Quite a bit of speculation abounds as to the whereabouts of Russia President Vladimir Putin. The serious questions began to be posed after President Putin suddenly canceled a trip to Astana, Kazakhstan where he was scheduled to meet on 13 March with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko. The tripartite meeting was to discuss trade and economic relations, including the likely topics of the Ukraine situation and global economic trends. According to President Putin’s press secretary, Dmitri Peskov, the meeting has been postponed for several days.

The last time President Putin was seen in public was on March 5th, in a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. A video showing President Putin greeting women on 8 March for International Women’s Day, a holiday celebrated more significantly in former Soviet lands than in the West was allegedly filmed earlier on March 5th, according to the same Russian press article. The Russian press secretary said President Putin has been having meetings and a decision just hasn’t been made to publicize them. He also responded to a query regarding whether Putin was dead with, “Sorry, but he’s still alive.”

The health-related rumored reasons run the gamut from a botched botox operation to cancer to the flu. Another rumor wonders whether President Putin may have secretly escaped Moscow with oft-rumored mistress former gymnast Alina Kabaeva to Switzerland for her to have a baby in a top notch medical clinic. A further report alleges the birth of a baby girl occurred a couple weeks ago and President Putin was not present.

The Washington Post’s Julia Ioffe reasons Putin’s absence causes concern because his image and power are predicated on his manliness, so there’s not likely to be any admission of illness. She also points out press secretary Peskov denied the Switzerland baby birth rumor. The article goes on to mention some of the more well-known instances of Russian leaders “disappearing” for a strange amount of time and when not so stable events were occurring.

Is the social media hype with #whereisPutin and #ПутинУмер overblown and overboard? Perhaps. However, as Ioffe notes, the absence of the top official in Russia has historically been a just cause for speculation. What’s interesting is a public appearance by President Putin would be an extremely simple fix, but the Kremlin has not chosen to dissolve the furor in this manner. On Sunday the 15th, press secretary Peskov said the subject about President Putin’s whereabouts and health is closed.

An important consideration in whether this “disappearance” should generate concern is whether or not it was planned. Having a pre-recorded International Women’s Day item would seem to indicate prior planning for an absence from public view. Therefore the first few days of the absence should not generate undue concern. Postponing the tripartite meeting in Kazakhstan might indicate the planned absence required an unplanned extension, but not necessarily. President Putin has a strong enough personal relationship with both presidents, Nazarbayev and Lukashenko, he could have arranged or excused his absence in any way desired. Both Nazarbayev and Lukashenko have led their respective countries authoritatively for over 20 years and neither would question any artifice President Putin required to retain power or preserve his image. Most importantly, President Putin could likely manage both relationships and the cancelation with phone calls of less than five minutes duration each. So the postponement of the Astana trip does not necessarily mean an unplanned extension, just a desire to hide the expected absence and keep the reason secret.

Is there a good reason President Putin might take a planned absence, but want it to be a secret? Yes, if the optics of the event would seem inappropriate. The explanation might be as simple as the poor optics of going on a vacation after personally promising to oversee the investigation into the 27 February assassination of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. Putin has been more careful about his public appearances since taking criticism over his absence when the submarine Kursk sank in 2000 or the Nord-Ost theater hostage crisis in 2002. However, this must also be combined with the well-known manly-man image of vitality and strength President Putin frequently displays with his media presence. When it comes right down to it, President Putin would not hesitate to just do what he wants. For example, if his mistress really did give birth to a baby girl a couple weeks ago, and President Putin just didn’t want to hear about it from the press, he could just avoid the media spotlight and carry on normally.

Could he then instrumentally use such a situation? Of course. It could be a loyalty test for the senior leaders. In the wake of Nemtsov’s murder near the Kremlin, the political environment in Russia is likely a bit tense. Predictably, President Putin initially topped the list of suspects behind the Nemtsov murder, but if he was not behind it, then a certain amount of suspicious caution on Putin’s part – both in public appearances and in trying to figure out who would take such action without his approval – is completely justified and reasonable. President Putin’s manly-man image likely would not willingly admit to avoiding public view for security reasons. This scenario would involve an initial period of demonstrating no security concerns by continuing business as usual, but initiating a planned absence after one week would then seem reasonable. The absence would necessarily have to be secret or the week-long demonstration of a lack of concern about security would have been wasted. If Putin did not order the hit, then he understandably would be very interested to identify who would order it and why.

A loyalty test for senior officials is a win-win proposition. He is more secure from assassination and he can focus on ensuring his closest advisors are still loyal. Already, rumors of a coup by regime insiders, including close Putin ally FSB (successor to the KGB) Director Nikolai Patrushev, are circulating. If Putin’s absence from public view tempts some officials to seize media attention to offer comment, then such activity might be useful information for a leader of Putin’s pedigree. Even conducting a sensing of his key advisors as they “check in” through their privileged access, or express thoughts about the media furor about his absence, can help President Putin judge the loyalty of the siloviki – those who hold official power and disproportionate influence in Russia.

Another interesting rumor is Putin’s absence presaging a possible significant change in government key leaders, like Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev. In my view, I doubt President Putin would need to take so much time off to consider the political ramifications of such a change. Monitoring and making the regime personnel changes has been a constant consideration and would more likely be planned over a period of months, rather than in an extended period of seclusion.

