Computer algorithms cannot interpret their data
In a recent article, 'Brain Drain', philosopher Roger Scruton has given a vivid illustration of the need for this third aspect of reality - mental imputation or designation - in addition to algorithms and data structures.

"...So just what can be proved about people by the close observation of
their brains? We can be conceptualised in two ways: as organisms and as
objects of personal interaction. The first way employs the concept
‘human being’, and derives our behaviour from a biological science of
man. The second way employs the concept ‘person’, which is not the
concept of a natural kind, but of an entity that relates to others in a
familiar but complex way that we know intuitively but find hard to
describe. Through the concept of the person, and the associated notions
of freedom, responsibility, reason for action, right, duty, justice and
guilt, we gain the description under which human beings are seen, by
those who respond to them as they truly are. When we endeavour to
understand persons through the half-formed theories of neuroscience we
are tempted to pass over their distinctive features in silence, or else
to attribute them to some brain-shaped homunculus inside. For we
understand people by facing them, by arguing with them, by understanding
their reasons, aspirations and plans. All of that involves another
language, and another conceptual scheme, from those deployed in the
biological sciences. We do not understand brains by facing them, for
they have no face.

We should recognise that not all coherent questions about human nature
and conduct are scientific questions, concerning the laws governing
cause and effect. Most of our questions about persons and their doings
are about interpretation: what did he mean by that? What did her words
imply? What is signified by the hand of Michelangelo’s David? Those are
real questions, which invite disciplined answers. And there are
disciplines that attempt to answer them. The law is one such. It
involves making reasoned attributions of liability and responsibility,
using methods that are not reducible to any explanatory science, and not
replaceable by neuroscience, however many advances that science might
make. The invention of ‘neurolaw’ is, it seems to me, profoundly
dangerous, since it cannot fail to abolish freedom and accountability —
not because those things don’t exist, but because they will never crop
up in a brain scan.

Suppose a computer is programmed to ‘read’, as we say, a digitally
encoded input, which it translates into pixels, causing it to display
the picture of a woman on its screen. In order to describe this process
we do not need to refer to the woman in the picture. The entire process
can be completely described in terms of the hardware that translates
digital data into pixels, and the software, or algorithm, which contains
the instructions for doing this.There is neither the need nor the
right, in this case, to use concepts like those of seeing, thinking,
observing, in describing what the computer is doing; nor do we have
either the need or the right to describe the thing observed in the
picture, as playing any causal role, or any role at all, in the
operation of the computer. Of course, we see the woman in the picture.
And to us the picture contains information of quite another kind from
that encoded in the digitalised instructions for producing it. It
conveys information about a woman and how she looks. To describe this
kind of information is impossible without describing the content of
certain thoughts — thoughts that arise in people when they look at each
other face to face.

But how do we move from the one concept of information to the other? How
do we explain the emergence of thoughts about something from processes
that reside in the transformation of visually encoded data? Cognitive
science doesn’t tell us. And computer models of the brain won’t tell us
either. They might show how images get encoded in digitalised format and
transmitted in that format by neural pathways to the centre where they
are ‘interpreted’. But that centre does not in fact interpret –
interpreting is a process that we do, in seeing what is there before us.
When it comes to the subtle features of the human condition, to the
byways of culpability and the secrets of happiness and grief, we need
guidance and study if we are to interpret things correctly. That is what
the humanities provide, and that is why, when scholars who purport to
practise them, add the prefix ‘neuro’ to their studies, we should expect
their researches to be nonsense."

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Pixel artPixel art uses the minimum number of pixels needed to give a recognisable object. Looked at closely it appears as an 'abstract art' style set of color blocks.

Looked at from a distance, cherries appear. But where does the appearance of the shiny cherries and their stalk originate? From a few dozen pixels, or from your mind?

Cherries and pixels

Pixel art long predates computers, and can be found in counted stitch embroideries, where the minimum configuration of counted stitches is used to invoke the mind's projection of an object.