The Warsaw Uprising (Polish: Powstanie Warszawskie) was a struggle
by the Polish Home
Army (Polish: Armia Krajowa) to liberate Warsaw from Nazi German
occupation during World War II. The Uprising began on 1
August 1944, as part of a nationwide rebellion, Operation
Tempest. It was intended to last for only a few days until the
Soviet Army reached the city. The Soviet advance
stopped short, however, while Polish resistance against the German
forces continued for 63 days until the Polish surrendered on 2
October.

Initially, the Poles seized substantial areas of the city, but
the Soviets did not advance beyond the city's borders until
mid-September. Inside the city, bitter fighting between the Germans
and Poles continued. By 16 September, Soviet forces had reached a
point a few hundred meters from the Polish positions, across the Vistula River, but they made no further
headway during the Uprising, leading to allegations that the Soviet
leader Joseph
Stalin had wanted the insurrection to fail so that the Soviet
occupation of Poland would be uncontested.

Although the exact number of casualties remains unknown, it is
estimated that about 16,000 Polish insurgents were killed and about
6,000 badly wounded. In addition, between 150,000 and 200,000
civilians died, mostly from mass murders conducted by troops
fighting on the German side. German casualties totaled over 16,000
soldiers killed and 9,000 wounded. During the urban
combat approximately 25% of Warsaw's buildings were destroyed.
Following the surrender of Polish forces, German troops
systematically leveled 35% of the city block by block. Together
with earlier damage suffered in the invasion of Poland (1939) and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943),
over 85% of the city was destroyed by January 1945, when the
Soviets finally entered the city.

By July 1944, Poland had been occupied by the forces of Nazi Germany for
almost five years. The underground Polish Home Army, which was loyal to the
Polish government-in-exile,
had long planned some form of insurrection against the occupiers.
Germany was fighting a coalition of Allied powers, led by the United States, the
United Kingdom
and the Soviet
Union. The initial plan of the Home Army was to link up with
the invading forces of the Western Allies as they liberated Europe
from the Nazis. However, in 1943 it became apparent that the
Soviets, rather than the Western Allies, would reach the pre-war
borders of Poland before the Allied invasion of Europe made notable
headway.[8] The
Soviets and the Poles had a common enemy—Nazi Germany—but other
than that, they were working towards different post-war goals; the
Home Army desired a pro-Western, democratic Poland but the Soviet
leader Stalin intended to establish a communist, pro-Soviet puppet
regime. It became obvious that the advancing Soviet Red Army might not come to
Poland as an ally but rather only as "the ally of an ally".[9]

A Polish flag
with an "anchor" device was
used as an emblem by the Polish resistance.

The Soviets and the Poles distrusted each other, and Soviet partisans in Poland
often clashed with Polish resistance increasingly united under the
Home Army's front.[10]
Stalin broke off Polish-Soviet relations on 25
April 1943 after the Germans revealed the Katyn massacre, in which Stalin had
personally approved the mass murder of Polish officer POWs.[11] On 26
October, the Polish government-in-exile issued an instruction to
the effect that if diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were
not resumed before the Soviet entry into Poland, Home Army forces
were to remain underground pending further decisions. However, the
Home Army commander, Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, took a
different approach, and on 20 November, he outlined his own plan,
which became known as "Operation Tempest". On the approach
of the Eastern Front, local units
of the Home Army were to harass the German Wehrmacht in the rear and co-operate
with incoming Soviet units as much as possible. Although doubts
existed about the military wisdom of a major uprising, planning
continued.[12]

Eve of the
battle

The situation came to a head on 13 July 1944 as the Soviet
offensive crossed the old Polish border. At
this point the Poles had to make a decision: either initiate the
uprising in the current difficult political situation and risk
problems with Soviet support, or fail to rebel and face Soviet propaganda describing the Home Army
as impotent or worse, Nazi collaborators. They feared that if
Poland was 'liberated' by the Red Army, then the Allies would
ignore the London-based
Polish government in the aftermath of the war. The urgency for
a final decision on strategy increased as it became clear that
after successful Polish-Soviet co-operation in the liberation of
Polish territory (for example, in Operation Ostra Brama), Soviet security forces behind the
frontline shot or arrested Polish officers and forcibly conscripted
lower ranks into the Soviet-controlled
forces.[10][13] On 21
July, the High Command of the Home Army decided that the time to
launch Operation Tempest in Warsaw was imminent.[14] The
plan was intended both as a political manifestation of Polish
sovereignty and as a direct operation against the German
occupiers.[5]
On 25 July, the Polish government-in-exile (without the knowledge
and against the wishes of Polish Commander-in-Chief General Kazimierz
Sosnkowski[15])
approved the plan for an uprising in Warsaw with the timing to be
decided locally.[16]

In the early summer of 1944, German plans required Warsaw to
serve as the
defensive center of the area and to be held at all costs. The
Germans had fortifications constructed and built up their forces in
the area. This process slowed after the failed 20
July Plot to assassinate the Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, and
around that time, the Germans in Warsaw were weak and visibly
demoralized.[17][18]
However, by the end of July, German forces in the area were
reinforced.[17] On
27 July, the Governor of the Warsaw District, Ludwig Fischer, called for 100,000 Polish
men and women to report for work as part of a plan which envisaged
the Poles constructing fortifications around the city.[19] The
inhabitants of Warsaw ignored his demand, and the Home Army command
became worried about possible reprisals or mass round-ups, which
would disable their ability to mobilize.[20] The
Soviet forces were approaching Warsaw, and Soviet-controlled radio
stations called for the Polish people to rise in arms.[21][17] On
25 July, the Union of Polish Patriots, in a
broadcast from Moscow, stated: "The Polish Army of Polish
Patriots... calls on the thousands of brothers thirsting to fight,
to smash the foe before he can recover from his defeat... Every
Polish homestead must become a stronghold in the struggle against
the invaders... Not a moment is to be lost."[22]On 29
July, the first Soviet armored units reached the outskirts of
Warsaw, where they were counter-attacked by two German Panzer
Corps: the 39th and 4th SS.[23]
On 29 July 1944 Radio Station Kosciuszko located in Moskow emitted
few times His "Appeal to Warsaw" and called to "Fight The
Germans!": "No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle
which is soon to bring her liberation. [...] The Polish Army now
entering Polish territory, trained in the Soviet Union, is now
joined to the People's Army to form the Corps of the Polish Armed
Forces, the armed arm of our nation in its struggle for
independence. Its ranks will be joined tomorrow by the sons of
Warsaw. They will all together, with the Allied Army pursue the
enemy westwards, wipe out the Hitlerite vermin from Polish land and
strike a mortal blow at the beast of Prussian Imperialism." [24][25]
Bór-Komorowski and several high-ranking officers held a meeting on
that day. Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, who had
recently arrived from London, expressed the view that support from
the Allies would be weak, but his points received little
attention.[26]
Believing that the time for action had arrived, on 31 July, the
Polish commanders General Bór-Komorowski and Colonel Antoni
Chruściel ordered full mobilization of Home Army forces for
17:00 the following day.[27]

The Home Army forces of the Warsaw District numbered between
20,000[1][28] and
49,000[2]
soldiers. Other formations also contributed soldiers; estimates
range from 2,000 in total[29] to
about 3,500 from the far-right National Armed Forces and a few dozen from
the communist People's
Army.[30] Most
of them had trained for several years in partisan and urban guerrilla warfare, but lacked
experience in prolonged daylight fighting. The forces lacked
equipment,[4]
because the Home Army had shuttled weapons to the east of the
country before the decision to include Warsaw in Operation
Tempest.[31] Other
partisan groups subordinated themselves to Home Army command, and
many volunteers joined during the fighting, including Jews freed from the Gęsiówkaconcentration camp in the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto.[32]

Kubuś the Polish
WWII armored car, made by the Home Army during the Uprising. A
single copy was built by insurgents from "Krybar" Group, on the
chassis of a Chevrolet 157 van. It took part in the attack on
Warsaw University.

Colonel Antoni Chruściel (codename "Monter")
commanded the Polish forces in Warsaw. Initially he divided his
forces into eight areas.[33]
On 20 September, they were reorganized to align with the three
areas of the city held by Polish forces. The entire force, renamed
the Warsaw Home Army Corps (Polish: Warszawski Korpus Armii Krajowej) and
commanded by General Antoni Chruściel—promoted from Colonel on 14
September—formed into three infantry
divisions (Śródmieście, Żoliborz and Mokotów).[33]

Germans

German soldiers at Theater Square with the National Theater visible
in the back. September 1944

In late July 1944 the German units stationed in and around
Warsaw were divided into three categories. The first and the most
numerous was the garrison of Warsaw. As of 31 July, it numbered
some 11,000 troops under General Rainer Stahel.[40]

These well-equipped German forces prepared for the defence of
the city's key positions for many months. Several hundred concrete
bunkers and barbed wire lines protected the buildings and areas
occupied by the Germans. Apart from the garrison itself, numerous
army units were stationed on both banks of the Vistula and in the
city. The second category was formed by police and SS under Col.
Paul Otto Geibel, numbering initially 5,710 men,[41]
including Schutzpolizei and Waffen-SS.[42] The
third category was formed by various auxiliary units, including
detachments of the Bahnschutz (rail guard),
Werkschutz (factory guard), Sonderdienst and
Sonderabteilungen (military Nazi party units).[43]

During the uprising the German side received reinforcements on a
daily basis, and Stahel was replaced as overall commander by
SS-General Erich von dem Bach in early August. As of
20 August 1944, the German units directly involved with fighting in
Warsaw comprised 17,000 men arranged in two battle groups:[44]
Battle Group Rohr (commanded by Major General Rohr), which included
Bronislav
Kaminski's brigade and Battle Group Reinefarth (commanded by
SS-GruppenführerHeinz Reinefarth) consisted of Attack Group Dirlewanger (commanded by Oskar
Dirlewanger), Attack Group Reck (commanded by Major Reck),
Attack Group Schmidt (commanded by Colonel Schmidt) and various
support and backup units.

Uprising

W-hour

Polish civilians preparing sand bags in the courtyard of townhouse
at Moniuszki street. August 1944

After days of hesitation, at 17:00 on 31 July, the Polish
headquarters scheduled "W-hour" (from the Polish wybuch,
"explosion"; also wolność, freedom), the moment
of the start of the uprising, for 17:00 on the following day.[45]
The decision proved to be a costly strategic mistake because the
under-equipped Polish forces were prepared for a series of
coordinated surprise night attacks. Attacking during daylight
exposed them to German machine gun fire. Although many partisan
units were already mobilized and waiting at assembly points
throughout the city, the mobilization of thousands of young men and
women was hard to conceal. Sporadic fighting started in advance of
"W-hour", notably in Żoliborz,[46] and
around Napoleon Square and Dąbrowski
Square.[47] The
Germans had anticipated the possibility of an uprising, though they
had not realised its size or strength.[48] At
16:30 Governor Fischer put the garrison on full alert.[49]

That evening the insurgents captured a major German arsenal, the
main post office and power station, Praga railway station and the
tallest building in Warsaw, the Prudential building. However, Castle
Square, the police district, and the airport remained in German
hands.[50] The
first two days were crucial in establishing the battlefield for the
rest of the fight. The insurgents were most successful in the City Center,
Old Town,
and Wola districts. However,
several major German strongholds remained, and in some areas of
Wola the Poles sustained heavy losses that forced an early retreat.
In other areas such as Mokotów, the attackers almost completely failed
to secure any objectives and controlled only the residential areas.
In Praga, on the east bank of
the Vistula, the Poles were sent back into hiding by a high
concentration of German forces.[51] Most
crucially, the fighters in different areas failed to link up,
either with each other or with areas outside Warsaw, leaving each
sector isolated from the others. After the first hours of fighting,
many units adopted a more defensive strategy, while civilians began
erecting barricades. Despite all the problems, by 4 August most of
the city was in Polish hands.

First four
days

The sewer system (map) was used to move insurgents between the Old
Town, Downtown (Śródmieście) and Żoliborz
districts.

German SdKfz 251 captured by Polish insurgents,
from 8-th "Krybar" Regiment, on Na Skarpie Boulevard on 14 August
1944 from 5th SS Panzer Division
Wiking. In this picture taken on Tamka Street, soldier with MP-40
submachine gun is his first insurgent commander Adam Dewicz "Gray
Wolf". From his nickname insurgents gave the vehicle name "Gray
Wolf" and used it in attack on Warsaw University.

The uprising was intended to last a few days until Soviet forces
arrived;[52]
however, this never happened, and the Polish forces had to fight
with little outside assistance. The results of the first two days
of fighting in different parts of the city were as follows:

Area I (city center and the Old Town): Units captured
most of their assigned territory, but failed to capture areas with
strong pockets of resistance from the Germans (the Warsaw
University buildings, PAST
skyscraper, the headquarters of the German garrison in the Saxon Palace, the German-only area near Szucha Avenue,
and the bridges over the Vistula). They thus failed to create a
central stronghold, secure communication links to other areas, or a
secure land connection with the northern area of Żoliborz through the
northern railway line and the Citadel.

