São Paulo, Abril 2 de 2014

Subnational Fiscal Rules and Debt Control
in Brazil
Islamabad, April 24th, 2014
Rafael Barroso
Economist, World Bank
Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Context
Subnational bail-outs in Brazil
The current subnational fiscal rules and debt controls in
Brazil
Performance of subnational finance
What worked and what did not work
Context
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Federative country with 27 states and 5,570
municipalities.
Municipalities are not creature of the states.
Highly decentralized federation:
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32.1 % of revenues collected by Subnational Governments
(SNG); and
43.1 % of available revenues (after transfers) to SNG in 2012.
Context – Revenue Assignment
Context – Expenditure Distribution
Public Security
Social Protection
6.1%
15.0%
14.1%
6.3%
79.5%
78.9%
Federal
States
Municipalities
Health
35.2%
Federal
States
Education
35.6%
35.8%
Federal
States
28.0%
36.2%
29.2%
Source: STN
Municipalities
Municipalities
Federal
States
Municipalities
Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Context
Subnational bail-outs in Brazil
The current subnational fiscal rules and debt controls in
Brazil
Performance of subnational finance
What worked and what did not work
1st and 2nd Subnational Bail-Out
1st Bail-Out (1989)
2nd Bail-Out (1993)
Debt
Refinanced
and Cut-off
Date
• LT external debt contracted • Contractual domestic debt
until Dec 1988
held before Jun 30, 1993
• Domestic debt service in
• External debt
arrears
• Excluded bonds
• Budget deficits until 1987
Terms
National currency, 20 year
final maturity, 5 year grace
period, interest rate and
index equal to Federal
Government
20 year final maturity, no
grace period, indexed to
General Price Index and
interest rate equal to average
of contracts (6.5%)
Cost
USD 8.7 Billion (Dec-98
prices)
USD 32.7 Billion (Dec-98
prices)
3rd Subnational Bail-Out (1997)
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Bail-out comprised bonds, domestic and external
contractual debt held by 1994, whose refinancing had
been authorized until Jun 30th, 1999.
Initially, it was thought of only to states, but it was
extended to municipalities in 2000 with similar conditions.
Innovations:
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Withhold of transfers and own source revenues as guarantee;
Refinancing in exchange of a fiscal adjustment program with
objective targets and penalties in case of non compliance;
Refinancing conditions tailored to each state;
SNGs supervised by the National Treasury.
3rd Subnational Bail-Out (1997)
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Establishment of a Fiscal Adjustment and Restructuring Plan
(PAF) with targets for:
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Total Debt/ Net Real Revenue ratio;
Primary Balance;
Payroll Expenditure;
Own source Revenue;
Public Sector Reform/ operating expenditures; and
Investment expenditures
Greatest beneficiaries were the four largest states: SP, RJ,
MG and RS.
3rd Subnational Bail-Out (1997)
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Final maturity: up to 30 years;
Interest rates: 6%, 7,5% or 9% + IGP-DI
Debt service cap: 13% to 15% of Net Real Revenue.
Value: USD74,2 billions (Dec-98 prices)
Initial Subsidy: difference between the interest rate in the
original contracts and the refinancing rate from the cut-off
date to the contract signing date.
Subsidy: difference between the interest rate charged to
SNG and the rate paid by the Federal Government on the
bonds issued to refinance the SNG debt.
3rd Subnational Bail-Out (1997)
Total Value of the Debt Refinanced (BRL billions)
States – Refinancing
117.5
States – Subsidies
14.3
States – Total
131.8
Municipalities
16.4
PROES
54.0
* Values in Dec/2000 prices, except for municipal debt which are the current value of the date of the contract
signature.
Source: (Mora, 2002) e Federal Senate Economic Affairs Committee Report
Why the 3rd bail-out worked?
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3rd bail-out was the most comprehensive. It encompassed the
majority of the debt stock, including bonds
No one-size fits all approach
It dealt with the root cause of the debt overhang – SNG fiscal
imbalances by demanding fiscal adjustment through a rolling 3
year fiscal plan, including privatization of SOEs and extinction
of public banks.
It created capacity and a special unit at the National Treasury
to supervise SNG
It was credible – sanctions were established and used and
money could be withheld from SNG Treasury Single Account
Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Context
Subnational bail-outs in Brazil
The current subnational fiscal rules and debt control in
Brazil
Performance of subnational finance
What worked and what did not work
The Three Mutually Reinforcing Rules of the
Current Subnational Fiscal Framework
Debt
Renegotiation
Law (9.496)
FRL
Supply side
constraints
(CMN)
Borrowing
Space
Fiscal Responsibility Law
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FRL is an all encompassing law of public finance, that has
introduced fiscal rules in Brazil but has gone beyond that
The most well known fiscal rules are the limits on payroll
expenditures and on net debt

Net Consolidated Debt/ Net Current Revenue is capped at 200% for states and
120% for municipalities

Debt limits were never set for the Federal Government

SNG were prohibited from issuing bonds until 2020

Payroll Expenditures/ Net Current Revenues is limited at 50% for the Federal
Government and 60% for SNG, with sub-limits for each Power
However, the limit on payroll is the only one inserted in the law,
all others are called for in the law, but set by Federal Senate
Resolutions and therefore more easily changed if needed
Fiscal Responsibility Law
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The FRL institutionalized fiscal discipline at all levels of
government.
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Incorporates hard budget constraints into a single unifying framework
Prohibits debt refinancing operations between different levels of
government
introduces more stringent requirements on fiscal targets in the
preparation of the Budget Guidelines Law
It also introduced other innovations such as estimation and disclosure of
tax expenditures and fiscal risks as well as the requirement for
frequent reporting
Is complemented by a Fiscal Crimes Law applicable to cases of noncompliance with the FRL
Debt Renegotiation Agreement
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It foresees a rolling three-year fiscal plan (PAF) with measures and
targets to be agreed between the state and the Federal
Government
Federal Government has total control over new debt for bailed-out
SNG
Until 2007, few new loans were authorized
After 2007, the Government introduced a rule in which states whose
actual Total Debt to NRR ratio were below the agreed trajectory
would have fiscal space to contract new loans
The so-called fiscal space is the difference between the agreed and
the actual debt to revenue trajectory
National Monetary Council Resolution
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The National Monetary Council set also a supply-side
restriction by determining that the outstanding domestic
bank credit to the whole public sector be limited to BRL 1
billion.
However, the original resolution provided for some
exceptions and the list of exceptions just grew over time
Thus, this limit has become the least binding one and has
served more for the Federal Government to direct the loan
proceeds to its areas of priority
Federal Government Guarantees to SNG
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The Federal Government can extend guarantees to SNG debt, as
requested by some lenders, but SNG have to offer counterguarantees (transfers, own source revenues) in exchange
In order to give the guarantee, the Federal Government rates SNG
in 4 categories (from A+ to D-) in accordance to 8 criteria: debt,
debt service, primary balance, operating balance, etc.
SNG with A or B rating will receive the guarantee.
Exceptions can be made to SNGs with a C rating by the Treasury
Secretary and by the Ministry of Finance for SNG with a D rating
Since 2005 there was no guarantee that needed to be honored by
the Federal Government
Recent Developments
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The Federal Government sent a proposal to Congress to
reduce the interest rate charged on the renegotiated debt.
The rate would be lowered to 4% to all SNG and the
index would be changed from the General Price Index to
the CPI or the benchmark interest rate, whatever is lower.
Congress changed the draft law to make the interest rate
reduction retroactive to the contract initial date.
Summary (1/2)
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In order to borrow a SNG has to comply with the following
rules:
Golden rule (loans can only be used to finance capital
expenditures)
 Net Consolidated Debt/ Net Current Revenues < 200% for states
and 120% for municipalities
 Payroll expenditure < 60% of Net Current Revenues
 Guarantees < 32% of Net Current Revenues
 Loan proceeds in a given year < 16% of Net Current Revenues
 Short term debt (less than 1year) < 7% of Net Current Revenues
 Total debt service < 11.5% of Net Current Revenues on average
during the life of the appraised loan
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Summary (2/2)
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In order to borrow a SNG has to comply with the following rules:

States must have achieved their Total Debt/ Net Real Revenue and primary
balance targets and have an actual debt to revenue ratio lower than the
contracted trajectory and show that new loan will not cause the debt to revenue
ratio to go over the agreed trajectory

Municipalities with debt renegotiation contracts with the National Treasury can only
borrow if Total Debt/ Net Real Revenue < 100%.

Federal Senate approval (only for external loans)
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SNG must have legal authorization from its legislative body.

SNG should not have any pending payment or document owed to the Federal
Government
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SNG should give a counter-guarantee to the Federal Government if sovereign
guarantee is required by the lender
Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Context
Subnational bail-outs in Brazil
The current subnational fiscal rules and debt control in
Brazil
Performance of subnational finance
What worked and what did not work
Performance of Subnational Finance
Evolution of Subnational Governments Net Debt: 1985-2013
(% of GDP)
Performance of Subnational Finance
Evolution of Subnational Governments Bonds (Net): 1987-2013
(% of GDP)
Performance of Subnational Finance
Evolution of SNG Public Sector Borrowing Needs: 1995-2013
(% of GDP)
Performance of Subnational Finance
Evolution of Net Consolidated Debt for Selected States: 2001-2013
(% of NCR)
Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Context
Subnational bail-outs in Brazil
The current subnational fiscal rules and debt control in
Brazil
Performance of subnational finance
What worked and what did not work
What worked …
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
Fiscal adjustment strategy for SNG addressed the root
cause of the imbalances
Supervision by the National Treasury helped reduce
information asymmetry between the Federal level and the
SNG
Fiscal responsibility was a value embraced by society.
And what did not work
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Debt concept and Quasi-debt exceptions
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The concept of debt in the FRL is very broad and encompassing,
however some states found ways to contract quasi-debt
instruments outside of the control of the National Treasury
Weakness of the enforcement by the Court of Accounts
The enforcement of the framework is a task shared by the
National Treasury and the Court of Accounts
 However, the enforcement by the Court of Accounts is some
jurisdictions proved to be weaker, specially in terms of payroll
expenditures in which they accepted a looser definition, which
ended up benefiting them as well

And what did not work
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The fiscal adjustment requested for SNG proved to be somewhat perverse
in the sense that initially it implied in a reduction in public investments, due
to the rigidity of other expenditures
After the recent crisis, the Federal Government responded by allowing the
states to contract more debt to leverage public investments. The result
however has been disappointing: loan proceeds have increased 92% from
2010 to 2013, but investments only grew by 4%
Since the estimation of the fiscal space is a forward looking calculation it
depends on assumption for revenues and optimistic assumptions can
generate more fiscal space
Therefore, there needs to be clear rules to project government balances
Lack of transparency in the fiscal space calculation as well as on the rating
assessments on SNG
Conclusions
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FRL was successful in changing SNG fiscal behavior
However, the success can not only be attributed to the FRL, but rather to
the whole SNG fiscal framework
Even more, it is hard (almost impossible) to disentangle the contribution of
each factor to the change in SNG fiscal behavior
The framework has showed to be relatively flexible to accommodate the
changes needed over time and to respond to challenges posed by the
economic environment
Administrative controls cannot last forever
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They do not incentivize SNG to perform better than the minimum threshold
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Over time, they become more prone to political pressure and patronage
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There need to be a transition strategy