QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO THE COURT
Is the Court’s statement that the Public Use Clause prohibits the
taking of “property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when
[the] actual purpose [is] to bestow a private benefit,” Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005), a rule of general application,
or is it limited to takings justified solely on economic development grounds?

Does the substantial deference afforded to legislative public use determinations
under Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), apply to non-legislative
condemnation decisions?

What are the elements of a Public Use Clause claim, and how should such
a claim be evaluated on a motion to dismiss, given the tension between Kelo’s
assurance that “purpose” and “pretext” matter and
Midkiff’s statement that courts should defer to a legislative
taking that appears “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”?