The strategic pause accompanying the end of the Cold War creates a window
of opportunity in which to apply emerging technology, advance new warfighting
capabilities, and test new doctrinal concepts without placing US combat
forces and interests at risk. Weapons systems and enabling technologies
are proliferating among our known and potential enemies, increasing the
danger to US forces and interests from hostile theater air and missile
systems. This Naval Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) Concept describes
the naval contributions to the joint TAMD system and its operations circa
2010. Navy and Marine capabilities and operations are joint, by design
and necessity, whether they serve as the foundation for a developing joint
force, reinforce an established joint force, or are the only forces in
an operation. The concept describes dynamic defense in depth, unifying
joint operations through developing network-based capabilities to achieve
cohesive, force-wide leverage of knowledge and understanding.

THEATER AIR & MISSILE DEFENSE
MISSION

TAMD operations integrate employment of forces to destroy, neutralize,
or prevent attacks by enemy aircraft and theater missiles in order to prevent
enemy air and missile forces from interfering with operations by US forces.
TAMD forces and operations are organized around the joint task forceís
operations area and its associated areas of interest (AOI), and emphasize
the interdependence between TAMD and other operations by the force. TAMD
is joint by nature, combining the strengths of available forces in four
mutually supportive "operational elements" of TAMD: active defense;
attack operations; passive defense; and command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C4I). These operational elements are briefly
defined below:

Active defense - operations to protect friendly forces and interests
by destroying or neutralizing aircraft and theater missiles in flight;

The four "operational elements" are conceptual and planning
constructs only, they are not functional or tactical organizations of forces.
Every Service contributes to all four operational elements of TAMD, but
their equipment, doctrine, and training reflect the unique requirements
of the environments in which they operate. Naval forces and their contributions
to TAMD are pivotal in a wide range of operations, from peacetime forward
presence through sustained, large-scale combat operations by a joint force.

Aircraft and theater missiles can attack
across hundreds of miles in minutes, engaging targets anywhere in the theater
of war.

The TAMD battlespace for any operation is the space within which the
force must operate to protect the force from aircraft and missile threats.
It is shaped by technology, politics, geography, and military operations,
and extends to areas previously of little direct concern to naval air defense
forces, including areas far inland, and into exoatmospheric space. Although
actual combat operations will occur in a joint task forceís operations
area, the term "theater" captures the extremely long distances
which may be involved when our enemies deploy medium and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles, long-range strike aircraft, and advanced cruise missiles.
It also captures the rapid, fluid nature of air and missile operations,
often involving all elements of the joint task force. Aircraft and missiles
can attack across hundreds of miles in a matter of minutes, engaging targets
which may be almost anywhere in the theater of war.

Threat

The historical theater air threat to US forces and interests was massed
attacks by piloted aircraft. Despite the end of the Cold War, this threat
remains widespread due to the continuing export of advanced combat aircraft,
and now is complicated by the rising threat from theater missiles. "Theater
missiles" include cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles (TBM),
both presenting very difficult technical and tactical problems to US forces.
Televised coverage of Iraqi SCUDs exploding in Israel and Saudi Arabia
focused US attention on the TBM threat and emphasized the political implications
of their proliferation. The overall TBM threat is predicted to increase
in quantity, range, and lethality in the next decade. Cruise missiles share
some characteristics of piloted, tactical aircraft but display others that
are unique. A significant cruise missile threat is emerging from the export
of current weapons, the proliferation of indigenous production capabilities,
and the likelihood that large inventories of antiship cruise missiles will
be converted to land attack cruise missiles using commercially available
technology. All three of these threat systems (piloted aircraft, TBMs,
and cruise missiles) can be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).

Sophisticated technology is proliferating among known and potential
enemies of the US, but threat systems are no longer defined principally
by Russian weapons exports. Potential adversaries often combine weapons
and enabling technologies exported by US, western European, Chinese, and
Russian producers, much as Iraq constructed an integrated air defense system
from French, Chinese, and Russian systems. New producers are exporting
weapons and enabling technologies as well, often based on indigenously-developed
systems, not just on modifications of US or Russian weapons. Examples of
commercially-available enabling technologies include GPS and GPS-like navigation
systems, computer workstations, advanced software applications, digital
communications, and satellite imagery. As WMD capabilities proliferate,
piloted aircraft and theater missiles can be used to conduct devastating
strikes with chemical agents, biological agents, or nuclear warheads, raising
the stakes for TAMD operations. Physical destruction is no longer the only
means available to potential enemies, for the threat now includes the possibility
of electronic attack using directed energy weapons or generation of an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to disable or destroy defenses and command
and control (C2) systems.

