A state law requiring an
early merits showing when a plaintiff seeks punitive damages from a religious
organization applies to an elder abuse claim against a religiously affiliated
healthcare corporation, the Court of Appeal for this district ruled yesterday.

Francisco Marin’s
mother, Julia Gomez died from complications related to her diabetes while under
the care of the Little Company of Mary Hospital and Subacute Care Center, which
are owned and operated by Providence Health System‑Southern California, a
tax-exempt religious corporation affiliated with the Catholic church. Marin
filed suit against the healthcare corporation, alleging elder abuse and seeking
punitive damages.

The healthcare
corporation moved to strike the punitive damages claim, invoking the
protections of California Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 425.14, which provides
that no claim for punitive damages can be made against a religious corporation
unless the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of prevailing.. Marin argued
that the pretrial showing of merit requirement was inapplicable to elder abuse
claims against healthcare providers pursuant to Sec. 425.13.

The trial judge reasoned
that both Sec. 425.13 and 425.134 had been enacted for similar purposes, and
therefore concluded the case law excluding elder abuse punitive damage claims
from the requirements of Sec. 425.13, which generally requires an early merits
showing when a punitive damage claim is made in a medical malpractice case,
applied equally to claims against religious organizations.

Writing for the
appellate court, Presiding Justice Dennis M. Perluss disagreed. He explained
that Sec. 425.13 only applies to actions arising out of a healthcare provider’s
professional negligence.

Perluss further noted
that Sec. 425.13 is “limited both by the identity of the defendant and the
nature of the plaintiff’s claim,” but that Sec. 425.14 is only limited by the
identity of the defendant as a religious organization.

Accordingly, Perluss
reasoned, Sec. 425.14’s pretrial-showing-of-merit requirement must be satisfied
whenever the defendant is a religious organization, regardless of the nature of
the plaintiff’s claim, even when the defendant is also a healthcare
organization, and even when Sec. 415.13 does not apply.

He acknowledged that
religious healthcare providers were thereby being afforded greater protection
from punitive damage claims than secular healthcare providers, but concluded
“[w]hatever the merits of that differentiation between religious not-for-profit
entities and their secular counterparts, that is precisely what the Legislature
intended.”

Justices Fred Woods and
Laurie D. Zelon joined Perluss in his opinion.

Daniel K. Dik, who
represented the healthcare corporation, said he client was pleased with the
decision and that “after today, it’s pretty clear that religious
organizations…are protected against punitive damages regardless of the claim
against them.”

Dik elaborated that the
appellate court’s holding will not prevent plaintiffs from ever getting
punitive damages from a religious organization, but only limits the situations
in which a “clever attorney could write a complaint seeking multi-millions in
punitive damages to force a settlement.”

Co-counsel Cecille L.
Hester agreed with the court’s distinction between religious and secular
healthcare corporations because the religious corporations’ operation of a
healthcare facility is a “charitable, benevolent act.”

She added:

“I think you can draw a
distinction between for-profit and non-profit groups for the same reasons.”

Peter J. McNulty and
Brett L. Rosenthal of the McNulty Law Firm, who represented Marin, could not be
reached for comment.