Seven Things to Remember When We Talk to the Taliban

UPDATE: The Times is reporting that deliberations with the Taliban over Afghan peace talks have commenced, and these seven truths continue to be self-evident, so — worth another look...

Originally published July 20

Is your stomach churning yet? The occasionally salacious but usually accurate Guardianis reporting that Team Obama is signaling that it's ready to negotiate with the Taliban. Through "trusted" intermediaries like the Pakistanis and Saudis, naturally, and via plausibly denied channels, of course, but... really? Is this what a peace-in-your-first-term, Nobel Prize-winning president looks like? If we're going to reconcile ourselves to this kind of indecent proposal — the last one led to the bloody Swat Valley offensive — the U.S. had better not lose site of reality. Here's how. If it's not too late.

More From Esquire

1. It means we're giving in.

This kind of outreach transmits neither strength nor staying power. It says, frankly: You're winning this round, and President Obama is desperate to end the bout as soon as the next bell rings. Worse, floating it just as General Petraeus steps into the ring says the fix is in.

2. There's no taking this back.

Consider the hypothetical: The Times Square bomber, instead of being an idiot, blows up what has now been estimated to be "thousands of people." How does any deal with the Taliban play in Peoria then, Secretary Clinton?

3. Pakistan is now in the driver's seat.

When you negotiate with the Taliban, you're also giving in to Pakistan's desire to retain its "strategic depth" vis-à-vis hated (and I mean hated) rival India. That "depth" can only be preserved so long as the Pashtun escape serious integration with the rest of Afghanistan. Recent history says Islamabad won't be satisfied until the Pashtun rule Kabul, meaning we're setting ourselves up — yet again — for a north-south civil war. Some Band-Aid.

4. India is now very pissed off.

And don't even get me started on Iran, because you can kiss any chance to make nice before it goes nuclear goodbye. But any deal that sees us choosing fragmented, impoverished Pakistan over rising, increasingly middle-class India is — by definition — strategically unsound. Expect New Delhi to both work against our deliberations (however backhanded they may be) and take out its frustration with us elsewhere.

5. We are now at the whim of the Saudis and the Chinese!

Sort of. I feel ludicrous even typing this, but tell me who else can possibly exert any control over Islamabad. Tell me who else can be considered an external "guarantor" once we go down this road.

6. Welcome to divided Afghanistan.

No less than the former U.S. ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, this month called for accepting Afghanistan's inevitable partition into north and south — and he cabled his insistence to no less than Joe Biden. Realistic? You bet. When you offer the Taliban a recognized enclave, you wall off the south from any effective nation-building effort. Period.

7. Don't expect any comprehensive deals.

By all expert accounts, we might be able to rope in former Afghan prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his crowd — assuming, that is, that we lift the State Department's designation of him as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist." (Details!) And Pakistan should be able to deliver Sirajuddin Haqqani's crew from south of the border (for how long is any optimist's guess). But Mullah Omar — the kind of man who can spiritually turn the entire Taliban movement on its head with one video, the kind of man who can harbor bin Laden, the kind of man who helped orchestrate the September 11 attacks — will remain beyond the pale, and in the fight. Remind me why we're talking to these people again?