The Jewish Ethicist - Universal Torah Ethics

The most basic and indispensable ethical obligations apply equally to all.

Q. The store accidentally gave me merchandise I didn’t pay for. Do I have to return it? Does it matter if the storeowner is Jewish?

A. I have been writing the Jewish ethicist column for over five years. From the very first column my approach has been that my answers to readers' questions embody universal principles of ethics that are based on Jewish law. Thus, I never vary my answers based on the religious background or level of the individuals involved. Readers occasionally mention in their letters whether or not they or the person they are dealing with are Jewish, as this reader did, and I always emphasize that this does not affect my reply. I never explained the reason for this lack of discrimination, and indeed I would consider a lack of discrimination a basic principle of ethics. In this column I would like to explain the basis for my approach.

First of all, the most basic and indispensable ethical obligations apply equally to all. Stealing is equally forbidden among Jews, among non-Jews, and between Jews and non-Jews. (1) So are fraud and other deceptive practices. (2)

But it is also true that some more refined ethical commandments formally apply only to interactions among Jews. Why this limitation? I think that the answer is simple. The ideal is for all of mankind to adopt these principles. However, the Giver of the Torah was well aware that the educational process leading to this ethical redemption would require millennia. So He imposed them on His chosen people, intending them to serve as a "light to the nations" which would then spread them among all those created in His image.

Should then the Jews adopt these principles, but apply them without discrimination in their dealings with all? This too is not practical. Asking only the Jewish people to apply these principles in a completely unilateral fashion in their dealings with other peoples is a recipe for exploitation. The solution is to make these commandments obligatory in relationships among Jews, in order that the benefits of these enlightened ethics should become evident and customary among all mankind. Then they will equally govern relationships among Jews, among non-Jews, and between Jews and non-Jews.

There are a number of prominent sources that I think make this conclusion clear. One is the great medieval authority Nachmanides. In his commentary on the Torah, Nachmanides discusses the commandment "And you shall do what is straight and right" (Deuteronomy 6:18). Here the Torah is commanding us to act in an ethical way, yet the commandment begs the question of how we know what course of action is the ethical one. Nachmanides explains that we are able to deduce general ethical principles from the specific mandates of the many laws of interpersonal behavior, principles that apply even in instances that may be beyond the scope of the law.

For it is impossible to mention in the Torah all of man's conduct with his neighbors and friends, all his business transactions, and all the institutions of community and all of the nations. Rather, after having mentioned a number of them, such as "Do not go about as a talebearer" (Leviticus 19:16), "Do not take vengeance or bear a grudge" (Leviticus 19:18), "Do not stand idly by your neighbor's blood" (Leviticus 19:16), "Do not curse the deaf" (Leviticus 19:14), "Stand before the aged"(Leviticus 19:32), and others like them, [Scripture] goes back to say in a general way that one should do the good and the straight in all matters.

Nachmanides refers to institutions of "all of the nations", yet includes in his list a number of commandments which formally apply only to Jews. In fact, the very first verse cited states in full, "Do not go about as a talebearer among your people," while the next one reads, "Do not take vengeance or bear a grudge against the members of your people." The resolution of this paradox is simple. As a specific command, these directives are binding only among Jews. But as an application of the general mandate to act in a straight and right fashion, they govern "all the institutions of the community and all of the nations." If we are among enlightened nations that acknowledge these principles, then part of the straight and right behavior commanded by the Torah is to abide by these principles in our dealings with them as well.

RETURNING LOST OBJECTS

Let us bring an additional example of a commandment which is explicitly binding only among Jews, yet is viewed by the Talmud as a universal ethical obligation. The Torah commands us to return lost objects: "Don't see you brother's ox or his sheep go astray and ignore them; surely return them to your brother." (Deuteronomy 22:1.) In the entire passage the Torah refers to "your brother," meaning that this commandment only applies to the lost object of another member of the Jewish people.

