This book explores the complex relationship between women’s presence and impact in two strikingly different, consecutive congresses. Drawing on hundreds of elite interviews and archival information, ...
More

This book explores the complex relationship between women’s presence and impact in two strikingly different, consecutive congresses. Drawing on hundreds of elite interviews and archival information, the case studies of three highly visible policy areas (reproductive rights, women’s health, and health care policy) move beyond the question of ‘Do women make a difference?’ to confront the oft-ignored, contested issues surrounding gender difference and impact: its probabilistic nature, contested legitimacy, and disputed meaning. The analysis enhances understanding of how gendered forces at the individual, institutional, and societal levels combine to reinforce and redefine gendered relationships to power in the public sphere, and suggests strategies to strengthen substantive representation of women.Less

The Impact of Women in Congress

Debra L. Dodson

Published in print: 2006-05-01

This book explores the complex relationship between women’s presence and impact in two strikingly different, consecutive congresses. Drawing on hundreds of elite interviews and archival information, the case studies of three highly visible policy areas (reproductive rights, women’s health, and health care policy) move beyond the question of ‘Do women make a difference?’ to confront the oft-ignored, contested issues surrounding gender difference and impact: its probabilistic nature, contested legitimacy, and disputed meaning. The analysis enhances understanding of how gendered forces at the individual, institutional, and societal levels combine to reinforce and redefine gendered relationships to power in the public sphere, and suggests strategies to strengthen substantive representation of women.

The September 11th Victims Compensation Fund can only hesitatingly find its place within a comprehensive study of reparation programs. While the origin of the Fund lies in the political exigencies ...
More

The September 11th Victims Compensation Fund can only hesitatingly find its place within a comprehensive study of reparation programs. While the origin of the Fund lies in the political exigencies surrounding a perceived threat to the security of the United States, it more accurately reflects the desire by the U.S. Congress to ensure the viability of its nation’s air carriers. Unlike traditional reparations which are closely related to a process of social reintegration of the victim, fostering civic trust and social solidarity, the Fund was not established to bring justice to the victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Also, unlike traditional reparations, the Fund did not seek to serve as a mechanism of corrective or distributive justice as a result of an authoritarian domestic regime or internal conflict. It was initially created out of fear that recourse to the U.S. courts would threaten the precarious financial health of the airline industry. Implicitly, however, such pragmatism reflected a desire by lawmakers that the government be seen as doing all it could to ease the pain of those who suffered so greatly on September 11, 2001. Initial motivations for the program aside, there is no question that the compensation scheme has since taken on a life of its own. Ultimately, the Fund’s contribution to any reparations case-study lies in its cautionary tale about the creation of elaborate administrative schemes that try to individualize recoveries as the mechanisms through which to compensate victims.Less

Compensation for the Victims of September 11

Samuel IssacharoffAnna Morawiec Mansfield

Published in print: 2006-03-01

The September 11th Victims Compensation Fund can only hesitatingly find its place within a comprehensive study of reparation programs. While the origin of the Fund lies in the political exigencies surrounding a perceived threat to the security of the United States, it more accurately reflects the desire by the U.S. Congress to ensure the viability of its nation’s air carriers. Unlike traditional reparations which are closely related to a process of social reintegration of the victim, fostering civic trust and social solidarity, the Fund was not established to bring justice to the victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Also, unlike traditional reparations, the Fund did not seek to serve as a mechanism of corrective or distributive justice as a result of an authoritarian domestic regime or internal conflict. It was initially created out of fear that recourse to the U.S. courts would threaten the precarious financial health of the airline industry. Implicitly, however, such pragmatism reflected a desire by lawmakers that the government be seen as doing all it could to ease the pain of those who suffered so greatly on September 11, 2001. Initial motivations for the program aside, there is no question that the compensation scheme has since taken on a life of its own. Ultimately, the Fund’s contribution to any reparations case-study lies in its cautionary tale about the creation of elaborate administrative schemes that try to individualize recoveries as the mechanisms through which to compensate victims.

