THE last days of February, 1913, witnessed one of those sanguinary
scenes in Mexico which for generations had accompanied changes
in the government of that distracted country. A group of revolutionists
assailed the feeble power of Francisco Madero and virtually imprisoned
that executive and his forces in the Presidential Palace. The
Mexican army, whose most influential officers were General Blanquet
and General Victoriano Huerta, was hastily summoned to the rescue
of the Government; instead of relieving the besieged officials,
however, these generals turned their guns upon them, and so assured
the success of the uprising. The speedy outcome of these transactions
was the assassination of President Madero and the seizure of the
Presidency by General Huerta. Another outcome was the presentation
to Page of one of the most delicate problems in the history of
Anglo-American relations.

At almost any other time this change in the Mexican succession
would have caused only a momentary disturbance. There was nothing
new in the violent overthrow of government in Latin-America; in
Mexico itself no president had ever risen to power except by revolution.
The career of Porfirio Diaz, who had maintained his authority
for a third of a century, had somewhat obscured this fundamental
fact in Mexican politics, but Diaz had dominated Mexico for seven
presidential terms, not because his methods differed from the
accepted methods of his country, but because he was himself an
executive of great force and a statesman of genius, and could
successfully hold his own against any aspiring antagonist. The
civilized world, including the United States, had long since become
reconciled to this situation as almost a normal one. In recognizing
momentarily successful adventurers, Great Britain and the United
States had never considered such details as justice or constitutionalism:
the legality of the presidential title had never been the point
at issue; the only question involved was whether the successful
aspirant actually controlled the country, whether he had established
a state of affairs that approximately represented order, and whether
he could be depended upon to protect life and property. During
the long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, however, certain events
had taken place which had awakened the minds of Americans to the
possibility of a new international relationship with all backward
peoples. The consequences of the Spanish War had profoundly impressed
Page. This conflict had left the United States a new problem in
Cuba and the Philippines. Under the principles that for generations
had governed the Old World there would have been no particular
difficulty in meeting this problem. The United States would have
candidly annexed the islands, and exploited their resources and
their peoples; we should have concerned ourselves little about
any duties that might be owed to the several millions of human
beings who inhabited them. Indeed, what other alternatives were
there?

One was to hand the possessions back to Spain, who in a four
hundred years' experiment had demonstrated her unfitness to govern
them; another was to give the islands their independence, which
would have meant merely an indefinite continuance of anarchy.
It is one of the greatest triumphs of American statesmanship that
it discovered a more satisfactory solution. Essentially, the new
plan was to establish in these undeveloped and politically undisciplined
regions the fundamental conditions that may make possible the
ultimate creation of democratic, self-governing states. It was
recognized that constitutions and election ballots in themselves
did not necessarily imply a democratic order. Before these there
must come other things that were far more important, such as popular
education, scientific agriculture, sanitation, public highways,
railroads, and the development of the resources of nature. If
the backward peoples of the world could be schooled in such a
preliminary apprenticeship, the time might come when the intelligence
and the conscience of the masses would be so enlightened that
they could be trusted with independence. The labour of Leonard
Wood in Cuba, and of other Americans in the Philippines, had apparently
pointed the way to the only treatment of such peoples that was
just to them and safe for mankind.

With the experience of Cuba and the Philippines as a guide,
it is not surprising that the situation in Mexico appealed to
many Americans as opening a similar opportunity to the United
States. The two facts that outstood all others were that Mexico,
in her existing condition of popular ignorance, could not govern
herself, and that the twentieth century could not accept indefinitely
a condition of disorder and bloodshed that had apparently satisfied
the nineteenth. The basic difficulty in this American republic
was one of race and of national character. The fact that was constantly
overlooked was that Mexico was not a Caucasian country: it was
a great shambling Indian Republic. Of its 15,000,000 people less
than 3,000,000 were of unmixed white blood, about 35 per cent.
were pure Indian, and the rest represented varying mixtures of
white and aboriginal stock. The masses had advanced little in
civilization since the days of Cortez. Eighty per cent. were illiterate;
their lives for the most part were a dull and squalid routine;
protection against disease was unknown; the agricultural methods
were most primitive; the larger number still spoke the native
dialects which had been used in the days of Montezuma; and over
good stretches of the country the old tribal regime still represented
the only form of political organization. The one encouraging feature
was that these Mexican Indians, backward as they might be, were
far superior to the other native tribes of the North American
Continent; in ancient times, they had developed a state of society
far superior to that of the traditional Redskin. Nevertheless,
it was true that the progress of Mexico in the preceding fifty
years had been due almost entirely to foreign enterprise. By 1913,
about 75,000 Americans were living in Mexico as miners, engineers,
merchants, and agriculturists; American investments amounted to
about $1,200,000,000---a larger sum than that of all the other
foreigners combined. Though the work of European countries, particularly
Great Britain, was important, yet Mexico was practically an economic
colony of the United States. Most observers agree that these foreign
activities had not only profited the foreigners, but that they
had greatly benefited the Mexicans themselves. The enterprise
of Americans had disclosed enormous riches, had given hundreds
of thousands employment at very high wages, had built up new Mexican
towns on modern American lines, had extended the American railway
system over a large part of the land, and had developed street
railways, electric lighting, and other modern necessities in all
sections of the Republic. The opening up of Mexican oil resources
was perhaps the most typical of these achievements, as it was
certainly the most adventurous. Americans had created this, perhaps
the greatest of Mexican industries, and in 1913, these Americans
owned nearly 80 per cent. of Mexican oil. Their success had persuaded
several Englishmen, the best known of whom was Lord Cowdray, to
enter this same field. The activities of the Americans and the
British in oil had an historic significance which was not foreseen
in 1913, but which assumed the greatest importance in the World
War; for the oil drawn from these Mexican fields largely supplied
the Allied fleets and thus became an important element in the
defeat of the Central Powers. In 1913, however, American and British
oil operators were objects of general suspicion in both continents.
They were accused of participating too actively in Mexican politics
and there were those who even held them responsible for the revolutionary
condition of the country. One picturesque legend insisted that
the American oil interests looked with jealous hostility upon
the great favours shown by the Diaz Administration to Lord Cowdray's
company, and that they had instigated the Madero revolution in
order to put in power politicians who would be more friendly to
themselves. The inevitable complement to this interpretation of
events was a prevailing suspicion that the Cowdray interests had
promoted the Huerta revolt in order to turn the tables on "Standard
Oil," to make safe the "concessions" already obtained
from Diaz and to obtain still more from the new Mexican dictator.

To determine the truth in all these allegations, which were
freely printed in the American press of the time, would demand
more facts than are at present available; yet it is clear that
these oil and other "concessions" presented the perpetual
Mexican problem in a new and difficult light. The Wilson Administration
came into power a few days after Huerta had seized the Mexican
Government. The first difficulty presented to the State Department
was to determine its attitude toward this usurper.

A few days after President Wilson's inauguration Mr. Irwin
Laughlin, then Chargé d'Affaires in London---this was several
weeks before Page's arrival---was instructed to ask the British
Foreign Office what its attitude would be in regard to the recognition
of President Huerta. Mr. Laughlin informed the Foreign Office
that he was not instructed that the United States had decided
on any policy, but that he felt sure it would be to the advantage
of both countries to follow the same line. The query was not an
informal one; it was made in definite obedience to instructions
and was intended to elicit a formal commitment. The unequivocal
answer that Mr. Laughlin received was that the British Government
would not recognize Huerta, either formally or tacitly.

Mr. Laughlin sent his message immediately to Washington, where
it apparently made a favourable impression. The Administration
then let it be known that the United States would not recognize
the new Mexican regime. Whether Mr. Wilson would at this time
have taken such a position, irrespective of the British attitude,
is not known, but at this stage of the proceedings Great Britain
and the United States were standing side by side.

About three weeks afterward Mr. Laughlin heard that the British
Foreign Office was about to recognize Huerta. Naturally the report
astonished him; he at once called again on the Foreign Office,
taking with him the despatch that he had recently sent to Washington.
Why had the British Government recognized Huerta when it had given
definite assurances to Washington that it had no intention of
doing so? The outcome of the affair was that Sir Cecil Spring
Rice, British Ambassador in Washington, was instructed to inform
the State Department that Great Britain had changed its mind.
France, Germany, Spain, and most other governments followed the
British example in recognizing the new President of Mexico.

It is thus apparent that the initial mistake in the Huerta
affair was made by Great Britain. Its action produced the most
unpleasant impression upon the new Administration. Mr. Wilson,
Mr. Bryan. and their associates in the cabinet easily found an
explanation that was satisfactory to themselves and to the political
enthusiasms upon which they had come into power. They believed
that the sudden change in the British attitude was the result
of pressure from British commercial interests which hoped to profit
from the Huerta influence. Lord Cowdray was a rich and powerful
Liberal; he had great concessions in Mexico which had been obtained
from President Diaz; it was known that Huerta aimed to make his
dictatorship a continuation of that of Diaz, to rule Mexico as
Diaz had ruled it, that is, by force, and to extend a welcoming
hand to foreign capitalists. An important consideration was that
the British Navy had a contract with the Cowdray Company for oil,
which was rapidly becoming indispensable as a fuel for warships,
and this fact necessarily made the British Government almost a
champion of the Cowdray interests. It was not necessary to believe
all the rumours that were then afloat in the American press to
conclude that a Huerta administration would be far more acceptable
to the Cowdray Company than any headed by one of the military
chieftains who were then disputing the control of Mexico. Mr.
Wilson and Mr. Bryan believed that these events proved that certain
"interests," similar to the "interests" which,
in their view, had exercised so baleful an influence on American
politics, were also active in Great Britain. The Wilson election
in 1912 had been a protest against the dominance of "Wall
Street" in American politics; Mr. Bryan's political stock-in-trade
for a generation had consisted of little except a campaign against
these forces; naturally, therefore, the suspicion that Great Britain
was giving way to a British "Standard Oil" was enough
to arm these statesmen against the Huerta policy, and to intensify
that profound dislike of Huerta himself that was soon to become
almost an obsession.

With this as a starting point President Wilson presently formulated
an entirely new principle for dealing with Latin-American republics.
There could be no permanent order in these turbulent countries
and nothing approaching a democratic system until the habit of
revolution should be checked. One of the greatest encouragements
to revolution, said the President, was the willingness of foreign
governments to recognize any politician who succeeded in seizing
the executive power. He therefore believed that a refusal to recognize
any government "founded upon violence" would exercise
a wholesome influence in checking this national habit; if Great
Britain and the United States and the other powers would set the
example by refusing to have any diplomatic dealings with General
Huerta, such an unfriendly attitude would discourage other forceful
intriguers from attempting to repeat his experiment. The result
would be that the decent elements in Mexico and other Latin-American
countries would at last assert themselves, establish a constitutional
system, and select their governments by constitutional means.
At the bottom of the whole business were, in the President's and
Mr. Bryan's opinion, the "concession" seekers, the "exploiters,"
who were constantly obtaining advantages at the hands of these
corrupt governments and constantly stirring up revolutions for
their financial profit. The time had now come to end the whole
miserable business. "We are closing one chapter in the history
of the world," said Mr. Wilson, "and opening another
of unimaginable significance. . . . It is a very perilous thing
to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material
interests. . . . We have seen such material interests threaten
constitutional freedom in the United States. Therefore we will
now know how to sympathize with those in the rest of America who
have to contend with such powers, not only within their borders,
but from outside their borders."

In this way General Huerta, who, in his own eyes, was merely
another in the long succession of Mexican revolutionary chieftains,
was translated into an epochal figure in the history of American
foreign policy; he became a symbol in Mr. Wilson's new scheme
of things---the representative of the order which was to come
to an end, the man who, all unwittingly, was to point the new
way not only in Mexico, but in all Latin-American countries. The
first diplomatic task imposed upon Page therefore was one that
would have dismayed a more experienced ambassador. This was to
persuade Great Britain to retrace its steps, to withdraw its recognition
of Huerta, and to join hands with the United States in bringing
about his downfall. The new ambassador sympathized with Mr. Wilson's
ideas to a certain extent; the point at which he parted company
with the President's Mexican policy will appear in due course.
He therefore began zealously to preach the new Latin-American
doctrine to the British Foreign Office, with results that appear
in his letters of this period.

.

To the President

6 Grosvenor Square, London,
Friday night, October 24, 1913.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

In this wretched Mexican business, about which I have read
columns and columns and columns of comment these two days and
turned every conceivable proposition back and forth in my mind---in
this whole wretched waste of comment, I have not seen even an
allusion to any moral principle involved nor a word of concern
about the Mexican people. It is all about who is the stronger,
Huerta or some other bandit, and about the necessity of order
for the sake of financial interests. Nobody recalls our action
in giving Cuba to the Cubans or our pledge to the people of the
Philippine Islands. But there is reference to the influence of
Standard Oil in the American policy. This illustrates the complete
divorce of European politics from fundamental morals, and it
shocks even a man who before knew of this divorce.

In my last talk with Sir Edward Grey I drove this home by
emphasizing strongly the impossibility of your playing primary
heed to any American business interest in Mexico ---even---the
immorality of your doing so; there are many things that come
before business and there are some things that come before order.
I used American business interests because I couldn't speak openly
of British business interests and his Government. I am sure he
saw the obvious inference. But not even from him came a word
about the moral foundation of government or about the welfare
of the Mexican people. These are not in the European governing
vocabulary.

