09TBILISI1058, GEORGIA: POLL SHOWS PROTESTS AND PROTEST LEADERS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001058
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: PGOVPHUMPRELGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: POLL SHOWS PROTESTS AND PROTEST LEADERS
UNPOPULAR
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) Summary/Comment: The Caucasus Research Resource
Center (CRRC), in partnership with the Eurasia Foundation,
polled over 1,800 Georgians in May 2009 to gauge public
opinion in regard to ongoing protests. The data indicated a
significant negative outlook towards both the protest leaders
and their aims. Among the non-parliamentary opposition, only
Irakli Alasania (Alliance) and to a lesser extent Shalva
Natelashvili (Labor), polled well. The overwhelming majority
of the country support dialogue and reject calls for
Saakashvili's resignation. Likewise, while generally
supportive of the right to protest, more radical actions like
blocking highways, railway stations, or streets with cells
are viewed very negatively. The data indicate that any
further radicalization of tactics will only serve to damage
already low approval ratings among the non-parliamentary
opposition. President Saakashvili and other GoG officials
have not benefited from their handling of the protests
meaning that the public does not view current events as a
zero-sum game. GoG ratings have dropped slightly, but remain
solid, although their numbers are much higher when viewed
countrywide since they are less popular in Tbilisi. The data
indicate that the drop is likely a result of current economic
and geo-political problems rather than as an acute result of
non-parliamentary criticism. The most striking figure is
that 70 percent of Georgians simply want the protesters to go
home, while only 5 percent of the respondents wanted the
government to take forcible action to send them home. The
results track with focus group data, informal public
feedback, and GoG polls. CRRC has shared results with
non-parliamentary leaders and GoG officials. End
Summary/Comment.
Little Public Support for Non-Parliamentary Opposition
Tactics:
¶2. (C) The polling from the CRRC shows that despite the
continued protests within Tbilisi and beyond, the
non-parliamentary opposition's message and tactics are not
resonating with the public. Of those polled, 85 percent said
that the government was justified in calling for dialogue and
86 percent said that the opposition was justified in calling
for dialogue (Embassy Comment: Although the question was
strangely worded, the data indicate that the public
overwhelmingly supports dialogue. End Comment.) The polling
shows that peaceful marches are also acceptable, with 82
percent saying the opposition's peaceful marches are
justified. The overall trend of the polls supports les
radical and peaceful options for resolution. More radical
actions drew dramatically less approval. Only 20 percent said
that the opposition picketing the Presidential Administration
was justified, while 17 percent said creating "corridors of
shame" was justified. Only 15 percent said that the
opposition putting up cells and blocking streets was
justified. The most radical actions, such as the planned
picketing of cross-country highways and attempting to break
into the Ministry of Internal Affairs building, were only
viewed as justified by 8 percent and 7 percent respectively.
Rather than rally the public, the numbers seem to indicate
that plans by some non-parliamentary leaders to engage in
more radical action would likely only serve to drive away
support. As with other focus groups and polling data, the
public generally does not approve of the protests but accepts
them. Dialogue is the preferred outcome and pursuing more
radical aims and tactics are deeply unpopular.
Qradical aims and tactics are deeply unpopular.
Resolution of the Protests - Just Go Home
¶3. (C) Interestingly, 46 percent of those polled expected
the protests to end peacefully with protesters returning home
without a negotiated settlement, while 70 percent named this
scenario as their desired outcome. Only 12 percent expected
the protests to end with a negotiated settlement, and 13
percent named this as their desired outcome. Only 9 percent
of those polled expected the government to assert itself and
eventually disperse the protesters, while just 5 percent
actually named government intervention as their preferred
outcome. Least popular among the options was the
non-parliamentary opposition's current strategy. Only 6
percent expected the protests to continue and force the
government into to major concessions, while only 3 percent
actually wanted that to happen. (Embassy Comment: The
pollsters did not define "major concessions" allowing
respondents to draw their own conclusions. Even assuming
major concessions means Saakashvili's resignation, only 3
percent actually support the non-parliamentary opposition's
single shared goal. End Comment.) The data clearly showed
that the public neither supports nor believes that the
non-parliamentary opposition will be able to force the
government into major concessions, overwhelmingly preferring
that the protests simply end.
TBILISI 00001058 002 OF 003
¶4. (C) Equally noteworthy is the attitud
e towards snap
parliamentary elections. Of those polled, 51 percent wanted
the elections to occur in 2012, as scheduled. Only 17 percent
said they wanted elections to occur now and 10 percent said
they want elections in the fall of 2009. Five percent said
they wanted elections sometime between the fall of 2009 and
January 2012. The data show that a majority of the public
does not support the non-parliamentary opposition's potential
fall-back position of immediate snap parliamentary elections.
Despite the fact that the majority of those polled wanted
the protests to end on their own, the polls showed that the
public places the majority of the burden of ending the
protests on the government (46 percent). The polls said 21
percent of the responsibility in ending the protests belongs
to the church, and that 25 percent belonged to the
protesters. (Embassy Comment: This was another strangely
worded question but highlights that although the public
clearly does not support the non-parliamentary opposition's
agenda; citizens still place a significant responsibility on
the government to handle the protests effectively and appear
to want the government to work towards a constructive and
peaceful resolution. End Comment.)
Who Is Handling the Protests Well?
¶5. (C) Not surprisingly, Patriarch Ilia II tops the list as
those performing well during the protests (75 percent rate
his performance very well, 12 percent well, 4 percent
neutral, 0 percent badly, 0 percent very badly). Following
in decreasing order are Ombudsman Sozar Subari (19 very well,
28 well, 25 neutral, 7 badly, 3 very badly); Georgian Army
(19,26,22,7,4); Georgian police (15,22,25,12,7); President
Saakashvili (13,20,30,17,10); Giorgi Targamadze (CDM)
(10,26,31,11,6); Irakli Alasania (Alliance) (9,24,38,11,3);
Gigi Ugalava (8,19,31,15,8); Levan Gachechiladze
(5,11,24,31,15); Giorgi Gachechiladze ("Utsnobi")
(5,9,21,29,21); David Usupashvili (Alliance - Republicans)
(4,13,34,17,9); Salome Zourabichvili (Georgia's Way)
(3,9,27,25,19) and Nino Burjanadze (Democratic Movement -
United Georgia) (2,7,24,37,16). The data indicate that the
public is generally satisfied with how the GoG has handled
the protests but not overwhelmingly so. On the other hand,
non-parliamentary leaders with the exception of Irakli
Alasania were viewed negatively as a result of the ongoing
protests.
Non-Parliamentary Leaders, Ratings Plummet - Alasania Strong
¶5. (C) There is a significant correlation between type of
participation in the protests and leaders, ratings. The
polls showed that those who have abstained from the protests
benefit, and conversely, with increased degrees of
involvement in the protests, ratings fall dramatically.
Labor Party Leader, Shalva Natelashvili who has largely
remained away from the protests, saw his rating increase
dramatically to 41 liking him (versus 24 in the latest
pre-protest poll) and a drop in negatives from 47 to 39
percent. Participants in the protests have seen their
negative numbers increase significantly. Comparing protest
versus pre-protest polls reveals an obvious negative trend.
In descending order, David Gamkrelidze (38 like, 41 dislike
(protest - May 2009) - 39 like, 31 dislike (pre-protest -
December 2008)); Davit Usupashvili (32 like, 44 dislike (May
2009) - 31 like, 30 dislike (December 2008)); and Levan
Gachechiladze (26 like, 55 dislike (May 2009) - 27 like, 41
dislike (December 2008)). More radical ctors have seen
their ratings fall even further. Salome Zourabichvili (16
Qtheir ratings fall even further. Salome Zourabichvili (16
like, 64 dislike (May 2009) - 22 like, 44 dislike (December
2008)), and Nino Burjanadze (13 like, 70 dislike (May 2009) -
30 like, 42 dislike (December 2008)) have seen their ratings
plummet indicating that the more radical the leader, the
worse the rating.
¶6. (C) Irakli Alasania's numbers are still strong (55
percent like, 25 dislike (May 2009) - 51 like, 15 dislike
(December 2008)). Nonetheless, Alasania's negatives rose 10
percentage points while his positives only 4 points which
indicates that on balance, Alasania has not benefited from
being involved in the protests but likewise has not damaged
his ratings. Alasania, who is widely viewed to be the most
moderate of the non-parliamentary opposition, is likely
benefiting from being perceived as pursuing a more moderate
course. The data indicate that if Alasania does indeed
pursue dialogue, he stands to gain stature; if he pursues
more radical aims, he is similarly likely to see his rating
drop.
GOG Numbers Holding Relatively Firm - Targamadze's Numbers
Strong
¶6. (C) Throughout the protests, the Georgian government's
TBILISI 00001058 003 OF 003
popularity numbers have been holding steady. Saakashvili (46
like, 35 dislike (May 2009) - 49 like, 24 dislike (December
2008)), Bakradze (43 like, 36 dislike (May 2009) - 46 like,
23 dislike (December 2008)), and Ugulava (41 like, 42 dislike
(May 2009) - 39 like, 30 dislike (December 2008) have seen
their negatives rise indicating that the protests have not
benefited the GoG either. However, when looking at the rise
in negatives with how each individual has been assessed as
handling the protests, the higher negatives are likely to do
with being office holders during an economic downturn rather
than as a direct result of the protests. The UNM is still
the party that those polled felt most positive about, with 16
percent feeling very positively, and 21 percent feeling
somewhat positively. National Forum (12 very positive, 14
positive), Labor (10 very positive, 17 positive), Alliance
for Georgia (9 very positive, 21 positive), and Christian
Democrats (7 very positive, 23 positive) round out the other
parties with significant public support. Christian
Democratic leader Giorgi Targamadze is still strong,
indicating that the protests have marginally affected his
numbers (55 like, 27 dislike (May 2009) - 52 like, 21 dislike
(December 2008)).
If Parliamentary Elections Were Held Tomorrow...:
¶6. (C) Those polled where asked who they would vote for if
parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, and the party
with the greatest percentage of votes by a significant margin
was UNM, at 30%. The Christian Democrats received 9%,
Alliance for Georgia 9%, the Labor Party 7%, and National
Forum 6%. Again, the numbers are roughly consistent with the
others that show significant support Saakashvili and the
government, as well as those parties perceived to be less
involved in the radical aspects of the protests.
TEFFT

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