[Mr. Pendleton:] Permit me to deliver a few sentiments
on the great and important subject of previous and subsequent
amendments. When I sat down to read that paper,
I did not read it with an expectation that it was perfect,
and that no man would object to it. I had learned, sir, that
an expectation of such perfection in any institute devised
by man, was as vain as the search for the philosopher's
stone. I discovered objections--I thought I saw there some
sown seeds of disunion--not in the immediate operation
of the government, but which might happen in some future
time. I wish amendments to remove these. But these remote
possible errors may be eradicated by the amendatory
clause in the Constitution. I see no danger in making the
experiment, since the system itself points out an easy mode
of removing any errors which shall have been experienced.
In this view, then, I think we may safely trust in the
government. With respect to the eight states who have already
acceded to it, do gentlemen believe that, should we
propose amendments as the sine qua non of our adoption,
they would listen to our proposals? I conceive, sir, that
they would not retract. They would tell us--No, gentlemen,
we cannot accept of your conditions. You put yourselves
upon the ground of opposition. Your amendments are dictated by
local considerations. We, in our adoption, have been influenced
by considerations of general utility to the Union. We cannot abandon
principles, like these, to gratify you. Thus, sir, by previous
amendments, we present a hostile countenance. If, on the
contrary, we imitate the conduct of those states, our language
will be conciliatory and friendly. Gentlemen, we put
ourselves on the same ground that you are on. We are not
actuated by local considerations, but by such as affect the
people of America in general. This conduct will give our
amendments full weight.

I was surprised when I heard introduced the opinion of
a gentleman (Mr. Jefferson) whom I highly respect. I
know the great abilities of that gentleman. Providence has,
for the good of mankind, accompanied those extensive
abilities with a disposition to make use of them for the
good of his fellow-beings; and I wish, with all my heart,
that he was here to assist us on this interesting occasion.
As to his letter, impressed as I am with the force of his
authority, I think it was improper to introduce it on this
occasion. The opinion of a private individual, however enlightened,
ought not to influence our decision. But, admitting
that this opinion ought to be conclusive with us, it
strikes me in a different manner from the honorable gentleman.
I have seen the letter in which this gentleman has
written his opinion upon this subject. It appears that he is
possessed of that Constitution, and has in his mind the
idea of amending it--he has in his mind the very question,
of subsequent or previous amendments, which is now under
consideration. His sentiments on this subject are as follows:
"I wish, with all my soul, that the nine first conventions
may accept the new Constitution, because it will
secure to us the good it contains, which I think great and
important. I wish the four latest, whichever they be, may
refuse to accede to it till amendments are secured." He
then enumerates the amendments which he wishes to be
secured, and adds, "We must take care, however, that neither
this nor any other objection to the form, produce a
schism in our Union. That would be an incurable evil; because
friends falling out never cordially reunite." Are
these sentiments in favor of those who wish to prevent its
adoption by previous amendments? He wishes the first
nine states to adopt it. What are his reasons? Because he
thinks it will secure to us the good it contains, which he
thinks great and important; and he wishes the other four
may refuse it, because he thinks it may tend to obtain necessary
amendments. But he would not wish that a schism
should take place in the Union on any consideration. If,
then, we are to be influenced by his opinion at all, we shall
ratify it, and secure thereby the good it contains. The Constitution
points out a plain and ordinary method of reform,
without any disturbance or convulsions whatever. I
therefore think that we ought to ratify it, in order to secure
the Union, and trust to this method for removing
those inconveniences which experience shall point out.

. . . . .

[Mr. Henry] The honorable gentleman has endeavored
to explain the opinion of Mr. Jefferson, our common
friend, into an advice to adopt this new government. What
are his sentiments? He wishes nine states to adopt, and
that four states may be found somewhere to reject it. Now,
sir, I say, if we pursue his advice, what are we to do? To
prefer form to substance? For, give me leave to ask, what
is the substantial part of his counsel? It is, sir, that four
states should reject. They tell us that, from the most authentic
accounts, New Hampshire will adopt it. When I
denied this, gentlemen said they were absolutely certain of
it. Where, then, will four states be found to reject, if we
adopt it? If we do, the counsel of this enlightened and
worthy countryman of ours will be thrown away; and for
what? He wishes to secure amendments and a bill of
rights, if I am not mistaken. I speak from the best information,
and if wrong, I beg to be put right. His amendments
go to that despised thing, called a bill of rights, and
all the rights which are dear to human nature--trial by
jury, the liberty of religion and the press, &c. Do not gentlemen
see that, if we adopt, under the idea of following
Mr. Jefferson's opinion, we amuse ourselves with the
shadow, while the substance is given away? If Virginia be
for adoption, what states will be left, of sufficient respectability
and importance to secure amendments by their rejection?
As to North Carolina, it is a poor, despised place. Its
dissent will not have influence to introduce any amendments.
Where is the American spirit of liberty? Where will
you find attachment to the rights of mankind, when Massachusetts,
the great northern state, Pennsylvania, the
great middle state, and Virginia, the great southern state,
shall have adopted this government? Where will you find
magnanimity enough to reject it? Should the remaining
states have this magnanimity, they will not have sufficient
weight to have the government altered. This state has
weight and importance. Her example will have powerful
influence--her rejection will procure amendments. Shall
we, by our adoption, hazard the loss of amendments? Shall
we forsake that importance and respectability which our
station in America commands, in hopes that relief will
come from an obscure part of the Union? I hope my countrymen
will spurn at the idea.

The necessity of amendments is universally admitted. It
is a word which is reëchoed from every part of the continent.
A majority of those who hear me think amendments
are necessary. Policy tells us they are necessary. Reason,
self-preservation, and every idea of propriety, powerfully
urge us to secure the dearest rights of human nature. Shall
we, in direct violation of these principles, rest this security
upon the uncertainty of its being obtained by a few states,
more weak and less respectable than ourselves, and whose
virtue and magnanimity may be overborne by the example
of so many adopting states? Poor Rhode Island, and North
Carolina, and even New York, surrounded with federal
walls on every side, may not be magnanimous enough to
reject; and if they do reject it, they will have but little influence
to obtain amendments. I ask, if amendments be
necessary, from whence can they be so properly proposed
as from this state? The example of Virginia is a powerful
thing, particularly with respect to North Carolina, whose
supplies must come through Virginia. Every possible opportunity
of procuring amendments is gone, our power
and political salvation are gone, if we ratify unconditionally.
The important right of making treaties is upon the
most dangerous foundation. The President, and a few senators,
possess it in the most unlimited manner, without any
real responsibility, if, from sinister views, they should
think proper to abuse it; for they may keep all their measures
in the most profound secrecy, as long as they please.
Were we not told that war was the case wherein secrecy
was the most necessary? But, by the paper on your table,
their secrecy is not limited to this case only. It is as unlimited
and unbounded as their powers. Under the abominable
veil of political secrecy and contrivance, your most valuable
rights may be sacrificed by a most corrupt faction,
without having the satisfaction of knowing who injured
you. They are bound by honor and conscience to act with
integrity, but they are under no constitutional restraint.
The navigation of the Mississippi, which is of so much importance
to the happiness of the people of this country,
may be lost by the operation of that paper. There are
seven states now decidedly opposed to this navigation. If
it be of the highest consequence to know who they are who
shall have voted its relinquishment, the federal veil of secrecy
will prevent that discovery. We may labor under the
magnitude of our miseries without knowing or being able
to punish those who produced them. I did not wish that
transactions relative to treaties should, when unfinished,
be exposed; but it should be known, after they were concluded,
who had advised them to be made, in order to
secure some degree of certainty that the public interest
shall be consulted in their formation.

