Monday, November 23, 2015

None of the five republics in Central Asia were ever
ethnically homogeneous. Joseph Stalin, in fact, purposefully drew their borders
so that there would always be a local minority that he could use against the
ethnic majority, either as his agents in place or as a target on which to shift
the anger of the majority away from Moscow. Since 1991, however, all five
republics have become far more ethnically homogeneous. This has largely been the
result of people fleeing countries where they had, often, lived for many years
due to violence or the fear of violence and moving to neighboring states where they
are members of the titular nationality.

That process had slowed in the early 2000s, but now there is
evidence that it is accelerating again, not because of violence or fear thereof,
but rather because of increasing ethnic hostility by ethnic majorities directed
against minority groups as well as discrimination against the latter in the
workplace and more generally. And what is worrisome is
that xenophobic attitudes among the titular majority nationalities appear to be
far stronger among young people than among their parents, who grew up in Soviet
times when “internationalism” was highly valued.

The attitudes of the majorities and the experiences of the fleeing
minorities will make it far more difficult for the governments in the region to
deal with one another, and far more likely that at least some politicians will
exploit these ethnic hostilities to the point that border conflicts in this already
tense and unstable region will become ever more likely.

Recently
illustrative of this wider trend has been the flight of ethnic Kyrgyz from the
Dzhirgatal district of Tajikistan. Many
Kyrgyz fled the region in the 1990s because of civil war. But the current
exodus, which has reduced this minority’s share of the region’s population by
an additional 50 percent, is reported by those Kyrgyz still living in the
region to be due to “discrimination on an ethnic and racial basis.” And they add that younger ethnic Tajiks are far more
likely to display anti-Kyrgyz attitudes than the older generation, which was
born and grew up in Soviet times (Centrasia.ru,
November 13).

Local officials play down the problem and say that the departure
of anyone from their region is entirely voluntary, the result of personal
social and economic problems of kinds found everywhere. But local
Kyrgyz residents dispute this, pointing to frequent discrimination against them.
At least a third of them say that they hope to leave once they save up enough money
to do so and find a place in Kyrgyzstan to move to.

One Kyrgyz resident of Dzhirgatal told a CentrAsia journalist that he could not
find work “only because he is a Kyrgyz,” adding that his patience with the
situation was running out. Another Kyrgyz there, a taxi driver, said
he and other members of his nation faced discrimination of both an open and a concealed
kind; they feel they are being forced out, despite what the authorities say. And
many local Kyrgyz say that “discrimination is especially developed” among young
Tajiks. “The older generation,” they say, “is more loyal to one another” (Centrasia.ru,
November 13).

Wednesday, November 18, 2015

The Russian
government recently announced a plan to open up 6 of its 42 publicly identified
closed cities (officially named closed administrative-territorial formations),
as of January 1, 2016 (Tvrain.ru,
October 30). Closed cities, a carryover institution from the Soviet Union, are
home to military installations; facilities used for the development,
production, or storage and disposal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and
other facilities considered central to Russian national security (Interfax, October 23). During
the Soviet era, these cities were given code names and did not appear on
official maps. In their current manifestation, many of these cities have been
identified and have been permitted to resume using the historical names they
held prior to their closure. However, entry into these cities is still strictly
regulated, even for Russian citizens.

Making the list of
cities to be opened starting next year are: Seversk (Tomsk Oblast), Zelenogorsk
(Krasnoyarsk Krai), Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk Oblast), Zarechny (Penza Oblast), Zvyozdny
Village (Permsky Krai), and Lokomotivny village (Chelyabinky Oblast). These
cities are home to over 350,000 people and are situated across the entire
expanse of Russia (Vedomosti,
October 29). Russia’s state nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom, administers
the first four of these cities, and the Russian Ministry of Defense administers
the remaining two (Interfax,
October 23). Among the strategically sensitive things located at these heretofore
closed cities are facilities for the enrichment of uranium (including the
facility at Novouralsk, which is the largest of its kind in the world) and
military installations dealing with missile production and housing Russian
missileers (Vedomosti,
October 29; Kommersant,
October 30; TASS, October 28; Tvrain.ru,
October 30).

According to the
Ministry of Economic Development, the goal of the government’s initiative to
open up these cities is linked to optimizing federal budgetary spending (Kommesrant, October 30).
Despite the prolonged decline in the value of the ruble and the sizable deficit
in the recently announced Russian budget, the reclassification of these cities
is said to be part of a development project that has been in the works since
before Russia fell into an economic downturn (BBC—Russian
service, October 27). Closed cities present unique challenges to economic
development. The strict control over what and who is allowed to enter these
cities restricts the flow of resources necessary to stimulate organic economic
development. As a result, large subsidies from the federal budget have been necessarily
allocated to supplement the budgets of closed cities.

What motivated the
Russian government to start this process? Even if transitioning these cities
had long been discussed, announcing these initiatives with only a two-month
lead time before implementation is quite sudden. According to the plan, there
will only be a nine-month transition period for the cities, starting on the
first of the year (Interfax,
October 23). Critics in the varying regional governments and within Rosatom are
likely considering this when it says that the move to reclassify these cities
is too fast and that more discussion is required to plan their smooth
transition. To put this in perspective, Seversk, the largest of Russia’s closed
cities, will instantly lose 900 million rubles of its 3.8 billion ruble ($13.9
million out of $59 million) budget, if it loses its status as a closed city at
the start of the year (Kommersant,
October 30). This one cut, which only saves the Russian government about $13
million, will leave the city of Seversk scrambling to find the resources
necessary to continue to provide services to its 120,000 residents after losing
almost one quarter of its budget, with little advanced notice.

The announcement
of the plan has already been met with broad pushback. Many residents prefer
that their city remains closed to the rest of Russia. In their measure, the
positive externalities of living in closed cities outweigh the negative ones.
The tight control over movement in and out of these cities provides residents
with an increased sense of security. One city official from a closed city not
slated for this round of status changes described closed cities as places where
residents do not lock there doors and children can safely walk to school
unaccompanied (Tvrain.ru,
October 30). Moreover, government subsidies allows these cities to provide a
level of benefits to the residents of these cities that would otherwise not be
possible. Residents speaking out against the government’s plan are motivated by
the fear of losing these subsidies and the standard of living they provide (Kommersant, Tvrain.ru,
October 30). Given the nature of what is located within these cities, however,
domestic political challenges are unlikely to either drive or redirect this
process.

Russia was able to maintain
its closed cities through all of the economic troubles of the 1990s. And the
Russian government’s decision to maintain its current level of defense spending
in its shrunken 2016 federal budget is a testament to the Kremlin’s commitment
to spending on issues related to national security. For this reason, the
transitioning of these cities from closed to open is particularly intriguing.
In some cases, it is quite possible that the city in question may no longer be
home to activities considered core to national security, or facilities in that
city could perhaps easily be converted into lower-risk establishments. From a
logistical standpoint, the two cities administered by the Ministry of Defense
will have an easier time redistributing any top-secret resources located there.
As for the cities with nuclear research activities, there is some talk of
adapting these facilities to expand production into other areas—likely part of
the much talked about, but thus far largely unsuccessful, plan to develop dual-use
military technologies. Potential development opportunities aside, the
heavy-handed decision by Russian officials to transition these cities on such a
short timeline presents an opening for possible breaches of Russian national
security.

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