Area II (Żoliborz, Marymont, Bielany): Units failed to secure the most
important military targets near Żoliborz. Many units retreated
outside of the city, into the forests. Although they captured most
of the area around Żoliborz, the soldiers of Colonel Mieczysław
Niedzielski ("Żywiciel") failed to secure the Citadel area and
break through German defences at Warsaw Gdańsk
railway station.[53]

Area III (Wola):
Units initially secured most of the territory, but sustained heavy
losses (up to 30%). Some units retreated into the forests, while
others retreated to the eastern part of the area. In the northern
part of Wola the soldiers of Colonel Jan Mazurkiewicz ("Radosław")
managed to capture the German barracks, the German supply depot at
Stawki Street, and the flanking position at the Okopowa Street Jewish
Cemetery.

Area IV (Ochota):
The units mobilized in this area did not capture either the
territory or the military targets (the Gęsiówka
concentration camp, and the SS and Sipo barracks on Narutowicz Square).
After suffering heavy casualties most of the Home Army forces
retreated to the forests west of Warsaw. Only two small units of
approximately 200 to 300 men under Lieut. Andrzej Chyczewski
("Gustaw") remained in the area and managed to create strong
pockets of resistance. They were later reinforced by units from the
city center. Elite units of the Kedyw managed to secure most of the northern part
of the area and captured all of the military targets there.
However, they were soon tied down by German tactical
counter-attacks from the south and west.

Area V (Mokotów): The situation in this area was very
serious from the start of hostilities. The partisans aimed to
capture the heavily defended Police Area (Dzielnica
policyjna) on Rakowiecka Street, and establish a
connection with the city center through open terrain at the former
airfield of Pole Mokotowskie. As both of the areas were
heavily fortified and could be approached only through open
terrain, the assaults failed. Some units retreated into the
forests, while others managed to capture parts of Dolny Mokotów,
which was, however, severed from most communication routes to other
areas.[54] The
last building held was on the corner of the Avenue of Independence
and Rakowieczka Street under formidable assault by German Panzers.
This building was named by Second Lieutenant Andrzej Zwartynski -
"Zyndram" - of Compania 02, "Baszta" saying, "This is our Alcazar,"
in reference to the Siege of the Alcázar in which the
nationalist forces held the castle Alcázar of
Toledo against overwhelming Spanish Republican forces, in
the Spanish Civil war.

Area VI (Praga):
The Uprising was also started on the right bank of the Vistula,
where the main task was to seize the bridges on the river and
secure the bridgeheads until the arrival of the Red Army. It was
clear that, since the location was far worse than that of the other
areas, there was no chance of any help from outside. After some
minor initial successes, the forces of Lt.Col. Antoni Żurowski
("Andrzej") were badly outnumbered by the Germans. The fights were
halted, and the Home Army forces were forced back underground.[45]

Area VII (Powiat warszawski): this area consisted of
territories outside Warsaw city limits. Actions here mostly failed
to capture their targets.

An additional area within the Polish command structure was
formed by the units of the Directorate of Sabotage and Diversion or
Kedyw, an elite
formation that was to guard the headquarters and was to be used as
an "armed ambulance", thrown into the battle in the most endangered
areas. These units secured parts of Śródmieście and Wola; along
with the units of Area I, they were the most successful
during the first few hours.

Among the most notable primary targets that were not taken
during the opening stages of the uprising were the airfields of Okęcie and Pole Mokotowskie, as well as the PAST
skyscraper overlooking the city center and the Gdańsk railway station guarding the passage
between the center and the northern borough of Żoliborz.

Wola
massacre

The Uprising reached its apogee on 4 August when the Home Army
soldiers managed to establish front lines in the westernmost
boroughs of Wola and Ochota. However, it was also the
moment at which the German army stopped its retreat westwards and
began receiving reinforcements. On the same day SS General Erich von dem Bach was appointed commander
of all the forces employed against the Uprising.[45]
German counter-attacks aimed to link up with the remaining German
pockets and then cut off the Uprising from the Vistula river. Among
the reinforcing units were forces under the command of Heinz
Reinefarth.[45]

On 5 August Reinefarth's three attack groups started their
advance westward along Wolska and Górczewska
streets toward the main East-West communication line of Jerusalem
Avenue. Their advance was halted, but the regiments began
carrying out Heinrich Himmler's orders: behind the
lines, special SS, police and Wehrmacht groups went from
house to house, shooting the inhabitants regardless of age or
gender and burning their bodies.[45]
Estimates of civilians killed in Wola and Ochota range from 20,000
to 50,000,[55]
40,000 by 8 August in Wola alone,[56] or as
high as 100,000.[57] The
main perpetrators were Oskar Dirlewanger and Bronislav
Kaminski, who committed the cruelest atrocities.[58][59][60]

The policy was designed to crush the Poles' will to fight and
put the uprising to an end without having to commit to heavy city
fighting.[61] With
time, the Germans realized that atrocities only stiffened
resistance and that some political solution should be found, as the
thousands of men at the disposal of the German commander were
unable to effectively counter the insurgents in an urban guerilla
setting.[62] They
aimed to gain a significant victory to show the Home Army the
futility of further fighting and induce them to surrender. This did
not succeed. Until mid-September, the Germans shot all captured
insurgents on the spot, but from the end of September, some of the
captured Polish soldiers were treated as POWs.[63]

Despite the loss of Wola, the Polish resistance stiffened.
Zośka and Wacek battalions managed to capture the
ruins of the Warsaw
Ghetto and liberate the Gęsiówka concentration camp, freeing about 350
Jews.[45]
The area became one of the main communication links between the
insurgents fighting in Wola and those defending the Old Town. On 7
August German forces were strengthened by the arrival of tanks
using civilians as human shields.[45]
After two days of heavy fighting they managed to bisect Wola and
reach Bankowy Square. However, by then the net of
barricades, street fortifications and tank obstacles was already
well-prepared and both sides reached a stalemate, with heavy
house-to-house fighting.

Between 9 August and 18 August pitched battles raged around the
Old Town and nearby Bankowy Square, with successful attacks by the
Germans and counter-attacks from the Poles. German tactics hinged
on bombardment through the use of heavy artillery[65] and
tactical
bombers, against which the Poles were unable to effectively
defend, as they lacked anti-aircraft artillery weapons. Even
clearly marked hospitals were dive-bombed by Stukas.[66]

Although the Battle of Stalingrad had already
shown the danger a city can pose to armies which fight within it
and the importance of local support, the Warsaw Uprising was
probably the first demonstration that in an urban terrain, a vastly
under-equipped force supported by the civilian population can hold
its own against better-equipped professional soldiers—though at the
cost of considerable sacrifice on the part of the city's residents.
The Poles held the Old Town until a decision to withdraw was made
at the end of August. On successive nights until 2 September, the
defenders of the Old Town withdrew through the sewers, which were a
major means of communication between different parts of the
Uprising.[67]
Thousands of people were evacuated in this way. Those that remained
were either shot or transported to concentration camps like
Mauthausen and Sachsenhausen once the Germans regained control.[68]

Berling's
landings

Soviet attacks on the 4th SS Panzer Corps east of Warsaw were
renewed on 26 August, and the Germans were forced to retreat into
Praga. The Soviet army under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky captured
Praga and arrived on the east bank of the Vistula in mid-September.
By 13 September, the Germans had destroyed the remaining bridges
over the Vistula, signalling that they were abandoning all their
positions east of the river.[69] In
the Praga area Polish units under the command of General Zygmunt Berling
(thus sometimes known as berlingowcy – "the Berling men")
fought on the Soviet side. Three patrols of his 1st Polish Army (Polish: 1 Armia Wojska Polskiego) landed in
the Czerniaków
and Powiśle areas and
made contact with Home Army forces on the night of 14/15 September.
The artillery cover and air support provided by the Soviets was
unable to effectively counter enemy machine-gun fire as the Poles
crossed the river, and the landing troops sustained heavy
losses.[70] Only
small elements of the main units made it ashore (I and III
battalions of 9th infantry regiment, 3rd Infantry Division).[71]

The limited landings by the 1st Polish Army represented the only
external ground force which arrived to physically support the
uprising; and even they were curtailed by the Soviet High
Command.[71]

The Germans intensified their attacks on the Home Army positions
near the river to prevent any further landings, but were not able
to make any significant advances for several days while Polish
forces held those vital positions in preparation for a new expected
wave of Soviet landings. Polish units from the eastern shore
attempted several more landings, and from 15 to 23 September
sustained heavy losses (including the destruction of all their
landing boats and most of their other river crossing
equipment).[71]
Red Army support was inadequate.[71]
After the failure of repeated attempts by the 1st Polish Army to
link up with the insurgents, the Soviets limited their assistance
to sporadic artillery and air support. Conditions that prevented
the Germans from dislodging the insurgents also acted to prevent
the Poles from dislodging the Germans. Plans for a river crossing
were suspended "for at least 4 months", since operations against
the 9th Army's five panzer
divisions were problematic at that point, and the commander of the
1st Polish Army, General Berling was relieved of his duties by his
Soviet superiors.[10][72] On
the night of 19 September, after no further attempts from the other
side of the river were made and the promised evacuation of wounded
did not take place, Home Army soldiers and landed elements of the
1st Polish Army were forced to begin a retreat from their positions
on the bank of the river.[71]
Out of approximately 900 men who made it ashore only a handful made
it back to the eastern shore of the Vistula.[73]
Berling's Polish Army losses in the attempt to aid the Uprising
were 5,660 killed, missing or wounded.[5]

From this point on, the Warsaw Uprising can be seen as a
one-sided war of attrition or, alternatively, as a fight for
acceptable terms of surrender. The Poles were besieged in three
areas of the city: Śródmieście, Żoliborz and Mokotów.

Life
behind the lines

Henryk Ożarek "Henio" (left) and Tadeusz Przybyszewski "Roma"
(right) from "Anna" Company of "Gustaw" Battalion in the region of
Kredytowa-Królewska Street. "Henio" holds a Vis pistol and "Roma"
fires a Błyskawica submachine gun. 3 October 1944

In 1939 Warsaw had roughly 1,350,000 inhabitants. Over a million
were still living in the city at the start of the Uprising. In
Polish-controlled territory, during the first weeks of the
Uprising, people tried to recreate the normal day-to-day life of
their free country. Cultural life was vibrant, both among the
soldiers and civilian population, with theatres, post offices,
newspapers and similar activities.[74] Boys
and girls of the Polish
Scouts acted as couriers for an underground postal service,
risking their lives daily to transmit any information that might
help their people.[75][45]
Near the end of the Uprising, lack of food, medicine, overcrowding
and indiscriminate German air and artillery assault on the city
made the civilian situation more and more desperate.

Food
shortages

Tadeusz Rajszczak ("Maszynka") (far left) and two other young
soldiers from Batalion Miotła, 2 September 1944

As the Uprising was supposed to be relieved by the Soviets in a
matter of days, the Polish underground did not predict food
shortages would be a problem. However, as the fighting dragged on,
the inhabitants of the city faced hunger and starvation. A major
break-through took place on 6 August, when Polish units recaptured
the Haberbusch i Schiele brewery
complex at Ceglana Street. From that time on the Varsovians lived
mostly on barley from the brewery's warehouses. Every day up to
several thousand people organized into cargo teams reported to the
brewery for bags of barley and then distributed them in the city
center. The barley was then ground in coffee grinders and boiled
with water to form a so-called spit-soup (Polish: pluj-zupa). The "Sowiński"
Battalion managed to hold the brewery until the end of the
fighting.

Another serious problem for civilians and soldiers alike was a
shortage of water.[45]
By mid-August most of the water conduits were either out of order
or filled with corpses. In addition, the main water pumping station
remained in German hands.[45]
To prevent the spread of epidemics and provide the people with
water, the authorities ordered all janitors to supervise the
construction of water wells in the backyards of every house. On 21
September the Germans blew up the remaining pumping stations at
Koszykowa Street and after that the public wells were the only
source of potable water in the besieged city.[76] By
the end of September, the city center had more than 90 functioning
wells.[45]

Polish
media

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media help.

