so faras Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases ofsupplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them norsupplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for uswas to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause waslost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we hadto go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, andasking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generalsupon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but Idid not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter wasnot answered and the subect was not subsequently mentionedbetween Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that Iremember of. I did not regard the letter as official, andconsequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished acopy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history ofmy campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation betweenus or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simplyfriendly advice which the relations between us fullyjustified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign asuccess that he would or could have done if it had been orderedby himself. I make this statement here to correct an impressionwhich was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman'sprejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.

(*14) Meant Edward's Station.

(*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJ0R-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions toMajor-General Thomas. You having been over the ground inperson, and having heard the whole matter discussed, furtherinstructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularlydesirable that a force should be got through to the railroadbetween Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off fromcommunication with the South, but being confronted by a largeforce here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this isto be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions toThomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee aboveChickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland orthereabouts.

U. S. GRANTMaj.-Gen'l.

CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,Chattanooga:

All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy'sposition on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not beingprovided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of themountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannotbe given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, youunderstand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with himstrengthened by a division from your command, to effect acrossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth ofChickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from theheights on the north bank of the river (to be located by yourchief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northernextremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy canconcentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. Thetroops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on yourleft flank, leaving only the necessary force to defendfortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column ofone division in readiness to move wherever ordered. Thisdivision should show itself as threateningly as possible on themost practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Youreffort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making youradvance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, andmoving as near simultaneously with him as possible. Thejunction once formed and the ridge carried, communications willbe at once established between the two armies by roads on thesouth bank of the river. Further movements will then depend onthose of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easilyheld by Geary's division and what troops you may still havethere belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard'scorps can then be held in readiness to act either with you atChattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Fridaynight to a position on the north side of the river, not lowerdown than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readinessfor such orders as may become necessary. All these troops willbe provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and onehundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantrysoldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to seethat ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. Youwill call on the engineer department for such preparations asyou may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artilleryover the creek.

U. S. GRANT,Major-General.

(*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reformafter taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carryingthe ridge.

(*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,Chattanooga

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnelwith only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunneland on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I haveinstructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light inthe morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, willbe in cooperation. Your command will either carry therifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to theleft, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker'sposition on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a smallforce, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from wherehe is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley withall the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicableroad.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanoogais now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so greatdifficulties, have effected that important object. God bless youall,

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.

(*19) General John G. Foster.

(*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for GeneralGrant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. Thescabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll runningnearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters thenames of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories atChattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg andChattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of thegovernment at Washington.

(*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.December 29, 1863.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command onaccount of disability from old wounds. Should his request begranted, who would you like as his successor? It is possiblethat Schofield will be sent to your command.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow meto take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all partsof the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. Foryour information I now write you my programme, as at presentdetermined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish uphis present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; toturn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and thenavy and to return your troops to you and his own to NewOrleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and tohold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce thenumber of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest numbernecessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not lessthan twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousandmen from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operationsagainst Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for himto commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operateagainst Richmond from the south side of the James River. Thiswill give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmorethe left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-fivethousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and theother, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, tomove against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in aboutSaltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force willbe all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousandmen of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it upand to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far asyou can, inflicting all the damage you can against their warresources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, butsimply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leaveyou free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however,as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as hecan. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel isconcentrating now. None will move from their places ofrendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready tomove by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now directis that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will havedifficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains towhere supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplishit.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I donot calculate on very great results; but it is the only way Ican take troops from there. With the long line of railroadSigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to movedirectly to his front. In this way he must get through toinflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach fromone of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words,if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some oneelse skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

(*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,Appendix.

(*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADECom'd'g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparationsfor the coming campaign, the following is communicatedconfidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, andtowards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turnover the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and thenavy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, andto concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, tomove on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to othermovements. From the scattered condition of his command,however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleansbefore the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the sametime you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's armybeing his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimateaim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga toMobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either ofthe great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to hisfront. This he has been directed to do, and is now makingpreparations for it. Two columns of his command will make southat the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, fromten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; theother from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, underBrig.-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reachthe Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg andreturn to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or joinyou. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastwardto join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributarieswould furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies towithin easy hauling distance of every position the army couldoccupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, ifhe chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line ratherinterior to the one I would have to take in following. Amovement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but allthat was done would have to be done with the supplies andammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latterplan was abandoned when the limited quantity of suppliespossible to take with us was considered. The country over whichwe would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage thatwe would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was notentirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in WestTennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison offour or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by anattack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While hewas able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or anypart of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest'sraid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himselfinto. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against himbefore he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops atFort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation ofthe Mississippi River. The garrison to force a passagesouthward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia andTennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connectingRichmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from SouthCarolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000men into the field directly to his front. The force will becommanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore,Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond fromthe south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneouswith yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now indoubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan aboveor below him. Each plan presents great advantages over theother with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee iscut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north ona raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be donewhilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate fromButler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By theother route Brandy Station can be used as a base of suppliesuntil another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you morefully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforceyou. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly afterthe 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road fromBull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enableyou to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to thefront.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, andtransports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fallback into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force andyours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducingbaggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to aregiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that shouldbe allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores andordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to divisionheadquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to makearrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwardedto White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for thiscontingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, thereis every probability they will be wanted on the James River orelsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be madefor ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundredrounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half theamount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command ofthe Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gaveour total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; andestimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: andGeneral G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Shermanthe enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon andwas broken by his depleted command, remarks: "The disparity offorces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by mytwo brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades andthree divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from theenemy."

*But one general officer reported present for duty in theartillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.

(*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,May II, 1864.--3 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps ina vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay withBurnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt andvigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps asclose to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of anydiversion caused by this attack, and to push in if anyopportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in mymind that the assault last evening would have proved entirelysuccessful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had beenheartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.