1. Proceedings on a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1501 are not subject to ordinary rules of civil procedure. To avoid summary dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition, allegations must be made of shocking and intolerable conduct or continuing mistreatment of a constitutional stature.

2. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself or herself at a criminal trial in which he or she is the defendant, but also gives the person the privilege not to answer official questions in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate that person in future criminal proceedings.

3. A witness protected by the privilege against self-incrimination may rightfully refuse to answer questions that would incriminate the witness unless and until he or she is protected at least against the use of his or her compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he or she is a defendant. Absent such protection, if the witness is nevertheless compelled to answer, the witness' answers are inadmissible against him or her in a later criminal prosecution.

Appeal from Reno district court; WILLIAM F. LYLE, JR., judge. Opinion filed June 5,
1998.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Michael K. Lehr, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for
appellant.

Timothy G. Madden, chief legal counsel, Kansas Department of Corrections,
argued the cause
and was on the brief for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ABBOTT, J.: This is a habeas corpus action brought by Michael A. Bankes, a
prisoner in the Hutchinson Correctional Facility (HCF). Bankes was convicted of
indecent liberties with a child and sentenced to 4 to 15 years in prison in 1990. Some
time after his sentencing, Bankes' unit team at the HCF recommended that he
participate in the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). In order to be admitted
into SATP, Bankes was required to admit guilt for the crime of which he was convicted.
This admission of guilt, along with any other information which Bankes conveyed to
SATP counselors, could be turned over to authorities and used against Bankes in future
proceedings. Due to this required admission of guilt, Bankes refused to participate in
SATP. As a result of his refusal to participate in SATP, Bankes' privilege incentive level
was reduced from a level 2 to a level 1, pursuant to the Kansas Department of
Corrections Internal Management Policies and Procedures (IMPP) Rule 11-101 (1998).
Because of this reduction in his privilege incentive level, Bankes lost his personal TV
and certain canteen privileges. Moreover, for each program review period in which
Bankes refused to participate in the recommended SATP, he did not receive any good
time credits pursuant to K.A.R. 44-6-124. This denial of good time credits resulted in an
extension of Bankes' parole eligibility date and his conditional release date. Both IMPP
11-101 and K.A.R. 44-6-124 were amended to create this outcome after Bankes had
been sentenced and served part of his sentence. Based on these consequences for
his refusal to participate in SATP, Bankes filed a petition for habeas corpus in Reno
County District Court, alleging that K.A.R. 44-6-124 violated his privilege not to
incriminate himself and constituted an ex post facto law. The Reno County District
Court dismissed Bankes' habeas corpus petition for failure to state a claim. Bankes
appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals. The case was transferred to this court
pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c).

Bankes' 4- to 15-year sentence did not include any order for Bankes to
participate in any kind of psychological or psychiatric treatment for sexual offenders.
The Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) placed Bankes in the HCF. At the time of his placement with the HCF, Bankes was not
ordered to participate in any kind of psychological or psychiatric counseling for sexual
offenders.

Further, at the time Bankes was sentenced to prison, KDOC had set out
regulations in K.A.R. 44-5-104 and K.A.R. 44-5-105. K.A.R. 44-5-105 required that all
inmates incarcerated in a KDOC facility be subject to a program plan conducted by a
unit team within 1 month of an inmate's admission into prison. The plan could assign
an inmate to participate in a certain program, but "the inmate [could] not be penalized
for refusal to participate in a formal program plan." K.A.R. 44-5-104 classified the
security level of the inmate. The inmate's security level determined his supervision
requirements and his allowable privileges and freedoms. The factors necessary to
determine an inmate's security level, pursuant to K.A.R. 44-5-104, and the supervision
and privileges associated with each level were set out in the Secretary of Corrections'
Internal Management Policies and Procedures manual (IMPP).

On February 9, 1993, and July 11, 1994, Bankes' program plan was reviewed by
his unit team. These reviews did not order Bankes to attend a program for sexual
offenders, and it classified Bankes as a medium security inmate pursuant to K.A.R. 44-5-104.

Good time credits are applied to an inmate's minimum sentence to determine his
or her parole eligibility date and are applied to the inmate's maximum sentence to
determine his conditional release date. K.A.R. 44-6-101(g), (m); K.A.R. 44-6-108.
Upon reaching the conditional release date, an inmate is entitled to be released. See
K.S.A. 22-3718; Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority, 241 Kan. 13, 29, 735 P.2d 222
(1987).

K.A.R. 44-6-108(c) (1989), which was in effect when Bankes committed his crime,
stated, in pertinent part, that "[t]o establish the conditional release date, good time
credits, not forfeited, shall be presumed earned and shall be applied to the maximum
sentence term when first computed." (Emphasis added.) Thus, it was presumed for
the purpose of conditional release that the inmate earned all available good time
credits, and his or her conditional release date was predicated on that presumption.
For parole eligibility, on the other hand, no such presumption applied, and the credits
were tallied as earned to establish parole eligibility. See K.A.R. 44-6-108(b) (1989).

K.A.R. 44-6-124 (1989) provided guidelines for awarding good time credits for
parole eligibility. No guidelines for the award of good time credits for conditional
release were necessary, as 100% was presumed. The regulation stated:

"(1) Inmates with no class I offenses during the review period shall receive at least 50%
of good
time credits allocated for that period.

"(2) Inmates with no class I or II offenses during the review period shall receive at least
60% of
the good time credits allocated for that period.

"(3) Inmates with no class I, II, or III offenses during the review period shall receive at
least 70%
of the good time credits allocated for that period.

"(4) Inmates with no class I, II, III or IV offenses during the review period shall receive
at least
80% of the good time credits allocated for that period.

"(5) The balance of the credits above the percentages listed in paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(4)
shall be
awarded by the unit team based on factors of good work, behavior, and on other performance
factors
related to effective rehabilitation of the inmate." K.A.R. 44-6-124(a) (1989).

The regulation went on to further provide that the unit team had the discretion to refuse
to award all or part of the portion of credits for which it had discretion based on an
inmate's refusal to participate in recommended programs. K.A.R. 44-6-124(b) (1989).

K.A.R. 44-6-125(b) provided for the forfeiture of those good time credits "earned"
for parole eligibility as well as those used to "create the conditional release date." It
stated:

"Forfeit only on minimum until parole eligibility. Prior to parole eligibility, forfeited good
time credits shall
be subtracted from the amount of good time credits earned toward the parole eligibility only, and
not from
those credits used to create the conditional release date. After parole eligibility is established,
forfeited
credits shall be subtracted from the credits used to form the conditional release date." K.A.R. 44-6-125(b)(1989).

Thus, for purposes of parole eligibility, an inmate under the system as it existed at the
time of Bankes' conviction was forced to earn his or her good time credits toward parole
eligibility, while good time credits for a conditional release date were awarded at the
outset. For the purposes of earning parole eligibility, an inmate with no class I offenses
during the review period would receive at least 50% of the good time credits for that
period. An inmate with no class I, II, III, or IV offenses was guaranteed to receive at
least 80% of the allocated good time credits. The balance of the credits were
discretionary and could be awarded or not awarded for failure to participate in a
program.

In January 1995, KDOC amended K.A.R. 44-6-124 to its present form. In
pertinent part, it provided that "[a] refusal by an inmate to constructively work or
participate in assigned programs shall result in the withholding of 100% of the good
time credits for that program classification review period, unless the inmate is
determined by the facility health authority to be physically or mentally incapable of
working or participating in a particular program or detail." K.A.R. 44-6-124(g)(6).
K.A.R. 44-6-142 was also amended and now provides that, rather than all available
good time credits being presumed earned for purposes of conditional release, such
credits were now subject to being earned as the sentence progressed, in the same
manner as used for the calculation of parole eligibility.

In addition to these regulatory amendments, the Secretary of Corrections also
revised the Department's internal management policies and procedures. Under IMPP
11-101, KDOC defined a new privilege incentives level system, the factors necessary to
move up or down an incentive level, and the supervision and privileges associated with
each level. This revised IMPP 11-101 is called the "Level System," and it created a
system of incentives and privileges to encourage inmates to participate in programs.
Under the level system, there are three levels at which an inmate can be classified.
Under level 1, inmates can watch the general TV and spend $20 per payroll period at
the canteen. Under level 2, an inmate can have a personal TV, and the inmate can
spend $80 per payroll period at the canteen. Obviously, the higher the level at which
an inmate is classified, the more privileges and liberties the inmate receives. Under
IMPP 11-101, if an inmate is assigned to participate in a certain program and the
inmate refuses, then the inmate can be moved down an incentive level and lose the
privileges associated with the higher level.

In 1995, Bankes participated in a 120-day program plan review by his unit team.
He was assigned to participate in SATP. Bankes refused to voluntarily sign the
program review or to participate in SATP. Pursuant to K.A.R. 44-6-124, 100% of
Bankes' good time credits for this review period were withheld due to his refusal to
participate in the assigned program.

At his next program review, the unit team again suggested that Bankes
participate in SATP. Bankes continued to refuse to participate in such treatment.
Pursuant to K.A.R. 44-6-124, 100% of Bankes' good time credits were again withheld
due to his refusal to participate in SATP. Eventually, Bankes was reclassified, under
IMPP 11-101, from a level 2 of privileges and incentives to a level 1, due to his refusal
to participate in SATP, and Bankes lost the privileges associated with a level 2.

One of the main reasons Bankes refused to participate in SATP is that SATP
requires each offender to "accept responsibility for the offense in which he was
involved." In order to voluntarily be admitted into SATP, the program requires that the
offender admit guilt to the crime of which he or she was convicted. As the SATP
admission document states:

"This is to confirm that I understand the criteria for being accepted into the S.A.T.P.
(Sexual
Abuse Treatment Program) at Hutchinson Correctional Facility, which includes an admission of
Guilt for
my sex crime. I realize that I am being allowed to participate in an evaluation for acceptance into
S.A.T.P.
with the understanding that I followed through with an Admission of Guilt. This document will
serve as my
official Admission of Guilt to the following: [space provided for the inmate to write in the crime
to which
they are admitting guilt]."

Bankes objected to this admission of guilt requirement and refused to participate
in SATP because of this requirement. At trial, Bankes denied that he committed the
crime. Bankes continues to deny that he committed the crime and is currently pursuing
an appeal of his conviction in federal court. According to Bankes, confessing guilt for
the purpose of admission into SATP would jeopardize his appeal and subject him to
perjury charges based on his testimony at trial.

In addition to requiring an admission of guilt for the crime for which the inmate is
convicted, SATP also requires a participant to sign releases allowing the disclosure of
confidential information gained by the SATP staff to KDOC personnel, the Kansas
Parole Board, and HCF-SATP coordinator and staff.

Further, SATP requires participants to submit to polygraph testing as a part of
the "treatment process." An unwillingness to participate in the polygraph testing as a
part of the treatment is considered a violation of the program agreement and can result
in the termination of SATP treatment. Prior to taking a polygraph test, the SATP
participant must provide an admission of guilt in his or her own words, an
autobiography, a complete sexual history, and a complete confidential polygraph
questionnaire. The polygraph results are only to be used for therapeutic purposes and
are not to be used to determine guilt or innocence.

Finally, SATP requires participants to submit to a plethysmograph examination to
evaluate the inmate's sexual arousal intensity and interests. Although the
plethysmograph testing is voluntary, if the inmate should refuse to complete the
evaluation or fail to cooperate with the evaluation, it will be noted and reported to the
SATP treatment team and may constitute grounds for termination from the program.

In 1994, the Kansas Legislature enacted K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq., the Kansas
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act. Under this Act, if KDOC has
information about an inmate convicted of a sexually violent offense which indicates that
the inmate has a mental abnormality or personality disorder and meets the criteria for a
sexually violent predator, then KDOC must give written notice of this information to the
Attorney General before the inmate is released from prison so that the Attorney General
can evaluate whether the inmate is a sexually violent predator and, if so, pursue
commitment proceedings. KDOC is required to turn over this information even if it was
gained through SATP. K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 59-29a16; K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 59-29a03.

The effect of the amendments to IMPP 11-101 and K.A.R. 44-6-124 on Bankes
has been substantial. Prior to his refusal to participate in SATP, Bankes was assigned
to a level 2 incentive level. Under this level, he was allowed his own personal TV and
was allowed to spend $80 per pay period at the canteen. However, once Bankes
refused to participate in SATP, his incentive level was reduced from a level 2 to a level
1 pursuant to IMPP 11-101. This reduction in incentive level resulted in Bankes losing
access to his own personal TV and only being allowed to spend $20 per pay period at
the canteen. Further, the amendments to K.A.R. 44-6-124 have affected both Bankes'
parole eligibility date and his conditional release date. Prior to the 1993 amendment,
his conditional release date was fixed by the presumption that all available good time
credits were earned. Thereafter, that date could only be changed if he lost credits for
committing offenses. However, under the 1993 amendment, Bankes became subject to
a mandatory loss of 100% of his good time credits for failing to participate in a program.
Thus, if he failed to participate, he would stop earning good time credits, and for every
good time credit he failed to earn, his conditional release date would be extended.
Thus, Bankes is now forced to earn good time credits toward conditional release,
whereas under the prior regulations, he could only lose them for his improper behavior.
He is also forced to earn good time credits toward parole eligibility, whereas previously
he was guaranteed at least a percentage (80%) of available credits should he not have
any Class I, II, III, or IV offenses.

The withholding of Bankes' earned good time credits lengthens his sentence for
each plan review period he continues to refuse to participate in SATP. Thus far,
KDOC's action has lengthened his parole eligible date from November 26, 1994, as of
February 9, 1993, to at least November 8, 1998, as of June 21, 1996, assuming he
earns all his future good time credits by participation in SATP. His conditional release
date has been lengthened from November 11, 2009, at the time of his incarceration, to
at least May 5, 2011, as of November 5, 1996, assuming he earns all future good time
credits. Bankes' release date, without receiving any future good time credits due to his
continued refusal to participate in SATP, is July 21, 2024. This increase in jail time
results from his refusal to participate in SATP, which requires him to not only admit to
the crime he was convicted of, but to admit to other possible violations of the law by
providing a complete sexual history to his SATP therapists. Should Bankes make these
admissions, they can be released to law enforcement agencies without any guarantee
that they will not be used against Bankes in any future criminal proceeding.

On December 26, 1996, Bankes filed this habeas corpus action in the District
Court of Reno County against his unit team members, the HCF warden, and the
Secretary of KDOC. In this action, Bankes claims that KDOC's requirement that he
admit guilt for the crime of which he was convicted and participate in SATP violates his
privilege not to incriminate himself as embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Further, Bankes
asserts that K.A.R. 44-6-124, which mandates KDOC to withhold his good time credits
for refusing to participate in SATP, constitutes an ex post facto law by increasing the
punishment for a crime for which he had already been convicted. The District Court of
Reno County dismissed Bankes' habeas corpus petition for failure to state a claim for
which relief could be granted. Bankes appealed.

The question of whether K.A.R. 44-6-124 violates Bankes' privilege not to
incriminate himself or whether it is an ex post facto law is a question of law. The district
court found there was no merit to this question and dismissed Bankes' habeas corpus
petition for failure to state a claim. However, "this court's review of conclusions of law is
unlimited." Gillespie v. Seymour, 250 Kan. 123, 129, 823 P.2d 782 (1991). Thus,
the
district court's conclusions are not binding on this court.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas
Constitution Bill of Rights provide identical language that "[n]o person 'shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'" The Kansas Supreme
Court has ruled that the provisions of § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights
grant no greater protection against self-incrimination than does the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The purpose of the constitutional provisions, both state
and federal, is to prohibit the compelling of self-incriminating testimonial or
communicative acts from a party or a witness.

The Fifth Amendment not only permits a person to refuse to testify against
himself at a criminal trial in which he is the defendant, but also "privileges him not to
answer official questions in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984), reh.
denied 466
U.S. 945 (1984); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 38 L. Ed. 2d 274, 94 S. Ct.
316
(1973). In all such proceedings:

"a witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is
protected at
least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent
criminal case in which he is a defendant. . . . Absent such protection, if he is nevertheless
compelled to
answer, his answers are inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution."
Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 78; see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426.

In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986),
the defendant challenged the Illinois State Sexually Dangerous Persons Proceedings Act.
The defendant was charged with committing the crimes of unlawful restraint and deviant
sexual assault. The State of Illinois filed a petition to have the defendant declared a
sexually dangerous person under an Illinois involuntary commitment procedure. Two
psychiatrists testified at the commitment trial and gave an opinion as to the defendant's
sexual dangerousness. Based in part on this testimony, the trial court committed the
defendant as a sexually dangerous person. The defendant appealed his commitment
to the United States Supreme Court. The Court held that the Illinois proceeding for
involuntary commitment of a sexually dangerous person was a civil proceeding, as
opposed to a proceeding of a "criminal" nature. Therefore, it concluded, the
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to him
during such proceedings; thus, his Fifth Amendment privilege was not violated.
However, in upholding the statute, the United States Supreme Court specifically noted
that the Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that a person the State attempts to commit
under the Act is protected from the use of his or her compelled answers in a
psychiatric
evaluation in any subsequent criminal case, as opposed to civil, in which he is the defendant. 478 U.S. at 368.

In Kansas, as in Illinois, commitment as a sexually violent predator is a civil
proceeding, not a criminal proceeding. Since the Fifth Amendment does not apply in
civil settings, the petitioner's compelled information required by SATP can be used
against him in a civil commitment proceeding as a sexually violent predator. The
Allen
case does not allow the use of compelled information in future criminal cases--other sex
crimes, perjury, etc.--but it does allow use of the compelled information in future civil
cases, such as a commitment for a sexually violent predator.

In view of our ruling this day in Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 960 P.2d 227 (1998), that the 1993 amendment to K.A.R. 44-6-124(g)(6) violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause to the United States Constitution, we follow that decision. Later in this
case, we find that many of the defendant's arguments concerning the Fifth Amendment
are moot.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Sexual Predator Act,
allowing a person's confinement for treatment as a violent sexual offender, is civil in
nature; thus, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply.
We see no valid reason to interpret § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights any
differently. This, however, does not end our inquiry. The question remains as to
information the defendant must furnish which subsequently can be used against him in
a criminal proceeding. The State of Kansas must either give the defendant immunity
from prosecution, or be subject to the well-recognized policies behind the privilege of
self-incrimination and the legitimate need of governments to protect its children. Thus,
if the State coerces a defendant into furnishing possible incriminating testimony by
giving a prisoner no choice but to furnish incriminating information or serve a longer
sentence for failure to do so, the State may not use that information or its fruits in
subsequent criminal proceedings. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70; Allen
v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364. We again note that the coerced information can be used in a civil
proceeding, subject to the rules of evidence.

The housing assignment given to an inmate, his or her custody classification,
granting of parole, spending limitations at a canteen, regulation of visiting hours,
withholding of good time awards, and regulation of other daily activities which are not
atypical and do not pose a significant hardship within a prison, do not involve a liberty
interest or violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment right by compelling him to
incriminate himself and participate in SATP. See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d
1197
(10th Cir. 1996); Lile v. Simmons, 23 Kan. App. 2d 1, 929 P.2d 171 (1996);
Gilmore v.
McKune, 22 Kan. App. 2d 167, 915 P.2d 779 (1995); Davis v. Finney, 21
Kan. App. 2d
547, 902 P.2d 498 (1995).

In State v. Imlay, 249 Mont. 82, 813 P.2d 979 (1991), the question, similar to
the
one in the case at hand, was whether an inmate could be compelled, as a prerequisite
to admission in a sexual therapy program, to admit guilt, where completion of such a
program was required in order to allow him to keep his suspended sentence. 249
Mont. at 83. The Montana Supreme Court found that compelling the inmate to do so
would cause a Fifth Amendment violation, absent any grant of immunity for the
statements. 249 Mont. at 91. In so finding, the Montana Supreme Court reasoned:

"Even though the defendant has already been convicted of the crime that he denies, our
system
still provides, as noted in [Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966)],
for opportunities to
challenge that conviction. For example, the defendant still had the right to challenge his
conviction, based
on newly discovered evidence, or by collateral attack. These are important rights guaranteed to
every
defendant under our criminal justice system, but would be rendered meaningless if the defendant
could be
compelled to admit guilt as a condition to his continued freedom. Furthermore, while such a
defendant
would be foreclosed from invoking the protection of such procedures to establish his innocence,
the
reliability of an admission of guilt under such circumstances would be highly suspect. In
addition, by
admitting guilt in this case, the defendant would have to abandon his right guaranteed by the
Fifth
Amendment, not only as to the crime for which he has been convicted, but also to the crime of
perjury. He
testified in his own defense during his trial and denied committing the offense with which he was
charged."
249 Mont. at 90-91.

Upon analyzing questions in conjunction with an inmate's probation, the United
States Supreme Court noted in Minnesota v. Murphy:

"Our cases indicate, moreover, that a State may validly insist on answers to even
incriminating
questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes the
required
answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of
incrimination. Under
such circumstances, a probationer's 'right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony
would not be
at stake'. [Citations omitted.]" 465 U.S. at 435 n. 7.

Thus, respondents, in administering their Sexual Abuse Treatment Program, can
insist that the petitioner admit responsibility, so long as his or her admission is not used
against the petitioner in later criminal proceedings.

This is not a terribly satisfactory outcome. Bankes stands convicted of the
offense, but maintains his innocence. He would consequently be forced to admit guilt
which he does not acknowledge in order to participate in SATP and to keep his level 2
privileges. Whether Bankes and society will benefit from Bankes' treatment under
those circumstances is not for the court to decide in this case. However, this situation
does not appear to rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment violation; thus, this issue fails.

II. EX POST FACTO

Bankes argues that K.A.R. 44-6-124 constitutes an ex post facto law. According
to Bankes, this regulation imposes an additional punishment on him after he had
already been sentenced for the crimes of which he was convicted.

This issue has been decided on this day in Stansbury, 265 Kan. ___. To the
reasoning in that case, we would add that trial judges are aware of conditional release
dates and how they are computed. When the defendant was sentenced, most trial
judges would have considered the maximum time the defendant would have to serve in
setting the sentence.

For the reasons set forth in Stansbury, the application of K.A.R. 44-6-124 by
KDOC to Bankes, due to his refusal to participate in SATP, violates the ban on ex post
facto laws contained in the United States Constitution. Thus, as to the ex post facto
issue only, the trial court's dismissal of Bankes' habeas corpus petition for failure to
state a claim is reversed.

MCFARLAND, C.J., concurring and dissenting: I dissent from the majority
opinion's determination that K.A.R. 44-6-124 constitutes an ex post facto law in reliance
upon Stansbury v. Hannigan, No. 79,384, this day decided. I concur with the
balance
of the majority opinion.

LOCKETT, J., concurring and dissenting: I dissent from the majority's
determination that withholding good time credits from a person who claims to be
innocent and will not acknowledge guilt in order to participate in sexual abuse treatment
program does not rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment violation. The majority requires
an individual who may or may not be innocent to serve a longer sentence than those
who admit guilt. Punishing Bankes for refusing to admit guilt is not violative of Bankes'
constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment, it is violative of Bankes' constitutional
equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

I concur with the balance of the majority opinion.

ALLEGRUCCI, J., joins in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Lockett, J.