Casting the Die

Von Braun's pronouncement in favor of lunar-orbit rendezvous, thus
aligning his center with Gilruth's in Houston, signaled the accord that
Holmes and Shea had so meticulously cultivated. Von Braun's conversion
brought the two centers closer together, paving the way for effective
cooperation. "It was a major element in the consolidation of
NASA," Shea said.77

Thereafter, ratification of the mode question - the formal
decision-making process and review by top management - followed almost
as a matter of course. The Office of Systems began compiling information
from the field center studies, adding the result of its own mode
investigations. Shea and his staff also listened to briefings from
several aerospace companies who had studied lunar rendezvous and the
mission operations and hardware requirements for that approach. These
firms, among them Douglas and a team from Grumman and RCA, believed that
such work might enhance their chances of securing the additional
hardware contracts that would follow a shift to lunar rendezvous.78

Shea's staff then compared the contending modes and prepared cost and
schedule estimates for each. It appeared that lunar-orbit rendezvous
should cost almost $1.5 billion less than either earth-orbit rendezvous
or direct flight ($9.2 billion versus $10.6 billion) and would permit
lunar landings six to eight months sooner.79

The Office of Systems issued the final version of the mode comparison at
the end of July. This was the foundation upon which Holmes would defend
his choice. Comparison of the modes revealed no significant technical
problems; any of the modes could be developed with sufficient time and
money, as von Braun had said. But there was a definite preferential
ranking.

Lunar rendezvous, employing a single Saturn C-5, was the most
advantageous, since it also permitted the use of a separate craft
designed solely for the lunar landing. In contrast, earth rendezvous
with Saturn C-5s had the least assurance of mission success and the
greatest development complexity of all the modes. Direct flight with the
Nova afforded greater mission capability but demanded development of
launch vehicles far larger than the C-5. A scaled-down, two-man C-5
direct flight offered minimal performance margins and portended the
greatest problems with equipment accessibility and checkout. Therefore,
"the LOR mode is recommended as most suitable for the Manned Lunar
Landing Mission."80

On 22 June, Shea and Holmes had presented their findings to the
Management Council. After extended discussions, the council unanimously
agreed that lunar-orbit rendezvous was the best mode. To underscore the
solidarity within the manned space flight organization, all of the
members decided to attend when Administrator Webb was briefed on the
mode selection.81

First, however, Holmes and Shea informed Seamans of the decision.
"By then," the Associate Administrator recalled, "I was
thoroughly convinced myself, and everybody agreed on it." This was
a technical decision that, from a general management position, he had
refused to force upon the field organizations, even though he had long
thought that lunar rendezvous was preferable.82

On 28 June, Webb listened to the briefing and to the recommendations of
the Management Council. He agreed with what was said but wanted Dryden,
who was in the hospital, to take part in the final decision. That night,
Seamans, Holmes, and Shea called on Dryden in his sickroom. Dryden had
opposed lunar rendezvous because of the risks he believed it entailed,
but he, too, liked the unanimity within the council and within NASA and
gave lunar-orbit rendezvous his blessing.83

Major configuration changes in the Apollo spacecraft from May 1960
to July 1962. The inset reentry bodies illustrate shapes that received
the greatest amount of study.

Although acceptance of lunar rendezvous by the agency came before the
end of June 1962, it was not announced until the second week in July.
The delay was caused by outside pressure. PSAC, the President's Science
Advisory Committee, headed by Jerome Wiesner, had developed an interest
in NASA's launch vehicle planning and the mode selection for Apollo.
Wiesner had formed a special group, the Space Vehicle Panel, to keep an
eye on NASA's doings, and Nicholas Golovin, no longer with NASA, worked
closely with this panel. Wiesner had hired Golovin for PSAC because of
his familiarity with the internal workings of the agency and his
knowledge of the country's space programs, both military and civilian.
Golovin led a persistent and intensive review of Apollo planning that
caused considerable turmoil within the agency and forced it into an
almost interminable defense of its decision to use lunar rendezvous.
Concurrently with Shea's drive for field center agreement, the PSAC
panel was holding meetings in Huntsville and Houston, demanding that the
two centers justify their stand on lunar-orbit rendezvous. The panel
then insisted on meeting with Shea and his staff in Washington for
further discussions.84

In a memorandum on 10 July, approved by both Webb and Dryden, Seamans
officially informed Holmes that the decision on the Apollo mode had been
approved. The Rubicon was crossed; Apollo was to proceed with lunar
rendezvous. Immediate development of both the Saturn C-IB and a lunar
excursion vehicle was also approved. Seamans added that "studies
will be undertaken on an urgent basis" to determine the feasibility
of earth-orbit rendezvous using the C-5 and a two-man capsule, one
"designed, if possible, for direct ascent . . . as a backup
mode."85

NASA announced selection of the lunar-orbit-rendezvous landing
technique at an 11 July 1962 press conference. At the conference table,
left to right above, are NASA Administrator James E. Webb, Associate
Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Office of Manned Space Flight
Director D. Brainerd Holmes, and OMSF Director of Systems Joseph F.
Shea.

Webb, Seamans, Holmes, and Shea announced the selection of lunar-orbit
rendezvous for Apollo at a news conference on 11 July 1962. Webb,
perhaps as a concession to Wiesner, warned that the decision was still
only tentative; during the forthcoming months, he added, the agency
would solicit proposals for the lunar landing module from industry and
would study them carefully before making a final decision. In the
meantime, studies of other approaches would continue.

Holmes, however, struck a more definite note on the finality of the
decision. Anything so complex, so expensive, as Apollo had to be studied
at length, he said. "However, there is a balance between studying a
program . . . and finally implementing it. There comes a point in time,
and I think the point in time is now, when one must make a decision as
to how to proceed, at least as the prime mode."

Webb concluded the press briefing:

We have studied the various possibilities for the earliest,
safest mission . . . and have considered also the capability of these
various modes . . . for giving us an increased total space
capability.

We find that by adding one vehicle to those already under development,
namely, the lunar excursion vehicle, we have an excellent opportunity to
accomplish this mission with a shorter time span, with a saving of
money, and with equal safety to any other modes.86

Shea uses models to demonstrate how the lunar module would dock
with the command module.

Early the next morning, Holmes and Shea appeared before the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics to explain NASA's seemingly abrupt
abandonment of earth-orbit rendezvous. Holmes said, "It was quite
apparent last fall this mission mode really had not been studied in
enough depth to commit the tremendous resources involved, financial and
technical, for the periods involved, without making . . . detailed
system engineering studies to a much greater extent than had been
possible previously." Nor had there been any agreement within the
agency on any approach; "further study was necessary for that
reason," as well. But investigations could go on forever, he added,
and "at some point one must make a decision and say now we go. It
has been really impossible for us to truly program manage [Apollo] until
this primary mode decision had been made." Although several modes
were workable, lunar-orbit rendezvous was "the most favorable one
for us to undertake today." Equally important was the new rapport
that had been achieved within the manned space flight organization
"to get the whole team pulling together."87

"Essentially," Holmes told an American Rocket Society audience
a week later, "we have now 'lifted off' and are on our way."88 But the PSAC challenge to NASA's choice
still had to be dealt with before the decision became irreversible.
While fending off this outside pressure, NASA had to keep North American
moving on the command and service modules, watch MIT's work on the
navigation and guidance system, and find a contractor for the lunar
landing module.

85. Seamans to Dir., OMSF,
"Recommendations of the Office of Manned Space Flight and the
Management Council concerning the prime mission mode for manned lunar
exploration," 10 July 1962. Gilruth wanted the Saturn C-1B
(consisting of the C-1 booster and the S-IVB stage) for development
testing and qualification of the command and service modules. The C-1
did not have the capability, and the C-V would be too expensive for such
a mission. Frick to NASA Hq., Attn.: Holmes, "Recommendation that
the S-IVB stage be phased into the C-1 program for Apollo earth orbital
missions," 23 Feb. 1962; Gilruth to von Braun, "Saturn C-1B
Launch Vehicle," 5 July 1962.