Commercially available technologies
are increasing the precision and accuracy with which potential enemies
can attack high value targets or systems with a high probability of success

The strategy, doctrine, and tactics for using air and missile capabilities
increasingly are a home-grown mix, as well. Our adversaries no longer slavishly
follow Soviet or US doctrine, and they vary widely in their capability
to project an air and missile threat. Exploiting the proliferation of sophisticated
weapons and enabling technologies, potential adversaries will use them
with varying levels of operational and tactical sophistication. Although
some potential adversaries are relatively unsophisticated and can easily
be neutralized, it is reasonable and prudent to expect future enemies to
employ piloted aircraft, TBMs, and land attack cruise missiles in coordinated
strike operations. Population centers may remain primary targets, particularly
for WMD, but commercially available technologies are increasing the ease
with which potential enemies can attack specific high-value targets or
systems with a high probability of success. Critical assets for TAMD protection
include U.S. and allied command and control systems, airfields, assembly
areas, seaports, logistics facilities, and transportation chokepoints.

THE TAMD CONCEPT

Above all, naval TAMD operations are driven by human understanding,
decision, and action. Automation, networking, and systems integration improve
the ability of operators and decision-makers to perform their duties and
work together. Naval forces increasingly fight as combined arms teams in
network-based operations, whether as the on-scene vanguard of a US joint
task force or as part of a synchronized, fully-developed joint force. Naval
forces bring forward presence, mobility, a minimal logistics footprint,
relative security, and flexibility to a joint task force. Additionally,
they are fully combat capable as soon as they arrive. Developing naval
doctrine fully exploits the "plug and fight" concept, enhancing
advanced, network-based capabilities for situational awareness, decision
support, and combat action.

Figure 1. The Enemy Theater Air and Missile Threat
is a System

Joint, integrated TAMD operations are one element of US network-based
warfighting capabilities. Cohesive, force-wide leverage of network-based
knowledge and understanding supports dynamic defense in depth against air
and missile attack. TAMD forces neutralize or destroy the threat before
launch where possible, engage and defeat attacks which are launched, and
minimize the effectiveness of attacks which canít be prevented or stopped
enroute. Dynamic defense in depth integrates mutually supportive, network-based
operations to prevent hostile air and missile forces from interfering with
US operations. Network-based forces wage dynamic defense in depth across
time and distance, engaging enemy forces in every phase of their operations,
and throughout the battlespace. Joint forces integrate their actions against
enemy aircraft, theater missiles, and the logistics, command, and control
infrastructure, engaging it as an operational system. Planning is centralized,
enabling operational commanders to synchronize decisive, high-tempo tactical
operations, issuing broad guidance and clear requirements to tactical commanders
and their units for decentralized execution. Tactical commanders integrate
combat actions and adapt decisions to exploit the changing situation, reporting
their status and the progress of the battle to the network.

Figure 2. TAMD Engages the Enemy Throughout the Battlespace.

The Foundation

The foundation of joint,
integrated TAMD is:

Integrated C4I

Integrated information

Common doctrine

Common tools

Joint TAMD combines the benefits of each Serviceís programs to implement
and employ automation, networking, and systems integration. It can be described
in four broad ideas. First, the Services are integrating their C4I architectures
into a joint architecture. Second, the Services and the DoD also are integrating
their information resources, focusing them on the end-users vice the producers.
Third, common decision support tools are in development to help users rapidly
and accurately use information via access to distributed resources. Finally,
the Services are developing and implementing common doctrine for TAMD,
promulgating shared principles and ideas in joint publications, with Service
doctrine applying these joint principles to tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) for Service-specific forces, organizations, and equipment. These
four initiatives build the foundation on which the Services will test and
experiment with new technologies and systems, such as the Navy Theater-Wide
TBMD capability, Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), the Joint
Aerostat, the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the JTIDS (Link-16),
the Airborne Laser (ABL), and Combat Identification (CID).

Integrated C4I

Each Serviceís
C4I is a functionally complete subset of the joint C4I architecture. The
initial command and control established by the first units is the cornerstone
of the developing force.

Each Serviceís C4I is a functionally complete subset of the joint C4I
architecture. The joint C4I architecture is an increasingly integrated
architecture of systems, processes, communications, and nodes with common
standards and protocols. Integrated C4I enables a smooth transition from
forward presence forces to a fully developed joint force as reinforcements
flow to the theater. The command and control architecture established by
the first units is the cornerstone of the developing force. The on-scene
C4I architecture must be consistent with the joint doctrine guiding the
fully developed joint force as it grows. Integrated C4I must enable the
smooth transition of forces and command structure as the theater develops
without compromising flexibility to accommodate different scenarios unique
to the operational environment.

Joint force systems will be integrated in each of the three subsystems
of the joint C4I architecture. The subsystems are discussed in the following
paragraphs.

The Joint Planning Network (JPN)is an emerging, Global
Command and Control System (GCCS)-based network of electronic communications
systems supporting force operational planning and situational awareness
for the senior levels of command. It carries mostly non-real time information.
It enables distributed, collaborative planning by providing access to planning
information, and provides the means to exchange and distribute plans between
commanders and their forces.

The Joint Composite Tracking Network (JCTN) is an network
of electronic communications systems passing precision sensor measurement
data and weapons engagement signals between cooperating units at the rate
those measurements are taken. The principal element of the JCTN is the
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), a real time network providing
composite tracking, precision cueing, and coordinated cooperative engagements.

Figure 3. Service C4I Integrates into the Joint Architecture.

By delivering timely access to tactical and non-tactical information
and to key transmission mechanisms, these three interdependent subsystems
serve different, mutually supportive purposes within the force, as shown
in Figure 3. Each network supports a different audience of interdependent
users, dynamically channeling torrents of data, information, and intelligence.
These three networks accommodate and exploit differences in certainty,
detail, and scope among non-real time, near-real time, and real time products.
The role of the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO) is increasingly
important to the effective design, construction, and operation of the integrated
C4I system. (The JICO is discussed more fully later, in "Joint TAMD
Operations" under "Organization".)

Improved sensor capabilities increase the effectiveness of force reconnaissance,
surveillance, identification, tracking, and cueing. More importantly, netting
these sensors helps associate and synthesize information from systems with
different time and location references, and different kinds of data and
information. Fusion and integration of information from radar, passive
sensors, combat identification systems, cryptological sources, lasers,
multispectral imagery, and acoustic systems supports a qualitatively better
picture than one which simply increases the frequency or intensity of coverage
for specific sensors. Combining multispectral data from distributed sensors,
advanced data processing, and sensor cooperation can help overcome jamming,
interference, and deception, and harvest geometric increases in information
without corresponding increases in the number of sensors. Polling and broadcast
architectures are complemented by time-division multiple access (TDMA)
systems, such as Link 16, the CEC, and Link-22, yielding tremendous increases
in jam-resistant, high volume, high data rate capacity.

Integrated Information Resources

Integrated C4I helps commanders adapt their information systems for
timely access to both tactical and non-tactical repositories of data, information,
and intelligence. The data from informed, sequential tasking of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) resources are indexed to common,
geodetically registered grids. Information and data are stored in systematic,
indexed databases following standardized, compatible formats as part of
the production or collection process. Users are supported by fusion capabilities
which find and call attention to associations and patterns in data and
information. As integration proceeds, users at all levels of the force
will use a common operating environment to search, comprehend, and act
on multimedia information, assisted by automated "mediators"
able to deal with the differences between tactical and non-tactical databases
within the distributed, open architecture. "User-pull" will collaborate
with "intelligent-push" to dynamically manage information resources
and prevent the overloading of end users. These end users are the best
authorities for deciding what they need, and in what form they need it.
"Intelligent push" sends applicable information targeted to the
userís needs, point casting and netcasting to a dynamically managed collection
of recipients. The JICO manages the networkís broad parameters for "push"
and "pull" in order to maintain efficient network operations
combining force-level decisions and end-user preferences.

Figure 4. The System Supporting Integrated Information
Resources

Common Tools

Research into developing and improving tools for understanding, decision,
and action is beginning to pay off, and follow-on efforts now are ensuring
that results are compatible. "Common tools" will combine expert
systems, intelligent agents, modeling and simulation capabilities, visualization
systems, and interactive displays and presentations to support a broad
range of functions. Information distribution tools will implement user
preferences and guidance for control of push and pull information access.
Processing tools will present the evaluated meaning of information,
going beyond mere categorization and display of data, facts, and details.
This will allow people to concentrate on, create, understand, and use information.
Routine administration is handled by automated protocols set up within
the force. Common tools enable collaboration between geographically separated
users via the integrated C4I system. Their tools will permit easy tailoring
of information, customizing presentations to missions and tasks while reliably
sustaining consistency of understanding between users. Common tools presently
under development include modeling and simulation systems for comparing
courses of action, visualization systems portraying the effects of combat
system operating algorithms in three dimensions, intelligent agents for
database query and retrieval, and analytical tools for Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlespace (IPB).

Powerful workstations combine formerly discrete pieces of equipment
in multifunction consoles through which planners and staffs can receive,
store, request, manipulate, and view integrated information drawn from
the C4I network. Multi-modal interfaces enhance userís interaction with
their consoles, overcoming limitations of video terminals, keyboards, and
trackballs. Multimedia presentations adapt representations of objects,
situations, threats, and processes to the perspective and mission of individual
users without compromising cohesive meaning within the overall network.
The same capabilities will be embedded as tactical decision aids (TDA)
in unit level combat systems aboard ships and in workstations accompanying
tactical MAGTF commanders in the field. Common planning tools and TDAs,
connected to a common pool of data, information, and intelligence, will
thus be available throughout the force.

Common Doctrine

Common principles captured in joint doctrine unify the individual Service
doctrines which implement them. The system supports unity of effort and
integration while preserving differences which capitalize on each Serviceís
strengths and contributions. Doctrine for integrated TAMD operations supports
the main effort, as designated by the Joint Force Commander (JFC), and
the JFCís course of action determines the structure of the joint force,
the operational plan, and the phasing of operations. Doctrine uses jointly
understood terms to define required capabilities, assignments, measures
of effectiveness, and procedures for TAMD operations. It matches capabilities
to the JFCís prioritization of interests and the forces to be protected.
Joint and Service TAMD doctrine captures the best uses of individual systems
and Service capabilities. Several core principles unite TAMD planning and
operations:

Centralized planning and decentralized execution - maintains
unity of effort, optimizes the contributions of all forces, and supports
timely, decisive action by all commanders;

Integrated C4I, integrated information resources, common tools, and
common doctrine create the foundation for plug and fight TAMD capability.
Plug and fight architecture smoothly adapts operations to changes in force
structure as reinforcements join the operation. Naval forces channel the
strength of the TAMD foundation through three enabling catalysts for network-based
warfighting. First, "flexible command structure" ensures all
of the functions necessary for joint TAMD are fulfilled, irrespective of
the forces on-scene. Second, battlespace awareness accurately links knowledge
and understanding between all the elements of the force despite differences
in time, space, responsibilities, and information. "Integrated airspace"
supports concurrent, mutually supportive action in the joint task force
operations area by all elements of the force, including aircraft, air defense
artillery, and fires.

Flexible Command Structure

In the flexible command structure each Serviceís air and missile defense
organization can perform all the duties of the joint air and missile defense
command structure, including operational and tactical functions. Each Serviceís
C4I complements this organization and constitutes a functionally complete
subset of the joint architecture. The flexible command structure enables
a smooth transition of forces and command responsibilities between Service
commanders and organizations in a developing joint force, while preserving
the flexibility to accommodate the operational requirements specific to
individual theaters. Command focuses and prioritizes TAMD actions in support
of the main effort, including operational and tactical planning, execution,
and assessment of TAMD operations. The nature of command makes forward
location desirable and the plug and fight foundation makes it possible.

The JFC may delegate authority and responsibility for air and missile
defense operations to an Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) as a functional
component commander. The AADC normally is the component commander with
the preponderance of air and missile defense forces, and the capability
to plan, task, and control TAMD operations in coordination with other operations
by the force. The duties of the AADC are interdependent with those of the
Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the Airspace Control Authority
(ACA). The JFCís Concept of Operations and force organization may combine
one or more of these discrete, interdependent functions, recognizing their
overlapping nature, but these functions are always closely coordinated
no matter how command is assigned. In a crisis response, the functions
of the JFACC, AADC, and the ACA may all be performed by the first commander
to arrive on the scene. The AADC normally exercises tactical authority
through the tactical command centers organic to the Service components
of the force, such as the Marineís Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC)
or the Navyís Combat Information Center (CIC). The AADC may choose to delegate
tactical authority over some or all air defense operations to one or more
Regional Air Defense Commanders (RADC). If necessary, RADCs may further
delegate tactical authority to Sector Air Defense Commanders (SADC). The
RADCs and SADCs are sited at the appropriate nodes within each Serviceís
organization as shown in Figure 6, using existing Service combat organizations
to plan and conduct TAMD operations.

