Turmoil in Syria: failed “Arab spring” or sectarian nightmare?

Although
inspired by the movements of the Arab spring, the protests in Syria have degenerated
into increasingly violent and militarised
conflict with sectarian overtones that threaten the rights of Syrians at large.
The means employed in the resolution of the crisis will determine the outcome
Yakin Ertürktells Deniz Kandiyoti

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Deniz
Kandiyoti
: Among the various popular uprisings of the “Arab spring” Syria stands out as
a country where a stalemate was reached on the question of regime change and we
are witnessing ongoing bitter clashes between government and opposition forces.
How do you evaluate this situation?

Yakin
Ertürk :
There is no doubt that opposition forces in Syria were inspired by the Arab
spring and that many underlying grievances were brought out into the open. We
must remember, however, that there is a history to these upheavals and that the
attack on the city of Hama by the government forces in 1982 occasioned an
alleged 20.000 victims as civilian casualties. The international climate then
was very different and these atrocities elicited no engagement but were seen as
the prerogative of a sovereign state protecting itself against internal
dissent. So, there are good reasons for people in Syria to take to the streets.

Although
the Assad regime is one among many repressive regimes in the region some
distinctions need to be made.

First,
this was a regime that brought relative stability to the country after series
of coups in the post independence period. It accorded personal security and a
right of existence to the religiously and ethnically plural fabric of society-
but the price was repression. The totalitarian and consolidated power of the
single party (Baath party) regime provided cover for the right to exist in
exchange for political allegiance and quiescence (although the context is
different, it is somewhat like what I had observed in south-eastern Turkey in the 1970’s, where the Syriacs (Süryani’s)
co-existed in predominantly Kurdish villages by giving the Kurds political
support in exchange for “protection” of their economic interests. Today there
is practically no Syriacs left in these villages). Nonetheless, this was hardly
a rosy picture. The mere hint of opposition was often met with repression
and prosecution. Among the dissidents
the Muslim Brotherhood has been banned for nearly 50 years. The terms of engagement even for the
regime’s less “threatening” elements such as the Christian minority were also
uneasy. The proportion of the Christians, which is around 10% today, is said to
have experienced a steady decline over the past 40 years.

Secondly,
in the past two decades Syria was the only remaining Arab country with a clear
stand with respect to foreign interests
in the region. It maintained its long term resistance to the occupation of
Palestine and opposed the invasion of Iraq. Syria provided a safe haven for the
Palestinian refugees and, more recently, the Iraqi refugees. These among other factors have earned Syria the reputation of being a
secular, socialist, anti-imperialist bastion
in the region. Of course times have changed and this legacy -even if true- cannot excuse or mask the crimes the state has committed against its
people.

Nonetheless, this discourse of stability and assumed
secularism -along with the fear caused by the uncertainty of what may replace
the regime- continues to inform many supporters of the Syrian government inside
and outside the country. Therefore, it is not surprising that unlike in Egypt
and Tunisia, the majority of Syrians
did not rise against the regime when the unrests began a year ago. Among the
opposition the Syrian National Council (SNC) has not emerged as a credible
alternative to the regime. Within its ranks the Muslim Brotherhood stands out
as a strong contender. The SNC is highly fragmented, their mood is not conciliatory and they have not
been able to offer a vision of Syria that is convincing and reassuring to the
silent majority. The army has also remained relatively intact; most of those
who defected are young conscripts with some high ranking members of the officer
corps. The Free Syrian Army is more of an identity than a real organized entity
with a clear chain of command. Its leadership,
Colonel Riyadh Asaad, is in a defector’s camp in Hatay, with only a mobile
phone and the internet as a communication device with the many localized
opposition armed groups on the ground.

DK:
The UN Human Rights Council established an Independent Commission of Inquiry on
Syria and you were one of three members of that Commission. What were the
findings of the COI on Syria?

YE:
The Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria was established in accordance
with a Human Rights Council resolution adopted in August 2011. I served on the
Commission from September 2011 to March 2012. Unfortunately the Syrian
government did not give us access to the country. But being a human rights
commission our mandate was by its nature victim centred. However, no access to
Syria did not mean no access to information. The Commission interviewed 369
victims, witnesses and army defectors who fled to neighbouring countries and
reached some in the country by phone. We also used other sources of information
such as satellite imagery, doctor’s reports, x-rays etc. to corroborate the
testimonies from our informants. As a result, we submitted two reports to the Human
Rights Council. The first report (23 Nov. 2011) documented the human rights
violations committed by state forces and it concluded that according to
international law grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity
were committed pursuant to policies and directives from the top and these acts
were committed with complete impunity. The second report (22 Feb. 2012), while updating human rights violations, including abuses by
opposition armed groups, focused mainly on the
issue of responsibility and accountability. A confidential list containing
names of individuals, army units, security agencies etc. who are believed to be
responsible for the crimes committed has been deposited with the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights in a sealed envelop to be made available for a
future credible investigation by competent authorities. While we did not
exclude the application of international jurisdiction, we did not refer Syria to the International
Criminal Court( ICC ) as has often been the case. Instead we emphasized that
the responsibility to investigate and prosecute lies first with the state and
recommended a series of legal and judicial reforms to this end. The COI also
called for a broad based negotiated settlement and cautioned against any
foreign military intervention.

The Commission’s mandate has been extended until
September 2012, at which time the Commission will submit a final report to the
HRC. However, due to the lack of access to the country which is essential for a
more comprehensive investigation into places such as detention centres,
hospitals and the issue of the missing etc, l felt I could no longer
contribute in a meaningful way, therefore, I decided to resign. Nonetheless,
documentation of the violations must continue, particularly in view of the fact
that the Annan plan does not have a human rights component.

DK:
What has been the role of the international community in the Syrian crisis?

YE:
This is one of the components of the Syrian human rights crisis. The
international community has been divided, some supporting the regime others the
opposition. This has not only reinforced the internal strife but it has also
hindered a common position on stopping the violence. The most promising
consensus was achieved on 21 March 2012 with the Security Council presidential
statement that endorsed the Annan plan of the joint UN and Arab League mission.
However, the international community continues to be deeply divided regarding
Syria’s future. Following the SC statement, the second meeting of the Friends
of Syria took place on April 1st in Istanbul, bringing together
representatives of 83 countries. The communiqué adopted supported the Annan
plan and declared the SNC as the “legitimate” representative of Syrian people,
among other things. It also displayed the very diverse interests among the
proponents of regime change in Syria, with the US, France, Turkey and the Arab
Gulf states standing out as the leading actors. One cannot help but notice
that the states pushing for regime change are Sunni hegemonic countries facing
problems with their own Shia minorities. For others, toppling the Assad regime
is a way to break the Syria/ Iran / Hezbollah bloc, which has been a long
standing concern for outside powers. Turkey’s position, on the other hand, is
more puzzling. Once a strong supporter
of Bashar al Assad and his government, Turkey has taken an aggressive stand
from the outset against the regime. To what extent sectarian motivations are at
play in the Turkish government’s Syria policy it is not clear. But its Alawite
population among others are not at ease.
An Alawite, speaking to a local newspaper on 15 April (Radikal Gazetesi)
said that they supported the cause of the Syrian people but now they are
apprehensive as they confront slogans like “Alawites to
the grave, Christians to Lebanon”. While the conflict in Syria is not a
sectarian one, sectarianism is now
being used by the government and the opposition for their own ends. Inevitably
this increases the likelihood of a sectarian war.

DK:
What are the broader stakes?

YE: It would not be wrong to say that the stakes
go beyond a democracy and human rights agenda.
The Wider Middle East project was a way for Western interests
to infiltrate the region. The Muslim world was split within itself and the
discourse of “moderate Islam” became a means of Western encroachment. In fact
we need to correct our imperfect secularisms rather than fall into the trap of
moderate Islam (defined to suit the convenience of internal or external
players). The Turkish opposition is critical of the government stance on Syria
mainly because they see it as a western plot. Those who support the Syrian regime cite the debacles of Libya and
Iraq which clearly demonstrate the negative effects of foreign interventions.
Both the internal mosaic of Syria and the diversity of external interests make
for a very complex picture. Countries who favour regime change in Syria (like
the US and France) are on the eve of elections, therefore, they are not eager
to venture into a risky affair. The Annan mission, which is still on the
agenda, is fragile to say the least. There is an impasse at the moment. Despite
the ceasefire and the presence of UN observers on the ground the violence is
continuing and none of the six points of the Annan plan has been realized. Some
observers have already declared the mission a failure but the irony is that
there is no other alternative plan for a negotiated settlement. On the contrary
militarily options, including the arming of the opposition are gaining greater
momentum. Such options can only further militarise Syria and result in an
outright civil war with serious regional and global consequences.

