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The U.S. Defense Department elected to postpone a planned user trial of an ICBM in order to avoid exacerbating already high tensions with North Korea, an anonymous high-ranking defense insider informed the Associated Press on Saturday.

The test-firing of the Minuteman 3 from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California has been pushed back from April to May. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on Friday made the call to delay the project, which was not a part of ongoing U.S.-South Korean armed forces exercises taking place on the Korean Peninsula.

The defense source said the test was not delayed due to any mechanical issues with the silo-based Minuteman 3, which comprises the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.

The delay was "absolutely not" a response to North Korea's recent spate of threats, including warnings of nuclear strikes against South Korea and the United States, The Hill quoted a senior White House official as saying on Sunday.

"The onus is on North Korea to take the step back," Dan Pfeiffer, senior adviser to President Obama, told "Fox News Sunday."

Much to the surprise of North Korea watchers, six Chinese Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) showed up in downtown Pyongyang on 15 April 2012. Initial interest focused on the six new — and possibly fake — road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) displayed in the military parade honoring founding father Kim Il Sung (missiles known outside of North Korea as the KN-08). [1] However, the vehicles carrying the missiles may ultimately have the most immediate impact on regional nonproliferation efforts. Chinese bloggers quickly observed that the trucks carrying the missiles were externally identical to Chinese-made vehicles. This revelation holds significant consequences for nonproliferation efforts in the region.

"Fake?" ICBMs, Real Launchers, and Other Developments

Rather than following a linear path, North Korea's missile development trajectory appears to be fragmenting as it tackles new technologies before perfecting older ones; Pyongyang is developing ballistic and cruise missiles; solid and liquid fuel technologies; working on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) before it successfully tests and deploys intermediate-range systems; and attempting to make road-mobile ICBMs before perfecting a static design. Essentially, Pyongyang is trying to do everything at once, and with minimal testing.

While previously content to threaten South Korea and most of Japan with hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, North Korea is now engaged in testing longer range systems such as the Unha (Paektusan/Taepodong) with an estimated range of 4,000-8,000 kilometers — though rarely and without success. [2] Pyongyang has also at least nominally displayed the KN-08, the design for which could have a range of 10,000 kilometers depending on payload. [3] However, it is very likely that the KN-08s displayed by Pyongyang on 15 April were "fakes;" what kind of fakes they might be remains heavily debated. While some researchers like Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker argue that the missiles are complete fantasy, other researchers like Jeffrey Lewis and Nick Hansen see them as design mockups, much as was the case with the Taepodong ICBM. [4] However, more than the missiles' alleged range, it is the road-mobile design that raises concern in the United States and elsewhere. Just before leaving office, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made a now-not-so-cryptic comment:

"North Korea now constitutes a direct threat to the United States. The president told [China's] President Hu that last year. They are developing a road-mobile ICBM. I never would have dreamed they would go to a road-mobile before testing a static ICBM. It's a huge problem. As we've found out in a lot of places, finding mobile missiles is very tough." [5]

While the debate about the KN-08's "realness" has subsided pending more evidence, the debate about the vehicles on which the missiles were displayed remains very much alive. Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) are the vehicles that transport, and eventually launch missiles. Countries such as China increase the survivability of their missile forces by making them road-mobile, and therefore easier to hide than missiles in fixed silos. North Korea is attempting to do the same with its own growing missile forces. In countries with established road-mobile programs, counting the number of missile launchers lends important clues to assessments of the country's missile capabilities.

A TEL is a specialized piece of equipment with varying degrees of complexity depending on the missile-type. Key components include the chassis — the strong and flexible undercarriage of the vehicle; specialized hydraulics for erecting and launching the missile; and systems to control the pressure of the tires to protect the missile on varied terrain. North Korea has a history of acquiring demilitarized vehicles and adapting them with its own erection and launching technology. [6] According to documents attributed to the U.S. State Department by Wikileaks, North Korea procures chassis abroad because they are too expensive and difficult for it to produce indigenously. [7]

Within minutes of the broadcast of the 15 April parade footage, Chinese bloggers began posting images of a specialized off-road heavy-duty vehicle known as the WS51200 (see figure 1). The vehicle is produced by Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), a Chinese state-owned enterprise. [8] Wanshan — based in Xiaogan, Hubei Province — is a large company under the supervisory control of the 9th Academy of CASIC, which oversees its parent company, the Sanjiang Space Industry Group. The company produces specialty vehicles and chassis for civilian and military applications, with total assets estimated at 1.1 billion yuan (approximately $172.5 million USD). [9] According to the Economy, Trade and Information Bureau of Yuan'an County, Wanshan had previously traded with North Korea as of 2009, but the Bureau does not specifically disclose the type of trade that occurred. [10]

Before Wanshan's website's sudden removal from the internet, the WS51200 was advertised as a civilian heavy-duty off-road vehicle with eight axles, an American Cummins KTTA19 C700 diesel engine, and a German ZF Friedrichshafen WSK440+16S251 automatic transmission. [11] While this vehicle is marketed for civilian applications such as hauling lumber, coal, and fuel, Wanshan produces other WS-series vehicles for use as TELs by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). These vehicles support ballistic and cruise missiles, some of which were developed by Wanshan's parent company CASIC. The short-range Dong Feng-11 (DF-11) uses the 8x8 WS-2400 series TEL, as do some DF-15s (or alternatively the TAS5450 TEL), and the Dong Hai-10 cruise missile. The DF-21C uses the newer WS-2500 TEL. [12]

Wanshan rated the WS51200 as 122 tons in total weight, 20.11 meters long, 3.35 meters wide, and 3.35 meters high, with a wheel diameter of 1.6 meters. [13] Interestingly, analyst Nick Hansen assesses the 122 ton WS51200 vehicle to be oversized for North Korea's KN-08 design, which is estimated to weigh approximately 35 to 40 tons. [14] Rather, Hansen finds the WS51200 comparable to the MZKT-79221 vehicle used by Russia for its SS-27 Topol-M ICBM, a much more substantial and weighty missile (see figure 2). [15] The similarity is not a complete coincidence, because in 2006 Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, Ltd.'s parent company, Sanjiang Space Industry Group, set up a joint venture with Minsk Plant of Wheeled Carriers Belarus, which produces the MZKT-79221. [16] Perhaps North Korea felt comfortable with this design because it obtained Belarusian vehicles from the same design family in the early 2000s and modified them for use with its Musudan IRBM. [17] Similarly, this was a case of too much truck for the missile, as the 12 meter Musudan only uses a fraction of the 17 meter TEL. [18]

The apparent transaction was complex (see figure 3). Shortly after the first sighting of the TEL in the 15 April parade, a commenter on the Arms Control Wonk blog posted two links. The first was to an October 2010 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) announcement of a WS51200 sale to a foreign party worth 30 million yuan (approximately $4.7 million USD). [19] The announcement went so far as to note the importance of developing the civilian trade of "military-civilian dual-use" technology [九院高度重视超重型越野车军民两用技术应用和民贸的开发工作]. [20] A second link, also from CASIC, noted that the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council reported in May 2011 on the successful delivery of WS51200 vehicles to an unnamed customer, who was satisfied with the vehicles' performance and wished to continue cooperation. [21]

In June 2012, the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun reported that Japanese officials from the 5th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters Based in Kobe, operating on intelligence from Japan, South Korea, and the United States, boarded the ship Harmony Wish on 3 October 2011 at Osaka Port. [22] Documents recovered from the ship indicated that a North Korean front company known as Rimmok General Trading solicited the WS51200 vehicles from Wuhan Sanjiang Import & Export Co. based in China. [23] According to the documents, four WS51200 were delivered to North Korea after completion in May 2011, and four more were delivered in August 2011. This documents the transfer of eight vehicles, six of which were most likely on display in Pyongyang’s 15 April 2012 parade. [24]

The Harmony Wish — a Cambodian-flagged ship operated by a Chinese company named Dalian Qingsong Co. with a Chinese and Burmese crew — delivered the August 2011 shipment of four WS51200 vehicles. [25] The ship left Shanghai, China on 1 August 2011 and arrived at the Port of Nampho in North Korea on 4 August 2011. [26]

The Chinese government has been tightlipped about the transaction. In public statements, Beijing has categorically denied that its enterprises, "exported any items prohibited by relevant UN Security Council resolutions and Chinese laws and regulations," to the DPRK. [27] However, some details about the transaction have surfaced, and Chinese leaders have reportedly talked with some outside governments about these allegations. [28] Chinese officials have also asserted that the exported vehicles "were intended for civilian use to mainly transport large pieces of lumber." [29] According to a June 2012 blog post by Mark Hibbs of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the intended end-user was "the DPRK Ministry of Forestry, a government agency that was squarely responsible for civilian-use activities having to do with public welfare and economic development and which had not been previously identified as a player in North Korea's ballistic missile or nuclear programs." [30] Despite the general dearth of economic activities in North Korea, the country was experiencing a (relative) construction boom in 2011 leading up to Kim Il Sung's centennial celebrations, which fueled growth in the forestry sector. [31]

There is little information about Wanshan's previous export activities. It is possible that if Wanshan was indeed already engaged in the trade of heavy-duty off-road vehicles with a party or parties in North Korea by 2009, that it became lax on the compliance side of the relationship, or engaged in willful blindness at the prospect of a multi-million dollar sale. However, a previous trade relationship with North Korea also makes it less likely that inexperience or naiveté played a role. Regardless, given that Wanshan's website disappeared precipitously from the worldwide web in the days after the parade, it seems likely that a powerful entity in China is looking into the case.

China is obliged by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to prevent the transfer of items and technology that could support North Korea's missile program. UNSC Resolution 1718, specifically decides that,

"all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any… items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes." [32]

UNSC Resolution 1874 further reinforces and expands on the decision. Both of the North Korea-specific resolutions were drafted in response to Pyongyang's missile and nuclear tests, and as a member of the Security Council China played a central role in developing the texts.

While China is not yet a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it maintains its own domestic export control regulations and a control list for missile-related materials that very closely resembles the MTCR list. The control list includes, "vehicles designed or modified for the transport, handling, control, activation and launching of the systems in Item 1," which are: "ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missile and unmanned air vehicles that can be used to deliver at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km." [33] Exports of items on this control list are restricted and require export licenses. Therefore, if Wanshan believed the item to be a military export, it would have had to apply for export per "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies."

Even if Wanshan believed the vehicle to be a dual-use item intended for lumber, China requires exporters to follow the "Measures for the Administration on Import and Export License for Dual-use Items and Technologies," as administered by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM). [34] This regulation includes a control list (in Chinese), which under "Ground Equipment" includes a provision for vehicles which verbatim duplicates the description listed above for regular missile-related exports. [35]

Additionally, China's export controls include a catch-all requirement that notes "where the exporter knows or should know" that the commodity it is exporting may "have the risk of being used in weapons of mass destruction and their related means of delivery, an export license shall be applied for towards the items and technologies concerned, whether included in the Controlling List or not, and an export license for dual-use items and technologies shall be handled in accordance with these Measures." [36]

It is unlikely that Wanshan could be unaware of these export requirements. According to the Ministry of Commerce, "export control regulations of China explicitly states that exporting enterprises should establish and improve the internal control mechanism for dual-use items and technologies." [37] A company as large and well-connected as Wanshan should indeed have such an internal compliance program, and should be well-aware of the export requirements for vehicles such as the WS51200, given that other WS-series vehicles are used as missile TELs by the Chinese military.

Some Explaining to Do: China's Underwhelming Transparency with the International Community

In the days after the 15 April parade, the UN Security Council committed to investigate the case. However, a senior official was quoted as saying that "political pressure not to implicate China in sanctions infringements may limit the panel's room to maneuver." [38] At the same time, the UNSCR 1874 Panel of Experts (POE) was preparing its 2012 annual report. According to Mark Hibbs, Beijing "would not accept draft reporting by the POE concerning equipment from China that showed up during a well-publicized military parade in Pyongyang earlier this year and was identified as TELs for new North Korean ballistic missiles." [39] Indeed, the POE report includes a photo of the KN-08 missile on its TEL, but makes no mention of the origin of the vehicle. [40]

It is not in China's strategic interests to support a road-mobile ICBM force in North Korea. China's goal on the Korean Peninsula is stability, because its greatest fear is the humanitarian disaster of a collapsed North Korea, followed closely by the possibility of sharing a border with a unified Korea allied with the United States. Supporting North Korea's ICBM program would undermine these goals, making it likely the TEL transfer was either accidental or the decision of a small number of individuals who prioritized their financial enrichment over larger Chinese strategic goals.

