Defense Priorities for the Next Four Years

About the Authors

Jack SpencerVice President, the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow

Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security PolicyDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

Having won re-election, President George
W. Bush has a historic opportunity to continue the sweeping changes
his Administration had begun in the Pentagon. The new
Administration should continue to transform the military by
developing the right set of skills and capabilities to meet the
security threats of the 21st century, while retaining robust force
levels and adequate funding for the military.

Maintaining
Robust Defense Budgets. Although defense spending has
increased ever since the Clinton Administration, chronic
underfunding continues to burden all of the armed services. Even
the most recent budget request contained shortfalls, including
inadequate funding for such important programs as vehicle armor,
military construction, aircraft survivability equipment, and
ballistic missile submarine communications. Sustained long-term
budget increases are necessary to ensure that America's forces are
prepared for an unpredictable future.

The
United States could reasonably afford to dedicate up to 4 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense--a level of spending
that would be well within historical norms. With the exception of
1948, the United States spent more than 4 percent of GDP on
national security in every year from 1941 to 1995. Given a focused
and well-balanced modernization strategy, this level of spending
would be adequate to maintain a force capable of protecting U.S.
territory and interests today, as well as to field an adequate
force in the future.

Ballistic
Missile Defense. The Bush Administration is on the cusp of
declaring operational a ballistic missile defense that can defend
U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile strikes. The
Administration's first priority should be to bring this operational
capability online as soon as possible. Next, the Administration
should move to expand and improve this limited defense, using its
spiral development process to achieve a more robust global missile
defense capability. The most important steps for building on this
initial missile defense capability are: (1) aggressively pursuing
options to deploy missile defense sensors and interceptors in
space, (2) continuing to build the global command and control
structure for managing missile defense assets, and (3) expanding
missile defense cooperation with friends and allies around the
world. Additional steps should include pursuing sea-based
deployments of missile defense interceptors, expanding the number
of interceptor and sensor sites, continuing to improve the existing
Patriot missile defense system, and proceeding with development of
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system.

Post-Conflict
Operations. As demonstrated in Iraq, the United States
needs to prepare better for the rigors of post-conflict operations
in the 21st century. To this end the United States must define the
responsibilities of its armed forces in these operations as well as
determine the legitimate roles for other agencies of the U.S.
government, host nations, and international organizations. Once
defined, the U.S. armed force should be structured to fulfill its
mission without subjecting itself to unnecessary strain. During
this process it will be necessary to distinguish between
post-conflict operations and other operations other than war
(OOTW), such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian
missions. Although these OOTW missions may share some
characteristics, they are not interchangeable.

Over
the next four years the Administration should be very careful not
to repeat the mistakes of previous Administrations. Even if
commitments associated with the war on terrorism decrease, the
United States should not become militarily involved in the same
kind of missions as it took on in the 1990s. Instead, it should
continue to rely on the model that was developed during the
Australian-led intervention in East Timor and followed again in
Liberia. In each of these cases the United States supported the
effort with its unique capabilities, but the overall effort was led
by regional interests.

The Military's Role in Homeland
Security. Although the Pentagon is not the primary federal
agent of homeland security, it does have a vital role to play and
must dedicate a portion of its resources to that mission. Two
aspects of that mission require particular attention. The National
Guard must increase its capacity to respond to catastrophic threats
and protection of critical infrastructure. Creating force
structures, doctrine, and acquisition programs that could support
both domestic security missions and overseas post-conflict and
theater-support missions might best accomplish this. The military
must also increase its capacity to support maritime security. This
might be done by restructuring the Littoral Combat Ship program to
support both theater missions and homeland security missions with
the Coast Guard.

Transforming the
Basing Infrastructure. The U.S. global (domestic and
foreign) basing infrastructure must be recalibrated to reflect
America's changing and unpredictable national security
requirements. President Bush has undertaken two initiatives that
will achieve this critical goal--initiating another round of Base
Realignment and Closure at home and reconfiguring America's basing
infrastructure abroad. This basing transformation is necessary
because the current base structure was developed to defend against
a largely static and predictable enemy--the former Soviet Union.
Today's threats, in stark contrast to those of the Cold War, are
dynamic and unpredictable, and therefore demand a flexibility that
is currently lacking. A flexible basing structure will promote
adaptability in a world of diverse political, strategic, and
diplomatic interests. America's commitment to regional stability
can no longer be measured by manpower alone. More efficient global
basing infrastructure will free up manpower resources and help to
alleviate personnel strains. Eliminating excess basing
infrastructure will also free up resources that can be reinvested
into the Pentagon's critical transformation initiatives. These
efforts should top the Bush Administration's national security
agenda for the next four years.

Conclusion. In his second term,
President Bush has the opportunity to make generational changes to
how the nation approaches national security. Doing so, however,
will require making some tough decisions.

Jack Spencer is Senior
Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security, James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National Security and
Homeland Security, and Baker Spring is F.
M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.

About the Author

Jack SpencerVice President, the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow

Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security PolicyDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy