Thursday, 31 May 2012

The outgoing army chief, General V K Singh, claims he scuttled a Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) bid to sell overpriced Tatra vehicles to the Indian Army. But, in February 2012, the army quietly signed a contract with BEML for an even larger and more controversial purchase: a $275-million (about Rs 1,500 crore) contract for 204 armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs).

Last week, the army chief declared in a television interview that he knew the WZT-3 ARV contract was a scam and BEML should be investigated in detail. He called the Tatra deal “a wake-up call for us to start examining other areas where things could have gone wrong”.

But in February, BEML was nominated, without bidding, for the lucrative order for additional WZT-3 ARVs. Disregarded entirely was the fact that in three previous contracts for a total of 352 WZT-3 ARVs (44 in 1999; 80 in 2002; and 228 in 2005), BEML had disregarded the contractual stipulation to indigenise the ARV. Instead, the Indian defence public sector undertaking (DPSU) imported fully built ARVs from a Polish company, Bumar, fitted cosmetic Indian components and supplied these to the army.

The WZT-3 ARVs are essentially T-72 tanks kitted for repair and recovery, rather than for fighting. Instead of a gun and turret, the T-72 is fitted with a heavy-duty crane, winch and repair equipment. This allows the ARV to travel cross-country with tank columns, repairing tanks that break down.

The purchase of these essential vehicles has been fraught with controversy. In 2003, Brigadier Inder Mohan Singh was a Deputy Director General in the Master General of Ordnance (MGO) Branch, which handles the procurement of “in-service equipment,” as the WZT-3 was since 1999. He has told Business Standard the tendering process was manipulated to ensure BEML emerged the lone bidder. The tender was sent out to only two PSUs, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (BHEL) and BEML; only BEML bid. When Larsen & Toubro threw its hat in the ring, the defence ministry’s acquisitions chief ruled it out as an “unsolicited bid”. That left BEML, the single vendor, at liberty to dictate terms.

Top L&T officials verify this happened, though the company has declined to comment officially, since it had not been invited to bid.

Brig I M Singh says Ukraine then wrote in, offering their T-72 based ARV for trials. This was an attractive offer, since Ukraine was willing to use the T-72 chassis and running gear that India was already building near Chennai, while importing only the recovery gear. This, saysby Singh, would have made their ARV 30-40 per cent cheaper than the WZT-3. He put up an official proposal that the Ukrainian ARV be invited for trials, since this was a Rs 1,000-crore contract that should not go to a single bidder.

That idea was quickly shot down by the MGO himself, Lt General V K Jetley, whose brother, Colonel Virendar Jetley, had been employed by Bumar India, a joint venture between Bumar Poland and the New Delhi-based Chemon Group, headed by prominent Delhi cigar baron, Chetan Seth. “Within days, I was removed from the ARV cost negotiation committee,” says Brig Singh.

Chetan Seth, interviewed by Business Standard, confirms Col Virendar Jetley was his employee. However, he denies any influence was exercised.

Arms dealers have long sought a link with the MGO’s office, which controls a large chunk of the defence budget.

The owner of Vectra, Ravi Rishi, now under the CBI scanner in the Tatra case, employed two successive MGOs soon after they retired: Lt Gen R I S Kahlon, from the time he retired till his death last year; and Lt Gen S J S Saighal, who hit the limelight when Eurocopter, which employed his brother, Lt Gen H S Saighal, won a massive Indian contract for 197 light helicopters. The defence ministry overturned that decision after rivals protested.

With the contract for 228 WZT-3 signed in 2005, Bumar Poland began sending shiploads of ARVs to Mumbai. While BEML was supposed to indigenise these quickly, Brig I M Singh says BEML did absolutely no work on the ARVs.

“The Bumar ARVs did not even go to the BEML plant. When the ship from Poland reached Mumbai, we would send drivers to unload the ARVs. They would load the ARVs onto a train to Ordnance Depot, Kirkee, from where the frontline units would collect them,” says Brig Singh.

Chetan Seth admits the ARVs never went to BEML but claims some Indian parts would be fitted onto the ARVs in Ordnance Depot, Kirkee. “It took some time, but we indigenised drivers’ periscope sights; drivers’ adjustable seats; periscopes; and radios. We had a team of five Polish engineers in Kirkee,” avers Seth.

Approached for comments, BEML chief, V R S Natarajan, said he would respond in a press conference once the army chief retired. When pressed for answers, he asked for an emailed list of questions, to which he has not responded.

Meanwhile, another Chetan Seth company, Optic Electronics, was providing an illustration of how “indigenisation” worked in the WZT-3.

According to a senior Chetan Seth employee, Optic Electronics functioned from an SEZ in Noida, importing surplus parts from East Europe depots, touching these up, and then re-exporting them at a 500 per cent profit.

“Optic Electronics would import the day sights for each WZT-3 ARV for $5,500. These stained, often rusty, parts would be cleaned up and re-exported to Bumar Poland for around $25,000. These would then be fitted onto the WZT-3,” says the Seth employee on condition of anonymity.

Chetan Seth says he built day sights in partnership with a Polish company called PCO. He admits providing day sights for the WZT-3, but denies they were surplus parts from junkyards.

Ironically, the “indigenisation” of the WZT-3, which never crossed even 20 per cent, was being done through low-tech routes like ploughs, driver sights, towing ropes and seats, even as India was running a full T-72 tank manufacturing line at Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi, and building T-72 engines at the Engine Factory, Avadi.

Business Standard learned during a visit to Avadi last November that the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) had quoted a price of Rs 40-50 lakh per engine for the WZT-3, but BEML rejected this as too high. Consequently, Bumar continues to source the engine from East Europe. The OFB’s quote has also been rejected for the latest order for 204 WZT-3 ARVs, which bodes ill for any prospect of indigenisation.

The ministry of defence has not responded to an emailed request for comments.

Tuesday, 29 May 2012

On April Fools’ Day 2010, while taking over
as Chief of Army Staff, General V K Singh identified his foremost goal as
restoring the army’s “internal health”. On Thursday, in what surely will be a
frosty ceremony, he will hand over to his successor, General Bikram Singh, an
army whose generals are badly divided. Not even in the 1950s and 1960s, when
the ambitious Lieutenant General B M Kaul exploited his proximity to Jawaharlal
Nehru to split the officer community into pro-Kaul and anti-Kaul factions, did
India witness the sorry spectacle of an army chief publicly denigrating his top
commanders.

Where did V K Singh go wrong? Many argued
(including this columnist) that the army chief was within his rights to take
his government to the Supreme Court. This after the defence ministry rejected
his petition to adjust his date of birth, and thereby allow him another 10
months in office. But once the Supreme Court judges rubbished his case in
court, forcing him to withdraw his petition, V K Singh faced the prospect of an
anonymous retirement just four months away.

His desperate riposte was ill-judged from
the start. Soon after his setback in the Supreme Court, a group of illustrious
citizens, including a retired navy chief, Admiral Ramdas, filed a writ petition
in the Supreme Court that rested on the communal narrative of a Sikh conspiracy
to get General Bikram Singh into office. While the petitioners cannot be
conclusively linked with V K Singh, the evidence suggests that they were at
least manipulated by him. On February 10, the day V K Singh withdrew from the
Supreme Court, the general’s henchmen approached me with a detailed briefing on
“Operation Moses”. Reduced to its cringe-worthy essentials, this had Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and his wife; Planning Commission Chairman Montek Singh
Ahluwalia and his wife; former army chief General J J Singh and his wife; and
the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (every Sikh down the chain, you get
the drift?) in cahoots to get V K Singh out of office on May 31, 2012, when
Bikram Singh would be poised to take over from him. I declined to pursue these
improbable and slanderous allegations. Regrettably, Admiral Ramdas & Co
approached the Supreme Court, challenging Bikram Singh’s appointment.

Perhaps this communalism should not have
been a surprise. After all, the Rajput card was played without compunction
whilst V K Singh was fighting his date of birth battle. A group of Rajput
parliamentarians was dispatched to the prime minister to plead on his behalf.
When a proxy was needed to file a Supreme Court writ petition on the general’s
date of birth, the “Rohtak Grenadiers’ Association”, packed with the general’s
fellow-Rajputs, was conveniently at hand.

Sadly for V K Singh, nothing worked. The PM
politely reminded the Rajput MPs that the army must remain apolitical. The
Supreme Court, less politely, dismissed the Rohtak Grenadiers’ Association writ
petition. And the apex court, while throwing out the “Operation Moses” writ
petition in end-April, scolded the petitioners for communalising the issue.

With avenues closing fast, V K Singh
apparently decided to use his office to launch himself into politics. By
end-March, he had donned the garb of an anti-corruption crusader. First an
earlier interview was dusted out in which he described turning down a Rs 14
crore bribe by one of his senior generals; that was followed in short order by
the leak of his letter (still a whodunit!) to the PM warning about the army’s
poor state of operational readiness. The insinuation was clear: with corruption
below him and indifference above, V K Singh alone was a bastion of morality.
Last month, in an unabashedly political move, the chief travelled to Ballia for
a Samajwadi Party function to unveil a statue of former prime minister Chandra
Shekhar.

Last Friday, the outgoing chief proved that
he had lost any lingering trace of judgement. Sharing a platform with R K Anand
– a disreputable lawyer who the Supreme Court convicted for contempt of court
after an NDTV camera caught him buying off a key witness in the notorious BMW
kill-and-run case – V K Singh launched a public tirade against one of his corps
commanders, Lt General Dalbir Singh Suhag, ironically accusing him of making
public a show-cause notice issued to him. Suhag was apparently being targeted
as the army chief who would take over from Bikram Singh. Earlier that day, V K
Singh had attended an ex-servicemen’s rally in Dharamsala, where he sat
listening as former Congressman Vijay Singh Mankotia flayed the government.

