A New Proposal

Early on Wednesday, the 20th, while the negotiations were still in
progress, Low and Frutkin met with Keldysh to talk about rendezvous and
docking. Having been advised of the subject, Keldysh had asked
Feoktistov to join them. Low said that NASA would like to propose the
development of compatible systems for use with Apollo and Soyuz rather
than with future spacecraft. He explained this idea in some detail,
pointing out to Keldysh that the Americans did not yet want to make
this a formal proposal but instead only wished to present it for the
Soviets' consideration. Low remarked that Gilruth favored focusing on
the development of equipment and systems for existing spacecraft to
give the specialists in the two countries something much firmer with
which to work.

Both Keldysh and Feoktistov were intrigued, and they said that although
they were not free to commit their government to such a project they
wanted to pursue this subject further and hear more details. Then they
could advise their superiors and obtain a decision. Low agreed to send
with the exchange of technical requirements scheduled for February a
fuller description of the type of project he was proposing. Keldysh
asked Low to refrain from mentioning this conversation publicly until
there had been consultations internally. The two sides would
subsequently make a public [131] announcement if this developed
into a formal topic for negotiation. Low agreed to this arrangement.*16

Low based his discussions with Keldysh concerning a joint rendezvous
and docking mission on the "USSR US Docking Studies" prepared at MSC in
late December 1970. In Houston, Clarke Covington had prepared materials
on the two aspects of possible docking activities - the near and far
term. For the former, he and his colleagues proposed feasibility
studies of [132] specific docking missions and specific hardware
systems that could be flown between 1972 and 1975. For the far term,
the specialists suggested that the Joint Working Groups develop
technical requirements and general concepts for the docking of future
systems "as a continuing show of good faith."17

In effect, the MSC proposal inserted a new activity into the scheme of
things as they had been agreed to earlier in Moscow. The primary focus
of the October agreement had been work on compatible systems for future
spacecraft. Now Caldwell Johnson, Covington, and their associates were
pushing for a real mission using existing hardware. MSC specialists had
listed several important guidelines. Such a joint mission should
provide a public demonstration of a viable joint activity and as such
should allow both countries to exhibit equal skill and effort. But
above all, it should be an open, non-military enterprise that would
continue NASA's philosophy of peaceful exploration in space.

To define the hardware needed for a rendezvous and docking mission,
Will Taub had drawn a series of sketches showing variations on an
Apollo-Soyuz mission. Covington used these in December 1970 when he
briefed MSC management on five mission possibilities:

Concept 1

CSM and Soyuz dock without a crew transfer.

Concept 2

CSM and Soyuz dock with an extravehicular transfer.

Concept 3

CSM and Soyuz dock with an internal transfer, possibly without
prebreathing; i.e., a "shirtsleeve transfer."

Concept 4

CSM and Soyuz dock to an adapter module that would permit
shirtsleeve transfer.

Concept 5

CSM and Soyuz dock to a more elaborate "experiment module" that
would permit extended scientific activities.18

Conceptual drawings created by the design team headed by Clarke
Covington; these were done prior to the January 1971 Low-Keldysh
meeting:

[image here]

(a) proposal for a minimum-modification approach to an
Apollo-Soyuz docking mission;

(c) proposal for an airlock adapter that would facilitate
transfer between spacecraft;

[image here]

(d) initial concept for an Apollo-Soyuz airlock
adapter.

Gilruth and his deputy, Chris Kraft, quickly decided that the fifth
concept was too elaborate; they argued for keeping the system simple.
They believed that in the absence of a political commitment from the
Nixon Administration and because this was an unsolicited proposal, it
would be best to suggest a "minimum meaningful" activity to the Soviets
and then await their reaction. Thus, when Covington later briefed
Headquarters before Low's trip, he dropped concepts 1 and 5 and
replaced them with a new suggestion that called for both spacecraft,
flying without structural modification, to rendezvous and stationkeep,
but to make no attempt to dock. In addition, he described a possible
rendezvous - with and without docking - of Soyuz with Skylab.19