Figure 6. Integrated C4I Hosts TAMD Command Within
Service C2 Centers

Battlespace Awareness

As difficult as it is for any one decision maker to understand the current
situation, it is even harder for the force to establish and maintain shared
understanding of the situation. Differences in understanding arise from
different perspectives and purposes, from access to different information,
and from time and friction. The challenge is to bring coherence to how
users throughout the force perceive the situation as well as to their decisions
and actions. Integrated C4I and integrated information resources create
and sustain the "common operational picture" and the "coherent
tactical picture." These interrelated representations of the current
situation arise from different purposes, users, types of data, and network
access, yet they must be mutually supportive.

The common operational picture is a non-real time presentation
of the current situation which is used for commanderís situational awareness
and force-level planning and coordination. The common operational picture
presents JPN information provided through the SIPRNET, Tactical Data Information
Exchange Systems (TADIXS) broadcasts, and the Tactical Intelligence (TACINTEL)
data exchanges.

The coherent tactical picture is "a clear, consistent,
and intuitively obvious display of all objects of interest to users across
the force, within an operator-selectable region of interest"
1. It is the near-real time presentation of the current
situation as represented by tactical data on the tactical data links comprising
the JCTN-enhanced JDN. It is used by tactical and unit-level commanders
to direct, integrate, and execute engagements by units in the force2
.

1 From the "Coherent Tactical Picture
Integrated Product Team Charter" of 27August, 1996. Cited in "Engineering
the Coherent Tactical Picture" by CDR Jeffrey W. Wilson, USN. Program
Executive Office for Theater Air Defense.

2 The term "single integrated
air picture" is less fully developed than "coherent tactical
picture". This concept uses "coherent tactical picture"
because it is focused on the users vice the data, because it accounts for
technical limits on the JDN/JCTN, because it has been in use longer, and
because it is not restricted to the air picture.

Battlespace awareness is coherent understanding
and action throughout the force overcoming differences due to distance
time functions or level of responsibility.

Establishing and maintaining coherent mutual support through the common
operational picture and the coherent tactical picture supports battlespace
awareness. "Battlespace awareness" describes coherence in the
understanding and actions of decision makers throughout the force, overcoming
differences arising from distance, time, functions, or levels of responsibility.
Coherent presentations of the current situation enable users to tailor
the common operational picture and the coherent tactical picture to their
circumstances and needs without compromising battlespace awareness. Battlespace
awareness helps units, tactical commanders, and operational commanders
implement the commanderís intent, enabling rapid, effective, and mutually
supportive action to achieve combat objectives. It supports initiative
and decisive action, enabling integrated operations at the tactical level
and synchronization of forces at the operational level.

Mutually supportive, tailored presentations of the common operational
picture and the coherent tactical picture build and maintain battlespace
awareness, creating the effect of a virtual "coherent force picture."
Coherence results from force-wide standards for system doctrine, threat
evaluation criteria, intelligence interpretation methodology, engagement,
and tactics, techniques, and procedures. It also results from use of common
tools operated with consistent settings and access to integrated information.
Each node in the network has a customized yet coherent presentation of
the current situation, strengthened by links to supporting data, information,
and intelligence. Operational, tactical, and unit-level representations
of the current situation focus userís attention on patterns, associations,
and assessed meaning rather than detail. Operator-defined parameters for
inferences and estimates will guide integration of new information into
the display. Information will be presented in the context of engagements,
battles, and the campaign, rather than as collections of separate events
and "threats." Information will be presented probabilistically,
identifying the level of confidence supporting its assessment. Integrated,
netted systems create a more accurate, comprehensive, and immediate representation
of the battlespace with higher levels of confidence, overcoming differences
in time, space, responsibilities, and information among users linked to
the three networks of the C4I system.

Integrated Airspace

Combat identification and track correlation
capabilities are the key to integrating airspace.

