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"India's frontier problem" should also be looked at as "China's frontier problem"

I will ignore Pakistan initially and mention internal security only to point out that in a state of war emergency - insurgents will get no talks, no clemency and they will be shot at sight and their jholawala supporters will be thrown in jail. That said - the support that insurgents get from abroad needs to be fought in peacetime, long before war comes.

India's China front is actually 8 fronts. China too faces the problem of 8 fronts and to jog memories let me re-post this video explaining the 8 potential zones/"fronts" that land conflict could take place at, ignoring the "borderless" aspect of air warfare. It is about 6-7 minutes long but the first 1 minute sums up the issue

China's logistical lines to Tawang and Doklam are relatively good. But the further west they go - the longer they get. If you look at the forces they dumped in Doklam and think about the logistics of dumping such forces in 8 different conflict zones - especially the western 3 points then we are looking at potential "chinese" in the armour. (BRF censorship does not allow me to use the correct expression chi**ks in the armour. Why not show some liberalism and remove that restriction?)

In 1965 the India-Pakistan conflict as started by Pakistan in Kashmir was converted into a 2-3 front war in the west - because the Lahore front was a separate one from the Kashmir front, and forces reserved for one had to be placed in readiness for use in the other.

So "2 Front war" is a dumbing down of the reality of what is actually a 9 to 10 front war. That is what we need to think about. If India is taken to be a circle like a clock face we have:

Potential of fighting land wars at 9, 10, 11, 12, 1, and 2 O'clock

The disadvantage that the center can be hit from any one of the radial points

The advantage that the center is closer to any one of the conflict points while our adversaries have to concentrate mainly on 3-4 of those points

We fear this so-called “2.5 front” war but in actuality, any war with the pigs from the failed chithole to our West is a firegine conclusion. And the 0.5 of Kashmir though a running sore is also a foregone conclusion — nothing will move the 500K jawans we have there. It is obvious that possible war with Cheen that creates all this handwringing about mulriple fronts.

But what are the real chances of war with the PRC?

And what if pro-longed peace, not war, means the progressively weakening of India’s relative position to Cheen — in Asia, in the IOR, in the world — under the relentless pressure of Chinese money, manufacture and infrastructure.

The truth is Cheen had not fought a hot war since Vietnam in 1979 and had grown immensely powerful as a result.

No war in the future means more of the same — with relentless production of ships, aircraft and infrastructure filling gray zones and the global commons.

Their production will be paired with greater and greatest technology as each year passes. We pin hopes that the gap will narrow in the future but we won’t see it in our lifetimes because the maturing of their technical base will grow the gap far wider than we can close.

Drones, stealth fighters, 13K ton cruisers, large transports and aircraft carriers are brand new gaps that are opening up now as we speak. There is no chance of keeping pace never mind closing.

The National Science Foundation and the National Science Board have just released their biennial “Science & Engineering Indicators,” a voluminous document describing the state of American technology. There are facts and figures on research and development, innovation and engineers. But the report’s main conclusion lies elsewhere: China has become — or is on the verge of becoming — a scientific and technical superpower.

We should have expected nothing less. After all, science and technology constitute the knowledge base for economically advanced societies and military powers, and China aspires to become the world leader in both. Still, the actual numbers are breathtaking for the speed with which they’ve been realized.

The only thing that can throw them off their stride and create havoc for their trade-based economy is war. We can hope their get themselves into a war with the US. We can hope they miscalculate.

But they haven’t in the past five decades. The PRC will not fight. Someone must bring the fight to them.

We must be willing to start a fight and pursue it the IOR — our region of influence. We must embrace a war with Cheen not fear it.

If we stay Dharmic then we will be in a Dharmic world for sure — constrained to India and India alone as all around us the relentless buildup of chini roads and chini ports flood the region with their equipment from a vast industrial base.

We would be a quaint reservation in Pax Sinica.

If we do not consider offensive war as a viable option of a great power that we are.

I realise more posts like this will derail the thread. However, I think Shiv and Chola raise points that are important in understanding China's ability and willingness to wage war and hence the kind of war it might fight against us in a 2 front scenario.

