4 Preface Farmers are exposed year round to a variety of risks, both market-related, such as price variations, and non-market-related, such as unfavourable weather, pests, and diseases. Such risks make agricultural production unstable from year to year, affecting the income and welfare of agricultural producers. If agricultural commodities are important food or export crops, the risks eventually reduce foreign exchange earnings and further lead to a lower national income and to reduced long-term productive investments in agriculture. Agricultural insurance, a financial tool to minimize the adverse effects of agricultural risks, has been devised to address the agricultural production or yield risks mainly due to adverse climate. As agriculture became more sophisticated, however, producers were demanding insurance to cover a greater number of risks. Complying with this demand and in order to overcome the limitations of traditional agricultural insurance that originate from the characteristics of agricultural risks (occurring over a wide area at the same time, etc.), new insurance products and schemes and alternatives have continuously been developed. This paper aims at identifying the recently developed innovative products and schemes of agricultural insurance, followed by some alternatives to insurance. It does not attempt to be a manual, but an introductory guide for policy-makers, farmers, and insurance planners. Acknowledgements The author wishes to express his special thanks to Calvin Miller, senior officer of the Rural Finance Group (RFG), Agricultural Management, Marketing and Finance Service (AGSF), who has given valuable suggestions and comments to improve the paper throughout the research period, and to Doyle Baker, Service Chief of AGSF, Richard Roberts, former Service Chief of the Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance Service (AGSM), and Anton Slangen, former senior officer of the RFG, who provided constructive guidelines during the research design. The author also wishes to thank the colleagues at the RFG for their visible and invisible support. Finally, my particular thanks should go to Barbara Hall, consultant editor, who has encouraged me to write my first English paper ever in my life with the least number of flaws. 3

6 I. Introduction The principle of insurance is risk-sharing. Agricultural insurance 1 is one of the financial tools used to manage the various risks that may arise in agricultural production. It operates by transferring the risks associated with farming to a third party via payment of a premium that reflects the true long-term cost of the insurer assuming those risks. In other words, the insurance agency is able to pool the risks by accepting appropriate premiums from a large number of clients. Agricultural insurance is able to reduce risk costs by spreading risks in such three ways, as shown in Table 1 (Hazell et al.1986, 37-38). Table 1 Risk spreading in agricultural insurance Where to spread risk How to spread risk (1) Among farmers Except in the case where crop risks are perfectly and positively correlated among farms, insurance pools among farms leads to an automatic reduction in the aggregate risk facing the insurance agency. (2) To other sectors of economy An insurance agency can diffuse crop risks to other sectors of the economy by offering a mix of insurance products and by reinsuring its policies with other institutions. If it is a government agency, it can also rely on the ultimate security afforded by the taxpayer. (3) Over time An insurance agency can spread risks over time by accumulating reserves. Since the proportion of farmers requiring indemnities in any one year is largely controllable, an insurer would also have a much better chance than an individual of surviving a run of bad years. In the recent past, the advent of some influential factors has renewed interest in agricultural insurance. Such factors for growth in demand for agricultural insurance are pointed out in Table 2 (Roberts, ). While stipulating reduction and phase out of direct support payments to farmers, the WTO regulations, inter alia, exempted the payments made by way of government financial participation in crop insurance schemes 2 from reduction commitment. These regulations have prompted an upsurge of interest of both developed and developing countries, as well as of insurance businesses. 1 Typically crop insurance : hereafter these two terms will be used interchangeably except when their distinction is necessary. 2 Item 8 of Annex 2 (Domestic Support: the Basis for Exemption from the Reduction Commitments) to the 1994 WTO Agreement on Agriculture: 8. Payments (made either directly or by way of government financial participation in crop insurance schemes) for relief from natural disasters (a) (b) Eligibility for such payments shall arise only following a formal recognition by government authorities that a natural or like disaster (including disease outbreaks, pest infestations, nuclear accidents, and war on the territory of the Member concerned) has occurred or is occurring; and shall be determined by a production loss which exceeds 30 per cent of the average of production in the preceding three-year period or a three-year average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and the lowest entry. Payments made following a disaster shall be applied only in respect of losses of income, livestock (including payments in connection with the veterinary treatment of animals), land or other production factors due to the natural disaster in question. 5

7 In light of this strong interest in and demand for agricultural insurance, this paper will at review how agricultural insurance products have evolved and then examine which innovative products have recently been developed and how they have been applied into practices. This paper is organized as follows: Chapter II reviews the evolution of traditional products of agricultural insurance, mainly insurance against yield risk and their inherent problems. Chapters III and IV examine several innovative insurance products and schemes as well as alternatives to insurance developed in the recent decade to cope with such problems using case examples of their application. Finally, Chapter V provides a summary and policy recommendations. Table 2 Renewed interest in agricultural insurance Factors 1. Increasing incidence of crop-damaging weather events of extreme severity 2. Farming becoming steadily more commercialized, with greater levels of financial investment 3. The WTO regulations exempting the governments from their subsidy reduction commitments, as regards assistance to agricultural insurance Remarks Farmers/investors and their banks will frequently examine the feasibility of using a financial mechanism, i.e. insurance, in order to address part of the risk to their financial investment. As a part of this trend to commercialization, greater use is now being made of contract farming arrangements, where insurance is one of many services provided to growers along with inputs. The WTO regulations generally forbid governments from subsidizing agriculture directly; however, they permit the subsidization of agricultural insurance. 4. New insurance products To reflect the dynamism of the farming sector and its environment, some new insurance products have been introduced in the last decade, such as crop revenue products and index or derivative products. 5. Accidental introduction of exotic pests/diseases 6. Expanded quality and food safety concerns for farm products as well as increasing environmental protection requirements including stricter rules for use of fertilizers, herbicides and medicines for animals This involves all countries where agriculture is an important part of the economy. Insurance can address the risk of a breakdown of these measures. Such trends are also likely to increase production risk. Insurance can also assist in managing the on-farm production risks as a result of changes in pest management practices, which are increasingly necessary in order to address environmental protection and food safety concerns. 7. Liberalization of agricultural trade This can be expected to lead to price volatility and to greater exposure of farmers to competitive market forces and income instability. (c) (d) (e) Payments shall compensate for not more than the total cost of replacing such losses and shall not require or specify the type or quantity of future production. Payments made during a disaster shall not exceed the level required to prevent or alleviate further loss as defined in criterion (b) above. Where a producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and under paragraph 7 (income insurance and income safety-net programmes), the total of such payments shall be less than 100 per cent of the producer's total loss. 6

8 II. Traditional insurance products and their problems (1) Traditional yield insurance products Single and named peril insurance The coverage of single peril insurance is against actual damage caused by single perils such as fire, hail, windstorm (and perils directly associated with this occurrence) or frost. Named peril insurance refers to insurance of specifically identified perils, typically covering approximately four specific ones. In some cases this number may be extended to six perils when two or more are very closely related (e.g. flood, excessive rain, or humidity) (FAO 1991, 76). In Western European countries, privately run hail crop insurance has been successfully practiced for around one century because it has been possible to set actuarially sound premiums and easy to verify damages and losses. There are a number of factors specific to hail damage that make it a much more favourable candidate for insurance than multi-peril or all risk cover insurance, which offer yield assurance in general (Quiggin 1994, ): (i) Hail damage risks are amenable to pooling. Given a moderate spread of locations, the likelihood that a large proportion will suffer from hail damage in any one year is fairly small. (ii) The lack of any major moral hazard problem 3 is another factor. There is nothing that can be done to mitigate its impact. This makes hail insurance more attractive. (iii) Adverse selection problems are also unlikely to be serious. While some localities are more hail-prone than others and some crops are more susceptible to damage than others, these facts can easily be taken into account in setting the premium rates. (iv) The absence of a correlation between hail damage for farmers in different regions means that prices are unlikely to be negatively correlated with hail damage. This reduces to some extent the problems of insufficient indemnity for covering the losses incurred by the farmer (measured by the differences between actual and expected yield at the price expected at the time the contract is sold), which are likely to occur in the multi-peril insurance. (v) A wide clientele has led to the successful development of private insurance markets against single peril (e.g. excess rainfall) including a certain number of agricultural industries, for example, tomato-related industries, and some non-agricultural industries, for example, outdoor entertainment. Although commercially viable, single or named peril insurance, however, is not sufficient to address a variety of agricultural risks from natural hazards to pests and diseases. As such, farmers are frequently interested in and demand multi-peril or all risk-inclusive insurance due to the broader impact of perils affecting all crop enterprises. Multi-peril or all risk insurance 3 Concerning moral hazard and adverse selection, see (2) Problems with the traditional yield insurance products in this chapter. 7

9 This insurance covers all perils 4 that could affect yield. Indemnities are paid when a farmer s actual yield falls below some predetermined threshold yield, and indemnity amounts are the shortfall in yield below that threshold multiplied by some predetermined price. According to a study, every multi-peril insurance programme that has progressed beyond infancy has been underwritten by a government. To our knowledge, attempts by private underwriters to provide multi-peril insurance have all failed. (Wright and Hewitt 1994, 76) In countries with multiple risk insurance schemes in place, government intervention or heavy support to agricultural insurance operations has been regarded as justifiable and inevitable due to market failures. 5 Such supports have been provided in the form of (i) subsidies on premiums to farmers; (ii) operation subsidies to private insurers to cover some of the high administrative costs associated with agricultural insurance contract underwriting; and (iii) subsidized reinsurance. The methods of government intervention also vary from country to country. For example, in Canada, Japan and the Philippines, the insurance schemes are operated under a central government or local government-commissioned body, while in the United States, Spain and Mexico, they are operated under a partnership between the government and private insurance companies with the former assuming the role of reinsurer of the latter. However, government support programmes are often fiscally burdensome, as seen in Table 3. To be profitable, the ratio of average administrative costs plus average indemnity payments to the average premiums collected must be less than one. Unfortunately, for most countries, the ratio has far exceeded one, indicating that the programmes have been unsustainable without subsidization. On the positive side, however, the current agricultural insurance programmes are also deemed an important vehicle for transferring support to the farm sector (Goodwin 2001) or a permanent income-transfer mechanism to benefit farmers (Siamwalla and Valdés 1986). 4 Events excluded from insurance are very exceptional (e.g. Art. 12, Basic Provisions, Common Crop Insurance Policy of FCIC under RMA, USDA available at RMA website ) (a) negligence, mismanagement, or wrongdoing by the insured, his or her family, tenants or employees; (b) the failure to follow recognized good farming practices for the insured crop; (c) water contained by any governmental, public, or private dam or reservoir project; (d) failure or breakdown of irrigation equipment or facilities: or (e) failure to carry out a good irrigation practice for the insured crop if applicable. 5 Wenner and Arias (2003) state: Private insurers have not been able to cope with systemic, non-diversifiable risk in crop yields stemming from say natural disasters affecting a large number of farms over a widespread region Portfolios of geographically dispersed crop insurance contracts can be as much as 20 times more risky than a equally valued portfolio of health and automobile insurance contracts Because of the geographic dispersion of clients in rural areas and the highly differentiated production characteristics of each farm, the administrative costs of effectively monitoring effort and differentiating between legitimate and fraudulent loss claims can be prohibitive. Makki (2003) adds another reason for public support: Farmers are not very risk averse or are unwilling to pay actuarially sound premiums because they find their own less costly methods to protect against loss, including savings, futures markets, and off-farm incomes. Berg (2002) presents more simply the specific preconditions to be fulfilled for an insurance market to be formed in which multiple risks can be covered: - identifiability and measurability of damage; - a large number of homogeneous and separate insured parties; - randomness and inalterability of damage; - calculability of risk; and - economically viable premiums. (pp as cited in Meyer 2002) 8

10 Table 3 Financial performance of agricultural insurance programmes: costs vs. premiums Brazil Costa Rica Japan Mexico Philippines USA. Country Time period (I+A)/P* * I indemnity payments; A administrative costs; P collected premiums Source: Skees 2003a. (2) Problems with the traditional yield insurance products Most basic insurance textbooks enumerate the necessary conditions for risks to be insurable. In assessing the insurability of crop loss risks, two of these conditions are particularly relevant: 6 (i) (ii) The risks should occur highly independently across insured individuals. The insurer and insured should have very nearly symmetric information regarding the probability distribution of the underlying risk. Traditional yield insurance, however, does not satisfy such conditions in the following respects: 7 (i) Correlation of crop risks Risks in agriculture stemming from natural disasters, pests or diseases affecting farms over a widespread region are systemic and not independent. These common risks are referred to as correlated risk. Unlike in other types of property and casualty insurance (e.g. automobile, fire), in agricultural insurance, all the farms in a given district are likely to suffer adverse conditions at the same time. Such correlation of systemic risks undermines an insurer s ability to diversify risks across farms, crops, or even regions, and prevents it from performing the essential function of an insurance intermediary: the pooling of risk across individuals. (Miranda and Glauber 1997) (ii) Asymmetric information Successful insurance programmes require that the insurer has adequate information about the nature of risks being insured. However, this is very difficult for farm-level yield insurance where farmers always know more about their potential crop yields than any insurer. Such asymmetric information exists in agriculture because of differences in inherent farm risks arising from factors such as the farm s location characteristics and farmers managerial abilities. 8 Asymmetry of information between the insurer and the insured brings about two types of problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. 6 Berliner, 1982, as cited in Miranda and Glauber (1997, 207) 7 Makki (2003); Miranda and Glauber (1997); Quiggin (1994); Skees (2003b); Wenner and Arias (2003); and World Bank (2004) 8 Knight and Coble (1997) cited in Makki (2003) 9

