In matters relating to international peace and security clarity
is needed to build consensus. Consensus on the need to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons has been growing since the end of the
Cold War. In fact, in order to obtain the indefinite extension of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), now with 188 states parties,
commitments to nuclear elimination were made by the five declared
nuclear weapon states – China, United States, France, Russia,
and Britain. However, the nuclear weapon states with over 96% of
the weapons, the United States and Russia, have not fully addressed
their fundamental dilemma: they want to keep their nuclear weapons
indefinitely and at the same time condemn others who would attempt
to acquire them. It is as if parents were telling their children
not to smoke while puffing on cigars themselves. It is simply not
effective.

The consequence of this incoherence in policies is instability
in cooperation. Nothing could be more hazardous in today’s
world. In order to ensure that nuclear weapons do not proliferate
to more states, confidence in the restraint of the exercise of power
by the most powerful is needed. Otherwise, nations will feel threatened
and look for more weapons to respond to the threat. In order to
make sure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists
or common criminals, collective action is necessary. The trust and
cooperation needed for a global assault against such threats will
not be effective if some states flaunt their disarmament obligations
yet display a passion for nonproliferation.

In this paper we briefly highlight some of the incoherences that
are creating instability in the nonproliferation regime. The path
to stability and security, we believe, is a return to promoting
the pursuit of collective security through the rule of law. In the
field of nuclear weapons, this translates into fulfilling the existing
legally mandated disarmament duties that remain unaddressed by the
nuclear weapon states. Condemning the quest to obtain weapons of
mass destruction as impractical, immoral, illegal, and unacceptable
is a multidimensional task. Policies must support the rhetoric and
at every juncture the taboo against use must be reinforced. When
any dimension of the task is ignored the entire edifice is diminished.
It is simply impractical and hypocritical for some to say that nuclear
weapons are morally acceptable for them to possess and even threaten
to use, and evil for others to attempt to acquire. We hope that
the following demonstration of the gap between actual U.S. policies
and its NPT commitments will stimulate greater engagement in the
disarmament agenda. It is imperative that the United States choose
a route to security based on the norm-setting capacity of the nonproliferation
regime to move the world towards universal elimination of nuclear
weapons.

U.S.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICIES MEASURED AGAINST
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY COMMITMENTS
AND THE VIEWS OF U.S. ALLIES AND FRIENDS

SUMMARY

U.S. Nuclear
Policy

U.S. NPT Commitments
Supported by U.S. Allies and Friends

6,000-plus nuclear
arsenal in 2012; maintenance of large nuclear forces for
foreseeable future

Unequivocal undertaking
to eliminate arsenal

2,000-plus warheads
ready for use in minutes

Concrete agreed
measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear
weapons systems

Options of use
in a broad and expanding range of circumstances, including
first use against non-nuclear states

Diminishing role
for nuclear weapons in security policies

Non-verification
of U.S.-Russian reductions; maintenance of large reserve
capable of redeployment

Principles of verification,
transparency and irreversibility to be applied to reductions

Withdrawal of support
for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Early entry into
force of CTBT

Non-verification
of proposed treaty banning production of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium for weapons (FMCT)

Negotiation of
effectively verifiable FMCT

ANALYSIS

U.S. nuclear arsenal

United States: Today the United States has over 10,000 warheads,
with over 6,000 deployed strategic (long-range) and 800 deployed
nonategic warheads. On June 3, 2004, the Bush administration
announced the submission to Congress of a classified plan for the
future size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. By 2012, after implementation
of the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, the United States
will still have over 6,000 warheads, according to a Natural
Resources Defense Council analysis of the plan. That includes 2,200
deployed strategic warheads with well more than 2,000 in reserve,
many capable of redeployment within weeks or months, and hundreds
of deployed and reserve nonategic warheads. In 2002 testimony
before the Senate, General John Gordon, head of National Nuclear
Security Administration, Energy Department, said that the December
2001 Defense Department Nuclear Posture Review "reaffirms
that nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, will remain a
key element of U.S. national security strategy.”

NPT Commitments: Under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), the United States is legally obligated "to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."
The 2000 NPT Review Conference, with U.S. support and no dissent
from any state, adopted an agenda of 13 practical steps for implementation
of the Article VI obligation (appended). The thrust is that nuclear
arsenals are to be reduced and eliminated globally in a verified,
transparent, and irreversible process. No timelines were set. Among
the steps approved was an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon
States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals
leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are
committed under Article VI."

U.S. allies and other friendly states: NATO states and other
close U.S. allies (Japan, Australia), as well as the independent,
influential and friendly states of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil,
Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden), strongly
support the 2000 agenda including the "unequivocal undertaking.”
Developing countries assembled in the Non-Aligned Movement for years
have been calling for the negotiation of a timebound framework for
elimination of nuclear arsenals. U.S. allies and friends have declined
to join in the demand for a timebound framework, believing it to
be premature.

Alert status

United States: Maintains more than 2,000 strategic warheads
in readiness to launch within minutes of an order to do so.

NPT Commitment: "Concrete agreed measures to further
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems" -
one of the 13 steps.

U.S. allies and other friendly states: Support the NPT commitment.
New Agenda states have emphasized de-alerting, for example stating
at the UN on October 4, 2004, "As a first step, all weapons
should be taken off alert immediately."

Threat/Use Policies

United States: Continues to plan, as it has for decades,
for a massive retaliatory or preemptive “counterforce”
attack in response to an actual or imminent nuclear attack, and
for first use of nuclear weapons against an overwhelming conventional
attack. The U.S. strategy of counterproliferation and the planning
reflected in the Nuclear Posture Review reveal some new trends towards
making nuclear arms more usable, identifying an enlarged range of
circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used, notably against
non-nuclear attacks or threats. For instance, it states that
nuclear weapons “could be employed against targets able to
withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers
or bio-weapon facilities)," and refers to nuclear use in response
to “surprising military developments.” In December 2002,
the presidentially approved National Security Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction announced that the United States will
respond with “overwhelming force” – a phrase invoking
the nuclear option – to chemical and biological attacks. It
also referred to preemptive attacks against nuclear, chemical, and
biological threats, and did not rule out nuclear use in such attacks.
The United States opposes negotiation of a treaty codifying commitments
not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. The
commitments have been made in declarations by the United States
and other nuclear weapon states in connection with the NPT.

NPT Commitments: "A diminishing role for nuclear weapons
in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will
ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination"
- one of the 13 steps. Also, in connection with the 1995 decision
to make the NPT permanent, the Review and Extension Conference stated:
"[F]urther steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon
States party to the Treaty against the use or threat or use of nuclear
weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally
binding instrument." Many non-nuclear weapon states regard
non-use commitments as flowing logically from their renunciation
of the weapons and want to see them legally codified.

U.S. allies and other friendly states: Support the NPT commitments.
The New Agenda countries have strongly criticized recent U.S. policy
statements regarding use of nuclear weapons. In the late 1990s,
Germany and Canada sought revision of NATO doctrine to rule out
use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and to
adopt a general no-first-use stance. The initiative was bluntly
rejected by the Clinton administration, and NATO doctrine continues
to highlight the role of nuclear weapons. Meeting in Washington,
DC, in April 1999, the North Atlantic Council stated that the "supreme
guarantee of the security of the allies is provided by the strategic
nuclear forces of the Alliance.” Yet NATO also claims to be
committed to implementing the conclusions of the 2000 NPT conference,
as stated in the June 2002 communiqué of the NATO defense
and nuclear planning ministerial meeting. Like and following the
United States, NATO is accordingly mired in policy incoherence,
despite the efforts of Canada, Germany, and other members. Further,
hundreds of U.S. nuclear bombs remain deployed under NATO auspices
in five NATO countries that have the status of non-nuclear weapon
states under the NPT. This impedes efforts to negotiate with Russia
regarding nonategic weapons, and perpetuates a terrible precedent
for other nuclear powers to deploy nuclear weapons outside their
territory and to share them with non-nuclear weapon states.

