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British IS recruiter Sally-Anne Jones 'killed by drone'

British IS recruiter Sally-Anne Jones was reportedly killed in a US drone strike in Syria, in June.
Jones, from Chatham in Kent, joined so-called Islamic State after converting to Islam and travelling to Syria in 2013.
Her death was first reported by The Sun.
The BBC's security correspondent Frank Gardner said Jones had been a useful propaganda agent for IS on social media and her death would be "significant".

UK facing most severe terror threat ever, warns MI5 chief

In his first selected media appearance MI5's Director said there was currently "more terrorist activity coming at us, more quickly" and that it can also be "harder to detect". He added that more than 130 Britons who travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight with so-called Islamic State had died.

A couple of quotes:

They are constantly making tough professional judgements based on fragments of intelligence; pinpricks of light against a dark and shifting canvas.

Where is the threat coming from?

Yet to catch up on my reading on UK CT, notably the report on the four attacks in 2017, so here is a recent article by Raffaello Pantucci, at RUSI, which was behind a paywall when published a few days ago.

The title: 'The new wave of terrorist threat comes more from the local lone wolf than international plotters'.

Here is a "taster":

This all paints a bleak picture at the start of a fresh new year and it is worth stopping a moment to recognize a more positive side. Notwithstanding this past year being a particularly grim one in terms of attacks, the UK has not faced a large-scale atrocity on the scale of the London bombings of July 7, 2005, when 56 people died. The attacks we have suffered are for the most part of a low calibre, driven by individuals of limited resources and ability.

In September 2017 a London BBC programme, with Raffaello as the reporter, was screened and is available (27 mins). The summary:

reveals how Isis used social media to plan and plot attacks on Westminster and London Bridge. He exposes how the terrorist group relies on encrypted messages and the dark web to coerce British Muslims to stage atrocities across the UK.

What do the statistics suggest?

A BBC report, with the official stats on arrest etc, here is one passage:

There were 400 arrests on suspicion of terrorism-related offences in the year to the end of September 2017. That's the highest recorded figure, up more than 50% on the previous year.

The author concludes:

So 2017 was a bad year for attacks, while still nowhere near the levels of The Troubles in Northern Ireland. But it definitely looks like there has been an unprecedented level of activity around tracking down people who are suspected of wishing to do harm to others.

UK CT: 2017 a brutal end to success, what next?

Seven weeks ago a public report on UK counter-terrorism revealed, within reason (national security and operational methods mainly) a great deal and some pointers to what was to be implemented next. Apologies for the delay, only today was there time to read the report and related comments.

The catalyst being in the words of the author, David Anderson, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (whose role is to monitor UK counter-terrorism legislation for its fairness, effectiveness and proportionality):

The excellent recent record of MI5 and police in defending the UK from terrorist attack came to a brutal end this year at Westminster, Manchester Arena, London Bridge and Finsbury Park….After four such incidents over a short period, unsparing reflection was required.”

The attacks were: 22nd March @ Westminster Bridge, London four deaths, with thirty-two injured by a suspect (shot dead) using a van and knives; 22nd May @ Manchester Arena, twenty-two dead, with one hundred and sixteen injured by a suicide bomber; 3rd June @ London Bridge, London, eight dead and forty-five injured by three men (shot dead) with a van and knives; and 19th June @ Finsbury Park Mosque, London one dead, eleven injured by a suspect in a van (currently on trial).

In the case of the Westminster attack, Khalid Masood was a closed subject of interest at the time of the attack. Neither MI5 nor the police had any reason to anticipate the attack.Regarding the Manchester Arena attack, Salman Abedi was also a closed subject of interest at the time of the attack, and so not under active investigation. In early 2017, MI5 nonetheless received intelligence on him, which was assessed as not being related to terrorism. In retrospect the intelligence can be seen to be highly relevant. Had an investigation been re-opened at the time, it cannot be known whether Abedi’s plans could have been stopped: MI5 assess that it would have been unlikely.
In the case of London Bridge, Khuram Butt was an active subject of interest who had been under investigation since mid-2015. A number of different investigative means were deployed against him, but they did not reveal his plans. His two conspirators had never been investigated by MI5 or CT Policing.
In regards to Finsbury Park, neither MI5 nor the police had any intelligence about this attack.The recommendations made in the MI5 and police operational review fall into four broad categories:First, there needs to be a concerted effort to enhance MI5 and the police’s ability to use data to detect activity of concern, and to test new approaches in the acquisition, sharing and analysis of data.Second, MI5 should share its intelligence more widely, and work with partners such as local authorities on how best to manage the risk posed by closed subjects of interest in particular. We are considering undertaking multi-agency pilots in a number of areas including Greater Manchester, and I have already started discussing how to take this forward with Andy Burnham.Third, there should be a new approach to managing domestic extremism, particularly extreme right wing groups, where their activity meets the definition of terrorism. Fourth, there are a large number of detailed and technical changes which could be made to improve existing operational counter-terrorism processes.

1.13 to 1.27 is a short section on terminology and in IMHO is the clearest explanation of how MI5 manages investigations and priorities in the public domain (There is a longer explanation in an Appendix pgs. 57-61; which has been amended after publication in an ISC report, November 2014).. 2.3 My more limited aim has been to give an idea of the quantity and quality of the intelligence that was available on each attacker at material times, thus introducing the context that needs to be understood before sense can be made of the recommendations in the various internal reviews.
2.38 Another tool promised well, but did not produce results in time. A process devised by MI5 to identify activity of renewed intelligence interest conducted by closed SOIs, using targeted data exploitation and other automated techniques, identified Salman Abedi as one of a small number of individuals, out of a total of more than 20,000 closed SOIs, who merited further examination.
2.77 How best to deal with the risk from persons not under active investigation has been a long-standing challenge for MI5, in respect of which a number of solutions have been tried in the past.39 Many of the recommendations in the OIR, summarised in chapter 3 below, are directed to improving coverage of such persons.

The report at 5.23 cites the Director General of MI5 recently described the work of his staff in the following terms

They are constantly making tough professional judgments based on fragments of intelligence: pin pricks of light against a dark and shifting canvas.

Part 2

The Anderson Report (as it is known) was well covered at the time and I have selected three particular comments.

The first is a quote from the report:

The unpalatable lesson of London Bridge is that even priority subjects of interest in respect of whom sound decisions are being made ... may retain the ability to conceal their attack planning from the authorities.

Yet headlines like these are misleading, neglecting the nuance in Anderson’s report that the decision to ignore or misinterpret the intelligence on Abedi was “understandable” in the circumstances, overlooking the complex nature of counter-terror investigations. So could the Manchester bombing really have been prevented?

The report states that there is “certainly room for improvement in analysing and sharing data”, and identifies three potential changes as being particularly important:

Improving “the ability of MI5 and the police to exploit data to detect activity of concern”: in particular, “a better strategy for acquiring, analysing and sharing data across intelligence and policing, for example through wider use of bulk personal datasets”;

“Enhancement of tools” such as a process devised by MI5 “toidentify activity of renewed intelligence interest conducted by [suspects]”, through “data exploitation and other automatic techniques”;

Allowing intelligence agencies such as MI5 to share its knowledge “beyond intelligence

The security and intelligence services should make their decisions based on objective evidence, not algorithmic speculation which may result in UK citizens’ privacy rights being infringed.

Radicalisation can be rapid, making it almost impossible to detect

A spin off from today's jailing of a white extremist for a murder in London last year of a Muslim man leaving a mosque, is the velocity of the radicalization process.

Sarah Andrews, his estranged partner, told detectives that Osborne was radicalised into a terrorist murderer in three weeks. Friends and family say there were no previous signs of racism or extremism. The catalyst, police believe, came three weeks before the attack, when his attitudes began to metastasise after he watched Three Girls, a BBC TV drama about the Rochdale grooming scandal. He also read extremist right wing propaganda online that left him “brainwashed” and a “ticking time bomb”.
Paul Gill, a terrorism expert and senior lecturer at at University College London, said radicalisation can be rapid, making it almost impossible to detect.
“It is rare, but violent extremism can occur quickly,” he said. “Brusthom Ziamani was a Jehovah’s Witness three months prior to his arrest for an Isis-inspired plot. It is usually expedited by primitive attack plans and a history of criminal activity and violence.”

A teenager inspired by the killing of Fusilier Lee Rigby has been jailed for 22 years for plotting to behead a British soldier. Brusthom Ziamani was carrying a hammer and a 12-inch knife wrapped in an “Islamic flag” when he was arrested by police in London in August.

The CT approach has "holes in the bucket"

A broad comment on the issues around returning foreign fighters by an "insider":

Ian Acheson led the independent review of Islamist extremism in prisons and probation ordered by then Justice Secretary Michael Gove in 2016

A classic example of how weak the UK CT approach is:

When I carried out my review of Islamist extremism for Government I was astonished to find that absolutely no thought had been given to forecasting the numbers of returning foreign fighters who might enter custody and how their special risks might be managed when they did. The expected surge hasn’t happened – yet – but the prison service is barely capable of maintaining order in our high security prisons, let alone accommodate a surge of combat-hardened Islamist terrorists.

A retiring CT police officer says

Yesterday Asst. Commissioner Mark Rowley, the National Co-ordinator of Terrorist Investigations, delivered a valedictory speech in London to Policy Exchange and he retires next month. There are numerous reports, some reflect his concerns and others identify his remarks on where public policy is lacking, notably whether radicalised families should retain their children.

Islamist and right-wing extremism is reaching into our communities through sophisticated propaganda and subversive strategies creating and exploiting vulnerabilities that can ultimately lead to acts of violence and terrorism. "Ten conspiracies of an Islamist nature were stopped since the Westminster attack. "And I can tell you today that over the same period police have been able to prevent a further four extreme, right-wing inspired plots in the UK.

Imprisonment: a gap in UK CT

This is now getting beyond a joke, if you accept a parliamentary report and the headline:

Let terrorists off jail because they may become more radicalised inside, say MPs

Why?

The Commons Justice Select Committee said it was making the call for leniency because counter-radicalisation work in jails was often “absent or inadequate”. As a result, the courts should consider whether a non-custodial sentence would be better than prison for rehabilitating the “lowest level” of terrorist offenders.

Given our existing experience and that from Northern Ireland surely politicians and bureaucrats have learnt that a CT strategy that pursues law enforcement cannot ignore what happens when imprisonment is used. Apparently not.

The foster mother who didn't know

Last week an Iraqi teenage asylum seeker Ahmed Hassan, who had been in foster care for two years, was convicted for a bomb attack on the London Underground, the bomb was faulty and only partly worked, injuring fifty-one. The foster parents knew nothing about his intentions, nor that for a year he had been subject of a counter-radicalisation action. Hassan awaits sentencing.

The carers were interviewed by ITV and this link is a detailed account. It ends with:

Parsons Green Tube bombing: Teenager Ahmed Hassan

His day in court:

Passing sentence, the judge, Mr Justice Haddon-Cave, said he would be treating the incident as a terrorist offence.In a January 2016 immigration interview, Hassan told officials he had been in contact with the Islamic State group and had been "trained to kill". The trial also heard he blamed the UK for the death of his father in Iraq.
The judge told Hassan: "There is no doubt that you are a very dangerous and devious individual. You quietly went about planning and executing this terrorist bomb attack with ruthless determination and almost military efficiency, whilst pretending to be a model asylum-seeker. I am satisfied you were determined to create as much death and carnage that day as possible."

An investigation into Westminster Bridge attacker, Khalid Masood

From the BBC Newsnight team and placed on YouTube (19 mins):

A year ago a 52 year old British man - Khalid Masood - brought terror to the heart of Westminster. More than fifty people were injured - five were killed. This Newsnight investigation by Richard Watson and Maria Polachowska reports on who he was and how he was radicalised.

The Threat From British Jihadists After the Caliphate’s Fall

A quick overview on this problem by James Brandon and an almost laughable, sadly true passage:

In contrast to this tough approach abroad, the treatment of many returnees has been exceedingly lenient, with only a fraction of returnees prosecuted. Indeed, a recent parliamentary report on terrorist sentencing recommended that—such was the level of prison radicalization and that absence of an effective de-radicalization scheme—those convicted of more minor terrorism offensives should receive a non-custodial sentence.