Top Menu

Follow Us:

From Qatar to Xinjiang: Security in China's Belt and Road Initiative

Dr. Hoh is an independent researcher in Middle Eastern Studies and program specialist in the African and Middle Eastern Division of the Library of Congress.

The opinions expressed here are her own and do not represent those of the Library of Congress.

In 2013, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the goals of securing China's energy sources and expanding its economic networks to the Asia-Pacific region, North and East Africa, and the Mediterranean regions by way of Russia, Central and South Asia. Many of the BRI projects involve infrastructure building in China as well as in politically unstable or economically disadvantaged countries. To ensure a successful initiative and safeguard China's investments, issues of domestic and regional security become vital.

Located in the heart of the BRI in northwest China is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Xinjiang borders Mongolia to the east and Russia to the north, with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to its west and south. Together with the Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia provinces, China's northwestern region accounts for 31.7 percent of China's overall territory, with a population of 97 million in 2018. Its population consists of more than 40 different ethnic groups, with the Turkic-speaking Uighurs and the Han Chinese being the two largest, followed by Hui Chinese Muslims, Mongolians, Khalkha, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Manchu, Tajiks, Tatars, Russians and others.1

For centuries, Xinjiang has been China's bridge to Central Asia and the Middle East. Today China sees it as the country's energy gateway and "extension" of the Middle East.2 Its proximity to energy sources predetermines its strategic importance in the BRI. However, throughout its modern history, Xinjiang has faced ethno-separatism and religious extremism, often associated with ethno-nationalism or border disputes between China and its western neighbors.3 Today, Xinjiang's diverse ethnicities and cultures continue to make this region vulnerable to political manipulation and thus a challenge for China to govern and stabilize.

Several events that took place before and after the launch of the BRI in 2013 provide a glimpse into how situations in the Middle East could have an impact on Xinjiang and China's overall domestic security. The outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 caused worries about its ripple effects in Chinese society, particularly in the northwest region, where separatists could take advantage of political trends to promote the independence of Xinjiang.4 In May 2017, there were news reports about Xinjiang Uighurs joining militant groups in Syria, an indication of resort to terrorism as a form of political protest against Chinese authorities.5 A more recent event is the fallout between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in June 2017, or the Qatar crisis, a political standoff resulting from Saudi accusations that Qatar supported extremist groups in Syria. Qatar's alleged sponsorship of terrorism does not signify an immediate or direct threat to Xinjiang's internal stability, given the vying of traditional regional players (Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) for domination and influence in the regional conflicts fought by militant and extremist groups in Syria, Iraq and Central Asia. However, China keeps a watchful eye on how this political incident could affect terrorist activity on its western front and adopts necessary measures to guard Xinjiang's stability as well as its BRI investments.

Several BRI projects in the Persian Gulf, including Qatar, have been ongoing for a number of years, as China continues to actively pursue bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation in Central Asia and the Middle East. While one cannot point to a direct economic collaboration between Qatar and the Xinjiang region, this paper argues that, from China's perspective, the two are interconnected through the BRI's expansive economic network and therefore by a set of common security concerns. The Qatar crisis, in China's view, reveals two points: (1) regional security in Central Asia and the Middle East is closely tied to Xinjiang's stability; and (2) a successful BRI depends on effective security collaboration between China and its partners.6 From these perspectives, one could understand China's view of the Qatar crisis and its corresponding security policy and strategies for the BRI. This paper aims to establish the correlation between the Qatar crisis and Xinjiang in the context of the BRI and review China's regional-security strategies designed to protect its BRI investments and ensure Xinjiang's stability.

This essay is only available in the print edition of Middle East Policy.

Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal articles.

Also in this issue

About MEPC

The Middle East Policy Council is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to contribute to American understanding of the political, economic and cultural issues that affect U.S. interests in the Middle East.