A lamp only in palaces lit
Shed light for a chosen few
Shade in which one has to fit
Such rites and lightless dawns
I will not accept; I refuse to know.
I am not afraid of execution,

Tell the world that I am the martyr
How can you frighten me with prison walls?
This language of oppression, this night of ignorance,
I will not accept; I refuse to know.

‘Flowers are budding on branches’, you say
‘Every cup overflows’, you say
‘Wounds are healing themselves’, you say
These bare-faced lies, this insult to the intelligence
I will not accept; I refuse to know.

Habib Jalib, 'Dastoor'

'Encounter' at Batla House: Unanswered Questions

I. Background

On the evening of 13 September 2008, Delhi was rocked by blasts. In
all, five bombs went off within the span of thirty minutes, between
6:00 pm to 6:30 pm. Two of them in the heart of Delhi in Connaught
Place, two at the upscale Greater Kailash M-Block market in south
Delhi, and one, the most damaging one, in the crowded Ghaffar Market in
Karol Bagh. Three unexploded bombs were found later taking the total
number of bombs to 8. The first was found near India Gate inside a
dustbin at the Children's Park and one was defused at Regal Cinema Hall
which was lying on the road, while another one was found at Central
Park, again inside a dustbin. The responsibility for the blasts was
claimed by an outfit called the Indian Mujahiedeen in an email.

Almost immediately, Jamia Nagar, a locality in South-east Delhi, home
to over 5 lakhs Muslims became the target of suspicion. The following
day (14th September, Sunday), a prominent social activist, Abdul
Rasheed Agwan, and a 30-year-old youth Adnan Fahad, both residents of
Abul Fazal enclave, were taken to the Special Cell headquarters in
Lodhi Road for questioning. They were released late in night after a
12-hour ordeal. On September 18th, a research student of Jamia Millia
Islamia was picked up by the Special Cell from the Jamia locality for
questioning, stripped, beaten and tortured in custody and was released
later on 21st September 2008. (See detailed reports in Appendix,
Section I)

On 19th September 2008, in an armed operation conducted by the Special
Cell of the Delhi Police, Flat number 108, in the building L-18 in
Batla House area of Jamia Nagar was raided. In the ensuing operation,
two alleged terrorists, Atif Amin and Sajid, were shot dead by the
police. Mohan Chand Sharma, an inspector of the Delhi Police's Special
Cell, was injured and later succumbed to his injuries in the Holy
Family hospital. A third flat mate, Md. Saif, was arrested from the
site. The Delhi Police claimed that two alleged terrorists had escaped
during the operation.

The Delhi Police claimed that the occupants of L-18, Batla House, all
students of various universities and institutes in Delhi, and all
hailing from Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh were part of 'Indian
Mujahedeen' – supposedly an Islamic terrorist group. Further, the Delhi
Police alleged that the deceased and arrested youth were the main
conspirators and executors of the Delhi bomb blasts. The following two
days saw more arrests: The caretaker of the flat 108, Abdul Rehman,
where the deceased boys resided was arrested, as was his son,
Zia-Ur-Rehman, a student of Jamia Millia Islamia. Saquib Nisar, a
friend of Atif, and Mohammad Shakeel, another student of JMI were also
arrested.

II. PROFILES

Profile of those killed and arrested in the Batla House operation:

Atif Ameen s/o Mohd Ameen. Age: 24
years. R/o Flat Number 108, L-18, Batla House, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi.
Was enrolled in M.A. Human Rights at Jamia Millia Islamia. He hailed
from Sarai Meer in Azamgarh. Had been living in Delhi for the past two
years, earlier in a Janta Flat in Jasola Vihar, New Delhi, before
moving to the present address in August 2008.

He had last visited his home at Sanjarpur during Holi in March for a week.

Md. Sajid s/o. Age: 17 years (a legal minor), R/o
Flat number 108, L-18, Batla House, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi. Student of
Class XI in Azamgarh. Sajid hailed from Sanjarpur in Azamgarh. He had
come to Delhi to seek admission in Jamia School. He sat for the
examination but could not succeed in securing admission. He instead
took admission in class XI in a school in Azamgarh (See copy of his school I-card) and enrolled in an English Speaking course in Batla House.

Sajid's school I-D Card

No official news of the killing of these boys was given to their
families, though their homes in Azamgarh were raided late in the night
of the 19th. Md. Saif s/o Shahdab Alam. Age: 23-24 years. R/o
Flat number 108, L-18, Batla House, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi. Hails from
Sanjarpur in Azamgarh. Mohd Saif had arrived in Delhi in 2008 only. He
had done his BA in Shibli College, Azamgarh, and MA in History from
Jaunpur in Poorvanchal University.

Zia-ur Rahman s/o Mr. Abdul Rehman. Age: 21 years
approx. R/o of Zakir Nagar, New Delhi. He is a B.A. (Pass) Final Year
student of Jamia Millia Islamia.

Tenant verification form of the Flat 108, L-18, Batla House. Note the police stamp on the left corner.

Zia already knew Md. Saif from earlier and had helped him and other
occupants of L-18 to rent the house, as his father was the caretaker of
the flat. On the night of September 19, his father, Mr. Abdul Rehman,
aged 57-58 years, went to the Jamia Nagar police station to show that
they had a received a copy of the tenant verification form for the
verification of the youth who were tenants in the L-18 flat on 21
August 08 and to clarify their association with the deceased. (See copy of Tenant Verification form)
They could not meet with anyone at the Police Station since there was
no one present. The same evening the father and son appeared on a Hindi
national news channel and showed the verification form duly stamped by
the Jamia Nagar PS. The next day, on 20 September, the two visited the
Police Station again at around 2 pm. The police charged them of
producing a 'farji' (forged/ false) verification form and they
were questioned throughout the night, after which they were separated.
Zia was handed over to the Special Cell and then charged as being one
of the bombers. He had no knowledge that his father had been arrested
on charges of forgery and cheating till 1st October, the first time he
was able to call up his family members and asked to speak to his father.

The family received no official intimation of Zia's arrest.

Mohd. Zeeshan s/o Mohd. Ehsan. Age: 24 years. R/o
L-18, Batla House, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi Was finishing a degree in
Business Management from Indian Institute of Public Management at Lodhi
Road, New Delhi. He was also working in a private firm alongside. He
also hails from Azamgarh, where his father teaches at the Shibli
College. One of the flatmates of the deceased at L-18, Zeeshan had gone
to write a re-examination for his MBA Ist year at IIPM (a management
institute) on 19th when the 'encounter' happened. He learned of the
incident after he came out of the examination hall; he called his
family and friends for advice and his father suggested that he should
go to any television channel to publicly declare his innocence. He
surrendered to the police waiting below the channel (Headlines Today)
office though the police initially sought to give the impression that
he had been 'nabbed'. The following day he was declared as one of the
'masterminds' behind the serial bomb blasts.

Mohd. Saquib Nissar s/o Nisar
Ahmed Azmi, Age: 23 years. R/o Shaheen Bagh, Jamianagar, Delhi. He is a
student of MBA (Third Semester) Sikkim Manipal University (Distance
Education). (See copy of his examination hall ticket).
Saquib completed his B.A. (Hons) in Economics from Jamia Millia Islamia
in 2007. He was also working in a private firm in Nehru Place in New
Delhi.

Copy of Saquib Nisar's Admit Card for the semester examinations of Sikkim Manipal University

On 19th September, he appeared on a national television channel and
expressed his shock and disbelief at the killing of Ameen and Sajid. He
was picked up from his house and taken to Jamia Nagar Police Station on
20th evening. Since the family was not informed, his father went to the
Jamia Nagar PS and returned re-assured that his son would come home the
next day. It was only later that he learnt from television news that
along with Zia and Shakeel, his son too had been declared as one of the
key accused in the Delhi blasts.

Mohd. Shakeel s/o Yameen Khan, r/o D 130/5 Sangam
Vihar, New Delhi. Age: 24 years. MA final year student of the Dept. of
Economics, Jamia Millia Islamia. He is a close friend of Saquib and Zia.

Shakeel was picked up early morning on 21st September from his home at
Sangam Vihar. At around 2 a.m. on 21 September around, 40-50
policemen, some in plainclothes and some in uniform (both from Special
Cell and Sangam Vihar PS) came to his family's Sangam Vihar home,
surrounding it from the narrow 8 ft lane in the rear and the road in
the front. Two men armed with a pistol and an AK 47 confronted
Shakeel's brother, who was sleeping on the terrace. They gestured him
to remain silent and asked his name. When he said 'Farid', he was taken
for identification to Saquib, who had been brought by the police to the
spot. Saquib confirmed him as Shakeel's brother, Farid. Shakeel woke up
with the noise. Farid, their younger brother Umar and father Yameen
Khan were also rounded up by the police and seated in a police vehicle.
Shakeel was separately interrogated by some officers for a few minutes
before boarding the police vehicle. Their house was searched and all
documents, including their mother's medical reports were seized without
giving a seizure memo to the family.

They were taken to the Lodhi Road office of the Special Cell for
questioning. While the family members were released the same day, he
was kept on police remand by the Special Cell.

Abdul Rehman R/o Zakir Nagar, New Delhi. He was
arrested on 20th September 2008 and handed over to the Special Cell
when he went voluntarily to the Okhla Police Station on the day of the
'encounter' twice and then on the 20th to clarify their association
with the deceased. While the flat owner Mohsin Nissar was allowed to go
free, Abdul Rehman, his PA in the National Highways office was arrested
for merely introducing the boys who have been staying in Jasola Vihar
for the past two years and all verification records had been with the
local police. He has now been released on bail.

III. Contradictions in the Police Version(s) The
drama of the 'encounter', staged by the Delhi Police under conspicuous
media glare, was from the very beginning scrutinized and questioned by
concerned citizens, activists, members of civil and human rights
groups. On 20th of September, a team comprising of activists,
academicians and journalists visited the site of the shoot out and
raised certain critical doubts about the nature of the 'encounter',
after interactions with the local residents, eye witnesses and reports
that had appeared in sections of the media Other human rights
organisations and independent civil rights groups including the PUDR
(Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights), PUCL (Peoples' Union for Civil
Liberties), Jan Hastakshep, APCR (Association for the Protection of
Civil Rights) and FDI (Forum for Democratic Initiatives) also carried
out their fact finding in the area. These groups have worked to expose
the several contradictions that have emerged over the last two months
in the claims made by the Delhi Police.

