Uit de bataljonsgechiedenis van The Blue and White Diamond. The history of the 28th Battalion 1915 – 1919, door Neville Browning.

4 oktober 1917
Rain fell on the evening of October while the attacking forces moved up for the assault. At 5.27 am an intense German barrage fell on the forward areas, exploding among the massed ranks of the 1st and 2nd Divisions lying along the jumping off tapes, causing heavy casualties. Thirty minutes later, the Allied bombardment fell on the entrenched German 4th Guard Division and the enemy bombardment promptly ceased.

Upon the command to advance, the Diggers fixed bayonets and moved forward. As the troops advanced they encountered waves of Germans from the 212 Infantry Regiment moving towards them in attack formation. The Diggers recovered from the surprise first and poured a withering fire into the German Regiment, annihilating their advance. The two companies of the 28th Battalion moved forward from Westhoek Ridge and occupied the jumping off point to the southwest of Draught House, vacated by the 26th Battalion.

The relentless advance overwhelmed the enemy attack and poured into the outpost line. Pillboxes were outfianked and bombed and the defenders dispatched. The first objective, the Red Line, was captured. The line was consolidated and the advance continued at 8.10 am. The 1st and 2nd Divisions swept over the crest of the ridge close on the heels of the retreating Germans.

On the right flank, the British divisions enjoyed similar success. On the left, the New Zealand Division seized Abraham Heights and the 3rd Division crossed the Ypres to Roulers railway line and seized their objectives. The British divisions to the north of the New Zealanders had also achieved their objectives. The assault had been a resounding success. All along the line, the divisions dug in under the cover of a protective barrage. Retaliatory German shellfire erupted along the captured line, in particular on the northern sector among the British battalions.
A few punitive probes by German troops were blasted into oblivion by barrages controlled by Forward Artillery Observers with excellent all-round views of the terrain from their vantage points on the crest of the ridge. Mortars were brought forward into the lines and used to effect against German troop concentrations. The captured enemy lines were strengthened and a deep communication trench was dug through to the front line. German prisoners were sent back under escort, the unwounded captives were used to carry wounded men back to the dressing station.

R Telfer wrote:
‘From the time of the stunt on the morning of the 4th we were going continuously for about 48 hours binding up wounded as fast as they came in. Germans were there in large numbers, mostly wounded and some chaps got large hauls of souvenirs, watches, wallets etc. But one can‘t leave off dressing wounded to ‘rat’ German prisoners....
The attack was successful being on a front of eight miles in front of Ypres and along the whole front, the two objectives were taken.’

6 oktober 1917Captain Harper, the 28th Battalion Regimental Medical Officer, operated on casualties for forty-eight hours without respite, often in the open air exposed to enemy shellfire. On October 6th the 17th Battalion relieved the 28th Battalion, which withdrew to bivouacs on Bellewaarde Ridge.
That night however, the divisional boundaries were moved, which entailed that the 28th move back into the line and relieve the 17th Battalion, which then moved to positions (connected shell holes) on the left flank. In the morning, two companies of the 26th Battalion were attached, forming a composite battalion of approximately 450 troops. The 28th was exhausted and undermanned due to the large working parties that had been detached from Battalion strength.
The 27th Battalion was in the front line, with the 25th in close support and the composite battalion in reserve. Hostile enemy artillery batteries bombarded the sector intermittently throughout the day. Movement was arduous due to the boggy terrain, caused by the heavy rain
and the wanton destruction wrought by the incessant shelling.

8 oktober 1917
On October 8th the 18th Battalion relieved the composite battalion. The two companies of the 26th returned to their battalion on Bellewaarde Ridge and the depleted 28th moved back to bivouacs at Kit Kat Camp after a wearisome trek through the boggy ground.
The march back was made slightly easier when the troops reached the duckboards.
At 3pm, an order came through detailing 350 men of the 28th Battalion as a working party burying communication cable on Tokyo Spur. The dispiriting work was carried out in pouring rain under desultory shellfire.
A party of 100 other ranks was detached to Signals Headquarters on Anzac Spur for fatigue duties, which predominately involved digging cable trenches. The Diggers were without their trench-coats but after prolonged exposure to the elements they became indifferent to their plight.
After completion of their detached duties the exhausted troops returned to their lines and huddled under waterproof capes in flooded trenches. As a result sickness became rife and throughout the Division hundreds of troops were evacuated suffering with debility and hundreds more with trench feet.

