ANDERSON, J.: Oscar Roy Padgett was convicted of failure to stop for
a blue light. The trial court sentenced him to a three-year term of imprisonment.
We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 31, 2000 at approximately 8:30 p.m., Officer Gerard Grenier of the
Ridge Spring Police Department observed a black Mustang parked at the gasoline
pumps at Kent’s Corner Gas Station on the corner of Highway 23 and Pecan Grove
Road in Ridge Spring. Officer Grenier recognized the vehicle as the same one
he had stopped two months earlier for a license tag violation. Padgett was
driving the vehicle at the time of the prior stop and had explained to Officer
Grenier that he had purchased it only a few days earlier.

Officer Grenier testified that, on the night in question, he saw
Padgett get into the vehicle and decided to follow Padgett to ascertain whether
he had obtained proper tags for the car. As he “squared off” behind the Mustang
on Highway 23, Officer Grenier noticed that no license tags were affixed to
the vehicle and, therefore, activated his patrol car’s blue lights. He stated
the driver of the vehicle did not stop in response to the blue lights, but rather
drove slowly for a time, turned onto Trojan Road, accelerated the vehicle, and
crossed over Highway 1 into Aiken. According to Officer Grenier, he pursued
Padgett with his siren and blue lights on for about three-fourths of a mile
outside of Ridge Spring, then terminated the pursuit. He returned to Kent’s
Corner and questioned the store manager regarding the identity of the person
driving the black Mustang. The manager informed Officer Grenier that the driver
was Oscar Padgett. Thereafter, Officer Grenier obtained a warrant for Padgett’s
arrest.

Officer Leroy Smith, who was on patrol with Grenier the night of the pursuit,
verified Officer Grenier’s account of the events.In particular, Officer
Smith confirmed that Officer Grenier turned on the patrol car’s blue lights
before Padgett turned onto Trojan Road and, thus, before he left the Ridge Spring
city limits.

At the close of the State’s case, Padgett moved for a directed
verdict of acquittal based generally on lack of sufficient evidence. The trial
court denied the motion.

Padgett declared he was not in Ridge Spring on
the night of October 31, 2000. He further asserted the transmission on his
black Mustang was malfunctioning at the time and had been parked in his back
yard.

At the close of evidence, Padgett renewed his motion for a directed
verdict. The trial court again denied the motion.The jury returned
a guilty verdict.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, an appellate court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Walker,
349 S.C. 49, 562 S.E.2d 313 (2002); State v. Morgan, S.C., 574 S.E.2d 203 (Ct. App. 2002). When ruling on a motion for a directed
verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of
evidence, not its weight. State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 564 S.E.2d 87
(2002); State v. McLauren, 349 S.C. 488, 563 S.E.2d 346 (Ct. App. 2002).
A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce
evidence of the offense charged. State v. McKnight, Op. No. 25585 (S.C.
Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 2003) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 3 at 42); State v.
McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 544 S.E.2d 30 (2001). However, if there is any direct
evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove
the guilt of the accused, this Court must find the case was properly submitted
to the jury. State v. Harris, 351 S.C. 643, 572 S.E.2d 267 (2002); State
v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 184, 562 S.E.2d 320 (Ct. App. 2002).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction
of Law Enforcement Officer

Padgett asserts the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict
of acquittal on the charge of failure to stop for a blue light due to the lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the pursuing officer. Padgett claims the officer
did not turn on his blue lights until he was “outside the corporate limits according
to the city map.”

The polestar of the factual inquiry in this case is a determination
of when the law enforcement activity began and whether it originated in the
town limits.

Law enforcement officer jurisdiction when in pursuit of offender; authority,
rights, privileges, and immunities extended.

(A) When the police authorities of a town or city
are in pursuit of an offender for a violation of a municipal ordinance or statute
of this State committed within the corporate limits, the authorities may arrest
the offender, with or without a warrant, at a place within the corporate limits,
at a place within the county in which the town or city is located, or at a place
within a radius of three miles of the corporate limits.

Padgett correctly notes that section 17-13-40(A), by its terms, operates
to limit the jurisdictional authority of town and city police officers to effectuate
arrests. However, the mere fact that there existed some question as to whether
the officers in the instant case were operating outside of their jurisdictional
limitations does not automatically give rise to the propriety of a directed
verdict on the issue. To the contrary, the facts and circumstances attendant
to this case present quintessential factual issues regarding the exercise of
the statutory grant of jurisdiction.

The officers’ testimony that they initiated the attempted traffic stop inside
the Ridge Spring city limits, standing alone, constituted sufficient evidence
to defeat Padgett’s motion for a directed verdict on the ground the officers
lacked jurisdiction to make the stop. Cf.State v. McAteer, 340
S.C. 644, 646, 532 S.E.2d 865, 866 (2000) (concluding that “[s]ince the officer
was outside the municipality’s city limits when he first observed petitioner,
he had no police authority to detain him.”). In ruling on the motion for a
directed verdict, the trial judge properly limited his inquiry to the existence
or nonexistence of evidence tending to establish the officers operated within
the confines of section 17-13-40(A), not the weight of that evidence. SeeState v. Morgan, 282 S.C. 409, 319 S.E.2d 335 (1984). The trial court
did not err in denying Padgett’s motion for a directed verdict.

II. Reasonable Suspicion
to Warrant Traffic Pursuit

Padgett contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion
for a directed verdict on the charge of failure to stop for a blue light due
to the lack of reasonable suspicion to warrant the traffic pursuit. We disagree.

A police officer may conduct a constitutionally valid traffic stop when the
officer has a reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant is
subject to seizure for violation of the law. SeeDelaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). As long as an officer reasonably
suspects the driver is violating “any one of the multitude of applicable traffic
and equipment regulations,” the police officer may legally stop the vehicle.
Id. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d at 672. Reasonable suspicion
is a lesser standard than probable cause and allows an officer to effectuate
a stop when there is some objective manifestation of criminal activity involving
the person stopped. SeeUnited States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer
can identify specific facts that, when taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief
that the detainee has committed (or is committing) a crime. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The propriety of a stop must
be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances. SeeUnited States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981).

No further inquiry beyond the requirement of reasonable suspicion
is necessary or warranted. State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App. 3d 585, 657
N.E.2d 591 (1995). Thus, if the specific and articulable facts available to
an officer indicate a motorist may be committing a criminal act, which includes
the violation of a traffic law, the officer is justified in making the stop.
Id. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has concluded an officer’s
subjective motive does not invalidate behavior that is objectively justified
under the Fourth Amendment. SeeWhren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (police officer may stop driver for
any observed traffic offense even if officer’s motivation for making stop is
unrelated to observed traffic offense). To satisfy the reasonable suspicion
standard, the State is not required to prove the suspected motor vehicle violation
occurred. State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 650 A.2d 348 (1994); see
alsoMarben v. State of Minnesota, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d
697 (Minn. 1980) (an actual traffic violation need not be detectable; all that
is required is that the stop be not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle
curiosity).

Jihad, 342 S.C. at 147-48, 536 S.E.2d at 83-84.

Pursuant to South Carolina Code Ann. § 56-3-1240 (Supp. 2002), “[i]t is unlawful
to operate or drive a motor vehicle with the license plate missing and a person
who is convicted for violating this section must be punished as provided by
Section 56-3-2520.” Officer Grenier testified he noticed that the vehicle he
pursued on October 31, 2000 did not have a license tag affixed to it. Because
the mere act of driving a vehicle without a license plate is a chargeable offense,
Officer Grenier’s observation that the plate was missing from the vehicle constituted
reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. The fact that Officer Grenier
was prompted to check for the missing license plate by his recollection of a
prior stop of the same vehicle does not negate the existence of reasonable suspicion
to initiate the stop when he actually observed Padgett committing a traffic
offense on the night in question. Concomitantly, we find the case was properly
submitted to the jury.