In late 2013, Zhou was placed under investigation for alleged abuse of power and corruption, a decision state media announced in July 2014.[1] Zhou was the first Politburo Standing Committee member – and the most senior-ranked official – since the founding of the People's Republic of China to be tried and convicted of corruption-related charges.[2] Following his investigation, Zhou was expelled from the Communist Party of China.[3] On June 11, 2015, Zhou was convicted of bribery, abuse of power and the intentional disclosure of state secrets by the Intermediate Court in Tianjin.[4] Zhou and his family members were said to have taken 129 million yuan (over $20 million) in bribes. He was sentenced to life in prison.[5]

Born Zhou Yuangen (Chinese: 周元根) in December 1942, Zhou is a native of Xiqiantou Village (西前头村), Wuxi County, in Jiangsu province. Xiqiantou is located 18 kilometers (11 mi) outside Wuxi city proper. The majority of Xiqiantou residents were surnamed "Zhou". Zhou took on the surname of his mother because his father, whose surname was Lu, was a 'live-in son-in-law' of his maternal grandparents. Upon joining the Zhou household when he married, Zhou Yongkang's father took on his wife's surname and became known as Zhou Yisheng (周义生).[6] Zhou was the eldest of three sons. Zhou's family was poor; his family made a living farming and fishing the Asian swamp eel. Zhou was sent to school with the financial assistance of his family friends. In 1954, Zhou was enrolled at one of the two top middle schools in the eastern Wuxi area. It was during this period that Zhou changed his name to "Yongkang" on the advice of his teacher, because there was another person in his class with an identical name.[6]

Zhou excelled at school, and was eventually accepted to enroll at the prestigious Suzhou High School, one of the most prominent secondary schools in the Jiangnan region. Zhou had good grades and was involved in extra-curricular activities, including the school's political ideology group as well as the events promoting literacy.[6] In 1961, after obtaining stellar results on his Gaokao exams, he was admitted to the Beijing Institute of Petroleum (now China University of Petroleum) soon after, and became the pride of his village.[6] He majored in geophysical survey and exploration.

In November 1964 Zhou became a member of the Communist Party of China. In 1966, the Cultural Revolution ensnared Beijing's higher education institutions. Zhou was told by the authorities to "wait for an assignment" while the political struggles wreaked havoc on China's universities. He waited for a year. He joined geological survey work in north-east China in 1967, assigned to become an intern technician at factory No. 673 at the Daqing oil field.[7] In 1970, Zhou was promoted to lead the geological survey division of a local department charged with carrying out an ambitious petroleum drilling initiative set out by the Party's top leadership.[6]

In 1973, Zhou Yongkang was promoted to head the Geophysical Exploration Department of the Liaohe Petroleum Exploration Bureau, located in Panjin, Liaoning. Liaohe would eventually become one of the China National Petroleum Corporation's (CNPC) largest oil fields. Zhou was seen as a hard-working and emotionally mature presence to his colleagues; he did not drink or smoke, and would rarely speak based on script. He would reputedly talk unscripted for hours on end while keeping his colleagues engaged.[6]

At Liaohe, Zhou met Wang Shuhua (Chinese: 王淑华), a factory worker from Hebei province, whom he later married. As the Liaohe exploration team grew, Zhou eventually became responsible for over 2,300 employees in his department. His work consisted mainly of leading teams to unexplored, barren territory to conduct site surveys to assess the potential for future oil drilling. He was known to be great at maintaining good interpersonal relationships with his superiors and subordinates, and gained significant personal clout.[6] During some years, Zhou did not go back to his home in Jiangsu even during the Chinese New Year holiday period, which is a time traditionally reserved for family reunions. Instead, Zhou would visit his colleagues who were working in harsh winter conditions in remote areas.[6] Beginning in the 1970s, Zhou would gain rapid career advancement. He owed much of his career growth to his mentors from the Beijing Institute of Petroleum, who were working in executive positions at the Liaohe oil fields at the time. In particular the university's president was known to be fond of Zhou's skills and was eager to promote him. In 1983, with the director of the Liaohe Oil Field Management Bureau being transferred for a job in Beijing, Zhou was promoted to manage day-to-day affairs of the oil field. Moreover, given the oil field's prominence in the municipal affairs of the city of Panjin, Zhou became concurrently the Mayor of Panjin and the city's deputy party secretary.[6] Zhou's stint as mayor was his first major role in government.

In 1985, Zhou Yongkang left Liaoning for Beijing to become the Deputy Minister of Petroleum Industry. In 1988, the ministry later folded and became a state-owned enterprise, the predecessor of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China's largest energy company. Zhou became a member of the company's senior executive team and was named deputy general manager. In March 1989, as part of the government's overall strategy to move oil production from east to west, Zhou led an oil and gas exploration and survey team to begin work in the Tarim Basin in the Xinjiang region of far-west China, near the city of Korla.[8]

In the mid-1990s, Zhou spearheaded CNPC's "go global" initiatives, winning bids for large projects in Sudan, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan. Zhou was particularly involved in the Sudan Nile petroleum project, including the construction of the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, CNPC's first major project outside of China. Zhou travelled to the African country 14 times. Beginning in 1996, Zhou became general manager (chief executive) of the CNPC.[7][9] As chief executive, Zhou was instrumental in the company's restructuring and the preparation the initial public offering of the company's subsidiary PetroChina. In October 1997, Zhou gained a seat on the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a leadership assembly of some 200 top political figures of the party.[8]

In March 1998, Zhou was elevated to become Minister of Land and Resources in Premier Zhu Rongji's cabinet. The "mega-ministry" was created after a merger of the formerly separate Ministry of Geology and Mining, Administration of National Land, National Administration of Oceans, and the National Surveying and Mapping Bureau. As minister, Zhou, upon finding that his staff did not have adequate housing, initiated a housing construction program for the department's engineers and senior technical staff.[8]

In 1999, Zhou became Party Secretary of Sichuan, the province's top political office. Sichuan was China's second most populous province at the time. Prior to Zhou, most of Sichuan's provincial leaders originated from the province. Zhou, an outsider, brought change to the province's political landscape. He spearheaded economic modernization policies and in particular focused on agricultural modernization. Sichuan was known to be a province highly dependent on agriculture, and its government operated at a slower pace compared to those of China's coastal regions. Zhou was known for his quick and efficient decision-making, significantly altering the traditionally lax culture of the province's civil service.[10]

During Zhou's tenure in Sichuan, the province's GDP grew at an average rate of 9.5% a year. One of his major achievements was securing investment from large multinationals such as Intel. The company opened a new computer chip factory near Chengdu shortly after Zhou left his post in Sichuan. He also focused on improving tourism resources, significantly revamping the Mount Emei scenic region to attract more visitors. Zhou also improved public safety in the province, for example enacting policies that aimed to reduce accidents in the province's water lanes.[10] On October 20, 2000, in the spirit of attracting investment for economic development, Zhou hosted visiting Chinese and international dignitaries and businesspeople at the China Western Forum held in Chengdu.[11][N 1]

While in Sichuan, he gained a reputation for dealing firmly with any signs of dissent – coming down hard on Tibetan groups and Falun Gong.[12]

Although Zhou left Sichuan to take up national leadership positions in Beijing in 2002, he cultivated a strong power base of patronage. The elite provincial political circles were stacked with Zhou allies, the most notable being deputy provincial party chief Li Chongxi, Chengdu party boss Li Chuncheng, and chief administrator Guo Yongxiang. Indeed, Zhou's network of patronage in Sichuan remained a highly influential force in provincial politics until the anti-corruption campaign of 2013, which saw all of Zhou's proteges fall from grace.[13]

Zhou's political fate was subject to rife speculation in the lead-up to the 16th Party Congress held in the fall of 2002. Widely regarded as a rising political star, Zhou was said to be a leading candidate for Vice-Premier or entry into the top ranks of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Zhengfawei). The central government was also in need of a tough and uncompromising figure to take reins of China's security system in the post-9/11 global security paradigm. With his quasi-military style training in the oil sector and a reputation for being able to make tough decisions, Zhou got the nod to become Minister of Public Security in December 2002.[10] He also earned a series of powerful posts in the party and government within the span of a few months, including membership in the Politburo, State Councilor, Deputy Zhengfawei Secretary, First Political Commissar of the People's Armed Police (China's paramilitary police force), and Secretary of the party's Central Secretariat (the party's internal policy execution and coordination body).[14]

