Editorial Digest Volume III, No. 10 (July 16, 1998)RUSSIAN FEDERATIONEXECUTIVE BRANCHPRESIDENCYGet with the programHow many times, in the course of the last year, has President Yel'tsin
denied he intends to seek a third presidential term, then reversed himself
a day or two later, hinting that he may stand for re-election? The first
few times it happened, one could assume that his aides convinced him, after
the initial statement, not to allow himself to be perceived as a lame duck
and to keep people wondering if he might actually run. The possibility of
a third term could serve to maintain Yel'tsin's political relevance, stifle
the overt jostling for position among potential candidates and give subordinates
an incentive to implement current presidential directives.

If this has been the Kremlin's strategy, someone forgot to inform Deputy
Administration Chief Igor Shabdurasulov. In an apparent attempt to emphasize
his point that Yel'tsin should not consider running for office in the year
2000, Shabdurasulov committed a venal Kremlin sin by commenting on the president's
health: "One cannot say that Yel'tsin's physical condition is ideal
and that he is full of vigor and is absolutely fit for work around-the-clock."
(Interfax, 0824 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190) While Shabdurasulov's comments
only seem to reflect that which is obvious to even casual Kremlin observers,
it represents quite a departure for so close an insider to make any negative
remarks at all on Yel'tsin's health or work habits. It was, however, Shabdurasulov's
advice to Yel'tsin that prompted the presidential press service to distance
itself from the deputy chief. Yel'tsin, according to Shabdurasulov, should
"complete building up the country over the next two years and then
transfer power." No word as yet that Shabdurasulov has been dismissed
from Kremlin service, but he might be well-advised to update his resume.

APPARATShakhrai bounced from the courtLongtime Yel'tsin loyalist Sergei Shakhrai was unceremoniously dumped
as the presidential representative to the Constitutional Court on 29 June.
(Interfax, 1352 GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-180) Returning to the position
is Mikhail Mityukov, who held the post before Shakhrai.

The dismissal was announced without comment, but likely explanations focus
on the court's upcoming consideration of the Kremlin's petition for interpretation
of Constitutional Article 81 Section 3, which may pave the way for a third
Yel'tsin presidency. Some analysts believe that Shakhrai's recent support
for presidential hopeful Yuri Luzhkov diminished his potential effectiveness
as the advocate for Yel'tsin before the court.

Shakhrai himself believes that it was the speech he gave to his PRES party
convention the weekend before his dismissal that prompted the move. During
the speech, Shakhrai commented on the impending presidential impeachment
vote in the Duma, claiming that he believed there would be sufficient votes
to bring it up for debate. It was this acknowledgment of reality that Shakhrai
feels stirred up unwarranted animosity in the Kremlin. "A timely warning
should be accepted with gratitude, not anger," he stated. (Interfax,
1438 GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-180)

GOVERNMENTIMF bailout agreement reachedRussian government and IMF representatives have come to agreement on
a multi-billion dollar bailout for the Russian economy. Announcement of
the deal has already sparked increases to the Russian stock market. The
deal, for a reported $14.8 billion this year, with $7.8 billion more available
down the line, was negotiated by Anatoli Chubais, who re-upped for government
service in the wake of the current economic crisis. According to Chubais,
the IMF bailout will alleviate the need for a ruble devaluation. (United
Press International, 14 Jul 98; C-upi@clari.net)

Rosneft updateStill no takers for the Rosneft shares
auction that seemed certain to spark a flurry of bids by high profile investors
just last Spring. The continued decline in world oil prices have wreaked
havoc in government plans to unload a major portion of the state oil firm.
Perhaps the IMF stabilization funds will entice buyers back to the auction
house.

SECURITY COUNCILYel'tsin sets START-II as priorityPresident Yel'tsin chaired a meeting of the Security Council on 3 July
which dealt with issues concerning the country's strategic nuclear forces
as well as the situation in the North Caucasus. During the meeting, President
Yel'tsin reportedly set ratification of START-II as priority. (Interfax,
1138 GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-184)

FSBDetails of Rokhlin murderThe Federal Security Service has concluded that "the murder of
Lev Rokhlin has no signs of a terrorist act related to an attempt on the
life of a political figure or political reasons." (ITAR-TASS, 1353
GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-184)

General Rokhlin was apparently killed with his own gun at his country house
on 3 July. His wife, who reportedly confessed to the killing, has been detained
despite objections from the family that the confession was coerced.

by Susan J. Cavan

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Polish-Russian summit a 'breakthrough'
Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski viewed his recent visit to Moscow
as a positive step toward better Russian-Polish relations. Kwasniewski expressed
his optimism in an official statement to journalists following a 45-minute
conversation with President Boris Yel'tsin on 29 June. Kwasniewski viewed
the talks as a "breakthrough" and stated that "the talks
with President Yel'tsin yielded much more than I expected." Among other
issues discussed, the two agreed to take part in turn-of-the-century ceremonies
at two sites containing the mass graves of Polish officers shot by the Soviet
secret police in 1940. (PAP, 1310 GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-180)

Is NATO an obstacle to Polish-Russian relations?
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov, who has continually spoken out
against further NATO expansion, does not view Poland only as a potential
member of NATO. After his meeting with Polish President Kwasniewski, Primakov
stated that "I would not look at our relations through the prism of
NATO. We have many common interests." Kwasniewski said Russia accepted
Poland's potential NATO membership, as evidenced by Yel'tsin's planned visit
to Poland in December. (PAP, 0935 GMT, 30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181, and Interfax,
0929 GMT, 30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181)

NATO membership for Russia?
While emphasizing that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) should be the lead security organization in Europe, Primakov
said that Russia might consider NATO membership if the conditions were right.
During a speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London
on 25 June, he said that Russia would join NATO if the alliance were transformed
into a political organization or if NATO in some way united with the OSCE.
During his speech Primakov also reiterated Russian opposition to further
NATO expansion eastward and to any expansion of NATO missions. (ITAR-TASS,
1821 GMT, 25 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176)

Russia welcomes Clinton vetoDemonstrating its continued strong support for the Iranian government,
Russia has publicly welcomed President Bill Clinton's veto of a bill that
would have imposed tough sanctions on foreign firms which sell missile technology
to Iran. A statement released by the Russian foreign ministry on 25 June
stated that "this step by the American administration chief meets the
spirit of Russian-American relations and the agreement reached between the
presidents of Russia and the United States at their meeting in Birmingham
in May." The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran radio station also
commented on the veto, viewing the action as a result of the importance
the US attaches to its ties with Russia as well as a victory for Iran. (Voice
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1130 GMT, 25 Jun 98; FBIS-NES-98-176, and
Interfax, 1203 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175)

Russian-Iraqi cooperation continues to strengthen
Russia stands to be the biggest winner outside of Iraq if the oil embargo
against the latter is fully lifted. Russia apparently is poised to deliver
oil production equipment to Iraq as soon as the embargo ends. Following
the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1175 on urgent measures for
the rehabilitation of Iraq's oil infrastructure, a Russian foreign ministry
statement addressed the need to coordinate promptly in the Committee on
Sanctions practical matters connected with the transfer of oil equipment,
also from Russia, to Iraqi territory. The focus of the UN resolution is
to work towards raising Iraqi oil exports to $5.2 billion within the next
six months, the Russian foreign ministry said. (Interfax, 1218 GMT, 23 Jun
98; FBIS-SOV-98-174, and ITAR-TASS, 1012 GMT, 23 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-174)

Connected to this development, Moscow and Baghdad agreed on stronger cooperation
in the framework of the UN aid program of oil-for-humanitarian-goods during
a 16-18 June meeting between Russia's presidential envoy to the Middle East,
Viktor Posuvalyuk, and Iraq's vice chairman of the Revolution Command Council,
Izzat Ibrahim. According to a Russian foreign ministry spokesman, "both
sides expressed satisfaction with the growing involvement of Russian companies
in the oil-for-humanitarian-goods formula." According to the official
Iraqi news agency, during these consultations Izzat Ibrahim expressed the
pride of Iraq's government and people in the stand taken by the Russian
government, people, parties, and organizations in support of Iraq's efforts
to have the embargo lifted. (INA, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-NES-98-169, and Interfax,
1647 GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173)

Primakov--Meritorious before the Motherland
Yevgeni Primakov, the architect of Russia's multipolar foreign policy approach,
received an award "For Merits before the Motherland" on 15 June.
During the ceremony President Boris Yel'tsin honored the foreign minister
for "defending Russia's interests across the world in a well respected
and consistent manner." "Russia is rising, and Russia's authority
throughout the world is increasing," Yel'tsin added. (Interfax, 1642
GMT, 15 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167)

Clinton to visit Moscow
The Russian response to the announcement of President Bill Clinton's plans
for a September visit to Moscow focused on reconfirming relations on a "partnership"
basis. Foreign ministry official Vladimir Rakhmanin said "talks between
the two presidents are expected to re-confirm the course for constructive
interaction and commitment to relations on a partnership basis." Russian
foreign ministry announcements emphasized a bilateral US-Russian relationship
highlighting interaction in crisis settlement, a joint approach to international
security and stability as well as the struggle against nuclear weapons proliferation,
terrorism and organized crime. According to Russian sources the specific
agenda for the summit will be worked on by Primakov and US Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, who will meet in Manila at the end of July. (ITAR-TASS,
1628 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190, and Interfax, 1359 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190)

by John McDonough

*****

Agreement possible with JapanAn agreement with Japan seems likely as
increased diplomatic exchanges take place amidst growing economic cooperation.
The Russian Duma set up a commission tasked with the duty of accelerating
the ratification of an agreement once reached by the foreign ministry. This
move indicates Duma support of efforts to normalize relations with Japan.
Several breakthroughs were made prior to Prime Minister Kirienko's planned
visit to Japan from 13-14 July. (Interfax, 1035 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175)
Agreements have been reached to guarantee investments made by both countries.
Additionally, a Japanese delegation has visited the contentious Kurile islands
and negotiations have begun on developing the islands. Moreover, a Japanese
astronaut will train in Russia as part of an international effort to construct
a space station.

While serious differences remain unresolved, the latest developments show
promise for future collaboration between Japan and Russia. Prospects for
joint space projects appear rather good. Both countries are prepared to
extend the current agreement on peaceful cooperation in outer space by five
years. Additionally, guarantees for Japanese investors are likely to have
a significant impact on bilateral relations. The economic benefits of such
an agreement come at a time when both countries face financial difficulties.

Relations with China improvingDespite recent incidents concerning border agreements, Sino-Russian
relations continue to improve. Progress has been made concerning cooperation
on peaceful use of atomic energy between the two countries. At a five-member
meeting in Almaty (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan),
Russian President Yel'tsin met with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The meeting
was held to discuss border issues but was extended to include regional security
concerns and economic cooperation. (ITAR-TASS, 1412 GMT, 6 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188)

Additionally, Russian Prime Minister Kirienko planned to visit China in
order to discuss economic concerns. On 14 July meetings with the prime minister
of the Chinese State Council, Rongji Zhu, and President Jiang Zemin were
scheduled. (Radio Rossii Network, 0800 GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188) Incidents
on the Russian-Chinese border have caused a degree of tension between the
countries, however, not to any great extent. In June, Russian border troops
detained two infiltrators crossing from China into Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1117
GMT, 15 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167) Earlier in June, relations became tense
over a Chinese fish-poaching incident. (See previous Editorial Digest.)
Still, these events do not seem to have marred the diplomatic efforts at
the highest levels.

Diplomats expelledWhile relations with Japan and China seem to be on an upswing, the same
cannot be said for South Korea. On 6 July, Moscow demanded the removal of
a South Korean diplomat, Cho Sung Woo, who was declared persona non grata
for spying. Angered by the indiscreet manner in which Russia handled the
situation, Korea retaliated by proclaiming Russian diplomat Oleg Abramkin
persona non grata on 8 July.

South Korea claimed that Moscow should have engaged in consultations before
making such an abrupt move. Meanwhile, Russia warned that South Korea's
retaliation was uncalled for and that relations could deteriorate readily.
(ITAR-TASS, 0908 GMT, 6 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-187, and ITAR-TASS, 1211 GMT,
8 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-189).

by Ray Gaul

DOMESTIC ISSUES & LEGISLATIVE BRANCHFEDERAL ASSEMBLYRussia may resume executions to cut costsThe Duma has decided against discussing the bill that would have imposed
a moratorium on capital punishment. Without further authorization, the present
moratorium will presumably end. Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov confirmed
that the number of people sentenced to death rises by about 150 every year,
and four new high-security prisons will soon have to be built for them.
This will cost the federal budget 580 million rubles, which, Nemtsov argues,
the country just does not have. Budget consciousness is, of course, laudatory,
but not when balanced upon the backs of prisoners condemned by a less-than-perfect
judicial system. (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 0900 GMT, 3 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-154)

MEDIANew TV company to be registered in St. PetersburgMedia outlets continue to proliferate. An open-type joint stock television
and radio company called "Petersburg" will be registered within
the next few days. The city of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region own controlling
shares. Other investors include three commercial banks: Inkombank (the Invest-proyekt
company with 14 percent), Promstroybank of St Petersburg (the Promstroybank
Property Fund company with 17.5 percent) and the Baltoneksimbank (the Baltoneksimkonsalt
company with 17.5 per cent). (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1339 GMT, 16 Jun
98; FBIS-SOV-98-170)

POLITICAL PARTIESDivision within the CPRFThe Russian Communist Party should seriously re-group, its leader Gennadi
Zyuganov said in his report to the party. The party seems to have split
into two camps: the fundamentalists, and the accommodationists. The fundamentalists
brim with "revolutionary impatience," while the accommodationists
believe the "that the masses are asleep" and so working within
the system is necessary.

Zyuganov noted that "attempts to split the party...are becoming stronger."
Does this mean the eventual end to the CPRF? Probably not, but it may mean
an end to the pretense of unity within the party.

Zyuganov attempted to remedy the problem by calling for "an end to...attempts
to split the party." In the fine democratic tradition of most communist
parties, Zyuganov claimed that the party is not a "disputers' club"
and all its members must abide resolutions coming from the leadership.

It seems that he is trying to hold the party together by limiting membership,
allowing in only the most convinced communists--read Zyuganov supporters.
"We are not seeking to formally enlarge the party, the party needs
qualitative changes in the social composition." In Zyuganov's words,
the basic task is to make former enemies first sympathizers and then party
supporters.

Zyuganov may be attempting to undercut or dilute Seleznev's support, thereby
capturing the party for himself; however, by choosing a "closed"
party with limited membership over an "open" one, the CPRF may
come to be perceived as a party out of touch with the average voter. (ITAR-TASS,
2126 GMT, 20 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171)

by Michael Thurman

NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATESCIS
Momentum building in Abkhazia talksThe month of June saw movement in discussions
over the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The active personal involvement and
shuttle diplomacy of CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky seems to have
created a more cooperative atmosphere, at least on paper. Two draft agreements
emerged from consultations in Sukhumi mediated by Berezovsky and Russian
First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Patsukhov. The first document details
a peace agreement between the two sides while the second establishes a protocol
on the return of refugees to the Gali district.

Even so, serious impediments remain to a finalized agreement. On 11 June,
a helicopter piloted by CIS peacekeepers came under fire, raising concern
that several factions will continue to undermine the negotiation process.
Also, May clashes in the Gali district demonstrated the volatility of the
situation. While Berezovsky's new role in the negotiations has been accepted
by Georgian President Shevardnadze and Abkhaz leader Ardzinba, Russian leaders
have attempted to undermine this role. The Russian Duma inflamed Georgian
leaders by authorizing the establishment of separate negotiating channels
in the peace settlements and by passing a 24 June resolution "[o]n
normalizing the border and customs procedures on the Abkhazian section of
the Russian-Georgian border." (Iprinda, 1251 GMT, 27 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-178)
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeni Primakov, while praising Berezovsky's
economic policies, made clear that he does not approve of Berezovsky's efforts.
He stated, " I think his main task should consist in concentrating
efforts to build a layer of transnational entrepreneurial structures in
the CIS countries." (ITAR-TASS, 1413 GMT, 25 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177)

CIS forum in St. Petersburg deemed successful
On 17 June the second St. Petersburg economic forum, held in the Tavria
Palace, began with a list of notable participants. CIS Executive Secretary
Berezovsky, Russian Prime Minister Kirienko, and Belarusian President Lukashenka
all spoke at the plenary session. Berezovsky amused the audience by calling
the CIS the "Commonwealth of Countries which are not rich." (ITAR-TASS,
1037 GMT, 17 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-168) He reiterated his beliefs that the
CIS should remain primarily an economic organization and that the best way
to do so is to establish social stability in member countries. Lukashenka,
while gaining applause, stated that the CIS was a "mirage." Meanwhile,
Kirienko drew support for his proposal to establish an anti-crisis program
to coordinate actions among member states in combating economic destabilization.
Kirienko's proposal is an effort to soften the impact of the Asian crisis
which had spillover effects in CIS member states.

Yegor Stroev, chair of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, led the forum
which was attended by over 2,500 prominent politicians, economists and scientists
from all members of the commonwealth, as well as from 50 other countries.
Leaders established numerous agreements on the implementation of investment
projects. They also made recommendations on how to further economic integration,
and promote social and cultural development in the commonwealth. Stroev
stated the CIS would follow a unique model of integration, dissimilar from
the European Union model or Chinese model. He said that different "roads
of development could be mutually enhancing." He also stated his belief
of foreign donor confidence in CIS countries' abilities to weather financial
and political crises. (ITAR-TASS, 1323 GMT, 19 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171)

Berezovsky discusses Nagorno-Karabakh with leadersCIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky signaled his intent to become
actively involved in the resolution of all conflicts within the CIS by attending
meetings with leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia from 21-22 June. Previously,
he had concentrated primarily on the conflict in Abkhazia. However, new
statements by Berezovsky in Baku indicate that his attention is spreading.
He remarked that all conflicts within the CIS are interrelated and that
they could not be solved independently. "The Commonwealth of Independent
States can be effective only if numerous conflicts in the territories of
states, forming its space, are settled," he said. (ITAR-TASS, 1010
GMT, 21 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-172) He also expressed concern over a deterioration
in affairs in southern Russia, indicating that he might propose a more comprehensive
approach to peace in the Caucausus region which would include numerous parties.

Chechnya pushes for CIS membershipThe Russian Duma invited a delegation from Chechnya for meetings in
Moscow. A major topic of discussion concerned Chechnya's possible integration
into the CIS. While Chechen leaders see this step as crucial in resolving
outstanding issues between Chechnya and Russia, Duma leaders did not support
the notion. Still, the fact that such issues were even discussed opens up
the possibility that Russia might eventually allow Chechnya to establish
some form of autonomous relationship within the CIS. (ITAR-TASS, 1502 GMT,
30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181)

by Ray Gaul

WESTERN REGIONMOLDOVARenewed financial assistance expected from IMFOn 18 June, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared that it will
resume financial assistance in the amount of $28 million to Moldova in October
1998, if Moldova shows signs of economic improvement in the financial, agricultural,
and energy sectors. Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc stated that a harsh fiscal
policy will be implemented for the next three months in order to meet the
requirements put forth by the IMF. The promised loan is another installment
from a total of $190 million which the organization agreed to appropriate
to Moldova. (Basapress, 1910 GMT, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-169) In addition,
the World Bank signed a credit agreement with Moldova on 23 June in which
a program for further privatization of land and development of real estate
was drafted. (Infotag, 1730 GMT, 23 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-174) These agreements
follow the installation of the new parliament in April and the selection
of a new cabinet in June. Most importantly, they constitute a positive step
towards building international organizations' confidence in Moldova's economic
recovery.

Transdniestr: Renewed efforts with dim signs of progressSix years after the armed conflict between Moldova and Transdniestr
began, the peace process seems to be making progress--according to the Russains.
The latest session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) held in Strasbourg on 22 June addressed the issue of the prolonged
conflict. Aleksandr Sohin, Russian State Duma deputy chairman, stated that
the Duma will vote to ratify the Moldova-Russia Treaty signed in October
of 1992 regarding the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from Transdniestr.
(Basapress, 1700 GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-UMA-98-173) One week later, Russian
President Yel'tsin officially confirmed Russia's commitment towards a peaceful
resolution of the conflict, but made no mention of when the Duma will ratify
the agreement. (Radio Rossii Network, 1800 GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-180)

In addition, on 1 July, Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi announced that
his government is ready to accord Transdniestr the status of autonomy with
a high degree of self-rule, similar to that of the autonomous region of
Gagauz, provided that Moldova will remain united. He declared that the conflict
should be resolved through administrative and territorial reforms, so as
to decentralize power. However, the Transdniestrian side did not participate
in the meeting held between the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and Moldova from 1 July, a fact which demonstrates the
obstacles that remain. (Interfax, 1512 GMT, 1 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-182) Finally,
on 7 July, the Joint Control Commission (JCC), made up of representatives
from Moldova, Transdniestr, and Russia, ruled that Transdniestr will reduce
its peacemaking forces in the security zone from 900 to 500 men by 8 July.
(Basapress, 1920 GMT, 1 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-182)

UKRAINEParliament concentrates on electing a speaker...After two months of parliamentary crisis in which no legislation had
been passed, the Ukrainian Supreme Council finally chose its speaker. The
main cause of the election stalemate had come from the center-right parliamentary
groups, which blocked almost every attempt to elect a leftist speaker since
the new parliament was elected. After the right-centrist faction boycotted
the elections held on 26 June, ex-speaker Oleksandr Moroz called for a closed
session that was attended by all deputies in order to solve the problem
of parliamentary deadlock. (Intelnews, 0141 GMT, 26 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177)
However, the next round of elections held on 3 July was again unsuccessful,
as only 234 delegates participated in the voting. (Infobank, 1751 GMT, 3
Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-184) The break in the crisis came only with the 7 July
election when, of the 441 lawmakers who registered for the voting, 363 took
ballots, and 314 voted. As a result of centrist deputies switching their
support from the right to the left, Oleksandr Tkachenko, a member of the
Left Center bloc and a leader of the Peasants' Party, was appointed speaker
of parliament with a vote of 232 to 37 (45 ballots were declared invalid).
(Interfax, 1226 GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188)

...while Kuchma focuses on the economyPresident Leonid Kuchma signed a series of presidential decrees in order
to overcome an economic crisis, while parliament was preoccupied for the
past two months with electing a new speaker. (Infobank, 2023 GMT, 18 Jun
98; FBIS-SOV-98-169) The president's actions seemed to prevent an even greater
crisis from occurring, as there had been talks of possibly dismantling the
government altogether.

Chernobyl faces technical and fiscal problemsThe only generating unit still functioning (Unit 3) at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant was shut down on 16 June for repairs of a faulty turbo-generator
and pipeline, which were caused by the idleness of the plant between July
1997 and May 1998. (Interfax, 1804 GMT, 16 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167) The
shutdown lasted until 22 June, when the unit was reconnected with Ukraine's
power grid. (Interfax, 1129 GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173) However, problems
with the Chernobyl plant were not only technical in nature: An audit by
the Ukrainian finance ministry found over 2,500 legal violations on 19 June.
The report stated that almost 10 million hryvnyas from the Chernobyl Fund
has been spent without authorization. (Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network,
0600 GMT, 19 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171)

These problems come at a time when the coal industry has been experiencing
great difficulties, especially after the series of miners' protests and
threats of shutting down the mines unless they are paid (see previous Editorial
Digest). At the same time, authorities recently declared that the power
industry is undergoing a deep and extended crisis: Customers simply do not
pay for 94 percent of their electricity. The debts make it difficult to
maintain the level of safety imposed by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Meanwhile, almost half of all electricity produced in Ukraine
is generated by nuclear power plants. (NTV, 1000 GMT, 2 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-183)

BELARUSForeign envoy crisis continues in MinskIn a "generous" effort to comply with the protests of the
foreign ambassadors, the Belorusian authorities extended the deadline for
leaving residences in the Drozdy compound from 10 June to 17 June (see previous
Editorial Digest). On 19 June, a slightly more conciliatory move came from
Belorusian Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Buzo, who allowed the diplomats
to stay at Drozdy during the planned repairs. They were given special passes
to get to their homes, as the property has just recently been declared a
presidential estate. (Interfax, 1427 GMT, 19 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-170) However,
the envoys who tried to return to their residences found no electricity,
water, or telephones, and they had no access to their homes. In response,
on 22 June the European Union ambassadors to Belarus returned to their capitals
for "urgent consultations"; some even considered not returning
to Minsk. In the end, they proved willing to resume dialogue with the Belorusian
government, provided that the Vienna Convention accords were respected.
(Belapan, 0205 GMT, 20 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171)

The Belorusian side accused the envoys of not complying with the Vienna
Convention by their refusal to leave their residences after they were given
an extra two weeks in which to vacate the area. The government considers
the repairs to be within its rights, since only ambassadorial residences,
not official buildings, are affected. (Belapan, 1448 GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173)
In addition, President Lukashenka declared that the current crisis had been
due to the West's reaction to Belarus' orientation towards union with Russia,
and its opposition to NATO's expansion. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1905 GMT,
26 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177) However, the Belorusian Supreme Soviet has blamed
Lukashenka for not having shown more understanding toward the envoys' requests,
as now the crisis may lead to the complete isolation of Belarus from the
West and an even further reduction of foreign investment and trade. (Belapan,
1710 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175)

by Monica Florescu

TRANSCAUCASUSDAGESTANMagomedov reelected amid growing violence and tension
On 25 June Dagestan's Constituent Assembly elected a State Council and reelected
the incumbent State Council Chairman, Magomedali Magomedov. He received
162 of the 242 votes cast. (Interfax, 1049 GMT, 25 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176)

Members of the assembly voted under very tense circumstances. Interior ministry
troops sealed off the center of Makhachkala where soldiers with machine
guns and grenade launchers guarded the government buildings. (NTV, 0600
GMT, 25 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176) Since the attempted coup in May, explosions,
assassinations, abductions and other acts of violence and terror have become
increasingly frequent. In June alone, there were several attacks against
military targets in Dagestan, including a helicopter division of the border
troops, an OMON division and a military convoy. (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25
Jun 98) (For more detail on the May coup attempt, see
Editorial Digest, Vol. 3, No. 8.)

The Constituent Assembly is composed of deputies from Dagestan's legislature
and representatives of local and regional governments. In accordance with
the 1994 constitution, the process of choosing the highest republican executive
authority is indirect and open to manipulation by the entrenched interests.
Magomedov's critics charge that the existing system, managed through back
room deals and intrigues, unfairly prohibits others from participating and
perpetuates the corruption, poverty, and violence that has characterized
Dagestani life in recent years. Various public figures, ranging from Nadir
Khachilaev, the Duma deputy who led the May coup, to Ramazan Abdulatipov,
the vice premier of the Russian government, have suggested that Dagestan
would be better served by direct elections of a republican president. Some
have conjectured that the two were working together. (Moskovskiye novosti,
24-31 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177)

Magomedov, a Dargin, has wielded political power in Dagestan since Soviet
times and was elected chairman of the State Council in 1994. When his term
expired in 1996 no elections were held due to the tensions and hardships
caused by the war in neighboring Chechnya. As a result, Magomedov has governed
for a term of four years although he was elected for only two years in 1994.

The constitution was amended on 19 March 1998 to make Magomedov's reelection
possible. On that occasion the People's Assembly repealed Article 93 of
the constitution which prohibited persons of the same nationality from occupying
the position of State Council chairman for two consecutive terms. (See Magomedkhan
Magomedkhanov, "Rents in the Fabric of Government," Perspective,
Vol. 8, No. 4, March-April 1998.) The original intention was to rotate the
highest executive position among the deputies of the 14 constituent nationalities
represented on the State Council. That provision was an important component
of the delicate power balance among the different nationalities of Dagestan.
Its repeal brought closer the danger of inter-ethnic strife.

On the eve of the election Izvestia speculated that Magomedov would have
been elected even under democratic procedures. The paper suggested that
the majority of Dagestanis fear the militant tactics of the opposition more
than they disapprove of the continuous decline of their republic under the
existing leadership. That seems like a reasonable conclusion in view of
all the violence that the republic has already endured and suggests that
the refusal to hold national elections was extremely shortsighted. Little
has been achieved other than the alienation of members of the opposition
from the peaceful political process.

GEORGIA
After clashes in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze comes under increasing pressure
The parties complied with the 25 May cease-fire agreement that ended several
days of heavy fighting in the Gali region, but no progress was achieved
on the repatriation of 35,000 Georgian refugees who fled the fighting. President
Eduard Shevardnadze estimated that between 300 and 320 Abkhaz militants
and 16 members of the local Georgian militia were killed in the clashes.
(ITAR-TASS, 1314 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-UMA-98-153) Georgian Prosecutor General
Jamlet Babishvili said his investigation showed that 35 Georgian civilians
and 17 Georgian interior ministry staff were killed in the fighting and
1,695 deserted houses were razed in the Gali district. (ITAR-TASS World
Service, 1001 GMT, 6 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-157)

As was the case on previous occasions, the Russian "peacekeepers"
not only failed to do anything to curb the fighting in Gali but allowed
the Abkhaz to bring heavy weapons into the demilitarized zone while denying
similar advantages to the Georgians. Shevardnadze said that between 60-70
percent of the combatants were soldiers from "foreign countries"
and suggested that the 14 heavy military vehicles used in the latest attack
belonged to the Russian military. (Iprinda, 0845 GMT, 8 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-159,
and Interfax, 1200 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-153) It appears that foreign
combatants included not only Russians, but also Armenians, several of whom
were killed in a mine explosion in June. (Iprinda, 1240 GMT, 26 Jun 98;
FBIS-SOV-98-177) In fact the local Armenians who had fought on the side
of the Abkhaz were the subject of discussion between Armenian and Georgian
representatives on 1 May. On that occasion Khosrov Arutyunian, chairman
of the Armenian National Assembly, indicated that Armenia had little influence
with those fighters. (Noyan Tapan, 1 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-124)

Throughout June numerous Georgian politicians criticized Shevardnadze's
failure to help the Georgian victims and home guards. On June 2, Akaki Asatiani,
the leader of the Union of Georgian Traditionalists, called on Shevardnadze
to resign. (Iprinda, 2 Jun 98, FBIS-SOV-98-153) On 10 June, a petition signed
by 2,000 refugees from Gali was presented to the president and the parliament;
it called for the resignation of the government and the removal of Russian
"peacekeepers." (Interfax, 1105 GMT, 10 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-161)
During the following week, two parties--the Georgian Socialist Party led
by Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, and the Labor Party led by Shalva Natelashvili--declared
a boycott of the parliament. (Tbilisi Network, 0600 GMT, 15 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167)
On 24 June, Aslan Abashidze, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ajaria, openly
attacked Shevardnadze and Zurab Zhvaniya, the chairman of Georgia's parliament,
for failing to pull Georgia out of the crisis. Abashidze called Zhvania
"the source of all our misery" and the "enemy of Ajaria."
(Iprinda, 1950 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176) Ajarian parliamentarians
who are members of Abashizde's Revival party suspended their participation
in the Georgian parliament. (Interfax, 1520 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175)

