2.
I am fearful that the principles of government inculcated in Mr. [John] Adams' treatise
[Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America], and
enforced in the numerous essays and paragraphs in the newspapers, have misled some
well designing members of the late Convention. But it will appear in the sequel, that
the construction of the proposed plan of government is infinitely more extravagant.
I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened patriot would, ere this, have
taken up the pen to expose the futility, and counteract the baneful tendency of such
principles. Mr. Adams' sine qua non of a good government is three balancing powers;
whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby
promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that the administrators of
every government, will ever be actuated by views of private interest and ambition, to
the prejudice of the public good; that therefore the only effectual method to secure the
rights of the people and promote their welfare, is to create an opposition of interests
between the members of two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of
government, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis supposes human
wisdom competent to the task of instituting three co-equal orders in government, and a
corresponding weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their
several parts, and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a
coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr. Adams, although he
has traced the constitution of every form of government that ever existed, as far as
history affords materials, has not been able to adduce a single instance of such a
government. He indeed says that the British constitution is such in theory, but this is
rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and not to be reduced to
practice. If such an organization of power were practicable, how long would it
continue? Not a day-for there is so great a disparity in the talents, wisdom and industry
of mankind, that the scale would presently preponderate to one or the other body, and
with every accession of power the means of further increase would be greatly
extended. The state of society in England is much more favorable to such a scheme of
government than that of America. There they have a powerful hereditary nobility, and
real distinctions of rank and interests; but even there, for want of that perfect equality
of power and distinction of interests in the three orders of government, they exist but
in name. The only operative and efficient check upon the conduct of administration, is
the sense of the people at large.
Suppose a government could be formed and supported on such principles, would it
answer the great purposes of civil society? If the administrators of every government
are actuated by views of private interest and ambition, how is the welfare and
happiness of the community to be the result of such jarring adverse interests?
Therefore, as different orders in government will not produce the good of the whole,
we must recur to other principles. I believe it will be found that the form of
government, which holds those entrusted with power in the greatest responsibility to
their constituents, the best calculated for freemen. A republican, or free government,

3.
can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is pretty
equally divided. In such a government the people are the sovereign and their sense or
opinion is the criterion of every public measure. For when this ceases to be the case,
the nature of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, monarchy or despotism
will rise on its ruin. The highest responsibility is to be attained in a simple structure of
government, for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of
government, and for want of due information are liable to be imposed on. If you
complicate the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and divided in
their sentiment about the source of abuses or misconduct; some will impute it to the
senate, others to the house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the
people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abortive. But if, imitating the
constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the legislative power in one body of men
(separating the executive and judicial) elected for a short period, and necessarily
excluded by rotation from permanency, and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by
delays imposed on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect responsibility. For
then, whenever the people feel a grievance, they cannot mistake the authors, and will
apply the remedy with certainty and effect, discarding them at the next election. This
tie of responsibility will obviate all the dangers apprehended from a single legislature,
and will the best secure the rights of the people.
Having premised this much, I shall now proceed to the examination of the proposed
plan of government, and I trust, shall make it appear to the meanest capacity, that it
has none of the essential requisites of a free government; that it is neither founded on
those balancing restraining powers, recommended by Mr. Adams and attempted in the
British constitution, or possessed of that responsibility to its constituents, which, in my
opinion, is the only effectual security for the liberties and happiness of the people. But
on the contrary, that it is a most daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocracy
among freemen, that the world has ever witnessed. . . .
Thus we see, the house of representatives are on the part of the people to balance the
senate, who I suppose will be composed of the better sort, the well born, etc. The
number of the representatives (being only one for every 30,000 inhabitants) appears to
be too few, either to communicate the requisite information of the wants, local
circumstances and sentiments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and
undue influence, in the exercise of such great powers; the term for which they are to
be chosen, too long to preserve a due dependence and accountability to their
constituents; and the mode and places of their election not sufficiently ascertained, for
as Congress have the control over both, they may govern the choice, by ordering the
representatives of a whole State, to be elected in one place, and that too may be the
most inconvenient.
The senate, the great efficient body in this plan of government, is constituted on the
most unequal principles. The smallest State in the Union has equal weight with the
great States of Virginia, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania. The senate, besides its

4.
legislative functions, has a very considerable share in the executive; none of the
principal appointments to office can be made without its advice and consent. The terin
and mode of its appointment will lead to permanency. The members are chosen for six
years, the mode is under the control of Congress, and as there is no exclusion by
rotation, they may be continued for life, which, from their extensive means of
influence, would follow of course. The President, who would be a mere pageant of
State, unless he coincides with the views of the senate, would either become the bead
of the aristocratic junto in that body, or its minion; besides, their influence being the
most predominant, could the best secure his re-election to office. And from his power
of granting pardons, he might screen from punishment the most treasonable attempts
on the liberties of the people, when instigated by the senate. . . .
Mr. [James] Wilson asserts that never was charge made with less reason, than that
which predicts the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the federal Senate. ' In my
first number, I stated that this body would be a very unequal representation of the
several States, that the members being appointed for the long term of six years, and
there being no exclusion by rotation, they might be continued for life, which would
follow of course from their extensive means of influence, and that possessing a
considerable share in the executive as well as the legislative, it would become a
permanent aristocracy, and swallow up the other orders in the government.
That these fears are not imaginary, a knowledge of the history of other nations, where
the powers of government have been injudiciously placed, will fully demonstrate. Mr.
Wilson says, "the senate branches into two characters; the one legislative and the other
executive. In its legislative character it can effect no purpose, without the co-operation
of the house of representatives, and in its executive character it can accomplish no
object without the concurrence of the president. Thus fettered, I do not know any act
which the senate can of itself perform, and such dependence necessarily precludes
every idea of influence and superiority. " This I confess is very specious, but
experience demonstrates that checks in government, unless accompanied with
adequate power and independently placed, prove merely nominal, and will be
inoperative. Is it probable, that the President of the United States, limited as he is in
power, and dependent on the will of the senate, in appointments to office, will either
have the firmness or inclination to exercise his prerogative of a conditional control
upon the proceedings of that body, however injurious they may be to the public
welfare? It will be his interest to coincide with the views of the senate, and thus
become the head of the aristocratic junto. The king of England is a constituent part in
the legislature, but although an hereditary monarch, in possession of the whole
executive power, including the unrestrained appointment to offices, and an immense
revenue, enjoys but in name the prerogative of a negative upon the parliament. Even
the king of England, circumstanced as he is, has not dared to exercise it for near a
century past. The check of the house of representatives upon the senate will likewise
be rendered nugatory for want of due weight in the democratic branch, and from their
constitution they may become so independent of the people as to be indifferent of its

5.
interests. Nay, as Congress would have the control over the mode and place of their
election, by ordering the representatives of a whole state to be elected at one place,
and that too the most inconvenient, the ruling powers may govern the choice, and thus
the house of representatives may be composed of the creatures of the senate. Still the
semblance of checks may remain, but without operation.
This mixture of the legislative and executive moreover highly tends to corruption. The
chief improvement in government, in modern times, has been the complete separation
of the great distinctions of power; placing the legislative in different hands from those
which hold the executive; and again severing the judicial part from the ordinary
administrative. "When the legislative and executive powers (says Montesquieu) are
united in the same person or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty. "
CENTINEL