Sunday, June 3, 2018

Three Prospective Reforms Likely to Hurt Putin with His Political Base in the Population

Paul
Goble

Staunton, June 3 – Vladimir Putin
has the coercive resources and elite support to remain in office regardless of
whether the population supports or deserts him, but at least some of his power
depends on his ability to mobilize his base which consists of government
employees, industrial workers, and especially pensioners.

At present, three reforms, driven by
technology, the economic crisis and demography, are moving forward that have
the potential to anger members of some of the most pro-Putin groups in the
population, opening the way at least potentially for opposition leaders to generate
support for themselves against the Kremlin.

First, according to Audit chief
Aleksey Kudrin, roughly a third of all Russian government officials will lose
their jobs over the next six years given the need to improve efficiency and the
ability to do so by relying on technological innovations like computerization (ura.news/news/1052337001).

Given the enormous size of the
bureaucracy in Russia, those who lose their positions and those who fear they
might constitute a large segment of the population, one which including their
family members could number in the millions. In the past, Putin has been able
to count on their near unanimous support. If this reform goes forward, he
probably won’t have that luxury.

Second, if the Russian economy is
going to recover and move beyond its reliance on the export of raw materials,
it will need to close down a large number of ineffective factories both in the
so-called “company towns” and elsewhere. At a minimum, that would disrupt the
lives of many workers; and at a maximum, it could lead to a significant jump in
unemployment (krizis-kopilka.ru/archives/52971).

But unless those factories are
closed, they will remain a burden on the economy even though they are
politically useful because they employ another group of millions of people, who
have counted on Putin to keep the plants open and their jobs in place. If that
changes, some of them are likely to question their support.

And third, it is already clear that
pensioners are going to take a double hit. On the one hand, as has already
attracted much comment, the government intends to raise retirement ages
reflecting budgetary stringencies and the somewhat longer life expectancies of
Russian employees.

On the other – and
this has so far attracted far less attention – the pensions Russians are
getting and will get are equal to a far smaller share of their working-age incomes
than was true in the past. In Soviet times, pensions were close to 50 percent
of working-age incomes; now they are about 20 percent and falling (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5B137B0B45B91).

This combination means that fewer
Russians will get pensions and that those who do will get less money than they
had expected and be pushed closer to poverty levels than ever before.It is difficult to see how such pensioners will
remain enthusiastic supporters of the Russian government and behind it the Kremlin
leader responsible for these changes.