To: All Permanent Representatives to the United Nations
From: New-York based civil society organizations working on disarmament/security
issues
Re: The Secretary-General’s Proposal to Make DDA an Office

Dear Ambassador:

The undersigned represent New York-based civil society organizations
that work on issues of disarmament and security in the United Nations
context and have worked closely with the Department for Disarmament
Affairs: Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, Reaching Critical
Will/Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Hague
Appeal for Peace, Global Action to Prevent War, Peace Boat US, Global
Policy Forum, International Action Network on Small Arms, NGO Committee
on Disarmament, Peace, and Security, Middle Powers Initiative, Institute
for Defense and Disarmament Studies, World Federation of United
Nations Associations, and World Federalist Movement-Institute for
Global Policy. We write in support of keeping an independent
Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), with its own mandate and
Under-Secretary-General.

We are greatly concerned by the Secretary-General’s proposal
that the DDA become an office under the Secretary-General’s
direct oversight headed by a special representative or high representative
of the Secretary-General who would, at least initially, have the
rank of assistant secretary-general. As elaborated below,
such a change is a demotion of DDA in appearance, and likely would
in fact decrease DDA’s importance, now or in the future, and
prevent realization of its potential. The proposal also would cause
practical problems by making the Secretary-General the focal point
of conflicting demands regarding disarmament and non-proliferation
and causing confusion about the authority and mandate of the head
of the Disarmament Affairs office.

DDA’s Role Should be Expanded, Not Diminished

Disarmament is one of the central tasks of the United Nations.
The first UN General Assembly resolution called for nuclear disarmament,
and the UN Charter envisions the “the least diversion for
armaments of the world's human and economic resources” (Article
26). The UN must live up to its mandate and prioritize disarmament
in the Secretariat, maintaining the independent DDA instead of subordinating
it to other agendas.

The UN should not be reducing the stature of disarmament
at a time when the problems posed by nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction, as well as small arms, are escalating.
The DDA was established in its current form in 1998 in order to
address post-cold war disarmament and non-proliferation issues.[1]
It is even more necessary in an era with increased opportunity for,
but decreased attention to, disarmament. Moreover, the world's disarmament
machinery, norms, and regimes are embattled now, and lowering the
profile of the primary global agency responsible for implementation
of UN decisions is the wrong course.

In a January 4 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for reassertion
of the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world, former high U.S. officials
George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, and Henry Kissinger and former
U.S. Senator Sam Nunn characterized the present situation this way:

[T]he world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear
era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists
will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing….
[U]nless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled
to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically
disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold
War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully
replicate the old Soviet-American ‘mutually assured destruction’
with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide
without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons
will be used.

Especially in this historical context, it is important for the
Department for Disarmament Affairs to remain its own entity with
its own mandate and Under-Secretary-General whose primary concern
is disarmament. DDA houses years of technical and policy expertise
and institutional memory which are invaluable to governments and
civil society. It could be quietly lost if the DDA becomes an office
under direct oversight of the Secretary-General. When the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency was moved into the State Department,
the Agency’s technical expertise and institutional memory
was lost, as was internal advocacy for disarmament.

Among its many crucial functions, the Department for Disarmament
Affairs:

serves states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), which does not have its own secretariat;

serves the General Assembly during the First Committee on Disarmament
and International Security when the world's governments meet and
debate the most pressing disarmament and security issues;

Further, there is potential, and the need, for DDA to do much more.
For example, the DDA could house a successor to UNMOVIC, and become
a center for addressing space and missile issues. Stripping DDA
of its departmental status may undermine its capacity to fulfill
its present functions, and almost certainly would prevent it from
realizing its potential. A demoted DDA would lack the flexibility,
mandate, and resources to play a significant role in emerging
issues on the arms control agenda.

We also observe that DDA has a good record on taking action-oriented
steps toward the inclusion of gender in all aspects of its work.
In March 2001, shortly after the Passage of UNSC Resolution 1325
on Women, Peace and Security, the DDA published a series of briefing
papers on gender and disarmament in collaboration with OSAGI and
DESA. In 2003, DDA continued this work by developing the first departmental
Gender Action Plan. Demoting a department that has emerged as a
leader in gender mainstreaming and in the promotion of Resolution
1325 sends the wrong message about which achievements are rewarded
and which are dismissed.