1. The Operation:

The Indian Express reported that Sharma went there along with five officers, while Mail Today reported a 15-member team. The Indian Express report stated: “Around 10:30 am, the door to (flat number) L- 18 opened and Sharma was shot thrice” ('Counter-terror', Indian Express,
Delhi, September 20, p 1.) A gun battle ensued in which the Delhi
police fired 22 rounds to register two kills and one capture. Eight
rounds in all were fired by the opposing side. Inspector Sharma was
then carried away to a nearby hospital where he died hours later,
reportedly of a cardiac arrest occasioned by severe bleeding.

On the same day another newspaper reported the press briefing of the
Delhi's Police Commissioner. In the briefing that evening, the Police
Commissioner stated that Inspector Sharma and his team had “cordoned
off” the area that morning. Armed policemen “took positions” around the
building at 10:30 that morning and a half-hour later, “another team
went up to the flat on the fourth floor”. ('Two Terrorists Shot Dead in
Delhi', The Hindu, September 20, p. 1) This team was fired upon, following which the gun battle ensued.

The Police Commissioner did not contradict the earlier version of the newspaper reports.

2. Information about 'dreaded terrorists': Delhi
Police has consistently made contradictory statements about their
intelligence reports regarding the occupants of fourth floor flat of
L-18.

20 September:

Quoting police sources, It was reported that the Special cell had
credible intelligence inputs about the presence of dreaded terrorists
involved in the bombings in Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Delhi in the
apartment that was raided. It was claimed that the Special Cell came to
know about the presence of a resident whose “physical appearance
tallied” with descriptions of a senior operative involved in the July
26 serial bombings in Ahmedabad. ('Shootout at Jamia Nagar', The Times of India, 20 September, p 1.)

9 October:

Another version in the press stated that the police has actually only
gone to the area to do a recce on 19 September, and that “the presence
of armed terrorists took them by surprise.” “The police did not expect an encounter at L-18.” (Indian Express 9 October).

10 October:

In an op-ed article defending the Batla House 'encounter', a senior
journalist claimed that “the investigators learned that top commander
'Bashir' and his assault armed squad left Ahmedabad on July 26 for a
safe house at Jamia Nagar.” Further he says, “the investigators came to
believe that Atif Amin either provided Bashir shelter or the two were
one and the same person.” ('Alice in Wonderland' by Praveen Swami, The Hindu, 10 October)

16 October:

The Joint Commissioner of Delhi Police filed an affidavit filed before
the High Court stating that the police had gone to Batla House to
conduct a raid, after a “specific tip off on September 19th that one
Atif alias Bashir… was presently residing at Batla House, Jamia Nagar.”
The affidavit then went to state that “the team knocked at the main
door of the flat and disclosed its identity but the occupants did not
respond… the team members entered the flat thought the side door to
apprehend the suspects.” 'The team had only meant to apprehend the
occupants of the flat but the occupants opened fire to evade arrest.
The team members also fired in self-defence…' (Indian Express, 16 October, 2008)

Surely there can be only one truth and not the many versions of 'truth' that have emerged in the above contradicting reports. The police must pick one of these 'truths'. It cannot claim all to be 'true' simultaneously:

The police knew that a “top commander” and his “armed assault team”
were residing in L-18 (as claimed confidently by Swami). In which case,
the Special Cell's almost cavalier approach is inexplicable. Knowing
full well that a dreaded terrorist was in residence in L-18, why did
the Police make no attempt at forcing a surrender, making public
announcements to the effect, vacating the other residents, sealing the
building and so on? This could have helped the police arrest the
alleged terrorists which would have provide crucial leads into bomb
blasts case.

The Police went to L-18 merely for investigation and was ambushed.
In which case, isn't it surprising that it took them only a few hours
to crack nearly all cases of bomb blasts that have occurred across the
country? It was of course inconvenient for UP, Gujarat, Rajasthan and
Maharashtra state police, who had been claiming their own successes in
uncovering their 'masterminds' – an obvious and sheer oneupmanship. (See
section on Changing Masterminds)

The Police commissioner Y. S. Dadwal announced at a news conference the
same day that “Atif was the mastermind behind all the recent serial
blasts,” and that he had plotted the 13th September's blasts... was
also involved in the Ahmedabad blasts on July 26, Jaipur blasts on May
13, and the August 25, 2007 blasts in Hyderabad. He was described as “a
key Indian Mujahideen functionary who played a major role in the
Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad (and) Delhi serial blasts”. ('Two
Terrorists Shot Dead in Delhi', The Hindu, 20 September)

The other slain boy, Sajid – a minor of 17 years – was described as
bomb-maker. Police Commissioner Dadwal declared that “explosives made
by him and his team bore their signature – two detonators, wooden frame,
ammonium nitrate and analogue quartz clocks,” (Hindustan Times, 20
September 2008). This begs the question: how was the police – which did
not even expect an 'encounter' in the morning – were able to say with
confidence by the evening that the bombs used in Delhi blasts bore the
'signature' of the slain Sajid?

3. The Puzzle of the Bullet Proof Jacket

The Delhi Police could not make up its mind on this
issue either. The Joint Commissioner of Police, Karnail Singh and
Deputy Commissioner of Police (Special Cell) Alok Kumar initially
reiterated that the Special Cell team members were not wearing Bullet
Proof Vests (BPVs). [“Entering a crowded locality would alert the
suspects and give them time to escape” (Indian Express Oct 9); “To maintain secrecy in a cramped area like Batla House” (Tehelka, Oct 4)]

A new version appeared however following the outcry
after the publication of pictures of Sajid's body, which clearly show
that he had been shot repeatedly in the head. Such bullet injuries
suggest that he could have been killed from extreme close range while
he was in a crouching or kneeling position. This in itself raises a
huge question mark over the 'encounter'. Senior police sources claimed
that Sajid was “lying on the floor when he opened fire at a cop. The
cop, unlike Inspector Sharma, was wearing a bullet-proof vest. He
retaliated by firing a burst from his AK-47, which hit Sajid on his
head.” (Times of India, Oct 8).

To be fair to the police, this answer does explain why and how Sajid
was killed. It also tells us why the cop in question was not much
injured when Sajid supposedly fired at him. But it doesn't square with
the line the Delhi Police have been pushing up till now, that Inspector
Sharma's men did not deliberately wear bullet proof vests; or with the claims that the Special team was “armed only with small arms”. (The Hindu, October 10)

The Delhi Police must clearly make up its mind if the cops that day were wearing Bullet-proof vests or not?

Why was the late Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma, a veteran of
dozens of encounter operations, the only officer in the operation not
wearing a bullet-proof vest? If the Special Cell knew that they were
terrorists why was M.C. Sharma not wearing a bullet-proof vest if the
Special Cell was going to arrest/apprehend dreaded terrorists?

4. Injuries and Bullets

Notice the bullet injuries
on Sajid's head

Photographs of the bodies of Atif and Sajid, taken during the ritual
bathing before burial clearly indicate injury marks on the bodies. This
has been testified by people who prepared the bodies of the dead boys
for their burial. In a statement at the Jan Sunwai organized at Batla
House by the Jamia Teachers' Solidarity Group on the 12th October 2008,
they testified that the skin on Atif's back was sloughed off. These
marks could definitely not have been caused by bullets. There were
multiple bullet injuries on Sajid's head. What caused these injury
marks? Were they captured before they were eliminated? In an earlier
response, the police had cited the elusive post mortem report, saying
that the two did not have any injuries on them apart from those caused
by bullets, in order to buttress their claim of the “shootout being
genuine”. (Times of India, Oct
9). The documentary proof of the existence of such marks on the bodies
however belies their claims. The statements of witnesses at the Jan
Sunwai and the photographic evidence cast strong aspersions on the
police version.

Rattled by the photographs of an injured Inspector Sharma being
escorted out of L- 18 building, where no blood stain is visible on the
front, the Police have stated that he was hit from the front as “one
bullet hit him in the left shoulder and exited through the left arm;
the other hit the right side of the abdomen, exiting through the hip.” (The Hindu, October
10) For this reason, they argue, the bleeding was from the back – the
points of exit. However, according to a senior doctor who conducted the
post- mortem on Inspector MC Sharma at the All India Institute of
Medical Sciences, “It was difficult to establish the entry and exit
points of the bullet because conclusive evidence had been wiped out by
the interventions of the doctors at Holy Family Hospital [where Sharma
was rushed to].” (Tehelka, October 4).

Injury marks on the leg of the deceased

Atif Amin's back. It appears as though the back has been skinned

According to the press statement issued by Holy Family Hospital
on September 19, 2008, X-rays of the chest and abdomen of M.C. Sharma
had “not revealed any foreign bodies”. Question remains: what has
happened to the bullets fired on him? Have these been collected from
the scene and sent for forensic analysis?

Further, one stenographic journalist tells us that the “abdomen wound
was inflicted with Amin's weapon and the shoulder (was) hit, by
Mohammad Sajid”. And how does he know? “The investigators believe
that.” (Praveen Swami, The Hindu, October
10) And the journalist (?) parrots the police investigators. Indeed,
this implicit faith in police sources, with no attempt at independent
investigation or verification had been the hallmark of most
journalistic reporting in the initial days after the 'encounter'. Few
journalists asked to be shown a copy of the post mortem report or the
videography of the post mortem.

In absence of the facts, following questions become important:

* What kind of bullets were fired upon Inspector Sharma?

* What was the weapon that killed Sajid and Atif?

* Why are the post mortem reports of Inspector Sharma and Atif and Sajid not being made public?

5. Corroborative evidence: 'Explosive Stuff'

All the newspapers reported substantial cache of arms, etc., recovered
by the Delhi Police from L-18 of Batla House, where two alleged
terrorists – 'responsible' for several bomb blasts – were shot dead and one
captured alive.

To begin with, The Hindustan Times quoted
Police Commissioner Y S Dadwal as saying that “explosives made by him
(Sajid) and his team bore their signature – two detonators, wooden frame,
ammonium nitrate and analogue quartz clocks.”

Following is the list of recoveries as reported in several newspapers based on police sources:

One AK 47, .30 bore revolver, two laptops, half a dozen mobiles and six pen drives

Most
significantly none of the dailies reported the recovery of any ammonium
nitrate and analogue quartz clocks, so crucial to the 'terrorists'
signature bombs, as claimed by the Delhi Police Commissioner. No
question is asked about the recovery of these chemicals or equipment
claimed to be part of the terrorist group's signature.

As evidence in support of their claim that the boys living in L-18 were terrorists, the police presented a bucket, adhesive tape and a bag. (Indian Express, Oct
9, 2008). The bucket was used to keep bombs (but was presumably empty
at the time of 'seizure'); the adhesive tape was used to seal the
explosives (!); and finally the bag was used to carry the bombs (but
again presumably empty when the police 'recovered' it).

