The Army has committed itself to the most dramatic change
of any of the US military services. In October 1999 General Eric K. Shinseki, then the
Army Chief of Staff, announced a goal of reconfiguring the Army from a force mainly
composed of heavy formations into a medium-weight force capable of deploying a
5,000-soldier brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours. The Army is replacing some
heavy armored and mechanized units with a force of six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
equipped with light wheeled armored vehicles. By 2010, it will field a networked Future
Force equipped with the Future Combat System.1 This shift away from heavy armor as the main combat element of the
Army portends change not only to the Armys organization and systems, but also to its
hierarchy, career paths, and organizational culture.

The officer corps
will play a key role in determining the success or failure of Army transformation.
Enthusiastic officers will work hard to make new concepts and organizations a reality.
Skeptical officers, by contrast, could undermine such efforts. Unfortunately, to date
leaders have had little reliable data upon which to gauge the attitudes of Army officers
toward the new combat methods. On the one hand, the Army leadership asserts that the
service embraces innovation. As the Army Transformation Roadmap puts it:

The Army recognizes
the need to create a culture of innovation, and we are beginning to address this need
through the officer professional development system. Initiatives to nurture innovation are
emerging from the top down and the bottom up. These provide evidence not only of the
Armys commitment to this endeavor, but also of the favorable climate within
todays Army towards innovation.2

57/58

On the other hand,
in the wake of General Shinsekis initiative there were numerous reports of
opposition to transformation from within the ranks of the service.3 Nearly all such reports, however, are anecdotal,
consisting of scattered quotes from unnamed sources.

This article
presents selected results of the first systematic effort to understand officer attitudes
toward transformation in recent years. It is based upon surveys conducted in 2000 and 2002
of more than 4,500 officersincluding nearly 1,900 Army officers. It reveals a
dramatic shift in Army attitudes toward transformation during that period. In 2000, Army
officers as a group were among the more skeptical of the need for change; in late 2002,
they were among the most supportive. In 2002 they shared a belief that the spread of
long-range precision-strike capabilities would require the Army to become lighter and more
capable of dispersing on the battlefield. However, they were uncertain that the Army was
on the right path in seeking to replace heavy armored vehicles with formations reliant
upon robust information networks. Moreover, many felt that elements of the Armys
organizational culture inhibited innovation.

Why Study
Officer Attitudes?

There are four
compelling reasons why it is important to understand officer attitudes toward
transformation. First, the military services will be the ultimate practitioners of the new
ways of war. The extent to which their members are enthusiastic about change may help
determine the success or failure of new technologies, operational concepts, and
organizations. Second, although very few officers will likely emerge as true innovators,
the existence of a climate conducive to innovation within the officer corps may encourage
individuals both to generate new ideas and to remain in the service to bring them to
fruition. Third, a large percentage of career officers will rise to senior leadership
positions within their services in the next 10 to 20 years. In those roles, they will
establish command climates that will either support or inhibit risk-taking and innovation.
Past research has demonstrated the importance to innovation of senior officers who protect
and nurture the careers of young innovators under their command who are willing to take
risks.4 Finally, officers

58/59

are the recognized experts in military
affairs in the United States. They should be expected to take a leading role in
determining the need for adopting different approaches to warfare.

Although officer
attitudes may play an important role in the process of innovation, to date they have
received little scrutiny. This article presents the results of a multi-year project
designed to redress this shortfall.5 Since
2000 we have employed two large-scale surveys and a series of focus groups to gain a
better understanding of officer attitudes and what shapes them. First, between March and
October 2000 we conducted a survey of more than 1,900 officersincluding 900 Army
officersattending seven US professional military education (PME) institutions.6 The survey population included junior and field-grade
officers (O-3 through O-4), senior officers (O-5 through O-6), and flag officers (O-7
through O-8) from all branches of the US military, their reserve components, and the
National Guard, as well as foreign officers and US government civilians.7 We
also conducted a series of focus groups to help us better understand the results of the
survey.

Second, in September
and October 2002 we administered a web-based survey of more than 2,500
officersincluding 962 Army officers attending 14 PME institutions.8 This survey included many statements that had appeared in
the 2000 survey as well as a number of new ones.9 Although the survey population may not be a characteristic
cross-section of the entire officer corps, it is representative of the subset of the
officer corps that gets an opportunity to attend PME institutions. Army, Air Force, and
Marine Corps officers in particular are selected to attend PME institutions based upon
their potential for higher command. Responses from todays senior and flag officers
provide insight into the attitudes of those who will be responsible for making decisions
about how the armed forces transform themselves over the next five to ten years. By
contrast, todays junior officers will occupy the leadership of the US armed forces
in 2020 to 2025.10

Our research
demonstrates that nearly two decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was designed
to make the US armed forces more joint, service affiliation remains the
strongest determinant of officer

59/60

attitudes. In
general, an officers service affiliation proved more important in shaping his
attitudes than his warfighting specialty. In other words, the attitudes of infantry
officers in the Army were more like those of Army officers as a whole than like those of
infantry officers in the Marine Corps. Rank also influenced attitudes, although to a much
lesser degree. Senior officers were generally more expectant of change than junior and
field-grade officers. Other demographic variables, like whether an officer had served in
combat, had little to no effect upon responses.

The two surveys
reveal a significant shift in Army attitudes toward transformation in recent years. In
2000, Army and Marine Corps officers were consistently more skeptical of the proposition
that we are experiencing a revolution in warfare than their Navy and Air Force
counterparts. Army and Marine Corps officers tended to feel most strongly that
todays dominant weapon systems and organizations would be as important in the future
as they are today. Conversely, they were more skeptical than their Navy and Air Force
counterparts that the information revolution is changing the character of warfare. They
believed less strongly than other officers that the United States was embarked upon a path
to radical change. Indeed, they were the most doubtful of the need for the US armed forces
to change.11

By late 2002, by
contrast, Army attitudes had shifted significantly toward those of the Air Force and Navy
officers and away from those of the Marine Corps officers. Army officers had become much
more supportive of change in the abstract and in the Army in particular. They also were
generally supportive of the move to medium-weight forces, though a significant minority
remained to be convinced that the Army was on the right path. On the other hand, the 2002
survey also revealed the widespread view that aspects of the Armys organizational
culture might inhibit innovation.

Transformation
and the US Armed Forces

George W. Bush
campaigned on a pledge to transform the US armed forces by skipping a generation of
technology. In a September 1999 campaign speech at The Citadel military college,
then-governor Bush noted that our military is still organized more for Cold War
threats than the challenges of the new centuryfor industrial-age operations, rather
than information-age battles.12
Transforming the US armed forces became one of the Bush Administrations top
priorities when it took office. Speaking at the Norfolk Navy Base in February 2001,
President Bush promised to move beyond marginal improvements to harness new
technologies that will support a new strategy. He called for the development of
ground forces that are lighter, more mobile, and more lethal, as well as manned and
unmanned air forces capable of striking across the globe with precision.13

60/61

Soon after assuming
office, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commissioned Andrew W. Marshall, the
Pentagons premier strategic thinker, to conduct a fundamental review of US strategy
and force requirements. He also commissioned a panel of senior experts to develop a
transformation strategy for the Pentagon.14 However, early proposals to reduce the size of the US armed forces
and cancel major acquisition programs to fund the development of new weapon systems
garnered opposition among members of Congress and senior members of the armed services.15 The Defense Departments 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review contained none of the radical changes that originally had been discussed within the
Defense Department.16

The war on terrorism
has given transformation a new lease on life. In a second speech at The Citadel on 11
December 2001, President Bush renewed his call for the transformation of the US armed
forces. Arguing that the conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future
of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums, Bush
called upon the military to field forces that would rely more heavily on unmanned aerial
vehicles and precision-guided munitions. He also called for sacrifice, warning that
every service and every constituency of our military must be willing to sacrifice
some of their pet projects. Our war on terror cannot be used to justify obsolete bases,
obsolete programs, or obsolete weapons. Every dollar of defense spending must meet a
single test: It must help us build the decisive power we will need to win the wars of the
future17

