Reed v. EOS CCA

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

November 22, 2016

Thomas Reed, Plaintiff,v.EOS CCA, Defendant.

ORDER

Hon.
Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge

This
case involves Defendant EOS CCA's
(“EOS”) efforts to collect a principal
amount, interest, and fees/collection costs on behalf of
AT&T Mobility. AT&T Mobility claimed Plaintiff Thomas
Reed owed these amounts after he stopped making payments on
his AT&T Mobility account. Mr. Reed initiated this action
against EOS, alleging that it violated § 1692d, 1692e,
and 1692f of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”). He argued that EOS violated
the FDCPA by attempting to collect interest and collection
costs not provided for in any contract between him and
AT&T Mobility. Despite settling numerous other cases
involving the same issue, EOS opted to vigorously litigate
this case. Ultimately, the Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Mr. Reed on his § 1692e and § 1692f claims
related to the collection of interest and costs, finding that
EOS had not provided any evidence suggesting the presence of
a binding contract between Mr. Reed and AT&T Mobility
that provided for the imposition of those amounts.
[Filing No. 62 at 9-12.] The Court denied Mr.
Reed's summary judgment motion as it related to his
§ 1692d claim, finding that he had not presented any
evidence of a violation of that provision. [FilingNo. 62 at 12-13.] On May 13, 2016, Mr. Reed notified
the Court that he was voluntarily dismissing his § 1692d
claim. [Filing No. 67.][1]

Presently
pending before the Court are Mr. Reed's Motion for
Assessment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, [Filing No.
75], and his Supplemental Motion for Assessment of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, [Filing No. 83]. As
discussed below, the Court finds the fees and costs Mr. Reed
requests to be reasonable for the most part, with some
adjustments. Accordingly, it grants Mr. Reed's motion in
part and denies it in part.

After
obtaining summary judgment on two of his claims, the parties
agreed that Mr. Reed would receive $1, 000 in statutory
damages from EOS, and the fee issue is now the only issue
remaining in this litigation. [SeeFiling No. 83
at 1.] Mr. Reed now seeks a total of $26, 791.51 in
attorneys' fees and $1, 390.26 in costs. [Filing No.
75;Filing No. 83.]

II.

Applicable
Law

Section
1692k of the FDCPA provides that “any debt collector
who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter
with respect to any person is liable to such person in an
amount equal to the sum of…in the case of any
successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the
costs of the action, together with a reasonable
attorney's fee as determined by the court.” 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). The party seeking the fee award
has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the fees
sought. Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d
544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999). Once this burden is met, then the
party opposing the fee award has the burden of demonstrating
why the amount sought is unreasonable. Pickett v.
Sheridan Health Care Ctr.,664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir.
2011).

Typically,
the district court “is in the best position to make the
‘contextual and fact-specific' assessment of what
fees are reasonable.” Montanez v. Simon, 755
F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 2014). Although the district
court's discretion is not boundless, the United States
Supreme Court “has said that there is hardly any
‘sphere of judicial decisionmaking in which appellate
micromanagement has less to recommend.'”
Id. (quoting Fox v. Vice,131 S.Ct. 2205,
2216 (2011)).

The
Court “generally begins the fee calculation by
computing a ‘lodestar': the product of the hours
reasonably expended on the case multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate.” Montanez, 755 F.3d at
553. “Although the lodestar yields a
presumptively reasonable fee, ” the Court may still
adjust that fee based on factors not included in the
computation. Id.(citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart,461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). Ultimately,
“the guiding inquiry is whether ‘the plaintiff
achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours reasonably
expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee
award.'” Montanez, 755 F.3d at 553
(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). In calculating
the lodestar the Court “need not, and indeed should
not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in
shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not
to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox, 131 S.Ct. at
2216. Accordingly, the Court “may take into account
their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in
calculating and allocating an attorney's time.”
Id.

III.

Discussion

Mr.
Reed argues in support of his motion that EOS chose to
litigate this case even though it settled seven similar
cases, that an award of attorneys' fees is mandatory
under the FDCPA when the plaintiff prevails, that the
lodestar method is applicable, that his attorneys' rates
are reasonable, and that his attorneys spent a reasonable
amount of time litigating the case. [Filing No. 76 at
1-13.] Mr. Reed submits the curriculum vitae of his
attorneys, [Filing No. 75-2;Filing No.
75-5], his attorneys' itemized invoices, [Filing
No. 75-3], and the Declaration of David J. Philipps,
[Filing No. 75-6]. Mr. Philipps is an experienced
FDCPA litigator who opines that Mr. Reed's attorneys have
“a solid reputation for their work for consumers on
FDCPA lawsuits, ” and that their hourly rates are
“at the low end of the range of rates charged in the
Indianapolis market for work performed in contingent,
statutory fee-shifting cases, particularly considering their
experience in such matters.” [Filing No. 75-6 at
20-21.] Mr. Philipps also opines that the paralegal who
performed work on Mr. Reed's case has a rate which is
within the reasonable range. [Filing No. 75-6 at
21.] Finally, he states that “[t]he records reveal
that [Mr. Reed's attorneys] have been extremely efficient
in their time, with much of the time incurred by [an
associate], who has a lower rate.” [Filing No. 75-6
at 21.]

In
response, EOS argues that the fees Mr. Reed seeks should be
“drastically reduced.” [Filing No. 80 at
1.] It agrees that the lodestar method applies, but
argues that the hourly rates requested are unreasonable, and
the hours expended are unreasonable for a variety of reasons,
including that: (1) time was spent on boilerplate forms and
tasks; (2) time was spent on purely administrative and
clerical tasks; and (3) time was spent on duplicative,
excessive, and unnecessary tasks. [Filing No. 80 at
2-14.] EOS requests that the fee award be reduced to an
amount not to exceed $5, 000. [Filing No. 80 at 14.]

On
reply, Mr. Reed reiterates many of his arguments, and
stresses that EOS levied an aggressive defense in this case,
that his attorneys needed to tailor boilerplate pleadings to
this case, that the items EOS claims were purely clerical in
nature were not, and that the attorneys did not perform
duplicative work. [Filing No. 82.]

The
Court will address each of EOS's arguments in turn.

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