52 responses to “Quote Of The Week”

Timely quote, especially in light of Zero and Billary’s “lunch date” yesterday and her breakfast with Crazy Uncle Joe this morning. Anyone think she’ll let Joe down easy or just go ahead and threaten him with an early diagnosis of Alzheimers that will disqualify him from seeking the nomination?

As an aside, I saw the official photo of the Resident and former SecState eating lunch outside (in the Rose Garden, I suppose) and the first thing that popped into my mind was that it was like watching Sauron and Saruman having lunch.

Not to defend the mistakes of the boomers, but I will tell you this… and take it as one will…

IF… the 50’s/60’s could be transported to today, the bitching of gen x and mills would be not so much.

Now, what is it that the gen x and mills want from their political masters today… after all? That’s right. They want what mommy and daddy had… plus some more licentiousness/immorality to boot. They want their fair share… and damn-it, they aren’t getting it because… mommy and daddy squandered it!

Gen x and the mills want no more freedom and liberty than mommy and daddy! Cold hard fact for anyone who isn’t blind.

Here is a word of advise to the squealing gen x/mills… you CAN break the generational curse. But I suppose it is much easier to squeal… “It’s not fair we are not getting our fair share government!

absolutely. imo, thats why the gop does nothing more than bark occasionally. with obamacare law of the land and every municipality likely to dump their employees in to make their balance sheets look better and texas possibly turning purple by 2016; liberals/progressives/democrats know they are about to own the country; all they got to do is keep things running until then. i’d hate to be 60 right now with chronic ailments that reqiure regular medication. those people’s parents may have lived to 85 with those ailments; i doubt their offspring will be allowed to do that.

In response to the original post, don’t plan for a “decade long fight”. “4th Gen Warfare” is a recipe for disaster, it hasn’t worked for anybody yet. Unconventional Warfare certainly has an important place in any conflict, but one cannot win a civil war without conventional fighting.

I’m not saying that a fight would be easy and quick, but the longer a war drags on the more decrepit a country becomes and victory becomes increasingly difficult. Beside the decay general infrastructure, we could have nuclear power-plants and toxic waste sites at risk. A long war doesn’t benefit anybody (except for arms dealers), it didn’t help Lebanon, and hasn’t helped Somalia, or Mexico. One key advantage Americans must realize is that the building block of all armies is the rifle, which we have in droves. Thus, making guerilla/unconventional warfare not as important as it is in most other countries (who don’t have widespread firearms possession among civilians, necessitating lengthy build-up times for a resistance force). This is not to say that caution should be thrown to the wind, but that the factors in a potential civil war in 21st century America would be truly unique, with little to no historical precedence.

It’s ugly and what you write is logical. Hell, it’s not tough to imagine 100 years for that matter, or even never. But happily, in predicting the future, the logic of the past doesn’t always hold. This is especially so in matters of the mind, which this happens to be.

Let’s not forget that only one side wants to make it about something else, as if it weren’t about matters of the mind. Big deal…so do wild animals, and we don’t have much of a problem with them.

The truth shall set us free. But please don’t misunderstand—I’m a huge believer in backup too.

“I say it will be more like 30 years to unfug North America.”
=============
What’s 80% of 312,000,000?
That’s how many will die, from all sides, within the first 2 years.
Of that 80%, 80% are 100% dependent on the current supply sources and are incapable of fending for themselves. When the noose tightens they will fold quickly. This includes all of the major metropolis’s.

North America will be a wasteland – at least those areas that used to be populated.
===============

Stick around, you’ll be surprised how fast nature reclaims what was borrowed from it.

7 years ago I scraped a section of the planet completely bare down to bedrock and walked away.
Now, untouched by human hands, it is the densest forest you have ever seen, completely impenetrable by any man or vehicle.

All of humanity is simply a shit stain on the surface of the earth and people that claim man is destroying the planet suffer from extreme arrogance.

Its important to remember that during the Thirty Years War, most people were self-reliant/self-sufficient. They grew their own food, acquired their own water, looked after their own security, and were used to living in hardship. It wasn’t until the 18th or 19th century that the world population became concentrated in the cities, where self-reliance started to drain. In a modern 30 year civil war II scenario, most of the US population would die of disease, starvation, or thirst within the first few years. At which time, if anyone were inclined to invade us (like China and Russia) they would probably receive little opposition. I base this on the fact that neither the Chinese or the Ruskies give a damn about public opinion, the media, world opinion, or “civilized” warfare. In such a scenario, unless they intend to enslave Americans (why do that when you have machines?) they will just seek to kill off all survivors. Also, remember that our reactors and waste sites are vulnerable and must be kept safe.