11 Adverse selection in insurance markets refers to the situation where insurers find it impossible or very expensive to distinguish between high-risk and low-risk insurance applicants and thus fail to set premiums commensurate with risk. Over time the low-risk clients drop out of the market, which is left with a very high-risk pool of clients with higher expected indemnities that negatively affect the insurer s profitability (Wenner and Arias 2003). Moral hazard occurs when producers, after purchasing insurance, alter their production practices in a manner that increases their chances of collecting indemnities. This problem arises from the fact that farmers can take a great many actions which affect their final yield (Quiggin 1994). 9 Many studies show that moral hazard affects the actuarial soundness of the multiple peril crop yield insurance and that it is likely to be a significant cause of excess losses in the crop insurance programme. Furthermore, they argue that the insured parties change their behaviour only in the years when losses appear imminent, and conclude that better monitoring in regions where substantial losses appear likely in a particular season or year could substantially reduce losses (Makki 2003). These two problems affect all insurance markets but more so in agricultural markets because obtaining information on clients is more difficult and monitoring client behavior is more costly. Moreover, because of the geographic dispersion of clients in rural areas and the highly differentiated production characteristics of each farm, the administrative costs of effectively monitoring effort and differentiating between legitimate and fraudulent loss claims can be prohibitive. If, on the other hand, loss coverage is set too low to discourage carelessness and negligence, the market can become very thin and the advantages gained by pooling risk types, the essence of insurance intermediation is lost (Wenner and Arias 2003). (3) Need for innovations As seen above, both correlation of crop risks and asymmetric information problems are likely to make risk pooling, the essential function of insurance ineffective. Therefore, the recent innovative instruments focus on tackling the traditional problems with agricultural insurance such as moral hazard, high transaction costs, adverse selection, and, most importantly, the problem of systemic climatic shocks to the agricultural sector. Although many of these instruments have been conceived and practiced in developed countries, they are also very promising for developing countries where most have high exposure to weather risks. Further, typical problems with traditional multi-crop insurance products, such as moral hazard and adverse selection, are exacerbated in developing countries with relatively higher numbers of smallholder farmers (Wenner and Arias 2003). Hence, international lending institutions such as the World Bank have recently intensified their role in enhancing the feasibility of the instruments in developing countries and complementing weak institutional capacity, weak infrastructure and a lack of information inherent in those countries For example, farmers can choose whether or not to apply pesticides and, if so, how much. They can choose varieties which have high yields but are highly susceptible to drought or insect attack, or instead, more robust but lower-yielding varieties. More subtle factors such as the care with which soil preparation and ploughing is undertaken may also have an impact. In all of these cases, it will be rational for insured farmers to choose techniques which involve a greater risk of failure. In the case of choosing between high yielding and robust varieties, an insured farmer will tend to choose the high yielding variety. If the season is good, he reaps the benefit. If it is bad, the insurer bears part of the cost (Quiggin 1994). 10 World Bank has set its future directions for lending with respect to agricultural risk management as the following, among others: (i) improving information systems; (ii) testing new approaches to agricultural insurance; (iii) promoting market-based price risk management; and (iv) emphasizing disaster planning rather than relief (World Bank 2004). 10

12 In the following two chapters, we will examine such innovative insurance products and schemes developed or being applied on trial in recent years. 11

13 III. Innovations of agricultural insurance products and schemes (1) Revenue insurance Insurance based on yield might not be very good compensation for income fluctuation, if price is variable. Revenue insurance was designed to provide a degree of price protection not just yield protection as under multi-peril crop insurance. It covers sharp drops in expected revenue, which may result from yield or price declines or a combination of the two. The revenue insurance products, which combine yield and price coverage, cover loss in value due to a change in market price during the insurance period, in addition to the perils covered by the standard loss of yield coverage. Indemnities are paid to farmers based on gross revenue shortfalls instead of yield or price shortfalls only. History in brief 11 The stage for revenue insurance was first set by the Congress and the Administration of the United States in the early 1980s. In the 1981 Farm Act, Congress mandated a study on the feasibility of revenue insurance. In nearly every relevant act since 1981, Congress mentioned revenue insurance. In both the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act and the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, Congress provided clear indications to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) on pilot testing of revenue insurance. Meanwhile in 1991, Canada s Gross Revenue Insurance Programme (GRIP) first introduced revenue insurance, but it was quite costly and interfered with market signals, largely because it used long-term average prices in establishing the guarantee. Therefore, after 1995 the programme was integrated into an income stabilization programme. 12 Based on this Canadian experience, all US revenue insurance products use an intra-year futures-based price in establishing guarantee, rather than a guarantee based on long-term average prices (Harwood et al.1999). In the United States, revenue insurance products, Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) and Income Protection (IP), first became available for new crops in selected areas in the 1996 crop year. Revenue Assurance (RA) was added in the 1997 crop year, and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) and Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) were added in the 1999 crop year. GRIP is also index-based insurance while AGR is also whole-farm insurance. These two products will be discussed under separate sections. Operation of products References to the evolution of revenue insurance products are based on Skees et al. (1998), Harwood et al. (1999) and Turvey (1992). 12 Since the Canadian GRIP paid indemnities based on a 15-year moving average of crop revenue, it ran into early problems because the guarantee was based on a long-run guarantee that reflected higher prices in early years. Because international commodity prices were low when GRIP was introduced, the revenue guarantee was too high to sustain. The programme was more of an income-enhancement programme than an insurance programme. This points out a significant problem in providing guarantees for long-term incomes (Skees et al. 1998). 13 The following details on the revenue insurance products being operated in the United States are taken from Harwood et al. (1999), Dismurke (1999 and 2002) and RMA, USDA website: 12

