Documents By ThemeIn addition to the internal administration memos charting the origins of – and legal arguments for – harsh interrogation techniques, there is much more. In this library, you will also find FBI e-mails, testimony from former prisoners in U.S custody, and the reports of numerous official investigations.

In 1956, Cornell psychologists on contract with the CIA examined Communist interrogation techniques that had been used on American POWs during the Korean War. They concluded that prolonged isolation had dramatic effects on prisoners: “Ultimately he [the prisoner] may seem to lose many of the restraints of ordinary behavior. He may soil himself. He weeps, he mutters, he prays aloud in his cell. He follows the orders of the guard with the docility of a trained animal. Indeed, the guards say that such prisoners are ‘reduced to animals.’”

SUBJECT: “Communist Attempts To Elicit False Confessions From Air Force Prisoners Of War”

AUTHOR: Harold Wolff and Lawrence Hinkle

In September, 1957 Albert Biderman published a study for the United States Air Force laying out interrogation techniques used to torture American POWs resulting in false confessions during the Korean War. Biderman’s list of techniques included death threats, degradation, and “induced debilitation.”

This 1963 manual was the culmination of the Agency’s studies into “The Coercive Counterintelligence Interrogation of Resistant Sources.” Having studied the methods used by communist regimes in China, North Korea and the Soviet Union, the CIA explored interrogations based on “pain,” “debility,” and “threats and fear.” KUBARK’s menu of coercive interrogation techniques instructed that prisoners be “cut off from the known” and “plunged into the strange.”

Memos from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel

Note: Legal opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel carry the weight of law within the executive branch.

This memo lays out an expansive vision of presidential power, arguing that Congress cannot “place any limits on the President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response. These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President alone to make.”

In this opinion, Yoo discussed possible changes to the laws governing wiretaps for intelligence gathering, and signaled that the government’s interest in keeping the nation safe following the terrorist attacks might justify warrantless searches.

The United States, it was argued, was in a “state of armed conflict.” The scale of violence, the authors added, was unprecedented and “legal and constitutional rules” governing law enforcement – such as the Fourth Amendment prohibition on “unreasonable” searches and seizures did not apply. “The President has both constitutional and statutory authority to use the armed forces in military operations, against terrorists, within the United States.”

The authors added that, “First Amendment speech and press rights may also be subordinated to the overriding need to wage war successfully.”

SUBJECT: Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists

AUTHOR: Patrick Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General

A legal opinion issued just a week before President Bush signed an order establishing military commissions to try prisoners who were deemed enemy combatants. In 2006, the Supreme Court ruled – in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld – that those military commissions were inconsistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In this memo, Yoo writes “We conclude that these treaties [including Geneva] do not protect members of the al Qaeda organization. We further conclude that that [sic] these treaties do not apply to the Taliban militia.”

Jay Bybee signs off on John Yoo’s January 9th draft, sending it in its final form to Pentagon General Counsel Jim Haynes and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales. The memo explains that “certain deviations from the text of Geneva III may be permissible, as a matter of domestic law, if they fall within certain justifications or legal exceptions, such as those for self defense.”

In this memo, Jay Bybee states that the President has the power to ignore Geneva’s requirement that prisoners be given “Article 5” hearings to establish their status as POWs. “The President … may use his constitutional power to interpret treaties and apply them to the facts, to make the determination that the Taliban are unlawful combatants… We therefore conclude that there is no need to establish tribunals to determine POW status under Article 5.”

In the wake of the capture of the “American Taliban” John Walker Lindh, questions about the rights of American citizens captured in the war on terror became a new issue. In conclusion, Bybee notes “even if the Government did in fact violate Rule 4.2 by having military lawyers interrogate represented persons (including Mr. Walker) without consent of counsel, it would not follow that the evidence obtained in that questioning would be inadmissible at trial.”

SUBJECT: The President’s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations

AUTHOR: Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, OLC

This memorandum appears to underpin the so-called “extraordinary rendition” program. It argues that the President has an unfettered right to transfer prisoners captured in the war on terror to governments around the world without regard for whether they would be tortured.

It further argues that “so long as the US does not intend for a detainee to be tortured post-transfer…no criminal liability will attach to a transfer, even if the foreign country receiving the detainee does torture him.”

The author concludes that Congress cannot interfere with the President’s exercise of his authority as Commander-in-Chief to control the conduct of operations during war, including his authority to promulgate rules to regulate military commissions.

Arguing that “the military has the legal authority to detain (Jose Padilla) as a prisoner captured during an international armed conflict,” this opinion was issued one day before Padilla – an American citizen arrested on American soil – was designated an “enemy combatant.”

The authors further concluded that the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act that had long limited the powers of the government to use the US military for law enforcement within the United States could be suspended; it “presents no statutory bar” to Padilla’s military imprisonment.

Written by the Office of Legal Counsel’s Jay Bybee and sent to the Central Intelligence Agency, this heavily redacted document was released to the ACLU in 2008. It details “advising the CIA regarding interrogation methods it may use against al Qaeda members,” and in one un-redacted portion, argues that “to violate the statute, an individual must have the specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering. Based on the information you have provided us, we believe those carrying out these procedures would not have the specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering.”

John Yoo writes to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales warning of potential threats of international prosecution regarding the administration’s interrogation policies. Yoo notes that “Interrogations of al Qaeda members … cannot constitute a war crime” because of the Presidential determination that Geneva’s protections do not apply.

In what has become notorious as the “torture memo,” Jay Bybee signs off on an opinion authored by John Yoo. The memorandum systematically dismisses numerous U.S. federal laws, treaties and international law prohibiting the use of torture, essentially defining the term out of existence.

Written at the request of DoD General Counsel William Haynes, the memo is an expansion of John Yoo’s August, 2002 “torture memo” and lays out in more expansive detail what would be permitted under the administration’s interrogation policy. Haynes makes it clear that the memo is the “controlling authority” for the Working Group.

Written by the new head of the Office of Legal Counsel, the opinion declared that the Geneva Conventions protected “citizens and permanent residents of Iraq,” including those “who commit hostile acts against the occupying power.” This opinion provoked the ire of the Vice President’s general counsel, David Addington, an incident described in detail in “The Terror Presidency” by Goldsmith.

This memorandum repudiates John Yoo’s secret October 23, 2001 opinion asserting that the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution must give way when the President deems it necessary in defense of the nation.

Stating that “certain propositions stated in several opinions issued by the Office Legal Counsel from 2001 – 2003 respecting the allocation of authorities between the President and Congress in matters of war and national security do not reflect the current views of this Office,” this memorandum disowns the broad claims of constitutional law reflected in the OLC opinions. It does not comment upon or disown the specific policies regarding surveillance, detention and interrogation.

SUBJECT: “Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban”

AUTHOR: Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel

This memo for the President outlines the benefits of opting out of the Geneva Conventions and lists the benefits of such a finding. Gonzales notes that non-compliance with Geneva “would create a reasonable basis in law that Section 2441 [War Crimes Act] does not apply, which would provide a solid defense to any future prosecution.”

John Ashcroft concludes that opting out of Geneva “would provide the highest assurance that no court would subsequently entertain charges that American military officers, intelligence officials, or law enforcement officials violated Geneva Convention rules relating to field conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of detainees.”

Secretary Rumsfeld declares that “The United States has determined that Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”

One of the earliest known documents regarding the use resistance training as a source for interrogation tactics, this memo was forwarded by the senior staff officer at the Survival, Evasion Resistance & Escape (SERE) school at Fort Belvoir to the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel. The author writes that when he has witnessed Americans subjected to waterboarding during the Navy’s SERE training, “use of the watering board resulted in student capitulation and compliance 100% of the time.”

SUBJECT: Memorandum from JPRA Chief of Staff for Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, Subject Exploitation (Extracts)

AUTHOR: USAF Lt. Col. Daniel Baumgartner, JPRA Chief of Staff

The senior staff officer for the US Air Forces SERE School in Fort Belvoir, Virginia cautions about the potential use of SERE techniques, saying that “ability to exploit however, is a highly specialized skill set built on training and expertise.”

SUBJECT: Memorandum from JPRA Chief of Staff for Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, Subject Exploitation and Physical Pressures.

AUTHOR: USAF Lt. Col. Daniel Baumgartner, JPRA Chief of Staff

The senior staff officer for the US Air Forces SERE School at Fort Belvoir forwards a document entitled “Physical Pressures used in Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees.” It details the use of interrogation techniques such as “walling,” “facial slap,” and stress positions.

A one page summary of Pentagon General Counsel Jim Haynes, and Vice President Cheney’s legal counsel David Addington’s trip to Guantanamo on September 25, 2002. The report notes that their stated purpose was to “receive briefings on Intel successes, Intel challenges, Intel techniques, Intel problems and future plans for facilities.”

Secretary Rumfeld’s General Counsel Jim Haynes, sends an “action memo” for the Secretary’s signature advising Rumsfeld to approve a list of harsh interrogation techniques. On December 2, 2002 Rumsfeld signs off, and authorizes all the Category I & II techniques, including 20 hour interrogations, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, removal of clothing, the use of phobias such as dogs, and stress positions for up to four hours. Haynes notes that Category III techniques, including waterboarding, “may be legally available” but “as a matter of policy a blanket approval. is not warranted at this time.” As Secretary Rumsfeld signs the action memo, he adds a post-script “I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?”

Written at the request of DoD General Counsel William Haynes, the memo is an expansion of John Yoo’s August, 2002 “torture memo” and lays out in more expansive detail what would be permitted under the administration’s interrogation policy. Haynes makes it clear that the memo is the “controlling authority” for the Working Group.

SUBJECT: “Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism”

AUTHOR: N/A

The report of the Working Group on interrogation policy is signed out. In 85-pages, it endorses a series of 35 interrogation techniques including “fear up harsh,” “emotional love,” “emotional hate,” “hooding,” and “sleep adjustment.” Though it is signed out in their names, members of the Working Group, were not informed of its final contents.

A senior CIA lawyer meets with military officials at Guantanamo, and states that laws banning torture are “basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies, you’re doing it wrong.” The pentagon’s top legal adviser at the camp responds, “We will need documentation to protect us.” When the military’s top criminal investigator reads the minutes, he forwards them to other senior personnel, noting “This looks like the kind of stuff Congressional hearings are made of.” Waterboarding, for example, would “shock the conscience of any legal body looking at the results of the interrogations or possibly even the interrogators. Somebody needs to be considering how history will look back at this.”

General Michael Dunlavey sends a formal request for approval of harsh interrogation techniques based on SERE up the chain of command to General James T. Hill, commander of USSOUTHCOM. The most extreme “Category III” techniques mirror “those used in US military interrogation resistance training or by other U.S. government agencies.”

General James Hill, commander of USSOUTHCOM, forwards the request to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but worries that, “I am particularly troubled by the use of implied or expressed threats of death of the detainee or his family.”

This draft memo, never before released in its entirety, directly links the tactics being used at Guantanamo to the U.S. military’s torture resistance training: “These tactics and techniques are used in SERE school to ‘break’ SERE detainees. The same tactics and techniques can be used to break real detainees during interrogation operations.”

Responding to a “high level directive,” two SERE instructors travel to Guantanamo, where they lead a class of 24 Guantanamo interrogators on the use of SERE techniques based on “Biderman’s Principles.” Principles include death threats, degradation, and “induced debilitation.”

This 238-page manual details nearly every facet of operations at Guantanamo’s Camp Delta. Regarding International Committee of the Red Cross access to detainees, the manual details a series of “levels” of restricted access, up to and including “no contact of any kind with the ICRC,” a potential violation of the Geneva Conventions.

On December 4, 2008, Specialist Brandon Neely approached CSHRA with testimony he wished to contribute to the Guantánamo Testimonials Project. He believed that insufficient attention had been paid to ‘the hell that went on at Camp X-Ray.'”

This memo issued by a U.S. Army military intelligence officer requests that interrogators come up with a “wish list” of interrogation techniques for use in Iraq. The memo notes, “The gloves are coming off gentleman regarding these detainees. [REDACTED] has made it clear that we want these individuals broken.” Responding, another interrogator suggests, “… a baseline interrogation technique that at a minimum allows for physical contact resembling that used by SERE instructors. Sleep deprivation. Fear of dogs and snakes appear to work nicely. I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off.”

General Ricardo Sanchez issues guidelines for the interrogation of Iraqi detainees. The techniques he authorizes are almost a verbatim copy of those authorized for Guantanamo by Secretary Rumsfeld in April, 2003.

The president of Amnesty International writes an urgent letter concerning detainees in U.S. custody, warning against the “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” noting hooding and blindfolding detainees is a violation of the Convention Against Torture.

Describing Yoo’s legal analysis as “seriously flawed,” the memorandum also warns that “this raises the risk of future criminal prosecution for U.S. civilian and military leadership and their advisers.”

SUBJECT: Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan

AUTHOR: Colin Powell, Secretary of State

Colin Powell warns of the consequences of opting out of the Geneva Convention. “It will reverse over a century of U.S. policy . . . and undermine the prosecutions of the law of war for our troops . . .” He adds, “it may provoke some individual foreign prosecutors to investigate and prosecute our officials and troops.”

The State Department’s Legal Adviser, William Taft IV, makes a final plea to Alberto Gonzales in support of the Geneva Conventions. “If the Conventions do not apply to the conflict, no one involved in it will enjoy the benefit of their protections as a matter of law.”

An FBI agent warns his superiors that several of the techniques being considered “are not permitted by the U.S. constitution” and others are “examples of coercive interrogation techniques that may violate 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (Torture Statute).”

The same day Secretary Rumsfeld authorizes harsh interrogation techniques, Colonel Mallow, Commander of Guantanamo’s Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), instructs his team of interrogators that “personnel will not participate in the use of any questionable techniques… Agents must report any such action to the SAC immediately.”

In this memo, a USAF Captain and Legal Adviser to the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) at Guantanamo lays out a heavily redacted record of “aggressive interrogation techniques” at Guantanamo. He notes that “All deployed CITF personnel are ordered to disengage, stand clear, and report any questionable interrogation techniques.”

Mohamed al Qahtani, suspected of being the September 11 plot’s missing “20th hijacker,” was transferred to Guantanamo after he was captured in Afghanistan. A 54-day account of his interrogation was leaked to Time Magazine.

In late 2004, Clive Stafford Smith, a human rights lawyer who has represented more than 40 detainees in the war on terror, compiled this 30-page report. It details his client, Moazzam Begg’s, treatment while under American custody in Afghanistan and later at Guantanamo Bay.

SUBJECT: Amended Petition for Relief Under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and in the Alternative, for Writ of Habeas Corpus

This 2008 filing on behalf of high-value detainee Abu Zubaydah (also known as Zayn Al Abidin Muhammad Husayn) gives an annotated description of the circumstances surrounding his capture and interrogation.

DATE: July 7, 2004SUBJECT: “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade”AUTHOR: Major General Antonio Taguba

After receiving the first photographs of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the Pentagon appoints Army Major General Antonio Taguba to investigate. His secret report finds, “numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” that was “intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force.”

DATE: July 21, 2004TITLE: Department of the Army Inspector General – Detainee Operation Inspection”AUTHOR: Lt. Gen. Paul Mikolashek, Army Inspector General

Inspector General Paul Mikolashek, charged with conducting an overview of the Army’s detainee operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, characterizes detainee abuses as “unauthorized actions taken by a few individuals.”

Prompted by allegations of abuse, the Schmidt-Furlow report is completed in April, 2005. The report outlines allegations of abuse made by detainees and FBI agents. It also details information about the “special interrogation plans” authorized for high-value detainees Mohamed al Qahtani and Mohamedou Slahi.

DATE: May 2008SUBJECT: A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Special Report

AUTHOR: N/A

This 438-page report released in May, 2008 details the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s involvement in interrogations in Iraq, Afghanistan and at Guantanamo. The report disclosed for the first time that FBI agents at Guantanamo in 2002 began keeping a “war crimes” file of alleged abuses occurring during interrogations.

DATE: December 11, 2008SUBJECT: Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. CustodyAUTHOR: Senate Armed Services Committee

In December, 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee completed a classified 250-page report outlining its 18-month investigation into U.S. detention and interrogation policies. The report’s Executive Summary concludes that “(t)he abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of ‘a few bad apples’ acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees.”

Senator John McCain, ranking Republican on the Committee, added, “The Committee’s report details the inexcusable link between abusive interrogation techniques used by our enemies who ignored the Geneva Conventions and interrogation policy for detainees in U.S. custody.”