Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 29, 1939.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): Since the
House met on Thursday last there has been little change in
the main features of the situation. The catastrophe, as I
said then, is not

* No. 75.

170 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

yet on us, but I cannot say that the danger of it has yet
in any way receded. In these circumstances it might perhaps
have seemed that it was unnecessary to ask the House to meet
again before the date which had been fixed, but in times like
these we have felt that it was right that the House should be
kept as far as possible continuously informed of all the
developments in the situation as they took place. That will
continue to be the principle which will guide us in further
meetings of this House.

There is one thing that I would like to say at this
moment with regard to the press. I think it is necessary once
more to urge the press to exercise the utmost restraint at a
time when it is quite possible for a few thoughtless words in
a paper, perhaps not of particular importance, to wreck the
whole of the efforts which are being made by the Government
to obtain a satisfactory solution. I have heard that an
account purporting to be a verbatim description of the
communication of the British Government to Herr Hitler was
telegraphed to another country last night or this morning.
Such an account could only be an invention from beginning to
end. It is, I think, very unfortunate that journalists in the
exercise of their profession should take such
responsibilities upon themselves, responsibilities which
affect not only themselves, but the inhabitants, perhaps, of
all the countries in the world.

I hope that it will not be necessary this afternoon to
have any long Debate. I will attempt to give the House an
account of the events of the last few days, but, of course,
there has been no change in the policy of the Government,
and, therefore, there would not appear to be any necessity
for any lengthy discussion. On the day after the House
adjourned-on Friday, that is-we received information in the
course of the morning that the German Chancellor had asked
the British Ambassador in Berlin to call upon him at
half-past one that day, and in the course of the afternoon we
were told by telephone that Sir Nevile Henderson had had an
interview lasting about an hour and a half with Herr Hitler,
that he was sending us an account of that interview, and that
Herr Hitler had suggested to him that it would be a good
thing if he were to fly over to this country the next morning
in order to give us a verbal and more extended account of the
conversation. We received the record of the interview from
our

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 171

Ambassador on that evening, on Friday evening, but it was
not completely deciphered until after midnight, and I did not
myself see the whole of it until the next morning, Saturday
morning. On Saturday Sir Nevile Henderson arrived by plane
from Berlin shortly before lunch, and we understood from him
that in Berlin it was not considered to be necessary that he
should go back the same day, as the German Government were
very anxious that we should give careful study to the
communication he had to make to us. Accordingly, we devoted
the whole of Saturday and the Sunday morning to a very
careful, exhaustive and thorough consideration of the
document which was brought to us by the British Ambassador
and of the reply that we proposed to send back, and our final
answer was taken by the Ambassador yesterday afternoon, when
he flew back to Berlin and delivered it to the Chancellor
last night.

I should be glad if I could disclose to the House the
fullest information as to the contents of the communications
exchanged with Herr Hitler, but hon. members will understand
that in a situation of such extreme delicacy, and when issues
so grave hang precariously in the balance, it is not in the
public interest to publish these confidential communications
or to comment on them in detail at this stage. I am, however,
able to indicate in quite general terms some of the main
points with which they deal. Herr Hitler was concerned to
impress upon His Majesty's Government his wish for an
Anglo-German understanding of a complete and lasting
character. On the other hand, he left His Majesty's
Government in no doubt of his views as to the urgency of
settling the German-Polish question. His Majesty's Government
have also frequently expressed their desire to see the
realisation of such an Anglo-German understanding, and as
soon as circumstances permit they would naturally welcome an
opportunity of discussing with Germany the several issues a
settlement of which would have to find a place in any
permanent agreement. But everything turns upon the manner in
which the immediate differences between Germany and Poland
can be handled and the nature of the proposals which might be
made for any settlement. We have made it plain that our
obligations to Poland, cast into formal shape by the
agreement which was signed on 25th August, on Friday last,
will be carried out. The House will remember

172 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

that the Government have said more than once, publicly,
that the German-Polish differences should be capable of
solution by peaceful means.

Meanwhile, the first prerequisite, if there is to be any
general and useful discussion, is that the tension created by
frontier clashes and by reports of incidents on both sides of
the border should be diminished. His Majesty's Government
accordingly hope that both Governments will use their best
endeavours to prevent the occurrence of such incidents, the
circulation of exaggerated reports, and all other activities
that result in dangerous inflammation of opinion. His
Majesty's Government would hope that if an equitable
settlement of Polish-German differences could be reached by
free negotiation, this might in turn lead on to a wider
agreement which would accrue to the lasting benefit of Europe
and of the world at large. At this moment the position is
that we are waiting for the reply of Herr Hitler to our
communication. On the nature of that reply depends whether
further time can be given for the exploration of the
situation and for the operation of the many forces which are
working for peace. A waiting period of that kind is often
very trying, but nothing, I think, can be more remarkable
than the calm which characterises the attitude of the whole
British people. It seems to me that there are two
explanations of that attitude. The first is that none of us
has any doubt of where our duty lies. There is no difference
of opinion among us; there is no weakening of our
determination. The second explanation is our confidence that
we are ready for any eventuality.

The House might like to hear one or two particulars of
the preparations which have been made. Obviously, there are
many things which I cannot very well say here because they
could not be confined to those whom I see before me. My
statement must, therefore, be in very general terms. Some of
the measures which we had to take, such as those in connexion
with requisitioning, necessarily must cause some degree of
inconvenience to the public. I am confident that the people
of the country generally recognise that the nation's needs
must now be paramount and that they will submit willingly,
and even cheerfully, to any inconvenience or hardships that
may be involved. At any rate, we have not had to begin here
by issuing rationing cards. To deal

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 173

first with the active defence of the country, the air
defence of Great Britain has been placed in a state of
instant readiness. The ground anti-aircraft defences have
been deployed and they are manned by territorial
anti-aircraft units. The regular squadrons of the Royal Air
Force have been brought up to war strength by the addition of
the necessary reservists, including a portion of the
Volunteer Reserve. The fighter and general reconnaissance
squadrons of the Auxiliary Air Force have been called up and
are standing ready and the balloon barrage is in position.
The Observer Corps are at their posts, and, indeed, the whole
warning system is ready night and day to be brought into
instant operation. The coast defences are ready and are
manned by the coast defence units of the Territorial Army.
Arrangements have also been made for the protection by the
National Defence companies, by the Militia and by units of
the Territorial Army of a very large number of important
points whose safety is essential for the national war
effort.

As to the Navy, the House will remember that in July last
it was announced that the Reserve Fleet would be called up at
the beginning of August in order to take part in combined
Fleet and Air exercises. For that purpose a number of
reservists were called up under the provisions of the
Reserves and Auxiliary Forces Act. As a result, the Navy was
in an advanced state of preparedness when the present crisis
arose, and the whole of our fighting Fleet is now ready at a
moment's notice to take up the dispositions which would be
necessary in war. A number of other measures have been taken
during the past week to increase the state of our naval
preparedness. I need not go into all the details, but the
naval officers in charge of the various commercial ports have
been appointed and have taken up their duties, and the naval
ports and bases have been put into an advanced state of
preparedness. As hon. members will be aware, the Admiralty
has also assumed control of merchant shipping, acting under
the powers conferred by the Emergency Powers Act, and written
instructions have already been issued to merchant shipping on
various routes. A considerable number of movements have been
carried out of units of the armed land forces both at home
and overseas. These movements are part of prearranged
plans to provide that in order to ensure a greater state
of readiness a

174 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

number of units should, if possible, move to their war
stations before the outbreak of war. The Civil Defence
regional organisation has been placed on war footing.
Regional commissioners and their staffs are at their war
stations.

The main responsibility for the organisation of Civil
Defence measures generally rests with the local authorities.
Instructions have been sent to the local authorities to
complete all the preparatory steps so that action can be
taken at the shortest notice. Plans for the evacuation of
school children, mothers with young children, expectant
mothers and blind persons from certain congested areas-plans
which have involved an immense amount of detailed
thinking-are ready. Those who have to carry out those plans
have been recalled for duty, school teachers in evacuation
areas have been kept in easy reach of school assembly points
since Saturday, and a rehearsal of the arrangements for
evacuating school children was carried out yesterday. Nearly
a week ago local authorities were warned to make arrangements
for the extinction of public lighting and to prepare the
necessary aids to movement when the lighting has been
extinguished. Arrangements have been completed for calling up
at very short notice of the personnel of the Air-Raid
Precautions Service, and duty officers are available
throughout the twenty-four hours at key posts. The last item
I mention is that the necessary preliminary steps have been
taken to prepare hospitals for the reception of
casualties.

I have given a number of instances of steps which have
been taken over and above the measures which have already
been put into operation. A complete and continuous survey is
being carried out over the whole range of our defence
preparations, and preparatory measures are being taken in
order to ensure that further precautionary measures, if and
when they should be found necessary, can be given effect to
as rapidly as possible. The instances I have given to the
House are merely illustrations of the general state of
readiness, of which the House and the country are aware. I
think that they justify and partly account for the general
absence of fear, or, indeed, of any violent emotion. The
British people are said sometimes to be slow to make up their
minds, but, having made them up, they do not readily let go.
The issue of peace or war is still undecided, and we still
will hope,

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 175

and still will work, for peace; but we will abate no jot
of our resolution to hold fast to the line which we have laid
down for ourselves.

Reply of the German Chancellor to the ommunication of August 28, 1939, from His Majesty's Government.* This reply was handed to Sir N. Henderson by Herr Hitler during the evening of August 29, 1939.

(Translation.)

THE British Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to the
British Government suggestions which I felt bound to make in
order-

(1) to give expression once more to the will of the Reich
Government for sincere Anglo-German understanding,
co-operation and friendship;

(2) to leave no room for doubt as to fact that such an
understanding could not be bought at the price of a
renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the
abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common
human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our
people.

The German Government have noted with satisfaction from
the reply of the British Government and from the oral
explanations given by the British Ambassador that the British
Government for their part are also prepared to improve the
relationship between Germany and England and to develop and
extend it in the sense of the German suggestion.

In this connexion, the British Government are similarly
convinced that the removal of the German-Polish tension,
which has become unbearable, is the pre-requisite for the
realisation of this hope.

Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last
occasion in March, 1939, there were submitted to the Polish
Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having
regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and
Poland, offered

* No. 74

176 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

the possibility of a solution of the questions in dispute
acceptable to both parties. The British Government are aware
that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, finally to
reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this
rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military
measures which have since been continuously intensified.
Already in the middle of last month Poland was in effect in a
state of mobilisation. This was accompanied by numerous
encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the
instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands in
the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were
addressed to that City. A closing of the frontiers, at first
in the form of a measure of customs policy but extended later
in a military sense affecting also traffic and
communications, was imposed with the object of bringing about
the political exhaustion and economic destruction of this
German community.

To this were added barbaric actions of maltreatment which
cry to Heaven, and other kinds of persecution of the large
German national group in Poland which extended even to the
killing of many resident Germans or to their forcible removal
under the most cruel conditions. This state of affairs is
unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced Germany,
after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her
turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding of
justified German interests. And indeed the German Government
can but assure the British Government in the most solemn
manner that a condition of affairs has now been reached which
can no longer be accepted or observed with indifference.

The demands of the German Government are in conformity
with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this
territory which has always been recognised as being
necessary: viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to
Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German
national group in the territories remaining to Poland.

The German Government note with satisfaction that the
British Government also are in principle convinced that some
solution must be found for the new situation which has
arisen.

They further feel justified in assuming that the British
Government too can have no doubt that it is a question now of
conditions, for the elimination of which there no longer
remain days,

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 177

still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the
disorganised state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the
possibility of incidents intervening, which it might be
impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be
reckoned with.

While the British Government may still believe that these
grave differences can be resolved by way of direct
negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no
longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have
made the attempt to embark on such peaceful negotiations,
but, instead of receiving any support from the Polish
Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of
measures of a military character in favour of the development
alluded to above.

The British Government attach importance to two
considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent
explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by
direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish
State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist,
should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and
political sphere by means of international guarantees.

On this subject the German Government makes the following
declaration:-

Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful
outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English
proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as
has already been emphasised, solely as the result of the
impression made upon them by the written statement received
from the British Government that they too desire a pact of
friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to
the British Ambassador.

The German Government desire in this way to give the
British Government and the British nation a proof of the
sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter into a lasting
friendship with Great Britain.

The Government of the Reich felt, however, bound to point
out to the British Government that in the event of a
territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be
able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate
in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated
therewith.

For the rest, in making these proposals the German
Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's
vital

178 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

interests or questioning the existence of an independent
Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these
circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer
of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a
Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival
of this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939.

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals
for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if
possible, place these at the disposal of the British
Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.

HERR HITLER handed me German reply at 7.15 this evening.
Translation of full text will follow as soon as possible.

2. In reply to two British proposals, namely, for direct
German-Polish negotiations and international guarantee of any
settlement, German Government declares:-

(1) That, in spite of its scepticism as to the prospect
of their success, it accepts direct negotiation solely out of
desire to ensure lasting friendship with Britain, and

(2) In the case of any modifications of territory German
Government cannot undertake or participate in any guarantees
without consulting the U.S.S.R.

3. Note observes that German proposals have never had for
their object any diminution of Polish vital interests, and
declares that German Government accepts mediation of Great
Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish
plenipotentiary. German Government, note adds, counts on
arrival of such plenipotentiary to-morrow, Wednesday, 30th
August.

4. I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum,
but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von
Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress
urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilised armies
were standing face to face.

5. I said that I would transmit this suggestion
immediately

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 179

to His Majesty's Government, and asked whether, if such
Polish plenipotentiary did come, we could assume that he
would be well received and that discussions would be
conducted on footing of complete equality. Herr Hitler's
reply was "of course."

6. German demands are declared to be revision of
Versailles Treaty; namely, return of Danzig and the Corridor
to Germany, security for lives of German national minorities
in the rest of Poland; note concludes with statement that the
German Government will immediately elaborate proposals for an
acceptable solution, and inform British Government, if
possible, before arrival of Polish plentipotentiary.

INTERVIEW this evening was of a stormy character and Herr
Hitler far less reasonable than yesterday. Press announcement
this evening that five more Germans had been killed in Poland
and news of Polish mobilisation had obviously excited
him.

2. He kept saying that he wanted British friendship more
than anything in the world, but he could not sacrifice
Germany's vital interests therefor, and that for His
Majesty's Government to make a bargain over such a matter was
an unendurable proposition. All my attempts to correct this
complete misrepresentation of the case did not seem to
impress him.

3. In reply to his reiterated statement that direct
negotiations with Poland, though accepted by him, would be
bound to fail, I told his Excellency that their success or
failure depended on his goodwill or the reverse, and that the
choice lay with him. It was, however, my bounden duty to
leave him in no doubt that an attempt to impose his will on
Poland by force would inevitably bring him into direct
conflict with us.

4. It would have been useless to talk of a truce, since
that can only depend on whether M. Beck or some other Polish
representative came to Berlin or not.

WE shall give careful consideration to German
Government's reply,* but it is, of course, unreasonable to
expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin
to-day, and German Government must not expect this.

It might be well for you at once to let this be known in
proper quarters through appropriate channels. We hope you may
receive our reply this afternoon.

