Wednesday, December 20, 2017

Bookmark that photo of Republican lawmakers gathering at the
White House today to celebrate their first major legislative victory of the
Trump era. If history is any guide, many of them may be on their way out this
time next year.

As others have documented, including Harry Enten at 538, the just-passed tax reform bill starts out life as the least popular tax legislation
going back to at least 1981. Tax HIKES in 1990 and 1993 got better reviews. For
the record, the Monmouth University Poll
puts public opinion of the current package at 26% approve and 47% disapprove.

Polling shows that the public feels the package was mainly designed
to benefit the wealthy rather than the middle class. Republicans, and Pres.
Trump in particular, currently suffer a credibility deficit with the middle
class. Based on Trump’s rhetoric that he would put average Americans first, fully
66% of the public believed when he took office that the middle class would benefit
from a Trump administration. That opinion has flipped. Currently, a majority of
53% say that middle class families have seen no benefit at all from the president’s
policies to date.

Importantly, fully half of the American public believes that
their own federal taxes will increase because of this new tax reform package.
Only 14% expect that their taxes will go down. In reality, many more than
1-in-7 taxpayers will see at least a nominal decrease. This reality is what GOP
lawmakers are banking on when they face the voters next year.

But politics – and voters’ decision-making process – isn’t always
based on reality. It is, however, always based on perception. And based on
historical perception metrics, the short-term future doesn’t look quite so
bright for the bill’s proponents.

Even though voters won’t feel the full impact of this tax
cut until they file their returns in early 2019, they should get a small
increase in their net take-home pay when the IRS adjusts the withholding tables
in the next few months. Will this be enough to turn around public opinion?
History says no.

For example, the 2009 stimulus package included tax cuts for
nearly all taxpayers that was reflected in an increase in net take-home pay.
Most Americans didn’t notice. A University of Maryland/Knowledge Networks survey conducted in November 2010 found that a majority of the public (52%) did not think
the stimulus bill included any tax cuts at all. In fact, 39% said their own federal
income taxes had gone up and 48% said they hadn’t changed. Just 9% said their
taxes had gone down – a perception that was far from the “reality” of nearly 95% of Americans whose taxes were decreased.

The Tax Policy Center estimates that the mid-point increase in net income for the current package will
be about 1.6%. My rough back of envelope calculations suggest that this might amount
to anywhere from $25 to $50 extra in the biweekly paycheck of someone earning
$60,000. I’m not convinced this amount will be perceived as significant by many
voters.

Of course, the IRS could always release new payroll tables that
significantly under-withhold federal taxes. This would mean taxpayers end up
owing money to DC when they file their 2018 returns – but that would happen
months after the midterm elections. Barring that type of manipulation, though,
the net increase is unlikely to be seen as significant if at all.

In the end, we have a tax package that starts out in a very
deep negative public opinion hole. Couple this with the prospect that the net take-home
pay impact is likely to be perceived as immaterial. It does not look very
likely that public opinion on this legislation will turn around in the next 10
months or so.

P.S. The 12 House Republicans who voted against the tax bill
should not get too confident that they’ve inoculated themselves from any fallout
in the upcoming midterms. In 2010, the ACA was the hot button issue and nearly
three dozen Democrats decided to buck their party and vote against it. Of the
30 who ran for reelection that year, 17 lost. By 2013, only 6 of the original
34 Democratic nay votes remained in the House.

Wednesday, December 13, 2017

West Long Branch, NJ – The MonmouthUniversity Poll accurately described the potential outcome in the
Alabama Senate race, both in terms of the margin of victory and in the level of
turnout. Monmouth’s midpoint model showed a razor thin race that Democrat
Doug Jones eventually won by 1.5 percentage points.

This unique special
election involved a high degree of uncertainty and Monmouth used this
opportunity to provide a realistic range of outcomes. Different turnout models
were based both on individual voting history as recorded in the voter rolls and
self-reported interest and enthusiasm in this election. Monmouth’s high turnout
model (about 55-60% of registered voters) with a light screen based on
presidential-electorate demographics showed Jones leading Republican Roy Moore
by 3 points. A lower turnout model (about 30-35%) based on typical midterm
demographics, including only voters who participated in at least two recent
elections or expressed a very high level of interest, had Moore up by 4 points.

Monmouth also
created an adjusted midterm model based on patterns seen in recent special
elections as well as last month’s Virginia gubernatorial contest. This model
projected a slight increase in typical midterm turnout (about 35-40%) driven by
Democratic voters in Democratic areas of the state.

This model assumed
that, regardless of overall turnout, Democratic strongholds would command a
larger than normal share of the electorate. For example, in last month’s
Virginia election, the region Monmouth defined as Northern Virginia accounted
for 31% of the total vote whereas this area would normally contribute about
28-29% of the final tally, with nearly all that increase coming from Democratic
voters. The model based on this turnout pattern produced a tied outcome for the
Alabama race.

In the actual
results, overall turnout came in at about 45% of registered voters, with
relatively higher turnout among Democratic voters in Democratic parts of the
state. For instance, Jefferson County – home to Birmingham, the state’s largest
city – comprised 16% of the final electorate whereas it usually contributes 14%
of the total vote. This result put the actual turnout somewhere between
Monmouth’s adjusted midterm model and high turnout model. The final margin of
victory – Jones by 1.5 points – was also midway between the estimates provided
by these two models.

“The 2016
presidential contest as well as the Virginia gubernatorial race last month
showed that slight deviations from typical turnout can have a huge impact on
election outcomes,” said
Patrick Murray, director of the independent Monmouth University Polling
Institute. “I don’t think pollsters should
present every possible model under the sun, but the current era of electoral
instability suggests it may be a good idea to show a realistic range of
outcomes in states where pollsters have little track record or where the nature
of the campaign itself invites uncertainty.”

Monmouth’s only other polls in Alabama were conducted during the 2016
presidential primaries. Monmouth’s Republican poll showed Donald Trump with a
23 point lead over his nearest opponent – a race he won by 22 points. That poll
was within one percentage point of the actual vote share for 4 of the 5
candidates on that ballot, underestimating only Ted Cruz’s total by 5 points.
Monmouth also showed Hillary Clinton ahead by 48 points in a Democratic primary
race that other polls suggested would be much tighter. She won that contest by
59 points.

The Monmouth University Polling
Institute was established in 2005 to be a leading center for the study of public
opinion on critical national and state issues. The Polling Institute's mission
is to foster greater public accountability by ensuring that the public’s voice
is heard in the policy discourse. The Monmouth University Poll,
which is conducted nationally and in 27 states, received an A+ rating from the
polling website FiveThirtyEight.com.

Monday, November 6, 2017

Here’s a quick overview on what harbingers to pay attention
to as the results start rolling in tomorrow night.

Virginia

The Virginia race for governor has been competitive from the
start, despite the fact that the polling has been all over the place – ranging from
a 17 point Democratic advantage to an 8 point Republican edge in various polls released
over the past two weeks alone. Ralph Northam seemed to have a small and consistent
advantage heading into the fall, but his lead was never a comfortable one. Monmouth’s
polling showed him doing
relatively well in traditionally conservative parts of the commonwealth in
September. That all changed as Republican Ed Gillespie focused on an
anti-immigration message and the race took a decidedly nasty turn. A majority
of 56% of voters described the campaign as being a largely positive affair back
in late September, but that number went down to 25% just six weeks later.

Basically, Gillespie’s strategy won back his conservative
base in Western Virginia, but simultaneously pushed moderate Northern Virginia
voters into Northam’s camp. This means the race is going to come down to base
turnout with just a few swing districts holding the key. Since Northam’s
support has grown stronger in the DC suburbs, Gillespie will need to surpass
his 2014 U.S. Senate performance in the western region. Our polling suggests he
might just do that. However, this
still wouldn’t determine the outcome.

From Northam’s perspective, he will have to romp in Northern
Virginia and pull big numbers from the Hampton Roads region. Specifically, he
will need two thirds of the vote in Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Hampton County,
and he must keep the margin close in Virginia Beach. If Northam exceeds these
targets he will likely be the next governor. If he falls significantly behind
these targets, Gillespie should emerge victorious. But if Northam is just
meeting these targets, we need to look for other tea leaves to read.

The counties just north of the Greater Richmond Area have
been a fairly good indicator of the commonwealth’s mood in past elections,
especially around the upper Rappahannock River. If I had to pick one set of returns
to watch on election night, it would be the numbers from Caroline County.

Caroline County tends to vote Democratic, but has swung to
Republicans on occasion. Importantly, it has voted with the winner in every Virginia
election for governor, U.S. senate, and president from 2001 to 2014. It broke
this trend in 2016, giving Donald trump a 5 point margin while Hillary Clinton won
the commonwealth by 5 points. However, the county has been uncannily reliable
in recent gubernatorial races: giving Democrat Terry McAuliffe a 5 point edge
in 2013 when he won Virginia by just over 2 points, giving Republican Bob
McDonnell a 13 point edge in 2009 when he won Virginia by 17 points, and giving
Democrat Tim Kaine a 10 point edge in 2005 when he won Virginia by 6 points. It
was a little more bullish on Democrat Mark Warner in 2001, giving him a 22
point margin when he only won the commonwealth by 5 points that year with an electorate
that looks notably different than Virginia does today.

So keep an eye on Caroline County. It has a history of voting
slightly more Democratic than the rest of Virginia in every election, but broke
with that streak to back Trump last year. If Northam wins this county by at
least 5 points, there’s a good chance he is meeting his targets elsewhere in
the commonwealth.

New Jersey

The polls have been exceedingly static in New Jersey’s race
for governor, landing somewhere between a 14 to 16 point lead for Democrat Phil
Murphy. Monmouth’s polling indicates that this will be a record low turnout
election (*see note). Even though this means the electorate will be comprised
of people who vote in nearly every election – a majority of these habitual voters
say they really
don’t know where either candidate stands politically. They are simply pulling the lever for the Democrat
or the Republican. And in New Jersey, that means a natural 12 point advantage
for the Democrat.

Republican Kim Guadagno has done everything in her power to
distance herself from Chris Christie – who is in part responsible for the GOP’s
poor standing in the Garden State – but she will need to take a page out of the
incumbent’s playbook if she is going to pull off a shocker.

Jon Corzine won the 2005 election by just over 10 points,
but he lost re-election to Christie four years later on a 14 point swing to the
Republican. This shift was fairly uniform in most of New Jersey’s 21 counties –
between 8 and 14 points. But there were three counties where Christie’s
performance was staggeringly good. He swung Ocean County by 23 points – going
from a +12 GOP advantage in 2005 to +38 in 2009 – as well as Monmouth County by
23 points – going from a +8 to +31 margin. He also swung the Democratic bastion
of Middlesex County from a 17 point deficit for the Republican nominee in 2005
to a +2 victory in 2009.

Guadagno needs to follow the same path if she is to win – i.e.
put up monster numbers in large Republican counties (Ocean, Monmouth, Morris)
and win at least one sizable Democratic county. Another option would be to padlock every
polling place in Hudson County and then put voting booths on the back of pickup
trucks to personally visit every registered voter in the rural counties of
Hunterdon, Warren, and Sussex. The fact that either scenario is about as likely
to happen is pretty much all you need to know about this race.

* Note on interpreting
turnout trends: You cannot compare recent turnout as a percentage of
registered voters to elections prior to 1997.
The Motor Voter law that went into effect in 1996 significantly
increased the voter rolls in New Jersey and Virginia. While the law may have
brought some new voters to the polls, it also added a lot of people to the
voter rolls who never had any intention of voting. As such, turnout figures for
elections prior to 1996 are higher in part because a smaller number of eligible
voters were actually registered. For example, even though turnout in New Jersey’s
gubernatorial elections seemed to take a massive hit from 65% of registered
voters in 1993 to 56% in 1997, the decline is much less precipitous if the pool
of all eligible voters is used as the base – taking turnout from 47% to 45%
over that period. This doesn’t discount the fact that turnout has continued to decline,
though. Since 1997, New Jersey’s gubernatorial turnout has consistently
declined, hitting a record low 40% of registered voters in 2013. Virginia’s lowest
gubernatorial turnout was 40% in 2009, although it rebounded to 43% four years
later. [Also, see note at bottom of Virginia’s election
page.]

Polling during the Watergate era gives some context. Four decades ago, the
public took their cue as much from Congressional leadership’s reaction as from
breaking news. In fact, public support for removing Richard Nixon from office
did not did not reach a majority until after the House Judiciary Committee
passed articles of impeachments – just days before Nixon resigned. Watergate
polling also shows that Nixon’s job approval rating hit a hard floor nearly a
year before he actually resigned.