Unfortunately, until authorities in Beijing choose to disclose more public details on this case, it will be difficult to assess the full story and the extent to which the state-owned companies involved knowingly violated Chinese export controls and UN sanctions. If Wanshan engaged in willful blindness, this puts China and its state-owned enterprises in a very embarrassing position. Regardless, it is in China's best interests to actively participate in the investigation of the transaction. All members of the Security Council have faced embarrassment over export control violations, some of which were more severe than the transfer of the eight TELs. Regrettably, absent more transparency from Beijing, China will continue to leave itself open to critics who insinuate that the country is explicitly supporting North Korea's missile program to the detriment of its international reputation and regional relationships. If the export was not sanctioned by the Chinese government, it will remain unclear whether Beijing is taking steps to close the loopholes in its dual-use export controls that made possible the transfer. And more broadly, useful lessons that can be used to strengthen regional and international dual-use control efforts will remain undisclosed, aiding neither Chinese nor international security.

Rather than following a linear path, North Korea's missile development trajectory appears to be fragmenting as it tackles new technologies before perfecting older ones; Pyongyang is developing ballistic and cruise missiles; solid and liquid fuel technologies; working on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) before it successfully tests and deploys intermediate-range systems; and attempting to make road-mobile ICBMs before perfecting a static design. Essentially, Pyongyang is trying to do everything at once, and with minimal testing.

The author of this article missed something very important, specifically in reference to NORK's development of ICBMs before intermediate range missiles (IRBMs) and their work on road-mobile as opposed to static systems.

1) They don't NEED intermediate range missiles (from their POV). They *DO* need ICBMs. Intermediate range missiles from NORK would only reach parts of Russia and China and *maybe* Guam and the Philippines. They don't need anything to hit Russia and China because those are their buddies. The same ICBMs that would reach the US could also be used to reach places like Guam and the PI. Why develop two different missile systems when one will do? Working on only one system conserves resources.

2) Road-mobile missile systems are much more survivable than static systems. They know that in any war with us we're gonna be hunting their missiles with a vengeance. Why leave them as sitting ducks on above-ground launch pads on in silos? Trucks can move around, hiding out in highway and railway tunnels, sufficiently large buildings, etc.

3) Their work on solid-fueled missile while they're still doing liquid-fueled makes perfect sense also. Solid-fueled is much better because the missiles can be left fully fueled and ready to launch on a moment's notice. Liquid-fueled missiles even on road-mobile TELs (transporter/erector/launcher) still have a significant delay in getting into action from the time the "go" order is issued. The TEL truck has to be parked on suitable ground, the missile raised to firing position, the service vehicles have to fuel it, and THEN it can be launched. Due to the short flight times of US and ROK aircraft from the south, TELs in such situations could be taken out during the lag time involved in erecting, fueling, and launching. *FOR NOW* they have to rely in liquid-fueled systems, but solid-fueled systems are much to be desired for the future.

US Military Will Not Intercept North Korean Missile If It Flies Over Japan

in: North Korea

At least that is what this Stars & Stripes report says:

Amid concerns that North Korea could be preparing to launch on if its new missiles, Pentagon officials told the New York Times that it could calculate the missile’s trajectory within seconds and attempt to to shoot it down if threatened South Korea, Japan or Guam, an American territory. However, if the missile was headed for the open sea, even if flew over Japan in the process, military action would not be taken, the Times reported. [Stars & Stripes]

I had been wondering what the response would be if a missile was fired over Japan because if you look at the geography the Musudan would have to fly over either Japan or Korea to test its maximum range. It appears the Pentagon has given the North Koreans the green light to fire over Japan. I wonder if the Japanese are on the same page with this?

I would not be surprised if the North Korean if they do in fact fire a missile over Japan than claim that their missile technology is so advanced that they defeated US and Japanese missile defense systems.

MID-WEST, UNITED STATES — Within hours of South Korean news sources breaking a story that several Sang-Ho class submarines had disappeared from their North Korean bases, a ham radio operator named Tim, picked up a “numbers station” broadcasting on the same frequency as “The Voice of Korea” propaganda station. What makes this even more interesting is that at the tail end of the numbers transmission there was a long duration digital transmission as well.

So why is this important and alarming?

There are several reasons why this new development is particularly alarming. The first being the existence of the numbers station coming online shortly after the submarines put to sea, but more importantly is the digital transmission apparently tacked onto the end of the transmission and the ramifications of that transmission.
Numbers Station?

Throughout the Cold War numbers stations were used to convey encrypted messages to covert operatives. The station would come online broadcast a series of numbers, possibly multiple times, then disappear into the darkness. Those numbers were used as coded messages to be decrypted on the other end by the in country operative. Examples of these numbers stations can be found at The Conet Project Archives. So what makes this number station significant is the proximity in timing to the disappearance of the San-Ho class submarines, as well as the digital transmission. It is important to point out that the Sang-Ho submarines in question were effectively purpose built for covert insertion of small teams ofNorth Korean Maritime Commandos who are part of North Korea’s much lauded Special Operations Force. So at this moment there is a covert North Korean force apparently heading for South Korea.

