Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran,
1951–1954

1. The government of General
Zahedi has engendered several points of serious
opposition represented by some old-time power seekers, several groups of
Mossadeq supporters including
the Tudeh, and several hundred bazaar merchants. These opposition
factors have found rallying points around the tardiness of the
government in the prosecution of Mossadeq and Tudeh leaders, delays in using impact
portion of U.S. emergency aid, and public uncertainty over the oil
problem.

2. The Shah and General Zahedi
have proposed that U.S. military aid be increased to permit the
development of the Iranian Army as a frontier screen of defense rather
than only as an internal police force. The U.S. Ambassador has endorsed
the idea and our Station has urged strong support by CIA as a potent factor in solidifying
public opinion behind the Zahedi
government and scattering the opposition.

3. The major elements of opposition to the Zahedi government have so far failed to present any
insurmountable problem to the government since they have lacked any
cohesive effort and no one element is believed to have financial support
capable of amounting to a positive [Page 823]threat. Furthermore the Zahedi government is taking significant steps to
eliminate the problems which constitute the grounds for opposition.

4. Intra-government discord continues chiefly on the dissatisfaction of
General Zahedi with Chief of
Staff General Batmangelich and his top aide, and the latter’s overtures
to the Shah derogatory to General Dadsetan’s effectiveness in prosecuting the Tudeh
leaders.

5. The Mossadeq trials were
scheduled to begin the 22nd of October but were subsequently postponed
to the first half of November. The government has been continuing its
mass arrests of Tudeh members, though reports continue that major
leaders have been able to escape arrests by means of bribery.

6. There have been no significant developments on the oil question,
though the visit of Herbert
Hoover, Jr. to Tehran as a U.S. State Department
consultant has been well noted in the Iranian Press.2
The Zahedi government is still
endeavoring to reveal the facts of the situation to the Iranian public
and it is believed that some headway has been made in the government’s
efforts to condition the public toward acceptance of an early oil
settlement. There have been significant exchanges between the Iranian
and British governments regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations
but Zahedi also reportedly
believes that the oil question must be resolved prior to
re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Britain.

7. The situation remains generally very favorable for the prosecution of
CIA activities in Iran.