So I started making a map, based on a 1992 map of Somalia – had I found this more recent map on the UTexas map server, I wouldn’t have had to draw in Eritrea… My goal was to combine a couple of maps I’d found useful – the territory map the BBC is using to explain the expansion of UIC influence, the Economist map that shows borderland areas and the influence of Somalia in Ethiopia. The goal is a map that helps narrate the forces behind the conflict that may be about to unfold in the Horn of Africa.

I guarantee that this map is inaccurate. It’s not just that I’m a crappy cartographer – it’s also that many borders in this part of the world are in dispute, and that the territory claimed by Somaliland and Puntland appears to vary map to map. Apologies in advance to anyone and everyone I’ve offended.

Click on the map for a larger version

Somalia only existed as a nation from 1960 to the late 1991, when Siad Barre was ousted and any semblence of statehood collapsed. Before 1960, British Somaliland – roughly corresponding to the pink Somaliland on the map above – and Italian Somaliland were separate colonial possessions. These two territories didn’t encompass all people of Somali heritage – many Somalis live in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and some over the border in Kenya.

In July 1977, Siad Barre invaded Ethiopia, hoping to capture the Ogaden region and create a “Greater Somaliland”. The invasion had less to do with Somali ethnic nationalism and more to do with opportunism and cold war politics. Ethiopia looked weak – Haile Selaisse had been overthrown by the Derg, and was transitioning to a Marxist-Leninist state, supported by the Soviet Union. Somalia – possibly encouraged by the US – invaded the Ogaden, supporting ethnic Somali rebels in the Ogaden This precipitated a war where socialist nations, including Yemen, Cuba and North Korea, sided with Ethiopia. By early 1978, Barre pulled back his troops, the Somali military largely destroyed by Ethiopia and allies. (More on the Ogaden war here and here.)

The events in Ogaden go a long way towards explaining why Ethiopia has interests in the current situation in Somalia. If the Union of Islamic Courts, which currently controls Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia, has expansionist urges, one could imagine UIC support for rebels in the Ogaden. Ethiopia recently announced that they’d arrested rebels associated with an independence movement in the Ogaden, who had crossed in from Somalia.

Or one could argue that Ethiopia is supporting the transitional government – which has international support, but very little control of the country outside of Baidoa – out of political expediency. Ethiopia needs a port since losing their northern coast when Eritrea broke away in 1991. A stable Somalia might give Ethiopia access to Mogadishu. Or Ethiopia might be backing the transitional government to win points with the US, which is deeply worried about the UIC gaining too much power and providing sanctuary to Al-Qaeda – given recent crackdowns on human rights and shooting of activists in the streets, Ethiopia could use some brownie points.

Ethiopia argues that UIC is backed by Eritrea, and that the Eritrean government is arming the UIC. The logic behind this? The Ethiopian/Eritrean border is still unsettled, even after the 1998-2000 civil war. Eritrea feels that the UN hasn’t done enough to settle final borders, and expelled UN peacekeepers in late 2005. If Ethiopia found itself fighting the UIC on a southern front, perhaps Eritrea could seize some of the disputed territory on its border.

One of the most intriguing recent developments: the UIC is advancing on Galkaayo, a major town in Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in northern Somalia. Unlike Somaliland, which is seeking independence, Puntland has sought to be part of a new, federal Somalia. The interim president of Somalia, Abdullahi Yusuf, is from Galkaayo, and given support for a federal model, Puntland is a natural ally to the Baidoa government.

How does Somaliland lean? That’s a little trickier. Ethiopia is one of the few governments to recognize an independent Somaliland, in part because Ethiopia wants access to the port at Berbera. On the other hand, a strengthened Baidoa government might try to keep Somaliland as part of a united Somalia.

So what’s going to happen? Your guess is as good as mine. But at least now we’ve got a map.

18 Responses to “Mapping Somalia”

Intelligent take on Somalia. As you’ve pointed out, the land between puntland and somaliland is disputed. Puntland is made up of the Harti tribe (a branch of Darood), Majeerteen and Dulbahante are the major clans. In Somaliland (or northern Somalia in general) the two major tribe are Isaaq and Dulbahante again.

Historically, Dulbahante did not sign a treaty with the British and engaged in a twenty year war with the British (one of fiercest in Africa), Italians and all the other clans that supported the British or the Italains (The Isaaq supported the British).

The Dulbahante clan is in Nugaal (exclusive) and Sanaag (shared with Isaaq and Warsengali). The majority of the population in Nugaal are decidedly pro-puntland and so is the administration there. However, Sanaag is heavily disputed. Somaliland needs both Nugaal/Sanaag to have any credibility and the same is for Puntland.

Within Somalia, Somaliland is seen as an Isaaq government and Puntland as a Harti (not Darood) government.

Another piece of history that might explain the situation is that Dulbahante tribe always had good representation in all previous governments particularly Siad Barre’s. Both Majeerteen (in Puntland) and Isaaq (Somaliland) had revolted against Siad Barre (in 1981 and 1988 respectively) so they had little share in the government.

Isaaq is a standalone tribe, while Majeerteen and Dhulbahante are part of the larger tribe of Darood. That’s a major reason why Somaliland wants independence and Puntland doesn’t.

The Somali population in the both Somaliland and Puntland are much effected with these disputes and trade and inter-marriage is normal. The president of the weak Transitional Government in the south is the former president of Puntland and the leader of the 1981 uprising against the government of Siad Barre.

There aren’t that many useful web resources on clan system in Somalia but I found few useful ones:

SOMALIA – A Country Study
This is a comprehensive resource on Somalia. You can find a good chart on Somali tribes here (pdf). There has been few changes in the last 15 years; Isaaq now comes under the Dir group and Rahanwayn and Digil are combined to form Digil & Mirifle. So the Transitional Government (TN) is divided into four major clan groups: Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Digil & Mirifle. There’re also minority groups (Bantu, Barawanese … etc) and they’re treated as a fifth group. This map shows the allocation of the various tribes.

Zooming into the Past: is a useful article on statecraft in Somalia. The author is Ali Khalif Galaydh a former prime minister of Somalia and member of the recently formed African Leadership Counsil.

Just to quickly illustrate the clan system; The UIC, General Aideed, Current Prime Minister of the TN and all the warlords that were chased away by UIC are from the Hawiye clan. Siad Barre, the former dictator of Somalia and the current President of TN are from the Darod clan. Puntland is all Darod and Somaliland is mostly Isaaq. That’s why for example the UIC will not venture into Puntland territory. The regions of Ogaden (Ethiopia) and NFD (North-East Kenya) are inhabited by Ogaden (branch of Darod).

The tribal system in Somalia is complex and useful to the Somali people in number of ways, for example assisting relatives and extended, locating people (like an address; for example, when sending money to someone).

The government have been divided on tribal basis and the system is usually exploited by politicians and warlords. Let me know if you’ve any questions in this regard.

I’ve a new post on Somalia, I would be grateful if you look at it and give your feedback.

Abdurahmam, that’s hugely helpful. I’m going to try to do another map fairly soon with more information on tribal allegiance. Your observation that UIC won’t move into Puntland is also an interesting one – that makes me wonder whether Ethiopia’s fear of UIC moving into Ogaden is also exaggerated.

Sam, please help yourself – I don’t really have clear title to the map (I’m violating the copyright holder’s rights), but you’re welcome to my work, such as it is…

Tribal based societies such as that of Somalia have hidden cultural/tribal lines that shouldn’t be crossed. That applies to UIC as well, crossing to Puntland would mean direct confrontation with Majeerteen clan (a branch of Darod), which is only possible if they’ve gone completely mad. It happened before when General Aideed attacked the city of Galkayo and even then he didn’t go any further and of course the results were of course devastating for both parties, hundreds were killed. The good thing is that UIC, though mostly from Hawiye tribe, are not interested in getting into a tribal war because they would like to be see as an Islamic force not a tribal one.

In terms of UIC attacking Ethiopia that’s even less likely. First there is the superiority of Ethiopia army over a group of militias, and secondly to get to the border the UIC will have to go through other tribes who will be hostile to any armed group in their backyard. If they get to the border, there another catch. Ogaden region(East Ethiopia now) has a majority of Ogaden clan (another branch of Darod) which will be hostile to any armed tribe from Somalia crossing into their territory (be it Darod or Hawiye).

However, what Ethiopia is worried about is that UIC will harbor and assist the OLF (Ogaden Liberation Army) guerrilla or even Oromo guerrillas. In fact, Ethiopia worries that any future Somali government will do so, because majority of the Somalis believe that it’s a priority to get Ogaden back (even when Somalia itself is without a government). So I think it’s impossible for the time-being for UIC to attempt such a thing as attack Puntland or Ethiopia.

Somaliland is predominantly an Isaaq territory. 80% of the land mass and 90% of people of Somaliland are of Isaaqi origin. Dhulmahante is minor Harti(Darut)sub clan that live in and around Las Anud and can’t even be compared to Habr Jelo subclan of Muse Abokor. Daaroods keep lying to foreigners about their land and people. Some maps even suggest that Daarood occupies 50% of Somali land mass, which is an absolute lie. Beside the Majertein desert, Daaroods don’t occupy much land.

In Somali Republic, Daaroods were 11 -12 % of total Somali population. The 8 Most populous cities in Somalia belongs to Hawiye, Isak and Rahanweins. Bosaso, which had a population of 2,000 soul before the influx of Daarood refugees in the early ninties.

I am quite fascinated by the disscusion in these very informative blogs! I was wondering if Abourahmane or Ethan had a solution to the conflict… what would you propose? How would you get the UIC and TFG to negotiate? What would a peaceful somalia look like and why have all the peace efforts failed?

Early History Digil and Rahawiin are descendants of the earliest wave of Somaloid peoples and also the most southern. Firm evidence for the history of the Somali people dates back to only about 1000 AD. Linguistic, cultural and historical evidence indicates D&M came originally from the southern highlands of what is now Ethiopia. The Somali are from the same broad group of early Cushitic peoples from which the Rendille came. The Somali-Rendille are one broad group with similar language and culture.
The Maay-speaking group came in contact with the northern Bantu peoples on the coast from Mogadishu south and inland and were an initial cause of migration back south of the Swahili and related peoples. Later the Digil and Rahawiin themselves suffered incursions from northern Somalis and then Oromos, the latter from about 1500. D&M maintained trading relations with the Arabs, Persians and remaining Swahilis on the coast, though preserving their nomadic cattle herding.

Digil and Mirifle clans are the descendants of the two sons of Mad Reewin with the Digil being the elder son and the Mirifle the younger son. The Digil settle around the Banadir the Jubba and the Shabelle regions while the descendants of the Mirifle settle around the central and the western portions of the region.

The Mirifle is divided into two main groups the sagaal and the siyeed. The Digil are divided into seven clans known as Todobadii Aw Digil.

These two groups (Digil & Mirifle) are socioculturaly and linguistically different from more nomadic groups of the North.

Colonial Period Throughout the colonial period, a condition of neglect and marginality characterized Digil & Mirifle society under colonial rule.
1945 – 1960

The modern political organization of the interriverine area was founded in 1920s as a philanthropic movement under the name of al Jam’iyyah al Khayriyyah al-Wataniyyah.
March 26, 1947 The Hisbiya Digil & Mirifle (HDM) was constituted preceding SYL which became a political organization from April 1, 1947.

At that time the HDM had 60,871 members and 800,000 supporters.

March 1954 when the first municipal elections based on direct male suffrage were held, there were more than 20 parties competing for 281 seats on municipal councils. The HDM won 57 seats in 15 municipalities coming second to the SYL.

In 1956 elections four parties won seats; SYL, HDM, SDM and Marehan Union with 43, 13, 3, and 1 seat respectively. However, HDM representing inter-riverine area received not a single ministerial portfolio.

Before unification the seats of the national assembly in the south were proportionately divided among the three major clans 30 reewin, 30 hawiye, 30 daarod but the Reewin did not gain a cabinet position despite having 20 out of 60 in the legislative assembly.

March 25, 1958 the HDM produced new program reflecting its future policy and its name changed to Hizbia Dastur Mustaqil al Somal (HDMS). The party declared its intention to establish a federal government, believing that a federal system was the only way to lead the entire Somali people.

On February 25, 1959 there were violent riots in Mogadishu which led the arrest of all party presidents.

The HDMS along with other opposition parties opposed the general elections of March 1959 and once again SYL formed the second Somali Government of Abdullahi Isse.

This political disenfranchisement of the Digil and Mirifle continued until 1969.

1969 – 1990 October 21,1969 the army seized power, parliament suspended and all parties were banned.
The clan orientation and the continued disenfranchisement of the Reewin by the Barre regime between 1969 to 1990 was evident from the beginning. For example, there was no single Reewin among the 25 members of the military junta and also the Central Committee for the Somali revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) in 1976. As a result, Reewin were completely deprived their political rights and representation, and their land tenure systems were violated.

D&M have been systematically excluded from the necessary education in the process of Mahatiri language acquisition. The school curriculum was also based on the perceptions and conceptualization of nomad’s world. For instance, certain Mahatiri individuals were glorified as patriotic while the role of southern nationalistic were down placed.

Almost all civil servants, local & regional administrators of D&M were Mahatiri speaking Somalis.

As a result of this political, linguistic and cultural subjugation the Reewin society was colonized.

1990 – 1995 Until the civil war the riverineland was a prosperous land. On the eve of the civil war in 1990, the D&M clans had no access to firearms and thus had no way of protecting themselves. By December 1992, the riverineland was called the “Triangle Death”. It is estimated that nearly 500,000 people died of starvation. Most died of starvation or fled the area when Siad Barre’s army moved twice through it destroying and looting of every thing they could possibly carry from stored grain to water pumps.
After Siad Barre’s army was forced out of the country, Aideed’s militia destroyed the city once again, looting everything that the dictator left behind.

The cause of the famine in riverineland was neither the consequence of natural and environmental calamities not the result of an all-out civil war. It was nothing else but genocidal. The main cause of the conflict was not a direct conflict between Darood and Hawiye, but a competition among them to occupy the land of the D&M.

“In Baidoa, Somalia, in 1992, I think what stuck in my mind more than anything was the sight of grain markets carrying on a busy trade not 100 yards from where I was watching people dying in the streets of hunger. I suppose it was this more than anything which convinced me that famines are always manmade disasters . . .” By Mr Stephen Jackson-Director, International Famine Centre at University College Cork.

During the UN intervention in Somalia, Baidoa become peaceful & prosperous, a local public service had formed with a council, police judiciary and prison service. Baidoa was also a symbol for many Somalis and the international community that peace, coexistence and reconstruction were possible.

In early 1988 a new political organization call Somali Democratic Movement was formed to represent the D&M.

During the this period some D&M politician aligned themselves to Aideed and Ali Mahdi. however, in April 1992 both wings of SDM agreed to unite under one SDM.

March 7, 1993 D&M reconciliation conference was held in Boonka (Baidoa). It was a very successful conference which spelled out many importance issues such D&M political representation, security, education, health and many other issues.

March 1995 UN withdrew from Somalia.

1995 -1999 The D&M never fully recovered from 1992 war between retreating Darod and the pursuing forces of Hawiye clans when in September 1995 Aideed forces invaded Baidoa and occupied almost 100% of D&M land.
After the occupation, many of D&M politicians abandoned their responsibility and the D&M became despair. In 1995 a new organization called Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) was formed to combat against the invasion of Aideed’s and his Habrgidir militia.

After long struggle of hit & runs and ambushes RRA succeeded to defeat Aideed militia in Hudur and liberated the town.

1999 – Present RRA took over Baidoa on June 6, 1999 after they expelled Aideed forces with heavy losses.
The population of Baidoa jumped from 15,000 to 50,000 within couple of weeks.

December 1999 an autonomous administration for the regions of Bay & Bakool has been established.

The struggle to liberate the remaining D&M land continues.

This time D&M are far more united and their recent victories will provide the popular support necessary for a successful regional administration.

Djibouti president proposed a Somali peace conference to be held in Djibouti on May 2. The majority of D&M people believe that they were sidestepped again and their plight was ignored, thus it is not going to be beneficial for D&M to attend the conference. RRA officially announced that they will not attend the conference.

Now the question remains whether D&M remaking the history of 1950s when HDMS boycotted the election and subsequently Mahatiri formed their own government or whether D&M are in a position for their voices to be heard.

The last quote refers to the recent incident in Bari region(Puntland) in which Warsangeli settles predominantly. There was an armed conflict over the right to explore minerals and oil. The Warsangeli considered it the very act as an intention of war. Their question was that how can a mere Majeerten impose itself on our territories”? The attitude reflects historical dominance of the tribe. The conflict was finally calmed down when neither side could win the war with many casualties.

Somalia: Information on the situation of the Warsangeli and on their relations with other clans in Somaliland

According to a Somali professor of African studies at the University of Florida in Gainsville, and a former director of higher education in Somalia now resident in Ottawa, the Warsangeli control the districts of Sool and Sanag (4 May 1994; 6 Apr. 1994). Since they are reportedly opposed to the current government of Somaliland, the Warsangeli are not represented in the parliament (ibid.). According to Le Nouvel Afrique Asie of March 1994, there is no sign of Somaliland Republic [administration] in Las Khorey, which is their stronghold. On the contrary, the Warsangeli’s sultan reportedly displays Somalia’s national flag in front of his house (ibid., 13). Nonetheless, the Warsangeli were initially represented at the meeting of elders, customary chiefs, academics, politicians and soldiers, that took place at Borama in February of 1993 (The Horn of Africa Bulletin Mar.-Apr. 1993, 27). Gilkes, in a report entitled “Ethnic and Political Movements in Ethiopia and Somalia,” the Warsangeli were represented in the initial government of Somaliland when the Somali National Movement (SMN) assumed power in 1991:

The constitutional commission was very carefully balanced to represent all northern clans … There are two Gadabursi, one Issa, one Warsengeli together with thirteeen Isaaq (July 1992, 52).

Relations between the Warsangeli and the Issaq appear to be tense. The head of the Warsangeli militia is quoted as saying that his clan would

deal with Somaliland … when its presumed president Ibrahim Egal, has extended his authority at least to the airport of his capital Hargeisa. At present, when he uses this airport, he has to pay a transit tax to the Isaaq clan (a clan different from his own) which controls the runway (Le Nouvel Afrique Asie Mar. 1994, 13).

According to the Sinaku professor of African studies, President Ibrahim Egal is a member of the Habr Awal sub-clan of the Isse Musa, a sub-clan of the Issaq (4 May 1994). For additional information on the Warsangeli in Somaliland, please refer to the attached document.

This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the DIRB within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

References

Gilkes, Patrick. July 1992. “Ethnic and Political Movement in Ethiopia and Somalia.”

most of the information about the population and history of somalis is contreversial.the sure fire way to identify who is who and get an accurate population estimate is by trekking through the greater somalia.fraught with dangers obvsly.however as to the ethnic divisions in somalia.people have the wrong end of the stick.we are not arabs, never were arabs.we were animist cushites converted to islam through sufism mainly.fmore apart from the darood, bantus, barwanis, bajunis, ashraf etc somalis are of cushitic stock.if u speak with traditional oral historians in their nomadic habitats, one will fnd that somalis descend from an ancestor called samaal.samaal had nine sons and if u look at the family tree of pure somalis it will lead to samaal.however due to poltical expediency identities shofy.for example the isaaqs claimed they are arab when they came in contact with traders and europeans so as to distance thmslces from being pure african.being a negro was equitable to bng a dalit in india during the 19th century.to be more noble is to b more arab in islamic socieites that are non arab in nature.fmore in the hawiya they are tribes who are not hawiya by ancestry.the hawadle and glajeecel r mayle and saransoor samaal rspctvly.please if u want the facts go and live among the people and dnt rely on the interpretations of others that are biased by politics.im lewis relied on infromation given by individuals from certain clans with an added motive to doctor history.the darood are prime examples of this.when siyad barre discovered the cushitic roots of somalis, he banned futuh al habash and restricted the scope in whch somali historians could write about.he knew there was no way of reconciling the jabarti ancestry of darood and the cushitic nature of somalis hences the creation of sab etc.

i just want to say that i am from somaliland ceerigaabo to be exact basically somaliland only controls areas that the local clans support somaliland the gadabursi isaaq and isse areas are contrlled by somaliland the dhulbahatas and warsengalis are daarood so they usually dont support somaliland because of aminosity between isaaqs and daaroods
basically somaliland controls all of awdal(boorama) maroodi jeex(hargeisa) and saaxil(berbera)
however a small part of togdheer is controlled by puntland beacuse most of the inhabitants in that area(buhoodle) are dhubahante but the major city of burco(capital) is controlled by somaliland as togdheer is mostly inhabited by habar yoonis and habar jeclo of the isaaq tribe they are more supportive of somaliland
western sanaag is inhabited by both habar yoonis and babar jeclo and the capital of sanaag is also inhabited by them so the capital of sanaag is controlled by somaliland but most of sanaag eastern, southern and northern is inhabited by warsegalis who are supportive of maakhir a new state in somalia but with no milatery power puntland controls warsengeli areas generally because of the daarood/harti link
sool is mostly inhabited by the dhulbahantas and sools capital is inhabited by the also this is why las anod(sools capital) is controlled by puntland
however a minority of isaaqs live in and arount the town of caynaba for this reason caynaba is under the control of somaliland.

Somalia is divided into various teritories in which the most of the land of somalia is occcupied by the greater Darod.In 2011 the population of the Somalis who live in somalia was said to be 17 million of which the Darod clan is claimed to be 7.5 million and Hawiye who are the arc rivals of Darod claimed to be 4.5 million while the remaining 5 million are comosed of the Rahanweyn,Dir,Jarerweyne and other minority clans.