Will China Fight Falklands-Style Wars?

HMS Invincible, a British light aircraft carrier, returns from Falklands War

Here is what the Pentagon’s analogy of China and Falkland-Style wars is really about. The PLAN is not yet meeting all necessary criteria. Instead, the analogy tells us the PLAN’s present and future rank in the hierarchy of navies. Although Europe is in decline, Europeans should not bury their heads in the sand yet. There are still useful efforts that can be done.

Does the analogy apply?
The Pentagon’s latest Annual Report to Congress says that China has even more emerging expeditionary naval interests. The Report emphasizes China would seek the capabilities to fight Falklands-Style wars:

The PLA Navy’s goal over the coming decades is to become a stronger regional force that is able to project power across the globe for high-intensity operations over a period of several months, similar to the United Kingdom’s deployment to the South Atlantic to retake the Falkland Islands in the early 1980s. However, logistics and intelligence support remain key obstacles, particularly in the Indian Ocean. — Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013“, Department of Defense, Abbual Report to Congress, p. 38.

However, one can doubt if the historic analogy between the UK in 1982 and China after 2013 does really apply. China has no overseas territories like Britain’s Falklands, Diego Garcia and Pitcairn or France’s Martinique, Reunion and Polynesia. Obviously, the geographical environment in the North and South Atlantic is very different from the Indo-Pacific theater. On the one hand, being under sequester-siege, one can ask, if the US Admirals are overhyping China’s rise to defend their budgets. On the other hand, one can be sure that Pentagon’s officers are aware of what they are talking about when they use analogies. Moreover, when talking about expeditionary campaigns of navies underneath the US full-scale war level, other cases can hardly be found.

Falklands-Style means a carrier centric operation far away from the homeland. Carriers are inevitable necessary for expeditionary campaigns due to the need of air superiority. Moreover, Falklands-Style includes some, but not a lot support from overseas bases. To meet the criteria Falklands-Style, the theater must be out of reach from homeland airbases. Port Stanley was 11.000 kilometers away from London. A Falklands-Style campaign’s ultimate operational target is to bring boots on the ground by amphibious landings. Politically and strategically, the aim is to achieve military superiority over another state in certain geographical areas, but not over a whole country. That would be Iraq-Style. In addition, Falklands-Style does not apply to non-state actors. They are lacking the ability to deliver significant, nearly equal air and sea power as the Argentinians did.

People’s Liberation Army Navy: Struggle hard, to build up a strong Navy, 1977

China’s Falklands-Style capabilities
Applied to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), geographically Falklands-Style means an operation beyond the second Island Chain or “West of Malacca”. However, China does not meet the carrier criteria and it is unlikely to do so before 2020. Moreover, overseas bases are planned, but their operational worth cannot be taken for granted. Gwadar in Pakistan is the PLAN’s only project, which can be taken serious right now. However, in any case of action, Gwadar would have to be supplied by complex air logistics (coming Y-20). Railroads or even useable roads from Pakistan to China just don’t exist.

Beside the two carriers with their 48 Harriers, the Royal Navy’s Task Force included two LPD, eight destroyers, 15 frigates, five nuclear subs (SSN), one conventional sub and dozens of support vessels. In total, Britain sent over a hundred ships. Many of the supply ships were requisited civilian vessels. China’s fleet in 2013 includes one carrier (Liaoning, not yet operational), three LPD, 14 destroyers, 62 frigates, four SSBN, five SSN, 55 conventional subs and 205 logistic and support ships (James Hackett, “The Military Balance 2013“, IISS, p. 289f). Thus, in all cases except the carriers China’s numbers meet or exceed Britain’s Task Force.

Last year, we were introduced to a LHD design that Chinas was offering for export. A couple of months ago, we’ve seen this LHD design displayed for export to Turkey and also at Abu Dhabi. This mysterious design is said to be 211 m long, 32.6 m in beam and 26.8 m high for a displacement of 20,000 to 22,000 ton. It’s a little wider than Type 071 and has a flat top, so it can hold 8 helicopters with the hangar space for 4. This is an increase over Type 071, but I would imagine the first Chinese LHD (let’s call it Type 081) to be much larger than this (30,000 to 40,000 in displacement) and able to hold carry more helicopters and armored vehicles. I personally think PLAN has studied USMC long enough that it would also want the LHD to be able to support STOVL fighter jet. Such a ship would be much more complex than Type 071, but is well within the technical capabilities of Chinese shipyards. — Feng, “PLAN amphibious development“, Information Dissemination, 06.05.2013.

In addition, Falklands-Style campaigns depend on a capable nuclear-powered submarine force. Argentina withdraw its surface fleet after the cruiser Belgrano has been sunk by the SSN HMS Conqueror, which provided the Royal Navy the freedom of action for amphibious landings. If you want your subs to go to places, you need nuclear power. Recently the PLAN has demonstrated that her SSN are able to reach out in the Indian Ocean. In contrast to Royal Air Force 1982, China is incapable to undertake long-range airstrikes in order to support expeditionary operations. Its so-called Xian H-6 “bombers” are a further developed Soviet Tupolev TU-16 aircraft. These are supported by very few aerial refueling capabilities and have no operational experience at all in conducting long-range airstrikes. How much operational experience matters, can be seen in the discussions about the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran.

Finally, Falklands-Style war and expeditionary operations require a lot of operational experience. Officers and crews need to be able to deal with and adjust to frictions immediately. The service(wo)men must have a pragmatic problem-solving attitude, because rapid help from home is unavailable. The Royal Navy had such an over decades gained experience in 1982. China today is slightly working on operation experience by anti-piracy operations, regular drills and friendly ports visits, but is far away from the human skills navies like US or British posses.

“The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the East and South Sea Fleets would be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coast, but could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets.” — Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013“, Department of Defense, Abbual Report to Congress, p. 76.

What the Falklands analogy really tells us
Discussing where Chinese Falkland-Style wars could take place is just like reading tealeaves. Will China raid Diego Garcia or Darwin in case of a fight against the US? Could Pacific Island states, Sri Lanka, the Seychelles or Mauritius somehow become object to PLAN amphibious invasions? Will China strike Persian Gulf or East African countries in order to secure its resources? Neither does anybody know, nor can anybody predict. We will see when we (don’t) get there.

What the analogy really tells us is where China is going in the hierarchy of navies. Geoffrey Till emphasized that the most sophisticated attempt ever undertaken at classifying navies has been done by Eric Grove (Cf.: Geoffrey Till, “Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century“, 14.01.2013, p. 114). In 1990, Grove classified navies from Rank 9 Token to Rank 1 Major Global Force Projection – Complete (Eric Grove, “The Future of Seapower“, 1990, p. 237-240). Of course, Rank 1, until present, was only achieved by the US. Rank 2 Major Global Force Projection – Partial was achieved just one time by the Soviets during the 1980s until 1991/92, but never again thereafter by any country.

Relevant for the given case are Rank 3 Medium Global Force Projection and Rank 4 Medium Regional Force Projection. Rank 3 means that a navy posses at least one carrier, amphibious capabilities, SSBN, SSN and a larger number of surface warships like destroyers and frigates. According to Grove, a Medium Global Force Projection Navy would “be capable of conducting one major ‘out of area operation and (…) would be capable of engaging in high-level naval operations in closer ocean areas” (Grove 1990: 238). Thus, Britain in 1982 has to be understood as a Rank 3 case.

Grove considered the PLAN to be a Rank 4 Medium Regional Force Projection case (Grove 1990: 238). With no carriers or expeditionary amphibious capabilities, the PLAN was able by its submarines and surface warships to exercise maritime power in the West Pacific, but not beyond.

The Pentagon’s Annual Report is talking about China to “become a stronger regional force that is able to project power across the globe for high-intensity operations over a period of several months” (p. 38). Hence, the Pentagon’s analysis matches exactly with Grove’s criteria (surprise, surprise???). Most remarkable is that even in 1990 Grove foresaw that China could become a candidate for Rank 3 “in the medium to long term” and could even move “into Rank 2, but not for several decades” (Grove 1990: 238). Now – 23 years after Grove’s excellent classification – China is on the way to move (sic!) from Rank 4 to 3. However, it is not there yet. The criteria for operational carriers is not fulfilled. Moreover, the main reason why I personally would not rank into no. 3 is that China’s military has no combat experience since 1979. Therefore, what the Pentagon’s analogy and Grove’s classification tell us, is how hard it is to climb up the Ranks in the hierarchy of navies.

How Europe should react
China’s expeditionary ambitions are more looking west- than eastwards. As the Report outlines, Beijing’s areas of concern are the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and even the Mediterranean. The Times of India, for example, reported something similar:

(…), and the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is expected to grow. David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador in Africa, expects China’s navy to make more frequent visits to port cities across the Indian Ocean – in South Asia, the southern Middle East and on the east coast of Africa – within the next 10 years and to expand its reach to North African ports on the Mediterranean Sea. — “China and India’s rivalry extends to the Arctic“, The Times of India, 08.05.2013.

Thus, Europeans should pay as much or even more attention than the US to what the Chinese are doing. Given that the US really continues to retreat from the Middle East, the Western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will become an area of major concern in particular for Europe.

Instead of living in the world of political correctness and talk about utopian ideas, so said in May by German EU-Commissioner Günter Oettinger, many Eurocrats from the Brussels Bubble must abandon their geostrategic blindness. Except themselves, in real life nobody outside Europe cares about that the EU is promoting human right, environmental protection and gender equality. Europe will never ever become an international actor, which is taken serious on other continents, as long as geopolitical, geostrategic and strategic thinking does only exist in Paris and London. Therefore, it is not a surprise, that China’s media scoffs about European decline and tells the Europeans to shut up.

However, there is no need for unconditional surrender. Many useful things can be done today. Maritime cooperation between NATO and China has already started and seems to work. Thus, this program should be continued and extended to build mutual trust. Moreover, the Chinese and European interests for safe and secure sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean are the same. Some kind of permanent maritime security cooperation, maybe even including India, would absolutely make sense.

To implement this, Europeans must preserve a Rank 3 status as Medium Global Force Projection Navy; either uni-/bilaterally by France and Britain or by a broader European coalition. If Europe would be unable to deliver significant maritime power eye on eye with China, leaders in Beijing with command over a Rank 3 navy (maybe moving towards Rank 2) would tell the Europeans to shut up, when Brussels would call for a “political solution” or “multilateral dialogue” about the Indian Ocean.

Britain and France will continue their fight not to drop down to Rank 4. The UK’s coming Queen-Elizabeth-Carriers are definitely a boost to British (and European) power projection capabilities. However, the economic and financial situation raises large question marks, if both countries will be able to sustain their levels of defense spending. Especially in France. Other than London, Paris has not undertaken any serious cuts yet. Needless to say that France’s terrifying financial and economic situation will bring the question of cutting defense spending on the table. The most likely scenario is that Britain and France will continue to go together, whenever they cannot go alone. However, due to harsh cuts in the French military budget, the time could come, where Anglo-French cooperation will not be enough anymore. Without any US military bailout insight. Pivotal for Europe’s future as a maritime power is, whether countries like the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and in particular Germany are more willing to pool and share substantially and to go to places together.

2 Responses to Will China Fight Falklands-Style Wars?

Felix, you’re doing well at dissecting the problem of historic analogy. In general, I would always say that taking historical examples 1:1 is a problematic approach, for history – as we know – does not repeat itself. At the same time, the Falkland War example is instructive for the question just how a force from 1,000s of miles away would re-take/liberate an island (or territory similiar to that) that has been taken over by a competitor state. In my view, the analogy is not about if and how much Wester Pacific islands resemble the British outpost in the South Atlantic, and how much of 1982 will be relevant in the year 20… (if at all); rather, it is important to note just how a potential grave escalation (invasion, take-over, breach of international law, etc.) could and should be contained or repelled. This is the back-story to what naval strategists and political planners will have to keep in mind, for the Falkland War does remain as one of the last state-on-state naval war examples. (cross-posted comment at Seidlers Sicherheitspolitik and CIMSEC)