Andrew was a small and ferocious Cape Verde
hurricane
that wrought unprecedented economic devastation along a path through the
northwestern Bahamas, the southern Florida peninsula, and south-central Louisiana.
Damage in the United States is estimated to be near 25 billion, making Andrew
the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history1. The
tropical cyclone struck southern Dade County, Florida,
especially hard, with violent winds and storm surges
characteristic of a category 4 hurricane (see addendum
on upgrade to category 5) on the Saffir/Simpson
Hurricane Scale, and with a central pressure (922 mb) that is the
third lowest this century for a hurricane at landfall in the United
States. In Dade County alone, the forces of Andrew resulted in 15
deaths and up to one-quarter million people left temporarily homeless. An
additional 25 lives were lost in Dade County from the indirect effects of
Andrew2. The direct loss of life seems remarkably
low considering the destruction caused by this hurricane.

Convection subsequently became more focused in a region of
cyclonic cloud rotation. Narrow spiral-shaped bands of clouds
developed around the center
of rotation on 16 August. At 1800 UTC on the 16th (UTC precedes EDT by four
hours), both the TSAF unit and SAB calculated
a Dvorak T-number of 2.0 and the "best track"
(Table 1 and
Fig. 1 [85K GIF]) shows that the
transition from tropical wave to tropical depression
took place at that time.

The depression was initially embedded in an environment of easterly vertical wind
shear. By midday on the 17th, however, the shear diminished. The depression grew stronger
and, at 1200 UTC 17 August, it became Andrew, the first Atlantic
tropical storm
of the 1992 hurricane season.
The tropical cyclone continued moving rapidly on a heading which turned from west
to west-northwest. This course was in the general direction of the Lesser Antilles.

Between the 17th and 20th of August, the tropical storm passed
south of the center of the high pressure area over the eastern
Atlantic. Steering currents carried Andrew closer to a strong
upper-level low pressure system centered about 500 n mi to the
east-southeast of Bermuda and to a trough that extended southward
from the low for a few hundred miles. These currents gradually
changed and Andrew decelerated on a course which became northwesterly.
This change in heading spared the Lesser Antilles from
an encounter with Andrew. The change in track also brought the
tropical storm into an environment of strong southwesterly vertical
wind shear and quite high surface pressures to its north. Although
the estimated maximum wind speed of Andrew varied little then, a
rather remarkable evolution occurred.

Satellite images suggest that Andrew produced deep convection
only sporadically for several days, mainly in several bursts of
about 12 hours duration. Also, the deep convection did not persist.
Instead, it was stripped away from the low-level circulation
by the strong southwesterly flow at upper levels.
Air Force Reserve unit reconnaissance aircraft
investigated Andrew and, on
the 20th, found that the cyclone had
degenerated to the extent that only a diffuse low-level circulation
center remained. Andrew's central pressure rose considerably
(Fig. 2 [87K GIF]). Nevertheless,
the flight-level data indicated that Andrew retained a vigorous
circulation aloft. Wind speeds near 70 kt were measured at an
altitude of 1500 ft near a convective band lying to the northeast
of the low-level center. Hence, Andrew is estimated on 20 August to
have been a tropical storm with 40 kt surface winds and an
astonishingly high central pressure of 1015 mb
(Figs. 2 and 3 [87K GIF]).

Significant changes in the large-scale environment near and
downstream from Andrew began by 21 August. Satellite imagery in
the water vapor channel indicated that the low aloft to the east-southeast
of Bermuda weakened and split. The bulk of the low
opened into a trough which retreated northward. That evolution
decreased the vertical wind shear over Andrew. The remainder of
the low dropped southward to a position just southwest of Andrew
where its circulation enhanced the upper-level outflow over the
tropical storm. At the same time, a strong and deep high pressure
cell formed near the U.S. southeast coast. A ridge built eastward
from the high into the southwestern Atlantic with its axis lying
just north of Andrew. The associated steering flow over the
tropical storm became easterly. Andrew turned toward the west,
accelerated to near 16 kt, and quickly intensified.

Andrew reached hurricane strength on the morning of 22 August,
thereby becoming the first Atlantic hurricane to form from a tropical
wave in nearly two years. An eye
formed that morning and the rate of strengthening increased. Just 36 hours later,
Andrew reached the borderline between a category 4 and 5 hurricane
(see addendum
on upgrade to category 5) and was
at its peak intensity (Table 1). From 0000 UTC on the 21st (when
Andrew had a barely perceptible low-level center) to 1800 UTC on
the 23rd the central pressure had fallen by 92 mb, down to 922 mb.
A fall of 72 mb occurred during the last 36 hours of that period and
qualifies as rapid deepening
(Holliday and Thompson, 1979).

