Authoritative source of information on Psychological Operations (PSYOP) or as it is now called Military Information Support Operations (MISO). Written by a retired senior Army Officer and former Honorary Colonel of the PSYOP Regiment.

Friday, August 28, 2015

National Military Strategy: Implications for MISO and Influence Operations

Those of us with military experience know that ‘stuff’ rolls
down hill and the impact of strategic documents is a good example. However, it
is often hard to figure out what the direct impacts will be – impacts to be
felt within the next couple of years.

The NMS mentions a number of nation states: Russia, China,
Iran, North Korea, etc. However, it is clear that the emphasis is on non-state
actors, especially Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO).

Here are a couple of quotes WRT VEO.

“But it (the NMS) also asserts
that the application of the military instrument of power against state threats
is very different than the application of military power against non-state
threats. We are more likely to face prolonged campaigns than conflicts that are
resolved quickly…that control of escalation is becoming more difficult and more
important…and that as a hedge against unpredictability with reduced resources,
we may have to adjust our global posture.”

“In this complex strategic
security environment, the U.S. military does not have the luxury of focusing on
one challenge to the exclusion of others. It must provide a full range of
military options for addressing both revisionist states and VEOs. Failure to do
so will result in greater risk to our country and the international order.”

“Violent Extremist
Organizations (VEOs) are taking advantage of
emergent technologies as well, using information tools to propagate destructive
ideologies, recruit and incite violence, and amplify the perceived power of
their movements. They advertise their actions to strike fear in opponents and
generate support for their causes.”

The NMS then goes on to
identify 3 National Military Objectives:

1. Deter,
deny, and defeat state adversaries.

2. Disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist
organizations.

3. Strengthen our global network of allies and partners.”

Accomplishing these objectives
will require a versatile, resilient and flexible force. From an influence
operations perspective, this means seamlessly reinforcing information
objectives across all forces and media. This implies that all of the services,
the PAO and others in the mix are all in synch and orchestrated to support the
CDR’s influence objectives.

The article quotes Cardon’s
simplistic vision: “Under
Cardon's vision, Signal Corps officers would manage communications systems,
public affairs staff would oversee information operations and develop social
media applications, and military intelligence units would collect and record
top-secret data for the Army Cyber Command.”

These
comments strike me as intelligence indicators that the responsibility for
directing and carrying out the influence war is murky at best. Anyone who has
ever worked with Public Affairs knows that they are very cautious about working
with other influence organizations for fear of ‘contaminating’ their position.

As the new leaders at the Joint
Chiefs level come into place and the Presidential election starts to come into
focus, we can only expect more turmoil and less continuity.