Computational social choice is an area on the intersection of computer
science, mathematics, and economics, which deals with algorithmic issues
that arise in group decision making. In this course, we will focus on
algorithms regarding elections, and we will discuss some classic and
cutting-edge results on this topic. We will start with problems
regarding single-winner elections, complexity of winner determination
and various problems regarding affecting their results. In the second
part of the course, we will consider multiwinner elections, where our
goal is to select a committee (of people,
of items, of web pages) that jointly serve some purpose (form a good
parliament, are attractive items to present on the homepage of an
Internet store, are good answers to a given query). We will consider
axiomatic properties of a number of voting rules and consider the
complexity of computing their results.

On the technical side, this course will mostly discuss algorithmic and
complexity-theoretic results (exact, approximate, fixed-parameter
tractable algorithms, NP-hardness, etc.), as well as results from
discrete math (e.g., axiomatic characterizations of voting rules).