Military

Further Reading

MOBILIZATION
AND DEMOBILIZATION
OF
NATIONAL GUARD FORCES

INTRODUCTION:
An
important issue that came to the forefront during the civil disturbance operation
was that the DOD GARDEN PLOT plan does not contain sufficient guidance on procedures
for the Army to execute a selective mobilization. Inherent in the lack of guidelines
was the issue of federalization of the National Guard. The requirements of
the defederalization process also caused confusion, to include the need for
physicals, and the manner in which service was documented.

To
eliminate confusion, statutory and administrative requirements, relating to
federalization of the National Guard, need study. In addition, the GARDEN PLOT
plan should be revised to specifically task military departments to develop
supporting plans for selective mobilization. The Department of the Army revised
plan will implement guidance for the Army, incorporating the Army Mobilization
and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) under selective mobilization.

TOPIC:
Federalization
Status of the National Guard.

DISCUSSION:
The
federalization status of several California National Guard units was not known
when JTF Los Angeles was activated by the FORSCOM commander. Neither the California
Adjutant General nor FORSCOM could provide an accurate list of federalized
National Guard units at the time the JTF was activated. As a result, the J1
spent a significant amount of time compiling this information, which was necessary
to properly employ, supply, and administer the National Guard units.

LESSON(S):
Parent
commands must pay close attention to the exact federalization status of their
units during mobilization. This will ensure a smooth transition to federal
control under a JTF. Upon the activation of a JTF for civil disturbance operations,
the J1 should inquire into the federalization status of the National Guard
units assigned to the command.

TOPIC:
Federalization
from the Legal Standpoint.

DISCUSSION:
From
a legal standpoint, the National Guard was unprepared for federalization. On
1 May 1992, the President directed federalization of certain National Guard
forces and the creation of a joint task force to assist in civil disturbance
operations. While the National Guard forces responded quickly, from a legal
perspective, they appeared to be generally unprepared for the transition to
federal service. Many National Guard attorneys were unfamiliar with the benefits
and problems associated with transitioning their force to federal service.

National
Guard Judge Advocates must always be prepared for federalization. The Guard
needs to develop standing operating procedures (SOPs) which allow a smooth
transition, and they must understand the implications of federalization before
it happens. Many of the more common issues (e.g., legal assistance issues,
such as reemployment rights and Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act benefits)
could be addressed in the GARDEN PLOT Operations Plan (OPLAN).

LESSON(S):
Develop
a legal SOP that outlines the mechanics and effects of federalizing the National
Guard. Add an annex to the GARDEN PLOT OPLAN that highlights the key legal
implications of federalizing the National Guard (e.g., legal assistance issues,
military justice issues, and administrative law problems).

TOPIC:
Military
Justice and Federalization.

DISCUSSION:
Federalization
of the National Guard, especially for short-term civil disturbance operations,
creates unique problems in the military justice system. Federalization of the
National Guard may create a jurisdictional gap for prosecution of offenses.
When a soldier is notified of activation under Title 32 and fails to report,
the National Guard can handle the case using state judicial or nonjudicial.
procedures. State procedures no longer apply when soldiers fail to report after
federalization. The offenses must be disposed of using Title 10, Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) procedures. However, a soldier cannot be considered
ordered to active duty under Title 10 unless notified of the activation. A
gap is created for offenses committed between the time of federalization and
the time the soldier receives notification. In AWOL cases, that time would
be lost for prosecution purposes.

Civil
disturbance operations that conclude quickly present difficult time restraints
for processing military justice actions. The command must act quickly either
to resolve the issue or reassign the soldier to a regular Army unit for disposition
before the individual is removed from federal status. Failure to act in a timely
fashion may result in misconduct going unpunished.

The
time constraint problem is compounded by the fact that many National Guard
attorneys lack familiarity with Title 10 military justice procedures. If JTF-LA
is any barometer for the future, planners should expect civil disturbance operations
to be concluded quickly, and, as such, there may be insufficient time for a
Title 10 learning curve.

Army
Regulation (AR) 27-10, Military Justice, specifies that only trial defense
attorneys can represent soldiers at special and general courts-martial. National
Guard units, being state entities, do not have trial defense attorneys assigned.
The trial defense attorney must, therefore, be provided from a regular Army
installation.

LESSON(S):
Each
National Guard JAG unit should dedicate an attorney, preferably a trial counsel,
to remain current in Title 10 procedures. Training for the dedicated "Title
10" attorney should include annual training (AT) with an active duty division
SJA office.

TOPIC:
Personnel
Accountability Difficulties.

DISCUSSION:
Personnel
accountability broke down during Operation GARDEN PLOT and headcounts became
both unreliable and difficult to verify. Some soldiers were originally deployed
on state active duty (SAD) orders and were then federalized. Others were not
federalized, but were retained longer than anticipated. Because both types
of soldiers were used to augment Active Component units or were placed as subordinate
units to JTF-LA, inaccurate manpower statuses for pay and personnel processing
resulted. This was especially confusing during the defederalization process.

LESSON(S):
The
Title 32 soldier must be placed in a Title 10 status for tactical employment
under Title 10 command. Exercise of precise personnel accountability is essential
to properly complete administrative functions. Attention to the proper use
of command and control, to include command emphasis on SOP, needs to drive
requirements for accountability.

TOPIC:
Personnel
Service Support and Federalization.

DISCUSSION:
The
CAARNG used an extract of the unit payroll instead of the DA Form 1379, Record
of Reserve Training. DA Form 1379 is used to account for, and record, active
federal service. If the CAARNG had used this form as directed, documentation
of federalized service and the preparation of DD Forms 214 would not have posed
the problems which were encountered. By using DA Form 1379, strength accounting
and preparation of the DD Form 214 is simpler and faster to complete upon defederalization.

The
supporting installation was required to prepare almost 10,000 DD Form 214s
and did not have the manpower nor the computer support necessary to perform
the mission within a reasonable timeframe. The CAARNG provided two units on
annual training (AT) to assist with the mission, and Sixth U.S. Army and DOD
provided experienced soldiers to supervise the effort. There was not a good
working program for the preparation of the DD Form 214. A completed DD Form
214 was required instead of the requested abbreviated form or use of the DD
Form 220 (Active Duty Report). Preparation of the DD Form 214 is impractical
for soldiers on active duty for less than 30 days.

A
National Guard division activated without its Personnel Service Company (PSC)
and Finance Company. While the division was federalized, routine personnel
and finance support was lacking. Active duty PSCs and Finance & Accounting
Offices (FAOs) are not staffed to perform services for an attached RC unit.

If
the operation had extended for a longer period of time, administrative support
by the supporting installation would have been reduced even further. The supporting
installation could not handle the defederalization process with its assigned
personnel. A division finance company assisted greatly during its AT with the
preparation of the DD Form 214s. Division support units should be activated
with the division and remain on active duty until all defederalization actions
are completed.

Because
of time constraints in federalizing and defederalizing the CAARNG, augmentation
of the CAARNG staff (personnel, logistics, medical and finance) to support
the operation was required. After federalization of the CAARNG, a critical
need surfaced to augment the personnel, logistics, medical and finance personnel
in performing those tasks required for defederalization. Several requests from
the CAARNG and Sixth U.S. Army seeking approval to use Active Duty for Special
Work (ADSW) were submitted and disapproved by DA. Temporary Tour of Active
Duty (TTAD) was authorized. TTAD is a cumbersome procedure which, had it been
used, would have resulted in a much slower reaction time than that required
to accomplish the mission. There is a need for Army policy to authorize the
augmentation of the ARNG staff with ADSW assets when needed.

LESSON(S):

*The
National Guard should use DA Form 1379, Record of Reserve Training, during
future federalizations to account for, and record, active federal service.
Army Regulations should be revised to use DD Form 220 or an abbreviated version
of DD Form 214 to document active duty service of less than 30 days. For 31
days or more, DD Form 214 should be prepared.

*Always
activate the PSC and finance company when a major portion of the division is
activated.

*Authorize
Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) during future ARNG federalizations and
provide guidance to identify ADSW as the preferred method of augmentation.

TOPIC:
Finance
and Federalization.

DISCUSSION:
There
was confusion with the payroll after federalization. State mission 92-1056
activated an MP brigade to perform duty in support of the civil disturbance
in the south central Los Angeles on 30 April 1992. While the brigade was deploying,
the Sixth U.S. Army published orders which superceded its state orders.

SAD
(Office of the Adjutant General (OTAG) Form 14) payroll was initiated for 30
April 1992 for an undetermined time. The state of California, Military Department,
was undecided as to which payroll procedure to invoke. The problem was to identify
the number of days the payroll would entail.

