29 July 2016

We all know the Orioles need another decent starting pitcher. But what they could really use is an excellent starting pitcher. Considering the O's farm system, however, they don't have the necessary pieces to acquire a true ace (if one were truly available). Well, let's go a little outside the box, then.

The Washington Nationals are desperate for a solid late-game relief arm. Hey, the Orioles have some of those (and one who is really, really good in Zach Britton)! And if you believe everything that's passed along from apparently plugged-in MLB reporters (hint: not always a great idea), the Nationals are willing to trade prized starting pitching prospect Lucas Giolito to accomplish the task:

Sources who have spoken with #Nats believe they would trade Lucas Giolito to #Yankees for Andrew Miller, straight up.

Apparently the Yankees are not willing to do this. But, you know, perhaps the Orioles should. The Orioles are trying to win now, and dominant relief arms are extremely important. But the O's should also be in the hunt for any kind of starting rotation help. And picking up one of the best young starters in the minors while also not trading away a young, everyday talent like Jonathan Schoop is enticing.

Picking up Giolito but losing Britton, though, isn't a win-now move. While it definitely helps in the long run, losing Britton still hurts. And even though it would make sense to keep Giolito and hope he transforms into an ace, why not use him to trade for someone who's already an ace? That ace would be Chris Sale.

As they should, the White Sox are asking for a ridiculous amount in return for Sale. If they were somehow able to land Giolito, the O's would be able to put together a competitive package for the... let's say, eccentric lefty. By offering Giolito and then two or three of the team's top prospects -- Chance Sisco, Cody Sedlock, Jomar Reyes, Ryan Mountcastle, etc. -- the O's would have a shot to land one of the very best starters in the game.

By doing so, Sale would headline a rotation that immediately doesn't make you shake your head in frustration:

Chris Sale
Chris Tillman
Kevin Gausman
Yovani Gallardo
Dylan Bundy

Regardless of what you think of Bundy's usage, that's a very intriguing and talented crop of pitchers (minus Gallardo). And the best thing about acquiring Sale, besides him being outstanding, is that he's under team control through 2019 for extremely reasonable terms: $12M in 2017, $12.5M option for 2018, and $13.5M club option for 2019. I mean, that's Ubaldo Jimenez money!

Will this actually happen? Of course not. The O's aren't going to trade Britton in the middle of a pennant race, though it will make sense to explore a Britton trade during the offseason. Still, you could kinda, sorta imagine it happening. And it's at least interesting, right?

28 July 2016

Over the past week, the Orioles engaged the Padres in an effort for each club to rearrange their own financial allotment into other areas. These financial commitments had no positive value, but varied on opinion to what extent they were negative.

For the Orioles. their regretful commodity is Ubaldo Jimenez. A pitcher who teams were unwilling to commit money to two and a half years ago because his mechanics are temporal, an annual salary requirement over 10 MM, and a lost draft pick. He was the final pitcher the Orioles targeted in an offseason full of pitchers they were targeting. I christened him Plan F as a designation of how far down the list we knew he was and as a statement that this was highly unlikely to work out. Jimenez' first season was a mess. His second season was adequate. His third season so far rivals many of the largest tire fires. There is still one more season to go at 13.5 MM.

For the Padres, they were saddled with Melvin Upton, a once promising star player who over the past year experienced a modest performance revival. Upton is a true left fielder, but is capable of playing center field and adequate in right field. Over the past year, Upton has punished left handed pitching and has performed slightly below average against right handers. He has amassed an fWAR of 3 over that time period with 1.9 this year (for comparison, Chris Davis sitis at 2.2). Even with an annual salary of 16.45 MM that lasts through next season, he seems like an expensive but useful player. Particularly, if the end result is a highly capable second division outfielder for 2.95 MM in 2017. Upton is really what some people around Baltimore think Joey Rickard is.

Allegedly, the deal was:

Ubaldo Jimenez, Garrett Cleavinger, and Jhon Peluffo
for Melvin Upton

Garrett Cleavinger is a left handed pitcher who was selected out of Oregon in the third round of last year's draft. Cleavinger has the promise of a backend bullpen arm, but has some considerable hurdles in his way. He works in the low 90s though has creeped into the mid-90s at times. He also employs a hard slider that is highly effective when he actually gets it across the plate. His main issue is that there is inconsistency in the quality of his pitches as well as a general inability to locate them. Promoted mid-season to Frederick, batters appeared to be forcing him deeper into counts and exposing his weaknesses. The hope is that he could be a late inning complement to Mychal Givens, but he will need considerably more developmental time.

Jhon Peluffo is a 19 year old who has been turning heads in the Gulf Coast League. The Orioles are not a major player on the international amateur market and typically play in the low cost fringes. Occasionally, this strategy of spending less than any other team in baseball on this type of talent still winds up being successful. When the Orioles signed the 16 year old in March 2014, he was not considered a valuable prospect. Valuable 16 year olds sign within a few years of the yearly active date of July 2nd. Just within Colombia, Peluffo was considered somewhere around the ninth or tenth best pitching prospect that year with players like David Ayala (Reds), Erick Julio (Rockies) and Erling Moreno (Blue Jays) receiving far more attention and money.

After two decent yet unspectacular seasons in the Dominican Summer League, Peluffo, who is 6'3 with a considerable frame that has yet to fill out, broke out in the Gulf Coast League. I was told that he works around 90 with a good breaking ball and that Peluffo will emerge from the farm wasteland to be recognized as a top five arm in the organization's minors. I was then reminded that the Orioles system is quite barren and that Peluffo would be a ten to fifteen arm in a top rated farm below what Hansel Rodriguez was. Beyond that, I do not know much about Peluffo. He appears like your typical low minors pitcher with current success and a lot of projection.

Beyond that there was some talk of money exchanging hands, but that has been a pretty loose and vague rumor. Some love the oldies and are playing the vinyl Peter Angelos is Cheap even though the current perspective in front offices is that the Orioles are desperate and that they are willing to take on more money than most mid-season. That makes this analysis a bit uncertain. Also uncertain is that it simply is difficult to get good information on Peluffo or someone among my circle who both is qualified and has seen him pitch.

With all that in mind, I would have leaned in favor of this deal happening. A Hyun Soo Kim / Melvin Upton platoon in left field would have been remarkable. Kim has a 147/-22 wRC+ RHP/LHP split. Meanwhile, Upton carries a 85/143 wRC+ RHP/LHP split (2015's split was 102/124). A leftfielder with a 140 wRC+ would be equivalent to fielding someone like Kris Bryant or Yoenis Cespedes out there. To get that kind of production out of less than 10 MM in cost would be impressive. However, that was simply not done and Upton now plays for the Blue Jays.

This leads us to consideration of the Three Outcomes for Ubaldo Jimenez:

1. Designation for Assignment
The argument to release Jimenez has nothing to do with cost. Cost is considered sunk into him and that simply is that. The true argument for his release is that there is no one appreciably better as a fifth starter or as the last man in the bullpen. Rumor mill suggests that Peter Angelos is willing to let Jimenez go free and swallow the rest of the contract. There is a growing feeling in the industry that Jimenez will not be an Oriole on August 1st. This is due to Jimenez' struggles with command and control for all of his pitches. He was described to me as a AA starting pitcher with no option in the pen as his fastball simply is not fast or deceptive enough to be overly relied on when his struggles with the strike zone deepen his counts.

However, the other lingering question is what else do the Orioles have. Tillman and Gausman have been solid members of the starting rotation. Dylan Bundy has shown glimpses of being a strong middle of the rotation starter. Yovani Gallardo unimpressively is putting out some adequacy and profiles at this point in his career as a solid 5th starter on a playoff team, a guy who gets left off post-season rosters typically. Then your fifth starter options consist of Jimenez, Vance Worley, Mike Wright, and Tyler Wilson.

Amongst that final rotation slot group is an abundance of underwhelming talent. Wright has been the darling of several organizations who are enamored with his velocity and think a few personalized tweaks can turn him into a solid MLB pitcher or, at worst, find him as a 7th or 8th inning arm. Tyler Wilson lives on the edge of effectiveness and is no stranger to good and poor games, unlikely to ever see much positive consistency. Worley exists in a similar space. You can dream on a few of his innings, but those dreams tend to dissipate into a cruel reality. Jimenez fits the same bill, but with such an issue with control that the pen is not an option. This hurts the club because it cannot do what teams generally do when all they have to offer at a slot is trash, which is riding the hot hand. Jimenez simply cannot be stored in the pen for a start or two.

2. Every Fifth Day, Praying for a Miracle
Based on his many ups and downs in the past few seasons, projection models had to cover their bases with Jimenez. His stretch of respectability last year resulted in him being perceived by the models as having a 25-30% chance of delivering above average performances over the course of the entire season. After a horrific first half, the model I use revised its estimate to about a 2% chance of a resurrection to above average performance. Worley, Wright, and Wilson all sit in the 5-15% range. For this year alone, it is difficult to argue that Jimenez should remain. Indeed, if he was sitting on a walk year, he would be gone.

He is not on a walk year though and another season is left on his contract. A season that will probably see him as a one in ten chance of being a positive pitcher, which would be in line with the W crew vying for that last rotation slot. With that in mind, it makes a little sense to keep him around simply in order to have him available next Spring Training. It is a meager hope.

3. Find Another Melvin
The third option is to find another bloated contract and get something that is at least of some use to the Orioles. Who would that be? I am unsure. Upton's deal fit well for what the Orioles need to shore up: outfield defense and another strong bat against left handers. Other options, like Upton's former teammate Matt Kemp, simply fall into a category of pointlessness for the club by providing little defensive value and a bat that comes and goes. Maybe something is out there, but I am unsure what.

So what Now?
I lean slightly to the idea that the Orioles lost out on an opportunity with Melvin Upton, assuming the money difference was not much, Peluffo is not some wunderkind, and Upton would be cool with remaining as a platoon player. Moving on from that situation, I frankly am at a loss to see another trade opportunity appearing. I think the club is unable to ride a hot hand with one of their other options, so the only option I see is the difficult one of letting him go to be the beautiful butterfly he could be. Jimenez would be a useful piece in Spring Training next year, but is that worth suffering through four starts in August before rosters expand? Maybe it is. Maybe four horrible starts is not a major trauma against the club's post season hopes. I think it might well be.

25 July 2016

Brad Brach has had some of the best results of any reliever so far this season. As of July 5th, he had an ERA below 1, with opposing batters having just a .462 OPS against him. Even now, he has an ERA of 1.17 while opposing batters have a .495 OPS against him. In return, he was rewarded by being selected to pitch in the All-Star game. One note, the data in this post in from early July unless mentioned otherwise. Sorry, life got busy and it doesn’t seem like things have changed much.

