The two armies began to collide at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863,
as Lee urgently concentrated his forces there. Low ridges to the
northwest of town were defended initially by a Union cavalry
division, which was soon reinforced with two corps of Union infantry. However, two large
Confederate corps assaulted them from the northwest and north,
collapsing the hastily developed Union lines, sending the defenders
retreating through the streets of town to the hills just to the
south.

On the second day of battle, most of both armies had assembled.
The Union line was laid out in a defensive formation resembling a
fishhook. Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank, and
fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the
Peach Orchard. On the
Union right, demonstrations escalated into
full-scale assaults on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. All across the
battlefield, despite significant losses, the Union defenders held
their lines.

On the third day of battle, July 3, fighting resumed on Culp's
Hill, and cavalry battles raged to the east and south, but the main
event was a dramatic infantry assault by 12,500 Confederates
against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge known as Pickett's
Charge. The charge was repulsed by Union rifle and artillery fire, at great losses
to the Confederate army. Lee led his army on a torturous retreat back to Virginia.
Between 46,000 and 51,000 Americans were casualties in the
three-day battle. That November, President Lincoln used the
dedication ceremony for the Gettysburg National
Cemetery to honor the fallen and redefine the purpose of the
war in his historic Gettysburg Address.

Shortly after the Army of Northern Virginia won a major victory
over the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville
(April 30 – May 6, 1863), Robert E. Lee decided upon a second
invasion of the North (the first was the unsuccessful Maryland
Campaign of September 1862, which ended in the bloody Battle of
Antietam). Such a move would upset Federal plans for the summer
campaigning season and possibly reduce the pressure on the besieged
Confederate garrison at Vicksburg. It would allow the
Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich Northern farms
while giving war-ravaged Virginia a much needed rest. In addition,
Lee's 72,000-man army[3]
could threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and
Washington, and possibly strengthen
the growing peace movement in the North.[6]

The Union Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker,
consisted of seven infantry corps, a cavalry corps, and an
Artillery Reserve, for a combined strength of about 94,000 men.[2]
However, President Lincoln replaced Hooker with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, a Pennsylvanian,
because of Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville and his
timid response to Lee's second invasion north of the Potomac River.

The first major action of the campaign took place on June 9
between the opposing cavalry forces at Brandy Station, near Culpeper,
Virginia. The 9,500 Confederate cavalrymen under Stuart were
surprised by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton's combined arms force
of two cavalry divisions (8,000 troopers) and 3,000 infantry, but
Stuart eventually repulsed the Union attack. The inconclusive
battle, the largest predominantly cavalry engagement of the war,
proved that for the first time, the Union horse soldier was equal
to his Southern counterpart.[8]

By mid-June, the Army of Northern Virginia was poised to cross
the Potomac River and enter Maryland. After defeating the Federal
garrisons at Winchester and Martinsburg, Ewell's Second
Corps began crossing the river on June 15. Hill's and Longstreet's
corps followed on June 24 and June 25. Hooker's army pursued,
keeping between the U.S. capital and Lee's army. The Federals
crossed the Potomac from June 25 to June 27.[9]

Lee gave strict orders to his army to minimize any negative
impacts on the civilian population.[10] Food,
horses, and other supplies were generally not seized outright,
although quartermasters reimbursing Northern farmers and merchants
using Confederate money
were not well received. Various towns, most notably York,
Pennsylvania, were required to pay indemnities in lieu of
supplies, under threat of destruction. The most controversial of
the Confederate actions during the invasion was the seizure of some
forty northern African
Americans, a few of whom were escaped slaves but most freemen. They were sent
south into slavery under guard.[11]

On June 26, elements of Maj. Gen. Jubal Early's division
of Ewell's Corps occupied the town of Gettysburg after chasing off
newly raised Pennsylvania militia in a series of minor skirmishes. Early
laid the borough under tribute but did not collect any significant
supplies. Soldiers burned several railroad cars and a covered bridge,
and they destroyed nearby rails and telegraph lines. The
following morning, Early departed for adjacent York County.[12]

This 1863 oval-shaped map depicts Gettysburg Battlefield during
July 1-3, 1863, showing troop and artillery positions and
movements, relief by hachures, drainage, roads, railroads, and
houses with the names of residents at the time of the Battle of
Gettysburg.

Meanwhile, in a controversial move, Lee allowed J.E.B. Stuart to
take a portion of the army's cavalry and ride around the east flank
of the Union army. Lee's orders gave Stuart much latitude, and both
generals share the blame for the long absence of Stuart's cavalry,
as well as for the failure to assign a more active role to the
cavalry left with the army. Stuart and his three best brigades were
absent from the army during the crucial phase of the approach to
Gettysburg and the first two days of battle. By June 29, Lee's army
was strung out in an arc from Chambersburg (28 miles
(45 km) northwest of Gettysburg) to Carlisle (30 miles (48 km)
north of Gettysburg) to near Harrisburg and Wrightsville on the Susquehanna
River.[13]

In a dispute over the use of the forces defending the Harpers Ferry garrison,
Hooker offered his resignation, and Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, who were looking for an
excuse to get rid of him, immediately accepted. They replaced him
early on the morning of June 28 with Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade,
at the time commander of the V Corps.[14]

