Nations are
not something eternal. They had their beginnings and they will
have an end. A European confederation will very probably replace them.
But such is not the law of the century in which we are living. At the
present time, the existence of nations is a good thing, a necessity even.
Their existence is the guarantee of liberty, which would be lost if the
world had only one law and only one master.1  Ernest Renan,
1882

With ten new members added into the fold and a new draft
constitution working its way through capitals for ratification, the European Union (EU) is
in the midst of unprecedented political and geographic integration.

This
transcontinental constitutional process is a major undertaking. Of course, at 263
single-spaced pages, just reading the EU constitution is a major undertaking. One
cant help but compare the EUs behemoth to the US Constitution, which is a
modest 4,600 words, not including amendments. While the EU document addresses everything
from fisheries to occupational hygiene, the US Constitution deals with broader
matterstreaties and taxation, war and peace, rights and responsibilities.

Perhaps its
understandable, then, that as Europe strives to come together, the transatlantic
community, led as it is by the United States, seems to be coming apart. Some voices on
both sides of the Atlantic argue that this parting of ways is inevitable, even desirable.
After all, the differences between Europe and the United States are more pronounced and
their common interests less obvious than at any time in the last 65 years. However, if the
history of the past

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hundred years or so
teaches us anything, it is that the transatlantic partnership is an essential
ingredient both to the security of the United States and to the security of the modern
world. Hence, understanding the changes and challenges within Europe could help Americans
respond to the changes and challenges facing the transatlantic community.

What is
Europe?

The question
What is Europe? is not so easily answeredespecially, it seems, inside
Europe. Some see Europe as a large chunk of the northern hemisphere stretching from
Iceland to Siberia; some say its smaller, but they dont know precisely how
much smaller. Some say Europe is an economic club, an idea, a common cultural heritage.
Others say its a political unit of diverse peopleshence, the EUs new
motto United in Diversity. British Prime Minister Tony Blair wants a
Europe of nation-states, while French President Jacques Chirac envisions a
grand design for Europe, one that will secure Frances place in the
world.2

Answering this
question is essential for Europeans and the rest of the world, however, because as long as
it remains unanswered the still-amorphous swath of earth known as Europe cannot really
play a dependable role in international security. Like a college student finding
herself or a 40-something going through his mid-life crisis, an undefined Europe may
be independent; it may even offer something constructive from time to time; but it will
usually be self-centered and focused inward. This sort of Europe cannot be an enduring
partner in the 21st century.

Europe is indeed a
common marketand a powerful one at that. After all, the European Union consists of
some 450 million people. When considered as one unit, the EUs 25 economies comprise
the largest gross domestic product (GDP) on earth. But is it really a union? It has a flag
and a pan-national anthem. It claims to have a common currency, though key members of the
EU, including the United Kingdom, have not adopted it. However, Europe has no common
foreign policy. It has no common language, except perhaps the language spoken by George W.
Bush and Blair, two men who have caused more than a little heartburn for the continental
club. Indeed, the EUs draft constitution is written in almost two dozen languages.

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Europe also has no
common history or ethnicity or founding moment. None of this precludes it from being a
confederation of countries, but simply serves to underscore that Brussels cannot forge a
United States of Europe. EU advocates might be able to create the appearance of
nationhood, but they cannot change whats in the heart: Paris is first and foremost
the capital of France, as every Frenchman knows. After spending 45 years under Soviet
occupation, a Warsaw shopkeeper will not soon forget that his home is Polandand will
not soon trade servitude in one union for servitude in another. In a word, it seems that
most Europeans still believe as Ernest Renan did in 1882that the existence of
nations is a good thing, a safeguard against a Europe with only one law, one master.

