Key findings of the London Assembly report, published on 5 June, on the response to the attacks in the city on 7 July 2005, in which four suicide bombers killed 52 people and injured hundreds of others.

The 157-page report by the assembly's cross-party Review Committee found:

There were failures of communication between the emergency services, as well as within each organisation.

Police, fire and ambulance staff all used different radio systems.

Some staff could not communicate with each other or with their control rooms, and rescuers at ground level could not talk to their colleagues underground.

The Fire Brigade, for example, had to use people running up and
down escalators to get information.

It was "unacceptable" that, 18 years after being recommended by the report into the 1987 King's Cross fire, there were still not digital communications which would have enabled communication below ground level.

There was an over-reliance on mobile telephones, especially by the London Ambulance Service.

Officials should have been aware the mobile network would become congested after a major incident.

Radio systems also need to be used more effectively. In some instances, the ambulance service had one member of staff monitoring two channels.

There was a lack of planning to care for survivors or traumatised relatives and friends of those affected by the bombings.

As many as 6,000 people were likely to have been severely psychologically affected, about half of them through direct experience. But the majority were still not known to the authorities or support networks.

A casualty bureau for people who were worried about missing relatives or friends had been set up "too slowly".

The ambulance service had a "lack of capacity" to bring equipment and medical supplies to a major incident at multiple sites.

There was a lack of basic equipment, including stretchers and triage cards, and too few essential supplies such as fluids at the affected sites.

Meeting points are identified on the tube network for the emergency services but not for survivors.

The NHS only put hospitals with accident and emergency services on alert and - ignored specialist hospitals who may be closest to the scene. Great Ormond Street children's hospital, near the Russell Square site, was never alerted - although a field hospital was set up.

There had been a "general failure" to maintain records of the emergency services' response to the bombings.

There were "incredible acts of courage and resourcefulness" by the emergency services, Underground workers, health professionals, and members of the public.

But emergency plans tend to cater for the needs of the emergency and other responding services, rather than explicitly addressing the needs and priorities of the people involved.