Yet the Talmud cites the example of Rabbi Shmuel bar Sosretai who found a valuable jewel belonging to the queen in Rome. The queen announced that anyone who returned the jewel within 30 days would receive a reward, but anyone found with it after 30 days would be executed. Rabbi Shmuel intentionally waited until the 30-day period was up, and then returned the jewel. Of course the grateful queen tried to find a way to exempt him from punishment. She asked him, perhaps you were out of town? Perhaps you didn't hear the warnings? He assured her that he was aware of the warnings, and for that precise reason he waited to return the jewels: "So that you should not say that I returned it because of fear of you, instead of the fear of the Holy One." (3)

How can Rabbi Shmuel bar Sosretai say that he returned the jewels to a Roman noble "because of the fear of the Holy One"? How could he have risked his very life to dramatize this claim? We have seen that the Torah only commands us to return lost objects of fellow Jews!

Again, the answer is simple. The ethical imperative to return the lost objects of "your brother" extends to non-Jews when they can be educated to behave towards us in a brotherly fashion -- as was evidently the case in the Rome of 1700 years ago, at least among the educated higher classes.

We find this same pattern over and over. The exact same passages chosen to illustrate that in a jungle-like ethical environment Jews are well advised to adapt themselves to the law of the jungle surrounding them, also explain that in a more enlightened and elevated society our relationship to our neighbors should conform to these norms. In a well-known passage in the Talmud, we learn that some prominent Jews were able to obtain great bargains from sellers who were not aware of the value of their own merchandise. This practice is strictly forbidden among Jews, but is accepted in a "buyer beware" marketplace which used to be the norm. Yet this same passage informs us that we are not allowed to steal from non-Jews or mislead them, and if there is a desecration of God's name involved we must return lost objects. (4)

When would not returning an object involve a desecration of God's name, that is, give Torah observance a bad name? Precisely in a society where such returns are a general norm. If everyone adopts an attitude of finders-keepers, there is no disgrace for Jews also to adopt this norm in their relationships with their neighbors. But wherever taking advantage of a seller's mistake is considered disgraceful, it would be a disgrace for Jews to display this behavior.

Regarding your particular situation, Maimonides writes: "Whether one deals with a Jew or with a heathen, one is forbidden by the Torah from giving short measure and he must return [any excess he received]. Likewise it is forbidden to mislead a non-Jew in an account, as it is written, "Make an accounting with his owner." . . . And the Torah says, "Anyone who does this, any doer of injustice, is an abomination before the Lord God." (5) Maimonides further writes that even if the Jew did not mislead the non-Jew but rather the seller made the mistake by himself, the purchaser is obligated to remind him to check the account. Acting otherwise, writes Maimonides, leads to a desecration of God's name. (6)

So you should certainly inform the seller of his mistake and return the excess merchandise you received without payment. If you already consumed it, you should state that you discovered you accidentally received extra merchandise, and you should offer to pay the seller. It doesn't matter if you ,or the seller, are Jewish or non-Jewish, as long as you live in a civilized country where such behavior is expected and admired.

The Jewish Ethicist presents some general principles of Jewish law. For specific questions and direct application, please consult a qualified Rabbi.

The Jewish Ethicist is a joint project of Aish.com and the Business Ethics Center of Jerusalem. To find out more about business ethics and Jewish values for the workplace, visit the Business Ethics Center of Jerusalem at www.besr.org.

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About the Author

Rabbi Dr. Asher Meir is Research Director at the Business Ethics Center of Jerusalem (www.besr.org). He studied at Harvard, received a PhD in Economics from MIT, and rabbinic ordination from the Israeli Chief Rabbinate. Prior to moving to Israel, he worked at the Council of Economic Advisers in the Reagan administration. Rabbi Dr. Meir is also a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Jerusalem College of Technology and has published several articles on business, economics and Jewish law. He is the author of the two-volume, "Meaning in Mitzvot (Feldheim), and his Aish.com columns form the basis of the "Jewish Ethicist" book (ktav.com).

I just got married and have an important question: Can we eat rice on Passover? My wife grew up eating it, and I did not. Is this just a matter of family tradition?

The Aish Rabbi Replies:

The Torah instructs a Jew not to eat (or even possess) chametz all seven days of Passover (Exodus 13:3). "Chametz" is defined as any of the five grains (wheat, spelt, barley, oats, and rye) that came into contact with water for more than 18 minutes. Chametz is a serious Torah prohibition, and for that reason we take extra protective measures on Passover to prevent any mistakes.

Hence the category of food called "kitniyot" (sometimes referred to generically as "legumes"). This includes rice, corn, soy beans, string beans, peas, lentils, peanuts, mustard, sesame seeds and poppy seeds. Even though kitniyot cannot technically become chametz, Ashkenazi Jews do not eat them on Passover. Why?