Using the Gallup Poll as the barometer, President Nixon’s job approval
rating hovered between 57% and 62% during the latter half of 1972. The
Watergate break-in and the indictment of its ringleaders were minor news stories
that fall as the president won re-election in a historic landslide. Nixon’s job
rating bounced around a bit during the first months of 1973, starting the year
at 51%, going to 67% after his inauguration and dropping back to a still healthy
58% in early April.

Then the bottom started to fall out. Key advisers resigned or were
fired after it was learned that potential evidence was destroyed, coinciding
with Nixon’s job approval dropping to 45%.
From May to June, the Senate began committee hearings on Watergate,
Archibald Cox was appointed special counsel, and reports emerged that John Dean
admitted to discussing the cover-up. Nixon’s job rating held steady at 44% in
late June, but slipped to 39% in early July.

At this time, Gallup added a poll question specifically on impeachment,
with an initial reading of 19% who supported removing Nixon from office in late
June. This ticked up to 24% in early July. The existence of an Oval Office taping system was revealed in mid-July with Nixon refusing to hand the tapes over to investigators. His approval rating dropped to 31% in August, while support for impeachment held fairly steady at 26%.

The fall of 1973 brought the infamous “Saturday Night Massacre” and the spectacle of Vice President Spiro Agnew‘s resignation, which was unrelated to Watergate but certainly not a helpful optic. Nixon’s job approval rating fell to 27% in late October and held there in early November. This would pretty much be this metric’s statistical floor for the remainder of his term. Support for removing Nixon from office rose to 33% in late October and again to 38% in early November.

In mid-November, Nixon gave his famous “I am not a crook” speech and the existence of an 18-1/2 minute gap in the White House tapes was revealed. Still, Nixon’s job rating saw an uptick to 31% in December and support for impeachment slipped to 35%. This would prove to be only a temporary reprieve. Nixon’s job rating fell to 23% in January, recovering slightly to 28% in February. Support for compelling the president to leave office held steady at 37%-38% during this time.

In March 1974, the “Watergate Seven” were indicted. Nixon’s approval rating dropped to 25% in April. Support for removing him from office stood at 46%, although it is unclear whether this was truly an increase from February’s result because Gallup decided to change the wording of its impeachment question. Both Nixon’s job rating (24%-25%) and support for his removal (46%-48%) was stable, though, from the spring into mid-July as impeachment hearings got underway in the House Judiciary committee.

After the Supreme Court ordered the Oval Office tapes’ release and the Judiciary Committee actually passed articles of impeachment in late July, support for removing Nixon from office rose dramatically to 57%, while his job approval rating held steady at 24%.

Even when Nixon’s job rating hit bottom in the Fall of 1973, he was able to cling to power on the back of minority support for his removal from office. That is, until Congress started the impeachment process. It’s worth noting that about two-thirds of House Republicans still opposed impeachment in early August 1974 – but they didn’t control the chamber.

In terms of the current state of affairs, the recent Politico/Morning Consult Poll puts public opinion on the impeachment of Donald Trump at 43% support and 45% oppose, while the incumbent’s job rating is 45% approve and 51% disapprove. At first glance it appears that support for impeachment is greater now than it was during Watergate. But there is a huge caveat. The Gallup questions back then specifically gauged public support for compelling Nixon to leave office. The current poll asks whether Congress “should or should not begin impeachment proceedings to remove President Trump from office.”

It will take a lot more polling, with a variety of approaches to question wording on impeachment and removal from office, before we know where the public really stands on this issue. One thing that Watergate teaches us, though, is that public opinion will be unlikely to move significantly unless a critical mass of Republicans in Congress decides that such a move must be made for the good of the country – or at least to save their own political skins.

-------------------------------------------------------------

* Polling
source: Gallup Organization. Dates refer to last day of interviewing for each poll.
Before March 1974, Gallup asked: “Do you think President Nixon should be
impeached and compelled to leave the Presidency, or not?” After March 1974, Gallup asked: “Just from
the way you feel now, do you think his actions are serious enough to warrant
his being removed from the presidency, or not?” Results obtained from the Roper center for Public Opinion Research iPOLL database.