Colorado Court of Appeals, 1116 COBJ, Vol. 45 No. 11

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Hebert
convinced an elderly man to give her loans totaling several
hundred thousand dollars and failed to pay them back. The
People charged Hebert with theft from an at-risk adult and
tax-related offenses. The victim died before Hebert’s
trial, and his two-way video deposition was admitted at
trial. Hebert was found guilty of all of the charged counts.

On
appeal, Hebert argued that the district court erred by
determining on remand that she was ineligible for appointed
counsel. She contended that because she was separating from
her husband, she no longer had access to his income and was,
in fact, indigent. However, the district court’s
finding that Herbert had not separated from her husband was
supported by the evidence. Therefore, the court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that Hebert was not indigent
and did not qualify for appointed counsel.

Hebert
also contended that she was denied the right to a fair trial
when the district court admitted the victim’s video
deposition testimony without adequate time for defense
counsel to prepare for the examination However, the court
allowed defense counsel additional time to prepare for the
deposition Therefore, Hebert was not denied the right to a
fair trial.

Hebert
also argued that admitting the video recording of the
victim’s deposition violated her Sixth Amendment
confrontation right because she was unable to confront the
victim face-to-face at the deposition. The at-risk adult
deposition statute provides for videotaped depositions. Here,
the victim was in hospice care and his survival was measured
in months. Therefore, admitting the video of the
victim’s deposition did not violate Hebert’s
confrontation rights because (1) the video conference
procedure was necessary to protect the health of the victim,
and (2) the procedure ensured the reliability of the
victim’s testimony. Further, because the victim was
deceased at the time of trial and Hebert had a full
opportunity to cross-examine him during the deposition,
admitting the video deposition did not violate Hebert’s
Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.

Grippin
was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident. At the time
of the accident, Grippin owned and lived in a home but also
lived with his grandparents at their house for approximately
one week per month. Grippin received the liability limits
from his and the other driver’s insurance policies, but
he sought additional coverage through the uninsured
motorist/underinsured motorist (UM/ UIM) provisions of his
family members’ State Farm policies, on which he was
listed as an “other household driver,” to cover
his medical bills. State Farm denied payment. Grippin filed
claims for breach of contract, bad faith breach of insurance
contract, and unreasonable delay or denial of payment of
benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of State Farm.

On
appeal, Grippin contended that State Farm’s definition
of “resident relative” violates public policy
because it provides coverage to a narrower class of persons
than the UM/UIM statute, and is therefore void and
unenforceable. State Farm’s definition of
“resident relative” narrows the statutorily
defined class of insureds because relatives who
“reside” with the named insured but do not reside
“primarily” with the named insured are included
under the statute but are not included under State
Farm’s policy. It therefore impermissibly limits
statutorily mandated coverage and violates public policy.

Grippin
also contended that he was alternatively entitled to UM/UIM
benefits because of ambiguity in the auto renewal forms. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the policies are not
ambiguous and Grippin is not entitled to coverage on those
grounds.

Lastly,
Grippin argued that the auto renewal forms and a State Farm
employee’s statement created a reasonable expectation
that he was insured and therefore entitled to coverage.
Whether Grippin is a resident relative and therefore an
insured under the policies is a question of fact yet to be
determined; therefore, the Court did not reach the question
of whether he had a reasonable expectation of coverage.

The
district court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed
and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs
obtained a judgment against United Securities Alliance, Inc.
(United), and then instituted garnishment proceedings against
Catlin Insurance Company (UK) Ltd. (Catlin), United’s
insurer. The district court deducted from the policy limit
the amount of attorney fees incurred by Catlin in defending
the underlying arbitrations against United, and entered
judgment for plaintiffs for the remainder of the policy. The
court denied plaintiffs’ requests for pre- and
post-judgment interest.

On
appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court acted
beyond the scope of the Court of Appeals mandate because, by
considering the unredacted attorney fees invoices submitted
after the mandate, the district court expressly disregarded
the mandate’s instruction to review “the existing
record.” Given the unusual procedural posture of this
case and the largely “indiscernible” unredacted
invoices, the language to review “the existing
record” was permissive rather than restrictive, and the
remand order meant that the district court could rely
exclusively on the existing record to calculate reasonable
fees, not that it had to. Accordingly, the district court did
not err in considering the unredacted invoices.

Plaintiffs
next contended that the district court erred in declining to
award prejudgment interest pursuant to CRS §
5-12-102(1). This statute, however, governs contract and
property damage cases. Because garnishment actions...