We are told that all powers not given are reserved. I am
sorry to bring forth hackneyed observations. But, sir, important
truths lose nothing of their validity or weight, by
frequency of repetition. The English history is frequently
recurred to by gentlemen. Let us advert to the conduct of
the people of that country. The people of England lived
without a declaration of rights till the war in the time of
Charles I. That king made usurpations upon the rights of
the people. Those rights were, in a great measure, before
that time undefined. Power and privilege then depended
on implication and logical discussion. Though the declaration
of rights was obtained from that king, his usurpations
cost him his life. The limits between the liberty of the
people, and the prerogative of the king, were still not
clearly defined.

The rights of the people continued to be violated till the
Stuart family was banished, in the year 1688. The people
of England magnanimously defended their rights, banished
the tyrant, and prescribed to William, Prince of Orange,
by the bill of rights, on what terms he should reign;
and this bill of rights put an end to all construction and
implication. Before this, sir, the situation of the public liberty
of England was dreadful. For upwards of a century,
the nation was involved in every kind of calamity, till the
bill of rights put an end to all, by defining the rights of
the people, and limiting the king's prerogative. Give me
leave to add (if I can add any thing to so splendid an example)
the conduct of the American people. They, sir,
thought a bill of rights necessary. It is alleged that several
states, in the formation of their government, omitted a bill
of rights. To this I answer, that they had the substance of
a bill of rights contained in their constitutions, which is the
same thing. I believe that Connecticut has preserved it, by
her Constitution, her royal charter, which clearly defines
and secures the great rights of mankind--secures to us the
great, important rights of humanity; and I care not in
what form it is done.

Of what advantage is it to the American Congress to
take away this great and general security? I ask, Of what
advantage is it to the public, or to Congress, to drag an
unhappy debtor, not for the sake of justice, but to gratify
the malice of the plaintiff, with his witnesses, to the federal
court, from a great distance? What was the principle that
actuated the Convention in proposing to put such dangerous
powers in the hands of any one? Why is the trial by
jury taken away? All the learned arguments that have been
used on this occasion do not prove that it is secured. Even
the advocates for the plan do not all concur in the certainty
of its security. Wherefore is religious liberty not secured?
One honorable gentleman, who favors adoption,
said that he had had his fears on the subject. If I can well
recollect, he informed us that he was perfectly satisfied, by
the powers of reasoning, (with which he is so happily endowed,)
that those fears were not well grounded. There is
many a religious man who knows nothing of argumentative
reasoning; there are many of our most worthy citizens
who cannot go through all the labyrinths of syllogistic, argumentative
deductions, when they think that the rights
of conscience are invaded. This sacred right ought not to
depend on constructive, logical reasoning.

When we see men of such talents and learning compelled
to use their utmost abilities to convince themselves
that there is no danger, is it not sufficient to make us tremble?
Is it not sufficient to fill the minds of the ignorant part
of men with fear? If gentlemen believe that the apprehensions
of men will be quieted, they are mistaken, since our
best-informed men are in doubt with respect to the security
of our rights. Those who are not so well informed will
spurn at the government. When our common citizens, who
are not possessed with such extensive knowledge and abilities,
are called upon to change their bill of rights (which,
in plain, unequivocal terms, secures their most valuable
rights and privileges) for construction and implication, will
they implicitly acquiesce? Our declaration of rights tells us
that "all men are by nature free and independent," &c.
[Here Mr. Henry read the declaration of rights.] Will they
exchange these rights for logical reasons? If you had a
thousand acres of land dependent on this, would you be
satisfied with logical construction? Would you depend
upon a title of so disputable a nature? The present opinions
of individuals will be buried in entire oblivion when
those rights will be thought of. That sacred and lovely
thing, religion, ought not to rest on the ingenuity of logical
deduction. Holy religion, sir, will be prostituted to the lowest
purposes of human policy. What has been more productive
of mischief among mankind than religious disputes?
Then here, sir, is a foundation for such disputes,
when it requires learning and logical deduction to perceive
that religious liberty is secure.

[24 June]

Mr. Madison. Mr. Chairman, nothing has excited more
admiration in the world than the manner in which free
governments have been established in America; for it was
the first instance, from the creation of the world to the
American revolution, that free inhabitants have been seen
deliberating on a form of government, and selecting such
of their citizens as possessed their confidence, to determine
upon and give effect to it. But why has this excited
so much wonder and applause? Because it is of so much
magnitude, and because it is liable to be frustrated by so
many accidents. If it has excited so much wonder that the
United States have, in the middle of war and confusion,
formed free systems of government, how much more astonishment
and admiration will be excited, should they be
able, peaceably, freely, and satisfactorily, to establish one
general government, when there is such a diversity of
opinions and interests--when not cemented or stimulated
by any common danger! How vast must be the difficulty
of concentrating, in one government, the interests, and
conciliating the opinions, of so many different, heterogeneous
bodies!

How have the confederacies of ancient and modern
times been formed? As far as ancient history describes the
former to us, they were brought about by the wisdom of
some eminent sage. How was the imperfect union of the
Swiss cantons formed? By danger. How was the confederacy
of the United Netherlands formed? By the same. They
are surrounded by dangers. By these, and one influential
character, they were stimulated to unite. How was the Germanic
system formed? By danger, in some degree, but
principally by the overruling influence of individuals.

When we consider this government, we ought to make
great allowances. We must calculate the impossibility that
every state should be gratified in its wishes, and much less
that every individual should receive this gratification. It
has never been denied, by the friends of the paper on the
table, that it has defects; but they do not think that it contains
any real danger. They conceive that they will, in all
probability, be removed, when experience will show it to
be necessary. I beg that gentlemen, in deliberating on this
subject, would consider the alternative. Either nine states
shall have ratified it, or they will not. If nine states will
adopt it, can it be reasonably presumed, or required, that
nine states, having freely and fully considered the subject,
and come to an affirmative decision, will, upon the demand
of a single state, agree that they acted wrong, and
could not see its defects--tread back the steps which they
have taken, and come forward, and reduce it to uncertainty
whether a general system shall be adopted or not?
Virginia has always heretofore spoken the language of respect
to the other states, and she has always been attended
to. Will it be that language to call on a great majority of
the states to acknowledge that they have done wrong? Is it
the language of confidence to say that we do not believe
that amendments for the preservation of the common liberty,
and general interests, of the states, will be consented
to by them? This is the language neither of confidence nor
respect. Virginia, when she speaks respectfully, will be as
much attended to as she has hitherto been when speaking
this language.

It is a most awful thing that depends on our decision--no
less than whether the thirteen states shall unite freely,
peaceably, and unanimously, for security of their common
happiness and liberty, or whether every thing is to be put
in confusion and disorder. Are we to embark in this dangerous
enterprise, uniting various opinions to contrary interests,
with the vain hope of coming to an amicable concurrence?

It is worthy of our consideration that those who prepared
the paper on the table found difficulties not to be
described in its formation: mutual deference and concession
were absolutely necessary. Had they been inflexibly
tenacious of their individual opinions, they would never
have concurred. Under what circumstances was it formed?
When no party was formed, or particular proposition
made, and men's minds were calm and dispassionate. Yet,
under these circumstances, it was difficult, extremely difficult,
to agree to any general system.

Suppose eight states only should ratify, and Virginia
should propose certain alterations, as the previous condition
of her accession. If they should be disposed to accede
to her proposition, which is the most favorable conclusion,
the difficulty attending it will be immense. Every state
which has decided it, must take up the subject again. They
must not only have the mortification of acknowledging
that they had done wrong, but the difficulty of having a
reconsideration of it among the people, and appointing
new conventions to deliberate upon it. They must attend
to all the amendments, which may be dictated by as great
a diversity of political opinions as there are local attachments.
When brought together in one assembly, they must
go through, and accede to, every one of the amendments.
The gentlemen who, within this house, have thought
proper to propose previous amendments, have brought no
less than forty amendments, a bill of rights which contains
twenty amendments, and twenty other alterations, some of
which are improper and inadmissible. Will not every state
think herself equally entitled to propose as many amendments?
And suppose them to be contradictory! I leave it
to this Convention whether it be probable that they can
agree, or agree to any thing but the plan on the table; or
whether greater difficulties will not be encountered than
were experienced in the progress of the formation of the
Constitution.

I have said that there was a great contrariety of opinions
among the gentlemen in the opposition. It has been heard
in every stage of their opposition. I can see, from their
amendments, that very great sacrifices have been made by
some of them. Some gentlemen think that it contains too
much state influence; others, that it is a complete consolidation;
and a variety of other things. Some of them think
that the equality in the Senate is not a defect; others, that
it is the bane of all good government. I might, if there
were time, show a variety of other cases where their opinions
are contradictory. If there be this contrariety of opinions
in this house, what contrariety may not be expected,
when we take into view thirteen conventions equally or
more numerous! Besides, it is notorious, from the debates
which have been published, that there is no sort of uniformity
in the grounds of the opposition.

The state of New York has been adduced. Many in that
state are opposed to it from local views. The two who opposed
it in the general Convention from that state are in
the state Convention. Every step of this system was opposed
by those two gentlemen. They were unwilling to
part with the old Confederation. Can it be presumed,
then, sir, that gentlemen in this state, who admit the necessity
of changing, should ever be able to unite in sentiments
with those who are totally averse to any change?

I have revolved this question in my mind with as much
serious attention, and called to my aid as much information,
as I could, yet I can see no reason for the apprehensions
of gentlemen; but I think that the most happy effects
for this country would result from adoption, and if Virginia
will agree to ratify this system, I shall look upon it as
one of the most fortunate events that ever happened for
human nature. I cannot, therefore, without the most excruciating
apprehensions, see a possibility of losing its
blessings. It gives me infinite pain to reflect that all the
earnest endeavors of the warmest friends of their country
to introduce a system promotive of our happiness, may be
blasted by a rejection, for which I think, with my honorable
friend, that previous amendments are but another
name. The gentlemen in opposition seem to insist on those
amendments, as if they were all necessary for the liberty
and happiness of the people. Were I to hazard an opinion
on the subject, I would declare it infinitely more safe, in
its present form, than it would be after introducing into it
that long train of alterations which they call amendments.

With respect to the proposition of the honorable gentleman
to my left, (Mr. Wythe,) gentlemen apprehend that,
by enumerating three rights, it implied there were no
more. The observations made by a gentleman lately up, on
that subject, correspond precisely with my opinion. That
resolution declares that the powers granted by the proposed
Constitution are the gift of the people, and may be
resumed by them when perverted to their oppression, and
every power not granted thereby remains with the people,
and at their will. It adds, likewise, that no right, of any
denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or
modified, by the general government, or any of its officers,
except in those instances in which power is given by the
Constitution for these purposes. There cannot be a more
positive and unequivocal declaration of the principle of
the adoption--that every thing not granted is reserved.
This is obviously and self-evidently the case, without the
declaration. Can the general government exercise any
power not delegated? If an enumeration be made of our
rights, will it not be implied that every thing omitted is
given to the general government? Has not the honorable
gentleman himself admitted that an imperfect enumeration
is dangerous? Does the Constitution say that they shall
not alter the law of descents, or do those things which
would subvert the whole system of the state laws? If it did,
what was not excepted would be granted. Does it follow,
from the omission of such restrictions, that they can exercise
powers not delegated? The reverse of the proposition
holds. The delegation alone warrants the exercise of any
power.

With respect to the amendments proposed by the honorable
gentleman, it ought to be considered how far they are
good. As far as they are palpably and insuperably objectionable,
they ought to be opposed. One amendment he
proposes is, that any army which shall be necessary shall
be raised by the consent of two thirds of the states. I most
devoutly wish that there may never be an occasion for having
a single regiment. There can be no harm in declaring
that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to
liberty, and ought to be avoided, as far as it may be consistent
with the protection of the community. But when we
come to say that the national security shall depend, not on
a majority of the people of America, but that it may be
frustrated by less than one third of the people of America,
I ask if this be a safe or proper mode. What parts of the
United States are most likely to stand in need of this protection?
The weak parts, which are the Southern States.
Will it be safe to leave the United States at the mercy of
one third of the states--a number which may comprise a
very small proportion of the American people? They may
all be in that part of America which is least exposed to
danger. As far as a remote situation from danger would
render exertions for public defence less active, so far the
Southern States would be endangered.

The regulation of commerce, he further proposed, should
depend on two thirds of both houses. I wish I could recollect
the history of this matter; but I cannot call it to mind
with sufficient exactness. But I well recollect the reasoning
of some gentlemen on that subject. It was said, and I believe
with truth, that every part of America does not stand
in equal need of security. It was observed that the Northern
States were most competent to their own safety. Was
it reasonable, asked they, that they should bind themselves
to the defence of the Southern States, and still be left at
the mercy of the minority for commercial advantages?
Should it be in the power of the minority to deprive them
of this and other advantages, when they were bound to
defend the whole Union, it might be a disadvantage for
them to confederate.

These were his arguments. This policy of guarding
against political inconveniences, by enabling a small part
of the community to oppose the government, and subjecting
the majority to a small minority, is fallacious. In some
cases it may be good; in others it may be fatal. In all cases,
it puts it in the power of the minority to decide a question
which concerns the majority.

I was struck with surprise when I heard him express
himself alarmed with respect to the emancipation of slaves.
Let me ask, if they should even attempt it, if it will not be
a usurpation of power. There is no power to warrant it, in
that paper. If there be, I know it not. But why should it
be done? Says the honorable gentleman, for the general
welfare: it will infuse strength into our system. Can any
member of this committee suppose that it will increase our
strength? Can any one believe that the American councils
will come into a measure which will strip them of their
property, and discourage and alienate the affections of
five thirteenths of the Union? Why was nothing of this sort
aimed at before? I believe such an idea never entered into
any American breast, nor do I believe it ever will enter
into the heads of those gentlemen who substitute unsupported
suspicions for reasons.

I am persuaded that the gentlemen who contend for
previous amendments are not aware of the dangers which
must result. Virginia, after having made opposition, will be
obliged to recede from it. Might not the nine states say,
with a great deal of propriety, "It is not proper, decent, or
right, in you, to demand that we should reverse what we
have done. Do as we have done; place confidence in us, as
we have done in one another; and then we shall freely,
fairly, and dispassionately consider and investigate your
propositions, and endeavor to gratify your wishes. But if
you do not do this, it is more reasonable that you should
yield to us than we to you. You cannot exist without us;
you must be a member of the Union."

The case of Maryland, instanced by the gentleman, does
not hold. She would not agree to confederate, because the
other states would not assent to her claims of the western
lands. Was she gratified? No; she put herself like the rest.
Nor has she since been gratified. The lands are in the
common stock of the Union.

As far as his amendments are not objectionable, or unsafe,
so far they may be subsequently recommended--not
because they are necessary, but because they can produce
no possible danger, and may gratify some gentlemen's
wishes. But I never can consent to his previous amendments,
because they are pregnant with dreadful dangers.

