New challenges, new tools for defense decisionmaking by Stuart E Johnson(
)14
editions published
between
2001
and
2003
in
English
and held by
1,713 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
It is still easy to underestimate how much the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War and then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed the task of American foreign and defense policymaking. In place of predictability (if a sometimes terrifying predictability), the world is now very unpredictable. In place of a single overriding threat and benchmark by which all else could be measured, a number of possible threats have arisen, not all of them states. In place of force-on-force engagements, U.S. defense planners have to assume "asymmetric" threats ways not to defeat U.S. power but to render it irrelevant. This book frames the challenges for defense policy that the transformed world engenders, and it sketches new tools for dealing with those challenges from new techniques in modeling and gaming, to planning based on capabilities rather than threats, to personnel planning and making use of "best practices" from the private sector

Exploring terrorist targeting preferences by Martin C Libicki(
)15
editions published
between
2006
and
2007
in
English
and held by
1,565 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
Governments spend billions to protect against terrorism. Might it help to understand what al Qaeda would achieve with each specific attack? This book examines various hypotheses of terrorist targeting: is it (1) to coerce, (2) to damage economies, (3) to rally the faithful, or (4) a decision left to affiliates? This book analyzes past attacks, post hoc justifications, and expert opinion to weigh each hypothesis

Byting back regaining information superiority against 21st-century insurgents by Martin C Libicki(
)8
editions published
in
2007
in
English
and held by
1,486 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power, which could be a U.S. advantage but instead is being used advantageously by insurgents. Because insurgency and counterinsurgency involve a battle for the allegiance of a population between a government and an armed opposition movement, the key to exploiting information power is to connect with and learn from the population itself, increasing the effectiveness of both the local government and the U.S. military and civilian services engaged in supporting it. Utilizing mostly available networking tech

How insurgencies end by Ben Connable(
)11
editions published
in
2010
in
English
and held by
1,458 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
"This study tested conventional wisdom about how insurgencies end against the evidence from 89 insurgencies. It compares a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies with lessons from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. While no two insurgencies are the same, the authors find that modern insurgencies last about ten years and that a government's chances of winning may increase slightly over time. Insurgencies are suited to hierarchical organization and rural terrain, and sanctuary is vital to insurgents. Insurgent use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading to its defeat. Inconsistent support to either side generally presages defeat for that side, although weak insurgencies can still win. Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) rarely succeed against insurgencies. Historically derived force ratios are neither accurate nor predictive, and civil defense forces are very useful for both sides. Key indicators of possible trends and tipping points in an insurgency include changes in desertions, defections, and the flow of information to the COIN effort. The more parties in an insurgency, the more likely it is to have a complex and protracted ending. There are no COIN shortcuts.."--Rand web site

How terrorist groups end lessons for countering Al Qa'ida by Seth G Jones(
)8
editions published
in
2008
in
English
and held by
1,436 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? Answers to this question have enormous implications for counterterrorism efforts. The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because they joined the political process, or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post September 11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The ending of most terrorist groups requires a range of policy instruments, such as careful police and intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic sanctions. Yet policy makers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. Following an examination of 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, the authors found that a transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended (43 percent). The possibility of a political solution is inversely linked to the breadth of terrorist goals. Most terrorist groups that end because of politics seek narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals of a terrorist organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent action and the more likely the government and terrorist group may be able to reach a negotiated settlement. Against terrorist groups that cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy (40 percent). Police and intelligence services have better training and information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations than do such institutions as the military. In 10 percent of the cases, terrorist groups ended because their goals were achieved, and military force led to the end of terrorist groups in 7 percent of the cases

Cyberdeterrence and cyberwar by Martin C Libicki(
)7
editions published
in
2009
in
English
and held by
1,415 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
Cyberspace, where information--and hence serious value--is stored and manipulated, is a tempting target. An attacker could be a person, group, or state and may disrupt or corrupt the systems from which cyberspace is built. When states are involved, it is tempting to compare fights to warfare, but there are important differences. The author addresses these differences and ways the United States protect itself in the face of attack

Global demographic change and its implications for military power by Martin C Libicki(
)5
editions published
in
2011
in
English
and held by
1,114 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
What is the impact of demographics on the prospective production of military power and the causes of war? This monograph analyzes this issue by projecting working-age populations through 2050; assessing the influence of demographics on manpower, national income and expenditures, and human capital; and examining how changes in these factors may affect the ability of states to carry out military missions. It also looks at some implications of these changes for other aspects of international security. The authors find that the United States, alone of all the large affluent nations, will continue to see (modest) increases in its working-age population thanks to replacement-level fertility rates and a likely return to vigorous levels of immigration. Meanwhile, the working-age populations of Europe and Japan are slated to fall by as much as 10 to 15 percent by 2030 and as much as 30 to 40 percent by 2050. The United States will thus account for a larger percentage of the population of its Atlantic and Pacific alliances; in other words, the capacity of traditional alliances to multiply U.S. demographic power is likely to decline, perhaps sharply, through 2050. India's working-age population is likely to overtake China's by 2030. The United States, which has 4.7 percent of the world's working-age population, will still have 4.3 percent by 2050, and the current share of global gross domestic product accounted for by the U.S. economy is likely to stay quite high