To conclude, we ABSOLUTLY CANNOT afford a long war! As Sherman said “War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.” and “Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.”

Barney,
There has not been a purely conventional war since Korea. All have had a heavy dose of PysOps and UW. I will however ask you to provide examples of 4GW failures? I am interested in what you will provide.

Grenadier, I’m not against unconventional warfare, I just recognize the fact that unconventional tactics DO NOT BY THEMSELVES win wars. Bad guerilla/unconventional fighters are nothing more than a nuisance to an OPFOR, while good guerilla/unconventional fighters are distractions at best, sowing paranoia in the OPFOR’s ranks. But when it comes down to it, the conventional warriors must win the day with overwhelming force. You ask for examples of 4GW failures? Ok, “The Troubles” of Northern Ireland (29 year conflict and the Irish Republican militants accomplished virtually nothing), The Sri-Lankan Civil War (The Tamil Tigers fought for 25 years to establish a separate Tamil-ruled state, they failed and were crushed in 2009), The various “Palestinian” nationalist groups have been fighting for over 40 years now with little to show for their efforts. Additionally, the FARC of Columbia have been fighting for nearly 50 years to bring a communist government to power, but they’re still hanging out in the jungles, dreaming of a revolution that has failed to come.

So yeah, I stand by my statement that 4th Gen warfare is a recipe for failure.

The term 4GW is thrown about pretty haphazardly. There’s nothing “fourth generation” about guerrilla warfare. It’s as old as…warfare itself. The term 4GW or Hybrid Warfare (definitions of both are all over the place and few agree on them) is probably more properly used in reference to a mix of UW, conventional, terrorist, cyber, etc. A very good example of a successful Hybrid campaign was the Hezbollah response to the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 2006. The Israelis, for all their vaunted prowess, got their asses handed to them by the Hez. Now, this was in large part due to the IDF’s combat edge being dulled by years of COIN/Counterterror duty in Gaza (sound familiar?) but they still, on paper, should have wiped the floor with the Hez.

Chuck, while the 2006 South Lebanon campaign was a defeat for the IDF and a minor victory for Hezbollah, it was FAR from a decisive ass-kicking Hezbollah victory. Hezbollah did not expect an invasion (although they prepared fairly well for one), and the IDF was mainly hampered by their own senior leadership being too timid to seize initiative, as well as being too casualty-averse, and too concerned about international perceptions. If the Israeli’s had been unconcerned about international opinion (which is always against them anyway), recognized the fact that casualties will happen in war, and allowed their field commanders to use aggression and all supporting arms at their disposal…then Hezbollah would have been driven out of South Lebanon in a matter of days, utterly destroyed. When you tie the hands of conventional forces, insurgents win by default. Right now, Hezbollah are getting their asses kicked by Sunni mujahedeen and other rebels in Syria because they are NOT fighting a self-restraining force.

Sort of. It’s a bit more complicated than “the IDF had their hands tied.” There was a bit more in the way of rookie mistakes and bungling by commanders who should have known better. They failed to apply basic combined arms principles and paid the price. Yes, there were certainly political considerations, and casualty aversion, but when is that not the case? As for invading Southern Lebanon…well, you don’t win a war with tactical victories alone. In 1982 the IDF found out the hard way that invading and seizing a country and a city is easier than holding it. So did the Soviets in Afghanistan. Ditto the US in 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq. And on and on.

Comparing Hezbollah fighting on its own turf in So Leb to fighting as mercenaries for the Syrian regime is apples and oranges. An effective irregular force fighting to defend its own country does not an expeditionary force make.

Further, you continue to conflate UW/guerrilla war with so-called 4GW. See G1’s explanation below.

“there were certainly political considerations, and casualty aversion, but when is that not the case? As for invading Southern Lebanon…well, you don’t win a war with tactical victories alone.”

The Russians certainly didn’t care about media/political considerations when they invaded Georgia in 2008, they openly bombed civilians and sent a battalion of Chechen Mercenaries to pillage the place. They know that what the media/world thinks of them is irrelevant. They knew that western leaders would puss-out and do nothing while Georgia was raped. All success in warfare is based on both tactical and strategic victories, you cannot have one without the other.

” In 1982 the IDF found out the hard way that invading and seizing a country and a city is easier than holding it.”

Yep, they invaded to kick out the PLO, the PLO soon left and the IDF inexplicably stayed in Beirut’s outskirts. Later they pulled back to Southern Lebanon, and made the mistake of pulling out of Lebanon completely in 2000.

Sure, Hezbollah isn’t an expeditionary force, but they are the best armed terror-org out there, that has to count for something when confronting other terrorists and guerillas. The point was that the Israelis spent more time fighting each other in 2006, rather than fighting Nasrallah’s band of merry Shiites.