14 The first three plans introduced in the United States have many similar features, while they are also unique in many ways. (i) Similarities between CRC, IP and RA Indemnities are due when any combination of yield and price result in revenue below the revenue guarantee. All use the basic policy terms and conditions of the traditional individual-farm yield insurance, the Actual Production History (APH) plan of Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI). 14 APH provides the yield value used to calculate the revenue guarantee by using the insured s historical yield records. APH is the documentation process to measure the yield for the insurance period. Revenue protection for all products is provided by extending traditional APH protection to include price variability measured by the prices discovered in the commodity futures market. Price discovery occurs twice in all three plans: first, before the insurance period (Base price for CRC, Projected price for IP, Projected Harvest price for RA) to establish the guarantee and premium; then, at harvest time (Harvest price for CRC and IP; Fall Harvest price for RA). All of these revenue insurance plans pay the insured producer an indemnity when any combination of harvested and appraised yield times the harvest price results in insurance revenue that is less than the revenue guarantee. All revenue product contract prices are the average of the daily settlement prices for the commodity futures exchange, contract, and period listed in the insurance contract. Before insurance begins, the guarantee price (Base, Projected, or Projected Harvest price) is calculated using the average of the daily settlement prices at the commodity futures exchange during the month designated in the insurance contract. Near the end of the insurance period, the Harvest price (Harvest or Fall Harvest price) is calculated using the average of the daily settlement prices at the commodity futures exchange during the month designated in the insurance contract. These prices are available on the RMA website shortly after the close of each discovery period. (ii) Uniqueness of each product The uniqueness of each product as described below is found in the specifications of the guarantee and the producer s ability to subdivide acreage into individual parcels. More details on the three products will be elaborated below. Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) uses two prices to measure price fluctuation during the insurance period. Base price establishes the revenue guarantee. Harvest price establishes the crop value to count against the revenue guarantee, and is also used to recompute the revenue guarantee when it is higher than the Base price. Price fluctuations are measured by the difference between the average commodity price before insurance begins, the Base price, and the price at harvest time, the Harvest price. Price fluctuations between the Harvest and Base price are limited to US$1.50 for corn, US$0.70 for cotton, US$1.50 for grain sorghum, US$0.05 for rice, US$3.00 for soybeans and US$2.00 for 14 APH-MPCI, which still accounts for the bulk of the Federal crop insurance business, insures producers against yield losses due to natural causes such as drought, excessive moisture, hail, wind, frost, insects and disease. The farmer selects the unit guarantee level, from 50 to 75 percent (in some areas to 85 percent). The unit guarantee is calculated as a four-to ten-year simple average of the producer s actual production history (APH) yield on the insured parcel of land. If a producer does not have records of actual yields, the series is filled in with a transitional yield based on county average yields. The farmer also selects the percentage of the predicted price that he or she wants to insure, which is between 55 and 100 percent of the crop price established annually by RMA. If the harvest is less than the yield insured, the farmer is paid an indemnity based on the difference. Indemnities are calculated by multiplying this difference by the insured percentage of the established price selected when crop insurance was purchased. 13

15 wheat. Any indemnity payments will be paid after the Harvest price and actual production are determined. CRC policyholders can select any county/crop combination, but must insure all acreage of the insured crop in the county in which they have an interest. Insurance is offered by units that describe acreage and location. Basic units are determined by ownership, owner-operator and cash rent, or each sharing entity. Basic units can be subdivided into Optional units that are determined by location and/or production practice. Each proposed Optional unit must be supported by the producer s historic records of planted acreage and harvested production. The revenue guarantee applies individually to each Basic or Optional unit. Producers may choose to create an Enterprise unit defined as the entire acreage of the insured crop in the county in which the insured has a share from several Basic or Optional units and receive a premium discount. Producers choose the amount of revenue protection that meets their risk management needs by selecting a coverage level between 50 and 75 percent (85 percent coverage level is available for selected crops and counties). The CRC revenue guarantee is calculated by multiplying the APH yield times the insured s chosen coverage level times the higher of the Base price, or the Harvest price. Therefore, CRC coverage can increase when the Harvest price is greater than the Base price. CRC policyholders are due an indemnity when the harvested and appraised yield times the Harvest price is less than the revenue guarantee. The CRC policy provides insurance protection for unavoidable loss of revenue due to insured causes of loss, including market prices. Exclusions are the same as in the MPCI policy. 15 Income Protection (IP) uses two prices to measure price fluctuation during the insurance period. Projected price establishes the revenue guarantee. Harvest price establishes the crop value to count against the revenue guarantee. Price fluctuations are measured by the difference between the average commodity price before insurance begins, Projected price, and the price at harvest time, Harvest price. Indemnity will be paid when the appraised production and the Harvest price are determined. Producers must insure all of their crop acreage in the county as a single parcel, an Enterprise unit, as referred to in the CRC. Producers choose the amount of revenue protection that meets their risk management needs by selecting either catastrophic coverage (CAT) 16 or a coverage level between 50 and 75 percent (85 percent coverage is available for selected crops and counties). The IP revenue guarantee is the insured s selected coverage level times the APH yield times the Projected price. IP policyholders are due an indemnity when the harvested and appraised yield times the Harvest price is less than the guarantee. If producers select the CAT level of protection and pay the administrative fee, no premium is due. Beginning with the 1999 crop year, the Indexed IP (IIP) pilot programme is available for selected crops and counties. IIP is identical to regular IP except in how the APH approved yield is calculated. This pilot programme makes a higher yield guarantee available in areas that have experienced unusually low yields in recent years and the traditional APH approved yields may not reflect the insured crop s expected yield. Indexing producer yields alleviates this problem. The indexing process uses county data to minimize the effect of unusually low yields. The approved APH yield for the Indexed IP policy is calculated by subtracting the average of producer s reported yields at the enterprise unit level from the county average yields for the same years, then subtracting that difference from the county s expected yield for the current crop year. The IP policy provides 15 See footnote Catastrophic Coverage (CAT) is crop insurance coverage at the lowest level. Coverage is set at the 50/55 level, meaning that yield must fall below 50 percent of average yield before a loss is paid, and such losses are paid at a rate of 55 percent of the highest price election. The premium on CAT coverage is paid by the government; however, producers must pay only a fixed administrative fee for each crop insured in each county. 14

