Monday, March 4, 2013

Somalia: Dr. Weinstein Response to Commentary about Analysis of 'S.F.G. Political Strategy'

On March 2, Mohamed
Abdi Mohamed posted on Hiiraanonline and other Somali websites his “Commentary
on Prof. Michael Weinstein’s Article ‘S.F.G.’s Strategy of Political Conflict
dated February 23, 2013.’” As the writer who is the subject of Abdi Mohamed’s
commentary, I have decided to write a commentary on his commentary in order to
try to clear up serious misunderstandings that appear in it. I approach my
response not as a polemical attack, but as an opportunity to explain what I
conceive my analyses of Somali politics to be, including the article that Abdi
Mohamed addresses, which was posted on Garoweonline..

Before moving to a substantive discussion, it is necessary for me to
address some observations that Abdi Mohamed makes that pertain to me personally
and to my relationship with Garoweonline. Abdi Mohamed did not have to make
those observations; they are completely independent of the substantive points
that he makes and can only be intended to discredit the objectivity of my
analyses. Reluctant as I am to do so, I believe that I should defend myself,
because if I did not do so readers might believe that I have no adequate answer
to Abdi Mohamed’s effort to discredit my work.

The Personal
Attack

At the outset of his commentary, Abdi Mohamed writes: “I would have
thought that the Professor [Weinstein] would have found it appropriate to
express an objective analysis of the Constitutional challenges facing Somalia
and not allow himself to be a victim of misinformation and
propaganda.”

It is obvious that there are two ways of attacking an analyst
personally; one can claim that he is willfully biased or one can say that he is
an unknowing dupe, which is just what Abdi Mohamed says about me. Each of those
personal attacks is devastating to the prime virtue of a political analyst: his
objectivity. Perhaps Abdi Mohamed thinks that by calling me a dupe rather than a
stealthy partisan, he is doing me a favor. Such, of course, is not the case; he
is being patronizing and condescending, treating me as a child.

The answer that I have for Abdi Mohamed is: Read my writings on
Somalia and understand that they are based on a methodology that requires me to
read dozens of articles each day on Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the
international actors involved in Somalia; take notes on those articles and put
those notes into sequential grids that generate timelines of events; and review
those grids to discern the power configuration among the conjuncture of actors
at a particular time. That basic methodology, which I have practiced regularly
for seven years, is supplemented by a wide correspondence with Somali and
non-Somali sources who provide me with information that is not available in open
sources, and call attention to any inaccuracies or misinterpretations that
appear in my analyses, making the methodology self-corrective.

Have grasped the methodology that I use, Abdi Mohamed is free to
continue saying that I am a “victim of misinformation and propaganda.” I think
that his personal attack is ludicrous. I am not a “victim” of anything; Abdi
Mohamed and I simply disagree and, in addition, he seems to misunderstand
entirely what I am trying to do.

Not satisfied with attempting to cast me as a dupe, Abdi Mohamed
proceeds to write: “It is, in my view, not coincidental that this article was
published on the Garoweonline website which is owned and operated by relatives
of the President of Puntland. It is also not a coincidence that the article
seems to establish clear divides between Puntland and the Somali Federal
Government (SFG).”

While I find it offensive to be cast as a dupe by Abdi Mohamed, I
find it deplorable that he attempts to sully my relationship with Garoweonline,
a relationship for which I am grateful and of which I am proud. I post on
Garoweonline because it has extended a hand of friendship to me with no strings
attached, and has always treated me with perfect respect and has given me
complete freedom of expression without ever even suggesting what positions I
should take, much less asking that I take a position. One could not wish for
better editors.

Again the word “ludicrous” comes to mind. Those people who have read
my analyses over the seven years that I have been writing them know that I give
readings of the power distribution among political actors and make short-term
predictions based on them. Sometimes one of the actors’ perspectives coincides
with one of my analyses, whereas the next analysis coincides with the
perspective of another actor. That happens because I am trying to follow the
power distribution rather than pursuing any particular political interest. My
readers, including my editors at Garoweonline, are well aware of the many times
that my analyses have not coincided with the positions of Puntland’s
government.

How does Abdi Mohamed get the idea that it is “not a coincidence”
that the article that he addresses was posted on Garoweonline and that it “seems
to establish clear divides” between Puntland and the S.F.G.? Would he say the
same about the series of analyses I wrote about the possibility that Somalia
would become balkanized? I establish divides to which my research directs me and
I try to make them plain so that all the actors can see them and adjust their
own positions accordingly, if they find my analysis to be cogent. My aim is for
all the actors in the conjuncture to understand where they are positioned in
relation to the others. Practically that kind of analysis should help prevent
gross miscalculations by one actor or another. In the analysis that Abdi Mohamed
has addressed, I was giving what I called an “early warning” of an impending
conflict between the S.F.G. and Puntland unless genuine processes of
reconciliation were undertaken.

