Saturday, January 20, 2018

"Dreams and Anxieties in the Dune-Like Fragments of Her Body" commissioned work in progress for Soprano Saxophone and Bassoon.

I am inspired by various theorems and this post from Philosotroll certainly resonated with my thinking.

I am sharing this with my input.

"Dreams and Anxieties in the Dune-Like Fragments of Her Body" commissioned work in progress for Soprano Saxophone and Bassoon.

"Dreams and Anxieties in the Dune-Like Fragments of Her Body" commissioned work in progress for Soprano Saxophone and Bassoon.

Radical concept nativism is the thesis that virtually all notational concepts are innate. Notoriously endorsed by Jerry Fodor, radical concept nativism has had few supporters. However, it has proven difficult to say exactly what's wrong with Fodor's argument. We show that previous responses are inadequate on a number of grounds.

Chief among these is that they typically do not achieve sufficient distance from Fodor's dialectic, and, as a result, they do not illuminate the central question of how new primitive concepts are acquired. To achieve a fully satisfactory response to Fodor's argument, one has to juxtapose questions about conceptual content with questions about cognitive development. To this end, we formulate a general schema for thinking about how concepts are acquired and then present a detailed illustration.Nativism is a theory advanced by a number of leading evolutionary psychologists, especially Steven Pinker.Nativism is the view that there are certain intuitive psychological distinctions that develop in individuals or populations, things like aesthetic preferences, and that there are widely held characteristics that are a part of all human beings by virtue of genetics, like language, sound and forethought. Purely through the genetically determined features of development, psychological features will emerge.Neuroconstructivism, by contrast, is a view articulated best by Annette-Karmiloff Smith. The view asserts, basically, that there are a number of psychological features which are actively influenced by the environment.

We have to have an environment behave in a certain way, Karmiloff-Smith argues, in order to realize what we consider a "neuro-typical" brain and mind. This doesn't reject the significance of genetic considerations, but rather includes a caveat: that we are really bound up in a discussion of complex factors in the development of our psychology.