C.E.W. Bean wrote:
‘Under such treatment the 6th Brigade, and the 7th also, simply faded away. . .By October 9th the 6th Brigade was down to 600 available men and 7th 800.’

9 oktober 1917
Orders were received for a move back into the front line. A forward party moved up to the line and reconnoitred the 6th Brigade sector, in preparation for a move forward in support of an advance on Passchendaele. The 28th Battalion marched out of Kit Kat Camp on the afternoon of October 9th and proceeded back up Broodseinde Ridge and into a sodden support trench. The exhaustive march was made in heavy rain wading through clinging mud.
In the 2nd Division’s area of operations, the 6th Brigade was on the right flank, the 5th on the left and the 7th Brigade in divisional reserve.

The 28th was placed at the disposal of the 6th Brigade for the impending assault. The 2nd Division was to advance on the right flank of a thrust by the British XIV Corps and XVIII Corps towards Passchendaele. The 2nd Division was on the right of the British 66th Division, with the Ypres-Roulers railway line separating the two divisions. The advance was to be made on a front of 13,500 yards, stretching from St. Janshoek to an area southeast of Broodseinde.
The objective of the 2nd Division was a projection known as the Keiburg Spur, running towards the village of Passchendaele. The leading units were the 49th and 66th Divisions. Jump off was timed for 5.20 am, but the troops had to trudge through two and a half miles of mud to get to the start line. Staff officers were aware that the lanes leading to the start line were duckboarded, but as none of them had traversed the lanes, they were oblivious to the fact that the trek made in the dark in torrential ram was of nightmare proportions as the boards had sunk into the mire and the approach was made through mud that at best was ankle deep and at its worst, up to the waist of the struggling exhausted men.
To increase the men’s anguish, desultory shelling fell on the approach roads. Spent men lay on the tapes, waiting for the signal to attack. The horrendous ‘march’ to the tapes was a preliminary of what was to follow.

At zero time, the men struggled to their feet and moved forward, behind the cover of an indifferent creeping barrage. Men too fatigued to bother largely ignored the time-honoured tradition of lighting a last ‘smoke’ during the crossing of No Man’s Land. On the northern flank, the British 49th West Riding Division lumbered into No Man’s Land and through the flooded Ravebeek, which was a fifty-yard wide sea of liquid mud with waist deep water in its centre. Once through this, the crawling advance encountered an apron of uncut barbed wire, with pillboxes and machine gun nests sited in shell holes. The leading brigades were slaughtered. Flooded trenches on the eastern slopes above the Ravebeek held up the sodden men of the 66th Division and the starkly silhouetted troops came under murderous machine gun fire from Bellevue.
On the 2nd Division front, the 5th Brigade advanced in conjunction with the Division. The 6th Brigade moved forward on the right and provided a covering screen for the 5th Brigade, which advanced into shellfire from the Allied bombardment. As the troops moved forward, they also came under machine gun fire fired in enfilade from in front of the 66th Division’s sector.
The machine gun post was eventually outflanked and overrun by the 20th Battalion. Despite the opposition, the Brigade gained its first objective and paused until the 6th Brigade caught up. The leading battalions of the 5th Brigade advanced again and drove a wedge into its second objective, a line of defended hedges dominated by a large barn known as ‘Assyria’.
Determined German thrusts drove the small numbers of 5th Brigade troops back. On the right flank of the 5th Brigade, the 24th Battalion met heavy resistance emanating from Daisy and Dairy Woods. An officer and thirty other ranks from the 28th Battalion were sent forward and into the front line, filling a fissure between 24th Battalion posts in front of Daisy Wood.

A second party of two officers and thirty men with Lewis guns from the 28th Battalion was also sent forward, upon receipt of a further request for help and moved into positions on the left flank, near the railway line. A third party of twenty-eight men later moved up and strengthened the line. Later in the evening, two more companies of the 28th moved up and reinforced the 21st and 23rd Battalions. The remaining company of the 28th Battalion provided stretcher-bearers for the beleaguered battalions.

