S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 12 RIYADH 04906
NOFORN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP, MCAP, MASS, SA
SUBJECT: THE ROLE OF SAUDI PRINCES IN UNIFORM
1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY. THE PRESENCE OF A NUMBER OF SAUDI
ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE MILITARY--WE CAN IDENTIFY
MORE THAN 25 AND THERE ARE CLEARLY OTHERS--HAS LONG
BEEN A SUBJECT OF INTEREST. ALSO THE FOCUS OF
CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION HAS BEEN THE ROYAL FAMILY'S
WELL CALCULATED EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN CAREFUL CONTROL
OVER THE MILITARY, TO PRECLUDE ITS BECOMING A THREAT
TO THE REGIME. THESE EFFORTS HAVE BEEN COMPLICATED
IN RECENT YEARS BY THE OFTEN CONTRADICTORY DEMANDS
FOR AN EFFICIENT, WELL EQUIPPED FORCE TO RESPOND
TO REAL THREATS. A KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER THE PRINCELY
PRESENCE IN THE MILITARY IS PART OF THE ROYAL FAMILY
CONTROL MECHANISM. BUT THERE ARE ALSO OTHER IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE ROYAL PRESENCE IN THE
MILITARY: IF NOT THERE AS PART OF A CONCERTED EFFORT
TO MAINTAIN ROYAL CONTROL, WHAT ARE THE ATTRACTIONS
OF THE MILITARY FOR PRINCES WHO APPEAR TO HAVE NO
SHORTAGE OF CAREER CHOICES? WHAT IMPACT DO PRINCES
IN UNIFORM HAVE ON MILITARY EFFICIENCY AND UNIT
MORALE GIVEN THEIR SPECIAL STATUS?
THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A GENERALLY CONCEIVED
PLAN TO MAINTAIN PRINCELY CONTROL OF THE MILITARY,
SPECIFICALLY IN THE PLACEMENT OF THE MOST SENIOR
MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY IN POSITIONS OF CIVILIAN
CONTROL OVER ALL UNIFORMED ELEMENTS--DEFENSE,
NATIONAL GUARD AND INTERIOR, INCLUDING ITS PARA-
MILITARY FORCES. GOING FURTHER, THE PREPONDERANCE
OF PRINCELY PRESENCE IN THE LAND AND AIR FORCES, THE
TWO STRONGEST ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY, AND THE
EY POSITIONS HELD BY CERTAIN OF THE UNIFORMED PRINCES,
SUGGESTS A BROADER DESIGN FOR ROYAL PRESENCE AND
CONTROL. BUT THERE ARE COUNTER SIGNALS, PROBABLY
MOST IMPORTANT BEING REAL QUESTIONS AS TO HOW
EFFECTIVE SUCH CONTROL MIGHT BE, GIVEN THE DIVERSITY
OF INTERESTS WITHIN THE ROYAL FAMILY. JUNIOR
PRINCES IN MANY CASES HAVE VERY LITTLE REASON TO
FEAR THE IMPOSITION OF DIRECT CONTROLS FROM THE KING.
OVERALL, IT IS OUR JUDGEMENT THAT THERE IS MORE
APPEARANCE THAN REALITY TO THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY
PRINCES, BELOW THE VERY TOP LEVELS, BEING CAREFULLY
PLACED WITH THE AIM OF ENHANCING FAMILY CONTROL.
THIS JUDGEMENT IS REINFORCED BY OTHER SOLID
ALTERNATIVE REASONS FOR PRINCES TO JOIN THE MILITARY:
GLAMOUR AND EXCITEMENT, THE HISTORICALLY HONORABLE
STATUS OF MILITARY SERVICE, BUSINESS SPIN-OFFS FROM
THE LARGE MILITARY BUDGET, AND EVEN USE OF THE
MILITARY AS A STEPPING STONE FOR BIGGER THINGS.
WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE DEGREE TO WHICH
PRINCES EXERT A STABILIZING EFFECT IN THE MILITARY,
THEIR MERE PRESENCE SHOULD BE OF SOME BENEFIT TO THE
REGIME. HAVING PRINCES IN THE ARMED FORCES, REGARDLESS
OF THEIR MOTIVES FOR BEING THERE, DOES PROVIDE A CERTAIN
DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AND OVERSIGHT.
AS FOR THE IMPACT OF UNIFORMED PRINCES ON MILITARY
MORALE AND EFFICIENCY, THIS CUTS BOTH WAYS. CLEARLY,
THEY DO COMMAND SPECIAL TREATMENT AND ARE LESS BOUND
BY MILITARY DISCIPLINE, WITH RESULTING RESENTMENT.
BUT SPECIAL TREATMENT IS NOT LIMITED TO PRINCES IN
THE MILITARY; STRICT MILITARY DISCIPLINE IS NOT IN
THE OVERALL SAUDI TRADITION; AND A NUMBER OF THE
MILITARY PRINCES MORE THAN BALANCE THE NEGATIVES
WITH THE HIGH QUALITY OF THEIR MILITARY ABILITY.
END SUMMARY.
3. INTRODUCTION. WHEN WE SPEAK OF MILITARY FORCES
IN SAUDI ARABIA, WE ARE SPEAKING ABOUT FORCES UNDER
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION (MODA), THE
SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD (SANG) AS WELL AS THE
SECURITY FORCES, FRONTIER FORCES AND COAST GUARD
ELEMENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (MOI).
HOWEVER, FOR PURPOSES OF DISCUSSING THE ROLE OF
PRINCES IN THE MILITARY, THIS REPORT IS CONFINED
TO THE TWO MORE CLASSICAL MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, THE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION AND THE SAUDI ARABIAN
NATIONAL GUARD. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS
REPORT DRAWS HEAVILY ON THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE
ELEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA, CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL WHO DEAL
WITH THE ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS THE EXPERIENCES OF
EMBASSY PERSONNEL. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
UNDERTAKE ANY MEANINGFUL EFFORT TO PLUMB THE SAUDI
PUBLIC OR MILITARY CONCERNING THEIR OWN, PERSONAL
FEELINGS. SOCIAL PRESSURE, CULTURAL BIAS, FEAR OF
REPRISAL AND PLAIN DISTRUST OF FOREIGNERS ARE POWERFUL
IMPEDIMENTS TO DIRECT INFORMATION GATHERING. WE
RECOGNIZE THEREFORE THAT OUR LIST OF PRINCES IS NOT
COMPLETE, THAT THERE ARE PROBABLY OTHER FACTORS WE
MAY NOT HAVE GIVEN THEIR PROPER EMPHASES, AND THAT
SUBJECTIVITY MUST ENTER INTO OUR JUDGEMENTS. HOWEVER,
NOTWITHSTANDING THESE DISADVANTAGES, THE INFORMATION
PROVIDED IN THIS REPORT PRESENTS THE BEST PICTURE
AVAILABLE OF THE ROLE OF PRINCES IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN
ARMED FORCES AND REPRESENTS A STARTING POINT ON THIS
USEFUL SUBJECT.
4. THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 25 UNIFORMED PRINCES IN
THE SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES RAISES A NUMBER OF
INTERESTING QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ROLE PLAYED BY
THESE ROYAL OFFSPRING. HOW THESE PRINCES AFFECT THE
STABILITY OF THE MILITARY AS WELL AS THEIR INFLUENCE ON
ITS EFFICIENCY AND CREDIBILITY AS A FIGHTING FORCE ARE
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS. IS ROYAL MILITARY
SERVICE THE RESULT, TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE, OF
AN ORCHESTRATED PLAN BY THE ROYAL FAMILY TO MAINTAIN
A DIVERSIFIED PRESENCE IN AND CHECK ON THE MILITARY?
WHY WOULD A PRINCE, WHO SUPPOSEDLY HAS EVERYTHING HE
COULD POSSIBLY WANT, JOIN THE MILITARY? HOW ENCUMBERED
BY MILITARY DISCIPLINE IS HE? WHAT IS THE EFFECT ON
UNIT MORALE AND DISCIPLINE WHEN A PRINCE JOINS THE
OUTFIT? DO THESE PRINCES HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE OVER
MILITARY DECISION MAKING? IF SO, HOW FAR DOES THEIR
AUTHORITY EXTEND INTO POLICY MAKING? DO THEY "ROUGH IT"
OR ARE THEY A PRIVILEGED LOT RELATIVELY EXEMPT FROM
UNDERGOING HARDSHIP?
5. THE SAUDIS ARE EXTREMELY SECRETIVE ABOUT THEIR
ROYAL AFFAIRS, AS THEY ARE ABOUT THE DEFENSE
ESTABLISHMENT, AND IT IS THEREFORE DIFFICULT TO
DETERMINE EXACTLY HOW MANY PRINCES ARE IN MILITARY
SERVICE. THE FOLLOWING LIST NOTES THOSE WHOSE DUTIES
HAVE BROUGHT THEM TO THE MISSION'S ATTENTION OR WHO
WERE INTRODUCED IN CHANCE MEETINGS. ONE FURTHER
DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING WHO IS OR IS NOT A PRINCE
IS THE COMMONALITY OF NAMES. WHILE SOME ARE RELATED
CLOSELY ENOUGH TO ABDUL AZIZ FOR THEIR ANCESTRY TO
BE APPARENT, EACH GENERATION ADDS ANOTHER LAYER OF
NAMES, CAUSING FAMILY ORIGIN TO BE INCREASINGLY
OBSCURED TO OUTSIDERS. SOME PREVIOUSLY KNOWN OFFICERS
HAVE DROPPED OUT OF SIGHT. THIS LIST IS THEREFORE
NOT ALL INCLUSIVE. BESIDES THE UNIFORMED PRINCES
CONTAINED IN THE LIST, THERE ARE ALSO A LARGE NUMBER
OF CIVILIAN PRINCES IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN ALL
THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.
-
- MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION
--------------------------------------------- ------------
-
-SAUDI ARABIAN LAND FORCES (SALF)------------------------
- NAME RANK/POSITION (IF KNOWN)
AHMED B. SALMAN B. ABDUL AZIZ
BADR B. FAHD AL SAUD AL KABIR LTC, MODA STAFF
BANDAR B. FAHD B. KHALID B.
- MUHAMMED B. ABDUL RAHMAN COL. DIR. AL KLHARJ
- ORDNANCE FACTORY
FAYSAL B. MUHAMMED B. SAUD
- AL KABIR BG, CDR SALF AVIATION
FAYSAL B. JALAWI CPT, MILITARY POLICE
FAYSAL B. MUSAID B. ABDUL RAHMAN CPT MILITARY POLICE
KHALID B. BANDAR B. ABDUL AZIZ G-3 ARMOR CORPS
MUHAMMED B. NASSIR B. ABDUL
- AZIZ COL. DEP CDR. INFANTRY
SULTAN B. FAHD B. ABDUL AZIZ MAJ. POS. UKN. (KING'S
- SON)
TURKI B. ABDULLAH AL FAYSAL B.
- ABDUL AZIZ
TURKI B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED
- B. ABDUL RAHMAN MAJ, CDR OF MP BN
- CENTRAL REGION
FAHD B. BADR B. ABDUL AZIZ LT, AIRBORNE BDE
-ROYAL SAUDI AIR FORCE (RSAF)----------------------------
ABDUL RAHMAN B. FAHD AL FAYSAL
- AL FARHAN LTC, BASE CDR, TABUK
BANDAR B. FAYSAL B. ABDUL AZIZ COL, DIR. AIR
- INSPECTIONS
BANDAR B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED AL
- SAUD AL KABIR F-15 PILOT
FAYSAL B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED
- B. ABDUL RAHMAN
MANSUR B. BANDAR B. ABDUL AZIZ LTC, F-15 WING CDR,
- DHAHRAN
MUHAMMED B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED
- B. ABDUL RAHMAN
TURKI B. NASSIR B. ABDUL AZIZ COL. BASE CDR, DHAHRAN
-
-ROYAL SAUDI NAVAL FORCES (RSNF)---------------------
-
FAHD B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED CAPTAIN
- B. ABDUL RAHMAN DEPUTY CDR, RSNF
-
-ROYAL SAUDI AIR DEFENSE FORCES (RSADF)--------------
-
KHALID B. SULTAN B. ABDUL AZIZ BG, DEP CDR, RSADF,
- SON OF MIN DEF
KHALID B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED
- B. ABDUL RAHMAN
-
--------------------------------------------- --------
- SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD
-
MITIEB B. ABDULLAH B.
- ABDUL AZIZ COL, CDR, SANG MILITARY
TURKI B. ABDULLAH B.
MOHAMMED AL SAUD AL KABIR MAJOR, S-3, 3D CAB,
- 1ST BDE, SANG
FAYSAL B. MISHARI B.
ABDUL AZIZ 1LT, ASST. S-3, 3D CAB.
- 1ST BDE, SANG
-
- (CAB-COMBINED ARMS BN.)
--------------------------------------------- ---------
-
-FORMER OFFICER PRINCES OF NOTE---------------------
BANDAR B. FAHD B. SAAD II BUSINESS
FAHD B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED DEPUTY MINISTER FOR
- AL SAUD AL KABIR CIVIL AVIATION AFFAIRS
FAYSAL B. MISHAL B.A.A. BUSINESS
MUQRIN B.A.A. GOVERNOR OF HAIL
SAUD B. ABDULLAH B. FAYSAL B.A.A. BUSINESS
FAYSAL B. BANDAR B.A.A. DEP. GOV. OF ASIR
BANDAR B. SULTAN AMB. TO USA
MUHAMMED B. SAAD B.A.A. VICE GOV. OF QASSIM
- PROVINCE
ABDUL RAHMAN AL FAYSAL
-B. ABDUL AZIZ FORMER ARMOR PROJECT
- CDR., RETIRED FOR
. HEALTH REASONS.
-FORMER OFFICER PRINCES OUT OF CONTACT---------------
ABDUL MALIK B. MUHAMMED AL
-AL SHAYKH LAST KNOWN RANK. MAJ.,
- SALF
KHALID B. BANDAR B.
-ABDUL AZIZ MAJOR, SALF (?)
KHALID B. FAYSAL B. TURKI
-B. ABDUL AZIZ MAJOR, HAWK BN
- RSADF (?)
AHMED B. NASSIR B. ABDUL AZIZ MAJ. RSAF (?)
FAHD B. ABDUL RAHMAN B. ABDUL
-AZIZ RSAF INTEL OFFICER (?)
MISH'ALB. SAUD B. ABDUL AZIZ (?)
SA'AD B. FAHD B. MUHAMMED PROBABLY TABUK AIR
-B. ABDUL AZIZ BASE
BANDAR B. FAHD B. MUHAMMED
B. ABDUL AZIZ
BANDAR AL THUNAYAN AL SAUD CPT, SANG (?)
SA'AD B. SAUD B. ABDUL RAHMAN LT, SANG (?)
TURKI AL THUNAYAN AL SAUD LT, SANG (?)
6. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT, WITH THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY
NOW ESTIMATED TO NUMBER MORE THAN 5,000 MALE MEMBERS,
SOME OF THESE PRINCES SHOULD FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE
ARMED FORCES. IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND THE ROLE
PLAYED BY THE SENIOR PRINCES; THEY ARE THE MINISTERS
AND SENIOR FUNCTIONARIES AT THE VERY TOP OF THE VARIOUS
MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, ENSURING POLITICAL CONTROL AND
RESPONSIVENESS. MORE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND IS THE
PLACE AND PURPOSE OF JUNIOR PRINCES IN MILITARY SERVICE,
THOSE IN UNIFORM AND STARTING, AT LEAST, AS JUNIOR
OFFICERS. SINCE THE LOYALTY OF ITS ARMED FORCES HAS
A CLEAR IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF AL SAUD RULE,
AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE "ROYAL CONNECTION" WITH
MILITARY SERVICE IS USEFUL IN JUDGING HOW THE ROYAL
FAMILY FEELS ABOUT AND DEALS WITH ITS MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT, AND HOW NON-ROYAL OFFICERS VIEW THEIR
AL SAUD COMRADES IN ARMS. END INTRODUCTION.
7. THE AL SAUD MONARCHY IS HIGHLY CONSCIOUS OF THE
UTILITY OF A MODERN MILITARY FORCE AND HAS SPENT
BILLIONS IN AN EFFORT TO CREATE ONE. A WELL-TRAINED
AND SUPERBLY-EQUIPPED MILITARY FORCE IS NOT ONLY VITAL
TO THE DEFENSE OF THE FRONTIERS, RESOURCES AND RULING
REGIME IN SAUDI ARABIA AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION
BUT IS ALSO USEFUL AS A SYMBOL OF SAUDI NATIONALISM--
FOSTERING POPULAR ATTACHMENT TO THE AL SAUD DYNASTY,
AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OLDER FOCAL POINTS OF LOYALTY
AND MOTIVATION SUCH AS ARAB LINEAGE OR ISLAMIC FAITH.
HOWEVER, THE AL SAUD DYNASTS HAVE SEEN MUSLIM
MONARCHIES FALL TO COUPS D'ETAT MOUNTED BY MILITARY
OFFICERS. THE HISTORY OF THE REGION OFFERS MANY
EXAMPLES, SUCH AS EGYPT, IRAQ, AND LIBYA, IN WHICH
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRY, STRENGTHENED AND
MODERNIZED, HAVE OVERTHROWN THE MONARCHIAL REGIME
THEY WERE ESTABLISHED TO DEFEND. THUS THE SURVIVAL
OF THE REGIME REQUIRES THAT CIVILIANS--READ MEMBERS
OF THE RULING FAMILY--MAINTAIN TIGHT CONTROL OVER THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THE REGIME HAS PUT THIS
FAMILIAR PRINCIPLE INTO PRACTICE BY ENSURING THAT
FAMILY MEMBERS SIT FIRMLY AT THE APEX OF EVERY
MILITARY OR QUASI-MILITARY COMMAND PYRAMID--WHETHER
IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION (MODA), THE
NATIONAL GUARD, OR THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.
8. GIVEN THESE SAME CONCERNS IT IS ALSO NOT
SURPRISING THAT, UNTIL FAIRLY RECENTLY, THE RULERS
OF SAUDI ARABIA DID VERY LITTLE TO IMPROVE THEIR
ARMED FORCES EITHER QUANTITATIVELY OR QUALITATIVELY.
THEY WERE CONTENT TO ALLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
ONLY A MODEST MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION
(MODA) AND MAINTAINED ONLY AN ANTIQUATED NATIONAL
GUARD. BUT THIS VIEW BEGAN TO CHANGE IN THE EARLY
SIXTIES. IN THE FACE OF WHAT THEY VIEWED AS
NASSIRITE AGGRESSION FROM THE YEMEN, THE AL SAUD
WERE FORCED TO RECOGNIZE THE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR
OWN REGIME TO OUTSIDE MILITARY THREATS. THEY BEGAN
A MODEST ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE THEIR DEFENSE FORCES
AND NATIONAL GUARD WHICH (WITH THE HELP OF NEW
OIL WEALTH) BECAME A MAJOR EFFORT TO EXPAND AND
UPGRADE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY. VAST BUILDING
PROJECTS AND THE ACQUISITION OF SOPHISTICATED
WEAPONRY HAVE BEEN A MAJOR SAG PREOCCUPATION FROM
1974 TO THE PRESENT.
9. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS LIMITED SAUDI PARTICIPATION
IN FIGHTING IN THE GOLAN IN 1973, IT WAS THE WAR BETWEEN
IRAN AND IRAQ WHICH FORCED THE SAG TO COME TO TERMS
WITH SOME OF THE REALITIES OF MODERN COMBAT. ALL THE
NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE WORLD IS OF LITTLE VALUE WITHOUT
A COHESIVE OFFICER CORPS CAPABLE OF MAKING QUICK,
SOPHISTICATED USE OF THEIR WEAPONRY. UNFORTUNATELY,
THIS IS PRECISELY THE SORT OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION
BEST SUITED, AND HENCE MORE LIKELY, TO SEEK POWER IN
ITS OWN RIGHT. THE AL SAUD HAVE ACCEPTED THE NEED TO
DEVELOP THE COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION AND STAFFING
MECHANISMS NEEDED TO OPERATE A MODERN MILITARY FORCE.
PEACE SHIELD, THE SAUDIS' MULTIBILLION DOLLAR C3 PROGRAM
FOR AIR DEFENSE, MAY EVENTUALLY LINK THE AIR DEFENSE
COMMAND, RSAF AND ROYAL SAUDI NAVY, BUT THIS PROGRAM
DOES NOT BEGIN TO TACKLE THE QUESTION OF COMBINED ARMS
OPERATIONAL CONTROL. IT ADDRESSES WHAT UNQUESTIONABLY
IS THE GREATEST CURRENT THREAT PERCEIVED BY THE SAUDI
REGIME, THAT OF AN AIR ATTACK AGAINST THEIR PETRO-
INDUSTRIAL-DESALINATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE
EASTERN PROVINCE. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTATION EVEN OF THIS
PROGRAM HAS BEEN SLOW AND A SYSTEM WHICH INTEGRATES
ALL THE MILITARY SERVICES, LET ALONE MODA AND THE SANG,
IS A LONG WAY OFF. FURTHER STEPS FACILITIATING MILITARY
COORDINATION BETWEEN SERVICES AND ITS TRANSFER OUT OF THE
HANDS OF PRINCELY AUTHORITY AND INTO THOSE OF A MILITARY
GENERAL STAFF DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE IN THE CARDS.
10. WARY THAT A STRONG, COHESIVE MILITARY MIGHT POSE
A THREAT TO THEIR RULE, THE AL SAUD TREAT EVERY BRANCH
OF THE MILITARY AS A SEPARATE ENTITY WITH ITS OWN
EQUIPMENT, GARRISON AND DISTINCT LINES OF COMMAND AND
CONTROL. THUS THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE ARE HAMPERED
BY INCOMPATIBILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, SPARE
PARTS AND AMMUNITION AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, MUTUAL
DISTRUST SOMETIMES BORDERING ON DISDAIN. THE NATIONAL
GUARD AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION HAVE BUT
LIMITED CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER, LITTLE CHANCE AT
INTEROPERABILITY, AND NO PROVISIONS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS
EXCEPT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE BROADEST MISSION
STATEMENTS. ARMY FORCES ARE ALL GARRISONED WELL AWAY
FROM THE CAPITAL. THE ONLY GROUND FORCES NEAR RIYADH
BELONG TO THE NATIONAL GUARD. RIYADH AIRBASE HAS NO
FIGHTER SQUADRONS. IT IS A FAIR ASSESSMENT TO SAY THAT
THE SAUDI REGIME HAS TRIED TO ACHIEVE A DELICATE BALANCE,
HAVING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY AND EFFICIENCY TO MEET
POTENTIAL EXTERNAL THREATS, BUT NOT SO MUCH AS TO
ENDANGER THE ROYAL FAMILY'S OWN DOMESTIC POSITION.
11. BUT ARE THE PRINCES IN THE MILITARY AN ELEMENT
OF THE SAME CONTROL PROCESS? DOES THEIR PRESENCE HAVE
AN IMPACT ON THE REGIME'S SECURITY, ON THE EFFICIENCY
OF THE ARMED FORCES, ON MILITARY MORALE? DO SENIOR
PRINCES WITH MINISTERIAL POSITIONS CAREFULLY PLACE THEIR
JUNIORS IN KEY, UNIFORMED JOBS? THE COMPLEXITY OF
AL SAUD FAMILY POLITICS MAKES HIGHLY SPECULATIVE ANY
ATTEMPT TO INFER THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL THAT
WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PLACE OFFICERS INTO KEY POSITIONS
IN THE MILITARY SUITABLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A
WATCHDOG ROLE. MOREOVER, FAR FROM BEING A MONOLITHIC
ORGANIZATION, THE AL SAUD FAMILY IS A SPRAWLING ENTITY
WITH AN ARRAY OF DISCRETE AND SOMETIMES COMPETITIVE
INTERESTS; COHESION AND INTERNAL CONTROL ARE A MAJOR
PREOCCUPATION OF THE SENIOR-MOST PRINCES.
12. UNQUESTIONABLY, THERE ARE REASONS WHY PRINCES
MIGHT PLAY A ROLE IN THE MILITARY BY DESIGN. GIVEN
AN ABUNDANCE OF WELL-EDUCATED, LOYAL PRINCES, A
LOGICAL MOVE FOR THE AL SAUD TO MAKE WOULD BE TO
ENCOURAGE SOME OF THESE YOUNG MEN TO JOIN THE MILITARY.
SUCH MEN, IMBUED AS THEY ARE WITH A VESTED SELF-
INTEREST IN THE REGIME, COULD SERVE AS ITS EYES AND EARS
AND ALSO EXERT AN INFLUENCE ON THE REST OF THE OFFICER
CORPS. CLEARLY THE TOP ECHELON OF THE SAG IS COMPOSED
ENTIRELY OF PRINCES. KING FAHD BIN ABDUL AZIZ IS THE
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. HE EXERCISES
CONTROL OVER THE REGULAR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
THROUGH HIS FULL BROTHER, SULTAN BIN ABDUL AZIZ,
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION. WHILE THE KING IS
ALSO NOMINAL CHIEF OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD,
HIS HALF BROTHER, ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ, IS ITS
COMMANDER. THE KING WOULD PROBABLY HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY
IN EXERTING ARBITRARY AUTHORITY OVER ABDULLAH,
ESPECIALLY IN MATTERS AFFECTING THE SANG. DECISIONS
ARE OFTEN MADE WITH SENIOR FAMILY AGREEMENT. SINCE
SURVIVAL OF THE REGIME IS THE AL SAUD FAMILY'S FIRST
IMPERATIVE, THERE IS LITTLE VISIBLE SIGN OF DISHARMONY.
AS CROWN PRINCE AND THUS FAHD'S PUTATIVE SUCCESSOR,
STABILITY OF THE REGIME IS ALSO VERY MUCH IN
ABDULLAH'S PERSONAL INTEREST.
13. MANY SEEMINGLY INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS BELOW THE
CIVILIAN POLITICAL DIRECTION LEVEL ARE HELD BY PRINCES.
UNTIL RECENTLY, THE DIRECTOR OF AIR OPERATIONS
FOR THE RSAF WAS A PRINCE. TWO OF THE FIGHTER BASE
COMMANDERS ARE PRINCES. (A THIRD IS COMMANDED BY
AN AL-SUDAIRY, ONE OF THE FAMILIES LONG ASSOCIATED
WITH THE ROYAL FAMILY (SEE PARA 16). WHILE OFTEN
ADDRESSED AS "PRINCE," AND CLEARLY POSSESSING
EXCELLENT ROYAL CONNECTIONS, EARLIER REPORTS OFFICIALLY
LABELING COL AHMED BIN MUSAID AL-SUDAIRY AS A PRINCE
WERE IN ERROR.) A NUMBER OF THE MILITARY POLICE
LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE ARMY ARE HELD BY PRINCES
AS WELL. THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE NAVY IS A PRINCE.
IN THE SANG, THE MOST POLITICIZED OF THE SERVICES,
WE FIND NOT ONLY THE TOP TWO POSITIONS HELD BY
CIVILIANS BUT ALSO CIVILIAN PRINCES IN KEY ROLES AS
THE SANG COMMANDERS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCE,
ABDULLAH'S SON KHALID, THE EASTERN PROVINCE, MISHARI
BIN SAUD,AS WELL AS OTHERS IN MORE REMOVED FINANCIAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS.
14. MOST PRINCES IN UNIFORM ARE OFFICERS IN THE RSAF
AND THE ARMY (SAUDI ARABIAN LAND FORCES, OR SALF),
THE TWO ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES MOST CAPABLE OF
MOUNTING A THREAT TO AL SAUD RULE. PRINCES ARE MORE
COMMON IN THE OFFICER RANKS OF THESE TWO ORGANIZATIONS
THAN IN ALL THE OTHERS (NAVY, SANG, MOI QUASI-
MILITARY FORCES). IF PRINCES ARE IN THE ARMED FORCES
TO FULFILL AN OVERSIGHT ROLE, THEY ARE CERTAINLY IN
THE RIGHT BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE.
