1. We were appointed on 11 July "to consider
and report on any draft civil contingencies Bill presented to
both Houses by a Minister of the Crown" and to do so by the
end of November 2003. The nature of the Parliamentary calendar,
however, is such that only 11 of those 21 weeks were available
for deliberation and the taking of evidence. This report therefore
only covers the main issues that appear to us to be of major concern,
making generalised recommendations on the substance of the Bill
and how it might be improved. It contains only a few detailed
proposed drafting changes. We should also record that the draft
of the regulations to be issued under Part 1 of the Bill, which
will identify the nature and extent of the duties to be imposed,
were not available to us. We were therefore unable to consider
their potential consequences on those that they may affect.

2. The Government has been engaged in wide-ranging
consultation, since before the events of 11 September 2001, on
the desirability of improving the UK's resilience to disruptive
challenge and the need to update the Emergency Powers Act 1920
and Civil Defence Act 1948. Those recent events however, led to
a reappraisal of the range of concerns to be considered, and it
was not until June 2003 that the draft Bill was published[1]
with explanatory notes, regulatory impact assessments, and a consultation
document.

3. Given the limited time available to us, we decided
not to issue a call for evidence but to rely instead on the responses
to the Government's own Consultation Document, which went to a
wide range of representative organisations. We did however seek
written comments on some specific issues from academic lawyers
and representative organisations that are closely involved in
contingency planning, and took oral evidence from a limited number
of witnesses. We appointed as specialist advisers Dr James Broderick,
Professor Clive Walker and Mr Garth Whitty and are most grateful
to them for their advice and expertise, which have greatly assisted
this inquiry. We were also guided in our deliberations by some
valuable comments from the House of Commons Defence Committee[2],
the Joint Committee on Human Rights[3],
the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution[4],
the House of Commons Transport Committee[5]
and the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform
Committee.[6] We were not
however, able to take account of the House of Commons Science
and Technology Committee's Report on "The Scientific Response
to Terrorism"[7],
which was published on 6 November, after we had completed our
deliberations.

Schedule 1 lists what are described in Part 1
as Category 1 and 2 Responders.

Schedule 2 is a comprehensive list of repeals,
including the Emergency Powers Act 1920 and the Civil Defence
Act 1948.

5. We agree with the large majority of stakeholders
who have shown general acceptance of the principle set out in
Part 1, namely that local bodies should have a statutory duty
to make contingency plans for dealing with a wide range of emergencies
and Government should have a role in ensuring national consistency.
We have concerns, however, that the draft Bill lacks sufficient
detail or provides adequate safeguards against potential misuse.
In the absence of publication of the regulations and guidance,
we agree that the draft Bill is something of "a 'leap of
faith' because we cannot judge the legislation until we
see the content of the regulations and also the funding".[9]

6. Our consideration of the draft Bill has been undertaken
in the knowledge that it is an enabling measure which may not
be invoked for a generation or more. Our concern, particularly
in respect of Part 2, is to ensure that the Bill does not provide
any exploitable opportunity to misuse emergency powers and potentially,
in a worst case scenario, allow for the dismantling of democracy.
In the course of his evidence, the Minister in charge of the draft
Bill referred several times to the need to achieve "balance"
in the provisions. In our view, given the nature of the legislation,
the emphasis should be on precision and clarity, to ensure that
the principles of democracy cannot easily be undermined.

12. We are concerned that regulations
should not be able to contravene any of the inalienable rights
protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. We recommend
that the Bill prohibit regulations which would breach any of the
Convention rights from which it is not possible to derogate or
any provision in the Geneva Conventions. (Chapter 4)

16. While we believe that there
is a good case for central government to meet all emergency planning
costs, the debate and the final decision need to be informed by
facts, not assumptions. We believe that the Government should
initiate, as a matter of urgency, a comprehensive review of the
funding provision once the detail of the regulations is known.
(Chapter 6)

18. There is also some concern about
crisis management in general. We recognise the merits of the "lead
department" concept in terms of providing advice, but believe
that the critical role of the Regional Nominated Coordinator in
England (Emergency Coordinator in Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland) should be allocated to an individual with proven management
skills, preferably in crisis management. We also believe that
the planning process would be enhanced through the creation of
a Civil Contingencies Agency, which would incorporate the dedicated
inspectorate. This would act as a source of advice on a range
of contingency planning issues and should report annually to Parliament
through the Home Secretary. (Chapter 7)

20. There is no mention of the regional tier on the
face of the draft Bill, apart from clauses outlining the appointment
and duties of Regional Nominated Coordinators. We
are concerned by the absence, in England, of a statutory basis
for regional governance by appointees. We believe that the role
of the regional tier should be detailed in statute on the face
of the Bill; that it should be subject to the same range of performance
criteria as local Responders; and that the role of democratically
elected members on the regional bodies should be consistent across
all regions.

21. The Bill allows for proclamation of an emergency
to be made at a regional level. We question the wisdom of the
intention, in England, to use the Government Office regions as
its basis. These regions have been created for administrative
convenience, are often very large and do not have a separate legal
personality.[15] We suggest
that Part 2 should include the
flexibility to proclaim emergencies in geographical rather than
administrative areas in circumstances which so dictate. (Chapter
8)