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So I'm finishing off a uni essay about the miners' strike 1984/5, and am pretty shocked at how little I knew about it really.

Obviously I knew:

Thatcher was bad.
She closed the mines.
The police used underhand tactics and were generally violent in order to try and undermine the strike.
The strike could very well have sent the country well up the shitter over winter, so Thatcher pretty much gave the police carte blanche...

But, never had a clue of the extent of the police's tactics, involving complete disregard for civil liberties/heavy violence which has as yet gone unpunished. For instance, over 7 months the police stopped 165,000 people from driving their cars into Nottingham, threatening anyone who refused to turn round with arrest under 'Breach of the peace' act.

Battle of Orgreave was one of the bloodiest police/protestor clashes, which subsequently resulted in a massive cover-up and charges against 95 people being thrown out of court because evidence given was clearly not credible. As always, no officer has been prosecuted in relation to it, although the South Yorkshire Police has recently referred itself to the IPCC so hopefully something will come out of that.

It seems that accusations of falsified statements/false evidence have largely been ignored, a bit like Hillsborough, but I had no idea of the scale of it, I guess.

Apparently there was a BBC doc about this a couple of weeks ago, anyone see it?

Think this sort of very modern history should be taught more in schools, ashamed that I was basically only informed by my vague anti-Thatcher knowledge and Billy Elliott.

lots of witness testimony and a focus on the local communities. basically trying to show that it wasn't just Scargill leading his troops, it was a much deeper 'class war' type affair.

the enemy without by Penny Green focuses more on the police and class consciousness.

both good, but both could well be described as dry too. Sociology textbooks from the 80s and 90s rarely have any pizzazz sadly.

My tutor's book, 'the politics of protest' - Peter Joyce is a great overview of changing means and methods of protest and the police's reactions/countermeasures against them... if the whole subject of police accountability and protest is of interest I highly recommend.

The summer of 1984 was one of the most bitter and divisive periods of industrial unrest in post-war Britain. Tens of thousands of miners had left work, protesting against the planned closure of collieries across the nation by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. These strikes became a bitter and often bloody campaign against the country’s police, who were determined to quell growing dissidence and resistance from the working class. Just two years after the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands, Thatcher’s government now faced “the enemy within…much more difficult to fight and more dangerous to liberty”. The scars of this period are still visible in today’s political landscape, as former union leaders continue to call for justice. Just two weeks ago, Ian Lavery, Labour MP for Wansbeck, put a motion forward in Commons demanding an independent inquiry into the police’s actions, describing the events and subsequent charges brought against strikers as “a massive miscarriage of justice”. More than eleven thousand miners were arrested during the dispute but the National Union of Mineworkers estimates that 60% of the subsequent charges were “bogus or exaggerated”. It is undeniable that police’s violent tactics on picket lines were unprecedented, and indeed that certain policies infringed on thousands of peoples’ civil liberties, while the subsequent falsification of statements and fabricated evidence in Britain’s courtrooms indicates a widespread cover-up, implicating police forces nationwide. Although the industrial action may have been highly charged and indicative of a wider malaise among the working classes, the police’s actions, on behalf of Thatcher’s government, are among the most hideous in British history.

In early March 1984, plans were announced to cut UK coal production by approximately four million tonnes, leading to 20,000 redundancies. The government argued that the pits were not productive enough to justify annual state subsidies of over £1bn. The NUM President, Arthur Scargill, vehemently contested the proposal, accusing the government of planning to force 84,000 people into redundancy. Despite Scargill’s outrage, the NUM avoided holding a national ballot of its workforce, fearing that they would not gain the 55% majority needed to call a general strike. Instead, they organised local strikes, beginning on Monday 12th March. Mines in Yorkshire, Kent, South Wales and Scotland heeded this call, but because there had been no official ballot, the action lacked the support of political powers like the Labour party. This lack of support meant the strike lacked credence in the public eye and Thatcher’s government used the media to reinforce this opinion at every opportunity.
Clearly, Thatcher had made the battle against organised labour a priority. The Conservative party viewed the primary industry sector as a key facet of the UK’s economic slump, as powerful unions were able to gain better pay without significant increase in productivity, resulting in inflation. Thatcher undermined the unions with a succession of Employment Acts, which gradually eroded the powers and rights of hundreds of thousands of union members across the country. The 1980/1982 Acts in particular penalised the use of pickets while the 1984 Act made it virtually impossible for union leaders to legally arrange strike action without widespread ballots. In addition, miners had begun to be paid relatively, according to their pit’s productivity. This meant while some were safe and well paid, others’ jobs hung by a thread. The government used the subsequent rifts in the NUM to gain the upper hand in the dispute, and clashes had always been a likely outcome.

Nottinghamshire held many of the most productive mines, and hence became the focal point for the lengthy battle that followed the first general strike. Despite large stockpiles, Britain could not survive the winter without some mining, dependent as it was on coal as its main energy resource. If the strike succeeded in its aims, the government would be forced to back down in the winter, losing credibility and also hamstringing Thatcher as an effective leader. With this dependency in mind, the miners used mass picketing to slow or stop the mines which did remain open, effectively preventing the flow of coal to power stations. This tactic also affected many of Britain’s other large industries, such as steel, which was still reliant on coal for production at the time. These tactics had been made illegal in the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts but the civil injunctions brought against the offending miners were simply ignored, leaving the government with no option but to use the police as a force to try to reclaim the pits from the picket lines. Using the police in this way, to enforce civil law, was unprecedented and this tactic reflects the desperate situation Thatcher’s government faced; they had underestimated the power of the picket.
Once the strike action had become widespread, and with Britain facing an uncertain winter, Thatcher began to lean on the police service to try to quell the dissident protests happening across the country. Workers behind the picket lines faced mass arrests on an almost daily basis, as the police struggled to cope with Thatcher’s quest for a clear and decisive victory for her government. Many of the strikers have claimed that such arrests would often lead to fictional charges – brought through court by police statements built on fabrication:
“It is alleged that false accounts were given by officers who were not at the scene of arrests, that miners’ statements were routinely invented, and that union activists and their families were systematically targeted and intimidated.”
(The Guardian, 2/12/12)
The police’s tactics were radically different than they would have been in previous years, following the introduction of mutual aid. The National Reporting Centre (NRC) at New Scotland Yard now co-ordinated all police movements from region to region. This allowed the police to be deployed from their own area to a site in need of reinforcements. However, this centralised system gave the government an easy target for suggestion and request. Soon, it would seem, Whitehall began leaning on the NRC in order to make unofficial orders known to the police forces across the country. These requests allowed tactics to be used in secret, without the media finding out and allowing deniability of the forces themselves. Thi practice effectively politicised the police force, providing Thatcher with an agency capable of enforcing her every policy or whim. In 1983, the ACPO produced the Public Order Manual of Tactical Operations and Related Matters. This standardisation of police tactics should, in theory, have led to a coherent force, using fair and uniform tactics across the country. The book included sophisticated and detailed descriptions of various tactics, including the offensive use of riot shields. However, the tactics on offer, even when adhered to, represented a huge shift in police practice, away from ‘minimum force’ towards a far more coercive and confrontational approach. Coupled with the alienation many officers felt in the foreign areas they were despatched to, it is little wonder that violence became commonplace, as the officers had no need to maintain any kind of relationship with the picketers they would never see again. The lack of accountability of forces and individuals in public order contexts would appear to cloud the judgement, at best, of a large proportion of the police force, while these minority’s actions tarnish the reputation of the service as a whole, therefore inciting more ill feeling and violence against them. This vicious cycle was never more apparent than during the mines’ strike.

On 18 March 1984, police officers initiated the ‘intercept policy’, which effectively aimed to seal Nottinghamshire off from potential picketers. Using road blocks, police simply told drivers whom they suspected of being miners or picketers to turn back or be arrested for breaching the peace. By using this tactic, the police prevented 164,508 people from entering Nottingham in the strike’s first twenty seven weeks. (NCCL, 1984:20-21). Not only did the police effectively deny the public freedom of the roads, they also used undercover officers to infiltrate the pickets and identify high profile targets for arrest. As the police began to be more visible, their tactics quickly began to be linked directly to Thatcher, and the force was accused of politicisation. The police quickly became known (in some areas) as ‘Maggie’s Boot Boys’, such was the ill feeling towards them. This was exacerbated by the obvious support Thatcher offered the police, surely allowing certain officers the freedom to behave however they wanted without fear of reprisal from above. This freedom, coupled with many officers being outside of their own towns under mutual aid, led to many acting on impulse and recklessly pursuing violence against the miners. Put simply, many areas began to become a ‘free-for-all’ as officers had no fear of recrimination, and the miners began to retaliate to their injustices. A vicious cycle took shape and continued for the next year.
Perhaps the worst example of such reckless police violence was what is now known as ‘The Battle of Orgreave’. Orgreave was a British Steel coking plant, and played host to the most violent confrontation of the whole strike, as 8,000 picketing miners and 4,500 police clashed. The violence used on the miners was at the time described as self-defence against rioters. However, the prosecution of 95 miners for rioting was dropped due to major doubts about the evidence provided. The South Yorkshire Police was forced to pay out £500,000 compensation to 39 miners seriously injured in the battle, yet no officer has ever been formally disciplined for the event. Following a recent BBC documentary, the SYP has referred itself to the IPCC, and is awaiting a verdict. However, given the endemic nature of the violence of the time, the nationwide police force should perhaps take similar action and accept culpability. The fact that no police officer has ever been prosecuted for murder or violence in relation to public protest speaks volumes; the force looks after its own.
The subsequent charges brought against many of the miners were heard in magistrates courts, requiring no witnesses and only one police officer. As a result, a number of ‘petty’ charges (such as obstruction of a police officer or breach of the peace), were heard and upheld despite a lack of evidence. Even a revival of the 1875 charge of ‘watching and besetting’ was used against 650 people. (Hardy, 2001:302).
Despite the damning facts of the clash at Orgreave, Thatcher staunchly defended the use of mounted police. It was becoming clear that the Prime Minister was ready to use whatever tactics were necessary to quell the strikes at any cost. To support her battle on the miners, she even denied benefits to the picketers and their families (1980 Social Security Act) on the false pretence that they would receive strike pay from the NUM. Effectively, Thatcher was attempting to starve the strikers into conceding defeat. Even MI5 were dragged into the conflict, accused of planting a mole within the NUM, spying on and undermining the organised action through a ‘dirty tricks’ campaign. Accusations of phone tapping and mail opening quickly followed. (NCCL, 1984:16; Milne, 1994:438). The media backed up these tactics by promoting the most violent clashes and highlighting picket line violence in the tabloid press.

there was a room on this, he did a massive reconstruction of the Battle of Orgreave and loads of interviews with people affected. Was very informative/upsetting . I think you can buy the film (it was in the exhibition).

I know absolutely nothing about the political background and the events of the strike. Part of the problem, I guess, is that both “sides” of the argument are so passionate and so angry that it’s hard to get a “balanced” idea of what the events actually are. I Would be grateful for anything that people could recommend for me to read on the matter.

Interesting that the OP should mention Nottingham though, as one of the few things I do know is that the Nottinghamshire Miners voted not to strike. Every time I go to see Forest play a South Yorkshire side, I get “scab” shouted at me, which is always uncomfortable as I was born in 1989 and no-one in my family has mined for at least 3 generations!

and he didnt strike (but would have if theyd have voted to formally). As far as he said the Derby /Notts pits didnt strike and it came down to not wanting to fuck the country up. Midlands way of looking at it though and its still a sore subject for those that did strike. Was a dying industry anyway.

Scargill was arguing that the industry wasn't dying - which tbf it probably wasn't at the time, but would have done soon. It is impossible to deny the broader political aspect - it was about the ruling Right taking on the Left-wing union element that had held sway over British industry since the 60s. And there were such divisive characters on both sides that anyone with even a passing interest would support one or other.

Ultimately, one could make an argument that the economy would not have strengthened without breaking the hold that the unions had over industry, but the cost of breaking that hold was massive

It is a matter of historical fact that Margaret Thatcher was the first environmentalist world leader. Her speech to the United Nations in 1989 was the very first of its kind on such a scale and to such an influential audience. You can go look it up for yourself.

Her closure of the mines was nothing more than an extension of this deeply-held environmentalism, and a clear understanding that fossil are not only polluting but that they also do not last forever. All the debates taking place today about offshore windfarms, the Green Deal, Renewable Heat Incentives, Feed-in Tariffs, and so on are a result of Thatcher's work. How many of you would be happy for new coal mines to be open in England today? Not many I would assume. It would be backward looking for a start, and uneconomical too. She was looking to the future, but a certain strand of society (ironically, a very 'small c' conservative strand) weren't ready for it.

You want to have a little cry about climate change today? Perhaps you should have listened to Maggie.

You can look up the work Maggie did on the environment. Her speech in 1989 to the UN General Assembly was genuinely revolutionary and unheard of at that time. Should could have spoken about anything, the middle east, nuclear weapons, famine, anything, but she spoke wholly and exclusively about the environment.

She said: "Of all the challenges faced by the world community... one has grown clearer than any other in both urgency and importance—I refer to the threat to our global environment. I shall take the opportunity of addressing the general assembly to speak on that subject alone."

Sections of her speech were dedicated to the 'vast increase in carbon dioxide', 'the scope for international action', setting up an international 'global convention on climate'.

No other world leader was talking about this stuff - definitely not so directly and so forcefully. And what were the movements of the left doing at this time? Arguing (violently in some cases) for sustained dependence on fossil fuels.

It is one of my greatest disappointments that the environmental movement has been commandeered to a large extent by the Left. Being 'pro-environment' is a fundamentally right wing ideology - it always has been and always will be.

Inside Cowley contains a thousand lessons for trade union militants. It explains how British PM Margaret Thatcher got away with taming the English trade union movement.

In the 1970s, the British unions were thriving. About 50% of all workers were members, there was a robust shop stewards movement, and delegate structures were bursting with life and energy. Within 10 years, the movement had lost half its members and was politically defeated.

Inside Cowley is about Alan Thornett's day to day experiences — between 1974 and 1984 — at the Leyland car plant in the Oxford suburb of Cowley. Through these experiences, the major issues that confronted the union movement at the time are discussed.

Thornett was a militant unionist and revolutionary socialist. His leadership and activism on the job resulted in him being elected to a number of union positions. He was the shop steward of the drivers at the Cowley plant, deputy Transport and General Workers Union convener (a full-time position), chairperson of the TGWU branch, and chairperson of the Joint Shop Stewards Committee.

He began as a member of the Communist Party, then joined the Socialist Labour League (later known as the Workers Revolutionary Party) led by Gerry Healy. He is now a leader of the group which produces the newspaper Socialist Outlook, and is affiliated to the Trotskyist Fourth International.

One of Thornett's main arguments is that the vibrant and grassroots union movement of the 1970s was undermined by the union bureaucracy, in cahoots with the British Labour Party (BLP).

The BLP attempted to control the unions, with mixed success. The union bureaucracy "cut the branch it was sitting on", disarming the workers' movement and rendering it unable to fend off attacks by the Tories only a few years later.

British Labour Party

In 1977, the Labour government offered firefighters a 10% wage increase, rather than the 30% the firefighters were demanding, to compensate for the high inflation rate. Troops were called in to do the work of firefighters. The Trades Union Council (TUC) voted to call the firefighters back to work.

Meanwhile, Thornett was conducting his own struggles at Cowley — not just against the Leyland bosses, but also against the media and conservative trade union officials. The union tops support for management victimisation of militants, including Thornett, opened the door to later Tory sorties on workers.

Wherever the left ran branches of the union, the right-wing of the union used every dirty trick in the book, and many not in the book, to undermine the militants. For example, they created new right-controlled union branches to neutralise left-controlled local branches.

