The authors conclude that though the United States technically abided
by Japan's "non-nuclear" principles, the non-nuclear status of the country
was fundamentally undermined. Japan was fully integrated into U.S. nuclear
war plans, nuclear warheads were deployed on the three Japanese islands
of Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, components were stored on the Japanese
mainland, and nuclear weapons were routinely present on U.S. ships and
submarines calling at Japanese ports. "Japanese post-war nuclear history
is now only becoming clear," said co-author William M. Arkin. "An elaborate
contraption was built to accommodate Japanese nuclear sensitivities, but
none of it meant that Japan truly escaped the potential effects of a nuclear
war."

In the article, "How Much Did Japan Know?," the authors show that the
scale of Japanese involvement in the U.S. nuclear infrastructure was much
larger than has ever been known. Ambiguity, secrecy, silence and ignorance
were the ingredients of the policy. Japan's non-nuclear policy was largely
fictitious, and it allowed the U.S. military to optimally base its weapons
to wage a nuclear war against the Soviet Union and China.

"There was some unfinished business from the first article," said co-author
Robert S. Norris. "There was the question of identifying a mystery site
that came alphabetically between Canada and Cuba, and there also was the
fact that we incorrectly identified Iceland as a nuclear storage location.
We now know that Chichi Jima is the "C" location and that Iwo Jima is the
real "I" location, and we have the ‘smoking gun' documents to prove it."

The United States stored nuclear weapons and/or components on the two
occupied Japanese islands from 1956 to 1966. Using newly discovered documents
from the National Archives and elsewhere, the authors also show that even
after the Pentagon had withdrawn nuclear weapons from Chichi Jima and Iwo
Jima when the islands reverted to Japan, military planners wanted to use
the islands as secret storage sites for nuclear weapons if World War III
broke out and other bases were destroyed.

Additionally, the article reveals for the first time that the United
States and Japan signed a secret agreement in 1968 enabling the U.S. military
to store nuclear weapons on the two islands in the event of an emergency.
According to co-author William Burr, "This agreement was an important precedent
for a similar nuclear storage arrangement reached in 1972 when the U.S.
returned control of Okinawa to Japan."

The article's co-authors are Robert S. Norris, senior research analyst
at the Natural Resources Defense Council, William M. Arkin, a military
expert, and William Burr, senior analyst at the National Security Archive.
Their article, "Where
They Were," in the November/December 1999 issue of the Bulletin, received
worldwide attention.

The Natural Resources Defense Council is a national, non-profit organization
of scientists, lawyers and environmental specialists dedicated to protecting
public health and the environment. Founded in 1970, NRDC has more than
400,000 members nationwide, served from offices in New York, Washington,
Los Angeles and San Francisco. More information is available through NRDC's
Web site at www.nrdc.org.

Document 1: Telegram 1204 from U.S. Embassy
Tokyo to Department of State, 13 October 1952, U.S. Department of State,
Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1952-54 (Washington, D.C. , 1985),
Volume XIV, Part 2, 1340-43.

This document recounts Admiral Radford's inspection
tour of the Bonin Islands in early October 1952 as well as his assessment
of their strategic importance. The archival file copy of this document
remains classified; only the sanitized version published in the FRUS
is available. The communique mentioned in the text refers to the
U.S.-Japanese statement, then undergoing negotiation, that would be issued
at the conclusion of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's visit to Washington.
The statement released on 15 November 1967 disclosed plans for the "early
restoration" of the Bonins to Japanese administration.

Not convinced by the Pentagon's arguments about Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima,
the State Department was interested in returning the islands to Japan.
The Joint Chiefs would block any initiative in that direction for years.

Document 3: Chairman's Staff Group to
Admiral Radford, "Dispersal of Atomic Weapons in the Bonin and Volcano
Islands," 4 June 1957, National Archives, Records of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Record Group 218, Chairman's Files, Admiral Radford, box 44, file
"476.1."

The only declassified document that discloses U.S. decisions to
deploy nuclear weapons on Chichi Jima.

In a memorandum to President Eisenhower's staff secretary, the Joint Chiefs
presented their case for continued U.S. control of the Bonins, although
they made no mention of current nuclear deployments there. President Eisenhower's
initials indicated that he read this document.

This review of U.S.
control of the Bonin and Volcano Islands and the plans to compensate former
Japanese residents discloses the little that could be told to Japanese
officials about U.S. military facilities on the islands.

Inquiries by Chicago Tribune reporter Samuel
Jameson prompted the State Department to inform the Tokyo embassy what
could be said publicly about the Bonins and what remained classified, including
their role in "special weapons storage."

Rusk cautioned Miki that Washington might try
to retain control of Iwo Jima while returning the rest of the islands to
Japan. Concern about the reactions of U.S. veterans groups to returning
Iwo Jima to Japan may have influenced Rusk's thinking. NODIS" means
"no distribution" to other officials in the State Department without the
approval of the Executive Secretary.

The State Department informed the Tokyo embassy
that the Joint Chiefs wanted the option to store nuclear weapons on the
Bonins in the event of a military confrontation in the region. The
communique mentioned in the text refers to the U.S.-Japense statement,
then undergoing negotiation, that would be issued at the conclusion of
Prime Minister Eisaku's talks with President Johnson. The text released
on 15 November disclosed the plans for the "early restoration" of the Bonins
to Japanese administration.

Document 10: Memorandum from Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy
to the Secretary, "Congressional Consultation on the Ryukus and the Bonins
-- Briefing Memorandum," 6 November 1967, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files,
file "POL 19 Ryu Isl."

Bundy reviewed State Department perspectives on
the reversion of the Bonins and the Ryukyus. The background papers listed
at the end of this document were not in the file. "EXDIS" means "exclusive
distribution" to those officials with an essential "need to know."

Responding to a still classified message from ambassador
Johnson, the State Department expressed its dismay over foreign minister
Miki's "last minute efforts" to change the nuclear weapons storage features
of the agreement on the Bonins.