Comrades, the plenum of the Central Committee which has just
concluded concerned itself with two sets of questions.

The first set consists of questions relating to major
problems of the Communist International in connection with the impending Sixth
Congress.

The second set consists of questions relating to our
constructive work in the U.S.S.R. in the sphere of agriculture -- the grain
problem and grain procurements -- and in the sphere of providing a technical
intelligentsia, cadres of intellectuals coming from the ranks of the working
class, for our industry.

Let us begin with the first set of questions.

I. THE COMINTERN

1. MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN

What are the major problems which confront the Sixth Congress
of the Comintern at the present time?

If one looks at the stage passed through between the Fifth
and Sixth Congresses, it is necessary first of all to consider the contradictions which have ripened in this interval within the imperialist camp.

What are these contradictions?

At the time of the Fifth Congress very little was said about
the Anglo-American contradiction as the principal one. It was even the custom
at that time to speak of an Anglo-American alliance. On the other hand quite a
lot was said about contradictions between Britain and France, between America
and Japan, between the victors and the vanquished. The difference between that
period and the present period is that, of the contradictions in the capitalist
camp, that between American capitalism and British capitalism has become the
principal one. Whether you take the question of oil, which is of decisive
importance both for the development of the capitalist economy and for purposes
of war; whether you take the question of markets, which are of the utmost
importance for the life and development of world capitalism, because goods
cannot be produced if there is no assured sale for them; whether you take the
question of spheres of capital export, which is one of the most characteristic
features of the imperialist stage; or whether, lastly, you take the question
of the lines of communication with markets or sources of raw material -- you
will find that all these main questions drive towards one principal problem,
the struggle between Britain and America for world hegemony. Wherever America,
a country where capitalism is growing gigantically, tries to butt in --
whether it be China, the colonies, South America, or Africa -- everywhere she
encounters formidable obstacles in the shape of Britain's firmly established
positions.

This, of course, does not do away with the other
contradictions in the capitalist camp: between America and Japan, Britain and
France, France and Italy, Germany and France and so on. But it does mean that
these contradictions are linked in one way or another with the principal
contradiction, that between capitalist Britain, whose star is declining, and
capitalist America, whose star is rising.

With what is this principal contradiction fraught? It is very
likely fraught with war. When two giants come into collision, when they find
the earth too small for both of them, they strive to cross swords in order to
decide their dispute over world hegemony by war.

That is the first thing to bear in mind.

A second contradiction is that between imperialism and the
colonies. This contradiction existed at the time of the Fifth Congress too.
But only now has it assumed an acute character. We did not at that time have
such a powerful development of the revolutionary movement in China, such a
powerful shaking up of the vast masses of the Chinese workers and peasants as
occurred a year ago and as is occurring now. And that is not all. We did not
at that time, at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, have that
powerful stirring of the labour movement and the national-liberation struggle
in India which we have now. These two major facts bring squarely to the fore
the question of the colonies and semi-colonies.

With what is the growth of this contradiction fraught? It is
fraught with national wars of liberation in the colonies and with intervention
on the part of imperialism.

This circumstance also must be borne in mind.

There is, lastly, a third contradiction -- that between the
capitalist world and the U.S.S.R., one that is growing not less but more
acute. Whereas at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern it could be
said that a certain equilibrium, unstable, it is true, but more or less
prolonged, had been established between the two worlds, the two antipodes, the
world of Soviets and the world of capitalism, now we have every ground for
affirming that the days of this equilibrium are drawing to a close.

It goes without saying that the growth of this contradiction
cannot fail to be fraught with the danger of armed intervention.

It is to be presumed that the Sixth Congress will take this
circumstance also into consideration.

Thus all these contradictions inevitably lead to one
principal danger -- the danger of new imperialist wars and intervention.

Therefore, the danger of new imperialist wars and
intervention is the main question of the day.

The most widespread method of lulling the working class and
of diverting it from the struggle against the danger of war is present-day
bourgeois pacifism, with its League of Nations, its preaching of "peace," its
"prohibition" of war, its talk of "disarmament" and so forth.

Many think that imperialist pacifism is an instrument of
peace. That is absolutely wrong. Imperialist pacifism is an instrument for the
preparation of war and for disguising this preparation by hypocritical talk of
peace. Without this pacifism and its instrument, the League of Nations,
preparation for war in the conditions of today would be impossible.

There are na´ve people who think that since there is
imperialist pacifism, there will be no war. That is quite untrue. On the
contrary, whoever wishes to get at the truth must reverse this proposition and
say: since imperialist pacifism and its League of Nations are flourishing, new
imperialist wars and intervention are certain.

And the most important thing in all this is that
Social-Democracy is the main channel of imperialist pacifism within the
working class -- consequently, it is capitalism's main support among the
working class in preparing for new wars and intervention.

But for the preparation of new wars pacifism alone is not
enough, even if it is supported by so serious a force as Social-Democracy. For
this, certain means of suppressing the masses in the imperialist centres are
also needed. It is impossible to wage war for imperialism unless the rear of
imperialism is strengthened. It is impossible to strengthen the rear of
imperialism without suppressing the workers. And that is what fascism is for.

Hence the growing acuteness of the inherent contradictions in
the capitalist countries, the contradictions between labour and capital.

On the one hand, preaching of pacifism through the mouths of
the Social-Democrats in order more effectively to prepare for new wars; on the
other hand, suppression of the working class in the rear, of the Communist
Parties in the rear, by the use of fascist methods, in order then to conduct
war and intervention more effectively -- such are the ways of preparing for
new wars.

Hence the tasks of the Communist Parties:

Firstly, to wage an unceasing struggle against
Social-Democratism in all spheres -- in the economic and in the political sphere, including in the latter the exposure of bourgeois
pacifism with the task of winning the majority of the working class for
communism.

Secondly, to form a united front of the workers of the
advanced countries and the labouring masses of the colonies in order to stave
off the danger of war, or, if war breaks out, to convert imperialist war into
civil war, smash fascism, overthrow capitalism, establish Soviet power,
emancipate the colonies from slavery, and organise all-round defence of the
first Soviet Republic in the world.

Such are the principal problems and tasks confronting the
Sixth Congress.

These problems and tasks are being taken into account by the
Executive Committee of the Comintern, as you will easily see if you examine
the agenda of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.

2. THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMINTERN

Closely linked with the question of the main problems of the
international working-class movement is the question of the programme of the
Comintern.

The cardinal significance of the programme of the Comintern
is that it scientifically formulates the basic tasks of the communist
movement, indicates the principal means of accomplishing these tasks, and thus
creates for the Comintern sections that clarity of aims and methods without
which it is impossible to move forward with confidence.

A few words about the specific features of the draft
programme of the Comintern submitted by the Programme Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. At
least seven such specific features might be noted.

1) The draft provides a programme not for particular
national Communist Parties, but for all Communist Parties taken together,
covering what is common and basic to all of them. Hence it is a programme
based on principle and theory.

2) It was the custom formerly to provide a programme for
the "civilised" nations. The draft programme differs from this in that it is
intended for all the nations of the world -- both white and black, both of the
metropolitan countries and of the colonies. Hence its all-embracing,
profoundly international character.

3) The draft takes as its point of departure not some
particular capitalism of some particular country or portion of the world, but
the entire world system of capitalism, counterposing to it the world system of
socialist economy. Hence its distinction from all hitherto existing
programmes.

4) The draft proceeds from the uneven development of the
capitalist countries and draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is
possible in separate countries, thus envisaging the prospect of the formation
of two parallel centres of attraction -- the centre of world capitalism and
the centre of world socialism.

5) Instead of the slogan of a United States of Europe,
the draft puts forward the slogan of a federation of Soviet Republics which
consists of advanced countries and colonies that have dropped, or are
dropping, out of the imperialist system, and which is opposed in its struggle
for world socialism to the world capitalist system.

6) The draft stresses opposition to Social-Democracy as
the main support of capitalism in the working class and as the chief enemy of
communism, and holds that all other trends in the working class
(anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, guild socialism, etc.) are in essence varieties of
Social-Democratism.

7) The draft puts in the forefront the task of
consolidating the Communist Parties both in the West and in the East as a
preliminary condition for ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat, and then
also the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The plenum of the Central Committee approved in principle the
draft programme of the Comintern, and charged comrades having amendments to
the draft to submit them to the Programme Commission of the Sixth Congress.

So much for questions concerning the Comintern.

Now let us turn to questions concerning our internal
development.

II. QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN THE U.S.S.R.

1. GRAIN PROCUREMENT POLICY

Permit me to give a little historical information.

What was the position by January 1 of this year? You know
from the Party documents that by January 1 of this year we had a deficit of
128,000,000 poods of grain as compared with the corresponding period last
year. I shall not dilate on the reasons for this: they are set forth in the
Party documents published in the press. The
important thing for us now is that we bad a deficit of 128,000,000 poods.
Yet only two or three months remained until the spring thaw on the roads. We
were thus faced with the alternative: either to make up for lost time and
establish a normal rate of grain procurement in future, or to face the
inevitability of a serious crisis of our entire national economy.

What had to be done to make up for lost time? It was
necessary, in the first p]ace, to strike at the kulaks and speculators who
were forcing up grain prices and threatening the country with hunger. It was
necessary, in the second place, to consign the maximum quantity of
manufactured goods to the grain-growing regions. It was necessary, lastly, to
rouse all our Party organisations into activity and bring about a radical
change in all our grain procurement work by putting an end to the practice of
allowing things to go of their own accord. Thus we were compelled to resort to
emergency measures. The measures we took proved effective, and by the end of
March we had been able to secure 275,000,000 poods of grain. We not only made
up for lost time, we not only averted a crisis of our whole economy, we not
only caught up with last year's rate of grain procurement; we also had every
possibility of emerging from the procurement crisis painlessly, if we
maintained any normal rate of procurement in the subsequent months (April, May
and June).

Owing, however, to the failure of the winter crops in the
South Ukraine, and partly in the North Caucasus, the Ukraine completely, and
the North Caucasus partially, dropped out as supplying regions, depriving the
Republic of 20,000,000-30,000,000 poods of grain. This
circumstance, combined with the fact that we had permitted an
over-expenditure of grain, faced us with the un avoidable necessity of
pressing harder on the other regions and thus of encroaching on the peasants'
emergency stocks, and this could not but worsen the situation.

Whereas we had succeeded in January-March in securing nearly
300,000,000 poods affecting only the peasants' manoeuvring stocks, in
April-June we failed to secure even a hundred million poods, owing to the fact
that we had to encroach on the peasants' emergency stocks, and at a
time, moreover, when the harvest prospects were not yet clear. Nevertheless,
grain had to be secured. Hence the renewed recourse to emergency measures, the
arbitrary administrative measures, the infringements of revolutionary law, the
house-to-house visitations, the unlawful searches and so on, which worsened
the political situation in the country and created a threat to the bond.

Was this a rupture of the bond? No, it was not. Was it,
perhaps, some trifling matter not worthy of consideration? No, it was not a
trifling matter. It was a threat to the bond between the working class and the
peasantry. That, in fact, explains why some of our Party workers lacked the
calmness and firmness necessary for appraising the situation soberly and
without exaggeration.

The subsequent good harvest prospects and the partial
withdrawal of the emergency measures helped to calm the atmosphere and improve
the situation.

What is the nature of our difficulties on the grain front?
What is the basis of these difficulties? Is it not a fact that we now have a
grain crop area nearby as large as before the war (only five per cent smaller)? Is it not a fact
that we are now producing nearly as much grain as before the war (about 5,000
million poods, or only 200,000,000-300,000,000 poods less)? How is it that, in
spite of this, we are producing only half as much marketable grain as in the
pre-war period?

It is because of the highly scattered character of our
agriculture. Whereas before the war we had about 16,000,000 peasant farms, now
we have not less than 24,000,000; moreover, the splitting up of the peasant
households and peasant holdings is showing no tendency to cease. And what is
small-peasant farming? It is the form of husbandry that produces the smallest
marketable surplus, is the least remunerative, and is in the highest degree a
natural, consuming form of husbandry, yielding a surplus of only 12-15 per
cent of marketable grain. Yet our towns and industry are growing rapidly,
construction is developing and the demand for marketable grain is growing at
incredible speed. That is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

Here is what Lenin said on this score in his speech on "The Tax in Kind":

"If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly
assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition to the next
stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated peasant farms, the least
profitable and most backward, gradually uniting to form socially-conducted,
large farms. That is how Socialists have always conceived it. That is how our
Communist Party conceives it" (Vol. XXVI, p. 299).

There, then, is the basis of our difficulties on the grain
front.

What is the way out?

The way out is, firstly, to improve small- and middle-peasant
farming, giving it every encouragement to expand its yield, its productivity.
Our task is to replace the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply pure
seed, fertiliser and small types of machines, to embrace the individual
peasant farms in a broad co-operative network by concluding agreements
(contracts) with whole villages. There exists the method of concluding
contracts between agricultural co-operatives and entire villages, the purpose
of which is to supply the peasants with seed and thus obtain higher crop
yields, to ensure the prompt delivery of grain by the peasants to the state,
giving them in return a bonus in the shape of a certain addition to the
contractual price, and to create stable relations between the state and the
peasantry. Experience shows that this method is productive of tangible
results.

There are people who think that individual peasant farming
has exhausted its potentialities and that there is no point in supporting it.
That is not true, comrades. These people have nothing in common with the line
of our Party.

There are people, on the other hand, who think that
individual peasant farming is the be-all and end-all of agriculture. That also
is not true. More, these people are obviously sinning against the principles
of Leninism.

We need neither detractors nor eulogisers of individual
peasant farming. We need sober-minded politicians capable of obtaining from
individual peasant farming the maximum that can be obtained from it, and at
the same time capable of gradually transferring individual farming to
collectivist lines.

The way out, secondly, is gradually to unite the isolated
small- and middle-peasant farms into large collective and co-operative farms,
which should be absolutely voluntary associations operating on a new technical
basis, on the basis of tractors and other agricultural machines.

In what does the advantage of collective farms over small
farms consist? In the fact that they are large farms and are therefore able to
utilise all the results of science and technology; they are more remunerative
and stable; they are more productive and yield larger marketable surpluses. It
should not be forgotten that the collective farms yield a surplus of from 30
to 35 per cent of marketable grain, and that their yield is sometimes as high
as 200 poods per dessiatin or more.

The way out, lastly, is to improve the old state farms and
establish new large state farms. It should be remembered that the state farms
are the economic units which produce the largest marketable surpluses. We have
state farms which yield a surplus of not less than 60 per cent of marketable
grain.

The task is correctly to combine all these three tasks and to
work strenuously along all these three lines.

The specific feature of the present moment is that fulfilment
of the first task, that of improving individual small- and middle-peasant
farming, while it is still our chief task in the sphere of agriculture, is
already insufficient for the solution of the problem as a whole.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first
task must be supplemented by two new practical tasks: promotion of collective
farming and improvement of state farming.

But besides the basic causes, there were also specific,
temporary causes which converted our procurement difficulties into a
procurement crisis. What are these causes? The resolution of the plenum of the
Central Committee includes among them the following:

a) a disturbance of market equilibrium, aggravated by a
more rapid increase of the peasants' effective demand than of the supply of
manufactured goods, owing to the rise of rural incomes resulting from a series
of good harvests, and especially to the rise of incomes of the well-to-do and
kulak strata;

b) an unfavourable relation between grain prices and the
prices of other agricultural produce, which lessened the incentive to sell
grain surpluses, and which the Party, however, could not change in the spring
of this year without damaging the interests of the economically weaker strata
of the rural population;

c) mistakes in planned management, chiefly as regards
the timely consignment of manufactured goods to the countryside and the
incidence of taxation (the low tax on the wealthier strata of the rural
population), and also as regards proper expenditure of grain stocks;

d) defects of the Party and Soviet procurement
organisations (no united front, lack of energetic action, reliance on things
going of their own accord);

f) exploitation of all these unfavourable factors by the
capitalist elements of town and country (kulaks, speculators) in order to
undermine grain procurement and worsen the political situation in the country.

While it will require several years to put an end to the
general causes, it is quite possible to do away at once with the specific,
temporary causes and thus avert the possibility of a repetition of the grain
procurement crisis.

What is required in order to put an end to these specific
causes?

It requires:

a) putting an immediate stop to the practice of house
to-house visitations, unlawful searches and all other infringements of
revolutionary law;

b) putting an immediate stop to any kind of reversion to
the surplus-appropriation system and to all attempts whatsoever to close
peasant markets, with the adoption by the state of flexible forms of
regulating trade;

c) a certain increase of grain prices, differentiated
according to region and kind of grain;

e) proper organisation of the supply of grain, not
permitting over-expenditure;

f) formation, without fail, of a state grain reserve.

An honest and systematic carrying out of these measures,
taking into account this year's favourable harvest, should create a situation
that will rule out the necessity of resorting to emergency measures of any
kind in the coming grain procurement campaign.

It is the immediate task of the Party to see to it that these
measures are carried out faithfully.

The grain difficulties have faced us with the question of the
bond, of the future of the alliance between the workers and peasants, of the
means of strengthening this alliance. Some say that the bond no longer exists,
that the bond has been replaced by estrangement. That, of course, is foolish and
worthy only of panicmongers. When there is no bond, the peasant loses faith in
the morrow, he retires into himself, he ceases to believe in the stability of
the Soviet Government, which is the chief purchaser of peasant grain, he
begins to reduce his crop area, or at any rate does not risk enlarging it,
fearing that there will again be house-to-house visitations, searches and so
on and that his grain will be taken away from him.

But what do we find in reality? We find that the spring crop
area has been enlarged in all areas. It is a fact that in the principal
grain-growing areas the peasant has enlarged his spring crop area by from 2
per cent to 15 and 20 per cent. Is it not clear that the peasant does not
believe that the emergency measures will be permanent, and has every ground
for believing that grain prices will be raised. Does that look like
estrangement? This, of course, does not mean that there is no threat, or that
there has been no threat, to the bond. But to conclude from this that there is
estrangement is to lose one's head and become a slave to elemental forces.

Some comrades think that, in order to strengthen the bond,
the main stress must be shifted from heavy industry to light industry
(textiles), believing that textiles are the principal and exclusive "bond"
industry. That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue!

Of course, the textile industry is of enormous importance for
the establishment of goods exchange between socialist industry and peasant
farming. But to think for this reason that textiles are the exclusive basis of
the bond is to commit a very gross error. Actually, the bond
between industry and peasant farming is maintained not only through cotton
goods, which the peasant requires for his personal consumption, but also
through metals and through seed, fertiliser and agricultural machines of all
kinds, which the peasant requires as a producer of grain. That is apart from
the fact that the textile industry itself cannot develop or exist unless heavy
industry, machine-building, develops.

The need for the bond is not in order to preserve and
perpetuate classes. The bond is needed in order to bring the peasantry closer
to the working class, to re-educate the peasant, to remould his individualist
mentality, to remake him in the spirit of collectivism, and thus pave the way
for the elimination, the abolition of classes on the basis of a socialist
society. Whoever does not realise this, or refuses to recognise it, is not a
Marxist, not a Leninist, but a "peasant philosopher," who looks backward
instead of forward.

And how is the peasant to be remade, remoulded? First and
foremost, he can be remoulded only through new technical equipment and through
collective labour.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

"The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his
whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small
tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy
lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by
introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by
electrification on a mass scale. That is what would remake the small tiller
fundamentally and with immense rapidity" (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Quite clearly, he who thinks that the bond can be guaranteed
only through textiles, and forgets about metals and machines,
which transform peasant farming through collective
labour, helps to perpetuate classes; he is not a proletarian revolutionary, he
is a "peasant philosopher."

Here is what Lenin says in another passage:

"Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the
advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil,
only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel
farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands,
actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually
secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry"
(Vol. XXIV, p. 579)

That is how to ensure that the vast masses of the peasantry
are really and durably won over to the side of the working class, to the side
of socialism.

It is sometimes said that to guarantee the bond we have only
one reserve -- concessions to the peasantry. On this assumption the theory of
continuous concessions is sometimes advanced, in the belief that the working
class can strengthen its position by making continuous concessions. That is
not true, comrades. It is quite untrue! Such a theory can only ruin matters.
It is a theory of despair.

In order to strengthen the bond, we must have at our
disposal, besides the reserve of concessions, a number of other reserves, in
the shape of economic strong points in the countryside (developed
co-operatives, collective farms, state farms), and also in the shape of
political strong points (energetic work among the poor peasants and assured
support on the part of the poor peasants).

The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If we do I not
have the support of the poor peasant, if the Soviet Government is weak in the
countryside, the middle peasant may swing towards the kulak. And, on the
contrary, if we have the sure support of the poor peasant, it may be said with
certainty that the middle peasant will swing towards the Soviet Government.
Hence, systematic work among the poor peasants and ensuring them both seed and
low-cost grain is an immediate task of the Party

2. TRAINING OF CADRES FOR THE WORK OF INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION

Let us pass now to the question of providing our industry
with new cadres of a technical intelligentsia.

This question concerns our difficulties in industry,
difficulties which came to light in connection with the Shakhty affair.

What is the essence of the Shakhty affair from the point of
view of the improvement of industry? The essence and significance of the
Shakhty affair lies in the fact that we proved to be practically unarmed and
absolutely backward, scandalously backward, in the matter of providing our
industry with a certain minimum of experts devoted to the cause of the working
class. The lesson of the Shakhty affair is that we must expedite the
formation, the training, of a new technical intelligentsia consisting of
members of the working class devoted to the cause of socialism and capable of
technically directing our socialist industry.

That does not mean that we shall discard those experts who
are not Soviet-minded or not Communists, but
who are willing to co-operate with the Soviet Government. It does not mean
that. We shall continue to strive with might and main to enlist the
co-operation of non-Party experts, non-Party technicians, who are prepared to
work hand in hand with the Soviet Government in building our industry. We by
no means demand that they should renounce their social and political opinions
at once, or change them immediately. We demand only one thing, and that is
that they should co-operate with the Soviet Government honestly, once they
have voluntarily agreed to do so.

But the point is that such old experts who are prepared to
work hand in hand with the Soviet Government are becoming relatively fewer and
fewer. The point is that it is absolutely necessary to have a new force of
young experts to succeed them. Well, the Party considers that the new
replacements must be brought into being at an accelerated rate if we do not
want to be faced with new surprises, and that they must come from the working
class, from among the working people. That means creating a new technical
intelligentsia capable of satisfying the needs of our industry.

The facts show that the People's Commissariat of Education
has failed to cope with this important task. We have no reason to believe
that, if left to itself, the People's Commissariat of Education, which has
very little connection with industry, and which is inert and conservative into
the bargain, will be able to cope with this task in the near future. The
Party, therefore, has come to the conclusion that the work of speedily forming
a new technical intelligentsia must be divided among three People's
Commissariats -- the People's Commissariat of Education, the Supreme
Council of National Economy and the
People's Commissariat of Transport. The Party considers that this is the most
expedient way of ensuring the required speed in this important work. That is
why a number of technical colleges have been transferred to the Supreme
Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Transport.

This, of course, does not mean that transfer of technical
colleges is all that is required for speedily forming new cadres of a
technical intelligentsia. Undoubtedly, material provision for the students
will be a highly important factor. The Soviet Government has therefore decided
to rate the expenditure on the training of new cadres on the same level of
importance as expenditure on the capital development of industry, and has
decided to allocate annually an additional sum of over 40,000,000 rubles for
this purpose.

III CONCLUSION

It must be admitted, comrades, that we have always learned
from our difficulties and blunders. At any rate, it has been the case so far
that history has taught us and tempered our Party in the school of
difficulties, of crises of one kind or another, of mistakes of one kind or
another that we have committed.

So it was in 1918, when, as a result of our difficulties on
the Eastern Front, of our reverses in the fight against Kolchak, we realised
at last the necessity of creating a regular infantry, and really did create
it.

So it was in 1919, when, as a result of the difficulties on
the Denikin Front, of Mamontov's raid into the rear of our armies, we realised
at last the necessity of having a strong regular cavalry, and really did
create it.

I think that this is more or less the case today. The grain
difficulties will not have been without their value for us. They will stir
Bolsheviks into action and impel them to tackle in earnest the work of
developing agriculture, especially of developing grain farming. Had it not
been for these difficulties, it is doubtful whether the Bolsheviks would have
tackled the grain problem seriously.

The same must be said of the Shakhty affair and the
difficulties resulting from it. The lessons of the Shakhty affair will not and
cannot be without their value for our Party. Tthink that these lessons will
impel us to face squarely the problem of creating a new technical
intelligentsia capable of serving our socialist industry.

By the way, you see that we have already taken the first
serious step towards the solution of the problem of creating a new technical
intelligentsia. Let us hope that this step will not be the last. (Stormy
and prolonged applause.)