Fortunately, it is time to turn the page.
It would be a mistake to believe (as Pakistan’s generals are prone to do) that
the Indian Army will remain deflated for long. The young and mid-ranking
officers, and the rank and file, remain untouched by V K Singh’s shenanigans.
Bikram Singh has his task cut out for him: to apply a healing touch and to
visibly and conclusively bury the vendettas that V K Singh pursued. The
corrosiveness of the outgoing chief will itself make his successor look good.
Above all, Bikram Singh must embrace the virtues of silence. An army chief
expresses himself with tanks and guns, not in lengthy interviews on news
television.

Monday, 28 May 2012

With the dollar hardening almost 25 per
cent from Rs 45 a year ago, to Rs 56 on Wednesday, our import-dependent defence
is obviously taking a hit. The 13.15 per cent rise in the latest defence budget
--- from Rs 1,70,937 crore last year, to Rs 1,93,407 crore for 2012-13 --- has
been wiped out and more. The picture is even bleaker when inflation is factored
in, which runs at about 15 per cent annually for defence equipment.

The damage extends to the Indian defence
industry, which even in “indigenous” weaponry uses a substantial share of
foreign components and systems, ranging from 30-70 per cent. Until last year,
the Defence Ministry (MoD) sheltered the defence public sector --- which
includes 8 defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs) and 39 Ordnance Factories
(OFs) --- through a mechanism called foreign exchange rate variation (FERV),
which adjusted their income to cover forex fluctuations. In contrast, the private
sector has stood exposed to foreign exchange (forex) risk.

Consequently, many private players stare at
unexpected losses. Take Larsen & Toubro, which won a Rs 1,000 crore
contract in March 2010 to build 36 fast interceptor craft for the Indian Coast Guard.
These are 110-tonne patrol and rescue vessels that are propelled by water jets
at a scorching 44 knots (81 kilometres per hour). L&T says that about 40
per cent of the vessel is imported, including the engine and the water jets.
Given a profit margin of 10 per cent, the L&T quote catered for a forex
component of Rs 360 crore. Given the rupee’s fall, that forex component has
risen to Rs 445 crore today. L&T says it is struggling to break even on
this contract.

Or take Bangalore-based Alpha Design Technologies
Ltd, which won a Rs 48 crore contract last September to build target
designators for the air force, laser beams that “light up” a target, allowing a
laser-detecting aircraft bomb to ride the reflected beam to the target for a
pinpoint strike. When Alpha submitted its bid in Nov 2010, the dollar was worth
Rs 44.37; today it is 25 per cent higher. Given that 70 per cent of the target
designator is imported, Alpha faces a substantial loss.

“We were competing against DPSUs like
Bharat Electronics Ltd, which the MoD covered against FERV risks. With profit
margins in defence electronics barely 5 per cent, how could we afford forex
hedging?” asks Colonel HS Shankar, CMD of Alpha.

Industry sources tell Business Standard
that forex hedging costs were about 6% per cent annually, when the rupee was
stable. A three-year hedge, essential given the time taken for discharging
defence contracts, would have cost 17-18 per cent. With the rupee in freefall
today, a three-year hedge will cost a vendor 30 per cent.

“With the rupee nose-diving, quoting for
fixed price contracts has become extremely risky without hedging at high cost.
Imagine the plight of Indian bidders when competing for Indian defence
contracts against foreign companies who are anyway automatically protected,”
says MV Kotwal, President (Heavy Engineering), L&T.

Now the private sector has asked industry
bodies, CII and Ficci, to approach the MoD for protection. Business Standard
has learnt that Ficci will be considering the issue at its National Executive
meeting on May 29th.

So far, the MoD has been entirely
unsympathetic. L&T’s Kotwal says that private sector companies had asked
the MoD to treat them at par with the DPSUs, which enjoyed FERV protection. The
government acceded to that request in the latest Defence Procurement Procedure
of 2011 (DPP-2011), but not in the manner requested.

“Instead of allowing FERV for the private
sector, DPP-2011 denied it to both the public and the private sector!” says
Kotwal.

In fact, DPP-2011 shelters Indian vendors
from FERV in global contracts, i.e. when an Indian company competes and wins in
an international tender. However, FERV shelter is disallowed in the contract
categories of “Buy (Indian)”; “Buy & Make (Indian)”; and “Make” categories,
which are open to Indian companies alone. The only exception is for DPSUs, when
the MoD nominates them as the source for procurement or production.

CEOs of defence manufacturers point out
that they already absorb significant risks, including potential fluctuations in
commodity prices, especially aluminium and steel. But they say it is unfair to
expect them to cater for rupee fluctuations that stem from the government’s
macro-economic policies.

“When the government buys from a foreign
arms vendor it absorbs the forex risk, but it wants fledgling Indian defence
manufacturers to absorb that risk themselves. The private defence industry is
just learning how to walk; it cannot yet carry the forex risk. If the MoD is
serious about building a private defence industry, it should not transfer forex
risk to us,” says Rahul Chaudhary, CEO of Tata Power (Strategic Electronics
Division).

