November 4, 2012

A Tale of Two Superpowers

The following article appeared in The Asian Age and The Deccan Chronicle on November 4, 2012.

In his charming Beastly Tales from Here and There, the poet Vikram
Sethrecounts a Chinese parable about the Rat and the Ox. The two animals vie to
appear first in the Chinese Zodiac on the basis of their size. So as not to be
humiliated by the obvious disparity, the Rat requests that he be made only
slightly larger, a request to which the Ox acquiesces. But after onlookers
marvel at his remarkable size – for a rodent – the Rat is deemed the winner and
granted the exalted position at the start of the Chinese calendar.

I recall this tale frequently – not least because of its origins – whenever
the contrast is made between the economic and political stasis of the United
States and the vibrancy and growing potential of China. The speed and scale of
China’s rise since 1979 is certainly without historical precedent. And the
polarizing political theatrics and entrenched special interests in Washington
can be stultifying. The United States is often unable to implement relatively
straightforward policies due to political bickering, its education system is
often considered lax and expensive, and its infrastructure feels woefully
outdated. By contrast, China’s decision-making seems swift and decisive, it is
churning out large numbers of trained scientific researchers and engineers, and
it now boasts state-of-the-art airports and rail networks.

A small cottage industry has sprung up to document and dissect the apparently
contrasting trajectories of the world’s two leading powers. The most
high-profile example is perhaps Martin Jacques’ When China Rules the
World in which the author posits that China’s civilizational experience and
its resurgence as Asia’s Middle Kingdom promise to refashion the global system.
In a very different analysis, Arvind Subramanian’s book Eclipse argues
that China has already surpassed the United States as the world’s dominant
economic force.

And yet, as both countries appear set for political transitions this year,
the contrast between the two processes – and the international interest and
attention paid to them – could not be more different. Communist China,
undergoing what is only its second peaceful transition, has had to postpone its
Party Congress in the light of the bizarre and embarrassing Bo Xilai scandal.
The constitution of China’s Politburo Standing Committee – the nation’s most
powerful decision-making body – is still unclear and reportedly subject to
fierce factionalism. Despite several volumes documenting the life and career of
its next presumed leader, Xi Jinping, almost nothing is known publicly about his
views on most major contemporary policy issues. Neither Xi nor the expected
future premier Li Keqiang is as yet a widely recognizable figure outside China.
And recent media reports about the immense personal wealth of the families of Xi
and outgoing premier Wen Jiabao threaten popular outrage at home. Hardly an
ideal state of affairs for a prospective global hegemon.

Barack Obama and Mitt Romney are both, by contrast, well known at home and
abroad. Every aspect of their personalities – including their backgrounds and
assets – and that of their top advisors has been subject to considerable public
scrutiny and occasional ridicule. Each of the three presidential debates between
the two was watched by an average of 64 million people across the country and
countless more around the world. Both candidates have had to make a host of
public statements on a variety of social, economic, and foreign policy issues.
And the two major political parties determined their nominees for president only
after organizing popular state-level elections known as primaries or caucuses,
necessitating exacting and occasionally grueling campaigns.

The American system is not without its flaws nor is it exempt from
controversy. The Electoral College – whereby candidates win states weighted for
population size, rather than individual votes – effectively disenfranchises many
voters and grants disproportionate influence to certain key ‘swing states’. Both
parties often espouse populist rhetoric in an effort to appeal to their
electoral bases. And while U.S. campaign financing is extraordinarily
transparent by international standards, it is not wholly so. But the relative
success of the two political systems is reflected in how often they are
replicated. Over the past three decades, countries as diverse as Indonesia,
Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, South Korea, and Argentina have adopted
multi-party presidential systems of governance, and today some ninety countries
hold direct presidential elections. By contrast, the only avowedly single-party
states, other than China, are Vietnam, Laos, Turkmenistan, Cuba, and North
Korea.

Unlike China’s past, present, and future policy toward India – which remain
the subject of speculation even among well-informed experts – the United States’
position is relatively clear. Both Republican and Democratic governments have
had to adapt to changing global realities over the past decade. China and
Pakistan remain significant potential security challenges for the United States
even though both exercise different forms and degrees of leverage over
Washington. These problematic relationships strengthen the basis for stronger
ties between DC and Delhi. India’s large market and human resources, its system
of governance, and its links with its diaspora in the United States also
contribute to the logic of enhanced relations. With these structural imperatives
in place, the forthcoming presidential election is unlikely to significantly
alter U.S. policy toward India, other than at the margins.

A second Obama administration can be expected to see a reconfigured foreign
policy team, and it may take some time for the new principals to hone in on
India’s strategic importance and appreciate its benefits and limitations.
Similarly, while a Romney administration can be expected to return several
veterans of George W. Bush’s tenure to government – many of whom have extensive
experience in working cooperatively with India – it will take some time to
reestablish policy priorities. In both instances, New Delhi will have to
carefully manage expectations.

The U.S. election is not the world’s election, even though it can seem so.
But the transparency and participatory nature of the process instills a certain
amount of predictability and comfort in the United States’ global leadership.
That remains a critical aspect of comprehensive national power that Beijing – in
its current state – will always find wanting.