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SADRŽAJ
UVOD ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4
Kako su mediji pratili izbore ........................................................................................................................................... 6
Slobodan Kremenjak, advokat
Prvih devet meseci Medijske strategije .................................................................................................................... 9
Kruna Savović, advokat
Prednacrt Zakona o elektronskim medijima – unapređivanje regulacije i prakse ................. 12
Prof. dr Rade Veljanovski
Post-komunističke medijske reforme iz ptičje perspektive ................................................................... 17
Dr Jovanka Matić
Evropski sud za ljudska prava - Informatori o sudskoj praksi .............................................................. 21
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................................... 24
Media Coverage of the Elections ................................................................................................................................. 26
Slobodan Kremenjak, attorney at law
The First Nine Months of the Media Strategy..................................................................................................... 29
Kruna Savovic, attorney at law
Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media – Improving Regulation and Practice .................................... 32
Prof. Rade Veljanovski, PhD
Post-communist Media Reforms from a Bird's Eye View .......................................................................... 37
Jovanka Matic, PhD
European Court of Human Rights - Information Notes on the Court’s case-law ........................ 41
3
UVOD
Medijska scena Srbije se nije mnogo izmenila za poslednje tri godine, koliko traje pravni
monitoring koga ANEM kontinuirano sprovodi u saradnji sa svojim dugogodišnjim partnerom,
advokatskom kancelarijom „Živković&Samardžić“. Zapravo, u ovom periodu, često se činilo da je
na „monitorima“ našeg ekspertskog tima slika srpske medijske scene „zamrznuta“, jer su se isti
problemi medija i novinara uporno ponavljali i ostajali bez ikakvog ili bez adekvatnog odgovora.
Ipak, prema mišljenju monitoring tima, prvih 6 meseci 2012. godine, na koje se ova Publikacija i
odnosi, posebno se izdvajaju po izuzetno jakom uticaju koji je na ceo medijski sektor, ali i
društvo u celini, imao izborni proces u Srbiji. Pretnje, pritisci i napadi na novinare i medije u
ovom periodu bili su pojačani a najčešće su dolazili od strane lokalnih političkih moćnika
nezadovoljnih kritičkim izveštavanjem pojedinih medija ili novinara o njima i njihovom radu.
Poseban i najčešći vid pritiska je bila diskriminacija tih novinara i medija, koja je u predizbornoj
atmosferi tretirana kao normalno i prihvatljivo ponašanje i predstavljana kao legitiman čin.
Pored toga, teška ekonomska kriza, visokokoncentrisano tržište oglašavanja, sve manji
oglašivački budžeti kontrolisani od malog broja velikih marketinških agencija koje su, po pravilu,
blisko povezane sa državnim i stranačkim funkcionerima, kao i nedovršena privatizacija medija i
neadekvatna primena propisa o kontroli državne pomoći koje su dovele dotle da se veliki broj
neprivatizovanih medija, pod neposrednom političkom kontrolom lokalnih vladajućih oligarhija,
finansira iz budžeta bez ozbiljne kontrole njihovih sadržaja – a takođe i izostanak opšteg
nadzora nad izbornim procesom i sprovođenje nadzora samo nad elektronskim medijima i to na
osnovu Оpštеоbаvеzuјućеg uputstvа RRA koje je bilo u toj meri nejasno da je sam RRA morao da
objavi i obavezujuće tumačenje tog uputstva, značajno su uticali na meru slobode medija u ovom
izbornom procesu koja nije bila na zavidnom nivou. Situacija je bila toliko očigledno loša da je
Delegacija Parlamentarne skupštine Saveta Evrope, koja je tokom aprila bоrаvilа u Bеоgrаdu u
оkviru priprеmа zа prаćеnjе izbоrа 6. mаја, u svom saopštenju izrazila zabrinutost zbog
ekonomskih i političkih pritisaka na pojedine novinare i pokušaja partija da utiču na uređivačku
politiku medija. Da je ovakva situacija veoma nepovoljno uticala na novinare i medije, govore i
rezultati monitoringa izveštavanja medija u predizbornoj kampanji (BIRODI) koji pokazuju da je
deo medija odustao od kritičkog i analitičkog izveštavanja o radu političkih stranaka, opredelivši
se za neutralno a često i promotivno izveštavanje. Sve navedeno govori da je u ovom izbornom
procesu bilo ugroženo ostvarivanje prava glasača na informisani izbor koji bi trebalo da se vrši
na osnovu potpunih, objektivnih, tačnih i blagovremenih informacija, prava kandidata da ukrste
svoje politike ali i prava samih medija da iznose svoje stavove i izveštavaju o pitanjima od javnog
interesa.
Još jedna loša posledica izbornog procesa po medijski sektor, nastala zbog gubljenja interesa ili
realnih nemogućnosti vlasti da nešto sistemski uradi, jeste ta da rešavanje ključnih pitanja koja
nastavljaju da opterećuju položaj medija u Srbiji, kao što su povlačenje države iz vlasništva u
medijima ili uređenje sistema finansiranja javnog interesa u medijskoj sferi u skladu s pravilima
o državnoj pomoći, ostaje da čeka neku novu vladu, dok je „stara“ vlada u predizbornoj kampanji
nekim svojim potezima pokazala da je praktično odustala od tih važnih principa za koje se
nekoliko meseci pre opredelila u Medijskoj strategiji. Tu novu vladu će sačekati i tri gotova
prednacrta važnih medijskih zakona predviđenih Strategijom, od kojih se za dva, koja su
užurbano pripremile radne grupe Ministarstva kulture (Zakon o javnom informisanju i Zakon o
javnim servisima), ništa ne zna – ni ko ih je radio, niti šta oni sadrže, što unapred izaziva
podozrivost prema njima, dok je treći Prednacrt – Zakona o elektronskim medijima, kojeg je
uradila radna grupa pod okriljem OEBS-a, nedavno javno predstavljen. Međutim, i na sudbinu
prednacrta tih zakona, ali i same Medijske strategije, može drastično uticati i sastav nove vlade,
imajući u vidu da u donošenje tog dokumenta nisu bile uključene sve parlamentarne stranke, niti
su se o njemu izjašnjavale. U međuvremenu, kriza i postojeći tržišni uslovi nastaviće dalje da
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urušavaju srpske medije. U ovakvoj situaciji, neke pozitivne promene koje su se desile u ovom
periodu – kao što su: pomaci u procesu digitalizacije omogućeni izmenama Strategije, izdavanje
dozvola za Inicijalnu digitalnu mrežu i početak simulkasta u Srbiji, naznake promena u sudskoj
praksi u medijskim slučajevima, pre svega u pogledu pooštravanja kažnjavanja učinilaca napada
na novinare i snimatelje ali i u pogledu većeg uvažavanja slobode medija i javnog interesa u
oblasti informisanja, pomaci u uređenju oblasti kablovske distribucije medijskih sadržaja
uvođenjem „must carry“ obaveze dominantnom kablovskom operatoru na ovom tržištu, ostaju u
senci svega lošeg što je nabrojano.
Tekstovi u ovoj Publikaciji se bave nekim od važnih medijskih pitanja za navedeni period – kako
su mediji pratili izbore, implementacijom Medijske strategije, Prednacrtom Zakona o
elektronskim medijima i pitanjem postkomunističkih medijskih reformi. Peti tekst i u ovom
broju Publikacije jeste specijalni dodatak koga čine izvodi iz Informatora sudske prakse
Evropskog suda za ljudska prava – sažet prikaz dve presude koje se odnose na primenu člana 10
Evropske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda: prva se odnosi na zaštitu
prava maloletnika a druga na pitanje balansa između slobode izražavanja i prava na poštovanje
privatnog života javnih ličnosti.
Beograd, jun 2012. god.
5
Kako su mediji pratili izbore
Slobodan Kremenjak, advokat1
Izbori su obeležili prvu polovinu 2012. godine na medijskoj sceni u Srbiji. Iako su za lokalne
skupštine, pokrajinsku i republičku skupštinu formalno raspisani tek 13. marta, a predsednički
još i kasnije, 5. aprila, slobodno se može reći da je i više meseci pre raspisivanja, surova borba za
poluge uticaja na javno mnenje već bila u punom jeku, kao i najrazličitiji pokušaji da se mediji
instrumentalizuju i da se obezbedi njihova „kooperativnost“ u predizbornoj kampanji. O
ozbiljnosti situacije svedoči i to da je čak i dеlеgаciјa Pаrlаmеntаrnе skupštinе Sаvеtа Еvrоpе,
koja je bоrаvilа u Bеоgrаdu u оkviru priprеmа zа prаćеnjе izbоrа, morala da pozove pаrtiјe nа
uzdržanost оd pоkušаја dа utiču nа urеđivаčku pоlitiku mеdiја i da izrazi svoju zаbrinutost
povodom еkоnоmskih i pоlitičkih pritisakа nа pојеdinе nоvinаrе.
Fazu pre samog raspisivanja izbora karakterisalo je svojevrsno „obeležavanje teritorije“ i
demonstracije moći, posebno na lokalnom nivou i od strane lokalnih vlastodržaca. „Nepodobni
novinari“ sprečavani su da izveštavaju, uskraćivan im je pristup konferencijama za medije i
drugim događajima. Obaveza koja važi za organe teritorijalne autonomije i lokalne samouprave,
kao i odbornike, da informacije o svome radu učine dostupnim za javnost i to pod jednakim
uslovima za sve novinare i sva javna glasila, propisana članom 10 Zakona o javnom informisanju,
kršena je gotovo svakodnevno. Tako je, recimo, u jednom od brojnih slučajeva o kojima su mediji
pisali, novinar sprečen da izveštava s konferencije za novinare predsednika Opštine. Sam
predsednik Opštine ovo je pravdao izjavom da novinar na konferenciju nije bio pozvan, kako je
naveo zbog „neprofesionalizma i kršenja osnovnih kodeksa novinarstva“. Kreirana je situacija u
kojoj predstavnici lokalne vlasti, bez suda i u suprotnosti s važećim zakonom, prava priznata
svim novinarima i svim medijima samovlasno uskraćuju onim novinarima i medijima koje
arbitrarno proglase za nepodobne. Kad se ovome doda da u uslovima duboke ekonomske krize,
budžeti kojima te iste lokalne vlasti raspolažu često predstavljaju slamku spasa za osiromašene
lokalne medije, postaje jasno zašto je sve manje kritičkih tonova u izveštavanju.
Zauzimanje što boljih početnih pozicija pred raspisivanje izbora obezbeđivano je i kroz
pokretanje novih medija u kojima su odgovorne položaje zauzimali visoki funkcioneri političkih
stranaka – učesnika na izborima. Tako je npr, početkom februara, Republička radiodifuzna
agencija izdala dozvolu za emitovanje programa kablovskoj televiziji Kopernikus 3 (Svet plus),
za koju su mediji pisali da je trećinu svog ukupnog vremena emitovanja praktično unapred
izdala Srpskoj naprednoj stranci, a čija je jedna od urednica, Tanja Vidojević, i članica Glavnog
odbora iste stranke. Ovaj medij do februara je radio bez dozvole a Služba za nadzor i analizu pri
RRA, kako je preneo dnevni list „Blic“, u više navrata je upozoravala Savet RRA da oni svojim
programskim sadržajima favorizuju Srpsku naprednu stranku i vode neprimerene kampanje
protiv funkcionera drugih partija. Predstavnici Republičke radiodifuzne agencije, izjavljivali su
da u skladu s važećim propisima praktično nisu imali mogućnost da uskrate izdavanje dozvole,
već jedino da nastave da prate program nakon njenog izdavanja i reaguju ako se s kršenjem
propisa nastavi.
Ono što je Republička radiodifuzna agencija uradila, jeste donošenje dva nova opšta obavezujuća
uputstva. Jedno je ─ Uputstvo radio i televizijskim stanicama (emiterima) u predizbornoj
kampanji za lokalne, pokrajinske i republičke skupštinske izbore, izbore za predsednika
Republike i izbore za nacionalne savete nacionalnih manjina, objavljeno 9. marta 2012. godine, a
1
Advokatska kancelarija „Živković&Samardžić“, Beograd
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drugo ─ Uputstvo emiterima radi omogućavanja nesmetanog informisanja gledalaca sa
oštećenim sluhom u toku predizborne kampanje u 2012. godini, objavljeno 12. aprila.
Po Zakonu o radio-difuziji, RRA Opšte obavezujuće uputstvo donosi radi bližeg uređivanja
određenih pitanja koja se odnose na sadržaj programa. Smisao Uputstva stoga i nije, niti je bilo
realno očekivati da bude, u tome da neposredno štiti emitere od pritisaka, već da podižući nivo
pravne sigurnosti otkloni nedoumice koje su mediji imali u vezi sa izveštavanjem o kampanji i
izbornom procesu, i time utiče na sužavanje prostora za pritiske usmerene na to da se nejasnoće
u propisima zloupotrebe u interesu bilo kog učesnika u izbornom procesu.
Nažalost, i pored činjenice da su ova dva opšta obavezujuća uputstva praktično već deveto i
deseto po redu koje RRA donosi od usvajanja Zakona o radio-difuziji, budući da su prethodno
donošena za predsedničke izbore 2003, 2004. i 2008. godine, za parlamentarne 2003. i 2007.
godine, za lokalne 2004. godine, zа lоkаlnе, pоkrајinskе i rеpubličkе parlamentarne 2008.
gоdinе, te za izbore za nаciоnаlnе sаvеtе nаciоnаlnih mаnjinа 2010. gоdine, što bi trebalo da
znači da se problemi znaju a da praksa u njihovom rešavanju postoji i da je dovoljno bogata,
dileme vezane za primenu i najnovijeg opšteg obavezujućeg uputstva nisu izostale.