Jeff Long, a writer for Baseball Prospectus, defended this decision by noting that Brach has been the best relief pitcher in baseball this season. Long noted that while Brach can’t boast the best FIP, Brach has the best RE/24 for a reliever in the majors. RE/24 is context-dependent and measures the number of runs that a pitcher allowed or prevented in a given inning compared to an average pitcher. Meanwhile, Keith Law wrote that the Brach silliness reminds him of Neshek in 2014 who had a .70 ERA in the first half, a 3.41 ERA in the second half and has had a strong ERA but a poor FIP for the Astros the past two years. He also wrote that Brach is a dime for dozen pitcher who was an AAA arm 18 months ago. Law is clearly using an FIP based approach to judge Brach. Brach has been largely worthless according to fWAR before 2015. Long is using a context-dependent approach to judge Brach and believes that Brach has control over balls put into play. Should Brach be considered an all-star?

Brach really put it together in 2016. In 2014, Brach had ranked 66th out of 203 relievers in wOBA on pitches put into play, but 141st in wOBA on at bats ending in a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch with an ERA ranking 103rd. Brach may have had a 3.13 ERA, but that was still only about average. In 2015, Brach ranked 78th out of 218 relievers in wOBA on pitches put into play, but 129th out of 218 relievers in wOBA on at bats ending in a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch with an ERA ranking 65th. This year, Brach ranks 8th out of 135 relievers in wOBA on pitchers put into play and 24th in wOBA on at bats ending in a walk, strikeout or hit by pitch and 4th in ERA. He’s gone from average, to above average, to elite.

One reason he became successful starting in 2015 is because he improved significantly against left handed batters. His K% increased from 17.3% to 22% from 2014 to 2015 while opposing batters had only a .239 BABIP and .259 wOBA against him. He continued his success in 2016 by reducing his walk rate from 11.5% to 7.5% while increasing his strikeout rate from 22% to 24%. His wOBA against lefties actually increased from 2015 to 2016, due to him allowing a more sustainable .737 OPS when lefties put a pitch into play compared to a .594 OPS in 2015.

However, the reason why he’s so successful in 2016 is because he’s been absolutely butchering right handed hitting. Right handed batters have only a .164 wOBA against him and he has a K% of 37.8% and a BB% of 7.8%. Opposing right-handed batters have only a .198 wOBA and .104 BABIP when they put a pitch into play.

The reason Brach improved in 2015 is because he started to throw a changeup instead of a splitter. Prior to 2015, he primarily used just a fastball and a slider against right handed batters and a fastball and splitter against left handed batters. With the introduction of the changeup, Brach throws only 60% fastballs to lefties and righties compared to the 70% he threw beforehand. He throws the changeup and slider about the same amount of time against right handed batters, but tends to use a slider early in the count while using the changeup to get strike three. Against lefties, he tends to primarily use a fastball and changeup although he does use a slider 8% of the time.

Brach has thrown 786 splitters and sliders from 2013 to 2016 and picked up 39 strikeouts using those pitches. That’s good for a 5% rate. Brach has also thrown 551 changeups over that same period and picked up 54 strikeouts or roughly a 10% rate. Brooks Baseball tells a similar story. Brach has thrown 511 changeups in 2015 and 2016 resulting in 49 strikeouts or a rate of 9.6%. In contrast, the slider has about a 4.6% strikeout rate. Brach had a tough time before 2015 because he didn’t have an off speed pitch that he could use to get a strikeout. Adding his changeup has largely fixed that problem. Being able to implement a third pitch to use against left handed batters could turn him into a legitimate closing option or perhaps even a potential starter if he has enough stamina.

This year, Brach has taken a major step forward against right handed batters by giving up fewer called balls while collecting a similar amount of called and swinging strikes. He has a called ball rate of 31.8% and a called or swinging strike rate of 30.8%. There’s only a one percent difference between these numbers, and therefore it’s no surprise that he’s collecting a large amount of strikeouts with a relatively low amount of walks. In addition, batters have a 25% foul rate, but only a 12.5% in play rate. In the rare cases where batters do make contact, they’re not hitting the ball fair. In many cases, this means that the batter is one strike closer to striking out. In every case, Brach receives another chance to get a strikeout.

Right handed batters are especially having problems dealing with Brach’s fastball. They’re only putting 9.9% in play, while fouling off 28%, having 29% result in balls and a whopping 32.6% are resulting in either called or swinging strikes. Even better, opposing batters have only put 23 into play and have just a .095 BABIP and a .280 wOBA.

He’s also taken a step forward against left-handed batters. His called ball percentage has dropped from 40% to 36%, while his called plus swinging strike percentage has increased from 25% to 29%. Again, it’s largely because of improvements in his fastball. His fastball had a called ball rate of 39% in 2015, and it’s down to 33% in 2016. In addition, batters are missing at 12% of fastballs this year compared to 5% in 2015. I think the problem that Brach faces against lefties is that he throws his changeup roughly a third of the time, but throws his changeup in the strike zone only 23% of the time. Otherwise, he probably needs a fourth pitch that he can throw early in the count for strikes. But then, relievers typically don’t use four pitches.

Brach has also gotten pretty lucky in 2016. Opposing batters have a .236 wOBA against him with the bases empty and a line of .156/.221/.302. Part of it is due to a 27.9% K-rate and a 7.7% BB rate but a large part is due to a .188 BABIP. Batters have a .192 wOBA against him with one runner on base and a .105 wOBA against him with two or more runners on base. With two or more runners on base, opposing batters have a .077/.133/.077 line – or 4 strikeouts, 1 walk, 1 single and 9 outs in play. As of July 10th, opposing batters have a .099 wOBA against him, and have a .071/.176/.071 line against him – or 4 strikeouts, 2 walks, 1 single and 10 outs in play. It’s highly unlikely that such a line is due to skill.

