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Friday, 1 May 2015

Hybrid Warfare: NATO needs a Stoltenberg Doctrine

Rome, Italy. 1 May. Manfred
Wӧrner had one. George Robertson had one. NATO needs a Stoltenberg Doctrine – a
galvanising and clarifying statement of intent that would define Secretary-General
Stoltenberg’s tenure. The need is pressing in the face of the new threats the
Alliance is facing. A Stoltenberg Doctrine would be thus: the re-forging of a true
political-military alliance via the regeneration of strategic and political unity
of effort and purpose to combat the wars being waged against the seams of Allied
societies and polities by the likes of Russia and Islamic State. Critically, a Stoltenberg Doctrine would help
close perhaps the most dangerous of NATO’s many seams – the growing gap between
Alliance political and military leaders.
Russia’s use of so-called hybrid warfare; the planned and skilled mix of
disinformation, destabilisation and intimidation is a dangerous gambit to
force Eastern European states back into Moscow’s sphere of influence.

My reason for being in
Rome was to act as Rapporteur for a high-level conference at Major-General
Bojarski’s excellent NATO Defence College entitled NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats. It was an outstanding conference as testified
by the twenty-six pages of notes I must now forge into a coherent and concise
report. However, excellent though the conference was I was struck by the absence
of any politician from any of NATO’s twenty-eight nations, and not for the
first time.

The gap between political
leaders and those charged with military leadership is an ever-more apparent and
dangerous phenomenon. The result is what
I call “summititis.” No, it is not some
form of urinary tract infection, but it can be even more painful. Rather, “summititis” is where political
leaders agree to Sherpa- drafted declarations that they neither understand nor
own. The 2014 Wales Summit Declaration saw a particularly painful dose of “summititis”
contracted. David Cameron’s ‘do as I
say, not what I do’ exhortation to other NATO leaders to spend a 2% of GDP on
defence which he had no intention of fulfilling was particularly painful.

Stoltenberg I would see
the re-invigoration of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept at the 2016 Warsaw
Summit through the realignment of collective defence, crisis management and co-operative
security (although why the Warsaw Summit is being held just before the 2016 US
presidential elections strikes me as both bad strategy and even worse politics). Both Russia and IS are exploiting the implied
division between the three pillars of the Strategic Concept by destabilising
the home political base of Alliance nations upon which NATO defence solidarity
is founded.

Stoltenberg II would
realign ill-thought through Alliance initiatives/sound-bites that have dripped
into Alliance planning since 2010, more often to fill a political void that
galvanise action. These include Smart
Defence, NATO Forces 2020 and the Connected Forces Initiative none of which have
any real planning traction. The focus for Stoltenberg must be the full spectrum
implementation of the Readiness Action Plan agreed at the Wales Summit to
provide credible forward deterrence and implied forward defence for Eastern
European allies. My sense at the moment
is that the Alliance has simply created yet more acronyms but no more forces. Indeed,
as someone said at the conference, “when in doubt form a committee”.

Stoltenberg III would offer
something genuinely new; the creation of an Alliance concept of hybrid warfare. Ironically, ‘hybridity’ is itself nothing
new. To paraphrase Clausewitz, hybrid warfare
is simply the continuation of naughty politics by nefarious means via a
defection from the rules and norms that render international relations
peaceful. Thus, the best way to counter hybrid warfare is hybrid warfare, i.e.
the exploitation of the political and societal seams of an adversary. Take Russia.
If Moscow continues to intimidate NATO’s Baltic allies with snap
exercises then NATO should devote at some exercises that imply the swift
removal of Kaliningrad from the Russian strategic and political orb, even if
that means calling Russia’s bluff over its implied use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Above all, a
Stoltenberg Doctrine would provide a coherent strategic ‘message’ demonstrating
NATO’s comparative advantages to political masters. In effect, a Stoltenberg Doctrine would offer
a compelling vision for a new balance between strategy, military capability and
capacity, and all-important value-for-money affordability. The reason NATO leaders are paying only
lip-service to the Alliance is that NATO is NOT a political priority. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its
destabilisation of “NATO Strategic Direction East” is seen as politically
inconvenient for the main thrust of debt-ridding austerity in Europe. The raging scourge of IS in “NATO Strategic
Direction South” is seen as politically inconvenient because politicians would
rather not face the seams that have opened up in many Alliance societies by a
failure to integrate minority communities.
Both threats must be confronted and whilst NATO could not prevail alone NATO
still has a vital role to play is Europe’s borders are again to be stabilised.

Winston Churchill once
said: “True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain,
hazardous and conflicting information”.
That is the essence of the hybrid warfare challenge which will dominate
Secretary-General Stoltenberg’s tenure at NATO’s political helm. Since his October 2014 appointment Stoltenberg
has rightly taken time to consider NATO’s position in the changing geopolitics of
Europe and the world. However, the
honeymoon period is now over. NATO needs a Stoltenberg Doctrine and fast.

About Me

Julian Lindley-French is Senior Fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, Director of Europa Analytica & Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington DC. An internationally-recognised strategic analyst, advisor and author he was formerly Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy,and Special Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden. He is a Fellow of Respublica in London, and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington.
Latest books: The Oxford Handbook on War 2014 (Paperback) (2014; 709 pages). (Oxford: Oxford University Press) & "Little Britain? Twenty-First Strategy for a Middling European Power". (www.amazon.com)
The Friendly-Clinch Health Warning: The views contained herein are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution.