What really happened in the conquest of Lod?

In a series of books on the taking of Arab cities during the War of
Independence, the Ministry of Defense launches an attack on the New
Historians

By Tom Segev,
Haaretz May 12, 2000

As the sun set on Sunday, July 11, 1948, IDF troops entered the town of Lod
(Lydda), and its notables surrendered. Lod was conquered in the course of
the Dani campaign; Ramle and some villages were taken as well. The objective
was to take control of the airstrip and secure the route to Jerusalem. The
significance of this story goes beyond the military results of the campaign,
because the battle for Lod gave luster to the biographies of a number of
army officers who subsequently became part of Israel's political leadership
- including Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon. Battles fought
during this stretch of the 1948 conflict became the crux of the political
and moral arguments about what is permissible and what is forbidden in war,
and about the future of relations between Israel and Palestinian Arabs. As
the battle for Lod drew near, and then as the town's fate was sealed, local
residents - 30,000 of them - left. They became refugees. Their story
represents a central chapter in the Palestinian tragedy.The Haganah Archive
and the Defense Ministry press are currently sponsoring the publication of a
new book about the conquest of Lod. It is to be the first in a series, "The
War for the Cities," whose publication is an important event. The intention
is apparently to issue a book for each city, and together, they should
constitute the most significant effort to consolidate an official military
historiography since the publication of "Toldot Hahaganah."

The authors of the volume on Lod are two well-known historians from the
Hebrew University, Alon Kadish, formerly the head of the university's
history department, and Avraham Sela, a Middle Eastern studies expert. A
section devoted to the city of Lod was written by a Haifa University
geographer, Arnon Golan. The publication's political and moral importance
should not be underestimated. A "peace of the brave" requires Israel to
courageously recognize its own part in the tragedy that befell the
Palestinians. This means disclosing war crimes committed in the past; any
attempt to conceal those wrongs is liable to pave the way for crimes in the
next war. With justification, the book's jacket says that the story of the
conquest of Lod is of considerable interest. The discussion revolves around
two fundamental questions: Did Palmach fighters massacre Arab prisoners who
were taken after the city was conquered? And were the town's residents made
to flee on the basis of a pre-prepared plan?

The formulation of the questions reflects a punctilious, almost legalistic,
approach. The same can be said for the answers supplied: "There is no
evidence" of a massacre; "There is no possibility of reconstructing with
certainty" who initiated the deportation. Regrettably, however, such answers
are inadequate.

The State of Israel has, over the years, been a prolific publisher of
history books. The Defense Ministry and the IDF run their own publishing
house to produce these histories. The Education Ministry, the Foreign
Ministry and the Israel State Archives also release official histories. Such
publishing efforts are, of course, perfectly legitimate, because the
struggle over history-telling has been paramount in the struggle for control
of the Land of Israel. By the same token, it's natural that the official
version of history is rife with mythology, apologetics, and ideology. In
fact, books about Israel's wars published by the Defense Ministry must be
perused with the same critical attitude applied to publications of the Red
Army press.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Israel opened some of its official archives
to research. For the first time, researchers were able to test official
histories with facts found in archival materials. A generation of Israeli
historians, branded the "New Historians," arose; they based much of their
work on the discovery that the state had often lied. Official published
histories, and texts incorporated in school curricula did not tell the whole
truth; and some of the stories they told, it turned out, were far from true.
Israel's "new history" is no longer a new story. Innumerable articles have
analyzed it; books and doctorates in virtually every language have been
written about the it. Fifteen years after they emerged for the first time,
virtually everything can be said about these historians, but they are not
"new."

In Israel, they are still often treated with suspicion, and hostility as
well; but the academic community abroad regards them as reliable scholars.
The best-known figure in this group is Benny Morris, a professor at
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Be'er Sheva. Among other publications,
Morris has written a book on the birth of the refugee problem. The new
Defense Ministry volume on the conquest of Lod is designed to prove that
Morris did not write the truth when he described the killing of civilians in
the town as a massacre. Half the book's opening page is taken up by a
quotation from an article published by Morris in Ha'aretz magazine - and the
next 56 pages promote the conclusion that Morris' statements are unfounded.
The tenor of the criticism leveled against Morris is acerbic, and verges on
ridicule.

Kadish, Sela and Golan proceed as though they are writing for readers who
are versed in the details of the Dani campaign, and who merely need some
reinforcement to stand up against the likes of people like Morris. Basic
questions, such as why Lod was conquered in the first place, remain
unanswered; they are treated as though they are self-evident issues. It's
not clear who decided to conquer the town or when this decision was reached.
The state had already been established, and the government was already
meeting. Was a comprehensive plan to conquer the country presented to it?
Did the government discuss details of the conquest? Was there any argument
about it? Was there a vote? No discussion about such issues appears in this
book.

The volume's opening section furnishes historical, geographic, economic,
demographic and military information about Lod. The section is written as
though it was prepared by an intelligence officer. There were people in this
town; they were born, and gave birth; they lived and died, loved and hated,
believed and feared. They had illusions and hopes, daily burdens, intrigues.
At the end of the day portrayed in the main part of this book, an entire
community was gone. It had departed to become part of a dispersion, to
become part of a terrible national and human tragedy. But Golan, Sela and
Kadish write about Lod as though it were simply a point on the map to be
conquered. Sometimes it seems as though they expect the readers to take up
cudgels, and head off to battle themselves.

Soldiers in the 3rd Battalion of the Palmach's Yiftah Brigade are depicted
in a more human way. The hours-long battle taxed them, the searing heat made
it tough: "The hamsin boiled, and our skin became a sticky layer of mud,"
one soldier in this battalion relates "Our steel helmets were akin to
white-hot frying-pans." Departing for battle, the soldiers grumbled that
they didn't have time to eat some chickens they had slaughtered. Sardines
eaten the night before caused indigestion, vomiting and headaches. Worse
than anything, they were thirsty; it seems that they hadn't taken enough
water with them to battle. Four soldiers were killed, and 42 were wounded.

Kadish details the battle plans and deployments, and the progress made by
the various units. He devotes a portion of his analysis to Moshe Dayan's
part in the conquest of Lod. Dayan was the commander of the 89th Battalion.
Kadish sternly upbraids him: "The 89th Battalion's engagement was
characterized by confusion, lack of familiarity with the territory, and
battalion commander Moshe Dayan's difficulties controlling his troops in the
battle - it [the battalion] brought about the collapse of the local Arab
effort in Lod's eastern parts by accident. Due to a dearth of field and
General Staff intelligence, an action that had originally been planned as a
step to finish up a military operation based on the principle of the
indirect approach, turned into a rash, full frontal assault."

Hence, the Defense Ministry is pitted here against Moshe Dayan. But the two
salient questions are left unresolved: the massacre and the expulsion; or,
to quote Kadish, faithfully, "the massacre," and the expulsion. @CROSStom:2.
'The Arabs are ridiculing us'Kadish cites two Arab authors: Nimr Al Khatib
estimated that the number of casualties in Lod reached 1,700, and Aref Al
Aref wrote that IDF soldiers killed 170 prisoners who were gathered at Lod's
largest mosque. Though the first figure apparently includes soldiers and
civilians, and does not relate to the massacre in the mosque, Kadish
concludes that "there is no evidence for the massacre of 1,700 prisoners."

This constitutes a denial of a claim that was never made to begin with.
Kadish writes that there is "no direct proof" of the massacre referred to by
Al Aref. He believes that the story about the massacre in the mosque derives
from a mistake: Armed Arab partisans who refused to surrender had
congregated at another mosque in Lod, the "little mosque." Jewish soldiers
charged, attacking this group. Many of the besieged in the little mosque
were killed.

One of the Palmach's dispatches referred to 250 Arab casualties. According
to Kadish, "it's reasonable to assume" that this reference applied to all
persons killed during the various stages of the fighting. He derives his
conclusion from the fact that this is the first number that surfaces in a
Palmach report after the inception of the fighting in the town, on July 11.
He is wrong. The enemy's losses were counted in daily reports. A dispatch
relating to the events of July 11 is extant, and it says that 40 Arabs were
killed. The report from July 12 refers to 250 Arabs killed. According to
Kadish, "there's considerable doubt" that the number of Arabs killed on July
12 in fact reached 250, "or even half of this." He doesn't explain how he
has reached this conclusion. He generally accepts at face value evidence
furnished in Palmach dispatches concerning battle events and so there is no
reason why he should dismiss its report about the number of casualties.

When a historian avers that "there is no evidence" of something, it behooves
him to prove to the reader that he has undertaken a reasonable search to
marshal such evidence. In this particular case, it would be worth knowing
how Kadish and Sela conducted their search for eyewitness accounts of the
events of July 12 in Lod. Perhaps some residents remain there who recall
what happened; perhaps there are some to be found elsewhere, in refugee
camps. Perhaps, as the years went by, eyewitnesses furnished testimony to
Arab historians; there are today Palestinian research institutes that
compile such recollections. Kadish and Sela, however, do not say whether
they undertook such a research effort. It is reasonable to suppose that when
they say that "there is no evidence" attesting to the killing of prisoners,
the reference is to Israeli evidence.

In any event, Kadish confirms that on July 12, 1948, unarmed civilians were
killed at Lod. That morning, Palmach fighters were seized by panic. They had
believed that Lod was in their hands, when suddenly armored vehicles
belonging to the Arab Legion rolled into the town, and snipers started to
fire from windows. Israeli historiography treats this incident as a
"rebellion." In one report, reference was made to what was apparently
considered to be the most loathsome of all possible occurrences: "the Arabs
have started to ridicule us." Palmach men received orders to "shoot at every
target." Kadish quotes an American journalist, Kenneth Balibi, who was on
the scene, and witnessed corpses of civilians strewn about the streets in
Lod - including the corpses of women and children. @CROSStom:3. 'There are
no Israeli Arabs'The major expulsion began that evening. About half an hour
after midnight, "Dani" headquarters ordered the 3rd Battalion to "encourage
the departure of residents" who were not being held prisoner, partly by
threatening that the IDF "isn't responsible for their defense." According to
the terms of this order, women, children and the infirm and elderly were not
to be compelled to leave; nor did the order apply to the monasteries or the
church.

Kadish's conclusion: The order applied "mainly" to army-age men about whom
no special reason to delay departure could be adduced. Some evidence remains
to suggest that Lod Arabs "wanted" to leave the town; Kadish finds that this
evidence "isn't implausible." Kadish doesn't know who gave the order to
carry out the expulsion: "On the basis of the available documentation, there
is no possibility of reconstructing with certainty the source of the
initiative whose result was the expulsion order; but it appears that it was
done in consultation with all the parties, that is, the 3rd battalion's
command, the operation's headquarters, and the political leadership."

Kadish quotes from Yitzhak Rabin's memoirs. Rabin and Yigal Allon turned to
David Ben-Gurion, asking what should be done with the town's residents.
Ben-Gurion responded with a wave of his hand, a gesture interpreted as
meaning "expel them."

Rabin's story was originally included in his memoirs of his army days,
"Pinkas Sherut," but the ministerial committee that reviewed the manuscript
refused to authorize its publication. Word about Rabin's recollection got
out after Peretz Kidron, who translated the book, told The New York Times
correspondent David Shipler about it. Shimon Peres subsequently explained
that Ben-Gurion's gesture was not fraught with meaning. Yigal Allon claimed
that what happened in Lod was a "concerted flight," not an expulsion.

Kadish, that is, the Ministry of Defense, confirms that there was an
expulsion. He believes it important to point out that the exodus "was not
complete": 232 Christians and 332 Muslims remained in Lod. At this stage,
the reader is likely to turn the pages back, wondering if he somehow skipped
over the section detailing the suffering endured by those who left. It turns
out that there is none. Kadish, Sela and Golan haven't supplied a single
shred of testimony from those who experienced the torments of expulsion - as
though they have no part to play in the story.

How were they brought out of their homes? What were they allowed to take
with them? How were they transported beyond the town limits? What happened
to the infirm, to the elderly, to the infants? Perhaps they too suffered
from nausea, like the soldiers who conquered the town. Were they given food,
water, medicine? Not a word about any of this appears in the text.

Some lines describing the expulsion come from the mouths of Palmach men. The
thrust here is to show how hard it was for them to view the suffering of the
deported: The abominations they witnessed reminded some Palmach fighters of
the Holocaust. Kadish alludes to phenomena of looting and pillage, and
quotes a story relating to abuse of an Arab. The author volunteers his own
moral assessment of this last incident: "The behavior of some of the Palmach
soldiers bears witness to vulgarity, insensitivity and childish cruelty, but
no more than that." Here's Kadish on the looting: "The Palmach was not one
of the IDF's worst units on the issue of plunder."

Any interested person can today visit the Israel State Archives' reading
room, and peruse the minutes of meetings convened by the country's first
government. Some discussion portions remain classified; words have been
excised from these sensitive sections, but the deletions themselves provide
some clues as to what the state is trying to conceal. On June 16, 1948,
about a month before Lod's conquest, the government conducted an extensive
discussion about the fate of refugees from towns and villages that had been
taken up to that date. The question was whether they would be allowed to
return to their homes. There was also some discussion about anticipated
events ahead. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion said: "Two thorns remain, Lod
and Ramle. And this hurts our status now." At this stage in the minutes, six
lines have been deleted. The historian who writes that he cannot determine
who initiated the expulsion "on the basis of available material" would be
wise to acknowledge that the government held a discussion about Lod, and
that the prime minister said something that the state finds cause to keep
concealed.

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion made other statements which, 50 years later,
remain out of bounds to historians. Almost all the deleted portions are
located in a section that precedes a claim about what would happen were the
Arabs to conquer Jewish cities - they would not show mercy to the
population.

"Were the Mufti to take the Old City of Jerusalem, he would slaughter all
its Jews," the minutes record. The context suggests that this claim served
as a basis for Ben-Gurion to justify statements he had made beforehand,
remarks which are in all likelihood sufficiently dreadful for the state to
keep them top secret. Ben-Gurion's conclusion from the battles is recorded
in another section of the government discussion: "Arabs of Israel aren't
considered as a military force, or a political force." After some deleted
words, the text continues: "There are no Arabs of the Land of Israel."

"When a Jew, in America or in South Africa, talks to
his Jewish companions about 'our' government, he means the
government of Israel."