Legal
requirements were blatantly flouted with regard to seizures. The police
are required to prepare a seizure list of all items recovered from the
site and it should be attested to by two public witnesses unconnected
with the police. Given that a huge crowd had gathered at the site,
surely, the police could have sought the assistance of members of the
public. The police did not show anyone the faces of the victims of the
'encounter' killings. Panchnamaof
the site should be done in presence of independent witnesses but this
was not done. Neither have the Police allowed the media access to the
scene of the crime which is still sealed, even after three months.
Normally this is done within a few hours.

The police officials claim that an AK-47 and pistols were recovered from L-18. What
was the weapon that killed Inspector Sharma? Was the AK- 47 used at all
and if so then by whom was it used? Going by some reports that have
appeared (see The Times of India, 20.09.08), the AK-47s have been used
by the police only. Is it not strange that alleged terrorists did not
use a more deadly and sophisticated weapon like the AK-47, which they
purportedly possessed, preferring to use pistols?

6. Escape Routes?

The four-storey house L-18 in Batla House where the alleged terrorists
were staying has only one access point, through the staircase, which is
covered by an iron grill. It is impossible to leave the house except
from the staircase. By all reports, the staircase was taken over by the
Special Cell and/ or other agencies during the counterterror operation.
The house, indeed the entire block, was cordoned off at the time of the
operation. The building is abutted on the left and right by two
buildings which are only about two floors high. There is a narrow lane
to the front and an even narrower lane at the back.

How
then was it then possible, as claimed by the police, for two alleged
terrorists to escape the premises during the police operation?

7. The Mystery of Fired Rounds

Ever since the Batla House 'encounter', the issue of the number of
rounds of fire – opened by the police and by the alleged 'terrorists' who
'supposedly' took on the raiding police party – has remained muddled and
inconclusive.

Interestingly, the Navbharat Times claimed that both the police and the suspects were armed with AK 47s but did not use them.

There are reports that towards the end of the counter-terror operation,
some policemen climbed on the roof of L-18 and fired several rounds in
the air. Other policemen were seen breaking windows and even throwing
flowerpots to the ground from flats adjacent or opposite to L-18.

Why was the police firing in the air and why did it indulge in destruction of property around L-18 after the encounter?

At the Jan Sunwai organised by the Jamia Teachers' Solidarity Group
12th October 2008), all witnesses uniformly testified that the firing
happened in quick succession punctuated by short intervals for nearly
an hour after Inspector Sharma was brought down from the flat. The
members of the locality raised questions about the long duration of
firing in L-18. The death of Inspector Sharma too is shrouded in
mystery.

Copy
of Atif Amin's driving license. This was appended to the house lease
agreement as proof of his permanent address. All details are true.

8. The Charge of 'over confident terrorists’

According to reports in the media after September 19th, the Delhi
Police had claimed that both Atif and Sajid had left behind a trail of
identification marks. In response to why these supposed 'terrorists'
would leave such a trail which would have made them sitting ducks, the
police had a simple answer. They were over confident. (Indian Express, October 9)

These boys (aged 17 years-24 years) were so confident that they had
their tenant verifications done in which they provided their genuine
addresses, including the address of the house they previously stayed
in. It is significant that all these details were found to be correct.
The police denied that the veracity of the verification form and insisted
that the tenancy verification obtained by Atif and Sajid was forged,
since the counterpart document did not exist in the concerned
police station. But Mr. Rehman, the caretaker of the flat,
has vouched, on camera, that he accompanied Atif to the Police Station
for the verification.

Atif had his driving license made by
providing his genuine details; carried out blasts and returned home
'confidently' to watch their exploits on television; felt no need to f
lee or change residences frequently; bought SIM cards in their own
names; registered as students in schools and institutions; sat for
examinations midway through planning and executing blasts. And yet,
these masterminds had no inkling of the special cell surveillance, and
indeed helpfully stored material such as photographs of blast sites on
their laptops and cell phones, so that their guilt could be proved
promptly by the police whenever they were caught.

Is it conceivable that the alleged kingpin behind the terrorist Indian
Mujahideen outfit would have wanted to undergo police verification,
just a week after the Ahmedabad blasts and a month before the bombings
in Delhi?

Furthermore, detentions and arrests in connection with the Delhi blasts
had begun in the Jamia Nagar area from 14th September onwards, and this
was public knowledge. Why would real terrorists continue to use a
hideout in a locality that was very obviously under the police scanner?

The jury of the Jan Sunwai (JTSG, 12th October 2008) similarly noted
that prior to moving to L-18, the deceased had verifications proofs in
place with the local police. Sajid had appeared for his 11th class
examination at Jamia School and all address details were genuine. Atif
had enrolled in Jamia Millia Islamia. Till date, all identification
records submitted by them have been found to be true. The verification
details for obtaining their mobile connections are also genuine. These
proofs establish the credibility of the boys killed in the encounter as
students seeking opportunities and a career in the city.

Copy of Sajid's admit card for his entrance examination at Jamia School

The Delhi Police is guilty of committing several serious procedural
lapses. The recommendations of the National Human Right Commission
(NHRC) on encounter
killings clearly state that “when information is received that death
was caused in an encounter as a result of firing by the police, prima
facie the ingredients of culpable homicide under section 299 of the IPC
are satisfied. That is sufficient to suspect that an offence of
culpable homicide has been committed.”

NHRC issued a notice to
the Delhi Police Commissioner Y.S. Dadwal on September 23 asking the
Delhi Police to submit a detailed report on the 19th September
'encounter' in accordance with the NHRC guidelines. It sought to know
if a magisterial inquiry had been ordered, if so, what was its status.
It asked the Commissioner to furnish details as to whether a criminal
case regarding the incident has been registered, and if so, the status
of the investigation. The Commission asked Dadwal to furnish the
post-mortem reports of suspected terrorists Mohd. Atif and Mohd. Sajid,
and Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma who were killed in the September 19
'encounter'. It has also asked the police chief to submit the inquest
reports.

All that the NHRC received was an intimation dated September 21 from
the SHO, Jamia Nagar, on October 13 regarding the incident. The Delhi
Police failed to submit the report within the stipulated 15 days as
asked by the Commission. On the contrary, the Department floated false
stories in the media that the NHRC was satisfied by their 'report'. In
its report submitted to the Delhi High Court on October 15, Joint
Commissioner of Police (Special Cell) Karnail Singh claimed that “the
so-called fact finding reports have no veracity and bearing as whenever
any death by encounter takes place, the report is sent to the NHRC”.
Further the police contended that the NHRC's refusal to recommend any
action against police officers in the encounter was testimony to the
fact that the commission was “satisfied”. (Hindustan Times, October 20).

This was roundly denied by the NHRC on its official website. And in
fact, the Commission sent a reminder to the Police Commissioner seeking
a complete report by 31st October. However, on the expiry of the 31st
October deadline, the Delhi Police asked for yet another extension for
submitting the report. NHRC has issued yet another reminder about the
magisterial enquiry to the Delhi Police on 6th January 2009 – three and a
half months after the 'encounter'.

The Police received support from Delhi Lieutenant Governor who refused
to grant permission for the magisterial enquiry. His decision was based
on reports by the Crime Branch of the Delhi Police – an obviously
interested party in the case – and CFSL reports. (Asian Age,
February 6, 2009). This decision is in direct conflict with the
guidelines laid down by the NHRC and as such, is a blow to the
institution of the NHRC.

Revised Guidelines/Procedures
to be followed in dealing with deaths occurring in encounter deaths
issued on 2.12.2003 by National Human Rights Commission

The
Following procedure is required to be followed by the State Governments
in all cases of deaths in the course of police action:

When
the police officer in charge of a Police Station receives information
about the deaths in an encounter between the Police party and others,
he shall enter that information in the appropriate register.

Where
the police officers belonging to the same Police Station are members of
the encounter party, whose action resulted in deaths, it is desirable
that such cases are made over for investigation to some other
independent investigating agency, such as State CBCID.

Whenever
a specific complaint is made against the police alleging commission of
a criminal act on their part, which makes out a cognisable case of
culpable homicide, an FIR to this effect must be registered under
appropriate sections of the I.P.C. Such case shall invariably be
investigated by State CBCID.

A Magisterial
Inquiry must invariably be held in all cases of death which occur in
the course of police action. The next of kin of the deceased must
invariably be associated in such inquiry.

Prompt
prosecution and disciplinary action must be initiated against all
delinquent officers found guilty in the magisterial enquiry/police
investigation.

Question of granting of
compensation to the dependents of the deceased would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case.

No out-of-turn promotion or instant gallantry rewards shall be bestowed on the concerned officers soon after the occurrence.
It must be ensured at all costs that such rewards are given/recommended
only when the gallantry of the concerned officer is established beyond
doubt.

V. Another Procedural Lapse

As per
news reports the police has so far not carried out a Test
Identification Parade (TIP) by eyewitnesses who claim to have seen
those responsible for the Delhi bomb blasts. Was a TIP done before the
burial of the two boys who were shot dead? Has the police tried to
match the sketches of the accused made earlier on with those being
arrested? What are the results of such efforts if they have been made?
As a matter of fact such an exercise of matching the sketches released
(of suspects) with those actually detained/arrested and allegedly held
responsible for the crime is never undertaken and now it seems to be
begging an urgent attention. The sketches released by the Delhi Police
do not match the features of those arrested or killed. (See sketches of blast suspects)

VI. Forced Confessions as 'Truth'

On 2nd October 2008, India Today magazine
carried a cover story, “Inside the Mind of the Bombers”. India Today's
reporter, Mihir Srivastava claimed that he met and interviewed the
accused youth on the sidelines of the press conference called by the
South District Police. In his 'exclusive' talk with the 'bombers'
(nowhere is the simple journalistic ethic of pre-fixing 'alleged'
before the term terrorists before the crimes have been proven, adhered
to), Srivastava presented what were obviously forced confessions under
real violence or threat of violence, as 'facts'. This was not simply an
infringement of journalistic codes of reporting but a flagrant
violation of the laws of the land, which strictly forbid the use of
confessions in police custody as evidence. While its value as evidence
may be nil, this article sought to establish the guilt of these accused
youth in the public consciousness.

The Delhi High Court on October
15th 2008, asked the police to file a response as to how a journalist
was allowed access to the accused in the custody of the Special Cell
even before his relatives or lawyers had a chance to meet him (Indian Express,
October 17). The police counsel agreed to file a response and conceded
to the court that “the confessions recorded in the story were not in
good taste and they had no evidential value”.

VII. Police insensitivity

The Delhi Police exhibited extreme insensitivity and callousness in
their treatment of the dead bodies of Atif Ameen and Mohd. Sajid. In
the Jan Sunwai of the 12th October 2008, questions were raised
regarding the condition in which the bodies were received by the family
members. Witnesses related how they were not allowed to bury the bodies
in the Okhla graveyard. They expressed their anguish about the way in
which the police kept the community on tenterhooks about the burial of
the bodies. The handing over of the bodies was delayed and the entire
process was marked by complete lack of sensitivity in relation to the
dead. In their report submitted after the Sunwai, the Jury stated that
minimum human sensibilities must be respected regardless of the charges
against the dead.

VIII. Travesty of Right to Information Act

A student of journalism at Jamia Millia Islamia, Afroze Alam Sahil,
filed a petition under the Right to Information Act (RTI) for access to
the post mortem reports of the deceased, Inspector Sharma and Atif and
Sajid. The Jaiprakash Narayan Apex Trauma Centre of AIIMS turned down
his request arguing that the case was related to Medico Legal Records.
They refused to provide information citing Sections 8(1) b and 8(1) h
of the RTI.

Section 8(1) b of the Right To Information Act–2005 states that
information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any
court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute
contempt of court cannot be provided to a RTI petitioner. Section 8(1)
h states that information cannot be provided about matters which would
impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of
the offenders.

Neither
of the above applies to this case, as no orders or rulings have been
passed by the court to withhold information in this case. It is also
beyond logical comprehension, how the truth of the post mortem reports
would impede investigations. Unless of course, the investigations are
biased and skewed towards camouflaging the truth.

The (non) response of the Delhi Police

The same petitioner also filed an RTI application to the Delhi Police.
On the question of post mortem reports, the Delhi Police declined to
provide the reports citing section 8(1)h of the RTI Act-05 as AIIMS had
done.

The petition also sought information about the number of people
arrested in connection to the serial blasts in the capital on September
13 and the places from where they were arrested. In addition, it was
asked if the police have evidence against those who have been arrested.

The Delhi police did not feel it was necessary to answer these questions.

IX. Contradictions in the 'mastermind' theory

A succession of organizations such as the HUJI, SIMI and the IM have
already been named by different state police as the organizations
responsible for the blasts that have taken place in Jaipur, Ahmedabad
and Delhi and the bomb scare in Surat.

Mastermind Chart

U.P. Police

Walliullah

Uttar Pradesh blasts, including Sankatmochan Temple in 2006

Jaipur Police

Shahbaz Hussain

Jaipur blasts in May 2008

Gujarat Police

Abu Bashar
and Tauqeer

Gujarat blasts in July 2008

Tauqeer: India's Osama Bin laden

Tauqeer was a member of the now-banned SIMI. He was a software engineer
who had worked in multinational software firms in Mumbai, before
quitting his job for full time work for SIMI.

Tauqeer's name first appeared in the press conference of the Gujarat
DGP in Ahmedabad on August 16, 2008, where his name was given as Altaf
Subhan and he was described as a “bomb making expert”.

On August 17, 2008, Tauqeer was described as the “crack bomb maker who
fabricated the improvised explosive devices used in Ahmedabad and
Surat” in an article by Praveen Swamy in The Hindu.) He expanded his name to Mohammad Altaf Subhan.

The Times of India ran
a PTI story on August 19, 2008, which quoted an ATS officer – albeit
speaking on condition of anonymity – that Tauqeer's real name was 'Abdul
Subhan'. It was alleged by this source that Tauqeer was one of the key
masterminds of the Ahmedabad serial blasts and possibly the author of
the emails sent prior to the Ahmedabad and Jaipur blasts.

On the day of the Delhi blasts, 13 September, The Hindu's
Swami extended upon the theme of his earlier write up, even expanding
the 'real name' of Tauqeer further to Abdul Subhan Usman Qureshi. He
alleged that the signature 'al arbi', in the email sent before the
Ahmedabad blasts, matched Tauqeer's handwriting.

Following the
Delhi blasts, Tauqeer was the focus of several frontpage stories in the
newspapers and several features in the television media. He was
described variously as the 'head of SIMI's IT wing'; 'terror
mastermind' behind all blasts across the country; India's Osama bin
Laden; and even compared to the fictional character of the Jackal (Sakaal Times).
It was reported that a nation-wide hunt had been launched by the police
forces of Mumbai, Gujarat, UP and Delhi, backed by IB.

Just two days before the Batla House 'Encounter', the Mumbai ATS additional Commissioner was cited in the Times of India saying,
“Subhan is the most wanted man. All agencies are coordinating to nab
him”. On the day of the 'encounter' itself, the DCP, Special cell,
Delhi Police, Alok Kumar told reporters: “Tauqeer is the main leader
who played an important in all the blasts.” It was also reported in the
media, who quoted police sources, that after the first Delhi blast,
Atif had sent an sms to Tauqeer in Mumbai, who thereupon sent the IM
email to the media.

So virulent and sensationalist was the media
hype surrounding Tauqeer that his mother, Zubeida Qureshi called a
press conference 1 on 17 September and pleaded the innocence of her
son.1

1 Based on the article, “Will the same fate meet Maria's find, the latest mastermind Peerbhoy”, by Jyoti Punwani”, www.thehoot.org

Delhi Police Claims:

The Delhi Police declared
after the 19 September 'encounter' that Atif was the real mastermind
plotting all the blasts. His name had never surfaced earlier, not even
a few days after the Delhi blasts when the sketches of the Delhi
Bombers were released. All other 'masterminds' of the different state
police were rendered 'secondary agents' as the Delhi Police claimed
triumphantly to have busted the Delhi blast case and 'terror module'
and proclaimed that Atif Ameen actually plotted the UP, Jaipur, Gujarat
and the Delhi blasts – he was the new and 'real' 'mastermind'.

Mumbai Police makes new claims:

In a hurriedly-convened press conference on Wednesday 24th Sept 2008,
Mumbai Police Commissioner Hassan Gafoor, announced the arrest of five
IM members and said they were involved in the recent bomb blasts across
the country and had plans to attack Mumbai. He proclaimed Mohammad
Sadiq Shaikh as the man ('mastermind') from whom Atif Ameen, the
alleged 'mastermind' and leader of the Delhi bombers, reportedly took
his orders. “It was not Atif Ameen who was the mastermind. He was just
the operations guy. It was actually Sadiq who used to control Atif and
made him do the terror attacks”.

Mumbai Police insisted that the five 'terrorists' they had apprehended
had actually orchestrated the strikes in other states. They were
identified as:

1) Afzal Mutalib Usmani (32)

2) Mohammed Sadiq Shaikh (38)

3) Mohammed Arif Shaikh (38),

4) Mohammed Zakir Shaikh (28)

5) Mohammed Ansar Sheikh (31)

Mumbai's Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), Rakesh Maria claimed
that, “the five (IM) members have assisted or been actively involved in
the unexploded bombs in Varanasi, the Shramjeevi Express attack, the
Sankatmochan Temple blast, the blasts in a waiting room in Varanasi
railway station, the 7/11 blasts in Mumbai local trains and all other
blasts in the country that have occurred from 2005.”

Quite theatrically, the Mumbai Police introduced new dramatis personae and
virtually threw out of the window the old theories of the police forces
of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Jaipur, Gujarat and Delhi – each of whom had
earlier claimed credit for arresting the 'real' terror 'mastermind'
behind bomb attacks in their states and elsewhere.

But most of all, it contradicted Maharashtra Police's own claims. As
per the Mumbai Police claims, these five men arrested engineered the
7/11 blasts by training and helping seven people – who are now in jail – to
plant bombs. But, the state police's Anti Terrorist Squad (ATS) which
had arrested those seven people for planning 7/11 blasts stated in its
charge sheet that the men were provided training by Pakistani
nationals. How could the five men, who are residents of India,
according to the Mumbai Police, become Pakistani nationals in the ATS
charge sheet? So either the Mumbai Police is wrong or the ATS has made
a mistake.

Then this was pointed out to Maria, he had a
ready reply: “Those arrested for 7/11 were told by these five men that
they were Pakistanis. Hence they believed these five men and told this
during our interrogation.”

So, what happened to Tauqeer?

After publicly reiterating the culpability of Tauqeer in sending the
soth called 'terror e-mails', on 6 October, Mumbai Police Crime branch,
in a press conference announced that the emails had actually been the
handiwork, not of Tauqeer,
but of three well-qualified, computer-savy IM operatives. The three
suspects were: Mansoor Peerbhoy (31), Mubeen Shaikh (24) and Asif
Shaikh (22). “The three were trained in an anti-hacking training class
in Hyderabad and the Indian Mujahideen had paid Rs. 70,000 per head as
their fee for the three-day course,” said an investigator. (Times of India, 7 October 2008).

The Crime Branch did not explain why well-qualified computer engineers
would have to enroll in a 'course' to gain skills such as hacking into
wi-fi accounts – skills that many computer-savvy metropolitan teenagers
are equipped with. No information was forthcoming either about the
institute offering such courses for the said fee.

But what was most notable was the convenient amnesia about Tauqeer. Tauqeer, chided Maria, was a mere “media creation” (TOI,
7 October 2008). Neither is Tauqeer mentioned in the Mumbai Police's
arrests nor in the chargesheets filed by the Delhi Police.

What
this reveals foremost is the manner in which state police departments
operate: feeding stories to the media that are often attributed to
unnamed 'sources' – literally manufacturing 'terrorists' and
'masterminds', and then moving on to new set of suspects when evidence
runs thin – all with the confidence that their past accusations will not
be challenged, or at best be treated as 'collateral damage' in the 'war
against terror'.

APPENDIX

I. Profile of those Illegally Detained and Arrested

Following is the list of Muslim men 'arrested' and detained by the
Police, in clear violation of the legal norms and rules. These were all
'picked up' (a euphemism for such police abductions) for questioning
related to bomb blasts across the country, in particular to the Delhi
blasts. Invariably, arrest warrants were never produced, Identification
cards were not shown; in no case was the police in either uniform or
travelling in vehicles that indicated they were police vehicles. This
is not an exhaustive list of all such 'arrests'.

ADNAN FAHAD

Adnan Fahad, father of two children, one aged three and half years old
and another barely one, runs a small shop for DTP work in Daryaganj in
the Walled City area.

Adnan Fahad's house in Abul Fazal Part I was raided by 12-15 gunth
toting men at around 11 am on 14 September. Initially, two of these
police men went up to the third floor, knocked at the door saying that
they were from the gas agency. They went in, and on finding no male in
the house, asked his wife to call up Adnan, who had stepped out in the
neighbourhood. As soon as he reached home he was asked to come with
them. His friend Nayeem accompanied him to some distance but was forced
to return by the police.

The police officers said they were taking him away for some questioning
for mere 15-20 minutes. At the Lodhi Road Special cell office, he said,
“Hundreds of questions were asked to me from 1 pm to 10:30 pm.” These
related to his alleged links to SIMI, but also humiliating questions
with clear communal bias. The first question to him was: “Are you Shia,
Sunni or Ahmadi?” When he replied that he was a “simple Muslim”, they
retorted, “You are ahle hadees as they say such things”. He was further
asked if he had a passport. When he replied in the affirmative, the
response was: “Why? Do you want to go to Pakistan?”

“Who do you know in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Gujarat,” they asked.
When he said he didn't know any one in particular, but people come to
him for business from across the country, the sleuths threatened him of
physical torture if refused to budge. He was asked to recall all his
activities of the past 14 days, from meal to namaz to meeting with
people. He was questioned about his friends or relatives in Pakistan,
Bangladesh and England.

His email ID and password was taken and his mails checked by the
policemen. At the end he was given a paper to sign. What he could read
in a flash of time was that it mentioned Delhi blasts and the failure
of interrogation.

What has shocked the families of Agwan and Adnan is that though they
were taken for questioning, within hours, news was flashed on
television channels that two persons had been arrested in the
connection of the Delhi serial blasts.

ABDUL RASHEED AGWAN

Agwan is president of Lucknow-based Foundation for Social Care, which
provides scholarship to students pursuing diploma courses. It also runs
a 10-bed hospital, another hospital for AIDS patients and a school. He
is also assistant general secretary of All India Education Movement
whose president is noted educationist Syed Hamid. The organization has
in the past launched several caravans on the issues of education,
health and communal harmony. He is also associated with Centre for
Advancement of Voluntary Efforts, a consultancy firm that helps people
in opening NGO, helping them in registration, shares information about
funding agencies and government schemes and trains their staff.

On 14th September, at around 12:15 pm, three vans full of plainclothes
sleuths entered his home in Shaheen Bagh (Abul Fazl Enclave Part II).
According to his son, Taufique Agwan, they refused to produce any ID
cards even when they were asked for it. He was taken away for
questioning to the Special Cell office in Lodhi Road where he was
subjected to sustained questioning about SIMI.

“They asked several questions about SIMI and its people, they pressed
me to give names of some SIMI people in my locality,” said Abdul
Rasheed Agwan He said he could not understand how a banned organization
could remain active. “The Delhi blasts are antihuman act and whoever is
responsible for it should be punished and I am ready to help the
police,” he told the police officials who were interrogating him.

He was asked where he was on Saturday between 5-5:30 pm. He said he was
at home with two non-Muslim guests from Hyderabad. They had come to
consult him about starting an NGO. The interrogators also asked him
about Abul Bashar who was arrested from Azamgarh last month and was
later projected as the mastermind of the Ahmedabad serial blasts.

“Do you know about Abul Bashar?” they asked. “Not more than what has
appeared in the media,” he said. They alleged that Bashar had his cell
number and that he had stayed at his home. Agwan denied the charges.2

2 Based on the reports on TwoCircles.net

MOHAMMAD RASHID

Rashid who hails from Allahabad has been living in the Jamia Nagar
locality of Delhi since 2000. He is a convert to Islam from Hinduism.
Rashid went to Azamgarh in 1995 and studied at the Jamia-tul-falah medarsafrom
1995 to 1999. Later he did his B.A, M.A (Islamic Studies) and also B.
Ed from Jamia. He is now enrolled for Ph. D at the Department of
Islamic Studies (Jamia Millia Islamia), and is a recipient of the UGC
scholarship for Ph.D students.

On the afternoon of 18th September
2008, he was picked up from his rented accommodation by plain clothed
policemen. While his room was being thoroughly searched he was asked
regarding his acquaintance with Abu Bashr, which he denied. Thereafter
Abu Bashr (whom Rashid could later recognize on account of his
photographs in the newspapers) was brought inside and asked whether he
recognized Rashid. Bashr who appeared under tremendous pressure nodded
his head towards Rashid. All the while Rashid kept asking these men
what the matter was. Not eliciting any reply from his 'tormentors' and
feeling hapless, Rashid agreed to voluntarily go with the police.

Rashid was driven around Jamia Nagar for hours; the police vehicle even
made a detour towards Jamia Hamdard, where they were denied permission
to enter. He was finally taken to the Special Cell Lodhi Road office at
around 8.30 pm. Abu Bashr also reached the Cell separately. Rashid was
again interrogated and asked if he knew Abu Bashr. Bashr was also asked
if he recognized Rashid. Bashr told them that he had met Rashid during
the namazat
the Markaz (Abul Fazal Enclave) on 25th of July. (While talking to us
Rashid refused this and again denied having ever met Bashr). Upon
Bashr's affirmation more than half a dozen plain clothed policemen
began wantonly hitting Rashid. Next he was taken to another room where
he was asked to strip, made to half-sit, and heavy rods were tied to
his fore arms. Whenever his hands shook, he was hit with rods on his
back and behind his ankle. This went on for the next 35 to 40 minutes
after which Rashid who couldn't take it any more, said he recognized
Bashr and also agreed to willingly sign wherever they wanted him to.
Rashid also told them that he was even ready to be proclaimed the
'mastermind', but he could not take this torture anymore. One of the
policemen – whom he recognized later from the newspapers – was Inspector
M.C. Sharma. One another person was addressed by others as Sanjeev.

The next day, i.e. 19th September, from the early morning he was again
interrogated about his acquaintance with both Abu Bashr and Yasin
Patel – the latter's phone number was found in Rashid's wallet. He
clarified that Yasin had once asked him to give tuitions to his
children and that his how he had his contact number. He reiterated that
he wasn't lying about anything and that they could verify his
information from other sources and enquire about him from his
Department, teachers and neighbours.

The same day, around 5.30. pm,
six boys were brought in to Rashid's room. Rashid later realized that
these must have been the boys from Jamia school picked up from the flat
opposite 108 in L-18. They were asked if they knew Rashid or had seen
him at L-18. One of the boys acknowledged that he had once seen Rashid
coming down the stairs from L-18. Rashid retorted that he had never
visited L-18 but used to go to Khalilullah Masjid occasionally on
Fridays. Towards the evening, Rashid overheard policemen saying that
M.C Sharma needed twenty units of blood. Late at night Rashid was taken
upstairs. A boy was present in that room and they were both asked to
recognize each other. Later Rashid realized from newspapers reports,
that he was Zeeshan. Meanwhile he also spotted another boy passing by,
whose shoulder and hand seemed broken.

On the third day, i.e, 20th September Rashid
was beaten up several times, even as he kept repeating that he would
sign wherever they wanted him to. While thrashing him, a policeman
remarked: 'now you recognise Bashr, but later in court you are going to
turn hostile and refuse to do so'. Rashid told that whosoever came in
used to beat him up for no reason, particularly after learning that he
was a convert, and fasting during the holy month.

He was asked
several times, why he converted and also hit by the police again and
again when he told them his story about conversion.

Rashid was enquired regarding his financial support, to which replied
that he earned enough through tuitions and that he received some
scholarships. He was also specifically asked who amongst his teachers
provide him money or support. He said none provided him financial help
on personal terms.

On this day, most people left for Inspector M.C.Sharma's funeral and
came back only late in the evening. A bearded person lectured Rashid
for four hours that day and it was also suggested to him subtly that he
should work for them: 'those who work for us, we take care of them'.

Finally on 21st Septmeber, Rashid's statement
was recorded in the morning. He was asked about his family members,
their names, age, addresses, what they do, etc. He was later asked to
call his roommate to come to the police station along with any elderly
person. His roommate came with an advocate named Ahsan to the Special
cell police station and Rashid was released.

SCHOOL CHILDREN

On September 19th, five school children who lived in the flats
adjoining 108 in L-18 were picked up after the 'encounter' and taken to
the Special Cell office to identify the arrested to establish their
links with the deceased. They were picked up in the evening and
released after 10.00 pm. the same day. The entire process is totally
illegal considering the fact that they were minors. The psychological
implications of it were so deep that the entire family has moved out of
their residence and have not come back till date.

MOHD. SAQUIB

Eyewitness account of a young boy picked up by the Special Cell from a locality adjacent to Jamia Nagar.

On 23rd September, against the backdrop of the conspicuous 'terror' of
the police in the area and some disquieting questions being raised that
underscored the grey zones in the encounter – even as young boys
continued to be being picked up – some academics from Jamia, journalists,
lawyers and members of civil society were closeted in a meeting,
deliberating the incident and the police's ultra enthusiasm. Suddenly
the meeting was interrupted by call received by a young man, a distant
cousin of the slain Atif, who had come to attend the meeting. It was
learnt that the Special Cell cops had picked up his younger brother,
who had just completed his Higher Secondary. 19-year-old Mohammad
Saquib had been picked up from his Shaheen Bagh home. Men in
plainclothes had arrived at their Shaheen Bagh home, asked for Talib
and not finding him at home, gagged and dragged the young Saquib away,
without even giving him time to wear his chappals. He was bundled in to
a car and taken to an undisclosed location. They were actually looking
for Talib, his brother.

Since the boy was been picked up by 'unknown' men, it was thus decided
to lodge an FIR at the Jamia Nagar PS. It was only sustained pressure
and the presence of senior Supreme Court lawyer and journalists that we
were successful in registering the FIR. This was probably the first
time in Jamia Nagar that such illegal abductions by police had been
challenged – it soon produced results. As we were contemplating the legal
course, Talib received a phone call from the Special Cell that his
brother Saqub had been picked up by their officers and that he could
come and fetch him home. Collin Gonsalves and another lawyer reached
the Lodhi Road office of the Special Cell to take custody of Saquib.
They were however denied his custody, as the Special Cell was willing
to release him only to his elder brother and father. We feared that it
might be a ploy to arrest Talib upon his visit to the Special Cell
office. But as the lawyers were returning and considering the next line
of action, they were re-called and asked to take back the boy.

The lawyers returned with Saquib in about 30 minutes. Barefoot and
dressed in pyajamas and T-shirt, he burst into tears as he embraced his
brother. The brothers could scarcely believe that they had found each
other. Saquib narrated his ordeal to his: he was dragged away and not
even allowed to have a word with his mother who present in the house.
All the way they kept hurling choicest of abuses, interspersed by
threats of dire consequences. Soon after they drove up, a car pulled
alongside in which a man, with face covered by black cloth was asked to
identify Saquib – the man gesticulated in the negative. Threats, abuses,
and intimidation continued, as they drove to the Special Cell
headquarters. Once there, he was questioned at length as to what was he
doing during the Jaipur blasts? Upon Saquib's reply that he had never
been to Jaipur, they again tried to terrorize and bully him by alleging
that he was present in the video footage of the encounter. Saquib
demanded to be shown the footage, upon which the Special Cell replied
that they did not have the footage with them at the moment. He was once
again made to be a part of an identification parade, where another man
was asked to identify him, who too had no clue regarding him. All
through this, Saquib was observing his Ramazan fast, as he sat on the
floor hand-cuffed – in gross violation of laws – facing a barrage of
abuses. Mercifully though Saquib's ordeal was over and he returned
safe, but the horror of those hours spent in unlawful custody – abused
and damned – still haunts him and has scarred his young mind.