Products of kitniyot often appear like chametz products. For example, it can be hard to distinguish between rice flour (kitniyot) and wheat flour (chametz). Also, chametz grains may become inadvertently mixed together with kitniyot. Therefore, to prevent confusion, all kitniyot were prohibited.

In Jewish law, there is one important distinction between chametz and kitniyot. During Passover, it is forbidden to even have chametz in one's possession (hence the custom of "selling chametz"). Whereas it is permitted to own kitniyot during Passover and even to use it - not for eating - but for things like baby powder which contains cornstarch. Similarly, someone who is sick is allowed to take medicine containing kitniyot.

What about derivatives of kitniyot - e.g. corn oil, peanut oil, etc? This is a difference of opinion. Many will use kitniyot-based oils on Passover, while others are strict and only use olive or walnut oil.

Finally, there is one product called "quinoa" (pronounced "ken-wah" or "kin-o-ah") that is permitted on Passover even for Ashkenazim. Although it resembles a grain, it is technically a grass, and was never included in the prohibition against kitniyot. It is prepared like rice and has a very high protein content. (It's excellent in "cholent" stew!) In the United States and elsewhere, mainstream kosher supervision agencies certify it "Kosher for Passover" -- look for the label.

Interestingly, the Sefardi Jewish community does not have a prohibition against kitniyot. This creates the strange situation, for example, where one family could be eating rice on Passover - when their neighbors will not. So am I going to guess here that you are Ashkenazi and your wife is Sefardi. Am I right?

Yahrtzeit of Rabbi Moses ben Nachman (1194-1270), known as Nachmanides, and by the acronym of his name, Ramban. Born in Spain, he was a physician by trade, but was best-known for authoring brilliant commentaries on the Bible, Talmud, and philosophy. In 1263, King James of Spain authorized a disputation (religious debate) between Nachmanides and a Jewish convert to Christianity, Pablo Christiani. Nachmanides reluctantly agreed to take part, only after being assured by the king that he would have full freedom of expression. Nachmanides won the debate, which earned the king's respect and a prize of 300 gold coins. But this incensed the Church: Nachmanides was charged with blasphemy and he was forced to flee Spain. So at age 72, Nachmanides moved to Jerusalem. He was struck by the desolation in the Holy City -- there were so few Jews that he could not even find a minyan to pray. Nachmanides immediately set about rebuilding the Jewish community. The Ramban Synagogue stands today in Jerusalem's Old City, a living testimony to his efforts.

It's easy to be intimidated by mean people. See through their mask. Underneath is an insecure and unhappy person. They are alienated from others because they are alienated from themselves.

Have compassion for them. Not pity, not condemning, not fear, but compassion. Feel for their suffering. Identify with their core humanity. You might be able to influence them for the good. You might not. Either way your compassion frees you from their destructiveness. And if you would like to help them change, compassion gives you a chance to succeed.

It is the nature of a person to be influenced by his fellows and comrades (Rambam, Hil. De'os 6:1).

We can never escape the influence of our environment. Our life-style impacts upon us and, as if by osmosis, penetrates our skin and becomes part of us.

Our environment today is thoroughly computerized. Computer intelligence is no longer a science-fiction fantasy, but an everyday occurrence. Some computers can even carry out complete interviews. The computer asks questions, receives answers, interprets these answers, and uses its newly acquired information to ask new questions.

Still, while computers may be able to think, they cannot feel. The uniqueness of human beings is therefore no longer in their intellect, but in their emotions.

We must be extremely careful not to allow ourselves to become human computers that are devoid of feelings. Our culture is in danger of losing this essential aspect of humanity, remaining only with intellect. Because we communicate so much with unfeeling computers, we are in danger of becoming disconnected from our own feelings and oblivious to the feelings of others.

As we check in at our jobs, and the computer on our desk greets us with, "Good morning, Mr. Smith. Today is Wednesday, and here is the agenda for today," let us remember that this machine may indeed be brilliant, but it cannot laugh or cry. It cannot be happy if we succeed, or sad if we fail.

Today I shall...

try to remain a human being in every way - by keeping in touch with my own feelings and being sensitive to the feelings of others.

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