The region of high pressure held steady and drove Andrew nearly
due west for two and a half days beginning on the 22nd. Andrew was
a category 4 hurricane when its eye passed over northern Eleuthera
Island in the Bahamas late on the 23rd and then over the southern
Berry Islands in the Bahamas early on the 24th. After leaving the
Bahamas, Andrew continued moving westward toward southeast Florida.

Andrew weakened when it passed over the western portion of the
Great Bahama Bank and the pressure rose to 941 mb. However, the
hurricane rapidly reintensified during the last few hours preceding
landfall when it moved over the Straits of Florida. During that period,
radar, aircraft and satellite data showed a decreasing eye diameter and
strengthening "eyewall" convection.
Aircraft and inland surface data Fig. 4 [121K GIF])
suggest that the deepening trend continued up to and slightly inland of the coast. For
example, the eye temperature measured by the reconnaissance aircraft
was at least 1-2C warmer at 1010 UTC (an hour after the eye
made landfall) than it was in the last "fix"
about 15 n mi offshore at 0804 UTC. These measurements suggest that the convection
in the eyewall, and the associated vertical circulation in the eye and
eyewall, became more vigorous as the storm moved onshore. The radar
data indicated that the convection in the northern eyewall became
enhanced with some strong convective elements rotating around the
eyewall in a counter-clockwise fashion as the storm made landfall.
Numerical models suggest that some enhancement of convection can
occur at landfall due to increased boundary-layer convergence in
the eyewall region. That situation appeared to have occurred in
Andrew. The enhanced convection in the north eyewall probably
resulted in strong subsidence in the eye on the inside edge of the
north eyewall. This likely contributed to a displacement of the
lowest surface pressure to the north of the geometric center of the "radar eye"
(cf., Fig. 4 and
6 [107K JPEG]). It is estimated that the
central pressure was 922 mb at landfall near Homestead AFB, Florida at 0905
UTC (5:05 A.M. EDT) 24 August (Fig. 4).

The maximum sustained surface wind speed (1-min average at 10
meters [about 33 ft] elevation) during landfall over Florida is
estimated at 125 kt (about 145 mph), with gusts at that elevation
to at least 150 kt (about 175 mph). The sustained wind speed
corresponds to a category 4 hurricane on the Saffir/Simpson
Hurricane Scale (see addendum
on upgrade to category 5). It should be noted that these wind speeds are
what is estimated to have occurred within the (primarily northern)
eyewall in an open environment such as at an airport, at the
standard 10-meter height. The wind experienced at other inland
sites was subject to complex interactions of the airflow with
trees, buildings, and other obstacles in its path. These obstructions
create a turbulent, frictional drag that generally reduces
the wind speed. However, they can also produce brief, local
accelerations of the wind immediately adjacent to the structures.
Hence, the wind speed experienced at a given location, such as at
a house in the core region of the hurricane, can vary significantly
around the structure, and cannot be specified with certainty. The
landfall intensity is discussed further in Section b.

Andrew moved nearly due westward when over land and crossed the
extreme southern portion of the Florida peninsula in about four
hours. Although the hurricane weakened about one category on the
Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale
during the transit over land, and the pressure rose to about 950 mb, Andrew was still a major
hurricane when its eyewall passed over the extreme southwestern Florida coast.

The first of two cycles of modest intensification commenced
when the eye reached the Gulf of Mexico. Also, the hurricane
continued to move at a relatively fast pace while its track
gradually turned toward the west-northwest.

When Andrew reached the north-central Gulf of Mexico, the high
pressure system to its northeast weakened and a strong mid-latitude
trough approached the area from the northwest. Steering currents
began to change. Andrew turned toward the northwest and its
forward speed decreased to about 8 kt. The hurricane struck a
sparsely populated section of the south-central Louisiana coast
with category 3
intensity at about 0830 UTC on the 26th. The landfall location is about 20 n mi
west-southwest of Morgan City.

