After the tragic terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September, 2001, media interest in the Al Qaeda organization rose immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of Al Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as possible ways for its disruption. One could thus read or hear that Al Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”, that “functions as a swarm”, that “gathers from nowhere and disappears after action”, that is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organization”, and that is extremely hard to destroy, especially by traditional anti-terrorist or counterterrorist methods [1].

After catastrophic terrorist attacks by kidnapped airlines on New York and Washington in September 2001 the interest for al-Qaeda terrorist organisation in public and media rose immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of al-Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as of possible ways of its disruption. [...]

One could thus read or hear that al-Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”,that it “functions as a swarm”, that it “gathers from nowhere and disappears after action”, that it is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organisation”, extremely hard to destroy, especially by traditional anti-terrorist methods.

Anmerkungen

The source is given at the end of the paragraph, but nothing indicates that most of the text is taken verbatim from the source.

According to many counterterrorism analysts today, Al Qaeda has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks [2]. Since war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded Osama bin Laden’s command and control, Al Qaeda does appear to have become increasingly decentralized. It is now seen by many as more of a social movement than coherent organization [3].

Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the [mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack.]

According to most counterterrorism analysts today, al-Qa’ida has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks.7 Indeed, since the war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded bin Laden’s command and control, al-Qa’ida has become increasingly decentralized, and is seen by some as more of a “movement” than any other form of organization.

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Indeed, several years ago al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean of students,” who directed training and placement for the group, was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on the first anniversary of the attacks. These and other counterterrorism successes ultimately led to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. And a month later, Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the USS Cole attack, was apprehended in Karachi.

The source is mentioned only at the end of the paragraph on the next page. See Nm6/Fragment 478 01 The extent of the copied text, including the reference to Grier, does not become clear from that reference.

[Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the] mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack. In response to these and other key losses, Al Qaeda allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize [4].

Indeed, several years ago al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean of students,” who directed training and placement for the group, was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on the first anniversary of the attacks. These and other counterterrorism successes ultimately led to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. And a month later, Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the USS Cole attack, was apprehended in Karachi. In response to the loss of key leaders, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council came to recognize that it could no longer exist as a hierarchy, but instead would have to become a decentralized network and move its operations out over the entire world.10

10 Robert Windrem, 2005.

Anmerkungen

The source is given at the end of the paragraph, but the extent of the text borrowed from it and the closeness of the text parallel does not become clear from this reference.

Hierarchy, as one common feature of many real world networks, has attracted special attention in recent years [5] [6] [7] [8]. Hierarchy is one of the key aspects of a theoretical model to capture statistical characteristics of terrorist networks.

In the literature, several concepts are proposed to measure the hierarchy in a network, such as the hierarchical path [7], the scaling law for the clustering coefficients of nodes in a network [5], etc. These measures can tell us of the existence and extent of hierarchy in a network. We address herein the problem of how to construct hidden hierarchy in terrorist networks (which are known as horizontal networks).

Hierarchy, as one common feature for many real world networks, attracts special attentions [sic] in recent years [9-12]. [...] Hierarchy is one of the key aspects of a theoretical model [9,13] to capture the statistical characteristics of a large number of real networks, including the metabolic [14,15], the protein interaction [16,17] and some social networks [18-20].

In literature, several concepts are proposed to measure the hierarchy in a network, such as the hierarchical path [10], the scaling law for the clustering coefficients of the nodes [9], the hierarchical components/degree [11], etc. These measures can tell us the existence and the extent of hierarchy in a network. We address herein another problem, that is, how to reconstruct the hierarchical structure in a network.

A review of key centrality concepts can be found in the papers by Freeman, et al. [9]. Their work has significantly contributed to the [conceptual clarification and theoretical application of centrality.]

The degree centrality Cd(v) of a vertex v is simply defined as the degree d(v) of v if the considered graph is undirected. The degree centrality is, e.g., applicable whenever the graph represents something like a voting result. These networks represent a static situation and we are interested in the vertex that has the most direct votes or that can reach most other vertices directly. The degree centrality is a local measure, because the centrality value of a vertex is only determined by the number of its neighbors.

The most simple centrality is the degree centrality cD(v) of a vertex v that is simply defined as the degree d(v) of v if the considered graph is undirected. [...] The degree centrality is, e.g., applicable whenever the graph represents something like a voting result. These networks represent a static situation and we are interested in the vertex that has the most direct votes or that can reach most other vertices directly. The degree centrality is a local measure, because the centrality value of a vertex is only determined by the number of its neighbors.

Data collection is difficult for any network analysis because it is difficult to create a complete network. It is not easy to gain information on terrorist networks. It is a fact that terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data [15]. A number of academic researchers [16] [17] [18] focus primarily on data collection on terrorist organizations, analyzing the information through description and straightforward modeling.

One promising activity is the development of a major terrorism web portal at the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Center. This website makes social network tools and data related to terrorism publicly available. One example is the Terrorism Knowledge Portal [19], a database consisting of over 360,000 terrorism news articles and related Web pages coming from various high-quality terrorism Web sites, major search engines, and news portals. By providing publicly available network tools and data, the research opens itself to a number of new scholars. Academics can double-check the work of others to ensure quality. New scholars can enter the field without the lengthy time commitment and financial cost of developing basic tools and getting data. Such activities, combined with the federal government’s support, will help push the field of terrorism-related social network analysis to new heights in the future.

15. Ressler, S.: Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present,
and Future Research (2006)

Data collection is difficult for any network analysis because it is hard to create a complete network. It is especially difficult to gain information on terrorist networks. Terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members, and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data. A number of academic researchers focus primarily on data collection on terrorist organizations, analyzing the information through description and straightforward modeling.

[...]

[...] One promising activity is the development of a major terrorism web portal at the
University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Center. This website makes social network
tools and data related to terrorism publicly available.18 One example is the Terrorism

[page 5]

Knowledge Portal, a database consisting of over 360,000 terrorism news articles and related Web pages coming from various high-quality terrorism Web sites, major search engines, and news portals. By providing publicly available network tools and data, the research opens itself to a number of new scholars. Academics can double-check the work of others to ensure quality. New scholars can enter the field without the lengthy time commitment and financial cost of developing basic tools and getting data. Such activities, combined with the federal government’s support, will help push the field of terrorism-related social network analysis to new heights in the future.

The source is given, but the reference doesn't give any indication that any text at all has been taken from it. It is given as reference for the insight: "It is a fact that terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data"

Despite their strength, researchers’ works have a few key drawbacks. By dealing with open sources, these authors use limited data sets. With open sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. For example, if one cannot find an Al Qaeda operative in Denmark in publicly available sources, the researcher could assume there is no Al Qaeda network. However, it is highly probable that this is not the case, since terrorists generally try to keep a low profile before committing an attack. The data collectors can also be criticized because their work is more descriptive and lacks complex modeling tools. Fostering relationships with modelers could augment the work being conducted by data collectors, as statistical analysis might be able to take into account some of the limitations of the data and provide an additional analytical framework.

Despite their many strengths, Krebs’ and Sageman’s works have a few key drawbacks. By dealing with open sources, these authors are limited in acquiring data. With open sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. If one cannot find an al Qaeda operative in the U.S. in publicly available sources, the researcher could assume there is no al Qaeda network. However, it is highly probable this is not the case, since terrorists generally try to keep a low profile before committing an attack. The data collectors can also be criticized because their work is more descriptive and lacks complex modeling tools. Fostering relationships with modelers could augment the work being conducted by data collectors, as statistical analysis might be able to take into account some of the limitations of the data and provide an additional analytical framework.

Anmerkungen

The source is mentioned two paragraphs further up on the previous page, but without any indication that any text at all has been taken from it.

It is given as reference for the sentence: "It is a fact that terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data"

Terrorist networks consist of many cells that attend to particular parts of their environment. Hierarchy is used to manage the interdependencies between the different subunits that are not easily resolved through direct interaction [21]. It also resolves issues by flat [sic!], balancing incentives at the sub-organizational level with the interest of (terrorist) network as a whole [22]. [...] It also has the power to change the direction of the organization through substantive decisions on what should be done or through asset allocations [24].

21. Thompson, J.D.: Organizations in Action. McGraw-Hill, New York (1967)

22. Williamson, O.E.: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York
(1985)

Organizations, as we saw, consist of many specialized sub-entities that attend to particular parts of their environment; [...]

First, hierarchy allows to manage the interdependencies between the different sub-units that are not easily resolvable through direct interaction (cf. Thompson, 1967); it also allows to resolve issues by fiat, thus becoming an arbiter of intra-organizational dispute, balancing incentives at the suborganizational level with the interests of the organization as a whole (Williamson, 1985). Relatedly, hierarchy has the power both to change the direction of an administration or an organization through substantive decisions on “what should be done”, or through asset allocation (Bower, 1976).

Hierarchy’s ability to take the role of network (organizational) architect and devise new ways of dividing labour allows a new set of frames to emerge. A new decomposition allows a new set of informational inputs to percolate through the network, and for new views to be formed [25] [26]. This is the cybernetic control function of hierarchy.

Hierarchy can also help to provide some real-time control of terrorist network’s
(organization) routine mode of operation, at the level of both actions and cognition.
In terms of action, it can step in to block routines that are not functional and override
or restructure a proposed course of action to the extent possible.

Second, hierarchy’s ability to take the role of the “organizational architect”, and devise new ways of breaking up the tasks, and new types of units provides the opportunity for a new set of “frames” to emerge. A new “decomposition”, a new structure leads to a new set of inputs to come through to the

[page 8]

organization, and for new views to be formed (see Simon, 1962; Jacobides, 2006).7 This is the
“cybernetic control” function of hierarchy.

Third, there is another important role for hierarchy, and that is to provide real-time control of the
organization’s routine mode of operation, at the level of both actions and cognition. Hierarchy, in
principle, provides the ability of stepping in (a) to “block” routines that are not functional, and
override the proposed or emerging course of action of a part of the organization; [...]

We are also confident that real-time or near real-time information from a multiplicity of databases could have the potential to generate early warning signals of utility in detecting and deterring terrorist attacks. It is necessary, of course, to have experts in the loop.

It has not escaped our notice that SNA, duly validated and used with real-time or near real-time information from a multiplicity of databases could have the potential to generate early warning signals of utility in detecting and deterring terrorist attacks. It is necessary, of course, to have ‘experts’ in the loop.