April 1-3 2011 in Amsterdam

WHICH SPORTS ARE MOST READILY USEFUL FOR WINCAST/SCORECAST-BETS? From where they derived its origin these methods are most widely known for his or her appearance in soccer games. But nevertheless sports are extremely well-liked with scorecasts and ( ZCode System - zcodesystemexclusive ) wincasts. E.g. In tennis you're able to bet on who wins the complete match and who wins the sport. Another great activity for all these strategies is icehockey. Should you need assist for the best the greatest matches for rating- and wincast bets..

Update:Videos of the presentations on
Saturday are now online! Please click on the respective talk's title to access the
website provided by the University of Amsterdam.

Program

Block 1: Lectures (each 45 min talk + short discussion)

To what extent are empirical and conceptual insights
concerning cognition and behavior dependent upon each other and capable
of informing each other? Is it possible to distinguish an apriori
(conceptual) and an empirical component in neuroscience research and if
so, what should their interaction amount to?

Abstract: There is a school
of
philosophers
who believe that the garden of nature should be cleaned first from the
conceptual weeds by qualified philosophers, before empirical
researchers should be allowed to enter the scene. I will defend a
different position. This is one in which, for the case of cognitive
neuroscience, knowledge on brain and cognition is strongly driven by
new research tools and methods, which provide new challenges for
conceptual analysis.

Abstract: Conceptual problems
are
the proper
province of philosophy. They cannot be resolved by empirical
investigations, for they are problems about the means of
representation, not about what is represented. Cognitive neuroscience
operates across the boundaries between neurophysiology and psychology,
the concepts of which are categorially dissimilar. Unsurprisingly the
history of the subject displays a multitude of conceptual difficulties,
which continue to this day. Analytic philosophy can contribute to the
resolution and clarification of a wide range of conceptual problems in
contemporary neuroscience. This can be readily exemplifed in the case
of neuroscientific investigations of perception.

18:00 Coffee break

Block 2: Lecture (as before) and General Discussion (max.
60
min)

Given the interest of psychology in person-level
investigations, it appears to remain closer to the apriori conceptual
analysis defended by Hacker than neuroscience does. However, has
neuroscience inspired psychologists to refer to lower levels of
explanation, taking more distance from the person-level? And has this
resulted in a re-consideration of the distinction between empirical and
conceptual analysis for psychologists?

Abstract: The enormous
success of
the
cognitive neurosciences poses a number of potentially threatening
challenges for psychology as a discipline. I will discuss several of
these challenges, such as the trend away from a mechanistic, functional
understanding of human cognition and towards theoretical reductionism
or the potential of expensive neuroscientific research to exhaust the
few financial resources that remain for funding behavioral research.
However, I will also emphasizes the importance of meeting these
challenges not the least because psychology is arguably the most
essential link between the natural sciences and the humanities. A
successful survival strategy for psychology should emphasize this
bridging potential, which among other things requires that
psychologists become more familiar with neuroscientific methodology,
including their strengths and limitations, and that they engage more in
interdisciplinary research and volatile, temporary research networks.

19:30 Discussion with the speakers and the audience,
moderated by Douwe Draaisma
(Groningen)

20:30 Reception with snacks and drinks (until approximately 22:00
oclock)

Saturday, April 2; Doelenzaal, University Library,
University
of Amsterdam, Singel 425

Background: According to the tri-level distinction
proposed by
David Marr, cognitive neuroscience research distinguishes between the
computational task/competence level, the algorithmic level, and the
neural implementation level. During this conference, presentations will
consider what neuroimaging research tells us about phenomena at these
levels and their (cor)relations. In particular, they will consider to
what extent the balance or interaction between levels has been changed
with the development of brain imaging techniques.

From the shared Nobel Prize for Ramón y Cajal and Golgi
in
1906 onwards, serious disagreements about neuroanatomy and functional
properties of neurons and their implications characterize neuroscience.
With the increase of neuroimaging experiments, precise anatomical
localization of functional activation has become more important than
ever. What are the contemporary disputes on the functioning and the
structure of the brain? Given the increasingly complexity of
neuroimaging results, are these capable of settling these disputes?