Andrew weakened rapidly after landfall, to tropical storm
strength in about 10 hours and to depression status 12 hours later.
During this weakening phase, the cyclone moved northward and then
accelerated northeastward. Andrew and its remnants continued to
produce heavy rain that locally exceeded 10 inches near its track
(Table 2b). By midday on the 28th,
Andrew had begun to merge with a frontal system over the mid-Atlantic states.

b. Meteorological Statistics

The best track intensities were obtained from the data presented in
Figs. 2, 3, 4,
and 5 (95K GIF).
The first two of those figures show the curves of Andrew's central pressure and
maximum sustained one-minute wind speed, respectively, versus time, along with the
observations on which they were based. The figures contain relevant
surface observations and intensity estimates derived from
analyses of satellite images performed by the TSAF unit,
SAB and the Air Force Global Weather Central
(USAF in figures). The aircraft data came from reconnaissance flights by the
U.S. Air Force Reserve 815th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
based at Keesler AFB, Mississippi. Additional data were collected
aboard a NOAA aircraft.

Table 2 lists a selection of surface observations.
The anemometer at Harbour Island, near the northern end of Eleuthera Island
in the Bahamas, measured a wind speed of 120 kt for an unknown
period shortly after 2100 UTC on the 23rd. That wind speed was the
maximum that could be registered by the instrument.

Neither of the two conventional measures of hurricane intensity,
central barometric pressure and maximum sustained wind speed,
were observed at official surface weather stations in close
proximity to Andrew at landfall in Florida. Homestead Air Force
Base and Tamiami Airport discontinued routine meteorological
observations prior to receiving direct hits from the hurricane.
Miami International Airport was the next closest station, but it
was outside of the eyewall by about 5 nautical miles when Andrew's
center passed to the south of that airport.

To supplement the official information, requests for data were
made to the public through the local media. Remarkably, more than
100 quantitative observations were received (see Figs.
4 and 5).
Many of the reports came from observers who vigilantly
took readings through frightening conditions including, in several
instances, the moment when their instruments and even their homes
were destroyed.

Some of the unofficial observations were dismissed as unrealistic.
Others were rendered suspect or eliminated during follow-up
inquiries or analyses. The remainder, however, revealed a physically
consistent and reasonable pattern.

1. Minimum pressure over Florida

The final offshore "fix" by the reconnaissance aircraft came at
0804 UTC and placed the center of the hurricane only about 15 nautical
miles, or roughly one hour of travel time, from the mainland.
A dropsonde indicated a pressure of 932 mb at that time. The pressure
had been falling at the rate of about 2 mb per hour, but the
increasing interaction with land was expected to at least partially
offset, if not reverse, that trend. Hence, a landfall pressure
within a few millibars of 932 mb seemed reasonable.

Shortly after Andrew's passage, however, reports of minimum
pressures below 930 mb were received from the vicinity of
Homestead, Florida (Fig. 4).
Several of the barometers displaying the lowest pressures were subsequently
tested in a pressure chamber and calibrated by the
Aircraft Operations Center (AOC)
of NOAA.
Two key observations came from a Mrs. Hall and Mr. Martens, sister
and brother. They rode out the storm in residences about one-quarter mile
apart. Mrs. Hall's home was built by her father and grandfather in 1945
to be hurricane-proof. Although some of the windows broke, the 22-inch thick
concrete and coral rock walls held steady, allowing her to observe her
barometer in relative safety. The AOC
tests indicate that the minimum pressure at her home was near 921 mb. The barometer at her
brother's home was judged a little more reliable and the reading there was adjusted to 923 mb.
Based on the observations and an eastward extrapolation of the pressure
pattern to the coastline, Andrew's minimum pressure at landfall is
estimated to be 922 mb. This suggests that the trajectory of the
dropsonde deployed from the aircraft did not intersect the lowest
pressure within the eye.

The strongest winds associated with Andrew on 24 August likely
occurred in the hurricane's northern eyewall. The relatively
limited number of observations in that area greatly complicates the
task of establishing Andrew's maximum sustained wind speed and peak
gust at landfall in Florida. While a universally accepted value
for Andrew's wind speed at landfall may prove elusive, there is
considerable evidence supporting an estimate of about 125 kt for
the maximum sustained wind speed, with gusts to at least 150 kt
(Fig. 5). (Please see addendum
on upgrade to category 5.)

The strongest reported sustained wind near the surface occurred
at the Fowey Rocks weather station at 0800 UTC
(Fig. 5). The
station sits about 11 n mi east of the shoreline and, at that time,
was within the northwest part of Andrew's eyewall. The 0800 UTC
data included a two-minute wind of 123 kt with a gust to 147 kt at
a platform height of about 130 ft. The U.S. National Data Buoy
Center used a boundary-layer model to convert the sustained wind to
a two-minute wind of 108 kt at 33 ft elevation. The peak
one-minute wind during that two-minute period at Fowey Rocks might have
been slightly higher than 108 kt.

It is unlikely that this point observation was so fortuitously
situated that it represents a sampling of the absolute strongest
wind. The Fowey Rocks log (not shown) indicates that the wind
speed increased through 0800 UTC. Unfortunately, Fowey Rocks then
ceased transmitting data, presumably because even stronger winds
disabled the instrumentation. (A subsequent visual inspection
indicated that the mast supporting the anemometer had become bent
90 degrees from vertical.) Radar reflectivity data suggests that
the most intense portion of Andrew's eyewall had not reached Fowey
Rocks by 0800 UTC and that the wind speed could have continued to
increase there for another 15 to 30 minutes. A similar conclusion
can be reached from the pressure analysis in
Fig. 4 which indicates
that the pressure at Fowey Rocks probably fell by about another 20
mb from the 0800 UTC mark of 968 mb.

Reconnaissance aircraft provided wind data at a flight level of
about 10,000 ft. The maximum wind speed along 10 seconds of flight
track (often used by the NHC to represent a one-minute wind speed
at flight level) on the last pass prior to landfall was 162 kt,
with a spot wind speed of 170 kt observed. The
162 kt wind occurred
at 0810 UTC in the eyewall region about 10 n mi to the north of
the center of the eye. Like the observation from Fowey Rocks, the
aircraft provided a series of "point" observations (i.e., no
lateral extent). Somewhat higher wind speeds probably
occurred elsewhere in the northern eyewall, a little to the left
and/or to the right of the flight track. A wind speed at 10,000 ft
is usually reduced to obtain a surface wind estimate. Based on
past operational procedures, the 162 kt flight-level wind is
compatible with maximum sustained surface winds of 125 kt.

One of the most important wind speed reports came from Tamiami
Airport, located about 9 n mi west of the shoreline. As mentioned
earlier, routine weather observations ended at the airport before
the full force of Andrew's (northern) eyewall winds arrived. However,
the official weather observer there, Mr. Scott Morrison,
remained on-station and continued to watch the wind speed dial.
Mr. Morrison notes that around 0845 UTC (0445 EDT) the wind speed
indicator "pegged" at a position a little beyond the dial's highest
marking of 100 kt, at a point that he estimates corresponds to
about 110 kt. (Subsequent tests of the wind speed dials observed at the
airport indicate that the needles peg at about 105 kt and 108 kt,
respectively). He recounts that the needle was essentially fixed at
that spot for three to five minutes, and then fell back to 0 when
the anemometer failed. Mr. Morrison's observations have been
closely corroborated by two other people. He has also noted that
the weather conditions deteriorated even further after that time
and were at their worst about 30 minutes later. This information
suggests that, in all likelihood, the maximum sustained wind speed
at Tamiami Airport significantly exceeded 105 kt.

A number of the wind speeds reported by the public could not
be substantiated and are therefore excluded from
Fig. 5. The
reliability of some of the others suffer from problems that include
non-standard averaging periods and instrument exposures, and equipment
failures prior to the arrival of the strongest winds.

The only measurement of a sustained wind in the southern eyewall
came from an anemometer on the mast of an anchored sailboat
(see Fig. 5).
For at least 13 minutes the anemometer there showed
99 kt, which was the maximum that the readout could display. A
small downward adjustment of the speed should probably be applied
because the instrument was sitting 17 m above the surface rather
than at the standard height of 10 m. On the other hand, the
highest one-minute wind speed during that 13-minute period could
have been quite a bit stronger than 99 kt. Again, there may
have been stronger winds elsewhere in the southern eyewall. For a westward-moving
hurricane the wind speed in the northern eyewall usually exceeds
the wind speed in the southern eyewall by about twice the forward
speed of the hurricane (Dunn and Miller 1964). In the case of
Andrew, that difference is about 32 kt, and suggests a maximum
sustained wind stronger than 130 kt.

Several indirect measures of the sustained wind speed are of
interest. First, a standard empirical relationship between central
pressure and wind speed (Kraft 1961) applied to 922 mb yields
around 135 kt. Second, the Dvorak technique classification performed
by the NHC Tropical Satellite Analysis and Forecast unit
using a 0900 UTC satellite image gives 127 kt. Also, an analysis
of the pressure pattern in Fig. 4
gives a maximum gradient wind of around 140 kt.

