Today it is easy to be despondent about the prospects of bringing about radical change in public policy or the political and social order. Policies that are widely recognized to be foolish and self-defeating (such as the “war on drugs”) seem to be immoveable. There are a plethora of analyses of faults in policy or in political institutions, but most of these lack the crucial ingredient of a plausible way of getting from A to B, from where we are now to somewhere better. However, history gives us a number of counterexamples that should lead us to think more carefully about how to understand both the need for certain kinds of political change and the ways of achieving this. One of the most striking of these counterexamples is the career of Richard Cobden and in particular the way that he pioneered forms of advocacy and organization in the Anti-Corn Law League in the late 1830s and early 1840s that were highly effective in his own time, had long-lasting effects, and are still relevant today. The Lead Essay has been written by Steve Davies who is education director at the Institute of Economic Affairs in London. The commentators are Gordon Bannerman who is a freelance writer and researcher, Professor Anthony Howe who is professor of modern history at the University of East Anglia, and Sarah Richardson who is associate professor of history at the University of Warwick.

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About the Authors

Stephen Davies is education director at the Institute of
Economic Affairs in London. Previously he was program officer at the Institute
for Humane Studies (IHS) at George Mason University. He joined IHS from the
United Kingdom, where he was senior lecturer in the department of history and
economic history at Manchester Metropolitan University. He has also been a
visiting scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green
State University, Ohio. A historian, he graduated from St. Andrews University
in Scotland in 1976 and gained his Ph.D. from the same institution in 1984.
He has authored several books, including Empiricism and History (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003), and was coeditor with Nigel Ashford of The Dictionary
of Conservative and Libertarian Thought (Routledge, 1991).

Gordon Bannerman is a freelance writer, researcher, and tutor.
He received his Ph.D. from King’s College London in 2005 having previously
studied modern history at the London School of Economics and King’s College
London. He has previously taught modern British history at the London School
of Economics, Dundee University, and King’s College London. Dr. Bannerman’s
research interests include the “fiscal-military State” of 18th-century Britain,
political radicalism in 19th-century Britain, and 20th-century international
history. He has coauthored and coedited (with Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey and
Anthony Howe) two volumes of a four-volume document-based collection, Battles
over Free Trade: Anglo-American Experiences with International Trade, 1776-2006,
(London: Chatto & Pickering,
2008). He has also written the entry “Free Trade” for European History
Online (2013; <www.ieg.ego.eu>) as
well as a number of biographical entries for The Encyclopaedia of Modern
Political Thought (CQ Press, 2013). His latest publication is “The Free
Trade Idea” in The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Trade,
ed. Lisa Martin (Oxford University Press) to be published in March 2015. Dr.
Bannerman also served as Research Officer for The Letters of Richard Cobden
project at the University of East Anglia.

Professor Anthony Howe, MA, D.Phil (Oxon), FRHistS, was educated at the University
of Oxford (Wadham and Nuffield Colleges) and was a lecturer at Oriel College,
Oxford, before moving to the department of international history at the London
School of Economics (1983-2003). Since 2003 he has been professor of modern
history at the University of East Anglia. His publications include Free
Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946 (Oxford, 1998) and Rethinking
Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicentenary Essays (with Simon Morgan) (2006). Since
2003 he has been the main editor of The Letters of Richard Cobden (1804-65),
the fourth and final volume of which will be published in August 2015, marking
the 150th anniversary of Cobden’s death. He is also working on an international
history of free trade from Adam Smith to globalisation.

Dr. Sarah Richardson is associate professor of history at the University of
Warwick. She received her PhD from the University of Leeds. Her work focuses
on the political history of Britain in the 19th century and her most recent
monograph is The Political Worlds of Women: Gender and Political Culture
in Nineteenth-Century Britain (2013) where she assesses the varied and complex
relationships between gender and political culture in the period before female
suffrage. She has also written 'Women, Philanthropy and Imperialism in Nineteenth-century
Britain' (2008); '"You know your father’s heart”. The Cobden sisterhood
and the legacy of Richard Cobden' (2006); and co-edited with Anna Clark the
6 volume collection on The History of the Suffrage, 1760-1867 (Pickering Chatto,
2000).

Additional Reading

Today it is easy to be despondent about the prospects of bringing about radical
change in public policy or the political and social order. Policies that are
widely recognized to be foolish and self-defeating (such as the “war on drugs”)
seem to be immoveable. There are a plethora of analyses of faults in policy
or in political institutions, but most of these lack the crucial ingredient
of a plausible way of getting from A to B, from where we are now to somewhere
better. Moreover, there is now an entire literature in economics and political
science to tell us that this is inevitable. The incentives facing ordinary
people mean that politics will always be dominated by a small number of wealthy
and privileged people (political “investors”);[1] the
lack of impact any one voter can have means that it is rational to be ignorant,
ill-informed, and apathetic;[2] the
way that the benefits of policy are concentrated while the costs are widely
dispersed means that the advantage is always with special interests rather
than the general interest.[3] It
is no surprise that the judiciary is now the favored route for political action
on all sides of current debate.

However, history gives us a number of counterexamples that should lead us
to think more carefully about how to understand both the need for certain kinds
of political change and the ways of achieving this. When we do this we will
realize that while the obstacles to change are still formidable, we can be
much more optimistic and, more importantly, more effective. One of the most
striking of these counterexamples is the career of Richard Cobden and in particular
the way that he pioneered forms of advocacy and organization that were highly
effective in his own time, had long-lasting effects, and are still relevant
today.

The main features of Cobden’s career in Victorian politics are well known.
He was a member of Parliament from 1841 to 1857 and again from 1859 to his
death in 1865. During this time he was regarded as a leading political figure
and was offered government office on at least two occasions. In 1860 he acted
as the British government’s representative in negotiating a free-trade agreement
between Britain and France. Despite this, he was always a political outsider
rather than a member of the inner circle, and saw himself as such. He was,
however, associated with one of the great dramas of Victorian politics, the
ultimately successful campaign to repeal the Corn Laws, fought between 1838
and 1846. This was more than just a change in trade policy. It meant a fundamental
shift in the longer term in the fiscal basis of the British state and both
symbolized and brought about a decisive move from one kind of political economy
to another. There had been steady movement in this direction for some time,
since the 1820s in fact, but this was still a critical moment.

Moreover, anyone who looked at British politics in 1838 with the benefit of
the kind of present-day analysis described above would have decided that the
odds against moving to a general policy of free trade and repealing the Corn
Laws in particular were overwhelming. With a restricted franchise the control
of politics and government by a privileged class was apparently stronger then
than now. The obstacles and disincentives for political organization and activism
by the mass of the population were also apparently more severe than they are
today. The special interest that gained from agricultural protectionism (much
of the landed aristocracy) was both concentrated and enormously powerful since
it directly or indirectly controlled both houses of Parliament. Finally, the
case for protectionism was part of a more general ideological defense of the
status quo that still had a hegemonic position, despite the great reforms that
had taken place since 1829.

Despite all of this, the Corn Laws were repealed. What also happened was a
decisive ideological shift in the way that trade and exchange were understood.
This became embedded in British popular culture to a remarkable degree, as
the work of Frank Trentmann shows, which meant that the effects of the repeal
were far more extensive than a simple change in trade policy.[4] Why,
though, did this happen? One reason was the personal qualities of Cobden himself,
his extraordinary ability as an organizer and innovator in political organization,
campaigning, and education. His personal capacity, however, was effective because
it was inspired by a particular kind of intellectual analysis, one that not
only identified bad policy and the reasons for it while proposing an alternative,
but also suggested how to bring about change. In other words, Cobden’s thinking
contained not only a clear sense of present evils and the alternative but also
a worked-out theory of how to get from A to B that was an inherent part of
the analysis itself rather than a tactical afterthought. Finally there were
structural changes in British society at this time, both technological and
social, that made this easier than would have been the case a hundred years
before. The question for ourselves is whether there was something historically
specific about Cobden’s success, dependent upon the particular circumstances
of his times, or alternatively that his methods and analysis are still applicable.

The crucial point to grasp is that Cobden’s decision to organize and run a
campaign to repeal the Corn Laws was tactical and derivative rather than primary.
In other words it was a consequence of a more general perspective and was chosen
as being the most effective action rather than as an end in itself.

What, though, was that perspective?

Cobden’s central ideas were not commonplaces and had a definite “oppositional”
quality to them, but they were also widespread among people of all social ranks.
They had been developed and articulated by a range of thinkers over the previous
two generations. Much of this had been done by economists, and it is easy to
see this as a narrowly economic way of thinking. Certainly Ricardo’s theory
of comparative advantage and the consequent benefits of free trade was a crucial
part of the arguments of Cobden and others. However, as reading of the speeches
and pamphlets of the time will show, purely economic theses as we would understand
them were embedded in and incorporated into a wider kind of analysis, and it
was this kind of political economy that generated an understanding of what
to do in order to change things.

One obvious element was the (accurate) perception that government and its
power was used by sectional interests to benefit themselves at the expense
of the wider community. Government as it was at the time was understood as
being simply the creature of special interests. In her life of Cobden, Wendy
Hinde quotes the economist Robert Torrens as saying about the proposed Corn
Law in 1815: “It would be tantamount to laying a tax upon bread, for the purpose
of pensioning off the landed aristocracy. It would be nothing better than legalized
robbery, taking money out of the pockets of the poor and industrious, in order
to lavish it on the idle and the rich.”[5] This
was very much the view of Cobden and his colleagues in the Anti-Corn Law League.

However, the understanding went deeper. The key insight was that government
power was also the creator of special interest and privilege. The
key terms in the Torrens quote are “industrious” and “idle” as the defining
features of two kinds of social entity. On the one side were the “industrious
classes,” those who created wealth and gained income by work and exchange.
On the other were the “idle classes,” which acquired wealth and income through
force and the use of political power. The problem for Cobden and his allies
was not a particular policy per se but rather the nature of government and
the way it created a privileged class that then used it to support itself,
both directly through things such as state pensions and employment, and indirectly
by effective income transfers such as those brought about by the Corn Laws.
In other words the real problem was aristocratic government, and agricultural
protectionism was one part of that system.

This insight also explained the connections between trade policy and other
areas. Free trade was seen as promoting peace, and protectionism war, for a
number of reasons and not just because greater trade relations would lead to
mutual dependency and greater personal contact between the inhabitants of rival
states, important as those arguments were. War, the organized use of violence,
was seen as both the ultimate source of aristocratic power and an important
source of support. Cobden’s colleague John Bright captured this when he described
British foreign policy and the wars it had led to as “an
enormous system of outdoor relief for the aristocratic classes.”[6]
Thus to undermine the economic power of the aristocracy and its ability to
extract rents from the rest of society would also reduce its ability to maintain
the war system of excessive armaments and secret diplomacy combined with regular
panics about foreign threats. For Cobden this was actually the main benefit
to be got from free trade, even over the enormous economic gains that would
result.

The other key element in Cobden’s thinking was the idea that all government
ultimately rested not upon force but on opinion (as Hume had put it). In other
words, the key thing was the beliefs of the mass of the population as to the
rightness or otherwise of political institutions and current policy. The innovation
in thinking about this was the concept of “public opinion,” which came into
being in Cobden’s own early life. As defined by authors such as William McKinnon
in 1828, public opinion was the settled view and understanding of the educated
part of the population (which meant that its scope could be enlarged by education,
whether formal or informal) and was formed by public discussion and conversation
through a number of media, including the early forms of what we would now call
the “mass media.”[7] For
Cobden and others this public opinion could be and often was formed and manipulated
by elites through official propaganda and the stirring up of panics, but it
could also be shaped by organized action on the part of private individuals.
If public opinion was moved decisively, then certain kinds of institution and
policy would simply become unsustainable or impossible to advocate successfully,
while policy could also be moved actively in a different direction.

This explains why Cobden thought, as he said to a correspondent in 1836, “The
Corn Laws are only part of a system in which the Whig and Tory Aristocracy
have about an equal interest. The Colonies, the Army, Navy and Church, are,
with the Corn Laws, merely accessories to our aristocratic government.”[8]

Why then decide to launch a campaign to repeal the Corn Laws rather than to
attack the system as a whole or some other part of it? Cobden’s own correspondence
shows that he considered other targets but decided on the Corn Laws because,
firstly, their repeal would have far-reaching effects beyond the obvious ones
(such as a decline in the price of bread and an increase in prosperity). Even
more importantly, he felt that they were the weak point in the aristocratic
fortress and thus a campaign on this subject was winnable. The reason was that
this was a subject that directly affected and interested a huge and diverse
range of people. Consequently it would be possible to extend and even in some
sense create public opinion on the subject of free trade and protection (with
the Corn Laws as a proxy for the general argument) in a way that would redefine
the range of political possibilities. What this meant was that the key strategy
had to be to create, inform, and mobilize public opinion rather than to make
arguments within Parliament or to seek to influence or persuade the elite.
(Not that he was averse to either of these, but they were seen as supportive
rather than as primary.) This in turn meant there were practical activities
that would bring this about.

It was here, in devising the kinds of activity that would bring about a revolution
in opinion, that Cobden’s practical organizing genius became apparent. There
had been campaigns before, and there were others going on at the same time,
most notably the campaign for the People’s Charter, but these were not as effective
as the Anti-Corn Law agitation. If we look at the amazing range of activities
that Cobden and his colleagues engaged in over the eight years between 1838
and 1846, we can see it as having two main aspects. The first was the project
itself. While the goal was the immediate and total repeal of the Corn Laws,
the means was through what became known as “pressure from without,” that is,
not by lobbying or seeking to directly influence the elite.[9] This
pressure, however, was not to be created through the implicit or explicit threat
of disorder or large public demonstrations and aggressive demands (which were
the methods of the dominant faction among the Chartists or later Irish Nationalists).
Rather it was done by creating and informing public opinion. This was done
by creating and then propagating a series of arguments, narratives, and images
that were then picked up and internalized not only by those who were already
interested or involved but also others who had previously not been concerned.
To use a current term, me may think of this as being the creation and propagation
of a set of “memes.”

The important point is that this was not just aimed at the “political nation,”
i.e., those who had the vote. Rather the idea was to create a set of settled
convictions, beliefs, and opinions that could be articulated in a range of
common arguments and be triggered by widely recognized narratives and images;
these would be held by a very large part of the population most of whom could
not vote. What this would do first, it was hoped, would be to press the entire
“political nation” (and not just the part of it that actually sat in Parliament)
to change its policy, partly through its becoming actually persuaded and partly
through a feeling that the existing policy was not sustainable because ordinary
people would simply not cooperate with it. Secondly, to the extent that this
became settled it would constrain the range of policy options by making the
entire policy of protectionism and all it implied impossible to take seriously
as an option.

Illustration 12: ACLL Badge or Button

Illustration 13: ACLL Medallion

A button or badge which is probably made
of wood or cardboard and which states: "No Corn Laws. We demand
Total & Immediate Repeal." The call for immediate and total
abolition was a deliberate strategic decision rather than agitiating
for partial reform.

Medallion of the National Anti-Corn Law
League. The symbol of the sheaf of wheat was commonly used by the ACLL
in its propaganda.

This was done through a massive campaign of both education and activism. Here
Cobden and his colleagues on the League Council created or perfected a whole
range of methods of political mobilization and activism. These included the
systematic use of mass public meetings, the use of paid and trained lecturers
and public speakers, the creation of a national membership organization with
local branches, the use of paid memberships and subscriptions to raise large
sums of money from large numbers of geographically dispersed small donors,
the use of membership lists to keep in contact with people and to identify
activists, and organized education through lectures. But even more importantly,
the campaign pressed its case through the production on a large scale of pamphlets
and leaflets, making use of literature such as the poetry of Ebenezer Elliot,[10] using
large-scale social events such as bazaars both to raise funds and to build
and strengthen networks and personal contacts, and taking advantage of political
events such as by-elections as a political platform.[11]

Looked at analytically, what Cobden and the League did was to educate a large
number of people in a way that created an active and engaged public opinion
and at the same time, by the very way this was done, to make that public opinion
more effective. This was done by mobilizing people and connecting and networking
them, and above all by reducing the cost of political participation in a way
that enabled a dispersed, diverse, and large group of people, each of whom
had a definite but small interest, to cooperate and contribute. The fact that
they were a large and general group rather than a specific and concentrated
one was actually an advantage once these organizational innovations had made
it possible to do this at a reduced cost.

