Tuesday, July 28, 2015

The “skin of blackness” mentioned by Nephi (2 Ne 5:21) - translated at other times into English as “very dark” or “dark” - may have actually been understood by Mayans according to extensional meanings represented in their language - and not physical coloration.

...the significance of the logogram for the color black extends beyond the notion of color into a broader range of meanings that includes hollow objects … The association of the term ihk with the notion of emptiness is indicated by the presence of dark or cross hatched spots on representations of objects, which are not necessarily black, but almost certainly hollow.

This opens up some interesting possibilities. “Emptiness” could of course mean "emptiness of soul." We might expect they were excommunicated from the Church and assumed different habits and practices. 2 Ne 5:24 tells us that because of the curse "they did become an idle people, full of mischief and subtlety and did seek in the wilderness for beasts of prey." The reference to "beasts of prey" could mean the jaguar in a Mesoamerican context - a beast of prey which was worshipped.

In the context of skin, perhaps there was a lack of clothing? Or garments? As far as literal darkness goes, lack of clothing would certainly cause darker skin under the hot Mesoamerican sun. Interesting possibilities.

Tokovinine goes on to state that when Mayans described objects and beings as a certain color, they usually didn’t mean the object or being actually was the color: "Classic Maya narratives’ fascination with extensional meanings … cautions us against automatically linking every instance of basic color terms in writing and imagery with color properties of objects or beings. The actual evidence suggests that, more often than not, this was not the case."

All of this is consistent with the fact that Joseph Smith changed the word “white” to “pure” (2 Nephi 30:6) in the 1840 edition of the Book of Mormon, before race was an issue. Nephi may have written a word for the color “white,” intending to convey a meaning other than color, but which in English is usually understood as just a reference to the color. Of course, Nephi would have expected his people to understand in terms of their culture, not ours, and that would be true regardless which language Nephi was writing in. Every language, not just Mayan, has a word for black. Presumably it is the color, not the language, which is the underlying factor behind the extensional meanings.

This explanation is also consistent with the Book of Mormon telling us the mark on the wicked is something they do to their own selves (Alma 3:18-19).

And, of course, the Native skin color of people living in the Americas when Nephi arrived was probably a beautiful brown or dark brown, having nothing to do with the mark the wicked placed on themselves.

In response to this, some people may quote Spencer W. Kimball or other church leaders and point out how they evidently understood the word "blackness" in terms of more modern cultural assumptions. If they had ideas that did not bear out, that does not diminish their stature as Apostles. I think we can learn a lot about how revelation works by looking at Christ's mortal ministry. He didn't reveal everything to His Apostles, and they had some misconceptions, but He was still leading them.

As knowledge shines forth in the Last Days, the Lord lights my path of faith with His Spirit.

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

To understand the importance of religious liberty, think
about two facts. First, to God, all things are spiritual. Second, it is
important that the Lord’s Church have open lines of communication with people,
unfettered by government control.

Religious liberty is not only a right protected by the
United States Constitution, it is a reason why God's hand set in motion the
events which established the United States. It’s obvious, though, that the very
idea of religious liberty is being challenged with increasing frequency.

One example of such an attack is the argument that we should
tax churches who communicate about certain subjects. Many people fail to
realize what it means to be a constitutionally protected body. The constitution
recognizes that the government and churches operate in separate spheres. Taxing
a church would be like taxing a city or state government. It doesn't make
sense.

Some argue that any organization which voices a political
opinion is somehow crossing a line and must “pay to play.” This argument falls
flat for three reasons.

First, it conflates the tax-exempt status of religion with
that of non-profit groups. The latter is an arbitrary act of goodwill on the
part of congress and is subject to being just as arbitrarily rescinded (i.e.
the status is not necessitated by any constitutional freedom). In contrast, the
former is part of a constitutional mandate that exercise of religion be
"free" - "free" as in not purchased, taxed or otherwise
abridged. People do not need to pay to practice religion – it is free, in a
public sense.

Second, if a religion voicing doctrine related to state
affairs (as opposed to claiming authority over state affairs) violates
separation between Church and State (which it does not, but “if” it did), then that would be true regardless of whether
the church paid taxes or not. So the issue of what Churches can and cannot say
is unrelated to the issue of whether Churches can or cannot be taxed.

To claim that paying taxes somehow “fixes” a Constitutional
problem is to say the establishment clause has a “selling of indulgences”
exception.

The state can no more give to a church in exchange for taxes
the right to violate "separation" than it can sell to a private
citizen the right to be elected at the age of 20 to the office of President of
the United States. Either the act itself is prohibited by the constitution, or
it is not. Taxation is moot.

Third, the argument completely ignores the tax exempt status
of organizations which make political statements all the time, such as the
Democratic National Committee, the Republican National Committee, and, in the
case of our current President at the time of this writing, the Obama Administration’s
Organizing for Action (the successor organization of the president’s reelection
campaign).

Would it make any sense at all to look at the money in
campaign coffers and say that it must be taxed because the organization makes
political statements? No. There is no reason to tax anyone on the basis of
their speech, whether that speech is political or not.

It is time to set the record straight and to assert the
rights we have as religious people.

Religious Liberty Series Part One

Thanksgiving and the Constitution: Some Facts People May Not
Be Aware Of

Ryan Larsen

The U.S. government specifically set aside Thanksgiving as a
day for public acknowledgment and gratitude to God, with wholehearted
official government acknowledgment of and expression of gratitude to God. Days
of Thanksgiving to God had also been practiced in Pilgrim days and Colonial
days, but origins within the U.S.
government extend back to 1776, soon after our nation's independence had been
declared, when Washington
and his troops stopped and held a Thanksgiving to God near Valley
Forge.

The Founding Fathers celebrated Thanksgiving as an official
U.S. holiday under resolution of the first Congress. This same session of Congress
drafted the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and, significantly,
passed the Thanksgiving to God resolution after drafting the clause.
Therefore, according to standards of Jurisprudence relating to consistency of
actions of a legislative body within the same session, the establishment clause
cannot be interpreted as prohibiting Governmental acknowledgment of God.

Let us examine the background.

Elias Boudinot proposed the day of Thanksgiving to God. The
following is from the annals of Congress Sept. 25, 1789:

Mr. Boudinot said, he could not think of
letting the session pass over without offering an opportunity to all the
citizens of the United
States of joining, with one voice, in
returning to Almighty God their sincere thanks for the many blessings he had
poured down upon them.

Embracing the idea, Washington proclaimed, "It is the
duty of all nations to acknowledge the Providence of Almighty God" and
officially assigned Nov. 26 "to be devoted by the people of these states
to the service of that great and glorious being."

This was the first official proclamation of any U.S.
President.

From time to time, the U.S. government celebrated other days
of Thanksgiving. Abraham Lincoln made Thanksgiving an annual event, setting it
apart as "a day of thanksgiving and praise to our beneficent Father who
dwelleth in the heavens."

These days, people may take for granted or may not be aware
of the religious nature of Thanksgiving, but even if people were to outright
intentionally refuse to celebrate it or even if we abolish the holiday
altogether, my point would still stand. The same session of Congress that
drafted the first amendment set apart a day for all U.S. Citizens to give Thanks to
God. Therefore, the First Amendment’s framers did not believe it prohibited
public acknowledgment of God.

Religious Liberty Series Part Two

Thomas Jefferson and the Establishment Clause

Ryan Larsen

Some may see a contradiction between the actions of the
founders in creating Thanksgiving and Thomas Jefferson's famous claim that the
religion clauses of the first amendment create “a wall of separation between
church and state.”

However, a general mandate for “separation between church
and state” has no basis from a straight reading of the text of the
establishment clause, whose purview only extends to prohibiting Congress from
making a specific type of law.

In fact, it sounds like Jefferson was saying that it is the
prohibition on Congress which constitutes “a” wall, not necessarily a wide wall
or an absolute wall, just “a” wall of separation between church and state. In
other words, Jefferson was describing the
prohibition on Congress rather than claiming that that prohibition extends
beyond congress or demanding that anyone separate Church and State in any kind
of general way.

Moreover, Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists (in
which he coined the phrase “a wall of separation between church and state”) was
itself official correspondence on behalf of the government, which is
significant because he ends the letter with “kind prayers for the protection
& blessing of the common father and creator of man.” So, using Jefferson's standard, government correspondence, even to
private individuals and groups, can freely include assertions of God. If the
government wants to, it can use public stationary and postage to send every
American a Thanksgiving card expressing “kind prayers for the protection and
blessing of the common father and creator of man.”

Now, you might say, maybe Jefferson's letter wasn't official
correspondence on behalf of the government. But then in that case it would have
no place being used as the official standard for interpreting the establishment
clause.

Did Jefferson not understand his own idea of “separation
between Church and State” or is it more likely that government acknowledgment
of God does not violate the separation between Church and State?

We may find the definitive answer to that question in the
reason why the U.S. Supreme Court chose to defer to Thomas Jefferson as the
authority on the Establishment Clause. The Court deferred to Jefferson because
Jefferson wrote the law upon which Congress based the Establishment Clause, the
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom.

However, that very law acknowledges God and does so
explicitly. In other words, the law written by Thomas Jefferson makes the claim
that God exists. Jefferson’s statement is authoritative to the Court because he
is the author of a law that acknowledges God. If that law which says God exists
is not valid, then “separation between church and state” is not authoritative.
We cannot therefore say that “separation between church and state” prohibits
government from acknowledging God, as that would mean that “separation between
church and state” prohibits the very law whose validity is necessary in order
for “separation between church and state” to be authoritative.

The statute in question, which served as the basis for the
religion clauses of the First Amendment, begins:

Whereas Almighty God hath
created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal
punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits
of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author
of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to
propagate it by coercions on either, as it was in his Almighty power to do...

Yes, the very man who the U.S. Supreme Court cited as the
authority on the meaning of the Establishment Clause, put the explicit
acknowledgment of God into the law.

Thanks to Thomas Jefferson, the government not only
acknowledges God but sets forth certain doctrines: that God is Almighty, that
God created the mind free, that God has a Holy plan, is Lord both of body and
mind, etc. And all of these things are necessarily valid if “separation” is
authoritative.

As mentioned earlier, the Establishment Clause itself only
limits congress. The Clause does not however say that congress, let alone any
other branch or representative of government, cannot officially acknowledge God
or make laws acknowledging God. God is Himself not an “establishment of
religion.”

Religious Liberty Series Part Three

How “Separation of Church and State" Took on Legal
Significance

Ryan Larsen

Now, it's true that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Everson v. Board of Education mentions much more than just Thomas Jefferson's statute, in explaining at
length the historical context in which the First Amendment was developed. But Jefferson's statute is the primary justification for the
Court's opinion. In fact, the vast majority of the other sources cited for context
in the decision are not directly related to the First Amendment.

Everson discusses the historic plight
of Protestants, for instance, which is interesting but hardly constitutes
jurisprudence. Therefore, we ought not concern ourselves with how many pages
and footnotes are spent in narrative. We ought to concern ourselves with the
bottom line justification offered by the Court, which the narrative culminates
towards, which is Jefferson’s statement.

Contrary to the idea that Jefferson's letter is “only” one
piece of evidence the Court used, Everson
singles out Virginia and speaks of the “dramatic climax” led by Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison.

Everson then quotes Jefferson's
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. Immediately after the Court quotes from
Jefferson's Statute (including the part of the Statute that puts explicit
governmental acknowledgment of God into law by setting forth the doctrines:
that God is Almighty, that God created the mind free, that God has a Holy plan,
is Lord both of body and mind, etc.), the decision immediately and
authoritatively states that “the provisions of the First Amendment … had the
same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.” It could
not be more clear.

Therefore, the only way the First Amendment can be seen to
inhibit governmental acknowledgment of God is if Jefferson's statute inhibits
itself, a claim which the Court did not made not the slightest indication of
when quoting the part of Jefferson's Statute which makes claims about God.

To re-iterate, the Court explicitly said that Jefferson's
Statute which declares the existence of God is the authoritative interpretation
of the First Amendment clauses.

Perhaps, in light of the facts I have presented so far, some
people might try to minimize Jefferson by arguing that the phrase
"separation between church and state" is merely a convenient set of
words which the Court chose for reasons having nothing to do with Jefferson's
Statute. This however would be a curious argument to make, considering Everson used the phrase more than once
and concludes with, “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach.”

Given the court's emphatic use of Jefferson's phrase from
the letter, we should note that Jefferson ends that letter with “kind prayers
for the protection & blessing of the common father and creator of man.” So,
if we are to use Jefferson's standard, as the
Court did in Everson, government
correspondence can include reference to God.

Some may claim that James Madison influenced the Court's
view more than Jefferson, however this is simply a speculative claim,
considering that the Court quoted Jefferson's work at length and explicitly
cited it as providing “the same” protection as the Establishment Clause; in
contrast, the Court lightly quoted Madison's work, citing it not as a basis for
the First Amendment but as having received “strong support throughout
Virginia.”

Regardless of how Madison may or may not have interpreted
the amendment, what matters is the intent of Congress as a body. Clearly, the
Congressional session which drafted and passed the religion clauses saw no
conflict between the clauses and governmental acknowledgment of God via
Thanksgiving—just as the Court in Everson
saw no conflict between those clauses and official government acknowledgment of
God in the Virginia Statute (a Statute which Jefferson remained proud of till
his dying day).

Is the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom is
unconstitutional? Is Thanksgiving as enacted by the very session of Congress
which wrote the constitution, unconstitutional?

I don't know of anyone who claims the Court relied
exclusively on Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists, in its Everson ruling. They did rely on it
however, and any speculation on how much they relied on it is just that,
speculation. But we are discussing it because the “Separation between Church
and State” phrase is constantly repeated by those who want to inhibit
government association with things relating to God. They are the ones who
propped up the phrase as being an authoritative encapsulation of the religion
clauses. For my part, I am simply responding, and I can't very well respond by
claiming that the Court didn't really mean it. After all, the Court did in fact
cite it.

To this day, the Virginia Statute is still on the books and
is valid. Some might propose that its Constitutionality should be challenged.
However, the Court quoted the religious doctrines in the Statute, which the
Statute specifically says is the basis for the rest of the Statute. By
citing those doctrines in that same context, the Court affirms that they are
legitimate premises for the rest of the Statute and thus this sets precedent
for the validity of basing laws on religious beliefs.

In other words, a court can't say that the preamble has no
legal effect—because the Statute makes that legal effect clear by not only
mentioning God but also explaining that this belief is the basis for the
Statute. The Statute itself tells us it was written because of religious
beliefs.

To make this perfectly clear:

1 - Religious doctrines are the basis for Jefferson's
Statute. The Statute introduces those doctrines with "Whereas" which
means "in view of the fact that." As such, the preamble contains
enumerated justifications or reasons for the part of the Statute that follows
after. The doctrines listed are: that God is Almighty, that God created the
mind free, that God has a plan, that attempts to influence the mind by
punishment are a departure from that plan, and that God is Lord both of body
and mind.

2 - Jefferson's
Statute is the basis for the Establishment Clause and it also takes sides on
the existence of God.

3 - The Supreme
Court said the religion clauses of the Constitution offer the exact same
protection as that offered under this Statute which takes sides on the
existence of God.

Does all this mean the government can take sides on the
question of God? Emphatically, yes. The government under the Framers did take
sides on the existence of God, and clearly they did not intend the Constitution
to ever inhibit the government from doing so.

Some people might try to challenge the word “same,” as used
by the Court when it said the religion clauses provide “the same” protection as
Jefferson's Statute (i.e. “the provisions of the First Amendment, in the
drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles,
had the same objective, and were intended to provide the same protection
against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute”)
The only argument that could be used is to say that “the same” does not really
mean “the same.” The way these people would probably go about arguing this is
to cite the fact that the Court also said:

The “establishment of religion” clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation
between church and State.”

The important three words in the first line are: “means at
least.” They would have to argue that this is broader than the provision in Jefferson's Statute, and therefore is not “the same.” The
provision in Jefferson's Statute reads:

That no man shall be compelled
to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever,
nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burdened in his body or goods,
nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but
that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish
enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.

The fallacy of this argument is that it misses the fact that
the Court could have just as easily said that the Virginia Statute also
"means at least" all of those same things. The Statute did not
enumerate every conceivable application of its use, nor did the religion clauses.
That doesn't make them different. The uses which apply to one also apply to the
other.

It is not valid to argue that because the Court's
description uses more words and cites more specifics that it is broader than
the scope of the Virginia Statute. Using that reasoning, the Court's
"description" of the religion clauses would be broader than the scope
of the religion clauses, which use very few words and no specifics. In other
words, the description does not in any sense contradict the Virginia Statute
and is absolutely consistent with the Court's claim that the two things offer
the same intended protections.

Religious Liberty Series Part Five

Did the Framers Not Know What They Were Doing?

Ryan Larsen

Another line of attack someone could make is the claim that
the official recognition of God by the government headed by the Founders was
some sort of oversight and they didn't realize what they were doing.

Not only is this unfounded, but Jurisprudence, as well as
common sense, assumes that the actions of the same session of Congress are not
contradictory. So certainly we should assume that the Founders did not do
something immediately after prohibiting themselves from doing that thing.

Because the meaning of the amendment was exactly identical
to what Congress intended it to mean, it's not possible that Congress did not
understand its own amendment. So if someone says there was a misstep that can
only imply that Congress either forgot the meaning of the amendment or
willfully chose to violate it. Both of those are implausible, since Days of
Thanksgiving to God continued to be declared in future years. It was not a one
time thing that could have slipped everyone's mind.

Moreover, Congress held actual debate over the Day of
Thanksgiving. Not everyone agreed to a Day of Thanksgiving. The congressional
record states that at least one person objected on the grounds that the
government's job was not to tell people to pray. So there was deliberation over
the prudence of the action and yet the record makes no indication that anyone
thought the Day of Thanksgiving would be contrary to the drafted amendment
which they had just recently been discussing at length.

If for some reason someone did want to argue that Congress
actually misunderstood its own amendment, despite the inherent logical problems
of that assertion, they would have a difficult time. For one thing, they would
have to limit their interpretation of the clause to the literal meaning of the
few words in it. They could not extrapolate any further meaning from those
words, since that extrapolation would rely on the validity of what Congress
understood - which is the very thing they are rejecting.

Possibly, one could argue against the facts I've presented
by agreeing that the original meaning of the clause did not prohibit
governmental recognition of God or "taking sides" on the existence of
God, but that the Constitution as a "living document" has changed in
that regard and so now it does prohibit those things. However, if someone wants
to argue this, then what would they argue as basis for that change? If we were
applying the constitution to a situation the Founders could not have foreseen,
that would be one thing. But the founders knew what atheism was and knew what
theism was, and they took sides.

What people using this argument would be demanding us to do
is intentionally conflate core concepts. For instance, a legitimate use of the
“living document” concept would be to apply it to the "right to bear
arms," since nuclear arms didn't exist when it was written. Clearly we can
assume the true meaning does not include a right to bear nuclear arms. But
those who demand that we conflate concepts would turn around and say, “it
doesn't include bayonets either,” which clearly it does.

One would have to use a truly militant version of the
"living document" argument to make the case, and that case would
necessarily fall apart when one realizes that the courts derive their power
from the original meaning of the Constitution, by presupposing that the
original meaning is intact. If the Constitution is constantly shifting in
meaning, who is to say the Justices of the Supreme Court are still the arbiters
of meaning? Moreover, if the Court's interpretation can contradict the intended
meaning of the Congress, why can't We the People turn around and contradict the
intended meaning of the Court's interpretation? And, the Court may interpret
the Constitution, but who interprets the Court's interpretation? If original
intent can be thrown out, then why can't the President, the Executive, throw
out the original intent of the Court's ruling, and replace it with one of his
own?

The bottom line is that if the Court disregards the original
meaning of the Constitution because it's “so old,” that leaves us without
anyone in authority.

Thus, sound jurisprudence is to interpret according to the
original meaning, to whatever extent that meaning can be attained, and to apply
that meaning to unforeseen circumstances as best as possible.

Words can be interpreted different ways. There may be some
way to interpret the establishment clause in a manner which makes it look as
though it prohibits governmental recognition of God. But even if someone twists
the words to that effect, the Congress did not intend the words to convey that
and therefore it is not a valid interpretation.

Religious Liberty Series Part Six

The Role of Thomas Jefferson

Ryan Larsen

Others may take the approach of calling Jefferson a deist,
and minimizing his reference to God. But Thomas Jefferson never called himself
a deist. The title was assigned to him by people who have speculated about his
beliefs, with limited evidence. His Statute declares that God chose not to
propagate religion by coercion, but that in no way indicates that God abandoned
mankind. Indeed, the Statute declares that God authored religion.

Some might argue that the religious doctrines in the
preamble part of Jefferson's Statute are not significant because of the very
fact that they are in the preamble. But as we have already discussed, the preamble
was quoted in Everson, they are listed in the Statute as being the basis for
the provisions which follow, and in addition to those two things is the fact
that preambles are official government declarations in their own right,
independent of other provisions.

No matter how you look at it, by quoting the doctrines
declared by Jefferson in the preamble, the Court used those doctrines as
relevant information in helping reveal the intent of the Founders who drafted
the First Amendment.

The Court did not quote the entire statute. It left much of
it out. Therefore, every part the Court chose to quote has merit on its own and
was not included by mere happenstance as a result of being attached to the
Statute. Furthermore, the Court quoted the preamble separately from other
provisions. Clearly, the Court was validating the preamble as being exactly
what it claimed to be, and because of the "whereas," we know that
what it claims to be is the authoritative consideration behind the rest of the
Statute.

And in quoting the preamble, the Court was not merely
recounting history. The Court said it was much more than that, stating,
"This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played
such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the
same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute."

Some may even attack Jefferson's preamble, and say that the
Court just didn't realize the implications. However, to argue that Jefferson's official declaration of God constitutes the
government aiding religion, would imply that Jefferson's
Statute is self-contradictory. The only logical escape from this conundrum is
to realize that Jefferson did not see his
official declaration of God as “aiding religion,” but separated religious
beliefs from religion itself. It is not the same as “giving aid,” because it
only indirectly benefits religion. If a religion happens to share those beliefs
and benefit, that is a coincidence. Moreover, the government is not forcing
anyone to agree with the doctrines.

But, how can the government do anything at all that benefits
religion? Surely, Congress makes laws all the time which benefit religion. For
instance, national security benefits religion. But it also benefits anyone else
who agrees that safety is a good thing. Likewise, when the Statute sets
forth religious beliefs, it is for the benefit of The People, not for the
benefit of any religion. The fact that the beliefs set forth are of a
religious nature does not change that.

God is not an establishment of religion any more than food
is an eating establishment or restaurant. To say the government cannot promote
restaurants is not to say the government cannot favor eating over starvation.
The same is true spiritually as well as temporally.

Religious Liberty Series Part Seven

Intent of the Framers

Ryan Larsen

Others may claim that ascertaining the intent of the First
Amendment is impossible, so we should just interpret it however we want. But
the amendment itself has no intent. Those who wrote it had intent, and their
actions which recognize God prove they did not intend the words in the
amendment to prohibit governmental recognition of God.

Yes, we are speaking of the intent of many people who took
part in bringing the First Amendment to us. The actions of the legislative body
demonstrated the intent of that body, while states who ratified the amendment
certainly did not believe that the amendment contradicted the actions of the
very session which hammered out the wording—wording which does not prohibit
governmental recognition of God. To reiterate: Neither the wording of the
amendment nor the actions of the federal government indicated a prohibition on
governmental recognition of God, and thus the states who ratified it did so
with the intent of something other than prohibiting governmental recognition of
God.

Still others will cite quotes out of context from Founders,
using those quotes to argue that for practical purposes we should abandon the
attempt at discerning the intent of the Fathers as a whole and simply go along
with their interpretation of the quotes that were dug up. This is a desperate
ploy. As I pointed out previously, Congress deliberated over holding official
Thanksgiving to God. Their verdict overwhelmingly favored the legitimacy of
governmental recognition of God. This fact is indeed readily accessible to us
today, and there is no “practical” need to abandon such plain facts.

Even more desperate is the argument that the Founders
intended future generations to discover the actual meaning of the clause.
Again, as I pointed out previously, we are not applying the constitution to an
unforeseen situation. The founders knew what atheism was and knew what theism
was, and they took sides, which means we have a right to take sides today as
well. The matter is that simple.

I realize I am being redundant on a number of levels, but
the answers to many of these differently nuanced questions with similar
implications are often the same.

All of the attacks on the facts I've presented will
inevitably say the intent of the Founders is “too ambiguous.” This is nothing
but an attempt to dodge the clear-cut case. By analogy, the concept of different
breeds of dog is quite ambiguous, but if the owners of a property have a
certain rule stating that wolves are not allowed on their property, while at
the same time those owners go out of their way to welcome German Shepherds to
the property, it is clear that the owners do not classify German Shepherds as
wolves and the rule can never be cited as a ban on German Shepherds. Similarly,
it is clear that those who brought us the first amendment did not classify God
as Himself being a “religion” and it similarly can never be cited as
prohibiting God in government.

To say that Congress acted on the religion issue without
realizing the implications of what they were doing is like saying the property
owners in my this analogy simply did not realize that the word
"wolves" implicated German Shepherds. The point is, if they did not
intend it to implicate a thing, then it does not implicate that thing. The only
rightful meaning of the clause is what they intended it to mean.

The Congress may have been composed of many individuals with
different mental states, but if Congress bans wolves, while at the same time
passing a resolution to allow German Shepherds to roam freely through the halls
and the streets, we can rest assured that they are not banning German Shepherds.
Any attempt to later claim that they banned German Shepherds is simply
deceptive.

Some will even try to claim that the Founders didn't really
mean it when they issued religious proclamations. For instance, James Madison
issued religious proclamations as president, but one person I know of has
claimed that what Madison actually believed is that in doing so he was
violating the Constitution and that he did so anyway out of a sense of
political duty because it's what the people wanted. To support this claim,
there are several Madison
quotes which can be taken out of context. In reference to the present
discussion on the first amendment, the claim is very misleading. Madison did not say
Thanksgiving or other governmental recognition of God contradicted the
establishment clause. What he said is that the role of the government is not to
advise people on their affairs - and this idea was not focused on religious
affairs but simply includes religious affairs. Madison was talking about the government, and
he stated this without even mentioning the constitution let alone the first
amendment, which makes all the more curious that anyone would characterize his
statement as a deviation from the establishment clause.

In the context of minimizing governmental advisement of the
people on their affairs, Madison worded his Thanksgiving proclamation to
"deaden as much as possible any claim of political right to enjoin
religious observances by resting these expressly on the voluntary compliance of
individuals, and even by limiting the recommendation to such as wished
simultaneous as well as voluntary performance of a religious act on the
occasion." Nowhere here does Madison
mention the first amendment. Madison worded his
proclamation to make clear that the government was not ordering people to
participate, which is something we hopefully all agree with.

What Madison did not do is word the proclamation in a
fashion which in any way minimizes the official governmental recognition of
God, as the argument falsely implies.

Religious Liberty Series Part Eight

Should the Government Recognize God?

Ryan Larsen

Some people will avoid the constitutional issues altogether
and simply claim that it is not prudent to allow the government to proclaim the
existence of God. But at issue here is not the prudence of taking sides but the
implications. For example. In Utah where I live, the state erected crosses as
roadside memorials for fallen state troopers (with the approval of their
families) and an atheist group sued saying that even if the families wanted the
religious displays it violates 'separation between church and state.' This type
of encroachment is disgusting to me. The atheists were not asking for the right
to opt out in the case of their own fallen loved one, which they already had,
or even asking that the reference to God be non-specific. In other words, they
were not asking for equal protection. They were asking that God not be
recognized at all on government property, and they were claiming that the
constitution demands this.

Without the governmental right to acknowledge God – whether
it chooses to exercise that right or not - problems can arise like the incident
I described. So, yes, it is prudent for the government to proclaim the
existence of God.

Others will argue all the points, losing on each point but
shifting from point to point without ever conceding any of them, then they will
claim that we have come full circle and are at an impasse. This could not be
further from the truth. The burden will always be on them to explain how the
establishment clause can possibly be interpreted to clearly mean that the
government cannot acknowledge God, in light of the various ways in which those
whose understanding of the clause dictated its meaning used government to
acknowledge God.

Another argument that could be attempted is to say that
proclaiming God is synonymous with proclaiming Christianity. This is not the
case. James Madison explained that that in the debate over the Virginia Statute
some people wanted “to insert the words 'Jesus Christ' after the words 'our
lord' in the preamble, the object of which, would have been to imply a
restriction of the liberty defined in the Bill to those professing his religion
only." Madison
further observed:

The opponents of the amendment having
turned the feeling, as well as the judgment of the House against it, by
successfully contending that the better proof of reverence for that holy name
would be not to profane it by making it a topic of legislative discussion, and
particularly by making his religion the means of abridging the natural and
equal rights of all men, in defiance of his own declaration that his Kingdom
was not of this world. This view of the subject was much enforced by the
circumstance that it was espoused by some members who were particularly
distinguished by their reputed piety and Christian zeal.

The fact that the
legislature deliberated over the religious phraseology of the preamble, doing
so in the explicit context of how the preamble affects the rest of the Statute,
coupled with the fact that the legislature freely made in the Statute explicit
acknowledgment of God, only demonstrates that the Virginia Statute was not
intended to prohibit governmental acknowledgment of God, and thus neither does
the First Amendment, which holds “the same” meaning as Jefferson's Statute.

Moreover, this only reaffirms that Madison did not believe
that governmental recognition of God contradicts the establishment clause, and
affirms the arguments I have made to that effect. With respect to Chaplains
being appointed to Congress, for instance, Madison did not say that his
objection to their appointment was over any concern that Chaplains in the
government would constitute recognizing God. Rather, Madison objected on grounds that it would be
akin to establishing a national religion. His reasoning makes sense, since
Chaplains are ministers of religion.

In his Detached Memoranda, Madison enumerated his specific
objections to Thanksgivings – none of which is that they comprise governmental
recognition of God. In fact, in that very document he praised the Virginia
Statue, which in fact is a governmental recognition of God, saying:

This act is a true standard of
Religious liberty: its principle the great barrier agst usurpations on the
rights of conscience.

Again, Madison was explicitly saying that a law which
proclaims the existence of God is “a true standard of Religious liberty.”

And, again, Madison’s objection is to the idea of an
“advisory government.” This is with respect to all advisory matters, which
being general includes religion. In the context of his objection to advisory
government, Madison
states: “The members of a Govt as such can in no sense, be regarded as
possessing an advisory trust from their Constituents in their religious capacities.”
Since Madison
is speaking in terms of the idea of an advisory role of government, Madison is not speaking
in terms of the government’s right to acknowledge God (which, incidentally, is
not a form of advisement but simply a right which the founders freely
exercised). Madison’s
concern then, up to this point, is that Thanksgiving falls under the government
advising the people. No reference to the Constitution, let alone the first
amendment, only to the idea that “advisory government” is a contradiction in
terms.

Indeed, Madison speaks in terms of what the government
“ought not” do, rather than what the government has authority to do. Madison goes on to state
that members of government cannot, in their governmental capacity, “form an
ecclesiastical Assembly, Convocation, Council, or Synod, and as such issue
decrees or injunctions addressed to the faith or the Consciences of the
people.” Here, Madison
does not state that members of government cannot acknowledge God in the
official governmental capacity, only that they do not have authority to create,
and dictate on behalf of, an ecclesiastical body. This leads into Madison’s
third objection: that Thanksgivings “seem to imply and certainly nourish the
erroneous idea of a national religion.” Madison’s phraseology that
Thanksgivings “seem to” as opposed to “certainly,” and that they “imply” rather
than “create” a national religion, is Madison describing his objection in terms
of his own level of comfort with the idea. This is a far cry from Madison claiming a
constitutional prohibition on the practice of Thanksgivings.

The bottom line is that the concept of God, and ideas
concerning God, does/do not rely on organizations of religion, just as food
does not rely on restaurants or other organizations. As stated previously,
Governmental acknowledgment of "God" only aids those various sects
that believe in God in the same sense that the government acknowledging the
existence of food aids restaurants. But no one would claim that acknowledging
food makes the government part of the food industry.

I will
end on an interesting side note. The Virginia legislature was swayed against
the use of the name "Jesus Christ" in the statute, but only on the
grounds that the use of Jesus’s name in law is too irreverent towards Him.

As knowledge shines forth in the Last Days, the Lord lights my path of faith with His Spirit.