16 insurance protection for unavoidable loss of revenue due to insured causes of loss, including low market prices. Exclusions are the same as in the MCPI policy. Revenue Assurance (RA) also uses two prices to measure price fluctuation during the insurance period. Projected Harvest price establishes the revenue guarantee. The Fall Harvest price establishes the crop value to count against the revenue guarantee. Price fluctuations are measured by the difference between the average commodity price before insurance begins, Projected Harvest price, and the price at harvest time, Fall Harvest price. The Fall Harvest price is used to recompute the revenue guarantee when the Fall Harvest price option is elected and the Fall Harvest price is higher than the Projected Harvest price. Indemnity payments will be paid when the harvest price and appraised production and Harvest price are determined. RA policyholders must insure all the acreage of the insured crop in the county in which they have an interest. However, they may select from several unit organizations: basic, optional, enterprise, or whole farm. Basic units are determined by ownership, owner-operator and cash rent, or each sharing entity. Basic units can be subdivided into Optional units that are determined by location and/or production practice, each proposed Optional unit must be supported by historic records of planted acreage and yield. RA provides a premium discount if the insured elects an Enterprise unit. An additional premium discount is available when the insured elects the Whole farm unit, which is the entire acreage of the insured crop in the county in which the insured has a share. In these cases, the premium discount is justified by a higher degree of self-insurance. The RA unit revenue guarantee is the insured s selected coverage level (from 65 percent with 5 percent increments to 85 percent) times the APH yield for the unit times the Projected Harvest price. RA indemnities are paid if the harvested and appraised yield times the Harvest price is less than the per-acre revenue guarantee times the number of acres. Table 4 shows a side-by-side comparison outlining the major features of the above three revenue insurance products. Growing participation in revenue insurance According to Dismurke, in the United States, revenue insurance participation has grown steadily since its introduction, reaching 43 percent of all acres insured in the crop insurance programme in Around 60 percent of the insured acres of corn and wheat and 37 percent of the acres of soybeans were covered by revenue insurance. The following are ascribed to this growing participation (Dismurke 2002): (i) Farmers are ultimately interested in dollars, not in bushels, and revenue coverage guarantees a specific revenue, regardless of whether low revenue results from low yields or from low prices. (ii) CRC, by far the most widely available and most popular form of revenue insurance, offers a feature that increases the revenue guarantee if the crop price at harvest is higher than the price used to establish coverage prior to planting. Farmers who believe prices are likely to rise in years when they have yield losses may find this feature appealing. RA with a harvest price option provides similar coverage. IP does not have this feature. (iii) The price used to establish the coverage level of CRC has often been slightly higher than that used to establish the value of a crop under MPCI yield insurance. CRC, RA and IP establish their coverage using futures market prices, which have in many cases been higher than the maximum prices used for yield insurance indemnities. 15

