The idea
of a basic income which is paid out to every individual irrespective
of income from other sources and without requiring any work performance,
is an idea which has remained popular in some quarters since theorists
started to discuss it seriously in the 1980s (but the idea itself
is, of course, older than that). The main philosophical arguments
that have been put forward in defense of a basic income are the
following:
(i) since the earth should belong to the whole of humanity, those
who appropriate parts of it for themselves must compensate those
who are left out of these resources (alternatively, one might
claim that people properly own the value of the improvements they
make upon, e.g., some piece of land, while a basic ground rent
must be paid to the community for the use of this common inheritance);
(ii) by egalitarian standards, everyone simply has a right to
get their basic needs satisfied;
(iii) a basic income would reduce alienation, as interpreted by
Marxists, or other bad effects of capitalism, such as exploitation;
(iv) people's sense of community would increase;
(v) a more green lifestyle would be enabled. Thus, the main arguments
seem to have been left-libertarian, egalitarian, Marxist, communitarian,
or environmentalist.

Other,
less philosophical, arguments that have been put forward for basic
income are that it lowers unemployment or that it compensates
women for their unpaid work . Some arguments based on different
kinds of efficiency, e.g., in the sense that it improves economic
growth or that basic income is less bureaucratic than other welfare
schemes, also exist. But is there a case to be made for basic
income on hedonist grounds? This is something that the literature
on basic income does not seem to contemplate very often (and utilitarians
rarely seem to discuss this specific measure themselves).

Philip
Pettit, in a short article, mentions that "utilitarian theory
makes a very good case for a financially adequate basic income,"
although he does not say any more about the reasoning that would
lie behind that conclusion (and he believes that the argument
would fail only because the utilitarian justification is too empirically
contingent – the right to basic income might be taken away
if the utilitarian calculus is revised. The reason for the neglect
of hedonism is probably one of the following:
(i) hedonism is not a moral doctrine to be taken seriously, either
because some other moral theory is presumed to be correct, or
because hedonism is simply not popular enough to warrant any attention;
(ii) basic income can so obviously be defended on hedonist grounds
that it is not worth mentioning;
(iii) basic income is so unlikely to be defended on hedonist grounds
that it is not worth mentioning. It is safe to say that the third
explanation seems unlikely, because most hedonists would probably
defend a robust welfare state, even though it remains an open
question whether the specific policy of a basic income would be
the best one, especially when one considers the many variables
that affect these decisions. This is, of course, a purely external
counter-argument, since it is a part of the utilitarian idea itself
that happiness or (preference satisfaction) is the only thing
that matters intrinsically. For a utilitarian, the value of all
policies are by necessity contingent on empirical facts.

It will
become evident that basic income, on hedonist grounds, can be
taken neither as obviously, or self-evidently, justified nor obviously
unjustified.

Hedonism
is a form of utilitarianism and its foundational moral principle
is that one should always act to maximize pleasure and minimize
pain. Other kinds of utilitarianism say that we should maximize
other things. The most common alternative to pleasure is degree
of preference satisfaction. It is important that we distinguish
between preference utilitarianism and hedonism in the present
context, since they may give different answers regarding the desirability
of basic income. One of the first famous hedonist philosophers
is Epicurus (341-270 BC). In order best to pursue pleasure and
avoid pain Epicurus and his followers "lived a life of semi-seclusion,
growing vegetables and herbs and discussing the proper conduct
of human life." In spite of the reputation that hedonism
has had during most of history, Epicurus did not think people
should live "by the frenetic pursuit of wine, women and song,
but by seeking health of body and serenity of soul," which,
among other things, entails cultivating "an inner self-sufficiency,
a contentment of [one's] own physical and mental states and a
suppression of unnecessary desires." Of course, he conceded
that other, more sybaritic, pleasures are also pleasures, and
have value; but they often tend to bring with them other kinds
of disturbances that far outweigh the pleasures. Thus, someone
who "sets his mind on acquiring fame or riches condemns himself
to a hectic and anxious life, with no sure hope of reaching his
goal."

If the
Epicurean version of hedonism is accepted the case for a basic
income seems strong. Most proponents of a basic income set the
amount of the income sufficiently high to allow someone to live
the sort of modest life that the Epicurean ideal entails. As long
as one is guaranteed a roof over one's head, decent food one's
table and decent clothes to wear (and we should also add free,
or cheap, healthcare, as well as other public amenities, such
as parks and libraries, since most people discuss basic income
in the context of a modern welfare state), it would be possible
to lead the sort of life that Epicurus commends. We might at least
say that then the politicians have done the best they can do to
promote the Epicurean lifestyle. Providing good company and friends
is sadly not something that the politicians can do. Of course,
if the level of the basic income is set lower than the Epicurean
minimum level, a lot of the benefits would disappear. A person
who is guaranteed money that suffices to buy only the lowest quality
of food, to rent an unheated room without running water in the
slums, and without resources to take the bus or train to visit
friends or relatives, to go to the dentist once in a while, to
pay the membership fees of a club etc, would probably not be a
very happy person (although Epicurus himself seems to have thought
that many great pains can be endured with the right attitude.

To be
sure, one should be careful of equating hedonism with Epicureanism
without further ado. Empirical happiness research seems to indicate
that Epicurus was correct on some things and incorrect on others.
He may have been mostly right about the importance of a healthy
body and mind, and in his observation that intimate relationships
enhance happiness more than material pursuits. But he was probably
wrong in advising us avoid public life (as well as to avoid marriage).

Another
advantage of a basic income is that it allows the "experiments
of living" that 19th century philosopher John Stuart Mill
talked about. Although Mill was a hedonist, it was not exactly
a hedonism of the Benthamite4 kind, since he – among other
revisions – distinguished between higher and lower pleasures.
A higher pleasure could be regarded as more valuable than a lower
pleasure, even though the former actually gave an equal amount
(or even a lower amount) of pleasure than the latter. Among the
higher pleasures he seems to have counted the appreciation of
art, science, nature and so forth. However, the distinction between
higher and lower pleasures does not seem to be extremely important
when it comes to deciding about basic income (it seems that the
policy could advance both higher and lower pleasures throughout
society). But another dimension of Mill's thought seems to be
more important. Mill was wary of the dangers of the "tyranny
of the majority," i.e. the risk that a political majority
might use their power to the severe detriment of the minority.
But he was also wary of more informal power, namely "the
tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; […] the tendency
of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its
own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent
from them." To combat this conformism, Mill thought that
not only is it desirable that there should be different opinions
in society, but also different practical experiments of living;
that "the worth of different modes of life should be proved
practically, when anyone thinks fit to try them." Now Mill's
proposal was that the government (at least among civilized peoples)
should not interfere with anyone's liberty, except for the reason
of protecting harm to other people. Actions that do not concern
other people (although it is not easy to interpret exactly what
Mill meant by this) should not come under the domain of law. However,
it is not obvious that this libertarian measure would be the best
to foster the kinds of experiments of living that Mill talked
about. A basic income should enable all people (and not just relatively
rich people, which the libertarian proposal entails) to live by
their own social rules and experiment with ways of living.

Now
it my be claimed that most people are really not that interested
in experiments of living, which would mean that a basic income
would not be desirable for that reason. On the other hand, Mill
probably thought that although experiments of living would be
of interest only to a few people, their experiments are very important
for the future. Every new social practice must be tried out by
some avant-garde before it can spread throughout the rest of society.
It seems obvious that a basic income would enable more of these
experiments of living, and if one agrees with Mill about the importance
of individuality for well-being then the case for the policy appears
to be strong. (Moreover, if very few people would be willing to
be a part of the avant-garde, the basic income scheme would be
cheap for society – and we should also keep in mind that
some of the experiments of living would probably contain some
entrepreneurial elements).

Thus,
the hedonist case for a basic income – set on a level that
allows one to live comfortably but modestly – seems, to
repeat, to be strong. But the strength of this conclusion depends
on how many people are, in reality, convinced hedonists. I am,
of course, alluding to the problem of incentives to work, to accumulate
capital. If everyone were convinced hedonists there would be no
problem in this regard. Since the hedonist ought to regard everybody's
pleasure as equally important there would be no need to persuade
anyone to set off some time to work for other people's benefit
or to save up and invest capital for the benefit of all (i.e.,
no consistent hedonist would really want to be very rich –
or refuse to do some of the necessary work to keep modern society
going – as long as there are plenty of poor people to help
in the world). Incidentally, this means that the modern hedonist
would probably have to reject one important aspect of Epicurus's
ideal, namely his advice to back away from society and reject
participation in politics and the common life outside the hedonist
Garden, as well as to accept the common hierarchies of one's society.

Anyway,
in the real world one cannot expect that everybody will be a convinced
hedonist. Thus, many people will feel that some people get things
they have not deserved through hard work, like the rest of us.
Still, this may not be a huge problem, since we must (if we want
to be democrats) assume that at least half of the population is
behind the idea of a basic income. The problem will only be acute
if the large minority who are against basic income are really
against it, and are prepared to evade taxes on a massive scale,
or the like. But it is hard to see that this would be the case,
since today other kinds of tax financed social benefits are widely
accepted. Of course, this is a matter where one can make different
empirical assessments. Still, there is another problem lurking
for the hedonist case for basic income. A basic income set at
the comfortable level discussed above seems to require vast resources,
such as can be found in modern industrialized countries (in a
very poor country, I assume, the level of the basic income would
be so low that it would defeat its purposes). If, however, it
would be possible to lead a happy, epicurean life – or a
life of various experiments of living – without working,
then the more the epicurean ideal becomes popular, the less people
would be willing to work hard to provide the resources that society
needs to keep the basic income scheme going (I am, again, assuming
that far from 100% of the population will be convinced hedonists).
Thus, it would be best if only a small portion of the population
pursue a hedonist lifestyle (or an epicurean type of hedonism),
while the rest of the population continue to work hard in order
to get the things in life that epicureans believe are unnecessary
for real happiness. But this rather paradoxical conclusion –
namely, that if too many were to pursue ‘real’ happiness,
we could not afford it as a society – can perhaps be avoided
if the basic income is not set high enough to allow for the raising
of a family. Since the urge to have children is so prevalent (even
though it is not clear that parents have more pleasure and less
pain in life than non-parents), most people would probably continue
to work hard in order to be able to raise a family.

At the
present time, immigration is a very pressing issue all over the
world. This raises important questions for the hedonist, since,
presumably, national borders are not supposed to matter when it
comes to maximizing pleasure. If more and more immigrants (and
refugees) turn up at the doorsteps of your country, are you not
supposed to welcome them and give them access to the basic income
without further ado? These questions cannot be handled at length
here, but the main question seems to be whether there are any
limits to what a hedonist must do in order to help other people
(and, correspondingly, what a rich country must do for people
living in, or leaving, poor countries). Must we say that the rich
hedonist should give until the poor recipient and the rich giver
have reached the same level of happiness? Must a rich country,
in other words, receive immigrants to the point where so many
receive no other income than the basic income that the scheme
is no longer affordable? Although some hedonists will answer yes
to these questions, I believe that answer is not self-evident.
It is possible to claim that the hedonist's duties to help stop
well before the equilibrium point discussed above.

J. W.
Bailey (1997) has argued forcefully that there is something counterproductive
for a hedonist to give until the recipient has reached the same
level of happiness (or level of income) as oneself. In a world
where hedonists must interact with non-hedonists, there is a chance
that the hedonists will simply be exploited. If, for instance,
the hedonist treats the children of egoists in exactly the same
way as her own children, then hedonism seems to become a very
evolutionarily unstable position, since egoists will free-ride
on the altruism of hedonists, while not giving back anything when
the tables have turned. Can, in other words, the hedonist expect
the same kind of help when she is put in dire straits herself
(which might easily happen if one altruistically gives away most
of one's income every month)? Similarly, it would be very doubtful
whether it is morally right for a hedonist to sacrifice his life
to save an egoist. A hedonist cannot, in other words, be a naïve
altruist (at least not in a world where everyone is not a hedonist).