The foundation of TAMD qualitatively improves US ability to effectively
create and use integrated airspace for concurrent, interdependent operations.
The common operational picture qualitatively enhances planning and situational
awareness, enabling the force to execute synchronized, mutually supportive
operations by naval fires, air operations, and air defense operations.
Tactical integration of airspace depends on the JCTN-enhanced JDN and dependable,
high confidence combat identification capabilities to develop the coherent
tactical picture. Enhanced combat identification and track correlation
capabilities are the key to integrating airspace. Robust, high confidence
combat identification enables positive identification and tracking of friendly,
hostile, and neutral forces and non-combatants. Friendly forces are the
simplest of these groups to identify and track. All other groups need non-cooperative
target recognition, automatic target recognition, and automatic target
extraction technology and methods. Today, the integration of the Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) and tactical data links (notably Link-16) provides
joint forces with an integrated, JCTN-enhanced JDN. Future incorporation
of combat identification information in the CEC, as well as integration
of non-radar sensor data, promises further improvement for the forceís
detection, combat identification, tracking, and engagement capabilities.

Joint TAMD Capabilities in Network-Based
Warfighting

The combination of the plug and fight foundation and the catalysts for
joint TAMD enables US forces to operate as a network-based force. Network-based
TAMD enhances human control and use of integrated systems, automation,
and networking to protect US forces and vital interests. It leverages knowledge
and understanding to increase the effectiveness and speed of TAMD combat
operations. Joint forces make the most of three capabilities: tailored
situational awareness, user-customized decision support, and unified combat
action.

Figure 7. The Structure of Network-Based TAMD Capabilities

Tailored Situational Awareness

Tailored situational awareness is the user-customized representation
of the current situation which builds understanding and informs decision.
It is an accurate representation of the situation focused on the userís
purposes and drawn from battlespace awareness. Tailored situational awareness
underpins effective, integrated TAMD operations, providing users with the
information they need to fulfill their responsibilities. Intelligent push
and user pull from networked information resources update and customize
the coherent tactical picture and the common operational picture. Battlespace
awareness is the unifying "big picture" making tailored situational
awareness possible across the operational, tactical, and unit levels. Human
decision makers use automated intelligent agents to tailor sensor cooperation
and management, information integration, information dissemination, presentation,
and exploitation of information to maintain situational awareness within
the network. Force operators collaborate to decrease data latency, enhance
accuracy and precision, and fuse all-source information. Users display
evaluated information in the context which is most effective for them,
making full use of multi-modal presentation.

User-customized Decision Support

User-customized decision support applies focused tactical and operational
decision aids to the issues relevant to each userís responsibilities. User-customized
decision support software focuses usersí attention and their tools on timely
and relevant information. User-customized decision support brings coherence
to force decision-making through common tools, doctrine, and integrated
information resources networked within the integrated C4I architecture.
Each of the decision support systems concentrates information and the userís
attention on the userís own purpose and responsibilities. Commanders will
be able to conduct distributed planning at both theater and force levels,
knowing that products will be consistent and mutually supportive. Networked
force resources, coupled with responsive access to remote resources, can
enable collaborative work with "virtual staffs" via the JPN,
connecting forward commanders to specialized information and capabilities
residing with geographically dispersed functional experts, "anchor
desks," and stay-behind augmentation cells.

Unified Combat Action

Unified combat action is synchronized, mutually supporting operations
undertaken concurrently by the forces in each of the operational elements.
Unified combat action is tactical integration and operational synchronization
of action by the force. Unified combat action results from cohesive decisions
and consistent understanding of the situation. Joint TAMD forces link the
four operational elements by synchronizing a layered, in-depth defense,
engaging the threat before launch, after launch, and in the impact area
of leakers. Unified combat action supports defense in depth within each
of the operational elements, as well:

Active defense layers include: Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) capability against
ballistic missiles, area TAMD by naval air superiority aircraft, SAM units
for area TAMD, and point defense or self-defense systems;

Passive defenses are functionally "layered": preventive measures
deny effective targeting information to the enemy; timely warning alerts
US forces and allies to inbound attacks; physical protective measures minimize
the effects of attacks; and damage control measures are taken to speed
recovery and reconstitution following attacks.

Joint TAMD Operations

U.S. forces deliver decisive combat power, rapidly maneuvering in synchronized
operations towards the commanderís objective. For TAMD, naval forces take
offensive action to neutralize or destroy the threat before launch where
possible, engaging and defeating attacks which are launched, and minimizing
the effectiveness of attacks which cannot be prevented or stopped enroute.
The key to joint, integrated TAMD is leveraging knowledge and understanding
to maintain unity of effort and spur decisive actions. Network-based tactical
integration makes it easier to synchronize activity among the four operational
elements of TAMD, combining tailored situational awareness, user-customized
decision support, and unified combat action to protect US forces and critical
interests through dynamic defense in depth.

Organization

Unified commanders designate joint force commanders (JFC) and form joint
task forces for specific warfighting tasks to execute the unified commanderís
strategy. The unified commander assigns missions and resources to the joint
force commander (JFC) who develops a concept of operations (CONOPS) to
achieve the assigned mission. The CONOPS shapes and guides the operational
plan built by the joint force staff, as well as planning by the component
commanders of the force. The JFC structures the force around the main effort,
using only as many command levels and nodes as are needed to accomplish
the mission, organizing the force around Service components, functional
components, or a combination of the two 3.
The JFCís command structure reflects the mission, the course of action,
and the relationship of these functions to the main effort. When the JFC
designates an AADC separate from the JFACC, the ACA responsibilities normally
remain with the JFACC. Operational planning is based on theater-level guidance,
objectives, and methodology as integrated into theater-level operations
plans and annexes accessible via the JPN.

3 When a naval force is the initial element
of a developing joint task force, the AADC most likely will develop from
the Air Warfare Commander (AWC). The AWC will execute the functions of
the AADC in a manner consistent with joint processes and doctrine, enabling
a smooth transition to the AADC for the fully developed force. The Navy
unit which supported the AADC capability may remain as an RADC after the
handover.

The ADP prioritizes the forces and critical
assets to be defended in a Defended Assets List and details which tactical
commanders are responsible for each of the assets. Operations are normally
executed through Service tactical command and control agencies to best
integrate the unique training equipment and combat forces of each component
in the force.

The AADC is responsible for planning, coordination, and execution of
TAMD operations within the theater of operations. The AADC constructs an
Air Defense Plan (ADP) to protect the force and vital US interests from
enemy air and theater missile operations. Once approved by the JFC, the
ADP details the AADCís strategy for defeating the threat from enemy air
and theater missile forces. The ADP assigns responsibilities and authority
for TAMD within the force and designates the chain of command and supporting
relationships within the force. The ADP conveys the rules of engagement,
operating procedures, guidance for systems doctrine and network setup,
integration of information, C4I requirements, and requirements for TAMD
standards and measures of effectiveness (MOE). The ADP prioritizes the
forces and critical assets to be defended in a Defended Assets List (DAL)
and details which tactical commanders are responsible for each of the assets.
TAMD operations normally are executed through the Service tactical commanders
and control agencies to integrate each component in a manner making best
use of its unique training, equipment, and combat forces to accomplish
their part of the ADP. These commanders and their command and control centers
implement centralized planning and decentralized execution, command by
negation, minimized communications, and planned responses to minimize the
complexity of real-time decision-making and increase the effectiveness
of dynamic defense in depth. If the AADC delegates authority to RADC(s)
and SADCs, these commanders assume the roles outlined above.

The Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO), presently under the AADC,
is functionally responsible for the JDN (and by extension the JCTN). The
JICO organization must work closely with the information systems manager
of the JPN for the force to build and maintain battlespace awareness, particularly
where more than one JCTN-enhanced JDN is operating within the joint operations
area. The JICO ensures the integrated C4I network effectively supports
TAMD operations, including battlespace awareness and battle management,
from the JFC to the unit-level. At the very least, the JICO plans, executes,
and maintains the interfaces between the various tactical data links used
in the force, ensuring smooth transfer of information. Joint C4I is increasingly
emerging as a complex, adaptive system, however. The JICO will also need
a trained cadre of experts to design and manage the complex interactions
between the algorithms ("system doctrine") controlling the automated
combat systems4and those for the JCTN systems (notably the CEC).

Dynamic defense in depth is fought across time and distance, engaging
the enemy in every phase of his operations throughout the battlespace.
Joint forces engage the enemy as a functioning system, overcoming defensive
tendencies to react to the enemy as a collection of independent "threats."
Dynamic defense in depth keys on the windows of opportunity to disrupt
or destroy the enemyís processes. Dynamic defense in depth synchronizes
TAMDís operational elements in decisive, high-tempo tactical operations.
Tactical commanders and their units integrate their tactical actions, implementing
the guidance and requirements from centralized planning. Decentralized
execution frees subordinates to adapt combat actions and decisions to exploit
the changing situation and report their status and the progress of the
battle to the network.

Attack operations and denial of targeting information are the first
line in plans for dynamic defense. U.S. attack aircraft and missiles press
deliberate strikes against the enemyís air and theater missile forces and
their supporting infrastructure. In some circumstances, special operations-capable
forces may be considered as a means to destroy exceptionally important
targets which cannot be otherwise neutralized. Deliberate strikes complement
interdiction missions by strike aircraft and fires to find and engage relocatable
and mobile elements of the enemy air and theater missile system. Attack
operations may occur anywhere in the joint operations area. They include
strikes against hangared aircraft and theater missile reload facilities,
deep strikes against production, assembly, and C2 nodes, and battlefield
interdiction against short-range theater missile launchers and forward
airbases. First-line passive defense measures deny effective targeting
information to hostile intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts
through camouflage, concealment, and deception.

The second and most important layer of dynamic defense in depth is prompt,
decisive action against theater missiles and aircraft in flight. Layering
is particularly important to effective active defense, and increasingly
extends to long distances inland and to exoatmospheric space. Ideally,
forward-stationed Aegis ships and combat aircraft promptly engage theater
missiles and aircraft deep in enemy airspace, primarily through network-supported
"beyond visual range" (BVR) engagement by air-to-air or surface-to-air
missiles. BVR engagement capabilities will be extended by air-directed
air-to-air missile (ADAAM) and air-directed surface-to-air missile (ADSAM).
In addition to being the first line in multiple engagement opportunities,
stand-off, long-range weapons enable prompt, early engagement. Ascent phase
interception by Navy Theater-Wide interceptors is the most effective active
defense against long-range TBMs. Fighters may be positioned anywhere between
the source of the threat and the protected forces and assets. Armed with
long-range, mid-range, and short-range air-to-air missiles, they form an
exceptionally flexible, strong defense when supported by long-range air
surveillance and electronic warfare assets. Surface-to-air missile systems
from Navy surface combatants and Marine or Army ground forces also cover
a significant portion of the airspace between enemy airbases and launch
positions and defended forces and assets, combining dispersed, often overlapping
capabilities for point defense and area defense against all threats. Offensive
air operations against enemy units detected during launch operations control
the tempo of the battle and enhance defensive operations. They ensure prompt
engagement of enemy systems by combat air patrol aircraft or naval fires,
extending attack operations into the launch and post-launch periods. During
this phase, passive defense measures focus on detecting attacks, providing
timely warning, and prompt institution of protective measures by unit commanders
in the targeted area(s).

Figure 8. Layers of Dynamic Defense in Depth

Reliance on integrated, network-based air and missile defenses is greatest
in the terminal areas, when the opportunity for defensive action is rapidly
closing. Tested, flexible automated responses programmed into networked
air and missile defense systems integrate hard kill and soft kill measures
for the most effective force response. They implement the commanderís guidance
through carefully analyzed, planned options to simplify decision-making
in urgent circumstances. Every unit commander is responsible for passive
defense, instituting measures for prevention, protection, and post-attack
recovery. U.S. forces use point defense weapons as a last layer of active
defense against attacking theater missiles and aircraft, relying on dispersion,
mobility, camouflage, concealment, deception, and hardening to minimize
the effects of attacks successfully penetrating active defenses. Passive
defense measures are exceptionally important if the enemy successfully
penetrates active defenses with theater missiles armed with weapons of
mass destruction. In addition to protection from immediate destructive
effects, passive defense includes physical hardening, damage control, decontamination
operations, reconstitution of forces, and recovery of operations.

SUMMARY

Naval forces normally are the first complete, integrated, and sustainable
combat force to arrive on the scene in conflicts, and are a central force
for continuity during developing joint operations. Joint, integrated TAMD
operations are one element of integrated U.S. capabilities in network-based
warfighting operations. Emerging and developing naval capabilities for
sea-based air defense complement other joint capabilities to wage offensive
operations ashore. Joint, integrated TAMD is based on a solid foundation
in which integrated C4I and information resources manipulated with common
tools support forces operating with common doctrine. This plug and fight
foundation is catalyzed by a flexible command structure operating with
battlespace awareness, enabling concurrent action in integrated airspace.
Dynamic defense in depth depends on network-based warfighting, exploiting
tailored situational awareness, user-customized decision support, and unified
combat action. Dynamic defense in depth synchronizes operations between
the four operational elements of TAMD, improving integration of their tactical
actions as mutually supportive, concurrent operations. Common doctrine
for TAMD unleashes the full power of U.S. capabilities through centralized
planning and decentralized execution. Joint forces fight with minimized
communications from a foundation of planned responses, sustaining layered
defenses against all avenues of approach. The full, focused power of the
joint force supports the units engaging the enemy, supported by early identification,
classification, and identification, and controlled through command by negation.