Another Original LR Translation: Sokolov is the New Sakharov

The following is a staff translation (not from our experts, corrections welcome!) of two items from the Russian press which detail the horrific neo-Soviet persecution that is now underway against those who dare to challenge the KGB regime of Vladimir Putin.

Over the past month, the historian Boris Sokolov has lost his job not once but twice.

First, he was suspended from his position as an op-ed columnist for the Gazeta newspaper. Then his resignation was demanded from his other employer, the Russian State Social University (“RSSU”). Both incidents were the result of a column Sokolov wrote for Gazeta in August entitled “Did Saakashvili Win or Lose?” in which he questioned the Kremlin’s version of the events in South Ossetia.

Soon after the column was published, Sokolov says, the newspaper’s editor in chief Pyotr Fadeyev was fired and the text was removed from its website. The paper then informed Sokolov that it was no longer interested in carrying his work. “My colleagues all said that this occurred after the paper received a telephone call from the offices of the presidential administration.”

When Sokolov did not tender his resignation, he says, on September 17th he was fired by RSSU, where he was a professor of social anthropology. “The Dean of my faculty made no attempt to hide the fact that the decision to terminate my employment was made by RSSU’s rector after several phone conversations with presidential administrative staff,” Solokov says. RSSU denies there was any political motivation behind the termination; according to Dina Tanatova, Acting Dean of the Factulty of Sociology, Sokolov voluntarily resigned because he preferred to engage in professional rather than academic work. “I very much regret his resignation,” said Tanatova.

Gazeta told a similar story. “Solokov probably misunderstood me,” claimed Dmitry Balburov, a newspaper spokesman. He asserts that the Professor has simply not submitted any publication-worthy material since the piece about Georgia appeared, and that he never said the relationship had ended. Further, he claimed that the disappearance of the Georgia text from the newspaper’s website was attributable to “technical reasons” and denied that the editor-in-chief had been terminated against his will. Anonymous sources at Gazeta confirmed Solokov’s version, however.

LR: The following is the text of Sokolov’s article (after that is the Russian original). It was obtained from a comment to an article on the same topic which appeared on the Grani.ru website, authored by dissident Valeria Novodvorskaya — an article we publishedin English shortly after it appeared and which has now collected nearly 1,500 comments on the orginal Russian page):

The outcome of the war in Georgia is not so clear as it is painted the official propaganda.

The Russian-Georgian war, characterized by a speed and success which appear alien to Russia, is in fact most likely to prove a long-term military and political defeat for Moscow. It’s easy to paint a picture of a crazy President of Georgia run amok, unable to perceive reality, who decided to attempt a suprise attack under cover of the Olympics and achieve with military force what he could not do through diplomacy. But is it really credible that a man like that could carry out the “Rose Revolution” so effectively and remain in power for so long thereafter, despite the turbulent seas surrounding him?

Another Scenario

In fact, had it not been for the Georgian Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, Moscow would have found another justification to use military force against Saakashvili. It might have been an operation of Abkhaz forces in the Kodori Gorge, where Georgian troops could not respond without being accused of using banned troops and weapons in the security zone, mandating a march by the 58th Army upon Tbilisi. Naval forces could have made landings along the Black Sea coast, the entire operation carried out in a single day. Georgian forces would have been tied down in the mountains of Ossetia while Russian tanks were rolling into Tbilisi, but the forces that actually overthrew the president might have been referred to as “militia” from the offended territories. The pro-Russian figure from Abkhazia, Igor Giorgadze, could have been installed as the new Georgian ruler. Neither the U.S. nor the EU would have had time to react and would have been presented with a fait accompli. The Rose Revolution would have been reversed.

Evidence

Such a scenario is not without basis in fact. On the first day of fighting, Russian forces claimed to have captured a map indicating Georgian plans to invade Abkhazia — but all its inscriptions were in English for some reason. This is perhaps owing to the fact that there are not many speakers of Georgian on the Russian general staff, and to have allowed such a document to be created at lower levels of the Russian army would create the possiblity for damaging leaks — and they did not have time to whip up a new map relating to Ossetia when they were surprised by the success Ossetians had in provoking the Georgians there. Why plans to invade Abkhazia would be part of the fighting in Georgia was a question it seems best left unasked.

If it was Russia’s intention to unseat Saakashvili, then his actions can be seen not only as effective but as the only possible means of guaranteeing his survival. And indeed, his advisors believed that a Russian invasion was imminent, as indicated by the rapid construction of railways in Abhkazia, bolstering of the “peace keeping” forces and the concentration of exercises on the Georgian border regions — as well as the evacuation of various segments of the civilian population. Tbilisi may have believed that the attack would come in the immediate aftermath of the Olympics when the festivities there were still something of a distraction. With that conclusion reached, Saakashvili’s decision may have been to instigate the confrontation while the Olympiad was still in progress, giving him the element of surprise and dividing the Russian leadership.

Georgia may have hoped to crush the rebel forces in a lightening strike, but of course could never have expected to ultimately with victory. Indeed, actual fighting lasted only two days. Still, Georgia inflicted rather heavy losses on the Russian side, with 74 killed, 171 wounded and 19 missing), including seriously injuring the commander of the 58th Army, Lieutenant General Anatoly Hrulev. The Georgians also downed four Russian attack aircraft including a Tu-22 bomber, and inflicted some damage to the Russian fleet in the Black Sea as well.

After this short burst of fighting, it appears that the Georgian forces pulled back according to an organized plan and took up densive positions around Tbilisi, losing very few prisoners (Russian TV showed only two Georgian soldiers, both wounded, captured in Tskhinvali). There were significant losses of equipment during the rapid retreat, but sufficient quantities for the defense of Tbilisi were retained along with the body of the fighting force.

Victims

The Russian version of events was immediately spurned by Western observers. It was claimed that Georgian forces had killed 2,000 civilians in Tskhinvali, so as to reinforce the notion of genocide against the Ossetians, but this was obviously absurd: How could such a number possibly have been tabulated so soon after the fighting ended? Of course, no such figures were ultimately documented. Human rights organizations in South Ossetia counted 44 dead civilians and concluded that the death toll amounted to dozens, not hundreds much less thousands. But the figure given on the Georgian side of 180 dead peaceful Georgian civilians, victims of Russian shelling and bombing, seems close to the truth. It is far from incredible for Saakashvili to claim that part of Tskhinvali was destroyed by Russian forces during their counterattack, especially since it is highly doubtful that Georgia would send their precious combat aircraft, where they would be easy prey for nearby Russian air defenses. But it is clearly establish that the city was bombed from the air, since Russian television so reported in the early hours. These were most likely Russian planes attacking the Georgian forces.

Losses and achievements

So did Saakashvili win or lose? He lost the Kodori Gorge, he lost the Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia, he lost hope of controlling the two rebel territories at any time in the near future. But he internationalized the conflict, so that now both regions are soon to be teeming with foreign observers and then, he hopes, peacekeepers. More important, he has received guarantees of protection of his government from Europe and the United States, and he remains in power.

What has Russia, by contrast, won — and what has it lost? It now has pro-Russian regimes in firm control in both breakaway regions, and it has conducted substantial ethnic cleansing in both regions. The threat of Georgian invasion of either region is now quelled. And that’s it. Just two items on the positive side of the ledger. There are many more debit items. For the first time since 1991, Russia faces a real threat of international isolation. The West’s behavior is eerily reminscent of historical patterns, and it does not seem that Western leaders are interested in a second Munich. It has become common for them to compare Russia’s actions in Ossetia with Hitler’s actions in the Sudetenland. Russia has enhanced the chances that John McCain will win the presidential election, in part because of his strong anti-Russian stance, and his proposal to exclude Russia from the G-8 has already been partially realized in fact if not in law. Now the G-7 is undertaking various consultations on the Georgia conflict without Russia’s participation and the issue of formal exclusion has increased crediblity.

Worse still is that Moscow seems to have lost its main ally in the European Union – Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel, despite her nation’s dependency on Russian gas, demanded a speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory and supported Georgia fully. And the French president is unlikely to risk the long-term unconditional support Russian actions in Georgia. He already faces serious consequences if Russia delay the withdrawal of troops as per the agreement he brokered. The notion of a “thaw” led by the new Medvedev regime has been discredited and Russia’s reputation has been seriously damaged.

The U.S. could, of course, hasten the Russian withdrawal from Georgia by inserting a few Army brigades, but have not done so. It may be they believe sufficent pressure can be brought to bear on Russia to force this outcome without using military force, a telling fact if true. And, of course, the chances of Georgia and Ukraine being invited to join NATO are greater now than they ever have been before, with Europe highly motiviated to deter any future “peacekeeping” in such places as the Crimea, Transnistria or Ajaria.

The author is a historian and professor at the Russian State Social University.

LR: Here is the Russian version of the text, which can now (as far as we know) only be retrieved from a comment on the Grani.ru website:

5 responses to “Another Original LR Translation: Sokolov is the New Sakharov”

“According to some sources [Frantisek Janouch] was working directly for Soviet Academician Andrei Sakharov as the only foreigner working inside the Soviet nuclear research [a communist military research operation].

According to Anatoliy Golitsyn Sakharov was a KGB agent of influence, a staunch promoter of the Perestroika fraud and if we take into regard the fact that Soviet nuclear research has always been run by the Soviet [Russian] military intelligence service GRU, such logical explanation about Sakharov [and his connections] is highly warranted.”

Quite funny, but Mr. Sokolov seems like the only person in the whole Russia with an ability to seriously analyze things.(Aside from Andrey Ilarionov, Latinina and 2-3 other free people) A shame really…

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