Month: April 2017

However, Daniel Pinkston, a professor of International Relations at Troy University in Seoul, said it would be a total waste of North Korea’s military assets to attack Japan. “Pyongyang doesn’t care about killing Japanese civilians, especially since it would serve no military or political purpose,” Pinkston said.

Geopolitical trends have combined to open a window of opportunity for Japan to become a nuclear state.

By Liubomir K. Topaloff
April 21, 2017

If Japan wanted to develop nuclear weapons, there would be no better moment than now to start. As the North Korean regime grows desperate to get a more generous ransom against its nuclear program, the threat it poses to Tokyo is multiplying. Last week Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, warned that North Korea is preparing the capability to launch missiles carrying the chemical weapon sarin against Tokyo.

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It’s true that Japanese society is largely against nuclear weapons, not only because of the fact that Japan is the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, but also due to the general isolationist and pacifist political identity of the majority of Japanese.

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Today, perhaps for a first time since the end of the World War II, such a window of opportunity has opened in front of Japan and has offered Tokyo the chance to take the matter of its national security into its own hands.

Thanks, but no. Japan do not want to develop nuclear weapons.

End of discussion.

Don’t even make “Nuclear armed Japan” a diplomatic “card” to play with.

Haha. So true. Well, more accurately, Korea had been a vassal state of China empire. (Like I explained here) If not, how do you explain the historical evidences such as Yeongeunmun and Independence Gate in Korea? There are whole lot more evidences.

Of course, Koreans or Korean descends deny it. It is a taboo for Koreans. But history is history and the fact is the fact.

In 1894 Japan declared war on China, largely for the purpose of settling once for all the international status of Korea, about which there had existed for centuries a dispute which constantly threatened the peace of the Far East. During more than two thousand years Korea had been alternately independent, and under the suzerainty of China, or of Japan. She had been repeatedly invaded from the north–by China, under both the Chinese and Manchu dynasties, by Mongols, and by nomadic tribes–and in 1592 the Regent of Japan, Hideyoshi, attacked Korea with an army of 300,000 men, as part of a project for the conquest of China. These various invasions and raids, together with the prevalence of piracy in Korean waters led the Korean authorities to adopt and to enforce with the utmost rigor a policy of absolute national seclusion, a policy which was followed for several centuries and was enforced with great rigor. It was from this circumstance that Korea became known throughout the world as the Hermit Kingdom. History has proved that this attitude of no-intercourse cannot be indefinitely maintained. In the case of Korea the matter was complicated by the question of the Chinese suzerainty. Was Korea a vassal state of China, or was she not? The answer made by Korea and China was at one time yes, at another time no. Thus, whenever it suited the purpose of the Koreans to claim the protection of China, the plea was made that the suzerain must defend the vassal; when, however, China sought to make its suzerainty effective for some purpose of her own, the Korean argument was that the suzerainty was a mere figment, the annual tribute being paid solely on sentimental grounds in perpetuation of an ancient custom which had completely lost its practical significance.

Conversely, when Peking saw some advantage to be gained by insisting on the living force of the suzerainty the point was made very clear to the Koreans; but when, as occurred from time to time–as, for example, when French and American punitive expeditions attacked Korea in 1866 and 1871, respectively–foreign nations sought redress from Korea for wrongs done to their citizens, China disclaimed any kind of bond with Korea which made her responsible for the latter’s acts.

No country had more reason to be irritated by the posture of Korean affairs than had Japan. In 1875 a Japanese war-ship was fired on by a Korean shore-battery without the slightest provocation. The Japanese at once captured the fort, and seized all the arms and ammunition in it. Tokyo decided that the occasion was favorable for bringing to an end the equivocal relationship between Korea and China. General Kiyotaka Kuroda was sent to Korea as Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, charged with the task of concluding a treaty between Japan and Korea. This compact, known as the Treaty of Kwangha, was signed in 1876. It provided for the mutual opening of ports, for mutual permission to trade, and for the formal recognition by Japan of the independence of Korea. It is from this date that an account of Japanese-Korean relations, in modern times, may take its departure.

In 1880 a Japanese Legation was established at Seoul, and it was hoped by sober-minded Japanese statesmen that with direct representation at the Korean capital the relations between the two countries would assume a more friendly tone. These hopes were not destined to be fulfilled. There existed at the time a long-standing rivalry between a party headed by the King of Korea’s uncle, the Tai Wen Kun, and the rich and powerful family of the Mins, of which the Queen of Korea was a member. In this domestic quarrel China intervened on the side of the Mins, sending troops into the Peninsula for the purpose of suppressing a revolt started by the Tai Wen Kun. For years Korea was the scene of coups d’état and of insurrections, in the course of which the Japanese Legation was twice attacked –once in 1882 by a Korean mob aided by Korean soldiers, and once in 1884 by Korean and Chinese troops acting in co-operation. On each occasion the Japanese Minister, with his wife and children, had to seek safety in flight.