Eban opened the discussion by
saying the Cabinet meeting on Sunday2May
28. was very important; there has never been a moment like
this in Israeli history; and the country is on the footing of
expectancy. If Israel is denied access to the Gulf of Aqaba, its primary
line to East Africa and Asia—half of the world—would be cut off. From a
legal point of view, the Law of the Sea Conference in 1958 clearly
supported the principle of freedom of the seas as applied to Gulf of
Aqaba and Strait of Tiran. Nasser
has committed an act of aggression and his objective is the
strangulation of Israel. Israel is confronted with two alternatives:
either to surrender or to stand, and we are confident if we stand we
will win.

We had raised the possibility of a third alternative: an international
solution.

He had come to explore that possibility. Eban referred to possible action by 17 maritime powers
in the Suez crisis who came out strongly for freedom of passage and
freedom of the seas.

He reviewed for the President his conversation with DeGaulle,
characterizing DeGaulle's attitude as “everything having to be talked
out between France and the
Soviet Union”. Eban did not have
great expectations regarding French support, although he said that the
French in the last few days, have been helping them with assistance for
the Israeli armed forces. France has “opened its armories” to Israel.
Regarding his conversation with Wilson, he was pleased that the UK is willing to play an active role in this matter on an
international basis, but only if the US was part of the whole
effort.

First question raised by Eban was
what can and will the US do to carry out its commitments to keep the
Straits and the Gulf open? Eban,
referring to the President's statement of a few days ago, said the
policy is there but the question is what are you willing to do to
enforce it. He characterized the Straits and Gulf issue as the crux of
the matter, since the Israeli position in Africa and Asia is dependent
on this link.

Second question related to UAR
intentions. Eban said he has been
receiving numerous cables from home that UAR preparing overall attack on Israel. He said the US is
skeptical, but his Prime Minister has told him the Israeli assessment is
based on facts. What if this Israeli assessment is true? Should there
not be a US warning? He stressed that Israel has to take this matter
seriously since Nasser, in his speeches and otherwise, has made it clear
that the UAR objective is destruction of
Israel. He then suggested that it was desirable for Israeli and American
military to get together and to plan what should be done if the Israeli
assessment proves true.

President Johnson said he had made
the US view absolutely clear in his public statement a few days ago. He
thought it was wise for him to make that statement when he did, and he
continued to believe this today. It may not have had the effect it
should have, (he said he saw tonight on television a parade in Cairo
against the US) but we feel strongly on this matter and therefore I
decided to make this statement to the American people and to the
world.

What to do and when to do it in order to assure free access to the
Straits and the Gulf is another question. President Johnson said he is of no value to
Israel if he does not have the support of his Congress, the Cabinet and
the people. Going ahead without this support would not be helpful to
Israel. We have a vital interest in maintaining free access to the Gulf
and Strait, and we have made it clear that the closing of the Straits by
Nasser would be illegal. As
to the Israeli Cabinet meeting on Sunday, this is a decision for the
Israeli Government to take without direction from us. However, the
Cabinet should know that our best efforts and our best influence will be
used to keep the Strait and the Gulf open to Israeli ships. We must now
await the Secretary General's report. If we move precipitously, it would
only result in strengthening Nasser. Moreover, we must do
everything we can through the UN, we must
see where it leads, even though we do not have great hopes.

The President continued that when we have the Secretary General's report,
we intend to pursue the UN track
vigorously. How satisfactory the result would be he did not know. He
said he was not confident, and he cited the inability of the UN to do something about Viet-Nam. He said
nevertheless the UN course must be
pursued in the first instance. The President then went on to say that
when it becomes apparent that UN is
ineffective, Israel and its friends, including the United States, who
are willing to stand up and be counted can give specific indication of
what they can do. He referred to a public declaration by the maritime
powers and an international naval force in the Straits area. We are
making our best effort, the President said, and Israel ought promptly to
get some judgment as to what other maritime powers are willing to do,
what the French and British are willing to do. We would like to try to
formulate an effective plan. Maybe other countries such as Italy,
Canada, Argentina, Japan and the Netherlands might join with us. Eban
interjected perhaps the Scandinavians would join.

