Political forces at a glance

Present government: Jordan is a monarchy with a bicameral parliament. The king appoints the Senate (the upper house); the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) is elected. The monarch, currently King Abdullah II, appoints the prime minister, who in turn appoints the cabinet, in close consultation with the king. Prime ministers and cabinets have usually served for short terms, reducing the opportunity for ministers to build up a power base. In line with this, the prime minister, Hani Mulki, who was appointed in May 2016, was forced to resign in June 2018 following protests against the tax reforms introduced by his government. The king responded by appointing Omar al-Razzaz, a technocrat and former World Bank economist, as prime minister. The king has ultimate power, and he is adept at balancing the demands of various interest groups, paying attention to popular sentiment on political, economic and social issues. King Abdullah has promised Jordanians genuine political reform and points to new electoral and decentralisation laws as evidence of serious intent. However, he is unlikely to allow changes that would seriously undermine the dominance of East Bank Jordanians (those whose tribes and families have been in Jordan since before the first major influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948). Cabinets are dominated by technocrats, although prime ministers have to take care that they represent Jordan’s major tribes and its geographic areas.

Parliamentary forces: The only consistently strong political party has been the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which has contested elections under the banner of the Islamic Action Front (IAF). However, the MB split prior to the 2016 election. The core IAF secured ten out of 130 seats, making it the largest party, having contested the election as part of a broader grouping, the National Alliance for Reform, including independents, tribal candidates, Christians and Circassians (who collectively won a further five seats). Zamzam, a splinter group from IAF, won another five seats. There are only a few other small parties, and more than three-quarters of seats are held by independents. Earlier electoral reforms were widely criticised for entrenching the power of tribal groupings at the expense of urban voters and Jordanians of Palestinian origin, which is why the IAF and others had boycotted the previous election in 2013. The new electoral law introduced an open proportional list at the district level with a voting system that allows all candidates to run on one multi-member ticket. It reduced the number of seats in parliament from 150 to 130, but retained the women's and ethnic minority quotas. King Abdullah advocates consolidating Jordan's fragmented political party landscape (50 parties registered for the 2016 election), with a focus on clear political programmes, but tribal and family identity remain important.

Extra-parliamentary forces: Jordan has always had an influential extra-parliamentary opposition, largely in the form of professional associations, which emerged as a focus for opposition in 2001‑03, during a period when parliament was suspended. The government has failed to introduce legislation to control them. The 2011 unrest brought new groups into prominence, including youth-led reformists such as the March 24th group and Salafis (hardline Islamists), but since the 2011 protests failed to gain traction, these groups have been fading in influence. Nevertheless, employee and professional associations held protests in June 2018 against the government’s decision to widen the income tax base. The protests marked the culmination of public discontent over measures such as subsidy cuts and tax increases introduced by the government since the start of the year. This indicates an influential presence of extra-constitutional groups that are powerful enough to affect the policy direction of the government.

The security apparatus and intelligence services (mukhabarat) are loyal to the king and have ensured that he has remained in power. Although these institutions do not play a direct role in politics, the monarchy's depen‑dence on the support of the mukhabarat, which derive most of their manpower from tribal groups, affects policymaking and the pace of political reform.