This opinion is subject to
further editing.If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.

A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals.SeeWis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.

Appeal No.

2012AP1439-CR

Cir. Ct.
No.2010CM6353

STATE OF WISCONSIN

IN COURT OF
APPEALS

DISTRICT I

State of Wisconsin,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Kenney Wayne Madlock,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for MilwaukeeCounty:MARY M. Kuhnmuench,
Judge.Affirmed.

¶1FINE, J. Kenney Wayne Madlock appeals the
judgment entered after a bench trial convicting him of knowingly violating a
domestic-abuse injunction. See Wis.
Stat. § 813.12(4) & (8). The injunction was sought by T.M., and was
entered on May 18, 2010,
when T.M. and Madlock were still married. They were divorced about one week before the
mid-June, 2011, bench trial.

¶2As material, the injunction directed Madlock to “avoid the
petitioner’s [T.M.’s] residence,” and was to “be effective until 5/18/14.” (Uppercasing,
bolding, and underlining omitted.). He
claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding
of guilt. We affirm.

I.

¶3T.M. testified at the bench trial that on October 23, 2010, she was with
Madlock’s sister, with whom she was friends, sitting in the sister’s car. The car was parked in front of T.M.’s house. At the time, she and Madlock were “in the
process of getting divorced.” T.M. told
the trial court that she and the sister “were sitting in the car talking and I
was going back in my home.” After
approximately ten minutes, she “was stepping out of her car when” she saw
Madlock drive around the corner onto 16th Street, which ran in front of her
house. She testified that Madlock was
driving a “Ford Econoline truck” that he used although it was registered in her
name. According to T.M., Madlock
“actually went past the [sister’s] car and stopped about a car length or so in
front of his sister’s car.” “The truck
stopped and he reversed it. Then he came
to block his sister’s parked car.” She
further explained on cross-examination:“He went past the car, her car. He
stopped. He then put it in reverse and
backed up. He blocked her car.”

¶4T.M. told the trial court that approximately “three or four
minutes” had elapsed from the time she saw Madlock turn onto her street until
he backed up to block his sister’s car.

QAnd during this time is there any eye
contact being made?

AYes.

QAnd how
far away are you from it?

AAbout 15
feet.

QFifteen
feet? Is he in the car or out of the
car?

AHe was in
the truck.

QAnd are
you in your [sic] car or out of the
car?

AI was
out of the car.

She went into her house and
called the police. Madlock was gone by
the time the police arrived some fifteen minutes later. T.M. told the trial court that the incident
made her “[v]ery upset and nervous. I
just couldn’t sleep.”

¶5Madlock testified at the trial. Although he admitted driving on the street
that ran past T.M.’s house, and also admitted that he saw T.M. standing near
his sister’s car when he turned onto the street, he denied stopping, making eye
contact with her, or trying to harass her. He testified that he was merely trying to show
a friend where he used to live.

¶6Madlock told the trial court that he recognized that the
injunction directed that he “avoid” T.M.’s house. Significantly, during re-direct examination by
his trial lawyer, Madlock admitted that he would have violated the harassment
injunction if he had stopped, as T.M. testified he did:

QYou just
drove straight by?

AJust
drove straight by minding my own business.

QDid you
think you were violating that order?

ANo.

QDo you
think right now you violated that order?

ANo.

QWhat if
you would have stopped?

AI would
have violated.

QIf you would have like stared at her or
parked or anything?

AI would
have violated it then.

QBut you
didn’t do that?

ANo.

Madlock said that T.M.’s
testimony—as summarized by his trial lawyer—that he “stopped and parked there
for a period of time and looked at her” was “not true.”

¶7The trial court found that T.M. was a credible witness and
that Madlock’s denials were not credible. Accordingly, as noted, it found Madlock guilty
of violating the domestic-abuse injunction.

II.

¶8As seen from Part I, this is a simple case, although the
transcript is larded with much inconsequentia that the briefs discuss in
distracting detail. The key issue is
whether the trial court was justified in believing T.M.’s testimony; if it was,
then, as Madlock admitted during the trial, he violated the injunction.

¶9The scope of our review is severely limited by the reality
that either a jury or a judge sitting as the trier of fact is better able to
assess testimonial evidence than are we, limited as we are to a cold
transcript:

When reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence, we will reverse a conviction only if “the evidence, viewed
most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so insufficient in probative
value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of fact,
acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, an appellate court must “search the
record to support the conclusion reached by the fact finder.” [This] rule applies to court trials.

Credible evidence placed Mr.
Madlock in a “truck,” on 16th Street, in front of[T.M.]’s
residence, on October 23, 2010. As Mr.
Madlock drove down 16th Street, he saw [T.M.], stopped his truck,
reversed it (remaining in the vehicle; on a public street), looked at [T.M.]
(from an estimated distance of 15 feet), and drove away.

(Emphasis in original, Record
references omitted.).Yet, immediately
after this summary, Madlock’s appellate brief asserts:“Considering these facts, Mr. Madlock
asks this Court to find that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” We
disagree.

¶10Given T.M.’s testimony, which the trial court found credible,
and Madlock’s awareness that had he
stopped in front of T.M.’s house, as T.M. testified he did, he would have violated the injunction, any
contention that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that
he knowingly violated the injunction’s direction to “avoid” T.M.’s “residence”
borders on the frivolous. Further, given the trial court’s findings, this case
is not, as Madlock seems to contend, his merely driving on a public street past
T.M.’s house—either inadvertently or unknowingly. The harassment order required that Madlock
“avoid” T.M.’s house. He knowingly did
not. Accordingly, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.