Designing Secure Protocols and Intercepting Secure Communication

Moxie Marlinspike

DC 2011 Training Session // january 16 - 17

Overview:

Attendees will walk away with everything they need to intercept several types of secure communication. Attendees will learn the fundamentals of how
to design a secure protocol, and be armed with the knowledge of how to
evaluate the security of and discover weaknesses in existing protocols.

This training will also cover tricks for attacking implementation
vulnerabilities and holes in the glue between different protocols, which
can allow for the interception of different types of secure traffic.

What You Will Learn:

This training is both theoretical and practical, both academic and
hacker-foo. The first day covers the design of secure protocols in
depth, leaving students with a thorough understanding of how secure
protocols are modeled, how the building blocks of cryptography can be
combined to result in something secure, and how to look at secure
protocols that others publish (from SSH to SSL to Tor to encrypted web
cookies) with a critical eye. Concepts that are often tossed around
such as IND-CCA, the birthday paradox, and authenticated encryption will
be covered in detail.

The second day covers clever tricks for manipulating implementation
vulnerabilities and holes in the glue between secure protocols.
Participants will be able to practice different types of
man-in-the-middle attacks, and different techniques for getting in the
middle.

Who Should Attend:

Anyone interested in designing or evaluating secure protocols, and
anyone interested in tricks for intercepting secure communication -- as
well as those seeking to defend their networks from these attacks. Some
existing basic knowledge of internet protocols will be useful to attendees.

What to bring:

Students are required to bring a laptop with a Debian or Ubuntu Linux install (either native or in a VM)
and a copy of VMWare as well.

Trainer:

Moxie Marlinspike
is a fellow at the Institute For Disruptive Studies with over thirteen
years of experience in attacking networks. He recently published the
null-prefix attacks on X.509, the session-denial attacks against OCSP,
and is the author of both sslsniff and sslstrip -- the former of which
was used by the MD5 Hash Collision team to deploy their rogue CA cert,
and the latter of which continues to implement Moxie's deadly
"stripping" technique for rendering communication insecure. His tools
have been featured in many publications including Hacking Exposed,
Forbes Magazine, The Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and
Security Focus as well as on international TV.