We know it works for the left. The left wouldn't have any political power, since it's a minority opinion, without its willingness to murder anyone it needs to. Will violence work for the White Right too?

The politicians do what the Jews want, because they intimidate them or kill them. Yes violence would work. If just one white person with balls would smoke just one useless politician the next one would think twice. Why do you think there are damn few late term abortion doctors? Because they have smoked a couple of them. Yes violence will work. If Lone Wolves were to whack a politician and leave no evidence, then the next one who prooposed some garbage might think twice

All too true.Violence is what the government uses daily to enforce it's laws and it seldom fails.The basic ,obvious problem is- violence is almost always followed with larger and more violent violence.Those who do such things have to be totally committed to the facts that they will also get terminated in the process; or soon after.As stated before,few have the balls to actually do anything significant.

The left has had to pay the price over and over countless times to get what they wanted; and apparently will continue to do so at any price.

Niggers intentionally raise their children to be very "Spartan" like;without fear of the law,respect for anyone,demanding of everything and hateful of any resistance to acquiring what they desire.Generally they are fully supported by their communities ,and often can accomplish goals never met before for niggers in the 21st century.

Spic's have learned to over come every opposition that has come across their path simply by reproduction over and over again.Niggers are meaner and stronger-but Spic;s still prevail.Asians and whites are smarter,stronger and more productive-but Spic's still keep working for pennies and keep on coming regardless of the damn consequences.

Jews and Asians are physically inferior but use their talents as deceptive motherfuckers to get what they need and want-without the slightest feeling of remorse, conscience or guilt.

Fear of violence and future reprisals by white people is exactly what's REALLY behind the gun laws arguments today-and all white people know it.Once disarmed,white people will "have to" stand by helplessly and watch as the nonwhites then fight each other over the last remaining scraps of humanity.

Trolling or Transformation?—CPAC, Matt Heimbach, Scott Terry, And The End Of Conservatism Inc.
By James Kirkpatrick
Created 03/23/13
Topic:
On Topic
Two students “ruined everything [1]” for Conservatism Inc. at last weekend’s Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), in the words of Slate’s David Weigel [2]. [CPAC Diary: Meet the White Nationalists Who Ruined Everything [1], March 16, 2013] Matt Heimbach and Scott Terry torpedoed any hopes that the American Conservative Union [3] (ACU) had of disassociating “conservatism” from its essence as an implicitly white movement [4] when they brought up racially sensitive topics [5] at a farcical panel dedicated to white self-flagellation [6].

The CPAC fun all started at a panel ludicrously entitled “Trump the Race Card: Are You Sick and Tired of Being Called a Racist [12] and You Know You're Not One?” The moderator: K. Carl Smith [13], a professional minority conservative, was hawking his book Frederick Douglass Republicans [14] and recycling the somewhat strained Conservatism Inc. narrative about how Democrats during the nineteenth century were racist and how Southern Democrats opposed the Civil Rights movement. [15] A typical and predictable applause line: Smith recounting his shock at discovering that the evil George Wallace had been (gasp!) a Democrat.

The panel was sponsored by Tea Party Patriots [16]. This was an odd choice to teach conservatives about avoiding charges of racism: TPP [17] has been repeatedly smeared by the Southern Poverty Law Center ($PLC to VDARE.com) as extremists [18] and conspiracy theorists [19]. Nonetheless, the panel would have gone down as another example of Conservatism Inc. fleecing the rubes by telling them what they want to hear—if Heimbach and Terry had not attended.

The panel spun off the rails when Scott Terry pointed out from the floor: “It seems to me that you're reaching out to voters at the expense of young white southern males like myself."

This turned into a larger debate about the history of the conservative movement. Matt Heimbach subsequently noted [20] that National Review and William F. Buckley [21] were defending segregation [22] during the 1960's. (See “Why the South Must Prevail.” [23] NR, August 24, 1957 and Can We Desegregate Hesto Presto? [24], by WFB, November 11, 1961 and the work of James Jackson Kilpatrick [25].)

Ironically, the duo was joined by a liberal black woman named Kim Brown who works for Voice of Russia. She made similar charges, though obviously she had a different take on their significance.

What generated most of the Main Stream Media [MSM] sound and fury: Smith, who typically for CPAC framed his egalitarianism in Christian terms, waxed poetic about how Frederick Douglass had forgiven his slave-owner. Terry responded: "Did he thank him for giving him shelter? And food?"

(Any fair viewer will note, however, that Smith and Terry, both Southerners, conducted themselves like gentlemen.)

Order was eventually restored, and Smith later was quoted [27] by TalkingPointsMemo.com to the effect that he and Terry had “left as friends.” Meet The Moderator Behind CPAC’s Race Panel Gone Wrong [27], Benjy Sarlin, TPM, March 18, 2013

But Leftist journalists rejoiced—this is exactly the kind of story that they go to CPAC to find. At a stroke, Heimbach and Terry had reinforced the accepted narrative that the conservative base is hegemonically white, male, Southern, Christian, and “racist.” To a typical Huffington Post reader, every Republican is Matt Heimbach and Scott Terry.

Think Progress gloated CPAC Participant Defends Slavery at Minority Outreach Panel [28]. [By Scott Keyes and Zack Beauchamp, March 15, 2013.] It also made the claim (explicitly refuted by the liberal TalkingPointsMemo.com report) that “several people in the audience cheered and applauded Terry's outburst.”

Daily Kos played [29] guilt by association, trying to link the duo to Rick Santorum's [30] group “Patriot Voices [31]” because of a sticker Terry was wearing. Author “eades” sneered that “conservatives at CPAC” are, after all, just a bunch of “rampaging bigots.” Of course, the likes [32] of Little Green Footballs [33] and Andrew Sullivan [34] quickly adopted Heimbach and Terry as the face of the conference. [An African-American CPAC Can Embrace [35], AndrewSullivan.com, March 15, 2013.]

In response, Conservatism Inc. quickly rallied around the idea that Heimbach and Terry were simply trolls looking for attention—or even liberals deliberately trying to sabotage CPAC. Twitchy.com reported [36] a host of defensive tweets from conservatives disowning the duo, claiming that they were “not conservatives” and talking up real conservative heroes [37] like defeated black Congressman Allen West [38].

Professional “black conservative” (and self-described “Christian”) Alonzo “'Zo” Rachel unconvincingly threatened to fight Heimbach and Terry and somehow interpreted them as indicative of the libertarian takeover of the GOP. An obviously confused Rachel rapped that conservatives should resist being co-opted by “neo-Confederate libertarians” and stand with the (nonexistent) Republican legacy of Frederick Douglass. [PJTV: Racists Have No Place in the Conservative Movement [39]] (Hey, 'Zo, 2008 [40] called. They want their neoconservative talking points back [41].)

At grassroots conservative sites like FreeRepublic [42] (which deletes [43] any article that links to Vdare.com [44]), conservative activists gleefully ruminated [45] on why Terry and Heimbach should be “purged” by a new William F. Buckley [46].

Of course, it was William F. Buckley himself to whom Heimbach had appealed in defending racial realism and states' rights [47] as part of conservative history.

Perhaps the most remarkable reaction came from Glenn Beck's The Blaze. [48] This webzine is utterly dependent on channeling white resentment [49] for traffic. But one of its reporters took to Twitter in the aftermath of the incident to condemn Heimbach and Terry as “not conservatives.”

Intriguingly, after an initially negative story portraying Heimbach and Terry as utter lunatics, the story has since been updated [50] to allow them to speak for themselves.

The Blaze quotes Terry's complaint that his supposedly outrageous positions of “defending slavery” and promoting black subservience are “completely false.”

The comments thread at The Blaze reveals significant support for Heimbach and Terry.

The CPAC debacle shows that any mention of whites as a group with legitimate interests [51] is immediately smeared, in the prevailing political culture, as “white supremacism.”

The Establishment Conservative media are just as complicit as the Left in this framing device, with commentators leaping to characterize racially conscious conservatives as “trolls”—even when the dissidents clearly know more about conservative movement history than the movement's own “intellectuals.”

In one particularly devastating response to a hostile reporter, Matt Heimbach [20] pointed out that Buckley defended segregation in the South (before characteristically reversing himself) and that the GOP was boosted by the defection of the Dixiecrats (still continuing in 2012). [ CPAC's 'Trump the Race Card' Panel Derailed by Actual Segregationist, [20] By Elspeth Reeve, March 15, 2013]

Contra movement conservatives, the fact that Republicans supported the Civil Rights Act by a greater margin than the Democrats is irrelevant because the “Dixiecrats” joined the GOP a few years later. As Heimbach made clear, Movement Conservatism can only “rebrand” itself by either ignoring or actively attacking its own intellectual history [52]. Of course, as he pointed out to Atlantic Magazine’s Reeves, the “right-wing” is very good at “lying to itself.”

This hostility to white racial consciousness is matched by an increasingly embarrassing multicultural opportunism by Republican operatives. They are abandoning colorblind rhetoric and openly pandering to blacks as blacks, Hispanics as Hispanics, and so on. Thus Rand Paul's speech to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce [53] makes clear he thinks that expecting non-whites to speak and understand the national language of English is exclusionary.

Furthermore, Conservatism Inc’s recent unconditional embrace [37] of the new black savior figure Dr. Ben Carson (who supports both gun control [54] and amnesty [55]) shows that a Politically Correct complexion can trump principles even among many activists.

It is whites – and only whites—who are not allowed advocate for their interests; or even their existence.

In an March 19 interview [56] with Thom Hartmann [57] on Russia Today, Heimbach lays out his position that the conservative movement should stand up for its supporters and reach out to disaffected blue-collar workers. He attacks policies of mass immigration and outsourcing that have crippled the American working class and forced patriots into an impossible choice between the Scylla of a Republican Party that wants to replace them and the Charybdis of a Democratic Party that actively hates them.

Note that both Heimbach and Hartmann agree on the “transition” of the GOP that took place with the Southern Strategy: Republicans made a conscious choice to appeal to disaffected white Democrats, especially in the South.

But Hartmann smears this vast portion of the American population as “racists” and suggests they shouldn't be represented at all. Like most progressives, Hartmann hates conservatives not because of what they believe—but because of who they are.

Conservatism Inc.'s political platform is slowly degenerating into its logical conclusion of left-libertarianism [58]. Cultural elements are being disregarded as the Left cruises from victory to victory. The Republican Party itself, as evidenced by the RNC’s recent report [59], is moving towards an agenda that can only be described as overtly anti-white—while paradoxically more reliant than ever on white voters.

At the same time, grassroots resentment against the Democrats (and fundraising for Conservatism Inc.) is being fueled by racial dog whistling that is hardly even disguised. A simple glance at the Drudge Report, [60] The Blaze [61], or Breitbart.com [62] each day shows that Conservatism Inc. exploits white racial resentments, [49] while simultaneously condemning [63]them.

The center cannot hold. Heimbach and Terry showed that even a couple of diversity dissidents can utterly discredit [64] any Conservatism Inc. event by simply highlighting the GOP's hypocritical reliance on its white base.

Heimbach and Terry proved that the GOP's preferred strategy of wishful thinking won't work. If a multimillion-dollar public relations campaign can be “ruined” by two students, it was built upon sand.

The historic American Conservative Movement is dead [65]. Conservatism Inc. exists as a racket. For immigration patriots, the only question is—what comes next?

The articles on VDARE.com are brought to you by the VDARE Foundation. We are supported by generous donations from our readers. Contributions are tax deductible and appreciated.

The first priority of WN is to be competent and able to run a government.