Adding a changeup to Brach’s repertoire has definitely made him a better pitcher and taken him from average to good. Keith doesn’t give Brach credit for this and therefore significantly underestimates Brach’s’ value. If Brach can add another pitch to use against lefties, then he’d likely be good enough to become a closer. In 2016, there’s no question that Brach has been lucky. He’s gotten extremely good fortune with multiple runners on base. When that luck evens out, his ERA will go up. He isn’t pitching well enough to deserve an ERA before 1.00. Realistically, he’s good enough to be an setup man. Not bad for a guy picked up in AAA.

In July, Brach is struggling as he "only" has a 1.69 ERA. This is because opposing batters have had an .804 OPS against him with two runners on base or with the bases loaded. He's allowed 1 strikeout, 1 walk, 4 outs in play, a single and a double. He's not getting as lucky with two or more runners on base as he had been previously and therefore it's hurting him.

I feel that Brach should be an all-star. Unlike Keith Law, I tend to think that 2016 performance should be the dominant factor in whether a pitcher is sent to the all-star game. I’m willing to consider previous performance when it comes to tiebreakers, but otherwise I want the best pitcher this year. Even if Brach has been lucky, there’s no question he’s also performed. But I also think that looking at RE24 just gives Brach credit for having an excellent BABIP with runners on base. Is that a skill or luck?

Brach is having a good year and has shown significant growth. If he can develop another pitch to use against lefties, he can legitimately become an elite reliever.

19 July 2016

Over half the season is in the books and one major story of the summer has been that home run rates have exploded to levels akin to the early 2000s. Some have suggested that all of a sudden that players, all of them, found a new Performance Enhancing Drug that cannot be detected. Of course, we can logic that out about how everyone just does not start doing something and that therapy treatments are rarely effectively trailblazed by gym rats and muscleheads. Others have proposed that millennial pitchers lack control and command, leaving balls up in the air to be clobbered. We dealt with that last week and it seems to hold no sauce. And then a few folks proclaimed that the ball, while legally within specs, is more juiced compared to other seasons.

I, on the other hand, will make another argument and then I will offer some conjecture. My argument is that we are not seeing a rise in home run rates around baseball. What we are seeing are home run rates exploding for middle infielders. Gone are the years of Cesar Izturises and now we welcome our Jonathan Schoops. Below is a table with HR/PA rates and percent change from 2015.

American League

2015

2016

%Change

Catcher

0.030

0.028

-5.1

1B

0.040

0.038

-4.6

2B

0.022

0.030

38.3

3B

0.032

0.037

17.1

SS

0.016

0.025

56.3

LF

0.028

0.026

-7.5

CF

0.022

0.025

13.5

RF

0.035

0.036

3.5

DH

0.035

0.041

16.3

Total

0.027

0.032

10.5

T wo/MI

0.031

0.033

4.6

A paired T-Test with Middle Infield included reaches significance at 0.03 while excluding the Middle Infield balloons it to 0.16. Meanwhile, a comparison with the National League renders a greater jump with values of 0.0002 and 0.003, respectively. Group it all together and both wind up as significant with 0.01 and 0.04, respectively.

Below is a graphical representation of how each position league-wide is impacted. DH (not shown) is tucked into Total and Total without Middle Infielders.

So, the great home run explosion is largely the result of the current crop of middle infielders slugging the ball better than last year's batch. Roughly, the leagues are seeing a 40% increase in home run hitting from those positions. That is what is happening. Now, some conjecture on why it is happening.

While the safe path is to simply call this a remarkable coincidence with so many young exciting middle infielders this year, such as Jonathan Schoop, Manny Machado, Trevor Story, Marcus Semein, and Roughned Odor. However, I wonder to what extent defensive shifts come into play here. For instance, a player like Jonathan Schoop benefits greatly from a shift. His main detriment is a lack of range while his greatest defensive advantage is his strong arm. As such, he can play deeper back and utilize a shift to take advantage of his arm and reduce the impact of his limited range. By doing this, you can get his bat in at second base when before you would need to rely on a more defensive player who likely has a worse bat.

Again, it may just be the ebb and flow of talent has decided to backwell into the middle infield. Or maybe it is a concerted effort to let guys with good bats stick in the middle infield until it is evidenced that they really do not belong there at all. To a lesser extent, you also see the increase in other shift position like third base and center field. If you batch position by shift impacted (2B, SS, 3B, and CF) vs. minimally impacted (C, 1B, LF, and RF), you see some stark differences. Home run rates increased for the shift position by 25% (p=0.006) while minimal shift increased by 2% (p=0.19).

As it stands, it seems untrue to blame millennial pitchers. It seems highly unlikely that there is some new wonder PED. It seems curious that a new ball would impact only certain positional hitters. It seems likely that for one reason or another players who are most employed with defensive shifts are those who also have a much stronger bat than those in years past.

15 July 2016

Did you know that Matt Wieters' career wRC+ is 98? It surprised me, because when I think of a solid offensive catcher Wieters comes to mind. He reached double digit doubles/home runs for four straight seasons. 2011 and 2012 were especially great, but going by wRC+ they were actually the only seasons that he was an above-average batter.

A wRC+ around 100 is pretty, pretty good for a catcher, but in baseball most backstops fall into one of two categories: bat-first or glove-first. (Excepting Buster Posey, Russell Martin, Salvador Perez and maybe Francisco Cervelli.) If your bat is average or below average as a catcher, it's likely that you're on the roster for your arm and/or your pitch framing abilities. In rare cases, such as Josh Thole, you're on the roster for your ability to catch a certain pitch. Washington's Wilson Ramos is a bat-first catcher. Boston's Christian Vazquez is a glove-first catcher.

