The Impact of Israel's Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in
July and August 2006

During Human Rights Watch's visits to south Lebanon in
August, September, and October 2006, researchers saw dozens of towns hit by
cluster munitions and hundreds of submunition duds littering backyards and
fields.[87]
The teams also witnessed UN, nongovernmental, and Lebanese Army deminers struggling
to cope with a problem of unprecedented magnitude. Israel had hit only the
peripheries of some towns with cluster munitions but had elsewhere blanketed
built-up areas. As civilians returned home immediately after the ceasefire,
they found their property had become de facto minefields. Villagers and
deminers discovered unexploded cluster duds inside houses, in the streets, in
gardens, on roofs, on patios, and hanging from trees and fences. In Tebnine, a
hospital had been struck, and the hundreds of duds strewn across the entryway
trapped doctors and patients inside (see Case Study below). MACC SL reported,
on January 15, 2008, 192 civilian casualties, including 20 killed and 172
wounded.[88]
Exploding duds were still injuring civilians in the south in December 2007.

A senior Human Rights Watch military analyst who arrived in
south Lebanon immediately after the ceasefire had surveyed cluster munitions on
the ground in both Kosovo and Iraq. The sheer number and density of dud fields
in urban areas dwarfed anything he had ever seen before.

The IDF's
cluster munition strikes were spread over an area of approximately 1,400 square
kilometers north and south of the Litani river, an area comparable in size to
the US state of Rhode Island (1,214 sq km). Of the 1,400 square kilometers
affected by the cluster munitions, an aggregate area of 38.7 square kilometers,
including 4.3 square kilometers of urban areas, 20 square kilometers of
agricultural land, and 4 square kilometers of woodland, has been confirmed by deminers as directly
contaminated by submunitions.[89] However, the lives of civilians in
the entire 1,400 square kilometer area have been severely affected, as they
cannot live in safety until demining crews clear and inspect their homes and
fields.

Shocking Scope: Number of Submunitions and Strikes

In the first two days after the
ceasefire, UN deminers beginning emergency survey and clearance work in south
Lebanon identified 10 locations where Israel used cluster munitions. A UN
official said he feared it could be only the "tip of the iceberg."[90]
By January 2008, the number of strike sites identified was 962,and
continued to grow as clearance professionals pushed into new corners of south
Lebanon.[91]

MACC SL has estimated that Israel used cluster munitions (artillery
shells, ground rockets, and air-dropped bombs) containing between 2.6 and four
million submunitions in Lebanon.[92]
It arrived at that estimate in the following fashion. First, it calculated that
Israel fired some 16,000 to 32,000 artillery cluster shells containing a total
of 1.4 to 2.8 million submunitions.[93]
To those figures, it added 1,800 MLRS rockets carrying 1,159,200 M77
submunitions, which Israeli soldiers reported to Ha'aretz newspaper.[94]
It also noted that Israel dropped an unknown number of aerially delivered
CBU-58B cluster bombs, each containing 650 BLU-63 bomblets.[95]
Given the high failure rates of these different types of submunitions, the UN
has estimated that the cluster barrages left behind hundreds of thousands,
possibly up to one million, hazardous duds.[96]

Outside of the UN
estimate, Israeli soldiers told Human Rights Watch that the 1,800 MLRS rockets
accounted for only those fired by a reserve MLRS battalion, and that an active
duty battalion fired 1,000 more, which would contain 644,000 submunitions,
bringing the number of rocket submunitions to more than 1.8 million.[97]This
additional information could raise the estimated total of Israeli submunitions
fired into Lebanon to some 3.2 to 4.6 million submunitions.

