Mar 24, 2011

Content Security Policy (CSP). This is completely new opt-in security innovation and it's among the first to address the Internet plague called cross-site scripting (XSS). Currently Firefox 4 is the only browser supporting CSP but Webkit browsers (Chrome and Safari) are developing their own flavor. The feature lets the developer specify a whitelist of source domains for JavaScript, images, media, and styling. The servers passes on the whitelist policy in a response header and the browser then enforces the policy for all subsequent resource loads when rendering the page. CSP also demands that all JavaScript code be loaded from files and not be inline. Since XSS attack code typically is either from a domain not on the whitelist or inline, the browser will not execute it if CSP is enabled. Coming up with the correct whitelist and moving all your JavaScript to files will be a burden on developers so adoption will take time. Twitter has already deployed a CSP onmobile.twitter.comand will enable it fortwitter.comafter a trial period (http://engineering.twitter.com/2011/03/improving-browser-security-with-csp.html).

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS). This is also a policy mechanism. It allows developers to tell browsers that this domain should only be accessed over SSL and the certificate may not cause any browser warnings. The policy is again sent via a response header so you would think it could be included in CSP. But there is a crucial difference. HSTS also specifies a time for how long in the future the browser should enforce it. After all the policy directive is about future requests. So the browser caches the HSTS policy for a whole domain and possibly for its subdomains which is fundamentally different from CSP which applies its policy to each page individually and allows a new policy on every request. PayPal have been one of the main contributors to HSTS and have deployed a policy for some time. HSTS is already supported by Chome and the Firefox plugin NoScript.

X-Frame-Options (XFO). Again, a response header security directive, originally a Microsoft innovation. It specifies whether the page should be allowed to be framed by another page or not. As such it's a partial countermeasure for clickjacking. But it really shouldn't be presented as such, rather a non-framing option for developers.

ES5/JavaScript Strict-Mode. Another Firefox first. JavaScript, formally named EcmaScript, is evolving and in version 5 there is an opt-in "strict mode" which gets rid of many of the nasty things in earlier versions. Attackers love the old oddities whereas developers hate them. So we can probably look forward to a fairly good adoption rate out there as soon as other browsers implement it (current statushttp://kangax.github.com/es5-compat-table).

Do-Not-Track (DNT). This is a privacy feature requested by the US Federal Trade Commission and jointly designed by Stanford Security Lab and Law School. It's an opt-in requestheader, i e sent by the browser not the server, which specifies that the enduser doesn't want to be tracked. This is of course a major issue for advertise-driven companies such as Google and Facebook who earn money on tracking endusers and serving them in-context ads. Security professionals are arguing that nobody will be able to know if they've been tracked anyway so we'll probably have to wait for large enduser adoption and a public lawsuit on some major company before DNT starts to mean something.

Mar 21, 2011

I've used this image on countless occasions in my talks on software and on application security. I got it from an academic research presentation back in 2004 or so.

The 5 Complexity Dimensions of Software

Complexity in this regard means complex for humans to understand and contribute to.

Scale. The larger the system, the more complex.

Diversity. The more frameworks, languages, integration techniques, tools, platforms, and design patterns used, the more complex.

Connectivity. The more connections, the more complex. This relates to coupling.

Dynamics. The more number of states or the larger state space, the more complex.

Refinement. Over time every living piece of software is refined, optimized, and polished. Corner cases are found and handled, and regression test suites grow. Refinement drives complexity.

In the context of application security there's always a relation between security and complexity. The more complex a system gets, the higher the risk of security vulnerabilities. Therefore managing application security is partly about managing the five dimensions above.

Mar 1, 2011

Right now there are tons of thoughts, ideas, and discussions on where OWASP should go. I'm beginning to see an image of a Client-Oriented OWASP (thanks Dinis, for finding the word). In that image there are great initiatives as well as a few things we have to set straight.

Client-Oriented Part 1 – Builders and Defenders
If you combine the Defenders and Builders initiatives, a new, more client-oriented OWASP emerges. Client-oriented in the sense that we put more effort into understanding and helping the IT industry who builds, operates and maintains web applications. On the less technical side we're doing this already with processes and guides – great!

But on the more technical side, OWASP needs to mix up the pentesting and appsec tooling with how to defend and how to build secure webapps. And that for me means Builders and Defenders projects but also gearing our conferences and chapters more towards builders and defenders.

I'm not saying we should cut down on pentesting or scanning tools. I love pentesters and ethical hackers. Heck, I read and retweet your blogs daily. I'm also very interested in static analysis tools, proven by my publications in the area in 2002 and 2005. I'm just saying we need to address a larger crowd and get more balance into our efforts.

OWASP should be independent in the statements it publishes, all the way from chapters to the board.

OWASP should not avoid certain projects, results, or discussions only because some individual/corporate member or sponsoring organization will be upset.

Right now I think OWASP is doing fine on number one. I hear no bashing nor promoting of brands or vendors except for publicly thanking them for their support. Thank you supporters!

But number two is worrying me. At AppSec NYC 2008 there was a talk on comparing static analysis tools called "NIST and SAMATE Static Analysis Tool Exposition" (video). Some well-known brands were in the study. But the speaker refused to show figures for individual tools. There seemed to be a consensus in the community that we should not present anything that could be interpreted as negative for certain vendors, not even if the test setup was made totally transparent. That's a violation of point two above, in my opinion.

2.5 years have gone and we're still not using our independence to compare and test appsec tools. Why? John Steven, an OWASP leader with immense experience in static analysis has published serious obstacles to comparing static analysis tools but they are all saying "Just don't make your tool choices based on a general comparison" which is good advice. We should tell people that. But we still need to start putting appsec tools to the test.

Creating the Client-Oriented OWASP means we'll have to start doing independent, client-oriented research. And if OWASP has been implicitly silenced before I will not take it anymore. Here's a list of ideas:

Create a space for customer comments on appsec tools (free as well as commercial). Something like AppStore reviews, good and bad.

Start to compare blackbox and whitebox scanning tools. I suggest we go for a synthesized testbed (i.e. a controlled environment) and invite tool vendors/builders to take part. They get a workday to configure their tools and then we go. The testbed, configurations, and versions will all be published along with due reservations such as John Steven's.

Start to organize free pentests and design reviews of open platforms. In the best case we cooperate, in the worst case we make our information public in an ethical way to help clients make the right choices.