Matt Wieters, at this stage of his career, is neither. And that doesn't mean he's useless trash; many teams have worse situations than a ~100 wRC+ catcher with deteriorating defensive skills on their hands. But the other day I was listening to Ben Lindbergh and Sam Miller talk about The Extra 2% Rays on their excellent daily podcast, Effectively Wild, and it got me thinking about the Oriole's catching situation. Lindbergh and Miller were discussing the market inefficiencies and radical strategies the impoverished Rays used to realize that extra 2%, and one strategy they brought up was punting offense for elite defense at the catcher position. Just look at some of the names that Tampa Bay has employed to catch over the last few years: Rene Rivera, Jose Molina, Jose Lobaton, Ryan Hanigan, Hank Conger, Kelly Shoppach. Those guys swing twigs at the plate but each of them rank near the top in advanced catching metrics.

Ever since the hype trainarrived in 2009, Wieters has started behind the plate whenever he's been healthy. It hasn't even been a question really. From 2011-2013, he led all catchers in number of pitches received. He had tons of potential, a plus arm, and graded as an OK pitch framer. He's still playable now, but with the ridiculous firepower of the 2016 O's lineup, would Baltimore be better off taking a page from the Rays' book and giving more at-bats to a catcher who might be an offensive black hole but will make up for it with caught base stealers and extra called strikes?

I presented that as a hypothetical, but the O's already have just the guy for this experiment, and his name is Caleb Joseph. After suffering a horrific injury in May, Joseph was recalled on June 30 and slid back into his back-up role behind Wieters. It would no doubt be an offensive downgrade, but Joseph doesn't even need to be average at the plate to be a net improvement over Wieters.

His .409 OPS over 75 at-bats this season has been a huge disappointment after a promising 2015 campaign in which he smacked 16 doubles and 11 homers in just 100 games. Most of his offensive struggles this year are due to a .214 BABIP that is due for a rebound, and a sudden change in his batted ball profile.

Goodbye fly balls, hello ground balls. Caleb Joseph is still a fly ball hitter, and his elevated 11.1 IFFB% indicates that he's trying hard to get under the ball but not squaring it up right. ZIPS projects him to post a .640 OPS going forward, compared to Wieters' projected .734 OPS. If, for the purpose of this experiment, we assume he gets regular playing time, Joseph it's not unreasonable to think Joseph could finish closer to his .693 OPS from last season.

Now, here's the stuff that needs to convince you, Buck Showalter, and Dan Duquette that Joseph can more than close that offensive gap with his defense.

The Pitch Framing
It's a relatively new field of research, but Matthew Carruth provides a sortable table of pitch framing metrics at his excellent site StatCorner. At the basis of all framing metrics lie two stats that are super intuitive: zBall% and oStr%.

zBall% is the percentage of pitches caught within the strike zone that are called balls. The lower the zBall% the better - you're getting the strikes you should get. The average zBall% in 2012 was 14.5%.

oStr% is the percentage of pitches caught outside the strike zone that are called strikes. The higher the oStr% the better - you're getting the strikes you shouldn't get. The average oStr% in 2012 was 7.2%.

Carruth uses these two stats to create an metric called +Calls, which is the number of extra called strikes a catcher is responsible for cumulatively. There's also PerGame, which is like +Calls but on a per game basis. If it sounds simple, that's because it is. The complex part that leads to some error is the fact that the strike zone is tough to define rigorously for the purposes of statistical analysis as it changes game to game, even hitter to hitter.

There has not been too much research into the stabilization point of catcher framing metrics, but Jeff Sullivan of Fangraphs, who has written a bunch about the topic, estimates it takes around 1,000 - 2,000 receptions to get a good idea of the talent.

Here is how Joseph stacks up against Wieters over their careers:

Over the past three years, Joseph has gotten 168 extra strikes called for his pitchers. Wieters has "lost" 128 strike calls for his pitchers. This graph makes it look like Joseph's skills are deteriorating, but if we look at the per game stats, a clearer picture emerges.

Among catchers with at least 1,000 receptions this season, Joseph's 1.41 PerGame mark ranks sixth in baseball. His 11.4 zBall% is particularly impressive, trailing only Yasmani Grandal, Kevin Plawecki, and Buster Posey. His 9.0 oStr% is also in the top ten.

Here is Joseph getting a called strike for Kevin Gausman on a borderline breaking ball around the outside edge:

Wieters, meanwhile, has been bad to awful. Most troubling is his oStr%, which ranked dead last among catchers with at least 4,000 receptions in 2015 and has been below average since 2012.

I can't claim to have done enough research to be able to quantify the impact that +2.51 extra called strikes per game makes, but given the seemingly unsolvable struggles of the starting rotation, the Orioles should be open to trying out any solution. Especially one that doesn't require making a trade in an extreme sellers market.

The Arm
Wieters never boasted elite arm strength, but his CS% was among the league leaders from 2011 to 2013 and I think the perception of his arm strength today has been skewed by that stretch. His arm started to decline in 2013, and he hasn't been the same since undergoing Tommy John in 2014.

Then there's Joseph, who led the AL with a 40.4 CS% in 2014, and his 33.6 CS% from 2014-2015 ranks fifth in baseball. Joseph's track record isn't very long, but he's actually the same age as Wieters. He took six years to get the majors and if you fold in his minor league track record, there's no reason to think the arm isn't legit.

14 July 2016

Yesterday, I heard about Matt Wieters' hypothesis about why home runs are up to potentially record breaking numbers after years of power decline. His thought was that pitchers were being aggressively promoted as a result of fastball velocity as opposed to being able to master command of their pitches. In other words, pitch locations were wobbling well away from the intended target and getting clobbered. Cynically, this would be an argument a catcher might make to explain why a pitcher is at fault with a focus on pitchers with no seniority.

