South Carolina Supreme Court - Justia Case Law Summarieshttp://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/south-carolina-supreme-court/2015-03-03T12:18:39-08:00Justia Inchttp://www.justia.com/Justia Lawhttps://justatic.com/v/20150115a/shared/images/social-media/law.pngCopyright 2014 Justia Inchttp://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27502.htmlSouth Carolina v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals2015-02-25T08:02:03-08:002015-02-26T04:30:20-08:00
Appellant Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals (Janssen) manufactured the antipsychotic drug Risperdal. The Attorney General of South Carolina believed that Janssen had violated the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA) by engaging in unfair methods of competition by willfully failing to disclose known risks and side effects associated with Risperdal. In 2007, the State and Janssen entered into a tolling agreement concerning the statute of limitations. The State filed its Complaint on April 23, 2007: the first claim arose from the content of the written material furnished by Janssen since 1994 with each Risperdal prescription (the "labeling claim"); the second claim centered on alleged false information contained in a November 2003 Janssen-generated letter sent to the South Carolina community of prescribing physicians (the "Dear Doctor Letter"). Because both claims arose more than three years prior to January 24, 2007, Janssen pled the statute of limitations as a bar to the Complaint. The matter proceeded to trial. A jury rendered a liability verdict against Janssen on both claims. The trial court rejected Janssen's defenses, including the statute of limitations, finding that both claims were timely. Janssen appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the liability judgment on the labeling claim but modify the judgment to limit the imposition of civil penalties to a period of three years from the date of the tolling agreement, which was coextensive with the three-year statute of limitations, subject to an additional three months by virtue of the time period between the January 24, 2007, tolling agreement and the filing of the Complaint on April 23, 2007. The Court affirmed the liability judgment on the doctor letter claim, but remitted the amount of penalties associated with that claim. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27502.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law</a>
2015-02-25stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27502http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27499.htmlIndependence National Bank v. Buncombe Professional Park2015-02-25T08:02:02-08:002015-02-26T04:30:20-08:00
Respondent David DeCarlis was the sole member of respondent Buncombe Professional Park, L.L.C., which owned an undeveloped parcel of land. In 2007, DeCarlis, as Buncombe's representative, executed a note and mortgage with Independence National Bank. At the same time, DeCarlis executed a personal guaranty. As part of this transaction, Bank satisfied the existing first mortgage at closing. Buncombe stopped paying on the mortgage. As Bank prepared to foreclose, it learned in 2010 that DeCarlis held what had been, prior to Bank's satisfaction of the original first mortgage, a second mortgage on the property executed and properly recorded in 2006. The same attorney represented both Bank and Buncombe at the 2007 mortgage closing, and had actual notice of DeCarlis' 2006 mortgage at the time of the 2007 closing since he had conducted the title search. The attorney testified at the hearing in this matter that he erroneously neglected to have DeCarlis execute a satisfaction, release, or subordination of his 2006 mortgage at the 2007 closing in order to effectuate the parties' agreement that Bank was to have a first mortgage. Since no such document was executed, DeCarlis' 2006 second mortgage became the first lien, with priority over Bank's 2007 mortgage. The Bank then foreclosed on Buncombe and DeCarlis. In a post-trial order following the parties' Rule 59 motions, the master found Bank was equitably subrogated to the original first mortgage which Bank had satisfied as part of the 2007 closing, thus giving Bank's 2007 mortgage priority over the 2006 DeCarlis mortgage on a second ground. Buncombe and DeCarlis appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in finding that the Bank had notice of the 2006 second mortgage by virtue of its agent's actual knowledge of that lien. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the master's judgment. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27499.html" target="_blank">View "Independence National Bank v. Buncombe Professional Park" on Justia Law</a>
2015-02-25stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27499http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27497.htmlSouth Carolina v. Baker2015-02-11T07:02:09-08:002015-02-12T04:28:19-08:00
Mark Baker was convicted of four counts of committing a lewd act upon a minor. In October 2004, Victim Two, Baker's youngest niece, informed her mother that "Uncle Mark was messing with" her older sister, Victim One. At that time, Victim Two denied that Baker had molested her. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Following the denial of his petition for rehearing, Baker petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari to analyze whether: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing to quash the indictments, which alleged the offenses occurred over a six-year time frame; and (2) qualifying a witness as an expert in forensic interviewing. After review, the Court reversed Baker's convictions because the Court found the indictments were unconstitutionally overbroad. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27497.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Baker" on Justia Law</a>
2015-02-11stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27497http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27491.htmlSouth Carolina v. Chavis2015-02-04T07:02:48-08:002015-02-05T05:07:38-08:00
Appellant George Chavis was convicted of multiple crimes involving unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, Appellant's step-daughter. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned the qualification and testimony of two child abuse assessment experts. Finding no reversible error as to the trial court's actions with regard to the experts, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27491.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Chavis" on Justia Law</a>
2015-02-04stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27491http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27490.htmlMcNaughton v. Charleston Charter School2015-01-28T07:03:11-08:002015-01-29T04:56:36-08:00
In late 2008, Cynthia McNaughton, who was in her early to mid 50's at the time, was accepted into the South Carolina Department of Education's Program of Alternative Certification for Educators (PACE program), which enabled individuals who earned a college degree but did not complete a traditional teacher preparation program, to become certified South Carolina public school teachers. When she was hired, Appellant Charleston Charter School of Math & Science, Inc. knew that McNaughton was participating in the PACE program, and that her completion of the program was contingent upon her fulfillment of further requirements, including the completion of an induction teaching year. McNaughton signed an employment agreement, which stated that McNaughton "agree[d] to be a full-time teacher at Charleston Charter School for Math and Science for the school year 2010–2011." The employment agreement further stated that it was "contingent on funding and enrollment." McNaughton received positive feedback from her students and their parents. Neither the principal nor any other faculty member experienced any problems with McNaughton's performance as a teacher, and McNaughton was never disciplined for any matter. However, on December 1, 2010 (in the middle of the school year) the principal informed McNaughton that the school was terminating her employment. The principal told McNaughton that Appellant needed to use the funds designated for McNaughton's salary to hire and pay a new math teacher because some of the students had performed poorly on a recent math achievement test. McNaughton sued and won on her wrongful termination/breach of contract complaint. The School appealed the trial court's decisions denying its motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); permitting the jury to award special damages; and granting attorney's fees to McNaughton. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27490.html" target="_blank">View "McNaughton v. Charleston Charter School" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-28stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27490http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27487.htmlSouth Carolina v. Brewer2015-01-28T07:03:10-08:002015-01-29T04:56:42-08:00
Appellant Jaquwn Brewer was convicted of multiple charges in connection with the shooting of two individuals at a nightclub. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned the admission of Brewer's unredacted audiotaped interrogation by the police. The Court found the admission of Brewer's interrogation was error. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed Brewer's convictions for assault and battery with intent to kill and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, finding the admission error was harmless with respect to these charges. The murder conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27487.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Brewer" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-28stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27487http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27488.htmlSouth Carolina v. Morris2015-01-28T07:03:10-08:002015-01-29T04:56:39-08:00
Appellant Kenneth Morris, II appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress ecstasy and marijuana discovered during a traffic stop, arguing they were obtained as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the officers had both reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27488.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Morris" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-28stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27488http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27486.htmlCarolina First Bank v. BADD, L.L.C.2015-01-28T07:03:09-08:002015-01-29T04:56:45-08:00
BADD, L.L.C. purchased three warehouse units in Myrtle Beach. To finance the transaction, BADD executed two promissory notes. A personal guaranty was also executed by William McKown, who was a member of BADD. After BADD defaulted, the Bank brought this foreclosure action and included McKown as a party based on his status as a guarantor. In McKown's amended answer and counterclaim, he demanded a jury trial because the Bank sought a money judgment for the breach of a guaranty arrangement. McKown further sought an accounting and a determination that the guaranty agreement was unconscionable. McKown then asserted two counterclaims: (1) civil conspiracy and (2) breach of contract, both based on an alleged conspiracy between the Bank and William Rempher. Finally, McKown asserted third-party claims against Rempher. The Bank moved for an order of reference. The circuit granted the motion, referring the matter in its entirety to the master-in-equity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding McKown was entitled to a jury trial because the Bank's claim on the guaranty agreement was a separate and distinct legal claim. The Bank appealed, challenging the Court of Appeals' finding that McKown was entitled to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McKown was not entitled to a jury trial solely because the Bank exercised its statutory right to join him as a party in the event of a deficiency judgment. Furthermore, the Court held McKown was not entitled to a jury trial based on his counterclaims, which, while legal, were permissive. McKown waived his right to a jury trial by asserting permissive counterclaims in an equitable action. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27486.html" target="_blank">View "Carolina First Bank v. BADD, L.L.C." on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-28stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27486http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27485.htmlTaghivand v. Rite Aid2015-01-28T07:03:08-08:002015-01-29T04:56:47-08:00
The federal district court certified a question of South Carolina law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Behrooz Taghivand was the manager of a Rite Aid store in a high crime area of North Charleston. While on duty, Taghivand observed a patron acting strangely and milling around the store with no apparent purpose. The patron stopped briefly in the section directly in front of the cashier, selected a few items, and made a purchase. After the patron checked out, the cashier told Taghivand that when the patron entered the store, he was carrying a bag that appeared to be empty but now had items in it. Taghivand instructed the cashier to call the police. An officer arrived at the scene and gathered together the items the patron claimed he purchased from the store, and Taghivand confirmed these as belonging to the patron. The officer also searched the patron's bag, and found it contained only dirty clothes. Taghivand was terminated effective that day, and was informed the incident was the reason for his termination. As a result, Taghivand filed this action against Rite Aid Corporation, Eckerd Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, and Steve Smith in federal court for wrongful termination; the defendants moved to dismiss. After finding that South Carolina law was not clear on the issue raised by the motion to dismiss, the federal district court certified this question: under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in South Carolina, does an at-will employee have a cause of action in tort for wrongful termination where: (1) the employee, a store manager, reasonably suspects that criminal activity, specifically, shoplifting, has occurred on the employer's premises; (2) the employee, acting in good faith, reports the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement; and (3) the employee is terminated in retaliation for reporting the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement? After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court answered the certified question: no. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27485.html" target="_blank">View "Taghivand v. Rite Aid" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-28stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27485http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27484.htmlColumbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare System v. So. Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association2015-01-21T07:03:09-08:002015-01-21T20:32:15-08:00
In 1997, Dr. Michael Hayes and Dr. Michael Taillon were working as emergency room physicians at Providence Hospital, presumably as independent contractors. Arthur Sharpe came to the Providence Hospital emergency room complaining of chest pain. Dr. Hayes and Dr. Taillon evaluated Sharpe and diagnosed him as suffering from reflux. Sharpe was discharged. Sharpe had actually suffered a heart attack, which was determined a few days later when he sought further medical care elsewhere. Because of the misdiagnosis, in 1999, Sharpe and his wife filed a medical malpractice and loss of consortium action against Providence Hospital and Dr. Hayes. The Sharpes did not name Dr. Taillon as a defendant. Providence Hospital settled with the Sharpes in 2004. In 2007, Providence Hospital filed this equitable indemnification action against Dr. Taillon and his medical malpractice insurer, The South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association (collectively Respondents). Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that the medical malpractice statute of repose barred Providence Hospital's claim and the circuit court granted the motion on that basis. Providence Hospital appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the medical malpractice statute of repose applied to Providence Hospital's indemnity claim. The Court concluded that Providence Hospital's indemnity action was indeed barred by the statute of repose, and as such affirmed the trial court. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27484.html" target="_blank">View "Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare System v. So. Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-21stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27484http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27479.htmlBarnes v. Charter 1 Realty2015-01-14T07:02:35-08:002015-01-15T04:34:51-08:00
Employee-petitioner Judy Barnes was employed as an administrative assistant at Charter 1 Realty. On the day of her injury, Barnes was asked to check the e-mail of one of the realtors before noon. Around 11:30 a.m., Barnes left her desk and walked toward the realtor's office. However, she stumbled, fell, and sustained serious injuries: a broken left femur, broken left humerus and a torn rotator cuff.Barnes subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation. At the hearing, Barnes testified she was hurrying to the realtor's office to check her e-mail and that caused her to fall. Evidence was also introduced that her husband did not like the shoes she wore, and he had told her she needed to pick up her feet when she walked. The single commissioner and appellate panel found that her fall was idiopathic and therefore noncompensable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the commissioner and appellate panel's findings, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27479.html" target="_blank">View "Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-14stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27479http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27478.htmlNicholson v. SC Dept. of Social Services2015-01-14T07:02:35-08:002015-01-15T04:34:49-08:00
Claimant-petitioner Carolyn Nicholson, a supervisor in the investigations area of child protective services for the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS), was on her way to a meeting when her foot caught on the hall carpet and she fell. She received treatment for pain to her neck, left shoulder, and left side connected with her fall. Nicholson's claim for workers' compensation was denied by the single commissioner because she failed to prove a causal connection between her fall and employment. The commissioner held there was nothing specific to the floor at DSS which contributed to Nicholson's fall and that she could have fallen anywhere. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioner was entitled to workers' compensation. "Despite how straightforward this issue appears to be," both the commissioner and the court of appeals found petitioner was not entitled to recover. The Supreme Court disagreed with both, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27478.html" target="_blank">View "Nicholson v. SC Dept. of Social Services" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-14stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27478http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27477.htmlSouth Carolina v. Nesbitt2015-01-14T07:02:34-08:002015-01-15T04:34:48-08:00
