Teng Wen Li

On February 13 2017, Kim Jong-nam, the estranged half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, died in Malaysia. Kim was apparently poisoned with a toxic liquid while awaiting a flight to Macau. North Korea initially denied that the victim was Kim Jong-nam, and denounced the Malaysian investigation as an act of pandering to South Korea and the United States. A diplomatic spat soon ensued, where North Korea and Malaysia tussled over the victim’s body and the investigation into the murder suspects. On March 4, the North Korean ambassador was expelled from Malaysia, prompting Pyongyang to order the Malaysian ambassador out of North Korea. Days later, North Korea barred all Malaysians from leaving the country, an act which Malaysia responded to by blocking all North Koreans from exiting its territory. That was the height of the crisis, but for now, the dust seems to have settled. On March 16, Kim Jong-nam’s family gave permission to the Malaysian government to manage his remains. Two weeks later, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak announced that Kim Jong-nam’s body will be sent to North Korea, and that Malaysians and North Koreans affected by the travel bans will be allowed to return home. Trials have been set for the two women charged with Kim Jong-nam’s assassination, Indonesian Siti Aisyah and Vietnamese Doan Thi Huong.

Arguably, the deterioration of Malaysian-North Korean relations was unexpected. Since June 1973, the two states have shared what might be considered a special relationship: Malaysia is one of fewer than 30 countries to have an embassy in Pyongyang, and was the only country whose citizens could enter North Korea without a visa. Not only did Malaysia boast of strong trade relations with North Korea, but North Koreans also could study in Malaysian universities, or work in mines there. That being said, Kim Jong-nam’s assassination and the resulting fallout are not likely to be detrimental for Malaysia and its leaders. Rather, the consequences are likely to be disproportionately negative for the North Koreans.

From an economic standpoint, there does not seem to be much to lose for Malaysia. Officially, two-way trade stands only at $4 million (in 2016). Malaysia has other trading partners it can rely on within and outside the region. 50.9% of its exports, amounting to $96.5 billion worth of shipments, goes to its top five partners: Singapore, China, the United States, Japan, and Thailand. Moreover, it is unlikely that Malaysia has reaped significant benefit from the North Korean front companies operating within its soil. The North Korean spy agency, for one, had been running an arms operation out of the Little India neighborhood of Kuala Lumpur. The contributions of such illicit companies to the Malaysian economy pale in comparison to the $300 billion foreign investment in Iskandar Malaysia, Sabah Development Corridor, East Coast Economic Region, Northern Corridor Economic Region and Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy. With a network of regional and bilateral free trade agreements (with ASEAN and the EU, for example) and four upcoming investment mega-projects, Malaysia does not have to rely on North Korean trade and investment.

On the other hand, the Kim Jong-nam incident could represent a greater economic loss for North Korea. While China’s trade with North Korea has increased, Pyongyang lost its third-largest trading partner on May 1, 2017, when India halted all trade (except food and medicine) with North Korea. Should the Trump administration exert more pressure on the international community, North Korea might lose other trading partners such as Pakistan ($43.1 million worth of exports) and Burkina Faso ($32.8 million worth of exports). While Malaysia was not particularly significant as an exporting or importing country to North Korea, when Pyongyang could hemorrhage further trade partners, Malaysia was an unneeded setback for North Korea.

The Kim Jong-nam episode might instead benefit the Malaysian government. Support for Prime Minister Najib Razak dipped during the height of the 1MDB scandal, where he was accused of pocketing $1 billion from the state investment fund. As David Han and Shawn Ho argue, the administration’s careful and transparent handling of the case might change that. The Malaysian government helped to defuse the crisis by allowing the North Korean suspects to leave after being questioned. It also demonstrating great sensitivity in allowing the Indonesian and Vietnamese governments access to the two women who had been arrested in connection with the case. Doubtlessly, the Prime Minister’s standing among Malaysians has improved, especially with the return of the nine Malaysians who had been unable to leave North Korea. It is entirely possible that Kim Jong-un enjoyed a similar revival in popularity in North Korea. However, in the absence of information, it would be speculative to assume that the North Korean propaganda machinery used this incident to promote the Dear Respected Comrade.

In the long run, Malaysia might improve its standing internationally by minimizing its links to North Korea. In its World Report 2016, the Human Rights Watch criticized Malaysia for its “increased harassment and persecution of human rights defenders, activists, political opposition figures, and journalists.” It would be helpful to Malaysia’s image if the country is not seen as a bedfellow to North Korea, which has often been singled out for its human rights record. On April 18, US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley demanded that the Security Council act against North Korea’s abuses, citing how the North Korean government “forces many of its citizens, including political prisoners, to work in life threatening conditions in coal mines and other dangerous industries to finance the regime’s military.” More recently, Pyongyang has also come under fire for its nuclear and missile activities. Lu Kang, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, expressed Beijing’s “grave concern” a day after North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister said Pyongyang would test missiles weekly and use nuclear weapons if threatened. As a member of the UN Security Council from 2015 to 2016, Malaysia had urged the use of mediation to resolve conflicts peacefully. Thus, it might be more beneficial for Malaysia to disassociate itself from a state much of the world considers hostile, belligerent and unpredictable. Malaysia has already condemned North Korea’s missile tests, supported UN resolutions sanctioning Pyongyang, and worked against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from states including North Korea.The crisis over Kim Jong-nam should be considered yet another step in this direction.

If anything, it is North Korea’s reputation that has suffered yet another hit from what has been called a “Cold War-style assassination.” North Korea, in this instance, has demonstrated an utter lack of regard for the sovereignty of other states. Pyongyang received much flak for its involvement in the Rangoon Bombing of 1983, where South Koreans and Burmese were killed in an assassination plot against then-President of South Korea Chun Doo Hwan. Three decades later, it appears that the North Korean government remains amenable to exercising violence in other countries to achieve domestic political aims. North Korea’s pariah status in the international community is unlikely to change if the regime continues to pursue such a policy.The events following Kim Jong-nam’s assassination have revealed the unique ties, from diplomats to dollars, between Malaysia and North Korea. With nuclear tensions simmering in East Asia, it remains to be seen if Malaysia has ultimately benefited from this unexpected crisis.

The Implications of Kim Jong-nam’s Assassination was last modified: May 14th, 2017 by Teng Wen Li

In December 2016, sailors from a Chinese warship seized a United States unmanned underwater vehicle operating in the international waters of the South China Sea. The Pentagon protested, demanding the immediate return of the drone. Within a week, after consultations between China and the US, the drone was returned.

One month earlier, in November, a similar situation played out on the border of the South China Sea. Nine armored personnel carriers were seized at the Kwai Chung container terminal of Hong Kong. The Terrex vehicles were returning from a Singaporean military exercise in Taiwan, transported by a commercial cargo ship. Like its American counterpart, Singapore’s Ministry of Defence expressed its expectation that the shipment be returned to Singapore expeditiously. However, the vehicles were only returned after two months. Similar incidents returned different results.

To understand why the disputes were resolved differently, it may be useful to first consider the context of each incident. The Terrex situation involved many more parties. Hong Kong’s Customs and Excise Department, Singapore’s Ministry of Defence (and Singapore Armed Forces), and the shipping contractor APL had to coordinate and organize various meetings to discuss the issue. Hong Kong has denied Beijing’s involvement in the incident, but mainland agents may have tipped off the Hong Kong Customs about the vehicles. In contrast, the drone situation involved mainly the Chinese Ministry of Defense (and Chinese Navy) and the US Department of Defense (and US Navy). With less stakeholders involved, it is possible that “friendly consultations” could be “smoothly completed”. Thus, it may simply be the case that for one situation, negotiations were more complicated and a compromise more difficult to reach.

Yet, inter-state tensions do not necessarily arise from the deployment of military vehicles in international waters, or the shipment of military cargo from one port to another. An explanation for why such disputes arose in the first place can be found in the bilateral relations between the involved parties.Granted, both the US and Singapore were seen to have violated the One China policy. Beijing opposes Singapore’s military ties and cooperative training with Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province. Similarly, then-President-elect Donald Trump challenged the One China policy by speaking on the phone with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen earlier in December 2016. However, unlike Singapore, the US has a strong and visible military presence in the South China Sea. The US has stationed warplanes in the Philippines to challenge Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, along with “ballistic missile defense-capable ships, submarines, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft”. Even though China was offended by both Singapore and the US, it may have been prompted by the military threat of the latter to expedite the resolution of the dispute for the US. At best, China may have remained inactive during the negotiations in Hong Kong. At worst, it may have stalled the discussions to force the Singaporean government to cease its relations with the Republic of China. At present, the Ministry of Defence has not announced any changes to the conduct of its military training in Taiwan.

Moving forward, both the US and Singapore can draw valuable lessons from these incidents. The Singapore Armed Forces has already changed its practices to better protect Singapore’s military assets. It would not be too far of a stretch to suggest that the US Navy has strengthened measures to prevent any unmanned underwater vehicles from being seized from the water by foreign military personnel. American and Singaporean leaders can also learn from each other’s experiences. To the US, the seizure of Singaporean military vehicles is yet more evidence of an increased Chinese initiative to gain a strategic foothold in Southeast Asia. It further confirms American views of China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. To avoid alienating its defense partners in the region, the Pentagon could consider reinforcing its military presence not only through the deployment of more assets, but also through conducting more multilateral and bilateral operations with Southeast Asian militaries. To Singapore, the seizure of the US drone is a reminder for the Singapore Armed Forces to exercise more caution in deploying its own unmanned underwater vehicles. To avoid antagonizing China in what it considers to be its territory, Singaporean military leaders may want to reconsider any deployments of such vehicles in the South China Sea.

Of Drones and Terrexes: The Seizure of Military Vehicles was last modified: March 8th, 2017 by Teng Wen Li