A philosopher defends Krauss

I'm writing to urge you to correct your unfair anti-Krauss stance in your earlier post on the Krauss-Albert affair. E.g., you say Krauss thought his book answered old philosophical questions about why there was something rather than nothing. But, if you had read the book, you'd know that Krauss did not claim to answer all such questions, and indeed that he openly acknowledges that there are open questions of precisely the sort that Albert raises, e.g., about why the laws of quantum mechanics should obtain in the first place. What Krauss does do - and do quite well - is provide an engaging popularly accessible depiction of how a universe like ours could come from initial quantum states involving nothing at all like familiar physical objects, nor even space-time. Krauss is admirably clear in the book about what he claims to have done, and it's not what you say he claims to have done.

You also suggest that Albert's review "called [Krauss] out for his intellectual limitations." But the only substantive disagreement Albert's review raises against Krauss involves the question of how ordinary people use the word 'nothing'. Albert thinks the only possible interpretation of 'nothing' is nothing at all, not even a particle-less space-time-less quantum vacuum state. Krauss openly acknowledges this as one reading, but argues (correctly) that people often use 'nothing' in a broader sense. E.g., many ordinary folk think it is impossible, without miraculous intervention, for ordinary physical objects spontaneously to come to exist where no such objects had existed before - something they often abbreviate by saying "something can't come out of nothing!" It is such people, and not we professional philosophers with our "wholly unrestricted quantifiers", who are the intended audience of Krauss' book. And Krauss' book provides a thrilling presentation of the diverse sorts of evidence that have convinced quantum theorists that physical particles can, and indeed do all the time, come from "nothing" in this way. Showing this clearly doesn't defang the cosmological argument - no one claims it does, except perhaps Dawkins - but it does help make clear what is at issue in this argument and dispels common misperceptions about it. This terminological squabble over 'nothing' really is the only substantive objection Albert raises against Krauss, and no matter what you think of this squabble, it's not fair for you to describe it as revealing "intellectual limitations" in Krauss.

Having read and enjoyed Krauss' book, I was shocked by the poor scholarship of Albert's review. Albert doesn't exactly judge the book by its cover, more by its subtitle and by Dawkins' hyperbolic afterword (from which Albert draws the longest quote of his review). Instead, Albert should have considered Krauss' own stated goals in the book, and acknowledged how well Krauss accomplishes these goals. The book makes extremely difficult science downright enjoyable for a lay audience, and it clearly distinguishes the different senses of 'nothing' upon which we can or can't (now, or perhaps even ever) understand how something could come out of nothing. The vast bulk of the book is good quality popularization of science, and the parts that are more philosophical are generally clear and modest, but you'd get no inkling of any of this from Albert's review.

Albert's review deteriorates even further in its concluding paragraph, where he criticizes Krauss for making the wrong sort of complaint about religion. Krauss' repeated complaint is that religion has failed to advance intellectual inquiry on cosmology, which Albert summarizes as "the pale, small, silly, nerdy accusation that religion is, I don't know, dumb". Albert says, in very purple prose, that he finds it "a pity, and more than a pity, and worse than a pity" that Krauss doesn't instead engage in Albert's preferred form of religion-bashing: accusing religion of being "cruel, and a lie, and a mechanism of enslavement, and something full of loathing and contempt for everything essentially human." But Albert can't seriously think Krauss should have taken his book on cosmology through an utterly irrelevant detour on negative social impacts of religion! What is relevant to a book on cosmology is Krauss' discussion of which approaches might help advance our quest to understand how our universe came to be as it is. Albert doesn't offer any reasons to disagree with Krauss' "nerdy accusation" that religion has actually done more to impede than advance this quest. Instead, Albert is clearly just being snide for the sake of being snide.

So Albert published a review that was needlessly uncharitable and snide, berating a good work in popularizing science for not solving philosophical puzzles that it openly acknowledges it doesn't solve. Albert was a jerk and then (as we all know) Krauss was a jerk back. It's all very entertaining drama. But why have you picked sides?

My own view is that Albert's review was an embarrassment to our profession, and a setback for all philosophers of science who want our work to be taken seriously by scientists. When a prominent philosopher publishes a careless snide review like this - and in the NYT, no less! - it should be no surprise that many scientists react as Krauss did, by suspecting that philosophers generally behave as Albert did in this review: shedding much noise and little light. And, you're not helping when you, as a prominent philosophical opinion-shaper, uncritically take Albert's side. So I urge you to consider at least staking a more moderate stance, if not actively admonishing Albert for publishing a pointlessly snide review that reflected poorly on all of us.

Professor Fisher also usefully points out this response by Krauss, which is closer to the substance of the issues raised, above. One could, of course, think Albert hit his target given things that Krauss says in the preface (e.g., page xiii), but perhaps this is why Krauss alleged that Albert hadn't read the substance of the book.

I'll open this for comments from philosophers who have read the book (and Albert's review), and would like to weigh in on the issues raised by Professor Fisher. All comments must have a full name and valid e-mail attached.

Comments

I'm writing to urge you to correct your unfair anti-Krauss stance in your earlier post on the Krauss-Albert affair. E.g., you say Krauss thought his book answered old philosophical questions about why there was something rather than nothing. But, if you had read the book, you'd know that Krauss did not claim to answer all such questions, and indeed that he openly acknowledges that there are open questions of precisely the sort that Albert raises, e.g., about why the laws of quantum mechanics should obtain in the first place. What Krauss does do - and do quite well - is provide an engaging popularly accessible depiction of how a universe like ours could come from initial quantum states involving nothing at all like familiar physical objects, nor even space-time. Krauss is admirably clear in the book about what he claims to have done, and it's not what you say he claims to have done.

You also suggest that Albert's review "called [Krauss] out for his intellectual limitations." But the only substantive disagreement Albert's review raises against Krauss involves the question of how ordinary people use the word 'nothing'. Albert thinks the only possible interpretation of 'nothing' is nothing at all, not even a particle-less space-time-less quantum vacuum state. Krauss openly acknowledges this as one reading, but argues (correctly) that people often use 'nothing' in a broader sense. E.g., many ordinary folk think it is impossible, without miraculous intervention, for ordinary physical objects spontaneously to come to exist where no such objects had existed before - something they often abbreviate by saying "something can't come out of nothing!" It is such people, and not we professional philosophers with our "wholly unrestricted quantifiers", who are the intended audience of Krauss' book. And Krauss' book provides a thrilling presentation of the diverse sorts of evidence that have convinced quantum theorists that physical particles can, and indeed do all the time, come from "nothing" in this way. Showing this clearly doesn't defang the cosmological argument - no one claims it does, except perhaps Dawkins - but it does help make clear what is at issue in this argument and dispels common misperceptions about it. This terminological squabble over 'nothing' really is the only substantive objection Albert raises against Krauss, and no matter what you think of this squabble, it's not fair for you to describe it as revealing "intellectual limitations" in Krauss.

Having read and enjoyed Krauss' book, I was shocked by the poor scholarship of Albert's review. Albert doesn't exactly judge the book by its cover, more by its subtitle and by Dawkins' hyperbolic afterword (from which Albert draws the longest quote of his review). Instead, Albert should have considered Krauss' own stated goals in the book, and acknowledged how well Krauss accomplishes these goals. The book makes extremely difficult science downright enjoyable for a lay audience, and it clearly distinguishes the different senses of 'nothing' upon which we can or can't (now, or perhaps even ever) understand how something could come out of nothing. The vast bulk of the book is good quality popularization of science, and the parts that are more philosophical are generally clear and modest, but you'd get no inkling of any of this from Albert's review.

Albert's review deteriorates even further in its concluding paragraph, where he criticizes Krauss for making the wrong sort of complaint about religion. Krauss' repeated complaint is that religion has failed to advance intellectual inquiry on cosmology, which Albert summarizes as "the pale, small, silly, nerdy accusation that religion is, I don't know, dumb". Albert says, in very purple prose, that he finds it "a pity, and more than a pity, and worse than a pity" that Krauss doesn't instead engage in Albert's preferred form of religion-bashing: accusing religion of being "cruel, and a lie, and a mechanism of enslavement, and something full of loathing and contempt for everything essentially human." But Albert can't seriously think Krauss should have taken his book on cosmology through an utterly irrelevant detour on negative social impacts of religion! What is relevant to a book on cosmology is Krauss' discussion of which approaches might help advance our quest to understand how our universe came to be as it is. Albert doesn't offer any reasons to disagree with Krauss' "nerdy accusation" that religion has actually done more to impede than advance this quest. Instead, Albert is clearly just being snide for the sake of being snide.

So Albert published a review that was needlessly uncharitable and snide, berating a good work in popularizing science for not solving philosophical puzzles that it openly acknowledges it doesn't solve. Albert was a jerk and then (as we all know) Krauss was a jerk back. It's all very entertaining drama. But why have you picked sides?

My own view is that Albert's review was an embarrassment to our profession, and a setback for all philosophers of science who want our work to be taken seriously by scientists. When a prominent philosopher publishes a careless snide review like this - and in the NYT, no less! - it should be no surprise that many scientists react as Krauss did, by suspecting that philosophers generally behave as Albert did in this review: shedding much noise and little light. And, you're not helping when you, as a prominent philosophical opinion-shaper, uncritically take Albert's side. So I urge you to consider at least staking a more moderate stance, if not actively admonishing Albert for publishing a pointlessly snide review that reflected poorly on all of us.

Professor Fisher also usefully points out this response by Krauss, which is closer to the substance of the issues raised, above. One could, of course, think Albert hit his target given things that Krauss says in the preface (e.g., page xiii), but perhaps this is why Krauss alleged that Albert hadn't read the substance of the book.

I'll open this for comments from philosophers who have read the book (and Albert's review), and would like to weigh in on the issues raised by Professor Fisher. All comments must have a full name and valid e-mail attached.