The
brigade was federalized, not mobilized, which caused additional confusion within
the chain of command during this effort. Once the brigade was federalized,
the payroll activity changed from SAD to federal pay. Upon federalization,
the State of California was trying to determine the number of SAD days to pay
the soldiers.

Federal
payroll was accomplished through the Unit Payroll Listing which placed all
personnel on one listing, and the pay period was stipulated to be 2 May through
15 May 1992. The SAD payroll was delayed because of the State of California's
inability to decide on the days to pay the personnel. Once the federal payroll
was completed on 10 May 1992, the SAD system was reconstituted for designated
units.

The
SAD system was a major burden to the State Personnel Office because each office
clerk was required to individually handle each payroll. Each of the payrolls
included handling each OTAG Form 14 verifying the address, typing an address
label, placing the label onto a State of California envelope, placing the SAD
check into the envelope, and mailing the envelope to each home of record.

LESSON(S):
Revamp
the antiquated state payroll system. For events that cause the governor to
activate units for state missions, the state payroll system should be integrated
with the Joint Service Software payroll system at the U.S. Property and Finance
Office USPFO). The state system should initiate a procedure to utilize a unit
payroll listing and accomplish the payment of payroll with a Class A Agent.

TOPIC:
Health
Care for Federalized National Guard.

DISCUSSION:
Poor
communication to health-care providers regarding entitlements to defederalized
soldiers caused some individuals and family members to be denied authorized
entitlements. Although all soldiers were informed of their entitlements after
defederalization, the information was not disseminated to the health-care providers.
As a result, some soldiers and their families were not provided care when they
attempted to receive treatment at some military hospitals and dental clinics.

Data
on ARNG family members must be entered in the Defense Eligibility Enrollment
Reporting System (DEERS) for eligibility to be established. Eligibility requires
current data be maintained for immediate input into DEERS through an annual
POM process, records update, or other means. The ARNG manually inputs data
into DEERS.

LESSON(S):
A
DA policy of communication to military and commercial facilities as to the
entitlements of defederalizing RC soldiers should be required to assure the
proper treatment of activated RC soldiers and their families.

TOPIC:
Medical
Screening during Demobilization.

DISCUSSION:
Effective
medical screening procedures were developed to defederalize the California
National Guard. U.S. Code 3502 requires that federalized National Guard soldiers
must be medically screened before release from active duty. Because of the
relatively brief period of federalization during Operation GARDEN PLOT, The
Army Surgeon General authorized the use of a health status interview to streamline
the screening process. Under the control of the JTF Surgeon, medical screening
for defederalization was conducted in three phases. Phase I was an initial
screening by qualified medics. If the patient reported no problems, he was
immediately cleared for defederalization. Soldiers reporting medical problems
would undergo a Phase II screening by a physician assistant or an Army nurse.
In Phase III, those soldiers requiring immediate hospitalization were treated.
Units from the 40th Infantry Division, 143rd Evacuation Hospital, and Long
Beach Naval Hospital conducted the screenings. The Sixth U.S. Army's Surgeon
Office supplied an advisory group to assist in the defederalization process.
Over 11,000 National Guard personnel successfully completed the medical screening
for defederalization. The requirement to medically screen National Guardsmen
taxed the JTF's medical assets. As a result, the medical coverage for ongoing
missions could have been jeopardized, had it not been for the medical screening
procedures established by the JTF Surgeon.

LESSON(S):
The
CONUSA, in conjunction with the state Adjutant General, should assume responsibility
for the medical screening process required for defederalization. The JTF's
medical assets should be used solely to support the operational mission. The
screening procedures used during Operation GARDEN PLOT should be used in the
future.

TOPIC:
Defederalization
from the Legal Standpoint.

DISCUSSION:
Rapid
defederalization with less than a 48-hour notice, resulted in limited legal
support for CAARNG troops at the out-processing station. Counseling on legal
matters, such as the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act, the Veteran's
Reemployment Rights Law, and personal property and disability claims, was limited.
Prepared handouts for the troops (e.g., Sixth U.S. Army DESERT STORM Demobilization
Handbook, DA PAM 600-2), were not distributed at home station to provide a
quick legal briefing for soldiers.

LESSON(S):
FORSCOM
and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) should develop an emergency response deployment
and demobilization handbook to provide soldiers with information on pay, medical,
legal matters, and other benefits and entitlements for short deployments.