If I’m confusing 4GW with unconventional warfare, its because 4GW is seemingly always professed by guerillas (or wannabe guerillas). Actually, I think 4GW is nonexistent BS. War is still in the 3rd Gen phase, but with increased unconventional/guerilla operations due to lack of force parity and nuclear concerns. The cyberhacking element is just a new form of espionage and sabotage that both nations and insurgents find occasionally useful.

Not many have actually mastered so-called 3rd Gen warfare which is just another term for Maneuver Warfare. Certainly the US military has never been good at it. Most First World militaries are still stuck in 2nd Gen warfare (Firepower/Attrition).

You and I agree on one point: at best the jury is still out on the existence of 4GW. I tend to side with you on that idea. I think “Hybrid Warfare” is a better term to describe what most people are getting at when they talk about 4GW, but it also imperfect.

I agree with most of what you said here, but I would argue that 3rd Gen warfare is what the US Military IS good at. Desert Storm, Grenada, Panama, and the 2003 Iraq invasion stage were conventional 3rd gen conflicts, with the USMC taking the overall lead in modern blitzkrieg.

No, the US military, even the Marines, although they talk a good game, is not particularly proficient at maneuver warfare. What they are good at is substituting firepower and technology for maneuver. I will grant you that at the operational level, the 2003 Iraq invasion was about as close as they have ever come in modern times. Desert Storm, Grenada and Panama most certainly do NOT qualify.

Ok Chuck, if the US military are NOT the masters of 3rd gen maneuver warfare, then who is? The USMC march to Baghdad was the quickest advance in military history, if I recall correctly. Keep in mind that not all situations require much maneuvering. If your enemy is dumb enough to expose themselves, then you fire for effect. There is no rule that says fire and maneuver are mutually exclusive.

Virtually nothing? No more British troops in N.I., no more direct rule from London. The entire old RUC police force was restructured into a new entity that was more even-handed. There’s a power-sharing government with Republican and Nationalist representation. Those are pretty concrete results and substantial gains. Was it total defeat of the UK – no, but it was a lot more than nothing.

This is incorrect, there are still garrisons and EOD units based in Northern Ireland, they’re not patrolling everyday, but they are still there.

“No direct rule from London”

The London direct-rule was put in place AFTER the Irish Republicans started their attacks. In 1972.

“The entire old RUC police force was restructured into a new entity that was more even-handed”

True, but that was only a minor objective of the Republicans.

” There’s a power-sharing government with Republican and Nationalist representation.”

True, but still a far cry from the original Republican objective of forming a united Ireland. Again, 29 years of fighting with little to show for it. We Americans achieved our independence in eight years. The illiterate Afghans somehow managed to kick the Soviets out of that region in ten years, even though the Soviets were truly fighting an all-out war against the Afghan resistance. Whereas the British Army never considered the Troubles any more than a police action, and prosecuted their counter-terror campaign as such. This is why I say that building a strategy around a “long war” (which most definitions of 4GW emphasize) is useless, It hasn’t worked for anybody yet that I know of.

“there are still garrisons and EOD units based in Northern Ireland, they’re not patrolling everyday, but they are still there. ”

There are still Federal troops garrisioning Southern states, too. They’re just not patrolling every day, either. Yes, The United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland maintains some units everywhere within its borders – hardly shocking. Operation Banner, however, is over.

“The London direct-rule was put in place AFTER the Irish Republicans started their attacks. In 1972. ”

Gross over-simplification and a primie example of correlation not being causation. Direct Rule was installed in response to a bunch of factors that all made Home Rule unworkable: routine abuses of power by the Unionists with their “a Protestant government for a Protestant people,” including open discrimination in housing, jobs, etc.; the failure of internment, IRA and Loyalist paramilitary violence, military/police failures such as Bloody Sunday, etc.

“True, but that was only a minor objective of the Republicans.”

It was achieved. Minor or not, it wasn’t “virtually nothing.”

“still a far cry from the original Republican objective of forming a united Ireland.”

They’re closer now than they were when it all started. No, there was nothing akin to a surrender on the deck of the Missouri, but they have gained and legitimized a lot of political power. The situation in NI was never a purely military campaign – it was parallel to a political campaign. When the politicians were able to secure a favorable peace, the fighting stopped.

“We Americans achieved our independence in eight years. The illiterate Afghans somehow managed to kick the Soviets out of that region in ten years, even though the Soviets were truly fighting an all-out war against the Afghan resistance.”

America was thousands of miles from Britain, was getting help from major powers (including direct introduction of troops and ships), and was a small part of a global war. Afghanistan was being armed by a superpower, and receiving aid and fighters from co-religionists, and was also a small part of a much larger geo-political conflict. Northern Ireland was a backwater conflict without foreign intervention on anything even remotely the same scale. Yes, the IRA got some weapons from people in the US and later Libya, and the Loyalists got some support from people in Canada, but the situations are vastly different.

“the British Army never considered the Troubles any more than a police action, and prosecuted their counter-terror campaign as such.”

The same British Army conceded that it could not defeat the IRA and that stalemate was the best it could do.

Jimmy, you continue talking about semantics. The definition of winning a war is the accomplishment of your major objectives, the Irish Republicans DID NOT accomplish their major objectives, they lost. 29 years of operations is not worth such minimal gains! The fact is that the Irish Republican campaigns from 1969-1998 stand as one of the most inefficient campaigns in history. It was a total waste of time. The only reason the Brits said that they couldn’t defeat them is because the British leadership still believe in civilized warfare. They could have wiped out the IRA forces within a few years if they took the Fallujah approach. Instead, they played nice and pretended that a police action could take care of the problem. Yes, I know that our War of Independence and the Afghan-Soviet War were different, the point is that those were both full all-out wars, where the insurgents faced huge obstacles to success. Meanwhile, the Brits in Northern Ireland were prevented from using supporting arms, no artillery, no gunships, and no tanks (they used them, but as engineer vehicles without the damn turrets!). In all that time, 29 years, the Republican militants only managed to kill a bit over 1,100 security personnel. It was a pathetic performance on the Republicans part. Illiterate Afghans with little advantage can cause more damage than that in just two years.

The Republican “Troubles” campaigns were a failure, politically and militarily, there is no way to rationalize three decades of warfare for minimal gain as a victory!

“The definition of winning a war is the accomplishment of your major objectives, the Irish Republicans DID NOT accomplish their major objectives, they lost.”

So, how long were you a squaddie? They may not have gotten everything that the firebrands wanted, but they definitely came out ahead. What you call “minimal gains” are seen far differently among the the populace. The Catholics have a real voice in the government now that they never had before.

“The only reason the Brits said that they couldn’t defeat them is because the British leadership still believe in civilized warfare. They could have wiped out the IRA forces within a few years if they took the Fallujah approach.”

Except the MoD’s own reports state that the Brits did attempt to destroy the IRA in the 80s and failed. The Brits never could have “taken a Fallujah approach” – to do so, they would have risked open war with Ireland and would very likely have done serious damage to relations with the United States and probably to other NATO nations as well.

“In all that time, 29 years, the Republican militants only managed to kill a bit over 1,100 security personnel.”

And the British Army managed to kill 156 civilians (51% of their total kills), 127 Republican paramilitaries, and 2 police. So, if “It was a pathetic performance on the Republicans part,” it was an absolutely abysmal one by the British Army and RUC.

“Illiterate Afghans with little advantage can cause more damage than that in just two years.”

Really? PIRA strength throughout The Troubles: less than 10,000; the Taliban are currently estimated have about 25,000, plus another several thousand in the Haqqani network, plus assorted foreign jihadis. Afghanistan is much closer to an actual war than The Troubles ever were in Northern Ireland. Add in the fact that the IRA’s attacks (mostly, but with some notable exceptions) were aimed more at causing economic damage than mass casualties, and you’re really comparing apples to oranges.

Lol, I have no dog in this fight. I’m neither Brit nor Paddy. I just call conflicts as they are. The fact is that the Union flag is still flying over Northern Ireland, the July 12th parades still go on, and the Protestants still live there. That is not the sign of Republican victory. In an insurgency, a lukewarm stalemate might as well be considered a loss.

” The Brits never could have “taken a Fallujah approach” – to do so, they would have risked open war with Ireland ”

ROFLMAO, Sure, the Irish Defence Forces, with less than 20,000 personnel would somehow invade Northern Ireland in order to take on over 120,000 British soldiers? You must have forgotten the fact that the Irish Defence Forces were at war with the Republican militants as well.

“Add in the fact that the IRA’s attacks (mostly, but with some notable exceptions) were aimed more at causing economic damage than mass casualties”

Yep, which is partly why they lost. War is about killing, not making noise. If several thousand bombs dropped by the Germans on Belfast in WW2 didn’t scare the British/Unionist people into submission, then why the hell would a few bombs planted here and there by the Republicans break the Unionists? Piss poor planning, Michael Collins is rolling in his grave.

Your using examples of traditional UW to demonstrate a failure of 4GW concepts. Many of those conflicts started before 4GW was even an idea. 4GW is not a phase of a conflict. Tradtional UW is a phase of an overall full spectrum war. Resistance begins as local UW forces and grows itself into a field army that can conduct traditional 2GW and 3GW against the government and its standing military. The failure of those traditional UW examples you cite lies fully in their inability to develope complete support for their movement, pushing them over the tipping point of an UW force to a standing field army. 4GW is a classification of conflict not a phase. Its charctorized by the use of technological force multipliers that amplify the impact that small groups have on the overall battlespace. These groups are disconnected physically but united in concepts. They rapidly modify their tactics and equipment based on direct feedback from the battlefield and share this feedback to all of the groups in the network. These groups attack nontraditional targets. Targets that risk little in the way of resources and casualties while having the most impact on the system under attack. There is heavy use of psy-ops and non kinetic action. If you notice all of these concepts are not limited to utilization by irregular forces. These concepts can be used by standing armies althought they may not be structured properly to gain the most from the concepts. What makes it 4GW is that the concepts are capable of being equally if not more significantly implemented by non-state forces.
It was a trick question BG because the reason I asked you to provide examples of failure is that 4GW has yet to be fully embraced by any force ,traditional or irregular, as a means in and of itself. Many of the elements have been utilized and adopted but no force in the world today is purely a 4G operator.

They were an idea without a name, Lind came up with 4GW theory in 1989, every conflict I mentioned was ongoing at the time and employed these concepts that you mentioned.

“The failure of those traditional UW examples you cite lies fully in their inability to develope complete support for their movement, pushing them over the tipping point of an UW force to a standing field army.”

That’s my point, that the tenants of 4GW dismiss the necessity of transition from insurgent to conventional fighter. Transition from guerilla to conventional fighting is essential, especially when fighting a local or domestic enemy, who will not simply be scared into submission. The Afghans managed to kick the Soviets out of Afghanistan without transitioning to conventional, but that is because the Soviets were not locals, therefore the Afghans only had to convince the Soviets to pull out. In the case of the IRA, they were never going to win without going conventional because the British soldiers, RUC, and Loyalists are all locals. The IRA looked at their struggle as a colonial struggle, thinking that negative world opinion of Britain would save them, instead of recognizing the fact that only brute conventional force would accomplish their objectives of driving the “Brits Out”.

“Its charctorized by the use of technological force multipliers that amplify the impact that small groups have on the overall battlespace.”

That’s a goal in any form of warfare, iron trumped bronze, cavalry with stirrups trumped cavalry without, repeating rifle trumped musket, troops with thermal imaging devices trump those without, etc. Very few modern guerilla/terrorist operations have any lasting impact beyond momentary shock and anger. In 1983, Hezbollah effectively destroyed the 1st Battalion of the 8th Marine Regiment by using one truck bomb to blow up the Battalion’s HQ building. But that is one trick they were never able to pull off again. 9/11/2001 saw the largest casualties ever suffered as a result of a terrorist operation, but that was a one-time-use attack that failed to do anything other than piss Americans off.

“They rapidly modify their tactics and equipment based on direct feedback from the battlefield and share this feedback to all of the groups in the network. These groups attack nontraditional targets. Targets that risk little in the way of resources and casualties while having the most impact on the system under attack.”

Depends on what you mean by “rapid”, it can take months or years before a guerilla/terror group change their modus operandi. The idea is that these groups will cause damage with non-traditional targets, but the reality is that they often accomplish little.

“There is heavy use of psy-ops and non kinetic action.”

Psychological operations CAN be useful, but non-kinetic action is useless if a war is already in progress. Once a hot war is on, the only things that truly matter are logistics and violence. Case in point, the Mongol Empire accomplished a lot with small numbers because they used speed and untamed aggression in order to win. They slaughtered entire cities (built a hill of skulls in Baghdad) and raped their way across Asia and Eastern Europe. News of their atrocities served as a highly effective psy-op, allowing them to accomplish their objectives easier. They Mongols were most definatly evil douchebags, but they certainly didn’t beat around the bush when it came to warfare! Modern forces, both conventional and unconventional, love to beat around the bush. There seems to be this inherent belief that large objectives can be accomplished with minimal loss of blood (both enemy and friendly). Western conventional forces operate on an out-dated concept of civilized warfare, which is the only thing that has allowed insurgencies like the Palestinian “Intifadas” to last for decades. Its not because the insurgents are effective or clever, but because the Israelis are too timid to go “old-school” status. Meanwhile, modern guerilla/terror groups recognize the fact that war is inherently uncivilized, but they either lack the skill, means, or will to fully commit to an “old-school” campaign. Thus, we have the virtual stalemates that exist today in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestinian territories, etc.

“4GW has yet to be fully embraced by any force, traditional or irregular, as a means in and of itself. Many of the elements have been utilized and adopted but no force in the world today is purely a 4G operator.”

That is because it wont work, 4GW tries to escape the inherent violence of war. As Lt. Col. Ralph Peters says “War means fighting, and fighting means killing”. The overall 3rd generation model still works, but to defeat guerillas/terrorists it requires abandoning the civilized warfare concept, and allowing room for at least SOME old-school tactics. Example, if the US Gov. had any sense, they would kill every mujahid detainee at Gitmo who is of no further use to us. No use keeping POWs that you have to take care of for the rest of their lives.

Barney,
Your all over the map here.
Your positions keep changing point of view, one minute you seem to be arguing from the position of the insurgent and another you are arguing from the position of the government fighting the insurgent. I can’t continue to waste time with you. You obviously consider yourself smarter than Lind and Robb so I will not attempt to accomplish what they have failed to do.

Grenadier, granted, we have gone off topic a bit, but what I am doing is criticizing both modern insurgent/guerilla doctrine and modern counter-insurgency doctrine, since neither are particularly effective. Proper understanding of warfare requires knowing what both sides must achieve. I’m not proclaiming to be smarter than anyone, I just disagree with Lind that warfare has entered a 4th generation, and I think that his proposed 4th gen model is a good way to ensure defeat. I’m not the first to call BS on 4GW either.

Barney, I will be happy to continue the conversation if we can keep from falling down an example /counter example spiral.
Folks reading this discussion need to see a debate on the concepts, that however requires that we actually debate the concepts.
The disagreement we have is that you are using examples of 3rd generation warfare , both conventional and unconventional, to demonstrate a failure of 4th generation concepts. Your line of reasoning to this point indicates that you equate 4th generation conflict as being a purely guerilla or unconventional conflict.
As I explained that is not the case. Standing armies are capable of utilizing 4G concepts effectively, however they are typically very slow to actualize new shifts in doctrine and thinking. Irregular forces are much more agile and adopt new methodologies without the historical thought box that hinders traditional organizations.
Some of the assertions that you have put forward need to be addressed. First and foremost that 4G warfare tries to escape the violence of war.
That is just not the case. The goal is to focus the violence as surgically as possible. Not because of an aversion to it but in an effort to maximize efficiency.
It is a waste of resources to bomb a communications node with 1000lbs of explosives when you can use a 10lb incendiary to melt it to a blob. Part of that efficiency is also in an effort to avoid civilian noncombatant casualties. Now you criticize current counterinsurgency operations as being incapable of dealing with insurgents by refusing to go “old school” on them. Your right modern COIN ops do target the specific insurgent, seek them out and detain them. So if warfare has not entered a 4th generation then why would that tactic be in play? Why would they not just drop 1000lb bombs on every neighborhood they think an insurgent is living in? Well because that’s a 2G and 3G COIN tactic and it does not work. It IS counterinsurgent but it is also counterproductive. You just turned an entire neighborhood into recruits for the insurgent. 4G warfare recognizes that populations will lay the blame for failures at the feet of the powers in control. The 4G warrior seeks to isolate his enemies from the overall population.That isolation delegitimize the powers in place and fractures the loyalties to that higher authority.
Now again this is a concept that can be applied across the board. The insurgent could destroy a government media TV station thus shutting down the government mouthpeice and isolating the government from the population, The airforce could strike an enemy communications node that isolates an air defense station from the overall AA defense network thus preventing that station from being updated or providing updates to the network. That does not sound very innovative or 4th Generation in and of itself, and its not on its own. What makes it innovative and a 4th generation is when it is done in concert with other efforts that surgically and systematically grow that isolation. Its not the specific tactic its how its used in an overall operation.

Alright, this thread is getting a bit long, but I’m up for proper debate.

“It is a waste of resources to bomb a communications node with 1000lbs of explosives when you can use a 10lb incendiary to melt it to a blob.”

Agreed, I don’t advocate wasteful firepower.

“Now you criticize current counterinsurgency operations as being incapable of dealing with insurgents by refusing to go “old school” on them. Your right modern COIN ops do target the specific insurgent, seek them out and detain them. So if warfare has not entered a 4th generation then why would that tactic be in play?”

Insurgent leaders and specialists have always been targets for arrest and interrogation. The reason that arrest, detention, and trial of average insurgents has become so popular is because governments (Western governments, particularly) think that its the most effective and moral route. They believe counterinsurgency to be a police action, it has nothing to do with basis on 4GW theory. Its done because western leaders have decided that being “civilized” is more important than being effective.

“Why would they not just drop 1000lb bombs on every neighborhood they think an insurgent is living in? Well because that’s a 2G and 3G COIN tactic and it does not work. ”

That is debatable, I’m not a proponent of wanton attack in every situation, but hostile populations ought to be considered enemies. What is the difference between the insurgent shooting at you and the guy who gives the insurgent shelter? Or the person who proudly proclaims their support of the insurgent at rallies? There is no difference, they both are hostile, and both will keep an insurgency alive. This is especially true when dealing with religious uprisings, which are usually ended only with a horrific amount of bloodshed. Look at the Second World War (I know it was conventional, but its relevant), Dresden was destroyed, Tokyo was destroyed, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed. People today debate whether or not these attacks were necessary, but lets not forget that both the Germans and Japanese were loyal to their oppressive governments, all the way to the end. They were our enemies, destroying their cities and population centers were vital to weakening enemy morale and denying the enemy personnel and material resources. Its truly tragic, but the lesson to learn from it all is NOT to start a war you cannot win.

“It IS counterinsurgent but it is also counterproductive. You just turned an entire neighborhood into recruits for the insurgent.”

Sometimes, you will turn a neighborhood against you. Other times, that neighborhood will cease to mess with you, or will cease to exist. For the latter two, either way the problem is solved for the counter-insurgent or conventional faction in question.

“4G warfare recognizes that populations will lay the blame for failures at the feet of the powers in control. The 4G warrior seeks to isolate his enemies from the overall population.That isolation delegitimize the powers in place and fractures the loyalties to that higher authority.”

That isn’t anything new or different, that has been one of the goals of guerilla warfare and unconventional warfare for thousands of years.

” Now again this is a concept that can be applied across the board. The insurgent could destroy a government media TV station thus shutting down the government mouthpeice and isolating the government from the population, The airforce could strike an enemy communications node that isolates an air defense station from the overall AA defense network thus preventing that station from being updated or providing updates to the network. That does not sound very innovative or 4th Generation in and of itself, and its not on its own. What makes it innovative and a 4th generation is when it is done in concert with other efforts that surgically and systematically grow that isolation. Its not the specific tactic its how its used in an overall operation.”

This is why I say that 4GW is BS, its all too vague and not innovative in the least. Total Warfare does the same thing, by using every means available to contribute to defeat of one’s enemy. Whether its assassinating generals or having your spies fart profusely in the enemy command center (destroys morale and distracts from operations). The first through third gen explanations make sense, but the 4th is just incoherent, in my opinion. I agree with Dr. Antulio Echevarria’s essay, that 4GW is a nonexistent concept. I don’t say this to cause trouble, but because I believe that following the misguided principles of 4GW theory will lead to consistent defeat for Americans, especially in the realm of reclaiming lost liberty. Battle plans must be crafted carefully, and too often people will just jump onto whatever is cool or new at the time. If liberty loving Americans are eventually forced into a fight, then we will have only ONE chance for success. I would rather base that chance upon tried and proven tactics and strategy, rather than an unproven theory.

Okay fair enough you dont buy into 4G warfare. So lets bring this back to our current situation. Your position is that the only way for FREEFOR to win a conflict with the US government is to raise a traditional army and combat the US military in the field? So based on your examples given earlier of the failed insurgencys and their inability to reach that field army status how can FREEFOR hope to do better?
Forgive me from sounding so dismissive of that strategy, see my ancestors tried that exact thing about 160 years ago and it didnt go so well for us.
The beauty of 4G is that you can try your method and I can try mine and we can go with what ends up working. Given the time it took my family to recover from the last one I dont see yours working out that well.

“Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as General Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation warfare. He said in his missive, “Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the ‘4th Generation of War’ intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say…’Not really…”

Well, that isn’t quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just “the extension of politics by other means.” And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces. When I am asked to recommend a good book describing what a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually suggest Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century.

Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call “terrorism,” are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.

“Your position is that the only way for FREEFOR to win a conflict with the US government is to raise a traditional army and combat the US military in the field?”

No, that is NOT what I mean. What I am saying is that insurgencies of a people against their own government will eventually REQUIRE a conventional transition, due to the need to take and hold important ground. I view the US military as a potential ally, most troops are conservatives and libertarians, and most are Southerners. Perhaps more importantly, they are tired of fighting unwinnable wars. Does anyone really think that the average Soldier or Marine will be interested in fighting insurgents/rebels who hold the same political beliefs and loyalty to the constitution as they do?

“So based on your examples given earlier of the failed insurgencys and their inability to reach that field army status how can FREEFOR hope to do better?”

The enemy in a hypothetical revolution should only be certain elements of the Federal government, resisting loyalists to those elements, and resisting collectivists. By themselves, they should be relatively easy to defeat, especially without any serious airpower or artillery to worry about. The Feds have decent emergency capabilities with regards to single cities (New Orleans and Boston come to mind) but they cannot handle a virtually nationwide situation. As I said in an earlier post, Americans are in a unique position. Normally rebellions have a long build-up/guerilla phase, due to lack of suitable arms being available prior to a revolt. Because of this general lack of arms availability, training on weapons usage and tactics also take longer, due to the need to train in secret. Americans do not face this problem because we have the largest amount of small arms on Earth. We have lots of shooting ranges where basic firearms training can take place without suspicion, and we have lots and LOTS of land to conduct tactical training on, secretly or openly. All of this could allow for a significantly shorter build-up/guerrilla phase, the Feds will feel confident going after guerillas and unconventional fighters, but they will NEED the military to save them from a conventional force. If the military says no? then DC is screwed. Let the unconventional fighters distract and harass, while the conventional forces take and hold ground. Again, it is crucial to not become the enemy of the military! They aren’t indestructible, but their firepower will make your day suck. We would need them to either stay neutral, or join the side of the FREEFOR. Against Barney Fife Feds, and inexperienced gun-hating hippies, the FREEFOR will prevail.

“Forgive me from sounding so dismissive of that strategy, see my ancestors tried that exact thing about 160 years ago and it didnt go so well for us.”

My ancestors included some Confederates as well. They faced some serious odds, and yet, for most of the war they were kicking the Union’s ass up and down. Now the tables have turned, the Southerners (and red states in general) now have the factories, the population, money, and the majority of military personnel and veterans that will allow us to succeed if war is forced upon us. The north (and blue states in general) used to have these positive factors, but through several decades of socialist policies they have unwittingly delivered them to us. Have faith my friend.

With all due respect to Mr. Lind, I would be inclined to trust the judgment of the finest American commander alive, General James Mattis, over an academic.

“Well, that isn’t quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just “the extension of politics by other means.” And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces.”-Lind

To me, Lind doesn’t read enough. Using American history as a short example; what was the Johnson County “Range” War? What was Hatfield-McCoy blood-feud? What was the West Virginia Coal Miners War? What were the Mormon Wars? What was the Battle of Athens, Tennessee in 1946? These were all conflicts that were primarily (or entirely) fought by non-state actors. using conventional, unconventional, and terrorist tactics.
The state has NEVER had a monopoly on warfare, the Mafia and Gang Wars of the last century could very well be interpreted as 4GW conflicts. General Mattis was correct, these kinds of conflicts have been around and ongoing since the dawn of man, but since there are now fewer nation on nation conflicts, these smaller non-state actor wars get more publicity.

“Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call “terrorism,” are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels”

Lol, that’s an insult to the Arab cavalry of old. a guy driving a VBIED, or a bunch of guys riding in the back of a technical do not a cavalry force make. I would be more concerned if Saladin and his army were resurrected.

I’m not a fan of Peter’s politics, but Peters certainly understands the flaws of modern thinking when it comes to warfare! Have you read Mao Tse-Tung’s book on guerilla warfare? His politics where messed up but the man knew guerilla warfare. What about Erwin Rommel’s book on blitzkrieg? What about Julius Caesar’s campaigns? Statists or not, these men were geniuses of warfare.

No Chuck, I’m not saying that Peters is a military genius, but he is (for the most part) a military realist. Too many commanders today are either idealists or political hacks, realist thinking is largely missing. Now, do you have any defense for your theories or are you going to keep playing the my-sources-are-better-than-your-sources game?

30 year wars only happen in rich countries. Santa Claus does not exist. Government does not produce wealth out of nothing to operate itself. Mad Max was just a movie.

Don’t confuse a “bankruptcy” because the government hyperinflated the currency or overpromised social programs, with a bankruptcy because the material wealth of farms, factories, and skilled labor has been harassed by regulation until it vanished.

When the national debt is unsustainable in an otherwise rich nation, there is a danger of the population accepting a strongman to “fix” everything. That often produces genocide. On the other had, when the actual material productive capability has been destroyed, the country collapses like the Soviet Union did, because the government has no practical ability to do anything else to the population.

If 80% of the population starves because the food growing and trucking system breaks down, then there is little tax base, and there will be correspondingly little government and correspondingly much liberty. If every city looks like Detroit, then there is no Northeast seaboard tax base of upper-middle class liberals to tap for welfare. Welfare recipients will either find honest work, be killed trying to steal from preppers, or starve. In none of these cases will they “vote” for more welfare because they aren’t in control, the liberals who donate to political campaigns and write for mass media are.