"If somebody gets a hold of one these things, it's not just one site that gets taken out," said Wilson, the senior vice president and general counsel for DigiCert, a Lindon, Utah, Internet security firm, over a hip hotel burger lunch.

The "thing" Wilson is sweating is called a certificate authority -- or CA in geek speak. That's the hidden, but critical, Web security organ that enables parts of secure Web transactions when say, shopping at Amazon (AMZN) or giving your tax ID to IRS.gov or buying and selling stock online at E*Trade (ETFC) .

"The volume CAs handle can be a major fraction of total Web traffic," said David Rockvam, senior vice president for certificate services at Entrust, a Dallas security firm. Entrust and DigiCert are among a half-dozen certificate authorities that control about 90% of the certificate authority market.

"Keeping them secure is critical," Rockvam said.

Wilson and Rockvam had invited me away from the crazy-busy RSA Conference, the computer security nerd Lollapalooza hosted by the security division of drive-maker EMC (EMC) . Here in the relative quiet, the two gave me the lowdown on the new dangers for CAs, away from the hordes gawking at big, sexy security companies such as VeriSign (VRSN) , ZixCorp, Symantec (SYMC) , StrikeForce Technologies (SFOR) and dozens of well-funded start-ups.

What makes Wilson and Rockvam so jittery is how -- not unlike publishing, movies and financial services -- the barriers to entry to becoming a CA, albeit a small one, have dropped to the point where Wilson estimates there are 60 to several hundred active certificate authorities.

"And if you are your own CA, you can do whatever you want," Rockvam explained. "Until you are discovered."

That makes CAs awfully attractive targets.

Just last month, a Turkish CA called TurkTrust began issuing insecure digital security certificates to the point where major traffic hubs Google (GOOG) , Microsoft (MSFT) and Mozilla refused to honor its Web transactions. The company publicly said its bogus certificates were a simple mistake. But it is far from the only example of a crumbling CA security infrastructure.

In 2011, the government of the Netherlands released a harrowing must-read account of the hacker takedown of a large Dutch certificate authority called DigiNotar. The frankly not terribly sophisticated attack effectively bankrupted the company and vaporized a $12.9 million investment by a firm called Vasco, which had bought DigiNotar earlier that year.

Not surprisingly, similar but bigger CAs such as DigiCert and Entrust have invested in ambitious cooperative security plans. But just like the rest of the wobbly Web, the race-to-the-bottom digital age economics makes law and order elusive.