Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Theistic Arguments Series: Leibniz’s Cosmological Argument

In my previous post, I made several points about deductive arguments, briefly summarized here, with some additional discussion:

1. The argument should be stated precisely, using clearly defined terms.

Imprecisely defined terms are the cause of endless debate over whether an argument succeeds. They lead to equivocation. Often, people will disagree about whether a particular statement is true because they don't interpret the statement in the same way. I find that this situation can go unrecognized, and the parties to the debate end up talking past each other, without realizing that a statement means something different to each of them, and this can affect their view of the logical validity of the argument.

2. There is no information in the conclusion that is not contained in the premises.

Logical operations merely manipulate the existing information included in the premises to arrive at a conclusion. Often, arguments depend on assumptions that are not explicitly stated. These assumptions form part of the information that is purported to be "proven" in the conclusion. This should be avoided, because it is easy for an assumption to be taken for granted that would be disputed if it was stated explicitly. Even if an assumption is not stated, it must be regarded as a premise to the conclusion. A good argument should state its assumptions.

3. The premises must be proven if the argument is to succeed.

This is a logical necessity. Either the premise is based on axiomatic truth (something to which all reasonable people would agree), or its truth must be demonstrated. Assumptions that form part of the argument are typically taken for granted without being proven, but they cannot be allowed to pass without challenge. If there is legitimate disagreement about the truth of a premise or assumption, then the argument has not succeeded.

(1) Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.

(2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.

(3) The universe exists.

(4) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence.

(5) Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God.

This is an example of the general form of argument called argument from first cause. It is also an example of the things I discussed that make for bad arguments. Let's examine them.

1. Is this argument stated precisely with well-defined terms?

No. In particular, it uses the word 'explanation' in a confusing manner that appears to be conflated with 'cause'. An explanation is not a cause. An explanation is something that people devise as a rationalization. It may or may not be true, and has no bearing on what actually causes something. Premise (1) says that everything has an explanation. That is not true. If something exists that we are completely unaware of, and we have never attempted to explain its existence, then there exists no explanation for it. Furthermore, before there were people to explain things, there was no explanation for the universe. The argument is really about causes, and so it should be restated in terms of causes rather than explanations. That would serve to eliminate the kind of confusion that leads to statement (2), which is also false. I could say that the universe is explained by fairies scattering pixie dust, which magically transforms into worlds. It may not be a good explanation, but it is an explanation, and the explanation is not God. So (2), as stated, is false.

Now you may think that my objection is too nit-picky, but if 'cause' is meant when the term 'explanation' is used, try substituting the word and read the argument again. You will easily see that it becomes a blatantly circular argument.

2. Does this argument contain unstated assumptions that form part of the conclusion?

Yes. One is that all physical things must have a cause that is external to themselves. This excludes the possibility of something existing as a brute fact. If the universe (or the thing from which the universe spawns) exists as a brute fact, it has no cause. To insist that it must have an external cause is nothing more than special pleading. Another assumption is the prohibition of an infinite regress. Why can't there be an eternal succession of worlds spawning worlds? There's no mathematical axiom or law of physics that prohibits it. A third assumption is the uniqueness and attributes of the ultimate cause. It is said that this cause must be God. It is assumed that there is one and only one such cause, and that this God must have the attributes of a god, including omniscience and omnipotence. Otherwise, it wouldn't be acceptable to theists as the ultimate cause of the universe. These assumptions are common among arguments from first cause.

It's OK to make assumptions, but you need to back them up with real justification. Which brings me to the next question:

3. Are the premises to this argument (including unstated assumptions) proven?

No. None of the assumptions identified above are proven. The first two have some rational justification, but the justification falls short of proof. In our human experience, we see that physical objects and events have causes. But our experience doesn't extend to transcendent things (ie, things that may exist outside the space-time of our universe). We simply don't know what's behind the curtain. In our finite world, there are no infinite sets of physical things, but what do we know about what might exist outside the confines of our own little world? The assumption of a godly being is not only unproven, but it doesn't even have rational justification that I can see. What if this creator had no knowledge of what it was doing? Can theists prove that it does? Or do they posit these attributes simply because that's what they want to believe?

19 comments:

im-skeptical wrote: "No. In particular, it uses the word 'explanation' in a confusing manner that appears to be conflated with 'cause'. An explanation is not a cause. An explanation is something that people devise as a rationalization. It may or may not be true, and has no bearing on what actually causes something."

OK, you've gone completely off the rails here; you're turning the argument into a straw man. The use of explanation in this argument has absolutely nothing to do with psychological states. Step back, for a moment and think about what you wrote. Is it a rationalization to say that the explanation for nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and bleeding (from the eyes) is the Ebola virus? No, of course not. Even before anyone knew what the Ebola virus is, the Ebola virus is still the explanation for the aforementioned symptoms.

I also can assure you that absolutely zero equivocation going on in this argument.

To be fair to you, even philosophers can be tripped up by the cause/explanation distinction, and I admit that I've gotten a little careless, at times, with this distinction. The fact that you still think that equivocation is going on tells me that I failed to properly explain this argument to you, so I'm going to try again.

First off, let's define the word explain. "Explain: to make clear the cause or reason of; account for (Dictionary.com)." I think it might help clarify things to use the phrase account for to talk about explanation. So, when premise one of the argument says that everything that exists has an explanation in an external cause or through its own nature it's saying that contingent objects, like us, can be accounted for by other contingent objects or by a necessary object. It's also saying that some objects can be accounted for by their nature, i.e. they exist necessarily in all possible worlds.

Premise two says that if the universe has an explanation, or can be accounted for, then that explanation is God. Now, if the universe has no explanation then it would be an eternal brute fact (EBF), and so would not be accounted for by anything. However, premise one has ruled out brute facts, and for good reason, as there is no evidence that they exist and the world be much more chaotic as elephants and other things would just pop into existence without cause.

Since EBF's have been ruled out, the universe must either be explained through its own nature, or accounted for by something external to itself. Our universe cannot exist in all possible worlds (such as a world without matter), so it's not a necessary object. The universe is taken to be the first contingent object, but if it turns out that there is a prior contingent object then we can kick it back to contingent object one (c1). Since EBF's have been ruled out and the universe is contingent the only way to explain, or account for, it is through a necessary object. The list of necessary objects include abstract objects and transcendent beings. Since abstract objects have no causal power, the necessary object that accounts for the universe is a transcendent being i.e. God.

Premise three makes the uncontroversial claim that the universe exists. From the fist three premises we can conclude that the universe has an explanation, and that explanation is God.

im-skeptical wrote: "Yes. One is that all physical things must have a cause that is external to themselves. This excludes the possibility of something existing as a brute fact."

Although the existence of an EBF is possible, it is not plausible. We have no good reason to think that an EBF exists, and saying that something is logically possible is not persuasive because almost anything is logically possible. The question is whether that logically possible thing is plausible.

im-skeptical wrote: "Another assumption is the prohibition of an infinite regress. Why can't there be an eternal succession of worlds spawning worlds?"

This is a metaphysically untenable position. Why can't there be an eternal succession of people? Well, person one (p1) is going to have to give birth to them-self before they can give birth to p2. How can p1 give birth to them-self if they don't exist. Since contingent p1 can't be accounted for contingent p2...pn are not accounted for, and so the whole chain fails to exist.

im-skeptical wrote: "A third assumption is the uniqueness and attributes of the ultimate cause."

I dealt with this is in a long explanation in the previous thread.

im-skeptical wrote: "No. None of the assumptions identified above are proven. The first two have some rational justification, but the justification falls short of proof."

Not only do these assumptions have good rational justification they are more plausible than their denial. I think it is true that this argument is not necessarily true, however it is probably true. I don't think it is reasonable to categorically reject this argument due to the outside chance that an EBF might exist. We have absolute, mathematical certainty about very few things, so often we must go by what is most probably true. As Lionel Ruby, the author of "Logic: An introduction," writes, "Every person who is interested in logical thinking accepts what we shall call the 'law of rationality,' which may be stated as follows: We ought to justify our conclusions by adequate evidence…. By 'adequate evidence' we mean evidence which is good and sufficient in terms of the kind of proof which is required. There are occasions when we require conclusive proof, as in mathematics, and there are occasions when it is sufficient to establish the probability of a given conclusion, as in weather prediction. But in all cases the evidence must be adequate to its purpose."

Also, Dr. William Lane Craig says that a good argument can have premises that are more plausible than their denial. He writes, "Now keep in mind what I mean by a 'good argument.' I mean an argument which (i) is logically valid; (ii) has true premisses; and (iii) has premisses which are more plausible than their negations. In order to show that an argument is no good, it is not enough for the sceptic to show that it’s possible that a premiss is false. Possibilities come cheap. I’m puzzled that so many laymen seem to think that merely stating another possibility is sufficient to defeat a premiss. This is mistaken, for the premisses of an argument need be neither necessary nor certain in order for that argument to be a good one. The detractor of the argument needs to show either that the premiss in question is false or that its negation is just as plausibly true as the premiss itself." I think that this is a reasonable position because expecting absolute proof will lead us to reject almost all arguments. If you're being a consistent skeptic then you should doubt the existence of the external world, as the existence of it is neither scientifically proven (science just assumes its existence) or philosophically proven with absolute certainty. In the face of a lack of certainty about most things we must go by what is most likely true, or be forever be enveloped by the darkness of skepticism.

im-skeptical wrote: "The assumption of a godly being is not only unproven, but it doesn't even have rational justification that I can see."