Shiv is right in suggesting that China's tenuous supply lines and the difficulty of operating at very high altitudes would mean that even preparing for full scale war would be a gigantic logistics undertaking. They would have to mass a large force at all the `points of the clock' where we already occupy strong positions. It would be easier for them to invade Taiwan. Even a best case scenario for China (their large army comprehensively defeating India) carries the same risk we face w.r.t Pak, i.e. the `losing' side may go nuclear. Both supply constraints and the risk of going nuclear, would mean that any war would be short with limited territorial aims and either involving a single corps (if it is 1 sector) or single divisions across multiple sectors.

I'd like to put Chola's point differently. China faces the following potential future conflicts: - Against Taiwan, aided by the US- Against Japan (island dispute) aided by the US- SCS Philippines or Vietnam - aided by the US- Regime change for a OBOR investee country refusing to pay interest on loans. - Against SoKo/ US, when siding with NoKo- India

Rank these 6 potential conflicts in terms of:- Ability of China to win - Importance of the dispute to China- Ability to rally the Chinese public - Economic cost to China- low downside risk (loss of face, possibility of defeat, nuke exchange etc)

IMO, based on these factors, India ranks in the bottom half of the list of countries China might start a war with. Doklam has contributed to this, as possibly will a 2nd term for Modiji. A full scale war will be difficult for Eleven to justify. This leads me to believe that, even in a `pessimistic' scenario, China would not deploy anything more than the forces in the Western Theatre, against India (which itself will time consuming). This limitation however increases the possibility of China going for a 2 front war, with Pak's help.

Same type of logic went into the 1950-1962 linear thinking in Indian power circles: it is illogical for China to attack India as they have many threats. Yet in 1962 the very unthinkable happened and led to a politico-economic disaster. India had to move from development or vikas to military spending, the old guns vs. butter policy making.

Every situation has two ways of looking at it: strategic/global point of view which looks at big picture and evaluates the situation. The other is tactical/operational point of view which looks at the little picture and evaluates the situation. The fatal flaw or hamartia is to mistake one for the other as it leads to disaster.Generally in my reading the tactical has to be won before the strategic prevails.

Deans, Of all the six conflicts you postulate the one that will benefit China most is a war with India for that derails a future rival in Asia and the world. All the others have low pay off.

All I am asking is to go with the situation and don't bring in strategic and global point of view which will cloud the mind. The very same thinking of global factors prevented India from even preparing for such a conflict.

I am not asking for why such a war will not happen. Why is this so difficult for even senior members to understand? What's the point of being on the board for last two decades when you cant approach a problem based on facts and not opinions?

Dokhlam keeps being brought up. If you go back to the old threads you will find that I dais India will confront at Dokhlam as it is untenable from India's security point of view.Let me say one more thing. The recent A5 test is a follow-up of that force posture first unveiled due to Dokhlam. India is that serious..

India's worst vulnerability is such a 2.5 front war. It will end all that freedom struggle and sacrifices of over a hundred years from 1857.

I have a request. Since all of you think such a war will not happen why don't you let us in peace to think about the war?

Ok. Let us take it as a given that the Chinese have decided to teach India a lesson, forget the why/wherefore. They have decided to attack, whatever the risks and expenses, and that's that.

So PLA, PLAAF, PLASAF assets are mobilized throughout the eight land fronts that Shiv has detailed in his video. Of course, we see it coming. In fact the Chinese know we are watching, so they go about the mobilization in a series of feints, moving many assets around at high speed from front to front as well as from the hinterland to numerous fronts. This is aimed at confounding us (we do not know which front they will activate first, and they hope this will paralyse our ability to respond appropriately against dummy vs. "real" preparations). It is also intended to intimidate/demoralize us with the sheer volume and efficiency of their logistical capability, and the amount of money they have to throw at a war against India. A display similar to their wargames on the plateau during Doklam, but on a much larger scale.

This begets the question: In this situation, how much does it help us to seize the initiative and open a naval front ourselves? Does it serve us to add a naval dimension to the conflict even before a shot has been fired on the land border? And if so, how could we go about it?

Around Urumqi PLA has one infantry division, two motorized infantry divisions, one artillery brigade and one army aviation brigade. These are presumably for occupation purposes in Xinjiang and may include some COIN elements, but could be brought to the India border if needed and local threat perception is low. PLAAF's 37th Fighter Division is also headquartered at Urumqi. These are likely to be the principal source of reinforcements on the Western front.

