Handbook of Warning Intelligence

Complete and Declassified Edition

Cynthia Grabo - With Jan Goldman

This new and final edition is a follow-up to the author’s first book, Anticipating Surprise (University Press of America, 2002) and the Handbook of Warning Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2010). The first book was an abridged version of Grabo’s 1972 manuscript, of which only 200 pages were allowed to be published by the government. The second book was published after it was agreed that the last 10 chapters would remain classified. These final 10 chapters have recently been released by the government and complete the manuscript as it was originally intended to be published by the author in 1972.

The Handbook of Warning Intelligence was written during the cold war and was classified for 40 years. Originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts, it explains the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting, discusses military analysis, as well as the difficulties in understanding political, civil, and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment."

Much of what Grabo wrote in her book seems to appear in many of the numerous commission reports that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. However, her book was written in response to the "surprise attack" of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to the author, that event was no surprise. And while analysts have to take some of the blame for their failure to strenuously present their case that the threat was real and imminent, what occurred was a failure by policymakers to listen to the warning intelligence reports that were written at the time.

In these last chapters, Grabo discusses scenarios where the United States will need to take action, especially describing Soviet indicators of such action. She also talks on how to influence policymakers to take, or not take, action based on intelligence. After the Soviet Union fell, the government was hesitant to release this information—especially considering what's going on with Putin today. « lessmore »

Cynthia Grabo received her bachelor's and master's degrees from the University of Chicago. In 1942, she was recruited by Army Intelligence as an analyst on Latin America. In 1949, she transferred to the Soviet branch and was assigned to analysis of Communist military threats. From 1950 to 1975, she was a researcher and writer for the U.S. Watch Committee, the inter-agency intelligence committee responsible for warning of threats to the U.S. and its allies. She subsequently served on the Intelligence Community's Strategic Warning Staff. Ms. Grabo was a recognized authority in the field of strategic warning. Her awards included the Defense Intelligence Agency's Exceptional Civilian Service Medal, the Sherman Kent award for outstanding contribution to the literature of intelligence, and the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement.

Jan Goldman is Professor of Intelligence and National Security Studies at Tiffin University. He has been an analyst and educator in the intelligence and academic communities for over 30 years. He is the founding editor of a series of textbooks for the intelligence profession, Security Professionals Intelligence Education Series–SPIES (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers), and an academic journal focusing on ethics and intelligence. His most recent publications include War on Terror Encyclopedia: From the Rise of Al Qaeda to 9/11 and Beyond, and The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Operations, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies. He received his doctorate from George Washington University.

Foreword to the new editionForeword to the previous editionAuthor’s note to the original editionPart I: Why Warning Intelligence And What Is It? Some Fundamentals Chapter 1: General Nature of the Problem Chapter 2: Definitions of Terms and Their Usage Chapter 3: What Warning Is and Is Not Chapter 4: Warning and Collection Chapter 5: Intentions versus Capabilities

Part III: Introduction to the Analytical Method Chapter 10: Some Fundamentals of Indications Analysis Chapter 11: Some Specifics of the Analytical Method. Chapter 12: What Makes a Good Warning Analyst?

Part IV: Specific Problems of Military Analysis Chapter 13: Importance of Military Indications Chapter 14: Order of Bottle Analysis in Crisis Situations Chapter 15: Analysis of Mobilization Chapter 16: Logistics is the Queen of Battles Chapter 17: Other Factors in Combat Preparations Chapter 18: Coping with Extraordinary Military Developments

Part VI: Some Major Analytical Problems Chapter 25: Warning from the Totality of Evidence Chapter 26: The Impact on Warning of Circumstances Leading to War Chapter 27: Reconstructing the Enemy’s Decision Making Process Chapter 28: Assessing the Timing of Attack Chapter 29: Deception: Can We Cope With It?

