Yemeni forces have launched an operation to drive al-Qaeda fighters out of southern towns, where air raids have killed nearly 60 fighters in recent days, military officials say.

Army troops backed by local militia members had moved in to "purge" the towns of Ahwar and al-Mahfad, in Abyan province, and Azzan, al-Houta, al-Rawda and al-Saeed in Shabwa province, a military official said on Tuesday.

"The campaign will not stop until these areas are purged of al-Qaeda militants," said official, who was speaking on condition of anonymity, according to AFP news agency.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) established strongholds in towns and rugged zones in Abyan and Shabwa provinces after security forces chased them from major cities in Abyan in 2012.

Government forces clashed on Tuesday with fighters in the Lahmar area, which overlooks al-Mahfad, a military commander said.

Other clashes took place near al-Saeed as al-Qaeda fighters confronted advancing government forces, other military sources said.

Hussein al-Wuhayshi, a leader of the Popular Committees armed groups that had fought in the past alongside government forces, said his fighters were taking part in the attack.

"There is an official decision to uproot al-Qaeda from Abyan and Shabwa," he said.

Officials spoke last week of an "unprecedented" US and aerial campaign against al-Qaeda fighters in the area after two days of strikes.

Yemen and US drone attacks last week targeted bases of AQAP, considered by the US to be the most dangerous affiliate of the global network with links to several failed terror plots against the West.

The Yemeni Interior Ministry said last week that air raids on April 20 in Abyan province killed 55 al-Qaeda fighters, while three others were killed in a strike in Shabwa.

A day earlier, a drone strike in the central Bayda province killed 10 al-Qaeda suspects and three civilians.

Yemen army captures key Al-Qaeda strongholdGovernment forces capture main stronghold in the south of the country, forcing AQAP fighters to flee to the mountains.Last updated: 06 May 2014 17:16Yemeni government forces have captured the main stronghold of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula (AQAP), officials have said.

Yemen's defence ministry said dozens of suspected AQAP fighters were killed after soldiers and allied tribal militias entered al-Mahfid, a town in Abyan province.

A local militia commander, Amin Qassem, told the Reuters news agency that AQAP fled under the pressure of government troops.

"The army and the Popular Committee members have completed control of al-Mahfid and we are now in the centre of the district. Al-Qaeda elements have fled to the mountains, but we will keep going after them," Qassem said.

Witnesses said the army had used heavy artillery to push into the town.

Yemeni forces have been pursuing AQAP fighters in a fresh military offensive launched eight days ago.

The offensive follows a series of air strikes, including US drones attacks against suspected AQAP areas, in which some 65 people have been killed.

The mountainous al-Mahfid area is home to 40,000 people and has been a stronghold of AQAP since 2012.

The group has been blamed for waging deadly attacks against security forces, foreigners and oil and gas facilities.

The campaign, which is backed by the US, is part of rolling operation againt the group's hideouts in Yemen.Source:Agencies http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/yemen-army-captures-key-al-qaeda-stronghold-201456154920352544.html

Yemen's defence minister escapes to AdenMajor-General Mahmoud al-Subaihi arrived in southern port city on Sunday as deadly fighting rages across the country.

08 Mar 2015 21:29 GMT | War & Conflict, Middle East, Yemen, HouthisAl-Subaihi is said to have driven all night to reach his house in a coastal area outside Aden [EPA]

Yemen's defence minister has arrived at his house outside the southern port city of Aden after fleeing the Houthi-held capital Sanaa, security officials say.

Major-General Mahmoud al-Subaihi was the chief guest at a meeting hosted by Ahmed Abdullah al-Majeedi, the governor of Lahj province, on Sunday afternoon.

The meeting was attended by dozens of influential Yemeni officials and high-ranking social dignitaries.

Security officials said Subaihi left Sanaa on Saturday and drove all night to reach his house in the village of Ras al-Ara in the coastal area of al-Madhariba outside Aden.Yemen's warring factions fight over media control

In Sanaa, Shia Houthi fighters who have been in control of since September stormed Subaihi's home after hearing the news of his flight but found only several guards there.

He had been previously placed under house arrest by the Houthis who took over the government in a coup on February 6.

Subaihi's escape comes as al-Qaeda and Houthi fighters engaged in an intense firefight, killing at least 12 people on Sunday in the central province of Bayda.

A separate encounter between pro and anti-Houthi tribes also killed five other people, the Associated Press news agency quoted security and tribal officials as saying.

Meanwhile, at least seven other Houthi fighters were killed when local tribesmen attacked their checkpoint in Qifa, in the city of Radaa.

Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, recognised as Yemen's president by regional powers, has set up his government in Aden.

Hadi, who also fled to the southern port city two weeks ago after escaping from a Houthi house arrest, considers Aden to be Yemen's capital, a top aide said.

Hadi traversed a tunnel linking his house to the nearby house of one of his sons, and then travelled to Aden using back roads.

"Aden became the capital of Yemen as soon as the Houthis occupied Sanaa," the aide quoted Hadi as saying in reference to their takeover of the capital several months ago.

The remarks about Aden reflect Hadi's determination to hold out against Houthi efforts to extend their influence, but are purely symbolic because moving the capital requires a change to the constitution.

Aden, Yemen's second largest city, was capital of a once independent South Yemen before unification in 1990, when Sanaa became the unified country's capital.

Several Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have already moved their embassies to Aden after an exodus of foreign diplomats from Sanaa in February over security concerns.

In Sanaa, the Houthis named a "presidential council" after Hadi and Khalid Bahah, Yemen's prime minister, submitted their resignations in January in protest at what critics branded a coup.

Yemen president considers 'Aden country's capital'Aide to President Hadi says southern port city became capital as soon as Houthis seized Sanaa.

07 Mar 2015 17:14 GMT | War & Conflict, PoliticsThe Yemeni capital Sanaa is now under the control of the Shia-back armed rebels [[Reuters]The Yemeni capital Sanaa is now under the control of the Shia-back armed rebels [[Reuters]

Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who fled to Aden after escaping from the Houthi armed group controlling Sanaa, considers the southern port city to be Yemen's capital, a top aide said.

"Aden became the capital of Yemen as soon as the Houthis occupied Sanaa," the aide quoted Hadi as saying in reference to their takeover of the capital several months ago.

The remarks about Aden reflect Hadi's determination to hold out against Houthi efforts to extend their influence, but are purely symbolic because moving the capital requires a change to the constitution.

Aden, the country's second largest city, was capital of a once independent south Yemen, before unification in 1990, when Sanaa became the unified country's capital.

Several Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, have already moved their embassies to Aden after an exodus of foreign diplomats from Sanaa in February over security concerns.

But the United States, the first to close its mission in Sanaa, has said it will not do so although it continues to back Hadi.

In Sanaa, the Houthis named a "presidential council" after Hadi and Prime Minister Khalid Bahah tendered their resignations in January in protest at what critics branded an attempted coup.

After fleeing house arrest in Sanaa, Hadi resurfaced in Aden where he retracted his resignation. Bahah remains trapped in the capital.

On Saturday, Hadi said that the Houthis had demanded 135 top government jobs and the vice-presidency for one of their leaders, Saleh al-Sammad.

They also demanded that 35,000 armed men be integrated into the armed forces and 25,000 into the police.

Escape from SanaaTensions have been running high in Aden in recent days, as special forces suspected of links to the Houthis readied defences against an anticipated assault by Hadi loyalists.

The special forces commander in Aden, Abdel Hafez al-Saqqaf, has also defied a decree by Hadi sacking him, and said he will only follow orders from the presidential council in Sanaa.

His men have cut roads leading to their headquarters near Aden's international airport and set up barricades, saying they fear an assault by the Popular Resistance Committees, loyal to Hadi.

On Saturday, Hadi also recalled how he escaped his Sanaa residence through a tunnel linking it to the nearby house of one of his sons and travelled to Aden using back roads.

The Houthis overran Sanaa in September and have since exerted their influence over several other areas.

The Shia group has long complained of marginalisation and fought the government between 2004 and February 2010.

The rise of the HouthisWhat happens in Yemen in the near term and long term really does matter - both locally and regionall

18 Nov 2014 10:07 GMT | War & Conflict, Politics, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Middle EastHouthi rebels succeeded in bringing the regime to its knees in a matter of just days, writes Reardon [Getty]Houthi rebels succeeded in bringing the regime to its knees in a matter of just days, writes Reardon [Getty]About the AuthorMartin Reardon

Martin Reardon is a senior vice president with The Soufan Group, a New York-based strategic security and intelligence consultancy, and senior director of Qatar International Academy for Security Studies. He is a 21-year veteran of the FBI, and specialised in counterterrorism operations.

@mdreardon79Story highlights

Yemen is burning. However, with bigger fires getting out of control in other parts of the world, it seems to have been relegated to the back page of mainstream media for most of the last few months. But what happens there in the near term and long term really does matter, both locally and regionally. The poorest country in the Middle East, Yemen has been plagued for decades by corrupt and weak governments, tribal infighting, resource depletion, a deteriorating security situation and utter poverty.

Two months ago, Houthi Rebels riding a wave of public discontent, swarmed into the capital city of Sana’a from the north, and succeeded in bringing the regime to its knees in a matter of just days. In the eyes of many Yemenis,

Yemen is burning. However, with bigger fires getting out of control in other parts of the world, it seems to have been relegated to the back page of mainstream media for most of the last few months. But what happens there in the near term and long term really does matter, both locally and regionally. The poorest country in the Middle East, Yemen has been plagued for decades by corrupt and weak governments, tribal infighting, resource depletion, a deteriorating security situation and utter poverty.

Two months ago, Houthi rebels riding a wave of public discontent, swarmed into the capital city of Sanaa from the north, and succeeded in bringing the regime to its knees in a matter of just days. In the eyes of many Yemenis, the Houthis are, at least for now, the dominant political force and best hope for change in a country that truly needs it from top to bottom. They are also a substantial military force, having taken control of much of Yemen's security apparatus in the north and central parts of the country. What makes both these points remarkable is that the Houthis are members of the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam, a small minority in an otherwise Sunni majority country.

The Zaidis reigned over much of northern Yemen under a system of religious and secular rule known as an imamate for over a thousand years until revolution swept through the country in 1962. Yemen's nationalist movement eventually led to the establishment of two separate countries: the Yemen Arab Republic or North Yemen and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen or South Yemen. In 1990, North and South Yemen united to become the present day Republic of Yemen.

Marginalised

However, the Zaidis never regained the power and influence they had prior to 1962, and have been both politically and economically marginalised by each successive government ever since - at least up until now. And that's an important point to remember in any discussion about the Houthis.Houthis tighten control of Yemen's capital

In 2004, Hussein Badr al Din al-Houthi, a dissident cleric from northern Yemen and head of the Zaidi sect there, started an uprising against the government in Sanaa, demanding greater autonomy in the north, as well as to protect Zaidi religious and cultural traditions from perceived impingement by Sunnis. Houthi was killed by government troops just a few months later, but his followers adopted his name and carried on the struggle.

Following a series of on again off again periods of bloody fighting, the Houthis agreed to a ceasefire with the government in 2010. However, not much changed for the Houthis in terms of perceived grievances perpetuated by the government, which brings us to the more recent events that resulted in the Houthis' rapid and astonishing rise to power.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled Yemen with an iron fist for more than 30 years, and although a Zaidi himself, was no ally of the Houthis. In fact, he was their nemesis during and after the six years of rebellion. As the Arab Spring swept through much of the Middle East in 2011, the Houthis took advantage of growing dissatisfaction throughout Yemen with the Saleh government, and began to consolidate their control in the north.

As part of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative signed later that year, Saleh agreed to step down and pass the reigns of power to his deputy, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. But once again, promises of government reform went nowhere and the lives of everyday Yemenis, to include the Houthis, were no better.

For the Houthis, the final straw in their clash with the government was the lifting of fuel subsidies in July 2014, which lead to wide scale protests by both Sunni and Shia in Sanaa. By that time, the Houthis had become much more politically astute and militarily capable. They knew what they wanted and how they were going to achieve it. After taking control of Sanaa in September, the Houthis forced Yemen's Prime Minister, Mohammed Basindwa, to resign, and then outright rejected Hadi's first nomination to replace him. From that point on, the Houthis have more or less been calling the shots in Sanaa, although it's important to note that what happens there doesn't necessarily carry weight in much of the rest of the country.

Political concessions

So what do the Houthis want? The short answer is political concessions that give them significant influence in the central government and greater regional autonomy throughout the country, particularly for them in the north. And so far, they've been very successful in that regard. Since taking control of security functions in and around Sana’a two months ago, the Houthis have proven to be a formidable military force, and have not shied away from flexing their muscle.

