Wednesday, January 13, 2016

Russia has no
plans to militarize the Arctic. At least, that is a according to Dmitry
Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister charged with overseeing Russia’s
defense industry. Speaking in St. Petersburg, on December 7, at the opening of
the forum “Arctic: Today and the Future,” Rogozin emphasized that Russia’s
rebuilding of military infrastructure in the Arctic is focused on creating the
conditions necessary for Russians to live and work peacefully in the region (Kommersant, December 8, 2015).
Just two days after this, however, Russia announced the opening of a major new
military installation on the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya.

The Novaya Zemlya facility
is home to the first full regiment of Russia’s Northern Fleet located on
Russia’s Arctic islands. Previously, deployments had been limited to smaller individual
units. Its primary role is to secure Russian airspace on the country’s northern
borders. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, modernized S-300
surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have been deployed to Novaya Zemlya to
achieve this. These systems, which have been modified to be able to work in Arctic
conditions, are capable of intercepting aircraft and intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) within a 400-kilometer perimeter around the site (Mil.ru, December
9, 10,
2015; TVRain.ru,
December 9, 2015). This marks a return of anti-aircraft/anti-ballistic missile
capabilities to Novaya Zemlya, last present on the island in the early 1990s (Interfax,
December 12, 2015).

In addition to the
S-300s, the installation on Novaya Zemlya is reportedly outfitted with weapons
systems to defend from both air and sea attack. The Pantsir-S1 (NATO name:
SA-22 “Greyhound”) is a combination weapons system that includes short- to
medium-range surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. This system
is capable of engaging aircraft and missiles flying at lower altitudes and has
a 20 km range, providing air defense for the area immediately surrounding the
installation. Likewise, the Bastion-P Costal Defense System (NATO name: SSC-5)
is capable of defending the area from surface-level ships. This system uses Oniks
supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (NATO name: SS-N-26 “Strobile”; also known
as the “Yakhont” in export markets). Traveling at a speed of Mach 2.5, these
missiles have a range of 120–300 km and are capable of engaging various
surfaces ships, carrier battle groups, convoys and landing crafts. Beyond
providing for the general defense of the installation on Novaya Zemlya, the
range of the Oniks missiles allows the Russians to create a choke point,
preventing the passage of ships from the Barents Sea to the Pechora Sea and onward
along the Northern Sea Route.

Further evidence
of Russia’s push to establish its presence in the Arctic can be seen in both
the organization of the Russian military and in official doctrine. In late
December 2014, Russia’s Northern Fleet left the Western Military District to
form the foundation of the newly created Arctic Joint Strategic Command.
Although it does not have the title of a military district, the Arctic Joint
Strategic Command is functionally a fifth military district responsible for
securing Russia’s entire northern border and the Arctic. This structural
reorganization, which is representative of the priority that the Kremlin is
placing on the Arctic, was intended to centralize responsibility for the
administration of this zone within the Russian military. Prior to this, these
responsibilities were spread across the Western, Central, and Eastern military
districts and the Northern and Pacific Fleets (TopWar.ru,
September 15, 2014). The hope is that this restructuring will allow for the
more efficient and effective administration of Russia’s growing military
resources in the Arctic.

This structural
reorganization came in the lead-up to the Russian government’s release of its
new maritime doctrine this past August (see EDM,
August 11, 2015). The Kremlin’s Arctic ambitions are reflected in the document,
which dedicates a whole section to the region. At a glance, establishing firm
control over its northern borders and the nearby Arctic zone is important to
Russia for two reasons: 1) ensuring the passage of its Northern Fleet to the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans and 2) safeguarding Russia’s access to the abundant
oil and gas resources in the area. Russia’s new Maritime Doctrine clearly
articulates both of these points. However, the doctrine also dedicates
significant attention to the increase of Russian military activity in the
Arctic and specifies that one of Moscow’s goals is to restrict foreign military
activity in the area (Kremlin.ru,
July 26, 2015). Russia’s opening of the military installation on Novaya Zemlya
is a major step toward establishing the regional capabilities that will make
these goals a reality.

The opening of the
new Russian military installation on Novaya Zemlya is all the more notable when
contextualized with Russia’s other activities in the Arctic. In conjunction
with Rogozin’s aforementioned proclamation, the opening of a new S-400 site in
Tiksi, Sakha Republic, was also announced (Kommersant, December 8, 2015).
Furthermore, Russia has built five other military bases on its Arctic islands
(New Siberian Islands, Alexandra Land, Severnaya Zemlya, Cape Schmidt, and
Wrangle Island) and began construction of over 440 military infrastructure
projects that were due to be completed by the end of 2015. Future projects
include the construction of a major airbase that is due to be completed by 2017
(Kommersant, December 8,
2015).

As a part of a
larger network of new and reopened Russian military installations in the
Arctic, the base on Novaya Zemlya is the Russian military’s largest unveiling
in the region thus far. The weapons systems deployed there give it firm control
over the Western end of the Northern Sea Route, as it exists along Russia’s
borders. Continued development in the region promises to increase Russia’s
capabilities and extend this level of control across Russia’s entire expansive
northern border. Russian officials, like Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin,
continuously emphasize that their goal is only to maintain stability and
security in the region so that life in Russia’s northernmost regions can
develop peacefully and its people can prosper from the resource wealth of the
area. Nevertheless, the reality remains that Russia is rapidly changing the
facts on the ground in the Arctic. While Moscow claims it is not trying to
militarize the High North, Russia’s rapidly expanding military presence in the
Arctic increases the possibility for conflict as other countries begin to
assert their interests in the region.

Thursday, January 7, 2016

The Trans-Baikal
Region is not generally known for its contentious politics or social
disharmonies. But a recent open letter from the Public Chamber of the region to
the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan of Chita suggests one could be in the offing.

On December 30, the
Trans-Baikal Public Chamber—an organization created in 2010 to resolve social
and political problems and defend civil rights in the region—addressed a letter
to the head of the city of Chita’s Orthodox Church, criticizing the suggested
transfer to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) of a building now housing a museum
dedicated to the 19th century “Decembrist” movement. The open letter
stated that “the mere posing of the question to transfer the building to the
ROC has become one of the most talked-about in the region, caused a wave of
indignation, and actually promised to split the society, threatening to develop
into civic strife… the pretensions of the Chita Metropolitan might become the
start of a dangerous split in a territory marked by peace, stability, and unity
in the Trans-Baikal region of which we are proud. We reckon that today it would
be a sign of positive historical memory, a sign of respect for people-patriots
of Russia, local pride in our region as a place of kindness and knowledge, for
the securing of social unity and peace, to preserve the Decembrist museum in
its present form” (Sova-center.ru,
December 30, 2015).

The museum
commemorating the Decembrists was opened in 1985 in Chita, the location of the first
cooperative community they had organized in the region. The Decembrists were
originally a group of liberal officers from the Russian army who were
encouraged by the reforms of Tsar Alexander I to demand further change and
modernization in their society. The group was made famous in the 1825
revolutionary uprising against Tsar Nicholas I, an event interpreted by some
observers after the fall of Communism as proof of Russia’s democratic heritage
and aptitude for democracy.

At the Christmas
session of the local legislature in Chita, Metropolitan Vladimir petitioned for
the transfer of the building used to house the Decembrist museum to the ROC. Deputy
Roman Shcherbakov supported the transfer, as did the leader of the Zabaikalsky
Cossacks, Ataman Gennadi Chupin. Similarly, the consul of the Australian branch
of the Zabaikalsky Cossacks called on his followers to mobilize in defense of
the church of the Archangel Michael. Activists from the regional branch of the
Russian Union of Architects have opposed the conversion of the building into a
church; and regional authorities recently prohibited the construction of a
church on the site of a local sports stadium. Reportedly, the activists have
also contested the claims of Chita’s 140-year-old Cossack organization to a
building dating back some 300 years (Chita.ru,
December 30). It remains to be seen how the issue will resolve itself, but the
contest is a microcosm of one of the larger social debates in Russia today.

The debate over
whether Russian national identity is an ethnic or civic category—the Russki/ Rossianie debate—has been in existence since the fall of the Soviet
Union (Valery Tishkov, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict After the Soviet
Union: The Mind Aflame,” 1997). The Decembrists are a symbol of a liberal,
civic, and inclusive sense of Russian national identity; the ROC’s attempt to
impose control over sites of popular memory symbolizes a conservative, ethnic,
and exclusive sense. Some analysts have claimed that this debate is behind the
spate of race riots in Russian cities over the past several years, including
the 2010 riots on Moscow’s Manezh Square (see EDM,
March 5, 2014; Vera Tolz and Steven Hutchings, Nation, Race, and Ethnicity on Russian Television, 2015) as well as
calls to establish a segregationist regime with the North Caucasus. Debates
over Russian national identity—and the need to undermine the appeal of ethnic-Russian
nationalists by assuming elements of their agenda—are also behind Russia’s
annexation of Crimea as well as the Kremlin championing the interests of ethnic
Russians in Donbas (see EDM,
October 23, 2015). Therefore, if not handled tactfully by the authorities, the
fate of a relatively minor museum in a remote Russian province could boil over
into the kind of social conflict warned about by the Trans-Baikal public
chamber.

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