Last Thursday evening, a French-Algerian footballer arrived at Charles de Gaulle Airport on a flight from Doha.

For
the previous two years, he had been trapped in Qatar. A dispute over
unpaid wages led to his numerous requests for an ‘exit visa’ being
denied. Eighteen months with no income. A wife and two children to
support.

Depressed, suicidal, he contemplated hunger strike. He sold his furniture and slept on the floor of his empty house.

For two years, Zahir Belounis was a slave, his basic human rights ignored. Last Thursday evening, he was finally free.

But Belounis is an after-thought. So too is Abdeslam Ouaddou, another
journeyman footballer, a former Moroccan international who endured a
similar stand-off with a Qatari club over wages owed. Speaking to the
International Trade Union Confederation earlier this year, Ouaddou said:
“When you arrive in Qatar, it’s beautiful — a country under
construction with tall skyscrapers. But it’s like spotting an oasis in
the desert when you’re thirsty.

“When you get closer, you realise there’s nothing there. It’s a mirage.
If the country does not change its ways then in 2022 we will have the
World Cup of Shame and the World Cup of Slavery because of how Qatar
disrespects human rights.”

Football has turned its back on social issues for a long time. The
sport’s governing body continues to avoid taking hard-line action
against racism and awarded successive World Cup tournaments in 2018 and
2022 to countries who take pride in their anti-gay legislation. But
Fifa’s form on such matters goes back a long way. In 2008, Sepp Blatter
suggested there was too much ‘modern slavery’ in how footballers were
bought and sold. He felt players weren’t protected enough. Naturally,
there was an outcry. Blatter was not just wrong. The flippant remark,
made in regard to the pampered, lock-jawed, pop-star, football elite,
was insensitive and ignorant to an ill that was rapidly spreading.

Monday, on RTÉ One, the first episode in a new series of Peadar King’s
‘What In The World?’ focuses on this ever-expanding African enterprise.
Filmed in Cameroon and France, the documentary investigates how rogue
agents and local football ‘experts’ trade in a most-lucrative of
currencies: young, naive footballers. They aspire to be the next Samuel
Eto’o or Yaya Toure. They want the Premier League or Serie A. What they
get is abandonment, homelessness and embarrassment.

We hear Issa’s story. A Malian, he arrived in Paris at 16. A goalkeeper,
he dreamed of emulating his heroes Iker Casillas and Gianluigi Buffon.
His ‘agent’ promised everything. A contract with a French club? No
problem. All the ‘agent’ needed was a substantial payment. Issa’s
parents raised the money, somehow. The ‘agent’ accompanied Issa to
Paris. They went to McDonalds. The ‘agent’ gave Issa €20. Then he left.
Issa waited for three hours. That’s Issa’s story.

Another young African, Willy, points to a stairwell inside a dilapidated
stadium. That’s where he slept for two months. He had been deserted by
his ‘agent’ too. He called him relentlessly. The ‘agent’s’ phone was
switched off. It’s a jarring, uncomfortable reality. The boys’ names are
interchangeable but their stories are identical. Another boy, Raul, had
paid the ultimate price. He returned home to Africa after similar
broken promises. A talented player, his parents had handed over
thousands of euro to get him to Europe. The ‘agent’ took the money and
never came back. Raul’s father now needs treatment for diabetes. There’s
no money for the treatment. Every day, Raul is reminded of the shame he
has brought on his family. It’s why so many of these African teenagers
choose a life on the streets of Paris. They will choose sleeping in
stadiums. They will choose drugs. They will choose crime. But they won’t
go back home.

Last Thursday evening, Zahir Belounis went home. He hugged his mother.
He spoke to radio and television stations. He had a platform with which
to tell his story. It’s a story of human rights violations, a story of
football slavery. It’s critical that people listen to his story. It’s
critical that people listen to Issa, Willy and Raul. It’s critical that
the 20,000 footballers trafficked out of Africa are given a voice.

Jean-Louis Dupont, a key member of Jean-Marc Bosman's legal team, has a new challenge: taking on UEFA's Financial Fair Play regulations.

Originally published in The Irish Examiner, 26th November 2013.

Earlier this year, Jean-Marc Bosman was sentenced to 12 months in prison for assault and battery.
Living
on benefits in Belgium, his life collapsed in a mire of alcoholism and
mental health problems since his landmark legal victory in 1995, a
generation-defining football moment. Though his personal story is more
complex, there is an inevitable conclusion to draw: Bosman’s scars are
the war-wounds of a weary, lengthy battle with a super-power.

He took on the force of football’s governing body. He bruised them,
broke them, embarrassed them. But the long-lasting effects of the fight
took him down too. An unwilling martyr.

But 20 years on from
Bosman’s case initially being submitted to the European Court of
Justice, another anti-hero is stepping forward.

In May of this
year, a football agent, Daniel Striani, lodged a complaint with the
European Commission (EC) on the grounds that Uefa’s Financial Fair Play
(FPP) regulations are anti-competitive and negatively impact his ability
to generate income. His lawyer is Jean-Louis Dupont, a key member of
Bosman’s legal team, who has a pedigree for taking on high-profile,
high-impact sports law cases and winning them.

Striani’s case
centres on FFP’s ‘break-even’ rule and its basic principle that a club
can only spend what it earns (though there are some ‘acceptable
deviations’). Failure to do so will result in suspension from Uefa
competitions.

With clubs having less to spend on transfers and
with wages likely to decrease, Striani’s economic situation will be
adversely affected. Clearly, FFP contravenes EU law — most notably
restraint on trade and, in the case of players, there’s perhaps a
violation of free movement of workers also. However, so far, the EC’s
view is that FFP regulations, though perhaps not perfect, are
proportional to what could happen to football clubs without stringent
financial stipulations. In simple terms, the end will justify the means.

But according to Dupont, the break-even rule will only serve
to widen the gulf between the traditional, ‘big’ teams and everyone
else. “The break-even rule only ossifies the existing market structure,”
he argues. “Even worse, it increases the gap between the haves and the
have-nots. Uefa, instead of coming up with a very technical answer to a
very technical financial issue, came up with a rather political and
ideological one instead.”

There is also the question of
whether FFP in its current format is legitimate and necessary. Uefa
extols its virtues — how it will provide long-term financial stability
to football clubs and how it will preserve the integrity of the game.
The second point, in particular, irritates Dupont, who feels Uefa’s
territorial plan is flawed and discriminates against smaller EU states,
including Ireland.

“Under Uefa rules, each national football
association must organise its competitions within its boundaries. By
maintaining those rules, Uefa denies top club football to places like
Dublin, Brussels [and] Vienna. Consequently, Uefa cannot use the
“integrity argument” regarding FFP since it has itself produced a
structural playing field that’s uneven to begin with.”

For
Dupont, the current FFP regulations overlook the importance of the size
of domestic markets. Under FFP, each league and each club is treated the
same regardless of the commercial gulf between them. Smaller clubs will
not be able to invest over the long-term and will stay small. That,
according to Dupont, is anti-competitive and goes against EU law.

So, what are the alternatives to FFP? How else can Uefa safeguard
against reckless financial mismanagement of football clubs? Dupont has
spoken before about a ‘luxury tax’ — clubs that want to overspend agree
to a levy, with the money then distributed in a way that promotes
competitive balance or other legitimate objectives. He believes that
changes to Uefa’s territorial pattern would provide viable alternatives
to FFP, alternatives that wouldn’t breach EU law, alternatives that
would see smaller EU countries afforded opportunities to become more
competitive.

Dupont says: “If tomorrow, Scotland and Ireland
would decide to have a common Premier League, would it improve (even
slightly) the level of football in both territories? I think it would.
This example is just to show that even small changes would make a
difference.”

Striani is not challenging Uefa’s existing
territorial pattern as part of his case but Dupont feels a club would
stand a reasonable chance in the EU courts if they decided to pursue a
legal route. “If a Dublin club agrees with the English Premier League to
play with them, from the perspective of EU law, it is their absolute
right to do so. Therefore, any entity (FAI, Uefa, etc) that would try to
stop it from happening would face an uphill battle. They would bear the
burden of proof and would need to justify why such a violation of EU
law would be absolutely necessary. I have my doubts that they would
succeed.”

When informed of Dupont’s latest project, a prickly
Uefa president Michel Platini brushed it off, saying he had a letter of
support from the EC.

Dupont dismisses that support as political, not legal.

Dupont has been here before but Daniel Striani hasn’t. The fight will
last a long time. Bosman’s took five years. It took his career too. And
ruined his life.

Sunday, November 10, 2013

When Roy Keane arrived at Old Trafford in the summer of 1993, it was
as the most costly player in the Premier League. The then-21 year-old
attempted to deal with the pressure and anticipation in the most obvious
way – scoring goals. Things began promisingly as he netted twice on his
home debut against Sheffield United. The following month he racked up
another brace on his European debut with the club against Honved of
Hungary. He wouldn’t score twice in a game for another two years.

The sense of energy and urgency was to be expected. At that stage of
his career, Keane covered a lot of ground, enjoyed the edginess of
launching into challenges and relished his occasional forays into the
area. But therein lacked a defining role within the side. His central
midfield partner, Paul Ince, was the self-appointed Guv’nor – the big
talker, the flash Londoner, that quintessential warrior. It took Keane
the bulk of two seasons to find out what he was. Two seasons of
discipline. Of developing an understanding that less is more. Of
embracing the idea that being positionally sound, of reading the game
properly and digesting its patterns and nuances, would ensure his
particular niche.

Keane’s on-field maturity came at the perfect time for a United side
under-going a well-documented transition. Often over-looked in the
much-discussed emergence of a stable of young stars-in-the-making is how
fragile the team was. The 1996 Double winners had a central defensive
duo whose combined age was 65. They struggled so badly with depth issues
that Keane was deployed at centre-back on a number of occasions. But,
just like the season before when Ferguson would alter things tactically
and drop Keane to right-back, his performance levels never dropped. His
attitude and desire ensured that at the very least he’d ‘put a shift
in’.

Phil Jones is still just 20 years old, raw and unpolished. But the
similarities are there. Jones has been used in three different positions
this season and despite a lack of continuity, he’s rarely been badly
exposed. In fact, his performances in the centre of defence (his
supposedly default position) have been the biggest grounds for concern.

When pushed further forward, he’s quietly and efficiently gone about
his role while his most explosive contributions have come in the most
unfamiliar environment of right-back. Like Keane, youthful exuberance
has led to Jones attempting too much in games – most notably selling
himself by diving into tackles in dangerous areas and always attempting
to play the ball. These aspects have shown up usually when Jones is part
of the back four.

When pushed into midfield though, he’s looked composed and assured.
His passing accuracy is a healthy 85% while his only Premier League goal
this season came at Villa Park when playing in midfield – ghosting in
behind Richard Dunne to neatly volley home from close-range. The
following game, away in Basel, may have resulted in a 2-1 defeat but
Jones once again impressed in central midfield – using his physicality
to score again – a difficult downward header from a standing-still
position.

Then, there are the runs. Those dazzling, powerful, uncompromising
surges seen most prominently against Arsenal and Bolton. Purposeful,
dangerous and a nod to the de rigeur resurgence of box-to-box
midfielders, should United operate with a 3-man midfield more commonly,
there will be plenty of opportunity for Jones to fine-tune his craft.

His midfield capabilities were also spotted by Fabio Capello who
praised his decision-making when playing a pass. The Italian handed him
midfield starts in the back-to-back friendlies against Spain and Sweden
at Wembley in November and though Jones lasted less than an hour against
Vincente del Bosque’s side, he did well considering the
mentally-draining and mechanical nature of the game.
Against the Scandinavians, he was deployed in Scott Parker’s
deep-lying role and almost grabbed England’s second goal, showing
sharpness to seize upon a loose pass and then setting off on a charge to
the Swedish area, rolling his shot just wide of the far post. After the
game, Capello made an interesting point – suggesting that if Parker,
for whatever reason, was forced to miss future England games, Jones
could step in to replace him.

Though his country may have other plans for him, at club level Jones
is currently a short-term solution to their right-back problems. For
years United were blessed with full-backs who slotted in and stayed
there for over a decade (Irwin/Neville). Though Evra should have two or
three campaigns left in him (he turns 31 in mid-May), United have been
attempting to introduce potential suitors to the position with 19
year-old Zeki Fryers hotly-tipped to command a starting berth in the
next few seasons.

Worryingly for the club, Brazilian twins Rafael and Fabio, who had
looked certain of cementing regular first-team football, have regressed.
Between them, they’ve racked up just 6 league starts this season –
injuries and a loss in form have contributed to their decline.

With Michael Carrick and Paul Scholes the first-choice midfield
pairing for the title run-in, Jones will remain a full-back until
season’s end. But, should United move in the summer transfer market and
bring in a specialist right-back, it’s a sign that Ferguson also sees
the long-term appeal of Jones as a midfielder. Given the right
development and encouragement to feel out the role, he will flourish.

Friday, October 4, 2013

"Arsenal are better off spending 42m on Özil than other clubs spending 100m+ on six players who aren’t world-class"

As a former Director of Football with Tottenham and Liverpool, Damien Comolli is well-placed to discuss the summer transfer window and provide some analysis as to how various top-flight teams did. Speaking with him recently, we touched on the strategies deployed by the sides destined to challenge reigning champions Manchester United for the Premier League title.

On ex-club Liverpool’s
signings:

“I think they’ve done some good
business. I think they made a big decision signing Simon Mignolet especially
when Pepe Reina was still there. They probably looked at data and stats and
thought that if they got Mignolet, even if Reina was to head out on loan and
they’d have to pay part of his wages, they could be better off. I don’t think
people talk enough about Mignolet – I think he’s a big, big signing for them.

What I find a little strange is
the Mamadou Sakho deal. PSG said they got €19m + €3m in
add-ons and he had only one year left on his contract. That’s a lot of money,
especially as he wasn’t playing. Carlo Ancelotti didn’t play him and Laurent
Blanc didn’t play him either. The other aspect is they’ve now bought a player
who will compete with Daniel Agger. They don’t need cover at left-back either
because they’ve signed Sissokho and they have Enrique so for me, it’s a strange
signing. If they’re thinking about long-term, they’ll have to deal with a
situation where Sakho won’t be happy. He left PSG because he wasn’t playing
enough and he wants to play for France in the World Cup, provided we qualify.
And if he doesn’t play, Liverpool will have an issue on their hands.”

On MamadouSakho
possibly being signed as a safety measure should Daniel Agger leave:

“Maybe. But I know how much
Agger loves Liverpool. And he’s not the type to request a transfer so unless
they push him out, I don’t think he’ll want to leave in the near future. That’s
why the situation with Sakho might become an issue. For me, Daniel is the best
left-footed central defender in the world so if you spend 19m euro on a player
who’s got one year left on his contract and he has to compete with the best
player in the world in that position, it’s going to be a challenge.”

AUDIO

LISTEN...to Damien's account of what deadline-day is like for a club executive here - and the important role pizza has in a frenzied 24 hours!

On Arsenal’s capture of Mesut Özil:

“Even though they couldn’t do
what they wanted in terms of a striker, they didn’t move from the fact that
they would only spend money on a world-class player. And that’s
why, in the end, they went for Özil. I think they’re better off spending 42m on Özil than other clubs spending 100m+ on six players who aren’t world-class.
They’ve added incredible creativity, imagination and skills to an already very
creative and skillful team. So it can only be very positive.”

On other Premier League teams
reportedly turning down the chance to sign Özil:

“Very often, at the end of the
transfer window, the clubs that lost out will say ‘We weren’t interested’ or
‘We couldn’t afford his wages’ or ‘We thought the price was too much’ but
what’s being said internally is not being said externally. I don’t think Özil
was shopped around because if Madrid didn’t get Bale, there was no way they
would have allowed him to go. Once they got Bale, something had to give.
Whether it was Benzema, di Maria, Özil – someone had to be a loser from a
Madrid perspective.”

On Spurs’ spending spree:

“I’m convinced they have a
better squad than last year, whether they have a better team than last year
remains to be seen. In the last 2/3 years, they’ve lost their three most
creative players in Van der Vaart, Bale and Modric. Have they replaced those
three extremely creative players? Last season, I never felt that was the case.
This season, I think Lamela and Eriksen will bring the creativity that Spurs had lost previously and
those two were ‘must-have’ players for the club. But they’re young and we must
wait to see how they will develop and adapt to the Premier League. All of
the other players, as far as I’m concerned, are at the same level as those that
Spurs have had before.”

On Manchester City’s transfer
activity:

“Fernandinho is a player we’ve
all been looking at and has always impressed, even before his injury. He broke
his leg a couple of years ago and we were at the match watching him, when I was
at Liverpool. He had an incredible game. He’s a very good player. For the first
few games, he didn’t show 20% of what he can do so I’m sure there’s a lot more
to come from him. Negredo is a top player who I really like. Jovetic is another
top player with plenty of room for improvement. And Navas, for the first few
games I think was their best player. They’ve got a very, very good manager and
with Begiristainthere, Pellegrini will be able to adapt
quickly – he can help him settle into the club. I’m a big admirer of Pellegrini
because all of his teams are very positive in their approach to the game, very
attacking. People should remember that he qualified Malaga for the Champions
League playing Jeremy Toulalan and Santi Cazorla in midfield. Toulalan is a
very good defensive midfielder but playing Cazorla at midfield takes incredible
bravery for a manager. I think they have the right setup with Begiristain and
Soriano and the experience they both have from Barcelona.”

On
Chelsea’s investments:

“Their big issue is up front. They didn't get the player
they wanted and who could have made a massive difference so they went to plan
B. But Eto’o will need a few months before getting back to where he was.
Obviously, Mourinho wasn't comfortable with any of the other strikers but over
the long term it could go against them.

It also shows the football landscape has changed so much.
When was the last time Chelsea didn't get the player they wanted? They didn't
get Cavani or Rooney.

Going forward, the competition for the few world-class
players available every year will be ferocious.”

Monday, September 9, 2013

'Trapattoni has been on thin ice since, not just the Euro 2012
tournament, but the qualification campaign that preceeded it'

There’s a
moment in Hunter Davies’ seminal 1972 classic ‘The Glory Game’ when Spurs are
in France for a UEFA Cup clash with Nantes. The game ends scoreless and the
visitors troop off the pitch frustrated at full-time. They were better than
this. A sullen Martin Chivers, who was well-marshalled, mutters to himself as
he slumps to his seat in the dressing-room. He’s venting. He knows both he and
his team didn’t perform. ‘A poor team’, a poor team’. Bill Nicholson
mis-interprets what’s been said. The boss starts to tremble a little. He stares
straight into the Big Fellow’s eyes. ‘You mean we had some poor players’.
Chivers’ mood changes. ‘What do you mean?’ He was animated now. ‘What do you
know about it? You never praise us when we do well. Never. You never do. What
do you know about it? You weren’t out there. You didn’t have to do it. It’s
easy to say we didn’t do well, bloody easy’.

Two weeks ago,
Giovanni Trapattoni gave an interview to Italian national broadcaster RAI.
Looking back on his managerial career, he gushed that he’d had ‘five beautiful
girls’ in Milan, Inter, Juventus, Bayern and Benfica. When asked if Ireland was
a beautiful girl, he replied, ‘She is nice. She needs small surgery, a
retouch’. A delicious line, one he couldn’t resist. The playful smile. The
twinkle in the eye. Everyone knew the situation. Everyone was in on the joke.
Ireland was the joke.

The oft-used
excuse does carry some weight. During Steve Staunton’s reign as Ireland boss –
the lowest ebb in recent memory – the players were better. Even on that fateful night in Nicosia
just over six years ago, the Irish back-four included one Champions League
winner, one soon-to-be Champions League winner and the then club-captain of
Manchester City. But, it’s worth pointing out that when the Trapattoni era
began in Mainz with a World Cup qualifier against Georgia in September 2008,
those three players also started. Two of those players remain critical members
of the current squad. And as much as Trapattoni feels this Irish team are a
limited group, he has had ample opportunity to refresh, to ‘retouch’. He’s
ignored the numbers, the data, the forward-thinking. And through his stubborn
resiliance, he’s lost a valuable buffer.

Over the last
three full seasons, Marc Wilson has started 84 Premier League games yet he’s
still to make a competitive start for his country. Instead, Stephen Ward
cemented a starting place in Trapattoni’s team in the same season that his
Wolves side were relegated. He featured in a defence that leaked the second highest
amount of goals in any Premier League season.

Against Germany,
Darren O’Dea partnered John O’Shea in the centre of defence. The 25 year-old
moved to Major League Soccer in August where he plays for the worst team in the
league – Toronto FC. He’s featured in 10 games for them so far – losing 8. In
fact, he’s still to win a game in TFC colours. In fact, outside of the victory
in Kazakhstan, you have to go back to April to find the last time O’Dea
featured in a competitive victory. Meanwhile, former England Under-18 captain
Ciaran Clark, who has steadily impressed for Aston Villa in a multitude of
different positions (under a multitude of different managers) was only sitting
on the Irish bench last weekend because of Sean St. Ledger’s withdrawal. Otherwise,
just like the trip to Kazakhstan, he would’ve been left out.

Plenty of other
examples abound – Gibson, Coleman, Hoolahan, McClean, Pilkington. Ultimately
however, just like the seeds of Mick McCarthy’s eventual exit were sewn in
Saipan, Trapattoni has been on thin ice since, not just the Euro 2012
tournament, but the qualification campaign that preceeded it. Unconvincing
against the minnows, embarrassed by the Russians, a sterile system being
adhered to by disinterested and bored players, luck came in the form of a
play-off meeting with Estonia. Suddenly, the growing discontent with the style
of play, the approach to games, the lack of exciting and fresh faces was gone.
As Euro 2012 got closer, the blind optimism, the giddiness took control. That
optimism was washed away five minutes into the second half of the first group
game. But according to Trap, ‘fear’ is what cost them in the end.

The fear has been
perpetuated from the top down. Through the snide comments, the relentless focus
on the players’ inability to do things right, Trapattoni’s belief that this
group will never be good enough, the basic strategy/formation/tactics – it has
all fed into the current malaise sweeping across the camp. Following Saturday’s
humiliation, there was no apology from the Italian. There was a shrug of the
shoulders, an acceptance of sorts. There was nothing to be ashamed about. Trap
told reporters after the game, ‘Realistically, we were never going to compete
with Germany for first place in the group’. He had prepared for a defeat and as
a result, the players were already beaten when they stepped onto that pitch,
whether they liked it or not.

In-game
management decisions were lazy. Before his first goal, Marco Reus had already
been roaming, cutting into central areas and popping up as a spare man. There
was no subtle change, no message to the Irish midfield and centre-backs about
the threat. No urgency, no energy. Slow, disinterested. Though it mattered
little because, well, we were going to lose anyway, weren’t we?

Upon the
inspection of the damage, there wasn’t anything to worry about, according to
Trap– just a few scratches on the
surface, nothing serious. There wasn’t even the faintest pang of anger or
frustration. That came only when quizzed on whether he’ll still have a job by
the end of the week. When his performance is brought into question, when he’s told he hasn’t been good enough, he
snaps.

October seems to
be a sorry time for Irish football, certainly in recent years. In 2009, the
team led Italy 2-1 at Croke Park in their penultimate World Cup qualifier. An
87th-minute header from Sean St. Ledger had seemingly given the team not just a
famous victory but possible automatic qualification for South Africa. Three
minutes later, Alberto Gilardino equalised and Ireland were in the play-offs. A
furious Trapattoni bounded down the tunnel, screaming and swearing in his
native language. Yet, according to Liam Lawrence, he never showed any anger in
the dressing room. Afterwards, he spoke of players being nervous, not being
experienced enough with winding down the clock. If it was a boxing match, he
said, Italy would’ve won on points.

So, there has
always been a dis-connect. The World Cup qualification campaign was different
however – there was a hunger, a passion. There were new faces. There was an
iconic football man in charge whose approach made sense. He spoke of ‘poetry
and novels’ (far cry from Stan) and the importance of knowing the difference
between them. Trapattoni’s Irish team wasn’t interesed in aesthetics. They were
interested in results. This was a new Ireland. Determined, professional,
borderline boring. With the team’s best players at their peak, the strategy
worked a treat and, in many ways, elimination in the play-offs was undeserved.

There needed to
be freshening up but some call-ups, particularly in light of what’s been
happening recently, lacked any sort of method. Greg Cunningham had made three
substitute appearances for Manchester City but was in the squad. Jonathan
Walters meanwhile, hadn’t even received a call-up to the senior team before
November 2010, despite impressing consistently for Ipswich over the previous
three seasons.

Trapattoni has
found it far too easy to blame the quality of the Irish players when his
selection policy is a flawed one. If there is a lack of natural talent, surely
players who are consistently proving their worth at club level need to be
handed opportunities in an Irish jersey? James McClean hasn’t made a
competitive start for his country, despite illuminating the Premier League last
term and subsequently being voted Sunderland’s Young Player of the Year. He had
been at the club for nine months. Robbie Brady, who has been handed a start
against the Faroes, has played five competitive minutes for Manchester United.
With Shane Long cutting a disconsolate figure on the bench, with Darron Gibson
fed up and in self-imposed exile, with Ciaran Clark admitting he doesn’t know
how to get back in contention, the atmosphere is toxic.

All of the
players mentioned above need to feature prominently for Ireland. They are the
future. They are also the present. Unfortunately, Trapattoni is the past.

Spurs did
ultimately do quite well come season’s end, of course, beating Wolves in the
UEFA Cup final to become the first British team to win two European
competitions. But even still, Nicholson was reluctant to indulge his players in
hearty congratulations. ‘We still have problems. For such experienced players,
a lot of them are not consistent. I can’t sit and watch them in comfort, not
the way I’ve done with other teams I’ve had.’

Two years
later, Nicholson stepped down as Spurs manager. He had difficulty in relating
to the changes within the game. He had difficulty, perhaps, in having reached
the peak many years before. He had difficulty, perhaps, in adapting to
something new when he’d already achieved so much with a tried and tested
method.

Monday, August 26, 2013

Standing room only for his first press conference since The Return. And early on, he gave the throngs what they came for, a few morsels thrown to the masses. But with the following day's headlines quickly out of the way, it became clear that Mourinho 2.0 was short on sound-bytes. The pout replaced by the slouch. He looked tired, bored, beaten? The talk of 'love' seemed cheap, disingenuous. The body language, the mood hinted at a stale relationship, devoid of passion and energy. He was 'happy'. Ouch. It seemed the new/old partnership was in place, well, because it seemed logical. Ouch again. As a football Lothario, Mourinho's arrogance, brazenness, brashness and success made him the most desirable bed-fellow. His high-octane trysts at Chelsea and Inter were refreshing, his style outrageous, the adoration infectious. But in Madrid, a sobering conclusion early on. Mourinho can never love a club more than he loves himself.

For Mourinho, it's been a frustrating realisation. It's why he's back at Stamford Bridge. It's why the pageantry at that press conference seemed tinged with melancholy. He eyed up a different girl at the party. She left with someone else. And a Lothario can never go home alone. The old flame made eyes from across the room. She loved him, needed him. Easy.

Mourinho's pride was dented when Manchester United didn't come calling. For a manager specialising in short-term stints, attempting to emulate an icon would be the stuff of fantasy. It would be a long-term project, no boardroom back-stabbing, back in a country where he's beloved. The energy. The freshness. The challenge. The biggest job. And he didn't get it. His CV counted for nothing more than a few customary conversations between the Old Trafford top-brass. Perhaps what hurt most of all was that Fergie wanted someone else. The old, wily dog played one final trick. Mourinho always the pretender, never the master.

Mourinho, of course, is unable to help himself. Last weekend, there was the finger-wagging at Paul Lambert. There was the post-game posturing and patronising, Lambert's in-game behavior reminiscent of a younger, sillier, immature Jose apparently. There were more lectures on Friday, pointedly, at his former stats-man, Andre Villas-Boas. Referring to Chelsea's poaching of Brazilian midfielder Willian from under the noses of Tottenham, Jose instructed the North Londoners as how best to conduct a player's medical. Funnily enough, no mention of Roman Abramovich's relationship with Anzhi Makhachkala ownerSuleiman Kerimov at the press conference.

In Madrid, Mourinho was held accountable for the gobby, impudent brat he was. Held accountable by his employers, he didn't like it. Held accountable by his players, he didn't like it. His legacy in Spain is that of a coach so thoroughly frustrated by his inability to beat another team, he resorted to mindless thuggery to make himself feel better. But in Mourinho's head, he broke Barcelona's dominance. At his Chelsea unveiling, he claimed to have 'hurt' Barca. Recounting Madrid's Cup wins and 'historic championship', Mourinho was over-reaching to an incomprehensible, almost pathetic, degree. Many were excited by Mourinho's return to Premier League management. But where once was a sharp, refreshing, unique personality there's now a stale, old-hat performer. Where once was the young, cheeky, runt-of-the-litter, there's now a grey, sombre, know-it-all. Reveling in this faux-role as a calmer, more mellow 'veteran', his dispensing of advice and opinion to all and sundry is tough to watch.

His comments about how David Moyes should be held responsible for Wayne Rooney's unhappiness at Old Trafford were bitter, ill-informed and mis-guided. But it's box-office, so that's okay. The pre-match narrative is set. The fancy TV graphics are being readied as we speak. IN THE RED CORNER: DAVID MOYES! IN THE BLUE CORNER: JOSE MOURINHO! There are those who identify this type of bullish behaviour as Mourinho unselfishly moving the spotlight away from his players. But it's too much of a coincidence that he has jeopardised each of his managerial jobs by failing to control his mouth. His opinion matters most. He shouts the loudest. It's about him. The problem for Jose though is that he's been here before. We've seen the jaded act before. And we know how it ends.

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

'Klopp’s greatest achievement at the club has been to develop a
relentless spirit, a common bond, a unity.'

They’ve learned the hard way,
Dortmund.

16 years ago, they were crowned
Europe’s best. 8 years later, they stared bankruptcy in the face. But since
then, with a couple of diversions along the way, they’ve dominated domestically
to such an extent that their bitter rivals Bayern have enticed some of the
world’s most sought-after youngsters and seduced the world’s most sought-after
manager to try and grapple control of German football again.

This year’s Champions League
decider at Wembley - a showdown between two German sides - has sparked plenty
of debate about the current state of football in the country. The Bundesliga is
being trumpeted as the best league in Europe. It’s entertaining, it’s
economical and it’s sustainable. But, for Dortmund and Germany, it wasn’t
always this way.

By November 2005, the club’s
financial situation was perilous. A Munich-based analyst Peter-Thilo Hasler
warned that “you
cannot make a business plan based on the best-case scenario". This was the
root cause of Dortmund’s predicament - basing future earnings on past successes
and gambling millions on inflated wages and ‘expected’ Champions League
qualification. An old cautionary tale perhaps but this was different. This
wasn’t just any club. Giddy on excitement, drunk on possibilities, a
high-profile European side embarrassed itself with its lack of basic business
acumen and brought a powerhouse to its knees.

In the summer of 2001, Marcio
Amoroso was signed for a German record 25m euro. He had an instant impact. The
club won its sixth league title with the Brazilian finishing the campaign as
joint-top scorer. But less than three years later, Amoroso would have his
contract cancelled due to increasingly volatile behaviour. Dortmund involved
themselves in other short-sighted transfers, dropping 6 million for Victor
Ikpeba, a similar amount for Fredi Bobic, even more for Sunday Oliseh. Within a
couple of years, all three would be moved on. Within a couple of years, the
club was a mess. A third-placed league finish in 2003 meant a Champions League
qualifier the following season. They lost on penalties to Club Brugge. It got
worse. The supposed tranquility and safety of the UEFA Cup spectacularly
backfired with a 6-2 aggregate defeat to Sochaux in the second round. The
second leg was in Dortmund. They were humiliated 4-0. This was not in the script.

Dortmund’s plight got so bad so
quickly that Bayern loaned them 2 million euro to pay staff for a number of
months. They sold their stadium to a real estate fund and leased it back. By early
2005, share prices were at an all-time low. Dortmund couldn’t afford to pay
their rent anymore. Having so desperately desired the deep end of the pool for
so long, they were now drowning in it. By March, desperate for cash to secure a
license to compete in the league the following season and avoid administration,
the club was thrown a lifeline. Its landlords, Molsiris, agreed to Dortmund’s
proposal of a buy-back of the Westfalenstadion. A deal was arranged which saw
the club get a crucial net cash-flow of 9 million euro. Molsiris allowed
Dortmund use a 52 million security deposit to buy back 42.8% of the stadium.
Rent was reduced from a crippling 1.3 million euro per month to 300,000 euro
through 2006. After the five-hour meeting with investors, club president Reinhard Rauball said 'I hope I never
have to endure another day like this.'He had only been in the role for a number of months, replacing the
long-serving Gerd Niebaum. He and Managing Director, Michael Meier, were seen
as the architects of Dortmund’s downfall, the focus of fans’ frustrations and
fury. By the end of the season, both had been banished from the club for good.

The club’s problems had deeply
worried German football authorities. After all, even hardcore Dortmund fans had
surrendered to the likelihood of the club going bust. But financial problems
were threatening a number of teams, not just one. In 2002, Kirch Media, who
owned German football’s biggest TV contract, went bankrupt. Bayern’s Karl Heinz
Rummenigge questioned the future
of the country’s second division and“about a third of the clubs in the first". 60
per cent of all players in the Bundesliga were foreign and commanding big
salaries.By 2005, the 36 Bundesliga teams had a combined debt
of 698 million euro. One financial expert was deeply pessimistic about the
future, ‘The situation is very tense and very critical. It's five minutes to 12
for the Bundesliga," said Angelika Amend. Schalke were struggling, though
their risk of carrying a heavy wage bill paid off as they racked up numerous
Champions League qualifications and unearthed a string of quality underage
players later sold for decent money. Hamburg also battled bravely against heavy
debt – their clever transfer policy keeping them consistent. For
Kaiserslautern, the 1998 Bundesliga champions, years of off-field problems
finally resulted in their relegation in 2006.

