ACCESSION NUMBER:00000
FILE ID:95082501.TXT
DATE:08/25/95
TITLE:25-08-95 IRAQ'S DECEPTION ON WEAPONS IS "COORDINATED" BY GOVERNMENT
TEXT:
(Text: Albright remarks) (740)
United Nations -- U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright August 25
described as "chilling" Iraq's admission of accelerated, advanced
programs to produce and deploy nuclear and biological weapons.
Speaking with journalists after a private council meeting with Rolf
Ekeus, chairman of the U.N. Commission overseeing the destruction of
Iraqi weapons (UNSCOM), Albright said that "the new information shows
that Iraq had a more dangerous weapons program before and after the
Gulf War than even UNSCOM had known."
The ambassador discounted Baghdad's claim that the program was all the
work of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel, a son-in-law of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein who recently defected to Jordan.
"Iraq's four-year long approach of false cooperation with UNSCOM is
not the work of a single individual, but the coordinated policy of the
Iraqi government," she said.
Following is the text of the ambassador's remarks:
(begin text)
Good morning, because of the importance on what we have just heard in
the council I would like to read a statement. We just received a
chilling briefing from Ambassador Ekeus providing major new
revelations of Iraq's efforts to produce and deploy nuclear and
biological weapons.
I would like to highlight three of those. First, Iraq produced
additional biological agents beyond the two previously disclosed. Two,
they had a comprehensive program to produce and deploy some 200 fully
capable biological warheads for delivery by air and long range
missiles, and they stood down after the United States made clear the
consequences of using such weapons. And three, Iraq launched a crash
program to deploy a nuclear device before the Gulf War and their
target date was April 1991.
The latest disclosures from Baghdad say much more about the
credibility of the Iraqi government, and the threat it still poses to
the region, than they do about the possibility of lifting sanctions
anytime soon.
On credibility: even when the Iraqi government provides information,
it feels compelled to wrap it in a package of falsehood. Iraq has
again insulted the intelligence of the council with a story even a
child could not believe: that in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Hussein Kamel
singlehandedly ran a weapons program involving Cabinet ministers and
thousands of specialists, and managed to conceal details of it from
Saddam Hussein himself.
Iraq's four-year long approach of false cooperation with UNSCOM is not
the work of a single individual, but the coordinated policy of the
Iraqi government. The new disclosures by Iraqi officials show that
these same officials were consciously lying to UNSCOM just three weeks
ago when they said then they had provided full information on their
biological weapons program.
Clearly, UNSCOM was correct to resist pressure some months ago from
Iraq and some council members to say that the nuclear, chemical and
missile files should be closed. These files are very much open and
should remain so.
Literally dozens of times the Iraqis have said that they have provided
full information on a particular subject. Every single time, the
United States has not believed that statement, and every single time
we have been correct. For anyone to believe Iraq when it now says it
has come clean would be naive in the extreme.
More importantly, the new information shows that Iraq had a more
dangerous weapons program before and after the Gulf War than even
UNSCOM had known. Iraq continued its work in these areas even after it
"accepted" Resolution 687, even when it claimed sanctions were
reducing Iraq to poverty. It did its best to preserve major elements
of its program in order to revive it as soon as possible.
The verification process will be long and difficult, but it is made
necessary by the Iraqi Government's utter lack of credibility. The
United States will assist UNSCOM in any way possible in the rapid and
complete analysis of the information supplied by Iraq.
Until now, Iraq has pursued a two-fold strategy: providing minimal
cooperation to UNSCOM, and ignoring all of its other requirements. If
it is now ready to change both parts of that strategy, and follows
through, that would be significant news.
However, it will not be enough for Iraq only to address the weapons of
mass destruction issues. Our position, shared by most members of this
council, remains that Iraq must be in overall compliance with all of
its obligations before we can consider modifying the sanctions regime.
(end text)
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