The 27th Battalion was ordered up and moved into positions near Daisy Wood. Daisy and Dairy Woods were swept dear by determined assaults at bayonet point by 5th and 6th Brigade troops. The 2nd Division troops dug in, but concentrated enemy artillery and machine gun fire was directed on the line throughout the day. Due to high casualties, the 25th and 26th Battalions were brought into the line to support the 5th Brigade, near the Ypres-Roulers railway.

To the north, elements of the 66th Division reached the crest of the ridge, one patrol succeeded in entering the deserted village of Passchendaele.
A German counter attack pushing through the Ravebeek Valley was shot to pieces. Strong German fighting patrols probed and infiltrated the ragged British lines throughout the day and evening, entailing a tactical withdrawal to avoid encirclement. By evening, a line had been dug and consolidated. The 5th Division entered the fray with an advance to the south against Polderhoek Chateau, but was checked by heavy machine gun fire.

The 4th Division moved up and prepared for the relief of the 2nd Division, commencing that night. The 28th was relieved by the 49th Battalion (13th Brigade). The 28th and the remnants of the 6th Brigade moved out of the lines and into supports in small detachments, wading through knee-deep mud.

The Official War Correspondent watched the spent troops trudging back to supports along the mud-laden road:
‘It was on the Menin Road that I first noticed the condition in which our men were coming back. A couple passed us, going very slow. They were white and drawn and detached, and put one foot slowly in front of the other, as I had not seen men do since the Somme winter, but these men looked whiter. . . On our way up to the duckboards we met an officer of the 28th Baltalion, who said that the mud was “nearly as bad as Flers.” A number of men of 7th Brigade and 3rd Brigade coming out, the 7th Brigade always looking like a dead man looks, and scarcely able to walk.”.

The depleted 28th Battalion arrived piecemeal at the Infantry Barracks in Ypres, throughout the morning. They arrived hungry, wet and exhausted. A foot inspection revealed that most of the men were suffering from trench foot. Hot food, clean clothing and rum were issued. The rum arrived in earthenware jugs stenciled S.R.D., which stood for ‘Service Rum Dilute,’
but the troops christened it ‘Seldom Reaches Destination,’ due to frequent inconsistencies in issue. A roll callrevealed that one officer and forty-four other ranks had been killed and eight officers and 102 other ranks were wounded, since October l. At 7pm the 7th Brigade boarded busses for Steenvoorde, where it arrived before midnight and moved into billets for the
night.

F.R. Whitham wrote:
Came back to billets near Steenvoorde after the worst trip, in France, with nine days in the line in rotten weather. There were heavy casualties.’

(…)
12 oktober 1917
On October 12th the 3rd and the New Zealand Division of II Anzac Corps, with the 4th Division in support, made a further assault on Passchendaele, while five British divisions attacked on the left flank. The attack was made over terrain with the consistency of porridge due to the unrelenting rain.
The New Zealanders made headway until they reached unbroken barbed wire entanglements and then their advance was checked with heavy casualties by German machine guns firing with impunity from the safety of pillboxes. The attacking troops of the 3rd Division struggled through the mire of the Ravebeek Valley, but elements fought their way to the outskirts of Passchendaele.
Excessive casualties were incurred when well emplaced German machine guns fired into their ranks in enfilade from in front of the New Zealand sector, when the Kiwis became bogged down.
At the cost of 1,000 casualties, the 4th Division fought its way onto the Keiberg, but was forced to withdraw. The 3rd Division was forced back to prevent encirclement. The assault cost II Anzac Corps 6,000 casualties for no tangible result.
To this date, Australian losses in the campaign were a costly 38,000 men and as reinforcements from Australia had been reduced to a trickle, it was to have far reaching consequences in the battalions.

