Vsevolod Merkulov

Vsevolod Merkulov was born in Russia on 27th November 1895. After studying physics and mathematics at St Petersburg University he joined the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (Cheka). He was a detective in the Transportation Unit in Georgia before becoming Head of Secret Operations Directorate in Adzharistan. (1)

Merkulov became a close associate of Lavrenty Beria, who replaced Nikolai Yezhov as head of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in November 1938. Merkulov now worked under Pavel Fitin, the head of NKVD's foreign intelligence unit and was responsible for Soviet spies working in the United States. He was described by Nikita Khrushchev as "an extremely presentable but no less unpleasant secret policeman." (2)

Anatoly Gorsky, who was NKVD's station chief in New York City became concerned about the possible defection of Elizabeth Bentley, who had recently taken over the network from Jacob Golos. Gorsky argued: "Taking into account that Bentley won't go any where voluntarily and she may damage us here very seriously only one remedy is left - the most drastic one - to get rid of her." On 11th October, 1944, Merkulov wrote to Gorsky urging caution and suggesting that her erratic behaviour was probably due to "oddities of her character, shattered nerves and an unsettled private life." Merkulov discounted the idea that Bentley would soon betray her associates, although "undoubtedly, her threats to communicate information about our work to American authorities known to her are a real danger." He ordered Gorsky to give Bentley "financial help (up to $3,000)" to overcome the problem. (3)

Manhattan Project

Vsevolod Merkulov was also involved with a plan to build up a network of spies inside the Manhattan Project. The NKVD's first success was the recruitment of Klaus Fuchs. The project was given the codename "Enormoz". In November 1944 Pavel Fitin reported: "Despite participation by a large number of scientific organization and workers on the problem of Enormoz in the U.S., mainly known to us by agent data, their cultivation develops poorly. Therefore, the major part of data on the U.S. comes from the station in England. On the basis of information from London station, Moscow Center more than once sent to the New York station a work orientation and sent a ready agent, too (Klaus Fuchs)." (4)

Another important source was John Cairncross. Pavel Fitin reported to Vsevolod Merkulov: "Valuable information on Enormoz is coming from the London station. The first materials on Enormoz were received in late 1941 from our source List (John Cairncross), containing valuable and absolutely secret documents both on the substance of the Enormoz problem and on measures by the British government to organize and develop work on the problem of atomic energy in our country. In connection with American and Canadian work on Enormoz, materials describing the state and progress of work in three countries - England, the U.S., and Canada - are all coming from the London station." (5)

The Soviet government was devastated when the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th August, 1945. Allen Weinstein, the author of The Hunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America (1999): "On August 25, Kvasnikov responded that the station had not yet received agent reports on the explosions in Japan. As for Fuchs and Greenglass, their next meetings with Gold were scheduled for mid-September. Moscow found Kvasnikov's excuses unacceptable and reminded him on August 28 of the even greater future importance of information on atomic research, now that the Americans had produced the most destructive weapon known to humankind." (6)

Pavel Fitin wrote to Vsevolod Merkulov: "Practical use of the atomic bomb by the Americans means the completion of the first stage of enormous scientific-research work on the problem of releasing intra-atomic energy. The fact opens a new epoch in science and technology and will undoubtedly result in rapid development of the entire problem of Enormoz - using intra-atomic energy not only for military purposes but in the entire modern economy. All this gives the problem of Enormoz a leading place in our intelligence work and demands immediate measures to strengthen our technical intelligence." (7)

Kim Philby informed the NKVD of Bentley's defection and on 24th November, 1945, Merkulov wrote to Joseph Stalin and Lavrenty Beria explaining the situation. "In November 1943, Golos died, and the management of both his organization, World Tourist, and of Golos's information network passed to his closest assistant, Elizabeth Bentley." Merkulov speculated that Bentley's behaviour might be related to the case of Louis Budenz, the editor of the Daily Worker, who had recently announced that he was leaving the Communist Party of the United States. "Bentley's betrayal might have been caused by her fear of being unmasked by the renegade Budenz who... knew about her participation in Soviet intelligence work in the U.S." (9)

Anatoly Gorsky now sent a memorandum to Moscow about Bentley suggesting that Joseph Katz should kill Bentley. (5) Allen Weinstein has pointed out: "Gorsky discussed and rejected in his November 27 memo a variety of options: shooting Bentley (too noisy), arranging a car or subway accident (too risky), and faking a suicide (too chancy). In connection with the last option, Gorsky noted that he had selected agent "X" (Joseph Katz) for the task of eliminating Bentley... In the end, Gorsky decided that a slow-acting poison should be administered to Bentley, something "X" could place on a pillow or handkerchief or in her food." (10)

Gorsky warned NKVD headquarters that Joseph Katz was not in good health and that Bentley might cause him problems as he was "a very strong, tall and healthy woman, and "X" was not feeling well lately". (7) Eventually Gorsky was told that: "No measures should be taken with regard to (Bentley)." Gorsky was informed by Vsevolod Merkulov that it had been decided that Lavrenty Beria would deal with Bentley. (11)

Khrushchev pointed out in his memoirs, Khrushchev Remembers (1971): "After Beria's arrest the question arose of what to do about Merkuslov, who was Minister of State Control. I admit that I held him in high regard and considered him a good Party member. He was unquestionably a cultured person, and in general I liked him." Khrushchev claims that he argued: "Just because Merkulov was Beria's assistant in Georgia doesn't mean he was an accomplice to Beria's crimes. Perhaps he wasn't. We can't treat everyone who worked for Beria as his accomplice. Let's call Merkulov in and have a talk with him. He might even help us to clear up some of the remaining questions about Beria."

Nikita Khrushchev told Merkulov "You worked for Beria for many years, Comrade Merkulov and therefore we thought you might be able to help the Central Committee with our investigation." He was asked to write down what he knew about Beria's crimes. "A few days passed and Merkulov turned in a lengthy memorandum. It was absolutely worthless. It was more like a piece of fiction. This man Merkulov was something of a writer. He'd written plays and was good at fiction writing. After I sent this material to the prosecutor's office, Rudenko called me and asked for an appointment. When he came to my office he told me that without Merkulov's arrest our investigation into Beria's case would be incomplete. The Central Committee approved Merkulov's arrest. To my regret, since I had trusted him, Merkulov turned out to have been deeply implicated in some of Beria's crimes, so he too was convicted and had to bear the same responsibility." (13)

Vsevolod Merkulov was executed with Lavrenty Beria on 23rd December 1953.

Primary Sources

Valuable information on Enormoz is coming from the London station. The first materials on Enormoz were received in late 1941 from our sorce List (John Cairncross), containing valuable and absolutely secret documents both on the substance of the Enormoz problem and on measures by the British government to organize and develop work on the problem of atomic energy in our country. In connection with American and Canadian work on Enormoz, materials describing the state and progress of work in three countries - England, the U.S., and Canada - are all coming from the London station.

Practical use of the atomic bomb by the Americans means the completion of the first stage of enormous scientific-research work on the problem of releasing intra-atomic energy. The fact opens a new epoch in science and technology and will undoubtedly result in rapid development of the entire problem of Enormoz - using intra-atomic energy not only for military purposes but in the entire modern economy. All this gives the problem of Enormoz a leading place in our intelligence work and demands immediate measures to strengthen our technical intelligence.

After Beria's arrest the question arose of what to do about Merkulov, who was Minister of State Control. I admit that I held him in high regard and considered him a good Party member. He was unquestionably a cultured person, and in general I liked him. Therefore I said to the comrades, "Just because Merkulov was Beria's assistant in Georgia doesn't mean he was an accomplice to Beria's crimes. Perhaps he wasn't. We can't treat everyone who worked for Beria as his accomplice. Let's call Merkulov in and have a talk with him. He might even help us to clear up some of the remaining questions about Beria." By arrangement with the others, I summoned Merkulov to the Cential Committee office and told him what had happened, that we had detained Beria, and that an investigation was under way. "You worked for Beria for many years, Comrade Merkulov;" I said, "and therefore we thought you might be able to help the Central Committee with our investigation."

"I will do whatever I can, with pleasure."

"Then write us a report"

A few days passed and Merkulov turned in a lengthy memorandum. It was absolutely worthless. It was more like a piece of fiction. This man Merkulov was something of a writer. He'd written plays and was good at fiction writing. After I sent this material to the prosecutor's office, Rudenko called me and asked for an appointment. When he came to my office he told me that without Merkulov's arrest our investigation into Beria's case would be incomplete. The Central Committee approved Merkulov's arrest. To my regret, since I had trusted him, Merkulov turned out to have been deeply implicated in some of Beria's crimes, so he too was convicted and had to bear the same responsibility.

In his last words, after his sentence had been announced by the court, Merkulov cursed the day and the hour when he first met Beria. He said Beria had led him to this end. Thus, in the final analysis, Merkulov recognized the criminality of his actions and pronounced his own judgment against the man who had incited him to crime.