On the diplomatic front neither CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky's
nor Russian envoy Boris Pastukhov's mediation missions seemed to have produced
any concrete results although drafts of a peace treaty and a protocol on
refugee repatriation were discussed. Shevardnadze thanked the two mediators
and indicated that he has had frequent conversations with Ardzinba; nevertheless,
the positions of the sides remained unchanged. Shevardnadze had reiterated
his offer of an "asymmetrical federation" in which South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and Ajaria would have greater powers than other Georgian regions.
He also said that he would meet with Abkhaz chief Ardzinba only after all
the refugees were allowed to return. The Abkhaz side has suggested that
the refugees could be repatriated over a period of one year and that the
process would begin only in exchange for the relaxation of the trade restrictions
on the Russian border. (Tbilisi Network, 0601 GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181,
and ITAR-TASS, 2218 GMT, 19 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-170, and Interfax, 1613
GMT, 11 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-163)

by Miriam Lanskoy

CENTRAL ASIAKAZAKHSTANJapan grants credits to Kazakhstan for airport modernization
At the end of June, the Japanese government granted privileged credit to
Kazakhstan for the third time since the republic became independent. This
credit is in the amount of 22.1 billion yen, and is designated to be used
in the modernization of the new Kazakh capital's airport, which currently
does not meet international safety standards. The loan is for a term of
30 years at a 2.2 percent interest rate, and the first repayment is due
in 10 years. In addition to announcing the loan, the Japanese government
also proclaimed its intention to provide further economic assistance to
Kazakhstan in the future. (ITAR-TASS, 1018 GMT, 30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181)

Iran, Kazakhstan further expand economic tiesOn 26 June, the co-chairmen of the Kazakh-Iranian Commission for Trade,
Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation, Erkin Kaliev (Kazakh
minister of transport and communications) and Eshaq Jahangiri (the Iranian
minister of mines and metals) signed a memorandum of understanding in Astana.
The two countries agreed to establish jointly a sea and rail transport company,
and the Iranian government declared its willingness to recommence the transport
of Kazakh oil to the world market via Iran (IRNA, 0717 GMT, 26 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177),
although Minister Jahangiri did not actually set a date for the oil transport's
resumption. Kazakh Prime Minister Balgymbaev also invited the Iranian government
to invest in the renovation and modernization of Kazakhstan's newly inaugurated
capital city, Astana. (IRNA, 1115 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175)

Prime Minister Balgymbaev and Minister Jahangiri met on 24 June, and in
addition to oil transportation issues, their discussion focused on an agreement
to provide Iran with Kazakh grain supplies. The Kazakh Food Contract Corporation
has already completed its first shipment of 100,000 tons of grain to Iran
(Interfax, 1520 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175), and although details of
the agreement itself have not been released, it is likely that more shipments
will follow this one.

TAJIKISTANDispute over religious parties law appears to have been resolvedOne day after the deadline set for the Conciliation Commission to submit
its proposals to the president, Ibragim Usmonov, a member of the commission
and chairman of the parliament's Committee for International Affairs, Inter-ethnic
Relations and Culture, discussed the commission's work in an interview with
ITAR-TASS. Usmonov reported that a compromise version of the law had been
adopted in order to permit the establishment of political parties which
are based on religion. Abdulmajid Dostiev, the chairman of the commission
and first speaker of the Tajik National Parliament, had officially submitted
the revised law to President Rahmonov. (ITAR-TASS, 1535 GMT, 18 Jun 98;
FBIS-SOV-98-169)

On 20 June, in a meeting with the UN secretary-general's special envoy,
Jan Kubis, United Tajik Opposition (UTO) chairman Said Abdullo Nuri gave
further details of the Conciliation Commission's proposal. He informed Kubis
that Article Four of the law on political parties was changed to state that,
although the formation of political parties which are religiously based
is to be allowed, these parties will not be permitted to accept support
from religious organizations. (ITAR-TASS, 1605 GMT, 20 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171)

Comment:
The difference between these two versions of the law on political parties
is so subtle as to be nearly nonexistent, and leads directly to the question
of how, or even whether, Tajik law currently differentiates between religious
organizations and political parties which are based on religion. If there
is no legal definition of either term, then it is more than likely that
the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)--Said Abdullo Nuri and Ali Akbar Turajonzoda's
party, and the strongest force in the UTO--will meet with many more obstacles
as the parliamentary elections approach.

The recent conflict over the political parties law passed by the Tajik parliament
at the end of May, in addition to highlighting the serious rifts that still
exist between the UTO and President Rahmonov's administration, also illustrate
clearly the weaknesses in the inter-Tajik peace agreement. The agreement
calls for actions which are not sanctioned by Tajikistan's current body
of laws (many of which date back to Soviet days). Furthermore, it is not
absolutely clear whose decisions carry more weight--the National Reconciliation
Commission (NRC), or the Tajik parliament. The NRC is indeed responsible
for proposing amendments to Tajikistan's election laws, but the peace agreement
does not state whether it is necessary for the legislature to accept these
proposals in order for them to become law, and what steps should be taken
if the legislature rejects any of the NRC's suggestions.

In other Central Asian republics, the president has sufficient authority
to order the legislature to accept certain measures. Whether this is also
the case in Tajikistan, President Rahmonov has thus far refrained from exerting
pressure on the Tajik parliament to accept the NRC's proposals, or to keep
its actions in line with the terms of the peace agreement. But then President
Rahmonov himself seems reluctant to carry out the requirements of the peace
agreement's political protocol.

NRC, government increase support for refugees' repatriationAs refugees of Tajikistan's recently ended civil war continue to return
to their home towns and villages, the NRC Subcommission on Refugees and
the Tajik government are being called upon to provide more financial and
material support to those areas which are receiving the largest influx.
The government pledged to grant each returning refugee family 25,000 Tajik
rubles, but there have been many complaints that these funds are not being
fairly distributed. Members of the NRC Subcommission on Refugees have decided
to visit the towns to which most of the refugees have been returning in
order to investigate these reports. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
0330 GMT, 16 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167)

Thousands of refugees have already returned to Tajikistan from Afghanistan,
Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Approximately 2,000 persons were repatriated
to the District of Tavil-Dara and to the Sagirdasht state farm in the District
of Darvoz by May. (Radio Tajikistan Network, 0800 GMT, 6 Jan 97; FBIS-SOV-98-175)
In an interview with the Daydzhest Press (a newspaper published in Dushanbe)
in mid-June, Rizoqul Juraev, a deputy chief of the Regional Committee for
Refugees in Khatlon Oblast', reported that nearly all those who had fled
Khatlon Oblast' during the war had returned. Juraev stated that 107,129
families had returned, out of the 109,000 which had left prior to December
1996. In Juraev's judgment, the main problem facing the refugees is a lack
of housing. During the war, 44,260 houses were destroyed in Khatlon Oblast',
and thus far only 24,000 have been rebuilt. Many refugees' homes that were
left undisturbed were appropriated by other families; 9,000 of these houses
have been returned to their rightful owners (Voice of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, 0330 GMT, 17 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171), but there are undoubtedly
many more cases in which the new owners refuse to vacate the refugees' residences.

UTO troops begin returning from AfghanistanOn 1 July the first group of UTO troops was finally allowed to begin
crossing from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. The first group is comprised
of approximately 150 men who had been waiting in the northern Afghan border
town of Shir Khan, and were to enter Tajikistan via the Panj-i Poyon (in
Russian, Nizhny Poyon) border post. UN military observers supervised the
operation, with the assistance of the Russian border patrol stationed on
the Tajik-Afghan border and CIS peacekeeping units (many of whom are also
stationed on the Tajik-Afghan border). The returning UTO troops were to
be escorted to temporary quarters in eastern Tajikistan. Their weapons and
ammunition were to be transported separately by members of the CIS peacekeeping
forces. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0803 GMT, 1 Jul 98; FBIS-UMA-98-182)

UTO chairman does not intend to seek the presidencyIn an interview with Ordo, a Kyrgyz newspaper, UTO Chairman Said Abdullo
Nuri, who also holds the post of chairman of the National Reconciliation
Commission, stated that he has no desire to run for office when Tajikistan's
first post-war presidential elections are held. (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 21 May
98, p. 3; FBIS-SOV-98-161) Nuri has held the highest office within the UTO
since the organization was formed in early 1994.

TURKMENISTANFurther progress made on Turkmen-Pakistan pipeline routeAfter a number of negotiation sessions held between Taleban and anti-Taleban
leaders and mediated by the Central Asian Gas Pipeline Company, the two
sides have agreed to sign protocols guaranteeing the security of the pipeline
itself, as well as of the Turkmen, Afghan, and Pakistani workers who will
be engaged in building the pipeline.

The protocols also set out labor conditions for the workers. The protocols
will be submitted for ratification to the governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan in August, in the hope that pipeline construction can begin
before the end of this year. (Interfax, 1601 GMT, 13 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-164)

US, UK-Chinese firms win tenders to Serdar, Gaplan oil fieldsOn 16 June, Turkmenistan's Competent Body for the Use of Hydrocarbons
announced that the US company Mobil and a joint British-Chinese company,
Kern Energy-Texuna, have won exploration and development rights to two offshore
oil and natural gas fields in the Caspian Sea. Mobil is to develop the Serdar
oil field (currently the subject of a territorial dispute between Turkmenistan
and Azerbaijan), which is believed to hold 150 million to 200 million tons
of oil and little or no natural gas. Kern Energy-Texuna won the right to
the Gaplan field, which contains an estimated 88 million tons of oil and
132 billion cubic meters of gas.

The companies will not be able to actually begin exploring the fields for
another few months, as they must first negotiate production-sharing agreements
with the Turkmen government. (Interfax, 1609 GMT, 16 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167)

Turkmenistan, Iran to permit 24-hour border crossings at BajgiranThe Iranian governor-general of Khorasan Province, Mohsen Mehr-'Alizadeh,
announced on 24 June that, as of 1 July, Turkmen and Iranian citizens would
be permitted to travel across the border between the two countries at the
Bajgiran border post (in the Iranian province of Khorasan, 210 km northwest
of Mashhad) at any time of day. This agreement seems to have resulted from
the increase in traffic across this border post since visa requirements
for entering either country were lifted on 22 May in order to facilitate
pilgrimages to Muslim holy sites (in both Iran and Turkmenistan) and tourist
trips. (IRNA, 1346 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-NES-98-175)

by Monika Shepherd

BALTIC STATES
The pen is mightier than the sword for NATO inclusionDespite repeated assurances from Baltic
spokesmen that the Baltic battalion is prepared for its first international
mission, a Finnish newspaper recently published a bleak evaluation of the
battalion's readiness. In response to Norway's suggestion that BaltBat be
sent to perform UN peacekeeping duties in place of Norwegian troops, Helsingen
Sanomat reported that training exercises held in the fall of 1997 proved
the troops were nowhere near able to serve as an independent unit. The chief
shortcoming apparently is linguistic: Proficiency in English, the essential
language for international operations (and the language of command in NATO),
is "very weak in the battalion as a whole," the paper reported.
(Helsingen Sanomat, internet version, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-WEU-98-160)

Lack of proficiency in English is not an insignificant hurdle. The ability
to communicate with other countries is far more important than a country's
arsenal to Baltic aspirations to join NATO, according to Javier Solana,
secretary-general of the alliance. "Absence of modern intricate weaponry
is not the main problem. One must develop the capacity of cooperation, language
skills, skills of communication with people and management techniques,"
Solana is quoted as saying during his visit to Estonia. (Baltic News Service
Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 19 Jun 98) The Baltic governments apparently were
not surprised by indications of deficiencies. Just days before Solana reached
Riga, the Latvian government resolved to raise defense funding to 1 percent
of the country's GDP in 1999 and to increase the portion gradually to 2
percent by 2003. The current defense budget amounts to .67 percent of GDP.
(Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 16 Jun 98) Moreover, President
Valdas Adamkus voiced his recognition of the Lithuanian military's need
to improve its ability to cooperate with others. During a meeting at defense
headquarters, Adamkus noted the necessity for officers to intensify English-language
education and to create NATO-level training programs. (ELTA, 1439 GMT, 25
Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176)

LATVIAFatherland faction hurls another wrench into citizenship machinery...The sigh of relief heard on 22 June when the Latvian parliament granted
final approval to changes to the country's citizenship law turned quickly
into a groan, as the For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK party began gathering
signatures to postpone publication of the amendments for two months and
to bring about a referendum on the subject.