1 have been trying to find a way to help this Government to
wake up to the effect of its pro-Huerta position and to give
them a chance to refrain from repeating that mistake---and to
save their faces; and I have telegraphed one plan to Mr. Bryan
to-day. I think they ought now to be forced to show their hand
without the possibility of evasion. They will not risk losing
our good-will---if it seem wise to you to put them to a square
test.

It's a wretched business, and the sordid level of European
statecraft is sad.

I ran across the Prime Minister at the royal wedding reception([1]) the other day.

"What do you infer from the latest news from Mexico?"
he asked.

"Several things."

"Tell me the most important inference you draw."

"Well, the danger of prematurely making up one's mind
about a Mexican adventurer."

"Ah!" and he moved on.

Very heartily yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

.

To the President

London, Sunday, Nov. 16, 1913.

. . . About the obligations and inferences of democracy, they
are dense. They don't really believe in it; and they are slow
to see what good will come of ousting Huerta unless we know beforehand
who will succeed him. Sir Edward Grey is not dense, but in this
matter even he is slow fully to understand. The Lord knows I've
told him plainly over and over again and, I fear, even preached
to him. At first he couldn't see the practical nature of so "idealistic"
a programme. I explained to him how the immemorial "policy"
that we all followed of recognizing momentarily successful adventurers
in Latin-America had put a premium on revolution; that you had
found something better than a policy, namely, a principle; that
policies change, but principles do not; that he need not be greatly
concerned about the successor to Huerta; that this is primarily
and ultimately an American problem; that Great Britain's interest
being only commercial is far less than the interest of the United
States, which is commercial and also ethical; and so on and so
on. His sympathies and his friendliness are all right. But Egypt
and India were in his mind. He confessed to me that he was much
impressed---"if you can carry it through." Many men
are seeing the new idea (I wonder if you are conscious how new
it is and how incredible to the Old World mind?) and they express
the greatest and sincerest admiration for "your brave new
President"; and a wave of friendliness to the United States
swept over the Kingdom when the Government took its open stand.
At the annual dinner of the oldest and richest of the merchants'
guilds at which they invited me to respond to a toast the other
night they proposed your health most heartily and, when I arose,
they cheered longer and louder than I had before heard men cheer
in this kingdom. There is, I am sure, more enthusiasm for the
United States here, by far, than for England in the United States.
They are simply dense about any sort of government but their
own---particularly dense about the application of democracy to
"dependencies" and inferior peoples. I have a neighbour
who spent many years as an administrator in India. He has talked
me deaf about the inevitable failure of this "idealistic"
Mexican programme. He is wholly friendly and wholly incredulous.
And for old-time Toryism gone to seed commend me to the Spectator.
Not a glimmering of the idea has entered Strachey's head. The
Times, however, now sees it pretty clearly. I spent Sunday
a few weeks ago with two of its editors in the country, and they
have come to see me several times since and written fairly good
"leaders" out of my conversation with them. So much
for this head. For the moment at least that is satisfactory.
You must not forget that they can't all at once take it in, for
they do not really know what democracy is or whither it leads
and at bottom they do not really believe in it as a scheme of
government---not even this Liberal Cabinet.

The British concern for commercial interests, which never
sleeps, will, I fear, come up continuously. But we shall simply
do justice and stand firm, when this phase of the subject comes
forward.

It's amusing, when you forget its sadness, that their first
impulse is to regard an unselfish international act as what Cecil
Rhodes called the English "unctuous rectitude." But
this experience that we are having with them will be worth much
in future dealings. They already feel very clearly that a different
hand has the helm in Washington; and we can drive them hard,
if need be, for they will not forfeit our friendship.

It is worth something to discover that Downing Street makes
many mistakes. Infallibility dwells a long way from them. In
this matter they have made two terrible blunders---the recognition
of Huerta (they know that now) and the sending of Carden (they
may already suspect that: they'll know it presently).

Yours always faithfully,

WALTER H. PAGE.

P. S. By Jove, I didn't know that I'd ever have to put the
British Government through an elementary course in Democracy!
To the President.

.</BLOCKQUOTE>

Occasionally Page discussed with Sir Edward Grey an alternative
American policy which was in the minds of most people at that
time:

<P ALIGN=CENTER>To the President

The foregoing I wrote before this Mexican business took its
present place. I can't get away from the feeling that the English
simply do not and will not believe in any unselfish public action---further
than the keeping of order. They have a mania for order, sheer
order, order for the sake of order. They can't see how anything
can come in any one's thought before order or how anything need
come afterward. Even Sir Edward Grey jocularly ran me across
our history with questions like this:

"Suppose you have to intervene, what then?"

"Make 'em vote and live by their decisions."

"But suppose they will not so live?"

"We'll go in again and make 'em vote again."

"And keep this up 200 years?" asked he.

"Yes," said I. "The United States will be here
two hundred years and it can continue to shoot men for that little
space till they learn to vote and to rule themselves."

I have never seen him laugh so heartily. Shooting men into
self-government! Shooting them into orderliness---he comprehends
that; and that's all right. But that's as far as his habit of
mind goes. At Sheffield last night, when I had to make a speech,
I explained "idealism" (they always quote it) in Government.
They listened attentively and even eagerly. Then they came up
and asked if I really meant that Government should concern itself
with idealistic things---beyond keeping order. Ought they to
do so in India?---I assure you they don't think beyond order.
A nigger lynched in Mississippi offends them more than a tyrant
in Mexico.

.
<P ALIGN=CENTER>To Edward M. House

London, November 2, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

I've been writing to the President that the Englishman has
a mania for order, order for order's sake, and for trade. He
has reduced a large part of the world to order. He is the best
policeman in creation; and---he has the policeman's ethics! Talk
to him about character as a basis of government or about a moral
basis of government in any outlying country, he'll think you
daft. Bah I what matter who governs or how he governs or where
he got his authority or how, so long as he keeps order. He won't
see anything else. The lesson of our dealing with Cuba is lost
on him. He doesn't believe that. We may bring this Government
in line with us on Mexico. But in this case and in general, the
moral uplift of government must be forced by us---I mean government
in outlying countries.

Mexico is only part of Central America, and the only way we
can ever forge a Central and South American policy that will
endure is this way, precisely, by saying that your momentarily
successful adventurer can't count on us anywhere; the man that
rules must govern for the governed. Then we have a policy; and
nobody else has that policy. This Mexican business is worth worlds
to us---to establish this.

We may have a diplomatic fight here; and I'm ready! Very ready
on this, for its own sake and for reasons that follow, to wit:

Extraordinary and sincere and profound as is the respect of
the English for the American people, they hold the American Government
in contempt. It shifts and doesn't keep its treaty, etc., etc.---They
are right, too. But they need to feel the hand that now has the
helm.