Abstract: Every mental and
emotional process is associated with localized activity in certain
brain regions the brain is segregated both structurally and
functionally. This is even true for complex human behaviour. Less well
understood is the relation between structure and function, particularly
in case of the human brain.
We aim to create a human brain model which integrates
microstructural/architectonic results with information coming from
functional imaging, receptor distribution analysis and high resolution
fiber tracking. Hereby, different scales ranging from the microscopical
level of neuronal systems to the molecular and systemic level require
the development of novel methodologies. I will illustrate the
relationship of the mental and the biological domain by research data
coming from studies analysing language, empathy and cognition and the
underlying microsctuctural segregation of the brain. Examples for
different approaches and how they are integrated into a multimodal
human brain model will be presented. This mapping effort provides a
basis for future clinical studies, and is prerequisite for
understanding the spatially organized structure of brain function.

Abstract: A decade after the
decade of the brain, we have by now performed tens of thousands of
functional neuroimaging studies, which offers a unique opportunity to
revisit some fundamental questions about the overall functional
architecture of the brain. This brief talk will present some of the
evidence coming from an analysis of 2600 neuroimaging studies that (1)
local brain circuits are used in many different psychological
functions, across multiple traditional cognitive domains (e.g.,
language, attention, motor control, etc); and (2) differences between
the neural underpinnings of these traditional cognitive domains are
reflected more in different patterns of cooperation between (the same)
neural regions, and less in differences in which neural regions are
used to support tasks in each domains. These findings have implications
for the overall functional architecture of the brain, and also
therefore for what experimental and interpretive best practices we
should follow when conducting research in the cognitive neurosciences.

11:00 Coffee break

Session 2: Contributions of neuroimaging to psychology

What has neuroimaging so far contributed to understanding
our
mind, a project traditionally carried out by philosophy of mind and
psychology? Is the relationship between cognitive psychology, cognitive
neuroscience, and philosophy of mind one of co-development, to what
extend are they independent of each other, or will cognitive
neuroscience even replace other mind-disciplines as has been claimed by
some?

Abstract: Cognitive
psychology has
developed
a rough taxonomy of human capacities and subpersonal mental states.
Neuroimaging evidence often fails to line up neatly with these
taxonomies. Several authors have thus argued that neuroimaging evidence
will prompt wholesale revision of these traditional cognitive
ontologies. I argue that the situation is likely to be more
complicated. Neuroimaging evidence can and should be read in a
level-neutral way. Doing so allows for a reciprocal process of
co-evolution between distinct scientific ontologies.

Abstract: Recent neuroimaging
evidence apparently contributes to our understanding of decision-making
under uncertainty. Based on a selection of influential studies and in
the context of psychological inquiry in a broader sense this talk will
assess the contribution of neuroscientific results to an understanding
of the underlying cognitive processes of decisions under uncertainty.

13:00 Lunch break

Session 3: States of phenomenal experience in
neuroimaging
measuring the immeasurable?

It can be argued that the psychological level of
explanation
is irreplaceable, so can it be argued that phenomenology is still
relevant for both experimental design and the development of relevant
research questions. Moreover, it can be argued that neuroscientific
insights will be judged for their phenomenological plausibility or
ecological validity, which is difficult to realize in neuroimaging
experiments. This renders phenomenology a status of being complementary
to neuroscientific insights The speakers discuss this with regard
to normal (Bayne) and abnormal (Aleman) states of phenomenal
experience. In addition, they will discuss whether neuroscience helps
in drawing a line between those two classes, or not?

Abstract: This talk considers
ways
in which neuroimaging might contribute to the study of
consciousness. I begin by distinguishing different types of
questions raised by the science of consciousness. I then turn to the
topic of whether the methods of neuroimaging might be adequate to
answering those questions, with a focus on whether there are principled
reasons for thinking that neuroimaging might simply be ill-suited to
solving certain types of questions regarding the nature of
consciousness. I argue that although neuroimaging will not provide us
with a full theory of consciousness, it can nonetheless provide us with
insight into certain problems that are not easily addressable via other
means.

Abstract: In this talk I describe
neuroimaging findings that give us a glimp of what goes on in the brain
during highly private experiences such as self-reflection. Although
neuroimaging methods are limited in nature and cannot give us a
complete account of subjective phenomena, they can help in elucidating
disorders of subjective experience as in the case of verbal
hallucinations (or hearing voices) in schizophrenia. I will argue
that linking phenomenal experience to cognitive processing and to the
corresponding neural substrate will open new vistas on the workings of
the human mind/brain.

16:00 Coffee break

Session 4 and final discussion: Beyond the individual
mind
society and culture in neuroimaging

It has been pointed out that most neuroscientific (and
psychological, in general) investigations are for the most part carried
out on Western psychology students and are thus not generalizable to
the global population. What do we know about transcultural differences
and what does that imply for our neuroimaging endeavours, in research
design as well as interpretation?

Abstract: To capture how intense is the
interest for neuroimaging techniques outside of biology, it is useful
to contrast it with the immediate past, and recall that more than a
disinterest, it was a frank opposition to biological observations which
characterized social sciences in the matters of culture and human
social behavior. This reminder makes all the more striking the
enthusiastic embrace of brain imaging techniques in the recent years
what caused this shift of attitude in social sciences, and the wider
society? We will suggest that as series of important methodological
changes were at work since the 1970s, which make of the popularity of
neuroimaging less as a revolution than an evolution. Ironically, this
is probably a more circumstantial aspect which accelerated the process
and is responsible for a degree of fascination for neuroimaging by the
social scientists, the wider public, and the biologists themselves.

Sunday, April 3; Center for Interdisciplinary Studies,
University of Amsterdam, Sarphatistraat 104

Two times two workshops of two hours will be held at 9:30 and
13:00 oclock to inform interdisciplinary scholars about pertinent
issues in neuroscience.

9:30 Michael Anderson
(Franklin & Marshall College and
University of Maryland): What
psychology tells us about the brain, and vice-versa: Two approaches to
interpreting neuroimaging data

Abstract: Neuroimaging experiments
offer a window through which to examine the brain and the way it
supports cognition in its myriad forms. However, individual experiments
are typically underpowered and focused on fairly narrow scientific
questions. In this workshop we will discuss several methods for
extracting information from large collections of neuroimaging results,
including cross-domain function-to-structure mapping and functional
connectivity analysis. Using these methods allows us to identify and
map the overlapping functional networks responsible for cognition, and
shed light on the overall functional architecture of the brain. This
general approach takes the standard view that what neuroimaging
experiments do is shed light on brain organization. But looked at
another way, these same experiments allow us to use the brain as a lens
through which to view the organization of cognition itself. That is,
the brain can be viewed as a machine evolved for differentially
responding to features of its environment, including features of
psychology experiments. We may think this set of experiments
manipulates cognitive load, and that set manipulates spatial attention,
but does the brain agree? Using brain activation as our guide, we may
be able to shed new light on what various experiments have in common,
and what differentiates them from one another. Thus, in this workshop
we will also discuss various methods for reinterpreting neuroimaging
experiments to help us do such things as (re-)evaluate and improve our
cognitive ontology.

Abstract: We tend to treat one another
as accountable persons. Part and parcel of this treatment is the
exchange of reasons: We constantly explain and justify to ourselves and
others why we do what we do, and for what reasons. Yet, some
neuroscientists as well as behavioral scientists claim that these
justifications and explanations are made up after the fact, moreover,
that they do not correspond with what actually explains our behavior.
What actually explains our actions are brainstates, states we are not
necessarily aware of (and that we, in the future, might be able to read
out of our brains). Therefore, we have to radically change our views
and practices involving the assumption that we possess free (conscious)
will and are accountable. In this workshop we discuss the
neuroscientists inclination to phrase their findings as a threat to
free will and accountability. We propose that discussing these findings
in terms of the role that reasons play in our everyday explanations and
justifications of our actions is much more interesting.

Abstract: Lourens Waldorp offers an
introduction to fMRI experimenting, from its initial phase until the
end, shedding light on all steps involved and some important
methodological issues. This workshop is meant for academics of all
disciplines who are interested to learn more about fMRI research.

There are no reading requirements for this workshop.

A maximum of 20 participants will be allowed to each workshop to
guarantee a high teaching quality. More details about the preparation
will be made available soon. Please use the facilities of your own
institution to access these papers, as they might not be available
publicly.

Participation

Reservation in advance is required and the number of
participants
is limited. Participation costs are 40 for Friday and 70 for
Saturday or 100 for both days together. Coffee, tea and pastry during
the breaks are included. Snacks on Friday evening are included but
drinks have to be paid at the bar. Bachelor and master students receive
a 25% discount on the conference participation fee. The workshops are
30 each and the number of participants is strictly limited to a maximum
of 20 to guarantee a high quality.

Reservation

To participate in the conference, please write to Felix Schirmann, , indicating the days you want to
participate in as
well as your academic affiliation. Please contact us for
last minute possibilities if you still want to join the conference but
have not registered so far.
You will receive details concerning
payment shortly. Reservations will become effective upon reception of
payment.