Appellant Charvus Nesbitt appealed a circuit court judgment finding that he entered a knowing and voluntary "Alford" plea to three of four charges listed in a negotiated plea agreement. On appeal, he argued that his plea agreement was a "package deal," and because his plea for one of the charges was invalid, please for the remaining charges were also invalid. The State conceded that the circuit court erred in failing to properly question and advise appellant of his rights with respect to the the charge appellant alleged was invalid. When the terms and obligations set forth in a plea agreement are not fulfilled, appellate courts may consider whether that failure constitutes harmless error. Here, Appellant received the forty-year sentence which he negotiated, and further received the benefit of having one of the charges against him essentially dropped, as his criminal record will only reflect three convictions and not four. Therefore, to the extent there was error, Appellant has suffered no prejudice. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27477.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Nesbitt" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-14stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27477http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27476.htmlSouth Carolina v. Hawes2015-01-07T07:03:13-08:002015-01-07T20:44:38-08:00
In 2007, respondent Alonzo Hawes shot and killed his estranged wife in the presence of their children. Following a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, the trial court granted Hawes's section 16-25-90 motion for eligibility for early parole, which the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. Because the trial court failed to exercise discretion, which the Supreme Court concluded was likely the result of its reliance on a prior version of section 16-25-90, it vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the correct version of the statute. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27476.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Hawes" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-07stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27476http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27475.htmlNorth American Rescue Products v. Richardson2015-01-07T07:03:12-08:002015-01-07T20:44:35-08:00
North American Rescue Products, Inc. (NARP) brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether P. J. Richardson had the right to purchase 7.5% of NARP's stock at a discount despite the fact that he had been terminated, the agreement to which purported to end the parties' relationship. A jury's verdict allowed Richardson to purchase the stock, but both parties appealed. The Supreme Court granted review of the appellate court's decision affirming the jury's verdict. After that review, the Supreme Court concluded the termination agreement unambiguously ended any right Richardson had to purchase the stock. The appellate court was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of NARP. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27475.html" target="_blank">View "North American Rescue Products v. Richardson" on Justia Law</a>
2015-01-07stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27475http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27474.htmlCarmax Auto v. South Carolina Dept. of Rev.2014-12-23T10:07:26-08:002014-12-24T05:26:41-08:00
Both CarMax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc., and the South Carolina Department of Revenue (appealed the court of appeals' decision, reversing and remanding a decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) upholding the Department's use of an alternative apportionment formula to calculate CarMax West's income tax for tax years 2002-2007. When a party seeks to deviate from a statutory formula, the proponent of the alternate formula bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the statutory formula does not fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in South Carolina and (2) its alternative accounting method is reasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed (as modified), and declined to remand at both parties' request. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' finding that the ALC erred in placing the burden of proof on CarMax West. Furthermore, while there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALC's finding that the Department's alternative accounting method was reasonable, the Department failed to prove the threshold issue that the statutory formula did not fairly represent CarMax West's business activity within South Carolina. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27474.html" target="_blank">View "Carmax Auto v. South Carolina Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law</a>
2014-12-23stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27474http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27473.htmlSouth Carolina v. Kinloch2014-12-23T10:07:25-08:002014-12-24T05:26:39-08:00
Respondent Bryant Kinloch was charged with trafficking cocaine, trafficking heroin, and possession with intent to distribute heroin within proximity of a park after law enforcement obtained a search warrant and discovered cocaine and heroin at a Charleston residence. Before trial, Kinloch moved to suppress the drugs, arguing: (1) the search warrant affidavit was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search the residence; (2) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply; and (3) even if the affidavit were sufficient, law enforcement intentionally omitted exculpatory information, which, if included, would defeat probable cause. The trial judge suppressed the drugs, finding the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The State appealed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's suppression ruling as the magistrate had a substantial basis for reaching his probable cause determination. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27473.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Kinloch" on Justia Law</a>
2014-12-23stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27473http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27469.htmlSouth Carolina Dept. of Trans. v. Revels2014-12-10T07:05:20-08:002014-12-10T13:34:53-08:00
After prevailing in a condemnation action, petitioners-landowners moved for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 28-2-510(B)(1) of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act. Contrary to petitioners' view, the circuit court determined attorneys' fees should be awarded based on an hourly rate via a lodestar calculation rather than the contingency fee agreement between Petitioners and their attorney. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court interpreted section 28-2-510 and concluded the General Assembly intended for attorneys' fees to be awarded based on a constellation of factors. Specifically, section 28-2-510(B)(1) mandated that in order for a prevailing landowner to recover reasonable attorneys' fees he or she must submit an application for fees "necessarily incurred." Therefore, by implication, the General Assembly precluded a landowner from recovering attorneys' fees based solely on a contingency fee agreement without regards for section 28-2-510. The Court explained that even though the contingency fee agreement is not the sole element in the calculation, it is still a significant component as it may be used to explain the basis for the fee charged by the landowner's counsel. "Our decision should not be construed as somehow condemning or eliminating an attorney's use of a contingency fee agreement. To the contrary, we recognize that the use of these agreements is a legitimate and well-established practice for attorneys throughout our state. This practice may still be pursued. Yet, it is with the caveat that the terms of the agreement are not controlling. Rather, they constitute one factor in a constellation of factors for the court's consideration in determining an award of reasonable litigation expenses to a prevailing landowner under section 28-2-510(B)(1). The court may, in fact, conclude that the contingency fee agreement yields a reasonable fee. However, the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement. " For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals misapplied case law precedent. Furthermore, the Court concluded the circuit court failed to conduct the correct statutory analysis, and remanded this matter to the circuit court. Petitioners' counsel was instructed to submit an itemized statement in compliance with section 28-2-510(B)(1) as counsel's original affidavit failed to identify the "fee charged" and the actual number of hours expended. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27469.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina Dept. of Trans. v. Revels" on Justia Law</a>
2014-12-10stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27469http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27065.htmlKiawah Development v. South Carolina Dept. of Health & Env. Ctrl.2014-12-10T07:05:19-08:002014-12-10T13:34:49-08:00
The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on the correct application of those statutes and regulations pertinent to an invaluable (environmentally, economically, and socially) stretch of tidelands located on the edge of a spit of land along the South Carolina coast. A landowner and real estate developer sought a permit to construct a bulkhead and revetment stretching over 2,700 feet in length and 40 feet in width over the State's tidelands, thereby permanently altering 111,320 square feet or over 2.5 acres of pristine tidelands. The landowner sought to halt ongoing erosion along that stretch of tidelands in order to facilitate a residential development on the adjacent highland area. The Department of Health and Environmental Control denied the majority of the requested permit and granted a small portion to protect an existing county park. An administrative law court (ALC) disagreed and found a permit should be granted for the entire structure, and this appeal followed. The Supreme Court concluded the ALC committed several errors of law and therefore, it reversed and remanded for further consideration. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27065.html" target="_blank">View "Kiawah Development v. South Carolina Dept. of Health & Env. Ctrl." on Justia Law</a>
2014-12-10stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27065http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27468.htmlBuist v. Buist2014-12-03T07:03:52-08:002014-12-03T13:53:23-08:00
Husband Michael Buist and Wife Katie Buist married in 1999 and had one child. In 2007, Wife filed for divorce, seeking, inter alia, attorneys' fees and costs. In 2009, the family court granted the couple a divorce on the grounds that they had lived separate and apart for one year. In November 2009, the family court conducted a final hearing, receiving testimony from Husband, Wife, their witnesses, and a guardian ad litem (GAL) regarding contested issues of division of marital assets, child custody and visitation, and child support. At the hearing, Wife's attorney submitted a fee affidavit requesting approximately $15,000 in attorneys' fees. Husband's attorney did not object to the affidavit, but submitted his own fee affidavit regarding his earlier motion for a rule to show cause. In the final divorce decree, the family court ordered Husband to pay $8,000 towards Wife's attorneys' fees and costs within 180 days. The court also ordered Husband and Wife to each pay half of the $2,768.90 owed to the GAL within 180 days. Finally, the family court ordered Wife to pay Husband's attorney $3,050 in regards to Husband's motion for a rule to show cause. Husband appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the family court erred in failing to apply the factors set forth in "Glasscock v. Glasscock" or "E.D.M. v. T.A.M" prior to awarding attorneys' fees to Wife. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that because Husband was not sufficiently specific in his objection to the family court's final divorce decree, he waived any objection that the family court did not adequately apply the Glasscock or E.D.M. factors. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27468.html" target="_blank">View "Buist v. Buist" on Justia Law</a>
2014-12-03stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27468http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27466.htmlAbbeville County School District v. South Carolina2014-11-12T08:03:46-08:002014-11-12T19:32:49-08:00
The plaintiffs, including eight South Carolina school districts, claimed that the State has failed to meet the constitutional obligation that there be a system of free public schools that affords each student the opportunity to receive a minimally adequate education. The trial court held that the State's failure to address the effects of pervasive poverty on students within the plaintiffs' school districts prevented those students from receiving the required opportunity. The trial court performed a "thorough and cogent examination" of the issues of this case. While the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion regarding the adverse effects of poverty, the Record demonstrated that there were myriad other issues, under the State's control, working to prevent students within these districts from receiving the constitutionally required opportunity. Thus, the Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, and affirmed as modified. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27466.html" target="_blank">View "Abbeville County School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law</a>
2014-11-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27466http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27463.htmlSouth Carolina v. Robinson2014-11-12T07:03:26-08:002014-11-12T19:32:44-08:00
Petitioner Jomar Robinson appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm his convictions for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute (PWID), PWID within one-half mile of a public park, unlawful carrying of a pistol, possession of marijuana, and resisting arrest. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed (as modified). <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27463.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Robinson" on Justia Law</a>
2014-11-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27463http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27465.htmlAiken v. Byars2014-11-12T07:03:26-08:002014-11-12T19:32:47-08:00
Fifteen inmates who were sentenced to life without parole as juveniles petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court for resentencing in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). The Court held that their sentences violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller and the petitioners and those similarly situated were entitled to resentencing. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27465.html" target="_blank">View "Aiken v. Byars" on Justia Law</a>
2014-11-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27465http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27462.htmlNucor v. SCDEW2014-11-12T07:03:25-08:002014-11-12T19:32:42-08:00
Respondent Kimberly Legette was employed by Appellant Nucor Corporation from 1998, through 2010. Nucor terminated Legette's employment after she failed a random on-site drug test in violation of Nucor's drug policy. Although Legette obtained an independent drug test, which tested negative for drugs, she was fired from her job at Nucor based on the two positive drug test results. Legette subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. Nucor requested that Legette be denied unemployment benefits, contending she was statutorily ineligible to receive them because she was fired for violating Nucor's drug policy by testing positive for drugs. This direct appeal from the Administrative Law Court (ALC) presented for the Supreme Court's review a threshold procedural challenge to appealability, and substantively, to the awarding of unemployment benefits to an employee terminated for failing a drug test administered by a laboratory that was not properly certified. Because this appeal arose from a final resolution of all issues, the Court found the matter is appealable. The Court affirmed the ALC. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27462.html" target="_blank">View "Nucor v. SCDEW" on Justia Law</a>
2014-11-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27462http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27444-0.htmlIn the Matter of Vincent Neal Way2014-11-12T07:03:25-08:002014-11-12T10:55:03-08:00
In 1993, Way pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a minor. The victim was Way's 13-year-old niece, who was spending the night with Way (who was then about 28 years old) and his wife. Way was sentenced to ten years in prison, suspended upon the service of eighteen months in prison and five years of probation. In 1995, while on probation, Way pled guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In that matter, Way allowed two girls who were runaways, one 13 and one 15, to spend the night at his home without notifying the police. While still on probation in 1997, Way pled guilty to committing a lewd act upon a minor. The victim was a 13-year-old girl, who reported that Way met her at a boat dock in 1995 and gave her marijuana, then had sexual intercourse with her. Way was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for this offense. In 2007, prior to his release from prison, Way was referred to the multidisciplinary team, which determined there was probable cause to believe Way met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator (SVP). The circuit court concluded probable cause existed and ordered a mental evaluation of Way. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Way met the definition of an SVP, and the circuit court ordered him to be civilly committed for long-term control, care and treatment. Way appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In his appeal, Way challenged the propriety of both the State's cross-examination of Way and its invocation of the missing witness rule in closing argument. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine Way about his retention of his non-testifying expert witness. Furthermore, the Court concluded the circuit court erred in allowing the State to assert that the jury could infer the missing witness' testimony would have been adverse to Way's case. Despite these errors, the Court concluded (as did the Court of Appeals) that these errors could not have reasonably affected the outcome of Way's case. The Court of Appeals was affirmed (as modified). <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27444-0.html" target="_blank">View "In the Matter of Vincent Neal Way" on Justia Law</a>
2014-11-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27444http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27460.htmlFabian v. Lindsay2014-10-29T06:03:46-08:002014-10-29T07:59:42-08:00
Appellant Erika Fabian brought this action for legal malpractice and breach of contract by a third-party beneficiary, alleging respondents attorney Ross M. Lindsay, III and his law firm Lindsay & Lindsay made a drafting error in preparing a trust instrument for her late uncle and, as a result, she was effectively disinherited. Appellant appealed the circuit court order dismissing her action under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP for failing to state a claim and contended South Carolina should recognize a cause of action, in tort and in contract, by a third-party beneficiary of a will or estate planning document against a lawyer whose drafting error defeats or diminishes the client's intent. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27460.html" target="_blank">View "Fabian v. Lindsay" on Justia Law</a>
2014-10-29stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27460http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27457.htmlBordeaux v. South Carolina2014-10-29T06:03:44-08:002014-10-29T08:01:37-08:00
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari in this post-conviction relief (PCR) action to review the Court of Appeals' decision, which remanded for a determination of the lawfulness of Antonio Bordeaux's sentence. Bordeaux's plea agreement was capped at a sentence of twenty-five years. He pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery and two counts of burglary. He was sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment on the armed robbery charges, and to twenty-five years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of twenty years with three years' probation on the burglary counts. Bordeaux's plea proceeding was conducted simultaneously with that of a co-defendant, Wesley Washington. Washington had been indicted on two counts of first degree burglary, but pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree burglary. The transcript reflected that the plea colloquy with the trial judge alternated between Bordeaux and Washington. During Bordeaux's plea colloquy, he acknowledged on at least seven occasions that he was pleading guilty to two counts of first degree burglary. At sentencing, Bordeaux was again reminded, and acknowledged, that he was being sentenced pursuant to his plea negotiations for two counts of first degree burglary, each of which carried a minimum fifteen-year sentence, and a maximum of life imprisonment. The State argued the Court of Appeals erred because the unambiguous plea colloquy and imposition of sentence control over the ambiguous written sentence. To this point, the Supreme Court agreed: it was clear Bordeaux pleaded guilty to first degree burglary, was sentenced within the legal limits for that crime, and in consonance with his negotiated plea agreement. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27457.html" target="_blank">View "Bordeaux v. South Carolina" on Justia Law</a>
2014-10-29stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27457http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27458.htmlSC Property v. Brock2014-10-29T06:03:44-08:002014-10-29T08:00:51-08:00
Roger Brock was passenger in a vehicle driven by Brian Mason, which was involved in an accident with a logging truck, driven by Ryan Stevens. At the time of the accident, Stevens was insured through the owner of the logging truck, Malachi Sanders' policy issued by Aequicap Insurance Company. Brock sustained severe injuries as a result of the wreck and filed suit. Soon after the litigation began, Brock settled his claim against Stevens and Sanders with Aequicap for $185,000 for the release of all claims. Shortly after the settlement was reached but before Brock received any payment, Aequicap was declared insolvent. Because Aequicap was an insurer licensed to do business in the State of South Carolina and the insured was a resident of South Carolina, the claim was referred to South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (Guaranty). As a result, Brock made demand on Guaranty for payment of the full settlement amount of $185,000. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the construction and application of the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act), S.C. Code Ann. Secs. 38-31-10 to -170 (2002 and Supp. 2013), and specifically the exhaustion/non-duplication provision in section 38-31-100(1). Guaranty and Brock moved for summary judgment on the issue whether Guaranty may offset payments from solvent insurance carriers against Brock's settlement under section 38-31-100. The circuit court found section 38-31-100 was ambiguous and granted partial summary judgment to both parties, holding that Guaranty may offset some but not all of the benefits received by Brock from solvent insurance carriers. The Supreme Court disagreed that section 38-31-100 was ambiguous and hold that the unambiguous language of section 38-31-100 provides that Guaranty may offset all payments from all solvent insurers made to Brock as a result of this wreck. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27458.html" target="_blank">View "SC Property v. Brock" on Justia Law</a>
2014-10-29stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27458http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27456.htmlSC Energy Users Committee v. SCE&G2014-10-22T06:03:45-08:002014-10-22T07:54:53-08:00
Appellants the South Carolina Energy Users Committee (the SCEUC) and the Sierra Club appealed orders of the Public Service Commission that approved Respondent South Carolina Electric & Gas's (SCE&G) application for updated capital cost and construction schedules, pursuant to the Base Load Review Act, (the BLRA). The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Commission applied the correct section of the BLRA, and whether the Commission had to also consider the prudence of project completion at the update stage. Finding no reversible error in the Commission's orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27456.html" target="_blank">View "SC Energy Users Committee v. SCE&G" on Justia Law</a>
2014-10-22stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27456http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27454.htmlJamison v. South Carolina2014-10-22T06:03:44-08:002014-10-22T07:52:59-08:00
Respondent Matthew Jamison pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. He did not petition for a direct appeal. Respondent's first application for post-conviction relief (PCR) was denied. Respondent filed a second PCR application alleging newly discovered evidence. The PCR judge granted relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR court erred in granting relief in respondent's second PCR application. Respondent's PCR testimony revealed that his decision to plead guilty rested on several considerations: the strength of the State's evidence against him, the relative weakness of his self-defense claim, and his counseled determination that it was to his advantage to plead guilty to the lesser charge of manslaughter in order to avoid going to trial on the indicted offense of murder. "Respondent is bound by his plea and conviction unless he can demonstrate the interest of justice requires that they be vacated. To grant relief under these circumstances would undermine the solemn nature of a guilty plea and the finality that generally attaches to a guilty plea." <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27454.html" target="_blank">View "Jamison v. South Carolina" on Justia Law</a>
2014-10-22stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27454http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27452.htmlSouth Carolina v. Coaxum2014-10-08T05:33:25-08:002014-10-09T03:34:59-08:00
The State appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the convictions of respondent William Coaxum, Sr., who was found guilty of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. In 2007, two men robbed a Pizza Hut in North Charleston. The respondent, driver of the get-away vehicle, refused to pull over, and a high-speed pursuit ensued. Within two miles of the start of the chase, Respondent lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a fire hydrant. Respondent and his passenger attempted to flee on foot. The police caught and arrested respondent at the scene of the crash, and their search of his car and person revealed a sawed-off shotgun and over $1,000 in cash. Prior to Respondent's trial, the trial court conducted voir dire of the prospective jurors. Specifically, the court asked: "Are there any members of the jury panel related [by] blood or marriage, socially or casually connected with [Respondent], or that have any business dealings, any connection whatsoever?" None of the prospective jurors responded. At trial, after the State presented the first four of its eight witnesses, the judge received a note from the jury foreperson indicating that Juror #7 recognized one of respondent's family members sitting in the courtroom. The solicitor requested Juror #7 be removed from the jury, arguing that although Juror #7's initial nondisclosure during voir dire was unintentional, "these types of relationships . . . [,] ultimately she may not be able to put it out of her mind." After conducting a lengthy inquiry, the trial court found that the alleged connection between Juror #7 and Respondent would have been a material factor in the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges. The court did not view Juror #7's connection with Respondent and his family as a basis for a challenge for cause. However, the court ruled that the connection would have been a legitimate basis for the State's exercise of its peremptory strikes, and that the State would have struck Juror #7 had she disclosed the connection. Therefore, the trial court excused Juror #7 from the jury and replaced her with the alternate juror. The State then called its remaining witnesses, and the jury ultimately convicted Respondent of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals reversed respondent's convictions and remanded the case for retrial, concluding that a trial court may not "automatically" remove a juror for an unintentional failure to disclose requested personal information during voir dire. Further, the court of appeals held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have removed Juror #7 because, in essence, a trial court may remove a juror mid-trial only if the juror has intentionally failed to disclose. As there was no question the jury was impartial after Juror #7's removal, the Supreme Court concluded that was not entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, it reversed the court of appeals decision reversing Respondent's convictions. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27452.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Coaxum" on Justia Law</a>
2014-10-08stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toalhttp://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27448.htmlBrown v. Baby Girl Harper2014-09-29T12:09:16-08:002014-10-01T15:37:06-08:00
Birth Mother was twenty-three years old when she learned that she was pregnant very late in the pregnancy. She received no prenatal care. She did not tell her parents she was pregnant, even though she lived with them. She gave birth alone after presenting to the emergency room when she went into labor with Baby Girl. Shortly after the birth, Birth Mother mentioned to hospital staff that she might be interested in placing Baby Girl for adoption. Other hospital workers were aware that Birth Mother was considering adoption, including the nurse midwife who delivered Baby Girl. The nurse midwife told Birth Mother that the nurse midwife's cousin, Adoptive Mother, was considering adoption, and gave her Adoptive Mother's telephone number. Birth Mother agreed to have Adoptive Mother adopt Baby Girl. Adoptive Mother's lawyer rented office space in an executive suite shared by other law firms, including the law firm where the attorney-witness worked. On the morning of the adoption, Adoptive Mother's lawyer asked the attorney-witness to act as a witness to the execution of the Consent. In addition, Adoptive Mother's lawyer asked a legal assistant from another law firm that also shared the office suite to be the second witness to the adoption. The legal assistant was present when Birth Mother signed the Consent, but did not see her initial the remainder of the document. She understood her role to be that of a witness to Birth Mother's signature. Adoptive Mother's lawyer notarized Birth Mother's signature. However, the attorney-witness did not enter the room until after Birth Mother signed the Consent, although she had the impression that Birth Mother had signed the Consent shortly before she entered the room. Neither witness was present for any discussions between Adoptive Mother's lawyer and Birth Mother regarding the Consent. The attorney-witness testified that she believed that Adoptive Mother's lawyer had explained the Consent to Birth Mother outside of her presence. Once the witnesses were in the room, Adoptive Mother's lawyer restated his prior conversation with Birth Mother in summary fashion. The witnesses signed the Consent, and the attorney-witness's law clerk notarized their signatures. The entire transaction lasted approximately ten minutes. Birth Mother left the office with Adoptive Mother's mother, who drove Birth Mother back to the local hotel where she had spent the previous night. Birth Mother spent time alone with Baby Girl there, and then relinquished Baby Girl to Adoptive Mother. However, Birth Mother explained that she "felt immediately that something was not right with the process." Five days later, Birth Mother sent a registered letter to Adoptive Mother's lawyer formally revoking her consent. The family court issued an order in a bifurcated hearing finding the Consent was invalid and requiring Baby Girl's immediate return to Birth Mother. In its order, the family court noted the only issue presented to the court was "whether the consent document was properly executed and, based on that ruling, whether Birth Mother's request for emergency transfer of legal and physical custody of the minor be granted." The court held that the relevant statutory provisions were clear and mandatory, such that strict compliance was required. Adoptive Mother appealed the court of appeals' decision affirming the family court order. Finding no error, the Supreme Court also affirmed.
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2014-09-29stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27448http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27447.htmlSouth Carolina v. Sams2014-09-24T06:09:22-08:002014-10-01T15:35:33-08:00
Desmond Sams was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after he strangled the victim, Jake Frazier, during an altercation. Sams appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court found Sams was not entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter because, as found by the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, Sams' actions did not fall within the range of conduct constituting involuntary manslaughter.
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2014-09-24stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27447http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27446.htmlMajor v. City of Hartsville2014-09-17T06:08:55-08:002014-10-01T15:33:20-08:00
Petitioner Alberta Major fell and sustained an ankle injury while walking across an unpaved area of an intersection, which was owned and maintained by respondent City of Hartsville. Petitioner asserted her injury was a result of a rut in the ground created by vehicles frequently driving over the unpaved area. Petitioner brought suit against respondent alleging negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton conduct. Prior to trial, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment contending it was not liable under the South Carolina Torts Claims Act (SCTCA) because it was not on notice of any rut at the location where petitioner allegedly sustained her injury. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, finding respondent's knowledge of vehicles cutting the unpaved corner at the intersection did not create a continual condition and did not place respondent on constructive notice of the actual rut. The Court of Appeals affirmed, referring to the SCTCA and finding although petitioner presented evidence that respondent had notice of circumstances it knew would eventually lead to a rut, there was no evidence respondent had notice of the specific rut petitioner alleged caused her injury. The Court of Appeals further found there was no continual condition sufficient to establish constructive notice and impute liability to respondent. Based on the testimony presented at the summary judgment hearing, the Supreme Court found, however, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether respondent should have been charged with constructive notice on the basis that the rut existed for such a period of time that respondent, in the use of reasonable care, should have discovered it. Furthermore, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the recurring nature of the defect created a continual condition giving rise to constructive notice. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
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2014-09-17stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme Court27446http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27445.htmlSouth Carolina v. Adams2014-09-10T05:34:38-08:002014-10-01T15:31:23-08:00
Officers from the North Charleston South Carolina Police Department (NCPD),believed Petitioner Alfred Adams was a drug dealer. Acting without a warrant, officers placed a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on petitioner's vehicle. After monitoring petitioner's travel to Atlanta, Georgia, and upon his return to South Carolina, law enforcement stationed a drug canine unit on the interstate within the NCPD's jurisdiction, with instructions to conduct a traffic stop on petitioner's vehicle. An officer conducted the requested traffic stop and discovered cocaine in petitioner's possession, which resulted in his arrest. Petitioner moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied petitioner's motion, finding no constitutional violation. The court of appeals found the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment but determined that the exclusionary rule did not apply because "Adams's traffic violations were intervening criminal acts sufficient to cure the taint arising from unlawfully installing the [GPS] device and monitoring the vehicle." Petitioner contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the court of appeals erred in finding that his traffic violations were intervening criminal acts that dissipated the taint from the unlawful search and concluding the facts did not warrant suppression. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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2014-09-10stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27445http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27442.htmlLevy v. Carolinian, LLC2014-09-03T05:30:29-08:002014-10-01T15:29:30-08:00
Carolinian, LLC was a closely held, manager-managed South Carolina limited liability company owned and managed various hotel and rental properties in Horry County. In February 2010, Appellants Shaul and Meir Levy obtained a judgment against Bhupendra Patel (a member of Carolinian) in the amount of $2.5 million. Thereafter, the Levys obtained a charging order from the circuit court, which constituted a lien against Patel's distributional interest in Carolinian. Subsequently, the Levys filed a petition to foreclose the charging lien, and the foreclosure sale was held in April 2012. The Levys were the successful bidders, purchasing Patel's distributional interest. Following the foreclosure sale, Carolinian asserted it was entitled to purchase Patel's distributional interest from the Levys pursuant to Article 11 of the Operating Agreement. Carolinian contended that, since the Levys failed to obtain the consent required under Section 11.1 of the Operating Agreement, their distributional interest was deemed to have been offered to Carolinian, and Carolinian was entitled to purchase that interest under Section 11.2. The Levys objected to Carolinian's attempt to force them to sell their interest, arguing they were not subject to the terms of Article 11 of the Operating Agreement and, thus, were not required to seek consent. The Levys subsequently filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that they were the lawful owners of Patel's distributional interest and that any right Carolinian had to compel the sale of the distributional interest terminated upon the foreclosure sale under the terms of Section 3.5 of the Operating Agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court found the foreclosure sale, which resulted in the transfer of Patel's distributional interest in Carolinian to the Levys, changed the Levys' status from that of mere judgment creditors to transferees of Patel's distributional interest. The trial court further found that, as transferees, the Levys became subject to the provisions of Article 11 of the Operating Agreement. Specifically, the trial court held that Carolinian could force the Levys to sell Patel's distributional interest pursuant to Sections 11.1 and 11.2 of the Operating Agreement. In their appeal, the Levys argued the circuit court committed an error of law in finding that, pursuant to Article 11 of the Operating Agreement, Carolinian could compel them to sell their interest. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial court.
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2014-09-03stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27442http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27440.htmlWhigham v. Jackson Dawson Communications2014-08-27T06:24:43-08:002014-10-01T15:27:27-08:00
Stephen Whigham was injured playing kickball during an event he organized for his employer, Jackson Dawson Communications. He filed a claim for workers' compensation. The commissioner denied the claim because she found the injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment, and that decision was affirmed by the full commission and the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that under the facts of this case, Whigham was entitled to workers' compensation because he was impliedly required to attend the kickball game he organized, and therefore, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
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2014-08-27stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27440http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27393-0.htmlSouth Carolina v. Sawyer2014-08-27T06:24:42-08:002014-10-01T15:27:27-08:00
The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's suppression of respondent Philip Sawyer's breath test results and video in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that a videotape from the breath test site that lacked the audio portion of the reading of Miranda rights and the informed consent law did not satisfy the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2953(A)(2) (2006).
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2014-08-27stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27393http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27439.htmlSouth Carolina v. Collins2014-08-20T06:19:53-08:002014-10-01T15:25:00-08:00
Respondent Bentley Collins was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and three counts of owning a dangerous animal causing injury to a person after a ten-year-old boy was killed and partially eaten by his dogs, most of whom were pitbull mixes. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' decision reversing and remanding the case for a new trial based solely on the trial court's admission of seven pre-autopsy photos of the victim. The State argued that the Court of Appeals: (1) failed to give due deference to the trial court's decision; (2) erred in finding that photos entered into evidence were more prejudicial than probative; (3) erred in finding the photos were not material to the elements of the offenses charged and corroborative of other evidence; and (4) erred in making a purely emotional decision to reverse and remand for a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the appellate court's decision.
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2014-08-20stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27439http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27438.htmlMalloy v. Thompson2014-08-20T06:19:52-08:002014-10-01T15:24:59-08:00
This action stems from a dispute between plaintiff James Robert Malloy and Swain R. Thompson, regarding assets of Robert L. Chamblee (Decedent). The complaint alleged that Thompson, with the assistance of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., acted to disrupt Decedent's estate plan and divert Decedent's assets from Malloy to Thompson. Malloy characterized his claims against Merrill Lynch as: (1) intentional interference with inheritance; (2) aiding and abetting intentional interference with inheritance; (3) and civil conspiracy. Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss and compel arbitration arguing that its only connection to this dispute was through its contractual duties under the client relationship agreements (CRAs) entered into between Decedent and Merrill Lynch, which contained mandatory arbitration clauses. Merrill Lynch argued that although Malloy was a non-signatory to the agreements, any duty, if any, owed by Merrill Lynch to Malloy derives from the CRAs, and therefore, he is bound by the arbitration clauses. The circuit court denied the motion and found that while non-signatories may be bound to an arbitration agreement under common law principles of contract and agency law, none of those principles applied in this case, and therefore, there was no basis to compel Malloy to arbitrate. Merrill Lynch appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision.
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2014-08-20stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27438http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27437.htmlSloan v. SCDOR2014-08-20T06:19:50-08:002014-10-01T15:25:00-08:00
After the South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) failed to produce public documents requested by Appellant Edward D. Sloan, Jr., Sloan filed s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against DOR and its director, James Etter, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. After suit was filed, the DOR produced the requested information and asserted that Sloan's action was mooted and should have been dismissed. The trial court agreed with the DOR and dismissed the complaint, denying all relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to Sloan. Despite the DOR's failure to comply with the requirements of FOIA, the Court held the trial court properly found that Sloan's request for a declaratory judgment was mooted when the DOR produced the requested information. Sloan contended, however, that the claim for declaratory relief remained viable. Here, the Court disagreed: "the information Sloan sought has been disclosed, [and] there [was] no continuing violation of FOIA upon which the trial court could have issued a declaratory judgment." As the prevailing party under these circumstances, the trial court erred in not awarding Sloan his reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
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2014-08-20stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27437http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27436.htmlHansen v. Fields Company2014-08-20T06:19:49-08:002014-10-01T15:24:59-08:00
The events giving rise to this lawsuit involved numerous individuals and corporate entities. Briefly: plaintiff Clifford Hansen was introduced to Robert Fields and through Fields engaged the services of Beechwood Advisory Group, Inc. to assist him in procuring capital in order to purchase a water bottling company in South Carolina. Fields and Hansen worked together toward this goal until Fields disavowed any obligation to Hansen and effectively cut him out of the deal. In doing so, Fields found investors, formed appellant Fields Company, LLC, and purchased the water bottling company. Hansen sued appellant for the actions of Fields and his various corporate entities, and following the denial of appellant's motion for a directed verdict, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Hansen. At its simplest, this appeal concerned whether a limited liability company (LLC) could be held liable for the actions of a promoter and whether any evidence to support such liability was presented in this case. The Supreme Court reversed and held the circuit court erred in denying the directed verdict on the issue of liability because there was no evidence on which a jury could hold appellant-defendant Beechwood Development Group of South Carolina, LLC liable.
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2014-08-20stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27436http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27435.htmlWilliams v. GEICO2014-08-20T05:26:50-08:002014-10-01T15:24:49-08:00
Delores Williams, the personal representative of the Estate of Edward Murry, and Matthew Whitaker, Jr., the personal representative of the Estate of Annie Mae Murry (PRs), brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a GEICO motor vehicle insurance policy issued to the Murrys provided $15,000 or $100,000 in liability proceeds for bodily injury for an accident in which both of the Murrys were killed. The circuit court concluded coverage was limited to the statutory minimum of $15,000 based on a family step-down provision in the policy that reduced coverage for bodily injury to family members from the stated policy coverage of $100,000 to the statutory minimum amount mandated by South Carolina law during the policy period. The PRs appealed, contending the step-down provision was ambiguous and/or violative of public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the circuit court that GEICO's policy is not ambiguous, but concluded the family step-down provision, which reduced the coverage under the liability policy from the stated policy amount to the statutory minimum, was violative of public policy and was, therefore, void. "The provision not only conflicte[d] with the mandates set forth in section 38-77-142, but its enforcement would be injurious to the public welfare."
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2014-08-20stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27435http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27434.htmlStevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia2014-08-20T05:26:49-08:002014-10-01T15:24:48-08:00
The respondents, two developers and an architectural firm, Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. (S&W), entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the City of Columbia as part of a larger project team to develop a publicly-funded hotel for the Columbia Metropolitan Convention Center. The City eventually abandoned its plan under the MOU, and the respondents brought suit on several causes of action including breach of contract and equitable relief. The City moved for summary judgment arguing the MOU was not a contract and therefore the contract claims failed. The circuit court agreed and, rejecting the equitable claims as well, granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The respondents appealed and the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed. Because the MOU was comprised of agreements to execute further agreements, there was no meeting of the minds on numerous material terms which had not yet been defined. Accordingly, the court of appeals was reversed with respect to that portion of the court's judgment; the Supreme Court held the MOU was unenforceable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court and reinstated its judgment in favor of the City.
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2014-08-20stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27434http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27433.htmlStevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia2014-08-20T05:26:47-08:002014-10-01T15:24:47-08:00
In April 2003, the City of Columbia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. (S&W) and several other parties, to develop a publicly-funded hotel adjacent to the Columbia Metropolitan Convention Center. As architect, S&W was to complete sufficient preliminary design work to determine a guaranteed maximum price for the project, which would be used by the City to obtain municipal bond funding to cover the cost of the hotel. Pursuant to the MOU, the construction company was to pay S&W directly. On June 26, 2003, the City received a letter stating S&W would complete its preliminary design on July 10, 2003, and would then stop working until the bond financing for the hotel was finalized. Realizing this could delay the start of construction, S&W offered to continue working the remaining ninety days until the anticipated bond closing date of October 13, 2003, but required assurance it would be compensated for the work it performed during this time frame. It provided an estimate requiring $650,000 and $75,000 per week after that. On July 30, the City approved "$650,000 for interim architectural design services for a period of 90 days prior to bond closing." The bond closing did not occur as scheduled, but S&W nevertheless continued to work. S&W submitted an invoice to the City for $697,084.79 for work that took place from July 10 to December 15, 2003. By letter dated December 17, 2003, S&W informed the construction company that the City had voted that day "to advance [$705,000.000] to the design team for design services and expenses. Because under the MOU the construction company was to pay S&W, not the City, the construction company agreed to reimburse the City for the funds paid to S&W after the bond closing. The City paid S&W's invoice. S&W continued to work on the project, but in March 2004, the City abandoned its plans under the MOU and ended its relationship with S&W. S&W received no further compensation and sued the City for breach of contract under the MOU and the July 2003 agreement. The City argued there was no separate agreement and the payment of interim fees was merely an advance on fees under the MOU and furthermore, the MOU provided that S&W was to be paid by the construction company, not the City. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of S&W, finding a contract existed between it and the City. On certiorari, the City conceded a contract exists, but argued the contract terms have been satisfied. The Supreme Court found the City's arguments were unpreserved and affirmed as modified.
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2014-08-20stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27433http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27430.htmlIn the Interest of Kevin R.2014-08-06T06:16:20-08:002014-10-01T15:19:34-08:00
The State charged appellant "Kevin R." with possessing a weapon on school grounds. Prior to his adjudicatory hearing before a family court judge, Appellant moved for a jury trial on the grounds the federal and state Constitutions guaranteed him the right to a jury trial. The judge denied the motion and proceeded to hear Appellant's case in a bench trial. Ultimately, the judge adjudicated Appellant delinquent and deferred sentencing until an evaluation of Appellant was completed. The sentencing hearing was conducted before a second family court judge, who sentenced Appellant to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his twenty- first birthday. The judge then suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on probation until his eighteenth birthday. On appeal, Appellant contended the family court judge erred in denying his motion for a jury trial. Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court held a juvenile did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in adjudication proceedings. However, the Court's decision in that case was not dispositive as it was presented with additional arguments raised by Appellant and the Amici Curiae. After consideration of these issues, the Court adhered to its decision in the earlier case, and affirmed the family court.
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2014-08-06stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27430http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27429.htmlDavis v. Parkview Apartments2014-08-06T06:16:18-08:002014-10-01T15:19:33-08:00
"The Record in this case is voluminous, and illustrates the complex and, at times, contentious nature of these proceedings. The circuit judge presided over numerous motion hearings and issued numerous orders over the course of this litigation." However, this appeal concerned a final order in which the circuit judge dismissed all of the cases and awarded fees and costs to Respondents as sanctions for Appellants' continued refusal to comply with his previous discovery rulings. In addition, Appellants appealed the judge's failure to disqualify himself at the outset of this litigation and late refusal to recuse himself. Appellants were limited partners in five separate limited partnerships and asserted legal claims in five separate actions against Respondents, their general partners. The limited partnerships were formed in the 1960s to construct and operate the properties at issue, affordable housing projects for low-income citizens in three counties. Respondents became general partners around 1975, and from that point forward, Appellants took no part in the management or business affairs of the complexes. In 1984, Respondents notified Appellants that they had contracted to sell the properties to Boston Financial Group (BFG). The terms of the sale called for a small amount to be paid upfront but the majority would be paid in 1999 in a "balloon" payment with accruing interest. However, BFG defaulted on the payment, and sold the properties without intervention from the partnerships. All of the claims stemmed from Respondents' roles in selling the properties and their actions in the aftermath of BFG's default. Appellants argued on appeal the Supreme Court that the circuit abused its discretion by dismissing these cases under the facts, particularly because" (1) less "draconian" punishments were available to the court; (2) Appellants agreed to receive a less harsh sanction and "took extraordinary steps to avoid dismissal"; (3) the judge consistently espoused Respondents' arguments as evidence constituting a factual basis to support his decisions; and (4) the judge deviated from South Carolina law to effect dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court in all respects: the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in the rulings it made, and Appellants failed to prove that they suffered any prejudice as a result of the judge's refusal to recuse himself in this case. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
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2014-08-06stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27429http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27428.htmlIn the Matter of Former Abbeville County Magistrate George T. Ferguson2014-08-06T06:16:17-08:002014-10-01T15:19:34-08:00
In this judicial disciplinary matter, respondent Former Abbeville County Magistrate George Ferguson and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent. Respondent was indicted on two counts of Misconduct in Office: the first indictment alleged respondent offered and gave Jane Doe #1 money and/or other benefits for the handling and disposition of legal matters involving Jane Doe #1 before him in his official capacity as Magistrate in return for sexual contact with her from 1996 to 2009; the second indictment alleged respondent offered and gave Jane Doe #2 money and/or other benefits for the handling and disposition of legal matters involving Jane Doe #2 before him in his official capacity as Magistrate in return for sexual contact with her from 2001 to 2011. In the Agreement, respondent admitted misconduct, consented to the imposition of a public reprimand and agreed never to seek nor accept a judicial office in South Carolina without the express written permission of the Supreme Court after written notice to ODC. The Supreme Court accepted the Agreement and publicly reprimanded respondent, the most severe sanction it was able to impose under these circumstances.
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2014-08-06stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme Court27428http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27427.htmlBrouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence2014-08-06T06:16:15-08:002014-10-01T15:19:41-08:00
Patricia Brouwer challenged the circuit court's order dismissing her medical malpractice case for failure to file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code. Brouwer argued she was exempt from filing an expert witness affidavit because section 15-36-100(C)(2) did not require an affidavit where the alleged negligent act "lies within the ambit of common knowledge and experience." The Supreme Court agreed because it previously held that section 15-79-125(A) incorporated section 15-36-100 in its entirety, including the common-knowledge exception codified in 15-36-100(C)(2). Furthermore, the Court concluded that Brouwer successfully invoked this exception and, thus, was not required to file an expert witness affidavit with her NOI.
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2014-08-06stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27427http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27424.htmlState Accident Fund v. SC Second Injury Fund2014-07-30T06:15:59-08:002014-10-01T15:16:57-08:00
Claimant Johnny Adger suffered an accidental injury to his left knee on while working as a police officer with the Manning Police Department. As a result, he was treated using various non-operative methods, including steroid injections. In January 2008, Claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and was assigned a 32% permanent impairment rating to his lower left extremity. However, in April 2008, Claimant returned to the doctor because he continued to experience swelling and pain in his left knee. Ultimately, Claimant underwent knee replacement surgery. Claimant continued to experience swelling and pain in his left knee, and Claimant followed up with the orthopaedic center for several months after the surgery. At the time of his injury, Claimant suffered from preexisting diabetes, which Claimant's employer was aware of prior to the injury. Claimant experienced problems with his diabetes for years before the accident and required medication to control the condition. Claimant's diabetes was medically controlled around the time of the injury; however, Claimant's diabetes was uncontrolled on several occasions during the course of his knee treatment. The State Accident Fund appealed an order from the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission denying its request for reimbursement from the South Carolina Second Injury Fund for benefits paid to Claimant. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Commission denied Appellant's claim for reimbursement in full. Without mentioning medical payments, the Commission stated that "Claimant's preexisting diabetes did not create substantially greater liability for permanent disability nor did it result in substantially greater lost time from work." However, these facts fell under the compensation liability prong of the applicable statute. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the Commission ignored expert opinion that Claimant's injury most probably aggravated his diabetes and resulted in substantially greater medical costs than would have resulted from his work-related injury alone. The Second Industry Fund presented no evidence or expert opinion that contradicted the statement concerning medical costs. Therefore, based on the fact that the medical evidence supported the conclusion that the Claimant's work-related injury aggravated his diabetes and resulted in increased medical costs, the Court held that the State Accident Fund satisfied the requirements of section 42-9-400(a), and the Commission's decision to deny its claim for reimbursement of medical payments was clearly erroneous.
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2014-07-30stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27424http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27423.htmlWilkinson v. East Cooper Community Hospital2014-07-23T06:14:34-08:002014-10-01T15:14:54-08:00
In this medical malpractice case, Vicki Wilkinson appealed the circuit court's dismissal of her civil action with prejudice based on the motions filed by respondents East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc., Carolina Aesthetic Plastic Surgery Institute, P.A., and Dr. Thomas Hahm. Wilkinson argued on appeal that the court erred in finding: (1) the statute of limitations was not tolled because she failed to file an expert witness affidavit contemporaneously with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code; and (2) she failed to file her Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations given she did not contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with the Complaint or within forty-five days thereafter in accordance with section 15-36-100(C). This appeal implicated the Court of Appeals' decision in "Ranucci v. Crain," (723 S.E.2d 242 (Ct. App. 2012)) ("Ranucci I"). The Supreme Court reversed Ranucci I, holding that section 15-79-125(A) incorporatesdsection 15-36-100 in its entirety. Therefore, Wilkinson could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit with her NOI and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. However, because the analysis in Ranucci II was limited to the dismissal of the pre-litigation NOI, it was not dispositive since this case involved the next procedural step in medical malpractice litigation. Accordingly, the circuit court's order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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2014-07-23stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27423http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27422.htmlRanucci v. Crain2014-07-23T06:14:33-08:002014-10-01T15:14:53-08:00
Shannon Ranucci appealed the circuit court's order dismissing her medical malpractice case for failing to contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code. Ranucci argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding the affidavit of her medical expert was not timely filed because section 15-79-125 incorporated section 15-36-100, which included a "safe harbor" provision that extends the time for filing the affidavit. The Court of Appeals, holding the pre-litigation filing requirement for a medical malpractice case found in section 15-79-125 incorporated only the parts of section 15-36-100 that related to the preparation and content of an expert's affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Court held that section 15-79-125(A) incorporated section 15-36-100 in its entirety. Thus, Ranucci could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit and tolled the applicable statute of limitations.
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2014-07-23stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27422http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27421.htmlWeik v. South Carolina2014-07-23T06:14:32-08:002014-10-01T15:14:53-08:00
John Weik was convicted of murdering his former girlfriend following an argument over the couple's child. He confessed to the shooting and cooperated with law enforcement. There was never any dispute regarding guilt. During the sentencing phase, the State proceeded on two aggravating circumstances: burglary and torture. Regarding Weik's mental status, the defense relied on three mental health experts, who all of whom testified that Weik suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, including auditory and visual hallucinations, suicidal ideations, and paranoid delusions. The defense, however, failed to present readily available evidence concerning Weik's chaotic upbringing and dysfunctional family. It was the absence of the social history mitigation evidence that compelled the South Carolina Supreme Court, "under controlling United States Supreme Court precedents, to grant Weik a new sentencing hearing."
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2014-07-23stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27421http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27420.htmlAshley II v. PCS Nitrogen2014-07-23T06:14:30-08:002014-10-01T15:14:52-08:00
In approximately twenty years PCS Nitrogen, Inc. contributed to environmental contamination by manufacturing fertilizer and disturbing contaminated soil during various demolition activities. In 2003, Ashley II of Charleston, Inc. purchased 27.62 acres of the PCS's property. Since that time, Ashley II has incurred substantial costs in remediating the environmental contamination. In July 2008, Ashley II filed a complaint against PCS seeking a declaration of joint and several liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) due to costs of the environmental cleanup at the Site. Additionally, PCS asserted a third-party indemnification claim against the site's previous owner based on the indemnity provision in a 1966 purchase agreement, seeking indemnification for attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses incurred in establishing that the predecessor contributed to the contamination. The South Carolina Supreme Court anwered the following certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "Does the rule that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligent acts, unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, apply when the indemnitee seeks contractual indemnification for costs and expenses resulting in part from its own strict liability acts? " In the context of the underlying claim in federal court, the South Carolina Court answered the question, "no."
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2014-07-23stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27420http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27419.htmlPerry v. Bullock2014-07-16T06:13:49-08:002014-10-01T15:12:20-08:00
The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether autopsy reports are "medical records" under Section 30-4-20(c) of the South Carolina Code (2007), and therefore exempt from disclosure under the South Carolina Freedom of Information Act, Title 30, Chapter 4 of the South Carolina Code (the FOIA). The appellants brought a declaratory judgment action under the FOIA requesting production of an autopsy report from a coroner. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the coroner, finding the records were exempt from disclosure as medical records. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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2014-07-16stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27419http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27418.htmlSouth Carolina v. Ramsey2014-07-16T06:13:47-08:002014-10-01T15:12:21-08:00
In early 2006, Deputy Chris Farrell responded to a domestic call at the home of defendant James Ramsey's estranged wife (Wife). Farrell interviewed both parties and noticed a bruise on Wife's hand, which she indicated was the result of Ramsey attempting to grab a phone from her. Based on his observations, Deputy Farrell issued Ramsey a uniform traffic ticket for criminal domestic violence (CDV). Ramsey moved to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that because the CDV was not committed in the presence of the officer, Deputy Farrell could not issue him a uniform traffic ticket under section 56-7-15(A), and absent a valid uniform traffic ticket, the magistrate lacked authority to hear the case. The magistrate agreed and dismissed the charges. The circuit court affirmed the dismissal on the alternative basis that only offenses listed under Section 56-710 of the South Carolina Code (2006), amended by 56-7-10 (Supp. 2013), allowed for prosecution solely based on a uniform traffic ticket and at the time the alleged crime was committed, CDV was not listed in section 56-7-10. Therefore, the circuit court concluded the magistrate did not have jurisdiction to hear the CDV charge until an arrest warrant was issued. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. Although the court disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion that CDV could never be prosecuted in magistrate court absent an arrest warrant, it found that pursuant to section 56-7-15, an officer could only issue a uniform traffic ticket for CDV if the crime was committed in his presence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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2014-07-16stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27418http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27417.htmlBoard of Trustees for the Fairfield County School District v. South Carolina2014-07-16T06:13:46-08:002014-10-01T15:12:21-08:00
For about forty years, 100 and 200 children residing in the Mitford Community of Fairfield County have been attending Chester County School District (CCSD) schools in the Great Falls area of Chester County. The CCSD schools are closer to the Mitford Community than are any Fairfield County School District (FCSD) schools. The Mitford students have been attending CCSD schools at no cost to the students or their families. Mitford students' attendance at CCSD schools began as a result of a Federal 1970 desegregation order, which required the all African-American Mitford Elementary School be closed, and its students be given the choice of attending CCSD's Great Falls schools. The General Assembly passed Act No. 1236, consolidating the Mitford Community into CCSD. This Act was repealed the following year based on an agreement between FCSD and CCSD respecting the Mitford Community's students' enrollment in CCSD's schools. Under this agreement, FCSD paid CCSD $25,000 per year for educational expenses. This agreement ended in the 2009-10 school year when no agreement was reached for that year or thereafter. In light of the school districts' failure to reach an agreement for payment to CCSD for the cost of educating Mitford Community's students in CCSD's schools and FCSD's refusal to continue negotiations, the General Assembly passed Act No. 294 of 2010 in order to provide for a uniform arrangement between FCSD and CCSD. Pursuant to section 59-63-485(C), CCSD has invoiced the Fairfield County Treasurer for the expenses of educating the Mitford children for the past three school years. FCSD filed suit against the Respondents seeking a declaratory judgment that Act No. 294 was unconstitutional. CCSD, the State, and FCSD filed cross motions for summary judgment as to the constitutionality of Act No. 294. The circuit court issued an order denying FCSD's motion and granting CCSD and the State's motions for summary judgment, holding that Act No. 294 was constitutional special legislation, and FCSD appealed. In a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the Board of Trustees for the FCSD appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State, CCSD, the Fairfield County Treasurer, and the State Department of Education. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27417.html" target="_blank">View "Board of Trustees for the Fairfield County School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law</a>
2014-07-16stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27417http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27415.htmlSouth Carolina v. Hewins2014-07-16T05:15:07-08:002014-10-01T15:11:54-08:00
Erick Hewins appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine. Hewins argued on appeal that the circuit court judge erred in ruling he was collaterally estopped from challenging the search of his vehicle, which precipitated the drug charge, because Hewins waived any challenge when he was convicted in municipal court of an open container violation resulting from the same search. The Supreme Court held the conviction in municipal court had no preclusive effect on Hewins's ability to litigate his motion to suppress in circuit court. Furthermore, the Court found the drug evidence should have been suppressed because it was discovered during an unlawful search. Accordingly, the Court reversed Hewins's conviction.
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2014-07-16stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27415http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27413.htmlIn the Interest of Stephen W.2014-07-16T05:11:21-08:002014-10-01T15:11:53-08:00
In August 2012, then-sixteen-year-old Appellant Stephen W. was charged with possession of marijuana. At the adjudicatory hearing, Appellant moved for a jury trial, claiming that he was entitled to a jury trial under the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. The family court denied Appellant's motion. The family court adjudicated Appellant delinquent and ordered that Appellant spend six consecutive weekends at the Department of Juvenile Justice, complete an alternative educational program, and continue with his prior probation for a period of time not to exceed his eighteenth birthday or until he obtained a G.E.D. Appellant directly appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued that the family court erred in denying his motion for a jury trial in a family court juvenile proceeding. Because there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in a family court juvenile proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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2014-07-16stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27413http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27412.htmlHarrell v. Attorney General of South Carolina2014-07-09T13:16:13-08:002014-10-01T15:09:18-08:00
On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. The complaint was originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee. That same day, the Attorney General forwarded the complaint to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and SLED carried out a 10-month criminal investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Chief of SLED and the Attorney General petitioned the presiding judge of the state grand jury to impanel the state grand jury on January 13, 2014. Acting presiding judge of the state grand jury, the Honorable L. Casey Manning, subsequently impaneled the state grand jury. On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion after which the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Another hearing was held, and the court found, as presiding judge of the state grand jury, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. The court discharged the grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation. The Attorney General appealed that order to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the original complaint. While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While the Court reversed the circuit court's order, it "in no way suggest[ed] that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was 'conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity.'" The case was remanded for a decision on whether the Attorney General should have been disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings.
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2014-07-09stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme Court27412http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27411.htmlSouth Carolina v. Hill2014-07-09T12:15:20-08:002014-10-01T15:09:08-08:00
Appellant Bruce Hill was convicted of two murders and first-degree burglary, arising from a home invasion and double homicide in Horry County in 2005. He received concurrent life sentences for the murders and a concurrent thirty-year sentence for the burglary. Prior to Appellant's trial, another individual, Richard Gagnon, was tried and convicted of these murders. During Gagnon's trial, the State maintained that there were two perpetrators involved, as there was blood at the scene that could not belong to either victim or to Gagnon. From blood droplets found at the crime scene, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) developed a DNA profile. The profile did not match either of the victims or Gagnon's. Approximately four years after the murders, the Horry County Police Department (HCPD) was notified in a letter from SLED of a CODIS match for the unknown individual's blood found at the crime scene: Appellant's, who, at that time, was incarcerated in Tennessee (Appellant's DNA had been placed into the CODIS database by the Tennessee Department of Corrections). HCPD agents travelled to Tennessee for the purpose of obtaining a buccal swab on Appellant for further DNA comparison. However, the investigators who obtained this order subsequently left HCPD, and the evidence of the swab was lost. Arrest warrants were issued charging Appellant with burglary and murder. In 2010, Appellant requested the final deposition of the charges pending against him in South Carolina. The solicitor's office and the clerk of court acknowledged receipt of Appellant's request in September, 2010, which triggered the IAD 180-day clock to bring trial. Appellant arrived in South Carolina on October 21, 2010; On March 1, 2011, the last day of the 180-day Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) limit, a hearing on the State's motion for a six-month continuance was held. Appellant opposed the continuance arguing that the State did not meet its burden for obtaining a continuance under the IAD. The circuit court disagreed with Appellant and ruled that there was good cause for granting the State's request. In addition to granting a continuance, the court ordered that a "Schmerber" hearing be conducted the next week. At the final pretrial hearing, the circuit court: (1) ruled that neither the State nor Appellant could make any reference to Gagnon's conviction, as it was irrelevant to the determination of Appellant's guilt; and (2) denied Appellant's motion to suppress any mention of Appellant being in the CODIS database. Appellant was ultimately convicted on all counts, and he appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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2014-07-09stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27411http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27410.htmlFerguson Fire v. Preferred Fire2014-07-09T12:15:18-08:002014-10-01T15:09:09-08:00
This case arose out of plaintiff Ferguson Fire's efforts to obtain payment for materials it supplied to defendant Preferred Fire Protection, LLC for defendant Immedion's data center. In 2007, Immedion, a telecommunications company, hired Rescom, L.L.C. to be the general contractor for improvements planned for its data center on property Immedion leased in Greenville. Rescom, in turn, hired Preferred Fire, a fire sprinkler company, as a subcontractor. In addition, Immedion directly hired Preferred Fire under a separate contract to install a special "pre-action" fire suppression system1 in its data center. To complete this work, Preferred Fire purchased materials from Ferguson Fire. Ferguson Fire began delivering materials to Preferred Fire in August, 2007, and the deliveries continued through October. In September, while its deliveries were in progress, Ferguson Fire sent a "Notice of Furnishing Labor and Materials" to Immedion advising it in relevant part that it had been employed by Preferred Fire to deliver labor, services, or materials with an estimated value of $15,000.00 to Immedion's premises. The Notice of Furnishing advised that it was being given as "a routine procedure to comply with certain state requirements that may exist," and that it was not a lien, nor any reflection on Preferred Fire's credit standing. Immedion paid Preferred approximately half of the contract price for installation of the system before receiving Ferguson Fire's Notice of Furnishing. After receiving the Notice, Immedion issued two additional checks to Preferred Fire for the unpaid balance of the contract price. Immedion paid everything it owed to Rescom, and it also paid its contractor Preferred Fire in full under the separate contract for the fire suppression system. However, Preferred Fire never paid Ferguson Fire for the materials it furnished. Ferguson brought a mechanic's lien foreclosure action against Immedion and Preferred Fire. Ferguson Fire contended (and the Supreme Court agreed) that the Court of Appeals erred in adding requirements to S.C Code Ann. 29-5-40 (2007) (governing a notice of furnishing) that were not in the statute itself and in concluding Ferguson Fire did not establish an effective lien upon which a foreclosure action could be premised. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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2014-07-09stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27410http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27408.htmlSouth Carolina v. Nation2014-07-02T06:15:41-08:002014-10-01T15:07:32-08:00
Appellant Anthony Nation appealed a circuit court's decision to statutorily impose lifetime global positioning satellite (GPS) monitoring on him due to his prior guilty plea for a sex offense with a minor and subsequent probation violations. On appeal, Appellant brought various constitutional challenges to section 23-3-540 and contests the validity of five of our previous decisions involving the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry and statutory authorization of GPS monitoring of sex offenders. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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2014-07-02stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27408http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27407.htmlSouth Carolina v. Reid2014-07-02T06:15:39-08:002014-10-01T15:07:33-08:00
Appellant Donta Reid challenged the trial court's failure to suppress his confession, arguing it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the facts of this case fell within the purview of "Montejo v. Louisiana," (556 U.S. 778 (2009)). Furthermore contended the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on the charges for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime because the State failed to prove he actually or constructively possessed a firearm. The Supreme Court found those charges were properly submitted to the jury and therefore affirmed his convictions.
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2014-07-02stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27407http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27406.htmlCrossland v. Crossland2014-07-02T06:15:38-08:002014-10-01T15:07:30-08:00
Appellant-wife Shirley Crossland contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the court of appeals erred in reversing the family court's award of alimony, in modifying the equitable division of the marital estate, and in remanded an issue over attorney fees. With regard to the alimony issue, Wife argued the court of appeals erred in holding that, for the purposes of awarding alimony, income should be imputed to her based on her eligibility for social security retirement benefits she has not applied to receive. "Indeed, the family court may, but is not in all cases required to, consider eligibility for government benefits, and under the circumstances of this case, the family court did not commit reversible error. Thus the court of appeals erred in finding the family court was required to impute income to Wife based on social security benefits she is eligible to receive at age sixty-two. Although voluntary decreases in income may prompt a family court to consider a party's earning capacity instead of actual income, it is clear that 'the failure to reach earning capacity, by itself, does not automatically equate to voluntary underemployment such that income must be imputed.'" The Supreme Court agreed with Wife with regard to her remaining issues, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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2014-07-02stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtMoore27406http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27405.htmlSouth Carolina v. Burgess2014-07-02T06:15:36-08:002014-10-01T15:07:31-08:00
Lawrence Burgess was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay a $25,000 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Following the denial of his petition for rehearing, Burgess petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the decision. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition to review whether: (1) the multi-jurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement (which formed the purported basis of the arresting officer's authority to arrest Burgess outside of the officer's territorial jurisdiction) satisfied the statutory prerequisites to constitute a valid agreement; and (2) whether Burgess should have been permitted to cross-examine the arresting officer with his personnel records pursuant to Rule 608(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Although the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed Burgess's conviction, it disagreed with the court's conclusion regarding the multijurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed as modified.
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2014-07-02stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27405http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27404.htmlSouth Carolina v. Wessinger2014-07-02T06:15:35-08:002014-10-01T15:07:34-08:00
Appellant pled guilty to two counts of indecent exposure and was sentenced to two consecutive three-year terms, with credit for 253 days already served. Appellant contended the trial court erred in denying his request for a full evidentiary hearing before the circuit court determined whether appellant's indecent exposure pleas should have been classified as sexually violent offenses for purposes of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the SVP Act). Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the trial court.
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2014-07-02stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27404http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27403.htmlKirven v. Central States2014-06-25T06:16:07-08:002014-10-01T15:03:20-08:00
The South Carolina Supreme Court answered certified two questions from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The case concerned supplemental health insurance policies, which differ from ordinary health insurance policies in both purpose and operation. The questions were: (1) whether the definition of "actual charges" contained within S.C. Code Ann. 38-71-242 be applied to insurance contracts executed prior to the statute's effective date; and (2) whether the South Carolina Department of Insurance could mandate the application of "actual charges" to policies already inexistence on the statute's effective dates by prohibiting an insurance company from paying claims absent the application of that definition. The South Carolina Supreme Court answered both questions "no."
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2014-06-25stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27403http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27402.htmlSouth Carolina v. Inman2014-06-18T06:15:40-08:002014-10-01T15:00:00-08:00
Appellant Damien Inman was convicted and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Mary Stutts. Appellant was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. On appeal, Appellant challenged his convictions on several grounds, including that the circuit court improperly granted the State's motion pursuant to "Batson v. Kentucky" after Appellant offered a race-neutral explanation for striking a particular juror. The Supreme Court agreed after review and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
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2014-06-18stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27402http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27401.htmlDean v. Heritage Healthcare2014-06-18T06:15:39-08:002014-10-01T14:59:59-08:00
Appellants Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, Uni-Health Post-Acute Care - Tanglewood, LLC (Tanglewood), and UHS-Pruitt Corporation (collectively, Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death and survival action involving Appellants' allegedly negligent nursing home care. Tanglewood is a skilled nursing facility located in Ridgeway, owned and controlled by Appellants. In January 2007, Tanglewood and Respondent Darlene Dean entered into a nursing home residency agreement in which Tanglewood assumed responsibility for the care of Respondent's mother, Louise Porter (the patient). The same day, Respondent signed a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. The patient did not sign either the residency agreement or the Agreement on her own behalf, although she was competent at the time of her admission to Tanglewood. Moreover, Respondent did not have a health care power of attorney empowering her to sign on the patient's behalf. In 2009, the patient fell three separate times within a ten day period, fracturing her hip in the third fall. Over the next two months, the patient underwent two hip surgeries; however, due to complications following the surgeries, the patient died on September 30, 2009. In late 2011, Respondent (acting in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate) filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, as well as an expert affidavit in support of her NOI. Respondent also alleged claims for survival and wrongful death. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Relying on "Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc.," (678 S.E.2d 435 (2009)), the circuit court invalidated the Agreement in its entirety and refused to compel arbitration between the parties. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Respondent's argument that Appellants' waived their right to enforce the Agreement was without merit. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the circuit court consider her remaining arguments (concerning Respondent's authority to sign the Agreement and whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties) prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration between the parties.
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2014-06-18stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27401http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27400.htmlLambries v. Saluda County Council2014-06-18T06:15:37-08:002014-10-01T15:00:00-08:00
In 2008, at a regularly scheduled meeting of the Saluda County Council, a motion was made and seconded to amend the posted agenda to take up a resolution. Both the motion and the resolution were voted upon and passed unanimously during the meeting, which was open to the public. The nonbinding resolution pertained to water and sewer services, although that subject was not originally listed on County Council's agenda. Dennis Lambries filed this action in the circuit court against the Saluda County Council and its members alleging County Council's amendment of the agenda without notice and in the absence of exigent circumstances and its passage of a resolution that was not on the posted agenda violated FOIA's notice provision in section 30-4-80. Lambries brought the action as a citizen of Saluda County and noted he was also the Chairman of the Saluda County Water and Sewer Authority. Specifically, Lambries asked the circuit court to declare that all resolutions, acts, ordinances, and statements made by County Council in violation of FOIA were null and void, and he sought injunctive relief to prevent future amendments of an agenda in the absence of "truly exigent circumstances." The circuit court noted the purpose of FOIA is for the activities of government "to be in open session and not behind closed doors." The court found that "the amendment of the agenda was performed in open session and in accordance with Saluda County Council rules of order as codified in their ordinances," and S.C. Code Ann. 4-9-110 (1986) authorized counties to establish their own rules and order of business. The circuit court denied Lambries's motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, reiterating that it "d[id] not agree with the plaintiff's fundamental position that a county council cannot amend agendas for regularly scheduled meetings without advance notice or exigent circumstances." The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision, the majority finding (1) an agenda is required for regularly scheduled meetings, and (2) County Council's amendment of an agenda less than twenty-four hours before the meeting violated the "spirit" and "purpose" of FOIA's notice requirement. The Supreme Court concluded FOIA's notice statute did not require an agenda to be issued for a regularly scheduled meeting, and FOIA contained no prohibition on the amendment of an agenda for a regularly scheduled meeting.
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2014-06-18stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtMoore27400http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27398.html5 Star v. Ford Motor2014-06-11T09:19:00-08:002014-10-01T14:57:26-08:00
Petitioner 5 Star, Inc. is a lawn maintenance and pressure washing company owned by Stan Shelby. In February 2005, 5 Star purchased a used 1996 Ford F-250 pickup truck. Several months later, Shelby parked the truck for the weekend in 5 Star's North Charleston warehouse. Two days later, Shelby returned to the warehouse and discovered that a fire had occurred. The truck was destroyed, and the warehouse was severely damaged. The Chief Fire Investigator for the North Charleston Fire Department, performed an investigation and observed that the truck was located in the middle of the warehouse, where the most extensive damage occurred. The Chief noted the engine compartment of the truck was the likely origin of the fire. 5 Star filed a products liability action against Ford Motor Co. for negligent design of the speed control deactivation switch (deactivation switch), seeking actual and punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict awarding $41,000 in actual damages in a negligent design products liability action based on the failure of the trial court to grant a directed verdict. The trial court qualified petitioner-expert Leonard Greene as an expert in electrical engineering and fire origin and cause. The court of appeals, however, found that Greene was not "qualified as an expert in automotive design or any other area of expertise that would enable [him] to offer opinions as to whether Ford's conduct was negligent." 5 Star claimed that the court of appeals erred and that Greene's extensive qualifications in electrical engineering related to automobiles were sufficient to enable him to testify regarding Ford's exercise of due care. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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2014-06-11stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27398http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27397.htmlMcCoy v. Greenwave Enterprises2014-06-11T09:18:58-08:002014-10-01T14:57:27-08:00
This case centered on a claim for equitable indemnification, which was denied by the trial court. Appellants were sued by adjacent property owners regarding environmental contamination. Appellants denied responsibility for the contamination and cross-claimed against the previous property owner, who was responsible for the damage. Because Appellants were not responsible for the ground contamination, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants but declined to award Appellants the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the lawsuit. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[t]he facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Appellants in defending the [plaintiffs'] lawsuit were the natural and probable consequences of [respondent's] breach of the purchase agreement."
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2014-06-11stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27397http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27396.htmlTown of Hilton Head Island v. Kigre, Inc.2014-06-04T06:14:53-08:002014-10-01T14:54:55-08:00
This direct appeal involved a constitutional challenge to the Town of Hilton Head Island's business license tax ordinance, which required businesses within the Town to pay an annual license fee based upon a business's classification and gross income. "Kigre has clothed its many arguments in the premise that the Ordinance is not sound policy," but the Supreme Court found that none rose to the level to sufficiently challenge the ordinance's constitutionality. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court.
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2014-06-04stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme Court27396http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27395.htmlHolmes v. Haynsworth, Sinkler & Boyd2014-06-04T06:14:52-08:002014-10-01T14:54:53-08:00
Appellant Cynthia Holmes, M.D. appealed a circuit court's grant of a directed verdict on her malpractice claim in favor of respondents Haynsworth, Sinkler & Boyd, P.A., Manton Grier, and James Becker, and award of sanctions against her. Appellant, an ophthalmologist, was previously a member of the consulting medical staff of Tenet HealthSystem Medical, Incorporated, d/b/a East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc. In 1997, appellant lost her privileges to admit patients and perform procedures at the Hospital. Appellant hired respondents to represent her in a legal action against the Hospital in 1998. Respondents pursued an unsuccessful appeal for reinstatement of full admitting privileges through the Hospital's administrative process. In 1999, Respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court on Appellant's behalf. As a result of that suit, the federal district court granted a temporary injunction reinstating Appellant's admitting privileges based, in part, on Appellant's averments in an affidavit that her patients needed urgent surgeries and her inability to perform surgery at the hospital was causing her to lose patients. However, because Appellant did not perform a single surgery in the wake of the temporary injunction, the district court dissolved the injunction in 2000, because "the alleged harm suffered by [Appellant's] current patients had not materialized." Appellant blamed Respondents for the dissolution of the injunction, claiming that Respondents did not act with due diligence on her behalf because she disputed their fees and refused to pay her legal bills. Respondents, however, attributed the dissolution of the injunction to Appellant's failure to utilize the injunction to perform surgery while it was in place and her lack of cooperation during discovery. On January 31, 2000, Appellant filed a pro se motion requesting the district court reconsider the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. In this motion, she also indicated she was dissatisfied with Respondents' representation and was critical of how Respondents had handled her case to that point and sought additional time to obtain substitute counsel and complete discovery. Because Appellant still refused to pay her legal bills, Respondents filed a motion to be relieved as counsel. A few months later, the district court granted summary judgment in the Hospital's favor, and dismissed the pendant state law claims without prejudice. After Respondents and Appellant ended their professional relationship, Appellant sought the return of the $43,000 in attorney's fees she paid pursuant to an addendum to their fee agreement. Respondents refused, and subsequently Appellant filed a Complaint alleging professional malpractice in handling her federal antitrust claims. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
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2014-06-04stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27395http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27394.htmlHorry Telephone v. City of Georgetown2014-06-04T06:14:51-08:002014-10-01T14:54:53-08:00
Appellant, Horry Telephone Cooperative Inc. (HTC), is a telecommunications company providing services in the Georgetown and Horry County areas. In 2007, as required by the South Carolina Competitive Cable Services Act, HTC filed for a state-issued certificate of franchise authority, where it sought to provide cable television services in the City of Georgetown (City). The Secretary of State, pursuant to 58-12-310, forwarded the notice of application to the City which was required to respond to the request within 65 days. On second reading from a city council meeting, the request was denied. The City informed the Secretary of State of the denial, and notice was sent to HTC informing them that their franchise for the City of Georgetown had been denied. HTC filed for reconsideration, which was ultimately denied. Finally, HTC applied for a third time, and after consideration, the application was tabled and subsequently failed. HTC then filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court to declare that the City's denial was unlawful under the Act. The circuit court held a bench trial and ruled that the Act did not create a private cause of action and the City's denial of HTC's consent request was a reasonable and valid exercise of legislative discretion. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed HTC's complaint with prejudice. This issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the City's denial HTC's multiple franchise applications was a violation of the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded it was not, and affirmed the circuit court.
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2014-06-04stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27394http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27393.htmlSouth Carolina v. Sawyer2014-06-04T06:14:49-08:002014-10-01T14:54:54-08:00
The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's suppression of respondent Philip Sawyer's breath test results and video in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI). In 2007, respondent was taken to the Spartanburg County Jail following a traffic stop made by a certified Data Master operator. Respondent was placed in the "subject test area" which is a room that adjoins the Data Master room. A deputy retrieved some forms from the Data Master room and then appeared to read respondent his Miranda rights and the implied consent information. Both respondent and the deputy signed the forms. There were separate audio and video recording devices in both the subject test area and in the breathalyzer room. In this case, the audio device in the subject test area did not function. Respondent moved to suppress the evidence relating to the breath test site alleging the videotape did not meet the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2953(A), which required that a person charged with DUI have his conduct at both the incident site and the breath test site videotaped. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a videotape from the breath test site that lacked the audio portion of the reading of Miranda rights and the informed consent law did not satisfy the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-52953(A)(2) (2006).
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2014-06-04stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtCosta M. Pleicones27393http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27392.htmlTant v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections2014-05-28T06:13:57-08:002014-10-01T14:52:59-08:00
Following his conviction for one count of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), one count of possession of a dangerous animal, and multiple counts of animal fighting, David Tant was remanded to the Department of Corrections. Upon receipt of his sentencing sheets, the Department recorded his sentence as fifteen years' imprisonment. However, the Department later determined the judge intended to sentence Tant to forty years' imprisonment and changed its records without notifying Tant. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Department of Corrections had the authority to alter its initial determination as to the length of an inmate's sentence. The Court held that when the Department decides its original recordation of a sentence was erroneous, it must afford the inmate formal notice of the amended sentence and advise him of his opportunity to be heard through the grievance procedure. Furthermore, "the Department is generally confined to the face of the sentencing sheets in determining the length of a sentence, but may refer to the sentencing transcript if there is an ambiguity in the sentencing sheets." Because the Court found that the sentencing sheets and the transcript in this case were ambiguous, it held Tant's sentences ran concurrently for a total of fifteen years' imprisonment.
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2014-05-28stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27392http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27385.htmlIn the Interest of Jane Doe2014-04-30T06:17:30-08:002014-10-01T14:45:02-08:00
Jane Doe appealed a family court's order declaring her to be a "vulnerable adult" and in need of protective services pursuant to the South Carolina Omnibus Adult Protection Act. Doe contended the South Carolina Department of Social Services ("DSS") failed to prove that she was at substantial risk of neglect due solely to her advanced age. Doe wanted reversal of the family court's order so that she may be released from involuntary protective custody and returned to her home. Because the Supreme Court found that Doe did not meet the statutory definition of a vulnerable adult under the Act, the Court reversed. However, because there may have been significant changes to Doe's physical and mental health and to the condition of Doe's home during the pendency of this appeal, the Court remanded the case in order for the family court to conduct a review hearing to assess the current status of Doe's case.
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2014-04-30stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27385http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27384.htmlSC Libertarian Party v. SC Election Commission2014-04-24T11:47:08-08:002014-10-01T14:43:23-08:00
The South Carolina Libertarian Party sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the Equal Access to the Ballot Act was in effect. If the Court determined the Act was effective, the Party requested that the South Carolina State Election Commission be ordered to conduct a Libertarian Party primary on June 10, 2014, and place a referendum question on the primary ballot for approval of the use of the convention method of nominating candidates by petitioner in 2016. The Supreme Court granted the petition for original jurisdiction and declared the Act was in effect. However. The Court denied the Party's request to require the Commission to conduct a primary and place a referendum question on the primary ballot.
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2014-04-24stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme Court27384http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27382.htmlAmisub v. SCDHEC2014-04-14T13:28:08-08:002014-10-01T14:40:24-08:00
Ten health care entities, along with the South Carolina Hospital Association and the South Carolina Health Care Association sought a declaration from the Supreme Court that the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHEC) was obligated to enforce the State Certification of Need and Health Facility Licensure Act (the CON Act) and fund the certificate of need (CON) program despite the South Carolina House of Representative's failure to override the Governor's veto of the line item in the state budget providing funding for the program. Upon review of matter in its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court granted the Petitioners' requested relief.
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2014-04-14stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27382http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27381.htmlBell v. Progressive Direct Insurance2014-04-09T06:17:11-08:002014-10-01T14:38:32-08:00
Petitioner was injured in a car accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by a co-employee. The liability limits of the at-fault driver were tendered, and there was no underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on the vehicle in which he was riding. Therefore, Petitioner submitted a claim for UIM benefits under a Progressive insurance policy, issued to Sarah Severn. At the time of the accident, Petitioner resided with Severn and their child. He described Severn as "his on again off again fiancé." Both Petitioner's and Severn's names appear on the Declarations Page of the Policy under the heading "Drivers and household residents." Under the heading "Additional information," Severn is listed as the "Named insured." Progressive denied UIM coverage to Petitioner under Part III of the Policy. According to the affidavit filed by Progressive's Claims Injury Operations Manager, "[t]he claim was denied because [Petitioner] did not fall within the terms, provisions and conditions of [the Policy] to qualify for benefits under the [UIM] provisions," as Petitioner "was only listed as a 'driver' on the policy and not a named insured, nor was he a resident relative of the named insured." The Supreme Court granted Bell's petition for review of the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27381.html" target="_blank">View "Bell v. Progressive Direct Insurance" on Justia Law</a>
2014-04-09stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27381http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27380.htmlDawkins v. Union Hospital2014-04-09T06:17:09-08:002014-10-01T14:38:31-08:00
Appellant Sarah Dawkins appealed the trial court's decision to grant Union Hospital District d/b/a Wallace Thomson Hospital's (the Hospital) motion to dismiss with prejudice and finding that Appellant was required to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a medical malpractice claim, specifically the Notice of Intent (NOI) and expert affidavit requirements. The Supreme Court emphasized that not every action taken by a medical professional in a hospital or doctor's office necessarily implicates medical malpractice and, consequently, the requirements of the applicable notice statute. Here, the Supreme Court found that Appellant's claim sounded in ordinary negligence and was not subject to the statutory requirements associated with a medical malpractice claim. Appellant's complaint made "clear that she had not begun receiving medical care at the time of her injury, nor does it allege the Hospital's employees negligently administered medical care. Rather, the complaint states that Appellant's injury occurred when she attempted to use the restroom unsupervised, prior to receiving medical care." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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2014-04-09stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27380http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27379.htmlKerr v. BB&T2014-04-09T06:17:08-08:002014-10-01T14:38:31-08:00
In a consolidated appeal, the plaintiffs from four separate actions (collectively, Appellants) ask the Supreme Court to reverse the trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss in favor of respondents Branch Banking & Trust Company (BB&T) and BB&T employee James Edahl. Skywaves I Corporation (Skywaves) was a South Carolina corporation that develops technology for the wireless telecommunications industry. In 2005, Skywaves entered into a factoring agreement with BB&T. From 2005 to 2007, Skywaves and BB&T occasionally amended the agreement via written modifications so that BB&T could fund Skywaves's working capital needs as those needs developed and expanded. In early 2007, Skywaves won several lucrative government contracts, and its Board of Directors determined that the company required more capital than BB&T provided at that time in order to meet the increased demand for their products. Skywaves therefore solicited funding proposals from various entities, including Wachovia, Hunt Capital, and BB&T. In July 2007, Edahl made a presentation to Appellants, each of whom was a director, officer, or shareholder in Skywaves, in addition to a current or potential investor in Skywaves. During the presentation, Edahl told Appellants that BB&T believed that Skywaves would continue to develop and expand into new markets, that BB&T "was fully committed to providing all of Skywaves['s] short-term and long-term financial needs for growth," and that BB&T would honor the new factoring agreement between itself and Skywaves. Appellants alleged that they each relied on these statements and were induced to "invest[] in the growth" of Skywaves via purchasing equity positions and making loans to Skywaves. BB&T funded Skywaves in accordance with the new factoring agreement from March 2007 until January 2008. In January 2008, BB&T asserted that Skywaves had defaulted under the terms of the factoring agreement, and BB&T refused to honor any further financial commitments in accordance with the contract. In the absence of funding, Skywaves filed for bankruptcy. As a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, Appellants lost their equity investments in Skywaves. Skywaves and Appellants therefore filed separate lawsuits against Respondents—Skywaves on its own behalf, and Appellants in their capacity as investors and employees of Skywaves. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss, finding all of Appellants' claims were barred for various reasons. The Supreme Court concluded that while Skywaves might be able to show that, as a BB&T customer, the bank owed the corporation a duty, Appellants were not BB&T's customers and therefore were not owed a similar duty. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that Respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all of Appellants' claims.
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2014-04-09stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27379http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27376.htmlLord v. D & J Enterprises2014-04-09T06:17:04-08:002014-10-01T14:38:30-08:00
Appellant Ida Lord appealed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of D & J Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Cash on the Spot ("D & J"). Lord argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in: (1) finding the balancing approach adopted in "Bass v. Gopal, Inc.," (716 S.E.2d 910 (2011) ("Gopal II")), used to determine a business owner's duty to protect a patron based on the foreseeability of violent acts by third parties, applied prospectively; and (2) granting summary judgment as she presented a genuine issue of material fact on each element of her negligence claim. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for trial because the Court found "Gopal II" applied here and its application warranted the denial of D & J's motion for summary judgment.
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2014-04-09stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27376http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27375.htmlSouth Carolina v. Hackshaw2014-04-09T06:17:02-08:002014-10-01T14:38:29-08:00
This case involves the payment of attorney's fees and expenses to attorneys, Appellant Tara Dawn Shurling and co-counsel, who were court-appointed to represent an indigent charged with multiple criminal offenses. Shurling was appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution for murder, assault with intent to kill, criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon during a violent crime, and possession of marijuana. Shurling sought approval for her fees and expenses to exceed the statutory caps provided by the South Carolina Indigent Defense Act. The trial court determined that the initial funding order precluded an award for the fees and expenses sought by appointed counsel, which total $46,388.66. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27375.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Hackshaw" on Justia Law</a>
2014-04-09stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27375http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27374.htmlCatawba Indian Nation v. South Carolina2014-04-02T06:16:55-08:002014-10-01T14:36:28-08:00
The Catawba Indian Nation brought a declaratory judgment action against the State (and Mark Keel) to determine the effect of the Gambling Cruise Act on its gambling rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, finding: (1) the Tribe's action was precluded by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata, and (2) the Gambling Cruise Act does not confer upon the Tribe the right to offer video poker and similar electronic play devices on its Reservation as the Act does not alter the statewide ban on video poker. The Tribe appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part: the circuit court's determination that the Gambling Cruise Act did not authorize the Tribe to offer video poker on its Reservation in contravention of the existing statewide ban on video gambling devices was affirmed; the Tribe's action was not precluded by collateral estoppel or res judicata, reversing this finding by the circuit court. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27374.html" target="_blank">View "Catawba Indian Nation v. South Carolina" on Justia Law</a>
2014-04-02stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27374http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27373.htmlGreen v. USAA2014-04-02T06:16:53-08:002014-10-01T14:36:27-08:00
Appellant Dorris Green, representing his child who was injured while a passenger in his mother's automobile, contended that as a matter of public policy the courts of South Carolina should refuse to recognize the validity of a family member exclusion in a Florida car insurance policy. Further, he contended that the circuit court erred in finding there was no uninsured motorist coverage for his minor child under his Florida policy. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that enforcement of this exclusion, valid under Florida law, did not offend South Carolina public policy, and that there was no underinsured coverage for father's minor child under the father's policy. The Court therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the insurance company.
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2014-04-02stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27373http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27372.htmlLee v. University of South Carolina2014-04-02T06:16:52-08:002014-10-01T14:36:26-08:00
The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court started from an agreement between Respondents, the University of South Carolina and the University Gamecock Club, and Appellant George M. Lee, III. In exchange for Appellant purchasing a $100,000 life insurance policy and naming the University the sole, irrevocable beneficiary of the policy, Appellant was given the "opportunity to purchase tickets" for his lifetime to University football and basketball games. Years later, the University instituted a program that required all Gamecock Club members, including Appellant, to pay a seat license fee as a prerequisite for purchasing season tickets. Believing that the University could not require him to pay additional consideration for the opportunity to purchase tickets without violating the agreement, Appellant brought a declaratory judgment action. The trial court entered judgment for the University and the Gamecock Club, finding that Appellant was not deprived of the opportunity to purchase season tickets when the University instituted the seat license fees. The Supreme Court reversed: the Agreement unambiguously prohibited the University from requiring Lee to pay the seat license fee as a prerequisite for the opportunity to purchase tickets pursuant to the Agreement.
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2014-04-02stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27372http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27371.htmlSCDSS v. Michelle G.2014-03-27T07:37:05-08:002014-10-01T14:34:23-08:00
In an expedited appeal, Michelle G. challenged the termination of her parental rights to two of her three sons. The family court terminated her rights as to two, and denied the mother's motion to dismiss on grounds that section 63-7-2570(1) was unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the mother argued that the TPR statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment and was void for vagueness. After review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the family court's termination decision.
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2014-03-27stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27371http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27370.htmlHolmes v. East Cooper Community Hospital2014-03-26T06:13:50-08:002014-10-01T14:33:35-08:00
Appellant Cynthia Holmes, MD was previously a member of the consulting medical staff of the Respondent East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc. During the relevant time period, Appellant was a member of the Hospital's medical consulting staff, appointed in two-year increments. In October 2006, she submitted a reappointment application seeking advancement in medical staff category and clinical privileges to perform surgery. The Hospital's credentialing committee found Appellant unqualified for the level of privileges she requested. Appellant received administrative review of this decision, and was ultimately reappointed as consulting medical staff for another two-year term. In October 2008, Appellant submitted another reappointment application requesting advancement. This time, the Hospital determined that Appellant's application was incomplete and requested she voluntarily resign from the medical staff without appellate rights under the medical staff bylaws. This appeal stemmed from the Hospital's privileging decisions. Respondent successfully moved summary judgment on several grounds, including that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the medical staff privileging decisions of a private hospital. Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion for sanctions under the Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (FCPSA), arguing, inter alia, that the circuit court should sanction Appellant for "seeking adjudication of claims over which this Court does not have jurisdiction" and "raising issues which have been previously adjudicated against [Appellant] and in [Respondents'] favor." Appellant appealed the sanctions order, arguing the circuit court erred in awarding sanctions against her, and challenging the Act's constitutionality. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decisions.
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2014-03-26stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27370http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27369.htmlStevens Aviation v. DynCorp International2014-03-26T06:13:49-08:002014-10-01T14:33:34-08:00
The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a subcontract for the maintenance of aircraft required a contractor to turn to a subcontractor for all maintenance the contractor needs to fulfill a contract with the United States Army. The contractor, DynCorp International, LLC, contended the contract did not create an exclusive relationship between the parties and it could send aircraft to other maintenance providers. The subcontractor, Stevens Aviation, contended the contract was a requirements contract under which DynCorp had to send all aircraft requiring maintenance to Stevens. Stevens moved for a partial summary judgment on the issue, the trial court granted the motion, and the court of appeals reversed and granted partial summary judgment to DynCorp. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision in part and affirmed in part, holding the contract was a requirements contract for certain aircraft. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27369.html" target="_blank">View "Stevens Aviation v. DynCorp International" on Justia Law</a>
2014-03-26stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27369http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27368.htmlWalker v. South Carolina2014-03-19T06:12:34-08:002014-10-01T14:31:12-08:00
The circuit court granted petitioner Joseph Walker's request for post-conviction relief on the ground that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to investigate a potential alibi witness. The court of appeals reversed, holding that while trial counsel's representation was deficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by it. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court and reversed its holding.
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2014-03-19stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtKaye Gorenflo Hearn27368http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27367.htmlIn the Matter of Charles Rider2014-03-19T06:12:33-08:002014-10-01T14:31:11-08:00
The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in "Rider v. Estate of Rider," (713 S.E.2d 643 (Ct. App. 2011)), which applied the common law of agency to hold that certain financial assets were part of the decedent's probate estate. The decedent had directed his bank to transfer specified assets in his investment account to a new account for his spouse, but died before all of the assets were credited to the account. The issue in this case was one of first impression for the Supreme Court, and after review of the facts, the Court reversed the appellate court: "[o]nce Husband issued the entitlement order and was the appropriate person, Wachovia was obligated by the UCC and the parties' Account Agreement to obey his directive. Wachovia had set up a new investment account in Wife's name and commenced the transfer of securities within a few days of Husband's request, so at that point, Wife already had a recognizable interest, even though Wachovia had not posted all of the securities to her account. The Court of Appeals, in focusing solely on the date of the 'book entry,' which it took to mean the date the securities were credited or posted to Wife's account, seemed to view this as the exclusive means for obtaining an interest in the securities." <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27367.html" target="_blank">View "In the Matter of Charles Rider" on Justia Law</a>
2014-03-19stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27367http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27365.htmlSouth Carolina v. Butler2014-03-12T06:06:48-08:002014-10-01T14:29:08-08:00
Petitioner Beulah Butler appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm her convictions for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm or a knife during the commission of a violent crime. She claimed appellate court erred in affirming the denial of her motion for a directed verdict on self-defense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27365.html" target="_blank">View "South Carolina v. Butler" on Justia Law</a>
2014-03-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27365http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27364.htmlPallares v. Seinar2014-03-12T06:06:47-08:002014-10-01T14:29:06-08:00
"Appellant and the Respondents are neighbors who obviously do not get along." Appellant Ursula Pallares brought suit alleging five claims against two of her neighbors, respondents Sharon Seinar and Lisa Maseng. Pallares claimed respondents had "mounted a campaign to harass and humiliate" her and to "drive her from her home." Pallares outlined four areas of conduct by one or both Respondents involving: (1) code violations; (2) nuisance animals; (3) a petition for a mental evaluation; and (4) requests for restraining orders, which Pallares averred gave rise to civil tort liability. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy. Pallares appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case for review. Based on careful consideration of the facts in record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claim for malicious prosecution. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on Pallares's claim for abuse of process.
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2014-03-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27364http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27363.htmlSpringob v. University of South Carolina 2014-03-12T06:06:45-08:002014-10-01T14:29:07-08:00
In anticipation of the opening of the University of South Carolina's new basketball arena, the University of South Carolina and the University of South Carolina Gamecock Club distributed a brochure to high-level Gamecock Club members. The brochure offered the opportunity to purchase premium seating including a number of amenities for basketball games and other events held at the arena. The brochure offered members the opportunity to purchase these tickets over a "five year term." Members were to pay $5,000 per seat in the first year and $1,500 per seat each year in years two through five. Appellants claimed that Athletic Department employees promised Appellants that, after year five, they would only have to maintain their Gamecock Club membership and pay the face value of season tickets to retain these premium seats. Appellants accepted the University's offer and made the required payments for years one through five. After the fifth year, the University contacted Appellants and requested a $1,500 payment per seat for the sixth year of premium seating. Appellants brought an action against the University alleging breach of contract and seeking specific performance. After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial judge denied Appellants' motion and granted the University's motion, finding that due to the absence of a written contract the statute of frauds barred Appellants' claims. The Supreme Court concluded the statute of frauds applied in the first instance, but that a question of fact existed concerning the question of equitable estoppel, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27363.html" target="_blank">View "Springob v. University of South Carolina " on Justia Law</a>
2014-03-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJohn W. Kittredge27363http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27362.htmlEngaging & Guarding Laurens County's Environment v. South Carolina Dept. of Health and Environmental Control2014-03-12T06:06:42-08:002014-10-01T14:29:05-08:00
The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal centered on a court of appeals' decision to reverse the administrative law court's (ALC) final order, which reversed and denied the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) issuance of a permit to respondent MRR Highway, 92, LLC for a commercial construction, demolition waste and land-clearing debris (C&D) landfill (the Landfill). Upon review of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in reversing the ALC, so it reversed and reinstated the ALC's final order.
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2014-03-12stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27362http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27358.htmlSouth Carolina v. Middleton2014-02-26T07:11:46-08:002014-10-01T14:24:32-08:00
Appellant Quashon Middleton was convicted on two counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon while committing a violent crime. Appellant pulled alongside his victims' stopped car one day in 2010 on his moped. He fired 5-7 times into the car, but none struck the car's occupants. But for the driver's hitting appellant as he sped away, the driver and passenger would have been killed. On appeal, appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree, and this error required reversal. The Supreme Court agreed the trial court's failing to include the lesser-included charge was made in error, however, the Court concluded this error was harmless.
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2014-02-26stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtJean H. Toal27358http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27360.htmlBeach First National Bank v. Estate of Gurnham2014-02-26T07:11:46-08:002014-10-01T14:24:33-08:00
Brian Hover, son of decedent Margaret Dever Hover Gurnham and the Personal Representative of her Estate, appealed the circuit court's order confirming the probate court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Beach First National Bank to enforce a deficiency judgment against the Estate. Hover argued the Bank's claim (which arose following a foreclosure action) was untimely and, thus, barred by section 62-3-8031 of the South Carolina Probate Code (Probate Code). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Bank's claim was barred because it was presented outside the time limits of the applicable statute. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27360.html" target="_blank">View "Beach First National Bank v. Estate of Gurnham" on Justia Law</a>
2014-02-26stateSouth CarolinaSouth Carolina Supreme CourtDonald W. Beatty27360