Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

Ive got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasnt really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I dont believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

Im wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isnt possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their digital phone terminal has been compromised though it isnt connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I donât remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

Iâve got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasnât really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I donât believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

Iâm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isnât possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their âdigitalâ phone terminal has been compromised though it isnât connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

The feature set doesnât imply that CBAC is configured correctly. Check your outside ACL and since youâre only using MGCP, you can use the link below to disable SIP processing (most likely your culprit, probably a calling card company that scans for open routers). You should also disable H323 as well. To see if the router has the firewall running, issue a show ip inspect sessions. The command I was thinking of earlier is âshow control-plan host open-portsâ, which do a netstat type listing on the router.

The router is on the Internet, is configured for MGCP and has ip advanced services with the firewall feature enabled (for VPN and nat). Wouldn't that block external connections?

On Jan 7, 2009, at 9:48 PM, "Ryan West" <rwest [at] zyedge<mailto:rwest [at] zyedge>> wrote: If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I donât remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

Iâve got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasnât really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I donât believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

Iâm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isnât possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their âdigitalâ phone terminal has been compromised though it isnât connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

I had this happen as well to a CME router which the customer connected to the Internet and the router also had a PRI from the local telco. Customer had put in a public ip on the router exposing it to the Internet as they wanted to do an IPSEC tunnel as well. After investigation it was discovered that some one was using SIP port on the router and running a script to call numbers in CUBA and all calls were a minute call. We put in an ACL to block SIP and H.323 on the router to stop this. I believe someone is using SIP port (5060) from the Internet and making calls through your FXO line.

Aman

On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 10:31 AM, Ryan West <rwest [at] zyedge> wrote:

> The feature set doesn't imply that CBAC is configured correctly. Check > your outside ACL and since you're only using MGCP, you can use the link > below to disable SIP processing (most likely your culprit, probably a > calling card company that scans for open routers). You should also disable > H323 as well. To see if the router has the firewall running, issue a show > ip inspect sessions. The command I was thinking of earlier is 'show > control-plan host open-ports', which do a netstat type listing on the > router. > > > > Hope that helps. > > > > -ryan > > > > *From:* Corbett Enders [mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi] > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:56 > *To:* Ryan West > *Cc:* Ahmed Elnagar; VOIP Group > > *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > > > The router is on the Internet, is configured for MGCP and has ip advanced > services with the firewall feature enabled (for VPN and nat). Wouldn't that > block external connections? > > > On Jan 7, 2009, at 9:48 PM, "Ryan West" <rwest [at] zyedge> wrote: > > If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP > UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some > versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable > default SIP and H323 processing: > > > > > https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_(SIP)_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router > > -ryan > > > > *From:* cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck [ > mailto:cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck<cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck>] > *On Behalf Of *Ahmed Elnagar > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:13 > *To:* cenders [at] homesbyavi > *Cc:* VOIP Group > *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > > > > Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in > Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from > the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this > amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never > exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 > which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt. > > After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was > configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP > address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the > strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to > H323 side which relay the call to the PRI. > > I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP > at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call > that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will > leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned... > > During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming > calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the > morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this > site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so > we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some > problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random > numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to > discussions with the teleco to solve this problem. > > I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed > bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls > maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show > commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or > so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it. > > Good luck with this strange issue. > > Thanks, > Ahmed Elnagar > > > > ------------------------------ > > From: cenders [at] homesbyavi > To: cisco-voip [at] puck > Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2009 20:26:56 -0700 > Subject: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > Hello List, > > > > I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days > in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for > SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't > really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls > to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not > dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration > from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen > right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between > calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half > until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line. > > > > The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the > SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax > machine. > > > > At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has > been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have > a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I > indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI > in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port. > > > > Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of > the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be > able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and > leave out our FXO port in our site. > > > > I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system > could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is > actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). > I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it > isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old > school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical > line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long > time making these crazy calls. > > > > I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can > provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000. > > > > Regards, > > Corbett Enders. > > > > *Corbett Enders* > > Network Manager > Homes by Avi - 2007 Canadian Builder of the Year. > Tel: (403) 536-7170 > Fax: (403) 536-7171 > www.homesbyavi.com > > > > > ------------------------------ > > check out the rest of the Windows Live. More than mailWindows Live goes > way beyond your inbox. More than messages<http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowslive/> > > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com> Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.4/1880 - Release Date: 1/7/2009 > 8:49 AM > > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > cisco-voip [at] puck > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> >

> I had this happen as well to a CME router which the customer connected to > the Internet and the router also had a PRI from the local telco. Customer > had put in a public ip on the router exposing it to the Internet as they > wanted to do an IPSEC tunnel as well. After investigation it was discovered > that some one was using SIP port on the router and running a script to call > numbers in CUBA and all calls were a minute call. We put in an ACL to block > SIP and H.323 on the router to stop this. I believe someone is using SIP > port (5060) from the Internet and making calls through your FXO line. > > > Aman > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 10:31 AM, Ryan West <rwest [at] zyedge> wrote: > >> The feature set doesn't imply that CBAC is configured correctly. Check >> your outside ACL and since you're only using MGCP, you can use the link >> below to disable SIP processing (most likely your culprit, probably a >> calling card company that scans for open routers). You should also disable >> H323 as well. To see if the router has the firewall running, issue a show >> ip inspect sessions. The command I was thinking of earlier is 'show >> control-plan host open-ports', which do a netstat type listing on the >> router. >> >> >> >> Hope that helps. >> >> >> >> -ryan >> >> >> >> *From:* Corbett Enders [mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi] >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:56 >> *To:* Ryan West >> *Cc:* Ahmed Elnagar; VOIP Group >> >> *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read >> >> >> >> The router is on the Internet, is configured for MGCP and has ip advanced >> services with the firewall feature enabled (for VPN and nat). Wouldn't that >> block external connections? >> >> >> On Jan 7, 2009, at 9:48 PM, "Ryan West" <rwest [at] zyedge> wrote: >> >> If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP >> UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some >> versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable >> default SIP and H323 processing: >> >> >> >> >> https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_(SIP)_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router<https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_%28SIP%29_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router> >> >> -ryan >> >> >> >> *From:* cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck [ >> mailto:cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck<cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck>] >> *On Behalf Of *Ahmed Elnagar >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:13 >> *To:* cenders [at] homesbyavi >> *Cc:* VOIP Group >> *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read >> >> >> >> >> Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in >> Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from >> the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this >> amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never >> exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 >> which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt. >> >> After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was >> configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP >> address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the >> strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to >> H323 side which relay the call to the PRI. >> >> I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP >> at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call >> that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will >> leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned... >> >> During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming >> calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the >> morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this >> site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so >> we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some >> problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random >> numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to >> discussions with the teleco to solve this problem. >> >> I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed >> bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls >> maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show >> commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or >> so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it. >> >> Good luck with this strange issue. >> >> Thanks, >> Ahmed Elnagar >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> From: cenders [at] homesbyavi >> To: cisco-voip [at] puck >> Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2009 20:26:56 -0700 >> Subject: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read >> >> Hello List, >> >> >> >> I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days >> in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for >> SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't >> really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls >> to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not >> dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration >> from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen >> right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between >> calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half >> until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line. >> >> >> >> The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to >> the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog >> fax machine. >> >> >> >> At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has >> been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have >> a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I >> indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI >> in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port. >> >> >> >> Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of >> the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be >> able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and >> leave out our FXO port in our site. >> >> >> >> I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system >> could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is >> actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). >> I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it >> isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old >> school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical >> line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long >> time making these crazy calls. >> >> >> >> I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can >> provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000. >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Corbett Enders. >> >> >> >> *Corbett Enders* >> >> Network Manager >> Homes by Avi - 2007 Canadian Builder of the Year. >> Tel: (403) 536-7170 >> Fax: (403) 536-7171 >> www.homesbyavi.com >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> check out the rest of the Windows Liveâ˘. More than mailâWindows Liveâ˘ goes >> way beyond your inbox. More than messages<http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowslive/> >> >> No virus found in this incoming message. >> Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com>> Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.4/1880 - Release Date: 1/7/2009 >> 8:49 AM >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> cisco-voip mailing list >> cisco-voip [at] puck >> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip>> >> > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > cisco-voip [at] puck > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> >

I was planning to send Cisco a letter complaining about the fact that these 'features' are enabled by default on an ISR which is positioned as the platform that does everything (in this case being a voip gateway and internet router). I would like to hear other thoughts about this as well.

