Axis History Forum

This is an apolitical forum for discussions on the Axis nations and related topics hosted by the Axis History Factbook in cooperation with Christian Ankerstjerne’s Panzerworld and Christoph Awender's WW2 day by day.
Founded in 1999.

Luft300 wrote:The Japanese were going nowhere, except back to Japan. After Midway and Guadalcanal, the Japanese were totally on the defensive. The only offensive operations they were engaged in was in New Guinea -- attempting to take Port Moresby from an overland route.

Not quite. The Japanese engaged in major offensives in both China and Burma after Midway.

Luft300 wrote:The Japanese were going nowhere, except back to Japan. After Midway and Guadalcanal, the Japanese were totally on the defensive. The only offensive operations they were engaged in was in New Guinea -- attempting to take Port Moresby from an overland route.

Not quite. The Japanese engaged in major offensives in both China and Burma after Midway.

I think what Luft300 means is that the Japanese Imperial Navy lost their capability to mount any offensive after the Battle of Midway 1943. From now on, the Japanese Navy were quite on the defensive especially in fleet movements..

But you're right, the Japanese Army did engaged in major offensives in both Burma (offensive against British held India) and China

Luft300 wrote:The Japanese were going nowhere, except back to Japan. After Midway and Guadalcanal, the Japanese were totally on the defensive. The only offensive operations they were engaged in was in New Guinea -- attempting to take Port Moresby from an overland route.

Not quite. The Japanese engaged in major offensives in both China and Burma after Midway.

I think what Luft300 means is that the Japanese Imperial Navy lost their capability to mount any offensive after the Battle of Midway 1943. From now on, the Japanese Navy were quite on the defensive especially in fleet movements..

That would be a true statement...but it isn't what he said.

The only offensive operations they were engaged in was in New Guinea -- attempting to take Port Moresby from an overland route.

"Victory Disease" was the term coined by the Japanese themselves to describe their over-confidence in the summer of 1942 in trying to expand and consolidate their victories in the Southern Area(the Philippines,Malaya,the East Indies).

If Midway could be taken,the all important Hawaiian islands themselves could be reduced in turn,driving the US right back to their Pacific coast.

If New Guinea could be added to the list of conquests,followed by New Caledonia,Fiji and Samoa,not only Australia but New Zealand could be cut off.

But these plans meant expanding from an already expanded perimeter,using forces already widely dispersed,and now to be dispersed even more.Even a partial victory would give Japan nothing more than thousands of more miles of vulnerable flank.

Its said that Yamamoto in disdain had described the US Navy as a club for golfers and bridge players---the latter at the Coral Sea and Midway proved themselves more worthy than this.

In 1945, From Shumshu Island to Iturup Island, IJA placed
88th division: Sakhalin
89th division: Itulup
91th division: Shumshu
129th Independent Mixed Brigade: Urupp
41st Independent Mixed Regiment: Matua
and three infantry batallions in addition to some remaining navy troops. Most of navies retreated by 1945.
91th division had independent 2nd tank company in it.
Most of army men retreated from Kiska was merged into these troops.

Siberia was a long term stratigic objective for Japan. In Japanese literature that region is refered to as the "Northern Resource Area". Some suggest this incudes Alaska as well as the eastern portions of the USSR. In this context extending the chain of island bases into the Alteutians makes sense. Keep in mind the Japanese strategy was based on the idea that the US & Britian would enter peace negotiations well before the end of 1942.

1. Air bases for reconissance of sea lanes between USSR & US, aiding the interruption of US aid to USSR in any subsequent campaign to take portions of Siberia.

2. Same for any subequent effort to take Alaskan resources from the US.

3. Fishing ports. The fishing industry has been critical for Japan. Friendly anchorages & ports further north would have aided the exploitation of the fish, whale, & seal in that region.

4. Bargaining chips for armistice/peace negotiations after the US Navy is completely defeated in June/July 1942.

Number two may be the least likely. Those who include Alaska in the Northern Resource Area dont offer much evidence. Number three is based on a thin knowledge of trends in the Japanese fishing industry from the early 20th Century. However economic policy drove Japans long term strategy Number four derives from the documented debate within the Japanese leadership over long term stratigic goals. Soviet prices for Siberian resources were a hindrance & direct control was desireable goal. Even if the short term conquest of Siberia was not possible control of the Pacific ports was, if the US was no longer interfering and the Germans controled European USSR.

Those photos were all in the archive in Alaska. They must have been selected uncritically. Susposedly they were accquired from a US Army intellegence collection, from the Aletutian campaign. Just perhaps one of the formations that was on Kiska or Attu had earlier served elsewhere & thats where the photos were taken.

Notice the tank in the last photo looks much like the US M3 light tank, the Stuart. Probablly from the Phillipines.

There are no longer any Japanese forces on Kiska. But it seems that in their place the heroic spirits of Attu have landed. Foreign reports reveal that the American forces fought intensely and bitterly against this army of spirits over a period of three weeks. In the South Pacific sector, too, spirits of the Japanese troops have tangled with the enemy, causing many of them mental derangements and others to kill themselves as a result of nervous breakdown and morbid fear...

Luft300 wrote:Was the invasion of the Aleutian Islands by the Japanese for any other reason than being part of the Midway plan? If I remember correctly the islands were invaded and occupied and Dutch Harbor bombed to draw the American carriers north from the Hawaiian area so they wouldn't be in the Midway area when that island was invaded. Other than that, did the Japanese have any serious thoughts to advancing up the Aleutian chain?

I think the U.S. spent a lot of precious resources retaking those two useless islands back... suffering many casualties, most of which were friendly fire and the loss of a lot of toes and feet to frostbite, for prestige purposes... that the Japanese weren't going anywhere. Also, from the point of using bases up there for bombing the Japanese home islands, the weather conditions up there were very bad for flying.

The Japanese had intended to invade the Aleutians as part of a defensive line running south to Midway. After the capture of both, the Aleutians were to have been supplied from Midway. Even though Midway was never captured the Japanese felt it would be wise to keeps troops in the Aleutians if only to deny the Americans basing long range bombers there.

A major Japanese blunder was including the Aleutians invasion with the Midway operation to draw the American fleet north. If the Aleutians operation had been postponed until after the Midway operation, the Japanese carriers at Midway might not have been destroyed. The two Aleutian carriers could have been used exclusively to attack Midway, leaving the four big carriers freed up for the task of fighting the American fleet and planes if they showed up.

The Japanese had intended to invade the Aleutians as part of a defensive line running south to Midway. After the capture of both, the Aleutians were to have been supplied from Midway. Even though Midway was never captured the Japanese felt it would be wise to keeps troops in the Aleutians if only to deny the Americans basing long range bombers there.

A major Japanese blunder was including the Aleutians invasion with the Midway operation to draw the American fleet north. If the Aleutians operation had been postponed until after the Midway operation, the Japanese carriers at Midway might not have been destroyed. The two Aleutian carriers could have been used exclusively to attack Midway, leaving the four big carriers freed up for the task of fighting the American fleet and planes if they showed up.

The Aleutians operation certainly complicated & dispersed their overall fleet ops for June 42. One secondary justification was that it would confuse the USN, hopefully drawing part of the US fleet north so as to allow piecemeal destruction. In that sense the timing was off. The Aleutians ops should have been run a bit sooner so as to better ensure a response. This also would have allowed the carrier group covering the Aleutians op to rejoin the Midway striking force, adding another large & a small aircraft carrier.

Carl Schwamberger wrote:Those photos were all in the archive in Alaska. They must have been selected uncritically. Susposedly they were accquired from a US Army intellegence collection, from the Aletutian campaign. Just perhaps one of the formations that was on Kiska or Attu had earlier served elsewhere & thats where the photos were taken.

Notice the tank in the last photo looks much like the US M3 light tank, the Stuart. Probablly from the Phillipines.

Accroding Brian Garfields "Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians" no tanks was used during the entire campagin and the japanese soldiers on the picture look like they have a nice hot day (something that dont exsist on the aleutian islands), so it cant be from the aleutian islands.

Im not even sure that the top picture, the one with a artillary gun being fired are from the aleutian islands as it looks like there are trees in the background and there was no trees on the islands during the conflict (one exception was a tree planted by US troops on one of their base islands, I dont remember which one)