BAKER, Judge
Today we must determine what tribunal is authorized to hear litigation following a
dissolution of marriage proceeding regarding the parties settlement agreement and decree of dissolution.
Appellant-plaintiff Pamela S. Fackler brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial courts
denial of her motion for summary judgment and request for attorneys fees.
Specifically, Fackler contends that she was entitled to summary judgment because
a Settlement Agreement (the Agreement) executed between the parties clearly and unambiguously awarded
full ownership of a promissory note and mortgage to her. Moreover, Fackler
argues in the alternative that if the Agreement is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence shows
that the parties intended that she become the owner of the promissory note
and mortgage.
Appellees-Defendants Melvin J. Powell, Jr. and M. Jack Powell, Jr. Living Trust (collectively,
Powell) cross-appeal the trial courts denial of their motion for summary judgment and
request for attorneys fees. Specifically, Powell contends that because the Agreement is
ambiguous and emanates from a marriage dissolution proceeding in a divorce court, the
trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve this dispute.
Further, Powell argues in the alternative that the Agreement clearly and unambiguously awarded
only $23,000 to Fackler.
We conclude that the terms of the Agreement were not ambiguous, and that
the Agreement awarded full ownership of the promissory note and mortgage to Fackler.
Thus, although the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this
case, it erred in denying Facklers motion for summary judgment and her request
for attorneys fees. Thus, we reverse and remand this cause to the
trial court for it to determine the amount of attorneys fees owed to
Fackler.

FACTS

The undisputed facts are that on December 31, 1996, Fackler and Powell were
married, and on October 3, 2001, Fackler filed a petition for dissolution in
Allen Superior Court  Family Relations Division (the dissolution court). On March
21, 2002, Fackler and Powell took part in a mediation of the final
settlement of their divorce action, resulting in the Agreement. The dissolution court
approved the Agreement and entered it as part of the final decree on
March 22, 2002.
Paragraph B(3) of the Agreement details the property that Fackler was to receive,
noting that she is awarded all property free and clear of any and
all claims which Husband may have therein or thereto . . . .
Appellants App. p. 372. Subsequently, Paragraph B(3)(g) of the Agreement awards
the following to Fackler:
Promissory Note and Mortgage given by Thomas Penny Builder to Husband in the
amount of $23,000.00 which Husband shall assign to Wife. Said Note shall
be paid upon the sale of Lot 22, Covington Pines and in any
event by no later than December 31, 2002 Husband shall guarantee payment of
said Note. Upon payment by Husband, Wife shall reassign the Note and Mortgage
to Husband.
Appellants App. p. 373. At the time that the parties signed and
the dissolution court approved the Agreement, $94,300.11 was owed on the Promissory Note
and Mortgage from Thomas Penny Builder.
The Agreement also contains an indemnification provision, providing that [e]ach party agrees to
indemnify and save and hold the other harmless from all damages, losses, expenses
(including attorneys fees), costs and other fees incurred by reason of the indemnitors
violation or breach of any of the terms and conditions hereof. Appellants
App. p. 377. Fackler and Powell both claim, pursuant to this provision,
that the other should pay all attorneys fees.
On May 28, 2002, Powell forwarded to Fackler a signed Assignment of Promissory
Note and Mortgage (the Assignment). Copies of the Promissory Note and Mortgage
were attached to the Assignment. The Assignment specifies that it is executed
pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Agreement. Appellants App. p.
57. Moreover, the Assignment notes that [t]he face amount of the Promissory
Note is $23,000.00 . . . . Id.
On September 4, 2002, Thomas Penny Builder and his company, Construction Information Systems,
LLC, conveyed Lot 22 to Powells Living Trust. Powell then notified Fackler
that he would pay Fackler $23,000 plus interest at eight percent on February
6, 2003. Displeased with Powells intentions, Fackler filed a Verified Complaint for Establishment
of Constructive Trust Or To Quiet Title, Or, In The Alternative, Suit Upon
Note And To Foreclose Real Estate Mortgage in Allen Superior Court  Civil
Division (the trial court) against Powell on January 29, 2003. The complaint
alleged that Fackler held legal and equitable title to the Note and Mortgage
and sought the remaining balance on the Note. Subsequently, on February 6,
2003, Powells Living Trust sold Lot 22 for a gross selling price of
$114,900.00. On the same date, Powell paid Fackler $23,000 plus accrued interest
in the amount of $179.40. The parties placed $83,785.44, the balance of
the selling price of Lot 22, in an escrow account.
On June 6, 2003, Fackler filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that
she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Agreement
clearly and unambiguously awarded full ownership of the Promissory Note and Mortgage to
her. On July 7, 2003, Powell filed a motion for summary judgment
of his own, asserting that he was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction or,
in the alternative, because the Agreement clearly and unambiguously awarded only $23,000 to
Fackler, leaving Powell the owner of the Promissory Note and Mortgage.
Following a hearing on August 1, 2003, on October 16, 2003, the trial
court denied both parties summary judgment motions, finding that it had subject matter
jurisdiction but that the ambiguity and the language of the Mediated Settlement Agreement
and the ambiguity in the language of the Assignment . . . [create]
genuine issues of material fact as to the intentions of the parties .
. . . Appellants App. p. 6. Fackler filed a motion
for certification of interlocutory appeal on October 27, 2003, which was ultimately granted
by the trial court. On December 22, 2003, this court accepted jurisdiction,
and both parties now appeal.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial courts ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this
court stands in the shoes of the lower court, applying the same standards
in deciding whether to affirm or reverse summary judgment. Ten Cate Enbi,
Inc. v. Metz, 802 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Summary
judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). This court, therefore, must determine whether there
is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court correctly
applied the law. Ten Cate Enbi, Inc., 802 N.E.2d at 980.
To make that determination, we must consider all of the pleadings and designated
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Powell argues that the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
this matter because the Agreement was incorporated into the final decree entered by
the dissolution court. Thus, according to Powell, the dissolution court retains exclusive
jurisdiction to interpret or modify the Decree of Dissolution, and the trial court
has jurisdiction only to enforce the Agreement as written. Fackler responds that
the Agreement unambiguously awards full ownership of the Promissory Note and Mortgage to
her, and that because the Agreement is unambiguous the trial court has subject
matter jurisdiction over this dispute.
See footnote
In resolving these issues, we first note that property rights established with certainty
in an unambiguous dissolution settlement agreement may be enforced by a court other
than the court that issued the dissolution decree. See Johnson v. Johnson,
575 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). But the dissolution court retains
exclusive jurisdiction to modify and interpret its own decrees. Behme v. Behme,
519 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Thus, if the settlement
agreement at issue is clear and unambiguous, and will not require either modification
or significant interpretation, a court other than the dissolution court may enforce the
dissolution decree.
Here, our first task is to determine whether the Agreement is ambiguous.
If the Agreement is clear and unambiguous, the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction, whereas if the Agreement was ambiguous, the dissolution court retained exclusive jurisdiction.
A court must interpret a contract to ascertain the intent of the parties
at the time of contracting. McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606, 611
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). If the contract language is clear and unambiguous,
the terms are conclusive. Ogle v. Ogle, 769 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Moreover, [t]he terms of a contract are
not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to the proper interpretation of
the terms. Id. To ascertain the contracts clarity, or lack thereof,
we must consider the whole document, not merely the disputed language. Ten
Cate Enbi, Inc., 802 N.E.2d at 981. A contract is ambiguous if
reasonable men would find the contract subject to more than one interpretation.
Bowell v. Lyon, 401 N.E.2d 735, 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
The entirety of the clause in the Agreement at issue in this case
is as follows:
Promissory Note and Mortgage given by Thomas Penny Builder to Husband in the
amount of $23,000.00 which Husband shall assign to Wife. Said Note shall
be paid upon the sale of Lot 22, Covington Pines and in any
event by no later than December 31, 2002 Husband shall guarantee payment of
said Note. Upon payment by Husband, Wife shall reassign the Note and Mortgage
to Husband.
Appellants App. p. 373. This paragraph is preceded by language stating that
Powell is awarded all property free and clear of any and all claims
which Husband may have therein or thereto . . . . Appellants
App. p. 372. The Promissory Note itself is incorporated by reference into
the contract, and the Note is in the sum of Twenty-three Thousand Dollars
($23,000.00) and the total of all documented construction costs, not to exceed Eighty
Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00). Appellants App. p. 58 (emphasis added).
The Agreement assigns to Fackler a Promissory Note in the amount of $23,000.
The Note itself is in the amount of $23,000 plus all constructions
costs that may total up to $80,000. It is common to identify
promissory notes by their principal amount, and the failure of the Agreement to
indicate the full amount due under the Note does not create an ambiguity.
Moreover, the prefatory language to the clause notes that Fackler receives the
property free and clear of any of Powells claims. Powells only interest
in the Note and Mortgage is that Fackler is to reassign them to
him in the event that he pays pursuant to his guaranty. Nothing
in the Agreement, nothing in the Note or Mortgage, and nothing in the
Assignment indicates that he retained any interest whatsoever beyond a reassignment upon payment.
As a result, we disagree with the trial courts determination that the
Agreement is ambiguous. Having made that determination and also finding that the
agreement requires neither modification nor interpretation, it follows that the trial court properly
exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this case by enforcing the dissolution decree.
Moving to the terms of the Agreement, it is clear that Powell guaranteed
payment of the Note to Fackler. The Note was in the amount
of $23,000 plus any construction costs that totaled up to $80,000, and the
Note was to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of Lot
22. Inasmuch as Powell received $114,900 from the sale of Lot 22,
he was obligated to pay Fackler $103,000 under the Agreement. Thus, there
is no genuine issue of material fact as to the ownership of the
Note and Mortgage, and Fackler is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. As a result, the trial court erred in denying Facklers motion
for summary judgment.

III. Attorneys Fees

We next address the parties requests for attorneys fees pursuant to the indemnification
provision in the Agreement. The Agreement provides that: [e]ach party agrees to
indemnify and save and hold the other harmless from all damages, losses, expenses
(including attorneys fees), costs and other fees incurred by reason of the indemnitors
violation or breach of any of the terms and conditions hereof. Appellants
App. p. 377. As our discussion above indicates, Powell was in breach
of the Agreement. Therefore, he must pay Facklers attorneys fees because of
his breach, in an amount to be determined by the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part
and remanded so that the trial court may determine the amount of attorneys
fees that Powell must pay Fackler.
KIRSCH, C.J., and ROBB, J., concur.

Footnote: Fackler argues that Powell did not properly appeal an April 22, 2003
order denying his motion to dismiss, but that motion is irrelevant to this
case. In fact, Powell is not appealing the denial of his motion
to dismiss and is instead appealing the trial courts denial of his motion
for summary judgment. That denial was a part of the same order
as the Trial courts denial of Facklers motion for summary judgment, and that
order is properly before this court.