if someone sells you something intended to do a job why shouldn't they be able to tell you the limits of its operating capability. eg minimum safe height to initiate reserve deployment

Again, because factors outside of the manufacturers control will effect the performance of the rig.

Quote:

They do give the Maximum speed and weight on the reserve canopy after all..

Of course, becasue you can test for those things. You can push a weighed dummy out the back of a plane flying at a specific speed, and see the results.

Harness manufacturers can give you specs on the strength of the harness because that's easy to test. Strap a harness into a hydraulic pull tester, and see what it takes to rip it apart.

There are just too many variables to a reserve deployment to assign a hard number to it. Generally accepted practices in most of the word are that main deployment should be initiated by 2k ft at a minimum, and then EPs should follow immediately if need be.

If a jumper wants to push things to limit, they can dump at 2k and take their chances. If they want to add in some 'wiggle room', they'll initiate main deployment higher than 2k, and EPs immediately after if needed.

In terms of an AAD, they can all be adjusted to fire higher than the 750 ft default setting. The problem then is that you increase the risk of a two-out if your main snivels into your AAD firing altitude. If you did adjust your AAD, you would want to also 'adjust' your main deployment altitude up to match.

if someone sells you something intended to do a job why shouldn't they be able to tell you the limits of its operating capability. eg minimum safe height to initiate reserve deployment

Again, because factors outside of the manufacturers control will effect the performance of the rig.

Quote:

They do give the Maximum speed and weight on the reserve canopy after all..

Of course, becasue you can test for those things. You can push a weighed dummy out the back of a plane flying at a specific speed, and see the results.

Harness manufacturers can give you specs on the strength of the harness because that's easy to test. Strap a harness into a hydraulic pull tester, and see what it takes to rip it apart.

There are just too many variables to a reserve deployment to assign a hard number to it. Generally accepted practices in most of the word are that main deployment should be initiated by 2k ft at a minimum, and then EPs should follow immediately if need be.

If a jumper wants to push things to limit, they can dump at 2k and take their chances. If they want to add in some 'wiggle room', they'll initiate main deployment higher than 2k, and EPs immediately after if needed.

In terms of an AAD, they can all be adjusted to fire higher than the 750 ft default setting. The problem then is that you increase the risk of a two-out if your main snivels into your AAD firing altitude. If you did adjust your AAD, you would want to also 'adjust' your main deployment altitude up to match.

Hey thanks for your interest but I don't usually bother with forums because there is always someone who wants to just get into some sort of personal debate or argument and unless you work for a container manufacturer I don't see any reason for you to argue the other corner. My first post was deliberately worded as information encouraging people to start questioning and therefore learning about what they have just assumed. If the customers don't ask then container manufacturers will never bother. Please check out the PIA web site and the new additions to the TSO system TS118/112 this is the start of performance standards for containers and the use of AAD's.

By the way you cannot set the Hard deck on a Cypres, you can tell it lies about the altitude of your intended drop zone if you want. But the point is owners don't have the information anyway.

I don't want to be rude, but my efforts have been directed towards the Manufacturers and by being an active member of the UK riggers committee. I even spent two days in Germany recently to discuss some of these issues.with Airtec. We can all do our selves a favor by directing some of the energy spent on forum debate towards the Manufacturers themselves. Forums are great to share information and for support.

There are just too many variables to a reserve deployment to assign a hard number to it.

This is not true. All of the variables may be established if you study the problem. If a rig is activated on the ground, on its front, laying on the pilot chute side, the pilot chute should throw the rig off of it. Any form of trapping the pilot chute is deadly. The MA-1 Spring has 28 pounds of force when compressed to within 1 inch. That much force, when released, should flip anything over which is properly designed. Additionally, no reserve container should require more than 18 pounds to extract the bag. If more than 18 pounds is required then a pilot chute with more effective drag surface than 6 sq. ft. must be used. I don't believe any are in service. One more thing: All manufacturers should identify the "Effective Size" of their pilot chutes as well as the extraction force. For more info see: http://www.jumpshack.com/...ds&SortBy=DATE_DAdditionally see the video:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4KArjdfBEA

There is nothing to add to this thread. A lot of noise for nothing! It's just plain fuckin' stupid to ground a rig based on such a deployment with a too long closing loop. The guys involved in this issue should be grounded for a long time...

Hey there this is not a new problem it has been around and effects small containers designed for free-fly and extreme conditions manufactured 2003/2004 onwards. Only occasionally does a very obvious demonstration of this known issue occur. There have been fatality's because reserves didn't fully deploy before impact, in the last year, where the AAD fired at the correct height. If you had been involved for longer than a year you might realize how inappropriate your post is. Most people simply want to keep others alive by posting what is very important information. Oh and please don't swear it does nothing to support your point of view.

On November 19, 2012, Aerodyne was notified of an instance where the reserve pilot chute didnít clear the reserve container side flaps when the pin was pulled in preparation for a routine repack on an Icon. We requested the Icon be sent to us immediately for evaluation and the Swedish Parachute Association issued an immediate grounding of all Icon harness/container systems as a ďsafety firstĒ measure.

A video was provided to us at that time showing the reserve deployment activation, from which the following were noted: 1. The Icon was not being worn during activation 2. The activation was not initiated by pulling the reserve handle

The rig arrived at Aerodyne on November 29, 2012 with the reserve packed and closed. The rig was then test pulled exactly as it arrived, using the reserve handle, with no hesitation from the reserve pilot chute. Subsequently, a total of 15 more test pulls were conducted in 3 different orientations of the rig (worn in upright position, worn in belly-to-earth position, on the floor not being worn) to see if any problems with the equipment could be detected. All 15 test pulls resulted in clear, unimpeded deployment of the reserve pilot chute from the reserve container.

The results of the tests and our observations from the customerís video are as follows:

1. Pulling the cable next to the pin to release it from the loop as seen in the video interfered with the systemís normal activation 2. The reserve closing loop was too long, reducing the compression on the reserve pilot chute spring We have determined that these two factors combined with the fact that the rig was not worn contributed to the irregular deployment. 3.We have concluded that the equipment is working correctly and no corrective actions are needed.

Swedish officials agree with our conclusions and have lifted the grounding. Please see the attached announcement from the Swedish Parachute Association.

Does anyone else feel like me that a little time spent checking that report before it was released might have caught the spelling errors 'appers', 'returnd', 'expirianced', 'manor', 'successfull', 'nessessary', 'schedualed' that just make the report look rushed and sloppy and perhaps erode people's confidence in Aerodyne's attention to detail?!

No, you can't. You have no way of knowing the airspeed or body position the jumper will be in. You don't know the size of the reserve, or how the bulk will be distributed. All of these things can have an effect on the time/altitude it will take to go from pulling the handle to the reserve slider coming down.

You did highlight some of the factors that you can measure, and manufacturers should measure these and use that info to design the 'best' rig they can, but it still doesn't add up to a reliable 'hard deck' for a reserve deployment in the real world.

Additionally, no reserve container should require more than 18 pounds to extract the bag. If more than 18 pounds is required then a pilot chute with more effective drag surface than 6 sq. ft. must be used. I don't believe any are in service.

Seems to me it's hard to fix something that's not really broke. Having a qualified rigger using the right loop appears to be the 'cure'...or did I miss something?

That's the point they are not fixing it so lets hope its not broke. If you are interested in the bigger picture though read my previous posts.

By the way i love it when a big boy comes to my rescue. See the thread Cypress announces variable activation height. All you need to know now is what height do you need to set for your container and reserve combination. Start asking the manufacturers ???????. Why do you think Airtec have done this !!!!!!

See the thread Cypress announces variable activation height. All you need to know now is what height do you need to set for your container and reserve combination. Start asking the manufacturers ???????. Why do you think Airtec have done this !!!!!!

To get themselves off the hook in the courtroom when somebody hit the ground with the freebag still in the container. They just want to give the responsibility to the jumper . That's all

Seems to me it's hard to fix something that's not really broke. Having a qualified rigger using the right loop appears to be the 'cure'...or did I miss something?

That's the point they are not fixing it so lets hope its not broke. If you are interested in the bigger picture though read my previous posts.

I don't understand what exactly they are supposed to fix?

They couldn't duplicate the reported problem when they received the rig in question...it worked even WITH the incorrect loop installed.

When they installed the correct length closing loop it also worked. . .how would you propose they 'fix' a system that works as designed??

I'm no rocket surgeon but prior to raising the panic flag were I the rigger reporting this I think I would have made sure all the components were to spec., that the thing was assembled correctly & the canopy was packed as directed.

If after doing all of that the problem was repeating, you obviously have a design situation...THEN make some notifications.

From what I see here...the incorrect loop was installed, the container was opened for an I&R in a way it wouldn't be in a real world application ~ not surprisingly there was an anomaly.

Looks to me like a rigger pointed a finger in the wrong direction...Had the system been packed in accordance with the manufactures instruction there would not have been an issue.

I kinda doubt that will be released. If it was rigger in question who okay-ed the wrong closing loop, they probably wouldn't want a video record of a mistake in the public domain...the manufacturer probably doesn't want a video out showing the rig isn't idiot proof.

I kinda doubt that will be released. If it was rigger in question who okay-ed the wrong closing loop, they probably wouldn't want a video record of a mistake in the public domain...the manufacturer probably doesn't want a video out showing the rig isn't idiot proof.

Hey Jim,

I'm with Paul and John on this one. There is anecdotal evidence that some modern rigs aren't getting timely reserve deployments. From a statistical point of view, 15 test pulls is nothing and doesn't account for a number of variables.

A few examples. Sweden is a cold European country - what temperature was the rig at on the failed pull? Second question - a routine repack is after the rig has 'settled' for about 6 months (I don't know the Swedish repack cycle). There is a heck of a lot that may have caused the issue.

If the pack is so critical that a closing loop less than an inch too long causes a total mal, doesn't seem to be a robust design. I'd hope there is more margin and tolerance available on getting a reserve to launch.

The weirdest things can cause un-expected failures, and from an engineering point of view, I'd say you only understand the failure when you can recreate it.

I kinda doubt that will be released. If it was rigger in question who okay-ed the wrong closing loop, they probably wouldn't want a video record of a mistake in the public domain...the manufacturer probably doesn't want a video out showing the rig isn't idiot proof.

Hey Jim,

I'm with Paul and John on this one. There is anecdotal evidence that some modern rigs aren't getting timely reserve deployments. From a statistical point of view 15 test pulls is nothing and also doesn't account for a vast number of variables.

Sweden is a cold European country - what temperature was the rig at on the failed pull? Second question - a routine repack is after the rig has 'settled' for about 6 months (I don't know the Swedish repack cycle). There is a heck of a lot that might have caused the issue.

If the pack is so critical that closing loop that is less than an inch too long causes a total mal, is that a robust design? I'd hope there is more margin and tolerance available on getting a reserve to launch.

The weirdest things can cause un-expected failures, and from an engineering point of view, I'd say you only understand the failure when you can recreate it.

Thing is Nigel, It's a popular rig used worldwide...are we seeing this problem anywhere else? Either through the static deployment for an I&R or in an actual emergency?

Certainly doesn't appear so.

From what was described and shown in stills...the pin was pulled by hand with the protective flap open and the riggers hand using the top flap for leverage to pull on the cable.

I don't jump one but isn't the top flap the last flap to close? If so wouldn't retarding it's movement tend to throw a monkey wrench in the works?

Add to that the longer than nominal closing loop which means the spring isn't compressed right - among other things...there's plenty wrong with that situation, but blaming the manufacturer???

I don't think so...

Yes there IS anecdotal evidence that some modern rigs aren't getting timely reserve deployments...however the basic design has to pass the TSO requirements which they do - so what is the 'end user' doing that's different than what the manufacturer did when it passed?

IMO tiny & tight is great for a wife but may not be the best choice for skydiving equipment.

In THIS case at least, the human factor is what caused the 'situation'.

~ Use the right closing loop, compress the reserve pilot-chute spring as it was intended to be...use the ripcord when pulling the pin and keep your hand from holding down the locking flap when ya pull in an emergency & all will be just ducky...trust me!

By the way the end user IS a major problem. I have no issue with the TSO testing.

When a rigger manages to get a reserve to not deploy it would be best if the manufacturer could replicate the failure. It can provide insight into what NOT to do, inform or change maintenance practise or simply show that a particular way of doing things is wrong.

I'm not sure that I agree with grounding equipment, based on speculation though. There are too many variables and taking the 'conservative' approach can seriously damage a business.