On June 29, when Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had
crossed the eponymous river, he ordered a concentration of his
forces around Cashtown, located
at the eastern base of South
Mountain and eight miles (13 km) west of Gettysburg.[15] On
June 30, while part of Hill's Corps was in Cashtown, one of Hill's
brigades, North Carolinians under Brig. Gen.J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured
toward Gettysburg. The memoirs of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander,
claimed that he sent Pettigrew to search for supplies in
town—especially shoes.[16]

When Pettigrew's troops approached Gettysburg on June 30, they
noticed Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. John Buford arriving south of town, and
Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them. When
Pettigrew told Hill and Heth about what he had seen, neither
general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or
near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania
militia. Despite General Lee's order to avoid a general engagement
until his entire army was concentrated, Hill decided to mount a
significant reconnaissance in force the following
morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in
his front. Around 5 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, two brigades of
Heth's division advanced to Gettysburg.[17]

First day of
battle

Buford laid out his defenses on three ridges west of Gettysburg:
Herr Ridge, McPherson Ridge, and Seminary Ridge. These were
appropriate terrain for a delaying action by his small cavalry
division against superior Confederate infantry forces, meant to buy
time awaiting the arrival of Union infantrymen who could occupy the
strong defensive positions south of town at Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge,
and Culp's Hill.
Buford understood that if the Confederates could gain control of
these heights, Meade's army would have difficulty dislodging
them.[18]

Heth's division advanced with two brigades forward, commanded by
Brig. Gens. James J. Archer and Joseph R.
Davis. They proceeded easterly in columns along the
Chambersburg Pike. Three miles (5 km) west of town, about 7:30
a.m. on July 1, Heth's two brigades met light resistance from vedettes of Union cavalry, and
deployed into line. According to the lore, the first Union soldier
to fire was Lt. Marcellus Jones.[19] In
1886 Lt. Jones returned to Gettysburg to mark the spot where he
fired the first shot with a monument.[20]
Eventually, Heth's men reached dismounted troopers from Col. William Gamble's cavalry brigade, who
raised determined resistance and delaying tactics from behind fence
posts with fire from their breechloading carbines.[21] By
10:20 a.m., the Confederates had pushed the Union cavalrymen east
to McPherson Ridge, when the vanguard of the I
Corps (Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds) finally arrived.[22]

North of the pike, Davis gained a temporary success against
Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade but was
repulsed with heavy losses in an action around an unfinished
railroad bed cut in the ridge. South of the pike, Archer's brigade
assaulted through Herbst (also known as McPherson's) Woods. The
Federal Iron
Brigade under Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith enjoyed initial
success against Archer, capturing several hundred men, including
Archer himself.[23]

Early in the fighting, while General Reynolds was directing
troop and artillery placements just to the east of the woods, he
fell from his horse, killed by a bullet, which struck him behind
the right ear.[24] Maj.
Gen. Abner
Doubleday assumed command. Fighting in the Chambersburg Pike
area lasted until about 12:30 p.m. It resumed around 2:30 p.m.,
when Heth's entire division engaged, adding the brigades of
Pettigrew and Col. John M. Brockenbrough.[25]

As Pettigrew's North Carolina Brigade came on line, they flanked the
19th Indiana and drove the Iron Brigade back. The 26th North
Carolina (the largest regiment in the army with 839 men) lost
heavily, leaving the first day's fight with around 212 men. By the
end of the three-day battle, they had about 152 men standing, the
highest casualty percentage for one battle of any regiment, North
or South.[26]
Slowly the Iron Brigade was pushed out of the woods toward Seminary
Ridge. Hill added Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pender's division
to the assault, and the I Corps was driven back through the grounds
of the Lutheran
Seminary and Gettysburg streets.[27]

As the fighting to the west proceeded, two divisions of Ewell's
Second Corps, marching west toward Cashtown in accordance with
Lee's order for the army to concentrate in that vicinity, turned
south on the Carlisle and Harrisburg Roads toward Gettysburg, while
the Union XI Corps (Maj. Gen. Oliver O.
Howard) raced north on the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road.
By early afternoon, the Federal line ran in a semi-circle west,
north, and northeast of Gettysburg.[28]

However, the Federals did not have enough troops; Cutler, who
was deployed north of the Chambersburg Pike, had his right flank in
the air. The leftmost division of the XI Corps was unable to deploy
in time to strengthen the line, so Doubleday was forced to throw in
reserve brigades to salvage his line.[29]

Around 2:00 p.m., the Second Corps divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes
and Jubal Early assaulted and out-flanked the Union I and XI Corps
positions north and northwest of town. The brigades of Col. Edward A.
O'Neal and Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson suffered severe losses
assaulting the I Corps division of Brig. Gen. John C.
Robinson south of Oak Hill. Early's division profited from a
blunder made by Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, when he advanced
his XI Corps division to Blocher's Knoll (directly north of town
and now known as Barlow's Knoll); this represented a salient[30] in
the corps line, susceptible to attack from multiple sides, and
Early's troops overran his division, which constituted the right
flank of the Union Army's position. Barlow was wounded and captured
in the attack.[31]

As Federal positions collapsed both north and west of town, Gen.
Howard ordered a retreat to the high ground south of town at
Cemetery Hill, where he had left the division of Brig. Gen. Adolph
von Steinwehr as a reserve.[32] Maj.
Gen. Winfield S. Hancock assumed command of the
battlefield, sent by Meade when he heard that Reynolds had been
killed. Hancock, commander of the II Corps and his
most trusted subordinate, was ordered to take command of the field
and to determine whether Gettysburg was an appropriate place for a
major battle.[33]
Hancock told Howard, who was technically superior in rank, "I think
this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle
that I ever saw." When Howard agreed, Hancock concluded the
discussion: "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field."
Hancock's determination had a morale-boosting effect on the
retreating Union soldiers, but he played no direct tactical role on
the first day.[34]

Gen. Lee understood the defensive potential to the Union if they
held this high ground. He sent orders to Ewell that Cemetery Hill
be taken "if practicable." Ewell, who had previously served under
Stonewall Jackson, a general well known for issuing peremptory
orders, determined such an assault was not practicable and, thus,
did not attempt it; this decision is considered by historians to be
a great missed opportunity.[35]

The first day at Gettysburg, more significant than simply a
prelude to the bloody second and third days, ranks as the 23rd
biggest battle of the war by number of troops engaged. About one
quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army
(27,000) were engaged.[36]

Second day
of battle

Plans and movement to
battle

Throughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2, most of
the remaining infantry of both armies arrived on the field,
including the Union II, III, V, VI, and XII Corps.
Longstreet's third division, commanded by George Pickett, had begun the march from
Chambersburg early in the morning; it did not arrive until late on
July 2.[37]

The Union line ran from Culp's Hill southeast of the town,
northwest to Cemetery Hill just south of town, then south for
nearly two miles (3 km) along Cemetery Ridge, terminating just
north of Little Round Top. Most of the XII Corps was on Culp's
Hill; the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill; II
Corps covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge; and III
Corps was ordered to take up a position to its flank. The shape of
the Union line is popularly described as a "fishhook" formation.
The Confederate line paralleled the Union line about a mile (1,600
m) to the west on Seminary Ridge, ran east through the town, then
curved southeast to a point opposite Culp's Hill. Thus, the Federal
army had interior lines, while the Confederate line was nearly five
miles (8 km) in length.[38]

Lee's battle plan for July 2 called for Longstreet's First Corps
to position itself stealthily to attack the Union left flank,
facing northeast astraddle the Emmitsburg Road, and to
roll up the Federal line. The attack sequence was to begin with
Maj. Gens. John
Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws's divisions, followed
by Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division of
Hill's Third Corps. The progressive en echelon sequence of this
attack would prevent Meade from shifting troops from his center to
bolster his left. At the same time, Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's
and Jubal Early's Second Corps divisions were to make a demonstration against Culp's
and Cemetery Hills (again, to prevent the shifting of Federal
troops), and to turn the demonstration into a full-scale attack if
a favorable opportunity presented itself.[39]

Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence,
exacerbated by Stuart's continued absence from the battlefield.
Instead of moving beyond the Federals' left and attacking their
flank, Longstreet's left division, under McLaws, would face Maj.
Gen. Daniel
Sickles's III Corps directly in their path. Sickles was
dissatisfied with the position assigned him on the southern end of
Cemetery Ridge. Seeing higher ground more favorable to artillery
positions a half mile (800 m) to the west, he advanced his
corps—without orders—to the slightly higher ground along the
Emmitsburg Road. The new line ran from Devil's Den, northwest to
the Sherfy farm's Peach Orchard, then northeast along the
Emmitsburg Road to south of the Codori farm. This created an
untenable salient at the Peach Orchard; Brig. Gen. Andrew A.
Humphreys's division (in position along the Emmitsburg Road)
and Maj. Gen. David B. Birney's division (to the
south) were subject to attacks from two sides and were spread out
over a longer front than their small corps could defend
effectively.[40]

Longstreet's attack was to be made as early as practicable;
however, Longstreet got permission from Lee to await the arrival of
one of his brigades, and while marching to the assigned position,
his men came within sight of a Union signal station on Little Round
Top. Countermarching to avoid detection wasted much time, and
Hood's and McLaws's divisions did not launch their attacks until
just after 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., respectively.[41]

Attacks on the Union left
flank

Map of battle, July 2, 1863

As Longstreet's divisions slammed into the Union III Corps,
Meade was forced to send 20,000 reinforcements[42] in
the form of the entire V Corps, Brig. Gen. John C.
Caldwell's division of the II Corps, most of the XII Corps, and
small portions of the newly arrived VI Corps. The Confederate
assault deviated from Lee's plan since Hood's division moved more
easterly than intended, losing its alignment with the Emmitsburg
Road,[43]
attacking Devil's Den and Little Round Top. McLaws, coming in on
Hood's left, drove multiple attacks into the thinly stretched III
Corps in the Wheatfield and
overwhelmed them in Sherfy's Peach Orchard.
McLaws's attack eventually reached Plum Run Valley (the "Valley of
Death") before being beaten back by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of
the V Corps, moving down from Little Round Top. The III Corps was
virtually destroyed as a combat unit in this battle, and Sickles's
leg was amputated after it was shattered by a cannonball.
Caldwell's division was destroyed piecemeal in the Wheatfield.
Anderson's division assault on McLaws's left, starting around 6
p.m., reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge, but they could not hold
the position in the face of counterattacks from the II Corps,
including an almost suicidal counterattack by the 1st Minnesota against
a Confederate brigade, ordered in desperation by Hancock.[44]

As fighting raged in the Wheatfield and Devil's Den, Col. Strong Vincent of
V Corps had a precarious hold on Little Round Top, an important
hill at the extreme left of the Union line. His brigade of four
relatively small regiments was able to resist repeated assaults by
Brig. Gen. Evander Law's brigade of Hood's division.
Meade's chief engineer, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, had realized
the importance of this position, and dispatched Vincent's brigade,
an artillery battery, and the 140th New York to occupy Little Round
Top mere minutes before Hood's troops arrived. The defense of
Little Round Top with a bayonet charge by the 20th Maine was
one of the most fabled episodes in the Civil War and propelled Col.
Joshua L. Chamberlain into prominence after
the war.[45]

Attacks on the Union right
flank

About 7:00 p.m., the Second Corps' attack by Johnson's division
on Culp's Hill got off to a late start. Most of the hill's
defenders, the Union XII Corps, had been sent to the left to defend
against Longstreet's attacks, and the only portion of the corps
remaining on the hill was a brigade of New Yorkers under Brig. Gen.
George S.
Greene. Because of Greene's insistence on constructing strong
defensive works, and with reinforcements from the I and XI Corps,
Greene's men held off the Confederate attackers, although the
Southerners did capture a portion of the abandoned Federal works on
the lower part of Culp's Hill.[46]

Just at dark, two of Jubal Early's brigades attacked the Union
XI Corps positions on East Cemetery Hill where Col. Andrew L.
Harris of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, came under a withering
attack, losing half his men; however, Early failed to support his
brigades in their attack, and Ewell's remaining division, that of
Maj. Gen. Robert
E. Rodes, failed to aid Early's attack by moving against
Cemetery Hill from the west. The Union army's interior lines
enabled its commanders to shift troops quickly to critical areas,
and with reinforcements from II Corps, the Federal troops retained
possession of East Cemetery Hill, and Early's brigades were forced
to withdraw.[47]

Third day of
battle

General Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday, July 3, using
the same basic plan as the previous day: Longstreet would attack
the Federal left, while Ewell attacked Culp's Hill.[49]
However, before Longstreet was ready, Union XII Corps troops
started a dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on
Culp's Hill in an effort to regain a portion of their lost works.
The Confederates attacked, and the second fight for Culp's Hill
ended around 11 a.m., after some seven hours of bitter combat.[50]

Lee was forced to change his plans. Longstreet would command
Pickett's Virginia division of his own First Corps, plus six
brigades from Hill's Corps, in an attack on the Federal II Corps
position at the right center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge.
Prior to the attack, all the artillery the Confederacy could bring
to bear on the Federal positions would bombard and weaken the
enemy's line.[51]

The "High Water Mark" on Cemetery Ridge as it appears today. The
monument to the 72nd Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiment
("Baxter's Philadelphia Fire Zouaves") appears at right, the Copse
of Trees to the left.

Around 1 p.m., from 150 to 170 Confederate guns[52] began
an artillery bombardment that was probably the largest of the war.
In order to save valuable ammunition for the infantry attack that
they knew would follow, the Army of the Potomac's artillery at
first did not return the enemy's fire. After waiting about 15
minutes, about 80 Federal cannons added to the din. The Army of
Northern Virginia was critically low on artillery ammunition, and
the cannonade did not significantly affect the Union position.
Around 3 p.m., the cannon fire subsided, and 12,500 Southern
soldiers stepped from the ridgeline and advanced the three-quarters
of a mile (1,200 m) to Cemetery Ridge in what is known to history
as "Pickett's Charge". As the Confederates
approached, there was fierce flanking artillery fire from Union
positions on Cemetery Hill and north of Little Round Top, and
musket and canister fire from Hancock's II Corps. Nearly one half
of the attackers did not return to their own lines. Although the
Federal line wavered and broke temporarily at a jog called the
"Angle" in a low stone fence, just north of a patch of vegetation
called the Copse of Trees, reinforcements rushed into the breach,
and the Confederate attack was repulsed. The farthest advance of
Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Armistead's brigade of Maj. Gen.
George
Pickett's division at the Angle is referred to as the "High-water mark of the
Confederacy", arguably representing the closest the South ever
came to its goal of achieving independence from the Union via
military victory.[53]

There were two significant cavalry engagements on July 3. Stuart
was sent to guard the Confederate left flank and was to be prepared
to exploit any success the infantry might achieve on Cemetery Hill
by flanking the Federal right and hitting their trains and lines of
communications. Three miles (5 km) east of Gettysburg, in what
is now called "East Cavalry Field" (not shown on the accompanying
map, but between the York and Hanover Roads), Stuart's forces
collided with Federal cavalry: Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's division and George A. Custer's brigade. A lengthy
mounted battle, including hand-to-hand sabre combat, ensued.
Custer's charge, leading the 1st Michigan Cavalry, blunted the
attack by Wade
Hampton's brigade, blocking Stuart from achieving his
objectives in the Federal rear. Meanwhile, after hearing news of
the day's victory, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick
launched a cavalry attack against the infantry positions of
Longstreet's Corps southwest of Big Round Top. Brig. Gen. Elon J.
Farnsworth protested against the futility of such a move but
obeyed orders. Farnsworth was killed in the attack, and his brigade
suffered significant losses.[54]

Aftermath

Casualties

"The Harvest of Death": Union dead on the battlefield at
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, photographed July 5 or July 6, 1863, by
Timothy H. O'Sullivan.

The two armies suffered between 46,000 and 51,000 casualties.
Union casualties were 23,055 (3,155 killed, 14,531 wounded, 5,369
captured or missing),[55] while
Confederate casualties are more difficult to estimate. Many authors
cite about 28,000 overall casualties, but Busey and Martin's
definitive 2005 work, Regimental Strengths and Losses,
documents 23,231 (4,708 killed, 12,693 wounded, 5,830 captured or
missing).[56]
Nearly a third of Lee's general officers were killed, wounded, or
captured.[57] The
casualties for both sides during the entire campaign were
57,225.[58]Bruce Catton wrote,
"The town of Gettysburg looked as if some universal moving day had
been interrupted by catastrophe."[59] But
there was only one documented civilian death during the battle: Ginnie Wade (also
widely known as Jennie), 20 years old, was shot by a stray bullet
that passed through her kitchen in town while she was making
bread.[60]

Nearly 8,000 had been killed outright; these bodies, lying in
the hot summer sun, needed to be buried quickly. Over 3,000 horse
carcasses[61] were
burned in a series of piles south of town; townsfolk became
violently ill from the stench.[62]

Confederate
retreat

The armies stared at one another in a heavy rain across the
bloody fields on July 4, the same day that the Vicksburg garrison surrendered to Maj. Gen.
Ulysses S.
Grant. Lee had reformed his lines into a defensive position on
Seminary Ridge the night of July 3, evacuating the town of
Gettysburg. The Confederates remained on the battlefield, hoping
that Meade would attack, but the cautious Union commander decided
against the risk, a decision for which he would later be
criticized. Both armies began to collect their remaining wounded
and bury some of the dead. A proposal by Lee for a prisoner
exchange was rejected by Meade.[63]

Lee started his Army of Northern Virginia in motion late the
evening of July 4 towards Fairfield and Chambersburg.
Cavalry under Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden was entrusted to escort
the miles-long wagon train of supplies and wounded men that Lee
wanted to take back to Virginia with him, using the route through
Cashtown and Hagerstown to Williamsport, Maryland. Meade's
army followed, although the pursuit was half-spirited. The recently
rain-swollen Potomac trapped Lee's army on the north bank of the
river for a time, but when the Federals finally caught up, the
Confederates had forded the river. The rear-guard action at Falling
Waters on July 14 added some more names to the long casualty
lists, including General Pettigrew, who was mortally wounded.[64]

In a brief letter to Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck written on July
7, Lincoln remarked on the two major Union victories at Gettysburg
and Vicksburg. He continued:

Now, if Gen. Meade can complete his work so gloriously
prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of
Lee's army, the rebellion will be over.[65]

Halleck then relayed the contents of Lincoln's letter to Meade
in a telegram. However, despite repeated pleas from Lincoln and
Halleck, which continued over the next week, Meade did not pursue
Lee's army aggressively enough to destroy it before it crossed back
over the Potomac River to safety in the South. The campaign
continued into Virginia with light engagements until July 23, in
the minor Battle of Manassas Gap, after
which Meade abandoned any attempts at pursuit and the two armies
took up positions across from each other on the Rappahannock
River.[66]

Union reaction to
the news of the victory

The results of this victory are priceless. ... The charm of
Robert E. Lee's invincibility is broken. The Army of the Potomac
has at last found a general that can handle it, and has stood nobly
up to its terrible work in spite of its long disheartening list of
hard-fought failures. ... Copperheads are palsied and dumb
for the moment at least. ... Government is strengthened four-fold
at home and abroad.

– George Templeton Strong,
Diary, p. 330.

However, the Union enthusiasm soon dissipated as the public
realized that Lee's army had escaped destruction and the war would
continue. Lincoln complained to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles that
"Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would
not close it!"[68] Brig.
Gen. Alexander S. Webb wrote to his father
on July 17, stating that such Washington politicians as "Chase, Seward and
others," disgusted with Meade, "write to me that Lee really won
that Battle!"[69]

Effect
on the Confederacy

The Confederates had lost politically as well as militarily.
During the final hours of the battle, Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens was approaching the
Union lines at Norfolk, Virginia, under a flag of truce. Although
his formal instructions from Confederate PresidentJefferson Davis
had limited his powers to negotiations on prisoner exchanges and
other procedural matters, historian James M. McPherson speculates that
he had informal goals of presenting peace overtures. Davis had
hoped that Stephens would reach Washington from the south while
Lee's victorious army was marching toward it from the north.
President Lincoln, upon hearing of the Gettysburg results, refused
Stephens's request to pass through the lines. Furthermore, when the
news reached London, any lingering hopes of European recognition of
the Confederacy were finally abandoned. Henry
Adams wrote, "The disasters of the rebels are unredeemed by
even any hope of success. It is now conceded that all idea of
intervention is at an end."[70]

The immediate reaction of the Southern military and public
sectors was that Gettysburg was a setback, not a disaster. The
sentiment was that Lee had been successful on July 1 and had fought
a valiant battle on July 2–3, but could not dislodge the Union Army
from the strong defensive position to which it fled. The
Confederates successfully stood their ground on July 4 and withdrew
only after they realized Meade would not attack them. The
withdrawal to the Potomac that could have been a disaster was
handled masterfully. Furthermore, the Army of the Potomac had been
kept away from Virginia farmlands for the summer and all predicted
that Meade would be too timid to threaten them for the rest of the
year. Lee himself had a positive view of the campaign, writing to
his wife that the army had returned "rather sooner than I had
originally contemplated, but having accomplished what I proposed on
leaving the Rappahannock, viz., relieving the Valley of the
presence of the enemy and drawing his Army north of the Potomac."
He was quoted as saying to Maj. John Seddon, brother of the
Confederate secretary of war, "Sir, we did whip them at Gettysburg,
and it will be seen for the next six months that that army
will be as quiet as a sucking dove." Some Southern publications,
such as the Charleston Mercury, criticized Lee's actions
in the campaign and on August 8 he offered his resignation to
President Davis, who quickly rejected it.[71]

Gettysburg became a postbellum focus of the "Lost Cause", a movement
by writers such as Edward A. Pollard and Jubal Early to explain the
reasons for the Confederate defeat in the war. A fundamental
premise of their argument was that the South was doomed because of
the overwhelming advantage in manpower and industrial might
possessed by the North. However, they claim it also suffered
because Robert E. Lee, who up until this time had been almost
invincible, was betrayed by the failures of some of his key
subordinates at Gettysburg: Ewell, for failing to seize Cemetery
Hill on July 1; Stuart, for depriving the army of cavalry
intelligence for a key part of the campaign; and especially
Longstreet, for failing to attack on July 2 as early and as
forcefully as Lee had originally intended. In this view, Gettysburg
was seen as a great lost opportunity, in which a decisive victory
by Lee could have meant the end of the war in the Confederacy's
favor.[72]

Historical
assessment

Decisive
victory?

The nature of the result of the Battle of Gettysburg has been
the subject of controversy for years. Although not seen as
overwhelmingly significant at the time, particularly since the war
continued for almost two years, in retrospect it has often been
cited as the "turning
point", usually in combination with the fall of Vicksburg the
following day.[5] This
is based on the hindsight that, after Gettysburg, Lee's army
conducted no more strategic offensives and merely reacted to the
initiative of Ulysses S. Grant in 1864 and 1865, and
by the speculative viewpoint of the Lost Cause writers that a
Confederate victory at Gettysburg might have resulted in the end of
the war.[74]

[The Army of the Potomac] had won a victory. It might be less
of a victory than Mr. Lincoln had hoped for, but it was
nevertheless a victory—and, because of that, it was no longer
possible for the Confederacy to win the war. The North might still
lose it, to be sure, if the soldiers or the people should lose
heart, but outright defeat was no longer in the cards.

It is currently a widely held view that Gettysburg was a decisive
victory for the Union, but the term is imprecise. It is
inarguable that Lee's offensive on July 3 was turned back
decisively and his campaign in Pennsylvania was terminated
prematurely (although the Confederates at the time argued that this
was a temporary setback and that the goals of the campaign were
largely met). However, when the more common definition of "decisive
victory" is intended—an indisputable military victory of a battle
that determines or significantly influences the ultimate result of
a conflict—historians are divided. For example, David J. Eicher
called Gettysburg a "strategic loss for the Confederacy" and James M.
McPherson wrote that "Lee and his men would go on to earn
further laurels. But they never again possessed the power and
reputation they carried into Pennsylvania those palmy summer days
of 1863." However, Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones wrote that the
"strategic impact of the Battle of Gettysburg was ... fairly
limited." Steven E. Woodworth wrote that "Gettysburg proved only
the near impossibility of decisive action in the Eastern theater."
Edwin Coddington pointed out the heavy toll on the Army of the
Potomac and that "after the battle Meade no longer possessed a
truly effective instrument for the accomplishments of his task. The
army needed a thorough reorganization with new commanders and fresh
troops, but these changes were not made until Grant appeared on the
scene in March 1864." Joseph T. Glatthaar wrote that "Lost
opportunities and near successes plagued the Army of Northern
Virginia during its Northern invasion," yet after Gettysburg,
"without the distractions of duty as an invading force, without the
breakdown of discipline, the Army of Northern Virginia [remained]
an extremely formidable force." Ed Bearss wrote, "Lee's invasion of the North
had been a costly failure. Nevertheless, at best the Army of the
Potomac had simply preserved the strategic stalemate in the Eastern
Theater ..." Peter Carmichael refers to the "horrendous losses at
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, which effectively destroyed Lee's
offensive capacity," implying that these cumulative losses were not
the result of a single battle. Thomas Goss, writing in the U.S.
Army's Military Review journal on the definition of
"decisive" and the application of that description to Gettysburg,
concludes: "For all that was decided and accomplished, the Battle
of Gettysburg fails to earn the label 'decisive battle'."[76]

Lee vs.
Meade

Prior to Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee had established a reputation
as an almost invincible general, achieving stunning victories
against superior numbers—although usually at the cost of high
casualties to his army—during the Seven Days, the Northern Virginia Campaign
(including the Second Battle of Bull Run),
Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Only the
Maryland
Campaign, with its tactically inconclusive Battle of
Antietam, had been less than successful. Therefore, historians
have attempted to explain how Lee's winning streak was interrupted
so dramatically at Gettysburg. Although the issue is tainted by
attempts to portray history and Lee's reputation in a manner
supporting different partisan goals, the major factors in Lee's
loss arguably can be attributed to: (1) Lee's overconfidence in the
invincibility of his men; (2) the performance of his subordinates,
and his management thereof; (3) health issues, and; (4) the
performance of his opponent, George G. Meade, and the Army of the
Potomac.

Throughout the campaign, Lee was influenced by the belief that
his men were invincible; most of Lee's experiences with the Army of
Northern Virginia had convinced him of this, including the great
victory at Chancellorsville in early May and the rout of the Union
troops at Gettysburg on July 1. Since morale plays an important
role in military victory when other factors are equal, Lee did not
want to dampen his army's desire to fight and resisted suggestions,
principally by Longstreet, to withdraw from the recently captured
Gettysburg to select a ground more favorable to his army. War
correspondent Peter W. Alexander wrote that Lee "acted, probably,
under the impression that his troops were able to carry any
position however formidable. If such was the case, he committed an
error, such however as the ablest commanders will sometimes fall
into." Lee himself concurred with this judgment, writing to
President Davis, "No blame can be attached to the army for its
failure to accomplish what was projected by me, nor should it be
censured for the unreasonable expectations of the public—I am alone
to blame, in perhaps expecting too much of its prowess and
valor."[77]

The most controversial assessments of the battle involve the
performance of Lee's subordinates. The dominant theme of the Lost
Cause writers and many other historians is that Lee's senior
generals failed him in crucial ways, directly causing the loss of
the battle; the alternative viewpoint is that Lee did not manage
his subordinates adequately, and did not thereby compensate for
their shortcomings.[78] Two
of his corps commanders—Richard S. Ewell and A.P.
Hill—had only recently been promoted and were not fully
accustomed to Lee's style of command, in which he provided only
general objectives and guidance to their former commander, Stonewall
Jackson; Jackson translated these into detailed, specific
orders to his division commanders.[79] All
four of Lee's principal commanders received criticism during the
campaign and battle:[80]

James
Longstreet suffered most severely from the wrath of the Lost
Cause authors, not the least because he directly criticized Lee in
postbellum writings and became a Republican after the
war. His critics accuse him of attacking much later than Lee
intended on July 2, squandering a chance to hit the Union Army
before its defensive positions had firmed up. They also question
his lack of motivation to attack strongly on July 2 and July 3
because he had argued that the army should have maneuvered to a
place where it would force Meade to attack them. The alternative
view is that Lee was in close contact with Longstreet during the
battle, agreed to delays on the morning of July 2, and never
criticized Longstreet's performance. (There is also considerable
speculation about what an attack might have looked like before Dan
Sickles moved the III Corps toward the Peach Orchard.)[81]

J.E.B.
Stuart deprived Lee of cavalry intelligence during a good part
of the campaign by taking his three best brigades on a path away
from the army's. This arguably led to Lee's surprise at Hooker's
vigorous pursuit; the meeting engagement on July 1 that escalated
into the full battle prematurely; and it also prevented Lee from
understanding the full disposition of the enemy on July 2. The
disagreements regarding Stuart's culpability for the situation
center around the relatively vague orders issued by Lee, but most
modern historians agree that both generals were responsible to some
extent for the failure of the cavalry's mission early in the
campaign.[82]

Richard S.
Ewell has been universally criticized for failing to seize the
high ground on the afternoon of July 1. Once again the disagreement
centers around Lee's orders, which provided general guidance for
Ewell to act "if practicable." Many historians speculate that
Stonewall Jackson, if he had survived Chancellorsville, would have
aggressively seized Culp's Hill, rendering Cemetery Hill
indefensible, and changing the entire complexion of the battle. A
differently worded order from Lee may have made the difference with
this subordinate.[83]

A.P.
Hill has received some criticism for his ineffective
performance. His actions caused the battle to begin and then
escalate on July 1, despite Lee's orders not to bring on a general
engagement (although historians point out that Hill kept Lee well
informed of his actions during the day). However, illness minimized
his personal involvement in the remainder of the battle, and Lee
took the explicit step of removing troops from Hill's corps and
giving them to Longstreet for Pickett's Charge.[84]

In addition to Hill's illness, Lee's performance was affected by
his own illness, which has been speculated as chest pains due to angina. He
wrote to Jefferson Davis that his physical condition prevented him
from offering full supervision in the field, and said, "I am so
dull that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently
misled."[85]

As a final factor, Lee faced a new and formidable opponent in George G. Meade, and the Army of the
Potomac fought well on its home territory. Although new to his army
command, Meade deployed his forces relatively effectively; relied
on strong subordinates such as Winfield S.
Hancock to make decisions where and when they were needed; took
great advantage of defensive positions; nimbly shifted defensive
resources on interior lines to parry strong threats; and, unlike
some of his predecessors, stood his ground throughout the battle in
the face of fierce Confederate attacks. Lee was quoted before the
battle as saying Meade "would commit no blunders on my front and if
I make one ... will make haste to take advantage of it." That
prediction proved to be correct at Gettysburg. Stephen Sears wrote,
"The fact of the matter is that George G. Meade, unexpectedly and
against all odds, thoroughly outgeneraled Robert E. Lee at
Gettysburg." Edwin B. Coddington wrote that the soldiers of the
Army of the Potomac received a "sense of triumph which grew into an
imperishable faith in [themselves]. The men knew what they could do
under an extremely competent general; one of lesser ability and
courage could well have lost the battle."[86]

Wittenberg, Eric J., J. David Petruzzi, and Michael F. Nugent,
One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the
Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4-14, 1863,
Savas Beatie, 2008, ISBN 978-1-932714-43-2.

^
Martin, pp. 80-81. The troopers carried single-shot, breechloading
carbines manufactured by Sharps, Burnside,
and others. It is a modern myth that they were armed with
multi-shot repeating carbines. Nevertheless, they were able to fire
two or three times faster than a muzzle-loaded carbine or
rifle.

^
Gallagher, Lee and His Generals, pp. 207-08; Sears, p.
503; Woodworth, p. 221. Gallagher's essay "Jubal A. Early, The Lost
Cause, and Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy" in Lee and
His Generals is a good overview of the Lost Cause
movement.

^
White, p. 251. White refers to Lincoln's use of the term "new birth
of freedom" and writes, "The new birth that slowly emerged
in Lincoln's politics meant that on November 19 at Gettysburg he
was no longer, as in his inaugural address, defending an old Union
but proclaiming a new Union. The old Union contained and attempted
to restrain slavery. The new Union would fulfill the promise of
liberty, the crucial step into the future that the Founders had
failed to take."

^
Sears, pp. 499-500; Glatthaar, p. 287; Fuller, p. 198, states that
Lee's "overweening confidence in the superiority of his soldiers
over his enemy possessed him."

^
For example, Sears, p. 504: "In the final analysis, it was Robert
E. Lee's inability to manage his generals that went to the heart of
the failed campaign." Glatthaar, pp. 285-86, criticizes the
inability of the generals to coordinate their actions as a whole.
Fuller, p. 198, states that Lee "maintained no grip over the
operations" of his army.

^
Fuller, p. 195, for example, refers to orders to Stuart that "were
as usual vague." Fuller, p. 197, wrote "As was [Lee's] custom, he
relied on verbal instructions, and left all details to his
subordinates."

The Battle of Gettysburg lasted 3 days, July 1- July 3, 1863. The battle took place between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General Robert E. Lee, and the Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by General George Meade. The Army of Northern Virginia was around 72,000 men. The Army of the Potomac was around 94,000.

Contents

July 1

Confederate infantry attacked the Union cavalry, commanded by John Buford, around 5:30 am on Herr Ridge. Buford would run back to McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge as the Confederate forces marched in more men. Buford would get more men later in the day and would be allowed to leave with his division. Buford slowed down the Confederate attack long enough for Union forces to set up a defense on Cemetery Ridge. That night, Confederate General Richard Ewell was given orders to take Culp’s Hill if possible. Ewell was too careful and decided not to take the hill. The Union took the hill and set up defense. This was the first major mistake of the battle for South. The Army of the Potomac would end the day with around 22,000 men on Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Ridge. The Army of Northern Virginia would have around 27,000 men from Benner’s Hill to Seminary Ridge.

July 2

Both armies got more men over the night to begin the second day of action. General James Longstreet, commander of the I Corp of the Army of Northern Virginia, set his troops on the right of the Confederate line. Around 4 pm, his forces attacked the Union left. Earlier in the day, Major General Daniel Sickles, commander of the III Corp of the Army of the Potomac, moved his Corp forward to the Peach Orchard without orders to do so. When attacked in this position, they were killed. Sickles fell back to the Wheatfield. Meade quickly rushed 20,000 men to his left to aid Sickles and fight off Longstreet. Meade’s men would take up position in Devil’s Den. They would fall back and run the Union left on Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top. The Confederate forces drove back the Union left, but were unable to break it. They would have to fall back. They formed the Confederate right and ran the line from Seminary Ridge to Devil’s Den. At 7 pm, Ewell attacked Union forces commanded by General Henry Slocum on Culp’s Hill on the Union right. Ewell was forced to fall back because Union forces were too strong.

July 3

The night of July 2, Longstreet’s largest division commanded by General George Pickett arrived and was placed in the center of the Confederate line. Lee’s plan was to attack on both the Union right and left as the day before. Around 4 am, fighting broke out on the Union right as Slocum attacked Ewell’s forces that had taken some ground on Culp’s Hill the day before. This fighting ended around 11 am with no winner. This changed Lee’s plans. Now he was going to blow up the union center with cannons and move across three quarters of a mile across open ground. He would use three divisions; General George Pickett, General Isaac Trimble, and General James Pettigrew. The three divisions amounted to around 13,000 men. At 1 pm, around 170 Confederate cannons opened fire. After two hours, the attack began. Confederate forces broke the Union center, commanded By General Winfield Hancock, for a just a moment at The Angle. This was the closest the Confederacy ever got to winning the war. This point of the battle is called the “High Water Mark” for this reason. Hancock would get more men and drive back the attack. Pickett’s division was killed. At the end of the battle, Lee ordered Pickett to gather his division and get ready to fight against a Union attack. Pickett said, “General Lee, I have no division.” Lee knew he was defeated and took his men back to Virginia on July 4.

Aftermath

Both the Confederate and Union forces had more than 23,000 casualties apiece. The battle took more American lives than any other battle in United States history. Gettysburg is still the largest battle to ever be fought on American soil. The Union victory over the Confederacy ended Lee’s invasion of the north. Lee would never try to invade the Union again. The Army of Northern Virginia would never get their strength back. Lee never had more than 51,000 men the rest of the war. Numbers from the Union forces wore down Lee and his army. This is why Gettysburg is said to be the turning point of the American Civil War.