All of this raises some interesting questions. First of all, did it actually
work? Some would argue that it was in fact the conversion of members of the
elite, above all Peel, that was crucial, rather than mass campaigning. There
are two responses to this: firstly, while Peel’s change of mind probably was
a matter of genuine intellectual conversion, the shift in position of others
such as Lord John Russell was more due to the effect of “pressure from without.”
Secondly, the real effect of the campaign was felt not just in 1846 but in
the longer run. What resulted was what Trentmann describes: a popular culture
in which free trade had a central place and was seen as a moral imperative.
This remained the case for a long time, so that when Joseph Chamberlain tried
to overturn it between 1903-6 (using exactly the same methods as Cobden) the
result was an electoral disaster for his party.

On the other hand, Cobden was less successful in his great endeavor after
the repeal of the Corn Laws, namely, his involvement in the organized Peace
Congresses in the 1840s and 1850s. Here a similar strategy failed to bring
about a shift in public thinking, and he and Bright were both decisively rebuffed
with the outbreak of the Crimean War. This may suggest that there was something
contingent or particular about his previous success.

Another question is the one posed at the start. Was there something peculiar
about Cobden’s own time that made this possible, and is it possible now? Certainly
there were a range of structural developments that made this kind of action
much easier, of which the most important were reductions in the cost of travel
and communication via the mail, and the appearance of the cheap press and other
publications. Conversely, in the course of the 20th century a number of developments
raised the cost of political organization and made this kind of campaign more
difficult for private actors while expanding the capacity of governments. Among
these we may note the rise of electronic mass media such as radio and television
and the rise (due to deliberate political choice in many cases) of suburbia
as the principal living arrangement. On the other hand, it may well be that,
even if that point is granted, current developments such as social media are
once again reducing the costs of political mobilization. What is lacking is
rather the kind of organizational skills that Cobden had and a systematic body
of thought that connects theory, analysis, and action.

End Notes

[1.] See,
Ferguson, Thomas. The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic
of Money-Driven Political Systems. University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Chicago, IL.

[6.] See
the quote of the week </quotes/388> "John
Bright calls British foreign policy “a gigantic system of (welfare) for the
aristocracy” (1858)" from John Bright, Selected Speeches of the Rt.
Hon. John Bright M.P. On Public Questions, introduction by Joseph Sturge
(London: J.M. Dent and Co., 1907). </titles/1658#Bright_0618_365>.

[7.] See,
McKinnon, William Alexander. On the Rise, Progress and Present State of
Public Opinion in Great Britain and Other Parts of the World London,
1828.

[10.] Ebenezer
Elliot was known as the "corn-law rhymer". See, The Poetical
Works of Ebenezer Elliott, the Corn-Law Rhymer (Endinburgh: William Tait,
1840). Especially the "Corn-Law Hymns No. I to XX," pp. 167-73.
Dedicated to Thomas Hodgskin.

“I am not sanguine as you know about the success of any effort to recall
to the attention of the public the details of our long agitation – I doubt
the possibility of any body making the history an interesting one. In fact,
it is not a pleasant chapter to go over again in all its minutiae; for it
was but a blundering unsystematic series of campaigns, in which we were indebted
for our success to the stupidity of our foes, & still more to the badness
of their cause.’ --Richard Cobden to Archibald Prentice, 13 September 18523. [12]

Cobden’s own comment on the history of the Anti-Corn Law League suggests that
he was less certain about the roots of his own success than Davies’s careful
reconstruction of his ideas and strategy implies. Nevertheless, in combating
the Corn Laws, not only did Cobden benefit from the weakness of the protectionist
cause, but unlike those seeking change today, he also rode the wave of recent
political activism. For following the Reform Act of 1832, the 1830s in Britain
had seen a revolution in political participation with the emergence of a vastly
increased electorate, local party politicization, and the revitalization of
municipal government, whose councils were in effect the “soviets of the bourgeoisie.”
(Hence Cobden began political life as “Alderman Cobden of Manchester.”)

Inspired by the successful antislavery movement, a huge number of pressure
groups were also already in action seeking goals as diverse as temperance,
disestablishment of the Church of England, and the repeal of the Union with
Ireland. The free-trade movement also existed at various levels – within the
bureaucracy, the Political Economy Club, and in various localities -- while
the Manchester Anti-Corn Law Association from which the League sprang existed
independently of Cobden. Indeed he had been absent in Germany when it was formed.[13] Cobden’s
success lay therefore in harnessing growing activism to a better-focused free-trade
movement, although all this may have been unnecessary had the Liberal Tory
William Huskisson (1770-1830), often deemed the father of free trade, succeeded
in the late 1820s in his planned reform (possibly even abolition) of the Corn
Laws.

Cobden’s own animus against the Corn Laws did, as Davies argues convincingly,
stem from his wider intellectual outlook, but it is useful to recall that this
was originally expressed in his pamphlets on foreign policy in the mid-1830s,[14] designed
to attack reliance upon the bogey of the “balance of power” to justify expensive
entanglements abroad, which in turn served only to benefit the few at the cost
of the many. Significantly these tracts were published under the sobriquet
of “A Manchester manufacturer.” This was important, for Cobden remained an
outspoken representative of the entrepreneurial classes, seeking to free industry
from the exactions of the aristocratic state, although his own rural roots
added a strong strain of radical hostility to landlordism or “territorialism.”[15] But
Cobden’s anti-aristocratic sentiment ran through his entire career, fueling
inter alia his campaigns for peace and the reform of foreign policy, his opposition
to colonial expansion, and his campaigns for financial and land reform. Here
in many ways therefore he held to a consistent worldview which directed his
efforts at reform.[16] This
therefore leads us to the question Davies rightly asks – was his success over
the Corn Laws “contingent” upon other factors -- and to the question Davies
prompts but does not answer – why did Cobden’s later campaigns fail to replicate
the success of his anti-Corn Law campaigns? Why did his single-minded strategy
work over the Corn Laws but not over land, peace, and foreign policy.

Illustration 11: Membership Cards for the National
ACLL

An example of a Membership Card for the National Anti-Corn
Law League:
Above: a membership card for "John Lomas", no. 1,362, which
shows a poor family eating dear bread (protection) and a prosperous family
eating cheap bread (free trade). They are separated by the ACLL symbol
of a sheaf of wheat, beneath a banner which says "He that withholdeth
corn, the people shall curse him."

Interestingly Cobden himself used the success over the Corn Laws to formulate
in effect a seven-year model of successful reform, combining the education
of opinion, pressure from without, and parliamentary campaigning: “We must
serve our apprenticeship in these great legislative measures … and it is well
we have to do so, for if we were to succeed too soon we should not consider
our advantages worth preserving.” (Morning Post, 27 November 1849)
Why did he not successfully put this into subsequent practice? One cardinal
rule he emphasized in the case of the League was single-issue politics, a clear
decisive legislative goal. This proved far more difficult in later radical
campaigns when goals were often confused, for example, financial and parliamentary
reform in the late 1840s. Nor did later reforms lend themselves to such well-orchestrated
social support – Cobden often referred to the League’s success as that of “a
middle class set of agitators,”[17] with
the cotton masters of northern England (of whom Cobden was one) providing the
spearhead and the vast majority of its funds while using the Corn Law issue
to assert their presence and identity within the political system.[18] Virtually
all later reforms fragmented rather than united the middle classes. Thus education,
to which Cobden attached huge importance, immediately fell victim to the church
and chapel consciousness of the Victorians, with the fissure between the Church
of England and the serried ranks of Dissenters and Catholics proving a fatal
obstacle to reform. Over land reform, the direct assault of the bastion of
the aristocracy, the middle classes as urban property owners remained indifferent,
or alternatively, as nouveaux riches aspiring to their own landed estates,
became hostile.

On major issues of foreign policy, especially the Crimean War, Cobden felt
isolated from the patriotism of the many, fed he believed by the war-mongering
martial spirit inculcated by the elite. Even before the end of the Crimean
war the Radicals Cobden and Bright appeared as “generals without armies.” Against
this background, despite his efforts to cultivate public opinion, Cobden remained
unable to recreate the enthusiasm generated by the anti-Corn Law movement,
which remained the outstandingly successful reform pressed from without. Equally,
following the suggestion in the quotation from Cobden above, we may surmise
that other causes were both “better” in themselves and better defended, for
example, the case for the reform of international maritime law, where Cobden
found J. S. Mill among his leading opponents.[19] Interestingly
other reforms with which Cobden was identified, for example, the important
introduction of limited liability in 1855, seemed to pass without great visible
external pressure, while the highly important repeal of the taxes on knowledge
(completed in 1861) has passed almost unnoticed by historians until recently.[20]
In later life Cobden lost confidence in his own ability to orchestrate reform
from without, but he also looked in vain for the new generation to succeed
him. Perhaps the greatest “missed opportunity” lay in terms of the peace movement,
where Cobden had the capacity to unite the disparate strands of utilitarian
pacifist and religious opposition to war.[21] Yet
here too the context remained unfavorable to success as war enveloped the Near
East, Italy, and the United States.

This therefore left repeal of the Corn Laws as the chief achievement of Cobden’s
career. Although he rightly took great satisfaction from the 1860 Anglo-French
commercial treaty, this had been achieved by working within the political system,
although Cobden’s purpose was still to use foreign economic policy in order
to subvert aristocratic rule, a consistency of ideas although not of strategy.
This also helped cement the gains of the 1840s, and here, while Davies rightly
points to the long-term impact of repeal, repeal in itself, while necessary,
was not sufficient for Britain’s becoming the free-trade nation.[22] Not
only was the memory of repeal carefully orchestrated in popular history and
memory, but institutions such as the Cobden Club[23] worked
avidly to cement this legacy, which was also central to the popular politics
of the Liberal party under Gladstone. In this way later challenges of “Fair
trade” and tariff reform were defeated by the deep-rootedness of the popular
loyalty to free trade created after 1846.[24]

Finally, as to context, the repeal movement undoubtedly benefited from the
new postal facilities of the 1840s, but free trade was also part and parcel
of the wider communications revolution in which the railways, the telegraph,
canals, and steam shipping reduced time and distance and sustained trade and
capital flows within the world economy. Here the third quarter of the 19th-century
proved to be a period of considerable globalization, of which Cobden himself
was an optimistic proponent, believing that all nations might be united by
trade, that imperial power was unnecessary as were wars, and that popularly
governed nations, on the model of the United States, would have “no
foreign politics.”[25] This
vision was already under threat before his death 150 years ago; whether it
is capable of resurrection in a new age of globalization will certainly require
at the very least an individual of supreme organizational skills and systematic
thought, but might be expected more readily to emerge within institutions (of
which Cobden himself was profoundly suspicious) devoted to global governance.

[16.] See,
Cain, Peter, “Capitalism, War, and Internationalism in the Thought of Richard
Cobden,” British Journal of International Studies 5 (1979), 229-47.

[17.] See
for example, "Our opponents have been fond of telling us that this is
a middle-class agitation. I do not like classes, and therefore have said that
we are the best of all classes; but this I believe, that we have enough of
the middle class, and the propertied portion of the middle class, to beat the
landlords at their own game in all the populous counties in England." in
Richard Cobden, Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden, M.P.,
ed. by John Bright and J.E. Thorold Rogers with a Preface and Appreciation
by J.E. Thorold Rogers and an Appreciation by Goldwin Smith (London: T.Fisher
Unwin, 1908). 2 volumes in 1. Vol. 1 Free Trade and Finance. "Speech on
Free Trade XIII. London, Dec. 11, 1844." </title/927#Cobden_0129.01_399>.

[25.] "We
know of no means by which a body of members in the reformed House of Commons
could so fairly achieve for itself the patriotic title of a national party,
as by associating for the common object of deprecating all intervention on
our part in continental politics. Such a party might well comprise every representative
of our manufacturing and commercial districts, and would, we doubt not, very
soon embrace the majority of a powerful House of Commons. At some future election,
we may probably see the test of “no foreign politics “applied to those who
offer to become the representatives of free constituencies. Happy would it
have been for us, and well for our posterity, had such a feeling predominated
in this country fifty years ago! " in "Part I. England" in England,
Ireland, and America (1835), in Richard Cobden, The Political Writings
of Richard Cobden, with a Preface by Lord Welby, Introductions by Sir Louis
Mallet, C.B., and William Cullen Bryant, Notes by F.W. Chesson and a Bibliography, vol.
1, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903). </titles/82#Cobden_0424-01_331>.

The
illuminating essay by Stephen Davies clearly identifies the strengths in Richard
Cobden’s intellectual armoury. Practical business experience, foreign travel,
and wide reading all contributed towards his great political acumen, along
with his ability to vibrantly assert and convey a coherent set of principles
encompassing a progressive worldview. These intellectual attributes marked
Cobden out as a unique figure outside the mainstream of political opinion,
most definitely a “Victorian outsider.” Equally, Cobden’s advocacy of commercial
liberalism and free exchange has led to his being known as “the International
Man.”[26] It
was particularly appropriate and just recognition of the importance Cobden
placed on freedom in international commerce as the facilitator and driver of
economic growth, international peace, and more philosophically, the progress
of ethical values and human civilization. Cobden built on Herbert Spencer’s
distinction between “militant” and “industrial” societies:[27] the former organized
primarily for war with free reign for militarism and aggressive instincts,
while the latter sublimated these instincts in work and commerce: civilized,
peaceful activities which contributed towards wealth-creation.[28] Here
was the broad basis for the division between “productive” and “idle” classes
which permeated Cobden’s social theory.

Cobden first came to public prominence as the author of two pamphlets, England,
Ireland, and America (1835) and Russia (1836) under the (significant)
pseudonym “A Manchester Manufacturer.”[29] Foreign policy and nonintervention were
Cobden’s main concerns early in his career, and his opposition to traditional
balance-of-power diplomacy was expressed in vigorous but disarmingly plain
terms:

Those who, from an eager desire to aid civilization, wish that Great Britain
should interpose in the dissensions of neighbouring states, would do wisely
to study, in the history of their own country.… To those generous spirits we
would urge, that, in the present day, commerce
is the grand panacea, which,
like a beneficent medical discovery, will serve to inoculate with the healthy
and saving taste for civilization all the nations of the world.[30]

Although often viewed as a highly progressive and modern thinker, elements
of Cobden’s thought clearly owed something to the oppositional 18th-century
“Country” tradition.[31] Yet,
while there were many different aspects to Cobden’s thought, and his radical
ideas were developed and refined over time, the fundamental principles he advocated
in the 1830s remained largely intact throughout his life.[32] Before
taking his message to the world Cobden had to convince his own countrymen of
the desirability of free trade. The notion of greater commercial freedom had
a long history in Britain, with abortive moves towards liberalization in the
1780s, and a more systematic implementation of freer trade by reciprocal commercial
treaty arrangements promoted by Huskisson in the 1820s. Despite these steps,
protectionism remained entrenched within the British body politic, for fiscal
and political reasons which had evolved over centuries.

Illustration 16: A mass produced copy of one of Cobden's
Speeches in the House

Illustration 17: TP of a presentation copy of key
ACLL literature

Title page of a mass distribution copy
of a speech given by Cobden in the House of Commons on Feb. 24, 1842.
Note that it cost 1 penny and that 16,000 had been printed. This was
part of the ACLL's strategy to diseminate their views as widely as possibl
in both visual and print formats.

This is from a 1842 edition of a selection
of ACLL material which was bound in a special presentation edition designed
to be signed and given away to potential supporters. It cost only 4 pence,
was embossed with a gold image on the cover [see below], had a presentation
page where the recipient's name could be hand written, and contained
a selection of key ACLL material. The ACLL also awarded money prizes
in essay competitions designed to stimulate interest in the topic of
free trade. Tis volume contains three of those prize-winning essays.

At a theoretical level the astonishing growth in political-economy ideas promoted
by the disciples of Adam Smith did not stop at the lecture-room but entered
the public domain through periodicals, pamphlets, and abridged and/or cheaper
volumes for working men.[33] Theoretical development, particularly Ricardian comparative
advantage in international commerce,[34] proved
to be hugely influential. Enlightened statesmanship and theoretical rigor were
accompanied by a vibrant, expanding manufacturing sector pursuing open markets
as a means of procuring cheap raw materials and selling finished products.
Cobden himself served an apprenticeship as a clerk and commercial traveler
before becoming a partner in a Lancashire calico-mill in 1828, and British
manufacturing expansion and industrial development raised suspicions that for
all the moralistic talk surrounding open markets, free trade, international
peace, and civilization, far more base motives were at work. Domestic protectionists
claimed Cobden and his business associates, particularly cotton manufacturers,
in the Anti-Corn Law League were primarily motivated by personal gain. The
nefarious activities of League “millocrats” were attacked by protectionists
and Chartists, and abroad the free trade ideas of “perfidious Albion” were
denounced more widely as a tool for ensuring British political and economic
hegemony.[35] This
type of critique has been maintained by historians in a less pejorative sense,
with Cobden characterized as a “middle-class Marxist” based on his blend of
“interest and principle.”[36] Certainly
manufacturers were important in financing and providing leadership, but the
League represented more than merely an organization established to obtain Corn
Law repeal for the benefit of manufacturing industry. For tactical reasons,
Cobden had to downplay the wider implications of repeal, not only because it
was potentially divisive but also because it risked diluting and detracting
from the repeal
campaign. Cobden patiently explained to colleagues that corn and provisions
alone must be the focus of the campaign, and by keeping to single-issue politics
he successfully avoided division, though, as the Chartist movement demonstrated,
divisions could also occur over means rather than ends.

The radical lineage relating to the Corn Laws went back to the immediate aftermath
of the 1815 Corn Law, and anti-Corn Law associations existed earlier in the
1830s, providing an example of how the Corn Laws could be viably agitated against
as a single-issue question.[37] Cobden
understood the importance of repeal towards other policy areas. For him the
Corn Laws were the “keystone of monopoly” within the protective system,[38] and
repeal would unlock further reforms as a means of undermining the aristocratic
“territorial Constitution” in Church and State. Cobden clearly had vision and
imagination, particularly notable in his speeches (and letters) which were
characteristically tersely argued, vividly described, and highly politicized.
As the most prominent and convincing advocate of repeal, his ability, determination,
and capacity for hard work were vitally important to the League campaign. Equally
though, repeal was a multifaceted issue, and the League drew on many influential
and often somewhat contradictory sources of political thought including theology,
secular radicalism, and older popular anti-aristocratic notions of moral economy.
In practical terms, repeal was a cause that encompassed different groups and
possessed a cross-class and cross-sector appeal. As Marx perceptively noted,
the objective of the League was “very general, very popular, very palpable.”[39]

The League was innovative in its methods of agitation and propaganda, and
employed numerous rhetorical and theatrical devices to deliver its message;
political theatres and staged “events” were often very successful in obtaining
publicity and were a potent ideological vehicle. Engels flippantly paid tribute
to the ubiquitous nature of the League campaign in citing a delegate to the
Economic Congress at Brussels in 1847 as stating “the stalest and most platitudinous
shibboleths of the Anti-Corn-Law League, long since known by heart to almost
every street urchin in England.”[40]

Nevertheless, the campaign was not all-conquering, and mistakes were made.
The annual parliamentary motion for total and immediate repeal did not achieve
much, and the petitioning campaign merely diverted opposition to the Corn Laws
into innocuous constitutional channels. Moreover, while the noble democratic
course of changing opinion was always important in the League campaign, less
politically reputable methods of legally challenging votes by the use of revising
barristers, and the creation of votes by property qualification were also sanctioned,
albeit intermittently, by the League.

Attempting to quantify influence is always difficult, and ultimately Peel
was responsible for repeal against the opposition of much of his party and
many people in the country. Clearly, the constant agitation and pressure exerted
by the League was influential in forcing the issue on to the political agenda,
and even into the 20th century, Corn Law repeal remained a symbolic motif embodying
a complex skein of quasi-populist, anti-aristocratic and democratic principles.
Conversely, many of the causes Cobden espoused in the post-repeal period failed
to gain significant traction during his lifetime. Initial support for financial
reform, international arbitration, and disarmament was curbed by the 1852 French
invasion scare, prompting years of international instability. Yet by the later
1850s, after the Crimean debacle, increasing support for nonintervention and
retrenchment in defense spending represented “visible signs of a shift towards
Cobdenite sensibilities within English liberalism.”[41]

The standard Cobden set for practical political organization and mobilization
of opinion remains relevant today. While impossible to doubt the extent or
importance of Cobden’s organizational or rhetorical abilities, contemporary
politics, notably Britain’s anti-poll tax campaign, illustrate the potency
of a single political issue which can somehow encapsulate a wider philosophy,
especially when incorporating a blend of morality, oppositional ideology, and
participation in an anti-establishment battle against elite power. Contemporary
political cynicism and a more diffuse political culture appear to militate
against mobilizing public opinion on the scale and nature of the anti-Corn
Law campaign. Yet the Tea Party in the United States, the UK Independence Party
in Britain, and the pro-independence “Yes” campaign in Scotland have made significant
progress, and all contain elements strikingly similar to the Anti-Corn Law
League in terms of their attack on entrenched vested interests, a shared populist
rhetoric, and the mobilization of public opinion on single issues, albeit issues
highlighting a deeper and wider malaise in the body politic.

Endnotes

[27.] On
Herbert Spencer’s distinction between “militant” and “industrial” societies,
see Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology, in Three Volumes (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1898). Vol. 2. </titles/2632>.
Part V. Political Institutions. Chap. XVII. The Militant Type of Society and
Chap. XVIII. The Industrial Type of Society.

[28.] Cain,
Peter. 1979. "Capitalism, War, and Internationalism in the Thought of
Richard Cobden". British Journal of International Studies 5,
p. 230.

[29.]England,
Ireland, and America (1835) </titles/82#lf0424-01_head_007> and Russia (1836) </titles/82#lf0424-01_head_015>,
which are both in The Political Writings of Richard Cobden, with a Preface
by Lord Welby, Introductions by Sir Louis Mallet, C.B., and William Cullen Bryant,
Notes by F.W. Chesson and a Bibliography (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903), vol.
1.

[30.] In
England, Ireland, and America (1835). Part I. England, reprinted in
The Political Writings of Richard Cobden, with a Preface by Lord Welby,
Introductions by Sir Louis Mallet, C.B., and William Cullen Bryant, Notes by
F.W. Chesson and a Bibliography, vol. 1, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903),
p. 20. </titles/82#Cobden_0424-01_335>

[31.] Conway,
Stephen. 1995. "Britain and the Impact of the American War, 1775-1783". War
inHistory 2, p.
136.

[33.] [Editor]
Cobden's own speeches were circulated in cheap editions such as The Corn
Laws. Speech of R. Cobden, Esq., M.P. in the House of Commons, on Thursday
Evening, February 24, 1842. (Manchester: J. Gadsby, n.d.). The 12 page
pamphlet was priced at "one penny" and it was the "Sixteenth
Thousand-Revised" edition.
One might also mention the work of Thomas Hodgskin who regularly lectured to
working men's groups at "Mechanics Institutes" and worked for James
Wilson's pro-free grade magazine The Economist. One of his lectures was published
as A Lecture on Free Trade, in connexion with the Corn Laws; delivered
at the White Conduit House, on January 31, 1843 (London: G.J. Palmer, 1843). </titles/321>.

[34.] On
Ricardian comparative advantage in international commerce: "Under a system
of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and
labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of
individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the
whole." in Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) "Chap.
VII. On Foreign trade". The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo,
ed. Piero Sraffa with the Collaboration of M.H. Dobb (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, 2005). Vol. 1. </titles/113#Ricardo_0687-01_454>

[38.] "I
say, then, that whatever may be the fate of the Navigation Laws, the Corn question
is a different thing. I was always an advocate for confining the public mind
to that one question; I call it the keystone of the arch; the rest will fall
of itself." in "Speech on Free Trade XXIII. House of Commons, March
8, 1849," Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden, M.P.,
ed. by John Bright and J.E. Thorold Rogers with a Preface and Appreciation
by J.E. Thorold Rogers and an Appreciation by Goldwin Smith (London: T.Fisher
Unwin, 1908). Vol. 1 Free Trade and Finance. <http://oll.libertyfu/title/927#Cobden_0129.01_655nd.org>.

Stephen Davies’s eloquent essay tackles one of the enduring
issues of Richard Cobden and his legacy: what traces did his philosophy, so
influential and so effective at mobilizing public opinion in the mid-19th century,
leave and is there anything of relevance in his ideas for politics today?
To borrow Cobden’s title for his pamphlet assessing the Crimean War and relations
with Russia: what happened next, and next?

The picture looked gloomy in 1903 when F. W. Hirst, the journalist and ardent
Cobdenite (he married Cobden’s great niece and for a period resided at Dunford
House, Cobden’s childhood home), wrote:

During the last decade it has been the
fashion to talk of the Manchester School with pity or contempt as of an almost
extinct sect, well adapted, no doubt, for the commercial drudgery of a little,
early Victorian England, but utterly unfitted to meet the exigencies or satisfy
the demands of a moving Imperialism.[42]

Other, more recent commentators
have supported this pessimistic assessment, with Frank Trentmann arguing that
Cobden’s vision of a free-trade nation fell out of favor in the interwar period
with liberal economists preferring a new internationalism which supported regulation
of the global economy.[43]

It is clear that many aspects of the economy
and society dear to Cobden’s heart were severely failing in the immediate decades
following his death in 1865. Although universal, mass education had been introduced
by the Education Act of 1870, many working-class children had an inferior and
sporadic experience of school, and educational standards remained low. The
numbers of unskilled workers continued to be stubbornly high. Wages were falling,
and wealth was unevenly distributed. The 1873 Return of Owners of Land demonstrated
that 43 percent of land was owned by a small group of around 1,600 landowners
(although it also revealed that there were numerous freeholders owning very
small parcels of land). Farms were generally getting larger and relying on
smaller numbers of wage laborers, restricting employment in the countryside.
The abolition of the Corn Laws had not led to universal free trade policies.
Nations such as Russia remained obstinately resistant and tariffs​,​ and monopolies
were used to develop industry and infrastructure in India and other parts of
the Empire. The cost of the army and navy continued to increase, and foreign
policy was increasingly militaristic.

As Davies notes,
free trade was but one aspect of Cobden’s worldview and his philosophy was
far broader. It is difficult to pin this down precisely as his political writings
tended to be commentaries rather than a setting out of a coherent ideological
standpoint, and his views were reinterpreted and refashioned by his wide circle
of followers. He had a holistic approach, believing that social progress towards
political democracy depended on the interaction of economic, moral and religious,
and educational factors. Liberty was core to Cobden’s set of values. The Corn
Laws were just one manifestation of the consequences of centuries of aristocratic
dominance. Others included the corrupt political and electoral system, the
intertwining of church and state, militarism, and the unequal distribution
of land. Cobden had connections to the complete suffrage movement arguing for
household suffrage, the ballot, shorter parliaments, and curbs on the House
of Lords. His support for free trade in land was key to his ideology and would
become the centerpiece of Cobdenist thought in the late 19th century. A few
months before his death, Cobden wrote:

If I were five and twenty or thirty,
instead of, unhappily, twice that number of years, I would take Adam Smith
in hand – I would not go beyond him, I would have no politics in it – I would
take Adam Smith in hand, and I would have a League for Free Trade in Land just
as we had a League for Free Trade in Corn.[44]

Davies poses a challenging question in his essay: “whether there was something
historically specific about Cobden’s success, dependent upon the particular
circumstances of his times, or alternatively that his methods and analysis
are still applicable.”

It is clear that the Great Reform Act inaugurated many reform agendas: in
the church, law, women’s rights, freedom of the press, health, local government,
and the arts. These are ably articulated and assessed in an edited collection
by Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes[45]. The 1830s witnessed a raft of legislation
including civil registration, the commutation of tithes, Jewish emancipation,
banking reform, the abolition of slavery in the British colonies, and the reduction
in duties on the press. Extra-parliamentary activities also grew in scale and
may be gauged by metrics such as the vast increase in the number of petitions
presented to parliament; the growth of pressure groups, societies and associations
for the social and economic issues such as temperance, education and the treatment
of the poor; and the number of mass meetings and campaigns taking place in
communities across Britain. Although the pace of reform diminished from the
1840s onwards, there is no doubt that the “people” had begun an important conversation
with parliament which shifted the contours of debate. The establishment now
had to engage with the language of reform.

Cobden thus had a fertile environment on which to launch the campaign to repeal
the Corn Laws. But was the Cobden moment only fleeting? Some would argue that
the lack of success for his later endeavors for land reform and international
peace demonstrate that the success of the Anti-Corn Law League was due more
to timing than to any ideological or organizational strategy. However, this
negative conclusion may be countered by considering the political education
gained by those participating in the mass campaign to repeal the Corn Laws
– particularly for those hitherto largely excluded from the public sphere.

Illustration 41: Jane Cobden (1851-1947)

Illustration 42: Campaign Poster for the London County
Council Election 1889

Jane Cobden stood for election to the
London County Council in 1889 on a platform against the tax on coal,
better housing for the poor, "fair" wages," and no "sweating:" (sweat
shops). Although women could vote in County elections they could not
serve if elected. Cobden was elected and took her seat which was challenged
in court and she was fined.

The League was a pivotal movement for both radicalizing women and for providing
a model for the organization of later political campaigns. Strategies which
were to prove successful in later campaigns for women’s rights, such as fund-raising,
lobbying and electoral canvassing, were shaped by the experiences gained by
participation in the movement. Paul Pickering and Alex Tyrrell have analyzed
the varied nature of female commitment to the Anti-Corn Law League and women’s
contribution to developing the League as a truly national movement[46].
My own work has further demonstrated the rich and vibrant female political
culture that proliferated in this period.[47] That
this was an enduring, rather than a fleeting, legacy may be demonstrated by
the activities of the daughters of Richard Cobden in the later 19th century,
at the very time when many commentators argued Cobden’s influence and vision
was fading. Jane Cobden carried forward the fight for land reform via her two
published books, The Hungry Forties:
Life under the Bread Tax (1904) and The Land Hunger: Life under
Monopoly. The
Land Hunger (1913)[48] was dedicated “To the memory of Richard
Cobden who loved his native land, these pages are dedicated by his daughter,
in the hope that his desire – ‘Free Trade in Land’ – may be filled.” Cobden’s
daughters were refashioning his democratic ideas for the political circumstances
of their own age. They were conscious that they were taking his work forward.
As well as harnessing his political philosophy, Cobden’s daughters built
on the organizational techniques which had made the Anti-Corn Law League
so successful. They utilized the courtroom and the streets as well more
formal methods of lobbying to keep issues such as land reform, education,
and women’s rights at the top of the political agenda in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. This is just one illustration of how Cobden’s
ideas remained at the forefront of radical and progressive politics well
into the 20th century, demonstrating that his contribution was not only
sustained but remodelled for a new age.

But what of today? Could Cobdenite ideas and tactics be successful in a televisual
age? Davies is cautious on this point arguing that the political environment
is more hostile to the activities of private individuals. However, whilst the
rise of radio and television has meant that face-to-face politics is increasingly
mediated through broadcasters, a campaign’s turning-point may still hinge on
an unscripted personal encounter between a politician and the public. Thus
many argue Gordon Brown’s 2011 election campaign was scuppered when he termed
Gillian Duffy a “bigoted woman” after a bruising encounter on the street. With
the rise of the Web 2.0 generation, politics is entering a new phase. The activities
of the 2009-10 Iranian Green Movement were termed the “Twitter Revolution”
because of the protesters’ reliance on Twitter and other social-networking
sites to communicate with one another. Attempts by political parties in Britain
to control the political blogosphere have gone seriously awry with politicians
deviating from the party message and coordinated smear campaigns. Thus, there
is potential for Cobden’s ideas and tactics to thrive and prosper in the 21st
century.

Endnotes

[42.] Hirst,
F. W. ed., Free Trade and Other Fundamental Doctrines of the Manchester
School. Set Forth in Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Its Founders
and Followers. Harper and Brothers, 1903. London. </titles/94#Hirst_0575_2>

[46.]
See, Pickering, Paul, A. and Tyrell, Alex. The
People’s Bread: A History of the Anti-Corn Law League. Leicester University
Press, 2000. London.

[47.] See,
Richardson, Sarah. The Political Worlds of Women: Gender and Political
Culture in Nineteenth-Century Britain. Routledge, 2013. London. See also
the collection of images on the Flickr
account of Manchester Archives which
demonstrate how the anti-Corn Law League appealed to and utilised women in
its campaign, many of which can also be found here in the "Images
of Liberty and Power" collection in the essay on "Cobden
and the Anti-Corn Law League". They include a membership card of Manchester
branch illustrating how the League is campaigning to protect the vulnerable,
an invitation to a meeting encouraging attendees to bring their family, a poster
encouraging voter registration asking women ‘the best of our auxilliaries’
to support the campaing, and a poster for a Manchester Bazaar.

[48.] Jane
Cobden, The Hungry Forties: Life under the Bread Tax. Descriptive
Letters and other Testimonies from contemporary Witnesses, with and Introduction
by Mrs. Cobden Unwin. Illustrated (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904); Jane
Cobden, The Land Hunger: Life under Monopoly. Descriptive Letters
and other Testimonies from those who have suffered, with an Introduction
by Mrs. Cobden Unwin and an Essay by Brougham Villiers (London: T. Fisher
Unwin, 1913).

The three responses all raise specific questions connected with Cobden’s career
and legacy while at the same time sharing a great deal in terms of perspective.
This shows that there is a wide agreement among historians about many parts
of Cobden’s intellectual and political biography but varying emphases when
it comes to interpreting them. I agree with Gordon Bannerman, Sarah Richardson,
and Anthony Howe that a coherent ideology stands behind Cobden’s career and
political activism; we also agree on what the content of that ideology, or
worldview, was. As Gordon Bannerman says, Cobden shared with Spencer and many
other 19th-century liberals a vision of both the development of history and
the nature of class and political divisions in his own time. Bannerman correctly
points out that this worldview descended in part from the older “Country” tradition
of 18th-century opposition, but it derived mainly from a combination of radical
interpretations of political economy and a highly individualistic conception
of human action and agency that came ultimately from religious thinking. (This
was perhaps less clear in the case of Cobden than in others such as the Quaker John
Bright). Two additional points can be made here. Firstly there was a clear
difference between this way of thinking and that of the Philosophic
Radicals and their intellectual descendants, no matter how much they may
have agreed on specific points of policy. Secondly this ideology was not simply
Cobden’s personal Weltanschaung; it was clearly shared by many others,
including most of the active members of the Anti-Corn Law League, as well as
the obvious cases such as John Bright, Harriet Martineau, Joseph Sturge, and
later on people such as Francis Hirst (who is cited by Richardson).

This way of thinking and the agenda it inspired came partly, as all three
respondents point out, from a particular place and social context, which was
the manufacturing districts of Britain and particularly, of course, Manchester.
Howe and Richardson both emphasize the essential part that a particular way
of thinking about foreign policy and international relations played in this.
As Bannerman points out, Cobden’s first venture into national politics came
with two pamphlets on foreign policy, and this was to remain a central concern
for him throughout his life. The point surely is that rather than a concern
with free trade leading to a particular position on international affairs,
the arrow rather went in the other direction. It was the concern with the war
system and its connection to aristocratic power that then led to his decision
to focus on free trade and the Corn Laws.

Howe and Richardson both address the question of why Cobden was unable to
reproduce his success with the Anti-Corn Law campaign later in his life and
with regard to other issues. The obvious campaign is that of the organized
peace movement, which for Howe was perhaps Cobden’s big failure. Certainly
this was an area where he and Bright suffered bruising political defeat, thanks
to their opposition to the Crimean War. Richardson emphasizes the importance
of the idea of
“free trade in land” for Cobden and the way this became a central issue for
followers of his (such as G.C. Broderick) but without success – British land
ownership is, if anything, even more secretive and just as concentrated as
it was at the time of the 1873 Return that she alludes to.

What to say then about this? One point is that there were many campaigns in
the 19th century that drew on Cobden’s model without enjoying the same ultimate
success. One was the cause of disestablishment, as advocated by the Liberation
Society and Edward Miall. Another was that of temperance, perhaps the biggest
single popular movement in later Victorian Britain. However, we should also
remember that even “failed campaigns” had major effects in terms of their impact
on the popular culture and mentality. Thus the temperance movement played a
major part in both a real shift in behavior and the development of an autonomous
working-class and artisan-political culture. Moreover, as Howe points out,
there were also considerable successes which are simply ignored or taken for
granted by much of the historiography. A good example is the one he cites:
the abolition of the newspaper duty (taxes on knowledge) 1861.[49]
This was a major event, controversial at the time, and the outcome of a large
and impressive campaign. (Another one he mentions, the adoption of limited
liability in 1855, interestingly was one that divided those who shared the
ideology mentioned, with Cobden a strong supporter and Herbert Spencer a vocal
critic).[50]

One explanation for the later failure to repeat the success of 1846, offered
by both Howe and Bannerman, emphasizes the lack of a single issue that could
attract a broad coalition of support. I think there is something in this, but
it is not principally a matter of finding it hard to mobilize support in the
absence of a single issue. The point about the campaign for free trade was
that there was a single specific political action that, if taken, would ultimately
bring down the entire protectionist structure – the knot of policy could be
unraveled by pulling on a single string. By contrast this was not the case
with either international relations or the land system. Even a measure such
as prohibiting entail would not have the same kind of extensive effects on
land ownership that repealing the Corn Laws had on trade and fiscal policy,
while in international and military affairs, there was no single move that
would change the nature of the system. Rather there had to be a gradual movement
to build up a different way of doing things, together with sustained pressure
over a long time on the military establishment. This was obviously much more
difficult. In the case of land, there would have to be a sweeping measure of
land reform (as happened in Ireland), and as Howe points out, this was hugely
divisive.

In addition, there is the vexed question of how public opinion moved on these
other issues that Cobden was concerned with. One of the great, perhaps the
greatest, failures of 19th- and 20th-century liberalism was the way in which
the ideal of a cosmopolitan world society (which Cobden clearly and consciously
adhered to) was overcome in popular culture by the ideology of nationalism.
Here it is worth pointing out that there were serious divisions and disagreements
among the broad class of liberals, with many strongly supportive of the kind
of romantic nationalism represented by people such as Kossuth and Garibaldi.
This led to support for what we might now call “liberal interventionism” in
addition to the traditional policy of the balance of power. Moreover, the dominant
whig tradition of historiography led to a perception of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism,
which militated against a more cosmopolitan outlook.

On the other hand I would disagree with both Howe and Richardson that the
cultural and political legacy of Cobden’s work had declined by the 20th century
(the view Trentman also takes). Even at the peak of an economic crisis in
1931, candidates who supported free trade still got a majority of the vote.
(The Labor Party and the Liberals both supported it, and a significant part
of the National Liberals who would later leave the government over this issue
also favored it.) Even today, surveys show that the British public is more
strongly supportive of free trade than is the case in most other developed
countries and particularly the United States.[51]

What this suggests is that the legacy of Cobden’s campaign is much more robust
than many think. One reason is the way, described by Howe, in which there was
a systematic effort by organizations such as the Cobden Club, and the Economist ,
to “fix” a particular way of thinking about this issue in the public mind and
to associate it with democracy, popular activism, and a whole series of cultural
norms (the process Trentman describes).

Moreover, Richardson makes the hugely important point that Cobden’s example
inspired a whole series of other movements that went on to have a transformative
effect, above all the women’s movement. Harriet
Martineau was one of Cobden’s closest allies and in addition to his daughter
Jane, most of the founders of so-called “first wave feminism,” such as Lydia
Becker, Jesse Boucheret, Helen Blackburn, and Barbara Bodichon, were both great
admirers of Cobden and people who went on not only to emulate the organizational
and propaganda techniques he had developed in the 1840s but also to develop
them. The 19th century-liberal movement can be thought of as in some sense
a coalition of movements seeking particular changes but united by a foundational
ideology, overlapping memberships and personal connections, and, increasingly,
a shared political methodology (however mixed the results). The bundle of issues
described as “the Woman Question” was central in all this because of the vital
part played by women in all kinds of social and political activism, something
that had begun in a small way with their participation in the repeal campaign.

The final question raised by my initial piece and addressed by the responses
is whether there was something specific about Cobden’s own times that does
not translate to ours in terms of enabling his kind of organization and activism.
Howe, Richardson, and Bannerman all point to the great upsurge of activism
and campaigning of all kinds that took place during the “Age of Reform” and
offer various explanations for this. Perhaps we can combine all of these using
a simple economic analysis. During the 18th century the cost of political activity
for individuals (both literal monetary cost and the virtual opportunity cost)
rose steadily as compared to the benefits that most individuals could expect
as a result, until at least the 1760s. The result was the political system
described by Lewis Bernstein Namier,[52.] dominated
by aristocratic patronage and factionalism and the systematic use of office
and legislation for personal and class benefit. Access to politics was effectively
open only to the seriously wealthy except in a number of exceptional constituencies.
(This all sounds fearfully familiar).

In the 1770s people such as Christopher Wyvill and the antislavery campaigners
started to develop ways of getting round these obstacles. What happened in
Cobden’s time, however, were the changes described by Howe, Richardson, and
Bannerman. The common factor was that these all reduced the cost of political
participation, mobilization, and propaganda. Cobden was the political entrepreneur
who took advantage of this opportunity most fully and effectively. One key
aspect was bundling the “public good” of political action with private goods
such as entertainment and even religious observance. With the passage of time
the scene became more crowded and defenders of the status quo also became adept
at using these new techniques.

In the course of the 20th century the process went into reverse and the cost
of political organization rose again, mainly due to the advent of mass media.
I am actually less pessimistic and cautious, however, than Sarah Richardson
supposes. I think in fact that the kind of developments she alludes to, such
as the rise of Twitter and other social media and the dramatic decline in the
cost of publishing and propaganda, mark the start of another period where campaigns
like Cobden’s will once again become both easier to organize and more effective
in shaping popular consciousness. The question then is, what issue or issues
can play the same role as the Corn Laws and free trade? (My own favored candidates
are intellectual property and home schooling, but no doubt others will have
different candidates). The final questions of course are these: is there another
Richard or Jane Cobden out there and is there an environment like that of early
19th-century Manchester that can produce people like that?

Endnotes

[49.] The
newspaper duty was abolished in 1861 in one of Gladstone’s budgets. The final
regulation of the press was done away with in 1868 (after a case involving
Bradlaugh). The best book on this is by Hewitt, Martin The Dawn of the
Cheap Press in Victorian Britain: the End of the ‘Taxes on Knowledge’, 1849
– 1869. London, Bloomsbury Press 2013.

[50.] Limited
liability by a standard procedure was effected by the Companies Act of 1855.
(before then it required a Royal Charter or special Act of Parliament.

This conversation on the ideas and strategies of Cobden and the Anti-Corn
Law League has perhaps taken an unduly negative turn in asking why no further
reforms followed from the repeal of the Corn Laws. This turn has come at the
expense of asking what had changed and how permanent the impact of repeal was.
Here, as I have argued elsewhere[53],
the 1840s debate fundamentally shifted the terms of political argument in Britain,
establishing the primacy or hegemony of a popular language of political economy
which suffused all levels of society. This remained dominant into the early
20th century, and even, as Davies argues, well into the 1930s and beyond, although
“free trade” as such receded from the center of political debate after 1931.
Crucial to the success of the language of free trade was the priority it gave
to consumers over producers, and this remained its strongpoint into the early
20th century, recruiting support from the newly enfranchised agricultural laborers
after 1885, while the emphasis on “cheap food” fitted well into the Edwardian
vocabulary of household management and added a new layer of appeal to groups
such as the Women’s Co-operative Guild. As the civil servant Edward Hamilton
concluded in 1902, “In the days of Protection, producers were more powerful
than consumers. Nowadays consumers are more powerful and will remain so.”[54] Ironically,
had the land-reform movement succeeded, creating a new class of small agrarian
producers, this may have jeopardized support for free trade and helped regenerate
a rural protectionist movement. As it was, whatever the movements in real wages,
free trade was seen as a vital defense of working-class living standards, and
the high degree of male and female literacy in Edwardian Britain saw this message
effectively communicated to voters and nonvoters. Free trade had become part
of a political consensus, however much Cobden in his day remained an “outsider,”
although in fact less one than he has been sometimes presented. (How many outsiders
expected The Times to give leaders on their speeches?) This was a
fundamental, not a fleeting, change in political life.

This adoption of free trade also reminds us that whatever the complexities
of Cobden’s ideas, the central message was, as he repeatedly emphasized, that
contained in Smith’s Wealth of Nations: to prevent powerful interests
from threatening the welfare of the many.[55] This,
however, was a message which after 1867 relied as much on political parties
(Liberal and Labor) as on pressure groups, whose heyday had been between 1832
and 1867. Arguably, therefore, after 1867 no more “Cobdens” were necessary,
although the Cobden Club guarded zealously his legacy, and periodic challenges
to free trade led to supplementary bodies such as the Free Trade Union, linked
to the Liberal Party. If we look too at those parties, we find more of the
Cobdenite message than previous contributions to this debate have recognized.
For example, Cobden’s hostility to empire and liberal internationalism remained
deeply entrenched and, I would argue against Davies, did not in Britain succumb
to the appeal of romantic nationalism.[56] This
contributed a central strand to debates on foreign policy into the interwar
period.

With the decline in the effectiveness of political parties in the present
day, perhaps there is scope once more for new “Cobdens” and new styles of politics,
whether in the blogosphere or through the ever-proliferating world of voluntary
associations and NGOs. Here we might add, however, that their power may be
more that of a veto than to promote positive change – we should not in this
context lose sight of the powerful global protest behind the antiglobalization
campaign as seen at Seattle in 1999. However, this also reminds us that it
was part of Cobden’s strategy to avoid physical confrontation with the state,
drawing the hotter heads of the Anti-Corn Law League back from this in the
dangerous crisis of 1842.

[55.]See
Adam Smith's classic statement in favour of free trade in the Wealth of
Nations, Book IV: Of Systems of political Œconomy. Chap. II. "Of
Restraints upon the Importation from Foreign Countries of such Goods as can
be produced at Home," in Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, edited with an Introduction,
Notes, Marginal Summary and an Enlarged Index by Edwin Cannan (London:
Methuen, 1904). Vol. 1. </titles/237#lf0206-01_label_925>.
Especially the quote on how “furious monopolists” will fight to the bitter
end to keep their privileges </quotes/367>.

Stephen Davies correctly points to the distinctive nature of Cobden’s thought,
while also alluding to the shared values and opinions of those in the forefront
of the League campaign. Clearly, however, Cobden’s rural background combined
with his education, industrial experience, and broad knowledge gained from
foreign travel made for an interesting form of radicalism which was more
nuanced and erudite than others from the manufacturing interest.

