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Fri, 18 May 2018 01:28:11 +0000en-UShourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.6Africa’s Desperate Youth Are Getting High on Opioids and Anything They Can Get Their Hands Onhttp://amandlanews.com/africas-desperate-youth-are-getting-high-on-opioids-and-anything-they-can-get-their-hands-on/
http://amandlanews.com/africas-desperate-youth-are-getting-high-on-opioids-and-anything-they-can-get-their-hands-on/#respondFri, 18 May 2018 01:18:04 +0000http://amandlanews.com/?p=5638Sitting in a dingy café in the crime. The actual details of the death of a young man called “Kenneth aka Dagba Junior” from the Lagos suburb of Ketu remain murky, but local news reports are clear on the culprit: gutter water.

His friends say Kenneth had gone out for the night at a local hotel and decided to indulge in the potent mix of codeine, tramadol, rohypnol, cannabis and water or juice.

While the mixture enhances the enjoyable high of each drug ingredient, their side effects are also increased leading to a very risky outcome.

Reports say after taking his gutter water mix he had a seizure, and was rushed to a local hospital, where he was declared dead a few hours later.

Gutter water isn’t the only dangerous cocktail of drugs which a generation of young Africans use to get their high or fix for relatively cheap.

Everything from lizard dung and cobwebs to petrol fumes and rat poison are on the list of DIY drugs for a generation of poor, disenfranchised young urban Africans who feel there are few options for a better life.

With expensive illicit drugs like cocaine and heroin out of reach for many unemployed young people, they’re turning to a range of cheap options— and concoctions—to get high.

The spreading addiction among Africa youth to cheap synthetic opioids brought in from China and India has had much press recently.

Tramadol, a pain relief drug, is flooding African cities including Khartoum, Libreville, Cairo and Accra. Last week, Nigeria banned codeine, typically found in cough syrups, following a BBC documentary which showed that a thriving black market trade involving insiders at some of the country’s biggest pharmaceutical companies.

Opioids are generally cheap and widely available due to unregulated production: Tramadol pills cost less than a dollar and codeine syrups sell for $3 in Nigeria. As a result, young adults are increasingly reaching extreme measures in search of a cheap high.

Combining opioids with alcohol is a popular choice. The mixture of two central nervous system depressants results in a wider effect on the brain: codeine binds to opioid receptors while alcohol affects the brain’s gamma-aminobutyric acid receptors.

Both drugs interact with neurotransmitters tied to mood, particularly dopamine and serotonin, and result in the high.

More than availability and the creativity of youthful addicts, much of the drug abuse culture is fueled by the inability of most African economies to grow quickly and get big enough to cater to a bulging youth population.

High unemployment rates mean that millions of young people in large countries like Nigeria and South Africa to much smaller ones have few options and are susceptible to turning to drugs as an escape.

It’s a problem that will likely get worse with an extra 1.3 billion people set to added to the continent’s population by 2050.

Beyond opiods

Beyond opioids and alcohol, young adults are turning to several crude options for a high. Smoking lizard parts and dung, known to possess psychoactive qualities is rampant in northern Nigeria. Sniffing glue, petrol, sewage and urine as inhalants has also become common.

Hydrocarbons in petrol suppress the central nervous system to deliver effects similar to getting drunk while gas from the fermented sewage has attributes of a hallucinogenic and delivers a “euphoric high similar to ingesting cocaine.”

In South Africa, a successful public health response to HIV/AIDS has led to a drug craze fueled by state-administered anti-retroviral treatment.

“Nyaope” is a cocktail of anti-retroviral drugs, low-grade heroin, marijuana and sometimes rat poison. Also known as whoonga or sugars, the cheap drug is rife in some of South Africa’s most impoverished neighborhoods.

“Tik,” as crystal methamphetamine is known in South Africa, has become popular delivering a high that can last for up to eight hours. Its effects, though, can last a lifetime as the stimulant is associated with brain and heart damage.

In neighboring Namibia and Botswana, drug abuse is also growing rapidly especially among young and unemployed. In Kenya, as as far back as 2009, a study showed that thousands of homeless street children were already addicted to sniffing glue.

The drug combinations may differ from country to country, but the symptoms are the same: a lack of opportunities for the so-called youth bulge. African governments are struggling to find a cure to both the the cause and the epidemic.

Few have adequately staffed and equipped public rehabilitation centers or a coordinated public health response, never mind how to create jobs for Africa’s youth.

Quartz

]]>http://amandlanews.com/africas-desperate-youth-are-getting-high-on-opioids-and-anything-they-can-get-their-hands-on/feed/0Congo-Brazzaville’s Hidden War Rages Onhttp://amandlanews.com/congo-brazzavilles-hidden-war-rages-on/
http://amandlanews.com/congo-brazzavilles-hidden-war-rages-on/#respondSat, 17 Feb 2018 01:38:35 +0000http://amandlanews.com/?p=5540The shells of burnt-out vehicles rust in the rain and crumbling houses poke out through the overgrown brush. The village of Soumouna in Congo-Brazzaville’s southern Pool region lies empty and guarded by soldiers, but there’s undeniable evidence of what happened here 20 months ago.

Isma Nkodia, 25, said she was passing through the village at four in the afternoon when government helicopters laid it to waste.

At first she thought the attack would be over quickly: just as soon as the pilots had found and destroyed the residence of the rebel leader they were hunting.

But an hour later Nkodia still lay crouched in the forest fearing death as the bombs kept falling and the village she had known since childhood turned into dust and rubble.

“They wanted to destroy everything,” she said.

It’s a scene of devastation that can be found in village after village across the Pool region, where a hidden conflict between the government and a previously dormant militia called the Ninjas has left tens of thousands displaced and entire districts deserted.

A neglected crisis

IRIN was granted rare access to the region, and was able to document the toll of the 20-month conflict. The violence here has played out with little international attention, unlike the humanitarian “mega-crisis” in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo.

The conflict dates back to March 2016 presidential elections won by Denis Sassou Nguesso, who has ruled Congo-Brazzaville for all but five years since 1979.

His victory, which was marred by allegations of fraud, followed a heavily contested constitutional referendum a year earlier that removed term and age constraints that would have prevented the now 74-year-old from standing.

On the morning of the 2016 election results, with tensions high, a series of attacks were carried out in the capital, Brazzaville. Government, police, and military buildings were set alight in opposition strongholds and

17 people were killed, including three police officers. The government blamed the attacks on a former militia group called the Ninjas, which had fought against Sassou Nguesso during civil wars in the 1990s and 2000s, but had largely demobilised.

The group’s leader, Frédéric Bintsamou, better known as Pastor Ntumi, denied responsibility. But the following day the government began major military operations against Ntumi and remnants of the group, whose fighters had been based in the forests of Pool, to the west of Brazzaville.

Sealed off from the press and human rights organisations, the operation in Pool has received little media coverage. But in advance of a ceasefire agreement between Ntumi and the government – signed in December – IRIN spent three weeks in the country.

Scorched-earth tactics

The most visible consequence of the crisis in Pool is the complete absence of people, in a region that was regarded as Congo’s breadbasket.

On the 60-kilometre highway from Brazzaville to Kinkala, the regional capital, IRIN passed just 10 civilian vehicles. Village after village lay empty, most cordoned off by army checkpoints.

While the authorities claim to have conducted a “targeted” offensive against the Ninjas, IRIN found clear evidence of scorched-earth tactics.

In Soumouna, the first village to be bombed, back in April 2016, witnesses said government helicopters indiscriminately targeted the civilian population.

Jidele Lounguissa, 25, said helicopters rocketed Ntumi’s large compound, before “bombing the entire village.” She said she knew of five civilians killed during the attack, which she escaped from by hiding in the forest with her son, who was born the day before.

“I was afraid he was going to be killed,” she said. Isma Nkodia said her 50-year-old friend, Adele, was hit by a bomb near Ntumi’s house, where she had gone to purchase traditional medicine. “Many people died inside their homes,” Nkodia said. “When it was over, I saw houses and cars badly burnt, schools completely destroyed and trees that had collapsed.”

While former Ninja combatants have lived in Soumouna for many years, Nkodia and Lounguissa both said none were present during the raid. “There were no Ninjas,” said Nkodia. “Just civilians.”

“People eat what they can find in the forest”

Several residents told IRIN that nearby villages that were spared the brunt of the air assault were later pillaged by ground troops.

Augustin Loufoua, 51, fled from a village called Vula in September 2016 when he heard helicopters firing into the forest several kilometres down the road. When he returned to the village a few months later, he said, “houses had collapsed, bricks had been smashed, doors kicked in, and everything in our households had been taken.”

“I don’t understand why the soldiers did this,” he said from a camp for displaced people located outside a church in Kinkala. “Before we had Ninjas, but they left the village a long time ago.”

In Pool’s northern districts, along the railway line connecting Brazzaville to the port of Pointe-Noire, towns and villages have been sealed off by military free-fire zones. Many residents have not been allowed to leave the area – where Ninjas are suspected of hiding – since the crisis began.

Last September, the NGO Caritas distributed food to a village called Madzia via military helicopter, but otherwise there has been “no humanitarian access” to this part of the region, said Alain Moukouri, secretary general of Caritas in the Republic of Congo.

“People eat what they can find in the forest,” he said.

Persecution

Meanwhile, in villages across Pool, young men have been arrested and accused of being Ninjas on the basis of physical appearance.

“It can be dreadlocks, tattoos on their arms, a torn shirt, even a strange face,” said Monica Ngalula, who works for the Congolese Observatory of Human Rights.

Thérèse Matounga’s son, Francie Nkouka, has been missing since October 2016, when he was arrested by soldiers in the village of Loumou. The 24-year-old truck driver had been socialising at a friend’s house in a nearby village when he returned to find military helicopters and soldiers on the ground.

He ran to his brother’s house nearby but attracted the attention of soldiers. They began searching through the house and found an old purple scarf – a colour associated with Ninjas. It belonged to his brother, who used to be part of the group but had demobilised in 1998. Nkouka protested his innocence but was put on a military helicopter and never seen again.

“My son was a serious man,” said Matounga, 65. “He had no ties with Ninjas.”

Between April and September 2017, the United Nations Population Fund documented 110 cases of rape by “men in uniform”. This could refer to rebels or government forces, but IRIN understands the vast majority were perpetrated by soldiers.

“Violence against women is the hidden part of a hidden crisis,” said UNFPA representative Barbara Laurenceau. Government spokesman Thierry Moungalla did not respond to multiple messages seeking comment.

Return of the Ninjas

The Ninjas emerged from the upheaval of the early 1990s when the country’s first multi-party elections took place after 13 years of rule by Sassou Nguesso’s Marxist-Leninist Congolese Labour Party. Despite demobilisation attempts, they never really went away, remaining in unplacated opposition to Sassou Nguesso.

Very little is known about how they are structured and operate, and how much real control Ntumi exerts at the local level. Bereft of information, the international community has termed them, “armed elements.”

To the government they are simply “terrorists.” Ntumi has consistently denied responsibility for the 2016 election attack in Brazzaville and many Congolese and foreign diplomatic officials believe him.

With protests building through 2015 and 2016, many observers say the government anticipated a popular uprising and sought to pre-emptively crush dissent. Ntumi’s Ninjas were the perfect pretext; Pool was the perfect location.

“People believe the government lost the presidential election and needed to create a mass security alert to prevent resistance,” a diplomatic source who asked not be named told IRIN.

Whether or not the Ninjas were responsible for the Brazzaville attack, after the first bombings in Pool a new insurgency quickly took shape.

“Everything started when soldiers began killing some of the population,” said a self-styled Ninja colonel from the village of Yangi, who said his group of 20 previously dormant Ninjas were taking orders from Ntumi. “That is why we started to fight.”

Ninjas have since: destroyed bridges on the rail line between Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, halting trade through the region; killed an unknown number of soldiers; and stepped up attacks on civilians in ambushes along the main roads to the capital.

Anicet Oungoula, 29, was part of an ambulance crew recently attacked by Ninjas near Kinkala. The group was attempting to rescue passengers from a bus that had been ambushed by Ninjas earlier in the day.

When they arrived on the scene, he said the fighters began shooting at the ambulance, wounding the driver and sending the vehicle into a ditch.

A soldier on board crawled out and was executed on the spot. A wounded man lying on a stretcher inside was killed by a Molotov cocktail the Ninjas tossed inside.

“I am still traumatised,” Oungoula said. “I think about it every day.”

Displaced and forgotten

Despite huge suffering, for over a year the government refused to recognise the existence of the crisis, leaving humanitarian organisations isolated and unable to publicly appeal for funds. That finally changed in July last year when the government signed a letter requesting international assistance.

By that stage 80,000 people had been forced to flee their homes and 138,000 people in a country of just 4.5 million were in need of humanitarian assistance.

In one assessment by the World Food Programme, more than 15 percent of children in Pool were found to be suffering from acute malnutrition.

Thirty children on the brink of death were brought to Brazzaville for treatment, but three of them died.

“People like to talk about the millions [of people suffering] in Kasai [a conflict-torn province in the DRC], but if you look at the proportion here, we had a lot more people in need,” said Anthony Ohemeng-Boamah, the UN’s resident coordinator in the Republic of Congo.

While aid groups have now reached tens of thousands of people, conditions remain challenging for thousands more displaced living with host families, in church grounds, and in local authority buildings.

At a run-down Catholic church in Loutété, a town just outside Pool, displaced people complained of hunger and sickness. Sitting in a dark, leaky room, 52-year-old Ermeline Kouelolo said her family had not eaten in two and a half days. Others said they had not eaten in three. Kouelolo fled to Loutété, which is now hosting 4,000 displaced people, in November 2016 when soldiers in armoured vehicles arrived in her village, Loulombo. Since then, her family of five has been sleeping in a small tent with no mattress, no electricity, and no source of light. Every day, she said, her youngest child, a six-year-old girl, gets thinner and thinner.

With donors preoccupied by crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic, raising funds for people in need in Pool has proved challenging.

“You walk into some of the embassies in Kinshasa [the capital of the DRC] and they don’t even know what is happening,” said a senior humanitarian source in Brazzaville who asked not to be named. “Donors to the central Africa humanitarian network are overstretched.”

“It is a national crisis not a local one”

The government’s ability to assist people in Pool has also been hampered by the country’s economic crisis. Congo-Brazzaville is one of the largest oil producers in the region, but declining prices for global crude have drained state funds while public debt has risen to 110 percent of GDP.

The closure of the Brazzaville to Pointe-Noire rail line has made a bad situation even worse, with goods now transported to the capital in long, cumbersome convoys under military escort.

While the ceasefire announcement has raised hope that the economic and humanitarian situation may improve in Pool, the root causes of the conflict remain largely unaddressed. “The Pool conflict is a consequence of the post-electoral crisis in Congo,” said Clement Mierassa, a leading opposition politician. “It is a national crisis not a local one.”

Back in Loutété, heavy rain turns the grounds of the church into mud as Kouelolo prepares for another night sleeping in a tent. It is the second occasion she has been displaced in the past two decades. For others, it is the third or fourth. This time, she says she will only return home if two conditions are met: “The soldiers must leave and the Ninjas must leave.”

Drone technology appears to be taking off at the United Nations, with unmanned aer- ial vehicles (UAVs) being used for various purposes, including in humanitarian, de- velopment and peacekeeping operations.

Although this technology is not a magic solution, “the promise of drones is really tremendous,” said Christopher Fabian, principal advisor on innovation at the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in an interview with UN News. For UNICEF and other humanitarian and development agencies, he said, drone technology can make a big difference in three ways.

First, drones can leapfrog over broken infrastructure in places where developed transportation networks or roads do not exist, carrying low-weight supplies. Second, UAVs can be used for remote sensing, such as gathering imagery and data, in the wake of natural disasters like mudslides, to locate where the damage is and where the affected peoples are.

Third, drones can extend WiFi connectivity, from the sky to the ground, providing refugee camps or schools with access to the Internet. As big as a Boeing 737 pas- senger jet and as small as a hummingbird, a huge variety of drones exist. According to research firm Gartner, total drone unit sales climbed to 2.2 million worldwide in 2016, and revenue surged 36 per cent to $4.5 billion. Although UNICEF’s use of drones has been limited, the agency is exploring ways to scale up the use of UAVs in its operations, Mr. Fabian said. In late June, Malawi, in partnership with UNICEF, launched Africa’s first air corridor to test the humanitarian use of drones in Kasungu District.

Also with UNICEF, Vanuatu has been testing the capacity, efficiency and effectiveness of drones to deliver life-saving vaccines to inaccessible, remote communities in the small Pacific island country. Vanuatu is an archipelago of 83 islands separated over 1,600 kilometres. Many are only accessible by boat, and mobile vaccination teams fre- quently walk to communities carrying all the equipment required for vaccinations – a difficult task given the climate and topography.

To extend the use of drones, UNICEF and the World Food Programmes (WFP) have formed a working group. In addition, UNICEF, together with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), chairs the UN Innovation Network, an informal forum that meets quarterly to share lessons learned and advance discus sions on innovation across agencies.

Drones are also used in other parts of the UN system. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its partners have introduced a new quadcopter drone to visually map gamma radiation at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, which was damaged by the devastating 2011 tsunami.

Last year, an IAEA-supported drone won fourth place in the 2016 United Arab Emirates Drones for Good Award competition, which received over 1,000 entries from more than 160 countries.

ROMEO, or the Remotely Operated Mosquito Emission Operation, met the competi- tion’s aim of improving people’s lives. It was designed to transport and release sterile male mosquitoes as part of an insect pest birth control method that stifles pest population growth.

Some UN peacekeeping mis sions, such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and the Central African Republic, have deployed unarmed surveillance UAVs to improve security for civilians.

Drone technology, however, can be a double-edged sword. UN human rights experts have spoken out against the lethal use of drones. “Hardware itself does not vi- olates human rights. It is the people behind the hardware,” said Mr. Fabian, stressing the need to “make sure that any technology we bring in or work on falls within the fram- ing of rights-based documents,” such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. UNICEF has a set of guiding principles for in- novation, which includes elements like designing with the end-user. For drone applications to spread further, Mr.

Fabian said, the UN has a strong role in advocating this technology and ensuring that policy is shared with different governments. In addition, governments have to clearly define why they need drones and what specifically they will be used for, while also building up national infrastructure to support their use. The private sector must understand that the market can provide them real business opportunities. In 10 to 20 years, drones might be “as basic to us as a pen or pencil,” said Mr. Fabian.

“I believe this technology will go through a few years of regulatory difficulty but will eventually become so ubiquitous and simple that it’s like which version of the cell phones you have rather than have you ever use the mobile phone at all,” he said.

Hopes have been revived for the 40 million people who depend on Lake Chad for their livelihoods following the signing last June in Hangzhou, China, of a deal between Chinese construction giant, PowerChina and the Italian firm, Bonifica Spa. However, the news was only made public at the beginning of this month.

Huge water transfer project

The agreement concerns the carrying out of feasibility studies on transferring 100 billion cubic metres of water per annum from River Congo in the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, to replenish the fast shrinking Lake Chad, a distance of 2,500 km. The project is also known as Transaqua. According to the website of Executive Intelligence Review, EIR magazine, the letter of intent was signed at a meeting between the executive of the two com- panies in the presence of the Italian Ambassador to China, Gabriele Menegatti.

The recent deal between PowerChina and Bonifica Spa is sequel to the Memo- randum of Understanding, MOU, signed between PowerChina and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, LCBC in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, on December 13, 2016. LCBC is made up of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and the Central African Republic, CAR. The MOU is for a period of four years, but can be extended after renegotiation by both parties. The agreement is “with a view to setting forth the principles of a technical and financial assistance arrangement towards the actualization of water transfer from the Congo Basin to Lake Chad,” LCBC website reported. PowerChina will fund the studies at the cost of 1.8 million US dollars, while LCBC will provide all necessary information and assis- tance.

Linking Central and West Africa
The MOU is to establish the basis on which the parties shall carry out further research on the Lake Chad Basin Water Transfer Project and other future projects in accordance with the Lake Chad Basin Water Charter, national legislations, regula- tions and practices of member countries. Additional research will be needed to strengthen climate change resilience in the Sahel and to raise the project into a continental infrastructure by opening up a new development corridor to link Central and West Africa.

The terms of the agreement between PowerChina and LCBC include the potential transfer of 50 billion cubic metres of water per annum to Lake Chad through a series of dams in DRC, Republic of Congo Brazzaville and the Central African Republic. There is also the possible generation of 15,000-25,000 kilowatts of hydroelectricity through the mass movement of water by gravity.
Other benefits are developing irrigated land for crop and livestock farming covering 50,000-70,000 square km in the Sahel zones of Chad, north-eastern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, and Niger; and providing new infrastructure platform for industries and water transport.

The core idea is to increase the water quantity in Lake Chad, improve water flow conditions, alleviate poverty within the basin through socio-economic activities, meet the energy needs of towns and surrounding areas in DRC and Congo Brazzaville, and conduct in-depth environmental impact assess- ment studies.

New Silk Road to Lake Chad
The Lake Chad Basin Commission resolved the issue of funding studies on water transer by creating a new Silk Road to Lake Chad. Power China, one of the country’s largest multinationals that built the Three Gorges dam, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with LCBC last December.

PowerChina committed to fi- nance the feasibility studies for the initial stages of Transaqua and eventually to build the infrastructure. The water transfer canal will be a navigable facility 100 metres wide and 10 metres deep, stretching from southern DRC to CAR’s northern border. The waterway will be flanked by a service road and eventually a rail line.

Fast-receding lake

Lake Chad, once one of the greatest in the world, has receded fast in recent years as a result of less rainfall and harmful irrigation practices. Other unforeseen phenomena like the exodus of refugees and displaced populations fleeing the atrocities of the Boko Haram terrorist group have since arisen.

According to experts, only a robust measure like replenishing the lake’s water could spare the wetland – a food basket located between Central and West Africa – from total disappearance. Mean- while, the impoverishment of the Lake Chad Basin has made it fertile ground for recruiting terrorists for Boko Haram. Although Transaqua offered a viable solution to the lake’s problems since the 1970s, Western nations and institutions showed little interest in funding the project.

Push by President Buhari

A shift occurred in May 2015 with the election of Nigeria’s President, Muhammadu Buhari. He came to power with a programme to develop national infrastructure, including implementing the water-transfer project for Lake Chad. At several inter- national gatherings, President Buhari made the case for resolving the problems of Lake Chad and requesting Western nations to deliver on promises for financial assistance. He has also strongly oriented his government towards co- operation with BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations. Discussing the groundbreak- ing water agreement in The Nigerian Tribune newspaper last July 25, Nigeria’s Minis- ter of Water Resources, Suleiman Adamu, noted that a similar project to move water from southern to north- ern China where some areas are semi-arid has been undertaken by the authorities. The Minister added that Nigeria is working with UNESCO to organize an international con- ference on Lake Chad in Abuja before the end of 2017 to rally support for Transaqua.

Role of LaRouche

Thanks to the fight taken up by LaRouche organization over the years and the initiators of Transaqua, the project is today becoming reality within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Executive Intelligence Review magazine and Schiller Insti- tute in 2015 arranged the first meeting between LCBC and the brains behind Transaqua. This was followed in December 2016 by the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between LCBC and PowerChina, and subsequent contacts between Bonifica Spa and the Chinese company.

Origin of Transaqua proj- ect
Transaqua was first developed by the Italian engineering firm, Bonifica, in the late 1970s. River Congo is the second largest river in the world with an average 41,000 cubic meters of unused water emptied at short intervals into the Atlantic Ocean. Bonifica then estimated that 3-4 per cent of this quantity of un- used water will be enough to replenish Lake Chad.

The project involved building of a 2,400 km canal from the southern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, (then Zaire) to intercept the right bank tributaries of River Congo through dams and reservoirs, and move 100 billion cubic metres of water per annum by gravity to Lake Chad. The project was given consideration by various stakeholders without much progress because of lack of interest or insufficient funding.

]]>http://amandlanews.com/chinese-italian-firms-reach-deal-to-refill-fast-shrinking-lake-chad/feed/0Ghana is safe and stable, but its young people are still risking their lives to cross to Europehttp://amandlanews.com/ghana-is-safe-and-stable-but-its-young-people-are-still-risking-their-lives-to-cross-to-europe/
http://amandlanews.com/ghana-is-safe-and-stable-but-its-young-people-are-still-risking-their-lives-to-cross-to-europe/#respondThu, 13 Jul 2017 00:11:41 +0000http://amandlanews.com/?p=5404

by Brennan Weiss

Kwesi Sampson made his first illegal trek across the Sa- hara desert nearly a decade ago in hopes of reaching Europe. He didn’t make it. Sampson worked construction jobs for three years in Libya’s capital, Tripoli, earning more money in one month than what he says he could make in two years back in Ghana. But as Libya descended into civil war in 2011, he decided to return home.

A year later, he set out once again for southern Europe only to return to Ghana a second time in 2014. Now amid increasing economic hardships, the 35-year-old poultry farmer is considering a third attempt.

“You need money to get a visa, but I don’t have money so I would still embark by illegal means to get to Eu- rope,” Sampson said. “There are no jobs [in Ghana] and I want to make money to assist my family.”

Ghanaians are increasingly among the ranks of the tens of thousands of migrants flooding Europe’s southern shores. A total of 5,636 Ghanaian migrants reached Italy by boat in 2016, up 27% from the previous year, ac- cording to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Through April of this year, 823 Ghanaians arrived in Italy.

Refugees fleeing violence or oppressive regimes in countries like South Sudan and Eritrea often overshadow the plight of irregular migrants— those who cross international borders without proper documentation—from peaceful, politically stable countries like Ghana. The West African nation of about 27 million people is an outlier among sub-Saharan African countries with high numbers of migrants. There is no war in Ghana. Few ethnic flare-ups or religious feuds occur, if ever. It’s a staunch ally of the West and a fierce defender of democracy. Yet many Ghanaians still dream of migrating to Europe. “Every young person looks up to migration, either internal or international, as an ultimate goal,” said Delali Margaret Badasu, director at the Center for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana. “It’s deep-rooted in their minds.”

Like many irregular migrants, Sampson comes from a small poultry farming community in Dormaa, a rural town in the Brong-Ahafo region just eight miles from the Cote d’Ivoire border. From there, aspiring migrants board Libya-bound buses that pass through Burkina Faso and Niger.

While most migrants come from Brong-Ahafo, it is surprisingly not the poorest region. In fact, it’s not even in the top four.

Migration is an expensive endeavor that can cost individuals and their families thousands of dollars, explains Kazumi Nakamura, IOM’s project manager. It is only possible when one has attained a certain level of economic development.“If you’re in a community that is so helpless, you can’t arrange to move,” said Nakamura. “The people who move are those who can afford to. In that context, I’m not too surprised that many Ghanaians move.”

Brong-Ahafo is also notable for being the center of Ghana’s floundering poultry industry, which has failed in recent years to adapt to changing market demands. This has put many poultry businesses on the verge of collapse, leaving farmers like Sampson struggling for livelihood.“The farmers are despondent,” said Anthony Abu, secretary for the Ghana National Association of Poultry Farmers in Brong-Ahafo. “People are really unhappy because almost everybody is losing money.”Abu estimates that 60% of poultry farms in the region has folded within the last five years.

Last year, former president John Dramani Mahama invoked poultry farmers during a speech at the United Nations in an apparent attempt to connect Ghana’s migrant crisis to systemic challenges in the poultry industry. “Some of the young Africans who hazard the desert and Mediterranean Sea to cross to Europe from my country are young poultry farmers or other entrepreneurs who sell their shops and undertake the journey because they can no longer compete with the tons of frozen chicken dumped on African markets annually,” Mahama said.

Vincent Amanor-Boadu, a professor of agribusiness at Kansas State University and co-author of a study on Ghana’s chicken industry, says that perception is misleading. “The whole argument that imports are driving down the Ghanaian poultry market exists because people are looking at imports rising but not at what’s happening in the market,” he said. “Once you talk to [the farmers], you recognize that they’re not actually competing against importers.” That’s because foreign importers sell processed chicken whereas Ghanaian poultry farmers sell live birds, Amanor-Boadu says.

The problem for Ghanaians is that consumers overwhelmingly prefer to buy processed chicken, thereby rendering live birds virtually worthless. Amanor-Boadu suggests the government avoid trying to regulate imports and instead boost infrastructural conditions and develop processor channels to help domestic farmers sell more processed chicken. His solution, however, will not single-handedly stem the flow of migrants from Brong-Ahafo. Although a correlation exists between the poultry industry’s struggles and the region’s high number of migrants, other factors come into play.