Before the Uprising the Bureau of Information and Propaganda of
the Home Army had set up a group of war correspondents. Headed by
Antoni
Bohdziewicz, the group made three newsreels and over 30,000 meters of film tape
documenting the struggles. The first newsreel was shown to the
public on 13 August in the Palladium cinema at Złota Street.[45]
In addition to films, dozens of newspapers appeared from the very
first days of the uprising. Several previously underground
newspapers started to be distributed openly.[77][78] The
two main daily newspapers were the government-run
Rzeczpospolita Polska and military Biuletyn Informacyjny. There
were also several dozen newspapers, magazines, bulletins and
weeklies published routinely by various organizations and military
units.[77]

The Błyskawica long-range
radio transmitter, assembled on 7 August in the city center, was
run by the military, but was also used by the recreated Polish Radio from 9 August.[45]
It was on the air three or four times a day, broadcasting news
programmes and appeals for help in Polish, English, German and
French, as well as reports from the government, patriotic poems and
music.[79] It
was the only such radio station in German-held Europe.[80] Among
the speakers appearing on the insurgent radio were Jan Nowak-Jeziorański,[81]
Zbigniew Swiętochowski, Stefan Sojecki, Jeremi Przybora,[82] and
John Ward, a war correspondent for The Times of
London.[83]

Lack of
outside support

According to many historians, a major cause of the eventual
failure of the uprising was the almost complete lack of outside
support and the late arrival of that which did arrive.[5][23]
The Polish government-in-exile carried out frantic diplomatic
efforts to gain support from the Western Allies prior to the start
of battle but the allies would not act without Soviet approval. The
Polish government in London asked the British several times to send
an allied mission to Poland;[10]
since such missions had already been dispatched to other resistance
movements in Europe. However, the British mission did not
arrive until December 1944.[84]
Shortly after their arrival, they met up with Soviet authorities,
who arrested and imprisoned them.[85] In
the words of the mission's deputy commander, it was "a complete
failure".[86]
Nevertheless, from August 1943 to July 1944, over 200 Royal Air Force
(RAF) flights dropped an estimated 146 Polish personnel trained in
Great Britain, over 4000 containers of supplies, and $16 million in
banknotes and gold to the Home Army.[87]

The only support operation which ran continuously for the
duration of the Uprising were night supply drops by long-range
planes of the RAF, other British Commonwealth air
forces, and units of the Polish Air Force, which had to use
distant airfields in Italy, reducing the amount of supplies they
could carry. The RAF made 223 sorties and lost 34 aircraft. The
effect of these airdrops was mostly psychological—they delivered
too few supplies for the needs of the insurgents, and many airdrops
landed outside insurgent-controlled territory.

Airdrops

“

There was no
difficulty in finding Warsaw. It was visible from 100 kilometers
away. The city was in flames and with so many huge fires burning,
it was almost impossible to pick up the target marker
flares.

Batalion
Zośka soldiers in Gęsiówka. Only Juliusz Deczkowski (center)
survived. From left: Wojciech Omyła "Wojtek" and from right:
Tadeusz Milewski "Ćwik". Milewski was killed on the same day. Omyla
was killed several days later on 8 August 1944. 5 August 1944

Young soldier

From 4 August the Western Allies began supporting the Uprising
with airdrops of munitions and other supplies.[89]
Initially the flights were carried out mostly by the 1568th
Polish Flight of the Polish Air Force stationed in Bari and Brindisi in Italy, flying B-24 Liberator,
Handley Page Halifax and Douglas C-47 Dakota
planes. Later on, at the insistence of the Polish
government-in-exile, they were joined by the Liberators of 2 Wing
–No. 31 and No. 34 Squadrons of the South African Air Force based
at Foggia in Southern Italy,
and Halifaxes, flown by No. 148 and No. 178 RAF Squadrons.
The drops by British, Polish and South African forces continued
until 21 September. The total weight of allied drops varies
according to source (104 tons,[90] 230
tons[89]
or 239 tons[10]),
over 200 flights were made.[91]

The Soviet Union did not allow the Western Allies to use its
airports for the airdrops,[5]
so the planes had to use bases in the United Kingdom and Italy which reduced
their carrying weight and number of sorties. The Allies' specific
request for the use of landing strips made on 20 August was denied
by Stalin on 22 August.[88]
Stalin referred to the insurgents as "a handful of criminals"[92] and
stated that the uprising was inspired by "enemies of the Soviet
Union".[93])
Thus by denying landing rights to Allied aircraft on
Soviet-controlled territory the Soviets vastly limited
effectiveness of Allied assistance to the Uprising, and even fired
at Allied airplanes which carried supplies from Italy and strayed
into Soviet-controlled airspace.[88]

American support was also limited. After Stalin's objections to
supporting the uprising, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill telegraphed U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 25
August and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin, to "see
what happens". Unwilling to upset Stalin before the Yalta
Conference, Roosevelt replied on 26 August: "I do not consider
it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to
join you".[88][94]

Finally on 18 September the Soviets allowed a USAAF flight of 107 B-17
Flying Fortresses of the 3 division Eighth Air Force to re-fuel and reload
at Soviet airfields used in Operation Frantic, but it was too
little too late. The planes dropped 100 tons of supplies but only
20 were recovered by the insurgents due to the wide area over which
they were spread.[93]
The vast majority of supplies fell into German-held areas.[95] The
USAAF lost two B-17s[96] with
a further seven damaged. The planes landed at the Operation Frantic
airbases in the Soviet Union. There they were rearmed and refuelled
and the next day 100 B-17s and 61 P-51s left the USSR to bomb the
marshalling yard at Szolnok
in Hungary on their way back to bases in Italy.[97]
Soviet intelligence reports show that Soviet commanders on the
ground near Warsaw estimated that 96% of the supplies dropped by
the Americans fell into German hands.[98] From
the Soviet perspective, the Americans were supplying the Nazis
instead of aiding the insurgents.[99] The
Soviets refused permission for any further American flights until
30 September, by which time the weather was too poor to fly, and
the insurgency was nearly over.[100]

From 14 September the Soviets began their own airdrops, dropping
about 55 tons in total until 28 September. However, since the
Soviet airmen did not equip the containers with parachutes, many of the
packages were damaged.[101]

Although German air defence over the Warsaw area itself was
almost non-existent, about 12% of the 296 planes taking part in the
operations were lost because they had to fly 1,600 km out and the
same distance back over heavily defended enemy territory (112 out
of 637 Polish and 133 out of 735 British and South African airman
were shot down).[93]
Most of the drops were made during night, at no more than 100–300
feet altitude, and poor accuracy left many parachuted packages
stranded behind German-controlled territory (only about 50 tons of
supplies, less than 50% delivered, was recovered by the
insurgents).[89]

Soviet
stance

“

Fight The Germans!
No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which is soon
to bring her liberation. [...] The Polish Army now entering Polish
territory, trained in the Soviet Union, is now joined to the
People's Army to form the Corps of the Polish Armed Forces, the
armed arm of our nation in its struggle for independence. Its ranks
will be joined tomorrow by the sons of Warsaw. They will all
together, with the Allied Army pursue the enemy westwards, wipe out
the Hitlerite vermin from Polish land and strike a mortal blow at
the beast of Prussian Imperialism.