The President then stressed that he did not want any of this information
to get out of this room, but he said to Eban very confidentially that he thought Canada would be
willing to provide a couple of ships if necessary. The President thought
that it ought to be possible with Israeli, US and UK leadership to evolve an effective plan. How effective a
plan could be would depend on many factors that we cannot now see. We do
not know what the Secretary General will report. We do not know what the
Security Council will do or not do. We did not know what our Congress
would do. We are fully aware of what three past Presidents have said but
this is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress did not
support the President. After the Secretary General's report and the
Security Council has considered the matter, we can see where we go from
here. He said it would be well for the Israeli Cabinet to focus promptly
on how to get the seventeen maritime countries to take steps to keep the
Straits open. We want to keep the waterway open for Israeli ships as
well as for the vessels of other countries. We will have to face up to
this at some point.

The President said candidly that he did not find appealing Prime Minister
Eshkol's ideas which were
conveyed to him yesterday. We are not retreating, we are not backing off
or forgetting what we have said publicly, but if he were to respond
affirmatively to Prime Minister Eshkol's request of yesterday, this wouldn't be worth
ten cents and Israel could get no help from the US. The US assessment
does not agree with that of the Israelis: our best judgment is that no
military attack on Israel is imminent, and, moreover, if Israel is
attacked, our judgment is that
the Israelis would lick them. Time would not work against Israel, it
would not lose by waiting for the Secretary General's report and
Security Council consideration. During this period there would not be
any deterioration in the Israeli military position. We know it is costly
economically, but it is less costly than it would be if Israel acted
precipitously and if the onus for initiation of hostilities rested on
Israel rather than on Nasser.

The President continued that the US, its people, its friends hold similar
views to those of the Israelis regarding the waterway, and we are
determined to find a resolution of this problem. The President expressed
doubt that a number of other maritime powers would be willing to take
steps unless UN processes had been
exhausted. We must mobilize international support for our effort. He
realized that the world had been brought to a new and grave situation,
that the Gulf is an international waterway, and that the blockade is
illegal and dangerous. But Eban
should also tell his Cabinet about our problems.

The President, drawing from the notes drafted earlier in the day in his
meeting with high-level advisers,3Document 74. said the following with
great deliberation. We have Constitutional processes which are basic to
any action the US takes in this matter. The Secretary General has not
yet reported to the Security Council and the Council has not shown what
it can or cannot do. You can assure the Cabinet, the President said, we
will pursue vigorously any and all possible measures to keep the Strait
open. If the Israelis had a better plan than that suggested by the
UK, he was willing to consider it. He
had stated our views publicly last week on the Strait of Tiran.

At the same time, Israel must not make itself responsible for initiating
hostilities. With emphasis and solemnity, the President repeated twice,
Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone. The President
added he did not know much about the Israeli Cabinet but he could not
imagine that they could make such a decision. The President stressed
that he had been spending most of his time on this problem and he
intends to continue to do so in order to bring about a satisfactory
resolution. At the same time he stressed that this must be done on a
step-by-step basis, and that he would do everything that he is permitted
to do. When we make a decision on what we will do, we will and must have
reasonable expectation of support at home and internationally for the
action that we intend to take. We are Israel's friend. The Straits must
be kept open. We cannot bring about a solution the day before yesterday.
If he were to take a precipitous decision tonight he could not be
effective in helping Israel. Eban
knew his Cabinet, the President
knew his Congress after 30 years of experience. He said that he would
try to get Congressional support; that is what he has been doing over
the past days, having called a number of Congressmen. It is going
reasonably well. He had also asked Bohlen and Bruce for suggestions that
they might have or the Governments to which they are accredited might
have to bring about a satisfactory solution.

At this point the President put a paper he was holding in his hands in
front of Harman and told him he
could take whatever notes he wished from it (attached).4The paper is not attached, but is quoted in Document 139. The slightly different text
quoted by Eban in Personal Witness, p. 390, is presumably based
on Harman's notes. The
President said again the Constitutional processes are basic to actions
on matters involving war and peace. We are trying to bring Congress
along. He said: “What I can do, I do”. He stressed also that he would
pursue every conceivable road he could find and take measures in concert
with other maritime nations to assure that the Gulf and the Straits
remain free and open to the vessels of all nations. His views are in his
May 23 statement. He stressed again that while this process was going
on, Israel should not make itself the guilty party by starting a war,
and that it was inconceivable the Cabinet would take such a fateful
decision.

Eban said the President had said
many impressive and sympathetic things. If the United States puts
together a maritime group, Eban
said Israel should be part of that group. Going to the UN is not enough, since the Soviet veto
would prevent any action. Eban
added with emotion that Israel was full of indignation at the Secretary
General, whose precipitous decision to pull out UNEF had done greater harm to Israel than any other single
act that he could recall. The Secretary General took this step without
consulting Israel as his predecessor, Hammarskjold, had indicated would
be done. Eban said Thant owes Israel a great deal for his
blunder. The UN was a useful diplomatic
conference, but it is not today an organ of security upon which Israel
or any other state can rely. Referring to the possible restoration of
the Armistice Agreement, Eban said
this had two holes in it: the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf and of the
Suez Canal. Eban hoped the UN exercise could be gone through quickly
and as innocuously as possible. In response to the President's query,
Eban said he was hopeful the
Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and a number of others would respond
favorably to join in a naval escort plan. These had responded favorably
in support of the principle, but there would have to be US encouragement
in order to get them to take concrete steps.

The discussion turned briefly as to when action is taken to transit the
Straits and Gulf, and Eban said
the test did not have to be with an Israeli ship. The President
interjected we are not going to say it's all right if the rest go
through, but Israel's ships cannot.

Then Eban spoke slowly and
precisely, and said the question he posed was is there a disposition on
the part of the US to take action? Time is important. I intend to
respond to the Cabinet that there is such a disposition on the part of
the US to act. He was confident that when Nasser saw a US–UK flag
on an escort ship, he would think twice about violating the rights of
nations in international waters, especially if the vessels are escorted.
Eban inquired whether he could
show the Cabinet a systematic plan to act, this would help him a great
deal.

In response to Secretary McNamara's query, Eban
ticked off Uganda, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Japan, Netherlands as
other possibilities if a naval escort team is formed. But he stressed
that each one of these countries has asked or will ask, is the US with
us? He thought they would join in international effort, but these
countries would not want to take the first leap, and that the US role
was key. He also thought the Scandinavians might participate,
particularly in view of the fact that Sweden, on behalf of the Nordics,
had made a statement in support of freedom of shipping in international
waterways. The President, at this point, urged Eban to step up their efforts in the
capitals in this regard.

Once again, choosing his words carefully, Eban said “I would not be wrong if I told the Prime
Minister that your disposition is to make every possible effort to
assure that the Strait and the Gulf will remain open to free and
innocent passage?” The President responded, “yes”.

Eban then returned to the question
of the possible imminent attack of the UAR on Israel, stressing that they had information which
led them to this conclusion. He didn't understand why the US didn't
believe this, and stressed the need to put our intelligence people
together to evaluate the situation. Under Secretary Rostow raised the
question of improved military and other liaison with the Israelis,
suggesting that our intelligence people should get together and compare
evaluations.

Secretary McNamara, in some
detail, explained to Eban that
three separate intelligence groups had looked into the matter in the
last twenty-four hours and that our judgment was that Egyptian
deployments made were defensive. Secretary McNamara said that, if
attacked, Israel would deal the UAR a
set-back. Under Secretary Rostow reminded Eban we had conveyed to the Egyptians this concern of
the Israelis. Eban stressed Israel
wants contact at the military level, the military people want some link.
The President stressed that all of our intelligence people are unanimous
regarding the assessment; that an attack is not imminent; and that if
the UAR attacks “you will whip hell out
of them”. Eban referred to the apocalyptic
atmosphere which existed in Israel. Harman said he hoped they were wrong
and their assessment was incorrect, but nevertheless if Israel was
attacked it would not have any telephone number to call, no military
group to plan with, and he, too, stressed the need for planning. Under
Secretary Rostow recalled that we had given the UAR an additional warning on the hypothesis that our
intelligence estimate might be incorrect.

President Johnson, while saying we
do not want to establish any joint staff which would become known all
over the Middle East and the world, told Secretary McNamara to get together with the
Israelis and to look into this problem. Secretary McNamara said we feel we are not
getting the information we should from the Israelis and that an exchange
of information would be useful. It was agreed some liaison arrangements
would be made.

1Source: Johnson Library, President's Appointment File,
May 26, 1967. Secret; Nodis. The
date and time of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary.
(Ibid.) No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it
was apparently drafted by Sisco, whose handwritten notes are in
Department of State, Sisco Files: Lot 70 D 237, Middle East.
Earlier, from 6:11 to 6:45 p.m., the President met with Israeli
Minister Evron and Walt Rostow. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary) No U.S. record of the meeting with
Evron has been found.
According to Evron's report of
the meeting, printed in Michael Brecher, with Benjamin Geist,
Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1980), pp. 136–137, the substance of the
President's comments was similar to his statements to Eban. Johnson described his meeting with Eban in The
Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 293–294. Eban described it in An Autobiography, pp. 354–359, and in
Personal Witness, pp. 386–391.