Violent men are useful for getting into government, but then become a liability, and usually have to then be destroyed, or else they take control themselves.
Since they can't handle issues without violence, they can't govern well, so everything turns into anarchy and civil war.
How many current US soldiers, used to years of violence, will end up working for drug lords?
The Mexican Los Zetas druglords were once patriotic, well trained Mexican troops, best of the best, today they're the worst of the worst.

WN need to use the same means to get into power, as we intend to use to stay in power. Do we want an illegal, violent government and society?

State groups based on violence turn corrupt, as happened with Operation Gladio, which turned into an organised crime syndicate.
Nevertheless, from a structural viewpoint, its organisation was flawless and to this day, unsurpassed.

It mostly died out at the ned of the nineties as its members aged and died off, but its networks are now replenished with unemployed Cold War warriors.
We can structurally learn much from it.
Cells, nodes, able to regenerate itself, swarm on an opponent, then disappear, it was the opneing move in fourth generation warfare.

The peacetime soldier's principal task is to prepare effectively for the next war. In order to do so, he must anticipate what the next war will be like. This is a difficult task that gets continuously more difficult. German Gen Franz Uhle-Wettler writes:

"At an earlier time, a commander could be certain that a future war would resemble past and present ones. This enabled him to analyze appropriate tactics from past and present. The troop commander of today no longer has this possibility. He knows only that whoever fails to adapt the experiences of the last war will surely lose the next one."

The Central Question

If we look at the development of warfare in the modern era, we see three distinct generations. In the United States, the Army and the Marine Corps are now coming to grips with the change to the third generation. This transition is entirely for the good. However, third generation warfare was conceptually developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918. It is now more than 70 years old. This suggests some interesting questions: Is it not about time for a fourth generation to appear? If so, what might it look like? These questions are of central importance. Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.

Our purpose here is less to answer these questions than to pose them. Nonetheless, we will offer some tentative answers. To begin to see what these might be, we need to put the questions into historical context.

Three Generations of Warfare

While military development is generally a continuous evolutionary process, the modern era has witnessed three watersheds in which change has been dialectically qualitative. Consequently, modern military development comprises three distinct generations.

First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc.— and partially in response to social conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon.

Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. Second generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the 1980s, and they are still practiced by most American units in the field.

While ideas played a role in the development of second generation tactics (particularly the idea of lateral dispersion), technology was the principal driver of change. Technology manifested itself both qualitatively, in such things as heavier artillery and bombing aircraft, and quantitatively, in the ability of an industrialized economy to fight a battle of materiel (Materialschlacht).

The second generation saw the formal recognition and adoption of the operational art, initially by the Prussian army. Again, both ideas and technology drove the change. The ideas sprang largely from Prussian studies of Napoleon's campaigns. Technological factors included von Moltke's realization that modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph.

Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack.

While the basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918, the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to time. This shift was explicitly recognized only recently in the work of retired Air Force Col John Boyd and his "OODA (observation- orientation- decision- action) theory."

Thus we see two major catalysts for change in previous generational shifts: technology and ideas. What perspective do we gain from these earlier shifts as we look toward a potential fourth generation of warfare?

Elements That Carry Over

Earlier generational shifts, especially the shift from the second to the third generation, were marked by growing emphasis on several central ideas. Four of these seem likely to carry over into the fourth generation, and indeed to expand their influence.

The first is mission orders. Each generational change has been marked by greater dispersion on the battlefield. The fourth generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy's society. Such dispersion, coupled with what seems likely to be increased importance for actions by very small groups of combatants, will require even the lowest level to operate flexibly on the basis of the commander's intent.

Second is decreasing dependence on centralized logistics. Dispersion, coupled with increased value placed on tempo, will require a high degree of ability to live off the land and the enemy.

Third is more emphasis on maneuver. Mass, of men or fire power, will no longer be an overwhelming factor. In fact, mass may become a disadvantage as it will be easy to target. Small, highly maneuverable, agile forces will tend to dominate.

Fourth is a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population's support for the war and the enemy's culture. Correct identification of enemy strategic centers of gravity will be highly important.

In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them.

Potential Technology-Driven Fourth Generation

If we combine the above general characteristics of fourth generation warfare with new technology, we see one possible outline of the new generation. For example, directed energy may permit small elements to destroy targets they could not attack with conventional energy weapons. Directed energy may permit the achievement of EMP (electromagnetic pulse) effects without a nuclear blast. Research in superconductivity suggests the possibility of storing and using large quantities of energy in very small packages. Technologically, it is possible that a very few soldiers could have the same battlefield effect as a current brigade.

The growth of robotics, remotely piloted vehicles, low probability of intercept communications, and artificial intelligence may offer a potential for radically altered tactics. In turn, growing dependence on such technology may open the door to new vulnerabilities, such as the vulnerability to computer viruses.

Small, highly mobile elements composed of very intelligent soldiers armed with high technology weapons may range over wide areas seeking critical targets. Targets may be more in the civilian than the military sector. Front-rear terms will be replaced with targeted-untargeted. This may in turn radically alter the way in which military Services are organized and structured.

Units will combine reconnaissance and strike functions. Remote, "smart" assets with preprogrammed artificial intelligence may play a key role. Concurrently, the greatest defensive strengths may be the ability to hide from and spoof these assets.

The tactical and strategic levels will blend as the opponent's political infrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets. It will be critically important to isolate the enemy from one's own homeland because a small number of people will be able to render great damage in a very short time.

Leaders will have to be masters of both the art of war and technology, a difficult combination as two different mindsets are involved. Primary challenges facing commanders at all levels will include target selection (which will be a political and cultural, not just a military, decision), the ability to concentrate suddenly from very wide dispersion, and selection of subordinates who can manage the challenge of minimal or no supervision in a rapidly changing environment. A major challenge will be handling the tremendous potential information overload without losing sight of the operational and strategic objectives.

Psychological operations may become the dominant operational and strategic weapon in the form of media/information intervention. Logic bombs and computer viruses, including latent viruses, may be used to disrupt civilian as well as military operations. Fourth generation adversaries will be adept at manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion to the point where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. A major target will be the enemy population's support of its government and the war. Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions.

This kind of high-technology fourth generation warfare may carry in it the seeds of nuclear destruction. Its effectiveness could rapidly eliminate the ability of a nuclear-armed opponent to wage war conventionally. Destruction or disruption of vital industrial capacities, political infrastructure, and social fabric, coupled with sudden shifts in the balance of power and concomitant emotions, could easily lead to escalation to nuclear weapons. This risk may deter fourth generation warfare among nuclear armed powers just as it deters major conventional warfare among them today.

A major caveat must be placed on the possibility of a technologically driven fourth generation, at least in the American context Even if the technological state of the art permits a high-technology fourth generation and this is not clearly the case — the technology itself must be translated into weapons that are effective in actual combat. At present, our research, development, and procurement process has great difficulty making this transition. It often produces weapons that incorporate high technology irrelevant in combat or too complex to work in the chaos of combat. Too many so-called "smart" weapons provide examples; in combat they are easy to counter, fail of their own complexity, or make impossible demands on their operators. The current American research, development, and procurement process may simply not be able to make the transition to a militarily effective fourth generation of weapons.

A Potential Idea-Driven Fourth Generation

Technology was the primary driver of the second generation of warfare; ideas were the primary driver of the third. An idea-based fourth generation is also conceivable.

For about the last 500 years, the West has defined warfare. For a military to be effective it generally had to follow Western models. Because the West's strength is technology, it may tend to conceive of a fourth generation in technological terms.

However, the West no longer dominates the world. A fourth generation may emerge from non-Western cultural traditions, such as Islamic or Asiatic traditions. The fact that some non-Western areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology may lead them to develop a fourth generation through ideas rather than technology.

The genesis of an idea-based fourth generation may be visible in terrorism. This is not to say that terrorism is fourth generation warfare, but rather that elements of it may be signs pointing toward a fourth generation.

Some elements in terrorism appear to reflect the previously noted "carryovers" from third generation warfare. The more successful terrorists appear to operate on broad mission orders that carry down to the level of the individual terrorist. The 'battlefield" is highly dispersed and includes the whole of the enemy's society. The terrorist lives almost completely off the land and the enemy. Terrorism is very much a matter of maneuver: the terrorist's firepower is small, and where and when he applies it is critical.

Two additional carryovers must be noted as they may be useful "signposts" pointing toward the fourth generation. The first is a component of collapsing the enemy. It is a shift in focus from the enemy's front to his rear. Terrorism must seek to collapse the enemy from within as it has little capability (at least at present) to inflict widespread destruction. First generation warfare focused tactically and operationally (when operational art was practiced) on the enemy's front, his combat forces. Second generation warfare remained frontal tactically, but at least in Prussian practice it focused operationally on the enemy's rear through the emphasis on encirclement The third generation shifted the tactical as well as the operational focus to the enemy's rear. Terrorism takes this a major step further. It attempts to bypass the enemy's military entirely and strike directly at his homeland at civilian targets. Ideally, the enemy's military is simply irrelevant to the terrorist.

The second signpost is the way terrorism seeks to use the enemy's strength against him This "judo" concept of warfare begins to manifest itself in the second generation, in the campaign and battle of encirclement. The enemy's fortresses, such as Metz and Sedan, became fatal traps. It was pushed further in the third generation where, on the defensive, one side often tries to let the other penetrate so his own momentum makes him less able to turn and deal with a counterstroke.

Terrorists use a free society's freedom and openness, its greatest strengths, against it. They can move freely within our society while actively working to subvert it. They use our democratic rights not only to penetrate but also to defend themselves. If we treat them within our laws, they gain many protections; if we simply shoot them down, the television news can easily make them appear to be the victims. Terrorists can effectively wage their form of warfare while being protected by the society they are attacking. If we are forced to set aside our own system of legal protections to deal with terrorists, the terrorists win another sort of victory.

Terrorism also appears to represent a solution to a problem that has been generated by previous generational changes but not really addressed by any of them. It is the contradiction between the nature of the modern battlefield and the traditional military culture. That culture, embodied in ranks, saluting uniforms, drill, etc., is largely a product of first generation warfare. It is a culture of order. At the time it evolved it was consistent with the battlefield, which was itself dominated by order. The ideal army was a perfectly oiled machine, and that was what the military culture of order sought to produce.

However, each new generation has brought a major shift toward a battlefield of disorder. The military culture, which has remained a culture of order, has become contradictory to the battlefield. Even in the third generation warfare, the contradiction has not been insoluble; the Wehrmacht bridged it effectively, outwardly maintaining the traditional culture of order while in combat demonstrating the adaptability and fluidity a disorderly battlefield demands. But other militaries, such as the British, have been less successful at dealing with the contradiction. They have often attempted to carry the culture of order over onto the battlefield with disastrous results. At Biddulphsberg, in the Boer War, for example, a handful of Boers defeated two British Guards battalions that fought as if on parade.

The contradiction between the military culture and the nature of modern war confronts a traditional military Service with a dilemma. Terrorists resolve the dilemma by eliminating the culture of order. Terrorists do not have uniforms, drill, saluting or, for the most part, ranks. Potentially, they have or could develop a military culture that is consistent with the disorderly nature of modern war. The fact that their broader culture may be non-Western may facilitate this development.

Even in equipment, terrorism may point toward signs of a change in generations. Typically, an older generation requires much greater resources to achieve a given end than does its successor. Today, the United States is spending $500 million apiece for stealth bombers. A terrorist stealth bomber is a car with a bomb in the trunk—a car that looks like every other car.

Terrorism, Technology, and Beyond

Again, we are not suggesting terrorism is the fourth generation. It is not a new phenomenon, and so far it has proven largely ineffective. However, what do we see if we combine terrorism with some of the new technology we have discussed? For example, that effectiveness might the terrorist have if his car bomb were a product of genetic engineering rather than high explosives? To draw our potential fourth generation out still further, what if we combined terrorism, high technology, and the following additional elements?

A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion. Our national security capabilities are designed to operate within a nation-state framework. Outside that framework, they have great difficulties. The drug war provides an example. Because the drug traffic has no nation-state base, it is very difficult to attack. The nation-state shields the drug lords but cannot control them. We cannot attack them without violating the sovereignty of a friendly nation. A fourth-generation attacker could well operate in a similar manner, as some Middle Eastern terrorists already do.

A direct attack on the enemy's culture. Such an attack works from within as well as from without. It can bypass not only the enemy's military but the state itself. The United States is already suffering heavily from such a cultural attack in the form of the drug traffic. Drugs directly attack our culture. They have the support of a powerful "fifth column," the drug buyers. They bypass the entire state apparatus despite our best efforts. Some ideological elements in South America see drugs as a weapon; they call them the "poor man's intercontinental ballistic missile." They prize the drug traffic not only for the money it brings in through which we finance the war against ourselves — but also for the damage it does to the hated North Americans.

Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media, particularly television news. Some terrorists already know how to play this game. More broadly, hostile forces could easily take advantage of a significant product of television reporting — the fact that on television the enemy's casualties can be almost as devastating on the home front as are friendly casualties. If we bomb an enemy city, the pictures of enemy civilian dead brought into every living room in the country on the evening news can easily turn what may have been a military success (assuming we also hit the military target) into a serious defeat.

All of these elements already exist. They are not the product of "futurism," of gazing into a crystal ball. We are simply asking what would we face if they were all combined? Would such a combination constitute at least the beginnings of a fourth generation of warfare? One thought that suggests they might is that third (not to speak of second) generation militaries would seem to have little capability against such a synthesis. This is typical of generational shifts.

The purpose of this paper is to pose a question, not to answer it. The partial answers suggested here may in fact prove to be false leads. But in view of the fact that third generation warfare is now over 70 years old, we should be asking ourselves the question, what will the fourth generation be?

by William S. Lind
Rather than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. The framework is the Four Generations of Modern War.

I developed the framework of the first three generations ("generation" is shorthand for dialectically qualitative shift) in the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps. Marines kept asking, "What will the Fourth Generation be like?", and I began to think about that. The result was the article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al-Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.

The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With the Treaty of Westphalia, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars – families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises – using many different means, not just armies and navies (two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue). Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves.

The First Generation of Modern War runs roughly from 1648 to 1860. This was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs from the fact that the battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian" - uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank – were products of the First Generation and are intended to reinforce the culture of order.

The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight (an 18th century's soldier's main objective was to desert), rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.

The problem ever since has been a growing contradiction between the military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of order that was once consistent with the environment in which it operated has become more and more at odds with it.

Second Generation warfare was one answer to this contradiction. Developed by the French Army during and after World War I, it sought a solution in mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The goal was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Centrally-controlled firepower was carefully synchronized, using detailed, specific plans and orders, for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, in a "conducted battle" where the commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.

Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. The focus was inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.

Second Generation warfare is relevant to us today because the United States Army and Marine Corps learned Second Generation warfare from the French during and after World War I. It remains the American way of war, as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq: to Americans, war means "putting steel on target." Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of most firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine's formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps' desert warfare training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is true at the Army's Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, "I don't know why I have to teach you all this old French crap, but I do."

Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare.

Third Generation warfare is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's rear and collapse him from the rear forward: instead of "close with and destroy," the motto is "bypass and collapse." In the defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where forces attempt to hold or advance a "line;" Third Generation warfare is non-linear.

Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process and method (in war games in the 19th Century, German junior officers were routinely given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders). Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but never the method ("Auftragstaktik"). Initiative is more important than obedience (mistakes are tolerated, so long as they come from too much initiative rather than too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in reality they had broken with the culture of order.

Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.

Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian West's oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war, invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army.

Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes) and a poisonous ideology of "multiculturalism," is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war – which is by far the most dangerous kind.

Where does the war in Iraq fit in this framework?

I suggest that the war we have seen thus far is merely a powder train leading to the magazine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a wide variety of Islamic non-state actors, directed at America and Americans (and local governments friendly to America) everywhere. The longer America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance that the magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all.

For almost two years, a small seminar has been meeting at my house to work on the question of how to fight Fourth Generation war. It is made up mostly of Marines, lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, with one Army officer, one National Guard tanker captain and one foreign officer. We figured somebody ought to be working on the most difficult question facing the U.S. armed forces, and nobody else seems to be.

The seminar recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the ideas it has come up with, and use this column to that end. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the whole task may be hopeless; state militaries may not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they do.

But for what they are worth, here are our thoughts to date:

If America had some Third Generation ground forces, capable of maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away with few casualties. To fight such battles we need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S. Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilometers.

Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions, but might some be open to a chivalric code governing how our war with them would be fought? It's worth exploring.

How U.S. forces conduct themselves after the battle may be as important in 4GW as how they fight the battle.

What the Marine Corps calls "cultural intelligence" is of vital importance in 4GW, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Marines seemed to grasp this much better than the U.S. Army.

What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces? The seminar thought minds were more important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. SOF understand this.

One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people.

Unfortunately, the American doctrine of "force protection" works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here's a quote from the minutes of the seminar:

"There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives."

What "wins" at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 4GW is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.

We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.

What can the U.S. military learn from cops? Our reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops; are we taking advantage of what they know?

One key to success in 4GW may be "losing to win." Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it is very difficult to recreate it. Here's another quote from the minutes of the seminar:

"The discussion concluded that while war against another state may be necessary one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the 'honors of war,' tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat 'civilized' so they can survive the war institutionally intact and then work for your side. This would be similar to 18th century notions of civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is always a serious mistake but one that Americans are prone to make. This is because the 'football mentality' we have developed since World War II works against us."