Tako je, npr. odredba Opšteg obavezujućeg uputstva, shodno kojoj u toku predizborne kampanje
emiteri treba da iz svog programa isključe dokumentarne, igrane, zabavne i slične emisije i
filmove u kojima se pojavljuje funkcioner, istaknuti predstavnik podnosioca izborne liste ili
kandidat i da izbegavaju druge oblike indirektne političke propagande u redovnim emisijama,
bila različito tumačena čak i od različitih predstavnika same agencije. Takođe, nerešeno pitanje
klasifikacije programskih žanrova, emisija i filmova na dokumentarne, igrane, zabavne i, što je
najgore, i „slične emisije i filmove“, moglo je samo da izazove nesigurnost emitera u obim svojih
prava. Naime, RRA nikada nije objavila kriterijume na osnovu kojih vrši klasifikaciju čak ni za
tradicionalne žanrove, a još manje kriterijume na osnovu kojih bi neke druge žanrove mogla
klasifikovati kao „slične“ dokumentarnim, igranim ili zabavnim programima. U datim
okolnostima bilo je krajnje nezahvalno tumačiti da li je konkretan program podoban za
emitovanje ili ne.
S druge strane, još veću zbrku izazvali su zahtevi stranaka za objavljivanje predizbornih oglasnih
poruka takozvane kontrastne ili negativne kampanje, kampanje koja je bila usmerena na
diskreditaciju drugih lista i kandidata. Marketinške agencije stranaka i koalicija praktično su se
utrkivale u proizvodnji takvih oglasnih poruka a mediji dovođeni u situaciju da je sva
odgovornost za emitovanje bila isključivo na njima. Naime, iako je Zakonom o izboru narodnih
poslanika predviđeno i postojanje opšteg nadzora nad postupcima političkih stranaka,
kandidata, pa samim tim i marketinških agencija koje u njihovo ime i za njihov račun vode
predizborne kampanje, a koji nadzor je trebalo da vrši Nadzorni odbor Narodne skupštine
Republike Srbije, takav odbor ni na ovim, kao ni na jednim prethodnim izborima još od 2000.
godine, nije bio formiran. Time je kreirana situacija u kojoj za povrede načela oglašavanja, osim
RRA koja je zakonom ovlašćena da pokreće postupke isključivo protiv radio i TV stanica, nije bilo
tela koje bi iniciralo postupke protiv samih stranaka i njihovih agencija i na taj način problem
rešavalo na njegovom izvorištu. Televizije su dovedene u situaciju da biraju između prijava
stranaka za diskriminatorsko odbijanje emitovanja njihovih spotova, ukoliko bi emitovanje
odbili, odnosno sankcija RRA za slučaj da emitovanje prihvate, dok se pitanjem odgovornosti
stranaka za neprimerenu kampanju niko nije bavio.
Sve navedeno, iako verovatno predstavlja tek vrh ledenog brega, u dovoljnoj meri svedoči o
uslovima u kojima su mediji pratili izbore. U takvim uslovima, bilo je nerealno očekivati da
mediji ostvare svoju funkciju i zadatke koji se od njih u izbornom procesu i u vezi s njim očekuju.
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Rezultati istrаživаnja kоје је оd 1. dо 14. аprilа sprоvео Birо zа društvеnа istrаživаnjа,
očekivano su pokazali da je izvеštаvаnjе mеdiја u prеdizbоrnој kаmpаnji dоminаntnо pоzitivnо,
а u mnоgim slučајеvimа čаk i prоmоtivnоg kаrаktеrа, kao i da su mеdiјi „uglаvnоm оdustаli оd
svоје kоntrоlnе ulоgе, оdnоsnо оd bilо kаkvоg kritičkоg i аnаlitičkоg izvеštаvаnjа, i pоnаšаli sе
sаmо kао prеnоsiоci infоrmаciја о аktivnоstimа pоlitičkih strаnаkа i njihоvih kаndidаtа“. Koliko
bi ovakvo poražavajuće stanje moglo da se promeni do nekih narednih izbora, zavisi pre svega
od spremnosti nove vlade da posle decenija ignorisanja problema u medijskom sektoru, te
probleme napokon počne da rešava.
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Prvih devet meseci Medijske strategije
Kruna Savović, advokat1
Strategija razvoja sistema javnog informisanja u Republici Srbiji do 2016. godine, usvojena je 28.
septembra 2011. godine i objavljena u Službenom glasniku br. 75/2011 od 7. oktobra. Gotovo
devet meseci, koliko je od tada proteklo, čini se sasvim dovoljnim vremenom za evaluaciju onoga
što je na implementaciji Strategije učinjeno.
Formalnopravno, vlada svaku strategiju, pa tako i medijsku, donosi shodno odredbi člana 45
Zakona o vladi („Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 55/2005, 71/2005 ─ ispr., 101/2007, 65/2008 i
16/2011), kako bi utvrdila stanje u konkretnoj oblasti iz svoje nadležnosti i predvidela mere
koje treba preduzeti radi njenog razvoja.
Strategija razvoja sistema javnog informisanja samo je jedna od osamdesetak strategija koje je
Vlada Republike Srbije donela poslednjih godina u najrazličitijim oblastima, od podsticanja
rađanja (Strategija podsticanja rađanja, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 13/2008) do starenja
(Nacionalna strategija o starenju, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 76/2006), i od povratka na Kosovo i
Metohiju (Strategija održivog opstanka i povratka na Kosovo i Metohiju, „Službeni glasnik RS“,
br. 32/2010) do razvoja širokopojasnog pristupa Internetu (Strategija razvoja širokopojasnog
pristupa u Republici Srbiji do 2012. godine, „Službeni glasnik RS“, br. 84/2009). Obilje strateških
dokumenata ne znači, međutim, da je Srbija istovremeno postala zemlja transparentne javne
politike u oblastima za koje se strategije donose. To bi se ponajmanje moglo reći za oblast
medijske javne politike.
Okruženje za delovanje medija u Srbiji oblikovano je, poslednjih deset godina, ne kao rezultat
mera koje bi sledile nekakve unapred definisane ciljeve, već pre kao posledica stihije, a često i
direktne opstrukcije definisanih ciljeva rukovođene pre svega ambicijom da se zadrže poluge
kontrole i uticaja na medijski sektor. Upravo iz razloga direktne opstrukcije, privatizacija medija
je, iako propisana kao obavezna još Zakonom o radio-difuziji iz 2002. godine i Zakonom o
javnom informisanju iz 2003. godine, umesto već davno okončana, sada ponovo u Strategiji
predstavljena kao aktuelno strateško opredeljenje.
Dokle se, dakle, stiglo s implementacijom Strategije, devet meseci nakon njenog usvajanja? Ako
pogledamo Akcioni plan za sprovođenje Strategije, videćemo da u njemu nijedna aktivnost nije
oročena na rok od 9 meseci ili kraći. Videćemo, međutim, i da su najkraći rokovi predviđeni u
Akcionom planu, oni koji traju 10 meseci, a koji se odnose na preispitivanje mogućnosti izmena
Zakona o oglašavanju, Zakona o pravu na besplatne akcije i novčanu naknadu koju građani
ostvaruju u postupku privatizacije, Zakona o porezu na dodatnu vrednost, Carinskog zakona,
Zakona o kontroli državne pomoći, kao i preispitivanje mogućnosti uvođenja programa medijske
pismenosti u proces obrazovanja.
Iako nije objašnjeno šta „preispitivanje mogućnosti“ u konkretnom slučaju znači,
pretpostavljamo da bi minimum onoga što je Vlada usvajajući strategiju imala u vidu,
podrazumevao da se, npr. u odnosu na preispitivanje mogućnosti izmena Zakona o oglašavanju,
Ministarstvo kulture, informisanja i informacionog društva u komunikaciji s ministаrstvom u
čijoj je to nadležnosti (konkretno s Мinistаrstvom pоlјоprivrеdе, trgоvinе, šumаrstvа i
vоdоprivrеdе), utvrdi da li već postoje planovi izmena Zakona o oglašavanju, kao i da li su
izmene predložene medijskom strategijom (regulisanje oglašavanja države, odnosno njenih
1
Advokatska kancelarija „Živković&Samardžić“, Beograd
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organa na način koji bi sprečio koncentraciju oglasnih budžeta, odnosno njihovu monopolizaciju
od strane pojedinih medija ili agencija; liberalizacija oglašavanja u medijima, u meri u kojoj je to
u skladu s međunarodnom praksom i međunarodnopreuzetim obavezama) kompatibilne s
izmenama koje se i inače planiraju, odnosno kompatibilne s drugim interesima koje vlada štiti u
toj oblasti. Slično je valjalo postupiti i u odnosu na druge zakone preispitivanjem mogućnosti
izmena predviđenih Akcionim planom. Samo mesec dana pre isteka roka za okončanje ove
aktivnosti predviđene Akcionim planom, ne postoje informacije da je bilo šta od navedenog
urađeno, u odnosu na bilo koji od navedenih zakona, što bi moglo da ukazuje na to da se na
implementaciji Strategije ne radi, odnosno da se, u najboljem slučaju, ne radi dovoljno.
Još je složenije pitanje rešenja ponuđenih Strategijom a koja nisu naišla na nepodeljenu podršku
javnosti, ili su, najblaže rečeno, nedovoljno razrađena. Recimo, ideja Strategije da se nesporna
potreba građana da na lokalnom i regionalnom nivou dobijaju blagovremene i tačne informacije
specifične za to područje rešava osnivanjem šest javnih regionalnih radio i televizijskih servisa
samo u centralnoj Srbiji, naišla je na kritike medijskih i novinarskih udruženja. Vlada se,
najavljujući osnivanje javnih regionalnih radio i televizijskih servisa, pozvala na poštovanje
preporuka Saveta Evrope koje se odnose na garancije nezavisnosti javnih radiodifuznih servisa i
garancije nezavisnosti i funkcija regulatornih tela u oblasti radio-difuzije. Ova druga preporuka u
dobroj meri već je prekršena usvajanjem Zakona o kinematografiji, kojim su narušeni sistemi
finansiranja i RRA i Ratela. Takođe, Strategija osim što kaže da će regionalni javni servisi
funkcionisati na principima na kojima funkcionišu RTS i RTV (koji teško da bi od bilo koga mogli
biti ocenjeni kao pozitivni primeri upravljačke, programske i posebno finansijske nezavisnosti),
ne precizira ni ko će upravljati regionalnim javnim servisima, s kakvim nadležnostima i
odgovornostima, ko će nadzirati njihov rad, i što je posebno važno, kako će se konkretno
regionalni javni servisi finansirati. Strategija, naime, kaže da će se finansirati u skladu s
pravilima o dodeli državne pomoći, ne pozivajući se neposredno na primenu Komunikacije
Evropske komisije o primeni pravila o kontroli državne pomoći na javne radiodifuzne servise iz
2009. godine. Primena navedene Komunikacije morala bi biti obaveza Srbije i u kontekstu
Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju. Ocena prihvatljivosti finansiranja javnih servisa sa
aspekta propisa koji se tiču kontrole državne pomoći, u kontekstu Komunikacije, podrazumeva
između ostalog i postojanje jasne definicije mandata, odnosno uloge javnih servisa, načina na
koji se taj mandat, odnosno uloga proveravaju i njihovo poštovanje nadzire, transparentnosti
finansiranja i posebno knjigovodstvenog razdvajanja aktivnosti javnog servisa od onih aktivnosti
koje to nisu, zabrane preplaćivanja, postojanja mehanizama finansijske kontrole, definisane
procedure za uvođenje novih servisa, ponašanja na tržištu kojim se ne narušava konkurencija.
Dragana Milićević-Milutinović, državna sekretarka u Ministarstvu kulture, informisanja i
informacionog društva, izjavila je početkom juna da je prednacrt Zakona o javnim servisima
pripremljen i predat ministarstvu od strane radne grupe koja je na njemu radila. Ministarstvo,
međutim, nije objavilo prednacrt, te je nemoguće oceniti u kojoj meri on prepoznaje sve ovde
navedeno. Dodatni razlog za brigu je i činjenica da je sam postupak imenovanja članova radne
grupe bio prilično netransparentan, te da se za razliku od prakse za koju se verovalo da je
ustanovljena prilikom izrade nacrta Strategije, a da se Ministarstvo prilikom izrade nacrta akata
od značaja za medijski sektor konsultuje sa udruženjima, u ovoj radnoj grupi nisu našli
predstavnici medijskih i novinarskih asocijacija. Ovo je tim više opasno što bi bilo kakva
nedoslednost u budućem Zakonu o javnim servisima kojim bi se odstupilo od kriterijuma
Komunikacije Evropske komisije o primeni pravila o kontroli državne pomoći na javne
radiodifuzne servise, praktično uništila komercijalnu radio-difuziju na regionalnom i lokalnom
nivou u Srbiji, ako je već i samo osnivanje regionalnih javnih servisa ne uništava. Imajući u vidu
raniju praksu neuvažavanja zahteva medijskih udruženja u javnim raspravama, pitanje je koliko
će na ovaj nacrt uopšte moći da se utiče jednom kada bude publikovan i pušten u javnu raspravu.
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Takođe, ništa nije urađeno ni po pitanju kontrole državne pomoći koje mediji, a posebno oni u
javnom vlasništvu, i inače dobijaju. Podsetimo, Strategija je najavila da će se ova pomoć
dodeljivati uz poštovanje kriterijuma koji podrazumevaju javnost, finansijsku kontrolu, zabranu
preplaćivanja, srazmernost, ponašanje na tržištu koje ne narušava propise o zaštiti konkurencije.
Takođe, najavljeno je uvođenje novog modela finansiranja, po projektnom principu, ali se ni tu
nije odmaklo dalje od same najave. Devet izgubljenih meseci za regulisanje ove oblasti, za
posledicu ima dalje urušavanje komercijalne radio-difuzije u Srbiji.
Zaključak koji možemo izvući je da se ─ ako izuzmemo da su prednacrti nekih zakona (Zakon o
javnom informisanju, Zakon o elektronskim medijima, Zakon javnim servisima) napisani i
predati ministarstvu, pri čemu ih ministarstvo još nije objavilo, te je samim tim nemoguće dati
njihovu ocenu ─ s implementacijom Strategija razvoja sistema javnog informisanja zapravo nije
ni počelo. Činjenica da raspisivanje izbora, do čega je u međuvremenu došlo, nije pogodovalo
njenoj punoj implementaciji možda i stoji, ali nikako ne može da opravda to što je Strategija
ostala mrtvo slovo na papiru, kupovina vremena i ispunjavanje uslova postavljenog iz Brisela za
dobijanje statusa kandidata za članstvo u EU koje je samo formalno i koje je lišeno sadržaja i
suštine.
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Prednacrt Zakona o elektronskim medijima –
unapređivanje regulacije i prakse
Prof. dr Rade Veljanovski1
Potreba da se temeljnije menja Zakon o radio-difuziji, koji je inače doživeo nekoliko manjih
promena, uočena je još pre četiri godine, a realizacija ideje izmene odredaba dovela je do
Prednacrta Zakona o elektronskim medijima. Ovako dug period priprema novog zakonskog
teksta može se objasniti činjenicom da je ista radna grupa u međuvremenu dobila zadatak da
pripremi i Prednacrt Zakona o javnosti i nedozvoljenom objedinjavanju vlasništva u medijima,
koji do sada nije ušao u proceduru usvajanja, a zatim je bilo nužno da se sačeka donošenje
Strategije razvoja sistema informisanja u Srbiji.
Skoro deset godina od kako je Zakon o radio-difuziji na snazi, dug je period za ovako dinamičnu
oblast kao što je delovanje elektronskih medija, pogotovo u novom tehnološkom okruženju.
Digitalizacija i primena novih medijskih tehnologija, koji iz određenih, manje ili više opravdanih,
razloga nisu zakonski tretirani pre jedne decenije, već nekoliko godina su regulatorni imperativ.
Činjenica da su u Srbiji usvojeni Strategija digitalizacije i Zakon o elektronskim komunikacijama,
kojim je zamenjen Zakon o telekomunikacijama, zahtevala je i usaglašavanje zakona koji se u
užem smislu bavi medijskim aspektima korišćenja frekvencija. Noviji evropski regulatorni
dokumenti, pre svega Direktiva o audio-vizuelnim medijskim servisima, ali i izvesnost prelaska
sa analognog na digitalno emitovanje, najkasnije do 17. juna 2015. godine, zahtevale su
normativno prilagođavanje u ovoj oblasti. I neke od izmena Zakona o radio-difuziji ali i
postupanje po njemu, bili su razlozi za novi regulatorni pogled.
Inicijativa za izmene Zakona o radio-difuziji i rad na tekstu zakona rezultirala je konstatacijom
da se pojam radio-difuzija ne može više koristiti na dosadašnji način jer je taj izraz označavao
pre svega distribuciju signala od dosadašnjih emitera do krajnjih korisnika. Prema obimu izmena
i značaju novih odredaba realnije je, dakle, govoriti o novom zakonu, a ne o izmenjenom Zakonu
o radio-difuziji.
Dalja harmonizacija sa evropskim regulatornim okvirom
Prednacrt Zakona o elektronskim medijima ima devet delova i 146 članova.
Njegova struktura, na prvi pogled, ne odudara mnogo od Zakona o radio-difuziji. I ovaj zakonski
tekst počinje s načelnim opredeljenjima kao što su: sloboda, profesionalizam i nezavisnost
medija, zabrana cenzure i uticaja na elektronske medije kao garancija nezavisnosti, puna
afirmacija građanskih prava i sloboda, primena međunarodnopriznatih normi i principa. Među
načelima su i objektivnost, zabrana diskriminacije u procesu izdavanja dozvola, podsticanje
slobodne konkurencije, pristup elektronskim medijima, podsticanje medijske pismenosti, zaštita
kulturne raznovrsnosti i podsticanje medijskog stvaralaštva.
Razdvajanje proizvodnje programa, odnosno produkcije sadržaja od distribucije, odnosno
emitovanja, prva je ključna razlika između Zakona o radio-difuziji i Prednacrta Zakona o
elektronskim medijima. Kao što kaže član 2 Prednacrta: „Odredbe ovog zakona ne odnose se na
uslove obavljanja delatnosti elektronskih komunikacija, uslove i način korišćenja radio1
Vanredni profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu
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frekvencija za distribuciju i emitovanje medijskih sadržaja, kao i na uslove postavljanja,
upotrebe i održavanja emisionih fiksnih i mobilnih uređaja“. Emitovanje je, po novom pristupu,
ostavljeno Zakonu o elektronskim komunikacijama, pa je time i pojam emiter izostao iz
Prednacrta. Emitovanjem medijskih sadržaja trebalo bi da se bavi posebno preduzeće, ili više
njih u budućnosti, i to će biti operatori elektronske komunikacione mreže za pružanje medijskih
usluga. Ono što smo do sada zvali emiterom, ubuduće će biti pružalac audio-vizuelne medijske
usluge koji ima uređivačku odgovornost za izbor sadržaja, odnosno audio-vizuelnih medijskih
usluga. Ovo su promene koje su direktno proizašle iz Direktive o audio-vizuelnim medijskim
servisima koja radio i televizijske kuće i ostale pružaoce programskih usluga naziva
provajderima medijskog servisa.
Prednacrt Zakona o elektronskim medijima ima ovakav naziv jer se, opet na osnovu evropskih
dokumenata, koji uvažavaju okolnosti nastale uvođenjem novih tehnologija, pojam elektronski
medij širi, pored radija i televizije, i na „druge audio-vizuelene medijske usluge, urednički
oblikovane internet stranice i drugo“, kako stoji u Prednacrtu.
Već u novom „pojmovniku“, odnosno članu koji govori o značenju pojedinih izraza, umesto
dosadašnjih definicija, mogu se naći mnogi novi izrazi koji dovoljno govore o prilagođenosti
zakonskog teksta Direktivi o audio-vizuelnim servisima. Tu je, već pomenuta, nova definicija
elektronskog medija, zatim medijska usluga i audio-vizuelna medijska usluga. Objašnjeno je
značenje programskog sadržaja i uređivačke odgovornosti. Uređivačka odgovornost je jedna od
ključnih reči u Prednacrtu jer ona, u skladu sa evropskom regulativom, omogućava redefiniciju
pojma elektronski medij, pošto obuhvata i nove medije na internetu, ali ne bilo koje, već one za
koje se može utvrditi profesionalni pristup i odgovornost.1 Definisane su linearne i nelinearne
medijske usluge, kao i usluga na zahtev. To su značajne novine u zakonu koji treba da reguliše
elektronske medije. S obzirom na to da se pomenuta Direktiva u najvećoj meri odnosi na
televiziju kao audio-vizuelni medij, kao i na činjenicu da je digitalizacija radija još neizvesna, već
u pojmovniku, a i kasnije u tekstu zakona, odvojeni su radio i televizija. Novi pojmovi su i
plasiranje proizvoda, zaštićena medijska usluga koja se pruža na osnovu uslovnog pristupa i zona
raspodele (allotment) umesto zone pokrivanja, što predstavlja usaglašavanje sa Zakonom o
elektronskim komunikacijama.
Regulatorna agencija i vrste usluga
Jedna od najvažnijih orijentacija dosadašnjeg zakona za oblast radio-difuzije, postojanje i
delovanje nezavisnog regulatornog tela, ostaje i u novom zakonu. Umesto RRA to bi ubuduće
trebalo da bude Agencija za elektronske medije ili AEM. Nije samo u tome razlika. Ponuđena su
dva rešenja za izbor članova Saveta Agencije. Jedan je praktično vraćanje na princip ovlašćenih
predlagača pre izmena zakona kojima je Odboru za kulturu i informisanje Narodne skupštine
Srbije data mogućnost da predlaže šest kandidata i tako utiče na izbor trećine članova Saveta.
Ovaj model je u izvesnoj meri modifikovan tako što su, kao ovlašćeni predlagač, dodati
nacionalni saveti nacionalnih manjina, koji bi do predloga došli zajedničkim dogovorom.
Procedura je u izvesnoj meri precizirana kako bi se olakšali, inače dosta komplikovani,
kandidovanje i izbor.
Alternativa ovoj odredbi je izbor članova Saveta na osnovu javnog konkursa za kandidate za koje
su predviđeni precizni uslovi. Ovaj model je proceduralno znatno jednostavniji, ali je važno
pitanje ko bi, od eventualno velikog broja prijavljenih kandidata koji zadovoljavaju formalne
uslove, pravio užu listu o kojoj bi odlučivala skupština. Radna grupa se opredelila za ideju da, od
prijavljenih kandidata, po dva imena za svako mesto člana Saveta, zajedničkim dogovorom
Direktiva 89/552/EEC Evropskog parlamenta i Saveta o audio-vizuelnim medijskim servisima, Glava I,
Član I, (c) i Rezolucija: Ka novom poimanju medija, Rejkjavik, 2009.
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predlože tri nezavisne institucije: Zaštitnik građana, Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i
Poverenik za zaštitu ravnopravnosti. U oba slučaja predloženo je da sadašnji članovi Saveta
ostanu u ovom telu do isteka mandata na koje su birani.
U pogledu rada regulatorne agencije, uneto je i nekoliko odredaba koje, ne narušavajući njenu
nezavisnost, treba da doprinesu većoj odgovornosti. U tom smislu uneta su rešenja o prestanku
mandata razrešenjem ukoliko je član Saveta radio nesavesno ili nepravilno. Pojačane su i
odredbe koje govore o javnosti rada Agencije.
Agencija za elektronske medije, ukoliko se tekst zakona usvoji, u okviru svoje nadležnosti,
ubuduće bi imala na raspolaganju preciznije definisane mere za kontrolu rada pružalaca
medijskih usluga. To bi trebalo da budu opomena, upozorenje i privremena zabrana dela
programskog sadržaja, zatim privremeno i trajno oduzimanje dozvole. Sve mere bi ubuduće bile
javne ─ sa obavezom objavljivanja u mediju na koga se odnose i još jednom štampanom mediju
koji se distribuira na području na kome pružalac medijske usluge ima dozvolu.
Jedna od suštinskih promena u novom zakonu odnosi se na audio-vizuelne medijske usluge prema
načinu pružanja i sadržaju. Član 47 Prednacrta predviđa usluge koje prema načinu pružanja
mogu biti: linearne i audio-vizuelne usluge na zahtev, a prema sadržaju: opšte i specijalizovane,
odnosno tematske: sportske, kulturne, muzičke, obrazovne, programi oglašavanja i drugo.
Uvođenje usluga na zahtev i njihovo razdvajanje po specijalizovanim servisima jesu novine koje
novi zakon svrstavaju u red savremenih regulatornih rešenja.
Audio-vizuelna komercijalna komunikacja, obuhvaćena je Prednacrtom u meri koja je nužna
prema revidiranoj Evropskoj konvenciji o prekograničnoj televiziji i Direktivi o audio-vizuelnim
medijskim servisima. Detalji o oglašavanju proizvoda i usluga i restrikcije u vezi s tim sadržani
su u delu Prednacrta koji govori samo o linearnim uslugama. Važno je napomenuti da, u vezi s
komercijalnim komunikacijama, kao i u vezi sa uslugama na zahtev, Prednacrt Zakona o
elektronskim medijima posebno razrađuje zaštitu maloletnika.
Nova odredba se odnosi i na kvote evropskih dela, što je takođe usaglašavanje sa evropskom
regulativom. Predviđena je obaveza pružalaca medijskih usluga da najmanje 10% ukupnog
godišnjeg programa nameni sadržajima evropske produkcije, izuzimajući vesti, sportske
događaje, igre, oglašavanje, teletekst i TV prodaju. Ova odredba zahteva i prisustvo evropske
kinematografije (filmovi i serije) u kvoti najmanje 20% godišnjeg programa.
Usluge javnog audio-vizuelnog medijskog servisa
I Prednacrt novog zakona ima odredbe o javnom servisu. S obzirom na to da je radna grupa
počela svoj rad pre nekoliko godina i da je završavala tekst neposredno posle donošenja
medijske strategije, u Prednacrtu nije tretirana ideja regionalnih javnih servisa. Pisci Prednacrta
su imali informaciju da je Ministarstvo kulture formiralo drugu radnu grupu koja radi na
posebnom zakonu o javnom servisu, koji će obuhvatiti i regionalne servise. Ovakve okolnosti će
sasvim sigurno zahtevati jasno opredeljivanje zakonodavca, uz nadu da će se to dogoditi na
osnovu kompetentne stručne rasprave.
Što se Prednacrta Zakona o elektronskim medijima tiče, on je unapredio odredbe o javnom
servisu koje se, kao i do sada, odnose na republički i pokrajinski javni servis. Najznačajnija
izmena sadržana je u članu 72 Prednacrta koji govori o nezavisnosti i funkcionalnoj autonomiji
javnog servisa. Deset tačaka preuzeto je iz Preporuke Saveta Evrope R (96) 10 o garantovanju
nezavisnosti javnog servisa radio-difuzije. Potpuna samostalnost se, prema ovoj odredbi, odnosi
pre svega na: programsku šemu, koncepciju i proizvodnju programa, uređivanje i prezentaciju
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vesti i programa o aktuelnim događajima, organizaciju delatnosti, izbor rukovodilaca, glavnih i
odgovornih urednika i zapošljavanje.
Finansiranje republičkog i pokrajinskog javnog servisa i dalje će biti moguće iz nekoliko izvora:
pretplate, oglašavanja, prodaje programa i nosača zvuka i slike, koncerata i drugih izvora u
skladu sa zakonom. Pretplata se i nadalje vidi kao glavni izvor prihoda a odredbe o njenoj naplati
su poboljšane. Predviđeno je da se posebno naplaćuje u Vojvodini a posebno u ostalim delovima
Srbije, uz obavezno prijavljivanje prijemnika. I dalje postoje kategorije lica i ustanova koje su
oslobođene plaćanja pretplate. Ovoga puta posebno su razrađene odredbe o naplati pretplate za
korišćenje radio-prijemnika u motornim vozilima. Približne računice govore da je na ovaj način
moguće povećati prihode iz pretplate za pet do šest miliona evra godišnje, što nije zanemarljiva
suma.
Znatne promene ponuđene su u načinu imenovanja članova upravnih odbora javnih servisa.
Prema Prednacrtu, umesto devet biće sedam članova a po jednog će imenovati: Srpska
akademija nauka i umetnosti, Rektorska konferencija Srbije, Koordinaciono telo Saveta
nacionalnih manjina, novinarska udruženja i udruženja koja se bave sobodom medija, ljudskim
pravima, obrazovanjem i zaštitom maloletnika a tri člana će birati regulatorna agencija. Za
pokrajinski javni servis predviđeno je slično rešenje, s tim što će članove imenovati pokrajinska
akademija i rektori Univerziteta s područja Vojvodine.
Ovlašćenja za pružanje usluga, dozvole, koncentracija vlasništva, privatizacija
Prednacrt zakona predviđa pružanje usluga bez pribavljanja dozvole ako se pružaju isključivo
putem informatičke mreže (Web casting) i u slučaju reemitovanja u skladu sa odredbama
Evropske konvencije o prekograničnoj televiziji. Dozvole se izdaju licima koja imaju sedište u
Srbiji i koja tako dobijaju ovlašćenje da svoje medijske usluge, putem javnih mreža elektronskih
komunikacija, pružaju neodređenom broju korisnika. U prelaznim i završnim odredbama
Prednacrta, član 139, predviđeno je da sadašnji imaoci dozvola za analogno emitovanje pružaju
medijske usluge do roka na koji su dozvole izdate i da će im u skladu s tim biti obezbeđen
pristup multipleksu u trenutku prelaska na digitalno emitovanje.
Postupak izdavanja dozvola je javan a dozvolu ne mogu dobiti političke stranke i koalicije, kao i
pravna lica čiji je osnivač država, računajući i pokrajinu i lokalnu samoupravu. Razume se,
izuzetak je javni servis, a ovoga puta dodata je jedna novina ─ a to je mogućnost da univerziteti,
čiji je osnivač država, mogu da osnivaju elektronske medije radi obuke studenata u vezi s
medijima i na neprofitnoj osnovi. Time su državni univerziteti u mogućnostima izjednačeni s
privatnim a bojazni da će se na taj način preneti uticaj države na studentske medije ne bi trebalo
da bude s obzirom na to da Zakon o univerzitetu ovim ustanovama garantuje političku
autonomiju.
Procedura dobijanja dozvola putem javnog konkursa vrlo detaljno je razrađena i usaglašena s
promenama koje nameće digitalizacija, kao i sa Zakonom o elektronskim komunikacijama. Radi
potrebe bolje evidencije i javnosti vlasništva, detaljnije je razrađen i registar medijskih usluga.
Radna grupa koja je pripremala Prednacrt bila je na stanovištu da do donošenja posebnog
zakona ili na drugi način boljeg regulisanja javnosti i nedozvoljenog objedinjavanja vlasništva u
medijskoj oblasti, u zakonu treba da ostanu odredbe o ovim pitanjima. Prednacrt Zakona o
elektronskim medijima sadrži odredbe koje su, manje-više, prošle javnu raspravu koja je vođena
o Prednacrtu zakona specijalizovanog za ovu tematiku. Tekst zakona određuje izvesne pragove
koncentracije koji su srazmerni evropskom iskustvu i praksi i koji ne sprečavaju zdravu
konkurenciju na medijskom tržištu.
15
Zakonska konfuzija u vezi s privatizacijom medija na lokalnom nivou, rukovodila je radnu grupu
da još jednom predvidi način rešavanja ovog problema. Prema prelaznim i završnim odredbama,
mediji čiji su osnivači organi lokalne samouprave, a koji nisu okončali proces privatizacije prema
Zakonu o radio-difuziji, imaju rok da ovaj proces završe u roku od 24 meseca od stupanja na
snagu Zakona o elektronskim medijima. Do tada, ovi mediji treba svoj rad i poslovanje da
usklade sa odredbama zakona koje se odnose na pružanje usluga javnog medijskog servisa.
16
Post-komunističke medijske reforme
iz ptičje perspektive
Dr Jovanka Matić1
Promene medijskih sistema u post-komunističkim društvima su razočaravajuće. Oni danas jesu
pluralistički, većinski su u privatnom vlasništvu, deluju u legalnom ambijentu precizno
definisanih prava i obaveza, a regulišu ih posebna tela odvojena od vlasti. Ipak, mediji su
ekonomski i politički zarobljeni. Državne monopole su zamenili faktički monopoli stranih
korporacija ili (ne)poznatih domaćih tajkuna, izbor regulatornih tela i upravljačkih tela javnih
servisa ostvaruje se uz političke uticaje i nagodbe, novinari su predmet čestih pretnji, napada pa
i ubistava, zakoni se sporo menjaju a moderni se ne poštuju, medijski sadržaji su međusobno
više slični nego različiti, a istraživački poduhvati su retki i ne donose željene rezultate. Prošlo je
već nešto više od 20 godina od obećanja radikalne demokratizacije medija.
Već ─ ili tek dve decenije?
Tranzicija u Srbiji, faktički, traje nepunih 12 godina. Možda bi sve bilo drugačije da su nam 5.
oktobra obećali znoj, krv i suze. Bez njih nema stvaranja novog društvenog poretka. Sa ovim
iskustvom, nada Egipćana da su dovoljni samo pluralistički izbori da se jedan rigidan, represivni
sistem pretvori u otvoren i demokratski ─ deluje nepodnošljivo naivno. Bez naivnih nada, ipak,
nema promena. Danas je, međutim, neophodno osigurati da se ne skrene u beznađe, putem koji
je obavezno popločan nerealnim očekivanjima. Za obnovu razorenog društva, kakvo je Srbija bila
na početku novog milenijuma, 12 godina može biti tek kraj početka.
Nepodnošljiva lakoća tranzicije
Mediji su bili prve društvene institucije koje su zakoračile u post-komunistički period u gotovo
svim zemljama Centralne i Istočne Evrope. Demontaža veza sa državnim strukturama i
oslobađanje medija od položaja sluge vladajuće političke partije i radničke klase svuda su
tumačeni kao najvažnija pretpostavka razvoja demokratije u novim sistemima u nastanku.
Početna brza pluralizacija medijske sfere, značajna uloga koju su imali u političkim promenama
režima, nova otvorenost prema raznolikim izvorima informisanja, reflektovanje širokog
socijalnog spektra mišljenja i njihov praktični i simbolički doprinos stvaranju civilnog društva
uticali su da preovlada stav da će mediji imati vodeću ulogu u stvaranju demokratske
infrastrukture post-komunističkih društava. Postojale su i nade da će nova socijalna situacija
poroditi nove, demokratskije oblike komuniciranja koje nisu uspela da ostvare ni razvijena
(post)industrijska društva. U najmanjem, očekivalo se da će mediji efikasno obavljati bar
nekoliko uloga: ulogu izvora tačnih i sveobuhvatnih informacija, ulogu kontrolora vlasti
(obezbeđivanje transparentnosti javnih institucija), ulogu foruma za javnu debatu o stvarima od
javnog interesa i ulogu promotera demokratskih vrednosti.
Današnji uvid u rezultate tranzicije ukazuje da je početni optimizam bio neosnovan. Položaj
medija u odnosu na institucije moći nije se radikalno izmenio. Ipak, ostvarene promene u
rekonstrukciji medijskih sistema su nepovratne. Ideal medija u službi civilnog društva, a ne
vlasti, još uvek je model kome se teži, makar njegovo ostvarenje izgledalo daleko, posebno u
uslovima aktuelne ekonomske krize.
1
Naučni saradnik Instituta društvenih nauka u Beogradu
17
Svi novouspostavljeni demokratski režimi opredelili su se za usvajanje zapadnog modela
medijskog sistema. A njemu je bilo potrebno više od dva veka da se etablira kao uzor.
Današnje iskustvo tranzicionih zemalja pokazuje da su za uspeh reformi neophodne ne samo
nove institucije već i odgovarajuća socio-kulturna podloga koja potpomaže njihov rad, odnosno
prihvatanje novih vrednosti i podrška javnosti ciljevima promena. Na dugi rok, njih stvara
obrazovni sistem, a u aktuelno vreme – mediji. Bez medija se ne može formirati nova politička i
ekonomska kultura potrebna za konsolidaciju demokratije. Od efikasnosti rada medija zavisi
koliko dugo će društvo ostati zarobljeno u pokušaju promene. Stoga se transformacija medija i
njihovo osposobljavanje za nove uloge postavlja kao primarni zadatak tranzicije ka pluralističkoj
demokratiji i tržišnoj ekonomiji. U praksi, međutim, medijske reforme nisu dobile taj značaj. One
su gurnute u drugi plan, ali se od medija i dalje očekivalo da budu katalizator strukturnih
promena i ključni faktor razvoja demokratske političke kulture.
Uticaj politike
Analiza reformi u post-komunističkim društvima u protekle dve decenije pokazuje da su brzina i
obim promena medijskih sistema uglavnom pratili oblik transformacije globalnih sistema.
Nasuprot optimističkim očekivanjima na početku, demokratizacija medijskih sistema više je bila
funkcija političke volje novih elita nego što je sama postala faktor demokratizacije celokupnog
društvenog sistema. Kako ističu analitičari, svuda je potcenjena sposobnost totalitarizma za
„strukturalnu i funkcionalnu mimikriju“.
Nove političke elite se nigde nisu odrekle mogućnosti i mera za kontrolu medija ili ograničenja
njihove autonomije. Mediji civilnog sektora ili neprofitno orijentisani mediji nisu postali
značajan deo medijskog sistema. Ako je demonopolizacija države u medijskom sektoru (posebno
u radiodifuziji) bila uspešna, praćena je politički orijentisanom medijskom koncentracijom ili
raznim merama da se očuva politička kontrola nad javnim servisom (kroz izbor članova
regulatornih tela ili upravljačkih tela javnih servisa), ili podrije ekonomska stabilnost kritičkih
medija. Medijski sistem u novim demokratijama jeste pluralistički, ali su mediji zavisni ili od
države ili različitih moćnih grupa pa u medijskim sadržajima nema mnogo političkog diverziteta.
Na pravnom planu, ista borba se vodila za rešavanje problema pristupa javnim informacijama,
zaštite novinarskih izvora, ograničenja tajnosti informacija, zaštite privatnosti, kažnjavanja
klevete i uvrede, raspodele dozvola za emitovanje...
Paradoks medijskih promena leži u tome što je za njih potrebna aktivna državna politika
usmerena na stvaranje uslova za medijsku autonomiju, dok su državi, da bi pridobila javnost za
tegobne tranzicione reforme, neophodni mediji-pudlice, a ne kontrolori. Za političku elitu, mediji
su samo neophodan saveznik u borbi za javnu podršku njihove politike. Sve ostalo se doživljava
kao nepotreban višak.
Istraživanja u zemljama bivšeg socijalističkog bloka ukazuju na politički sistem kao krucijalni
faktor koji otežava proces demokratizacije medija. Vlast deluje kao najkonzervativniji faktor
masovnog komuniciranja, jer društvo vidi kao objekat na koji treba da utiče, a medije isključivo
kao pogodan instrument za ostvarenje svog uticaja.
Posle 2000. godine, vladajuće garniture u Srbiji nikada u izbornoj kampanji nisu pominjale
reformu medijskog sistema kao jedan od političkih prioriteta. Ni u izborima 2012. godine
nijedna politička partija nije uključila promene u medijima u svoju izbornu platformu. Vladajuće
partije bi najradije da zadrže status quo. Opozicione partije nikada nisu bile zadovoljne
medijima, ali ako su nešto činile, onda je to stvaranje duboko politizovanih i prema njima
pristrasnih medija, čime se samo dodatno problematizuje novinarski profesionalizam i
kredibilitet medija uopšte.
18
Ni u narednim godinama od bilo koje vlasti ne treba očekivati drugačije ponašanje. Promena se
mora nametnuti inicijativama i pritiskom civilnog društva, jer ono ima autentičan interes da se
stvore mediji u funkciji kontrolora javnih resursa i javne politike i poštovanja proklamovanih
vrednosti. Samo stalni pritisak na vlast povodom inicijativa za usvajanje novih zakonskih i
regulatornih rešenja, predloga novih rešenja, novih pravila državne pomoći i podstreka za
medije koji zadovoljavaju javni interes može dovesti do neophodnih reformi u medijskom
sektoru.
Uticaj ekonomije
U većini post-komunističkih zemalja tržište je postalo glavna snaga koja opredeljuje medijski
pejzaž. Na početku tranzicije, većina novinara u oslobađanju medija od državne kontrole i u
razvoju privatnih, komercijalnih glasila videla je dovoljnu garanciju medijske autonomije. Danas
se vajkaju da su tražili slobodu, a umesto nje dobili tržište. Umesto na novom sistemu odnosa
finansijera i novinara, reforme su insistirale na privatizaciji i otvorile polje bespoštednoj
konkurenciji radi ostvarivanja privatne finansijske, a ne društvene dobiti. Posledice su
dalekosežne i teško zaustavljive: komercijalizacija medija, tabloidizacija sadržaja, segmentacija
publike, koncentracija vlasništva, remonopolizacija, pojava domaćih medijskih tajkuna,
nestajanje kvalitetne štampe, prevlast zabave nad informativnom i edukativnom funkcijom
medija, zanemarivanje manjinskih interesa i glasova.
Ovo su normalni trendovi i u razvijenom delu sveta. Ipak, u okolnostima post-komunističkih
društava – prevlasti politike nad ekonomijom, sporih ekonomskih reformi, niskog ekonomskog
rasta, nedostatka kapitala, nerazvijenog reklamnog tržišta i siromašne publike, haotičnog tržišta,
netransparentnosti vlasništva, odsustva sindikalnog organizovanja, itd. ─ posledice su znatno
drugačije. Proizvedeni su ekonomski neodrživi i siromašni mediji, zavisni od interesa vlasnika i
države kao dodatnog finansijera i ekonomski i socijalno ugroženi novinari. Nenalaženje
adekvatnog rešenja za finansiranje javnog servisa onemogućilo je da se on posveti obavljanju
svojih posebnih funkcija i gubi bitku u poređenju sa profitno orijentisanim medijima.
Snažna komponenta ekonomskog propadanja medija jeste opadanje efikasnosti dosadašnjeg
poslovnog modela, usled razvoja novih informacionih tehnologija, ali i globalne ekonomske
krize. Sigurno je da veliki broj medija u Srbiji neće uspeti da preživi ekonomske turbulencije. U
postojećim okolnostima, nema garancija da će opstati oni najpotrebniji ─ najprofesionalniji,
najkredibilniji, oni koji najviše rade u javnom interesu. Ali se državna pomoć medijima, koja je
neophodna i koja se ostvaruje i u drugim tržišnim ekonomijama, pod uslovom da je
transparentna i neutralna, može usmeriti upravo na medije koji najbolje ostvaruju javni interes.
