Ikossi sued the
employer for violation of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), and the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). The trial
court granted summary judgment to the employer. The DC Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The question presented
on this appeal of a "mixed case" (adverse personnel
actions appealable to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB)
where discrimination played a role) was whether the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction over non-discrimination
claims under 5 USC Section 7702(e)(1). The trial court ruled
that since the MSPB failed to issue a decision within 120
days, it had jurisdiction over the discrimination claims; but
it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
non-discrimination claims until the MSPB issued a final
decision. The court concluded the trial court erred. The court
found that the "mixed case" was to be treated as a
unit, which was consistent with the statutory language and
legislative history of section 7702. The court followed the
6th and 11th circuits and held that the trial court had
jurisdiction over non-discrimination claims when agencies fail
to issue a decision within the 120 day time line established
by section 7702(e)(1)(B).

King (African-American
teacher) sued the employer pursuant to 42 USC Sections 1981
and 1983 alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The
trial court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment. The 8th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part.

The court concluded
that the trial court erred in not applying the direct evidence
analysis of mixed-motive cases under the Price Waterhouse test
(if there was direct evidence of race discrimination, the
burden rested with the employer to show that it more likely
than not would have made the same decision without
consideration of the illegitimate factor). While many of the
alleged racial comments fell into the "stray remark"
category, the court found that the employer's statement to
King that "white people teach black kids ... better than
someone from their own race," was evidence that may be
viewed as directly reflecting the employer's alleged
discriminatory attitude.

McClain sued the
employer for violation of Title VII and 42 USC Section 1981
alleging disparate-impact racial discrimination in initial
assignment of newly hired black employees and in promotions.
The trial court found in favor of McClain. The 5th Circuit
found that exhaustion of remedies before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission had been met except for the foundry
division of the employer with respect to the initial hiring
claim. The court could not say that the trial court's finding
of subjective decision making in promotions amounted to clear
error. The court concluded that there was no indication that
the trial court applied incorrect legal principles in
determining that the employer's practices for promotion were
incapable of separation.

Lapka sued the
employer for violation Title VII alleging hostile work
environment and retaliation. The trial court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment. The 7th Circuitaffirmed. The issue on appeal was whether the employer
was negligent in the supervision of a co-worker. The court
found that the employer took reasonable steps to stop the
harassment.

Duncan sued the
employer for violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) alleging he was forced to give up his job as a
material handler. The trial court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment. The 7th Circuit reversed. The
court found that the explanation the employer gave for taking
Duncan's job could not be characterized as legitimate: the
employer did not dispute that Duncan met the legitimate
performance expectations, yet it argued Duncan was unable to
meet the physical demands of the material handler job. The
court also found that Duncan produced sufficient evidence to
call into question the employer's honesty in its explanation
for taking away the material handler job.

The issue on appeal
was whether a deputy county sheriff holding a classified civil
service position may challenge his discharge under the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), or only through an appeal to the
employer's civil service commission. The trial court found
relief may be granted only by the civil service commission.
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The court agreed with the
trial court that Iowa Code chapter 314A constituted the
exclusive remedy for deputies in civil service positions and
that section 341A.12 provided the civil service commissions as
the exclusive remedy.

The employer
petitioned for a declaratory judgment seeking to set aside a
hearing examiner's award reinstating firefighter Clopton. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Clopton. The
Texas Court of Appeal affirmed. The court stated that the
evidence before the hearing examiner contained no evidence of
a zero-tolerance policy or that illegal drug usage mandated
indefinite suspension, and that Clopton was not informed that
his admitted drug use in his employment application more than
ten years ago was his first chance. The court concluded the
summary judgment evidence showed the hearing examiner did not
abuse his authority.