Alfred von Tirpitz and German
Right-wing Politics, 1914-1930

Alfred Tirpitz contributed to the disaster called World War I. He was an
admiral and Germany's secretary of the navy in 1900, when he encouraged his
king, Wilhelm II, to pursue what became an arms race in warships. Tirpitz wanted
his country to have its proper place in the sun and to be second to none as
a military power, which meant competition with the world's greatest naval power,
Britain. He was optimistic that Britain would not be able to keep up with Germany
in a naval arms race. Tirpitz contributed to winning the support of a large
segment of public opinion, and he won the support of Germany's parliament, the
Reichstag. The naval arms race began. Tirpitz did not want war. He believed
that making Germany's navy superior would discourage Britain from going to war,
but it did not work out that way.

During the war, Tirpitz led in opposing the restrictions on submarine warfare
-- restrictions created by the German government and favored by Kaiser Wilhelm.
With other rightists in Germany he believed that anything that did not leave
Germany with gains would be a defeat. He opposed any compromise and favored
all those positions that contributed to failures in negotiations during the
war.

After the war he was unhappy with the moderate government of the Social Democrats.
He disliked the compromises of Germany's centrist politician,
Gustav Stresemann. He failed
to blame rightists like himself for Germany's failures,
despite their contribution, and he sought redemption for Germany
in a leader with exceptional charisma and the will to make
Germany a great power again. He did not think Hitler was that
man, and he died in 1930, before his fellow rightists, who
also had not cared much for Hitler, handed Hitler power as
an alternative to the Social Democrats.

Too bad for the world that Tirpitz did not see benefit in compromise and
strength in cooperation. Germany would have been better off focusing on ground
defense, on economic and technological advancement and a more modest approach
to its neighbors – similar to Norway, Sweden, Holland, Denmark and Belgium.

The book is 218 pages, scholarly and easy reading.

Paul Kennedy of Yale University describes the book as follows:

"...a most important contribution to our understanding of German right-wing
politics in the aftermath of the First World War and through the 1920s."