The first case study is the Declaration against the slave trade made as part of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. How and why did this become an international concern, and with what results? The ...
More

The first case study is the Declaration against the slave trade made as part of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. How and why did this become an international concern, and with what results? The chapter analyses how the international diplomacy of slave trade abolition was interconnected with the domestic political pressures brought to bear, especially upon the British government, by William Wilberforce and the Abolition Society, especially when the terms of the first Treaty of Paris became known. It explores the combination of interest and principle in Castlereagh's foreign policy. It describes the nature and the methods of the transnational movement against the slave trade. Critically, however, the chapter also insists that the international Declaration against the trade established a new normative framework, intended as it was to shame those who would flout its provisions. The articulation of an accepted international legitimacy principle against the trade was to be of major importance in the longer term.Less

Vienna and the Slave Trade, 1815

Ian Clark

Published in print: 2007-04-01

The first case study is the Declaration against the slave trade made as part of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. How and why did this become an international concern, and with what results? The chapter analyses how the international diplomacy of slave trade abolition was interconnected with the domestic political pressures brought to bear, especially upon the British government, by William Wilberforce and the Abolition Society, especially when the terms of the first Treaty of Paris became known. It explores the combination of interest and principle in Castlereagh's foreign policy. It describes the nature and the methods of the transnational movement against the slave trade. Critically, however, the chapter also insists that the international Declaration against the trade established a new normative framework, intended as it was to shame those who would flout its provisions. The articulation of an accepted international legitimacy principle against the trade was to be of major importance in the longer term.

This is the exceptional case in that the proposal to include a racial equality clause in the League Covenant was rejected. On the other hand, this is another case where the norm was supported by a ...
More

This is the exceptional case in that the proposal to include a racial equality clause in the League Covenant was rejected. On the other hand, this is another case where the norm was supported by a leading state (Japan), in conjunction with a wider world society movement. The drafting history casts doubts on Japanese motives for pressing the proposal, but the failure reflects the relative weakness of Japan as a normative sponsor. While opposition to the clause certainly came from Britain, in response to pressure from parts of the empire, President Wilson's own position was ambiguous, and he certainly was not prepared to risk the Treaty of Versailles (and the League Covenant) to include it. There was a widespread pressure to hold a Pan-African Congress at Paris to coincide with the settlement. However, the Japanese delegate Baron Makino expressed a number of interesting normative arguments in support of the clause, appealing to the blurring of the distinction between international and world society brought about by the principle of collective security.Less

Versailles and Racial Equality, 1919

Ian Clark

Published in print: 2007-04-01

This is the exceptional case in that the proposal to include a racial equality clause in the League Covenant was rejected. On the other hand, this is another case where the norm was supported by a leading state (Japan), in conjunction with a wider world society movement. The drafting history casts doubts on Japanese motives for pressing the proposal, but the failure reflects the relative weakness of Japan as a normative sponsor. While opposition to the clause certainly came from Britain, in response to pressure from parts of the empire, President Wilson's own position was ambiguous, and he certainly was not prepared to risk the Treaty of Versailles (and the League Covenant) to include it. There was a widespread pressure to hold a Pan-African Congress at Paris to coincide with the settlement. However, the Japanese delegate Baron Makino expressed a number of interesting normative arguments in support of the clause, appealing to the blurring of the distinction between international and world society brought about by the principle of collective security.

This book uses the writing of three 20th century Indian women to interrogate the status of the traditional archive, reading their memoirs, fictions, and histories as counter-narratives of colonial ...
More

This book uses the writing of three 20th century Indian women to interrogate the status of the traditional archive, reading their memoirs, fictions, and histories as counter-narratives of colonial modernity. Janaki Majumdar was the daughter of the first president of the Indian National Congress. Her unpublished “Family History” (1935) stages the story of her parents' transnational marriage as a series of homes the family inhabited in Britain and India — thereby providing a heretofore unavailable narrative of the domestic face of 19th century Indian nationalism. Cornelia Sorabji was one of the first Indian women to qualify for the bar. Her memoirs (1934 and 1936) demonstrate her determination to rescue the zenana (women's quarters) and purdahnashin (secluded women) from the recesses of the orthodox home in order to counter the emancipationist claims of Gandhian nationalism. Last but not least, Attia Hosain's 1961 novel, Sunlight on Broken Column, represents the violence and trauma of partition through the biography of a young heroine called Laila and her family home. Taken together, their writings raise questions about what counts as an archive, offering insights into the relationship of women to memory and history, gender to fact and fiction, and feminism to nationalism and postcolonialism.Less

