People do not like to delegate the distribution of favors. To explain this reluctance, we disentangle reward motives in an experiment in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the transfer values of the investor and delegate, we find that the trustee's rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who ultimately decides gets a higher reward. Unlike studies on the punishment of delegated unkind decisions, our results do not reveal a more sophisticated reward behavior that takes people's responsibility into account.

<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/29882">
<dc:contributor>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:contributor>
<dc:contributor>Eisenkopf, Gerald</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29882"/>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-19T09:41:52Z</dc:date>
<dcterms:issued>2015</dcterms:issued>
<dcterms:title>Naïve Responses to Kind Delegation</dcterms:title>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-19T09:41:52Z</dcterms:available>
<dc:creator>Eisenkopf, Gerald</dc:creator>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/>
<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">People do not like to delegate the distribution of favors. To explain this reluctance, we disentangle reward motives in an experiment in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the transfer values of the investor and delegate, we find that the trustee's rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who ultimately decides gets a higher reward. Unlike studies on the punishment of delegated unkind decisions, our results do not reveal a more sophisticated reward behavior that takes people's responsibility into account.</dcterms:abstract>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dc:creator>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:creator>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>