The strongest gust reported from near the
surface occurred in the northern eyewall a little more than a mile
from the shoreline at the home of Mr. Randy Fairbank. He observed
a gust of 184 kt moments before portions of a windward wall failed,
preventing further observation. The hurricane also destroyed the
anemometer. To evaluate the accuracy of the instrument, three
anemometers of the type used by Mr. Fairbank were tested in a wind
tunnel at Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University. Although the turbulent nature of the
hurricane winds could not be replicated, the results of the
wind tunnel tests suggest that the gust Mr. Fairbank observed was
less than 184 kt and probably near 154 kt. Of course, stronger
gusts may have occurred there at a later time, or at another site.
Damage at that location was significantly less than the damage to
similar structures located about 2 miles south of this neighborhood,
implying even stronger winds than observed at this location.

Strong winds also occurred outside of the eyewall, especially
in association with convective bands (Fig. 6).
A peak gust to 139 kt was observed at a home near the northern end of
Dade County (Fig. 5) on an anemometer of the brand used by
Mr. Fairbank. Applying the reduction suggested by the wind tunnel tests to 139 kt
yields an estimate close to the 115 kt peak gust (a five-second average)
registered on a National Ocean Survey anemometer located not far to the east, at the coast.

3. Storm surge

During the afternoon of 23 August, Andrew crossed over the north end
of the island of Eleuthera in the Bahamas and generated significant storm
surge flooding. Two high water marks were recorded and referenced to
mean sea level. The first mark of 16 ft was recorded in a house in the
town of Little Bogue. The second mark of 23 ft was recorded in a damaged
house in the town of The Current several miles west of Lower Bogue. Since
this structure was located near the shoreline it suggests that battering
waves riding on top of the storm surge helped to create this very high water mark.

During the morning hour of 24 August, Andrew generated storm surge along
shorelines of southern Florida
(Fig. 7)
(103K GIF). On the southeast Florida coast, peak storm surge arrived near the time of high
astronomical tide. The height of the storm tide
(the sum of the storm surge and astronomical tide, referenced to mean sea level) ranged
from 4 to 6 ft in northern Biscayne bay increasing to a maximum value of 16.9 ft at the Burger
King International Headquarters, located on the western shoreline in the center
of the bay, and decreasing to 4 to 5 ft in southern Biscayne Bay. The observed
storm tide values on the Florida southwest coast ranged from 4 to 5 ft near
Flamingo to 6 to 7 ft near Goodland.

4. Tornadoes

There have been no confirmed reports of tornadoes associated
with Andrew over the Bahamas or Florida. Funnel sightings, some
unconfirmed, were reported in the Florida counties of Glades,
Collier and Highlands, where Andrew crossed in daylight. In
Louisiana, one tornado occurred in the city of Laplace several
hours prior to Andrew's landfall. That tornado killed 2 people and
injured 32 others. Tornadoes in the Ascension, Iberville, Baton
Rouge, Pointe Coupee, and Avoyelles parishes of Louisiana reportedly
did not result in casualties. Numerous reports of funnel clouds
were received by officials in Mississippi and tornadoes were
suspected to have caused damage in several Mississippi counties.
In Alabama, the occurrence of two damaging tornadoes has been
confirmed over the mainland while another tornado may have hit
Dauphin Island. As Andrew and its remnants moved northeastward
over the eastern states, it continued to produce severe weather.
For example, several damaging tornadoes in Georgia late on 27
August were attributed to Andrew.

5. Rainfall

Andrew dropped sufficient rain to cause local floods even
though the hurricane was relatively small and generally moved
rather fast. Rainfall totals in excess of seven inches were
recorded in southeast Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi
(Table 2b). Rainfall amounts
near five inches occurred in several neighboring states. Hammond,
Louisiana reported the highest total, 11.92 inches.

c. Casualty and Damage Statistics

Table 3 lists a count of casualties and
damages associated with Andrew. The number of deaths directly attributed to Andrew
is 26. The additional indirect loss of life brought the death toll
to 65 (see footnote 2). A combination of
good hurricane preparedness and evacuation programs likely helped
minimize the loss of life. Nevertheless, the fact that no lives
were lost in the United States due to storm surge is viewed as a
fortunate aberration.