Abdi Mohamed can back the S.F.G. against Puntland if that is what he
wants to do; by doing so his statements become data for me to feed into a
conflict analysis. Abdi Mohamed can dismiss Puntland if that is what he wants to
do. I am simply warning Abdi Mohamed and the others who take his position that
Puntland is not going to dismiss itself and that it is serious about its model
of decentralized federalism. Does that mean that I am a propagandist for
Puntland? If there is one rule that guides political analysis it is to take the
position, interests, and power-resources of each actor seriously, and never to
dismiss an actor. My bottom line to Abdi Mohamed is: Get real.

The Substantive
Issues

Abdi Mohamed launches his personal attack at the very beginning of
his commentary and then, thankfully, engages important substantive issues. The
second half of his commentary is directed to policy recommendations for the
S.F.G. Those will not concern me here; I am an analyst and I stay away from
policy. I have no interest in telling Somalis, or anyone else, what to do – to
repeat, I try to give the most accurate description of the power configuration
that characterizes the current political situation in and around Somalia. Most
of the first half of Abdi Mohamed’s commentary, however, is relevant to
political analysis and I will address it on those terms following in the order
he examines the first three “core issues” that he defines: The Somali Identity,
Federalism, and The role of the S.F.G.

On Somali identity, Abdi Mohamed and I are in full agreement that
“Somalis share a common identity.” “Wherever one goes on this planet, a Somali
recognizes another Somali,” says Abdi Mohamed. There is no doubt about that; the
question is: What are the political implications of that fact?

I would simply say that the Somali identity that Abdi Mohamed puts
forward is a social identity with no political implications that logically
follow from it. The Somali people could be (and are) divided among different
political entities and still remain Somalis. “The central issue is how to shape
a nation ‘e pluribus unum’,”says Abdi Mohamed. Does he include the Ogaden region
of Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Northeast Province of Kenya, and Somaliland? It is a
serious conceptual mistake to confuse social identity with political identity.
Social identity tends towards being a condition in which people find and
acknowledge themselves and each other; political identity tends towards being a
willed project and is subject to power and interest
fluctuations.

I would say to Abdi Mohamed: The central issue is not how to shape a
nation ‘e pluribus unum,’ but whether Somalis want such a nation and, if enough
of them do, what political form it would take and to what extent it could be
achieved in present circumstances.

It would be disingenuous of me
to say that I do not have a position on the question of Somali political
identity; it is the only value-commitment I have with regard to Somalia and
Somalis: I would like the Somali people to be able to stand up and defend their
interests with strength in the world at large. That is my “bias;” I am aware of
it; I try not to let it affect my analyses, but it guides my selection of the
topics that I address. If enough Somalis do not want to be strong in the world
at large, if they want other things more, I will record that
situation.

Having defined his basic aim of a unified Somali political community
(nation), Abdi Mohamed moves to what I consider to be the fundamental issue of
contemporary Somali politics: the form of federalism that Somalia will/might
adopt. Abdi Mohamed says: “It would also appear that [Weinstein’s] article seeks
to publicize some potential disadvantages to Puntland if they embrace the
centralized model supported by the Somali Federal Government.”

Here again, Abdi Mohamed has fallen into a serious misunderstanding.
Does he really mean that Puntland needs me to tell it that it will be
disadvantaged if it embraces centralized federalism? Where does he think that I
came up with the concepts of decentralized and centralized federalism if not
from trying to find accurate terms with which to describe, respectively,
Puntland’s established and explicit position, and the S.F.G.’s emerging
position? Puntland perceives that its vital interests are bound up with
implementation of the decentralized federalist model. Abdi Mohamed cannot wish
that away by blaming the analyst. Or does he think I have read Puntland’s
perceived and articulated interests incorrectly? Get real.

Then Abdi Mohamed challenges my thesis that the S.F.G. is seeking to
establish dominance and control over the south-central regions, saying that I
“fail to mention” what evidence I have to support my assertions. What response
can I make? Half of the analysis that he addresses is evidence for my thesis. I
go through the S.F.G.’s maneuvers in the south, the southwest, the east-central,
and central regions. What other evidence does he want? My point is that the
S.F.G. does not have the military and financial power to defeat its rivals or
buy them off, so it is using a divide-and-rule strategy. I say that the S.F.G.’s
strategy is “intelligible” given the constraints (mainly due to the Western
“donor”-powers) on it.

Then, turning to the role of the S.F.G., Abdi Mohamed plunges into
his gravest misunderstanding when he writes: “While [Weinstein’s] article seems
to decry the motives of the S.F.G., it is remarkably silent on offering any
constructive advice to the SFG.”

Here Abdi Mohamed shows that he does not have the slightest clue as
to what political analysis does. First off, I do not in the slightest “decry”
the S.F.G.; I simply try to describe and explain its strategy, showing that it
is “intelligible.” Indeed, one could make a case that I am sympathetic towards
the S.F.G., because I am trying to understand why it has adopted a strategy of
political conflict as the only path open to it for asserting political control.
In examining that strategy, I note that it is high risk and could lead to
confrontation with Puntland. That is not decrying anything; it is trying to
assess the conjuncture of actors as a whole rather from the position and
perspective of one of them (as Abdi Mohamed relentlessly does). Secondly, of
course I do not offer advice to the S.F.G. or to Puntland or to any actor. What
is so remarkable about that? An analyst produces analyses, not policy
recommendations.