Soviet advances from 1 August 1943 to 31 December 1944: to 1 December 1943 to 30 April 1944 to 19 August 1944 to 31 December
1944

The role of the Red Army during the Warsaw Uprising remains
controversial and is still disputed by historians.[23]
The Uprising started when the Red Army appeared on the city's
doorstep, and the Poles in Warsaw were counting on Soviet aid
coming in a matter of days. This basic scenario of an uprising
against the Germans launched a few days before the arrival of
Allied forces played out successfully in a number of European
capitals, notably Paris[103] and
Prague.
However, despite retaining positions south-east of Warsaw barely 10
km from the city center for about 40 days, the Soviets did not
extend effective aid to the desperate city. The sector was held by
the understrength German
73rd Infantry Division, destroyed many times on the Eastern
Front and recently reconstituted.[104] The
division, though weak, did not experience significant Soviet
pressure during that period. The Red Army was fighting intense
battles to the south of Warsaw, to seize and maintain bridgeheads
over the Vistula river, and to the north, to gain bridgeheads over
the river Narew. The best German armored divisions were fighting on
those sectors. Despite that, both of these objectives had been
mostly secured by early September. The Soviet 47th army did not
move into Praga, on the right
bank of the Vistula, until the 11th of September. In three days the
Soviets gained control of the suburb, a few hundred meters from the
main battle on the other side of the river, as the resistance by
the German 73rd division collapsed quickly. If the Soviets had
reached this stage in early August, the crossing of the river would
have been easier, as the Poles then held considerable stretches of
the riverfront. However, by mid-September a series of German
attacks had reduced the Poles to holding one narrow stretch of the
riverbank, in the district of Czerniaków. The Poles were counting on the
Soviet forces to cross to the left bank where the main battle of
the uprising was occurring. Though Berling's 1st Polish army did
cross the river, their support from the Soviets was inadequate and
the main Soviet force did not follow them.[105]

One of the reasons given for the failure of the uprising was the
reluctance of the Soviet Red Army to help the Resistance. On 1
August, only several hours prior to the outbreak of the uprising,
the Soviet advance was halted by a direct order from the
Kremlin.[106]
Soon afterwards the Soviet tank units stopped receiving any oil
from their depots.[106]
By then the Soviets knew of the planned outbreak from their agents
in Warsaw and, more importantly, from the Polish prime minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who
informed them of the Polish plans a few hours before.[106][107] The
Red Army's order to halt just a short distance away on the right
bank of the Vistula, and not to link up with or in any way assist
the Resistance forces, is blamed on post-war political
considerations and malice by Stalin.[10]
According to this opinion, by ordering his forces to halt before
entering the city, Stalin ensured that the Home Army would not
succeed. Had the Home Army triumphed, the Polish
government-in-exile would have increased their political and moral
legitimacy to reinstate a government of its own, rather than accept
a Soviet regime. The destruction of Polish resistance guaranteed
that they could not resist Soviet occupation, that it would be the
Soviets who "liberated" Warsaw, and that Soviet influence would
prevail over Poland.[10]
At times during the uprising the NKVD actively arrested Home Army forces in the
East of Warsaw and a large proportion of RAF losses were caused by
Soviet anti-aircraft fire. This appears to strengthen the claim
that the Western Allies were deliberately blocked from providing
support to the Poles so that any independent-minded Polish forces
were destroyed before the arrival of Soviet troops.

Polish-controlled area after the fall of the Old Town, around 10
September

One way or the another, the presence of Soviet tanks in nearby
Wołomin 15 kilometers
to the east of Warsaw had sealed the decision of the Home Army
leaders to launch the uprising. However, as a result of the initial
battle of Radzymin in the
final days of July, these advance units of the Soviet 2nd Tank Army
were pushed out of Wołomin and back about 10 km.[108][109][110] On
9 August, Stalin informed Premier Mikołajczyk that the Soviets had
originally planned to be in Warsaw by 6 August, but a
counter-attack by four Panzer divisions had thwarted their attempts
to reach the city.[111] By
10 August, the Germans had enveloped and inflicted heavy casualties
on the Soviet 2nd Tank Army at Wołomin.[23]
When Stalin and Churchill met face-to-face in October 1944, Stalin
told Churchill that the lack of Soviet support was a direct result
of a major reverse in the Vistula sector in August, which had to be
kept secret for strategic reasons.[112] All
contemporary German sources assumed that the Soviets were trying to
link up with the insurgents, and they believed it was their defense
that prevented the Soviet advance rather than a reluctance to
advance on the part of the Soviets.[113]
Nevertheless, as part of their strategy the Germans published
propaganda accusing both the British and Soviets of abandoning the
Poles.[114]

Picture of the Uprising taken from the opposite side of the Vistula river. Kierbedź Bridge
viewed from Praga district towards Royal castle and burning Old
Town.

The Soviet units which reached the outskirts of Warsaw in the
final days of July 1944 had advanced from the 1st
Belorussian Front in Western Ukraine as part of the Lublin-Brest Offensive Operation, between
the Lvov-Sandomierz Operation on its left and
Operation Bagration on its
right.[23]
These two flanking operations were colossal defeats for the German
army and completely destroyed a large number of German
formations.[23]
As a consequence, the Germans at this time were desperately trying
to put together a new force to hold the line of the Vistula, the
last major river barrier between the Red Army and Germany proper,
rushing in units in various stages of readiness from all over
Europe. These included many infantry units of poor quality,[115]
and 4–5 high quality Panzer Divisions in the 39th Panzer Corps and
4th SS Panzer Corps[23]
pulled from their refits.[115]

Other possible explanations for Soviet conduct are possible. The
Red Army geared for a major thrust into the Balkans through Romania
in mid-August and a large proportion of Soviet resources was sent
in that direction, while the offensive in Poland was put on
hold.[116]
Stalin had made a strategic decision to concentrate on occupying
Eastern Europe, rather than on making a thrust toward Germany.[117] The
capture of Warsaw was not essential for the Soviets, as they had
already seized a series of convenient bridgeheads to the south of
Warsaw, and were concentrating on defending them against vigorous
German counterattacks.[23]
Finally, the Soviet High Command may not have developed a coherent
or appropriate strategy with regard to Warsaw because they were
badly misinformed.[118]
Propaganda from the Polish Committee of
National Liberation minimized the strength of the Home Army and
portrayed them as Nazi sympathizers.[119]
Information submitted to Stalin by intelligence operatives or
gathered from the frontline was often inaccurate or omitted key
details.[120]
Possibly because the operatives were unable, as part of a
repressive totalitarian regime, to express opinions or report facts
which diverged from the party line, they "deliberately resorted to
writing nonsense".[121]

According to David
Glantz, the Red Army was simply unable to extend effective
support to the uprising, which began too early, regardless of
Stalin's political intentions.[23]
German military capabilities in August—early September were
sufficient to halt any Soviet assistance to the Poles in Warsaw,
were it intended.[23]
In addition, Glantz argued that the Warsaw would be a costly city
to clear it of Germans and unsuitable location as a start point for
subsequent Red Army offensives.[23]

Aftermath

Polish soldier surrenders to German troops 27 September 1944. For
many years it was thought that this soldier was actually saved as
Germans were mistaken for insurgents

By the first week of September both German and Polish commanders
realized that the Soviet army was unlikely to act to break the
stalemate. The Germans reasoned that a prolonged insurgency would
damage their ability to hold Warsaw as the frontline; the Poles
were concerned that continued resistance would result in further
massive casualties. On 7 September, General Rohr proposed
negotiations, which Bór-Komorowski agreed to pursue the following
day.[123]
Over the 8, 9 and 10 September about 20,000 civilians were
evacuated by agreement of both sides, and Rohr recognized the right
of Home Army insurgents to be treated as combatants.[124] The
Poles suspended talks on the 11th, as they received news that the
Soviets were advancing slowly through Praga.[125] A
few days later, the arrival of the 1st Polish army breathed new
life into the resistance and the talks collapsed.[126]

Warsaw Uprising surrender, 5 October 1944

However, by the morning of 27 September, the Germans had retaken
Mokotów.[127]
Talks restarted on 28 September.[128] In
the evening of 30 September, Żoliborz fell to the Germans.[129] The
Poles were being pushed back into fewer and fewer streets, and
their situation was ever more desperate.[130] On
the 30th, Hitler decorated von dem Bach, Dirlewanger and
Reinefarth, while in London General Sosnkowski was dismissed as
Polish commander-in-chief. Bór-Komorowski was promoted in his
place, even though he was trapped in Warsaw.[131]
Bór-Komorowski and Prime Minister Mikołajczyk again appealed
directly to Rokossovky and Stalin for a Soviet intervention.[132]
None came. According to Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who was by this time at
the Vistula front, both he and Rokossovsky advised Stalin against
an offensive because of heavy Soviet losses.[133]

German Brennkommando burn Warsaw.

The capitulation order of the remaining Polish forces was
finally signed on 2 October. All fighting ceased that evening.[45][134]
According to the agreement, the Wehrmacht promised to
treat Home Army soldiers in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and to treat the
civilian population humanely.[45]

The next day the Germans began to disarm the Home Army soldiers.
They later sent 15,000 of them to POW camps in various parts of
Germany. Between 5,000 and 6,000 insurgents decided to blend into
the civilian population hoping to continue the fight later. The
entire civilian population of Warsaw was expelled from the city and
sent to a transit camp Durchgangslager 121 in Pruszków.[135]
Out of 350,000–550,000 civilians who passed through the camp,
90,000 were sent to labour camps in the Third Reich, 60,000 were
shipped to death and concentration camps (including Ravensbruck, Auschwitz, and Mauthausen, among
others), while the rest were transported to various locations in
the General Government and released.[135]

The Eastern Front remained static in the Vistula sector, with
the Soviets making no attempt to push forward, until the Vistula-Oder Offensive began on 12 January
1945. Almost entirely destroyed, Warsaw was liberated from the
Germans on 17 January 1945 by the Red Army and the 1st Polish Army.[45]

Bank Polski in 2004, bearing the scars of the Uprising. The
lighter-colored bricks were added during the building's
reconstruction after 2003.

The destruction of the Polish capital was planned before the
start of World War II. On 20 June 1939 while Adolf Hitler was
visiting an architectural bureau in Würzburg am Main, his attention was captured
by a project of a future German town – "Neue deutsche Stadt
Warschau". According to the Pabst Plan Warsaw was to be turned into a
provincial German city. It was soon included as a part of the great
germanization plan of the East; the
genocidal Generalplan Ost. The failure of the
Warsaw Uprising provided an opportunity for Hitler to begin the
transformation.[136]

After the remaining population had been expelled, the Germans
continued the destruction of the city.[5]
Special groups of German engineers were dispatched to burn and
demolish the remaining buildings. According to German plans, after
the war Warsaw was to be turned into nothing more than a military
transit station,[64]
or even a lake.[137] The
demolition squads used flame-throwers and
explosives to methodically destroy house after house. They paid
special attention to historical monuments, Polish national archives
and places of interest.[138]

By January 1945 85% of the buildings were destroyed: 25% as a
result of the Uprising, 35% as a result of systematic German
actions after the uprising, and the rest as a result of the earlier
Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and the
September
1939 campaign.[5]
Material losses are estimated at 10,455 buildings, 923 historical
buildings (94%), 25 churches, 14 libraries including the National Library, 81 primary schools, 64
high schools, University of Warsaw and Warsaw University of
Technology, and most of the historical monuments.[5]
Almost a million inhabitants lost all of their possessions.[5]
The exact amount of losses of private and public property as well
as pieces of art, monuments of science and culture is unknown but
considered enormous. Studies done in the late 1940s estimated total
damage at about $30 billion US
dollars.[139] In
2004, President of WarsawLech
Kaczyński, now President of Poland, established a
historical commission to estimate material losses that were
inflicted upon the city by German authorities. The commission
estimated the losses as at least US$31.5 billion at 2004
values.[140]
Those estimates were later raised to US$45 billion 2004 US dollars
and in 2005, to $54.6 billion.[141]

Casualties

The exact number of casualties on both sides is unknown.
Estimates of casualties fall into roughly similar ranges. Polish
civilian deaths are estimated at between 150,000 and 200,000.[6]
Both Polish and German military personnel losses are estimated
separately at under 20,000.[5][142]

After the
war

Mały Powstaniec (The Little Insurgent), raised just
outside Warsaw's medieval city walls in 1981, commemorates the child soldiers that fought in the Warsaw
Uprising.

Due in part to the lack of Soviet cooperation, and often active
Soviet aggression, the Warsaw Uprising and Operation Tempest failed
in their primary goal: to free part of the Polish territories so
that a government loyal to the Polish government-in-exile could be
established there instead of a Soviet puppet state. There is no consensus among
historians as to whether that was ever possible, or whether those
operations had any other lasting effect.

