Below are highlights of the discussion, featuring a question posed to each panelist by event moderator Shaka Ssali, host of “Straight Talk Africa,” who also invited the online and in-person audience to answer the same questions in live polling. AGI experts will comment on the poll results in a forthcoming post.

What type of financing is most needed to catalyze development in Africa?

“When it comes to more financing,” Sy said, “Africa has really got more external financing. Over the past 20 years, for example, foreign direct investment has been multiplied 30 times. So we’ve been receiving much more private capital. When it comes to aid, unfortunately the promises of Gleneagles have not been really fulfilled. So aid is on a downward trend.”

Plus, he argued, while “private capital flows and remittances on an upward trend,” we “have to be careful” because the money is going to a very few sectors, such as natural resources.

Concerning “better financing,” Sy noted that many countries are avoiding financing flows that are considered volatile, instead favoring long term financing. Still, since 2006, $15 billion in Eurobonds have been issued by African countries.

Sy emphasized a few key questions:

How does the money really benefit development?

How does the money really lead to increasing jobs?

How can the money we get really lead to Africa better fulfilling its development objectives?

How does Africa insert itself into this global value chain?

Will Africa see increased peace and security in 2015?

Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, director of research in Foreign Policy and the Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair in International Security, broke the question down into three categories of violence—terrorism, civil war, and crime—and then by region.

On terrorism, he said “trends are not good” (though with regional variations) and “Exhibit A on why we have to worry” is Boko Haram in Nigeria. He called civil war “a mixed picture,” with progress in some places and “backsliding or failure to take the next step in places like Sudan.” O’Hanlon also observed that Nigeria is “prone to civil warfare.” There is a slightly positive note: The state of civil war in Africa is “a little better in this decade than they have often been in previous decades.” Importantly, O’Hanlon said crime, which he called “the silent scourge in much of Africa,” “is the issue we don’t talk about enough and African governments need help strengthening their internal ability to control crime.” While there is gradual progress in addressing the lack of economic opportunity, underdevelopment, poor education and other conditions that reinforce crime, “I don’t think we’re doing enough,” he said.

Regionally, O’Hanlon characterized the Horn of Africa (despite the tragedy in Kenya), as “a little better” because of recent successes in curbing al-Shabab: “Somalia ironically is one of the good news stories.” Central northern Africa “doesn’t look better as we had hoped,” he said, due to the “disappointment” of Sudan and South Sudan. In western Africa, O’Hanlon noted his biggest worry: “It is all about Nigeria,” the “giant of west Africa.” Regarding another hot spot, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, O’Hanlon called the central government in Kinshasa “still weak and not necessarily distinguishing itself as a legitimate and truly unifying force in the country.” Finally, on southern Africa, O’Hanlon noted the good news that there is not a lot of terrorism or civil warfare, “but unfortunately there is still plenty of crime.”

Rate the national and international response to the Ebola crisis

Nonresident Senior Fellow Vera Songwe discussed the national and international responses to the Ebola crisis emphasizing that the national and international responses should not be rated the same. “In countries where we saw the Ebola virus quickly contained,” she observed, “we got a lot of leadership.” She pointed to good leadership, governance, and communication in Senegal, Nigeria, and Uganda (in a past outbreak). But in Guinea, for example, she explained that the virus hit rural areas that did not have the educational framework to quickly contain it. The private sector and civil society, too, played important roles in countries like Senegal to contain the spread of disease. “This is one of the first cases,” she said, “where the responses in terms of the private sector and capital flows into Africa begins to link up—we see logistics working, we see private sector working, we see [information and communications technology] and information working. So at that national level I think things worked quite well.”

Songwe noted two issues with the international response: Who was going to be first responder and what was the coordinating mechanism? “This was where the international response was maybe slow to act,” she said. While the World Health Organization is the repository of the technical and medical protocols, the IMF and World Bank would respond from the financial side. Plus, the international community, including the United States, made financial commitments. “How do you collect those resources,” she asked. “There is no international emergency response resource institution.”

Although “at the international level the coordination was slow to come,” she said, “there is now a concerted, coordinated effort around [it].”

How is the African Union doing?

Senior Fellow Mwangi Kimenyi, former director of the Africa Growth Initiative, called the AU a “very important institution” that “I would like to see succeed.” He cited the fact that African economies are small, and that Africa “has a very small voice globally.” So, “this tells us that we need to think about working together as a continent, having an institution that can represent all the countries,” Kimenyi added. The AU is also very important, he said, in terms of coordinating security and regional integration.

However, “what we need to do for an imagined continent,” he said, “is that we really need to reform the AU.” Kimenyi cited a few cases where the AU could do better, such as coordinating the response to Ebola, leading peacekeeping in places like Central African Republic (where France took the lead), and reforming the AU’s leadership, which is currently rotational and allowed anti-democratic leaders to take the helm.

Has President Obama fulfilled his potential in harnessing U.S.-Africa relations?

Nonresident Senior Fellow Witney Schneidman characterized President Obama’s legacy as “still very much a work in progress.” While he “raised expectations quite significantly” by visiting Ghana very early in his administration, Schneidman said, “that was sort of it for the next four years” as the president dealt with an economic crisis at home, unwinding from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and political heat at home. Then, Schneidman explained, President Obama’s 2013 trip to Africa produced three initiatives: Power Africa; Trade Africa; and the Young African Leaders Initiative, which he called “probably the most exciting initiative which is focused on engaging Africa’s next generation of leaders.”

These three plus the Feed the Future program launched in 2009, Schneidman said, have all featured the private sector from the beginning, “so no longer are we treating Africa as this strange market that you might want to invest in.” The Obama administration, he said, “has done a good job of working with the U.S. private sector to put this issue at the forefront,” an approach exemplified by the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014.

Despite this progress, Schneidman added that “the work in progress is still quite significant.” He cited a number of issues that still need to be addressed, including:

the critical importance of extending AGOA, which if it expires in September 2015 would “be a big setback for U.S.-Africa commercial engagement”;

competition from the European Union, which has signed economic partnership agreements with 33 African countries that “will put U.S. companies at a serious commercial disadvantage once they come into force”;

the EU’s free trade agreement with South Africa “that’s already putting U.S. companies at a serious disadvantage”;

security, including the Bush administration’s inadequately coordinated rollout of Africom and the Obama administration’s “missed opportunity” to have a security dialogue with heads of state and ministers of defense; and

Authors

Fred Dews

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Fri, 16 Jan 2015 15:21:00 -0500Fred Dews
On Thursday, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion with leading experts on the most important challenges the continent faces in 2015. The event marked the official launch of AGI's annual report, “Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2015.”
Below are highlights of the discussion, featuring a question posed to each panelist by event moderator Shaka Ssali, host of “Straight Talk Africa,” who also invited the online and in-person audience to answer the same questions in live polling. AGI experts will comment on the poll results in a forthcoming post.
What type of financing is most needed to catalyze development in Africa?
Amadou Sy, director of the Africa Growth Initiative, posed two key questions: How do we get more financing? And, how do we get better financing?
“When it comes to more financing,” Sy said, “Africa has really got more external financing. Over the past 20 years, for example, foreign direct investment has been multiplied 30 times. So we've been receiving much more private capital. When it comes to aid, unfortunately the promises of Gleneagles have not been really fulfilled. So aid is on a downward trend.”
Plus, he argued, while “private capital flows and remittances on an upward trend,” we “have to be careful” because the money is going to a very few sectors, such as natural resources.
Concerning “better financing,” Sy noted that many countries are avoiding financing flows that are considered volatile, instead favoring long term financing. Still, since 2006, $15 billion in Eurobonds have been issued by African countries.
Sy emphasized a few key questions:
- How does the money really benefit development? - How does the money really lead to increasing jobs? - How can the money we get really lead to Africa better fulfilling its development objectives? - How does Africa insert itself into this global value chain?
Will Africa see increased peace and security in 2015?
Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon, director of research in Foreign Policy and the Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair in International Security, broke the question down into three categories of violence—terrorism, civil war, and crime—and then by region.
On terrorism, he said “trends are not good” (though with regional variations) and “Exhibit A on why we have to worry” is Boko Haram in Nigeria. He called civil war “a mixed picture,” with progress in some places and “backsliding or failure to take the next step in places like Sudan.” O'Hanlon also observed that Nigeria is “prone to civil warfare.” There is a slightly positive note: The state of civil war in Africa is “a little better in this decade than they have often been in previous decades.” Importantly, O'Hanlon said crime, which he called “the silent scourge in much of Africa,” “is the issue we don't talk about enough and African governments need help strengthening their internal ability to control crime.” While there is gradual progress in addressing the lack of economic opportunity, underdevelopment, poor education and other conditions that reinforce crime, “I don't think we're doing enough,” he said.
Regionally, O'Hanlon characterized the Horn of Africa (despite the tragedy in Kenya), as “a little better” because of recent successes in curbing al-Shabab: “Somalia ironically is one of the good news stories.” Central northern Africa “doesn't look better as we had hoped,” he said, due to the “disappointment” of Sudan and South Sudan. In western Africa, O'Hanlon noted his biggest worry: “It is all about Nigeria,” the “giant of west Africa.” Regarding another hot spot, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, O'Hanlon called the central government in Kinshasa “still weak and not ... On Thursday, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion with leading experts on the most important challenges the continent faces in 2015. The event marked the official launch of AGI's annual report, “

Below are highlights of the discussion, featuring a question posed to each panelist by event moderator Shaka Ssali, host of “Straight Talk Africa,” who also invited the online and in-person audience to answer the same questions in live polling. AGI experts will comment on the poll results in a forthcoming post.

What type of financing is most needed to catalyze development in Africa?

“When it comes to more financing,” Sy said, “Africa has really got more external financing. Over the past 20 years, for example, foreign direct investment has been multiplied 30 times. So we’ve been receiving much more private capital. When it comes to aid, unfortunately the promises of Gleneagles have not been really fulfilled. So aid is on a downward trend.”

Plus, he argued, while “private capital flows and remittances on an upward trend,” we “have to be careful” because the money is going to a very few sectors, such as natural resources.

Concerning “better financing,” Sy noted that many countries are avoiding financing flows that are considered volatile, instead favoring long term financing. Still, since 2006, $15 billion in Eurobonds have been issued by African countries.

Sy emphasized a few key questions:

How does the money really benefit development?

How does the money really lead to increasing jobs?

How can the money we get really lead to Africa better fulfilling its development objectives?

How does Africa insert itself into this global value chain?

Will Africa see increased peace and security in 2015?

Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, director of research in Foreign Policy and the Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair in International Security, broke the question down into three categories of violence—terrorism, civil war, and crime—and then by region.

On terrorism, he said “trends are not good” (though with regional variations) and “Exhibit A on why we have to worry” is Boko Haram in Nigeria. He called civil war “a mixed picture,” with progress in some places and “backsliding or failure to take the next step in places like Sudan.” O’Hanlon also observed that Nigeria is “prone to civil warfare.” There is a slightly positive note: The state of civil war in Africa is “a little better in this decade than they have often been in previous decades.” Importantly, O’Hanlon said crime, which he called “the silent scourge in much of Africa,” “is the issue we don’t talk about enough and African governments need help strengthening their internal ability to control crime.” While there is gradual progress in addressing the lack of economic opportunity, underdevelopment, poor education and other conditions that reinforce crime, “I don’t think we’re doing enough,” he said.

Regionally, O’Hanlon characterized the Horn of Africa (despite the tragedy in Kenya), as “a little better” because of recent successes in curbing al-Shabab: “Somalia ironically is one of the good news stories.” Central northern Africa “doesn’t look better as we had hoped,” he said, due to the “disappointment” of Sudan and South Sudan. In western Africa, O’Hanlon noted his biggest worry: “It is all about Nigeria,” the “giant of west Africa.” Regarding another hot spot, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, O’Hanlon called the central government in Kinshasa “still weak and not necessarily distinguishing itself as a legitimate and truly unifying force in the country.” Finally, on southern Africa, O’Hanlon noted the good news that there is not a lot of terrorism or civil warfare, “but unfortunately there is still plenty of crime.”

Rate the national and international response to the Ebola crisis

Nonresident Senior Fellow Vera Songwe discussed the national and international responses to the Ebola crisis emphasizing that the national and international responses should not be rated the same. “In countries where we saw the Ebola virus quickly contained,” she observed, “we got a lot of leadership.” She pointed to good leadership, governance, and communication in Senegal, Nigeria, and Uganda (in a past outbreak). But in Guinea, for example, she explained that the virus hit rural areas that did not have the educational framework to quickly contain it. The private sector and civil society, too, played important roles in countries like Senegal to contain the spread of disease. “This is one of the first cases,” she said, “where the responses in terms of the private sector and capital flows into Africa begins to link up—we see logistics working, we see private sector working, we see [information and communications technology] and information working. So at that national level I think things worked quite well.”

Songwe noted two issues with the international response: Who was going to be first responder and what was the coordinating mechanism? “This was where the international response was maybe slow to act,” she said. While the World Health Organization is the repository of the technical and medical protocols, the IMF and World Bank would respond from the financial side. Plus, the international community, including the United States, made financial commitments. “How do you collect those resources,” she asked. “There is no international emergency response resource institution.”

Although “at the international level the coordination was slow to come,” she said, “there is now a concerted, coordinated effort around [it].”

How is the African Union doing?

Senior Fellow Mwangi Kimenyi, former director of the Africa Growth Initiative, called the AU a “very important institution” that “I would like to see succeed.” He cited the fact that African economies are small, and that Africa “has a very small voice globally.” So, “this tells us that we need to think about working together as a continent, having an institution that can represent all the countries,” Kimenyi added. The AU is also very important, he said, in terms of coordinating security and regional integration.

However, “what we need to do for an imagined continent,” he said, “is that we really need to reform the AU.” Kimenyi cited a few cases where the AU could do better, such as coordinating the response to Ebola, leading peacekeeping in places like Central African Republic (where France took the lead), and reforming the AU’s leadership, which is currently rotational and allowed anti-democratic leaders to take the helm.

Has President Obama fulfilled his potential in harnessing U.S.-Africa relations?

Nonresident Senior Fellow Witney Schneidman characterized President Obama’s legacy as “still very much a work in progress.” While he “raised expectations quite significantly” by visiting Ghana very early in his administration, Schneidman said, “that was sort of it for the next four years” as the president dealt with an economic crisis at home, unwinding from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and political heat at home. Then, Schneidman explained, President Obama’s 2013 trip to Africa produced three initiatives: Power Africa; Trade Africa; and the Young African Leaders Initiative, which he called “probably the most exciting initiative which is focused on engaging Africa’s next generation of leaders.”

These three plus the Feed the Future program launched in 2009, Schneidman said, have all featured the private sector from the beginning, “so no longer are we treating Africa as this strange market that you might want to invest in.” The Obama administration, he said, “has done a good job of working with the U.S. private sector to put this issue at the forefront,” an approach exemplified by the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014.

Despite this progress, Schneidman added that “the work in progress is still quite significant.” He cited a number of issues that still need to be addressed, including:

the critical importance of extending AGOA, which if it expires in September 2015 would “be a big setback for U.S.-Africa commercial engagement”;

competition from the European Union, which has signed economic partnership agreements with 33 African countries that “will put U.S. companies at a serious commercial disadvantage once they come into force”;

the EU’s free trade agreement with South Africa “that’s already putting U.S. companies at a serious disadvantage”;

security, including the Bush administration’s inadequately coordinated rollout of Africom and the Obama administration’s “missed opportunity” to have a security dialogue with heads of state and ministers of defense; and

On December 16, the anniversary of the outbreak of violence in South Sudan, Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice published an op-ed in The Washington Post calling for stronger leadership from South Sudan’s top officials in ending the ongoing violence there. Kerry and Rice rightly plead with the country’s leaders, arguing for transparency, inclusive growth, and improved governance, among other ambitions. They recognize, though, that the country cannot grow without peace and reconciliation. They affirm:

“After months of delay and false pledges, both sides must return to negotiations, make necessary compromises and finally end this conflict without further delay. Barren vows and rosy words are not enough; too many people have died while too many promises have been broken. It is past time for South Sudan’s leaders to take responsibility and end the fighting.”

The fighting in this fledgling country was sparked one year ago by the accusation by President Salva Kiir of an attempted coup by the then-recently-sacked vice president, Riek Machar. This event was not necessarily a surprise, as President Kiir had fired his entire cabinet earlier that summer over tension between himself and Machar. As Africa Growth Initiative Senior Fellow Mwangi Kimenyi and Guest Scholar Josephine Kibe warned five months before the violence:

“The future of South Sudan does not look good and, unless there are concerted efforts to assist the state in building institutions and in accelerating economic and human development programs, the story of this young state will soon be yet another post-independence African tragedy.”

And so, in the days that followed Kiir’s announcement, violence quickly spread throughout the capital of Juba and spilled over into the rest of the country. It has since transformed into a bloody civil war, with undertones of ethnic divisions—as Kiir is an ethnic Dinka and Machar, a Nuer.

How Might We Get Peace in South Sudan?

On-and-off talks between the leaders, moderated by East African leaders and the regional authority Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have failed to broker a deal. In fact, in November of this year, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalgen stated that there “appears to be little appetite for peace.” This news is particularly troublesome because, while the violence has tapered over the last few months, many expect it to ramp up again as the rainy season ends.

Thus, Kerry and Rice’s entreaty is a welcome (though belated) one. Importantly, their conciliatory tone does not reflect the fact the United States does have sanctions against leaders on both sides and may work through the United Nations to impose international sanctions: The United States has shown grave concern for the country during this time. Similarly, Brookings scholars have been calling for leadership, peace and transparency in South Sudan for years.

“As the citizens of South Sudan watch and wait in utter fear and disgust, it is time for you, the country’s leaders, to decide whether you want to lead them into a future filled with unending violence, hunger, and desolation, or into one where all of the country’s various peoples, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, gender, and economic status, can live together peacefully and pursue their values and interests without molestation from others.”

Mbaku tells them to step aside and “provide the country’s new crop of leaders with the type of advice and support that can help the country successfully emerge from its violent and destructive past, as well as chart a path towards peace, sustainable economic growth and development.”

Similarly, earlier this year in an Africa in Focus blog, Peter Biar Ajak, founder and director of the think tank Center for Strategic Analysis and Research in South Sudan, noted that there are three likely scenarios for peace: victory by the government, a power sharing deal involving Kiir and Machar, and an interim government involving neither. Because military victory by the government would likely fail in creating a real reconciliation process, and a coalition government with Kiir and Machar would likely fall apart again, Ajak also argues that a government including both sides—but without those specific leaders—might be the best answer. Even this scenario is dangerous, though, in that it might set a precedent for the overthrow of the government or the country might collapse under “local strongmen.” In any case, Ajak states, “With the commitment of the region and international community, an interim government could give South Sudan a chance of starting over and embarking on a reconciliation process.”

Authors

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Tue, 16 Dec 2014 13:36:00 -0500Amadou Sy
On December 16, the anniversary of the outbreak of violence in South Sudan, Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice published an op-ed in The Washington Post calling for stronger leadership from South Sudan's top officials in ending the ongoing violence there. Kerry and Rice rightly plead with the country's leaders, arguing for transparency, inclusive growth, and improved governance, among other ambitions. They recognize, though, that the country cannot grow without peace and reconciliation. They affirm:
“After months of delay and false pledges, both sides must return to negotiations, make necessary compromises and finally end this conflict without further delay. Barren vows and rosy words are not enough; too many people have died while too many promises have been broken. It is past time for South Sudan's leaders to take responsibility and end the fighting.”
The fighting in this fledgling country was sparked one year ago by the accusation by President Salva Kiir of an attempted coup by the then-recently-sacked vice president, Riek Machar. This event was not necessarily a surprise, as President Kiir had fired his entire cabinet earlier that summer over tension between himself and Machar. As Africa Growth Initiative Senior Fellow Mwangi Kimenyi and Guest Scholar Josephine Kibe warned five months before the violence:
“The future of South Sudan does not look good and, unless there are concerted efforts to assist the state in building institutions and in accelerating economic and human development programs, the story of this young state will soon be yet another post-independence African tragedy.”
And so, in the days that followed Kiir's announcement, violence quickly spread throughout the capital of Juba and spilled over into the rest of the country. It has since transformed into a bloody civil war, with undertones of ethnic divisions—as Kiir is an ethnic Dinka and Machar, a Nuer.
As Kerry and Rice note in their piece, thousands of people have died in the conflict (10,000 according to The Wall Street Journal) and about 2 million have been displaced. In a country where the life expectancy is barely 55 and only 25 percent of people have access to health services, this violence is devastating. In addition, it disrupts agriculture, greatly threatening the food security of the citizens of South Sudan.
How Might We Get Peace in South Sudan?
On-and-off talks between the leaders, moderated by East African leaders and the regional authority Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have failed to broker a deal. In fact, in November of this year, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalgen stated that there “appears to be little appetite for peace.” This news is particularly troublesome because, while the violence has tapered over the last few months, many expect it to ramp up again as the rainy season ends.
Thus, Kerry and Rice's entreaty is a welcome (though belated) one. Importantly, their conciliatory tone does not reflect the fact the United States does have sanctions against leaders on both sides and may work through the United Nations to impose international sanctions: The United States has shown grave concern for the country during this time. Similarly, Brookings scholars have been calling for leadership, peace and transparency in South Sudan for years.
In fact, earlier this year, in a blog entitled “Dear South Sudan's Leaders,” my colleague Nonresident Senior Fellow John Mukum Mbaku demanded that Kiir and Machar demonstrate leadership, stating:
“As the citizens of South Sudan watch and wait in utter fear and disgust, it is time for you, the country's leaders, to decide whether you want to lead them into a future filled with unending violence, hunger, and desolation, or into one where all of the country's various peoples, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, gender, and economic status, ...
On December 16, the anniversary of the outbreak of violence in South Sudan, Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice published an op-ed in The Washington Post calling for stronger leadership from South Sudan's top ...