As reported in earlier digests, several leaders of the international community
had weighed in with support for the changes; by the end of the May no external
voices were heard in favor of maintaining the legal status quo. As the parliamentary
session neared the scheduled summer recess without the final reading of
the bill, the last wrench was turned: While on the Latvian leg of his visit
to the Baltic states, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana did not issue
the expected reassurance of NATO's doors remaining open to all candidates
as he had in Lithuania. Instead, during a press conference at the end of
his stay in the Latvian capital, Solana stated that he hoped the Saeima
would pass amendments to the citizenship law in the final reading. (Baltic
News Service, 1600 GMT, 18 Jun 98)

The amendmentswhich envisage abolition of naturalization quotas and the
granting of citizenship to children born in Latvia after 21 August 1991did
pass during a special session, with a vote of 42 for, 26 against, and 7
abstaining. (Radio Riga, 1700 GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173) Before the
vote on the amendments was taken, Prime Minister Guntars Krasts advised
MPs that the constitution provided an opportunity to organize referenda
to decide crucial issues. Given Latvia's domestic and international situation,
he said, the citizenship issues could be passed for broad public assessment.
(Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 22 Jun 98) Once the vote was
taken, the For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK party immediately began to
gather signatures calling for such a referendum. The petition was submitted
to President Ulmanis on 26 June, with the backing of 38 Saeima deputies.
(Radio Riga Network, 1700 GMT, 26 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177) To stage the
referendum, one-tenth of voters (approximately 133,000 persons) must support
the idea. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 30 Jun 98) Signatures
will be collected from 20 July to 18 August.

After the Saeima vote Vitaly Makarov, spokesman for the Russian foreign
ministry, said that the amendments still did not meet fully the recommendations
of OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Max van der Stoel. Apparently,
the foreign ministry misread either the amendments or the recommendations:
A press statement by van der Stoel said the recommendations had been met.
(Radio Riga Network, 1700 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175)

...as language issue moves to education arenaWhile children born on independent Latvian soil may escape having to
pass language exams in order to gain citizenship, teachers at Russian-language
schools learned they would be expected to show a proficiency in Latvian
by September. According to Minister of Education and Science Janis Gaigals,
the requirement is aimed at furthering the integration of all into Latvian
society. (Radio Riga Network, 1300 GMT, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-169) The
day after Gaigals' announcement, Radio Riga reported that about 50 persons
"with posters and placards in incorrect Latvian" were protesting
outside the ministry. (1100 GMT, 19 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-170)

Relations with Russia remain bad for the long haulLatvia has been the recipient of an incredible amount of pressure from
the international community on the matter of citizenship eligibility, much
to Russia's delight. However, while discussions raged over the citizenship
bill and other language issues, Latvia signaled its willingness to go on
the offensive. In a symbolic gesture of defiance, the Saeima trotted out
an old standby sure to ignite Russian ire: a parliamentary resolution to
acquaint the international community with the declaration on Latvian occupation.
The declaration itself, which was adopted in August 1996, calls on foreign
countries to help remove the consequences of the Soviet occupation and denounces
the incorporation of the Abrene district into Russia in 1944. Shortly after
the declaration's initial adoption, it was criticized and termed a provocation
by Russia. Under the recent resolution, the declaration has to be disseminated
as a United Nations document. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT,
11 Jun 98) The recent resolution prompted yet another spate of sharp words
between the two foreign ministries. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1800
GMT, 17 Jun 98)

Words are not the only weapons being wielded. Although Russia continues
to deny that it has placed economic sanctions on Latvia, Latvian truckers
report incredible difficulties in obtaining entry permits for Russia. Over
1700 hauler companies are having trouble buying single-entry permits to
Russia for the stipulated price of $250. (Radio Riga, 1300 GMT, 20 Jun 98;
FBIS-SOV-98-173) Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin explained
that "Russia opposes economic sanctions." The cancellation of
discounts on international carriage of most freight going to Latvia, effective
1 July, was simply meant "to streamline trade and economic relations
with Latvia," he said. (Interfax, 1147 GMT, 2 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-183)
Apparently trade with Lithuania is already streamlined. At the same time
that the number of permits available to Latvian truckers is decreasing,
the total granted to their Lithuanian counterparts is increasing. The Russian
transportation ministry has granted Lithuanian haulers an additional 8,000
permits for shipping international freight, according to government officials
in Vilnius. (Baltic News Service, 1000 GMT, 25 Jun 98)

ESTONIAGovernment demonstrates disoriented foreign policyRumblings from Russia seem to indicate that Estonia is next on the list
for pressure to be exerted. However, government leaders in Tallinn seem
intent on proving that relations with the east are not their uppermost concern.
The Riigikogu voted to postpone the second reading of amendments to Estonia's
citizenship law until after the summer recess. As in Latvia, the amendments
would grant almost automatic citizenship to children born on independent
Estonian soil. (Baltic News Service, 1000 GMT, 18 Jun 98) The amendments,
submitted at the end of 1997, fall in line with OSCE recommendations and
a convention on the rights of children accepted by the European Union and
the Council of Baltic Sea States.

Moreover, in a bizarre demonstration of what can at best be termed diplomatic
naivete, Estonia's foreign minister, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, gave some astonishing
answers according to an interview published in the The Ottawa Citizen. When
asked about Estonian-Russian relations, Ilves responded: "The Russians
are a pain in the ass. They've never gotten over their post-colonial stress
syndrome...But the empire's gone, baby--and you have to get used to that."
(The Ottawa Citizen, 8 Jun 98, p. B4; NEXIS) Not surprisingly, Vladimir
Rakhmanin, a spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry, did not take kindly
to Ilves' "outright antipathy" and word choice. An official of
the foreign ministry press service quoted Ilves as saying that certain Canadian
media had misrepresented his remarks. (Interfax, 1802 GMT, 16 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167)

LITHUANIABrazauskas reports belief he was under watchIn the continuing saga of the Third Unit surveillance scandal, the chairman
of the special parliamentary commission established to investigate this
issue has been unable to find sufficient evidence that high-ranking state
officials had been the victim of surveillance by the recently disbanded
unit. However, former president Algirdas Brazauskas recently announced that
he believed he had been under surveillance. "Certain words or even
entire sentences which I said in my office were quoted in conversations
with other officials," Brazauskas told Lietuvos rytas. The former president
has been invited by parliament to give more precise testimony about his
claim. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1000 GMT, 17 Jun 98) Seimas Chairman
Vytautas Landsbergis denied he knew the details of last year's confidential
conversation between Brazauskas and fellow presidential candidate Arturas
Paulauskas to which Brazauskas referred in the newspaper interview and said
that statements he made that mirrored that conversation were just a lucky
guess. "After the press reported about the August 15 meeting between
above-mentioned persons last year, just days after it, Landsbergis told
a news conference he reckoned they talked about the forthcoming presidential
elections, final goals, and ways to achieve them by using joint and tuned
tactics," a spokesman for Landsbergis said. (ELTA, 1600 GMT, 30 Jun
98; FBIS-SOV-98-181)