The Sang-Ho submarines can carry as many as 30 commandos per submarines giving the current submarines a combined force of around 60 troops. Those 60 troops are specially trained to carry out behind enemy lines covert actions such as sabotage and assassinations. So in this case the numbers station was most likely broadcasting a special code to North Korean operatives to announce the impending arrival of the covert operations teams.
The Digital Transmission

What is more significant is the digital signal at the end of the transmission. Digital transmissions such as this one may indicate the presence of a burst transmission which contains a compressed and encrypted message bound for some covert force, somewhere. Typically a burst transmission is used to minimize the download time at the end point to prevent discovery. The unusual part of this potential burst transmission is being attached to a numbers station as well as the length and the power of the broadcast. Normal burst transmissions are in the one second to two second range. This transmission was in the 10 to 15 second range which is almost unheard of, unless the end point is a submarine.

The ham operator who picked up this particular transmission was located in the Midwest of the United States, and he reported the transmission was received 4 by 5 indicating a significant power was used to send the transmission. That level of power coupled with the length and possible submarine end point opens up a new and alarming tangent to this escalating conflict. It is important to point out that the numbers are being read in Spanish but that is typically done to confuse the original source of the transmission. In this case the transmission was detected on a upper side band of the AM range used by the Voice of Korea so while the numbers are Spanish the transmission does appear to originate in North Korea. That fact coupled with the missing submarines seems to provide evidence of the nature of the transmission despite being in Spanish. Its also important to note that the numbers being in Spanish could also be used to employ a different set of codes in the operatives code books.

Now the really alarming part, if the submarines and number station wasn’t alarming enough. One of the things that hasn’t been discussed in mainstream news is the fact that North Korea has between 22 to 24 diesel electric submarines of the Romeo Class. These subs, which are heavily antiquated and for the most part decommissioned, are capable of open ocean missions. They have also been successfully retrofitted to carry a small anti-ship cruise missile, actually six of those missiles and while the YJ-8, the missile used for those retrofits, is an anti-ship missile (similar to the Exocet in use) they could carry a conventional warhead used to hit a building, damage a runway or some other kind of ground based target. But its not beyond the pale to suggest that the warhead could be modified to carry a more interesting payload and it is important to remember that North Korea does have one of the largest chemical weapons stockpiles in the world. The submarine in question also has a range of over 9,000 miles but a top speed of 8 knots which is fairly slow. Its also a diesel so the submarine would would have to run on the surface to recharge batteries of let off exhaust from its engines which is a byproduct of their origin which was late war German U-Boats. Its also important to note that Romeo Class submarines which have been retrofitted must fire their missiles from the surface.

We don’t currently know if any of the Romeo Class submarines are missing, and if they are where they are going or even if they have been retrofitted but if they have then they represent a significant risk to Japan, Guam and even the western coast of the United States. As I said it’s impossible to know if that is the game plan but experts I consulted seem to believe that a burst of that size and power would be destined for a submarine be it Sang-Ho or Romeo Class.

All things being equal the transmission could have also been destined for the commando forces aboard the Sang-Ho submarines, which we know from news reports are at sea, or targeted for the operatives that will be meeting the covert operations teams on their arrival.

At this point we only have the transmission to go on, but its ramifications are both interesting and alarming at the same time. The transmission and the missing submarines also indicate a significant escalation in the deteriorating Korean political situation. Given the deadline North Korea has issued for embassies to shutdown and their staffs to depart we will soon find out.

Tune into Ground Zero Radio Tuesday 4.9.13 – Clyde Lewis will be doing a special show on Numbers Stations and we will be discussing this evolving story.

The Transmission

Thanks again to Tim for finding this broadcast and bringing it to our attention, and as with all things like this please do your own research and come to your own conclusions. What I have provided here is just a few of the possible scenarios gleaned from research and the news of the day but it is by no means the only option. The information presented is fairly easy to find with some good keyword searching on your favorite search engine as well as the Wikipedia and FAS.org. So trust no one and make your own final decisions.

“If we must have an enemy at the head of government, let it be one whom we can oppose, and for whom we are not responsible.” – Alexander Hamilton

indicate a significant escalation in the deteriorating Korean political situation. Given the deadline North Korea has issued for embassies to shutdown and their staffs to depart we will soon find out.

I missed that little cherry---just what "is" the "deadline" NK has given for embassies to shut down and staffs to depart???

The 10th. They asked embassies if they needed any help getting their people out by the 10th of April, but never strictly said it was a "deadline". ETA: I'm don't think they actually said the people had to leave.

That is also why I posted (waay back) the image of the notice posted outside of the NK (DPRK) embassy in London saying that April 9th was going to be a loading area. It sounded like NK will be leaving their embassy.

The 10th. They asked embassies if they needed any help getting their people out by the 10th of April, but never strictly said it was a "deadline". ETA: I'm don't think they actually said the people had to leave.

That is also why I posted (waay back) the image of the notice posted outside of the NK (DPRK) embassy in London saying that April 9th was going to be a loading area. It sounded like NK will be leaving their embassy.

IIRC, the explanation is that from the 10th onwards the DPRK would "no longer be able to guarantee their safety", presumably from the Imperialist Americans and war-mongering South Koreans...

Only the sword now carries any weight in the balance for the destiny of a nation.

Experience from a U.S. Navy submariner:
Those antiquated diesel-electric boats are nearly impossible to track while submerged and running on electric power. Their top speed is only about 5 knots if they want to have any effective range (say, 100 miles). In order for them to affect an open-ocean transit, they'll have to run their diesel engines. That means a surface run to achieve 15 or 16 knots. If they decide to "snorkel" instead, they will be limited in speed due to the issues of the snorkel head valve closing on water intrusion and the possibility of damaging the snorkel mast. I think 10 knots is the top speed at snorkel depth. In any case, they'll be easy prey for any SOSUS net or random sonobuoy they pass. Also, they'll be leaving an easily tracked wake - even at night (marine life fluoresces when disturbed). I don't expect them to be heading for the U.S. shores - but you can never underestimate the enemies stupidity. I think they may try a desperate "Hail Mary" and detonate a nuclear fission device or two near Japan and/or some American bases such as Guam or Hawaii. Heck, since the Philippine Islands are so graciously allowing us to use the bases and airstrips we built, they could be a target too.

My wife's oldest brother works for "the Government". He is currently stationed in Korea, and he is not very talkative right now. All I really know is that he works in "communications".

SEOUL, April 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korean regions bordering North Korea need hundreds more shelters to house evacuees in emergency situations such as the North's provocations, government data showed Tuesday.

According to the data compiled by the Ministry of Security and Public Administration, and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the country's 15 regions in the western port city of Incheon and the northern parts of the Gyeonggi and Gangwon provinces that border North Korea lack a combined 287 shelters to accommodate their residents in emergency situations.

"Most of the regions without such shelters are small towns that do not have any existing underground facilities, which could be easily turned into emergency shelters," said an NEMA official.

"To guarantee the safety and security of the people there, we've been discussing with relevant government bodies such as the finance ministry to secure budget for their construction," he added.

Some 400 million won (US$350,263) is required to build one shelter, the home affairs ministry said, meaning the country needs 114.8 billion won to meet the demand in the border towns.

In the wake of the communist country's 2010 provocations of torpedoing South Korea's warship the Cheonan and the shelling of the Western border island of Yeonpyeong, the government set up 56 evacuation facilities in 2011 and 17 in 2012, with construction of 20 more under way.

Tensions have been escalating on the Korean Peninsula over Pyongyang's near-daily threats of war, particularly after the North's Feb. 12 nuclear test, which earned the country fresh U.N. sanctions. Joint annual U.S.-South Korean military drills in March also contributed to the North's threats.
Raising the stakes further, Pyongyang withdrew all of its workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex on Tuesday. The North had previously halted movements to and from the North Korean border town on three occasions in March 2009 when Seoul and Washington conducted military exercises.

“If we must have an enemy at the head of government, let it be one whom we can oppose, and for whom we are not responsible.” – Alexander Hamilton

SEOUL, April 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korea may stage a surprise provocation this month when the communist country marks several key national anniversaries, as it did in the past, observers said Tuesday.

Tuesday marks the 1993 selection of Kim Jong-il as North Korea's second leader, succeeding his father and North Korean founder Kim Il-sung, who died in 1994. The Supreme People's Assembly approved the succession of Kim on April 9 that year.

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