17 (iv) Revenue insurance products provide protection against declines in price during the crop growing season and not against declines that occur between growing seasons or over several seasons. Prices of revenue coverage are determined when insurance guarantees are set at planting based on prices of futures contracts with delivery dates near harvest time. This procedure keeps the value of insurance consistent with the expected value of the crop. Table 4 Comparison of the three revenue insurance products Feature CRC IP RA Basic, optional, or enterprise units Unit organization Basis for insurance guarantee Maximum protection unit price increase Reference commodity price Higher of 1) APH yield Base price; or 2) APH yield Harvest price Insurance guarantee increases when the Harvest price exceeds the Base price corn US$1.50 cotton US$0.70 grain sorghum US$1.50 rice US$0.05 soybeans US$3.00 wheat US$2.00 For corn, cotton, rice, soybeans and wheat, 100% of the selected commodity contract traded on a commodity futures exchange Enterprise unit (all acreage of the insured crop in the county in which the insured has interest) APH yield Projected price Not applicable For corn, cotton, soybeans, and wheat, 100% of selected commodity contract traded on a commodity futures exchange Basic, optional, enterprise, or Whole farm units (all RA insurable crop acreage in the county in which the insured has an interest) APH yield Projected Harvest price Harvest price option increases the guarantee when the Harvest price exceeds the Projected Harvest price Not applicable 100% of selected commodity contract traded on a commodity futures exchange Grain sorghum is 95% of the corn futures Grain sorghum is 90% of the corn futures Eligibility for high-risk land Coverage levels High-risk land is eligible for coverage if elected by insured 50-75% in 5% increments, except 50-85% where 85% APH is available CAT is not available Barley is 85% of the corn futures High-risk land is not eligible for coverage 50-75%, except 50-85% where 85% APH is available CAT is 27.5% High-risk land is eligible for coverage if elected by insured 65-75%, except 65-85% for Whole farm and Enterprise units CAT is not available Hail and fire exclusion Insured crops Premium rating Not available Not available Not available Corn, cotton, grain sorghum, rice, soybeans and wheat APH base rate plus low price factor plus high price factor plus CRC factor Source: RMA, USDA website: Barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, soybeans and wheat New rating model incorporating yield and price variability Corn, feed barley, canola/rapeseed, soybeans, sunflowers and spring wheat New rating model incorporating yield and price variability and yield and price correlation 16

18 (2) Whole farm insurance This insurance product offers coverage on a whole-farm basis rather than on a crop-by-crop basis. The whole farm insurance product was first introduced in 1999 in the United States as Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR), an expansion of revenue insurance. 17 AGR provides protection against low revenue due to unavoidable natural disasters and market fluctuations that occur during the insurance year. Under this programme, a producer can insure gross revenue from all farm commodities, including incidental amounts of income from animals, animal products and aquaculture reared in a controlled environment. AGR bases insurance coverage on income from agricultural commodities reported on a producer's Schedule F tax form 18 to calculate the policy revenue guarantee. AGR provides insurance coverage for multiple agricultural commodities in one insurance product, therefore targeting crop producers particularly specialty crops for which individual crop insurance programmes are not presently available. AGR liability (protection) is calculated by multiplying the approved adjusted gross revenue by the coverage level (65 percent, 75 percent and 80 percent) selected by the producer. Coverage levels and payment rates can vary with the number of crops produced and are selected by the producer from the county actuarial document. A producer selects one amount of coverage. Loss payments are triggered when the adjusted income for the insured year is less than the AGR liability. Once a revenue loss is triggered, the insured is paid based on the payment rate selected, either 75 percent or 90 percent of each dollar lost. For example, if a farm with approved AGR of US$ bought an AGR insurance policy of an 80 percent coverage level and a 90 percent payment rate, the farm s AGR liability (protection guarantee) would be US$ (= US$ percent). If the farm earned its adjusted gross income of US$ for the insured year, its loss of revenue would be US$ (= US$ US$21 000) and its due indemnity would be US$ (= US$ percent). Whole-farm insurance is less likely to distort markets because it is less likely to influence farmers planting and other management decisions than some other insurance plans. By using coverage levels based on gross sales receipts reported on the Schedule F tax form, the costs of administration and delivery of the insurance programmes could be greatly reduced (Makki 2002). (3) Price insurance Price insurance products are designed to provide price protection only. Unlike crop farmer s income, livestock producer s income is affected more by market price changes than production volatility. Two price insurance products have been available for livestock producers in the United States. 19 (i) Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) LRP protects against decreases in the market value of insured cattle and swine. LRP protects producers of swine, feeder cattle and fed cattle against a decline in market prices below the established 17 The following details on AGR are taken from the RMA, USDA website: 18 In the United States, farmers must report annually to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to declare their taxable income from trade or business of farming by completing and filing a Schedule F form. 19 The following details on LRP and LGM are taken from the RMA, USDA website: 17

19 coverage price. Coverage prices are based on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange s (CME s) Feeder Cattle Contract, which is settled to the CME Index. Producers may select from a variety of coverage levels ranging from 70 to 95 percent and periods of insurance to correspond with the time their hogs or cattle would normally be marketed. LRP may be purchased continuously throughout the year. For an illustration of indemnity calculation, let us observe an operation with 100 head of feeder cattle, a target weight of 7.5 cwt 20 each and a coverage price of US$75 live cwt. If the actual ending value is US$70 per live cwt, an indemnity is due, since US$70 is less than the coverage price of US$ head times the 7.5 cwt target weight equals the target weight of 750 cwt; 2. subtracting the actual ending value of US$70 from the coverage price of US$75 equals $5/cwt; 3. multiplying 750 cwt by US$5/cwt equals an indemnity payment of US$ Sales for LRP Feeder Cattle and Fed Cattle were suspended on 23 December 2003 when bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was detected in the State of Washington. In order to address these and other abnormal occurrences, changes were submitted by the product developer. On 29 July 2004, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) Board of Directors approved the resumption of sales and expansion of the LRP programme for fed and feeder cattle and swine pending final policy revisions and the determination of a sales date by RMA. Until July 2004 when the resumption of sales was approved, several regulations were modified. The modified regulations stipulate for long-term suspension and resumption of sales in cases of catastrophic events or highly volatile futures market prices. A new daily limit of premium by class of livestock was also included. Provisions were added to suspend sales for any endorsement period that involves rating based on a futures contract that is above or below the limit allowed by the CME. (ii) Livestock Gross Margin (LGM) Livestock Gross Margin (LGM), available only for swine, protects against decreases in the margin between the market value of the animal and the cost of feed inputs. Approved together with LRP as another pilot insurance programme on hog prices in November 2001, LGM provides protection against the loss of gross margin (market value of livestock minus feed costs) on the swine. LGM does not insure against death loss or any other loss or damage to the producer s hogs. The indemnity at the end of the six-month insurance period is the difference, if positive, between the gross margin guarantee and the actual gross margin. LGM uses simple averages of futures contract daily settlement prices to determine the Expected Gross Margin and the Actual Gross Margin. The price the producer receives at the local market is not used in these calculations. LGM is sold on the last business day of each month, so producers can sign up for LGM twelve times per year and insure all of the hogs they expect to market over a rolling six month insurance period. (4) Index-based insurance Index-based insurance products pay indemnities based on changes in the value of an index rather than on actual losses incurred by the farmer. Various events can be used as indices: weather variables (rainfall, temperature, wind speed, etc.), area yield, price and even mortality rate of livestock. 20 Cwt is a unit of weight in the US Customary System equal to 100 pounds (45.36 kg). 18

20 Advantages Index insurance products have several advantages relative to traditional insurance products. 21 Index insurance products are not susceptible to common insurance problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Both of these problems are caused by the fact that relevant information is asymmetrically distributed that is, policyholders (or potential policyholders) typically have better information about their risk exposure than does the insurer. In the long run, both of these problems can cause insurers to increase premium rates, driving lower-risk insurance purchasers out of the market. Index insurance products, however, eliminate the problem of moral hazard because indemnities are based on an index over which the policyholder has no control, and avoid adverse selection problems since there is no information asymmetry between the insurer and the insured. In other words, the policy-holder likely has no better information than the insurer about the potential realized values of the index (and hence, the probability of an indemnity occurring or potential magnitude of an indemnity). 22 They have less potential for error and lower transaction costs because they do not require individual contracts and on-field inspections or loss adjustment. It is very difficult to make accurate estimates of farm-level expected yields and to verify the accuracy of the documentation provided. However, index insurance products require no such historic or actual farm-level yield data. The only data required are historical values of the index. These data are generally available for much longer periods of time than the farm-level yield data required for farmlevel yield and revenue insurance products. In addition, the data are typically easily accessible, transparent, and verifiable. A reason for less error comes from the fact that they require no farm-level loss adjustment, which even with careful adjustment procedures simply cannot avoid errors in calculating the true realized value for yields. In contrast, there should be far less error in calculating the true realized value for most index insurance products. The transaction cost savings occur primarily in two areas the establishment of the insurance trigger and loss adjustment: With index insurance products, the purchasers need not provide historic farm-level yield data to establish a yield guarantee, because trigger is based on the expected value of the index rather than individual historic yields. This is particularly beneficial to new farmers, in addition to those farming new parcels of land, those who do not maintain historic yield documentation, or those who simply prefer not to disclose their historic yield data required for traditional insurance products. Even growers who have been farming the same parcels for many years may find it time-consuming to locate the documents needed to verify historical yield records. Whatever the reason, index insurance products are of benefit to growers who cannot or do not wish to provide farm-level yield data. Similarly, sales agents benefit because they are not required to collect and document grower-provided yield records. Loss adjustment is also less costly for index insurance than for traditional insurance products. Once the realized value of the index has been established (e.g. agricultural statistics authorities and weather station in the case of area-based index and weather-based index insurance, 21 Barnett (2004), Skees, Hazell and Miranda (1999), and Hess, Richter and Stoppa (2002) were used as references for discussions on advantages and limitations. 22 Taking the example of area-based yield insurance as shown below, policies are sold only in regions with sufficient acreage so that no individual grower s yield will significantly affect the realized region average yield (i.e. the index). Thus, unlike traditional insurance products, indemnities are based on an index over which the policyholder has no control. Further, there is no reason to believe that growers have any better information about expected region average yields than does the insurer. Since there is no information asymmetry, there should be no problems with moral hazard or adverse selection (Barnett 2004). 19

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