The other relatively-nearby concentration is near Chengdu and Chongqing. Here PLA has one infantry division, one motorized infantry division, one SOF brigade, one armoured brigade, one artillery brigade, one army aviation brigade, and one air defense brigade all constituting 13th Group Army. PLAAF has 4th Transport Division and 33rd Fighter Division headquartered here. These are likely to be the principal source of reinforcements on the Eastern front.

Secondary reinforcements may be derived from the 21st and 47th Group Army's assets based in Shaanxi.

Nothing very new to us, but a little reminder of the "conventional wisdom" given the context from above posts:

The PLA would conduct a Mountain Offensive Campaign or possibly a Joint Fire Strike Campaign if Beijing issued orders for offensive operations. A Joint Fire Strike campaign would support the border counterattack or mountain offensive, but could also represent an independent campaign. The terrain, weather, and difficult engineering and comprehensive support conditions restraining the deployment and sustainment of forces could make a joint fire strike appear more advantageous to a mountain offensive. A mountain offensive would require a substantial advantage in the correlation of forces for the attacker operating under terrain and weather restrictions. As an independent campaign, a joint fire strike could represent punitive strikes against key Indian targets.

A joint fire strike campaign is a long-range precision strike by long-range rocket, missile and air forces with the objective to destroy important enemy targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems (integrated force grouping), weaken the will to resist and destroy war potential, or create conditions for other operations.

The Chinese leadership could conclude that conducting precision strikes against key Indian targets was preferable to conducting difficult offensive ground operations where the defender has an advantage.

Three infantry brigades, one mech inf brigade, one armoured brigade, one air-defence brigade, one artillery brigade. Plus of course elements of 13th Group Army if they decide to go that route. 44th Fighter Division of PLAAF is also headquartered here.

Not to step on any Mil guru's toes but here would be my top priorities:

1) Induct very large numbers of precision standoff munitions. Prithvis are not enough. Need Shauryas, Agni I/II, Prahaar. And CMs of course. Nirbhay should be on accelerated development, BrahMos II as well. And ramp up BrahMos production. We need to match or overmatch the Chinese joint fire strike capability. Particularly important if they try the Myanmar workaround... give them a nice roasting on unfamiliar terrain in Shan, Kachin, Sagaing before they even get here.

2) Air defence. S-400s posthaste!

3) Few more Netras and EL/W-2090 would be a good idea (question here too... like the Hercules and Globemasters, which force, and which command operates these units?)

4) LCAs, keep rolling them out and replace the 21-bis with them. This is important for any front, not just China.

I am less concerned about the gee-whiz glamourous flyboy or tanker stuff.

Not even thinking about the ocean yet, but I think the navy and naval aviation is where we should focus our offensive capability. This is where our dagger points. Start painting Chinese vessels and subs from the first sign of any funny business on their part on the LAC/IB.

Three infantry brigades, one mech inf brigade, one armoured brigade, one air-defence brigade, one artillery brigade. Plus of course elements of 13th Group Army if they decide to go that route. 44th Fighter Division of PLAAF is also headquartered here.

How big are these? The rest are about two divisions worth. So more like a light Corps.

A PLAAF division has 3 regiments of the same kind of aircraft. A fighter regiment has 24 aircraft - 18 for bombers and transports.There are a couple of divisions in the Western theatre (as of a year ago) which have 2 regiments and not 3. The PLAAF is also working on mixed regiments, the first of which is in the Western theatre.

There is also a relatively lower proportion of modern aircraft assigned to the western theatre. Even including the Jinan military district (possibly a reserve) there are a total of 288 J10/ J11 aircraft in the Western theatre.

The number of aircraft the PLAAF can effectively deploy against us, is constrained not by total numbers, but by the number of airfields in Tibet(six), payload limitations at high altitude and air to air refueling capability. This would be further constrained by non availability of an airfield (cratered runway) or the airfield being used for transports. The PLAAF will find it far more feasible to field for e.g. 1 J11 squadron instead of 2 * J7, so the total no of modern aircraft available in the theatre + uncommitted reserve (288 fighters), would be a good proxy for the PLAAF's starting ORBAT against us.

Despite all those numbers, they don't really have much experience operating out of Tibetan airbases except for <squadron level detachments every year (albeit steadily increasing in size). Lack of aircraft shelter or support infra for war-level surge operations from these airbases is very suspect given nearly all of them are also civilian airports. We've covered much of this in the china thread earlier.

AAD & EW will as much of a threat as any for us esp given they've started doing flights of their new E6(H?) in the east. Efficacy and operational performance of such platforms might still be a big ? but it is a capability we'll have to factor in, especially given it is based on a bomber platform and can be staged from much further away. Anyway, short of an actual shooting war, we really need to step up our game of playing within China. They have many weakpoints and we've not even scratched the surface of pushing their buttons. That should go into the strat forum imo but we need to factor in any and all help we can bring in during any conflict in Tibet, especially if it escalates.

16 islands have been leased by the Chinese in the Maldives .They own 80% of Maldivian debt.It is a Chinese take-away as they will swiftly outnumber the population of the Maldivians.Signs in Chinese are commonplace now.The window of opportunity for India to intervene and boot out the dictator in charge is fast closing.Once Chinese troops land there to "defend the dictator, the game will be up.Does our govt. have the guts of Rajiv G. who swiftly crushed an attempted coup there 3 decades ago? Past time to dust off the files on Op. Cactus.Watch this space.An even bigger challenge than in Doklam, which is a sideshow to divert our attention from the real Great Game, the Indian Ocean!....where we're steadily losing influence and the game.

-Note that IX Corps is Western Command not Northern Command. Also note the 2/3 indp armd bdes under IX Corps used to be with XVI Corps-I also don't think we can use XV and XVI Corps against China - they are needed against Pak. Only formation of Northern Command available against China is 3 Div at Leh-What on earth are these Tipu Sultan and Aurungzeb Armd Regts ??? This is Indian Army Orbat or Pak Army Orbat ?-Why have you listed WAC (Western Air Command) for forces against China ? Lets use only CAC and EAC.-Jamnagar is SWAC

Ramana sir, you will have my list of requirements as Theatre Commander West today.

List of Requirements as Theatre Commander West - Northern Command, Western Command, South Western Command and Southern Command + WAC and SWAC

1. What is the political objective - defined as clearly as possible2. What is my military objective - defined as clearly as possible with specific objectives in terms of territories captured, boundary chnages achived (liberate Sindh, Balochistan, POK, realingn LC ?) damage inflicted, which areas must I absolutely defend, where can I trade land for time, am I only defensive 3. What is the political will to initiate and sustain offensive operations - can I attack first to achieve strategic and tactical surprise, how long will offensive operations be sustained, will you wilt under media pressure if my forces reach Sargodha4. What are absolutely can't dos ? What if mosques and madarsas are destroyed in my air offensive or arty operations, what about collateral damage, what about school children used as shields on Pak airbases which are my primary targets 5. What do I do about militancy and terrorism in Kashmir. Will CRPF and BSF take over and can I use some RR formations ?6. Autonomy in selecting targets and maneovering my forces - will I have to get everything approved by AHQ and ARMY HQ who in turn will get it approved by MOD and therefore by CCS or can I select targets at will and adapt7. Same for my plans and operations and changing my deployments according to the exigencies of battle8. How many days of campaign can nation take9. My ammunition stocks, restocking ability, POL stocks, restocking ability, other logistcis - weapon systems, food, transport10. Medical facilities for my causlaties, appetite for casulaties11. What is our nuclear scenario plan - what capacities do I have to mount offensive ops in NBC environment, what is our nuclear use policy, will we call the bluff, what happens when my spearheads are hit by sub kiloton tacs nukes, will you allow me to use some as well ? Under what scenarios will we retaliate

Enemy Intentions, Deployments & capacities

1. What are Pak intentions 2. What resources will they have - current ORBAT and capacity of their economy to deliver war materiel, current supply of ammunition, POL, state of their equipment and capacity to increase it and sustain operations3. What resources will they have from China, saudi, US and other allies like Turkey4. Maps - I need very good maps and intel on all their communication networks - road, rail, canal5. Maps and intel on key infratstructure - telecom nodes, rail nodes, electricty nodes, dams, food stocks nodes, water supply system. Are there any targets I can hit that can really sap their will to fight and bring pressure on their elite - army and mullahs6. Industrial base and key targets7. Can I destroy dams to flood certain areas and channel their forces where I want them7. Good handle on their political and national will. How aggressive will they be in defence and offense8. Plans - offensive and defensive in as much detail as possible9. Defences - how hardened are their various defences starting from LC/IB to big obstacles. What about their air bases protection - radars, AA and hardened shelters. 10. Defences - hows their AD network, radar coverage. I need maps if possible

In Pakistan, there are numerous freedom fighters from Pashtuns to Sindhis to Balochs, who has shown their ability to strike at will at military targets in Islamabad. What about the local freedom fighters in Tibet? Would they be able to strike as far as Beijing during a war to push out the PLA?

Given the limitations of logistics, the Indian ORBAT that Akshayji has posted, would be oriented towards specific sectors of the LAC and fairly static once they are forward deployed. Each sector would be covered as follows (East to West) :

We should also be able to reinforce ladkah with a brigade each from the Dras and Baramula divisions, as the remainder of XV, XVI and IX corpswould still have parity over whatever Pak is able to deploy in the J&K theatre.

2 armoured brigades from IX corps (seconded to Northern command) can be deployed in tank friendly terrain in Ladakh/Himachal whilestill ensuring armoured superiority over Pak.1 of our 2 artillery divisions could be deployed against China. In the West they would represent a significant force multiplier.

hnair wrote:In Pakistan, there are numerous freedom fighters from Pashtuns to Sindhis to Balochs, who has shown their ability to strike at will at military targets in Islamabad. What about the local freedom fighters in Tibet? Would they be able to strike as far as Beijing during a war to push out the PLA?

The Special frontier force (Tibetan exiles) would I assume, be tasked with activity inside Tibet. The railway lines for e.g. would be an inviting target as they are too long to defend and are critical to the PLA's supplies.

Deans wrote:Given the limitations of logistics, the Indian ORBAT that Akshayji has posted, would be oriented towards specific sectors of the LAC and fairly static once they are forward deployed. Each sector would be covered as follows (East to West) :

We should also be able to reinforce ladkah with a brigade each from the Dras and Baramula divisions, as the remainder of XV, XVI and IX corpswould still have parity over whatever Pak is able to deploy in the J&K theatre.

2 armoured brigades from IX corps (seconded to Northern command) can be deployed in tank friendly terrain in Ladakh/Himachal whilestill ensuring armoured superiority over Pak.1 of our 2 artillery divisions could be deployed against China. In the West they would represent a significant force multiplier.

I didn’t post an ORBAT. But it’s interesting you bring up the indp arms bdes of IX Corps. I was thinking of using them for my plans for a thrust South from Tawi. But that’s much later. Ramana ji wants a soecific information gathering exercise based on the parameters he has listed. Let’s stick to that for now.

My post was in response to Ramanaji response to question ‘what do I need as theatre commander west’.

Akshay Kapoor wrote:-Note that IX Corps is Western Command not Northern Command. Also note the 2/3 indp armd bdes under IX Corps used to be with XVI Corps-I also don't think we can use XV and XVI Corps against China - they are needed against Pak. Only formation of Northern Command available against China is 3 Div at Leh-What on earth are these Tipu Sultan and Aurungzeb Armd Regts ??? This is Indian Army Orbat or Pak Army Orbat ?-Why have you listed WAC (Western Air Command) for forces against China ? Lets use only CAC and EAC.-Jamnagar is SWAC

Ramana sir, you will have my list of requirements as Theatre Commander West today.

Thanks.

Tipu Sultan and Aurungzeb Armd Regts (I thought it was strange too) come from the ORBAT given here: http://indiandefence.com/threads/indian ... tle.62823/ As an internet forum post, it's probably not the most reliable source I just used it as a starting point, in the hope that it could be cleaned up to something acceptable with inputs from yourself and others.

I have tried to list all army and AF assets that could *potentially* be used, even as holding formations, in case of a war with China. Just as I've listed their entire WTC, and parts of CTC and STC, on the Chinese side. Not necessary that all or even most of these will end up being committed. Let the simulations start, phir dekhenge.

