1. The case originated in an
application (no. 14258/03) against the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Macedonian national, Mr Sterija Parizov (“the applicant”), on 11
April 2003.

2. The
applicant was represented by Mr N. Zendelov, a lawyer practising in
Štip. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs R. Lazareska Gerovska.

3. On 7
May 2007 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided
to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same
time.

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. The circumstances of the case

4. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in
Štip.

5. On 17 November 1986 the applicant
and three other persons instituted civil proceedings before the then
Štip Municipal Court (Општински Суд Штип) for annulment of a care
agreement (“the agreement”) (договор за доживотна издршка) concluded
on 7 December 1979 between the applicant’s late father and his step-mother
(“the defendant”). They maintained that the applicant’s late father
had been in a fit condition and that he had sufficient financial means
to take care of himself and that, accordingly, there had been no need
for the agreement under which, the defendant had been granted four hundred
golden liras, a priceless ancient icon and a land.

6. On 25 June 1987 the Štip Municipal
Court partially upheld the applicant’s claim and annulled the agreement.
It declared, inter alia, that the icon would be included in the applicant’s
late father’s inheritance, but it dismissed the claim concerning the
golden liras. That decision was served on the applicant on 3 March 1988.

7. On 14 March 1988 both parties appealed.

8. On 29 September 1989 the then Štip
District Court (Окружен суд) dismissed the appeals and upheld the
lower court’s decision.

9. On 25 September 1990 the Supreme
Court upheld the applicant’s appeal on points of law (ревизија) submitted on 19 December 1989. It remitted
the case for a renewed consideration since the first-instance court
had not given sufficient reasons for its decision.

10. The proceedings resumed on 19 June
1991. Of four hearings fixed before the first-instance court, none was
postponed upon the applicant’s request.

11. On 14 October 1992 the Štip Municipal
Court gave the same decision as on 25 June 1987 in which it established
that the applicant’s father had been amongst the richest people in
his village; that he had been in a fit condition and that, by entering
into the agreement, the defendant had acquired considerable interest
(значителна имотна корист) which had not
been in compliance with the then State order (општествено уредување).It dismissed the applicant’s claim concerning the golden
liras since there had been no evidence that the applicant’s father
had been in possession of any.

12. On 25 December 1992 the applicant
appealed. On 6 February 1993 he submitted observations in reply to the
defendant’s appeal, together with an addendum to his appeal.

13. On 8 October 1993 the Štip District
Court set aside the first-instance court’s decision since it had not
complied with the Supreme Court’s instructions.

14. The proceedings resumed on 25 January
1994. Eight hearings were held before the first-instance court, of which
none was adjourned upon the applicant’s request.

15. On 8 December 1994 the Štip Municipal
Court partially upheld the applicant’s claim. It declared that only
the icon be included in his late father’s inheritance and dismissed
the claim for annulment of the agreement. It further reiterated its
earlier findings as to the golden liras. The decision was served on
the applicant on 13 October 1995.

16. On 16 October 1995 the applicant
appealed.

17. On 20 March 1996 the Štip District
Court overturned the decision and decided the case itself. It declared
the agreement null and void, but considered it as having been concluded
as a gift contract (договор за подарок). It upheld the remainder
of the first-instance court’s decision.

18. On 2 July 1996 the defendant filed
an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court.

19. On 9 December 1998 the Supreme Court
upheld the defendant’s appeal and quashed the District Court’s decision.
It further instructed that court to establish whether the agreement
had been concluded in a statutory form.

20. On 14 April 2000 the Štip Court
of Appeal remitted the case for re-examination before the first-instance
court. The decision was served on the applicant on 8 April 2002.

21. Between 11 February 2003 and 20
April 2004 the first-instance court scheduled five hearings, of which
one was adjourned because of the applicant’s fault. During that time,
the applicant lodged four submissions before the court.

22. On 20 April 2004 the Štip Court
of First Instance partially upheld the applicant’s claim - it declared
that the agreement be invalid and considered it as having been concluded
as a gift contract.

23. On 24 February 2005 the Štip Court
of Appeal upheld the defendant’s appeal of 10 May 2004 and remitted
the case for re-consideration.

24. On 24 June 2005 the Štip Court
of First Instance declared the applicant’s claim as withdrawn, as
he had not appeared in court despite being duly summoned. It so ruled
as the case concerned a dispute of minor value.

25. On 24 January 2006 the Štip Court
of Appeal set aside that decision arguing that the case could not be
regarded as a dispute of minor value.

26. On 15 June 2006 the Štip Court
of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s claim for annulment of
the agreement finding that the latter had met the statutory requirements.
That decision was given after a hearing fixed for 23 May 2006 had been
adjourned due to the applicant’s absence.

27. On 21 August 2006 the applicant
appealed.

28. On 15 March 2007 the Skopje Court
of Appeal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the first-instance court’s
decision.

29. On 23 April 2007 the applicant lodged
an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. Proceedings before
that court are still pending.

B. Relevant domestic law

30. Section 35 § 1 (6) of the Courts Act (Закон за
судовите) of 2006 (“the 2006 Act”) provides that
“the Supreme Court is competent to decide applications about a violation
of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, in proceedings specified
by law.”

31. Section 36 of the 2006 Act provides that
“a party concerned can lodge with the immediate higher court (непосредно
повисокиот суд) an application for the protection
of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time if he or she considers
that it has been violated by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
immediate higher court considers the application (постапува по барањето) within six months
after it has been lodged and decides whether the court below violated
the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The higher court shall
award just satisfaction to the claimant if it finds a violation of the
right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The just satisfaction shall
be paid from the State’s budget.”

32. Section 128 of the 2006 Act provides that
it would become operational on 1 January 2007.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
§ 1 OF THE CONVENTION

33. The applicant complained that the length of
the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads
as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable
time by [a] ... tribunal...”

A. Admissibility

1. Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies

(a) The parties’ submissions

34. The Government maintained that the applicant
had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not lodged an application
about a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time
under the 2006 Act. They argued that following the Atanasovic and Kostovska judgments (see Atanasovic and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
no. 13886/02, § 47, 22 December 2005 and Kostovska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 44353/02,
§ 53, 15 June 2006), the respondent State had introduced a specifically
designed remedy to address the issue of an excessive length of proceedings.
They averred that although that remedy was of a compensatory nature,
the wording of the 2006 Act implied that it provided also for a preventive
remedy. They further submitted that that remedy was to be exhausted
in two cases: 1) in respect of all applications lodged with the Court
that post-dated the introduction of the 2006 Act, and 2) where the impugned
proceedings were pending at domestic level after 1 January 2007 and
the application lodged with the Court pre-dated that date. Relying on
the Court’s jurisprudence, they maintained that the applicant had
been required to exhaust that remedy although it had not existed at
the time when he had lodged his application with the Court.

35. They further submitted that the remedy had
been used in twenty cases until 3 July 2007 and that no court decision
had been taken yet. However, the lack of domestic jurisprudence should
not have been considered to the detriment of the effectiveness of the
remedy in practice. Finally, they undertook to notify the Court about
any court decision if taken.

36. The applicant contested the effectiveness
of the remedy introduced by the 2006 Act. He disputed that that remedy
had been apt to expedite the proceedings. He confirmed the lack of domestic
jurisprudence in that respect and argued that it had been unclear which
court would be competent to decide it in his case. He finally referred
to a Supreme Court’s report in which the latter had allegedly criticised
the lack of clarity of the 2006 Act and the effectiveness of the remedy.
He did not provide that report in support of his allegation.

(b) The Court’s assessment

37. The Court reiterates that the purpose of
the exhaustion rule, contained in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, is
to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting
right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are
submitted to it (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR 1999-IV).
That rule is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 of the
Convention - with which it has close affinity - that there is an effective
remedy available in respect of the alleged breach in the domestic system
(see Kudła
v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 152, ECHR 2000-XI).

38. The only remedies which Article 35 of the
Convention requires to be exhausted are those that relate to the breaches
alleged and at the same time are available and sufficient. The existence
of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but
also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility
and effectiveness (see Mifsud v. France (dec.) [GC], no. 57220/00, ECHR 2002-VIII).

39. Furthermore, in the context of Article 13
of the Convention, in the Kudła judgment, the Court has held that remedies available
to a litigant at the domestic level for raising a complaint about a
length of proceedings are “effective” if they prevent the alleged
violation or its continuation, or provide adequate redress for any violation
that has already occurred.

40. It is true that, according to the “generally
recognised principles of international law”, there may be special
circumstances which absolve the applicant from the obligation to exhaust
the domestic remedies at his disposal. However, the Court points out
that the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of
a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason
for failing to exhaust domestic remedies (see Giacometti and Others v. Italy (dec.), no. 34939/97, ECHR 2001-XII).

41. The assessment of whether domestic remedies
have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the date
on which the application was lodged with it. However, this rule is subject
to exceptions, which may be justified by the particular circumstances
of each case (see Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, 22 May 2001 and Brusco v. Italy (dec.), no. 69789/01, ECHR 2001-IX). In particular,
the Court had previously departed from this general rule in cases against
Poland, Croatia and Slovakia concerning remedies against the excessive
length of the proceedings (see Michalak v. Poland (dec.), no. 24549/03, § 36, 1 March 2005; Nogolica v. Croatia
(dec.), no. 77784/01, ECHR 2002-VIII, Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00, 60226/00,
60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00 and 68563/01, ECHR 2002-IX).

42. As to the present case, at the time when
the applicant brought his complaint to the Court, he did not have any
effective remedy available under the law of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia in respect of the length of the pending proceedings in
issue (see the Atanasovic and Kostovska judgments, cited above). The remedy against the excessive
length of the proceedings was introduced by the 2006 Act which became
operational on 1 January 2007. The applicant has not availed himself
of that remedy.

43. The Court notes, first, that section 36 of
the 2006 Act provides for a compensatory remedy – a request for just
satisfaction – through which a party may, where appropriate, be awarded
just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage sustained.
A compensatory remedy is, without doubt, an appropriate means of redressing
a violation that has already occurred (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 187, ECHR 2006; Mifsud v. France
(dec.), no. 57220/00, § 17, 11 September 2002; Kudła, §§ 158 and 159, cited above).

44. The Court further observes that the expression
“the court considers the application (постапува по барањето) within six months”
is susceptible to various interpretations (see, mutatis mutandis, Horvat v. Croatia, no. 51585/99, § 43, ECHR 2001-VIII). It remains
open to speculation whether the proceedings upon such application should
terminate within that time-limit. In addition, the 2006 Act defines
two courts which may decide upon such remedy: the immediately higher
court and the Supreme Court. It does not specify which court would be
competent to decide if a case is pending before the Supreme Court, as
it is in the present case (see, a contrario, Michalak, § 14,cited above). Even though the Court accepts that statutes
cannot be absolutely precise and that the interpretation and application
of such provisions depend on practice (see, mutatis mutandis, Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no.
260-A, p. 19, § 40), the fact remains that no court decision has been
taken although more than twelve months have elapsed after the introduction
of the remedy. The absence of any domestic case-law appears to confirm
that ambiguity.

45. Finally, unlike Slovenian, Polish and Italian
laws which contain transitional provisions concerning cases pending
before the Court (see Grzinčič v. Slovenia, no. 26867/02, § 48, ECHR 2007; Michalak,
§ 20, cited above and Brusco v. Italy, (dec.), no. 69789/01, ECHR 2001-IX), the 2006
Act does not contain a provision which would explicitly bring within
the jurisdiction of the national courts all applications pending before
the Court irrespective of whether they are still pending at domestic
level.

46. Bearing in mind that the case was pending
before the domestic courts for more than twenty years before the introduction
of the remedy by the 2006 Act and is still not decided and that no conclusions
can be drawn from the Government’s submissions about its effectiveness in
the particular circumstances of a case like the present one, the Court
considers that it would be disproportionate to require the applicant
to try that remedy.

47. Against this background, the application
cannot be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
within the meaning of Article 35 of the Convention. Accordingly, the
Government’s objection must be rejected. It further notes that it
is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

48. The Government submitted that the period which
elapsed before the entry into force of the Convention in respect of
the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia should not be taken into consideration.
They considered that there had been complex circumstances related to
the case, including the subject-matter of the dispute and the passage
of time between the conclusion of the agreement (1979) and the introduction
of the applicant’s claim before the domestic courts (1986), a fact
which had a negative effect to establishing of facts.

49. As to the applicant’s behaviour, they argued
that he had contributed to that complexity by frequently amending the
arguments and the nature of his claim. That fact required the national
courts to establish considerable facts relevant for the case. Confusing
and inconsistent manner in which the applicant had presented his case
reflected on the number of remittal orders given in the impugned proceedings.

50. Finally, they averred that the length of each
segment of the proceedings, after the case was remitted for re-consideration,
had not lasted unreasonably long. The only exception was the service
of the Court of Appeal’s decision of 14 April 2000 (see paragraph
20 above), which had not added considerably to the overall length of
the proceedings.

51. The applicant contested the Government’s
argument about the complexity of the case. He disagreed that he had
modified his claim and that that had affected the length of the proceedings
given the fact that, under the applicable rules, the national courts
had not been bound with the contents of his claim. Relying on the numerous
remittal orders given in the proceedings, he stated that the length
of the proceedings had been excessive. Finally, in view of what was
at stake for him, he concluded that the national courts had not decided
his case with due diligence.

2. The Court’s assessment

52. The Court notes that the impugned proceedings
started on 17 November 1986 when the applicant brought his claim before
the then Štip Municipal Court. However, as noted by the Government,
the period which falls within its competence did not begin on that date
but rather on 10 April 1997, after the Convention entered into force
in respect of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (see Lickov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 38202/02,
§ 21, 28 September 2006).

53. In assessing the reasonableness of
the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the
state of proceedings on 10 April 1997 (see Ziberi v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 27866/02, § 41,
5 July 2007). In this connection, the Court notes that at that point
the proceedings had lasted over ten years and ten months for three court
levels. The then District Court’s decision of 20 March 1996 was the
last decision given within this time. During this time, the case was
re-considered on three occasions.

54. The impugned proceedings have not ended yet
since the Supreme Court has not decided upon the applicant’s appeal
on points of law of 23 April 2007. They have already lasted for over
twenty-one years of which ten years, nine months and five days fall
within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction.

55. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness
of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances
of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity
of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities
and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

56. The Court considers that the subject-matter
of the case cannot, in itself, explain the length of the proceedings.

57. It also observes that changes of the applicant’s
claim and the two adjournments requested by the applicant (see paragraphs
21 and 26 above) did not add much to the length of the proceedings.

58. The Court considers that the protracted length
of the proceedings was due to the repeated re-examination of the case
(see Ziberi
v. the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 27866/02, § 46, 5 July
2007). During the time which falls within its competence ratione temporis, the case was reconsidered on five occasions.
The domestic courts thus cannot be said to have been inactive. However,
although the Court is not in a position to analyse the quality of the
case-law of the domestic courts, it considers that, since the remittal
of cases for re-examination is usually ordered as a result of errors
committed by lower courts, the repetition of such orders within one
set of proceedings discloses a serious deficiency in the judicial system
(see Pavlyulynets
v. Ukraine, no. 70767/01, § 51, 6 September 2005; Wierciszewska v. Poland, no. 41431/98, § 46, 25 November 2003).
It further observes that, as noted by the Government, it took the domestic
authorities nearly two years to serve the Court of Appeal’s decision
on the applicant (see paragraph 20 above).

59. In this context, the Court recalls that it
is for the Contracting States to organise their legal systems in such
a way that their courts can guarantee everyone’s right to obtain a
final decision on disputes relating to civil rights and obligations
within a reasonable time (see Kostovska, § 41, cited above and Muti v. Italy, judgment of 23 March 1994, Series A no. 281-C,
§ 15).

60. Having examined all the material submitted
to it, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the
proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time”
requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

61. There has accordingly been a breach of that
provision.

II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE
CONVENTION

62. In submissions filed in reply to the Government’s
observations, the applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 of the Convention that due to the excessive length of the impugned
proceedings, his right to bring a compensation claim for having been
unable to use the land, subject of the agreement, had become time-barred.

63. The Court notes that the impugned proceedings,
which concerned the assessment of the validity of the agreement under
which the defendant had obtained the title to the land, are still pending.
In this respect, any complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 related
to the outcome of the proceedings is premature. In addition, the applicant
cannot be regarded as having a “possession” within the meaning of
the Article invoked.

64. The Court finds therefore that the matters
complained of do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows
that this complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION

65. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Damage

66. The applicant claimed 144,900 euros (EUR)
in respect of pecuniary damage. This claim related to the income that
the applicant would have earned if he would have used the land while
the proceedings in question have been pending. He also claimed an interest
on 1,000,000 Macedonian denars (MKD) (the value of the golden liras)
because of his inability to use them since 1986. Finally, he claimed
EUR 60,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the anxiety and emotional
suffer sustained as a result of the protracted length of the proceedings.

67. The Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated.
They further maintained that there was no causal link between the pecuniary
damage claimed and the alleged violation because the applicant had not
had a title to the land and the impugned proceedings had not ended yet.

68. The Court, as argued by the Government, does
not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary
damage alleged. The Court therefore rejects this claim. On the other
hand, it considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary
damage in respect of the violation found. Ruling on an equitable basis,
it awards a total sum of EUR 4,000 under that head.

B. Costs and expenses

69. The applicant also claimed EUR 5,000 for the
costs and expenses without specifying whether they were incurred before
the domestic courts or before this Court. He did not provide any supporting
document.

70. The Government contested the claim as excessive
and unsubstantiated.

71. According to the Court’s case-law, an award
can be made in respect of costs and expenses only in so far as they
have been actually and necessarily incurred by the applicant and are
reasonable as to quantum (see Kostovska,
cited above, § 62; Arvelakis v. Greece, no. 41354/98, § 34, 12 April 2001; Nikolova
v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 79, ECHR 1999-II). The
Court points out that under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court “the applicant
must submit itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant
supporting documents failing which the Chamber may reject the claim
in whole or in part”.

72. The Court notes that the applicant did not
submit any supporting documents or particulars to substantiate his claims.
Accordingly, the Court does not award any sum under this head.

C. Default interest

73. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the
proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay
the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR
4,000 (four thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be
converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the
above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 7 February 2008, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of
Court.