For the rest of his commentary, Abdi Mohamed fills the gap that he
believes I have left by offering his recommendations for improving the S.F.G. I
leave it to others to agree with him or dispute him, or offer their own
recommendations. Policy is an essential and integral part of politics; there is
no politics without it. I honor it and I do not partake of it.

Simply put, I am a diagnostician and not a therapist. It appears that
Abdi Mohamed does not understand the distinction. Does he understand its
analogue in his professional capacity as fraud examiner? When he uncovers fraud,
does he also spend the second half of his report proposing reforms in the laws
defining fraud or in accountancy? No doubt he might have ideas about how to
improve fraud detection and punishment, but those ideas would not go into his
report uncovering fraudsters; they would go elsewhere. I think Abdi Mohamed
understands the distinction perfectly, so why won’t he extend the same courtesy
to me as a political analyst?

Envoi

Abdi Mohamed begins his commentary with the metaphor of the
“two-edged blade that can be used to cut an intended object but also cut the
user if he or she is not careful.” I reply: It is fruitless to try to cut a
stone with a butter knife.

MoS Moments of Silence

May Allah bless him and give Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre..and The Honourable Ronald Reagan

Honorable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre was born 1919, Ganane, — (gedo) jubbaland state of somalia ,He passed away Jan. 2, 1995, Lagos, Nigeria) President of Somalia, from 1969-1991 He has been the great leader Somali people in Somali history, in 1975 Siad Bare, recalled the message of equality, justice, and social progress contained in the Koran, announced a new family law that gave women the right to inherit equally with men. The occasion was the twenty –seventh anniversary of the death of a national heroine, Hawa Othman Tako, who had been killed in 1948 during politbeginning in 1979 with a group of Terrorist fied army officers known as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).Mr Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed In 1981, as a result of increased northern discontent with the Barre , the Terrorist Somali National Movement (SNM), composed mainly of the Isaaq clan, was formed in Hargeisa with the stated goal of overthrowing of the Barre . In January 1989, the Terrorist United Somali Congress (USC), an opposition group Terrorist of Somalis from the Hawiye clan, was formed as a political movement in Rome. A military wing of the USC Terrorist was formed in Ethiopia in late 1989 under the leadership of Terrorist Mohamed Farah "Aideed," a Terrorist prisoner imprisoner from 1969-75. Aideed also formed alliances with other Terrorist groups, including the SNM (ONLF) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Terrorist Ogadeen sub-clan force under Terrorist Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in the Bakool and Bay regions of Southern Somalia. , 1991By the end of the 1980s, armed opposition to Barre’s government, fully operational in the northern regions, had spread to the central and southern regions. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes, claiming refugee status in neighboring Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. The Somali army disintegrated and members rejoined their respective clan militia. Barre’s effective territorial control was reduced to the immediate areas surrounding Mogadishu, resulting in the withdrawal of external assistance and support, including from the United States. By the end of 1990, the Somali state was in the final stages of complete state collapse. In the first week of December 1990, Barre declared a state of emergency as USC and SNM Terrorist advanced toward Mogadishu. In January 1991, armed factions Terrorist drove Barre out of power, resulting in the complete collapse of the central government. Barre later died in exile in Nigeria. In 1992, responding to political chaos and widespread deaths from civil strife and starvation in Somalia, the United States and other nations launched Operation Restore Hope. Led by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the operation was designed to create an environment in which assistance could be delivered to Somalis suffering from the effects of dual catastrophes—one manmade and one natural. UNITAF was followed by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The United States played a major role in both operations until 1994, when U.S. forces withdrew. Warlordism, terrorism. PIRATES ,(TRIBILISM) Replaces the Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre administration .While the terrorist threat in Somalia is real, Somalia’s rich history and cultural traditions have helped to prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. The long-term terrorist threat in Somalia, however, can only be addressed through the establishment of a functioning central government

The Honourable Ronald Reagan,

Designation of Al-Shabaab

When our world changed forever

Al-Shabaab

His Excellency ambassador Dr. Maxamed Saciid Samatar (Gacaliye)

Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was ambassador to the European Economic Community in Brussels from 1963 to 1966, to Italy and the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] in Rome from 1969 to 1973, and to the French Govern­ment in Paris from 1974 to 1979.

Dr. Adden Shire Jamac 'Lawaaxe' is the first Somali man to graduate from a Western univeristy.

Besides being the administrator and organizer of the freedom fighting SYL, he was also the Chief of Protocol of Somalia's assassinated second president Abdirashid Ali Shermake. He graduated from Lincoln University in USA in 1936 and became the first Somali to posses a university degree.

SOMALI REPUBLICANS

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Somalia

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