If Russia were contemplating possible military conflict in Ukraine or the Baltic states, it would make sense for such a sensitive discussion to involve an extended session of wargaming at the highest level. While military planning would have been ongoing for many months and the President received numerous briefings, it would not be a ridiculous idea for the President to take some quality time to contemplate all the diplomatic, domestic, and military implications of a potential military crisis with NATO and the United States. It would not be prudent for a head of state to sandwich the planning for a possible nuclear war inside the normal daily routine. President Putin has personally participated in strategic level exercises, especially those involving potential nuclear scenarios with the U.S. and NATO. The Western press has provided extensive speculation about Russian military moves.

It would not surprise me for President Putin to reappear and make a strong statement or even ultimatum about Ukraine and/or the Baltic states after this absence for strategic contemplation about the way ahead. Is it coincidence, after widespread speculation focuses attention on Moscow and President Putin, a documentary film about Crimea is released with choice sound bites from President Putin about the crisis? Short Russian press articles containing Putin announcements about Ukraine accuse the Americans of puppet mastering the Ukraine events and assess Yanukovich’s refusal to use force as having serious consequences. The announcements are from Putin’s commentary in a documentary film that aired about Crimea rejoining the Motherland. Putin’s recent absence would lend substantial weight to an ultimatum because it would appear the Russians have meticulously planned a showdown and are ready to follow through with any threats. It would be a bold move. If the period of absence really was spent in intensive preparation for brinksmanship, the Russians would possibly be steps ahead of NATO, which could be a decisive advantage.

A less likely, less bellicose, but still important possibility could be President Putin is reviewing preparations for the 70th Anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War, as the Russians remember World War 2. This is not a meaningless commemoration and significant government activities and events are planned. The Mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin, indicated veterans may receive substantial one-time payments. The last great 70th anniversary was of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union did not last to celebrate a 75th, this subtly connotes a greater meaning to a major 70th anniversary event. Then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev gave a notable speech about Soviet history and the state of the Revolution to address a country shaken by his perestroika and glasnost policies. This speech also signified developments in reducing the possibility of nuclear war and an end to Khrushchev’s threat to obliterate capitalism. The 70th Anniversary of Victory in Europe on 9 May will be an important moment for President Putin to issue a similar anniversary speech. In the atmosphere of tensions between the U.S., Europe and Russia over Ukraine, the upcoming prospect of celebrating the Allied victory in World War 2, may give a venue for a strong Russian statement about the state of relations between the former Allies. President Putin may be working through the wording of a speech to re-ignite the Cold War or prevent it.

President Putin showed up to the D-Day event in Normandy, France in June 2014 despite Western opposition to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine. Russia’s support for the commemoration of this important historical event was an effective signal to give Western leaders hope in being able to resolve Ukraine’s crisis and moderate a possible escalation in the crisis. Will Western leaders fail to attend the anniversary events in Russia for political optics? Such failure could have serious consequences. If we are not already in a new Cold War, the appearance of the wrong U.S. leaders in early May in Russia could signal the start of a new Cold War.

It is altogether possible President Putin will show up at any moment and refuse to explain his absence. He may wipe his own nose and admit recovering from a flu or taking a rest. I think it more likely he will reappear with some powerful statements about strength and security and the future of Russia. The next strategic key date in Russian relations with the West is 9 May. Putin’s recent absence will either boost the power of his statements upon return or be quickly forgotten. But the real question may quickly become about who is absent from Moscow on 9 May.

Are American leaders thinking about this? “I have enough trouble keeping track of the whereabouts of one world leader,” White House spokesman Eric Schultz told reporters. “I would refer you to the Russians for questions on theirs. I’m sure they’ll be very responsive.” While Mr. Schultz certainly has no responsibility for keeping track of Putin, there are others who do and who should be thinking carefully about what this absence might mean.

Suggestion – President Obama might want to consider a “disappearance” from media view for a few days, maybe meet with some good Russian experts and key military and intelligence leaders at Camp David to think about a new Cold War. Such a reaction might “steal a march” on any upcoming Russian political maneuver. Even if President Putin shows back up with the sniffles, I am certain the time spent by important people thinking about Putin’s absence and the 9th of May will not have been wasted.

Wide-eyed and claustrophobic in a minivan taxi cab, I sat and pondered. Having just spent several days with pasture users in Doobolu village in Naryn Province, Kyrgyzstan, I had many thoughts to chew on as the wintry cab windows revealed glimpses of the mountainscape. Kyrgyz pastoralism amidst decades of land reform policy, I thought, had been left as crooked as the pitiful roads which trace Kyrgyzstan’s mountain passes.

I puzzled over the responses I had received from interviewees regarding their usage paradigms, their adherence to customs, and their awareness of land reform policy. I recognized that ignorance of land law among pastoral communities had persisted not as a result of lawlessness, but rather as a consequence of unaccountability and systemic mistrust between policymakers and those who put policies to practice.

Pasture law in Kyrgyzstan is characterized by community-level management and user-driven regulation–at least in principle. The 2009 law “On Pastures,” which was introduced upon the government’s realization that post-Soviet pastureland privatization too dramatically contradicted customary conceptions of land tenure, set out to restore some integral collective aspects of pastoral tradition. To do so, the law dictated that all pasture land was to become property of the state and that local administrative bodies, called djait komitet, perform regulatory and managerial tasks, taking into account the contextual specificities of each community. The law “On Pastures,” prompted a structural shift whereby pasture users earned access to the land not by renting a geographical space, but by renting usage rights from the djait komitet on a per-head of livestock basis.

