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The “Third Offset” strategy, officially launched with this year’s budget request, attempts to identify asymmetries between U.S. forces and those of potential adversaries. What role can military innovation play in enhancing U.S. military advantages?

First, Second, Third Offsets

Secretary Work reminded the audience that the United States has enjoyed a conventional advantage over recent adversaries. Importantly, that advantage has been against small regional powers. There has been less worry about peer competitors since the end of the Cold War, he said, but that has changed again over the past decade.

With an ascendant China and a re-strengthened Russia, a new military strategy called the Third Offset “helps deter a conventional conflict with a large state power,” according to Work. A key facet is strengthening conventional deterrence. In short, the Third Offset is meant to help prevent war with a great power by ensuring that if we did ever fight, we would prevail.

The First Offset, as O’Hanlon outlined, covers the full range of U.S. nuclear capabilities in the 1950s. The Second Offset is more focused on precision weaponry and air-land battle concepts from the 1970s and 1980s. All offsets, Work noted, “are focused on operational and organizational constructs that provide an advantage at the operational level of war.” But the Third Offset is more open-ended, long-term, and diffuse, compared to the first and second offsets. While we knew the end game of the First Offset and the Second Offset as they were developed, we do not necessarily know the end state when it comes to the Third Offset.

We do know that technology—specifically its connectedness to military organizations and to military doctrine—provide the key to the Third Offset. Secretary Work highlighted five areas of focus:

Learning machines

Human-machine collaboration

Assisted human operations (such as exoskeletons and wearables)

Man-unmanned combat teaming

Better autonomous weapons

Work stressed the criticalness of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomy. “Putting AI and autonomy into the battle network is the most important thing we can do first,” he said. Missile defense, robotics, and unmanned systems also fit into the Third Offset framework, and Work said these systems can be thought of as “assisted human ops” (as distinct from “enhanced human ops,” which involve genetically modifying the soldier; that’s not something the United States is pursuing, but it is possible competitors may try). There is also a clear cyber element to the Third Offset—for one, autonomous machines driven by AI might be the first line of defense in a cyberattack.

What about possible ethical concerns of these military systems? O’Hanlon queried Secretary Work on the potential for machines making their own decision to shoot. Work indicated that was more likely to happen under authoritarian governments—pointing, for example, to a Soviet conception that was totally automatic. In the United States, he said, our focus has been on enabling better communications and network capabilities for the human warfighters.

The Third Offset, in Work’s view, is not unlike other major revolutions that started in the commercial technology space, such as the telegraph and railroad, which ultimately transformed war.

By land and by sea

Kelly Marchese reminded the audience that the Third Offset is not just about technology, highlighting the importance of overall architecture and integration. According to Marchese, the most important aspects are “operational and organizational constructs.” Since technology changes so rapidly, improving agility and the way technologies interact in a network are also key. Marchese expressed concern that networking standards have not been set.

O’Hanlon pointed out that many networks are unlikely to survive a cyber attack. Could much of our technology be rendered useless in such incidents?, he wondered. Marchese responded: “The good news is much of this technology is still not connected. The bad news is it needs to be connected to operate as effectively as we want.”

Related Books

Turning to more traditional means of warfighting, O’Hanlon asked Alan Easterling about the oceans, adding that they are thought of as an “area of great promise” in the international arena. Easterling agreed, but emphasized that there’s a problem with ships. Modern ships are very vulnerable, he said—during the Falklands War of 1982, for example, superior British ships proved little match for advanced missiles. That is very much the story today, Easterling added, saying: “Any surface vessel within 1,200 miles of determined opponent is at risk.” And this problem tends to push everyone underwater. In many ways, he said, submarines are the “last bastion of stealth.” There are still unresolved difficulties under water, though (including communication), and concluded that combining above and below water assets remains key.

Finally, O’Hanlon turned to land bases and their vulnerability. He pointed out that there are things we can do like hardening, dispersal, and retaining short-takeoff aircraft to help overcome the issues. But is this enough? Easterling argued that the best strategy is distribution, and that forward bases are often quickly overwhelmed, adding: the “age of the medium range ballistic missile changes everything.” Circling back to remarks by Secretary Work, Easterling remarked that the United States has not faced a foe with this kind of capability, and that it is of great potential concern.

While some challenges lie ahead, the overall message of the event was that the Third Offset strategy or its natural successor, whatever that may be called (but which will likely preserve many elements of the Third Offset), will offer considerable hope for the United States in the decades ahead.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/cyberwar_center001.jpg?w=293The “Third Offset” strategy, officially launched with this year’s budget request, attempts to identify asymmetries between U.S. forces and those of potential adversaries. What role can military innovation play in enhancing U.S. military advantages?
Author I
Ian Livingston
Senior Research Assistant Twitter islivingston
On December 5, the Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence hosted an event discussing the future of U.S. military innovation with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work. Alan Easterling of Northrop Grumman and Kelly Marchese of Deloitte Consulting also spoke, and Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon moderated the event.
First, Second, Third Offsets
Secretary Work reminded the audience that the United States has enjoyed a conventional advantage over recent adversaries. Importantly, that advantage has been against small regional powers. There has been less worry about peer competitors since the end of the Cold War, he said, but that has changed again over the past decade.
With an ascendant China and a re-strengthened Russia, a new military strategy called the Third Offset “helps deter a conventional conflict with a large state power,” according to Work. A key facet is strengthening conventional deterrence. In short, the Third Offset is meant to help prevent war with a great power by ensuring that if we did ever fight, we would prevail.
Related
- Order from Chaos
Trump and China David Dollar Thursday, June 30, 2016 - Arms Control
50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons Today Monday, April 28, 2014 - Order from Chaos
Trump and the generals Michael E. O'Hanlon Wednesday, September 14, 2016
The First Offset, as O’Hanlon outlined, covers the full range of U.S. nuclear capabilities in the 1950s. The Second Offset is more focused on precision weaponry and air-land battle concepts from the 1970s and 1980s. All offsets, Work noted, “are focused on operational and organizational constructs that provide an advantage at the operational level of war.” But the Third Offset is more open-ended, long-term, and diffuse, compared to the first and second offsets. While we knew the end game of the First Offset and the Second Offset as they were developed, we do not necessarily know the end state when it comes to the Third Offset.
We do know that technology—specifically its connectedness to military organizations and to military doctrine—provide the key to the Third Offset. Secretary Work highlighted five areas of focus:
- Learning machines - Human-machine collaboration - Assisted human operations (such as exoskeletons and wearables) - Man-unmanned combat teaming - Better autonomous weapons
Work stressed the criticalness of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomy. “Putting AI and autonomy into the battle network is the most important thing we can do first,” he said. Missile defense, robotics, and unmanned systems also fit into the Third Offset framework, and Work said these systems can be thought of as “assisted human ops” (as distinct from “enhanced human ops,” which involve genetically modifying the soldier; that’s not something the United States is pursuing, but it is possible competitors may try). There is also a clear cyber element to the Third Offset—for one, autonomous machines driven by AI might be the first line of defense in a cyberattack.
What about possible ethical concerns of these military systems? O’Hanlon queried Secretary Work on the potential for machines making their own decision to shoot. Work indicated that was more likely to happen under authoritarian governments—pointing, for example, to a Soviet conception that was totally automatic. In the United States, he said, our focus has been on enabling better communications and network capabilities for the human warfighters.
The Third Offset, in Work’s view, ... The “Third Offset” strategy, officially launched with this year’s budget request, attempts to identify asymmetries between U.S. forces and those of potential adversaries. What role can military innovation play in enhancing U.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/12/06/fleeting-convergence-building-partner-capacity-and-militias/Fleeting convergence: Building partner capacity and militiashttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/239387186/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~Fleeting-convergence-Building-partner-capacity-and-militias/
Tue, 06 Dec 2016 15:31:02 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=345361

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After a decade and a half of being involved in large-scale military operations in the Middle East and South Asia, the United States is increasingly looking for ways to pursue its security interests with minimal involvement. This shift—a key hallmark of the outgoing Obama administration—is unlikely to change under the administration of Donald Trump. The number and complexity of military conflicts burning in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia make large-scale military involvement very costly. Yet allowing for large territories around the world to disintegrate into brutal conflicts—or be dominated by terrorist groups threatening the United States and its allies—may also be highly detrimental to U.S. interests.

The Obama administration thus embraced a strategy of building up the capacities of partners in such conflicts—preferably, those of national governments. But when national forces prove insufficient, unable, or unwilling to defeat the threat—such as in Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Somalia—the United States has to decide whether to support (or establish) local militia and other irregular forces. Indeed, militias are likely to stay in vogue as a tool of U.S. security policy, given the individuals President-elect Donald Trump is considering as key national security and foreign policy principals.

Fleeting convergence

Building partner capacity and standing up militias may at times turn out to be the least bad of available policy options. The two approaches are not identical: Building up the official forces of a country allows for greater levels of host-nation accountability to donors and to their domestic population than standing up irregular forces. Building up official partner capacity is thus clearly preferable to embracing militias.

Nonetheless, both policies need to be adopted with a clear understanding of how limited their contribution will be to the prosecution of U.S. interests. Despite the seductive promise that in situations of limited U.S. engagement, others will do for the United States what it is not willing to do for itself, a robust alignment of U.S. interests with those of its presumed partners will often be lacking.

Instead of a robust alignment—and a joint strategy for how to build stable and legitimate political order—the United States and its presumed partner might often enjoy only a momentary intersection of interests. A divergence of interests is likely to arise quickly during intense and fluid conflict situations, but also when conflict subsides and the government’s survival is no longer threatened. The United States could thus rapidly find its partners unreliable and pursuing policies directly contradictory to its own. Partner governments may well pocket U.S. assistance and undertake only the bare minimum policy to keep U.S. resources flowing—while at the same time striking their own deals and accommodations, hedging their bets, or targeting their own enemies, not those of the United States. Even when militias seem to be defeating the enemy du jour, they will have a tendency to go rogue and themselves become one of the deep-seated drivers of conflict.

[T]he United States and its presumed partner might often enjoy only a momentary intersection of interests.

What to do?

Does this imply that the United States should not engage in building up capacities of presumed partner governments and standing up militia forces? That needs to be decided on a case by case basis, and one of the criteria needs to be an in-depth consideration of when and how these presumed partners will defect from U.S. objectives and undertake actions inconsistent with U.S. interests. Policy evaluations need to consider what kind of restraint and rollback capacity of these presumed partners—whether the state or militias—the United States will have when interests diverge, as well as what kind of actions the United States could take to mitigate the negative impacts on U.S. interests and values.

To the extent that the United States does provide security assistance to a new “partner,” it should primarily seek to engage formal military and police forces. They can presumably be more accountable to the United States—as well as, and no less importantly, to local populations. Such security assistance is also more easily consistent with future stabilization and state-building efforts than supporting non-state militias.

Particularly in the case of militias, the presumption for U.S. policy should be not to stand them up. Nonetheless, if supporting militia forces is the least bad option—such as because formal military and police forces are totally corrupt, abusive, collapsed, or antagonistic to the United States—the United States needs, from the very beginning, to build into its militia effort a plan for how to roll them back. Merely defunding the militias is not enough: Cutting them off from funds without dismantling them is only likely to encourage them to engage in predation on local communities or sign up with U.S. enemies willing to pay them, perhaps even the very ones they fought before with U.S. money.

It’s also important to have nuanced intelligence and a broad understanding of the multiple political impacts the militias and the rollback processes have. If such restraint mechanisms are elusive (which will often be the case in many situations of intense conflict with dangerous terrorist groups and miserable governance by official state actors), the United States needs to realize that its embrace of militias will merely defer immediate threats to later and long-term problems, even compound them. Our friendly militias today will likely end up a threat to our interests in a matter of time.

Our friendly militias today will likely end up a threat to our interests in a matter of time.

Assessments of the chances of success thus need to be much broader than merely eliminating a particular terrorist group. They also need to include judgement of whether a sufficiently stable, sustainable, and legitimate order and governance will ensue, or whether supporting “partners” merely perpetuates structural causes of instability.

Upholding human rights restrictions in deciding to whom U.S. security assistance can be provided—such as embodied in the Leahy Amendment—is important. It is crucial not only because of U.S. values and humanitarian interests; it’s important because such assessments of eligibility are a good indication of whether U.S. assistance will be effective, or end up supporting an actor whose rapacious, predatory behavior ultimately fuels a cycle of instability and keeps the United States stuck in a mire—even if via a proxy.

Finally, the United States need to recognize that providing security assistance, building up partner capacity, or standing up militias are not merely technical endeavors or tactical military tools. They are all profoundly political undertakings, with potentially large impacts on power distribution and political arrangements in recipient countries. All such efforts by the United States thus need to be linked to a larger U.S. political strategy of how to create sustainable structures of stability and order, backed up by sufficient and sustainable resources and legitimacy.

]]>
After a decade and a half of being involved in large-scale military operations in the Middle East and South Asia, the United States is increasingly looking for ways to pursue its security interests with minimal involvement. This shift—a key hallmark of the outgoing Obama administration—is unlikely to change under the administration of Donald Trump. The number and complexity of military conflicts burning in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia make large-scale military involvement very costly. Yet allowing for large territories around the world to disintegrate into brutal conflicts—or be dominated by terrorist groups threatening the United States and its allies—may also be highly detrimental to U.S. interests.
The Obama administration thus embraced a strategy of building up the capacities of partners in such conflicts—preferably, those of national governments. But when national forces prove insufficient, unable, or unwilling to defeat the threat—such as in Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Somalia—the United States has to decide whether to support (or establish) local militia and other irregular forces. Indeed, militias are likely to stay in vogue as a tool of U.S. security policy, given the individuals President-elect Donald Trump is considering as key national security and foreign policy principals.
Fleeting convergence
Building partner capacity and standing up militias may at times turn out to be the least bad of available policy options. The two approaches are not identical: Building up the official forces of a country allows for greater levels of host-nation accountability to donors and to their domestic population than standing up irregular forces. Building up official partner capacity is thus clearly preferable to embracing militias.
Nonetheless, both policies need to be adopted with a clear understanding of how limited their contribution will be to the prosecution of U.S. interests. Despite the seductive promise that in situations of limited U.S. engagement, others will do for the United States what it is not willing to do for itself, a robust alignment of U.S. interests with those of its presumed partners will often be lacking.
Instead of a robust alignment—and a joint strategy for how to build stable and legitimate political order—the United States and its presumed partner might often enjoy only a momentary intersection of interests. A divergence of interests is likely to arise quickly during intense and fluid conflict situations, but also when conflict subsides and the government’s survival is no longer threatened. The United States could thus rapidly find its partners unreliable and pursuing policies directly contradictory to its own. Partner governments may well pocket U.S. assistance and undertake only the bare minimum policy to keep U.S. resources flowing—while at the same time striking their own deals and accommodations, hedging their bets, or targeting their own enemies, not those of the United States. Even when militias seem to be defeating the enemy du jour, they will have a tendency to go rogue and themselves become one of the deep-seated drivers of conflict.
[T]he United States and its presumed partner might often enjoy only a momentary intersection of interests.
What to do?
Does this imply that the United States should not engage in building up capacities of presumed partner governments and standing up militia forces? That needs to be decided on a case by case basis, and one of the criteria needs to be an in-depth consideration of when and how these presumed partners will defect from U.S. objectives and undertake actions inconsistent with U.S. interests. Policy evaluations need to consider what kind of restraint and rollback capacity of these presumed partners—whether the state or militias—the United States will have when interests diverge, as well as what kind of actions the United States could take ... After a decade and a half of being involved in large-scale military operations in the Middle East and South Asia, the United States is increasingly looking for ways to pursue its security interests with minimal involvement.https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/emerging-u-s-defense-challenges-and-worldwide-threats/Emerging U.S. defense challenges and worldwide threatshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/239365706/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~Emerging-US-defense-challenges-and-worldwide-threats/
Tue, 06 Dec 2016 14:30:34 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=testimony&p=345317

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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the Committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify this morning.

Since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy has aimed at defending and extending a liberal world order that conforms to American interests and principles. It has done so not as a favor to others but based on the hard-won understanding that in the absence of such a world order, both American interests and our cherished principles will eventually be imperiled. This was the lesson that those who were “present at the creation” of the American-led world order learned 70 years ago, after two world wars and the rise of fascism and totalitarian communism. If we are not vigilant, we will have to learn that lesson all over again, and perhaps at even greater cost.

It has become common to say that the last 25-30 years of American foreign policy have been a failure. This betrays both a lack of historical memory and a lack of imagination. Which 25-year period of the last century would we rather have: the first 25 years of the 20th century, which gave us World War One, the breakdown of British-dominated world order, the Bolshevik revolution, and the birth of fascism? The second 25 years, which gave us the rise of Hitler and Stalin and Imperial Japan, World War Two, the communist revolution in China, and the imprisonment of half of Europe behind the Iron Curtain? The thirty years between 1950 and 1980, which despite the extraordinary success of the United States in establishing the secure basis of what used to be called the free world and which eventually produced the liberal world order we today enjoy, nevertheless also gave us the Korean War, the Vietnam War, three major wars in the Middle East, the Arab oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and the Iran hostage crisis?

The fact is that for all the difficulties of the past 25-30 years, for all the errors, of which there have been many—because this is the real world in which failure is more common than success—for all the costs in lives and treasure, this period has been by any reasonable historical measure one of remarkable success. From the 1980s onward, we saw the fall of Soviet communism and the Soviet empire, the liberation of central and eastern Europe, the spread of democracy in Asia and Latin America, a global prosperity unmatched in human history, and, very importantly, no conflict between the great powers. Throughout much of this period, in crises in the Balkans and in the Middle East, the United States and its allies have operated effectively to stem humanitarian disasters and put an end to brewing conflicts. Democratic government has spread throughout Asia and Latin America, regions which were dominated by dictatorships in previous decades. Despite the economic downturn following the 2008 financial crisis, this is has been a period of extraordinary prosperity by historical standards.

These past 25-30 years have also provided us a clear formula for success, a formula inherited from those early years after World War Two. By building and maintaining strong alliances with democratic nations and by supporting an open global economy that allows those nations to prosper, and which lifts billions of others in developing nations out of poverty, the United States can best protect its own security and the well-being of its own people. One need only think of the strong democratic alliances maintained during the 1980s, the relationships between Ronald Reagan and close allies like Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, and Yasuhiro Nakasone. Those bonds, together with a strong U.S. military and strong U.S. economy, prevailed in the Cold War, convinced Soviet leaders to concede peacefully, and established this extraordinary period in the history of international relations. It has not been perfect, because perfection in human affairs is not possible. But by any reasonable standard, this formula has been successful—and successful for the American people. It created a world order conducive to American interests and American values.

Today that order faces severe challenges, both from without and from within. The external challenges are obvious enough. Since 9/11 we have faced the threat of radical Islamic terrorism, which has proved resilient and to which we have responded inadequately. Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon, and to spread its influence by military means throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf, have helped destabilize a region that remains strategically relevant despite the declining American reliance on its oil. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities as well its ballistic missile capacities are growing.

Today, however, I would like to focus on what I believe to be the greatest threats that we are going to face in the years and decades, and those are threats posed by China and Russia. For while the other threats I have mentioned pose serious challenges, and in the case of terrorism obviously require the utmost vigilance, only these two great powers have the capacity to upend the world order which has long provided for Americans’ security and well-being. The unmistakable hegemonic ambitions of China and Russia threaten the stability and security of the world’s two most important regions, East Asia and Europe. These regions are vital to the United States both economically and strategically. They are the regions where two world wars originated in the first half of the 20th century and would be the locus of the next great war should the United States fail to play the role it has played over the past 70 years in undergirding their security and stability. The simple fact is, the era of great-power rivalries has returned. In the past these great-power competitions have led invariably to great-power wars. Managing these rivalries, avoiding war, and doing so without abandoning the liberal world order in the misguided belief that we will be spared when it collapses, is the greatest challenge we face today and in the years and decades to come.

The simple fact is, the era of great-power rivalries has returned. In the past these great-power competitions have led invariably to great-power wars.

Both China and Russia have much in common. Both are classic revisionist powers. Although both China and Russia have never enjoyed greater security from foreign attack than they do today—Russia has never been more secure from attack by its traditional enemies to the west, and China has never been more secure from attack by its traditional enemy in the east—both are dissatisfied with the current configuration of power in the world. Both seek to restore a hegemonic dominance in their regions that they enjoyed in the past. For China that means dominance of East Asia, with nations like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acknowledging Chinese hegemony and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in the areas of Central and Eastern Europe which Russia has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the American-led postwar global order. Being autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order which stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies.

The two great powers differ, so far, chiefly in their methods. China has until now been the more careful and cautious, seeking influence primarily through its great economic clout in the region and globally, and using its growing military power chiefly as a source of deterrence and intimidation. It has not resorted to the outright use of force yet, although its actions in the South China Sea are military in nature and carry the risk of producing military conflict. China’s willingness to use force cannot be ruled out in the future, and possibly in the near future. Revisionist great powers with growing military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities when they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs. If the Chinese perceive America’s commitment to its allies and its position in the region to be weakening, or its capacity to make good on those commitments to be declining, then they will be more inclined to attempt to use the power they are acquiring in order to achieve their objectives.

Russia, on the other hand, has already been far more aggressive. It has invaded two neighboring states—Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014—and in both cases has hived off significant portions of those two nations’ sovereign territory. It has also projected military force into Syria, lending its military support to the Syrian regime’s efforts to crush all opposition, including by the aerial bombing and massacre of civilian populations. Russia has also been aggressive in other ways. It has wielded its control of European energy resources as a weapon. It has used cyberwarfare against neighboring states. It has engaged in extensive information warfare on a global scale. And it has interfered directly in Western electoral processes, both to try to influence their outcomes and more generally to discredit the democratic system. This past year, Russia for the first time employed this powerful weapon against the United States, heavily interfering in the American electoral process with as yet unknown consequences.

Although Russia, by any measure, is the weaker of the two great powers, it has so far had more success than China in accomplishing its objective of dividing and disrupting the West. Its interference in Western democratic political systems, its information warfare, and perhaps most importantly, its role in creating increased refugee flows from Syria into Europe have all contributed to the sapping of Europeans’ confidence in their political systems and their established political parties. Its military intervention in Syria, contrasted with American passivity, has exacerbated already existing doubts about American staying power in the region. China, until recently, has succeeded mostly in driving American allies closer to the United States out of concern for growing Chinese power. That could change quickly, however, and especially if the United States continues on its present trajectory. We could soon face a situation where both great revisionist powers are acting aggressively, including by military means, which would pose an extreme challenge to American and global security.

The return of this great-power challenge has come just at the moment when American and Western will, confidence, and capacity to meet the challenge have been in decline. The present administration has emphasized global retrenchment at the expense of engagement and although its stated policy has aimed to “rebalance” American foreign policy, the overall effect of its statements and actions has been to raise doubts around the world about America’s staying power as the critical supporter of the present global order. Its early attempt to “reset” relations with Russia was a first blow to America’s reputation as a reliable ally, partly because it came just after the Russian invasion of Georgia and thus appeared to be almost a reward for Russian aggression; partly because the “reset” came at the expense of planned programs of military cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic that were jettisoned to appease Moscow; and partly because this effort at appeasement came just as Russian policy toward the West, and Vladimir Putin’s repressive policies toward the Russian people, were hardening. Then in 2014, the West’s collective response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, though better than the Bush administration’s response to the invasion of Georgia—Europe and the United States at least imposed sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine—still indicated reluctance on the part of the U.S. administration to challenge Russia in what the American President regarded as Russia’s own sphere of interest. In Syria, the present administration practically invited Russian intervention, if only through American passivity, and certainly did nothing to discourage it, thus reinforcing the already prevalent impression of an America in retreat in that region (an impression initially created by the unnecessary and unwise withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq). Subsequent Russian actions which increased the refugee flow from Syria into Europe also brought no American response, despite the evident damage of those refugee flows to European democratic institutions. The overall impression given by the present administration has been that none of this is America’s problem.

In East Asia this administration’s otherwise commendable efforts to assert America’s continuing interest and influence have been undermined by a failure to follow through with policies to support the rhetoric. The military component of the so-called “Pivot” has been hollow due to inadequate defense spending which has made it impossible to enhance the American military presence in a meaningful way. The important economic component of the pivot, meanwhile, represented most prominently by the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, was undermined this year when both leading presidential candidates announced their opposition to the agreement. The general perception of American global retreat and retrenchment, encouraged both by presidential rhetoric and by administration policies, especially in the Middle East, has also been noticed in Asia, where allies are left wondering how reliable the U.S. commitment may be when facing the challenge posed by China, for instance, in the continuing conflict over the South and East China Seas.

The perceived weakness and withdrawal of the United States as a result of the present administration’s policies and rhetoric has unfortunately been greatly exacerbated by the comments of the president-elect and his proxies during this year’s campaign. Suggestions that the United States might not come to the defense of NATO allies if attacked by Russia, that it is not worth going to war over a country that is “in the suburbs of St. Petersburg,” that it is a “real problem” that the United States has to come to Japan’s defense if it is attacked, and in general that the United States should fulfill its security commitments to other nations only if it makes economic sense—all these have only increased doubts about America’s reliability as an ally and partner.1 They have given the clear impression to both friends and potential adversaries that the United States is turning inward, abjuring responsibility for global security, and effectively ceding hegemonic dominance of Europe and East Asia to Russia and China.

As history has shown, however, a world order collapses with remarkable rapidity and with great violence.

The conjunction of these two trends—the growing ambition and aggressiveness of the two revisionist great powers and the increasing global perception (and perhaps reality) of a United States withdrawing from its international responsibilities to provide security—is at some point going to produce a dangerous crisis, or more likely, multiple simultaneous crises. Americans have tended to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in maintaining that stability. As history has shown, however, a world order collapses with remarkable rapidity and with great violence. The apparent calm of the 1920s became within a decade the crisis-ridden 1930s, eventually culminating in world war. Continued American withdrawal from its global role could quickly tempt the rival great powers to seize the moment and try to reshape fundamentally the power structures in East Asia and Europe, both of which are of vital strategic and economic importance to the United States. At that point the United States would be faced with the choice of responding with the necessary force or acquiescing.

The goal of American policy now should be to avoid those crises and confrontations by moving quickly to re-establish the U.S. position as the principal upholder of the international order. That means reaching out immediately both publicly and privately to reassure allies in both Europe and Asia that the United States will not only make good on its commitments but intends to bolster its capacity to do so. These reassurances must therefore be accompanied by an immediate end to the sequester and a substantial increase in defense spending in line with the recommendations of recent secretaries of defense. Nothing would send a stronger signal that the United States is not engaged in a withdrawal from the world but means to continue playing its role as the principal upholder of the international order.

The incoming administration must also find a way to move forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership in some form. That agreement, like most trade agreements, is not just about trade. It is a strategic investment in security and stability in East Asia, a low-cost and low-risk way of ensuring the United States and its friends and allies in the region remain close and united in the face of possible Chinese pressures.

Finally, there is the question of Russian interference in the most recent American presidential election. Some may not view this as a strategic and national security matter, but it is. Russian interference in Western democratic political processes has become a major element of Moscow’s strategy to disrupt, divide, and demoralize the West. The tactics it has recently employed in the United States it has already used in elections and referendums across Europe, including most recently in Italy, and will likely use again in France and Germany. For the United States to ignore this Russian tactic, and particularly now that it has been deployed against the United States, is to cede to Moscow a powerful tool of modern geopolitical warfare. It is extraordinary that the United States government has taken no act of retaliation. And it is unconscionable, and an abdication of responsibility, that Congress has not launched an investigation to discover exactly what happened with a view to preventing its recurrence in the future. One hates to think that because the Republican Party was the beneficiary of Russian intervention in this election that as the majority party in both houses of Congress it has no interest in discovering the truth about the foreign government’s assault on American democratic processes.

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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the Committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify this morning.
Since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy has aimed at defending and extending a liberal world order that conforms to American interests and principles. It has done so not as a favor to others but based on the hard-won understanding that in the absence of such a world order, both American interests and our cherished principles will eventually be imperiled. This was the lesson that those who were “present at the creation” of the American-led world order learned 70 years ago, after two world wars and the rise of fascism and totalitarian communism. If we are not vigilant, we will have to learn that lesson all over again, and perhaps at even greater cost.
It has become common to say that the last 25-30 years of American foreign policy have been a failure. This betrays both a lack of historical memory and a lack of imagination. Which 25-year period of the last century would we rather have: the first 25 years of the 20th century, which gave us World War One, the breakdown of British-dominated world order, the Bolshevik revolution, and the birth of fascism? The second 25 years, which gave us the rise of Hitler and Stalin and Imperial Japan, World War Two, the communist revolution in China, and the imprisonment of half of Europe behind the Iron Curtain? The thirty years between 1950 and 1980, which despite the extraordinary success of the United States in establishing the secure basis of what used to be called the free world and which eventually produced the liberal world order we today enjoy, nevertheless also gave us the Korean War, the Vietnam War, three major wars in the Middle East, the Arab oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and the Iran hostage crisis?
The fact is that for all the difficulties of the past 25-30 years, for all the errors, of which there have been many—because this is the real world in which failure is more common than success—for all the costs in lives and treasure, this period has been by any reasonable historical measure one of remarkable success. From the 1980s onward, we saw the fall of Soviet communism and the Soviet empire, the liberation of central and eastern Europe, the spread of democracy in Asia and Latin America, a global prosperity unmatched in human history, and, very importantly, no conflict between the great powers. Throughout much of this period, in crises in the Balkans and in the Middle East, the United States and its allies have operated effectively to stem humanitarian disasters and put an end to brewing conflicts. Democratic government has spread throughout Asia and Latin America, regions which were dominated by dictatorships in previous decades. Despite the economic downturn following the 2008 financial crisis, this is has been a period of extraordinary prosperity by historical standards.
These past 25-30 years have also provided us a clear formula for success, a formula inherited from those early years after World War Two. By building and maintaining strong alliances with democratic nations and by supporting an open global economy that allows those nations to prosper, and which lifts billions of others in developing nations out of poverty, the United States can best protect its own security and the well-being of its own people. One need only think of the strong democratic alliances maintained during the 1980s, the relationships between Ronald Reagan and close allies like Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, and Yasuhiro Nakasone. Those bonds, together with a strong U.S. military and strong U.S. economy, prevailed in the Cold War, convinced Soviet leaders to concede peacefully, and established this extraordinary period in the history of international relations. It has not been perfect, because perfection in human affairs is ... Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the Committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify this morning.
Since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy has aimed at defending and extending a liberal world order that ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/12/06/the-limits-of-air-strikes-when-fighting-the-islamic-state/The limits of air strikes when fighting the Islamic Statehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/239383054/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~The-limits-of-air-strikes-when-fighting-the-Islamic-State/
Tue, 06 Dec 2016 13:00:42 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=345365

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When it comes to the Islamic State, who doesn’t want to “bomb the shit out of them,” as our president-elect so eloquently put it? The group is violent, aggressive, and almost cartoonishly evil: torture, mass murder, and sexual slavery are only a few of the abhorrent practices the Islamic State embraces. Left unchecked, it may consolidate power and expand. After years of surviving largely underground, in 2014 it took over vast swaths of Iraq and Syria, and it has established so-called “provinces” in Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, and other countries.

Bombing is attractive because Americans are rightly leery of a prolonged ground campaign in the Middle East. The Iraq debacle still colors our thinking on intervention. A poll taken in August showed that only 42 percent of Americans favored deploying a significant number of ground troops to Syria to fight the Islamic State, though a slight majority is comfortable with limited numbers of special operations forces.

Air power seems like the perfect middle ground between a large ground force invasion and inaction: a way to hit the Islamic State hard while avoiding an Iraq-like quagmire. The previously cited poll also showed that 72 percent of Americans favor airstrikes on the Islamic State, and apparently our president-elect is among their ranks. As Eliot Cohen, one of our country’s leading military analysts, once wryly remarked, “Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment.” Yet air power, if not used carefully, runs all the risks of a one-night stand: it can create false expectations, drag America into unwanted relationships with flawed partners, and winds up meaning little in the long-term.

Not surprisingly, in Iraq and Syria, the United States relies heavily on airpower to supplement Iraqi Security Forces, Peshmerga, Sunni tribal, and other militias to fight the Islamic State. Over the course of Operation Inherent Resolve’s two year life, Coalition aircraft (with the United States by far the largest contributor) have flown an estimated 125,000 sorties and destroyed or degraded around 32,000 targets—a massive effort. Air strikes also play an important role in Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and other countries where the United States is fighting jihadist organizations.

Air power’s attractions are both clear and real. A sustained campaign of targeted killing using drones or fixed-wing aircraft can remove large numbers of terrorist leaders from the Islamic State’s ranks. Although killing one leader rarely has a decisive impact, the cumulative effects are considerable. Over time, veterans are weeded out and replaced by less experienced figures. At the very least, the constant transition in leadership is disruptive, as anyone who has worked in an office where bosses seem to rotate constantly can testify.

Perhaps most important, adaptation in response to air strikes renders terrorists less effective. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants they could avoid drones by maintaining “complete silence of all wireless contacts,” “[avoiding] gathering in open areas,” and taking strenuous measures to root out spies, and noted that leaders “should not use communications equipment,” among other suggestions. These are all sensible tips for avoiding death from above, but the implications for group effectiveness are staggering. Training on a large-scale is harder, if not impossible, as large gatherings can be lethal. Group leaders’ influence wanes, as they must hide or remain incommunicado. Trying to organize a kids’ soccer game, let alone a global terrorist network, becomes almost impossible if you can’t use phones or the Internet regularly. The indirect effects also matter. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been laying low since U.S. military operations began, diminishing his charismatic presence from Islamic State propaganda and, presumably, disheartening his beleaguered troops. Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the spokesman who headed the group’s external operations, was also charismatic and inspired terrorists around the world to attack—and eventually the United States tracked him down and killed him in an airstrike.

Politically, air power is also attractive, and it is not surprising politicians as diverse as Donald Trump, Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and Bill Clinton found it appealing. When drones crash or are shot down, the pilot still lives. Pilots of fixed-wing aircraft, of course, take on more risk, but the combination of terrorists’ weak air defenses and the sophisticated aircraft U.S. pilots fly often limit this danger considerably. Because few or no American lives are at risk, U.S. leaders can intervene with less concern about the political costs at home.

Air power is particularly valuable when it can be yoked with local allied fighters on the ground. In Afghanistan after 9/11, the rag-tag Northern Alliance quickly turned the tables on the Taliban after the U.S. Air Force entered the fray. NATO airpower stopped Gadhafi’s forces at the gates of Benghazi and then helped the Libyan opposition push back regime forces and eventually gain victory. When local fighters support air power—and vice versa—enemy forces find it hard to maneuver and mass: when they do, they risk being destroyed. This puts them on the defensive, enabling allied militaries or militias to isolate terrorist fighters. Air power plays a role in crushing these isolated forces too, helping support ground operations, even in relatively built up areas.

Urban environments present significantly greater challenges for targeting and minimizing civilian casualties, yet the U.S. has still identified and destroyed hundreds of Islamic State fighting positions, fortified buildings, vehicles, and equipment in the support of the Mosul offensive. In the first week of the offensive alone, coalition air power conducted around 100 airstrikes in and around the city. As the Iraqi forces approached the city’s outskirts, Islamic State defenders were subjected to strikes every eight minutes during one three-day period. U.S. airpower continues to be critical in enabling even minor tactical advances against the Islamic State to the point of near dependency, which some observers, including my colleague Kenneth Pollack, warn could overstretch even the relatively substantial coalition effort.

Yet air power has real limits.

For it to be effective, for starters, certain preconditions must be met. Bombers need bases near the conflict zone and access to the battlefield. True, some systems can fly bombing runs all the way from the United States. But to maintain a sustained battlefield presence, aircraft must be able to get to and from the conflict zone quickly and easily. Allies, of course, don’t provide access to their bases for free: they expect favors in return. Current armed drone systems also need a permissive environment, as they are simply too easy to shoot down otherwise. Thus, the United States either needs local governments to cooperate with drone strikes or the absence of an effective government (and thus the absence of air defenses).

Nor does air power address the biggest long-term challenges in fighting the Islamic State: governance. The United States has proven again and again that it can dislodge terrorists, insurgents, and forces loyal to local despots. Filling the vacuum so that they don’t return is much harder. The terrorists often come back, or, at times, chaos rules. Neither outcome is an improvement for locals, and new terrorist groups can breed if there is no government to keep them down. You can’t provide that governance with a drone.

Moreover, for air power to be effective, you need capable local allies. Their forces can provide the necessary intelligence to find and target Islamic State fighters. In addition, when they advance, they force Islamic State forces to mass—making them vulnerable to air power. If Islamic State fighters stay dispersed and hidden, then forces on the ground can root them out. Local forces can also fill the vacuum after victory, ideally establishing a legitimate government and preventing the terrorists from returning or new extremist groups from arising.

The trouble is that local allies are often themselves flawed instruments: corrupt, ineffective, and brutal. Often, U.S. troops are necessary to leaven local forces, provide necessary intelligence, and otherwise carry much of the burden.

Finally, by using air power, the United States becomes implicated in the local conflict. Bombing “the shit out of” the bad guys leaves an impression on more than just the bad guys. Although from a U.S. perspective the current intervention seems limited and low-risk, the perception may be different on the ground. The United States has taken sides in a war, and Washington’s partnership with local forces means locals do not always distinguish between more precise U.S. air strikes and more brutal and indiscriminate attacks from allied militias and forces.

Like all good things except sex and barbeque, in other words, air power is best in moderation. It can keep the bad guys off balance, tilt the playing field in favor of U.S. allies, and otherwise help in the fight against terrorism. But it is an imperfect instrument even when it works well, and absent other tools and a broader strategy its benefits will always be limited.

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When it comes to the Islamic State, who doesn’t want to “bomb the shit out of them,” as our president-elect so eloquently put it? The group is violent, aggressive, and almost cartoonishly evil: torture, mass murder, and sexual slavery are only a few of the abhorrent practices the Islamic State embraces. Left unchecked, it may consolidate power and expand. After years of surviving largely underground, in 2014 it took over vast swaths of Iraq and Syria, and it has established so-called “provinces” in Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, and other countries.
Bombing is attractive because Americans are rightly leery of a prolonged ground campaign in the Middle East. The Iraq debacle still colors our thinking on intervention. A poll taken in August showed that only 42 percent of Americans favored deploying a significant number of ground troops to Syria to fight the Islamic State, though a slight majority is comfortable with limited numbers of special operations forces.
Air power seems like the perfect middle ground between a large ground force invasion and inaction: a way to hit the Islamic State hard while avoiding an Iraq-like quagmire. The previously cited poll also showed that 72 percent of Americans favor airstrikes on the Islamic State, and apparently our president-elect is among their ranks. As Eliot Cohen, one of our country’s leading military analysts, once wryly remarked, “Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment.” Yet air power, if not used carefully, runs all the risks of a one-night stand: it can create false expectations, drag America into unwanted relationships with flawed partners, and winds up meaning little in the long-term.
Not surprisingly, in Iraq and Syria, the United States relies heavily on airpower to supplement Iraqi Security Forces, Peshmerga, Sunni tribal, and other militias to fight the Islamic State. Over the course of Operation Inherent Resolve’s two year life, Coalition aircraft (with the United States by far the largest contributor) have flown an estimated 125,000 sorties and destroyed or degraded around 32,000 targets—a massive effort. Air strikes also play an important role in Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and other countries where the United States is fighting jihadist organizations.
Air power’s attractions are both clear and real. A sustained campaign of targeted killing using drones or fixed-wing aircraft can remove large numbers of terrorist leaders from the Islamic State’s ranks. Although killing one leader rarely has a decisive impact, the cumulative effects are considerable. Over time, veterans are weeded out and replaced by less experienced figures. At the very least, the constant transition in leadership is disruptive, as anyone who has worked in an office where bosses seem to rotate constantly can testify.
Perhaps most important, adaptation in response to air strikes renders terrorists less effective. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants they could avoid drones by maintaining “complete silence of all wireless contacts,” “[avoiding] gathering in open areas,” and taking strenuous measures to root out spies, and noted that leaders “should not use communications equipment,” among other suggestions. These are all sensible tips for avoiding death from above, but the implications for group effectiveness are staggering. Training on a large-scale is harder, if not impossible, as large gatherings can be lethal. Group leaders’ influence wanes, as they must hide or remain incommunicado. Trying to organize a kids’ soccer game, let alone a global terrorist network, becomes almost impossible if you can’t use phones or the Internet regularly. The indirect effects also matter. ... When it comes to the Islamic State, who doesn’t want to “bomb the shit out of them,” as our president-elect so eloquently put it? The group is violent, aggressive, and almost cartoonishly evil: torture, mass murder, and ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/12/02/always-ready-ensuring-todays-coast-guard-can-meet-the-challenges-of-tomorrow/Always ready: Ensuring today’s Coast Guard can meet the challenges of tomorrowhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/237349364/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~Always-ready-Ensuring-today%e2%80%99s-Coast-Guard-can-meet-the-challenges-of-tomorrow/
Fri, 02 Dec 2016 16:37:02 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=344962

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The U.S. Coast Guard has protected the United States—and has acted as a critical instrument of security and diplomacy—for over two centuries. Its duties are many, and despite its relatively small size, there is little question that the Coast Guard lives up to its motto of “Always ready.”

Flow of people

Although it has a personnel of just over 40,000 active-duty members, the U.S. Coast Guard has many important missions. Among its most consuming are issues related to the Western Hemisphere, immigration, counter-narcotics, the Arctic, and facilitating commerce. This list makes it clear that maintaining talent in the all-volunteer force is vital.

Immigration has been a hot button issue as of late. Admiral Zukunft pointed out that recent Gallup polling indicates the United States is still—by far—the most sought-after country for people who are seeking a new home.

Given this, and given the potential for significant changes to immigration policies ahead, an uptick in migrants has been noted over the past year or so. Zukunft pointed to the “wet foot, dry foot” policy on Cubans and the unique challenges associated with it, including people who cause self-harm to end up in a U.S. hospital rather than being sent home.

While there is considerable public and political focus on the border with Mexico, Admiral Zukunft reminded the audience that it is only part of the larger picture. “If you secure the Southwest border, it is now a maritime threat,” he said.

Flow of illicit goods

The maritime threats go well beyond immigration. Another key concern for the Coast Guard is counter-narcotics.

Fueled by demand in the United States and elsewhere, fiscal year 2016 brought an increased flow of drugs to the country—but it was also a record year for drug interdiction by the Coast Guard, according to Zukunft. He noted that 20 percent of the drug flow into the United States comes from the Caribbean, with 80 percent via the Eastern Pacific region. The Coast Guard is one of the main lines of defense, because it has the unique authority to enforce the rule of law on the sea.

In addition to slowing the flow of drugs, stopping smugglers also has the added benefit of gaining intelligence. Even when protecting their own group, most smugglers will end up giving up details on rivals, Zukunft noted.

Drug smuggling is just one of several non-state actor concerns that have flourished in recent decades. Zukunft sees no end to this, and believes such challenges will continue to impose significant demands on the Coast Guard in the years to come.

Northern territory

Another long-term concern for the Coast Guard is the Arctic. Zukunft argued that, for the Coast Guard, the “Western Hemisphere and Arctic are sacrosanct.” Despite the growing importance of an increasingly ice-free Arctic, the Coast Guard is operating with limited capability to operate in the region.

The current state of U.S. ice breaking is “miserable,” according to Zukunft. “We had seven ice breakers when I entered the service,” he said. When it comes to heavy ice breaking, the Coast Guard is now down to one ship—the Polar Star—and there has not been a new one built in 40 years.

Although this is a challenge, particularly given that other countries (such as Russia) have interests in the region, Admiral Zukunft was optimistic that more ice breakers will be built. Congress has set aside funds, and industry is eager to help, he said.

The Coast Guard does a lot with a little.

Looking ahead

Queried by Michael O’Hanlon if today’s Coast Guard was large enough, Zukunft observed that one could imagine making a case for a force of 50,000, but that he also needed to ground any such options in strong analysis, while bearing in mind serious national fiscal constraints. He reiterated the need for more ice breakers—three heavy and three medium—while reminding everyone that this is not a static environment. The service must be able to evolve as rapidly as the environment it operates in does.

Any concerns aside, the overall tenor of the discussion was positive. The Coast Guard does a lot with a little. It is also a bridge-builder with other nations. Zukunft was hopeful that challenges like dealing with Russia in the Arctic can end up being opportunities to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships in the years ahead.

