Artillery should always be placed in themost advantageouspositions
…Napoleon1

The organizational changes made in artillery, combining
the batteries into battalions and brigades, the high level of experience
the cannoneers had by the time the battle was fought, and the relatively
open countryside made Gettysburg the fiercest artillery struggle of the
war. These factors also made the battle around the Peach Orchard an action
that was "dominated" by the artillery, and one that many referred to as
the most intense counterbattery clash of the war.2

The first hour of action near the Peach Orchard was almost
exclusively an artillery battle, in which the Confederate field pieces
attempted to soften the Federal defenses – especially their artillery –
before the infantry assault. A substantial portion of the Federal line,
fronting south and stretching from the Peach Orchard to the stony hill,
was held by an impressive row of cannon – Ames’, Thompson’s, Hart’s, Clark’s,
Phillips’ and Bigelow’s batteries, thirty-two guns. These field pieces
greatly strengthened the Federal line, and although they could not hold
back the infantry alone, they served to inflict significant damage on the
enemy forces, delayed and altered troop movements and dispositions, and
disrupted communications

110 Artillery Action in the
Peach Orchard

(including inflicting casualties in the officer corps).

For the Federals, we see the presence of three key artillery
officers, each having a hand in the tactical deployment of guns that day.
First, was Captain George Randolph, the chief of artillery for the Third
Corps. He probably made the most significant gun placement on the field
when he sent Smith’s Fourth New York Independent to the ridge at Devil’s
Den. Here they provided a converging fire to damage Henry’s and Cabell’s
guns, and also caused problems for the Confederate infantry when on the
attack. Before completing his deployment, Randolph conferred with General
Henry Hunt, who used his expertise in directing the captain in the remaining
gun placements. But Hunt’s main contribution was his Artillery Reserve.
By making the guns available to the Third Corps, he dramatically increased
the firepower and defensibility of the salient.

The final Federal artillery officer, Colonel Freeman McGilvery,
was probably the most significant in exercising tactical command that afternoon.
Colonel McGilvery placed his artillery brigade and then, most importantly,
directed their firing. A major advantage of the brigade system was in its
potential for concentrating fire. This not only meant deploying guns in
a specific location, but also focusing them on specific targets. McGilvery’s
efforts in directing his command to fire on individual batteries appears
to have been a significant factor in the Confederates’ disproportionate
losses.

When artillerists were engaged in battle, they naturally
wanted to exchange fire with the batteries on their immediate front, those
shooting at them. But, as we have seen, there were advantages to concentrating
the fire of several batteries on one target. First, by firing at an angle
the relative size of the target increased, enhancing the potential for
damaging the enemy’s guns (see Diagram 9-2) Second, there was the psychological
impact of focusing on a single target. General Gibbon wrote of this tactic,
"the moral effect produced by such a result being still more terrible than
the physical."3 Freeman McGilvery maximized the effectiveness of the Union
batteries by coordinating their fire against specific targets.

McGilvery also ordered his guns to disengage their counterbattery
action and shell the infantry as they advanced. In some cases the artillerists
did not immediately notice the targets. Thus, McGilvery’s

Artillery Action
in the Peach Orchard 111

guidance increased the number of rounds fired at the infantry
columns.4

For the Confederates, the most significant figure in directing
the artillery was Colonel E. P. Alexander. This engagement, however, was
not Alexander’s finest hour. In fact, his batteries failed in the mission
assigned to them, to neutralize the Federal artillery before the infantry
assault, despite having several key advantages over the Federals.5

The first advantage for Alexander was occupying a superior
position.6 His guns were deployed on a wider arc and the Federals on a
salient, giving the Confederates the advantage of converging fire. Second,
because the Federals occupied a salient they were more vulnerable to enfilade
fire, thus increasing the effectiveness of the Confederate shots. Third,
because Alexander’s guns were in position before the Federals, they had
the potential advantage of superior firepower, especially at the beginning
of the cannonade. The Federals had to bring the majority of their guns
in line under fire.7 Fourth, there was a tree line behind the
Confederates’ row of guns that helped provide cover for their limbers and
caissons.8 Finally, the Confederates also had the advantage
of having their ammunition reserve "close at hand behind the ridge."9

Unfortunately, for whatever reason, these factors were
not fully exploited. In fact, most of Alexander’s potential supremacy was
nullified by his failure to immediately and fully deploy his artillery.
Had he placed all of his guns at the beginning of the engagement, his prospect
for damaging the Federal batteries would have increased substantially.
As already discussed, the failure to put all of his guns in line reduced
the quantity and quality of his fire, allowing the enemy to suffer less
damage.

112 Artillery Action in the
Peach Orchard

The decision for partial deployment apparently hinged
on two factors: one, Alexander underestimated the Federal resistance, and
second, he wanted to have cannon available for a grand artillery charge.
The first factor seems ironic in the face of his later comment, "The Federal
artillery was ready for us in their usual full force and good practice."
Concerning the second factor, Alexander stated, "But we only had a moderately
good time with Sickles’s retreating corps after all." The effect of his
grand artillery charge was disappointing.10

Overall, Alexander’s artillery was less than effectively
handled and he failed to accomplish his primary tactical objective, neutralizing
the Federal guns in the pre-assault cannonade. For the Federals, their
new artillery brigade system and Hunt’s increased control over the artillery
arm enabled the Union batteries to accomplish their objective, occupying
and disabling the Confederate cannon and adding to the defensibility of
the Third Corps line. They outperformed the Confederate artillerists in
the cannonade, inflicting significant damage to the enemy while sustaining
no net loss in their own guns.

During the actual infantry assault, Alexander’s guns performed
excellent service. They accomplished the difficult task of supporting infantry
on the offensive, with the highlight being how they increased their fire
on the Peach Orchard just after the initial Confederate assault was repulsed.11
Their fire also took General Sickles out of action, causing confusion and
decreased morale in the rear. Alexander’s batteries also managed to advance
quickly with the infantry and dropped trail in time to fire on the retiring
Federals.

Overall, it was the presence and effectiveness of the
Federal artillery that had the more dramatic outcome on the battle. Hunt’s
cannon knocked opposing guns out of action, battered infantry formations,
slowed assaults, changed dispositions, separated commands and injured possibly
the best tactical commander on the field, General John Bell Hood. They
also plugged important gaps in the line. If not for McGilverys’ guns, Kershaw’s
Brigade could have swept to the rear of Humpreys’ line, making the entire
Third Corps position untenable. Additionally, Colonel McGilvery later assembled
a row of guns that were the only significant defensive force for several
hundred yards. Without the presence of the Federal batteries, especially
those sup-

Artillery Action in the
Peach Orchard 113plied by the Artillery Reserve, it seems unlikely that
the Federals would have held their line on July 2, on the southern end
of the field.

But still, one has to look at this artillery battle and
wonder, what if Alexander had fully deployed his guns? If all of his guns
had been in position sooner, could they have substantially damaged the
line of artillery that played such a key role in defending the Third Corps
salient? One thing is for certain: Alexander failed to give his forces
their best opportunity for success. His decision to hold back so many guns
and to delay the deployment of others meant that his cannon did a mere
fraction of the damage they could have. In a day’s action that is still
surrounded by questions, this has to be near the top of the list: What
would have happened if Alexander had fully deployed all of his guns, especially
at the beginning of the engagement; could this substantial increase of
firepower have made a difference in a struggle that was so close to being
a Confederate victory?

Diagram 9-4

Alexander’s Gun Deployment

during the Pre-Infantry Assault Cannonade

Battery

Guns

When deployed_______

Cabell’s Battalion

Manley’s Battery

4

Initial deployment

Fraser’s Battery

4

Initial deployment

McCarthy’s Battery

section

2

Initial Deployment*

section

2

Did not deploy (2 Napoleons)

Carlton's Battery

4

Initial Deployment

Henry's Battalion

Latham’s Battery

5

Initial deployment

Bachman’s Battery

4

Did not deploy (4
Napoleons)

Garden's Battery

4

Did not deploy (2
Napoleons)

Reilly’s Battery

6

Initial deployment

Alexander’s Battalion

Woolfolk’s Battery

4

Did not deploy #(2
Napoleons)

Jordan’s Battery

4

Did not deploy #

Gilbert’s Battery

4

Second deployment

Moody’s Battery

4

Second deployment

Parker’s Battery

4

Second deployment

Taylor’s Battery

4

Second deployment

Total number of guns

59

Total in Initial deployment

25

42% of available guns

Total after Second deployment

41

69% of available guns

Alexander’s forces probably fought for the first half
of the cannonade with just over 40% of their available pieces in action,
until he finally committed part of his battalion. Overall, Alexander allowed
over 30% (18 of 59) of his guns to sit idly by, not participating in the
cannonade.

*McCarthy states that the was originally ordered to remain in reserve
but had those orders changed. He probably put his guns in line just
after the first deployment. See O.R. Vol. 27, Part II, 379.