A Google search of the term “innovation district” reveals over 200,000 results, indicating the extent to which the phrase has permeated the fields of urban economic development, planning, and placemaking. The term is used to refer to areas, often in the downtowns of cities, where R&D-laden universities or firms are surrounded by a growing mix of start-ups and spin-offs. The term is also increasingly applied to densely populated urban neighborhoods where firms like Google are establishing campuses. But it also pops up to describe new office complexes whose amenities include a few stores or a fashionable coffee shop.

The variation in understanding of the term and its application suggests the need for a routinized way to measure the essential quantitative and qualitative assets of innovation districts. Given this, for the past nine months the Brookings Institution, Project for Public Spaces (PPS), and Mass Economics have collaborated to devise and test an audit tool for assessing innovation districts.

What to count? Considerations in designing an audit

Innovation ecosystems comprise complex, overlapping relationships between firms, individuals, unique spaces, private real estate, public infrastructure, capital, expertise, and conviviality, congregated in a roughly delineated area. To begin to determine how to identify and measure assets, we developed a process that was both rigorous and reflective, drawing together some of the brightest minds in the field, top practitioners on the ground, and a team strong in quantitative analysis.

Innovation districts, like in Philadelphia, benefit from the clustering of innovation assets in a dense urban geography that attracts workers, firms, and investment; enables resource-sharing and collaboration; and encourages informal social interactions.

Next, we considered which specific inputs—such as the density of innovation-oriented spaces, the density of talent, and the concentration of quality places—should be bundled and assessed cumulatively. We then tested our theories with experts—both disciplinary specialists and those working between disciplines.

Our research led us to develop several guidelines for the audit, which contribute to its value as an assessment tool:

An audit should analyze district data against city and regional data. An innovation district rich in growing and emerging clusters of related industries, new firms, and buzzing social networks is only a partial picture of broader economic agglomeration. Because economic clusters and talent pools tend to form at the regional scale, it is important to identify the relationship between a district and the larger metropolitan area. This enables us to discern, for example, whether the strength of the district talent pool is a local phenomenon or part of a broader city or regional trend. Understanding this fuller picture helps in designing strategies to strengthen a district’s ecosystem. A district that is not currently aligned with the sectors driving the broader metropolitan economy nevertheless has the potential to become a research and entrepreneurial hub for leading companies and clusters. The Detroit Innovation District initially grew with minimal relationship to the automotive cluster, but the addition of the American Lightweight Materials Manufacturing Innovation Institute now links the district to the city’s legacy industry.

An audit should include comparisons across innovation districts. While the scope of the audit measures the performance of individual districts, it is important to be able to benchmark performance against other districts. In broad strokes, innovation districts possess similar research strengths and economic clusters and, although not all data can be analyzed across districts, identifying data that are both useful and comparable across a range of districts will be an important part of the audit design.

An audit should use qualitative data to identify important factors such as culture. While quantitative data are essential for understanding much of the innovation district machinery, some assets, processes, and relationships simply cannot be quantified. Interviews with stakeholders from universities, incubators, nonprofit organizations, the start-up community, and the public sector are important for identifying particular challenges or flagging opportunities that raw numbers won’t surface. Interviews can also uncover important intelligence about the strength of relationships between institutions and other actors, how well institutional policies and programs are working to help achieve their stated goals, and the extent to which the district culture is supportive, collaborative, and risk taking.

Using these guidelines, we set out to define an audit framework, including the identification of research questions that test specific theories of change.

The audit framework

The first step in developing the audit tool was to better understand what important, measurable elements add up to an innovation ecosystem. With the help of extensive research and the input of experts across numerous fields, we identified five cross-cutting characteristics that likely contribute to an innovation ecosystem: critical mass, competitive advantage, quality of place, diversity and inclusion, and culture and collaboration.

Described below are the key questions and examples of measures for each element:

Critical mass: Does the area under study have a density of assets that collectively begin to attract and retain people, stimulate a range of activities, and increase financing?

Through our research, we determined that several types of data can help answer this question. This includes identifying the concentration of specific innovation assets, such as anchor institutions, co-working spaces, and accelerators, as well as the level or concentration of research dollars. With respect to place assets, the audit looks at the general concentration of place assets and the ratio of built to un-built space. Another important input is employment and population density, comparing these figures to the broader city and region. Lastly, the audit includes data on human capital to determine the concentration of talent.

Future development of this part of the audit may include overall square footages of specific development types. Conversations with real estate investment companies, whose ambitions include growing ecosystems around universities, have revealed that minimum thresholds of research, office, retail, and educational facilities are needed to support an innovation ecosystem.

An important piece of assessing a district’s critical mass involves the density of talent in the district.

Competitive advantage: Is the innovation district leveraging and aligning its distinctive assets, including historic strengths, to grow firms and jobs in the district, city, and region?

The audit incorporates the traditional exercise for understanding competitive advantage that identifies an area’s industry-cluster strengths, both generally and along the innovation continuum. In addition, it measures the number of publications, the rating of academic programs, and the number of research awards. To further assess the degree to which research assets are being translated into products, services, and companies, the audit gathers data on commercialization, tech transfer practices, and models of research entrepreneurship. An interesting part of the audit involves assessing the alignment between research strengths and industry clusters. This examination is important because the district can identify opportunities where research strengths are not aligned with employment. Lastly, from the perspective of place, the audit measures whether the built environment reflects cluster strengths. For example, do building façades help heighten the visibility and overall culture of innovation activities across the district?

Quality of place: Does the innovation district have a strong quality of place and offer quality experiences that attract other assets, accelerate outcomes, and increase interactions?

This analysis starts with PPS’s four qualities of great places: uses and activities, access and linkages, comfort and image, and sociability. A combination of surveys, asset mapping, geographic information system analysis, and onsite observations allows an assessment of the overall vibrancy of the area. The analysis pays particular attention to the number, location, and quality of key gathering places within the district, as well as what uses are missing from the overall mix. These factors are important in encouraging cross-disciplinary socializing, broadening the shared benefit of innovation districts to the surrounding community, and encouraging entrepreneurs, investors, researchers, residents, and others to put down roots in the district.

This plaza at the corner of 36th and Walnut Streets in Philadelphia’s innovation district provides a prime example of a quality place.

Diversity and inclusion: Is the innovation district a diverse and inclusive place that provides broad opportunity for city residents?

This audit question aims to help district leaders understand the extent to which a district supports the advancement of local residents in the emerging district economy. Unlike science parks and corridors, innovation districts are commonly surrounded by socioeconomically diverse neighborhoods with many underserved residents. The mere proximity of these neighborhoods creates unique opportunities to grow and develop the diversity of workers in the innovation economy and the supportive industries it generates; to catalyze the local economy through procurement programs and place-based opportunities for entrepreneurship; and to leverage the influence of these districts to secure new amenities and services that would benefit workers and surrounding residents alike.

Innovation districts should strive to be diverse and inclusive, qualities that can be measured in a variety of ways. The Oklahoma City innovation district, for example, has jobs that can be filled by local residents who do not have four-year college degrees.

The audit analyzes the demographic composition of the district’s residents and employees as well as of adjacent neighborhoods, and compares those figures to the city or region as a whole. It also seeks to determine whether opportunities for economic inclusion exist based on jobs available and specific institutional practices that support inclusive growth. For example, do anchor institutions have local procurement policies in place to hire local firms and workers? Other specific data include employment by race, income, and educational attainment, and the level of education required for entry into district employment. This assessment also includes place-based measures such as access to healthy groceries, parks, pharmacies, and other basic goods and services.

Culture and collaboration: Is the innovation district connecting the dots between people, institutions, economic clusters, and place—creating synergies at multiple scales and platforms?

Answering this question requires qualitative research to analyze a district’s overall culture and risk-taking environment, and whether physical spaces and programs are cultivating collaboration. In the future, we expect to strengthen and systematize this part of the audit by, for example, using online surveys to scale-up findings and make them comparable across districts.

Testing the audit

Brookings and PPS selected Oklahoma City and Philadelphia for audit testing as part of a larger engagement to support each city’s innovation district. The fact that the two districts have highly differentiated economic clusters and research strengths helps our research because we can discern whether specific data sets can work across very different districts. Of equal value, both districts have highly motivated stakeholders who were willing to engage in the testing and experimentation. Here is the draft audit of the Oklahoma City innovation district, allowing you to see how the analysis is shaping up.

In cases where formal district boundaries did not already exist, PPS and Brookings collaborated with local leaders to define the geography. While we generally do not advocate for places to draw borders—recognizing that market changes will change the geography of innovation—boundaries are essential for data collection and analysis.

Our work moving forward will involve tightening the audit and testing the framework in a third city.

As we proceed with fine tuning the audit, we will need to assess whether it will be possible to create a high-level audit that enables innovation districts to assess themselves or whether the audit will demand more intensive data collection, which will require the use of outside experts. In either scenario, our ambition is to write a guidebook to help the local leaders and practitioners think critically about their starting assets.

So if you think you have an innovation district, your best path forward is to undertake an empirically grounded exercise of self-discovery. We believe an evidence-driven assessment will both enable a district to leverage its own distinctive strengths and provide investors and companies with the data necessary to warrant increased investment and business presence. The result will be more businesses, more jobs, more local revenues, and more opportunities for equitable, sustainable growth.

Authors

]]>
Wed, 30 Mar 2016 11:30:00 -0400Julie Wagner and Nathan Storring
Less than two years ago, the Brookings Institution unveiled the research paper, “The Rise of Innovation Districts,” which identified an emerging spatial pattern in today's innovation economy. Marked by a heightened clustering of anchor institutions, companies, and start-ups, innovation districts are emerging in central cities throughout the world.
A Google search of the term “innovation district” reveals over 200,000 results, indicating the extent to which the phrase has permeated the fields of urban economic development, planning, and placemaking. The term is used to refer to areas, often in the downtowns of cities, where R&D-laden universities or firms are surrounded by a growing mix of start-ups and spin-offs. The term is also increasingly applied to densely populated urban neighborhoods where firms like Google are establishing campuses. But it also pops up to describe new office complexes whose amenities include a few stores or a fashionable coffee shop.
The variation in understanding of the term and its application suggests the need for a routinized way to measure the essential quantitative and qualitative assets of innovation districts. Given this, for the past nine months the Brookings Institution, Project for Public Spaces (PPS), and Mass Economics have collaborated to devise and test an audit tool for assessing innovation districts.
What to count? Considerations in designing an audit
Innovation ecosystems comprise complex, overlapping relationships between firms, individuals, unique spaces, private real estate, public infrastructure, capital, expertise, and conviviality, congregated in a roughly delineated area. To begin to determine how to identify and measure assets, we developed a process that was both rigorous and reflective, drawing together some of the brightest minds in the field, top practitioners on the ground, and a team strong in quantitative analysis.
First, we conducted research across numerous relevant topics including entrepreneurship, real estate development, commercialization, economic geography, city planning, institutional culture, finance, and inclusive development. This exercise generated hundreds of potentially applicable measures for the audit.
Innovation districts, like in Philadelphia, benefit from the clustering of innovation assets in a dense urban geography that attracts workers, firms, and investment; enables resource-sharing and collaboration; and encourages informal social interactions.
Next, we considered which specific inputs—such as the density of innovation-oriented spaces, the density of talent, and the concentration of quality places—should be bundled and assessed cumulatively. We then tested our theories with experts—both disciplinary specialists and those working between disciplines.
Our research led us to develop several guidelines for the audit, which contribute to its value as an assessment tool:
- An audit should analyze district data against city and regional data. An innovation district rich in growing and emerging clusters of related industries, new firms, and buzzing social networks is only a partial picture of broader economic agglomeration. Because economic clusters and talent pools tend to form at the regional scale, it is important to identify the relationship between a district and the larger metropolitan area. This enables us to discern, for example, whether the strength of the district talent pool is a local phenomenon or part of a broader city or regional trend. Understanding this fuller picture helps in designing strategies to strengthen a district's ecosystem. A district that is not currently aligned with the sectors driving the broader metropolitan economy nevertheless has the potential to become a research and entrepreneurial hub for leading companies and clusters. The Detroit Innovation District initially grew with minimal relationship to the automotive cluster, but the ... Less than two years ago, the Brookings Institution unveiled the research paper, “The Rise of Innovation Districts,” which identified an emerging spatial pattern in today's innovation economy. Marked by a heightened clustering of anchor ... Less than two years ago, the Brookings Institution unveiled the research paper, “The Rise of Innovation Districts,” which identified an emerging spatial pattern in today’s innovation economy. Marked by a heightened clustering of anchor institutions, companies, and start-ups, innovation districts are emerging in central cities throughout the world.

A Google search of the term “innovation district” reveals over 200,000 results, indicating the extent to which the phrase has permeated the fields of urban economic development, planning, and placemaking. The term is used to refer to areas, often in the downtowns of cities, where R&D-laden universities or firms are surrounded by a growing mix of start-ups and spin-offs. The term is also increasingly applied to densely populated urban neighborhoods where firms like Google are establishing campuses. But it also pops up to describe new office complexes whose amenities include a few stores or a fashionable coffee shop.

The variation in understanding of the term and its application suggests the need for a routinized way to measure the essential quantitative and qualitative assets of innovation districts. Given this, for the past nine months the Brookings Institution, Project for Public Spaces (PPS), and Mass Economics have collaborated to devise and test an audit tool for assessing innovation districts.

What to count? Considerations in designing an audit

Innovation ecosystems comprise complex, overlapping relationships between firms, individuals, unique spaces, private real estate, public infrastructure, capital, expertise, and conviviality, congregated in a roughly delineated area. To begin to determine how to identify and measure assets, we developed a process that was both rigorous and reflective, drawing together some of the brightest minds in the field, top practitioners on the ground, and a team strong in quantitative analysis.

Innovation districts, like in Philadelphia, benefit from the clustering of innovation assets in a dense urban geography that attracts workers, firms, and investment; enables resource-sharing and collaboration; and encourages informal social interactions.

Next, we considered which specific inputs—such as the density of innovation-oriented spaces, the density of talent, and the concentration of quality places—should be bundled and assessed cumulatively. We then tested our theories with experts—both disciplinary specialists and those working between disciplines.

Our research led us to develop several guidelines for the audit, which contribute to its value as an assessment tool:

An audit should analyze district data against city and regional data. An innovation district rich in growing and emerging clusters of related industries, new firms, and buzzing social networks is only a partial picture of broader economic agglomeration. Because economic clusters and talent pools tend to form at the regional scale, it is important to identify the relationship between a district and the larger metropolitan area. This enables us to discern, for example, whether the strength of the district talent pool is a local phenomenon or part of a broader city or regional trend. Understanding this fuller picture helps in designing strategies to strengthen a district’s ecosystem. A district that is not currently aligned with the sectors driving the broader metropolitan economy nevertheless has the potential to become a research and entrepreneurial hub for leading companies and clusters. The Detroit Innovation District initially grew with minimal relationship to the automotive cluster, but the addition of the American Lightweight Materials Manufacturing Innovation Institute now links the district to the city’s legacy industry.

An audit should include comparisons across innovation districts. While the scope of the audit measures the performance of individual districts, it is important to be able to benchmark performance against other districts. In broad strokes, innovation districts possess similar research strengths and economic clusters and, although not all data can be analyzed across districts, identifying data that are both useful and comparable across a range of districts will be an important part of the audit design.

An audit should use qualitative data to identify important factors such as culture. While quantitative data are essential for understanding much of the innovation district machinery, some assets, processes, and relationships simply cannot be quantified. Interviews with stakeholders from universities, incubators, nonprofit organizations, the start-up community, and the public sector are important for identifying particular challenges or flagging opportunities that raw numbers won’t surface. Interviews can also uncover important intelligence about the strength of relationships between institutions and other actors, how well institutional policies and programs are working to help achieve their stated goals, and the extent to which the district culture is supportive, collaborative, and risk taking.

Using these guidelines, we set out to define an audit framework, including the identification of research questions that test specific theories of change.

The audit framework

The first step in developing the audit tool was to better understand what important, measurable elements add up to an innovation ecosystem. With the help of extensive research and the input of experts across numerous fields, we identified five cross-cutting characteristics that likely contribute to an innovation ecosystem: critical mass, competitive advantage, quality of place, diversity and inclusion, and culture and collaboration.

Described below are the key questions and examples of measures for each element:

Critical mass: Does the area under study have a density of assets that collectively begin to attract and retain people, stimulate a range of activities, and increase financing?

Through our research, we determined that several types of data can help answer this question. This includes identifying the concentration of specific innovation assets, such as anchor institutions, co-working spaces, and accelerators, as well as the level or concentration of research dollars. With respect to place assets, the audit looks at the general concentration of place assets and the ratio of built to un-built space. Another important input is employment and population density, comparing these figures to the broader city and region. Lastly, the audit includes data on human capital to determine the concentration of talent.

Future development of this part of the audit may include overall square footages of specific development types. Conversations with real estate investment companies, whose ambitions include growing ecosystems around universities, have revealed that minimum thresholds of research, office, retail, and educational facilities are needed to support an innovation ecosystem.

An important piece of assessing a district’s critical mass involves the density of talent in the district.

Competitive advantage: Is the innovation district leveraging and aligning its distinctive assets, including historic strengths, to grow firms and jobs in the district, city, and region?

The audit incorporates the traditional exercise for understanding competitive advantage that identifies an area’s industry-cluster strengths, both generally and along the innovation continuum. In addition, it measures the number of publications, the rating of academic programs, and the number of research awards. To further assess the degree to which research assets are being translated into products, services, and companies, the audit gathers data on commercialization, tech transfer practices, and models of research entrepreneurship. An interesting part of the audit involves assessing the alignment between research strengths and industry clusters. This examination is important because the district can identify opportunities where research strengths are not aligned with employment. Lastly, from the perspective of place, the audit measures whether the built environment reflects cluster strengths. For example, do building façades help heighten the visibility and overall culture of innovation activities across the district?

Quality of place: Does the innovation district have a strong quality of place and offer quality experiences that attract other assets, accelerate outcomes, and increase interactions?

This analysis starts with PPS’s four qualities of great places: uses and activities, access and linkages, comfort and image, and sociability. A combination of surveys, asset mapping, geographic information system analysis, and onsite observations allows an assessment of the overall vibrancy of the area. The analysis pays particular attention to the number, location, and quality of key gathering places within the district, as well as what uses are missing from the overall mix. These factors are important in encouraging cross-disciplinary socializing, broadening the shared benefit of innovation districts to the surrounding community, and encouraging entrepreneurs, investors, researchers, residents, and others to put down roots in the district.

This plaza at the corner of 36th and Walnut Streets in Philadelphia’s innovation district provides a prime example of a quality place.

Diversity and inclusion: Is the innovation district a diverse and inclusive place that provides broad opportunity for city residents?

This audit question aims to help district leaders understand the extent to which a district supports the advancement of local residents in the emerging district economy. Unlike science parks and corridors, innovation districts are commonly surrounded by socioeconomically diverse neighborhoods with many underserved residents. The mere proximity of these neighborhoods creates unique opportunities to grow and develop the diversity of workers in the innovation economy and the supportive industries it generates; to catalyze the local economy through procurement programs and place-based opportunities for entrepreneurship; and to leverage the influence of these districts to secure new amenities and services that would benefit workers and surrounding residents alike.

Innovation districts should strive to be diverse and inclusive, qualities that can be measured in a variety of ways. The Oklahoma City innovation district, for example, has jobs that can be filled by local residents who do not have four-year college degrees.

The audit analyzes the demographic composition of the district’s residents and employees as well as of adjacent neighborhoods, and compares those figures to the city or region as a whole. It also seeks to determine whether opportunities for economic inclusion exist based on jobs available and specific institutional practices that support inclusive growth. For example, do anchor institutions have local procurement policies in place to hire local firms and workers? Other specific data include employment by race, income, and educational attainment, and the level of education required for entry into district employment. This assessment also includes place-based measures such as access to healthy groceries, parks, pharmacies, and other basic goods and services.

Culture and collaboration: Is the innovation district connecting the dots between people, institutions, economic clusters, and place—creating synergies at multiple scales and platforms?

Answering this question requires qualitative research to analyze a district’s overall culture and risk-taking environment, and whether physical spaces and programs are cultivating collaboration. In the future, we expect to strengthen and systematize this part of the audit by, for example, using online surveys to scale-up findings and make them comparable across districts.

Testing the audit

Brookings and PPS selected Oklahoma City and Philadelphia for audit testing as part of a larger engagement to support each city’s innovation district. The fact that the two districts have highly differentiated economic clusters and research strengths helps our research because we can discern whether specific data sets can work across very different districts. Of equal value, both districts have highly motivated stakeholders who were willing to engage in the testing and experimentation. Here is the draft audit of the Oklahoma City innovation district, allowing you to see how the analysis is shaping up.

In cases where formal district boundaries did not already exist, PPS and Brookings collaborated with local leaders to define the geography. While we generally do not advocate for places to draw borders—recognizing that market changes will change the geography of innovation—boundaries are essential for data collection and analysis.

Our work moving forward will involve tightening the audit and testing the framework in a third city.

As we proceed with fine tuning the audit, we will need to assess whether it will be possible to create a high-level audit that enables innovation districts to assess themselves or whether the audit will demand more intensive data collection, which will require the use of outside experts. In either scenario, our ambition is to write a guidebook to help the local leaders and practitioners think critically about their starting assets.

So if you think you have an innovation district, your best path forward is to undertake an empirically grounded exercise of self-discovery. We believe an evidence-driven assessment will both enable a district to leverage its own distinctive strengths and provide investors and companies with the data necessary to warrant increased investment and business presence. The result will be more businesses, more jobs, more local revenues, and more opportunities for equitable, sustainable growth.

Throughout the past few decades, Texas’ cities have topped many lists for economic growth and population gain, but that hasn’t necessarily put them on top of any urbanists’ lists for smart development. Instead, there has long been a (largely accurate) perception that places like Houston are city-builders’ nightmares, stuck in a pattern of 20th century sprawl, and fueled by economic exuberance.

The transformation began in the downtown with the creation of Sundance Square, a 25 plus block area, and Sundance Plaza, arguably one of the top town squares in North America. This largely privately led effort has put Fort Worth in the company of other cities such as Pittsburgh and Detroit who have led their revival with strong placemaking agendas centered around squares (Market Square and Campus Martius) creating high energy centers around which innovation and local entrepreneurs are creating new identities for their cities.

That development is now spreading to the 1.4 square mile Near Southside neighborhood, where we both visited as part of the Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking, a collaboration between the Brookings Institution and Project for Public Spaces, which advances vibrant public spaces, innovative urban economies, and inclusive growth. There, we witnessed an eclectic blend of the medical, industrial and creative economies—one of the most interesting we’ve seen in the US. This is all situated within a community that is seeing the growth of purposefully driven mixed-use development.

On one level, the Near Southside is home to Tarrant County's major hospitals distributed across the area (Cook Children's Health Care System, JPS Health Network, Texas Health Resources Harris Methodist, Baylor Scott & White, HCA’s Plaza Medical Center, and University of Texas Southwestern's Moncrief Cancer Institute) and dozens of independent medical clinics. This is a true medical district which has substantial growth possibilities, most immediately if JPS' proposed $809 million bond for expansion is approved this fall by voters and as a major medical school expands activities in the District.

But unlike districts such as Houston’s Texas Medical Center, the Southside isn’t exclusively a medical hub: it also contains an interesting mix of older and newer manufacturing companies, often in distinctive, historic buildings—Justin Boots, Vandervoorts Dairy, Dannon Company, Rahr & Sons Brewing Company, Firestone & Robertson Whiskey, Fresnel Technologies, and others. And then there is the creative sector—advertising companies like Schaefer Advertising, film and video companies like Near South Studios, musical production companies like Niles City Sound (where we walked in on a photo shoot with Leon Bridges), art "maker spaces" like SiNaCa Ceramics Studios and a slew of artists and musicians. All of these assets are situated within an easy bike ride or walk to Magnolia Avenue, whose restaurants and amenities rival many main streets in big cities around the country.

This district is a poster child for the new cross-sector entrepreneurialism emerging in cities, with medical anchors and a local incubator co-located with creativity and innovation of a different sort, particularly around arts, culture, manufacturing, and culinary startups. The momentum created by this diversity of assets is palpable—and the local BID-like non-profit, Near Southside, Inc. (NSI, formerly Fort Worth South, Inc.), points out that more than $750 million in development is still in the pipeline. (See video below.) In addition to private development, the neighborhood benefits from a TIF district (administered by NSI) that has obligated $53.6 million in funding of public improvements since its inception in 1997.

Despite these developments and investments, more is needed in the Near Southside. While “urban” by Texan standards, the district remains significantly below potential density and the streetscape would benefit from increased activation and a higher concentration of pedestrian activity. At the same time, much of the innovative activity remains hidden—stuck in archaic, institutional buildings that disguise the level of economic activity occurring within the district. One potential transformative investment: the stalled Hemphill-Lamar Connector, which will connect the primary Southside arterial with downtown, tunneling under rail tracks.

All that said, the caliber and commitment of the leaders within the district is encouraging for the economic and distinctly urban growth of one of Texas’ largest cities.

Authors

]]>
Wed, 16 Mar 2016 15:30:00 -0400Bruce Katz and Fred Kent
Throughout the past few decades, Texas' cities have topped many lists for economic growth and population gain, but that hasn't necessarily put them on top of any urbanists' lists for smart development. Instead, there has long been a (largely accurate) perception that places like Houston are city-builders' nightmares, stuck in a pattern of 20th century sprawl, and fueled by economic exuberance.
Only recently, as market forces are revaluing “urban amenities” has this perception (and reality) begun to change. A recent visit to Fort Worth confirms this dynamic. This city—part of the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, which is growing jobs at twice the rate of the country—seems to be channeling economic strength not into suburban sprawl, but rather urban renewal.
The transformation began in the downtown with the creation of Sundance Square, a 25 plus block area, and Sundance Plaza, arguably one of the top town squares in North America. This largely privately led effort has put Fort Worth in the company of other cities such as Pittsburgh and Detroit who have led their revival with strong placemaking agendas centered around squares (Market Square and Campus Martius) creating high energy centers around which innovation and local entrepreneurs are creating new identities for their cities.
That development is now spreading to the 1.4 square mile Near Southside neighborhood, where we both visited as part of the Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking, a collaboration between the Brookings Institution and Project for Public Spaces, which advances vibrant public spaces, innovative urban economies, and inclusive growth. There, we witnessed an eclectic blend of the medical, industrial and creative economies—one of the most interesting we've seen in the US. This is all situated within a community that is seeing the growth of purposefully driven mixed-use development.
On one level, the Near Southside is home to Tarrant County's major hospitals distributed across the area (Cook Children's Health Care System, JPS Health Network, Texas Health Resources Harris Methodist, Baylor Scott & White, HCA's Plaza Medical Center, and University of Texas Southwestern's Moncrief Cancer Institute) and dozens of independent medical clinics. This is a true medical district which has substantial growth possibilities, most immediately if JPS' proposed $809 million bond for expansion is approved this fall by voters and as a major medical school expands activities in the District.
But unlike districts such as Houston's Texas Medical Center, the Southside isn't exclusively a medical hub: it also contains an interesting mix of older and newer manufacturing companies, often in distinctive, historic buildings—Justin Boots, Vandervoorts Dairy, Dannon Company, Rahr & Sons Brewing Company, Firestone & Robertson Whiskey, Fresnel Technologies, and others. And then there is the creative sector—advertising companies like Schaefer Advertising, film and video companies like Near South Studios, musical production companies like Niles City Sound (where we walked in on a photo shoot with Leon Bridges), art "maker spaces" like SiNaCa Ceramics Studios and a slew of artists and musicians. All of these assets are situated within an easy bike ride or walk to Magnolia Avenue, whose restaurants and amenities rival many main streets in big cities around the country.
This district is a poster child for the new cross-sector entrepreneurialism emerging in cities, with medical anchors and a local incubator co-located with creativity and innovation of a different sort, particularly around arts, culture, manufacturing, and culinary startups. The momentum created by this diversity of assets is palpable—and the local BID-like non-profit, Near Southside, Inc. (NSI, formerly Fort Worth South, Inc.), points out that more than $750 million in development is still in the pipeline. (See video below.) In ... Throughout the past few decades, Texas' cities have topped many lists for economic growth and population gain, but that hasn't necessarily put them on top of any urbanists' lists for smart development. Instead, there has long been a (largely accurate)

Throughout the past few decades, Texas’ cities have topped many lists for economic growth and population gain, but that hasn’t necessarily put them on top of any urbanists’ lists for smart development. Instead, there has long been a (largely accurate) perception that places like Houston are city-builders’ nightmares, stuck in a pattern of 20th century sprawl, and fueled by economic exuberance.

The transformation began in the downtown with the creation of Sundance Square, a 25 plus block area, and Sundance Plaza, arguably one of the top town squares in North America. This largely privately led effort has put Fort Worth in the company of other cities such as Pittsburgh and Detroit who have led their revival with strong placemaking agendas centered around squares (Market Square and Campus Martius) creating high energy centers around which innovation and local entrepreneurs are creating new identities for their cities.

That development is now spreading to the 1.4 square mile Near Southside neighborhood, where we both visited as part of the Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking, a collaboration between the Brookings Institution and Project for Public Spaces, which advances vibrant public spaces, innovative urban economies, and inclusive growth. There, we witnessed an eclectic blend of the medical, industrial and creative economies—one of the most interesting we’ve seen in the US. This is all situated within a community that is seeing the growth of purposefully driven mixed-use development.

On one level, the Near Southside is home to Tarrant County's major hospitals distributed across the area (Cook Children's Health Care System, JPS Health Network, Texas Health Resources Harris Methodist, Baylor Scott & White, HCA’s Plaza Medical Center, and University of Texas Southwestern's Moncrief Cancer Institute) and dozens of independent medical clinics. This is a true medical district which has substantial growth possibilities, most immediately if JPS' proposed $809 million bond for expansion is approved this fall by voters and as a major medical school expands activities in the District.

But unlike districts such as Houston’s Texas Medical Center, the Southside isn’t exclusively a medical hub: it also contains an interesting mix of older and newer manufacturing companies, often in distinctive, historic buildings—Justin Boots, Vandervoorts Dairy, Dannon Company, Rahr & Sons Brewing Company, Firestone & Robertson Whiskey, Fresnel Technologies, and others. And then there is the creative sector—advertising companies like Schaefer Advertising, film and video companies like Near South Studios, musical production companies like Niles City Sound (where we walked in on a photo shoot with Leon Bridges), art "maker spaces" like SiNaCa Ceramics Studios and a slew of artists and musicians. All of these assets are situated within an easy bike ride or walk to Magnolia Avenue, whose restaurants and amenities rival many main streets in big cities around the country.

This district is a poster child for the new cross-sector entrepreneurialism emerging in cities, with medical anchors and a local incubator co-located with creativity and innovation of a different sort, particularly around arts, culture, manufacturing, and culinary startups. The momentum created by this diversity of assets is palpable—and the local BID-like non-profit, Near Southside, Inc. (NSI, formerly Fort Worth South, Inc.), points out that more than $750 million in development is still in the pipeline. (See video below.) In addition to private development, the neighborhood benefits from a TIF district (administered by NSI) that has obligated $53.6 million in funding of public improvements since its inception in 1997.

Despite these developments and investments, more is needed in the Near Southside. While “urban” by Texan standards, the district remains significantly below potential density and the streetscape would benefit from increased activation and a higher concentration of pedestrian activity. At the same time, much of the innovative activity remains hidden—stuck in archaic, institutional buildings that disguise the level of economic activity occurring within the district. One potential transformative investment: the stalled Hemphill-Lamar Connector, which will connect the primary Southside arterial with downtown, tunneling under rail tracks.

All that said, the caliber and commitment of the leaders within the district is encouraging for the economic and distinctly urban growth of one of Texas’ largest cities.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/11/02-military-family-veteran-challenges-orino?rssid=quality+of+life+issues{68C733D6-DCC7-44C8-B158-E190058B96A2}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/121982785/0/brookingsrss/topics/qualityoflifeissues~Better-understanding-the-challenges-that-servicemembers-military-families-and-veterans-faceBetter understanding the challenges that service-members, military families, and veterans face

By taking a comprehensive look at the needs and priorities of military families and service-members, the survey helps point to policies that can sustain and improve the all-volunteer force and their families, all of whom make tremendous sacrifices in service to their nation. Military families are assets to their communities and national defense writ large, but they are frequently overlooked.

Big picture survey findings

Military members and their families are most concerned about pay and benefits. Shiffer noted that, “Under 50 percent of people believe that they would actually be getting their post-retirement benefit.” This is on top of trends showing anxiety over the military lifestyle: not only do the economics sometimes fail to add up, but the way of life can be expensive and frustrating.

Transition from military to civilian life continues to be a particularly difficult process, but things are improving slightly. More than 40 percent of those transitioning or recently transitioned felt stress about the process, highlighting the need to make service-members more aware of the tools and resources available to them, like counselors, transition assistance, and additional education. Armstrong, however, highlighted that of those service-members transitioning, “close to 60 percent noted that they felt prepared for civilian employment … a positive sign that our transition programs are working.”

Civilian employment post-military was also at the top respondents’ concerns. Although a majority of respondents indicated that they felt prepared for civilian employment and 80 percent said they were ready to take on leadership opportunities in their communities, roughly half of veterans indicated that they are not in their desired career field or finding meaning in their involvement, showing the need to better leverage veterans’ skills in the civilian workplace.

In addition, spousal employment is hindered by a variety of military lifestyle factors, including moves across the country and sometimes around the globe. While 45 percent of military spouses have a full or part-time job, 58 percent of those who are not working would like to be employed outside the home.

Policy prescriptions for improving military service and life

Better communicating with service-members and veterans

The Department of Defense is persistently working to recognize where its programs are wanting, even if it doesn’t have all the solutions. By understanding how the military is changing, it can better anticipate the expectations that military families have.

Carson addressed this need, explaining “It’s very sobering to me about the need to talk better and talk more about what we are trying to do, and learn more from service-members and their families, from retirees, from veterans, about what we can do better to educate them about the many programs that we are working very diligently to executive.” Communicating to the force, even about national budget issues affecting everything from acquisition and readiness to compensation, can assuage the nervousness that promised benefits will not materialize farther down the line.

Learning among the services

The individual services should examine their own best practices and share those with the other branches. Even though each service operates under unique circumstances, each has undertaken experiments and initiatives, such as base consolidation, that could have implications across the military spectrum, particularly for spousal employment and civilian integration.

Re-examine the Choice Act

All veterans, most notably post-9/11 veterans, face general financial volatility and challenging job prospects, but there are major concerns over their mental health care. Many might benefit from changes to the Choice Act, which Michael O’Hanlon said could “tackle waiting lists for veteran’s care … even more aggressively rather than asking people to wait a certain period of time before they the option of going to a private provider.”

Authors

]]>
Mon, 02 Nov 2015 17:30:00 -0500Brendan Orino
On October 29, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence welcomed Blue Star Families to Brookings to discuss their 2015 Annual Military Family Lifestyle Survey, an important tool for understanding the issues facing service-members, veterans, and military family members. Joining Michael O'Hanlon onstage was his colleague Elaine Kamarck, founding director of the Center for Effective Public Management, as well as Cristin Orr Shiffer of Blue Star Families, Nicholas Armstrong from the Institute for Veterans and Military Families, and Brad Carson, the acting undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness.
By taking a comprehensive look at the needs and priorities of military families and service-members, the survey helps point to policies that can sustain and improve the all-volunteer force and their families, all of whom make tremendous sacrifices in service to their nation. Military families are assets to their communities and national defense writ large, but they are frequently overlooked.
Big picture survey findings
Military members and their families are most concerned about pay and benefits. Shiffer noted that, “Under 50 percent of people believe that they would actually be getting their post-retirement benefit.” This is on top of trends showing anxiety over the military lifestyle: not only do the economics sometimes fail to add up, but the way of life can be expensive and frustrating.
Transition from military to civilian life continues to be a particularly difficult process, but things are improving slightly. More than 40 percent of those transitioning or recently transitioned felt stress about the process, highlighting the need to make service-members more aware of the tools and resources available to them, like counselors, transition assistance, and additional education. Armstrong, however, highlighted that of those service-members transitioning, “close to 60 percent noted that they felt prepared for civilian employment … a positive sign that our transition programs are working.”
Civilian employment post-military was also at the top respondents' concerns. Although a majority of respondents indicated that they felt prepared for civilian employment and 80 percent said they were ready to take on leadership opportunities in their communities, roughly half of veterans indicated that they are not in their desired career field or finding meaning in their involvement, showing the need to better leverage veterans' skills in the civilian workplace.
In addition, spousal employment is hindered by a variety of military lifestyle factors, including moves across the country and sometimes around the globe. While 45 percent of military spouses have a full or part-time job, 58 percent of those who are not working would like to be employed outside the home.
Policy prescriptions for improving military service and life
Better communicating with service-members and veterans
The Department of Defense is persistently working to recognize where its programs are wanting, even if it doesn't have all the solutions. By understanding how the military is changing, it can better anticipate the expectations that military families have.
Carson addressed this need, explaining “It's very sobering to me about the need to talk better and talk more about what we are trying to do, and learn more from service-members and their families, from retirees, from veterans, about what we can do better to educate them about the many programs that we are working very diligently to executive.” Communicating to the force, even about national budget issues affecting everything from acquisition and readiness to compensation, can assuage the nervousness that promised benefits will not materialize farther down the line.
Learning among the services
The individual services should examine their own best practices and share those with the other branches. Even though each service operates under unique ...
On October 29, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence welcomed Blue Star Families to Brookings to discuss their 2015 Annual Military Family Lifestyle Survey, an important tool for understanding the issues facing service-members, ...

By taking a comprehensive look at the needs and priorities of military families and service-members, the survey helps point to policies that can sustain and improve the all-volunteer force and their families, all of whom make tremendous sacrifices in service to their nation. Military families are assets to their communities and national defense writ large, but they are frequently overlooked.

Big picture survey findings

Military members and their families are most concerned about pay and benefits. Shiffer noted that, “Under 50 percent of people believe that they would actually be getting their post-retirement benefit.” This is on top of trends showing anxiety over the military lifestyle: not only do the economics sometimes fail to add up, but the way of life can be expensive and frustrating.

Transition from military to civilian life continues to be a particularly difficult process, but things are improving slightly. More than 40 percent of those transitioning or recently transitioned felt stress about the process, highlighting the need to make service-members more aware of the tools and resources available to them, like counselors, transition assistance, and additional education. Armstrong, however, highlighted that of those service-members transitioning, “close to 60 percent noted that they felt prepared for civilian employment … a positive sign that our transition programs are working.”

Civilian employment post-military was also at the top respondents’ concerns. Although a majority of respondents indicated that they felt prepared for civilian employment and 80 percent said they were ready to take on leadership opportunities in their communities, roughly half of veterans indicated that they are not in their desired career field or finding meaning in their involvement, showing the need to better leverage veterans’ skills in the civilian workplace.

In addition, spousal employment is hindered by a variety of military lifestyle factors, including moves across the country and sometimes around the globe. While 45 percent of military spouses have a full or part-time job, 58 percent of those who are not working would like to be employed outside the home.

Policy prescriptions for improving military service and life

Better communicating with service-members and veterans

The Department of Defense is persistently working to recognize where its programs are wanting, even if it doesn’t have all the solutions. By understanding how the military is changing, it can better anticipate the expectations that military families have.

Carson addressed this need, explaining “It’s very sobering to me about the need to talk better and talk more about what we are trying to do, and learn more from service-members and their families, from retirees, from veterans, about what we can do better to educate them about the many programs that we are working very diligently to executive.” Communicating to the force, even about national budget issues affecting everything from acquisition and readiness to compensation, can assuage the nervousness that promised benefits will not materialize farther down the line.

Learning among the services

The individual services should examine their own best practices and share those with the other branches. Even though each service operates under unique circumstances, each has undertaken experiments and initiatives, such as base consolidation, that could have implications across the military spectrum, particularly for spousal employment and civilian integration.

Re-examine the Choice Act

All veterans, most notably post-9/11 veterans, face general financial volatility and challenging job prospects, but there are major concerns over their mental health care. Many might benefit from changes to the Choice Act, which Michael O’Hanlon said could “tackle waiting lists for veteran’s care … even more aggressively rather than asking people to wait a certain period of time before they the option of going to a private provider.”

In a proposed regulation announced on July 8th the Medicare program plans to reimburse physicians for their time spent in conversations with patients about how and whether they wish to be kept alive if they become too sick to express their wishes. Today physicians can only receive payment under Medicare if such conversations are part of a routine annual wellness examination.

This is a welcome proposal, and reflects a growing recognition among Americans that the health system too easily goes on autopilot, undertaking invasive procedures that often do little to improve the quality of a patient’s life. This is particularly troubling for many families when a loved one reaches the final weeks of life and there is uncertainty or disputes about the patient’s wishes. Physician-authors like Atul Gawande have drawn attention to the “overmedicalization” of dying. The National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine) is one of many medical research bodies that have examined the issue. And organizations such as AARP have been raising the importance of families and their physicians discussing end-of-life options and making appropriate plans to have wished known and honored.

For physicians in many specialties, the need for lengthy conversations about end-of-life is rare and can be part of a regular examination. But for geriatricians, oncologists and others who have many elderly Medicare patients, there is a greater need for such conversations with patients and their families. Doing that properly takes time, and so it makes sense for physicians to be able to take that time without losing money under Medicare’s reimbursement system. The proposed new regulation would address that financial issue.

The proposal may re-ignite the “death panel” cries when a similar Medicare reimbursement was included in early drafts of the Affordable Care Act legislation in 2009 – unwisely identified as a budgetary “pay for” to help cover the cost of new coverage. That political furor set back what should have been a reasoned conversation. Hopefully the climate now is more open to careful consideration.

To be sure, while providing reimbursement is an important step, it is not enough. As Gawande notes, physicians typically are very poorly trained in how to have these difficult conversations with their patients, and often do not convey the quality of life considerations in ways that their patients and their families can fully understand. That problem needs to be addressed by medical schools and by better professional training after medical school. But by removing the financial disincentives for physicians to devote time to such conversations, the proposed change in Medicare payments is a good beginning.

Authors

]]>
Wed, 08 Jul 2015 20:00:00 -0400Stuart M. Butler
In a proposed regulation announced on July 8th the Medicare program plans to reimburse physicians for their time spent in conversations with patients about how and whether they wish to be kept alive if they become too sick to express their wishes. Today physicians can only receive payment under Medicare if such conversations are part of a routine annual wellness examination.
This is a welcome proposal, and reflects a growing recognition among Americans that the health system too easily goes on autopilot, undertaking invasive procedures that often do little to improve the quality of a patient's life. This is particularly troubling for many families when a loved one reaches the final weeks of life and there is uncertainty or disputes about the patient's wishes. Physician-authors like Atul Gawande have drawn attention to the “overmedicalization” of dying. The National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine) is one of many medical research bodies that have examined the issue. And organizations such as AARP have been raising the importance of families and their physicians discussing end-of-life options and making appropriate plans to have wished known and honored.
For physicians in many specialties, the need for lengthy conversations about end-of-life is rare and can be part of a regular examination. But for geriatricians, oncologists and others who have many elderly Medicare patients, there is a greater need for such conversations with patients and their families. Doing that properly takes time, and so it makes sense for physicians to be able to take that time without losing money under Medicare's reimbursement system. The proposed new regulation would address that financial issue.
The proposal may re-ignite the “death panel” cries when a similar Medicare reimbursement was included in early drafts of the Affordable Care Act legislation in 2009 – unwisely identified as a budgetary “pay for” to help cover the cost of new coverage. That political furor set back what should have been a reasoned conversation. Hopefully the climate now is more open to careful consideration.
To be sure, while providing reimbursement is an important step, it is not enough. As Gawande notes, physicians typically are very poorly trained in how to have these difficult conversations with their patients, and often do not convey the quality of life considerations in ways that their patients and their families can fully understand. That problem needs to be addressed by medical schools and by better professional training after medical school. But by removing the financial disincentives for physicians to devote time to such conversations, the proposed change in Medicare payments is a good beginning.
Authors
- Stuart M. Butler
In a proposed regulation announced on July 8th the Medicare program plans to reimburse physicians for their time spent in conversations with patients about how and whether they wish to be kept alive if they become too sick to express their wishes.

In a proposed regulation announced on July 8th the Medicare program plans to reimburse physicians for their time spent in conversations with patients about how and whether they wish to be kept alive if they become too sick to express their wishes. Today physicians can only receive payment under Medicare if such conversations are part of a routine annual wellness examination.

This is a welcome proposal, and reflects a growing recognition among Americans that the health system too easily goes on autopilot, undertaking invasive procedures that often do little to improve the quality of a patient’s life. This is particularly troubling for many families when a loved one reaches the final weeks of life and there is uncertainty or disputes about the patient’s wishes. Physician-authors like Atul Gawande have drawn attention to the “overmedicalization” of dying. The National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine) is one of many medical research bodies that have examined the issue. And organizations such as AARP have been raising the importance of families and their physicians discussing end-of-life options and making appropriate plans to have wished known and honored.

For physicians in many specialties, the need for lengthy conversations about end-of-life is rare and can be part of a regular examination. But for geriatricians, oncologists and others who have many elderly Medicare patients, there is a greater need for such conversations with patients and their families. Doing that properly takes time, and so it makes sense for physicians to be able to take that time without losing money under Medicare’s reimbursement system. The proposed new regulation would address that financial issue.

The proposal may re-ignite the “death panel” cries when a similar Medicare reimbursement was included in early drafts of the Affordable Care Act legislation in 2009 – unwisely identified as a budgetary “pay for” to help cover the cost of new coverage. That political furor set back what should have been a reasoned conversation. Hopefully the climate now is more open to careful consideration.

To be sure, while providing reimbursement is an important step, it is not enough. As Gawande notes, physicians typically are very poorly trained in how to have these difficult conversations with their patients, and often do not convey the quality of life considerations in ways that their patients and their families can fully understand. That problem needs to be addressed by medical schools and by better professional training after medical school. But by removing the financial disincentives for physicians to devote time to such conversations, the proposed change in Medicare payments is a good beginning.

Two decades ago, Hillary Clinton delivered a speech in Beijing that inspired feminists around the world, declaring “women’s rights are human rights.” Since that declaration, a lot has changed for women globally. But what has changed for women in China?

While Chinese women today have increased freedoms, there is still a long way to go before gender equality is realized. Civil unrest concerning gender inequality recently made headlines in China and abroad when a group of five female protesters in China were arrested and jailed for publicly demonstrating against gender inequities, such as inequality in higher education and domestic violence. This incident underlined much of the commentary at a recent Brookings’s John L. Thornton China Center forum on women’s issues and gender inequality in China, during which the following key messages were conveyed:

China is in the midst of a rapid, if quiet, sexual revolution

China’s first and leading sexologist, Li Yinhe, delivered a keynote address that emphasized that when it comes to sex, China is in the midst of an “era of important changes.” Li explained that all sexual activities before marriage were illegal in China before 1997 because of a “hooliganism law,” and a woman could be arrested for having sex with more than one man. Thus, premarital sex was forbidden. In surveys in 1989, only 15% of citizens reported having premarital sex—and “most of them were having sex with their permanent partners,” Li said. That law was overturned in 1997, and recent surveys show that 71% of Chinese citizens admit to having sex before marriage. This is a dramatic change in a short period of time, and marks what Li asserts is a sexual revolution for Chinese citizens.

Chinese law still lags behind changes in social customs

While some sex laws have adapted, others are far behind. Li highlighted some “outdated” sex laws in China that are still “on the book[s],” but that are no longer strictly obeyed by the Chinese people.

Li said the indicators are clear that the force of these laws is waning. There are fewer people being punished for these offenses and the punishments are becoming increasingly less severe. Her discussion stressed four areas where public opinion has changed drastically over the last few decades, but Chinese laws haven’t adapted:

Pornography: Pornography isn’t considered to be protected as it is in the U.S. In contrast, Chinese law strictly prohibits creating and selling porn. In the 1980s, porn publishers would be sentenced to death. Now the punishment is less severe—for example, a 24-year-old Beijing woman published seven “sex novels” online. Her viewership was 80,000 hits on her novels, but her punishment was only six months in criminal detention.

Prostitution: Prostitution is another activity affected by outdated laws in China, where any solicitation of sex is strictly illegal. In the early-1980s through late-1990s the punishment for facilitating prostitution was severe. In 1996, a bathhouse owner was sentenced to death for organizing prostitution. Now, prostitution is widely practiced and the most severe punishment for organized prostitution is that those managing sex workers are ordered to shut down their businesses.

Orgies and sex parties: Chinese law used to brutally punish swingers and individuals who planned sex parties. For example, in the early-1980s “the punishment for spousal swapping was death…[and] people would be sentenced to death for organizing sex parties,” Li explained. But this is another area where the punishment for the law has now become less strict. In 2011 in Nanjing, an associate university professor organized a sex party with 72 people, and the “punishment for him was three and a half years in prison.” Also, in 2014 in Shanghai, some citizens recently organized an online sex party, and their punishment was only three months of criminal detention. According to recent private surveys, “many people are [engaging] in sex parties or orgies.” While in theory these are punishable by criminal law, “no one reports [them], so they do not get noticed,” Li said.

Homosexuality and same-sex marriage: In regards to homosexuality, Li was quick to note that China’s view of homosexuality is historically very different from Western views. For example, in some U.S. states, laws “criminalized or deemed homosexual activities illegal.” But throughout China’s history, there were not severe repercussions or the death penalty for homosexuality, and it “was never illegal.” However, this is not the case for same-sex marriage. Li thinks it will be “hard to predict” when same-sex marriage might be legalized.

Chinese women will have sexual freedom, but when isn’t clear

So what does the future hold for these laws? Li explained that sex is a “hot topic” right now in Chinese public debate, and the “general consensus among legal scholars and sociologists is that these [outdated] laws need to be removed.” Those who oppose removing these laws are “in the minority.” While that may be true, she suggested it would be difficult to “form a timetable” when politicians might consider amending these laws.

As for the five young women sentenced to jail last month, Li said she usually tries to stay out of politics, but thinks people “should stand up and speak out” when their own rights are being violated. Li argued that jailing these women for expressing their opinions violated the rights of all women—and hopes that other women speak up about their arrest.

If you are interested in learning more, watch Li Yinhe’s full keynote and the entire panel eventhere:

Alison Burke contributed to this post.

Authors

Alexandria Icenhower

]]>
Thu, 09 Apr 2015 15:30:00 -0400Alexandria Icenhower
Two decades ago, Hillary Clinton delivered a speech in Beijing that inspired feminists around the world, declaring “women's rights are human rights.” Since that declaration, a lot has changed for women globally. But what has changed for women in China?
While Chinese women today have increased freedoms, there is still a long way to go before gender equality is realized. Civil unrest concerning gender inequality recently made headlines in China and abroad when a group of five female protesters in China were arrested and jailed for publicly demonstrating against gender inequities, such as inequality in higher education and domestic violence. This incident underlined much of the commentary at a recent Brookings's John L. Thornton China Center forum on women's issues and gender inequality in China, during which the following key messages were conveyed:
China is in the midst of a rapid, if quiet, sexual revolution
China's first and leading sexologist, Li Yinhe, delivered a keynote address that emphasized that when it comes to sex, China is in the midst of an “era of important changes.” Li explained that all sexual activities before marriage were illegal in China before 1997 because of a “hooliganism law,” and a woman could be arrested for having sex with more than one man. Thus, premarital sex was forbidden. In surveys in 1989, only 15% of citizens reported having premarital sex—and “most of them were having sex with their permanent partners,” Li said. That law was overturned in 1997, and recent surveys show that 71% of Chinese citizens admit to having sex before marriage. This is a dramatic change in a short period of time, and marks what Li asserts is a sexual revolution for Chinese citizens.
Chinese law still lags behind changes in social customs
While some sex laws have adapted, others are far behind. Li highlighted some “outdated” sex laws in China that are still “on the book[s],” but that are no longer strictly obeyed by the Chinese people.
Li said the indicators are clear that the force of these laws is waning. There are fewer people being punished for these offenses and the punishments are becoming increasingly less severe. Her discussion stressed four areas where public opinion has changed drastically over the last few decades, but Chinese laws haven't adapted:
- Pornography: Pornography isn't considered to be protected as it is in the U.S. In contrast, Chinese law strictly prohibits creating and selling porn. In the 1980s, porn publishers would be sentenced to death. Now the punishment is less severe—for example, a 24-year-old Beijing woman published seven “sex novels” online. Her viewership was 80,000 hits on her novels, but her punishment was only six months in criminal detention. - Prostitution: Prostitution is another activity affected by outdated laws in China, where any solicitation of sex is strictly illegal. In the early-1980s through late-1990s the punishment for facilitating prostitution was severe. In 1996, a bathhouse owner was sentenced to death for organizing prostitution. Now, prostitution is widely practiced and the most severe punishment for organized prostitution is that those managing sex workers are ordered to shut down their businesses. - Orgies and sex parties: Chinese law used to brutally punish swingers and individuals who planned sex parties. For example, in the early-1980s “the punishment for spousal swapping was death…[and] people would be sentenced to death for organizing sex parties,” Li explained. But this is another area where the punishment for the law has now become less strict. In 2011 in Nanjing, an associate university professor organized a sex party with 72 people, and the “punishment for him was three and a half years in prison.” Also, in 2014 in Shanghai, some citizens recently organized an online sex party, and their punishment was ...
Two decades ago, Hillary Clinton delivered a speech in Beijing that inspired feminists around the world, declaring “women's rights are human rights.” Since that declaration, a lot has changed for women globally.

Two decades ago, Hillary Clinton delivered a speech in Beijing that inspired feminists around the world, declaring “women’s rights are human rights.” Since that declaration, a lot has changed for women globally. But what has changed for women in China?

While Chinese women today have increased freedoms, there is still a long way to go before gender equality is realized. Civil unrest concerning gender inequality recently made headlines in China and abroad when a group of five female protesters in China were arrested and jailed for publicly demonstrating against gender inequities, such as inequality in higher education and domestic violence. This incident underlined much of the commentary at a recent Brookings’s John L. Thornton China Center forum on women’s issues and gender inequality in China, during which the following key messages were conveyed:

China is in the midst of a rapid, if quiet, sexual revolution

China’s first and leading sexologist, Li Yinhe, delivered a keynote address that emphasized that when it comes to sex, China is in the midst of an “era of important changes.” Li explained that all sexual activities before marriage were illegal in China before 1997 because of a “hooliganism law,” and a woman could be arrested for having sex with more than one man. Thus, premarital sex was forbidden. In surveys in 1989, only 15% of citizens reported having premarital sex—and “most of them were having sex with their permanent partners,” Li said. That law was overturned in 1997, and recent surveys show that 71% of Chinese citizens admit to having sex before marriage. This is a dramatic change in a short period of time, and marks what Li asserts is a sexual revolution for Chinese citizens.

Chinese law still lags behind changes in social customs

While some sex laws have adapted, others are far behind. Li highlighted some “outdated” sex laws in China that are still “on the book[s],” but that are no longer strictly obeyed by the Chinese people.

Li said the indicators are clear that the force of these laws is waning. There are fewer people being punished for these offenses and the punishments are becoming increasingly less severe. Her discussion stressed four areas where public opinion has changed drastically over the last few decades, but Chinese laws haven’t adapted:

Pornography: Pornography isn’t considered to be protected as it is in the U.S. In contrast, Chinese law strictly prohibits creating and selling porn. In the 1980s, porn publishers would be sentenced to death. Now the punishment is less severe—for example, a 24-year-old Beijing woman published seven “sex novels” online. Her viewership was 80,000 hits on her novels, but her punishment was only six months in criminal detention.

Prostitution: Prostitution is another activity affected by outdated laws in China, where any solicitation of sex is strictly illegal. In the early-1980s through late-1990s the punishment for facilitating prostitution was severe. In 1996, a bathhouse owner was sentenced to death for organizing prostitution. Now, prostitution is widely practiced and the most severe punishment for organized prostitution is that those managing sex workers are ordered to shut down their businesses.

Orgies and sex parties: Chinese law used to brutally punish swingers and individuals who planned sex parties. For example, in the early-1980s “the punishment for spousal swapping was death…[and] people would be sentenced to death for organizing sex parties,” Li explained. But this is another area where the punishment for the law has now become less strict. In 2011 in Nanjing, an associate university professor organized a sex party with 72 people, and the “punishment for him was three and a half years in prison.” Also, in 2014 in Shanghai, some citizens recently organized an online sex party, and their punishment was only three months of criminal detention. According to recent private surveys, “many people are [engaging] in sex parties or orgies.” While in theory these are punishable by criminal law, “no one reports [them], so they do not get noticed,” Li said.

Homosexuality and same-sex marriage: In regards to homosexuality, Li was quick to note that China’s view of homosexuality is historically very different from Western views. For example, in some U.S. states, laws “criminalized or deemed homosexual activities illegal.” But throughout China’s history, there were not severe repercussions or the death penalty for homosexuality, and it “was never illegal.” However, this is not the case for same-sex marriage. Li thinks it will be “hard to predict” when same-sex marriage might be legalized.

Chinese women will have sexual freedom, but when isn’t clear

So what does the future hold for these laws? Li explained that sex is a “hot topic” right now in Chinese public debate, and the “general consensus among legal scholars and sociologists is that these [outdated] laws need to be removed.” Those who oppose removing these laws are “in the minority.” While that may be true, she suggested it would be difficult to “form a timetable” when politicians might consider amending these laws.

As for the five young women sentenced to jail last month, Li said she usually tries to stay out of politics, but thinks people “should stand up and speak out” when their own rights are being violated. Li argued that jailing these women for expressing their opinions violated the rights of all women—and hopes that other women speak up about their arrest.

If you are interested in learning more, watch Li Yinhe’s full keynote and the entire panel eventhere:

Alison Burke contributed to this post.

Authors

Alexandria Icenhower

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2014/09/carol-graham-awarded-substantial-contribution-quality-of-life-research?rssid=quality+of+life+issues{AE38F692-DA4C-49F0-93EC-921442332B36}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/74683209/0/brookingsrss/topics/qualityoflifeissues~Carol-Graham-Awarded-for-Substantial-Contribution-to-Quality-of-Life-ResearchCarol Graham Awarded for "Substantial Contribution" to Quality of Life Research

Graham has explored happiness, well-being, and inequality in Colombia, Chile, the United States, and other countries worldwide; has studied the effects of education, aging and working, and technology on happiness; and has examined well-being through the prisms of religion and gender. On age itself, Graham calls the relationship between age and happiness "one of the most striking" consistencies of subjective well-being across peoples and cultures globally:

In her most recent work, Graham and colleagues conducted an extensive study of well-being in Mongolia, finding that the more peoples' incomes are below the average of their community, the less happy they are. "Inequality in this instance is not a sign of future progress," she writes, "but rather of being left behind at a time of dramatic economic change and progress." Continuing, Graham writes:

While being around wealthier people may generate envy among some, being around happier people has positive externalities. This is an intuitive finding and fits with an increasing body of work on well-being that shows that higher levels of well-being are associated with better labor market outcomes, health, and social behaviors and interactions. In contrast, some of the same studies show that very low well-being levels—in particular high levels of stress and difficulties with daily life—lead to short-time horizons and obstacles to investing in the future. Thus, while wealthier neighbors are not necessarily good for you, happier ones surely are.

Authors

Fred Dews

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Tue, 16 Sep 2014 12:27:00 -0400Fred Dews
This week in Berlin, Brookings scholar Carol Graham, the Leo Pasvolsky Senior Fellow, is being recognized by the International Society for Quality of Life Studies (ISQOL) with a research fellow award for "substantial contribution to quality-of-life research."
Graham is the author of numerous books and articles on quality-of-life issues, happiness, and well-being. In her book, Happiness Around the World: The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires, Graham studied happiness across countries and regions, finding that the determinants of happiness are consistent across levels of development worldwide.
Graham has explored happiness, well-being, and inequality in Colombia, Chile, the United States, and other countries worldwide; has studied the effects of education, aging and working, and technology on happiness; and has examined well-being through the prisms of religion and gender. On age itself, Graham calls the relationship between age and happiness "one of the most striking" consistencies of subjective well-being across peoples and cultures globally:
In her most recent work, Graham and colleagues conducted an extensive study of well-being in Mongolia, finding that the more peoples' incomes are below the average of their community, the less happy they are. "Inequality in this instance is not a sign of future progress," she writes, "but rather of being left behind at a time of dramatic economic change and progress." Continuing, Graham writes:While being around wealthier people may generate envy among some, being around happier people has positive externalities. This is an intuitive finding and fits with an increasing body of work on well-being that shows that higher levels of well-being are associated with better labor market outcomes, health, and social behaviors and interactions. In contrast, some of the same studies show that very low well-being levels—in particular high levels of stress and difficulties with daily life—lead to short-time horizons and obstacles to investing in the future. Thus, while wealthier neighbors are not necessarily good for you, happier ones surely are.
Graham is affiliated with the Global Economy and Development Program at Brookings, as well as the Brookings Global-CERES Economic and Social Policy in Latin America Initiative. She is also College Park Professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.
Authors
- Fred Dews
This week in Berlin, Brookings scholar Carol Graham, the Leo Pasvolsky Senior Fellow, is being recognized by the International Society for Quality of Life Studies (ISQOL) with a research fellow award for "substantial contribution to ...

Graham has explored happiness, well-being, and inequality in Colombia, Chile, the United States, and other countries worldwide; has studied the effects of education, aging and working, and technology on happiness; and has examined well-being through the prisms of religion and gender. On age itself, Graham calls the relationship between age and happiness "one of the most striking" consistencies of subjective well-being across peoples and cultures globally:

In her most recent work, Graham and colleagues conducted an extensive study of well-being in Mongolia, finding that the more peoples' incomes are below the average of their community, the less happy they are. "Inequality in this instance is not a sign of future progress," she writes, "but rather of being left behind at a time of dramatic economic change and progress." Continuing, Graham writes:

While being around wealthier people may generate envy among some, being around happier people has positive externalities. This is an intuitive finding and fits with an increasing body of work on well-being that shows that higher levels of well-being are associated with better labor market outcomes, health, and social behaviors and interactions. In contrast, some of the same studies show that very low well-being levels—in particular high levels of stress and difficulties with daily life—lead to short-time horizons and obstacles to investing in the future. Thus, while wealthier neighbors are not necessarily good for you, happier ones surely are.

Justin Wolfers, professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, re-joins Brookings, Vice President and Economic Studies Co-Director Karen Dynan announced today. Wolfers was a visiting fellow from 2010-2011.

A world-renowned empirical economist, Wolfers will continue in his role as co-editor, along with David Romer of the University of California, of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA), the flagship economic journal of the Institution. He will continue his focus on labor economics, macroeconomics, political economy, economics of the family, social policy, law and economics, public economics, and behavioral economics. His appointment as senior fellow will last 13 months.

Wolfers is also a research associate with the National Bureau for Economic Research, a research affiliate of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London, a research fellow of the German Institute for the Study of Labor, and a senior scientist for Gallup, among other affiliations. He is a contributor for Bloomberg View, NPR Marketplace, and the Freakonomics website and was named one of the 13 top young economists to watch by the New York Times. Wolfers did his undergraduate work at the University of Sydney, Australia and received his Master’s and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. He is a dual Australian-U.S. national and was once an apprentice to a bookie which led to his interest in prediction markets.

“We are pleased to re-welcome Justin back to Economic Studies,” said Dynan. “His work continues to challenge the conventional wisdom, and we look forward to collaborating with him once again.”

“Justin is outstanding at communicating economic ideas to a wide audience, as evidenced by his regular writings for media as well as his large social media presence,” added Ted Gayer, co-director of Economic Studies.

“I have enormous affection for the Brookings Institution, which provides not only a home for deep scholarly research, but also an unmatched platform for engaging the policy debate,” said Wolfers. “The Economic Studies program has a rich history of being the go-to place for policymakers, and I look forward to coming back and engaging in debate with my colleagues there.”

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Wed, 31 Jul 2013 00:00:00 -0400
Justin Wolfers, professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, re-joins Brookings, Vice President and Economic Studies Co-Director Karen Dynan announced today. Wolfers was a visiting fellow from 2010-2011.
A world-renowned empirical economist, Wolfers will continue in his role as co-editor, along with David Romer of the University of California, of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA), the flagship economic journal of the Institution. He will continue his focus on labor economics, macroeconomics, political economy, economics of the family, social policy, law and economics, public economics, and behavioral economics. His appointment as senior fellow will last 13 months.
Wolfers is also a research associate with the National Bureau for Economic Research, a research affiliate of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London, a research fellow of the German Institute for the Study of Labor, and a senior scientist for Gallup, among other affiliations. He is a contributor for Bloomberg View, NPR Marketplace, and the Freakonomics website and was named one of the 13 top young economists to watch by the New York Times. Wolfers did his undergraduate work at the University of Sydney, Australia and received his Master's and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. He is a dual Australian-U.S. national and was once an apprentice to a bookie which led to his interest in prediction markets.
“We are pleased to re-welcome Justin back to Economic Studies,” said Dynan. “His work continues to challenge the conventional wisdom, and we look forward to collaborating with him once again.”
“Justin is outstanding at communicating economic ideas to a wide audience, as evidenced by his regular writings for media as well as his large social media presence,” added Ted Gayer, co-director of Economic Studies.
“I have enormous affection for the Brookings Institution, which provides not only a home for deep scholarly research, but also an unmatched platform for engaging the policy debate,” said Wolfers. “The Economic Studies program has a rich history of being the go-to place for policymakers, and I look forward to coming back and engaging in debate with my colleagues there.”
Justin Wolfers, professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, re-joins Brookings, Vice President and Economic Studies Co-Director Karen Dynan announced today. Wolfers was a visiting fellow from 2010-2011.

Justin Wolfers, professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, re-joins Brookings, Vice President and Economic Studies Co-Director Karen Dynan announced today. Wolfers was a visiting fellow from 2010-2011.

A world-renowned empirical economist, Wolfers will continue in his role as co-editor, along with David Romer of the University of California, of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA), the flagship economic journal of the Institution. He will continue his focus on labor economics, macroeconomics, political economy, economics of the family, social policy, law and economics, public economics, and behavioral economics. His appointment as senior fellow will last 13 months.

Wolfers is also a research associate with the National Bureau for Economic Research, a research affiliate of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London, a research fellow of the German Institute for the Study of Labor, and a senior scientist for Gallup, among other affiliations. He is a contributor for Bloomberg View, NPR Marketplace, and the Freakonomics website and was named one of the 13 top young economists to watch by the New York Times. Wolfers did his undergraduate work at the University of Sydney, Australia and received his Master’s and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. He is a dual Australian-U.S. national and was once an apprentice to a bookie which led to his interest in prediction markets.

“We are pleased to re-welcome Justin back to Economic Studies,” said Dynan. “His work continues to challenge the conventional wisdom, and we look forward to collaborating with him once again.”

“Justin is outstanding at communicating economic ideas to a wide audience, as evidenced by his regular writings for media as well as his large social media presence,” added Ted Gayer, co-director of Economic Studies.

“I have enormous affection for the Brookings Institution, which provides not only a home for deep scholarly research, but also an unmatched platform for engaging the policy debate,” said Wolfers. “The Economic Studies program has a rich history of being the go-to place for policymakers, and I look forward to coming back and engaging in debate with my colleagues there.”

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/sandy-hook-promise-gun-safety?rssid=quality+of+life+issues{E7CFB078-1928-4072-8FFD-C5C6FF7E5D02}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65494428/0/brookingsrss/topics/qualityoflifeissues~The-promise-The-families-of-Sandy-Hook-and-the-long-road-to-gun-safetyThe promise: The families of Sandy Hook and the long road to gun safety

Editor's Note: The following speech was delivered at Tamkang University in Taiwan on April 10, 2013.

It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak at Tamkang University. I was first on your campus almost thirty years ago when I was working as a staff member in the US Congress and my boss, the late Congressman Steve Solarz spoke here. I have probably made visits since then but really can’t remember when they were. In any event, it’s great to be back. Thank you, Dean Dai, for that kind introduction. It’s always good to see Professor Lin, who was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in the first year I worked there.

The topic I picked for my speech today is “Facing Mainland China: Taiwan’s Future Challenges.” Actually, Taiwan has faced challenges stemming from the Mainland for a long time, actually for more than six decades. But the challenges today and in the future are more complex and consequential than ever before. The choices for Taiwan will be difficult, and it is important that they be made well. To avoid making choices is also a choice.

Actually, it’s a bit presumptuous for an outsider to try to give advice to the citizens of another country, particularly a democratic country, on the challenges they face and how to face them. In a profound way, that really is their business. And I readily acknowledge that my own country is having great difficulty meeting its formidable challenges. But my ties to Taiwan were first formed almost forty years ago, and have only grown over time. I care very much what happens to this island and its people. So I hope you will permit me to make a few observations on my topic. I won’t talk for too long, because I want plenty of time for questions.

To begin, it is worth noting that Taiwan would face some difficult challenges even if China were not such an important factor. That is because Taiwan, like some other places in East Asia, has entered a transition in its social and economic development that requires new policy models. Even if China did not exist, these challenges would press Taiwan.

In addition, Taiwan’s economy is increasingly post-industrial and is finding it harder to remain both competitive in the global economy and provide good jobs and good wages for all. Income inequality is trending upward. The unemployment rate was higher in this past decade than it was in the 1990s (1-3 percent). The central government budget has been basically flat over the last few years, government debt is growing, but the tax burden of Taiwan citizens is fairly light (58th among a group of 65 more advanced countries). The island has already begun to move, correctly, to a knowledge-based economy, but there a still a large number of small, inefficient, family operations. And for a knowledge-based economy, its companies will need people with the right kinds of skills, which probably requires reform of the education system.

If these challenges weren’t enough, demography makes them much more difficult. Taiwan’s total population will peak relatively soon, probably in 2025. The working age population will decline from 74 percent of the total today to around 67 percent in 2025; the elderly’s share of the population will increase from 11 percent today to 20 percent. That means that smaller numbers of workers will be supporting more and more old people. By 2060, half the population (workers) will be supporting 40% of the population (retirees). To make this specific, the students in this room will have to pay for the pensions and health care of your professors after they retire. And as long as young people either don’t get married or don’t have children, that situation will continue.

So even if China did not exist, Taiwan would face tough choices as a society: choices between economic prosperity on the one hand and social welfare—for the old and the young—on the other. But China does exist. It provides Taiwan with opportunities, to be sure. Many of you young people may work on the Mainland. But China is a source of insecurity for Taiwan, and so an added challenge. So the task for the island’s leaders and citizens will be to balance their desire for security, prosperity and welfare.

Let me turn now to the various challenges that Mainland China poses for Taiwan.

The first and fundamental challenge is Beijing’s ultimate objective regarding Taiwan, what it calls “peaceful unification” under the one country, two systems formula. In effect, it wishes to have Taiwan become a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, with a status essentially the same as Hong Kong and Macau.

Now Taiwan has always said “no” to one country, two systems (1C2S), and there is little public support for it. It’s important, however, that Taiwan people have a substantive foundation for their opposition rather than be opposed for opposition’s sake. To my mind, there are at least two reasons. The first that there are a serious conceptual differences between Beijing and Taipei over whether Taiwan is a sovereign entity in two important respects: first, the island’s international role, and second, cross-Strait relations. Essentially, this is the issue of the Republic of China, and there is a broad consensus here that the ROC does exist, while Beijing’s formal view is that the ROC hasn’t existed since the founding of the PRC. For Hong Kong and Macau, 1C2S granted a “high degree of autonomy” but not sovereignty. Beijing remains the exclusive sovereign. To my mind, this disagreement over sovereignty is rather fundamental.

The second reason is what 1C2S would mean, hypothetically, for Taiwan’s democracy after unification. Hong Kong is important here as well. When crafted the Hong Kong political system over twenty years ago, through the Basic Law, it skewed the electoral process in ways that made it difficult—or impossible—for individuals and political forces it does not like to come to power. We of course don’t know whether China, as part of a unification deal, would seek to change Taiwan’s political system so that it has the same effect as in Hong Kong. If it did, however, the DPP, which today is a significant portion of Taiwan sentiment, would be marginalized.

But that is just my view. What’s important is how Taiwan citizens and leaders think about this.

When the results of the 2012 presidential elections were announced on the evening of January 14th last year, President Ma Ying-jeou said that he would “safeguard the sovereignty of the Republic of China with my life.” That’s a strong statement, and I am pretty sure that President Ma knows what he means by it. But I believe that Taiwan as a whole could broaden and deepen its understanding of the sovereignty concept. In this regard, it would be particularly useful for each of the major political parties to come to their own internal consensus and then work on a cross-party consensus.

So Challenge Number One is Beijing’s current ultimate goal, unification under 1C2S. That option – and it’s an option only – creates Challenge Number Two. That challenge is the possibility that as the ROC government negotiates with Beijing today, it may make concessions that undermine its claim of sovereignty when it comes to resolving the fundamental cross-Strait dispute. Note that Beijing has a similar challenge: as it negotiates with Taipei today, it wishes to avoid making concessions that undermine 1C2S.

This challenge has been around a long time – for both sides. It is one reason that cross-Strait relations were so difficult from the early 1990s until 2008, to the point that the United States occasionally feared that the two sides might slide toward a conflict that neither intended. This short term-long term problem remains today. Some in Taiwan say that the Ma Administration has damaged Taiwan’s sovereignty in the way it negotiated various economic agreements like ECFA without specifying exactly how. My own analysis concludes that the Ma Administration has not negotiated badly and has preserved Taiwan’s position on this key issue. But it will become important if and when the two sides begin discussions on political and security talks, because sovereignty is an inherently political issue. Which is one reason why those talks are so difficult to start, and may not start anytime soon.

Challenge Number Three is different. It concerns not the content of cross-Strait negotiations but how Beijing seeks to promote its goals concerning Taiwan. Here we need to think about how China is pursuing its objectives regarding Taiwan, and I find it useful to distinguish analytically between two different ways or paradigms: the paradigm of mutual persuasion and the paradigm of power asymmetry, which is different.

Essentially, the paradigm of mutual persuasion is a shared approach of negotiation, persuasion, incrementalism, and mutual adjustment. I would argue that this is the approach that the two sides have followed since Ma Ying-jeou took office. It is part of what Beijing understands by its concept of peaceful development. It is in Taiwan’s interest that mutual persuasion continue (also, I would argue, it is in China’s and America’s interest).

The paradigm of power asymmetry is different. Here, China would exploit the growing power gap with Taiwan – economic, diplomatic, military, and so on – by pressuring Taiwan to accept a resolution of the fundamental dispute more or less on its terms, and even though many in Taiwan would be unhappy about submitting in this way. But listen to how one influential PRC scholar of cross-Strait relations has put the matter: “The severe asymmetrical balance of power between mainland China and Taiwan is a fact that no one can change. Moreover, this problem . . . will continue to increase, a situation that Taiwan needs to handle pragmatically and calmly.” We can speculate on what the scholar means by “pragmatically and calmly.”

Why would Beijing decide on a shift in paradigm? First of all, it might do so if it decided, based on its perceptions or misperceptions, that a future Taiwan government was moving towards de jure independence, and if it could not get Washington to restrain Taipei.

But let us assume, purely for purposes of discussion, that the KMT remains in power, why then might Beijing decide to shift to a strategy of pressure and intimidation? This would happen, I speculate, if it became impatient and decided that Taiwan would never move from the status quo to unification. We have seen hints of that impatience in Chinese suspicions that President Ma’s true objective was “peaceful separation” with a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” character. And recall that one of the circumstances specified in the 2005 anti-secession law is that “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.”

Now I actually don’t think that China will lose patience in the foreseeable future – for the rest of President Ma’s second term, perhaps. I believe that the PRC officials responsible for the conduct of cross-Strait relations are realistic about the views of the Taiwan public and the limits that places on the Taipei government. They seem to believe that time is on Beijing’s side. On the other hand, I don’t know what “new thinking” Xi Jinping may have concerning Taiwan policy, and recent statements by PRC officials urge movement on political issues. So it’s impossible to know whether Beijing’s patience will last indefinitely. No-one should assume that it will.

Note that when I talk about a Chinese strategy of pressure and intimidation, I don’t mean the use of force or even the explicit threat of force. In a situation of power asymmetry, the stronger power need not act overtly to compel the weaker power. In the Taiwan case, Beijing might conclude the very fact that Taiwan is quite dependent on the Mainland economically and the mere existence of its increasingly robust military capabilities will be sufficient to secure Taipei’s submission more or less on its terms.

Obviously, a pressure strategy would create a great challenge for Taiwan. It would. I think, create intense pressure on Taiwan’s leaders and turmoil among the public. The political system would be under tremendous strain.

So what should Taiwan do about this situation? This is my final challenge, the challenge of self-strengthening. It is really a set of challenges. And Taiwan isn’t the only country that needs to strengthen itself from within. In my view, frankly speaking, there is a lot that the United States must do to strengthen itself from within in order to rebuild the pillars of national power that have permitted it to play a dominant role in world affairs since World War II.

I have already referred to the first of these self-strengthening challenges. It is to maintain and enhance Taiwan’s global economic competitiveness in spite of the demographic shift. This requires the continued building of a knowledge-based, innovation-driven economy, and all that this implies for education, financial markets, and the level of government regulation. It requires that the Mainland side properly protects the intellectual property owned by Taiwan companies.

But economic self-strengthening also requires liberalizing its economic ties with all its major trading partners, not just China. To liberalize with China alone runs the risk of being too dependent on the Mainland. Liberalizing with all major trading partners will require eliminating some protectionist barriers, but the structural adjustment that this stimulates will work to Taiwan’s benefit. In fact, this is the policy of the Ma Administration.

I have also suggested that n terms of fundamental policy, it is a good idea for Taiwan to foster a clearer sense of what it means to say that Taiwan or the ROC is a sovereign entity, not just for its role in the international system but also regarding cross-Strait relations and the domestic political system. This will ensure that if and when political and security talks come, Taiwan’s negotiators will no what aspects of sovereignty are relatively minor and can be conceded and which are so important that they must be defended at all costs. One part of this self-strengthening will be public education so voters understand along with officials.

Diplomatically, Taiwan should ensure that its relationships with its most important diplomatic partners are strong and positive. This includes, of course, the United States and Japan, but also the principal countries of Western Europe. In this regard, I am pleased to report that relations with the United States have improved in recent years.

Militarily, Taiwan should skillfully enhance the deterrent capabilities of Taiwan’s armed forces. By this I mean raising the costs and uncertainties for Beijing if it were ever to mount an intimidation campaign, which at least implies a willingness to use force. Here, I associate myself with the Obama Administration which, in the words of one official, believes that “Lasting security cannot be achieved simply by purchasing limited numbers of advanced weapons systems. Taiwan must also devote greater attention to asymmetric concepts and technologies to maximize Taiwan’s enduring strengths and advantages.”

Finally, there is the question of the political system. Frankly, I believe that Taiwan’s political system tends to focus on relatively superficial issues – such as the security of President Ma’s daughter – rather than on the fundamental challenges that face the island. Politicians are aided in this tendency by this mass media.

Now, I understand that this is a structural problem, created not by individual politicians or media companies but by the nature of competition within both the political and media world. I also believe that Taiwan is better off having a democratic system than something else, in part because it creates a challenge for Beijing – that if it wishes to achieve its political goals concerning Taiwan, it will have to satisfy a broad spectrum of public opinion. And I realize that reforming a political system is very hard to do. Just look at the similar problems that exist in the United States. But it is Taiwan’s political system that will be the mechanism by which self-strengthening occurs in the other areas I have mentioned. So if that mechanism is not strong and effective itself, everything else will be difficult. The fundamental question is, are the people of Taiwan being well served by their political system.

None of these forms of self-strengthening will be easy, particularly in a divided polity. But they are areas where a broader and deeper Taiwan consensus will buoy Taiwan’s psychological confidence and reduce the chances of PRC pressure in the first place. In this regard, young people have a special role to play, for the simple reason that over the long term, you have the most at stake. On the other hand, for Taiwan to remain divided and forego the opportunity for self-strengthening only increases the island’s vulnerability. And it will be young people who have the most to lose.

My final question, Question 8, is what are the implications of all of this for the United States?You may have seen the policy brief of mine that Brookings issued recently, so I will just summarize its conclusions.

First of all, the fact that stabilization has only gone part way and could stall should allay any American fears that, in effect, Taiwan will “abandon America” for the sake of its relationship with China.

Second, it would be unwise for the United States to “abandon Taiwan” for the sake of its relationship with China. I and other scholars have offered several compelling reasons why this is so (as long, of course, as Taiwan desires American support):

First of all, Although Taiwan has at times been the most important source of U.S.-China differences, it is not the only one. Frictions over maritime East Asia and North Korea are examples. So conceding to Beijing on our security relationship with Taiwan would not necessarily foster a more friendly China.

Second, U.S. allies and partners—Japan, the Republic Korea, and others not necessarily in the Asian region—have much at stake in Washington’s future approach to Taiwan. Simply put, a United States that would abandon Taiwan could abandon them too.

Third, whatever China says, U.S. arms are actually not the reason that Beijing has been unable to bring Taiwan “into the embrace of the Motherland.” More to the point, China has not been able to persuade Taiwan’s government and public to accept its “one country, two systems” formula. If China were to make an offer that was actually to Taiwan’s liking, Taipei would not refuse that offer because of U.S. arms sales.

Fourth, there have been points in the past when the United States has acted in ways that placed Taiwan in a vulnerable position. Most or all of those occurred before the people of Taiwan had any say in their future, as they clearly do now. I hope that we don’t repeat this unfortunate history.

Finally, how a status quo United States and a reviving China cope with each other will be played out over the next few decades in a series of test cases. North Korea, maritime East Asia, and Iran are a few of them. Taiwan is another. Should the United States concede to China on Taiwan, the lessons that Beijing would learn about the intentions of the United States would likely discourage its moderation and accommodation on other issues like North Korea or maritime East Asia; in that respect, America’s friends and allies are right. Continuity of U.S. policy toward Taiwan will not guarantee that China’s actions in other areas will support the status quo, but it increases the likelihood that it will. Conversely, a China that addresses its Taiwan problem with creativity and due regard to the views on the island says something positive about what kind of great power the PRC will be. A more aggressive approach, one that relies on pressure and intimidation, signals reason for concern about its broader intentions. In this regard, Taiwan is the canary in the East Asian coal mine.

Authors

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Wed, 10 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400Richard C. Bush III
Editor's Note: The following speech was delivered at Tamkang University in Taiwan on April 10, 2013.
It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak at Tamkang University. I was first on your campus almost thirty years ago when I was working as a staff member in the US Congress and my boss, the late Congressman Steve Solarz spoke here. I have probably made visits since then but really can't remember when they were. In any event, it's great to be back. Thank you, Dean Dai, for that kind introduction. It's always good to see Professor Lin, who was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in the first year I worked there.
The topic I picked for my speech today is “Facing Mainland China: Taiwan's Future Challenges.” Actually, Taiwan has faced challenges stemming from the Mainland for a long time, actually for more than six decades. But the challenges today and in the future are more complex and consequential than ever before. The choices for Taiwan will be difficult, and it is important that they be made well. To avoid making choices is also a choice.
Actually, it's a bit presumptuous for an outsider to try to give advice to the citizens of another country, particularly a democratic country, on the challenges they face and how to face them. In a profound way, that really is their business. And I readily acknowledge that my own country is having great difficulty meeting its formidable challenges. But my ties to Taiwan were first formed almost forty years ago, and have only grown over time. I care very much what happens to this island and its people. So I hope you will permit me to make a few observations on my topic. I won't talk for too long, because I want plenty of time for questions.
To begin, it is worth noting that Taiwan would face some difficult challenges even if China were not such an important factor. That is because Taiwan, like some other places in East Asia, has entered a transition in its social and economic development that requires new policy models. Even if China did not exist, these challenges would press Taiwan.
In addition, Taiwan's economy is increasingly post-industrial and is finding it harder to remain both competitive in the global economy and provide good jobs and good wages for all. Income inequality is trending upward. The unemployment rate was higher in this past decade than it was in the 1990s (1-3 percent). The central government budget has been basically flat over the last few years, government debt is growing, but the tax burden of Taiwan citizens is fairly light (58th among a group of 65 more advanced countries). The island has already begun to move, correctly, to a knowledge-based economy, but there a still a large number of small, inefficient, family operations. And for a knowledge-based economy, its companies will need people with the right kinds of skills, which probably requires reform of the education system.
If these challenges weren't enough, demography makes them much more difficult. Taiwan's total population will peak relatively soon, probably in 2025. The working age population will decline from 74 percent of the total today to around 67 percent in 2025; the elderly's share of the population will increase from 11 percent today to 20 percent. That means that smaller numbers of workers will be supporting more and more old people. By 2060, half the population (workers) will be supporting 40% of the population (retirees). To make this specific, the students in this room will have to pay for the pensions and health care of your professors after they retire. And as long as young people either don't get married or don't have children, that situation will continue.
So even if China did not exist, Taiwan would face tough choices as a society: choices between economic prosperity on the one hand and social welfare—for the old and the young—on the other. But China does exist. It provides Taiwan with opportunities, to be sure. Many of you ...
Editor's Note: The following speech was delivered at Tamkang University in Taiwan on April 10, 2013.
It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak at Tamkang University. I was first on your campus almost thirty years ago when I was ...

Editor's Note: The following speech was delivered at Tamkang University in Taiwan on April 10, 2013.

It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak at Tamkang University. I was first on your campus almost thirty years ago when I was working as a staff member in the US Congress and my boss, the late Congressman Steve Solarz spoke here. I have probably made visits since then but really can’t remember when they were. In any event, it’s great to be back. Thank you, Dean Dai, for that kind introduction. It’s always good to see Professor Lin, who was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in the first year I worked there.

The topic I picked for my speech today is “Facing Mainland China: Taiwan’s Future Challenges.” Actually, Taiwan has faced challenges stemming from the Mainland for a long time, actually for more than six decades. But the challenges today and in the future are more complex and consequential than ever before. The choices for Taiwan will be difficult, and it is important that they be made well. To avoid making choices is also a choice.

Actually, it’s a bit presumptuous for an outsider to try to give advice to the citizens of another country, particularly a democratic country, on the challenges they face and how to face them. In a profound way, that really is their business. And I readily acknowledge that my own country is having great difficulty meeting its formidable challenges. But my ties to Taiwan were first formed almost forty years ago, and have only grown over time. I care very much what happens to this island and its people. So I hope you will permit me to make a few observations on my topic. I won’t talk for too long, because I want plenty of time for questions.

To begin, it is worth noting that Taiwan would face some difficult challenges even if China were not such an important factor. That is because Taiwan, like some other places in East Asia, has entered a transition in its social and economic development that requires new policy models. Even if China did not exist, these challenges would press Taiwan.

In addition, Taiwan’s economy is increasingly post-industrial and is finding it harder to remain both competitive in the global economy and provide good jobs and good wages for all. Income inequality is trending upward. The unemployment rate was higher in this past decade than it was in the 1990s (1-3 percent). The central government budget has been basically flat over the last few years, government debt is growing, but the tax burden of Taiwan citizens is fairly light (58th among a group of 65 more advanced countries). The island has already begun to move, correctly, to a knowledge-based economy, but there a still a large number of small, inefficient, family operations. And for a knowledge-based economy, its companies will need people with the right kinds of skills, which probably requires reform of the education system.

If these challenges weren’t enough, demography makes them much more difficult. Taiwan’s total population will peak relatively soon, probably in 2025. The working age population will decline from 74 percent of the total today to around 67 percent in 2025; the elderly’s share of the population will increase from 11 percent today to 20 percent. That means that smaller numbers of workers will be supporting more and more old people. By 2060, half the population (workers) will be supporting 40% of the population (retirees). To make this specific, the students in this room will have to pay for the pensions and health care of your professors after they retire. And as long as young people either don’t get married or don’t have children, that situation will continue.

So even if China did not exist, Taiwan would face tough choices as a society: choices between economic prosperity on the one hand and social welfare—for the old and the young—on the other. But China does exist. It provides Taiwan with opportunities, to be sure. Many of you young people may work on the Mainland. But China is a source of insecurity for Taiwan, and so an added challenge. So the task for the island’s leaders and citizens will be to balance their desire for security, prosperity and welfare.

Let me turn now to the various challenges that Mainland China poses for Taiwan.

The first and fundamental challenge is Beijing’s ultimate objective regarding Taiwan, what it calls “peaceful unification” under the one country, two systems formula. In effect, it wishes to have Taiwan become a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, with a status essentially the same as Hong Kong and Macau.

Now Taiwan has always said “no” to one country, two systems (1C2S), and there is little public support for it. It’s important, however, that Taiwan people have a substantive foundation for their opposition rather than be opposed for opposition’s sake. To my mind, there are at least two reasons. The first that there are a serious conceptual differences between Beijing and Taipei over whether Taiwan is a sovereign entity in two important respects: first, the island’s international role, and second, cross-Strait relations. Essentially, this is the issue of the Republic of China, and there is a broad consensus here that the ROC does exist, while Beijing’s formal view is that the ROC hasn’t existed since the founding of the PRC. For Hong Kong and Macau, 1C2S granted a “high degree of autonomy” but not sovereignty. Beijing remains the exclusive sovereign. To my mind, this disagreement over sovereignty is rather fundamental.

The second reason is what 1C2S would mean, hypothetically, for Taiwan’s democracy after unification. Hong Kong is important here as well. When crafted the Hong Kong political system over twenty years ago, through the Basic Law, it skewed the electoral process in ways that made it difficult—or impossible—for individuals and political forces it does not like to come to power. We of course don’t know whether China, as part of a unification deal, would seek to change Taiwan’s political system so that it has the same effect as in Hong Kong. If it did, however, the DPP, which today is a significant portion of Taiwan sentiment, would be marginalized.

But that is just my view. What’s important is how Taiwan citizens and leaders think about this.

When the results of the 2012 presidential elections were announced on the evening of January 14th last year, President Ma Ying-jeou said that he would “safeguard the sovereignty of the Republic of China with my life.” That’s a strong statement, and I am pretty sure that President Ma knows what he means by it. But I believe that Taiwan as a whole could broaden and deepen its understanding of the sovereignty concept. In this regard, it would be particularly useful for each of the major political parties to come to their own internal consensus and then work on a cross-party consensus.

So Challenge Number One is Beijing’s current ultimate goal, unification under 1C2S. That option – and it’s an option only – creates Challenge Number Two. That challenge is the possibility that as the ROC government negotiates with Beijing today, it may make concessions that undermine its claim of sovereignty when it comes to resolving the fundamental cross-Strait dispute. Note that Beijing has a similar challenge: as it negotiates with Taipei today, it wishes to avoid making concessions that undermine 1C2S.

This challenge has been around a long time – for both sides. It is one reason that cross-Strait relations were so difficult from the early 1990s until 2008, to the point that the United States occasionally feared that the two sides might slide toward a conflict that neither intended. This short term-long term problem remains today. Some in Taiwan say that the Ma Administration has damaged Taiwan’s sovereignty in the way it negotiated various economic agreements like ECFA without specifying exactly how. My own analysis concludes that the Ma Administration has not negotiated badly and has preserved Taiwan’s position on this key issue. But it will become important if and when the two sides begin discussions on political and security talks, because sovereignty is an inherently political issue. Which is one reason why those talks are so difficult to start, and may not start anytime soon.

Challenge Number Three is different. It concerns not the content of cross-Strait negotiations but how Beijing seeks to promote its goals concerning Taiwan. Here we need to think about how China is pursuing its objectives regarding Taiwan, and I find it useful to distinguish analytically between two different ways or paradigms: the paradigm of mutual persuasion and the paradigm of power asymmetry, which is different.

Essentially, the paradigm of mutual persuasion is a shared approach of negotiation, persuasion, incrementalism, and mutual adjustment. I would argue that this is the approach that the two sides have followed since Ma Ying-jeou took office. It is part of what Beijing understands by its concept of peaceful development. It is in Taiwan’s interest that mutual persuasion continue (also, I would argue, it is in China’s and America’s interest).

The paradigm of power asymmetry is different. Here, China would exploit the growing power gap with Taiwan – economic, diplomatic, military, and so on – by pressuring Taiwan to accept a resolution of the fundamental dispute more or less on its terms, and even though many in Taiwan would be unhappy about submitting in this way. But listen to how one influential PRC scholar of cross-Strait relations has put the matter: “The severe asymmetrical balance of power between mainland China and Taiwan is a fact that no one can change. Moreover, this problem . . . will continue to increase, a situation that Taiwan needs to handle pragmatically and calmly.” We can speculate on what the scholar means by “pragmatically and calmly.”

Why would Beijing decide on a shift in paradigm? First of all, it might do so if it decided, based on its perceptions or misperceptions, that a future Taiwan government was moving towards de jure independence, and if it could not get Washington to restrain Taipei.

But let us assume, purely for purposes of discussion, that the KMT remains in power, why then might Beijing decide to shift to a strategy of pressure and intimidation? This would happen, I speculate, if it became impatient and decided that Taiwan would never move from the status quo to unification. We have seen hints of that impatience in Chinese suspicions that President Ma’s true objective was “peaceful separation” with a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” character. And recall that one of the circumstances specified in the 2005 anti-secession law is that “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.”

Now I actually don’t think that China will lose patience in the foreseeable future – for the rest of President Ma’s second term, perhaps. I believe that the PRC officials responsible for the conduct of cross-Strait relations are realistic about the views of the Taiwan public and the limits that places on the Taipei government. They seem to believe that time is on Beijing’s side. On the other hand, I don’t know what “new thinking” Xi Jinping may have concerning Taiwan policy, and recent statements by PRC officials urge movement on political issues. So it’s impossible to know whether Beijing’s patience will last indefinitely. No-one should assume that it will.

Note that when I talk about a Chinese strategy of pressure and intimidation, I don’t mean the use of force or even the explicit threat of force. In a situation of power asymmetry, the stronger power need not act overtly to compel the weaker power. In the Taiwan case, Beijing might conclude the very fact that Taiwan is quite dependent on the Mainland economically and the mere existence of its increasingly robust military capabilities will be sufficient to secure Taipei’s submission more or less on its terms.

Obviously, a pressure strategy would create a great challenge for Taiwan. It would. I think, create intense pressure on Taiwan’s leaders and turmoil among the public. The political system would be under tremendous strain.

So what should Taiwan do about this situation? This is my final challenge, the challenge of self-strengthening. It is really a set of challenges. And Taiwan isn’t the only country that needs to strengthen itself from within. In my view, frankly speaking, there is a lot that the United States must do to strengthen itself from within in order to rebuild the pillars of national power that have permitted it to play a dominant role in world affairs since World War II.

I have already referred to the first of these self-strengthening challenges. It is to maintain and enhance Taiwan’s global economic competitiveness in spite of the demographic shift. This requires the continued building of a knowledge-based, innovation-driven economy, and all that this implies for education, financial markets, and the level of government regulation. It requires that the Mainland side properly protects the intellectual property owned by Taiwan companies.

But economic self-strengthening also requires liberalizing its economic ties with all its major trading partners, not just China. To liberalize with China alone runs the risk of being too dependent on the Mainland. Liberalizing with all major trading partners will require eliminating some protectionist barriers, but the structural adjustment that this stimulates will work to Taiwan’s benefit. In fact, this is the policy of the Ma Administration.

I have also suggested that n terms of fundamental policy, it is a good idea for Taiwan to foster a clearer sense of what it means to say that Taiwan or the ROC is a sovereign entity, not just for its role in the international system but also regarding cross-Strait relations and the domestic political system. This will ensure that if and when political and security talks come, Taiwan’s negotiators will no what aspects of sovereignty are relatively minor and can be conceded and which are so important that they must be defended at all costs. One part of this self-strengthening will be public education so voters understand along with officials.

Diplomatically, Taiwan should ensure that its relationships with its most important diplomatic partners are strong and positive. This includes, of course, the United States and Japan, but also the principal countries of Western Europe. In this regard, I am pleased to report that relations with the United States have improved in recent years.

Militarily, Taiwan should skillfully enhance the deterrent capabilities of Taiwan’s armed forces. By this I mean raising the costs and uncertainties for Beijing if it were ever to mount an intimidation campaign, which at least implies a willingness to use force. Here, I associate myself with the Obama Administration which, in the words of one official, believes that “Lasting security cannot be achieved simply by purchasing limited numbers of advanced weapons systems. Taiwan must also devote greater attention to asymmetric concepts and technologies to maximize Taiwan’s enduring strengths and advantages.”

Finally, there is the question of the political system. Frankly, I believe that Taiwan’s political system tends to focus on relatively superficial issues – such as the security of President Ma’s daughter – rather than on the fundamental challenges that face the island. Politicians are aided in this tendency by this mass media.

Now, I understand that this is a structural problem, created not by individual politicians or media companies but by the nature of competition within both the political and media world. I also believe that Taiwan is better off having a democratic system than something else, in part because it creates a challenge for Beijing – that if it wishes to achieve its political goals concerning Taiwan, it will have to satisfy a broad spectrum of public opinion. And I realize that reforming a political system is very hard to do. Just look at the similar problems that exist in the United States. But it is Taiwan’s political system that will be the mechanism by which self-strengthening occurs in the other areas I have mentioned. So if that mechanism is not strong and effective itself, everything else will be difficult. The fundamental question is, are the people of Taiwan being well served by their political system.

None of these forms of self-strengthening will be easy, particularly in a divided polity. But they are areas where a broader and deeper Taiwan consensus will buoy Taiwan’s psychological confidence and reduce the chances of PRC pressure in the first place. In this regard, young people have a special role to play, for the simple reason that over the long term, you have the most at stake. On the other hand, for Taiwan to remain divided and forego the opportunity for self-strengthening only increases the island’s vulnerability. And it will be young people who have the most to lose.

My final question, Question 8, is what are the implications of all of this for the United States?You may have seen the policy brief of mine that Brookings issued recently, so I will just summarize its conclusions.

First of all, the fact that stabilization has only gone part way and could stall should allay any American fears that, in effect, Taiwan will “abandon America” for the sake of its relationship with China.

Second, it would be unwise for the United States to “abandon Taiwan” for the sake of its relationship with China. I and other scholars have offered several compelling reasons why this is so (as long, of course, as Taiwan desires American support):

First of all, Although Taiwan has at times been the most important source of U.S.-China differences, it is not the only one. Frictions over maritime East Asia and North Korea are examples. So conceding to Beijing on our security relationship with Taiwan would not necessarily foster a more friendly China.

Second, U.S. allies and partners—Japan, the Republic Korea, and others not necessarily in the Asian region—have much at stake in Washington’s future approach to Taiwan. Simply put, a United States that would abandon Taiwan could abandon them too.

Third, whatever China says, U.S. arms are actually not the reason that Beijing has been unable to bring Taiwan “into the embrace of the Motherland.” More to the point, China has not been able to persuade Taiwan’s government and public to accept its “one country, two systems” formula. If China were to make an offer that was actually to Taiwan’s liking, Taipei would not refuse that offer because of U.S. arms sales.

Fourth, there have been points in the past when the United States has acted in ways that placed Taiwan in a vulnerable position. Most or all of those occurred before the people of Taiwan had any say in their future, as they clearly do now. I hope that we don’t repeat this unfortunate history.

Finally, how a status quo United States and a reviving China cope with each other will be played out over the next few decades in a series of test cases. North Korea, maritime East Asia, and Iran are a few of them. Taiwan is another. Should the United States concede to China on Taiwan, the lessons that Beijing would learn about the intentions of the United States would likely discourage its moderation and accommodation on other issues like North Korea or maritime East Asia; in that respect, America’s friends and allies are right. Continuity of U.S. policy toward Taiwan will not guarantee that China’s actions in other areas will support the status quo, but it increases the likelihood that it will. Conversely, a China that addresses its Taiwan problem with creativity and due regard to the views on the island says something positive about what kind of great power the PRC will be. A more aggressive approach, one that relies on pressure and intimidation, signals reason for concern about its broader intentions. In this regard, Taiwan is the canary in the East Asian coal mine.

Editor's Note: For Campaign 2012, Alice Rivlin wrote a policy brief proposing ideas for the next president on America’s health care system. The following paper is a response to Rivlin’s piece from Ross Hammond. Tom Mann also prepared a response arguing that Americans must accept the reality of today’s political polarization and challenge Washington to offer tangible solutions to the nation’s most urgent problems.

Alice Rivlin highlights the twin health care challenges facing America and the next president: covering the uninsured while curbing unsustainable increases in health care costs and their impact on the debt. She provides a compelling argument for how to address these challenges through health care legislation. I would like to focus here on the role that investment in public health and prevention can play as a complementary strategy for controlling health care spending.

Perhaps the most pressing public health challenge for the United States today is the epidemic of overweight and obesity, which is linked to an array of costly and debilitating health consequences. According to data from the National Center for Health Statistics, two in three American adults are now overweight, including one in three who are obese. A recent study also found that almost one-third of children and adolescents are overweight or obese. These rates are even higher among ethnic minorities, rural populations, and those with low income or education. The health risks associated with obesity reported by the Institute of Medicine include a much higher incidence of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, several cancers, hypertension, high cholesterol, asthma, osteoarthritis, and liver disease.

Not surprisingly, then, the obesity epidemic is a major driver of health care costs in the United States, and the costs may continue to increase significantly in the future if it is not controlled. The increased health risks for major disease that come with obesity carry not only a high social price tag but also a high economic one—relative medical costs for the obese are estimated to be 36 to 100 percent higher than for Americans of healthy weight. A 2009 study found that childhood obesity alone is responsible for $14.1 billion in direct medical costs annually. By some estimates, nearly 21 percent of all current medical spending in the United States is now obesity related. A significant proportion of these medical costs is paid by Medicaid and Medicare, and one recent analysis concluded that total Medicaid spending would be almost 12 percent lower in the absence of obesity. Beyond direct medical spending, additional costs from obesity are driven by increased rates of disability and by reduced productivity.

The impact of obesity on health care spending is likely to increase in the coming years unless further preventative steps are taken. Although recent data suggest that obesity rates may now be leveling off after a period of very rapid growth, the epidemic in children is especially worrisome because most obese children become obese adults. Childhood obesity means more chronic disease will begin earlier in life for more people—driving up lifetime costs considerably. For example, type 2 diabetes (for which obesity is a particularly strong risk factor) occurred primarily in adults until recently, but the Centers for Disease Control report that it is now beginning in childhood for more Americans. A recent report in the Journal of the American Medical Association estimates that one-third of all children born in the United States today (and one-half of all Latino and African American children) will develop type 2 diabetes in their lifetime. Even if the epidemic does not worsen, these costs are likely to prove an unsustainable burden on the health system given the long-term growth of the federal debt.

Keeping the costs of obesity from overwhelming the health care system will require a renewed focus by the next president on obesity prevention. This has the potential to contain costs much more effectively than the mere treatment of obesity-related chronic health conditions. Early childhood can be an especially important period—once obesity develops, a powerful set of physiological processes and behavior patterns make it challenging to reverse. From the perspective of health care costs, early prevention can produce substantial savings. According to an analysis in the American Journal of Public Health, as little as a 5 percent reduction in the prevalence of diabetes and hypertension would save almost $25 billion annually in medium-term health care costs.

Prevention is important, but designing effective prevention efforts remains challenging. The drivers of the obesity epidemic are complex and multifaceted, so there is likely no single solution. Continued investment in research on effective prevention strategies is needed, especially in support of what the Institute of Medicine and National Institutes of Health refer to as new “systems” approaches. Indeed, it may be critical to coordinate policy across many domains and levels of scale in order to see a rapid change in the obesity epidemic. To be most effective, prevention efforts must focus not just on educating individuals or on changing environments, but on doing both together.

The next president should take several steps to address the major public health challenge of obesity and help avoid the unsustainable health care costs it will generate:

Renew the emphasis on prevention efforts. Prevention is especially important, given the role of childhood influences in the development of overweight and the challenge of reversing obesity once entrenched.

Increase investment in public health research to develop an evidence base that supports the design and testing of powerful new prevention strategies for the future. As the scientific community emphasizes, innovative approaches are greatly needed to continue to improve how policy addresses the complex drivers of obesity.

Coordinate public policy across domains and agencies. Many policy areas “outside” of health—including education, housing, transportation, agriculture, and tax policy—have strong effects on public health and obesity. A more systemic approach that takes into account connections across these areas should be a central element in an effective obesity prevention strategy.

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Fri, 04 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400Ross A. Hammond
Editor's Note: For Campaign 2012, Alice Rivlin wrote a policy brief proposing ideas for the next president on America's health care system. The following paper is a response to Rivlin's piece from Ross Hammond. Tom Mann also prepared a response arguing that Americans must accept the reality of today's political polarization and challenge Washington to offer tangible solutions to the nation's most urgent problems.
Alice Rivlin highlights the twin health care challenges facing America and the next president: covering the uninsured while curbing unsustainable increases in health care costs and their impact on the debt. She provides a compelling argument for how to address these challenges through health care legislation. I would like to focus here on the role that investment in public health and prevention can play as a complementary strategy for controlling health care spending.
Perhaps the most pressing public health challenge for the United States today is the epidemic of overweight and obesity, which is linked to an array of costly and debilitating health consequences. According to data from the National Center for Health Statistics, two in three American adults are now overweight, including one in three who are obese. A recent study also found that almost one-third of children and adolescents are overweight or obese. These rates are even higher among ethnic minorities, rural populations, and those with low income or education. The health risks associated with obesity reported by the Institute of Medicine include a much higher incidence of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, several cancers, hypertension, high cholesterol, asthma, osteoarthritis, and liver disease.
Not surprisingly, then, the obesity epidemic is a major driver of health care costs in the United States, and the costs may continue to increase significantly in the future if it is not controlled. The increased health risks for major disease that come with obesity carry not only a high social price tag but also a high economic one—relative medical costs for the obese are estimated to be 36 to 100 percent higher than for Americans of healthy weight. A 2009 study found that childhood obesity alone is responsible for $14.1 billion in direct medical costs annually. By some estimates, nearly 21 percent of all current medical spending in the United States is now obesity related. A significant proportion of these medical costs is paid by Medicaid and Medicare, and one recent analysis concluded that total Medicaid spending would be almost 12 percent lower in the absence of obesity. Beyond direct medical spending, additional costs from obesity are driven by increased rates of disability and by reduced productivity.
The impact of obesity on health care spending is likely to increase in the coming years unless further preventative steps are taken. Although recent data suggest that obesity rates may now be leveling off after a period of very rapid growth, the epidemic in children is especially worrisome because most obese children become obese adults. Childhood obesity means more chronic disease will begin earlier in life for more people—driving up lifetime costs considerably. For example, type 2 diabetes (for which obesity is a particularly strong risk factor) occurred primarily in adults until recently, but the Centers for Disease Control report that it is now beginning in childhood for more Americans. A recent report in the Journal of the American Medical Association estimates that one-third of all children born in the United States today (and one-half of all Latino and African American children) will develop type 2 diabetes in their lifetime. Even if the epidemic does not worsen, these costs are likely to prove an unsustainable burden on the health system given the long-term growth of the federal debt.
Keeping the costs of obesity from overwhelming the health care system will require a renewed focus by the next president on obesity ... Editor's Note: For Campaign 2012, Alice Rivlin wrote a policy brief proposing ideas for the next president on America's health care system. The following paper is a response to Rivlin's piece from Ross Hammond. Tom Mann also prepared a response ...

Editor's Note: For Campaign 2012, Alice Rivlin wrote a policy brief proposing ideas for the next president on America’s health care system. The following paper is a response to Rivlin’s piece from Ross Hammond. Tom Mann also prepared a response arguing that Americans must accept the reality of today’s political polarization and challenge Washington to offer tangible solutions to the nation’s most urgent problems.

Alice Rivlin highlights the twin health care challenges facing America and the next president: covering the uninsured while curbing unsustainable increases in health care costs and their impact on the debt. She provides a compelling argument for how to address these challenges through health care legislation. I would like to focus here on the role that investment in public health and prevention can play as a complementary strategy for controlling health care spending.

Perhaps the most pressing public health challenge for the United States today is the epidemic of overweight and obesity, which is linked to an array of costly and debilitating health consequences. According to data from the National Center for Health Statistics, two in three American adults are now overweight, including one in three who are obese. A recent study also found that almost one-third of children and adolescents are overweight or obese. These rates are even higher among ethnic minorities, rural populations, and those with low income or education. The health risks associated with obesity reported by the Institute of Medicine include a much higher incidence of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, several cancers, hypertension, high cholesterol, asthma, osteoarthritis, and liver disease.

Not surprisingly, then, the obesity epidemic is a major driver of health care costs in the United States, and the costs may continue to increase significantly in the future if it is not controlled. The increased health risks for major disease that come with obesity carry not only a high social price tag but also a high economic one—relative medical costs for the obese are estimated to be 36 to 100 percent higher than for Americans of healthy weight. A 2009 study found that childhood obesity alone is responsible for $14.1 billion in direct medical costs annually. By some estimates, nearly 21 percent of all current medical spending in the United States is now obesity related. A significant proportion of these medical costs is paid by Medicaid and Medicare, and one recent analysis concluded that total Medicaid spending would be almost 12 percent lower in the absence of obesity. Beyond direct medical spending, additional costs from obesity are driven by increased rates of disability and by reduced productivity.

The impact of obesity on health care spending is likely to increase in the coming years unless further preventative steps are taken. Although recent data suggest that obesity rates may now be leveling off after a period of very rapid growth, the epidemic in children is especially worrisome because most obese children become obese adults. Childhood obesity means more chronic disease will begin earlier in life for more people—driving up lifetime costs considerably. For example, type 2 diabetes (for which obesity is a particularly strong risk factor) occurred primarily in adults until recently, but the Centers for Disease Control report that it is now beginning in childhood for more Americans. A recent report in the Journal of the American Medical Association estimates that one-third of all children born in the United States today (and one-half of all Latino and African American children) will develop type 2 diabetes in their lifetime. Even if the epidemic does not worsen, these costs are likely to prove an unsustainable burden on the health system given the long-term growth of the federal debt.

Keeping the costs of obesity from overwhelming the health care system will require a renewed focus by the next president on obesity prevention. This has the potential to contain costs much more effectively than the mere treatment of obesity-related chronic health conditions. Early childhood can be an especially important period—once obesity develops, a powerful set of physiological processes and behavior patterns make it challenging to reverse. From the perspective of health care costs, early prevention can produce substantial savings. According to an analysis in the American Journal of Public Health, as little as a 5 percent reduction in the prevalence of diabetes and hypertension would save almost $25 billion annually in medium-term health care costs.

Prevention is important, but designing effective prevention efforts remains challenging. The drivers of the obesity epidemic are complex and multifaceted, so there is likely no single solution. Continued investment in research on effective prevention strategies is needed, especially in support of what the Institute of Medicine and National Institutes of Health refer to as new “systems” approaches. Indeed, it may be critical to coordinate policy across many domains and levels of scale in order to see a rapid change in the obesity epidemic. To be most effective, prevention efforts must focus not just on educating individuals or on changing environments, but on doing both together.

The next president should take several steps to address the major public health challenge of obesity and help avoid the unsustainable health care costs it will generate:

Renew the emphasis on prevention efforts. Prevention is especially important, given the role of childhood influences in the development of overweight and the challenge of reversing obesity once entrenched.

Increase investment in public health research to develop an evidence base that supports the design and testing of powerful new prevention strategies for the future. As the scientific community emphasizes, innovative approaches are greatly needed to continue to improve how policy addresses the complex drivers of obesity.

Coordinate public policy across domains and agencies. Many policy areas “outside” of health—including education, housing, transportation, agriculture, and tax policy—have strong effects on public health and obesity. A more systemic approach that takes into account connections across these areas should be a central element in an effective obesity prevention strategy.

Science is progressing at a rapid pace. The human genome sequence has been completed and evidence on how diseases occur at the molecular level is growing by the day. Researchers and clinicians have been steadily working to use this data to make personalized medicine become a reality. However, with all of this new information, these prospective breakthroughs aren't yet reaching patients as quickly as needed. In the coming year alone, cancer will claim the lives of over 550,000 Americans. To address this incredible burden, and to ensure that patients have access to the most beneficial treatments, the process for turning these scientific insights into safe and effective treatments needs to accelerate as well.

Our progress in understanding the specific pathways of disease has identified hundreds of new targets for potentially life-saving drugs that hold the potential to treat individual patients much more effectively.

The result of this understanding is an emerging paradigm shift for the development of new medicines. This paradigm is beginning to yield drugs that may have much more of a positive impact on the lives of these patients than traditional therapies.

The regulators at the FDA must be fully engaged in this shift in development, which may involve a sharpening focus on particular subsets of a disease. When a new drug or drug combination shows extreme activity very early, like these new targeted agents are capable of doing, new approaches are needed that focus on the most efficient mechanisms to get a potential medical breakthrough to the relevant patients—and that may require significant revisions in the way such drugs are tested for safety and effectiveness under the FDA's oversight.

Over the past year, our organizations—Friends of Cancer Research and the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings—have convened a series of workshops to explore potential scientific strategies that FDA and drug researchers could use to address this new paradigm. We found that FDA and the scientists involved in product development have already taken a number of promising steps to respond to these new trends in medical product development. Working with FDA, we also identified some critical further steps to make sure that the development and regulatory processes for breakthrough drugs are aligned with the rapid progression of science.

Recently, to ensure that FDA can actively and quickly engage, Senators Bennet (D-Colo.), Hatch (R-Utah) and Burr (R-N.C.) introduced a bill in the Senate to establish a Breakthrough Product Designation.

The Breakthrough Product Designation has two main goals: 1) to reduce the total development time and cost of the most promising "breakthrough" treatments; and 2) to minimize the number of patients that would be given a "control" regimen or a currently available treatment that doesn't work well. This legislation does not alter current FDA standards and any new drug would continue to be required to fully demonstrate both safety and efficacy.

Upon designation, the FDA and the drug sponsor would engage in intensive interactions to collaboratively construct and agree upon a development strategy for the drug. This could include the use of a variety of innovative clinical trial designs, or specific strategies for accumulating further evidence on the breakthrough drug after it is approved.

In order to be most effective, the Breakthrough Product designation would be given as early as possible, so that the sponsor and FDA can discuss ways to condense traditional, often lengthy multi-phase trials into rigorous and efficient protocols to cut that time down. This designation would allow FDA to prepare for and implement a consistent strategy for potentially revolutionary medicines. It would signal to developers that, for the most promising products to battle severe illness and disease, the FDA will actively marshal these products through the course of development—and would help them identify the most efficient ways to develop their drugs.

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Fri, 20 Apr 2012 11:59:00 -0400Mark B. McClellan and Ellen Sigal
Science is progressing at a rapid pace. The human genome sequence has been completed and evidence on how diseases occur at the molecular level is growing by the day. Researchers and clinicians have been steadily working to use this data to make personalized medicine become a reality. However, with all of this new information, these prospective breakthroughs aren't yet reaching patients as quickly as needed. In the coming year alone, cancer will claim the lives of over 550,000 Americans. To address this incredible burden, and to ensure that patients have access to the most beneficial treatments, the process for turning these scientific insights into safe and effective treatments needs to accelerate as well.
Our progress in understanding the specific pathways of disease has identified hundreds of new targets for potentially life-saving drugs that hold the potential to treat individual patients much more effectively.
The result of this understanding is an emerging paradigm shift for the development of new medicines. This paradigm is beginning to yield drugs that may have much more of a positive impact on the lives of these patients than traditional therapies.
The regulators at the FDA must be fully engaged in this shift in development, which may involve a sharpening focus on particular subsets of a disease. When a new drug or drug combination shows extreme activity very early, like these new targeted agents are capable of doing, new approaches are needed that focus on the most efficient mechanisms to get a potential medical breakthrough to the relevant patients—and that may require significant revisions in the way such drugs are tested for safety and effectiveness under the FDA's oversight.
Over the past year, our organizations—Friends of Cancer Research and the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings—have convened a series of workshops to explore potential scientific strategies that FDA and drug researchers could use to address this new paradigm. We found that FDA and the scientists involved in product development have already taken a number of promising steps to respond to these new trends in medical product development. Working with FDA, we also identified some critical further steps to make sure that the development and regulatory processes for breakthrough drugs are aligned with the rapid progression of science.
Recently, to ensure that FDA can actively and quickly engage, Senators Bennet (D-Colo.), Hatch (R-Utah) and Burr (R-N.C.) introduced a bill in the Senate to establish a Breakthrough Product Designation.
The Breakthrough Product Designation has two main goals: 1) to reduce the total development time and cost of the most promising "breakthrough" treatments; and 2) to minimize the number of patients that would be given a "control" regimen or a currently available treatment that doesn't work well. This legislation does not alter current FDA standards and any new drug would continue to be required to fully demonstrate both safety and efficacy.
Upon designation, the FDA and the drug sponsor would engage in intensive interactions to collaboratively construct and agree upon a development strategy for the drug. This could include the use of a variety of innovative clinical trial designs, or specific strategies for accumulating further evidence on the breakthrough drug after it is approved.
In order to be most effective, the Breakthrough Product designation would be given as early as possible, so that the sponsor and FDA can discuss ways to condense traditional, often lengthy multi-phase trials into rigorous and efficient protocols to cut that time down. This designation would allow FDA to prepare for and implement a consistent strategy for potentially revolutionary medicines. It would signal to developers that, for the most promising products to battle severe illness and disease, the FDA will actively marshal these products through the ... Science is progressing at a rapid pace. The human genome sequence has been completed and evidence on how diseases occur at the molecular level is growing by the day. Researchers and clinicians have been steadily working to use this data to make ...

Science is progressing at a rapid pace. The human genome sequence has been completed and evidence on how diseases occur at the molecular level is growing by the day. Researchers and clinicians have been steadily working to use this data to make personalized medicine become a reality. However, with all of this new information, these prospective breakthroughs aren't yet reaching patients as quickly as needed. In the coming year alone, cancer will claim the lives of over 550,000 Americans. To address this incredible burden, and to ensure that patients have access to the most beneficial treatments, the process for turning these scientific insights into safe and effective treatments needs to accelerate as well.

Our progress in understanding the specific pathways of disease has identified hundreds of new targets for potentially life-saving drugs that hold the potential to treat individual patients much more effectively.

The result of this understanding is an emerging paradigm shift for the development of new medicines. This paradigm is beginning to yield drugs that may have much more of a positive impact on the lives of these patients than traditional therapies.

The regulators at the FDA must be fully engaged in this shift in development, which may involve a sharpening focus on particular subsets of a disease. When a new drug or drug combination shows extreme activity very early, like these new targeted agents are capable of doing, new approaches are needed that focus on the most efficient mechanisms to get a potential medical breakthrough to the relevant patients—and that may require significant revisions in the way such drugs are tested for safety and effectiveness under the FDA's oversight.

Over the past year, our organizations—Friends of Cancer Research and the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings—have convened a series of workshops to explore potential scientific strategies that FDA and drug researchers could use to address this new paradigm. We found that FDA and the scientists involved in product development have already taken a number of promising steps to respond to these new trends in medical product development. Working with FDA, we also identified some critical further steps to make sure that the development and regulatory processes for breakthrough drugs are aligned with the rapid progression of science.

Recently, to ensure that FDA can actively and quickly engage, Senators Bennet (D-Colo.), Hatch (R-Utah) and Burr (R-N.C.) introduced a bill in the Senate to establish a Breakthrough Product Designation.

The Breakthrough Product Designation has two main goals: 1) to reduce the total development time and cost of the most promising "breakthrough" treatments; and 2) to minimize the number of patients that would be given a "control" regimen or a currently available treatment that doesn't work well. This legislation does not alter current FDA standards and any new drug would continue to be required to fully demonstrate both safety and efficacy.

Upon designation, the FDA and the drug sponsor would engage in intensive interactions to collaboratively construct and agree upon a development strategy for the drug. This could include the use of a variety of innovative clinical trial designs, or specific strategies for accumulating further evidence on the breakthrough drug after it is approved.

In order to be most effective, the Breakthrough Product designation would be given as early as possible, so that the sponsor and FDA can discuss ways to condense traditional, often lengthy multi-phase trials into rigorous and efficient protocols to cut that time down. This designation would allow FDA to prepare for and implement a consistent strategy for potentially revolutionary medicines. It would signal to developers that, for the most promising products to battle severe illness and disease, the FDA will actively marshal these products through the course of development—and would help them identify the most efficient ways to develop their drugs.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2011/10/25-material-wellbeing-burtless?rssid=quality+of+life+issues{016D969C-AC6C-46DD-9B0F-C12FB9A3B5EF}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65494432/0/brookingsrss/topics/qualityoflifeissues~Comments-on-the-Material-WellBeing-of-the-Poor-and-the-Middle-Class-sinceComments on the Material Well-Being of the Poor and the Middle Class since 1980

Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan have spent a great deal of time and effort
trying to persuade us that American living standards have improved over the past
three decades. Further, living standards have improved not only at the very top
of the income distribution, as everyone suspects, but also in the middle and at
the bottom.

I hope Bruce and James have succeeded in persuading most of their
readers, because they’re basically correct. It may seem odd for them to make
this particular claim in the midst of the worse post-World-War-II slump, but
maybe that is exactly the right time to make and defend such a claim.

People who think middle-income living standards have stopped rising, if
they are well informed, are thinking of living standards over a fairly brief period –
say, the last five or ten years, when living standards have been affected by a
steep recession and anemic recovery. Alternatively, if they’re thinking about
living standards over two or three decades, they are only thinking about the trend
in living standards within fairly narrow slices of the population – unmarried men in
their 20s and early 30s who have below-average schooling, for example, or
groups that have been particularly hard hit in the recent slump.

Americans in the broad middle and at the bottom of the distribution have,
on average, seen their real incomes and consumption improve over the past
three decades.

Why is this claim so controversial? There are four main reasons:

A defective price index, which makes unwary observers think real
incomes are climbing more slowly than they really are.

Household income measures that fail to account for shrinking
household size. If median household income has remained unchanged
(and I’m not saying it has), then shrinking household size means there
is an increase in the amount of income per household member.

Incomplete measures of income, in other words, definitions that exclude
or undercount sources of income particularly important at the bottom
and in the middle of the income distribution than they are at the top.

Finally, inequality has unquestionably increased over the past 30 years
(and in the past 10 years and 20 years). This means that average living
standards have improved faster than median living standards. More of
the economy-wide income gains have been enjoyed by Americans with
a high perch in the income distribution; smaller fractions have been
received by people in the middle and at the bottom.

Improvements in median living standards are nonetheless continuing, at
least if we take a long enough perspective. The plain fact is, however, they are
improving more slowly than they did in the first three or four decades after World
War II. That is especially true if we focus solely on the past 11 or 12 years.
Under any plausible measure of Americans’ income or consumption possibilities,
gains in middle-class living standards have been slower in the recent past than
they were in the earlier post-war period. You cannot put a happy face on a
decade-long period that ends with the longest and worst economic slump of the
post-war era. Rising inequality has certainly made things worse for many folks
now in the middle and at the bottom. If the pain of the slump were more equally
distributed across the nation’s households, many people would certainly feel
better about progress in their living standards. But a deep slump combined with
rising inequality will never be kind to either the poor or the middle class.

I brought 10 slides, and I now have a lot less than 10 minutes to go over
them. They were created to defend the statements I just made and to lend
support to the basic conclusions reached by Bruce and James.

Downloads

Authors

]]>
Tue, 25 Oct 2011 16:17:00 -0400Gary Burtless
On October 25, 2011, Gary Burtless provided comments to the paper "The Material Well-Being of the Poor and Middle Class since 1980" by Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan at the American Enterprise Institute's event Are the Poor and Middle Class Actually Getting Poorer? Reassessing Prosperity Trends Since 1980.
Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan have spent a great deal of time and efforttrying to persuade us that American living standards have improved over the pastthree decades. Further, living standards have improved not only at the very topof the income distribution, as everyone suspects, but also in the middle and atthe bottom.
I hope Bruce and James have succeeded in persuading most of theirreaders, because they’re basically correct. It may seem odd for them to makethis particular claim in the midst of the worse post-World-War-II slump, butmaybe that is exactly the right time to make and defend such a claim.
People who think middle-income living standards have stopped rising, ifthey are well informed, are thinking of living standards over a fairly brief period –say, the last five or ten years, when living standards have been affected by asteep recession and anemic recovery. Alternatively, if they’re thinking aboutliving standards over two or three decades, they are only thinking about the trendin living standards within fairly narrow slices of the population – unmarried men intheir 20s and early 30s who have below-average schooling, for example, orgroups that have been particularly hard hit in the recent slump.
Americans in the broad middle and at the bottom of the distribution have,on average, seen their real incomes and consumption improve over the pastthree decades.
Why is this claim so controversial? There are four main reasons:
- A defective price index, which makes unwary observers think realincomes are climbing more slowly than they really are.- Household income measures that fail to account for shrinkinghousehold size. If median household income has remained unchanged(and I’m not saying it has), then shrinking household size means thereis an increase in the amount of income per household member.- Incomplete measures of income, in other words, definitions that excludeor undercount sources of income particularly important at the bottomand in the middle of the income distribution than they are at the top.- Finally, inequality has unquestionably increased over the past 30 years(and in the past 10 years and 20 years). This means that average livingstandards have improved faster than median living standards. More ofthe economy-wide income gains have been enjoyed by Americans witha high perch in the income distribution; smaller fractions have beenreceived by people in the middle and at the bottom.
Improvements in median living standards are nonetheless continuing, atleast if we take a long enough perspective. The plain fact is, however, they areimproving more slowly than they did in the first three or four decades after WorldWar II. That is especially true if we focus solely on the past 11 or 12 years.Under any plausible measure of Americans’ income or consumption possibilities,gains in middle-class living standards have been slower in the recent past thanthey were in the earlier post-war period. You cannot put a happy face on adecade-long period that ends with the longest and worst economic slump of thepost-war era. Rising inequality has certainly made things worse for many folksnow in the middle and at the bottom. If the pain of the slump were more equallydistributed across the nation’s households, many people would certainly feelbetter about progress in their living standards. But a deep slump combined withrising inequality will never be kind to either the poor or the middle class.
I brought 10 slides, and I now have a lot less than 10 minutes to go overthem. They were created to defend the statements I just made and to lendsupport to the basic ... On October 25, 2011, Gary Burtless provided comments to the paper "The Material Well-Being of the Poor and Middle Class since 1980" by Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan at the American Enterprise Institute's event Are the Poor and Middle ...

Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan have spent a great deal of time and effort
trying to persuade us that American living standards have improved over the past
three decades. Further, living standards have improved not only at the very top
of the income distribution, as everyone suspects, but also in the middle and at
the bottom.

I hope Bruce and James have succeeded in persuading most of their
readers, because they’re basically correct. It may seem odd for them to make
this particular claim in the midst of the worse post-World-War-II slump, but
maybe that is exactly the right time to make and defend such a claim.

People who think middle-income living standards have stopped rising, if
they are well informed, are thinking of living standards over a fairly brief period –
say, the last five or ten years, when living standards have been affected by a
steep recession and anemic recovery. Alternatively, if they’re thinking about
living standards over two or three decades, they are only thinking about the trend
in living standards within fairly narrow slices of the population – unmarried men in
their 20s and early 30s who have below-average schooling, for example, or
groups that have been particularly hard hit in the recent slump.

Americans in the broad middle and at the bottom of the distribution have,
on average, seen their real incomes and consumption improve over the past
three decades.

Why is this claim so controversial? There are four main reasons:

A defective price index, which makes unwary observers think real
incomes are climbing more slowly than they really are.

Household income measures that fail to account for shrinking
household size. If median household income has remained unchanged
(and I’m not saying it has), then shrinking household size means there
is an increase in the amount of income per household member.

Incomplete measures of income, in other words, definitions that exclude
or undercount sources of income particularly important at the bottom
and in the middle of the income distribution than they are at the top.

Finally, inequality has unquestionably increased over the past 30 years
(and in the past 10 years and 20 years). This means that average living
standards have improved faster than median living standards. More of
the economy-wide income gains have been enjoyed by Americans with
a high perch in the income distribution; smaller fractions have been
received by people in the middle and at the bottom.

Improvements in median living standards are nonetheless continuing, at
least if we take a long enough perspective. The plain fact is, however, they are
improving more slowly than they did in the first three or four decades after World
War II. That is especially true if we focus solely on the past 11 or 12 years.
Under any plausible measure of Americans’ income or consumption possibilities,
gains in middle-class living standards have been slower in the recent past than
they were in the earlier post-war period. You cannot put a happy face on a
decade-long period that ends with the longest and worst economic slump of the
post-war era. Rising inequality has certainly made things worse for many folks
now in the middle and at the bottom. If the pain of the slump were more equally
distributed across the nation’s households, many people would certainly feel
better about progress in their living standards. But a deep slump combined with
rising inequality will never be kind to either the poor or the middle class.

I brought 10 slides, and I now have a lot less than 10 minutes to go over
them. They were created to defend the statements I just made and to lend
support to the basic conclusions reached by Bruce and James.

Downloads

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2011/09/28-measuring-happiness?rssid=quality+of+life+issues{09F68C14-719C-41EF-88FB-233FFE4B7B83}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65494434/0/brookingsrss/topics/qualityoflifeissues~Measuring-Happiness-and-Opportunity-Around-the-WorldMeasuring Happiness and Opportunity Around the World

Event Information

In recent years, a number of nations—from Bhutan to Britain, France, China and Brazil —have begun to incorporate measures of happiness into their benchmarks for national progress. Even in the United States— where the Declaration of Independence promises all citizens the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”— policymakers are beginning to consider the merits of measuring happiness. In her latest book, The Pursuit of Happiness: An Economy of Well-being (Brookings Press, 2011), Brookings Senior Fellow Carol Graham explores what we know about the determinants of happiness, across and within countries at different stages of development. She also examines both the promises and potential pitfalls of injecting the “economics of happiness” into policymaking.

On September 28, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion with Carol Graham on her book and whether happiness can be a new marker for economic progress in the United States and across the world. Panelists included David Brooks, New York Times op-ed columnist; and Brookings Senior Fellow Isabel V. Sawhill. Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks. Carol Lancaster, dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, moderated the discussion.

After the program, the panelists took audience questions.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
Wed, 28 Sep 2011 15:00:00 -0400http://e94516386dde43a790f1-3efc6a395eb32e640ae30c4edef7596c.r44.cf1.rackcdn.com/1192234756001.mp3
Event Information
September 28, 2011
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC Register for the Event
In recent years, a number of nations—from Bhutan to Britain, France, China and Brazil —have begun to incorporate measures of happiness into their benchmarks for national progress. Even in the United States— where the Declaration of Independence promises all citizens the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”— policymakers are beginning to consider the merits of measuring happiness. In her latest book, The Pursuit of Happiness: An Economy of Well-being (Brookings Press, 2011), Brookings Senior Fellow Carol Graham explores what we know about the determinants of happiness, across and within countries at different stages of development. She also examines both the promises and potential pitfalls of injecting the “economics of happiness” into policymaking.
On September 28, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion with Carol Graham on her book and whether happiness can be a new marker for economic progress in the United States and across the world. Panelists included David Brooks, New York Times op-ed columnist; and Brookings Senior Fellow Isabel V. Sawhill. Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks. Carol Lancaster, dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, moderated the discussion.
After the program, the panelists took audience questions.
Audio
- Measuring Happiness and Opportunity Around the World
Transcript
- Transcript (.pdf)
Event Materials
- 20110928_measuring_happiness
Event Information
September 28, 2011
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC Register for the Event
In recent years, a number of nations—from Bhutan to Britain, ...

Event Information

In recent years, a number of nations—from Bhutan to Britain, France, China and Brazil —have begun to incorporate measures of happiness into their benchmarks for national progress. Even in the United States— where the Declaration of Independence promises all citizens the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”— policymakers are beginning to consider the merits of measuring happiness. In her latest book, The Pursuit of Happiness: An Economy of Well-being (Brookings Press, 2011), Brookings Senior Fellow Carol Graham explores what we know about the determinants of happiness, across and within countries at different stages of development. She also examines both the promises and potential pitfalls of injecting the “economics of happiness” into policymaking.

On September 28, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion with Carol Graham on her book and whether happiness can be a new marker for economic progress in the United States and across the world. Panelists included David Brooks, New York Times op-ed columnist; and Brookings Senior Fellow Isabel V. Sawhill. Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks. Carol Lancaster, dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, moderated the discussion.

After the program, the panelists took audience questions.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/08/19-roma-haskins?rssid=quality+of+life+issues{D6200655-C6F2-44E0-A290-5BEA45BA8CD1}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65494436/0/brookingsrss/topics/qualityoflifeissues~Helping-the-Roma-in-Bulgaria-Recommendations-to-the-Board-of-the-America-for-Bulgaria-FoundationHelping the Roma in Bulgaria: Recommendations to the Board of the America for Bulgaria Foundation

The Roma people, the largest minority group in Europe and in many European
countries, trail other ethnic groups in almost every characteristic that defines well-being.
Perhaps of greatest importance, the Roma are less educated than other ethnic groups. But
they also suffer from excess health problems, high unemployment, poverty, and political
weakness. The Roma population of Bulgaria is certainly no less disadvantaged than the
Roma in other countries. An especially poignant example of Bulgarian Roma
disadvantage is that the death rate among children under age 1, a prime indicator of
children’s health in any nation, is 25 per 1,000 for Roma children as compared with 9.9
for children of Bulgarian ethnic origin. The mathematics of death almost before life gets
started is a symbolic indicator of the Roma burden in Bulgaria. Similarly, research
conducted for UNICEF by the University of York shows that the poverty rate among
Roma children in Bulgaria is 92 percent, perhaps the highest poverty rate for any ethnic
group in Europe. By contrast, the poverty rate among children of Bulgarian heritage is
less than half as high at 43 percent.

It is not surprising, then, that over at least the past decade, the European Union
(EU) and most European governments, joined by the Open Society Foundation, the
World Bank, and other organizations, have created important initiatives to address all
these problems. It is possible to think that now is an historic moment in which European
governments and dominant ethnic groups, after eight or nine centuries of the most
pernicious types of discrimination against the Roma, are finally, albeit often reluctantly,
admitting the problems facing their Roma populations and their own role in creating and
sustaining these problems. Equally important, most of the Central and Eastern European
(CEE) governments, where discrimination against the Roma has been and continues to be
particularly intense, are gradually adopting policies to address the problems.

To the extent that the moment of Roma opportunity has arrived, perhaps the most
important force moving Bulgaria and other CEE nations in the direction of integration
and inclusion is the EU. In the period leading up to the ascension of Bulgaria and other
CEE nations to membership in the EU, all the new member states were required to meet a
host of conditions required by the EU as the price of admission. Among these conditions
were laws outlawing discrimination and requiring equality of educational opportunity.
The CEE nations complied with the EU directive to pass such laws, but implementation
of the laws in Bulgaria and other nations has been something less than aggressive.

Nor is EU ascension the only force driving the CEE nations to reduce
discrimination against the Roma and other minorities. The Open Society, the World
Bank, and a number of other private organizations, including several Roma nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), have initiated a sweeping program to promote
inclusion of the Roma in the civil society of the CEE nations. Called the “Decade of
Roma Inclusion” (2005-2015) the initiative is notable for getting all the CEE nations
(plus Spain) to participate, to commit themselves to activities designed to promote
inclusion and nondiscrimination, and to make a financial commitment to a fund
administered by the World Bank to promote the initiative. As a part of the initiative,
Bulgaria and the other participating nations originated ten-year action plans. The
Bulgarian action plan, the purpose of which is to create a set of goals and activities that
will promote Roma integration, includes proposals for education, health care, housing,
employment, discrimination and equal opportunity, and culture.

An important part of the Decade program was the establishment of the Roma
Education Fund in 2005. Eight nations (Canada, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK), as well as several international agencies including the
Open Society, pledged a total of 34 million Euros to support Fund activities during the
Roma decade. The major goal of the fund is to “support policies and programs which
ensure quality education for Roma, including the desegregation of education systems.”

By joining the EU, Bulgaria and the other CEE nations brought themselves into a
well-developed culture of inclusion and a complex system of interlocking laws and
agencies that not only outlaw exclusion and discrimination, but provide funds to
implement inclusion policies and to monitor the extent to which EU nations are
aggressively implementing these laws. The laws and directives include the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the
Racial Equality Directive, and several others. It would be a mistake to conclude that
every EU member, even the original 15 EU nations with relatively more advanced
economies and longer histories as democracies than the CEE nations, faithfully
implement every component of the various legal requirements of being an EU member.
Even so, EU requirements and funds have initiated both profound legal changes and a
host of programs to increase the social, economic, political, and cultural inclusion of the
Roma as well as studies and evaluations that bring some light to the actual situation of the
Roma and other minorities in member nations. Given the all but inevitable distance
between the laws on inclusion and discrimination the CEE nations passed in order to join
the EU and the actual implementation of those laws, studies commissioned by various EU
agencies and NGOs illuminate the gaps between policies and implementation.

An excellent example of such illumination is a 2006 study commissioned by the
Economic and Scientific Policy program of the European Parliament. The report is a
hard-hitting assessment of the status of Roma throughout Europe with regard to their
legal status and socio-economic conditions. The latter category includes assessments of
Roma exclusion from employment, education, social services, health care, and
community integration. The upshot of the report is that although there may be some
progress in these important areas of integration, the Roma are still a second-class group
throughout the CEE nations. Seemingly, good laws have not yet produced good results.
Laws may be changed, but changing human behavior and culture takes longer.

CEE governments and their defenders are reluctant to admit the lamentable lack
of progress in Roma integration. In part for this reason, the European Commission, based
on extensive evidence from evaluations, surveys, and news reports of often ferocious
discrimination against the Roma, felt the need to publish “An EU Framework for
National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020” in April 2011. The need for a new
framework is a clear signal that the EU Commission believes the CEE governments in
general and Bulgaria in particular are not achieving the results the EU hoped for when it
approved these nations for EU membership and is therefore trying to push the
governments of these nations into further action.

Following publication of the Framework, the Open Society released one of the
most thorough and provocative reports on the situation faced by the Roma in Europe and
strategies that should be adopted to attack the wide range of Roma disadvantages.
Appropriately entitled “Beyond Rhetoric,” the Open Society report includes entire
chapters on two issues that I will examine in more detail below.

First, the Open Society strongly recommends that nations collect ethnically
disaggregated data. Logically enough, the report holds that it is impossible to document
the effects of policy initiatives on the Roma and other groups unless outcome data,
including measures of health, education, housing, employment, income, and death rates
by age, are collected for individual ethnic groups. So important are ethnically
disaggregated data that the report goes so far as to recommend that, if necessary,
governments should change their statistical systems to “incorporate ethnic data
components into regular statistical surveys.” A second recommendation that deserves
special attention is the report’s emphasis on early childhood education and care. Virtually
every report about the Roma emphasizes the vital importance of education in fighting
Roma exclusion, but the Open Society report strongly recommends that nations
implementing the EU Framework should “give urgent consideration” to establishing an
early child development fund to “support innovative early development programs and
allow for scale up of what works.”

Beyond these specific recommendations, the Open Society report emphasizes that
the EU Commission stated explicitly in its Framework document that “member states do
not properly use EU money for the purpose of effective social and economic integration
of Roma. As if this judgment, which seems to represent the views of many EU
agencies, the World Bank, the Open Society, and many Roma groups themselves, needed
additional reinforcement, a United Nations expert on minority issues visited Bulgaria this
summer and called upon the government to “turn its policies on Roma integration into
concrete action.” She went on to give what seems to represent the views of all these
groups on the flaws in the Bulgarian government’s approach to fighting Roma exclusion:
“Many policies seem to remain largely only rhetorical undertakings aimed at external
audiences – official commitments that are not fulfilled in practice.” The result, according
to the UN expert, is that “all the evidence demonstrates that Roma remain in desperate
circumstances at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder.” In particular, she
mentioned that the access of Roma children to quality education “remains
overwhelmingly unfulfilled.”

If CEE nations are now entering a period in which governments will be working,
often ineffectively or at a very modest pace, to improve the conditions of the Roma,
judging by the efforts of other nations to reduce discrimination against minority groups
and by the stately rate of progress so far in the CEE nations, it can be assumed that the
fight for Roma equality in Bulgaria will be measured in decades. In the U.S., for
example, the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was largely successful. By
the mid-1960s, vital court decisions had dismantled major parts of the system of legal
discrimination against blacks and the federal government had enacted programs to ensure
voting rights and other fundamental rights to blacks. To enhance the legal war on poverty
and discrimination, the federal government also initiated an army of social programs
designed to boost the education, health, employment, housing, and political participation
of the poor in general and blacks in particular. Yet today, nearly half a century after
achieving legal rights and the initiation of large-scale government inclusion programs,
blacks (and Hispanics) still trail whites by large margins in education, income, housing,
poverty levels, and health. Although achieving significant progress against
discrimination may require decades or generations, discrimination will not diminish until
strong legal, economic, and social forces are mobilized against it. Expecting a long
struggle cannot be a reason not to begin.

If the history of making substantial progress in overcoming ethnic discrimination
in the U.S. can serve as a rough comparison to the situation of the Roma in CEE nations,
several factors are going to be vital in the fight of the Roma to overcome discrimination
and exclusion in Bulgaria and throughout Europe. These factors include an antidiscrimination
plan, aggressive implementation of the plan by all levels of government,
leadership by the Roma themselves, educational progress by Roma children and young
adults, political activism by the Roma people, a media committed to accurate reporting
and fairness, and a civil society that reflects underlying public opinion favoring
integration and opposed to discrimination. Most of these factors appear to be present in
Bulgaria, often in rudimentary and brittle form, but present and in many cases moving in
the right direction nonetheless. The progress that is just now beginning can be greatly
enhanced by the efforts of groups that have the resources, the will, and the vision to roll
up their sleeves and help promote Roma inclusion.

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Authors

]]>
Fri, 19 Aug 2011 00:00:00 -0400Ron Haskins
The Roma people, the largest minority group in Europe and in many Europeancountries, trail other ethnic groups in almost every characteristic that defines well-being.Perhaps of greatest importance, the Roma are less educated than other ethnic groups. Butthey also suffer from excess health problems, high unemployment, poverty, and politicalweakness. The Roma population of Bulgaria is certainly no less disadvantaged than theRoma in other countries. An especially poignant example of Bulgarian Romadisadvantage is that the death rate among children under age 1, a prime indicator ofchildren’s health in any nation, is 25 per 1,000 for Roma children as compared with 9.9for children of Bulgarian ethnic origin. The mathematics of death almost before life getsstarted is a symbolic indicator of the Roma burden in Bulgaria. Similarly, researchconducted for UNICEF by the University of York shows that the poverty rate amongRoma children in Bulgaria is 92 percent, perhaps the highest poverty rate for any ethnicgroup in Europe. By contrast, the poverty rate among children of Bulgarian heritage isless than half as high at 43 percent.
It is not surprising, then, that over at least the past decade, the European Union(EU) and most European governments, joined by the Open Society Foundation, theWorld Bank, and other organizations, have created important initiatives to address allthese problems. It is possible to think that now is an historic moment in which Europeangovernments and dominant ethnic groups, after eight or nine centuries of the mostpernicious types of discrimination against the Roma, are finally, albeit often reluctantly,admitting the problems facing their Roma populations and their own role in creating andsustaining these problems. Equally important, most of the Central and Eastern European(CEE) governments, where discrimination against the Roma has been and continues to beparticularly intense, are gradually adopting policies to address the problems.
To the extent that the moment of Roma opportunity has arrived, perhaps the mostimportant force moving Bulgaria and other CEE nations in the direction of integrationand inclusion is the EU. In the period leading up to the ascension of Bulgaria and otherCEE nations to membership in the EU, all the new member states were required to meet ahost of conditions required by the EU as the price of admission. Among these conditionswere laws outlawing discrimination and requiring equality of educational opportunity.The CEE nations complied with the EU directive to pass such laws, but implementationof the laws in Bulgaria and other nations has been something less than aggressive.
Nor is EU ascension the only force driving the CEE nations to reducediscrimination against the Roma and other minorities. The Open Society, the WorldBank, and a number of other private organizations, including several Roma nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs), have initiated a sweeping program to promoteinclusion of the Roma in the civil society of the CEE nations. Called the “Decade ofRoma Inclusion” (2005-2015) the initiative is notable for getting all the CEE nations(plus Spain) to participate, to commit themselves to activities designed to promoteinclusion and nondiscrimination, and to make a financial commitment to a fundadministered by the World Bank to promote the initiative. As a part of the initiative,Bulgaria and the other participating nations originated ten-year action plans. TheBulgarian action plan, the purpose of which is to create a set of goals and activities thatwill promote Roma integration, includes proposals for education, health care, housing,employment, discrimination and equal opportunity, and culture.
An important part of the Decade program was the establishment of the RomaEducation Fund in 2005. Eight nations (Canada, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia,Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK), as well as several international agencies including theOpen Society, pledged a ... The Roma people, the largest minority group in Europe and in many Europeancountries, trail other ethnic groups in almost every characteristic that defines well-being.Perhaps of greatest importance, the Roma are less educated than other ethnic groups.

The Roma people, the largest minority group in Europe and in many European
countries, trail other ethnic groups in almost every characteristic that defines well-being.
Perhaps of greatest importance, the Roma are less educated than other ethnic groups. But
they also suffer from excess health problems, high unemployment, poverty, and political
weakness. The Roma population of Bulgaria is certainly no less disadvantaged than the
Roma in other countries. An especially poignant example of Bulgarian Roma
disadvantage is that the death rate among children under age 1, a prime indicator of
children’s health in any nation, is 25 per 1,000 for Roma children as compared with 9.9
for children of Bulgarian ethnic origin. The mathematics of death almost before life gets
started is a symbolic indicator of the Roma burden in Bulgaria. Similarly, research
conducted for UNICEF by the University of York shows that the poverty rate among
Roma children in Bulgaria is 92 percent, perhaps the highest poverty rate for any ethnic
group in Europe. By contrast, the poverty rate among children of Bulgarian heritage is
less than half as high at 43 percent.

It is not surprising, then, that over at least the past decade, the European Union
(EU) and most European governments, joined by the Open Society Foundation, the
World Bank, and other organizations, have created important initiatives to address all
these problems. It is possible to think that now is an historic moment in which European
governments and dominant ethnic groups, after eight or nine centuries of the most
pernicious types of discrimination against the Roma, are finally, albeit often reluctantly,
admitting the problems facing their Roma populations and their own role in creating and
sustaining these problems. Equally important, most of the Central and Eastern European
(CEE) governments, where discrimination against the Roma has been and continues to be
particularly intense, are gradually adopting policies to address the problems.

To the extent that the moment of Roma opportunity has arrived, perhaps the most
important force moving Bulgaria and other CEE nations in the direction of integration
and inclusion is the EU. In the period leading up to the ascension of Bulgaria and other
CEE nations to membership in the EU, all the new member states were required to meet a
host of conditions required by the EU as the price of admission. Among these conditions
were laws outlawing discrimination and requiring equality of educational opportunity.
The CEE nations complied with the EU directive to pass such laws, but implementation
of the laws in Bulgaria and other nations has been something less than aggressive.

