The text of the article that appeared in Medieval History Magazine Dec 2004.

Introduction

Trying to get a ‘new’ battle accepted into the historical ‘fixture list’ has
proved difficult. English Heritage was sanguine in its appraisal. Little
evidence could have survived the 938 years separating us from the battle on 20th
September 1066 they pointed out.

Medieval battlefields are not artefact-rich environments. The armies arrived,
fought, died, fled or marched away after a few hours. The combatants came clad
in iron armour, clutching iron weapons. Such ferrous fragments that survived the
attention of scavengers would rust, so the material is not popular with
archaeologists or conservationists. No site of this antiquity has so far yielded
a recognizable weapon.

Battles of this era did not leave structures. There is no evidence that
eleventh century defenders enhanced any natural defences by digging or building.
The intervening centuries would have degraded any surface evidence while the
regular floods, prevalent in this area, might have flushed or buried items
beneath centuries of silt.

The location of any mass graves was also unlikely. The damp, acid soil and
subsequent agricultural activity would have dissolved and distributed any mortal
remains within a century of the battle. Contemporary accounts record that wolves
lived in the nearby woods ready to accelerate the dispersal process.

The limited literature seemed the best place to begin the hunt for Fulford
followed by a study of the local geology and the landscape before extensive
archaeological survey work was begun.

1066 started badly for Anglo-Saxon England

The chronicler sets the scene. King Edward died and was buried in his
recently built and consecrated west minster. Harold Godwinson was confirmed as
king of England by the nobles of the land. Harold then set off to visit his
kingdom aware of the perils that attended many accessions at that time.

‘In this year came king Harold from York to Westminster the Easter following
the Christmas of the king’s death, Easter being on 16 April. At that time,
throughout all England, a portent such as men had never seen before was seen in
the heavens. Some declared that the star was a comet, which some call "the
long-haired star": it first appeared on the eve of the festival of Letania maior,
that is on 24 April, and shone every night for a week.’ (1)

Harold had fences to mend and plans to prepare which had necessitated his
journey to York. His brother, Tostig, had been ousted the previous year by an
uprising of the Northumbrians. Tostig had been replaced by Morcar, brother of
Edwin, earl of Mercia. A dynastic marriage to the house of Mercia would provide
the unity that Harold’s kingdom needed to meets its enemies. Harold married
Aldyth, making her Queen of England. The northern earls became his
brothers-in-law. Their task was to keep Harold’s northern kingdom secure against
invasion.

Tostig, from his exile base in Flanders, had already begun to visit the other
contenders to the throne of England. Embassies to the Normans, Danes and
Norwegians are recorded. The effect of Tostig’s travels in the spring of 1066
would have a profound influence on the subsequent events. By early summer, it
was time for Tostig to make his presence felt around the south and east coasts
of England.

‘Soon thereafter came earl Tostig from across the sea to the Isle of Wight,
with as many household troops as he could muster, and there he was given both
money and provisions. He sailed thence, and did damage everywhere along the sea
coast where he could, until he came to Sandwich. When king Harold, who was in
London, learnt that his brother Tostig had come to Sandwich, he gathered
together greater naval and land levies than any king in this country had ever
gathered before, for he was credibly informed that duke William of Normandy,
kinsman of king Edward, was about to invade to conquer this land, just as it
subsequently came to pass.’(1)

Tostig had chosen his first target well. The early attacks were on the
estates of the Godwinson family. Honour made it impossible to ignore these raids
but when Tostig learnt that king Harold was on his way to confront Tostig at
Sandwich, ‘he sailed away, taking with him shipmen from the port; some went
willingly, but others unwillingly. He sailed north into [the Humber], and there
harried in Lindsey, slaying many good men there. When earl Edwin and earl Morcar
perceived this, they marched thither and drove him out from the land.’(1)

The chronicler goes on to tell us that Tostig ‘stayed the whole summer.’
Tostig’s months of coastal raiding had a more important role than raising
troops, supplies or treasure. His actions forced the English armies in the north
and south to mobilise. In addition to the hearth-troops retained by each
nobleman for the routine exercise of their power, there was the reserve force
that lived among the community.

The rules of the fyrd had evolved from a Saxon muster for an
expeditionary force to something that we might recognise as a territorial
defence force.