In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war between the forces of 4GW and Brave New World. The 4GW forces understand this, while the international elites that seek BNW do not. Another quote from the minutes:

"Osama bin Ladin, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security but it is also leadership by example. It may make it harder to separate (physically or psychologically) the 4GW leaders from their troops. It also makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their followers… This contrasts dramatically with the BNW elites who are physically and psychologically separated (by a huge gap) from their followers (even the generals in most conventional armies are to a great extent separated from their men)… The BNW elites are in many respects occupying the moral low ground but don't know it."

In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Italians in many ways were more effective than the Germans. The key to their success is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus, the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion as more effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines did not want to fight. What lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?

How would the Mafia do an occupation?

When we have a coalition, what if we let each country do what is does best, e.g., the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. firepower and logistics, maybe the Italians the occupation?

How could the Defense Department's concept of "Transformation" be redefined so as to come to grips with 4GW? If you read the current "Transformation Planning Guidance" put out by DOD, you find nothing in it on 4GW, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two wars we are now fighting. It is all oriented toward fighting other state armed forces that fight us symmetrically.

The seminar intends to continue working on this question of redefining "Transformation" (die Verwandlung?) so as to make it relevant to 4GW. However, for our December meeting, we have posed the following problem: It is Spring, 2004. The U.S. Marines are to relieve the Army in the occupation of Fallujah, perhaps Iraq's hottest hot spot (and one where the 82nd Airborne's tactics have been pouring gasoline on the fire). You are the commander of the Marine force taking over Fallujah. What do you do?

I'll let you know what we come up with.

Will Saddam’s capture mark a turning point in the war in Iraq? Don’t count on it. Few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam’s capture may lead to a fractioning of the Baath Party, which would move us further toward a Fourth Generation situation where no one can recreate the state. It may also tell the Shiites that they no longer need America to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in their struggle for free elections.

If the U.S. Army used the capture of Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. But I don’t think we’ll that be smart. When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems nobody in the American military gets it.

Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General Mattis, commander of I MAR DIV, to ask his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of taking time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools. "Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation," Mattis said. "It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead."

Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as General Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation warfare. He said in his missive, "Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the ‘4th Generation of War’ intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say…’Not really…"

Well, that isn’t quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just "the extension of politics by other means." And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces. When I am asked to recommend a good book describing what a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually suggest Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century.

Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call "terrorism," are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.

As I have said before in this column, most of what we are facing in Iraq today is not yet Fourth Generation warfare, but a War of National Liberation, fought by people whose goal is to restore a Baathist state. But as that goal fades and those forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe. A good example is the advent of female suicide bombers; do U.S. troops now start frisking every Moslem woman they encounter? The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.

General Mattis is correct that none of this is new. It is only new to state armed forces that were designed to fight other state armed forces. The fact that no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy reminds us that Clio has a sense of humor: history also teaches us that not all problems have solutions.

Asymmetric tactics and network-centric warfare demand a new look at command and control. Information now is a weapon of choice; software, radio frequencies and bandwidth are critical commodities; networks are essential delivery platforms; and access controls are mandatory. All must be melded into operational art. The foremost challenge for commanders and staffs in this new battlespace environment may be the command and control (C2) of the infostructure.

The acronym C2 will be useful in 21st century warfare only if it is redefined to reflect realities of asymmetric warfare against unconventional foes on an information-rich battlefield. Each of the armed forces will field nimble and powerful formations equipped with cutting-edge technologies that will be useless unless matched with fundamental changes in organization, training, doctrine and command and control processes.

Terms such as consultation, collaboration, cooperation and coordination express the vital relationships that must be established among disparate yet richly interconnected fighting units. These relationships are essential if their individual skills and initiatives are to conjoin to achieve common joint and coalition goals.

“Slaves to technology in their thinking” is how two Chinese authors describe the U.S. penchant to seek quick and easy technical solutions to new operational problems. History is replete with examples of information technology that induced changes in the doctrine, organization and employment of land, sea and air formations. Rail, telegraph, telephone and radio each inspired, enabled and, in some instances, mandated substantial change in methods of control of the battleground. But, until now, these changes have been gradual and evolutionary and have enhanced centralized control—satisfying, in the words of one commentator, the desire of “commanders to command and staffs to staff.”

However, the arrival of digital information age technology heralds a true revolution in military affairs. This revolution demands substantial changes not only in organization and doctrine but also in the exercise of centralized command and the management of information systems over which control is exercised. Seminal research by Kevin Kelly, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Sean Edwards and Martin Libicki, to name a few, provides a useful guide to trace and understand the flows and forces that information technologies have impressed on warfare in the past. These analysts discuss the evolution of the following flows and forces:

•Melee—the primeval state of war with no discernible organization, no need for C2 and no technologies beyond the visual and the aural acuity of the combatants. Aerial dogfights in both world wars are examples.

•Massing—where written messages and primitive signaling enabled a hierarchically organized central authority to command and control dispersed mass forces, achieving maximum shock and firepower. These tactics were last seen in attrition war on the linear battlegrounds of World War I, World War II and Korea.

•Maneuver—exploiting electronic communication and sensing technologies for command and control of complex, synchronized, multilinear operations that surprised, penetrated and flanked, and focused on the decisive point. These have been described as two-way technologies that turned armed forces into sensing as well as fighting units and were most recently seen as AirLand doctrine in operation Desert Storm.

•Swarming—“a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military strikes from all directions … sustainable pulsing of force or fire … from a myriad of small, dispersed, networked maneuver units,” as noted by Arquilla, among others, and where information and sensing technologies empower lower-level units to function more effectively without hierarchical command levels.

Swarming is an ancient form of asymmetric warfare that has resurfaced under new colors. Without using that term, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA, writing in the Joint Force Quarterly, describes a counterstrategy in which an adversary seeks to gain an objective then quickly disperses to avoid the killing effect of firepower. He writes that this is a way for “adaptive enemies [to] achieve victory by avoiding defeat.” It is one, Gen. Scales continues, that can be an effective challenge to the Western way of war established through a “characteristic arrogance” that presumes that threats must be symmetrical or must mimic Western war methods.

Gen. Scales and other analysts, such as Sean Edwards in Swarming on the Battlefield, provide examples of various asymmetric tactics: China in 1946-49 and the Chosin Reservoir in Korea; the destruction of the German submarine fleet in the North Atlantic in World War II; the defeat of the U.S. Army at St. Clair in 1791 and in Somalia in 1993; tactics by both sides and the public at home during the Vietnam conflict; the “swarm of bees” that forced British regulars to run a 16-mile gauntlet from Concord to Charlestown in 1776; the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the Russian stalemate in Chechnya; and most recently, the Serbian army in Kosovo.

Swarming engagements are characterized by pulsing attacks from all quarters by an often inferior but elusive opponent. They are successful because of tactical elements such as limited objectives, adequate weaponry and communications, terrain-tailored tactics and superior situational awareness. This enables defeat, in detail, of forces that never could have been overcome by mass or maneuver. The synergy of these elements is held by some analysts to be a consistent factor in both the tactical and the strategic application of swarming—past, present and our post-Cold-War future as well.

None of these elements necessarily demands cutting-edge technology. Any can be synthesized into a particularly effective tactic to confront a modern mechanized army in low-intensity conflict and unconventional warfare. These conflicts are widely predicted to dominate U.S. security concerns in the immediate future. This is outlined in Recommendation 33 in Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, January 31, 2001.

“The information revolution and advances in information operations in particular are giving swarming an opportunity to diffuse across much of the spectrum of conflict. … The phenomenon of swarming is likely to have overarching effects on military affairs in coming years,” Arquilla and others note. Scenarios as diverse as the “shock and awe” effect exhorted in the concept of parallel attacks by Col. John Warden, USAF, and distributed denial of service attacks on the Internet both possess the essential attributes of swarming.

Some analysts find a musical metaphor useful in grasping the ever-changing role of and increasing dependence on information under different warfighting scenarios and in assessing the demands that network technology will make on organization, training, doctrine and operations. A current U.S. Defense Department lecture on information operations describes the necessary symphonic integration of a myriad of separate elements that must effectively link and integrate for a common objective—as in, for example, AirLand doctrine. The Chinese also find that metaphor useful, as Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui write in their 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare. “The situation of loud solo parts is in the process of being replaced by a multipart chorus,” they state.

But, decentralized, self-synchronized network-centric warfare with sophisticated sensing and striking capabilities at the very tip of the combat spear demands far more of command and control than does the orchestration of a symphony with its centralized direction and well-rehearsed score. Widely dispersed combat units, which must necessarily act as one, will not benefit from centralized orchestration. Instead, they require the integrated flexibility described by musician Wynton Marsalis in explaining how innovative and individualistic jazz artists “negotiate their agendas” in real-time pursuit of a common theme—in this case, commander’s intent.

Some essential attributes must be included in the redefined C2 in support of decentralized and self-synchronized, multidimensional orchestration of military operations:

•Networks must function securely and be resistant to all forms of malicious attack, including electromagnetic disruption. This requires a new architecture providing diversity in both transmission media and operating systems, positive network access control, node hardening and path redundancy.

•Senior officials who share situational awareness with combat units must refrain from interfering. One author describes this as a command element with “topsight” that knows a great deal but that devolves control to lower echelons and intervenes sparingly.

•Junior-level officers must be trained to think in high-level ways because their actions likely will have immediate effect at the operational or strategic levels. Cmdr. Paul Murdock, USN (Ret.), describes this as “diffused implementation” or operational art that requires tactical operations officers to “know how to think at the operational level.”

•Personnel must be trained to function in an information-rich environment, quickly sifting knowledge from a deluge of data yet able to perform when information systems fail or data are corrupted.

•Doctrine should integrate the data gathering of all services and provide methods to share essential operational information with coalition partners when necessary.

Col. Alan D. Campen, USAF (Ret.), is manager, AFCEA International Press; contributing editor to SIGNAL; a member of the adjunct faculty, School of Information Warfare and Strategy, National Defense University; and contributing co-editor of the latest AFCEA International Press book, Cyberwar 3.0: Human Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict.
- See more at: http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=swar....5MyNSQMJ.dpuf

This, I believe, is an essential topic for any true white nationalist. We have to concede that the Jews and their minions have won the battle for institutional control. Any movement within the existing institutions therefore is at best an uphill fight, and at worst an exercise is self-identifying so that our enemies can target us.

Life is violence. From the lowliest mole eating a worm to the implicit violence required to force taxation to the outright murder of the enemies of the jew but moronic white patriotards, it is all violence.

__________________
Channon and Chris; gone but not forgotten.

Fuck you hippie, you are the system.

Jews are not just a race or just a religion; they are a race who worship themselves religiously.

from my experience in the US (and principal reason I don't live there anymore) is that the criminal justice system is so slanted against European Americans that you don't have any choice but to be a victim if you live in a poor or borderline neighborhood. I was attacked numerous times by the "minorities" once being critically wounded (sucking chest wound from being stabbed by a mestizto) and it was treated with about the same seriousness as a traffic violation. I fought back against one who had threatened me with a weapon and they wanted to lock me up for five years.

The trouble with the people on the right is, they are too laid back. They are listening to the dribble that we must take the high road. In any war, and we are at war with the democrats and liberals, we must become worse than our enemies. They want to kick us, we shoot them. We must forget any rules and regulations when it comes to war. You will lose if you follow the rules of engagement because in war there is only one rule and that is win no matter what.

