Where Teachers Come First

[This 1823 translation
of Montesquieu's classic text in political theory is by Thomas Nugent.]

Charles, Baron
De Montesquieu, the Spirit of the Laws (1748)

CHAPTER 6.Of the Constitution of England

In every government
there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive, in respect
to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, in regard
to matters that depend on the civil law.

By virtue of the first,
the prince, or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends
or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes
peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security,
and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or
determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we
shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power
of the state.

The political liberty
of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each
person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite
that the government be so constituted as one man needs not be afraid of
another.

When the legislative
and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body
of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise,
lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute
them in a tyrannical manner.

Again, there is no
liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative
and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would
be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything,
were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people,
to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing
the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.

Most kingdoms in Europe
enjoy a moderate government, because the prince who is invested with the
two first powers, leaves the third to his subjects. In Turkey, where these
three powers are united in the Sultan's person, the subjects groan under
the most dreadful oppression.

In the republics of
Italy, where these three powers are united, there is less liberty than
in our monarchies. Hence their government is obliged to have recourse
to as violent methods for its support, as even that of the Turks: witness
the state inquisitors [at Venice], and the lion's mouth into which every
informer may at all hours throw his written accusations.

In what a situation
must the poor subject be, under these republics! The same body of magistrates
are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have
given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state
by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary
power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular
decisions.

The whole power is
here united in one body; and though there is no external pomp that indicates
a despotic sway, yet the people feel the effects of its every moment.

Hence it is, that
many of the princes of Europe, whose aim has been levelled at arbitrary
power, have constantly set out with uniting in their own persons all the
branches of magistracy, and all the great offices of state....

As in a country of
liberty, every man who is supposed a free agent, ought to be his own governor;
the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. But
since this is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject
to many inconveniences, it is fit the people should transact by their
representatives what they cannot transact by themselves.

The inhabitants of
a particular town are much better acquainted with its wants and interests,
than with those of other places; and are better judges of the capacity
of their neighbours, than of that of the rest of the countrymen. The members,
therefore, of the legislature should not be chosen from the general body
of the nation; but it is proper that in every considerable place, a representative
should be elected by the inhabitants. The great advantage of representatives
is their capacity of discussing public affairs. For this the people collectively
are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy.

It is not at all necessary
that the representatives who have received a general instruction from
their constituents, should wait to be directed on each particular affair,
as is practised in the diets of Germany. True it is, that by this way
of proceeding, the speeches of the deputies might with greater propriety
be called the voice of the nation; but, on the other hand, this would
occasion infinite delays; would give each deputy a power of controlling
the assembly; and, on the most urgent and pressing occasions, the wheels
of government might be stopped by the caprice of a single person.

When the deputies,
as Mr. Sidney well observes, represent a body of people, as in Holland,
they ought to be accountable to their constituents; but it is a different
thing in England, where they are deputed by boroughs. All the inhabitants
of the several districts ought to have a right of voting at the election
of a representative, except such as are in so mean a situation, as to
be deemed to have no will of their own.

One great fault there
was in most of the ancient republics, that the people had a right to active
resolutions, such as require some execution, a thing of which they are
absolutely incapable. They ought to have no share in the government but
for the choosing of representatives, which is within their reach. For
though few can tell the exact degree of men's capacities, yet there are
none but are capable of knowing in general, whether the person they choose
is better qualified than most of his neighbours.

Neither ought the
representative body to be chosen for the executive part of government,
for which it is not so fit; but for the enacting of laws, or to see whether
the laws in being are duly executed, a thing suited to their abilities,
and which none indeed but themselves can properly perform....

The executive power
ought to be in the hands of a monarch, because this branch of government,
having need of dispatch, is better administered by one than by many: on
the other hand, whatever depends on the legislative power is often better
regulated by many than by a single person.

But if there were
no monarch, and the executive power should be committed to a certain number
of persons selected from the legislative body, there would be an end then
of liberty: by reason the two powers would be united, as the same persons
would sometimes possess, and would be always able to possess, a share
in both.

Were the legislative
body to be a considerable time without meeting, this would likewise put
an end to liberty. For the two things one would naturally follow: either
that there would be no longer any legislative resolutions, and then the
state would fall into anarchy; or that these resolutions would be taken
by the executive power, which would render it absolute.

It would be needless
for the legislative body to continue always assembled. This would be troublesome
to the representatives, and, moreover, would cut out too much work for
the executive power, so as to take off its attention to its office, and
oblige it to think only of defending its own prerogative, and the right
it has to execute....

Were the executive
power not to have the right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative
body, the latter would become despotic; for as it might arrogate to itself
what authority it pleased, it would soon destroy all the other powers.
But it is not proper, on the other hand, that the legislative power should
have a right to stay the executive. For as the execution has its natural
limits, it is useless to confine it; besides, the executive power is generally
employed in momentary operations. The power, therefore, of the Roman tribunes
was faulty, as it put a stop not only to the legislation, but likewise
the executive part of government, which was attended with infinite mischiefs.

But if the legislative
power in a free state has no right to stay the executive, it has a right
and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have
been executed; an advantage which this government has over that of Crete
and Sparta, where the Cosmi and the Ephori gave no account of their administration.

But whatever may be
the issues of that examination, the legislative body ought not to have
a power of arraigning the person, nor, of course, the conduct of him who
is entrusted with the executive power. His person should be sacred, because
as it is necessary for the good of the state to prevent the legislative
body from rendering themselves arbitrary, the moment he is accused or
tried, there is an end of liberty....

Though, in general,
the judiciary power ought not to be united with any part of the legislative,
yet this is liable to three exceptions, founded on the particular interest
of the party accused.

The great are always
obnoxious to popular envy; and were they to be judged by the people, they
might be in danger from their judges and would, moreover, be deprived
of the privilege which the meanest subject is possessed of in a free state,
of being tried by his peers. The nobility, for this reason, ought not
to be cited before the ordinary courts of judicature, but before that
part of the legislature which is composed of their own body.

It is possible that
the law, which is clear sighted in one sense, and blind in another, might,
in some cases, be too severe. But as we have already observed, the national
judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law,
mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour.
That part, therefore, of the legislative body, which we have just now
observed to be a necessary tribunal on another occasion is also a necessary
tribunal in this; it belongs to its supreme authority to moderate the
law in favour of the law itself, by mitigating the sentence....

Were the executive
power to determine the raising of public money, otherwise than by giving
its consent, liberty would be at end; because it would become legislative
in the most important point of legislation.

If the legislative
power were to settle the subsidies, not from year to year, but forever,
it would run the risk of losing its liberty, because the executive power
would be no longer dependent; and when once it was possessed of such a
perpetual right, it would be a matter of indifference, whether it held
it of itself, or of another. The same may be said if it should come to
a resolution of intrusting, not an annual, but a perpetual command, of
the fleets and armies to the executive power.

To prevent the executive
power from being able to oppress, it is requisite that the armies with
which it is entrusted should consist of the people, and have the same
spirit as the people, as was the case at Rome till the time of Marius....

When once an army
is established, it ought not to depend immediately on the legislative,
but on the executive power; and this from the very nature of the thing,
its business consisting more in action than deliberation.

It is natural for
mankind to set a higher value upon courage than timidity, on activity
than prudence, on strength than counsel. Hence the army will ever despise
a senate, and respect their own officers. They will naturally slight the
orders sent them by a body of men, whom they look upon as cowards, and
therefore unworthy to command them. So that as soon as the troops depend
entirely on the legislative body, it becomes a military government; and
if the contrary has ever happened, it has been owing to some extraordinary
circumstances....

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