cloudburst wrote:Did Gorampa accept that the Alaya as a consciousness was non-existent like the hair on a bald man's head? If not we DO disagree there which as the original point.

Candra says: in MAv 6:43-44 (my translation):

''The ālaya exists', 'the person exists','only these aggregates exist',these teachings are for those whocannot understand the profound dharma. Just as the Buddha taught 'I' and 'mine',though free from the view of a self [satkāyadṛiṣṭi];likewise, though indeed things are natureless, 'existence' is demonstrated as the provisional meaning [neyartha].

The first question I have for you is: do persons and aggregates exist conventionally, and if they do, upon what basis are we then to reject the ālaya as being the son of a barren women, if we on the other hand admit that persons and aggregates are the sons of fertile women?

The second question I have for you is: what in your view, is the difference between the provisional meaning and conventional truth?

''The ālaya exists', 'the person exists','only these aggregates exist',these teachings are for those whocannot understand the profound dharma. Just as the Buddha taught 'I' and 'mine',though free from the view of a self [satkāyadṛiṣṭi];likewise, though indeed things are natureless, 'existence' is demonstrated as the provisional meaning [neyartha].

The first question I have for you is: do persons and aggregates exist conventionally, and if they do, upon what basis are we then to reject the ālaya as being the son of a barren women, if we on the other hand admit that persons and aggregates are the sons of fertile women?

We can reject the alaya as a non-existent by carefully reading Chandrakirti.

In the Bhasya he says that it is emptiness alone that is intended by the term 'foundation consciousness,' as you correctly point out in your earlier post.

In the MAv verse you cite above, he says that although things are natureless, he taught that they exist. This can only mean that although things are natureless, he taught that they exist by nature, because otherwise he wouldn't have set up natureless and existence as opposites and used the word "though." So Buddha taught that the alaya, persons, aggregates, etc exist inherently or by nature whereas they do not.

In MAv 6:39 Chandrakirti says that there is no alaya, but that nevertheless karma still gives rise to it's effects even after a great deal of time has passed. Here this can only refer to the 8th consciousness, the context ensures this.

So we can determine that Chandrakirti accepts that there is no alaya that is a consciousness that is a storehouse for karmic imprints, it is like the child of a barren woman, a non-existent.

This does not preclude a statement that the alaya exsits conventionally, as by Chandrakirti's own statement, emptiness is the referent object of the term 'alaya.'

Namdrol wrote:The second question I have for you is: what in your view, is the difference between the provisional meaning and conventional truth?

N

Gotta run out.... how about this.....

Not all things taught in Buddhas teaching are conventional truths (the inherently existent self, for example) but all things that are conventional truths are of provisional meaning.

In order to answer this question clearly we would need to agree on some terms, my understanding is that ultimate truths are the definitive meaning, conventional truths are interpretable or provisional. Not all provisional teachings teach conventional truths, though, as Buddha also taught some non-existent in order to lead others along the paths and to avoid upsetting them. Also, something can be provisional and also literally true, such as that from concentration comes peace.

cloudburst wrote:Yes, persons and aggregates exist conventionally.We can reject the alaya as a non-existent by carefully reading Chandrakirti.

So in other words, you admit that it is not explicitly obvious that Candrakiriti rejects ālaya conventionally, and this rejection must be based on a "careful" reading of the MAV.

In the MAv verse you cite above, he says that although things are natureless, he taught that they exist. This can only mean that although things are natureless, he taught that they exist by nature, because otherwise he wouldn't have set up natureless and existence as opposites and used the word "though." So Buddha taught that the alaya, persons, aggregates, etc exist inherently or by nature whereas they do not.

Here is Candra's statment commenting on 6:46:

"Now then, if it is said that ālayavijñ̄ana is something which is said in the Ārya Lankāvatara and so on to be the basis [possessing a special power of limitless phenomena] of all seeds which are the cause of the arising of all things, like waves and an ocean. Does that not exist as arising in any way at all?"

Such is not the case, but that was demontrated as stated because it is demonstrated as existing to those to be disciplined. In order to introduce the nature [svabhāva] of all things, only emptiness is demonstrated by the word ālayajiñāna."

If you read this passage alone, you will come away with the idea that Candra is basically saying there is no ālaya. But...

Jayananda's expansion of this passage is interesting, and I think it is likely a source of disagreement among Tibetan scholars on this point because of a) how he qualifies Candra's discussion b) because his is the only Indian commentary we possess after Candrakirti bhasyaṃ of MAV. I have parsed out the passage for clarity and have spent some time doing so today since I don't know that anyone has actually looked at this before (maybe, perhaps in some journal somewhere). That 'suppose' is for demonstrating the argument of the cittamatrins, it is said "Supposing in that way...". When 'presented in connection with the result of actions', though the ālayavijñāna does not exist, since the actions lack a nature, the conclusion of a perished action is presented as the production of the the result of action in the relative [samvṛtti].

The 'basis which has a special power of limitless phenomena' means a consciousness of the appearance of infinite phenomena such as blue, yellow, and so on. The power of those means the traces (vāsanā). For example, like the scent arising from approaching a flower, in that same way, the consciousness of blue and so on perfume the ālayavijñāna; it is the basis or support of the traces. Therefore, this is the significance of saying it is the cause of all the seeds (bijas) i.e. consciousnesses.

Now in order to demonstate the example, waves and so on are mentioned.

'The cause of the arising all things' means because it is the cause of giving rise to the consciousness of the appearances of blue and so on.

"Ārya Lankāvatara and so on..." says

The ālayavijñāna is deep and subtle, like a flowing river upon which all the seeds fall,I do not teach this to the immaturesince they will imagine they should impute a self.

'Does that not exist in anyway?' means 'has it never existed'?

Now then, in order to respond to the question, it is said 'Such is not the case...' and so on.

'Such is not the case' means 'it is not non-existent', but on the other hand, 'it was taught as existent for a purpose by the Bhagavan.'

'That was demonstrated as stated because it is demonstrated as existing to those to be disciplined' means 'Since the ālayavijñāna was demonstrated as existent, the ālayavijñāna was demonstrated as existent to those persons who were to be disciplined'.

Ultimately [don dam], because the 'ālayavijñāna' is demonstrated as being an description of only emptiness, it is said '...the nature of all things' and so on.

For what reason is it said 'In order to introduce the nature of all things'? It is for introducing the the emptiness of things with "Not from self, not from other..." i.e. only emptiness is the ālaya, but because of the consciousness of that [emptiness] itself [de nyid] i.e. because of the perfect comprehension of that is free from perception of all phenomena [chos thams cad mi dmigs pa], therefore, emptiness itself is demonstrated by the term ālayavijñāna."

I submit therefore that this passage opens up a very different way of looking the Candrakirtian treatment of the ālayavijñāna. Since we ought to accept that Jayānanda possessed the oral lineage of interpreting this text, I think we can safely say that this passage means we really ought to carefully rethink whether Candrakirti so thoroughy rejects ālayavijñana as some Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars seem to think he does.

Namdrol wrote:So in other words, you admit that it is not explicitly obvious that Candrakiriti rejects ālaya conventionally, and this rejection must be based on a "careful" reading of the MAV.

Sure, with topics this profound, it always pays to be thorough.

Namdrol wrote:I have parsed out the passage for clarity and have spent some time doing so today since I don't know that anyone has actually looked at this before (maybe, perhaps in some journal somewhere).

This is wonderful, thank you for taking the time to do this. I hope to have an opportunity to read this carefully before too long.

Namdrol wrote:Jayananda's expansion of this passage is interesting, and I think it is likely a source of disagreement among Tibetan scholars on this point because of a) how he qualifies Candra's discussion b) because his is the only Indian commentary we possess after Candrakirti bhasyaṃ of MAV. I have parsed out the passage for clarity and have spent some time doing so today since I don't know that anyone has actually looked at this before (maybe, perhaps in some journal somewhere). That 'suppose' is for demonstrating the argument of the cittamatrins, it is said "Supposing in that way...". When 'presented in connection with the result of actions', though the ālayavijñāna does not exist, since the actions lack a nature, the conclusion of a perished action is presented as the production of the the result of action in the relative [samvṛtti].

The 'basis which has a special power of limitless phenomena' means a consciousness of the appearance of infinite phenomena such as blue, yellow, and so on. The power of those means the traces (vāsanā). For example, like the scent arising from approaching a flower, in that same way, the consciousness of blue and so on perfume the ālayavijñāna; it is the basis or support of the traces. Therefore, this is the significance of saying it is the cause of all the seeds (bijas) i.e. consciousnesses.

Now in order to demonstate the example, waves and so on are mentioned.

'The cause of the arising all things' means because it is the cause of giving rise to the consciousness of the appearances of blue and so on.

"Ārya Lankāvatara and so on..." says

The ālayavijñāna is deep and subtle, like a flowing river upon which all the seeds fall,I do not teach this to the immaturesince they will imagine they should impute a self.

'Does that not exist in anyway?' means 'has it never existed'?

Now then, in order to respond to the question, it is said 'Such is not the case...' and so on.

'Such is not the case' means 'it is not non-existent', but on the other hand, 'it was taught as existent for a purpose by the Bhagavan.'

'That was demonstrated as stated because it is demonstrated as existing to those to be disciplined' means 'Since the ālayavijñāna was demonstrated as existent, the ālayavijñāna was demonstrated as existent to those persons who were to be disciplined'.

Ultimately [don dam], because the 'ālayavijñāna' is demonstrated as being an description of only emptiness, it is said '...the nature of all things' and so on.

For what reason is it said 'In order to introduce the nature of all things'? It is for introducing the the emptiness of things with "Not from self, not from other..." i.e. only emptiness is the ālaya, but because of the consciousness of that [emptiness] itself [de nyid] i.e. because of the perfect comprehension of that is free from perception of all phenomena [chos thams cad mi dmigs pa], therefore, emptiness itself is demonstrated by the term ālayavijñāna."

I submit therefore that this passage opens up a very different way of looking the Candrakirtian treatment of the ālayavijñāna. Since we ought to accept that Jayānanda possessed the oral lineage of interpreting this text, I think we can safely say that this passage means we really ought to carefully rethink whether Candrakirti so thoroughy rejects ālayavijñana as some Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars seem to think he does.

Namdrol wrote:I submit therefore that this passage opens up a very different way of looking the Candrakirtian treatment of the ālayavijñāna. Since we ought to accept that Jayānanda possessed the oral lineage of interpreting this text, I think we can safely say that this passage means we really ought to carefully rethink whether Candrakirti so thoroughy rejects ālayavijñana as some Tibetan Madhyamaka scholars seem to think he does.

It seems to me that the passage actually does not do a great deal to alter the way Chandrakirti describes the alaya, although an interesting distinction is introduced. Chandrakirti and Jayananda both clearly do not accept the 8th consciousness that is the repository of karmic seeds, but say that the term "alayavijnana" is being used to teach the ultimate, emptiness. Jayananda introduces the idea that this term can also be used to indicate the consciousness knowing the ultimate, becasue these two are non-dual.

This is not unique to Jayananda as Nagarjuna does the same, although less explicitly, in his Bodhicittavivarana.

In conclusion it is as clear as ever that Chandrakirti completely rejects an Alaya which is of a different nature from the six consciousnesses, although he accepted the use of Alaya understanding the referent object to be the ultimate, and on some occasions, the mental consciousness.

This discussion arose over a flap with Gorampa saying that although such are rejected ultimately, this does not mean that we should not accept entities like the alaya, the manas and self-cognizers conventionally.

I agree with his point that just because something is rejected ultimately does not mean that it is conventionally non-existent. However, I believe this point is misapplied in his passage, becasue as it turns out the three examples are things which are utterly non existent in both truths. The fact that we can use the terms "alaya" to refer to the sixth consciousness does not really bear on that point, becasue it seems clear in the context of the original discussion through the inclusion of the seventh consciousness posited by the cittamatrins and the self-cognition clearly refuted by Shantideva and others, that Gorampa was not referring to this.

Further, I think Gorampa's arguments and consequences here do not add up, mainly because the example of the butterlamp dispelling darkness is undifferentiated in Nagarjuna, he shows that the lamp does not dispel darkness ultimately in order to prove that arising from self and other do not exist ultimately.

However just as arising from other does exist conventionally, so too a lamp dispels darkness conventionally. Arising from self, however exists in neither truth, and in a similar way self-cognition is faulty in both truths.

