Sunday, 20 July 2014

Putin’s Next Move

Ukraine has been thrust into the center of world media
attention by the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. This atrocity may
have finally forced the international community to take the threat of Russia’s
actions in the east of Ukraine seriously. Predictably, after the incident, the
Kremlin’s propaganda machine went into overdrive, pumping out incredible
nonsense such as Ukraine’s government ordering the shooting down of the
aircraft in the mistaken belief that it was the Russian presidential plane
carrying Russian President Vladimir Putin back to Moscow from Brazil. This and
other equally bizarre conspiracy theories have since been lapped up by pro-Russian
useful idiots and regurgitated all over the Internet. So the first thing
to do, in speculating about what the Russian leader's next move might be, is to return to
the real world and review what we know with reasonable certainty.

MH17 was shot down by a powerful ground-to-air missile
system, and the aircraft broke up in the air, as we know from the large debris
field of four to six square miles (at least). The only other likely cause of
such destruction would have been a bomb on the aircraft, and there is no
indication that there was one. In contrast, there is every indication that it
was indeed a missile that shot down the plane – this was the early view of the
Ukrainian authorities, who identified the weapon as a Buk-M or “Gadfly”
anti-aircraft missile system, which was later corroborated by U.S. intelligence
sources, who identified the trajectory and impact point of the missile using
satellite date.

The Russian-led insurgents certainly had a Buk-M missile system
(there are recent photos and videos of such systems in insurgent-held territory,
and phone intercepts of insurgents discussing its deployment with their Russian
handlers.) The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) also released damning phone
intercepts of the insurgents reporting to their Russian superiors, in shock,
that they had mistakenly shot down a civilian airliner. The SBU later released
video it said showed the Buk-M system, on a trailer and minus one missile,
being towed out of the area in the direction of Russia in the early hours of
July 18, the morning after the shooting down of MH17.

It is also a fact that the
Russian-led insurgents have been shooting down aircraft regularly – they may
also have used the Buk-M system to down a Ukrainian air force An-26 transport aircraft
a few days before the MH17 atrocity. From the initial reports by the
insurgents, it is clear that they believed they had shot down another An-26 –
the Russian insurgent commander Igor Girkin bragged about it in a blog post
soon after the attack - the post was removed when it became clear that a
civilian airliner had in fact been downed. The insurgents also removed a picture
of a Buk-M tweeted a few days earlier from Twitter.

Thus, from the best
evidence we have so far, it seems MH17 was shot down by a Buk-M system,
probably supplied by Russia (the Ukrainians insist they had full account of all
their missiles, and any systems captured by the insurgents were unusable, their
warheads having been disabled in March.) There is mounting evidence that Russia
is directly involved in supporting the insurgency in eastern Ukraine, and is
ultimately responsible for the shooting down of MH17.

Given all that, what is Putin’s next move likely to be? Here
are some possible options:

1) End all support for insurgency, pull Russian mercenaries,
weapons, tanks, artillery, rocket systems out of Ukraine, and prevent any flow
of more mercenaries and supplies into eastern Ukraine.

Effect: Without continual resupply and reinforcement from
Russia, the insurgents will be unable to resist the Ukrainian military, and the
insurgency will start to collapse. The insurgents will put up a desperate fight
in their last strongholds, and civilian casualties and destruction of
infrastructure are unfortunately inevitable before they are defeated. Ukraine
will, however, eventually regain control of all of Luhansk and Donetsk,
including the border region, and further Russian attempts to destabilize the
area will be much harder to implement.

Why he’d do it: This would immediately take Western pressure
of Putin, and he’d be able to cast himself in the role of peacemaker, with the
chance of rehabilitating his image internationally, and warding off the threat
of further sanctions that actually hurt Russia’s economy.

Why he wouldn’t: It
would be seen in Russia as a serious defeat for Putin – a humiliation, and
Putin does not like to be humiliated. Also, everything Putin has done so far
indicates he does not much care about his international image – he’s much more
concerned about his domestic image, and he wants to look strong and resolute, not
weak, humiliated and defeated. In addition, ending the east Ukraine escapade
might let Crimea slip back onto the agenda, and Putin himself might face more emboldened
opposition in Russia itself.

2) Ignore all Western pressure and threats of sanctions, and
go for an all-out invasion of eastern Ukraine, carrying out some false-flag
operations as an excuse to send in first a large peacekeeping force, and then
later push in regular troops to take over an area encompassing at least,
Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolayiv and Odesa oblasts, and possibly Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk
oblasts as well.

Effect: The modern state of Ukraine would cease to exist –
it would consist only of a landlocked rump state of western and central
Ukraine, severely weakened, and no longer a “threat” to Russia. (Indeed, after
a period Russia might start to meddle with the affairs of the remaining
independent part of Ukraine.) Russia would gain control of one or more likely
two vassal statelets (the Donbas Republic of Luhansk and Donetsk – and maybe
Kharkiv – oblasts, and the state of Novorossiya, consisting of Zaporizhia,
Kherson, Mykolayiv and Odesa oblasts, and possibly Dnipropetrovsk oblast as
well.

Why he’d do it: This would be a spectacular win for Putin,
ticking some great big strategic and domestic policy boxes. Russia would
effectively expand its borders to the Dniester River in the west, and would gain
a vital land border with Crimea. A new scale would have to be devised to
measure Putin’s public popularity at home, the West would suffer a humiliating
defeat that could even cause serious strains in Nato (especially when the
Baltic states started to bay for iron-tight security guarantees). Moreover,
Putin would have a free hand to turn his attention to other land-grab projects
in Central Asia and perhaps even Belarus.

Why he wouldn’t: The Russian people themselves appear to be
against a full invasion of Ukraine, although for the Kremlin propagandists and
opinion managers this is not a huge problem. A bigger problem is the reaction
of the West, which would definitely be against it. Putin could probably count
on dithering and hot air from the EU in the face of a full invasion of Ukraine,
but the U.S. reaction would be much firmer and more dangerous. The new state of
Western Ukraine would de facto become another U.S. ally on the borders of “Russian
land,” which would no doubt be well supplied with enough weapons to ward off
further Russian expansion. Western Ukraine could even opt to conduct a partisan
war in an attempt to regain its lost territory (as it would be entitled to do
under international law.) The situation in the conquered territories could end
up being as much of a mess as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics are
now, except over a vastly broader area. Russian soldiers would regularly return
to the Motherland in “200’ convoys.

3) After waiting for a bit for the media frenzy to die down
and the West to get distracted by some other big news, continue support for
insurgency, with more regular Russian troops and military equipment, beat back
Kyiv’s advance, move in a long-prepared peace-keeping force (which seems to
have been part of the original plan). Attempt to gain control of most of
Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.

Effect: Kyiv will probably be forced to accept a ceasefire
on terms better for Russia and the insurgents. Ukraine will lose
control of most of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, which will merge and turn into
a quasi-statelet on the lines of Transdniestria or Abkhazia. A long-term “frozen
conflict” will be up and running, causing headaches for Kyiv and acting as a
useful lever of influence for Russia.

Why he’d do it: This would be the repeat of a
tried-and-tested plan for the Kremlin, which has worked well for the Russians
in Moldova and Georgia. Ukraine will be weakened over the long-term, Crimea
will be safe, and eventually it will be back to business as usual with the West.
It would be nothing but a win for the Kremlin, and Putin personally. To deal
with the immediate problem of the airliner atrocity, Russia will try to obfuscate
the investigation into the airliner atrocity in every way it can, float absurd
conspiracy theories, and lay a smokescreen so thick that the shooting down of
MH17 becomes a favorite topic of conspiracy theorists for decades to come.

Why he wouldn’t: There’s no certainty the media frenzy will
die down, as more and more evidence of direct Russian involvement in the
shooting down of MH17 comes to light. While there’s no danger of Putin himself
being sent to The Hague, captured insurgents or Russians being put on trial in
the International Court would not look good for Russia, and by extension, Putin
himself, and he doesn’t want anything to undermine his support at home.

Option 3 is probably the one Putin would go for. That’s why
it’s absolutely vital for the West to keep up the pressure on Russia, push for
a proper investigation into the shooting down of MH17, with the trial (even in
absentia) of those responsible for firing the missile, and realistic threats of
painful sanctions if the Russians don’t cooperate – at the very least the
Mistral helicopter carrier deal with France should be scrapped. Determined Western pressure could
force Putin to take option 1, which would be the best outcome for Ukraine and
the rest of the world, and, ultimately, the best for Russia.

Putin is on the hook now. The West must not allow him to
wriggle off it.