Conclusion 27. The judgment in the NIE, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, was not supported by the intelligence. The Committee agrees with the State Department's alternative view that the available intelligence "does not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution."

Conclusion 29. Numerous intelligence reports provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was trying to procure high-strength aluminum tubes. The Committee believes that the information available to the Intelligence Community indicated that these tubes were intended to be used for an Iraqi conventional rocket program and not a nuclear program.

Conclusion 31. The Intelligence Community's position in the NIE that the composition and dimensions of the aluminum tubes exceeded the requirements for non nuclear applications, is incorrect.

Conclusion 33. The suggestion in the NIE that Iraq was paying excessively high costs for the aluminum tubes is incorrect.
In addition, 7075-T6 aluminum is not considerably more expensive than other more readily available materials for rockets as alleged in the NIE.

Conclusion 34. The analysis that the material composition of the tubes was unusual for rocket motor cases was incorrect, contradicted information later provided to the Committee, and represented a serious lapse for the agency with primary responsibility for conventional ground forces intelligence analysis.

Conclusion 38. The CIA’s initial reporting on its aluminum tube spin tests was, at a minimum, misleading and, in some cases, incorrect. The fact that these tests were not coordinated with other Intelligence Community agencies is an example of continuing problems with information sharing within the Intelligence Community.

Conclusion 39. Iraq's performance of hydrostatic pressure tests on the tubes was more indicative of their likely use for a rocket program than a centrifuge program.