Repositório Colecção:http://hdl.handle.net/10362/23092015-03-04T00:20:35Z2015-03-04T00:20:35ZRebalancing frequency and the welfare cost of inflationSilva, André C.http://hdl.handle.net/10362/123412014-07-05T01:01:28Z2014-07-01T00:00:00ZTítulo: Rebalancing frequency and the welfare cost of inflation
Autor: Silva, André C.
Resumo: Cash-in-advance models usually require agents to reallocate money and
bonds in fixed periods, every month or quarter, for example. I show that fixed
periods underestimate the welfare cost of inflation. I use a model in which
agents choose how often they exchange bonds for money. In the benchmark
specification, the welfare cost of ten percent instead of zero inflation increases
from 0.1 percent of income with fixed periods to one percent with optimal periods.
The results are robust to different preferences, to different compositions
of income in bonds or money, and to the introduction of capital and labor.2014-07-01T00:00:00ZThe strength of the waterbed effect depends on tariff typeHoernig, Steffenhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/121312014-05-23T14:59:46Z2014-05-01T00:00:00ZTítulo: The strength of the waterbed effect depends on tariff type
Autor: Hoernig, Steffen
Resumo: We show that the waterbed effect, i.e. the pass-through of a change in one price of a firm to its other prices, is much stronger if the latter include subscription rather than only usage fees. In particular, in mobile network competition with a fixed number of customers, the waterbed effect is full under two-part tariffs, while it is only partial under linear tariffs.2014-05-01T00:00:00ZGoing beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party paysHoernig, Steffenhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/121302014-05-23T14:49:00Z2014-03-01T00:00:00ZTítulo: Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
Autor: Hoernig, Steffen
Resumo: We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, only equilibria with finite call prices and receiving prices exist. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero.2014-03-01T00:00:00ZMajoritarian delaysJúlio, Paulohttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/118602014-03-27T18:34:02Z2007-05-12T00:00:00ZTítulo: Majoritarian delays
Autor: Júlio, Paulo
Resumo: This paper illustrates how delayed debt stabilizations can arise in a
society without any emerging conflict of interests among its members.
We argue that, under a majority voting rule, the economy may generate excessive levels of government spending and larger debts over time, and that this delay is increasing in income inequality. The intuition
for this result is simple: a majority of citizens may find in delaying stabilizations a way to increase government expenditures, transferring in this way resources from the richest to the poorest citizens in the economy. This process may explain the upward trend and the difficulty to reduce public expenditures, the so called "ratchet effect."2007-05-12T00:00:00Z