This case requires us to determine whether
certain formalities must be satisfied for a limited judgment to be final and appealable.
Specifically, the issues are: (1) whether either a limited judgment document,
or the record more generally, must reflect an express determination by the
circuit court that there is "no just reason for delay"; and (2) whether
a limited judgment document, to finally dispose of a claim, must use words of
"adjudication." The Court of Appeals concluded that neither formality
had to be satisfied for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over any claims
that are, in fact, conclusively decided by a limited judgment. Interstate
Roofing, Inc. v. Springville Corp., 217 Or App 412, 418-20, 177 P3d 1, modified
on recons, 220 Or App 671, 188 P3d 359, modified on recons, 224 Or
App 94, 197 P3d 27 (2008). The Court of Appeals then determined that the
limited judgment in this case conclusively resolved only two of the three
claims addressed in the document; the court therefore dismissed plaintiff's appeal
as to those resolved claims, because the notice of appeal was untimely as to them.
See 217 Or App at 419-20 (concluding that limited judgment resolved
breach of contract claim); 220 Or App at 678-80 (concluding that limited
judgment also resolved lien foreclosure claim); id. at 675 n 2
(explaining why defendant could appeal claims not finally resolved by limited
judgment). On review, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The pertinent facts are largely procedural.
In September 2004, plaintiff filed a civil action against defendant in circuit
court. Plaintiff pleaded three claims for relief: foreclosure of a
construction lien, breach of contract, and quantum meruit. Under its
breach of contract claim, plaintiff also sought attorney fees. In its answer,
defendant asserted counterclaims for breach of contract and for negligence.
Defendant also sought an award of attorney fees under the terms of the
contracts.

The case was bifurcated, with
plaintiff's construction lien claim and defendant's counterclaims for breach of
contract and negligence to be first tried to the court; any claims not resolved
at trial, together with the remaining claims, would be later tried to a jury. Trial
was held in July and August 2006. After trial, both parties, apparently
understanding that the trial court intended to resolve some but not all claims
in the case, submitted proposed forms of limited judgment. The trial court did
not adopt either of the proposed limited judgment documents; instead, the court
entered its own document titled "Limited Judgment and Money Award." That
document, which was entered on September 29, 2006, provided, in part:

"Having heard the testimony of the
witnesses, and having reviewed their accompanying exhibits, and having heard
the statements of counsel, and then being fully advised in the matter, the
Court recited [its] ruling from the bench, including some findings of fact. In
addition to all findings related on the record, the Court found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that:

"1. Plaintiff's Construction Lien
was overstated and thus is invalid as a matter of law. As such, Defendant
Springville is the Prevailing Party on that claim and is entitled to an Award
of Attorney Fees and Costs to be determined by ORCP 68.

"2. As to Defendant Springville's
Claim of Breach of Contract, Defendant is entitled to a Judgment against
Plaintiff and a Money Award in the amount of $346,872.22. Prevailing Party
Status has not yet been determined on this claim.

"3. The Court finds Defendant's
Claims for Negligence, including Negligence per se[,] are inapplicable
to the subject case. Specifically, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, a
remedy in Tort is not available.

"Notwithstanding the remaining issues and
claims in the case, the determination of prevailing party status, and awards of
Attorney's Fees and Costs, the Court does find it in the interest of clarity
and judicial economy to render said Limited Judgment and hereby Orders the following
Money Award: [followed by a money award of $346,872.22].

In November 2006, plaintiff moved to
dismiss its remaining claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit, asserting
that they were the only remaining unadjudicated claims in the case. Defendant
objected on the theory that it was still entitled to a jury trial on its counterclaims.
After a hearing, the trial court, which determined that defendant's
counterclaims had been resolved by the limited judgment and that only
plaintiff's claims remained in the case, granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
On April 20, 2007, the trial court entered a general judgment dismissing
plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit.

On May 16, 2007, within 30 days of
entry of the general judgment, defendant filed a notice of appeal. The notice
of appeal purported to appeal (among other things) the general judgment entered
on April 20, 2007, and the limited judgment entered on September 29, 2006.
Defendant acknowledged in the notice of appeal that the Court of Appeals'
jurisdiction was in doubt.

The Court of Appeals rejected both of
defendant's arguments as to the formalities that a trial court must satisfy to
render an appealable limited judgment. Interstate Roofing, Inc., 217 Or
App at 418-21 ("Interstate I"). In particular, the court
concluded that no statutory provision required a limited judgment to use the
word "adjudged" or any variation of it. Id. at 418. The
court also concluded that a limited judgment, pursuant to statutory provisions
enacted in 2003, need not reflect the determination that there is no just
reason for delay. Id. at 420 (citing ORS 18.052(1)).

On plaintiff's petition, the Court of
Appeals reconsidered whether plaintiff's lien foreclosure claim and defendant's
negligence counterclaim also were conclusively decided by the limited
judgment. Interstate Roofing, Inc., 220 Or App 671, 188 P3d 359, modified
on recons, 224 Or App 94, 197 P3d 27 (2008) ("Interstate II").
The court viewed the text of the limited judgment document as ambiguous in that
regard. Interstate II, 220 Or App at 676. The court reasoned that, on
the one hand, the text declared the lien foreclosure claim to be "invalid"
and the negligence counterclaim to be "inapplicable," which suggested
legal determinations. Id. at 675. On the other hand, neither determination
"[was] the same as dismissing the claim or rendering judgment in favor of
the party against whom the claim was asserted." Id. at 675-76.

The Court of Appeals concluded that
it could resolve the ambiguity by considering the text of the limited judgment document
itself in the context of the appellate record more generally. Id. at
676-77 (citing Bennett v. Bennett, 208 Or 524, 529, 302 P2d 1019
(1956)). That review led the Court of Appeals to conclude that the trial court
had intended the limited judgment to dispose of the lien foreclosure claim. Id.
at 679-80 (among other things, limited judgment stated that defendant was the
prevailing party on lien foreclosure claim, and transcript excerpts indicated
trial court believed it had resolved that claim). The Court of Appeals found
nothing in the record that similarly suggested that the trial court intended conclusively
to dispose of defendant's negligence counterclaim. Id. at 680. Consequently,
the court modified its first decision and also dismissed the appeal as to the
lien foreclosure claim. Seeid. at 679-80 (determining that
limited judgment conclusively disposed of lien foreclosure claim).

On review, the parties renew the
arguments that they made to the Court of Appeals. Their arguments particularly
focus on whether, for a limited judgment to be appealable, a trial court must
make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, and
whether, to conclusively decide a claim, a limited judgment must resolve it
using words of adjudication. Although they disagree on those points, the
parties agree that, in all events, an appellate court should not look beyond
the limited judgment document to determine which, if any, claims were resolved
by the limited judgment. And, finally, the parties disagree on which claims,
if any, were resolved by the limited judgment entered in this case.

The starting point for our analysis
is the statutory scheme that governs entry of judgment and appellate court
jurisdiction.(5)
In 2003, the legislature comprehensively revised the statutes governing
judgments and many of the provisions governing their appealability; many of those
revisions now are codified in ORS chapter 18. See Or Laws 2003, ch 576
(enacting extensive statutory scheme regarding judgments). Of importance to
this case, that statutory scheme now distinguishes -- in a way that the former
statutes did not -- between the trial court's subjective decision resolving a
claim and the way in which that decision must be reflected in a judgment
document. In particular, ORS chapter 18 defines "judgment" as
follows:

"'Judgment' means the concluding decision
of a court on one or more requests for relief in one or more actions, as
reflected in a judgment document."

ORS 18.005(8). "Judgment document," in turn, is also
expressly defined:

"'Judgment document' means a writing in the
form provided by ORS 18.038 that incorporates a court's judgment."

Under the 2003 judgments legislation,
there are three basic types of judgments: general judgments, limited
judgments, and supplemental judgments. See ORS 18.005(7) (defining
general judgment); ORS 18.005(13) (defining limited judgment); ORS 18.005(17)
(defining supplemental judgment). This case concerns a limited judgment,
which, as relevant here, is defined to mean "[a] judgment entered under ORCP
67 B[.]" Since 2003 (and at all times relevant to the entry of the
limited judgment in this case), ORCP 67 B has provided:

"When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third
party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may render a
limited judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties. A judge may render a limited judgment under this section only if the
judge determines that there is no just reason for delay."

See Or Laws 2003, ch 576, § 90 (amending prior version
of ORCP 67 B). Parallel requirements are imposed by ORS 18.052, which was adopted
in 2003 as part of the same act that amended ORCP 67 B. That statute provides,
in part:

"If the judgment is a limited judgment rendered under
the provisions of ORCP 67 B, the judge must determine that there is no just
reason for delay, but the judgment document need not reflect that determination
if the title of the judgment document indicates that the judgment is a limited
judgment."

Defendant's first argument relies on
the requirement in ORCP 67 B and ORS 18.052(1) that the trial court judge, as a
predicate for rendering a limited judgment, must determine that there is "no
just reason for delay." Defendant acknowledges that, because the limited
judgment at issue here is titled "limited judgment," the finding of
no just reason for delay did not have to be recited in the judgment document
itself. See ORS 18.052(1) (expressly so providing). Nevertheless,
defendant contends, the record must somewhere reflect the trial court's express
determination of no just reason for delay. Defendant asserts that the trial
court never made any such determination on the record in this case; therefore, according
to defendant, the limited judgment was a legal nullity.

Defendant is correct that both ORCP
67 B and ORS 18.052(1) require the trial court to determine that there is no
just reason for delay. Textually, however, both are silent on whether the
record must expressly reflect that determination. To determine whether those
statutes impose such a requirement, we evaluate their text in context, and then,
to the extent we find it helpful, we consider the legislative history proffered
by the parties. SeeState v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d
1042 (2009) (after considering text and context, court considers any pertinent
legislative history, giving it appropriate weight). In this case, the context
that we consider along with text includes the law as it existed before the 2003
amendment to ORCP 67 B and enactment of ORS 18.052. SeeState ex rel
Penn v. Norblad, 323 Or 464, 468 n 1, 918 P2d 426 (1996) (prior enacted
versions of a statute are part of context for purposes of statutory
interpretation).

Thus, the law before 2003 was that
ORCP 67 B (2001) required the trial court to make a determination of no just
reason for delay. The trial court was not required to make that determination
on the record or to explain the reasons for its determination in the record,
and the determination itself was not reviewable on appeal. Instead, the trial
court was required only to state summarily in the judgment document that it had
determined that there was no just reason for delay.

The 2003 judgments legislation eliminated
that one requirement that the judgment document expressly state the trial
court's determination of no just reason for delay. And it did so in two ways.
First, the 2003 amendment to ORCP 67 B specifically deleted the requirement of
an "express determination" of no just reason for delay. Or Laws
2003, ch 576, § 90. Second, ORS 18.052(1), as enacted in 2003, affirmatively
provided that a limited judgment document need not reflect the trial court's
determination of no just reason for delay, as long as the document was titled
as a limited judgment. Id. § 7. The 2003 legislation thus unequivocally
evidences the legislature's intent to eliminate the one previously existing requirement
that the record -- through the express terms of the written judgment -- reflect
the determination of no just reason for delay. It is implausible to infer that
the legislature deleted the requirement of an "express" determination
of no just reason for delay in the judgment document, intending, by the
deletion alone, to require an express determination elsewhere in the record.

"The most significant provision in this
section is the last sentence of subsection (1) [ORS 18.052(1)]. As can been
seen, this sentence eliminates the requirement of ORCP 67 B that 'magic words'
appear in the judgment document to acquire an appealable judgment. Instead,
the judge is charged with making the required determination (no just reason for
delay) and by the very act of signing a 'limited judgment' attests to having
made that determination."

Testimony, House Judiciary Committee, HB 2646, Mar 25, 2003,
Ex C, at 13 (Judgments/Enforcement of Judgments: Judgments Report (HB 2646)) (emphasis
added) (hereafter OLC Judgments Report). Thus, as the text of the 2003
legislative changes itself indicates, the legislature in fact intended (1) to
dispense with the requirement of an express trial court determination of no
just reason for delay, and (2) to make the trial court's signature sufficient to
manifest that determination, as long as the signed document bears the title
"limited judgment." We therefore conclude that defendant's first argument
is not well taken.

The pertinent statutes, however, do
not impose any such formalistic requirement. The legislature has specified
that, to render a legally effective "judgment," the trial court must
arrive at a "concluding decision * * * on one or more requests for relief[.]"
ORS 18.005(8). The concluding decision or decisions also must be
"reflected" in a judgment document. Id. Neither the
definition of "judgment" (id.) nor "judgment document"
(ORS 18.005(9)) prescribes the words that must be used to "reflect[]"
the trial court's concluding decision or decisions. Rather, the only
"term of adjudication" that a judgment document statutorily must
contain is the title itself -- that is, the document must be titled as a
judgment. See ORS 18.038(1) ("A judgment document must be plainly
titled as a judgment."); ORS 18.052(1) (unless document is exempt,
"judge shall ensure that the title of the judgment document indicates
whether the judgment is a limited judgment, general judgment, or supplemental
judgment"); ORS 18.245(1) (jurisdictional requirements for appeal include
that "[t]he judgment document for the judgment must be plainly titled as a
judgment as required by ORS 18.038(1)"). Based on that statutory scheme,
we conclude that, as a matter of form, a judgment document that contains the
statutorily prescribed title of "judgment" contains sufficient words
of adjudication to be appealable; the legislature did not impose a formal
requirement of additional, particular words of adjudication elsewhere in the
text of a judgment.

In that regard, we emphasize that we
are rejecting a very narrow argument -- viz., the contention that a limited
judgment, to be appealable, must contain in the body of the document particular
words of adjudication, such as "adjudged." Although we reject that
as a formal requirement for a "judgment document," the fact remains
that, substantively, the judgment document must express a concluding decision
on one or more claims in a case. See ORS 18.005(8) (definition of
judgment specifically requires that it be "the concluding decision of a
court on one or more requests for relief in one or more actions"). Words
of adjudication undoubtedly may assist in conveying that the trial court has
made a concluding decision on one or more of the claims before the court, and
thus rendered judgment as to the decided claim or claims. But no statute
prescribes the use of such words as the only way to express a concluding
decision in a judgment document. If the terms used by a trial court suffice to
convey the court's concluding decision or decisions, and if they are set forth
in a document properly titled as a judgment, the statutory requirement that a "judgment"
be reflected in a judgment document is satisfied.

The remaining issue, then, is whether
the trial court in this action rendered a "concluding decision" on
one or more of the claims and, if so, which ones. That issue subsumes one further
issue: What may an appellate court examine to make that determination? Both
plaintiff and defendant contend that the Court of Appeals erred on
reconsideration in Interstate II, because it looked beyond the judgment
document and more broadly examined the record to determine whether the
foreclosure lien claim and the negligence counterclaim had been conclusively
decided by the limited judgment. Although the Court of Appeals expressed misgivings,
it concluded that it was required to do so by this court's decision in Bennett
v. Bennett, 208 Or 524, 302 P2d 1019 (1956). Interstate II, 220 Or
App at 676-77 (relying on Bennett); see Bennett, 208 Or at 528-32
(court examined record on appeal to determine whether ambiguous phrase in
divorce decree was intended to award wife sum certain as alimony or as part of property
division). As we will explain, we agree with the parties (although for reasons
that differ in part from theirs) that the appellate courts may not resort to
the record to resolve the meaning or intent of ambiguous provisions of a
limited judgment, at least for purposes of determining whether that judgment expresses
a concluding decision on the claims at issue.

We therefore turn to the three claims
discussed in the limited judgment. The Court of Appeals determined, first, that
the limited judgment did conclusively determine the breach-of-contract
counterclaim. Interstate I, 217 Or App at 419-20. It did so,
moreover, based on the terms of the judgment document itself, rather than a
review of the record more generally. Defendant contends that the Court of
Appeals erred in that regard, because the limited judgment also stated that
prevailing party status had not yet been determined on that claim.

We do not agree with defendant. No
statute or rule requires a trial court to designate a prevailing party at the
time it enters a judgment. To the contrary, the statutory scheme provides that
attorney fees may be awarded by a supplemental judgment, thus implicitly
contemplating that a prevailing party designation can be made after entry of a limited
or general judgment. See ORCP 68 C(5)(b) (attorney fees may be awarded
by supplemental judgment); ORS 18.005(17) ("'Supplemental judgment' means
a judgment that may be rendered after a general judgment pursuant to a legal
authority."); ORS 20.077 (establishing process to determine prevailing
party for purpose of attorney fee award). In this case, the limited judgment specifically
stated that defendant was entitled to judgment on the breach-of-contract
counterclaim, and it made a money award to defendant of a specified amount,
which plainly reflected a final determination of the merits of that claim. The
terms of the limited judgment themselves suggest that the trial court merely
reserved the determination of prevailing party status and attorney fees on that
finally resolved claim: The limited judgment was entered "[n]otwithstanding
* * * the determination of prevailing party status, and awards of Attorney's
Fees and Costs[.]"

"Plaintiff's Construction Lien was overstated and thus
is invalid as a matter of law. As such, Defendant Springville is the Prevailing
Party on that claim and is entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs to
be determined by ORCP 68."

As we have explained, a properly titled judgment need not use
particular words of adjudication in the text, as long as the text expresses a concluding
decision on the claim. The text of the limited judgment here indicates that
the trial court resolved the lien foreclosure claim in defendant's favor. Specifically,
the judgment document declares that the lien was "invalid as a matter of
law" and determines that the adverse party is the prevailing party for
purposes of an attorney fee award. Although a limited judgment need not
designate a prevailing party (as we determined for the breach-of-contract
counterclaim), the actual designation of a prevailing party does indicate that
the court made a concluding decision of the claim. See ORS 20.077(2)
("For the purposes of making an award of attorney fees on a claim, the
prevailing party is the party who receives a favorable judgment * * * on the
claim."). We therefore conclude that the limited judgment reflected a
concluding decision as to plaintiff's lien foreclosure claim.

Regarding the negligence counterclaim,
the limited judgment stated:

"The Court finds Defendant's Claims for Negligence,
including Negligence per se[,] are inapplicable to the subject case.
Specifically, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, a remedy in Tort is not
available."

Fairly read, that text represents a concluding decision on
the negligence counterclaim.

Three aspects of the text of the limited
judgment lead us to that conclusion. First, the express text addressing that
claim itself seems to foreclose any further consideration of it by the trial
court: "as a matter of law, a remedy in Tort is not available."

Second, the negligence counterclaim
is numbered sequentially ("3.") after the first two claims that the
limited judgment decides. Then, immediately following the numbered
declarations of the resolution of the three claims, the document, in a new,
unnumbered paragraph, declares: "Notwithstanding the remaining issues
and claims in the case," the court finds it appropriate to render a
limited judgment. That juxtaposition, too, reflects that, although there are
other remaining issues and claims in the case, the claims discussed in the
previously enumerated paragraphs, including the negligence counterclaim, are not
among them.

In summary: For the reasons that we
have explained, neither ORCP 67 B nor ORS 18.052(1) requires the record to
reflect the trial court's determination that there is no just reason for delay
in rendering a limited judgment. Also, a limited judgment is not rendered jurisdictionally
defective merely because the text omits the word "adjudged" or other
particular words of adjudication in resolving one or more claims. In
determining whether the trial court made a concluding decision on one or more
claims in an action, an appellate court is limited to the terms of the limited judgment
document itself; it should not consult the record to resolve uncertainty about the
trial court's subjective intent regarding the disposition of claims. Finally, the
limited judgment at issue in this case contained a concluding decision on all
three of the claims that it addressed.

The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings.

1.A
party wishing to appeal a limited judgment must appeal within 30 days after its
entry. ORS 19.205(1) specifically allows that a limited judgment to be
appealed. Under ORS 19.255(1), the notice of appeal "must be served and
filed within 30 days after the judgment appealed from is entered in the
register." Timely filing of an appeal is jurisdictional. ORS
19.270(2)(b). A party who obtains a limited judgment cannot wait until the
remaining claims in the case are resolved by a general judgment, because the
limited judgment is not incorporated into the general judgment. See ORS
18.082(2)(a) (general judgment incorporates any prior written decision that
"[i]s not a judgment").

2.Defendant
has never disputed that, if the document that the trial court entered as a
"limited judgment" was final and appealable as to any of the claims
in the case, defendant's notice of appeal was untimely as to those claims.
Defendant has disputed only whether the limited judgment signed and entered by
the trial court in fact conclusively determined one or more claims.

"When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third
party claim, * * * the court may render a limited judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties. A judge may render a limited
judgment under this section only if the judge determines that there is no just
reason for delay."

4.The
Court of Appeals also concluded that the general judgment was appealable and
that the notice of appeal had been timely filed as to the claims that the
general judgment resolved. 217 Or App at 421-26.

5.Defendant's
starting point is different. Defendant begins with what it perceives to be
Oregon's historic "aversion to" and policies disfavoring
interlocutory appeals. The right to appeal, however, is wholly statutory. See,
e.g., State v. K. P., 324 Or 1, 4, 921 P2d 380 (1996) (right of
appeal is conferred by statute; statutory scheme is starting point in analyzing
whether document is appealable). The appropriate policies for this court's
consideration are those embodied in the controlling statutes, however much they
may favor or disfavor interlocutory appeals.

6.There
are two exceptions, both of which apply only to a general judgment. A general
judgment is deemed to address claims to which it does not expressly refer,
either by incorporating earlier written dispositions or by dismissing the
unaddressed claims with prejudice. See ORS 18.082(2), (3) (so stating).

7.ORS
18.038 lists certain other requirements of form that a judgment document must
meet. See ORS 18.005(9) (definition of limited judgment incorporates
ORS 18.038 by reference). They include (with limited exceptions) that the
document must be titled as a judgment; it must be separate from any other
document in the action; and it must identify the court rendering the judgment,
the case itself, and the parties who prevailed and against whom judgment is
given. See ORS 18.038(1), (3) and (4) (setting out those and other
requirements of form). Also, specific types of judgments may be subject to their
own formal requirements beyond those listed in ORS 18.038. See, e.g.,
ORS 18.042 (listing requirements for judgment in civil action that contains
money award); ORS 18.048 (listing requirements for judgment in criminal action
that contains money award).

"When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third
party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence
of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as
to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."

9.See,
e.g., State ex rel Orbanco Real Estate Serv. v. Allen, 301 Or 104,
116, 720 P2d 365 (1986) (in multiple party case involving more than one claim
for relief, interim documents adjudicating some claims as to some parties did
not contain express ORCP 67 B determination that "there is no just reason
for delay"; in combination, however, those documents adjudicated all
claims as to all parties and constituted a final judgment in the case); Industrial
Leasing Corp. v. Van Dyke, 285 Or 375, 378-79, 591 P2d 352 (1979)
(interpreting nearly identical text in the predecessor to ORCP 67 B (2001), former
ORS 18.125 (1979); because judgments of involuntary nonsuit in favor of
defendants did not contain an "express determination that there is no just
reason for delay," they were not final judgments as to any of the claims
or parties and appellate courts lacked jurisdiction over appeal).

10.HB
2646 was sponsored by Representatives Lane Shetterly and Max Williams at the
request of the Oregon Law Commission (OLC), which drafted the bill. The OLC is
a legislatively created body "established to conduct a continuous substantive
law revision program." ORS 173.315(1); see also ORS 173.315 - 173.357
(enabling legislation for OLC). The OLC's Judgments Report was submitted as an
exhibit during the legislative hearings concerning HB 2646. Testimony, House
Judiciary Committee, HB 2646, Mar 25, 2003, Ex C (Judgments/Enforcement of
Judgments: Judgments Report (HB 2646)). In the absence of a contrary
indication, we assume that the legislature accepted the OLC's explanations for
its drafting choices, as we have done for other legislation that was
accompanied by similar formal drafters' reports. See, e.g., State v.
Woodley, 306 Or 458, 462, 760 P2d 884 (1988) (unless contrary indication
exists, court assumes that legislature accepted explanations of Criminal Law
Revision Commission for its drafting choices). The OLC's Judgments Report thus
provides us with an extensive record of the purposes and intentions behind HB
2646.

11.Factually,
defendant's assertion is problematic. Although the limited judgment's text
does not use the word "adjudged," it does use the word
"judgment." Specifically, regarding defendant's breach-of-contract
counterclaim, the limited judgment states that "Defendant is entitled
to aJudgment against Plaintiff and a Money Award in the amount of
$346,872.22." (Emphasis added.) Even accepting defendant's premise, the
phrase "is entitled to a Judgment" surely would qualify as words of
adjudication.

Similarly, although the limited
judgment also uses the word "[o]rders," it does so to refer to the
money award, which comes immediately after the declaration that the written
document is a limited judgment: "[T]he Court does find it in the interest
of clarity and judicial economy to render said Limited Judgment and
hereby Orders the following Money Award[.]" (Emphases added.)
Considered as a whole, that phrase, too, would seem to qualify as words of
adjudication.

12.Worth
noting is that the distinction the legislature drew in that regard was a
particularly deliberate one. See OLC Judgments Report, at 9 (judgment
is now "defined to have two distinct requirements. First a judgment has
to be a 'concluding decision of a court on one or more claims in one or more
actions.' Second, a 'judgment' must be 'reflected in a judgment
document.'"); id. at 10 (existing law frequently confused judgment
of court with document that reflected that judgment; drafters' goal was to
correct problem by carefully delineating between decision of court in abstract
and the writing that reflects that decision).

13.A
judgment document's failure to unambiguously manifest a concluding decision on
a claim does not necessarily require automatic dismissal on appeal. As we noted
previously, there are two situations in which a general judgment is deemed to
have disposed of claims that it does not specifically address. See ORS
18.082(2), (3) (identifying circumstances). In addition, the legislature has
contemplated other solutions when a timely appealed judgment document contains an
ambiguity fatal to its appealability. See ORS 19.270(4) (appellate
court may give trial court leave to enter appealable judgment if trial court
had intended to do so, but judgment from which appeal has been taken is
defective in form).

14.This
court has never had occasion to determine whether its approach in Bennett
of examining the record on appeal would extend to a judgment that is ambiguous
for the purpose of determining its finality and appealability. The 2003
judgments legislation preempts any extension of Bennett to such a
context. But nothing in our opinion in this case should be understood to
prevent appellate courts from considering the record to resolve ambiguities in
a judgment in other circumstances.

15.To clarify, plaintiff's disagreement with the Court of Appeals'
resolution of the lien foreclosure claim is not with the court's conclusion,
but rather with the court's view that the limited judgment was ambiguous as to
that claim and that the ambiguity should be resolved by resort to the record.

16.We
acknowledge that the limited judgment precedes its discussion of the three
claims with confusing and inappropriate text -- for example, describing
conclusions of law as findings of fact. SeeInterstate I, 217 Or
App at 418-19 (identifying various problems). Yet when we consider the limited
judgment as a whole -- and in light of its designation as a limited judgment --
we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the document leaves significant
doubt that the trial court had rendered a concluding decision on all three
claims.

17.The
Court of Appeals determined that the appeal could proceed from the general
judgment and the supplemental judgment, after giving the trial court leave
under ORS 19.270(4) to vacate and renter the supplemental judgment. Interstate
I, 217 Or App at 427. Before this court, the parties have not raised any
issue with respect to that aspect of the Court of Appeals' disposition of the
case.