Verification and negotiation of reductions

United States: The 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty (SORT) requires each state to deploy no more than
2200 long-range strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2012. But
unlike previous existing and planned bilateral agreements, it contains
no provisions whatever for verification, transparency, and irreversible
dismantlement and destruction in relation to the warheads and delivery
systems removed from deployment. So far the Bush administration
has resisted Russian requests to discuss verification and transparency
through established consultation mechanisms. There are no publicly
known plans for negotiations regarding further strategic reductions
or reductions of nonategic weapons.

NPT Commitments: The 13 steps implicitly endorse verification
by calling for implementation of the START process, which was subsequently
abandoned by the Bush administration. Existing and planned START
agreements contain far-reaching verification provisions. The 13
steps also call for irreversible arms control and disarmament, transparency,
and development of verification capabilities. Regarding nonategic
weapons, the 13 steps call for their "further reduction".

U.S. allies and other friendly states: Strongly support
the application of the NPT principles of verification, transparency,
and irreversibility to reductions. New Agenda countries have objected
to the lack of verification of SORT reductions and to the maintenance
of large numbers of warheads in storage ready for redeployment.
They have also sponsored resolutions in the General Assembly calling
for measures to control and reduce nonategic nuclear weapons.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

United States: The Bush administration does not support
U.S. ratification, which is required for entry into force. The treaty
remains in the Senate, which could reconsider its 1999 failure to
approve ratification.

NPT Commitments: Completion of a CTBT was one of the principal
commitments made in connection with the decision to make the NPT
permanent at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. One of the
13 steps calls for its early entry into force.

U.S. allies and other friendly states: Strongly support
the CTBT, viewing it as a sine qua non for a viable non-proliferation
regime. At the time of Senate consideration of the treaty, Prime
Minister Blair, President Chirac, and Chancellor Schroeder published
an op-ed in the New York Times to that effect.

Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

United States: In the summer of 2004, the Bush administration
announced its readiness for negotiations on a treaty banning production
of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, but
stated that it cannot be effectively verified. At the United Nations
in October, the United States called for negotiation of an FMCT
"without verification provisions.” The way was opened
for FMCT talks in 2003 when China dropped its insistence that negotiations
begin simultaneously on an FMCT, prevention of arms race in outer
space, and complete nuclear disarmament.

NPT Commitments: Negotiation of an FMCT was a second principal
commitment made in connection with the decision to make the NPT
permanent at the 1995 Conference. The commitment references a mandate
for negotiations on an "effectively verifiable" treaty.
One of the 13 steps calls for commencement of negotiations of an
"effectively verifiable" FMCT.

U.S. allies and other friendly states: Support negotiation
of an "effectively verifiable" FMCT.

Appendix

The 13 Practical Steps Adopted Unanimously at the 2000 Review
of the NPT

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the
systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs
3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications,
without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional
processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other
nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in
1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration
both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme
of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations
on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament
an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear
disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on
a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment
of such a body.

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament,
nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish
the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear
disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article
VI.

The early entry into force and full implementation of START
II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving
and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as
a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons,
in accordance with its provisions.

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative
between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and
the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament
in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the
principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their
nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard
to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of
agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building
measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- The further reduction of nonategic nuclear weapons, based
on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear
arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status
of nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies
to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and
to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon
States in the process leading to the total elimination of their
nuclear weapons.

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon
as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as
no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant
international verification and arrangements for the disposition
of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material
remains permanently outside military programmes.

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of
States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament
under effective international control.

Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review
process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties
on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the
1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

The further development of the verification capabilities that
will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear
disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of
a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The Global Security Institute
was founded by Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000) who considered
it unworthy of civilization to base security on terror or
on the threat to annihilate millions of innocent people. Our
survival and values require ending the unacceptable risks
posed by nuclear weapons.
GSI targets influential stakeholders, networks and decision-makers
to promote incremental steps that enhance security and lead
to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Founded in 1981, the Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) is a national nonprofit
educational association that uses national and international
law to promote peace and disarmament. LCNP has been a vital
link between policy makers, legal scholars and activists.

LCNP:

provides legal information and analysis
to policy makers, diplomats, activists, and the media on
disarmament and international law;