YOUR message** was conveyed to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs at 4 a. m. this morning. I had made similar
observation to Herr Hitler yesterday evening, his reply being
that one could fly from Warsaw to Berlin in one and a half
hours.

2. I repeated the message this morning by telephone to
State Secretary, who said that it had already been conveyed
to Herr Hitler. He added that something must be done as soon
as possible.

3. While I still recommend that the Polish Government
should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct
contact with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the
world that they were prepared to make their own sacrifice for
preservation of peace, one can only conclude from the German
reply that Herr Hitler is determined to achieve his ends by
so-called peaceful fair means if he can, but by force if he
cannot. Much, of course, may also depend on detailed plan
referred to in the last paragraph of the German reply.

4. Nevertheless, if Herr Hitler is allowed to continue to
have the initiative, it seems to me that result can only be
either war or once again victory for him by a display of
force and encourage-

*No. 78.

**No. 81.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 181

ment thereby to pursue the same course again next year or
the year after.

I FEEL sure that it would be impossible to induce the
Polish Government to send M. Beck or any other representative
immediately to Berlin to discuss a settlement on basis
proposed by Herr Hitler. They would certainly sooner fight
and perish rather than submit to such humiliation, especially
after examples of Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania and Austria.

2. I would suggest that if negotiations are to be between
equals it is essential that they should take place in some
neutral country or even possibly Italy, and that the basis
for any negotiations should be some compromise between the
clearly defined limits of March proposals on the German side
and status quo on the Polish side.

3. Considering that the Polish Government, standing alone
and when they were largely unprepared for war, refused the
March terms it would surely be impossible for them to agree
to proposals which appear to go beyond the March terms now
that

* No. 78.

182 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

they have Great Britain as their ally, France has
confirmed her support and world public opinion is clearly in
favour of direct negotiations on equal terms and is behind
Poland's resistance to a dictated settlement.

4. I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish
Government, nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler's
reply * till I receive instructions which I trust will be
without delay.

ATMOSPHERE may be improved if strict instructions are
given or confirmed by Polish Government to all their military
and civil authorities:-

(1) Not to fire on fugitives or members of the German
minority who cause trouble, but to arrest them;

(2) To abstain themselves from personal violence to
members of German minority, and to prevent similar violence
on the part of the population;

(3) To allow members of the German minority wishing to
leave Poland to pass freely;

(4) To stop inflammatory radio propaganda.

Please inform M. Beck, adding that I realise that Herr
Hitler is using reports to justify immoderate action, but I
am anxious to deprive him of this pretext. I am requesting
German Government to reciprocate; and warning them that
Polish Government can only be expected to maintain such
instructions if no provocation is offered by members of the
German minority.

1. His Majesty's Government may rest absolutely assured
that Polish Government have no intention of provoking

* No. 78.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 183

any incidents. On the other hand, they point out that
German provocation at Danzig is becoming more and more
intolerable.

2. In connexion with proposed British answer to Herr
Hitler, Polish Government feels sure that His Majesty's
Government will not express any definite views on problems
concerning Poland without consulting Polish Government.

IN informing German Government of the renewed
representations which have been made in Warsaw, please make
it clear that Polish Government can only be expected to
maintain an attitude of complete restraint if German
Government reciprocate on their side of frontier and if no
provocation is offered by members of German minority in
Poland. Reports are current that Germans have committed acts
of sabotage which would justify the sternest measures.

WE understand that German Government are insisting that a
Polish representative with full powers must come to Berlin to
receive German proposals.

2. We cannot advise Polish Government to comply with this
procedure, which is wholly unreasonable.

3. Could you not suggest to German Government that they
adopt the normal procedure, when their proposals are ready,
of inviting Polish Ambassador to call and handing proposals
to him for transmission to Warsaw and inviting suggestions as
to conduct of negotiations.

4. German Government have been good enough to promise
they will communicate proposals also to His Majesty's
Govern-

184 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

ment. If latter think they offer reasonable basis they
can be counted on to do their best in Warsaw to facilitate
negotiations.

Reply of His Majesty's Government to the German Chancellor's Communication of August 29, 1939.* This reply was handed by Sir N. Henderson to Herr von Ribbentrop at Midnight on August 30, 1939.

His Majesty's Government appreciate the friendly
reference in the Declaration contained in the reply of the
German Government to the latter's desire for an Anglo-German
understanding and to their statement of the influence which
this consideration has exercised upon their policy.

2. His Majesty's Government repeat that they reciprocate
the German Government's desire for improved relations, but it
will be recognised that they could not sacrifice the
interests of other friends in order to obtain that
improvement. They fully understand that the German Government
cannot sacrifice Germany's vital interests, but the Polish
Government are in the same position and His Majesty's
Government believe that the vital interests of the two
countries are not incompatible.

3. His Majesty's Government note that the German
Government accept the British proposal and are prepared to
enter into direct discussions with the Polish Government.

4. His Majesty's Government understand that the German
Government accept in principle the condition that any
settlement should be made the subject of an international
guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this
guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His
Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the
German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the
assent of the U.S.S.R., whose participation in the Guarantee
His Majesty's Government have always assumed.

5. His Majesty's Government also note that the German
Government accept the position of the British Government as
to Poland's vital interests and independence.