Migration is considered a rite of passage in Brong-Ahafo for impressionable young people who have for years seen friends and family leave for economic opportunities abroad and return with luxurious possessions and enticing stories of life in the West. What they aren’t told, however, are the stories of those who perish in the desert or sea, or those abused and exploited by smuggling networks along the way.

Early last year, IOM partnered with the Ghana Immigration Service to educate the local population about the dangers of migrating. A Migration Information Center was established in Sunyani, Brong- Ahafo’s capital city, thanks to a $3 million grant from the European Union.

While education may eventually thwart migration over time, economic and societal pressures persuading young people to travel will likely persist. Some will head to more prosperous African coun- tries. Others will continue on to Europe. It’s not so much the destination that matters, but the prospect of leaving Ghana.

“If you go to Accra there is no work there,” said Sampson. “If you go to Kumasi there is no work there. So the only option is to embark on the journey to Europe to better my life.”

qz.com

]]>http://amandlanews.com/ghana-is-safe-and-stable-but-its-young-people-are-still-risking-their-lives-to-cross-to-europe/feed/0A way of life under threat in Kenya as Lake Turkana shrinkshttp://amandlanews.com/a-way-of-life-under-threat-in-kenya-as-lake-turkana-shrinks/
http://amandlanews.com/a-way-of-life-under-threat-in-kenya-as-lake-turkana-shrinks/#respondMon, 19 Jun 2017 15:53:56 +0000http://amandlanews.com/?p=5355Layeni/Kenya

The last native speaker of the Elmolo language reportedly died sometime in the 1970s. By then, only a few hundred Elmolo remained, eking out a living on Kenya’s southern waters of Lake Turkana as they always had, drinking its brackish waters and fishing for catfish, tilapia, and Nile perch. Thanks to intermarriage with other tribes and adopting the Samburu language, the number of Elmolo has today increased to a few thousand. But their long-term survival remains far from certain, thanks to a new threat. Lake Turkana is the largest desert lake in the world and has existed in some form for nearly four million years. Ancient hominids, like the contemporaries of Turkana Boy – the nearly complete skeleton of homo erectus discovered in nearby Nariokotome – fished and lived along its shores. Now, the lake itself, along with the populations that depend on it, are increasingly vulnerable. Nearly 90 percent of its freshwater inflow comes from the Omo River across the border in Ethiopia. Last year, the government in Addis Ababa unveiled Africa’s tallest hydroelectric dam and announced plans to build a series of water-hungry plantations along the Omo.

Nearly 30,000 hectares have already been cleared in the Lower Omo for sugar plantation. Those projects threaten to strangle Turkana’s water supply, and have the potential to devastate the livelihoods of nearly 300,000 people in Kenya who rely on the lake for food. Because of this – and the largely manmade nature of the potential crisis – Lake Turkana is now being referred to as an East African Aral Sea. Communities like the Elmolo are already experiencing changes. Since 2015, Lake Turkana’s waters have dropped by 1.5 meters, according to satellite data collected by the US Department of Agriculture and published this year by Human Rights Watch. A recent study by the Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI) showed declining catches, both due to changes in water levels and overfishing. For the Elmolo and others who depend on these waters, that means less fish to bring home to their families. “Sometimes you get one perch, and after two or three months, you get another,” said Lpindirah Lengutuk, a 32-year-old Elmolo fisherman who spent most of his life on the lake’s jade waters. “The fish have moved. We don’t know what has taken the fish.” The situation is only expected to get worse.

Grounded fleets and brewing violence

Should water inflow of Lake Turkana reduce to below that lost by evaporation, its sensitive ecosystem could be changed permanently, scientists say. In the worst-case scenario, the lake could be divided into two lakes, with a smaller section breaking off and eventually becoming a lifeless, salty pool of algae. “The salinity of the lake would likely increase to the level that it cannot support freshwater organisms that live in the lake,” said John Malala, a senior research officer at KMFRI. “Many productive areas will definitely be lost.” Shifting rainfall patterns due to climate change and cyclical drought are making the situation even worse. This year, much of Kenya, including the areas that straddle Lake Turkana, is experiencing a devastating drought, prompting the national government to declare a national disaster. In Turkana County, more than 60 percent of wells are dry, according to the country’s National Disaster Management Authority. Thousands of dead livestock litter roadsides. In such extreme periods, many pastoralists, like the Turkana people, traditionally rely on the lake not just for food, but to make enough money to replenish their livestock once the rains return.

Now, even that insurance may disappear. “The buffer against the drought was fishing,” said Felix Horne, a researcher for Human Rights Watch. “When that’s gone, there will be a big problem.” On the lake’s western shores is the bustling fishing town of Kalokol, named after the Turkana name of the lake, an’am Ka’alokol, or sea of many fish. Its residents are among the country’s poorest citizens: The poverty rate is almost 90 percent, according to data from the 2013 Kenya Bureau of Statistics, and the lake is one of the few sources of employment. For decades, fish hauled out and dried here made their way to markets across Africa, including as far as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today, dozens of boats sit idle on the shoreline, some with their bottoms rotted out, weeds growing through the wood planks.

Dead camels rot on the outskirts of informal settlements in Ethiopia’s rain-starved Somali region as their owners, once proudly self-sufficient pastoralists, turn to government aid to stay alive. Ethiopia is facing a drought so terrible that nomadic herders, the hardiest of survivors, have been pushed to the brink. The lucky ones receive supplies of food and brackish water, but the majority, who have settled in spontaneous camps in the remotest reaches, must look after themselves.

“We call this drought sima,” said 82-year-old Abdu Karim. “It means ‘everyone is affected.” Even when I was a child, no one spoke of a drought like this one.” Across the Horn of Africa, people are struggling after three successive years of failed rains. In Somalia and Yemen, there is real fear of famine. While Ethiopia’s remote southern region has been spared the warfare that has deepened the crisis confronting its neighbours, the drought has been no less brutal.

“Having lost most of their livestock, they have also spent out the money they had in reserve to try to keep their last few animals alive,” said Charlie Mason, humanitarian director at Save the Children. “For those who have lost everything, all they can now do is go to a government assistance site for food and water.”

Livestock are the backbone of the region’s economy. Pastoralists here are estimated to have lost in excess of $200 million-worth of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels. That is not only a blow to their wealth, but also deprives them of the meat and milk that is the mainstay of the pastoralist life-support system.

Last year, more than 10 million people were affected by an El Niño-induced drought. The government spent an unprecedented $700 million, while the international community made up the rest of the $1.8 billion needed to meet their needs.

This year, the appeal is for $948 million to help 5.6 million drought-affected people, mainly in the southern and eastern parts of the country. So far, only $23.7 million has been received.

“Last year’s response by the government was pretty remarkable,” said World Vision’s Ethiopia director, Edward Brown. “We dodged a bullet. But now the funding gaps are larger on both sides. The UN’s ability is constrained as it looks for big donors – you’ve already got the US talking of slashing foreign aid.”

Under strain

The government has a well-established safety net programme managed by the World Bank that supports the chronically food insecure, typically with cash-for-work projects. But it doesn’t pick up those affected by sudden shocks like the current drought. They fall under a new and separate programme, which is struggling to register all those in need.

There are 58 settlements for the internally displaced in the Somali region currently receiving government aid. But that’s only a fraction of the 222 sites containing nearly 400,000 displaced people identified in a survey by the International Organization for Migration. Forty-four percent of these camps reported no access to food, and only 31 percent had a water source within a 20-minute walk. “People were surviving from what they could forage to eat or sell but now there is nothing left,” said one senior aid worker who visited a settlement 70 kilometres east of the southern town of Dolo Ado, where 650 displaced pastoralist families weren’t receiving any aid at all.

The only livestock left alive in the camp was one skinny cow, its rib cage undulating through its skin, and her new-born calf. In some shelters people were reported as too weak to move.

Informal settlements have sprung up wherever the exhausted pastoralists have stopped. The further away from the regional capital, Jijiga, the less likely they are to be supplied by the government. There is also a degree of friction between the fed- eral government and the semi-autonomous regional authority.

“There’s a logical reason to limiting the number of temporary assistance sites – because otherwise getting assistance to people scattered over such a large area becomes a massive challenge,” said Mason.

“The authorities are doing their best. This is a natural disaster, which has affected a huge number of people over an area larger than the UK or New Zealand, and we’re in a race against the clock to get enough food and clean water to enough people in time.” But given the security restrictions on travel in the Somali region, and the well-known nervousness aid agencies have over antagonising the government, it is very hard to gauge how many people may have fallen through the cracks and are not receiving assistance.

Refugees vs IDPs

The Ethiopian government is far more open over the refugees it helps. It has main- tained an open-door policy and currently shelters an estimated 800,000.

Just outside Dolo Ado, where the Ethiopian border intersects with Kenya and Soma- lia, are two enormous camps. With rows of corrugated iron roofs glinting in the sun, each houses about 40,000 Somalis escaping their own food crisis and ongoing conflict.

“I came with my family because of drought and fear,” said 51-year-old Hasaam Muhammed Ali. He arrived in Buramino camp in 2012 with his two wives and 17 children. “People have different opinions but I know what is there – I will not go back. Perhaps, if the country gets peace like Ethiopia, I might.”

Refugees complain of headaches and itchy skin due to the pervading heat of 38 – 42 degrees Celsius, and of a recent reduction in their monthly allowance of cereals and grains from 16 to 13.5 kilograms. However, they are guaranteed that ration, along with water, health and education services – none of which is available to IDPs in a settlement on the outskirts of Dolo Ado. “We don’t oppose support for refugees – they should be helped as they face bigger problems,” said 70- year-old Abiyu Alsow. “But we are frustrated as we aren’t getting anything from the government or NGOs.”

Abiyu spoke amid a cluster of women, children, and a few old men beside makeshift domed shelters fashioned out of sticks and fabric. Husbands were away either trying to source money from relatives, looking for daily labour in the town, or making charcoal for family use and to sell. “When people cross borders, the world is more interested,” said Hamidu Jalleh from the UN’s emergency aid coordination office, OCHA. “Especially if they are fleeing conflict, it is a far more captivating issue. But the issue of internally displaced persons doesn’t [generate] the same attention.”

In the Somali region’s northern Siti zone, IDP camps from droughts in 2015 and 2016 are still full. It takes between seven and 10 years for pastoralists to rebuild flocks and herds after losses of more than 40 percent, according to research by the International Livestock Research Institute and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization. “Humanitarian responses around the world are managing to get people through these massive crises to prevent loss of life,” said Mason. “But there’s not enough financial backing to get people back on their feet again.” And Ethiopia’s crisis is far from over. The main spring Gu/Ganna rains have finally begun in parts of the Somali region, but they were a month late. The forecast is that they will be below aver- age and won’t regenerate pasture sufficiently for the pastoralists, who have lost so much, to rebuild their lives.

In the political history of this country, no political leader has been subjected to insults, humiliation, abuse of his human rights etc. than Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo, the President elect of the Republic of Ghana. Losing an election is very unpleasant but losing two or more elections can be a very devastating experience and it takes courage, humility and the grace of God to endure it.The President elect had demonstrated in 2008, 2012 and after the Supreme Court ruling that he has what it takes to be a leader. On several occasions, the President elect has been ac- cused of being “desperate for power” but what hap- pened during the 2016 elections left no one in doubt as to who was more desperate for power. In fact for a sitting President to use money and vehicles to plan the destruction of the image and personality of his main polit- ical rival is far below the belt and beats all ethical standards. President Ma- hama brought this defeat upon himself because the President and his government consistently lied to the people of Ghana without scruples and became very arrogant, deceitful, insulting, corrupt and incompetent to the extent that many Ghanaians felt enough was enough. President Mahama earned the Presidency on a silver platter after the death of President Mills, suc- ceeded in rigging the 2012 elections and believed he was impregnable and consequently was careless with his utterances and decisions. If only he had experienced a quarter of President elect’s misfortunes, he would have been humble and given Ghanaians some respect. How could a President who inherited the slogan“I care for you”adopt a policy of “yentieobiaa” on assumption of power?

The NDC knew very well that they were going to lose the elections but they were not prepared to release power to the NPP without a fight and consequently hatched a diabolical plot to push the elections into “one touch victory” for the NDC or a run off. The plan focused on presidential elections and major ingredients were, the use of STL to transmit results, thump printing of cloned ballot papers for President Mahama, the use of the military to intimidate and create mayhem, publication of fake poll results to counter the ones published by creditable pollsters and lastly the use of media and propaganda to create confusion in the minds of Ghanaians.

As a prelude to the imple- mentation of the plan, series of actions were initiated which included the Presi- dent’s use of Usain Bolts’ victory sign with a strange prediction of winning over sixty (60) per cent of the votes, Ben Ephson’s predic- tion of fifty-two (52) per cent for President Mahama and forty-two (42) per cent for the President elect, Kwesi Pratt’s bogus predic- tion and a suggestion that ambulance vehicles must standby to convey NPP eld- ers to the hospital,Dr.Omane Boamah’s ungodly com- ments that “Nana can never be a President of Ghana …” and many others all geared towards preparing the minds of gullible Ghana- ians for the impending rigged victory . Having prepared the minds of Ghanaians, the next ac- tion, it is alleged was for the Electoral Commissioner (EC) to set the plan in motion by issuing results which would have been inconsis- tent with the actual results declared at the polling stations. This would have obviously been vehemently rejected by the NPP and with the tension in the country, your guess would have been good as mine, the whole country would have been set on fire. The President elect as usual would have been accused by Koku Anyidoho and his ilk for being the cause of the disturbances and would have loudly repeated their accusation of the President elect being a “violent man”. In the midst of the confusion the EC would have ordered a recount of the ballot especially at the NPP strongholds especially the Ashanti Region. Unknown to the NPP, the security of the areas where most of the ballot boxes had been kept had already been compromised and infested with cloned ballot papers of President Mahama. These ballot papers would have mysteriously migrated into the ballot boxes. The EC would then have been offered an opportunity to release already prepared results, some which are al- ready circulating in the social media that would have given President Mahama the much needed majority or some results which would have sent the elections into a run- off. To meet the NPP’s demand for fairness, the EC would have once again told the NPP to go to court.

To support this diabolical plan, the security forces had been prepared to crack down on all forms of violence and protests in the country. Unfortunately, due to the divine intervention, the electronic system which would have been operated by STL personnel from Israel and South Africa to massage the results was seriously disrupted and the diabolical plan could not be implemented. Koku Anyidoho’s accusation of over voting in more than two hundred polling stations in Ashanti Region, was all part of the abortive scheme. The NDC lost the elections because of its “RIGGING MENTALITY” and thus failed to plan effectively and rather concentrated on wild forecasts which were aimed at preparing the minds of Ghanaians for the impending rigged results. NDC has never won any election on merit in the past and had always colluded with the EC to rig past elections they won, namely 1992, 1996, 2008 and 2012.

The NDC’s message of“infrastructure” was ambiguous and even the literate community did not understand let alone the illiterates. The justification by the EC for not releasing any results because it was com- paring manual figures with electronic ones, eight hours after the close of the poll, badly exposed its intentions. The EC’s failure to release the results until after the President had conceded de- feat cast doubt on the Chair- man’s integrity and if she has any conscience should resign now. The NPP won because of the good leader- ship by the President elect and his Vice, effective planning, good messages for the campaign, selection and training of competent polling agents, manual and electronic systems of collecting and collation of pink sheets and the last but not the least, monitoring and provision of security in all polling areas. Whilst the NPP was busy with dry rehearsals to collate its results, NDC was busy sharing monies they have stolen to buy 2016 elections. In addition, the enthusiasm, support and determination by many Ghanaians who wanted a change was overwhelming and could not be simply ignored. For example, at the end of the poll, when EC’s vehicles to convey Presiding Officers were late in many polling stations, many good citizens of this country volunteered and conveyed the Presiding Officers, Polling Agents and the ballot boxes in their own vehicles to the various collation centres and in effect helped speed up the collation of the results.

The lessons learnt from these elections were many but it will suffice to mention a few. Firstly, insults of the elderly who are old enough to be the fathers and grand- fathers by young men “with sharp teeth”offended many Ghanaians.

Secondly, propaganda, lies and deceit, the hallmarks of NDC’s politics have been very detrimental to the progress of our society and many Ghanaians cannot discern the truth from the lies of the NDC. For example, at the latter days of the election when it was very obvious that the NDC was losing the elections, their supporters ignored the figures on the TV screens and believed the lies of Asiedu Nketia and Koku Anyidoho which suggested they were comfortably ahead of the NPP. Lastly, Ghanaians have proved that they do not have short memories and that they have wised up and have sent a clear message that the use of money to buy votes cannot work and that their franchise is not for the highest bidder. The celebrations that followed the NPP’s victory throughout the country sent a clear message to the major political parties that Ghanaians can no longer be taken for granted. To the NPP, Ghanaians do not have short memories and will not take kindly to unfulfilled promises. Secondly, corruption in Government must be curbed and the protection of the na- tional purse must be guaran- teed. Thirdly, Ghanaians deserve some respect and Government officials must demonstrate humility and not be arrogant and insulting. The last but not the least, Government needs to instil some discipline in the society especially the youth. To the NDC, firstly, they must take the defeat in good faith, stop the blame game, remove the “rigging mentality” and reorganise well for 2020. Secondly, the party must be more patriotic and stop the practice of importing other nationals to vote in our elections. Lastly, the use of propaganda, lies and deceit as a way of doing politics should give way to some decency in dealing with the electorate.

She’s watching the road just outside her house, sitting on a tree trunk used as a barricade during anti-government protests last year against President Pierre Nkurunziza. And she’s talking to herself. “This person walks like Benny. Even his shirt looks like Benny’s,” she says, her grief heavy, as a man walks past the house.

Janet Bizimana’s* son disappeared on 19 January, 2016. Her neighbour says that on the 19th of each month she stays up crying through the night. Burundi has been through many dark days of brutal violence: its two civil wars and repeated bouts of ethnic cleansing have all left scars in this small, densely populated country.

And the violence is far from over. For almost two years now, Burundi has been torn by renewed political conflict in which hundreds of people have been killed, and thousands detained and tortured – all creating fresh layers of trauma. Opposition to Nkurunziza flared over his decision to run for a third presidential term, which many viewed as unconstitutional. He won the controversial elections in July last year after surviving an attempted coup, and Burundi has teetered on the brink of civil war ever since.

The conflict, which is in danger of re-opening the ethnic-based fault lines of the past, has forced 327,400 Burundians to flee into neighbouring countries. Burundi has a total population of just 10 million.

Two narratives

While Burundian human rights activists say 1,000 people have been killed and more than 9,000 detained since April 2015, the government insists the situation is improving, and was backed recently by the president of the National Independent Human Rights Commission, Jean-Baptiste Baribonekeza.

“The country is calm; we no longer hear gun shots in the capital,” Baribonekeza was quoted as saying by IWACU English News. “If we visit places of detention, we notice that the number of arrested people has significantly decreased from more than 9,000 in 2015 to about 6,000 today. In general, there has been an improvement compared to last year.”
Mutakura is a low-income district of junior civil servants and small-scale company workers outside the capital, Bujumbura. It’s also the home of Bizimana*, the 70-year-old mother of Benny Runyaga*, who was a well-known member of the opposition Movement for Solidarity and Democracy**, a party linked to the rebel RED-Tabara group.

“When the phone rings at home, she’s the first to run to pick it up. She thinks her son will be on the line,” explains a family friend. “It’s the same thing when someone knocks on the door. She tries to be the first to open the door, believing her son will come home.” Benny Runyaga was the father of two children. The youngest was born only a month before he disappeared, presumably picked up by the police.

“The oldest child takes his father’s clothes, lays them out, and calls his mother and says, ‘mum, here is dad’” explains a neighbour. Not knowing whether Runyaga is alive or dead is torturing the family, especially Janet. The neighbour is worried she might need institutional care.

Feeding on the blood

Jane* is also a victim. Her husband, an army officer, died in an attack on their home in Bujumbura. Their four children still ask when he will come back to them. “Only the oldest child, who is almost nine, seems to understand what happened to us. Every day, he asks why the world is so mean to refuse him the right to hold his father’s hand,” Jane tells IRIN. “Every time we visit his grave he tells me that he’s scared that those who killed my husband can see us.

“He tells me: ‘They are here, mum; they are following us; they don’t want us to come here. They are animals, mum: beasts feeding on blood.” Her voice is shaking.

Apart from the emotional impact, the loss of Jane’s husband has had a devastating economic effect on the family.

“I’ve had to leave the house we lived in before the attack for another, cheaper one. I am not paying the rent because I don’t have a job. Friends, acquaintances, and some old colleagues of my husband are paying for me and the children,” she explains. They are doing it secretly because they are afraid too. We never got the results from the investigation [into her husband’s death]. “Even old friends of my husband, although members of the security forces, or in defence, are asking about the investigation into his death, like I am.”

Jane doesn’t want to talk about whether he had any political affiliations.

Disorders

Jean-Pierre Ntamatungiro* is a psychologist with a private office in Bujumbura’s city centre.

“Before the crisis, I was seeing at least three patients with signs of trauma,” he tells IRIN. “Today, I receive nine or 10 every day. Do the maths and you’ll see the number of people we receive every month. It’s a big number for a small country like Burundi.”

The people who come for counselling are only those who can afford it. Others are left on the streets, and many young people are taking to drugs, the psychologist says. “[This crisis] affects young people from all political par- ties in Burundi: opposition and pro-government alike,” says Ntamatungiro*. “Some of them have developed sui- cidal tendencies, following what they have seen. There are others who have lost the ability to speak, following what they went through or witnessed.”

The future

Last month, IRIN watched three boys playing on the streets of Bujumbura’s southern Musaga district. It’s an area known for opposition to the government, and therefore also for crackdowns by the security forces.

One of the boys was imitating a policeman. “Get out of your house or I’ll shoot the door,” he commanded. Another had a small round stone, which he pretended was a grenade; the third was singing a popular song from last year against the re-election of Nkurunziza. They were scattered back to their families by an older man – made uncomfortable by what he was witnessing and the presence of a journalist. “They are only repeating what they saw here,” explained a passer-by. “But I have doubts for the future of these children in such a country.”

* Names have been changed to protect identities for security reasons
** An earlier version of this story incorrectly labelled the opposition party the Movement for Solidarity and Justice

Salah spent most of his early life as a student in Uganda, where he acquired the excel- lent English he speaks. In 2003, he moved back home to South Sudan. Since then, he has worked as a farmer in the fertile southern Equatoria region.

This is not the future he had in mind. Salah wanted to return to Uganda and study for a Bachelor of Business Administration at Makerere University. But, he says, the government would not sponsor him to go.

Salah believes the South Su- danese government keeps scholarships only for the Dinka, the largest ethnic group in the country. It is the community to which Presi- dent Salva Kiir belongs, as do the majority of senior figures within his administration. Like many non-Dinka in South Sudan, Salah thinks the government is solely ded- icated to keeping the Dinka people in power. Kiir is backed by the influential Jieng (Dinka) Council of Eld- ers and supported by military chief-of-staff General Paul Malong Awan.

To the bush

Salah is a Kakwa, a relatively small ethnic group that strad- dles southwestern South Sudan, northwestern Uganda, and northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Last year, he joined the rebel SPLA-IO, a movement asso- ciated with the country’s sec- ond largest ethnic group, the Nuer. But the insurgency is also attracting the loyalty of existing community-based militia in the Equatoria re- gion and beyond – anyone to challenge the Dinka’s perceived hold on national power and resources.

Salah is a captain in the SPLA-IO. Asked how he thinks fighting will bring about the political resolution he wants, he laughs and says something about how this is the only way to bring about change in this part of the world.

Salah’s comrade-in-arms, Samuel Denyag, was a policeman in the capital, Juba, where he says he saw ethnic chauvinism first-hand. Denyag claims his Dinka commanders fixed the books, adding dozens of ghost names to the payroll, and then shared out the proceeds among just the Dinka cops. When South Sudan’s civil war broke out in December 2013, over a contest for power between Kiir and his rival, former vice president Riek Machar, Denyag headed home to western Equatoria. He joined the Arrow Boys, a broad militia originally formed to defend the commu- nity against attacks by Uganda’s notorious Lord’s Resistance Army.

The LRA are gone. Now there are new threats. Local anger has long been stoked by the encroachment of heav- ily armed Dinka cattle herders onto farmland, and the disappearance of young men in the government’s heavy-handed counter-insurgency operations.

Rebellion spreads

As armed groups bubbled up in western Equatoria in 2015, some Arrow Boy factions threw in with SPLA-IO. Denyag was one of them. Some of these emerging armed groups looked to be absorbed into the national army under an agreement ne- gotiated in 2015 to end the civil war. But the accord didn’t last. Although Machar fi- nally returned to Juba to join a government of national unity in April this year, three months later he was fleeing for his life, heading south through Equatoria and over the Congolese border. Fighting followed in his wake. Yei, in southern Equatoria, was previously thought of as one of the safest places in South Sudan. But Human Rights Watch reported in October “numerous cases” of abuse by the army against civilians as they hunted for SPLA-IO supporters.

IRIN was unable to get com- ment from the government. Among the most brutal of the government’s forces are the all-Dinka Mathiang Anyoor militia, created by Malong. They were instrumental in the purging of Nuer neigh- bourhoods in Juba in 2013.

Revenge

The violence has spurred opposition, increasingly united in a sense of victimhood. It has also generated a cycle of revenge. In October, armed gunmen attacked a bus on the Yei-Juba road, separated the 21 Dinka from the other passengers, and shot them.

“The history of mass atrocities suggests that ethnic violence is normally a political tool waged for – often petty – political purposes. South Sudan is no different,” re- searcher Alan Boswell told IRIN. “It’s a political war for a new state that never fully formed, but is now being fought over as it collapses.” The brutality under way in Equatoria has forced 246,000 South Sudanese to flee to northwest Uganda in six months. Tens of thousands of them – if not more – have crossed Captain Salah’s rickety bridge.

“These atrocities are not an abuse of power per se, but rather the desperation of the weak lacking true state power,” said Boswell. “This is ethnic cleansing as desperation, not strength.”

Lona Saima walked for seven days with her family from Yei to reach safety. In early December, she’d just been trucked from the South Su- danese border to Kuluba Transit Centre in Uganda. “If they [the Dinka] get you, they will slaughter you like a chicken,” she told IRIN. “They want to kill anyone because they don’t trust you… they think you are hiding rebels.”

Saima has tuberculosis and hasn’t been able to access medicine for two months, since war shut the hospital and supply lines down. Her body aches.

At least 85 percent of the people in the heaving camps are women and children. The men have stayed to fight and to protect their property. Otto John Adema bucks the trend. An HIV-positive preacher with 12 children, he arrived from Torit, in south- eastern South Sudan, in Au- gust. He sits against the mud brick house he built in Bidi Bidi camp, holding his baby boy. He saw three civilians shot, but doesn’t know if it was the SPLA or the rebels who did the killing. He is sure, though, that it was five SPLA-IO raping a woman in the street with a stick. Ethnic killings have been a feature of South Sudan’s civil war since it began. Kem Ryan, who was the head of operations for the relief and protection section of the UN’s peacekeeping mission, has plenty of evidence.

“I have hundreds of photos from the three years of war in South Sudan of people killed, mostly civilians, many bound and executed,” he told IRIN. The violence forced 200,000 people from their homes in 2015.

Genocide

The UN didn’t use the terms “ethnic cleansing” or “genocide” then, but now they do. On 11 November, Adam Dieng, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, said South Sudan risked “outright ethnic war” and genocide. The last time he was in the country was in 2014.

The UN Human Rights Commission said in statement on 30 November: “there is already a steady process of ethnic cleansing under way in several areas of South Sudan using starvation, gang rape and the burning of villages.” No one knows how many people have been killed in South Sudan’s civil war. There are estimates of up to 300,000, but the phrase “tens of thousands” is normally used in news reports.

“The UN is the only actor in South Sudan with the capacity to collect and verify death tolls and they chose not to,” said International Crisis Group’s South Sudan senior analyst, Casie Copeland. “Death tolls are important for our humanity, to raise aware- ness and as empirical evidence of how the war evolves.” Richard Batili also guards the bridge on the Kaya river. He sees no end in sight to this conflict. “What is going to happen will be unacceptable,” he told IRIN. “This fighting will continue to our children.”