NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
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press.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[May 31, 2005]

Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 3 of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat.
804, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc1(a)(1)(2), provides in part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution, unless the burden furthers a
compelling governmental interest, and does so by
the least restrictive means. Plaintiffs below,
petitioners here, are current and former inmates of
institutions operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction and assert that they are adherents of
nonmainstream religions: the Satanist, Wicca, and
Asatru religions, and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian.1 They complain
that Ohio prison officials (respondents here), in violation of
RLUIPA, have failed to accommodate their religious exercise

in a variety of different ways, including retaliating and
discriminating against them for exercising their nontraditional
faiths, denying them access to religious literature, denying
them the same opportunities for group worship that are granted
to adherents of mainstream religions, forbidding them to adhere
to the dress and appearance mandates of their religions,
withholding religious ceremonial items that are substantially
identical to those that the adherents of mainstream religions
are permitted, and failing to provide a chaplain trained in
their faith. Brief for United States 5.

For purposes of this litigation at its current stage,
respondents have stipulated that petitioners are members of
bona fide religions and that they are sincere in their beliefs.
Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833
(SD Ohio 2002).

In response to petitioners
complaints, respondent prison officials have mounted a facial
challenge to the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA;
respondents contend, inter alia, that the Act improperly
advances religion in violation of the First
Amendments Establishment Clause. The District Court
denied respondents motion to dismiss petitioners
complaints, but the Court of Appeals reversed that
determination. The appeals court held, as the prison officials
urged, that the portion of RLUIPA applicable to
institutionalized persons, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc1, violates the Establishment Clause. We
reverse the Court of Appeals judgment.

This Court has long recognized
that the government may accommodate religious practices
without violating the Establishment Clause.
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commn of
Fla.,480 U.S.
136, 144145 (1987). Just last Term, in Locke
v. Davey,540
U.S. 712 (2004), the Court reaffirmed that there is
room for play in the joints between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate
religion beyond free exercise requirements, without offense to
the Establishment Clause. Id., at 718 (quoting
Walz v. Tax Commn of City of New York,397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970)). At some point, accommodation may devolve into
an unlawful fostering of religion. Corporation of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter&nbhyph;day
Saints v. Amos,483 U.S. 327,
334335 (1987) (quoting Hobbie, 480 U.S., at 145).
But §3 of RLUIPA, we hold, does not, on its face, exceed
the limits of permissible government accommodation of religious
practices.

I

A

RLUIPA is the latest of long-running
congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened
protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent with
this Courts precedents. Ten years before RLUIPAs
enactment, the Court held, in Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,494 U.S. 872,
878882 (1990), that the First
Amendments Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit
enforcement of otherwise valid laws of general application that
incidentally burden religious conduct. In particular, we ruled
that the Free Exercise Clause did not bar Oregon from enforcing
its blanket ban on peyote possession with no allowance for
sacramental use of the drug. Accordingly, the State could deny
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs
because of their religiously inspired peyote use. Id.,
at 874, 890. The Court recognized, however, that the political
branches could shield religious exercise through legislative
accommodation, for example, by making an exception to
proscriptive drug laws for sacramental peyote use. Id.,
at 890.

Responding to Smith, Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),
107 Stat. 1488, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bbet seq. RFRA prohibits
[g]overnment from substantially
burden[ing] a persons exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless
the government can demonstrate the burden (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
City of Boerne v. Flores,521 U.S. 507,
515516 (1997) (brackets in original) (quoting
§2000bb1). [U]niversal in its coverage,
RFRA applie[d] to all Federal and State law,
id., at 516 (quoting former §2000bb3(a)), but
notably lacked a Commerce Clause underpinning or a Spending
Clause limitation to recipients of federal funds. In City
of Boerne, this Court invalidated RFRA as applied to States
and their subdivisions, holding that the Act exceeded
Congress remedial powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id., at 532536.2

Congress again responded, this time
by enacting RLUIPA. Less sweeping than RFRA, and invoking
federal authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses,
RLUIPA targets two areas: Section 2 of the Act concerns
land-use regulation, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc;3
§3 relates to religious exercise by institutionalized
persons, §2000cc1. Section 3, at issue here,
provides that [n]o [state or local] government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution, unless
the government shows that the burden furthers a
compelling governmental interest and does so by the
least restrictive means.
§2000cc1(a)(1)(2). The Act defines
religious exercise to include any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system
of religious belief. §2000cc5(7)(A). Section
3 applies when the substantial burden [on religious
exercise] is imposed in a program or activity that receives
Federal financial assistance,4 or the substantial burden
affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or
with Indian tribes. §2000cc1(b)(1)(2).
A person may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
against a government. §2000cc2(a).

Petitioners initially filed suit
against respondents asserting claims under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. After RLUIPAs enactment, petitioners
amended their complaints to include claims under §3.
Respondents moved to dismiss the statutory claims, arguing,
inter alia, that §3 violates the Establishment
Clause. 221 F. Supp. 2d, at 846. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2403(a), the United States intervened in the District Court
to defend RLUIPAs constitutionality. 349 F.3d 257, 261
(CA6 2003).

Adopting the report and recommendation
of the Magistrate Judge, the District Court rejected the
argument that §3 conflicts with the Establishment Clause.
221 F. Supp. 2d, at 846848. As to the Acts
impact on a prisons staff and general inmate population,
the court stated that RLUIPA permits safety and
securitywhich are undisputedly compelling state
intereststo outweigh an inmates claim to a
religious accommodation. Id., at 848. On the
thin record before it, the court declined to find, as
respondents had urged, that enforcement of RLUIPA, inevitably,
would compromise prison security. Ibid.

On interlocutory appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed. Citing Lemon v. Kurtzman,403 U.S. 602
(1971),6 the
Court of Appeals held that §3 of RLUIPA
impermissibly advanc[es] religion by giving greater
protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally
protected rights. 349 F.3d, at 264. Affording
religious prisoners rights superior to those of
nonreligious prisoners, the court suggested, might
encourag[e] prisoners to become religious in order to
enjoy greater rights. Id., at 266.

We granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict among Courts of Appeals on the question whether
RLUIPAs institutionalized-persons provision, §3 of
the Act, is consistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
543 U.S. ___ (2004).7 Compare 349 F.3d 257, with Madison v.
Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 313 (CA4 2003) (§3 of RLUIPA
does not violate the Establishment Clause); Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 610611 (CA7 2003) (same);
Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062,
10681069 (CA9 2002) (same). We now reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

II

A

The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
provide: Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The first of the two Clauses, commonly called
the Establishment Clause, commands a separation of church and
state. The second, the Free Exercise Clause, requires
government respect for, and noninterference with, the religious
beliefs and practices of our Nations people. While the
two Clauses express complementary values, they often exert
conflicting pressures. See Locke, 540 U.S., at 718
(These two Clauses are frequently in
tension.); Walz, 397 U.S., at 668669
(The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between
the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other.).

Our decisions recognize that
there is room for play in the joints between the
Clauses, id., at 669, some space for legislative action
neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by
the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Smith, 494
U.S., at 890 ([A] society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be
solicitous of that value in its
legislation .); Amos, 483 U.S.,
at 329330 (Federal Government may exempt secular
nonprofit activities of religious organizations from Title
VIIs prohibition on religious discrimination in
employment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (The constitutional
obligation of neutrality is not so narrow a channel
that the slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course
leads to condemnation. (citation omitted)). In accord
with the majority of Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the
question, see supra, at 78, we hold that §3
of RLUIPA fits within the corridor between the Religion
Clauses: On its face, the Act qualifies as a permissible
legislative accommodation of religion that is not barred by the
Establishment Clause.

Foremost, we find RLUIPAs
institutionalized-persons provision compatible with the
Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise. See
Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v.
Grumet,512
U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (government need not be
oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises of state
power may place on religious belief and practice);
Amos, 483 U.S., at 349 (OConnor, J., concurring in
judgment) (removal of government-imposed burdens on religious
exercise is more likely to be perceived as an
accommodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a
Government endorsement of religion). Furthermore, the
Act on its face does not founder on shoals our prior decisions
have identified: Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may
impose on nonbeneficiaries, see Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc.,472 U.S. 703 (1985);
and they must be satisfied that the Acts prescriptions
are and will be administered neutrally among different faiths,
see Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. 687.8

[T]he exercise of
religion often involves not only belief and profession
but the performance of physical acts [such as]
assembling with others for a worship service [or] participating
in sacramental use of bread and wine .
Smith, 494 U.S., at 877. Section 3 covers state-run
institutionsmental hospitals, prisons, and the
likein which the government exerts a degree of control
unparalleled in civilian society and severely disabling to
private religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc1(a); §1997; see Joint Statement S7775
(Institutional residents right to practice their
faith is at the mercy of those running the
institution.).9 RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized
persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious
needs and are therefore dependent on the governments
permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.10

We note in this regard the Federal
Governments accommodation of religious practice by
members of the military. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §
3073 (referring to Army chaplains); Katcoff v.
Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 225229 (CA2 1985) (describing
the Army chaplaincy program). In Goldman v.
Weinberger,475
U.S. 503 (1986), we held that the Free Exercise Clause did
not require the Air Force to exempt an Orthodox Jewish officer
from uniform dress regulations so that he could wear a yarmulke
indoors. In a military community, the Court observed,
there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as
there is in the larger civilian community. Id.,
at 507 (brackets in original; internal quotation marks
omitted). Congressrespondedto Goldman
by prescribing that a member of the armed forces may wear
an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform,
unless the wearing of the item would interfere with the
performance [of] military duties [or] the item of apparel is
not neat and conservative. 10 U.S.C. §
774(a)(b).

We do not read RLUIPA to elevate
accommodation of religious observances over an
institutions need to maintain order and safety. Our
decisions indicate that an accommodation must be measured so
that it does not override other significant interests. In
Caldor, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that
arm[ed] Sabbath observers with an absolute and
unqualified right not to work on whatever day they designate[d]
as their Sabbath. 472 U.S., at 709. We held the law
invalid under the Establishment Clause because it
unyielding[ly] weigh[ted] the interests of
Sabbatarians over all other interests. Id.,
at 710.

We have no cause to believe that
RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way,
with particular sensitivity to security concerns. While the
Act adopts a compelling governmental interest
standard, see supra, at 5, [c]ontext matters
in the application of that standard. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 327 (2003).11 Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful
of the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in
penal institutions. See, e.g., 139 Cong. Rec. 26190
(1993) (remarks of Senator Hatch). They anticipated that
courts would apply the Acts standard with due
deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and
procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline,
consistent with consideration of costs and limited
resources. Joint Statement S7775 (quoting S. Rep.
No. 103111, p. 10 (1993)).12

Finally, RLUIPA does not
differentiate among bona fide faiths. In Kiryas Joel,
we invalidated a state law that carved out a separate school
district to serve exclusively a community of highly religious
Jews, the Satmar Hasidim. We held that the law violated the
Establishment Clause, 512 U.S., at 690, in part because it
single[d] out a particular religious sect for special
treatment, id., at 706 (footnote omitted). RLUIPA
presents no such defect. It confers no privileged status on
any particular religious sect, and singles out no bona fide
faith for disadvantageous treatment.

B

The Sixth Circuit misread our
precedents to require invalidation of RLUIPA as
impermissibly advancing religion by giving greater
protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally
protected rights. 349 F.3d, at 264. Our decision in
Amos counsels otherwise. There, we upheld against an
Establishment Clause challenge a provision exempting
religious organizations from Title VIIs prohibition
against discrimination in employment on the basis of
religion. 483 U.S., at 329. The District Court in
Amos, reasoning in part that the exemption improperly
single[d] out religious entities for a benefit,
id., at 338, had declared the statute
unconstitutional as applied to secular activity,
id., at 333. Religious accommodations, we held, need
not come packaged with benefits to secular
entities. Id., at 338; see Madison, 355
F.3d, at 318 (There is no requirement that legislative
protections for fundamental rights march in
lockstep.).

Were the Court of Appeals view
the correct reading of our decisions, all manner of religious
accommodations would fall. Congressional permission for
members of the military to wear religious apparel while in
uniform would fail, see 10 U.S.C. § 774
as would accommodations Ohio itself makes. Ohio could not, as
it now does, accommodate traditionally recognized
religions, 221 F. Supp. 2d, at 832: The State provides
inmates with chaplains but not with publicists or
political consultants, and allows prisoners to
assemble for worship, but not for political rallies.
Reply Brief for United States 5.

In upholding RLUIPAs
institutionalized-persons provision, we emphasize that
respondents have raised a facial challenge to [the
Acts] constitutionality, and have not contended that
under the facts of any of [petitioners] specific cases
[that] applying RLUIPA would produce unconstitutional
results. 221 F. Supp. 2d, at 831. The District
Court, noting the underdeveloped state of the record,
concluded: A finding that it is factually
impossible to provide the kind of accommodations that
RLUIPA will require without significantly compromising prison
security or the levels of service provided to other
inmates cannot be made at this juncture. Id., at
848 (emphasis added).13 We agree.

For more than a decade, the
federal Bureau of Prisons has managed the largest correctional
system in the Nation under the same heightened scrutiny
standard as RLUIPA without compromising prison security, public
safety, or the constitutional rights of other prisoners.
Brief for United States 24 (citation omitted). The Congress
that enacted RLUIPA was aware of the Bureaus experience.
See Joint Statement S7776 (letter from Department of Justice to
Senator Hatch) ([W]e do not believe [RLUIPA] would have
an unreasonable impact on prison operations. RFRA has been in
effect in the Federal prison system for six years and
compliance with that statute has not been an unreasonable
burden to the Federal prison system.). We see no reason
to anticipate that abusive prisoner litigation will overburden
the operations of state and local institutions. The procedures
mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, we note,
are designed to inhibit frivolous filings.14

Should inmate requests for religious
accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on
other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective
functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to
resist the imposition. In that event, adjudication in
as-applied challenges would be in order.

***

For the reasons stated, the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Notes

1. Petitioners Cutter and Gerhardt are no
longer in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction. Brief for Petitioners 2, n. 1. No party
has suggested that this case has become moot, nor has it:
Without doubt, a live controversy remains among the
still-incarcerated petitioners, the United States, and
respondents. We do not reach the question whether the claims
of Cutter and Gerhardt continue to present an actual
controversy. See Steffel v. Thompson,415 U.S. 452,
459460, and n. 10 (1974).

3. Section 2 of RLUIPA is not at issue
here. We therefore express no view on the validity of that
part of the Act.

4. Every State, including Ohio, accepts
federal funding for its prisons. Brief for United States 28,
n. 16 (citing FY 2003 Office of Justice Programs & Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services Grants by State).

5. The hearings held by Congress revealed,
for a typical example, that [a] state prison in Ohio
refused to provide Moslems with Hallal food, even though it
provided Kosher food. Hearing on Protecting Religious
Freedom After Boerne v. Flores, before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, p. 11, n. 1
(1998) (hereinafter Protecting Religious Freedom) (prepared
statement of Marc D. Stern, Legal Director, American Jewish
Congress). Across the country, Jewish inmates complained that
prison officials refused to provide sack lunches, which would
enable inmates to break their fasts after nightfall.
Id., at 39 (statement of Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, Director
of Legal Affairs for the Aleph Institute). The Michigan
Department of Corrections prohibit[ed] the lighting of
Chanukah candles at all state prisons even though
smoking and votive candles were
permitted. Id., at 41 (same). A priest responsible for
communications between Roman Catholic dioceses and corrections
facilities in Oklahoma stated that there was [a] nearly
yearly battle over the Catholic use of Sacramental Wine
for the celebration of the Mass, and that prisoners
religious possessions, such as the Bible, the Koran, the
Talmud or items needed by Native Americans[,] were
frequently treated with contempt and were confiscated, damaged
or discarded by prison officials. Id., pt. 2, at
5859 (prepared statement of Donald W. Brooks, Reverend,
Diocese of Tulsa, Oklahoma).

6.Lemon stated a three-part test:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion. 403 U.S., at 612613 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). We resolve this case on
other grounds.

7. Respondents argued below that RLUIPA
exceeds Congress legislative powers under the Spending
and Commerce Clauses and violates the Tenth Amendment.
The District Court rejected respondents challenges under
the Spending Clause, Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221
F. Supp. 2d 827, 839849 (SD Ohio 2002), and the Tenth Amendment,
id., at 850851, and declined to reach the Commerce
Clause ques-tion, id., at 838839. The Sixth
Circuit, having determined that RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause, did not rule on respondents further
arguments. See 349 F.3d 257, 259260, 269 (2003).
Respondents renew those arguments in this Court. They also
augment their federalism-based or residual-powers contentions
by asserting that, in the space between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, the States choices are not subject
to congressional oversight. See Brief for Respondents 9,
2533; cf. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310,
322 (CA4 2003). Because these defensive pleas were not
addressed by the Court of Appeals, and mindful that we are a
court of review, not of first view, we do not consider them
here. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran
S. A., 542
U.S. 155, 175 (2004); United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 494
(2001). But cf. post, at 12, n. 2 (Thomas,
J., concurring).

8. Directed at obstructions institutional
arrangements place on religious observances, RLUIPA does not
require a State to pay for an inmates devotional
accessories. See, e.g., Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 605 (CA7 2003) (overturning
prohibition on possession of Islamic prayer oil but leaving
inmate-plaintiff with responsibility for purchasing the oil).

10. Respondents argue, in line with the
Sixth Circuit, that RLUIPA goes beyond permissible reduction of
impediments to free exercise. The Act, they project, advances
religion by encouraging prisoners to get religion,
and thereby gain accommodations afforded under RLUIPA. Brief
for Respondents 1517; see 349 F.3d, at 266 (One
effect of RLUIPA is to induce prisoners to adopt or feign
religious belief in order to receive the statutes
benefits.). While some accommodations of religious
observance, notably the opportunity to assemble in worship
services, might attract joiners seeking a break in their
closely guarded day, we doubt that all accommodations would be
perceived as benefits. For example, congressional
hearings on RLUIPA revealed that one state corrections system
served as its kosher diet a fruit, a vegetable, a granola
bar, and a liquid nutritional supplementeach and every
meal. Protecting Religious Freedom, pt. 3, at 38
(statement of Jaroslawicz). The argument, in any event,
founders on the fact that Ohio already facilitates religious
services for mainstream faiths. The State provides chaplains,
allows inmates to possess religious items, and permits assembly
for worship. See App. 199 (affidavit of David Schwarz,
Religious Services Administrator for the South Region of the
Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction (Oct. 19, 2000))
(job duties include facilitating the delivery of
religious services in 14 correctional institutions of various
security levels throughout Ohio); Ohio Dept. of
Rehabilitation and Correction, Table of Organization, available
at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/DRCORG1.pdf (department
includes Religious Services division) (as visited
May 27, 2005, and available in Clerk of Courts case
file); Brief for United States 20, and n. 8 (citing,
inter alia, Gawloski v. Dallman, 803
F. Supp. 103, 113 (SD Ohio 1992) (inmate in protective
custody allowed to attend a congregational religious service,
possess a Bible and other religious materials, and receive
chaplain visits); Taylor v. Perini, 413
F. Supp. 189, 238 (ND Ohio 1976) (institutional chaplains
had free access to correctional area)).

11. The Sixth Circuit posited that an
irreligious prisoner and member of the Aryan Nation who
challenges prison officials confiscation of his white
supremacist literature as a violation of his free association
and expression rights would have his claims evaluated under the
deferential rational-relationship standard described in
Turner v. Safley,482 U.S. 78 (1987). A
member of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian challenging a
similar withholding, the Sixth Circuit assumed, would have a
stronger prospect of success because a court would review his
claim under RLUIPAs compelling-interest standard. 349
F.3d, at 266 (citing Madison v. Riter, 240
F. Supp. 2d 566, 576 (WD Va. 2003)). Courts, however, may
be expected to recognize the governments countervailing
compelling interest in not facilitating inflammatory racist
activity that could imperil prison security and order. Cf.
Reimann v. Murphy, 897 F. Supp. 398,
402403 (ED Wis. 1995) (concluding, under RFRA, that
excluding racist literature advocating violence was the least
restrictive means of furthering the compelling state interest
in preventing prison violence); George v.
Sullivan, 896 F. Supp. 895, 898 (WD Wis. 1995)
(same).

12. State prison officials make the first
judgment about whether to provide a particular accommodation,
for a prisoner may not sue under RLUIPA without first
exhausting all available administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc2(e) (nothing in RLUIPA shall be
construed to amend or repeal the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995); §1997e(a) (requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies).

13. Respondents argue that prison gangs
use religious activity to cloak their illicit and often violent
conduct. The instant case was considered below on a motion to
dismiss. Thus, the parties conflicting assertions on
this matter are not before us. It bears repetition, however,
that prison security is a compelling state interest, and that
deference is due to institutional officials expertise in
this area. See supra, at 1213. Further, prison
officials may appropriately question whether a prisoners
religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested
accommodation, is authentic. Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into
whether a particular belief or practice is central
to a prisoners religion, see 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc5(7)(A), the Act does not preclude inquiry into
the sincerity of a prisoners professed religiosity. Cf.
Gillette v. United States,401 U.S. 437, 457
(1971) ( [T]he truth of a belief
is not open to question; rather, the question is whether
the objectors beliefs are truly
held.  (quoting United States v.
Seeger,380
U.S. 163, 185 (1965))).