‘It seems that at this time fyrd service was performed in two month
periods, but it is unclear how many times a year the king could call upon this
service. What is clear is that the warrior sent was given money for his own
maintenance from the lands he was serving. This payment was, on average, twenty
shillings for each two month period - a figure equivalent to the pay of many
post conquest knights! This high 'rate of pay' further argues for the
professional nature of the late Saxon fyrdman.’(4)

It is tempting to interpret the spring travels and subsequent raiding by
Tostig as a demonstration of strategic sophistication. His coastal raids forced
the fyrd to use up their service time and resources. Tostig would have
learnt from his embassies that William’s fleet and the army of Northmen could
not be ready until the end of the summer. His actions seized the initiative and
weakened the country’s defences for later in the year.

It may also be coincidence that the twin invasions were launched
simultaneously and at the very moment when the English forces had been stood
down. No records survive to indicate whether Tostig had orchestrated a
co-ordinated plan of attack. It is intriguing to imagine the subsequent events
had both invasion succeeded. King Harold felt the need to keep two armies on
standby during the summer and into the autumn. The force available at Fulford
would be halved. Harold, it appears, took the threat of a coordinated plan of
attack seriously.

Things did not go entirely to plan for Tostig if the chroniclers are to be
believed. All his raids were driven off and many of those pressed into service
at Sandwich apparently deserted him just before he sailed north to meet king
Harald of Norway. However, the chroniclers might have misunderstood Tostig’s
guerrilla tactics. Tostig only released the press-ganged seamen that had
inflated the size of his fleet, when the time came for his rendezvous with king
Harold of Norway.

Meanwhile, King Harold of England was putting his own plan into operation. He
would position his southern force at the western end of the channel where he
could rely on the tides and prevailing wind to speed him to confront the
expected landing from Normandy.

‘Then came king Harold to Sandwich, and waited there for his household troops
to gather, because it took a long time for them to be mobilized. When they had
assembled, he then sailed to the Isle of Wight, and lay there the whole summer
and autumn, and the levies were stationed everywhere along the coast, although
in the end it was all to no purpose. When the festival of the Nativity of St
Mary came [8 September], the men’s provisions had run out, and no one could keep
them there any longer: they were therefore given permission to return home.’(1)

Harold must have hoped that by September he had survived the year of crisis
and that it was now too late in the year for a campaign of invasion to begin.

The Northmen arrive

If William and Harald planned to launch their invasions simultaneously, the
English weather intervened to influence the course of history. Harold’s own
fleet was hit by a storm as it made its way east along the Channel.

‘Then the king rode up and the ships were sailed to London, but many were
lost before they arrived. Then while the ships were in port, king Harold from
Norway came unexpectedly north into the Tyne with a great pirate host – it was
anything but small, for it numbered about [three hundred ships] or more – and
Earl Tostig joined him, as they had previously agreed, with all the host he had
been able to muster. They sailed together with their combined troops along the
Ouse up towards York.’(1)

The storm that battered Harold’s ships as they dispersed to their home ports
probably had its origin in a strong north wind which is an autumn feature of
northern metrology to this day. This wind would favour the Northmen and blow
their longships south. Harald brought his family and proclaimed his elder son,
Magnus, king of Norway before his departure.

‘When King Harald was clear for sea, and the wind became favourable, he
sailed out into the ocean; and he himself landed in Shetland, but a part of his
fleet in the Orkney Islands. King Harald stopped but a short time in Shetland
before sailing to Orkney, from whence he took with him a great armed force, and
the earls Paul and Erlend, the sons of Earl Thorfin; but he left behind him here
the Queen Ellisif, and her daughters Maria and Ingegerd. Then he sailed, leaving
Scotland and England westward of him, and landed at a place called Klifland.’(5)

To accompany his invasion, William, duke of Normandy, had a banner and relics
blessed by the Pope. The weather nearly wrecked his plans. The fleet of 700,
simple transport craft set sail for England from the River Dives on 12
September. William’s attempt to cross the Channel was driven back to the coast
by the north-wind and the ships took shelter in the Somme estuary.

It would take two weeks to gather and re-organise the surviving fleet at St
Valery-sur-Somme before embarking on a desperate night crossing when the wind at
last returned to its habitual south-west.

So far the literary sources have provided a good outline of the major events
that would shape the history of 1066 and set the scene for the opening battle at
Fulford. However, the chroniclers then dismiss the battle itself in a few lines.

‘Together [King Harald and Tostig] sailed into the Humber until they came to
York, where earl Edwin and earl Morcar, his brother, fought against them, but
the Norwegians had the victory.’(2)

‘but before king Harold could arrive, earl Edwin and earl Morcar had gathered
as great a force as they could from their earldom, and fought that host and made
great slaughter of them; but a great number of the English were either slain or
drowned or driven in flight, and the Norwegians had possession of the place of
slaughter.’(1)

The literary sources tell us what happened but do not help us to learn why
the events unfolded in the way they did. The search for Fulford will have to
look elsewhere if we want to appreciate more of the drama that lead to the
eventual defeat of the norse invasion.

What the landscape can tell us?

The local geology has been friendly to those hoping to find Fulford. The
landscape has been stable since the last ice-sheet retreated. The melting ice
carved a channel in the compacted material of the moraine that the glacier had
built at its front edge. The sea level was many meters lower providing a
forceful flow of water that carved out the course of the river Ouse that has
remained stable over the subsequent millennia.

Fulford is located at the place where an extensive, ancient lagoon drains
into the river Ouse. This is the only place where the moraine is breached.
Until modern hydrology and building technology became available, the landscapes
was reserved for annual pasture.

The place where the moraine is breached remains the obvious place for a
crossing point. The existence of a deep layer of peat on the lagoon side of the
moraine indicates, and micro-fossil dating confirms, that the area was a morass
until around the time of the battle. This was the ford.

‘Ford, is one of the commonest topographical place-name elements as indeed we
might expect, in view of its importance to the new settlers in any area. It is
also well-represented in English documents recorded before 731 and it is likely
to have been used to form place-names from an early stage in the Anglo-Saxon
settlement of Britain.’(3)

‘Further, most names (ending) in -ford must have had a local significance and
it has been pertinently said they can only reflect routes by which villagers
communicated with their neighbours.’(3)

‘It has been shown that the commonest word compounded with ford are
descriptive of the ford itself.’ So long, broad, stony, shallow and deep are all
common. ‘The water was 'clear' at Sherford, 'slaggy' (muddy) at Slaggyford
and 'foul' at Fulford, a name found in at least six counties.’(3) Happily, there
are no other instances of the name Fulford are documented in the area.

There is another intriguing clue in the names. According to Cameron when
‘Gate’ is prefixed to village-names it implies that the place is located on a
Roman road. Until the eighteenth century, the villages of Gate Fulford and Water
Fulford were recorded. However, the identity of the road has yet to be confirmed
but it would confirm the place as a significant crossing point. The stream
crossed by the ford is known as Germany Beck.

The nature and shape of the landscape dictates the course of every battle so
can the landscape be closely matched to the literature? The river was on one
flank and the Ouse has remained in its course although it has wandered a little,
constrained by the underlying strata to follow its present course. An area of
marshy land provided the other boundary although work is still needed to define
the full area of this morass. A natural feature which can be translated from the
Nordic sources as ditch, dyke or marsh separated the sides and at Fulford,
Germany Beck has meandered little from its present course since the ice-sheet
retreated.

The land created by these geological forces matches the literature extremely
well.

‘King Harald now went on the land, and drew up his men. The one arm of this
line stood at the outer edge of the river, the other turned up towards the land
along a ditch; and there was also a morass, deep, broad, and full of water.’(5)

There is one other natural feature that will influence the course of the
battle described in the sagas. Whenever a river floods, it has a tendency to
raise a levee beside its banks. The heavy material quickly drops out of
suspension, depositing the finer material further from the river. The bank is
then consolidated and forms a dam to limit the flow of flood-water back to the
river. Beside the river Ouse, this has produced an environment know as the Ings.

The Fulford Ings are marshland that tithe maps show would later be employed
as summer grazing by sheep. The mining of zinc and lead from the Yorkshire Dales
since Roman times has provided a ‘pollution scale’ that can be used to date the
stratified deposits of alluvial material on the Ings. A representative
core-sample indicates that the Ings were wet in 1066 and would not have
supported a warrior. Any fighting would be confined to the margins along the
river bank or at the base of the escarpment.

The moraine on which Fulford is constructed rises about twenty metres above
the Ings. So the English troops in the centre and on the left flank would not be
able to observe those defending the riverbank to their right. The first they
would see of any outflanking troops was when the attackers reached the top of
the moraine escarpment some 200 metres behind their shield-wall. Such was the
landscape on which earl Morcar mustered the men of Northumbria to defend
England.

The battle begins

A study of the sizes of the respective armies could provide the material for
another article and still leave scope for speculation. The number of ships and
size of army that the kings of Norway mustered in previous campaigns makes it
safe to assert that Harald’s army was at least five thousand strong but a strong
case can be made for a force of twice that size.

One unintended consequence of the summer raiding by Tostig was the presence
at Fulford of the professional troops of Mercia and their earl, Edwin. A party
of Mercian warriors was stationed on the river Warfe near Tadcaster to oppose
any attempt by the invaders to row their longships inland, towards Mercian
territory.

The Northumbrian nobles had risen against their earl, Tostig, the previous
year. A full attendance to support their imported earl, Morcar, could be
expected. An English force of three thousand would have provided a shield-wall
to cover the six hundred metres between the river and the morass that marked
their left flank. The English were probably outnumbered but with five warriors
per metre and with marshy ground covering two-thirds of the opposing bank, this
strategic choke-point would have been effectively covered.

‘When the earls advanced downwards along the ditch, the arm of the Northmen's
line which was at the ditch gave way; and the Englishmen followed, thinking the
Northmen would fly. The banner of Earl Morukare advanced then bravely.’(5)

The defenders were in a strong position so it is not obvious why Morcar made
the first move. The attackers would have to cross the ditch to bring the battle
to them. We have no records to indicate that earl Morcar was an experienced
soldier. He was probably just 20 years old. He was facing an army led by
arguable the greatest warrior of that era with thrity years fighting experience.
Harald had led the Varangian Guards in Constantinople while in exile and had on
occasions stood aside while the Emperor’s army was mauled to make sure his
prowess as a commander was appreciated.

The skill and subtlety of his military mind had even led Harald to fake his
own death on one occasion. The besieged city was then begged to provide him with
a Christian burial. The coffin of a suitable size to contain his giant frame was
employed to wedge open the city gates while the pall-bearers grabbed their
weapons from the box and held the gate until the rest of the ‘mourners’ could
arrive.(5)

At Fulford, King Harald had put his weakest troops, possibly those who had
joined him in the Orkneys, to confront earl Morcar at the ford. The
inexperienced earl might have been tempted by this target and left the high
ground. The micro-topography of a battlefield can be important. When the English
‘advanced bravely’ they moved into a small valley from where they could no
longer see the rest of the battle. King Harald now made his move.

‘When King Harald saw that the English array had come to the ditch against
him, he ordered the charge to be sounded, and urged on his men. He ordered the
banner which was called the Land-ravager to be carried before him, and made so
severe an assault that all had to give way before it;’(5)

The English outflanked

Bringing an overwhelming superiority to bear on the battlefield has always
provided the seed of any military victory. Re-enactment groups have, in the last
decade, provided a much firmer basis than pure speculation to talk about the way
battles at the time were fought. The wedge or ‘pigs-head’ can break most
shield-walls.

Successful defence, on the other hand, relies upon a rapid response to
isolate and then destroy each breakthrough. An attacker normally has their
flanks exposed to counter-attack once they break through. The landscape where
King Harald launched his assault would favour the brave as it would prevent such
a riposte.

Harald’s assault along the firm ground near the river had only to progress
about a short distance before the Ings would protect his advancing flank. Once
the right flank of the English force was forced back ten or twenty metres it was
isolated from the rest of the army. The Northmen would have the river on their
left and the marsh on their right. With little or no risk of an attack from the
rear, king Harald’s gambit was a winner.

The use of soil surveying has helped to identify those areas over which the
battle on the English right flank, beside the river, could continue. They had a
narrow front of less than fifty metres to defend as they withdrew towards York,
two kilometres behind them. For half of that distance their flanks, as well as
those of their attacker, would be protected by the river and the Ings.

Because the city was not captured, it is legitimate to speculate that this
force was able to block the road to the city until their leaders, exhaustion or
nightfall halted the Northmen. The effectiveness and discipline of these
defenders prompts the further speculation that they had an effective commander.
Earl Edwin is the obvious candidate although his role on the battlefield is
nowhere recorded. This retreat along the river to York was however a side-show.
The English army at the ford were now fatally exposed but oblivious to their
fate.

The plight of those in the shield-wall near the river was unenviable. Fresh
Norse troops had a firm foothold and a secure crossing place to the defended
bank. If an English warrior turned to fact this new threat, they would be
exposed to attack by missiles from those across the ditch. The options were to
fall back or be overrun. It is unlikely that the right wing could have held out
for very long and once they reached the escarpment, the superior numbers of
attackers would allow them to bypass any remaining defenders.

When the Norse army reached the top of the escarpment they would have emerged
among some sparse buildings. Once clear of these they would have been able to
see the English army two hundred metres away to their right. They had only to
rush down the slope to seal the fate of those who had advanced so bravely at the
ford perhaps an hour before.

Regrettably, this feature is the only one to be significantly changed by man
or nature since the time of the battle. When the nearby ring road was
constructed in the seventies, this low-lying land was illegally filled. In 1066
the ground would have risen on all sides. Pressed into this boggy terrain, and
surrounded, the fate of these troops was sealed.

The press of warriors would have limited the scope to wield weapons
effectively. There would be no line behind which a wounded warrior could retire
to stem the bleeding, no place where a drink could be snatched while others held
the line and no chance to catch ones breath as missiles and blows rained in from
all angles. Shields would soon be shattered or weighted down with spears it had
intercepted. The warriors in the centre could not charge or dodge as their boots
got stuck in the mud at the ford. Their fate was sealed.

When the sagas report that the victors could cross the ford dry-shod using
the fallen warriors as stepping stones, it is credible although it is difficult
to imagine that the victors would have chosen to do so. The ground at the ford
has a thin covering of mud rather than the deep layers of peat found fifty
metres away from the ford itself. The bodies of the warriors who fell at the
ford would have been pressed down and soon encountered the firm material of the
underlying moraine.

However, this was not the end of the battle. The shield-wall on the English
left flank had been separated from their enemy by a peat bog that probably
defied either side’s attempts to cross. The battle here would have been limited
to the exchange of missiles until they saw the approach of the outflanking
Northmen. With their obvious route back to the city blocked, retreat along the
beck was their only option. There is much evidence of another Roman road just
half a kilometre away although the existence of the road has yet to be
established.

A disciplined force could have held up a determined attack for many hours in
this terrain. Attackers could not charge across the soft ground so any assaults
would be ponderous and relatively ineffective. As the outcome of the battle
became obvious to everybody one can speculate that shows of aggression gradually
replaced more sustained assaults.

We know that earl Edwin survives the battle so his hearth troops would have
kept the discipline among the surviving troops on the left flank. Various
sources simply record that the English eventually fled ‘along the ditch’ and
Heslington is mentioned as the destination in one account which is consistent
with ancient and modern geography.

After the battle

Fulford was a long and hard-fought battle. English and Norse sources record
that both sides sustained heavy casualties. The English could claim to have held
their own in the battles on the wings but had lost the clash in the centre
disastrously after a promising start. This interpretation gives credit to the
skill and discipline of both armies but it was King Harald’s superior tactical
appreciation of the ground that won the day for the Norsemen.

To accept the result of any battle, uncritically, without studying how and
why the events unfolded in the way they did can be compared to a football fan
whose interest is confined to the team list and the final score rather than
studying the beautiful game itself. A study of the dynamics of a battle sheds
some light on subsequent events.

The success of the forces on the wings helps explain why it would be some
days before Harald and Tostig entered York to accept the surrender. They
‘offered to conclude an abiding peace with the citizens provided that they all
marched southwards with them to conquer this realm.’(1) That, at least , was the
victor’s plan.

Harald and Tostig set out on Sunday with part of their army, probably those
who were still fit after the battle. Their mission was to collect the hostages
promised by the nobility of Northumberland. They left much of their armour and
weaponry at Riccall. It was probably in need of repair although the sagas
suggest the decision was taken because the weather was hot. It was a bad
decision. The divided, Norse force was caught and destroyed the following day.
The Mercian troops who had blocked the way inland now attacked the base at
Riccall. The invaders were scattered or massacred.

The brother-earls, Edwin and Morcar survived Fulford with their lives and
reputations intact. They would soon accept William as their new king before,
belatedly, playing their part as leaders among the English resistance. The
events after 1066 are proving a fruitful area of study. One can envy historians
who have the luxury of revising the story as more evidence emerges.

Sadly, archaeology is not always afforded this luxury. The builders are
poised to ‘develop’ the area of the battle. The landscape that has changed
little in 1000 years will be reshaped to accommodate 600 homes. The beck along
which the battle was fought will be filled to provide an access road. The
forensic problem set by the planners is one of ‘proof’ while, cynically, the
would-be developers deny access to the site so preventing the gathering of
evidence. So Fulford could soon be lost again. Such is the sad story of Fulford.

5 Heimskringla Online Medieval and Classical Library Release #15b. Originally
written in Old Norse, about 1225 by the poet and historian Snorri Sturluson.
English translation by Samuel Laing (London, 1844).

Further Reading

Mercia And the making of England Ian Walker Sutton Publishing 2000
0750921315 A wonderful synthesis of the sources that illustrates how the
earldoms became a kingdom in the two centuries before the Norman invasion.

Bloodfeud: Murder and Revenge in Anglo-Saxon England Richard Fletcher
Allen Lane 2002 A gripping investigation of the bloody feuding among the leading
families of Northumbria that opened the way for Morcar to become their earl in
1065.

English Resistance, The underground was against the Normans. Peter Rix
Tempus 2004 0752428276 A scholastic analysis of the literature that demonstrated
the extensive resistance that existed to the establishment of Norma rule
throughout England after ‘the conquest’ of 1066.