This
matter is before the Court on the pro se petition of Missouri
state prisoner Christopher Piersee for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On August 26, 2009,
Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree
murder and was thereafter sentenced to concurrent sentences
of life without the possibility of parole. In his petition
for federal habeas relief, Petitioner raises two ineffective
assistance of counsel claims: (1) plea counsel was
ineffective because he failed to hire a forensic psychiatrist
to establish that Petitioner was incompetent to plead guilty
on August 26, 2009; and (2) plea counsel was ineffective
because he failed to hire a forensic psychiatrist to
establish that, at the time Petitioner committed the murders,
he suffered from a mental disease or defect that prevented
him from having the capacity to form the intent necessary to
commit first-degree murder. For the reasons set forth below,
federal habeas relief will be denied.

BACKGROUND

On or
about February 2, 2009, Petitioner killed his wife and
six-month-old son in their home in La Grange, Missouri. Three
weeks prior, Petitioner began ingesting excessive amounts of
Coricidin HBP, a cold medicine containing dextromethorphan,
which can produce dissociative hallucinogenic states when
ingested at doses much higher than those medically
recommended. On the night of February 2, 2009, Petitioner
shot his wife in the head and inflicted blunt force trauma to
the head of his infant son, killing both. On the morning of
February 3, 2009, Petitioner's father-in-law discovered
the bodies of Petitioner's wife and infant son and
Petitioner, who was naked, covered in blood, and on the bed.
Petitioner had a number of self-inflicted wounds on his arms.
Petitioner's father-in-law held Petitioner at gunpoint
until the authorities arrived.

Petitioner
was immediately taken into custody and transported to a
hospital. There, Petitioner was prescribed a number of
medications, including Risperdal, Lorazepam, Paxil, and
Ativan, [1] to manage his symptoms of depression and
psychosis, and he remained in the hospital for 24 days before
being transferred to jail. Petitioner attempted suicide on
three occasions while in jail after returning from the
hospital. ECF No. 10-1 at 12.

The
State charged Petitioner with two counts of the class A
felony of murder in the first degree and one count of the
unclassified felony of armed criminal action. After meeting
with Petitioner and in light of the serious nature of the
charges, plea counsel hired forensic psychologist Jeffry
Kline, Ph.D., to evaluate Petitioner's mental state, and
Dr. Kline provided plea counsel with a written report. ECF
No. 10-2. The report contains the following information. On
June 16, 2009, Dr. Kline performed a mental evaluation of
Petitioner for the purpose of determining Petitioner's
mental state at that time, as well as at the time of the
murders. Dr. Kline reviewed a number of records, including
medical records from the hospital and records from the
Missouri State Highway Patrol. Dr. Kline reported on
Petitioner's family, educational, employment, military,
relationship, psychiatric, and alcohol and substance abuse
history. He also went through a detailed description of the
murders based on documents obtained from the Missouri State
Highway Patrol.

Dr.
Kline observed that during the examination, Petitioner was
generally cooperative and was oriented to person, place,
time, and situation. Dr. Kline observed that Petitioner's
insight and judgment were both fair, and Petitioner's
flow of thought was logical and goal-directed. Petitioner
described his mood to Dr. Kline as being somewhat sad and
depressed. Dr. Kline observed no evidence of delusions of
paranoia, grandiosity, reference, or influence. During the
course of the interview, Dr. Kline opined that
Petitioner's intellect was in the low average range and
that there was no apparent interference with his ability to
reason or comprehend information presented to him. Dr. Kline
observed that Petitioner's concentration was grossly
intact.

Dr.
Kline determined that Petitioner suffered from symptoms of a
major depressive disorder that was of mild intensity. He
found that Petitioner responded to medication for the
disorder, but there was no evidence to suggest this disorder
was present in the weeks prior to the murders. He opined that
“[Petitioner] was clearly suffering from symptoms of a
substance induced psychosis at the time of the alleged
criminal acts which resolved itself during his hospital stay
after the events.” ECF No. 10-2 at 13. Dr. Kline went
on to report that “[i]t is clear that [Petitioner] took
these substances on a voluntary basis and had at least some
understanding that he was becoming intoxicated on them. While
it is clear that he was suffering from hallucinations and
delusions at the time of the alleged criminal acts, which
were likely the impetus for his actions, it is also clear
that these hallucinations and delusions arose directly from
the presence of the dextromethorphan in his system.”
Id. at 16. Within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, Dr. Kline found that Petitioner did not suffer
from a mental disease or defect at the time of the murders,
but that he did suffer from hallucinations and delusions
secondary to voluntary use of and intoxication on
dextromethorphan.

Guilty
Plea

On
April 22, 2009, Petitioner was charged with two counts of
class A felony murder in the first degree and one count of
the unclassified felony of armed criminal action. The State
indicated it would seek the death penalty. Based on Dr.
Kline's report, plea counsel believed that Petitioner was
competent to plead. On August 26, 2009, Petitioner pleaded
guilty to two counts of murder in the first degree. As part
of the plea bargain, the third count of felony armed criminal
action was dismissed, and the State agreed it would not seek
the death penalty, but instead would seek life imprisonment.

During
his guilty plea, Petitioner admitted to the two murders,
expressed his remorse, and stated that he understood the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The plea court
asked Petitioner whether he was on medication and, when
Petitioner indicated he was, asked whether the medication
made it difficult for Petitioner to understand the nature of
the proceeding. Petitioner answered that it did not and
asserted that he was not suffering from any mental condition
that made it difficult for him to understand the proceeding
and the implications thereof. The plea court accepted
Petitioner's guilty plea (ECF No. 8, Ex. A, at 9), and on
October 29, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison
without possibility of parole for each count of murder in the
first degree. Petitioner did not directly appeal his
convictions.

State
Post-Conviction Proceedings

On
August 17, 2010, Petitioner, through appointed counsel, filed
a Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035 amended motion seeking
post-conviction relief and raising the same claims as those
contained in this habeas action. Petitioner claimed that plea
counsel was ineffective because he hired a forensic
psychologist rather than a forensic psychiatrist to establish
that Petitioner was incompetent to plead guilty, and that on
the date of the murders, he suffered from a mental defect or
disorder that prevented him from having the intent necessary
to commit first-degree murder.

In
support of his claims, Petitioner relied on the written
report of Ansell E. Daniel, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist.
Dr. Daniel performed examinations of Petitioner on June 14
and 22, 2010, and July 1, 2010. ECF No. 10-1. Dr.
Daniel's report contains the following information. The
purpose of Dr. Daniel's evaluations of Petitioner were to
determine, inter alia, whether Petitioner suffered from a
mental disease or defect at the time of the evaluations,
whether he suffered from a mental disease or defect at the
time of the murders, whether he was competent to plea bargain
at the time the plea was offered to him, and whether he was
competent to proceed with motions for post-conviction relief.
Dr. Daniel evaluated Petitioner for a total of about six
hours and interviewed Petitioner's mother and
grandmother. Dr. Daniel also reviewed a number of records,
including medical records from the hospital and the jail.

During
the evaluations of Petitioner, Dr. Daniel observed that
Petitioner was generally oriented to time, place, and person
and that Petitioner was alert and cooperative. Petitioner
told Dr. Daniel that he had stopped taking medications about
a month before. Dr. Daniel observed that Petitioner's
mood was depressed and that he occasionally experienced
flashbacks and morbid thoughts about death. Dr. Daniel
concluded with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
Petitioner suffered from a psychotic disorder induced and
caused by dextromethorphan. He opined that the psychotic
disorder began in January 2009 after Petitioner began
consuming large quantities of cold medicine tablets. The
disorder was active at the time of the murders, and Dr.
Daniel determined that the symptoms of psychosis persisted
during Petitioner's hospitalization and continued during
his incarceration at the jail and thereafter. Treatment of
Petitioner's psychosis required heavy doses of
antipsychotic medication (Risperdal and Haldol), a heavy dose
of Ativan, and an antidepressant (Paxil or Celexa) over the
course of approximately 18 months.

Dr.
Daniel stated that psychosis induced by a substance generally
resolves with the discontinuation of the offending agent
and/or treatment with antipsychotic medication, with the
psychosis lasting a maximum of six months. Dr. Daniel opined
that in Petitioner's case, clinical evidence indicated
that Petitioner was psychotic for 18 months, which indicated
an underlying psychotic disorder. Dr. Daniel opined that
Petitioner was clearly psychotic and out of contact with
reality at the time of the murders.

As to
Petitioner's mental state at the time of the plea, Dr.
Daniel reported that Petitioner did not recall the specifics
of his meetings with plea counsel. Petitioner told Dr. Daniel
that Petitioner was taking medications that “made him
slow down, zombie-like and moody.” Id. at 17.
Dr. Daniel opined that the medications that Petitioner was
taking at the time he pleaded guilty were at a dosage
sufficient to blunt alertness, slow Petitioner's
thinking, and cause short-term memory impairment. As a
result, he “probably” suffered from substantial
impairment of his sensorium, clarity in thinking, attention
span, and registration and memory, precluding his ability to
consider the pros and cons of the plea offer. Dr. Daniel
opined that, as a result, it was unlikely Petitioner would
have had the capacity to understand the charges against him
or the implications of accepting or rejecting a plea
agreement, nor would Petitioner have been unable to carefully
evaluate his acceptance of the plea agreement. Dr. Daniel
pointed out that Dr. Kline's report did not address the
issue of Petitioner's competence to plead guilty and
concluded that Petitioner:

1) Suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of
the offenses when he killed his wife and son as per the
provisions of Chapter 552 RSMo (2000). As a result of the
mental disease or defect, he did not know the nature,
criminality and wrongfulness of his conduct and did not have
the capacity to form the necessary intent to commit first
degree murders.

2) Was not competent to plead guilty to the offenses in
August, 2009. At the time when the plea bargain was offered
to him by his attorney, he was heavily medicated with a
combination of Risperdal and Ativan in doses far exceeding
the usual therapeutic range. Under this heavily medicated
state, he was substantially impaired in his ability to
knowingly and voluntarily consider implications of such an
offer and make a rational judgment.

Id. at 18.

On
April 19, 2012, the motion court[2] held an evidentiary hearing
on Petitioner's motion for post-conviction relief, at
which Dr. Daniel, Petitioner's grandmother, plea counsel,
and law enforcement witnesses testified. Dr. Daniel testified
consistent with his written report. He also testified that
psychiatrists differ from psychologists in several respects.
Psychiatrists hold medical degrees and undergo in-depth
training regarding indications, side effects, and dosage of
medications because they have the ability to prescribe
medicine to patients. Psychologists, on the other hand,
typically hold a Ph.D. and are unable to prescribe medicine.
This distinction, Dr. Daniel opined, was relevant in
Petitioner's case because a psychologist would be more
able to identify whether Petitioner's competence to plead
was impaired due to excessive medication. He did, however,
concede that he would expect Dr. Kline to identify certain
symptoms of over-medication, such as sedation. ECF No. 8, Ex.
B, at 154-56.

The law
enforcement witnesses testified about the scene of the
murders and Petitioner's demeanor after he was taken into
custody. Specifically, the police witnesses established that
various portions of the home were in disarray with pools of
blood on the floor, a bloody knife, and numerous bullet holes
in the wall. The walls were covered with handwritings that
appeared to be written in blood, including
“Lucifer” and “Michael the Arch
Angel.” After Petitioner was taken into custody, he
made several biblical references and referred to his son as
“Lucifer.” Petitioner's grandmother testified
that Petitioner had a good sense of humor as a child and that
she had a good relationship with him. She testified that
Petitioner loved his wife and son and that she would visit
Petitioner and his family approximately every week.
Petitioner's grandmother continued to visit Petitioner
regularly after he was incarcerated, and she testified that
between Petitioner's initial incarceration through
sentencing, he seemed unable to focus when on medication. She
also testified that at his sentencing, Petitioner did not
seem like himself.

Plea
counsel testified as follows. Plea counsel was initially
concerned about Petitioner's mental state and considered
the possibility that Petitioner might not be competent to
proceed with a plea agreement or trial. Plea counsel also
wanted to investigate whether the defenses of not guilty by
reason of insanity (“NGRI”) or diminished
capacity were available to Petitioner. As a result, plea
counsel engaged Dr. Kline to examine Petitioner in June 2009.
Plea counsel gave Dr. Kline general instructions to examine
Petitioner's mental health and competency, but did not
specifically direct Dr. Kline to evaluate the potential
defenses. ECF No. 8, Ex. B. at 74-75. Plea counsel did not
specifically inform Dr. Kline that Petitioner was taking
Risperdal, Lorazepam, Paxil, and Ativan, although Dr. Kline
reviewed Petitioner's records from the hospital.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Plea
counsel testified that he discussed Dr. Kline&#39;s report
and its impact on possible defenses with Petitioner. ECF No.
8, Ex. A at 47. Plea counsel also discussed the NGRI and
diminished capacity defenses with colleagues at the Capital
Division of the Missouri State Public Defender system. ECF
No. 8, Ex. B at 80. The attorneys he consulted did not
believe either defense was a &ldquo;real possibility.&rdquo;
Id. This was in line with ...

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