Nor is EU ascension the only force driving the CEE nations to reduce
discrimination against the Roma and other minorities. The Open Society, the World
Bank, and a number of other private organizations, including several Roma nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), have initiated a sweeping program to promote
inclusion of the Roma in the civil society of the CEE nations. Called the “Decade of
Roma Inclusion” (2005-2015) the initiative is notable for getting all the CEE nations
(plus Spain) to participate, to commit themselves to activities designed to promote
inclusion and nondiscrimination, and to make a financial commitment to a fund
administered by the World Bank to promote the initiative. As a part of the initiative,
Bulgaria and the other participating nations originated ten-year action plans. The
Bulgarian action plan, the purpose of which is to create a set of goals and activities that
will promote Roma integration, includes proposals for education, health care, housing,
employment, discrimination and equal opportunity, and culture.

An important part of the Decade program was the establishment of the Roma
Education Fund in 2005. Eight nations (Canada, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK), as well as several international agencies including the
Open Society, pledged a total of 34 million Euros to support Fund activities during the
Roma decade. The major goal of the fund is to “support policies and programs which
ensure quality education for Roma, including the desegregation of education systems.”

By joining the EU, Bulgaria and the other CEE nations brought themselves into a
well-developed culture of inclusion and a complex system of interlocking laws and
agencies that not only outlaw exclusion and discrimination, but provide funds to
implement inclusion policies and to monitor the extent to which EU nations are
aggressively implementing these laws. The laws and directives include the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the
Racial Equality Directive, and several others. It would be a mistake to conclude that
every EU member, even the original 15 EU nations with relatively more advanced
economies and longer histories as democracies than the CEE nations, faithfully
implement every component of the various legal requirements of being an EU member.
Even so, EU requirements and funds have initiated both profound legal changes and a
host of programs to increase the social, economic, political, and cultural inclusion of the
Roma as well as studies and evaluations that bring some light to the actual situation of the
Roma and other minorities in member nations. Given the all but inevitable distance
between the laws on inclusion and discrimination the CEE nations passed in order to join
the EU and the actual implementation of those laws, studies commissioned by various EU
agencies and NGOs illuminate the gaps between policies and implementation.

An excellent example of such illumination is a 2006 study commissioned by the
Economic and Scientific Policy program of the European Parliament. The report is a
hard-hitting assessment of the status of Roma throughout Europe with regard to their
legal status and socio-economic conditions. The latter category includes assessments of
Roma exclusion from employment, education, social services, health care, and
community integration. The upshot of the report is that although there may be some
progress in these important areas of integration, the Roma are still a second-class group
throughout the CEE nations. Seemingly, good laws have not yet produced good results.
Laws may be changed, but changing human behavior and culture takes longer.

CEE governments and their defenders are reluctant to admit the lamentable lack
of progress in Roma integration. In part for this reason, the European Commission, based
on extensive evidence from evaluations, surveys, and news reports of often ferocious
discrimination against the Roma, felt the need to publish “An EU Framework for
National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020” in April 2011. The need for a new
framework is a clear signal that the EU Commission believes the CEE governments in
general and Bulgaria in particular are not achieving the results the EU hoped for when it
approved these nations for EU membership and is therefore trying to push the
governments of these nations into further action.

Following publication of the Framework, the Open Society released one of the
most thorough and provocative reports on the situation faced by the Roma in Europe and
strategies that should be adopted to attack the wide range of Roma disadvantages.
Appropriately entitled “Beyond Rhetoric,” the Open Society report includes entire
chapters on two issues that I will examine in more detail below.

First, the Open Society strongly recommends that nations collect ethnically
disaggregated data. Logically enough, the report holds that it is impossible to document
the effects of policy initiatives on the Roma and other groups unless outcome data,
including measures of health, education, housing, employment, income, and death rates
by age, are collected for individual ethnic groups. So important are ethnically
disaggregated data that the report goes so far as to recommend that, if necessary,
governments should change their statistical systems to “incorporate ethnic data
components into regular statistical surveys.” A second recommendation that deserves
special attention is the report’s emphasis on early childhood education and care. Virtually
every report about the Roma emphasizes the vital importance of education in fighting
Roma exclusion, but the Open Society report strongly recommends that nations
implementing the EU Framework should “give urgent consideration” to establishing an
early child development fund to “support innovative early development programs and
allow for scale up of what works.”

Beyond these specific recommendations, the Open Society report emphasizes that
the EU Commission stated explicitly in its Framework document that “member states do
not properly use EU money for the purpose of effective social and economic integration
of Roma. As if this judgment, which seems to represent the views of many EU
agencies, the World Bank, the Open Society, and many Roma groups themselves, needed
additional reinforcement, a United Nations expert on minority issues visited Bulgaria this
summer and called upon the government to “turn its policies on Roma integration into
concrete action.” She went on to give what seems to represent the views of all these
groups on the flaws in the Bulgarian government’s approach to fighting Roma exclusion:
“Many policies seem to remain largely only rhetorical undertakings aimed at external
audiences – official commitments that are not fulfilled in practice.” The result, according
to the UN expert, is that “all the evidence demonstrates that Roma remain in desperate
circumstances at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder.” In particular, she
mentioned that the access of Roma children to quality education “remains
overwhelmingly unfulfilled.”

If CEE nations are now entering a period in which governments will be working,
often ineffectively or at a very modest pace, to improve the conditions of the Roma,
judging by the efforts of other nations to reduce discrimination against minority groups
and by the stately rate of progress so far in the CEE nations, it can be assumed that the
fight for Roma equality in Bulgaria will be measured in decades. In the U.S., for
example, the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was largely successful. By
the mid-1960s, vital court decisions had dismantled major parts of the system of legal
discrimination against blacks and the federal government had enacted programs to ensure
voting rights and other fundamental rights to blacks. To enhance the legal war on poverty
and discrimination, the federal government also initiated an army of social programs
designed to boost the education, health, employment, housing, and political participation
of the poor in general and blacks in particular. Yet today, nearly half a century after
achieving legal rights and the initiation of large-scale government inclusion programs,
blacks (and Hispanics) still trail whites by large margins in education, income, housing,
poverty levels, and health. Although achieving significant progress against
discrimination may require decades or generations, discrimination will not diminish until
strong legal, economic, and social forces are mobilized against it. Expecting a long
struggle cannot be a reason not to begin.

If the history of making substantial progress in overcoming ethnic discrimination
in the U.S. can serve as a rough comparison to the situation of the Roma in CEE nations,
several factors are going to be vital in the fight of the Roma to overcome discrimination
and exclusion in Bulgaria and throughout Europe. These factors include an antidiscrimination
plan, aggressive implementation of the plan by all levels of government,
leadership by the Roma themselves, educational progress by Roma children and young
adults, political activism by the Roma people, a media committed to accurate reporting
and fairness, and a civil society that reflects underlying public opinion favoring
integration and opposed to discrimination. Most of these factors appear to be present in
Bulgaria, often in rudimentary and brittle form, but present and in many cases moving in
the right direction nonetheless. The progress that is just now beginning can be greatly
enhanced by the efforts of groups that have the resources, the will, and the vision to roll
up their sleeves and help promote Roma inclusion.

Last week’s inter-party feud over publicly funded family planning was pure political showmanship and had nothing to do with curbing abortions, cutting spending, or helping women and children. Here’s why.

First, family planning subsidies reduce the incidence of abortion. The Republican rider that became a bone of contention last week (and was stripped from the final budget agreement) would have ended federal support for Planned Parenthood, which provides women with contraception, pregnancy tests, screenings for cancer and sexually transmitted infections, and—yes—abortion services. However, the so-called Hyde Amendment prohibits federal funding for abortion under nearly all circumstances, and the approximately $320 million in federal support that Planned Parenthood receives each year pays for its other activities—most importantly, its contraceptive services.

Detractors argue that, as a result of the federal funding that the organization receives for those other activities, it is able to reallocate some of its resources to the provision of abortions. While some reallocation undoubtedly occurs, it is almost certainly overwhelmed by the reduction in abortions brought about by federal financing for the contraceptive services that Planned Parenthood provides. Subsidizing contraception is an effective way of reducing unintended pregnancies, which are responsible for virtually all abortions (40% of unintended pregnancies are terminated, whereas the same is true of only 3% of intended pregnancies). In several recent studies, we estimated that a $235 million expansion in publicly subsidized family-planning services would reduce the number of abortions each year by more than 40,000. In short, family-planning subsidies are an important tool for policymakers who are genuinely committed to reducing the number of abortions.

Second, subsidies for family planning more than pay for themselves. The pregnancies that are prevented by publicly financed contraception tend to involve low-income women who, if they were to become pregnant, would be disproportionately likely to claim government benefits (Medicaid, welfare cash assistance, food stamps, and so forth) for themselves and their families. Preventing these pregnancies—even if they are simply delayed until the women in question have improved their financial situations—saves taxpayers money. In the studies described above, we found that an expansion in subsidies for family planning services would likely save taxpayers more than five dollars for every one dollar that the government spends. Given the strong cost-saving properties of these subsidies, they ought to be particularly appealing to fiscal conservatives who are concerned about our yawning national debt and the burden that it will place on current and future generations of taxpayers.

Third, subsidized family planning is good for children and their families. Women who experience unintended pregnancies are less likely to graduate from college, have lower levels of labor-force participation, and are more likely to be unmarried than women who experience intended pregnancies. Similarly, children who were conceived unintentionally have lower levels of educational attainment and higher rates of infant mortality, and they are more likely to engage in criminal and delinquent behavior as they get older. By reducing the prevalence of unintended pregnancy, family-planning subsidies help to ensure that a larger share of children are raised in stable and healthy household environments by mothers and fathers who are ready to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.

In sum, subsidized family planning is a public-policy trifecta: it reduces the prevalence of abortion, it saves tax dollars, and it improves the lives of children and families. If this policy comes under fire once again, we hope that cool heads will continue to prevail. It would be a disservice to children, their families, and American taxpayers if family planning subsidies were relegated to the status of a political football that is one day kicked to the curb.

Authors

]]>
Tue, 12 Apr 2011 12:11:00 -0400Isabel V. Sawhill and Adam Thomas
Last week’s inter-party feud over publicly funded family planning was pure political showmanship and had nothing to do with curbing abortions, cutting spending, or helping women and children. Here’s why.
First, family planning subsidies reduce the incidence of abortion. The Republican rider that became a bone of contention last week (and was stripped from the final budget agreement) would have ended federal support for Planned Parenthood, which provides women with contraception, pregnancy tests, screenings for cancer and sexually transmitted infections, and—yes—abortion services. However, the so-called Hyde Amendment prohibits federal funding for abortion under nearly all circumstances, and the approximately $320 million in federal support that Planned Parenthood receives each year pays for its other activities—most importantly, its contraceptive services.
Detractors argue that, as a result of the federal funding that the organization receives for those other activities, it is able to reallocate some of its resources to the provision of abortions. While some reallocation undoubtedly occurs, it is almost certainly overwhelmed by the reduction in abortions brought about by federal financing for the contraceptive services that Planned Parenthood provides. Subsidizing contraception is an effective way of reducing unintended pregnancies, which are responsible for virtually all abortions (40% of unintended pregnancies are terminated, whereas the same is true of only 3% of intended pregnancies). In several recent studies, we estimated that a $235 million expansion in publicly subsidized family-planning services would reduce the number of abortions each year by more than 40,000. In short, family-planning subsidies are an important tool for policymakers who are genuinely committed to reducing the number of abortions.
Second, subsidies for family planning more than pay for themselves. The pregnancies that are prevented by publicly financed contraception tend to involve low-income women who, if they were to become pregnant, would be disproportionately likely to claim government benefits (Medicaid, welfare cash assistance, food stamps, and so forth) for themselves and their families. Preventing these pregnancies—even if they are simply delayed until the women in question have improved their financial situations—saves taxpayers money. In the studies described above, we found that an expansion in subsidies for family planning services would likely save taxpayers more than five dollars for every one dollar that the government spends. Given the strong cost-saving properties of these subsidies, they ought to be particularly appealing to fiscal conservatives who are concerned about our yawning national debt and the burden that it will place on current and future generations of taxpayers.
Third, subsidized family planning is good for children and their families. Women who experience unintended pregnancies are less likely to graduate from college, have lower levels of labor-force participation, and are more likely to be unmarried than women who experience intended pregnancies. Similarly, children who were conceived unintentionally have lower levels of educational attainment and higher rates of infant mortality, and they are more likely to engage in criminal and delinquent behavior as they get older. By reducing the prevalence of unintended pregnancy, family-planning subsidies help to ensure that a larger share of children are raised in stable and healthy household environments by mothers and fathers who are ready to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.
In sum, subsidized family planning is a public-policy trifecta: it reduces the prevalence of abortion, it saves tax dollars, and it improves the lives of children and families. If this policy comes under fire once again, we hope that cool heads will continue to prevail. It would be a disservice to children, their families, and ...
Last week’s inter-party feud over publicly funded family planning was pure political showmanship and had nothing to do with curbing abortions, cutting spending, or helping women and children. Here’s why.

Last week’s inter-party feud over publicly funded family planning was pure political showmanship and had nothing to do with curbing abortions, cutting spending, or helping women and children. Here’s why.

First, family planning subsidies reduce the incidence of abortion. The Republican rider that became a bone of contention last week (and was stripped from the final budget agreement) would have ended federal support for Planned Parenthood, which provides women with contraception, pregnancy tests, screenings for cancer and sexually transmitted infections, and—yes—abortion services. However, the so-called Hyde Amendment prohibits federal funding for abortion under nearly all circumstances, and the approximately $320 million in federal support that Planned Parenthood receives each year pays for its other activities—most importantly, its contraceptive services.

Detractors argue that, as a result of the federal funding that the organization receives for those other activities, it is able to reallocate some of its resources to the provision of abortions. While some reallocation undoubtedly occurs, it is almost certainly overwhelmed by the reduction in abortions brought about by federal financing for the contraceptive services that Planned Parenthood provides. Subsidizing contraception is an effective way of reducing unintended pregnancies, which are responsible for virtually all abortions (40% of unintended pregnancies are terminated, whereas the same is true of only 3% of intended pregnancies). In several recent studies, we estimated that a $235 million expansion in publicly subsidized family-planning services would reduce the number of abortions each year by more than 40,000. In short, family-planning subsidies are an important tool for policymakers who are genuinely committed to reducing the number of abortions.

Second, subsidies for family planning more than pay for themselves. The pregnancies that are prevented by publicly financed contraception tend to involve low-income women who, if they were to become pregnant, would be disproportionately likely to claim government benefits (Medicaid, welfare cash assistance, food stamps, and so forth) for themselves and their families. Preventing these pregnancies—even if they are simply delayed until the women in question have improved their financial situations—saves taxpayers money. In the studies described above, we found that an expansion in subsidies for family planning services would likely save taxpayers more than five dollars for every one dollar that the government spends. Given the strong cost-saving properties of these subsidies, they ought to be particularly appealing to fiscal conservatives who are concerned about our yawning national debt and the burden that it will place on current and future generations of taxpayers.

Third, subsidized family planning is good for children and their families. Women who experience unintended pregnancies are less likely to graduate from college, have lower levels of labor-force participation, and are more likely to be unmarried than women who experience intended pregnancies. Similarly, children who were conceived unintentionally have lower levels of educational attainment and higher rates of infant mortality, and they are more likely to engage in criminal and delinquent behavior as they get older. By reducing the prevalence of unintended pregnancy, family-planning subsidies help to ensure that a larger share of children are raised in stable and healthy household environments by mothers and fathers who are ready to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.

In sum, subsidized family planning is a public-policy trifecta: it reduces the prevalence of abortion, it saves tax dollars, and it improves the lives of children and families. If this policy comes under fire once again, we hope that cool heads will continue to prevail. It would be a disservice to children, their families, and American taxpayers if family planning subsidies were relegated to the status of a political football that is one day kicked to the curb.

Three years after the Great Recession began in December 2007, 6.6 million people have been added to the ranks of the unemployed, and demand for assistance through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) is at a record high. Although the U.S. economy officially entered its recovery nearly twenty months ago, in July of 2009, job growth continues to be slow and uneven. The unemployment rate remains high at nearly 9 percent—though this rate varies considerably across the country.

This paper, the third and final analysis in the Landscape of Recession series, tracks leading indicators of poverty and need across cities and their surrounding suburbs. Specifically, this edition assesses unemployment trends by community type from the beginning of the recession (officially December 2007) through December 2010. It also analyzes trends among food stamp recipients, between July 2007 and July 2010, the most recent county-level data available. These indicators offer an initial glimpse of how poverty might trend in 2010, following two years of widespread, but uneven, increases in poverty across city and suburban communities.

Between December 2007 and December 2010, 99 large metro areas accounted for more than two-thirds of the net increase nationwide in the unemployed population, with the bulk of those increases concentrated in suburbs. During that time, the number of unemployed in suburbs rose by 3.1 million, compared to 1.5 million in cities. By December 2010, the suburban unemployment rate trailed the city rate by less than one percentage point (8.9 percent in suburbs versus 9.8 percent in cities).

Metro areas in the interior West like Las Vegas, Stockton, Fresno, and Riverside experienced the highest increases in unemployment in the three-year period since the recession began. In these metro areas, unemployment rates in both cities and suburbs increased by more than 7 percentage points. In theyear from December 2009 to December 2010, metropolitan unemployment rates fell in every broad U.S. region except the West.

Among suburban communities, higher-density and mature suburbs experienced the greatest growth in their unemployed populations. Older, denser suburbs saw their jobless populations more than double in the three years following the start of the recession. By December 2010, the unemployment rate in mature suburbs had surpassed the traditionally higher rates in low-density exurban communities (9.0 versus 8.9 percent).

Suburban counties were home to a growing share of the nation’s SNAP recipients between July 2007 and July 2010, but urban counties still account for more than 60 percent of metropolitan SNAP receipt. Suburban counties added 3.2 million SNAP recipients—an increase of 73 percent compared to 61 percent in urban counties. Faster enrollment gains in suburbs raised their share of metropolitan SNAP recipients from 36 percent in 2007 to 38 percent in 2010.

Twenty months following the official start of economic recovery, metropolitan communities across the country find themselves still struggling with high levels of unemployment and relying increasingly on services like SNAP. The demand for jobs and a social safety net—evident across cities and suburbs alike—is widespread, and will necessitate metropolitan-scale coordination to balance social and economic needs as the recovery progresses.

Downloads

Authors

Emily Garr

]]>
Thu, 31 Mar 2011 00:00:00 -0400Emily Garr
Three years after the Great Recession began in December 2007, 6.6 million people have been added to the ranks of the unemployed, and demand for assistance through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) is at a record high. Although the U.S. economy officially entered its recovery nearly twenty months ago, in July of 2009, job growth continues to be slow and uneven. The unemployment rate remains high at nearly 9 percent—though this rate varies considerably across the country.
This paper, the third and final analysis in the Landscape of Recession series, tracks leading indicators of poverty and need across cities and their surrounding suburbs. Specifically, this edition assesses unemployment trends by community type from the beginning of the recession (officially December 2007) through December 2010. It also analyzes trends among food stamp recipients, between July 2007 and July 2010, the most recent county-level data available. These indicators offer an initial glimpse of how poverty might trend in 2010, following two years of widespread, but uneven, increases in poverty across city and suburban communities.
- Between December 2007 and December 2010, 99 large metro areas accounted for more than two-thirds of the net increase nationwide in the unemployed population, with the bulk of those increases concentrated in suburbs. During that time, the number of unemployed in suburbs rose by 3.1 million, compared to 1.5 million in cities. By December 2010, the suburban unemployment rate trailed the city rate by less than one percentage point (8.9 percent in suburbs versus 9.8 percent in cities).
- Metro areas in the interior West like Las Vegas, Stockton, Fresno, and Riverside experienced the highest increases in unemployment in the three-year period since the recession began. In these metro areas, unemployment rates in both cities and suburbs increased by more than 7 percentage points. In the year from December 2009 to December 2010, metropolitan unemployment rates fell in every broad U.S. region except the West.
- Among suburban communities, higher-density and mature suburbs experienced the greatest growth in their unemployed populations . Older, denser suburbs saw their jobless populations more than double in the three years following the start of the recession. By December 2010, the unemployment rate in mature suburbs had surpassed the traditionally higher rates in low-density exurban communities (9.0 versus 8.9 percent).
- Suburban counties were home to a growing share of the nation’s SNAP recipients between July 2007 and July 2010, but urban counties still account for more than 60 percent of metropolitan SNAP receipt. Suburban counties added 3.2 million SNAP recipients—an increase of 73 percent compared to 61 percent in urban counties. Faster enrollment gains in suburbs raised their share of metropolitan SNAP recipients from 36 percent in 2007 to 38 percent in 2010.
Twenty months following the official start of economic recovery, metropolitan communities across the country find themselves still struggling with high levels of unemployment and relying increasingly on services like SNAP. The demand for jobs and a social safety net—evident across cities and suburbs alike—is widespread, and will necessitate metropolitan-scale coordination to balance social and economic needs as the recovery progresses.
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Authors
- Emily Garr
Three years after the Great Recession began in December 2007, 6.6 million people have been added to the ranks of the unemployed, and demand for assistance through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps)

Three years after the Great Recession began in December 2007, 6.6 million people have been added to the ranks of the unemployed, and demand for assistance through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) is at a record high. Although the U.S. economy officially entered its recovery nearly twenty months ago, in July of 2009, job growth continues to be slow and uneven. The unemployment rate remains high at nearly 9 percent—though this rate varies considerably across the country.

This paper, the third and final analysis in the Landscape of Recession series, tracks leading indicators of poverty and need across cities and their surrounding suburbs. Specifically, this edition assesses unemployment trends by community type from the beginning of the recession (officially December 2007) through December 2010. It also analyzes trends among food stamp recipients, between July 2007 and July 2010, the most recent county-level data available. These indicators offer an initial glimpse of how poverty might trend in 2010, following two years of widespread, but uneven, increases in poverty across city and suburban communities.

Between December 2007 and December 2010, 99 large metro areas accounted for more than two-thirds of the net increase nationwide in the unemployed population, with the bulk of those increases concentrated in suburbs. During that time, the number of unemployed in suburbs rose by 3.1 million, compared to 1.5 million in cities. By December 2010, the suburban unemployment rate trailed the city rate by less than one percentage point (8.9 percent in suburbs versus 9.8 percent in cities).

Metro areas in the interior West like Las Vegas, Stockton, Fresno, and Riverside experienced the highest increases in unemployment in the three-year period since the recession began. In these metro areas, unemployment rates in both cities and suburbs increased by more than 7 percentage points. In theyear from December 2009 to December 2010, metropolitan unemployment rates fell in every broad U.S. region except the West.

Among suburban communities, higher-density and mature suburbs experienced the greatest growth in their unemployed populations. Older, denser suburbs saw their jobless populations more than double in the three years following the start of the recession. By December 2010, the unemployment rate in mature suburbs had surpassed the traditionally higher rates in low-density exurban communities (9.0 versus 8.9 percent).

Suburban counties were home to a growing share of the nation’s SNAP recipients between July 2007 and July 2010, but urban counties still account for more than 60 percent of metropolitan SNAP receipt. Suburban counties added 3.2 million SNAP recipients—an increase of 73 percent compared to 61 percent in urban counties. Faster enrollment gains in suburbs raised their share of metropolitan SNAP recipients from 36 percent in 2007 to 38 percent in 2010.

Twenty months following the official start of economic recovery, metropolitan communities across the country find themselves still struggling with high levels of unemployment and relying increasingly on services like SNAP. The demand for jobs and a social safety net—evident across cities and suburbs alike—is widespread, and will necessitate metropolitan-scale coordination to balance social and economic needs as the recovery progresses.

Downloads

Authors

Emily Garr

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/12/15-happiness-easterlin-graham?rssid=quality+of+life+issues{E2761159-5084-4F51-959E-13832E88A936}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65494439/0/brookingsrss/topics/qualityoflifeissues~More-on-the-Easterlin-Paradox-A-Response-to-WolfersMore on the Easterlin Paradox: A Response to Wolfers

Justin Wolfers’ column titled “Debunking the Easterlin Paradox, Again” dismisses Richard Easterlin’s work as just plain wrong. I argue here, as I have elsewhere, that where you come out on the Easterlin paradox depends on the happiness question (and therefore the definition of happiness) that you use, as well as the sample of countries and the period of time.

Richard Easterlin finds no clear country-by-country relationship between average per capita GDP and life satisfaction (among wealthy countries), despite a clear relationship between income and happiness at the individual level within countries. Easterlin also found – and continues to find, based on methods different from Wolfers’ – an absence of a relationship between life satisfaction and long-term changes in GDP per capita.

