Wednesday, 11 June 2014

Interview with Hugh Pope, the Turkey/Cyprus Project Director of the International Crisis Group (Published in Turkish in Havadis Newspaper on 13 April 2014)

Hugh Pope -
International Crisis Group

Interview
by Esra Aygin

Was there a particular experience or experiences that
convinced you that partition could be a better option for Cyprus?

Pope: No. Partition is not the “better option” – it is an
imperfect situation that is unfortunately the reality today. If you look at the
titles of our earlier reports (“the drift towards partition”, “reunification or
partition”), we were not in favour of the idea but judged non-negotiated
partition was becoming inevitable if a federal settlement was not reached in
the 2008-2012 process. What we are now saying is that if Cyprus is going to end
up with partition anyway, it would be far better to have a negotiated partition
than the current status quo.

The International Crisis Group has advocated a federal
solution in Cyprus for many years. What made you change your mind almost
suddenly and argue that federation is not suitable for Cyprus?

Pope: International Crisis Group has published seven
reports on Cyprus since 2006, all in support of a federal settlement; this is
the eighth. We are still supporting a federal settlement if the two sides can
actually reach a deal, but in the meantime we are urging them to see if there
is another possible settlement they could both live with.

This change was not sudden. We started looking into
ways forward when the 2008-2012 process broke down, and, as we spoke to all
sides in Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, Brussels, London and Washington, we gradually
came to the conclusion that a sixth round of talks on exactly the same basis
was going to produce the same failed result. The reasons are many and fully
explained in the report, but just a few examples would be: the lack of a common
language or any real bilingualism, the complete lack of infrastructure
integration and the lack of any sign that open front lines since 2003 had
brought any knitting back together of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities.

Why partition and not a unitary state then, if we are
talking about alternatives?

Pope: Indeed, a unitary state is a possible option, and
would certainly have strong support from the Greek Cypriot side. But the
differences and suspicions between the two communities seem too great to make
it seem feasible. Polls show 40 per cent of Turkish Cypriots may be able to
accept it or find it tolerable, but the reality is that 60 per cent reject it
entirely. They voted in a leader in 2010 who makes no secret of his preference
for a two-state option. They and Turkey would certainly insist on powerful
guarantees if this route to a settlement was to be chosen, and this is
something that Greek Cypriots would not want to accept. It also strongly goes
against the realities on the ground -- imperfect as they may be -- over the
past four decades.

Do you really believe that the Turkish Cypriots are
living under desirable conditions and that the status quo is ‘peaceful and
viable’ as you state in your report?

Pope: No, not at all! That’s one of the reasons we have
written eight reports trying to find ways to a settlement. The first thing that
most Turkish Cypriots say to me is that they want an end to the uncertainty,
and that they want to live in a normal country. The status quo is peaceful and
viable – as long as Turkey is ready to pay for it, and Turkish Cypriots are
ready to continue becoming more and more like Anatolia – but it is a
sub-optimal situation for both Turkey, Greece, Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriots.

Your report comes at a time of a high level of
determination by the two sides on the island to reach a federal solution and
almost an unprecedented international interest and support for the process.
Don’t you think your report is completely contrary to the present atmosphere,
and process that seems so promising?

Pope: No. This is the sixth major round of talks in five
decades on a bizonal, bicommunal federation, and the atmosphere seems even less
promising than in 2008-12 or 2002-2004. Officials on all sides tell us they are
“hearing nothing new”. The international interest is relatively subdued and
certainly not unprecedented. The U.S. has shown a new interest, possibly due to
a combination of the Israeli connection, the idea of promoting peace in the
east Mediterranean and to help a U.S. company involved in natural gas
exploration. But Washington has not appointed a special envoy.

The presence of a pragmatic Greek Cypriot leader is
very helpful, but we must remember that the banking crisis has gravely weakened
him.

The crosstalks with Mr. Mavroyiannis going to Ankara
and Mr. Ozersay going to Athens were very positive, an idea that Crisis Group
has actively supported since February 2011, and it could be the beginning of
something very important. But there is no sign yet that this is going to become
the regular exchange that it should.

Your report mentions that negotiations have been
carried out for decades for a federal solution. However, the Turkish side,
until the early 2000s advocated a confederal solution. Don’t you think we
should give more chance to the negotiations aimed at a federation?

Pope: A federation has been the goal of five rounds of
talks over four decades – thousands of meetings, every combination of
negotiators, all kinds of settings -- how much more of a chance can it be
given?

There are basically two kinds of federation that are
talked about: there is the bizonal, bicommunal federation (i.e. a variety of
Belgium), the ‘normal’ federation which has not worked out for Cyprus for the
reasons outlined above. Then there is a confederation, or a “light federation”,
which sometimes seems to be what the government of Nicos Anastasiades may be
aiming for, and what Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have aimed for in the past
(when not seeking an independent Turkish Cypriot state). The light federation
or confederal systems seem to mean roughly the same thing. The problem with
them is that no other example exists anywhere in the world (the Swiss one is
really a federation), and it is almost impossible to imagine how a “light”
federation can work if the state has to act as a united entity in the EU. Any
Cypriot government will be obliged to deliver a united implementation of EU
regulations country-wide, necessitating multiple levels of government that will
inevitably need to include the cumbersome, heavy checks and balances of the “Convergences”
of the 2008-12 process, or the Annan Plan.

Don’t you think an independent Turkish Cypriot state
would be a big injustice in that it would legitimise the status quo?

Pope: Yes, in a way, but everything is relative. The
prolongation of the current situation – non-negotiated partition, occupation of
37 per cent of the island, very little property compensated for, disputes that
are casting a shadow over natural gas development south of the island, and tens
of thousands of Turkish troops on the island – is clearly far more unfair on
Greek Cypriots than what we suggest be discussed: a negotiated peace
settlement, 29 per cent or less of the island as Turkish Cypriot, all the
property compensated for in some way, a clear division of territorial waters that
leave Greek Cypriots free to exploit whatever gas they can find and all Turkish
troops off the island.

Do you believe that a Turkish Cypriot state could
truly be independent of the influence of Turkey?

Pope: Geography dictates that both sides of Cyprus will be
strongly influenced by Turkey after any settlement, and of course Turkish
Cypriots will probably want to continue to have special relations with Turkey.
But a Turkish Cypriot state within the EU would finally have alternatives to
Turkey, that would allow it to start to grow with other partners and stand on
its own feet. Many of those partners would actually be Greek Cypriot. A Turkish
Cypriot state within the EU would actually mean that the two sides of the
island would have the same currency, overall regulations, visa regime, and, in
due course, a border that would be as invisible as the border between normal EU
states.

Prof. Dr. Niyazi Kızılyürek, in his article published
in Yenidüzen newspaper on 23 March, wrote that your report is either aimed at
getting the Greek Cypriots support a federation by threatening them with
partition; or at showing the Greek Cypriot side that the things it would gain
in return for an independent Turkish Cypriot state are very attractive and
therefore helping put into practice the Turkish thesis of partition… What was
your intention in publishing this report?

Pope: Prof. Kizilyurek makes an accurate list of the
proposals in the Crisis Group report but I disagree with the reasons with which
he concludes that it is “faulty” [kusurlu]. He believes that consciously or
unconsciously that we are simply enacting a Turkish nationalist thesis, namely
partition [taksim], Turkey’s Plan B. In fact, the Turkish nationalist Plan B is
the reality today – non-negotiated partition, exposure of the island to an
unrestricted monopoly of Turkish predatory capitalism and dependence on Turkish
subsidies. In fact it is not International Crisis Gropu proposal, but this
current Plan B which is leading, as Prof. Kizilyurek fears, to the gradual evolution
of north Cyprus into a Gibraltar.

What we are proposing is much more of a Plan C. Prof.
Kizilyurek seems to dismiss the possibility that the EU will accept a Turkish
Cypriot state. Our research shows that there is no way that the EU can say no
to this, if the Greek Cypriot side accepts it. The question is much more, what
can persuade the Greek Cypriots to do take such a step? First of all, trust in
Turkey, which will take a great deal of effort on Turkey’s part, plus a
withdrawal of troops, an end to the guarantees, proper compensation for property
and so on – all things that I have never ever heard proposed in the “Turkish
nationalist thesis” [Turk milliyetci tezi].

Surely, the tearing apart of Cypriot society in 1963
and 1974 is morally repugnant, but it happened. This is why International
Crisis Group refers to the present reality as imperfect. Unfortunately, as our
report points out, this division is indeed a reality. And our proposal is a
suggestion of how it might be dealt with.

On the other hand, as Prof. Kizilyurek points out,
once it starts being seriously discussed, then the two sides may discover it is
harder to split the island than to reunite it. That knowledge might then make
it easier for the leaders to return in good faith to the idea of a federation,
or reunification as equal citizens without any of the outdated ideas of people
either being “Greek Cypriot” or “Turkish Cypriot”.

You are also being criticised for misinterpreting
SeeD/Cyprus 2015 polls. “It is misleading to claim that the communities oppose
a compromise federal settlement model. Our polls demonstrate remarkable level
of support for the compromise model despite decades of disappointment,” said
SeeD/Cyprus 2015 in a statement last week. How would you respond to this
criticism?

Pope: It’s true that the SeeD/Cyprus 2015 polls find that a
federation is acceptable as the second best choice for both communities.But when you break down what people really
want, support for the compromises needed in a bizonal, bicommunal are hard to
find. As the Crisis Group reports from the poll results in footnote 25:

Turkish Cypriots see a consensual separation with
both states in the EU as the ideal outcome (79 per cent) and better than the
Turkish Cypriot interpretation of federation (69 per cent), while interim
solutions such as Taiwanisation or Kosovoisation are rejected as half measures
(50 per cent and 46 per cent respectively). Greek Cypriots see consensual
separation as entirely unacceptable (79 per cent), but do not support key
stated goals of the talks: political equality (32 per cent), a federal
government (31 per cent), bizonality (19 per cent), bicommunality (18 per
cent), and equal constituent states (15 per cent). As for both communities
sharing power, 58 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 54 per cent of Turkish
Cypriots are opposed.

Your report seems to be ignoring the financial crisis
in the south. Don’t you think that this crisis made people more supportive of a
federal solution?

Pope: A wish for a settlement is different from a wish for
a federal solution. I’ve seen no polling data that indicates that Greek
Cypriots are suddenly warmer to a federation. But the financial crisis has
however certainly made Greek Cypriots much keener on some kind of settlement,
which as the report points out will be a far surer provider of economic health
than, say, natural gas. On page 17 we state:

“One reason for the new thinking is the collapse of
the economy since the crushing banking crisis of March 2013 and a slow
realisation that Cyprus urgently needs to reinvent itself. Some Greek Cypriots
even believe that the EU’s crippling bailout terms were a plot to force them to
surrender cherished hopes of reunification. President Anastasiades shares a
wide recognition that a settlement is vital for restoring economic health.
Outsiders judge him to be acting on a realisation that the self- contained,
uncompromising Greek Cypriot “castle” of international legitimacy and support
has been undermined.”