Dwelling in the Archive : Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India

Antoinette Burton

Published in print: 2003-04-03

This book uses the writing of three 20th century Indian women to interrogate the status of the traditional archive, reading their memoirs, fictions, and histories as counter-narratives of colonial modernity. Janaki Majumdar was the daughter of the first president of the Indian National Congress. Her unpublished “Family History” (1935) stages the story of her parents' transnational marriage as a series of homes the family inhabited in Britain and India — thereby providing a heretofore unavailable narrative of the domestic face of 19th century Indian nationalism. Cornelia Sorabji was one of the first Indian women to qualify for the bar. Her memoirs (1934 and 1936) demonstrate her determination to rescue the zenana (women's quarters) and purdahnashin (secluded women) from the recesses of the orthodox home in order to counter the emancipationist claims of Gandhian nationalism. Last but not least, Attia Hosain's 1961 novel, Sunlight on Broken Column, represents the violence and trauma of partition through the biography of a young heroine called Laila and her family home. Taken together, their writings raise questions about what counts as an archive, offering insights into the relationship of women to memory and history, gender to fact and fiction, and feminism to nationalism and postcolonialism.

Chapter 5 and the corresponding Ch. 10 in Part Three of the book provide background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, ...
More

Chapter 5 and the corresponding Ch. 10 in Part Three of the book provide background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, the background is given to the conflict between the Federalists and the Antifederalists over the military clauses of the US Constitution, a conflict that is analyzed in Chs 6–8 (the debate over the fiscal clauses is analyzed in Part Three of the book). It is argued that two principles frustrated the ability of the Confederation Congress to provide the union with the military capacity it needed to function: first, the sovereignty of the states; and, second, the strong aversion in the American political tradition to a peacetime standing army. In the end, these principles led Congress to become passive in foreign affairs. Ends with an attempt to locate the Federalist demand for an improved military capacity of the national state not in the context of militarism, but in the context of the promotion of commerce.Less

An Impotent Congress

Max. M Edling

Published in print: 2003-10-09

Chapter 5 and the corresponding Ch. 10 in Part Three of the book provide background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, the background is given to the conflict between the Federalists and the Antifederalists over the military clauses of the US Constitution, a conflict that is analyzed in Chs 6–8 (the debate over the fiscal clauses is analyzed in Part Three of the book). It is argued that two principles frustrated the ability of the Confederation Congress to provide the union with the military capacity it needed to function: first, the sovereignty of the states; and, second, the strong aversion in the American political tradition to a peacetime standing army. In the end, these principles led Congress to become passive in foreign affairs. Ends with an attempt to locate the Federalist demand for an improved military capacity of the national state not in the context of militarism, but in the context of the promotion of commerce.

How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? This book combines new theoretical ...
More

How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? This book combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. The book shows how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, the book documents that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The book finds considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, it shows that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. This book shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.Less

The Constrained Court : Law, Politics, and the Decisions Justices Make

Michael A. BaileyForrest Maltzman

Published in print: 2011-09-11

How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? This book combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. The book shows how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, the book documents that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The book finds considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, it shows that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. This book shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.

This chapter focuses on congressional efforts to curtail the president's foreign policy over terrorism and the Middle East, almost all of which has been unilaterally instituted. With a series of case ...
More

This chapter focuses on congressional efforts to curtail the president's foreign policy over terrorism and the Middle East, almost all of which has been unilaterally instituted. With a series of case studies and new experimental survey data, it is shown that congressional opposition to the president systematically influences the willingness of average citizens to support the president's military campaigns abroad and, moreover, that such opposition has occasionally induced the president to back off from his preferred policies. So doing, it demonstrates that congressional checks on presidential war powers, though certainly diminished, remain a core feature of unilateral politics.Less

Bending so as Not to Break: What the Bush Presidency Reveals about the Politics of Unilateral Action

William G. HowellDouglas L. Kriner

Published in print: 2007-05-01

This chapter focuses on congressional efforts to curtail the president's foreign policy over terrorism and the Middle East, almost all of which has been unilaterally instituted. With a series of case studies and new experimental survey data, it is shown that congressional opposition to the president systematically influences the willingness of average citizens to support the president's military campaigns abroad and, moreover, that such opposition has occasionally induced the president to back off from his preferred policies. So doing, it demonstrates that congressional checks on presidential war powers, though certainly diminished, remain a core feature of unilateral politics.

The crime rate in the US has exploded since 1960. Despite decreases in recent years, reported violence in 2001 exceeded the levels of the late 1970s. Government at all levels has tried to address the ...
More

The crime rate in the US has exploded since 1960. Despite decreases in recent years, reported violence in 2001 exceeded the levels of the late 1970s. Government at all levels has tried to address the crime problem, with mixed success. Police forces that formerly focused on patrol cars’ responding to citizen calls embraced the proactive approach of community policing; courts set up specialized branches, hearing cases relating to narcotics, guns, and domestic violence; criminal sentences sharply increased, filling prisons and jails with more than 2 million people. Yet, crime rates continue to rise and fall, seemingly without regard to government programs. Strikingly, little evidence has been collected about which anticrime activities are truly effective and which are not. Instead, members of Congress and state legislators, who set the tone for the fight against crime, tend to base their actions on what sounds good in political advertisements rather than what has proved to work through scientific experiment. Still, there are a number of promising ideas in law enforcement, juvenile crime, corrections, and other areas that could help prevent crime if they could obtain adequate financial support.Less

Crime and Politics : Big Government's Erratic Campaign for Law and Order

Ted Gest

Published in print: 2001-07-05

The crime rate in the US has exploded since 1960. Despite decreases in recent years, reported violence in 2001 exceeded the levels of the late 1970s. Government at all levels has tried to address the crime problem, with mixed success. Police forces that formerly focused on patrol cars’ responding to citizen calls embraced the proactive approach of community policing; courts set up specialized branches, hearing cases relating to narcotics, guns, and domestic violence; criminal sentences sharply increased, filling prisons and jails with more than 2 million people. Yet, crime rates continue to rise and fall, seemingly without regard to government programs. Strikingly, little evidence has been collected about which anticrime activities are truly effective and which are not. Instead, members of Congress and state legislators, who set the tone for the fight against crime, tend to base their actions on what sounds good in political advertisements rather than what has proved to work through scientific experiment. Still, there are a number of promising ideas in law enforcement, juvenile crime, corrections, and other areas that could help prevent crime if they could obtain adequate financial support.

An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. This book evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs ...
More

An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. This book evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. The book finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that U.S. foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the book notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts. It attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. The book's detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president's national security policies. It argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace. It investigates America's oversight of national security and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.Less

Watchdogs on the Hill : The Decline of Congressional Oversight of U.S. Foreign Relations

Linda L. Fowler

Published in print: 2015-03-22

An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. This book evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. The book finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that U.S. foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the book notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts. It attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. The book's detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president's national security policies. It argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace. It investigates America's oversight of national security and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives is the most powerful partisan figure in the contemporary U.S. Congress. How this came to be, and how the majority party in the House has made control of ...
More

The Speaker of the House of Representatives is the most powerful partisan figure in the contemporary U.S. Congress. How this came to be, and how the majority party in the House has made control of the speakership a routine matter, is far from straightforward. This book provides a comprehensive history of how speakers have been elected in the U.S. House since 1789, arguing that the organizational politics of these elections were critical to the construction of mass political parties in America and laid the groundwork for the role they play in setting the agenda of Congress today. The book shows how the speakership began as a relatively weak office, and how votes for Speaker prior to the Civil War often favored regional interests over party loyalty. While struggle, contention, and deadlock over House organization were common in the antebellum era, such instability vanished with the outbreak of war, as the majority party became an “organizational cartel” capable of controlling with certainty the selection of the Speaker and other key House officers. This organizational cartel has survived Gilded Age partisan strife, Progressive Era challenge, and conservative coalition politics to guide speakership elections through the present day. This book reveals how struggles over House organization prior to the Civil War were among the most consequential turning points in American political history.Less

Fighting for the Speakership : The House and the Rise of Party Government

Jeffery A. JenkinsCharles Stewart

Published in print: 2012-11-11

The Speaker of the House of Representatives is the most powerful partisan figure in the contemporary U.S. Congress. How this came to be, and how the majority party in the House has made control of the speakership a routine matter, is far from straightforward. This book provides a comprehensive history of how speakers have been elected in the U.S. House since 1789, arguing that the organizational politics of these elections were critical to the construction of mass political parties in America and laid the groundwork for the role they play in setting the agenda of Congress today. The book shows how the speakership began as a relatively weak office, and how votes for Speaker prior to the Civil War often favored regional interests over party loyalty. While struggle, contention, and deadlock over House organization were common in the antebellum era, such instability vanished with the outbreak of war, as the majority party became an “organizational cartel” capable of controlling with certainty the selection of the Speaker and other key House officers. This organizational cartel has survived Gilded Age partisan strife, Progressive Era challenge, and conservative coalition politics to guide speakership elections through the present day. This book reveals how struggles over House organization prior to the Civil War were among the most consequential turning points in American political history.

This chapter suggests that precedent is often discounted as a source in constitutional decision making because it is usually understood narrowly as judicial decisions. But it shows that a broader ...
More

This chapter suggests that precedent is often discounted as a source in constitutional decision making because it is usually understood narrowly as judicial decisions. But it shows that a broader definition of precedent encompasses nonjudicial precedent (any of the past constitutional judgments of nonjudicial actors which judicial or other authorities seek to invest with normative power). It shows how nonjudicial precedent is important not only to courts, but to nonjudicial actors.Less

Nonjudicial Precedent

Michael J. Gerhardt

Published in print: 2008-03-13

This chapter suggests that precedent is often discounted as a source in constitutional decision making because it is usually understood narrowly as judicial decisions. But it shows that a broader definition of precedent encompasses nonjudicial precedent (any of the past constitutional judgments of nonjudicial actors which judicial or other authorities seek to invest with normative power). It shows how nonjudicial precedent is important not only to courts, but to nonjudicial actors.

Compares Northern Ireland's peace process with the transition to democracy in South Africa. The chapter details the ways in which Northern Ireland's political elites learnt from South Africa's ...
More

Compares Northern Ireland's peace process with the transition to democracy in South Africa. The chapter details the ways in which Northern Ireland's political elites learnt from South Africa's negotiations, and argues that they have more to learn. It squarely rejects the claim of Irish republican militants that their position is analogous to that of South Africa's African National Congress.Less

Northern Ireland and South Africa: ‘Hope and History at a Crossroads’

Padraig O'Malley

Published in print: 2001-08-09

Compares Northern Ireland's peace process with the transition to democracy in South Africa. The chapter details the ways in which Northern Ireland's political elites learnt from South Africa's negotiations, and argues that they have more to learn. It squarely rejects the claim of Irish republican militants that their position is analogous to that of South Africa's African National Congress.

Chapter 6 and the corresponding Ch. 11 in Part Three of the book provide the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American ...
More

Chapter 6 and the corresponding Ch. 11 in Part Three of the book provide the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks more closely at Antifederalist objections to the military clauses of the U S Constitution, here the concern is only with the proposals for amendments to the Constitution that Antifederalists suggested, or that Federalists suggested as concessions to Antifederalist objections; the purpose of the chapter is to address the question of why the Federalists refused to accept limits to the army clauses of the Constitution. When the first Congress presented the states with the proposal for what would become the Bill of Rights, this contained a guarantee against the disarmament of the people, as well as a specification of what was involved in Congress's power to govern state militias; it also contained a restriction on the right of the national government to quarter troops in private houses. The first ten amendments, however, made no attempt to restrict the right of the national government to raise an army, and not because of oversight, since neither James Madison, nor anyone else present at the first Congress, could have been unaware of the strong reservations that Antifederalists had expressed against the unlimited power to raise and maintain armies that the Constitution vested in Congress. This power was central to the national state that the Federalists attempted to form, and in the debate over ratification they made clear why no limits could be placed on Congress's power of military mobilization.Less

Independence, Commerce, and Military Strength

Max. M Edling

Published in print: 2003-10-09

Chapter 6 and the corresponding Ch. 11 in Part Three of the book provide the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks more closely at Antifederalist objections to the military clauses of the U S Constitution, here the concern is only with the proposals for amendments to the Constitution that Antifederalists suggested, or that Federalists suggested as concessions to Antifederalist objections; the purpose of the chapter is to address the question of why the Federalists refused to accept limits to the army clauses of the Constitution. When the first Congress presented the states with the proposal for what would become the Bill of Rights, this contained a guarantee against the disarmament of the people, as well as a specification of what was involved in Congress's power to govern state militias; it also contained a restriction on the right of the national government to quarter troops in private houses. The first ten amendments, however, made no attempt to restrict the right of the national government to raise an army, and not because of oversight, since neither James Madison, nor anyone else present at the first Congress, could have been unaware of the strong reservations that Antifederalists had expressed against the unlimited power to raise and maintain armies that the Constitution vested in Congress. This power was central to the national state that the Federalists attempted to form, and in the debate over ratification they made clear why no limits could be placed on Congress's power of military mobilization.

Chapter 7 and the corresponding Ch. 12 in Part Three of the book present the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking ...
More

Chapter 7 and the corresponding Ch. 12 in Part Three of the book present the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the military clauses of the US Constitution. The opponents of the Constitution never accepted the Federalist claim that the independence, liberty, and prosperity of the American republic depended on the creation and maintenance of a peace establishment consisting of regular troops, and did not believe that the union faced as serious threats as the Federalists claimed, keeping to the view that standing armies in time of peace were a threat to liberty. Both ancient and modern history had taught that “almost all” nations in Europe and Asia had lost their liberty because of the establishment of a standing army, so it hardly made sense for Americans to imitate them. To Antifederalists, it seemed that if the military clauses of the Constitution were adopted and the Federalists realized their plan to raise a standing army, the people of America would soon find that the Constitution's supporters would make use of it on the domestic rather than the international scene. The Antifederalist criticism of the army clauses therefore said little about commercial treaties and the importance of military strength in international relations; instead, they approached the issue from the traditional British Country perspective, claiming that standing armies in time of peace posed a threat to liberty, that transfer of military power from the states to Congress threatened both the state militia and the state assemblies, and that a standing army would make it possible for the national government to deprive people of their property without their consent by levying and collecting arbitrary taxes – in other words, a standing army in a time of peace was to the Antifederalists an objection to the centralization of power at the expense of the people's ability to withhold consent through their control of strong local institutions.Less

A Government of Force

Max. M Edling

Published in print: 2003-10-09

Chapter 7 and the corresponding Ch. 12 in Part Three of the book present the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the military clauses of the US Constitution. The opponents of the Constitution never accepted the Federalist claim that the independence, liberty, and prosperity of the American republic depended on the creation and maintenance of a peace establishment consisting of regular troops, and did not believe that the union faced as serious threats as the Federalists claimed, keeping to the view that standing armies in time of peace were a threat to liberty. Both ancient and modern history had taught that “almost all” nations in Europe and Asia had lost their liberty because of the establishment of a standing army, so it hardly made sense for Americans to imitate them. To Antifederalists, it seemed that if the military clauses of the Constitution were adopted and the Federalists realized their plan to raise a standing army, the people of America would soon find that the Constitution's supporters would make use of it on the domestic rather than the international scene. The Antifederalist criticism of the army clauses therefore said little about commercial treaties and the importance of military strength in international relations; instead, they approached the issue from the traditional British Country perspective, claiming that standing armies in time of peace posed a threat to liberty, that transfer of military power from the states to Congress threatened both the state militia and the state assemblies, and that a standing army would make it possible for the national government to deprive people of their property without their consent by levying and collecting arbitrary taxes – in other words, a standing army in a time of peace was to the Antifederalists an objection to the centralization of power at the expense of the people's ability to withhold consent through their control of strong local institutions.

Provides background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military ...
More

Provides background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, an account is given of the efforts of Congress to implement the fiscal clauses of the US Constitution, which shows that the national government created by the Articles of Confederation experienced serious difficulties in its ability to raise money, and in the end failed to raise sufficient money to meet its expenses. The focus of the chapter is on the means by which Congress raised money from the outbreak of the War of Independence up to the Philadelphia Convention, and also on how, one by one, these means were lost, so that by 1787 the insolvency of the national government was total. The first two parts of the chapter describe the attempts of Congress to raise money through fiat (printed) money, loans, and taxes, with the author contending that the Federalists accepted existing restrictions to taxation and formed a tax system that would be able to generate sufficient income for the national government without putting undue pressure on the American people. The last section of the chapter looks at the problem of the public debts run up by Congress and the states during the War of Independence, and at the reasons for the federal assumption of state debts – whether they were democratic or economic – and the reasons given by the Federalists as to why Congress had to resume payment of the public domestic and foreign debt.Less

Congressional Insolvency

Max. M Edling

Published in print: 2003-10-09

Provides background accounts of political development in the USA from the American War of Independence to the Philadelphia Convention, and establish that, by 1787, Congress was marked by military weakness and financial insolvency. Here, an account is given of the efforts of Congress to implement the fiscal clauses of the US Constitution, which shows that the national government created by the Articles of Confederation experienced serious difficulties in its ability to raise money, and in the end failed to raise sufficient money to meet its expenses. The focus of the chapter is on the means by which Congress raised money from the outbreak of the War of Independence up to the Philadelphia Convention, and also on how, one by one, these means were lost, so that by 1787 the insolvency of the national government was total. The first two parts of the chapter describe the attempts of Congress to raise money through fiat (printed) money, loans, and taxes, with the author contending that the Federalists accepted existing restrictions to taxation and formed a tax system that would be able to generate sufficient income for the national government without putting undue pressure on the American people. The last section of the chapter looks at the problem of the public debts run up by Congress and the states during the War of Independence, and at the reasons for the federal assumption of state debts – whether they were democratic or economic – and the reasons given by the Federalists as to why Congress had to resume payment of the public domestic and foreign debt.

Provides the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the ...
More

Provides the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks in greater depth at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, here the concern is solely with the restrictions to this power that they suggested in the form of amendments. The reasons are discussed as to why the Federalists refused to accept these Antifederalist amendments (and indeed any restrictions on the fiscal power of Congress other than those already written into the Constitution), repeatedly and forcefully making it clear why it was crucial that no restrictions be placed on the right of Congress to extract money from society by means of taxation. The different sections of the chapter argue that the need for an unbridled federal right to raise tax revenue arose from the conviction that Congress had to have full command over all the resources of the nation in times of crisis. Primarily, this was needed so that the government could borrow money abroad and at home, which suggests that the Federalists designed the Constitution as much for future challenges as for present problems, and that for this reason, they refused to let the powers of the national government be defined by the demands on the union existing in the late 1780s, but instead strove to create a government with powers sufficiently extensive to safeguard the union's future existence, in peace as well as in war.Less

Unlimited Taxation, Public Credit, and the Strength of Government

Max. M Edling

Published in print: 2003-10-09

Provides the layout of the Federalist argument that Congress had to possess an unlimited power to raise men and money from American society without any intervention from the states. While the following chapter looks in greater depth at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, here the concern is solely with the restrictions to this power that they suggested in the form of amendments. The reasons are discussed as to why the Federalists refused to accept these Antifederalist amendments (and indeed any restrictions on the fiscal power of Congress other than those already written into the Constitution), repeatedly and forcefully making it clear why it was crucial that no restrictions be placed on the right of Congress to extract money from society by means of taxation. The different sections of the chapter argue that the need for an unbridled federal right to raise tax revenue arose from the conviction that Congress had to have full command over all the resources of the nation in times of crisis. Primarily, this was needed so that the government could borrow money abroad and at home, which suggests that the Federalists designed the Constitution as much for future challenges as for present problems, and that for this reason, they refused to let the powers of the national government be defined by the demands on the union existing in the late 1780s, but instead strove to create a government with powers sufficiently extensive to safeguard the union's future existence, in peace as well as in war.

Presents the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers ...
More

Presents the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, and the answers of the Federalists to these. Only rarely did the Antifederalists raise any objections to the right of Congress to borrow money, but the fact that they seemed to accept that public borrowing might sometimes be necessary did not mean that they accepted the need for an unlimited federal power over taxation. In their opposition to the Constitution's tax clauses, the Antifederalists continued an Anglo‐American political tradition of opposition against state growth that in turn is but an instant of a universal resistance to the centralization of power characteristic of early modern Europe. The Antifederalist opposition centered on the future role of the state legislatures: in Antifederalist thought the state assembly had come to take on the function filled by the House of Commons in English “Country” thought, so it was regarded as a crucial barrier against government abuse and as the only institution that made possible taxation with the consent of the governed.Less

The Costs of Government

Max. M Edling

Published in print: 2003-10-09

Presents the Antifederalist objections to a stronger national government in the “fiscal‐military” sphere, with this chapter looking closely at Antifederalist objections to the federal fiscal powers of the US Constitution, and the answers of the Federalists to these. Only rarely did the Antifederalists raise any objections to the right of Congress to borrow money, but the fact that they seemed to accept that public borrowing might sometimes be necessary did not mean that they accepted the need for an unlimited federal power over taxation. In their opposition to the Constitution's tax clauses, the Antifederalists continued an Anglo‐American political tradition of opposition against state growth that in turn is but an instant of a universal resistance to the centralization of power characteristic of early modern Europe. The Antifederalist opposition centered on the future role of the state legislatures: in Antifederalist thought the state assembly had come to take on the function filled by the House of Commons in English “Country” thought, so it was regarded as a crucial barrier against government abuse and as the only institution that made possible taxation with the consent of the governed.

Electoral reform in the US sees a great deal of experimentation in electoral reform at the local level but almost none at the national level. Explaining the lack of change in electoral institutions ...
More

Electoral reform in the US sees a great deal of experimentation in electoral reform at the local level but almost none at the national level. Explaining the lack of change in electoral institutions is quite difficult. Explanations grounded in a rational choice approach that compares the differing incentives facing electoral winners and losers and compares the differing preferences of each take us some — but not all — the way to understanding (the lack of) American electoral reform.Less

Election Reform and (the Lack of) Electoral System Change in the USA

Shaun BowlerTodd Donovan

Published in print: 2008-05-08

Electoral reform in the US sees a great deal of experimentation in electoral reform at the local level but almost none at the national level. Explaining the lack of change in electoral institutions is quite difficult. Explanations grounded in a rational choice approach that compares the differing incentives facing electoral winners and losers and compares the differing preferences of each take us some — but not all — the way to understanding (the lack of) American electoral reform.

A major federal anticrime agency had its roots in an Office of Law Enforcement Assistance established in the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The agency was enacted into law in a wide‐ranging crime law ...
More

A major federal anticrime agency had its roots in an Office of Law Enforcement Assistance established in the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The agency was enacted into law in a wide‐ranging crime law enacted in 1968. Its name was changed to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA); its purpose was to distribute federal aid to state and local criminal justice programs. But Congress ordered the agency to be headed by an unwieldy troika of administrators. A succession of leaders over a decade frequently changed policy directions, setting an erratic course while spending almost $1 billion annually in some years. The agency funded some pioneering programs, such as units in prosecutors’ offices to help crime victims and witnesses. Eventually, however, its programs lacked sufficient proof of significant impact on the crime problem or the justice system. President Jimmy Carter proposed its elimination in 1980 and Congress agreed.Less

The Rise and Fall of LEAA

Ted Gest

Published in print: 2001-07-05

A major federal anticrime agency had its roots in an Office of Law Enforcement Assistance established in the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The agency was enacted into law in a wide‐ranging crime law enacted in 1968. Its name was changed to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA); its purpose was to distribute federal aid to state and local criminal justice programs. But Congress ordered the agency to be headed by an unwieldy troika of administrators. A succession of leaders over a decade frequently changed policy directions, setting an erratic course while spending almost $1 billion annually in some years. The agency funded some pioneering programs, such as units in prosecutors’ offices to help crime victims and witnesses. Eventually, however, its programs lacked sufficient proof of significant impact on the crime problem or the justice system. President Jimmy Carter proposed its elimination in 1980 and Congress agreed.