Excerpten uit Christopher Pugsley’s boek The ANZAC Experience. New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War, Auckland, 2004

20 september
Training and planning continued throughout September, with divisional conferences on 6 and 19 September to discuss points arising from the II ANZAC conference the previous day. Russell (Major-General Sir A.H., commander of the New Zealand division; EF) noted that 20 September and the morning of 21 September were spent ‘studying map of our projected attack’. Changes in planning were then discussed with his corps commander the following day. This paralleled his daily inspections, and on 24 September Russell viewed an attack practice by Hart’s 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which was ‘fairly well carried out, rather amateurish’. One can be sure that these shortcomings were then talked through in detail with both Hart and his commanding officers.
Russell met with Plumer and Harington, his Chief of Staff, on 25 September, and also Major-General Smyth VC, GOC 2 Australian Division, ‘who was on Walkers Ridge with me. He told us a lot about the attack on the 19/20 [September] and details which are useful.’
The next day was spent over maps, and reconnoitring the ground for the attack before motoring to corps for the latest orders.

28 september
On 28 September Russell met Lieutenant-General Maxse, ‘who commands the adjoining Corps to discuss matters, or rather to be talked to; he is full of his own ideas, which are good’. Maxse made his name as the outstanding commander of the 18th British Division and was at the forefront of the evolution of tactical doctrine in 1916.

His re-emphasis on platoon fire and movement was a catalyst for change in the British armies. He would become the Inspector General of Training at GHQ in July 1918, but as we have seen, by then what he initiated was already standard tactical doctrine.
For Russell the last two days of September were taken up with corps and liaison visits to flanking divisions, discussions with his brigade commanders, and finally on 30 September a visit to Plumer ‘to explain plans’.

(…) Pedersen (in Monash as military commander, Melbourne, 1984;EF) outlines the confusion that accompanied the formulation of the corps plan leading up to the attack on 4 October at Passchendaele. There was a great deal of pressure on Godley, (commander of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force;EF) and he was intent on achieving the same success that II ANZAC had won at Messines. Haig had made his intentions clear in a visit to Godley on 1 October:

“I spoke to him of the importance of making his arrangements so as to be able to exploit any success gained without delay. The guns should be placed behind Gravenstafel Hill (as soon as it is captured) for dealing with Passchendaele — and the reserve brigades of attacking divisions should be used at once to exploit a success, if the enemy counter-attacks and fails. Further reserves will be brought up by train. This is now possible, as we have three lines (broad gauge) beyond Ypres, so there must be no hesitation in using reserves on the spot.”

By now both Russell and Monash (Major General and taking command of 3rd Division; EF). commanded well-drilled and experienced teams. On 2 October Russell saw his brigadiers and COs, later noting: ‘I fancy we have got most of the work done and everyone seems confident — visited some of the battalion camps in the afternoon.’

4 oktober 1917
The attack on 4 October was successful. It was notable for the fact that it was the first time four Anzac divisions had attacked side by side. Twelve divisions in the six attacking corps attacked on a 13 kilometre front.
The 1st and the 2nd Australian Divisions of I ANZAC were in the right centre, with the 3rd Australian and new Zealand Division of II ANZAC to their north. Russell wrote:

(…)
“The more I see of it [battle] the less I like it. These long casualty lists, with all they mean do not lose their effect thro’ familiarity. It seems so futile, tho’ one knows it isn’t. Unfortunately it is raining and the sun hasn’t the power to dry the ground so late in the year. We’ve got a very muddy time in front of us, and that means a lot. The mud is a worse enemy than the German who did not, today, put up much of a show of resistance.”

Monash and Russell used identical methods in this attack. Here again Russell’s divisional objectives included the vital ground of Abraham’s Heights and Monash’s advance, as at Messines, was dependent on New Zealand success. Pedersen is incorrect in saying that ‘Monash was the only one of the four ANZAC divisional commanders who prescribed intermediate objectives.’ Russell, like Monash, ‘divided the attack into a series of progressively shorter advances, for each of which fresh infantry would be available’. This battle showed both commanders and their staffs at their peak.

However, the success on 4 October 1917 was a prelude to disaster. The rain and mud prompted Gough to recommend closing down the Third Battle of Ypres. In Plumer’s Second Army Birdwood’s (Lieutenant-General Sir William, commander of the ANZACS; EF) I ANZAC, having successfully mounted three attacks, was exhausted. Russell’s concern was the weather and its impact on the single road forward, which supplied his division.

