"In my view, Walt has considerable difficulty fitting al Qaeda and other Islamic terror organizations into his conceptual framework. This is probably true for most or all neo-realists. A school of thought that has the balance of power as its foundational principle is ill-equipped to understand a world in which the primary security threat is from transnational, religiously-inspired terrorist groups. For the U.S. or any other country to base a foreign policy on the assumption that al Qaeda will respond to carrots and sticks in the same manner as states would be the height of folly. "

Very well put. The dominant schools of thought in IR are Liberalism and Realism with Realism having more of an edge among practitioners in the diplomatic corps, intelligence services and staffers on the Hill ( among whom you also find idealists of various stripes). Neither Liberalism nor Realism/Neo- Realism have come to grips with Islamist terrorism or the broader phenomenona of the deterioration of the Westphalian state system, the rise of non-state actors or even, in my view, the implications of globalization. Both schools are simply too state-centric in their analytical orientation and are intellectually very, very, insular. They are not yet getting the context of everything else, nor do I think they will any time soon.

"Many more states are threatened by al Qaeda and/or al Qaeda-inspired terrorism than by aggression from another state. Given the nature of the threat and the unmatched strength of the U.S. military, balance of power theory, if it is to have any validity in the current era, would have to say that other states would have moved into ever-closer relationships with America in the years since 9/11. Except for heightened behind-the-scenes cooperation within the intelligence community, quite the reverse has happened. The counter-argument is that, as has been shown in several public opinion polls, many populations fear U.S. power more than terrorism — even if their governments do not. It would be absurd for America to assign a greater priority to appeasing foreign publics than to eliminating terrorists."

To generalize and simplify Marc's point, globalization has made it far easier for non-state and subnational actors to destabilize nation-states by striking at systemic " choke points" and causing an enormous amount of economic and moral damage via ripple effects at a very low cost in terms of investing resources. Bin Laden spent pennies to cause millions of dollars of damage. On the flip side, state vs. state war between major powers has grown increasingly unlikely.

Hence the increasing popularity and traction in government circles of explanations by defense intellectuals like Dr. Barnett'sPNM theory, William Lind's4GW and John Robb'sGlobal Guerillaism, all of which begin with a strategic and systemic orientation.

"If al Qaeda and the like were not part of the equation, Walt’s thesis — that the Bush Doctrine, because it has intensified anti-Americanism among peoples and governments, and allies and enemies — would have merit. But, not only is al Qaeda part of the equation, it is the most important part of the equation. Given that there is scant evidence that the policies of the Bush Administration has undermined relationships among intelligence organizations, it is far from clear that altering these policies in a manner that would lessen anti-Americanism would aid in the fight against al Qaeda. There may be — and, in my opinion, there is — a trade-off between improving our relations with foreign governments and our overseas approval ratings, and the efficacy of our efforts to defang the Islamic terrorists."

Here I must disagree with my friend Marc.

Of course the Bush Doctrine intensified anti-Americanism - there were many statesmen who were quite content, privately, to see the United States under attack, despite their loud public declarations of sympathy just as there were some genuinely hostile statesmen who were quite alarmed at al Qaida's brazen attack ( if Bin Laden can hit the U.S. then...) and gave the U.S. a surprising amount of sub rosa help. The intelligence information Teheran provided on the Taliban and Iraq was substantial - something neither Khameini nor President Bush are likely to shout from the rooftops.

The Bush Doctrine forced many players to put some cards on the diplomatic table that they would rather have kept in their hand. Regardless of their view of American policy on its merits, I think most foreign leaders would have preferred that we had pretended we were keeping to the status quo even as we toppled the Taliban and invaded Iraq. We denied a lot of important people a face-saving lie in front of their own people and forced them to take a position. Nor does a more assertive " hyperpower" suit any of the would-be regional hegemons from Paris to Moscow to Beijing - their interest lies in a United States that is a passive and restrained stabilizer of the international system.

Now I think the old, Cold War status quo was as dead as Julius Caesar and admitting that the international system is totally broken, as Bush did, will be to the long-term good because eventually it will force the great powers to find a new consensus - but it is undeniable that the Bush Doctrine came with some sizable short term costs.

I suspect I'll get tabbed as a neo-Realist here, but let me ask, does al-Qaeda really threaten states?

It's an attractive phrase, rolls easily off the tongue, but what exactly is it that al-Qaeda (or let's broaden it to similar organizations) is doing that threatens states?

They kill people, yes, and some of them have something like an ideology they want to advance, but so did Timothy McVey and the Red Brigades.

They don't have the resources to mount real wars, in the sense of organized groups of people shooting at each other, or even in the sense of heaving rockets at each other.

They don't seem to have an organized ideology once you get beyond slogans about the caliphate.

Terror is meant to demoralize the opponent with minimal use of resources by groups with minimal resources. This isn't the same as war, although bad judgement on the part of the stronger party can cause something like war, as in Iraq. This gives the advantage to the weaker party by allowing an insurgency better use of Clausewitz's rules.

A strong response to terror would fall largely on the political front via a refusal to fall for this "danger to the state" stuff in the first place.

The Red Brigades were championing a discredited ideology and not a genuinely revolutionary one. And in a NATO country to boot. Their cause was hopeless from the start.

al Qaida - or at least the broad radical Salafist Jihadi movement - does have a coherent ideology and moral critique. It doesn't have much resonance with us but it does in the Muslim world because it reifies powerful existing cultural and religious ideas for its own purposes. It remains an extremist doctrine at present but unlike western imports socialism or pan-Arab nationalism it is indigenous so it shouldn't be underestimated. AQ does not need to command anything more than the support of a significant minority of a state's population to make most Arab states ungovernable.

Secondly, the environment has changed markedly for states since the 1970's thanks to globalization. Pre-globalization limits on commerce, capital and information flows helped make fragile states of dubious legitimacy appear stronger than they really were. The color revolutions have shown that it takes relatively little to topple some of these regimes and al Qaida is quite capable of launching attacks with calculated political effects. They simply have not really exerted themselves to do so in KSA or the gulf states ( if they did Saudi princes would quickly be be blowing up across the Levant)

al Qaida - or at least the broad radical Salafist Jihadi movement - does have a coherent ideology and moral critique.

Not in any way even roughly comparable to the Soviet Union. Note that you have to extend from al-Qaeda to the "broad radical Salafist Jihadi movement." Also, the Soviet Union coupled, strongly, its ideology with a foreign policy, army, and nuclear arsenal. The jihadists have none of these, nor a coherent coupling.

Failed and failing states are a problem, but if they are the only ones vulnerable to the jihadists, then the jihadists aren't a first-order problem.

CKR makes an interesting point and reminds me of an episode of M.A.S.H. involving practical jokes. The winner of the competition succeeded in making the loser believe that a horrible practical joke was coming his way -- when none was planned.

This also reminds me of thoughts expressed by Alan Sullivan on my blog about 9/11 and 5GW: that the attack on WTC was very much like a 5GW maneuver. We could overreact in one of several ways: including increasing bureaucracy, excessive spending, and, now it seems, internal political strife.

On the other hand, CKR's assertion that AQ does not have missiles and nukes, etc., may only represent a present situation (if at all) and doesn't take into account the resources AQ would gain if a significant number of failed states were won by AQ -- or, aligned with AQ (as in the case of N. Korea?) Also, if states fail badly enough, leading to genocides and plagues and civil wars etc., the U.S. and other core states would be very tempted to step into the fracas; so, AQ wouldn't need to acquire those states so much as create situations that would deplete U.S. resources or serve as major distractions and further catalysts for future internal domestic political strife in the U.S.

I.e., even if the endeavor in Iraq is viewed as a mistake by CKR, the same sort of bad intervention could be accomplished via the instigation of civil wars, plagues, genocides, etc....AQ, as a great disrupter, uses disruptions to drain and preoccupy the great organizer/stabilizer (U.S., Core) until said stabilizer destabilizes.

I should have clarified: if failed states are "won" by AQ, it could merely mean that whoever ascends to the throne, via coup or election, is sympathetic to AQ's cause or at least to anti-globalization or even merely anti-American or anti-Chinese or anti-whatever.

