Monday, June 18, 2012

What Does Iraq’s Sadr Want?

What Moqtada al-Sadr wants out of Iraqi politics has been a major question on the minds of many since the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein. After the 2010 parliamentary elections, the Sadr bloc in parliament at first opposed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s return to power, but then became the main supporters of his second term. Since February 2012 however, Sadr has become one of the premier’s leading critics calling him a dictator, and seemingly leading the push for a no confidence vote against him. A closer look at the bloc’s announcements however, show that it continually makes contradictory statements, convoluting its message, and making it hard to determine its true goals. It appears that Sadr does not want to depose the prime minister at this time, but is rather setting the ground work to challenge his State of Law list in the next round of elections.

Moqtada al-Sadr and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have always had a difficult relationship. After the March 2010 parliamentary elections, the Iraqi National Movement (INM) won the most seats, but the premier immediately set about to out maneuver it. Sadr was initially opposed to Maliki’s return to office, calling him a liar and a schemer, and at one point came out in support of Iyad Allawi and his INM. After some pressure from Tehran, a meeting with Maliki in Qom, Iran, and the prime minister promising Sadr the most cabinet positions, other top offices, and the release of Sadr’s followers who were not charged, but still in prison, Moqtada relented. As a result, the Sadr Trend got the deputy speakership in parliament, and six ministries, the most of any list, in the initial cabinet put together in December 2011. By February 2012 however, the Sadrists started changing their tune. Sadr for example, gave an interview with Ashar al-Awsat that month calling Maliki a dictator. The next month, a Sadr lawmaker compared Maliki to Saddam. At the same time, the Sadrists were standing behind the prime minister’s policies. The list never wavered in its support for trying Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi for instance. That showed that while rhetorically the Sadr Trend as coming out against the premier, it never took any substantive actions. Sadr appeared to be trying to maintain his populace image as someone outside of the government, who was standing up for his people and the general public, but all the time was benefiting from his association with Maliki with his seven positions in the new administration.

April 2012 statement by Sadr responding to one of his followers calling Maliki a dictator (Shatt News)

One of Sadr's main goals has been to increase his influence over the security forces (Getty Images)

Ever since 2003, there has been plenty of speculation about what Moqtada al-Sadr’s goals are within Iraq. Some, such as Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs have speculated that his current actions might be at the behest of Iran to try to keep Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in check. It’s much more likely that Sadr is following his own plans, hence the attempts by Tehran to reign him in. Sadr’s maneuvers have made him a major player in Iraqi politics. The Iraqi National Movement, the Kurdish Coalition, and State of Law have all courted him to try to bring him to their side in the current crisis. This has raised Sadr’s standing amongst the country’s elites, something that he has always wanted since many dismissed him as an upstart and militia leader early on after the U.S. invasion. Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis recently returned from a trip to Iraq where he held discussions with the Sadr movement. They told him that their overall goal was to increase the number of ministries they controlled and positions they held within the security forces. Hiltermann believed that the list did not want Maliki out now, but were positioning themselves for the provincial and parliamentary voting to be held in 2013 and 2014. They could use their critique of the prime minister to gain seats at the expense of State of Law, and perhaps even replace Maliki. If he were able to come out on top again, the Trend would be able to convert their independence from him into even more places in the government as they would still hold a large position within parliament, and thus would be necessary to form a new ruling coalition. In the meantime, this all means that Iraq’s political dispute will continue on for the next several years. Sadr and Maliki will have periods of reconciliation, followed by more back and forth. At the same time, the movement will take no serious action against Maliki, limiting themselves to verbal jabs as they have for the last two years. The government will be deadlocked with no meaningful decisions being made as a result. There will simply be a continuation of the on-going arguments. Nothing is written in stone yet, but Sadr does appear to be committed to his strategy. In the end, he could very well achieve his goals if he is able to resist the intense pressure he will face from Tehran and Maliki.

1 comment:

I agree with you that Sadr is not likely to be acting at the behest of Iran. Visser's line echoes Nimrod Raphaeli who as I recall described Sadr as 'Iran's mouthpiece in Iraq'. That's not to deny that Sadr has ties with Iran, but he is sensitive to the notion that he is a foreign agent and I think his rejection of Ayatollah al-Haeri's fatwa is significant. In fact, according to some sources in Najaf and the Sadrist movement, Sadr made clear that he would only accept such a fatwa from Sistani or al-Fayad, since he sees them as voices acting on behalf of Iraq and not foreign powers.

I believe what foremost motivates Sadr is that he is a relatively young figure eager to establish himself as a kingmaker among political factions if not leading the Shi'a of Iraq, hence his eagerness to 'show up' the likes of Maliki.

On a final point, I note many observers say that Sadr turned to Iran after the U.S. began targeting him. Isn't it also relevant to consider the fact that in 2007 Maliki began turning against the Sadrists to consolidate his power at the time (e.g. shuffling his cabinet to exclude the Sadrists) as he no longer perceived the Sunni insurgency to be an existential threat, in contrast to the previous year when his forces were protecting the Mahdi Army in the sectarian civil war centred on Baghdad?

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News, and I have been interviewed by Rudaw English. I was interviewed on CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com