Media and apathy pushing Russians to self-isolation

While global media talked about Russia’s potential isolation from the rest of the global community in 2014, Russians were forming their own attitude to the outside world.

For many
years, the Levada Center has been monitoring public opinion in Russia on a
regular basis. It measures the ratings of top officials and identifies the main
assessments of ordinary Russians regarding the economic and political
situation. In addition, respondents are invited to answer the question of which
events they believe to be the most important on a monthly basis. A comparison
of the 2013 and 2014 results shows that serious changes have occurred in the
“informational” consciousness of Russians over the last year.

At the
end of 2013, the responses to that question varied widely. The typhoon in the
Philippines was the key topic of interest to Russians in November 2013, and in
December 2013 it was the Olympic torch relay. Other noteworthy events included floods
in Eastern Russia, the Euromaidan demonstrations on Kiev’s Maidan Square in
Ukraine, the pardoning of imprisoned oligarch and ex-Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
the death of Nelson Mandela, the birth of a son to Russian pop diva Alla
Pugacheva and her young husband, and the riots in the Biryulevo district of
Moscow. A number of these events also attracted the attention of people from
around the world – in this respect Russia did not differ much from other
countries.

A year
later, that picture has changed dramatically. By December 2014, the Russian
population was disconnected from the global information agenda. The top 10
events of December, as listed by Russians, almost exclusively had to do with
the situation in Ukraine or the confrontation between Russia and the West. But
the main event – mentioned twice as often as any other event – was the collapse
of the ruble. All other events were pushed into the background. Calm and
inclusion in the global agenda were supplanted by anxiety and introversion.

Russians
first expressed interest in events in Ukraine after Euromaidan in
November-December 2013. By January-February 2014, “the unrest in Kiev and other
Ukrainian cities” had attracted as much attention as the pre-New Year terrorist
attack in the southern Russian city of Volgograd (about 50 percent in January)
and the Sochi Olympics (more than 60 percent in February).

In
March-April, the main event was Crimea’s annexation by Russia, often referred
to by Russians as the “reunification” or “return.” Russians turned their
attention almost exclusively to the events in and surrounding Ukraine
throughout the spring, summer, and fall. Seven of the 10 main events in March,
April, June, and August, eight of the 10 in July and September, and six of the
10 in November and December were linked to Ukraine.

Against that
backdrop, the Ebola virus, the referendum on Scottish independence, and various
international summits went virtually unnoticed. Ukraine and the subsequent
confrontation with the West overshadowed everything else for many months.
However, the ruble’s decline and oil prices again eclipsed the Ukraine agenda
in November-December.

Why has
the global agenda ceased to be of concern to ordinary Russians? The structure
of the Russian media audience has a substantial role to play, of course. In
Russia, 90-95 percent of the population learns about domestic and international
events on television. For half of Russians, televised news is virtually their
sole source of information.

Four main
TV channels have the largest audience (Channel One, Rossiya, NTV, and Rossiya-24)
and are either directly or indirectly controlled by state-run structures. No
more than 10-15 percent of Russians watch independent Russian media channels.

The
state-run TV channels started to actively broadcast the goings-on in Ukraine
almost immediately after Euromaidan. By the spring, the majority of newscasts
were taken up by Ukraine. According to Arina Borodina, one of Russia’s most
authoritative TV critics, no other political campaign has ever garnered such
powerful media coverage – not even the presidential elections or the war with
Georgia in 2008.

But
despite the excess of information, Russians admit that they are not too
well-versed in what is happening and that they only listen to the news with
“half an ear.” They are not particularly interested in the details and are not
willing to seek out alternative points of view. A mere 12 percent of Russians
say that they often hear a point of view that differs from the official one,
while 46 percent say they sometimes hear alternative points of view, and 37
percent say they have never heard any other point of view.

However,
it would be wrong to place the blame for self-isolation squarely on the
shoulders of the state-run Russian media. The emergence of this trend was
largely facilitated by the general population’s detachment from everything that
happens outside of a small circle of family, friends, and acquaintances.

According
to numerous public opinion polls, the vast majority of Russians (more than 65
percent) are completely indifferent to international conflicts (in Syria, Israel/Palestine,
Libya, Egypt, etc.) and to elections in the United States, Ukraine, and other
countries.

The
imminent economic crisis, which ordinary Russians are already starting to feel,
will in all likelihood only compel Russians to turn further inward and focus on
their own problems. This, in turn, will merely deepen the country’s
self-isolation and delay Russia’s integration into the international
community.

Denis Volkov is the leading sociologist at the Levada Center. The column
is based on statistics from the Levada Center.