Tom wrote: Imagine a doctor who spends his/her entire life researching cures for illnesses and then, based on the prevailing idea of the time that medicine should be independent of market dynamics, gives them away for free. Now, this person has no other source of income and the research and development of the medicine comes at considerable cost, not to mention the expenses piled up from his training. The medicine/cures should be free, but without support, not only will this doctor be destitute, but their work will stop and people will suffer.

Tibetan physicians traditionally treat patients without charge. They pray to the Medicine Buddha for any required items. When a Thangka painter is commissioned by a temple he symbolically receives an (excessive) amount of 'decorative gold'. Temples are also charged a fraction of what a thangka is actually worth. Lotsawa (translator) is another Buddhist craft that must be practised carefully and without personal profit, though one may receive a discreet gift for expenses from a sponsoring temple.

It seems you have not read the four medical tantras. Tactics to maximize payment are given

tobes wrote:Perhaps I am imputing a little too much - but it seems to me you were deploying a logic of utility in your original statement. Intuitively it makes a great deal of sense, but I think that is simply because we have all been living in a market system for so long that what is constructed seems natural and just.

Of course I agree that translators need material support. But the question is of intellectual property, and whether the material support they gain ought to be derived from the rights they gain over their work. If we are speaking practically, there are three good ways in which material support can be given without the claim for copyright - tenured academics supported by their institution and grants, monastics and privately funded translation projects such as the 84,000 project.

I agree that anyone with the means ought to support all three causes. What I question is that dharma practitioners who make use of translated sutras have some moral obligation to support those three causes, by virtue of using the material. That would be, as I mentioned, to reduce ethics into exchange relations - an implicit expression of the morality of the market. Danaparamita is not that - giving is only perfect when it does not even consider such things.

My main point is that it is in dharma practitioners' own interest to support translators.

There was a hint of ought in my original statement, but not as you described it. I also don't think you can equate the benefits of the work of translators to merely some aesthetic value. Buddhists seem to like medical analogies, so consider the following thought experiment:

Imagine a doctor who spends his/her entire life researching cures for illnesses and then, based on the prevailing idea of the time that medicine should be independent of market dynamics, gives them away for free. Now, this person has no other source of income and the research and development of the medicine comes at considerable cost, not to mention the expenses piled up from his training. The medicine/cures should be free, but without support, not only will this doctor be destitute, but their work will stop and people will suffer.

In this scenario I contend that there is a moral obligation to support the doctor. I could concoct some consequentialist argument to support this intuition, but I think you get where I'm coming from. Moreover, I think the moral obligation falls more heavily on those who have already benefited from the cures. Although, I suspect that this intuition would be harder to defend. Perhaps the obligation falls more heavily on those that might benefit in the future. In any case, I think there is a similar moral obligation to support translators independent of the translators' intentions (which may be consistent with danaparamita), and perhaps more importantly, it is in the dharma practitioners' own best interest to do so.

This indeed the exact moral logic I'm questioning.

When a buddha or bodhisattva teaches, they benefit. The do not extract a moral obligation from those who benefit to repay them. That reduces the gift of dharma to a consequentialist/utility transaction.

This is not to say that such teachers do not require material support - it is merely to say that that is an independent issue (one that we all acknowledge is very important).

As soon as you posit a consequentialist moral obligation between those who 'produce' the dharma and those who 'consume' or 'benefit' from it, then you reduce all the agents to self-interested actors, and reduce the dharma material to a mere commodity.

I argue here that this is contrary to the spirit of the dharma - which ought to flow freely wherever it is needed, without caveats and obligations predicated on self-interest.

tobes wrote:Perhaps I am imputing a little too much - but it seems to me you were deploying a logic of utility in your original statement. Intuitively it makes a great deal of sense, but I think that is simply because we have all been living in a market system for so long that what is constructed seems natural and just.

Of course I agree that translators need material support. But the question is of intellectual property, and whether the material support they gain ought to be derived from the rights they gain over their work. If we are speaking practically, there are three good ways in which material support can be given without the claim for copyright - tenured academics supported by their institution and grants, monastics and privately funded translation projects such as the 84,000 project.

I agree that anyone with the means ought to support all three causes. What I question is that dharma practitioners who make use of translated sutras have some moral obligation to support those three causes, by virtue of using the material. That would be, as I mentioned, to reduce ethics into exchange relations - an implicit expression of the morality of the market. Danaparamita is not that - giving is only perfect when it does not even consider such things.

My main point is that it is in dharma practitioners' own interest to support translators.

There was a hint of ought in my original statement, but not as you described it. I also don't think you can equate the benefits of the work of translators to merely some aesthetic value. Buddhists seem to like medical analogies, so consider the following thought experiment:

Imagine a doctor who spends his/her entire life researching cures for illnesses and then, based on the prevailing idea of the time that medicine should be independent of market dynamics, gives them away for free. Now, this person has no other source of income and the research and development of the medicine comes at considerable cost, not to mention the expenses piled up from his training. The medicine/cures should be free, but without support, not only will this doctor be destitute, but their work will stop and people will suffer.

In this scenario I contend that there is a moral obligation to support the doctor. I could concoct some consequentialist argument to support this intuition, but I think you get where I'm coming from. Moreover, I think the moral obligation falls more heavily on those who have already benefited from the cures. Although, I suspect that this intuition would be harder to defend. Perhaps the obligation falls more heavily on those that might benefit in the future. In any case, I think there is a similar moral obligation to support translators independent of the translators' intentions (which may be consistent with danaparamita), and perhaps more importantly, it is in the dharma practitioners' own best interest to do so.

This indeed the exact moral logic I'm questioning.

When a buddha or bodhisattva teaches, they benefit. The do not extract a moral obligation from those who benefit to repay them. That reduces the gift of dharma to a consequentialist/utility transaction.

This is not to say that such teachers do not require material support - it is merely to say that that is an independent issue (one that we all acknowledge is very important).

As soon as you posit a consequentialist moral obligation between those who 'produce' the dharma and those who 'consume' or 'benefit' from it, then you reduce all the agents to self-interested actors, and reduce the dharma material to a mere commodity.

I argue here that this is contrary to the spirit of the dharma - which ought to flow freely wherever it is needed, without caveats and obligations predicated on 'own' self-interest.

tobes wrote:Perhaps I am imputing a little too much - but it seems to me you were deploying a logic of utility in your original statement. Intuitively it makes a great deal of sense, but I think that is simply because we have all been living in a market system for so long that what is constructed seems natural and just.

Of course I agree that translators need material support. But the question is of intellectual property, and whether the material support they gain ought to be derived from the rights they gain over their work. If we are speaking practically, there are three good ways in which material support can be given without the claim for copyright - tenured academics supported by their institution and grants, monastics and privately funded translation projects such as the 84,000 project.

I agree that anyone with the means ought to support all three causes. What I question is that dharma practitioners who make use of translated sutras have some moral obligation to support those three causes, by virtue of using the material. That would be, as I mentioned, to reduce ethics into exchange relations - an implicit expression of the morality of the market. Danaparamita is not that - giving is only perfect when it does not even consider such things.

My main point is that it is in dharma practitioners' own interest to support translators.

There was a hint of ought in my original statement, but not as you described it. I also don't think you can equate the benefits of the work of translators to merely some aesthetic value. Buddhists seem to like medical analogies, so consider the following thought experiment:

Imagine a doctor who spends his/her entire life researching cures for illnesses and then, based on the prevailing idea of the time that medicine should be independent of market dynamics, gives them away for free. Now, this person has no other source of income and the research and development of the medicine comes at considerable cost, not to mention the expenses piled up from his training. The medicine/cures should be free, but without support, not only will this doctor be destitute, but their work will stop and people will suffer.

In this scenario I contend that there is a moral obligation to support the doctor. I could concoct some consequentialist argument to support this intuition, but I think you get where I'm coming from. Moreover, I think the moral obligation falls more heavily on those who have already benefited from the cures. Although, I suspect that this intuition would be harder to defend. Perhaps the obligation falls more heavily on those that might benefit in the future. In any case, I think there is a similar moral obligation to support translators independent of the translators' intentions (which may be consistent with danaparamita), and perhaps more importantly, it is in the dharma practitioners' own best interest to do so.

This indeed the exact moral logic I'm questioning.

When a buddha or bodhisattva teaches, they benefit. The do not extract a moral obligation from those who benefit to repay them. That reduces the gift of dharma to a consequentialist/utility transaction.

This is not to say that such teachers do not require material support - it is merely to say that that is an independent issue (one that we all acknowledge is very important).

As soon as you posit a consequentialist moral obligation between those who 'produce' the dharma and those who 'consume' or 'benefit' from it, then you reduce all the agents to self-interested actors, and reduce the dharma material to a mere commodity.

I argue here that this is contrary to the spirit of the dharma - which ought to flow freely wherever it is needed, without caveats and obligations predicated on 'own' self-interest.

Just so I am clear that we are communicating - what is the good that you think I am proposing needs to be promoted?

Last edited by Tom on Sun May 26, 2013 1:46 am, edited 1 time in total.

tobes wrote: I argue here that this is contrary to the spirit of the dharma - which ought to flow freely wherever it is needed, without caveats and obligations predicated on 'own' self-interest.

That is not the issue. You are not paying for the dharma. You are paying for the translation.Either you are, or somebody else is.the fact that the content is Buddhist teaching is actually beside the point.

For the dharma to "flow freely" to you,if it is a book:somebody has to pay for printing somebody has to pay for shippingsomebody has to pay for storage.and so on.

if it available on line:somebody has to pay for the computer where the files are storedsomebody has to pay for the internet connectionand so on.

So, since all of this stuff has to be paid for,why, of all the steps along this interconnected processof getting the teachings from the Buddha to you,...why is the translator singled out as the one who shouldn't get paid?

It is a purely arbitrary point along the distribution chain.The translator is merely the one who is most visible.An easy target.Attachment to outward appearances strikes again!

Furthermore,why of all people, shouldn't the one who wants the teachingsalso be the one who pays for it?

If you want to get teachings for free,meditate harderand then when dakinis appear, place an order....

Profile Picture: "The Foaming Monk"The Chinese characters are Fo (buddha) and Ming (bright). The image is of a student of Buddhism, who, imagining himself to be a monk, and not understanding the true meaning of the words takes the sound of the words literally. Likewise, People on web forums sometime seem to be foaming at the mouth. Original painting by P.Volker /used by permission.

Why four pages of this? It's pretty straightforward. Legally, the translator owns the copyright for the duration of copyright law. Generally for the life of the translator plus 50 years. After that, it is public domain.

Morally, copying a work is a problem if you are "taking that which is not given". If the translator is okay with you making copies, go right ahead. It is legally and morally fine because you have permission. On the other hand, if the translator wants to get paid for making copies, then your moral and legal obligation is simple: don't do it unless you pay him or her. It's illegal and it is in violation of the precept against stealing.

The only gray area is the morality of the translator in asking for payment. But that is his or her business, not yours or mine.

tobes wrote:As soon as you posit a consequentialist moral obligation between those who 'produce' the dharma and those who 'consume' or 'benefit' from it, then you reduce all the agents to self-interested actors, and reduce the dharma material to a mere commodity.

This is not what I am suggesting and in any case consequentialist theories are generally agent neutral.

What I am supporting is the promotion of spiritual knowledge free from the barrier of language. Since supporting translators promotes this good, they should be supported. Although, I think that it makes sense that this obligation falls primarily to those who use the texts, I never suggested a transactional obligation indexed directly to use, etc., and this also need not reduce the dharma material to a mere commodity.

In any case I did not want to put forward a consequentialist argument because I don't think it suits Buddhist ethics. I would perhaps suggest that it is common sense for dharma practitioners to support translators and leave it at that. This we seem to agree on.

KeithBC wrote:Why four pages of this? It's pretty straightforward. Legally, the translator owns the copyright for the duration of copyright law. Generally for the life of the translator plus 50 years. After that, it is public domain.

Morally, copying a work is a problem if you are "taking that which is not given". If the translator is okay with you making copies, go right ahead. It is legally and morally fine because you have permission. On the other hand, if the translator wants to get paid for making copies, then your moral and legal obligation is simple: don't do it unless you pay him or her. It's illegal and it is in violation of the precept against stealing.

The only gray area is the morality of the translator in asking for payment. But that is his or her business, not yours or mine.

Om mani padme humKeith

Im afraid its not as simple as that.The translator is copying from a work that isnt even his to own,then places copyright on the said work.

Now who was the original author of the text?well the original author of the text was the Bhagavan Buddha.now the original author made it very clear in his own texts that Dharma itself shouldnt be peddled as a commodity(now of course that would mean the translator cannot peddle his translation for profit)

and what does the copyright do?it makes it to where you cannot spread the Dharma/translation because this guy thinks he owns it. must I pay 30$ for a 150 page book?and watch the Dharma be used for profiteering?When I know good and well a 150 page book can be produced for $2.00...wow thats like 5X the profit.