Across the defence sector, there is
recognition that the ongoing forex-related turmoil is rooted substantially in
the MoD’s inability to develop manufacturing capabilities in the materials,
components and sub-systems that that go into modern weapons systems.

“India has successfully integrated
high-tech weaponry like the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft; the Arjun tank; even a
nuclear submarine. But as long as the MoD does not build capability in basic
components that we continue to import --- such as Very Large Scale Integrated
(VLSI) chips and image intensifier tubes and thermal imaging detectors for
night vision devices --- even these indigenous programmes carry extensive forex
risk,” says Major Karun Khanna, Advisor to Alpha Design Technologies.

The rupee depreciation has also affected
capital procurement from overseas vendors. Says KPMG’s defence analyst, Neelu
Khatri: “The capital budget allocation of Rs 79,579 crore in April was worth US
$15.6 billion then; today it is worth just $14.22 billion. An effective cut of
$1.42 billion means a 9 per cent procurement cut for a nation that is heavily
dependent on imports and already suffering alarming rate of equipment
obsolescence.”

Friday, 25 May 2012

The Indian
Navy's training sailship, the Mhadei, arrived at Kochi Port today after completing a grueling
5000 nautical mile odyssey to South East Asia. The vessel, skippered by naval pilot Lieutenant Commander Abhilash Tomy, was on a training voyage
to provide off shore sailing experience to two officers and four sailors.

The Mhadei began its voyage from its base port, Goa, on 17th March. Over the next two months, it sailed to Ezhimala, Kochi, Port Blair, Langkawi and Phuket. Lieutenant Commander
Tomy terms it a good experience despite having to face the
gathering monsoon winds on their return leg.

The vessel will cast off from Kochi
on 29th May to return to Goa. Mhadei had created history when
Commander Dilip Donde of Indian Navy became the first Indian to circumnavigate
the globe solo in May 2010.

Wednesday, 23 May 2012

The NATO summit in Chicago that concluded
on Monday put the stamp of finality on a western withdrawal from Afghanistan by
31st Dec 2014, leaving security thereafter in the hands of Afghans.
Starting next summer the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will assume the
lead role in imposing security across the country, with western forces moving
to a backup role. The question of who will pay the ANSF’s $4.1 billion annual tab
remains unanswered for now.

Announcing the withdrawal of the 40-nation,
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has overseen
Afghanistan’s security since 2001, a joint communiqué stated on Monday, “ISAF’s
mission will be concluded by the end of 2014. But thereafter Afghanistan will
not stand alone.”

That generosity will last only for a
decade; NATO says that Kabul must support its own forces by 2024.
“Afghanistan’s yearly share (of the security budget) will increase
progressively from at least US$500m in 2015, with the aim that it can assume,
no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces,”
says the communiqué.

During the interim period, NATO’s support
remains conditional on Kabul’s “commitment to a democratic society, based on
the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against
corruption.” The western insistence on corruption-free governance has been a
major irritant for President Hamid Karzai.

Turning the screws on Karzai, who must
constitutionally step down as Afghanistan’s president after completing his
second term in 2014, NATO leaders stated, “The forthcoming elections must be
conducted with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and in accordance with the
Afghan Constitution. Their transparency, inclusivity and credibility will
also be of paramount importance. In this context, continued progress towards
these goals will encourage ISAF nations to further provide their support up to
and beyond 2014.”

So far, ISAF has functioned under a
“peace-enforcement” mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Now NATO will
seek a fresh UN mandate for its new mission that would be confined to training,
advice and assistance. The communiqué noted. “We will ensure that the new
mission has a sound legal basis, such as a United Nations Security Council
Resolution.

The joint communiqué papered over serious
rifts within NATO. Newly-elected French president, Francois Hollande, insists
on withdrawing French forces from Afghanistan by 2012, while German Chancellor
Angela Merkel wants to salvage NATO’s honour through a synchronised pullout.
These divisions are being gleefully exploited by the Taliban, which registered
its presence at Chicago with a 3-page statement urging NATO countries to follow
France’s example.

The ANSF already has responsibility for
security across half of Afghanistan, according to time lines that were mandated
in the November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon. In the first phase, which was
completed in July 2011, the ANSF took charge of Kabul city, six smaller towns,
and two of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. In the second phase that began last
November, Afghan forces assumed responsibility for a much larger area: six
provinces, seven cities and 40 rural districts. With the completion of the third
phase, which President Karzai announced on 13th May, three quarters
of Afghanistan will be under ANSF charge. But the most violent areas --- like
southern Afghanistan, where Taliban influence is strongest --- are still
controlled by western forces.

Despite “assuming security responsibility”
for large swathes of Afghanistan, the ANSF remains incapable of operating
independently. Western forces still provide crucial logistic support; medical
facilities; air support and mentoring. Experts say it will take at least a
couple of years for the ANSF to operate independently.

The biggest loser at Chicago was Pakistan’s
president, Asif Zardari, who accepted a special invitation to Chicago but
couldn’t get to meet his US counterpart. According to US press reports,
President Barack Obama is believed to have made a meeting conditional on
Islamabad agreeing to reopen American supply routes from Karachi Port to
Afghanistan. Despite a meeting between Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and
President Zardari, that deal was not closed.

At a press conference after the summit, US
president Barack Obama acknowledged “tensions between ISAF and Pakistan, the
United States and Pakistan,” but pointed out that, “they are being worked
through both military and diplomatic channels.”

Referring to the extremism and instability
in that country, Obama declared that “it is in Pakistan’s interest to work with
us and the world community to ensure that they themselves are not consumed by
extremism that is in their midst.”

Saturday, 19 May 2012

On Sunday and Monday, at a keenly-watched
meeting in Chicago, NATO leaders will argue over who should pay the US $4.1
billion bill for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after the pull-out
of foreign troops by end-2014 leaves Afghan security largely in the hands of
Afghans.

Currently, a NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) oversees Afghan security, along with US
military forces that operate independently of ISAF. Starting from 2015, an Afghan National Army
(ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), numbering some 352,000 troopers, would
assume full responsibility for security. Their numbers would be reduced
incrementally to 228,000 by 2017.

NATO has assessed that Kabul would require
about US $4.1 billion annually for maintaining this force. High-level
Washington sources say the US is trying to peg its contribution to $2 billion;
NATO countries could contribute another $1 billion; the Afghan budget would pay
for about $500 million; leaving a $600 million gap that must be filled in
Chicago.

So far, NATO countries have been less than
forthcoming. Germany has pledged $193 million annually; the UK has offered $110
million per year; and non-NATO member, Australia, will pay $100 million per
year for the next three years. Over several years now, NATO members have
regularly failed to meet their financial commitments towards ANSF training.

Afghan authorities are pressing Washington
to fill the budget gaps. Afghanistan’s deputy foreign minister, Jawed Ludin, pointed out at a
press briefing in Kabul this week that, “The $4.1bn is the cost not of 352,000
[soldiers and police] but of the reduced size, which is 228,000. The United
States will be paying for the extra soldiers that will be needed between 2014
to 2017.”

Washington faces difficulties in allocating
more money, given the depth of anti-war sentiment that is playing out in
Chicago, where busloads of demonstrators are arriving to protest the war. The
US has lost almost 2000 soldiers during a decade of war in Afghanistan. Another
4,500 US citizens lost their lives in Iraq.

The US draw down from Afghanistan plays out
in the strategic backdrop of the US “pivot to Asia,” presented by President
Obama in January. “We’re turning the page on a decade of war,” Obama had said,
announcing that the US would turn away from Europe and West Asia towards “the
arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean
region and South Asia.”

However, Washington is negotiating an
arrangement with Kabul that could allow for a residual footprint of some 25,000
to 30,000 US troops in garrisons in Afghanistan that would focus on
“counter-terrorist operations,” a euphemism for drone strikes against radical jehadi forces.

On Sunday, Afghan president Hamid Karzai
will hold one-on-one talks with Obama in Chicago. There is no meeting scheduled
between Obama and Pakistan’s president Asif Zardari, but his attendance
suggests a cooling of tensions between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan has
blocked the move of US logistic supplies through the country after at least 24
Pakistani soldiers were killed in a NATO air strike on their border check post
last November. Seen as a key player in any solution in Afghanistan, Pakistan is
believed to have been lured to Chicago with the promise of $1 billion in
released grants and an estimated $1 million per day in transit fees for the
move of supplies into Afghanistan.

NATO last met in the US in 1999, two years
before Al Qaeda terrorists brought down the World Trade Centre twin towers,
triggering the war in Afghanistan. The 9/11 attacks led NATO member countries
to invoke, for the first time ever, the common defence provisions of the North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949. This mandates that an attack on one member country
will be regarded as an attack on all of them.

Friday, 18 May 2012

Today, Vice Admiral KN Sushil, Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Southern Naval Command spent time with his sea going units, the last time he will do so before retiring from service on 31st May. A proud submariner, Admiral Sushil was among those who inducted the Shishumar Class (HDW) submarines into the Indian Navy. As the first Inspector General Nuclear Safety of Indian Navy, Admiral Sushil did the ground work for inducting advanced nuclear submarines like INS Chakra into the navy.

In the maneuvers held off the Kochi coast today, eight ships from the Southern Naval Command participated. INS Tir, from the Kochi-based 1st Training Squadron was the FOC-in-C's flag ship. Dorniers, Seakings, Chetaks and Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters from INS Garuda also participated. The admiral exhorted the men on board to keep the Naval Ensign flying high and remain sharp and ready to defend the interests of the nation.

Wednesday, 16 May 2012

Seven years before its scheduled
completion, the defence ministry (MoD) has already announced a two-year delay
in the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) that India and Russia will
jointly develop.

Defence Minister AK Antony has been saying
that the FGFA would join the Indian Air Force by 2017. On Monday, his deputy,
MM Pallam Raju told parliament that “The fifth generation aircraft is scheduled
to be certified by 2019 following which the series production will start.”

The FGFA is the flagship of the
Indo-Russian partnership. Both countries say it will be the world’s most
advanced fighter. But interviews with Indian designers who have overseen the
project suggest significant disquiet. There is apprehension that the FGFA will
significantly exceed its current $6 billion budget, because this figure
reflects the expenditure on just the basic aircraft. Crucial avionics systems
would all cost extra.

On the positive side, Indian designers say
the FGFA project will provide invaluable experience in testing and certifying a
heavy fighter aircraft that is bigger and more complex than the Tejas Light
Combat Aircraft (LCA), India’s foundational aerospace achievement.

The Russian and Indian Air Forces each plan
to build about 250 FGFAs, at an estimated cost of US $100 million per fighter.
That adds up to US $25 billion each, in addition to the development cost.

But Sukhoi insists that the PAK-FA already
meets Russia’s requirements, says NC Agarwal, the HAL design chief, who
spearheaded the FGFA negotiations until his recent retirement. HAL worries that
Russia might ask India to pay extra for further development, particularly the
avionics that transform a mere flying machine into a lethal weapons platform.
That would leave the $6 billion budget in tatters.

The IAF clearly wants a top-of-the-line
FGFA. According to Ashok Nayak, who spoke to Business Standard as HAL’s chairman before retiring last Oct, the IAF has specified
40-45 improvements that must be made to the PAK-FA. These have been formalized
into an agreed list between Russia and India, which is called the Tactical
Technical Assignment.

A key IAF requirement is a “360-degree”
AESA (airborne electronically scanned active) radar, rather than the AESA radar
that Russia has developed. Either way, India would pay Russia extra: either in
licence fees for the Russian radar; or hundreds of millions, perhaps billions,
for developing a world-beating, 360-degree AESA radar.

Nor is the IAF clear on whether the FGFA
should be a single-seat fighter like the PAK-FA, or a twin-seat aircraft like
the Sukhoi-30MKI. A section of the IAF backs a single-seat fighter, while
another prefers two pilots for flying and fighting a complex, networked
fighter. During the ongoing Preliminary Design Phase (PDP), for which India has
paid $295 million, a two sides will determine whether developing the PAK-FA
into a twin-seat aircraft (inevitably more bulky) would reduce the FGFA’s
stealth and performance unacceptably.

“The single-seat FGFA is essential for the
IAF, and we will transform the Russian single-seat fighter into our single-seat
version with a large component of Indian avionics. The twin-seat version will
depend on the PDP conclusions,” says Nayak.

The PDP also requires Sukhoi to hand over
design documentation to HAL, providing it a detailed insight into the design
processes of the PAK-FA. Since
India took years to decide to join the FGFA project, HAL missed out the design
phase entirely.

The 18-month PDP, which terminates this
year, will be followed by the “R&D Phase,” which could take another 7
years, says the HAL chairman. The FGFA will be designed in both countries; some
100 HAL engineers already operate from a facility in Bangalore. Another
contingent will move to Russia to work in the Sukhoi Design Bureau.

“Our boys will learn the Russian language;
their way of working; their design rules; their design norms. We are left hand
drive, while they are right hand drive. The Russians say they will part with
all these things,” says Nayak.

But the most valuable learning, say HAL
executives, will happen during the FGFA’s flight-testing. “Unlike the basic design
phase, which we missed out on, we will actually gain experience during flight
testing. This phase throws up dozens of problems and we will participate in
resolving these, including through design changes.”

HAL engineers recount the complexity of
flight-testing the Tejas LCA. “Fuel flow to the engine was a challenging issue.
As the LCA flew, its centre of gravity shifted because fuel was consumed
unevenly between its 7-8 fuel tanks. So we learned to balance the fuel between
tanks, completely changing the design of this system during flight-testing.
Similarly, we had to strengthen the wings when we mounted the R-73 missile. All
this you learn only by experience,” says Agarwal.

Despite the LCA experience, HAL engineers
believe that the 30-tonne FGFA is a far more complex challenge. They estimate
that flight testing such an aircraft without Russian help might take 15 years,
as long as the LCA.

HAL designers also relish the FGFA’s
specific challenges. For achieving stealth, its missiles, rockets and reconnaissance
payloads are concealed in an internal bay under the wings. Before using these,
a door slides open, exposing the weapon for use.

The Russians clearly believe that HAL
possesses useful capabilities, including the ability to design the AESA radar.
Also attractive is India’s experience in composites.

“The LCA program has generated a high level
of expertise in composite materials within the National Aerospace Laboratory
and some joint teams. The FGFA requires “higher modulus” composites, which can
withstand the 120-130 degree Centigrade temperatures that arise whilst flying
at Mach 1.7 speeds,” says Agarwal.

Despite the continuing imponderables, HAL
believes that the FGFA project provides genuine technological skills, far more
useful than licensed manufacture. “We will pay some $6-7 billion to France for
the licence to build the Rafale in HAL. In the FGFA project, a similar sum will
bring in genuine design knowledge that will help us in the future.”

