MAJOR: An effort was made last night
by about two regiments of Feds to take our picket line on the Hall's Ferry road. They were
gallantly met and repulsed by the pickets of Cumming's right and Reynolds' left, and
driven back. That line is now held by a strong force of pickets.
A scout ordered out from my extreme right
reports the enemy's line complete and compact, and that it was impossible for them to get
through it.

Respectfully,
C. L. STEVENSON, Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS, June 17, 1863.

The enemy made several efforts on
yesterday to drive the pickets from General Barton's front. They finally concentrated on
those of the Fortieth Georgia and drove them. I ordered the post to be retaken last night.
The within is the reply thereto.
They have placed some guns in our battery
opposite the canal, near the gin-house. The house was burned on yesterday.
Respectfully forwarded for the information of
the lieutenant-general commanding.

C. L. STEVENSON, Major-General.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT, June 17, 1863--7.30 a.m.

[J. J. REEVE.]

MAJOR: An effort was made last night
to retake the picket posts in front of the Fortieth Georgia, but the enemy was found in so
great force that the loss which must have ensued in forcing the point would have been out
of proportion to the value gained. It was, therefore, abandoned, and other posts
established, which, it is thought, will render the first untenable by the enemy. This
proves to be the case.
A dash was made on the extreme outpost of the
Forty-second Georgia last night, and the post and 4 men captured. The post has been
retaken this morning.
An effort was also made to establish a battery
opposite the Fifty-second Georgia, but was defeated.

Very respectfully,
S. M. BARTON, Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS FORCES ON THE RIGHT, June 24, 1863.

Maj. R. W. MEMMINGER, Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAJOR: The firing of the enemy on
General Barton has been very severe to-day. They kept up a fire with nine pieces, and this
evening drove in one of his pickets, capturing 7 men. General Barton seems to apprehend an
attack on his right, and states that the enemy is in much greater force there than
heretofore. I have sent him two regiments.
To-night the enemy opened with grape and
canister on the position recently taken from them by General Cumming's brigade, and,
moving up a force, succeeded in recapturing it. Our pickets on Lee's line were met by an
officer to-night, sent by Grant to say that he would place no more pickets in front of
that line, and would fire on ours. Our pickets were consequently withdrawn to the
immediate front of the works. I have one regiment in reserve in rear of Cumming's, and can
spare no more men for the river front, as the loss of the work on the Hall's Ferry road
renders that position very weak, and I may have to recall one of the regiments sent to the
river front.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit
the following report of the operations of my division from its advance from Vicksburg to
the capitulation of the city. It has been delayed to this time by the constant occupation
of myself and my subordinate commanders during the siege of Vicksburg and by the march
which followed its capitulation.

* * * * * * * * * *

At about 10 a.m. [May 17], I
received orders to take command of the army, and conduct its retreat to the fortifications
around Vicksburg. The brigade of Brigadier-General Baldwin, of Smith's division, was
assigned to the duty of bringing up the rear. Just before getting into the works, I was
joined by the brigade of Colonel Reynolds, to whom, as I before stated, had been intrusted
the charge of the trains of the whole army. He had crossed the Big Black after much
difficulty and delay, occasioned by the absence of any facilities for so doing, at
Bridgeport.
By a mistake in the transmission of the order,
the regiment of Colonel Beck (Lee's brigade) remained at the river, resisted the attempts
of the enemy to cross until 11 o'clock that night, and only withdrew upon the receipt of a
peremptory order.
The retreat was conducted in a leisurely and
orderly manner, and the troops entered the line of fortifications at about 3 p.m.

* * * * * * * * * *

On the morning of May 18, the
positions to be held by each of the different divisions were assigned by the
lieutenant-general himself. The portion of the line of defense which was assigned to my
division included the river front and the works south of the city from the river to the
railroad, a line of about 5 miles in length. Barton occupied the river front and the
fortifications on the right; Reynolds, those on the right center to the Hall's Ferry road;
Cumming, the left center, and Lee, re-enforced by Waul's Texas Legion, the extreme left.
Several sections and companies of artillery not properly belonging to my division were
posted on my line. Captain [J. W.] Johnston, Botetourt Artillery Company, was assigned to
duty as inspector-general of light artillery on my staff, and the artillery on the right
of the Hall's Ferry road placed under the command of Capt. J. B. Grayson, First Louisiana
Heavy Artillery, and that on the left under that of Capt. J. F. Waddell, of my division.
On the evening of the 18th, the enemy made his
appearance in front of our lines, and immediately began to push forward his sharpshooters.
The number of guns, superiority of range and metal, and exhaustless supply of ammunition,
enabled them in a very short time to plant many batteries in such commanding positions as
to damage our works materially, and inflict a very considerable loss among the men.
On the morning of May 22, many indications
showed that they contemplated an assault upon the line of General [S. D.] Lee. A
tremendous artillery fire was opened and kept up for about two hours, while the fire of
their large force of sharpshooters was heavy and incessant.
At about 1 p.m. a heavy force moved out to the
assault, making a gallant charge. They were allowed to approach unmolested to within good
musket range, when every available gun was opened upon them with grape and canister, and
the men, rising in the trenches, poured into their ranks volley after volley with so
deadly an effect that, leaving the ground literally covered in some places with their dead
and wounded, they precipitately retreated. An angle of one of our redoubts hail been
breached by their artillery before the assault and rendered untenable. Toward this point,
at the time of the repulse of the main body, a party of about 60 of the enemy, under the
command of a lieu-tenant-colonel, made a rush, and succeeded in effecting a lodgment in
the ditch at the foot of the redoubt and planting two flags on the edge of the parapet.
The work was constructed in such a manner that this ditch was commanded by no part of the
line, and the only means by which they could be dislodged was to retake the angle by a
desperate charge, and either kill or compel the surrender of the whole party by the use of
hand-grenades. A call for volunteers for this purpose was made and promptly responded to
by Lieut. Col. E. W. Pettus, Twentieth Alabama Regiment, and about 40 men of Waul's Texas
Legion. A more gallant feat than this charge has not illustrated our arms during the war.
The preparations were quietly and quickly made,
but the enemy seemed at once to divine our intention, and opened upon the angle a terrible
fire of shot, shell, and musketry. Undaunted, this little band, its chivalrous commander
at its head, rushed upon the work, and in less time than it requires to describe it, it
and the flags were in our possession.
Preparations were then quickly made for the use
of hand-grenades, when the enemy in the ditch, being informed of our purpose, immediately
surrendered.
From this time forward, although on several
occasions their demonstrations seemed to indicate other intentions, the enemy relinquished
all idea of assaulting us, and confined himself to the more cautious policy of a system of
gradual approaches and mining.
The weakness of our garrison prevented anything
like a system of sallies, but from time to time, as opportunities offered, and the enemy
effected lodgments too close to our works, they were made with spirit and success. Among
them, I may particularize a night sally made under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel [C.
S.] Guyton, of the Fifty-seventh Georgia Regiment, with a portion of that regiment and of
the Forty-third Tennessee, the former of Cumming's, the latter of Reynolds' brigade. The
enemy had intrenched themselves at three different points on and to the left of the Hall's
Ferry road. The command sallied out, charged their works with admirable gallantry, and
took them, with considerable loss to the enemy, who were in greatly superior force.
On the lines occupied by General Barton and
Colonel Reynolds, the configuration of the ground favoring it, the enemy were prevented
from making any close lodgments by a judicious system of picketing and a series of
attacks; and although they sometimes succeeded by force of numbers in gaining favorable
positions, they were invariably dispossessed by the daring sallies of the garrison. A
reconnaissance made of the Warrenton road, under Colonel Curtiss, Forty-first Georgia,
re-suited in the capture of 107 of the enemy's pickets. The reconnaissance was conducted
in a manner which reflects credit on that able officer.
I cannot find words sufficiently strong to
express the pride and gratification afforded me by the dauntless spirit with which
officers and men encountered all the dangers, and by the unmurmuring endurance with which
they bore up for forty-seven sleepless nights and days, under all the hardships incident
to their position. Confined, without a moment's relief from the very day of their entrance
into the fortifications to that of the capitulation of the city, to the narrow trenches;
exposed without shelter to the broiling sun and drenching rain; subsisting on rations
barely sufficient for the support of life; engaged from the earliest dawn till dark, and
often during the night, in one ceaseless conflict with the enemy, they neither faltered
nor complained, but, ever looking forward with confidence to relief, bore up bravely under
every privation--saw their ranks decimated by disease and the missiles of the enemy--with
the fortitude that adorns the soldier and the spirit that becomes the patriot who battles
in a holy cause.
It was thus that the true soldier and gifted
patriot, Colonel [Isham W.] Garrott, of the Twentieth Alabama, died, as did the brave
Captain [F. O.] Claiborne, of the artillery, and many others whose names I cannot mention
without extending this report to too great a length. The regiment of Colonel Garrott was
fortunate in having for his successor Lieutenant-Colonel [E. W.] Pettus, an officer who
deserves and is competent to fill a higher position.
On July 1, I received the accompanying
confidential communication, marked A, from the lieutenant-general commanding. I
immediately addressed a circular to my brigade commanders requiring their opinions on the
points suggested in the note of the commanding general. Having received their opinions in
writing (copies of which are appended, marked B, C, D, E), I submitted the following reply
to the lieutenant-general:

HEADQUARTERS STEVENSON'S DIVISION, Vicksburg, July 2, 1863.

GENERAL: Your confidential note of
yesterday, requesting me to inform you as to the condition of my troops and their ability
to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful
evacuation of this city, was duly received, and I have the honor to state, in reply
thereto, that my men are very cheerful, but from long confinement in the trenches and
short rations are necessarily much enfeebled, and a considerable number would be unable to
make the march and undergo the fatigues which would probably be necessary in a successful
evacuation of this city. If pressed by the enemy, and it should be necessary to place the
Big Black in our rear in one march, the chances are that a considerable number of those
now in the trenches could not succeed. I believe, however, that most of them, rather than
be captured, would exert themselves to the utmost to accomplish it.
I respectfully transmit herewith the opinions
of my brigade commanders on these points.

A council was then called on the 3d
instant by the lieutenant-general, in which he stated that, from information received from
General Johnston, all hope of raising the siege of Vicksburg must be abandoned, and that
it was only possible to save the garrison. The opinions of those present were then asked
as to the best manner of accomplishing it, and it was their unanimous opinion that, rather
than surrender, the garrison would attempt to cut its way out under all circumstances, but
that if an honorable capitulation could be effected it would be the best and wisest
course, considering the condition of the men, as stated at that time by their commanders,
and it was suggested that a communication should be addressed to Major-General Grant,
commanding United States forces, asking him to appoint commissioners to meet a like number
of ours to agree upon terms. It was consented to by the lieutenant-general reluctantly, I
think, and a communication was addressed to General Grant, which resulted in the
capitulation. The correspondence between the two commanders has already been made public.
A strong argument with me in favor of the capitulation was that we would march the army
out intact; that they would be exchanged in a very short time, and again be armed and
equipped for service.
In conclusion, I desire to return my thanks to
the officers and men of my command.
I have to thank my brigade commanders,
Brigadier-Generals Barton, Cumming, Lee, and Colonel Reynolds, as also Colonel [T. N.]
Waul, of the Texas Legion, to whose efficient co-operation I am greatly indebted for the
successful defense of my line at Vicksburg, for the untiring energy which they displayed
in the management of their brigades, and for examples of devotion, intrepidity, and
coolness under every danger, by which they inspired their men.

* * * * * * * * * *

Maj. G. L. Gillespie, chief of
subsistence, is deserving of special commendation. To his energy, zeal, and judicious
exertions we were indebted, in my opinion, for the supplies which enabled us to make so
protracted a defense of Vicksburg.
Capt. J. W. Johnston, inspector-general of
light artillery, and Captains [James F.] Waddell and Grayson, commanding artillery on the
left and right of the Hall's Ferry road, respectively, were always at their posts, and by
the intelligence with which they discharged their duties contributed very materially to
the defense.
Captain [Powhatan] Robinson, engineer officer
in charge of my lines, performed his duties promptly and efficiently.
Major [J. E.] McElrath, acting quartermaster of
my division during the siege, has placed me under many obligations by his ready
anticipation of the wants of the command and his untiring energy in supplying them.
Lieut. G. D. Wise, ordnance officer of
Cumming's brigade, has already been especially mentioned. During the siege he was selected
to carry important dispatches through the lines of the enemy, and the duty was
successfully performed. I commend him to the notice of the lieutenant-general as a bold
and intelligent officer, and one who deserves a higher position.
Accompanying, please find a tabular statement
of the casualties of my division in the different actions, &c., in which it
participated up to June 16.
The absence of subordinate officers renders it
impossible for me to give my whole loss during the siege of Vicksburg.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF MISSISSIPPI AND EAST LOUISIANA, Vicksburg, Miss., July 1, 1863.

Maj. Gen. C. L. STEVENSON, Commanding Division.

GENERAL: Unless the siege of
Vicksburg is raised or supplies are thrown in, it will be necessary very shortly to
evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are very great, if not
insuperable, obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to inform
me, with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops, and their
ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful
evacuation. You will, of course, use the utmost discretion while informing yourself
through your subordinates upon all points tending to a clear elucidation of the subjects
of my inquiry.

GENERAL: In reply to your inquiry as
to the "ability of my men to march and undergo the fatigues and hardships incidental
thereto," I have the honor to state that probably half of them are fit to take the
field.
The command suffers greatly from intermittent
fever, and is generally debilitated from the long exposure and inaction of the trenches.
Of those now reported for duty, fully one-half are undergoing treatment. These I think are
unfit for the field.

Very respectfully,
S. M. BARTON, Brigadier-General.

[Inclosure C.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, STEVENSON'S DIVISION,July 1, 1863.

Maj. Gen. C. L. STEVENSON, Commanding, &c.

GENERAL: I am in receipt of your
communication, inclosing copy of a note from the lieutenant-general commanding, of this
instant, in the former of which I am directed to give my opinion, as far as concerns my
brigade, on several points raised in the latter.
As to the general fact that the troops of this
brigade are in a condition of great physical debility and weakness, it needs but to see
them in, or on their short beats to and from, the trenches, to be able to bear testimony
to it.
Everything beyond this assertion of the general
fact must, of course, be mere matter of opinion and conjecture. After much reflection upon
the subject, based upon my own observations and the remarks, casual and incidental, of the
regimental commanders, I would state the following as the conclusions at which I have
arrived:
From shortness of rations, and greatly more
from a confinement of forty-five days to the trenches, under the summer sun of a
debilitating climate, few, if any, of the men are in their ordinary health and vigor.
I am disposed to believe that perhaps one in
five of those now reported for "duty in the trenches" would, under different and
favorable circumstances, be receiving medical treatment; and I have less hesitation in
declaring it as my opinion that of this number, for "duty in the trenches," 50
per cent. would, on trial, be found unfit to encounter the fatigues incident to the life
of the soldier in the field.

GENERAL: I have the honor to
acknowledge the receipt of your note, inclosing a copy of one from General Pemberton,
relative to supplies, &c., and on the two points involved, as far as my brigade is
concerned, will state that I consider my brigade in tolerable condition; and though they
are weak from forty-five days' confinement in the trenches on scant diet, still, I
consider them equal to undergoing the fatigue which would be incident to our evacuation of
this city, taking in view its importance and the interest of our Confederacy.

Yours, respectfully,
STEPHEN D. LEE, Brigadier-General.

[Inclosure E.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH BRIGADE, July 1, 1863.

Maj. Gen. C. L. STEVENSON, Commanding Division, &c.

GENERAL: In reply to your inquiries
as to the condition of my troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the
fatigue necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation, I have the honor to report that
the condition of my troops is not good. Owing to the reduced quantity and quality of the
rations on which they have subsisted for six weeks past, to their close confinement in the
trenches, constant exposure to the intense heat of the sun and frequent rains, and to
impure water they are obliged to drink, my men are much reduced in strength, and in many
instances entirely prostrated. It would be utterly impossible for most of them to make a
forced march of any distance. Many of my men are in the hospital, and many of those
reported for duty in the trenches are extremely weak and unable to undergo the slightest
fatigue. Perhaps on an average 200 men from each of my regiments, animated by patriotic
motives and a desire to be free, might be able to make a march of 10 or 15 miles and still
be in a condition to give battle to the enemy, but hardly more than this number.
The spirits of my men are good, and I believe
that almost to a man they would be willing to make vigorous efforts and to strike a blow
for freedom; but I regret to say that two-thirds are unable to endure a march of 10 miles.