HARRIS-FIELDS v. SYZE

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HARRIS-FIELDS v. SYZE

April 7, 1998
No. 199039

BRENDA HARRIS-FIELDS, Personal

Representative of the Estate of

MANUEL HENRY FIELDS, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

Jackson Circuit Court

HARRIET MAXINE SYZE, LC No. 96-075610 NI

Defendant-Appellee. ON REHEARING

Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Hood and Hoekstra, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case arises out of the death of Michigan State Police
trooper Manuel Henry Fields. Plaintiff appeals as of right from
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
defendant. MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm. This case is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

Defendant struck and killed Trooper Fields as he was standing
on the shoulder of I-94, near the driver’s door of a vehicle that
he had stopped for a traffic violation. Defendant subsequently
pleaded no contest to negligent homicide, MCL 750.324; MSA
28.556. In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that
defendant was negligent in the operation of her motor vehicle and
that this negligence caused the decedent’s death. Defendant moved
for summary disposition, asserting that plaintiff’s action was
barred by the fireman’s rule. The circuit court agreed and
dismissed the action.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the fireman’s rule
precludes plaintiff’s cause of action against defendant for her
negligence in causing the death of Trooper Fields. The fireman’s
rule bars public safety officials such as fire fighters and
police officers from suing private parties for injuries sustained
in the course of the public safety officer’s employment. Miller
v Inglis, 162 Mich App 159, 162-163; 567 NW2d 253 (1997). The
fundamental rationale behind the rule is that fire fighters and
police officers are hired, specially trained, and paid to
confront dangerous situations, and they enter their professions
with the certain knowledge that their personal safety is at risk
while on duty. Kreski v Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co,
429 Mich 347, 371-372; 415 NW2d 178 (1987).

The Kreski Court recognized that the fireman’s rule is
not a bright-line rule, but instead is subject to "fine
tuning . . . to best balance the underlying rationales with the
interest of allowing recovery when those rationales are not
implicated." 429 Mich 371. Gibbons v Caraway, 455
Mich 314; 565 NW2d 663 (1997), represents the Court’s most recent
"fine tuning" of the rule. In Gibbons, the
plaintiff police officer was directing traffic at the scene of an
automobile accident when he was struck by a vehicle that swerved
for an undetermined reason. The officer’s suit against the
driver, Caraway, alleged that Caraway operated the vehicle in a
wanton, reckless, careless, negligent, or grossly negligent
manner. In four separate opinions, a majority of the Court
concluded that the fireman’s rule should not be applied. In an
opinion joined by Chief Justice Mallett and Justice Kelly,
Justice Cavanagh concluded that when a police officer responds to
an accident scene and is subsequently injured by a third party’s
"wanton, reckless, careless, negligent, or grossly
negligent" conduct, the fireman’s rule may not serve as a
bar to a tort action by the officer against the third party. 455
Mich 314, 325-326. Because there was a factual dispute concerning
the reason why Caraway swerved, Justice Cavanagh declined to
apply the fireman’s rule. Justice Boyle, joined by Justice
Brickley, concurred, but stated that "the fireman’s rule
does not bar a claim for damages for injuries caused by the
subsequent wrongdoing of a third party uninvolved with the
original act, where the wrongdoing resulted from wanton,
reckless, or grossly negligent behavior." 455 Mich 314,
329-330. Justice Boyle’s opinion specifically stated, that
"[i]n regard to carelessness or ordinary negligence,
however, the fireman’s rule bars the claim." Id., p
330. Justice Weaver concurred in the result, but for the reason
that application of the fireman’s rule should be limited to
premises liability cases. 455 Mich 314, 334. Finally, Justice
Riley stated that the fireman’s rule should apply to bar the
officer’s tort action because his injury stemmed directly from
his police function. 455 Mich 314, 339.

Reading Justice Cavanagh’s plurality opinion together with
Justice Boyle’s concurrence, it is apparent that a majority of
our Supreme Court agrees that the fireman’s rule may not apply,
and a tort action may be maintained, when a police officer has
responded to a call or an offense and is injured as a result of
the subsequent wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct of
an independent third party unconnected to the situation that
brought the officer to the scene. A majority does not
agree that the fireman’s rule bars a claim alleging carelessness
or ordinary negligence on the part of a third party unconnected
to the event to which the officer was responding.

In this case, plaintiff has never alleged that Trooper Fields’
death was the result of defendant’s wanton, reckless, or grossly
negligent operation of her vehicle. Further, the crime of which
defendant was convicted in connection with Trooper Fields’ death
– negligent homicide — involves only ordinary negligence. People
v Clark, 171 Mich App 656, 659; 431 NW2d 88 (1988). Under
these circumstances, the limited exception to the fireman’s rule
recognized by a majority of the Justices in Gibbons, supra,
does not apply. The trial court therefore properly concluded that
plaintiff’s complaint did not state a claim that avoids the
fireman’s rule.