22.03.2013The ex-President of Moldova, Chairman of the Communist Party MP Vladimir Voronin says he doesn’t really see a particular need for holding consultations with the Liberal Democratic Party to launch the procedure of discharging Parliament Speaker Marian Lupu.

Unlike Rosca, other Moldovan politicians and political scientists preferred to not comment rumors about the new Russian plan of Transnistrian conflict settlement – at least because none of them held the document in hands, or could read whatever official publications confirming its existence.

As for Iurie Rosca, he published his comments because he is the most unbending opponent to an early parliamentary election. His Christian Democratic Popular Party nowadays feels quite cozy in the Communists-dominated parliament, playing the role of a ‘constructive opposition’, with the party chairman sitting in the Parliament Presidium and with a possibility to use the valuable administrative resource, including during preparation to elections.

Judging by local papers, upon the recent memorable privatization of the Chisinau municipal electronic mass media, the Rosca’s CDPP received at its disposal the EuroTV channel, and hopes to actively use it in the just started local election campaign to thus get better prepared to the future political battles and brighten up the somewhat tarnished CDPP image.

Yet the CDPP leader would not agree with such assertions, and is actively trying to prove the opposite already in this year’s local election campaign. Two years ago, for the sake of avoiding an early election, this extreme Right-wing political formation merged into an alliance with its former mortal political enemies – the Communists. And it seems that even now, 2 years after the previous polls, the CDPP continues to hate the very thought of a possible early election.

The ruling Communist Party, on the contrary, is not afraid of elections. Rumors are circulating in the local press that President Vladimir Voronin has, allegedly, stated that, if need be, he stands ready to act as a bulldozer to clear the way in parliament to adopting any decisions or documents necessary for the Transnistrian conflict settlement.

In plainer words, the head of state fully realizes that the Plan implementation will require titanic efforts – including maybe to amend the Constitution and much of the existing legal frame in the republic. Naturally, the ruling Communist Party may decide to start all this, bearing in mind that yet in 2001 the country reintegration was declared by the victorious Communists as their chief strategic priority.

Despite all failures in the re-integration question, this objective would remain invariably the key – unlike other priorities that were revised quite often. Voronin even stated once that for the sake of resolving the Transnistrian dispute, he is ready to tender resignation. This was said during his first tenure, and extraordinary steps are by far more topical now, when his second mandate has already passed its equator.

Despite the continuing differences between the power and the opposition (both constructive and non-constructive), nobody can overtly stand up against a scenario giving a real chance to settle the Transnistria problem. That’s apparently why most local politicians are being silent, scrutinizing the situation.

Besides this, they fully understand that Moldova is in the middle of Europe, at least geographically, and cannot solve any problems by ignoring its own legislation. But by Law, the realization of the Plan is almost impossible, even if President Voronin himself bulldozered it through the Parliament. Yes he is able to persuade the loyal parliamentary majority and the ‘constructive opposition’. But the Republic of Moldova has long ago created a substantially efficient leverage to preserve the stability of laws and the inviolability of constitutional principles. Any amendment of the Constitution requires minimum 1.5 years, so an early election would only be possible at best in early 2009, i.e. by the time when the next ordinary election campaign is due.

Besides this, the implementation of the Plan is substantially restrained by the package of acts passed by the Moldovan Parliament on June 10, 2005. These documents stipulate principles of defining a future status for Transnistria. They are based on the so-called [Ukrainian President] Yushenko Plan, which is substantially different from what Moscow is proposing now. The Moldovan Parliament may indeed begin saying that some sections of the 1994 Constitution are outdated and need to be perfected. But the forum will certainly find it difficult to substantiate the ignoring of laws it itself adopted only 2 years ago with a full consensus of all deputies of the current Parliament.

By the way, the realization of all these acts (or, more precisely, their non-realization) will be the topic of debates at special hearings the Parliament has scheduled for this June, i.e. by the 2nd anniversary of the adoption of the above-mentioned laws on Transnistrian settlement.
They openly say in both Moscow and Tiraspol that on June 10, 2005 the Moldovan Parliament drove itself into a corner: without consulting Russia or Transnistria, Chisinau passed a package of documents that unilaterally determined the principles of a future status for Transnistria, and has thus closed the door to compromises through negotiations of the sides concerned. By the way, the authors of such assertions do not highlight that the 2005 documents have things in common with both the Yushenko Plan and the new Moscow’s proposals – in particular in what pertains the neutrality of Moldova.
Besides the Moldovan legislation that may upset the Plan realization, there still exists Transnistria, whose leaders are not in a hurry, either, to comment the new initiatives. They are largely dependent on Moscow, and their position may become quite favorable with respect to Chisinau if only the Kremlin says so. The Russian press even wrote that Moscow was restricting its funding for Transnistria to provoke the local population’s discontent in order to replace Igor Smirnov with a more tractable leader.
However, there is a multitude of other politicians in Transnistria who have an irreconcilable position with regard to Chisinau. Also, there exists a powerful propaganda machine doing an excellent brainwashing work last 16 years, preparing the populace to a war against Moldova rather than to re-unification with it. And there exist many other objective factors disregarded by the new Plan.
Presently, few are able to remember that last several years saw many other interesting proposals similar to the ones present in the Plan in question, and these include not only the Kozak Memorandum. Perhaps one of the brightest was the initiative put forth in February 2003 by President Vladimir Voronin, who offered to work out a new Constitution of a unified state. The two conflicting sides even set up a joint constitution drafting commission that included Chisinau and Tiraspol representative. The Transnistrian delegation to the commission was headed by the incumbent chairman of the Transnistrian supreme soviet [parliament], Yevgeny Shevchuk. The commission worked out a whole Chapter and several dozen Articles for the would-be Constitution, but the work came to a standstill when the drafters approached the question of status for Transnistria.
By the way, that memorable proposal by Voronin’s looked much better-thought, and envisaged stages of the conflict settlement, including the adoption of a constitution through organizing a referendum on both Dniester banks and through holding an early parliamentary election in late 2003 – early 2004. That project, however, envisaged the formation of a bicameral parliament, several administrative-territorial units, and a federative system in Moldova.
Those proposals earned understanding by the mediators to the negotiation process, and U.S. Ambassador Pamela Smith even convened a special news conference to convince journalists that federalization was expedient for Moldova. In the fall of that year, when that project collapsed, Moscow stood up with the so-called Kozak Memorandum, after which the idea of building a federation or confederation with Transnistria was unanimously rejected by the Moldovan political class.
Those who are speaking of the new Russian Plan these days, are preferring to avoid the question of a state system for Moldova, though it is perfectly clear that when, and if, it comes to a detailed discussion of the Plan, this question will inevitably emerge. May be, that’s why the West showed a very cautious reaction to the rumors about the new Plan, which was not agreed upon in the 5+2 format.
To a certain extent, the situation is repeating that emerged in 2003, when, in Voronin’s words, the Russian Federation promised to coordinate its proposals with the Western partners but failed to, and that served the chief reason why the Kozak Memorandum was rejected.
It’s pretty hard to say if the new Moscow Plan really exists or not. But it is obvious that the OSCE, the United States and the European Union learned about it from the press or from some unofficial sources. At any rate, at the April 23 informal meeting with journalists the Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Moldova, Cesare de Montis, was sincerely surprised to hear about the new Russian Plan.
The same reaction was demonstrated by the OSCE, including by the Organization’s Spanish Chairman-in-Office. And the final line under those informal discussions was drawn by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, David Kramer, who is the U.S. observer at the 5+2 Transnistria negotiations. Visiting Chisinau last week, Kramer made necessary inquiries about the issue, and expressed confidence that there existed no Moscow Plan as such. Kramer said that he had held meetings with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, with Deputy Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Andrei Stratan, and with Minister of Reintegration Vasile Sova, and all them assured him Moldova had not received such a document.
And, still, the American diplomat is not ruling out completely the existence of such Plan. However, upon the assessments given, it is becoming clear that the realization of such a document is hardly possible.
(To be cont’d)