Corn Law repeal was a facet of Cobden’s wider internationalism. Indeed in
December 1847, referring to his pamphlets of the 1830s concerning balance-of-power
politics, secret diplomacy, and militarism, Cobden said, “Free trade has been
only a labour of love with me, in order that I might carry out those views.”[57]

While it was the aristocratic warmongering basis of the British State, and
its convoluted, tortuous, and secretive diplomacy and foreign policy, which
primarily propelled Cobden into political activity, there was an interesting
juxtaposition in early League propaganda between war, antimilitarism, and free
commerce which was a very apt reflection of Cobden’s linkage of these issues.
Thackeray’s woodcut “Illustrations of the Rent Laws,” published in the Anti-Corn Law Circular in
1839, strikingly displayed the legal and military forces of the State forcibly
preventing grain imports.[58]

As Davies notes, nationalism proved to be too powerful for the type of cosmopolitan
internationalism advocated by Cobden. Cosmopolitanism was easily equated with
antipatriotism, and as an old anti-Jacobin rhyme put it, the cosmopolitan was:[59]

A steady patriot of the world alone
The friend of every country but his own

Curiously enough, Cobden was rarely criticized for lack of patriotism. While
many opposed his views, he remained respected for the principled, robust, and
consistent stance he maintained. Cobden himself was never “co-opted” to the
British political elite. His role in the Anglo-French Treaty negotiations was
the nearest he came to acting in an “official” capacity, and his refusal to
consider political office often puzzled those like his political nemesis Palmerston.
Uncompromised by office, Cobden’s intellectual legacy has remained untarnished,
for maintaining his principles was never tested against the trammels of House
of Commons majorities, collective responsibility, and ministerial discipline.

Cobden’s
political career was facilitated by constitutional reform and economic development.
As Davies argues, the greater activism of the 19th century was clearly related
to the reduced cost of political activity. Ironically the increasing cost of
elections in the 18th century was perhaps largely owing to greater accumulation
of wealth from those involved in “modern” economic activity, that is, wealthy
merchants, nascent industrialists, and upstart “nabobs,” securing the representation
of small boroughs. As Howe convincingly argues, the anti-Corn Law agitation
was an element of the new political activism inaugurated by the 1832 Reform
Act. Yet though there was scarcely a feature of the unreformed system that
could not be found in existence after 1832, reform paved the way for the influence
of local manufacturers in civic and parliamentary life.[60]

In 19th-century Britain, it was the “local state” which “provided the setting
where a self-confident middle class built its characteristic institutions and
culture.”[61] (Daunton, 152) Nevertheless, the political contours of the British
State remained largely dominated by the aristocratic elite. Significantly,
on his election to Parliament in 1841 Cobden informed his brother that he was
“looked upon as a Gothic invader.”[62] The
impulse given to reform movements in the wake of the League, noted by Sarah
Richardson and Stephen Davies, was clearly vitally important. Indeed, despite
the practical political need to isolate the Corn Law issue, the repeal campaign
effectively fueled related issues such as land reform and the Game Laws. These
were incorporated within the League campaign, serving as powerful ancillary
evidence in the League’s case against landlord legislation and the “usurpations
of our feudal lords.”[63]

Despite recent claims of the robust, rounded, and representative nature of
the League in national terms, the extent of the League’s popularity must be
questioned. While the League campaign was ultimately successful, it did take
nearly 10 years to achieve its aim, and the impact of anti-Corn Law meetings,
speeches, and literature was highly variable. Attempts to wean workers away
from Chartism, though not entirely unsuccessful, met with disappointing results.
Bids to construct a hybrid movement failed, with even many notable radicals,
including Thomas Hodgskin, trying in vain to win over the working classes towards
supporting repeal.[64]

Moreover, agricultural protectionism was buttressed by the complex network
of City of London interests, with much support for protectionism, especially
relative to sugar and shipping.[65]

Ultimately, the fears of conservatives, if not protectionists, were largely
not realized. While Corn Law repeal did bring down the “entire protectionist
structure,” repeal seemed to stand as a self-contained, if momentous, reform
rather than the precursor of fundamental reform in Church and State. The “Age
of Reform” did not fundamentally alter the political foundations of the State,
and as John Bright stated in 1866: “There is no greater fallacy than this—that
the middle classes are in possession of power.”[66]

The fragmentation of the radical ranks of the 1840s in later decades was clearly
a deeply disappointing and disillusioning experience for Cobden.[67] Nevertheless, as Howe points out, there was clearly a paradigm shift in commercial
policy which was not overturned until 1931. Equally, the participation of women
proved to be inspirational and an important exemplar and template for future
political activity. We can therefore agree that there were many positive elements
of repeal, and its impact, influence, and legacy were great.

In response to Stephen Davies’s query about the future trajectory of popular
movements, I would like to offer a slight variant by alluding to recent events
where elements of Cobdenite thought seem to have entered the policy space or
at least converged with developments and approaches in international relations.
For example, would Cobden have approved of the exercise of “soft” power? While
preferable to the “hard” power of coercion and military force, is this not
merely a warmer, friendlier term for the economic imperialism and market hegemony
of earlier centuries? What of the use of international institutions to resolve
and avert conflict? While the record of the United Nations and the European
Union is questionable, the principles of conciliation, diplomacy, and pacification
embodied by these institutions would surely be approved by Cobden. Yet it is
doubtful whether he would have approved of another layer of bureaucratic and
highly politicized institutions regardless of the ideals, or the greater emphasis
on transparency, accountability, and democratic legitimacy.

If international institutional developments have fallen short of attaining
Cobdenite ideals, greater parliamentary consultation and scrutiny of the decision
to go to war, emanating from within the UK government, appears more promising.
The erosion of the “war prerogative” held by the Crown (though exercised by
ministers) is not yet legally enshrined, but after the Iraq debacle, amid accusations
that the government waged an “illegal” war, the government is now wary of committing
troops without parliamentary consultation and, in the recent case over Syria,
parliamentary approval. This change in the operation of the “war prerogative,”
inserting democratic accountability and public opinion into the decision to
go to war while providing safeguards for national security and operational
efficiency, is highly significant.[68] For
while Cobden advocated international commerce to completely obviate the need
for war, in the absence of this counsel of perfection, moves towards diplomatic
transparency and democratic accountability must surely be considered advances
in the direction of a Cobdenite conception of international relations.

The legal, political, and diplomatic technicalities inherent in these issues
make them unlikely to either capture the public imagination or to provide impetus
and enthusiasm for activists. The interaction among political ideas, economic
interest groups, and national and supranational institutions has never seemed
more complex. It seems unlikely that any popular movement will be able to influence
popular consciousness in the same way the Anti-Corn Law League did. Clearly
there is no lack of available resources for promoting and pursuing political
objectives. However, the proliferation of social media seems thus far to have
led to a highly transient and fickle audience, a cacophony of discordant voices,
and an ill-defined delineation of political issues, often characterized by
sloganeering and oversimplification.

There are clearly limits to what technology can achieve. It can facilitate
rather than create, and greater opportunities for political engagement and
activism will not necessarily lead to a more politically-conscious nor more
politically-active electorate and population. All future activists will have
to think carefully about how to effectively deliver, as well as formulate,
their message.

[58.] See, Stray
Papers by William Makepeace Thackeray. Being Stories, Reviews, Verses, and
Sketches (1821-1847). Edited, with an Introduction and Notes. By Lewis Saul
Benjamin. With Illustrations. (London: Hutchinson and co., 1901). Frontispiece,
pp. 167-68, p. 416. The images can be found in Cobden
and the Anti-Corn Law League.

[59.]The
verse comes from George Canning, "New Morality" in the last issue
of The Anti-Jacobin, or, Weekly Examiner (No. 36, 9 July 1798). The full stanza
is:

Taught in her school to imbibe thy mawkish strain,
Condorcet, filtered through the dregs of Paine,
Each pert adept disowns a Briton's part,
And plucks the name of England from his heart.

What! shall a name, a word, a sound, control
Th' aspiring thought, and cramp th' expansive soul?
Shall one half-peopled Island's rocky round
A love, that glows for all creation, bound?
And social charities contract the plan
Framed for thy freedom, Universal Man!
No—through th' extended globe his feelings run
As broad and general as th' unbounded sun!
No narrow bigot he;—his reason'd view
Thy interests, England, ranks with thine, Peru!
France at our doors, he sees no danger nigh,
But heaves for Turkey's woes th' impartial sigh;A steady patriot of the world alone,
The friend of every country—but his own.

Republished in 1852 following another French Revolution in 1848, Poetry
of the anti-Jacobin: comprising the celebrated political & satirical
poems, parodies and jeux-d'esprit of the Right Hon. George Canning, the Earl
of Liverpool, Marquis Wellesley, the Right Hon. J. H. Frere, G. Ellis, esq.,
W. Gifford, esq., and others. New and Revised Edition, with Explanatory
Notes. (London: G. Willis, 1852), No. XXXVI (July 9, 1798), "New Morality," pp.
201-20 [quote from p. 204-5.]

[66.] Bright,
Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by John Bright M.P. Edited
by James Edwin Thorold Rogers in Two Volumes. Second Edition (London:
Macmillan, 1869), Speech to the National Reform Union, Free Trade Hall, Manchester
on 20 November 1866, vol. II, p. 216. A larger section of Bright's speech is
worth quoting at greater length:

The middle class are told that since the Reform Bill of 1832 political power
has been in their hands; before 1832 it was with the lords and great land owners,
but since 1832 it has been in the hands (if the middle class; and now the middle
class are asked whether they are willing to surrender that power into the hands
of a more numerous, and, as these persons assert, a dangerous class, who would
swamp, not the exalted class of lords and great landowners, the highest in
social position, but would swamp also the great middle class with whom power
is now said to rest. And they try to teach the middle class that there is an
essentially different interest between them and the great body of the people
who are not yet admitted into that class. They say the one class is in power,
and the other class is outside, and out of power, and they warn the middle
class against admitting the outsiders into partnership with them, for fear
they should dethrone the middle class and set up an unintelligent, unreasoning,
and selfish power of their own.

That is the sort of argument which is used to the middle class to induce them
to take no part in any measure that shall admit the working class to a participation
in political power. I should be ashamed to stand on any platform and to employ
such an argument as this. Is there to be found in the writings or the speaking
of any public man connected with the Liberal or the Reform party so dangerous
and so outrageous a policy as that which these men pursue? When separating
the great body of the people into the middle and the working class, they set
class against class, and ask you to join with the past and present monopolists
of power in the miserable and perilous determination to exclude for ever the
great body of your countrymen from the common rights of the glorious English
constitution. There is no greater fallacy than this—that the middle classes
are in possession of power. The real state of the case, if it were put in simple
language, would be this—that the working-men are almost universally excluded,
roughly and insolently, from political power, and that the middle class, whilst
they have the semblance of it, are defrauded of the reality. The difference
and the resemblance is this, that the working-men come to the hustings at an
election, and when the returning-oflicer asks for the show of hands, every
man can hold up his hand although his name is not upon the register of voters;
every working-man can vote at that show of hands, but the show of hands is
of no avail. The middle class have votes, but those votes are rendered harmless
and nugatory by the unfair distribution of them, and there is placed in the
voter’s hand a weapon which has neither temper nor edge, by which he can neither
fight for further freedom, nor defend that which his ancestors have gained.

I perhaps gave Stephen Davies the wrong impression of my views on the continuing
influence of Cobdenite ideas and strategies as the 20th century progressed.
I am not as despondent as Trentmann and others that his ideas lost their
relevance, and in my response I demonstrated how his daughters (particularly
Jane and Annie) carried forward his legacy in their work on women’s rights
and land reform. Jane was also a key figure in ensuring that Cobden’s significant
contribution to the ideology of the international peace movement was continued
into the 20th century. Jane was active in antiwar activities, founding the
South African Conciliation Committee in 1899 and publishing “The Recent Development
of Violence in Our Midst” with the Stop the War Committee in 1900[69] She
later donated Dunford House, her father’s childhood home, to the LSE in order
to further the causes of peace, free trade, and education.

As we have all demonstrated, peace was the cornerstone to Cobden’s ideological
world view. In one of his earliest publications, “England, Ireland and America”
(1835), he bemoaned England’s “fatal mania for intervention in foreign politics”.[70] The
following year his pamphlet “Russia” (1836) advocated “peace,
economy, and a moral ascendancy over brute violence”.[71]

Cobden’s support for peace and noninterventionist policies was directly linked
to his advocacy of free trade. He argued that the economic, cultural, and political
power of the aristocracy was a key element in the pursuit of wars and the acquisition
of colonies, which were a drain on national resources and benefited only a
few. This landed/military alliance was a precursor to the industrial-military
complex identified by Eisenhower in 1961.[72] Cobden suggested that instead
national greatness should be gained through the power of trade:

Cobden considered that the pursuit of free trade would promote peace by transforming
the national government, releasing the mass of the people from the excessive
levels of taxation necessary for the pursuit of military adventures. However,
he also considered international free-trade policies would cause states to
become dependant on each other, writing,

England has by the magic of her
machinery, united for ever two remote hemispheres
in the bonds of peace, by placing European and American in absolute and inextricable
dependence on each other.[74]

In an important speech delivered to the House of Commons on June 28, 1850,
as a response to a motion of confidence in Palmerston’s foreign policy, Cobden
made direct connections between his economic and international policies:

I believe the progress of freedom depends more on the maintenance of peace
and the spread of commerce and the diffusion of education than upon the labour
of Cabinets or Foreign Offices. And if you can prevent those perturbations
which have recently taken place abroad in consequence of your foreign policy,
and if you will leave other nations in greater tranquillity, those ideas of
freedom will continue to progress, and you need not trouble yourselves about
them.[75]

Thus, Cobden was not advocating a policy of isolationism; rather, he saw the
pursuit of international trade as a positive method of intervening in the internal
affairs of other nations, a policy that would ultimately lead to freedom and
peace.

David Nicholls has carefully charted Cobden’s contribution to the Peace Congress
Movement, arguing that his ideology of international cooperation changed policy
towards an emphasis on international arbitration and treaties as means of resolving
disputes.[76]

In the short-term the Congress movement may be regarded as a failure. The
Crimean War turned public opinion against the peace campaigners, and both Cobden
and Bright lost their seats in Parliament in the 1857 general election. The
last of the organizing committees of the Congress Movement was dissolved in
1859. However, Cobden remained pragmatic, strategic, and tactical, committed
to a longer view. He understood that the constituency that had supported the
repeal of the Corn Laws would not necessarily back the peace movement, writing:
“It would be about as rational to argue that the tree which has yielded a good
crop of oranges must be able to give you some apples also.”[77] He did not lobby for free trade to be an intrinsic element of the Congress
program, realizing that its inclusion would alienate many supporters. He gave
equal weight to the moral and the economic aspects of his strategy.

In the decade before his death he was instrumental in negotiating the Anglo-French
trade treaty of 1860, which averted the danger of a panic-fed war, and argued
against British intervention in the American Civil War.

Notwithstanding the short-term failures of Cobden’s peace program, are his
ideas of any consequence for later periods? The verdict of many modern scholars
is that what is termed the “Trade-Conflict Nexus” does lead to greater peace
and prosperity. Thus, the international economist Solomon Polachek argued that
countries with the greatest levels of economic trade have the lowest amounts
of hostility, and this is measurable. On average, a doubling of trade leads
to a 20 percent reduction in hostility between countries.[78] The
links Cobden made between the moral and economic aspect of a peace policy have
also been employed successfully by many pressure groups for peace in the 150
years since his death.

Endnotes

[70.] The
quotation comes from Cobden's Preface (p. vi) to the 1835 edition of England,
Ireland, and America which was not included in the 1903 edition which we have
online in HTML. The 1835 edition is only available in PDF format </titles/2650>.