We suggested to Talib that he might be safer living elsewhere. But he
refused to go to any 'safe place' for indeed neither he nor his brother
had committed any crime to 'elude' the police in this manner. He was at
loss to know 'why the police wanted to pick them up.' To the contrary
he was most willing to go to the police station, and answer any
question they had for him.

AMIR

On 16 October, the local residents of Shaheen Bagh (near Abul Fazl
Enclave) captured a NOIDA police official and his car (without number
plate), while 3 others fled. People in Jamia's Shaheen Bagh area
managed to avert another possible violent scene when they stopped a
black unnumbered Hyundai car in which about 4 people had kidnapped a
local boy Amir as he had just entered the area to meet his
brother-in-law. The local residents became suspicious of the activity
when they spotted the car was without a number plate. As the crowd
gathered, 3 persons ran away, but one of them named Mahesh was
captured, and taken to the Jamia Nagar police station. According to
sources he is a sub-inspector from NOIDA police, although local DCP
Vijay Gupta refused to confirm or deny this. The local residents feel
that Amir was being kidnapped to be used in another encounter. They
found the number plate of the car inside (DL1-TW 1590). They also found
two PAN cards – one of Jitendra Chopra s/o Om Prakash, and the other of
Yogesh Pal Singh s/o Vishnu Pal Singh, besides a VISA card from
Oriental Bank of Commerce with the name Priti Singh. The local police
tried to hush the incident, although the leaders of Jamia area have
been making a lot of noise about it, and the atmosphere in Shaheen Bagh
is tense.

IMRAN

On 8th November, about 20 days after the
foiled kidnapping by Noida Police of a Muslim youth in Jamia Nagar's
Shaheen Bagh area, the Haryana Police in broad daylight tried to do a
Shaheen Bagh in Malviya Nagar but again they had to face public
resistance and flee the scene in 'local police cover' It was around
3:30 pm yesterday when everything was normal in Hauz Rani Gaon area
under Delhi's Malviya Nagar Police Station. Imran, 28, was at his shop
Gauri Motors. A white colour Bolero jeep with blue beacon light atop
but with no number plate came to the shop. Six armed men, who later
turned out to be policemen from Ballabhgarh in Haryana, came out and
dragged Imran into the van. He cried for help, local residents gathered
and asked the 'kidnappers' to show their ID if they are policemen but
they threatened to kill them. Yet the locals including women braved
their threat and did not allow them to pick the youth. The local police
came and took the Haryana Police to Malviya Nagar Police Station. After
some time they were released. Locals say that the policemen had some
sinister plan to kill the youth in a fake encounter and declare him as
terrorist. They said Imran has no criminal background. When the locals
asked the policemen to show their ID as they were in civilian dress and
in a van with no number plate, they took out their arms and threatened
to kill them. The residents called the local police, who assured them
of action against those who wanted to pick the youth. They took them in
their custody and drove to the Malviya Nagar Police Station. People
alleged that the police sided with the Haryana cops upon reaching the
police station and released them. Haji Quresh, Imran's brother has
filed a complaint.

MURTAZA ALI KHAN

The most recent case is that of a young man from Bareily, missing since
28th November 2008 from Zakir Nagar an area adjacent to Batla House.
His ailing sister and old father since then have been doing the rounds
of local police station and the Special Cell but nobody has so far paid
any attention to them.

According to a news item in the 4th December 2008 issue of the Delhi Urdu daily Roznama Rashtriya Sahara a
young man named Murtaza Ali Khan alias Mannan of Izzat Nagar of Bareily
district of Uttar Pradesh came to see his ailing sister Mumtaz, a
resident of Zakir Nagar, on 27th November 2008. In the morning of 28th
November, his sister asked him to get some medicine from the Lions
Hospital in New Friends Colony. When he did not return for quite some
time, his sister Mumtaz and some others went to Lions Hospital where
some people told them that a young man has forcibly been picked up by
some men who appeared to be police men. They told that those men came
in a Santro car with number plate DL-3CY-0718. His relatives approached
a former local Municipal Councillor who rang up the police at about
9.45 am. After some time the former Municipal Councillor received a
call from the New Friends Colony police station informing that a young
man named Mannan has been taken away by the Special Cell. The same day
his ailing sister informed the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, Police
Commissioner of Delhi, National Human Rights Commission, National
Minority Commission of the incident. But no action till late evening of
3rd December was taken. Despite repeated attempts, the relatives failed
to lodge an FIR with the New Friends Colony Police Station. As a
result, his sister approached the Delhi High Court demanding that the
Court should order the Delhi Police to locate the whereabouts of her
brother. His sister told Rashtriya Sahara that there was no case either
in Bareily or in Delhi against her brother. She feared that her brother
may be implicated in any false case or may be done away with in a fake
encounter.

After repeated denials, the Special Cell finally acknowledged that they have indeed picked up Mannan.

II. Terror Trails of 'Special' Cops (Special Cell, STF, ATS)3

3 We are thankful to Prof. Nirmalangshu Mukherjee for sharing this with us. It has also appeared in Revolutionary Democracy, Vol. XIV, No. 2, September 2008.

The Batla house operation by the Special Cell of the Delhi police has
re-opened unanswered questions about the functioning of this and
similar agencies. Killings and arrests of Muslim youths by the Special
Cell of Delhi police in its anti-terrorist operations are a routine
matter by now. For example, as a representation in July 2005 to the
National Human Rights Commission by the Committee for Inquiry on
December 13 (chaired by late Nirmala Deshpande) documented, the Cell
conducted the following operations during the short period between
February to July 2005. Importantly, this is the period in which the
Supreme Court formulated its judgment on the Parliament attack case,
and the conduct of the Cell in its handling of the case was under close
scrutiny.

July 10: Abdul Majid Bhatt of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen arrested (The Times of India, 18 July 2005).

In each case one could notice a similar pattern:

the media reported just the police version of the story in a language and with visual aids that vastly heightened the atmosphere of fear.;

There were no follow-ups to ascertain whether the arrests and the encounters were genuine;

After the arrests, the arrested persons simply disappeared from view;

the media made no inquiries about their treatment in police custody, and whether the accused have been given the due protection of law.

Besides, the media conducted no investigation on the following issues:

sudden increase in anti-terrorist operations by the Special Cell;

that dreaded terrorist organizations such as LeT could allow
themselves to be repeatedly caught in the traps set up by the Special
Cell;

every time the Special Cell with remarkable ease was able to recover
huge amounts of explosives and incriminating material, so much so that
the identity and the goals of the organizations are immediately exposed;

the remarkable ability of the Special Cell to remain unharmed in alleged gun-battles.

In at least two cases, there are reasons to doubt the veracity of the
police story. First, the alleged ex-militant Mohammad Ahsan Untoo is in
fact a senior human rights campaigner in Kashmir, who was arrested by
the Special Cell illegally and was brutally tortured in an attempt to
extract a confession implicating him with the murderous attack on S. A.
R. Geelani (Indian Express, 17 May). Second, the People's Union for
Democratic Rights (PUDR) has shown that the encounter near Pragati
Maidan in which two alleged militants were gunned down was possibly an
act of cold-blooded murder, reminiscent of the Ansal Plaza incident
some years ago (The Hindu, 3 May, 2005).

Repeatedly it has been pointed out by the Civil Liberties organizations
and Human Rights lawyers that the methods of this special police cell,
which functions as a law unto itself, are seriously questionable. In
the name of “counter-terrorist” operations, this Cell has repeatedly
engaged in false arrests and encounter killings of innocent people. For
example, the National Human Rights Commission had questioned their role
in the Ansal Plaza incident in which officer Rajbir Singh and his
colleagues shot down two unarmed persons allegedly belonging to the
Lashkar-e-Toiba.

In spite of persistent and detailed reporting of the unlawful – often
murderous – actions of the Cell, by human rights organizations such as
People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and People's Union of Civil
Liberties (PUCL), these appeals and reports fell on deaf ears of even
otherwise competent authorities including the National Human Rights
Commission – they were only marginally covered by the print media, if at
all. What stayed in public memory were the dramatic operations of the
Special Cell resulting in elimination of dreaded terrorists, recovery
of large amount of explosive material and other weapons, large cache of
foreign exchange, mobile and e-mail records, and, of course, the
immediate detailed confessions. Officers such as Rajbir Singh and Mohan
Chand Sharma were projected as national heroes, notwithstanding
side-reports of the involvement and subsequent murder of Rajbir Singh
in connection with shady land deals worth astronomical amounts of money.

It is natural to ask whether the suggested judicial probe should be
restricted to Batla house episode alone. In his recent submission
before the Delhi High Court, senior counsel Prashant Bhusan, appearing
for PUDR, questioned the legality of the Batla House operation. In the
course of his argument, he mentioned several other cases – such as the
'encounter' at the Millenium Park – in which the operations of the Cell
had been seriously questioned by human rights organizations earlier.

At a demonstration against the Special Cell at Jantar Mantar on 26 November 2008.

The Case of Mohammad Qamar and Irshad Ali

In a more recent case, the judicial pronouncement against the Cell had
been even more damaging. In a repetition of the familiar story, the
Cell had arrested two Muslim youth, Mohammad Maurif Qamar and Irshad
Ali and charged them as terrorists belonging to the Al-Badr outfit.

Upon investigation it turned out that Qamar and Ali were actually
police informers who were assigned the task of infiltrating terrorist
organizations in Jammu and Kashmir. When they refused, Qamar was
abducted from his residence in Bhajanpura on 22 December 2005 while Ali
had earlier gone missing from his Sultanpuri house on 12 December 2005.
Qamar was taken to a room near Red Fort where he came across Ali. Both
were needlessly interrogated and tortured by the IB and Delhi Police
officers. On 28 December 2005, missing person report was filed by the
kin of Qamar, alleging that he had been kidnapped. Representations were
also sent to the President, Prime Minister and Home Minister of India,
by Aqif Qamar, his brother, seeking directions to Delhi Police to trace
his missing brother. Subsequently the Special Cell sleuths showed the
arrest of Ali and Qamar, alleging that they were picked up by the Cell
from Mubaraka Chowk, on G.T. Karnal Road in north Delhi on 9 February
2006. Among other things, two kg of RDX and pistols were shown to have
been recovered from them and booked them under sections 121 (waging war
against the state) and 120B (criminal conspiracy) as well as under the
Explosives Act.

Fortunately, the accused found a zealous and courageous lawyer to
defend them. The lawyer could establish the fact that they were police
informers from the phone records between the members of the Special
Cell and the accused. The matter was referred to the High Court which
ordered a supplementary investigation into the case by the CBI. The
agency's investigation conclusively proved that calls were made often
to both Ali and Qamar from the landline telephones of intelligence
agencies, proving that the duo were indeed informers. In its Status
Report submitted before the court of Justice Reva Khetrapal, the CBI
stated that:

There was nothing to prove that Qamar was associated with Al-Badr.

There were no independent witnesses to the seizure of arms and ammunition.

The police had made no efforts to trace how the weapons reached the accused.

The police failed to explain why the mobile phones of the accused were switched off for two months prior to their arrest.

After concluding that the arrests and the recoveries do not 'inspire
confidence', the CBI suggested that it seemed that the duo were victims
of a conspiracy hatched by the Special Cell in collusion with
intelligence bureau operatives. The CBI asked the court to entrust the
'investigation of the case to CBI for a thorough and impartial
investigation into the matter'. After a strong reminder by the High
Court, the CBI submitted its Closure Report in the court of the
Additional Session Judge, S.S. Mohi on 11th November 2008. The CBI came
out with some startling findings: the agency told the Sessions Court
that Ali and Qamar were as a matter of fact IB informers and – not as
alleged by the Special Cell, Al-Badr terrorists. They were innocents
who were framed and falsely implicated in the entire case by the
Special Cell, which had planted fabricated evidence on these men. The
CBI also disclosed that these two had been kidnapped by the Special
Cell in December 2005 – a full two months before they were shown to be
arrested. These startling revelations have brought into open the way in
which such 'special' security agencies operate: kidnapping, framing
innocents, planting pistols and explosives, and justifying their
high-handedness in the name of fighting 'terror'. The agency further
recommended that the three Special Cell cops who were part of the
operation and frame-up be booked for fabricating evidence and planting
incriminating evidence.

The parallels between 'Al Badar operation' and the Batla House 'Encounter':

* The Special cell team which conducted the 'Al Badr' operation was
headed by ACP Sanjeev Yadav and Inspector Sharma – the very same people
who led the Batla House operation!

* Moreover, there were several common members between the two Special
Cell teams: Sub-Inspectors Ravinder Tyagi, Sanjay Dutt and Rahul Kumar
played an important role in both events. Incidentally, Tyagi is the
recipient of this year's President's Gallantry Award.

* Arms have been shown to be seized on both occasions. No seizure lists made or verified in either cases.

Sub-Inspectors Ravinder Tyagi, Sanjay Dutt and Rahul Kumar have been
recommended for prosecution by the CBI. The CBI report clearly points
to a nexus between the IB and the Special Cell in framing Qamar and Ali
(and many others like them). Apart from the Delhi Police officials, the
CBI also found that an Inspector rank officer of the IB, namely Majid
Din, was involved in the abduction and illegal detention of the two
youths.

The latest gallantry of the Special Cell comprises threats to the CBI
Inspector, Santosh Kumar, for daring to unearth the Special Cell dirt.
Kumar has moved an application in the court of Additional Sessions
Judge S K Gautam seeking “protection” against threats received from
Sub-Inspector Vinay Tyagi of the Special Cell. Kumar has claimed in his
application that Tyagi, who was the first investigating officer in the
case, had threatened him with “dire consequences for exposing some
officers in the case of framing two persons as members of Kashmir-
based militant outfit Al Badr”.

Kumar claims Tyagi issued the threats while they were coming out of
courtroom after a hearing on December 15. He has also alleged that
Tyagi was trying to tamper with evidence in the case. (Indian Express,
15 January 2009).

III Report of the Jan Sunwai in Batla House (12th October 2008)

The audience listens to the testimonies of the eye witnesses at Jan Sunwai.
Batla House, 12 October 2008

On
the 12th October, 2008, the Jamia Teachers' Solidarity Group organized
a Jan Sunwai and Public Meeting on the Batla House 'Encounter' in the
ground opposite Khalilullah Masjid, Batla House, Jamia Nagar, New
Delhi, from 10.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m.

The jury constituted of Swami
Agnivesh, John Dayal, Harsh Mander, Tripta Wahi, Tanika Sarkar, Vijay
Singh and Nirmalangshu Mukherji. Prominent members of the civil society
who attended the Jan Sunwai included, among others, Prashant Bhushan,
Arundhati Roy, Kavita Srivastava and Kavita Krishnan. Faculty, staff
and students of Jamia Millia Islamia, University of Delhi and JNU, and
members of the media too joined the proceedings of the Jan Sunwai to
listen to the eye witness' accounts of the 'encounter'.

The Sunwai helped towards breaking the shroud of silence in which the
members of the Jamia Nagar community had been pushed into following the
policed feeding of accounts of the 'encounter' that was coming through
the media through previous weeks. The people of Jamia Nagar
participated overwhelmingly in the Jan Sunwai. The predominant
sentiment among the local residents about the 'encounter' was one of
shock, anger and disbelief. There was a strong unanimity among the
people present regarding the fake nature of the 'encounter' and the
entire locality appeared to disagree with the story of the 'encounter'
of the police.

This feeling was articulated by the participants and those who gave
testimony before the jury. Several people of the community spoke as
neighbours, eye witnesses and relatives of either the deceased or the
accused and argued that while the problem of terrorism needs serious
attention, one cannot subscribe to an alternate reign of terror
perpetrated by certain sections of the state authority.

Local residents took strong exception to the stereotyping of young
Muslim educated youth in this area and also in general as terrorists.
It was widely felt that the links which the pliant media and the state
is making between education, especially professional technical
education among Muslim youth and terrorism has fuelled fears that it
will inhibit the progress and social advancement of the community.

Following are the testimonies before the Jury of local residents who were eyewitnesses4 to the 'encounter':

4 Names of eyewitnesses and other witnesses have been withheld to protect their identity

Witness 1 (Neighbour)

The witness came to know
of the police action only when he heard the police firing, which he
initially thought of as bursts of firecrackers. In his opinion the
police should have taken some people from the locality or the building
into confidence before beginning the operation. Perhaps this way any
untoward accident in such an action could have been avoided. According
to him, the police perhaps consulted just the kooda-wallah(garbage-picker)
and the watchman of the building to build more upon their claimed
intelligence leads. He said that the police could have got more
appropriate intelligence inputs if they had bothered to make enquiries
with the residents of the building regarding these boys. On being
quizzed what time he turned his attention to the police action, he
replied that it must have been around 10:45 am. He mentioned that he
heard gunfire of only one kind, and at marked intervals, suggesting
that there were no crossfiring and only one party did all the shooting.

He mentioned that when two policemen brought down Inspector Mohan Chand
Sharma from L-18, he was walking though propped, and there seemed no
bullet injuries to the frontal torso though there was some blood around
the left arm. He finds it strange that nobody from police ever came to
talk to the residents even after the incident so as to gather any
information about the boys.

Witness 2

The witness works in an electricity related firm, and one of their
facilities is in the vicinity of L-18. He said he received a call from
his office supervisor that some gun firing was going on around his
office. He lives close by and immediately rushed off to investigate,
reaching the site around 11:20 am. He saw pistol wielding policemen
around – some of them were scaling the terrace of L-10, the house
opposite L-18, and throwing flower pots onto L-18 breaking window
panes, apparently trying to present it as a credible a site of struggle.

He also pointed out that the media was present when he came to the
site, though they were not allowed to go beyond the Khalillullah
Masjid, where police by this time had put up barricades.

Witness 3 (Neighbour)

The witness recounted that on the morning of the 19th September, he saw
some people running around the Khalillullah mosque crossing. He heard
that there was some fighting going on. He dismissed it as a brawl
between some property dealers who live in the locality. But soon he
realized the gravity of the matter, when he saw plain-clothes policemen
around and he heard about five rounds of gunfire. He was able to see
one gunman in civilian clothes. He heard another five rounds and then
saw Mohan Chand Sharma descending down the stairs of L-18, supported by
others. He also recounts that all the gunfire had a singular sound
type, and hence there must have been no cross firing. Most
significantly, he heard nothing to suggest any struggle or shouts,
etc., between the police and the boys alleged to be terrorists.

He said that following Inspector Sharma's departure, there were five
more rounds of fire, and sounds of breaking glass. In total he claims
that there must have been around 20-22 rounds of gunfire; all of one
sound-type.

According to him, the police brought the dead bodies completely wrapped
in bed sheets, and these were quickly taken away, so they could not
identify the faces of the dead. He was also at loss to understand as to
why the AK-47 assault rifles and others explosives that the police
claimed to have recovered from the site were not shown to anyone?

On being asked if he ever saw any suspicious activity involving these
dead students he answered in the negative. Answering about the
chronology of the events he says it all began around 10:30 am, around
11:00 am Inspector Sharma was rushed out, and by 11:30 am the bodies of
the dead were taken away.

He was very disturbed by the connections being made between technical
education among Muslims and terrorism. As a teacher at a polytechnic,
he felt himself vulnerable to similar charges.

Witness 4 (Neighbour)

The witness is an advocate and lives in the same lane in which L-18 is
located. At the time of police action he heard gunshots and when he
came out to see what was going on, he saw some plainclothes policemen
with guns. Since he was familiar with some of these policemen – having
met them in some or the other connection in the courts – he enquired
from them as to what was going on. He was told that there were SIMI men
upstairs. He wanted to know more which led to heated exchange between
him and couple of these policemen who refused to tell him anymore. Then
he saw a policeman whom he recognised, rushing up.

He heard some firing, all of one kind only, which suggested absence of crossfire.

Next he saw Mohan Chand Sharma being carried down propped on shoulders
of ACP Sanjeev Yadav who was wearing his bullet-proof jacket, while
Mohan Chand was not. There were more pistol shots. Then two policemen
carried stretchers upstairs, and quickly returned with one dead body
completely wrapped in sheets. It was carried out in a Qualis, which was
taken right into the complex's parking and nobody was allowed to see
what was happening there. Soon after this, a man with his head covered
was taken away in a Santro car with a damaged number plate. Everything
was over within 25 minutes. The witness then called Zee News. Soon more
police force arrived and the witness even saw Karnail Singh walking
about.

Regarding the 'controversial' picture of Mr Mohan Chand, the witness
suggested that it must have been clicked between 10:30–10:45 am. He
said that while Mohan Chand was carried to a vehicle the policemen kept
abusing everyone around.

The Jury asked him if he had ever earlier seen or met the boys who were
killed. He replied that indeed on a couple of occasions he had seen
them in the mosque.

He also told Jury that some policemen climbed L-10 and L-11 and threw
flowerpots, etc., on to the balcony of the L-18. Some also fired in the
air. Responding to another question he told the Jury that Mohan Chand
Sharma seemed to have received bullet wound on his shoulder and there
was some blood there. Asked if the dead body that was brought down had
blood on it…he said that the body was wrapped in sheets and he could
not see any blood anywhere.

He also stated that many more people had been picked up from Shaheen
Bagh, Zakir Nagar, etc in the aftermath of the 'encounter'. And from
the same building six very young schoolboys studying at Jamia school
living in the flat below were picked up and released only late in the
night.

Witness 5 (Neighbour)

The witness was heading for his office when he heard gunshots and
stopped. He saw Inspector Sharma, bleeding from his left shoulder,
being carried by two colleagues. He told the jury that the police
abused them and said “saalon gaadi hatao…”. Soon after he left for his office and returned only by the evening.

Witnesses to the Burial

Others who were not eyewitnesses to the encounter killings namely but
otherwise were present when the bodies of the deceased were given final
ablution before the burial, testified about the injuries on the dead
bodies. They all pointed that Sajid had distinct bullet marks on the
head indicating as if he was made to kneel down and then was shot in
cold blood at a close range. They also told the jury that Atif ’s skin
was badly bruised and sloughed off from the back as if he was dragged
on some rough ground.

Atif had injury marks around his waist and a number of bullet wounds around his chest.

Report of the Jury

On the 14th October, 2008, the jury of the Jan Sunwai submitted its
report. The jury was of the view that the on-going targeting of the
Muslim minority in the country has created an atmosphere of fear and
anxiety. The complete disregard and violation of fundamental civil
rights in the process of the State's efforts to control 'terrorist'
activities has raised questions regarding the secular character of the
Indian democracy and the impartiality of its institutions. The
widespread sense of alienation among the minorities can only be
mitigated by ensuring justice.

The jury strongly felt that there was ample ground to doubt the
veracity of the police version of the sequence of events on 19th
September. Following its observations in the Jan Sunwai, the Jury
demanded:

Judicial probe into the 19th September encounter by a sitting Supreme Court judge

The investigations must be handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigations.

IV. Azamgarh phobia

Azamgarh has been touted as the 'hub of terror'. Dozens of youth are
missing, either absconding for fear of charges of terror being forced
on them, or picked up by the police, their parents are unsure. A
climate of fear still prevails, with arbitrary arrests still continuing
unabated.

Azamgarh hockey team called 'terrorists':

The unfounded maligning of Azamgarh by the media as 'atankgarh' has had
severe repercussions, which seem to be widening its ambit. Most
unfortunate is the case that involved members of the Azamgarh hockey
team. The incident happened on the 9th November 2008, when under the
coach Abu Lais, three district level players from Azamgarh, namely,
Shivanand Maurya, Shamiullah and Pawan Gaud were headed to Etawah to
participate in the state level, under-16 hockey tournament. At the
Kanpur railway station they were waiting for a train bound to Etawah.
Around 2.30 pm when they were boarding the train, one of them suddenly
remembered that they left their jerseys behind. The boys rushed back to
retrieve their jerseys. As they were running , they were stopped by
some GRP personnel and questioned: 'Kahan sey aa rahe ho?'; 'Kahan jaa
rahe ho?' ('where are you guys coming from?'; 'where are you all
heading to?'). The boys replied they were from Azamgarh and were going
to Etawah to take part in satelevel hockey tournament. No sooner did
the GRP men hear the name of Azamgarh that they were called as
'aatanki' (terrorists) and were subjected to severe physical search,
during which Rs 200 was snatched from one boy and Rs 700 from another
boy. Monetarily ransacked and emotionally scarred the boys nonetheless
left for their tournament, and returned to Azamgarh on 13th November.
Subsequently the District Hockey Association submitted a memorandum to
the District Magistrate demanding action against GRP personnel involved.

A Hajj pilgrim's hopes dashed:

69-year-old Nurul Hassan had waited all his life to make a pilgrimage
to Mecca and thus accomplish Hajj. But instead of being on a flight to
Mecca – scheduled for 16th Nov 2008 – he is bed-ridden and almost paralysed
from waist downwards; a condition accruing from the torture he was
subjected to by the police. On the 24th October 2008, for the
rectification of certain irregularities in his Hajj application, Nurul
Hassan (a resident of Bahadurganj's mohalla Dakniganj, Janapada
Ghazipur) along with his son Salaamat-ullah, from Mau took a UP
roadways bus for Lucknow. As he alighted at the Alambagh bus station,
some people in plaincloths caught hold of him, bundled him into a
waiting Tata Sumo, and took him to an unknown place, where he was kept
confined. For three days he was relentlessly questioned and brutally
tortured. He was asked to admit to being involved in bomb blasts and
provide the names of his relatives who lived in Sanjarpur, Azamgrah.
Failing in their designs, the police dumped him on the road in an
unconscious state. When he regained consciousness, he managed to reach
Mau. He was admitted to hospital and slowly recovered, though he is
still unable to even sit straight. Consequently he had to cancel his
ticket for Hajj. Even though he filed a report in Ghazipur, the
administration has not heeded to his plight, and he fast seems to be
loosing hope in 'justice', as his bleary eyes tell a tale of horror and
reflect fear that he has been living since then.

Aamir Talha

On 21st December 2008, the Nagpur ATS picked up 23-year-old Mohammad
Talha, who belongs to Azamgarh. Mohammad Talha, a financial analyst has
been working with India's leading IT company Wipro in Hyderabad for the
last three years. He had come to Azamgarh for Eid-ul-Azhaand
was returning to Hyderabad by Patna- Sikandarabad Express. He is the
son of the prominent Azamgarh cleric, Maulana Rashadi, also a
vociferous voice against the spate of illegal detentions and arrests of
Muslim youth from Azamgarh.

Talha met some friends on the train
with whom he had dinner. At the Nagpur railway station (around 11.30
pm) he and one of his friends got down to fetch water. Suddenly, he was
accosted by 4-5 people who claimed to be ATS officers. They pushed his
friend to the floor and dragged Talha away. When the men shouted for
help, Talha was gagged, and his friends punched at and threatened with
murder.

The GRP (railway police) Nagpur produced Talha before the Railway
Magistrate S.P. Pawar and showed him in possession of a pistol and some
live cartridges. A case was filed against him under the Arms Act. The
court sent him to police custody till January 3. The Maharashtra ATS
took him away to Mumbai for interrogation. Police teams from Gujarat,
Rajasthan, Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh also arrived there
to interrogate him as part of their investigations into terror attacks
in those states. But none of them found him involved in any terror act.

In an interview, Talha's father vouched that he had packed his son's
bag when he was leaving for Hyderabad. He said: “there was not even a
nail cutter in his bag. He had in his bag 2-3 pairs of dress, some rotiand halwa.” (See TwoCircles.net, 12/30/2008)

After interrogating him for 13 days, the Mumbai Crime Branch, which is
looking into the 26/11 Mumbai attack, did not find him involved in any
terror act. On January 3 the Maharashtra ATS told the Nagpur court that
they found no evidence of Talha's involvement in any terror case and
they did not want to keep him on further police remand. The court heard
Talha's bail petition and ordered his release.

Dr Tasleem Rahmani of the Muslim Political Council, said Talha has been
falsely implicated in the case. The allegation of him possessing arms
is false. “In fact the arms were planted on him and we will prove the
allegation wrong,” he said.

Talha Aamir's father Maulana Aamir Rashadi (the chief of Uttar Pradesh UlemaCouncil
and Principal of Madrasa Jamiatur Rashad, Azamgarh), a well-known
Muslim scholar and human rights activist in Uttar Pradesh had been at
the forefront of agitation against the attitude and campaign of the
media and security agencies towards tarnishing the image of Azamgarh
and its people.

The arrest of an IT professional – son of a
well-known Muslim scholar and human right activist who had strongly
disapproved the criminalization of Azamgarh in the wake of the Batla
House encounter – is a grim reminder and warning to all those, especially
Muslims, who are raising their voices against the injustices
perpetrated by security agencies in the name of fighting terror. Prima facie it is a case of exerting pressure on an active human rights defender.

JTSG Charter of Demands

A Judicial Probe headed by a sitting judge of the Supreme Court

The Investigations must be transferred from the Delhi Police to the CBI.

Exemplary punishment should be meted to police officers guilty of
implicating innocent Muslim youth in false cases of terrorism

Adequate compensation and jobs should be provided to those acquitted in the terror-related cases.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ANHAD (Act Now for Harmony And Democracy)

APCR (Association for the Protection of Civil Rights)

AWAM theatre group, Jamia Millia Islamia

DUJ (Delhi Union of Journalists)

FDI (Forum for Democratic Initiatives)

HRLN (Human Rights Law Network)

Janhastakshep

PUDR (peoples' union for democratic rights)

Revolutionary Democracy

TwoCircles.net

Mahtab Alam

And All Fellow Travellers in the Struggle for Justice

JAMIA TEACHERS' SOLIDARITY GROUP

The events of 19th September and subsequent days left the Jamia
community shocked, aggrieved and fearful. In particular the manner and
the suspicious circumstances in which young boys, many of them students
of Jamia Millia Islamia, were picked up by the Special Cell, and
pronounced “dreaded terrorists” by a trial by an utterly sensationalist
and prejudiced media created an atmosphere of fear and suspicion.

We as teachers felt that we could not afford to isolate ourselves in
intellectual ivory towers. There was an urgent need to reach out to the
community, which lives at our very doorstep, and where a large number
of teachers, administrative staff and our students reside. Jamia
Teachers' Solidarity Group was thus formed. The need for a civil
society campaign on this was further underscored when the various
contradictions in the police theories emerged.

Through a number of initiatives, including a Jan Sunwai in Batla
House, a march to Parliament to demand a judicial probe into the
‘encounter’, a demonstration against the Special Cell, and public
discussions on the role of the media, Supreme Court guidelines on
encounter killings etc, we believe we have managed to create a wedge,
however small, in the prevailing discourse – a discourse that questions
the nationalism and patriotism of people who ask uncomfortable
questions. We believe that the true foundation of a democracy can only
be justice. Anyone with an interest in deepening and strengthening
Indian democracy should raise her voice against this brazen witch-hunt
in the name of fighting terror.

Jamia Teachers' Solidarity Group condemns terrorism of all kinds, including state terror.

Citizens March to Parliament called by Jamia Teachers' Solidarity Group
to demand Judicial probe into the Batla House 'Encounter'. 24 October 2008