But one or two things have first to be got out of the way.
That Panama tolls is the worst. We are dead wrong in that, as
we are dead right on the Mexican matter. If it were possible
(I don't know that it is) for the President to say (quietly,
not openly) that he agrees with us---if he do---then the field
would be open for a fight on Mexico; and the reenforcement of
our position would be incalculable.

Then we need in Washington some sort of Bureau or Master of
Courtesies for the Government, to do and to permit us to do those
little courtesies that the English spend half their time in doing---this
in the course of our everyday life and intercourse. For example:
When I was instructed to inform this Government that our fleet
would go to the Mediterranean, I was instructed also to say that
they mustn't trouble to welcome us---don't pay no 'tention to
us! Well, that's what they live for in times of peace---ceremonies.
We come along and say, "We're comin' but, hell! don't kick
up no fuss over us, we're from Missouri, we are!" And the
Briton shrugs his shoulders and says, "Boor!" These
things are happening all the time. Of course no one nor a dozen
nor a hundred count; but generations of 'em have counted badly.
A Government without manners.

If I could outdo these folk at their game of courtesy, and
could keep our treaty faith with 'em, then I could lick em into
the next century on the moral aspects of the Mexican Government,
and make 'em look up and salute every time the American Government
is mentioned See?---Is there any hope?---Such is the job exactly.
And you know what it would lead to---even in our lifetime---to
the leadership of the world: and we should presently be considering
how we may best use the British fleet, the British Empire, and
the English race for the betterment of mankind.

Yours eagerly,

W. H. P.

.

A word of caution is necessary to understand Page's references
to the British democracy. That the parliamentary system is democratic
in the sense that it is responsive to public opinion he would
have been the first to admit. That Great Britain is a democracy
m the sense that the suffrage is general is also apparent. But,
in these reflections on the British commonwealth, the Ambassador
was thinking of his old familiar figure, the "Forgotten Man"---the
neglected man, woman, and child of the masses. In an address delivered,
in June, 1914, before the Royal Institution of Great Britain,
Page gave what he regarded as the definition of the American ideal.
"The fundamental article in the creed of the American democracy---you
may call it the fundamental dogma if you like---is the unchanging
and unchangeable resolve that every human being shall have his
opportunity for his utmost development---his chance to become
and to do the best that he can." Democracy is not only a
system of government---"it is a scheme of society."
Every citizen must have not only the suffrage, he must likewise
enjoy the same advantages as his neighbour for education, for
social opportunity, for good health, for success in agriculture,
manufacture, finance, and business and professional life. The
country that most successfully opened all these avenues to every
boy or girl, exclusively on individual merit, was in Page's view
the most democratic. He believed that the United States did this
more completely than Great Britain or any other country; and therefore
he believed that we were far more democratic. He had not found
in other countries the splendid phenomenon presented by America's
great agricultural region. "The most striking single fact
about the United States is, I think, this spectacle, which, so
far as I know, is new in the world: On that great agricultural
area are about seven million farms of an average size of about
140 acres, most of which are tilled by the owners themselves,
a population that varies greatly, of course, in its thrift and
efficiency, but most of which is well housed, in houses they themselves
own, well clad, well fed, and a population that trains practically
all its children in schools maintained by public taxation."
It was some such vision as this that Page hoped to see realized
ultimately in Mexico. And some such development as this would
make Mexico a democracy. It was his difficulty in making the British
see the Mexican problem in this light that persuaded him that,
in this comprehensive meaning of the word, the democratic ideal
had made an inappreciable progress in Europe-and even in Great
Britain itself.

.

<P ALIGN=CENTER>II

These letters are printed somewhat out of their chronological
order because they picture definitely the two opposing viewpoints
of Great Britain and the United States on Mexico and Latin-America
generally. Here, then, was the sharp issue drawn between the Old
World and the New---on one side the dreary conception of outlying
countries as fields to be exploited for the benefit of "investors,"
successful revolutionists to be recognized in so far as they promoted
such ends, and no consideration to be shown to the victims of
their rapacity; and the new American idea, the idea which had
been made reality in Cuba and the Philippines, that the enlightened
and successful nations stood something in the position of trustees
to such unfortunate lands and that it was their duty to lead them
along the slow pathway of progress and democracy. So far the Wilsonian
principle could be joyfully supported by the Ambassador. Page
disagreed with the President, however, in that he accepted the
logical consequences of this programme. His formula of "shooting
people into self-government," which had so entertained the
British Foreign Secretary, was a characteristically breezy description
of the alternative that Page, in the last resort, was ready to
adopt, but which President Wilson and Secretary Bryan persistently
refused to consider. Page was just as insistent as the Washington
Administration that Huerta should resign and that Great Britain
should assist the United States in accomplishing his dethronement,
and that the Mexican people should have a real opportunity of
setting up for themselves. He was not enough of an "idealist,"
however, to believe that the Mexicans, without the assistance
of their powerful neighbours, could succeed in establishing a
constitutional government. In early August, 1913, President Wilson
sent Mr. John Lind, ex-Governor of Minnesota, to Mexico as his
personal representative. His mission was to invite Huerta to remove
himself from Mexican politics, and to permit the Mexican people
to hold a presidential election at which Huerta would himself
agree not to be a candidate. Mr. Lind presented these proposals
on August 15th, and President Huerta rejected every one of them
with a somewhat disconcerting promptitude.

That Page was prepared to accept the consequences of this failure
appears in the following letter. The lack of confidence which
it discloses in Secretary Bryan was a feeling that became stronger
as the Mexican drama unfolded.

.

<P ALIGN=CENTER>To Edward M. House

London, August 25, 1913.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

. . . If you find a chance, get the substance of this memorandum
into the hands of two men: the President and the Secretary of
Agriculture. Get 'em in Houston's at once---into the President's
whenever the time is ripe. I send the substance to Washington
and I send many other such things. But I never feel sure that
they reach the President. The most confidential letter I have
written was lost in Washington, and there is pretty good testimony
that it reached the Secretary's desk. He does not acknowledge
the important things, but writes me confidentially to inquire
if the office of the man who attends to the mail pouches (the
diplomatic and naval despatches in London)(<A NAME="n35"></A><A
HREF="Pagenotes.htm#35">35</A>) is not an office into which he
might put a Democrat.---But I keep at it. It would be a pleasure
to know that the President knows what I am trying to do. . .
.

Yours heartily,

WALTER H. PAGE.

.

Following is the memorandum:

.

In October the provisional recognition of Huerta by England
will end. Then this Government will be free. Then is the time
for the United States to propose to England joint intervention
merely to reduce this turbulent scandal of a country to order---on
an agreement, of course, to preserve the territorial integrity
of Mexico. It's a mere police duty that all great nations have
to do---as they did in the case of the Boxer riots in China.
Of course Germany and France, etc., ought to be invited---on
the same pledge: the preservation of territorial integrity. If
Germany should come in, she will thereby practically acknowledge
the Monroe Doctrine, as England has already done. If Germany
stay out, then she can't complain. England and the United States
would have only to announce their intention: there'd be no need
to fire a gun. Besides settling the Mexican trouble, we'd gain
much---having had England by our side in a praiseworthy enterprise.
That, and the President's visit(<A NAME="n36"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#36">36</A>)
would give the world notice to whom it belongs, and cause it
to be quiet and to go about its proper business of peaceful industry.

Moreover, it would show all the Central and South American
States that we don't want any of their territory, that we will
not let anybody else have any, but that they, too, must keep
orderly government or the great Nations of the earth, will, at
our bidding, forcibly demand quiet in their borders. I believe
a new era of security would come in all Spanish America. Investments
would be safer, governments more careful and orderly. And---we
would not have made any entangling alliance with anybody. All
this would prevent perhaps dozens of little wars. It's merely
using the English fleet and ours to make the world understand
that the time has come for orderliness and peace and for the
honest development of backward, turbulent lands and peoples.

If you don't put this through, tell me what's the matter with
it. I've sent it to Washington after talking and being talked
to for a month and after the hardest kind of thinking. Isn't
this constructive? Isn't it using the great power lying idle
about the world, to do the thing that most needs to he done?

.

Colonel House presented this memorandum to the President, but
events sufficiently disclosed that it had no influence upon his
Mexican policy. Two days after it was written Mr. Wilson went
before Congress, announced that the Lind Mission had failed, and
that conditions in Mexico had grown worse. He advised all Americans
to leave the country, and declared that he would lay an embargo
on the shipment of munitions---an embargo that would affect both
the Huerta forces and the revolutionary groups that were fighting
them.

Meanwhile Great Britain had taken another step that made as
unpleasant an impression on Washington as had the recognition
of Huerta. Sir Lionel Edward Gresley Carden had for several years
been occupying British diplomatic posts in Central America, in
all of which he had had disagreeable social and diplomatic relations
with Americans. Sir Lionel had always shown great zeal in promoting
British commercial interests, and, justly or unjustly, had acquired
the fame of being intensely anti-American. From 1911 to 1913 Carden
had served as British Minister to Cuba; here his anti-Americanism
had shown itself in such obnoxious ways that Mr. Knox, Secretary
of State under President Taft, had instructed Ambassador Reid
to bring his behaviour to the attention of the British Foreign
Office. These representations took practically the form of requesting
Carden's removal from Cuba. Perhaps the unusual relations that
the United States bore toward Cuba warranted Mr. Knox in making
such an approach; yet the British refused to see the matter in
that light; not only did they fail to displace Carden, but they
knighted him---the traditional British way of defending a faithful
public servant who has been attacked. Sir Lionel Carden refused
to mend his ways; he continued to indulge in what Washington regarded
as anti-American propaganda; and a second time Secretary Knox
intimated that his removal would be acceptable to this country,
and a second time this request was refused. With this preliminary
history of Carden as a background, and with the British-American
misunderstanding over Huerta at its most serious stage, the emotions
of Washington may well be imagined when the news came, in July,
1913, that this same gentleman had been appointed British Minister
to Mexico. If the British Government had ransacked its diplomatic
force to find the one man who would have been most objectionable
to the United States, it could have made no better selection.
The President and Mr. Bryan were pretty well persuaded that the
"oil concessionaires" were dictating British-Mexican
policy, and this appointment translated their suspicion into a
conviction. Carden had seen much service in Mexico; he had been
on the friendliest terms with Diaz; and the newspapers openly
charged that the British oil capitalists had dictated his selection.
All these assertions Carden and the oil interests denied; yet
Carden's behaviour from the day of his appointment showed great
hostility to the United States. A few days after he had reached
New York, on his way to his new post, the New York World
published an interview with Carden in which he was reported as
declaring that President Wilson knew nothing about the Mexican
situation and in which he took the stand that Huerta was the man
to handle Mexico at this crisis. His appearance in the Mexican
capital was accompanied by other highly undiplomatic publications.
In late October President Huerta arrested all his enemies in the
Mexican Congress, threw them into jail, and proclaimed himself
dictator. Washington was much displeased that Sir Lionel Carden
should have selected the day of these high-handed proceedings
to present to Huerta his credentials as minister; in its sensitive
condition, the State Department interpreted this act as a reaffirmation
of that recognition that had already caused so much confusion
in Mexican affairs.

Carden made things worse by giving out more newspaper interviews,
a tendency that had apparently grown into a habit. "I do
not believe that the United States recognizes the seriousness
of the situation here. . . . I see no reason why Huerta should
be displaced by another man whose abilities are yet to be tried.
. . . Safety in Mexico can be secured only by punitive and remedial
methods, and a strong man; "---such were a few of the reflections
that the reporters attributed to this astonishing diplomat. Meanwhile,
the newspapers were filled with reports that the British Minister
was daily consorting with Huerta, that he was constantly strengthening
that chieftain's backbone in opposition to the United States and
that he was obtaining concessions in return for this support.
To what extent these press accounts rested on fact cannot be ascertained
definitely at this time; yet it is a truth that Carden's general
behaviour gave great encouragement to Huerta and that it had the
deplorable effect of placing Great Britain and the United States
in opposition. The interpretation of the casual reader was that
Great Britain was determined to seat Huerta in the Presidency
against the determination of the United States to keep him out.
The attitude of the Washington cabinet was almost bitter at this
time against the British Government. "There is a feeling
here," wrote Secretary Lane to Page, "that England is
playing a game unworthy of her."

The British Government promptly denied the authenticity of
the Carden interview, but that helped matters little, for the
American public insisted on regarding such denials as purely diplomatic.
Something of a storm against Carden arose in England itself, where
it was believed that his conception of his duties was estranging
two friendly countries. Probably the chief difficulty was that
the British Foreign Office could see no logical sequence in the
Washington policy. Put Huerta out---yes, by all means: but what
then? Page's notes of his visit to Sir Edward Grey a few days
after the latest Carden interview confirm this:

I have just come from an hour's talk with Grey about Mexico.
He showed me his telegram to Carden, asking about Carden's reported
interview criticizing the United States, and Carden's flat denial.
He showed me another telegram to Carden about Huerta's reported
boast that he would have the backing of London, Paris, and Berlin
against the United States, in which Grey advised Carden that
British policy should be to keep aloof from Huerta's boasts and
plans. Carden denied that Huerta made such a boast in his statement
to the Diplomatic Corps. Grey wishes the President to know of
these telegrams.

Talk then became personal and informal. I went over the whole
subject again, telling how the Press and people of the United
States were becoming critical of the British Government; that
they regarded the problem as wholly American; that they resented
aid to Huerta, whom they regarded as a mere tyrant; that they
suspected British interests of giving financial help to Huerta;
that many newspapers and persons refused to believe Carden's
denial; that the President's policy was not academic but was
the only policy that would square with American ideals and that
it was unchangeable. I cited our treatment of Cuba. I explained
again that I was talking unofficially and giving him only my
own interpretation of the people's mood. He asked, if the British
Government should withdraw the recognition of Huerta, what would
happen.

"In my opinion," I replied, "he would collapse."

"What would happen then---worse chaos?"

"That is impossible," I said. "There is no
worse chaos than deputies in jail, the dictatorial doubling of
the tariff, the suppression of opinion, and the practical banishment
of independent men. If Huerta should fall, there is hope that
suppressed men and opinion will set up a successful government."

"Suppose that fail," he asked----"'what then?"

I replied that, in case of continued and utter failure, the
United States might feel obliged to repeat its dealings with
Cuba and that the continued excitement of opinion in the United
States might precipitate this.

Grey protested that he knew nothing of what British interests
had done or were doing, that he wished time to think the matter
out and that he was glad to await the President's communication.
He thanked me cordially for my frank statements and declared
that he understood perfectly their personal nature. I impressed
him with the seriousness of American public opinion.

The last thing that the British Government desired at this
time was a serious misunderstanding with the United States, on
Mexico or any other matter. Yet the Mexican situation, in early
November, 1913, clearly demanded a complete cleaning up. The
occasion soon presented itself. Sir William Tyrrell, the private
secretary of Sir Edward Grey sailed, in late October, for the
United States. The purpose of his visit was not diplomatic, but
Page evidently believed that his presence in the United States
offered too good an opportunity to be lost.

.
<P ALIGN=CENTER>To Edward M. House

Newton Hall, Newton, Cambridge.
Sunday, October 26, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

Sir William Tyrrell, the secretary of Sir Edward Grey---himself,
I think, an M. P.---has gone to the United States to visit his
friend, Sir Cecil Spring Rice. He sailed yesterday, going first
to Dublin, N. H., thence with the Ambassador to Washington. He
has never before been to the United States, and he went off in
high glee, alone, to see it. He's a good fellow, a thoroughly
good fellow, and he's an important man. He of course has Sir
Edward's complete confidence, but he's also a man on his own
account. I have come to reckon it worth while to get ideas that
I want driven home into his head. It's a good head and a good
place to put good ideas.

The Lord knows you have far too much to do; but in this juncture
I should count it worth your while to pay him some attention.
I want him to get the President's ideas about Mexico, good and
firm and hard. They are so far from altruistic in their politics
here that it would be a good piece of work to get our ideas and
aims into this man's head. His going gives you and the President
and everybody a capital chance to help me keep our good American-English
understanding.

Whatever happen in Mexico, I'm afraid there will be a disturbance
of the very friendly feeling between the American people and
the English. I am delivering a series of well-thought-out discourses
to Sir Edward with what effect, I don't know. If the American
press could be held in a little, that would be as good as it
is impossible.

I'm now giving the Foreign Office the chance to refrain from
more premature recognizing.

Very hastily yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

.

Sir William Tyrrell, to whom Page refers so pleasantly, was
one of the most engaging men personally in the British Foreign
Office, as well as one of the most influential. Though he came
to America on no official mission to our Government, he was exceptionally
qualified to discuss Mexico and other pending questions with the
Washington Administration. He had an excellent background, and
a keen insight into the human aspects of all problems, but perhaps
his most impressive physical trait was a twinkling eye, as his
most conspicuous mental quality was certainly a sense of humour.
Constant association with Sir Edward Grey had given his mind a
cast not dissimilar to that of his chief---a belief in ordinary
decency in international relations, an enthusiasm for the better
ordering of the world, a sincere admiration for the United States
and a desire to maintain British-American friendship. In his first
encounter with official Washington Sir William needed all that
sense of the ludicrous with which he is abundantly endowed. This
took the form of a long interview with Secretary Bryan on the
foreign policy of Great Britain. The Secretary harangued Sir William
on the wickedness of the British Empire, particularly In Egypt
and India and in Mexico. The British oil men, Mr. Bryan declared,
were nothing but the "paymasters" of the British Cabinet.

"You are wrong," replied the Englishman, who saw
that the only thing to do on an occasion of this kind was to refuse
to take the Secretary seriously. "Lord Cowdray hasn't money
enough. Through a long experience with corruption the Cabinet
has grown so greedy that Cowdray hasn't the money necessary to
reach their price."

"Ah," said Mr. Bryan, triumphantly, accepting Sir
William's bantering answer as made in all seriousness. "Then
you admit the charge."

From this he proceeded to denounce Great Britain in still more
unmeasured terms. The British, he declared, had only one interest
in Mexico, and that was oil. The Foreign Office had simply handed
its Mexican policy over to the "oil barons" for predatory
purposes.

"That's just what the Standard Oil people told me in New
York," the British diplomat replied. "Mr. Secretary,
you are talking just like a Standard Oil man. The ideas that you
hold are the ones which the Standard Oil is disseminating. You
are pursuing the policy which they have decided on. Without knowing
it you are promoting the interest of Standard Oil."

Sir William saw that it was useless to discuss Mexico with
Mr. Bryan---that the Secretary was not a thinker but an emotionalist.
However, despite their differences, the two men liked each other
and had a good time. As Sir William was leaving, he bowed deferentially
to the Secretary of State and said:

"You have stripped me naked, Mr. Secretary, but I am unashamed."

With President Wilson, however, the Englishman had a more satisfactory
experience. He was delighted by the President's courtesy, charm,
intelligence, and conversational powers. The impression which
Sir William obtained of the American President on this occasion
remained with him for several years and was itself an important
element in British-American relations after the outbreak of the
World War. And the visit was a profitable one for Mr. Wilson,
since he obtained a clear understanding of the British policy
toward Mexico. Sir William succeeded in persuading the President
that the so-called oil interests were not dictating the policy
of Sir Edward Grey. That British oil men were active in Mexico
was apparent; but they were not using a statesman of so high a
character as Sir Edward Grey for their purposes and would not
be able to do so. The British Government entertained no ambitions
in Mexico that meant unfriendliness to the United States. In no
way was the policy of Great Britain hostile to our own. In fact,
the British recognized the predominant character of the American
interest in Mexico and were willing to accept any policy in which
Washington would take the lead. All it asked was that British
property and British lives be protected; once these were safeguarded
Great Britain was ready to stand aside and let the United States
deal with Mexico in its own way.

