Sokolski and Gilinsky are out of touch with the current
realities of nuclear diplomacy and trade.The inclusion of new nonproliferation requirements in bilateral nuclear
cooperation agreements is just one of many tools used by the United States to
restrain the spread of E&R.U.S.
insistence on renouncing E&R in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements will
not be persuasive to most countries.It
will also harm multiple U.S. interests – including interests in nuclear safety,
security and nonproliferation – which are advanced by U.S. nuclear cooperation
and supply.A few points to consider:

1.U.S. cooperation
advances nonproliferation interests.The
authors recommend a “strict, uniform policy” that conditions U.S. nuclear
cooperation on a partner country’s renunciation of its rights to uranium
enrichment.But such an inflexible approach
would be counterproductive to nonproliferation interests.

In a piece
recently published by the Carnegie Endowment, nonproliferation experts Mark
Hibbs and Fred McGoldrick examine in detail how the United States should
approach E&R in nuclear cooperation agreements and in the Vietnam agreement
in particular.They conclude that

“Using U.S. bilateral agreements as
a lever to limit the spread of ENR may sound like a good idea. But for a number
of reasons, insisting that all countries legally forgo ENR for all future U.S.
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements risks undermining U.S. nonproliferation
interests.”

Hibbs and McGoldrick note that recent U.S. initiatives to
deny E&R technologies have succeeded only in provoking widespread
opposition from non-nuclear weapons state parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).Few of these countries have any interest in developing E&R
facilities but oppose attempts to deny what they regard as their sovereign
rights, which are protected by Article IV of the NPT.A no-E&R requirement for U.S. nuclear
cooperation would open the United States to charges that it is undermining the
NPT, and “inevitably diminish U.S. influence within the NPT regime and weaken
the already-fragile bonds that hold the treaty together.”

The end result of a universal no-E&R requirement “would
be to push the United States out of many nuclear markets,” Hibbs and McGoldrick
warn. No other nuclear energy supplier country demands no-E&R terms for
nuclear trade, and none is likely to do so.United States would lose not only exports and jobs, but also the nuclear
cooperation agreement itself, which is “an important bilateral legal instrument
to influence other countries’ nuclear behavior.”Without a nuclear cooperation agreement, the
United States would lose nine nonproliferation assurances and guarantees from the
partner country, including consent rights that other nuclear supplier countries
do not require. By precluding U.S. nuclear supply arrangements, the United
States would also lose the ability of U.S. personnel to identify potential red
flags in the other country’s nuclear energy program.

As Hibbs and McGoldrick note, a universal no-E&R policy would
“do nothing” to mitigate the larger proliferation risk posed by clandestine activities.
By insisting on no-E&R conditions,
the United States would also encumber its efforts to gain broad acceptance of
more useful nonproliferation commitments, such as the IAEA Additional Protocol.

They conclude that a case-by-case approach to addressing
E&R issues in Section 123 agreements is the “realistic and effective”
approach to handling E&R in nuclear cooperation agreements, and “may lead
to greater overall effectiveness of U.S. civil nuclear energy and
nonproliferation policies.”Applying
this approach to the Vietnam agreement, they write:

“Based on what is reported to be in
that agreement, it would appear Washington and Hanoi have reached a joint
political understanding that Vietnam has no intention of engaging in ENR
activities. An agreement along these lines would strengthen the economic and
energy ties between Washington and Hanoi, promote U.S. strategic objectives in
East Asia, and reinforce the global nonproliferation regime.”

2.U.S. cooperation
advances nuclear safety.Citing
no evidence, Sokolski and Gilinsky claim that “there is no adequate safety
agency” in Vietnam.In fact, Vietnam has
taken deliberate steps to develop its nuclear energy program consistent with the
highest safety standards.Vietnam established
the Vietnam Agency for
Radiation and Nuclear Safety and Control and the Vietnam Atomic Energy Institute in
2008 as the two main agencies responsible for nuclear safety and security.

Vietnam has worked closely on nuclear safety issues with the
IAEA and leading nuclear energy countries, including the United States.Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and Technology
signed a nuclear security cooperation agreement with U.S. National Nuclear
Security Administration in 2007.The
following year, Vietnam began receiving technical assistance from the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). That assistance deepened in 2009 when
Vietnam became a pilot country for the NRC’s New Reactor Assistance Program.
Vietnam has also received technical assistance from Japan, Korea and Russia.Like other countries developing new nuclear
plants, Vietnam and its foreign partners are incorporating lessons from
Fukushima, including new risk assessments for earthquakes and tsunamis.

If U.S. suppliers are enabled to export to Vietnam advanced
reactor designs and world-class operational expertise, they will further
enhance nuclear safety in the country.

The authors cite nuclear safety is a reason “to be cautious
about pushing nuclear power in Vietnam,” but Vietnam’s nuclear energy program
is well under way with no “push” from the United States.And preventing U.S. nuclear cooperation would
only harm the interest of nuclear safety in Vietnam.

3.The Vietnam nuclear
energy market.The authors also
take aim at the economic benefits of U.S. nuclear energy exports to
Vietnam.They scorn projections of the
Vietnam nuclear energy market as “wildly optimistic” but provide no actual
evidence to challenge industry and government estimates.Vietnam’s nuclear energy plans, developed in
cooperation with the IAEA and foreign partners, call for 10 GW to 15 GW of
nuclear generating capacity by 2030.The
first two plants, supplied by Russia, are scheduled to begin construction next
year at a southern coastal site and come on line in 2020.Two additional plants, supplied by Japan,
will be constructed in the same province.An additional 6-11 plants are planned at up to 8 sites in 5
provinces.Vietnam has indicated strong
interest in partnering with U.S. suppliers.

The authors cite the lack of U.S. nuclear exports to India
as evidence that international nuclear energy markets are overstated.But the reason that significant U.S.-India
nuclear trade has not yet occurred nothing to do with India’s market demand or India’s
interest in U.S. procurement.The issue
is India’s flawed domestic liability law.Unique in the world, the Indian law has prevented Indian cooperation
with foreign and domestic suppliers alike, and must inevitably be reformed to
enable India to achieve its nuclear energy plans.

The potential for nuclear energy exports to Vietnam and
other countries is far from the “old saw” claimed by the authors.That the global market for nuclear energy is
very large and rapidly growing is plain in the numbers.According to the World Nuclear Association,
434 commercial nuclear reactors are in operation around the world.72 are under construction, and another 167 are
planned or on order.

To maintain U.S. influence over global nonproliferation
policy and international nuclear safety, the U.S. commercial nuclear energy
sector must participate in these markets.Without U.S. commercial engagement, the United States would have substantially
diminished influence over other nations’ nonproliferation policies and
practices. U.S. technology and U.S. industry are a critical engine that drives
U.S. nonproliferation policies. A successful nuclear trade and export policy
must go hand in hand.

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