Dr Phil Clark2015-03-31T16:53:30-04:00Dr Phil Clarkhttp://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/author/index.php?author=dr-phil-clarkCopyright 2008, HuffingtonPost.com, Inc.HuffingtonPost Blogger Feed for Dr Phil ClarkGood old fashioned elbow grease.Democracy in Rwanda, 20 Years after Genocidetag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2014:/theblog//3.50680132014-04-01T06:48:38-04:002014-06-01T05:59:01-04:00Dr Phil Clarkhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-phil-clark/
A core tension has defined Rwanda's political trajectory since 1994. A highly motivated, disciplined ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which is the main reason that Rwanda has rebuilt so effectively, now poses its greatest challenges, namely the need for a wider spectrum of political opinion and more space for opposition political parties to organise and campaign. Understanding Rwanda's post-genocide development requires recognising the double-edged nature of the RPF. The tendency of many commentators has been to either praise Rwanda unreservedly as a post-conflict success story or to damn it as a dictatorship that is likely to explode again soon into mass violence. These polarised depictions overlook critical positives and negatives in the Rwandan landscape - which tend to flow from the same political source.

The complex legacies of the genocide, as well as the history, ideology and internal structures of the RPF, as a former rebel movement turned ruling party, are crucial in interpreting Rwanda's situation since 1994 and its likely future directions. The fervour and discipline of the RPF in reconstructing the nation after the genocide stem from several factors: the party's formation in exile and the long refugee experiences of its founding members, many of whose parents fled waves of anti-Tutsi violence in the early 1960s; many RPF leaders' (including Kagame's) direct experiences of conflict as part of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda in the 1980s; the RPF's military campaign against the Hutu-dominated government of Juvénal Habyarimana in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, which the RPF framed as the rightful return of Tutsi refugees to their homeland; and the genocide in 1994 and the RPF's coming to power at the same time as its fighters found their home villages destroyed and families murdered. These experiences instilled a deep sense of purpose and resolve, a collective identity forged through conflict, and an ethos of self-reliance that remains one of the RPF's defining features.

The evolution of the RPF as a ruling party echoes the experiences of other rebel forces or liberation movements that assumed power after armed struggle, such as the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), now the ruling party in South Sudan. The genocide, however, exerted specific pressures that are largely unknown to the RPF's post-liberation cousins. After defeating the genocidal forces in July 1994, the RPF inherited a devastated country: three-quarters of the Tutsi minority had been killed, the remaining population suffered extreme trauma, the national infrastructure had been destroyed, economic productivity had ceased and most of the personnel required to run the state had been murdered or had fled the country. The scope for nationwide revenge killings was enormous. The RPF also faced a major security threat from tens of thousands of genocide perpetrators who remained in Rwanda or had escaped across the border into Zaire (now the DRC) and other neighbouring states.

This extreme political, social and military situation inevitably dominated the Rwandan policy domain for years after the genocide. While there were some revenge attacks against Hutu civilians, the RPF favoured a large-scale programme of arrest and detention. This led to the prosecution of around 400,000 genocide suspects, regardless of their political or social standing, through a system of 11,000 community-based courts known as 'gacaca' - the most extensive post-conflict justice process attempted anywhere in the world. The involvement of former génocidaires in new rebel groups in eastern DRC also generated a persistent sense of vulnerability within Rwanda - an issue often manipulated by the Rwandan government to justify its military presence in the DRC but nevertheless genuinely felt by many Rwandans, especially those living in the country's western border regions.

The RPF's high degree of hierarchical discipline - coupled with vital external assistance from an international community seeking redemption after its failure to intervene to halt the genocide - suited perfectly the task of rebuilding the nation after 1994. Internal party cohesion and low corruption (factors lacking in most other African rebel movements) meant the RPF could focus on rebuilding national infrastructure, political and judicial institutions and the means of service delivery. The negative example of neighbouring Uganda, where Museveni's increasingly corrupt NRM failed to deliver on its promises of national socio-economic emancipation, directly informed the RPF's strategy. A key lesson for the RPF from the Ugandan experience was that failing to provide tangible development in rural areas generated widespread political discontent and spawned rebel movements such as the West Nile Bank Front, the Holy Spirit Movement and the Lord's Resistance Army.

In contrast to most of its neighbours, Rwanda has recorded substantial post-genocide economic growth while delivering improved education, healthcare, transport networks and agricultural assistance across ethnic lines. All current indications are that these impressive socio-economic gains will continue, although Rwanda (already one of the most densely populated countries in the world) faces a significant challenge in the form of an estimated 25 per cent population growth over the next decade. Through the gacaca trial process, the country has also laid important foundations for long-term reconciliation by directly confronting the causes of - and ordinary citizens' complicity in - the genocide. Gacaca has been vital in addressing a prevailing atmosphere of community suspicion since 1994 and the need for greater clarity about who did and did not commit genocide crimes. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of mainly Hutu combatants from Congolese rebel groups have been reintegrated into Rwandan communities through an extensive demobilisation scheme. The scale and speed of Rwanda's reconstruction would have been unimaginable in 1994.

The core strengths of the RPF in responding to the genocide - discipline and single-mindedness - however, pose substantial challenges in other vital policy areas. In particular, the RPF's desire for internal cohesion has made it suspicious of critical voices within and outside of the party - a feature compounded by Rwanda's fraught experience of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, which saw the rise of ethnically driven extremist parties and helped to create an environment conducive to genocide. The RPF's singular focus on rebuilding the nation and facilitating the return of refugees means it has often viewed dissent as an unaffordable distraction. The disastrous dalliance with multipartyism before the genocide has only added to the deep suspicion of policy based on the open contestation of ideas.

Another crucial feature that the RPF shares with other former rebel movements is the pressure to absorb opposing factions into a cohesive whole. As liberation movements become governments, they inevitably require the finance and expertise of members and allies who did not fight on the front lines, but often supported the movements while in exile. A challenge for political parties such as the RPF is to deploy the legitimising discourse of armed struggle while integrating important actors who may have lived in relative comfort overseas as the fighting raged. This latter category possesses resources that are vital to the reconstruction of a nation after conflict but may hold divergent views on the necessary political directions because of their very different histories.

Within the RPF, important factions have developed since 1994 between hard-line and more moderate voices, with returnees from the Tutsi diaspora heavily represented in the latter group. In the last five years, the RPF has recruited large numbers of highly educated young Tutsi from the diaspora in North America, Europe and the Great Lakes region who have no direct experience of the genocide but whose energy, skills and international networks are essential to the RPF's rebuilding programme. Over the last decade, many key Rwandan government debates - for example, over justice processes for genocide crimes, repeal of the death penalty, laws against 'genocide ideology' and ethnic 'divisionism', freedom of the press, the switch of the national language from French to English, and the presidential succession plan, given that Kagame is constitutionally required to step down when his second term expires in 2017 - have centred around these factions. While many commentators have focused on the influence of donors and other external parties on Rwandan policy-making, insufficient attention has been paid to these vital internal dynamics and the importance of maintaining cohesion within a highly divided RPF.

These two main challenges regarding democratic space and internal party cohesion stem from central features of the RPF and will need to be addressed. For the moment, there are few signs of large-scale popular discontent with the closed political space. However, any substantial decline in socio-economic conditions in the countryside will challenge this. The RPF's gamble appears to be that the population will tolerate a lack of national political contestation provided domestic stability and basic living standards are maintained. For now, the RPF seems to have rightly judged the popular mood but that situation may not hold.

Meanwhile, the issue of internal RPF cohesion has already come to a head, with a series of high profile political and military defections from the party in recent years, including that of Patrick Karegeya, the former Rwandan head of intelligence who was murdered in Johannesburg in January 2014. The greater challenge to the RPF at present comes from within the party, rather than from everyday Rwandans. Some of the old RPF guard such as Karegeya have fallen out with Kagame and formed opposition parties in exile. Meanwhile, the recent sacking of RPF stalwarts and cabinet ministers, Tharcisse Karugarama and Protais Musoni, highlight critical internal party divisions. Karugarama was reportedly sacked after giving an interview to Chris McGreal from The Observer in which he insisted that Kagame should respect the constitution and step down before the 2017 election.

Rwanda has made remarkable strides since 1994. Many of these important gains could be undermined, however, if Rwanda does not embark on the difficult process of liberalising the national political terrain and providing greater space for dissent within and outside of the RPF, while guarding against the danger of ethnically extremist politics, as the country experienced in the early 1990s (and which today characterises much of the political mobilisation in the Rwandan diaspora). This is a difficult but necessary balancing act and would require the RPF to display a tolerance to political opposition that the ANC, NRM, SPLM and other post-liberation movements - not to mention its Rwandan predecessors - have largely failed to achieve. The 20th anniversary of the genocide therefore represents an opportunity to celebrate the extent of Rwanda's development but also a challenge to the RPF to consider the forms of governance necessary for continuing prosperity over the next twenty years and beyond.

A version of this article first appeared in Juncture. The author is also the co-editor (with Jason Mosley) of a special issue, 'Rwanda under the RPF: Assessing Twenty Years of Post-Conflict Governance', in the Journal of Eastern African Studies.]]>Why the Congo Experts Need More Scrutinytag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2013:/theblog//3.23914702013-01-02T03:49:42-05:002013-03-03T05:12:01-05:00Dr Phil Clarkhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-phil-clark/
Meanwhile, the UN Security Council and the US and UK governments have debated sanctions against the rebels and their backers, the withdrawal of international aid to Rwanda, which is accused of supporting M23, the need for a more robust UN peacekeeping mission to protect Congolese civilians and the possible naming of a UN special envoy for the Great Lakes region.

Amid the sound and the fury, however, worrying trends have emerged in the ways that external actors have responded to this latest episode of violence in Congo. In particular, the widespread adoption of the UN Group of Experts (GoE) analysis of M23 by the international media and many policymakers raises critical questions about how we understand and address conflict.

The issue here isn't whether we should agree with the GoE that Rwanda and Uganda are responsible for creating and directing M23 but rather the rushed and generally uncritical way in which the findings of one particular source have so fundamentally shaped public perceptions and international policy. Despite the complexity of violence in this region, there has been limited public deliberation of the GoE's findings, which in many quarters have been treated as gospel truth. This sets a troubling precedent for the analysis of this and other conflict-affected regions in the future.

With this in mind, we should examine the broader context in which the GoE has released its reports as well as the Group's specific methods and conclusions. These issues highlight the need for a more nuanced dissection of the GoE's evidence.

The Wider Picture

There are numerous reasons why the GoE findings on M23 have been so widely accepted, not all of which concern the M23 situation or the Great Lakes region. Key M23-related issues have been magnified, simplified or distorted in order to fit other narratives and agendas. The vociferous debates around M23 quickly morphed into denunciations of Rwanda's various armed interventions in Congo since 1996, as well as Rwanda's domestic human rights record and accusations of authoritarianism at home. Human rights organisations have raised these concerns for many years but international criticism of Rwanda has increased markedly since the volatile 2010 presidential election and the release soon after of a UN mapping report that accused Rwanda of committing serious crimes in Congo between 1993 and 2003.

The GoE reports on M23 therefore provided a pretext to denounce Rwanda for a catalogue of recent as well as historical violations. While it is legitimate to criticise Rwanda's armed interventions in Congo over the last 16 years, the GoE reports have entrenched the view that M23 represents simply the latest in a series of rebel movements being directed and supported by senior Rwandan officials. That the GoE reports provide more systematic evidence on Rwanda's role in creating, rather than directing, M23 has largely been overlooked because of many commentators' desire to fit this latest rebellion into a wider historical pattern.

The GoE findings have also been widely accepted because they resonate with extraneous domestic debates within donor countries. Even before the emergence of M23, the UK government was having to justify its foreign aid policy in the wake of severe austerity cuts. The British press continues to rail against aid to developing countries when so many Britons are seeing their public services and welfare benefits slashed. The GoE's findings of Rwandan complicity in backing M23 fuelled the media furore and heaped pressure on the UK government to withdraw aid to Rwanda.

Meanwhile, the M23 script has been shaped by a cast of British and American political luminaries - David Cameron, Tony Blair, Andrew Mitchell, Bill Clinton, Susan Rice - who have had significant dealings with Rwanda and are lightning rods for criticism on a host of political issues. In the UK, the GoE reports quickly became part of the stew of controversy around Mitchell, the former International Development Secretary, who resigned from Cabinet after allegedly abusing police officers outside Downing Street but not before he had reinstated a previously withheld aid package to Rwanda. At the same time across the Atlantic, the GoE findings became a political weapon against Rice - like Mitchell, pilloried as an unwavering friend of Rwanda - during her ultimately aborted bid to become the next US Secretary of State. Amid these domestic spats, the GoE reports gained unexpected political salience and a momentum that militated against close scrutiny of their methods and findings.

Issues for Debate in the Experts' Reports

It is now worth highlighting some elements from five relevant documents - the 27 June, 15 and 27 November 2012 GoE reports, the Rwandan government's rebuttal to the June GoE analysis and the evidence by the GoE coordinator, Steve Hege, to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 11 December 2012 - that warrant greater debate. Together these may not undermine the view that Rwanda and Uganda are ultimately responsible for creating and supporting M23. The main point here is that a systematic analysis of the situation should have included these issues for the sake of a more informed media and policy response - and to set a higher standard for future evidence-gathering.

Four issues, in particular, deserve further examination.

First, the GoE reports rely too heavily on Congolese government sources who are far from impartial on questions of Rwandan involvement on their territory. Annex 2 to the 15 November GoE report states, "The Group prioritizes testimonies from current and former members of armed groups, local witnesses of specific events, and security services principally from the DRC." The last category constitutes the overwhelming majority of sources cited in the three GoE reports. When the Rwandan government raised concerns over this issue following the June report, the GoE dismissed it, stating in Annex 3 on 15 November that it would be impossible for the dozens of Congolese political and military officials interviewed to mount a "conspiracy" of information against Rwanda. This reply, however, avoids the core contention, which is not whether large numbers of Congolese officials could coordinate their answers to GoE researchers but rather that the GoE preferenced the views of informants who clearly had a vested interest in the issues at hand. A conspiracy on the scale posited by the GoE would not have been necessary for this approach to still skew its findings.

Second, exacerbating this first problem, the GoE conducted minimal research inside Rwanda. This resulted primarily from a lack of cooperation by the Rwandan government, which generally has not helped its cause when dealing with the GoE over the last year. Regardless, the geographical limitation of the GoE's work constrained evidence-gathering and fact-checking on the Rwandan side. In turn, this resulted in various errors that raise wider questions about the reliability of the GoE's sources.

To take one example, the June report by the GoE states incorrectly that Rwanda trained some M23 fighters at the Kanombe military camp in the Rwandan capital, Kigali - a key claim in showing the extent of Rwandan involvement in the M23 rebellion - when that site comprises only a military hospital and a cemetery. After the Rwandan government identified this mistake in its rebuttal to the June report, the GoE admitted on 15 November that its original claim was based on an interview with a single source. However, it went on to state that a visit by the GoE to Kanombe in July showed that the camp could be used for training M23 because it contains "parade fields" and "wooded areas". Besides, the GoE added, "'training' for experienced RDF soldiers usually consists of briefings and preparations of small groups, to be carried out in any military facility."

The GoE's response here is unsatisfactory: it does not acknowledge that its original claim was based on faulty and unverified evidence and instead maintains that M23 "training" could take place at Kanombe but on grounds entirely different from those stated in the initial report. No one familiar with the site - which is located beside the international airport and has never previously been used for military training - would accept this latter claim. More generally, the Kanombe example highlights the weakness of the GoE's analysis of dynamics inside Rwanda.

Third, while the GoE claims that it has adopted "elevated methodological standards" due to the gravity of its allegations against Rwanda, those standards are highly variable across its 2012 reports. While some GoE claims are supported by a range of corroborated sources, others - such as the Kanombe example above - are based on single interviews or, in some cases, on telephone conversations overheard by third parties. A consistent trend in the GoE's attempt to show substantial Rwandan support for M23 has been to trace back to Kigali weapons found on the battlefield in eastern Congo. The most common GoE method to substantiate such claims has been to show that the weapons in question have never been formally registered in the Congolese army's stocks. This approach, however, does not prove that the weapons emanated from Rwanda when the region is awash with weapons acquired from numerous international sources over several decades.

Perhaps the most concerning issue relating to methodology, though, is the range of claims made by Hege - soon after he left his position as coordinator of the GoE - during his testimony to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The second half of Hege's evidence outlines Rwanda's regional motivations for backing M23, which amounts to amplifying a longstanding Great Lakes myth about Rwanda's desire for the secession of eastern Congo and the creation of an autonomous Rwandan-controlled state. The basis for Hege's statements is a jumbled collection of conversations with unidentified Rwandan officials whom he claims told him personally, long before the creation of M23, that this was Rwanda's primary objective in the region. It is impossible to verify this type of anecdotal evidence. More importantly, Hege does not explain why Rwandan officials would admit such expansionist intentions to a senior member of a UN investigative body. Important questions should therefore be asked about the basis of such statements, as well as the impact of repeating highly divisive narratives about Rwanda's interest in the "balkanization" of Congo.

Finally, there should be closer inspection of the GoE's response to the Rwandan government's rebuttal of its claims, which is contained in Annex 3 to the GoE's 15 November report. In substantive terms, the GoE does not acknowledge specific errors in any of its reports and instead claims that any identified mistakes do not undermine the broader case being made regarding Rwanda's support for M23. This approach is concerning because it suggests a lack of openness and responsiveness to external critique.

In terms of tone, the GoE response to Rwanda's rebuttal is strident and dismissive in a way unbecoming of an official UN document. The GoE reply begins in a barbed fashion:

The [Government of Rwanda's] rebuttal seeks to distort the conclusions of the Group's investigations so as to portray them as if they "hinge on" specific minor details. However, the Group purposefully stated that it had gathered "overwhelming evidence" demonstrating that the [Government of Rwanda] had directly violated the United Nations arms embargo and sanctions regime.

Certainly Rwanda has not helped matters by adopting a consistently belligerent stance toward the GoE. Rwanda has also mounted a campaign of character assassination against Hege and other members of the GoE, which has weakened its critique of their findings. Nonetheless, as an impartial international body, the GoE should have adopted a more measured tone in its reply to Rwanda. Coupled with the practice of leaking its reports weeks before Rwanda could respond fully to any accusations, this has increased Rwanda's intransigence and stymied efforts at meaningful diplomacy to resolve the current conflict.

These issues underscore the need to scrutinise more closely the methods and findings of analysts working on the Great Lakes. This is particularly the case when a source such as the GoE is so influential in shaping international media and policy responses. The GoE could not have imagined the enormous impact its 2012 reports would have, especially on decisions about foreign aid and sanctions in central Africa. That those reports were not examined more critically, though, has clouded reactions to the current conflict and established concerning precedents for analysing this region in the future.]]>Rethinking the International Response to the Congo Conflicttag:www.huffingtonpost.com,2012:/theblog//3.18242892012-08-23T08:14:16-04:002012-10-23T05:12:11-04:00Dr Phil Clarkhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-phil-clark/
The UN Group of Experts report in June, which accused Rwanda of supporting the mutiny of M23 rebels from the Congolese army, sparked international condemnation of the Rwandan government. Driven by the evidence in the report as well as fierce criticism by human rights groups and media commentators, the governments of the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden delayed or withdrew aid packages to Rwanda. While there is little doubt that Rwanda - not for the first time - has interfered dangerously in Congolese affairs, we need to cast a critical eye over both the UN report and the use of foreign aid as a tool for changing Rwanda's regional policy.

That loyal supporters of Rwandan President Paul Kagame's government, such as the US and the UK, have responded so strongly to the UN report highlights the power of the Group of Experts to influence international diplomacy. The report, however, is far from the watertight analysis that some diplomats and commentators have assumed. The dearth of comprehensive information on political and military affairs in central Africa means that many foreign actors rely too heavily on this particular UN group and often fail to sufficiently scrutinise its findings.

In the case of the June report, donors have responded to what is explicitly an interim analysis by the Group of Experts. UN protocol dictates that such findings are released mid-year, leaving time for responses from the relevant regional governments and peer review by commentators, before the final, revised report is submitted at the year's end. In this instance, the donors have shifted their policies on Rwanda - which denies any involvement in Congo - before the UN's evidence has been adequately assessed.

While the Rwandan government's detailed response to the report, released two weeks ago, contains many questionable claims, it also raises some compelling points that warrant attention. To take one example, the Group of Experts erroneously claimed that Rwanda trained some M23 fighters at the Kanombe army barracks in the Rwandan capital, Kigali, when those barracks comprise only a military hospital and a cemetery. This error suggests that the Group of Experts conducted rapid evidence-gathering in a confined region of eastern Congo and spent little time researching within Rwanda. This geographical limitation has implications for other key aspects of the report.

The recent case of the alleged Congolese rebel leader, Callixte Mbarushimana, at the International Criminal Court (ICC) criticised the methodologies employed by a range of international observer groups in eastern Congo, including the UN Group of Experts. A key reason that the ICC found Mbarushimana not guilty was that the evidence gathered by the Group of Experts, Human Rights Watch and others, upon which the ICC prosecution built its case, did not withstand the forensic scrutiny of the courtroom. This highlights the need for slow, careful assessment of the methods and conclusions of all observer groups working in this region. The latest Group of Experts report reads like a final legal judgment - and has been treated as such in many quarters - rather than a separate piece of evidence that requires critical evaluation.

Not only have international donors reacted too hastily, without sufficiently assessing the UN findings, but their decision to use aid as a bargaining chip with the Rwandan government is also highly problematic. Even if we agree that Rwanda's intervention in Congo exacerbates a volatile situation, decreasing aid to Rwanda will not solve the problem of endemic violence and deprivation in Congo. Furthermore, it risks damaging a still fragile social and economic situation in Rwanda.

One major problem with the UN report and the international reaction to it is the insistence that Rwanda is primarily responsible for current instability in eastern Congo. This view neglects the role played by Congolese President Joseph Kabila in generating the M23 mutiny. One key motivator for the rebellion was that Kabila reneged on deals with these same rebels in 2009, before they were integrated into the Congolese army, that they would not be scattered away from their homelands in North and South Kivu - which Kabila threatened to do earlier this year - and that they would be paid adequate salaries. Kabila's bad faith on these counts has undermined the 2009 peace agreement between Congo, Rwanda and a range of rebel groups, which improved the security situation in eastern Congo.

More broadly, the singular focus on Rwanda ignores Kabila's failure to control his armed forces, which are responsible for as many attacks on Congolese civilians as the litany of rebel groups operating in the eastern provinces, as well as his tendency to use inflammatory ethnic rhetoric against supposed 'Rwandans' living in Congo, as seen during the 2006 and 2011 presidential campaigns. Simply removing Rwandan influence from eastern Congo will not address these fundamental causes of conflict and Kabila's role in fomenting tensions for his own political gain.

Finally, withdrawing aid from Rwanda could have dire consequences for a country still addressing the complex legacies of the 1994 genocide. Donor contributions represent around 48% of the Rwandan national budget, the vast majority of which is spent on education, health and poverty alleviation. Most observers agree that Rwanda has recorded extraordinary successes in these domains since the genocide because of its effective use of international aid and its low levels of corruption. These major socio-economic achievements have been the bedrock of the peace and stability that Rwanda has enjoyed over the last 18 years. The positive impact of aid in Rwanda poses a major dilemma for donors, who have few levers of influence over Kagame's government other than the delay or withdrawal of budgetary support. The danger, however, in using aid in this way is that ultimately it will be the Rwandan population that suffers from any reduction in social and economic services. Withholding aid will do little to address systemic problems in Congo and will undermine substantial gains in Rwanda. This risks causing major instability within Rwanda and the region as a whole.]]>