Tottenham Hotspur's defeat to Manchester United on Sunday was, in some ways, freakish. United were second best for much of the first hour, but found themselves 2-0 up thanks to two defensive errors. First, Kyle Walker failed to pick up Wayne Rooney from a corner and then Luka Modric switched off to allow Nani to collect a throw-in unchallenged, allowing him the space to put in the cross that led to Ashley Young's first goal. Young's second was also partly down to poor defending as everybody backed off allowing him the space to shape in his shot.

That happens sometimes and in isolation an unfortunate 3-1 defeat to United would not raise too many concerns. What is more troubling is the general pattern that is emerging of what happens when Tottenham lose and it raises serious questions about Harry Redknapp's suitability for the England job.

Spurs have lost six league games this season. One of them, at Stoke City, was largely the result of some poor refereeing. In the other five, Spurs have conceded three on three occasions and five twice. In all of them, there were moments when Spurs played well, when it looked like the game might fall their way, but in all of them they ultimately paid for their openness. In both the 5-1 home defeat to Manchester City and the 5-2 defeat at Arsenal, there was a spell of 20 to 25 minutes when they seemed powerless to stop the tide.

Both involved Spurs setting out in a 4-4-2 against a side that outnumbered them in central midfield (Arsenal in a classic 4-3-3, City playing a narrow 4-4-1-1/4-2-3-1 that, with Sergio Agüero dropping deep and Samir Nasri and James Milner playing narrow, gave them an effective extra man in the middle). The gamble then is always that the team playing 4-4-2 will be unable to gain meaningful possession either because they are being bullied physically in the middle or because the team with the extra central man can keep the ball away from them. The pay-off is that with two forwards the side playing 4-4-2 can be more direct and, when they do get possession, are able to exploit space in wide areas (as Spurs did, for instance, away to Milan and more especially at home to Internazionale in the Champions League last season).

In that Tottenham rapidly went 2-0 up at the Emirates, the gamble could be said to have paid off. But really both goals stemmed from defensive laxity, as Arsenal were caught with both full-backs high up the pitch with Alex Song in no position to cover. Even then it took a deflection and a questionable refereeing decision to bring the goals. Arsenal might have wilted and the game would have been written off as Spurs capitalising on their shortcomings at the back, but they did not. So palpable was Arsenal's superiority even at 2-0 down that the comeback always seemed possible. Once the first goal had gone in, it even seemed likely.

Redknapp recognised that, of course, and switched to a 4-3-3-cum-4-1-4-1 at half-time, bringing on Sandro and Rafael van der Vaart for Louis Saha and Niko Kranjcar. He was unable, though, to staunch the bleeding. Partly that was down to momentum, but equally there was a loss of shape. Gareth Bale did almost nothing to check Bacary Sagna's forward surges – one of which led directly to Arsenal's third goal. Sandro seemed confused as to what his role was supposed to be; if he was meant to be sitting, he did not. Spurs pushed higher than they had in the first half – logically, for a single striker can become very isolated if his back four sits too deep, but with the offside line rickety and the pressing lacking focus all that did was create room for Theo Walcott to attack with his pace.

Redknapp is far from the tactical Luddite he often likes to make out . He tends to deal in broad brush-strokes, preferring to get the basic strategy right and avoid the risk of overcomplicating things. There is nothing wrong with that and his success over the past couple of years at Spurs is evidence of how effective the approach can be. There is no such thing as the perfect manager who is supremely gifted in all aspects of the game.

But, at the very highest level, there will be times when a manager sees an opponent hitting form and is forced simply to shut the game down, to minimise the damage, see through the storm and then assess if anything can be salvaged. Roberto Mancini did it last season when his Manchester City side ran into an Arsenal in peak form. After enduring a 10-minute drubbing, he retreated to the bunker and dug in for a goalless draw, a decision that drew criticism but also won a point they almost certainly would not have won otherwise.

Or take the way Antonio Conte shuffled his Juventus side from 3-5-2 to 4-3-3 as Milan outplayed them in the first half a fortnight ago . Even 1-0 down there was a spell of simply breaking up the game and keeping Milan in reach. Having done so, he could then look to strike back and did so, finding an equaliser through the substitute Alessandro Matri. Conte admitted he got it wrong initially, but the point is he was able to correct the error.

Contrast that, say to Tottenham's performance away to Real Madrid in the Champions League last season when having gone a goal and a man down with the sending-off of Peter Crouch, they were not only unable to check Madrid's forward momentum, but seemed to have little notion of how they might begin to do so, being run ragged by Madrid's overlapping full-backs.

Killing the game is not pretty. It is not something that wins reams of positive media coverage. But it is necessary, particularly at international level where football has become increasingly attritional because of the lack of time available to coaches to develop attacking cohesion.

If he takes the England job, Redknapp will probably inspire a short-term jolt of optimism and his uncomplicated attacking approach may bring impressive results against lesser opposition. The problem, though, will come when England have to break up the game against opponents of similar or greater stature. Tottenham are the third-best team in the country and have let in 14 goals in four games against the two sides better than them and six in two against the fourth-best. In tournament football, that equates to comfortable qualification followed by an exit against the first serious contender England meet, which is pretty much where they have been since 1968.

If only there was somebody around who could organise a side to frustrate, say, the reigning world and European champions and then nick a goal from a set-play to pull off an improbable 1-0 win.