Secretary of State Colin Powell said the U.S.
government is reviewing a three-point policy to deal with
Iraq that involves applying modified U.N. sanctions,
enforcing no-fly zones, and supporting Iraqi opposition
groups.

He said the U.S. government is consulting with the
United Nations, its NATO allies and Arab governments on
dealing with Iraq.

Powell gave a detailed description of
U.S. Iraq policy while testifying before the International
Relations Committee of the House of Representatives March 7.
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde asked Powell whether U.S.
policy is designed to contain or to remove Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein.

Powell said the U.N. sanctions are
designed solely to prevent Saddam from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction, while the enforcement of no-fly zones in
northern and southern Iraq is intended to protect Kurds in
the north and provide warning and protection in the
south.

He said the third part of the policy deals with
regime change in that the U.S. government supports the Iraqi
National Congress and other Iraqi groups seeking the
overthrow of Saddam.

Powell said the U.N. sanctions are
being revamped in a way to continue denying Saddam the
ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction while
avoiding harm to Iraqi civilians and children. Powell said
Iraq's neighbors, moderate Arab governments and the NATO
allies have made initial expressions of support for the
modifications in the U.N. sanctions policy.

Following is
an excerpt related to U.S. Iraq policy from the transcript
of Powell's testimony:

(begin transcript excerpt)

REP.
HYDE: I will ask just one rather short question. Mr.
Secretary, regarding Iraq, what is our policy, to contain
him or to remove him?

SEC. POWELL: There are several
policies really. And let me answer your question by
describing three baskets of things we do. First, we work
within the UN system to make sure he has not developed and
put into his inventory weapons of mass destruction. That is
a result of the resolutions he agreed to at the end of the
Gulf War. That has nothing to do with regime overthrow. That
is not a UN objective, and it is not part of the
oil-for-food program or the sanctions program.

The United
States, working with some of its allies, principally the
United Kingdom, also has a no-fly zone, which is used to
protect the Kurds in the northern part of the country and
also to provide warning and protection in the southern part
of Iraq. Now we have been flying in those no-fly zones for
some time.

The third part of U.S. policy does deal with
regime change. It has been part of the government's policy
for a number of years now to advocate that the country would
be better off without this regime. And to that end and with
the support of the Congress, we have been supporting
organizations that are committed to that proposition. The
principle one, known well to this committee, is the Iraqi
National Congress.

As part of the new administration's
look, we're reviewing all three of those baskets. When we
took office on the 20th of January, and I stepped into the
cockpit to see what was going on, especially with respect to
the sanctions basket as it's called, the UN effort, what I
found was a plane that was descending, and it was on the way
to a crash. The sanctions were starting to fall apart.
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime had successfully put the
burden on us as denying the wherewithal for civilians and
children in Iraq to live and to get the nutrition and the
health care they needed. That was not true, but we had
gotten that burden. And I found that our allies wanted the
sanctions to go off -- some of our allies did. I found
weakening throughout the Gulf region with respect to the
sanctions. I found the Russians wanting to make a serious
change; the Syrians wanting to make a serious change; the UN
wondering if this regime, this sanctions regime can
continue.

So, Mr. Chairman, what I discovered was
something that was collapsing. And what we've been trying to
do for the last six weeks now is to see how we could
stabilize this collapsing situation and find some basis of
stabilization that would bring the coalition back together:
the UN, our Permanent Five colleagues in the UN and the
moderate Arab nations and all others who are concerned about
the Iraqi regime.

And one model we are looking at, the
model I am discussing with all of my colleagues and I
discussed with in other lands and discuss with you today,
begins with this proposition: First, let's stop talking
about what we're doing to the Iraqi children. It's not us;
it's him. Let's start talking about exactly what the
sanctions exist for in the first place, and that's to keep
him from developing weapons of mass destruction. It is not
to hurt his civilian population. It was never the purpose of
it.

The oil-for-food program was put in place to take care
of his civilian needs, but to make sure he did not get
weapons and he did not get materials that could develop
weapons of mass destruction.

So if that was the goal,
let's take a look at how we're applying the sanctions and
make sure the sanctions apply to that goal, and take a hard
look at any other things we are doing within the sanctions
regime that might be denying civilian goods to his
population, and get that off our shoulders as a burden.
Everybody is pointing to us as being responsible for the
problems of the civilian population. If we do that, then,
we, I think, are in a much stronger position, with all of
the coalition members together again, and making it clear in
a way that it cannot be denied by Saddam Hussein or by any
other Arab leaders, make it perfectly clear that the
sanctions are directed at weapons of mass destruction.

I
would not call it an easing of sanctions. What's been
happening is not only an easing of sanctions, it's a verge
of collapse of sanctions. This gives us a new floor that all
can agree to. As I took this idea around the Gulf region, as
I talked to my NATO and United Nations colleagues about it,
I found pretty good support. And in fact, in Syria when I
discussed it with President Assad, who has been calling for
the end of sanctions, he saw some merit in this because he,
too, is concerned about weapons of mass destruction, and
even suggested that if we can move in this direction, he is
willing to put the flow of oil through that pipeline under
U.N. control, which it is now not under.

Another piece of
this policy is to get those front-line states like Syria to
get back under U.N. sanctions control. Another piece of this
policy is to make sure that we understand that at the end of
the day, the only way to get out of this regime of control
of money is for us to be satisfied that no such weapons
exist or are being developed. The inspectors have to go back
in. But we're not going to -- my judgment is we should not
plead with the Iraqi regime to let them in. We put these
tougher sanctions in at a level we all can support. We start
closing down some of the outlets that exist from the
front-line states. And then we let him know this is the way
it's going to be and we're going to keep control of your
money until our inspectors have satisfied themselves. So you
let us know when you're ready to let the inspectors in.

We
also reserve the right under this policy that if and when we
find facilities or other activities going on in Iraq that we
believe are inconsistent with our obligations, we reserve
the right to take military action against such facilities
and will do so. That is the U.N. piece. On the no-fly zone
piece, essentially between us and the United Kingdom.
Secretary Rumsfeld and his associates in the United Kingdom
are reviewing how we are conducting those no-fly-zone
operations to see if we are doing them in the best possible
way to achieve the objective.

With respect to the third
basket, which is regime change and opposition activities,
last week I released more money for the Iraqi National
Congress so they can step up the level of their activity,
and the administration is also undertaking a fuller review
of other things that can be done to support opposition
activities against the regime.

And so that's the approach
we're taking, Mr. Chairman. And we're still in a
consultative stage. It's something that the United Nations
will have to consider. There's an Arab summit coming up, and
we'll have to see what their judgment is. But I think the
characterization that I have sometimes seen that we are
easing up or giving up is quite incorrect. We discovered a
collapsing situation; we're trying to fix that collapsing
situation with respect to the sanctions.

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