Abstract: We analyze
hand-collected data on the curricula of 1,627 individuals who worked in hedge
funds at some point during their careers. We investigate the extent to which
their careers are sensitive to funds’ relative performance. They experience a
significant acceleration of their career upon being hired by hedge funds,
especially if these recently performed strongly relative to their benchmark,
and the relative performance of hiring funds is more persistent than that of
other funds. This evidence is consistent with assortative matching between
better funds and talented professionals. Conversely, the careers of high-ranking employees are
significantly and permanently damaged by the liquidation of their funds. This
“scarring eﬀect” is concentrated in funds that underperform before liquidation,
and thus appears related to the employee’s reputational loss. Overall,
our results reveal a new facet of market discipline in asset management, operating
via the managerial labor market.