Missile Defense Scores a Hit

About the Author

Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security PolicyDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

It went underreported in the news, but two weeks ago U.S.
intelligence sources confirmed that North Korea is preparing a
late-summer launch of its Taepo Dong 2 missile, an ICBM capable of
reaching Alaska or Hawaii. This will make North Korea, an unstable
regime long hostile toward the United States, one of only a few
countries able to strike U.S. soil with long-range missiles. The
question is: What can the United States do about it?

A partial answer came on June 10 when, over the early morning
skies of New Mexico, the Army's new anti-missile system
successfully intercepted a target ballistic missile launched 120
miles away. Without using an explosive warhead, the interceptor
destroyed the incoming missile by crashing into it-a very difficult
feat-at an altitude of almost 60 miles.

The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is designed to
defeat intermediate-range missiles and, as such, will not be able
to stop North Korea's Taepo Dong 2. But it proves that
"hit-to-kill" technology can work-something critics of missile
defense have long denied. Indeed, as recently as three months ago,
during congressional debate over a bill committing the United
States to field a national missile defense, opponents refused to
admit it could be done. "Hit-to-kill technology is nowhere near
feasible," said Rep. Tammy Baldwin, D-Wisc., in a typical
dismissal.

The challenge now is to build an effective defense against
long-range missiles that builds on THAAD's success. This will
require much more development and testing, and much more support
from Congress and the administration. The fact that it took the
Army seven tests to score the first THAAD "hit" is not an argument
against missile defense but an argument for investing more in
anti-missile technologies.

Unfortunately, the United States cannot make progress as long as
the Clinton administration observes the restrictions of the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The recent decision by
President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin to revisit
the ABM Treaty is meaningless. As a matter of international law the
treaty is defunct since our signing partner, the Soviet Union,
ceased to exist in 1991. Misplaced devotion to the ABM Treaty
hampers the development, testing and deployment of certain kinds of
missile defenses, ensuring that any system will be less capable
than it otherwise could be.

Something must be done to free engineers and scientists from the
constraints imposed on them by the Administration and allow them to
create the most effective ballistic missile defense possible. As a
first step, the administration should remove barriers erected
during the president's first term that prevent the successful
testing of missile defenses such as the sea-borne Navy Theater Wide
(NTW) system.

The NTW system would use "hit-to-kill" technology similar to
that demonstrated in the THAAD test. The Administration's policy,
however, bars the testing of the NTW system against long-range
ballistic missiles, including North Korea's Taepo Dong and a new
class of missile China is now developing with stolen U.S. nuclear
and missile technology.

Congress should require that the NTW system be tested against
such longer-range missiles. To increase the likelihood of success,
Congress also should insist that the speed of the NTW's interceptor
not be slowed to meet the administration's restrictions and that
the NTW be allowed to use external sensor data, including data
provided by satellites.

Such a system, once fully tested, would deploy 650 interceptors
on 22 of the Navy's Aegis ships to defend U.S. territory against a
limited ballistic missile attack. Unlike the president's proposed
missile defense, which would consist of one or two ground-based
interceptor sites, a sea-based system would allows ships to patrol
off the coast of North Korea, China or other nations and destroy
missiles shortly after they leave the launch pad. This "ascent
phase" intercept ability is necessary to destroy a target missile
when it is easy to track and still traveling at a relatively slow
speed. It would also destroy the missile before it releases decoys
or "penetration aids."

No one denies that missile defense is difficult, but one of
America's strengths is that it does not hesitate to take on
technological challenges. Building a missile defense for America is
no more difficult-and just as important-as that other great
technological challenge of our age: putting a man on the moon.

Baker Spring is a senior defense policy analyst at The Heritage
Foundation (http://www.heritage.org), a
Washington-based public policy research institute.

About the Author

Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security PolicyDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy