Virtualism and the Mind: Rethinking Presence, Representation and the Self

In the early 21st century metaphors of virtual reality, are used by a number of influential philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to explain various aspects of mental phenomena. Philosophers who developed (very different) ideas about mind, making use of metaphors or concepts of virtuality or virtual reality include Alva Noë (2004), Thomas Metzinger (2004), Andy Clark (2008), Evan Thompson (2007) and Antti Revonsuo (2006). Strikingly, the use of the virtuality metaphor cuts across one of the most pronounced divisions in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, namely the division between representationalism and enactivism.

While the use of concepts and metaphors of virtual reality or virtuality are persistent themes in contemporary philosophy of mind and in cognitive science, the implications of this usage have seldom been worked out in detail. Indeed, without further constraint, metaphors and concepts of virtuality can easily imply quite contradictory accounts of mind and cognition (Clowes & Chrisley, 2012). This workshop aims to investigate and explore some of the ways concepts of virtuality and virtual reality can be used and deployed in explanation in the cognitive sciences and mind.

This first of a series of workshops to be held in Lisbon on the 23rd of April aims to explore the working out of the virtuality metaphor including, investigating such themes as: