Monday, February 27, 2017

Putin in Syria, 2017

Now that he has established a
firm foothold in Syria, following 18 months of direct military intervention,
Russia’s strongman, Vladimir Putin, has to politically safeguard his gains in
order to ensure their long-term consolidation and present the world with a fait
accompli. For this, he needs to create a new administrative architecture for
the country and to introduce a new way for governing it, one that accommodates
not only his interests and those of his allies but also the interests and
concerns of some of his enemies as well, now that they can no longer pose a
threat to Russia’s interests in the country.

Putin is going about this
cleverly, apparently mindful of the lessons of the old Soviet experiences in
Afghanistan, as well as those of Syria itself during its long intervention in
the Lebanese civil war.

The lessons of Afghanistan seem
to be compelling Putin to focus on the doable and to avoid overreach. This is
why helping Syria’s genocidal leader, Bashar Al-Assad, reestablish his control
over the whole country, as
per the latter’s desire, is not in the card. That would require a much
larger deployment of troops and resources than Putin is willing to commit.

Meanwhile, the lessons of the
Syrian intervention in Lebanon underscores the wisdom of avoiding overreliance
on one particular ally and of trying to be equidistant from all warring parties
in order to maintain the appearance of a fair overlord. It also avoids
transforming any particular ally or party into a likely rival, or at least an
unruly trouble-maker. As such, Putin cannot risk re-empowering Assad or giving
too much leeway to Iran.

In fact, at this stage, to Putin,
Assad is no longer as useful as he was during the early days of the Russian
intervention in Syria, and Putin doesn’t seem to be personally attached to him.
Assad does not appear destined to be the Syrian version of the Chechen leader
and longtime Putin’s ally, Ramzan Kadirov. The latter fought in the trenches
and has blood on his hands, quite literally, while Assad sits in his palace
letting the people around him do all the dirty work, while he keeps washing his
hands of any culpability. A man whose mind and worldview have been shaped by
his experiences in the KGB will not hold both men in equal regard. To Putin,
Kadirov has become a reliable ally because he doesn’t bother pretend to be what
he is not and he accepts the role that Putin has assigned to him. Assad, on the
other hand, will always seem to Putin like a weasel with delusions of grandeur,
a pitiful and untrustworthy creature that needs to be put on a leash, one that
will keep getting tighter and shorter until the moment comes for some final
neck-snapping.

Until then, however, the weasel
has his uses, so Assad’s occasional off-script statements and moves will be
tolerated. And Putin will wait to see how the Trump administration’s plans in
Syria take shape and what change the elections in France and Germany will put
on the table.

Moreover, Putin and his team will
be busy running his new political process for Syria in Astana, Kazakhstan, the
seemingly “neutral” country that enjoys good diplomatic relations with all
states taking part in the conflict, including Iran and Turkey. Having convinced
rebel groups to take part in the process alongside the Syrian opposition and
representatives of the Assad regime, Iran, and Turkey, Putin has built himself
a laboratory in which he can test out various political formulas, including the
offer of a new constitution for the country—all while undermining the
Geneva process run by UN envoy Staffan de Mistura.

But until a suitable agreement
materializes, Putin will prefer to keep Assad in play, even if Assad continues
to misbehave and tries to derail any potential agreement. The real decisive
factor as far as Putin’s calculations are concerned is the willingness of the
Trump administration to endorse an agreement, while showing some flexibility on
the crisis in Ukraine. This is what ultimately matters to Putin, and what will
ultimately coax him to move fast to close a deal on Syria. Assad’s desires and
shenanigans are a sideshow.

Another factor in this formula
that is bound to influence and complicate Putin’s calculations is represented
by Iran’s growing ambitions, and Israel’s security needs. Iran has already
built its own militias in the country and continues to grow them by the day. It
clearly has plans to build its own military bases in Syria, including a naval
base near Tartous. That fact combined with its presence alongside Hezbollah
militias in the southern parts of the country presents a real security
challenge to Israel. Putin is aware of this, and seems comfortable with
allowing Israel to strike
Hezbollah and Iranian targets in the southern parts of the county, including in
the periphery of Damascus itself. But a formula for balancing Israeli and
Iranian interests in Syria remains elusive at this stage. This is not an issue
that will likely be resolved in the near future and will require continuous
adjustment and recalibration on Putin’s part, over time.

Russia could play a far more
decisive role than it is playing in the current battles taking place in the
province of Daraa in southern Syria pitting Iran-backed pro-regime militias
against rebel groups. The battles started few weeks ago as part of a rebel
offensive to take wrest control of the province from pro-regime militias as
well as units affiliated with the Islamic State. Despite launching a few air
strikes against rebel positions during the last couple of weeks, Putin seems to
be taking more of a wait-and-see approach. Perhaps he is not too unhappy with
the fact that Iran-backed militias seem to be losing out to rebels supported by
Jordan. A stronger rebel presence in the south could help Putin offset Iranian
influence there, thus accommodating some of Israel’s demands.

Considering all these
calculations, 2017 seems unlikely to bring us any closer to resolution of the
Syrian conflict, though some progress in the fight against ISIS in the northern
and northeastern parts of the country might well take place. The turf war
between pro-regime militias and rebels groups will continue, so will the
internal rivalry pitting various rebel groups against each other - a tendency
that has
recently began plaguing pro-regime militias as well. Israel’s strikes against
Iranian and Hezbollah targets will also continue, so will the Turkish
intervention in northern Syria. But, barring a major shift in U.S. policy under
the Trump administration, Putin will use the next few months to consolidate his
position as the main architect of Syria’s future, with all the headaches and
benefits that that reality involves.

Go ahead, patronize me!

About Ammar

I am a Syrian-American Author and Blogger, and I currently work as a political analyst at Alhurra. The Delirica is a blog that relates my personal views and takes on current developments which do not necessarily reflect those espoused by any institution with which I am affiliated. My most recent publication is titled “The Irreverent Activist” and is available on Amazon.

The Delirica

Throughout the years, I have operated a variety of political, intellectual and artistic blogs in both Arabic and English. However, I am currently relying on The Delirica as my main personal online outlet for political analysis in English. All my previous online writings in English can be accessed at Ammar.World, The Daily Digest of Global Delirium and related sites. Arabic readers should refer to Hartaqah.