[25 June]

Mr. Madison. Mr. Chairman, I should not have risen at
all, were it not for what the honorable gentleman said. If
there be any suspicions that, if the ratification be made,
the friends of the system will withdraw their concurrence,
and much more, their persons, it shall never be with my
approbation. Permit me to remark that, if he has given us
a true state of the disposition of the several members of
the Union, there is no doubt they will agree to the same
amendments after adoption. If we propose the conditional
amendments, I entreat gentlemen to consider the distance
to which they throw the ultimate settlement, and the extreme
risk of perpetual disunion. They cannot but see how
easy it will be to obtain subsequent amendments. They can
be proposed when the legislatures of two thirds of the
states shall make application for that purpose; and the legislatures
of three fourths of the states, or conventions in
the same, can fix the amendments so proposed. If there
be an equal zeal in every state, can there be a doubt that
they will concur in reasonable amendments? If, on the
other hand, we call on the states to rescind what they have
done, and confess that they have done wrong, and to consider
the subject again, it will produce such unnecessary
delays, and is pregnant with such infinite dangers, that I
cannot contemplate it without horror. There are uncertainty
and confusion on the one hand, and order, tranquillity,
and certainty, on the other. Let us not hesitate to
elect the latter alternative. Let us join with cordiality in
those alterations we think proper. There is no friend to
the Constitution but who will concur in that mode.

Mr. Monroe, after an exordium which could not be
heard, remarking that the question now before the committee
was, whether previous or subsequent amendments
were the most prudent, strongly supported the former. He
could not conceive that a conditional ratification would, in
the most remote degree, endanger the Union; for that it
was as clearly the interest of the adopting states to be
united with Virginia, as it could be her interest to be in
union with them. He demanded if they would arm the
states against one another, and make themselves enemies
of those who were respectable and powerful from their
situation and numbers. He had no doubt that they would,
in preference to such a desperate and violent measure,
come forward and make a proposition to the other states,
so far as it would be consistent with the general interest.
Adopt it now, unconditionally, says he, and it will never be
amended, not even when experience shall have proved its
defects. An alteration will be a diminution of their power,
and there will be great exertions made to prevent it. I have
no dread that they will immediately infringe the dearest
rights of the people, but that the operation of the government
will be oppressive in process of time. Shall we not
pursue the dictates of common sense, and the example of
all free and wise nations, and insist on amendments with
manly fortitude?

It is urged that there is an impossibility of getting previous
amendments, and that a variety of circumstances
concur to render it impracticable. This argument appears
to me fallacious, and as a specious evasion. The same cause
which has hitherto produced a spirit of unanimity, and a
predilection for the Union, will hereafter produce the
same effects.

How did the federal Convention meet? From the beginning
of time, in any age or country, did ever men meet under
so loose, uncurbed a commission? There was nothing to
restrain them but their characters and reputation. They
could not organize a system without defects. This cannot,
then, be perfect. Is it not presumable that by subsequent
attempts we shall make it more complete and perfect?

What are the great objections now made? Are they local?
What are the amendments brought forth by my friends?
Do they not contemplate the great interests of the people,
and of the Union at large? I am satisfied, from what we
have seen of the disposition of the other states, that, instead
of disunion and national confusion, there will be
harmony and perfect concord. Disunion is more to be apprehended
from the adoption of a system reprobated by
some, and allowed by all to be defective. The arguments
of gentlemen have no weight on my mind. It is unnecessary
to enter into the refutation of them. My honorable
friends have done it highly to my satisfaction. Permit me
only to observe, with respect to those amendments, that
they are harmless. Do they change a feature of the Constitution?
They secure our rights without altering a single
feature. I trust, therefore, that gentlemen will concur with
them.

. . . . .

Mr. Tyler. Mr. Chairman, I should have been satisfied
with giving my vote on the question to-day; but, as I wish
to hand down to posterity my opposition to this system, I
conceive it to be my duty to declare the principles on
which I disapprove it, and the cause of my opposition. I
have seriously considered the subject in my mind, and
when I consider the effects which may happen to this
country from its adoption, I tremble at it. My opposition
to it arose first from general principles, independent of
any local consideration. But when I find that the Constitution
is expressed in indefinite terms, in terms which the
gentlemen who composed it do not all concur in the meaning
of,--I say that, when it is thus liable to objections and
different constructions, I find no rest in my mind. Those
clauses which answer different constructions will be used
to serve particular purposes. If the able members who
composed it cannot agree on the construction of it, shall I
be thought rash or wrong to pass censure on its ambiguity?

The worthy member last up has brought us to a degrading
situation--that we have no right to propose amendments.
I should have expected such language had we already
adopted a Constitution which will preclude us from
this advantage. If we propose to them to reconsider what
they have done, and not rescind it, will it be dictating to
them? I do not undertake to say that our amendments will
bind other states: I hope no gentleman will be so weak as
to say so. But no gentleman on the other side will deny
our right of proposing amendments. Wherefore is it called
dictatorial? It is not my wish that they should rescind but
so much as will secure our peace and liberty. We wish to
propose such amendments to the sister states as will reconcile
all the states. Will gentlemen think this will dissolve
the Union?

Among all the chimeras adduced on this occasion, we
are intimidated with the fear of being attacked by the petty
princes of Europe. The little predatory nations of Europe
are to cross the Atlantic and fall upon us; and to avoid
this, we must adopt this government, with all its defects.
Are we to be frightened into its adoption?

The gentleman has objected to previous amendments,
because the people did not know them. Have they seen
their subsequent amendments?

[Here Mr. Innes rose, and explained the difference--that
previous amendments would be binding
on the people, though they had never seen
them, and should have no opportunity of considering
them before they should operate; but that
subsequent amendments, being only recommendatory
in their nature, could be reviewed by the
people before they would become a part of the
system; and, if they disapproved of them, they
might direct their delegates in Congress to alter
and modify them.]

Mr. Tyler then proceeded: I have seen their subsequent
amendments, and, although they hold out something
like the thing we wish, yet they have not entered
pointedly and substantially into it. What have they said
about direct taxation? They have said nothing on this subject.
Is there any limitation of, or restriction on, the federal
judicial power? I think not. So that gentlemen hold
out the idea of amendments which will not alter one dangerous
part of it. It contains many dangerous articles. No
gentleman here can give such a construction of it as will
give general satisfaction. Shall we be told that we shall be
attacked by the Algerines, and that disunion will take
place, unless we adopt it? Such language as this I did not
expect here. Little did I think that matters would come to
this, when we separated from the mother country. There,
sir, every man is amenable to punishment. There is far less
responsibility in this government. British tyranny would
have been more tolerable. By our present government,
every man is secure in his person, and the enjoyment of
his property. There is no man who is not liable to be punished
for misdeeds. I ask, What is it that disturbs men
whose liberty is in the highest zenith? Human nature will
always be the same. Men never were, nor ever will, be satisfied
with their happiness.

They tell you that one letter's alteration will destroy it. I
say that it is very far from being perfect. I ask, if it were
put in immediate operation, whether the people could
bear it--whether two bodies can tax the same species of
property. The idea of two omnipotent powers is inconsistent.
The natural tendency must be, either a revolt, or the
destruction of the state governments, and a consolidation
of them all into one general system. If we are to be consolidated,
let it be on better grounds. So long as climate
will have effect on men, so long will the different climates
of the United States render us different. Therefore a consolidation
is contrary to our nature, and can only be supported
by an arbitrary government.

Previous and subsequent amendments are now the only dispute;
and when gentlemen say that there is a greater probability
of obtaining the one than the other, they accompany their
assertions with no kind of argument. What is the reason
that amendments cannot be got after ratification? Because
we have granted power. Because the amendments you
propose will diminish their power, and undo some clauses
in that paper. This argument proves to me that they cannot
be serious. It has been plainly proved to you that it is
impracticable. Local advantages are given up, as well as the
regulation of trade. When it is the case, will the little states
agree to an alteration? When gentlemen insist on this,
without producing any argument, they will find no credulity
in me. Another convention ought to be had, whether
the amendments be previous or subsequent. They say another
convention is dangerous. How is this proved? It is
only their assertion. Gentlemen tell us we shall be ruined
without adoption. Is this reasonable? It does not appear so
to me.

Elliot, Jonathan, ed. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. . . . 5 vols. 2d ed. 1888. Reprint. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.