Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)

Commentary by Jon Roland

While I generally concur in the decision and opinions in this case, it is
with a caution. In recogizing a right to have the state provide counsel, it did
not go far enough, because it did not specify that the counsel must be the
choice of the accused, and not of the judge. This case was not as long a step
forward as many civil libertarians would like to think. It opened the door
further to an abuse that was already apparent, the practice of providing
indigent defendants in criminal cases with lawyers, often poorly prepared and
poorly paid, often over the objections of the accused, from a pool of public
defenders under the control of the courts and prone to be more representative
of the interests of the government than of their client. The result has too
often been the conviction of innocent persons, who are often persuaded by their
court-appointed lawyers to plead to a lesser offense, even when they are
totally innocent, or to have such counsel offer inadequate defense. This has
further led to more litigation arising from claims of inadequate
representation. It has also led to the widespread practice of public defenders
trading a conviction of one of their clients on a greater charge for a lesser
charge against another client, without disclosure of such negotiations to
either client.

The precedent set in this case will not be complete until it is followed by
one that establishes the right of the accused to counsel of his choice, and to
have such counsel compensated at a level sufficient to enable him to have of
choice of competent counsel who will represent him and not the government.