6 oktober 1917
The 49th British Division relieved the New Zealanders on 6 October, and with the 66th British Division, which replaced the 3rd Australian Division, was to continue the attack under Godley’s direction. Russell took his successor, Major-General Perceval, forward on foot to Spree Farm — ‘wanted him to see roads’.94 Russell’s fears were realised when ram on 5—6 October made it impossible to get guns forward to the new battery positions. ‘Guns out of action were in every case either completely bogged or else blocked on the road.’ Mud was the enemy rather than German artillery, which made little impression with few casualties.
At this critical time there was a lack of drive by Headquarters II ANZAC and the necessary coordination of engineer and logistic effort to see that the attack on 9 October had the necessary foundation for success was never carried out.
Johnston, Russell’s CRA, made this criticism of the corps: ‘The advent of wet weather must have been anticipated, and even if the weather had remained dry the road was not in a state to stand the enormous amount of traffic which would follow the first advance.’

Most critical of all was Godley’s failure to see that his artillery was able to carry out the preparatory fire to destroy the wire and had sufficient guns and ammunition forward to provide for the creeping barrage and counter-battery fire. Johnston, the CRA New Zealand Division, was highly critical of the actions of II ANZAC Corps, as his report shows:

“Men and horses worked incessantly till they were tired out when the battle of the l2th took place. Heavy and Field guns were constantly bogged, and it must be remembered that it is not only necessary to get guns forward, it is necessary to put them on stable platforms, and to make side roads by which ammunition may be brought up. Many officers seem to think that it is sufficient to get the guns forward; this is a mistake: it is equally important to have them mounted on stable platforms, ammunition clean, and the equipment in good order. The fine shooting necessitated by the modern barrage necessitates the most thorough preparation.”

None of this was achieved. It was worse for the British infantry of the 49th and 66th Divisions wading forward in the morass.
Russell recorded in his diary that the II ANZAC attack on 9 October was a failure:’... troops held up early and arrived at Assembly point exhausted’. This was not the message that Haig got. The day before he had visited General Plumer who told him that Godley ‘had specially asked that there should be no postponement’.
On the night before the attack Haig recorded that “a gale blew all night…. A general attack was launched at 5.30 am today .... The results were very successful the 66th Division advanced without barrage and took all objectives. 49th gained all except small piece on the left.”

It was only the next day that these achievements by Godley’s corps were qualified:
‘Reports from Second Army show that progress on 2nd Anzac Corps front yesterday was not so great as first stated! The 66th Division on the right advanced a mile; the 49th Division on the left about 500 yards on an average.’
In fact even these limited gains were exaggerated. Both divisions were stuck on their start lines with no gain in ground. The attacking brigades were broken and demoralised, and made little or no attempt to bring in the wounded who lay dying in the shell-holes.

Godley, like his two British divisional commanders, had no idea of the situation forward. He was intent only on meeting Haig’s expectations, and having failed him on 9 October was even more determined to succeed on 12 October.

10 -12 oktober 1917
When Haig met with Godley on 10 October he was told:
“…. the 3rd Australian Division and the New Zealand Division go into the line again tonight. Godley told me that they are determined to take Passchendaele in the next attack and will put the Australian flag on it! The advance will be then over 2000 yards. But the enemy is now much weaker in morale and lacks the desire to fight.”

It was wishful thinking on both their parts, but it was Godley’s duty as corps commander to ensure the necessities for a successful attack were in place. He failed to do this, and it is dear that his mindset brushed all obstacles aside in his determination to please his Commander-in-Chief. Godley’s trump card was that his two divisional commanders, Russell and Monash, had never failed him, and he saw no reason to believe it would be any different this time despite the weather and its impact on artillery preparations

Russell’s and Monash’s divisions moved back into the line on the night of 10/11 October and both divisions assumed command of their sectors at 10 a.m. on 11October, less than 24 hours before the attack. Brigadier-General Napier Johnston, Russell’s CRA, was particularly worried about the artillery situation and, after a morning reconnaissance, saw Russell in the early afternoon. “The guns are all forward but he evidently feels uneasy about the attack — says preparation inadequate. Night dark and showers of rain.”

Johnston took his concerns to Godley’s corps headquarters and was assured that guns and ammunition would get forward. This was not done, and on the evening of 11 October Russell’s patrols brought in the news that the wire in front of the pillboxes on Bellevue Spur was not cut. As Russell would later note to his Defence Minister, had this news been established 24 hours earlier a delay in the attack could have been requested, but in a coordinated army attack involving a number of corps it was now too late to request a delay. There was a faint possibility that the artillery fire plan would cut the wire. However, given Johnston’s pessimistic assessment, Russell warned his brigadiers of the situation and told them they had to be prepared to fight their way forward with the prospect of minimal artillery support.
Russell has been criticised for not insisting on a delay. However, this ignores the wider context of the Second Army plan, Godley’s determination and, given the particular wording used by Godley in telling Haig they were determined to raise an Australian flag over Passchendaele, perhaps Monash’s own belief that the attack should continue. All of this was driven by a ruthlessly tight timetable that ignored the conditions facing the attacking divisions.
Messines had highlighted weaknesses in II ANZAC staff procedures. Passchendaele ruthlessly exposed these deficiencies. Coordination of the corps’ engineer, artillery and medical plans was lacking. On taking over the sector the day before the attack the New Zealand Division found its stretcher-bearers exhausted and its clearing stations rapidly filling because they had to collect the wounded who had been left to die by the outgoing 49th Division.
Much had been promised but nothing had been done in the way of administrative preparations for the attack.

The New Zealand Division, as usual, attacked on the left. The attack was launched 18 hours after Russell and Monash had taken over responsibility for the front line. As at Messines and at Gravenstafel on 4 October 1918 the New Zealand Division had the task of securing the vital ground that would dictate the success or failure of the corps plan.
Russell attacked with two brigades up each on a battalion frontage with a series of intermediate objectives.

“Attacked this morning at daybreak — we, and indeed all other divisions, were held up from the start by M.G. Evidently the artillery preparation was insufficient, the barrage poor, and it goes to show the weakness of haste our casualties are heavy — I am very sad — Weather conditions bad.”

The move up on the night of 11/12 October was hampered by drizzling ram and atrocious ground conditions. The attacking brigades were in position at 5.00 a.m. At Zero Hour, 5.25 a.m., there was a weak artillery barrage. The infantry assault was held up by enfilade fire from guns on Bellevue Spur, and the men were shot down on the continuous line of uncut wire on its forward slopes and died in the Ravebeek swamp.
Monash’s left flank was laid open to enfilade fire, and despite progress on his right flank the New Zealand failure prevented any further progress towards Passchendaele. A call to renew the attack at 3.00 p.m. by Godley, after he had consulted with Harington at Second Army, was cancelled on Russell’s insistence.

Hier zweeg Pugsley ..... z’n blik afgewend, naar Marsh Bottom .....

“The direct cause of failure was strong and continuous wire entanglements. When as in the operation of the l2th October, the attacking Division takes over the line only a few hours before ZERO, it is necessary that an Intelligence Staff should precede it 2 or 3 days ... In the operations under review the formidable nature of the wire entanglements in BELLEVUE were not known until the evening of the 11th by the brigade holding the line when a patrol report was received which fully disclosed it…….
This information 24 hours earlier would have been invaluable.”

Russell also condemned the lack of artillery support. Corps failed to provide ‘the provision of means of moving forward the guns and stable platforms for them’. Russell had no doubt that given sufficient artillery support his soldiers could have taken the ridge. He went forward with the relieving Canadian divisional commander on 15/16 October and noted: “It is plain we attacked a strong position, stoutly defended with no adequate preparation, nor was the supporting barrage or rather the covering barrage such as to help us over the difficulty”
While the failure could have been blamed on II ANZAC Corps, Russell blamed himself. He emphasised this failure to his commanders and staff at the conferences following the battle: “Divisional Conference at which I drew attention to our failure and its lessons — Notably the crime of the Division in assuming the wire to be cut which ought to have been verified.”

In his diary Russell wrote that the principal fault ‘applying more especially to Divl. Staff and Self, is that under no circumstances in war is one justified in assuming anything which can possibly be verified — and that where there are certain known conditions necessary to success it is a great risk, however justifiable, to attack before they are fulfilled.”