To test better conceptualize that, I put together a series of graphs showing home run per fly ball rates from 2008 until 2016. If mistakes are the issue, then one would expect an increase in that rate as more pitches are squared up on. Second, if this was an age issue, then that would become evident. Historically, there are no significant differences between age groups.

The above graph makes it clear that all age groups have seen a major increase in home runs per fly ball. It simply is not a youth issue and one would suspect that very few players above the age of 31 are without much experience at the MLB level. I next broke this out into starters and relievers (not shown). The rate follow the same shape, but with relievers 0.5 to 1.0 % fewer HR/FL than starters. No significant differences were found for any age group for either relievers or starters.

To gauge how much of an increase we are discussing here compared to the historical (2008-2015) mean, I graphed each age group and separated them by starters and relievers.

There is a U shape here where younger and older pitchers have been more aversely impacted with HR/FL increase in rates. Again though, all groups have observed significantly higher HR/FL rates.

With these graphs in mind, it is difficult to see much beyond the Wieters' hypothesis about poorly experienced arms making everyone look bad (or good, depending on your point of view). After writing this up, the Washington Post took some aims at answering whether Wieters was right. They looked into whether more home runs are being hit (they are), whether fastball velocity has increased (it has, which we have known for quite a while and actually wrote the seminal piece several years ago on this site), whether more mistake pitches down the middle are being hit for home runs (yes, which tracks with more home runs overall being hit though), and whether young pitchers are at fault (not beyond historical norms).

While looking at the batted ball data, the differences are not much and do not appear to be significant. However, it seems that this noisy data might suggest that there is more hard hit contact and that it siphoned it from the medium hit group.

Season

Soft%

Med%

Hard%

2008

17

56

27

2009

16

57

27

2010

18

52

30

2011

24

52

24

2012

16

56

28

2013

17

53

30

2014

18

53

29

2015

19

53

28

2016

19

50

31

Maybe this means that players are squaring up on the ball better. I do not know.

Another idea is that perhaps teams are embracing more uppercut style hitters as the league embraces more groundball pitching. How does that pan out?

Season

LD%

GB%

FB%

2008

20

44

36

2009

19

43

38

2010

18

44

38

2011

20

44

36

2012

21

45

34

2013

21

45

34

2014

21

45

34

2015

21

45

34

2016

21

45

34

Honestly, if you had told me that the last five years have resulted in a leveling off of batted ball profiles and that we are seeing levels lowers than the pre-PED testing era. All in all, I am at a bit of a loss. Perhaps teams and players are more effective with changing swing planes, but I am doubtful of that. Perhaps the ball is both legal and accidentally a little juiced this year. Regardless, I do not think Wieters' hypothesis about millennial pitchers works.

12 July 2016

Since November 2015, after Justice Marks vacated the RSDCs previous decision, the Nationals have attempted to compel MASN to return to arbitration before the RSDC. The Nationals claimed that a footnote in the Justice’ decision meant that MASN needed to submit to arbitration if the Nationals just changed their lawyers. On the other hand, MASN felt that the sides should agree to submit this case before a different arbitral body and thereby avoid the appeals process. Failing this, MASN wanted its appeal to be heard before a second arbitration case would be heard before the RSDC.

After more than half a year, Justice Marks ruled on Monday that MASN shouldn't be forced to submit to a second arbitration before the RSDC until appeals have been completed. Justice Marks clarified his original decision by stating that his footnote didn’t compel MASN to return to arbitration before the RSDC just because the Nationals changed their lawyers. He further noted that he was unwilling to re-write the parties contract to force its process to move faster than plain language requires.

It’s pretty simple when it comes down to it. As the decision states, it is inefficient for a court to have motions and appeals regarding confirmation and vacature of different arbitration awards, at the same time, all stemming from the same dispute. In this case, there have been multiple motions and therefore Justice Marks decided it was best to ensure simplicity in order to conserve court resources. In addition, this would have the potential of wasting significant amounts of the parties’ time. Depending on the result of the appeal, a decision made in a second arbitration could easily become moot. And it was highly unlikely that a decision tendered in a second arbitration would be put into effect before appeals were heard for both the first and second arbitration.

As stated previously, the impact of this decision is negligible. This merely delays a future RSDC arbitration until after the appellate court rules on each parties appeal. If the appellate court doesn’t rule in MASNs favor, then it seems likely that this case will eventually go back to the RSDC. Likewise, if the appellate court does rule in MASNs favor, then the results of a second arbitration would be meaningless. This was nothing more than a skirmish.

And yet, it does have some interesting implications. The Nationals have claimed that they’ve receiving unreasonably low rights fees for the past three years. They were hoping to compel MASN to go to arbitration in order to rectify the solution. On Monday, they discovered that they wasted half a year on this motion and have nothing to show for it. Even worse for the Nationals, the current five year contract ends after 2016. It doesn’t appear that the sides will come to a decision by 2017 and therefore this dispute could impact the next contract. This was a costly waste of half a year.

Justice Marks noted that neither party has perfected its appeal as of today. Rachel Thorn, an attorney for MASN, noted previously that for the appeal to have been scheduled for the June term, the perfection date was March 21, 2016. MASN didn’t perfect its appeal by that date because the parties were in the midst of mediation and MLB hadn’t responded to Mr. Hall’s February 5, 2016 letter. It seems that she implied that if the Nationals’ didn’t waste everyone’s time by trying to compel MASN to participate in a premature arbitration, then MASN may have perfected its appeal in March and the case could have been heard in June. Instead, MASN needed to use its resources to respond to the Nationals attempt to compel arbitration. If so, it’s questionable whether even a Nationals victory would have sped up the process.

Mrs. Thorn further noted that the next available terms for the appeal to be scheduled are September 2016 and October 2016, which would require perfection by July 11, 2016 and August 8, 2016 respectively. Given that Monday was the 11th, it seems unlikely that the parties will be ready to submit their appeals by that date. It seems that the earliest this case might be heard is in October, but it’s very possible that this case won’t be heard by the appellate court until 2017. Even after the case is heard, it will still take a few months for them to come to a decision.

Furthermore, it isn’t clear what the Nationals were hoping to achieve by bringing this motion. Even if they were successful, it was unlikely that the RSDCs decision would be implemented before MASN had a chance to appeal Justice’ Marks decision about the first arbitration as well as the RSDCs second arbitration. It isn’t time efficient to attempt to compel MASN to return to arbitration if it meant a delay in the appeals’ process.

Also, suppose the Nationals were victorious on Monday. If MASN was successful in the RSDCs second arbitration, then the Nationals would be in the uncomfortable position of needing a victory when appealing the RSDCs first arbitration. If MASN wasn’t successful in a second arbitration, they could use the results of the second arbitration to strengthen their appeal of the Judge’s ruling of the first arbitration. It seems like the Nationals placed MASN in a win-win situation with this motion while placing themselves in a situation where they couldn’t win.

In the meantime, Manfred has continued to make outrageously biased comments in favor of the Nationals. The Commissioner stated that “It is important to bear in mind the fundamentals. The fundamentals are that the Orioles agreed the RSDC would set the rights fees for MASN and the Orioles every five years. The Orioles have engaged in a pattern of conduct designed to avoid that agreement being effectuated.” Manfred has further argued that “We are intent on making sure that the agreement that gets the Nationals a fair market value for their TV rights is enforced, and we’ll do whatever is necessary to get that.” Yet, Manfred refused to acknowledge that the agreement was also vacated due to evident partiality and therefore that the panel was biased towards the Nationals. It is obviously unreasonable to claim that MASN is at fault for fighting against a decision found to be unfairly biased against them. As this case continues to progress, Manfred is further demonstrating his anti-MASN bias and thereby ruining his credibility. The appellate court will have to wonder if the RSDC is independent enough from the Commissioner to make a fair ruling. The longer MASN is able to delay a final decision, the higher the likelihood that Manfred will make a significant error which proves that the RSDC is an unsuitable arbitrator for this dispute.

All in all, the practical implications of this victory are minimal. But the fact that the Nationals just wasted months on this motion and have yet to win a single victory in this entire case is probably a bad sign for them. Why did they decide to waste several months on a motion which had little importance and a minimal chance of success if they want a decision as soon as possible? One has to question whether the disqualification of Proskauer Rose has had significant implications.

11 July 2016

If you're a glass-half-full type of person, then, at best, you may view the Orioles' trade deadline deals of the past few years as a mixed bag. If you're not, then surely you hated many of them. There are a couple of players who helped the O's -- Andrew Miller, Bud Norris, Scott Feldman -- and also a bunch of guys who didn't. And when you look back at the price to acquire them, it doesn't look so great.

I might have left a couple out, but it's clear that the O's didn't get many bargains. The O's pulled off a cream-of-the-crop addition one time: Andrew Miller. Regardless of what you think of the Miller trade, he was very good in an O's uniform.

The rest of the time, Duquette aimed for the middle, or for relatively minor or moderate upgrades, and those moves mostly did not pay off. If the Orioles wanted to go after another reliever -- clearly Buck Showalter craves another left-hander in the bullpen -- they could put together a trade package for that. But many teams desperately need starting pitching upgrades, and nearly all of them will be able to assemble more enticing groups of prospects than what the O's can cobble together. That could lead the Orioles again shooting for a fringe starter.

So how should the Orioles proceed? It's not an easy question to answer. The way I see it, the Orioles could do one of three things. They could do nothing, rolling the dice with what they have and hoping it somehow works out. Second, they could target a few low-risk, high-variance players who wouldn't cost much. That could keep the likes of Ubaldo Jimenez, Mike Wright, and/or Tyler Wilson out of the starting rotation, even if there's no guarantee the new additions pitch any better. Or third, they could go after a legitimate starting rotation upgrade, whether that's Julio Teheran, Jake Odorizzi, Sonny Gray, Matt Moore, Rich Hill, Drew Pomeranz, Jeremy Hellickson, Ervin Santana, or someone else. Maybe some of those guys aren't on the market. Most likely, the O's would struggle to put together an enticing package for many of those names. And maybe they'd struggle to outbid other teams in the hunt for rotation upgrades. But at least some of those names are within reach.

I've been going back and forth about this. For a while I was in the do-nothing camp, but it's extremely difficult to talk yourself into riding things out with this group of starters. It's just too painful for a core that has a chance to win something significant right now.

The Orioles clearly want to add a left-handed starter. My guess is they would prefer to add two starters to go along with Chris Tillman, Kevin Gausman, and Yovani Gallardo. Maybe it would be easier to do that by adding someone like Jon Niese instead of Rich Hill. Either way, you're rolling the dice. These guys aren't aces.

You'd figure it wouldn't take a whole lot to acquire Niese. And again, Niese is just one example. There don't appear to be any slam-dunk starters in this market, or anything similar to the skill level the O's acquired when they picked up Miller to improve their bullpen a couple years ago. Maybe the O's could similarly acquire an add-on to a powerhouse bullpen to aid a bad rotation, but it's unlikely they go for a top-shelf reliever again. The O's also probably view Darren O'Day's impending return as the shot in the arm the bullpen needs.

At the minimum, I think the O's need to pursue a starting pitcher of some kind and a left-handed reliever. But no matter what, I won't feel great about it. The O's have the opportunity to make a decent move or two and improve their chances of getting into the playoffs, but in order to do that, they'd hurt an already weak farm system. Just because the Orioles have a low-rated minor league system doesn't mean it's completely devoid of talent. Whether the O's would be able to get the most out of those prospects is a fair question to ask, but that that's even a question is pretty sad for the state of the O's prospect development system currently in place.

This is what can happen when you both refuse to pay top dollar for starting pitching but are also terrible at developing your own pitching prospects. And yet, the O's are still, somehow, two games up in the American League East.

Being a GM is hard. The Orioles need starting rotation help. They also routinely need prospect help. Who's ready for the trade deadline?

Back in March, mouths were foaming about how the projection models rated the Baltimore Orioles. Steve Melewski was alleged going to local Best Buys, drinking a six pack in the parking lot, and then going inside to jeer at salespeople in the tablet section. It was a dark time in Baltimore, but a rather proliferous one for message boards and writers who needed inspiration for fan friendly columns.

Truth be told, the projection models were not exactly in unison. While Baseball Prospectus' PECOTA had the Orioles at 72 wins, ZiPS and FanGraphs pegged the club at 81 and 82 wins, respectively. Some took those rosier projection harshly as well without acknowledging that the first place clubs were sitting with 84 wins in those projections. In other words, two model approaches saw the AL East largely flattened while PECOTA was off on its own doing its own thing, which is what more recent iterations of PECOTA has been known to do as it has been more aggressively updated in the past few years.

At the Depot, I usually put together projections, but time was rushed and I simply was more focused on my CRAP draft system than updating my BUCK patch model to the ZiPS system. In my gut, the club felt like a fourth place team around 82 wins in a pretty competitive AL East. Other clubs looked better like Toronto and Boston, but the difference was not all that great.

In the first few weeks of the season, the Orioles won and won often, but typically not all that pretty. The rotation was a mess, but the offense was humming and the club got some good fortune. It meant that the data analyst cautious approach continued to note that the Orioles looked uneven and ready to fail. Keith Law noted that without the winning streak at the beginning of the year, the club had played .500 ball. Yes, we all know that removing a winning streak makes a team look worse and that there is typically no good reason to ignore a week and a half of games. Anyway, an allegedly drunken Steve Melewski allegedly ran wild in several more local Best Buys.

In June, I decided to finally go back and figure out what my Buck patch model would have projected in the AL East. I updated the system to consider the past three seasons each manager managed and each General Manager general managed. I looked at what ZiPS thought they would do and then what they wound up doing in order to get an idea of the impact of those positions on the success of a baseball club. All of this is based on my previous work, which I still have trouble believing. For those without much experience, I simply projected them to not deviate from ZiPS in those seasons.

AL East

adjCD

RankCD

Rank

Baltimore

85

1

1

New York

83

2

4

Toronto

82

3

2

Boston

79

4

3

Tampa Bay

77

5

5

AL Central

Royals

92

1

2

Cleveland

88

2

1

Chicago

79

4

4

Detroit

77

5

3

Twins

80

3

5

AL West

Houston

88

1

2

Texas

84

2

1

LAAA

81

3

5

Mariners

80

4

3

Oakland

76

5

4

The patch model elevated the Orioles over the opposition as it considers the work by Showalter and Duquette to be exceptional with respect to expectations. Over 2/3 of the projected ranks are off no more than one from where the clubs currently sit. The biggest misses are the Twins who have been simply gruesome in part due to a heavy reliance on Minor League data for their projections. The other big miss is the Rangers who have been blowing up other clubs this year even though they are a bit saddled with an aging and sleep deprived Prince Fielder.

All in all, it seems the data analysis approach has worked remarkably well for most of us doing this.

Contact Camden Depot

We look forward to your questions as well as any suggestions you may have for us.

Additionally, we are always looking for new contributors, so if you want to write for the Depot then e-mail us with an example column that you think fits the tone of the site.

Contributors

Jon Shepherd - Founder/Editor@CamdenDepotStarted Camden Depot in the summer of 2007. By day, a toxicologist and by night a baseball analyst. His work is largely located on this site, but may pop up over at places like ESPN or Baseball Prospectus.

Matt Kremnitzer - Assistant Editor@mattkremnitzerMatt joined Camden Depot in early 2013. His work has been featured on ESPN SweetSpot and MASNsports.com.

Matthew Cassidy - WriterMatt joined Camden Depot before Spring Training in 2017. His love of music is surpassed only by his obsessions with food (unhealthy) and baseball statistics (totally healthy).

Patrick Dougherty - Writer@pjd0014Patrick joined Camden Depot in the fall of 2015, following two years writing for Baltimore Sports & Life. He is interested in data analysis and forecasting, and cultivates those skills with analysis aimed at improving the performance of the Orioles (should they ever listen).

Nate Delong - Writer@OriolesPGNate created and wrote for Orioles Proving Ground prior to joining Camden Depot in the middle of 2013. His baseball resume includes working as a scorer for Baseball Info Solutions and as a Video Intern for the Baltimore Orioles. His actual resume is much less interesting.

Matt Perez - Writer@FanOfLaundryMatt joined Camden Depot after the 2013 season. He is a data analyst/programmer in his day job and uses those skills to write about the Orioles and other baseball related topics.

Joe Reisel - WriterJoe has followed the Norfolk Tides now for 20 seasons. He currently serves as a Tides GameDay datacaster for milb.com and as a scorer for Baseball Info Solutions (BIS). He is computer programmer/analyst by day.

Joe Wantz - WriterJoe is a baseball and Orioles fanatic. In his spare time, he got his PhD in political science and works in data and analytics in Washington DC.