On December 16, the anniversary of the outbreak of violence in South Sudan, Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice published an op-ed in The Washington Post calling for stronger leadership from South Sudan’s top officials in ending the ongoing violence there. Kerry and Rice rightly plead with the country’s leaders, arguing for transparency, inclusive growth, and improved governance, among other ambitions. They recognize, though, that the country cannot grow without peace and reconciliation. They affirm:

“After months of delay and false pledges, both sides must return to negotiations, make necessary compromises and finally end this conflict without further delay. Barren vows and rosy words are not enough; too many people have died while too many promises have been broken. It is past time for South Sudan’s leaders to take responsibility and end the fighting.”

The fighting in this fledgling country was sparked one year ago by the accusation by President Salva Kiir of an attempted coup by the then-recently-sacked vice president, Riek Machar. This event was not necessarily a surprise, as President Kiir had fired his entire cabinet earlier that summer over tension between himself and Machar. As Africa Growth Initiative Senior Fellow Mwangi Kimenyi and Guest Scholar Josephine Kibe warned five months before the violence:

“The future of South Sudan does not look good and, unless there are concerted efforts to assist the state in building institutions and in accelerating economic and human development programs, the story of this young state will soon be yet another post-independence African tragedy.”

And so, in the days that followed Kiir’s announcement, violence quickly spread throughout the capital of Juba and spilled over into the rest of the country. It has since transformed into a bloody civil war, with undertones of ethnic divisions—as Kiir is an ethnic Dinka and Machar, a Nuer.

How Might We Get Peace in South Sudan?

On-and-off talks between the leaders, moderated by East African leaders and the regional authority Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have failed to broker a deal. In fact, in November of this year, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalgen stated that there “appears to be little appetite for peace.” This news is particularly troublesome because, while the violence has tapered over the last few months, many expect it to ramp up again as the rainy season ends.

Thus, Kerry and Rice’s entreaty is a welcome (though belated) one. Importantly, their conciliatory tone does not reflect the fact the United States does have sanctions against leaders on both sides and may work through the United Nations to impose international sanctions: The United States has shown grave concern for the country during this time. Similarly, Brookings scholars have been calling for leadership, peace and transparency in South Sudan for years.

“As the citizens of South Sudan watch and wait in utter fear and disgust, it is time for you, the country’s leaders, to decide whether you want to lead them into a future filled with unending violence, hunger, and desolation, or into one where all of the country’s various peoples, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, gender, and economic status, can live together peacefully and pursue their values and interests without molestation from others.”

Mbaku tells them to step aside and “provide the country’s new crop of leaders with the type of advice and support that can help the country successfully emerge from its violent and destructive past, as well as chart a path towards peace, sustainable economic growth and development.”

Similarly, earlier this year in an Africa in Focus blog, Peter Biar Ajak, founder and director of the think tank Center for Strategic Analysis and Research in South Sudan, noted that there are three likely scenarios for peace: victory by the government, a power sharing deal involving Kiir and Machar, and an interim government involving neither. Because military victory by the government would likely fail in creating a real reconciliation process, and a coalition government with Kiir and Machar would likely fall apart again, Ajak also argues that a government including both sides—but without those specific leaders—might be the best answer. Even this scenario is dangerous, though, in that it might set a precedent for the overthrow of the government or the country might collapse under “local strongmen.” In any case, Ajak states, “With the commitment of the region and international community, an interim government could give South Sudan a chance of starting over and embarking on a reconciliation process.”

Over the past year, however, some countries with historically low governance scores improved significantly, including Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea (which are in the process of recovering from political instability) as well as Niger and Zimbabwe. Other countries with strong governance records made negligible improvements or declined in their scores, (namely Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa). Consequently, Mo Ibrahim, the founder of the index, called on African governments to prevent this sort of “backsliding” and “remain vigilant and not get complacent.” Furthermore, the index suggests a shift in the “drivers of governance improvements, from economic to political,” according to the Institute of Security Studies, as gains in sustainable economic opportunity and human development have been relatively limited in recent years when compared with progress seen in political participation and human rights.

Authors

Amy Copley

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Fri, 03 Oct 2014 12:14:00 -0400Amy Copley
Kenya Rebases GDP and Becomes Ninth-Largest African Economy
On Tuesday, Kenyan Planning Minister Anne Waiguru announced that Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP) is 25 percent larger than previously thought after it was recalculated using updated statistics. Kenya's “rebased” GDP—which takes into account a revised base year of 2009 (from 2001) as well as better data from the high-performing sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, telecommunications and real estate—is now estimated at $53.3 billion (compared to $42.6 billion before the revision). This makes Kenya the ninth-largest economy in Africa and classifies it as a middle-income country since its gross national income (GNI) per capita, $1,160, has surpassed the World Bank threshold of $1,036 to qualify. According to Bloomberg, the boost in GDP also means that the Kenyan government will likely have an easier time accessing commercial loans since “a higher figure for GDP will help to lower Kenya's debt ratios.” Kenya's move to revise its GDP comes just months after Nigeria rebased its GDP in April and became the largest economy on the continent.
Despite this boost in GDP, many observers have noted that this revision does not mean that Kenya has overcome its economic challenges: More than four in 10 Kenyans live in poverty according to the World Bank, and Kenya still has a considerable way to go to achieve 10 percent growth annually as outlined in its Vision 2030 Agenda. Its 2013 growth rate after the rebasing is still only 5.7 percent.
Mo Ibrahim Index Reveals Slight, Though Lower Than Recent, Progress in African Governance Performance
This week the Mo Ibrahim Foundation released the 2014 Ibrahim Index on African Governance, highlighting incremental improvement in principles of good governance across the continent. The index, which gives national, regional and continental scores from 0 to 100 related to four governance indicators (i.e., human development, safety and rule of law, human rights and sustainable economic opportunity), revealed that continent-wide governance performance increased by just 0.9 percent over the past five years, representing a slight decrease from the previous five years' (2005-2009) growth of 1.2 percent.
Over the past year, however, some countries with historically low governance scores improved significantly, including Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea (which are in the process of recovering from political instability) as well as Niger and Zimbabwe. Other countries with strong governance records made negligible improvements or declined in their scores, (namely Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa). Consequently, Mo Ibrahim, the founder of the index, called on African governments to prevent this sort of “backsliding” and “remain vigilant and not get complacent.” Furthermore, the index suggests a shift in the “drivers of governance improvements, from economic to political,” according to the Institute of Security Studies, as gains in sustainable economic opportunity and human development have been relatively limited in recent years when compared with progress seen in political participation and human rights.
Encouraging Developments in South Sudan's Peace Process
Direct discussions between representatives of the warring parties in South Sudan are taking a positive turn, according to the Sudan Tribune. Over the weekend, President Kiir's government reportedly agreed to implement a federal system of governance in the country as called for by rebel negotiators, signaling a promising step towards a political settlement.
Still, it remains unclear whether the parties will reach a final peace agreement before the deadline set by the mediating body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), expires in mid-October. On Tuesday, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power warned both Kiir and Machar that if a peace deal is not ...
Kenya Rebases GDP and Becomes Ninth-Largest African Economy
On Tuesday, Kenyan Planning Minister Anne Waiguru announced that Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP) is 25 percent larger than previously thought after it was recalculated using ...

Over the past year, however, some countries with historically low governance scores improved significantly, including Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea (which are in the process of recovering from political instability) as well as Niger and Zimbabwe. Other countries with strong governance records made negligible improvements or declined in their scores, (namely Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa). Consequently, Mo Ibrahim, the founder of the index, called on African governments to prevent this sort of “backsliding” and “remain vigilant and not get complacent.” Furthermore, the index suggests a shift in the “drivers of governance improvements, from economic to political,” according to the Institute of Security Studies, as gains in sustainable economic opportunity and human development have been relatively limited in recent years when compared with progress seen in political participation and human rights.

Authors

Amy Copley

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/09/25-humanitarian-access-displacement-kaelin?rssid=sudan{E88E8F31-776D-4171-9AAB-2771AF934817}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/75355772/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~The-Guiding-Principles-on-Internal-Displacement-and-the-Prohibition-of-Arbitrary-Denial-of-Humanitarian-Access-A-Story-of-SuccessThe Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Prohibition of Arbitrary Denial of Humanitarian Access: A Story of Success

In July 2010, during one of my last missions as Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, I was negotiating humanitarian access with the then-Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic. Just days before I had met a group of people in the North of the country who, after several weeks of hiding in the forest and surviving just on edible plants and berries, had just escaped from a war zone that was declared by the military authorities as a no-go area for humanitarian agencies and organizations. One of my arguments to convince the Minister was a reference to Guiding Principle 25 on humanitarian access and its maxim that consent to offers of humanitarian assistance “shall not be arbitrarily withheld.” I found this reference useful because the heads of state and government including the Minister’s father, then-President Bozize, had unanimously recognized the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement “as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons” when in September 2005 they adopted the outcome document of the Millennium Summit in New York. At the same time, I was fully aware that the notion of a prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access was soft law at best and not recognized as part of binding international law.

That states have an almost unfettered right to decide whether or not to grant humanitarian access to the UN and other international actors was still widely acknowledged in the mid-1990s when we – a group of legal experts brought together by Francis Deng, the then- Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, and Roberta Cohen, the former director of the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement – set out to draft what were to become the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. However, we wondered whether this prevailing view was still correct at that time. We were aware of several Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that urged states to authorize humanitarian organizations to bring life-saving assistance to those in need. We strongly felt that these decisions by the world’s apex body on issues linked to armed conflict defied the idea that sovereignty included the right to say no to offers of humanitarian assistance even when to do so meant certain death for civilians caught up in armed conflict. We also turned to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which mandates States to work towards the full realization of the rights contained therein, including the right to adequate food and shelter and the right to health, not only “individually” but also “through international assistance and co-operation” (article 2). Some of us also felt that the duty to protect life as enshrined in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 6) would be violated if a state were to deny humanitarian access to people whose life was at stake due to a lack of assistance. Our conceptual decision to not create new law with the Guiding Principles but rather codify and explicitly state in this document what was already implicit in international law thus excluded the possibility to suggest a right to humanitarian access. Instead, we concluded that while decisions to grant or refuse humanitarian access continued to be a matter of sovereignty, saying “no” must be based on objective and serious reasons rather than frivolous political considerations. We gave expression to this idea by recognizing, in Principle 25, that while humanitarian actors “have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced,” the “primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies with national authorities.” To this we added that consent to such offers “shall not be arbitrarily withheld.” Although we were on safe legal ground, this was nevertheless a bold step as no official UN document at that time mentioned the concept of a prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access.

International law is not static but rather continuously evolves, especially when faced with systematic and egregious violations of the rights of the human person. The International Law Commission, the UN expert body entrusted by the General Assembly to codify and progressively develop international customary law, is presently developing draft articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters caused by natural or man-made hazards. In 2011 it adopted—at first reading—a provision that, while recognizing the requirement of state consent to the provision of external assistance, stresses: “Consent to external assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily.” Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, the Commission’s Special Rapporteur for this project mentioned the Guiding Principles as one of the key sources for this provision.

Earlier this year, a further and even more important step was taken by the Security Council in terms of its legal authority. On February 22, it adopted Resolution 2139 (2014) on Syria where it not only found “that humanitarian aid delivery continues to be impeded throughout Syria,” but also recalled in one of the preambular paragraphs “that arbitrary denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supply and access, can constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.” Consequently, it unequivocally demanded in the operational paragraphs of the resolution “that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders, in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches people in need through the most direct routes.” While the resolution shies away from authorizing UN agencies to provide cross-border humanitarian assistance in the absence of authorization by the Syrian state, it sets a precedent of utmost importance.

Sudan is another country where humanitarian access has often been denied by authorities. In July of this year, Sudan was up for review of its state report under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. During the dialogue between the Human Rights Committee, the expert body monitoring the implementation of the Covenant, and a large Sudanese delegation, I had the opportunity to raise the issue of severe restrictions of humanitarian access, in particular in South Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces. In its Concluding Observations, the Human Rights Committee expressed its concern “at reports indicating that State party authorities have at times arbitrarily denied the timely access of life saving humanitarian assistance for civilian populations in some conflict-affected areas, particularly those controlled by rebel groups” and, referring to the right to life, recommended to Sudan to “[a]uthorize and facilitate the timely and unrestricted access of humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in all conflict-affected areas in full compliance with the prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access.”

This recognition of the prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access by three authoritative UN bodies are important steps as it can no longer be said that by virtue of international law decisions to refuse humanitarian access are within the permit of unlimited national sovereignty. Rather, they give specific content to a concept of sovereignty that puts the emphasis on the responsibility of states to protect those on their territory or under their jurisdiction. While certainly insufficient to ensure humanitarian assistance in all situations where it is needed, the recognition of a prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access as part of the legal duties of states is certainly a necessary element to enhance the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including internally displaced persons. At the same time, Security Council resolution 2139 and the other decisions discussed here are testimony of the enduring relevance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Authors

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Thu, 25 Sep 2014 14:22:00 -0400Walter Kälin
In July 2010, during one of my last missions as Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, I was negotiating humanitarian access with the then-Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic. Just days before I had met a group of people in the North of the country who, after several weeks of hiding in the forest and surviving just on edible plants and berries, had just escaped from a war zone that was declared by the military authorities as a no-go area for humanitarian agencies and organizations. One of my arguments to convince the Minister was a reference to Guiding Principle 25 on humanitarian access and its maxim that consent to offers of humanitarian assistance “shall not be arbitrarily withheld.” I found this reference useful because the heads of state and government including the Minister's father, then-President Bozize, had unanimously recognized the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement “as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons” when in September 2005 they adopted the outcome document of the Millennium Summit in New York. At the same time, I was fully aware that the notion of a prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access was soft law at best and not recognized as part of binding international law.
That states have an almost unfettered right to decide whether or not to grant humanitarian access to the UN and other international actors was still widely acknowledged in the mid-1990s when we – a group of legal experts brought together by Francis Deng, the then- Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, and Roberta Cohen, the former director of the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement – set out to draft what were to become the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. However, we wondered whether this prevailing view was still correct at that time. We were aware of several Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that urged states to authorize humanitarian organizations to bring life-saving assistance to those in need. We strongly felt that these decisions by the world's apex body on issues linked to armed conflict defied the idea that sovereignty included the right to say no to offers of humanitarian assistance even when to do so meant certain death for civilians caught up in armed conflict. We also turned to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which mandates States to work towards the full realization of the rights contained therein, including the right to adequate food and shelter and the right to health, not only “individually” but also “through international assistance and co-operation” (article 2). Some of us also felt that the duty to protect life as enshrined in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 6) would be violated if a state were to deny humanitarian access to people whose life was at stake due to a lack of assistance. Our conceptual decision to not create new law with the Guiding Principles but rather codify and explicitly state in this document what was already implicit in international law thus excluded the possibility to suggest a right to humanitarian access. Instead, we concluded that while decisions to grant or refuse humanitarian access continued to be a matter of sovereignty, saying “no” must be based on objective and serious reasons rather than frivolous political considerations. We gave expression to this idea by recognizing, in Principle 25, that while humanitarian actors “have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced,” the “primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies with national authorities.” To this we added that consent to such offers “shall not be ...
In July 2010, during one of my last missions as Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, I was negotiating humanitarian access with the then-Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic.

In July 2010, during one of my last missions as Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, I was negotiating humanitarian access with the then-Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic. Just days before I had met a group of people in the North of the country who, after several weeks of hiding in the forest and surviving just on edible plants and berries, had just escaped from a war zone that was declared by the military authorities as a no-go area for humanitarian agencies and organizations. One of my arguments to convince the Minister was a reference to Guiding Principle 25 on humanitarian access and its maxim that consent to offers of humanitarian assistance “shall not be arbitrarily withheld.” I found this reference useful because the heads of state and government including the Minister’s father, then-President Bozize, had unanimously recognized the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement “as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons” when in September 2005 they adopted the outcome document of the Millennium Summit in New York. At the same time, I was fully aware that the notion of a prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access was soft law at best and not recognized as part of binding international law.

That states have an almost unfettered right to decide whether or not to grant humanitarian access to the UN and other international actors was still widely acknowledged in the mid-1990s when we – a group of legal experts brought together by Francis Deng, the then- Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, and Roberta Cohen, the former director of the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement – set out to draft what were to become the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. However, we wondered whether this prevailing view was still correct at that time. We were aware of several Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that urged states to authorize humanitarian organizations to bring life-saving assistance to those in need. We strongly felt that these decisions by the world’s apex body on issues linked to armed conflict defied the idea that sovereignty included the right to say no to offers of humanitarian assistance even when to do so meant certain death for civilians caught up in armed conflict. We also turned to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which mandates States to work towards the full realization of the rights contained therein, including the right to adequate food and shelter and the right to health, not only “individually” but also “through international assistance and co-operation” (article 2). Some of us also felt that the duty to protect life as enshrined in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 6) would be violated if a state were to deny humanitarian access to people whose life was at stake due to a lack of assistance. Our conceptual decision to not create new law with the Guiding Principles but rather codify and explicitly state in this document what was already implicit in international law thus excluded the possibility to suggest a right to humanitarian access. Instead, we concluded that while decisions to grant or refuse humanitarian access continued to be a matter of sovereignty, saying “no” must be based on objective and serious reasons rather than frivolous political considerations. We gave expression to this idea by recognizing, in Principle 25, that while humanitarian actors “have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced,” the “primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies with national authorities.” To this we added that consent to such offers “shall not be arbitrarily withheld.” Although we were on safe legal ground, this was nevertheless a bold step as no official UN document at that time mentioned the concept of a prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access.

International law is not static but rather continuously evolves, especially when faced with systematic and egregious violations of the rights of the human person. The International Law Commission, the UN expert body entrusted by the General Assembly to codify and progressively develop international customary law, is presently developing draft articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters caused by natural or man-made hazards. In 2011 it adopted—at first reading—a provision that, while recognizing the requirement of state consent to the provision of external assistance, stresses: “Consent to external assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily.” Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, the Commission’s Special Rapporteur for this project mentioned the Guiding Principles as one of the key sources for this provision.

Earlier this year, a further and even more important step was taken by the Security Council in terms of its legal authority. On February 22, it adopted Resolution 2139 (2014) on Syria where it not only found “that humanitarian aid delivery continues to be impeded throughout Syria,” but also recalled in one of the preambular paragraphs “that arbitrary denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supply and access, can constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.” Consequently, it unequivocally demanded in the operational paragraphs of the resolution “that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders, in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches people in need through the most direct routes.” While the resolution shies away from authorizing UN agencies to provide cross-border humanitarian assistance in the absence of authorization by the Syrian state, it sets a precedent of utmost importance.

Sudan is another country where humanitarian access has often been denied by authorities. In July of this year, Sudan was up for review of its state report under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. During the dialogue between the Human Rights Committee, the expert body monitoring the implementation of the Covenant, and a large Sudanese delegation, I had the opportunity to raise the issue of severe restrictions of humanitarian access, in particular in South Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces. In its Concluding Observations, the Human Rights Committee expressed its concern “at reports indicating that State party authorities have at times arbitrarily denied the timely access of life saving humanitarian assistance for civilian populations in some conflict-affected areas, particularly those controlled by rebel groups” and, referring to the right to life, recommended to Sudan to “[a]uthorize and facilitate the timely and unrestricted access of humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in all conflict-affected areas in full compliance with the prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access.”

This recognition of the prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access by three authoritative UN bodies are important steps as it can no longer be said that by virtue of international law decisions to refuse humanitarian access are within the permit of unlimited national sovereignty. Rather, they give specific content to a concept of sovereignty that puts the emphasis on the responsibility of states to protect those on their territory or under their jurisdiction. While certainly insufficient to ensure humanitarian assistance in all situations where it is needed, the recognition of a prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian access as part of the legal duties of states is certainly a necessary element to enhance the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including internally displaced persons. At the same time, Security Council resolution 2139 and the other decisions discussed here are testimony of the enduring relevance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/09/16-south-sudan-leadership-state-failure-kimenyi?rssid=sudan{61130F1C-5E44-4B34-8EA0-D2E7E93380A5}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/74692526/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Folly-of-South-Sudan-Leadership-All-but-Guarantees-Total-State-FailureFolly of South Sudan Leadership All but Guarantees Total State Failure

Notwithstanding the grave human capacity conditions in South Sudan and the serious humanitarian crisis facing the country, the government of South Sudan has banned all foreign workers in the country and ordered that their jobs be filled by South Sudanese nationals. A statement issued on Tuesday, September 16 by the government states that “all non-governmental organizations, private companies, banks, insurance companies, telecommunication companies, petroleum companies, hotels and lodges working in South Sudan are directed to notify all aliens working with them in all positions to cease working as of from 15th October” (for more information, see this article from the Daily Nation).