15. BUT IF THERE ARE THESE INDICATIONS SUPPORTING
THE CONCEPT OF DIRECTED ROYAL PLACEMENT IN THE
MILITARY, THERE IS MUCH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
ALSO TENDING TO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THE PRESENCE
AND PLACEMENT OF PRINCES IN THE MILITARY REFLECTS
INDIVIDUAL INCLINATION AND AMBITION AS MUCH AS--
OR MORE THAN--THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PUTATIVE
PROTECTION PLAN ELABORATED BY THE AL SAUD. PRINCES
FREELY REFUSE ASSIGNMENTS AND APPEAR TO BE FREE TO
LEAVE THE SERVICE IF THEY DESIRE TO DO SO. THE
AL SAUD LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT
PUSHING PRINCES TOO FAR TOO FAST AS WELL. PROMOTIONS
INTO THE GENERAL OFFICER RANKS HAVE ONLY RECENTLY
BEEN MADE. BREAKING THE PROMOTION ICE WAS
COL. FAHD B. ABDULLAH, FORMER RSAF DIRECTOR OF
AIR OPERATIONS, WHO BECAME SAUDI ARABIA'S FIRST
PRINCE TO BE PROMOTED THROUGH THE OFFICER RANKS TO
BRIGADIER GENERAL IN JANUARY 1984. THIS PROMOTION
WAS LATER FOLLOWED BY THE PROMOTIONS OF COL. FAYSAL B.
MUHAMMED, SALF AVIATION CHIEF, AND KHALID B. SULTAN,
DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE RSADF.
16. THERE IS ALSO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ROYAL
CONTROL IS REALLY FURTHERED THROUGH A PRINCELY
PRESENCE. ABDUL AZIZ FATHERED 45 ACKNOWLEDGED SONS
FROM AT LEAST 22 WIVES. THE SURVIVORS AMONG THESE
SONS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR OWN OFFSPRING, HAVE, OVER
THE YEARS, ESTABLISHED INFORMAL BLOCKS COMPOSED
GENERALLY OF GROUPINGS OF FULL-BROTHERS BUT ALSO
INCLUDING HALF-BROTHER ALLIES. TO THESE MUST BE
ADDED THE SONS OF ABDUL AZIZ'S RELATIVES WHOSE
FAMILIES CONSTITUTE THE AL SAUD CADET BRANCHES,
AND THE CHILDREN OF LONG TIME ASSOCIATES NOW
MARRIED INTO THE GREATER FAMILY. THESE LATTER
GROUPS ARE IN AN AMBIGUOUS, AMBIVALENT POSITION:
WHILE MANY AL SHAYKH AND AL SUDAIRY DAUGHTERS CONTINUE
TO MARRY YOUNG SCIONS OF THE AL SAUD, MALE MEMBERS
OF THESE FAMILIES OFTEN EXHIBIT--AND SOMETIMES ARE
REMINDED BY THE AL SAUD--THAT THEIR LINEAGE IS
DISTANT. THIS DIVERSIFICATION OF FAMILY GROUPINGS,
WITH THEIR CONCOMITANT LOYALTIES, COMPLICATES THE
ROYAL PRESENCE IN THE ARMED FORCES AND REFLECTS AMONG
THE UNIFORMED PRINCES A DIVERSITY OF ROLES, INTERESTS
AND ASPIRATIONS. THIS DIVERSITY IMPOSES LIMITS TO THE
DEGREE OF CONTROL AVAILABLE TO THE SENIOR PRINCES
THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF PRINCES IN THE MILITARY.
IT IS SIMILARLY FLAWED EVEN AS AN INFORMATION/
INTELLIGENCE CONDUIT. OFFICER PRINCES ARE OFTEN
ABLE TO AVOID SUBJUGATING THEIR PERSONAL GOALS AND
AMBITIONS TO THE DESIRES OF THEIR MORE REMOVED UNCLES
AND COUSINS.
17. CONTROL AMONG THE SENIOR PRINCES IS COMPLICATED
ENOUGH (SEE PARA 12). IT IS EVEN MORE SO AMONG
THE JUNIORS. THE PRINCES ALL APPEAR TO BE LOYAL
TO THE REGIME. WHILE THERE MAY BE A VARIETY OF
DIFFERENT SELF-INTERESTS AMONG THEM, ALL THE PRINCES
ARE DEPENDENT ON THE MONARCHY FOR THEIR STATION IN
LIFE. COMPLICATIONS BEGIN WHEN WE EXAMINE THE
MAKEUP OF THE ROYAL FAMILY AND SEE THAT WHILE MANY
BEAR THE TITLE OF PRINCE, ALL PRINCES ARE NOT EQUAL.
THIS LACK OF EQUALITY OFTEN BRINGS WITH IT A WIDE
RANGE OF PRIORITIES IN LIFE. SOME PRINCES, MOSTLY
FROM THE MORE DISTANT BRANCHES OF THE FAMILY,
ARE LESS CONCERNED WITH POWER POLITICS AND MORE
WITH JUST PLAIN UPWARD MOBILITY. UNABLE TO ASPIRE
TO THE HIGHEST OFFICES IN THE LAND, THESE PRINCES
HOLD A WIDE VARIETY OF OTHER ASPIRATIONS AND
AMBITIONS. FIRST PRIORITY FOR THESE MEN CAN BE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS,
THE SECURING OF A CONTRACT, THE PURCHASE OF NEW
EQUIPMENT OR THE OPENING OF A NEW BRANCH OFFICE,
JUST AS MUCH AS THE SECURING OF A MILITARY PROMOTION
OR NEW, BETTER POSITION. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE
FAIRLY TOLERANT OF THIS ATTITUDE.
18. IN SUM, WE CAN SAY THAT AT THE VERY TOP OF THE
CHAIN OF COMMAND--THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL--PRINCES
HAVE BEEN GIVEN ABSOLUTE CONTROL OVER THE ARMED
FORCES AND OPERATE THOSE FORCES VERY MUCH WITH
THE SURVIVAL OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE REGIME IN MIND.
AS WE GO FARTHER DOWN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, WE FIND
A NUMBER OF PRINCES WHOSE REASON FOR BEING THERE IS
MUCH MORE OBSCURE. HOWEVER, IF THEY ARE NOT
SPENDING A GREAT DEAL OF TIME LOOKING AFTER THE
INTERESTS OF THE REGIME, THEY AT LEAST GIVE
OUTSIDERS THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT BE. THUS
THE REGIME PROBABLY PROFITS MORE FROM THE PERCEPTION
THAN THE REALITY, AND MORE SO AMONG THE EXPATRIATE
COMMUNITY THAN INSIDERS. ALTHOUGH SOME PRINCES ARE
IN POSITIONS FROM WHERE THEY CAN OVERSEE THE GOINGS
ON IN THE MILITARY, THERE ARE ENOUGH
KEY POSITIONS FILLED BY COMMONERS AND, SIMILARLY,
ENOUGH POSITIONS FILLED BY PRINCES WHERE THERE IS
RELATIVELY LITTLE CONTROL OR OVERSIGHT TO CAST
DOUBT THAT THE AL SAUD MAKE ANYTHING MORE THAN A
HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPT TO POSITION THEIR TRUSTED SONS
IN KEY JOBS. SELECTIONS APPEAR TO BE BASED ON
THE PRINCES' INDIVIDUAL DESIRES, AND THE AVAILABILITY
OF POSITIONS AT A GIVEN TIME.
19. IF PRINCES ARE NOT IN THE MILITARY TO ACT PRIMARILY
AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REGIME, WHY THEN ARE THEY
THERE? FIRST OF ALL, THERE ARE NOT MANY JOBS THAT A
PRINCE WILL ACCEPT. WHILE SOME OF THE OLDER, MORE
RETIRING PRINCES ARE CONTENT WITH THE WORLD OF
BUSINESS AND FINANCE, THIS IS NOT THE CASE WITH MANY
OF THE YOUNGER, WESTERN EDUCATED AND MORE WORLDLY
MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY. FOR SOME, THERE IS SIMPLY
NO MOTIVATION TO SPEND LONG HOURS TENDING AFTER
FAMILY BUSINESS INTERESTS. FOR OTHERS, DEALING
DIRECTLY IN BUSINESS IS DEMEANING. FOR STILL OTHERS,
THERE IS A YEARNING FOR BIGGER, MORE IMPORTANT TASKS.
20. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, MILITARY SERVICE HAS BEEN AN
ACCEPTABLE OCCUPATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE NOBILITY.
DEFENSE OF THE FAITH AND THE NATION, HONOR AND
GLORY, PRIDE AND ALL THE OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF
MILITARY SERVICE PERMIT PRINCES TO JOIN THE ARMED
FORCES ALONG WITH THEIR COMMONER COUNTRYMEN. WHILE
THE PREPONDERANCE OF PRINCES ARE IN THE SALF AND RSAF,
THERE ARE A NUMBER OF REASONS WHY THIS SHOULD BE THE
CASE. IN A COUNTRY WITH LITTLE IN THE WAY OF EXCITING
DIVERSIONS, FLYING AN F-15 OR AN F-5 WITH THE
POTENTIAL OF ENGAGING IN AERIAL COMBAT IS VERY
STIMULATING. VIRTUALLY ALL THE PRINCES IN THE RSAF
ARE PILOTS. TWO FIGHTER BASES ARE COMMANDED BY
PRINCES. THEIR ACCESS TO THE BEST EDUCATION, THEIR
LEADERSHIP ADVANTAGES AND THE BASIC ABILITY OF MANY
OF THE RSAF PRINCES ALL MAKE THEIR APPOINTMENT TO
LEADERSHIP POSITIONS A LOGICAL OUTCOME OF SERVICE.
21. SERVICE IN THE LAND FORCES GROWS OUT OF A LONG
TRADITION OF GROUND COMBAT. THE VIEW AMONG THE
BEDOUIN OF SAUDI ARABIA IS THAT SERVICE IN THE "GROUND
GAINING ARMS" OF THE MILITARY, WHETHER FOR DEFENSE,
OR IN OLDER TIMES FOR THE HONOR IT WAS POSSIBLE TO
ACQUIRE IN THE ONCE PERENNIAL RAIDING, IS THE MOST
HONORED FORM OF MILITARY SERVICE. IF MANY OF THE MORE
EDUCATED, COSMOPOLITAN SAUDIS, PRINCES AND COMMONERS,
ARE FINDING THE OTHER BRANCHES OF SERVICE--AIR FORCE,
NAVY AND AIR DEFENSE--EQUALLY ATTRACTIVE, FAMILY AND
SOCIAL PRESSURE STILL FORCE MANY OF THOSE WHO DO
ENTER MILITARY SERVICE TO ENTER THE LAND FORCES AND
SANG. RELUCTANT AS SOME MAY BE TO JOIN, SERVICE IN
THE SANG CAN AMOUNT TO A FAMILY OBLIGATION FOR FAVORS
GIVEN OR EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE. AT THE SAME TIME,
SANG OFFICERS AUTOMATICALLY INCUR A DEBT OF LOYALTY
TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH. THIS REQUIREMENT PROBABLY
KEEPS PRINCES WHOSE FAMILY LOYALTIES ARE TO OTHER
SECTORS OF THE FAMILY, OUT OF THE SANG.
22. JOINING THE ARMED FORCES CARRIES WITH IT A NUMBER
OF OBVIOUS BENEFITS. A NUMBER OF PRINCES HAVE USED
MILITARY SERVICE TO ESTABLISH THEIR CREDENTIALS AS
CAPABLE LEADERS AND HAVE GONE ON TO OTHER CAREERS
IN GOVERNMENT. OTHERS SEEM INCLINED TO GO FROM THE
MILITARY INTO BUSINESS HAVING MADE LUCRATIVE CONTACTS
OR BEGUN THEIR FORTUNES IN OTHER WAYS WHILE IN THE
SERVICE. OTHERS STAY IN THE SERVICE BALANCING MILITARY
DUTY WITH PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. HOWEVER, ONE FACT STANDS
OUT ABOVE ALL THE REST--MILITARY SERVICE IS NO BAR
TO GETTING WEALTHY. MANY OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN
HAVE AMASSED GREAT FORTUNES THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF
MILITARY SERVICE. UNTIL RECENTLY, MODA WAS A SEEMINGLY
INEXHAUSTIBLE SOURCE OF CONTRACTS, PROJECTS, PROCUREMENT
ACTIONS AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES. WITH NO ENFORCEMENT
OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS AGAINST PRINCES, MEMBERS
OF THE MILITARY, TOGETHER WITH THEIR CIVILIAN RELATIVES,
TAPPED THIS VAST RESERVE OF FUNDS. FOR PRINCES, THE
INSIDE TRACK PROVIDED BY THEIR FAMILY CONNECTION
HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO OUTSHINE ALL THEIR
NON-ROYAL COLLEAGUES. THE HIGHER IN RANK, THE BIGGER
THE OPPORTUNITIES.
23. SOME OFFICERS, SUCH AS COL TURKI BIN NASSIR,
BASE COMMANDER AT DHAHRAN AND SON OF NASSIR BIN
ABDUL AZIZ, HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES. AMONG HIS INTERESTS ARE SEVERAL
BUSINESSES IN WHICH THE F-15 SQUADRON COMMANDER LTC
MANSOUR BIN BANDAR, ANOTHER PRINCE, IS HIS PARTNER.
OTHER PRINCES, SUCH AS THE FORMER RSAF DIRECTOR
OF AIR OPERATIONS, BG FAHD BIN ABDULLAH BIN MUHAMMED
BIN SAUD AL KABIR, AND HIS YOUNGER UNCLE, BG FAYSAL
BIN MUHAMMED BIN SAUD AL KABIR, CONDUCT BUSINESS
THROUGH RELATIVES OR OTHER SURROGATES OUTSIDE THE
MILITARY. WHILE FAYSAL, HEAD OF ARMY AVIATION,
APPEARS TO OWN ONLY A TRAFFIC LIGHT COMPANY,
IN REALITY HE IS TIED THROUGH HIS BROTHERS INTO
MANY ESTABLISHMENTS DIRECTLY RELATED NOT ONLY TO
ARMY AVIATION BUT ALSO OTHER MILITARY AREAS FROM
WHICH HE TOO IS PROFITING. LTC MANSOUR BIN BANDAR,
THE COMMANDER OF THE F-15 SQUADRON AT THE DHAHRAN
AIR BASE, RECENTLY DECLINED A TRANSFER WHICH WOULD
HAVE MADE HIM BASE COMMANDER IN TAIF. THE REPORTED
REASON FOR THIS REFUSAL WAS THE REQUIREMENT TO
GIVE UP PERSONAL CONTROL OF HIS BUSINESS OPERATIONS
IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE.
24. MINDEF SULTAN'S SON, BG KHALID BIN SULTAN, IS
THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE ROYAL SAUDI AIR DEFENSE
FORCES. IN HIS ROLE AS DEPUTY COMMANDER, KHALID
HAS PROFITED SMARTLY FROM THE VARIOUS WEAPONS
DEALS HE HAS HELPED ENGINEER. REPORTEDLY, BOTH
KHALID AND HIS FATHER OBTAINED HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS
OF DOLLARS IN THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED DEAL TO PURCHASE
SHAHINE MISSILES FROM THE FRENCH. OTHER PRINCES
HAVE PROFITED BY WRITING THE SPECIFICATIONS NEEDED
FOR A PARTICULAR WEAPON OR SERVICE TO FIT A PARTICULAR
COMPANY'S OFFER OR THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
COMPETITIVE RUNOFFS. OFTEN, AS FOR EXAMPLE IN THE
CASE OF A LARGE FOOD SERVICE COMPANY SUPPORTING MODA,
THE OWNER CAN BESTOW THE CONTRACT ON HIMSELF, IN THIS
CASE, VICE DEFENSE MINISTER ABDUL RAHMAN. INSIDE
TRADING IS A COMMON PRACTICE. SINCE THERE ARE NO
CONFLICT OF INTEREST WORRIES, THE PRINCES OFTEN ACT
WITH IMPUNITY. A NUMBER OF PRINCES ARE MANEUVERING
ACTIVELY FOR A PIECE OF THE PEACE SHIELD OFFSET
PACKAGE. SOME HAVE ARRANGED THE PLACEMENT OF PERSONAL
EMPLOYEES WITH COMPANIES THEY THOUGHT WOULD GET A
PIECE OF THE ACTION.
25. DESPITE AL SAUD PREOCCUPATION WITH IT, MONEY
IS NOT THE ONLY ATTRACTION FOUND IN MILITARY SERVICE.
WHILE SOME PRINCES DEVOTE THEMSELVES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY
TO SELF ENRICHMENT, AND OTHERS, LIKE THE SAUD AL KABIR,
CONTENT THEMSELVES WITH MONEY AS A HANDSOME SIDELINE
TO THEIR MILITARY CAREERS, OTHERS HAVE HIGHER
ASPIRATIONS. THE MILITARY CAN BE A STEPPING STONE
TO BIGGER THINGS. IT IS CLEARLY NOT A DISADVANTAGE.
AMONG THE MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLES ARE THAT OF BANDAR
BIN SULTAN, ANOTHER SON OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE,
AND MITIEB BIN ABDULLAH, SON OF THE CROWN PRINCE.
BANDAR WAS DOUBTLESS A BUSINESSMAN WHEN HE WAS IN
UNIFORM. FOR THAT MATTER, HE STILL IS INVOLVED
IN BUSINESSES HE HAD WHEN F-15 COMMANDER IN DHAHRAN.
HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO A VERY AMBITIOUS MAN WHO ASPIRES
TO DOING GREAT THINGS FOR HIS COUNTRY. BANDAR WAS
QUICK TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY THE ARMS
SALE DEBATE IN THE U.S. IN THE EARLY 80'S. HE
QUICKLY BECAME AN ARTICULATE SPOKESMAN FOR HIS
COUNTRY'S MILITARY POLICY NEEDS. HIS FAMILY
CREDENTIALS AND POLITICAL ACUMEN ENABLED HIM TO
GAIN ACCESS TO THE KING'S EAR AND HIS PERSONAL
CHARM AND ABILITY EARNED HIM THE KING'S ATTENTION.
NOW AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES AND SOMETIMES
MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATOR FOR THE KING, BANDAR IS RUMORED
TO BE HEADING FOR AN EVEN LARGER FOREIGN POLICY ROLE.
ABDULLAH'S SON, MITIEB, IS ALSO A VERY AMBITIOUS MAN.
USING HIS POSITION AS SON OF THE SANG COMMANDER, MITIEB
HAS QUICKLY RISEN IN RANK, FAR FASTER THAN ANYONE ELSE
IN THE ORGANIZATION. HE ANSWERS ONLY TO HIS FATHER
AND PERHAPS HIS FATHER'S MOST SENIOR ADVISOR. MITIEB
IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE MILITARY LIFE, HOWEVER.
REPORTEDLY, HE IS ANXIOUS FOR A ROLE SIMILAR TO THAT
OF BANDAR. IF AND WHEN HIS FATHER BECOMES KING,
MITIEB MAY WELL GET HIS WISH. SOME OTHERS WHO HAVE
MOVED ON ARE LISTED IN LAST SECTION OF LIST PROVIDED
IN PARA 4. THE VERY FACT THAT A NUMBER OF PRINCES
HAVE MOVED ON FROM APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL MILITARY
CAREERS TENDS TO FAVOR THE VIEW THAT THE ROYAL
FAMILY IS NOT THAT CONCERNED WITH THE PRINCELY
PRESENCE IN THE MILITARY.
26. REGARDLESS OF THEIR REASON FOR BEING THERE,
THE FINAL KEY QUESTION IS: WHAT IMPACT DOES THE
ROYAL CONNECTION HAVE ON THE ARMED FORCES? COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PRINCES AND THEIR COMMONER
COLLEAGUES ARE ESTABLISHED BY PRINCE SULTAN AND
PRINCE ABDULLAH. IN THE SANG, NONE OF THE PRINCES
APPEAR TO ANSWER TO ANYONE BUT THE CROWN PRINCE OR
HIS MOST SENIOR DEPUTY. HOWEVER, THE SANG IS SMALL,
IS MORE ABDULLAH'S PRIVATE DOMAIN, AND ITS UNIQUE
TRIBAL ORIENTATION MAKES THE PLACE OF PRINCES
(ESPECIALLY PRINCES RELATED TO ABDULLAH) MORE
SECURE. IN MODA, PRINCES ARE USUALLY IN A POSITION
TO TAKE ORDERS FROM COMMONERS. OFFICIAL POLICY
SAYS THEY ARE TO BE TREATED ACCORDING TO THEIR RANK.
BUT THE REAL RELATIONSHIP IS UNCLEAR. A PRINCE
HAS DIRECT ACCESS TO THE TOP, EITHER PERSONALLY OR
THROUGH HIS FAMILY. THE HIGHER THE PRINCE, THE
EASIER IT IS FOR HIM TO GET HIS OWN WAY IN A DISPUTE.
WE DO NOT HEAR, HOWEVER, OF MANY DISPUTES WHICH
REQUIRE ROYAL SETTLEMENT FROM ABOVE. WE KNOW OF
RIVALRIES BUT NOT OPEN INSUBORDINATION. IT IS
PROBABLE THAT ANY PRINCE WHO CANNOT GET ALONG IN
MODA IS QUIETLY MOVED OUT. WHILE STORIES ABOUND
AS TO THE ACTUAL REASON, BG FAHD BIN ABDULLAH'S
RECENT RETIREMENT WAS REPORTEDLY DUE IN PART TO
THE PERSONAL POWER HE HAD ACQUIRED OVER RECENT
YEARS, POWER WHICH SOMETIMES APPEARED TO EXCEED THAT
OF HIS NOMINAL BOSS, THE RSAF COMMANDER. (WHETHER
OR NOT THIS PROMPTED HIS PROMOTION/REMOVAL IS UNCLEAR.
MOST OBSERVERS AGREE HIS COMING IS AT LEAST A BENEFIT
TO CIVIL AVIATION AND A TECHNICAL PROMOTION.)
27. BUT TIGHT MILITARY DISCIPLINE IS NOT REALLY IN
THE SAUDI TRADITION--FOR COMMONERS AS WELL AS ROYALTY.
SAUDI SOCIETY REMAINS CLOSE TO THE STRONG BEDOUIN
ETHIC OF FIERCE PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE AND STRONG,
FAMILY/CLAN ORIENTED LOYALTY. WHILE NOT OBVIOUS,
EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING HAS ITS PLACE IN THE ORDER
OF IMPORTANCE. LOYALTY IS FIRST TO ONE'S FATHER
AND THEN TO A LESSER DEGREE, TO OTHER PERSONS,
INSTITUTIONS AND PURSUITS. IN THE ARMED FORCES,
THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE REDUCTION OF WHAT ARE
ELSEWHERE STRICT MILITARY REGULATIONS INTO THE
LEAST RESTRICTIVE, LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR.
WESTERN CONCEPTS OF MILILARY DISCIPLINE AS APPLIED
IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES ARE LIBERAL,
AND TO OUTSIDERS OFTEN SEEM PATENTLY INEFFECTIVE.
SOLDIERS ON GUARD DUTY CAN BE SEEN WITHOUT LACES
IN THEIR SHOES OR OUT OF PROPER UNIFORM IN SOME
OTHER WAY. ALTHOUGH FORBIDDEN BY REGULATIONS,
SOLDIERS AND SAILORS CAN STILL BE SEEN LEAVING
THEIR OFFICES AT 2:00 PM (DAY'S END) AND GETTING
INTO THEIR TAXI CABS TO BEGIN A SECOND OCCUPATION.
28. DESPITE OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY,
WITH NO EQUALITY BETWEEN PRINCES AND OFFICERS OF EQUAL
RANK, LARGE DISPARITY IN PAY AND ALLOWANCES (PRINCES
GET A ROYAL STIPEND OF AROUND USD 120,000 PER YEAR,
DEPENDING ON PLACE IN THE FAMILY), AND A VAST ARRAY
OF PREREQUISITES SUCH AS FREE USE OF GOVERNMENT OWNED
AIRCRAFT, HOMES, ETC., IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THEY
ARE RELATIVELY ISOLATED FROM THEIR COMMONER COLLEAGUES
WITHIN THE MILITARY. PRINCES ASSOCIATE VERY LITTLE
OUTSIDE THEIR OWN CIRCLES, BUT THIS INDEED IS THE
CASE WITH FAMILIES IN THE REST OF SAUDI SOCIETY.
HOWEVER, WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE ARMED FORCES IS THAT
THE BONDS OF COMRADESHIP ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT.
WHILE PRINCES HAVE, THROUGH THEIR PERSONAL CONNECTIONS,
THE ABILITY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BEHALF OF THEIR UNITS,
INFLUENCE IS THE WAY VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING IS MOVED IN
THE SAUDI BUREAUCRACY AND NOT MUCH CREDIT IS GIVEN FOR
DOING SOMETHING WHICH IS EXPECTED. THE PRESENCE OF A
PRINCE IN THE UNIT IS THEREFORE NOT NECESSARILY A
BOON TO MORALE.
29. THE MISSION IS AWARE OF COMPLAINTS AMONG COMMONER
OFFICERS ABOUT THE OBVIOUS PRIVILEGES AND EXCESSIVE
GREED OF ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN
QUIET GRUMBLING ABOUT EXCESSIVE ADVANCEMENT, SUCH AS
IN THE CASE OF CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH'S SON MITIEB.
WHILE OFFICERS WILL MOST GENERALLY WITHHOLD THEIR
COMMENTS FROM FOREIGNERS, THE FACT THAT A FEW HAVE
BEEN WILLING TO SPEAK IS PROBABLY INDICATIVE OF WIDER,
PRIVATE ATTITUDES IN THE OFFICER CORPS. (THERE IS
NO PROVISION FOR COMPLAINTS SUCH AS THESE AND THEREFORE,
IF THEY ARE WIDESPREAD, THEY ARE PROBABLY VOICED ONLY
AMONG CONFIDANTS. WE KNOW OF CASES IN WHICH OFFICERS
WITH OUTSPOKEN OPINIONS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO ATTACHE
POSITIONS OUT OF THE COUNTRY, BEEN GIVEN RETIREMENT,
OR BEEN SECONDED TO NON-MILITARY, GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS.) PERHAPS THE EVIDENCE OF CAUTION
OF MOVING PRINCES TO THE MOST SENIOR POSITIONS
INDICATES SOME ROYAL FAMILY AWARENESS OF THE POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF OFFICER CORPS MORALE IF THEIR
OWN ARE PUSHED TOO FAR. THE SANG APPEARS TO BE LESS
AFFECTED THAN MODA AND MORE RELAXED ABOUT THE PRINCELY
ROLE.
30. OVERALL, PRINCES DO NOT APPEAR TO HELP OR HARM
THE CAPABILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES. WHILE IT IS
DEBATABLE HOW MUCH THEIR EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
AFFECT MORALE, THEIR ABILITY TO CUT THROUGH RED
TAPE AND FACILITATE MATTERS ON BEHALF OF THEIR UNITS
SHOULD HELP OFFSET AT LEAST ANY NEGATIVE FEELINGS.
WHILE SOME MAY COME IN FOR CRITICISM, THE PROVEN
ABILITY OF OTHERS HAS CERTAINLY BEEN RECOGNIZED AND
LEADERS SUCH AS COL. MITIEB, OVERALL, ARE RESPECTED
BY THEIR COLLEAGUES AND SUBORDINATES. HOWEVER, THE
FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES WHICH ONCE FELL TO EVERYONE
WITH A LITTLE IMAGINATION ARE DWINDLING FAST. SOON,
THE CASE MAY BE THAT ONLY PRINCES WILL HAVE THE CLOUT,
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND OPERATING LATITUDE TO MAKE
IT RICH. IF THIS OCCURS, THEIR PLACE IN THE MILITARY
MAY BECOME MORE CONTROVERSIAL.
31. THE MERE PRESENCE OF PRINCES IN THE ARMED FORCES
PROVIDES SOME DEGREE OF STABILITY TO THE AL SAUD
REGIME. REGARDLESS OF THEIR MOTIVES IN ENTERING
THE MILITARY, THEIR OVERSIGHT CAPABILITY AND
INFLUENCE ON EVENTS IN THE MILITARY MUST INEVITABLY
HAVE SOME EFFECT ON UNIT PERSONNEL. AND INEVITABLY,
EVEN IF LINKS TO THE SENIOR PRINCES ARE WEAK, THERE
MUST BE SOME FEEDBACK ON MILITARY ATTITUDES FROM
THE PRINCELY PRESENCE. WHETHER OR NOT A PRINCE
IMPROVES OR DETRACTS FROM THE MORALE OR CAPABILITY
OF HIS UNIT IS MORE OR LESS DEPENDENT ON HIS ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE PROFESSION AND HIS PERSONAL INTERESTS.
HOWEVER, HIS PRIMARY BENEFIT TO THE REGIME, WHETHER
BY DESIGN OR NOT, IS THE ROYAL PRESENCE HIS ASSIGNMENT
BRINGS.
SUDDARTH