6. His Majesty's Government must make an express
reservation in regard to the statement of the particular
demands put

* No. 78.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 185

forward by the German Government in an earlier passage in
their reply. They understand that the German Government are
drawing up proposals for a solution. No doubt these proposals
will be fully examined during the discussions. It can then be
determined how far they are compatible with the essential
conditions which His Majesty's Government have stated and
which in principle the German Government have expressed their
willingness to accept.

7. His Majesty's Government are at once informing the
Polish Government of the German Government's reply. The
method of contact and arrangements for discussions must
obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German and
Polish Governments, but in His Majesty's Government's view it
would be impracticable to establish contact so early as
to-day.

8. His Majesty's Government fully recognise the need for
speed in the initiation of discussion, and they share the
apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of
two mobilised armies standing face to face. They would
accordingly most strongly urge that both parties should
undertake that, during the negotiations, no aggressive
military movements will take place. His Majesty's Government
feel confident that they could obtain such an undertaking
from the Polish Government if the German Government would
give similar assurances.

9. Further, His Majesty's Government would suggest that a
temporary modus vivendi might be arranged for Danzig,
which might prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to
render German-Polish relations more difficult.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Sent to Sir H. Kennard on August 30 and acted on in the
early morning of August 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 30,
1939.

MY telegram to Berlin gives the text of the reply of His
Majesty's Government * to the German communication ** which
has been repeated to you.

2. Please communicate it to M. Beck. In doing so, you
should

*No. 89

**No. 78.

186 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

point out that, whilst the first part of the German
Government's reply consists of an indefensible and misleading
presentation of the German case, the really important part of
the reply consists of Germany's acceptance of the proposal
for direct discussion, of the suggestion of the proposed
international guarantee, and Germany's assertion that she
intends to respect Poland's vital interests.

3. It is perhaps unnecessary to take exception at this
stage to much that finds place in the German reply, of which
His Majesty's Government would be as critical as, they have
no doubt, would be the Polish Government, but His Majesty's
Government have made an express reservation in regard to
statement of the particular demands put forward in the German
note. The point that seemed to call for immediate comment was
the German demand that a Polish representative should present
himself at Berlin to-day. M. Beck will see the line we took
last night on this (see my telegram to Berlin *) and the
further reference we have made to point in our reply to
German Government's latest communication. German Government
are now drawing up proposals for a solution, and it will be
in the light of these, and of other developments, that the
decision as to future procedure, including place and
conditions of discussion, will have to be taken.

4. M. Beck will see from the reply of His Majesty's
Government that the proposal has been made for a military
standstill during discussions, to which His Majesty's
Government earnestly hope that the Polish Government will
have no objection.

5. His Majesty's Government would be glad to have the
views of the Polish Government urgently. In view of the fact
that the Polish Government have authorised His Majesty's
Government to say that they are prepared to enter into direct
discussions with the German Government, His Majesty's
Government hope that, provided method and general arrangement
for discussions can be satisfactorily agreed, Polish
Government will be prepared to do so without delay. We regard
it as most important from the point of view of the internal
situation in Germany and of world opinion that, so long as
the German Government profess themselves ready to negotiate,
no opportunity should be given them for placing the blame for
a conflict on Poland.

*No. 81.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 187

6. You should, of course, emphasise that His Majesty's
Government have made it quite clear to Herr Hitler that they
are irrevocably determined to implement their obligations
without reserve. On this point there is no misunderstanding
in Berlin. The position of the Polish Government is very
different from that which they occupied last March, since it
is now supported both by direct British guarantee and promise
of British participation in guarantee of any settlement
reached on bases we have indicated, and the conversations
would be carried on against this background.

I INFORMED Herr von Ribbentrop to-night of the advice
given to the Polish Government in your telegram of 30th
August to Warsaw.*

2. Practically his only comment was that all provocation
came from the side of Poland. I observed that His Majesty's
Government had constantly warned the Polish Government that
all provocative action should be vigorously discouraged and
that I had reason to believe that the German press accounts
were greatly exaggerated. Herr von Ribbentrop replied that
His Majesty's Government's advice had had cursed
("verflucht") little effect. I mildly retorted that
I was surprised to hear such language from a Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

I TOLD Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His
Majesty's Government found it difficult to advise Polish
Government to accept procedure adumbrated in German reply,
and suggested

*No. 85.

188 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that
when German proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador
to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his
Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations.
I added that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His
Majesty's Government could be counted upon to do their best
in Warsaw to temporize negotiations.

2. Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy
document which he read out in German aloud at top speed.
Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me I did not
attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or more articles
which it contained. Though I cannot therefore guarantee
accuracy the main points were: restoration of Danzig to
Germany; southern boundary of Corridor to be line
Marienwerder, Graudenz, Bromberg, Schönlanke; plebiscite
to be held in the Corridor on basis of population on 1st
January, 1919, absolute majority to decide; international
commission of British, French, Italian and Russian members to
police the Corridor and guarantee reciprocal communications
with Danzig and Gdynia pending result of the plebiscite;
Gydnia to be reserved to Poland; Danzig to be purely
commercial city and demilitarised.

3. When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these
proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply
of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish
representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

4. I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that
request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th
August constituted, in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he
and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied,
saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my
imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal
procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish
Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned
me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to
Polish Government? In the most violent terms Herr von
Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to
visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for
interview it might be different. I said that I would
naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said
while those were his personal views he would

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 189

bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler's notice. It was
for Chancellor to decide.

5. We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr
von Ribbentrop's whole demeanour during an unpleasant
interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed
incidentally against Polish mobilisation, but I retorted that
it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilised as
Herr Hitler himself had admitted to me yesterday.

I HAVE communicated to M. Beck the reply of His Majesty's
Government to Herr Hitler and made the comments therein in
the sense of your telegram of 30th August.* M. Beck stated
that before giving me a definite reply he would have to
consult his Government but he could tell me at once that he
would do everything possible to facilitate the efforts of His
Majesty's Government which he greatly appreciated. I think he
was greatly relieved to know that His Majesty's Government
had not in any way committed themselves as regards demands
put forward by German Government and he fully realised the
main importance which His Majesty's Government attaches to
the necessity for not giving the German Government any
opportunity for placing the blame on Poland in any refusal to
enter into direct negotiations.

2. He has promised me the considered reply of his
government by mid-day to-morrow.**

3. I took the opportunity of impressing upon him again
the necessity of avoiding any incidents in the meantime and
asked him whether any had recently occurred. He said he had
just heard that there had been a clash between German and
Polish military forces but as at present informed he did not
think it had amounted to more than an exchange of shots
without serious casualties.

You should concert with your French colleague in
suggesting to Polish Government that they should now make
known to the German Government, preferably direct, but if
not, through us, that they have been made aware of our last
reply to German Government and that they confirm their
acceptance of the principle of direct discussions.

French Government fear that German Government might take
advantage of silence on part of Polish Government.

Please at once inform Polish Government and advise them,
in view of fact that they have accepted principle of direct
discussions, immediately to instruct Polish Ambassador in
Berlin to say to German Government that, if latter have any
proposals, he is ready to transmit them to his Government so
that they may at once consider them and make suggestions for
early discussions.

M. Beck has just handed me in writing Polish reply to my
démarche last night***; translation is in my
immediately following telegram.# He particularly asked that
it should be treated as most confidential.

*No. 92.

**No. 93

***i.e., the night of August 30/31.

#No. 97.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 191

2. I asked M. Beck what steps he proposed to take in
order to establish contact with the German Government. He
said he would now instruct M. Lipski to seek an interview
either with the Minister for Foreign Affairs or State
Secretary in order to say Poland had accepted British
proposals. I urged him to do this without delay.

3. I then asked him what attitude Polish Ambassador would
adopt if Herr von Ribbentrop or whoever he saw handed him the
German proposals. He said that M. Lipski would not be
authorized to accept such a document as, in view of past
experience, it might be accompanied by some sort of
ultimatum. In his view it was essential that contact should
be made in the first instance, and that then details should
be discussed as to where, with whom, and on what basis
negotiations should be commenced.

4. As regards Danzig he pointed out that the situation
there was becoming extremely serious. Polish officials were
being arrested, railway traffic was suspended, and he thought
it essential that immediate steps should be taken to secure a
modus vivendi as a result of which those arrested
would be released and railway traffic would be resumed. He
suggested M. Burckhardt might be able to effect this.

5. He confirmed that no other serious incidents had
occurred, but stated that he feared that in connexion with
any negotiations he would have to appeal to the intervention
of His Majesty's Government.

6. He added that if invited to go to Berlin he would of
course not go, as he had no intention of being treated like
President Hacha.

"(1) Polish Government confirm their readiness which
has previously been expressed for a direct exchange of views
with the German Government on the basis pro-

192 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

posed by British Government and communicated to me by
Lord Halifax's telegram of 28th August addressed to the
British Ambassador, Warsaw.*

"(2) Polish government are also prepared on a
reciprocal basis to give a formal guarantee that in the event
of negotiations taking place Polish troops will not violate
the frontiers of the German Reich provided a corresponding
guarantee is given regarding non-violation of frontiers of
Poland by troops of the German Reich.

"(3) In the present situation it is also essential
to create a simple provisional modus vivendi in the
Free City of Danzig.

"(4) As regards the suggestions communicated to
Polish Government on 28th August through the intermediary of
the British Ambassador at Warsaw, an explanation of what the
British Government understands by international guarantee
would be required in regard to relations between Poland and
the German Reich. In default of an answer to this fundamental
question the Polish Government are obliged completely to
reserve their attitude towards this matter until such time as
full explanations are received.

"(5) Polish Government express hope that in the
event of conversations with the German Reich being initiated,
they will continue to be able to take advantage of good
offices of His Majesty's Government."

Message which was communicated to H.M.
Ambassador in Berlin by the State Secretary on August 31,
1939, at 9:15 p. m.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty's Government informed the German Government,
in a note dated the 28th August, 1939,** of their readiness
to offer their mediation towards direct negotiations between

*Conveying the substance of No. 74.