The decision by the government is clearly a stupid one. It lacks any sound basis, and it runs counter to any informed and developmental-minded leadership. Such a move reminds us of the action by the former dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin, who, early in his reign, expelled foreigners and even seized their investments. The consequences of such actions—namely the collapse of the Ugandan private sector—are well-known, and it is quite surprising that a struggling economy would take actions that accelerate the downward spiral of economic growth and human development. Again, I say this is quite stupid on the part of the South Sudanese government.

South Sudan is in real bad shape when it comes to human capacity. It lacks well-qualified personnel to run the government and private sector. There is a dire scarcity of medical personnel, teachers, engineers, agriculturalists, private sector managers, and indeed workers in all sectors. The country needs all the support it can get to build human capacity. It needs more teachers and doctors, and greatly benefits from private investors. It needs additional training facilities for agriculturalists to train extension workers in order to more effectively exploit the great agricultural opportunities that abound in that country. With a very weak financial system and where most of the population is excluded from access to finance, foreign banks and workers have been playing critical roles in extending financial access. The expulsion of all these workers clearly spells doom for the economy.

The action by the government will have the immediate effect of undermining the prospects for foreign investment. This action itself will exacerbate the already very poor environment for doing business in the country, which is compounded by the ongoing conflict. It is a totally poorly thought-out action and one that must be reversed if South Sudan is to make any progress in development. The African governments must make bold statements criticizing such actions as they have broader implications for the region.

A few years ago, I had the opportunity to discuss development challenges and opportunities with then-Vice President Riek Machar. My advice (in this 2012 Brookings report discussing post-independence development in South Sudan) then was that the country must focus on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and concentrate on human capacity development. I noted that many neighboring countries have a surplus of well-trained workers, which provides a great opportunity for South Sudan. I noted that the availability of skills and FDI are intractably linked, and it is critically important for South Sudan to focus on the two. This latest action shows that the government is receiving terrible advice or the leadership has absolutely no interest in the long-term development of the country.

But African governments have moved very far from the times of Idi Amin: Since the 1990s alone, the number of democracies has increased from four to 17, and the number of autocracies has decreased nearly fourfold, indicating a dramatic change the continent’s political landscape. South Sudan needs to not retreat to outdated and dangerous political decisions and risk falling into economic chaos. In addition, the actions by the government of South Sudan will have negative effects on other African countries as perceptions about a worsening investment climate in South Sudan will spill over to its neighboring countries. This decision should be a red flag for members of the East African Community (EAC) and signals that they should not rush to admit this country into the EAC. Its actions remove it far from the convergence necessary for a well-functioning economic community. The government of South Sudan must reverse this action immediately or it will have serious development consequences.

Authors

]]>
Tue, 16 Sep 2014 15:00:00 -0400Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Notwithstanding the grave human capacity conditions in South Sudan and the serious humanitarian crisis facing the country, the government of South Sudan has banned all foreign workers in the country and ordered that their jobs be filled by South Sudanese nationals. A statement issued on Tuesday, September 16 by the government states that “all non-governmental organizations, private companies, banks, insurance companies, telecommunication companies, petroleum companies, hotels and lodges working in South Sudan are directed to notify all aliens working with them in all positions to cease working as of from 15th October” (for more information, see this article from the Daily Nation).
The decision by the government is clearly a stupid one. It lacks any sound basis, and it runs counter to any informed and developmental-minded leadership. Such a move reminds us of the action by the former dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin, who, early in his reign, expelled foreigners and even seized their investments. The consequences of such actions—namely the collapse of the Ugandan private sector—are well-known, and it is quite surprising that a struggling economy would take actions that accelerate the downward spiral of economic growth and human development. Again, I say this is quite stupid on the part of the South Sudanese government.
South Sudan is in real bad shape when it comes to human capacity. It lacks well-qualified personnel to run the government and private sector. There is a dire scarcity of medical personnel, teachers, engineers, agriculturalists, private sector managers, and indeed workers in all sectors. The country needs all the support it can get to build human capacity. It needs more teachers and doctors, and greatly benefits from private investors. It needs additional training facilities for agriculturalists to train extension workers in order to more effectively exploit the great agricultural opportunities that abound in that country. With a very weak financial system and where most of the population is excluded from access to finance, foreign banks and workers have been playing critical roles in extending financial access. The expulsion of all these workers clearly spells doom for the economy.
The action by the government will have the immediate effect of undermining the prospects for foreign investment. This action itself will exacerbate the already very poor environment for doing business in the country, which is compounded by the ongoing conflict. It is a totally poorly thought-out action and one that must be reversed if South Sudan is to make any progress in development. The African governments must make bold statements criticizing such actions as they have broader implications for the region.
A few years ago, I had the opportunity to discuss development challenges and opportunities with then-Vice President Riek Machar. My advice (in this 2012 Brookings report discussing post-independence development in South Sudan) then was that the country must focus on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and concentrate on human capacity development. I noted that many neighboring countries have a surplus of well-trained workers, which provides a great opportunity for South Sudan. I noted that the availability of skills and FDI are intractably linked, and it is critically important for South Sudan to focus on the two. This latest action shows that the government is receiving terrible advice or the leadership has absolutely no interest in the long-term development of the country.
But African governments have moved very far from the times of Idi Amin: Since the 1990s alone, the number of democracies has increased from four to 17, and the number of autocracies has decreased nearly fourfold, indicating a dramatic change the continent's political landscape. South Sudan needs to not retreat to outdated and dangerous political decisions and risk falling into economic chaos. In addition, the ...
Notwithstanding the grave human capacity conditions in South Sudan and the serious humanitarian crisis facing the country, the government of South Sudan has banned all foreign workers in the country and ordered that their jobs be filled by South ...

Notwithstanding the grave human capacity conditions in South Sudan and the serious humanitarian crisis facing the country, the government of South Sudan has banned all foreign workers in the country and ordered that their jobs be filled by South Sudanese nationals. A statement issued on Tuesday, September 16 by the government states that “all non-governmental organizations, private companies, banks, insurance companies, telecommunication companies, petroleum companies, hotels and lodges working in South Sudan are directed to notify all aliens working with them in all positions to cease working as of from 15th October” (for more information, see this article from the Daily Nation).

The decision by the government is clearly a stupid one. It lacks any sound basis, and it runs counter to any informed and developmental-minded leadership. Such a move reminds us of the action by the former dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin, who, early in his reign, expelled foreigners and even seized their investments. The consequences of such actions—namely the collapse of the Ugandan private sector—are well-known, and it is quite surprising that a struggling economy would take actions that accelerate the downward spiral of economic growth and human development. Again, I say this is quite stupid on the part of the South Sudanese government.

South Sudan is in real bad shape when it comes to human capacity. It lacks well-qualified personnel to run the government and private sector. There is a dire scarcity of medical personnel, teachers, engineers, agriculturalists, private sector managers, and indeed workers in all sectors. The country needs all the support it can get to build human capacity. It needs more teachers and doctors, and greatly benefits from private investors. It needs additional training facilities for agriculturalists to train extension workers in order to more effectively exploit the great agricultural opportunities that abound in that country. With a very weak financial system and where most of the population is excluded from access to finance, foreign banks and workers have been playing critical roles in extending financial access. The expulsion of all these workers clearly spells doom for the economy.

The action by the government will have the immediate effect of undermining the prospects for foreign investment. This action itself will exacerbate the already very poor environment for doing business in the country, which is compounded by the ongoing conflict. It is a totally poorly thought-out action and one that must be reversed if South Sudan is to make any progress in development. The African governments must make bold statements criticizing such actions as they have broader implications for the region.

A few years ago, I had the opportunity to discuss development challenges and opportunities with then-Vice President Riek Machar. My advice (in this 2012 Brookings report discussing post-independence development in South Sudan) then was that the country must focus on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and concentrate on human capacity development. I noted that many neighboring countries have a surplus of well-trained workers, which provides a great opportunity for South Sudan. I noted that the availability of skills and FDI are intractably linked, and it is critically important for South Sudan to focus on the two. This latest action shows that the government is receiving terrible advice or the leadership has absolutely no interest in the long-term development of the country.

But African governments have moved very far from the times of Idi Amin: Since the 1990s alone, the number of democracies has increased from four to 17, and the number of autocracies has decreased nearly fourfold, indicating a dramatic change the continent’s political landscape. South Sudan needs to not retreat to outdated and dangerous political decisions and risk falling into economic chaos. In addition, the actions by the government of South Sudan will have negative effects on other African countries as perceptions about a worsening investment climate in South Sudan will spill over to its neighboring countries. This decision should be a red flag for members of the East African Community (EAC) and signals that they should not rush to admit this country into the EAC. Its actions remove it far from the convergence necessary for a well-functioning economic community. The government of South Sudan must reverse this action immediately or it will have serious development consequences.

In a recent blog, Africa Growth Initiative Visiting Fellow Yun Sun outlines the longstanding allied relationship between China and Zimbabwe. According to Sun, China has been viewed by some analysts as the “only major international supporter of Zimbabwe.” China has been criticized for continuing to support the longstanding dictator and has taken a more cautious approach when dealing with its African ally. However, with Mugabe’s recent election to first vice-chair of the African Union Bureau, China seems to be reigniting the relationship.

Some Nigerians are not excited about the identification cards. The Premium Timesreported on citizen’s concerns about the collection of biometric information. Nigerians also reported distrust about the collaboration between MasterCard and the Nigerian government stating, “The new ID card with a MasterCard logo does not represent an identity of a Nigerian. It simply represents a stamped ownership of a Nigerian by an American company.”

Rebels Reject South Sudan Truce Agreement

On Tuesday this week, the South Sudanese government and the opposition faction headed by former Vice President Riek Machar signed a truce agreement that was negotiated by the regional body the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The IGAD accord provides 45 days to establish an interim government for South Sudan. Under the truce agreement, the rebels would be allowed to nominate a prime minister to serve in a 30-month Transitional Government of National Unity, but this prime minister will not be eligible to run in the upcoming presidential election. The agreement also threatened sanctions from IGAD on both the South Sudan government and the rebels if conflict continues. Shortly afterwards, however, the agreement was rejected by the rebel leaders in South Sudan. The rebels stated that they oppose the agreement because it locks current President Salva Kiir into the presidency.

Authors

Jessica Pugliese

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Fri, 29 Aug 2014 11:38:00 -0400Jessica Pugliese
President Mugabe Leaves China with Less Funding than Desired
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe visited China this week from August 24-28. The media speculated that Mugabe was headed to China in search of a $10 billion bailout package to help the Zimbabwean economy stay afloat. While Mugabe did not return to Zimbabwe with the bailout package he desired, he did garner $2 billion for a coal mine, power station and dam. In addition, China committed $8 million in food assistance and a $24 million grant to build clinics and schools.
In a recent blog, Africa Growth Initiative Visiting Fellow Yun Sun outlines the longstanding allied relationship between China and Zimbabwe. According to Sun, China has been viewed by some analysts as the “only major international supporter of Zimbabwe.” China has been criticized for continuing to support the longstanding dictator and has taken a more cautious approach when dealing with its African ally. However, with Mugabe's recent election to first vice-chair of the African Union Bureau, China seems to be reigniting the relationship.
Nigeria Teams up with MasterCard to Launch ID Cards
Nigeria launched new national identification cards this week, and President Goodluck Jonathan received the first card. Each card contains biometric information and has the capability to receive electronic payments. The first phase of the collaborative effort between MasterCard and the Nigerian government will issue cards to 13 million Nigerians. The government plans to use the cards to electronically deliver salaries and pensions to reduce mismanagement of government payments.
Some Nigerians are not excited about the identification cards. The Premium Times reported on citizen's concerns about the collection of biometric information. Nigerians also reported distrust about the collaboration between MasterCard and the Nigerian government stating, “The new ID card with a MasterCard logo does not represent an identity of a Nigerian. It simply represents a stamped ownership of a Nigerian by an American company.”
Rebels Reject South Sudan Truce Agreement
On Tuesday this week, the South Sudanese government and the opposition faction headed by former Vice President Riek Machar signed a truce agreement that was negotiated by the regional body the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The IGAD accord provides 45 days to establish an interim government for South Sudan. Under the truce agreement, the rebels would be allowed to nominate a prime minister to serve in a 30-month Transitional Government of National Unity, but this prime minister will not be eligible to run in the upcoming presidential election. The agreement also threatened sanctions from IGAD on both the South Sudan government and the rebels if conflict continues. Shortly afterwards, however, the agreement was rejected by the rebel leaders in South Sudan. The rebels stated that they oppose the agreement because it locks current President Salva Kiir into the presidency.
Also on Tuesday in South Sudan, a United Nations helicopter was shot down near the town of Bentiu. The shots were fired from a surface-to-air weapon that killed three of the helicopter's Russian air crew members. Reportedly, a rebel commander warned the U.N. not to fly over the territory earlier in the week. The South Sudanese government has blamed the attack on rebel forces, a charge that the rebels have denied. The attack violates the Status of Forces agreement and interrupts the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).
Authors
- Jessica Pugliese
President Mugabe Leaves China with Less Funding than Desired
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe visited China this week from August 24-28. The media speculated that Mugabe was headed to China in search of a $10 billion bailout package to help ...

In a recent blog, Africa Growth Initiative Visiting Fellow Yun Sun outlines the longstanding allied relationship between China and Zimbabwe. According to Sun, China has been viewed by some analysts as the “only major international supporter of Zimbabwe.” China has been criticized for continuing to support the longstanding dictator and has taken a more cautious approach when dealing with its African ally. However, with Mugabe’s recent election to first vice-chair of the African Union Bureau, China seems to be reigniting the relationship.

Some Nigerians are not excited about the identification cards. The Premium Timesreported on citizen’s concerns about the collection of biometric information. Nigerians also reported distrust about the collaboration between MasterCard and the Nigerian government stating, “The new ID card with a MasterCard logo does not represent an identity of a Nigerian. It simply represents a stamped ownership of a Nigerian by an American company.”

Rebels Reject South Sudan Truce Agreement

On Tuesday this week, the South Sudanese government and the opposition faction headed by former Vice President Riek Machar signed a truce agreement that was negotiated by the regional body the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The IGAD accord provides 45 days to establish an interim government for South Sudan. Under the truce agreement, the rebels would be allowed to nominate a prime minister to serve in a 30-month Transitional Government of National Unity, but this prime minister will not be eligible to run in the upcoming presidential election. The agreement also threatened sanctions from IGAD on both the South Sudan government and the rebels if conflict continues. Shortly afterwards, however, the agreement was rejected by the rebel leaders in South Sudan. The rebels stated that they oppose the agreement because it locks current President Salva Kiir into the presidency.

Editor's Note: This opinion on the impact of the overwhelming number of humanitarian crises in the world was originally published in the Global Post.

Humanitarian crises in the world today — Syria, Iraq, Central African Republic, South Sudan and now Gaza — all demand immediate and massive humanitarian response.

The crises are not only large-scale, affecting millions, but the conflicts also are complex, each with unique political realities and on-the-ground difficulties.

They are not alone among crises competing for our attention. They are simply the biggest, pushing off the front pages other crises where human needs remain urgent: Darfur, Central America, Pakistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia.

It’s not only the number and the scale that challenge the humanitarian community, but the proliferation of humanitarian actors, the politicization of humanitarian responses and the insecurity that confronts humanitarian workers.

Kristalina Georgieva, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, warns that there is “no light at the end of this tunnel: we must get used to a ‘new normal,’ where we face multiple challenges with finite resources.” We need to accept the reality of not having enough money to respond.

With so many crises, the tendency is to focus on the latest and the “biggest” crises. A “crisis of the month” mentality has been replaced by “crisis of the week.”

Numbers matter, so understandably our focus is drawn to large-scale crises. When hundreds of thousands of refugees flee a country, we respond. When smaller numbers are displaced by, say, a storm on a Pacific Island – even when proportionally a greater percentage of the population is affected — we tend to overlook it.

We also tend to focus on crises that are visible. I was in Central America a couple of weeks ago looking at displacement caused by what are called “new forms of organized violence.” While the story in the US is about the +50,000 unaccompanied Central American children on the US-Mexico border, the real crisis is in Central America.

But as there are no reliable estimates of the number of people displaced or affected by criminal violence, the story doesn’t attract the attention it deserves.

Even in a high-visibility crisis such as Syria, we focus on those we can access. My guess is that at least 20 news stories have been published on Syrian refugees for every story about Syrians displaced within their country. Yet there are 6.5 million internally displaced personscompared to 2.5 million refugees.

Syria is far from the only crisis for which urgent appeals for funding are made. South Sudan, Central African Republic and Gaza are all desperate situations that need a robust international response.

Where are the donors getting the money? Are they raising new funds or are they diverting funds from other emergencies or from long-term development programs? And what does it mean for the refugees or the disaster-affected communities when the appeals are only 25 percent or 6 percent funded?

Too many crises also increase the demand for experienced staff. Humanitarian agencies find it daunting to maintain adequate stand-by capacity to respond to a wave of major disasters. Stand-by rosters are stretched.

International agencies compensate by either reassigning experienced staff from one emergency to another or hire new staff. Both options have consequences.

Reassigning staff from, say, Iraq to Central African Republic or from Pakistan to Lebanon may meet immediate needs but such deployments are usually temporary, giving rise to rapid turnover. What suffers is knowledge of the local situation and relations with local actors, both critical factors.

Still another cost is failing to address potential crises In spite of the work done to establish early warning systems.

The system is simply too stretched to respond adequately to simmering situations, places such as Venezuela and Nigeria where ominous signs of trouble are brewing.

An overwhelming number of crises make it almost impossible for the international community to respond well — or even adequately — to the existing humanitarian disasters, much less to prepare for future ones.

Humanitarian crises are influenced by political problems; the inability of our international political system to resolve these crises is stunning. The Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing has emerged as an important global principle since its adoption by the UN World Summit in 2005. The fact that there are too many humanitarian crises today is the result of a failure in global governance.

Change is needed in the international humanitarian system and perhaps the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016 will provide an opportunity for fresh — and even radical — thinking about the way the system responds.

Authors

]]>
Wed, 30 Jul 2014 00:00:00 -0400Elizabeth Ferris
Editor's Note: This opinion on the impact of the overwhelming number of humanitarian crises in the world was originally published in the Global Post.
Humanitarian crises in the world today — Syria, Iraq, Central African Republic, South Sudan and now Gaza — all demand immediate and massive humanitarian response.
The crises are not only large-scale, affecting millions, but the conflicts also are complex, each with unique political realities and on-the-ground difficulties.
They are not alone among crises competing for our attention. They are simply the biggest, pushing off the front pages other crises where human needs remain urgent: Darfur, Central America, Pakistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia.
It's not only the number and the scale that challenge the humanitarian community, but the proliferation of humanitarian actors, the politicization of humanitarian responses and the insecurity that confronts humanitarian workers.
Kristalina Georgieva, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, warns that there is “no light at the end of this tunnel: we must get used to a 'new normal,' where we face multiple challenges with finite resources.” We need to accept the reality of not having enough money to respond.
With so many crises, the tendency is to focus on the latest and the “biggest” crises. A “crisis of the month” mentality has been replaced by “crisis of the week.”
Even when a crisis isn't resolved — as in long-standing displacement in Colombia or reconstruction in Haiti — the demands of responding to new situations tend to overshadow on-going crises.
Numbers matter, so understandably our focus is drawn to large-scale crises. When hundreds of thousands of refugees flee a country, we respond. When smaller numbers are displaced by, say, a storm on a Pacific Island – even when proportionally a greater percentage of the population is affected — we tend to overlook it.
A few years ago the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies reported that 90 percent of all natural disasters have fewer than 50 casualties; numbers not sufficient to mobilize an international response but no less devastating to those affected.
We also tend to focus on crises that are visible. I was in Central America a couple of weeks ago looking at displacement caused by what are called “new forms of organized violence.” While the story in the US is about the +50,000 unaccompanied Central American children on the US-Mexico border, the real crisis is in Central America.
But as there are no reliable estimates of the number of people displaced or affected by criminal violence, the story doesn't attract the attention it deserves.
Even in a high-visibility crisis such as Syria, we focus on those we can access. My guess is that at least 20 news stories have been published on Syrian refugees for every story about Syrians displaced within their country. Yet there are 6.5 million internally displaced personscompared to 2.5 million refugees.
Too many crises have consequences. In 2012 the worry was how the international community would come up with the resources to meet humanitarian needs in Syria, estimated at $1 billion a year. Today, the appeal for Syria is over $6 billion with less than 25 percent funded by mid-year.
Syria is far from the only crisis for which urgent appeals for funding are made. South Sudan, Central African Republic and Gaza are all desperate situations that need a robust international response.
Where are the donors getting the money? Are they raising new funds or are they diverting funds from other emergencies or from long-term development programs? And what does it mean for the refugees or the disaster-affected communities when the appeals are only 25 percent or 6 percent funded?
Too many crises also ... Editor's Note: This opinion on the impact of the overwhelming number of humanitarian crises in the world was originally published in the Global Post.
Humanitarian crises in the world today — Syria, Iraq, Central African Republic, South ...

Editor's Note: This opinion on the impact of the overwhelming number of humanitarian crises in the world was originally published in the Global Post.

Humanitarian crises in the world today — Syria, Iraq, Central African Republic, South Sudan and now Gaza — all demand immediate and massive humanitarian response.

The crises are not only large-scale, affecting millions, but the conflicts also are complex, each with unique political realities and on-the-ground difficulties.

They are not alone among crises competing for our attention. They are simply the biggest, pushing off the front pages other crises where human needs remain urgent: Darfur, Central America, Pakistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia.

It’s not only the number and the scale that challenge the humanitarian community, but the proliferation of humanitarian actors, the politicization of humanitarian responses and the insecurity that confronts humanitarian workers.

Kristalina Georgieva, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, warns that there is “no light at the end of this tunnel: we must get used to a ‘new normal,’ where we face multiple challenges with finite resources.” We need to accept the reality of not having enough money to respond.

With so many crises, the tendency is to focus on the latest and the “biggest” crises. A “crisis of the month” mentality has been replaced by “crisis of the week.”

Numbers matter, so understandably our focus is drawn to large-scale crises. When hundreds of thousands of refugees flee a country, we respond. When smaller numbers are displaced by, say, a storm on a Pacific Island – even when proportionally a greater percentage of the population is affected — we tend to overlook it.

We also tend to focus on crises that are visible. I was in Central America a couple of weeks ago looking at displacement caused by what are called “new forms of organized violence.” While the story in the US is about the +50,000 unaccompanied Central American children on the US-Mexico border, the real crisis is in Central America.

But as there are no reliable estimates of the number of people displaced or affected by criminal violence, the story doesn’t attract the attention it deserves.

Even in a high-visibility crisis such as Syria, we focus on those we can access. My guess is that at least 20 news stories have been published on Syrian refugees for every story about Syrians displaced within their country. Yet there are 6.5 million internally displaced personscompared to 2.5 million refugees.

Syria is far from the only crisis for which urgent appeals for funding are made. South Sudan, Central African Republic and Gaza are all desperate situations that need a robust international response.

Where are the donors getting the money? Are they raising new funds or are they diverting funds from other emergencies or from long-term development programs? And what does it mean for the refugees or the disaster-affected communities when the appeals are only 25 percent or 6 percent funded?

Too many crises also increase the demand for experienced staff. Humanitarian agencies find it daunting to maintain adequate stand-by capacity to respond to a wave of major disasters. Stand-by rosters are stretched.

International agencies compensate by either reassigning experienced staff from one emergency to another or hire new staff. Both options have consequences.

Reassigning staff from, say, Iraq to Central African Republic or from Pakistan to Lebanon may meet immediate needs but such deployments are usually temporary, giving rise to rapid turnover. What suffers is knowledge of the local situation and relations with local actors, both critical factors.

Still another cost is failing to address potential crises In spite of the work done to establish early warning systems.

The system is simply too stretched to respond adequately to simmering situations, places such as Venezuela and Nigeria where ominous signs of trouble are brewing.

An overwhelming number of crises make it almost impossible for the international community to respond well — or even adequately — to the existing humanitarian disasters, much less to prepare for future ones.

Humanitarian crises are influenced by political problems; the inability of our international political system to resolve these crises is stunning. The Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing has emerged as an important global principle since its adoption by the UN World Summit in 2005. The fact that there are too many humanitarian crises today is the result of a failure in global governance.

Change is needed in the international humanitarian system and perhaps the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016 will provide an opportunity for fresh — and even radical — thinking about the way the system responds.

Just a few short years ago, South Sudan, the world’s youngest country, celebrated its independence from Sudan after a long and bloody conflict. Today, July 9, South Sudan turns 3 years old. The joy of independence has since, however, been overshadowed by political disputes and violence.

Even on South Sudan’s independence day, internal tensions simmered beneath the surface. Following the August 2013 sacking of then-Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, by President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, those tensions turned into political conflict. In December that political conflict turned into violence, plunging the new nation into an ethnically charged civil war.

For some, this outbreak came as no surprise. Upon South Sudan’s independence, many experts foresaw that the task of creating a united nation would be the biggest challenge facing the country. In August 2013, when Kiir fired Machar as well as his entire cabinet, Africa Growth Initiative Guest Scholar Josephine Kibe and Senior Fellow and Director Mwangi Kimenyi warned that even the perceived abuse of power by the president in this fragile country would lead it down a dangerous road.

Now, 1.5 million people have been forced from their homes by the conflict, 3.5 million suffer from crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity, and 4 million are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. And the effects of the conflict are spilling over into neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Peace talks in Ethiopia have started and stopped since earlier this year, with ceasefires (not always kept) in between. But a permanent solution has yet to be found and, just today, President Kiir asked to restart the talks.

But is this scenario likely or even desirable? In an AGI blog earlier this year, the founder and director of the Center for Strategic Analysis and Research in South Sudan, Peter Biar Ajak, discussed the outcomes of this scenario:

“There is… a risk that the country could fall apart in the absence of Mr. Kiir, and local strongmen could carve out fiefdoms, ending the integrity of South Sudan as a state. It could also set up a dangerous precedent where an elected president is asked to resign in the wake of an armed rebellion in order for peace to return. However, with the commitment of the region and international community, an interim government could give South Sudan a chance of starting over and embarking on a reconciliation process.”

On the other hand, Ajak also noted that a coalition government including the two would likely be similar to the one that recently fell apart and, after all that has happened, is unlikely to form.

On South Sudan’s birthday this year, let’s hope that its leaders can remember their success in working together to achieve their independence and can come together to unify and heal their young nation.

Authors

]]>
Wed, 09 Jul 2014 15:17:00 -0400Amadou Sy
Just a few short years ago, South Sudan, the world's youngest country, celebrated its independence from Sudan after a long and bloody conflict. Today, July 9, South Sudan turns 3 years old. The joy of independence has since, however, been overshadowed by political disputes and violence.
Even on South Sudan's independence day, internal tensions simmered beneath the surface. Following the August 2013 sacking of then-Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, by President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, those tensions turned into political conflict. In December that political conflict turned into violence, plunging the new nation into an ethnically charged civil war.
For some, this outbreak came as no surprise. Upon South Sudan's independence, many experts foresaw that the task of creating a united nation would be the biggest challenge facing the country. In August 2013, when Kiir fired Machar as well as his entire cabinet, Africa Growth Initiative Guest Scholar Josephine Kibe and Senior Fellow and Director Mwangi Kimenyi warned that even the perceived abuse of power by the president in this fragile country would lead it down a dangerous road.
Now, 1.5 million people have been forced from their homes by the conflict, 3.5 million suffer from crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity, and 4 million are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. And the effects of the conflict are spilling over into neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Peace talks in Ethiopia have started and stopped since earlier this year, with ceasefires (not always kept) in between. But a permanent solution has yet to be found and, just today, President Kiir asked to restart the talks.
Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow John Mbaku has called on both leaders to step aside. He argues that an interim government without these two powerful, controversial figures has the most hope for creating peaceful coexistence and successful reforms.
But is this scenario likely or even desirable? In an AGI blog earlier this year, the founder and director of the Center for Strategic Analysis and Research in South Sudan, Peter Biar Ajak, discussed the outcomes of this scenario:
“There is… a risk that the country could fall apart in the absence of Mr. Kiir, and local strongmen could carve out fiefdoms, ending the integrity of South Sudan as a state. It could also set up a dangerous precedent where an elected president is asked to resign in the wake of an armed rebellion in order for peace to return. However, with the commitment of the region and international community, an interim government could give South Sudan a chance of starting over and embarking on a reconciliation process.”
On the other hand, Ajak also noted that a coalition government including the two would likely be similar to the one that recently fell apart and, after all that has happened, is unlikely to form.
On South Sudan's birthday this year, let's hope that its leaders can remember their success in working together to achieve their independence and can come together to unify and heal their young nation.
Authors
- Amadou Sy
Just a few short years ago, South Sudan, the world's youngest country, celebrated its independence from Sudan after a long and bloody conflict. Today, July 9, South Sudan turns 3 years old. The joy of independence has since, however, been ...

Just a few short years ago, South Sudan, the world’s youngest country, celebrated its independence from Sudan after a long and bloody conflict. Today, July 9, South Sudan turns 3 years old. The joy of independence has since, however, been overshadowed by political disputes and violence.

Even on South Sudan’s independence day, internal tensions simmered beneath the surface. Following the August 2013 sacking of then-Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, by President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, those tensions turned into political conflict. In December that political conflict turned into violence, plunging the new nation into an ethnically charged civil war.

For some, this outbreak came as no surprise. Upon South Sudan’s independence, many experts foresaw that the task of creating a united nation would be the biggest challenge facing the country. In August 2013, when Kiir fired Machar as well as his entire cabinet, Africa Growth Initiative Guest Scholar Josephine Kibe and Senior Fellow and Director Mwangi Kimenyi warned that even the perceived abuse of power by the president in this fragile country would lead it down a dangerous road.

Now, 1.5 million people have been forced from their homes by the conflict, 3.5 million suffer from crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity, and 4 million are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. And the effects of the conflict are spilling over into neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Peace talks in Ethiopia have started and stopped since earlier this year, with ceasefires (not always kept) in between. But a permanent solution has yet to be found and, just today, President Kiir asked to restart the talks.

But is this scenario likely or even desirable? In an AGI blog earlier this year, the founder and director of the Center for Strategic Analysis and Research in South Sudan, Peter Biar Ajak, discussed the outcomes of this scenario:

“There is… a risk that the country could fall apart in the absence of Mr. Kiir, and local strongmen could carve out fiefdoms, ending the integrity of South Sudan as a state. It could also set up a dangerous precedent where an elected president is asked to resign in the wake of an armed rebellion in order for peace to return. However, with the commitment of the region and international community, an interim government could give South Sudan a chance of starting over and embarking on a reconciliation process.”

On the other hand, Ajak also noted that a coalition government including the two would likely be similar to the one that recently fell apart and, after all that has happened, is unlikely to form.

On South Sudan’s birthday this year, let’s hope that its leaders can remember their success in working together to achieve their independence and can come together to unify and heal their young nation.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/05/09-south-africa-election-world-economic-forum-south-sudan-conflict-copley?rssid=sudan{C1702D9D-9943-47F4-9925-25423D5523C0}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495237/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Africa-in-the-News-South-Africa-Votes-Talks-at-the-World-Economic-Forum-Peace-Negotiations-in-South-Sudan-Passage-of-Electrify-Africa-ActAfrica in the News: South Africa Votes, Talks at the World Economic Forum, Peace Negotiations in South Sudan, Passage of Electrify Africa Act

South Africa Votes, Freely and Fairly

On Wednesday, May 7, South Africans took to the ballot box for a historic vote—20 years since the end of apartheid. By mid-day Thursday, 83 percent of the ballots were counted, and the ruling ANC party was projected to win the election with 63 percent of the vote. In a distant second place, the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, held 22 percent. The elections were carried out with no major objections or incidents, save concerns over images of dumped ballots in Pretoria, currently under investigation by local authorities.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon commended “the determination of South Africans to participate meaningfully in the democratic system the country has fought so hard to establish.” With the ANC looking set to win the election, the rand gained against the dollar, rising to its strongest level so far this year. The rand’s strength was further bolstered by data on trade expansion with China that surpassed initial estimates by 0.9 percent. An ANC victory will pave the way for President Jacob Zuma to usher in the pro-business reforms his party hopes will spur economic growth and create jobs to address the country’s high unemployment rate, which currently stands at 25 percent.

Talks on Inclusive Growth at the World Economic Forum

As the World Economic Forum on Africa got underway in Abuja, recent attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram threatened to overshadow the summit’s proceedings.

Despite heightened security concerns surrounding the meeting, it was well attended by African heads of state, international business leaders and political figures such as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, who is participating in the meeting as a part of his tour of the continent. Mr. Li began his trip in Ethiopia, where on Sunday he signed more than a dozen agreements to expand trade ties. He also pledged that China will set aside $2 billion for an African Development Fund with a view to supporting the construction of a high-speed railway system across the continent.

At the opening of the forum on Wednesday, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan called Boko Haram’s kidnapping of 276 school girls last month a turning point in the fight against the group and “the beginning of the end for terror in Nigeria.” His statements came shortly after another deadly assault on Monday, in which 310 people were killed in the town of Gamboru Ngala near the border with Cameroon. The U.S.—alongside France, Britain and China—is preparing to send a group of military, law enforcement and security advisers to assist Nigerian officials in locating the missing school girls.

Peace Negotiations over South Sudan Conflict

In other news, talks between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar are poised to take place today in Addis Ababa. The talks come shortly after Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip to Africa, during which he spoke with President Kiir in Juba to secure his commitment to the negotiations. On Thursday, a U.N. human rights report detailing crimes against humanity committed by both parties to the conflict was released. It called for the perpetrators of the widespread atrocities to be brought to justice.

The Electrify Africa Act Passes

The Electrify Africa Act (H.R. 2548), which passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February, passed the House Floor yesterday by a margin of 21 votes. This Act, in conjunction with the Obama Administration’s Power Africa Initiative, demonstrates U.S. commitment to supporting the continent as it strives to sustainably and inclusively meet its energy needs. As the bill moves on to the Senate, its proponents are calling for the addition of “clear goals for rural access and distributed renewable energy development.”

Authors

Amy Copley

]]>

]]>
Fri, 09 May 2014 09:54:00 -0400Amy Copley
South Africa Votes, Freely and Fairly
On Wednesday, May 7, South Africans took to the ballot box for a historic vote—20 years since the end of apartheid. By mid-day Thursday, 83 percent of the ballots were counted, and the ruling ANC party was projected to win the election with 63 percent of the vote. In a distant second place, the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, held 22 percent. The elections were carried out with no major objections or incidents, save concerns over images of dumped ballots in Pretoria, currently under investigation by local authorities.
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon commended “the determination of South Africans to participate meaningfully in the democratic system the country has fought so hard to establish.” With the ANC looking set to win the election, the rand gained against the dollar, rising to its strongest level so far this year. The rand's strength was further bolstered by data on trade expansion with China that surpassed initial estimates by 0.9 percent. An ANC victory will pave the way for President Jacob Zuma to usher in the pro-business reforms his party hopes will spur economic growth and create jobs to address the country's high unemployment rate, which currently stands at 25 percent.
Talks on Inclusive Growth at the World Economic Forum
As the World Economic Forum on Africa got underway in Abuja, recent attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram threatened to overshadow the summit's proceedings.
Despite heightened security concerns surrounding the meeting, it was well attended by African heads of state, international business leaders and political figures such as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, who is participating in the meeting as a part of his tour of the continent. Mr. Li began his trip in Ethiopia, where on Sunday he signed more than a dozen agreements to expand trade ties. He also pledged that China will set aside $2 billion for an African Development Fund with a view to supporting the construction of a high-speed railway system across the continent.
At the opening of the forum on Wednesday, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan called Boko Haram's kidnapping of 276 school girls last month a turning point in the fight against the group and “the beginning of the end for terror in Nigeria.” His statements came shortly after another deadly assault on Monday, in which 310 people were killed in the town of Gamboru Ngala near the border with Cameroon. The U.S.—alongside France, Britain and China—is preparing to send a group of military, law enforcement and security advisers to assist Nigerian officials in locating the missing school girls.
Peace Negotiations over South Sudan Conflict
In other news, talks between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar are poised to take place today in Addis Ababa. The talks come shortly after Secretary of State John Kerry's trip to Africa, during which he spoke with President Kiir in Juba to secure his commitment to the negotiations. On Thursday, a U.N. human rights report detailing crimes against humanity committed by both parties to the conflict was released. It called for the perpetrators of the widespread atrocities to be brought to justice.
The Electrify Africa Act Passes
The Electrify Africa Act (H.R. 2548), which passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February, passed the House Floor yesterday by a margin of 21 votes. This Act, in conjunction with the Obama Administration's Power Africa Initiative, demonstrates U.S. commitment to supporting the continent as it strives to sustainably and inclusively meet its energy needs. As the bill moves on to the Senate, its proponents are calling for the addition of “clear goals for rural access and distributed renewable energy development.”
Authors
- Amy Copley
South Africa Votes, Freely and Fairly
On Wednesday, May 7, South Africans took to the ballot box for a historic vote—20 years since the end of apartheid. By mid-day Thursday, 83 percent of the ballots were counted, and the ruling ANC ...

South Africa Votes, Freely and Fairly

On Wednesday, May 7, South Africans took to the ballot box for a historic vote—20 years since the end of apartheid. By mid-day Thursday, 83 percent of the ballots were counted, and the ruling ANC party was projected to win the election with 63 percent of the vote. In a distant second place, the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, held 22 percent. The elections were carried out with no major objections or incidents, save concerns over images of dumped ballots in Pretoria, currently under investigation by local authorities.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon commended “the determination of South Africans to participate meaningfully in the democratic system the country has fought so hard to establish.” With the ANC looking set to win the election, the rand gained against the dollar, rising to its strongest level so far this year. The rand’s strength was further bolstered by data on trade expansion with China that surpassed initial estimates by 0.9 percent. An ANC victory will pave the way for President Jacob Zuma to usher in the pro-business reforms his party hopes will spur economic growth and create jobs to address the country’s high unemployment rate, which currently stands at 25 percent.

Talks on Inclusive Growth at the World Economic Forum

As the World Economic Forum on Africa got underway in Abuja, recent attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram threatened to overshadow the summit’s proceedings.

Despite heightened security concerns surrounding the meeting, it was well attended by African heads of state, international business leaders and political figures such as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, who is participating in the meeting as a part of his tour of the continent. Mr. Li began his trip in Ethiopia, where on Sunday he signed more than a dozen agreements to expand trade ties. He also pledged that China will set aside $2 billion for an African Development Fund with a view to supporting the construction of a high-speed railway system across the continent.

At the opening of the forum on Wednesday, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan called Boko Haram’s kidnapping of 276 school girls last month a turning point in the fight against the group and “the beginning of the end for terror in Nigeria.” His statements came shortly after another deadly assault on Monday, in which 310 people were killed in the town of Gamboru Ngala near the border with Cameroon. The U.S.—alongside France, Britain and China—is preparing to send a group of military, law enforcement and security advisers to assist Nigerian officials in locating the missing school girls.

Peace Negotiations over South Sudan Conflict

In other news, talks between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar are poised to take place today in Addis Ababa. The talks come shortly after Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip to Africa, during which he spoke with President Kiir in Juba to secure his commitment to the negotiations. On Thursday, a U.N. human rights report detailing crimes against humanity committed by both parties to the conflict was released. It called for the perpetrators of the widespread atrocities to be brought to justice.

The Electrify Africa Act Passes

The Electrify Africa Act (H.R. 2548), which passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February, passed the House Floor yesterday by a margin of 21 votes. This Act, in conjunction with the Obama Administration’s Power Africa Initiative, demonstrates U.S. commitment to supporting the continent as it strives to sustainably and inclusively meet its energy needs. As the bill moves on to the Senate, its proponents are calling for the addition of “clear goals for rural access and distributed renewable energy development.”

Authors

Amy Copley

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/05/02-john-kerry-south-africa-election-ivory-coast-lee?rssid=sudan{5E4ECE50-5E8F-48A5-9D13-BEA4AE8B5DCB}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495239/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Africa-in-the-News-John-Kerry-Goes-to-Africa-South-Africa-Prepares-to-Vote-and-C%c3%b4te-d%e2%80%99Ivoire-Diamond-Ban-LiftedAfrica in the News: John Kerry Goes to Africa, South Africa Prepares to Vote, and Côte d’Ivoire Diamond Ban Lifted

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry Travels to Addis Ababa, Juba, Kinshasa and Luanda

On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, his first stop on his visit to Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola. The top items on the secretary’s agenda include discussing regional security issues—including those in South Sudan and the Central Africa Republic—speaking out against recent human rights abuses in the region and advancing opportunities for economic development. Already, Kerry advocated for the release of nine journalists and bloggers arrested by the Ethiopian government for “working with a foreign organization to incite public violence.” He also met with Ethiopian, Ugandan and Kenyan leaders to discuss possible economic sanctions on South Sudan as well as a potential travel ban.

Kerry’s visit has been met with criticism: Some believe that this trip signifies heightened U.S. competition with countries such as China and Brazil to increase its own interests in the oil-rich nations of South Sudan and Angola. On the other hand, others claim that conflict resolution and peace are more central to this visit than economic interests. Center for Global Development Chief Operating Officer and Senior Fellow Todd Moss argues that Kerry’s visit will focus on security while serving as a preview for the upcoming U.S. Africa Leaders’ Summit.

South Africa Prepares for May 7’s Presidential Election

After celebrating its 20th anniversary since the historic post-apartheid election, South Africa will hold its general election on May 7, marking its first since Nelson Mandela’s death.

This year’s election has centered on a few key issues. The economy has stagnated while other African nations undergo economic booms, and unemployment has sharply risen, with a third of the working-age population now unemployed. Union members have been striking for better wages in South Africa’s platinum belt. Corruption is also an important issue, as reports of widespread fraud (e.g., President Jacob Zuma’s controversial $23 million security upgrades for his private home that included a swimming pool and a chicken run) have been in the news

The three largest parties in the running are the current governing African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance and the Congress of the People. While Mandela’s former party, the Zuma-led ANC, is favored to win, some say that this election may be the last time the ANC will have a wide majority. Importantly, many voters prefer the ANC, but support replacing President Zuma. Experts argue that these trends signify a shift in the country’s political landscape.

Authors

Ethan Lee

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Fri, 02 May 2014 16:28:00 -0400Ethan Lee
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry Travels to Addis Ababa, Juba, Kinshasa and Luanda
On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, his first stop on his visit to Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola. The top items on the secretary's agenda include discussing regional security issues—including those in South Sudan and the Central Africa Republic—speaking out against recent human rights abuses in the region and advancing opportunities for economic development. Already, Kerry advocated for the release of nine journalists and bloggers arrested by the Ethiopian government for “working with a foreign organization to incite public violence.” He also met with Ethiopian, Ugandan and Kenyan leaders to discuss possible economic sanctions on South Sudan as well as a potential travel ban.
Kerry is currently in Juba, South Sudan meeting President Salva Kiir to argue for peace in the 4-month-old civil war. Kerry has warned that the conflict may lead to genocide and has raised the flag to warn of a possible famine. This morning, USAID Administrator Raj Shah emphasized the danger and deadly consequences of a famine in the region.
Kerry's next stop is Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where he will focus on long-term stability and justice or amnesty for former rebels. Finally, Kerry will finish his trip in Luanda, Angola where he plans to commend President José Eduardo dos Santos for Angola's leadership in the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and Angola's push for solutions for crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. Kerry will also discuss bilateral policy and trade issues with Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti.
Overlapping with Kerry's visit, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang will also travel to African nations—including Angola—for additional energy deals to promote economic partnerships as well as development aid for the region. France also recently welcomed President dos Santos in hopes of increasing investment opportunities and securing overseas contracts there.
Kerry's visit has been met with criticism: Some believe that this trip signifies heightened U.S. competition with countries such as China and Brazil to increase its own interests in the oil-rich nations of South Sudan and Angola. On the other hand, others claim that conflict resolution and peace are more central to this visit than economic interests. Center for Global Development Chief Operating Officer and Senior Fellow Todd Moss argues that Kerry's visit will focus on security while serving as a preview for the upcoming U.S. Africa Leaders' Summit.
South Africa Prepares for May 7's Presidential Election
After celebrating its 20th anniversary since the historic post-apartheid election, South Africa will hold its general election on May 7, marking its first since Nelson Mandela's death.
This year's election has centered on a few key issues. The economy has stagnated while other African nations undergo economic booms, and unemployment has sharply risen, with a third of the working-age population now unemployed. Union members have been striking for better wages in South Africa's platinum belt. Corruption is also an important issue, as reports of widespread fraud (e.g., President Jacob Zuma's controversial $23 million security upgrades for his private home that included a swimming pool and a chicken run) have been in the news
The three largest parties in the running are the current governing African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance and the Congress of the People. While Mandela's former party, the Zuma-led ANC, is favored to win, some say that this election may be the last time the ANC will have a wide majority. Importantly, many voters prefer the ANC, but support replacing President Zuma. Experts argue that these trends signify a shift in the country's political ... U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry Travels to Addis Ababa, Juba, Kinshasa and Luanda
On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, his first stop on his visit to Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of ...

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry Travels to Addis Ababa, Juba, Kinshasa and Luanda

On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, his first stop on his visit to Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola. The top items on the secretary’s agenda include discussing regional security issues—including those in South Sudan and the Central Africa Republic—speaking out against recent human rights abuses in the region and advancing opportunities for economic development. Already, Kerry advocated for the release of nine journalists and bloggers arrested by the Ethiopian government for “working with a foreign organization to incite public violence.” He also met with Ethiopian, Ugandan and Kenyan leaders to discuss possible economic sanctions on South Sudan as well as a potential travel ban.

Kerry’s visit has been met with criticism: Some believe that this trip signifies heightened U.S. competition with countries such as China and Brazil to increase its own interests in the oil-rich nations of South Sudan and Angola. On the other hand, others claim that conflict resolution and peace are more central to this visit than economic interests. Center for Global Development Chief Operating Officer and Senior Fellow Todd Moss argues that Kerry’s visit will focus on security while serving as a preview for the upcoming U.S. Africa Leaders’ Summit.

South Africa Prepares for May 7’s Presidential Election

After celebrating its 20th anniversary since the historic post-apartheid election, South Africa will hold its general election on May 7, marking its first since Nelson Mandela’s death.

This year’s election has centered on a few key issues. The economy has stagnated while other African nations undergo economic booms, and unemployment has sharply risen, with a third of the working-age population now unemployed. Union members have been striking for better wages in South Africa’s platinum belt. Corruption is also an important issue, as reports of widespread fraud (e.g., President Jacob Zuma’s controversial $23 million security upgrades for his private home that included a swimming pool and a chicken run) have been in the news

The three largest parties in the running are the current governing African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance and the Congress of the People. While Mandela’s former party, the Zuma-led ANC, is favored to win, some say that this election may be the last time the ANC will have a wide majority. Importantly, many voters prefer the ANC, but support replacing President Zuma. Experts argue that these trends signify a shift in the country’s political landscape.

Authors

Ethan Lee

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/04/30-sanctions-south-sudan-schneidman?rssid=sudan{47A50C15-9EF8-4E29-968A-0DE8D4D43D12}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495241/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Approaching-the-Sanctions-Tripwire-in-South-SudanApproaching the Sanctions Tripwire in South Sudan

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has an extremely full agenda, especially regarding South Sudan, during this week’s visit to Africa. Most immediately, he has to put in place measures that will prevent further civilian atrocities in South Sudan. The recent attacks on civilians in Bentiu and Bor cannot be repeated. At the same time, the secretary needs to jump-start a peace negotiation that will lead to the emergence of institutions of governance and security that have never worked effectively in the country.

The good news is that the Obama administration appears to be stepping up its engagement in a country that at one time qualified as a foreign policy “success” for the administration.

On April 3, President Obama signed an executive order that will allow the U.S. to impose sanctions on individuals violating human rights, contributing to unrest or interfering in efforts to resolve the conflict in South Sudan—indicating a growing fissure in the once-close relationship between Washington and Juba. The order also reflects a new resolve by Washington to end the fighting in this young nation. It is unlikely, however, that the conflict will subside any time soon unless President Salva Kiir takes decisive actions to end the fighting.

The Obama administration hopes that the executive order will create an “incentive” for Salva Kiir and his allies and the forces of former Vice President Riek Machar to de-escalate the conflict in that nation.

In reality, the executive order is a stark warning to both sides that Washington is deeply disturbed by the senseless violence, and particularly angry that both leaders have allowed—if not ordered—massive human rights violations, including ethnic killings and displacement of more than a million citizens. The administration is also rightly disturbed at the verbal attacks on the United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan by the Kiir administration. Indeed the U.N. Security Council needs to take a firm stance on these attacks and warn Kiir and others that attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, such as those in Bor, are unacceptable and could lead to the imposition of sanctions.

Such an outcome was unimaginable on July 9, 2011, when South Sudan won its independence from Sudan. In fact, the U.S. played the role of what many describe as the midwife. But over the past two years Washington has become concerned over the increasingly authoritarian actions by the Kiir government, including harassment of human rights workers, nongovernmental organizations, and journalists, as well as an unwillingness to address problems of governance and corruption. Dissent within the ruling party was seen as treason rather than a need for reform. All this erupted in the violent confrontations in Juba last December and the descent into civil war. Nevertheless, ethnic attacks and other humanitarian crimes are no more allowable or justified by the forces in opposition to Kiir than by those loyal to the government. The Obama administration’s warning is to both.

In addition to the violence, one immediate result of the ongoing conflict is the prospect of widespread famine. According to the U.N., the country could face the worst starvation in Africa since the 1980s in Ethiopia when several hundred thousand people perished. Already, one million South Sudanese have been displaced internally or have fled to neighboring countries.

Neighboring African countries under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are working to bring about a cease fire, enhance the protection of civilians, and facilitate the provision of desperately needed humanitarian aid. The U.S., U.K., Norway and China are all assisting in this effort. But once the fighting ends, there will be need for a major political transformation in South Sudan, one that leads to a government that is truly democratic and committed to the development of the country. There will also be a need for accountability for all that has happened this past year. Anything less would be a further betrayal of the hopes and dreams of the millions of South Sudanese who thronged the capital and all other major cities in the country in joyful celebration on July 9, 2011, believing that after decades of fighting for their independence their time for peace and development had finally come.

Authors

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Wed, 30 Apr 2014 13:28:00 -0400Witney Schneidman and Princeton Lyman
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has an extremely full agenda, especially regarding South Sudan, during this week's visit to Africa. Most immediately, he has to put in place measures that will prevent further civilian atrocities in South Sudan. The recent attacks on civilians in Bentiu and Bor cannot be repeated. At the same time, the secretary needs to jump-start a peace negotiation that will lead to the emergence of institutions of governance and security that have never worked effectively in the country.
The good news is that the Obama administration appears to be stepping up its engagement in a country that at one time qualified as a foreign policy “success” for the administration.
On April 3, President Obama signed an executive order that will allow the U.S. to impose sanctions on individuals violating human rights, contributing to unrest or interfering in efforts to resolve the conflict in South Sudan—indicating a growing fissure in the once-close relationship between Washington and Juba. The order also reflects a new resolve by Washington to end the fighting in this young nation. It is unlikely, however, that the conflict will subside any time soon unless President Salva Kiir takes decisive actions to end the fighting.
The decision last week by the South Sudan government to drop treason charges against four senior politicians detained in connection with an alleged coup attempt in mid-December is a positive action, but much more is needed from the Kiir government.
The Obama administration hopes that the executive order will create an “incentive” for Salva Kiir and his allies and the forces of former Vice President Riek Machar to de-escalate the conflict in that nation.
In reality, the executive order is a stark warning to both sides that Washington is deeply disturbed by the senseless violence, and particularly angry that both leaders have allowed—if not ordered—massive human rights violations, including ethnic killings and displacement of more than a million citizens. The administration is also rightly disturbed at the verbal attacks on the United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan by the Kiir administration. Indeed the U.N. Security Council needs to take a firm stance on these attacks and warn Kiir and others that attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, such as those in Bor, are unacceptable and could lead to the imposition of sanctions.
Such an outcome was unimaginable on July 9, 2011, when South Sudan won its independence from Sudan. In fact, the U.S. played the role of what many describe as the midwife. But over the past two years Washington has become concerned over the increasingly authoritarian actions by the Kiir government, including harassment of human rights workers, nongovernmental organizations, and journalists, as well as an unwillingness to address problems of governance and corruption. Dissent within the ruling party was seen as treason rather than a need for reform. All this erupted in the violent confrontations in Juba last December and the descent into civil war. Nevertheless, ethnic attacks and other humanitarian crimes are no more allowable or justified by the forces in opposition to Kiir than by those loyal to the government. The Obama administration's warning is to both.
In addition to the violence, one immediate result of the ongoing conflict is the prospect of widespread famine. According to the U.N., the country could face the worst starvation in Africa since the 1980s in Ethiopia when several hundred thousand people perished. Already, one million South Sudanese have been displaced internally or have fled to neighboring countries.
Neighboring African countries under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are working to bring about a cease fire, enhance the protection of civilians, and facilitate the provision of desperately needed humanitarian aid. The U.S., U.K., Norway and China are all assisting in this ...
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has an extremely full agenda, especially regarding South Sudan, during this week's visit to Africa. Most immediately, he has to put in place measures that will prevent further civilian atrocities in South Sudan.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has an extremely full agenda, especially regarding South Sudan, during this week’s visit to Africa. Most immediately, he has to put in place measures that will prevent further civilian atrocities in South Sudan. The recent attacks on civilians in Bentiu and Bor cannot be repeated. At the same time, the secretary needs to jump-start a peace negotiation that will lead to the emergence of institutions of governance and security that have never worked effectively in the country.

The good news is that the Obama administration appears to be stepping up its engagement in a country that at one time qualified as a foreign policy “success” for the administration.

On April 3, President Obama signed an executive order that will allow the U.S. to impose sanctions on individuals violating human rights, contributing to unrest or interfering in efforts to resolve the conflict in South Sudan—indicating a growing fissure in the once-close relationship between Washington and Juba. The order also reflects a new resolve by Washington to end the fighting in this young nation. It is unlikely, however, that the conflict will subside any time soon unless President Salva Kiir takes decisive actions to end the fighting.

The Obama administration hopes that the executive order will create an “incentive” for Salva Kiir and his allies and the forces of former Vice President Riek Machar to de-escalate the conflict in that nation.

In reality, the executive order is a stark warning to both sides that Washington is deeply disturbed by the senseless violence, and particularly angry that both leaders have allowed—if not ordered—massive human rights violations, including ethnic killings and displacement of more than a million citizens. The administration is also rightly disturbed at the verbal attacks on the United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan by the Kiir administration. Indeed the U.N. Security Council needs to take a firm stance on these attacks and warn Kiir and others that attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, such as those in Bor, are unacceptable and could lead to the imposition of sanctions.

Such an outcome was unimaginable on July 9, 2011, when South Sudan won its independence from Sudan. In fact, the U.S. played the role of what many describe as the midwife. But over the past two years Washington has become concerned over the increasingly authoritarian actions by the Kiir government, including harassment of human rights workers, nongovernmental organizations, and journalists, as well as an unwillingness to address problems of governance and corruption. Dissent within the ruling party was seen as treason rather than a need for reform. All this erupted in the violent confrontations in Juba last December and the descent into civil war. Nevertheless, ethnic attacks and other humanitarian crimes are no more allowable or justified by the forces in opposition to Kiir than by those loyal to the government. The Obama administration’s warning is to both.

In addition to the violence, one immediate result of the ongoing conflict is the prospect of widespread famine. According to the U.N., the country could face the worst starvation in Africa since the 1980s in Ethiopia when several hundred thousand people perished. Already, one million South Sudanese have been displaced internally or have fled to neighboring countries.

Neighboring African countries under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are working to bring about a cease fire, enhance the protection of civilians, and facilitate the provision of desperately needed humanitarian aid. The U.S., U.K., Norway and China are all assisting in this effort. But once the fighting ends, there will be need for a major political transformation in South Sudan, one that leads to a government that is truly democratic and committed to the development of the country. There will also be a need for accountability for all that has happened this past year. Anything less would be a further betrayal of the hopes and dreams of the millions of South Sudanese who thronged the capital and all other major cities in the country in joyful celebration on July 9, 2011, believing that after decades of fighting for their independence their time for peace and development had finally come.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/04/25-international-monetary-fund-africa-growth-south-sudan-car-copley?rssid=sudan{C9E31D38-D78F-4637-95F0-9AA56D440A25}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495243/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Africa-in-the-News-IMF-Releases-Growth-Projections-While-Security-in-South-Sudan-and-the-CAR-DeteriorateAfrica in the News: IMF Releases Growth Projections, While Security in South Sudan and the CAR Deteriorate

IMF Envisages Accelerated Growth for Sub-Saharan Africa

On April 24, the IMF launched its latest Regional Economic Outlook report for sub-Saharan Africa, forecasting a marked rise in economic growth from 4.9 percent last year to 5.5 percent in 2014. This projection reflects several positive developments in the region that contributed to robust growth in 2013, including large investments in infrastructure and natural resources, maturing investments, and improvements in political and security situations (notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali).

At the same time, the report also identifies a number of domestic and external risks that may hinder certain countries’ performance moving forward. South Africa in particular, which experienced sluggish growth in 2013, continues to face multiple challenges such as protracted labor strikes by platinum miners, a constrained electricity supply, and weak private investment and consumer confidence. Moreover, capital outflows threaten to further undercut growth not only in South Africa, but in countries with climbing debt levels such as Ghana and Zambia. As investors’ appetite for emerging market debt decreases due to the U.S. Federal Reserve’s reduction in funding for its $85 billion-a-month asset purchase program, developing countries may experience “weaker currencies” and additional “pressure on inflation,” according to Bloomberg. Therefore the outlook for the region—while qualified by these risks—remains cautiously optimistic.

China and the United States Agree on Condemnation of Attacks in South Sudan

In his recent analysis of the conflict, Nonresident Senior Fellow John Mukum Mbaku contends that the country’s pervasive violence stems from the government’s failure to address “mechanisms for all individuals and groups to compete fairly for positions in the political and economic systems” during the state formation process. As a result, he suggests that South Sudan’s leaders face a choice: step aside and allow an interim government to establish a more inclusive system or continue to advance personal agendas through violence and the instrumentalization of ethnicity.

United Nations Security Council Deliberates Sanctions on the Central African Republic

On the other hand, the U.S.’s proposed sanctions against former President Francois Bozizé of the Central African Republic and two other key actors in the conflict have been blocked by China and Russia over administrative and substantive objections. On Tuesday, the U.S. State Department appointed Ambassador W. Stuart Symington to be special representative for the Central African Republic. He will lead the implementation of the U.S. strategy in the CAR, which centers on ending the violence, supporting humanitarian needs and instituting effective systems of governance. However, as violence continues, there is another major obstacle facing local and global leaders: Calls for state partition.

Authors

Amy Copley

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Fri, 25 Apr 2014 17:03:00 -0400Amy Copley
IMF Envisages Accelerated Growth for Sub-Saharan Africa
On April 24, the IMF launched its latest Regional Economic Outlook report for sub-Saharan Africa, forecasting a marked rise in economic growth from 4.9 percent last year to 5.5 percent in 2014. This projection reflects several positive developments in the region that contributed to robust growth in 2013, including large investments in infrastructure and natural resources, maturing investments, and improvements in political and security situations (notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali).
At the same time, the report also identifies a number of domestic and external risks that may hinder certain countries' performance moving forward. South Africa in particular, which experienced sluggish growth in 2013, continues to face multiple challenges such as protracted labor strikes by platinum miners, a constrained electricity supply, and weak private investment and consumer confidence. Moreover, capital outflows threaten to further undercut growth not only in South Africa, but in countries with climbing debt levels such as Ghana and Zambia. As investors' appetite for emerging market debt decreases due to the U.S. Federal Reserve's reduction in funding for its $85 billion-a-month asset purchase program, developing countries may experience “weaker currencies” and additional “pressure on inflation,” according to Bloomberg. Therefore the outlook for the region—while qualified by these risks—remains cautiously optimistic.
China and the United States Agree on Condemnation of Attacks in South Sudan
Following the escalating violence in South Sudan last week, detailed accounts of the atrocities at Bentiu reveal the ethnic dimension of the attacks in which hundreds of civilians were targeted and killed. Meanwhile, both the United States and China have strongly condemned the recent attacks, creating a rare consensus that will enable discussions over sanctions against key members of the warring parties to proceed in the U.N. Security Council.
In his recent analysis of the conflict, Nonresident Senior Fellow John Mukum Mbaku contends that the country's pervasive violence stems from the government's failure to address “mechanisms for all individuals and groups to compete fairly for positions in the political and economic systems” during the state formation process. As a result, he suggests that South Sudan's leaders face a choice: step aside and allow an interim government to establish a more inclusive system or continue to advance personal agendas through violence and the instrumentalization of ethnicity.
United Nations Security Council Deliberates Sanctions on the Central African Republic
On the other hand, the U.S.'s proposed sanctions against former President Francois Bozizé of the Central African Republic and two other key actors in the conflict have been blocked by China and Russia over administrative and substantive objections. On Tuesday, the U.S. State Department appointed Ambassador W. Stuart Symington to be special representative for the Central African Republic. He will lead the implementation of the U.S. strategy in the CAR, which centers on ending the violence, supporting humanitarian needs and instituting effective systems of governance. However, as violence continues, there is another major obstacle facing local and global leaders: Calls for state partition.
In other news, CAR interfaith leaders Imam Omar Kobine Layama, Archbishop Dieudonné Nzapalainga and Rev. Nicolas Guérékoyame-Gbangou, who engaged in a recent dialogue at Brookings, were listed among TIME Magazine's 100 Most Influential People for their work “to prevent violence and promote interreligious tolerance.”
Authors
- Amy Copley
IMF Envisages Accelerated Growth for Sub-Saharan Africa
On April 24, the IMF launched its latest Regional Economic Outlook report for sub-Saharan Africa, forecasting a marked rise in economic growth from 4.9 percent last year to 5.

IMF Envisages Accelerated Growth for Sub-Saharan Africa

On April 24, the IMF launched its latest Regional Economic Outlook report for sub-Saharan Africa, forecasting a marked rise in economic growth from 4.9 percent last year to 5.5 percent in 2014. This projection reflects several positive developments in the region that contributed to robust growth in 2013, including large investments in infrastructure and natural resources, maturing investments, and improvements in political and security situations (notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali).

At the same time, the report also identifies a number of domestic and external risks that may hinder certain countries’ performance moving forward. South Africa in particular, which experienced sluggish growth in 2013, continues to face multiple challenges such as protracted labor strikes by platinum miners, a constrained electricity supply, and weak private investment and consumer confidence. Moreover, capital outflows threaten to further undercut growth not only in South Africa, but in countries with climbing debt levels such as Ghana and Zambia. As investors’ appetite for emerging market debt decreases due to the U.S. Federal Reserve’s reduction in funding for its $85 billion-a-month asset purchase program, developing countries may experience “weaker currencies” and additional “pressure on inflation,” according to Bloomberg. Therefore the outlook for the region—while qualified by these risks—remains cautiously optimistic.

China and the United States Agree on Condemnation of Attacks in South Sudan

In his recent analysis of the conflict, Nonresident Senior Fellow John Mukum Mbaku contends that the country’s pervasive violence stems from the government’s failure to address “mechanisms for all individuals and groups to compete fairly for positions in the political and economic systems” during the state formation process. As a result, he suggests that South Sudan’s leaders face a choice: step aside and allow an interim government to establish a more inclusive system or continue to advance personal agendas through violence and the instrumentalization of ethnicity.

United Nations Security Council Deliberates Sanctions on the Central African Republic

On the other hand, the U.S.’s proposed sanctions against former President Francois Bozizé of the Central African Republic and two other key actors in the conflict have been blocked by China and Russia over administrative and substantive objections. On Tuesday, the U.S. State Department appointed Ambassador W. Stuart Symington to be special representative for the Central African Republic. He will lead the implementation of the U.S. strategy in the CAR, which centers on ending the violence, supporting humanitarian needs and instituting effective systems of governance. However, as violence continues, there is another major obstacle facing local and global leaders: Calls for state partition.

Today, the country that all of you and your fellow citizens fought to establish is at a crossroads. And you, the country’s leaders, are now standing at the proverbial “fork in the road.” The question now is: Which road will each of you take? Your choice will determine not only your place in history but will significantly impact the future of your shared country, its diverse peoples and your neighbors. Each of you can choose to chase after personal power, primitive accumulation, and self-enrichment—using the ethnic group that you belong to as a foundation for that quest. This disastrous decision would plunge your country further into violent and destructive mobilization, effectively shutting the door to the type of state formation that is undergirded by a desire to achieve national integration, peaceful coexistence and sustainable development. Alternatively, each of you can opt to maximize a different value, one that places you among the world’s greatest leaders—that is, those who, when they came to the fork in the road, chose to lead their people down the road of opportunities for peaceful coexistence, prosperity and liberty.

As the citizens of South Sudan watch and wait in utter fear and disgust, it is time for you, the country’s leaders, to decide whether you want to lead them into a future filled with unending violence, hunger, and desolation, or into one where all of the country’s various peoples, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, gender, and economic status, can live together peacefully and pursue their values and interests without molestation from others.

In the early 1990s, Nelson Mandela and his compatriots found themselves at a similar crossroads. They chose not to act opportunistically and retreat to their various ethnic enclaves. Like the great leaders that history has proven them to be, they knew that, as apparently beneficial as such an option would have been to them, they would have plunged their country into an abyss from which it was unlikely to recover anytime soon. Instead, they chose the road that led them and their country to the type of state formation that is undergirded by institutional arrangements that provide an enabling environment for wealth creation and economic growth. That is why, today, the country that they founded has one of the world’s most progressive and human-rights friendly constitutions.

South Sudan is a new and relatively underdeveloped country, but it has the potential to emerge as a highly developed and peaceful one. However, in order for that potential to be fully exploited and used effectively to enhance development, the latter must be provided with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law.

To you, the leaders of this new country: All of you can gracefully exit the scene, serve as elder statesmen, and provide the country’s new crop of leaders with the type of advice and support that can help the country successfully emerge from its violent and destructive past, as well as chart a path towards peace, sustainable economic growth and development, and equitable and fair allocation of national resources.

How will history judge you? As tyrants, opportunists, despots, exploiters, and oppressors, who used their public positions to grab power and riches for themselves or as public servants who spearheaded and led the transformative processes that brought peace, security, and development to their country? The choice is yours.

Posterity will judge you well, but only if you choose wisely!

Authors

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Wed, 23 Apr 2014 10:54:00 -0400John Mukum Mbaku
Dear South Sudan's Leaders:
Today, the country that all of you and your fellow citizens fought to establish is at a crossroads. And you, the country's leaders, are now standing at the proverbial “fork in the road.” The question now is: Which road will each of you take? Your choice will determine not only your place in history but will significantly impact the future of your shared country, its diverse peoples and your neighbors. Each of you can choose to chase after personal power, primitive accumulation, and self-enrichment—using the ethnic group that you belong to as a foundation for that quest. This disastrous decision would plunge your country further into violent and destructive mobilization, effectively shutting the door to the type of state formation that is undergirded by a desire to achieve national integration, peaceful coexistence and sustainable development. Alternatively, each of you can opt to maximize a different value, one that places you among the world's greatest leaders—that is, those who, when they came to the fork in the road, chose to lead their people down the road of opportunities for peaceful coexistence, prosperity and liberty.
As the citizens of South Sudan watch and wait in utter fear and disgust, it is time for you, the country's leaders, to decide whether you want to lead them into a future filled with unending violence, hunger, and desolation, or into one where all of the country's various peoples, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, gender, and economic status, can live together peacefully and pursue their values and interests without molestation from others.
In the early 1990s, Nelson Mandela and his compatriots found themselves at a similar crossroads. They chose not to act opportunistically and retreat to their various ethnic enclaves. Like the great leaders that history has proven them to be, they knew that, as apparently beneficial as such an option would have been to them, they would have plunged their country into an abyss from which it was unlikely to recover anytime soon. Instead, they chose the road that led them and their country to the type of state formation that is undergirded by institutional arrangements that provide an enabling environment for wealth creation and economic growth. That is why, today, the country that they founded has one of the world's most progressive and human-rights friendly constitutions.
South Sudan is a new and relatively underdeveloped country, but it has the potential to emerge as a highly developed and peaceful one. However, in order for that potential to be fully exploited and used effectively to enhance development, the latter must be provided with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law.
To you, the leaders of this new country: All of you can gracefully exit the scene, serve as elder statesmen, and provide the country's new crop of leaders with the type of advice and support that can help the country successfully emerge from its violent and destructive past, as well as chart a path towards peace, sustainable economic growth and development, and equitable and fair allocation of national resources.
How will history judge you? As tyrants, opportunists, despots, exploiters, and oppressors, who used their public positions to grab power and riches for themselves or as public servants who spearheaded and led the transformative processes that brought peace, security, and development to their country? The choice is yours.
Posterity will judge you well, but only if you choose wisely!
Authors
- John Mukum Mbaku
Dear South Sudan's Leaders:
Today, the country that all of you and your fellow citizens fought to establish is at a crossroads. And you, the country's leaders, are now standing at the proverbial “fork in the road.

Dear South Sudan's Leaders:

Today, the country that all of you and your fellow citizens fought to establish is at a crossroads. And you, the country’s leaders, are now standing at the proverbial “fork in the road.” The question now is: Which road will each of you take? Your choice will determine not only your place in history but will significantly impact the future of your shared country, its diverse peoples and your neighbors. Each of you can choose to chase after personal power, primitive accumulation, and self-enrichment—using the ethnic group that you belong to as a foundation for that quest. This disastrous decision would plunge your country further into violent and destructive mobilization, effectively shutting the door to the type of state formation that is undergirded by a desire to achieve national integration, peaceful coexistence and sustainable development. Alternatively, each of you can opt to maximize a different value, one that places you among the world’s greatest leaders—that is, those who, when they came to the fork in the road, chose to lead their people down the road of opportunities for peaceful coexistence, prosperity and liberty.

As the citizens of South Sudan watch and wait in utter fear and disgust, it is time for you, the country’s leaders, to decide whether you want to lead them into a future filled with unending violence, hunger, and desolation, or into one where all of the country’s various peoples, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, gender, and economic status, can live together peacefully and pursue their values and interests without molestation from others.

In the early 1990s, Nelson Mandela and his compatriots found themselves at a similar crossroads. They chose not to act opportunistically and retreat to their various ethnic enclaves. Like the great leaders that history has proven them to be, they knew that, as apparently beneficial as such an option would have been to them, they would have plunged their country into an abyss from which it was unlikely to recover anytime soon. Instead, they chose the road that led them and their country to the type of state formation that is undergirded by institutional arrangements that provide an enabling environment for wealth creation and economic growth. That is why, today, the country that they founded has one of the world’s most progressive and human-rights friendly constitutions.

South Sudan is a new and relatively underdeveloped country, but it has the potential to emerge as a highly developed and peaceful one. However, in order for that potential to be fully exploited and used effectively to enhance development, the latter must be provided with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law.

To you, the leaders of this new country: All of you can gracefully exit the scene, serve as elder statesmen, and provide the country’s new crop of leaders with the type of advice and support that can help the country successfully emerge from its violent and destructive past, as well as chart a path towards peace, sustainable economic growth and development, and equitable and fair allocation of national resources.

How will history judge you? As tyrants, opportunists, despots, exploiters, and oppressors, who used their public positions to grab power and riches for themselves or as public servants who spearheaded and led the transformative processes that brought peace, security, and development to their country? The choice is yours.

Professor Riek Machar, former vice president of South Sudan and now leader of the rebel group that is fighting the government of South Sudan for control of the apparatus of the government, has publicly threatened to capture and take control of both the capital city of Juba and the oil-producing regions of the country. Branding South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, a “dictator” and arguing that he does not recognize the need to share power, Professor Machar stated that the present conflict, which has lasted for more than five months and resulted in the killing of many people and the destruction of a significant amount of property, will not end until Kiir is chased out of power.

Violent mobilization by groups loyal to Machar against the government in Juba began in December 2013. It was only after bloody confrontations between the two parties that targeted civilians based on their ethnicity had resulted in the deaths of many people (creating a major humanitarian crisis) that a cease-fire agreement was signed in Addis Ababa on January 23, 2014, with the hope of bringing to an end the brutal fighting. The cease-fire, however, was seen only as the first step towards negotiations that were supposed to help the country exit the violent conflict and secure institutional arrangements capable of guaranteeing peaceful coexistence.

If Machar and his supporters have the wherewithal to carry out the threats and successfully do so, there is no guarantee that peace would be brought to the country. For one thing, any violent overthrow of the government would only engender more violence as supporters of Kiir and his benefactors are likely to regroup and attempt to recapture their lost political positions. What South Sudan badly needs is an institutionalization of democracy and not a government led by political opportunists. In fact, an effective strategy to exit from this incessant violence must be centered around the election of an inclusive interim government—minus both Kiir and Machar—that would engage all of the country’s relevant stakeholders in negotiations to create a governing process that adequately constrains the state, establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict, enhances peaceful coexistence, and provides an enabling environment for the rapid creation of the wealth needed to deal with poverty and deprivation.

On March 9, 2012, less than a year after South Sudan gained independence, then-Vice President Machar met with several Brookings scholars, including myself, in New York City. The meeting was part of the new country’s efforts to seek assistance from its international partners to address complex and longstanding development challenges, including critical issues such as the effective management of the country’s natural resource endowments, gender equity, the building of government capacity to maintain law and order, the provision of other critical public goods and services, and poverty alleviation. Among participants in this critical consultation were Mwangi S. Kimenyi, senior fellow and director of the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution; Witney Schneidman, AGI nonresident fellow and former deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs; and me. The vice president, who appeared extremely energetic and optimistic about prospects for sustainable development in the new country, requested an analysis of the commitments and achievements that the government of South Sudan had made since independence and suggestions for a way forward. The scholars, working in close collaboration with their colleagues at Brookings, produced a policy report requested by the vice president. The report entitled, South Sudan: One Year After Independence—Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa’s Newest Country, was presented at a well-attended public event on July 28, 2012. Panelists included Peter Ajak, director of the Center for Strategic Analyses and Research in Juba; Ambassador Princeton Lyman, U.S. special envoy for South Sudan and Sudan; Nada Mustafa Ali scholar at the New School for Social Research; Mwangi S. Kimenyi and me.

The report provided a comprehensive review of the policy issues requested by the vice president—the provision of basic services; future engagement between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan; efficient and equitable management of natural resources; ethnic diversity and peaceful coexistence; federalism; eradication of corruption; and the benefits of regional integration. Most important is the fact that the report placed emphasis on the need for the government of South Sudan to totally reconstruct the state inherited from the Khartoum government through democratic constitution making and produce a governing process that (i) guarantees the protection of human and fundamental rights, including those of vulnerable groups (e.g., women, minority ethnic groups); (ii) adequately constrains the government (so that impunity, corruption and rent seeking are minimized); (iii) enhances entrepreneurial activities and provides the wherewithal for wealth creation and economic growth; and (iv) establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict and creates an environment within which all of the country’s diverse population groups can coexist peacefully.

Unfortunately, when the report was completed, members of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement were already embroiled in a brutal power struggle that eventually led to President Kiir sacking his entire cabinet, including the vice president. The collapse of the government raised the prospects of violent and destructive mobilization by groups that felt the president’s actions were marginalizing them both economically and politically. The ensuing chaos created an environment that was hardly conducive to the implementation of policies such as those presented in the Brookings report.

The government of Sudan has failed to engage in the type of robust institutional reforms that would have effectively prevented President Kiir and his government from engaging in the various opportunistic policies that have been partly responsible for the violence that now pervades the country. South Sudan’s diverse ethnic groups put forth a united front in their war against Khartoum for self-determination. Following independence, the new government engaged in state formation processes that did not provide mechanisms for all individuals and groups to compete fairly for positions in the political and economic systems. Instead, the government’s approach to state formation politicized ethnic cleavages and made the ethnic group the basis and foundation for political, and to a certain extent, economic participation. This approach has created a "sure recipe for breeding ethnic antagonism," and has led to the crisis that currently consumes the country.

While the most important policy imperative in South Sudan today is the need to make certain that the cease-fire continues to hold, long-term prospects for peaceful coexistence and development call for comprehensive institutional reforms to provide the country with a governing process that guarantees the rule of law. Hence, both the opposition and the government—the two sides in the present conflict—should take advantage of the cease-fire and start putting together the framework that will eventually be used to put the state back together. A new interim government, without the participation of the two protagonists—Kiir and Machar—should be granted the power to bring together all of the country’s relevant stakeholders to reconstitute and reconstruct the state, including negotiating a permanent constitution.

Authors

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Mon, 21 Apr 2014 15:37:00 -0400John Mukum Mbaku
Professor Riek Machar, former vice president of South Sudan and now leader of the rebel group that is fighting the government of South Sudan for control of the apparatus of the government, has publicly threatened to capture and take control of both the capital city of Juba and the oil-producing regions of the country. Branding South Sudan's president, Salva Kiir, a “dictator” and arguing that he does not recognize the need to share power, Professor Machar stated that the present conflict, which has lasted for more than five months and resulted in the killing of many people and the destruction of a significant amount of property, will not end until Kiir is chased out of power.
Violent mobilization by groups loyal to Machar against the government in Juba began in December 2013. It was only after bloody confrontations between the two parties that targeted civilians based on their ethnicity had resulted in the deaths of many people (creating a major humanitarian crisis) that a cease-fire agreement was signed in Addis Ababa on January 23, 2014, with the hope of bringing to an end the brutal fighting. The cease-fire, however, was seen only as the first step towards negotiations that were supposed to help the country exit the violent conflict and secure institutional arrangements capable of guaranteeing peaceful coexistence.
If Machar and his supporters have the wherewithal to carry out the threats and successfully do so, there is no guarantee that peace would be brought to the country. For one thing, any violent overthrow of the government would only engender more violence as supporters of Kiir and his benefactors are likely to regroup and attempt to recapture their lost political positions. What South Sudan badly needs is an institutionalization of democracy and not a government led by political opportunists. In fact, an effective strategy to exit from this incessant violence must be centered around the election of an inclusive interim government—minus both Kiir and Machar—that would engage all of the country's relevant stakeholders in negotiations to create a governing process that adequately constrains the state, establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict, enhances peaceful coexistence, and provides an enabling environment for the rapid creation of the wealth needed to deal with poverty and deprivation.
On March 9, 2012, less than a year after South Sudan gained independence, then-Vice President Machar met with several Brookings scholars, including myself, in New York City. The meeting was part of the new country's efforts to seek assistance from its international partners to address complex and longstanding development challenges, including critical issues such as the effective management of the country's natural resource endowments, gender equity, the building of government capacity to maintain law and order, the provision of other critical public goods and services, and poverty alleviation. Among participants in this critical consultation were Mwangi S. Kimenyi, senior fellow and director of the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution; Witney Schneidman, AGI nonresident fellow and former deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs; and me. The vice president, who appeared extremely energetic and optimistic about prospects for sustainable development in the new country, requested an analysis of the commitments and achievements that the government of South Sudan had made since independence and suggestions for a way forward. The scholars, working in close collaboration with their colleagues at Brookings, produced a policy report requested by the vice president. The report entitled, South Sudan: One Year After Independence—Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country, was presented at a well-attended public event on July 28, 2012. Panelists included Peter Ajak, director of the Center for Strategic Analyses and Research in ...
Professor Riek Machar, former vice president of South Sudan and now leader of the rebel group that is fighting the government of South Sudan for control of the apparatus of the government, has publicly threatened to capture and take control of ...

Professor Riek Machar, former vice president of South Sudan and now leader of the rebel group that is fighting the government of South Sudan for control of the apparatus of the government, has publicly threatened to capture and take control of both the capital city of Juba and the oil-producing regions of the country. Branding South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, a “dictator” and arguing that he does not recognize the need to share power, Professor Machar stated that the present conflict, which has lasted for more than five months and resulted in the killing of many people and the destruction of a significant amount of property, will not end until Kiir is chased out of power.

Violent mobilization by groups loyal to Machar against the government in Juba began in December 2013. It was only after bloody confrontations between the two parties that targeted civilians based on their ethnicity had resulted in the deaths of many people (creating a major humanitarian crisis) that a cease-fire agreement was signed in Addis Ababa on January 23, 2014, with the hope of bringing to an end the brutal fighting. The cease-fire, however, was seen only as the first step towards negotiations that were supposed to help the country exit the violent conflict and secure institutional arrangements capable of guaranteeing peaceful coexistence.

If Machar and his supporters have the wherewithal to carry out the threats and successfully do so, there is no guarantee that peace would be brought to the country. For one thing, any violent overthrow of the government would only engender more violence as supporters of Kiir and his benefactors are likely to regroup and attempt to recapture their lost political positions. What South Sudan badly needs is an institutionalization of democracy and not a government led by political opportunists. In fact, an effective strategy to exit from this incessant violence must be centered around the election of an inclusive interim government—minus both Kiir and Machar—that would engage all of the country’s relevant stakeholders in negotiations to create a governing process that adequately constrains the state, establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict, enhances peaceful coexistence, and provides an enabling environment for the rapid creation of the wealth needed to deal with poverty and deprivation.

On March 9, 2012, less than a year after South Sudan gained independence, then-Vice President Machar met with several Brookings scholars, including myself, in New York City. The meeting was part of the new country’s efforts to seek assistance from its international partners to address complex and longstanding development challenges, including critical issues such as the effective management of the country’s natural resource endowments, gender equity, the building of government capacity to maintain law and order, the provision of other critical public goods and services, and poverty alleviation. Among participants in this critical consultation were Mwangi S. Kimenyi, senior fellow and director of the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution; Witney Schneidman, AGI nonresident fellow and former deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs; and me. The vice president, who appeared extremely energetic and optimistic about prospects for sustainable development in the new country, requested an analysis of the commitments and achievements that the government of South Sudan had made since independence and suggestions for a way forward. The scholars, working in close collaboration with their colleagues at Brookings, produced a policy report requested by the vice president. The report entitled, South Sudan: One Year After Independence—Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa’s Newest Country, was presented at a well-attended public event on July 28, 2012. Panelists included Peter Ajak, director of the Center for Strategic Analyses and Research in Juba; Ambassador Princeton Lyman, U.S. special envoy for South Sudan and Sudan; Nada Mustafa Ali scholar at the New School for Social Research; Mwangi S. Kimenyi and me.

The report provided a comprehensive review of the policy issues requested by the vice president—the provision of basic services; future engagement between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan; efficient and equitable management of natural resources; ethnic diversity and peaceful coexistence; federalism; eradication of corruption; and the benefits of regional integration. Most important is the fact that the report placed emphasis on the need for the government of South Sudan to totally reconstruct the state inherited from the Khartoum government through democratic constitution making and produce a governing process that (i) guarantees the protection of human and fundamental rights, including those of vulnerable groups (e.g., women, minority ethnic groups); (ii) adequately constrains the government (so that impunity, corruption and rent seeking are minimized); (iii) enhances entrepreneurial activities and provides the wherewithal for wealth creation and economic growth; and (iv) establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict and creates an environment within which all of the country’s diverse population groups can coexist peacefully.

Unfortunately, when the report was completed, members of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement were already embroiled in a brutal power struggle that eventually led to President Kiir sacking his entire cabinet, including the vice president. The collapse of the government raised the prospects of violent and destructive mobilization by groups that felt the president’s actions were marginalizing them both economically and politically. The ensuing chaos created an environment that was hardly conducive to the implementation of policies such as those presented in the Brookings report.

The government of Sudan has failed to engage in the type of robust institutional reforms that would have effectively prevented President Kiir and his government from engaging in the various opportunistic policies that have been partly responsible for the violence that now pervades the country. South Sudan’s diverse ethnic groups put forth a united front in their war against Khartoum for self-determination. Following independence, the new government engaged in state formation processes that did not provide mechanisms for all individuals and groups to compete fairly for positions in the political and economic systems. Instead, the government’s approach to state formation politicized ethnic cleavages and made the ethnic group the basis and foundation for political, and to a certain extent, economic participation. This approach has created a "sure recipe for breeding ethnic antagonism," and has led to the crisis that currently consumes the country.

While the most important policy imperative in South Sudan today is the need to make certain that the cease-fire continues to hold, long-term prospects for peaceful coexistence and development call for comprehensive institutional reforms to provide the country with a governing process that guarantees the rule of law. Hence, both the opposition and the government—the two sides in the present conflict—should take advantage of the cease-fire and start putting together the framework that will eventually be used to put the state back together. A new interim government, without the participation of the two protagonists—Kiir and Machar—should be granted the power to bring together all of the country’s relevant stakeholders to reconstitute and reconstruct the state, including negotiating a permanent constitution.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/04/18-south-sudan-conflict-nigeria-attack-olin-ammentorp?rssid=sudan{487AE454-4808-4489-912D-CAF52629C0CF}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495250/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Africa-in-the-News-Remittances-in-Africa-Are-%e2%80%9cSuperTaxed%e2%80%9d-South-Sudan-Conflict-Escalates-and-Attacks-in-Nigeria-Affect-HundredsAfrica in the News: Remittances in Africa Are “Super-Taxed,” South Sudan Conflict Escalates, and Attacks in Nigeria Affect Hundreds

Considering the increased use of mobile banking and online services, one might assume that middlemen’s fees would be decreasing, notes TheEconomist, but this is not the case. Western Union and MoneyGram continue to dominate the money transfer market in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in a lack of competition and limited transparency in foreign exchange fees. ODI argues that reducing money transfer fees would have an enormously beneficial effect on African economies: $1.8 billion, for example, could fund primary education for 14 million children.

United Nations Compound Attacked and Bentiu Seized by Rebels in South Sudan

An explosion at a bus station outside central Abuja killed more than 70 and injured over 120 individuals on Monday morning. No group has yet claimed responsibility, but Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has blamed the Islamist group Boko Haram, which is based in northeastern Nigeria. They are also assumed to be behind the abduction of more than 100 schoolgirls from their hostel in Chibok, in the northeastern state of Borno. Although Nigerian military officials stated that they had freed nearly all the girls on Wednesday, it later recanted this claim, acknowledging that only 30 girls were accounted for out of 129.

Authors

Jane Olin-Ammentorp

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Fri, 18 Apr 2014 16:45:00 -0400Jane Olin-Ammentorp
Remittance “Supertax” Costs African Countries Nearly $2 Billion per Year
On Wednesday, the UK-based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) released a report estimating that excess money transfer fees—incurred when individuals abroad send money to contacts in African countries—amount to $1.8 billion annually. The report, co-authored by Brookings Center for Universal Education Nonresident Senior Fellow and ODI Executive Director Kevin Watkins, finds that the cost to transfer money to sub-Saharan Africa remains at an average rate of 12.3 percent per $200 (about $25), far above the global average of 7.2 percent and the G-8's target rate of 5 percent.
Considering the increased use of mobile banking and online services, one might assume that middlemen's fees would be decreasing, notes The Economist, but this is not the case. Western Union and MoneyGram continue to dominate the money transfer market in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in a lack of competition and limited transparency in foreign exchange fees. ODI argues that reducing money transfer fees would have an enormously beneficial effect on African economies: $1.8 billion, for example, could fund primary education for 14 million children.
United Nations Compound Attacked and Bentiu Seized by Rebels in South Sudan
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) compound in Bor was attacked on Thursday, resulting in dozens of civilian casualties. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the attack constituted a war crime and was a “serious escalation” of the ongoing crisis in the country. South Sudan sent troops to secure the compound, but no one has yet been arrested over the attack.
Further north in Unity State, rebel forces took control of Bentiu from the South Sudanese army earlier this week. Hundreds are feared dead in the fighting, which has also forced the shutdown of oil-producing operations in the area. The U.S. Department of State condemned all attacks this week, urging all parties to abide by the January 23 Cessation of Hostilities agreement and threatening further sanctions on “anyone violating human rights or obstructing the peace process in South Sudan.”
Nigeria Experiences Tragedies with Abuja Bombing and Kidnapping of 129 Schoolgirls
An explosion at a bus station outside central Abuja killed more than 70 and injured over 120 individuals on Monday morning. No group has yet claimed responsibility, but Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has blamed the Islamist group Boko Haram, which is based in northeastern Nigeria. They are also assumed to be behind the abduction of more than 100 schoolgirls from their hostel in Chibok, in the northeastern state of Borno. Although Nigerian military officials stated that they had freed nearly all the girls on Wednesday, it later recanted this claim, acknowledging that only 30 girls were accounted for out of 129.
If Boko Haram is determined to be responsible for the Abuja attack, The New York Times contends, it would represent a “significant amplification” of the group's attempts to challenge central authority in Nigeria. The attack also magnifies existing security concerns for the World Economic Forum on Africa, which is scheduled to be held in Abuja in early May. However, in The Wall Street Journal, Ian Birrell argues that it would be a mistake to let ongoing violence detract from the economic and entrepreneurial success that Nigeria is currently experiencing.
Authors
- Jane Olin-Ammentorp
Remittance “Supertax” Costs African Countries Nearly $2 Billion per Year
On Wednesday, the UK-based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) released a report estimating that excess money transfer fees—

Considering the increased use of mobile banking and online services, one might assume that middlemen’s fees would be decreasing, notes TheEconomist, but this is not the case. Western Union and MoneyGram continue to dominate the money transfer market in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in a lack of competition and limited transparency in foreign exchange fees. ODI argues that reducing money transfer fees would have an enormously beneficial effect on African economies: $1.8 billion, for example, could fund primary education for 14 million children.

United Nations Compound Attacked and Bentiu Seized by Rebels in South Sudan

An explosion at a bus station outside central Abuja killed more than 70 and injured over 120 individuals on Monday morning. No group has yet claimed responsibility, but Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has blamed the Islamist group Boko Haram, which is based in northeastern Nigeria. They are also assumed to be behind the abduction of more than 100 schoolgirls from their hostel in Chibok, in the northeastern state of Borno. Although Nigerian military officials stated that they had freed nearly all the girls on Wednesday, it later recanted this claim, acknowledging that only 30 girls were accounted for out of 129.

Authors

Jane Olin-Ammentorp

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/04/04-us-sanctions-south-sudan-eu-africa-summit-car-conflict-pugliese?rssid=sudan{3ED0AE3D-1EBC-4DA4-831D-1CB6C17D1469}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495252/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Africa-in-the-News-US-Paves-the-Way-for-Sanctions-in-South-Sudan-and-the-EUAfrica-Summit-is-Overshadowed-by-CAR-ConflictAfrica in the News: US Paves the Way for Sanctions in South Sudan, and the EU-Africa Summit is Overshadowed by CAR Conflict

The United States Threatens Sanctions Against Individuals that Block Peace in South Sudan

Authors

Jessica Pugliese

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Fri, 04 Apr 2014 17:51:00 -0400Jessica Pugliese
The United States Threatens Sanctions Against Individuals that Block Peace in South Sudan
Yesterday, President Obama signed an executive order that threatens sanctions against individuals involved in threatening the peace and security of South Sudan. However, the order is a warning and no individuals have been named directly within the executive order. The White House press secretary's announcement clarifies that any individuals that “threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan, obstruct the peace process, target U.N. peacekeepers, or are responsible for human rights abuses and atrocities will not have a friend in the United States and run the risk of sanctions.”
Interestingly, the news of the sanctions came just as the South Sudanese ambassador to the U.S., Michael Makuei, accused the United States of interfering with sovereign affairs. Ambassador Makuei has also accused the U.S. ambassador to South Sudan, Susan Page, of making statements in support of Riek Machar and the rebel groups.
In related news, the head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Hilda Johnson, broke her silence yesterday for the first time since an incident in which a U.N. food relief convoy vehicle was found to be shipping arms. According to the U.N., an investigation into the incident is underway, and it seems that an arms shipment was mistakenly put on a road convoy. The arms shipment was seen by the government of South Sudan as an attempt to arm rebel forces. After the incident, Johnson faced protests that called for her resignation. Meanwhile, the U.N. has also traded accusations with the government of South Sudan of blocking humanitarian efforts such as famine relief.
EU-Africa Summit Promotes Trade, But Is Overshadowed by Peace and Security Issues
The two-day European Union-Africa summit in Brussels this week sought to focus on people, prosperity and peace. In anticipation of the event, Africa Growth Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Vera Songwe suggests that African countries can learn a lot from Germany, in the particular areas of energy management and efforts for regional integration.
While peace was a key part of the agenda at the summit, critics reported that the prosperity-centered trade and investment talk was overshadowed by the conflict and security issues in the Central African Republic (CAR). The summit started after the official launch of EU mission to the CAR on Tuesday, and 1,000 EU peacekeepers were deployed on the eve of the summit. The summit also comes ahead of the October 2014 deadline for African countries to sign the Economic Partnership agreements with the EU, an important agenda item for trade and prosperity.
The summit was not without its diplomatic hiccups. Robert Mugabe boycotted the conference after his wife was denied a visa. He has received criticism for the move based on the overall impact it will have for long term Zimbabwean foreign relations. South African President Jacob Zuma joined Mugabe in the boycott; Zuma reportedly took issue with invitations to the summit dictated solely by the EU. Earlier in March, the African Union Security Council, an organ of the AU, called for an Africa-wide boycott based on the restriction of certain countries, such as Sudan, from participation. The Security Council deemed this exclusion a violation of an AU resolution that states that the EU does not have the right to determine the composition of the African delegation.
In related news, Chad announced this week that it will pull troops from the CAR after facing repeated criticism by the U.N. on its conduct there.
Authors
- Jessica Pugliese
The United States Threatens Sanctions Against Individuals that Block Peace in South Sudan
Yesterday, President Obama signed an executive order that threatens sanctions against individuals involved in threatening the peace and security of South ...

The United States Threatens Sanctions Against Individuals that Block Peace in South Sudan

Authors

Jessica Pugliese

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/03/25-reconciliation-south-sudan-ajak?rssid=sudan{57B50303-F934-4DA8-AE97-23018A170933}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495254/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Reconciliation-in-South-Sudan-Three-Likely-ScenariosReconciliation in South Sudan: Three Likely Scenarios

The 3-month-old violence in South Sudan between the supporters of President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who is from the Dinka tribe, and the followers of his former Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, has opened deep wounds in the nascent republic. The conflict has claimed thousands of lives and displaced nearly a million people in shocking episodes of violence reminiscent of the 1990s when Mr. Machar turned against his compatriots in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) during the new country’s fight for independence. The violence then, as it is now, has resulted in perpetration of heinous crimes against humanity, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region, where the town of Bor has, once again, been the scene of another massacre. Peace remains elusive, as the latest round of negotiations under IGAD’s mediation was postponed after the government boycotted the talks this month.

Despite the current tragedy, the South Sudanese have been through equally painful experiences in the past and were able to forgive one another. And while they can exercise such forgiveness again, there is no guarantee that it will end the cycle of violence. The people need a genuine reconciliation process that goes beyond “forgiveness” in order for them to move forward.

A credible reconciliation process cannot occur while the conflict rages on in some parts of the country. While the institutional deficiencies to mediate political pressures exerted by a power struggle lie at the root of the crisis, the fighting has generally taken ethnic lines. The supporters of Mr. Machar claim that Mr. Kiir has lost legitimacy following the massacre of Nuer civilians by government forces in the nation’s capital and are fighting to remove him and install Mr. Machar to power. On the other hand, Mr. Kiir’s government has accused Mr. Machar of treason and wants him to face charges. Reconciling these narratives has proved difficult for the East African mediators, particularly in finding a meaningful deal to end the violence.

There are only three possible scenarios to end the conflict: a military victory by the government over the rebels, a power sharing deal involving Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar, and an interim government involving neither. A national reconciliation process would look fundamentally different in each of these three scenarios—but for it to be credible it has to be led by a government seen as legitimate by the people, and it has to provide justice for the victims of the ongoing violence.

Under the scenario of a military victory by the government, it is unlikely that the majority of rebel sympathizers would change their views regarding Mr. Kiir’s legitimacy. His government would lack legitimacy in their eyes and so would any reconciliation process under him. These challenges could hinder a genuine reconciliation process, not to mention the enormous loss of lives and issues of access to justice by rebels’ sympathizers under this scenario. Besides, the government can only manage a military victory with the military support of regional allies.

In the event that Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar reach a deal, they would likely form a coalition government, where Mr. Kiir could remain as president and Mr. Machar could become the prime minister or a first vice president. Such an arrangement would be similar to the one that existed between them before July 2013, but, obviously, the duo was unable to conduct a reconciliation process or build credible institutions to mediate their competing ambitions after nearly eight years of working together. The two men were deeply suspicious of one another, and after the events of last few months, it is difficult to see how they could bridge this challenge. Moreover, Mr. Machar is likely to return to Juba with tens of thousands of troops loyal to him for his protection, making the environment not conducive for a genuine reconciliation.

Could an interim government that excludes both Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar be the answer? They could each back a preferred candidate as the recent experience in Madagascar has shown. There is also a risk that the country could fall apart in the absence of Mr. Kiir, and local strongmen could carve out fiefdoms, ending the integrity of South Sudan as a state. It could also set up a dangerous precedent where an elected president is asked to resign in the wake of an armed rebellion in order for peace to return. However, with the commitment of the region and international community, an interim government could give South Sudan a chance of starting over and embarking on a reconciliation process.

In any scenario, a credible reconciliation process would be challenging for the 2-year-old country. But it remains farthest from reconciliation as long as the violence continues. The IGAD countries sponsoring the talks do not have a common strategy for handling the South Sudan’s crisis. Uganda has sent in troops to fight alongside Mr. Kiir’s forces—a move that has drawn criticism among other member states. The two warring sides do not seem in hurry to end the violence despite the ongoing suffering of their people. And while the options for ending the conflict are messy, they are nonetheless clear. For any option to succeed, it would require a significant and united commitment from the neighbors and friends of South Sudan.

Note: This blog reflects the views of the author only and does not reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative.

Peter Biar Ajak, founder and director of the Center for Strategic Analysis and Research in Juba and a member of the National Security Policy Drafting Committee in the Office of the President of South Sudan since 2011, is a Ph.D. candidate at Trinity College, University of Cambridge.

Authors

Peter Biar Ajak

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Tue, 25 Mar 2014 11:07:00 -0400Peter Biar Ajak
The 3-month-old violence in South Sudan between the supporters of President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who is from the Dinka tribe, and the followers of his former Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, has opened deep wounds in the nascent republic. The conflict has claimed thousands of lives and displaced nearly a million people in shocking episodes of violence reminiscent of the 1990s when Mr. Machar turned against his compatriots in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) during the new country's fight for independence. The violence then, as it is now, has resulted in perpetration of heinous crimes against humanity, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region, where the town of Bor has, once again, been the scene of another massacre. Peace remains elusive, as the latest round of negotiations under IGAD's mediation was postponed after the government boycotted the talks this month.
Despite the current tragedy, the South Sudanese have been through equally painful experiences in the past and were able to forgive one another. And while they can exercise such forgiveness again, there is no guarantee that it will end the cycle of violence. The people need a genuine reconciliation process that goes beyond “forgiveness” in order for them to move forward.
A credible reconciliation process cannot occur while the conflict rages on in some parts of the country. While the institutional deficiencies to mediate political pressures exerted by a power struggle lie at the root of the crisis, the fighting has generally taken ethnic lines. The supporters of Mr. Machar claim that Mr. Kiir has lost legitimacy following the massacre of Nuer civilians by government forces in the nation's capital and are fighting to remove him and install Mr. Machar to power. On the other hand, Mr. Kiir's government has accused Mr. Machar of treason and wants him to face charges. Reconciling these narratives has proved difficult for the East African mediators, particularly in finding a meaningful deal to end the violence.
There are only three possible scenarios to end the conflict: a military victory by the government over the rebels, a power sharing deal involving Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar, and an interim government involving neither. A national reconciliation process would look fundamentally different in each of these three scenarios—but for it to be credible it has to be led by a government seen as legitimate by the people, and it has to provide justice for the victims of the ongoing violence.
Under the scenario of a military victory by the government, it is unlikely that the majority of rebel sympathizers would change their views regarding Mr. Kiir's legitimacy. His government would lack legitimacy in their eyes and so would any reconciliation process under him. These challenges could hinder a genuine reconciliation process, not to mention the enormous loss of lives and issues of access to justice by rebels' sympathizers under this scenario. Besides, the government can only manage a military victory with the military support of regional allies.
In the event that Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar reach a deal, they would likely form a coalition government, where Mr. Kiir could remain as president and Mr. Machar could become the prime minister or a first vice president. Such an arrangement would be similar to the one that existed between them before July 2013, but, obviously, the duo was unable to conduct a reconciliation process or build credible institutions to mediate their competing ambitions after nearly eight years of working together. The two men were deeply suspicious of one another, and after the events of last few months, it is difficult to see how they could bridge this challenge. Moreover, Mr. Machar is likely to return to Juba with tens of thousands of troops loyal to him for his protection, making the environment not conducive for a genuine reconciliation.
Could an interim government that excludes both Mr. Kiir and Mr. ...
The 3-month-old violence in South Sudan between the supporters of President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who is from the Dinka tribe, and the followers of his former Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, has opened deep wounds in the nascent republic.

The 3-month-old violence in South Sudan between the supporters of President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who is from the Dinka tribe, and the followers of his former Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, has opened deep wounds in the nascent republic. The conflict has claimed thousands of lives and displaced nearly a million people in shocking episodes of violence reminiscent of the 1990s when Mr. Machar turned against his compatriots in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) during the new country’s fight for independence. The violence then, as it is now, has resulted in perpetration of heinous crimes against humanity, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region, where the town of Bor has, once again, been the scene of another massacre. Peace remains elusive, as the latest round of negotiations under IGAD’s mediation was postponed after the government boycotted the talks this month.

Despite the current tragedy, the South Sudanese have been through equally painful experiences in the past and were able to forgive one another. And while they can exercise such forgiveness again, there is no guarantee that it will end the cycle of violence. The people need a genuine reconciliation process that goes beyond “forgiveness” in order for them to move forward.

A credible reconciliation process cannot occur while the conflict rages on in some parts of the country. While the institutional deficiencies to mediate political pressures exerted by a power struggle lie at the root of the crisis, the fighting has generally taken ethnic lines. The supporters of Mr. Machar claim that Mr. Kiir has lost legitimacy following the massacre of Nuer civilians by government forces in the nation’s capital and are fighting to remove him and install Mr. Machar to power. On the other hand, Mr. Kiir’s government has accused Mr. Machar of treason and wants him to face charges. Reconciling these narratives has proved difficult for the East African mediators, particularly in finding a meaningful deal to end the violence.

There are only three possible scenarios to end the conflict: a military victory by the government over the rebels, a power sharing deal involving Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar, and an interim government involving neither. A national reconciliation process would look fundamentally different in each of these three scenarios—but for it to be credible it has to be led by a government seen as legitimate by the people, and it has to provide justice for the victims of the ongoing violence.

Under the scenario of a military victory by the government, it is unlikely that the majority of rebel sympathizers would change their views regarding Mr. Kiir’s legitimacy. His government would lack legitimacy in their eyes and so would any reconciliation process under him. These challenges could hinder a genuine reconciliation process, not to mention the enormous loss of lives and issues of access to justice by rebels’ sympathizers under this scenario. Besides, the government can only manage a military victory with the military support of regional allies.

