In 1991, Brown University announced that it was going to eliminate four sports: women’s volleyball, women’s gymnastics, men’s golf, and men’s water polo. Brown University explained that the teams could still compete as club sports, but it was no longer able to provide university funding for ...
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In 1991, Brown University announced that it was going to eliminate four sports: women’s volleyball, women’s gymnastics, men’s golf, and men’s water polo. Brown University explained that the teams could still compete as club sports, but it was no longer able to provide university funding for financial reasons. At that time, Brown’s student body was comprised of 52 percent male and 48 percent female students, though 63 percent of its student-athletes were male.

On April 9, 1992, affected women students filed this class action lawsuit, claiming discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. The named plaintiffs include student members of the women's gymnastics and volleyball teams at Brown. The plaintiffs alleged that the decision to eliminate these teams was a violation of Title IX, because it was based on the stereotype that men are more interested in sports participation than are women.

On May 4, 1992, Brown filed a motion to dismiss. On May 12, 1992, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. On July 15, 1992, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On August 7, 1992, the court denied Brown's motion to dismiss.

On October 26, 1992, a bench hearing on the preliminary injunction was held over a period of 15 days. On December 22, 1992, the court (Judge Raymond Pettine) granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting Brown from eliminating the women’s gymnastics and volleyball programs. Specifically, in the preliminary injunction, the court ordered Brown to restore women's gymnastics and women's volleyball to their former status; prohibit the elimination or reduction in status or the reduction in the current level of university funding. 809 F. Supp. 978.

On December 29, 1992, appealed; First Circuit Court of Appeals granted a temporary stay, holding the injunction in abeyance while it decided the appeal. On April 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision on the preliminary injunction. The court held that trial judge did not abuse discretion by issuing an injunction, and the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 991 F.2d 888.

The actual trial on the merits began Sept. 28, 1994. On December 16, 1994, during the trial, the parties reached a Partial Settlement Agreement. The agreement settled plaintiffs' allegations that significant disparities exist in the relative financial support of and benefits given to men's and women's university-funded varsity teams. The inequality in funding between male and female varsity teams had never been in contention. The dispute involving the overall difference between male and female opportunities for participation continued. The Settlement Agreement regarding varsity teams "did not resolve any program-wide treatment inequities. Rather, it settled only the relative support afforded to men's and women's university-funded teams [as opposed to donor-funded teams] as to which there is no dispute concerning their university-funded varsity status." In essence, and as the docket stated on December 16, 1994, the "Settlement Agreement" was a stipulation acknowledging the inequality of opportunities to participate in university-funded activities, and a dismissal of the claims surrounding that issue. 879 F. Supp. 185.

The trial concluded with final arguments on Dec. 16, after 29 days in court. The attorneys addressed the court on a possible settlement on treatment issues, the discussed participation issues. Judge Pettine entered his final opinion and order, finding for the plaintiffs, on March 29, 1995. The court held that: (1) university violated Title IX by failing to effectively accommodate interests and abilities of women athletes, failing to steadily increase the number of opportunities for women, and failing to effectively remedy athletic interests and ability of women, and (2) two-tiered structure of intercollegiate varsity program failed to provide equal treatment of athletes. The defendant was given 120 days to come up with a comprehensive plan for complying with Title IX. 879 F. Supp. 185.

On April 19, 1995, Brown appealed the District Court's ruling. Brown claimed error in certain evidentiary rulings made during the trial and in the district court's order of specific relief in place of Brown's proposed compliance plan. In addition, Brown challenged on constitutional and statutory grounds the test employed by the district court in determining whether Brown's intercollegiate athletics program complies with Title IX.

On May 4, 1995, the district court subsequently issued a modified order, requiring Brown to submit a compliance plan within 60 days. Finding that Brown's proposed compliance plan was not comprehensive and that it failed to comply with the previous order, the district court rejected the plan and ordered in its place specific relief consistent with Brown's stated objectives in formulating the plan. On Aug 17, 1995, Brown University was ordered to elevate and maintain women's gymnastics, women's water polo, women's skiing, and women's fencing to university-funded varsity status.

