After receiving a public records request from Promenade D’Iberville, LLC (Promenade), with whom the Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA) was in active litigation in Mississippi, the JEA filed a motion for protective order in the Mississippi court to circumvent the request. The JEA eventually turned over the requested records, but only after two months had passed and Promenade was forced to file an action for the public records.

The appellate court framed the issue as whether the JEA had violated the public records law by withholding requested non-exempt public records. The court noted that, as a general rule, governmental entities in Florida are broadly responsible to make public records available to all who request them. The JEA did not argue that any statutory exemption excused its obligation to make the requested documents available. Rather, the JEA delayed making the records available pending a ruling on its Mississippi motion, even though the pending litigation was not grounds for a public records exemption. Thus, the appellate court concluded, the JEA violated the public records law by delaying Promenade’s access to non-exempt public records for legally insufficient reasons.

Moreover, the appellate court concluded that JEA’s delayed production of records did not “cure” its unjustified delay. Only justified delay is permissible, such as to determine whether such records exist or due to a relief that some or all of the requested records are exempt from disclosure. Unjustified delay violates Florida public records law. Where there is unjustified delay to the point of forcing a requester to file a law suit that, alone, is “tantamount to an unlawful refusal to provide public records in violation of the Act.”
The case summary above was originally published in the Administrative Law Section Newsletter, Vol, 34, No. 2 (Dec 2014), a publication of the Administrative Law Section of the Florida Bar.

Blog Editor’s Comments:

Florida has a very broad Public Records Act, codified in Chapter 119, Florida Statutes. It entitles Florida residents to obtain copies of most records kept by state agencies (with certain exceptions, of course).

If a state agency denies a person’s request improperly, that person may sue the agency. If successful, the person is awarded attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bringing the litigation.

Comments?

Do you think that governmental entities in Florida are responsible to make public records available to all who request them? Do you agree/disagree that Unjustified delay violates Florida public records law? Do you think a person should be able to sue state agency if their request is denied improperly? Please leave any thoughtful comments below.

About the Author: George F. Indest III, J.D., M.P.A., LL.M., is Board Certified by The Florida Bar in Health Law. He is the President and Managing Partner of The Health Law Firm, which has a national practice. Its main office is in the Orlando, Florida, area. www.TheHealthLawFirm.com The Health Law Firm, 1101 Douglas Avenue, Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714, Phone: (407) 331-6620.

Edited by George F. Indest III, J.D., M.P.A., LL.M., Board Certified by The Florida Bar in the Legal Specialty of Health Law

An interesting summary of a Florida appellate case from Florida’s First District Court of Appeal recently came across my desk. Florida has a very broad Public Records Act and Sunshine Act. We are often involved in suing state agencies for force disclosure of documents and information.

The following is from a summary that was originally published in the newsletter of the Florida Bar’s Administrative Law Section.

After requesting various public records related to the Clay County School Board’s operation, and receiving only some of the responsive documents, the Clay County Education Association (CCEA) filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the circuit court to compel production of the records. In unsworn defenses to the complaint, the school board stated that it had already produced the documents, did not have the information in the requested format, or that the requested documents did not exist. The circuit court granted the school board’s motion to dismiss the complaint, and the CCEA appealed.

The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that CCEA’s petition for writ of mandamus was legally sufficient. The complaint alleged a violation of a clear legal right and breach of an indisputable legal duty, thereby showing a prima facie basis for relief.

The appellate court also concluded that the circuit court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed issues of fact, which CCEA requested. The school board’s defenses likewise created issues of fact that should have been grounds for a priority bearing under section 119.01, Florida Statutes.

Additional Comments.

This case is important for several reasons. It took place in the First District Court of Appeal. Since most Florida agencies are located in Tallahassee, most Public Records Act cases are filed there. Additionally this shows that the Florida Appellate Courts will require trial courts to actually have evidentiary hearings and trials when there are facts in contention between the parties, which is good for citizens.

Contact The Health Law Firm Attorneys Experienced in Administrative Law.

The attorneys of The Health Law Firm represent clients in administrative and civil litigation (both state and federal) throughout the state and in other states as permitted by their rules. We also represent clients in cases involving the Florida Public Records Act, the Sunshine Act, the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. Our attorneys are available to provide emergency hearing coverage, administrative hearing representation, emergency board representation (Board of Medicine, Board of Dentistry, Board of Nursing, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, Board of Pharmacy, Board of Psychology, Board of Licensed Clinical Social Work, Marriage & Family Therapy & Mental Health Counseling and other professional boards), as well as the Agency for Health Care Administration, emergency deposition coverage and other litigation coverage on short notice. Should you need local counsel or just coverage for a hearing or deposition, we are available; contact us.

Source: The original case summary discussed above was originally published in the Administrative Law Section Newsletter, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Dec. 2014), a publication of The Administrative Law Section of the Florida Bar.

FACTS: The Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) is responsible for administering Florida’s Medicaid program and conducting investigations and audits of paid claims to ascertain if Medicaid providers have been overpaid. With regard to investigations of physicians, section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, provides that AHCA must have a “peer” evaluate Medicaid claims before the initiation of formal proceedings by AHCA to recover overpayments. Section 409.9131(2)(c) defines a “peer” as “a Florida licensed physician who is, to the maximum extent possible, of the same specialty or subspecialty, licensed under the same chapter, and in active practice.” Section “109.9131(2)(a) deems a physician to be in “active practice” if he or she has “regularly provided medical care and treatment to patients within the past two years.”

Alfred Murciano, M.D., treats patients who are hospitalized in Level III neonatal intensive care units and pediatric intensive care units in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach County hospitals. His practice is limited to pediatric infectious disease. He has been certified by the American Board of Pediatrics in two areas: General Pediatrics and Pediatric Infectious Diseases. AHCA initiated a review of Medicaid claims submitted by Dr. Murciano between September 1, 2008, and August 31, 2010, and referred those claims to Richard Keith O’Hern, M.D., for peer review. Dr. O’Hern practiced medicine for 37 years, and was engaged in a private general pediatric practice until he retired in December of 2012. During the course of his career, he was certified by the American Board of Pediatrics in General Pediatrics, completed a one-year infectious disease fellowship at the The University of Florida, and treated approximately 16,000 babies with infectious disease issues. However, he was never board certified in pediatric infectious diseases, and at the time he reviewed Dr. Murciano’s Medicaid claims, Dr. O’Hern would have been ineligible for board certification in pediatric infectious diseases. In addition, Dr. O’Hern would have been unable to treat Dr. Murciano’s hospitalized patients in Level III NICUs and PICUs.

After Dr. O’Hern’s review, AHCA issued a Final Agency Audit Report alleging Dr Murciano had been overpaid by $l,051.992.99, and that he was required to reimburse AHCA for the overpayment. In addition, AHCA stated it was seeking to impose a fine of $210,398.60.

OUTCOME: Dr. Murciano argued at the formal administrative hearing that Dr O’Hern was not a “peer” as that term is defined in section 409.9131(20)(c). The ALJ agreed and issued a Recommended Order on May 22, 2014, recommending that AHCA’s case be dismissed because it failed to satisfy a condition precedent to initiating formal proceedings. While recognizing that AHCA is not required to retain a reviewing physician with the exact credentials as the physician under review, the ALJ concluded Dr. O’Hern was not of the same specialty as Dr. Murciano.

On July 31, 2014, AHCA rendered a Partial Final Order rejecting the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. O’Hern was not a “peer.” In the course of ruling that it has substantive jurisdiction over such conclusions and that its interpretation of section 409.9131(2)(c), Florida Statutes, is entitled to deference, AHCA stated that it interprets the statute “to mean that the peer must practice in the same area as Respondent, hold the same professional license as Respondent, and be in active practice like Respondent.” AHCA concluded that “Dr. O’Hern is indeed a ‘peer’ of Respondent under the Agency’s interpretation of Section 409.9131(2)(c), Florida Statutes, because he too has a Florida medical license, is a pediatrician and had an active practice at the time he reviewed Respondent’s records. That Dr. O’Hern did not hold the same certification as Respondent, or have a professional practice identical to Respondent in no way means he is not a ‘peer’ of Respondent.” AHCA’s rejection of the ALJ’s conclusion of law regarding Dr. O’Hern’s “peer” status caused AHCA to remand the case back to the ALJ to make the factual findings on the claimed overpayments that were not made in the Recommended Order because of the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. O’Hern did not qualify as a “peer.”

On August 18, 2014, the ALJ issued an Order respectfully declining AHCA’s remand. AHCA then filed a Petition for writ of Mandamus in the First District Court of Appeal, asking the court to direct the ALA to accept the remand and to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each overpayment claim. The court assigned case number 1D14-3836 to AHCA’s Petition, and the case is pending.Source:

AHCA v. Alfred Murciano, M.D., DOAH Case No. 13-0795MPI (Recommended Order May 22, 2014), AHCA Rendition No. 14-687-FOF-MDO (Partial Final Order July 31, 2014)About the Author: The forgoing case summary was prepared by and appeared in the DOAH case notes of the Administrative Law Section newsletter, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Dec. 2014), a publication of the Administrative Law Section of The Florida Bar.

The foregoing case summary was prepared by Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire, of The Administrative Law Section of The Florida Bar.

Davis Family Day Care Home (“Davis”) was issued a license as a family day care home in 2007. Davis applied annually for renewal of that license. In 2011, Davis applied for renewal of its license and also applied for a license as a large family child care home.

The Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) proposed to deny both the renewal application and the application for licensure as a large family child care home. Davis sought an administrative hearing on both denials. After an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a recommended order recommending issuance of the renewal on a probationary basis and issuance of the large family child care home application on a provisional basis. The ALJ held that the burden of proof for the license denial was clear and convincing evidence. DCF rejected that conclusion, and provided a substituted conclusion of law that the burden of proof was by competent substantial evidence. DCF adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to renew the family day care home on a probationary basis, but denied the application for a large family child care home license.

On appeal, the court reversed and remanded. It held that DCF had misused the appellate “competent substantial evidence” standard of review as the burden of proof.

With respect to the appropriate burden on DCF, the court held that DCF must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the license should be denied, and not by a preponderance of the evidence. The court opined that the denial of the license for a large family child care home was essentially a disciplinary action since it was predicated on violations allegedly committed under the day care home license. The statute relied on by DCF authorized imposition of “disciplinary sanctions,” including denial or revocation of a license, for violations of the licensing laws. The court noted that DCF itself had acknowledged the disciplinary nature of its action, referring to its initial decision letter as an “administrative complaint.”

While recognizing that the court in Department of Banking and Finance v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2006), had applied the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof (instead of clear and convincing evidence) to license application proceedings, the court noted that section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., had been amended since the Osborne decision. Section 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat., now provides that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies except in penal or disciplinary actions. In this case, the statute made clear that DCF was taking disciplinary action.

FACTS:The Agency for Health Care Administration’s (“AHCA”) Office of Medicaid Program Integrity audited Dr. Rao, an authorized provider of Medicaid services, for claims between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2009, and found him to be in violation of certain Medicaid provider policies. AHCA prepared a Final Audit Letter on June 1, 2011, notifying Dr. Rao that he had been overpaid by the Medicaid program by $110,712.09 for services provided during the audit period. Dr. Rao’s administrative hearing challenging AHCA’s overpayment determination was pending before DOAH. On August 17, 2012, Dr. Rao filed an unadopted rule challenge, alleging that AHCA’s overpayment determination was based on unadopted rules regarding the medical necessity of long-term monitored electroencephalograms (LTM EEGs).

OUTCOME: The ALJ found that AHCA’s peer review expert applied certain standards to the Medicaid claims he examined in conducting the Medicaid audit, but “exercised his discretion as to whether to apply them based on the specifics of each patient’s medical records.” The ALJ dismissed the unadopted rule challenge, explaining that “where application of agency policy is subject to the discretion of agency personnel, the policy is not a rule. . . . The medical standards at issue in this case are not self-executing and require the exercise of discretion in their application.” The ALJ noted that “the medical standards of practice must be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the services provided were medically necessary, and provided both an appropriate level of care and standard of care ‘customarily furnished by the physician’s peers and to recognized health care standards” as required by section 409.9131(2)(d), Florida Statutes.

The foregoing case summary was prepared by Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire, of The Administrative Law Section of The Florida Bar.

The City of Avon Park (“City”) terminated Michael Rowan’s employment as Chief of Police. In the subsequent administrative hearing, at issue was Rowan’s investigation of certain city council members and alleged deletion of certain information from his work computer.

An investigator with the State Attorney’s Office was called in to investigate those issues; he prepared a report of his findings. The City subpoenaed the investigator to appear as a witness at the administrative hearing on Rowan’s termination, and to bring his report, which the City wanted to rely on. The State sought a circuit court order quashing the subpoena issued to the investigator. It also sought to prevent disclosure of portions of the report which constituted mental impressions of the investigator. The circuit court granted in part and denied in part the State’s petition. It concluded the investigator’s mental impressions were exempt from the Public Records Act and entered a protective order limiting the investigator’s testimony and protecting the mental-impression portions of the report.

The City appealed, arguing the report should be admissible in full and Rowan’s testimony should not be limited; Rowan cross-appealed, arguing that he should not be required to testify at all. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision excluding from evidence the portion of the report containing the investigator’s mental impressions. The court pointed to section 119.071(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, which protects mental impressions from disclosure only until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings. In this case, the court concluded that the investigation had ended and no charges had been filed. Therefore, the investigator’s mental impressions were no longer protected.

McAlpin appealed an order of the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”) suspending his law enforcement certification for eighteen months. The Commission filed an administrative complaint alleging misconduct during the course of a criminal investigation. A formal administrative hearing was held and a recommended order was issued.

At the Commission hearing to consider the recommended order, the attorney who prosecuted the case against McAlpin was present and offered advice to the Commission. The Commission’s staff had prepared a memorandum to the Commission recommending an increase in the recommended penalty to revocation of McAlpin’s license. It was not clear who prepared the staff memorandum. However, it was clear the prosecuting attorney had prepared exceptions to the recommended order for the agency.

On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for a new Commission hearing. While the Commission did not ultimately adopt the agency’s recommendation of an increased penalty, the court held that the staff attorney’s enhanced access to the Commission undermined the Commission’s function as an unbiased reviewer of the recommended order.

The court did note that it was not inherently inappropriate to consolidate investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory authority in a single agency. Each case must be considered on its unique factual background.