In my view, opening a TAC case would be of lesser use. Better send a letter to John Chambers or the like of him.

Stefan

On Thu, Jan 08, 2009 at 10:39:34AM +0100, Nicolas wrote: > Does someone open a TAC at Cisco to talk aout it ? > What Cisco say about that ? > > Nicolas > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 6:16 AM, Aman Chugh <aman.chugh [at] gmail> wrote: > > > I had this happen as well to a CME router which the customer connected to > > the Internet and the router also had a PRI from the local telco. Customer > > had put in a public ip on the router exposing it to the Internet as they > > wanted to do an IPSEC tunnel as well. After investigation it was discovered > > that some one was using SIP port on the router and running a script to call > > numbers in CUBA and all calls were a minute call. We put in an ACL to block > > SIP and H.323 on the router to stop this. I believe someone is using SIP > > port (5060) from the Internet and making calls through your FXO line. > > > > > > Aman > > > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 10:31 AM, Ryan West <rwest [at] zyedge> wrote: > > > >> The feature set doesn't imply that CBAC is configured correctly. Check > >> your outside ACL and since you're only using MGCP, you can use the link > >> below to disable SIP processing (most likely your culprit, probably a > >> calling card company that scans for open routers). You should also disable > >> H323 as well. To see if the router has the firewall running, issue a show > >> ip inspect sessions. The command I was thinking of earlier is 'show > >> control-plan host open-ports', which do a netstat type listing on the > >> router. > >> > >> > >> > >> Hope that helps. > >> > >> > >> > >> -ryan > >> > >> > >> > >> *From:* Corbett Enders [mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi] > >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:56 > >> *To:* Ryan West > >> *Cc:* Ahmed Elnagar; VOIP Group > >> > >> *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > >> > >> > >> > >> The router is on the Internet, is configured for MGCP and has ip advanced > >> services with the firewall feature enabled (for VPN and nat). Wouldn't that > >> block external connections? > >> > >> > >> On Jan 7, 2009, at 9:48 PM, "Ryan West" <rwest [at] zyedge> wrote: > >> > >> If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP > >> UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some > >> versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable > >> default SIP and H323 processing: > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_(SIP)_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router<https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_%28SIP%29_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router> > >> > >> -ryan > >> > >> > >> > >> *From:* cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck [ > >> mailto:cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck<cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck>] > >> *On Behalf Of *Ahmed Elnagar > >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:13 > >> *To:* cenders [at] homesbyavi > >> *Cc:* VOIP Group > >> *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in > >> Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from > >> the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this > >> amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never > >> exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 > >> which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt. > >> > >> After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was > >> configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP > >> address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the > >> strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to > >> H323 side which relay the call to the PRI. > >> > >> I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP > >> at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call > >> that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will > >> leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned... > >> > >> During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming > >> calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the > >> morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this > >> site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so > >> we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some > >> problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random > >> numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to > >> discussions with the teleco to solve this problem. > >> > >> I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed > >> bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls > >> maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show > >> commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or > >> so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it. > >> > >> Good luck with this strange issue. > >> > >> Thanks, > >> Ahmed Elnagar > >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> From: cenders [at] homesbyavi > >> To: cisco-voip [at] puck > >> Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2009 20:26:56 -0700 > >> Subject: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > >> > >> Hello List, > >> > >> > >> > >> I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days > >> in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for > >> SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't > >> really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls > >> to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not > >> dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration > >> from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen > >> right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between > >> calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half > >> until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line. > >> > >> > >> > >> The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to > >> the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog > >> fax machine. > >> > >> > >> > >> At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has > >> been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have > >> a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I > >> indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI > >> in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port. > >> > >> > >> > >> Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of > >> the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be > >> able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and > >> leave out our FXO port in our site. > >> > >> > >> > >> I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system > >> could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is > >> actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). > >> I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it > >> isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old > >> school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical > >> line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long > >> time making these crazy calls. > >> > >> > >> > >> I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can > >> provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000. > >> > >> > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> Corbett Enders. > >> > >> > >> > >> *Corbett Enders* > >> > >> Network Manager > >> Homes by Avi - 2007 Canadian Builder of the Year. > >> Tel: (403) 536-7170 > >> Fax: (403) 536-7171 > >> www.homesbyavi.com > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> check out the rest of the Windows Live?. More than mail?Windows Live? goes > >> way beyond your inbox. More than messages<http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowslive/> > >> > >> No virus found in this incoming message. > >> Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com> >> Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.4/1880 - Release Date: 1/7/2009 > >> 8:49 AM > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> cisco-voip mailing list > >> cisco-voip [at] puck > >> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> >> > >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > > cisco-voip mailing list > > cisco-voip [at] puck > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> > > > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > cisco-voip [at] puck > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip

and this has been going on for years now. I think the keyword here is ignorance.

Even as as an afterthought I do agree with Cisco (that ACLs, firewalls should be put in place etc.) I still cannot accept, that this is a sane default.

Anyway. You'll see a bunch of angry rants every time someone pops up this question, then nothing.

regards, Zoltan Kelemen

Nicolas wrote: > Does someone open a TAC at Cisco to talk aout it ? > What Cisco say about that ? > > Nicolas > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 6:16 AM, Aman Chugh <aman.chugh [at] gmail > <mailto:aman.chugh [at] gmail>> wrote: > > I had this happen as well to a CME router which the customer > connected to the Internet and the router also had a PRI from the > local telco. Customer had put in a public ip on the router > exposing it to the Internet as they wanted to do an IPSEC tunnel > as well. After investigation it was discovered that some one was > using SIP port on the router and running a script to call numbers > in CUBA and all calls were a minute call. We put in an ACL to > block SIP and H.323 on the router to stop this. I believe someone > is using SIP port (5060) from the Internet and making calls > through your FXO line. > > > Aman > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 10:31 AM, Ryan West <rwest [at] zyedge > <mailto:rwest [at] zyedge>> wrote: > > The feature set doesn't imply that CBAC is configured > correctly. Check your outside ACL and since you're only using > MGCP, you can use the link below to disable SIP processing > (most likely your culprit, probably a calling card company > that scans for open routers). You should also disable H323 as > well. To see if the router has the firewall running, issue a > show ip inspect sessions. The command I was thinking of > earlier is 'show control-plan host open-ports', which do a > netstat type listing on the router. > > > > Hope that helps. > > > > -ryan > > > > *From:* Corbett Enders [mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi > <mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi>] > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:56 > *To:* Ryan West > *Cc:* Ahmed Elnagar; VOIP Group > > *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > > > The router is on the Internet, is configured for MGCP and has > ip advanced services with the firewall feature enabled (for > VPN and nat). Wouldn't that block external connections? > > > On Jan 7, 2009, at 9:48 PM, "Ryan West" <rwest [at] zyedge > <mailto:rwest [at] zyedge>> wrote: > > If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 > TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't > remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code > it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable > default SIP and H323 processing: > > > > https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_(SIP)_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router > <https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_%28SIP%29_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router> > > -ryan > > > > *From:* cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck > <mailto:cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck> > [mailto:cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck] *On Behalf Of > *Ahmed Elnagar > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:13 > *To:* cenders [at] homesbyavi <mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi> > *Cc:* VOIP Group > *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > > > > Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I > have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and > informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ > for a period of 3 months and they never produce this > amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and > the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers > happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl > prefix here in Egypt. > > After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the > gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the > internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that > is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing > is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it > to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI. > > I did the following to ensure that it will not happen > again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted > the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the > gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will > leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the > problem contiuned... > > During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot > of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local > number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this > number and he told us that he know no one in this site and > he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco > too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the > CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating > calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange > thing I know but till now this company still going to > discussions with the teleco to solve this problem. > > I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and > have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare > these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help > you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands > "there is some tools that can automate show command every > 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and > what is the source of it. > > Good luck with this strange issue. > > Thanks, > Ahmed Elnagar > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > From: cenders [at] homesbyavi <mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi> > To: cisco-voip [at] puck > <mailto:cisco-voip [at] puck> > Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2009 20:26:56 -0700 > Subject: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > Hello List, > > > > I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course > of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS > line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded > to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a > pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of > repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the > dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of > sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from > 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call > would happen right away and other times there would be > several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to > occur over the course of about a day and a half until the > POTS provider called us and we blocked the line. > > > > The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is > connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router > and also connects to the analog fax machine. > > > > At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the > 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to > route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on > an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I > indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would > leave through our PRI in the main office, through the > phone line on the FXO port. > > > > Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password > for the console of the router, I don't believe that person > sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to > connect from their computer, through the Internet, and > leave out our FXO port in our site. > > > > I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as > to how the system could have been compromise or if it just > isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line > provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel > that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised > though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One > other possibility is old school phone phreaking where > someone has actually tapped into the physical line but > they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a > very long time making these crazy calls. > > > > I look forward to any insight the collective brain power > of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over > $6000. > > > > Regards, > > Corbett Enders. > > > > *Corbett Enders* > > Network Manager > Homes by Avi - 2007 Canadian Builder of the Year. > Tel: (403) 536-7170 > Fax: (403) 536-7171 > www.homesbyavi.com <http://www.homesbyavi.com/> > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > check out the rest of the Windows Liveâ˘. More than > mailâWindows Liveâ˘ goes way beyond your inbox. More than > messages <http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowslive/> > > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/> > Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.4/1880 - Release > Date: 1/7/2009 8:49 AM > > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > > cisco-voip [at] puck <mailto:cisco-voip [at] puck> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> > > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > cisco-voip [at] puck <mailto:cisco-voip [at] puck> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > cisco-voip [at] puck > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip>