Different well-being questions measure different dimensions of “happiness”, and, in turn, they correlate differently with income (something they themselves show at the end of their last paper, and admit that the relationship between income and well-being is complex). The best possible life question – which Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson primarily use in the first work, and also in the second – asks respondents to compare their life today to the best possible life they can imagine for themselves. This introduces a relative component, and, not surprisingly, the question correlates most closely with income of all of the available subjective well-being questions. Life satisfaction, which they use in the second work, also correlates with income more than open-ended happiness, life purpose or affect questions, but not as closely as the best possible life question.

Wolfers and Stevenson used the most recent and extensive sample of countries available from the Gallup World Poll, and, as the measure of “happiness”, the best possible life question therein, and challenged the Easterlin paradox. In more recent work, with Stevenson and Dan Sacks (2010), referenced in this blog, the authors look at the relationship between life satisfaction and economic growth, based on the World Values survey and GDP levels and the best possible life question, based on the Gallup World Poll. They isolate a clear relationship between life satisfaction and GDP levels, and their statistical analysis is spot on.

Recent studies by Kahneman and Deaton (2010), and Diener and colleagues (2010), for example, find that happiness in a life evaluation sense (as measured by the best possible life question) correlates much more closely with income than does happiness in a life experience sense (as measured by affect or more open ended happiness questions). This holds within the United States (Kahneman and Deaton) and across countries (Diener et al.).

My own work on Latin America, with Soumya Chattopadhyay and Mario Picon, tested various questions against each other and finds a similar difference in correlation, with affect and life purpose questions having the least correlation with income and the best possible life question the most. My work on happiness in Afghanistan found that Afghans were happier than the world average (on par with Latin Americans) as measured by an open ended happiness question, and 20 percent more likely to smile in a day than Cubans. Yet they scored much lower than the world average on the best possible life question. This is not a surprise. While naturally cheerful and able to make the best of their lot, the Afghans also know that the best possible life is outside Afghanistan.

Thus the conclusions that one draws on whether there is an Easterlin paradox or not in part rest on the definition of happiness, and therefore the question that is used as the basis of analysis. Wolfers and co-authors find a clear relationship between GDP levels and life satisfaction and best possible life – clearly important dimensions of well-being. Yet in the same paper they find much less clear relationships when they use happiness, affect and life purpose questions.

There is also the question of the sample of countries, and whether one is examining cross section or time series data. The most recent debate with Easterlin is about the trends over time rather than cross-sectional patterns. Dropping the transition economies, as Easterlin does, may be a mistake, as Wolfers contends. But it is also important to recognize the extent to which including a large sample of countries that experienced unprecedented economic collapse and associated drops in happiness alters the slope in the cross-country income-happiness relationship (making it steeper). Wolfers also criticizes Easterlin for relying on financial satisfaction data for his Latin American time series sample (because there is not enough life satisfaction data); financial satisfaction correlates closely, but not perfectly, with life satisfaction. Easterlin’s technique allows for the inclusion of a much larger sample of middle income developing countries, a sample of countries that one can imagine is very important to the growth and happiness debate. Wolfers and co-authors use far fewer Latin American countries because comparable life satisfaction data is limited. Either approach is plausible and, as with all work with limited data, is not perfect. But I would not go as far as calling one or the other “plain wrong”.

Finally, there is the simpler question of giving credit where credit is due. We would not be having this debate, nor would we have a host of analysis on well-being beyond what is measured by income, had Easterlin not triggered our thinking on this with his original study of happiness and income over three decades ago (and his patient and thoughtful mentoring of many economists since then). In the big picture of things, Easterlin had the idea.

Authors

]]>
Wed, 15 Dec 2010 10:11:00 -0500Carol Graham
Justin Wolfers’ column titled “Debunking the Easterlin Paradox, Again” dismisses Richard Easterlin’s work as just plain wrong. I argue here, as I have elsewhere, that where you come out on the Easterlin paradox depends on the happiness question (and therefore the definition of happiness) that you use, as well as the sample of countries and the period of time.
Richard Easterlin finds no clear country-by-country relationship between average per capita GDP and life satisfaction (among wealthy countries), despite a clear relationship between income and happiness at the individual level within countries. Easterlin also found – and continues to find, based on methods different from Wolfers’ – an absence of a relationship between life satisfaction and long-term changes in GDP per capita.
Different well-being questions measure different dimensions of “happiness”, and, in turn, they correlate differently with income (something they themselves show at the end of their last paper, and admit that the relationship between income and well-being is complex). The best possible life question – which Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson primarily use in the first work, and also in the second – asks respondents to compare their life today to the best possible life they can imagine for themselves. This introduces a relative component, and, not surprisingly, the question correlates most closely with income of all of the available subjective well-being questions. Life satisfaction, which they use in the second work, also correlates with income more than open-ended happiness, life purpose or affect questions, but not as closely as the best possible life question.
Wolfers and Stevenson used the most recent and extensive sample of countries available from the Gallup World Poll, and, as the measure of “happiness”, the best possible life question therein, and challenged the Easterlin paradox. In more recent work, with Stevenson and Dan Sacks (2010), referenced in this blog, the authors look at the relationship between life satisfaction and economic growth, based on the World Values survey and GDP levels and the best possible life question, based on the Gallup World Poll. They isolate a clear relationship between life satisfaction and GDP levels, and their statistical analysis is spot on.
Recent studies by Kahneman and Deaton (2010), and Diener and colleagues (2010), for example, find that happiness in a life evaluation sense (as measured by the best possible life question) correlates much more closely with income than does happiness in a life experience sense (as measured by affect or more open ended happiness questions). This holds within the United States (Kahneman and Deaton) and across countries (Diener et al.).
My own work on Latin America, with Soumya Chattopadhyay and Mario Picon, tested various questions against each other and finds a similar difference in correlation, with affect and life purpose questions having the least correlation with income and the best possible life question the most. My work on happiness in Afghanistan found that Afghans were happier than the world average (on par with Latin Americans) as measured by an open ended happiness question, and 20 percent more likely to smile in a day than Cubans. Yet they scored much lower than the world average on the best possible life question. This is not a surprise. While naturally cheerful and able to make the best of their lot, the Afghans also know that the best possible life is outside Afghanistan.
Thus the conclusions that one draws on whether there is an Easterlin paradox or not in part rest on the definition of happiness, and therefore the question that is used as the basis of analysis. Wolfers and co-authors find a clear relationship between GDP levels and life satisfaction and best possible life – clearly important dimensions of well-being. Yet in the same paper they ...
Justin Wolfers’ column titled “Debunking the Easterlin Paradox, Again” dismisses Richard Easterlin’s work as just plain wrong. I argue here, as I have elsewhere, that where you come out on the Easterlin paradox depends ...

Justin Wolfers’ column titled “Debunking the Easterlin Paradox, Again” dismisses Richard Easterlin’s work as just plain wrong. I argue here, as I have elsewhere, that where you come out on the Easterlin paradox depends on the happiness question (and therefore the definition of happiness) that you use, as well as the sample of countries and the period of time.

Richard Easterlin finds no clear country-by-country relationship between average per capita GDP and life satisfaction (among wealthy countries), despite a clear relationship between income and happiness at the individual level within countries. Easterlin also found – and continues to find, based on methods different from Wolfers’ – an absence of a relationship between life satisfaction and long-term changes in GDP per capita.

Different well-being questions measure different dimensions of “happiness”, and, in turn, they correlate differently with income (something they themselves show at the end of their last paper, and admit that the relationship between income and well-being is complex). The best possible life question – which Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson primarily use in the first work, and also in the second – asks respondents to compare their life today to the best possible life they can imagine for themselves. This introduces a relative component, and, not surprisingly, the question correlates most closely with income of all of the available subjective well-being questions. Life satisfaction, which they use in the second work, also correlates with income more than open-ended happiness, life purpose or affect questions, but not as closely as the best possible life question.

Wolfers and Stevenson used the most recent and extensive sample of countries available from the Gallup World Poll, and, as the measure of “happiness”, the best possible life question therein, and challenged the Easterlin paradox. In more recent work, with Stevenson and Dan Sacks (2010), referenced in this blog, the authors look at the relationship between life satisfaction and economic growth, based on the World Values survey and GDP levels and the best possible life question, based on the Gallup World Poll. They isolate a clear relationship between life satisfaction and GDP levels, and their statistical analysis is spot on.

Recent studies by Kahneman and Deaton (2010), and Diener and colleagues (2010), for example, find that happiness in a life evaluation sense (as measured by the best possible life question) correlates much more closely with income than does happiness in a life experience sense (as measured by affect or more open ended happiness questions). This holds within the United States (Kahneman and Deaton) and across countries (Diener et al.).

My own work on Latin America, with Soumya Chattopadhyay and Mario Picon, tested various questions against each other and finds a similar difference in correlation, with affect and life purpose questions having the least correlation with income and the best possible life question the most. My work on happiness in Afghanistan found that Afghans were happier than the world average (on par with Latin Americans) as measured by an open ended happiness question, and 20 percent more likely to smile in a day than Cubans. Yet they scored much lower than the world average on the best possible life question. This is not a surprise. While naturally cheerful and able to make the best of their lot, the Afghans also know that the best possible life is outside Afghanistan.

Thus the conclusions that one draws on whether there is an Easterlin paradox or not in part rest on the definition of happiness, and therefore the question that is used as the basis of analysis. Wolfers and co-authors find a clear relationship between GDP levels and life satisfaction and best possible life – clearly important dimensions of well-being. Yet in the same paper they find much less clear relationships when they use happiness, affect and life purpose questions.

There is also the question of the sample of countries, and whether one is examining cross section or time series data. The most recent debate with Easterlin is about the trends over time rather than cross-sectional patterns. Dropping the transition economies, as Easterlin does, may be a mistake, as Wolfers contends. But it is also important to recognize the extent to which including a large sample of countries that experienced unprecedented economic collapse and associated drops in happiness alters the slope in the cross-country income-happiness relationship (making it steeper). Wolfers also criticizes Easterlin for relying on financial satisfaction data for his Latin American time series sample (because there is not enough life satisfaction data); financial satisfaction correlates closely, but not perfectly, with life satisfaction. Easterlin’s technique allows for the inclusion of a much larger sample of middle income developing countries, a sample of countries that one can imagine is very important to the growth and happiness debate. Wolfers and co-authors use far fewer Latin American countries because comparable life satisfaction data is limited. Either approach is plausible and, as with all work with limited data, is not perfect. But I would not go as far as calling one or the other “plain wrong”.

Finally, there is the simpler question of giving credit where credit is due. We would not be having this debate, nor would we have a host of analysis on well-being beyond what is measured by income, had Easterlin not triggered our thinking on this with his original study of happiness and income over three decades ago (and his patient and thoughtful mentoring of many economists since then). In the big picture of things, Easterlin had the idea.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/12/13-debunking-easterlin-wolfers?rssid=quality+of+life+issues{6AA31913-AA88-44F6-9311-19102B81BA1D}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/65494440/0/brookingsrss/topics/qualityoflifeissues~Debunking-the-Easterlin-Paradox-AgainDebunking the Easterlin Paradox, Again

Rather than challenge our careful statistical tests, he’s simply offered a new mishmash of statistics that appear to make things murkier.

For those of you new to the debate, the story begins with a series of papers that Richard Easterlin wrote between 1973 and 2005, claiming that economic growth is unrelated to life satisfaction. In fact, these papers simply show he failed to definitively establish such a relationship. In our 2008 Brookings Paper, Betsey and I systematically examined all of the available happiness data, finding that the relationship was there all along: rising GDP yields rising life satisfaction. More recent data reinforces our findings. Subsequently, Easterlin responded in of papers circulated in early 2009. That’s the research journalists are now asking me about. But in a paper released several weeks ago, Betsey, Dan Sacks and I assessed Easterlin’s latest claims, and found little evidence for them.

Let’s examine Easterlin’s three main claims.

1. GDP and life satisfaction rise together in the short-run, but not the long-run. False. Here’s an illustrative graph. We take the main international dataset — the World Values Survey — and in order to focus only on the long-run, compare the change in life satisfaction for each country from the first time it was surveyed until the last, the corresponding growth in GDP per capita. Typically, this is a difference taken over 18 years (although it ranges from 8 to 26 years). The graph shows that long-run rises in GDP are positively associated with growth in life satisfaction.

Image

This graph includes the latest data, and Dan generated it just for this blog post. In fact, Easterlin was responding to our earlier work, which showed each of the comparisons one could make between various waves of this survey: Wave 1 was taken in the early ‘80s; Wave 2 in the early ‘90s; Wave 3 in the mid-late ‘90s; Wave 4 mostly in the early 2000s. And in each of these comparisons, you see a positive association — sometimes statistically significant, sometimes not.

Image

What should we conclude from this second graph? Given the typically-significant positive slopes, you might conclude that rising GDP is associated with rising life satisfaction. It’s also reasonable to say that these data are too noisy to be entirely convincing. But the one thing you can’t conclude is that these data yield robust proof that long-run economic growth won’t yield rising life satisfaction. Yet that’s what Easterlin claims.

2. The income-happiness link that we document is no longer apparent when one omits the transition economies. Also false. One simple way to see this is to note that in the first graph the transition countries are shown in gray. Even when you look only at the other countries, it’s hard to be convinced that economic growth and life satisfaction are unrelated. To see the formal regressions showing this, read Table 3 of our response. (Aside: Why eliminate these countries from the sample?)

Or we could just look to another data source which omits the transition economies. For instance, the graph below shows the relationship between life satisfaction and GDP for the big nine European nations that were the members of the EU when the Eurobarometer survey started. Over the period 1973-2007, economic growth yielded higher satisfaction in eight of these nine countries. And while we’re puzzled by the ninth — the increasingly unhappy Belgians — we’re not going to drop them from the data! And if you think Belgium is puzzling, too, then we’ve done our job.

Image

3. Surveys show that financial satisfaction in Latin American countries has declined as their economies have grown. Perhaps true. But how are surveys of financial satisfaction relevant to a debate about life satisfaction? And why focus on Latin America, rather than the whole world? In fact, when you turn to the question we are actually debating — life satisfaction —these same surveys suggest that those Latin American countries which have had the strongest growth have seen the largest rise in life satisfaction. This finding isn’t statistically significant, but that’s simply because there’s not a lot of data on life satisfaction in Latin America! (Given how sparse these data are, we didn’t report them in our paper.)

What’s going on here?

Now it’s reasonable to ask how it is that others arrived at a different conclusion. Easterlin’s Paradox is a non-finding. His paradox simply describes the failure of some researchers (not us!) to isolate a clear relationship between GDP and life satisfaction.

But you should never confuse absence of evidence with evidence of absence. Easterlin’s mistake is to conclude that when a correlation is statistically insignificant, it must be zero. But if you put together a dataset with only a few countries in it — or in Easterlin’s analysis, take a dataset with lots of countries, but throw away a bunch of it, and discard inconvenient observations — then you’ll typically find statistically insignificant results. This is even more problematic when you employ statistical techniques that don’t extract all of the information from your data. Think about it this way: if you flip a coin three times, and it comes up heads all three times, you still don’t have much reason to think that the coin is biased. But it would be silly to say, “there’s no compelling evidence that the coin is biased, so it must be fair.” Yet that’s Easterlin’s logic.

There’s a deeper problem, too. The results I’ve shown you are all based on analyzing data only from comparable surveys. And when you do this, you find rising incomes associated with rising satisfaction. Instead, Easterlin and co-authors lump together data from very different surveys, asking very different questions. It’s not even clear how one should make comparisons between a survey (in the US) asking about happiness, a survey (in Japan) asking about “circumstances at home,” surveys of life satisfaction in Europe based on a four-point scale, and global surveys based on a ten-point scale. Easterlin’s non-result appears only when comparing non-comparable data.

If you want to advocate against economic growth — and to argue that it won’t help even in the world’s poorest nations — then you should surely base such radical conclusions on findings rather than non-findings, and on the basis of robust evidence.

A final thought

Why not look at the levels of economic development and satisfaction? The following graph does this, displaying amazing new data coming from the Gallup World Poll. There’s no longer any doubt that people in richer countries report being more satisfied with their lives.

Image

Is this relevant? Easterlin argues it isn’t — that he’s only concerned with changes in GDP. But the two are inextricably linked. If rich countries are happier countries, this begs the question: How did they get that way? We think it’s because as their economies developed, their people got more satisfied. While we don’t have centuries’ worth of well-being data to test our conjecture, it’s hard to think of a compelling alternative.

Authors

]]>
Mon, 13 Dec 2010 11:10:00 -0500Daniel Sacks and Justin Wolfers
I’ve written here before about my research with Betsey Stevenson showing that economic development is associated with rising life satisfaction. Some people find this result surprising, but it’s the cleanest interpretation of the available data. Yet over the past few days, I’ve received calls from several journalists asking whether Richard Easterlin had somehow debunked these findings. He tried. But he failed.
Rather than challenge our careful statistical tests, he’s simply offered a new mishmash of statistics that appear to make things murkier.
For those of you new to the debate, the story begins with a series of papers that Richard Easterlin wrote between 1973 and 2005, claiming that economic growth is unrelated to life satisfaction. In fact, these papers simply show he failed to definitively establish such a relationship. In our 2008 Brookings Paper, Betsey and I systematically examined all of the available happiness data, finding that the relationship was there all along: rising GDP yields rising life satisfaction. More recent data reinforces our findings. Subsequently, Easterlin responded in of papers circulated in early 2009. That’s the research journalists are now asking me about. But in a paper released several weeks ago, Betsey, Dan Sacks and I assessed Easterlin’s latest claims, and found little evidence for them.
Let’s examine Easterlin’s three main claims.
1. GDP and life satisfaction rise together in the short-run, but not the long-run. False. Here’s an illustrative graph. We take the main international dataset — the World Values Survey — and in order to focus only on the long-run, compare the change in life satisfaction for each country from the first time it was surveyed until the last, the corresponding growth in GDP per capita. Typically, this is a difference taken over 18 years (although it ranges from 8 to 26 years). The graph shows that long-run rises in GDP are positively associated with growth in life satisfaction.
Image
This graph includes the latest data, and Dan generated it just for this blog post. In fact, Easterlin was responding to our earlier work, which showed each of the comparisons one could make between various waves of this survey: Wave 1 was taken in the early ‘80s; Wave 2 in the early ‘90s; Wave 3 in the mid-late ‘90s; Wave 4 mostly in the early 2000s. And in each of these comparisons, you see a positive association — sometimes statistically significant, sometimes not.
Image
What should we conclude from this second graph? Given the typically-significant positive slopes, you might conclude that rising GDP is associated with rising life satisfaction. It’s also reasonable to say that these data are too noisy to be entirely convincing. But the one thing you can’t conclude is that these data yield robust proof that long-run economic growth won’t yield rising life satisfaction. Yet that’s what Easterlin claims.
2. The income-happiness link that we document is no longer apparent when one omits the transition economies. Also false. One simple way to see this is to note that in the first graph the transition countries are shown in gray. Even when you look only at the other countries, it’s hard to be convinced that economic growth and life satisfaction are unrelated. To see the formal regressions showing this, read Table 3 of our response. (Aside: Why eliminate these countries from the sample?)
Or we could just look to another data source which omits the transition economies. For instance, the graph below shows the relationship between life satisfaction and GDP for the big nine European nations that were the members of the EU when the Eurobarometer survey started. Over the period 1973-2007, economic growth yielded higher satisfaction in eight of these nine countries. And while we’re puzzled by the ninth — the increasingly ... I’ve written here before about my research with Betsey Stevenson showing that economic development is associated with rising life satisfaction. Some people find this result surprising, but it’s the cleanest interpretation of the ...

Rather than challenge our careful statistical tests, he’s simply offered a new mishmash of statistics that appear to make things murkier.

For those of you new to the debate, the story begins with a series of papers that Richard Easterlin wrote between 1973 and 2005, claiming that economic growth is unrelated to life satisfaction. In fact, these papers simply show he failed to definitively establish such a relationship. In our 2008 Brookings Paper, Betsey and I systematically examined all of the available happiness data, finding that the relationship was there all along: rising GDP yields rising life satisfaction. More recent data reinforces our findings. Subsequently, Easterlin responded in of papers circulated in early 2009. That’s the research journalists are now asking me about. But in a paper released several weeks ago, Betsey, Dan Sacks and I assessed Easterlin’s latest claims, and found little evidence for them.

Let’s examine Easterlin’s three main claims.

1. GDP and life satisfaction rise together in the short-run, but not the long-run. False. Here’s an illustrative graph. We take the main international dataset — the World Values Survey — and in order to focus only on the long-run, compare the change in life satisfaction for each country from the first time it was surveyed until the last, the corresponding growth in GDP per capita. Typically, this is a difference taken over 18 years (although it ranges from 8 to 26 years). The graph shows that long-run rises in GDP are positively associated with growth in life satisfaction.

Image

This graph includes the latest data, and Dan generated it just for this blog post. In fact, Easterlin was responding to our earlier work, which showed each of the comparisons one could make between various waves of this survey: Wave 1 was taken in the early ‘80s; Wave 2 in the early ‘90s; Wave 3 in the mid-late ‘90s; Wave 4 mostly in the early 2000s. And in each of these comparisons, you see a positive association — sometimes statistically significant, sometimes not.

Image

What should we conclude from this second graph? Given the typically-significant positive slopes, you might conclude that rising GDP is associated with rising life satisfaction. It’s also reasonable to say that these data are too noisy to be entirely convincing. But the one thing you can’t conclude is that these data yield robust proof that long-run economic growth won’t yield rising life satisfaction. Yet that’s what Easterlin claims.

2. The income-happiness link that we document is no longer apparent when one omits the transition economies. Also false. One simple way to see this is to note that in the first graph the transition countries are shown in gray. Even when you look only at the other countries, it’s hard to be convinced that economic growth and life satisfaction are unrelated. To see the formal regressions showing this, read Table 3 of our response. (Aside: Why eliminate these countries from the sample?)

Or we could just look to another data source which omits the transition economies. For instance, the graph below shows the relationship between life satisfaction and GDP for the big nine European nations that were the members of the EU when the Eurobarometer survey started. Over the period 1973-2007, economic growth yielded higher satisfaction in eight of these nine countries. And while we’re puzzled by the ninth — the increasingly unhappy Belgians — we’re not going to drop them from the data! And if you think Belgium is puzzling, too, then we’ve done our job.

Image

3. Surveys show that financial satisfaction in Latin American countries has declined as their economies have grown. Perhaps true. But how are surveys of financial satisfaction relevant to a debate about life satisfaction? And why focus on Latin America, rather than the whole world? In fact, when you turn to the question we are actually debating — life satisfaction —these same surveys suggest that those Latin American countries which have had the strongest growth have seen the largest rise in life satisfaction. This finding isn’t statistically significant, but that’s simply because there’s not a lot of data on life satisfaction in Latin America! (Given how sparse these data are, we didn’t report them in our paper.)

What’s going on here?

Now it’s reasonable to ask how it is that others arrived at a different conclusion. Easterlin’s Paradox is a non-finding. His paradox simply describes the failure of some researchers (not us!) to isolate a clear relationship between GDP and life satisfaction.

But you should never confuse absence of evidence with evidence of absence. Easterlin’s mistake is to conclude that when a correlation is statistically insignificant, it must be zero. But if you put together a dataset with only a few countries in it — or in Easterlin’s analysis, take a dataset with lots of countries, but throw away a bunch of it, and discard inconvenient observations — then you’ll typically find statistically insignificant results. This is even more problematic when you employ statistical techniques that don’t extract all of the information from your data. Think about it this way: if you flip a coin three times, and it comes up heads all three times, you still don’t have much reason to think that the coin is biased. But it would be silly to say, “there’s no compelling evidence that the coin is biased, so it must be fair.” Yet that’s Easterlin’s logic.

There’s a deeper problem, too. The results I’ve shown you are all based on analyzing data only from comparable surveys. And when you do this, you find rising incomes associated with rising satisfaction. Instead, Easterlin and co-authors lump together data from very different surveys, asking very different questions. It’s not even clear how one should make comparisons between a survey (in the US) asking about happiness, a survey (in Japan) asking about “circumstances at home,” surveys of life satisfaction in Europe based on a four-point scale, and global surveys based on a ten-point scale. Easterlin’s non-result appears only when comparing non-comparable data.

If you want to advocate against economic growth — and to argue that it won’t help even in the world’s poorest nations — then you should surely base such radical conclusions on findings rather than non-findings, and on the basis of robust evidence.

A final thought

Why not look at the levels of economic development and satisfaction? The following graph does this, displaying amazing new data coming from the Gallup World Poll. There’s no longer any doubt that people in richer countries report being more satisfied with their lives.

Image

Is this relevant? Easterlin argues it isn’t — that he’s only concerned with changes in GDP. But the two are inextricably linked. If rich countries are happier countries, this begs the question: How did they get that way? We think it’s because as their economies developed, their people got more satisfied. While we don’t have centuries’ worth of well-being data to test our conjecture, it’s hard to think of a compelling alternative.