Dortmund meanwhile acted fast to
rebuild the club. By December 2005, the Westfalenstadion had been re-christened
Signal Iduna Park, ironically enough through a sponsorship deal with a German
insurance company. The transaction netted the club about 20 million euro.
Salaries were slashed by, reportedly, as much as 30 million euro when compared
to late-90s figures. Between 2004 and 2005, Dortmund spent next to nothing on
transfers. High-earners like Amoroso, Frings, Lehmann and Heinrich were sold.
Youth was given a chance, essentially by default. Roman Weidenfeller was
brought in on a free from Kaiserslautern, sixteen year-old Nuri Sahin was
promoted to the senior side, making an historic debut against Wolfsburg in the
opening game of the 05/06 campaign. The average age of the Dortmund starting XI
that day was 25. CEO Hans-Joachim Watzke said, ‘The young players are our
future and so won't be sold’. This wasn’t quite true. Watzke was intent on
operating a business, not an unsustainable fantasy like his predecessors. At 25
years old, Tomas Rosicky was sold to Arsenal for 10 million in the summer of
2006. At the same time, 22 year-old David Odonkor was moved on to Betis in
Spain for 6.5 million. Watzke knew a good deal when he saw it. Those young
players were hot commodities. It was his job to get the club back on a
relatively even keel financially. Performances on the pitch came second to
performances in the boardroom.

Jurgen Klopp’s eventual arrival
as manager led to much of the deadwood being swept away. The summer of 2008 saw
17 players leave the club, only three of them on loan deals. Klopp made shrewd
additions to the squad, focusing on young, cheap players. 19 year-old
centre-back Neven Subotic was signed from Klopp’s former club Mainz for 4.0
million. 22 year-old defender Felipe Santana was brought in from Brazil for
less than 2 million. 20 year-old Marcel Schmelzer was promoted from the youth
team. Tamas Hajnal came from Karlsruhe for next to nothing. Over 2 million was
spent on Mohamed Zidan from Hamburg. Sahin was back after a highly successful
loan spell with Feyenoord. After years struggling to find an on-field identity
owing to the off-field pressures and blinkered transfer strategy, Dortmund had
a solid spine to work with. And when there was an urge to ‘splash out’ on a
player (Mats Hummels moving permanently from Bayern in 2009 for 4.2m, Lucas
Barrios signed for the same amount), funds were raised from player sales
(Petric, Valdez, Frei). The success of Klopp’s bargain-bin strategy in the
transfer market has been commonly highlghted by Shinji Kagawa’s arrival from
the J-League for 350,000. But between 2009 and 2010, Sven Bender, Kevin
Grosskreutz, Lucasz Piszczek and Mario Goetze all arrived in Dortmund’s senior
side for a combined total of 1.5 million.

Dortmund’s strategy used to be
based on a simple economic ideal: spending more money on players means better
results. But football has too many variables for economics to work flawlessly
every time. Klopp’s greatest achievement at the club has been to develop a
relentless spirit, a common bond, a unity. The goalkeeper, Roman Weidenfeller,
has been with the club ten and a half years - from the relegation and
administration scraps through successive league titles to a Champions League
final.Captain Sebastian Kehl has
been there even longer. Grosskreutz and Reus used to cheer on the team from the
Yellow Wall when they were part of the club’s academy. Hummels, Schmelzer,
Bender, Subotic, Blaszczykowski and
Piszczek
have all signed new contracts this season. When Reus explained his decision to
re-join the club who let him go as a youth, he said,’ I just felt this is the best-supported team with
players who work well together under a great coach. Players don't come and go
as often as they do at Bayern. It's the same with the manager. I felt there
would be more stability and consistency here. It was the best place for me, and
I was coming home’. There’s a comfort to Dortmund now. They are a club once
again.

On Saturday, Bayern’s starting
XI will comprise of seven signings and four products of their youth system (it would be five if Toni Kroos was fit). The
seven signings cost the club 140 million euro. Dortmund’s starting XI, by way of
contrast, cost them 41 million. Four players cost them nothing at all. Bayern
will always have the luxury to splash out on desirable objects of affection
like Martinez or Goetze. They will always pay the biggest wages and offer the
best incentives. It’s a unique existence. Years ago, Dortmund attempted to live
in the same world. Now, they’re just happy to still be living.

About Me

Eoin has over seven years experience working at the highest level of sports broadcasting in both Europe and North America.
In the USA and Canada, he's best-known as a former host of Fox Soccer's nightly studio show Fox Soccer Report while he spent three years with Ireland's national broadcaster RTE.
He's covered world soccer in-depth since starting out as a TV sport researcher and has worked on a multitude of tournaments including FIFA World Cups and UEFA Champions Leagues.
The very first game he attended was Cork City's pre-season friendly against Celtic in July 1994.
City lost 3-2.