Editorial: U.S. should call Karzai’s bluff

If Afghan President Hamid Karzai is bluffing with his 11th hour set of new conditions for the U.S. and NATO to remain in Afghanistan, we should call his bluff. If he's not bluffing, we should start packing up to depart our longest war by the end of 2014.

Milford Daily News

Writer

Posted Nov. 30, 2013 at 12:01 AM
Updated Nov 30, 2013 at 11:38 PM

Posted Nov. 30, 2013 at 12:01 AM
Updated Nov 30, 2013 at 11:38 PM

» Social News

If Afghan President Hamid Karzai is bluffing with his 11th hour set of new conditions for the U.S. and NATO to remain in Afghanistan, we should call his bluff. If he's not bluffing, we should start packing up to depart our longest war by the end of 2014.

The U.S. thought it had reached agreement with Karzai on a Bilateral Security Agreement that could have kept the U.S. there for up to another 10 years. Indeed, the agreement had been "overwhelmingly" - the White House's word - endorsed by a loya jirga, an informal but influential council of Afghan notables.

But at the very end of a three-day visit to Kabul by President Obama's national security adviser Susan Rice, Karzai suddenly sprang a new set of demands on the U.S. delegation.

This is a typical Karzai tactic, but enough is enough.

Karzai said he would not sign the pact "if another (U.S.) soldier sets foot in an Afghan home" even though tough new restrictions on such entries have already been agreed on.

Instead of signing the BSA by the end of this year, as agreed, Karzai now says he won't sign until after his country's presidential elections in April. If he doesn't sign when and as promised, the White House national security council backed up Rice by saying the U.S. would have "no choice" but to leave; our NATO allies would be only too happy to leave with us.

Karzai also demanded that the U.S. release the 17 Afghanis being held at Guantanamo. We should be grateful for the opportunity to get rid of them but there are necessary U.S. legal and security procedures to be followed.

Rather bizarrely, Karzai said he wants the U.S. to join with him in peace talks with the Taliban, although last summer when the U.S. arranged such talks in Qatar Karzai refused to attend.

Going to war in Afghanistan wasn’t a mistake, given the fresh wound of the 9/11 attacks directed by terrorists the ruling Taliban had harbored there. But after chasing the Taliban from Kabul and chasing al-Qaida out of their havens, the war morphed into nation-building, a well-intentioned mission to tame a wild nation that has resisted outsiders for centuries.

A key move in that mission was elevating Karzai, whose tribal and family associations outweighed doubts about his stability and honesty. That big mistake has undermined a decade of sacrifices by the U.S. and its NATO allies. Karzai could have been Afghanistan’s George Washington or Nelson Mandela. Instead, he has failed in just about everything except holding on to power.

We doubt another decade in Afghanistan will change much. America simply cannot impose good governance on that country if the Afghans themselves are unwilling to take the lead. Karzai has provided us ample reason to pull out in 2014 and leave the Afghans to their fate. Washington should tell Karzai what to do with his demands and head for the exits.