Theoretically, the scheme is clear-cut. Local pasture committees are given jurisdiction over an allotted space, pasture users report their pasture needs, and collectively the entities orchestrate plans for spatial and temporal herd mobility which embrace the seasonal vertical rotation model characteristic of traditional practice. However, I quickly learned that the condition on the ground is far removed from the legislated ideal.

In Doobolu I administered 12 interviews over the course of 2 blustery January days. The farmers’ responses were ubiquitous and resounding: “we live by our own law here.” These words, often sliding past grins of comic satisfaction from the worn farmers’ faces, each time gave me pause. Perhaps my own academically-enriched biases toward good governance and upstanding citizenship were strung up in a space too utopian for the “real world.” I entered Doobolu with a sense that the law had made an impact, and was utterly shocked when farmer after farmer explained their relationship with the pasture committee essentially as “they come once a year, take the money, and we use the pastures as we please.”

Don’t get me wrong, I’m all for autonomy. But at the same time I saw (and still do see) in the law a real potential for sustainability and advancement of the Kyrgyz pastoral enterprise both socially and economically.

It wasn’t until my taxi ride back to the city, stuffed between vomiting toddlers on a chilly minivan’s back seat, that I realized the law hadn’t actually missed the mark so drastically in Doobolu. In fact, it seemed that the basic intentions of the law “On Pastures” had actually come to fruition, ironically amidst a striking neglect of the law itself.

Namely, in tossing the legislation aside and taking managerial tasks into their own hands, pasture users had deconstructed the post-Soviet privatization model and calibrated their ideological framework back toward the customary paradigm–a shift that the law had aimed to achieve. Further, several respondents claimed that in the wake of djait komitet formation, and in the subsequent (albeit unintentional) absence of local-level administrative influence, users felt a sense of autonomy in tailoring their pastoral experience to the specific social and geographic context.

So what’s the problem? Truly, it seems that one way or another–law or not–pasture management in Kyrgyzstan had taken a turn for the better, toward community-guided management, precisely in a direction policymakers had anticipated in creating the pasture law. Even so, it’s worth pointing out that improvements generated by farmers’ own leanings toward tradition, while substantial, are limited. While my observations have evidenced that customary pastoral traditions could be revitalized with or without adherence to the new law, the somewhat superficial nature of these improvements masks some of the subtler, deeper issues which the law aims to address, such as environmental impact, land quality, social and infrastructural development, agricultural outreach, and veterinary medicine. It is therefore imperative that attentions be refocused toward building strong relationships between pasture users and their respective djait komitets, such that the progresses already realized by farmers living according to “their own law” can catalyze smallholder mobilization around land reform policy and help to fully realize its promised benefits.

On 27 February, Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was killed by unknown assailants less than 200 meters away from the Kremlin. A former deputy prime minister and vocal Putin critic, Nemtsov feared that his most recent campaign against Russian involvement in Ukraine could pose a threat to his life. Tragically, this proved to be true. In the aftermath, many theories on the motive of the murder have surfaced in both Russian and Western media. The most outlandish of these range from a CIA-orchestrated plot to an act of vengeance by a disgruntled girlfriend. Propaganda aside, we will now examine the most plausible explanations as to who killed Boris Nemtsov.

Putin Strikes Again

Our discussion must begin with the man at the top, Russian President Vladimir Putin. One year in, his subversion of eastern Ukraine remains largely unabated. With an impressive 86% domestic approval rating, Putin continues to ride the wave of popularity from his illegal annexation of Crimea last March. His unwavering public denials of Russian involvement in Ukraine enrage Western officials now trying to secure the latest fragile ceasefire.

However, parts of the official narrative are under pressure. Bold opposition leaders, like the late Boris Nemtsov, work at great personal risk to expose the truth. Nemtsov had prepared to release a report that outlines direct Russian support to the separatists, including conventional military forces and deliveries of heavy weapons systems. As an integral voice of the movement, his death came as a shock just days before a highly anticipated anti-war rally. This nascent challenge to Putin’s policy in Ukraine may have prompted the removal of ever-defiant Nemtsov.

The attack has all the signs of a contract killing from the cloak-and-dagger era of Putin’s KGB days. Fellow opposition leader Alexei Navalny asserted that Nemtsov was definitely under surveillance. Additionally, a spotter signaled the attackers when Nemtsov and his girlfriend approached the Great Moskvoretsky Bridge, according to a police source. Bullets found at the scene came from a Makarov pistol, used by Russian security forces for years. These facts indicate a high level of preparation and professionalism previously seen in assassinations tied to the Putin regime, such as the shooting of investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

A government sanctioned plot is certainly within the realm of possibility. Though Putin may not have directly ordered the hit, it is likely Russian security services were involved. Surveillance cameras outside the Kremlin should have captured footage of the incident. Conveniently, authorities said they were turned off for maintenance, literally turning a blind eye to the crime. Whether involved or not, Putin must be pleased with having one less critic to stifle.

Bad for Business

Though irritated by the liberal opposition, Putin must be even more wary of his own class of elites, the bigwig oligarchs who pull the financial levers of industry that dictate politics in Russia. Western sanctions due to Putin’s Ukrainian venture coupled with the global decline in oil prices have hit the country hard. The ruble has depreciated by a staggering 50% against the dollar since September. Shrinking foreign investment and restrictions on the financial, defense, and energy sectors continue to hurt all to the detriment of economic growth. Russian businessmen are not happy to say the least.

“The economic and business elite is just in horror,” said Igor Bunin, director of the Moscow-based Center for Political Technology, in a July interview with Bloomberg after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over rebel-held territory in eastern Ukraine. Yet Bunin explains that any overt challenge to Putin is simply too dangerous. “Any sign of rebellion and they’ll be brought to their knees.”

