African Al-Qaeda increasingly using kidnapping for profit

Northern Africa’s Sahel region is a broad band of grassland, shrub and desert that spans the continent from Senegal’s Atlantic Coast to the Red Sea.

It is here, in this “arc of instability” 5,400 kilometres long and up to 1,000 km wide, jihadists in pick-up trucks and 4X4 vehicles hold sway. Porous borders have long allowed smugglers and drug dealers to flourish, but now al-Qaeda and associated groups have established a new trade: kidnapping.

“What you’re dealing with in that region is a nexus of crime, terror and religious extremism,” said Vicki Huddleston, a former U.S. ambassador to Mali, who witnessed the development of the Sahel’s hostage economy firsthand.

Last year, David Cohen, a U.S. Treasury official, described kidnapping for ransom as the “most significant terrorist financing threat today,” estimating various groups had collected at least US$120-million over the last decade.

“That first payment started the idea that kidnapping could be a lucrative model. It was an indication that if European [governments] would pay ransoms, it could be a way to get money and build up.”

In the decade since, tourists, foreign workers and diplomats have made easy marks, vulnerable to being snatched from mining plants, aid camps and heritage sites, and taken to areas seldom crossed, let alone governed.

As the ransom funds poured in, the frequency of kidnappings spiked.

“Countries have incentivized kidnapping by paying ransoms,” Mr. Watts said. [I]f you’re from a country that pays, you’re more likely to be taken.”

In December 2008, Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler was kidnapped by AQIM while serving as an envoy for the United Nations in Niger.

He was held prisoner for 130 days in the Sahara’s harsh climate in constant fear of execution. But he and his assistant Louis Guay were released in an apparent prisoner exchange and ransom agreement.

While the Harper government denies it negotiated with Mr. Fowler’s captors, experts believe Canada paid AQIM millions for their freedom and provided other favours.

“A lot of governments who say publicly that they don’t pay [ransoms] secretly do pay them,” said Raffaello Pantucci, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

Ms. Huddleston agreed, pointing to reports four AQIM leaders were released in Mauritania soon after Mr. Fowler and Mr. Guay returned home.

What you’re dealing with in that region is a nexus of crime, terror and religious extremism

Kidnappings for ransom are a delicate ethical dilemma, she said. “Nobody wants to see people killed, but ransoms allow these groups to grow, making everyone more vulnerable.”

Without ransom revenue, AQIM would not have been able to “recruit or buy weapons,” which played a key role in enabling it to annex most of northern Mali last year.

The money also “fed, clothed and armed” AQIM soldiers and paid bribes for local tribes, Mr. Pantucci said.
With zealous conviction to the jihadist cause, AQIM spent its earnings on practical necessities, rather than “earthly goods.”

Common criminals are also getting in on the act. Gangs with no idealistic ethos beyond the pursuit of cash seek out Westerners to sell on to Islamists. In addition, some government officials are involved, taking a healthy cut for their role in hostage negotiations.

“It’s like a supply chain,” Mr. Watts said.

“Tribal groups with access to foreigners will snatch them up and put them up for sale. They’re even selective about which Westerners they take, based on each country’s history of payment.”

Mr. Fowler also raised the possibility UN officials may collude with hostage takers, by “shopping” the agendas and itineraries of diplomats.

The issue could get even worse, experts warn, as jihadists seek retribution for the French military’s operation in Mali.

“The West needs to be very careful with what it does,” Ms. Huddleston said. “Obviously the terrorists need to be defeated, but then there also has to be stability in the north [of Mali].”

In the last month, French forces have effectively pushed Islamic rebels out of Malian cities, into the desolate north, a vast inhospitable area that will provide logistical nightmares for further operations — especially when the windy, rainy season comes in May, Ms. Huddleston said.

While it is virtually impossible for France to smoke out all the Sahel’s jihadists, she believes there are more practical measures that could help win the battle against kidnapping and terrorism.

Economic hardship and disaffected ethnic groups, like the nomadic Tuareg, must be addressed, she said, because the Sahel nations “do not have the capacity to deal with the problems on their own.”

Support from regional powers, through groups such as the Economic Community of West African States and the United Nations, will be “essential to any stability.”