DK:
Why has the international community failed to comply with its “responsibility
to protect”?

YE:
The Syrian crisis has once more revealed the gap between international human
rights standards and enforcement mechanisms. While, responsibility to protect is a powerful concept
there is no international government as such to implement it. We are responding
to transnationalized problems within the existing state centric model. States
are not equal in power, authority, and wealth. Therefore, they are parties to
disputes not impartial arbitrators. If the universal human rights standards are
to be observed in responding to human rights violations perpetrated by states
or non-state actors there is a need for intermediary monitoring, enforcement
and accountability mechanisms that do not get entangled in interstate politics.
The ICC is a great invention but it is a last resort.

DK:
How are women in Syria faring in this climate?

YE:
Several months ago I was told by opposition groups that 30% of the Syrian
National Council consists of women but they have so far remained invisible. The
military component of the resistance against the regime is naturally entirely
male. Some testimonies suggest that women are active at the local level, in the
Local Coordinating Committees (LCCs) that operate independently organizing
protests, assistance to the victims and monitoring casualty figures. As a
result women are gaining new experiences and agency. How this agency at the
local level will translate into getting women to the negotiating table is an
open question. There are many negative examples from previous conflict zones in
this regard. The COI has emphasized the importance of broad based negotiations
including women as part of this process.

DK:
What about the position of women within the Muslim Brotherhood?

YE:
It is difficult to gauge what is happening at the grassroots within Syria and
among the rank and file of the Muslim Brotherhood. As I mentioned earlier the Commission was denied access to the
country, therefore, we did not have any basis for making such assessments. But as in many conflict zones among refugees it
is possible to see how women are targeted and mobilized by conservative forces.
In October 2011 when we visited Jordan, we saw how local Islamist NGOs, with
women in the forefront, had organized to meet and settle incoming refugees.
There are transnational Islamic linkages across borders receiving and inducting
refugees. The situation in Turkey is somewhat different. The influx of refugees
is accommodated in seven-eight camps in the provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep and Kilis,
totally over 25,000 people. These camps are under local government control. The
wider society in Hatay, where the majority of the camps are, is predominantly
Alevi and not as forthcoming with Sunni refugees as the neighbouring Arab
countries. There are also many people
who are not in the camps and may be integrated in the cities, as you know SNC
is based in Istanbul. We have less information on the situation of these
people.

DK: What are the major challenges now?

YE:
The success of Islamist parties in the elections in Egypt and Tunisia is no
doubt on the minds of many Syrians. Islamization of politics in Syria will not
only imply the exclusion of minorities but strict rules for women. In an
interview with Colonel Riyadh Asaad last October, I asked his opinion about
these concerns. He said that as a
military person he does not have a political agenda but that he is fighting for
freedom and democracy, and he added, if Islamists come to power through free
elections, what is the problem with that? This is a serious dilemma we need to
come to terms with. But we also need to recognize that the “politics of fear”
of Islamic encroachment has only provided authoritarian regimes and military
interventions in the region with a strong pretext to advance their oppressive
rule. So, we need to understand why Islamist movements are enjoying popular
support and at the same time, we
need to confront these forces with democratic demands. As long as democratic processes are observed,
when in power Islamic and secular parties alike will have to respond to endemic
economic and social problems domestically and engage with a complex set of
values and standards internationally. Those who succeed will prevail and those
who do not will be eliminated. Syria’s
pluralism and experience with secularism can hopefully curb radical forces. It
is, therefore, all the more important that a broad based
negotiated settlement is achieved in Syria. Proponents of militarization of
Syria must recognize that this will only empower the most radical groups.
Islamic totalitarianism will then become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Yakin
Ertürk served on the International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Republic
established by the UN Human Rights Council from Sept 2011 to March 2012

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