Gilbert Islands--MAKIN, TARAWA

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

The Central Pacific Force which began the occupation of
the Gilbert Islands with amphibious landings on Makin and Tarawa Atolls on 20
November, 1943, involved some 116 combatant vessels and 75 auxiliaries. These
were organized into 3 major groups, the Assault Force (Task Force 54), the
Carrier Force (Task Force 50) and the Defense Forces and Shore Based Air (Task
Force 57). The Assault Force was composed of Northern Attack Force (Task Force
52) and a Southern Attack Force (Task Force 53). Bach of these was composed of a
Transport Group, a Fire Support Group, an Air Support or Carrier Group, a
Minesweeper Group, a Landing Force, and LST and Garrison Groups. The Coast Guard
manned Assault Transport Leonard Wood was one of the Transport Group of the
Northern Attack Force, while the Coast Guard manned Assault Transport Arthur
Middleton was part of the Southern Attack Force. Five of the LST's assigned to
the Tarawa landing were Coast Guard manned, these being LST's Nos. 20, 23, 69,
169, and 205. There were Coast Guard personnel assigned to a number of other
units. This was the first amphibious assault against strongly defended enemy
atolls. The distance from our bases and the size and complexity of the forces
involved required a high degree of coordination and cooperation.

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BITUTU (BETIO) ISLAND

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These forces had to be assembled from widely separated
areas, trained for the specific operation, furnished detailed plans, given a
final rehearsal and made ready for a coordinated attack against separated
objectives, while being prepared to repel a major sea attack. In attacking small
fortified atolls there was no element of surprise except possibly as to the
exact time. Unlike landing on a large island where lightly defended beaches may
generally be found, making possible surprise attacks on the enemy's flank or
rear, the size of the atolls made it relatively easy to fortify them completely,
rendering their capture difficult and costly in casualties.

ASSEMBLY AND BOMBARDMENT

The forces destined for the operation had been widely
dispersed at the beginning of the assembly and training period early in
October. They were brought together in two groups, the Southern Attack Force in
the New Hebrides Area and the Northern Attack Force in the Hawaiian Area. After
intensive training and rehearsals in their respective areas, the Northern Force
departed Pearl Harbor on 9 November and the Southern left Efate, New Hebrides on
12 November. The final general approach of the main Attack Forces was from the
eastward with the Task Forces within sight contact on the 18 and 19 November.
Due to the slow speeds of the two LST groups from the Ellice Islands and the
necessity that their arrival coincide with that of the Main Transport groups,
they were much closer to the Gilbert Islands on the 18 and 19 November than the
Attack Forces. The LST's were sighted on the 18 and 19 by enemy planes and two
air attacks made on them. Through the period 13-19 November, 350 to 400 aircraft
of Task Force 57, based on islands of the Ellice, Phoenix and Samoan Groups, and
on Baker Island, made daily strikes on the Japanese bases in the Gilbert and
Marshall Islands. Carrier air strikes were made on Nauru and Tarawa on the 18th
and on Tarawa, Mille and Makin on the 19th. Also on the 19th a Cruiser Division
of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers bombarded Bititu Island on Tarawa
Atoll with 250 tons of HC projectiles at 20,000 yards,

TRANSPORTS UNLOAD

The beaches selected for the initial landings at Tarawa
were inside the lagoon on the northern side of Bititu Island. The entire island
was surrounded by a shallow coral reef which extended for about 500 to 1,000
yards off shore. The transports arrived outside the lagoon entrance at 0355 on
the 20th and commenced unloading. The LST group, with their cargoes of LVT's
arrived shortly afterward. Unloading was completed at 0616.

PRE-LANDING BOMBARDMENTS

Enemy shore batteries opened fire at 0507 and our
counter battery fire commenced two minutes later ceasing at 0542 in
anticipation of the dawn air strike. When this failed to develop counter battery
fire was recommenced at 0600 and continued 12 minutes. The air strike was
finally delivered between 0610 and 0620. At 0622 battleships opened fire at
10,000 to 15,000 yards closing to 2,000 to 6,000. Cruisers followed battleships
at 20 to 30 minute intervals. Destroyers screened the heavy ships. This phase
ended at 0735, with large fires and explosions

frequently observed. Due to change in H-hour about this time from 0830
to 0900, the timing of Phase Two firing was considerably interrupted.
Actually the first wave of assault troops did not reach the landing beaches
until about 0917. Fire was to begin at H minus 45 minutes and cease at H
minus 5 minutes. Due to the 17 minute delay in the boats reaching the Line
of Departure gunfire actually ceased at H minus 22 minutes. This left the
enemy on the beaches under only relatively light attack during the last 22
minutes of the approach of the first wave of assault troops. Fighter planes
strafed the beaches between 0825 and 0840, failing to get word of the
change in H-hour. They strafed them again at 0917 just prior to the landing
of the first wave. Phase Three was to be as requested by Shore Fire
Control parties and on the whole was well carried out. Destroyers stationed
in the lagoon gave invaluable support to troops ashore.

LANDING ON TARAWA

Beginning with H-hour six waves of landing craft (LVT's,
LVCP's, and LCM's) were scheduled to land in 25 minutes.
Loaded LVT's of the first three waves proceeded from
transports to the Rendezvous Area and from there into
the lagoon to the Line of Departure. Overloading, wind,
sea, and the ebb tide slowed the first wave to 2½ knots instead of the 3
knots expected, and it reached the Line of Departure 39 minutes late. This
necessitated changing H-hour to 0900. The first three waves of LVT's had no
difficulty in crossing the reef and no underwater mines or obstructions were
encountered. However, all waves were under heavy enemy fire. About 95% of
the LVT's reached the reef and 85% reached the beaches. The fourth, fifth,
and sixth waves of LCVP's and LCM's could not pass over the reef and troops
and equipment were put ashore either by loading into LVT's or on rafts, or
by landing at the pier which extended out across the reef to deeper water.
Troops attempting to wade ashore over the reef other than along the pier
met intense fire and suffered heavy casualties.

CONFUSION AT THE BEACHHEADS

Because no suitable beachheads had been established
on any of the beaches, no beach parties were able to
land. The LVT's of the first three waves, after leaving
the beaches, were apparently more or less leaderless.
Some proceeded back to the transport area, others stopped
on the reef northwest of Bititu Island where it was difficult to signal
them and others stopped just outside enemy fire with complaints of mechanical
trouble. Later in the day nearly 200 other landing craft, most of them
loaded with either troops or supplies were still floating around in the
lagoon. It was not until early next morning that order was restored. By
noon on the 21st several beach parties had established themselves ashore.FIGHTING ASHORE BITTER

The fighting ashore was bitter and became a matter of
destroying the enemy in small groups entrenched in
pill boxes, machine gun nests, and other strong fortifications.
By nightfall of D-day 5 battalion landing
teams had established a fair beachhead on the western
beach but the two beaches to the eastward had practically no beachheads.

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Butaritari IslandMakin Atoll, Gilberts Islands

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By noon of the 21st the situation ashore showed marked improvement.
Late in the afternoon troops were landed on Bairiki Island, adjacent
to Bititu, with no opposition, and also on GREEN Beach on the western
side of Bititu. Mopping up operations on the western end of the island
proceeded on the 22nd and 23rd, assisted by air and naval gunfire and
artillery ashore, with the enemy pushed to the east. By the 23rd,
Bititu Island was completely in our hands. The total number of troops
in the 9 Marine Battalion Landing Teams used in the attack was about
15,545. Of these, 913 were killed or were missing and 2,037 were wounded.
Of Navy personnel, 26 were killed and 48 wounded. Of the probable 4,800
Japanese and Koreans on the Atoll, all were killed except 146 prisoners
taken, including 17 Japanese and 129 Korean laborers.

OCCUPATION OF MAKIN AND APAMAMA

As at Tarawa, there was only one island in the Makin
Atoll which was defended. This was Butaritari, which
was a lone narrow anchor-shaped island, on the northern
part of which the enemy concentrated his defenses and
made his stand. Landings were made on two beaches on
the south and one on the western end of the island. The coral reef at
the south beaches had from 12-18 inches of water at low tide and the
water was never deep enough to allow boats to get into the beach over
the reef. This necessitated the use of LVT's entirely to unload boats
onto the beach. On 20 November there was a concentrated aerial bombing
from carrier planes between 0615 and 0630 followed by ship's bombardment
between 0640 and 0825. The first wave was landed at 0833 on the west
beach. There followed 8 waves of landing boats, most of which were
directed to one of the beaches as coral conditions on the other necessitated
its abandonment, causing confusion, delay and damage to the
landing craft. Fortunately there was only slight enemy resistance.
Between 0850 and 1025 the south beaches were bombarded and the first
landings were made at 1041 from the transports and LST's which had moved
inside the lagoon. Enemy resistance consisted chiefly of machine gun
fire and casualties were light. By the 22nd, a total of 409 officers
and 6,098 men had been landed to engage an estimated 600-800 of the enemy.
Our casualties were 56 killed and 131 wounded, with 104 prisoners taken.
The remainder of the enemy were either killed or committed suicide.
Apamama Atoll, in the Gilberts, was occupied on the 20th of November with
only negligible resistance. There were no fortifications and only a
small group of about 24 Japanese were found on the island. These were
eliminated by a small force of 78 men landed from a submarine. Construction
of an air field began on the 26th.

COAST GUARD AT MAKIN

Following some of the heaviest naval bombardment in
Pacific history, Coast Guardsmen, acting as coxswains
of the landing craft, steered their craft thru the
surfs and coral reefs of the Gilbert Islands to land
assault troops on enemy beaches on 20 November 1943. They shuttled
their boats between the transport and the shore to take supplies and
munitions to the fighting troops when and where they were needed, dodging
and twisting their small craft under Japanese fire from coconut trees
and taro holes. They swept the enemy-held beach with machine guns, then

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LST-18 Landing at Arawe, New Britain

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with wide open throttles rammed the bows onto the beach.
The boat crews waited under fire of Japanese snipers while the soldiers plunged
out across the strip of coral sand. With the troops safely landed, their boats
skimmed back through treacherous reefs and pinnacles for another load. In the
invasion of Makin Island some Coast Guard coxswains and their crews worked for
four straight days never leaving their boats. Men and engines were halted only
when sharp coral reefs tore the propellers off the boat or coral pinnacles
gouged holes in their hulls. Sandwiches and coffee were lowered to them on a
line from the transport. When night fell they anchored their small boats out on
the lagoon and snatched a few minutes sleep on top of their cargo, their sleep
being frequently interrupted by random fire from Japanese patrols and snipers.
Fully Coast Guard manned vessels engaged in the Gilbert Islands operations were
the Leonard Wood (APA-12), Arthur Middleton (APA-25) and LST's 19, 20, 23, 69,
169, and 205.