The politicians do what the Jews want, because they intimidate them or kill them. Yes violence would work. If just one white person with balls would smoke just one useless politician the next one would think twice. Why do you think there are damn few late term abortion doctors? Because they have smoked a couple of them. Yes violence will work. If Lone Wolves were to whack a politician and leave no evidence, then the next one who prooposed some garbage might think twice

Femegericten

Membership and procedure
The sessions were often held in secret, whence the names of “secret court” (German: heimliches Gericht), “silent court” (German: Stillgericht), etc. Attendance of secret sessions was forbidden to the uninitiated, on pain of death, which led to the designation “forbidden courts” (German: verbotene Gerichte). A chairman (German: Stuhlherr) presided over the court, and lay judges (German: Freischöffen) passed judgment. The court also constituted a Holy Order.

Any free man "of pure bred German stock" and of good character could become a judge. The new candidate was given secret information and identification symbols. The “knowing one” (German: Wissende) had to keep his knowledge secret, even from his closest family (“vor Weib und Kind, vor Sand und Wind”). Lay judges had to give formal warnings to known troublemakers, issue warrants, and take part in executions.

The organization of the Fehme was elaborate. The centre of each jurisdiction was referred to as a “free seat” (German: Freistuhl), and its head or chairman (German: Stuhlherr) was often a secular or spiritual prince, sometimes a civic community, the archbishop of Cologne being supreme over all (German: Oberststuhlherren). The actual president of the court was the “free count” (German: Freigraf, chosen for life by the Stuhlherr from among the Freischöffen, who formed the great body of the initiated. Of these the lowest rank were the Fronboten or Freifronen, charged with the maintenance of order in the courts and the duty of carrying out the commands of the Freigraf. The immense development of the Fehme is explained by the privileges of the Freischöffen; for they were subject to no jurisdiction but those of the Westphalian courts: whether as accused or accuser they had access to the secret sessions, and they shared in the discussions of the general chapter as to the policy of the society. At their initiation these swore to support the Fehme with all their powers, to guard its secrets, and to bring before its tribunal anything within its competence that they might discover. They were then initiated into the secret signs by which members recognized each other, and were presented with a rope and with a knife on which were engraved the mystic letters S.S.G.G., supposed to mean Stein, Strick, Gras, grün (stone, rope, grass, green).

The Freistuhl was the place of session, and was usually a hillock, or some other well-known and accessible spot. The Freigraf and the Schöffen (judges) occupied the bench, before which a table, with a sword and rope upon it, was placed. The court was held by day and, unless the session was declared secret, all freemen, whether initiated or not, were admitted. The accusation was in the old German form; but only a Freischöffe could act as accuser. If the offence came under the competence of the court, meaning it was punishable by death, a summons to the accused was issued under the seal of the Freigraf. This was not usually served on him personally, but was nailed to his door, or to some convenient place where he was certain to pass. Six weeks and three days' grace were allowed, according to the old Saxon law, and the summons was thrice repeated. If the accused appeared, the accuser stated the case, and the investigation proceeded by the examination of witnesses as in an ordinary court of law. The judgment was put into execution on the spot if that was possible.

The secret court, from whose procedure the whole institution has acquired its evil reputation, was closed to all but the initiated, although these were so numerous as to secure quasi-publicity; any one not a member on being discovered was instantly put to death, and the members present were bound under the same penalty not to disclose what took place. Crimes of a serious nature, and especially those that were deemed unfit for ordinary judicial investigation, such as heresy and witchcraft, fell within its jurisdiction, as also did appeals by persons condemned in the open courts, and likewise the cases before those tribunals in which the accused had not appeared. The accused, if a member, could clear himself by his own oath, unless he had revealed the secrets of the Fehme. If he were one of the uninitiated it was necessary for him to bring forward witnesses to his innocence from among the initiated, whose number varied according to the number on the side of the accuser, but twenty-one in favour of innocence necessarily secured an acquittal. The only punishment which the secret court could inflict was death. If the accused appeared, the sentence was carried into execution at once; if he did not appear, it was quickly made known to the whole body, and the Freischöffe who was the first to meet the condemned was bound to put him to death. This was usually done by hanging, the nearest tree serving for gallows. A knife with the mystic letters was left beside the corpse to show that the deed was not a murder.

It has been claimed[by whom?] that, in some cases, the condemned would be set free, given several hours' head start and then hunted down and put to death. So fearsome was the reputation of the Fehme and its reach that many thus released committed suicide rather than prolonging the inevitable. This practice could have been a holdover from the ancient Germanic legal concept of outlawry (Acht).

Legend and romance have combined to exaggerate the sinister reputation of the Fehmic courts; but modern historical research has largely discounted this, proving that they never employed torture, that their sittings were only sometimes secret, and that their meeting-places were always well known.

The spread of the Vehmic courts
The system, though ancient, came into wider use only after the division of the duchy of Saxony after the fall of Henry the Lion, when the archbishop of Cologne Engelbert II of Berg, (also duke of Westphalia from 1180) placed himself at the head of the Fehme as representative of the emperor. The organization then spread rapidly. Every free man born in lawful wedlock and not excommunicated nor an outlaw was eligible for membership.

Princes and nobles were initiated; and in 1429 even the Emperor Sigismund himself became “a true and proper Freischöffe of the Holy Roman Empire.” There is a manuscript in the Town Hall of the Westphalian town of Soest, which consists of an original Vehmic Court Regulation document, along with illustrations.

By the middle of the 14th century these Freischöffen (Latin scabini), sworn associates of the Fehme, were scattered in thousands throughout the length and breadth of Germany, known to each other by secret signs and pass-words, and all of them pledged to serve the summons of the secret courts and to execute their judgment.

We know it works for the left. The left wouldn't have any political power, since it's a minority opinion, without its willingness to murder anyone it needs to. Will violence work for the White Right too?