So what do the Houthis want? The short answer is political concessions that give them significant influence in the central government and greater regional autonomy throughout the country, particularly for them in the north.

Frustrated with Hadi's slow pace toward reform, the Houthis gave him a 10-day ultimatum at the end of October to form a new government, which he subsequently announced on November 9. The new technocratic reconciliation government includes representatives from the traditional power bases as well as the Houthis, southern secessionists and most every other political party in the country. For now, the Houthis have established themselves as a legitimate political party with long-term goals, and an essential part of the security apparatus.

So what stands in the way of the Houthis' plans for greater influence in Yemeni politics? Plenty. In the south, the al-Hirak secessionist movement looks at the Houthis as a direct threat to their long sought after aim of independence, especially if the Houthis begin to move in that direction.

Consider also, the Islah Party, which is Yemen's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Houthis' biggest political rival. Each will do what they can to undermine the other. And then of course there is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based primarily in central Yemen, where the Houthis have already begun to extend their influence. Daily clashes between the Houthis and AQAP are taking a deadly toll on both sides, with no sign of letting up.

AQAP will forge whatever relations they can with the Sunni tribes in central Yemen to exploit in their favor the Sunni-Shia struggles seen throughout much of the Middle East. And speaking of Sunni-Shia struggles, don't discount Saudi Arabia either, which looks at the Houthis as nothing more than an Iranian tool to undermine them.

The Houthis' rise to power and influence was as sudden as it was unexpected, and for now at least, they have brought about political change that may not have occurred otherwise for many years. Change that for the first time in Yemen's history is set to be truly representative of all the disparate political factions. Only time will tell whether the new government can effectively control a country as complex and diverse as Yemen. But the Houthis' best chance at helping it to succeed is to maintain their role as a legitimate long-term political party with limited goals and a short-term guarantor of security.

What they don't want to do is become another divisive political or military element with a grand scheme for power and influence, something Yemen has proven to have no shortage of in the past.

Martin Reardon is a Senior Vice President with The Soufan Group, a New York-based strategic security and intelligence consultancy, and Senior Director of Qatar International Academy for Security Studies. He is a 21-year veteran of the FBI, and specialised in counterterrorism operations.

Yemen's President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi has declared as invalid and unconstitutional all actions taken by the Shia Houthis after September 21 when the group moved into Sanaa.

In a statement issued to Al Jazeera late on Saturday, Hadi said that he was upholding decisions adopted by the national dialogue and the agreement reached by Gulf Arab states for a political solution in the Arabian Peninsula nation.

He called on the international community to protect the political process.

The statement was signed by Hadi "as president of the republic".

An aide to Hadi told AFP news agency that he will call on parliament to meet in Aden, as powerful tribes in the southern provinces of Marib, Jawaf and Baida urged him to declare Sanaa an "occupied city".Profile: Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi

The aide said Hadi "remains the legitimate president and that he resigned under pressure from Houthis".

Earlier on Saturday, Hadi managed to slip house arrest in Sanaa, the capital, and is now in his home town of Aden.

Hadi arrived in his power base in the south on Saturday afternoon, after he left his home in Sanaa, which was under siege from the Houthis, Al Jazeera's Mohamed Vall, reporting from Aden, said.

Following his return, Hadi held a meeting with the security council of Aden province to discuss the situation in the country.

Our correspondent also said that security forces were on alert in Aden, where Hadi has strong loyalty among Sunni Muslims.

Al Jazeera has learned that Jamal Benomar, the UN special envoy to Yemen, held an emergency meeting with Houthi leaders in Sanaa to discuss possible withdrawal of their fighters from the city to normalise the political situation.

The news came as Houthi fighters opened fire on protesters in the central Yemeni city of Ibb on Saturday, killing one person and wounding another, activists said.

Clashes in Ibb

The crowd had gathered in a public square in Ibb after a new power-sharing deal was reached on Friday to demonstrate against the Houthis' role in the overthrow of Hadi's government last month.

Following the shooting, thousands more people took to the streets in protest. Witnesses said the Houthis were deploying more security forces in response.Southern Yemen separatists continue to demand independence

Yemen's feuding political parties agreed on Friday to create a transitional council to help govern the country and allow a government to continue operating with input from rival factions after the effective Houthi takeover.

Western countries are worried that unrest in Yemen could create opportunities for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to plot more attacks against international targets.

Late on Friday, a drone destroyed a car carrying suspected members of AQAP in Shabwa province, a bastion of the armed group in the rugged mountains of southern Yemen, killing at least three people, residents said.

The US has acknowledged it carries out drone strikes against targets in Yemen but does not comment on specific attacks.

The strikes, which have sometimes killed civilians, have angered many people in the country.

Hadi was seen as a supporter of the use of drone strikes against AQAP.Yemen explained in one minute

A delegation of Houthis just returned from Iran and a spokesperson said Iran had pledged to expand Yemen's ports, help build power plants and provide Yemen with enough oil to last a year.

Yemen is caught in a standoff between deposed president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the Houthi rebels, who seized control of the capital Sanaa and staged a coup in February by dissolving the country's parliament and creating a "presidential council".

A spokesman for the exiled government, Rajeh Badi, said the Houthis would be the only ones to benefit from a deal with Iran.Al Jazeera explains the Yemen crisis in 60 seconds

"The Iranian interference is merely, inside or outside Yemen, about military support to some militias or military groups," Badi said.

Meanwhile, Yemeni political forces opposing the Houthis released a statement announcing their alliance on Saturday, saying they want to restore state authority and rebuild weakened security forces.

The National Alliance for Rescue comprises Sunni Muslim and secular parties, as well youth groups, tribal alliances and members of the Southern Movement, which seeks greater autonomy for the formerly independent south.

The United Nations warned this week that the situation in Yemen can spiral into something similar to Syria, Libya or Iraq if no solution is found through talks between the country's rival parties.

The UN special envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, told Al Jazeera on Thursday that there was a real danger of the country disintegrating and a civil war erupting.

Benomar has been meeting all parties in Yemen as well as regional powers in a bid to resolve the country's crisis

"If there is no agreement, the prospects are very bleak. It’s a combination of scenarios like Syria, Libya and Iraq. It’s a horrible scenario and all sides are aware that every effort should be made for a peaceful way forward."

The Houthi takeover has also stoked secessionist sentiments in the south, raising fears of a repeat of the 1994 civil war, when the formerly independent south attempted to break away from its union with the north, forged four years earlier.

In the spring of 1967, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, lamented to the U.S. ambassador in Cairo that the war in Yemen had become his “Vietnam.” He subsequently explained to an Egyptian historian how the conflict spiraled out of control: “I sent a company to Yemen and ended up reinforcing it with 70,000 troops.”

Over the course of the five-year war, from 1962 to 1967, Nasser lost more than 10,000 men, squandered billions of dollars, and painted himself into a diplomatic corner from which the only way out was through war with Israel. As Nasser himself would realize by the war’s end, Yemen was to Egypt what Vietnam was to the United States — and what Afghanistan was to the Soviet Union, what Algeria is to France, and what Lebanon is to Israel.

Not surprisingly, the predominant takeaway for Egyptians was “never again.” Never again would they send their boys to fight for a dubious cause on a remote battlefield. Never again would they waste their modern army to build a nation where there was none. Never again would they set foot in Yemen.

Perhaps “never” is too strong a word. A half-century later, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is once again contemplating the dispatch of ground forces to Yemen, this time in support of the Saudi-led assault on the Houthis. Sisi has already committed Egypt’s navy and air force to the military campaign and has said that ground forces would be sent “if necessary.” As the Saudis, the Egyptians, and their allies hover on the brink of another military adventure in Yemen, history offers some stark lessons of the challenges that may block their road to victory.* * *

In the fall of 1962, a perceptive battalion commander named Salah al-Din al-Mahrizi was urging his superiors in Egypt’s high command that predictions of a quick, easy war in Yemen were wildly off target. A coup d’état had just toppled the monarchy in Yemen; a republic, modeled on Egypt’s, had been established in its place. Yet the republic was weak, and the Zaidi Shiite tribes of the north, loyal to ousted Imam Muhammad al-Badr, threatened to crush it, with Saudi support.

Nasser, who was engaged in a ferocious struggle with King Saud over leadership of the Arab world, saw an opportunity to plant the seeds of revolution on the Arabian Peninsula. There was no time to lose.

A senior official in Egyptian military intelligence suggested the military campaign would be a cakewalk. At a meeting with senior commanders of the armed forces, he argued that all that was necessary to scare off the tribes was to send a handful of paratroopers armed with megaphones, firecrackers, and smoke grenades.

This was too much for Mahrizi, who had spent the better part of the previous decade at the head of an Egyptian military delegation to Sanaa. Yemen, he reminded the general, had consumed four Turkish divisions in the 19th century. No force would ever suffice. In their native mountain habitat, the warlike tribesmen of the north, armed with knives and rifles, were more than a match for Egypt’s trained infantrymen. The Egyptians’ tanks would be useless in the highlands of Yemen, and their air force ineffective. They could expect ambushes everywhere. The 1,200 miles separating Egypt from Yemen, meanwhile, would make resupply of the fighting forces a logistical nightmare.

In short, Mahrizi suggested, it would be best to leave the defense of Yemen to the Yemenis. On account of these words of wisdom — later communicated in a letter to Nasser himself — Mahrizi was grounded for insubordination and proceeded to sit out the first months of a war that developed more or less as he predicted.

In the months that followed, the Egyptians poured men and materiel into Yemen over an air bridge constructed with help from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. First came a company of commandos to guard the capital, then a squadron of fighters to provide them with air support, and soon after an armored battalion to secure the surrounding countryside. Yet as Mahrizi had warned, no force seemed sufficient to secure the republic — let alone crush the rebel cause. Over the course of 1963 and 1964, the fighting spread across northern Yemen, sucking in ever more Egyptian manpower.

Three factors drove the escalation. First, the Saudis were able to send supplies to Imam al-Badr’s men over Yemen’s porous borders faster than the Egyptians could interdict them. To prevent supplies from reaching royalist supporters, the Egyptians deployed considerable air power to Yemen and launched airstrikes on Saudi territory to the north and on the British-controlled Aden Protectorate to the south.

Third, the mere declaration of a “republic” over the ruins of al-Badr’s imamate was a far cry from the establishment of a centralized modern state capable of containing Yemen’s powerful centrifugal forces. Accordingly, an army of Egyptian administrators descended on Yemen, where they succeeded mainly in replicating Egypt’s police state.

From 1964 onward, Nasser sought a way to retreat from Yemen with his reputation intact. In 1965, he swallowed his pride and went to Jeddah to make peace with King Faisal. But the peace did not hold, mainly because the “proxies” in Yemen stubbornly refused to play their part in a deal made over their heads and at their expense. Soon enough, Nasser and King Faisal were at loggerheads again, and King Faisal traveled to Tehran to offer the Shah of Iran an “Islamic pact” against the godless Egyptians.

The irony of the Saudis’ present attempt to form a “Sunni axis” — this time with Egypt as an ally, not an antagonist — against the opponent du jour, Iran, suggests that we should avoid casting the present struggle in Yemen in purely sectarian terms. Back in the 1960s, King Faisal cast about for a source of legitimacy that would aid him in his competition with the immensely popular leader of pan-Arabism, Nasser. Religion was a convenient choice: The Saudis held custody over the holy sites of Islam, Nasser’s Arab socialism left him open to charges of impiety, and King Faisal’s most likely ally in the struggle against Nasser, the Shah of Iran, shared his Muslim faith, if not his denomination. Nor did sectarian differences stand in the way of Riyadh’s alliance with the mostly Zaidi Shiite opponents of Egypt’s intervention within Yemen.

Today, of course, the Saudis are opposing many of those very same tribes — not because they are Shiite, but because they are seen as colluding with a hostile power that is threatening to upset the regional balance of power. Conversely, there is less sectarian coherence to Iranian actions than meets the eye. While supporting the Houthis, who adhere to the Zaidi version of Shiism, the Iranians are also supporting Sunni elements in Yemen who have chosen to align with the Houthis and are affiliated with ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh (himself a Shiite). It is also important to recognize that religious identity in Yemen is more malleable than in other parts of the Arab world, and the divisions between various strands of Sunnis and Shiites are less stark than they are in Iraq, for example.

Nasser’s deepening reliance on the Soviet Union and sharpening conflict with Saudi Arabia and Britain placed a growing strain on relations with the United States. While President John F. Kennedy’s administration was committed to a policy of détente with Nasser — much to British and Saudi frustration — the persistence of conflict in Yemen made a deterioration of relations all but inevitable. Under President Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. economic aid to Cairo eventually ceased.

The war in Yemen was not only poisoning Nasser’s international standing, but it was also threatening to upset stability back home. As the intervention dragged on, Egypt’s economic condition went from bad to worse, domestic discontent rose to dangerous levels, and mounting criticism from within the Arab world began to take its toll on Nasser’s reputation. In May 1967, Nasser made a gambit to solve all of these problems by shifting world attention northward.

He marched his army into the Sinai desert in broad daylight, triggering an international crisis that erupted in six days of war with Israel. The result was a catastrophic defeat, which led to the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen — thus making Israel the unlikely handmaiden of Saudi victory.

With Egypt now bankrupt, Nasser was forced to pull out of Yemen in exchange for a pledge of financial aid from King Faisal. This transaction, which took place in August 1967 at the Arab League summit in Khartoum, Sudan — famous for its “three no’s” to Israel — symbolized the shift of power from Cairo to Riyadh that had occurred over the course of the war in Yemen. Nasserism was a spent force.

In November 1967, the last Egyptian soldier departed the Arabian Peninsula, ending the existential threat to the Saudi kingdom for a generation. Egypt’s man in Yemen, President Abdullah al-Sallal, was ousted in a coup as soon as Egyptian forces left Sanaa. Remarkably, the republic survived, though Sallal’s successors did little to fulfill the grand promises of the revolution, and the kleptocracy they built collapsed under the weight of its own illegitimacy nearly a half-century later.* * *

If President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi knows his history, he should be hesitant to commit Egypt to another ground war in Yemen. Yet the temptation to seize this opportunity to restore Egypt’s diminished stature in the region must be great — as it was for Nasser in 1962.

There may be a middle way. Back then, sensible advisors urged Nasser to make do with air and logistical support for indigenous forces fighting in support of the Yemeni republic. Surely, a similar scenario is making the rounds in Cairo at the moment. For Egypt’s sake, we can hope that today’s Mahrizis carry the day.

And if they do not? Here are three lessons that the intervening powers can draw from the Egyptian experience in Yemen.

First, they should not expect the full backing of the United States. The vantage point of a superpower is always more complicated than the perspective of any regional actor. But this administration’s perspective on the Middle East diverges sharply from prevailing opinion in Cairo and Riyadh. The Saudis — now joined by their erstwhile adversaries, the Egyptians — will do their best to point out the folly of U.S. efforts to appease Iran, just as they did in the 1960s when their nemesis was Nasser. Then as now, it is doubtful their pleas will be heard.

Second, the intervening powers will have to marshal a sizable army if they wish to conquer and hold Yemen. In the 1960s, the Egyptians deployed 70,000 men, lost at least 10,000 of them, and still failed to pacify the forerunners of today’s Houthis. Not for nothing is Yemen known as maqbarat al-Atrak — “graveyard of the Turks” — after Ottoman forces suffered heavy losses in their attempts to subdue repeated tribal rebellions throughout the 19th century. The intervening powers might do better to limit their objectives: If they are prepared to accept a power-sharing agreement that preserves Houthi gains but denies them the strategic prizes of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb, they could make do with smaller ground forces buttressed by air and sea power.

Third, there are no permanent allegiances in Yemen. The Saudis recently received a reminder of this fact when their man in Yemen, ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, dropped them in a heartbeat for the ascendant Houthis. The Houthis, in turn, had no problem joining hands with Saleh, even though their founder had been killed in 2004 by the Yemeni army — on Saleh’s orders.

The disintegrative tendencies that have always plagued Yemen have only gained force since the Arab Spring struck Sanaa in 2011. Yemen today is a broken state, in which tribal affiliations are once more paramount and alliances form and dissolve in a kaleidoscopic manner. Any would-be conqueror with the temerity to ride the tribal tiger in Yemen will need considerable dexterity to navigate among the clans and an endless supply of funds with which to ply them.

If the prosperous Saudis can avoid the sort of protracted counterinsurgency that bogged down four Egyptian divisions in the 1960s, they should be able to keep up the war effort in Yemen indefinitely. The bigger question is: How long can the Iranians, while still under debilitating economic sanctions, sustain a competition with Saudi treasure in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? That answer may not be found in Cairo, Riyadh, or Sanaa, but depends instead on the final outcome of the negotiations underway between Washington and Tehran over the future of Iran’s nuclear program.