By David Crystal

New from Cambridge University Press!

By Peter Mark Roget

This book "supplies a vocabulary of English words and idiomatic phrases 'arranged … according to the ideas which they express'. The thesaurus, continually expanded and updated, has always remained in print, but this reissued first edition shows the impressive breadth of Roget's own knowledge and interests."

András Kertész's book "Cognitive Semantics and Scientific Knowledge" is an attempt to answer the question "How should we analyze scientific knowledge?". Although the book is organized in a way that brings cognitive semantics in focus, it actually addresses the problem that neither traditional analytic philosophy nor more recently developed naturalized philosophy of science based on behavioral psychology can explain some basic questions pertaining to scientific knowledge. As a solution, Kertész proposes to develop 'cognitive science of science' -- i.e. a version of the naturalized philosophy of science which would be based on linguistics as one of the disciplines that constitute cognitive science. More specifically, Kertész chooses to apply the methods of cognitive semantics, i.e. the cognitive theory of metaphor and the two-level approach to meaning to the domain of scientific knowledge. This choice is based on an assumption that not only psychology, but other disciplines contributing to cognitive science (e.g. linguistics) as well as their sub-disciplines (cognitive semantics) can borrow their methodology to philosophy of science.

By narrowing down a more general question "What the case would be if the methods of cognitive semantics were applied to scientific knowledge?" to a few specific hypotheses and research questions carefully formulated in terms of the scope of the two cognitive semantics theories, Kertész addresses this main question at different levels in each of the four parts of the book. In the first part, 'Preliminaries', we find that Kertész's approach was inspired by cognitivism on one side, and the naturalized philosophy, on the other. Cognitivism postulates that certain behaviors (e.g. language) can be explained only by appeal to 'internal cognitive processes'. These internal processes consist of mental representations of information and a finite set of rules that operate on them. The mind's capacity to automatically receive, store, manipulate, and output INFORMATION depends on its receiving, storing, manipulating and outputting REPRESENTATIONS of that information (Von Eckardt 1995).

Note that cognitivism is still a theory of COGNITIVE states and processes, yet to learn how to tackle phenomena such as understanding, sensations, emotions, moods, skills, consciousness, or creativity. The concept of understanding is particularly elusive, because it exhibits different paradigms, such as 'insightful understanding' in science (Haugeland 1998), which differs from our understanding of the world we live in, which in turn differs from our capacity to understand language. Since the purpose of scientific endeavor is to understand phenomena, it is interesting to observe the efforts to determine to what extent cognitivism, which cannot fully grasp the process of understanding, can contribute to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of understanding of scientific knowledge.

Kertész believes that cognitivism, combined with the naturalized philosophy of science, has the potential to solve the problems of theoretical terms, the problem of the criterion of truth, and Zeno paradox, among others. The major limit of the traditional, analytic philosophy of science was its concern to JUSTIFY its object of inquiry, based on the principles of rationality and a priori assumptions. The naturalized philosophy of science, an analogue of the naturalized epistemology, aims to DESCRIBE and EXPLAIN scientific knowledge by using empirical, a posteriori evidence. While NATURALISM for Quine means 'behaviourism', SCIENCE is a synonym for natural sciences, and SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE should be explained in terms of behavioral psychology, Kertész opts for a weak version of naturalism and a less rigid concept of science: explanations, after all, are not all alike, and cognitive science has already resulted in empirically legitimate (i.e. testable) explanations of phenomena.

In the second part of the book, 'Prospects: Theoretical Terms', Kertész tests the hypothesis that the cognitive theory of metaphor and the two-level approach to meaning can solve the problem of theoretical terms (Chapter 3). The author asks 'what the case would be' (p. 65) if the two metascientific extensions of cognitive semantics, the cognitive theory of metaphor (Chapter 4) and the two-level approach to meaning (Chapter 5), were involved in solving the problem of theoretical terms, which are introduced to build theories, explain observable facts, and provide understanding of phenomena. However, theoretical terms are only hypothetical constructs, which do not refer to 'observable reality'. Yet, it is precisely the theoretical terms that, via the method of explication, establish the relationship between a theory and that reality. The early logical empiricism, which was focused on the semantic (referential) aspect of theoretical terms, failed to capture the dichotomy. A more plausible approach, Kertész suggests, would perhaps attempt a pragmatic explanation, focusing on the context-dependency of theoretical terms, with a specific scientific theory functioning as a context.