Gorampa makes some poor arguments here. The fact that I am a follower of Je Tsongkhapa does not mean I am rejecting Gorampa's points for that reason, and it is not the case that great and renowned scholars like Gorampa never make mistakes. I think he is wrong here, and elsewhere, and have good reasons to think so.

Namdrol wrote:In other words, for Gorampa there is no doubt that these things like ālaya-vijñāna, the afflicted mind, and so on cannot bear analysis -- but as conventions we leave them alone with all their myriad internal contradictions just as we leave the convention that lamps remove the darkness of rooms alone.

This is not the case. Some things that cannot bear analysis are also dispelled conventionally, taking into account the contradictions that arise if they were to be allowed t stand conventionally. Consult Shantidevas chapter 9 for a flawless description of how self-cognition is non-existent even conventionally. He does not say "this does not exist ultimately, but let's allow it to stand conventionally even though it is contradictory." He demolishes it.

The fact that we leave a convention like "a lamp lights up a room" alone arises from the fact that it does precisely that, and cannot be shown to be false conventionally. It is conventionally non-contradictory. Examining how the light and darkness meet and so on is the examination for the ultimate, and so is irrelevant here.

cloudburst wrote:In conclusion it is as clear as ever that Chandrakirti completely rejects an Alaya which is of a different nature from the six consciousnesses, although he accepted the use of Alaya understanding the referent object to be the ultimate, and on some occasions, the mental consciousness.

I think you are missing the point. The point is really pretty simple: Buddha used a number of terms in different sutras. If you claim that the Buddha intended the son of a barren women by using the term ālayavijñāna, then you are really doing a disservice to the Buddha's teachings -- the Buddha, as stated by Candrakirti, was referring to something conventionally acceptable.

If on the other hand you merely assert that Yogacara scholars are not correctly understanding the intent of such terms, then there is no problem. But this still gives no cause for a complete negation of the ālayavijñāna.

Again you bring up the term term "rang rig" (svasamvedana). There seems to be no mention at all of a "rang rig", a "svasaṃvedana" in the sutras (there is, in the Lanka and Gandavyuha, frequent mention of "so sor rang rig" or "pratyatmyavedana" -- but this means "personally intuited/known" or "known for oneself", etc. rather than "self-knowing", and is a partial term, not a complete term. It is combined with many other terms such a ye shes, and so on). Careful analysis of the sutras by word search therefore suggests the term is something introduced into Buddhism through pramana. In the tantras, however the term "rang rig" appears in all classes of tantra from kriya on up. But we are discussing Madhyamaka and sutra, not tantra, so we shall leave that aside and remain focused on the actual issue at hand -- ālayavijñāna.

Further, if you look into the commentaries on the Bodhicaryāvatara, it is made abundantly clear that what is being refuted is this "svasamvedana" advanced in the treatises of the pramanikas -- it is stated there explicitly. The ālayavijñāna itself is not mentioned even once in the root text nor is it discussed in any of the two volumes of extant commentary we have on the text apart from a single mention in the Pañjika. Shantideva not only does not refute ālayavijñāna, he never mentions it. If you think about it, it is really kind of amazing. Therefore, comparing Santideva's refutation of svasaṃvedana with Candrakirti's criticism of the Yogacara usage of ālayavijñāna is mistaken. The passage in the Bodhicaryāvatara refuting reflexive cognition is always presented as a refutation of Yogacara, but in reality it is actually just a refutation of Pramana. It bears consequences for Yogacara, of course, but the advocates of consciousness-only [vijñānamatravadins, rnam par shes pa tsam du smra ba] are merely mentioned as an afterthought in the Pañjika.

So, you cannot equate ālayavijñāna with svasaṃvedana -- that former is the teaching of the Buddha, the latter is not. Thus in the passage I intitially introduced there is no mention of svasaṃvedana:

These three are accepted conventionally, but not necessarily in the fashion in which, for example, the Pudgalavadins might acept the statement "the person exists" when they suggest that that there is an inexpressible person which is neither the same as nor different than the aggregates.

N

Last edited by Malcolm on Mon Feb 13, 2012 6:54 pm, edited 4 times in total.

Have either of you two sages read The Buddhist Unconscious: The alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist thought by William S. Waldron? I was about 1/3 through it and have not been able to get back to it, but intend to. I thought it was comprehensive, and insightful - so far as I got.