In the event that Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar reach a deal, they would likely form a coalition government, where Mr. Kiir could remain as president and Mr. Machar could become the prime minister or a first vice president. Such an arrangement would be similar to the one that existed between them before July 2013, but, obviously, the duo was unable to conduct a reconciliation process or build credible institutions to mediate their competing ambitions after nearly eight years of working together. The two men were deeply suspicious of one another, and after the events of last few months, it is difficult to see how they could bridge this challenge. Moreover, Mr. Machar is likely to return to Juba with tens of thousands of troops loyal to him for his protection, making the environment not conducive for a genuine reconciliation.

Could an interim government that excludes both Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar be the answer? They could each back a preferred candidate as the recent experience in Madagascar has shown. There is also a risk that the country could fall apart in the absence of Mr. Kiir, and local strongmen could carve out fiefdoms, ending the integrity of South Sudan as a state. It could also set up a dangerous precedent where an elected president is asked to resign in the wake of an armed rebellion in order for peace to return. However, with the commitment of the region and international community, an interim government could give South Sudan a chance of starting over and embarking on a reconciliation process.

In any scenario, a credible reconciliation process would be challenging for the 2-year-old country. But it remains farthest from reconciliation as long as the violence continues. The IGAD countries sponsoring the talks do not have a common strategy for handling the South Sudan’s crisis. Uganda has sent in troops to fight alongside Mr. Kiir’s forces—a move that has drawn criticism among other member states. The two warring sides do not seem in hurry to end the violence despite the ongoing suffering of their people. And while the options for ending the conflict are messy, they are nonetheless clear. For any option to succeed, it would require a significant and united commitment from the neighbors and friends of South Sudan.

Note: This blog reflects the views of the author only and does not reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative.

Peter Biar Ajak, founder and director of the Center for Strategic Analysis and Research in Juba and a member of the National Security Policy Drafting Committee in the Office of the President of South Sudan since 2011, is a Ph.D. candidate at Trinity College, University of Cambridge.

Authors

Peter Biar Ajak

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/03/12-south-sudan-crsis-kenya-interests-odhiambo-muluvi?rssid=sudan{4B23AD87-A1A0-4D5E-9120-77ABD238B817}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495256/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Impact-of-Prolonged-South-Sudan-Crisis-on-Kenya%e2%80%99s-Economic-and-Security-InterestsImpact of Prolonged South Sudan Crisis on Kenya’s Economic and Security Interests

Though news on the conflict in South Sudan has begun to be overshadowed, negotiations and reports of violence still continue in this small country. Importantly, the crisis in South Sudan has a regional bend: Regional states, especially Kenya, are concerned that the repercussions from the prolonged conflict could compromise regional security, peace and stability, thus undermining their economic, political and security interests. Being a close neighbor on the northern frontier, a protracted conflict in South Sudan will affect Kenya in terms of trade and investment, infrastructure projects and influx of refugees.

The signing of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-mediated cease-fire by the South Sudan government and the rebels on January 23, 2014 in Addis Ababa marked the first phase of the peace process. This agreement was hailed by regional states and the rest of the international community as a major breakthrough in resolving the young republic’s crisis, which had begun as a power struggle among politicians and escalated to a major conflict engulfing the military, political leadership and civilian population throughout the country.

Though the second phase of peace talks began in mid-February, the process has faced seemingly insurmountable challenges as the rebel delegations insist that serious negotiations will only take place after the release of the remaining four detainees and the withdrawal of Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) from South Sudan. At the same time, there have been cases of the parties violating the signed cease-fire with clashes being reported among the two parties in Upper Nile State, Unity State and Jonglei State. Massive violations of human rights of the civilian population and destruction of property, including hospitals, have also been reported. Currently, the peace talks are suspended in Ethiopia and are expected to restart on March 20.

Kenyan investments, trade and infrastructure take a hit

The protracted violence in South Sudan and stalemate in the peace process has had and will continue to have a number of effects on Kenya. First, Kenyan nationals stand to lose their sunk costs on investments in South Sudan. Since the signing of comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) eight years ago, Kenyan investors have made significant inroads into South Sudan. Kenyans have invested in various sectors including banking, insurance, aviation, construction, hospitality, and information and communication technologies (ICT), transportation, and wholesale and retail trade. Today Kenya is one of the largest foreign investors in South Sudan. Since the escalation of the conflict, a number of Kenyan businesses, especially those outside Juba have remained closed or have scaled down operations, while others have been looted by the warring factions. In addition, a number of Kenyans working in the country have since been forced to return home with the huge loss in employment opportunities. Kenyan workers were providing substantial human resources to the country before the conflict started.

Second, trade between Nairobi and Juba has begun and will continue to plunge. In recent years, South Sudan has become an important export destination for Kenya. For example, in 2012, Kenyan exports to South Sudan accounted for 10.2 percent of total exports to Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2013). This puts South Sudan as the fourth-largest export destination for Kenya out of the 18 other members of COMESA. Exports to the COMESA region constitute 34 percent of total Kenyan exports to the world. In addition, since most of the Kenyan exports to the country are through the road network, increased security concerns will also negatively impact the flow of goods to the country.

Third, work on mega infrastructure projects that impact on the region’s (and especially Kenya’s) socio-economic development such as the Lamu Port-South-Sudan-Ethiopia (LAPSSET) corridor and standard gauge railway will experience delays. The development of this crucial infrastructure is important for trade in the region. The LAPSSET corridor, jointly launched in March 2012 by Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia, involves the construction of a new transport corridor from the new Port of Lamu through the Kenyan towns of Garissa and Isiolo with one part of the corridor connecting Kenya and Ethiopia. The other part of the corridor will connect Kenya and South Sudan through Isiolo and border town of Nakodok. The LAPSSET project comprises a new road network, a railway line, an oil refinery at Lamu, an oil pipeline, airports in Lamu and Isiolo, and resort cities in Isiolo and at the shores of Lake Turkana. Not only is this major project envisaged to foster transport linkages between Kenya and its two neighbors, it is expected to promote trade along the corridor, especially opening up northern Kenya for faster development. South Sudan’s instability threatens the construction of this important project.

In addition to economic challenges, the influx of refugees from South Sudan into the Kenya is likely to worsen. According to United Nations High Commission for Refugees, by February 2014, an estimated 170,000 South Sudanese had crossed into neighboring countries of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan. Of these refugees, 20,000 had entered Kenya alone, creating pressure on security and service delivery systems.This influx of refugees will not only strain resources in host countries, but also compromise national and regional security as it will exacerbate proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons.

Finally, since independence in 2011, South Sudan has deepened bilateral ties with Kenya and other regional states. As a result, South Sudan today is a member of IGAD, COMESA, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the African Union. The country has also applied for membership in the East African Community (EAC). Kenya has stood out as one of the most ardent supporters of South Sudan’s quest to join the EAC. As South Sudan is a key market for Kenyan goods, her entry in EAC will mean fewer restrictions on the movement of goods and investment. In addition, the entry of South Sudan into the EAC will not only deepen economic relations between the two countries, but will also consolidate cooperation on security issues. However, the admission of South Sudan into the regional bloc expected in April 2014 may suffer a major blow if peace will not have returned in the country, as this is one of the key conditions of the EAC treaty for countries seeking membership.

What can Kenya do for South Sudan?

Addressing the root causes of the conflict in South Sudan will be critical to Kenya and other regional states that stand to benefit from a stable, secure and well-governed neighbor. Kenya and other regional states should therefore support the negotiations between the two conflicting parties. While Uganda has agreed in principle to withdraw its forces in phases, there is an urgent need for willing countries to contribute the proposed 5,500 troops to join the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). A quick contribution of troops for this multilateral peace support operation is likely to boost security in South Sudan and, hence, enable Uganda to withdraw its forces. Kenya should be at the forefront in driving this process.

The release of four political detainees remains a key demand of rebels for the peace process to succeed. Towards this end, Kenya and other IGAD countries have the critical task of ensuring that the government of South Sudan releases the remaining detainees.

Lastly, Kenya and other IGAD states should ensure that the monitoring and verification team (MVT) is in place in accordance with the agreement on cessation of hostilities. An effective MVT will ensure that the parties abide by the cessation of hostilities agreement. It is also imperative to prevail upon the two parties to return to the negotiating table in Addis Ababa in order to foster dialogue and a lasting solution to the grievances that led to the escalation of the conflict.

Note: This blog reflects the views of the authors only and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative.

Paul Odhiambo and Augustus Muluvi are policy analysts in the trade and foreign policy division at the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA). KIPPRA is one of the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative’s six local think tank partners based in Africa.

Authors

Paul Odhiambo

Augustus Muluvi

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Wed, 12 Mar 2014 10:50:00 -0400Paul Odhiambo and Augustus Muluvi
Though news on the conflict in South Sudan has begun to be overshadowed, negotiations and reports of violence still continue in this small country. Importantly, the crisis in South Sudan has a regional bend: Regional states, especially Kenya, are concerned that the repercussions from the prolonged conflict could compromise regional security, peace and stability, thus undermining their economic, political and security interests. Being a close neighbor on the northern frontier, a protracted conflict in South Sudan will affect Kenya in terms of trade and investment, infrastructure projects and influx of refugees.
The signing of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-mediated cease-fire by the South Sudan government and the rebels on January 23, 2014 in Addis Ababa marked the first phase of the peace process. This agreement was hailed by regional states and the rest of the international community as a major breakthrough in resolving the young republic's crisis, which had begun as a power struggle among politicians and escalated to a major conflict engulfing the military, political leadership and civilian population throughout the country.
Though the second phase of peace talks began in mid-February, the process has faced seemingly insurmountable challenges as the rebel delegations insist that serious negotiations will only take place after the release of the remaining four detainees and the withdrawal of Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) from South Sudan. At the same time, there have been cases of the parties violating the signed cease-fire with clashes being reported among the two parties in Upper Nile State, Unity State and Jonglei State. Massive violations of human rights of the civilian population and destruction of property, including hospitals, have also been reported. Currently, the peace talks are suspended in Ethiopia and are expected to restart on March 20.
Kenyan investments, trade and infrastructure take a hit
The protracted violence in South Sudan and stalemate in the peace process has had and will continue to have a number of effects on Kenya. First, Kenyan nationals stand to lose their sunk costs on investments in South Sudan. Since the signing of comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) eight years ago, Kenyan investors have made significant inroads into South Sudan. Kenyans have invested in various sectors including banking, insurance, aviation, construction, hospitality, and information and communication technologies (ICT), transportation, and wholesale and retail trade. Today Kenya is one of the largest foreign investors in South Sudan. Since the escalation of the conflict, a number of Kenyan businesses, especially those outside Juba have remained closed or have scaled down operations, while others have been looted by the warring factions. In addition, a number of Kenyans working in the country have since been forced to return home with the huge loss in employment opportunities. Kenyan workers were providing substantial human resources to the country before the conflict started.
Second, trade between Nairobi and Juba has begun and will continue to plunge. In recent years, South Sudan has become an important export destination for Kenya. For example, in 2012, Kenyan exports to South Sudan accounted for 10.2 percent of total exports to Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2013). This puts South Sudan as the fourth-largest export destination for Kenya out of the 18 other members of COMESA. Exports to the COMESA region constitute 34 percent of total Kenyan exports to the world. In addition, since most of the Kenyan exports to the country are through the road network, increased security concerns will also negatively impact the flow of goods to the country.
Third, work on mega infrastructure projects that impact on the region's (and especially Kenya's) socio-economic development such as the Lamu Port-South-Sudan-Ethiopia ...
Though news on the conflict in South Sudan has begun to be overshadowed, negotiations and reports of violence still continue in this small country. Importantly, the crisis in South Sudan has a regional bend: Regional states, especially Kenya, ...

Though news on the conflict in South Sudan has begun to be overshadowed, negotiations and reports of violence still continue in this small country. Importantly, the crisis in South Sudan has a regional bend: Regional states, especially Kenya, are concerned that the repercussions from the prolonged conflict could compromise regional security, peace and stability, thus undermining their economic, political and security interests. Being a close neighbor on the northern frontier, a protracted conflict in South Sudan will affect Kenya in terms of trade and investment, infrastructure projects and influx of refugees.

The signing of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-mediated cease-fire by the South Sudan government and the rebels on January 23, 2014 in Addis Ababa marked the first phase of the peace process. This agreement was hailed by regional states and the rest of the international community as a major breakthrough in resolving the young republic’s crisis, which had begun as a power struggle among politicians and escalated to a major conflict engulfing the military, political leadership and civilian population throughout the country.

Though the second phase of peace talks began in mid-February, the process has faced seemingly insurmountable challenges as the rebel delegations insist that serious negotiations will only take place after the release of the remaining four detainees and the withdrawal of Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) from South Sudan. At the same time, there have been cases of the parties violating the signed cease-fire with clashes being reported among the two parties in Upper Nile State, Unity State and Jonglei State. Massive violations of human rights of the civilian population and destruction of property, including hospitals, have also been reported. Currently, the peace talks are suspended in Ethiopia and are expected to restart on March 20.

Kenyan investments, trade and infrastructure take a hit

The protracted violence in South Sudan and stalemate in the peace process has had and will continue to have a number of effects on Kenya. First, Kenyan nationals stand to lose their sunk costs on investments in South Sudan. Since the signing of comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) eight years ago, Kenyan investors have made significant inroads into South Sudan. Kenyans have invested in various sectors including banking, insurance, aviation, construction, hospitality, and information and communication technologies (ICT), transportation, and wholesale and retail trade. Today Kenya is one of the largest foreign investors in South Sudan. Since the escalation of the conflict, a number of Kenyan businesses, especially those outside Juba have remained closed or have scaled down operations, while others have been looted by the warring factions. In addition, a number of Kenyans working in the country have since been forced to return home with the huge loss in employment opportunities. Kenyan workers were providing substantial human resources to the country before the conflict started.

Second, trade between Nairobi and Juba has begun and will continue to plunge. In recent years, South Sudan has become an important export destination for Kenya. For example, in 2012, Kenyan exports to South Sudan accounted for 10.2 percent of total exports to Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2013). This puts South Sudan as the fourth-largest export destination for Kenya out of the 18 other members of COMESA. Exports to the COMESA region constitute 34 percent of total Kenyan exports to the world. In addition, since most of the Kenyan exports to the country are through the road network, increased security concerns will also negatively impact the flow of goods to the country.

Third, work on mega infrastructure projects that impact on the region’s (and especially Kenya’s) socio-economic development such as the Lamu Port-South-Sudan-Ethiopia (LAPSSET) corridor and standard gauge railway will experience delays. The development of this crucial infrastructure is important for trade in the region. The LAPSSET corridor, jointly launched in March 2012 by Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia, involves the construction of a new transport corridor from the new Port of Lamu through the Kenyan towns of Garissa and Isiolo with one part of the corridor connecting Kenya and Ethiopia. The other part of the corridor will connect Kenya and South Sudan through Isiolo and border town of Nakodok. The LAPSSET project comprises a new road network, a railway line, an oil refinery at Lamu, an oil pipeline, airports in Lamu and Isiolo, and resort cities in Isiolo and at the shores of Lake Turkana. Not only is this major project envisaged to foster transport linkages between Kenya and its two neighbors, it is expected to promote trade along the corridor, especially opening up northern Kenya for faster development. South Sudan’s instability threatens the construction of this important project.

In addition to economic challenges, the influx of refugees from South Sudan into the Kenya is likely to worsen. According to United Nations High Commission for Refugees, by February 2014, an estimated 170,000 South Sudanese had crossed into neighboring countries of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan. Of these refugees, 20,000 had entered Kenya alone, creating pressure on security and service delivery systems.This influx of refugees will not only strain resources in host countries, but also compromise national and regional security as it will exacerbate proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons.

Finally, since independence in 2011, South Sudan has deepened bilateral ties with Kenya and other regional states. As a result, South Sudan today is a member of IGAD, COMESA, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the African Union. The country has also applied for membership in the East African Community (EAC). Kenya has stood out as one of the most ardent supporters of South Sudan’s quest to join the EAC. As South Sudan is a key market for Kenyan goods, her entry in EAC will mean fewer restrictions on the movement of goods and investment. In addition, the entry of South Sudan into the EAC will not only deepen economic relations between the two countries, but will also consolidate cooperation on security issues. However, the admission of South Sudan into the regional bloc expected in April 2014 may suffer a major blow if peace will not have returned in the country, as this is one of the key conditions of the EAC treaty for countries seeking membership.

What can Kenya do for South Sudan?

Addressing the root causes of the conflict in South Sudan will be critical to Kenya and other regional states that stand to benefit from a stable, secure and well-governed neighbor. Kenya and other regional states should therefore support the negotiations between the two conflicting parties. While Uganda has agreed in principle to withdraw its forces in phases, there is an urgent need for willing countries to contribute the proposed 5,500 troops to join the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). A quick contribution of troops for this multilateral peace support operation is likely to boost security in South Sudan and, hence, enable Uganda to withdraw its forces. Kenya should be at the forefront in driving this process.

The release of four political detainees remains a key demand of rebels for the peace process to succeed. Towards this end, Kenya and other IGAD countries have the critical task of ensuring that the government of South Sudan releases the remaining detainees.

Lastly, Kenya and other IGAD states should ensure that the monitoring and verification team (MVT) is in place in accordance with the agreement on cessation of hostilities. An effective MVT will ensure that the parties abide by the cessation of hostilities agreement. It is also imperative to prevail upon the two parties to return to the negotiating table in Addis Ababa in order to foster dialogue and a lasting solution to the grievances that led to the escalation of the conflict.

Note: This blog reflects the views of the authors only and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative.

Paul Odhiambo and Augustus Muluvi are policy analysts in the trade and foreign policy division at the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA). KIPPRA is one of the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative’s six local think tank partners based in Africa.

Authors

Paul Odhiambo

Augustus Muluvi

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/02/14-nigeria-oil-somalia-turkey-support-south-sudan-cessation?rssid=sudan{65043B42-E3C2-4E4A-9EB1-84CCC7525517}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65495258/0/brookingsrss/topics/sudan~Africa-in-the-News-Nigeria-Tracks-Down-Lost-Oil-Money-Somalia-Loses-Support-from-Turkey-and-South-Sudan-Parties-Warned-on-CeaseFire-ViolationsAfrica in the News: Nigeria Tracks Down Lost Oil Money, Somalia Loses Support from Turkey, and South Sudan Parties Warned on Cease-Fire Violations

Nigeria Looks for Lost Oil Money While President Goodluck Jonathan Prepares for Re-election

Authors

Jessica Pugliese

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Fri, 14 Feb 2014 16:48:00 -0500Jessica Pugliese
Nigeria Looks for Lost Oil Money While President Goodluck Jonathan Prepares for Re-election
As noted by the Financial Times, Nigerian Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi provided pages of data, expert opinions and evidence in the form of contracts in a memo outlining the theft of government oil revenues. Sanusi's memo to the Nigerian Senate Committee on Finance has prompted an audit of fuel subsidy payments. The minister of finance, minister of oil and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation have already been queried by the Senate Committee. Political analysts wonder how these allegations will impact current President Goodluck Jonathan's 2015 election campaign. The president is still working on stabilizing the north and preventing attacks by terrorist groups Boko Haram and Ansaru. Meanwhile, he has also gone into full election preparation mode, with the sacking of four more ministers deemed unsupportive of his re-election goals. Jonathan also announced stronger attention to energy sector reforms this week, which are estimated to require $900 billion over 30 years.
Somalia Loses Donor Support from Turkey
Turkey removed direct budgetary support to the Somali government this week. Turkey was formerly Somalia's largest donor and reportedly provided Somalia's central bank with $4.5 million per month in cash payments. The assistance was halted after a graft scandal was revealed when the current central bank governor resigned to avoid being pressured into corruption after only seven weeks on the job. Western donors are now in a quandary on whether or not to support the Somali government in order to keep al-Shabab at bay. Attacks from the organization continued this week: A car bomb outside the Mogadishu airport killed five people.
South Sudan Government and Rebels Warned About Violating the Cessation Agreement
The U.S. State Department made a statement over the weekend expressing concern about reports of violence on both sides of the current civil conflict in South Sudan. The U.S. statement provides a strong suggestion that anti-government and government forces comply with withdrawals of troops, and with U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also issued statements of concern and warning to the newly independent nation. These statements came ahead of the International Governmental Authority on Development's talks that resumed in Addis Ababa on Tuesday.
Oil Governance and the State of the Kenyan Economy are Highlighted by the Africa Growth Initiative
Next week, AGI partners with Oxfam America to host a panel discussion about managing resources in economies with new oil and gas discoveries, e.g., Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique. The event is private, but a webcast is available and Twitter discussion highly encouraged using #AfricaOilGas.
In addition to covering East Africa's oil and gas boom, AGI and its partner think tank the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis will host a discussion on the state of the Kenyan economy. The conversation will center on KIPPRA's fifth annual report on the topic. The event will also be webcast and the twitter hashtag is #KenyaEconomy.
Authors
- Jessica Pugliese
Nigeria Looks for Lost Oil Money While President Goodluck Jonathan Prepares for Re-election
As noted by the Financial Times, Nigerian Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi provided pages of data, expert opinions and evidence in the form of ...

Nigeria Looks for Lost Oil Money While President Goodluck Jonathan Prepares for Re-election