"[a] party seeking attorneys fees shall allege the facts, statute or rule that
provides a basis for the award of such fees in a pleading filed by that party.
* * * No attorney fees shall be awarded unless a right to recover such fee is
alleged as provided in this subsection."

We have held that "[t]he requirement that the party seeking fees state the 'facts, statute or
rule' that provides a basis for a fee award is mandatory." Cramblit v. Diamond B
Constructors, 197 Or App 358, 371, 105 P3d 906 (2005); see alsoMulier v. Johnson, 332
Or 344, 350, 29 P3d 1104 (2001). Identifying the precise statutory basis for an award of
attorney fees is not necessary "when the facts asserted would provide a basis for an award
of fees, the parties have fairly been alerted that attorney fees would be sought and no
prejudice would result." Page and Page, 103 Or App 431, 434, 797 P2d 408 (1990).
However, those facts "must clearly and explicitly indicate a party's entitlement to fees."
Cramblit, 197 Or App at 371 (suggesting that a recognizable relationship between the
facts asserted and the entitlement to attorney fees must exist).

We have recognized that the stringent requirements of ORCP 68 C(2)(a)
may be "tempered by ORCP 12 B, which directs the court to 'disregard any error or defect
in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse
party.'" Lumbermen's v. Dakota Ventures, 157 Or App 370, 375, 971 P2d 430 (1998).
However, ORCP 12 B does not operate to excuse a party from failing to provide adequate
notice to an adverse party of the basis for an award of fees. Id.

Here, mother's answer identified no rule or statute as a source of authority
for an award of attorney fees, so we must look to the facts alleged in the answer to
determine if they are sufficient to "clearly and explicitly indicate a party's entitlement to
fees." The answer denies that mother is in contempt, alleges that she has complied with
the court order, and requests attorney fees. Mother contends that her denial that she was
in contempt can be understood to constitute an allegation that aunt did not have an
objectively reasonable basis for her claim that mother was in contempt. She also argues
that both parties understood throughout the proceedings that ORS 20.105 was the basis
for mother's attorney fee request. We disagree with mother on both points.

First, mother's denial in her answer that she had violated the court's order
cannot be understood to constitute an allegation that aunt had no objectively reasonable
basis to have alleged that mother had violated the order. To conclude otherwise would
mean that every pleading that denied a claim and requested an award of attorney fees
would allege a right to an award of fees under ORS 20.105. That would eviscerate the
pleading requirement in ORCP 68 C(2)(a) for a claim for fees under ORS 20.105.

Second, nothing in the record supports mother's assertion that aunt
understood that mother was seeking an award of attorney fees under ORS 20.105.
Mother claims that Bruce v. Cascade Collections, Inc., 199 Or App 59, 110 P3d 587
(2005), supports her position, but it does not. In Bruce, we upheld an award of attorney
fees even though the party who was awarded the fees had identified the wrong statute as
the basis for them. The party who sought the fees claimed entitlement to them under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) but listed the wrong FCRA statute as authority for the
award. Bruce, 199 Or App at 64. We held that the citation to an erroneous statute was
harmless because the adverse party was on notice that attorney fees were being sought
under FCRA and sufficient facts to support a claim for attorney fees under FCRA were
alleged in the complaint. Id. at 65. This case is easily distinguishable from Bruce,
because mother did not identify any statute as a basis for an award of fees nor allege any
facts by which to identify such a statute. Therefore, aunt was not on notice as to which
statute mother was claiming as a basis for an award of attorney fees.

In summary, mother did not plead a basis for an award of attorney fees as
required by ORCP 68 C(2)(a). Hence, the trial court did not have the authority to award
attorney fees to mother.

Reversed.

1. Aunt made other arguments on appeal against the award. Because we agree with
aunt that mother failed to satisfy the pleading requirement in ORCP 68 C(2)(a) for an award of
fees, we do not discuss aunt's other arguments.