ORSAM Report 102: HOW AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD IRAQ BE SPLIT UP? BEİNG READY FOR THE WORST (English)

The political crisis, which broke out in Iraq short while after the withdrawal of the U.S., brought up the political developments in Iraq in the shadow of the developments centering around the Arab Spring to the agenda again. The stability and future of Iraq started to be discussed both in Turkey and in world public opinion, and many possibilities ranging from good to bad was reassessed. The possibility of Iraq’s splitting has been brought up to the agenda on Turkish news and comments as well, and the arguments related to the solution of political crisis taking place in Iraq also started to be reflected in the press. It is not right to expect this dynamic and ambiguous process in Iraq to immediately turn into a big crisis in country in a short time. However, as all the developments taking place since the U.S. invasion of Iraq have showed over and over again, Iraq is becoming a country, which is getting hard to protect the territorial integrity and political unity with each passing day. It would be good to think the situation outside the box, rather than making simple predictions related to the future of Iraq, whose state authority was destroyed and where a healthy structure could not be established instead, and giving short answers to the question.

In this study, Iraq’s future is strived to be handled within the framework of the current developments in the country and the socio-political structure of the country. At the end of the study, the resulting table shows that there are 4 interrelated possibilities on the future of Iraq. Analyzing these scenarios, each of which are handled within the study, is increasing reasons for being pessimistic about the future of Iraq more and more with each passing day.

Content

Presentation Executive Summary Introduction

1. Scenarios on the Continuation of the Current Situation in Iraq

1.a. Iraq With A Strong Central Structure

1.a.1. Strengthening the Central Government Through Democratic Methods:

1.a.2. Strengthening the Central Government Through Armed Conflict

1.a.3. Establishing Centralism By Using the Tools within the System 1. b. Iraq with a Weak Central Structure
1.b.1. The Parties’ Weakening the Centralism on Their Own Wills

1.b.2. Stopping the Conflict Before It Expands
1.c. Fragile and Unstable Iraq:
1.d. Civil War and Chaotic Environment:
2. The End of the Current Situation: Scenarios of a Split Iraq Scenarios on the Future of Iraq

by: Eric Schmitt and Michael S. Schmidt, The New York Times News Service | Report

A senior American official said that negotiations were under way to obtain authorization for the current drone operations, but Ali al-Mosawi, a top adviser to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki; Iraq’s national security adviser, Falih al-Fayadh; and the acting minister of interior, Adnan al-Asadi, all said in interviews that they had not been consulted by the Americans.

Mr. Asadi said that he opposed the drone program: “Our sky is our sky, not the U.S.A.’s sky.”

Maliki, in his statements, has argued that Turkey is interfering with the internal affairs of Iraq; however, he has failed to accuse the US, which occupied the country as of 2003, or Iran of doing the same, especially given that Iran even interfered with the appointment of its government. Nobody can argue that Maliki holds constructive and positive views on Turkey. However, he has never made such strong public statements before. Why is he making them now?Maliki has argued that Turkey has strong ties with the Sunni Arabs in the country through bonds with Sunni leader Tariq al-Hashimi. However, it is a known fact that Turkey has good relations with the Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council and its leader, Ammar al-Hakim, as well as the Sadr movement. It is obvious that not all Shiites have trouble with Turkey and that only relations with Maliki and the Dawa Party have deteriorated. This is the best indicator that Turkey has been relying on a discourse that does not put emphasis on sectarianism.

Maliki’s new policy of targeting Turkey since Dec. 2011, which has escalated tension with Ankara, appeared to come to a halt on Jan. 25, when Hakim paid a visit to Ankara. However, Maliki still keeps criticizing and condemning the Sunni-Arab leaders in the country. Over the past week, the Baghdad deputy governor, the Diyala deputy governor and the Salahaddin parliament speaker have been arrested for supporting terrorism. All of them are members of the Sunni al-Iraqiya movement. Vice President Hashimi, another Sunni-Arab politician, is still in Erbil. His motion to be tried in Kirkuk has been dismissed by the Iraqi Supreme Court. Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq may be replaced by another politician from Iraqiya. It is useful to recall that Mutlaq is a former Baath member and that he participated in the elections due to strong demand by the US and Turkey despite the fact he was on a list of those banned from running for office before the March 7, 2010 elections.

As Maliki takes a stronger stance against the Sunni-Arab politicians, the troubles within Iraqiya are manifesting more visibly. The leadership of the party, which protested the cabinet and the parliament after the arrest of Hashimi and did not join the parliamentary sessions, is now unable to control the party group. Some ministers and deputies did not comply with the party’s decision to boycott the parliamentary activities. The Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC) in the Iraqiya bloc endorsed the party’s decision; however, some of its ministers did not support it.

To what point will Maliki escalate tension? When he was elected prime minister in 2006, Maliki did not have strong tribal or political support. He was appointed prime minister because he was not strong not because he was strong. However, over time, he proved that he was a smart politician, showing that a weak prime minister could actually turn into a strong political figure. He attracted the support of civilian and military bureaucracy, putting emphasis on the unity and integrity of Iraq. It has become a fashion to wear badges and tags of the Iraqi map. Only nine months after the general elections on March 7, 2010, Maliki was able to form the government on Dec. 21, 2010. The new election system and the parties’ preference to take part in the elections as coalitions and political blocs created a divided parliament and government. For this reason, after the withdrawal of the US troops, Maliki has been trying to intimidate the Sunni-Arab politicians. If he succeeds in this plan, Maliki, as argued by reports and analyses, could turn his attention to the Shiite parties and then the Kurds as well to secure a Shiite union in the country.

Maliki’s policies that have been escalating tensions as of late have also led to escalated violence, particularly in Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk. The manageable chaotic environment is about to be replaced by an unpredictable chaos in the country.

At the end of December 2011,Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani, backed by the United States, called for a national conference of all of Iraq’s ruling political parties to try to resolve their on-going disputes. At first, it seemed like this would happen as planned, but nothing is that easy inIraq. First, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Lawand the National Alliance led by the Sadrists demanded that the meet happen in Baghdad, while the Iraqi National Movement (INM) and the Kurdish Coalition said it should occur in Kurdistan. Then, the INM demanded Vice President Tariq Hashemi’s terrorism case by dealt with at the conference; something that they had previously said should be excluded. Third, Maliki suspended the National Movement ministers that were boycotting the cabinet, escalating tensions once more. Finally, the INM is making empty threats about replacing Maliki, which only exposes their already weakened position. All together, it does not look like the conference will resolve much, as the soap opera of Iraqi politics continues.

Western Oil Firms Big Winners In Iraq

By Sherwood Ross

19 January, 2012Countercurrents.org

Western oil producers have emerged as the big winners of the Iraq war.

“Prior to the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq US and other
western oil companies were all but completely shut out of Iraq’s oil
market,” industry analyst Antonia Juhasz told Al Jazeera wire service.
“But thanks to the invasion and occupation, the companies are now backinside Iraq and producing oil there for the first time since beingforced out of the country in 1973.”

“Western producers like BP, Exxon Mobil, and Shell are enjoying their
best access to Iraq’s southern oil fields since 1972,” Business Week
noted in its issue of March 4th of last year. (1972 was the year
Saddam Hussein nationalized Iraq’s oil fields.)

Business Week quotes Andy Inglis, BP’s chief executive for exploration
and production as saying, “We see this as the beginning of a long-term
relationship with Iraq and will continue to look for further
opportunities.”

Turkmens in Iraq fear for their future

BAGHDAD – Anatolia News Agency

Chairman of the Iraqi Turkmen Front Arshad al-Salehi said the future of Turkmen in Iraq was in danger. Speaking to the Anatolia news agency, al-Salehi said some wanted Iraq to be divided into three parts, one each for Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, and did not want Turkmen in the country. Al-Salehi said Turkmen were now in need of “full support” because their future was in danger.

Al-Salehi said the Turkmen Front would attend a national conference to be held in Iraq in the coming days, representing Turkmen. They would then present their demands at the conference, he said. “We will ask support of everyone there. We will hold talks. We will demand meetings from political groups and parties,” he said. Turkmen should be regarded as the cement of Iraq, he said.

Israeli drones are reported spying on Turkey for the Kurdish group PKK

Heron unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Photo: EPA

Israeli drones have been detected spying on Turkish military units in southern Turkey for the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party), according to Today’s Zaman, Turkey’s English version of the mass-circulation Turkish daily Zaman. The PKK is considered by the US and EU to be a terrorist organization.

Turkish intelligence agencies prepared a report after the detection of two Israeli Herons in Hatay and Adana roughly two months ago, claiming that the Herons are collecting intelligence on Turkish military units in order to aid PKK operations in those regions.

The report asserts that the PKK’s training camps in northern Syria, near Turkey’s Hatay border “where Turkish military border posts are relatively weak,” were established in those locations based on intelligence collected by the UAVs.

The report also claims that Kenan Yıldızbakan, a PKK member who commanded an assault against a Turkish naval base in İskenderun in 2010, has made repeated trips into Israeli territory, reinforcing suspicions of a possible link between Israel and the PKK.

Today the same publication reported there were “increasing indications” that Israel and the PKK were “uniting against the Turkish government” in an analysis by Dr. Othman Ali titled “Possible consequences of PKK-Israeli union:”

If this alliance is to take place, it will have serious and far-reaching consequences for Turkey and the Kurdish question. It is our contention that the Kurds and the PKK, in particular are going to be the most adversely affected by this alliance. How and why did this union between PKK and Israel come up and what can be done to deny Israel this leverage in its conflict with Turkey? Starting in the early 1950s, the Israeli intelligence service (Mossad) developed what was known as “the “periphery policy” of the Middle East in which it planned to establish ties with ethnic and religious minorities in the area in order to break the Arab embargo and the isolation Israel feels. Thus, Israel cemented close ties with some Maronites, Druze, Copts, the shah of Iran and Kurdish leaders and groups….

Consequently, Mossad managed to penetrate the Kurdish movement in the early 1960s. The story of Kurdish-Israeli ties has been detailed in “The Mossad in Iraq” by Shlomo Nakdimon. It suffices to say that the relationship was very exploitive and had harmful consequences for the Kurds. It was Zionist circles which in response to then-Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s request to end the war in Iraqi Kurdistan asked the shah of Iran in 1975 to cut support for the Kurdish revolution. So Kurds have experienced Israel, with tragic consequences in the last century, and the PKK needs to take this into account.

The Jerusalem Post is following this story under the title ‘PKK using Israeli drones to attack Turkish troops’

The party, known by its acronym PKK, has a long history of violence in pursuit of Kurdish-self rule and is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union.

The report also claims that Kenan Yıldızbakan – a PKK member who led an assault against a Turkish naval base in Hatay in 2010 – has visited Israel on numerous occasions, further raising suspicions of his organization’s ties to the Jewish state.

Seymour Hersh reported in 2004 that hundreds of Israeli agents, including Mossad agents, were conducting covert operations in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Iran and Syria. PKK militants have confessed to having received training from Mossad officials.

We are extremely distressed to hear of the rocket launcher attack against the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Baghdad on the 18th of January Wednesday. On behalf of myself, the Iraqi Turkmen and the Iraqi Turkmen Front Turkey Representation I protest this attack with vehemence and hope the perpetrators are apprehended without delay. Such attacks of terror targeting to destroy the stability being established in Iraq as well as harm the relationship between Turkey and Iraq are unacceptable.

We take the opportunity to wish the personnel of the Republic of Turkey Baghdad Embassy leading with the distinguished Ambassador, His Excellency Yunus Demirer and the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey a speedy recovery and hope such a vile incident never recurs.