Summary

Did Hitler mean to pursue global conquest once he had completed his mastery of Europe? In this startling reassessment of Hitler's strategic aims, Duffy argues that he fully intended to bring the war to America once his ambitions in the Eurasian heartland were achieved. Detailed here for the first time are the Third Reich's plans for a projected series of worldwide offensives using the new secret weapons emerging from wartime research. Duffy also recounts other Axis schemes to attack American cities through the use of multi-stage missiles, submarine launched rockets, and suicide missions against ships in the New York harbor. Taken together, these plans reveal just how determined the Axis powers were to attack the United States.

Whether German forces could actually reach America has been long debated. What is certain is that Wehrmacht planners explored various options. In 1942 a secret plan was submitted to Hermann Goring for the use of long-range bombers against targets across the globe. The scheme, prepared by a select group within the Luftwaffe, is believed to be the result of direct discussions with Hitler. Long rumored to exist, this document was recently discovered in the military archives in Freiburg. This account provides the first detailed analysis of the plan and places it in the context of Germany's global war objectives.

Author Notes

Booklist Review

Duffy's work discusses Axis aspirations to attack the continental U.S. Its virtue lies partly in its collection of dispersed information into one volume and partly in the speculation of what was in store for America had Hitler defeated the Soviet Union. His most immediate means of attack (in addition to the submarine campaign that devastated East Coast shipping) would have been transatlantic bombers, of which the Germans built perhaps a dozen prototypes and about which a technical report was compiled in early 1942. The report has never been published and examined in detail before, asserts the author, probably precisely accurate though his footnotes about the report cite histories published in the 1970s. At any rate, the report forms the backbone of Duffy's presentation, expanded by the author's commentary on the German failure to build the bombers. Elsewhere, Duffy delves into alternate schemes of attack. Engrossing coverage for readers interested in the weaponry what-ifs of World War II. --Gilbert Taylor Copyright 2004 Booklist