**No. 74

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 193

Germany and Poland over the problems in dispute. In so
doing they made it abundantly clear that they, too, were
aware of the urgent need for progress in view of the
continuous incidents and the general European tension. In a
reply dated the 28th August,* the German Government, in spite
of being sceptical as to the desire of the Polish Government
to come to an understanding, declared themselves ready in the
interests of peace to accept the British mediation or
suggestion. After considering all the circumstances
prevailing at the time, they considered it necessary in their
note to point out that, if the danger of a catastrophe was to
be avoided, then action must be taken readily and without
delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready to
receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to
the evening of the 30th August, with the proviso that the
latter was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to
conduct and conclude negotiations.

Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt
able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an
understanding available to the British Government by the time
the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.

Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an
authorised Polish personage, the first answer the Government
of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding
was the news of the Polish mobilisation, and only towards 12
o'clock on the night of the 30th August, 1939, did they
receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to
help towards the commencement of negotiations.

Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by
the Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the
necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government of
the views of the German Government as regards possible bases
of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had
pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and
Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von
Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of
the presentation of the last British note precise information
as to the text of the German proposals which would be
regarded as a basis of negotiation in the event of the
arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.

*No. 78.

194 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

The Government of the German Reich considered themselves
entitled to claim that in these circumstances a Polish
personage would immediately be nominated, at any rate
retroactively.

For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their
part continually not only to emphasise their willingness to
start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while
being from the Polish side merely put off with empty
subterfuges and meaningless declarations.

It has once more been made clear as a result of a
démarche which has meanwhile been made by the
Polish Ambassador that the latter himself has no plenary
powers either to enter into any discussion, or even to
negotiate.

The Führer and the German Government have thus
waited two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish
negotiator with plenary powers.

In these circumstances the German Government regard their
proposals as having this time too been to all intents and
purposes rejected, although they consider that these
proposals, in the form in which they were made known to the
British Government also, were more than loyal, fair and
practicable.

The Reich Government consider it timely to inform the
public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated
to the British Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop.

The situation existing between the German Reich and
Poland is at the moment of such a kind that any further
incident can lead to an explosion on the part of the military
forces which have taken up their position on both sides. Any
peaceful solution must be framed in such a way as to ensure
that the events which lie at the root of this situation
cannot be repeated on the next occasion offered, and that
thus not only the East of Europe, but also other territories
shall not be brought into such a state of tension. The causes
of this development lie in: (1) the impossible delineation of
frontiers, as fixed by the Versailles dictate; (2) the
impossible treatment of the minority in the ceded
territories.

In making these proposals, the Reich Government are,
therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting solution
which will remove the impossible situation created by
frontier delineation, which may assure to both parties their
vitally important line of

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 195

communication, which may-as far as it is at all
possible-remove the minority problem and, in so far as this
is not possible, may give the minorities the assurance of a
tolerable future by means of a reliable guarantee of their
rights.

The Reich Government are content that in so doing it is
essential that economic and physical damage done since 1918
should be exposed and repaired in its entirety. They, of
course, regard this obligation as being binding for both
parties.

These considerations lead to the following practical
proposals:-

(1) The Free City of Danzig shall return to the German
Reich in view of its purely German character, as well as of
the unanimous will of its population;

(2) The territory of the so-called Corridor which extends
from the Baltic Sea to the line
Marienwerder-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (inclusive) and thence
may run in a westerly direction to Schönlanke, shall
itself decide as to whether it shall belong to Germany or
Poland;

(3) For this purpose a plebiscite shall take place in
this territory. The following shall be entitled to vote: all
Germans who were either domiciled in this territory on the
1st January, 1918, or who by that date have been born there,
and similarly of Poles, Kashubes, &c., domiciled in this
territory on the above day (the 1st January, 1918) or born
there up to that date. The Germans who have been driven from
this territory shall return to it in order to exercise their
vote with a view to ensuring an objective plebiscite, and
also with a view to ensuring the extensive preparation
necessary therefor. The above territory shall, as in the case
of the Saar territory, be placed under the supervision of an
international commission to be formed immediately, on which
shall be represented the four Great Powers-Italy, the Soviet
Union, France and England. This commission shall exercise all
the rights of sovereignty in this territory. With this end in
view, the territory shall be evacuated within a period of the
utmost brevity, still to be agreed upon, by the Polish armed
forces, the Polish police, and the Polish authorities;

(4) The Polish port of Gdynia, which fundamentally
constitutes Polish sovereign territory so far as it is
confined territorially to the Polish settlement, shall be
excluded from the

196 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

above territory. The exact frontiers of this Polish port
should be determined between Germany and Poland, and, if
necessary, delimited by an international committee of
arbitration;

(5) With a view to assuring the necessary time for the
execution of the extensive work involved in the carrying out
of a just plebiscite, this plebiscite shall not take place
before the expiry of twelve months;

(6) In order to guarantee unrestricted communication
between Germany and East Prussia and between Poland and the
sea during this period, roads and railways shall be
established to render free transit traffic possible. In this
connexion only such taxes as are necessary for the
maintenance of the means of communication and for the
provision of transport may be levied;

(7) The question as to the party to which the area
belongs is to be decided by simple majority of the votes
recorded;

(8) In order to guarantee to Germany free communication
with her province of Danzig-East Prussia, and to Poland her
connexion with the sea after the execution of the
plebiscite-regardless of the results thereof-Germany shall,
in the event of the plebiscite area going to Poland, receive
an extra-territorial traffic zone, approximately in a line
from Butow to Danzig or Dirschau, in which to lay down an
autobahn and a 4-track railway line. The road and the railway
shall be so constructed that the Polish lines of
communication are not affected, i.e., they shall pass
either over or under the latter. The breadth of this zone
shall be fixed at 1 kilometre, and it is to be German
sovereign territory. Should the plebiscite be favourable to
Germany, Poland is to obtain rights, analogous to those
accorded to Germany, to a similar extra-territorial
communication by road and railway for the purpose of free and
unrestricted communication with her port of Gdynia;

(9) In the event of the Corridor returning to the German
Reich, the latter declares its right to proceed to an
exchange of population with Poland to the extent to which the
nature of the Corridor lends itself thereto;

(10) Any special right desired by Poland in the port of
Danzig would be negotiated on a basis of territory against
similar rights to be granted to Germany in the port of
Gdynia;

(11) In order to remove any feeling in this area that
either

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 197

side was being threatened, Danzig and Gdynia would have
the character of exclusively mercantile towns, that is to
say, without military installations and military
fortifications;

(12) The peninsula of Hela, which as a result of the
plebiscite might go either to Poland or to Germany, would in
either case have similarly to be demilitarised;

(13) Since the Government of the German Reich has the
most vehement complaints to make against the Polish treatment
of minorities, and since the Polish Government for their part
feel obliged to make complaints against Germany, both parties
declare their agreement to have these complaints laid before
an international committee of enquiry, whose task would be to
examine all complaints as regards economic or physical
damage, and any other acts of terrorism. Germany and Poland
undertake to make good economic or other damage done to
minorities on either side since the year 1918, or to cancel
expropriation as the case may be, or to provide complete
compensation to the persons affected for this and any other
encroachments on their economic life;

(14) In order to free the Germans who may be left in
Poland and the Poles who may be left in Germany from the
feeling of being outlawed by all nations, and in order to
render them secure against being called upon to perform
action or to render services incompatible with their national
sentiments, Germany and Poland agree to guarantee the rights
of both minorities by means of the most comprehensive and
binding agreement, in order to guarantee to these minorities
the preservation, the free development and practical
application of their nationality (Volkstum), and in
particular to permit for this purpose such organisation as
they may consider necessary. Both parties undertake not to
call upon members of the minority for military service;

(15) In the event of agreement on the basis of these
proposals, Germany and Poland declare themselves ready to
decree and to carry out the immediate demobilisation of their
armed forces;

(16) The further measures necessary for the more rapid
execution of the above arrangement shall be agreed upon by
both Germany and Poland conjointly.

PLEASE inform German Government that we understand that
Polish Government are taking steps to establish contact with
them through Polish Ambassador in Berlin.

2. Please also ask them whether they agree to the
necessity for securing an immediate provisional modus
vivendi as regards Danzig. (We have already put this
point to German Government.) Would they agree that M.
Burckhardt might be employed for this purpose if it were
possible to secure his services?

1. I am glad to learn that Polish Ambassador at Berlin is
being instructed to establish contact with German
Government.

2. I fully agree as to the necessity for discussing
detailed arrangements for the negotiations and as to the
undesirability of a visit by M. Beck to Berlin.

3. On the other hand, I do not see why the Polish
Government should feel difficulty about authorising Polish
Ambassador to accept a document from the German Government,
and I earnestly hope that they may be able to modify their
instructions to him in this respect. There was no mention of
any ultimatum in the report on the German proposals which has
been furnished to us, and the suggestion that the demand for
the presence of a Polish plenipotentiary at Berlin on 30th
August amounted to an ultimatum was vigorously repudiated by
Herr von Ribbentrop in conversation with His Majesty's
Ambassador. If the document did contain an ultimatum, the
Polish Government would naturally refuse to discuss it until
the ultimatum was withdrawn. On the other hand, a refusal by
them to receive proposals would be gravely misunderstood by
outside opinion.

* Nos. 96 and 97.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 199

4. I should have thought that the Polish Ambassador could
surely be instructed to receive and transmit a document and
to say (a)if it contained anything like an ultimatum,
that he anticipated that the Polish Government would
certainly be unable to discuss on such a basis, and (b) that,
in any case, in the view of the Polish Government, questions
as to the venue of the negotiations, the basis on which they
should be held, and the persons to take part in them, must be
discussed and decided between the two Governments.

5. If negotiations are initiated, His Majesty's
Government will at all times be ready, if desired, to lend
any assistance in their power to achieve a just
settlement.

6. As regards an international guarantee, this will no
doubt have to be fully discussed. What His Majesty's
Government had in mind was a guarantee of the full and proper
observance of any settlement reached.

7. As regards Danzig, we fully share the view of M. Beck
as to the importance of establishing some modus vivendi.
We have already made a suggestion in this sense to the
German Government and will in the light of paragraph 4 of
your telegram of 31st August** do so again. If German
Government agree, I will at once approach M. Burckhardt.

2. M. Lipski had already called on the German Foreign
Minister at 6:30 p. m. yesterday. In view of this fact, which
was followed by German invasion of Poland at dawn to-day, it
was clearly useless for me to take the action suggested.