Sprint Nextel (S)

As
long-term shareholders of Sprint Nextel , we support transparency and accountability in corporate spending on political activities. These activities include direct and indirect political contributions to candidates, political parties or political
organizations; independent expenditures; or electioneering communications on behalf of a federal, state or local candidate.

Disclosure is consistent with
public policy and in the best interest of the company and its shareholders. Absent a system of accountability, company assets can be used for policy objectives that may be inimical to the long-term interests of and may pose risks to the company and
its shareholders.

Sprint Nextel contributed at least $1.4 million in corporate funds since the 2002 election cycle. (CQs PoliticalMoneyLine:
http://moneyline.cq.com/pml/home.do and the National Institute on Money in State Politics: http://www.followthemoney.org/index.phtml).

However, relying on publicly available data does not provide a complete picture of the Companys political expenditures. For example, the Companys payments to trade associations used for political activities are undisclosed and
unknown. In many cases, even management does not know how trade associations use their companys money politically. The proposal asks the Company to disclose all of its political contributions, including payments to trade associations and other
tax exempt organizations. This would bring our Company in line with a growing number of leading companies, including Pfizer, Aetna, and American Electric Power that support political disclosure and accountability and present this information on
their websites.

In our view, senior executive compensation at Sprint, prior to
the merger with Nextel, has not always been structured in ways
that best serve shareholders interests. When CEO Gary
Forsee was hired in 2003, the golden hello package
of restricted stock units and guaranteed bonus was valued at
over $14 million. Former CEO William Esrey, forced to
resign that year as a result of a tax shelter scandal, was
retained as a consultant for ten years; this
agreement had a total value of $3,250,000 and was paid on top of
a severance package valued at over $4 million.

We believe that existing U.S. corporate governance
arrangements, including SEC rules and stock exchange listing
standards, do not provide shareholders with enough mechanisms
for providing input to boards on senior executive compensation.
In contrast to U.S. practices, in the United Kingdom,
public companies allow shareholders to cast an advisory vote on
the directors remuneration report, which
discloses executive compensation. Such a vote isnt
binding, but gives shareholders a clear voice that could help
shape senior executive compensation.

Currently U.S. stock exchange listing standards require
shareholder approval of equity-based compensation plans; those
plans, however, set general parameters and accord the
compensation committee substantial discretion in making awards
and establishing performance thresholds for a particular year.
Shareholders do not have any mechanism for providing ongoing
feedback on the application of those general standards to
individual pay packages. (See Lucian Bebchuk &
Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance 49 (2004)).

Similarly, performance criteria submitted for shareholder
approval to allow a company to deduct compensation in excess of
$1 million are broad and do not constrain compensation
committees in setting performance targets for particular senior
executives. Withholding votes from compensation committee
members who are standing for reelection is a blunt and
insufficient instrument for registering dissatisfaction with the
way in which the committee has administered compensation plans
and policies in the previous year.

Accordingly, we urge Sprints board to allow shareholders
to express their opinion about senior executive compensation at
Sprint by establishing an annual referendum process. The results
of such a vote would, we think, provide Sprint with useful
information about whether shareholders view the companys
senior executive compensation, as reported each year, to be in
shareholders best interests.

Cumulative voting means that each shareholder may cast as many votes as equal the number of shares held, multiplied by the number of directors to be
elected. Each shareholder may cast all such cumulated votes for a single candidate or split votes between one or more candidates, as each shareholder sees fit.

We believe that cumulative voting increases the possibility of electing at least one director with a viewpoint independent of management. In our
opinion, this will help achieve the objective of the board representing all shareholders.

We urge our fellow shareholders to vote yes for cumulative voting and the opportunity to enhance our Board with a more independent perspective.