III. SHOW
THAT IN SOME SENSE THE PURPOSES OF GOD MUST EXTEND TO ALL EVENTS.

IV. STATE
DIFFERENT SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSES DIFFERENT EVENTS.

V. THAT GOD'S
REVEALED WILL IS NEVER INCONSISTENT WITH HIS SECRET WILL OR
PURPOSE.

VI. NOTICE
THE WISDOM AND BENEVOLENCE OF THE DIVINE PURPOSES.

VII. SHOW THE
IMMUTABILITY OF THE DIVINE PURPOSES.

VIII. THAT
THE PURPOSES OF GOD ARE A GROUND OF ETERNAL AND JOYFUL CONFIDENCE.

IX. CONSIDER
THE RELATION OF THE PURPOSES TO THE PRESCIENCE OR FOREKNOWLEDGE OF
GOD.

X. SHOW THAT
GOD'S PURPOSES ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH, BUT DEMAND THE USE OF
MEANS, BOTH ON THE PART OF GOD AND ON OUR PART TO ACCOMPLISH THEM.

I. What I
understand by the purposes of God.

Purposes, in
this discussion, I shall use as synonymous with design, intention.
The purposes of God must be ultimate and proximate. That is, God
has and must have an ultimate end. He must purpose to accomplish
something by his works and providence, which he regards as a good
in itself, or as valuable to himself, and to being in general.
This I call his ultimate end. That God has such an end or purpose,
follows from the already established facts, that God is a moral
agent, and that he is infinitely wise and good. For surely he
could not be justly considered as either wise or good, had he no
intrinsically valuable end which he aims to realize, by his works
of creation and providence. His purpose to secure his great and
ultimate end, I call his ultimate purpose. His proximate purposes
respect the means by which he aims to secure his end. If he
purposes to realize an end, he must of course purpose the
necessary means for its accomplishment. The purposes that respect
the means are what I call in this discussion, his proximate
purposes.

II.
Distinction between purpose and decree.

Purpose has
just been defined, and the definition need not be repeated. The
term decree is used in a variety of senses. It is much used in
legal and governmental proceedings. When used in judicial or
equitable proceedings, it is synonymous--

1. With
judgment, decision, determination; and--

2. With
order, direction, command.

When used in
legislative proceedings, it is synonymous with ordinance, law,
statute, enactment, command. The term is used in the Bible as
synonymous--

(1.) With
fore-ordination or determination, appointment.

Job xxviii.
10. "He putteth forth his hand upon the rock; he overturneth the
mountains by the roots. 26. When he made a decree for the rain,
and a way for the lightning of the thunder."

Ps. xi. 2: "I
will declare the decree, the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my
son; this day have I begotten thee."

Ps. cxlviii.
6. "He hath also established them for ever and ever; he hath made
a decree which shall not pass."

Prov. viii.
29. "When he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should
not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of the
earth."

Jer. v. 22.
"Fear ye not me? saith the Lord: will ye not tremble at my
presence, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea, by
a perpetual decree that it cannot pass it, and though the waves
thereof toss themselves, yet can they not prevail; though they
roar, yet can they not pass over it?"

Dan. iv. 24.
"This is the interpretation, O king, and this is the decree of the
Most High, which is come upon my lord the king."

(2.) It is
used as synonymous with ordinance, statute, law.

Dan. vi. 7.
"All the presidents of the kingdom, the governors, and the
princes, the counsellors, and the captains, have consulted
together to establish a royal statute, and to make a firm decree,
that whosoever shall ask a petition of any god or man for thirty
days, save of thee, O king, he shall be cast into the den of
lions. 8. Now, O king, establish the decree, and sign the writing,
that it be not changed, according to the law of the Medes and
Persians, which altereth not. 26. I make a decree, that in every
dominion of my kingdom men tremble and fear before the God of
Daniel; for he is the living God, and steadfast for ever, and his
kingdom that which shall not be destroyed, and his dominion shall
be even unto the end."

This term has
been generally used by theological writers as synonymous with
fore-ordination, appointment. To decree, with these writers, is to
appoint, ordain, establish, settle, fix, render certain. This
class of writers also often confound decree with purpose, and use
the word as meaning the same thing. They seldom, so far as I
recollect, use the term decree as synonymous with law, enactment,
command, &c.

I see no
objection to using the term decree, in respect to a certain class
of physical events, as synonymous with appointment,
fore-ordination, fixing, rendering certain. But I think this use
of it, applied, as it has been, to the actions of moral agents, is
highly objectionable, and calculated to countenance the idea of
fatality and necessity, in respect to the actions of men. It seems
inadmissible to speak of God's decreeing the free actions of moral
agents, in the sense of fixing, settling, determining,
fore-ordaining them as he fixes, settles, renders certain all
physical events. The latter he has fixed or rendered certain by a
law of necessity. The former, that is, free acts, although they
may be, and are certain, yet they are not rendered so by a law of
fate or necessity; or by an ordinance or decree that fixes them
so, that it is not possible they should be otherwise.

In respect to
the government of God, I prefer to use the term purpose, as I have
said, to signify the design of God, both in respect to the end at
which he aims, and the means he intends or purposes to use to
accomplish it. The term decree I use as synonymous with command,
law, or ordinance. The former I use as expressive of what God
purposes or designs to do himself, and by his own agency, and also
what he purposes or designs to accomplish by others. The latter I
use as expressive of God's will, command, or law. He regulates his
own conduct and agency in accordance with the former, that is,
with his purposes. He requires his creatures to conform to the
latter, that is, to his decrees or laws. We shall see, in its
proper place, that both his purposes and his actions are conformed
to the spirit of his decrees, or laws; that is, that he is
benevolent in his purposes and conduct, as he requires his
creatures to be. I distinguish what God purposes or designs to
accomplish by others, and what they design. God's end or purpose
is always benevolent. He always designs good. His creatures are
often selfish, and their designs are often the direct opposite to
the purpose of God, even in the same events. For example, see the
following cases:--

Gen. xlv. 4:
"And Joseph said unto his brethren, Come near to me I pray you;
and they came near. And he said, I am Joseph your brother, whom ye
sold into Egypt. 5. Now therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with
yourselves that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you,
to preserve life. 6. For these two years hath the famine been in
the land, and yet there are five years, in the which there shall
neither be earing nor harvest."

Gen. l. 19:
"And Joseph said unto them, Fear not; for I am in the place of
God. 20. But as for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant
it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much
people alive."

Isa. x. 5: "O
Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is
mine indignation. 6. I will send him against a hypocritical
nation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a
charge, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them
down like the mire of the streets. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so,
but it is in his heart to destroy, and cut off nations not a few.
12. Wherefore it shall come to pass, that when the Lord hath
performed his whole work upon Mount Zion and on Jerusalem, I will
punish the fruit of the stout heart of the king of Assyria, and
the glory of his high looks."

Mark xv. 9:
"But Pilate answered them, saying, Will ye that I release unto you
the king of the Jews? 10. (For he knew that the chief priests had
delivered him for envy)."

John iii. 16;
"For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son,
that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have
everlasting life."

Acts ii. 23:
"Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge
of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and
slain."

III. There
must be some sense in which God's purposes extend to all
events.

1. This is
evident from reason. His plan must, in some sense, include all
actual events. He must foreknow all events by a law of necessity.
This is implied in his omniscience. He must have matured and
adopted his plan in view of, and with reference to, all events. He
must have had some purpose or design respecting all events that he
foresaw. All events transpire in consequence of his own creating
agency; that is, they all result in some way directly or
indirectly, either by his design or sufferance, from his own
agency. He either designedly brings them to pass, or suffers them
to come to pass without interposing to prevent them. He must have
known that they would occur. He must have either positively
designed that they should, or, knowing that they would result from
the mistakes or selfishness of his creatures, negatively designed
not to prevent them, or, he had no purpose or design about them.
The last hypothesis is plainly impossible. He cannot be
indifferent to any event. He knows all events, and must have some
purpose or design respecting them.

2. The Bible
abundantly represents God's purposes as in some sense extending to
all events. For example:

(1.) He is
represented as perfectly wise in his works, and ways, and plan of
creation and government:

Deut. xxxii.
4: "He is the Rock, his work is perfect; for all his ways are
judgment; a God of truth, and without iniquity; just and right is
he."

Ps. civ. 24:
"O Lord, how wonderful are thy works; in wisdom hast thou made
them all; the earth is full of thy riches."

Eccl. iii.
14: "I know that whatsoever God doeth it shall be for ever;
nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it; and God
doeth it, that men should fear before him."

If God is
infinitely wise, he must have had a universal plan.

(2.) The
Bible represents his purposes as universal and particular.

Job xiv. 5:
"Seeing his days are determined, the number of his months are with
thee; thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot pass."

Isa. xiv. 26:
"This is the purpose that is purposed upon the whole earth; and
this is the hand that is stretched out upon all the nations."

Acts xvii.
26: "And hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on
all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before
appointed, and the bounds of their habitation."

Eph. i. 11:
"In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated
according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the
counsel of his own will."

(3.) It
represents his purposes as in some sense extending both to natural
evil, and to sin or moral evil.

Acts ii. 23:
"Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge
of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and
slain."

Acts iv. 27:
"For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast
anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and
the people of Israel, were gathered together. 28. For to do
whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done."

Acts xiii.
29: "And when they had fulfilled all that was written of him, they
took him down from the tree, and laid him in a sepulchre."

1 Pet. ii. 8:
"And a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, even to them
which stumble at the word, being disobedient; whereunto also they
were appointed."

Jude 4: "For
there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old
ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of
our God, into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, and
our Lord Jesus Christ."

Rev. xvii.
17: "For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to
agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of
God shall be fulfilled."

(4.) It
represents God's purposes as both ultimate and proximate, or
including means and ends.

Acts xxvii.
22: "And now I exhort you to be of good cheer; for there shall be
no loss of any man's life among you, but of the ship. 23. For
there stood by me this night the angel of God, whose I am, and
whom I serve. 24. Saying, Fear not Paul, thou must be brought
before Cæsar and, lo, God hath given thee all them that sail
with thee. 30. And as the shipmen were about to flee out of the
ship, when they had let down the boat into the sea, under colour
as though they would have cast anchors out of the foreship, 31.
Paul said to the centurion and to the soldiers, Except these abide
in the ship, ye cannot be saved."

2 Thess. ii.
13: "But we are bound to give thanks alway to God for you,
brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning
chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and
belief of the truth."

1 Pet. i. 2:
"Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through
sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the
blood of Jesus Christ."

(5.) The
Bible represents God's providence and agency as extending in some
sense to all events; from which also we must infer the
universality of his purposes:--

Ps. cxlvii.
8: "Who covereth the heaven with clouds, who prepareth rain for
the earth, who maketh grass to grow upon the mountains. 9. He
giveth to the beast his food, and to young ravens which cry. 15.
He sendeth forth his commandment upon earth; his word runneth very
swiftly. 16. He giveth snow like wool; he scattereth the
hoar-frost like ashes. 17. He casteth forth his ice like morsels;
who can stand before his cold? 18. He sendeth out his word and
melteth them, he causeth his winds to blow, and the waters flow."

Isa. xxvi.
12: "Lord, thou wilt ordain peace for us; for thou also hast
wrought all our works in us."

Isa. xlv. 7:
"I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace and create
evil. I the Lord do all these things."

Dan. iv. 36:
"And all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing; and
he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among
the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say
unto him, What doest thou?"

Amos. iii. 6:
"Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not be
afraid? shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done
it?"

Matt. x. 29:
"Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall
not fall on the ground without your Father."

Rom. xi. 36:
"For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things."

Eph. i. 11:
"In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated
according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the
counsel of his own will."

Phil ii. 13:
"For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his
good pleasure."

Heb. xiii.
20: "Now the God of peace, that brought again from the dead the
Lord Jesus, that great Shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of
the everlasting covenant, 21. Make you perfect in every good work
to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his
sight, through Jesus Christ."

Ps. civ. 14:
"He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the
service of man, that he may bring forth food out of the earth; 15.
And wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his
face to shine, and bread which strengtheneth man's heart. 21. The
young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God.
27. These wait all upon thee, that thou mayest give them their
meat in due season. 28. That thou givest them they gather, thou
openest thine hand, they are filled with good."

Matt. v. 45:
"That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven;
for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and
sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."

Matt. vi. 26:
"Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they
reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth
them. Are ye not much better than they? 28. And why take ye
thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they
grow; they toil not, neither do they spin. 19. And yet I say unto
you, That even Solomon in all his glory, was not arrayed like one
of these. 30. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field,
which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not
much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?"

(6.) The
Bible also represents all creatures as dependent on the
providence, and of course on the purposes of God.

Job xii. 10:
"In whose hand is the soul of every living thing, and the breath
of all mankind."

Ps. lvii. 7:
"As well the singers as the players on instruments shall be there:
all my springs are in thee."

Jer. x. 23:
"O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself; it is not
in man that walketh to direct his steps."

Jer. xviii.
6: "O house of Israel, cannot I do with you as this potter? saith
the Lord. Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye
in mine hand, O house of Israel."

John xv. 5:
"I am the vine, ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I
in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can
do nothing."

Acts xvii.
26: "And hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell
on all the face of the earth; and hath determined the times before
appointed, and the bounds of their habitation. 27. That they
should seek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him, and
find him, though he be not far from every one of us. 28. For in
him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your
own poets have said, For we also are his offspring."

2 Cor. iii.
5: "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything, as
of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God."

(7.) The
Bible also represents all creatures as preserved by the providence
of God, from which also we must infer, that his purposes extend to
them.

Neh. ix. 5:
"Thou, even thou, art Lord alone: thou hast made heaven, the
heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things
that are therein, the seas, and all that is therein, and thou
preservest them all; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee."

Job vii. 20:
"I have sinned; what shall I do unto thee, O thou Preserver of
men? why hast thou set me as a mark against thee, so that I am a
burden to myself?"

Heb. i. 3:
"Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of
his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power,
when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand
of the Majesty on high."

(8.) The
Bible also represents the Lord, as, in some sense, and in some
manner, influencing the hearts of men.

From this
also we must infer, that his purposes, in some sense, extend to
the moral actions of men.

Ezra vii. 27:
"Blessed be the Lord God of our fathers, which hath put such a
thing as this in the king's heart, to beautify the house of the
Lord which is in Jerusalem."

Prov. xvi. 1:
"The preparation of the heart in man, and the answer of the
tongue, is from the Lord. 9. A man's heart deviseth his way; but
the Lord directeth his steps."

Prov. xxi. 1:
"The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of
water; he turneth it whithersoever he will."

Isa. lxiv. 8:
"But now, O Lord, thou art our Father; we are the clay, and thou
our Potter; and we all are the work of thy hand."

Zec. xii. 1:
"The burden of the word of the Lord for Israel, saith the Lord,
which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of
the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him."

Acts xvi. 14:
"And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, of the city
of Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard us: whose heart the Lord
opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of
Paul."

Rom. ix. 20:
"Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall
the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me
thus? 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same
lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?"

(9.) The
Bible represents God as often, at least, controlling public
sentiment.

Gen. xxxxi.
21: "But the Lord was with Joseph, and showed him mercy, and gave
him favour in the sight of the keeper of the prison."

Exod. iii.
21: "And I will give this people favour in the sight of the
Egyptians."

Dan. i. 9:
"Now God had brought Daniel into favour and tender love with the
prince of the eunuchs."

Acts vii. 9:
"And the patriarchs, moved with envy, sold Joseph into Egypt: but
God was with him. 10. And delivered him out of all his
afflictions, and gave him favour and wisdom in the sight of
Pharaoh, king of Egypt; and he made him governor over Egypt, and
all his house."

From these
passages we must infer, that the purposes of God extend to these
events.

(10.) The
Bible also represents the providence of God as extending to moral
evils and delusions; from which again we must infer, that his
purposes in some sense extend to them.

Exod. vii. 3:
"And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and
wonders in the land of Egypt."

Exod. ix. 7:
"And the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, and he did not let the
people go."

Exod. x. 1:
"And the Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh; for I have
hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might
show these my signs before him."

Exod. xiv. 8:
"And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh king of Egypt, and he
pursued after the children of Israel. 17. And I, behold, I will
harden the hearts of the Egyptians."

Deut. ii. 30:
"But Sihon king of Heshbon, would not let us pass by him: for the
Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate,
that he might deliver him into thy hand, as appeareth this day."

Joshua xi.
19: "There was not a city that made peace with the children of
Israel, save the Hivites, the inhabitants of Gibeon: all other
they took in battle. 20. For it was of the Lord to harden their
hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he
might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favour,
but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses."

Judges vii.
22: "And the three hundred blew the trumpets, and the Lord set
every man's sword against his fellow, even throughout all the
host."

2 Sam. xxiv.
1: "And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel,
and he moved David against them to say, Go, number Israel and
Judah."

1 Kings xxii.
23: "Now therefore, behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit in
the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil
concerning thee."

Ezek. xiv. 6:
"And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the
Lord have deceived that prophet; and I will stretch out my hand
upon him, and will destroy him from the midst of my people
Israel."

Zech. viii.
10: "For before these days there was no hire for man, nor any hire
for beast; neither was there any peace to him that went out or
came in, because of the affliction: for I set all men every one
against his neighbour."

Luke x. 21:
"In that hour Jesus rejoiced in spirit, and said, I thank thee, O
Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things
from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes: even
so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight."

John xii. 32:
"Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again,
40. He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that
they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their
heart, and be converted, and I should heal them. 41. These things
said Esaias, when he saw his glory, and spake of him."

Rom. ix. 18:
"Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he
will he hardeneth."

Rom. xi. 7:
"What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for,
but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded. 8.
(According as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of
slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should
not hear), unto this day."

2 Thess. ii.
10: "And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that
perish; because they received not the love of the truth, that they
might be saved. 11. And for this cause God shall send them strong
delusions, that they should believe a lie; 12. That they all might
be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in
unrighteousness."

Rev. xvii.
17: "For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to
agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast until the words of
God shall be fulfilled."

These
passages will show the general tenor of scripture upon this
subject.

IV.
Different senses in which God purposes different events.

1. The great
end of all his works and ways he must have purposed positively,
that is, absolutely. This end, namely his own good and the highest
good of the universe, he set his heart upon securing. This end he
no doubt properly intended, or purposed to secure. This must have
been his ultimate intention or purpose. This end was no doubt a
direct object of choice.

