9/11
Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds

Breaks
John Ashcroft's Gag Order Against Her

Dear
friends,

Sibel Edmonds is an amazingly courageous former FBI translator.She lost her job at the
FBI for insisting that extremely important information on
the 9/11 attacks which she came across in her work be correctly interpreted
and passed on to the appropriate high-level officials. This information
reveals clear foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks not mentioned in the recently
released 9/11 Commission report.

As
I also work as a contract interpreter for the US Department of State, a
mutual friend put me in email contact with Sibel several months ago. I have
been deeply impressed with her unwavering commitment to honesty and to
revealing the truth so that we can avoid another attack on the scale of 9/11.
She has been courageously trying to expose this information ever since losing
her job, until now working within the constraints of a gag order against her.

What Sibel saw and experienced first hand proves without a doubt
that the recently released report of the 9/11 Commission failed miserably to
report key disturbing facts that point to a cover-up of large proportions. I invite you to read below her letter sent to
the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean on Aug. 1st. This
letter is a devastating indictment of our 9/11 Commission. In
revealing here for the first time the names and details related to her
allegations, Sibel is bravely violating a gag order placed on her
directly by US Attorney General John Ashcroft.

I
have highlighted to most important point of the letter for your reading
convenience. Note that although Sibel's past claims have at times gotten some
press coverage, in a thorough Internet search, I could not find a single
mainstream media source who reported this most important story below.
Please help to educate the public of the travesty of the 9/11 Commission
report by spreading this news far and wide. Together, we can make a
difference!

It
has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on September 11;
during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant threat of
terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission,
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, was
created by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide
recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism", and has
now issued its "9/11 Commission Report". You are now asking us to
pledge our support for this report, its recommendations, and implementation
of these recommendations, with our trust and backing, our tax money, our
security, and our lives.

Unfortunately,
I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious
intelligence issues that I am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which
as a witness to the commission, I made you aware of. Thus, I must assume
that other serious issues that I am not aware of were in the same manner
omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your
report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations.

Considering
what is at stake, our national security, we are entitled to demand answers to
unanswered questions, and to ask for clarification of issues that were
ignored and/or omitted from the report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned
American Citizen, a former FBI translator, a whistleblower, a witness for a
United States Congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff for the
Department of Justice Inspector General investigation, and a witness for your
own 9/11 Commission investigation, request your answers to, and your public
acknowledgement of, the following questions and issues:

After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at the
FBI's largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down,
even stop, translation of critical information related to terrorist
activities so
that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of
'extensive backlog of untranslated documents', and justify its request for
budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were
desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ
and its language units to provide them with needed translated information,
hundreds of translators were being told by their administrative supervisors
not to translate and to let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS-60
Minutes transcript dated October 2002, and provided to your investigators in
January-February 2004).

This issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Please refer to Senator Grassley
and Senator Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your
investigators in January-February 2004). This confirmed report has been reported to be
substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report (Please
refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you
prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators
with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other
witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5
hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February
11, 2004).

Today,
almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since this information
has been confirmed and made available to our government, the administrators
in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their positions and in
charge of the information front lines of the FBI's Counter terrorism and
Counterintelligence efforts. Your report has omitted any reference to this
most serious issue, has foregone any accountability what so ever, and your
recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which when
left un-addressed will have even more serious consequences. This issue is
systemic and departmental.

Why
did your report choose to exclude this information and this serious issue
despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases
address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How
can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence
Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and
resolve this problem?

Melek
Can Dickerson, a Turkish Translator, was hired by the FBI after September 11,
and was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information
related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureau's investigation. Melek
Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be granted only
after conducting a thorough background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson
used to work for a semi-legit organizations that were the FBI's targets of
investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with two
individuals who were FBI's targets of investigation. For months Melek Can
Dickerson blocked all-important information related to these semi-legit
organizations and the individuals she and her husband associated with. She
stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents related to these targets as
'Not Pertinent.' Melek Can Dickerson attempted to prevent others from
translating these documents important to the FBI's investigations and our
fight against terrorism.

Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor,
Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence
documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with
the assistance of her direct supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents
related to certain 9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed
and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in
her position, to continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received
by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret clearance.

Apparently
bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and administrators decided that it
would not look good for the Bureau if this security breach and espionage case
was investigated and made public, especially after going through Robert
Hanssen's case (FBI spy scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was
confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Please refer to Senator
Leahy and Grassley's letters dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator
Grassley's statement on CBS-60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to your
investigators in January-February 2004).

This
Dickerson incident received major coverage by the press (Please refer to
media background provided to your investigators in January-February 2004).
According to Director Mueller, the Inspector General criticized the FBI for
failing to adequately pursue this espionage report regarding Melek Can
Dickerson (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I
provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this
issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and
additional documents. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours
testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11,
2004).

Today,
more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and
more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States
Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in charge of FBI
personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in their
positions and in charge of translation quality and translation departments'
security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily
left the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated
criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal
conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to
supervising Arabic language units of the FBI's Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence investigations.

