2. If actors will be able to solve the problem among themselves
through appropriate distribution of property rights, symmetric information and
low negotiation transaction costs (see Coase, 1960). [If adopted insert ref.:
Coase R.H., 1960, The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics,
pp.355-378.

3. In order to increase the effectiveness of aid, both increased
recipient participation (including NGO) and reduced donor control are required.
Today, aid is increasingly seen as a resource to help ensure the sustainable
and efficient use of domestic resources in recipient countries. One approach
to increase the effectiveness of aid has been the call to link, or tie, aid
to performance. To the extent this is perceived as another conditionality, and
leads to a reduction in country ownership, it could be counter-productive. Untying
of aid has advantages for both recipients and donors. In 1992, OECD Member countries
agreed that tied aid should be extended only to projects that are not commercially
viable and that are unable to attract commercial financing. To the extent that
this commitment is respected, it could prove beneficial to several climate-friendly
renewable energy technologies, which face difficulty in attracting financing
even when they are least-cost options for certain applications.

4. Even if a MNC could be optimised at a given moment in time,
the rapid rate of change of the market, regulatory, and environmental factors
with which it must contend would guarantee the emergence of profit opportunities.

5. Of course, the assumption of individual rationality has
itself been questioned (Zey, 1992; Etzioni, 1987). For studies dealing specifically
with energy technology choices, see Stern and Gardner (1981), Dennis et al.
(1990), Stern (1992), Geller (1992), and Crabb (1992). Arrow (1951) gives the
classical rigorous treatment of the problem of reconciling individual and social
choice. The general problem of governance and of the efficiency of collective
action pertains not only to voting rules for public decisions and the operation
of capital-controlled firms, but also to cooperatives and worker-managed firms.