[75.]Speeches
on Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden, M.P., ed. by John Bright and
J.E. Thorold Rogers with a Preface and Appreciation by J.E. Thorold Rogers
and an Appreciation by Goldwin Smith (London: T.Fisher Unwin, 1908). 2
volumes in 1. Vol. 2 War, Peace, and Reform. Speech in the House of Commons
(June 28, 1850) </titles/931#Cobden_0129.02_315>.

Anthony Howe’s justified cautionary note in relation to the somewhat negative
tone of earlier contributions is well-timed and calls for further explanatory
comment. Clearly, by his role in the successful anti-Corn Law campaign Cobden
had much to live up to in later campaigns. The failure of many of the causes
he advocated cannot be attributed solely to Cobden, just as the success of
Corn Law repeal was not his alone. With the possible exception of the 1849
“National Budget,” which was primarily his own work, Cobden was only one member
of many movements which had a highly variegated membership, and it was often
the case that others assumed a leading role. Movements for financial reform
and parliamentary reform were highly complex and involved a clash of a wide
range of ideas and interests. Education was the classic example where the competing
claims of the Established Church, Dissent, and secularism were only the most
obvious fault lines in a fractious issue. Moreover, reform agitation surrounding
these movements reflected this complexity inasmuch as the varied proposals
and recommendations did not lend themselves to an easy or convenient identification
of interests which encompassed a wider socioeconomic critique.

In terms of my previous comment regarding the extent of support for the League,
I would add a qualification in the sense that a simple head count of the population
with a majority in favor of repeal would not, given the political culture of
the 1840s, have automatically justified or legitimized repeal. Despite the
1832 Reform Act, Britain was a very long way from a democratic model whereby
parliamentary representatives acted as quasi-delegates and whose votes in the
House of Commons were merely a reflection of public opinion in their constituencies.

In 1817, George Canning had stated:

When I am told that the House of Commons is not sufficiently identified
with the people, to catch their every nascent wish and to act upon their
every transient impression, — that it is not the immediate, passive, unreasoning
organ of popular volition, — I answer, thank God that it is not! I answer,
that according to no principle of our constitution, was it ever meant to
be so; — and that it never pretended to be so, nor ever can pretend to be
so, without bringing ruin and misery upon the kingdom.[79]

By 1846 the position was not substantially different. Despite a small number
of resignations by MPs whose opinions conflicted with majority opinion in their
constituencies, the trustee model of representative democracy famously outlined
by Edmund Burke on 3 November 1774 in his Speech to the Electors of Bristol remained
dominant.

Burke said:

Parliament is not a Congress of Ambassadors from different and hostile interests;
which interests each must maintain, as an Agent and Advocate, against other
Agents and Advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative Assembly of one Nation,
with one Interest, that of the whole; where, not local Purposes, not local
Prejudices ought to guide, but the general Good, resulting from the general
Reason of the whole. You chuse [sic] a Member indeed; but when you have chosen
him he is not Member of Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament.[80]

Schonhardt-Bailey has demonstrated how League activity, institutional reform,
and changing economic interests at the constituency level were important variables
influencing policy preferences in parliamentary votes on repeal.[81] Even
if there was clearly no automatic mechanism for translating constituency opinion
into parliamentary votes, bringing pressure to bear within constituencies and
keeping the question alive was still vitally important. By utilizing a range
of propaganda devices and instruments, the League’s “multimedia” approach,
in speech, text, and illustration, was innovative in popularizing repeal, but
quantifying its impact is extremely difficult. [See below for two examples
of illustrations (45-46) conceived by Cobden for use by the ACLL.] In defending
free trade from fair traders in the 1800s and Tariff Reformers in the 1900s,
free traders adopted largely the same propagandist instruments and devices.
However, aided by technological advances, the expansion of the press, and the
growth of political democracy, late 19th-century and early 20th-century free
traders arguably reached a wider and more-informed audience than had been possible
in the 1840s.

Yet, while
free trade was highly influential in British political culture well into the
20th century, it was never unanimously accepted. Dissenters from free-trade
policies and the worldview they represented were fairly consistent in advocating
an alternative conceptual framework for the role of commerce within the State.
While protectionism languished in mid-Victorian Britain, the emergence of historical
economists counterposing a “national” economic policy to the internationalism
of free trade provided some theoretical ballast, vibrancy, and respectability.
Nevertheless, the theoretical dominance of free-trade ideas is very apparent
when we consider that Friedrich List’s National
System of Political Economy was not translated into English until 1885,
over 40 years after it was first published and circulated widely in Continental
Europe.[82]

As we have seen, by the 20th century Free Trade was under threat from a more
coherent collectivism and a more powerful rights-based socialist labor movement.
Arguments for free trade were modulated and adjusted commensurately with these
changes in political culture.[83] The
economic case for free trade, on the basis of individual liberty, natural justice,
and economic efficiency, was increasingly supplemented by a politically neutral
consumerism for the benefit of working-class opinion. In the short-term the
success of this approach led socialists to lament the consumer psychology which
had subverted proletarian class consciousness. Theodore Rothstein described
the shift from militant proletarian to petit bourgeois as characterized by
workers’ interest “not so much in the income as in the expenditure side of
his budget.”[84]

The social contract with the Victorian state, based on the primacy of the
citizen-consumer and embodying a political guarantee of working-class material
welfare, proved to be powerful in securing working-class support. The continuity
of free-trade principles and the policy instruments it contained made it theoretically
and practically mutable, and able to serve as the basis for liberal social
democracy in the early 20th century.[85]

Cobden’s influence in
this transformation was not lost on contemporaries. As one organ of provincial
liberalism stated in the centenary year of his birth:

Were there no fiscal
revival to stimulate interest in his life and work he would nevertheless continue
a living force, persisting powerfully in numerous directions.[86]

By 2004, with the passage of time and the revolution and reconfiguration of
modern political ideas, appreciation of the political importance of Cobden
was more the province of academics than of the popular press or popular political
culture. While press comment in 2004 was limited (though not completely absent),
it was the bicentenary essays in Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism,
edited by Anthony Howe and Simon Morgan (2006), which has revived interest
in the man and illustrated the contemporary relevance of his ideas.[87]

Illustration 45: Page 1 from a Letter from Cobden
republished in Jane's The Hungry Forties (1904) showing him
working on ACLL designs for anti-protectionist imagery↩

Illustration 46: Page 2 from a Letter from Cobden
republished in Jane's The Hungry Forties (1904) showing him
working on ACLL designs for anti-protectionist imagery↩

Richard Cobden's sketches for images of
loaves of bread and sugar cones to show how free trade provides bigger
ones and protection smaller ones. Possibly drawn to be used in ACLL propaganda.

[80.] Burke's
Speech to the Electors of Bristol (3 November 1774) in Mr Edmund Burke’s
Speeches at His Arrival at Bristol: and at the Conclusion of the Poll.
(London: J. Dodsley, 1775), pp 28-29 ; and Select Works of Edmund Burke.
A New Imprint of the Payne Edition. Foreword and Biographical Note by Francis
Canavan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 4. "Mr. Edmund Burke’s
Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (3 Nov., 1774) </titles/659#Burke_0005-04_80>.

[82.] Friedrich
List's protectionist work National System of Political Economy was published
in Stuttgart in 1841 with a second revised edition in 1844. It was translated
into French in 1851 by Henri Richelot who was head of the Ministry of Commerce.
It was first translated into English in 1856 in Philadelphia, with a London
edition appearing in 1885. The 1909 edition of the London translation can be
found on the OLL </titles/315>.

The comments by the other participants in this conversation contain so many
interesting points that I hardly know where to begin in reacting as well as
making further points of my own. As such I will highlight what I see as the
most important or insightful points, but this should not be taken to mean that
other parts of what they have said are not worthy of attention.

I agree with Anthony Howe that perhaps in our focus upon the question of why
it proved hard in several cases to repeat the success of the Anti-Corn Law
campaign we adopted an excessively negative tone. What is important to remember,
as he says, is just how extraordinary the success of the campaign was, given
the obstacles it faced. It did take 10 years, as Gordon Bannerman points out,
but I suspect that informed political opinion in Cobden’s own time would have
thought it impossible that it would ever succeed. The many images and texts
that David Hart has incorporated[88] remind us of just how varied and extensive
the propaganda and activities of the League were. We are in need of a proper
comparative study of 19th- and early 20th-century campaigns and pressure groups
(Patricia Hollis’s edited collection[89] is still the best work on this) which
would show, I suspect, that the League employed a far more varied range of
techniques than most other campaigns.

One interesting comparison is with Irish nationalism. If we compare Cobden’s
campaign with the movement to repeal the Act of Union led by his contemporary
(and ally) Daniel O’Connell, what becomes clear is the way that the latter
was focused very closely on politics, with huge mass meetings the primary activity.
The same point can be made a fortiori about Chartism or later Irish nationalism
in the age of Parnell. All of these movements were about pressuring the political
class to take certain measures, but beyond that, to mobilize a large group
(the Irish or manual workers) so that they could gain political power. Both
of these were present in the free trade campaign, particularly the former of
course, but they were combined with something that was incidental in the contrasting
movements, even Chartism. This was what Gordon Bannerman and Sarah Richardson
allude to (particularly in the discussion of Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey’s work)
– a deliberate effort to shape public culture and outlook. This has much more
profound and long-lasting effects arguably than political action and is much
more likely to succeed, particularly when compared to an attempt to alter not
just a particular government but the entire political regime. Unfortunately
the kind of politics that Michael Davitt or Parnell practiced has a persistent
fascination for the radical mind when the kind of cultural or institution-building
politics of Cobden and others has more chance of lasting effect.

One particular point made by Anthony Howe is the way Cobden successfully brought
about a radical shift in the popular perspective, from a focus on the interests
of producers to those of consumers. This of course was strongly contested,
and the idea that production takes place in order to create jobs rather than
to produce goods for consumption is still very popular. However, polls and
other tests of opinion in the United Kingdom repeatedly show that the majority
of the British public continues to take the consumer-oriented position. This
is a simple change of thinking and perspective that has profound and extensive
consequences. The interesting contrast is with the United States, where producerist
arguments continue to have enormous popular purchase and there is an entire
genre of popular economic writing that calls for protection and other measures
to boost production at the expense of consumption. There is no counterpart
to this in the United Kingdom.

One interesting question that Gordon Bannerman raises is that of Cobden’s
view of international relations. Put simply, what would he make of supranationalism
of the kind represented by the United Nations and other institutions and the
growth of a body of international law in the form of binding treaties and covenants.
This is a controversial topic, with some authors such as Razeen Sally[90] arguing
that this kind of development is very much the realization of Cobden’s ideas.
I personally disagree strongly with that. In my view the model of international
relations that Cobden and many of his contemporaries espoused was very different,
with two important elements not found in current internationalist thinking.
The first was the idea that a stable order of commonly shared principles and
rules would grow up piecemeal from the bottom up through repeated resort to
arbitration and plebiscites to settle disputes between states. This is critically
different from the top down model of sovereign states (particularly the great
powers) acting to impose an order on the world. In particular the content of
the emergent world order was not prescribed for Cobden or derived from abstract
principles; it was rather something that would emerge or be discovered. The
second was the idea found in the writings of several of his contemporaries
(notably French liberals such as Charles Dunoyer)
and which Cobden himself alluded to, that of the “municipalization of the world.”
This was the idea that as society progressed, large territorial states and
empires would be replaced by a multiplicity of small self-governing communities
organized collectively in voluntary confederations or leagues. In a speech
Cobden gave in Manchester on January 15, 1846 he states:

I see in the Free-trade principle
that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation
in the universe,—drawing men together, thrusting
aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and language, and uniting us in the
bonds of eternal peace. I have looked even farther. I have speculated, and
probably dreamt, in the dim future—ay, a thousand years hence—I have speculated
on what the effect of the triumph of this principle may be. I believe that
the effect will be to change the face of the world, so as to introduce a system
of government entirely distinct from that which now prevails. I believe that
the desire and the motive for large and mighty empires; for gigantic armies
and great navies—for those materials which are used for the destruction of
life and the desolation of the rewards of labour—will die away; I believe that
such things will cease to be necessary, or to be used, when man becomes one
family, and freely exchanges the fruits of his labour with his brother man.
I believe that, if we could be allowed to reappear on this sublunary scene,
we should see, at a far distant period, the governing system of this world
revert to something like the municipal system; and I believe that the speculative
philosopher of a thousand years hence will date the greatest revolution that
ever happened in the world's history from the triumph of the principle which
we have met here to advocate.[91]

This is relevant for a point made by Sarah Richardson. She mentions Cobden’s
involvement in the Peace Congress movement, as examined by my former colleague
David Nicholls. This was indeed much more successful and had a greater impact
at the time and subsequently than we realize. One important part of this whole
movement, which Cobden supported although it was most associated with his ally
Joseph Sturge, was the notion of “peoples diplomacy.” This meant developing
what we would now call civil-society connections between the inhabitants of
different states, direct personal contacts and links between ordinary people
as opposed to formal diplomatic relations between governments. (One reason
for this was the explicit belief that diplomats reflected the interests of
ruling classes rather than ordinary people.) This kind of activity, as Sarah
points out, did indeed bring about significant shifts in outlook. Unfortunately
the later 19th and very early 20th centuries saw a sudden revival of the idea
that relations between different national groups were zero-sum competitions
and that war was actually a good, particularly as a character-building exercise.
This strikes most people today as simply bonkers, but it became an important
part of both elite and popular culture by the 1890s and 1900s.

An important point that Gordon Bannerman makes is the enduring resistance
to free trade and the later revival of economic nationalism. He mentions the
crucial figure in this process, Friedrich List. As he says, List’s ides did
not have an impact in Britain until a comparatively late date. In fact when
List’s book The
National System of Political Economy was first published in 1841, it
had little success, and when he took his own life in 1846 due his having
a terminal illness, he probably thought it had completely failed. It was,
however, always popular in the United States (where he had actually formed
his theories under the influence of people such as Henry Charles Carey[92])
and was translated into English there as early as 1856. However, the real
breakthrough for List happened after 1870, particularly of course in his native
Germany. In the United States the last third of the 19th century saw a robust
debate between supporters of List’s approach and advocates of free trade associated
with the so-called Bourbon Democrats (such as Grover Cleveland) and the Mugwump
faction of the Republicans. A key role in this was played by a network of
Cobden Clubs as grassroots advocates of the free-trade position. In 1896,
however, the protectionist side gained a crushing and decisive victory.
Meanwhile in Britain, there was a challenge to Cobden’s legacy with the appearance
of the historical approach to economics by people such as William Cunningham.
All this came to a head with the great debate over tariff reform between
1902 and 1906.[93] Both
sides, as Gordon points out, employed the methods pioneered by Cobden in the
1840s but with much greater reach. The result at the time was a decisive victory
for the free-trade side, even greater than the contrary outcome in the United
States in 1896.

Left: The Free Trade shop is full of goods(note the size of the 4 d.
loaf of bread) and customers are lined up to buy things.
Right: The Protection shop is shabby, with few goods in the window (note
the small size of the 4 d. loaf of bread) which are more expensive; a
government official with a large "Rates" book under his arm
is lecturing the shopkeeper.

One final point is that of how to assess current technological developments
and whether they make the kind of cultural politics Cobden pioneered more or
less likely. I think it is fair to say that Sarah and I are more optimistic,
Gordon less so. I think that Sarah and I would emphasize the mobilizing and
connecting potential of social media and other developments, while Gordon is
more struck by the frivolous and often ill-tempered and splenetic side of phenomena
such as Twitter conversations. Certainly it can seem that all that social media
have done so far is to provide a megaphone for popular ignorance and bile.
However, what it also does is allow opportunity for the correcting and often
the shaming or ridiculing of that ignorance (as we have seen a splendid example
of recently in the case of the Fox
News “terrorism expert” who thought that
Birmingham was a majority Muslim city [94]). Clearly we will have to wait
and see which of these perceptions is more correct. But I remain hopeful.

[90.]Razeen
Sally, Classical Liberalism and International Order. Routledge, London 1998.

[91.] Cobden's
quote comes from Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden,
M.P., (1908), Vol. 1 Free Trade and Finance. Free Trade Speech XX. (Manchester,
Jan. 15, 1846) </titles/927#Cobden_0129.01_579>.
Charles Dunoyer (1786-1862) was a lawyer, social theorist, and president of
the Political Economy Society. He wrote two books during the 1820s in which
he showed how America provided the model for how liberty and industrialism
would “municipaliser le monde” (municipalize the world). By this he meant that
as industrial societies advanced, they would reach a point where all large
political structures would break down into smaller municipalities of self-governing
cities and their hinterlands. See, Charles Dunoyer, L'Industrie et la morale
considérées dans leurs rapports avec la liberté (Paris: A. Sautelet et Cie,
1825), p. 366-7, fn 1.

[92.] Henry
Charles Carey (1793-1879) was an American economist who was a strong critic
of British free trade policies and a supporter of Alexander Hamilton's "American
system" of high tariffs and government funded public works ("internal
improvements"). His main works were Principles of Political Economy,
in 4 vols. (Philadelphia: Carely, Lea & Blanchard, 1837-1840), and The
Harmony of Interests: Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Commercial (Philadelphia:
J.S. Skinner, 1851).

One aspect of Cobden’s success was his ability to present himself equally
effectively as the Manchester Manufacturer or the Sussex Yeoman Farmer. This
dual identity enabled him to be all things to all men: the cotton merchant
campaigning for free trade or the rural agriculturalist urging land reform.

In his earliest pamphlets, Cobden wrote anonymously as A Manchester Manufacturer,
using these credentials to speak authoritatively on aspects of economic and
foreign policy. As the “Manchester School,” he worked effectively with radical
business leaders, including John Bright, Archibald Prentice, Edward Miall,
and J. B. Smith. The term “Manchester School” was actually coined by Cobden’s
arch enemy, Benjamin Disraeli, who in a mocking speech to Parliament in 1846
accused the repealers of a naïve belief that other nations would sign up to
commercial free-trade treaties :

I
want to ask the right hon. Gentleman a very important question—does he
believe that he can fight hostile tariffs with free imports? That is the
point. ["Hear!"] "Hear,
hear," from the disciples of the school of Manchester! A most
consistent cheer! They have always maintained they can; and if their principles
are right, as they believe they are—as I believe they are not—I can easily
understand, that their premises being assumed, they may arrive at that conclusion.
They believe they can fight hostile tariffs with free imports, and they tell
us very justly, “Let us take care of our imports, and every thing else will
take care of itself.”[95]

According to William Dyer Grampp, who wrote a key monograph, The Manchester
School of Economics, Cobden was pleased with the nomenclature and apparently
liked to term himself and John Bright as “professors”
of the school.[96] Manchester
too remained loyal to Cobden and the Manchester School. The Free Trade Hall
was built on land donated by Cobden in St Peter’s Fields, Manchester between
1853 and 1856. Its name keeping the policy firmly in the minds of the population
of the city. A statue to Cobden was also erected in St Ann’s Square, Manchester
funded by public subscription. The surplus was given to educational causes
including funding a Chair of Political Economy at Owens College (later the
University of Manchester). The statue was unveiled in 1867 with great pomp,
attended by leading northern Liberals, although a notable absence was John
Bright. Among the banners and artefacts there were two imitations loaves of
bread: a larger one inscribed with the message ‘Free Trade’ and a smaller one
entitled ‘Protection’.

However, as Cobden’s political interests moved away from repeal towards issues
such as land reform, he drew on his early boyhood experience living on (and
losing) the family farm at Heyshott in Sussex. Anthony Howe demonstrates how
his move back to rural Sussex in 1850 enlightened him to the backwardness and
feudal nature of rural society, citing this letter written by Cobden to Brougham:

I have frequently asked myself, whilst perambulating the Duke of Richmond’s
villages, -- in what do these peasants differ from their Saxon forefathers?
-- The range of their ideas is about the same; bounded by their daily occupations,
which have not much varied in a thousand years. – Their knowledge of the world
does not extend much beyond their own parish. -- No light penetrates their
mind beyond their hamlets.[97]

However, Anthony Taylor argues that Cobden was reinvented as a great land-reform
crusader by his brother-in-law, James Thorold Rogers, in the years after his
death.[98] This
reworking of Cobden’s identity as a Sussex yeoman rather than a Manchester
businessman was aided by Cobden’s daughters. An article in the Daily Chronicle in 1904 based on conversations with Annie Cobden-Sanderson
and Kate Cobden Fisher emphasizes that he was first and foremost a friend and
advocate of the rural peasantry:

One of Cobden’s most striking characteristics was his antagonism to the feudal
class as it survived in his day. He believed that the only class which possessed
sufficient wealth and influence to counteract the feudal spirit was the great
manufacturers and merchants of England. Mrs. Cobden-Sanderson supplied an interesting
gloss on this point. “It was,” she said, “living in the country and knowing
so much of the lives of the people there that made him understand what feudalism
meant.”[99]

Kate Fisher recollected,

He came into the country rather for rest. He loved the country. He was always
particularly fond of the South Downs, and he loved all the life of Nature.
He liked to watch how the crops were coming on and to visit the farmyard –
he loved all the animals; and then he was always glad to talk to the labourers
at their work on the farm or on the roads; indeed he was interested in everybody
around him or whom he met.

The country, of course, was much more Conservative then than it is now; but
there was an old tenant farmer who had such a great admiration for my father
-- both for himself and for what he had done in giving the people cheap bread
-- that, after my father’s death, he had a little obelisk erected to his memory,
which is still standing in West Lavington. It was a brave thing at that time
for a man to do who was only a tenant farmer….[100]

In 1880, Cobden’s daughter Jane donated a cottage to Heyshott village to establish
a Cobden Club, one of the first rural working men’s clubs in England. The Cobden
Club Hall moved to a new building in the twentieth century and the original
was converted to a private cottage. His daughters then, were instrumental in
re-inventing their father as the champion of rural labourers, to keep his legacy
relevant for future generations.

Cobden was a consummate politician and propagandist. His ability to flip identities
from urban industrialist to rural landowner was surely part of his success.

Illustration 58: Richard Cobden Obelisk 1, Cocking
Causeway (1868)

Cobden lived at Dunford House a mile from where this obelisk was erected
in 1868 in his honor (he died in 1865). It was commissioned by H.Y. Court
(1868), and the stonemason was J.S. Grist.

Endnotes

[96.] William
Dyer Grampp, The Manchester School of Economics (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1960). </titles/2128#Grampp_1445_21>.
Note: Grampp wrongly states that Disraeli’s speech was delivered in 1848.

[97.] Cited
in Howe, p. 84. Howe, A. “The ‘Manchester School’ and the Landlords: The Failure
of Land Reform in Early Victorian Britain,” 74-91 in Cragoe and Readman.

Stephen Davies’s excellent summary of the conversation offers much food for
thought. The conversation has ranged far and wide in exploring, explaining,
and defining Cobden’s influence in time and space. The multifaceted influence
and relevance of Cobden’s ideas has been very apparent. The centrality of the
League campaign is entirely understandable and justifiable but should not of
course blind us to Cobden’s long-term international influence, and the longevity
and continuing relevance of his ideas. The domestic influence of Cobdenite
ideas was indeed great, and the growth of consumer-related politics as the
primary theme of free-trade agitation in a more democratic age, with a mass
of working-class consumers and voters, was long-lived, despite coming to a
rather abrupt end.

While clearly an important figure in forging new and
more effective modes of political agitation, perhaps Cobden’s most lasting
achievement was in creating an intellectual outlook that linked domestic commercial
policy, antimilitarism, and international commercial cooperation, which ultimately
offered a vision of a better future for humanity. For Cobden international
free trade should lead to a transformation in the conduct of diplomacy and
foreign policy, from being the province of diplomats and politicians to that
of communities, merchants, and traders. Cobden’s internationalist outlook,
as described by Stephen Davies, was of a world where there would be an international
community sharing common principles and values, and which possessed a broad
agreement on arbitration, conciliation, and the peaceful settling of international
disputes.

The practicality of these ideas was questioned even by Cobden’s admirers.
For example Goldwin Smith claimed that Cobden had succumbed to his own enthusiasm:

Hardly
any mind can escape the bias of its history. Cobden’s had no doubt constructed
a bias, and a serious one, from the Free Trade struggle. Absolutely free from
any sordid sentiment, from any disposition to believe that man lives by bread
alone, from any conscious preference of material over moral and political consideration,
yet he was inclined to overrate the beneficent power of commercial influences,
and consequently the value of commercial objects.[101]

Nevertheless,
elements of Cobdenite thought remain in the international policy space, and
free trade has generally retained its positive connotations despite attacks
from the modern “fair-trade” movement. Of course, while many politicians pay
lip-service to the moralistic and ethical aspects of free trade, in practice,
the implementation of the policy, or the extent of its application, is largely
dictated by national “vital interests.” Clearly, this “politicking” would not
be approved by Cobden, for as he famously stated on 28 June 1850:

I believe
the progress of freedom depends more upon the maintenance of peace, the spread
of commerce, and the diffusion of education than upon the labours of Cabinets
or Foreign-offices.[102]

While we are very far from having established this state of affairs in foreign
relations, it remains a noble aspiration. Yet somewhat ironically, the desire
to sustain local economies and small producers, underpinned by ethical and
moral imperatives, in a “fair” global commercial environment has resulted in
broad-based attacks by NGOs and anticapitalist protesters against open markets
and globalization.[103] Popular
protest has been supplemented by the loss of academic and theoretical hegemony,
with the complexity of the international economy making the modern case for
free trade appear, according to Razeen Sally, as “too narrow and mechanical”
and even “a little unreal.”[104]

It
is certainly true that a particularly interesting aspect of the conversation
has been the contemporary as well as historical relevance of many of Cobden’s
ideas. Perhaps new social media will more easily allow the transmission of
Cobdenite ideas as well as other radical ideas to reach a wider audience with
far less effort than Cobden had to exert. While it seems unlikely that the
mere existence of social media can lead to a greater interest in politics or
political ideas, it can certainly supplement a popular movement and create
something of a community of interest. In that respect, I am not so far away
from the more optimistic position of Sarah Richardson and Stephen Davies.

Endnotes

[102.] Cobden,
"Speech in the House of Commons (June 28,
1850),"
Speeches on Questions of Public Policy, vol. 2, 228 </titles/931#Cobden_0129.02_315>. For speeches
on this theme see: Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden,
M.P., ed. by John Bright and J.E. Thorold Rogers with a Preface and Appreciation
by J.E. Thorold Rogers and an Appreciation by Goldwin Smith (London: T.Fisher
Unwin, 1908). 2 volumes in 1. Vol. 2 War, Peace, and Reform.

Amongst the many interesting
points in this conversation, two may be worth elaborating further, the timing
and degree of popular support for free trade and Cobden’s understanding of
internationalism and people’s diplomacy.

On the first, while Gordon Bannerman is right to set limits to the Anti-Corn
Law League’s working-class following, as he also shows, free-trade values permeated
popular consciousness, as was seen in the degree of support from trade unions
by the 1860s, the cult of Cobden after his death, and the many ways in which,
as Sarah Richardson has shown, his legacy was reaffirmed by his daughters.
Here we should not forget the huge impact of Jane Cobden-Unwin’s The Hungry
Forties (1904), which also contains interesting reminders of Cobden’s
Sussex rural radicalism. Hence as Ross McKibbin concluded in a celebrated article,
“The free trade fiscal system had, before 1914, an ideological value for the
working class far beyond any conceivable socialist doctrine.” [105] Here,
too, as Stephen Davies rightly notes, most British workers (including agricultural
ones) saw themselves as consumers, in contrast to the producers’ rhetoric in
the United States.[106] This
suggests that rather than comparing the League with later British reform movements
we might compare it with the activities of groups such as the American Free
Trade League, and compare Cobden with the aspiring “Cobden of America,” David
Wells.[107] This also reveals the extent to which Cobden or the Cobden Club became
an object of suspicion within the rhetoric of Anglophobic economic nationalism
in the United States.[108] One
elderly American once contacted me to recall that in his youth he had been
a member of the “Anti-Cobden Club” in Philadelphia. For Cobden himself I would
argue that free trade was an essential part of emancipating the people – that
tariffs represented “interests” battening on popular welfare, and that with
their removal, the “natural order” would be restored, all in line with his
desire to popularize Smithian economics.

More difficult to achieve was the alignment
of foreign policy with what might be deemed people’s diplomacy. Cobden was
suspicious of congresses of nations because in his day they would have reinforced
the power of existing, mostly reactionary, states. Hence, as Davies points
out, Cobden wanted to maximize connections between peoples at all levels,
as seen, for example, in his approval of the visit of over 2000 French male
singers to the Crystal Palace in 1860: “If the relations between the two
countries depended only on the conduct of the peoples towards each
other I should have no fear;- their instincts alone & force of natures
laws would keep them at peace.” [109]

However, this spontaneous peacefulness was vitiated in his view by the
John Bullish instincts aroused by Palmerstonian diplomacy. Cobden wrestled
with the question as to whether wars were genuinely or artificially popular
and by the 1860s came optimistically to believe that with greater democracy
in Britain, war would become less popular, an early expression of the view
that democracy favored peace.[110] What
remains unclear in Cobden’s thought is whether future international bodies
might have been deemed to represent the collective peoples’ will – arguably
a Gladstonian-style Concert of Europe did promise this. Likewise, avid Cobdenites
like Sir Louis Mallet favored an international body to determine tariffs, surely
a route to the WTO. Here, too, while I think Stephen Davies is right to link
Cobden to the “municipalization of the world” in the 1830s and 1840s, I would
suggest his ideas changed after 1848, that he came to recognize more strongly
the force of nationalism and therefore became a pioneer of “inter-nationalism,”
the building of ties between nations which became a feature of the 1860s.[111] Here,
too, Gordon Bannerman is right to stress democratic accountability of foreign
policy, which became a hallmark of the Cobdenite tradition, with which a U.S.
vote over Syria in 2013 would have accorded precisely; oddly the Cobdenite
echoes here seem to have gone unnoticed in public debate.

In trade and foreign policy, therefore,
Cobden’s concern was that government should reflect the will of the governed,
a view he traced back to the 18th-century “Friends of America.” How far this
pertains to the present day is more difficult to judge – can social media and
the blogosphere reinforce democracy or not? Cobden himself, however, we can
be sure valued highly active citizenship, independent judgement, and the maximum
of political information, although he did not of course live to see the age
of Victorian two-party representative government.

One final note, in terms
of Cobden’s views on government and peoples, this conversation has largely
omitted Cobden’s anti-imperial views, surely a major area of his legacy in
late-19th- and early-20th-century Britain (and certainly one his daughters
enthusiastically took up).

Endnotes

[105.] McKibbin,
R. “Why Was There No Marxism in Great Britain?,” English Historical Review 99
(1984),
p. 322.

[107.] DMH:
The American Free Trade League was founded in 1864 by the lawyer Simon Sterne
(1839-1901) and the economist and statistician Alexander del Mar (1836–1926)
and included among its membership the economist Arthur Latham Perry (1830-1905),
the New York politician Horace White (1865-1943), the engineer and economist
David Ames Wells (1828-1898), and the essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882).
Related to this were regional groups such as The New York Free-Trade Club
which was founded in 1878 and seems to have been quite active, publishing a
magazine called The Free-Trader, and books like William Graham Sumner's Lectures
on the History of Protection in the United States. Delivered before the International
Free-Trade Alliance (New York: Published for the New York Free Trade Club
by G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1883). The engineer and economist David Ames Wells (1828-1898)
wrote many pamphlets for the League as well as an important article on "Free
Trade" for Lalor's Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political
Economy, and of the Political History of the United States (1899).
The French economist and friend and colleague of Bastiat, Gustave de Molinari
(1819-1912), wrote the article on "Protection" (based
upon his article on "Tariffs" in the Dictionnaire de l'économie
politique (1853-54)
; and David H. Mason wrote the lengthy pro-protectionist article "Protection
in the United States" .

As all the participants in this conversation have noted, the
influence of the Anti-Corn Law League on the political consciousness of the
British nation was of long duration. As Anthony Howe argues, the idea that
taxes on food imports deleteriously impacted on the welfare of the nation was
increasingly accepted. Although the League failed to attract mass working-class
support, it did succeed in effecting a fundamental shift in the political psychology
of workers and in identifying free trade as a vital national interest for an
expanding industrial and commercial economy. Over time, working-class opposition
to protective duties (and perhaps less enthusiastically, support for free trade)
became more pronounced. However, alongside the political opinion of the respectable
and politically aware working class, we must set the opinion of those in late-Victorian
and early Edwardian Britain who thought little of politics. In August 1903
a walking tour of Britain intended to gauge opinion on the tariff reform issue
concluded:

Above all, the wearisome lack of interest or monotonous opposition to the
food taxes as they are known universally throughout the land by the working
classes is evident.[112]

It would have taken
and indeed ultimately did take a great crisis to effect a paradigm shift of
sufficient magnitude to sever the association between protective duties and
high food prices.

The power of the League’s propaganda in forging that association
in the public mind was evident, not least and perhaps especially, among its
opponents. In the 1880s, the fair-trade campaign, in attempting to counter
the “big loaf” arguments of free traders, tried to turn the tables by portraying
“The Free Trade Loaf” as one-third home-grown, two-thirds foreign-grown, with
factories running short time and men out of work. By contrast “The Fair Trade
Loaf” was all grown within the Empire, with secure return markets for manufactures,
and factories running full-time with plenty of work.[113] Interestingly
enough, a placard featured in a drawing was inscribed, “independent of the
world,” thus indicating a concern with self-sufficiency, a vintage autarkic
pro-Corn Law argument.[114] By
contesting anti-corn law discourse and motifs, fair traders, although subverting
the original message, perhaps did little more than propagate that message and
bolster the association in the public mind between protective duties and high
food prices.

Illustration 51: Thackeray, Illustrations Of The
Rent Laws II, "The Choice of a Loaf" (1839)

Certainly,
among the political classes, in a more democratic age, adopting food taxes
was considered socially and politically dangerous. Even sympathizers like
Lord Randolph Churchill held the view that:

Low prices in the necessaries of
life and political stability in a democratic Constitution are practically inseparable,
and that high prices in the necessaries of life and political instability in
a democratic Constitution are also practically inseparable.[115]

Fair
trade struggled to create an identity clearly distinguishable from older forms
of protectionism. As Platt has argued, while the movement sought to construct
a “national” commercial policy based on protection for domestic industries
and imperial preference, “its misfortune was that it became popularly identified
with a return to the discredited Protectionism which had ended effectively
with the Repeal of the Corn Laws.”[116]

The imperial link was increasingly
important in 19th-century politics and political discourse. Clearly Anthony
Howe is correct to point to anti-imperialism as something not only submerged
within this conversation but also perhaps an understated element in Cobdenite
historiography. As well as opposing the protectionist regulatory framework
of preferential tariffs, Cobden’s anti-imperialism was closely linked to support
for retrenchment in government expenditure, opposition to the growth of militarism,
and the rapid and alarming acceleration in Britain’s acquisition of colonial
territories.

Anti-imperialism was a pervasive though often subordinate element
of his political thought. Early in his career, in a letter of 29 April 1837,
he informed William Tait of his thoughts on Britain’s Mediterranean colonies:

Upon
Gibraltar I shall give my opinion that it would be best for the English nation
to destroy the fortifications; & give up this barren rock to the
Spaniards in consideration of a commercial treaty—Upon the subject of Malta
I would also advocate the demolition of the fortifications, & the policy
of making the island a free port governed by its own people—The Ionian Islands
ought not, & must not be suffered, to cost the English a penny—what use
are they to us”?[117]

By referencing national self-determination, representative
democracy, financial retrenchment, and commercial cooperation, this critique
neatly incorporated many important strands in Cobden’s radical anti-imperialism.
After Cobden’s death in 1865, the empire assumed greater prominence in British
politics. Disraeli was not alone in considering colonial territories as “millstones,”
but later in the 19th century Disraeli’s brand of Toryism was increasingly
superseded by a more aggressive and modern Conservatism which promoted tighter
imperial institutional, political, and commercial links.

While fair trade promoted
the linkages between tariffs, military power, and empire, these elements were
more coherently bound together and displayed more overtly and vigorously in
Joseph Chamberlain’s tariff-reform movement. The struggle between “formal”
empire, imperial expansion, territorial annexations, and Cobden’s belief in
commerce as a great civilizing force had of course a long lineage. The 1850s
had been a particularly tumultuous decade, when Cobden’s vision of a new, peaceful
form of international relations based on commercial activity rather than diplomatic
and military alliances and rivalries foundered and was continually undermined
by colonial wars and territorial expansion in India and China, and war in the
Crimea. For
Cobden’s consideration of retribution for “imperial crimes,” see this passage
from his 1853 pamphlet How
Wars are got up in India:

But it is not consistent with the supremacy of that moral law which mysteriously
sways the fate of empires, as well as of individuals, that deeds of violence,
fraud, and injustice, should be committed with permanent profit and advantage.
If wrongs are perpetrated in the name, and by the authority, of this great
country, by its proconsuls or naval commanders in distant quarters of the globe,
it is not by throwing the flimsy veil of a “double government” over such transactions
that we shall ultimately escape the penalty attaching to deeds for which we
are really responsible. How, or when, the retribution will re-act upon us,
I presume not to say. The rapine in Mexico and Peru was retaliated upon Spain
in the ruin of her finances. In France, the razzias of Algeria were repaid
by her own troops, in the massacres of the Boulevards, and the savage combats
in the streets of Paris. Let us hope that the national conscience, which has
before averted from England, by timely atonement and reparation, the punishment
due for imperial crimes, will be roused ere it be too late from its lethargy,
and put an end to the deeds of violence and injustice which have marked every
step of our progress in India. [118]

Imperial and military rivalry meant maintaining a high level of military preparedness.
How far Cobden was opposing “official” opinion on peace, international relations,
and foreign policy can be seen by reference to the historical trajectory of
the mindset of those responsible for British foreign policy. On 14 April 1749,
Lord Barrington stated: “Sir, it is a maxim with all wise and well-governed
nations, in time of peace, to provide for war.”[119] Over
one hundred years later, on 11 March 1861, Viscount Palmerston speaking amidst
the threat of war with France stated:

I
am really sorry to be discussing the possibility of feelings of hostility between two countries that, I hope, will long remain friends; but it is with
the object of impressing on the House and on the country that there is no possibility
of peace and friendship between two wealthy and powerful nations unless each
is on such a footing as to its defences that neither may invite attack by the
other.[120]

This type of language was depressingly familiar to Cobden
and reflected the war-like, defensive, and suspicious propensities of the political
elite, fueled by aristocratic political control of the State. Despite his period
of political isolation, Cobden’s return to activity and in negotiating the
1860 Anglo-French treaty validated his belief in commerce as a force for international
peace. While this process was diplomatic and political rather being based on
purer notions of free exchange between peoples, it did offer a way forward.
Cobden saw it mainly as a means of avoiding war, but in personal terms, perhaps
his involvement represented a new realism based on the practicalities of working
within the diplomatic parameters of the international state system.

We have
seen how Cobden’s political ideas remain influential, albeit operating in a
very different political context from that of mid-Victorian Britain. Moreover,
Cobden’s influence is likely to endure for some time yet. The complexities
of global trade, and the struggle for open markets against regulatory restrictions
like quotas and subsidies, as well as the continually contested area of ethical
foreign policies mean there is much scope for further exploration of Cobdenite
ideas. Elements of Cobden’s thought are likely to remain within the policy
space and may well inform or at least be a point of reference for policymakers
in the future.

Reading the exchanges among Stephen Davies, Anthony Howe, Gordon Bannerman,
and me over the past weeks, I have been struck at how modern Cobden’s
ideas and campaigning strategies appear.

A fine example of this is his connections with the revolutionary campaign
to reform the postal system in the 1830s, led by Rowland Hill and supported
by reformers such as Henry Cole, Francis Place, and Robert Wallace. Cobden
read Hill’s detailed analysis of the deficiencies of the existing postal system
and his utilitarian solutions: Post Office Reform: Its Importance and Practicability (1837).[121] He gave evidence to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Postage as a representative
of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. In his evidence he stressed the ineffectiveness
of the current system, stating that when he traveled between Manchester and
Liverpool he carried pocketfuls of correspondence with him because of the expense
and cumbersome nature of the post. He also argued the existing rate of postage
was a tax on the poor, effectively excluding them from an essential means of
communication and impeding the spread of education. Finally, he emphasized
the moral benefits of cheap and simple mass communication. Whilst we should
not doubt Cobden’s commitment for post reform on the grounds of moral, intellectual,
and commercial improvement, there is no doubt that he also realized the political
benefits. In a letter to his ally Charles Pelham Villiers in 1840 he wrote:

We shall radicalise the country in the process of carrying the repeal of the
Corn Law, and we are effecting such an organisation by means of the penny-postage
(that destined scourge of the aristocracy) that we shall, by and by, be able
to carry any measure of a popular nature by a coup de billet.[122]

The Anti-Corn Law League harnessed the power of the new penny post, sending
out millions of pamphlets, newspapers, and magazines and even designing their
own prepaid stamped envelopes. Cobden estimated that the Corn Laws were repealed
two years early because of the introduction of the penny post.

Illustration 32: Illustrated envelopes with ACLL imagery

These are two examples of elaborately
illustrated envelopes which supporters of free trade could purchase to
both take advantage of the new penny post and make their political views
known to the recipient of their mail.
Above: At the bottom centre is a globe with a sash on which is written "Free
Trade". To the left is a female figure pointing to some cargo which
will be soon loaded onto the ship behind her; to the right is another female
figure who is holding a hand scythe used to harvest grain, behind her is
a field with a wheat sheaf and a windmill.
Below: This is a simpler design with ears of wheat forming a border around
the envelope. At the top and bottom centre are the words "Free Trade."

Bless yourself that you lived in times when reform bills, steamboats, railroads,
penny postage, and free trade, to say nothing of ratification of civil and
religious liberties, have been possible facts.[123]

There is no doubt that Cobden embraced the revolutionary new technologies
of his time, identifying their potential for democratization and mass education.
I like to think he would have been equally excited by the opportunities offered
by tweets, text messages, and Tumblr blogs.

Richard Cobden, What Next and Next? (London: James Ridgway, 1856). </titles/2652>

Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by Richard Cobden, M.P., ed. by
John Bright and J.E. Thorold Rogers with a Preface and Appreciation by J.E.
Thorold Rogers and an Appreciation by Goldwin Smith (London: T. Fisher
Unwin, 1908). 2 volumes in 1.

Cobden, Richard. 1878. The Political Writings of Richard
Cobden.
London: William Ridgway.

The Political Writings of Richard Cobden, with a Preface by Lord Welby,
Introductions by Sir Louis Mallet, C.B., and William Cullen Bryant, Notes
by F.W. Chesson and a Bibliography, 2 vols. (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903). </titles/173>.

Works by Jane Cobden

Jane Cobden, The Hungry Forties: Life under the Bread Tax. Descriptive
Letters and other Testimonies from contemporary Witnesses, with and Introduction
by Mrs. Cobden Unwin. Illustrated (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904).

Jane Cobden, The Land Hunger: Life under Monopoly. Descriptive Letters
and other Testimonies from those who have suffered, with an Introduction
by Mrs. Cobden Unwin and an Essay by Brougham Villiers (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913).

Works published by The National Anti-Corn Law League

The gold embossed leather cover of The
Three Prize Essays on Agriculture and the Corn Law (and other
writings) (Manchester: J. Gadsby, 1842). The first prize was 20 guineas,
2nd prize 10 guineas, 3rd prize 5 guineas. The first half of the book
(118 pp.) contained the three prize winning essays with the rest being
made up of a selection of other ACLL literature. [See below for a more
detailed image of the cover illustration.]

The collection of essays was designed
to be given away to prospective supporters in large numbers (4 pence).
Inside the cover one could inscribe the copy to a particular person.
The accompanying illustation has a globe surrounded by the motto "Free
Trade with All the World." There is a sheaf of wheat at the top;
2 cornucopias at the bottom above a picture of a factory, a ship, and
sacks of wheat and a plough.

National Anti-Corn Law League, The Three Prize Essays on Agriculture and
the Corn Law. Published by the National Anti-Corn Law League (Manchester:
J. Gadsby, 1842). </titles/2653>.

[National Anti-Corn Law League]. 1842. The Anti-Bread Tax Almanack for
the Year of our Lord 1842. Manchester: J. Gadsby.

The National Anti-Corn Law League, The League. The Exponent of the Principles
of Free Trade, and the Organ of the National Anti-Corn-Law League (London:
Published at the Office, 67, Fleet Street, 1845). </titles/2092>.
The organ of the National Anti-Corn-Law League was based in London and appeared
between 1843 and 1846. It closed when the League achieved its goal of abolishing
the Corn Laws in 1846. These PDF files are from a poor quality micro-film copy
of the journal.

Burke's Speech to the Electors of Bristol (3 November 1774) in Mr Edmund
Burke’s Speeches at His Arrival at Bristol: and at the Conclusion of the
Poll. (London: J. Dodsley, 1775), pp 28-29 ; and Select Works of
Edmund Burke. A New Imprint of the Payne Edition. Foreword and Biographical
Note by Francis Canavan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). Vol. 4. "Mr.
Edmund Burke’s Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (3 Nov., 1774) </titles/659#Burke_0005-04_80>.

[George Canning], Poetry of the anti-Jacobin: comprising the celebrated
political & satirical
poems, parodies and jeux-d'esprit of the Right Hon. George Canning, the Earl
of Liverpool, Marquis Wellesley, the Right Hon. J. H. Frere, G. Ellis, esq.,
W. Gifford, esq., and others. New and Revised Edition, with Explanatory
Notes. (London: G. Willis, 1852).

Hirst, F. W. ed., Free Trade and Other Fundamental Doctrines of the Manchester
School. Set Forth in Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Its Founders
and Followers. Harper and Brothers, 1903. London. </titles/94>.

Thomas Hodgskin, A Lecture on Free Trade, in connexion with the Corn Laws;
delivered at the White Conduit House, on January 31, 1843 (London: G.J.
Palmer, 1843). 1/7/2015. </titles/321>.

Lalor's Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the
Political History of the United States by the best American and European
Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899).
3 vols.

Georg Friedrich List, National system of political economy, tr. by G.A. Matile,
including the notes of the Fr. tr. by H. Richelot, with a prelim. essay and
notes by S. Colwell (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1856).

Condy Raguet, The Principles of Free Trade illustrated in a series of
short and familiar Essays originally published in the Banner of the Constitution,
2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1840). </titles/raguet-the-principles-of-free-trade>.

David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817)
in The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo,
ed. Piero Sraffa with the Collaboration of M.H. Dobb (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, 2005). Vol. 1. </titles/113#Ricardo_0687-01_454>.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
by Adam Smith, edited with an Introduction, Notes, Marginal Summary and an
Enlarged Index by Edwin Cannan (London: Methuen, 1904). 2 vols. </titles/171>.

William Graham Sumner, Lectures on the History of Protection in the United
States. Delivered before the International Free-Trade Alliance (New
York: Published for the New York Free Trade Club by G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1883).