Following the current trend to reconstruct the problem of theoretical terms 'as an essentially linguistic issue' (p. 57), Kertész analyzes the terms of the Standard Theory (ST) and the Government and Binding Theory (GB). The author conducts the analysis in three steps: first he analyzes the structure of theoretical terms, then the structure of scientific explanations, and finally the relationship between theoretical terms and the context (pragmatics). According to the holistic approach, the theoretical terms such as for example 'tree', 'node', 'cycle', or 'daughter', are part of metaphorical expressions, which in turn are based on metaphorical concepts. The explanations are structured in such a way that the explication process focuses on the relation holding between the theoretical term and the underlying metaphorical concept. Finally, the pragmatic aspects of theoretical terms are already part of metaphorical concepts and scenarios in which they are employed.

On the other side, the modular approach postulates that the interpretation of a lexical item (or a theoretical term) in a certain context is the mapping of its semantic representation onto the level of its conceptual structure (hence the name 'two-level approach'). The relationship between the conceptual and the semantic representations entails that theoretical terms, like other lexical items, are semantically underdetermined. However, several conceptual principles regulate interpretation of a lexical item in a certain context (the principle of conceptual shift, conceptual specification and conceptual selection), enabling a correct mapping of semantic representations onto the conceptual representations required by the context. Thus, unlike the traditional analytic philosophy, which is interested in the relationship between the EXPLICANS and EXPLICANDUM, the cognitive science of science focuses on the CONCEPTUAL aspects of theoretical terms.

Part III of the book, 'Prospects: Sociological Extensions', explores some elements of the sociological perspective on scientific knowledge (Chapter 7), proposing sociological extensions of the modular (Chapter 8) and the holistic approach (Chapter 9), and testing whether the two extensions can capture the interactions between the conceptual and social factors that shape scientific knowledge. The sociological extension of the modular approach is a case study aiming to show that 'theoretical contents' of ST and GB are based on interaction of the conceptual and the motivational modules. These modules, the argument goes, have universal principles and parameters.

For example, a universal principle of the conceptual module is the relevance principle, adapted from Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory, stating: "Every explanation is put forward in a context ct under the assumption of its maximal relevance with respect to ct." While this principle, among many other pragmatic principles, can easily be applied to scientific theories, that is not the case with the universal principle of the so-called motivational module, which is probably 'the weakest link' of the sociological extension. It states that the social interests select 'I-properties' of scientific theories. In other words, the social interests determine which conceptual properties of an object will become elements of its conceptual representation. As an example, Kertész comments on the social interests that governed the development of ST and GB, i.e. systematic description and systematic restriction of grammar, respectively. These social interests are reflected in the motivational principles underlying the two theories (the principle of systematicity / simplicity and the principle of restrictiveness), with the motivational element functioning as a part of the conceptual structures in these theories.

The sociological extension of the holistic approach is a case study about the relationship between the conceptual and social factors in the theories of AIDS, emphasizing the role of conversational analysis in these theories and suggesting that metascientific reflexion of the cognitive theory of metaphor could contribute to object-scientific research (e.g. conscious use of metaphors).

Chapter 10 is an attempt to justify the application of the two cognitive semantic theories to scientific knowledge with regard to the following: double-facedness of scientific knowledge, its uniqueness, the explication of the term 'theory', the self-application and the pragmatics of scientific discourse. In brief, unlike the analytic philosophy of science, which cannot explain the relationship between these universal principles and the principles of specific scientific theories, Kertész claims that the two-level approach explains this relationship in terms of modularity, and the cognitive theory of metaphor does that in terms of conceptual structure. Unlike the analytic philosophy of science, which assumes that scientific knowledge is unique, both cognitive semantic theories integrate this knowledge into a 'wider context of human behavior' (p. 135, 139). Further, the author claims, the two theories offer a new approach to the term 'theory' by considering scientific theory as a set of representations (modularism) and a conceptual framework within which different conceptual domains interact (holism). Finally, both approaches are self-applicable (p. 136, 141) and both approaches are compatible with the idea that scientific research / knowledge should include not only logical, syntactic, semantic, but also 'communicative, textual and social factors' (137).

Part IV of the book, 'Limits', explains why the two cognitive semantic theories fall short of their goal when applied to scientific knowledge. By addressing the problem of normativity of metascientific reflexion, as well as drawbacks of plausible reasoning and fallacies in the two approaches (Chapter 11), circularity in them (Chapter 12), and their inability to solve, without first empirically reformulating, problems such as the criterion of truth or Zeno's paradox (Chapter 13), Kertész concludes the book with an emphasis on the limits of the two cognitive semantic theories (Chapter 14), pointing out to further questions for the cognitive science of science (Chapter 15).

