On Aug. 6, 2001, President George W. Bush
received a classified review of the threats posed by Osama bin Laden and his
terrorist network, Al Qaeda. That morning’s “presidential daily brief” — the
top-secret document prepared by America’s intelligence agencies — featured the
now-infamous heading: “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” A few weeks
later, on 9/11, Al Qaeda accomplished that goal.

On April 10, 2004, the Bush White House declassified that daily brief — and only
that daily brief — in response to pressure from the 9/11 Commission...
Administration officials dismissed the document’s significance, saying that,
despite the jaw-dropping headline, it was only an assessment of Al Qaeda’s
history, not a warning of the impending attack. While some critics considered
that claim absurd, a close reading of the brief showed that the argument had
some validity.

That is, unless it was read in conjunction with the daily briefs preceding Aug.
6, the ones the Bush administration would not release. While those documents are
still not public, I have read excerpts from many of them, along with other
recently declassified records, and come to an inescapable conclusion: the
administration’s reaction to what Mr. Bush was told in the weeks before that
infamous briefing reflected significantly more negligence than has been
disclosed. ...

The direct warnings to Mr. Bush about the possibility of a Qaeda attack began in
the spring of 2001. By May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency told the White
House of a report that “a group presently in the United States” was planning a
terrorist operation. Weeks later, on June 22, the daily brief reported that
Qaeda strikes could be “imminent,” although intelligence suggested the time
frame was flexible.

But some in the administration considered the warning to be just bluster. An
intelligence official and a member of the Bush administration both told me in
interviews that the neoconservative leaders who had recently assumed power at
the Pentagon were warning the White House that the C.I.A. had been fooled;
according to this theory, Bin Laden was merely pretending to be planning an
attack to distract the administration from Saddam Hussein, whom the
neoconservatives saw as a greater threat. ... In response, the C.I.A. prepared
an analysis that all but pleaded with the White House to accept that the danger
from Bin Laden was real. ... And the C.I.A. repeated the warnings... Yet, the
White House failed to take significant action. ...

On Aug. 6, 2001, President George W. Bush
received a classified review of the threats posed by Osama bin Laden and his
terrorist network, Al Qaeda. That morning’s “presidential daily brief” — the
top-secret document prepared by America’s intelligence agencies — featured the
now-infamous heading: “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” A few weeks
later, on 9/11, Al Qaeda accomplished that goal.

On April 10, 2004, the Bush White House declassified that daily brief — and only
that daily brief — in response to pressure from the 9/11 Commission...
Administration officials dismissed the document’s significance, saying that,
despite the jaw-dropping headline, it was only an assessment of Al Qaeda’s
history, not a warning of the impending attack. While some critics considered
that claim absurd, a close reading of the brief showed that the argument had
some validity.

That is, unless it was read in conjunction with the daily briefs preceding Aug.
6, the ones the Bush administration would not release. While those documents are
still not public, I have read excerpts from many of them, along with other
recently declassified records, and come to an inescapable conclusion: the
administration’s reaction to what Mr. Bush was told in the weeks before that
infamous briefing reflected significantly more negligence than has been
disclosed. ...

The direct warnings to Mr. Bush about the possibility of a Qaeda attack began in
the spring of 2001. By May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency told the White
House of a report that “a group presently in the United States” was planning a
terrorist operation. Weeks later, on June 22, the daily brief reported that
Qaeda strikes could be “imminent,” although intelligence suggested the time
frame was flexible.

But some in the administration considered the warning to be just bluster. An
intelligence official and a member of the Bush administration both told me in
interviews that the neoconservative leaders who had recently assumed power at
the Pentagon were warning the White House that the C.I.A. had been fooled;
according to this theory, Bin Laden was merely pretending to be planning an
attack to distract the administration from Saddam Hussein, whom the
neoconservatives saw as a greater threat. ... In response, the C.I.A. prepared
an analysis that all but pleaded with the White House to accept that the danger
from Bin Laden was real. ... And the C.I.A. repeated the warnings... Yet, the
White House failed to take significant action. ...