Napore je potrebno usmeriti i na obezbeđivanje stabilnog i neutralnog finansiranja javnog
servisa, zbog njegovih prednosti u ostvarivanju interakcije različitih društvenih grupa i
zadovoljavanju važnih, a zanemarenih interesa publike.
Uticaj civilnog društva
Razlika između post-komunističkih zemalja u unpaređivanju medijskog sistema ipak ima.
Poljska, Češka, Mađarska, Slovenija i Baltičke zemlje uspele su da ostvare relativno uspešnu
tranziciju i stvore pluralističke i kompetitivne demokratije, sa relativno demokratizovanim
komunikacionim strukturama. Manje su uspešne Slovačka, Rumunija, Bugarska, Ukrajina, Rusija
i druge, u kojima su politički režimi „koncentrovani“ pre nego kompetitivni. Post-konfliktne
zemlje, poput Srbije, Bosne i Hercegovine, Makedonije, Gruzije itd. izdvajaju se u posebnu grupu
jer je njihova tranzicija opterećena dodatnim teškoćama ekonomske devastiranosti, ideološke i
političke podeljenosti, vrednosne razorenosti.
19
Na osnovu iskustva nabrojanih zemalja, analitičari u faktore koji olakšavaju tranziciju ubrajaju
ekonomski razvoj, visoke obrazovne standarde, tradiciju autohtonih antirežimskih pokreta,
tradiciju ujedinjavanja raznolikih društvenih grupa oko zajedničkog cilja, iskustvo reformi,
nacionalnu homogenost. U nepovoljne faktore ubrajaju se nerazvijena ekonomija, nizak životni
standard, niski obrazovni standardi, etničke tenzije i nerazvijenost civilnog društva.
U slučaju Srbije, nepovoljnih faktora je mnogo, računajući i zakasneli početak tranzicije.
Ohrabruje, ipak, to da javnost poseduje iskustvo o važnosti nezavisnih i kredibilnih medija i da je
civilno društvo, a posebno profesionalna i strukovna udruženja, aktivno u otporu na drastične
oblike ugrožavanja medija i novinara i dovoljno je kompetentno da traži promene i usmerava ih
u željenom pravcu. Civilno društvo u Srbiji se tek uči svojim novim ulogama. U Americi je, na
primer, prvo udruženje univerzitetskih nastavnika novinarstva osnovano pre tačno 100 godina
(1912. god.). U Srbiji nema čak ni ideje da je ono potrebno. Na redu je učenje profesionalne
solidarnosti, efikasnog organizovanja različitih (i sukobljenih) delova medijske zajednice radi
postizanja zajedničkih ciljeva, lobiranja, traženja saveznika u političkoj, ekonomskoj i kulturnoj
eliti, kao i mogućnosti za korišćenje prihvaćenih procedura za svrstavanje promena medijskog
sistema u društvene prioritete.
Kada nove institucije ne uspevaju da ostvare ono što se od njih očekivalo, jedino što može
produžiti njihovu validnost, kako kažu poznavaoci tranzicije, jeste čvrsto ukorenjen sistem
verovanja koji ih podupire ─ ne zato što su date institucije korisne (jer trenutno nisu), već zato
što su odgovarajući izbor za postizanje dugoročnog cilja.
20
Evropski sud za ljudska prava
Informatori o sudskoj praksi1
Informator br. 148 /januar 2012
ČLAN 10 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda
SLOBODA IZRAŽAVANJA
Obaveza plaćanja naknade detetu koje je žrtva seksualnog zlostavljanja, zbog otkrivanja
njenog identiteta u novinskom članku: nema povrede
Kurier Zeitungsverlag i Druckerei GmbH protiv Austrije –
3401/07 presuda 17.1.2012 [Odeljak I]
Činjenice: Novine, podnosilac predstavke, objavile su dva teksta koja se tiču slučaja C - deteta
koje je bilo maltretirano i seksualno zlostavljano od svog oca i maćehe. Tekstovi objavljeni
tokom krivičnog postupka vođenog protiv oca i maćehe, dali su detaljan opis okolnosti slučaja,
otkrivajući identitet C i puna imena i fotografije njenog oca i maćehe. Budući da je njen slučaj
izazvao veliku medijsku pažnju, C je ponovo primljena u bolnicu zbog psihičkih problema.
Kasnije je podnela tužbu za naknadu štete protiv podnosioca predstavke, zbog objavljivanja
njenog imena i detalja njenog slučaja. Presuda kojom je njena tužba usvojena, potvrđena je i u
postupku po žalbi i podnosilac predstavke je obavezan da plati naknadu u iznosu od 10.000
EUR, zbog toga što otkrivanje identiteta C, u stvari koja se tiče isključivo njenog privatnog života,
nije bilo neophodno i što je predstavljalo povredu nacionalnog prava.
Pravo: Član 10. Slučaj se tiče balansa između prava podnosioca predstavke na slobodu
ižražavanja i prava C na zaštitu svog identiteta. C nije bila javna ličnost i ne može se smatrati da
je ušla na javnu scenu time što je postala žrtva krivičnog dela koje je privuklo znatnu pažnju
medija. Dalje, iako su se sporni članci bavili pitanjem od javnog značaja, činjenica da ni
okrivljeni, ni žrtva, nisu bili javne ličnosti, znači da poznavanje njihovog identiteta nije bilo od
ključnog značaja za razumevanje pojedinosti slučaja. Podnosilac predstavke nije bio sprečavan
da izveštava o detaljima slučaja, već samo da otkrije identitet C. Identitet žrtava krivičnih dela
zaslužuje posebnu zaštitu, zbog njihove ranjivosti. Ta obaveza je bila još izraženija u slučaju C,
jer je ona bila dete u vreme zlostavljanja. I Konvencija o zaštiti dece od seksualne eksploatacije i
seksualnog zlostavljanja i brojne preporuke Komiteta Ministara Saveta Evrope pozivaju države
da preduzmu mere zaštite identiteta žrtava krivičnih dela. Na kraju, sankcija nametnuta
podnosiocu predstavke nije bila nesrazmerna: iznos dosuđene naknade razuman je u datim
okolnostima, naročito uzimajući u obzir uticaj koji su tekstovi morali imati na C, koja je doživela
ozbiljne psihičke probleme i morala ponovo da bude hospitalizovana.
Zaključak: nema povrede (jednoglasno)
Izvodi iz zvaničnih „Informatora o sudskoj praksi“ Evropskog suda za ljudska prava, dostupnih na
Internet prezentaciji Suda; prevod uradila advokatska kancelarija “Živković&Samardžić”, Beograd
1
21
Informator br. 149 /februar 2012
ČLAN 10 Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda
SLOBODA IZRAŽAVANJA
Zabrana izveštavanja o hapšenju i osudi poznatog glumca: povreda
Axel Springer AG protiv Nemačke –
39954/08 presuda 7.2.2012 [GC]
Činjenice: Kompanija podnosilac predstavke, izdavač nacionalnih dnevnih novina velikog tiraža,
septembra 2004. godine objavila je na naslonoj strani članak o zvezdi popularne televizijske
serije, koja je uhapšena na festivalu piva u Minhenu zbog posedovanja kokaina. Članak je bio
praćen detaljnijim tekstom na još jednoj strani ilustrovanim sa tri fotografije istog glumca.
Odmah pošto je članak objavljen, glumac je izdejstvovao privremenu meru zabrane deljeg
objavljivanja članka i fotografija. Privremena mera, u delu koji se odnosio na zabranu
objavljivanja članka, potvrđena je i u postupku po žalbi u junu 2005. godine (podnosilac
predstavke nije se žalio na privremenu meru u delu kojim je zabranjeno objavljivanje
fotografija). U novembru 2005. godine, zabranjeno je objavljivanje gotovo čitavog članka, a
podnosilac predstavke obavezan da plati kaznu u iznosu koji je, nakon žalbe, smanjen na 1.000
EUR.
U međuvremenu, u julu 2005. godine, novine su objavile drugi članak, u kome su izvestile da je
glumac, nakon priznanja, osuđen za neovlašćeno držanje opojnih droga, i kažnjen novčanom
kaznom. Glumac je podneo predlog za određivanje privremene mere i u odnosu na drugi članak.
Privremena mera je i određena, na suštinski istim osnovima, kao i u slučaju prve privremene
mere. Odluka je potvrđena u postupku po žalbi. Podnosilac predstavke je kasnije obavezan da
plati kaznu, od dva puta po 5.000 EUR zbog kršenja zabrane određene privremenom merom.
Pravo: Član 10: Opšte je mesto da su odluke domaćih sudova predstavljale mešanje u pravo
podnosioca predstavke na slobodu izražavanja. To mešanje je propisano zakonom i imalo je
legitiman cilj zaštite ugleda i prava drugih. Sud je utvrđivao da li je mešanje bilo neophodno u
demokratskom društvu.
Primenivši kriterijume utvrđene u svojoj praksi, a koji se tiču balansa između slobode
izražavanja i prava na poštovanje privatnog života, Sud je primetio, prvo, da se objavljeni članci
tiču hapšenja i osude glumca, odnosno podataka iz javnog sudskog postupka, za koje se može
smatrati da su od javnog interesa. Drugo, glumac je bio dovoljno poznat da ga to kvalifikuje kao
javnu ličnost i, iako je priroda dela takva da o njoj verovatno ne bi bilo izveštavano da ga je
počinio obični građanin, činjenica da je glumac bio uhapšen na javnom mestu i da je aktivno
tražio pažnju medija otkrivajući detalje svog privatnog života u brojnim intervjuima, znači da su
njegova legitimna očekivanja da će mu pravo na privatnost biti efektivno zaštićeno, bila
smanjena. Što se tiče trećeg kriterijuma - kako je informacija dobijena i da li je bila pouzdana prvi članak o glumčevom hapšenju imao je dovoljan činjenični osnov, budući da je bio zasnovan
na informacijama javnog tužilaštva, i istinitost informacija iznetih u oba članka nije bila predmet
spora između stranaka. Podnosilac predstavke nije postupao u lošoj veri: ne samo da je dobio
potvrdu objavljene informacije od tužilaštva, već nije bilo ničega što bi ukazivalo da i sam nije
cenio balans između svog interesa da informaciju objavi i prava glumca na poštovanje privatnog
života pre objavljivanja, te da uzimajući u obzir sve okolnosti konkretnog slučaja nije našao
dovoljno jake razloge da štiti glumčevu anonimnost. Što se tiče sadržaja, forme i posledica
objavljivanja, članci nisu otkrili detalje o privatnom životu glumca, već su se uglavnom ticali
okolnosti njegovog hapšenja i ishoda krivičnog postupka. Nije bilo omalovažavajućih komentara
ili neosnovanih optužbi. Podnosilac predstavke nije sporio privremenu meru zabrane
22
objavljivanja fotografija i nije dokazano da je objavljivanje članaka dovelo do ozbiljnih posledica
za glumca. U odnosu na poslednji kriterijum, iako su sankcije nametnute podnosiocu zahteva
bile blage, one su ipak bile podobne da imaju odvraćajući efekat i nisu bile opravdane u svetlu
gore navedenog. Stoga, ograničenja nametnuta podnosiocu predstavke nisu bila srazmerna
legitimnom cilju zaštite prava na poštovanje privatnog života glumca.
Zaključak: povreda ( dvanaest glasova prema pet)
Član 41: 17.734,28 EUR na ime materijalne štete, što odgovara kaznama i troškovima nastalim u
postupku pred domaćim sudovima, umanjenim za dve kazne isplaćene u iznosu od po 5.000
EUR.
23
INTRODUCTION
The Serbian media scene has not changed considerably in the last three years since ANEM
started its legal monitoring in collaboration with its long-time partner, the Zivkovic&Samardzic
Law Office. In the said period, it often seemed that the picture of the Serbian media scene was
“frozen” on the “screens” of our monitoring team as the same problems tormenting the media
and the journalists remained unaddressed.
However, according to the opinion of the monitoring team, in the first six months of 2012 (the
period covered by this Publication), the electoral process in Serbia was the factor that had the
strongest influence on the media sector, as well as on society as a whole. Threats, pressures and
attacks against journalists were on the rise, typically coming from local politicians, unhappy with
media or journalists’ criticism of their activities. The particular and the most common form of
pressure was discrimination against those media and journalists, which in the pre-election
environment was considered almost as normal and legitimate behavior. In addition, the difficult
economic situation, saturated advertising market, shrinking advertising budgets typically
controlled by a small number of marketing agencies affiliated with state and political party
officials, as well as the unfinished media privatization and inadequate enforcement of state aid
control regulations (which resulted in many not privatized media, by rule directly controlled by
local ruling oligarchies, being financed from the budget without any serious control of their
content), but also the lack of general oversight of the election process and controlling of only
broadcast media, on the basis of the RBA’s General Binding Instruction that were so unclear that
the RBA itself had to release a binding interpretation of Instruction, considerably affected
already critically law level of media freedom in the latest electoral process. In light of such an
obviously poor situation, the Delegation of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly, which visited
Belgrade in April in the scope of the preparations for observing the elections on May 6, voiced its
concerns in a press release over the economic and political pressure faced by some journalists
and the attempts of political parties to influence the editorial policy of the media. Such adverse
situation affecting the journalists and the media is evidenced in the results of the monitoring of
reporting of the media in the election campaign (BIRODI), showing that some media renounced
critical and analytical reporting about political parties, opting instead for a neutral, and very
often promotional reporting. All the above clearly shows that, in this electoral process the right
of the voters to make an informed choice that should have been based on complete, objective,
accurate and timely information, was threatened, as was the right of candidates to mutually
challenge their respective policies and the right of the media to voice their views and report
about issues of public interest.
Another negative consequence of the election process for the media sector, caused by loss of
interest or absence of realistic means by the government to do something systemically, is the
fact that addressing the key problems that continue to burden the media in Serbia (such as the
withdrawal of the state from media ownership or regulating the system of financing the public
interest in media sphere in accordance with state aid rules) will likely have to wait for the new
government. The old one certainly demonstrated, with some decisions in the electoral campaign,
that it renounced the key principles it had opted for in the Media Strategy several months before.
The new government will also have to deal with three new pre-draft versions of important
media laws provided for by the Strategy, of which two laws (prepared in haste by working
groups of the Ministry of Culture – the Public Information Law and the Public Service
Broadcasters Law) have been kept in the dark as to who drafted them and what they contain,
which automatically raises doubts. Meanwhile, the third pre-draft Law on Electronic Media,
produced by the working group under the auspices of OSCE, has been publicly released only
recently. However, the fate of these pre-drafts and that of the Media Strategy itself could be
drastically affected by the composition of the new government, since not all political parties
24
participated in the production thereof or expressed their opinion. Meanwhile, the economic
downturn and the market conditions will continue to hurt Serbian media. In such situation,
certain positive changes that have occurred, such as: the progress in the digitalization process,
enabled by the amendments to the Strategy; the issuance of licenses for the initial digital
network and the beginning of the simulcast in Serbia; hints of changes in the practice of Serbian
courts in media cases (harsher penalties against attackers on journalists and cameramen and
greater consideration for media freedom and the public interest in the field of information); as
well as progress in the regulation of the field of cable distribution of media content with the
introduction of the “must carry” obligation to the dominant cable operator on the market, have,
however remained in the shadow of all the negative developments we have cited above.
The texts in this Publication deal with some of the important media-related questions for the
period in question: how the media covered the elections, the implementation of the Media
Strategy, the Pre-Draft of the Law on Electronic Media and the issue of post-communist media
reforms. The fifth text in this edition of the Publication is a special addendum, consisting of
excerpts from the Information Notes on the case-law of the European Courts of Human Rights, a
digest of two verdicts concerning the enforcement of Article 10 of the European Convention on
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the first pertains to the protection
of the rights of minors, while the second concerns the balance between freedom of expression
and the right to the privacy of public figures.
Belgrade, June 2012
25
Media Coverage of the Elections
Slobodan Kremenjak, attorney at law1
The elections have marked the first half of 2012 as far as the media in Serbia are concerned.
Although the elections for local assemblies and the provincial and national parliaments were
formally called on March 13 and the Presidentials even later – on April 5 – it may be rightfully
said that the battle for the “hearts and minds” of the voters was already in full swing, just as the
various attempts to put the media under control, so as to make them “cooperative” in the preelection campaign. The seriousness of the situation is also evidenced by the fact that even the
delegation of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly, which visited Belgrade in the scope of the
preparations for monitoring the elections, had to call on political parties to refrain from
attempts to influence the media's editorial policy, while voicing its concern regarding economic
and political pressure against certain journalists.
In the stage before the elections were called, local power players started marking their territory
and showing off their power. “Politically incorrect” journalists were prevented from reporting
and were denied access to press conferences and other events. The obligation applying to all
territorial autonomy and local self-government bodies – to make information about their work
available to the public and under equal conditions for all journalists and public media – as
provided for in Article 10 of the Public Information Law, was violated almost on daily basis.
Hence, for example, in one of the many cases reported about by the media, a journalist was
prevented from reporting from a press conference held by the mayor. The mayor’s excuse was
that the journalist was not invited “due to his unprofessionalism and violations of the basic
journalism standards”. A situation was created where local authorities, without a court decision
and in breach of the current legislation, denied lawfully guaranteed rights to those reporters and
media whose work did not suit their agenda. Add to that the fact that municipal budgets
controlled by these local authorities often are, due to the economic crisis, the sole source of
revenue for impoverished local media, it is no surprise that criticism has become a rare
commodity.
Grabbing the best possible starting positions on the eve of the elections was also secured by
launching new media controlled by high officials of political parties participating in the elections.
Hence, in early February, the RBA issued a broadcasting license to the cable TV stations
Kopernikus 3 (Svet plus), which was reported to have leased in advance up to a third of its air
time to the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). One of TV Kopernikus’ editors is Tanja Vidojevic,
who is also a member of the SNS’ main board. Kopernikus 3 operated without a license until
February; the RBA’s Supervision and Analysis Department repeatedly warned the RBA Council
that the said station was promoting the SNS and waging smear campaigns against the officials of
other political parties. The RBA representatives said, however, that under the current
regulations, they were unable to deny the broadcasting license to Kopernikus 3 and that they
could only keep on monitoring its program after the license was issued and react if noncompliance persisted.
Meanwhile, the RBA passed two new general binding instructions – the first (released on March
9) aimed at radio and television stations (broadcasters) in the campaign for local, provincial and
national parliamentary elections, presidential elections and elections for ethnic minorities'
national councils. The second was made public on April 12 and was aimed at the broadcasters,
1
Law office “Zivkovic&Samardzic”, Belgrade
26
which were tasked with enabling unhidered access to information to hearing impaired viewers
during the 2012 election campaign.
Under the Broadcasting Law, the RBA passes general binding instructions in order to regulate in
more detail certain issues pertaining to the content of the program. The purpose of the
instructions is hence not (nor was it realistic to expect it to be) to directly protect broadcasters
from pressure, but to raise the level of legal certainty to remove the dilemmas faced by the
media in reporting on the campaign and the election process. This would, in turn, reduce the
opportunities for putting pressure on media applied by taking advantage of the gaps in the law.
Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that the aforementioned two general binding instructions were
the ninth and the tenth, respectively, passed by the RBA since the adoption of the Broadcasting
Law given that the previous instructions were passed on the eve of the presidential elections in
2003, 2004 and 2008, for the parliamentary elections in 2003 and 2007, for local elections in
2004, for local, provincial and national parliamentary elections in 2008, as well as for elections
for ethnic minorities' national councils in 2010) – which should mean that the problems are
well-known and that there is abundant experience as to how to handle them – the dilemmas
related to the enforcement of the latest general binding instructions persist.
Hence, the provision of the general binding instructions, according to which the broadcasters,
during the election campaign, must remove from their program documentary, feature,
entertainment and similar programs or films if they feature an official, renown representative of
the submitter of the electoral list or candidate and to avoid other forms of indirect political
propaganda in the content they broadcast, was interpreted differently even by different
representatives of the Agency itself. Furthermore, the issue of classifying program genres, shows
and films into documentary, feature or entertainment is far from clarified. The same applies to
the concept of “similar programs and films”, thus creating uncertainty with the broadcasters as
to what they are entitled to air. The RBA has namely failed to make public the criteria according
to which it classifies television content, not even for traditional genres and let alone criteria
based on which other genres could be classified as “similar” to documentary, feature or
entertainment content. In the relevant situation, it was utterly difficult to discern if a specific
program was fit for broadcasting or not.
On the other hand, political parties added to the general confusion by demanding their
advertising agencies to produce election advertisements in the scope of the so-called
contrasting, or negative campaign, targeting other lists and candidates. At the same time, the
media were in the situation to risk being held accountable for releasing such content. Namely,
the Law on the Election of Members of Parliament provides for the existence of general
supervision of the actions of political parties and candidates, which entails the supervision of
marketing/advertising agencies managing their election campaigns (which should have been
carried out by the Supervision Committee of the Serbian Parliament, however, such Committee
was not set up neither for 2000 elections, nor for the latest ones). This has resulted in a situation
where, except for the RBA, which is authorized by law to initiate proceedings against TV and
radio stations only, there is no body that would initiate such proceedings against political parties
and their agencies, which would address the problem at its source. Broadcasters are now in the
position to pick their poison: if they refuse to air political advertisements, they risk being taken
to court by political parties for discrimination; if they accept to broadcast such advertisements,
they risk to be fined by the RBA. Meanwhile, nobody was dealing with the responsibility of
political parties for inappropriate political advertising.
The aforementioned issues are probably only the tip of the iceberg, which is an evidence of the
complicated situation in which the media covered the elections. In such an environment, it was
unrealistic to expect them to fulfill their expected role during and in relation to the election
process. The results of the survey, carried out on April 1-14 by the Bureau for Social Research
27
(BSR), have shown that media coverage of the election campaign was mainly positive and in
some cases almost tantamount to political advertising. According to the BSR “most media
renounced their watchdog role and any semblance of critical and analytical coverage, opting
instead to behave as mere conveyors of information about the activities of political parties and
their political candidates”. If such an appalling situation is to change for some future elections,
the new government must start addressing the problems plaguing the media sector, which have
been ignored and neglected for decades.
28
The First Nine Months of the Media Strategy
Kruna Savovic, attorney at law1
The Strategy for Development of the Public Information System of the Republic of Serbia until
2016 was adopted on September 28, 2011 and published in the Official Gazette no. 75/2011
dated October 7. The nine months that have passed since seem to have been quite sufficient to
evaluate the achievements as to the Strategy’s implementation.
From the legal point of view, the Government passes each strategy (in this case the Media
Strategy) in accordance with Article 45 of the Law on the Government (“Official Gazette of the
Republic of Serbia” no. 55/2005, 71/2005 – corrected, 101/2007, 65/2008 and 16/2011), in
order to ascertain the situation in a specific area from its competence and provide for measures
to be taken in order to develop that area.
The Strategy for Development of the Public Information System is merely one of the 80-some
strategies that the Government of the Republic of Serbia passed in the last few years in various
domains – from incentives for having children (Strategy for Encouraging Childbirth, “Official
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” no. 13/2008) to those dealing with old age (National Strategy
on Aging, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” no. 76/2006); from returning to Kosovo and
Metohija (Sustainable Survival and Return to Kosovo and Metohija Strategy, “Official Gazette of
the Republic of Serbia” no. 32/2010) to broadband Internet access development in Serbia
(Strategy for the Development of Broadband Internet Access in the Republic of Serbia until
2012, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” no. 84/2009). An abundance of strategic
documents also means that Serbia has become a country with transparent public policies in the
areas for which the aforementioned strategies were adopted. However, the same does not seem
to apply to the area of public media policy.
The media environment in Serbia was shaped, in the last decade, not as a result of measures
aimed at certain predefined objectives, but rather as the consequence of a frenzy and often
direct obstruction of the identified goals, with the ambition to maintain the control of and
influence over the media sector. It is precisely due to direct obstruction that the privatization of
the media – although it was declared mandatory under the Broadcasting Law from 2002 and the
Public Information Law from 2003 – has been again put forward by the Strategy as a strategic
commitment, instead of having been completed a long time ago.
What have been the achievements as to the implementation of the Strategy, nine months after its
adoption? If we look at the Action Plan for Enforcing the Strategy, we shall see that none of the
activities have been placed in a 9-month time frame or shorter. The shortest deadlines set forth
by the Action Plan are 10-month terms pertaining to reviewing the possibilities for amending
the Advertising Law, the Law on the right to free shares and remuneration the citizens receive in
the privatization process, the VAT Law, the Customs Law, the Law on State Aid Control as well as
to reconsider the possibility for introducing the media literacy program in the education
process.
Although the meaning of “reconsider the possibility” in the concrete case was not explained, we
suppose that the minimum the Government had in mind when adopting the Strategy would
involve – in relation to reviewing the possibility of amending the Advertising Law – having the
Ministry of Culture, Media and Information Society, in communication with the competent
1
Law office „Zivković&Samardzic“, Belgrade
29
ministry (in this case the Ministry of Agriculture, Trade, Forestry and Water Management)
establish whether there are already plans for amending the Advertising Law, as well as if the
amendments proposed in the Media Strategy (regulating advertising by the state, namely by the
state bodies, so as to avert the concentration of advertising budgets, namely the monopolization
thereof by certain media or agencies; the liberalization of advertising in the media to the extent
to which that is compatible with international practice and ratified international commitments)
are compatible with the already planned changes, namely with other interests protected by the
Government in that domain. A similar approach should have been taken in relation to other laws,
which ought to be reviewed under the Action Plan. Only a month prior to the expiration of the
term for finalizing this activity (under the Action Plan) there is no information whatsoever as to
what has been accomplished with respect to the above, which could be understood as a sign of
inactivity or insufficient activity at best.
Things are even more complex when it comes to issues for which the solutions proposed by the
Strategy did not receive broad public support or which were insufficiently elaborated at best.
For example, the Strategy envisioned the establishing of six regional public service broadcasters
(PSB) in Central Serbia only, for the purpose of meeting the undisputed need of the citizens to
receive, at local and regional level, timely and accurate information specific for a certain region.
This concept was criticized by media and journalists’ association. By announcing the
establishing of regional radio and TV public service broadcasters, the Government invoked the
need to adhere to the recommendation of the Council of Europe pertaining to the guarantees of
independence of public service broadcasters and the guarantees of independence and functions
of regulatory bodies in the area of broadcasting. The latter recommendation has already been, to
a considerable extent, breached by the adoption of the Film Industry Law, which has
undermined the systems of funding the RBA and RATEL. Moreover, in addition to stipulating
which regional PSBs will operate under the principles of RTS and RTV (which are everything but
good examples of managing, programming and especially financial independence), the Strategy
fails to stipulate in detail who is going to manage the said regional PSBs, with which
competences and responsibilities, who will be overseeing their activities and, most importantly,
how will those regional PSBs be funded. The Strategy namely says that they will be financed in
keeping with the rules on state aid allocation, while not invoking directly the implementation of
the EC’s Communication from 2009 on the enforcement of state aid control rules with respect to
PSBs. The enforcement of the said Communication should be an obligation of Serbia also in the
context of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Assessing the acceptability of the
financing of PSBs from the aspect of state aid control regulations, in the context of the
Communication, involves, amongst other things, the existence of a clear definition of the
mandate and the role of PSBs, the manner in which this mandate and role, as well as compliance
therewith, are checked; the issue of transparent financing and accounting separation of publicservice related activities from other operations; the prohibition of overpayment; the existence of
financial control mechanisms; defined procedures for introducing new services; behavior on the
market that does not undermine competition. The State Secretary in the Ministry of Culture,
Media and Information Society Dragana Milicevic-Milutinovic said in early June that the predraft Law on Public Service Broadcasters had been prepared and tabled to the Ministry by the
working group. The Ministry, however, is yet to publish this pre-draft and hence it is impossible
to judge to what extent it has recognized the above mentioned issues. An additional concern is
the fact that the procedure of appointment of the working group members was everything but
transparent. Namely, as opposed to the procedure believed to be established during the
production of the Strategy, when the Ministry consulted the media sector while working on draft
regulations relevant for the media, the latest working group did not comprise any
representatives of media and journalists’ associations. The above is all the more dangerous,
since any inconsistency in the future Law on PSBs, which would see a divergence from the
criteria set in the EC’s Communication from 2009 on the enforcement of state aid control rules
with respect to PSBs, would practically destroy commercial broadcasters at the regional and
local level in Serbia, if the latter manage to survive the establishment and regional PSBs. Since
30
the requests voiced by media associations during the public debates were shunned in the past,
the question remains if it will be possible at all to influence the latest draft once it is published
and released for public debate.
Besides, nothing was done with respect to the control of state aid received by the media – those
owned by the state in particular. The Strategy has announced that such aid would be allotted in
compliance with the criteria of transparency, financial control, prohibition of overpayment,
proportionality, behavior on the market that does not undermine competition. The introduction
of a new, project-based funding model was also announced, but nothing was done in practice.
The nine months lost for regulating this field has further undermined commercial broadcasting
in Serbia.
The conclusion that we may draw is that the implementation of the Strategy for Development of
the Public Information System has not not even started (except for the fact that the pre-drafts of
certain laws – Public Information Law, Law on Electronic Media, Law on Public Service
Broadcasters – have been written and tabled to the Ministry, but, as stated above, it is
impossible to assess them since the Ministry is yet to make them public. The fact is that the
recent elections were not exactly conducive to full implementation, but it cannot be an excuse
for the Strategy remaining a dead letter on paper and mere lip service with the purpose of
buying time as to compliance with Brussels-imposed conditions for EU membership.
31
Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media –
Improving Regulation and Practice
Prof. Rade Veljanovski, PhD1
The need to amend more thoroughly the Broadcasting Law, which has already undergone
several minor changes, emerged four years ago, whereas the amended provisions have resulted
in the Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media. Such a long time for preparing a new legal text may be
explained by the fact that the same working group in the meantime tasked to also prepare the
Pre-Draft Law on Transparency and unlawful Concentration of Media Ownership, which is yet to
enter the procedure for adoption, and then it was necessary to wait for the adoption of the
Strategy for the Development of the Information System in Serbia.
Nearly ten years after the adoption of the Broadcasting Law is a long period for a dynamic area
such as the activities of broadcast media, especially in the new technological environment.
Digitalization and the application of new media technologies, which were, out of more or less
justified reasons, not regulated by law a decade ago, became in the last few years a regulatory
imperative. The fact that Serbia has adopted the Digitalization Strategy and the Law on
Electronic Communications (replacing the Law on Telecommunications) also required the
harmonization of the laws dealing with media aspects of using frequencies. The latest European
regulatory documents – and especially the Audiovisual Media Services Directive – but also the
imminent digital switchover by June 17, 2015 at the latest, required some normative
adjustments in this field. Some of the amendments to the Broadcasting Law and the enforcement
thereof were the reason to embrace a new regulatory outlook. The initiative with the
amendments to the Broadcasting Law and the work on the text of the law have led to the
conclusion that the term broadcasting may not be used like in the past anymore, because it used
to refer to the distribution of the signal from the hitherto broadcasters to the end users. In view
of the scope of the amendments and the importance of the new provisions, it is more realistic to
refer to a new law and not an amended Broadcasting Law.
Further harmonization with the European regulatory framework
The Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media has nine sections and 146 articles. Its structure, at first
glance, does not diverge much from the Broadcasting Law. The Pre-Draft Law on Electronic
Media also begins with some principal commitments such as freedom, media professionalism
and independence, prohibition of censorship and influence on broadcast media as a guarantee of
independence, full affirmation of civil rights and freedoms, enforcement of internationally
recognized norms and principles. These principles also include objectivity, prohibition of
discrimination in the process of license issuance, promoting freedom of competition, access to
broadcast media, promoting media literacy, protection of cultural diversity and promotion of
media creativity.
The separation of content production from distribution, i.e. broadcasting, is the first key
difference between the Broadcasting Law and the Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media. As Article
2 of the latter stipulates, “the provisions of this Law shall not pertain to the conditions of
performing the activity of electronic communication, the conditions and the manner of setting
up, use and maintenance of fixed and mobile broadcasting devices”. According to the new
1
Associate professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade University
32
approach, broadcasting is left to the Law on Electronic Communications to regulate; accordingly,
the term broadcaster was omitted from the Pre-Draft. The broadcasting of media content is to be
left to a separate company or several such companies in the future, which are dubbed operators
of the electronic communication network for provision of media services. What was until now
called a broadcaster will in the future be a media services provider, which is editorially
accountable for the choice of content/audiovisual media services. These changes directly stem
from the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, under which radio and television stations and
other programming services providers are called media services providers.
The Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media has embraced such a term because, again on the basis of
European documents that have taken into account the new circumstances resulting from the
introduction of new technologies, the term broadcast media (electronic media in the Serbian
text) is wider and includes, apart from radio and television, “other audiovisual media services,
editorialized web pages and the like”, as indicated in the Pre-Draft.
In the new “glossary”, i.e. the Article explaining the meaning of certain terms instead of the
hitherto definitions, one may find many new terms that are evidence of the compliance of the
legal text with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Hence, we have the already mentioned
new definition of the broadcast media, media services and audiovisual media services. The text
explains the meaning of programming content and editorial responsibility. The latter is one of the
key words in the Pre-Draft, because, under European regulation, it enables the redefining of the
term broadcast media, since it also includes new online media, but not just any online media, but
only those that have been ascertained to possess a professional approach and responsibility. 1
Linear and non-linear media services are defined, as well as on-demand services. These are
significant novelties in a legislation aiming at regulating broadcast media. Since the
aforementioned Directive mostly pertains to television as an audiovisual media, as well as to the
fact that the digitalization of radio remains uncertain, the glossary and later the text have seen a
separation of radio and television. New terms are also product placement, protected media
services provided on the basis of conditional access and allotment zone instead of coverage zone,
which is also harmonization with the Law on Electronic Communications.
Regulatory agency and service type
The new Law has kept one of the most important commitments of the hitherto law governing
the field of broadcasting – the existence of an independent regulatory body. The RBA should be
replaced by the Electronic Media Agency (AEM). This is not the only difference. Two solutions
were proposed for the election of AEM’s Council. The first is practically returning to the principle
of authorized proposers prior to amendments to laws, which allowed the Culture and
Information Committee of the Parliament to propose six candidates and hence have an influence
on the election of one third of Council members. That model was somewhat modified by adding
national councils of ethnic minorities as authorized proposers, which are then supposed to come
to a proposal by mutual agreement. The procedure has also been laid down in more detail, in
order to facilitate the already complicated candidacy and election procedure.
The alternative to this provision is the election of Council members on the basis of an open
competition, for which the requirements have been specified more precisely. This model is
procedurally much simpler. However, an important question is who would, out of a potentially
large number of candidates meeting the formal criteria, make it to the shortlist to be decided
upon by the Parliament? The working group opted for the idea that, out of candidates proposed,
three independent institutions would make a mutual agreement to propose two names for each
Directive 89/552/EEC of the European Parliament and Audiovisual Media Services Council, Chapter I,
Article I, (c) and Resolution: Toward a New Notion of Media, Reykjavik, 2009.
1
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position in the Council: the Ombudsman, the Commissioner for Information of Public
Importance and the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality. In both cases, it was proposed
that the current Council members remained until the expiration of their term of office.
Regarding the activity of the regulatory agency, several new provisions have been introduced,
with the aim of making it more responsible, without undermining its independence. In that
sense, it is stipulated that the Council member’s term of office will be terminated if he/she has
worked improperly or unethically. The provisions on the Agency’s transparency have also been
boosted.
If the text of the Law were adopted, the Electronic Media Agency would have at its disposal more
precisely defined measures for controlling the activities of media services providers. These
measures should include a notice, warning and a temporary ban on a part of programming
content, as well as temporary and lasting revoking of the license. All these measures will be
public, they will have to be published by a broadcaster subject to these measures and by a print
outlet, distributed in the area covered by the media services provider’s license.
One of the key changes in the new law pertains to audiovisual media services by manner of
provision and content. Article 47 of the Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media foresees services that
(by manner of provision) may be linear and audiovisual services on-demand, and by content:
general and specialized, namely thematic: sports, culture, music, education, advertising
programs, etc. The introduction of on-demand services and their classification in specialized
services are the novelties placing this law among modern regulatory concepts.
Audiovisual commercial communication is foreseen in the Pre-Draft to the extent necessary
according to the revised European Convention on Cross-Border Television and the Directive on
Audiovisual Media Services. The details on product and services advertising and the related
restrictions are contained in the section of the Pre-Draft dealing with linear services only. It is
important to stress that, regarding commercial communications, as well as on-demand services,
the Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media elaborates in detail on the protection of minors.
The new provision also pertains to quotas of European works, which also constitutes alignment
with European regulations. The media service providers are required to allot at least 10% of the
annual program to European production content, excluding news, sport events, games,
advertising, teletext and the like, as well as Teleshop sales. That provision also requires a quota
for European films and series in the amount of no less than 20% of the annual program.
Services of the public audiovisual media service
The Pre-Draft of the new Law also contains provisions about the public service broadcaster.
Since the working group started its activities a couple of years ago and that it completed the text
immediately after the passing of the Media Strategy, the Pre-Draft did not deal with the concept
of regional public service broadcasters. The writers of the Pre-Draft did not have the information
if the Ministry of Culture had set up the second working group working on a separate law on the
public service broadcaster, which would encompass regional public service broadcasters. Such
circumstances will require the lawmakers to make a clear commitment, to be hopefully
delivered after a competent public debate.
As for the Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media, it has improved the provisions on the public
service broadcaster, which, just like until now, concern the national and provincial public service
broadcasters. The most significant change is contained in Article 72 of the Pre-Draft dealing with
independence and functional autonomy of the public service broadcaster. Ten points have been
transposed from the CE Recommendation R (96) 10 on the guarantee of independence of the
34
public service broadcasting. Under this Recommendation, total independence concerns
primarily: programming schedule, programming concept and production, editing and presenting
news programs and current affairs programs, activity organization, appointment of managers,
editors-in-chief and employment.
The financing of the national and provincial public service broadcaster will still be possible from
several sources: subscription fee, advertising, sales of programming content and carriers of
sound and picture, concerts and other sources under the law. Subscription fee remains the main
source of revenue, while the provisions on the collection thereof have been boosted. It will be
charged separately in Vojvodina and separately in other parts of Serbia, while citizens will be
required to report the possession of a TV set. The categories of persons and institutions relieved
of paying the subscription fee remain. The Pre-Draft has elaborated in more detail the provisions
on charging the subscription fee for the use of radios in motor vehicles. It is estimated that this
could boost the revenues from the subscription fee by 5-6 million Euros a year, which is not a
negligible amount.
Substantial changes were also proposed in relation to the appointment of members of public
service broadcasters’ managing boards. According to the Pre-Draft, instead of nine, there will be
seven members, each of which will be appointed by: the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts;
the Rector Conference of Serbia; the Coordination Body of the Ethnic Minorities Council;
journalists’ associations and associations promoting media freedoms, human rights, education
and protection if minors; finally, three members will be elected by the regulatory agency. A
similar solution is foreseen for the provincial public service broadcaster, whereas the members
will be appointed by the provincial Academy and the rectors of universities on the territory of
Vojvodina.
Authorizations for the provision of services, licenses, concentration of ownership,
privatization
The Pre-Draft Law on Electronic Media foresees the provision of services without obtaining a
license, if such services are provided solely through the information network (Web Casting) and
in the case of rebroadcasting, in accordance with the provisions of the European Convention on
Cross-Border Television. Licenses shall be issued to persons seated in Serbia, which will in that
way receive the authorization to provide their media services through public electronic
communication networks to an unspecified number of users. In the transitional and closing
provisions of the Pre-Draft, Article 139 stipulates that the current license holders for analog
broadcasting shall provide media services until the expiry of the term of such licenses and that
they will accordingly be enabled multiplex access when the digital switchover takes place.
The license issuance procedure is public and the license may not be granted to political parties
and coalition, or legal persons founded by the state, including the Province and local
governments. It goes without saying that the public service broadcaster is an exception, but
there is a novelty – the possibility for universities founded by the state to be able to set up
broadcast media with the purpose of media training for students, on non-profit basis. State
universities have thus been put on equal footing with private institutions and there should be no
concern that this will “transpose” the influence of the state on student media, since political
autonomy in this field is guaranteed by the Law on the University.
The procedure of obtaining a license on an open competition was elaborated on in very much
detail and adjusted to changes resulting from digitalization, as well as to the Law on Electronic
Communications Act. Due to the need to keep better records and the transparency of ownership,
the Register of Media Services was also provided for in detail.
35
The working group that prepared the Pre-Draft was of the opinion that until the adoption of a
separate law, or until transparency and unlawful concentration of media ownership were not
better regulated, the Law should maintain provisions on these issues. The Pre-Draft Law on
Electronic Media contains provisions that were mainly discussed in public, on a debate about the
pre-draft law in this field. The text of the Law lays down certain thresholds for concentration in
proportion to European practice and not detrimental to healthy competition on the media
market.
The legal confusion about the privatization of local media made the working group reconsider
the way of solving this problem. According to the transitional and closing provisions, media
founded by local self-government bodies, which were not privatized according to the
Broadcasting Law, have a 24-month term to finalize that process, until the Law on Electronic
Media comes into force. Until then, these media must adjust their operations with the provisions
of the law pertaining to the public service broadcaster services.
36
Post-communist Media Reforms
from a Bird's Eye View
Jovanka Matic, PhD1
The long awaited changes of the media systems in post-communist countries have been a
disappointment. Today they are and mainly privately owned; they operate in a lawful
environment of clearly defined rights and obligations and they are controlled by independent
bodies, separate from the government. However, the media are economically and politically
subdued. State monopolies have been replaced by those imposed by foreign corporations or
(un)known domestic tycoons. The regulatory agencies and managing bodies of public service
broadcasters are established and appointed in a process marred by political wheeling and
dealing. Journalists are often threatened, attacked and even murdered. Changes to the relevant
legislation are slow; modern laws are not complied with. Content is often all too similar, while
investigative journalism is rare and often unsuccessful. Twenty-some years have passed since
we were promised that the media would be radically democratized.
Two decades: too long or too short of a period?
The transition in Serbia started almost 12 years ago. Things might have been different had they
promised us blood, sweat and tears on October the 5th. Without that, a new system may not be
instituted. With this experience, Egypt’s hope that democratic elections alone will suffice to
transform a rigid, oppressive system into a democratic one, seems utterly naïve. Absent of naïve
hopes, however, there may be no change. Today, though, we must not stray into despair, a path
typically paved with unrealistic expectations. For rebuilding a destroyed society like Serbia at
the start of the new millennium, 12 years may only be the end of a beginning.
The unbearable ease of transition
The media are the first institutions of society to have entered the post-communist period in
almost all countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The dismantling of the links with
government structures and freeing the media from the role of ruling oligarchy and working class
mouthpiece were seen everywhere as the most important preconditions for the development of
these emerging democracies. The initial quick pluralization of the media sphere, the significant
role the media had played in the political changes, the newly-found openness to diverse sources
of information and willingness to reflect a wide social spectrum of opinions, as well as their
practical and symbolic contribution to the creation of civil society, have resulted in the belief
that the media would embrace the leading role in setting up the democratic infrastructure in
these post-communist societies. The hope was that the new social environment would give birth
to new, democratic forms of communication that remained out of reach of even advanced postindustrial societies. At the very least, it was expected that the media would take upon several
roles: the role of sources of accurate and comprehensive information; the role of a watchdog
(securing the transparency of the work of public institutions); the role of forum for public debate
about issues of public interest; and the role of promoters of democratic values.
1
Research Associate, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade
37
Today’s state of affairs, in terms of the outcome of the transition, shows that the initial optimism
was unfounded. While the position of the media vs. government institutions has not changed
dramatically, irreversible changes have been achieved in rebuilding the media systems. Having
the media serve civil society remains a much-aspired model, albeit difficult to achieve, in light of
the current economic downturn.
All the emerging democracies have opted for instituting a Western-style media system. The
latter, however, needed more than two centuries to take root and establish itself as a model.
The current experience of countries in transition shows that the success of reforms hinges not
only on new institutions, but also on the appropriate socio-cultural backdrop underpinning their
work and the acceptance of new values/public support to the goals of the changes. On the long
term, these are created by the education system and in the current times – the media. Without
the media, the new political and economic culture, necessary for consolidating democracy,
simply cannot take hold. The efficiency of the media will determine the time during which
society will be “imprisoned” in the attempt to bring about change. Thus, transforming the media
and making them fit for new roles is believed to be the primary task in the transition towards
democratic pluralism and market economy. In practice, however, media reforms did not receive
the necessary attention, although the media were nonetheless expected to be the catalyst of
structural changes and the key factor of the development of democratic political culture.
Political influence
Analyses of the reforms in post-communist societies in the last two decades have shown that the
speed and scope of the changes to the media systems were in sync with the transformation of
the global systems. Contrary to the initial optimistic expectations, the democratization of the
media was more of a function of the political will of the new elites, rather than becoming a factor
of overall democratization itself. According to analysts, everyone has underestimated the
capacity of totalitarianism for “structural and functional mimicry”.
The new political elites in emerging democracies have not renounced the opportunities to
control the media and restrict their autonomy. Civil society and/or non-profit media have never
become an important segment of the media system. Where the dismantling of the state
monopoly in the media sector (especially in broadcasting) was successful, it was typically
accompanied by a politically oriented media concentration or various measures aimed at
preserving political control over the public service broadcasters (by electing the members of
regulatory bodies or appointing members of managing bodies of these public service
broadcasters) and undermining the economic stability of those media prone to criticism. The
media system in emerging democracies is pluralistic, but the media are dependent on the state
or various powerful groups and hence their content is often devoid of political diversity. From
the legal aspect, the issues of contention are always the same: access to public information,
protection of journalist’s sources, restriction to secrecy of information, protection of privacy,
penalization of defamation and insult, allocation of broadcasting licenses…
The paradox of media changes is that they require an active state policy aimed at creating the
conditions for media autonomy. Meanwhile, the state, in order to win over public support for
painful reforms, needs media that are mouthpieces and not watchdogs. Everything else is seen
as a superfluous.
Researches conducted in former Socialist countries have shown the political system to be the
chief factor hampering the democratization of the media. The government acts as the most
conservative agent of mass communication, for it sees society as an entity to be influenced and
the media as a suitable instrument for exerting such influence.
38
After 2000, the ruling establishment in Serbia never mentioned in the election campaigns the
reform of the media system as a political priority. The same was true for the latest elections. No
political party had included these changes as a goal in their respective electoral agendas. The
ruling parties prefer to keep the status quo. Opposition parties were never happy with the
media. However, the only thing they did about it was to create their own, deeply politicized and
biased media, dealing an additional blow to the professionalism of journalists and the credibility
of media in general.
Future governments are unlikely to change that pattern of behavior. Changes must be imposed
by initiatives and pressure by the civil sector, which has the authentic interest to create media
that will watch over public resources and public policy and the respect of core values. The
necessary reforms of the media sector may only be achieved by putting constant pressure on the
government in the form of initiatives for the adoption of new regulations, proposing new
concepts, new state aid rules and incentives for the media that work in the public interest.
Economic influence
In the majority of post-communist countries, the market has become the leading force
determining the media landscape. At the start of the transition, most journalists believed that
liberating the media from state control and developing private commercial outlets would suffice
to guarantee media autonomy. Today, they lament on how they sought freedom and got the
market instead. Instead of aiming at a new relationship between financiers and journalists, the
reforms insisted on the accumulation of private financial profit, rather than on social wealth. The
consequences are far reaching and hardly reversible: the commercialization of media,
“tabloidization” of content, segmentation of audiences, concentration of ownership, renewed
monopolization, the emergence of domestic tycoons, disappearance of quality print media,
dominance of entertainment at the expense of the informative and educational function of the
media, neglecting minority interests and voices.
Truth be told, the above has happened in the developed world too. However, in the context of
post-communist societies, where politics controlled the economy, with slow economic reforms,
low economic growth, lack of capital, undeveloped advertising market and low purchasing
power of the audience, chaotic market, opaque media ownership and lack of meaningful trade
union activity, the fallout has been much more severe. Such a situation has produced
economically unsustainable and poor media, dependent on the interests of the owner and the
state as the additional sponsor, as well as in poor journalists. Due to the failure to find an
appropriate solution for financing the public service broadcaster, the latter has neglected its
core functions and lost the battle against commercial media.
One of the root causes of the media’s economic decline is the inefficiency of the hitherto business
model due to the advent of new information technologies, but also because of the global
economic downturn. Many media in Serbia will definitively not survive the crisis. In the current
situation, there are no guarantees that the best ones – the most professional, the most credible,
those that are working in the public interest – will make it. However, state aid – which is
necessary and is being implemented in other market economies – could be channeled (if
transparent and neutral) to the media working best in the public interest. It is necessary to
institute a stable and neutral system of financing the public broadcasting service, since the latter
is able to provide a setting for the interaction of various social groups and fulfilling the often
neglected interests of the audience.
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Civil society influence
Still, differences between post-communist countries with regard to improving the media system
do exist. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the Baltic countries have managed to
achieve a relatively successful transition and build pluralist and competitive democracies and
democratized communication structures. Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia and other
countries, where the political regimes are “concentrated” and not competitive, are less
successful. Post-conflict countries, such as Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia or Georgia fall
into a separate group, with a transition process burdened by additional difficulties – economic
devastation, ideological and political divisions and a destroyed value system.
Based on the experience of the aforementioned countries, the analysts have identified the
factors that have facilitated the transition process: economic development, high education
standards, the tradition of autochthonous anti-regime movements, the tradition of various social
groups joining forces for a common cause, the experience of reforms, ethnic homogeneity…
Negative factors include underdeveloped economy, low standards of living, low education
standards, ethnic tensions and weak civil society.
Serbia faces many unfavorable factors, including a belated transition. Still, it is encouraging to
see that the citizens understand the importance of having independent and credible media;
furthermore, civil society and especially professional associations are active in resisting drastic
threats against the media and journalists. It is also competent enough to demand changes and
guide them in the right direction. Civil society in Serbia is only starting to learn its new roles. In
the United States, for example, the first association of university journalism professors was
founded exactly 100 years ago (1912). In Serbia, there is not even awareness of the need to have
such an association. What remains to be learned is professional solidarity, efficient organization
of various (and conflicting) segments of the media community in order to achieve common
goals, lobbying and seeking allies in the political, economic and cultural elite, as well as the
possibility to use established procedures for making changes to the media system a social
priority.
The connoisseurs of transition say that when the new institutions fail to meet the expectations,
the only thing that may prolong their legitimacy is a firm belief system underpinning such
institutions, not because they are useful (since they currently are not), but because they are the
most appropriate choice for achieving a long-term goal.
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European Court of Human Rights
Information Notes on the Court’s case-law1
Information Note no. 148/January 2012
ARTICLE 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Freedom of expression
Obligation to pay compensation to child victim of sexual abuse for revealing her identity
in a newspaper article: no violation
Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria –
3401/07 Judgment 17.1.2012 [Section I]
Facts – The applicant newspaper published two articles concerning the case of C, a child who
had been ill-treated and sexually abused by her father and stepmother. The articles were
published during the latter’s criminal trial and gave a detailed description of the circumstances
of the case, revealing C’s identity, her father’s and stepmother’s full names and their
photographs. Given the significant media attention in her case, C had to be re-admitted to
hospital for psychological problems. She subsequently filed a claim for compensation against the
applicant company for publication of her name and the particulars of her case. Her claim was
upheld on appeal and the applicant company was ordered to pay compensation in the amount of
EUR 10,000 on the grounds that revealing C’s identity in a matter concerning exclusively her
private life had been unnecessary and in breach of domestic law.
Law – Article 10: The case concerned a balancing of the applicant newspaper’s right to freedom
of expression against C’s right to protection of her identity. C was not a public figure and could
not be considered to have entered the public scene by becoming a victim of a criminal offence
which attracted considerable media attention. Further, even though the impugned articles dealt
with a matter of public concern, the fact that neither the offenders nor the victim were public
figures meant that knowledge of their identity had not been material for undestanding the
particulars of the case. The applicant newspaper had not been prevented from reporting all the
details of the case, only from revealing C’s identity. The identity of victims of crime deserved
special protection due to their vulnerable position. That obligation had been all the more
important in C’s case as she was a child at the time of the abuse. Both the Council of Europe’s
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and various
recommendations adopted by its Committee of Ministers urged the States to take measures to
protect the identity of victims of crime. Lastly, the sanction imposed on the applicant newspaper
had not been disproportionate: the amount of compensation awarded appeared reasonable in
the circumstances, in particular given the impact the articles must have had on C, who had
experienced severe psychological problems and had had to be re-admitted to hospital.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
1
Excerpts from the official documents of the European Court of Human Rights, available on its web site
41
Information Note no. 149/February 2012
ARTICLE 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Freedom of expression
Prohibition on reporting arrest and conviction of famous actor: violation
Axel Springer AG v. Germany –
39954/08 Judgment 7.2.2012 [GC]
Facts – The applicant company is the publisher of a national daily newspaper with a largecirculation which in September 2004 published a front-page article about the star of a popular
television series who had been arrested at the Munich beer festival for possession of cocaine.
The article was supplemented by a more detailed article on another page and was illustrated by
three pictures of the actor in question. Immediately after that article appeared, the actor
obtained an injunction restraining any further publication of the article or photographs. The
injunction on publishing the article was upheld on appeal in June 2005 (the applicant company
did not challenge the injunction concerning the photographs). In November 2005 the injunction
was continued in respect of almost the entire article and the applicant company was ordered to
pay an agreed penalty, which, on appeal, was reduced to EUR 1,000.
In the interim, in July 2005, the newspaper had published a second article, reporting that the
actor had been convicted of unlawful possession of drugs following a full confession and had
been fined. The actor applied for and obtained an injunction restraining publication of the
second article on essentially the same grounds as for the first. That judgment was upheld on
appeal. The applicant company was later ordered to pay two penalty payments of EUR 5,000 in
respect of subsequent breaches of that injunction.
Law – Article 10: It was common ground that the domestic courts’ decisions had constituted
interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression; which interference
was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of
others. The Court went on to determine whether the interference had been necessary in a
democratic society.
Applying the criteria it had established in its case-law for balancing the right to freedom of
expression against the right to respect for private life, the Court noted, firstly, that the published
articles concerned the arrest and conviction of an actor, that is public judicial facts that could be
considered to present a degree of general interest. Second, the actor was sufficiently well known
to qualify as a public figure and, even though the nature of the offence was such that it would
probably not have been reported on had it been committed by an ordinary individual, the fact
that the actor had been arrested in public and had actively sought the limelight by revealing
details about his private life in a number of interviews meant that his legitimate expectation that
his private life would be effectively protected was reduced. As regards the third criterion – how
the information was obtained and whether it was reliable – the first article about the actor’s
arrest had a sufficient factual basis as it was based on information provided by the public
prosecutor’s office and the truth of the information related in both articles was not in dispute
between the parties. The applicant company had not acted in bad faith: not only had it received
confirmation of the information from the prosecuting authorities, there was nothing to suggest
that it had not undertaken a balancing exercise between its interest in publishing and the actor’s
right to respect for his private life before concluding, in the light of all the circumstances, that it
did not have sufficiently strong grounds for believing it should preserve the actor’s anonymity.
As to the content, form and consequences of the publications, the articles had not revealed
details about the actor’s private life, but had mainly concerned the circumstances of his arrest
42
and the outcome of the criminal proceedings. There had been no disparaging comments or
unsubstantiated allegations. The applicant company had not challenged a court injunction
prohibiting it from publishing photographs and it had not been shown that the publication of the
articles had resulted in serious consequences for the actor. As regards the final criterion, while
the sanctions imposed on the applicant company were lenient, they had nevertheless been
capable of having a chilling effect and were not justified in the light of the factors referred to
above. Accordingly, the restrictions imposed on the company had not been reasonably
proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the actor’s private life.
Conclusion: violation (twelve votes to five).
Article 41: EUR 17,734.28 in respect of pecuniary damage, corresponding to penalties and costs
incurred in the domestic proceedings less the two penalty payments of EUR 5,000.
43