The Case of a Child bitten by a Neighbours Dog

Peter Banaag v. Arthur Sison

THE ISSUE

Whether or not the defendant, Arthur Sison is liable to Mary for damages as defined in Article2129, Article 2176, Article 2179 and Article 2183 of the New Civil Code.

BRIEF ANSWER

Yes, as supported by Articles 2129, 2176, 2179, and 2183 of the New Civil Code and someSupreme Court decisions, the defendant, Arthur Sison is liable for damages notwithstanding hisdefenses that he was not at fault. He was negligent and as the owner of the dog, he would beresponsible to any damage it would cause except for inevitable circumstances. I recommend to file thiscase.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Sometime on September 12, 2016 at around 3 p.m., Mr. Peter Banaags daughter, Mary Banaag,six years old, went to Mr. Arthur Sisons house to buy ice-candy. Mary knocked at the gate many times,but got no response from Arthur. She pushed the gate and it yielded. Arthurs dog, Prancer, jumped outand attacked her from behind. He bit Marys leg and when she fell to the ground, Prancer bit her arms.She was saved by Fred Puzon, a neighbor, who kicked the dog away and protected her. Awakened bythe commotion and having heard shouts that his dog had attacked a child, Arthur went out. Then, hecommanded his dog to go back to his yard. Thereafter, he brought Mary to a nearby clinic fortreatment, paying the medical bills thereafter. Because of the injury suffered by his daughter, Peter Banaag demanded twenty thousand pesosas damages from Arthur Sison. In reply, Arthur rejected his demand alleging that he was not at fault.In fact, despite not being at fault, he still took the effort of bringing Mary to the clinic and paying forher treatment.DISCUSSION

Based on the established facts, Arthur Sison is liable because according to Article 2176 of theNew Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault ornegligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existingcontractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions ofthis Chapter.

As for the nature of Arthurs liability, the provision that governs is Article 2183 of the CivilCode. It provides that:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damagewhich it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case thedamages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based onthe negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing thedamage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possessesanimals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

Now, Arthur may say that what happened was brought about by contributory negligence onMarys part as the former implied in his letter, or he may claim that letting Mary roam the vicinityunaccompanied is negligence on the part of the parents and constitutes the proximate cause of herinjuries, notwithstanding his own negligence in leaving the gate unlocked before napping. Bothscenarios are governed by Article 2179 of the Civil Code that provides:

When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, hecannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximatecause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but thecourts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In the first scenario, the Supreme Courts ruling in Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court ofAppeals (G.R. No. 129792, 321 SCRA 375) that a child under nine years of age must be conclusivelypresumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law covers Mary, hence throwing thenotion of contributory negligence on her part out the window. As for the second scenario, the ruling inUmali v. Bacani (G.R. No. L-40570, 69 SCRA 263) provides that parental negligence in allowing ayoung child to go out of the house alone may at most qualify as contributory negligence and as suchwould be covered by the second sentence of Article 2179.

Arthur, being the owner of the dog that attacked Mary, is liable for damages. Had Arthur not leftthe gate unlocked before taking a nap (an act showing a lack of due care), there would have been noway the dog could have attacked Mary. Of course, he may say that paying Marys medical bill shouldbe enough, but that does not cover the moral damages that Mary is entitled to under Article 2219 (2) ofthe Civil Code, which specifically pertains to quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. As mentionedearlier, the only reprieve due him would be a mitigation of his liability.

By way of a concluding statement, it is respectfully submitted that Arthur Sison, despite all hisjustifications, remains liable for damages. At best, his defenses may only mitigate his liabilities.