EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTSFIRST SECTIONCASE OF
YAROSLAVTSEV v. RUSSIA (Application No. 42138/02)JUDGMENT (Strasbourg, 2.XII.2004)In the case of Yaroslavtsev v. Russia,
-------------------------------- This judgment will become final in
the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.The European Court of Human Rights (First
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Mr C.L. Rozakis,
President, Mrs S. Botoucharova, Mr A. Kovler, Mrs E.
Steiner, Mr K. Hajiyev, Mr D. Spielmann, Mr S. Jebens,
judges, and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar, Having deliberated
in private on 9 November 2004, Delivers the following judgment, which
was adopted on that date:PROCEDURE1. The case originated in an
application (No. 42138/02) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by a Russian national, Mr Aleksandr
Borisovich Yaroslavtsev, on 7 November 2002. 2. The Russian Government
("the Government") were represented by their Agent, Mr P. Laptev, Representative
of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. 3. On
24 August 2003 the Court decided to communicate the complaint concerning the
length of the proceedings. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same
time.THE FACTS4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in
Moscow. 5. In 1996 the applicant purchased a foreign-made car at a car
market in Belarus from an unidentified seller. On coming back to Moscow he
applied for its registration. Registration was refused because the car had not
been properly registered in Belarus and its previous owner was not known. A
criminal investigation was opened. 6. On 19 March 1998 a police
department of Moscow decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings. No
indication of a criminal offence in the applicant"s actions was established as
he was not aware that the car had been sold with forged documents and without
registration with the competent traffic police department. The engine and
chassis numbers were not forged and the car was not in the search list. The
applicant was advised to apply to a court to be recognised as a good faith
purchaser and the legal owner of the car. 7. On 22 June 1998 the
applicant applied to a court. 8. On 7 August 1998 the Butyrskiy District
Court of Moscow delivered a judgment in the applicant"s case. However, the
applicant is not aware of the contents of the judgment. He explains that the
judgment was not pronounced publicly, and the court"s registry refused to give
him a copy of the judgment because "[his] case, along with several others, had
been taken up to the city court". 9. On 12 August 1998 the State
Automobile Inspectorate refused to register the applicant"s car because the
applicant had no court judgment. 10. On 25 February 1999 the Presidium
of the Moscow City Court, by way of supervisory review, quashed the judgment of
7 August 1998 and remitted the case for a new examination. 11. Between 2
August 1999 and 15 January 2001 nine hearings were scheduled. Of those, seven
hearings did not take place because the representatives of the State Automobile
Inspectorate and tax inspectorate No. 15 failed to appear. Two hearings did not
take place because both parties did not appear. Three judges in succession dealt
with the case. The applicant sent many complaints to the Moscow City Court, the
Moscow Justice Department, the Moscow Courts" Administration Department and
other authorities about unreasonable delays in the hearing of his case.
12. On 19 February 2001 the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the
applicant"s action. It found that, pursuant to the Regulations on registration
of automobiles and motorcycles No. 624 of 26 November 1996, the vehicles
previously registered by one department of the traffic police could not be
registered by another department unless the former registration had been duly
cancelled. As the applicant failed to produce documents showing that the
registration of his car in Belarus had been duly cancelled or, for that matter,
that it had been ever effected, the refusal of the Moscow traffic police to
register the car had been lawful. 13. On 5 March 2001 the applicant
filed his grounds of appeal. On 12 April 2001 the court invited the applicant to
pay the appeal fee by 23 April 2001. The applicant did not pay the fee and his
appeal was not considered. 14. Subsequently the time-limit for lodging
the appeal was extended. On 18 July 2001 Judge G. of the Butyrskiy District
Court of Moscow accepted the grounds of appeal and told the applicant to pay the
court fee of RUR 4,110 (EUR 187). The applicant complained to the judges"
qualification panel about the excessive and arbitrarily calculated amount. Upon
examination of his complaint, the fee was substantially reduced and the judge
was disciplined. 15. On 18 September 2001 the applicant applied to the
Moscow City Court for an extension of the time-limit to submit his points of
appeal. Having received no response for several months, the applicant complained
to the Moscow Justice Department and the Moscow Courts" Administration
Department. On 18 May 2002 the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow ordered to
extend the time-limit until 14 June 2002. 16. On 3 June 2002 the
applicant submitted his points of appeal. On 29 July 2002 the applicant paid the
court fee. 17. On 18 September 2002 the Moscow City Court upheld the
judgment of 19 February 2001. 18. On 24 October 2002 the applicant
complained to the Supreme Qualification Panel of Judges that the acting
president of the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow failed to provide him with a
copy of the judgment of 18 September 2002. The copy was not made available to
the applicant until December 2002 at the earliest.THE LAWI. Alleged
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention19. The applicant complained
that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the "reasonable
time" requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ...
tribunal..." 20. The Government contested that argument. They claimed
that the delays were - to a significant extent - attributable to the applicant"s
conduct because he had not appeared at the scheduled hearings and because he had
not paid the court fee for the examination of his appeal on time. 21.
The applicant submitted that he had refused to pay the court fee only once when
the unlawful amount had been exacted from him. Furthermore, all of his 19
complaints, except for one concerning the amount of the court fee, had contained
requests for expedition of the proceedings. 22. The period to be taken
into consideration began on 22 June 1998 when the applicant lodged his action.
It ended on an unspecified date in December 2002 when a copy of the final
judgment was made available to the applicant, which is not contested by the
Government. However, it is appropriate to take into account only the periods
when the case was actually pending before the courts, i.e. the periods when
there was no effective judgment in the applicant"s case and when the authorities
were under an obligation to determine his rights and obligations within a
"reasonable time". Accordingly, the period between 17 August 1998 when the first
judgment of the district court entered into legal force and 26 February 1999
when that judgment was quashed is not taken into account. 23. It follows
that the period under consideration thus lasted approximately three years and
eleven months.A. Admissibility24. The Court notes that this
complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B. Merits25. The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be
assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the
following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and
the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute
(see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], No. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII). 26. The Court considers that the case was not
complex as the purchase of the car by the applicant was not disputed. The
domestic courts were called upon to determine whether the applicant could be
considered bona fide purchaser for the purposes of State registration. This was
a straightforward claim, familiar to the Moscow courts. 27. The Court
finds that the applicant did cause certain delays in the proceedings. In
particular, he did not attend two hearings and omitted to pay the court fee in
April 2001. The duration of these delays cannot be determined precisely, but, in
any event, it was less than six months in total. 28. As regards the
conduct of domestic authorities, the Court observes that between 2 August 1999
and 15 January 2001 the court fixed nine hearings, none of which was attended by
representatives of State bodies. Further delays were due to two re-assignments
of the case to new judges and to Judge G."s incorrect calculation of the court
fee which required the intervention of the judges" qualifications panel acting
on the applicant"s complaint. Moreover, the Government did not explain why it
took the Butyrskiy District Court eight months to examine the applicant"s
request for an extension of the time-limit for lodging the appeal (from 18
September 2001 to 18 May 2002). This delay is also attributable to the domestic
authorities because the incorrect calculation of the court fee had lain at its
origin. In sum, the domestic authorities are responsible for approximately two
and a half years of delays. 29. Having examined all the material
submitted to it, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the
proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the "reasonable time"
requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.II. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 130. The applicant
complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the domestic courts" decisions
deprived him of his property because in the absence of State registration the
commercial value of his car is greatly diminished. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
provides: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions
shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties." 31. The Court recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first sentence of
the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of
peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The second rule, contained in the second
sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and makes it
subject to certain conditions. The third rule, stated in the second paragraph,
recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. 32.
In the present case the applicant has been prevented from using his car in
Russia because he could not show that it had been lawfully registered and
un-registered in Belarus where he purchased it. The Court considers that the
refusal of registration of the applicant"s car amounted to an interference with
his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It also notes that the applicant"s
right to possess the car was not disputed. Accordingly, the alleged interference
falls to be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(see Svidranova v. the Czech Republic, No. 35268/97, Commission decision of 1
July 1998; Sildedzis v. Poland (dec.), No. 45214/99, 13 November 2003).
33. It remains to be determined whether the obligation imposed on the applicant
was proportionate and necessary to control the use of his property in accordance
with the general interest. 34. The Court notes that the contested
provisions of the Regulations on registration of automobiles and motorcycles
pursued the legitimate aim of preventing registration of vehicles in respect of
which the lawfulness of their acquisition could not be shown. The obligation
imposed on the applicant by the aforesaid provisions was therefore in the
general interest within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. 35. As regards the proportionality of the interference,
the Court observes that at the moment of acquisition the applicant should have
been aware of the regulations preventing registration of vehicles of unknown
origin. Nevertheless, he proceeded with the purchase of the car from an
unidentified vendor, relying on the latter"s oral representations, without
verifying their accuracy. In these circumstances the applicant should have
reasonably foreseen possible problems with the registration of the vehicle. As
matters transpired, the representations were untrue and the car registration
papers were a forgery. The Court considers, bearing in mind the general
importance of a system ensuring traceability of the legal owner of a vehicle for
the purposes of the regulation of road traffic and the wide margin of
appreciation afforded to States in this respect, that, in the circumstances of
the present case, the control of the use of the applicant"s property was
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 36. It follows that this
complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.III. Application of Article 41
of the Convention37. Article 41 of the Convention provides: "If
the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the
Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall,