SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. I will just
quickly emphasize a few of the points that my colleague made in the most
ambitious arms control agenda since the dawn of the nuclear age.

Under the START Treaty which, as you know, entered into
force on December 5th, we are already -- have already dismantled
thousands of weapons. Both the United States and Russia are ahead of
schedule in taking down weapons controlled by the START I treaty because
they anticipated its entry into force. In fact, the inspectors -- the
baseline inspections under that treaty are beginning this weekend, and
the Russian inspectors will be arriving at Dulles and on the West Coast
to begin the baseline, inspectors confirming the declarations under the
treaty.

A second major accomplishment has been, and was at the
beginning of the administration, a major goal to prevent the emergence
of any more nuclear weapons states out of the collapse of the former
Soviet Union. We've succeeded in gaining agreement to accomplish that
objective. The three former Soviet Republics are all engaged in
transferring -- have agreed to, and are engaged in transferring their
nuclear weapons back to Russia.

In terms of the 1995 agenda, it is very broad and
comprehensive. The President will address it in some detail tonight.
The leading item on that agenda is the indefinite and unconditional
extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which is a cornerstone
of our efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries.
And it also makes possible the continuation of the deep cuts that we've
already made and are engaged in making. As part of the effort to spur
that agreement -- or that decision in New York, the President will
announce tonight that he will place an additional 200 tons of fissile
material -- remove 200 tons -- an additional 200 tons of fissile
material from our active stockpile -- active weapons stockpile. That's
enough for thousands of nuclear weapons.

I want to emphasize, in the context of the NPT, that
contrary to reports, we are not -- I repeat not -- considering any
compromise in our goal of an indefinite extension. And the reason for
that is clear. There is a vast difference, a difference so great as to
be a difference in kind, rather than in quantity, between an indefinite
extension and an extension for a term of years; because after the term
of years, the treaty would expire unless amended. That jeopardizes the
future of the treaty, and therefore, would undermine its effectiveness,
even in the short-term.

The ratification of the START II treaty is an important
part of our effort to pursue indefinite extension because it will reduce
nuclear warheads on both sides to a level of about one-third, or less,
of their peak levels, and therefore, is the clearest possible indication
that our obligations to negotiate disarmament are underway.

We've made significant progress in the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty negotiations in Geneva, and these -- and also on the
fissile cutoff, where we will soon have a negotiating mandate. Those
relate back to important decisions the President made in 1993 that set
us on this broad agenda, and we're making progress.

Another key issue this year, of course, will be
implementation of the North Korean agreement and carefully to monitor
compliance with their performance under that agreement.

With that, let me turn back to questions.

Q Two hundred tons of what -- can you compare that to what
is now in the stockpile?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't specifically --
can you give me a number?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's -- of course, the
overall number is classified, but I think we can say that it is a
significant portion and --

Q (inaudible)

Q I'm sorry, significant --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- a significant portion
of the available stockpile, and it would be both -- it would comprise
both highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

Q Is this done immediately?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be done -- the
process will be worked out. The President in making the statement
commits us to do it, and the specific steps --

Q What happens to that material? What happens to it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have to -- we're
engaged -- the plutonium is a complicated question because both we and
the Russians are working on how you dispose of plutonium over the
long-term. There are a number of options under consideration. The
uranium can be used after you blend it down in power reactors.

Q Is this something we were going to have to do under this
treaty anyway and we're doing it ahead of schedule? Is that what's
happening, or is this over and above that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, this is a --there's no
treaty requiring this. This is a new initiative.

Q This is a measure of goodwill for the countries that
we're trying to get to sign NPT?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a demonstration of
the United States continuing commitment to the process of reducing
nuclear arsenals and making that process irreversible. When you take
the material to make nuclear weapons out of the stockpile, you make it
impossible for them -- for it to be used --

Q But in the case of the plutonium, you're only moving it
from one place to the other --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it will be --

Q because you don't know how to deal with it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's true, we have to
figure out how to deal with it. But the President's commitment is
that it won't go back into the weapons stockpile -- it won't be
available for weapons.

Q Were we planning to build weapons with this material any
time in the foreseeable future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as long as it's in
the stockpile, the option exists to build weapons. What we're doing is
removing that option.

Q Are you asking other countries to take the same step?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are engaged in
negotiations with the Russians on reciprocal steps along this line, but
this is separate from that; this is a unilateral step.

Q Where are we on trying to get a comprehensive ban on
production of fissile materials?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The major obstacle to an
agreement on a negotiating mandate in Geneva, which was the Pakistanis'
resistance to a simple negotiating mandate, has been removed. The
negotiating mandate will likely be agreed to within the next few weeks.
That, of course, will open negotiations. It's not the end of them. But
it's an important first step.

Q How many nations are you short on NPT?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are in the 60, 70
range. We will require 87. There are now 172 members of the
Nonproliferation Treaty, and a majority of the membership who cast the
vote. I'm pretty confident that we'll get there. We can't put our
finger on the right number of countries yet. My expectation is that
once we get to the necessary 87 that the numbers will grow
significantly, that we won't stop there.

Q So you're at 70; you need 87.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're in the 70s.

Q And do you think this move with the material is going to
lure 12, 20, something like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think that by
itself will. It's another demonstration of good faith. There is a very
large and broad effort underway, both in the United States government
and in other countries, including both nonaligned countries and
developed countries, European allies, Japan, Canada, Australia and
others, who are working very hard on this effort to persuade countries
to exceed -- or to support the indefinite extension. I want to
emphasize in that context, a lot of the focus is on the -- what steps
the United States and the nuclear weapon states should take in order to
-- in terms of disarmament, in order to encourage other countries to
support indefinite extension.

The main value of the Nonproliferation Treaty is not a
favor to the United States -- it's important to us -- but the main value
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is a security instrument to the
member states. The original plan, which was developed by the Irish in
the '60s to negotiate a nonproliferation treaty, didn't even contemplate
participation by the nuclear weapon states, that they'd have any
obligation at all. It's an agreement by countries that saves them from
the danger and risk and cost of a nuclear arms race in specific regions.