"Entity" is more like also just our description. I meant that it could turn out that hydrogen atoms have a different weight in the same context in other regions of the universe, and we would probably still call them hydrogen atoms.

"Entity" is more like also just our description. I meant that it could turn out that hydrogen atoms have a different weight in the same context in other regions of the universe, and we would probably still call them hydrogen atoms.

"... other regions of the universe," would be a different context.

Then everything is a different context. The hydrogen atom in front of me is a different entity than the hydrogen atom at my feet. So you are saying we have infinitely many kinds of hydrogen atoms, and well, infinitely many kinds of everything. Surely you must realize that this way of thinking doesn't work?

Then everything is a different context. The hydrogen atom in front of me is a different entity than the hydrogen atom at my feet. So you are saying we have infinitely many kinds of hydrogen atoms, and well, infinitely many kinds of everything. Surely you must realize that this way of thinking doesn't work?

This kind of thinking does work in a type-theoretic ontology. There is a difference between the the Atom-Type, Hydrogen-Type and an instance of the Hydrogen-Type.

Then everything is a different context. The hydrogen atom in front of me is a different entity than the hydrogen atom at my feet. So you are saying we have infinitely many kinds of hydrogen atoms, and well, infinitely many kinds of everything. Surely you must realize that this way of thinking doesn't work?

This kind of thinking does work in a type-theoretic ontology. There is a difference between the the Atom-Type, Hydrogen-Type and an instance of the Hydrogen-Type.

The hydrogen atom in front of me is a different entity than the hydrogen atom at my feet.

Well, they are different entities only in the sense that the same atom cannot be in two different places at the same time, but they are not different kinds of entities. Unfortunately when you chose a characteristic for hydrogen to illustrate what you believed demonstrated hydrogen could have different attributes and still be hydrogen, you chose one of its, "relative," attributes, weight. If you had chosen mass, of course, this problem could not have come up. Hydrogen's weight can be different in different places, because its mass will always be the same.

So you are saying we have infinitely many kinds of hydrogen atoms, ...

I am saying that like all other things, hydrogen atoms will have different relative attributes in different environments, but always the same essential attributes in all environments, and are all the same kind of elements.

The hydrogen atom in front of me is a different entity than the hydrogen atom at my feet.

Well, they are different entities only in the sense that the same atom cannot be in two different places at the same time, but they are not different kinds of entities. Unfortunately when you chose a characteristic for hydrogen to illustrate what you believed demonstrated hydrogen could have different attributes and still be hydrogen, you chose one of its, "relative," attributes, weight. If you had chosen mass, of course, this problem could not have come up. Hydrogen's weight can be different in different places, because its mass will always be the same.

So you are saying we have infinitely many kinds of hydrogen atoms, ...

I am saying that like all other things, hydrogen atoms will have different relative attributes in different environments, but always the same essential attributes in all environments, and are all the same kind of elements.

Yeah by lighter hydrogen, I was initially thinking about its mass and not weight, but then we started talking about weight and I keep confusing these words. My mistake.

My point is that it's impossible to know that the essential attributes will always be the same in all environments. Unless that's really the case plus you are omniscient or something.

Great! Then we agree - that which you call 'knowledge' is just a model.

Read carefully. I said, "all universal concepts are abstractions." Universals are classes and categories of existents such as 'apple,' 'dog,' or 'philosopher. The existents subsumed under any universal concept (called its referents, units, or particulars) must be real things correctly identified, NOT MODELS. The referents of a concept are what the concept means. The universal concept 'apple' means any apple, past, present, or future, with the attributes that identify it as an apple. A universal concept is only abstract in the sense that it identifies every possible existent it subumes, and excludes all non-essential but possible attributes of particular existents it identifies. Apple includes all apples, Baldwins, Macintosh, Granny Smiths, etc. excluding the characteristics (abstracting them) that would distinguish between different varieties, for example.

All knowledge is in the form of propositions. Concepts, all by themselves are not knowledge, only identifications of existents. (Most concepts are not possible without knowledge, because their definitions are proposition.) Knowledge is certainly not 'models," knowledge is the description of the relationships between concepts which identify the facts of reality.

Justified? Perhaps you are interested in why this is true. If that is the case, here's why:

Concepts Are Not Knowledge

I said concepts are the foundation of knowledge, but, by themselves, they are not knowledge, because their function is identification. In most cases knowing a concept implies knowledge (at least of the concept's definition) but a concept, all by itself is not knowledge. To be knowledge a thing must be true, but a concept is neither true or false.
All Knowledge Is Propositional

All knowledge exists in the form of propositions, because only propositions can be true or false.

A proposition is a statement that asserts something about an existent or existents. If I simply write or say the word "Zeus," it is neither true or false. In classical logic it is called a simple apprehension. If I say, "Zeus is a god worshiped by the ancient Greeks," it asserts something about Zeus. If what is being asserted is correct, the proposition is true; if what is being asserted is incorrect, the proposition is false. The assertion, in this case, and therefore the proposition, is true, even though the concept "Zeus" is a fiction. The same concept can be use in both true and false propositions. "The phoenix is a common bird found in the forests of Colorado," is false, but, "the phoenix is a mythical bird of ancient Egypt," is true.

All knowledge consists of propositions that assert something correct about some aspect of reality. By the time one is an adult one has stored millions of propositions, many explicitly and many more implicitly or derived from other propositions. All these propositions make up all our basic views of life, of reality, and our values—in other words, all that we believe and guide our lives by.

The most important thing to human life, if there is anything that can identified as an ultimate requirement or need, it is knowledge. For a human being, it is more important than water, or food, or clothing, or shelter, because before any of these can be acquired one must know why one needs them, what they are, and how to acquire them. Because a human being must live by conscious choice, and our only means of making choices is by means of reason, and because knowledge is all we have to reason with or reason about, the limit of a human life is the limit of one's knowledge. Knowledge is the one thing a human being can never have enough of.