and this has been going on for years now. I think the keyword here is ignorance.

Even as as an afterthought I do agree with Cisco (that ACLs, firewalls should be put in place etc.) I still cannot accept, that this is a sane default.

Anyway. You'll see a bunch of angry rants every time someone pops up this question, then nothing.

regards, Zoltan Kelemen

Nicolas wrote: > Does someone open a TAC at Cisco to talk aout it ? > What Cisco say about that ? > > Nicolas > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 6:16 AM, Aman Chugh <aman.chugh [at] gmail > <mailto:aman.chugh [at] gmail>> wrote: > > I had this happen as well to a CME router which the customer > connected to the Internet and the router also had a PRI from the > local telco. Customer had put in a public ip on the router > exposing it to the Internet as they wanted to do an IPSEC tunnel > as well. After investigation it was discovered that some one was > using SIP port on the router and running a script to call numbers > in CUBA and all calls were a minute call. We put in an ACL to > block SIP and H.323 on the router to stop this. I believe someone > is using SIP port (5060) from the Internet and making calls > through your FXO line. > > > Aman > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 10:31 AM, Ryan West <rwest [at] zyedge > <mailto:rwest [at] zyedge>> wrote: > > The feature set doesn't imply that CBAC is configured > correctly. Check your outside ACL and since you're only using > MGCP, you can use the link below to disable SIP processing > (most likely your culprit, probably a calling card company > that scans for open routers). You should also disable H323 as > well. To see if the router has the firewall running, issue a > show ip inspect sessions. The command I was thinking of > earlier is 'show control-plan host open-ports', which do a > netstat type listing on the router. > > > > Hope that helps. > > > > -ryan > > > > *From:* Corbett Enders [mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi > <mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi>] > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:56 > *To:* Ryan West > *Cc:* Ahmed Elnagar; VOIP Group > > *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > > > The router is on the Internet, is configured for MGCP and has > ip advanced services with the firewall feature enabled (for > VPN and nat). Wouldn't that block external connections? > > > On Jan 7, 2009, at 9:48 PM, "Ryan West" <rwest [at] zyedge > <mailto:rwest [at] zyedge>> wrote: > > If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 > TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't > remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code > it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable > default SIP and H323 processing: > > > > https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_(SIP)_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router > <https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_%28SIP%29_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router> > > -ryan > > > > *From:* cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck > <mailto:cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck> > [mailto:cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck] *On Behalf Of > *Ahmed Elnagar > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:13 > *To:* cenders [at] homesbyavi <mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi> > *Cc:* VOIP Group > *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > > > > Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I > have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and > informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ > for a period of 3 months and they never produce this > amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and > the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers > happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl > prefix here in Egypt. > > After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the > gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the > internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that > is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing > is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it > to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI. > > I did the following to ensure that it will not happen > again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted > the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the > gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will > leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the > problem contiuned... > > During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot > of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local > number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this > number and he told us that he know no one in this site and > he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco > too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the > CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating > calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange > thing I know but till now this company still going to > discussions with the teleco to solve this problem. > > I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and > have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare > these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help > you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands > "there is some tools that can automate show command every > 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and > what is the source of it. > > Good luck with this strange issue. > > Thanks, > Ahmed Elnagar > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > From: cenders [at] homesbyavi <mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi> > To: cisco-voip [at] puck > <mailto:cisco-voip [at] puck> > Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2009 20:26:56 -0700 > Subject: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > > Hello List, > > > > I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course > of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS > line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded > to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a > pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of > repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the > dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of > sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from > 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call > would happen right away and other times there would be > several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to > occur over the course of about a day and a half until the > POTS provider called us and we blocked the line. > > > > The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is > connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router > and also connects to the analog fax machine. > > > > At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the > 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to > route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on > an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I > indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would > leave through our PRI in the main office, through the > phone line on the FXO port. > > > > Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password > for the console of the router, I don't believe that person > sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to > connect from their computer, through the Internet, and > leave out our FXO port in our site. > > > > I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as > to how the system could have been compromise or if it just > isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line > provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel > that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised > though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One > other possibility is old school phone phreaking where > someone has actually tapped into the physical line but > they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a > very long time making these crazy calls. > > > > I look forward to any insight the collective brain power > of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over > $6000. > > > > Regards, > > Corbett Enders. > > > > *Corbett Enders* > > Network Manager > Homes by Avi - 2007 Canadian Builder of the Year. > Tel: (403) 536-7170 > Fax: (403) 536-7171 > www.homesbyavi.com <http://www.homesbyavi.com/> > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > check out the rest of the Windows Liveâ˘. More than > mailâWindows Liveâ˘ goes way beyond your inbox. More than > messages <http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowslive/> > > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/> > Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.4/1880 - Release > Date: 1/7/2009 8:49 AM > > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > > cisco-voip [at] puck <mailto:cisco-voip [at] puck> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> > > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > cisco-voip [at] puck <mailto:cisco-voip [at] puck> > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > cisco-voip [at] puck > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip>