Israel's use of cluster munitions was the most extensive use
of the weapon anywhere in the world since the 1991 Gulf War and was
concentrated in a relatively small geographical area. The number and density of
cluster munitions used in Lebanon vastly exceeded their use in prior wars in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq where Human Rights Watch also conducted
investigations. NATO air forces used 1,765 cluster bombs with about 295,000
bomblets in Kosovo in 1999, the US Air Force used 1,228 cluster bombs with
about 248,000 bomblets in Afghanistan in 2001 to 2002, and Coalition forces
used about 13,000 cluster munitions with about 1.9 million submunitions in Iraq
in 2003.[98]

"I've seen every single cluster use since 1991 and this is
more than I have ever seen," Chris Clark, program manager of MACC SL, told
Human Rights Watch. "A similar amount of ordnance was thrown in Iraq, but south
Lebanon is much smaller."[99]
Israel's use of cluster munitions in Lebanon compares most closely to Coalition
use in Iraq in 2003 because in both cases most of the attacks were
ground-launched and included counter-battery fire. Still, the use of so many
cluster munitions in such a small area is shocking and unprecedented.

Timing and
Targets: When and How Cluster Munitions Were Used

The Early Phases of the War

Israel launched sporadic cluster munition attacks on south
Lebanon in the first two weeks of the war. Human Rights Watch first confirmed
Israeli use of cluster munitions when it reported on a July 19 attack on Blida
that left one civilian dead and at least 12 wounded.[100]
Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch researchers observed large numbers of
artillery-fired cluster munitions in the arsenals of the IDF artillery teams
deployed in Israel's border with Lebanon.

Attacks increased in the days after the 48-hour partial
cessation of air strikes of July 31 to August 1. Israeli soldiers serving with
an MLRS unit told Human Rights Watch that it was in August when they fired many
of their cluster rockets.[101]
Through field visits and other sources, Human Rights Watch identified strikes
that had taken place before the last three days of the war in about 10 towns
other than Blida: `Ainata, `Aitaroun, Deir Qanoun, Hasbayya, Hebbariyeh, Kfar
Dounine, Kfar Hamam, Rashaya al Foukhar, Sawane, and Tair Debbe.[102]

Human Rights Watch's investigations and interviews indicate
that Israel aimed some of its cluster strikes prior to the last days at
Hezbollah rocket launch sites, largely in olive groves and tobacco fields. Some
villagers told Human Rights Watch researchers that Hezbollah fighters used such
fields to fire rockets into Israel.[103]
Others who suffered cluster attacks, such as those in Blida, said there was no
Hezbollah military activity nearby.

Israeli soldiers told Human Rights Watch that their radar
would locate Hezbollah launch sites while the rocket was airborne, and the IDF
would then fire cluster munitions in the vicinity of the launch area, using the
area-effect weapons in an attempt to kill the launch crew and destroy its
launchers as they tried to escape. Shooting back-typically with a "six-pack" of
US M26 rockets-at Hezbollah rocket launch sites generally occurred within one
to 1.5 minutes of receipt of the launch detection coordinates.[104]

Civilian casualties from cluster munitions at the time of
these strikes seem to have been fairly limited, reflecting the fact that so
much of the population had vacated south Lebanon or hid in their basements, and
that much of the Hezbollah rocket fire and Israeli counter-battery fire
occurred in fields and valleys where civilians were not present at the time.
However, the exact number of injuries and deaths from these cluster strikes may
never be known, as hospital staff were too overwhelmed at the time to ask
questions about the specific causes of injury or death.

The Final Barrage

Over the final days of the conflict, the Israeli use pattern
changed dramatically. According to the UN, Israel fired 90 percent of its
cluster munitions during the last 72 hours, after the UN Security Council had
passed Resolution 1701 calling for a ceasefire on August 11, but before the
ceasefire took effect at 8 a.m. on August 14.[105]
During this period, there was also an intensification of bombardment by other
weapons, including artillery strikes as well as the aerial strikes on civilian
homes with 500-pound bombs. The increase coincided with an increase in
Hezbollah rocket strikes on Israel. According to Israeli government statistics
and news accounts, Hezbollah increased its rocket attacks in the final days,
and on the last day of the war launched 252 rockets, the highest daily toll of
the conflict.[106]
However, even given an increase in Hezbollah attacks, the use of more than four
million submunitions to strike at hundreds of rocket launches posed a high
likelihood of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, particularly when so
many of the submunitions hit built-up areas, predictably leaving behind
thousands of duds.

