At the close of former President Clinton’s term of office, General
John M Shalikashvili, former chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff, presented his findings and recommendations on the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The report stressed that
the ratification of the CTBT by the United States Senate was vital to
United States security concerns.

The report came too late for action by the former President, and it
is now in the hands of new United States President Bush to re-submit or
not the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent. The United States
was the first to sign the Treaty on 24 September 1996. The Treaty can,
according to its own provisions, only enter into force with the
ratification of 44 States, including the United States. It is widely
accepted that ratification by the United States would be a major source
of encouragement for other countries to follow suit.

On 5 February this year, the Department sponsored a briefing by Dr.
Trevor Findlay, Chairman of the Independent Commission on the
Verifiability of the CTBT. He is also Executive Director of the
Verification Research, Training and Information Technology Centre (VERTIC)
in London.

The Independent Commission, established in 2000, was comprised of a
renowned group of scientists and experts in the field. Its mandate was
to assess the CTBT’s verifiability, concentrating on the contribution
it can make through its system of international on-site inspections,
confidence-building measures, of adding an international dimension to
national technical means and the establishment and nurturing of
communities of scientists with similar skills, training and background.

The report, according to the Commission’s chairman, stressed that
100% verifiability of the CTBT cannot be achieved. But the means to
verifying the compliance to a considerably high degree exists. The
International Monitoring System, located in some 90 countries, is being
established. Seismological, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide
stations are involved in the system. It is expected to be able to detect
with a very high level of confidence a non-evasively conducted explosion
of at least one kiloton with a real possibility of detection
significantly below this yield. This should serve as a considerably
effective deterrent, the report contends.

Preparations have already begun for the Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the CTBT to be held in New York from 25 to 27
September 2000.

The report of the Independent Commission is available at www.ctbto.org.