Two important points had to be considered for any of the docking
missions - the docking gear to be used and the impact of cabin
atmosphere on crew transfers. For an Apollo-Soyuz linkup, the hardware
proposals ranged from a simple adaptation of the existing gear to the
creation of a [133] special docking module with Apollo gear on
one end and Soyuz gear on the other. The minimal changes to the docking
equipment called for building an adapter that would permit the
installation of a lunar-module-type drogue into the cone of the Soyuz.
Then the Apollo could dock and latch its probe into this adapted Soyuz.
This particular modification could be varied for use with either the
solid face or the swing-away Soyuz docking mechanisms. A more
elaborate alternative called for building an "airlock docking adapter,"
a mini-spacecraft that would be carried into orbit in the spacecraft
lunar module adapter (SLA) behind the command and service module
(CSM).** Following the CSM's
docking and removal maneuver with the airlock module, the Soyuz could
dock with it, employing the standard Soyuz probe. While crew transfer
in the simple system would be either internal or external depending
upon the type of Soyuz docking interface, the airlock module concept
assumed the use of the swing-away hatch on Soyuz.

[Image here]

[Image here]

Two detailed views of the new Soyuz docking mechanism, prepared
by W. K. Greasy and T. O. Ross at the Manned Spacecraft Center to give
the NASA team a clearer understanding of how that system operated. One
of the notes on the drawings reads, "The dimensions and scale of this
drawing are based on the assumption that the spacecraft spherical
diameter is 2.08 meters." As they later discovered, it was actually 2.2
meters. Otherwise their drawing was correct.

Docking was only half the story; the differences between spacecraft
environments had to be considered in any plans to transfer crews. Based
on the rather limited information available about the Soyuz life
support system,*** NASA
specialists assumed that crew transfer would likely occur at the normal
operating pressures for both spacecraft, requiring the men moving from
the higher to the lower pressure to pre-breathe. The cabin pressure of
Apollo could not be raised above 414 millimeters of mercury (8 psi)
because of structural limitations in the CSM, and the Soyuz cabin
pressure could not be lowered much below that without significantly
increasing the risk of fire, as the percentage of oxygen increased in
the total volume of the remaining gases. While the obvious solution
would have been compromise on cabin pressure at about 414 millimeters,
this would have required substantial modifications, which at the time
seemed to be contrary to the desire to make the fewest possible changes
to the basic spacecraft. If the two spacecraft were flown with their
standard atmospheres, oxygen would have to be pre-breathed prior to
entering Apollo to prevent the bends. In an effort to provide for
crewmember oxygen without adding additional oxygen to the Soyuz
atmosphere, the MSC environmental control specialists fully expected to
develop a new closed system portable life support mechanism to provide
oxygen and recycle carbon dioxide for the Americans. Work had begun on
such a unit in an effort to eliminate the problem of oxygen enrichment
and any increased danger of fire during the pre-breathing period.
[134] And as always, the risk of fire was the primary worry of
the American environmental control systems designers.20

Developing an airlock module would have solved some of the problems
involved in changing the pressure in either spacecraft. If the
astronauts wanted to transfer to Soyuz, they would enter the airlock,
close the hatch behind them, raise the pressure to 760 millimeters, and
then enter the Soviet spacecraft. Going the other direction, they would
enter the airlock after pre-breathing oxygen aboard Soyuz (or
alternatively in the airlock itself) and when it was safe lower the
pressure to 258 millimeters. Throughout this process, the pressure in
each craft would remain virtually unchanged.

At this point, complexities of design seemed to abound. If the crewmen
pre-breathed in the airlock module, then a full life support system
would have to be included in that mini-spacecraft. If the pre-breathing
occurred in Soyuz, a simpler life support system could be used in the
airlock module, but the Americans would have to transfer in their
suits, requiring provision for suit cooling circuits aboard Soyuz.
Walter W. Guy of the Crew Systems Division urged the specialists to
find a simpler way to conduct the transfers. Otherwise, life was going
to be too complex for the crews.

