Summary: Cooperative Inter-Domain Traffic Engineering
Using Nash Bargaining and Decomposition
Gireesh Shrimali Aditya Akella Almir Mutapcic
Stanford University
, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Abstract-- We present a new inter-domain traffic engineer-
ing protocol based on the concepts of Nash bargaining and
dual decomposition. Under this scheme, ISPs use an iterative
procedure to jointly optimize a social cost function, referred
to as the Nash product. We show that the global optimization
problem can be separated into sub-problems by introducing
appropriate shadow prices on the inter-domain flows. These
sub-problems can then be solved independently and in a
decentralized manner by the individual ISPs. Our approach
does not require the ISPs to share any sensitive internal
information (such as network topology or link weights). More
importantly, our approach is provably Pareto-efficient and fair.
Therefore, we believe that our approach is highly amenable to
adoption by ISPs when compared to past naive approaches.
We conduct simulation studies of our approach over several