Aggressive foreign policy is generally bad for business. Therefore, it is possible that an opportunistic oligarch finally had enough of Putin’s escapades abroad. He hired a team of hit men to assassinate vocal anti-war activist Boris Nemtsov in the hopes of riling public dissent against Russian involvement in Ukraine. The act was executed with alacrity and secrecy in order to dodge detection and the ire of Putin. Kremlin authorities ludicrously posited that a fellow opposition leader may have killed Nemtsov to create a martyr for the movement and destabilize the regime. It is highly doubtful a friend of Nemtsov would do such a thing. On the other hand, a ruthless businessman with millions of dollars at stake makes a more likely suspect.

Attack of the Separatists

According to Moscow, the thousands of Russians fighting in Donbas are not government-directed military and intelligence personnel but instead “patriotic volunteers.” These individuals, euphemistically known as “little green men,” back a ragtag assemblage of Russian-speaking Ukrainian locals, ultranationalist Cossack fighters, and Chechen mercenaries who make up the pro-Russian separatist movement in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. There is no question that direct Russian support has proved crucial on the battlefield as seen in recent rebel gains at Debaltseve.

Russian radicals sympathetic to the separatist cause in eastern Ukraine and perhaps aided by rogue elements in the Russian intelligence services may be behind the tragic demise of Boris Nemtsov. Enamored by the prospect of acting independently on behalf of Putin and Mother Russia, such culprits would have perpetrated this deadly deed for a number of reasons. First, they sought to earn the favor of Putin by disposing of a key opposition leader. Second, his death draws international attention away from the conflict zone, which gives the rebels additional breathing room to maneuver for a new assault. Lastly, this development potentially derails the shaky truce and restarts the war, enabling the separatists with Russian assistance to seize even more territory.

This theory should be grounded in reality though. Even with Russian backing, pro-Russian separatists have limited resources and more pressing priorities that likely trump such a provocative operation on Russian soil. A far-right Russian group battling in Donbas released a video accepting responsibility for the fatal shooting of Nemtsov. Not surprisingly, their leader quickly dismissed the claim.

“We would have liked to bump him off but we wouldn’t even have the money for the car,” he admitted on social media. In sum, any attack tied to separatists in eastern Ukraine would likely have involved material and logistical support from Russian security personnel.

Blame the Islamic Extremists

Russian Investigative Committee spokesperson Vladimir Markin has suggested that Islamic extremists carried out this brutal murder, citing Ingushetia license plates on the getaway car. As Russia has a rocky history with terrorism, most recently in the North Caucasus, this initially seems like a semi-reasonable assumption. Following the Paris terrorist attacks, Boris Nemtsov reportedly received death threats due to his strong public stance on freedom of speech. Charlie Hebdo’s latest satirical caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad sparked large protests in Muslim-majority regions of Russia and around the world. It is remotely possible a radical organization like the Caucasus Emirate sought to strike down Nemtsov in retaliation.

However, the targeted assassination of Nemtsov does not match the modus operandi of many Islamic extremist groups. Most glaringly, no valid claim of responsibility has surfaced. Terrorist networks often attempt to exploit the media sensation surrounding their acts of violence in order to spread their religious rhetoric. Instead, an outpouring of sympathy and sorrow dominated the aftermath. During Nemtsov’s funeral procession, mourners held signs that read “борись,” a play on his first name Boris/Борис and the Russian verb for fight on. Others said “Je Suis Nemtsov” from the popular mantra Je Suis Charlieused to show solidarity with Charlie Hebdo. As much as the Russian government would love to pin this murder on their usual suspect, the Chechens, this case bears no evidence of Islamic extremists.

Going Forward

These four theories accusing President Vladimir Putin, business elites, pro-Russian separatists, and Islamic extremists represent the most plausible amid the conspiracies that continue to abound in Russian and Western media. Do not expect justice to be served in a swift and satisfactory manner. As seen in past investigations, the Russian government prefers to jail the convenient scapegoat over the actual perpetrator. Ultimately, we will likely never know who killed Boris Nemtsov, but one fact shines forth from his untimely passing. The political opposition in Russia faces darker days ahead under the reign of Putin.

Even with crippling Western economic sanctions over its military involvement in Ukraine, Russia continues attempts to build more diplomatic clout on the international stage, with the latest launching Egypt into the orbit of the Kremlin-led Eurasian Union to the chagrin of the United States.

During a recent two-day visit to Cairo, Russian President Vladimir Putin landed multiple new agreements with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi that would improve bilateral cooperation in the realms of trade, energy, security, and tourism. Most notably, Egypt agreed to establish a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union, joining Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan in the power-projection pet project of President Putin.

The deal is the culmination of strengthening ties between the two countries. In 2014, Russia and Egypt shared more than $4.5 billion in trade, which marks an 80% increase compared to the previous year. Additional collaborations involve mutual counterterrorism efforts, a Russian industrial zone close to the Suez Canal, and preliminary plans to jointly construct the first Egyptian nuclear power plant.

Beyond the tangible gains for their strategic relationship, the Russian-Egyptian summit was a symbolic gesture of solidarity, a snub to Western leaders critical of Russia’s activity in Ukraine and Egypt’s recent human rights record. On arrival, President Putin was welcomed with much fanfare, including a military parade of horsemen waving Russian flags and schoolchildren chanting, “Putin, Putin, Sisi, Sisi, and long live Egypt!” A local state-owned newspaper similarly declared the Russian leader “a hero of our time.” President Putin reciprocated with a fitting gift: a wood-handled AK-47 assault rifle in clear reference to a $3.5 billion bilateral arms deal still under consideration that would challenge the U.S. monopoly on military assistance to Egypt.

“Historically, Egypt has been playing this game before, when it shifted between the Soviets and the Americans,” said a Western diplomat in an interview with the Financial Times. “They are playing both nations against each other.”

Since the ousting of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi in 2013, the U.S.-Egyptian partnership has deteriorated, leaving space for Russia to boost its interests in the region. Last year President Putin strongly supported the election bid of General Sisi whose brutal crackdown on protestors forced a suspension of military aid from American officials still hopeful for the promises of democracy after the Arab Spring. President Sisi’s visit to Sochi in August 2014 for his first international trip further signaled warming Russian-Egyptian relations.

The latest summit offers several indicators of attempts at expanding Russian influence. First, President Putin exploited the pomp and circumstance of his dignitary status in Cairo both to draw international attention away from Ukraine and show the world that Russia is not diplomatically isolated due to Western condemnation. Second, the free trade zone with Egypt brings a minor boost to the struggling Eurasian Economic Union hit hard by economic sanctions and ruble depreciation. Greater access to markets in the Middle East and North Africa may open up as well, especially with large energy infrastructure projects on the way. Lastly, Russian inroads into Egypt offer additional avenues of regional cooperation for Moscow-led peace talks over the Syrian civil war.

Despite these prospects, the present Russian-Egyptian partnership appears to be more symbolic than substantive in nature, challenging but not replacing U.S. power in the region. Both countries face declining economies, which limits the scope of mutually achievable benefits. More immediately, Russia wants to propagate an image of growth, while Egypt seeks to show the world a foreign policy independent of the United States. But Egypt remains reliant on longstanding U.S. support in the region, particularly $1.3 billion in annual military aid restarted in December.

“Russia can’t offer all that much to Egypt,” said Mark Katz, Professor of International Affairs at George Mason University, in an interview with Voice of America.

The Egyptians enjoy the publicity of associating with the Eurasian Union but not as a viable alternative to the United States. “They would much rather continue to deal with the U.S. and while the U.S. is not happy with the way Sisi came to power or the way he ruled, the U.S. has very little choice but to work with him,” he added.

Otherwise, a stronger Russia with less costly priorities in its near abroad may eventually exploit the goodwill recently attained with the Egyptian leadership to the detriment of U.S. influence in the region.

“In Azerbaijan, a sensitive debate is being reintroduced to the political foreground: “Did Talyshistan belong to the Azerbaijan Republic? And if not can the current Republic of Azerbaijan legitimately claim the region as its sovereign territory?” Although this seems like an academic question, debated in the confines of history departments; the discussion is loaded with geopolitical baggage.”

Argument strongly revised and published on http://muftah.org/

by Ryan McCarrel (@ryanmccarrel)
PhD Candidate
University College Dublin
Department of Geography Planning and Environmental Policy

and Bradley Jardine (@Jardine_bradley)
MA Candidate
University of Glasgow
International Masters in Russian and Central and East European Studies

On 11 February, a four-way meeting attended by Presidents Vladimir Putin, Petro Poroshenko, François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, alongside OSCE and Donbass representatives from the Contact Group, took place in Minsk to discuss what we dubbed the “last chance” for peace over the Donbass conflict and the Ukrainian crisis. After more than 16 hours of negotiations and intensive talks, the leaders announced in the morning of February 12 that all parties involved in the conflict had accepted a ceasefire agreement and a 13-point global political settlement roadmap that will (eventually) lead to peace in Donbass. Initial talks, however, bore little hope when President Poroshenko stormed out of the negotiation room early on 12 February to denounce that the Russian position was “unacceptable”.

A roadmap agreement was nonetheless struck later in the morning and consequently signed by the Normandy format Foreign Ministers of the four states and most importantly by the OSCE Contact Group representatives – including the “Donetsk People’s Republic” leader Oleksandr Zakharchenko and “Lugansk People’s Republic” chief Igor Plotnytsky.

From day one, the genuine purpose of the new summit was to completely revamp the initial Minsk agreement of 19 September 2014 and re-negotiate its content. The Minsk 2 agreement therefore replaces the September deal under new arrangements that are, once more, considerably advantageous for Moscow and clearly favor Donbass separatist forces.

A security and military slap in the face for Kyiv…

The 13-point document and its annex provide for an immediate and full ceasefire to begin on Sunday 15 February. The delay in the implementation of the ceasefire, between the 12th and 15th, allowed both the Ukrainian army and rebel forces to intensify their respective shelling and military incursions in the Donbass regions held by separatists. So much for peace.

Under Article 2, the agreement encompasses the withdrawal under OSCE supervision of heavy weapons by both sides to equal distance from the front line by 50 to 140 km (depending on the weaponry and equipment) within 14 days after the ceasefire takes effect. Nonetheless, if the Ukrainian army has to pull back from the actual de facto contact line established as of February 12th, separatist forces are requested to vacate from the September 19 Minsk Memorandum line. This situation means that the genuine conflict separation line is the actual one, which implies that separatist military advances between Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 are officially considered legitimate claims and recognized as such. The secure demilitarized zone will therefore encompass the territory taken by rebels since Minsk 1, which is in clear violation of the initial agreement. In this, Minsk 2 simply enshrined the infringement on the initial Memorandum, and sent a powerful signal to Moscow that no matter what, diplomatic agreements can be reshaped at Russia’s will. This is in itself a slap in the face for Kyiv, as the new conflict line conceded further losses of Ukrainian territory at the benefice of separatists.