In addition to making the transfer process somewhat easier and reducing
further the possibility of oxygen enrichment to the Soviet craft, the
airlock had several good features from a designer's point of view. In
the first instance, all Soyuz docking aids could be secured on the
exterior of the module, thus eliminating major changes to the CSM.
Second, the interior surfaces of the airlock module would provide
places for mounting various communication and power units that would
otherwise have to be added to the CSM or to the Soyuz. But the airlock
module was a new piece of hardware that would have to be designed,
built, and tested. This was the major objection raised by both MSC and
Headquarters.21

George Low, Wernher von Braun,****
and others at Headquarters were interested in pursuing the simpler
drogue-in-cone adaptation, and it was this type of system that Low had
considered in January when he had talked to Keldysh in Moscow. So in
February 1971, NASA transmitted two documents to the Academy of
Sciences, the first fulfilling the 1970 agreement to exchange
"technical requirements for rendezvous and docking." "Preliminary
Rendezvous and Docking System Requirements for United States
Spacecraft" was generated to provide the Soviets with only an "overview
of NASA . . . requirements and systems," not specific solutions to
compatibility issues. From this general paper, the planners hoped to
move on to more detailed discussions.22

[135] The second paper - "A Concept
for a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United States of America
Rendezvous and Docking Mission" - was prepared by MSC personnel under
the direction of René Berglund. Although drawn up in a
relatively short time and based upon a still limited understanding of
the Soyuz docking system, the document drafted by William K. Greasy and
Thomas O. Ross, among others, was a rather detailed study of the
docking interface for Apollo and Soyuz, presented as an illustration.
Similar details were given for the necessary docking targets,
communications equipment, and pre-breathing apparatus. These studies
were designed to outline the way NASA would create compatibility and
conduct a joint mission.23

In his letter of 17 February transmitting the two documents to Petrov,
Gilruth explained why he sent the paper proposing a joint Apollo-Soyuz
flight. Since this topic had been discussed by Low, Keldysh, Frutkin,
and Feoktistov during January, the MSC staff had looked into the whole
question of compatible systems. "In the process of our deliberation on
this subject," Gilruth noted, "we have found the postulation of a
specific docking mission and spacecraft configuration useful in
understanding potential problem areas." He also told Petrov that
analysis of such a typical mission concept - Apollo and Soyuz should
"be a beneficial way of assessing compatibility during the March April
Working Group Meetings."24

Gilruth then addressed the agenda for that spring gathering. "With
regards to these detailed Working Group activities, I believe that a
preliminary meeting . . . should be held to establish the types of
spacecraft to be considered by the Working Groups." Not everyone need
be present, Gilruth suggested, but he did "feel that the participation
of the chairmen of our respective Working Groups would be most
beneficial." For such discussions, Gilruth had appointed Glynn Lunney,
Donald C. Cheatham, and Donald C. Wade to chair groups one through
three respectively, and they would be joined by Arnold Frutkin, George
Hardy, Caldwell Johnson, and René Berglund. "Should this
suggestion meet with your approval," Gilruth continued, "I would like
to invite you and your delegation . . . to the Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, in March to conduct these discussions."
Afterwards the full Working Groups could meet and begin their
efforts.25

During the six months following the October meeting, MSC had begun to
find some minor problems that would have to be worked out as they
continued to expand the scope of their joint work- language and
communications being two examples. Preliminary studies conducted at
Houston, based on available Soviet data, opened as many questions as
they answered. These new questions confirmed the necessity for
additional information exchanges. [136] There was also evidence
that both sides would have to come to agreement on technical
translation, so that each side could be assured that the other
understood precisely what had been meant by specific words, phrases,
and documents.26

[137] Then there was the time-gap problem in coordinating these
communications. For instance, when Gilruth sent a draft of his letter
to Petrov to Washington for approval on 12 February , Houston was still
thinking about a meeting scheduled for March/April. But these plans
were to be altered several times before the meetings finally took
place. Academician Petrov sent his response on 15 March to Gilruth's
letter dated 17 February. Petrov's response, along with seven documents
that constituted the Soviet technical requirements for compatibility,
was sent via diplomatic pouch from the American Embassy in Moscow to
the State Department in Washington. That agency passed the material
over to NASA Headquarters, where Frutkin's office received them on the
24th. The documents were next sent out for translation, and MSC
finally received them at the end of the month. Gilruth got a
preliminary briefing of their contents on 1 April and dispatched his
reply on the 9th. For both the February letter from Gilruth and the
March letter from Petrov, the turn-around time had been almost a month.
Much faster communications would be essential to any joint
enterprise.27