Table 3a reveals that more than one-half of
the fatalities were indirect. Many of the indirect deaths occurred
during the "recovery phase" following Andrew's passage.

Damage is estimated at $25 billion. Andrew's impact on
southern Dade County, Florida was extreme from the Kendall district
southward through Homestead and Florida City, to near Key Largo
(Table 3b). Andrew reportedly destroyed 25,524 homes
and damaged 101,241 others. The Dade County Grand Jury reported that ninety
percent of all mobile homes in south Dade County were totally
destroyed. In Homestead, more than 99% (1167 of 1176) of all
mobile homes were completely destroyed. The Miami Herald reported
$0.5 billion in losses to boats in southeast Florida.

The most devasted areas correspond closely in location to the
regions overspread by Andrew's eyewall and its accompanying core
of destructive winds and, near the coastline, decimating storm surges.
Flight-level data about an hour prior to landfall places the radius of
maximum wind at 11 n mi (in the northern eyewall at 10,000 ft altitude).
The radius of maximum wind at the surface was likely a little less than
11 n mi. (Figure 6) displays a radar reflectivity
pattern (similar to rainfall intensity) about 30 minutes prior to landfall, superimposed
on a map of southern Florida, from which it can be seen that the average
diameter of the "radar" eye was about 11 n mi at landfall.)

The damage to Louisiana is estimated at $1 billion.

Damage in the Bahamas has been estimated at $0.25 billion.

Andrew whipped up powerful seas which extensively damaged many
offshore structures, including the artificial reef system of southeast
Florida. For example, the Belzona Barge is a 215 ft, 350-ton
barge that, prior to Andrew, was sitting in 68 ft of water on the
ocean floor. One thousand tons of concrete from the old Card Sound
bridge lay on the deck. The hurricane moved the barge 700 ft to
the west (50-100 tons of concrete remain on deck) and removed
several large sections of steel plate sidings.

Damage in the Gulf of Mexico is preliminarily estimated at $0.5
billion. Ocean Oil reported the following in the Gulf of Mexico:
13 toppled platforms, five leaning platforms, 21 toppled satellites,
23 leaning satellites, 104 incidents of structural damage,
seven incidents of pollution, two fires, and five drilling wells
blown off location.

Hurricanes are notoriously capricious. Andrew was a compact
system. A little larger system, or one making landfall just a few
nautical miles further to the north, would have been catastrophic
for heavily populated, highly commercialized and no less vulnerable
areas to the north. That area includes downtown Miami, Miami
Beach, Key Biscayne and Fort Lauderdale. Andrew also left the
highly vulnerable New Orleans region relatively unscathed.

d. Forecast and Warning Critique

Track forecast errors by the NHC and by the suite of track
prediction models are given in Table 4.
On average, the NHC errors were about 30% smaller than the current 10-year
average. The most significant changes in Andrew's track and intensity (see
Fig. 1,
Table 1)
were generally well anticipated (noted in NHC's
Tropical Cyclone Discussions) and the forecast tracks generally lie
close to the best track. However, the rate of Andrew's westward
acceleration over the southwestern Atlantic was greater than
initially forecast. In addition, the NHC forecast a rate of
strengthening that was less than what occurred during Andrew's
period of rapid deepening.

Several of the dynamic track models had stellar performances
during this hurricane. The Aviation Model and a tracking routine
that follows a simulated hurricane vortex (AVNO) performed
especially well. However, this was the first storm for which AVNO
output was available to NHC forecasters. Hence, its
operational reliability was not established. The
GFDL and QLM models also had small errors.
It should be pointed out, however, that the NHC works on a six-hourly
forecast cycle and that the models mentioned above are run
just once per 12 hours. Moreover, the output from these models
becomes available to forecasters no earlier than the following six-hour forecast cycle.

Historically, the NHC90 statistical-dynamical model has been
the most accurate of NHC's track guidance models. The NHC90
errors were rather large during Andrew. Because the NHC90 uses
output from the Aviation Model it is possible that the recent
changes in the latter model may be responsible for the NHC90's
degraded performance.

Table 5 lists a chronology of watches
and warnings issued by the National Hurricane Center and the Government of the Bahamas.
The associated lead times (based on landfall of the eye) are given
in Table 6.