Your report has omitted these significant incidents, has foregone any
accountability what so ever, and your recommendations have refrained from
addressing this serious information security breach and highly likely
espionage issue. This
issue needs to be investigated and criminally prosecuted. The translation of
our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our
enemies. Important 'chit-chats' and 'chatters' are being intentionally
blocked. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these
serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can
budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level
bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence
Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and
resolve this problem?

Over
three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11 terrorist
attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been
providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents
and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being
planned by Osama Bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level
intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan.
Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama
Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States
targeting 4-5 major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3)
some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in
place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon,
in a few months.

The
agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special
Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism, Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington
Field Office, by filing "302" forms, and the translator translated
and documented this information. No action was taken by the Special Agent
in Charge, and after 9/11, the agents and the translators were told to 'keep
quiet' regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the
session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident
to Director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice
Inspector General.

The
press reported this incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune
on July 21, 2004 stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this
information was received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune
quoted an aide to Director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the
Commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing(Please refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004).

Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on February 12,
2004, and provided them with specific dates, location, witness names, and the
contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who
received the information (Please refer to the tape-recorded testimony
provided to your investigators during a 2.5 hours testimony by Mr. Sarshar on
February 12, 2004). I provided your investigators with a detailed and
specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I
had seen. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel
Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr.
Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector General with
specific information regarding this issue ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report
Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the
completion of your report).

After
almost three years since September 11, many officials still refuse to admit
to having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to attack the
United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the 9/11 attacks,
specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their possible link to
terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the
terrorist attacks, the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific
information regarding the'use of airplanes', 'major US cities as
targets', and 'Osama Bin Laden issuing the order.'

Coleen
Rowley likewise reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ.
All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington,
DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC. Yet, your report
claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be
gathered as one of the main factors in our intelligence failure.

Why did your report choose to exclude the information regarding the
Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarsharfrom its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was
this significant incident not mentioned; despite the public confirmation by
the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received
directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by refraining from
asking him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse during
your hearing (Please remember that you ran out of questions during your
hearings with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a
'time limit' excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve these
problems and failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic management at FBI
Headquarters? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "
Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines,
address and resolve this problem?

Over
two years ago, and after two 'unclassified' sessions with FBI officials, the
Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director Mueller, Attorney General
Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of
unqualified translators in charge of translating high level sensitive
intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a
Turkish translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the
fact that he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact,
Kevin could not understand or speak even elementary level English. He had
failed English proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the
target language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other
qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked in FBI
Headquarters as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everybody
in FBI Headquarters and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet,
Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive terrorist related
information, and he was sent to Guantanamo Bay to translate the
interrogation of and information for all Turkic language detainees
(Turkish, Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc.).

The
FBI was supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible future
attack plans from these detainees, and yet, the FBI knowingly sent
unqualified translators to gather and translate this information. Further,
these detainees were either released or detained or prosecuted based on
information received and translated by unqualified translators knowingly sent
there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin
Taskesen's case (Please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to
your investigators in January-February 2004).

CBS-60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and stated his name as one of
the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, and as a case confirmed
by the FBI(Please
refer to CBS-60 Minutes transcript provided to your investigators).
Department of Justice Inspector General had a detailed account of these
problems (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I
provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this
issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please
refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004).

After more than two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly
confirmed, and after almost two years since CBS-60 Minutes broadcasted
Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish
and Turkic language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin
Taskesen was not qualified to perform the task of translating sensitive
intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps
him in charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those
individuals in the FBI's hiring department and those who facilitated the
hiring of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism are still in those
departments and remain in their positions.

Yet, your report does not mention this case, or these chronic problems
within the FBI translation departments, and within the FBI's hiring and
screening departments. The issue of accountability for those responsible for these practices
that endangers our national security is not brought up even once in your
report. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why did
your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues
despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases
address and resolve the intentional continuation of ineptitude and
incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a
new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon
removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

In
October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an agent
from a (city name omitted) field office, re-sent a certain document to the
FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This Special
Agent, in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed that,
considering his target of investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and
the issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain
information that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist
activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field
Office and retranslated verbatim, the field agent's hunch appeared to be
correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding
blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being sent
overseas.

It
also revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain
embassies in the Middle East, through network contacts and bribery. However,
after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information
was revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern
languages, Mike Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated information to
the Special Agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to
send this agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the
original translation was accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate
translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for
the FBI language department.

The
FBI agent requesting the retranslation never received the accurate
translation of that document. I provided your investigators with a detailed
and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular
investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please
refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004). This information was also provided
to the Department of Justice Inspector General (Please refer to DOJ-IG
report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the
completion of your report).

Only
one month after the catastrophic events of September 11; while many agents
were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, and to
investigate those responsible for the attacks, those with possible
connections to the attack, and those who might be planning possible future
attacks; the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most
important translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking
important leads and information, and jeopardizing on going terrorist
investigations.

The
supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain
important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office,
and had a record of previous misconducts. After this supervisor's several
severe misconducts were reported to the FBI's higher-level management, after
his conducts were reported to the Inspector General's Office, to the United
States Congress, and to the 9/11 Commission, he was promoted to include the
FBI's Arabic language unit under his supervision.

Today
this supervisor, Mike Feghali, remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and
is in charge of a language unit receiving those chitchats that our
color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet your report contains zero
information regarding these systemic problems that led us to our failure in
preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no
references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current
investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security and our
lives for their career advancement and security.

This
issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why does your report
choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite all the
evidence and briefings you received? Why does your report adamantly refrain
from assigning any accountability to any individuals responsible for our past
and current failures? How can budget increases address and resolve these
intentional acts committed by self-serving career civil servants? How can the
addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar",
in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this
problem?

The
latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing
information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and between intelligence
agencies. To this date the public has not been told of intentional
blocking of intelligence, and has not been told that certain information,
despite its direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related activities,
is not given to or shared with Counterterrorism units, their investigations,
and countering terrorism related activities.

This
was the case prior to 9/11, and remains in effect after 9/11. If
Counterintelligence receives information that contains money laundering,
illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities, directly linked to terrorist
activities; and if that information involves certain nations, certain
semi-legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or political
relations in this country, then, that information is not shared with
Counterterrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences.

In
certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited 'direct pressure by the State
Department,' and in other cases 'sensitive diplomatic relations' is
cited. The Department of Justice Inspector General received detailed and
specific information and evidence regarding this issue ( Please refer to
DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to
the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a
detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses
willing to corroborate this, and the names of certain U.S. officials involved
in these transactions and activities. ( Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5
hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February
11, 2004).

After almost three years the American people still do not know that
thousands of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of'protecting certain foreign
business relations.'The victims' family members still do not realize
that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for over two years
has been blocked due to the unspoken decisions made and disguised under'safeguarding
certain diplomatic relations.'Your report did not even attempt to
address these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed
under any gag.

Your
hearings did not include questions regarding these unspoken and unwritten
policies and practices. Despite your full awareness and understanding of
certain criminal conduct that connects to certain terrorist related
activities, committed by certain U.S. officials and high-level government
employees,you have not proposed criminal investigations into this
conduct, although under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How
can budget increases address and resolve these problems, when some of them
are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can a new
bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon
removed from the action lines, override these unwritten policies and unspoken
practices incompatible with our national security?

I
know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation cannot be
brushed off as minor problems among many significant problems. Translation
units are the frontline in gathering, translating, and disseminating
intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack may, and
probably will, come in the form of a message or document in foreign language
that will have to be translated. That message may be given to the translation
unit headed and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even
stops, translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his
department, who has participated in certain criminal activities and security
breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up failures and criminal
conducts within the department, so it may never be translated in time if
ever. That message may go to Kevin Taskesen, or another unqualified
translator; so it may never be translated correctly and be acted upon. That
message may go to a sympathizer within the language department; so it may
never be translated fully, if at all. That message may come to the attention
of an agent of a foreign organization who works as a translator in the FBI
translation department, who may choose to block it; so it may never get
translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have been prevented by
acting on information in that message, who will tell family members of the
new terrorist attack victims that nothing more could have been done? There
will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.

I
am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI's
translation unit during the most crucial times after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain problems and cases
within the Bureau's language units, and in light of what has already been
established as facts. As you are fully aware, the facts, incidents, and
problems cited in this letter are by NO means based upon personal opinion or
un-verified allegations.

As you are fully aware, these issues and
incidents were found confirmed by a Senior Republican Senator, Charles
Grassley, and a Senior Democrat Senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know,
according to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice
Inspector General's report on my allegations, 'none of my allegations were
disproved.' As you are fully aware, even FBI officials 'confirmed all my
allegations and denied none' during their unclassified meetings with the
Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However, neither your
commission's hearings, nor your commission's five hundred sixty seven-page
report, nor your recommendations include these serious issues, major incidents,
and systemic problems. Your report's coverage of FBI translation problems
consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote #25). Yet, your commission
is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily
implement your measures and recommendations based upon your incomplete and
deficient report.

In
order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to
correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all
visible symptoms. Your Commission's investigations, hearings, and report have
chosen not to consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing 'visible',
because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the
intelligence community and have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing
'visible' because the few specific symptoms I provided you with in this
letter have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged.

During its many hearings your commission chose not to ask the
questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence
system. Your Commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms, and
chose not to include them in its five hundred and sixty seven-page report. Now, without a complete list of
our failures pre 9/11, without a comprehensive examination of true symptoms
that exist in our intelligence system, without assigning any accountability
what so ever, and therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your
commission is attempting to divert attention from the real problems, and to
prescribe a cure through hasty and costly measures. It is like attempting
to put a gold-lined expensive porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with
a rotten root, without first treating the root, and without first
cleaning/shaving the infected tooth.