Abstract

Using the URL or DOI link below will
ensure access to this page indefinitely

Based on your IP address, your paper is being delivered by:

New York, USA

Processing request.

Illinois, USA

Processing request.

Brussels, Belgium

Processing request.

Seoul, Korea

Processing request.

California, USA

Processing request.

If you have any problems downloading this paper,please click on another Download Location above, or view our FAQFile name: SSRN-id2405233. ; Size: 1562K

You will receive a perfect bound, 8.5 x 11 inch, black and white printed copy of this PDF document with a glossy color cover. Currently shipping to U.S. addresses only. Your order will ship within 3 business days. For more details, view our FAQ.

Quantity:Total Price = $9.99 plus shipping (U.S. Only)

If you have any problems with this purchase, please contact us for assistance by email: Support@SSRN.com or by phone: 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 585 442 8170 outside of the United States. We are open Monday through Friday between the hours of 8:30AM and 6:00PM, United States Eastern.

“Market discipline” — the notion that short-term creditors can efficiently rein in bank risk — has been a central pillar of banking regulation since the late 1980s, both in the United States and abroad. While market discipline did not prevent the buildup of bank risk that caused the recent financial crisis, the conventional wisdom has been that this failure was due to an insufficiency of market discipline, rather than any problems with the concept itself. As a result, policy makers have increased regulatory reliance on market discipline, making this a central part of their reform efforts. This Article challenges the prevailing wisdom and makes two significant contributions to the literature. First, I demonstrate that market discipline failed more severely and completely than has previously been acknowledged, as it did not even identify rising bank risk until after the financial crisis had already begun. Second, I explain the causes of this failure. Market discipline conflates two distinct types of bank-issued securities — investment securities and money instruments — and therefore errs in two critical ways. Market discipline relies too heavily upon investors in money instruments, who are relatively insensitive to risk and thus particularly poor monitors of banks. And market discipline ignores the effects of bank shareholders, who are highly risk-sensitive but may have incentives adverse to those of public policy. Despite these enormous flaws, market discipline continues to be a major point of emphasis among bank regulators and policy makers, increasing the risk that regulators may again be blindsided by another financial crisis.

Date posted: March 5, 2014
; Last revised: March 23, 2014

Suggested Citation

Min, David, Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline (March 3, 2014). Washington University Law Review, Vol. 92, 2014; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2014-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2403988

Contact Information

David Min (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email ) ( email ) ( email )

535A AdministrationIrvine, CA 92697-1000United States

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email ) ( email ) ( email )

535A AdministrationIrvine, CA 92697-1000United States

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email ) ( email ) ( email )

535A AdministrationIrvine, CA 92697-1000United States

Feedback to SSRN

Feedback (Required)

1,000 character maximum

Email Address (Required)

If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 585 442 8170 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.