Nazi Conspiracy & AggressionIndividual
Responsibility Of Defendants

Constantin Von
Neurath

(Part 3 of 6)

[Page 1020]

D. VON NEURATH'S PART, AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND ADVISOR TO
THE FUEHRER, IN THE PLANNING OF WARS OF AGGRESSION.

Both as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as one of the inner
circle of the Fuehrer's advisors on foreign political
matters, von Neurath participated in the political planning
and preparation for acts of aggression against Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and other nations.

(1) The von Neurath technique. If von Neurath's policy may
be described in a sentence it may be summarized as breaking
one treaty only at a time. He himself put it slightly more
pompously but to the same effect in a speech before the
Academy of German Law on 30 October 1937:

" *** Out of the acknowledgment of these elementary
facts the Reich Cabinet has always interceded in favor
of treating every concrete international problem within
methods especially suited for it, not to complicate it
unnecessarily by amalgamation with other problems, and
as long as problems between only two powers are
concerned to choose the way for an immediate
understanding between these two powers. We are in a
position to state that this method has fully proved
itself good not only in the German interest, but also
in the general interest."

The only countries whose interests von Neurath failed to
mention in that speech are the other parties to the various
treaties that were dealt with in that way. The working out
of that policy can be seen from a brief summary of the
actions of von Neurath when he was Foreign Minister, and
those of his immediate-successor when von Neurath still
purported to have influence.

In 1935 action was directed against the Western Powers, in
the form of the rearmament of Germany. When that was going
on another country had to be reassured. At that time it was
Austria, which still had -- up to 1935 -- the support of
Italy. Hence, the fraudulent and clearly false assurance,
the essence of the technique in that case, given by Hitler,
on 21 May 1935. (TC-26)

Then, in 1936, action was again taken against the Western
Powers in the occupation of the Rhineland. Another
fraudulent assurance was made to Austria in the Treaty of 11
July of that year, (TC-22) the deceitful nature of which is
shown by letters from von Papen. (2246-PS;

Then, in 1937 and 1938, the Nazis moved on a step and action
was directed against Austria. That action was absorption,
finally planned, at the latest, at the meeting on 5 November
1937

[Page 1021]

(386-PS). The action was taken on 11 March 1938. Reassurance
had to be given to the Western Powers; hence the assurance
to Belgium on 13 October 1937. (TC-34)

Less than a year later the object of the aggressive action
was Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland was obtained in
September 1938, and the whole of Bohemia and Moravia was
absorbed on 15 March 1939. At that time it was necessary to
reassure Poland; so an assurance to Poland was given by
Hitler on 20 February 1938 (2357-PS), and repeated up to 26
September 1938 (2358-PS). The falsity of that assurance is
shown in Section 8 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against
Poland.

Finally, when the Nazis decided to take action for the
conquest of Poland in the next year, assurance had to be
given to Russia. Hence, a non-aggression pact was entered
into with the USSR. on 23 August 1939. (TC-25)

With regard to the foregoing summary, the Latin tag, res
ipsa loquitur is apposite. But a frank statement from von
Neurath with regard to the earlier part of it is found in
the account of his conversation with the United States
Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt, on 18 May 1936 (L-150):

"Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs
until 'the Rhineland had been digested.' He explained
that he meant that, until the German fortifications had
been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers,
the German Government would do everything possible to
prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis
in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to
Czechoslovakia. 'As soon as our fortifications are
constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize
that France cannot enter German territory at will, all
those countries will begin to feel very differently
about their foreign policies and a new constellation
will develop,' he said."

The conversation between von Papen as Ambassador and Mr.
Messersmith is much to the same effect. (1760-PS)

(2) Austria. At the time of the aggression against Austria
von Neurath was Foreign Minister. This included the
preliminary stages, during the early Nazi plottings against
Austria in 1934. In this period occurred the Nazi murder of
Chancellor Dolfuss and the ancillary acts which were
afterwards so strongly approved by the German Government.
(See Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)
Von Neurath was also Foreign Minister when the false
assurance was given to Austria

[Page 1022]

on 21 May 1935 (TC-26) and the fraudulent treaty was made on
11 July 1936 (TC-22). And von Neurath was Foreign Minister
when his ambassador to Austria, von Papen, was carrying on
his subterranean intrigue in the period from 1935 to 1937.
(2247-PS; 2246-PS)

Von Neurath was present when Hitler declared, in a highly
confidential circle, on 5 November 1937, that the German
question could only be solved by force, and that his plans
were to conquer Austria and Czechoslovakia (386-PS). Hitler
expressed his designs on Austria as follows:

" For the improvement of our military political
position, it must be our first aim in every case of
entanglement by war to conquer Czechoslovakia and
Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat
from the flanks in case of a possible advance
westwards." (386-PS)

It is impossible for von Neurath, after that meeting, to say
that he was not acting except with his eyes completely open
and with complete comprehension as to what was intended.

During the Anschluss von Neurath received a note from the
British Ambassador dated 11 March 1938 (045-PS). In reply
von Neurath uttered two obvious untruths. The first:

" It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure
to bring about this development, especially the
assertion, which was spread later by the former
Chancellor Schuschnigg, that the German Government had
presented the Federal President with a conditional
ultimatum. It is a pure invention." (3287-PS)

According to the German ultimatum, Schuschnigg had to
appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and form a
Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German
Government. Otherwise the invasion of Austria by German
troops was held in prospect. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on
Aggression Against Austria.) The second untruth:

"The truth of the matter is that the question of
sending military or police forces from the Reich was
only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet
addressed a telegram, already published by the press,
to the German Government, urgently asking for the
dispatch of German troops as soon as possible, in order
to restore peace and order and to avoid bloodshed.
Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a
bloody civil war in Austria the German Government then
decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it."
(3287-PS)

[Page 1023]

(As to the inspired nature of the Austrian telegram, see
Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)

All that can be said is that it must have given von Neurath
a certain macabre sort of humor to write that note (3287-PS)
when the truth was the opposite, as shown by the report of
Gauleiter Rainer to Buerckel (812-PS), the transcripts of
Goering's telephone conversations with Austria (2949-PS),
and the entries in Jodl's diary for 11, 13, and 14 February.
(1780-PS)

According to Jodl's diary -- the entry for 10 March:

"At 13.00 hours General Keitel informs Chief of
Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is
being detained in London. Neurath takes over the
Foreign Office." (1780-PS)

It is inconceivable when von Neurath had taken over the
Foreign Office, was dealing with the matter and was co-
operating with Goering to suit the susceptibilities of the
Czechs, that he should have been so ignorant of the truth of
events as to write that letter (3287-PS) in good faith.

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