EU advocates are
quick to counter such Euro-skepticism by arguing that Americans feel the same
way about their home states. Perhaps this was true in the time of Robert E. Lee, when
Virginians fought for Virginia, but it is no longer. Indeed, the US Civil War itself
settled that question. As US historians have observed, before the war, United
States was used in the plural form, as in The United States are bound
together by the Constitution. After the war, it was singularized, as in The
United States is a democratic republic. There is no question about where US
foreign policy is made or executed, what currency it uses, which constitution is supreme,
where its boundary lines are, or which language is held in common. These questions remain
unanswered for Europe, and they cannot be solved by a piece of paper signed in Brussels.

Pan-Nationalism

Thanks to 60 years
of cooperation and confidence-building, the prospect of these questions being settled on a
battlefield is unthinkable. However, the prospect of the European Union coming apart is
not. When or if the EU splits up, the blame will be laid at the feet of those who pushed
too far, too fast, and too deep.

At least since the
end of the Cold War, and arguably even earlier, proponents of an undivided Europe have
generally fallen into two camps. On one side was the group proposing to widen Europe
geographicallythat is, to steadily bring new European countries into the common
market formed after World War II. What was once a group of six grew to ten, and then to
15,

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and now to
25from Britain all the way to the Baltics. This view of Europe, centered on the
principles of economic community, focuses largely on the free movement of people, capital,
and goods.

On the other side
was a group that promoted a deeper Europe, one that was institutionally connected in areas
that would ultimately infringe on national sovereigntyareas such as currency,
foreign policy, defense, and governance. However, most proponents of this politically and
governmentally integrated Europe recognized that its success depended on shared values and
interests, rather than shared geography.

In recent years, key
European players began to argue that political deepening and geographic widening were
inextricably linked. Thus, they advocated both a wider Europe (stretching to the borders
of Russia) and a deeper Europe (bound together by one currency, a common foreign and
security policy, and even a single constitution).3

The outlines of this
deeper Europe are found in the Constitution for Europe, which was endorsed by
the EUs 25 heads of government in June 2004 and is now facing national parliaments
and referendums for ratification. If all goes well for EU constitutionalists, the document
could come into force in spring 2005. In its 260-plus pages, the document seeks to further
legitimize and strengthen many of Europes existing structures, while creating new
ones. The EUs major organs of power will include:

The European
Parliamentthe EUs chief legislative body, its members directly elected by the
European populace to five-year terms.

The European Councilan
administrative and deliberative body comprising the heads of state or government from the
EUs 25 member states, plus the President of the European Commission.

The Council of Ministerssomething
like a council of councils consisting of ministers from each member state, grouped
together by function. For example, all 25 telecommunications ministers will be part of the
Council of Ministers of Telecommunications.

The European Commissionthis EU
executive committee will consist of 13 commissioners selected by a rotating group of EU
states; a president, who is selected by a qualified majority of the European Council
after appropriate consultations and confirmed by a majority vote of the
European Parliament; non-voting commissioners, as chosen by the president; and the new
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The European Court
of Justicethe EUs main judicial body, which adjudicates disputes between the
European Commission and member states, as well as referrals from national courts.4

The draft
constitution also strives to make EU policymaking more efficient. According to Heather
Grabbe of the Center for European Reform and

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Ulrike Guerot of the
German Marshall Fund, The EU has spent 12 years tryingand failingto make
much progress towards greater efficiency and legitimacy.5 This drive toward efficiency no doubt plays a part in the
distance between the European Union and the people it serves. Indeed, the EU is struggling
to find a balance between efficiency and accountability, with every move toward one
invariably weakening the other. For instance, the European electorate doesnt have
much of a direct say in who sits on the European Commission, even though the commission
shall promote the general European interest and take appropriate initiatives to that
end. 6

Of course, it pays
to recall that the US political system has its own democratic deficit. After
all, the Electoral College does not always reflect the will of a national majority.
Moreover, how Europeans choose to govern themselves is not Americas worry. Even so,
there is something unsettling to American eyes about an EU system that puts so much
distance between the people and their political representativesand so much power in
a supranational body.

Historian Hans Kohn
defined 18th-century nationalism as a political movement to limit government
power,7 but this European pan-nationalism seems
to be a movement aimed at expanding the power of government. Consider the so-called
double-majority system aimed at preventing small and medium-sized countries
from having veto power over the will of large states. Under a plan developed in Nice in
2000, EU members initially agreed to a population-based formula that weighted the
legislative power of France, Britain, Germany, and Italy just slightly higher than that of
Spain and Poland. However, fearing that the Nice agreement gave too much clout to
medium-sized countries like Spain and Poland, the larger states reneged and proposed a
plan that would have enabled supranational laws to be passed with a bare majority of EU
member states (13 of the 25) plus a 60-percent majority of the EUs total population.
Representatives from the large and medium states finally agreed on a plan that requires at
least 15 countries representing 65 percent of the EU population to support a measure
before it becomes law.8

This wasnt the
only time the EUs political center of gravity decided that agreements are subject to
change. Mired in recession, France and Germany flouted the EUs Stability and Growth
Pact, which calls on members to hold budget-deficit spending under a fixed percentage of
GDP. The EUs newest members can expect more double standards: As a New York Times
analysis revealed, Almost all of the 15 current Western members are imposing
restrictions to keep out Eastern workers for several years.9

If the 2004 European
Parliamentary elections are any indication, the EUs double standards and distance
from the average voter may be having an effect. Only 26 percent of eligible voters in the
EUs eastern half even bothered to voteand this was their first election.10

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The Foreign
Legion

All of this points
to the possibility that by forcing political union and geographic expansion, Europes
new founding fathers may be attempting too much and reaching too far. As one European
diplomat remarked at a recent conference, Europe needs to walk before it can
run.11 This is especially true in the realm of foreign and security
policy.

Given recent
history, the draft constitutions promise to create an EU foreign minister and its
requirement that member states support the common foreign and security policy
actively and unreservedly seem laughably premature. After all, if the war in (and
about) Iraq has proven anything, its that the EUs 25 members do not have a
common foreign policy. Instead, they have 25 foreign policies that sometimes coalesce on
ends, sometimes on means, but seldom on both. Britain, Italy, and Poland led Europes
sizable hawkish bloc into Iraq. France and Germany led a much smaller but louder dovish
bloc. And Spain has found a way to be in both camps.

Advocates of the
European Union point to this splintered state during the Iraq crisis as evidence of the
need for a faux foreign minister rather than evidence of the oppositeand this
is where the EU becomes Americas worry. The EUs internal
foreign-policy disagreements are muddying the transatlantic waters and affecting US
security.

Bounced back and
forth between Brussels and national capitals, non-European diplomats privately talk about
how difficult it is for them to deal with the EU. As it stands now, the EU comprises
25 sovereign countrieseach with its own head of state, its own foreign minister, its
own defense minister. In addition, the EU also has a president, an external affairs
commissioner, and soon, apparently, a foreign ministerand all of these people claim
to speak for Europe. Consider a recent press conference hosted by US Secretary of State
Colin Powell: The Irish Foreign Minister was there representing the EU presidency (at the
time held by the Irish Prime Minister), the EU external affairs commissioner was there
representing the EU Commission, and the EUs High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (precursor to the EU foreign minister) was in attendance
representing the European Council.

Regrettably, the
problems caused by the EUs refusal to recognize its own limits on the global stage
are more serious than the size of the stage needed to accommodate the EUs foreign
legion. Again, the Iraq War is instructive. Thanks to French President Jacques Chirac and
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, it took eight weeks for the UN Security Council to
agree on a resolution requiring Iraq simply to comply with existing resolutions, even
though a healthy majority of their fellow EU members and virtually ev-

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ery leader in
Eastern Europe supported a hard line against Baghdad.12 (Even then,
the French and Germans made sure not to explicitly authorize military action to bring Iraq
into compliance.)

When Britain and the
United States returned to the UN for authorization in March 2003, they found the French
and German governments unwilling to compromise. In a naked bid to win support during his
reelection campaign in late 2002, Schroeder had announced that Germany would oppose
military action in Iraqwith or without a UN Security Council resolution. We
will not be part of it, he vowed.13

The French
government tried to make sure no one else would be a part of it either. As a sovereign,
independent country, France should never be expected to simply fall in line behind
America, but Iraq marked a new low. Instead of keeping the focus on Iraq and
Saddam, as former US Secretary of State George Shultz observed, France induced
others to regard the problem as one of restraining the US.14 Indeed, given the size, reach, ambitions, and actions of
the European Union, one gets the sense that some proponents of the EU see it as a check on
American power.

After Frances
opposition at the United Nations, President Chirac threatened the East Europeans for
siding with Washington rather than Paris on Iraq: If they wanted to diminish their
chances of joining [the EU], he snapped, they couldnt have chosen a
better way.15 (Diversity apparently has its limits in
Chiracs Europe.) Acting like a counterweight to Washington rather than an ally, the
French President then dispatched his Foreign Minister to more than a dozen capitals to
organize an international opposition against his erstwhile allies. In fact, when London
circulated an eleventh-hour compromise requiring Saddam to pass six diplomatic and
military tests to prove he had disarmed, France actually rejected the plan before Iraq.

President Chirac
ultimately condemned the Iraq War because it was undertaken without the approval of
the United Nations . . . which is the only legitimate framework for building peace in
Iraq16even though military action was
arguably justified under 16 separate UN resolutions.

Winston Churchill
worried about the corrosive effect of such mischief on the United Nations. We must
make sure that its work is fruitful, he

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warned in 1946,
that it is a reality and not a sham, that it is a force for action, and not merely a
frothing of words.17

Of course, words are
all the European Union could offer, but this is only partly because EU members could not
agree on a course of action. Even if all 25 EU leaders had marched lockstep into Iraq,
another impediment to action would have remained. Defense spending in France is $46
billion, or just 2.5 percent of GDP; in Germany its a scant 1.3 percent of GDP; and
if Britain remains estranged from Brussels, what military muscle the EU can claim will be
in doubt. Without the UK, according to Grabbe and Guerot, a foreign and
security policy venture would lack political credibility.18 And
without a unifying foreign policy, one wonders if EU members will ever invest the kind of
resources necessary to enhance the organizations military muscle.

A Strained
Alliance

Doubtless,
Washingtons difficulty in finding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq has
given President Chirac reason to gloat. Yet some observers have concluded that Iraqs
WMD program may have been spirited out of the country during the diplomatic foot-dragging.19 In
others words, even if Saddams flouting of UN resolutions wasnt enough to
justify the use of force, there is more than circumstantial evidence to indicate that he
had stores of WMD materials to the very end.

Of course, Iraq was
neither the beginning nor the end of the US-European rivalry. Europe has a set of
primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation, as George
Washington concluded in his farewell address in 1796. Our detached and distant
situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.20

This transatlantic
disconnect continued into the 19th and 20th centuries. By the middle of the Great War, as
Europe bled itself white, Americans began to stray from their isolationist instincts. For
their part, Europeans began to recognize that the United States was a source of stability
and security. Yet even during the most dangerous and deadly decades of the Cold War, the
transatlantic partnership was strained. Derek Leebaert details some of these strains in
his essential history of the Cold War, The Fifty-Year Wound:

After World War II,
prominent US policymakers wondered why 140 million Americans should protect 200 million
Europeans.21 The numbers have changed, but the question still hangs in the air
in some corners of America.

In 1954, US
taxpayers were covering 75 percent of the French war in Indochina. Yet France often
parlayed US assistance and equipment into financial payoffs. For example, after using a US
aircraft carrier earmarked for the war effort in Vietnam to ship and sell fighter jets,
the French government had the gall to ask Washington for additional aircraft carriers.22 There are

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echoes of this self-serving duplicity in
the gathering reports of French complicity in the UNs scandal-plagued Oil for Food
Program in Iraq.

In 1956, France and
Britain diverted equipment intended for NATOs European defense to launch their war
in Egypt. Eisenhower found out about British preparations for war from US reconnaissance
photos.23 Less than a decade later, France pulled
out of NATOs military structure.

In the 1980s, NATO
leaders wobbled as millions of Europeans protested the decision to station Pershing
missiles along the Iron Curtain in response to Moscows deployment of SS-20s.

President Reagan was
vindicated by the course of history. Yet the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 seemed to
widen the transatlantic divide. Brent Scowcroft, who served as National Security Advisor
to the elder President Bush, noticed that the United States seemed largely absent in
longer-term French calculations about Europe.24 As he recalled in A World Transformed, the outlines
of a Europe in which NATO [and hence, America] would play a stagnant role or even
disappear began to emerge.25

When Yugoslavia
began to descend into civil war in 1991, the Europeans seized upon the crisis as an
opportunity to prove themselves. It was, as one European diplomat dramatically declared,
the hour of Europe. Washington took the hint and stood aside. Yet there was
little action behind the words. Indeed, European governments slouched toward the
lowest-common denominator of inaction throughout the war. As historian William Pfaff
observed in The Wrath of Nations, the Europeans were unable to act
collectively and refused to act individually. In Pfaffs view, organizations
such as the European Community (forerunner to the EU) proved an obstacle to action,
by inhibiting individual national action and rationalizing the refusal to act
nationally.26

After four years of
feckless diplomacy, 250,000 deaths, and two million refugees, the hour of Europe had
passed. The Bosnian war would end only after America reasserted itself. The Kosovo War
would further highlight the transatlantic asymmetry in military and political power.

Americas
willingness to act without Europes help or blessing is arguably more a function of
this imbalance than it is of some desire to go it alone or play the role of
cowboyand it definitely predates the presidency of George W. Bush. Recall how
President Bill Clinton unilaterally broke the UN arms embargo in the former
Yugoslavia.27 He opposed the EU-backed Landmine Treaty.
He ordered Americas representatives to the treaty-writing conference that spawned
the International Criminal Court (also strongly endorsed by EU members) to vote against
the final document,28 although he reversed himself at the
eleventh hour of his presidency. And in his final five years as President, he bombed no
fewer than five countriesAfghanistan,

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Bosnia, Iraq, Serbia, and Sudan. Of those
military operations, the UN explicitly authorized precisely one (Bosnia).

In other words, this
transatlantic tension isnt caused by the party affiliation of the US President. As Financial
Times columnist Gerard Baker recently put it, The most powerful illusion under
which many Europeans seem to be laboring is the idea that if only President Bush would go
away, the world would revert to the status quo ante, a mythical world of brotherly love
and UN-mandated multilateralism.29

Common Ground

To be sure, European
and American interests converge less today than they did in the years between the end of
World War II and the end of the Cold War, but they converge more than they did in George
Washingtons day. America and Europe may indeed be taking different courses, but to
extend President Washingtons metaphor, these paths often overlap.

The War on Terror

Fully 21 of the
European Unions 25 members supported the campaign in Iraq. The fact that the two
largest, Germany and France, chose not to be among that number has more to do with their
internal politics than with Washington. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld notes that 24
of NATOs 26 current or future members have troops in Afghanistan or Iraq, and 17 of
them have deployed troops on both fronts.30 As European Commission President Romano Prodi says of the US-EU
relationship, The situation is much better than one year ago.31

Indeed it is, as
evidenced by US-EU cooperation in June 2004 on a UN resolution officially authorizing the
US-led peacekeeping force in Iraq. The resolution passed unanimously; it conferred
international legitimacy on the nascent Iraqi government (and by extension, on the US
counterinsurgency operation); and it unearthed common ground between the wars
opponents and supporters. NATO is now committed to training Iraqs army.

Beyond Iraq, key
European Union nationsincluding France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdomhave joined the United States in form-

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ing the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to strengthen their capacity to secure the seas
and intercept weapons of mass destruction and their precursors while in transit. More than
40 other countries are supporting the PSI, which already has scored successes in
intercepting Libyan and North Korean weapons and weapons material.32

Likewise,
Washingtons Container Security Initiative (CSI) relies on close cooperation with
European governments. The CSI program deploys US Customs personnel in some of
Europes largest, busiest seaportsincluding Rotterdam, LeHavre, Bremerhaven,
Hamburg, and Antwerp. The rationale for the program is simple: As the worlds biggest
consumer, the United States opens its ports to some six million cargo containers every
year, making US port security difficult. Under the CSI, US Customs officials can screen
containers coming into the United States before they arrive at American ports. This keeps
US ports open and efficient, which makes EU governments happy, and adds another ring of
security to Americas open borders, which makes US citizens safer.33

Even so, there are
plenty of reminders that coalition warfare is never easy: After the March 2004 terror
attacks in Spain, the hawkish ruling party was ousted in favor of an anti-war party
committed to yanking Spanish forces out of Iraq. As Michael Radu of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute laments, The most important lesson to be learned from Spain is
the most depressing and the one most likely to be assimilated by the terrorist networks
the world over: in a Western democracy, terrorism, if massive enough, pays.34

In addition,
although NATOs European members are engaged in training Afghanistans new army,
providing security for elections, and extending stability from Kabul into other cities,
NATO can and should do more. Indeed, there was wide agreement within the alliance to
augment NATOs 6,500-man commitment in Afghanistan with elements of the new NATO
Response Force (NRF), a self-contained rapid-reaction unit of warplanes, warships, and
20,000 troops. Predictably, Chirac balked, declaring, The NRF is not designed for
this. It shouldnt be used for any old matter.35

Afghans and
Americans alike might take issue with the notion that the security and long-term stability
of the very place that incubated al Qaeda is just any old matter.

Regional
Challenges

On other fronts,
Germany and Britain have signed on to the Bush Administrations Greater Middle East
Initiative. According to President Bush and Chancellor Schroeder, the wide-ranging plan
will promote freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, economic
opportunity, and security in the Greater Middle East.36 In exchange, those governments that take the path of

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reform will receive more aid, lucrative
trade opportunities, and new military and diplomatic contacts. Although Paris has
expressed qualms about following Washingtons lead, the EU already has a similar
program in place, focusing on the southern Mediterranean basin.

In a sign of common
ground, France and the United States brought about a relatively peaceful solution in
Haiti, deploying a joint force to stabilize the impoverished Caribbean nation in early
2004. NATO is handing off its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia to the European Union.
Likewise, Washington and the EU have been collaborating closely to keep nuclear weapons
out of the hands of the Iranian government.37

IMD Coalition

Finally, the
emerging international missile defense (IMD) coalition is built around a strong
transatlantic core. Britain was the first ally to join, as the Blair government agreed to
software and hardware upgrades of existing ground-based radar stations at Fylingdales and
Menwith Hill. Denmark is paving the way for similar technology upgrades at radar and
satellite-tracking stations in Greenland. The Polish and Czech governments are negotiating
with Washington on the deployment of interceptors and/or radar stations on their soil.
Japan and Australia serve as the coalitions key pillars in the Pacific.38

These heady days of
missile defense call to mind something Churchill said in March of 1955, when he called on
the West to maintain a defensive shield and rallied his countrymen to preserve
the unity and brotherhood between the United Kingdom and the United States.39
Churchill wasnt talking specifically about missile defense, of course, but his words
take on special meaning in the shadow of North Korean nukes and Iranian missilery.

Adjustments

In sum, the
transatlantic community is still a community, and the outlines of a durable post-9/11
security order are emerging. If given space to grow, this emerging order could allow
European governments to play niche roles where they are able, EU powers Germany and France
to participate where they are comfortable, and the United States to lead a true coalition
of the willing. It could even open the door to the possibility of Europe and America
playing good cop/bad cop with rogue regimes. Without question, this post-9/11 security
system is premised on US leadership, but it relies on existing NATO structures and a
dependable European Union.

Before this new
security architecture can take shape, both America and Europe have adjustments to make.
For its part, Washington should remember that how something is said is often more
important than what is said, especially to European ears. US Presidents often speak
bluntly and some-

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times must act
without the UNs permission. However, nuance and process are important in Europe. The
us or them ultimatum doesnt sound any better coming from Washington than
it does coming from Paris or Brussels.

As Secretary
Rumsfeld has said of the War on Terror, Victory will require that every element of
American influence and power be engaged.40 Military
strength is part of that power, but so is diplomatic deftness. Although the US military
can crush any foe, winning the peace requires ambidexterity, and keeping the peace
requires partners. Nation-building, like misery, loves company.

For its part, the
European Union must address some basic questions. Does the EU really need a foreign
minister, or will such an experiment create more problems than it will solve? Is it time
to invest more in defense and less in new bureaucracies? And perhaps most important of
all, do the EUs powerbrokers really want differences over style and semantics to
divide their new union and cripple the venerable transatlantic alliance?

Prime Minister Tony
Blair, who at times seems like the last thread holding Europe and America together, has
answered this last question with one of his own: If our plea is for America to work
with others, to be good as well as powerful allies, will our retreat make them
multilateralist? Or will it not rather be the biggest impulse to unilateralism there could
ever be?41

In other words, the
United States is neither the EUs nor the worlds master; however, if European
leaders fail to recognize that America plays a special role in the world, they could drive
the United States away from the very organizations that promote international
cooperationand thus ultimately jeopardize Europes own security.

As historian John
Lewis Gaddis writes, There is something worse out there than American
hegemony.42 Some in Europe understand this; some do
not.

NOTES

1. See Hans Kohn, Nationalism:
Its Meaning and History (Melbourne, Fla.: Robert Krieger Publishing, 1982).

3. See Heather
Grabbe and Ulrike Guerot, Could a Hard Core Run the Enlarged EU? Center for
European Reform Briefing Note, February 2004; see also Cornelius Brokelmann, Young
Leaders Study Group on the Future of Europe, First Conference Report, 12-15 November
2003, American Council on Germany/Draeger Foundation/ZEIT Foundation, 2003.

4. Draft Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 20 June 2003.

5. Grabbe and
Guerot.

6. European Union
Draft Constitution.

7. Kohn. p. 29.

8. EU Business,
EUs Presidency Warns of Race against Time on Constitution,
EUBusiness.com, 10 March 2004; Thomas Fuller and Katrin Bennhold, Leaders Reach
Agreement on a European Constitution, The New York Times, 19 June 2004.

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9. John Darnton,
Union, Not Unanimity, as Europes East join West, The New York Times,
11 March 2004.

11. Remarks
delivered under Chatham House Rules, Berlin, November 2003.

12. Patrick Tyler,
NATO Backs Bush on Iraq but Germans Oppose War, The New York Times, 22
November 2002; United We Stand: Eight European Leaders Are as One with President
Bush, The Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2003.

13. Bruce Jacobs,
2002 in Review: A Year Marked by a New Currency, Old Tensions, and Expanded
Alliances, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/12/17122002170625.asp.

33. US Department of
Homeland Security, US Customs & Border Protection, Hong Kong Implements the CSI
and Begins to Target and Pre-Screen Cargo Destined for US, 5 May 2003, and
China Joins the U.S. in Container Security Initiative, 25 October 2003; US
State Department, US Customs Services CSI, 22 February 2002.

Alan W. Dowd is a senior fellow
at the Sagamore Institute for Policy Research, a columnist for The American Legion
Magazine and The American Enterprise Online, and a member of the Young Leaders
Study Group, which brings together policy shapers from the United States and Europe to
address transatlantic issues at conferences in Warsaw, Washington, Berlin, and Brussels.
His work has appeared in Parameters, Policy Review, The World & I,
The Washington Times, The American Enterprise, and The Jerusalem Post.