Chapter XXIV: The Final Japanese Offensive

Friday, 3 April, was not only the day Homma had selected to open the
offensive; it was also a religious and national holiday for the
soldiers on both sides of the battle line. For the Christian defenders
it was the Friday of Holy Week, and the more devout observed the
anniversary of the Crucifixion with prayers and fasting. For the
Japanese, the 3d of April marked the anniversary of the death of the
legendary Emperor Jimmu, the first ruler to sit on the imperial throne.
In Japan there would be religious ceremonies and feasting; on Bataan
the soldiers of Hirohito, a direct descendant of the Emperor Jimmu,
would celebrate the day in more warlike manner. If all went well, they
might gain victory in time to make the emperor's birthday, 29 April, a
day of special rejoicing.[1]

Capture of Mt. Samat

On Good Friday the sun rose in a cloudless sky and gave promise of
another hot, dry day so like those which had preceded it with endless
monotony. From the top of Mt. Samat two American officers serving as
artillery observers could plainly see the heavy Japanese guns, two to
three miles behind the line, making ready to fire. Before their view
was obscured they counted nineteen batteries of artillery and eight to
ten mortar batteries. Observers to their east reported many more
batteries of light artillery massed in close support of the infantry.[2] At 0900 this large array of guns,
howitzers, and mortars, altogether almost 150 pieces, began to register
on their targets.

The Japanese began firing for effect at 1000 and continued to fire
with only one half-hour pause until 1500, in what was undoubtedly the
most devastating barrage of the campaign, equal in intensity, many
thought, to those of the first World War.[3]
Simultaneously, the bombers of the 22d Air Brigade came out in
force to add the

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weight of their bombs to the constant stream of shells
falling upon the defenders huddled in their foxholes. In the 150
sorties flown that day, General Mikami's air force dropped more than
sixty tons of bombs. Smaller aircraft swooped low over the front lines,
strafing troops and vehicles at will, while fare above them observation
planes guided the bombers toward those batteries brave enough to reply
to the Japanese barrage. "It was agonizing," wrote the commander of an
antiaircraft battery, "to watch the heavies sail serenely over us,
1,000 yards beyond our maximum range."[4]

The effect of the air-artillery bombardment was devastating. So
violent and continuous were the explosions, so thunderous the din that
it seemed as though "all hell" had broken loose.[5] Man of the defenses so carefully constructed during
the weeks preceding the attack "were churned into a worthless and
useless mess."[6] Telephone lines and
artillery positions were knocked out. Fire spread rapidly when the cane
fields and bamboo thickets were set ablaze and the smoke and dust lay
so thick over the battlefield that observers atop Mt. Samat were unable
to direct fire. By 1500 the artillery and aircraft had done their work.
At that time the infantry and armor moved out to the attack.

Penetration

The air and artillery preparation which had begun at 1000 that morning
had been concentrated against the comparatively narrow front on the
extreme left of II Corps, held by the troops of Sector D. It was in
this sector, commanded by General Lough, that the American line was
stretched thinnest, and it was in this sector that the Japanese first
came.

Sector D extended from KP 136 on the Pilar-Bagac road westward for
about 5,000 yards to the corps boundary along the Pantingan River.
Bisecting the sector front was the Catmon River, which, with the
Pantingan, offered a natural route of advance southward. (Map 21) In addition to these two river valleys,
Sector D contained three excellent north-south trails, two of which
connected with the main east-west trail system. The westernmost of the
was Trail 29, between the Pantingan and the Catmon. About five miles in
length, this trail ran from the Pilar-Bagac road along the western
foothills of Mt. Samat to Trail 8, the main east-west line of
communication in II Corps. Along the east bank of the Catmon was Trail
6, which also began at the Pilar-Bagac road and ran to Trail 8. East of
Mt. Samat was the third of the north-south trails in Sector D, Trail 4.
In addition to Trail 8, lateral communication in Sector D was provided
by Trail 429. This trail ran due east from Trail 29 to Trail 6 which it
joined until it cleared the western foothills of Mt. Samat. At that
point it branched east again, skirting the southern edge of the
mountain to meet Trail 4 near the boundary of Sectors D and C.

Sector D was held by two Philippine Army divisions. On the right
(east), in front of Mt. Samat, was the 21st Division, led by Brig. Gen.
Mateo Capinpin, and next to it, on the extreme left of the II Corps
line, was General Lim's 41st. Both divisions had their three infantry
regiments posted along the main line of resistance which generally
paralleled the Pilar-Bagac road just south

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of the Tiawir-Talisay River. About 1,500 yards to he rear
was the regimental reserve line. With their three regiments on the line
and with the few remaining elements deployed elsewhere, both divisions
would be hard pressed if the need for reserves should arise.

MAP 21: Japanese Penetration

In the 21st Division area General Capinpin had placed two of his
regiments, the 22d and 23d, east of the Catmon River, with the former
holding the division right flank and tying in with Sector C to the
right. The 21st Infantry on the division left flank held both banks of
the Catmon as well as Trail 6, which cut diagonally across the
regimental area from the right front to the left rear. General Lim's
regiments were posted in order, with the 43d on the right, tying in
with the 21st Infantry, the 42d in the center, and the 41st holding
down the

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division and sector flank along the Pantingan. Across the
river, on the extreme right of the I Corps line, was the 2d Philippine
Constabulary.

Against this front the Japanese had massed the entire force
committed to the assault, the 65th Brigade and the 4th
Division both heavily reinforced. With the exception of one
battalion west of the Pantingan, all of General Nara's reinforced
brigade was concentrated before the 42d Infantry where Trail 29 joined
the Pilar-Bagac road. The Right Wing of the 4th Division,
led by General Taniguchi and consisting of tanks, the 61st Infantry,
a battalion of the 8th Infantry, plus supporting and service
elements, had taken up a position north of the Tiawir, opposite the
center of Sector D, and was poised to strike down Route 6 and the
Catmon River valley. The division's Left Wing (8th Infantry),
which was not scheduled to attack until the 5th, was farther to the
east and north, facing the two right regiments of the 21st Division.

At 1500, when the air and artillery bombardment shifted south, the
65th Brigade and Toniguchi's Right Wing moved out to
the assault. Nara's troops on the left (west) bank of the north-flowing
Pantingan, supported by heavy mortar fire, pushed hard against the 2d
Philippine Constabulary to reach the I Corps main line of resistance.
Though it was unable to penetrate the I Corps line, this force, a
reinforced battalion, presented a real threat to Jones' right flank and
prevented him from coming to the aid of the adjacent units in Parker's
corps. Nara's main effort, however, was made against II Corps. Here,
the bulk of his brigade, led by tanks, pushed down against the center
of the 51st Division and by late afternoon reached the 42d Infantry
main line of resistance, where, according to plans, it should have
halted. The Japanese had expected to meet opposition there, but the
line was not occupied, whereupon Nara ordered his men to continue
southward along Trail 29. By nightfall the brigade had scored an
advance of about 1,000 yards.

Taniguchi's force to the left (east), led by tanks of the 7th
Tank Regiment, crossed the Tiawir just north of the boundary
between the 43d and 21st Infantry, in the center of Sector D. Two
37-mm. antitank guns had been emplaced here to oppose a crossing, but
they had been put out of action by the heavy bombardment earlier in the
day. once across the river Taniguchi led his men against the main line
of resistance. After desultory fire the Filipinos scattered and
Taniguchi advanced without difficulty. Before halting for the night he
had taken his men about 1,000 yards down Trail 6. The Japanese advance
for the first day of the attack exceeded even their most optimistic
estimates.[7]

The lack of opposition to the Japanese advance on the afternoon of
3 April was due entirely to the effects of the air and artillery
bombardment earlier that day on the hungry and weakened troops of the
51st Division. It was upon this division that the weight of the shells
and bombs had fallen and in its area that the damage had been greatest.
Dazed and demoralized by the intensity

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of the five-hour-long artillery concentration and the
ferocity of the strafing and bombing attacks, choked and blinded by the
smoke and dust, literally burned out of their positions by the brush
fires which sprang up everywhere along the front lines, the Filipinos
had fled south in disorganized and unruly mobs. Nothing and no one
could stop them. When one officer ordered some of his men back into the
line, they "stared dumbly" at him and continued on their way to the
rear.[8] Even before the Japanese
tank-infantry attack had begun to roll, the 41st Division had ceased to
exist as an effective military organization.

The units most affected by the bombardment and the assault were
the 42d and 43d Infantry. The first, in the center of the division
front where bamboo fires burned fiercely, had retreated in a disorderly
fashion, some of the men following Trail 29 into the 41st Infantry
area, and others drifting eastward to join the retreating 43d on the
western slopes of Mt. Samat. Only the 51st Infantry on the extreme left
of the line, which had escaped the full weight of the preliminary
bombardment, had withdrawn in an orderly fashion. Augmented by a
continuous stream of stragglers from the 42d, the regiment had fallen
back to its regimental reserve line near the junction of Routes 29 and
429 and held firmly there all afternoon. Early in the evening, on the
basis of misunderstood or garbled orders, the regiment began to move
south toward Trail 8.

The 21st Division had also suffered heavily from the day's
bombardment, but only its westernmost element, the left battalion of
the two-battalion 21st Infantry, had broken. Posted in front of the
Pilar-Bagac road, on the west bank of the Catmon River, this battalion
stood in the path of Taniguchi's powerful Right Wing, and when
the enemy tanks appeared the Filipinos, "shattered by incessant
shelling and bombing, weak from dysentery, malaria, and malnutrition,"
fled to the rear.[9] The right battalion
of the regiment, however, held firm. Hurriedly organizing the scattered
elements of the left battalion, the regimental commander, Lt. Col.
William A. Wappenstein, was able by nightfall to re-establish his line
with a refused left flank along the east bank of the Catmon.

News of the rout of the 41st Division and the disintegration of
the corps left flank reached General Parker, the corps commander, late
in the afternoon of Good Friday. The danger was immediate and
compelling and he quickly released the only unit he had in reserve, the
33d Infantry (PA), less the 1st Battalion, to General Lough, commander
of Sector D. The regiment, led by Maj. Stanley Holmes, moved out at
dusk, under orders to establish a defensive position across Trail 6
between Mt. Samat and the Catmon River by morning of the 4th.

Sector D headquarters, too, took prompt measures to stem the rout
of the 51st Division and set up a line in front of the advancing
Japanese. The 42d Infantry, hopelessly disorganized and scattered, it
apparently wrote off as a total loss, but General Lough thought there
was still a chance to salvage the shattered 43d and use it against the
Japanese. On the evening of the 3d he sent Col. Malcolm V. Fortier,
senior instructor of the 41st Division, northward to help reorganize
the regiment and lead it back up the Catmon valley to a position west
of the 33d Infantry. Later that night, the sector G-3, Col. Robert J.
Hoffman, learning that the 41st Infantry had retreated to the junction

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of Trails 29 and 8, sent the regiment back along Trail 29
with orders to occupy the regimental reserve line. Thus, by the morning
of the 4th, if all went well, there would be three regiments, the 41st,
43d, and 33d, in position to oppose a Japanese advance south along the
Pantingan and Catmon valleys.

Homma's original plan had been a cautious one, calling for a
limited advance on 4 April to gain positions from which to launch the
drive on Mt. Samat. But the unexpected success of the first day's
action justified a bolder course and on the evening of the 3d he
ordered the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade to
disregard earlier orders and to continue their advance toward Mt. Samat
next day. Their attack would be preceded by a co-ordinated air and
artillery bombardment almost equal in intensity to that which had
preceded the Good Friday attack.

When Homma's orders reached them, both commanders quickly revised
their plans and prepared to attack the next morning. The 65th
Brigade on the west would continue its drive south up the Pantingan
valley, on both sides of the river. The 4th Division's Right Wing
would advance along the line of the Catmon River, and the 7th Tank
Regiment east along the Pilar-Bagac road. Colonel Morita's Left
Wing, which had not been in action on the first day of the
offensive, would cross the Tiawir-Talisay River in front of the right
half of Sector D, the area held by the 22d and 23d Infantry, during the
morning. Once across the river it would pause to reorganize, then
attack in force at about noon, at the same time that Taniguchi's
infantry moved out to the assault.

American plans to place three infantry regiments in the path of
the Japanese advance were only partially successful. When Colonel
Fortier reached the 43d and the remnants of the 42d Infantry on the
western slopes of Mt. Samat on the night of the 3d, he found the men
still bewildered and demoralized. American officers had sought vainly
to calm them and restore some semblance of order, and Fortier was able
to round up only several hundred men from the two regiments. After the
men had been served hot coffee, they started advancing along the trail
in the darkness toward their new position west of the Catmon River.
There was no difficulty with the 51st Infantry. This regiment, which
Colonel Hoffman had ordered forward on the night of 3-4 April, reached
its former regimental reserve line between Trail 29 and the Pantingan
River without incident by 0930 of the 4th.

Major Holmes' 33d Infantry, numbering about 600 men, had begun its
march west along the section of Trail 429 which extended south of Mt.
Samat early on the evening of the 3d.[10]
The men, many of whom had just risen from sick beds, moved slowly in
the darkness, passing large numbers of stragglers pouring back to the
rear. "Few had arms of any kind. . . . Few even had packs . . .," wrote
Capt. Robert M. Chapin, 3d Battalion commander. "I asked several what
unit they were from but they just looked at me blankly and wandered
on."[11] When the regiment turned north
on Trail 6, the stream of stragglers ended and the advance was more
rapid. At a zigzag about a mile north of the intersection Major

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Holmes found a platoon of the 41st Engineer Battalion
busily constructing tank obstacles and decided to set up his line
there, in position to block the Japanese advance in the Catmon valley.
By dawn the regiment was deployed in depth across the trail with flank
guards out to warn of an unexpected attack.

The Disintegration of Sector D

The Japanese resumed the offensive on the morning of 4 April with
another heavy artillery preparations, co-ordinated with bombing and
strafing attacks by the 22d Air Brigade. The first salvos
passed over the 33d Infantry astride Trail 6 to fall on the luckless
men of the 42d and 43d Infantry about a mile to the south. Again they
stampeded, heading back along Trail 6 "for all they were worth." Until
they reached the junction of Trail 6 and 8, about 4,500 yards to the
south, that evening, wrote Colonel Fortier, "we could do nothing to
stop them."[12] Thus, even before the
Japanese infantry had moved out, one third of the force expected to
hold the Pantingan and Catmon valleys had given way.

The advance of the 65th Brigade in the Pantingan valley
met with little serious opposition. Only the 41st Infantry, now back on
its original reserve line between Trail 29 and the Pantingan River,
stood in its way. Shortly after 0930, after Japanese planes had strafed
the trail to clear the way for the infantry advance, Nara's men hit the
front and right of the 41st Infantry line. Unable to stand against the
weight of the assault and in danger of being outflanked, the Filipinos
withdrew to a new line about 500 yards to the rear. Here they held
until 1700 when the 65th Brigade moved around their unprotected
right flank, threatening to take them from the rear. For the second
time that day the 41st withdrew, this time to a point about 1,000 yards
farther south, where it established a semicircular position on the
Pantingan River with the arc facing east, just short of Trail 29.
Though its own position was more secure, the regiment could no longer
block General Nara's route south along Trail 29.

The advance of the 4th Division against the center and
right elements of Sector D met with the same success that attended
Nara's efforts that day. Arrayed against the center of the line was
General Taniguchi's Right Wing, strongly supported by the armor
of the 7th Tank Regiment. This force opened its attack at about
0830 of the 4th with an armored thrust across the Tiawir River to the
Pilar-Bagac road. Having gained the road, the tanks moved eastward to
strike the refused left flank of the 21st Infantry. The main line of
resistance in this area ran in front of the Pilar-Bagac road, with the
result that the advancing armor turned the defender's line and
penetrated to the rear of his position.

The 21st Division, hurt badly by the morning's bombardment, was
ill prepared to meet the attack. on the left the 21st Infantry fell
back in disorder before the crushing attack of the Japanese tanks. The
23d on the right bent back its exposed flank, offering protection to
the retreating men of the 21st. The entire attack lasted for only a
short time and at its conclusion, even before his infantry had moved
into action, Taniguchi was in control of both banks of the Catmon River
and the area formerly occupied by the 43d and 21st Infantry.

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General Lough's troops now held only about one-third of the
original main line of resistance in Sector D.[13]

That same morning the third column of the Japanese assaulting
force, the Left Wing of the 4th Division, composed of
Colonel Morita's reinforced 8th Infantry (less one battalion),
entered the action for the first time. Jumping off from the north bank
of the Tiawir-Talisay, opposite the 23d and 22d Infantry (the only two
units in Sector D still on the main line of resistance), Morita's men
crossed the river under cover of artillery and air support at about
0900, occupied the line of departure, and prepared to attack south
later in the day. The 23d Infantry, already under pressure from the
tank column to the west, and now threatened by a strong force on its
front, began to fall back at about 1000. The 22d, on the division and
sector right flank, followed suit soon after, thus completing the
withdrawal of the last unit from the sector main line of resistance.

Though the Japanese had already scored important gains, neither of
the 4th Division's two columns had yet begun the day's
offensive. The advance of the Right Wing's tanks along the
Pilar-Bagac road and the Left Wing's main force across the
Tiawir had been designed to secure positions from which the infantry
would jump off at noon. At 1100 General Taniguchi asked for an hour's
grace, explaining that he needed more time to prepare after the rapid
advance of the day before. This request was readily granted.

Colonel Morita, too, was directed to hold up his attack for an
hour so that both wings would move out simultaneously. These new
instructions never reached Morita, however, for the American artillery
had cut his telephone lines, and promptly at noon he began the attack.
Japanese artillery, unaware of Morita's assault, laid down a barrage in
the area into which the Left Wing was moving, firing "at both
friendly and enemy units simultaneously."[14]
Fortunately for the Japanese cause, Morita's men suffered few
casualties and a disaster was narrowly averted. Aside from this
misadventure, the advance of the Left Wing was uneventful. The
22d and 23d Infantry had already abandoned the main line of resistance
and Morita's 8th Infantry continued south for about one mile
before halting for the night.

At 1300 the Right Wing moved out, crossing the Catmon and
pushing southeast through the area abandoned by the 21st Infantry
earlier in the day. By nightfall it had reached the northern foothills
of Mt. Samat.

Untouched by the Japanese attack of the 4th was the 33d Infantry
at the zigzag on Trail 6, west of Mt. Samat. What artillery fire it
received during the day was not directed at it specifically but was
intended to neutralize the area on Taniguchi's right flank. The
Japanese seemed to be unaware of the regiment's existence, and Holmes,
though he sent out patrols to the north, east, and west, had little
knowledge of the situation along the front. Aside from the few
stragglers who came down the road and a battalion of the 41st Field
Artillery some distance to his right rear, on the south slopes

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of Mt. Samat near Trail 6, the regiment was alone.

At the end of the day's action, the Japanese were in possession of
the entire main line of resistance in Sector D. The 41st Division had
been routed and the 21st forced back to me reserve line in front of Mt.
Samat, its left flank hanging in the air. The 65th Brigade had
pushed south up the Pantingan valley, twice outflanked the 41st
Infantry, and now stood ready to march unimpeded down Trail 29. The 4th
Division had taken the 21st Division on its left flank, forced it
off the main line of resistance, and then launched a co-ordinated flank
and frontal assault to gain control of the Catmon valley. The Japanese
were now one day ahead of schedule and in position to storm the heights
of Mt. Samat, the first objective of the offensive begun on the morning
of Good Friday.

Easter Sunday

Homma's original plan for the seizure of Mt. Samat had called for a
regrouping of the 4th Division's two columns once the northern
foothills of the mountain had been reached, shifting the strength of
the division from the right to the left wing, then attacking in force
along the east slopes down Trail 4. At the same time the 65th
Brigade was to continue its drive west of Mt. Samat toward
Mariveles, while the 16th Division and the Nagano Detachment
prepared to join in the attack against the Limay line. The only change
made in this plan as a result of the unexpected gains won on 3 and 4
April was to move the schedule ahead. Anticipating an earlier attack
against the Limay line than originally planned, Homma, on the night of
the 4th, ordered the 16th Division to move east "as soon as
possible" and the Nagano Detachment to prepare for an attack
against Orion.[15]

The regrouping of the 4th Division for the attack against
Mt. Samat was accomplished with little difficulty on the night of 4-5
April. General Taniguchi, taking his tanks and one battalion of the 61st
Infantry, moved over to the Left Wing. Reorganized and
strengthened, this wing became the main striking force of the 4th
Division. Command of the Right Wing, reduced to less than
one regiment, the 61st, plus attached troops, passed to Col.
Gempachi Sato. Division artillery moved south of the Talisay to provide
the necessary support for the infantry advance, and the 37th
Infantry, in division reserve, took up a position behind the Left
Wing. It was the Left Wing under Taniguchi which was to
make the main effort down Trail 4 next morning. Sato's wing was to
seize the heights of Mt. Samat then continue down the south side of the
mountain to the line of the Tala River, the jumping-off point for the
next attack.

At dawn, 5 April, the Japanese resumed their devastating air and
artillery bombardment. It was Easter Sunday and many of the Americans
and Filipinos were attending dawn services "in the fastness of the
jungle" when the shells and bombs began to fall.[16] For them the day of the Resurrection was not the
joyous occasion it had been in peacetime. The services, wrote one
officer, had "a serious atmosphere for us," and chaplains, invoking
divine guidance, did not fail to ask as well for "deliverance from the
power of the enemy."[17]

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The attack began at 1000 when both columns of the 4th
Division moved out. The strengthened Left Wing, making the
main attack against the right flank of the 21st Division, soon ran into
unexpectedly stubborn resistance. The Filipinos, supported by two
battalions of the 41st Field Artillery on the south slope of Mt. Samat
and by artillery from the adjoining sectors, put up so stiff a fight
that one Japanese officer described it as "the fiercest combat in the
second Bataan campaign."[18] Against
this determined opposition, Taniguchi's men made little headway and by
early afternoon were still pinned down on Trail 4, far short of their
objective.

The Right Wing under Colonel Sato had meanwhile been
pushing ahead unopposed on the exposed left flank of the 21st Division,
up the northwest slopes of Mt. Samat. Near the summit it met a single
platoon of the 21st Infantry which it easily routed and at 1250 secured
possession of the mountain top. The position of the 41st Field
Artillery, whose fire was so effectively pinning down General
Taniguchi's Left Wing on Trail 4, was now untenable, and the
artillerymen were forced to evacuate. Before they did, they destroyed
their equipment and rolled their guns over the cliffs.

No longer pinned down by the artillery General Taniguchi promptly
resumed the offensive. At 1400 he sent one of his battalions across the
northeast slopes of the mountain in a flanking movement while
increasing pressure on the defenders to his front. The disorganized but
hard-fighting 21st Division troops, deprived of their artillery
support, were in no condition to stand against the powerful Left
Wing alone and shortly before 1530 began to fall back. Only
scattered elements along Trail 4 barred Taniguchi's way south and he
and his men easily pushed toward the line of the Tala River, below Mt.
Samat.

That same afternoon Sato's Right Wing made its way
unopposed down the southern slopes of Mt. Samat. At 1630 advance
elements of this force reached the command post of the 21st Division
near the junction of Trails 4 and 429. Taken by surprise, officers and
men of the headquarters took flight, the majority moving west along
Trail 429 to set up a new command post a mile away, at the junction of
that trail and Trail 6. General Capinpin, the division commander, was
not among those who reached safety; he had become separated from his
staff during the disorganized flight and been captured by the Japanese.

Hardly had the new command post been established when it had to be
abandoned because of the appearance at 1700 of Japanese troops near the
trail junction. These troops were part of Sato's force which had come
down the west side of Mt. Samat during the afternoon. After routing the
21st Division headquarters, the Japanese hit the remaining battalion of
the 41st Field Artillery still in position west of Mt. Samat. The
artillerymen fled to the rear, leaving their guns behind. "No Americans
killed, wounded or decorated," wrote an officer of the battalion at the
conclusion of the action.[19] That
night Taniguchi and Sato joined forces at the old 21st Division command
post near Trail Junction 4-429.

Between dawn of Good Friday and nightfall of Easter Sunday, in
three days of infantry and tank assaults accompanied by the largest
artillery and air bombardments

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of the campaign, the Japanese had gained the first
objective in their final drive to end the siege of Bataan. They had
broken through the American line, swept aside the troops of Sector D,
virtually destroyed two Philippine Army divisions, and seized Mt.
Samat. Homma's hopes, twice frustrated, of turning General Parker's
flank and driving II Corps into Manila Bay, thus ending the campaign,
were near realization. Only a successful counterattack, or an
unexpectedly strong stand by a foe already reduced to near impotence by
starvation and disease, could deprive him of the long-delayed victory.

6 April: The Day of Decision

The events of 6 April determined the fate of the Bataan garrison. On
that day the weary American and Philippine troops made a desperate
effort to drive back the enemy and regain the main line of resistance.
At the same time the Japanese launched a fresh offensive t the south
and east. The two forces met head on and by evening the issue had been
decided.

Plans and Preparations

Since the Japanese penetration on the afternoon of Good Friday, the
Americans had been laying plans for a counterattack while seeking
vainly to halt the enemy advance. The means with which to launch such
an attack were extremely limited. Corps reserve, consisting of less
than one regiment, had been committed on the first day of the offensive
without any visible effect on the enemy's operations. Most of the
troops in Sector D had been routed and could not be relied upon for a
counterattack. By the second day of the offensive it had become evident
that, if the Japanese were to be stopped and the main line of
resistance regained, fresh troops would have to be thrown into the
battle.

At the start of the attack Luzon Force had in reserve the American
31st Infantry, the Scouts of the 57th Infantry--both a part of the
Philippine Division--the Provisional Tank Group, and two battalions of
combat engineers. The third regiment of the Philippine Division, the
45th Infantry (PS), was in I Corps reserve. Only a few days before,
General King, the Luzon Force commander, had ordered the 31st to Lamao,
behind II Corps, and the 45th Infantry to the junction of Trails 7 and
9, behind I Corps. The 57th remained farther south, in position to move
to the support of either corps.

When news of the Japanese attack first reached General King on 3
April he ordered the 31st Infantry to move under cover of darkness to
"a position of readiness" near the junction of Trails 10 and 2.[20] From there it could move north on
Trail 2 or west on Trail 10 to almost any point along the front. At the
same time King ordered the Provisional Tank Group (less two companies)
to move to the direct support of Parker's imperiled corps. There was
nothing more that General King could do that day. Parker had already
released his reserve to the Sector D commander and every effort was
being made to re-form the shattered 41st Division and to establish a
line in front of the advancing Japanese.

When, on the morning of 4 April, the 21st Division fell back from
the main line of resistance, General King took prompt measures to avert
the threatened disaster in II Corps. He gave to Parker, who already had
the support of the Provisional Tank Group, the American 31st Infantry,
possibly the

--431--

most carefully hoarded unit of the Philippine campaign, and
ordered the battle-tested 45th Infantry (PS), less the 1st Battalion,
east across the Pantingan to the junction of Trails 29 and 8 in the II
Corps area. The 57th Infantry King retained in force reserve, but
ordered it to move forward that night to the bivouac area vacated by
the 31st Infantry. The 14th Engineer Battalion (PS), part of the
Philippine Division, and the Americans of the 803d Engineer Battalion
(US) were ordered to discontinue all engineering activities and to
assemble immediately in preparation for combat. Thus, at the end of the
second day's attack, Luzon Force had given General Parker two regiments
of the Philippine Division, placed the third in "a position of
readiness" behind his line, and ordered the tanks to give him direct
support.

With these forces the corps and sector commanders made their plans
for a counterattack.[21] On the 4th,
before the reinforcing units had reached their designated assembly
areas, Parker released to General Lough the 31st Infantry, the 45th
Infantry (less the 1st Battalion), and one company of tanks. With these
troops, and those already in his sector, Lough was to launch a
counterattack on the morning of the 6th to regain first the reserve
line and finally the main line of resistance.

At 1600 of the 4th the 45th Infantry began its march east toward
II Corps. By dawn the next morning it had crossed the Pantingan and
reached Trail Junction 8-29. The 31st Infantry and Company C, 194th
Tank Battalion, began their march north along Trail 2 toward the battle
area at 2000 of the 4th. They found the road almost completely blocked
by retreating Filipinos and took three hours to reach the San Vicente
River, where, at an abandoned bivouac area, the 31st Infantry halted
for the night. The tankers presumably camped near by and next day
marched west to join the 4th Infantry.

Easter Sunday was a hectic day at Sector D headquarters. Between
frantic phone calls to and from units in front of the advancing
Japanese the staff prepared its plan for the counterattack. This plan,
completed late on the afternoon of the 5th, provided for a co-ordinated
drive, starting at 0600 on the 6th , north on the three trails in
Sector D toward the reserve line. on the right, east of Mt. Samat, the
31st Infantry would attack north on Trail 4. The remnants of the 21st
Division, the extent of whose disastrous rout that afternoon was still
not fully known at Sector D headquarters, would advance up the slopes
of Mt. Samat. The 33d Infantry, in position at the zigzag on Trail 6,
was to advance along that trail, between the Catmon River and the
western slopes of Mt. Samat. The remnants of the 42d and 43d Infantry,
about four hundred men, were to push north from Trail Junction 6-8
along Trail 6 behind the 33d Infantry.

--432--

If they could not advance they were to hold Trail Junction
6-8, near which Sector D headquarters was located. Farther west, the
Scouts of the 45th Infantry, supported by a company of tanks, would
advance north on Trail 29 to the reserve line formerly held by the 41st
Infantry. That regiment, which had crossed the Pantingan to the safety
of I Corps area during the day, was directed in separate orders to
recross the river that night and establish a line across Trail 29.[22]

For the counterattack General Lough would have the support of the
troops in Sector C to his right. The 51st Combat Team, on that sector's
left flank, would launch its own attack when the 31st Infantry reached
its line. General Bluemel, the Sector C commander, also promised
artillery support in addition to the scheduled 30-minute artillery
barrage preceding the counterattack.[23]
In sector reserve General Lough had the 57th Infantry (PS), recently
released by Luzon Force. Elements of that regiment were already moving
toward the San Vicente River, behind the 31st Infantry.

General Homma had no intention of waiting passively for an
American counterattack. He had the initiative and had scored a victory
which he intended to exploit fully. His plans for 6 April called for an
attack against Sector C, which now formed the left flank of II Corps
line, and a continuation of the drive southward toward the Limay River.
The main effort that day would be made by the 4th Division, one
portion of which would strike east to seize the Capot area in Sector C
while the bulk of the division pushed southeast toward the Limay River.
The right (west) flank of the Japanese advance would be guarded by the 65th
Brigade on Trail 29. Elements of the brigade had already moved
overland toward Trail Junction 6-8, and Nara was directed to continue
his efforts to seize that important road junction while protecting the 4th
Division's right flank. The divisions' east flank would be
protected by the Nagano Detachment. Reinforced with a company
of tanks, Nagano was to send one column forward to the Talisay River in
position to join later in the attack against the Limay line, while the
remainder of his detachment maintained pressure against the enemy line
across the East Road. As before, 14th Army artillery would fire
a preliminary bombardment while the 22d Air Brigade would
strike at enemy artillery positions, vehicles, and troop
concentrations.[24]

Under cover of darkness, Easter Sunday, both sides prepared for
the next day's attack. The Japanese were confident and the odds were in
their favor. For the Americans it was a gamble, but one that had to be
taken. To it they had committed most of their reserves. If the
counterattack failed they would be hard pressed to prevent the enemy
from rolling up the rest of the line and driving the corps into Manila
Bay.

All hopes for success rested on the comparatively fresh troops of
the Philippine Division, two of whose regiments were in the line and
one in reserve. Understrength, weakened by disease and starvation,
these regiments were hardly a match for the Japanese.

--433--

The 31st Infantry, when it moved out from its bivouac area
at Lamao on 3 April, had to leave behind about one third of the men for
evacuation to the hospital. Many who should have remained behind rose
from their sick beds to join their comrades. Along the line of march,
men fell out of rank, too exhausted to continue. The efficiency of
those who reached the front line could not have been more than 50
percent.[25] It is not surprising,
therefore, that General Wainwright, when he visited Bataan on the 5th,
approved the plans for the morrow's counterattack "with misgivings as
to the outcome."[26]

The American Counterattack

The mission of the 31st Infantry in the counterattack of the 6th was to
advance north on Trail 4, east of Mt. Samat, to the reserve line of the
21st Division. The regiment, in position at the intersection of the San
Vicente River and Trail 2 when it received its orders, was to move to
Trail Junction 4-429, the designated jump-off point, sometime during
the evening of the 5th and move out from there at 0600 the next
morning.

Almost immediately this plan miscarried. Late on the afternoon of
the 5th General Taniguchi's powerful Left Wing, advancing south
on T rail 4, had routed the 21st Division elements along the trail and
Colonel Sato's Right Wing had hit the division command post on
Trail Junction 4-429. When informed of these events, sector
headquarters changed the 31st Infantry's jump-off point to Trail
Junction 44-429, about 1,300 yards east of the original starting
positions.[27] The regiment now would
have to recapture Trail Junction 4-429 before it could even begin its
counterattack along Trail 4.

On the evening of the 5th the regiment moved out from its bivouac
near the San Vicente River toward its new assembly area, with the 1st
Battalion in the lead. The battalion's mission was to secure Trail 44
from its starting point on Trail 2 to its junction with Trail 429, a
distance of about 1,300 yards. The remaining battalions were to pass
through the 1st, the 2d taking position west of the trail junction and
the 3d to me south. As it passed through the 1st Battalion shortly
after midnight, the 2d Battalion came under fire from the Japanese who
had secured Trail Junction 4-429 and were advancing along Trail 429
toward the 31st Infantry's new assembly area. If unchecked they might
seize Trail Junction 44-429 to, depriving the Americans of even this
jump-off point. Lt. Col. Jasper E. Brady, Jr., now commander of the
31st Infantry, ordered his 2d Battalion to press forward quickly to
occupy this last trail junction before the Japanese. The battalion
accomplished its mission, but only with difficulty and after a fight
lasting several hours.[28]

--434--

While this action was in progress, the main body of
Taniguchi's Left Wing was attacking the remnants of the 21st
Division on Trail 4. Encircled and isolated, the Filipinos sought
desperately to break through the Japanese ring and make their way back
to safety. Most were killed or captured, but some escaped. Of these a
small number reached the American lines. The news they brought of the
disintegration of the 21st Division and the strength of the Japanese on
Trail 4 was disquieting. On the basis of these reports Colonel Brady
concluded that his regiment of about 800 men, most of them in poor
condition, was faced by a much stronger force than had been thought.
Even in he could launch a successful counterattack he doubted that he
could hold any gains made with the few men he had. He therefore halted
his men until he had presented his conclusions to General Lough. Unable
to reach Sector D headquarters by telephone, he sent Lt. Col. Peter D.
Calyer, his operations officer, together with some of the 21st Division
men, in a jeep to General Lough's command post to present these new
facts and to get further instructions.[29]

Not long after Calyer had left, the main force of Taniguchi's Left
Wing approached the 31st Infantry outposts on Trail 429. The
situation was urgent and Brady again sought to reach sector
headquarters by telephone. This time he was successful and soon had
General Lough's G-3 on the line. Informed of the situation, the G-3
changed Brady's orders and assigned the 31st Infantry a defensive
mission. Instead of attacking, the regiment was to hold Trail Junction
44-429 at all costs. A short time later Colonel Calyer returned from
sector headquarters with written confirmation of the new orders.

On receipt of these orders Brady pulled back the tired men, who
had been trying all night to advance west along Trail 429 toward the
original jump-off point, and issued new orders for the establishment of
a defensive line facing west across the trail junction. The 1st
Battalion would take up a position on the right (north) and the 2d on
the left. Contact by patrol would be maintained with the 51st Combat
Team to the north, on the refused left flank of Sector C. Regimental
headquarters and the reserve 3d Battalion would take up a position
about a mile to the east near the former bivouac area at the
intersection of Trail 2 and the San Vicente River. By morning these
moved had been completed and the men of the 31st Infantry settled down
to hold the trail junction.

On the west, along the line of the Pantingan, the counterattack of
6 April got off to a good start. Shortly after midnight, 5 April, the
300 men of the 41st Infantry moved out from their position on the west
bank of the Pantingan, climbed the 300-foot bluffs of the river and
struck east toward Trail 29. Their aim was to establish a line across
the trial, about 200 yards below Trail Junction 29-429, to which the
Scouts of the 45th Infantry could advance the next morning. At about
0200 the 41st Infantry reached its former bivouac area, occupied by a
small number of men from the 65th Brigade, and succeeded in
routing the surprised Japanese, bayoneting those who lay asleep. The
regiment then pushed ahead and reached the trail by daybreak. There it
was met and halted by a 65th Brigade counterattack. The
Japanese, whose strength finally reached that of a reinforced

--435--

battalion, hit the Filipinos on three sides and by noon had
forced them back to a defensive line along the river. Here the 41st
Infantry held, hoping that the 45th Infantry, attacking north along
Trail 29, would soon arrive.[30]

The counterattack of the 45th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) had
begun at 0200 of the 6th. At that time the regiment, with the 3d
Battalion in the lead, had moved out to the line of departure. From
there, the Scouts had advanced cautiously along Trail 29 in the dark.
Company C, 194th Tank Battalion, supporting the attack, did not catch
up with the Scouts until daylight, after an all-night march over the
mountains from the east. It was not until midmorning that the regiment
made contact with the enemy when it pushed aside the 65th Brigade
outposts. Resistance thereafter was stronger and early in the afternoon
the Scouts had to beat off a flanking attack. The tanks, held to the
trail by the dense undergrowth on each side, could be of little
assistance. At about 1500, after an advance of approximately 2,500
yards, the regiment came to a halt before a strong Japanese position
astride the trail.

The 45th Infantry had been under heavy enemy mortar fire all day
but, with a limited supply of shells, had refrained from returning
fire. At this point the Scout commander, Colonel Doyle, decided to use
half of the 3d Battalion's ten 81-mm. shells to open a hold in the
Japanese line through which the tanks could thrust. The tank commander
agreed to this plan and later in the afternoon the mortars opened fire.
The few shots proved surprisingly effective. The Japanese on the trail
fell back so quickly that the Scouts pushed into the breach before the
tanks could move up. It was fortunate that they did for the trail had
been heavily mined and a tank advance might have proved disastrous.

Despite his success, Colonel Doyle was uneasy. Patrols sent out to
establish contact with I Corps to the west and the 33d Infantry to the
east had either failed to return or reported they had met only enemy
units. It was now late afternoon and Colonel Doyle decided that it was
too risky to continue the advance as long as his flanks were
unprotected. He therefore halted his men and ordered them to dig in for
the night. With his executive officer and the tank commander, he went
back to his command post in the rear to report to General Lough and ask
for instructions. When reached on the telephone, Lough confirmed
Doyle's decision and ordered him to consolidate his gains that evening
in preparation for a fresh attack the next morning. Several thousand
yards to the north, in position along the high bluffs of the Pantingan,
the men of the 41st Infantry were still waiting for the Scouts to reach
them.

It was in the center, along the line of the Catmon River and Trail
6, that the counterattack of 6 April ended disastrously. There the plan
called for an advance by the 33d Infantry, backed up by the remnants of
the 42d and 43d Infantry. But the Japanese had begun moving into this
area the day before, and on the 5th General Nara had sent the bulk of
his brigade overland in two columns to seize Trail Junction 6-8. A
portion of this force had struck the "hungry, spiritless" stragglers of
the 42d and 43d as they were moving north of Trail 6 to join in the
counterattack. At the first sign of the enemy, the men had broken and
fled. All efforts to put

--436--

them back in lace were fruitless; they simply disappeared
into the jungle, leaving the vital Trail Junction 6-8 open to the
advancing Japanese. The 33d Infantry, like the 41st, waited in vain for
the counterattacking troops to reach it. During the afternoon the 33d,
too, came under attack and its last communications to the rear were
destroyed. Presumed lost, the regiment spent the night in fearful
apprehension of an enemy attack the next morning.

Before the day was over it was already evident that the carefully
planned counterattack was a failure. On the east the 31st Infantry had
not even been able to reach the line of departure. The 21st Division,
routed on the night of 5-6 April, made no effort to carry out its part
of the plan to restore the line. In the center the 42d and 43d had
again been routed and the 33d Infantry surrounded. Only on the west,
along Trail 29 had the Americans met with any success that day. But the
victory was a hollow one, for the 41st Infantry was still cut off and
the Japanese were threatening a move which would isolate the 45th from
the rest of the troops in Sector D.

The Japanese Attack

The Japanese attack on 6 April, which began simultaneously with the
American counterattack, accomplished decisive results. This attack,
made the by the 4th Division and 65th Brigade, had a
double objective: to seize the high ground in Sector C, near Capot, and
to push forward to the line of the Limay River. The task of the 65th
Brigade was a subordinate one. It was to protect the right flank of
the 4th Division drive while seizing the high ground near Trail
Junction 6-8.

Nara's advance on the 6th, though not a part of the main drive
planned for that day, proved far more decisive than the Japanese had
thought. His two columns advancing overland in a southeasterly
direction from Trail 29 hit and routed the 42d and 43d Infantry with no
difficulty. The Japanese kept going down Trail 6 and shortly after noon
advance elements of the brigade reached and seized Trail Junction 6-8
where General Lough had his headquarters. By this move the Japanese
bisected Sector D and cut General Lough off from his forces to the
east.

Just east of the trail junction was a portion of the 57th Infantry
(PS). This regiment, sector reserve for the counterattack, was in the
process of moving up to the front line when its 1st Battalion met
General Nara's forward elements around noon. The arrival of the 2d
Battalion later in the day coincided with the arrival of additional
troops from the 65th Brigade. Any chance of regaining the trail
junction was now gone; the Scouts were finding it difficult even to
maintain their position east of the trail junction. The situation was
extremely serious and at 1600 General Lough, who had moved his command
post west to the vicinity of Trail Junction 8-29, ordered Colonel Doyle
to withdraw his 45th Infantry along Trail 29 and establish contact with
the 57th Infantry.

Colonel Doyle, whose men had made the only gains of the day, had
only a short time before halted his men and ordered them to dig in for
the night. He now had to move the tired Scouts out of their position,
turn them around, and march them back to the point from which they had
started at 0200 the night before. That prospect alone was discouraging
enough but at the conclusion

--437--

of the march they were expected to continue east along
Trail 8, then fight their way through the roadblock at Trail Junction
6-8 to re-establish contact with the 57th Infantry. Until they did,
General Lough and his forces west of the block would be separated from
the rest of Sector D and from II Corps.

The attack of the 4th Division against Sector C, the main
Japanese effort of the 6th, was equally disastrous to the American
cause. This sector, whose main line of resistance at the start of the
Japanese offensive had extended for 4,500 yards eastward from Sector D,
had by 6 April given way on the left. On the 4th, on orders from corps,
General Bluemel had pulled back his outpost line to the Pilar-Bagac
road and prepared for an attack against his left flank. This attack had
not materialized, but when the 21st Division had fallen back before
Taniguchi's Left Wing on the 5th, leaving the left flank of
Sector C, exposed, General Bluemel had requested permission to fall
behind the San Vicente River. Plans for the counterattack had already
been made and corps turned down Bluemel's request, ordering him instead
to bring his left flank unit, the 51st Combat Team, back to the Pilar
River, thus refusing his line sharply.

Bluemel's desire to fall back to the San Vicente River was an
understandable one. That river formed a natural obstacle to me advance
of an enemy moving, as the Japanese were, in a southeasterly direction.
It cut diagonally across the rear of Sector C to the right of the
sector main line of resistance, then turned east to Orion and the bay.
Behind its banks a line could be formed which would protect the most
vital portion of the corps main line of resistance covering the East
Road, as well as Trails 8 and 2. If it should prove necessary to fall
back, there were other rivers, the Mamala, the Alangan, and the Lamao,
which would provide natural defensive positions for a planned
withdrawal.

The abortive counterattack by the 31st Infantry had begun in
Sector C, at the intersection of the San Vicente River and Trail 2. By
morning of the 6th that regiment had established a line facing north
and west across Trail Junction 44-429, maintaining contact by patrol
with the refused left flank of the 51st Combat Team to the north. It
was in this area that the Japanese attack came.

When he received his orders on the night of the 5th to seize the
area around Capot, General Kitano, the 4th Division commander,
was already convinced that his troops had scored a major success. He
decided therefore to commit his reserve, the 37th Infantry
(less one battalion), to this new enterprise rather than weaken his
main force on Trail 4. Convinced also, by the experience of the 65th
Brigade in its attacks against Sector C in late January and early
February, that a frontal assault would be hazardous, he decided upon a
flanking attack. Orders to Col. Jiro Koura, therefore, specified that
the 37th Infantry, reinforced with tanks, artillery, and
engineers, would step off from the northeast foothills of Mt. Samat and
strike the sharply refused left flank of Sector C in an effort to take
the objective from the rear.

At 1030 of the 6th Colonel Koura's force, led by six or seven
tanks of the 7th Tank Regiment, jumped off. The tanks hit the
main line of resistance from the north, just above Trail 2 where a
portion of the Antitank Company of the 31st Infantry (US) was posted.
Heavy fire from two 37-mm. guns halted the tank attack, but the guns,
lacking armor-piercing shells, were unable

--438--

to knock out the enemy tanks. But this was not the main
Japanese effort. The bulk of Koura's infantry had struck from the west
against the 51st Combat Team in place behind the Pilar River. Before
the morning was over, they had overrun the 51st Engineers and forced
the entire line back. Trail 2 now lay open to the advancing Japanese
and the entire left of Sector C was imperiled.

The main force of the 4th Division, meanwhile, had been
increasing its pressure against the 31st Infantry (US) guarding Trail
Junction 44-429 to the south. Here Taniguchi's men, advancing east
along Trail 429, had been pushing strongly against the 2d Battalion on
the left (south) in an effort to turn the American flank and get behind
Sector C. By 1400 the pressure had become so great that Colonel Brady
had to commit Companies L and k from his reserve battalion to the
threatened flank. Enemy planes, which had been overhead all day, now
intensified their attacks while the Japanese infantry pushed ever
harder. Finally, at 1500, when he had lost all contact with the
withdrawing 51st Combat Team to the north, Colonel Brady gave the order
to withdraw.

The possibility of a withdrawal had been foreseen by sector
headquarters. Brady's first orders had been to hold the trail junction
at all costs. Around noon General Lough had modified these orders to
allow Brady to withdraw if necessary to the San Vicente. At 1500,
therefore, the regiment began to move to its new position behind the
river, with the two reserve companies covering the withdrawal. The
maneuver was a difficult one for the tired men, many of whom were too
weak to carry their machine guns through the jungle and up the steep
ravines. Companies L and K, using to good advantage their small supply
of 81-mm. mortar shells, succeeded in disengaging the enemy and
rejoined the regiment which by nightfall was in its new position. There
was nothing now to prevent a juncture between Taniguchi's men and the 37th
Infantry advancing south on Trail 2.

By 1600 of the 6th it was evident that a line in front of the San
Vicente could not be held and at that time General Parker directed a
general withdrawal to the river. Bluemel, who had three times before
requested permission to pull back to the San Vicente, was given command
of the 31st Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 57th, and directed to
establish his line along the river's east bank.

From the main line of resistance in Sector B, the new line would
extend in a southwesterly direction through Sector C to link up with
the 57th Infantry troops facing the Japanese on Trail Junction 6-8. On
the north, to the left of Sector B, was the 32d Infantry (PA). Next to
it, across Trail 2, were the remaining elements of the 51st Combat Team
and some 31st Division (PA) troops. Below the trail was the American
31st Infantry with the 31st Engineer Battalion (PA) to its left. The 3d
Battalion, 57th Infantry, under Major Johnson, which moved up to the
San Vicente on the night of the 6th, took up a position on the left of
the engineers, on the south flank.

Southwest of this line, east of Trail Junction 6-8, was the rest
of the 57th Infantry. In the same order which established the San
Vicente line, Parker placed all the Sector D troops east of Trail 6
under Col. Edmund J. Lilly, Jr., the 57th commander, and gave him the
201st and 202d Engineer Battalions (PA) from corps reserve. Lilly's
mission was to recapture the trail junction and establish contact with
the 45th Infantry to the west.

--439--

The two engineer battalions were to move up that night and
take a position on the right of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 57th,
to tie in Lilly's force with the 3d Battalion of the regiment on the
south flank of the San Vicente line. When this move was completed, the
II Corps line would extend west from Orion along the Orion cutoff, then
southwest behind the San Vicente River across Trail 2 to Trail 8 east
of the trail junction.

When the action of the 6th was over the Americans and Filipinos
found themselves in a desperate situation. The carefully prepared
counterattack launched that morning had failed dismally and the enemy
had quickly seized the initiative to score decisive gains. He had
secured the vital Trail Junction 6-8 to cut off General Lough, with the
45th and 41st Infantry, from II Corps. All of the important north-south
trails in Sector D--29, 6, and 4--as well as Trail 44 and a portion of
Trail 2, were now in his hands. He had driven in the left half of the
II Corps line, split the two corps, occupied Mt. Samat, and threatened
to turn the unhinged II Corps flank and push on to the bay.

To forestall this move the Americans had established a sharply
bent and shortened line behind the San Vicente River. The men on this
line were already weakened and partially disorganized. Two entire
divisions and a regiment had been lost. Another two regiments and a
sector headquarters had been cut off. The remaining troops, in poor
condition at the start, were hardly fit for combat. Most of the
reserves had been committed, and additional forces would have to come
largely from Jones' intact I Corps. The outlook was bleak.

For the men on Bataan there was only one bright spot in an
otherwise gloomy picture. At the start of the offensive General
Wainwright had ordered an increase in the rice ration, to be taken from
the Corregidor reserves, and had sent to General King all but 5,000
cases of C rations of the supplies in the Bataan reserve held on the
island. By the 5th the ration issues had been increased to 27 ounces,
still far below the minimum required but double the daily issue since
22 March. The allotment of flour to American troops was increased from
1.44 to 2.88 ounces; the rice ration went up from 8.5 to 17 ounces and
canned meat from 1.22 to 2.44 ounces. The Filipinos, instead of wheat,
received an additional allowance of rice and canned fish.[31] An antiaircraft battery commander was
surprised one morning when he received more rations than he expected.
"There were," he noted, "a few cans of Abalone, which defied
preparation; a little more salmon and tomatoes and some type C
[rations], and wonder of wonders, some cigarettes."[32]

In an Army Day broadcast General Wainwright spoke bravely of those
who were "privileged to be charged with the defense of this distant
bastion."[33] But his official
dispatches show a clear appreciation of the catastrophic events of the
past twenty-four hours. To Washington he reported that the enemy had
driven a wedge into the right center of his front, that the air and
artillery

--440--

bombardment begun on the 3d had continued without letup,
and that fresh enemy troops had been thrown into the battle and were
gaining ground slowly.[34]

In his message to General MacArthur, Wainwright added the
significant details which would enable the commander of USAFFE to form
his own estimate. The enemy, Wainwright explained, had penetrated to
Trail 8, 7,000 yards south of the main line of resistance, seized Mt.
Samat, and routed three Philippine Army division.

To MacArthur these events signified imminent disaster. "It is
apparent to me," he told the Chief of Staff, "that the enemy has driven
a wedge between I and II Corps and is still advancing."[35] By the time this estimate reached Washington,
disaster had already overtaken the luckless men on Bataan.

[12]
Fortier, 41st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 6. The Japanese that day flew
133 sorties and dropped a total of 87 tons of bombs on II Corps alone. 5th
Air Gp Opns, p. 73.

[13]
This account of action in the 21st Division area is based upon the
general sources cited in note 1 and upon the
following records dealing with the 21st Division (PA); O'Day, 21st Div
(PA), I, Part 2, 4-6, II, 40-42; Capt J.C. Ellis, 23d Inf (PA), p. 14,
and Oster and Richards, 21st Inf (PA), p. 10, both in Chunn Notebooks.

Many of the sources for the counterattack disagree on times and
places, and the author has often had to adopt a reconstruction at
variance with the majority of the sources, but one which seemed most
reasonable and was in accord with those facts which were not in
dispute.