The argument shows that most likely the explanation of the universe is a transcendent being. As to God's attributes, I already explained how the attributes of God flow from this argument in the last thread.

Let start with 'explanation'. Statement (1) clearly says that everything has an explanation of its existence. If we take that at face value, then why are the next three statements needed? They end up at the same point: the universe has an explanation of its existence. We already knew that. The only additional bit of information introduced is the assertion that the explanation is God. But I think it makes more sense if you understand that the word 'explanation' is being used in a different sense. Statement (2) says "If the universe has an explanation ...", meaning "If the universe has a cause ...".

There's no question in my mind that the word 'explanation' is being used equivocally here. I think after statement (1), he means 'cause' when he says 'explanation'. If he means 'cause' he should say 'cause'. But if he means 'explanation', then statements (2), (3), and (4) can be replaced with "God is the explanation of the universe's existence."

You may disagree about this, but that goes back to my original point: "The argument should be stated precisely, using clearly defined terms." If that were the case, we wouldn't be having this discussion.

Keith: "Although the existence of an EBF is possible, it is not plausible. We have no good reason to think that an EBF exists, and saying that something is logically possible is not persuasive because almost anything is logically possible. The question is whether that logically possible thing is plausible."

If the argument was stated in terms of probabilities, statement (1) would say "It is likely that everything that exists has an explanation of its existence ...", and the conclusion would say "the likely explanation of the existence of the universe is God." But that's not what is says. This argument is stated as a proof. The assumption that there is no EBF is made in no uncertain terms. It is ruled out altogether.

Keith: "This [the possibility of an infinite regress] is a metaphysically untenable position."

It is untenable in the metaphysics of a theist, who must have faith that God is the first cause of everything. I don't share that faith, so I don't share your metaphysics. You think a transcendent being (which is God) exists, I think a transcendent thing (of some kind) exists, but I don't claim to know what it is.

Keith: "I dealt with this is in a long explanation in the previous thread."

So did I.

Keith: "Not only do these assumptions have good rational justification they are more plausible than their denial."

You think they are more plausible because your faith dictates your metaphysics. Your metaphysics assumes the existence of God, and all logic flows from that. I don't think those assumptions are more plausible, because I don't share your faith and your metaphysics. In fact, I think the existence of a God is most unlikely, and the existence of a mindless reality is much more plausible. And unlike God, that possibility is supported by observation.

im-skeptical wrote: "Statement (1) clearly says that everything has an explanation of its existence. If we take that at face value, then why are the next three statements needed?"

Because one premise is not an argument, it's just a premise. Premise one says nothing in particular about the universe. Premises two and three deal with the existence of the universe and what kind of object it is as well as what kind of explanation it must have.

im-skeptical wrote: "There's no question in my mind that the word 'explanation' is being used equivocally here. I think after statement (1), he means 'cause' when he says 'explanation'. If he means 'cause' he should say 'cause'. But if he means 'explanation', then statements (2), (3), and (4) can be replaced with "God is the explanation of the universe's existence."

Well, you're flat out wrong, but I still believe that you're capable of understanding why you're all mixed-up about this issue. I think it should be fairly obvious why the word explanation is used in premise one rather than cause because few people believe that everything that exists has a cause--certainly a theist would not believe this. For the argument to logically follow we can't talk about explanations in premise one and then switch to talking about causes in the next premise, so the argument is properly formulated in this regard. Now, did the formulator of this argument mean to say explanation in premise two? Yes, because premise two, and its argumentation, are establishing that the universe is not a necessary object and that it is the first contingent object; that as the first contingent object its explanation could only come from God. The reason why replacing "explanation" with "cause" doesn't work is if the universe is a necessary object then the second half of premise two makes no sense because a necessary object doesn't need to be explained by another necessary object. Also, if the universe was caused by another contingent object then the universe would be directly by it and not God. Premise three simply states that the universe exists. Four is the first conclusion and simply follows from premises one and three.