Witness testimonies from south Lebanon's villages also
indicate that there was a massive increase in cluster munition attacks in the
last few days before the ceasefire. The head of Tair Debbe municipality, `Ali
Moughnieh, said that in the last several days of the war, "it started raining
cluster bombs."[107]
Hassan `Abass Hattab, the mukhtar (a
local official with administrative responsibilities) of Habboush, similarly
said that Israel launched cluster munitions on his village during "the last
four days of the war."[108]
Several others, including the mukhtars
of both Tebnine and Kfar Rommane, echoed these statements.[109]

Soldier testimony further attests to the IDF's
heavy use of cluster munitions in the final hours of the war. "In the last 72
hours we fired all the munitions we had, all at the same spot, we didn't even
alter the direction of the gun," an IDF soldier said. "Friends of mine in the
battalion told me they also fired everything in the last three days-ordinary
shells, clusters, whatever they had."[110]UN
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) fire mission data supports these assertions.[111]

The use of cluster munitions in the last 72 hours elicited
outrage from UN officials. The UN's humanitarian coordinator in Lebanon, David
Shearer, said, "The outrageous fact is that nearly all of these [cluster]
munitions were fired in the last three to four days of the war…. Outrageous
because by that stage the conflict had been largely resolved in the form of [UN
Security Council] Resolution 1701." He said it "defied belief" that Israel had
used so many cluster munitions in the last hours of the war.[112]
The UN's then emergency relief coordinator and under-secretary-general for
humanitarian affairs,Jan Egeland,
called Israel's use of cluster munitions "completely immoral."[113]

IDF lawyers told Human Rights
Watch that the ceasefire negotiations did not change operational decisions over
the last three days of the war because the IDF considered itself still in
combat. Maj. Dorit Tuval, head of the strategic section in the IDF's
International Law Department, said, "As a lawyer, it was not important. It was
a legitimate decision to be taken by commanders. As far as we know, the use was
legal."[114]

Attacks on Population Centers

Many cluster munitions struck population centers. According
to a land use study commissioned by the UN Development Program (UNDP), cluster
munitions contaminated about 4.3 million square kilometers of urban areas
during the conflict.[115]
A senior UN demining official said he had "no doubt" that Israel had
deliberately hit built-up areas with cluster munitions, stating, "These cluster
bombs were dropped in the middle of villages."[116]
The program manager of MACC SL told Human Rights Watch that "the vast majority
of clusters were used in towns."[117]

Human Rights Watch field research corroborated the
widespread use of cluster munitions in population centers. In the first week
after the ceasefire, Human Rights Watch visited about 30 villages and towns
that the IDF attacked with cluster munitions and visited more than a dozen more
in October. Cluster munitions landed in large villages such as Tebnine and
Nabatiyah. Towns that were especially hard hit include: Ain B'al, Bar'achit,
Bint Jbeil, Majdel Selm, Kfar Tebnit, Sawane, Srifa, Tebnine, Yohmor, Zawtar
al-Gharbiyeh, and Zawtar al-Sharkiyeh.

The IDF has since acknowledged that it targeted built-up
areas with cluster munitions. A statement released by the IDF Spokesman's Office
in November 2006 said that "the use of cluster munitions against built-up areas
was done only against military targets where rocket launches against Israel
were identified and after taking steps to warn the civilian population."[118]
In July 2007, IDF lawyers reiterated this position in a meeting with Human
Rights Watch. "In cases where there was a need to direct cluster munitions
toward the vicinity of a built-up area, they were always directed toward places
where rockets were shot from toward Israel. It was always after messages to
leave the area and then we made sure distinction and proportionality were
applied," Major Tuval said.[119]
She added, "Even if they were used in the vicinity of built-up areas, it was
much less than necessary. Operational considerations were hurt because of our
efforts."[120]

The IDF statement in December 2007 reporting the results of
the second internal inquiry echoed these statements. It said that investigating
officer Maj. Gen. Gershon HaCohen found that "cluster munitions were fired by
the IDF on built-up areas only in direct response to Hizbullah's firing of
rockets from within those areas…. Furthermore, the munitions were fired on
villages only when the forces understood them to have been almost completely
evacuated, hence the anticipated harm to civilians was small."[121]

However, soldiers have offered eyewitness accounts with a
very different description of the targets. A commander of an IDF MLRS unit told
a Ha'aretz reporter, "What we did was
insane and monstrous, we covered entire towns in cluster bombs." He said that
to compensate for the cluster rockets' imprecision, his unit was ordered to
"flood" the area with cluster munitions. In one case, his unit was ordered to
fire cluster rockets toward "a village's outskirts" in the early morning
because "people are coming out of the mosques and the rockets would deter
them."[122]

Failure Rates

As described earlier, the presence of duds is an inevitable
result of the use of cluster munitions. "It's a bad weapons system. So many
things need to happen to deploy and arm properly," the program manager for MACC
SL said.[123]
A BACTEC deminer added, "A lot of things can go wrong."[124]
Given the vast number of submunitions used in Lebanon, the only result could be
a huge number of duds.

Mine clearance personnel in Lebanon report the failure rates
for Israeli submunitions to be exceptionally high, with a large number of duds
compared to impact sites. The program manager of MACC SL has projected an
average failure rate of 25 percent, with up to 70 percent in some locations.[125]
In some strikes, especially with BLU-63 submunitions, deminers have found dud
rates of 90 to 100 percent.[126]
The dud rates in the field of Israel's submunitions have been substantially
higher than published test data and also substantially higher than those found
in previous conflicts, such as Iraq and Kosovo.

Israel has not provided any reasons for the exceptionally
high dud rates in Lebanon. It questioned MACC SL's estimates, claiming instead
that the dud rate was under 10 percent, and dismissed the problem as being
quickly dealt with by clearance.[127]
The rates have been documented by deminers, however, and may be the result of
the extensive use of older cluster munitions, especially dated US weapons.
Explosive materials deteriorate over time, making the weapons increasingly
unstable and more likely to fail.

Another possible factor is low trajectory or short-range
firing. A report in Ha'aretz said
that in some cases the IDF fired M26 MLRS rockets "at a range of less than 15
kilometers, even though the manufacturer's guidelines state that firing at this
range considerably increases the number of duds."[128]
An IDF reservist told Human Rights Watch that he thought the reserve MLRS unit
shot 20 to 25 percent of the M26 rockets at minimum ranges of 13 to 15
kilometers.[129]
According to the US Army, the M26 rocket's M77 "submunition dud rate increases
significantly at ranges less than 10 km."[130]
The high dud rate may also be partially attributable to landscape
characteristics, such as the soft ground of agricultural fields, and the
density of trees and vegetation, which may catch cluster submunitions as they
fall.[131]

The large number of Israeli-produced M85 submunition duds is
particularly striking since one model of that submunition, used extensively during
the conflict, has a self-destruct feature that reportedly reduces the failure
rate to some 1.3 to 2.3 percent under testing conditions. As mentioned earlier,
many experts have pointed to it as one of the most reliable submunitions in the
world.[132]
However, a report in December 2007 by three organizations that carefully
studied the performance of the M85 with self-destruct devices in Lebanon,
including the primary institution responsible for defense-related research in
Norway, estimated the failure rate to be about 10 percent.[133]
The study said that the "inescapable conclusion from Israel's use of M85
bomblets…is that they failed far more often than would have been predicted
based on the claims of stockpiling states and manufacturers."[134]

Earlier, the program manager of MACC SL had reached a
similar conclusion. In April 2007, he stated, "Whilst several military users
maintain that the M85 with self-destruct mechanism has a failure rate of less
than 1%, the evidence on the ground in South Lebanon clearly shows that this
weapon has a reality failure rate of between 5 and 10%. It is common to find at
least 3 unexploded submunition grenades from individual carrier shells (M396/49
per shell) equating to a 6% failure rate."[135]

cleared were the self-destructing types, but the precise
number is not known. According to MACC SL the M85 without the self-destruct
mechanism is "commonly found with a 15% failure rate on the ground."[137]

In recent years, the United States
and several other countries have identified a one percent failure rate as the
desirable standard for submunition procurement, but the performance of the M85
in Lebanon calls into question the feasibility and effectiveness of this
potential future standard, since even a very low failure rate in test
conditions gives way to a much higher failure rate in the conditions of actual
combat.

Israeli soldiers were well aware
of the large numbers of duds their cluster strikes were producing. A soldier
said that his MLRS commander gave a "pep talk" after a period of heavy fire,
saying, "Just wait until Hezbollah finds the little presents we left them."[138]Soldiers also told Human Rights Watch
that IDF soldiers were taught throughout their training to ignore the manufacturer's
claim of a 5 percent submunition failure (dud) rate for the M77 submunitions
contained in the M26 rocket, and to presume a 15 percent submunition failure
rate instead.[139]
A reserve officer told a reporter that there is an IDF regulation prohibiting
the firing of cluster munitions on areas the IDF is planning to enter to avoid
exposing IDF soldiers to risks of death or injury by duds.[140]

[87]
Human Rights Watch has separately reported on violations of international
humanitarian law by both Israel and Hezbollah during the 2006 conflict. See
Human Rights Watch, Why They Died,
and Human Rights Watch, Civilians under
Assault.

[97]
Human Rights Watch interviews with IDF reservists (names withheld), Tel Aviv
and Jerusalem, Israel, October 2006. The reservists were experienced
non-commissioned officers leading platoons with an MLRS unit. They also
commanded resupply missions from the active unit to the reserve unit.

[101]
Human Rights Watch interviews with IDF reservists (names withheld), Tel Aviv
and Jerusalem, Israel, October 2006. A launcher commander in the reserve MLRS
unit said that this unit "did nothing" during the first week of conflict, and
"only shot sporadically" during the second week. He said the largest volume of
fire for the reserve MLRS unit was during the third week, immediately after the
48-hour ceasefire when civilians were told to leave. He said "we fired tons" during
this time and noted that one launcher under his command shot 60 pods (360
rockets, 231,840 M77 submunitions) in a 24-hour period during this time. The
volume of fire from his unit was reduced for the remainder of the conflict due
to ammunition shortages.

[104]
Human Rights Watch interviews with IDF reservists (names withheld), Tel Aviv
and Jerusalem, Israel, October 2006. Human Rights Watch was told that for MLRS
units Lebanon was divided into two sectors. The first was the tactical battle against
Hezbollah forces south of the Litani River under the direction of the IDF's
Northern Command. The second sector was the strategic effort targeting
locations north of the Litani River controlled by the operations division of
the General Staff Headquarters. Both active-duty and reserve MLRS battalions
fired at targets in both sectors. Most MLRS attacks occurred prior to the final
72 hours of fighting.

[105]
The UN has explained that "UNMACC's calculations are based both on-the-ground
identification of cluster bomb strike locations and extensive conversations
with South Lebanon residents." UNOCHA, "A Lasting Legacy: The Deadly Impact of
Cluster Bombs in South Lebanon," undated, but information as of September 16,
2006, p. 1, fn 3. Chris Clark, program manager of MACC SL, told Human Rights
Watch he reached this conclusion based largely on his own firsthand
observations of Israeli attacks throughout the war. He also noted the small
number of reports of cluster munition attacks and casualties prior to the final
days of the war. Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Clark, program
manager, Tyre, October 25, 2006.

[106]
On the last three days of the conflict, Hezbollah launched 115, 70 and 252
rockets respectively. Israeli Police North District, Central Command Center,
"War in the North," powerpoint presentation obtained by Human Rights Watch in
October 2006. Israel has not presented information indicating that cluster
munitions caused any significant damage to Hezbollah personnel or weaponry.

[111]
Landmine Action, "Foreseeable Harm: The Use and Impact of Cluster Munitions in
Lebanon, 2006," October 2006,
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/ForeseeableHarmfinal.pdf (accessed
September 3, 2007), p. 11. This report has a chart titled "Fire Missions
Observed by UN Observers in UNIFIL Areas of Operation, 16 July-13 August 2006,"
based on data provided by UNIFIL. It notes, "Whilst an average of 2,000 fire
missions were recorded each day during the conflict, this increased to
approximately 6,000 per day in the last three days before the ceasefire."

[117]
Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Clark, program manager, MACC SL, Tyre,
September 14, 2006.The NGO Landmine
Action analyzed maps provided by MACC SL and concluded that 60 percent of
cluster strikes hit built-up areas, and that there were cluster munition
strikes in or near 90 towns and villages. This was based on data as of
September 5, 2006, and indicated where the center of the strike hit less than
500 meters from a built up area. Landmine Action, "Foreseeable Harm: The Use
and Impact of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon: 2006," pp. 13-15.

[127]
Major Tuval said, "There is a certain rate of duds, but one could deal with it
by clearing…. Even if we can't release [the dud rate], we're not talking about
25 percent. It's less than 10 percent as far as I know." Human Rights Watch
interview with Maj. Dorit Tuval, Tel Aviv, Israel, July 2, 2007.

[129]
Human Rights Watch interview with IDF reservist (name withheld), Tel Aviv,
Israel, October 2006. He also estimated half of the targets fired at by the
reserve unit were close to the maximum range of 38 to 40 kilometers and likely
north of the Litani River. He said one time they were shooting at such a flat
trajectory, almost horizontal, that they accidentally drilled their rockets
into a mountain in Israel.

[131]
The US Marine Corps has stated that DPICMs "should not be fired into wooded
areas. Submunitions may become suspended in tree branches and later pose a
threat to friendly forces. Firing DPICMs into mountainous areas where the slope
is greater than 60 percent increases the dud rate." US Marine Corps, "Fire
Support Coordination in the Ground Control Element," MCWP 3-16, November 2000,
pp. 5-38 and 5-39.

[132]
The submunition (or variations of it) is found in the arsenals of many
countries, including Argentina, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece,
India, Italy, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.

[134]
Ibid., p. 6. The study said that in the three strike sites with the most conclusive
information, the failure rates were 9.8, 11.5, and 12.2 percent. The study also
concluded: "The specific example of the M85 demonstrates that while SD
[self-destruct] mechanisms in general may help to lower failure rates, they are
not capable of ensuring against post-conflict contamination at an unacceptable
level. The specific example of M85 also illustrates the substantial differences
between results obtained during testing and reality seen during operations.
This suggests that current testing practices may have little or no utility as a
predictor of the risk that will be created to the post-conflict civilian
population." The report also "strongly rejects the distinction between
'hazardous' and 'non-hazardous' duds as conceptually flawed, misleading and
dangerous." Ibid., p. 5.

[139]
Human Rights Watch interviews with IDF reservists (names withheld), Tel Aviv
and Jerusalem, Israel, October 2006. This dud rate is consistent with US
testing data, which reports a 16 percent submunition failure rate. See Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, "Unexploded
Ordnance Report," table 2-3, p. 5. The US General Accounting Office reported
some lots of M26 in US stockpiles to have dud rates as high as 23 percent,
based on testing done to accept newly produced batches. See US General
Accounting Office, "GAO/NSIAD-92-212: Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused
by Improper Handling of Unexploded US Submunitions," August 1993, pp. 5-6.