In the
immigration case this means that the hedonist who argues for a
basic income has some grounds for either restricting immigration
when the level gets too high (although this ‘too high’
level may not have been reached yet in any rich country) or postponing
the basic income reform until the financial stress due to immigration
has abated. Of course, this would not be a problem if the number
of immigrants and refugees were more equitably distributed across
the rich countries (and across different regions within countries)
than what has been the case in recent years.

In conclusion,
the hedonist case for basic income seems sound, provided that
most people do not, in reality, adhere to the epicurean lifestyle
(and where immigration is handled in a more equitable way than
today). Were more people to adhere to it, we would probably have
to implement other kinds of schemes to allow people to have more
leisure, while still having access to the amenities that are taken
for granted in a welfare state. We could, for instance, institute
a maximum working day of five hours, thus giving those who already
have jobs more leisure, while giving the unemployed the work that
remains do be done. And with unemployment virtually gone, the
need for a basic income would be substantially less. Furthermore,
a traditional unemployment scheme (perhaps involving means testing
and/or compulsory education or other training activities), coupled
with a shorter workday, might give isolated individuals the chance
to engage in the social relationships, which are of such great
importance for Epicurus (and confirmed by happiness research).
A basic income may keep some isolated individuals in a passive
state, and passive pleasures (such as watching television by yourself)
are usually perceived as less pleasurable than active, social
pleasures. Reducing the length of the workday (with a corresponding
reduction in earnings) would of course mean lowering the income
and standard of living substantially for many people. But that
is just the point of epicurean politics; many people – at
least the affluent middle class and above in industrialized countries
– already have more money than they need to be happy, while
many have less than they need to be happy.

So how
would the hedonist analysis differ from an analysis based on preference
satisfaction? The main difference, I believe, is that a hedonist
must consider more empirical factors than the preference utilitarian.
The latter perspective is based on simply accepting whatever people
want, whereas the hedonist may, so to speak, dismiss some people's
(demonstrated) preferences on the grounds that they do not promote
pleasure. Thus, the hedonist perspective includes some measure
of paternalism that preference utilitarianism (at least in the
form considered here) lacks. For instance, a preferentialist defense
of a basic income would probably not be affected very much by
the considerations about leisure and isolation discussed above
– instead it would probably rely heavily on the diminishing
marginal utility of money.

Welfare
utilitarianism might be viewed as a sort of middle ground between
hedonism and preference utilitarianism. Welfare utilitarianism
basically accepts that preference satisfaction should be maximized,
but that there are certain basic needs, the satisfaction of which
is necessary to all humans, or that one cannot simply take people's
demonstrated preferences at face value, because they may be constrained
(or misshaped) by circumstances of which one must take account.
Robert Goodin has endorsed a utilitarianism of a welfarist kind
and argued for a basic income on the grounds that they are "less
prying and intrusive, less demeaning and debasing" than conventional
programs of income support, and they "simply make fewer assumptions
and presumptions about whom they are aiding." Although Goodin
is no doubt correct when he rejects some presumptions built into
regular social programs (for instance, regarding a "conservative"
family structure), there may be other presumptions that the hedonist
must accept; for instance, that the social benefits are used to
enable a lifestyle consistent with the Epicurean-Millian lifestyle
described above. If we have reasons to assume that social benefits
will not be spent in that way by most people who receive them,
then those benefits should perhaps not take the form of a universal
basic income. On the other hand, it might be difficult to imagine
that traditional social benefits would do a better job in furthering
that lifestyle. Thus, the hedonist who rejects basic income will
probably need to get seriously creative in order to come up with
a scheme that will be superior to both basic income and traditional
welfare programs.