Tuesday, 15 May 2012

Barely masked by the warm sunshine here in
Washington on Mothers’ Day is a stormy political mood over Iran’s defiant
refusal to halt uranium enrichment despite the most far-reaching economic
sanctions in recent times. That failure is being blamed partly on India,
especially in the US media, for New Delhi’s refusal to terminate oil imports
from Iran and, instead, to deepen trade ties with Teheran. “Delhi is turning
out to be the mullahs' last best friend,” trumpeted The Wall Street Journal.
With Team Obama’s political gaze focused on re-election in November, the White
House fears that a pre-emptive military strike by Israel on Iran’s nuclear
facilities might transform the discourse of the election campaign.

That fear was fanned last Tuesday by the
dramatic formation of a national unity government in Israel, when the leftist
Kadima Party hopped over from the opposition to join Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu’s Likud government. To American observers, the Israeli polity seems
to be closing ranks for a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel
had formed a national unity government, in similar fashion, before launching
the fateful Six Day War against an Arab coalition in 1967.

Washington has tried to restrain Israel by
arguing that tightening sanctions would bring Iran around. But several
countries, including India, make this a difficult argument to sell. India buys
some 350,000 to 400,000 barrels of oil from Teheran everyday, since our energy
requirements do not allow the tap to be turned off suddenly. Although Iran’s
share of our oil imports is just 10.4% today, down from 16.5% in 2008, that translates
into a billion dollars a month for Teheran.

India, everyone admits, is not alone in
importing oil from Iran. Teheran obtains greater support from Beijing and
Moscow, especially in the UN Security Council. But given the media perception
that New Delhi must constantly repay the debt of the US-India nuclear
agreement, India’s oil purchases are portrayed as the most unkindest cut of
all.

Interestingly, the top leadership in
Washington does not share this media and think tank obsession. Washington is displaying
sensitivity to Iran’s role in the Indian strategic calculus: as an oil
supplier; as a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia; and as an emotional
locus for Indian Shia Muslims. Washington knows that New Delhi does not want a
nuclear Iran; India voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) twice, in 2005 and 2009. The US is also aware of Iran’s unrelenting
assault over decades on crucial Indian interests, e.g. the Jammu & Kashmir
issue, in bodies like the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).

New Delhi has also pointed out that some 4
million Indians live and work in West Asia. A major regional conflict stemming
from an attack on Iran could force India into a major evacuation, far larger
than those that were necessary during the two US wars against Iraq (1990-91 and
2003) and during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon (2006).

And so Washington, for now, is not reacting
to the media drumbeat that an ungrateful New Delhi is siding against Washington
on a crucial foreign policy issue, just as it had on Libya and Syria. This
reflects intensified conversations between New Delhi and Washington, and a
growing maturity in the relationship. New Delhi has been understanding of
America’s engagement and even arms supplies to Pakistan --- surely a key Indian
foreign policy concern --- and now the US is accommodating India’s compulsions
on Iran. Their strategic objectives converge: neither likes the idea of Teheran
brandishing nukes. The divergence is on how that is best achieved.

New Delhi, with its own experience in
beating sanctions in the quest for nuclear weapons, believes that coercion
alone would only deepen Iranian determination. Alongside the spectre of
economic disruption and military force, Iran must be offered a face-saving withdrawal
through cast-iron security guarantees. Given America’s physical presence on
both its flanks, Israeli sabre-rattling and the contemporary lessons of Iraq,
Libya and Syria (in contrast to nuclear North Korea and Pakistan), it would be
surprising if Teheran were not to conclude that nuclear weapons are the only
guarantee of regime survival.

India can offer more than advice, howsoever
sage. Negotiations with Iran are going nowhere, although the so-called P5+1
(the five permanent UN Security Council members, plus Germany) will meet
Iranian negotiators later this month. The ongoing process is based on mutual
deception. Teheran is fighting a rearguard action to gain space for its nuclear
weapons programme; meanwhile the P5+I is arm-twisting Iran without addressing
its core concerns. The technical issues of verification, inspection and
relocation of nuclear fuel that are discussed up-front must be complemented
with a back-channel process that addresses the key issue of Iranian insecurity.
New Delhi, as the only agent that enjoys trust in all the key capitals ---
Teheran, Washington, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Ankara and Moscow --- must offer itself
as back-channel interlocutor. For years, New Delhi’s strategic policy of
multi-alignment has built trust and equity in these countries. Stepping up to
the plate would enhance Indian stature; cement relations with important
regional and global powers; and defuse the threat of a confrontation that can
only end in turmoil.

Friday, 11 May 2012

On 12 May 1987 HMS Hermes became
INS Viraat under the command of Capt (later Vice Admiral) Vinod Pasricha. Commissioned in Nov 1959 as HMS Hermes, the ship completed 28 years in the Royal Navy and saw combat in the Falklands Campaign.

The commissioning signal from the
Naval Headquarters said:

“Your commissioning today marks an important milestone in the development
of our Navy’s blue water capability. May your operational prowess match your
gigantic name and good fortune attend on you wherever you may sail. I wish all
officers and men a happy, challenging and rewarding commission”

The message from the crew of the Hermes read:

“Bringing forward HMS Hermes for hand over to the Indian Navy and
commissioning as INS Viraat… It is with a mixture of sadness, pride and
confidence that we today handover this magnificent ship to the Indian Navy;
sadness in that we with our happy memories witness her passing from the Royal
Navy, pride in the capabilities noting that
she will be in good hands and confident that she will prove equal and worthy of
all the aspirations the Indian Navy have for her as Viraat. The Captain, officers
and ships company of HMS Hermes congratulate the Captain, officers and ships
company on the majesty of INS Viraat and may good fortune attend all who sail
in her quest to control the sea and be all powerful.

INS
Viraat has been maintained and run by the
Indian Navy for a quarter century after that, making Hermes-Viraat one of the longest
serving aircraft carrier in the history of naval operations anywhere in the
world. This says something about the Indian Navy’s capability in maintaining and
operating warships.

In 2009, when the Hermes-Viraat
completed 50 years in service, the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Nirmal
Verma, who commanded Viraat from 08 Nov 1996 to 13 Dec 1997 said:

“The fact that a warship designed
in 1940s and built in the 1950s could evolve and adjust to the technological
and strategic imperatives of the post war years, the Cold War and continues to
have utility in the 21st century is testimony to the men and women
who built her and also those who have contributed to transforming her over the
years.

The ship's motto is “Any Mission, Any Time, Anywhere”

Some other interesting facts
of INS Viraat

When commissioned in 1987, her
envisaged life was 10 years....

INS VIraat’s last major
modernisation and life enhancement refit was undertaken in 2008-09 enabling a
life extension of a few more years ie till the arrival of Vikramaditya ie
definitely till 2013...

INS Viraat was the flag ship of
the western fleet during Op Parakram. With its full strength of Sea Harriers
embarked, Viraat was central to the Western Fleet deployment for over six
months. She was at sea with Capt (now VAdm) DK Joshi as the Commanding Officer
and RAdm (later VAdm) JS Bedi as the Fleet Commander.

She is currently commanded by Capt Ajendra Bahadur Singh, the 19th
CO of the ship.

Ship has seen 18 Commanding
Officers, three of which three went onto become Chiefs of Naval Staff --- Adm
Madhvendra Singh, Adm Arun Prakash and Adm Nirmal Verma.

Ship has done over 40,000 hours
of steaming and traversed over 5,00,000 nautical miles across the proverbial
seven seas. The ship has undertaken over 20,000 hrs of flying from its
deck.

INS
VIRAAT - LIST OF COMMANDING OFFICERS

S NO.

NAME

FROM

TO

1

CAPTAIN VINOD PASRICHA NM

12 May 1987

15 Dec 1988

2.

CAPTAIN MADHAVENDRA
SINGH

15 Dec 1988

30 Aug 1990

3.

CAPTAIN ARUN PRAKASH VRC
NM

30 Aug 1990

26 Dec 1991

4.

CAPTAIN MADANJIT SINGH

26 Dec 1991

21 Mar 1993

5.

CAPTAIN YASHWANT PRASAD

21 Mar 1993

28 Sep 1994

5.

CAPTAIN JAGJEET SINGH
BEDI VSM

28 Sep 1994

13 Oct 1995

6.

CAPTAIN VIJAY SHANKAR

20 Oct 1995

08 Nov 1996

7.

CAPTAIN NIRMAL KUMAR
VERMA

08 Nov 1996

13 Dec 1997

8.

CAPTAIN SK DAMLE NM VSM

13 Dec 1997

15 JUN 2000

9.

CAPTAIN RF CONTRACTOR

16 Jun 2000

18 Dec 2001

10.

CAPTAIN DK JOSHI NM VSM

18 Dec 2001

07 Jan 2003

11.

CAPTAIN ANIL K CHOPRA

07 Jan 2003

06 Jan 2004

12.

CAPTAIN PRADEEP CHAUHAN

06 Jan 2004

31 May 2005

13.

CAPTAIN SPS CHEEMA NM

31 May 2005

15 May 2006

14.

CAPTAIN GIRISH LUTHRA

15 May 2006

11 Aug 2007

15.

CAPTAIN AR KARVE

11 Aug 2007

27 Dec 2008

16.

CAPTAIN ANIL KUMAR
CHAWLA

27 Dec 2008

06 Aug 2010

17.

CAPTAIN HARI KUMAR

06 Aug 2010

15 Nov 2011

18.

CAPTAIN AJENDRA BAHADUR
SINGH

15 Nov 2011

Onwards till date

All major refits of Viraat have
been undertaken by the Cochin Shipyard Limited. The extension of the ship’s
life far beyond initial expectations is stands as a testimony to the high
levels of workmanship and dedication of the yard staff at Cochin Shipyard.