Saturday, February 28, 2015

China on Friday formally backed a trilateral partnership with India and Sri Lanka to establish a Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and promote the rise of Eurasia.

Responding to a question from The Hindu, during a joint press conference with visiting Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi declared that “China is open to a triangular cooperative relationship” involving India and Sri Lanka. He reinforced the three-way engagement by pointing out that China would like to “expedite such cooperation and see practical measures between China and India,” where each country would pool its bilateral strengths, leading to Sri Lanka’s social and economic development.

Mr. Wang’s comments, signalling a more inclusive strategic appreciation of the region, run counter to Indian concerns, expressed during former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure, that a firm military relationship between China and Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean was taking root, following the docking of a Chinese submarine in Colombo.

Mr. Wang said China would “certainly like to hold talks” with India on a triangular relationship with Sri Lanka in the future, in tune with Sino-Indian partnership on key global and regional issues. The Chinese Minister commented that Beijing would like to see progress in India-Sri Lanka relations, which would become a factor of stability in South Asia.

With the conceptual lines of a triangular relationship surfacing, Mr. Samaraweera also said Sri Lanka saw China as a “great friend” and India as a “neighbour and relative.” He stressed that Sri Lanka’s centrist and pragmatic foreign policy, liberated from any specific ideology, was grounded in the principle of non-alignment, and was ultimately geared to benefit the Sri Lankan people.

By Ben Blanchard/Reuters
Feb. 27, 2015
Beijing -- Sri Lanka is concerned with the roughly $5 billion in Chinese loans it has and will send its finance minister to Beijing to discuss the issue, the foreign minister said on Saturday, as he also ruled out future Chinese submarine visits to the country.
New Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena has unnerved China with his re-examination of certain projects that China has invested in, including a $1.5 billion "port city" project in the capital Colombo.
India, which lost out to China in infrastructure development on the Indian Ocean island, was in particular concerned about the security threat posed by Chinese ownership of land, aggravated by the docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo last year.
India had grown increasingly wary of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa's pursuit of closer ties with China, which became a key supporter of the island's economy after its 26-year-civil war ended in 2009.
Speaking in Beijing at the end of a two-day visit, Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera said there were concerns about the manner in which the some $5 billion Chinese loans for his country had been raised.
"During the run up to the last presidential campaign the people of Sri Lanka raised many, many questions about the interest rates especially, and also in certain cases about the manner in which these loans were raised," he told a news conference.
"So we will, as a government committed to transparency, want to go into each of these matters."
The country's finance minister will visit Beijing after President Sirisena's state visit to China, slated for March 26-28, Samaraweera said.
China has built a seaport and airport in the south of the country, raising fears it is seeking influence in a country with which India has traditionally had deep ties.
India's concern grew after the Rajapaksa government allowed the Chinese submarines to dock.
Asked whether there would be any Chinese submarine visits in the near future, Samaraweera said: "I don't see any".
"I really don't know which circumstances lead to some submarines coming to the port of Colombo on the very day the Japanese prime minister was visiting Sri Lanka, but we will ensure that such incidents -- from whatever quarters -- do not happen during our tenure."
Samaraweera said the re-examination of certain projects was actually a good thing for foreign, including Chinese, investors.
"We want to create a rule-based investor climate because we feel that some of the investments which were decided upon by the previous government were not totally given on merit," he said.

Canada’s trouble-plagued submarine fleet, once the butt of jokes after a slew of problems, has finally managed to right itself.

For the first time since they were purchased in 1998, the Royal Canadian Navy has reached a stage where three of its four diesel-electric submarines are now shipshape and available for operations.

The Navy bought the pre-owned boats from the United Kingdom for nearly $900-million, an apparent bargain at the time, but costly repairs and upgrades in the ensuing years left Canada’s sub capacity weakened.

The costly series of mishaps and breakdowns on submarines included a deadly fire, a collision with the ocean floor, maintenance errors and a defective diesel engine. Until recently, only two subs were available for operations, at most.

Together with HMCS Chicoutimi and Windsor, there are enough boats to station one on each coast with another to spare. HMCS Corner Brook, which ran aground off Vancouver Island in 2011, is undergoing maintenance and upgrades are expected to take until 2017.

Naval captain Jamie Clarke, commander of the Canadian Submarine Force, says submarines with their torpedoes are ready to do what they’ve always done, including patrolling Canada’s coasts, thwarting drug smuggling, stopping foreign fish poachers and training with allied nations.

“Submarine capability gives you the ability to know with great detail what’s going on underneath the ocean. They also provide a very persistent capability that’s not necessarily equivalent to the surface ships. A submarine can go unsupported for in excess of 40 days at sea,” Captain Clarke said.

“The submarine is the one tool that can go to sea and actually control a large chunk of ocean space.”

Analysts warn Canada needs to start planning for the next generation of submarines, given these Victoria-class vessels are more than halfway through their operating life.

The Department of National Defence, asked this week why replacement subs aren’t part of the government’s 30-year National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, declined to answer the question.

Ottawa’s silence on the future of subs is troubling, defence watchers say.

“The submarines are already a quarter-of-a-century old, with the HMCS Chicoutimi being 29 years old, and will soon need to be replaced,” Michael Byers, who holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia, said.

He noted it takes 15 to 20 years to complete a major military purchase.

“If there is no plan for replacement submarines, the achievement of operational status by the Victoria-class fleet will provide only a brief respite from underwater irrelevance. By failing to plan for the future, the Harper government is condemning the Navy to another submarine gap – another long period without operational submarines.”

The Canadian submarine force says reaching a “steady state” with three operating boats has left it better equipped than ever to train the next generation of submariners. “We have a limit of 11 trainees per boat, so if we have three boats running we can train 33 submariners at a time,” Commander Alex Kooiman, commanding officer of HMCS Victoria, said.

There are about 270 sailors able to be deployed on subs now, but their ranks need to be repopulated regularly with younger replacements.

The risk for submariners today is that Ottawa has learned to live without their services during the years of mishaps and problems.

Defence analyst Martin Shadwick says the limited availability of Canada’s subs over the past decade undercuts their ability to “validate and demonstrate” they’re needed in both military and non-military roles.

“They could demonstrate credible utility over time, but this assumes that the availability and related issues are well and truly resolved,” Mr. Shadwick said.

Submariners, however, are adamant they make a difference.

“The submarine adds that beneath-the-ocean component of maritime defence. So without submarines the Navy would be incomplete as you’d be missing a vital component of undersea warfare,” Commander Kooiman said.

The military won’t discuss future missions, but in the past the subs have been used to thwart drug smugglers and greedy foreign fishing boats as well as train Canadian and U.S. anti-submarine forces.

Lieutenant-Commander Darryl Gervis, an officer serving on HMCS Victoria, said subs excel at covert surveillance and Canada’s diesel-electric vessels can run particularly quietly.

From CBC News/British Columbia
A longtime critic of Canada's submarine program is raising questions about a development the navy considers to be a "milestone."
For the first time since Canada's four Victoria-class subs were purchased almost 20 years ago, The navy says the fleet is now "operational." That means three of the subs are finally able to conduct naval operations. But only one of the subs, HMCS Victoria, can currently fire a torpedo.
"They are reaching for the glimmers of hope and they've found a couple, and I don't want to deny them that," says Michael Byers, a UBC political science professor and a Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law.
"But we also have to take this with a large grain of salt. This is not a huge accomplishment, this is simply the first good news the navy has had for a number of years."

Byers says the operational subs are a mark of success for the navy, especially in terms of becoming more useful to the U.S. in training exercises. But he says there are some serious questions that still aren't answered. "One of them is obviously how operational are they really? Is this just symbolic or can they actually engage in combat if necessary?"

From CBC News/British Columbia
Canada's Navy is marking what it calls a milestone for its controversy-plagued submarine program.
For the first time since Canada's four Victoria-class subs were purchased almost two decades ago, the navy says the fleet is now "operational", meaning three of the subs are able to conduct naval operations.
Two of the subs, HMCS Victoria and HMCS Chicoutimi will be in the water off Esquimalt, B.C. this week, while HMCS Windsor is currently operating out of Halifax.
A fourth vessel, HMCS Corner Brook is currently in dry dock in Esquimalt in what the navy calls a period of "deep maintenance".

Canada's submarines were bought second-hand from Britain for $896 million in 1998. Critics believe they've cost at least twice that much to fix, maintain and update to modern standards.
They've also suffered a series of troubling accidents over the past two decades, including a deadly fire on HMCS Chicoutimi in 2004, and a 2012 incident off Vancouver Island, where HMCS Corner Brook hit the ocean floor.

But navy officials are keen to put that all behind them and call the operational fleet a critical step forward. This week the navy invited a few members of the media to tour HMCS Victoria, considered Canada's lone "high-readiness" submarine.
The crew took our CBC cameras 60 metres below Juan De Fuca Strait to show off the sub.

Friday, February 27, 2015

From the Associated Press
CAPE LEGOUPIL, Antarctica — From the ground in this extreme northern part of Antarctica, spectacularly white and blinding ice seems to extend forever. What can't be seen is the battle raging underfoot to re-shape Earth.

Workers and union representatives are planning to target marginal Liberal seats in a campaign to have submarines built in South Australia.

Dozens of ASC workers have rallied outside the Osborne shipyards, protesting against plans to build the submarines overseas.
Last week the Government announced Japan, France and Germany would compete for the contract as it continues its search for a potential partner.
Defence Minister Kevin Andrews said he expected significant work would be undertaken in Australia, particularly during the build phase, leading to the creation of at least 500 new, high-skilled jobs.
But the workers said they did not trust promises that hundreds of jobs would be created in the process.
Pipe welder Matthew Primiero said he was not confident of keeping his job.
"There's not a good feeling at the moment," Mr Primiero said.
"We're feeling pretty gutted.
"Being a young guy here I thought I'd have a job for the future and for eventually my kids and their kids but at the moment it's looking very bleak."
Apprentice boiler maker Lexi Grzywacz said without work at ASC, she would have to leave the state.
"This is the job I want but if the future doesn't remain here then I don't really have much to keep me here in SA," Ms Grzywacz said.
"I'd probably move back interstate and I reckon I wouldn't be the only one in that situation."
The Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) plans to letterbox drop and doorknock in the South Australian marginal electorates of Boothby, Sturt and Hindmarsh and urge residents not to vote Liberal at the next federal election.
Boiler maker and union delegate Andrew Daniels said he hoped that would put pressure on the Federal Government to change its mind.
"In each state we target three seats and if we can make those seats change, they only need 21 seats I believe or 22 seats," he said.
"If we can knock off 10 to 12 well it's only Labor, or whoever wins Parliament, only has to win another 10 seats."

Smoke fills the sky from a vessel off the coast of North Carolina during World War II. This photo is featured in the book War Zone, by Kevin Duffus, a story part of a presentation at 7 p.m. Thursday, Feb. 26, at the Carteret County History Museum in Morehead City. (Contributed photo)

Feb. 26, 2015

For seven months in 1942, black smoke and orange flames from torpedoed vessels filled the ocean skies off the coast of North Carolina, and at 7 p.m. Thursday (Feb. 26), historian Kevin Duffus will tell the story at the History Museum of Carteret County in Morehead City. He will detail the fate of those involved in what is called the greatest single defeat ever suffered by American naval forces. As the fate of the allied war effort in World War II hung in the balance off the east coast of the United States, its epicenter of losses took place between Cape Lookout and Cape Hatteras according to the book War Zone, written by Mr. Duffus.
A total of 397 ships were sunk or damaged, and 5,000 people died. For six months, 65 German U-boats hunted merchant vessels, practically unopposed, within view of coastal communities – the greatest of these attacks being off North Carolina’s Outer Banks. Mr. Duffus has compiled a collection of eyewitness stories from those who survived the events.
The presentation will discuss the facts behind the decades-old urban legends of German spies, sympathizers and saboteurs. The story will expose efforts of faith, courage and determination as well as infamy, irony and innocence, according to the N.C. Humanities Council.
Explosions rattled windowpanes and the nerves of coastal residents. Beaches were awash with wreckage, oil, empty lifeboats and bodies. Mr. Duffus will reveal this amazing story of World War II that took place just of the coast and how if affected the lives of merchant sailors, allied servicemen, lifesavers and island residents.

Using recently released Royal Navy submarine data, researchers at the National Oceanography Centre (NOC) have investigated the nature of turbulence in the ocean beneath the Arctic sea-ice.

Recent decreases in Arctic sea ice may have a big impact on the circulation, chemistry and biology of the Arctic Ocean, due to ice-free waters becoming more turbulent. By revealing more about how these turbulent motions distribute energy within the ocean, the findings from this study provide information important for accurate predictions of the future of the Arctic Ocean.
NOC scientist and lead author of this research, Charlotte Marcinko, said "By investigating the nature of turbulence under sea ice, we can begin to understand how the circulation of the Arctic Ocean is likely to change as it becomes more ice-free during the summer."
The melting of Arctic sea-ice is expected to be accelerated as the cold, fresh layer of water just beneath the ice mixes with a relatively warm, salty layer below it. This mixing is caused by turbulent motions, such as internal waves and eddy currents, which are likely to increase as the sea-ice thins and breaks up, causing a positive feedback effect.
Turbulence also plays a key role in the ocean circulation, linking currents spanning ocean basins to others spanning just millimetres. The wind is a major factor in driving these ocean currents, but in the Arctic sea-ice can shield the ocean from it. However, this lid of sea-ice also makes it difficult for scientists to investigate what is happening in the ocean currents beneath. As a result currently little is known about turbulence in oceans covered in sea-ice, and how these processes might change in future.
Submarines are equipped with sensors that collect various ocean measurements, including temperature and salt content. Due to the sensitive nature of submarine environmental data collection, MoD approval for access to a relevant dataset has only recently been given to the scientists at the NOC.
The study, published in the Journal of Geophysical Research Letters, shows that there are differences in the way energy is distributed by turbulent motions in the Arctic when compared to open, ice-free seas. Findings showed that the nature of turbulence was very similar in Arctic regions with high and low amounts of sea-ice. This suggests that the nature of turbulence in the Arctic is altered by the way sea-ice affects the structure and stability of the water column, rather than just by the ice acting as a lid protecting the ocean from the wind.
This research was conducted by a team of scientists at the National Oceanography Centre and the University of Portsmouth. It forms part of the Arctic Research Programme, a £15m programme to enhance the UK's research effort in the Arctic, funded by the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).

Secret Easter Egg in the Tesla Model S car activates a 'James Bond' mode on the dashboard, changing the view into the famous submersible Lotus Espirit from the 1977 movie "The Spy Who Loved Me". The depth - in 'leagues under the sea' - can also be selected, referencing the 1870 book by Jules Verne

By Jonathan O'Callaghan/Daily Mail

Feb. 27, 2015

You might think the Tesla Model S is pretty impressive as it is - but one of the world’s most popular electric cars just got a whole lot cooler.

An owner of one of the vehicles has discovered a hidden ‘James Bond’ mode that allows you to turn the car into 007’s famous submersible spy car - on the dashboard at least.

The Easter Egg also lets you set the ‘depth’ of the car (in leagues under the sea, of course) - although it’s probably not advisable to actually test out its sea-faring capabilities.

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A Youtube user has revealed a secret Easter Egg in the Tesla Model S car. The US company has included a 'James Bond' mode on the dashboard (shown). Holding the 'T' button brings up an access code window. Typing in '007' then changes the view of the car on the dashboard

The secret feature was posted to YouTube by Model S owner Josh Heffner.

To activate it, users need to hold down the ‘T’ button on the main dashboard of the car.

A window will then appear that asks for an access code, and by typing in zero-zero-seven, James Bond mode can be activated.

Where the image of a Model S car on the dashboard normally appears, instead now the famous Lotus Espirit from the 1977 James Bond movie The Spy Who Loved Me is seen.

The Tesla Model S dashboard, shown, allows users to select and alter different features of the car

Mr Heffner explained that this was a ‘technician login’ that was ‘normally where servicing will get access to their menus and make changes.’

He admits, though, that he hasn’t ‘really found a good way to get rid of it yet’ without having to reset the dashboard.

A Deputy Carrier Airwing Commander receives input from a member of a Seal team, as well as pilots, during a briefing in the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Harry S Truman's mission planning room. ONR is hoping to demonstrate an Operational Planning Tool aboard a Carrier Strike Group in the 2019-20 time frame. Source: US Navy

Key Points

US Navy Office of Naval Research's Mission Planning Application is part of the Advanced Processing Build programme for submarines

ONR hopes to demonstrate the software during a one-year demonstration on board the DDG 51 cruiser USS Mobile Bay, beginning in 2015

The US Navy (USN) Office of Naval Research's (ONR's) Mission Planning Application, being integrated into submarines via the Advanced Processing Build (APB)-13 programme (a series which prioritises new concepts and technologies for at-sea delivery), is to undergo a one-year demonstration on board the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG 53).A sailor on board the DDG 51 lead vessel USS Arleigh Burke tracks the ship's location on a voyage management system as the vessel departs from Bahrain. Throughout 2015, ONR will be testing a new mission planning application designed to improve how surface ships and submarines prepare for operations. (US Navy)
The goal of this demonstration is to improve situational awareness for surface ships, particularly in an air-defence scenario.
The software, developed by Dr William 'Kip' Krebs, a programme officer in the navy's warfighter performance department (Code 34), was initially demonstrated on board a Virginia-class submarine in November 2014. Following the demonstration, the Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) 5 (undersea systems) put the application into production as part of a programme of record for AN/BYG-1, the submarine Tactical Control System. APB-13 contained the first spiral of the Mission Planning Application. ONR has since delivered the software code for inclusion in APB-15.
The Mission Planning Application will be hosted on Mobile Bay 's Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS), which provides the backbone for Internet Protocol communications within the ship, Krebs told IHS Jane's .
Currently, mission planning is carried out with sailors relying on ring binders, paper documents, and several different software products, a combined approach that can slow the planning process, he added.

Decision-making

To improve the process, ONR sought to minimise the need for manual entry of mission planning information. Instead, the idea was to allow computers to process the data and enable operators to focus on decision-making, Krebs said.Mission planning on board surface ships today is based on traditional methods. ONR is hoping to demonstrate mission planning software options designed to minimise manual data entry requirements and enable operators to focus on decision-making. (US Navy)
"The software has all the chart data on one side and a timeline on the other. You can specify any time and space on the chart where the ship is. I can understand all the activities that are [occurring] on board, and I can look at any time and space and see what I am going to be doing at that particular [moment]," he explained.
"It is pretty powerful in that respect because you are looking ahead in time at 'what do I want to plan', not just for navigation."
For example, if a junior officer is trying to pursue qualifications, the submarine's commander knows he has to have the boat at a specific location, conducting certain activities. He would also need to make sure that the junior officer involved is on board at that time to be able to accomplish those tasks.
The Mission Planning Application will also be integrated into the Royal Australian Navy's Collins-class diesel-electric submarines, Krebs noted. "The Collins class shares the same combat system as the US submarines."
Initially, one of the submarine requirements was having the ability to communicate off-board, Krebs said.
"One could envision [a situation] in the future where a submarine would want to be part of the overall network, the idea being that instead of a submarine [operating] alone in the battle, [it would be] connected to the rest of the battle," he said. "[If you] can distribute the mission plan or share the mission plan [you will] have a common situational awareness shared between a submarine and surface ship."
To achieve that shared situational awareness, ONR had to ensure it was able to develop the Mission Planning Application. Once that was accomplished, ONR had to be able to demonstrate an off-board communications capability, he explained.
"You could save an output of a file from the Mission Planning Application. For instance, if I add the SPY Sliderule overlay or KML [Keyhole Markup Language - a file format used to display geographic data] overlay of the air defence for Mobile Bay , they can then send that through a radio message to the submarine and the submarine could import it and deploy it on their Mission Planning Application and see those air-defence rings on their geo [chart].
"If everyone has the same software now you can share that back and forth and get a much better understanding of where everyone is and what they are doing."

Surface trials

Although the version being installed on Mobile Bay is similar to the submarine version in APB-13, there are some differences. For example, the network on a cruiser is different to that on a submarine. For the Mobile Bay demonstration, the Mission Planning Application will be installed on a laptop that can be plugged into the ISNS.
"We made a slight modification to the software. What [ Mobile Bay 's crew] were interested in was having the SPY Sliderule and PCIMAT [personal computer interactive multi-sensor analysis tool]. They were looking more at the air-defence threats and how to position a ship based upon air-defence issues," Krebs said.
ONR added the SPY Sliderule programme software and PCIMAT, so now sailors on board Mobile Bay will be able to draw circles around threat areas on geographic charts.
The SPY Sliderule software has been used to increase the AN/SPY-1's effectiveness against anti-ship cruise missiles, according to the USN.
Unlike the submarine demonstration, which led to the planning software becoming a programme of record, the trial on board Mobile Bay is a one-off activity, Krebs noted.
"We are working with the crew on how to use this application. Once we get the authorisation to operate [ATO], then it will be installed on ISNS and they can start using it."
As of 23 February, Naval Surface Warfare Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, had not issued the ATO. Krebs said the centre is still reviewing the package.
He expects to begin the demonstration on board Mobile Bay in 2015 and hopes to use feedback as a stepping stone for a carrier strike group (CSG) operations demonstration. N2/6, the USN's office for information dominance matters, is sponsoring Krebs' future naval concept, named the Operational Planning Tool. This tool will be part of the Maritime Tactical Command-and-Control (C2) system, which is replacing the Global C2 System-Maritime, known as GCCS-M.
"They want to take this fleetwide so instead of taking this from a single ship or submarine, let's bring this concept forward for CSG operations. That starts in [fiscal year (FY)] 2016, and the goal is to demonstrate this capability on a CSG in the FY 2019-20 time frame."

Mission planning

Krebs explained that each platform would have the Mission Planning Application software. "In today's system, the way they do it, they have all the planners spending many hours building that plan on a PowerPoint presentation. It is static, you can't change it; and from that PowerPoint you send it to a synchronisation matrix XL file then you send it out as a text file with a schedule of events."
Each ship receives the text file, informing them to be at a specific location at a specific time. However, that text file does not provide information on what other vessels in the CSG are doing, he noted.
"Now, if you have this Mission Planning Application, [not only] will you be able to see where all the other ships are, but you will also be able to see [what] everyone else is doing."

Going deep underwater in video games such as Minecraft or Zelda: Ocarina of Time can be pretty fun. Now, imagine being able to go deep under the water in real life, exploring plants and animals and interesting pieces of sea wreckage. Well, that is exactly what OceanGate’s new Cyclops submarine does, and it is controlled with a PlayStation 3 DualShock 3 controller.
According to their website, OceanGate decided upon using the gaming controller partly as a way to save money, seeing as it is apparently “$1,500 for a commercial grade industrial joystick.” The cheap, “$29″ DualShock 3 controller has been integrated with many pieces of the sub’s fancy equipment, meaning it can “run the entire control system of Cyclops.” That’s pretty impressive.

What do you think of the submarine’s unique control system? Would you like to put your DualShock 3 skills to the test by taking this thing out for a whirl?

BANGOR — The USS Pennsylvania Blue and Gold crews have been named to receive the 2014 Trident Submarine Outstanding Performance Award.
Also known as the Olympic Bowl Trophy, the award is presented annually by the Bremerton-Olympic Peninsula Council of the Navy League to the top ballistic missile submarine in the Pacific Fleet.
Rear Adm. Dave Kriete, commander of Submarine Group 9, said it's remarkable the Blue and Gold crews upheld the highest standards while working on completely separate patrol cycles.
The Pennsylvania crews spent two-thirds of the year supporting the nation's strategic deterrence mission. They also achieved superior marks in every external validation of readiness during the year, a process that helps determine the award recipient.
The areas include weapons system performance and readiness, navigation performance and practices, communication system performance, material condition and engineering readiness, personnel readiness, initiative in promoting new operational concepts, and tactical readiness.
Also last year, Pennsylvania set the record for the longest strategic deterrent patrol recorded since the beginning of the Poseidon C3 ballistic missile program in the early 1970s. For the year, it traveled more than 27,000 nautical miles.
The two crews are scheduled to receive the Olympic Bowl Trophy on May 16 during the Armed Forces Gala in Bremerton.

Suddenly the submarine debate has been brought into the public arena. Photo: Michael Fitzjames

We're often told good policy is good politics. Sometimes however what seems like terrible politics can create good policy. So it is this month with Australia's submarines.
Ever since the last Collins Class submarine rolled off the production line, a closed door discussion has occurred within government over how to replace them. The public was excluded on the basis that these issues are too sensitive and technical for open debate. But far from keeping the politics out, this allowed many base political and sectional interests to find a way in.
The Australian Labor Party during its time in office seems to have decided that, on the basis of supporting domestic industry and some notional reassurance from still being able to "make things", the submarines had to be built at home.
During the Rudd years we also saw a doubling of the intended submarine fleet without any public discussion of why this was necessary. Unfortunately after six years in power Labor had a large scoping study but no final decision. .
The Liberal Party of Australia on the other hand have viewed any government supported manufacturing as deeply suspect. And again, without bringing the public into their confidence, seem to have decided that getting close to Japan is worth the risks. These include not only the chance of entanglement in North Asia, but also that Tokyo might not be able to deliver a vessel that fits Australia's needs.
Both parties have treated the issue seriously, but precisely because this was a private discussion they have been able to shoehorn their own political interests into the process, at the cost of rigorous policy. In February 2015 however fate intervened. Paradoxically as the politics of submarines has become more public and more partisan a better policy process has actually emerged.
Facing the fight of his life to keep the Prime Ministership, Tony Abbott clearlymade some form of promise to South Australian Liberals that he would let Australia's industry compete for or participate in some of the work. Identifying just what he had promised quickly turned into a media game, with the Prime Minister and Defence Minister Kevin Andrews unable to explain what they had proposed and how it was different from a traditional "tender" process.
This looked a mess to observers, but suddenly Australia's leaders could no longer declare the submarine decision a closed door affair. Over the next few weeks the Australian government was forced to move to a much more open approach, via international proposals, parliamentary debates over eligibility and competition over the design and development of the submarines.
Even more importantly, they've had to try and gain public support for their approach, requiring some – albeit still too limited – explanation of why our leaders think they have the right choice.
The past few weeks might look like a textbook case of that common political sin of conducting "policy on the run" but this time, good policy has been the outcome.
Australia's submarine fleet is a $100 billion dollar question that requires us to make decisions today that will direcdtly affect our security in 2030 and beyond. Normally, we think issues of such magnitude ought to be discussed by serious people behind closed doors and with politics and the media kept as far away as possible.
The experience of the past month however should give pause to those who hold that assumption. Noisy debate about submarines might not look efficient but it has forced the government to publicly explain, moderate and begin to justify its choice.
That doesn't guarantee we will ultimately get the right choice, and the ALP is not yet showing similar flexibility to that forced on the government. But at least the public now has a sense of participation and ownership in the outcome. This is vital when ultimately they will have to foot the bill.
We don't know who will be the prime minister when the international review is done and the final design selected. But at least the benefits and risks will have been seriously and publicly discussed.
Heated political debates, which Australian politics today seems fond of, might seem a world away from the refined ideal of strategic planning. But in policy terms, we're unquestionably the better off for it.Dr Andrew Carr is a research fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in The Australian National University's Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs.

“Submarines are the spaceships of the ocean.” Idiosyncratic as ever, the remark from Australia’s independent Senator John Madigan on the ABC program “Q&A,” who had seemingly come down from a distant historical shelf, says the needed thing when it comes to submarine fleets. Submarines are akin to extra-terrestrial vessels, moving through space. They are also the obsessive hallmarks of military establishments keen for a fictional presence in the deep ocean. To hell with the logistics – every state shall have its childish complexes.
Certainly, in the context of such countries as Australia, the presumption is that maritime powers need to have some submerged, naval deterrent. Britain continues to intrigue with its nostalgically pining idea of a nuclear-sea deterrent, with Trident becoming the unimpeachable weapon of politics, ever costly, ever draining. Abandon Trident, it seems, and you commit a form of treason, or at the very least, political suicide.
When Philip Hammond replaced Liam Fox as secretary of state for defence in October 2011, commentators were aflutter that the successor “may be less committed to renewal of the country’s nuclear deterrent than his predecessor.” There was little to fear, with Hammond doing the customary reassuring rounds, and claiming that threats posed by Iran and North Korea somehow necessitated Britain’s continued need for Trident. The UK Ministry of Defence and partners have now gone for over two years in their efforts in delivering a new generation of ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) class submarines, though the first is only scheduled to appear in costly majesty in 2028.
Like all deterrents, there are usually emotional yard sticks rather than genuine statements, which are almost always irrelevant. But the submarine entices and excites, a weapon that gives the scantiest of illusions about security. “And when we talk about the subs,” exclaimed Madigan, “it absolutely bloody well astounds me that the rest of the world, our major competitors like Japan and Germany, these countries have been building submarines for over a hundred years.”
And not just those powers. The fantasy of security at sea, bought with expansive submarine fleets, risks creating another distracting, and ultimately dooming arms race. New Delhi, to give one notable example, is pushing for nuclear-armed submarines, with the INS Arihant scheduled to come into service this year. China is already bristling in that department, with US Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy suggesting that it has outpaced the US in terms of raw numbers.
The Australian Defence Force Chief Mark Binskin is certainly unconvinced about any need for such a new fleet, which will cost in the order of $20 to $30 billion, though he does concede to its emotive potential. “I don’t believe you have to build [submarines] to be able to sustain in the country.” The Abbott government has been squirming over the process of how, exactly, the submarines will be built, be it offshore or actually in Australia itself. No formal tender process has been suggested – instead, a “competitive evaluation process” is on the cards, which is bound to involve neither competition or evaluation.
In the spirit of jingoism, Prime Minister Tony Abbotthas made it clear that an openly competitive process might lead to the sneaky Russians getting a bite of the submarine market. “An open tender is there for anyone and the last thing we would want to see is a Russian company, for argument’s sake, bidding to produce an Australian submarine.” Fears, perhaps, that it just might work.
The government has, in turn, attacked their opposite numbers for wanting submarines from Russia or, in a rather stretched manner, Korea. “What the leader of the Opposition wants, he wants anyone to be able to compete to provide Australia’s next generation submarines. He might want the Russians to compete. The Putin class subs.” As for North Korea, an open tender might well give Australia “Kim Jong-il submarines.”
Across the political aisle, opposition leader Bill Shorten has been happily dumping on the Japanese, whom he cannot stand coming into contention as a possible builder of Australian submarines. “In the Second World War, 366 merchant ships were sunk off Australia and the government in the 1930s said ‘we don’t need Australian ships, we’ll privatise them.” This, argues Abbott, demonstrates a form of “antediluvian xenophobia.”
Both sides of politics, in other words, have their foreign monsters, engineers and designers who just won’t, for some far-fetched historical reason, be considered. Not only is the construction issue a vapidly patriotic one; it is steeped with competitive idiocy.
All in all, the question to be asked is how a fleet of 12 costly, overbearingly unproductive submarines could make a difference in the Asia-Pacific, other than wounding the budget. Maritime power is, as defined by the British Ministry of Defence., “The ability to project power at sea and from the sea to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events.” The British rationale for exercising maritime power is bound up in its past as a naval power, wedded, as well, to the idea that “prosperity, stability and security depend upon the vital access provided by the sea and the maintenance of an international system and free trade.” That too, has its inventory of illusions.
The Australian variant of this vision, however, is hard to fathom. It intends introducing the equivalent of air rifles before howitzers. For the US cheerleaders such as Greg Sheridan of The Australian, the presence of a new submarine fleet is necessary to “balance” the arms race in the region. How that balance is measured is impossible to say, though certainty is never far from those who have invested in deterrence the properties of clarity and reality. Perhaps they are spaceships of the ocean after all.

Thursday, February 26, 2015

Should the bomber go the way of the battleship? That is what T.X. Hammes recently suggested here at War on the Rocks. Hammes urged policymakers to abandon the U.S. Air Force’s Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) program. Recalling procurement debacles like the B-2 and F-35 programs, Hammes argued that policymakers and planners should avoid the risk of another such acquisition fiasco and instead give standoff missiles and the emerging technology of autonomous drones a chance. Hammes compared the Air Force’s effort to field another manned bomber with the Navy’s attempt after World War I to hold on to the battleship, only to see that increasingly costly platform surpassed by a new technology, swarms of aircraft. However, this essay will show that missile-only alternatives are more speculative, more risky, and much more expensive methods of delivering large volumes of firepower against heavily defended targets, an essential capability the United States will need if it is to maintain deterrence and stability in the face of increasingly sophisticated challengers around the world.The need for long-range strike
Hammes stated, “The requirement for a long-range strike capability in the era of increasingly effective anti-access weapons systems is clear.” This point is indisputable. The ability of future potential adversaries (and not just China) to attack and suppress forward air and naval bases and surface warships with precision missiles threatens to negate the massive investment the United States has made over many decades in relatively short-range tactical airpower and missiles.
In the case of the Western Pacific, by next decade China will have the capacity to project a large volume of precision firepower out roughly 2,000 kilometers from China’s coast and thus push U.S. Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft, along with Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles deployed on surface ships, out of range of China’s military and command infrastructure (Iran may gain a similar capability by next decade). The U.S. Pacific Fleet’s two guided missile submarines (due for retirement next decade) could launch roughly 300 Tomahawks, a wholly inadequate strike capacity against a challenging opponent. The Navy’s attack submarines could add a few hundred more Tomahawks but only at the risk of sacrificing their critical anti-ship and anti-submarine missions.
Thus long-range strike may very well be the only remaining useful military capability available to U.S. policymakers and commanders against opponents with their own long-range missile forces. Having the ability to strike the assets and conditions most valued by an adversary anywhere they are located is critical to deterring adversary misbehavior and for prevailing in a conflict should deterrence fail. Failing to have this capability – in other words, leaving the adversary with a sanctuary for production, organization, and training – is a recipe for defeat. The ability to deliver a large volume of sustained firepower against an adversary – his military forces,infrastructure, internal security forces, or even the personal interests of the adversary's leadership – is a powerful tool for dissuading that adversary against aggressive behavior in the first place, the fundamental goal of deterrence.
U.S. commanders will need a stealthy long-endurance aircraft like LRS-B for maritime surveillance and strike in order to prosecute a war at sea against an enemy fleet. Should China, for example, have the capability next decade of knocking out U.S. air and naval bases in the Western Pacific, its forces would then be able to establish air superiority out to perhaps 1,500 kilometers (the combat radius of its Flanker and J-20 strike-fighters). It would then presumably be too risky for the Navy’s non-stealthy P-8 Poseidon and MQ-4 maritime surveillance aircraft to operate in this denied zone. The LRS-B might be the only aircraft able to fly there, identify enemy surface naval targets, and either strike them or pass them off to U.S. and allied attack submarines.
U.S. planners should pursue a capability to target mobile missiles and their transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). This is a very challenging mission, but the United States will need this capability if it is to achieve fundamental campaign objectives such as reopening sea lines of communication and protecting the global commons in the face of adversary long-range land-based anti-ship missiles and airpower. In a recent essay for Breaking Defense, I proposed an operational concept using miniature autonomous search and strike missiles that would be deployed from stealthy U.S. bombers to hunt for TELs and thus, at least temporarily, suppress long-range anti-ship missiles. A large and sustained air campaign (described below) could suppress adversary air defenses to the point when around-the-clock suppression of TELs could be possible.
The larger point of that article was to show that it would be relatively inexpensive to add this capability to the LRS-B’s portfolio of missions. The ability to target mobile missiles would threaten the large investments adversaries have made in this concept, threaten a sanctuary he may have planned on, and disrupt his long-range anti-ship operations – something the United States must achieve if it is to meet a fundamental campaign objective. The new National Security Strategy of the United States recommits to the goal of protecting the global commons. Military planners have a duty to devise capabilities that respond to policymaker’s priorities, even when they are challenging to achieve.Costs and risks of the LRS-B program
Expecting the LRS-B program to resemble the poor experience of the B-2 and F-35 programs is employing the wrong analogy. Both of those programs were at the edge of technology and thus took great technical risks, with large cost overruns the result. With LRS-B by contrast, program managers are allowing very little technical risk. Indeed, according to a Congressional Research Service report, the new bomber might already be designed and nearing production.
In 2012, a top Air Force acquisition official described how the LRS-B program is using subsystems already in use on the F-22 and F-35 aircraft. Managers are restricting the use of unproven subsystems and technology in the new bomber in order to reduce risk and improve the odds of hitting the unit fly-away cost target of $550 million (2010 dollars). A 2010 report, written by Mark Gunzinger for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, further described how the new bomber could make use of existing systems such as the F-35’s sensors and combat systems.
If the Pentagon purchases 100 LRS-Bs, what capability will it have acquired? We don’t know LRS-B’s payload capacity. If it matches the B-2’s, an LRS-B will be able to deliver 80 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs, with up to five-meter accuracy (a JDAM kit currently costs about $25,000; the Pentagon plans to have over 217,000 in its inventory). We should also assume that LRS-B will be able to employ air-to-surface missiles, decoys, and air defense suppression weapons.

For a large-scale conventional air campaign, let us assume that 70 bombers are available with 35 flying each day. This results in a capacity to strike 2,800 aim points every day, or almost 20,000 aim points a week, for an open-ended period of time. To put this in context, during the six weeks of the 1991 air war against Iraq (Operation Desert Storm), coalition air forces attacked 35,085 targets (some consisting of more than one aim point). The sustained strike capacity of the LRS-B fleet will substantially exceed that of all the coalition airpower assembled for Desert Storm. The capacity to precisely strike over 80,000 aim points per month, month after month, anywhere in the world, and in several theaters simultaneously should be a strong factor bolstering deterrence.
What is the future for LRS-B’s stealthiness, a top program priority and a requirement for mission success? Stealthiness is not a yes or no question but rather a function of radar cross section combined with route planning, the ability to sense and avoid threats, electronic attack support, deception, and air defense suppression techniques. There is concern that greatly increased computer processing power will allow VHF and UHF spectrum radars to now be useful for targeting previously stealthy aircraft. However it is small tactical fighter aircraft and cruise missiles, with their vertical and horizontal stabilizer tail surfaces, that are most vulnerable to this emerging counter-stealth technology. Large tailless aircraft like the B-2, RQ-180, and presumably LRS-B are much better positioned to retain their stealthiness across the broad spectrum of radar frequencies. Those who are concerned about the decay of radar stealthiness should favor large wingless aircraft like the new bomber which will very likely stay relevant for longer than other aircraft types.
If the LRS-B program is well-managed and achieves it cost goals, it is reasonable to expect to pay $65 billion or less for 100 bombers. This number would include additional development and fielding costs plus inflation. But let us assume for the moment that the program suffers from problems that raise the cost 50 percent to $100 billion. Let us also assume that counter-stealth advances force the new bomber out of service after 25 years (the Air Force plans to operate its current bombers for at least 50 to 80 years). Even with these pessimistic assumptions, the program would constitute a trivial burden on defense spending over the service life of the aircraft. If the United States spends $600 billion per year (in constant dollars) on defense over the next 25 years, acquiring 100 of the new bombers for $100 billion would sum to less than 0.7 percent of defense spending over that period. For that small burden, policymakers and commanders would obtain a very impressive strike capacity, with great benefits for deterrence and stability.Where are those missiles?
Replicating the new bomber’s strike capacity with a standoff missile would require the Pentagon to design and acquire a weapon it has never contemplated before. And the cost of delivering sustained firepower with such missiles that matched that of the new bomber fleet would be grossly more expensive than the LRS-B program.
We should begin by dismissing the Tomahawk cruise missile as a point of reference. When China’s land-based missile forces and airpower are able to suppress surface targets (including warships) out to 2,000 kilometers (likely by next decade), U.S. military forces would need a land-attack missile with a range of at least 4,000 kilometers in order to launch from a relatively secure distance and strike targets significantly inland. This is two and half times Tomahawk’s range of 1,600 kilometers. With the exception of its strategic nuclear missiles (currently Minuteman and Trident, both restricted by the New START Treaty), the United States possesses no such missile and never has. It has been three decades since the U.S. has designed and fielded a theater-range missile. The last such missile, the nuclear armed Pershing II (banned in 1987 by the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty), had a range of 1,770 kilometers, short of these requirements.
What would be the cost of a new missile with a range of 4,000 kilometers and possessing up to five-meter accuracy, matching JDAM’s performance? No one knows since it has never been tried. A recent report from RAND estimated that rebuilding the Pershing II force would cost $18.4 million per missile (2011 dollars). As noted above, the U.S. would need a missile with more than twice the range of the Pershing II, implying a larger and more expensive missile. Let us give missile advocates a large benefit of the doubt and assume that the U.S. could build a 4,000-kilometer ballistic missile for $20 million (in 1982 the Pershing II program was cited by the Congressional Budget Office for cost overruns and mismanagement; it is not only aircraft programs that suffer from such problems). For $100 billion, a very bad outcome for the LRS-B program, the Pentagon could acquire 5,000 “Pershing III” missiles. The new bomber fleet could deliver more firepower in one day than this investment in missiles.
Missile advocates may argue that cruise missiles would be much less expensive than a Pershing III ballistic missile. This is likely although we still don’t know what a 4,000-kilometer cruise missile would cost because none has ever been produced. The Navy continues to purchase Tomahawks at $1.8 million per missile. Again giving missile advocates the benefit of the doubt and assuming the United States could acquire a cruise missile with 2.5 times the Tomahawk’s range for $2 million, the Pentagon would get 50,000 missiles for $100 billion, the bad outcome for the LRS-B program. As calculated above, the LRS-B fleet, using conservative assumptions for campaign planning, could strike that many aim points in under 18 days and then continue with the campaign. Under the missile-only option, the United States would have to end its campaign. Giving missile advocates every benefit in the assumptions, there is no way the missile option can match the LRS-B fleet’s sustained strike performance.

Can new technologies reduce missile costs?
Missile advocates hope that emerging technologies, such as nano structures and additive manufacturing (3D printing) will greatly reduce the cost and increase the performance of future missiles. That may end up being the case someday. But these technologies and techniques are still in the laboratory and so formulating assumptions about their prospective future benefits to weapon acquisition is speculative. Further, it is not logical to assert that such benefits, should they appear, can only benefit missile production but not aircraft production. For now it seems safe to surmise that these hypothetical benefits to weapon production are many years in the future and well beyond the planning horizon of today’s policymakers and planners who have urgent decisions to make regarding access-denial capabilities adversaries are fielding right now.Finding bases for missiles
Finding bases for the new 4,000-kilometer missiles would not be simple. The new missiles would have to be larger than Tomahawk, meaning that they would not fit inside the Navy’s standard Mk 41 vertical launch system cells. The Navy would have to design a new launch system for the larger missiles and either retrofit this system onto some of existing cruisers and destroyers (removing those ships from their current missions) or acquire new ships designed to support the new missiles. The Navy is struggling to fund its current shipbuilding plan; a new class of “arsenal ships” would add to the existing budget trouble.
Analysts have long discussed the idea of using cargo aircraft as “missile trucks.” The Missile Defense Agency has used C-17 cargo aircraft to deploy medium range target missiles to test its interceptors. We don’t know the dimensions of hypothetical 4,000-kilometer ballistic or cruise missiles but let us assume that a C-17 could carry 16 such missiles in its cargo compartment. That is one-fifth the number of bombs the B-2 (and perhaps LRS-B) can carry. If the Air Force has no spare capacity in its C-17 fleet (a very reasonable assumption during a wartime emergency), the Air Force would have to restart the C-17 production line. In 2012 the Air Force purchased its final C-17 for $170 million. It would take 500 C-17s (costing $85 billion) to replicate the daily striking power of the LRS-B fleet. As calculated above, the missiles to arm the C-17s would be an extra expense (generously assumed at $2 million for a cruise missile and $20 million for a ballistic missile as compared to $25,000 for a JDAM kit). The “missile truck” option is far more expensive than the new bomber program.
The cheapest option would be to base the new missiles on land and on TELs. This of course would require the United States to abrogate the INF treaty. Assuming a future U.S. president did so, planners would then have to find bases and operating areas for the missiles and TELs. In the Pacific, Guam and several other small neighboring islands could be candidates. One risk is that Guam is already getting very crowded with other important military assets and is becoming increasingly vulnerable to Chinese missile suppression. Concentrating the missiles on Guam and neighboring islands would reinforce Guam’s status as a “single point of failure” for U.S. strategy in the region. Foreign basing would be highly controversial, with such deployments likely at risk at each general election in these countries, leaving sustainment of the concept in a constant state of uncertainty. It would be risky and expensive to solely rely on a missile-only strategy to substitute for the volume of sustained firepower and flexibility a new bomber fleet will deliver.Suppressing bomber bases
In 2003, hobbyist Maynard Hill assembled an 11-pound balsa airplane that flew from Newfoundland to Ireland (1,882 miles) on less than one gallon of gasoline. This demonstration could inspire an adversary to fashion swarms of cheap drones to target U.S. Air Force bomber bases from very long range. An impact from such a drone armed with even a tiny warhead could result in a scrubbed mission for a stealth bomber that relies on an unblemished skin for its performance.
This could be a reasonable concern but an adversary like China would have to overcome some significant hurdles to turn it into a plausible military threat. The distance from China’s coast to Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri (currently the home of the Air Force’s B-2 fleet) is over 7,000 miles, almost four times the distance of Hill’s flight. Such a drone would require alternate navigation systems (such as inertial or terrain-matching systems plus a radar altimeter) in addition to satellite navigation, which the Air Force could locally jam when bombers emerge from their shelters for takeoff. The drone swarm would have no idea in advance when U.S. bombers would emerge from their shelters to taxi to the runway. Thus, they would need targeting sensors (such as millimeter wave radar, an imaging infrared sensor, and laser-radar) and the ability to loiter for long periods above the many air bases the U.S. bomber force would use in wartime.
Avionics, sensors, and navigation systems add weight and require electrical power, resulting in the need for a substantial engine. This in turn will add to the fuel requirement to traverse over 7,000 miles and then loiter for perhaps many hours. The result will be a substantial (and not inexpensive) aircraft or cruise missile and thus a conventional target for existing U.S. air defense systems.Conclusion
Potential adversaries are exploiting their positions on the Eurasian continent and the rapidly improving performance of missiles and sensors to build strike capabilities that will increasingly threaten the handful of bases and surface forces the United States employs to maintain forward presence. As these capabilities grow, adversary leaders may come to believe they will have military options during a future crisis. To prevent a breakdown in deterrence, the United States needs to bolster its deep strike capacity in order to remove any doubt about its ability to strike any target and at any point along the spectrum of escalation. After examining the alternatives, the Long-Range Strike-Bomber program offers the greatest sustained deep strike capacity at the lowest cost and with the lowest program risk.

Robert Haddick is a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command. He writes here in a personal capacity. His book “Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific,” is now out from Naval Institute Press. He receives no compensation from any defense contractor or associated organization.

About Me

My blog concentrates on submarine history and modern strategy. I plan to sprinkle in commentary on anything of interest. My publisher is the U.S. Naval Institute Press. Information about my books is available at USNI.com. I also have an interest in Bucks County, Pa. history and write a weekly column for the Bucks County Courier Times and The Intelligencer. My new book on the subject is "Bucks County Adventures" available through Amazon.com.