As for keeping states: that wouldn't necessarily be an issue. Imagine the U.S. stepping in to overthrow a genocidal antiglobalist and then spending umpteen years trying to rebuild that state... AQ would have lost control of the state, or influence over the state, or whatever, but would have gained by America's distraction and all the things that come with the distraction. (Such as political instability/friction within the U.S., or financial dilemma, or frictions between the U.S. and other state supporters/allies of the overthrown dictator...) I.e., imagine all the things you don't like about GWB's response to 9/11, and consider how those responses wouldn't have happened if not for AQ's decision to bomb the WTC and various embassies, etc.

I don't know the entire make-up of AQ -- who supports AQ, who's a "manchurian candidate" for AQ within failed states, etc. -- so I can't actually prognosticate with confidence on al-Qaeda's chances for forming a caliphate or even just a small confederation of Islamic states under AQ leadership. I suspect that al-Qaeda's performance is actually quite shoddy, compared against their ambitions. I don't think they know precisely what they are doing; and, I think that they make many mistakes. I don't really believe they're involved in 4GW, although I suspect they think they are; but that they are skirting the line between 4GW and 5GW. I.e., they may have started by believing that America would not have the will to fight them globally, but having recognized America's intransigence, they've slipped into using jujitsu-esque 5GW moves in order to first weaken the West.

"What has al-Qaeda actually done so far? Hit the WTC and hotels and embassies in several cities."

They tipped Spain's election with 3/11 and Bali has intimidated the Indonesian government into a policy of appeasing Salafi radicals - even though they constitute a microscopic minority of Indonesian Muslims.

" What resources do they have to win territory?

Assuming that they can win territory, what resources do they have to hold it?"

Should Musharraf be assassinated then at best his successor will move away from the U.S. and at worst will be himself a radical Islamist. The general officer corps is split between old-style nationalists and Hamid Gul Islamists who have " higher" jihadi priorities.

As for AQ resources, financially they are substantial given the lack of interest in attacking the weak Gulf emirates like U.A.E. where huge pre-9/11 donations came from. Sympathy for AQ among Saudi and Gulf royals continues.

" agree that their primary capability is in disruption. How we respond to that is up to us, and we haven't put in an exactly stellar performance so far"

True. Very true.

Nation-States hold great inherent advantages over non-state 4GW forces but having them and systematically maximizing those advantages are two different things.

Curtis wrote: I suspect that al-Qaeda's performance is actually quite shoddy, compared against their ambitions. I don't think they know precisely what they are doing; and, I think that they make many mistakes. I don't really believe they're involved in 4GW, although I suspect they think they are; but that they are skirting the line between 4GW and 5GW. I.e., they may have started by believing that America would not have the will to fight them globally, but having recognized America's intransigence, they've slipped into using jujitsu-esque 5GW moves in order to first weaken the West."

Pretty good summary. AQ is not able to put up their " A" team anymore as we have killed many of them off and losing the state they held (Afghanistan) hurt the training of new cadres - we put a severe dent in their quality control

I would classify AQ as 4GW now - a genuine scale-free network. Moreover, we know that they have read William Lind and other avant-garde military theorists and incorporated those ideas into their online training articles.

Previously they were a modular network untilthe taliba was overthrown and were able to exercise some State-like powers.

as to the "Bush Doctrine" causing anti-american attitudes...well there clearly has been an increase in anti-americanism in Europe. Since the Bush Doctrine hasn't really impacted Europe directly in any manner at all, this change in attitude is really one that Europe chooses for itself; i.e. a person chooses their emotional response to any situation and this particulary relevant in this case since Bush has done little that directly impacts Europe. Europe "wants" to be anti-american and so they are (for a range of their own domestic political and pschological reasons). As to AQ's capabilities, CKR definitely does not understand the post 9/11 world. One nuke can ruin not only your whole day but much of your economy...not to mention the human toll. The ability to disrupt a modern economy using relatively cheap biological, chemical and nuclear weapons is immense. 9/11 demonstrated their will, the only question is their capability. Lastly, this is an ideological war that needs to be fought by muslims. If we try and fight it, as we are now, it's only going to get ugly(ier).