Crisis and escalation in cyberspace by Martin C Libicki(
)3
editions published
in
2012
in
English
and held by
554 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
"The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover

Dominant battlespace knowledge the winning edge(
Book
)12
editions published
between
1995
and
1996
in
English and Undetermined
and held by
430 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
The Department of Defense has been successfully exploiting rapidly developing advances in information technology for military gain. On tomorrow's multidimensional battlefield-or 'battlespace'-the increased density, acuity, and connectivity of sensors and many other information devices may allow U.S. Armed Forces to see almost everything worth seeing in real or near-real time. Such enhanced vision of the battlespace is no doubt a significant military advantage, but a question remains: How do we achieve dominant battlefield knowledge, namely the ability to understand what we see and act on it decisively? The papers collected here address the most critical aspects of that problem-to wit: If the United States develops the means to acquire dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK), how might that affect the way it goes the war, the circumstances under which force can and will be used, the purposes for its employment, and the resulting alterations of the global geomilitary environment? Of particular interest is how the authors view the influence of DBK in light of the shift from global to regional stability issues that marks the post-Cold War world. While no definitive answer has yet emerged, it is clear that the implications of so profound a change in military technology are critical to the structure and function of the U.S. Armed Forces. In working toward a definitive answer, the authors of this volume make an important contribution to a debate whose resolution will shape the decades to come

H4ckers5 wanted : an examination of the cybersecurity labor market by Martin C Libicki(
)3
editions published
in
2014
in
English
and held by
326 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
The perceived shortage of cybersecurity professionals working on national security may endanger the nation's networks and be a disadvantage in cyberspace conflict. RAND examined the cybersecurity labor market, especially in regard to national defense. Analysis suggests market forces and government programs will draw more workers into the profession in time, and steps taken today would not bear fruit for another five to ten years

Markets for cybercrime tools and stolen data : hackers' bazaar by Lillian Ablon(
)3
editions published
in
2014
in
English
and held by
318 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
Criminal activities in cyberspace are increasingly facilitated by burgeoning black markets for both tools (e.g., exploit kits) and take (e.g., credit card information). This report, part of a multiphase study on the future security environment, describes the fundamental characteristics of these markets and how they have grown into their current state to explain how their existence can harm the information security environment. Understanding the current and predicted landscape for these markets lays the groundwork for follow-on exploration of options to minimize the potentially harmful influence these markets impart. Experts agree that the coming years will bring more activity in darknets, more use of crypto-currencies, greater anonymity capabilities in malware, and more attention to encrypting and protecting communications and transactions; that the ability to stage cyberattacks will likely outpace the ability to defend against them; that crime will increasingly have a networked or cyber component, creating a wider range of opportunities for black markets; and that there will be more hacking for hire, as-a-service offerings, and brokers. Experts disagree, however, on who will be most affected by the growth of the black market (e.g., small or large businesses, individuals), what products will be on the rise (e.g., fungible goods, such as data records and credit card information; non-fungible goods, such as intellectual property), or which types of attacks will be most prevalent (e.g., persistent, targeted attacks; opportunistic, mass "smash-and-grab" attacks)

Defending cyberspace, and other metaphors by Martin C Libicki(
Book
)9
editions published
between
1997
and
1998
in
English and Chinese
and held by
284 WorldCat member
libraries
worldwide
Information warfare, as any casual observer of the Pentagon can attest, remains a hot-button topic in the military community. Broader claims for it have been toned down, and few now argue that all aspects of warfare are now revealed as information warfare, but an ideology of information warfare has nevertheless wended its way into the heart of defense planning. The Air Force's Cornerstones of Information Waffare, for example, has approached the status of doctrine. The spring 1996 establishment of the 609th Squadron (at Shaw Air Force Base) dedicated to information warfare offers further evidence of the seriousness with which that ideology is maintained. In 1996 the National Defense University (NDU) ended its two-year experiment of offering a forty-four-week program on Information Warfare and Strategy after forty-eight students were graduated, but what has replaced it is a broader thmst in teaching the all four hundred students the rudiments of information warfare (and offering related electives). In 1995-96 large portions of the Defense budget were designated information operations (although only a small portion represents information warfare)