receipt of reports of that kind was
the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating
details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl's
diary, which is the last document in the document book. I will refer the
Court to the entry of the 3rd of March.

"The
Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a swift
entry into N"  which is Norway  "with strong
forces.

"No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces.
Very rapid acceleration of the attack necessary."

Then
the last entry on March the 3rd:

"Führer
decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow with a few days
interval."

So that the
important issue of strategy which had been concerning the German High
Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the fate of
Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Countries; and
the Court will observe from those entries of March 3 that by that date
Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of a Norwegian
aggression.

The next entry in Jodl's diary of the 5th of
March:

"Big
conference with the three commanders-in-chief about Weser Exercise;
Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till now. Won't listen
to anyone and wants to show that all preparations so far made are
worthless.

"Result:

"(a) Stronger forces
to Narvik; (b) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or
Lützow in Trondheim); (c) Christiansand can be left out
at first; (d) six divisions envisaged for Norway; (e) a foothold to be
gained immediately in Copenhagen also."

Then
the next entry to which I desire to draw the Court's attention is the
entry of the 13th of March, which the Court may think is one of the most
remarkable in the whole documentation of this case:

"Führer
does not give order yet for 'W.'"  Weser Exercise 

"He is still looking for justification."

The
entry of the next day, the 14th of March, shows a similar pre-occupation
on the part of Hitler with seeking justification for this flagrant
aggression. It reads:

"English
keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 submarines; doubtful whether
reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Führer
has not yet decided what reason to give for Weser Exercise."