On July 1, 2019, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi issued a decree ordering the militias of the PMF to choose between full integration into the Iraqi armed forces or disarmament by July 31. If the groups oppose integration, they will be considered outlaws. The prime minister’s decree stated that the PMF factions have to choose between either political or paramilitary activity and if they choose politics, they are not allowed to carry weapons.Jared Szuba, “Mahdi orders full integration of Shia militias into Iraq’s armed forces,” July 3, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/07/03/iraq-mahdi-orders-popular-mobilization-units-integration/.; “Shia militia agrees to integrate into Iraq state army,” Middle East Monitor, July 3, 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190703-shia-militia-agrees-to-integrate-into-iraq-state-army/. The decree is Mahdi’s latest attempt at gaining influence over the Iran-backed militias, which boast more than 120,000 fighters. Some critics consider the decree to have been issued at the behest of the United States and Saudi Arabia after U.S. officials have concluded that drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil pipeline last May were launched from Iraq, not Yemen, which raised the concerns over the activities of Iran-backed militias in Iraq.Isabel Coles in Beirut and Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S.: Saudi Pipeline Attacks Originated From Iraq,” Washington Post, June 28, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-saudi-pipeline-attacks-originated-from-iraq-11561741133. U.S. officials want the Iraqi government to do more to rein in Iranian-allied militias that have grown in power since they helped win the war against ISIS, including preventing them from using Iraqi territory as a launchpad for attacks against the American military or its allies. KH slammed Abdul Mahdi’s decree, calling it a regional and international scheme that “would weaken security” and “strengthen the presence and goals of the American enemy, producing another [ISIS].”Ali Mamouri, “Iraq seeks Iranian assistance to curb militias' reign,” Al Monitor, July 24, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/iraq-iran-abdul-mahdi-sanction-pmu-militias.html.

Doctrine:

According to the U.S. Department of State, KH is “a radical Shia Islamist group with an anti-Western establishment and jihadist ideology.”“Designation of Kata’ib Hizballah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” U.S. Department of State, July 2, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125582.htm. The group is virulently anti-American and ideologically loyal to the Iranian regime.

Anti-American: During the U.S.-led war in Iraq, KH built its reputation by targeting U.S. personnel and interests and killing numerous U.S. soldiers in terrorist attacks.“Hezbollah threatens withdrawal over Baghdad ‘lack of support’,” April 24, 2015, Rudaw, http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/240420151. Since the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, KH has retained its anti-American ideology. KH’s website states that the group’s first goal “was and still remains: thwarting the American project in the region, defeat of the occupation, and expelling them from Iraq, broken and humbled…. As for our jihadi pillars, there are four. Firstly, waging jihad against the occupation until the last American is expelled from Iraq.”“About Kata’ib Hezbollah,” The Islamic Resistance Kata’ib Hezbollah Official Website, http://www.kataibhizbollah.com/institute/2711. In KH’s efforts to fight ISIS in Iraq, KH remains opposed to any cooperation with the United States. In September 2014, for example, KH released a statement saying, “We will not fight alongside the American troops under any kind of conditions whatsoever. [Our only contact with Americans will be] if we fight each other.”David D. Kirkpatrick, “Shiite Militias Pose Challenge for U.S. in Iraq,” New York Times, September 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/world/middleeast/shiite-militias-pose-challenge-for-us-in-iraq.html?_r=0. In March 2015, KH’s military spokesman reaffirmed the group’s anti-American position, saying, “It is not possible for Kataib Hizbollah or any of the resistance factions to be in the same trench as the Americans.”Saif Hameed, “Iraq special forces advance in Tikrit, U.S. coalition joins fight,” Reuters, March 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0MM0R220150327. In December 2017, following ISIS’s defeat in Iraq, KH released a statement declaring that “the enemy of humanity, the US, can no longer desecrate Iraqi soil, as the fighters of [KH] will not allow them to do so.”Baxtiyar Goran, “Hezbollah Brigades: US troops will be forced to withdraw from Iraq,” Kurdistan 24, December 30, 2017, http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/582120a4-c8a0-40f1-a652-a9a46a43b926.

Recruitment:

KH has sought to lure recruits by advertising its fight against U.S. forces in Iraq. Following the start of the Syrian civil war, the group also advertised its efforts to support Assad forces in neighboring Syria.

Seyyed Hashem al-Haydari

Jaafar al-Husseini

Omar Abdullah al-Jbara

Jassim al-Saidi

Abu Hamza

Abu Abdullah

Commander (as of November 2014)

Raad Al Kafaji

Commander (as of November 2014)

Abu Fadl

Commander (as of June 2016)

Erfad

Commander (as of June 2016)

History

Violent Activities

March 2007 - June 2008: KH launches a number of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and improvised rocket-assisted mortars (IRAMs) at U.S. targets in Iraq.“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx.

February 19, 2008: KH launches an IRAM attack at a U.S. base southeast of Baghdad. The attack by KH kills one U.S. civilian and injures additional coalition force personnel and U.S. civilians.“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx.

September 2008: KH continues to target U.S. military bases, coalition and U.S. vehicles, and contractors working with coalition forces.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2009: Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm.

July 2, 2009: The U.S. Treasury Department designates Kata’ib Hezbollah and its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, for having “committed, directed, supported, or posed a significant risk of committing acts of violence against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces.”“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx. The U.S. State Department notes that in addition to executing attacks against U.S., Iraqi, and coalition forces, KH has threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians, as well as civilians, who support Iraq’s political process.“Designation of Kata’ib Hizballah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” U.S. Department of State, July 2, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125582.htm.

June 2014: Human Rights Watch finds that KH, AAH, and other Shiite militias have carried out “indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas,” and have also conducted kidnapping operations and carried out summary executions of Sunnis. These attacks have occurred in the Iraqi towns of Buhriz, Mada’in, al-Heetawy, and others, according to Human Rights Watch’s findings.“Iraq: ISIS Advance Threatens Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, June 12, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/12/iraq-isis-advance-threatens-civilians.

March 21, 2015: Two Iraqi local officials and a police officer accuse KH militants of burning and looting homes in the Iraqi town of al-Dour after capturing it from ISIS. Both a KH spokesman and a security commander in the area deny the claim.“Iraqi Sunnis accuse Shi’ite paramilitaries of burning homes outside Tikrit,” Reuters, March 21, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/22/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0MH0R720150322.

February 6, 2018: KH warns that it might engage in armed confrontation with U.S. forces in Iraq at any moment. It is the second warning issued by KH against American troops in the country since the Iraqi government declared final victory over ISIS in late 2017. Jaafar Al-Husseini, spokesman for KH claims, “There is no stable Iraq with the presence of the Americans.”Sangar Ali, “Iraqi Shia militia: Confrontation with US troops can happen at any moment,” Kurdistan 24, February 6, 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/ee824c8e-0250-4ace-9937-097cd6820f93.

July 2, 2009: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated “Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes” as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on July 2, 2009.“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx.

Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi, the leader of KH, joined the Badr Organization’s predecessor, the Badr Corps, in 1985. By 2001, he had risen to become one of the deputy commanders of the Badr Corps.Michael Knights, “The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq,” Combatting Terrorism Center, November 1, 2010, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-evolution-of-iran%E2%80%99s-special-groups-in-iraq. Ibrahimi’s connection to the Badr Corps is not unique. According to U.S. intelligence officers, the majority of KH’s members as of 2010 had served in the Badr Corps before 2003.Michael Knights, “Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US drawdown,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 30, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4e8b0eba7c0a2.pdf. The connection between KH and the Badr Organization (so renamed in 2003) has continued. In early 2013, KH and the Badr Organization formed Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS or “The Master of the Martyrs Brigade”) to fight in Syria.Phillip Smyth, “All the Ayatollah’s Men,” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/18/all-the-ayatollahs-men/. Further, while KH does not affiliate with any one political party in Iraq, the group is reported to have a “familial” relationship with political figures within the Badr Organization, according to a RAND Corporation report.Richard R. Brennan et al., eds., Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: the Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 139, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf. KH and the Badr Organization, along with Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) comprise “Iran’s three big Iraqi militias,” according to Reuters.Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Special Report: The fighters of Iraq who answer to Iran,” Reuters, November 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-mideast-crisis-militias-specialreport-idUSKCN0IW0ZA20141112. All three groups are part of the Haashid Shaabi, an umbrella organization of Shiite militias also called the popular mobilization forces (PMF).

While Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Lebanese Hezbollah share a name, the two Iranian proxies operate independently. KH has ideological ties to Lebanese Hezbollah and may have received support from the latter group, according to the U.S. State Department.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2009: Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm. In particular, KH has developed especially close ties with Unit 3800, the wing of Lebanese Hezbollah devoted to arming and training Iraqi Shiite militias.Matthew Levitt and Phillip Smyth, “Kataib al-Imam Ali: Portrait of an Iraqi Shiite Militant Group Fighting ISIS,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 5, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kataib-al-imam-ali-portrait-of-an-iraqi-shiite-militant-group-fighting-isis. The U.S. State Department wrote in 2010 that KH is suspected to receive its aid from Iran through its Lebanese Hezbollah proxy.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2009: Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm. The U.S. Treasury Department wrote more explicitly in 2008 that KH had been receiving weapons training and support from Lebanese Hezbollah.“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx.

As described in a report by the RAND Corporation, “Kata’ib Hezbollah, like Lebanese Hezbollah, is used as a tool to ‘export the Islamic revolution’ as practiced in Tehran.”Richard R. Brennan et al., eds., Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: the Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 139, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf. According to 70 USF-I staff officers, KH, like Lebanese Hezbollah, “should be considered a direct action arm of the Quds Force.”Richard R. Brennan et al., eds., Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: the Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 140, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf.

Rhetoric

View All

“The Hezbollah Brigades derives its goals and pillars from the sharia rulings, on which the formation was based. Our first goal was and still remains: thwarting the American project in the region, defeat of the occupation, and expelling them from Iraq, broken and humbled. The second goal is reclaiming Iraq’s sovereignty and granting all of its people their rights. As for our jihadi pillars, there are four. Firstly, waging jihad against the occupation until the last American is expelled from Iraq.”“About Kata’ib Hezbollah,” The Islamic Resistance Kata’ib Hezbollah Official Website, accessed June 27, 2018, http://www.kataibhizbollah.com/institute/2711.

“The enemy of humanity, the US, can no longer desecrate Iraqi soil, as the fighters of the Hezbollah Brigades will not allow them to do so. The Iraqi government and Council of Representatives need to make a decisive decision about the presence of US troops who should voluntarily withdraw before we force them to flee from the country.”Baxtiyar Goran, “Hezbollah Brigades: US troops will be forced to withdraw from Iraq,” Kurdistan 24, December 30, 2017, http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/582120a4-c8a0-40f1-a652-a9a46a43b926.

“We have vanquished the American occupation with our quality and quantity in the past and we will continue attacking them, with our resources significantly increased. Iraq’s streets are still filled with the ruins of their vehicles that destroyed our explosive devices, and those injured by their soldiers are still hospitalized.”Maayan Groisman, “Hezbollah Brigades vows to attack US forces ‘defending ISIS’ in Iraq,” Jerusalem Post, March 21, 2016, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hezbollah-vows-to-attack-US-forces-defending-ISIS-in-Iraq-448657.

Pages

Pages

Pages

KH is a U.S.-designated anti-American Shiite militia operating in Iraq with ancillary operations in Syria. During the U.S.-led war in Iraq that began in 2003, KH earned a reputation for planting deadly roadside bombs to attack U.S. and coalition forces.

On July 1, 2019, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi issued a decree ordering the militias of the PMF to choose between full integration into the Iraqi armed forces or disarmament by July 31. If the groups oppose integration, they will be considered outlaws. The prime minister’s decree stated that the PMF factions have to choose between either political or paramilitary activity and if they choose politics, they are not allowed to carry weapons.Jared Szuba, “Mahdi orders full integration of Shia militias into Iraq’s armed forces,” July 3, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/07/03/iraq-mahdi-orders-popular-mobilization-units-integration/.; “Shia militia agrees to integrate into Iraq state army,” Middle East Monitor, July 3, 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190703-shia-militia-agrees-to-integrate-into-iraq-state-army/. The decree is Mahdi’s latest attempt at gaining influence over the Iran-backed militias, which boast more than 120,000 fighters. Some critics consider the decree to have been issued at the behest of the United States and Saudi Arabia after U.S. officials have concluded that drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil pipeline last May were launched from Iraq, not Yemen, which raised the concerns over the activities of Iran-backed militias in Iraq.Isabel Coles in Beirut and Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S.: Saudi Pipeline Attacks Originated From Iraq,” Washington Post, June 28, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-saudi-pipeline-attacks-originated-from-iraq-11561741133. U.S. officials want the Iraqi government to do more to rein in Iranian-allied militias that have grown in power since they helped win the war against ISIS, including preventing them from using Iraqi territory as a launchpad for attacks against the American military or its allies. KH slammed Abdul Mahdi’s decree, calling it a regional and international scheme that “would weaken security” and “strengthen the presence and goals of the American enemy, producing another [ISIS].”Ali Mamouri, “Iraq seeks Iranian assistance to curb militias' reign,” Al Monitor, July 24, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/iraq-iran-abdul-mahdi-sanction-pmu-militias.html.

Doctrine:

According to the U.S. Department of State, KH is “a radical Shia Islamist group with an anti-Western establishment and jihadist ideology.”“Designation of Kata’ib Hizballah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” U.S. Department of State, July 2, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125582.htm. The group is virulently anti-American and ideologically loyal to the Iranian regime.

Anti-American: During the U.S.-led war in Iraq, KH built its reputation by targeting U.S. personnel and interests and killing numerous U.S. soldiers in terrorist attacks.“Hezbollah threatens withdrawal over Baghdad ‘lack of support’,” April 24, 2015, Rudaw, http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/240420151. Since the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, KH has retained its anti-American ideology. KH’s website states that the group’s first goal “was and still remains: thwarting the American project in the region, defeat of the occupation, and expelling them from Iraq, broken and humbled…. As for our jihadi pillars, there are four. Firstly, waging jihad against the occupation until the last American is expelled from Iraq.”“About Kata’ib Hezbollah,” The Islamic Resistance Kata’ib Hezbollah Official Website, http://www.kataibhizbollah.com/institute/2711. In KH’s efforts to fight ISIS in Iraq, KH remains opposed to any cooperation with the United States. In September 2014, for example, KH released a statement saying, “We will not fight alongside the American troops under any kind of conditions whatsoever. [Our only contact with Americans will be] if we fight each other.”David D. Kirkpatrick, “Shiite Militias Pose Challenge for U.S. in Iraq,” New York Times, September 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/world/middleeast/shiite-militias-pose-challenge-for-us-in-iraq.html?_r=0. In March 2015, KH’s military spokesman reaffirmed the group’s anti-American position, saying, “It is not possible for Kataib Hizbollah or any of the resistance factions to be in the same trench as the Americans.”Saif Hameed, “Iraq special forces advance in Tikrit, U.S. coalition joins fight,” Reuters, March 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0MM0R220150327. In December 2017, following ISIS’s defeat in Iraq, KH released a statement declaring that “the enemy of humanity, the US, can no longer desecrate Iraqi soil, as the fighters of [KH] will not allow them to do so.”Baxtiyar Goran, “Hezbollah Brigades: US troops will be forced to withdraw from Iraq,” Kurdistan 24, December 30, 2017, http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/582120a4-c8a0-40f1-a652-a9a46a43b926.

Recruitment:

KH has sought to lure recruits by advertising its fight against U.S. forces in Iraq. Following the start of the Syrian civil war, the group also advertised its efforts to support Assad forces in neighboring Syria.

History Timeline
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Q_mxk2ixqpqUdyAx2VaA2S7JdmE5ywcaEdGrfCqRZ7Q/pubhtml

Violent History

March 2007 - June 2008: KH launches a number of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and improvised rocket-assisted mortars (IRAMs) at U.S. targets in Iraq.“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx.

February 19, 2008: KH launches an IRAM attack at a U.S. base southeast of Baghdad. The attack by KH kills one U.S. civilian and injures additional coalition force personnel and U.S. civilians.“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx.

September 2008: KH continues to target U.S. military bases, coalition and U.S. vehicles, and contractors working with coalition forces.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2009: Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm.

July 2, 2009: The U.S. Treasury Department designates Kata’ib Hezbollah and its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, for having “committed, directed, supported, or posed a significant risk of committing acts of violence against Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces.”“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx. The U.S. State Department notes that in addition to executing attacks against U.S., Iraqi, and coalition forces, KH has threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians, as well as civilians, who support Iraq’s political process.“Designation of Kata’ib Hizballah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” U.S. Department of State, July 2, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125582.htm.

June 2014: Human Rights Watch finds that KH, AAH, and other Shiite militias have carried out “indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas,” and have also conducted kidnapping operations and carried out summary executions of Sunnis. These attacks have occurred in the Iraqi towns of Buhriz, Mada’in, al-Heetawy, and others, according to Human Rights Watch’s findings.“Iraq: ISIS Advance Threatens Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, June 12, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/12/iraq-isis-advance-threatens-civilians.

March 21, 2015: Two Iraqi local officials and a police officer accuse KH militants of burning and looting homes in the Iraqi town of al-Dour after capturing it from ISIS. Both a KH spokesman and a security commander in the area deny the claim.“Iraqi Sunnis accuse Shi’ite paramilitaries of burning homes outside Tikrit,” Reuters, March 21, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/22/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0MH0R720150322.

February 6, 2018: KH warns that it might engage in armed confrontation with U.S. forces in Iraq at any moment. It is the second warning issued by KH against American troops in the country since the Iraqi government declared final victory over ISIS in late 2017. Jaafar Al-Husseini, spokesman for KH claims, “There is no stable Iraq with the presence of the Americans.”Sangar Ali, “Iraqi Shia militia: Confrontation with US troops can happen at any moment,” Kurdistan 24, February 6, 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/ee824c8e-0250-4ace-9937-097cd6820f93.

July 2, 2009: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated “Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes” as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on July 2, 2009.“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx.

Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi, the leader of KH, joined the Badr Organization’s predecessor, the Badr Corps, in 1985. By 2001, he had risen to become one of the deputy commanders of the Badr Corps.Michael Knights, “The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq,” Combatting Terrorism Center, November 1, 2010, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-evolution-of-iran%E2%80%99s-special-groups-in-iraq. Ibrahimi’s connection to the Badr Corps is not unique. According to U.S. intelligence officers, the majority of KH’s members as of 2010 had served in the Badr Corps before 2003.Michael Knights, “Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US drawdown,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 30, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4e8b0eba7c0a2.pdf. The connection between KH and the Badr Organization (so renamed in 2003) has continued. In early 2013, KH and the Badr Organization formed Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS or “The Master of the Martyrs Brigade”) to fight in Syria.Phillip Smyth, “All the Ayatollah’s Men,” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/18/all-the-ayatollahs-men/. Further, while KH does not affiliate with any one political party in Iraq, the group is reported to have a “familial” relationship with political figures within the Badr Organization, according to a RAND Corporation report.Richard R. Brennan et al., eds., Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: the Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 139, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf. KH and the Badr Organization, along with Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) comprise “Iran’s three big Iraqi militias,” according to Reuters.Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Special Report: The fighters of Iraq who answer to Iran,” Reuters, November 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-mideast-crisis-militias-specialreport-idUSKCN0IW0ZA20141112. All three groups are part of the Haashid Shaabi, an umbrella organization of Shiite militias also called the popular mobilization forces (PMF).

While Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Lebanese Hezbollah share a name, the two Iranian proxies operate independently. KH has ideological ties to Lebanese Hezbollah and may have received support from the latter group, according to the U.S. State Department.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2009: Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm. In particular, KH has developed especially close ties with Unit 3800, the wing of Lebanese Hezbollah devoted to arming and training Iraqi Shiite militias.Matthew Levitt and Phillip Smyth, “Kataib al-Imam Ali: Portrait of an Iraqi Shiite Militant Group Fighting ISIS,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 5, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kataib-al-imam-ali-portrait-of-an-iraqi-shiite-militant-group-fighting-isis. The U.S. State Department wrote in 2010 that KH is suspected to receive its aid from Iran through its Lebanese Hezbollah proxy.“Country Reports on Terrorism 2009: Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm. The U.S. Treasury Department wrote more explicitly in 2008 that KH had been receiving weapons training and support from Lebanese Hezbollah.“Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx.

As described in a report by the RAND Corporation, “Kata’ib Hezbollah, like Lebanese Hezbollah, is used as a tool to ‘export the Islamic revolution’ as practiced in Tehran.”Richard R. Brennan et al., eds., Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: the Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 139, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf. According to 70 USF-I staff officers, KH, like Lebanese Hezbollah, “should be considered a direct action arm of the Quds Force.”Richard R. Brennan et al., eds., Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: the Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 140, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf.