About Me

I saw active service in conventional, clandestine and covert units of the South African Defence Force. I was the founder of the Private Military Company (PMC) Executive Outcomes in 1989 and its chairman until I left in 1997. Until its closure in 1998, EO operated primarily in Africa helping African governments that had been abandoned by the West and were facing threats from insurgencies, terrorism and organised crime. EO also operated in South America and the Far East. I believe that only Africans (Black and White) can truly solve Africa’s problems. I was appointed Chairman of STTEP International in 2009 and also lecture at military colleges and universities in Africa on defence, intelligence and security issues. Prior to the STTEP International appointment, I served as an independent politico-military advisor to several African governments. Until recently, I was a contributing editor to The Counter Terrorist magazine. All comments in line with the topics on this blog are welcome. As I consider this to be a serious look at military and security matters, foul language and political or religious debates will not be entertained on this blog.

Thursday, November 21, 2013

(RE)STRUCTURING AFRICAN ARMIES

The age
of colonialism and the subsequent decolonisation of Africa along with the Cold
War has long past and despite the geographical tragedies that occurred in terms
of arbitrary borders, the continent needs to come to terms with itself. It also
needs to take responsibility for both its internal and external security.

Africa
can no longer afford to lay the blame for its woes outside of the continent.
Whereas several of Africa’s problems may indeed originate from beyond its
shores, countries need to review their national security strategies and act
accordingly. Failure to do so simply renders them more vulnerable to the
numerous threats and threat networks that are able to penetrate and exploit the
numerous security lapses that exist.

Cooperation
between the threats operating in Africa is increasing as criminal, insurgent
and terrorist networks cross and even join paths. Indeed, in several places across
Africa, criminal networks support insurgent and terror networks and visa versa
and on occasion, they are part of the same threat network. In parts of Africa,
they have morphed into proxy forces under the control of foreign governments. On
occasion, foreign interests coincide with the aims of the threats and/or threat
networks and either wittingly or unwittingly support these networks.

As the
threats and the threat networks across the continent have increased, so too has
Africa’s military capacity to deal with them been gradually reduced – due in
part to a lack of focussed intelligence and foresight, incoherent strategies, incorrect
structures, inadequate doctrine, substandard training and obsolete equipment. This
slow decay becomes very difficult, costly and time consuming to reverse – time
that is often not available.Added to
this has been the rise of ethnic and political tensions infused with religious
extremism.

African countries
need to strengthen their defensive and offensive intelligence gathering
capabilities in order to provide early warning to strategists and planners. A
strong intelligence capability will furthermore allow predictions to be made in
terms of real or potential threats that may or will manifest themselves. This
ought to act as a guideline in terms of organisational structures, training and
equipment.

To enter
into a conflict or a war implies a progressive move towards economic, political
and populace exhaustion. This exhaustion becomes even more evident when the
conflict or the war is allowed to drag on indefinitely due to a lack of
actionable intelligence along with an inability of the armed forces to
contain/destroy the threat and both military and civilian casualties increase
and infrastructure and equipment is either damaged or destroyed. This damages
the economy which is needed to sustain the efforts of the armed forces.

However,
without wide intelligence coverage and a coherent strategy, the exhaustion is
multiplied – especially if the means to achieve the ends are not present or the
means are lacking in ability, equipment and the political and national will is
eroded or non-existent.

The primary
problem however lays with the means: most African armies are organisational clones
of their once colonial masters or their later East Bloc allies. This has
resulted in incorrect organisational structures, incorrect training, inadequate
doctrine, terrain and enemy-irrelevant TTPs and incorrect – often obsolete - equipment
and so forth.

An
incorrect organisational structure that is poorly prepared and postured prohibits
rapid deployment and response and is usually accompanied by cumbersome command
and control lines, inadequate logistics, inadequate personnel administration and
that, in turn, impacts on morale and forces armies to become reactive as
opposed to proactive.

The
current structures most African armies follow are not conducive to rapid
deployment or focussed effort. We have proven the concept that smaller, more
agile units, correctly structured and trained and well-led are able to
manoeuvre at speed – if they have the necessary assets at their disposal. These
forces are able to operate independently and yet rapidly regroup to form a
larger, very aggressive, efficient and potent fighting force.

Whether
mechanised, motorised, riverine or air delivered, these forces are able to
conduct numerous offensive tasks from a single large-scale conventional attack
to smaller swarm attacks, COIN operations, raids and ambushes and so forth. It
is this very concept that allows for the relentless pursuit of an enemy force.

This
structure furthermore enables dispersed defence, forcing any enemy to attack
over a very wide front whilst simultaneously dispersing his forces and exposing
them to numerous flank and swarm attacks.

Unfortunately,
many African armies have tried to clone foreign armies or have been ill-advised
and misled in terms of intelligence, strategy, organisational structure,
training, equipment and other related defence and security issues.
Additionally, African armies have become very political in terms of
appointments and missions. In turn, this has allowed numerous threats to be ignored,
misjudged and subsequently not taken seriously until it has become almost too
late. It has also resulted in a hesitancy to adapt their forces to deal with
the current and future threat networks.

However,
these remain mere factors that are often overlooked but that impact negatively on
the abilities of African armies to achieve mission success.

For
African armed forces to engage a threat or a threat network efficiently, rapidly
and with economy of force, serious consideration needs to be given to
restructuring the armies and training and equipping them accordingly.