The Lessons Obama Should Learn from Kennedy Before Talking to Iran

by Michael Oren

Mr. Oren is senior fellow at the Shalem Center and the author of Power,
Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present,
(W.W. Norton, 2007).

Barack Obama has often been compared to John F. Kennedy in his hopeful
message, his charisma, and his youth. In terms of Middle East policy,
however, there is an even more substantive similarity between the
Illinois senator and the thirty-fifth president. Obama has promised to
pursue a dialogue with America's adversaries in the region, above all
Iran. "[O]ur first line of offense must be a sustained, aggressive,
coordinated diplomatic effort to make clear to Iran the costs of its
current path," he declared. "I would engage Iran in direct, bilateral
discussions - much as we negotiated with the Soviet Union throughout the
Cold War."

Kennedy, too, vowed to renew communication with Middle
Eastern leaders who had resisted American policies. Kennedy's
initiatives, mounted nearly a half-century ago, provide a precedent for
understanding the dynamics of such discussions and to assess Obama's
chances for formulating a new paradigm in America-Middle East relations.

Kennedy's inauguration in January 1961 coincided with a nadir in
America's Middle East standing. Under the Republican administration of
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United States had orchestrated the overthrow
of the popular Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and replaced
him with an oppressive Shah. Bitter rifts had opened between Washington
and the radical regimes in Baghdad and Damascus, while moderate Arabs
resented America's continuing support of Israel. Most rancorous,
though, was the relationship between the United States and Egypt's
pan-Arab champion, Gamal Abdul Nasser. In spite of Eisenhower's success
in saving him from almost certain overthrow in the 1956 Suez Crisis,
Nasser emerged as a powerful anti-American force in the Middle East,
threatening pro-Western governments and strengthening ties with the
Soviet Union. In response, Eisenhower issued a doctrine pledging to
defend any Middle Eastern country from "International Communism"--a
euphemism for Egypt. Accordingly, when Nasserist forces threatened the
governments of Lebanon and Jordan in the summer of 1958, Eisenhower
dispatched troops to Beirut and military supplies to Amman. "The USA is
[trying] to impose her influence over the Middle East," proclaimed
Nasser's spokesman, Anwar Sadat, indicating the gulf now yawning between
them.

Kennedy resolved to bridge that gap. Prior to assuming the
presidency, he asserted his intention to depart from the previous
administration's policies toward the developing world, the Middle East
included. "The single most important test of the American foreign
policy today is how we meet the challenge of imperialism," Kennedy
averred. "On this test more than any other, this nation shall be
critically judged by the uncommitted millions in Asia and Africa."
Rising to this challenge, Kennedy entered the White House with a public
endorsement of Algeria's quest for independence, and, one month later,
began a warm correspondence with Nasser. Reminding him that the United
States once resembled the Middle East, a collection of
recently-liberated colonies yearning for unity, Kennedy affirmed
America's affection for Egypt and the Arab World and its commitment to
their independence. Nasser, in reply, expressed "immense satisfaction
and appreciation" for Kennedy's gesture and "love and admiration for the
American people." To fortify these bonds, Kennedy approved massive
wheat shipments to Egypt. By 1963, some 60% of all Egyptians received
their daily bread from the United States.

The Kennedy-Nasser correspondence nevertheless ended in
acrimony. The reason was Yemen. Nasser sent tens of thousands of
troops to aid the revolutionaries who overthrew the pro-Western imam in
the 1962 coup, triggering a proxy war with Saudi Arabia. Eager to
preserve both his friendship with a revered Arab nationalist and the
US-Saudi alliance, Kennedy mediated a cease-fire. Nasser accepted the
terms and then violated them with poison gas attacks on loyalist bases.
One of Kennedy's last acts in office was to fortify Saudi defenses with
American warplanes.

Kennedy's experiences may provide some useful precedents for Barack
Obama as he seeks to open new channels to Iran, which has replaced Egypt
as the predominant Middle Eastern Muslim power. In contrast to Nasser
who espoused a secular nationalist ideology which afforded him a degree
of latitude in diplomacy and domestic politics, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders are bound to a jihadist theology
that severely constricts their ability to compromise. Unlike Egypt,
which had been humbled by the Israelis in 1948 and again in 1956, Iran
has overcome all of its opponents, repulsing the Iraqis in the 1980s and
later extending its influence through Syria, Lebanon, and the
Palestinian territories.

Kennedy's failure to establish a rapport with
Nasser's Egypt based on mutual respect and flexibility augurs poorly for
Obama's prospects to create an amicable relationship Ahmadinejad's Iran.
In addition to dialoguing with America's nemeses in the Middle
East, Obama also resembles Kennedy in his determination to secure an
Arab-Israeli accord. "We must strive to secure a lasting settlement of
the conflict with two states living side by side in peace and security,"
Obama has asserted, "a task that the Bush administration neglected for years."
In assuming this responsibility, though, Obama would do well to recall
Kennedy's experience. Efforts to broker a treaty between Israel and its
Arab neighbors stalled under the Eisenhower administration and, to
regain momentum, Kennedy embarked on a secret initiative to resettle
thousands of Palestinian refugees in the Jordan Valley. The plan, which
was to have been the first step toward a comprehensive agreement, called
on the Israelis to cede control over part of their territory and the
Arabs to implicitly recognize Israel. Neither side consented, however,
and Kennedy's initiative proved stillborn.

Though much progress has been made over the past fifty years,
the core issues of Israeli reluctance to sacrifice land and Arab refusal
to recognize Israel's legitimacy continue to plague peacemakers.
Surmounting these obstacles requires not only the kind of activist
diplomacy prescribed by Obama, but, above all, committed Israeli and
Arab leaders capable of breaking from previous positions and forging new
models of co-existence.

In his optimism, charm, and vitality, Barack Obama may indeed
evoke John F. Kennedy. Yet, in dealing with the Middle East, Obama
should heed Kennedy's lessons. Dialogue is indeed preferable to
conflict, but there are limits to which communication can moderate the
policies of a regime lacking diplomatic leeway and bent on regional
domination. America must strive to facilitate Arab-Israeli peace, but
peace can only be made by Arabs and Israelis. Kennedy approached the
Middle East with a message of hope only to be disappointed. Obama offers
the region a similar vision but, if tempered with realism, he may yet
succeed where Kennedy failed.

More Comments:

Arnold Shcherban -
7/13/2008

This country, i.e. the US, being an agressor itself has/had no moral
or legal right to be a sole conductor
of a peaceful resolution between Israel and Arabs, or between any other countries in the world, including resolutions of conflicts between itself and another country. Such matters have to be relegated to the UN bodies and commissions, entirely.
Only by discarding Pax Americana strategies the US will eliminate the overwhelming number of its small and big problems.

John L. Godwin -
6/25/2008

This is a good article. I enjoyed hearing Mr. Oren's views--so clearly steeped in the history of this region.
But don't we have a clear example of success in the Mideast negotiation process in the Jimmy Carter era accords? Negotiated through painstaking efforts on the part of a U.S. president clearly devoted to peace?
The Kennedy example is also so compelling--especially because it offered tangible benefits to Palestianian people historically victimized by this country's adoption of Israel as a Mideast client state.
My primary question: what would happen if we told the Israelis that they must come to terms with the Palestinians or face a reduction in U.S. military and economic support? And the same to our Arab allies?