The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has identified a new potential risk that Boeing Co must address on its 737 MAX before the grounded jet can return to service, the agency told Reuters on Wednesday. The risk was discovered during a simulator test last week, sources with knowledge of the matter told Reuters. As a result, Boeing is not expected to run a certification test flight until at least July 8, they said. "On the most recent issue, the FAA’s process is designed to discover and… (www.msn.com) Más...

Clear evidence that the FAA and other certifying agencies around the world need to have direct (not delegated) involvement in the certification process. The Joint European Agency will now not trust the FAA certification standars and this will extend the process of recertification. A MAJOR blunder by Boeing that will cost them and their shareholders a lot of money.

So you want to blame the guvmint for not catching Boeing's incompetence and/or willful attempt to cut corners and get away with it? There's lots of blame to go around and Boeing certainly qualifies for its full share of it.

No..no way should an aircraft manufacture be allowed to basically sign it's own air worthiness certificate...simple fact is if not enough folks are around to do all certificates in a timely manner...you wait!

He does have a point, as the government did let Boeing play loose here with all but using the actual words "self certification." If anything here, the Government should be blamed for their negligence in not being as stern as they needed to be with regarding certification of the MAX.

So Boeing and its fellow capitalists use their economic muscle to pressure Congress to not only limit funding of the FAA etc but also push for "less government regulations" and trust the free market, elect people who are in their pocket, etc. etc...... And when it all goes wrong, as it has here, it is "the Government's" fault.

as far as NEGLIGENCE is concerned, yes. Boeing is at fault for creating an aircraft with a serious design flaw and trying to use software to compensate for that design flaw, which lead to the deaths of hundreds of people.

The Government here is negligent in letting Boeing basically self-certify their own aircraft.

The government is the one with oversight here, they are the final answer if a plane is safe or not, if they did their job right in the first place we won't be here today and 346 people would still be alive

So Boeing, who deliberately hid what they were doing from the FAA, misrepresented the MCAS system etc. is not to blame but rather the blame belongs to the body that was repeatedly lied to. Sounds logical to me.

Until corporate execs face serious personal jeopardy they will feel free to create an environment where the only measure of success is the value of their stock options, which is a short term view. We have seen this scenario play out repeatedly in various industries, not just here with Boeing.

Once corporate headquarters were moved from where the planes were being built and designed this sort of outcome was almost enevitable. Senior management needs to keep its ear the the ground.....but it does no good if the ear to the ground is in Chicago not Washington State.

I am not going to comment on " Boeings most recent issue " because the specific problem has not been revealed . But knowing the press and " Reliable sources " , someone will spill the beans , off the record in the next while . But what i am noticing is how much anger and resentment there is towards Boeing and the FAA people involved in the Certification process . It seems that every-one wants their pound of flesh . I am not saying that this wrong , but it shows that Boeing and the FAA are in deep . I live in Canada , and our Minister responsible for signing off on the Max when the FAA does , has indicated that " Not so fast ....Not this time " There is an indication that the Canadian Officials may wish to do their own review . If other countries are of like mind , this could really mess up the plans of Boeing . I've said enough for now , but am very interested in this continuing discussion ..........DGR

I agree, especially knowing that FAA tried to hide important information from our Canadian officials in order to keep the MAX in the air. And I trust that our Minister is uniquely qualified to judge the situation, being a former astronaut.

What else did the FAA miss during certification? Shouldn't the whole airplane be recertified? I guess not as we know Boeing put profits first, as their track record suggests! Let us hope no more innocent passengers and crew pay the ultimate price rather than Boeing.

I have this following question for all to comment on . What will it take to regain the trust and sterling reputation of the FAA ? Also , I know Boeing is in full damage control , and will peddle any story that will help to get the Max back in the air . But , with another problem being discovered , that a software solution may not solve ,but the possibility that it may only be solvable by a hard ware up grade , and with an out of balance design , is the Max even a save-able model ? The reason i ask this , is i have serious concerns about the whole package . Is this aircraft beyond hope ? What do you folks out there think ?...........DGR

Since 1981, Republicans have been seeking to emasculate the U.S. government by undermining regulatory agencies like the FAA. This latest debacle is just the latest example of why we need effective government oversight of industry on behalf of the public. The reputation of the FAA and other Federal agencies will not be restored until we elect a government that believes in the idea of governing. One could make a case that Boeing is a victim of Reaganist government that failed, on principle, to protect them from themselves.

Abolish manufacturing of 737 MAX. Recycle the current completed and partially completed units. The world will never have confidence in this craft and potential passengers will never want to fly in them. Boeing can bear the loss.

How will anyone ever have confidence in this plane again? It’s beginning to feel as if fixes are being rushed at the expense of safety. I’m not a pilot-I’m an aviation enthusiast. If I have a future flight scheduled on a 737 MAX, I don’t know if I’ll be able to get on the plane ðð¤

How is it that the U.S. & Canadian pilots were flying it without any incidents, then these two foreign crashed and now everyone is concerned. The U.S. and Canadian pilots were flying the Max and now they say it is dangerous? Something is amiss!!

As far as I'm concerned, this whole business is no different from the story of the DC-10; even with its rocky start and grounding, it still ultimately proved to be comparable in terms of safety to similar aircraft.

This 737 MAX debacle is symptomatic of a serious decline in American technical leadership across the board. Since 1981 industry consolidation and regulatory capture have hollowed out the U.S. We spend trillions on "national security" while allowing the industries that won two world wars atrophy. Our once dominant aerospace sector is reduced to a handful of companies who have divided the market amongst themselves effectively eliminating competition and squeezing out innovation. Boeing today makes far more money suckling at the federal teat that it does in commercial aviation. The 737MAX suggests that they no longer really care about that business.

The Max is the love child of Boeing and Wall Street, and right now it's in the ICU. Can it be brought back to health by making all the fixes (assuming they find them all) and changing the name from "Max" to something that erases the flying public's memory, or are they in for a reprise of the British Comet experience?

The problem is, and it is 1 that is being over looked and making a lot of folks "upset" (upset is a nicer word to use) is, "Boeing said in a legal document that the larger, upgraded 737MAX "cannot be used and are unsuitable at what are referred to as 'high/hot' airports." If this is the case, WTH gave Boeing the right to sell the MAX to airlines who have a majority of their airports described as such??

The point being made is Boeing sold these MAX 8 to airlines where most, if not all, could fall into a high or hot category. Boeing has sold to United, American, Southwest, but most of the airports they fly into are not high or hot. They alsop mentioned in their brief which US airports "probably" would not suit the larger MAX variants. The MAX 7 or 737NG can work at hot or high airports.Someone also brought up about Jakarta. Airfields such as the Jakarta airport, produce similar air densities as high elevations.

Someone said the buyer is responsible for choosing what equipment they purchase. You said you disagree, which I assumed meant (and the point being made was) you thought the manufacturer should dictate what equipment the customer can or cannot buy.

In these cases, yes...this isn't a shovel, not a home appliance, not even an automobile (although I do know some auto companies will not sell certain vehicles to people in certain geographical regions due to those vehicles not being safe transportation in those regions). Boeing knows the airports the airlines fly into the majority of the time. My original reply was to Chris, as he stated they still have to test in hot and high, and my reply was Boeing has a legal document stating the larger MAX variants are unsuitable and cannot fly in high/hot airports.

Well I'm talking about your reply to dnorthern obviously, but no matter because it's absurd any way you slice it.

Ok, so roll the clock back 12 months and imagine Boeing telling Ethiopian no can do. Yeah, you have a long runway and yeah you've been operating out of that same hot and high location for a century, and yeah we couldn't possibly know what your plans are for in the future, and yeah nobody knows what you need better than you... but yeah except us. We're Boeing so don't argue. Again, nope you cannot buy these airplanes... not from us anyway. Check the used lot down the street.

RACIST BOEING REFUSES TO SELL AIRPLANES TO AFRICAN AIRLINES !!!!

rapidwolve, this would have gone over like a pregnant pole vaulter and you know it.

I did not know this, but doesn't the U.S. have quite a few of these, like in Arizona, Nevada, parts of Texas ? It makes little sense to me for Boeing to make a "high-volume" aircraft that cannot even serve the domestic market properly.

Not for nothing, but 12 years ago, the first B787 came up here to Sacramento for hot weather testing. In fact, it flew in and out of MHR for 4 days. Coincidentally, we hit over 100 degrees for 3 weeks surrounding their test flights.

So it isn't as if Boeing can claim that the MAX couldn't be flown out of hot or high airports, when they did their test flights for B787 certification out of a hot airport.

Having read the article and the comments, I have a couple thoughts. 1. Does Boeing conduct drug tests? You'd have to be high (on drugs) to design an aircraft for commercial passenger use that can only be operated in certain air mass conditions. You'd have to be high to think an airline would never deploy an aircraft to a high/hot airport (especially if you hadn't advised the airline of the operating restriction at the time of sale). You'd have to be high to release to customers an aircraft controlled by software that will not relinquish command to human pilots. 2. From everything I've read/heard about this debacle, absolutely everyone who has touched the 737 MAX shares blame for this aircraft's air-unworthiness and for the loss of life.

I was just wondering , if the stellar reputation of Boeing in Proving the airworthiness of their Aircraft over Boeings history , may have lawed the FAA to say , we believe Boeing . They have never deceived the FAA before , so why should we doubt Boeing now ? So i do not think that Politics over the ages is the problem here . I just think that the 2 Parties just became to cosy and complacent . So what do you think ?.............DGR

Mr . Green . I am curious about your comment on the B-787 . You insinuate that there is a problem , but do not comment further . On a related Boeing problem is the USAF KC-46 . Aside from the imaging / remote viewing system , the USAF is very angry about FOD , Foreign object debris that they are finding in the Aircraft . Further to that , at least one Airline has noticed similar concerns on the passenger version ..B-767 . Just some info for you to consider .........DGR

Not being a pilot, would uninstalling the upgrade make the plane safer? In the computer world if you have a problem with a new program or upgrade, you uninstall it and wait for a reliable update. Would the MAX be safe to fly if this was accomplished? It was flying before this upgrade.

But, as I understand it, the aircraft would need to be recertified as a new type and additional pilot certification would also be required. MCAS was developed (and after testing changed from 0.6 degree maximum deflection to 2.4 or 2.5 degree maximum deflection, without telling anyone) so that the aircraft would seem to perform "just like" other 737s and neither it nor its pilots would need additional certification, so it would be cheaper for 737 operators than converting to an Airbus A320.

Not a pilot either, but I thought the reason for MCAS was because the engines those mounted on the wings were too powerful and could cause the place to pitch up too high on takeoff. leading to a stall.

Fly-by-wire aircraft need not be stable. Aircraft like the B2 and F117, among others, cannot fly without the computers. It is wrong to characterize systems like MCAS as fixes to technical flaws. They are an integral part of the flight control system. At issue here is that Boeing appears to have done a poor job of redundancy management and possibly of software validation.

Not just that they were too powerful, it's the fact that they are physically bigger than the CFMs found on the B737/738/739s. To compensate for that, they moved the engines closer to the fuselage on the wing, which affects the CG of the aircraft. Additionally, because they moved those, they are also now capable of producing lift, which would cause the aircraft to pitch up (read: Angle of Attack), which would lead to that stall you're talking about.

MCAS was developed to prevent that. However, the problem that they have here is that the design flaw in the aircraft was the moving of those engines to have clearance for them mounted on the wing. To fix that hardware flaw, they used software, which is more susceptible to failure.

It is a misnomer to say the aircraft has a design flaw. It is simply a different aircraft that tor training purposes they want it to fly like previous aircraft. An analogy would be taking your 250hp mustang and designing the same car with 500hp. You can no longer punch the throttle in a turn and expect the rear end to stay behind the direction of travel. It will take software to control traction, suspension, and throttle to make it act like the previous model.

Moving the engines to accommodate for their size, which altered the CG of the aircraft, and without the realization that such a much larger engine on the same airframe would also produce lift and increase the AoA is inherently a design flaw, which they chose to compensate for and resolve the issue with software. They should have resolved this at the hardware (read: airframe) level instead of trying to cut costs with recertification and letting software - especially software without any redundancy or crosschecking - handle the problem.

That goes to the differing philosophies applied in fly-by-wire systems. Airbus airliners, and most military aircraft as far as I know, do not permit the crew to exceed the design limits of the airframe. Boeing, on the other hand, has traditionally given pilots the last word. I believe that the 737 MAX flight control system is more like Airbus's--perhaps someone could comment on that. The basic problem, however, is not the flight control system but sensor redundancy management. In the case of AF447, the flight control system compensated for an iced up sensor until it could no longer do so then turned control over to the crew who had no idea what was happening and, as it happens, responded inappropriately for which they can hardly be blamed. In the 737 MAX crashes, there seems to have been no provision in the MCAS portion of the flight control system to determine which of two sensors was giving an erroneous reading. A human pilot would have noticed that the AOA sensor output was not consistent with the attitude of the plane. The MCAS could not.

I have read many of the posted comments . Many of these comments are directed at the US Gov't and the progressive cuts to the FAA budgets . I do not deny that Cuts may have hobbled the Department as a whole over the years . But i won't accept that these Cuts have caused the FAA to abandon it's core mission of Certifying Aircraft . I still feel that it is more a case of the FAA being too trusting of Boeing , and Boeing taking advantage of this situation . By Boeings' own admission , they peddled the Max 8 and 9 to be so similar to the 737 NG , it was hardly worth a detailed investigation by the FAA . As this story continues to un-ravel i am seeing the CEO of Boeing dodging the tough questions , and the people of the FAA are fit to be tied for ruining their reputation . What do you think ? Always open to hear your comments ......DGR

I think it is just fair to all , that i reveal my source for todays earlier comments . The daily blog i am speaking ofis " Good Morning From CNN " It is located under heading " The week that was " and with a link that reads ........Boeing's " Very bad year , just got worse " . I hope you all can find it .........DGR

I am not a pilot. i do not work for B or the US gov.i am not glad we are still playing the blame game. There is plenty to go around. Let's focus on playing the 'identify and fix the issues' game. Even if you have to redesign the entire automated system. It will be worth it.Not sure if this article mentions ?? having a single-point-of-failure (sensor) on this a/c was absurd. I see they addressed it by adding an additional sensor. Good starting point. Keep going......

They are trying to make an aircraft damn fool proof which is an impossibility. Somewhere along the line they will need to settle for just fool proof or this aircraft and all future ones will be deemed "unsafe."

Leeham.com : Site does not exist.Leehamnews.com does exist on a subscription basis - starts at %54.95/mo.Why should I pay that much to research a question for which you assert knowledge?I agree $55/mo isn't cheap.

This may be an apples to oranges comparison, but, 50 years ago we managed to land man on the moon with a computer that had less computing power than my alarm clock. The reason I think is that it was so thoroughly tested and developed by a TEAM from all departments. If indeed the processor is under powered as some news sites postulate, or if it is a software error, it’s telling of the world today that we can’t keep a plane in the air with something so infinitely more powerful than the Apollo computers.

The guys flying the LM had seen a wide variety of unusual and even emergency situations in a wide variety of aircraft. They had confidence in their own ability to take control away from the automation when necesary.

That said, I'm wondering if the "ab-initio" training concept is such a great idea. Neither of those MAX accident aircraft were unflyable if Memory Items in the FCOM Runaway Stabilizer checklist had been completed. Are we training a generation of pilots that do not have confidence in their own ability to fly the aircraft without the automation active?

Brian, speaking of automation, any comment questioning training's role in these accidents gets auto-downvoted as will my reply, but hey, everyone is entitled to an opinion.

Your suspicions are true. Ab-initio is a bad idea but it is what we have in today's world. It is fantastic training to accomplish what it does but what it doesn't accomplish is to give experience and a deeply ingrained understanding of aerodynamic principals and airmanship that are required to survive when it seems that everything else has gone to hell.

I don't think it's so much talking about training/experience and the fact that, yes, automation is taking over far too much. It is some folks insinuation " Neither of those MAX accident aircraft were unflyable if Memory Items in the FCOM Runaway Stabilizer checklist had been completed." 2 fully trained MAX pilots took the Ethiopian flight in a simulator, followed through with memory checklist, and results were not good. BTW, according to logs/data etc, the Ethiopian crew did follow the memory checklist.

"Ethiopian crew did follow the memory checklist". Yes, and then they turned the "Stab Cutout" switches back on.

