in <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Sep/132> I showed a
elaborated way for privilege elevation using IExpress (and other
self-extracting) installers containing *.MSI or *.MSP which works
"in certain situations".

The same IExpress installer(s) but allow a TRIVIAL to exploit
privilege escalation which works in all situations too:

Step 2:
download <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.EXE>
(note: all downloads go per default into the same directory)
as MSIEXEC.EXE (this executable is just used as a canary).

Step 3:
execute the downloaded "CAPICOM-KB931906-v2102.exe" (UAC will
ask for confirmation or prompt for administrative credentials).

Result:
the downloaded MSIEXEC.EXE is executed with administrative
credentials!

Reason:
the COMPLETELY SUPERFLUOUS elevation of IExpress packages through
UAC (due to its braindead "installer detection").

Note 0:
it is completely sufficient to run IExpress packages unprivileged/
unelevated: the target directory for the extraction,
"%TEMP%\IXP000.TMP", can be created/written with standard user
rights!

Note 1:
if the downloaded MSIEXEC.EXE requests elevation by itself UAC
displays the publisher name etc. read from the digital signature
of the downloaded MSIEXEC.EXE giving the user a chance to detect
the "fake" MSIEXEC.EXE.

Note 2:
if an IExpress installer executes another command (setup.exe,
...) rename the downloaded file to the resp. name.

Note 3:
of course other self-extractors which execute commands without
fully qualified path (remember: the application directory is
searched first) can be used too!

Note 4:
in general, setup PROGRAMS are evil!

there is no need to wrap a call of "MSIEXEC.EXE /package *.MSI"
or "RUNDLL32.EXE SETUPAPI.DLL,InstallHinfSection ... *.INF"
into an executable!

at least Microsoft stopped to deliver updates/hotfixes/patches
for NT6.x as executables, but uses CAB archives named *.MSU.

Timeline:
~~~~~~~~~

2013-09-22 sent report to vendor

2013-09-23 vendor replies and asks: is the vulnerability in IExpress?

2013-09-23 NO, the vulnerability results from the UAC!

2013-09-23 vendor replies: "this scenario has been publicly known,
and was mentioned in a presentation a Black Hat in 2012.
the resolution was to implement a policy that IExpress
will no longer be used on Microsoft Update."

Really & really?

The Black Hat presentation used IExpress to wrap and
disguise a MetaSploit/meterpreter payload, not for a
privilege escalation.

<http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=39802>
alias <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/931125> is an
IExpress package AND is delivered via Microsoft Update!

2013-09-23 asked about the details of the Black Hat presentation and
whether/when the SUPERFLUOUS detection and elevation of
IExpress installers will be addressed.

2013-09-30 vendor replies: "I still do not see any security vulnerability
here. I can see an escalation of UAC privileges, but as has
been documented on numerous occasions*, UAC is not considered
to be a security boundary, so such an escalation is not
considered to be a security vulnerability."