This discussion arose over a flap with Gorampa saying that although such are rejected ultimately, this does not mean that we should not accept entities like the alaya, the manas and self-cognizers conventionally.

While I don't really want to discuss Gorampa, but this is not what he says, at least not in lta ba shan 'byed. He does not argue, in this text at any rate, that we must believe that Candrakirti accepts rang rig conventionally. He does assert that we must accept that Candrkirti accepts ālayavijñāna conventionally as Candrakirti presents it in the bhasyaṃ. I beleive that he does so based on how he reads Jayananda.

Namdrol wrote:I think you are missing the point. The point is really pretty simple: Buddha used a number of terms in different sutras. If you claim that the Buddha intended the son of a barren women by using the term ālayavijñāna, then you are really doing a disservice to the Buddha's teachings -- the Buddha, as stated by Candrakirti, was referring to something conventionally acceptable.

It seems that from this point of view, there are two different types of sutra- Those that propound the existence of six consciousness, such as the Prajnaparamitra sutras, and those that advocate the existence of eight consciousnesses, such as the Samdhinirmochana, Lanakvatara etc.

There are many instances of the Buddha teaching things that were nonexistent like the child of a barren woman for the benefit of those to be trained, so I do not see why it would a disservice to the Buddha's teaching overall to show that the alayavijnana- as a consciousness different from the six is nonexistent. That does not mean that the alaya is nonexistent full stop, it only means this if you accept a storehouse consciousness as the referent object of the term "alayavijnana."

Namdrol wrote:Again you bring up the term term "rang rig" (svasamvedana)..... Shantideva not only does not refute ālayavijñāna, he never mentions it. ...Therefore, comparing Santideva's refutation of svasaṃvedana with Candrakirti's criticism of the Yogacara usage of ālayavijñāna is mistaken.....you cannot equate ālayavijñāna with svasaṃvedana Thus in the passage I intitially introduced there is no mention of svasaṃvedana......

I am sorry you spent the time typing that all out. I fully agree with all you have said there, I wasn't bringing up rang rig becasue I think it can be related to the alaya, etc, It was you who brought it up in your Gorampa quote

that passage is not about whether reflexive cognitons exist. The passage is concerned with how Candrakirti treats citations concerning conventionality.

and you concluded

for Gorampa there is no doubt that these things like ālaya-vijñāna, the afflicted mind, and so on cannot bear analysis -- but as conventions we leave them alone with all their myriad internal contradictions just as we leave the convention that lamps remove the darkness of rooms alone.

My response is based on the fact that I think Gorampa's refutation is faulty. You can read why in my previous post.

These three are accepted conventionally, but not necessarily in the fashion in which, for example, the Pudgalavadins might acept the statement "the person exists" when they suggest that that there is an inexpressible person which is neither the same as nor different than the aggregates.

If you hold that the verse above indicates that the alaya existed conventionally, how do you explain verse 39, in which Chandrakirti says that

Since it does not inherently cease, It has ability even though there is no foundation consciouness

?

His own commentary to that verse states that

no matter how much time passes after karmas have ceased, they are still related to their effects without the need to conceive of a foundation consciousness....

It is clear he is not talking about emptiness here. It is a refutation of the cittamatrin position, and in those sutras mention earlier identified whith the cittamatrin point of view, the alaya is posited as an eighth consciousness. When Chandrakirti says this does not exist, he most certainly means that it does not exist in any way.

The verse you quote stating that the alaya exists is listing some examples that Buddha taught in order to benefit disciples who were not ready to hear something more profound. The Samdhinirmochana and Lankavatara require interpretation as does the abhidharama where Buddha explained the self and aggregates to exist ultimately. All three are non-existent, taught for the benefit of those who lacked the faculties to go deeper at the time.

This discussion arose over a flap with Gorampa saying that although such are rejected ultimately, this does not mean that we should not accept entities like the alaya, the manas and self-cognizers conventionally.

While I don't really want to discuss Gorampa, but this is not what he says, at least not in lta ba shan 'byed. He does not argue, in this text at any rate, that we must believe that Candrakirti accepts rang rig conventionally. He does assert that we must accept that Candrkirti accepts ālayavijñāna conventionally as Candrakirti presents it in the bhasyaṃ. I beleive that he does so based on how he reads Jayananda.

N

Sorry, I should have read this before posting....