My question is, did they fully understand the aerodynamic implications of what was happening? Why did they feel the need to restore faulty automation when maybe a better solution would be to reduce automation???

Fully trained on the MAX. The Ethiopian crew turned the switches back on when, it was shown, they could no longer move the flight wheels. Theory is they probably hoped the electric jackscrew would help relieve some pressure, but in fact just exasperated things. That is another "stupid" design flaw...motors can also go in reverse, so why was that not thot of when doing this MCAS thing? The Ethiopian crew had already tried reducing automation when they hit "stab cutout" off as instructed in the checklist.Reduced automation is what should have happened before this craft even thought of leaving the plant. A good pilot can understand and notice if a nose is pitching up more than he would like and can adjust for it, not having some damn system "think" the nose is pitching up, when in fact it may not be, and drive the nose downward!

I posted in more detail about this below. The throttles were set to climb on takeoff. They weren't climbing because MCAS kept trimming nose down. They couldn't throttle back as they were 1,000 feet agl and in the Max when you throttle back the nose drops. They switched MCAS off but that switched off electric trim. They tried but couldn't manually trim because of the airspeed. They switched stab trim back on to trim electrically but that brought MCAS back on which trimmed nose down.

Thanks Frank...The reason I think JM says I get mad is folks say the throttles were set for the entire flight when they were not. The report states "most of the flight" and according to other reports, the autopilot did throttle back when it was first engaged. (thou a brief 33 seconds) What I still cannot understand is, if autopilot was on, even for the brief time, how is it the system was online when it should have been disengaged and autopilot should have trimmed properly?

Except that the LM's small computer was easily over-ridden by the astronauts. Theis later reported problem specifically says that over-riding it was difficult and sometimes impossible, so comparing apples to grapes isn't any more helpful than to oranges.

Boeing has NO credibility, just like the President! Read "Boeing falsified records for 787 jet sold to Air Canada. It developed a fuel leak" : https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-air-canada-jet-fuel-leak-1.5193550

On one hand I hope you are right, as I don’t want to see an Airbus monopoly, but on the other hand, if the problem is fixed that will not magically grow the cabin width of the B737 by a much needed six inches. Boeing squeezed enough out of the design, time to bring something more in line with the present 95 percentile of the population.

Boeing builds what its customers want and what they buy. If the airlines don't/won't buy something else, there's no reason for Boeing (or Airbus or anyone else) to build something different.

Airlines make more money by stuffing in more people and maximising the use of the cabin space. If you want a chuckle, look back at the early proposals for lounges, restaurants, casinos, and shops on board 747s and A380s. The idea that an airline would take revenue-producing space out of use like that is pretty funny these days.

The cost of designing, producing AND convincing airlines heavily invested in 737s to buy a six-inch wider aircraft just because people are fat simply won't happen.

You either think they can go from a blank CAD screen to an in-production aircraft extremely quickly or that recertifying the 737 MAX will take an extremely long time.

Even if Boeing's next design was ready to build and the factory was tooled and ready to go today, after the MAX's multiple problems and the ongoing KC-46 FOD problem, certifying the next Boeing product will take a very, very long time. No one involved in that process will want to be the one who missed something and the scrutiny will be incredibly intense.

THE HELL IT IS. BOEING HAS GOT IT WRONG IN THE MOST DISASTROUS WAY LIVES LOST DUE TO RUSHING OUT A DANGEROUS AIRCRAFT. CUTTING CORNERS. THEY WILL DO ANYTHING TO KEEP THEM AT THE TOP OF THE TREE. BUT NOW THE BRANCHES HAVE STARTED TO TUMBLE. RIP BOEING !!!!!

It appears to me that this a/c flies, its just it flies differently to other 737s.

The immediate problem seems to be the MCAS computer program built into the electric trimming system.

Why can't Boeing strip out MCAS and teach pilots that when they increase power the nose will rise which they will have to counteract with nose down trim, when they cut power the nose will fall and they can counteract that with nose up trim ?

It seems that adding more and more programming just increases the possibility for more programming errors or unforeseen occurrences by increasing the complexity of the software and taking away pilots' options.

The Ethiopian pilots wanted to raise the nose but it was trimmed nose down by the MCAS computer program built in to the electric trim.

When they switched off electric trim to turn off MCAS they could not turn the trim wheel by hand because of the force generated by the speed they were doing.

They could not reduce power to reduce speed so they could use the trim wheel because the nose fell when they did.

When they switched the electrical trim back on to use that to overcome the force, MCAS came back on and trimmed nose down.

If MCAS hadn't existed they could have used the electric trim to get the nose up.

Exactly Frank...however if they removed the MCAS system, they would need a complete aircraft certification as thou was completely new model.Stupid thing is, because of their foul ups, it will cost them more, in time and money, than if they had just done a new certify.

I feel this a/c needs to be completely certified as there are very different features to prior 737 models.

For example I am interested in the relatively elevated position of the engines located partially within the airflow pattern into the leading edge (when compared with other certified 737s). In the event of an uncontained catastrophic compressor failure, what is the potential for blade shrapnel or hub debris to destroy a significant section of the leading edge to the extent that there is a grossly asymmetric lift mismatch leading to an uncontrollable roll moment, especially if this were to occur at a high power setting, eg post Vr at takeoff, or in a go-around initiation ?

There were two other factors I did not detail regarding the Ethiopian crash:

1. The throttles were advanced to give power to climb, which the a/c would have been doing if MCAS was not trimming nose down. Because of the MCAS imposed nose down trim, the power was converted to airspeed rather than altitude. If the pilots had been able to get the nose up they would have gained altitude and reduced airspeed.

2. The a/c was only about 1,000 feet agl, which is almost nothing for a 737 flying into rising terrain. If the pilots had cut power (to bring down the airspeed to reduce the load on the elevator trim to a point they could manually overcome this load) the nose would have fallen and, at their airspeed, they would have lost the 1,000 feet rapidly.

Their only hope might have been to continue flying with MCAS/electric trim switched off hoping that they could very gradually, slowly reduce the throttles and using all their strength to keep the nose on or above the horizon, hope that ground effect would keep them just sufficiently aloft to clear any obstacles until they could get the airspeed down to a level that they could manually trim. Any attempt to turn would probably have been fatal as would any sudden terrain change.

1. The max engines are placed in the same relative position as, say, the the a320 are they not? So Airbus might be able to answer your question about uncontained failure when engines are mounted that far forward. I would think it would be less damaging out in front of the wing rather than directly underneath them, but who knows.

2. You don't advance the throttles to climb, you pull them back. Throttles were set at take off power and stayed at take off power.

3. MCAS didn't activate until two minutes into the flight.

4. They did't even try the manual trim until 4.5 minutes into the flight, which was about the same time they blew past Vmo.

They didn't have seconds, they had between 4-5 minutes. I'm not saying that was enough time or it wasn't, I'm saying we need to get it right.

Not just the seconds, but altitude...and again, I wonder why autopilot did not correct when it was commanded on. Hopefully reports down the road can also have that figured out.Also good thot about engine failure. They do sit rather high.

There was a time that airlines recruited their pilots from the military. These recruits had been trained well and had accumulated 1000's of hours of multi-engine jet time. Now training has diminished and electronics have taken over the cockpit. I submit that the airlines with well trained and experienced pilots will always be the best. Further those airlines that fly the most MAX 8's and have multiple touchdowns daily do not appear from records to have had ant issues with the MACS systems. However two less experienced foreign carriers with poorly trained, minimal experience (200 hours)do the deed and it becomes the manufacturer fault. I don't work for Boeing and obviously not a lawyer. Today it's always find another party to blame for incompetence. Real pilots will concur.

The further they dive the more information they will find about the missteps by Boeing and the FAA. I believe they should scrap the Max and start from scratch. At this point, I can't imagine who would feel safe flying on or working on a Max. Admit defeat and start to put this baby to bed before it gets so deep you may never see the light of day again.

I receive on a daily bases , a Blog from CNN . On Sunday ,June 30th , they put together several bits / comments on the MCAS , AOA sensors and just newly a micro processor , that puts the Stabilizer Trim , nose down . It was found by FAA Pilots in simulators . It is said that it took " several Seconds " to recover . This Trim , nose down was an un-commanded event . Could this be the event i heard about 2 days ago , that nobody wanted to go into detail about ? I like to hear from others about this . DGR