This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 001454
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/NB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2014
TAGS: PRELPGOVUKLH
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: RUSSIANS REPORTEDLY BLAME U.S. FOR
UNREST; ADAMKUS EXPECTS RETURN MISSION TO KIEV
REF: VILNIUS 1450
Classified By: Ambassador Steve Mull. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
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Â¶1. (C) Adamkus expects to return to Ukraine with Kwasniewski
and Solana before December 3 to continue mediation efforts,
according to a senior adviser. Kwasniewski predicted
privately to Adamkus November 30 that Ukraine would likely
turn into "another Georgia" within a few days. A November 26
conversation with Kuchma convinced the Lithuanians he would
throw his support to whomever offers him a better "deal" in
retirement. The Lithuanians strongly condemn Russian efforts
to exacerbate separatist tensions in Ukraine and reported
that Russian parliamentary speaker Boris Gryzlov pointedly
told Ukrainian leaders and European mediators in their
November 26 meeting that the U.S. is orchestrating street
protests in Kiev. The Lithuanians strongly welcome high
profile U.S. activism on Ukraine as an important impetus for
a democratic outcome. But they worry about the EU ) Solana
was poorly prepared, said Adamkus's adviser, and report
worrying indications of an accommodation between Putin and
key Europeans to safeguard Russian equities in Ukraine.
Domestic political support for Lithuania's involvement in
mediation efforts remains high, including now from the
previously skeptical Prime Minister Brazauskas. End Summary
Nov 26 Talks
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Â¶2. (C) Ambassador called on Adamkus's chief foreign policy
adviser Edminas Bagdonas (strictly protect) November 30 for a
debrief of the Adamkus mission to Kiev with Kwasniewski and
EU foreign policy chief Solana on November 26. Bagdonas said
the principle achievements of the session were the agreements
to foreswear violence and to form a small decisionmaking body
comprised of Kuchma, Lytvyn, Yanukovych, Yushchenko, and some
supporting staff to chart a political solution to the crisis.
Bagdonas reported that Adamkus and he had a private meeting
with Kuchma before a plenary session with the other
international mediators. It was clear to Adamkus at that
meeting, said Bagdonas, that Kuchma was already having doubts
about the wisdom of continued support for Yanukovych, leading
the Lithuanians to predict that Kuchma would ultimately
support the candidate who offered him a better "deal" in
retirement (presumably immunity from prosecution and
protection of privileges, said Bagdonas).
Â¶3. (C) Russian Duma Speaker Gryzlov and Russian Ambassador
Chernomyrdin had attempted to exert heavy pressure against
compromise at the talks, said Bagdonas. Gryzlov said at the
outset that Russia only recognizes one "legal" President )
Yanukovych ) and that the U.S. was responsible for secret
efforts to stir up street protests in Kiev. He called on the
group to band together to limit American influence on the
process. Bagdonas said Adamkus and Kwasniewski had
particularly harsh views of Russian and Yanukovych efforts to
play the separatist card. They agreed it was a serious
strategic blunder on their part that would only strengthen
Yushchenko's prospects, as indicated in the reported
resignation of the chief of the Central Election Committee in
protest.
Â¶4. (C) Bagdonas frankly described Kwasniewski as the true
motor of the mediation process. Showing off his fluent
command in Russian, Bagdonas said that the Polish leader's
pragmatic, energetic and problem-solving approach drove
everyone to abandon rhetoric and focus on cooperation during
the November 26 talks.
Return to Kiev
--------------
Â¶5. (C) Bagdonas said Adamkus would join Kwasniewski and
Solana on a return trip to Kiev before December 3. During
the Ambassador's meeting with Bagdonas, Kwasniewski called
Adamkus to discuss options, and the two planned to hold a
conference call with Kuchma on the late afternoon of November
30 to coordinate a return trip. During the call, Kwasniewski
told Adamkus he was concerned that the rising temperature of
street protests would likely lead to "another Georgia" within
a few days. Adamkus and Kwasniewski agreed to hold off
announcing a return trip to Kiev until after conferring with
Kuchma.
Praise for U.S.; Doubts about EU
--------------------------------
Â¶6. (C) The high U.S. profile in rejecting results of the
November 21 elections and repeated calls for a peaceful legal
and political settlement had provided a huge impetus for the
mediation process, Bagdonas said. U.S. statements,
particularly from Secretary Powell, had shaken Kuchma's
support of Yanukovych and gave Putin second thoughts about
pressing too hard on the issue.
Â¶7. (C) Bagdonas shared deep concerns about Solana, whom he
described as clearly unprepared to engage substantively in
the mediation process, and for the EU in general. He said
Kuchma had complained bitterly to Adamkus that Solana had
never shown serious interest in Ukraine before ) "Why should
I bother talking to him now?" Bagdonas quoted Kuchma. More
worrying, said Bagdonas, are indications of Putin's success
in winning quiet accommodation with Chirac, Schroeder,
Berlusconi and possibly Blair, in protecting Russian equities
in Ukraine in efforts to resolve the crisis. Lithuania
encourages a continued high U.S. profile on the issue,
Bagdonas said, as a means of keeping pressure on for a
democratic outcome.
Strong Support at Home
----------------------
Â¶8. (U) Meanwhile, popular political support for Lithuania's
mediation mission remains strong (reftel). Prime Minister
Brazauskas, who had earlier scolded eager parliamentarians to
avoid meddling in Ukrainian affairs, warmly praised the
Adamkus initiative on November 30 as strongly in support of
Lithuania's interests. He blamed his earlier grouchiness on
annoyance with conservative parliamentarians who had argued
in favor of using the Ukraine crisis to mount greater
pressure on Russia.
MULL