2. God must
no doubt also, in some sense, have purposed all the necessary
means to this result. Such actions as tended naturally, or on
account of their own nature, to this result, he must have purposed
positively, in the sense that he delighted in them, and chose them
because of their own nature, or of their natural relation to the
great end he proposed to accomplish by them. Observe, the end was
an ultimate end, delighted in and chosen for its own sake. This
end was the highest good or well-being of himself and the universe
of sentient existences. This has been sufficiently shown in former
lectures; and besides it follows of necessity from the nature and
attributes of God. If this were not so, he would be neither wise
nor good. Since he delighted in and chose the end for its own sake
or value, and purposed it with a positive purpose, he must also
have chosen and delighted in the necessary means. He must have
created the universe, both of matter and of mind, and established
its laws, with direct reference to, and for the sake of, the end
he purposed to accomplish. The end was valuable in itself, and
chosen for that reason. The necessary means were as really
valuable as the end which depended upon them. This value, though
real, because of their tendency and natural results, is not
ultimate, but relative; that is, they are not, in the same sense
that the end is, valuable in themselves; but they being the
necessary means to this end, are as really valuable as the end
that depends upon them. Thus our necessary food is not valuable in
itself, but is the necessary means of prolonging our lives.
Therefore, though not an ultimate good, yet it is a real good of
as great value, as the end that naturally depends upon it. The
naturally necessary means of securing a valuable end we justly
esteem as equally valuable with the end, although this value is
not absolute but relative. We are so accustomed to set a value on
the means, equal to the estimated importance of the end to which
they sustain the relation of necessary means, that we come loosely
to regard and to speak of them as valuable in themselves, when in
fact their value is not absolute but relative.

God must have
purposed to secure, so far as he wisely could, obedience to the
laws of the universe, both physical and moral. These laws were
established for the sake of the end to which they tended, and
obedience to them must have been regarded by God as of real,
though not ultimate, value, equal to that of the end, for the
accomplishment of which they were ordained. He must have delighted
in obedience to these laws for the sake of the end, and must have
purposed to secure this obedience so far as he could in the nature
of things; that is, in so far as he wisely could. Since moral law
is a rule for the government of free moral agents, it is
conceivable, that, in some cases, this law might be violated by
the subjects of it, unless God resorted to means to prevent it,
that might introduce an evil of greater magnitude than the
violation of the law in the instances under consideration would
be. It is conceivable, that, in some cases, God might be able so
to overrule a violation of his laws, physical and moral, as upon
the whole to secure a greater good than could be secured, by
introducing such a change into the policy and measures of his
administration, or so framing his administration, as to prevent
altogether the violation of any law. God might, and no doubt does,
prefer that every creature should, in the precise circumstances in
which he is placed, obey all the laws of his being. But if, under
these circumstances, voluntary agents will in any case disobey,
their disobedience, though a real, may be a less evil than such a
change in the administration of his government as would prevent
the violation, would be. In this case, he might regard the
violation as the less of two evils, and suffer it rather than
change the arrangements of his government. He might sincerely
deplore and abhor these violations of law, and yet might see it
not wise to prevent them, because the measures necessary to
prevent them might result in an evil of still greater magnitude.
He might purpose to suffer these violations, and take the trouble
to overrule them, so far as was possible, for the promotion of the
end he had in view, rather than interpose for their prevention.
These violations he might not have purposed in any other sense
than that he foresaw them, and purposed not to prevent them, but
on the contrary to suffer them to occur, and to overrule them for
good, so far as this was practicable. These events, or violations
of law, have no natural tendency to promote the highest well-being
of God and of the universe, but have in themselves a directly
opposite tendency. Nevertheless, God could so overrule them, as
that these occurrences would be a less evil than that change would
be that could have prevented them. Violations of law then, he
might have purposed only to suffer, while obedience to law he
might have designed to produce or secure.

3. We have
seen, that God and men may have different motives in the same
event, as in the case of the brethren of Joseph, already alluded
to:--

Gen. xlv. 4:
"And Joseph said unto his brethren, Come near to me, I pray you.
And they came near. And he said, I am Joseph your brother, whom ye
sold into Egypt. Now therefore be not grieved nor angry with
yourselves that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you
to preserve life. 6. For these two years hath the famine been in
the land, and yet there are five years, in the which there shall
neither be earing nor harvest!"

As also in
the case of the king of Assyria: Is. x. 5. "O Assyrian, the rod of
mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation. 6. I
will send him against a hypocritical nation, and against the
people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to take the spoil,
and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the
streets. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart
think so; but it is in his heart to destroy and cut off nations
not a few. 12. Wherefore it shall come to pass, that when the Lord
hath performed his whole work upon mount Zion, and on Jerusalem, I
will punish the fruit of the stout heart of the king of Assyria,
and the glory of his high looks."

Also, John
iii. 16: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish,
but have everlasting life."

Acts ii. 23.
"Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge
of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and
slain."

These, and
such like instances, show that wicked agents may, and often do,
and when wicked, always do, entertain a very different reason for
their conduct from what God entertains in suffering it. They have
a selfish end in view, or do what they do for a selfish reason.
God, on the contrary, has a benevolent end in view in not
interposing to prevent their sin; that is, he hates their sin as
tending in itself to destroy, or defeat the great end of
benevolence. But foreseeing that the sin, notwithstanding its
natural evil tendency, may be so overruled, as upon the whole to
result in a less evil than the changes requisite to prevent it
would, he benevolently prefers to suffer it rather than interpose
to prevent it. He would, no doubt, prefer their perfect obedience,
under the circumstances in which they are, but would sooner suffer
them to sin, than so change the circumstances as to prevent it;
the latter being, all things considered, the greater of two evils.
God then always suffers his laws to be violated, because he cannot
benevolently prevent it under the circumstances. He suffers it for
benevolent reasons. But the sinner always has selfish reasons.

4. The Bible
informs us, that God brings good out of evil, in the sense that he
overrules sin to promote his own glory, and the good of
being:--Ps. lxxvi. 10. "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee;
the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain."

Rom. iii. 5:
"But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what
shall we say? Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? (I speak as
a man.) 7. For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my
lie unto his glory; why yet am I judged as a sinner? And not
rather (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we
say,) Let us do evil, that good may come? whose damnation is
just."

Rom. v. 20:
"Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might abound; but
where sin abounded, grace did much more abound."

Rom. viii.
28: "And we know that all things work together for good to them
that love God, to them who are the called according to his
purpose."

5. The Bible
also informs us that God does not aim at producing sin in creation
and providence; that is, that he does not purpose the existence of
sin in such a sense as to design to secure and promote it, in the
administration of his government. In other words still, sin is not
the object of a positive purpose on the part of God. It exists
only by sufferance, and not as a thing which naturally tends to
secure his great end, and which therefore he values on that
account and endeavours to promote, as he does obedience to the
law.

Jer. vii. 9.
"Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely,
and burn incense unto Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye know
not? 10. And come and stand before me in this house, which is
called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these
abominations?"

1 Cor. xiv.
33: "For God is not the author of confusion, but of peace, as in
all churches of the saints."

James i. 13:
"Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God
cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; 14. But
every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and
enticed. 15. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin;
and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death. 16. Do not err,
my beloved brethren. 17. Every good gift and every perfect gift is
from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom
is no variableness, neither shadow of turning."

James iii.
14: "But if ye have bitter envying and strife in your hearts,
glory not, and lie not against the truth. 15. This wisdom
descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish. 16.
For where envying and strife is, there is confusion, and every
evil work. 17. But the wisdom that is from above is first pure,
then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy
and good fruits, without partiality and hypocrisy."

1 John ii.
16: "For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the
lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but
is of the world."

Obedience to
law is an object of positive purpose. God purposes to promote it,
and uses means with that design. Sin occurs incidentally, so far
as the purpose of God is concerned. It need not be, and doubtless
is not, the object of positive design or purpose, but comes to
pass because it cannot wisely be prevented. God uses means to
promote obedience. But moral agents, in the exercise of their free
agency, often disobey in spite of all the inducements to the
contrary which God can wisely set before them. God never sets
aside the freedom of moral agents to prevent their sinning, nor to
secure their obedience. The Bible everywhere represents men as
acting freely under the government and universal providence of
God, and it represents sin as the result of, or as consisting in,
an abuse of their freedom.

Gen. xlii.
21: "And they said one to another, We are verily guilty concerning
our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he
besought us, and we would not hear; therefore is this distress
come upon us."

Ex. viii. 32:
"And Pharaoh hardened his heart at this time also, neither would
he let the people go."

Ex. ix. 27:
"And Pharaoh sent, and called for Moses and Aaron, and said unto
them, I have sinned this time: the Lord is righteous, and I and my
people are wicked."

Ex. x. 16:
"Then Pharaoh called for Moses and Aaron in haste; and he said, I
have sinned against the Lord your God, and against you. 17. Now
therefore forgive, I pray thee, my sin only this once, and entreat
the Lord your God, that he may take away from me this death only."

Deut. xxx.
19: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that
I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing:
therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

Josh. xxiv.
15: "And if it seem evil unto you to serve the Lord, choose ye
this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers
served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of
the Amorites, in whose land ye dwell; but as for me and my house,
we will serve the Lord."

2 Sam. xxiv.
1. "And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel,
and he moved David against them to say, Go, number Israel and
Judah. 10. And David's heart smote him after that he had numbered
the people. And David said unto the Lord, I have sinned greatly in
that I have done: and now, I beseech thee, O Lord, take away the
iniquity of thy servant; for I have done very foolishly."

Prov. i. 10:
"My son, if sinners entice thee, consent thou not. 29. For that
they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord: 30.
They would none of my counsel; they despised all my reproof; 31.
Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be
filled with their own devices."

Matt. xiii.
15: "For this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are
dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time
they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and
should understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I
should heal them."

Matt. xviii.
7: "Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be
that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence
cometh!"

Luke xxii.
22: "And truly the Son of man goeth as it was determined; but woe
unto that man by whom he is betrayed."

Luke xxiii.
39: "And one of the malefactors which were hanged, railed on him,
saying, if thou be Christ, save thyself and us."

John v. 40:
"And ye will not come to me, that ye might have life."

Acts iv. 27:
"For of a truth, against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast
anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and the
people of Israel were gathered together. 28. For to do whatsoever
thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done."

Rom. ii. 15:
"Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their
conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile
accusing, or else excusing one another."

Philip. ii.
12: "Wherefore, my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as in my
presence only, but now much more in my absence, work out your own
salvation with fear and trembling: 13. For it is God which worketh
in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure."

The following
things appear to be true in respect to the purposes of God, as
taught both by reason and revelation:--

(1.) That
God's purposes extend in some sense to all events.

(2.) That he
positively purposes the highest good of being, as a whole, as his
end.

(3.) That he
has ordained wise and wholesome laws as the necessary means of
securing this end.

(4.) That he
positively purposes to secure obedience to these laws in so far as
he wisely can, and uses means with this design.

(5.) That he
does not positively purpose to secure disobedience to his laws in
any case, and use means with that design; but that he only
purposes to suffer violations of his law rather than prevent them,
because he foresees that, by his overruling power, he can prevent
the violation from resulting in so great an evil as the change
necessary to prevent it would do. Or in other words, he sees that
he can secure a greater good upon the whole, by suffering the
violation under the circumstances in which it occurs, than he
could by interposing to prevent it. This is not the same thing as
to say, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. For
should all moral agents perfectly obey, under the identical
circumstances in which they disobey, this might, and doubtless
would result in the highest possible good. But God, foreseeing
that it were more conducive to the highest good of being to suffer
some to sin, rather than so change the circumstances as to prevent
it, purposed to suffer their sin, and overrule it for good; but he
did not aim at producing it, and use means with that intent.

(6.)
Obedience to law he directly purposes to secure.

(7.)
Disobedience to law he never purposed or aimed to secure; but on
the contrary purposed to prevent it, so far as he wisely could.

(8.) When he
cannot wisely prevent it, he wisely suffers and overrules it, so
as to render it, not a less evil than obedience would have been in
the identical circumstances in which the disobedience occurs, but
as a less evil than the change of circumstances necessary to
prevent it would be.

V. God's
revealed will is never inconsistent with his secret purpose.

It has been
common to represent sin as the necessary occasion, condition, or
means of the greatest good, in such a sense, that upon the whole
God secretly, but really prefers sin to holiness in every case
where it exists; that while he has forbidden sin under all
circumstances, upon pain of eternal death, yet, because it is the
necessary occasion, condition, or means of the greatest good, God
really prefers its existence to holiness in every instance in
which it exists. It has been said, sin exists. God does not
therefore prevent it. But he could and would prevent it, if he did
not upon the whole prefer it to holiness, in the circumstances in
which it occurs. Its existence, then, it has been said, is proof
conclusive that God secretly prefers its existence to holiness, in
every case in which it occurs. But this is a non sequitur.
It does not follow from the existence of sin, that God prefers
sin to holiness in the circumstances in which it occurs; but it
may be, that he only prefers sin to such a change of circumstances
as would prevent it. Suppose I require my son to do a certain
thing. I know that he will do it, if I remain at home and see to
it. But I know also, that if I go from home he will not do it. Now
I might prefer that he should do as I command, and consider his
disobedience as a great evil; still I might regard it as a less
evil than for me to remain at home, and keep my eye upon him. I
might have just reasons for supposing that, under the
circumstances, a greater good could be secured upon the whole by
my going from home, although his disobedience might be the
consequence, than by remaining at home, and preventing his
disobedience. Benevolence therefore might require me to go.

But should my
son infer from my leaving him, under these circumstances, that I
really, though secretly, preferred his disobedience to his
obedience, under the identical circumstances in which I gave the
command, would his inference be legitimate? No, indeed. All that
he could justly infer from my leaving him, with the knowledge that
he would disobey me if I did, would be, that although I regarded
his disobedience as a great evil, yet I regarded remaining at home
a greater.

Just so, it
may be when sin exists. God is sincere in prohibiting it. He would
greatly prefer that it should not exist. All that can be justly
inferred from his not preventing it is, that, although he regards
its existence as a great and real evil, yet upon the whole he
regards it as a less evil, than would result from so great a
change in the administration of his government as would prevent
it. He is therefore entirely and infinitely sincere in requiring
obedience, and in prohibiting disobedience, and his secret purpose
is in strict keeping with his revealed will. Were the moral law
universally obeyed, under the circumstances in which all moral
agents exist, no one can say, that this would not be better for
the universe, and more pleasing to God than disobedience is in the
same circumstances. Nor is it fair to infer, that upon the whole,
God must prefer sin to holiness, where it occurs, from the fact
that he does not prevent it. As has been said, all that can justly
be inferred from his not preventing it is, that under the
circumstances he prefers not sin to holiness, but prefers to
suffer the agent to sin and take the consequences, rather than
introduce such changes in the policy and administration of his
government as would prevent it. Or it may be said, that the
present system is the best that infinite wisdom could devise and
execute, not because of sin, but in spite of it, and
notwithstanding sin is a real though incidental evil.

It is a
palpable contradiction and an absurdity to affirm, that any being
can sin, intending thereby to promote the greatest good. This will
appear if we consider:

1. That it is
admitted on all hands, that benevolence is virtue.

2. That
benevolence consists in willing good, or the highest good of being
as an end.

3. That it is
duty to will both the end and the necessary means to promote it.

4. That right
and benevolence are always at one, that is, that which is
benevolent must always be right, and can in no case be wrong.

5. That
consequently it can never be sin to choose the highest good of
being, with all the necessary occasions, conditions, and means of
promoting it.

6. It is
impossible therefore for a being to sin, or to consent to sin, as
an occasion, condition, or means, or designing thereby to promote
the highest good of being; for this design would be virtue, and
not sin. Whether all virtue consist in benevolence, or not, still
it must be admitted, that all forms of virtue must be consistent
with benevolence, unless it be admitted, that there can be a law
of right inconsistent with, and opposed to, the law of
benevolence. But this would be to admit, that two moral laws might
be opposed to each other; which would be to admit, that a moral
agent might be under an obligation to obey two opposing laws at
the same time, which is a contradiction. Thus it appears, that
there can be no law of right opposed to, or separate from, the law
of benevolence. Benevolence and right must then always be as one.
If this be so, it follows, that whatever benevolence demands,
cannot be wrong, but must be right. But the law of benevolence
demands, not only the choice of the highest good of being as an
end, but also demands the choice of all the known necessary
occasions, conditions, and means with a design to promote that
end.

It is
naturally impossible to sin, in using means designed and known to
be necessary to the promotion of the end of benevolence. It is
therefore naturally impossible to do evil, or to sin that good may
come, or with the design to promote good thereby. To deny this,
and to maintain, that a man can possibly sin in intending to
promote the highest good of being, and in fulfilling the necessary
conditions, and in using what he regards as the necessary means,
is, I say again, to hold, that there is a law of right separate
from, and opposed to, the law of benevolence;--which is, as before
said, to hold, that two moral laws are opposed to each other, and
require opposite courses of conduct in the same agent at the same
time;--which is to hold, that there are two opposing laws of
nature and of God at the same time;--which is to hold, that a
moral agent may justly be required, on pain of eternal death, to
choose, design, and act in opposite directions at the same
time;--which is to hold, that it is his duty to sin and not to sin
at the same time;--which is to hold, that a moral agent might sin
in doing his duty, or in obeying moral law.

Let those who
hold that right and benevolence may be opposed to each other, and
that a moral agent can sin with a benevolent intention, see what
their doctrine amounts to, and get out of the absurdity as best
they can. The fact is, if willing the highest good of being is
always virtuous, it must always be right to will all the necessary
occasions, conditions, and means to that end. It is therefore a
contradiction to say that sin can be among the necessary and
intended occasions, conditions, and means; that is, that any one
could sin intending thereby to promote the highest good.

But it is not
pretended by those who hold this dogma, that sin sustains to the
highest good the same relations that holiness does. Holiness has a
natural tendency to promote the highest good; but the supposition
now under consideration is, that sin is hateful in itself, and
that it therefore must dissatisfy and disgust all moral agents,
and that its natural tendency is to defeat the end of moral
government, and to prevent rather than promote the highest good;
but that God foresees that, notwithstanding its intrinsically
odious and injurious nature, he can so overrule it as to make it
the condition, occasion, or instrument of the highest good of
himself and of his universe, and that for this reason he really
upon the whole is pleased that it should occur, and prefers its
existence, in every instance in which it does exist, to holiness
in its stead. The supposition is, that sin is in its own nature
infinitely odious and abominable to God, and perfectly odious to
all holy moral agents, yet it is the occasion of calling into
developement and exercise such emotions and feelings in God and in
holy beings, and such modifications of benevolence, as do really
more than compensate for all the disgust and painful emotions that
result to holy beings, and for all the remorse, agony, despair,
and endless suffering, that result to sinners.

It is not
supposed by any one that I know of, that sin naturally tends to
promote the highest good at all, but only that God can, and does,
so overrule and counteract its natural tendency, as to make it the
occasion or condition of a greater good, than holiness would be in
its stead. Now in reply to this, I would say, that I pretend not
to determine to what extent God can, and will, overrule and
counteract the naturally evil and injurious tendency of sin. It
surely is enough to say, that God prohibits it, and that it is
impossible for creatures to know that sin is the necessary
occasion, or condition, or means of the highest good.

'If sin is
known by God to be the necessary occasion, condition, or means of
the highest good of himself and of the universe, whatever it may
be in itself, yet viewed in its relations, it must be regarded by
him as of infinite value, since it is the indispensable condition
of infinite good.' According to this theory, sin in every instance
in which it exists, is and must be regarded by God as of
infinitely greater value than holiness would be in its stead. He
must then, upon the whole, have infinite complacency in it. But
this leads me to attend to the principal arguments by which it is
supposed this theory is maintained. It is said, for example:--

(1.) That the
highest good of the universe of moral agents is conditionated upon
the revelation of the attributes and character of God to them;
that but for sin these attributes, at least some of them, could
never have been revealed, inasmuch as without sin there would have
been no occasion for their display or manifestation; that neither
justice nor mercy, nor forbearance, nor self-denial, nor meekness,
could have found the occasions of their exercise or manifestation,
had sin never existed.

