Sunday, June 23, 2013

Book review – British Intelligence in the Second World War

In the 1970’s
the first books came out that revealed how in WWII the Allied codebreakers were
able to solve the German Enigma cipher
machine (and other systems). Those early books were written without access
to all the official documents and many of the things they claimed were
incorrect. They also greatly exaggerated the effects of codebreaking on the
various campaigns of the war.

Unfortunately
historians have mostly relied on those early books so most history books
continue to claim that the Allies won specific battles or campaigns
because they could read German messages etc.

If you are
looking for a more reliable analysis of the role that secret intelligence
played in WWII then you need to read the official ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War’ volumes:

Volume I: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 1979

Volume II: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 1981

Volume III, Part 1: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 1984

Volume III, Part 2: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 1988

Volume IV: Security and Counter-Intelligence, 1990

Volume V: Strategic Deception,
1990

These books
are large and heavy with many chapters and appendices, covering all the
campaigns of the war and the role that intelligence played.

They’re also
out of print so you’ll have to go to a used books store and be prepared to pay
a premium. If you do get hold of them however you will undoubtedly be impressed
by their scope and analysis.

The first
four books on operations each cover a specific time period. There are separate
chapters for the organization of the intelligence agencies, economic and
strategic assessments and of course the role that intelligence played in the
actual campaigns. Volume 4 deals with internal security, ‘double’ agents and
the operations of the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst.
At this time I haven’t gone through the fifth volume.

Overview

1). The first
volume covers prewar intelligence arrangements and ends with operation
Barbarossa in the summer of 1941. The campaigns of Norway, France, Battle of
Britain, Battle of the Atlantic, the Balkans and N.Africa are covered. Among
the most interesting appendixes are: appendix 1 which covers the Polish and
French contribution to the solution of the Enigma machine (with mistakes that
were corrected in vol3), appendix 9 ‘Intelligence in advance of the GAF raid on
Coventry’ andappendix 11 ‘GAF
Navigational Aids’.

2). The
second volume covers the British strategic assessments from mid ’41 to mid ’43,
the War at sea up to summer ‘43 and most importantly the North African campaign
from July 1941 till the fall of Tunisia. Some of the appendices have
interesting information on the security of British ciphers (appendix 1), the
German police ciphers (appendix 5), the British assessment of German tanks and
A/T guns (appendix 14) and the compromise of the initial German plan for the
battle of Kursk (appendix 22).

3). Volume 3
part 1 has the strategic assessments from June ’43 to June ’44, the British
assessments of the German war economy, the Italian campaign, the developments
in occupied Yugoslavia (Chetnik-Partisan conflict), the War at sea from summer
’43 to summer ’44, the air war in the West and the intelligence on the
V-weapons (V1 flying
bomb and V2 rocket).
There is interesting information in appendix 2 describing the solution of the Tunny teleprinter, in
appendix 4 ‘Intelligence estimates and German statistics on the German war
economy’, in appendix 10 ‘’German anxieties about Allied ability to locate
U-boats’ and appendix 16 ‘Decrypt of the Japanese ambassador’s report to the
foreign ministry Tokyo of his interview with Field Marshal Milch in Berlin, 17
August 1943’.

4). Volume 3
part 2 is the largest book (1.038 pages!) and covers the planning and execution
of operation ‘Overlord’, the fighting in the Eastern Front, the Italian
campaign, the War at sea and the Allied strategic bombing offensive up to the
defeat of Germany. There is interesting information in appendix 9 ‘Intelligence
on Germany’s reinforcement of the Cotentin peninsula and its effects on First
US Army’s operational plans’, appendix 10 ‘Allied intelligence on German
divisions on the Eve of D-day’, appendix 14 ‘Intelligence relating to 21st
Panzer division and 352nd Infantry division up to D-day’, appendix
26 ‘Intelligence on the Axis oil situation up to the summer of 1944’, appendix
29 ‘TA project: Enemy intelligence’ (nuclear weapons research) and appendix 30
‘Polish, French and British contribution to the breaking of the Enigma: A
revised account’.5). Volume 4
is smaller in size than the previous books but it has interesting information
on the counterintelligence operations of the British security services in the
UK and abroad. In 1940 the sudden German successes in Norway and France led to
the belief that a vast underground network of spies, saboteurs and
collaborators had assisted the German forces. This led to a ‘Fifth column’
panic with the authorities fearing that such a network might be operational in
the UK. In reality the actual German spy network was very small and was quickly
rounded up by MI-5. Attempts of the Abwehr to insert spies were so clumsy that
they all failed. The Brits not only arrested the German spies and interrogated
them but in many cases they were able to use them in radio-games and thus
transmit false information to the Abwehr.Things were not as easy abroad as the German agencies were assisted in
their work by friendly foreign governments, for example in Spain. Codebreaking
played a major role in uncovering the German spy networks in neutral countries
since in 1940-41 the hand cipher and the Enigma machine used by the Abwehr were
‘broken’ and their communications could be read. Interesting information is
included in the appendices, especially appendix 1 which has an overview of the
Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst and
appendix 14 dealing with the resistance leader turned double agent Christiaan
Lindemans.

As in all
books there are some small mistakes (or white lies) especially regarding the
influence of codebreaking on actual operations (for example on the sinking of
Rommel’s supplies). However these are nothing compared to the monstrosities
that one reads in other history books.

Overall the ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War’
volumes remain the most authoritative source on signals intelligence in WWII.