The same goes for Article 10, which requires the withdrawal of all “foreign forces” and “mercenaries” (i.e. Russian proxies) from the Donbass as well as the disarmament of all illegal groups under OSCE supervision. There, Russia once more dodges the bullet as the document does not directly address Moscow as a party to the conflict. This means the Kremlin can still use plausible deniability concerning the presence of Russian troops and military equipment on the territory of Donbass (ergo Ukraine). Moscow will hence still be allowed to say that Russian troops were never there in the first place…

Finally, Article 3 states that “effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire” and withdrawal process will be ensured by the OSCE. Nevertheless, the OSCE does not have full access in the Donbass and its war zone today: in this, Russia might be tempted to further deny access to the OSCE, hamper the border monitoring mission, and overall slow the whole process down. Furthermore, Moscow completely controls the exact mandate of the OSCE, the content of which has to be accepted by Russia beforehand.

…wrapped a in strategic and political farce

In terms of political concessions and diplomatic compromises, Ukraine is the biggest loser of the Minsk 2 agreement. Article 4 and its annex task for the organization of local elections in Donbass occupied territories under Ukrainian legislation as well as the establishment of a special regime therein. This implies two serious drawbacks – if not defeats – for Ukraine. On the one hand, Kyiv must now change its constitution to accommodate a special status for the Donbass “Republics”: this explicitly means that Ukraine must accept the existence of the “DPR” and “LPR” representatives as quasi-legitimate authorities – as they are official signatories of the Minsk 2 agreements under the OSCE Contact Group – and the legitimacy of these territories. This is a huge victory for Russia, as Kyiv will have to discuss with the Donbass leaders to enact the special status and organize local elections.

On the other hand, Minsk 2 enshrines the concept of decentralization of the Ukrainian state, a proposed reform that Kyiv was seeking to push back as much as possible in order to avoid the dilution of its national political authority. The constitution will have to be changed by the end of 2015 and introduce increased self-government in Donbass – this includes the ability to form their independent police forces and appoint their prosecutors and judges. Ukraine will not become a federation but will have to deal with a more autonomous Donbass. This is a smaller victory for Moscow, but a victory nonetheless.

Border control, under Article 9, is another serious blow against Kyiv. As such, full Ukrainian control of its national border in the conflict area is conditioned to the full political regulation of the conflict. This implies Kyiv grating Donbass the special status – namely the constitutional changes to provide for decentralization – and only after the organization of local elections. The double conditionality is a nightmare for Ukraine, which now has no other choice but to decentralize its state and acknowledge the existence of the separatist authorities in Donbass.

Finally, Kyiv will have to bear the cost of the restoration of “social and economic connections” in the Donbass region, and notably resuming social payments and pensions, restarting the banking system, and providing humanitarian aid. It remains to be seen how a virtually bankrupt country already on life support through international donors will be able to autonomously pay for the Donbass…

Score: Russia 1 – Ukraine 0

In the end, the Minsk 2 peace roadmap is a serious slap in the face for Ukraine, who made the most drastic compromises – including implicitly legitimizing both “People’s Republics” – and will have to take in the cost of the Donbass redevelopment. The only “real” concession bestowed by Moscow is the fact the local elections in Donbass will still take place under Ukrainian law. This in turn somewhat dashes the immediate Russian hopes of a genuine autonomy of the Donbass as well as brings down, at least for now, the federalization project the Kremlin has been so hell bent on imposing over Ukraine for the past year.

The “hot phase” of the Donbass war might be over, allowing Russia to concentrate on the political and territorial appropriation of the Donbass. If Moscow wants its geopolitical test Novorossia to exist fully on the long run, a phase of territorial consolidation and rationalization is likely to take place in the Donetsk and Lugansk “Republics” – if only to unify military command, get rid of rogue groups in Lugansk undermining local rule, and strengthen local infrastructures. Only then will Novorossia spawn as a unified territorial construct. Then, a phase of expansion may ensue, and especially towards Mariupol, and why not towards Kharkov or Dnipropetrovsk. In parallel, Moscow will move in the shadows to ensure that Ukraine will never join the European Union or NATO – a point that was not addressed during the Minsk 2 summit – but seeking to talk the country into reestablishing its non-aligned and neutral military status.

What is even scarier is the hypothesis that President Putin might not have yet established his “end game” strategy for Ukraine. At stake could be the very survival of Ukraine as an autonomous, sovereign state.

I’ve published a new article in the most recent edition of the Russian Analytical Digest on growing economic relations between Mongolia, the Tuva Republic, and other south Siberian border regions. This article builds on an earlier post I wrote for Registan, “Tuva Looks To Mongolia for Investment in a Post-Crimea World,” and provides a fuller picture of growing Mongolian investment in culturally similar “national republics” in Russia. I suggest that Tuva’s active courting of Mongolian investors could serve as a template for other border regions to follow:

A mineral mining boom in Mongolia has made the land of Genghis Khan the fastest growing economy in the world for the past several years, and both Ulaanbaatar and Kyzyl (the Tuvan capital) are now eyeing greater economic and cultural ties. Russia and Mongolia’s decision in September 2014 to cancel the visa regime between their countries for visitors staying no longer than 30 days will only serve to further lower the barriers to Tuvan–Mongolian cooperation.

With Russia facing Western economic sanctions for its role in the Ukraine crisis, the Kremlin is increasingly looking to the East for new partners, most critically in Beijing. But Russia-watchers should not overlook Ulaanbaatar. Mongolia may lack the sheer economic might of China, but cultural commonalities with south Siberia and the poor economic position of the regions directly across the border in Russia can create unique opportunities for investment and cooperation. In this regard, Tuva’s growing ties with its southern neighbor may provide an example for other parts of the south Siberian region.

On 26 December 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed into law the revised version of Russia’s 2010 military doctrine. Left largely unchanged, the document still encompasses what is commonly called a “defensive” stance, i.e. the fact Russia will deplete all non-violent means to settle a diplomatic issue before engaging in military might and resorting to use its armed forces. If Russia’s nuclear forces engagement remains untouched, the updated document introduces the concept of “non-nuclear deterrence”, aimed at keeping the national sanctuary in a high level of preparedness for conventional forces and “non-nuclear means” – yet without clearly stating how this might actually unfold.

A much-commented point, NATO’s military buildup in Central and Eastern Europe is still, like in 2010, considered a “main external threat” to national security. It the latest events in Ukraine and Crimea have somewhat altered the situation, the appraisal remains the same: measures taken by the Alliance to reinforce offensive capabilities and the expansion of NATO members “to the borders of the Russian Federation” are always considered major threats. At stake are NATO’s strategic deployments and enlargement in the Baltic States, Romania, and the Black Sea. In this context, on 13 January, the Russian Ministry of Defense unveiled a plan to boost military and combat capabilities in Crimea, Kaliningrad, and in the Arctic region – namely areas around which NATO enlargement plans are present. Yet it is important to make out that only NATO’s enlargement is considered a threat, not the Atlantic Organization in itself (nor the United States per se), as it was often misconceived in the media.

Just as much as “organizations of foreign governments and their coalitions against the Russian Federation” and foreign private military companies deployed along Russian borders are an existential threat to Moscow, according to the doctrine. Which means that foreign interference and attempts at destabilizing Russian interests at its borders – namely in the “near abroad” – will not be tolerated.

A new trend, information war is mentioned for the first time in a Russian military doctrine, emphasizing that information and communication technologies are now considered both an external but also an internal threat. It unambiguously cites the fact that young Russians can be disrupted by such information war and prevent them from “defending the fatherland”. This surely includes young political activists and organizations using modern communication services, now considered national threats. In retrospect, this move is probably aimed at preventing the emergence of a “Maidan 2.0” in Russia or avoid a repeat of the 2011-2012 anti-Putin social movement.

In terms of military cooperation, the doctrine insists once again on the necessity to increase common security with the CSTO, the SCO, the rest of CIS countries, as well as with BRICS countries. The document also outlined the possibility to create joint missile defense systems with such allies. Unsurprisingly, the protection of Russian citizens outside the country’s defined borders is repeated as a priority in terms of the “lawful use of the armed forces”. Which inevitably raises the issue of knowing until where Russian borders might actually stop – Crimea and the Donbass region driving the point home…

In the end, Russia’s latest update of its military doctrine offers nothing surprising or shockingly new, as only a few (yet paramount) details were added. The nuclear posture remains unchanged, the defensive nature of the document prevails, and NATO’s enlargement – and not the Alliance as such – is still considered a military threat. Nothing new under the sun.

As Russia’s relations with the United States and the European Union continue to deteriorate, it’s tough to find real fans of Vladimir Putin west of Hungary. But they’re out there, even in America. I recently published an article on Muftah.org about a group of men with a passion for the countries of the old Eastern Bloc and a great respect for Putin and his leadership. They are the “manosphere,” a loose, online collective of men’s rights activists, pickup artists, and “traditionalists” who believe that Eastern Europe is one of the last holdouts in the battle against the oppressive feminism and androgyny they see reigning in the West:

Faced with a social environment at home that is increasingly hostile to their beliefs, members of the manosphere have directed their search for affirmation, sex, love, and everything in between abroad–often to Eastern Europe.

This is nothing new. The old Eastern Bloc has long been regarded as a mecca for lonely and horny men of all ages. Popular perceptions of the region are saturated with images of so-called mail order brides, leggy blondes in high heels, and stodgy American losers drooling after them. But while the average American “marriage agency” client may fantasize about rescuing his dream woman from gray, post-Soviet industrial poverty, the manosphere has a different view: it is Eastern Europe that can save America.

The logic is simple. The manosphere posits that, as America falls under the oppressive yoke of feminism, the post-communist East provides an alternative example: conservative values, traditional gender roles, and strong, masculine leadership as embodied by Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

Want to know why U.S.-Russian wrangling over Syria’s chemical weapons was allegedly just like pickup artistry? Or why feminism is supposedly responsible for separatism in Ukraine’s Donbas region?

On 24 November 2014, Russia and Abkhazia, a small self-declared republic on the Black Sea, signed a new treaty aimed at deepening their relationship and providing security guarantees for Abkhazia. The treaty signs away not only much of the proto-state’s independence but also condemns Georgia to further long term instability. While Russia recognises Abkhazia as independent - together with only Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru – the treaty itself is not aimed at Abkhazia, but rather at Georgia, whose sovereignty over Abkhazia is recognised by the remainder of the international community. Rather than support Abkhazia’s independence, the new treaty largely serves to erode it. At the same time, the treaty dramatically reshapes Georgia’s political outlook. The treaty effectively offers Georgia no choice other than to give up its NATO aspirations or to give up its claim to Abkhazia, neither of which Georgia will accept, thereby setting the stage for a potential new crisis in the region.