A meeting of the TGWU Oxford Automotive Committee was held to elect a delegate to a national TGWU conference. Nine people voted for the left candidate and eight for the right. The right-wing chairperson announced the result as eight all, which included his vote. He then voted a second time, and declared the right candidate elected.

Despite the BLP's attempts, in 1978 many unions remained independent. There were a number of strikes, including at Ford, in the public sector and by the civil service unions. The capitalist class decided there was no longer a need for a Labour government, which had shown it could not keep the lid on trade union struggles.

The "winter of discontent" brought down the Labour government. According to Thornett, the main lesson the TUC drew from this was that militant action had to be lessened if Labour was to get back into office, not that Labour's pro-business policies needed to be changed.

Thatcher elected

When Thatcher was elected in 1979, tens of thousands rallied against her: 50,000 protested against her racist immigration laws; 50,000 protested in favour for women's right to choose abortion; and thousands fought cuts to the public sector.

Many people on the left are aware of the defeat of the miners' union in 1985, but few know of the major industrial and political battles that precipitated the defeat.

In 1980, the steel strike was the first national strike against the Tories. The steelworkers went for a 17% pay increase (the inflation rate was 20%) and fought to protect jobs. British Steel offered 2%, and proposed plant closures and 52,000 redundancies.

The steelworkers fought hard. Huge pickets were mounted at some sites, like Hadfield's in Sheffield, and flying pickets were organised against private sector steel users.

After a 13-week battle, the workers won a 19% wage increase (including 5% for productivity trade-offs), but thousands of jobs were lost. It was a victory for the government. The main reason for the partial defeat was the isolation of the steelworkers.

Following this, the Tories moved to beef up anti-union laws by outlawing solidarity strikes and picketing. The TUC's response has to call a national day of action, in which 250,000 people marched in 130 cities. But there was no follow-up action and the anti-union legislation was passed.

By October 1981, the Tories were on the nose. The Social Democratic Party-Liberal Alliance was scoring 59% in opinion polls. The Tories announced new anti-worker legislation, which included outlawing unions from engaging in political action, allowing employers to sack and selectively redeploy workers, and sequestrating unions' assets if they broke industrial laws.

The union tops failed to call for strike action. Instead, they adopted a position of "non-cooperation" with the act. If a union was attacked, the TUC promised to support it.

In the meantime, an earth-shaking event occurred — Britain went to war with Argentina. This was the perfect diversion for the unpopular government. A short, sharp war — oozing with nationalism — which Britain could not lose.

In the first major test of the Tory's legislation, railway workers launched an all-out strike to stop trade-offs in working conditions. The strike was solid and picket lines were respected.

The TUC called a general council meeting, ordered the workers back to work and warned that if the strikers did not obey, the rail union would be suspended from the TUC. The union was forced to accept defeat and go back to work.

TUC betrayal

The TUC "non-cooperation" with the act turned into a cynical betrayal. The rationale was that the strike must end to get Labour re-elected.

Thatcher was re-elected in a landslide in 1983 and worse was to come for the union movement. The next major industrial stoush was in the printing industry, between the National Graphical Association and Eddie Shah, the owner of the Stockport Messenger.

Shah won an injunction to have the union remove a picket line but the union refused. The union was fined £150,000 for contempt of court. The picket line at Warrington was attacked by 3000 riot police. The cops broke the line, chased people into neighbouring fields and beat them up.

A further fine of £375,000 was imposed and the union's assets were sequestrated. The union called a 24-hour strike and went to the TUC for support, citing its pledge to defend any union under attack.

The TUC decided not to support the printers — a move warmly welcomed by Thatcher. Thornett's describes the TUC's decision as a "total collapse in front of the anti-union laws without a shot being fired — a defining moment in the history of the British trade union movement."

Thatcher now knew that she could pick off each union one by one. The coalminers were next in line, followed by Murdoch's attack on the newspaper printers.

The Australian union movement stands where the British movement did at the time of the steelworkers' strike. It is faced with two paths — surrender or launch a fight back.

Either the trade unions rally behind the next group of workers attacked by the Howard government, or each union that is singled out will be isolated and lose.