The Armys
transformation program is motivated by a perceived gap between the changing security
environment and the Armys force structure. On the one hand, the emerging strategic
environment increasingly demands forces that are rapidly deployable. On the other hand,
the US Army is divided between forces that are heavily armored and pack a lot of firepower
but are slow to deploy, and light forces that can deploy quickly but lack lethality and
survivability. The Army Transformation Roadmap puts the situation in stark terms:

With each passing
year, our condition as a force becomes a greater liability. In time, that liability will
become an unacceptable risk. . . . Taken together, the demands of the strategic
environment and the realities of the Armys current condition necessitate profound
change. We recognize our future shortcomings and we know that we have operational
deficiencies today. The Army must transform.18

This transformation
effort is proceeding along three pathways. First, the Army is modernizing selected units
in the Current Force to provide a heavy capability for the foreseeable future. Second, the
Army is fielding a force of six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), which are designed
to be lighter and more deployable. Rather than relying upon armor for protection, they
will gain survivability through a combination of mobility and im-

61/62

proved information
regarding the battlefield and the enemy. The SBCTs main combat vehicle is the 19-ton
wheeled Stryker, more than 2,000 of which in ten variants will eventually be fielded. The
SBCTs will use enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to develop an
understanding of the battlefield situation before making contact with the enemy. The
SBCTs Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadron is designed to
provide critical information on the enemy.

Third, the Army is
in the early phases of developing the Future Force, a networked, combined-arms formation
with manned and unmanned ground and air systems, robust communications networks, and
reduced dependence on fixed infrastructure. As the Army Transformation Roadmap puts
it, We will design and structure [Future] Force formations for rapid response and
deployment, including the capability to conduct operational maneuver from strategic
distance employing combined arms in decisive operations.19 The
Future Force will feature the Future Combat System (FCS), a family of manned and unmanned
weapon systems, and will rely upon information networks for intelligence, planning, and
operations.

Character of
Future Wars

In 2000, Army and
Marine Corps officers were the most skeptical of the proposition that new technology,
doctrine, and organizations were changing the character of war.20 Such a response is hardly unexpected. Land warfare is
less technology-dependent and more manpower-intensive than combat at sea or in the air.
Between 2000 and 2002, however, Army officers became significantly more convinced of the
changing character of war. Marine Corps officers, by contrast, became more skeptical.

In 2002, a large
majority of Army officers believed that information-age ways of war would make it easier
for the United States to use force to achieve decisive battlefield victories with
substantially reduced risk of US casualties. Sixty-seven percent of the Army officers felt
that new technology, operational concepts, and organizations would make it easier to use
force, 10 percent more than in 2000. Moreover, while 28 percent disagreed with the
statement in 2000, only 20 percent disagreed in 2002. This represented the largest shift
toward agreement of any service. By contrast, only 48 percent of Marine Corps officers
believed it would be easier to use force, 11 percent fewer than in 2000.

An even larger
majority of Army officers92 percentfelt that new ways of war would make it
easier to achieve decisive battlefield victories, compared to 56 percent in 2000. This
represented both the largest positive response and the largest shift of any service.
Although we cannot tell for

62/63

certain what caused
this shift, it appears likely that the relative ease with which US forces dislodged the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan influenced officers attitudes toward the future.

Ground forces
generally suffer the largest proportion of casualties in war. For example, ground forces
sustained 102 of the 107 combat deaths during major combat operations in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, and most of the deaths since then. Most Army officers surveyed in 2002, however,
believed that new ways of war were making combat less lethal for American service-members.
Sixty-three percent felt that new technology, operational concepts, and organizations
would offer the United States the ability to engage in high-intensity operations with a
substantially reduced risk of casualties, 11 percent more than in 2000. By contrast, only
39 percent of Marine officers agreed, 20 percent less than in 2000.

Army officers were
less sure that new ways of war would yield shorter conflicts, a view seemingly bolstered
by continuing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Only 45 percent believed that
new technology, operational concepts, and organizations would substantially reduce the
duration of future conflicts, a view essentially unchanged since 2000. Even here, however,
the Army response diverged from that of Marine Corps officers, 29 percent of whom agreed
with the statement, 15 percent fewer than in 2000.

In short, Army
officers, unlike their Marine Corps counterparts, believed that new ways of war would make
it easier for the US armed forces to use force to achieve decisive battlefield victories
with reduced casualties. Perhaps reflecting recent experience, however, they were
ambivalent over whether the information age would bring shorter conflicts.

Attitudes
Toward Change

Army officers became
significantly more supportive of change in the abstract between 2000 and 2002. For
example, 58 percent of the Army officers we surveyed in 2002 believed that the US armed
forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete effectively
with future adversaries, 10 percent more than in 2000. Similarly, while 39 percent
disagreed with the need to change radically in 2000, only 26 percent disagreed in 2002.
The response of Army officers was comparable to that of Navy and Air Force officers, 58
percent and 56 percent of whom agreed with the statement, respectively. By contrast, only
42 percent of Marine Corps officersand only 30 percent of Marine infantry
officersagreed. Moreover, 41 percent of Army officers equated transformation with
radical change, the highest percentage of any service.

Most Army officers
also believed that their service was undertaking large-scale change. Fifty-eight percent
felt that the Army was embarked upon a

63/64

path that would lead
to radical change in military technology, doctrine, and organization, the highest positive
response of any service. Similarly, 61 percent believed that the US armed forces as a
whole were embarked upon a path that would lead to radical changealso the highest
positive response of any service.

Junior officers
tended to see current changes as more significant than senior officers. Sixty-one percent
of Army captains and majors believed that the Army was undergoing radical change, compared
to 53 percent of lieutenant colonels and colonels. Similarly, 64 percent of Army junior
officers believed the US armed forces as a whole were experiencing radical change,
compared to 56 percent of senior officers.

We also found a
major shift in attitudes toward change in the Army. Most Army officers who participated in
our 2000 survey were solidly in favor of maintaining the status quo. Army officers tended
to believe more strongly than Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps officers that todays
dominant weapon systems would be equally important in 20 years time. This included
not only armored and mechanized formations, but also manned aircraft and carrier battle
groups.21 By contrast, respondents to the 2002
survey appeared to take the Army leadership at its word that heavy formations would play a
progressively less important role in the service. For example, only 18 percent predicted
that armored and mechanized units would be the primary force element of the Army in 2020.22
They also believed that the Army would deploy something like the Future Combat System to
replace the main battle tank. Sixty-three percent felt that it was likely that by 2020
main battle tanks like the M1A2 Abrams would be replaced by smaller vehicles that would
retain their survivability by substituting mobility and information networking for heavy
armor.

Although Army
officers believed that the service would move from heavy to medium-weight forces, they
were less sure that this was advisable. Although two-thirds of respondents believed that
heavy armor would not be the primary force element of the Army in 2020, only a small
percentage (17 percent) definitively believed that heavy armor would not be relevant to
future conflicts. Moreover, the experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom is likely to have
increased support for the future relevance of heavy armor.

Army transformation
is based upon a series of premises. The first is that advanced weaponryincluding
nuclear, biological, and chemical arms in the hands of adversaries will require that
forces disperse in order to survive. In the words of the Army Transformation Roadmap,
the Future Force will negate anti-access and area-denial strategies through its
ability to deploy from multiple points of origin to multiple points of entry, in remote
areas with unimproved infrastructure, and operate with a minimal logistical tail.23 The second is that advanced information technology will
allow dispersed forces to retain or even increase their effectiveness. Indeed, information
technology may allow

64/65

ground forces to
mass effects without massing physically. It may also permit ground forces to conduct
decisive engagements at far greater ranges than has heretofore been possible.

Most officers
appeared to agree with the need to deploy forces that are less dependent upon ports and
airfields. Seventy-three percent of Army officers believed that within the next ten years
some adversaries would likely have the ability to use long-range, precision-strike weapons
such as ballistic and cruise missiles to deny the United States the use of fixed military
infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and logistical sites. This represented a
complete turnaround from 2000, when only eight percent agreed with that statement.24
While we can only speculate as to the source of this change, it appears that the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon shattered a sense
of invulnerability that had previously obtained. Moreover, 82 percent of those who agreed
felt the risk to forward bases of being attacked by precision-strike weapons would force
the US armed forces to introduce new operational concepts that would allow them to project
power without reliance on forward bases.

Many officers also
felt that the US Army would need to disperse in future conflicts. Forty-six percent
believed that within the next ten years, the proliferation of long-range, precision-strike
weapons would make it too risky for the US military to mass forces geographically in small
areas like it did during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Seventy percent of those who agreed
believed that this increased risk would require the US military to adopt lighter and more
mobile forces, and new concepts of operations, in order to avoid being attacked.

The Armys move
to distributed forces is premised upon the existence of robust, survivable C4ISR systems.25 As
the Army Transformation Roadmap puts it:

As an
information-enabled force, Army formations will input to and leverage the Joint C4ISR
network to enable it to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. . .
. Harnessing the power of information will enable [Future] Force units to increase their
lethality, precision, and survivability even while dramatically reducing their mass and
footprint.26

Critics, however,
argue that pinning transformation upon the development of such networks is both unwise and
dangerous.27

Although many Army
officers supported the rationale for lighter, more dispersed formations, they were
skeptical of the notion that networking can substitute for armor to ensure the
survivability of future land forces. Army officers were concerned about the vulnerability
of US information systems to attack. For example, 71 percent of Army officers felt that
within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks would become a central feature of
mili-

65/66

tary operations.
Moreover, 72 percent believed that information systems and networks were highly vulnerable
to enemy countermeasures at the time of the 2002 survey. Junior officers were particularly
concerned about network vulnerability. And two-thirds believed that some future
adversaries would be able to prevent US forces from conducting operations by denying them
the use of critical information networks.

Army officers were
confident in the ability of the United States to provide persistent surveillance of areas
of interest. Fifty-four percent of Army officers felt that within the next 20 years,
sensor and command and control technology would allow the US armed forces to locate,
track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited geographic area, regardless of enemy
countermeasures, a response comparable to that in 2000. The source of this confidence is
unclear, however. Certainly the US armed forces have access to increasingly sophisticated
sensors and information processing systems. However, recent experience demonstrates the
limitations of even these systems. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, for
example, US forces have repeatedly found it difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint
Taliban and al Qaeda leaders.

In short, most Army
officers appear to support the underlying rationale for the Armys transformation to
a medium-weight force. They are also confidentperhaps overconfidentin the
ability of US sensors to provide adequate information on the adversary to enable lighter
forces to be effective. However, they are skeptical of the robustness of the information
networks needed to support dispersed operations.

Are We on the
Right Path?

Although we found
significant support for the underlying rationale for Army transformation, many Army
officers question whether the service is on the right path. Even though there is support
for the Armys plan to field medium-weight formations, a significant number of
officers remain skeptical. Forty-one percent agreed that the Army should begin now
to replace most heavy armored and mechanized forces with medium-weight or light forces.

66/67

Predictably, support
was weakest among armor officers, only 15 percent of whom agreed. By contrast, 40 percent
of infantry and 58 percent of special forces officers supported the move. However, 64
percent of Army officers believed that the Army would replace most heavy armored
and mechanized forces with medium-weight or light forces within the next 20 years. In
other words, 23 percent more officers think the Army will transform itself into a
medium-weight force than believe it should.

An officers
rank influenced his or her views of the desirability of moving from heavy to medium-weight
units. Although there was little difference between the proportion of junior officers and
senior officers who predicted that the Army would move to a medium-weight force, more
senior officers were convinced that it was the right thing to do. Forty-eight percent of
senior officers believed the Army should field medium-weight units, compared to only 38
percent of junior officers.

Officers were
similarly unsure of whether being assigned to a medium-weight unit would enhance an
officers career prospects. Forty-eight percent of Army officers responded that they
would advise a junior officer to serve in a Stryker Brigade Combat Team because it would
enhance his career. However, 58 percent of officers tended toward uncertainty (responding
3, 4, or 5 on a scale from 1 to 7), with 30 percent unsure (responding 4 on a
scale from 1 to 7). Moreover, the desirability of serving with an SBCT varied considerably
depending on an officers branch. Infantry officers saw posting to an SBCT as more
desirable than armor officers, with 61 percent of infantry and 39 percent of armor
officers responding positively to the statement. More senior officers (52 percent) saw
such an assignment as beneficial than did junior officers (47 percent).

Army officers also
saw a gap between what they believed was necessary to effect real transformation and what
the Army was actually doing. Eighty-five percent felt that real transformation would
require major changes to personnel management policies and procedures, but only 41 percent
saw evidence of major changes to personnel management in the Army. Moreover, 60 percent
tended toward uncertainty.28 Similarly, 85 percent felt that real
transformation would require major changes to military training and education, but only 48
percent saw evidence of major changes, while 63 percent were unsure.29 In
addition, 58 percent felt that training in the Army was not keeping pace with the
introduction of technology, the highest level of agreement of any service.

In short, many Army
officers we surveyed were supportive of the move from heavy to medium-weight forces.
However, a significant part of the officer corps did not believe such change was
warranted. The infantry appears more enthusiastic about transformation than armor branch
officers. This is hardly surprising, as the formation of SBCTs would appear to have no

67/68

detrimental effect
upon the infantry. By contrast, the move to medium-weight forces would appear to be a
direct threat to the continuing role of heavy armored forces. Similarly, senior officers
were more supportive than junior officers. Perhaps this was because they understood the
need for change. Or perhaps they pay more attention to the Army leaderships
rhetoric. Moreover, large majorities of officers had yet to see evidence that the Army was
serious about transforming its personnel and education systems.

Organizational
Climate

Although there is
reason for supporters of transformation to be optimistic, there are also grounds for
caution. Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor has argued that the officer corps is suspicious
of significant change and innovation that is not driven from above. Moreover,
he feels that the Armys internal insistence on homogeneity of thinking across
the officer corps is an impediment to change. In fact, the dissension that genuine open
discussion and debate would create is viewed as a threat to transformation to be avoided
at all costs.30

Our research found
that many Army officers feel that their service is not fully supportive of innovation.
Only 34 percent of the Army officers surveyed in 2002 felt their service rewards
innovators, compared to 56 percent of Air Force and 58 percent of Marine Corps officers.
Moreover, 65 percent of Army officers were unsure, suggesting they really hadnt seen
a lot of innovation in their careers. Only 24 percent felt that officers who take
innovative risks or try new approaches tended to get promoted as readily as those who do
not, the lowest positive response of any of the services. Moreover, 66 percent were
uncertain, again suggesting little contact with innovative risk-takers. Finally, 28
percent of Army officers believed that there were career penalties for being an innovator
in their service, the highest such response of any service.

Many Army officers
believed their service has a climate that is intolerant of criticism. Fifty-four percent
responded that their superiors are not open to criticism of their initiatives or projects,
the highest positive response of any service. In addition, 41 percent believed that an
Army officer would put his career at risk if he were to criticize official doctrine and
programs to his superiors, the second highest of any service.31

Many Army officers
saw their services culture as an impediment to innovation. Fifty-one percent argued
that fear of failure inhibits true innovation in the Army, the highest percentage of any
service. This view was most widely held among armor and aviation branch officers, 56
percent and 63 percent of whom agreed with the statement, respectively. And although 32
percent of Army officers disagreed with the statement, this was the lowest percentage of
any service. Forty-eight percent felt that their branch of the

68/69

Army had a culture
that is open to self-criticism, and 61 percent were unsure.32 Again, there were significant branch differences.
Although 45 percent of infantry and 56 percent of armor officers believed that their
branch was open to self-criticism, 59 percent of aviation branch officers disagreed. By
contrast, 75 percent of Marines felt that their branch of service was open to
self-criticism, with 49 percent unsure.33

Army officers did
not feel well informed about developments within their service. Seven out of ten were
unsure whether they knew what the Army was doing to explore new approaches to warfare, the
highest level of uncertainty of any service. Moreover, senior officers felt they were only
slightly better informed than their juniors. In part, this may flow from the fact that
most Army officers do not read professional military publications. Only 36 percent of the
Army officers we surveyed regularly read Parameters,34
compared to 53 percent of all officers who read the National Defense Universitys Joint
Force Quarterly and 87 percent of Marines who read the Marine Corps Gazette.

Explaining
Army Attitudes Toward Transformation

Our research
revealed substantial support for change within the ranks of the Army. The Army officers we
surveyed had largely bought into the services transformation plan, though hardly
without reservation. Indeed, Army attitudes swung dramatically in favor of transformation
between 2000 and 2002.

We can only
hypothesize as to the causes of this shift. However, several trends appear to be at work.
One is a growing awareness and acceptance of the Armys transformation plan among
Army officers. Although General Shinseki first articulated his vision of a medium-weight
Army in late 1999, it clearly took time for that vision to spread. Over the past four
years, the Army has consistently publicized its emphasis on medium-weight forces.
Moreover, it has moved out smartly to make that vision a reality. It has published
documents like Concepts for the Objective Force and the Army Transformation
Roadmap. It also has fielded the first SBCT, deploying it to Iraq. Even such a
seemingly minor change in the uniform regulations as the adoption of

69/70

the black beret
served as a tangible sign of the services commitment to change. As a result, most
Army officers now believe that the Army will transform, even if they do not believe that
it should transform.

Another determinant
of Army attitudes may be the services performance in Afghanistan. Although special
operations forces and light units saw extensive action, it was yet another conflict in
which heavy formations played no role. Operation Enduring Freedom once again demonstrated
that the Army could not get heavy formations to the theater of operations quickly and may
have bolstered support for transformation within the Army.

It is important to
reemphasize that our most recent survey was conducted prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. It
is entirely possible that the war in Iraq triggered a significant shift in officer
attitudes regarding transformation, particularly given the apparent utility of heavy armor
and the reported difficulty of networking in the conflict. We plan additional surveys to
explore this issue.

Not all the news for
supporters of transformation is good, however. Although Army officers saw evidence of
transformation when it comes to the organization of the Army, they perceived less change
in the organizations culture. Many Army officers felt that their service was hostile
toward innovation. Moreover, they believed that it had yet to reform significantly its
personnel and educational systems. Advocates of transformation would be well advised to
take these considerations into account.

Our research has
several implications for those who seek to promote innovation within the Army. First, it
appears that support for transformation is most pronounced in the lightest branches of the
Armythe infantry and special forces. The Armys current transformation program
in general, and the Stryker Force and Future Force in particular, would appear to benefit
these communities. It might make sense to further empower these officers to promote
transformation. Armor officers, by contrast, appear to be significantly more skeptical. In
a broad sense, the shift from heavy to medium-weight forces is based upon assumptions with
respect to information networking, communications, and long-range targeting that have yet
to be demonstrated in combat. The experience of armor forces in the Middle East may
indicate to armor officers that abandoning heavy armor protection on the battlefield could
be a much higher risk than is appreciated by the other combat arms. In a personal and
institutional sense, the armor branch would seemingly have the most to lose in a major
shift away from heavy forces. For the individual officer it would appear to equate to a
loss of opportunities for command and even promotion. As a result, it might make sense to
develop strategies to increase support for transformation among armor branch officers.

Second, our research
shows that there is still considerable uncertainty over the desirability of duty with an
SBCT. However, the Stryker Force

70/71

plays a key role in
Army transformation as a bridge to the Future Force. The Army needs to ensure that its
best and brightest are attracted to service with the SBCTs, both to develop new concepts
of operations and to get the officer corps to buy into medium-weight forces. It might
therefore make sense to develop incentives to service in the SBCTs.

Third, any effort to
transform the Army needs to address personnel management and education and training. The
sweeping changes in organization that the Armys transformation plan envisions imply
an alteration of Army career paths. Most officers have yet to see evidence of such
innovations.

Fourth, there is
clearly a need to address the Armys organizational culture. While the service has
fostered a culture of innovation rhetorically, many officers do not see the Army as open
to new ideas. Instead, they see their superiors as intolerant of criticism and possessing
a zero-defect mentality. If the success of transformation is to be judged by changing
organizational culture, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has said,35
then clearly the Army has its work cut out for it (as do all of the military services).

Finally, there is a
need for a certain amount of patience. The evolution of Army attitudes toward
transformation shows that it takes time for new ideas to spread to the broad officer
corps. As a result, Army leaders must be persistent in both demonstrating the need for
change as well as the benefitsboth to the institution and to the individualof
transformation.

NOTES

For an elaboration
of the authors research data, see their monograph The Limits of Transformation:
Officer Attitudes Toward the Revolution in Military Affairs, Newport Paper 17
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003).

1. The Future Combat
System (FCS) is to be a network of lightpossibly unmannedvehicles that would
replace tanks and self-propelled artillery in medium-weight units. The Army envisions that
the system will weigh no more than 20 tons (compared to the 70-ton M1A2 Abrams) to allow
it to be transported aboard the Air Forces most numerous transport aircraft, the
C-130. A recent General Accounting Office report also says that it is to roll off
combat ready and self-sustaining for 3 to 7 days, that it is to use the network to
gain information superiority, locate and identify the enemy, and kill at a distance
before the enemy can engage [it], and that it will use advanced signature
management and other techniques to avoid detection. US General Accounting Office, Issues
Facing the Armys Future Combat Systems Program, GAO-03-1010R (Washington: GAO,
13 August 2003), p. 10.

4. In particular,
Stephen Peter Rosen has shown the importance of senior officers in providing professional
support to proponents of change. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation
and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 20, 251.

6. The Naval War
College (including the College of Naval Command and Staff and the College of Naval
Warfare), Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, Army Command and Staff College,
Army War

71/72

College, National
War College, and National Defense Universitys Capstone Course for newly-promoted
flag officers.

7. On the
demographic characteristics of the survey group, see Mahnken and FitzSimonds, The
Limits of Transformation, pp. 11-13.

8. Naval
Postgraduate School, Air Command and Staff College, Army Command and General Staff
College, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
School of Advanced Military Studies, School of Advanced Warfighting, Air War College, Army
War College, Marine Corps War College, Naval War College, Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, National War College, and Capstone Course. The survey population included 2,147 US
and 188 foreign officers. It contained 76 O-3s, 1,520 O-4s, 586 O-5s, 123 O-6s, and 18
O-7s. It included 962 Army, 296 Navy, 877 Air Force, and 191 Marine Corps officers.

9. The first survey
consisted of 36 statements and the second consisted of 97. Respondents were asked to agree
or disagree with each on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicated strong disagreement, 4
uncertainty, and 7 strong agreement. For analytical purposes, we considered answers of 1,
2, or 3 to indicate disagreement with the statement, and 5, 6, or 7 to indicate agreement.
We also adopted two different measures of uncertainty: we considered answers of 4 to
reflect genuine uncertainty, while those responses with values of 3, 4, and 5 were
considered to be tending toward uncertainty.

10. Current
Department of Defense regulations require officers to retire after 30 years of
commissioned service unless selected as flag officers. If current regulations remain in
force, then todays junior and field-grade officers, the largest proportion of the
survey population, will be able to remain in uniform until 2020 to 2025. Some portion of
this group will remain in the armed forces until 2025 to 2030.

11. Mahnken and
FitzSimonds, The Limits of Transformation, p. 108.

12. Frank Bruni,
Bush Vows Money and Support for Military, The New York Times, 24
September 1999, p. A22.

13. David E. Sanger,
Bush Details Plan to Focus Military on New Weaponry, The New York Times,
14 February 2001, p. 1.

22. There were,
however, notable differences among members of different combat arms: 33 percent of armor
officers, but only 20 percent of infantry officers and 11 percent of special forces
officers, agreed with the statement.

23. US Army, Army
Transformation Roadmap, p. 8.

24. It is worth
noting that the statement was phrased somewhat differently in the 2000 survey:
Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as
ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports,
airfields, and logistical sites. While this phrasing may account for some of the
shift, it is hard to see how it could account for its magnitude.

Thomas G. Mahnken is
Visiting Professor and Acting Director of the Strategic Studies Program at the Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He is on leave
from the US Naval War College, where he is a professor of strategy. He formerly served in
the Defense Departments Office of Net Assessment.

Captain James R.
FitzSimonds (USN Ret.) is a Research Professor in the War Gaming Department at the US
Naval War College, Newport R.I. He also formerly served in the Defense Departments
Office of Net Assessment.