Most soldiers of the Home Army (including those who took part in
the Warsaw Uprising) were persecuted after the war: captured by the
NKVD or UB political police. They were interrogated
and imprisoned on various, often absurd, charges like for example -
"fascism.[148][149]
Many of them were sent to Gulags, executed or "disappeared".[148]
Many insurgents, captured by the Germans and sent to POW camps in
Germany, were later liberated by British, American and Polish
forces and remained in the West. Among those were the leaders of
the uprising: Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski and Antoni
Chruściel. Polish émigrés and Home Army soldiers were shocked
when the Western Allies recognized the Soviet controlled
pro-Communist regime installed by Stalin.

Single grave of a victim of the fighting, intentionally left in
place on a Warsaw street

Graves of a Hungarian honvéd captain and 6
of his men who fell, fighting on the Polish side

The facts of the Warsaw Uprising were inconvenient to Stalin,
and were twisted by propaganda of the People's Republic of
Poland, which stressed the failings of the Home Army and the
Polish government-in-exile, and forbade all criticism of the Red
Army or the political goals of Soviet strategy.[150]
In the immediate post-war period, the very name of the Home Army
was censored, and most films and novels covering the 1944 Uprising
were either banned or modified so that the name of the Home Army
did not appear.[150]
From the 1950s on, Polish propaganda depicted the soldiers of the
Uprising as brave, but the officers as treacherous, reactionary and
characterized by disregard of the losses.[150][151] The
first publications on the topic taken seriously in the West were
not issued until the late 1980s. In Warsaw no monument to the Home
Army was built until 1989. Instead, efforts of the Soviet-backed People's Army were
glorified and exaggerated.

Warsaw monument to insurgents

By contrast, in the West the story of the Polish fight for
Warsaw was told as a tale of valiant heroes fighting against a
cruel and ruthless enemy. It was suggested that Stalin benefited
from Soviet non-involvement, as opposition to eventual Russian
control of Poland was effectively eliminated when the Nazis
destroyed the partisans.[152] The
belief that the Uprising failed because of deliberate
procrastination by the Soviet Union contributed to anti-Soviet
sentiment in Poland. Memories of the Uprising helped to inspire the
Polish labour movement Solidarity, which led a peaceful opposition
movement against the Communist government during the 1980s.[153]

Until the 1990s, historical analysis of the events remained
superficial because of official censorship and academic
disinterest.[154]
Research into the Warsaw Uprising was boosted by the fall of communism in 1989, due to the
abolition of censorship and increased access to state archives. As
of 2004, however, access to some material in British, Polish and
ex-Soviet archives was still restricted.[155]
Further complicating the matter is the British claim that the
records of the Polish government-in-exile were destroyed,[156] and
material not transferred to British authorities after the war was
burnt by the Poles in London in July 1945.[157][158]

Re-enactment of the Uprising on its 62nd Anniversary

In Poland, 1 August is now a celebrated anniversary. On 1 August
1994, Poland held a ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of
the Uprising to which both the German and Russian presidents were
invited.[159]
Though the German President Roman Herzog attended, the Russian
President Boris
Yeltsin declined the invitation; other notable guests included
the U.S. Vice President Al
Gore.[159][160]
Herzog, on behalf of Germany, was the first German statesman to
apologize for German atrocities committed against the Polish nation
during the Uprising.[160]
During the 60th anniversary of the Uprising in 2004, official
delegations included: German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder, UK deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and US Secretary of State
Colin Powell; Pope John Paul
II send a letter to the president of Warsaw, Lech
Kaczyński on this occasion.[161]
Russia once again did not send a representative.[161]
A day before, 31 July 2004, the Warsaw Uprising Museum opened in
Warsaw.[161]

Photograph
gallery

German guards next to a guardhouse and a bunker at the Puławska
Street gate to the base of air defence units (Flakkaserne) located
at the old Polish base between Puławska and Rakowiecka Streets.)
July 1944

German guards next to a guardhouse and a bunker at the Puławska
Street gate to the base of air defence units (Flakkaserne) located
at the old Polish base between Puławska and Rakowiecka Streets.)
July 1944

Aleje Szucha street with German bunker on the right side of the
street viewed from Unii Lubelskiej Square. Behind the barriers lies
German district sometimes called “German Ghetto”. July 1944

Aleje Szucha street with German bunker on the right side of the
street viewed from Unii Lubelskiej Square. Behind the barriers lies
German district sometimes called “German Ghetto”. July 1944

Guardhouse and a bunker at the gate to the Stauferkaserne base
at Rakowiecka 4 Street housing an SS battalion. View from
Rakowiecka street corner with Kazimierzowska street. July 1944

Month before Warsaw Uprising: Guardhouse and a bunker in front
of City Headquarters building at 4 Piłsudski Square in the back
townhouses along of Krakowskie Przedmieście street, from the left:
40 (fragment), 38 and 36 (ruins). July 1944

Bunker and gate of Abschnittwache Nord (so called Nordwache)
building at Żelazna 75a street behind barbed wire obstacles “Cheval
de fries” July 1944

German bunker on Kierbiedź Bridge.July 1944

German bunker in front of National Museum in Aleje
Jerozolimskie. July 1944

Bunker in front of gate to University of Warsaw converted to a
base for Wehrmacht viewed from Krakowskie Przedmieście Street. July
1944

Insurgents from "Chrobry I" Battalion in front of German police
station “Nordwache” at the junction of Chłodna and Żelazna Streets.
3 August 1944

Insurgents from Ruczaj Battalion after fight for Mała PASTa
building take pictures at the main entrance at Piusa 19 Street next
to a bunker. 24 August 1944

SS-GruppenführerHeinz Reinefarth "Butcher of Wola"
(left, in Cossack headgear) and the Regiment III of
Cossacks of Jakub Bondarenko during Warsaw Uprising around Wolska
street. Third Regiment of Cossacks contained mix of Cossacks from
many regions, and Jakub Bondarenko was commanding 5th Regiment of
Kuban Cossack Infantry

One of the German POW's from PAST-a building at Zielna 37
street, was SS-Sturmscharführer, who supposedly was terrorizing
other defenders 20 August 1944

German soldier killed by insurgents during attack on Mała PASTa.
23 August 1944

^
The exact number of Poles of Jewish ancestry and Jews to take part
in the uprising is a matter of controversy. General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski estimated
the number of Jewish Poles in Polish ranks at 1,000, other authors
place it at between several hundred and 2,000. See for example:
(Polish)Edward Kossoy. Żydzi w Powstaniu
Warszawskim. Task Force for International Cooperation on
Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research.

^ ab
German MIA were never declared dead and are
still considered missing 60 years after the battle. According to
various Polish historians (among them Col. Jerzy
Kirchmayer) the purpose of this policy is to lessen the total
casualty rate.