I am happy to leave Gorampa out of it. I am happy to hear that he does not argue here for Chandrakirtis's support of the conventional existence of rang rig, it seems to me that would be a mistake.

I agree that we should accept the alayvijnana conventionally as Chandrakirti presents it. In other words, we should accept that the term alaya refers only to emptiness.

Will wrote:The Buddhist Unconscious: The alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist thought by William S. Waldron? I was about 1/3 through it and have not been able to get back to it, but intend to. I thought it was comprehensive, and insightful - so far as I got.

I have a PDF by WW on the topic, downloaded from Gampo abbey translations. I hope to read it sometime, although it seems that in the PDF and also in the text you mention, he does not include Madhyamikas, but only yogacharin takes. Still may well be interesting and informative. Thanks for the tip. Let us know if you finish it...

cloudburst wrote:All three are non-existent, taught for the benefit of those who lacked the faculties to go deeper at the time.

You means that skandhas and persons are conventionally non-existent?

As for your other points, as I said before, Candrakirti is criticizing the way the Yogacarins used the term ālayavijñāna. Jayananda makes it very clear that the reason why Candrakirti cites the Lanka at them is that they have not understood their own sutras, not that we should necessarily dicard the sutras. For example, the primary citation refuting svasaṃvedana comes from the Lanka itself, using the example of the edge of a sword which cannot cut itself.

Namdrol wrote:You means that skandhas and persons are conventionally non-existent?

inherent persons and aggregates, as taught in the abhidharma.

Namdrol wrote:As for your other points, as I said before, Candrakirti is criticizing the way the Yogacarins used the term ālayavijñāna. Jayananda makes it very clear that the reason why Candrakirti cites the Lanka at them is that they have not understood their own sutras, not that we should necessarily dicard the sutras. For example, the primary citation refuting svasaṃvedana comes from the Lanka itself, using the example of the edge of a sword which cannot cut itself. N

so your claim is that Buddha never taught that there were 8 consciousnesses? Not in the Samdhinirmochana? What of the afflicted mind?

So your claim is that Gorampa, understood the alaya to be the mental consciousness realizing the ultimate, grouped it with the afflicted mind and rang rig, and claimed that although they are conventionally contradictory (even though rang rig and the afflicted mind do not exist at all), we accept them with no distinction as to whether or not they are true? Do you have any citations that give us any reaon to believe that the afflicted consciousness is anything other than non-existent?

Why does Gorampa say that the mental consciousness realizing the ultimate, or the alaya, is conventionally contradictory?

To me it feels like you are bending over backwards to defend Gorampa. Maybe this is why you feel that debate is 'dancing on books.'

Will wrote:The Buddhist Unconscious: The alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist thought by William S. Waldron? I was about 1/3 through it and have not been able to get back to it, but intend to. I thought it was comprehensive, and insightful - so far as I got.

I have a PDF by WW on the topic, downloaded from Gampo abbey translations. I hope to read it sometime, although it seems that in the PDF and also in the text you mention, he does not include Madhyamikas, but only yogacharin takes. Still may well be interesting and informative. Thanks for the tip. Let us know if you finish it...

I just want to note that I am far more interested in what Candrakirti has to say for himself, and what Jayananda has to say about that; then what Gorampa, or Tsongkhapa or any Tibetan scholar has to say about them from here on out.

cloudburst wrote:

Namdrol wrote:You means that skandhas and persons are conventionally non-existent?

inherent persons and aggregates, as taught in the abhidharma.

So in other words you accept that aggregates and persons conventionally exist. Well, it seems that the ālaya, according to Candra, also exists in that way i.e. conventionally. (No abhidharma treatises teaches there are inherent aggregates since this contradicts the name i.e. skandha. Persons are only taught by Pudgalavadins. Atoms and moments are the main problem with Vaibhaṣikas and Sautrantikas).

What of the afflicted mind?

The kliṣṭamanas is never mentioned by Candrakirti at all in any text. This leads me to be believe he has very little interest in rejecting it.

The term does occur Jayananda's Tika. I need to read what Jayananda is saying carefully. From what I can tell via a quick scan, Jayananda does not seem reject the kliṣṭamanas outright.

Last edited by Malcolm on Tue Feb 14, 2012 5:54 pm, edited 1 time in total.