Although mineral specialization in Africa is closely linked
with colonial history, political independence was not accompanied
by a desire to break with it. During the 1960s and 1970s world
capitalism's economic system has been subject to decisive changes
as a result both of objective processes and of deliberate
strategies of social actors, in the West as well as in parts of
the Third World. But the African continent has been largely
excluded from such structural changes so that its position within
the world capitalist economy remains almost unchanged.

The contemporary growth of industry and modern services in
Asia and South America has no equivalent in Africa, even north of
the Sahara, and domestic economies remain mainly based on primary
activities, agriculture and mining. With the change in the
characteristics of international investment Africa has become
less important as an outlet for capital exports of European
metropoles. Actually the African continent now receives only a
very minor share of the direct foreign investments of Western
enterprises. For example, around the mid-1970s, foreign
investments in Africa represented barely 5% of total foreign
investments in the world, and most of these followed the
traditional pattern of plantation or mining investment. Yet, if
in relative terms direct investment in Africa has decreased,
other financial flows, such as commercial and bank credits or
government loans have increased, so that the proportion of direct
investments in total financial flows became very small, compared
to other areas of the Third World. In 1974, this proportion was,
for example, 28% in Liberia, 11 % in Zaire and the Congo, and 0%
in Zambia, while according to OECD data it was 38% in the
Philippines; 50% in South Korea; 83% in Malaysia; 60% in
Indonesia; 54% in Brazil; and 70% in Mexico. These figures are
all the more interesting as the volume of total financial flows
that Africa received was relatively very high. For instance, in
1974, Zaire attracted as much capital as South Korea, and the
Congo as much as the Philippines. The amount and structure of
financial flows must be linked with the consolidation of the
mining specialization of some African countries on the one hand,
and the new financing strategies of Western and Japanese groups
on the other.

The study of mining investment projects in Africa confirms
what has been said earlier about the trends of mineral
specialization.

Copper development seems to be definitely not on the agenda
since the only big project considered is that of Tenke-Fungurume
in Zaire, where there are estimated reserves of 50 million tons
of very high grade ore (5.7%). Initially, this project was to
give an output of 150,000 tons of metallic copper per year, but
the figure was later reduced by one-third. The Société Minière
of Tenke-Fungurume, which was created ten years ago to implement
this project, has already spent $280 million of an estimated
total cost of one billion dollars, but construction has been
stopped because of the recession in the world copper market. If
the project had been achieved, the additional output would not,
in any case, have decisively affected the world position of
Africa for copper. By contrast, the number of big investment
projects for the extraction of iron ore, bauxite and uranium is
really impressive.

Six big projects were adopted during the 1970s which if
implemented would have increased the present production capacity
of iron ore in Africa (excluding South Africa) two and a half
times. These projects followed the old colonial pattern of
mineral exploitation, based on the combination of a mining field,
a railway corridor and a harbour, which characterizes the iron
ore activity in Liberia and Mauritania. But the depletion of the
coastal deposits leads in some cases to the exploitation of
fields farther inland, which of course increases the cost of
infrastructures. The six projects are located in Mauritania (the
Guelbs), Senegal (Faleme), Guinea (Mifergui-Nimba), Liberia (Bie
Mountain and Wologisi), Ivory Coast (Mount Klahoyo) and Gabon
(Belinga).

The Guelbs project in Mauritania, actually replaces the
present mines which are likely to be depleted by the end of the
1980s. Reserves on the new site are estimated at 500 million tons
and the projected output as 12 million tons around 1989. But in
contrast to the ore extracted from the Kedia d'Idjil mine, that
of the Guelbs is of low metallic content (35% to 42%) and will
have to be processed on site to obtain concentrates of higher
grade. The project, however, does not require big infrastructural
investments as it is located near the old deposit and its railway
line.

The exploitation of the Faleme project in Senegal, however,
requires the construction of a railway track, a hydroelectric dam
and a harbour. The cost of these infrastructures represents
between 75% and 80% of total investment, which in 1980 was
estimated at 250 billion CFA francs. Ore reserves, of a very high
grade (63%) amount to some 350 million tons, and the planned
output is 12 million tons per annum.

The Mifergui-Nimba project in Guinea is bigger still. Ore
reserves on the field are estimated at 600 million tons of rich
ore (65%) and the site is near the Liberian facilities which,
with some small investments, could be utilized. But this project,
with a planned production of 15 million tons, is actually the
least expensive. Long-term prospects are also more promising in a
country such as Guinea, which is endowed with huge resources of
rich iron ore (around nine billion tons!) and which possesses the
best fluvial network in Western Africa.

Two other big projects for iron ore extraction are planned in
Liberia. The first, with a production target of five million
tons, will replace the Bomi Hill mine exploited by the US group
Republic Steel. The second is that of Wologisi, with a planned
output of ten million tons; this requires new infrastructures.

The Mount Klahoyo project, in Ivory Coast, is also very
important, with a planned production of 12.5 million tons, as is
the Belinga project in Gabon, with 15 million tons of rich ore.

All these projects are run by joint ventures in which the
participants are local governments, Western and Japanese steel
companies and, less frequently UK and US mining groups and
European state agencies such as the French Bureau of Geological
and Mineral Research. While most old mines supply only the plant
of the overseas owner, new mines must supply the steel plants of
all foreign investors in proportion to their capital share and
only the output corresponding to the local government's share is
for the open market. These joint venture projects were planned by
the Western and Japanese steel groups in the framework of a
global strategy of iron ore supply during the 1960s and early
1970s when there was rapid growth in the world iron demand and a
search for higher grade ore. But the crisis of the Western steel
industry from the mid-1970s has delayed the implementation of
most of these projects. According to the Ivorian Ministry of
Mines, 'the delay in the implementation of the Mount Klahoyo
project is due to the fact that Japanese and European steel
companies, which have a participation of 85%, face huge
difficulties, although the ore is of very high quality'. This
holds true of all other projects, except those replacing mines
that are becoming exhausted, such as those in Mauritania and
Liberia.

Hence, the world capitalist crisis that has affected the
Western and Japanese steel industries since the 1970s has delayed
Africa's specialization in iron ore production which was
projected in the context of an expanding world economy. While the
growth prospects of copper extraction in Africa were quite
negligible by comparison with Asia and South America, the
investment projects in iron ore would have given Africa, along
with Brazil and Australia, a greater role in supplying Western
and Japanese steel industries.

By contrast, the extraction of bauxite and uranium has been
developed despite or maybe because of the crisis. The investment
projects should entail a very big increase of bauxite production
into the late 1990s. Most of these projects are located in
Guinea, but some also involve other countries such as Ghana and
Sierra Leone. Besides the extension of the Boke field from five
to ten million tons per year, three big projects will enable
Guinea to maintain its position for a long period. The Tougue
project, with two billion tons of reserves and eight million tons
of output, is run by a joint venture between the Guinean
government and the Swiss group Alusuisse. The Ayekoye deposit,
with 500 million tons of reserves and nine million tons of
planned output, is run by an association between the government
and Arab investors from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. Lastly
the Dabola deposit, with comparable reserves, is managed by an
association between the state, the US group Reynolds, and
investors from Yugoslavia, Algeria and Nigeria. The first two
projects are semi-integrated, as the ore extracted will be
processed on site to produce alumina. Other bauxite investment
projects are less ambitious. These are located in Kibi in Ghana,
with three million tons of planned output; in Marondo Mountain in
Mozambique (two million tons); in Manatenina, Madagascar (two
million tons); and in Minim Martap, in Cameroun (one million
tons). Other projects could be elaborated in the future for Mali,
Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau. Of all these, however, only the
Guinean projects have so far gone beyond the stage of feasibility
studies. Here, too, the decrease in world demand for metals has
an impact, even if less pronounced than for iron and copper. But
the additional production capacity that will result from the
Guinean projects is about 20 million tons of bauxite ore, while
the current capacity is only 14 million tons. Such an expansion
in the context of the world crisis is quite remarkable, as is the
fact that in the Third World only the Guinean projects are being
implemented. The relative importance of Guinea's resources, their
quality (the alumina content of the ore is around 45-55%) and its
low ratio of production to resources, compared to other producing
areas, can easily explain this expansion. Yet the strategies of
the world aluminium industry's leading firms, which try to
diversify their sources of supply, are also a decisive factor.
These firms are very much interested in reducing the relative
significance of the producing countries in the Caribbean in the
world bauxite deliveries, as these countries were very active in
the International Bauxite Association during the 1970s. The major
participants in the world aluminium industry are involved in the
three Guinean investment projects.

As is the case of bauxite, the investment projects for uranium
confirm the specialization of some African countries in its
production and export. Apart from South Africa, these projects
are concentrated in three countries: Namibia, Niger and Gabon. In
Niger, two important mines, in Imouraren (70,000 tons of
reserves) and Azelik (12,000 tons) will soon be opened; and
exploration continues actively on a territory of nearly 300,000
square kilometres. Here too, the investment projects are managed
by joint venture finance, which associates the Nigerian
government, the French Commissariat for Atomic Energy, North
American oil groups or European and Japanese power agencies.

In Namibia, intensive search is carried out in the Namib
desert and in other places, but little information is available
on the importance of the fields discovered there. Development
prospects seem to be very favourable, especially for the deposits
of the Namib desert and Trekkopje, which very soon are to be
exploited. Concessions have been granted by the South African
government to big British and US mining groups (Rio Tinto Zinc,
Newmont, Consolidated Gold Fields) to French oil companies and,
of course, to South African groups such as De Beers and
Anglo-American.

Of all projects, those of Niger are the most advanced. When
completed, the mines of Imouraren and Afasto will give an
additional output of 5,000 tons a year, which will considerably
reinforce Africa's position on the international uranium market.

For bauxite and uranium, then, the world crisis seems to
increase the mineral specialization of Africa. This process is
the outcome of the strategies of the mining and industrial groups
in advanced countries rather than local state policies response
to the world crisis. These strategies try to concentrate the
growth of mining production in those countries where the
possibilities of challenging the world imperialist system are the
weakest, either because these countries are subject to
neo-colonial links or because their political and economic
influence is too weak to allow any possibility of action, at
least individually. Also, most of the investment projects are
located in countries which (except for iron ore) are already
producing minerals; the biggest projects for bauxite are in
Guinea, uranium mines are being opened in Namibia and Niger,
while iron ore projects are located, on the one hand, in Liberia
and Mauritania, which are old producers, and, on the other, in
countries such as Gabon, Ivory Coast and Senegal that are heavily
dependent on France and the EEC.

The direct intervention of Western and Japanese groups in the
investment projects confirms the existence of an oligopolistic
strategy which aims at maintaining Africa's specialization for
some minerals (copper) and reinforcing others (iron ore, bauxite
and uranium). This occurs when elsewhere in the Third World the
traditional forms of specialization in primary products are
increasingly challenged. It appears, then, that these strategies
separate the African mineral producing countries from other Third
World producers. This is all the more obvious for bauxite
extraction, since its strong growth in Guinea under the control
of Western aluminium companies has been clearly related to their
aim at reducing the relative significance of the Caribbean
producers.

Foreign states' intervention, either with direct participation
in financing, with a long-term purchase guarantee, or through
their mining or energy agencies, reflects their growing interest
in Africa's mineral resources. Such interest is not new: we have
recalled the influential role played by the European states in
the mining colonization of Central Africa at the turn of the
century, in close co-operation with private capitalists. Yet the
involvement of Western states (and also now Japan) in the
exploitation of African mineral riches in the recent period is
more clearly founded on strategic considerations, especially for
uranium, because of its military and energy uses, but also for
the other minerals needed by the West's advanced capitalist
countries' industries.

Africa's mineral specialization is not necessarily matched by
world mineral demand, in particular the metal consumption of
advanced capitalist countries. The demand for copper, iron ore
and aluminium, owing to the world crisis tended to stabilize
during the 1970s, as is shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 World Metal consumption (tons)

1970

1976

1983

Iron ore (millions)

773

875

764

Copper (millions)

7.5

8.8

7.7

Bauxite (millions)

40

80.4

75.8

Uranium (thousands)

-

28.3

41.5

Source: Metal Bulletin, various issues 1974 and
1984.

Traditional growth sources of iron, copper and aluminium
consumption dried up with the exhaustion of the accumulation
model based on the production of 'metal intensive' durable
consumer goods and on the use of highly mechanized technology in
the advanced capitalist world. Investment in mechanical and
electrical industries, as well as in building and construction
works, declined in Europe, the USA and Japan. The relative
stagnation of world demand for the first three metals conceals
the fact that decreased consumption by the Western economies was
compensated by an increase in Third World and socialist
countries.

The crisis in the advanced capitalist countries only
accentuates earlier trends. The progressive saturation of the
consumer durables market and the technical progress which
increased the efficiency of raw material use prefigured a
declining trend in metal consumption well before the world
economic crisis. Thus, the increase in per capita consumption of
copper and steel between 1963 and 1974 was due only to
requirements in Japan where the initial equipment level, compared
to other advanced countries, was low. In addition, the quantity
of copper used by unit of investment diminished in most
industrial countries during the decade preceding the crisis. As
for iron ore, whereas in 1960 an average of two tons was needed
to produce one ton of pig iron, in 1974 only one and a half tons
were required.

Aluminium was introduced in the middle of the last century but
its large-scale use began only after the Second World War. During
the 1950s and 1960s the general increase in mineral costs and
prices was less for aluminium than for copper and steel,
therefore, both because of a high global economic growth and
because of its substitution for other metals the consumption of
aluminium increased. This trend in the 1960s could be observed in
advanced and in Third World countries, see Table 3.2.

After 1975, however, world demand for aluminium dropped, for
the first time since 1957, as for other metals. The declining
trend in metal consumption therefore represents a structural
phenomenon that was first aggravated by the general crisis during
the 1970s, then by the big capitalist countries' deflationary
policies applied in the 1980s. True, industrial growth has
continued in socialist economies, although at a reduced rate, and
in some parts of the Third World, but this has not been enough to
compensate for the reduction of Western and Japanese consumption.

Table 3.2 Per capita consumption of aluminium (lb)

1960

1972

USA

24

56.4

France

11

21.5

Italy

6.5

17.5

Federal Republic of Germany

16

33.7

Great Britain

17.2

24

Japan

4.3

32.5

Brazil

1.2

3.5

Taiwan

1.1

4.8

Source: Industrie Minérale, 1974.

The forecasts made in the 1970s about the future growth of
metal demand, when the structural character of the crisis was not
yet fully understood, were too optimistic and had to be
systematically revised. Because of the oil price rise, only the
demand for uranium has increased during the recent period. Today,
uranium is mainly used as an energy source, even if its military
use is far from insignificant in the developed countries. Between
1942 and 1975, military requirements for uranium represented
about 200,000 tons, that is, almost half of the world's cumulated
output in that period. After 1975, however, demand for uranium
accelerated in the advanced countries, as OPEC's decision to
increase oil prices made the production of electricity more
profitable by utilizing nuclear power. Calculations made in 1977
by the French Ministry of Industry show not only that nuclear
powered electricity had become profitable, but also that its cost
is less, dependent on the price of other raw materials used in
its production. At a price of $35 per pound of uranium, the unit
cost of electricity (in cents/kilowatt/hour) and its breakdown
according to the raw material used is illustrated in Table 3.3.

The growth of civil demand for uranium may be estimated on the
basis of the growing share of nuclear fuelled electricity in the
global energy supply. At the beginning of the 1980s this share
was more than 10% in the USA and Britain, around 20% in Germany
and Japan, and almost 40% in France. The development of nuclear
energy in France has been so important that the proportion of
nuclear fuelled electricity in total electricity production
reached the level of 65% in 1985.

Table 3.3 Comparative cost per unit to produce electricity
according to fuel used

Uranium

Fuel-oil

Coal

Investment

5

2.7

3.1

Exploitation

2

1.7

1.8

Fuel-oil

3

8.9

6.7

Total

10

13.3

11.6

Source: French Ministry of Industry, 1977.

Nuclear energy has been developed mainly as a substitute for
traditional energy sources rather than as a response to growing
global energy needs. Between 1960 and 1981, the number of nuclear
power stations in operation grew tenfold and their total capacity
increased from one to 170 gigawatts (one gigawatt = one thousand
million watts). In 1984, there was a world total of 323 nuclear
power stations in 26 countries, with a combined capacity of 208
gigawatts. The present forecasts give an estimated additional
capacity of 150 to 200 gigawatts for the year 2000.

In interpreting the recent evolution of Africa's mineral
specialization, it is apparent that the stagnation of copper
extraction corresponds to the declining trend in copper use in
those advanced countries that have always been the main outlets
for African exports. Likewise, the growth of uranium production
in Africa seems to reflect the growing nuclear energy needs of
the advanced countries. By contrast, the development of bauxite
production in Africa has occurred in spite of the fall in demand
for aluminium which the crisis induced in the major capitalist
economies. Mining growth in Africa is clearly here a substitute
for actual production elsewhere, especially in those producing
countries of the Caribbean which tried to challenge the
multinationals' power on the world market during the 1970s. Iron
ore specialization follows quite a similar pattern. True, the
severe steel crisis in the Western countries and Japan has
delayed the opening of new African mines. The declining trend in
steel consumption observed in developed countries before the
crisis, however, did not discourage the big steel companies of
the West and Japan from planning ambitious development programmes
for iron ore extraction in Africa. The growth of iron ore
production on the African continent is, therefore, also a
substitute for production elsewhere, at least potentially, as
long as the Western steel crisis continues. The divergence
between the pattern of world metal consumption, and particularly
that of the advanced capitalist countries, and the profile of the
mineral specialization of Africa is an indication of the play of
Western and Japanese operators' strategies aimed at reshaping the
role of Africa in the world metal market.