The following chapters are new to this edition.Part VII: Problems of Particular Types Of Warfare Chapter 30: Analysis with Hostilities Already in Progress Chapter 31: Problems Peculiar to Guerrilla Warfare and “Wars of Liberation”Chapter 32: Hypothetical Problems of the Coming of World War III

Part VIII: Reaching And Reporting The Warning Judgment Chapter 33: Vital Importance of the Judgment Chapter 34: What Does the Policy Maker Need, and Want to Know? Chapter 35: How to Write Indications or Warning Items Chapter 36: Assessing Probabilities Chapter 37: Some Major Factors Influencing Judgments and Reporting Chapter 38: Most Frequent Errors in the Judgment and Reporting Process

Part IX: Conclusions Chapter 39: A Summing Up, With Some Do’s and Don'ts for Analysts and Supervisors

About the Authors

Cynthia Grabo’s original Handbook of Warning Intelligence, written in the aftermath of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia has, at long last, been fully declassified. The hitherto secret Part III of her study is now accessible for a public readership in this definitive volume. Professionals, scholars of Intelligence and Security Studies, students of International Affairs, and readers sharing an interest in Conflict and Crisis Management generally will all gain valuable historical and analytical insights from this most valuable—and greatly valued—manual.

The focal points on the hitherto classified Part III are on intelligence analysis relating to particular types of warfare, and the provision of relevant, actionable warning intelligence to policy makers. Although the original time frame of the Handbook preceded the contemporary threat of Militant Jihadism, Cynthia Grabo’s risk assessments should provide important insights into current, all the more complex intelligence challenges facing analysts and policy makers. The issues addressed in the concluding chapters dealing with the making of analytical judgments regarding imminent threats, and with conveying these threat warnings upwards to managers and policy maker, are all the more telling and pertinent in today’s very volatile global security environment. This is a “need to know” Handbook of Warning Intelligence, a Complete and Declassified Work of Cynthina Grabo.— Martin Rudner, distinguished research professor emeritus at Carleton University, Ottawa. Prior to his retirement he was a professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, and founding director of the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies at Carleton

Handbook of Warning Intelligence

Complete and Declassified Edition

Hardback

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Summary

Summary

This new and final edition is a follow-up to the author’s first book, Anticipating Surprise (University Press of America, 2002) and the Handbook of Warning Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2010). The first book was an abridged version of Grabo’s 1972 manuscript, of which only 200 pages were allowed to be published by the government. The second book was published after it was agreed that the last 10 chapters would remain classified. These final 10 chapters have recently been released by the government and complete the manuscript as it was originally intended to be published by the author in 1972.

The Handbook of Warning Intelligence was written during the cold war and was classified for 40 years. Originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts, it explains the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting, discusses military analysis, as well as the difficulties in understanding political, civil, and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment."

Much of what Grabo wrote in her book seems to appear in many of the numerous commission reports that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. However, her book was written in response to the "surprise attack" of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to the author, that event was no surprise. And while analysts have to take some of the blame for their failure to strenuously present their case that the threat was real and imminent, what occurred was a failure by policymakers to listen to the warning intelligence reports that were written at the time.

In these last chapters, Grabo discusses scenarios where the United States will need to take action, especially describing Soviet indicators of such action. She also talks on how to influence policymakers to take, or not take, action based on intelligence. After the Soviet Union fell, the government was hesitant to release this information—especially considering what's going on with Putin today.

Cynthia Grabo received her bachelor's and master's degrees from the University of Chicago. In 1942, she was recruited by Army Intelligence as an analyst on Latin America. In 1949, she transferred to the Soviet branch and was assigned to analysis of Communist military threats. From 1950 to 1975, she was a researcher and writer for the U.S. Watch Committee, the inter-agency intelligence committee responsible for warning of threats to the U.S. and its allies. She subsequently served on the Intelligence Community's Strategic Warning Staff. Ms. Grabo was a recognized authority in the field of strategic warning. Her awards included the Defense Intelligence Agency's Exceptional Civilian Service Medal, the Sherman Kent award for outstanding contribution to the literature of intelligence, and the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement.

Jan Goldman is Professor of Intelligence and National Security Studies at Tiffin University. He has been an analyst and educator in the intelligence and academic communities for over 30 years. He is the founding editor of a series of textbooks for the intelligence profession, Security Professionals Intelligence Education Series–SPIES (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers), and an academic journal focusing on ethics and intelligence. His most recent publications include War on Terror Encyclopedia: From the Rise of Al Qaeda to 9/11 and Beyond, and The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Operations, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies. He received his doctorate from George Washington University.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Foreword to the new editionForeword to the previous editionAuthor’s note to the original editionPart I: Why Warning Intelligence And What Is It? Some Fundamentals Chapter 1: General Nature of the Problem Chapter 2: Definitions of Terms and Their Usage Chapter 3: What Warning Is and Is Not Chapter 4: Warning and Collection Chapter 5: Intentions versus Capabilities

Part III: Introduction to the Analytical Method Chapter 10: Some Fundamentals of Indications Analysis Chapter 11: Some Specifics of the Analytical Method. Chapter 12: What Makes a Good Warning Analyst?

Part IV: Specific Problems of Military Analysis Chapter 13: Importance of Military Indications Chapter 14: Order of Bottle Analysis in Crisis Situations Chapter 15: Analysis of Mobilization Chapter 16: Logistics is the Queen of Battles Chapter 17: Other Factors in Combat Preparations Chapter 18: Coping with Extraordinary Military Developments

Part VI: Some Major Analytical Problems Chapter 25: Warning from the Totality of Evidence Chapter 26: The Impact on Warning of Circumstances Leading to War Chapter 27: Reconstructing the Enemy’s Decision Making Process Chapter 28: Assessing the Timing of Attack Chapter 29: Deception: Can We Cope With It?

The following chapters are new to this edition.Part VII: Problems of Particular Types Of Warfare Chapter 30: Analysis with Hostilities Already in Progress Chapter 31: Problems Peculiar to Guerrilla Warfare and “Wars of Liberation”Chapter 32: Hypothetical Problems of the Coming of World War III

Part VIII: Reaching And Reporting The Warning Judgment Chapter 33: Vital Importance of the Judgment Chapter 34: What Does the Policy Maker Need, and Want to Know? Chapter 35: How to Write Indications or Warning Items Chapter 36: Assessing Probabilities Chapter 37: Some Major Factors Influencing Judgments and Reporting Chapter 38: Most Frequent Errors in the Judgment and Reporting Process

Part IX: Conclusions Chapter 39: A Summing Up, With Some Do’s and Don'ts for Analysts and Supervisors

About the Authors

Reviews

Reviews

Cynthia Grabo’s original Handbook of Warning Intelligence, written in the aftermath of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia has, at long last, been fully declassified. The hitherto secret Part III of her study is now accessible for a public readership in this definitive volume. Professionals, scholars of Intelligence and Security Studies, students of International Affairs, and readers sharing an interest in Conflict and Crisis Management generally will all gain valuable historical and analytical insights from this most valuable—and greatly valued—manual.

The focal points on the hitherto classified Part III are on intelligence analysis relating to particular types of warfare, and the provision of relevant, actionable warning intelligence to policy makers. Although the original time frame of the Handbook preceded the contemporary threat of Militant Jihadism, Cynthia Grabo’s risk assessments should provide important insights into current, all the more complex intelligence challenges facing analysts and policy makers. The issues addressed in the concluding chapters dealing with the making of analytical judgments regarding imminent threats, and with conveying these threat warnings upwards to managers and policy maker, are all the more telling and pertinent in today’s very volatile global security environment. This is a “need to know” Handbook of Warning Intelligence, a Complete and Declassified Work of Cynthina Grabo.— Martin Rudner, distinguished research professor emeritus at Carleton University, Ottawa. Prior to his retirement he was a professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, and founding director of the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies at Carleton