Practical Problems with the Secretary-General’s Proposal

As an independent department, DDA is shielded to some extent from
the intense political pressures that disarmament/non-proliferation
issues generate. If Disarmament Affairs is more closely associated
with the Secretary-General, inevitably political pressures from
all quarters would impede achievement of objectives. Further, the
Secretary-General himself could be harmed by failure to meet heightened
expectations. The Secretary-General can find other ways to strategically
intervene on important matters where his influence could make a
difference.

Also, the DDA Under-Secretary-General (USG) already has direct access
to the Secretary-General. So nothing is really added by making the
head of the Disarmament Affairs office a special or high representative.
Since initially at least the head of the office will be an assistant
secretary-general (ASG), he or she will not be a peer to clearly-defined
USGs. In particular, the head of the Disarmament Affairs office
will be junior to many of the principal officers with whom he or
she must work: the chief UN official servicing the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva and the heads of the IAEA and the verification
bodies for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty all are director-generals with the rank of USG.

The Secretary-General’s proposal may also introduce confusion
over the Disarmament Affairs mission. DDA’s mandate is based
on the directives of the current Secretary-General and his two predecessors
as well as numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and Security
Council. A special or high representative heading Disarmament Affairs
would muddy the waters as to the extent of his or her mandate since
the SRSG’s mandate generally is linked to the Secretary-General
personally and is time-bound. It would be difficult to pursue new
mandates within the field, as the USG can now do. While the Secretary-General’s
proposal affirms that the office would continue to implement existing
directives, the practice might be different. In short, we do not
want DDA's mandate and chief to change from being part of the UN
secretariat's institutional framework to being personally linked
to changing Secretary-Generals.

We appreciate the Secretary-General’s desire to give the
disarmament/non-proliferation agenda a higher profile by associating
it more directly with him. However, there are other ways to accomplish
this that do not have the weaknesses of the proposal. In addition
to taking a personal role, the Secretary-General could, for example,
appoint to his staff a special advisor on disarmament/non-proliferation.

If part of the motive for the DDA proposal is to keep the number
of USGs constant in view of the proposal to split the Department
of Peace-keeping Operations, that aim can be achieved by means that
do not downgrade the DDA. There may be offices outside the peace
and security field which could be headed by ASGs rather than USGs.
Another possibility would be simply to increase the total number
of USGs by one. Or the DPKO could have two divisions headed by ASGs,
one for peace operations, one for field support.

Conclusion

In sum, the Department for Disarmament Affairs must not lose
its unique identity and mandate and its ability to report directly
to the Secretary-General through its own Under-Secretary-General.
The quantity and technical nature of the Department's work is sufficient
to warrant a dedicated department, and the subject the Department
covers is sufficiently urgent and complex to justify expansion rather
than demotion to an office.

Pera Wells
Secretary-General, World Federation of United Nations Associations

William Pace
Executive Director, World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global
Policy

cc: Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
Mr. Vijay Nambiar, Chef du Cabinet

[1] In 1997, a report of the Secretary-General
explained the rationale for the establishment of DDA as follows:

2B.1 Disarmament is a central issue on the global agenda. With
the end of super-Power rivalry, nationals everywhere have come to
recognize their stake in the success of multilateral negotiations
and the monitoring of weapons development. The emergence of
new dangers and actors has added fresh urgency to the tasks that
the United Nations is called upon to play in the area of disarmament.
In the post-cold-war period, there is a growing threat from the
spread of nuclear weapons technology and material, as well as a
wider interest in acquiring biological and chemical weapons and
means of delivery for such weapons. Regional warlords, criminal
syndicates and various terrorist groups have during recent years
become involved in trading in and the acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction. The extensive use and destructive power of landmines
in areas of armed conflict and the flow of conventional weapons
and small arms into the hands of civilians have become items on
the international agenda and have often to be addressed in the context
of peacekeeping operations.

2B.2 Consequently, a managerial reorganization of Secretariat
capacities will now be effected so that a structure can be put
in place to respond more effectively the priorities of Member States
in the fields of disarmament and arms regulations. A Department
for Disarmament and Arms Regulation will therefore be established,
headed by an Under-Secretary-General.