The one disappointment of this visit was that Sir William Tyrrell
was unable to obtain from President Wilson any satisfactory statement
of his Mexican policy.

"When I go back to England," said the Englishman,
as the interview was approaching an end, "I shall be asked
to explain your Mexican policy. Can you tell me what it is?"

President Wilson looked at him earnestly and said, in his most
decisive manner:

"I am going to teach the South American Republics to elect
good men!"

This was excellent as a purpose, but it could hardly be regarded
as a programme.

"Yes," replied Sir William, "but, Mr. President,
I shall have to explain this to Englishmen, who, as you know,
lack imagination. They cannot see what is the difference between
Huerta, Carranza, and Villa."

The only answer he could obtain was that Carranza was the best
of the three and that Villa was not so bad as he had been painted.
But the phrase that remained with the British diplomat was that
one so characteristically Wilsonian: "I propose to teach
the South American Republics to elect good men." In its attitude,
its phrasing, it held the key to much Wilson history.

Additional details of this historic interview are given in
Colonel House's letters:

.

<P ALIGN=CENTER>From Edward M. House

145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
November 4, 1913.

DEAR PAGE:

Your cablegram, telling me of the arrival of Sir William Tyrrell
on the Imperator, was handed me on my way to the train
as I left for Washington.

The President talked with me about the Mexican situation and
it looks as if something positive will be done in a few days
unless Huerta abdicates.

It is to be the policy of this Administration henceforth not
to recognize any Central American government that is not formed
along constitutional lines. Anything else would be a makeshift
policy. As you know, revolutions and assassinations in order
to obtain control of governments are instituted almost wholly
for the purpose of loot and when it is found that these methods
will not bring the desired results, they will cease.

The President also feels strongly in regard to foreign financial
interests seeking to control those unstable governments through
concessions and otherwise. This, too, he is determined to discourage
as far as it is possible to do so.

This was a great opportunity for England and America to get
together. You know how strongly we both feel upon this subject
and I do not believe that the President differed greatly from
us, but the recent actions of the British Government have produced
a decided irritation, which to say the least is unfortunate.

Faithfully yours,

E. M. HOUSE.

.

145 East 35th Street.
New York City.
November 14, 1913.

DEAR PAGE:

Things have happened quickly since I last wrote to you.

I went to Washington Monday night as the guest of the Bryans.
They have been wanting me to come to them and I thought this
a good opportunity.

I talked the Mexican situation out thoroughly with him and
one of your dispatches came while I was there. I found that he
was becoming prejudiced against the British Government, believing
that their Mexican policy was based purely upon commercialism,
that they were backing Huerta quietly at the instance of Lord
Cowdray, and that Cowdray had not only already obtained concessions
from the Huerta Government, but expected to obtain others. Sir
Lionel Carden was also all to the bad.

I saw the President and his views were not very different
from those of Mr. Bryan. I asked the President to permit me to
see Sir William. Tyrrell and talk to him frankly and to attempt
to straighten the tangle out. He gave me a free hand.

I lunched with Sir William at the British Embassy although
Sir Cecil Spring Rice was not well enough to be present. I had
a long talk with Sir William, after lunch and found that our
suspicions were unwarranted and that we could get together without
any difficulty whatever.

I told him very frankly what our purpose was in Mexico and
that we were determined to carry it through if it was within
our power to do so. That being so I suggested that he get his
government to cooperate cordially with ours rather than to accept
our policy reluctantly.

I told him that you and I had dreamed of a sympathetic alliance
between the two countries and that it seemed to me that this
dream might come true very quickly because of the President and
Sir Edward Grey. He expressed a willingness to cooperate freely
and I told him I would arrange an early meeting with the President.
I thought it better to bring the President into the game rather
than Mr. Bryan. I told him of the President's attitude upon the
Panama toll question but I touched upon that lightly and in confidence,
preferring for the President himself to make his own statement.

I left the Bryans in the morning of the luncheon with Sir
William, intending to take an afternoon train for New York, but
the President wanted me to stay with him at the White House over
night and meet Sir William with him at half past nine the following
morning. He was so tired that I did not have the heart to urge
a meeting that night.

From half past nine until half past ten the President and
Sir William. repeated to each other what they had said separately
to me, and which I had given to each, and then the President
elaborated upon the toll question much to the satisfaction of
Sir William.

He explained the matter in detail and assured him of his entire
sympathy and purpose to carry out our treaty obligations, both
in the letter and the spirit.

Sir William was very happy after the interview and when the
President left us he remained to talk to me and to express his
gratification. He cleared up in the President's mind all suspicion,
I think, in regard to concessions and as to the intentions and
purposes of the British Government. He assured the President
that his government would work cordially with ours and that they
would do all that they could to bring about joint pressure through
Germany and France for the elimination of Huerta.

We are going to give them a chance to see what they can do
with Huerta before moving any further. Sir William thinks that
if we are willing to let Huerta save his face he can be got out
without force of arms.

Sir William said that if foreign diplomats could have heard
our conversation they would have fallen in a faint; it was so
frankly indiscreet and undiplomatic. I did not tell him so, but
I had it in the back of my mind that where people wanted to do
right and had the power to carry out their intentions there was
no need to cloak their thoughts in diplomatic language.

All this makes me very happy for it looks as if we are in
sight of the promised land.

I am pleased to tell you of the compliments that have been
thrown at you by the President, Mr. Bryan, and Sir William. They
were all enthusiastic over your work in London and expressed
the keenest appreciation of the way in which you have handled
matters. Sir William told me that he did not remember an American
Ambassador that was your equal.

Faithfully yours,

E. M. HOUSE.

.

So far as a meeting between a British diplomat and the President
of the United States could solve the Mexican problem, that problem
was apparently solved. The dearest wish of Mr. Wilson, the elimination
of Huerta, seemed to be approaching realization, now that he had
persuaded Great Britain to support him in this enterprise. Whether
Sir William Tyrrell, or Sir Edward Grey, had really become converted
to the President's "idealistic" plans for Mexico is
an entirely different question. At this time there was another
matter in which Great Britain's interest was even greater than
in Mexico. These letters have already contained reference to tolls
on the Panama Canal. Colonel House's letter shows that the President
discussed this topic with Sir William Tyrrell and gave him assurances
that this would be settled on terms satisfactory to Great Britain.
It cannot be maintained that that assurance was really the consideration
which paved the way to an understanding on Huerta. The conversation
was entirely informal; indeed, it could not be otherwise, for
Sir William Tyrrell brought no credentials; there could be no
definite bargain or agreement, but there is little question that
Mr. Wilson's friendly disposition toward British shipping through
the Panama Canal made it easy for Great Britain to give him a
free hand in Mexico.