The district court entered final judgment on September 1, 1995, and on September 27, 1995, denied Brown's motion for additional findings of fact and to amend the judgment. 879 F.Supp. 185.

Brown filed an appeal from the judgment of the District Court on September 1995. On November 21, 1996, the appellate court found no error in the district court's factual findings or in its interpretation and application of the law in determining that Brown violated Title IX in the operation of its intercollegiate athletics program. Applying the three-prong test of the Policy Interpretation, the court held that participation opportunities were not provided in substantial proportion to enrollment, that the university did not show either a practice of program expansion or full and effective accommodation of the interests and abilities of its women students. The court found that Brown had violated each of the 3 prongs of Title IX in that they did not: meet the substantially proportionate standard due to the 11% gap between opportunities for male and female athletes and their respective student enrollment; did not engage in the continued expansion of women’s sports previously. The appellate court affirmed in all respects the district court's analysis and rulings on the issue of liability.

However, the appellate court found error in the district court's award of specific relief and therefore remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of the remedy. The appellate court found Brown's proposal to cut men's teams was a permissible means of effectuating compliance with the statute. The appellate court stated that the district court was wrong to reject Brown's alternative plan to reduce the number of men's varsity teams. Chief Judge Juan Torruella dissented and indicated that he would have reversed the District Court's decision. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997).

Back in the district court, on April 21, 1997, Brown submitted a new proposed compliance plan. The plan included eliminating men's positions without eliminating any men's teams; enforcing team minimums and maximums to stabilize relative proportions of men and women; and creating additional women's intercollegiate opportunities. In order to comply with the court's criteria that "intercollegiate level participation opportunities [be] provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollment," Brown decided to calculate the ratio of female students to male students, and then, based on that number, mandate strict minimum participation numbers for female teams and strict maximum participation numbers for male teams. In the event that the court rejected Brown's plan, the proposal also included alternative plans to change the status of one or more men's teams from University-funded to Donor-Funded Status, or to eliminate one or more men's Varsity teams. The complaince agreement contained no duration information or enforcement information, possibly because Brown was still fighting against the judgment of the district court.(http://www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/1996-97/Plan.WD.html)

On June 23, 1998, following settlement discussions, the parties reached an agreement and settled all outstanding issues, except for attorneys' fees and expenses. The Settlement Agreement had "indefinite duration," and required relative participation on intercollegiate athletic teams to be within 3.5% of the gender ratio for undergraduate student enrollment. The agreement also stipulated that, in the event Brown added any new men's teams, the variation from the gender ratio of undergraduate student enrollment was to be no more than 2.25% and a women's team would need to be added at the same time. The settlement also defined funding for both men's and women's donor-funded teams in the years immediately following the settlement. Annual reports were to be published to the plaintiffs. Additionally, a provision was added to prevent retaliation against any person who opposed any Title IX violations by Brown. On June 23, 1998, the court gave interim approval to the settlement agreement. Following notice to the members of the class, the court on October 8, 1998, gave final approval to the settlement.

On October 16, 1998, the court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and established a schedule for the Plaintiffs to submit their fee application.

The plaintiffs' fee application was filed on December 7, 1998. Plaintiffs sought $1,023,842.50 in attorneys' fees and $104,182.25 for their expenses. With interest (calculated through December 31, 1998), the combined amount sought for attorneys fees and expenses exceeded $1.4 million dollars. Brown contested the fee. During that contest, the case was reassigned to Judge Paul Barbadoro; on the recommendation of Magistrate Judge David Martin, on December 5, 2001, he granted attorneys fees and and costs of $1.08 million. In 2003, again on the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, Judge Barbadoro granted another $250,000 for the fees incurred during the fee contest. Defendants appealed, but settled that appeal later in 2003.

The case is technically still active. The attorneys still receive reports on the relative participation of Brown's male and female students.

More on terms here: https://www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau//1997-98/97-148.html

The plaintiff class comprises all present, future, and potential Brown University women students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown.