The pages down the right hand side comprise an essay in defence of panexperientialism and should be read in order.

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The Boundaries of Panexperientialism

The continued existence of any object is
rendered certain only during unbroken periods of its appearance within the
field of experience, but given the idea of mutual immanence, an object’s
continued existence would be ensured by its appearance in any field of
experience provided these appearances overlap. However, it is possible that
this overlap may, for some particular object, be broken - i.e. a particular
object may be absent from the minds of all other objects for some small
duration (between its interactions with other objects). Not only would
the object be absent from all other minds for this duration, but also the mind
associated with the object, being devoid of constituents for this duration, should
also be considered absent. Consequently the object and its associated mind
might justifiably be considered to have “dissolved back into the underlying
wholeness” for this duration. The idea of a conventional trajectory
between the point of its dissolution into the wholeness and the point of its
subsequent precipitation out of the wholeness (i.e. its next interaction) would
then be inappropriate.

The characteristics of the precipitating
object would have to be sufficiently consistent with the characteristics of the
dissolved object if it is to give the appearance of being the same object
- consistent, that is, but not necessarily identical (a trivial example would
be that the precipitating object will in all likelihood have a different
spatial relationship to other objects and thus appear to some of those objects to
have moved). Regarding the attributes of the precipitating object, this
scenario would permit a range of possible values that could be assigned
to certain of those attributes - i.e. values that would all be
consistent with it being the same object that had previously “dissolved”
- butfor which only one value can be actualised (i.e. observed
or measured).

(Note that this would be consistent with
the stochastic character of the measurements or observations of the kinds of
objects studied in quantum physics and which gave rise to the idea of “wave
function collapse”, thereby engendering the measurement problem. It
should be noted that the scenario outlined above pertains only to objects that
are simple enough to undergo periods of non-interaction with any other object,
and so would render impotent Schrodinger’s attempt to subject the “Copenhagen
Interpretation” of quantum mechanics to a reductio-ad-absurdum
by use of his famous “cat-in-a-box” thought-experiment. It may also be
pertinent to the “Quantum Zeno Effect”. See appendix 1.)

All hierarchies within the all-in-all can
now be seen to resolve downwards (on the pyramid analogy) to a common
base-layer comprised of quantum objects. Also, the apex of any hierarchy
implicated in a compound object will most likely be a member of a more
encompassing hierarchy, and this kind of layering would continue upwards
until all such hierarchies converge either upon a single apex associated with
the entire all-in-all, or upon a set of such apexes that collectively
constitute an aggregate.