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January 2017 book: Demons & Dragons - The New Geopolitics of Terror (Routledge)

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Thursday, 25 May 2017

President Trump, the DIP, and NATO BS

Bratislava, Slovakia. 25
May. I have just arrived from Brussels at the superb GLOBSEC conference here in
Bratislava. Back in Brussels President Trump is about to speak BS
(burden-sharing) over dinner to other NATO leaders. He needs to. A slithering
sound can be heard in Brussels these days. It is the sound of several NATO nations
sliding out of the so-called Defence Investment Pledge or DIP. What would be an
acceptable burden-sharing ratio for the Americans, and how much will the
European Allies likely stump up?

In an ‘ideal’ world the
Americans would want their European Allies to field forces that could match at
least 50% of US military capability. After all, NATO is part of both European
and world security which is ‘guaranteed’ by the sole superpower – the US. It is a
vital European interest to keep the US strong where it needs to be. And yet, whilst the Americans today provide 68.8% of
all NATO-assigned forces, the US GDP represents only 48% of the NATO GDP total. Political
realism suggests that it will be a push for Europeans to provide even 50% of
the US forces that are committed solely to the Alliance.

NATO officials make much
these days of the Defence Investment Pledge of at least 2% GDP to be spent on
defence by 2024, of which 20% should be spent on the acquisition of new
equipment. This benchmark is important for the Alliance. Indeed, if Europeans
met the ‘DIP’ it would mean an extra $100bn each year for NATO. On
Dutch TV this week, the Belgian Defence Minister said that under no
circumstances could he envisage Belgium spending 2% GDP on defence. Which
raises a further point; are any of the commitments made by NATO’s Allies worth
the price of the pigment they are no doubt written on?

‘The Meeting’, as today’s mini-summit is
euphemistically called by senior NATO officials, follows hard on yesterday’s
publication of the new US defence budget, which saw big hikes in some future critical areas,
such as cyber. The US defence budget sends two messages to Europeans. First, the
US will continue to fund the defence of Europe for the time-being at least. Second,
the future US force envisaged could soon be too technologically-advanced for
many European armed forces to work with, particularly at the high-end of the
conflict spectrum. ‘The Meeting’ also follows hard on the Manchester atrocity,
something British Prime Minister May will drive home, no doubt in tandem with
President Trump (but only after giving Trump a firm wigging about Washington
leaking British intelligence to the American press). Expect NATO to at least promise
to expand its role in counter-terrorism, and become a formal member of the Global Coalition against ISIL.

President Trump will
drive particularly hard on what I call NATO’s 3Cs – cash, capabilities, and contributions. And,
no doubt, those many Europeans not spending enough on defence will seek to reassure
him by suggesting the lack of cash does not imply a paucity of contribution. After
all, the defence budgets of most European Allies have at least stopped falling,
and some even show modest signs of modest increases. To use a technical term well known to Yorkshire diplomacy, this is bollocks!

The spending devil
will, as ever, be in the NATO detail. NATO is an institution that is ruled by consensus which
means for political reasons no Ally can be seen to fail to meet its
commitments. This supreme NATO political rule is reinforced by the nature of both the
3Cs and the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Improvements to the NDPP have
indeed been made, and the system is far more rigorous that it once was when
European defence spending commitments were in fact great works of European
fiction. However, there are still times when a better acronym for the NDPP
would be FUDGE.

Yes, the Allies will
today agree to provide annual national reports to demonstrate their progress
towards the 2%/20% targets. And yes, those that fail will receive damning
reports on their performance, or rather lack of it, that it is hoped will shame
them into action. However, in my experience European politicians can cope with
an awful lot of shame within NATO, if they believe paying for social welfare
instead of defence will get them re-elected at home.

The European Allies should be under no illusion; business as free-riding usual is simply no longer possible for the Americans. Burden-sharing is not
simply about cash, capabilities and commitments. It is also about sharing the
benefits of Alliance. Last month I was in the White House where I spoke to a
senior member of the Administration. During that trip I also spoke with senior
Democrats. In other
words, Europeans, no more benefits without more defence.

European
leaders must not for a moment believe that if they can outlast President Trump
Europe can somehow return to Sleepy Hollow and the Americans will continue to
defend them. Times really are a-changing and an over-stretched US vitally needs
strong Allies, and the Allies vitally need a strong US. Even the ‘2%’ target is something of an anomaly. By
setting such an arbitrary target many Europeans have in effect stopped
analysing the threats against which they must defend, setting the priorities they
must keep, and making the hard choices strategic judgement demands of them.

My fear is that Trump will not be the only one
speaking BS in Brussels today! Tweet anyone?

About Me

Julian Lindley-French is Vice-President, Atlantic Treaty Association, Senior Fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, Director of Europa Analytica & Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington DC. An internationally-recognised strategic analyst, advisor and author he was formerly Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy,and Special Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden. He is a Fellow of Respublica in London, and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington.
Latest books: The Oxford Handbook on War 2014 (Paperback) (2014; 709 pages). (Oxford: Oxford University Press) & "Little Britain? Twenty-First Strategy for a Middling European Power". (www.amazon.com)
The Friendly-Clinch Health Warning: The views contained herein are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution.