There's a good deal of paranoia in Syria these days, much of it justified.

The verbal attacks from Washington look and sound like a fulfilment of the plan set out by Richard Perle and others seven years ago.

In 1996 Mr Perle - who went on to become a Pentagon adviser and one of the main architects of war with Iraq - was chief author of a paper entitled Clean Break, which proposed ways of reshaping the Middle East to Israel's advantage.

"This effort," the paper said, "can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq - an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right - as a means of foiling Syria's regional ambitions".

In Mr Perle's paper, once the Iraqi regime had gone, the "rolling back" of Syria would begin. hence the fears in Damascus.

To the recent US accusations of harbouring members of the Iraqi regime, of possessing chemical weapons, of supplying Iraq with military equipment (albeit in very limited quantities), and of allowing Arab volunteers across the border to resist the American-led invasion, Syria has responded in its usual knee-jerk way: with denials and obfuscation.

Some of the charges laid against Syria are almost certainly exaggerated but others appear to contain at least a grain of truth.

The denials from Damascus are of little help to countries such as Britain which dislike the American eagerness to move beyond Iraq and would much prefer to tread softly where Syria is concerned.

But Syria's behaviour is all too reminiscent of Arthur Scargill, the British miners' leader of the 1980s who may have had a valid point but ended up getting clobbered nevertheless.

In the same way Syria, unfortunately, is playing directly into the hands of American neo-conservatives.

According to diplomatic sources, the onslaught from Washington is by no means over, and the US is now threatening to expose key business figures in Syria over military sales to Saddam's regime.

The American move could plunge Syria into political turmoil because those involved are closely linked to the country's "old guard" - senior members of the regime who retained power after the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, succeeded his father almost three years ago.

This means that when the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, visits Syria shortly, 37-year-old Assad will be confronted with a stark choice: either to purge the old guard or face renewed American wrath.

Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair, who has good relations with Mr Assad, is understood to have warned him in a recent telephone call of what is in store.

Following the fall of Saddam, the Americans are hopeful of finding documents in Baghdad that will incriminate Syrian companies, though they may already have specific evidence in the case of the night-vision goggles that the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, has alleged were supplied from Syria to Iraq.

Normally, of course, misdemeanours by private companies are not the same as misdemeanours by government. But in Syria it's often difficult to separate the two: relatives of prominent regime members have long taken advantage of their political and military ties to further their business interests.

Despite the president's apparent eagerness for reform, the old guard are still firmly entrenched. Attempting to dislodge them could put his own position at risk.

According to one story circulating in Damascus, Iraq previously sent some chemical weapons to Syria for safekeeping without Mr Assad's knowledge, and when the president found out he said "get rid of them at once!".

The story may be untrue but its currency illustrates a widespread belief that the president does not have full control, mainly because of the way he came to power.

The late president, Hafez al-Assad, was still preparing the succession for his son when he died. Some long-serving members of the regime had been cleared out - partly as a result of an anti-corruption drive - and replaced with Bashar loyalists.

Plans were afoot to ease Bashar into the post of vice-president but Hafez's sudden death on June 10 2000, technically left the vice-president, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, as acting head of state.

In the confusion that followed, the defence minister, Mustafa Tlass, came to Bashar's rescue and summoned a meeting of the main figures in the old guard.

They were persuaded to support Bashar for the presidency but, in return, Bashar was to halt his anti-corruption drive and spare the old guard's business interests.

Mr Khaddam, meanwhile, was pressured into legitimising Bashar's succession, with the vague promise that his political future would be guaranteed.

Using his powers as acting president, he issued two decrees, one promoting Bashar from colonel to lieutenant general, and the other naming him commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Most importantly, he signed a constitutional amendment lowering the minimum age for the presidency to 34 years - since Bashar would otherwise have been too young to succeed.

The crucial role played by Mr Khaddam and Mr Tlass at this critical moment means that Bashar owes now his position to them and ousting them to please the Americans will not be easy.

On his visit to Damascus, Mr Powell is also expected to step up the pressure on Syria over its military involvement in neighbouring Lebanon and its support for the Lebanese Hizbullah movement.

For the first time, Mr Powell recently referred to the Syrian troops in Lebanon as "occupation forces". They entered the country to help end the civil war and are still there, but their numbers have been reduced.

Officially, they are in Lebanon at the invitation of the Lebanese government - though at the time it had little choice but to invite them.

Until now, the most vocal opposition to the Syrian presence has come from Israel and right-wing Lebanese Christians. Official American talk of a Syrian occupation is new, and it may be intended to counter what Syria regards as the American occupation of Iraq.

American pressure on Syria over its backing for Hizbullah, and other groups regarded by the US as terrorists, is likely to meet even greater resistance in Damascus. They are, after all, Syria's main bargaining chip for securing an eventual Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

In public at least, much of the pressure is dismissed in Damascus as bluster inspired by Israel and the American right. But deep down it looks increasingly messy. Syria would be well advised to work out a new survival strategy sharpish.