To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .

To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services
Please confirm that you accept the terms of use.

The article examines the content of the constitutional amendments with respect to the Senate. While symmetric bicameralism would be abolished with respect to policymaking, it would be preserved and even exacerbated with respect to constitutional revisions. The consequences of the first would be a reduction of the number of institutional veto players, which would lead to the facilitation of policy change, and an increase in the power of the government (who is the agenda setter). The content of the new policies remains unknown, as are the economic consequences of the proposed changes. Constitutional revisions would become more difficult, because the ideological distance between the Chamber of Deputies and Senate would be likely to increase (because of the mode of selection of Senators), while article 138, which specifies the requirements for amendment to the constitution, would remain the same. As a result, the role of the Italian Constitutional Court would also likely increase.

This article starts with two empirical observations from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries about longer constitutions: (1) they are more rigid (that is, more difficult to amend) and (2) they are in practice more frequently amended. The study presents models of the frequently adopted rules for constitutional revision (for example, qualified majorities in one or two chambers, referendums) and demonstrates that, if longer constitutions are more frequently revised, it is because they must impose actual harm on overwhelming majorities. In trying to explain this finding, the article demonstrates that longer constitutions tend to contain more substantive restrictions. Countries with longer constitutions also tend to have lower levels of GDP per capita and higher corruption. Finally, the negative effect of constitutional length on GDP per capita is shown to persist even if corruption is controlled for.

Coalition theories have produced arguments about the importance of party positions for participation in government coalitions, but have not connected the existing government institutions (in particular agenda setting) with the coalition government that will be formed. This article presents a veto players’ approach to coalition formation, which pushes the logic of non-cooperative game-theoretic models one step further: we argue that policy positions play a significant role in coalition formation because governments in parliamentary systems control the agenda of the policymaking process. As a result, the institutions that regulate this policymaking process affect coalition formation. In particular, positional advantages that a government may have (central policy position of formateur, fewer parties, and small policy distances among coalition partners) will become more necessary as a government has fewer institutional agenda setting advantages at its disposal. The empirical tests presented in this paper corroborate these expectations by explicitly accounting for the conditional effects of policy positions and institutional agenda setting rules on one another in a set of multilevel logit models.

Most intergovernmentalist analyses of European integration focus on treaty bargaining among European Union member governments. Recent articles also have examined everyday decision making through power index analysis, an approach that asserts that a government's ability to influence policy is a function of all possible coalitions in the Council of Ministers to which it is pivotal. This approach suffers from two major weaknesses. First, it fails to take into account the policy preferences of governments; it overestimates the influence of governments holding extreme preferences and underestimates that of more centrist governments. Second, power index analysis fails to consider the important roles of the Commission of the European Communities and the European Parliament in legislative processes. Today's procedures affect the mix of agenda-setting and veto power, and this has systematic effects on policy outcomes. If intergovernmentalism is to explain choices made during treaty rounds, it must take into account these legislative dynamics.

Triple majority for changing the status quo in Treaty of Nice (2001): qualified majority of weighted votes, majority of countries, qualified majority of the population. Convention proposal (2003): requirements from three to two by dropping the qualified majority of weighted votes and reducing the qualified majority threshold of the population from 62% to 60%. Important consequences for the political institutions of the Union: 1) facilitates political decision-making; 2) reduces relative weight of governments participating in the Council and increases the importance of the European Parliament; 3) reduces the role of the judiciary and bureaucracies in the Union in favor of the political process. Consequences of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed in Rome 29 October 2004. Exactly in the middle between Nice and the European Convention.

Ten Latin American presidents have a power that has not received the study that it deserves: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. These “amendatory observations” return to Congress for afinalround of voting. Sometimes the presidential version of the bill becomes the default alternative automatically and may require qualified majorities to be overturned. The authors analyze veto procedures in eighteen Latin American countries and argue that amendatory veto power significantly increases presidential weight in legislative decision making.

We present a unified model of the politics of the European Union (EU). We focus on the effects of the EU's changing treaty base (from the Rome to Amsterdam Treaties) on the relations among its three supranational institutions—the Commission of the European Communities, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament—and between these actors and the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. We analyze these institutional interactions in terms of the interrelationships among the three core functions of the modern state: to legislate and formulate policy (legislative branch), to administer and implement policy (executive branch), and to interpret policy and adjudicate disputes (judicial branch). Our analysis demonstrates that the evolution of the EU's political system has not always been linear. For example, we explain why the Court's influence was greatest before the passage of the Single European Act and declined in the following decade, and why we expect it to increase again in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty. We also explain why the Commission became a powerful legislative agenda setter after the Single European Act and why its power today stems more from administrative discretion than from influence over legislation.

The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-operation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision.

This article investigates hypotheses generated by the veto players' theory. The fundamental insight of this theory is that an increase in the number of veto players (for all practical purposes, in parliamentary systems the number of parties in government) and their ideological distance from one another will reduce the ability of both government and parliament to produce significant laws. In addition, the number of significant laws increases with the duration of a government and with an increase in the ideological difference between current and previous government. These propositions are tested with legislative data (both laws and government decrees) on working time and working conditions identified in two legislative sources: the NATLEX computerized database in Geneva (produced by the International Labour organization) and Blanpain's International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations. The data cover fifteen West European countries for the period 1981–91. The evidence corroborates the proposed hypotheses.

Conference committees are frequently employed to resolve disagreements between chambers that remain after one or more rounds of the navette. In Chapter 5, we pointed out that the importance of conference committees lies in their ability to make proposals to the parent chambers under closed rule, that is, without amendments. Consequently the details of a bicameral compromise are worked out in the conference committee, without possibility of new input from the parent chambers. Delegating the power of agenda setting to the conference committee presents the parent chambers with a serious danger, a “runaway conference” in U.S. terminology (Longley and Oleszek 1989: 4–5). The runaway conference is a conference committee that proposes compromise positions that either differ from the common positions of the chambers or exclude common positions of the chambers.

To avoid this danger, the parent chambers have two ways to rein in conference committees. The first is the explicit, restrictive, and credible specification of the set of acceptable solutions. Where the lower and upper house versions of the bill follow the same structure and disagreements are located at specific points, the conference committee may be restricted to discussing only those aspects remaining in disagreement and to locating a compromise somewhere between the positions of the two parent chambers. Conversely, where the two versions of the bill differ widely, sharing only the topic of legislation, the leeway of the conference committee expands to the maximum. In Chapter 5, we noted that since the compromise must be within the bicameral restrictions, reducing the space contained within bicameral restrictions will reduce the freedom of choice of the committee.

The basic problem with identifying the possible outcomes of a majoritarian decision-making process, such as decisions of unicameral or bicameral legislatures, is the fact that collective preferences, unlike individual ones, are not transitive. This means that although a legislature can prefer outcome a over b, and outcome b over c, by majority rule, it is still possible for the same legislature to prefer outcome c over a. This set of preferences results in unstable decision making; any outcome may be defeated by a majority, and that outcome in turn may be defeated by yet another majority. And the process may be repeated endlessly.

For this reason, the concept of the core became a basic tool in social choice theory and cooperative game theory. The core is the set of points that cannot be defeated by the application of the decision-making rule. So the core of a unicameral institution is the set of points that cannot be defeated by majority or any other decision-making rule; the core of a bicameral legislature is the set of points that cannot be defeated by concurrent majorities in both chambers; and so forth.

For unicameral legislatures, Plott has shown that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a core are very restrictive (Plott 1967: 790). He demonstrated that in a legislature with an odd number of members, a core exists in an n-dimensional legislative space (n > 1) only when it is located on the ideal point of at least one member and the remaining even number of members are “divided into pairs whose interests are diametrically opposed.”

In the preceding chapter we argued that bicameralism stresses one dimension of conflict, the line connecting the centers of the yolks of each chamber. Here we take this finding for granted. We assume conflict along one dimension, either because there is only one policy dimension or because, on the basis of the previous argument, the two chambers are negotiating along line UL of Figure 3.6. This dimension represents the redistributive, or political, dimension of bicameralism described in Chapter 1.

In the following account we present complete and incomplete information models of bargaining. Complete information is the technical term indicating that the two players know each other's payoffs, while incomplete information indicates that some characteristic of one player is unknown to the other player.

Consider the lower house and the upper house as unified players and their ideal positions L and U on a particular bill. Along line segment LU, each house prefers a point that is closer to its own ideal point. Rubinstein (1982, 1985) developed the first bargaining model where two players divide an object between them – in this case, a dollar. One can think of the dollar as a unit segment with each player bargaining for the largest part. Our spatial representation of bargaining in legislatures is similar to the Rubinstein model; one difference is that, in the dollar model, each player is interested in obtaining the biggest possible part, while in our spatial representation, each player wants the smallest part. For reasons of mathematical convenience we will adopt the Rubinstein representation, where each player is interested in maximizing his or her share of the dollar.

Some of the arguments made in this book, such as the proposition that bicameralism makes a change to the status quo more difficult than unicameralism, may seem intuitive, even trivial, to the reader. Other arguments, like the rarity of a bicameral core in more than two dimensions, or empirical evidence, such as the connection between chamber composition and length of intercameral negotiations, dispute the conventional wisdom in the literature or point legislative research in a new direction.

In this chapter we review the different theories and arguments presented in the literature with a critical eye, explaining which are sound and justified, which require restrictions or modifications, and which are false and unsupported by the evidence. Finally, we raise other methodological, theoretical, and empirical issues that merit a more sustained investigation.

The chapter is organized in three sections, ordered from the more specific and the less objectionable to the more general and controversial. The first section deals with topics and ideas that are considered intuitive or at least well known. We show how we generalize these ideas or how we restrict their domain of application. The second section demonstrates that on a series of issues, we disagree both in theory and in evidence with the existing literature. The third part discusses the research agenda generated by this book. Given that some items fall into multiple categories, there is an overlap of subject matter among the three parts.

What difference does it make if a country has a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one? Our purpose in Part II is to outline a framework to answer this question and to analyze the historical and geographic diversity of bicameral institutions. Thus, the overarching research question is supplemented by more detailed investigations of the specific mechanisms of intercameral reconciliation. What difference does it make if the navette system can last for one, or two, or an infinite number of rounds, as exemplified in the procedural rules of Austria, France, and Italy, respectively? What is the effect of a conference committee at the end of the navette instead of a final decision by the upper chamber or the lower one, as exemplified in the procedural rules of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Spain, respectively? Does it make any difference if the government introduces legislation in the lower house first, as required by many constitutions for budgetary matters? Do conference committees affect the outcomes of bicameral bargaining and, if so, how?

Our account demonstrates that bicameral institutions share features that differentiate their outcomes from unicameral ones. In addition, we show how the institutional variations of bicameralism affect relative house power, providing a series of hypotheses that can be tested systematically. Part II constitutes the theoretical foundation on which we conduct empirical analyses in subsequent chapters, so that, in the conclusions, we will be able to assess critically the arguments on bicameralism proposed by various analysts.

Figure II. 1 presents in a nutshell the problem we investigate in this part of the book. The current policy, the status quo, is indicated in the figure by the point SQ.

Given the diverse national paths in the development of bicameral legislatures, it is not surprising to find substantial institutional variation. In this chapter, we explore these institutional differences. The characteristics of lower and upper legislative houses differ on a number of dimensions, and analysts have relied on these differences to explain cross-national variations in upper house power. Although there are variations in size, legislative term of office, turnover, membership, representativeness, and institutional power, two particular characteristics have been emphasized. The first is the membership of the two houses, based on selection methods and categories of citizens represented. The second is the relative power of the two houses as reflected in their mechanisms for resolving intercameral differences. Here we focus on these two critical dimensions of variation.

Political analysts who examine the variation in bicameral institutions argue that bicameralism produces disparate results across countries. Lijphart (1984) attributes variation to the degree of congruence between the two legislative houses and power asymmetries, whereas Mastias and Grangé (1987) focus on upper house legitimacy as the important independent variable.

Lijphart (1984: 99) defines “congruence” as similarity of political composition. Regardless of the variations in selection methods, if the two houses have similar political representation, they are deemed congruent. Disparities in power range from full symmetry, where agreement of the two houses is necessary to enact a law, to total asymmetry, where one house is granted decision-making power. Using these two categories, Lijphart constructs three types of bicameralism. He argues that “strong” bicameral legislatures are characterized by significant differences in composition and by relatively symmetric power. “Weak” bicameral legislatures are characterized either by asymmetric power or by congruent chambers.

In this chapter we present a short recapitulation of our arguments and findings. We began with a review of the historical and geographic dimensions of bicameralism. We pointed out that bicameral institutions are protean and, like the ancient Greek god Proteus, change form. These different forms are accompanied by different analyses and justifications for such institutions. We know that our unscripted excursion in time and space impressed the reader with the variety of forms and functions.

In Part I we demonstrated that bicameral institutions can serve either functional (classes) or geographic diversity (federalism), but diversity does not require bicameral representation. Both stratified and federal societies may be represented by unicameral legislatures. From this account, we want to stress one historical point. Although currently federalism appears to be the only justification for an upper chamber's veto power, federalism was originally organized through unicameral legislatures with qualified majority or unanimity as the decision-making rule.

The institutions of bicameralism are diverse in their specifics, but they involve some form of the navette system, usually followed by some stopping rule: either conference committees, or joint sessions, or the possibility of one chamber to overrule the other. Financial legislation often elicited a different set of institutional rules. The wealth of institutional “details” in Part I may have seemed overwhelming in the beginning.

Part II aimed to organize this diversity and to demonstrate the bottom line consequences of bicameralism. We drew a series of conclusions, some of them singled out as “propositions” in Chapters 3 to 5, others simply discussed in the text. Here we recapitulate briefly.

In the next four chapters we empirically investigate the predictions developed in Part II and compare our findings with alternative theories of bicameralism outlined in Chapter 1. In Chapters 6 and 7, we draw on data from the French Fifth Republic. The prominent position of France is attributable to the complexity of its institutions: the two houses may be equal or, upon decision of the government, unequal; the deliberation may involve a conference committee or not; the navette may conclude after a single round or last indefinitely. With the exception of the United States and the European Union, no other country or institution has bicameral procedures that vary so extensively. Thus, France presents an opportunity to test various dimensions of our models and to evaluate institutional features of the bicameral systems described in Chapter 2 within a single country, so that we can hold a variety of conditions constant.

Chapter 8 relies more heavily on data from other countries in order to capture the variations in conference committee composition, decisionmaking rules, and constraints imposed by the parent chambers – the characteristics of conference committees that are important independent variables in our theoretical models. The tests presented here are far from exhaustive. We strongly believe our models should undergo additional evaluation employing data from a wide variety of countries. Nonetheless, the evidence presented here helps to establish the plausibility of the models developed in Part II.

In Part III, we employ both statistical analysis and case studies to evaluate our theoretical arguments. Undoubtedly, it would be helpful to extend statistical analyses further than we have done in this book.