To this I
reply, that sin has indeed furnished the occasion for a glorious
manifestation of the moral perfections of God. From this we see
that God's perfections enable him greatly to overrule sin, and to
bring good out of evil; but from this we are not authorized to
infer, that God could not have revealed these attributes to his
creatures without the existence of sin. Nor can we say, that these
revelations would have been necessary to the highest perfection
and happiness of the universe, had all moral agents perfectly and
uniformly obeyed. When we consider what the moral attributes of
God are, it is easy to see that there may be myriads of moral
attributes in God of which no creature has, or ever will have, any
knowledge; and the knowledge of which is not at all essential to
the highest perfection and happiness of the universe of creatures.
God's moral attributes are only his benevolence, existing and
contemplated in its various relations to the universe of beings.
Benevolence in any being must possess as many attributes as there
are possible relations under which it can be contemplated, and
should their occasions arise, these attributes would stand forth
in exercise. It is not at all probable, that all of the attributes
of benevolence, either in the Creator or in creatures, have yet
found the occasions of their exercise, nor, perhaps, will they
ever. As new occasions rise to all eternity, benevolence will
develope new and striking attributes, and manifest itself under
endless forms and varieties of loveliness. There can be no such
thing as exhausting its capabilities of developement.

In God
benevolence is infinite. Creatures can never know all its
attributes, nor approach any nearer to knowing all of them than
they now are. For it is infinite, and there can be no end to its
capabilities of developing in exercise new forms of beauty and
loveliness. It is true, that God has taken occasion to show forth
the glory of his benevolence through the existence of sin. He has
seized the occasion, though mournful in itself, to manifest some
of the attributes of his benevolence by the exercise of them. It
is also true, that we cannot know how or by what means God could
have revealed these attributes, if sin had not existed; and it is
also true, that we cannot know that such a revelation was
impossible without the existence of sin; nor that, but for sin,
the revelation would have been necessary to the highest good of
the universe.

God forbids
sin, and requires universal holiness. He must be sincere in this.
But sin exists. Shall we say that he secretly chooses that it
should, and really, though secretly, prefers its existence to
holiness, in the circumstances in which it occurs? Or shall we
assume, that it is an evil, that God regards it as such, but that
he cannot wisely prevent it; that is, to prevent it would
introduce a still greater evil? It is an evil, and a great evil,
but still the less of two evils; that is, to suffer it to occur,
under the circumstances, is a less evil than such a change of
circumstances, as would prevent it, would be. This is all we can
justly infer from its existence. This leaves the sincerity of God
unimpeached, and sustains his consistency, and the consistency and
integrity of his law. The opposite supposition represents God and
the law as infinitely deceitful.

(2.) It has
been said, that the Bible sustains the supposition, that sin is
the necessary means of the highest good. I trust the passages that
have been quoted, disprove this saying.

(3.) It is
said, that to represent sin as not the means of the highest good,
and God as unable to prevent it, is to represent God as unable to
accomplish all his will; whereas he says, he will do all his
pleasure, and that nothing is too hard for him.

I answer: God
pleases to do only what is naturally possible, and he is well
pleased to do that and nothing more. This he is able to do. This
he will do. This he does. This is all he claims to be able to do;
and this is all, that in fact infinite wisdom and power can do.

(4.) But it
is said, that if sin is an evil, and God can neither prevent nor
overrule it, so as to make it a means of greater good than could
be secured without it, he must be unhappy in view of this fact,
because he cannot prevent it, and secure a higher good without it.

I answer: God
neither desires nor wills to perform natural impossibilities. God
is a reasonable being, and does not aim at nor desire
impossibilities. He is well content to do as well as, in the
nature of the case, is possible, and has no unreasonable regrets
because he is not more than infinite, and that he cannot
accomplish what is impossible to infinity itself. His good
pleasure is, to secure all the good that is possible to infinity:
with this he is infinitely well pleased.

Again: does
not the objection, that the view of the subject here presented
limits the divine power, lie with all its force against those who
make this objection? To hold that sin is the necessary means or
condition of the highest good, is to hold that God was unable to
promote the highest good without resorting to such vile means as
sin. Sin is an abomination in itself; and do not they, as really
and as much limit the power of God, who maintain his inability to
promote the highest good without it, as they do who hold, that he
could not wisely so interfere with the free actions of moral
agents as to prevent it? Sin exists. God abhors it. How is its
existence to be accounted for? I suppose it to be an evil
unavoidably incidental to that system of moral government which,
notwithstanding the evil, was upon the whole the best that could
be adopted. Others suppose, that sin is the necessary means or
condition of the greatest good; and account for its existence in
this way:--that is, they suppose that God admits or permits its
existence as a necessary occasion, condition, or means of the
highest good; that he was not able to secure the highest good
without it. The two explanations of the admitted fact that sin
exists, differ in this:--

One method of
explanation holds, that sin is the necessary occasion, condition,
or means of the highest good; and that God actually, upon the
whole, prefers the existence of sin to holiness, in every instance
in which it exists; because, in those circumstances, it is a
condition or means of greater good than could have been secured by
holiness in its stead. This theory represents God as unable to
secure his end by other means, or upon other conditions, than sin.
The other theory holds, that God really prefers holiness to sin in
every instance in which it occurs; that he regards sin as an evil,
but that while he regards it as an evil, he suffers its existence
as a less evil than such a change in the administration of his
government as would prevent it, would be. Both theories must
admit, that in some sense God could not wisely prevent it. Explain
the fact of its existence as you will, it must be admitted, that
in some sense God was not able to prevent it, and secure his end.

If it be
said, that God could neither wisely prevent it, nor so overrule it
as to make it the means or condition of the highest good, he must
be rendered unhappy by its existence; I reply, that this must be
equally true upon the other hypothesis. Sin is hateful, and its
consequences are a great evil. These consequences will be eternal
and indefinitely great. God must disapprove these consequences. If
sin is the necessary condition or means of the greatest good, must
not God lament that he cannot secure the good without a resort to
such loathsome, and such horrible means? If his inability wisely
to prevent it will interfere with and diminish his happiness, must
not the same be true of his inability to secure the highest good,
without such means as will prove the eternal destruction of
millions?

VI. Wisdom
and benevolence of the purposes of God.

We have seen
that God is both wise and benevolent. This is the doctrine both of
reason and of revelation. The reason intuitively affirms that God
is, and is perfect. The Bible assumes that he is, and declares
that he is perfect. Both wisdom and benevolence must be attributes
of the infinite and perfect God. These attributes enter into the
reason's idea of God. The reason could not recognize any being as
God to whom these attributes did not belong. But if infinite
wisdom and benevolence are moral attributes of God, it follows of
course that all his designs or purposes are both perfectly wise
and benevolent. God has chosen the best possible end, and pursues
it in the use of the best practicable means. His purposes embrace
the end and the means necessary to secure it, together with the
best practicable disposal of the sin, which is the incidental
result of his choosing this end and using these means; and they
extend no further; they are all therefore perfectly wise and good.

VII. The
immutability of the divine purposes.

We have seen
that immutability is not only a natural, but also a moral
attribute of God. The reason affirms, that the self-existent and
infinitely perfect God is unchangeable in all his attributes. The
ground of this affirmation it is not my purpose here to inquire
into. It is sufficient here to say, what every one knows, that
such is the affirmation of the reason. This is also everywhere
assumed and taught in the Bible. God's moral attributes are not
immutable in the sense of necessity, but only in the sense of
certainty. Although God is not necessarily benevolent, yet he is
as immutably so, as if he were necessarily so. If his benevolence
were necessary, it would not be virtuous, for the simple reason
that it would not be free. But being free, its immutability
renders it all the more praise-worthy.

VIII. The
purposes of God are a ground of eternal and joyful confidence.

That is, they
may reasonably be a source of eternal comfort, joy, and peace.
Selfish beings will not of course rejoice in them, but benevolent
beings will and must. If they are infinitely wise and good, and
sure to be accomplished, they must form a rational ground of
unfailing confidence and joy. God says:--

Isa. xlvi.
10: "Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times
the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand,
and I will do all my pleasure."

Psa. xxxiii.
11: "The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of
his heart to all generations."

Prov. xix.
21: "There are many devices in a man's heart, nevertheless, the
counsel of the Lord, that shall stand."

Acts v. 39:
"But if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be
found even to fight against God."

These, and
many parallel passages are reasonably the source of perpetual
confidence and joy to those who love God, and sympathize with him.

IX. The
relation of God's purposes to his prescience or foreknowledge.

We have seen
that God is omniscient, that is, that he necessarily and eternally
knows whatever is, or can be, an object of knowledge. His purposes
must also be eternal and immutable, as we have seen. In the order
of time, therefore, his purposes and his foreknowledge must be
coeval, that is, they must be co-eternal.

But in the
order of nature, God's knowledge of what he could do, and what
could be done, must have preceded his purposes: that is, he could
not, so to speak, in the order of nature, have formed his purpose
and made up his mind what to do, until he had considered what
could be done, and what was best to be done. Until all possible
ends, and ways, and means, were weighed and understood, it was of
course impossible to make a selection, and settle upon the end
with all the necessary means; and also settle upon the ways and
means of overruling any evil, natural or moral, that might be seen
to be unavoidably incidental to any system. Thus it appears, that,
in the order of nature, fore-knowledge of what could be done, and
what he could do, must have preceded the purpose to do. The
purpose resulted from the prescience or fore-knowledge. He knew
what he could do, before he decided what he would do. But, on the
other hand, the purpose to do must, in the order of nature, have
preceded the knowledge of what he should do, or of what would be
done, or would come to pass as a result of his purpose. Viewed
relatively to what he could do, and what could be done, the Divine
prescience must in the order of nature have preceded the Divine
purposes. But viewed relatively to what he would do, and what
would be done, and would come to pass, the Divine purposes must,
in the order of nature, have preceded the Divine prescience. But I
say again, as fore-knowledge was necessarily eternal with God, his
purposes must also have been eternal, and therefore, in the order
of time, neither his prescience could have preceded his purposes,
nor his purposes have preceded his prescience. They must have been
contemporaneous and co-eternal.

X. God's
purposes are not inconsistent with, but demand the use of means
both on his part, and on our part, to accomplish them.

The great end
upon which he has set his heart necessarily depends upon the use
of means, both moral and physical, to accomplish it. The highest
well-being of the whole universe is his end. This end can be
secured only by securing conformity to the laws of matter and of
mind. Mind is influenced by motives, and hence moral and physical
government are naturally necessary means of securing the great end
proposed by the Divine mind.

Hence also
results the necessity of a vast and complicated system of means
and influences, such as we see spread around us on every hand. The
history of the universe is but the history of creation, and of the
means which God is using to secure his end, with their natural and
incidental results. It has already been shown, that the Bible
teaches that the purposes of God include and respect both means
and ends. I will only add, that God's purposes do not render any
event, dependent upon the acts of a moral agent, necessarily
certain, or certain with a certainty of necessity. Although, as
was before said, all events are certain with some kind of
certainty, and would be and must be, if they are ever to come to
pass, whether God purposes them, or whether he fore-knows them or
not; yet no event, depending upon the will of a free agent, is, or
can be, certain with a certainty of necessity. The agent could by
natural possibility do otherwise than he will do, or than God
purposes to suffer him to do, or wills that he shall do. God's
purposes, let it be understood, are not a system of fatality. They
leave every moral agent entirely free to choose and act freely.
God knows infallibly how every creature will act, and has made all
his arrangements accordingly, to overrule the wicked actions of
moral agents on the one hand, and to produce or induce, the holy
actions of others on the other hand. But be it remembered, that
neither the Divine fore-knowledge nor the Divine purpose, in any
instance, sets aside the free agency of the creature. He, in every
instance, acts as freely and as responsibly, as if God neither
knew nor purposed anything respecting his conduct, or his destiny.

God's
purposes extend to all events in some sense, as has been shown.
They extend as really to the most common events of life as to the
most rare. But in respect to the every day transactions of life,
men are not wont to stumble, and cavil, and say, Why, if I am to
live, I shall live, whatever I may do to destroy my health and
life; and if I am to die, I cannot live, do what I will. No, in
these events they will not throw off responsibility, and cast
themselves upon the purposes of God; but on the contrary, they are
as much engaged to secure the end they have in view, as if God
neither knew nor purposed anything about it. Why then should they
do as they often do, in regard to the salvation of their souls,
cast off responsibility, and settle down in listless inactivity,
as if the purposes of God in respect to salvation were but a
system of iron fatality, from which there is no escape? Surely
"madness is in their hearts while they live." But let them
understand, that, in thus doing, they sin against the Lord, and be
sure their sin will find them out.

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