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--------------
(C) Key Points
--------------
-- The Mauritanians, whether in government, civil society, or
politics, made a convincing case that they are committed to a
national transition to democracy. But their timeline is
extremely ambitious. They will need technical and financial
assistance, from us and from others, in order to succeed.
-- The most immediate danger to the election process is the
impending census and the associated national voter list will
be done poorly. That could throw off the timetable. It
would certainly make election results less credible. It
could even cause civil strife.
-- As many as 200,000 Mauritanian citizens of voting age do
not have the national identity cards needed to register to
vote. Many, maybe even most, are Afro-Mauritanians. The
danger remains that Afro-Mauritanians will be disenfranchised
at a much higher rate than other racial groups in the census
and voter registration process. The Embassy is raising this
issue frequently, including with Colonel Fal during the
delegation's visit.
-- Miscommunication and suspicion continue to hinder
cooperation between political parties and civil society.
-- Mauritanian government officials continued to express
their unwavering commitment to counterterrorism.
End Key Points.
1. (C) The high level mission to Nouakchott headed by AF PDAS
Bobby Pittman contributed significantly to the advancement of
our policy in Mauritania. The delegation met with government
officials (septel) and members of political parties and civil
society (septel).
2. (C) The Embassy's assessment is that, in every meeting,
the delegation succeeded in impressing upon the Mauritanians
the need to adhere strictly to the established election
timetable. The delegation also succeeded in communicating
the USG's interest in engaging with the Mauritanians on
issues of vital interest, such as democracy and
counter-terrorism. The delegation also promised a return to
full relations following free and fair elections. That came
under attack by some of the "independent" press, but it was
certainly the right thing to say.
3. (C) The delegation was led by AF PDAS Bobby Pittman, and
included S/CT Virginia Palmer, DRL DAS Jeff Krilla, AF/W
Director Phil Carter, OSD Principal Director Office of
African Affairs Chuck Kosak, NSC Director of African Affairs
Mark Swayne, and Democracy Officers Ryan McCannell and Dana
Beegun from USAID.
------------------
ELECTION TIMETABLE
------------------
4. (C) The transitional government has committed to hold a
series of elections culminating in the turnover of power to a
constitutional government, which PDAS Pittman correctly
described in his press statement as "ambitious." While
realizing the obstacles facing them, virtually all the
Mauritanians with whom the delegation met were optimistic
that the goal could be met. International observers,
including the local head of the UN mission, strongly agreed
with the PDAS's assessment. Several are quite concerned
about the Mauritanians' ability to hold to the timetable,
even with significant technical and financial assistance.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
POLITICAL PARTY-CIVIL SOCIETY: COMPETITORS FOR AID
--------------------------------------------- --------------
5. (C) In several meetings, the delegation witnessed
first-hand the miscommunication and suspicion between
NOUAKCHOTT 00000154 002 OF 002
political parties and civil society. For their part,
political parties were largely unable to work effectively
together, and refused to consider that civil society had a
role in the political process. While government officials
stressed their open and collaborative approach, some
political parties expressed frustration at not having been
consulted enough during the election planning process.
6. (C) The delegation has a useful meeting with all 16
members of the National Independent Electoral Commission.
From their words and demeanor, the commission members clearly
took seriously their role as overseers of a historic process.
They appeared to guard jealously their independence.
However, they were quick to admit that they were not
elections experts. From the discussion it was clear that the
members understood the daunting task ahead.
7. (C) Signficantly, despite some criticism about the
commission's ability to fulfill its mission, the delegation
did not hear any complaints about the integrity of commission
members.
--------------------------
THE AFRO-MAURITANIAN ISSUE
--------------------------
8. (C) The delegation heard several comments about the extent
to which Afro-Mauritanians, both inside and outside
Mauritania, can participate in the electoral process. Col.
Fal was adamant in his meeting with the delegation that
Mauritania was not in the position to conduct any type of
out-of-country voting given the short timetable. He refused
to provide any views on establishing procedures to allow
Mauritanians residing outside to return to vote.
9. (C) At the same time, quite a few Mauritanians appear to
view full participation of Afro-Mauritanians in the process
as a critical element for credible elections. While an
estimated 150,000 to 200,000 eligible Mauritanian voters do
not currently have national identity cards -- which are
required to register to vote -- the vast majority of these
are Afro-Mauritanians. The government has taken efforts to
accelerate the ID issuance process, but the Embassy continues
to assess that Afro-Mauritanians are likely to be
disenfranchised at a much higher rate than other racial
groups. Embassy officers continue to raise these concerns
whenever and wherever appropriate.
----------------
COUNTERTERRORISM
----------------
10. (C) On all occasions Mauritanian government officials
expressed their unwavering commitment to counterterrorism.
Most telling, however, was the delegation's meeting with the
five heads of intelligence services. The discussions clearly
demonstrated that the services do not routinely interact
(please see septels for additional information and comment,
including IIRs).
----------
NEXT STEPS
----------
11. (C) At all levels, the Mauritanians welcomed and
encouraged U.S. participation in the transition process. The
visit also raised expectations for increased U.S. involvement
in the future.
12. (C) Embassy encourages the Department to fund electoral
assistance to the greatest extent possible. It strongly
recommends that the UN basket fund be funded as much as
possible. NDI is also doing critically important work with
the political parties and should be funded, too.
13. (U) This cable was prepared after the departure of the
delegation. The delegation has not cleared the text.
LeBaron

Raw content

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000154
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, EAID, MR
SUBJECT: THE HIGH-LEVEL US DELEGATION'S VISIT TO MAURITANIA
-- THEMES AND OBSERVATIONS
Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------
(C) Key Points
--------------
-- The Mauritanians, whether in government, civil society, or
politics, made a convincing case that they are committed to a
national transition to democracy. But their timeline is
extremely ambitious. They will need technical and financial
assistance, from us and from others, in order to succeed.
-- The most immediate danger to the election process is the
impending census and the associated national voter list will
be done poorly. That could throw off the timetable. It
would certainly make election results less credible. It
could even cause civil strife.
-- As many as 200,000 Mauritanian citizens of voting age do
not have the national identity cards needed to register to
vote. Many, maybe even most, are Afro-Mauritanians. The
danger remains that Afro-Mauritanians will be disenfranchised
at a much higher rate than other racial groups in the census
and voter registration process. The Embassy is raising this
issue frequently, including with Colonel Fal during the
delegation's visit.
-- Miscommunication and suspicion continue to hinder
cooperation between political parties and civil society.
-- Mauritanian government officials continued to express
their unwavering commitment to counterterrorism.
End Key Points.
1. (C) The high level mission to Nouakchott headed by AF PDAS
Bobby Pittman contributed significantly to the advancement of
our policy in Mauritania. The delegation met with government
officials (septel) and members of political parties and civil
society (septel).
2. (C) The Embassy's assessment is that, in every meeting,
the delegation succeeded in impressing upon the Mauritanians
the need to adhere strictly to the established election
timetable. The delegation also succeeded in communicating
the USG's interest in engaging with the Mauritanians on
issues of vital interest, such as democracy and
counter-terrorism. The delegation also promised a return to
full relations following free and fair elections. That came
under attack by some of the "independent" press, but it was
certainly the right thing to say.
3. (C) The delegation was led by AF PDAS Bobby Pittman, and
included S/CT Virginia Palmer, DRL DAS Jeff Krilla, AF/W
Director Phil Carter, OSD Principal Director Office of
African Affairs Chuck Kosak, NSC Director of African Affairs
Mark Swayne, and Democracy Officers Ryan McCannell and Dana
Beegun from USAID.
------------------
ELECTION TIMETABLE
------------------
4. (C) The transitional government has committed to hold a
series of elections culminating in the turnover of power to a
constitutional government, which PDAS Pittman correctly
described in his press statement as "ambitious." While
realizing the obstacles facing them, virtually all the
Mauritanians with whom the delegation met were optimistic
that the goal could be met. International observers,
including the local head of the UN mission, strongly agreed
with the PDAS's assessment. Several are quite concerned
about the Mauritanians' ability to hold to the timetable,
even with significant technical and financial assistance.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
POLITICAL PARTY-CIVIL SOCIETY: COMPETITORS FOR AID
--------------------------------------------- --------------
5. (C) In several meetings, the delegation witnessed
first-hand the miscommunication and suspicion between
NOUAKCHOTT 00000154 002 OF 002
political parties and civil society. For their part,
political parties were largely unable to work effectively
together, and refused to consider that civil society had a
role in the political process. While government officials
stressed their open and collaborative approach, some
political parties expressed frustration at not having been
consulted enough during the election planning process.
6. (C) The delegation has a useful meeting with all 16
members of the National Independent Electoral Commission.
From their words and demeanor, the commission members clearly
took seriously their role as overseers of a historic process.
They appeared to guard jealously their independence.
However, they were quick to admit that they were not
elections experts. From the discussion it was clear that the
members understood the daunting task ahead.
7. (C) Signficantly, despite some criticism about the
commission's ability to fulfill its mission, the delegation
did not hear any complaints about the integrity of commission
members.
--------------------------
THE AFRO-MAURITANIAN ISSUE
--------------------------
8. (C) The delegation heard several comments about the extent
to which Afro-Mauritanians, both inside and outside
Mauritania, can participate in the electoral process. Col.
Fal was adamant in his meeting with the delegation that
Mauritania was not in the position to conduct any type of
out-of-country voting given the short timetable. He refused
to provide any views on establishing procedures to allow
Mauritanians residing outside to return to vote.
9. (C) At the same time, quite a few Mauritanians appear to
view full participation of Afro-Mauritanians in the process
as a critical element for credible elections. While an
estimated 150,000 to 200,000 eligible Mauritanian voters do
not currently have national identity cards -- which are
required to register to vote -- the vast majority of these
are Afro-Mauritanians. The government has taken efforts to
accelerate the ID issuance process, but the Embassy continues
to assess that Afro-Mauritanians are likely to be
disenfranchised at a much higher rate than other racial
groups. Embassy officers continue to raise these concerns
whenever and wherever appropriate.
----------------
COUNTERTERRORISM
----------------
10. (C) On all occasions Mauritanian government officials
expressed their unwavering commitment to counterterrorism.
Most telling, however, was the delegation's meeting with the
five heads of intelligence services. The discussions clearly
demonstrated that the services do not routinely interact
(please see septels for additional information and comment,
including IIRs).
----------
NEXT STEPS
----------
11. (C) At all levels, the Mauritanians welcomed and
encouraged U.S. participation in the transition process. The
visit also raised expectations for increased U.S. involvement
in the future.
12. (C) Embassy encourages the Department to fund electoral
assistance to the greatest extent possible. It strongly
recommends that the UN basket fund be funded as much as
possible. NDI is also doing critically important work with
the political parties and should be funded, too.
13. (U) This cable was prepared after the departure of the
delegation. The delegation has not cleared the text.
LeBaron