The Intelligence Community has completed its
classification review of the Independent Panel's report on NIE
95-19: "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the
Next 15 Years." Enclosed is the unclassified version of the
panel's report. The Chairman of the ' panel, former DCI Robert
Gates, testified on the judgments of the report before Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence in a public hearing on 4
December 1996.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any further
questions on this matter.

Sincerely,

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

NIE 95-19:
INDEPENDENT PANEL REVIEW OF "EMERGING MISSILE THREATS TO NORTH AMERICA DURING THE NEXT 15 YEARS"

Congress directed the Director of Central Intelligence to
review the underlying assumptions and conclusions of National
Intelligence Estimate 95-19, "Emerging Missile Threats to North
America During the Next 15 Years." The legislation required that
this review be carried out by an independent, non-governmental
panel of individuals with appropriate expertise and experience. To
comply with the legislation, DCI Deutch asked former Director of
Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates to chair the Panel. The other
members included Ambassador Richard Armitage, now engaged in a
range of worldwide business and policy endeavors. Past experiences
include service as Coordinator for Emergency Humanitarian
Assistance to the former Soviet Union in 1992, Presidential Special
Negotiator for the Philippines Base Agreement in 1989, and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
in 1983; Dr. Sidney Drell, Professor and Deputy Director, Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center, Member, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, past Chairman, SSCI Technology Review Panel, and
HASC Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety; Dr. Arnold Kanter, a Senior
Associate at the Forum for International Policy in Washington, DC
He has served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
Special Assistant to the President for Defense Policy and Arms
Control at the National Security Council, and in private industry
he directed the national security strategies program at the Rand
Corporation. Dr. Janne E. Nolan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, past
senior designee to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and member
of the President Clinton National Security Transition Team; Mr.
Henry S. Rowen, Professor Emeritus with the Graduate School of
Business Administration at Stanford University, past President of
the Rand Corporation, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, and Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council; and Major General Jasper Welch, USAF (Ret), a
private consultant to government and industry; he previously served
as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, Assistant Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis,
Headquarters, USAF, and Defense Policy Coordinator, National
Security Council Staff. The conclusions of the panel are organized
under three issues: politicization, process, and presentation.
These have the unanimous support of the panel members.

Politicization

Certain Members of Congress alleged that NIE 95-19 had been
"politicized," implying that Intelligence Community analysts' views
had been influenced by policymakers or individual policy preferences
seeking to downplay an emerging missile threat. The Panel found no
evidence of politicization and is completely satisfied that the
analysts' views were based on the evidence before them and their
substantive analysis. There was no breach of the integrity of the
intelligence process. Beyond this, the Panel believes that
unsubstantiated allegations challenging the integrity of
Intelligence Community analysts by those who simply disagree with
their conclusions, including Members of Congress, are irresponsible.
Intelligence forecasts do not represent "revealed truth," and it
should be possible to disagree with them without attacking the
character and integrity of those who prepared them--or the integrity
of the intelligence process itself.

Process

1. While the conclusions of a National Intelligence Estimate
must not be influenced by policy debates or views, Estimates cannot
be prepared in a political vacuum--at least if they are to be
relevant. Particularly when controversial issues are involved, it is

the task of senior Intelligence Community officials to ensure that
an Estimate addresses its subject matter in such a way as to
anticipate questions and potential criticisms while fully protecting
the integrity of the intelligence process. It also is the job of
senior Intelligence Community officials to ensure that the outcome
of an Estimate is not predetermined by the way in which the policy
requester asks the question. While an Estimate must answer and give
a best estimate in response to the question asked, senior
intelligence officials must make certain that the Estimate addresses
the issue in a comprehensive manner that provides both perspective
and context. When the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
and Space Command quite legitimately request an Estimate on future
missile threats, senior intelligence officials must recognize that
the Estimate is likely to be a political football. They should take
special steps to ensure that an Estimate with conclusions which may
be unwelcome to a policy requester--or which alters previous
judgments--provides unusually comprehensive analysis, clearly states
the reasons for any change in previous judgments, explores
alternative scenarios, and is candid about uncertainties and
shortcomings in evidence. In the case of NIE 95-19 far from
politicizing this Estimate, senior Intelligence Community managers
failed adequately to alert analysts to the sensitivity of this
Estimate, the uses to which it might be put in the policy debate,
and thus the need to err on the side of comprehensiveness--and the
need to draft the Estimate with great care. There was too much of a
hands-off approach by senior management in the preparation of this
Estimate. The result was not a politicized Estimate but one that
was politically naive.

2. There were continuing changes in the title of the Estimate.
This may have been due simply to editorial changes from original
request to final draft, but also may have reflected uncertainty
about the scope of the Estimate. At minimum, what were seemingly
minor changes narrowed the scope of the Estimate and opened the way
for embarrassing criticism. BMDO asked for an Estimate on the foreign
missile threat to the United States. Space Command asked for an
Estimate on the ballistic missile and cruise missile threat to North
America and to theater deployed forces and allies. The Estimate
ultimately focused only on North America, devoted inadequate
attention to the cruise missile problem, and did not address the
missile threat to theater and allied forces at all (as requested by
Space Command). The failure to more fully consider Alaska and Hawaii
(where, everyone knows, an attack provoked American entry into World
War II] was foolish from every possible perspective. In sum, the
failure to get the scope of the Estimate framed correctly set the
stage for future problems.

3. After months of delay and slow work on the terms of
reference, the loss of the original drafter, and the need to
rework an initially unsatisfactory first draft, final drafting of
the Estimate was done in haste in the fall of 1995. A likely
controversial Estimate, as the Senior Review Panel warned in
November 1995, that should have been drafted with unusual care and
thorough analysis, was rushed to completion. This haste led to
many of the presentational and analytical problems our Panel
identified.

Presentation

The Panel identified a number of problems in this Estimate--
problems we elaborate below. But, based on our investigation and
study of relevant documents, perhaps the most serious deficiency
is that the Intelligence Community's conclusions in the NIE with
respect to the intercontinental ballistic missile threat to the
United States are based on a stronger evidentiary and technical
case than was presented in the Estimate. The Vice Chairman for
Estimates of the National Intelligence Council on
October 12, 1995, and the Senior Review Panel on November 28, 1995,
both warned in so many words that the analysis was too thin for
such an important Estimate. While there may have been some effort
to be responsive to these cautions, it was clearly superficial and
inadequate. (U)

There was much that could have been added to the main text of
the Estimate that would have strengthened the analysts' case with
respect to the future timing of an intercontinental ballistic
missile threat to the United States:

1. A review of successful ballistic missile programs in other
countries such as China, India and even the Soviet Union and the
United States would have shown the lengthy time required to develop
and test a ballistic missile with intercontinental range (even to
Hawaii). For these countries, with vastly larger resources than
North Korea, their very different paths to development took many
years and numerous flight tests. For example, China took more than
20 years to develop its CSS-3 ICBM. India's Polar Satellite Launch

Vehicle took more than 15 years to develop.

2. The Estimate failed to point out that development of a
ballistic missile that could threaten the US ' involves two
separate challenges: acquisition of the hardware and system
integration. Community analysts make a strong case that even if
foreign countries were clandestinely to acquire critical
technologies and hardware, integrating that hardware into their
missiles would be a major and time-consuming challenge, even with
foreign engineering help. In addition, the difficulty of developing
an effective WMD warhead capable of surviving missile launch and
reentry, and integrating it onto a multi-stage intercontinental
ballistic missile poses additional challenges.

3. The text of the Estimate should have presented more
information on the technical obstacles to development of an
intercontinental ballistic missile that could hit the United
States. Some of this is in the Estimate, but much more-relating to
propulsion, re-entry vehicles, guidance, staging, the technical
challenges in moving from a SCUD missile derivative to an ICBM,
and more--is in the back-up materials for the Estimate.

4. The Estimate did not highlight at the outset where the
Intelligence Community's analysis had changed since the last
Estimate and, with specificity, why it had changed. Some years ago,
the annual Estimate on Soviet strategic forces began with a
summarized version of what was new and what had changed from the
year before. This helps the reader know what has happened and what
to look for in the detailed analysis.

5. The Estimate does not highlight what elements of a
strategic range ballistic missile program must be done in the open,
where they can be observed with some confidence; what elements of a
program the Intelligence Community believes it will know about with
confidence; and what elements we may well not know about and how
critical they are.

6. The Estimate was not as categorical as it could have been
that there would have to be a flight test of any missile actually
intended to hit the United States. No country in the world has
developed a long-range ballistic missile with multiple stages
without testing it, if for only demonstration purposes. (Moreover,
the Panel cannot imagine any country placing a biological or
nuclear warhead--using perhaps most of a rogue state's fissile
material--on an untested missile and lighting it off. The risk of
unsuccessful delivery or launch failure with potentially severe
local consequences would be very high.) Further, virtually every
flight test program for a new missile has lasted several years--no
matter which country has developed it. In short, if any country is
developing a ballistic missile that could reach the United States --
any of the fifty states--they will test it. The Community also
would help policymakers by providing information on how long a time
passed in China, India and elsewhere between the first flight test
and initial operating capability (and for that matter, between the
first successful flight test and initial operating capability).

7 The Estimate should have pointed out that missile
development programs and weapons of mass destruction programs in
other countries represent one of the highest priority issues for US
intelligence agencies. As such, both collection and analysis--and
estimating--will be ongoing, with regular reports to the Executive
and Legislative Branches of government. Policymakers can have high
confidence that any development of interest in this arena will be
reported promptly. In this light, the Estimate should have provided
to policymakers what analysts will be looking for as evidence of
progress in such missile programs. It also should provide an
estimate of minimum likely times from observation of such new
development to the IOC of a deployed threat.

Although the Panel was impressed by the technical analysis
and broad agreement across the Intelligence Community, and we found
the Community view on ballistic missile programs quite persuasive
(more so than the Estimate), there were nonetheless some very important
weaknesses and deficiencies in the analytical approach:

a. Perhaps most important among the deficiencies was the
failure to address adequately the motives and objectives of the
governments developing missile programs, and how they affect
technology needs. The brief discussion of motive focuses entirely
on deterrence and prestige.

Intelligence Community estimates on weapons programs and
strategic capabilities traditionally have been prepared by technical
analysts. In the days of the Soviet Union, strategic forces
estimates for years tended to avoid questions of doctrine and
purpose, in no small part because there were no clear answers, and
the issues were so violently disputed. Given the size of Soviet
forces, capability was considered all-important and most
policymakers did not object to the technical focus of those
estimates.

With the ballistic missile programs we are seeing now, however,
motive matters a great deal, and can significantly affect
technology. What is required technically for a crude terror weapon
is very different than what is required for a weapon that is
militarily useful. Placing the issue in recent historical context,
what is required in terms of guidance and control from a missile
launched from Iraq and targeted simply on the city of Tehran is
quite different than what is needed to hit a specific military base
or target in or near Tehran. Indeed it is conceivable to the Panel
that a country might assemble a missile that appears to have
intercontinental range but never test it, in order to intimidate the
US or other countries from taking action.

With respect to ballistic missiles of strategic range, motive
and how that might affect technology is given short shrift in the
Estimate because operational capability is judged so far into the
future.

b. By contrast, the Panel believes the Estimate did not give
nearly enough attention to the potential for land-attack cruise
missiles launched from within several hundred miles of US territory
The Estimate acknowledges the technical feasibility of such an
attack, but discounts the likelihood because of motive--the
Community thinks there are better ways to deliver a weapon of mass
destruction. In sum, there is an inconsistency in the Estimate in
its treatment of ballistic and cruise missiles. The former is
technologically infeasible now from North Korea or Iran (or others)
and thus motive is unimportant. The latter is technologically
feasible, but dismissed because the analysts don't know why anyone
would want to do that. (The Panel discussed several possible
reasons and scenarios.)

c. This inconsistency brought us to another problem: on a
challenge as important as the emerging missile threat to North
America, the Estimate fails to ask a critical question: what if our
potential adversaries pursue approaches--technical or otherwise-
unexpected by the Intelligence Community? While in this specific
Estimate the Community has a strong analytical case, the
consequences of being wrong are very high. This problem cries out
for an Intelligence Community commissioned Red Team, a group of
technically innovative men and women challenged to explore
alternative approaches that could lead to a missile threat-ballistic
or cruise--to the US earlier than 2010. And to keep on doing it in
order to assure there will be adequate time for appropriate US
responses to any observation of a new potential threat.

d. The Panel also believes that the possibility of a sea-based
ballistic missile of less than intercontinental range warrants more
attention than given in the Estimate. The' Estimate's assessment of
the ballistic missile threat to North America concentrates almost
exclusively on ballistic missiles with intercontinental range.
Consideration of scenarios involving crude Sea-launched ballistic
missiles (e.g., Scud-derived missiles launched from mobile launchers
driven aboard transport ships) is limited. Since developing missiles
with sufficient range was identified as one of the most difficult
technical obstacles which would have to be overcome before North
America would face an ICBM threat, the lack of serious attention to
possible SLBM threats is all the more noteworthy.

e. The Panel believes the Estimate places too much of a burden
on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a means of
limiting the flow of missile technology to rogue states. In our
view, actions by Russia and especially China to constrain ICBM
missile technology transfers have a great deal more to do with
evident self-interest than in international stigma. We acknowledge
(and believe) that the MTCR has been a positive influence,
especially in identifying key technologies, getting mutual agreement
that transfer of those technologies should not be allowed, making
such transfers a legitimate issue for diplomatic discussion, and
imposing political costs for violators. However, compliance with
MTCR is completely voluntary and each country makes its own
decisions.

f. With major forces of change still at play in Russia, the
Panel believes the Estimate's discussion of unauthorized launch is
superficial and may be overly sanguine. All agree that a launch
unauthorized by the Russian political leadership is a remote
possibility. But it would appear to be technically possible.

g. In this connection, the Panel notes that deteriorating
conditions inside Russia for the military, the military industrial
complex, and for weapons design and engineering institutions all
increase the danger of leakage of hardware and expertise that could
fuel? governments aspiring to develop ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

h. In sum, the estimate too easily dismisses missile scenarios
alternative to an indigenously developed and launched
intercontinental ballistic missile by countries hostile to the US,
such as, for example, a land attack cruise missile. It should have
assured policymakers that this issue will receive continuing high
priority, and that all possible technical alternatives will be
investigated vigorously and time to respond can be provided. In
international affairs, 15 years is a very long time. A decade ago,
the notion that the Soviet Union would collapse add disappear within
five years would have been regarded by most as ridiculous. The
United States cannot rule out the possibility of a strategic change
of direction or policy in Russia or China--or in other countries-
over a fifteen-year span of time that might lead to the sale of a
long-range missile system to a Third World country. Nor can the US
rule out that potential adversaries will turn to missile threats
other than ballistic missiles of intercontinental range. However,
the Panel believes the Intelligence Community has a strong case
that, for sound technical reasons, the United States is unlikely to
face an indigenously developed and tested intercontinental ballistic
missile threat from the Third World before 2010, even taking into
account the acquisition of foreign hardware and technical
assistance. That case is even stronger than presented in the NIE.