Massive evacuations were ordered in Florida and Louisiana as
the likelihood of Andrew making landfall in those regions increased
(Table 7). About 55,000 people left the Florida Keys.
Evacuations were ordered for 517,000 people in Dade County, 300,000 in Broward
County, 315,000 in Palm Beach County and 15,000 in St. Lucie
County. For counties further west in Florida, evacuation totals
exceeding one thousand people are Collier (25,000), Glades (4,000)
and Lee (2,500).

It is estimated that 1,250,000 people evacuated from parishes
in southeastern and south-central Louisiana.

About 250,000 people evacuated from Orange and Jefferson
Counties in Texas.

The winds in Hurricane Andrew wreaked tremendous structural damage, particularly
in southern Dade County. Notwithstanding, the loss of life in
Hurricane Andrew, while very unfortunate, was far less than has
previously occurred in hurricanes of comparable strength. Historical
data suggests that storm surge is the greatest threat to life.
Some lives were likely saved by the evacuation along the coastline
of southeast Florida. The relatively small loss of life there
serves as testimony to the success and importance of coordinated
programs of hurricane preparedness.

Acknowledgments

Much of the data in this summary was provided by NWS
WSFO/WSO reports from
MIA,EYW, MLB, PBI,
TBW,
SIL, BTR,
LCH,
JAN,
BHM,
MOB,
MEM, BPT and
ATL. Sam Houston of the
AOML Hurricane Research Division collected additional
observations. Jerry Kranz of the
NOAA Aircraft Operations Center performed the barometer
calibrations. Martin Nelson provided a summary
on the damages to artificial reefs adjacent to the southeast Florida coast.
Joan David, Stan Goldenberg and Mike Black developed several of
the figures. Sandra Potter helped prepare the manuscript.

[1] When indirect and continuing costs are considered,
the total could ultimately rise to $40 billion, according to a
personal communication from William E. Bailey, Co-Director,
Hurricane Insurance Information Center. Mr. Bailey indicates that
Floridians filed more than 725,000 insurance claims related to
Andrew.

[2] Based on data from the Dade County Medical Examiner.
The Miami Herald reported on 31 January 1993 that it could relate
at least 43 additional (indirect) deaths in Dade County to Hurricane
Andrew.

a NOAA buoys report hourly an 8-min average wind. C-MAN station reports
are 2-min average winds at the top of the hour and 10-min averages at
the other times. Contact NDBC for additional details.

b A more extreme value may have occurred.

c Equipment became inoperable shortly after observation.

Table 3a. Deaths and damages incurred in association with Hurricane Andrew.
Based, in part, on reports from the Dade County Medical Examiner and Louisiana Office of Public
Health for their respective jurisdictions.

Deaths

Damage($ Billion)

Direct

Indirect

Bahamas

3

1

0.25

Florida:

15

29

25

Dade County

15

25

25

Broward County

0

3

0.1

Monroe County

0

1

0.131

Collier County

0

0

0.03

Louisiana:

8

9

1

St. John the Baptist Parish

2

0

Offshore

6

0

Lafayette Parish

0

2

0.017

Vermillion Parish

0

0

0.001

Iberville Parish

0

1

Terrebonne Parish

0

3

Orleans Parish

0

1

Plaquemines Parish

0

1

Iberia Parish

0

1

Georgia

0.001

Total

26

39

26

Note: The Miami Herald reported on 31 January 1993 that it could relate at least 43 additional (indirect)
deaths in Dade County to Hurricane Andrew.

From American Insurance Services Group, Inc., property February 1993 based on major
insurers. Includes homes, mobile homes, commercial and industrial properties and
their contents; boats; autos; farm equipment and structures; "time-element" losses of
living expenses and "business interruption."

2. Uninsured homes

0.35

From The Miami Herald (MH), 16 February 1993 for cost to rebuild.
May not include contents.

3. Government property:

a. Federal Government:

i. Homestead AFB

0.5

From CARCAH

ii. Other

?

b. State Governments

?

c. County Governments

0.287

Uninsured loss to Metro-Dade reported by Audit and Management Services Department
on 25 January 1993.

d. City Governments

?

e. Schools

0.358

MH, 10 September 1992 for K-12, FIU, Dade County CC and UM.
FEMA estimate of $0.06
billion for school repair on 27 February 1993.

4. Agriculture

1.0

MH, 10 September 1992. Part of loss covered in #1. Excludes loss of row crops.

5. Environment:

a. Clean-up

2.0

Amount requested of Federal Government by State of Florida.
FEMA estimate of $0.375
billion on 27 February 1993.