DISCUSSION

The idea of widening the scope both of the naturalized philosophy of science and of cognitive semantics deserves credit. However, Kertész shows that this goal cannot be achieved by accepting the main hypotheses of the book. The hypotheses are not only overgeneralized, as pointed by the author, they are also inconsistent at several levels. For example, it is not always clear whether Kertész talks about Fodorian or Chomskian or the modularity of the two-level approach, although they differ in important ways. Also, throughout the book Kertész develops case studies as thought experiments, with terminology used in pre-explicative sense. If we recall that the basic concepts of the theories whose methodology the author adopts in search for the cognitive science of science also lack precise definitions (e.g. concept, conceptual domain, metaphorical representation, etc.), then it becomes clear that the naturalized philosophy of science based on the two semantic theories lacks the potential to coherently and consistently EXPLAIN phenomena, evolving into a better alternative to the analytic philosophy of science.

This informationally dense book requires a patient reader. Chapters are structured around the main hypotheses and research questions, but the book also provides ample background information, sometimes incorporated into the text, but more often presented as notes and quotations. Those who write about interdisciplinary topics know how difficult it is to appropriately incorporate background information and will perhaps tolerate text's fragmentation. Other readers may feel occasionally frustrated by a half-page or longer quotations that very often are not necessary.

Finally, Kertész's stand on the concept of cognitive architecture is not clear. This is problematic, given that explanations of the relationship between the scientific knowledge and knowledge of language should stem from the conception of the functional architecture within which the two entities relate in a clear way. Kertész's proposal stems from relating these two entities methodologically, not theoretically per se. Methodological choices can affect theory in unwanted ways. In this case, application of linguistics methodology to scientific knowledge has theoretical consequences: an incorrect assumption that the two types of knowledge belong to the same type of knowledge. However, that is not the case. Note that LANGUAGE, the object of linguistics and semantics, can be studied as either KNOWLEDGE of language (competence) or as USE of that knowledge (performance). Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is always explicit. By choosing to apply the methods of two cognitive semantic theories to scientific knowledge, Kertész dismisses the distinction between the tacit or implicit knowledge, such as knowledge of language, and explicit knowledge, such as scientific knowledge.

Also, there is growing neuropsychological evidence indicating that the two types of knowledge employ different cognitive resources. While deterioration of episodic memory is one of the first symptoms of Alzheimer's dementia, followed by gradual deterioration of semantic knowledge, semantic dementia wipes out a person's semantic knowledge (i.e. knowledge about the world and the mental lexicon), leaving out only those aspects that are tightly related to everyday experience. On the other side, aphasic syndromes affect language in different ways, without in principle affecting either episodic or semantic memory.

Thus, knowledge of language and scientific knowledge are parallel neither methodologically nor theoretically. Why, then, use the methods of linguistics to explain the nature of scientific knowledge? While it is certainly interesting to follow the author's reasoning on 'what the case would be' if one applied modularism of a certain type or semantic holism in analysis of scientific knowledge, the book could have benefited from a clearer picture on the author's understanding of the relationship between language and scientific knowledge.

This brings out the main objection to this book. It pertains to the author's assumption that since linguistics is a contributing discipline of cognitive science, and cognitive semantics is part of linguistics, cognitive semantics is also part of cognitive science. Based on this assumption Kertész proposes employing the methods of cognitive semantics in analysis of scientific knowledge (object of philosophy of science, which is also 'part' of cognitive science). This reflects the so called 'weak', 'less ambitious' concept of cognitive science (Gardner 1985) according to which cognitive science is just a 'collaboration' among the following disciplines: neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence and philosophy. Although this concept is present in most dictionaries and textbooks on cognitive science, it does not correctly reflect the state of affairs. Cognitive science is a scientific paradigm (Kuhn 1962), based on specific theoretical and methodological assumptions (Von Eckardt 1995, Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science 2003), which guide research towards coherent and consistent explanations of phenomena. In other words, cognitive science is not the sum of the five disciplines, but rather their crossing point. This means that, contrary to the 'weak' view, not all the content of the contributing disciplines necessarily constitutes cognitive science.

Does it mean, then, that it is too early to talk about the cognitive science of science? The answer to this question is perhaps in the 'strong' version of cognitive science as a basis for the naturalized philosophy of science. That means acceptance of cognitive science as a new paradigm, which is emerging from the crossing of the five disciplines. In other words, instead of 'borrowing' the methods from the contributing sub-disciplines of cognitive science, the cognitive science of science would explain the underlying mechanisms of scientific knowledge by a theory that could consistently explain conceptualization at all levels, starting from the word-level and text, and capturing the mapping processes between the levels (conceptual vs. semantic), across the domains (source vs. target), and between the elements of cognition (perception vs. conception interactivity). Developing such a theory, which could be done within the context of Jackendoff's representational modularity, would perhaps bail out the idea of cognitive science of science.

Vanja Kljajevic received her doctorate in Cognitive Science from Carleton University, Ottawa. Her research interests include language disorders, processing of complex syntax, syntactic working memory, and philosophy of psychology. She is currently involved in projects related to human-computer interaction and verbal communication of emotions.