The forming–storming–norming–performing model of group development was first proposed by Bruce Tuckman in 1965,[1] who said that these phases are all necessary and inevitable in order for the team to grow, face up to challenges, tackle problems, find solutions, plan work, and deliver results.

Thinking over it, I am wondering if a Schlieffen-plan type maneuver via Myanmar would work for PRC.

Reasons:1) The distance is considerably longer: on average, ~400 kms for the PLA vs ~200 kms for the Germans2) The terrain is considerably worse. Belgium is a flat, low country with plenty of roads. Northern Myanmar is mountainous and densely forested with no infrastructure. If the Chinese build a road it will be the only available route, and can be interdicted by air and missile strikes.3) Time factor (because of distance and terrain) the PLA cannot just roll through Myanmar in a matter of hours. It would likely take several days (or weeks, if they encountered any resistance). Can Beijing count on Naypyidaw's generals to stay the course, and risk turning their country into a chronic, attritive proxy-war zone?

I am far more worried about Nepal in a Schlieffen-like scenario. Especially with Oli in charge there, a bitterly anti-India Maoist firmly under the Chinese thumb.

Terrain is still rough, but distances to our heartland much shorter, and a wide front can be formed allowing for feints and diversions.

Rapid airborne deployment of PLA shock troops and armour at a number of staging areas along the Prithvi Highway, plus a division of PLAAF aircraft arriving at NAAS airbases: how would we respond? Do we want to blitz Nepal and risk massive collateral damage to common Nepalis?

Akshay Kapoor wrote:-Note that IX Corps is Western Command not Northern Command. Also note the 2/3 indp armd bdes under IX Corps used to be with XVI Corps-I also don't think we can use XV and XVI Corps against China - they are needed against Pak. Only formation of Northern Command available against China is 3 Div at Leh-What on earth are these Tipu Sultan and Aurungzeb Armd Regts ??? This is Indian Army Orbat or Pak Army Orbat ?-Why have you listed WAC (Western Air Command) for forces against China ? Lets use only CAC and EAC.-Jamnagar is SWAC

Ramana sir, you will have my list of requirements as Theatre Commander West today.

Thanks.

Tipu Sultan and Aurungzeb Armd Regts (I thought it was strange too) come from the ORBAT given here: http://indiandefence.com/threads/indian ... tle.62823/ As an internet forum post, it's probably not the most reliable source I just used it as a starting point, in the hope that it could be cleaned up to something acceptable with inputs from yourself and others.

I have tried to list all army and AF assets that could *potentially* be used, even as holding formations, in case of a war with China. Just as I've listed their entire WTC, and parts of CTC and STC, on the Chinese side. Not necessary that all or even most of these will end up being committed. Let the simulations start, phir dekhenge.

Sorry, as Theatre Commander West, no way I can release both 8 Div and 3 Div to Eastern theatre. What will I protect Kargil with if I release 8 Div ???

Wouldn't a Joint Pak+China invasion across the IB the most appealing in terms of gains?

Capture Punjab+Haryana. Take away one of our major bread basket. Industrialized area.Indus rivers.GujaratThese are major economic regions, thereby hitting us economically.Put Delhi under major security threatPotential destruction of Indian forces.Of-course for Pakis, cutoff J&K.

Compare to the mountains, IB is flat. Already existing Pakistan defense ecosystem. So PLA would be more comfortable in applying mechanized warfare and it's rocket forces.PLA can be easily stationed in Pakistan, under the pretext of safeguarding their Gwadar naval base.

A invasion across mountains gives them some empty mountains with no economic value. Neither will it dent our fighting capability.

PA alone cannot do a invasion. However a joint PA+PLA across the IB is definitely a threat.

Akshay Kapoor wrote:Sorry, as Theatre Commander West, no way I can release both 8 Div and 3 Div to Eastern theatre. What will I protect Kargil with if I release 8 Div ???

Theek hai, can I at least have U/I Arty Bde as well as 3 Div?

Yes but we should use it for Ladakh. They know the terrain and are acclimatised. And if Ladakh becomes fulcrum of attack we might have to bring more forces. I’ll get some from my strike formations if necessary.