Reminds me of a time when Windows 2000 server was shipped with EVERYTHING turned on by default (IIS, etc). And here today we have Windows 2008 which boots up with NOTHING enabled. Probably something Cisco should start doing.

I was planning to send Cisco a letter complaining about the fact that these 'features' are enabled by default on an ISR which is positioned as the platform that does everything (in this case being a voip gateway and internet router). I would like to hear other thoughts about this as well.

In my view, opening a TAC case would be of lesser use. Better send a letter to John Chambers or the like of him.

Stefan

On Thu, Jan 08, 2009 at 10:39:34AM +0100, Nicolas wrote: > Does someone open a TAC at Cisco to talk aout it ? > What Cisco say about that ? > > Nicolas > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 6:16 AM, Aman Chugh <aman.chugh [at] gmail> wrote: > > > I had this happen as well to a CME router which the customer connected to > > the Internet and the router also had a PRI from the local telco. Customer > > had put in a public ip on the router exposing it to the Internet as they > > wanted to do an IPSEC tunnel as well. After investigation it was discovered > > that some one was using SIP port on the router and running a script to call > > numbers in CUBA and all calls were a minute call. We put in an ACL to block > > SIP and H.323 on the router to stop this. I believe someone is using SIP > > port (5060) from the Internet and making calls through your FXO line. > > > > > > Aman > > > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2009 at 10:31 AM, Ryan West <rwest [at] zyedge> wrote: > > > >> The feature set doesn't imply that CBAC is configured correctly. Check > >> your outside ACL and since you're only using MGCP, you can use the link > >> below to disable SIP processing (most likely your culprit, probably a > >> calling card company that scans for open routers). You should also disable > >> H323 as well. To see if the router has the firewall running, issue a show > >> ip inspect sessions. The command I was thinking of earlier is 'show > >> control-plan host open-ports', which do a netstat type listing on the > >> router. > >> > >> > >> > >> Hope that helps. > >> > >> > >> > >> -ryan > >> > >> > >> > >> *From:* Corbett Enders [mailto:cenders [at] homesbyavi] > >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:56 > >> *To:* Ryan West > >> *Cc:* Ahmed Elnagar; VOIP Group > >> > >> *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > >> > >> > >> > >> The router is on the Internet, is configured for MGCP and has ip advanced > >> services with the firewall feature enabled (for VPN and nat). Wouldn't that > >> block external connections? > >> > >> > >> On Jan 7, 2009, at 9:48 PM, "Ryan West" <rwest [at] zyedge> wrote: > >> > >> If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP > >> UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some > >> versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable > >> default SIP and H323 processing: > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_(SIP)_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router<https://supportwiki.cisco.com/ViewWiki/index.php/How_to_disable_H.323_and_Session_Initiation_Protocol_%28SIP%29_services_on_TCP_ports_1720_and_5060_of_a_IOS_gateway_router> > >> > >> -ryan > >> > >> > >> > >> *From:* cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck [ > >> mailto:cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck<cisco-voip-bounces [at] puck>] > >> *On Behalf Of *Ahmed Elnagar > >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 07, 2009 23:13 > >> *To:* cenders [at] homesbyavi > >> *Cc:* VOIP Group > >> *Subject:* Re: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in > >> Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from > >> the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this > >> amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never > >> exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 > >> which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt. > >> > >> After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was > >> configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP > >> address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the > >> strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to > >> H323 side which relay the call to the PRI. > >> > >> I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP > >> at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call > >> that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will > >> leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned... > >> > >> During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming > >> calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the > >> morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this > >> site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so > >> we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some > >> problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random > >> numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to > >> discussions with the teleco to solve this problem. > >> > >> I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed > >> bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls > >> maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show > >> commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or > >> so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it. > >> > >> Good luck with this strange issue. > >> > >> Thanks, > >> Ahmed Elnagar > >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> From: cenders [at] homesbyavi > >> To: cisco-voip [at] puck > >> Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2009 20:26:56 -0700 > >> Subject: [cisco-voip] Fraud calls to Cuba - Please read > >> > >> Hello List, > >> > >> > >> > >> I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days > >> in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for > >> SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't > >> really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls > >> to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not > >> dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration > >> from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen > >> right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between > >> calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half > >> until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line. > >> > >> > >> > >> The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to > >> the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog > >> fax machine. > >> > >> > >> > >> At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has > >> been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have > >> a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I > >> indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI > >> in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port. > >> > >> > >> > >> Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of > >> the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be > >> able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and > >> leave out our FXO port in our site. > >> > >> > >> > >> I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system > >> could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is > >> actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). > >> I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it > >> isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old > >> school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical > >> line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long > >> time making these crazy calls. > >> > >> > >> > >> I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can > >> provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000. > >> > >> > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> Corbett Enders. > >> > >> > >> > >> *Corbett Enders* > >> > >> Network Manager > >> Homes by Avi - 2007 Canadian Builder of the Year. > >> Tel: (403) 536-7170 > >> Fax: (403) 536-7171 > >> www.homesbyavi.com > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> check out the rest of the Windows Live?. More than mail?Windows Live? goes > >> way beyond your inbox. More than messages<http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowslive/> > >> > >> No virus found in this incoming message. > >> Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com> >> Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.4/1880 - Release Date: 1/7/2009 > >> 8:49 AM > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> cisco-voip mailing list > >> cisco-voip [at] puck > >> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> >> > >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > > cisco-voip mailing list > > cisco-voip [at] puck > > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip> > > > > _______________________________________________ > cisco-voip mailing list > cisco-voip [at] puck > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

this is very interesting information. our routers are protected from Internet with ACLs, but I'd like to run that "show sockets" command anyways. We'll eventually have to configure them to block these ports anyways.

does anyone know what that command is? i tried running "show ip sockets" but it's not available.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I donât remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

Iâve got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasnât really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I donât believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

Iâm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isnât possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their âdigitalâ phone terminal has been compromised though it isnât connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

this is very interesting information. our routers are protected from Internet with ACLs, but I'd like to run that "show sockets" command anyways. We'll eventually have to configure them to block these ports anyways.

does anyone know what that command is? i tried running "show ip sockets" but it's not available.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I donât remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

Iâve got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasnât really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I donât believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

Iâm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isnât possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their âdigitalâ phone terminal has been compromised though it isnât connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

this is very interesting information. our routers are protected from Internet with ACLs, but I'd like to run that "show sockets" command anyways. We'll eventually have to configure them to block these ports anyways.

does anyone know what that command is? i tried running "show ip sockets" but it's not available.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I donât remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

Iâve got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasnât really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I donât believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

Iâm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isnât possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their âdigitalâ phone terminal has been compromised though it isnât connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

Don't forget TCP/5060. I assist my companies fraud team from time to time in VoIP fraud, and when we find an open CME/CUBE or the like and we ask for it to be secured, most people forget that SIP can run on both UDP and TCP and they leave themselves vulnerable.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

Don't forget TCP/5060. I assist my companies fraud team from time to time in VoIP fraud, and when we find an open CME/CUBE or the like and we ask for it to be secured, most people forget that SIP can run on both UDP and TCP and they leave themselves vulnerable.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.

Not to beat a dead horse, but I thought you might find this interesting. A new customer was just turned up on my network and there were some install problems, so my team was involved into trying to find the root cause. While we were running the "debug ccsip messages", we noticed some unexpected traffic. This is on a router that has not even been on the internet for more than a day or so. It is absolutely amazing to see how fast something like this can happen. Someone doing "voip wardialing" international numbers on a brand new customer install.

Don't forget TCP/5060. I assist my companies fraud team from time to time in VoIP fraud, and when we find an open CME/CUBE or the like and we ask for it to be secured, most people forget that SIP can run on both UDP and TCP and they leave themselves vulnerable.

If the router is connected to the Internet, both H323 TCP/1720 and SIP UDP/5060 need to blocked. I don't remember the command offhand, but on some versions of code it is show ip sockets. Check this out to actually disable default SIP and H323 processing:

Wow...exaclty the same problem I had...but with PRI...I have a site in Egypt that the user called us one day and informed that he has a bill from the Teleco for 100,000$ for a period of 3 months and they never produce this amount of calls...all calls were for random numbers and the call never exceeded 1 minute and these random numbers happen to be starting with 00 which is the internationl prefix here in Egypt.

After long nights of troubleshootting...I found that the gateway was configured to register SIP phones from the internet and I found an IP address from Mexico city that is trying this random calls so frequent, the strange thing is that the gateway was accepting these calls and route it to H323 side which relay the call to the PRI.

I did the following to ensure that it will not happen again...removed SIP at all from the gateway...converted the gateway to MGCP so that every call that will pass the gateway will need signalling from Callmanager and will leave a record in the CDR. But the strange thing the problem contiuned...

During troubleshooting we noticed something strange...alot of incoming calls coming to the PRI from a certain local number...and it was 3 AM in the morning we called this number and he told us that he know no one in this site and he has a problem that he got high invoices from the Teleco too...so we come up with this conculsion...seems that the CO. equipments has some problems and it is generating calls on behalf of the user to random numbers...a strange thing I know but till now this company still going to discussions with the teleco to solve this problem.

I suggest to do the followin...try to review CDR files and have a detailed bill from your Teleco and try to compare these calls with the CDR calls maybe this would help you...also try to activate some debugs and show commands "there is some tools that can automate show command every 5 mins or so" to know exactly when these calls happen and what is the source of it.

I've got a situation with 2 remote sites. Over the course of several days in late November, somehow the analog POTS line in the site (which we use for SRST backup) proceeded to make approx 4,940 calls to Cuba. There wasn't really a pattern to the calls. It started with a couple of repeated calls to the same number and from that point, the dialed number changed (not dialed in any sort of sequential pattern either). Calls varied in duration from 0 seconds to many minutes long. Sometimes the next call would happen right away and other times there would be several minutes delay between calls. This proceeded to occur over the course of about a day and a half until the POTS provider called us and we blocked the line.

The analog line in the show home serves 2 purposes. It is connected to the SRST FXO port on the Cisco 2801 router and also connects to the analog fax machine.

At this point, the POTS provider feels that somehow the 2801 router has been compromised and is being used to route calls out the FXO port. We have a cordless phone on an ATA, and at first they felt this was the source but I indicated that any calls from the cordless phone would leave through our PRI in the main office, through the phone line on the FXO port.

Even if someone had managed to guess our admin password for the console of the router, I don't believe that person sitting on the Internet would be able to get a call to connect from their computer, through the Internet, and leave out our FXO port in our site.

I'm wondering if anyone on the list has some thoughts as to how the system could have been compromise or if it just isn't possible. The POTS line is actually a digital line provided by Shaw (a local cable/telco in Alberta). I feel that their "digital" phone terminal has been compromised though it isn't connected to the Internet in any way. One other possibility is old school phone phreaking where someone has actually tapped into the physical line but they would have been sitting outside in the cold for a very long time making these crazy calls.

I look forward to any insight the collective brain power of this list can provide. The bill for these calls is over $6000.