A few days after this White House interview Sir Lionel Carden
performed what must have been for him an uncongenial duty. This
loquacious minister led a procession of European diplomats to
General Huerta, formally advised that warrior to yield to the
American demands and withdraw from the Presidency of Mexico. The
delegation informed the grim dictator that their governments were
supporting the American policy and Sir Lionel brought him the
unwelcome news that he could not depend upon British support.
About the same time Premier Asquith made conciliatory remarks
on Mexico at the Guildhall banquet. He denied that the British
Government had undertaken any policy "deliberately opposed
to that of the United States. There is no vestige of foundation
for such a rumour." These events changed the atmosphere at
Washington, which now became almost as cordial to Great Britain
as it had for several months been suspicious.

.

<P ALIGN=CENTER>To Edward M. House

London, November 15, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

All's well here. The whole trouble was caused not here but
in Mexico City; and that is to be remedied yet. And it will be!
For the moment it is nullified. But you need give yourself no
concern about the English Government or people, in the long run.
It is taking them some time to see the vast difference between
acting by a principle and acting by what they call a "policy."
They and we ourselves too have from immemorial time been recognizing
successful adventurers, and they didn't instantly understand
this new "idealistic" move; they didn't know the man
at the helm! I preached many sermons to our friend, I explained
the difference to many private groups, I made after-dinner speeches
leading right up to the point---as far as I dared, I inspired
many newspaper articles; and they see it now and have said it
and have made it public; and the British people are enthusiastic
as far as they understand it.

And anybody concerned here understands the language that the
President speaks now. You mustn't forget that in all previous
experiences in Latin America we ourselves have been as much to
blame as anybody else. Now we have a clear road to travel, a
policy based on character to follow forever---a new era. Our
dealing with Cuba was a new chapter in the history of the world.
Our dealing with Mexico is Chapter II of the same Revelation.
Tell 'em this in Washington.

The remaining task will be done too and I think pretty soon.
For that I need well-loaded shells. I'll supply the gunpowder.

And don't you concern yourself about the English. They're
all right---a little slow, but all right.

Heartily yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

.
<P ALIGN=CENTER>To Edward M. House

Newtimber Place, Hassocks, Sussex,
Sunday, November 23, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

Your letter telling me about Tyrrell and the President brought
me great joy. Tyrrell is in every way a square fellow, much like
his Chief; and, you may depend on it, they are playing fair---in
their slow way. They always think of India and of Egypt---never
of Cuba. Lord! Lord! the fun I've had, the holy joy I am having
(I never expected to have such exalted and invigorating felicity)
in delivering elementary courses of instruction in democracy
to the British Government. Deep down at the bottom, they don't
know what Democracy means. Their Empire is in the way. Their
centuries of land-stealing are in the way. Their unsleeping watchfulness
of British commerce is in the way. "You say you'll shoot
men into self-government," said Sir Edward. "Doesn't
that strike you as comical?" And I answered, "It is
comical only to the Briton and to others who have associated
shooting with subjugation. We associate shooting with freedom."
Half this blessed Sunday at this country house I have been ramming
the idea down the throat of the Lord Chancellor.(<A NAME="n37"></A><A
HREF="Pagenotes.htm#37">37</A>) He sees it, too, being
a Scotchman. I take the members of the Government, as I get the
chance or can make it, and go over with them the A B C of the
President's principle: no territorial annexation; no trafficking
with tyrants; no stealing of American governments by concession
or financial thimble-rigging. They'll not recognize another Huerta---they're
sick of that. And they'll not endanger our friendship. They didn't
see the idea in the beginning. Of course the real trouble has
been in Mexico City---Carden. They don't know yet just what he
did. But they will, if I can find out. I haven't yet been able
to make them tell me at Washington. Washington is a deep hole
of silence toward ambassadors. By gradual approaches, I'm going
to prove that Carden can do---and in a degree has already done---as
much harm as Bryce did good---and all about a paltry few hundreds
of million dollars' worth of oil. What the devil does the oil
or the commerce of Mexico or the investments there amount to
in comparison with the close friendship of the two nations? Carden
can't be good long: he'll break out again presently. He has no
political imagination. That's a rather common disease here, too.
Few men have. It's good fun. I'm inviting the Central and South
American Ministers to lunch with me, one by one, and I'm incidentally
loading them up. I have all the boys in the Embassy full of zeal
and they are tackling the Secretaries of the Central and South
American legations. We've got a principle now to deal
by with them. They'll see after a while.

English people are all right, too---except the Doctrinaires.
They write much rank ignorance. But the learned men learn things
last of all.

I thank you heartily for your good news about Tyrrell, about
the President (but I'm sorry he's tired: make him quit eating
meat and play golf); about the Panama tolls; about the Currency
Bill (my love to McAdoo); about my own little affairs.---We are
looking with the very greatest pleasure to the coming of the
young White House couple. I've got two big dinners for them---Sir
Edward, the Lord Chancellor, a duchess or two, some good folk,
Ruth Bryan, a couple of ambassadors, etc., etc., etc. Then we'll
take 'em to a literary speaking-feast or two, have 'em invited
to a few great houses; then we'll give 'em another dinner, and
then we'll get a guide for them to see all the reforming institutions
in London, to their hearts' content---lots of fun.

Lots of fun: I got the American Society for its Thanksgiving
dinner to invite the Lord Chancellor to respond to a toast to
the President. He's been to the United States lately and he is
greatly pleased. So far, so good. Then I came down here---where
he, too, is staying. After five or six hours' talk about everything
else he said, " By the way, your countrymen have invited
me," etc., etc. "Now what would be appropriate to talk
about?" Then I poured him full of the New Principle as regards
Central and South America; for, if he will talk on that, what
he says will be reported and read on both continents. He's a
foxy Scot, and he didn't say he would, but he said that he'd
consider it. "Consider" means that he will confer with
Sir Edward. I'm beginning to learn their vocabulary. Anyhow the
Lord Chancellor is in line.

It's good news you send always. Keep it up--keep it up. The
volume of silence that I get is oppressive. You remember the
old nigger that wished to pick a quarrel with another old nigger?
Nigger No. 1 swore and stormed at nigger No. 2, and kept on swearing
and storming, hoping to provoke him. Nigger No. 2 said not a
word, but kept at his work. Nigger No. 1 swore and stormed more.
Nigger No. 2 said not a word. Nigger No. 1 frothed still more.
Nigger No. 2, still silent. Nigger No. 1 got desperate and said:
"Look here, you kinky-headed, flat-nosed, slab-footed nigger,
I warns you 'fore God, don't you keep givin' me none o' your
damned silence!" I wish you'd tell all my friends that story.