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The U.S. Coast Guard has protected the United States—and has acted as a critical instrument of security and diplomacy—for over two centuries. Its duties are many, and despite its relatively small size, there is little question that the Coast Guard lives up to its motto of “Always ready.”
On November 29, Brookings’s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence hosted Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, the Coast Guard’s 25th commandant. Admiral Zukunft discussed the opportunities and challenges facing today's Coast Guard and looked ahead to the needs of the future. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon moderated the event.
Flow of people
Although it has a personnel of just over 40,000 active-duty members, the U.S. Coast Guard has many important missions. Among its most consuming are issues related to the Western Hemisphere, immigration, counter-narcotics, the Arctic, and facilitating commerce. This list makes it clear that maintaining talent in the all-volunteer force is vital.
Immigration has been a hot button issue as of late. Admiral Zukunft pointed out that recent Gallup polling indicates the United States is still—by far—the most sought-after country for people who are seeking a new home.
Given this, and given the potential for significant changes to immigration policies ahead, an uptick in migrants has been noted over the past year or so. Zukunft pointed to the “wet foot, dry foot” policy on Cubans and the unique challenges associated with it, including people who cause self-harm to end up in a U.S. hospital rather than being sent home.
While there is considerable public and political focus on the border with Mexico, Admiral Zukunft reminded the audience that it is only part of the larger picture. “If you secure the Southwest border, it is now a maritime threat,” he said.
Flow of illicit goods
The maritime threats go well beyond immigration. Another key concern for the Coast Guard is counter-narcotics.
Fueled by demand in the United States and elsewhere, fiscal year 2016 brought an increased flow of drugs to the country—but it was also a record year for drug interdiction by the Coast Guard, according to Zukunft. He noted that 20 percent of the drug flow into the United States comes from the Caribbean, with 80 percent via the Eastern Pacific region. The Coast Guard is one of the main lines of defense, because it has the unique authority to enforce the rule of law on the sea.
In addition to slowing the flow of drugs, stopping smugglers also has the added benefit of gaining intelligence. Even when protecting their own group, most smugglers will end up giving up details on rivals, Zukunft noted.
Drug smuggling is just one of several non-state actor concerns that have flourished in recent decades. Zukunft sees no end to this, and believes such challenges will continue to impose significant demands on the Coast Guard in the years to come.
Northern territory
Another long-term concern for the Coast Guard is the Arctic. Zukunft argued that, for the Coast Guard, the “Western Hemisphere and Arctic are sacrosanct.” Despite the growing importance of an increasingly ice-free Arctic, the Coast Guard is operating with limited capability to operate in the region.
The current state of U.S. ice breaking is “miserable,” according to Zukunft. “We had seven ice breakers when I entered the service,” he said. When it comes to heavy ice breaking, the Coast Guard is now down to one ship—the Polar Star—and there has not been a new one built in 40 years.
Although this is a challenge, particularly given that other countries (such as Russia) have interests in the region, Admiral Zukunft was optimistic that more ice breakers will be built. Congress has set aside funds, and industry is eager to help, he said.
The Coast Guard does a lot with a little.
Looking ... The U.S. Coast Guard has protected the United States—and has acted as a critical instrument of security and diplomacy—for over two centuries. Its duties are many, and despite its relatively small size, there is little question that the ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/12/02/the-trump-administration-and-nuclear-arms-control-treaties/The Trump administration and nuclear arms control treatieshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/237284910/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~The-Trump-administration-and-nuclear-arms-control-treaties/
Fri, 02 Dec 2016 14:00:17 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=344883

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A recent Heritage Foundation issue brief on nuclear weapons policy advocated, among other things, that the Trump administration withdraw from the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as well as end consideration of ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Before undoing these deals, President-elect Trump should consider the consequences for U.S. national security. For one thing, the recommendations could prompt a new arms race—and give Russia a big head-start. That does not seem wise.

New START

The Heritage issue brief advocates withdrawal from New START, which limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. Those limits take effect in February 2018. According to the September 2016 data exchange, the United States then had 1,367 deployed strategic warheads on 681 deployed missiles and bombers. Russia had more deployed warheads—1,796—but fewer deployed missiles and bombers—508.

The Heritage paper expresses concern about the disparity in warheads. What matters, however, are the numbers in February 2018. Russia has many outdated missile systems, such as the SS-18 and SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles, carrying a large number of warheads. They can be removed from deployed status over the next 14 months in order to meet the 1,550 limit.

The Heritage paper says Moscow “has demonstrated that it is not interested in a benign relationship with the United States.” That may be true, but that is no reason to withdraw from New START. Quite the opposite: Arms control treaties are more important with nuclear powers with which America has an adversarial relationship. New START’s limits cap the strategic nuclear competition, and the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications and inspections provide important information about Russian strategic forces. The U.S. military is not all that worried about the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France.

Arms control treaties are more important with nuclear powers with which America has an adversarial relationship.

The paper also cites Russia’s “massive nuclear weapons modernization investments” as a reason to abandon New START. It is true that Moscow is spending a lot of money to modernize its strategic forces. Most of that is going to replace old systems, including missiles that the Russian military would have replaced years ago had it had the funds. Flash forward to the mid 2020s. The Pentagon then plans to be building new ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers to replace aging U.S. systems, which the Kremlin undoubtedly will term a “massive” modernization.

By all appearances, Moscow has sized its strategic modernization program to fit within the limits of New START. If Washington withdraws from the treaty, Russia has the option of continuing production of new missiles and submarines on already hot production lines. The United States could end up launching an arms race and spotting Russia a decade’s head-start. That does not seem to make sense for U.S. national security.

The INF treaty

The Heritage paper calls for withdrawal as well from the INF Treaty, which bans the testing and deployment of all U.S. and Russian land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. According to the U.S. government, the Russian military has tested a ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate-range in violation of the treaty. That is a serious problem, but it is not deployment. The Trump administration should consider that bringing Russia back into full compliance with the treaty—if possible—is preferable to the United States killing the treaty.

The Heritage recommendation seems to miss several key points. First, American allies in Europe and Asia want the treaty preserved, because Russian intermediate-range missiles would target them (those missiles do not have the range to reach the United States).

Second, the U.S. charge of a Russian violation remains shrouded in secrecy. If Washington withdraws from the treaty but does not present compelling evidence, while Moscow denies the charge, the United States would get the blame for the treaty’s demise.

Third, the Pentagon currently has no identified requirement or prospective funding for new intermediate-range missiles. Even if the United States proceeded to build them after withdrawing from the treaty, those missiles could hold targets in Russia at risk only if deployed on the territory of NATO allies, Japan or South Korea. The prospect that NATO would agree to accept new U.S. missiles is virtually zero. While some suggest that conventionally-armed intermediate-range missiles could address threats from North Korea or China, the likelihood that Japan or South Korea would accept them is very low.

The deployment of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe in the early 1980s proved the key factor in getting Moscow to accept a treaty banning all intermediate-range missiles. But no one who went through that experience on the American side—I worked on this on the NATO desk at the State Department—would be eager to repeat it. The missiles were deployed, but the process almost broke NATO.

U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty at this point would mean that the political heat for ending the agreement would be directed at Washington. Russia would be free to test and deploy intermediate-range missiles…again with a big head-start, as the Pentagon does not even have plans for a U.S. counterpart and would have nowhere to deploy it. It is difficult to see how that would benefit U.S. and allied security interests.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Heritage paper could not propose withdrawal from the CTBT, as the United States has not yet ratified it. It instead recommends ending any consideration of the treaty’s ratification. The Senate did not consent to ratification in 1999, primarily due to concerns about detecting cheating and maintaining confidence in the U.S. nuclear arsenal without testing. But the Trump administration should consider the following.

A lot has changed since 1999. The CTBT Organization has built a monitoring system with some 300 stations around the world. Twenty-five of those promptly reported the North Korean nuclear test in September. The system can detect tests down to one kiloton (the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was 14 kilotons). In some geologies, the system can detect even smaller explosions. U.S. national technical means have reportedly improved as well, but their precise capabilities remain classified. According to the National Academy of Sciences, tests as low as .1-.2 kilotons can be detected.

As for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the United States now has 20 years of experience with the stockpile stewardship program. The directors of the national nuclear laboratories are confident that, with that program, they can certify the reliability of nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile without the need for explosive testing.

So the two questions that bothered the Senate in 1999 today have much better answers.

While the Senate has not consented to CTBT ratification, no one seriously calls for a resumption of U.S. nuclear tests. Mr. Trump might want to ask his friends in Las Vegas—60 miles from the former Nevada Test Site and with a population nearly triple what it was in 1992, the year of the last U.S. nuclear test—how they would feel about it. Recall that Nevada fought tooth-and-nail against even storage of nuclear waste at the site.

Moreover, the United States conducted more nuclear tests than the rest of the world’s nuclear powers combined and learned more from those tests. No country can match the U.S. stockpile stewardship program. The CTBT thus would lock in a U.S. nuclear advantage. How could that not be good for the United States?

President-elect Trump and his administration will have a full foreign policy in-box when they take office in 2017. They ought not to complicate their life further by undoing arms control deals that serve U.S. national security interests. They certainly should not take steps that would launch a new nuclear arms race with Russia when doing so would spot Moscow a significant head-start.

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A recent Heritage Foundation issue brief on nuclear weapons policy advocated, among other things, that the Trump administration withdraw from the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as well as end consideration of ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Before undoing these deals, President-elect Trump should consider the consequences for U.S. national security. For one thing, the recommendations could prompt a new arms race—and give Russia a big head-start. That does not seem wise.
New START
The Heritage issue brief advocates withdrawal from New START, which limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. Those limits take effect in February 2018. According to the September 2016 data exchange, the United States then had 1,367 deployed strategic warheads on 681 deployed missiles and bombers. Russia had more deployed warheads—1,796—but fewer deployed missiles and bombers—508.
The Heritage paper expresses concern about the disparity in warheads. What matters, however, are the numbers in February 2018. Russia has many outdated missile systems, such as the SS-18 and SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles, carrying a large number of warheads. They can be removed from deployed status over the next 14 months in order to meet the 1,550 limit.
The Heritage paper says Moscow “has demonstrated that it is not interested in a benign relationship with the United States.” That may be true, but that is no reason to withdraw from New START. Quite the opposite: Arms control treaties are more important with nuclear powers with which America has an adversarial relationship. New START’s limits cap the strategic nuclear competition, and the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications and inspections provide important information about Russian strategic forces. The U.S. military is not all that worried about the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France.
Arms control treaties are more important with nuclear powers with which America has an adversarial relationship.
The paper also cites Russia’s “massive nuclear weapons modernization investments” as a reason to abandon New START. It is true that Moscow is spending a lot of money to modernize its strategic forces. Most of that is going to replace old systems, including missiles that the Russian military would have replaced years ago had it had the funds. Flash forward to the mid 2020s. The Pentagon then plans to be building new ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers to replace aging U.S. systems, which the Kremlin undoubtedly will term a “massive” modernization.
By all appearances, Moscow has sized its strategic modernization program to fit within the limits of New START. If Washington withdraws from the treaty, Russia has the option of continuing production of new missiles and submarines on already hot production lines. The United States could end up launching an arms race and spotting Russia a decade’s head-start. That does not seem to make sense for U.S. national security.
The INF treaty
The Heritage paper calls for withdrawal as well from the INF Treaty, which bans the testing and deployment of all U.S. and Russian land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. According to the U.S. government, the Russian military has tested a ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate-range in violation of the treaty. That is a serious problem, but it is not deployment. The Trump administration should consider that bringing Russia back into full compliance with the treaty—if possible—is preferable to the United States killing the treaty.
The Heritage recommendation seems to miss several key points. First, American ... A recent Heritage Foundation issue brief on nuclear weapons policy advocated, among other things, that the Trump administration withdraw from the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/12/02/the-state-of-the-middle-east-from-the-point-of-view-of-the-centcom-commander/The state of the Middle East, from the point of view of the CENTCOM commanderhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/237284602/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~The-state-of-the-Middle-East-from-the-point-of-view-of-the-CENTCOM-commander/
Fri, 02 Dec 2016 14:00:07 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=344875

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On November 30 at the Newseum, I had the privilege of conducting a conversation with General Joseph Votel of CENTCOM as part of the Foreign Policy Initiative’s day-long conference on American national security policy. General Votel, true to form, was fascinating. The conversation was sobering, but not without a number of hopeful dimensions.

Here are some of the major takeaways:

On Egypt, according to the general, collaboration with the United States has been set back by all the events beginning with 2011 and the Arab spring, and it has not yet fully recovered. But Egypt has done a great deal to continue to collaborate on counterterrorism, on ensuring prompt access to the Suez Canal, and on ensuring the stability of its own country. Recently, President Abdel Fatah el-Sissi’s more restrained treatment of former President Morsi (taking him off death row, notably) has helped create a somewhat more conducive environment for U.S.-Egypt cooperation.

Within Iraq, there are perhaps 100,000 Shiite militia fighters on the battlefield in one way or another today, many of them supported by Iran. (That number was higher than I expected, and more specific than I’d previously heard from a U.S. official.) While there is no significant progress towards the possible creation of a National-Guard like force, the government does seem to be doing generally better at collaborating with key Sunni figures in preparing for the period after Mosul is liberated, working with tribes, police forces, and other authorities.

In Syria and Iraq, there is overall progress in defeating ISIS, though it is conceivable that the liberation of Mosul could take a couple more months.

In Syria, the former al-Qaida affiliate, the Nusra Front (or the “Front for Conquest”) remains a significant and serious concern. One hopes that any change in future U.S. policy towards Syria, under a new president, would still allow for some support for certain moderate opposition groups that have been helpful in defending American interests in the region (for example, in helping to stabilize the region near the Jordanian border).

While Iran does seem to be complying, in general, with the basic terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), its overall level of assertiveness and nefarious activity in the broader region may have increased somewhat since the signing and initial implementation of the JCPOA.

In Afghanistan, the quality of Afghan army leadership seems to be gradually improving. Casualties to the Afghan army and police are still high, however, and U.S. as well as Afghan policymakers are looking for ways to reduce these in various ways. On balance within Afghanistan, one might say—according to General Votel—that there is an equilibrium that favors the government. Put differently, the government might control some 60 percent of the country, the Taliban some 10 percent, and the remaining 30 percent is still contested. Despite some losses and setbacks in places such as Helmand, Kunduz, and parts of the east, no major deterioration of the overall situation has occurred in 2015 or 2016. A broader policy review on U.S. policy in Afghanistan (and other parts of the region) would certainly be warranted by a new administration: “in the CENTCOM theater, nothing is on cruise control and nothing should be,” as General Votel so aptly put it.

General Votel also spoke favorably of the new authorities granted to Special Operations Command, which he formerly led, argued that SOCOM together with the Joint Staff and broader U.S. government could help prevent an overly stove-piped approach to transnational threats in which each geographic command focused too narrowly on its own “turf.”

I found it remarkable how much information General Votel conveyed in less than one hour, and certainly believe that one of President Obama’s strong legacies of 2016 will be the selection of this particular military leader to head up American military efforts in the broader Middle East region.

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On November 30 at the Newseum, I had the privilege of conducting a conversation with General Joseph Votel of CENTCOM as part of the Foreign Policy Initiative’s day-long conference on American national security policy. General Votel, true to form, was fascinating. The conversation was sobering, but not without a number of hopeful dimensions.
Here are some of the major takeaways:
- On Egypt, according to the general, collaboration with the United States has been set back by all the events beginning with 2011 and the Arab spring, and it has not yet fully recovered. But Egypt has done a great deal to continue to collaborate on counterterrorism, on ensuring prompt access to the Suez Canal, and on ensuring the stability of its own country. Recently, President Abdel Fatah el-Sissi’s more restrained treatment of former President Morsi (taking him off death row, notably) has helped create a somewhat more conducive environment for U.S.-Egypt cooperation.
- Within Iraq, there are perhaps 100,000 Shiite militia fighters on the battlefield in one way or another today, many of them supported by Iran. (That number was higher than I expected, and more specific than I’d previously heard from a U.S. official.) While there is no significant progress towards the possible creation of a National-Guard like force, the government does seem to be doing generally better at collaborating with key Sunni figures in preparing for the period after Mosul is liberated, working with tribes, police forces, and other authorities.
- In Syria and Iraq, there is overall progress in defeating ISIS, though it is conceivable that the liberation of Mosul could take a couple more months.
- In Syria, the former al-Qaida affiliate, the Nusra Front (or the “Front for Conquest”) remains a significant and serious concern. One hopes that any change in future U.S. policy towards Syria, under a new president, would still allow for some support for certain moderate opposition groups that have been helpful in defending American interests in the region (for example, in helping to stabilize the region near the Jordanian border).
- While Iran does seem to be complying, in general, with the basic terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), its overall level of assertiveness and nefarious activity in the broader region may have increased somewhat since the signing and initial implementation of the JCPOA.
- In Afghanistan, the quality of Afghan army leadership seems to be gradually improving. Casualties to the Afghan army and police are still high, however, and U.S. as well as Afghan policymakers are looking for ways to reduce these in various ways. On balance within Afghanistan, one might say—according to General Votel—that there is an equilibrium that favors the government. Put differently, the government might control some 60 percent of the country, the Taliban some 10 percent, and the remaining 30 percent is still contested. Despite some losses and setbacks in places such as Helmand, Kunduz, and parts of the east, no major deterioration of the overall situation has occurred in 2015 or 2016. A broader policy review on U.S. policy in Afghanistan (and other parts of the region) would certainly be warranted by a new administration: “in the CENTCOM theater, nothing is on cruise control and nothing should be,” as General Votel so aptly put it.
General Votel also spoke favorably of the new authorities granted to Special Operations Command, which he formerly led, argued that SOCOM together with the Joint Staff and broader U.S. government could help prevent an overly stove-piped approach to transnational threats in which each geographic command focused too narrowly on its own “turf.”
I found it remarkable how much information General Votel conveyed in less than one hour, and certainly believe that one of President ... On November 30 at the Newseum, I had the privilege of conducting a conversation with General Joseph Votel of CENTCOM as part of the Foreign Policy Initiative’s day-long conference on American national security policy.https://www.brookings.edu/events/investing-in-the-future-of-u-s-defense-during-a-time-of-transition-at-home-and-abroad/Investing in the future of U.S. defense during a time of transition at home and abroadhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236344728/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~Investing-in-the-future-of-US-defense-during-a-time-of-transition-at-home-and-abroad/
Tue, 22 Nov 2016 19:38:02 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=event&p=343717

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Technology, innovation, concepts, and tactics are key to the future of U.S. defense. All deliver numerous challenges as well as opportunities. In some senses, new ways of waging war have leveled parts of the playing field that have historically been dominated by the United States. Intertwined with these opportunities and challenges, the “Third Offset” strategy, officially launched with this year’s budget request, attempts to identify asymmetries between U.S. forces and potential adversaries. Across the spectrum, it is critical to remember that no single concept or technology is enough on its own, as it must exist within a large and complex system.

On December 5, the Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence hosted an event discussing the future of U.S. defense with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work. Secretary Work partook in a conversation with Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon before turning over to a panel to further discuss the issues. Panelists included Alan Easterling of Northrop Grumman; William Lynn of Leonardo North America and DRS Technologies; and Kelly Marchese of Deloitte Consulting LLP. Michael O’Hanlon moderated the discussion.

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Technology, innovation, concepts, and tactics are key to the future of U.S. defense. All deliver numerous challenges as well as opportunities. In some senses, new ways of waging war have leveled parts of the playing field that have historically been dominated by the United States. Intertwined with these opportunities and challenges, the “Third Offset” strategy, officially launched with this year’s budget request, attempts to identify asymmetries between U.S. forces and potential adversaries. Across the spectrum, it is critical to remember that no single concept or technology is enough on its own, as it must exist within a large and complex system.
On December 5, the Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence hosted an event discussing the future of U.S. defense with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work. Secretary Work partook in a conversation with Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon before turning over to a panel to further discuss the issues. Panelists included Alan Easterling of Northrop Grumman; William Lynn of Leonardo North America and DRS Technologies; and Kelly Marchese of Deloitte Consulting LLP. Michael O’Hanlon moderated the discussion. Technology, innovation, concepts, and tactics are key to the future of U.S. defense. All deliver numerous challenges as well as opportunities. In some senses, new ways of waging war have leveled parts of the playing field that have historically been ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/11/21/give-flynn-a-chance/Give Flynn a chancehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236344732/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~Give-Flynn-a-chance/
Mon, 21 Nov 2016 16:00:57 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=343445

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According to the New York Times and many others, President-elect Donald Trump’s choices to head up his national security team to date include individuals outside the mainstream consensus of the Republican Party in particular, and U.S. foreign policymakers in general. That list includes retired Lt. General Mike Flynn, slated to be Mr. Trump’s national security advisor, a position that does not require Senate confirmation.

While I have some concerns about certain other choices Mr. Trump has made to date, and serious worries about his foreign policy instincts in general, the frequent critique that General Flynn’s worldview is somehow outside the reasonable bounds of normal American foreign policymaking is too strong and rather unfair.

General Flynn has, to be sure, been a controversial figure in recent months, and he has made a couple mistakes. While there is nothing wrong with talking to Vladimir Putin, General Flynn allowed himself to be seen being too publicly friendly to the Russian strongman, during a visit to Moscow some months ago. He was also wrong to egg on Trump supporters when they chanted “lock her up” about Hillary Clinton at various campaign rallies this year. And I am very skeptical that the United States should do as Flynn suggests and extradite Fethullah Gülen, the leader of a large but politically rather harmless and nonviolent, movement to Turkey just to assuage President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan there. To be sure, Flynn will have to polish his game and improve some of his judgments now that he is stepping into such a monumentally important job. But others have had to do the same when taking on such a weighty position.

But Flynn has lots going for him, beyond the simple but crucial fact that he and Trump clearly have a good relationship. I know him well, especially from my dealings with him on Afghanistan over the years. He was always serious, and far from extreme in his views there. What I remember most was his open-mindedness—to the views of others, to dynamics on the battlefield, to new information, to our overall prospects for the mission there. He was always sober, and generally prescient, in what he saw coming. He was neither fatalistic nor Pollyannaish. And he was willing to break china to improve how we did business in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, in terms of challenging our own organizational methods and intellectual paradigms. I expect that he will encourage entrepreneurial thinking in regard to the broader “war on terror” in his new national security advisor job as well.

After leaving that job, General Flynn became director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was a disruptive force there as well—perhaps in both good and bad ways. Some found his management style ineffectual, though it is always easy to find anonymous critics of any leader, so I take those points with a grain of salt. While there, he continued his emphasis on trying to focus more intelligence work on field operations. He also accurately assessed that ISIS, and the extremist/Salafi threat in general, was more serious than the Obama administration recognized. Alas, Flynn has been proven correct on this point.

I wish Flynn had never said that Islam itself should be feared. He should not repeat that line; in fact, he should clarify and correct his earlier comment to that effect. But he was right that elements of prominent Islamist extremist thought are dangerous. In his frustration with conventional thinking of the time, he was too blunt, and let his anger get a bit carried away. But the larger context for this mistake on his part was a situation in which he correctly diagnosed a looming problem that others were missing, and that had serious national security implications for the United States. I am willing to cut him a little slack under such conditions.

General Flynn is going to have to learn, and grow, in his new job, to be sure. But he has many more strengths in his effort to do so than he is currently being given credit for.

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According to the New York Times and many others, President-elect Donald Trump's choices to head up his national security team to date include individuals outside the mainstream consensus of the Republican Party in particular, and U.S. foreign policymakers in general. That list includes retired Lt. General Mike Flynn, slated to be Mr. Trump's national security advisor, a position that does not require Senate confirmation.
While I have some concerns about certain other choices Mr. Trump has made to date, and serious worries about his foreign policy instincts in general, the frequent critique that General Flynn's worldview is somehow outside the reasonable bounds of normal American foreign policymaking is too strong and rather unfair.
General Flynn has, to be sure, been a controversial figure in recent months, and he has made a couple mistakes. While there is nothing wrong with talking to Vladimir Putin, General Flynn allowed himself to be seen being too publicly friendly to the Russian strongman, during a visit to Moscow some months ago. He was also wrong to egg on Trump supporters when they chanted “lock her up” about Hillary Clinton at various campaign rallies this year. And I am very skeptical that the United States should do as Flynn suggests and extradite Fethullah Gülen, the leader of a large but politically rather harmless and nonviolent, movement to Turkey just to assuage President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan there. To be sure, Flynn will have to polish his game and improve some of his judgments now that he is stepping into such a monumentally important job. But others have had to do the same when taking on such a weighty position.
But Flynn has lots going for him, beyond the simple but crucial fact that he and Trump clearly have a good relationship. I know him well, especially from my dealings with him on Afghanistan over the years. He was always serious, and far from extreme in his views there. What I remember most was his open-mindedness—to the views of others, to dynamics on the battlefield, to new information, to our overall prospects for the mission there. He was always sober, and generally prescient, in what he saw coming. He was neither fatalistic nor Pollyannaish. And he was willing to break china to improve how we did business in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, in terms of challenging our own organizational methods and intellectual paradigms. I expect that he will encourage entrepreneurial thinking in regard to the broader “war on terror” in his new national security advisor job as well.
After leaving that job, General Flynn became director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was a disruptive force there as well—perhaps in both good and bad ways. Some found his management style ineffectual, though it is always easy to find anonymous critics of any leader, so I take those points with a grain of salt. While there, he continued his emphasis on trying to focus more intelligence work on field operations. He also accurately assessed that ISIS, and the extremist/Salafi threat in general, was more serious than the Obama administration recognized. Alas, Flynn has been proven correct on this point.
I wish Flynn had never said that Islam itself should be feared. He should not repeat that line; in fact, he should clarify and correct his earlier comment to that effect. But he was right that elements of prominent Islamist extremist thought are dangerous. In his frustration with conventional thinking of the time, he was too blunt, and let his anger get a bit carried away. But the larger context for this mistake on his part was a situation in which he correctly diagnosed a looming problem that others were missing, and that had serious national security implications for the United States. I am willing to cut him a little slack under such conditions.
General Flynn is going to have to learn, and grow, in his ... According to the New York Times and many others, President-elect Donald Trump's choices to head up his national security team to date include individuals outside the mainstream consensus of the Republican Party in particular, and U.https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-all-volunteer-force-at-a-crossroads-the-military-family-and-veteran-connection/The all-volunteer force at a crossroads: The military family and veteran connectionhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/235472914/0/brookingsrss/topics/usdefensebudget~The-allvolunteer-force-at-a-crossroads-The-military-family-and-veteran-connection/
Fri, 18 Nov 2016 20:36:14 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=event&p=343196

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Serving in the military goes well beyond the individual and to the entire family, which makes having an understanding of the issues involved even more important. It is also critical to inform policymakers from the White House to Congress, the Department of Defense, and beyond. Military families face unique needs and challenges, and there is no alternative to hearing from them directly. Increasing the dialogue between the military community and the broader public minimizes the gap between the two, and supports the health and viability of the all-volunteer force.

The event opened with an introduction by Kathy Roth-Douquet of Blue Star Families. Following Roth-Douquet’s introduction, Secretary of the Army Eric Fanning gave remarks and took audience questions. Immediately after that, a panel discussion commenced. Panel participants included Cristin Orr Shiffer, senior advisor for policy and survey at Blue Star Families; and Rosalinda Maury, director for applied research and analytics at the Institute for Veterans and Military Families at Syracuse University. Both organizations are responsible for conducting the survey. Todd Weiler, assistant secretary of defense for manpower and reserve affairs, and Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings joined them. Elaine Kamarck, senior fellow and director of the Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, moderated the panel.

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Serving in the military goes well beyond the individual and to the entire family, which makes having an understanding of the issues involved even more important. It is also critical to inform policymakers from the White House to Congress, the Department of Defense, and beyond. Military families face unique needs and challenges, and there is no alternative to hearing from them directly. Increasing the dialogue between the military community and the broader public minimizes the gap between the two, and supports the health and viability of the all-volunteer force.
On December 8, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted a discussion to mark the release of the 2016 Blue Star Families annual Military Family Lifestyle Survey, one of the most critical tools to understanding the issues facing service members, veterans, and military family members.
The event opened with an introduction by Kathy Roth-Douquet of Blue Star Families. Following Roth-Douquet's introduction, Secretary of the Army Eric Fanning gave remarks and took audience questions. Immediately after that, a panel discussion commenced. Panel participants included Cristin Orr Shiffer, senior advisor for policy and survey at Blue Star Families; and Rosalinda Maury, director for applied research and analytics at the Institute for Veterans and Military Families at Syracuse University. Both organizations are responsible for conducting the survey. Todd Weiler, assistant secretary of defense for manpower and reserve affairs, and Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings joined them. Elaine Kamarck, senior fellow and director of the Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, moderated the panel.
Learn more by visiting bluestarfam.org/survey. Serving in the military goes well beyond the individual and to the entire family, which makes having an understanding of the issues involved even more important. It is also critical to inform policymakers from the White House to Congress, the ...