KeithBC wrote:Why four pages of this? It's pretty straightforward. Legally, the translator owns the copyright for the duration of copyright law. Generally for the life of the translator plus 50 years. After that, it is public domain.

Morally, copying a work is a problem if you are "taking that which is not given". If the translator is okay with you making copies, go right ahead. It is legally and morally fine because you have permission. On the other hand, if the translator wants to get paid for making copies, then your moral and legal obligation is simple: don't do it unless you pay him or her. It's illegal and it is in violation of the precept against stealing.

The only gray area is the morality of the translator in asking for payment. But that is his or her business, not yours or mine.

Om mani padme humKeith

It is pretty straightforward. When you copy something you don't steal it. Period. You violate the copyright. There is not a system of law on the planet that considers copyright infraction to be theft (as there are already laws against theft, there would be no need for an additional body of law specific to it).

Nobody disputes the illegality of copyright infraction. The dispute is over whether producing another copy of something can be considered taking what is not given. As clear as it is to you in one direction, it is likewise to me in the other. I spent many, many hours photocopying books for my late guru who was a very pure monk. The idea that this was "taking what was not given" never arose. The vinaya was not concerned with legitimizing obsolete business models.

In any case, it is very rarely the translator that is impacted as they are given advances for the books and gain relatively little if anything from each copy that is sold. It is the publishers that suffer. It is arguable that if a book is widely distributed virtually and it is of great use, it may sell even more hard copies than if it were not. It costs almost the same now to photocopy a book as to buy it and you don't have the benefit of binding, production value, etc.

tobes wrote:As soon as you posit a consequentialist moral obligation between those who 'produce' the dharma and those who 'consume' or 'benefit' from it, then you reduce all the agents to self-interested actors, and reduce the dharma material to a mere commodity.

This is not what I am suggesting and in any case consequentialist theories are generally agent neutral.

What I am supporting is the promotion of spiritual knowledge free from the barrier of language. Since supporting translators promotes this good, they should be supported. Although, I think that it makes sense that this obligation falls primarily to those who use the texts, I never suggested a transactional obligation indexed directly to use, etc., and this also need not reduce the dharma material to a mere commodity.

In any case I did not want to put forward a consequentialist argument because I don't think it suits Buddhist ethics. I would perhaps suggest that it is common sense for dharma practitioners to support translators and leave it at that. This we seem to agree on.

Okay we're getting close Tom! It would be good if dharma practitioners chose to support translators. No doubt at all. Obligation is a much stronger moral term, I think, far too strong for the relationships at play.

Tom wrote:Just so I am clear that we are communicating - what is the good that you think I am proposing needs to be promoted?

Something like: those who benefit spiritually from intellectual labour ought to return that benefit in squarely material terms.

This reads more like what might be right to do, an ought, rather than a good, such as some kind of welfare typical of consequentialist ethical theories.

tobes wrote:[ It would be good if dharma practitioners chose to support translators. No doubt at all. Obligation is a much stronger moral term, I think, far too strong for the relationships at play.

Yes, my original objection to your suggestion that I presupposed a market logic was that I am really just proposing a "simple choice." However, I do disagree with you that a consequentialist moral obligation necessarily is agent relative reducing agents to self-interested actors, and needs to be transactional. In fact, it would be more likely the opposite. That it might propose an ought rather than choice and seem too strong and overly demanding is the signature of such theories. Interestingly the same theories could require us to also ignore copyright in some circumstances. As mentioned, I believe that while the consequentialist ethical arguments might provide a way to argue that we are morally obligated to support translators, they do not really accord with Buddhist ethics.

"Translators have to eat and have families to feed, clothe and house and have invested years of their life in becoming a skilled translator hence they should be paid for everything that they translate."

How is this different from saying:

"Lamas have to eat and have families to feed, clothe and house and have invested years of their life in becoming a skilled meditator hence they should be paid for everything that they teach."

We all give dana for teachings. Would we be comfortable if lamas charged a set fee? "If you want this initiation that's going to be a hundred and eight bucks." It's apparent that *everyone* here agrees that translators should be supported, and many of us contribute regularly to translators. The problem is the quid pro quo thinking that the current publishing business model engenders. I think it is immensely fortunate that we are in a situation where dharma can spread instantly around the world using the Internet at negligible cost. This should be embraced, not lamented.

Point of fact, where do you get the idea that copyright infringement is legally not a species of theft? Can you please quote me a legal definition from some book or statute that acknowledges that copyright infringement is specifically not a species of theft? I'm not saying that you're wrong, but, in my 30 some years of working as a copyright editor (as well as other editorial jobs), I have never, ever heard this.

Just because there are copyright laws as well as laws for stealing in general, doesn't mean that copyright infraction is not stealing. It is intellectual theft since copyright protects "intellectual property." There is a separate law covering infraction of copyright just to clarify to those who might not understand that this is a species of theft. It arose out of a new historical need (correct me if I'm wrong) in the 19th century. It also required its own law because the legal punishments for it are different from robbing a bank and other types of stealing. Every time I play a commercial DVD these days, there is a warning that copyright infringement is "piracy" (and that it is not an victimless crime). Wouldn't you consider piracy a species of theft?

Can you quote a legal definition or whatever that says copyright infringement is a species of theft? This article:http://www.copyhype.com/2010/09/is-copyright-infringement-theft/ makes it seem like it is not clear cut, from a legal POV. However, it does appear that copyright infringement is not a species of theft from the Buddhist POV, at least from the POV of the Theravadan Vinaya.

Point of fact, where do you get the idea that copyright infringement is legally not a species of theft? Can you please quote me a legal definition from some book or statute that acknowledges that copyright infringement is specifically not a species of theft? I'm not saying that you're wrong, but, in my 30 some years of working as a copyright editor (as well as other editorial jobs), I have never, ever heard this.

Just because there are copyright laws as well as laws for stealing in general, doesn't mean that copyright infraction is not stealing. It is intellectual theft since copyright protects "intellectual property." There is a separate law covering infraction of copyright just to clarify to those who might not understand that this is a species of theft. It arose out of a new historical need (correct me if I'm wrong) in the 19th century. It also required its own law because the legal punishments for it are different from robbing a bank and other types of stealing. Every time I play a commercial DVD these days, there is a warning that copyright infringement is "piracy" (and that it is not an victimless crime). Wouldn't you consider piracy a species of theft?

Bob,

As theft refers specifically to unlawful appropriation of a physical object, it is clear that copyright is not of the same body of law. I think it is incumbent on you to show where intellectual property is defined as a species of theft, as it has its own body of law and its own penalties. If the two are equivalent, why do the definitions and penalties differ?

And as to copying DVDs, I don't see it as a species of theft for all the same reasons detailed above. It's illegal but hardly something intended to be covered by pratimoksha. It is simply a case of an antiquated business model railing against the advent of new technology. The technology is in place for translators to distribute their wares online, with no publisher involvement for a fraction of the cost to the end customer. This cutting out of middlemen has to be seen as a good thing. There is also the opportunity to crowd source translation in a similar way to the Free Open Source Software movement, which has produced better software for free than most commercial endeavours.

One can double down on commitment to an inaccurate metaphor and enforcement of a body of law that is extremely difficult to prosecute given the worldwide nature of file-sharing or come up with an innovative approach to the situation and move on.

Perhaps not, if you limit the meaning of "stealing" to depriving the other person of the work.

But the relevant precept in Buddhism is not "Thou shalt not steal", but "I undertake the training rule to abstain from taking what is not given." It is not about whether or not you deprive the person of the object, but about whether you acquire it with or without permission. Taking stuff without permission is bad karma.

Perhaps not, if you limit the meaning of "stealing" to depriving the other person of the work.

But the relevant precept in Buddhism is not "Thou shalt not steal", but "I undertake the training rule to abstain from taking what is not given." It is not about whether or not you deprive the person of the object, but about whether you acquire it with or without permission. Taking stuff without permission is bad karma.

Om mani padme humKeith

Again, you miss the point. "The object" is the issue here... if your neighbour has a Ferrari parked in his driveway and by meticulous observation you create an exact copy of it using your own materials, in what strange parallel reality have you "stolen" his car? You are happy to take ideas as being objects one can own, and think that having many copies of something is the same as stealing. Others here are not inclined to follow your line of reasoning, pointing to the example from the tradition since time immemorial of new generations making copies of texts to spread them.