Although Russia claims the treaty is one between two sovereign nations it is by no means one of equals. The agreement calls for the creation of a joint military command – to be headed by Russia – in the event of crisis while also granting Russia control of the de facto Georgian-Abkhaz border. The Kremlin will further fund Abkhazia’s stillborn development and increase its subsidies to Abkhazia’s ministries and their employees, thereby governing both its fledgling private and public sectors. The treaty thereby effectively makes Abkhazia’s ‘sovereignty’ entirely dependent on Russia.

The treaty has even evoked some negative responses in Abkhazia itself, a rare occurrence in a country that views Moscow as its only ally. It is worth noting that the treaty also only came about after Raul Khajimba, a long-time ally of the Kremlin and its chief spin master Vladislav Surkov, was narrowly elected president on 24 August. Belying the support of the Abkhaz for the Kremlin, it took Khajimba four attempts to secure the presidency, as well as a convenient coup against his predecessor widely rumoured to have been orchestrated by Moscow.

The significant measures Russia undertook to ensure that the Abkhaz government would endorse the treaty beget the question of why Russia would pursue such efforts to deepen its alliance with such a small, impoverished and under-developed region that has no other viable partner. It is unlikely that Abkhazia’s natural beauty or history as a capital of Soviet tourism provided the necessary impetus. After all, Sochi was built to replace those. Furthermore, the Abkhaz have never called for unification with Russia, while Georgia’s other breakaway region, South Ossetia, regularly implores Russia to support a unification referendum.

The reasoning behind Russia’s insistence on the new relationship with Abkhazia lies in the fact that it presents the clearest challenge to Georgia’s desired pro-Western pathway. Abkhazia is more viable as an entity than South Ossetia given its far larger population, greater economic potential, and the ease of land and sea access while tiny South Ossetia is only accessible via the Roki Tunnel through the Caucasus Mountains. It also presents an emotional affront to Georgia, and the vast majority of its nearly 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) hail from Abkhazia. Although further integration and a similar treaty with South Ossetia are likely to follow, the Russian-Abkhaz treaty presents a clear and immediate challenge to Georgia’s aspirations.

Georgia’s pro-Western aims do not receive the same attention from the West it aspires to join. The muted response to crucial developments in the Caucasus, despite their relevance given the conflict in Ukraine, demonstrates the West’s lack of a coordinated policy for the region. The few steps NATO and the European Union have taken in response to Georgia’s western aspirations are likely to further exacerbate Georgian-Russian tensions.

Russia has painted Georgia’s Association Agreement with the European Union as a threat to its trade interests, much as it done with Ukraine’s Association Agreement as well. The sticking point lies in the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, a portion of the larger agreement that eliminates tariff between Georgia and the EU, which Russia has warned could lead EU goods to be re-exported to Russian markets while bypassing Russian tariffs. In August, Russia responded by suspending its free trade agreement with Georgia. The restoration of economic ties since 2012 had been a key area of reconciliation between Russia and Georgia in the aftermath of the 2008 war. Although Georgia will gain significant access to European markets, the expected decline in its trade relations with Russia poses significant economic and political risks.

Many in Georgia see the Association Agreement as offering the long-term prospect of further integration into the European single economic space. However, Europe is unlikely to offer sufficient diplomatic support to counteract Russia if it moves to more aggressively oppose the agreement. The imbalance between the relative importance of the Association Agreement in Georgian and European politics risks creating a sense of betrayal, and potentially a reversal of Georgia’s pro-Western path, in the event of a renewed crisis between Russia and Georgia.

At the September NATO Summit in Wales, Georgia failed to receive the Membership Action Plan (MAP) it has long coveted. Instead, NATO offered a package of enhanced co-operation measures, most notably the creation of a joint training centre in Georgia. At the same time, Moscow will consider even the deployment of small training contingents to Georgian territory as an act of aggression. Yet the failure to grant Georgia a MAP will serve as a key reminder that NATO has so far been unwilling to fully commit to Georgia, thereby emboldening Russia.

James Appathurai, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, warned on 4 October that NATO perceived the new Russian-Abkhaz treaty as a ‘substantial’ development for the region, before qualifying the comment by stating NATO did not perceive it as an impediment to Georgia’s NATO path. Whether or not that statement accurately reflects internal opinion within NATO is less clear. Many NATO members remain to be convinced that Georgia is on the path to membership, after all, this path is typically begun by granting candidate states a MAP. If Georgia were to gain NATO membership, NATO would find itself in the awkward and volatile position of the defensive treaty covering Abkhazia due to its de jure status as a part of Georgia. Although a defensive treaty covering territory controlled by Russian forces would be an absurdity, it would also force the Kremlin to the negotiating table – after all, the recent Russian-Abkhaz treaty emphasises the insincerity of Russia’s support for Abkhazia’s sovereignty.

The Kremlin views the conflict in Abkhazia not as a frozen conflict – the term most frequently applied to Georgia’s breakaway regions – nor as one between two sovereign nations, but rather as a active means of counteracting Georgia’s pro-Western path. Moscow has escalated its efforts to disrupt this path through the new Russian-Abkhaz treaty, while the limited nature of the steps taken by the EU and NATO may increase the likelihood of further provocations. Although an adequate Western response does not appear to be forthcoming, without one Georgia’s foreign policy will remain on a direct collision course with Russia’s, an eventuality that has proven all too disastrous for Georgia in the recent past.