Ra Jong-yil is national security advisor to South
Korean President Roh Moo Hyun.

Seoul—The policy of the present
Korean administration is at once a continuation and expansion of the "sunshine
policy" initiated by former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung.
Even in light of North Korea’s recent claim that it possesses a
nuclear weapon, we remain as convinced as ever that engagement through
our "policy of peace and prosperity" is the proper approach.

The principle of the engagement policy is simple: to unilaterally move
toward reconciliation with North Korea, starting with issues in the limited
realm of low politics and gradually expanding the areas of common concern
until enough trust has been built up to finally establish institutions
leading to eventual unification.

Leaving aside the truism that it requires two sides to reconcile, South
Korea also took the initiative in the form of humanitarian assistance,
shipping food and fertilizer to the North.

This political approach deviates sharply from that prevalent during the
last century. In place of pursuing a grand agenda in the name of national
glory or ideology or "fugoku gyohei"—the Japanese term
for the economic and military strength of a nation—the policy of
engagement is aimed at addressing the basic necessities of individuals:
better food, medical care, education and a wider range of choices for
everyone in whatever station of life. In other words, the political agenda
must be defined in terms of concretely advancing human welfare.

In this perspective, even the reunification of Korea should be judged
in terms of whether it would be able to contribute to the quality of life
not only for Koreans but also everyone living around the Korean peninsula.

We want to avoid the fate of other instances in history in which apparently
great political achievements were initially welcomed with enthusiasm but
did little to improve the conditions of life and instead led to enormous
suffering and misery.

Indeed, the first stage of engagement has succeeded in melting away the
thick layer of ice left over from the Cold War era. There have been drastic
increases in the number of contacts between the two sides of Korea. Only
2,405 South Koreans visited North Korea between 1989 and 1997, whereas
3,317 South Koreans visited the North in 1998 alone. The number increased
rapidly to 12,825 in 2002. In the meantime, North Korean visitors to the
South reached 1,052 in 2002. Altogether, 510,000 South Korean tourists
went to Kumgangsan (Diamond Mountain), located in the southeastern coast
of North Korean territory, between 1998 and February of 2003.

There has been a continuing stream of bilateral talks, including ministerial-level
meetings, between the two sides, resulting in concrete breakthroughs in
mostly functional areas such as railway linkages and the establishment
of an industrial complex for South Korean companies just north of the
western end of the demilitarized zone that separates the two parts of
the peninsula.

To date, there have been six family reunions for relatives who had not
been able to meet or communicate with each other for nearly 50 years,
one exchange of letters and two searches to identify family members who
are still alive. In June 2000, of course, the historic inter-Korean summit
was held.

These achievements may appear modest to an outsider. However, there were
many difficulties, including strong domestic opposition. Despite this,
the previous government held its course—as will this government.
Considering the past half-century of tragic confrontation between two
sides locked in a zero-sum game of conflict, the breakthrough has been
remarkable.

To build on this achievement, President Roh Moo Hyun has set out the guidelines
for future engagement: to resolve all pending issues through dialogue;
to give priority to building mutual trust and upholding reciprocity; to
seek active international cooperation on the premise that South and North
Korea are the two main actors in inter-Korean relations; to enhance transparency,
expand citizen participation and secure bipartisan support for engagement.

The immediate task ahead, of course, is to properly address what are commonly
called "North Korean issues." Rather than be seen as a roadblock,
working to resolve these issues can also be a good opportunity to promote
better cooperation among the countries of the region.

There is remarkable consensus in the international community
that it is not desirable for North Korea to develop weapons of mass destruction
and that this problem should be dealt with peacefully and diplomatically.
This basic consensus, I believe, is in part due to the achievements of
the "sunshine policy." It is a confirmation that engagement
remains the best path forward.