China’s New Law on International NGOs – And Questions about Legal Reform

A Chinese paramilitary guard stands at the great Hall of People in Beijing, on April 28, 2016.
Photo:
Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

International non-government organizations (INGOs) have been operating in China in increasing numbers in recent years. Now China has adopted a new law to regulate them. Until now there have been no uniform rules regulating these organizations, and many that are presently active were not registered and have also been operating without offices or permanent staff based in China.

One of the many questions raised by the new law (“Management of Foreign Non-Government Organizations Activities in China”) includes the fate of INGOs involved in assisting law reform. Although the new law specifically lists areas in which INGOs can be authorized, it does not include law-related activities, which immediately raises questions about the status and fate of organizations that have been active in that area for years, such as the American Bar Association and the Ford Foundation.

All foreign foundations, charities, advocacy organizations and academic exchange programs must register with Public Security Bureaus (PSBs) for authorization to conduct their activities; they must also have approved Chinese sponsors. The new law also permits INGOs to conduct “exchanges and cooperation” with certain Chinese partners engaged in “research and technology, academic exchanges and joint research,” although the scope of these activities awaits further definition. As is common with Chinese legislation, many details have yet to appear.

INGOs must report to PSBs annually and submit to inspections of their offices and bank accounts. They cannot engage in fundraising in China. Their registration can be cancelled under a vague provision that declares punishable creating rumors, engaging in defamation or publishing “other harmful information that endangers state security or damages the national interest.”

The specific areas in which they can now operate are the economy, education, science, culture, health, sports and the environment; others may be added later. The government has permitted nonprofits operating in these areas to address a variety of issues raised by China’s rapid economic growth. In the meantime, the occurrence of “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia -- often with NGOs involved -- prompted government anxiety about INGOs associated with human rights issues like the Ford Foundation (DeYong Yin, “China's Attitude Toward Foreign NGOs”).

The thrust of the new law is very clear: It is consistent with a vigorous neo-Maoist campaign launched by President Xi Jinping against foreign ideologies and other influences on Chinese social and political development, and is intended to strengthen control by the Chinese Communist Party over Chinese society.

The absence of law and legal reform from the categories designated as permissible creates uncertainty about INGOs that have been active in these areas. Previously unregistered INGOs will presumably be excluded from working on law reform, but INGOs already operating legally in China are being promised streamlined reregistration procedures, and it is therefore unclear what will happen to those now engaged in law reform projects. Will promotion of such projects by any of them be affected by the new law and the restrictive atmosphere it signals? This is especially pertinent to judicial reform.

Judicial reform has been in the works since late 2013, even though harassment and criminal punishment of activists and dissenters continues. The Supreme People’s Court “Court Reform Plan Outline” issued in February 2015 aims at “diminishing control over the courts by local party and government officials” and establishing a “hearing-controlled procedural system.” Progress toward these goals would improve system’s operation, professionalism and autonomy in most cases.

Judicial reform is a special and limited sphere, but as long as neo-Maoist authoritarianism inhibits reflection and discussion on China’s governance, especially when Western ideas and institutions are positively mentioned, other law-related reforms may be slowed. The major obstacle is that Mao’s legacy and the party’s role in Chinese history cannot be objectively reexamined under the present rule of Xi Jinping. China’s leader today continues to reinforce Mao’s basic distinction between friends and enemies, with no one in between.

More fundamentally, columnist Andrew Browne emphasizes the link between Mao and Xi: “Like Mao [Xi] believes in the power not of institutional constraints but of ideology to mold human nature and reform behavior.” As long as Xi insists on the primacy of this adherence to ideology, the neo-Maoism to which he clings will reign supreme over reform.

How the new law will be applied for punishing threats to “state security” and “the national interest” can’t be predicted, although the current political atmosphere is not hospitable to foreign thought and practice “contaminated” by the feared Western ideology. Consistent with this attitude, we can expect a continued government posture hostile to INGOs that work on law reform.