In his letter, Petrov approached the question of an actual test flight:
"As far as your new proposal . . . of an actual example of docking of
the 'Soyuz' and 'Apollo' type spacecraft, it requires further study
which our specialists are now engaged in." Noting that this was
apparently "an intermediate solution" toward the development of
compatible systems, Petrov felt that the two sides should stick to the
schedule as agreed upon in the Moscow "Summary of Results." He did
agree to the preliminary discussions suggested by Gilruth for planning
the agenda more fully, and he proposed that they be held immediately
before the Working Groups met. After asking Gilruth to select a date
for the meetings, Petrov added, "From our point of view, the meeting of
the Working Groups could be . . . conducted in the middle of May."28 Gilruth in turn suggested the period
17-21 May for their meeting and provided a summary of the agenda and
the activities planned for the Soviets' stay in Houston.29

While his staff prepared for the Working Group meetings, Gilruth tried
for an even earlier discussion with Petrov. The American Ambassador to
Moscow, Jacob D. Beam, had reported to NASA via the State Department
that one of Petrov's deputies had said that the installation of a
compatible rendezvous and docking system on Soyuz and Apollo would be
"difficult." Nevertheless, the deputy had indicated that this might be
a proper topic for discussion during an upcoming visit by Petrov to the
U.S. for an international symposium. Donald Morris, Frutkin's deputy,
attempted to find a suitable time for Petrov and Gilruth to meet during
this visit, but he was unsuccessful. Any consideration of the American
proposal would have to wait until May.30

Hearing nothing to the contrary from the Soviets, MSC assumed that
[138] the May dates were acceptable and continued planning for
the meetings. Late on the afternoon of 7 May, they received word that
there was going to be a change. Leonard S. Nicholson, Berglund's
assistant, remembered sitting in a briefing session in which Gilruth
and Frutkin were being given a report on the preparations for the
visit, when Frutkin received a call from his office. The U.S.S.R.
delegation would not be coming.31 The
full text of the cable from Petrov, received the following morning in
Houston, read: "To my regret I have to ask you to postpone meetings of
our working groups [until] June due to engagements of our specialists.
I shall let you know names of Soviet participants and desirable date of
meeting in the near future."32 The men
gathered that Saturday morning were perplexed; Gilruth asked them to
study the implications of slipping the meeting date to June and then
report back to him by the following Friday.

Unknown to the Americans, the Soviets were planning another significant
manned launch for early June. But the Americans also had a flight in
the final stages of preparation. René Berglund reported to
Gilruth on 14 May that "the unanimous conclusion of the working group
chairmen and myself is that a meeting in June would be very
inconvenient." Glynn Lunney was particularly concerned since Apollo 15
was scheduled to be launched on 26 July. As he was deeply involved with
the mission as Chief of Flight Operations, any meeting within the last
30-45 days prior to launch would pose serious scheduling difficulties.
Berglund told the Director that he and the chairmen were proposing that
the meeting be delayed until early September, and they had drafted a
letter to that effect. He continued, "There is some question as whether
we should bother to reply at all until such time as Petrov proposes a
date." Clearly there was some unhappiness, but Gilruth's calm and
measured approach prevailed. NASA, he decided, should await the
Soviets' next move.33

* At this meeting in Moscow, Low
had also presented to the cosmonauts a plaque designed by Gilruth to be
placed in the Gagarin museum. As Low said to Gilruth in a 27 Jan. 1971
letter, "It was an emotional moment, and it was obvious that they were
pleased at the recognition by us of their being first in space."

** The SLA, an 8.5-meter truncated
cone between the service module and the launch vehicle instrument unit,
enclosed the lunar module (LM) during launch and on its way to the
moon.

*** The information available to
NASA included materials that had appeared in the American press over
the years, those obtained during the October 1970 trip, and the report
sent to Houston in the first technical exchange.

**** Von Braun had been appointed
Deputy Associate Administrator for Planning in Mar. 1970.

22. NASA, MSC, "Preliminary Rendezvous
and Docking Requirements for United States Spacecraft," 2 Feb. 1971.
This document was compiled with the help of many people at MSC under
the editorial supervision of Leonard S. Nicholson.