Since you demand that theists prove, with absolute certainty, that God exists do demand that all arguments be proven with absolute certainty? Do you believe that a world exists outside of your mind, even it has not been proven with absolute certainty? If you do believe in the existence of the external world despite a lack of certainty why do disbelieve the existence of a God, who can't be proven with absolute certainty?

im-skeptical wrote: "If the argument was stated in terms of probabilities, statement (1) would say "It is likely that everything that exists has an explanation of its existence ...", and the conclusion would say "the likely explanation of the existence of the universe is God." But that's not what is says."

An inductive argument could be formed, but this is a deductive arguments that shows that most likely God is the explanation of the universe.

im-skeptical wrote: "It is untenable in the metaphysics of a theist, who must have faith that God is the first cause of everything."

This is a complete non-sequiter, faith in God has nothing to do the problem of an infinite chain of contingents. Explain to me how contingent p1 could be the cause of contingent p2 if p1 has no cause and therefore doesn't exist.

im-skeptical wrote: "You think they are more plausible because your faith dictates your metaphysics. Your metaphysics assumes the existence of God, and all logic flows from that."

I think this argument is more plausible than its denial because all experience shows that things have explanations for their existence, and there is no good reason to think that there is an exception it.

It certainly does. It says the universe has an explanation for its existence, unless you want to contend that the universe is not part of "everything that exists". Guess what - that is exactly what statement (4) says. The existence of the universe is built into the statement. Statement (4) is little more than a tautology, unless you feel that it's necessary to first go through the formality of establishing that the universe exists. I find this quite strange, because you don't seem to think it is necessary to establish that God exists before asserting that God is the cause (or 'explanation') of the universe.

Keith: "but I still believe that you're capable of understanding why you're all mixed-up about this issue."

I understand what 'explanation' means, and I understand what 'cause' means, and I understand that this argument conflates them. Apparently, you don't agree, so this will remain an issue of disagreement between us.

Keith: "For the argument to logically follow we can't talk about explanations in premise one and then switch to talking about causes in the next premise ..."

If you reformulate the argument to remove any possible equivocation, you will see what I mean. This argument is about causes, not about explanations. That's why it is classified as an argument from first cause, like the entire genre of cosmological arguments. You need to admit that.

Keith: "you demand that theists prove, with absolute certainty ..."

No, I don't. I am criticizing an argument that takes for granted that God is the cause of the universe, without even considering other possibilities. You say this is "more plausible than its denial" precisely because you make this assumption. To anyone who doesn't make this assumption up front, it's not more plausible.

Keith: "faith in God has nothing to do the problem of an infinite chain of contingents. Explain to me how contingent p1 could be the cause of contingent p2 if p1 has no cause and therefore doesn't exist."

The scenario you describe is completely nonsensical. This is because your scenario presumes a first cause in order to show that the absence of first cause is absurd. That's circular reasoning. Here's something more sensible: Contingent object p(0) is caused by contingent object p(-1), which is caused by contingent object p(-2). For every n, contingent object p(n) is caused by another contingent object p(n-1). That describes an infinite regress without any logical absurdity whatsoever. I repeat what I said earlier: this metaphysical necessity of a first cause is based entirely on your belief in God. If you didn't first assume this God as the first cause of everything, then there would no no logical necessity to have a first cause at all.

Keith: "Last I saw you didn't deal with my comments on the attributes of God."

- Transcendent: OK, no argument.- Changeless: Non sequitur. An eternal thing can change, and can still cause a contingent object to exist.- Immaterial: Non sequitur. The universe could be caused by an eternal succession of material things.- Omnipotent: Non sequitur. It could very well be constrained by the (transcendent) laws of nature.- Personal: Non sequitur. People are personal. Nature is not. - Mindful: Non sequitur. Without brains, there are no minds.All these attributes are nothing more than presumptions and wishful thinking. You presume that the genesis of the universe had to be an act of volition. You presume that it must have been Mr. Wonderful who made it happen. You presume that Mr. Wonderful can do anything. You presume that Mr. Wonderful is your good buddy. Etc, etc. You know none of these things.

Keith: "What evidence do you have that the EBF exists?"

I said it is a possibility. The evidence we have is far more consistent with the EBF than with your God. We both agree that some transcendent thing is plausible. The question is: what is the nature of that thing? We don't see immaterial beings - we see only physical things. We don't see volition in the unfolding of events - we see that things happen in predictable patterns. We don't see some benevolent presence watching out for us - we see that life often hangs by a thread, and can be extinguished in a flash.

im-skeptical wrote: "- Changeless: Non sequitur. An eternal thing can change, and can still cause a contingent object to exist."

You're missing the point. What would account for the change in state in state of a physical object? An immaterial object needs no accounting for a change of state because there are no changes of state.

im-skeptical wrote: "- Immaterial: Non sequitur. The universe could be caused by an eternal succession of material things."

You're assuming that matter has always existed. What proof do we have the matter has always existed? Just because matter currently exists it doesn't follow that it has always existed.

im-skeptical wrote: "- Omnipotent: Non sequitur. It could very well be constrained by the (transcendent) laws of nature."

Did you mean to say, It could very well be [explained] by the (transcendent) laws of nature"? First of all, you're assuming that the laws of nature exist as a brute fact. Secondly, even if the laws of nature exist as some sort of Platonic object how can they cause anything without the existence of matter/energy?

I never said that nature is personal. I'm saying that the existence of nature can be explained personally in that God can decide to create it. If nature has an explanation which is not a transcendent being then we'd have to assume that the explanation involves randomness. If the explanation involves randomness then why did the random event not occur prior to 13.8 billion years ago?

im-skeptical wrote: " - Mindful: Non sequitur. Without brains, there are no minds."

Your second statement commits the argument from ignorance fallacy. It's funny that when the preponderance of evidence goes in favor of God you claim that mere a possibility is enough to make us doubt God's existence, and yet when the preponderance of evidence goes against God you're quick to ignore the possibility that minds are immaterial by saying that the absence of evidence is evidence of absence. I'm not going to psychologize your motivation in reasoning, as you have with me, but I'm awfully tempted to.

Keith: "Did you mean to say, It could very well be [explained] by the (transcendent) laws of nature"? First of all, you're assuming that the laws of nature exist as a brute fact. Secondly, even if the laws of nature exist as some sort of Platonic object how can they cause anything without the existence of matter/energy? "

First I did mean to say 'constrained'. This is an argument against the necessity of omnipotence. Whatever made the universe could have done it while being constrained to act within those laws. Omnipotence is not necessary. Second, I don't believe or imply that anything exists as a Platonic object, nor do I assert that natural laws, in their own right, have any causal efficacy.

Keith: "I'm saying that the existence of nature can be explained personally in that God can decide to create it."

"can be explained personally" ?? I thought you were claiming that it must be explained by a God that has the attribute of being personal.

Keith: "... why did the random event not occur prior to 13.8 billion years ago? "

How do you know it didn't? How do you know it hasn't been happening for all eternity? How do you know ours isn't just one in an infinite set of cosmoses?

Keith: "yet when the preponderance of evidence goes against God you're quick to ignore the possibility that minds are immaterial by saying that the absence of evidence is evidence of absence."

Again. you misunderstand. I'm arguing against your insistence that God must have a mind. I'm not ignoring the possibilities - you are. Observation tells us that minds occur only where there is a brain. This is true 100% of the time. You have no evidence to assume otherwise. But the universe may still have been caused by a purely random event. What makes you think it wasn't?

im-skeptical wrote: "Whatever made the universe could have done it while being constrained to act within those laws. Omnipotence is not necessary."

There could be an inexplicable change of state in whatever physical object that has inexplicably existed forever, but this assumes that matter/energy and space have always existed.

im-skeptical wrote: "'can be explained personally' ?? I thought you were claiming that it must be explained by a God that has the attribute of being personal."

I'm saying that the existence of nature can most likely be explained through the choice of an ultra powerful, transcendent being.

im-skeptical wrote: "How do you know it didn't? How do you know it hasn't been happening for all eternity? How do you know ours isn't just one in an infinite set of cosmoses?"

It's possible that the observable universe has existed eternally, but the scientific consensus is that the universe is ~13.8 billion years old.

Oscillating models of the universe have fallen out of favor as it is not congruent with the Hawking-Penrose Singularity Theorems. Also, the fact is that the universe has been rapidly expanding for 13.8 billion years, and there is no reason to think that the universe will suddenly reverse into a Big Crunch.

Even if a multiverse exists, the question of what can account its existence remains.

im-skeptical wrote: "I'm arguing against your insistence that God must have a mind. I'm not ignoring the possibilities - you are. Observation tells us that minds occur only where there is a brain. This is true 100% of the time. You have no evidence to assume otherwise. But the universe may still have been caused by a purely random event. What makes you think it wasn't?"

Well, first of all, if the universe's existence is explained through the existence of a necessary object then it only makes sense to say that the necessary object is a being with a mind, as it's ludicrous to think that the number two caused the universe.

Secondly, we don't definitively know that the mind equals the brain. Observation tells us that animals do have nervous systems, and that animals physical bodies can't survive without a functioning brain. However, this does not show that a mind can't exist apart from a brain or that all beings have brains.

If the universe was caused by an inexplicable random event from an inexplicable physical object then why did this only happen once 13.8 billion years ago and why does the object only create universes? Shouldn't we be seeing all kinds of things randomly and inexplicably popping into existence?

im-skeptical wrote: "It certainly does. It says the universe has an explanation for its existence, unless you want to contend that the universe is not part of 'everything that exists'."

Go back and read premise one. Does it actually mention the universe? No, of course it doesn't. We know, from premise one, that for any object x, x has an explanation for its existence. Premise two introduces a certain object x, which is the universe, and then deals with what type of explanation it has. We're going from the general to the specific here.

im-skeptical wrote: "Guess what - that is exactly what statement (4) says. The existence of the universe is built into the statement. Statement (4) is little more than a tautology, unless you feel that it's necessary to first go through the formality of establishing that the universe exists."

Four is not a statement or tautology, it is the first conclusion of the argument which follows from premises one and three.

im-skeptical wrote: "I find this quite strange, because you don't seem to think it is necessary to establish that God exists before asserting that God is the cause (or 'explanation') of the universe."

The whole point of the argument is to establish the existence of God.

im-skeptical wrote: "I understand what 'explanation' means, and I understand what 'cause' means, and I understand that this argument conflates them...If you reformulate the argument to remove any possible equivocation, you will see what I mean. This argument is about causes, not about explanations."

The equivocation only exists in your mind. What you're saying does not even make any sense. If this argument is about causes then the first premise becomes absurd because you're saying that even necessary objects have causes. Taking a literal interpretation of premise two makes complete sense because it's dealing with what accounts for the existence of the universe.

im-skeptical wrote: "That's why it is classified as an argument from first cause, like the entire genre of cosmological arguments. You need to admit that."

I don't need to admit anything because you're getting the cosmological arguments mixed up. The Kalam deals with the first cause, while this argument deals with the question of why there is something rather than nothing.

im-skeptical wrote: "I am criticizing an argument that takes for granted that God is the cause of the universe, without even considering other possibilities. You say this is "more plausible than its denial" precisely because you make this assumption."

I think that most people who defend this argument and really understand this argument realize that the existence of an EBF is logically possible, however they take this argument to be more plausible than its denial because all evidence shows that things have explanations for their existence.

im-skeptical wrote: "That's circular reasoning. Here's something more sensible: Contingent object p(0) is caused by contingent object p(-1), which is caused by contingent object p(-2). For every n, contingent object p(n) is caused by another contingent object p(n-1). That describes an infinite regress without any logical absurdity whatsoever. I repeat what I said earlier: this metaphysical necessity of a first cause is based entirely on your belief in God."

You're assertion that my incredulity about an infinite chain stems from my belief in God commits the genetic fallacy, as the truth or falsity of the chain has nothing to do with my belief in God. By the way, if I were to revert back to atheism, I would hold to the possibility of an EBF, as I don't think that even the magic of infinity can account for the fact that some contingent in the chain won't have a cause.

Keith: "Go back and read premise one. Does it actually mention the universe? ... Four is not a statement or tautology, it is the first conclusion of the argument which follows from premises one and three."

(1) mentions "everything", and the universe is a subset of that. But this is a silly diversion. I think the argument takes three statements to say what could be said in one. But if you think it's necessary to first assert that something exists before saying anything more about it, fine. Then be consistent, and assert that God exists before positing Gos as the explanation for the universe.

Keith: "The whole point of the argument is to establish the existence of God."

And this is done by first claiming that God is the cause (or explanation) of the universe's existence (2), and then concluding that God is the cause (or explanation) of the universe's existence (5). Can you say "circular reasoning"?

Keith: "The equivocation only exists in your mind."

OK, then provide a precise definition of the word 'explanation' that fits for all occurrences of the word in this argument.

Keith: "I don't need to admit anything because you're getting the cosmological arguments mixed up. The Kalam deals with the first cause, while this argument deals with the question of why there is something rather than nothing."

Most philosophers agree that this argument is based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), otherwise known as "The Causal Principle". Read about it here. The argument does not answer the question"why there is something rather than nothing?" It certainly doesn't tell us why there is a God rather than no God. (Just asserting that God is necessary doesn't answer the question. Why can't there be no God? God may be necessary in your view to explain existence, but it still doesn't explain non-existence.)

Keith: "I think that most people who defend this argument and really understand this argument realize that the existence of an EBF is logically possible, however they take this argument to be more plausible than its denial because all evidence shows that things have explanations for their existence."

Make that "most theists". If you're not a theist, God as an explanation is not most plausible. I say again: this assumption is based on an a priori belief in God.

Keith: "You're assertion that my incredulity about an infinite chain stems from my belief in God commits the genetic fallacy, as the truth or falsity of the chain has nothing to do with my belief in God."

The argument you gave is mathematically unsound. It is not valid logic. The logical possibility of an infinite series is mathematically valid. Your incredulity is not based on valid logic.

Keith: "I don't think that even the magic of infinity can account for the fact that some contingent in the chain won't have a cause."

im-skeptical wrote: "(1) mentions "everything", and the universe is a subset of that. But this is a silly diversion. I think the argument takes three statements to say what could be said in one."

This criticism of logic is like someone saying, "Scientists waste so much time and effort finding random samples and setting up controls--they should just start testing things." Scientists could just carelessly run experiments on the variable, but then their results would not be very reliable. In much the same way, someone could just assert something, but then that assertion is not necessarily true, and in fact may be wrong. If an argument moves from universal truths to particular truths then the conclusion(s) of that argument will be necessarily true.

im-skeptical wrote: "But if you think it's necessary to first assert that something exists before saying anything more about it, fine. Then be consistent, and assert that God exists before positing Gos as the explanation for the universe...Can you say "circular reasoning"?"

You're still not understanding what's going on this argument. Premise one deals with the universal truth that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence and is either contingent or necessary. Premise two says that if there's a particular entity called the universe, which is the first contingent object, and it has an explanation then it would be explained by another particular necessary object, God. Premise three says that the particular object, the universe, actually exists. Since we know, via premise one, that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence and that the universe exists, from premise three, we can conclude the universe has a cause of its existence. Finally, from premise two and the first conclusion (4) we can conclude that God is the explanation of the universe, as the universe, which exists as the first contingent thing, can only be explained via a transcendent being, as the only other possible necessary objects are abstract objects which have no causal power.

You see, from the existence of the universe we can deduce that God exists.

im-skeptical wrote: "OK, then provide a precise definition of the word 'explanation' that fits for all occurrences of the word in this argument."

I go back to account for. The online Oxford English Dictionary defines explain as, "To make clear the cause, origin, or reason of; to account for." This works for un-caused necessary objects which exist through, "the necessity of [their] own nature." This also works in the case of the existence of the universe which can be accounted for by the existence of a necessary being who created it.

im-skeptical wrote: "Most philosophers agree that this argument is based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), otherwise known as "The Causal Principle".

You're certainly right about the PSR, which is one of the first principles of logic, as the first premise of the argument restates it. The PSR is also known as "the principle of causality," however the principle is not dealing with causal mechanisms. D.Q. McInerny in "Being Logical" writes, "[The PSR] states that everything that actually exists in the physical universe has an explanation for its existence. What is implied in the principle is that nothing in the physical universe is self-explanatory or the cause it-self."

im-skeptical wrote: "The argument does not answer the question"why there is something rather than nothing?" It certainly doesn't tell us why there is a God rather than no God. (Just asserting that God is necessary doesn't answer the question. Why can't there be no God? God may be necessary in your view to explain existence, but it still doesn't explain non-existence.)

According to Dr. William Lane Craig the Leibnizian cosmological argument does deal with the question of why is there something rather than nothing. He writes, "In 'The Monadology' Leibniz formulates his Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as follows: "no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise." On the basis of this principle Leibniz held that there must be a sufficient reason why anything at all exists. He went on to argue that the sufficient reason cannot be found in any individual thing in the universe, nor in the collection of such things which is the universe, nor in earlier states of the universe, even if these regress infinitely. Therefore, there must exist an ultra-mundane being which is metaphysically necessary in its existence, that is to say, its non-existence is impossible. It is the sufficient reason for its own existence as well as for the existence of every contingent thing.” So, this argument accounts for the existence of the universe, the first contingent object which must have some explanation for its existence, through the existence of a necessary being who caused the universe to exist. So, if God doesn't exist then nothing would exist, but since a universe (which is something) exists its existence can be accounted by the existence of God.

im-skeptical wrote: "Make that "most theists". If you're not a theist, God as an explanation is not most plausible. I say again: this assumption is based on an a priori belief in God."

How about un-biased people who are not in either the theist or atheist camps? The PSR, which is one of the first principles of logic, states that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence, and all experience shows that things in the physical world are finite and have explanations for their existence. Given this information, an un-biased person is not lead to conclude that an eternal physical brute fact is the cause of the world.

im-skeptical wrote: "The argument you gave is mathematically unsound. It is not valid logic. The logical possibility of an infinite series is mathematically valid. Your incredulity is not based on valid logic."

The concept of infinity might be a useful fiction in calculus, but the fact that this concept is used in math does not to show that an infinity in the past has been instantiated or that an infinite chain of contingent beings can actually exist. I come back to the distinction between logically possible things and likely things. It's logically possible that a unicorn might pop into existence in the room where I'm writing this, but it's certainly not likely.

In conclusion, I think that the Leibnizian cosmological argument successfully shows that God is the most likely explanation of the universes existence. I do concede that this argument, due to our ignorance about the true nature of existence, fails to demonstrate with absolute certainty that God exists. However, I think that a consistent skeptic who rejects this argument, due to its inability to prove with absolute certainty that God exists, aught to also reject the existence of an external world and scientific truths, as these things are not proven with absolute certainty. It is inconsistent to demand that God's existence be proven with absolute certainty, and not demand that the existence of an external be proven with absolute certainty.

This is my final response, as I've spent as much time as I want to on this discussion. Thanks for the discussion, im-skeptical, it was interesting.

Keith: Scientists could just carelessly run experiments on the variable, but then their results would not be very reliable. In much the same way, someone could just assert something, but then that assertion is not necessarily true, and in fact may be wrong."

Scientists and philosophers both make assertions (or hypotheses). The major difference between them is that scientists conduct experimentation to verify their assertions, and philosophers don't. A philosopher may rely on his logic (which can be, and often is flawed) as assurance that his assertion is true, while the scientist abandons the assertion if the experimental verification process shows that it is not true.

Keith: "You're still not understanding what's going on this argument."

Oh, I understand all too well what is going on in this argument. God's existence is assumed (in statement 2) and then concluded (in statement 5). This is circular reasoning. I find it utterly amazing that you are not willing to take the existence of the universe for granted (you feel the need to explicitly assert it), but you are willing to take God's existence for granted (no assertion necessary, it is just assumed, without any other possibility being mentioned).

Keith: "The online Oxford English Dictionary defines explain as ..."

Great. You provide a definition of the verb 'explain', and not for the noun 'explanation', which is used in this argument. Another thing to note is that by this definition, this is something that a human does. As I pointed out in the OP, there are no explanations unless there are humans to make them. Therefore, premise 1, as stated, is clearly false.

Keith: "What is implied in the principle [PSR] is that nothing in the physical universe is self-explanatory or the cause it-self."

What is not implied is that something outside the universe (a transcendent cause), or even that the universe itself must have a cause.

Keith: "So, if God doesn't exist then nothing would exist."

Hence my objection - why can't there be nothing at all (as a logical possibility)? Leibniz's argument does not answer this question.

Keith: "On the basis of this principle [PSR] Leibniz held that there must be a sufficient reason why anything at all exists. He went on to argue that the sufficient reason cannot be found in any individual thing in the universe, nor in the collection of such things which is the universe, nor in earlier states of the universe, even if these regress infinitely."

His argument rests on assumptions taken for granted, without proof.

Keith: "Given this information, an un-biased person is not lead to conclude that an eternal physical brute fact is the cause of the world."

An unbiased person would admit that there are at least three distinct possibilities: 1 - a necessary being, which is God, 2 - some other kind of transcendent thing, which is not God, and 3 - an infinite succession of things. There is no reason for an unbiased person to suppose that God is the only realistic possibility. It is only theistic bias that leads you to think that.

Keith: "The concept of infinity might be a useful fiction in calculus, but the fact that this concept is used in math does not to show that an infinity in the past has been instantiated or that an infinite chain of contingent beings can actually exist."

The objective of this argument is to try to figure out what is a fiction and what isn't. While I agree that in a finite universe we don't see any infinite sets instantiated, we are talking about what exists outside the confines of our finite world. This is something that is outside our experience, so it is not justified to base our belief about what exists on that experience alone. By your logic, God would also be considered a fiction.

Keith: "It's logically possible that a unicorn might pop into existence in the room where I'm writing this, but it's certainly not likely."

Just as likely as God, I'd say.

Keith: "I think that a consistent skeptic who rejects this argument, due to its inability to prove with absolute certainty that God exists, aught to also reject the existence of an external world and scientific truths, as these things are not proven with absolute certainty. It is inconsistent to demand that God's existence be proven with absolute certainty, and not demand that the existence of an external be proven with absolute certainty."

I don't demand absolute proof. I criticize the proof that is offered. But with regard to the existence of an external world, we have our own direct experience as evidence. Not absolute proof, to be sure, but way better than the evidence we have for God.

And I too think we have taken this as far as it is likely to go. My thanks to you as well.