U.S. Supreme Court

MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the
opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the district
court for Hamilton county, Nebraska, under an information which charged
that on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School he
unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to
Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, who had not attained and successfully passed the eighth
grade. The information is
based upon 'An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the
state of Nebraska,' approved April 9, 1919, which
follows:

'Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in
any private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any
subject to any person in any language than the English language.

'Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught
as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully
passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation
issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the child
resides.

'Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be
subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more
than one hundred dollars ($100), or be confined in the county jail for
any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.

'Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from
and after its passage and approval.'

The Supreme Court of the state affirmed the judgment of conviction.
It declared the offense charged and
established was 'the direct and intentional teaching of the German
language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the eighth
grade,' in the parochial school maintained by Zion Evangelical Lutheran
Congregation, a collection of Biblical stories being used therefore.
And it held that the statute forbidding this did not conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment, but was a valid exercise of the police power. The
following excerpts from the opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons
advanced to support the conclusion:

'The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The Legislature had seen
the baneful effects of permitting foreigners,
who had taken residence in this country, to rear and
educate their children in the language of their native land. The result
of that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety. To allow
the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught from
early childhood the language of the country of their parents was to
rear them with that language as their mother tongue. It was to educate
them so that they must always think in that language, and, as a
consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments
foreign to the best interests of this country. The statute, therefore,
was intended not only to require that the education of all children be
conducted in the English language, but that, until they had grown into
that language and until it had become a part of them, they should not
in the schools be taught any other language. The obvious purpose of
this statute was that the English language should be and become the
mother tongue of all children reared in this state. The enactment of
such a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the
state.

'It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in
that it applies to all citizens of the state and arbitrarily interferes
with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign ancestry, and
prevents them, without reason, from having their children taught
foreign languages in school. That argument is not well taken, for it
assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the statute. The
hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of
school are limited. It must have ample time for exercise or play. Its
daily capacity for learning is comparatively small. A selection of
subjects for its education, therefore, from among the many that might
be taught, is obviously necessary. The Legislature no doubt had in mind
the practical operation of the law. The law affects few citizens,
except those of foreign lineage. Other citizens, in their selection of studies, except perhaps
in rare instances, have never deemed it of importance to teach their
children foreign languages before such children have reached the eighth
grade. In the legislative mind, the salutary effect of the statute no
doubt outweighed the restriction upon the citizens generally, which, it
appears, was a restriction of no real consequence.'

The problem for our determination is whether the statute as
construed and applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to
the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment:

'No state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.'

While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt,
it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. The established doctrine is that this liberty
may not be
interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by
legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.
Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of
police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision
by the courts....

It is the natural duty of
the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life; and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this
obligation by compulsory laws. Practically, education of the young is
only possible in
schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves
thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and honorable,
essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge of the German
language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has
been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error
taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right
thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
their children, we think, are within the liberty of the amendment.

The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any
subject except in English; also the teaching of any other language
until the pupil has attained and successfully passed the eighth grade,
which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve. The Supreme
Court of the state has held that 'the so-called ancient or dead
languages' are not 'within the spirit or the purpose of the act.' Latin,
Greek, Hebrew are not proscribed; but German, French, Spanish, Italian,
and every other alien speech are within the ban. Evidently the
Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of
modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of
their own.

It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic
development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in
foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire
American ideals, and 'that the English language should be and become
the mother tongue of all children reared in this state.' It is also
affirmed that the foreign born population is very large, that certain
communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in
a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereb hindered from
becoming citizens of the most useful type and the public safety is
imperiled.

That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
imporve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally,
is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must
be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to
those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English
on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by
methods which conflict with the Constitution-a desirable and cannot be
promoted by prohibited means.

For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law
which should provide:

'That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children
are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent. ... The proper officers will take
the
offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will
deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but
the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be
deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they
should be.'

In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens,
Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their
subsequent education and training to official guardians. Although such
measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius their
ideas touching the relation between individual and state were wholly
different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly
will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose such restrictions
upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter and
spirit of the Constitution.

The desire of the Legislature to foster a homogeneous people
with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions
of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate experiences during
the late war and aversion toward every character of truculent
adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the
means adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the
state and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The
interference is plain enough and no adequate reason therefor in time of
peace and domestic tranquility has been shown.

The power of the state to compel attendance at some school and
to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement
that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned. Nor
has challenge been made of the state's power to prescribe a curriculum
for institutions which it supports. Those matters are not within the
present controversy. Our concern is with the prohibition approved by
the Supreme Court. No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a
child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to
justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long
freely enjoyed. We are constrained to conclude that the statute as
applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within
the competency of the state.

As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching
which involves a modern language, leaving complete freedom as to other
matters, there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the
purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his mental
activities. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign language
seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age, and experience
shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding
of the ordinary child.

The judgment of the court belo must be reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.