Helmuth von Moltke and the
Origins of the First World War

Author:
Annika Mombauer

Mombauer writes much about Germany's military before 1914, the title of the
first of her five chapters: "Military decision-making in Wilhelmine Germany."
And she describes the ins-and-outs of the German military's Schlieffen Plan,
modified in 1911,
for executing the next war. The part of the book that interests me is the German
military's responsibility for the Great War of 1914 -19.

The man in charge of Germany's military in 1914 – the Chief of the General Staff
- was Helmuth von Moltke. He and other German generals cannot be blamed for
wanting the best performance for Germany's military. Whatever Annika Mombauer
writes about von Moltke regarding the Schlieffen Plan, von Moltke didn't
get close to producing the of performances by Germany's military. He was out of touch as were other generals across Europe in
believing that an attack was the best defense. Germany's military would have
performed better if it had waged a defensive war in 1914. But back to the point
that interests me most: the decision whether to go to war.

Mombauer repeatedly
describes von Moltke as wanting a war sooner than later, while Germany was stronger
vis-à-vis its potential enemies. In 1908 von Moltke wanted war and did not
get it then because he did not have the power to get it.
And he lacked that power in 1914.
When the Russians mobilized, it put the issue of Germany defending itself
military above other issues. The German Kaiser's attempt to avoid war with
Russia was over. The war, in effect, had begun. If von Moltke was instrumental in provoking Russia, as
opposed to Austria-Hungary provoking Russia, then he can be said to have had
some responsibility in creating the war. Mombauer does not make the case that
von Moltke
was responsible for provoking Russia. Von Moltke wanted war, and he responded to the
opportunity that the Russians and his German superiors gave him to do his job,
but this does not make him instrumental in creating the war. Von Moltke was not
among those who had the power to choose whether to go to war. It was what was in
their minds that made the difference between war and peace, not von Moltke's
mind.