Zhou's assuming the deputy secretary position at the Zhengfawei meant that his status in the Chinese domestic security system was second only to Politburo Standing Committee member Luo Gan.[15] Zhou was the first Minister of Public Security to hold a Politburo seat since Mao's successor Hua Guofeng, a testament to the renewed importance of the domestic security portfolio. This was partially attributed to the increasingly sharp social conflict in China as a result of the wealth imbalance created by the post-Mao era economic reform policies. At the turn of the century, "mass incidents" – a catch-all euphemism that could refer to any organized or spontaneous protests of social, political, economic, or religious nature – had become commonplace across the country. In response, Beijing mandated sweeping structural reforms that significantly elevated the status of Public Security organs across the country.[15]

Somewhat emulating Zhou's concurrently holding party and government posts in addition to his role as Minister of Public Security, the reforms carried out during Zhou's tenure called for provincial and local police chiefs (i.e., heads of Public Security organs) to also hold membership in local party leadership councils as well as leading government posts, and, more importantly, hold a leading post in the Zhengfawei.[15] The intent of the reforms were to make decisions about policing, investigations, and the court system more efficient in an era of more pronounced social conflict. However, in practice the reforms gave party and government policy makers, who were not constitutionally empowered to serve day-to-day executive duties, an avenue to directly intervene in domestic security concerns, such as using force to crack down on "mass incidents". In addition, that the Zhengfawei, which normally oversaw government policy in the courts, prosecution agencies, criminal legislation, paramilitary forces, and internal intelligence services, had combined jurisdiction over executive police organs meant that Zhengfawei chiefs held immense and largely unchecked legislative, executive, and judicial power.[15]

As Minister of Public Security, Zhou was seen as China's "national police chief". He undertook significant reforms of the country's policing system, which not only faced external pressures from a deteriorating domestic security situation, but also internal dissent due to stagnant wages and lack of resources. Zhou set out mandating the construction of new office buildings to serve as police headquarters, provided modern housing for officers. He also implemented a wide array of disciplinary regulations, including making offenses such as using firearms outside of work duties, drinking and driving, and gambling during work hours causes for dismissal.[15] He was also said to have fired several hundred police officers for drinking problems.[16]

Zhou held high-profile "mass study sessions" in an attempt to indoctrinate officers politically on party policies. He also instituted a nationwide "professional training boot camp" intended to streamline police operations and teach officers about professional ethics, making it mandatory for rank-and-file officers to take "professional training" for half of their working day. Zhou also began a national campaign for xinfang petitioners to "speak directly with the police chief", aimed at creating a more effective means to address petitioner grievances. As part of this campaign, the number of petitions and their response rates were tied to financial and career advancement consequences for local officials. As a result, many local authorities hired thugs and private security firms to detain, harass, beat, or otherwise discourage petitioners from filing their grievances. It spawned an entire industry of private security firms specializing in petitioners, as well as an increase in the number of extrajudicial detention centres known as "black jails". With increased resources at the disposal of police departments and a higher concentration of power, law enforcement agencies often found itself at odds with public interest; public trust in domestic security organs eroded.[15]

Zhou's time as the top official in Sichuan, the oil sector, and Public Security Minister earned him significant leadership experience and personal clout, as well as a complex network of patronage. In 2007, Zhou was transferred to fill the vacancy from Luo Gan, who retired from his leadership position as central Zhengfawei chief. With this powerful position, Zhou also gained a spot on the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest council of Communist Party rulers. With the expansion of Zhengfawei authority in the preceding years, Zhou became the top official responsible for China's courts, law enforcement, prosecution agencies, paramilitary forces, and domestic intelligence agencies. Even though he was ranked ninth in the party leadership hierarchy, Zhou, dubbed China's "security tsar" by select English-language media, emerged as one of the Standing Committee's most important members, and one of China's most powerful men.

In his position as national Zhengfawei chief, Zhou oversaw extensive security preparations for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 60th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 2009, and Expo 2010 in Shanghai. At around this time, "weiwen" (维稳; roughly, "protecting stability") became a top political priority of the Chinese government. Zhou headed the national weiwen task force, overseeing law enforcement, suppression of dissent, state surveillance, and combating separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet. By 2011, during the unfolding of Arab Spring and the subsequent "Jasmine Revolution" movement, the national weiwen budget, valued at 624.4 billion yuan (US$95 billion), had exceeded the military budget for the first time in history.[17]

On February 20, 2011, Zhou said to assembled officials at a national security conference that law enforcement must "put together a comprehensive system to prevent disturbance and control social order, so that conflict can be resolved at the embryonic stage."[17] In that year, some 130,000 "mass incidents" of protest and violence were reported around the country, mostly caused by official corruption, environmental degradation, and social security issues. Incidences of police brutality increased, and in many cases police involvement in popular protests exacerbated underlying problems and led to further violence.[18] Towards the end of his term, Zhou presided over a national security & law enforcement system that operated with no meaningful external oversight and operating independently from government organs and the party's collective leadership.[7][18] As a result of his vast state security "empire" as well as strong remnants of his influence in the national oil sector and Sichuan, Zhou was ranked 29th in the 2011 Forbes list of the world's most powerful people.[19]

Chinese rights activists, such as members of the Weiquan movement, were especially critical of Zhou's tenure as China's security chief. Civil rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang criticized Zhou in a public lecture at Hong Kong University in December 2011. Two years later, Pu wrote on his microblog that Zhou "brought great disaster and inflicted great suffering on the country and its people."[N 2] Pu wrote that the weiwen policies spearheaded by Zhou had severely undermined progress in the protection of human rights and rule of law, led to unprecedented levels of popular distrust of government authority, expanded the realm of party control in the lives of ordinary citizens, and ran counter to the spirit of the "Harmonious Society" ideology of the Hu-Wen administration.[20] Former State Council functionary Yu Meisun (俞梅荪) said that Zhou's ten years in power were the "ten darkest years for law and order in history [...] a severe reversal of progress."[21]

Zhou (right) listens to American Admiral Thad Allen during a 2006 trip to the United States

Several leaked U.S. diplomatic cables from Wikileaks have alleged Zhou's involvement in Beijing's cyber attack against Google, though the claim's veracity has been questioned.[22] Other cables said it was "well-known" that Zhou Yongkang controlled the state monopoly of the oil sector.[23] Zhou also served as China's 'high representative' in matters relating to North Korea, attending the Arirang Festival as a guest of Kim Jong-il before Kim died in 2011.[24]

In February 2012, former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun made an abrupt and unexpected visit to the United States consulate in the city of Chengdu. The event set off a political storm which eventually resulted in the ouster of Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai. Bo, considered a political ally of Zhou, was rumoured to be next-in-line to Zhou's powerful position of Legal and Political Committee (Zhengfawei) Secretary, and thus the Standing Committee.[25] Zhou had a close relationship with Bo, and he was reportedly acquainted with Wang Lijun as far back as his early days as mayor of Panjin.[26] On Zhou's 2010 visit to Chongqing, he publicly endorsed Bo's "Red Songs" and "Strike Black" campaigns (Chinese: 唱红打黑), showing enthusiasm for the so-called "Chongqing model" unmatched by his other Standing Committee colleagues.[26] Zhou lauded Bo's heavy-handed approach to reduce crime in the city, and praised Bo's style of state-driven, populist "mass movements" which had some characteristics of a Maoist-style political campaign. In March, the Standing Committee moved to remove Bo from his positions as a result of Bo being implicated in the Wang Lijun scandal, a decision which Zhou alone was said to have resisted.[27]

In the days following Bo Xilai's fall, rumours circulated about Zhou's break with the party leadership as well as a "coup d'etat" on March 19. Unconfirmed reports surfaced on the U.K.-based Sunday Times, citing Hong Kong magazine Frontline (《前哨》), that the paramilitary forces under Zhou's disposal had narrowly avoided direct conflict with the 38th Army in the center of Beijing.[N 3][28] Outwardly, Zhou appeared to be toeing the party line between March 2012 and his scheduled retirement in November.[27] For example, several days after Bo Xilai was suspended from the Politburo, Zhou held a national conference call with police officials, publicly declaring, "police officers must [...] understand what political position they need to take, maintain the correct political course, and always remain in line with the party centre led by comrade Hu Jintao as its General Secretary."[18]

On May 14, 2012, the Financial Times reported that Zhou had relinquished the operational control of the party's Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission to Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu due to his support for Bo Xilai, and had lost his right to select his successor when he retires from the Politburo Standing Committee in the fall of 2012.[29] The New York Times later reported that Zhou's status remained unchanged.[30] At around the same time, a group of provincial party veterans from Yunnan province penned an open letter to Hu Jintao calling for the removal of Zhou Yongkang due to his support of Bo Xilai.[31] The veterans voiced concerns that those supporting Bo intended to reinstate Mao-style policies in China.[32]

Zhou retired at the 18th Party Congress held in November 2012, an event which saw Xi Jinping ascend to become General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, China's top leader. In a significant change to China's top ruling council, Zhou's Political and Legal Affairs Commission portfolio did not feature in the new Standing Committee at all; instead, the Committee had shrunk to its pre-2002 size of seven instead of nine members. This was followed by wide-ranging reforms to local Zhengfawei organs. For example, the practice of lower-level Zhengfawei chiefs concurrently holding the office of police chief (i.e. Public Security) and concurrent government posts was gradually phased out, and the Zhengfawei was discouraged from directly interfering with on-going investigations or cases.[37] These reforms signaled a reduction in the executive authority of Zhengfawei chiefs in favour of better checks and balances in the legal system, and a restoration of the Zhengfawei in a policy oversight role rather than being an executive organ, which had been the case under Zhou.[18]

In 2013, Zhou appeared in public three times. He visited his alma maters, Suzhou High School and the China University of Petroleum in April and October, respectively; on June 23, Zhou visited the Zibo, Shandong-based Qilu Petrochemicals Company (Chinese: 齐鲁石化公司), a subsidiary of Sinopec. His visit to Suzhou High School also marked his final pilgrimage to his hometown. During this visit, Zhou suggested that it might be his last visit home.[38] At his visit to the China University of Petroleum campus, Zhou publicly 'pledged his allegiance' to Xi Jinping, China's new leader, rallying students to unite behind Xi to pursue the "Chinese Dream".[39]

The new party leadership under Xi reportedly began planning the crackdown on Zhou beginning in 2012. Xi's 'tough talk' on corruption began immediately after his ascension to the post of General Secretary. In his first days in office, Xi vowed to crack down on "tigers and flies", meaning extremely powerful officials as well as petty ones. Xi moved quickly to set a new standard for expected behavior of party officials, issuing a series of guidelines to clean up the party bureaucracy. Xi may have also been concerned that Zhou might use his influence and power to turn various state security entities into tools for advancing his interests, and in the process undermine the central authority of the state.[40]

Discussions surrounding the Zhou case took place in the summer of 2013. In June, the Politburo of the Communist Party of China held a four-day-long conference in Beijing specifically to discuss Zhou Yongkang.[41] During the meeting the members of China's ruling council reportedly exchanged differing viewpoints on Zhou. Eventually Xi Jinping and the other six members of the newly formed 18th Politburo Standing Committee came to consensus to investigate Zhou.[41]

Zhou's case was unprecedented, as no corruption investigation had ever been initiated against a member of the elite Politburo Standing Committee. The last PSC member to be ousted politically was Zhao Ziyang in the aftermath of Tiananmen in 1989, and the last PSC members to be put on trial were those of the Gang of Four following the Cultural Revolution.

Owing to the far-reaching impact Zhou's case would have on the party as well as the potential for intra-party conflict, Xi also reportedly sought the blessing of former General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao as well as other 'party elders'. Jiang was said to have met with Xi several times in Beijing between June and July to discuss Zhou Yongkang.[41] During these meetings, Xi was said to have directly elaborated to Jiang on Zhou's alleged crimes, as well as convincing Jiang of the potential harm to the party and the state if Zhou were not brought down. Jiang, though initially reluctant, eventually threw his weight behind Xi. Jiang subsequently applauded Xi's leadership skills during a visit by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.[41] Hu Jintao was reportedly fully supportive of investigating Zhou prior to the power transition to Xi Jinping at the 18th Party Congress.[41] Zhou himself reportedly sought two audiences with Xi, during which he discussed his contributions to the country and attempted to plead clemency, to no avail.[41]

In August 2013, the Party began a corruption investigation into Zhou.[42] A number of Zhou's former subordinates who were then in high-ranking positions were sacked in quick succession. These included Li Chuncheng, a former deputy party secretary in Sichuan; Jiang Jiemin, former chief executive of China Petroleum;[43]Li Dongsheng, former deputy minister of Public Security; Ji Wenlin, Mayor of Haikou and Zhou's former secretary; and Li Chongxi, a high-ranking official in Sichuan province. His former secretaries (i.e., directors of his office, chief of staff) Li Hualin, Shen Dingcheng, and Guo Yongxiang were all detained.

In December, Zhou, his son Zhou Bin and his daughter-in-law Huang Wan were taken into custody. The home of Zhou's younger brother Zhou Yuanxing (周元兴) was searched by the authorities twice. Yuanxing died in December 2013 after a battle with cancer. Zhou Yongkang and his son Zhou Bin were not present at the funeral, fuelling speculation that Zhou and his family members were all in custody.[44]

Zhou's family reportedly made billions of dollars by investing in the oil industry, of which Zhou had headed the largest company, China National Petroleum Corp. According to the Hong Kong-based Apple Daily, Zhou's eldest son made more than US$1.6 billion from public works in the city of Chongqing alone. He also supposedly used his father's prominence to extort millions of dollars in protection fees from various businesses and organizations.[45]

Zhou was reportedly being held in confinement without visitation rights in a heavily guarded facility on a military base near Baotou, Inner Mongolia.[46]

By March 2014, Chinese authorities were reported to have seized assets worth at least 90 billion yuan ($14.5 billion) from Zhou's family members and associates.[47]

By Spring 2014, it became increasingly clear that Zhou's spheres of influence – the oil sector, Sichuan, the legal system, and his family members – were being methodically rounded up for investigation. However, in the absence of any official reports on Zhou himself, Chinese and international media became rife with speculation about his fate. At a press conference during the March 2014 national meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a reporter from Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post directly asked the spokesperson if he could provide more information on the rumours circulating about the Zhou Yongkang case. In response, the spokesman chuckled and said, "like you, I've seen some stories on a select few media outlets," he then recited a prepared party-line reply, then ended off his response with a smile, "this is really all I can say in response to your question, I think you know what I mean." (你懂的)[N 4][48] Afterwards the assembled press gallery burst into laughter.[49]

On July 29, 2014, state media formally announced an internal party investigation against Zhou Yongkang's "violations of party discipline", but did not mention any criminal wrongdoing.[50] Several months later, the party investigation concluded that Zhou abused his power for the illicit gain of his family, friends, and associates, took "large amounts in bribes personally and through his family and associates; abused his power to further the interests of his family, mistresses, and associates; committed adultery with multiple women and engaged in the exchange of money and favours for sex; and leaked state and party secrets."[51] State media announced Zhou's arrest to face criminal proceedings on December 5, 2014. He was expelled from the Communist Party of China.[52] Zhou was the first Politburo Standing Committee member to be expelled from the party since the fall of the Gang of Four in 1980[N 5] at the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution.[53]

After the announcement of Zhou's expulsion from the party, the party's official newspaper People's Daily editorialized that Zhou's expulsion was part of the "strong resolve" to stamp out corruption in the party by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The editorial said the case demonstrated that the party saw "everyone as equal in the eyes of the law." It said that Zhou "betrayed the essence and mission of the party" and that "corruption in the party is like fire and water."[54] Media outlets outside of mainland China speculated about the political reasons behind Zhou's downfall. The Economist compared Zhou's fall with earlier internecine struggles in the party and noted Xi's anti-corruption campaign had "apparent factional bias", quoting a study that no "Princelings" have been investigated in the anti-corruption campaign.[55] He Pin (何频), the chief editor of the overseas Chinese news portal Mingjing, went one step further and asserted plainly that Zhou fell because he was engaged in a political conspiracy to depose Xi Jinping.[56][N 6]

In contrast, The New York Times did not speculate on political reasons behind Zhou's arrest, simply writing that ordinary Chinese people may be alarmed that the legal system was once under the hands of a deeply corrupt politician.[57]Duowei Times expressed disappointment with mainstream Western media characterization of the event as "yet another political purge", asserting that seeing modern China, particularly the post-Xi Communist Party, as rife with political intrigue and full of backroom deals is imprecise and naive. Duowei stated that Western media had a very poor grasp of what Xi was actually trying to achieve, and that Zhou's downfall was but a small element of a larger campaign by Xi Jinping to clean up the party, institutionalize power structures, and re-build the party's legitimacy.[58]

According to The New Yorker profile of Xi, "corruption had become so threatening to the Party’s legitimacy that only the most isolated leader could have avoided forcing it back to a more manageable level, but railing against corruption was also a proven instrument for political consolidation, and at the highest levels Xi has deployed it largely against his opponents. Geremie Barme, the historian who heads the Australian Centre on China in the World, analyzed the forty-eight most high-profile arrests, and discovered that none of them were second-generation reds."[59]

In the days leading up to the anticipated trial, Supreme Court President Zhou Qiang (no relation) told an assembled international press conference that Zhou Yongkang's trial would be "open and in accordance with the law."[60] In April 2015, Zhou Yongkang was formally charged with abuse of power, bribery, and intentionally leaking state secrets, and scheduled to face trial at the Tianjin First Intermediate People's Court.[4][61] Overseas Chinese media was rife with speculation about the 'treatment' Zhou was to receive. However, Zhou's trial unexpectedly took place behind closed doors. On June 11, state media made an announcement – without any apparent warning – that Zhou's verdict had already been reached. The official report on Zhou's trial was brief, and stated that he had been convicted on all three charges. The legal sentence, according to the state, was life in prison for bribery, seven years for abuse of power, and four years for "leaking state secrets." The court decided that Zhou could serve prison terms concurrently and amalgamated the sentences into one 'combined' life sentence. The total value of bribes taken by Zhou and his family was said to be 129.7 million yuan (~$18.87 million). State television showed Zhou pleading guilty with a head of fully gray hair, in contrast to his combed jet black hair dye he was known for prior to his retirement.[62]

Overseas media had compared Zhou's trial to that of Bo Xilai two years earlier, which was noted for being unusually open. In contrast to Bo, Zhou did not appear to dispute his charges. Bo, for the most part, denied his guilt and blamed much of the misdeeds he was accused of on his associates and his family. Zhou, on the other hand, said that "they tried to bribe my family, but really they were after my power. I should assume major responsibility for this." State-run news agency Xinhua said that the trial took place in secret because state secrets involved in the case.[62] However, it was also likely that Zhou's trial was not open to the public as a result of the sensitivity of the subject matter and its political implications. Observers also cited that the Bo trial became "out of control" as Bo made many shocking revelations during the deliberation of his trial which became tabloid fodder and led to many rumours circulating on social media, making the authorities more risk averse to do the same with Zhou.[63]

Zhou's son Zhou Bin absconded to the US in early 2013, and returned after negotiations with Chinese authorities. In June 2016, Zhou Bin was found guilty of taking 222 million yuan ($34m) in bribes and illegally trading in restricted commodities, and 350 million yuan ($53m) of illicit gains were confiscated; Zhou's wife, Jia Xiaoyue, was fined 1m yuan ($150,000) for bribe-taking. Zhou son and wife were sentenced to 18 years and 9 years imprisonment respectively.[64]

Zhou Yongkang has two sons, Zhou Bin (周滨) and Zhou Han (周涵), with his first wife, Wang Shuhua (王淑华), whom he met while working in the oilfields of Liaoning province. Wang has been described as a plain, hardworking woman who devoted much of her time to family and raising their two children. The couple had cordial relations while Zhou was at the Liaohe oil field, but the marriage later deteriorated.[65] Zhou was said to be a workaholic on the oil fields, often working into the morning hours and sleeping in his office. Wang died in a motor vehicle collision in 2001, reportedly one of the vehicles involved had military license plates; the cause of the crash was unclear.[66] In 2013, overseas Chinese news websites Mingjing and Boxun both reported that Zhou Yongkang had conspired with his secretary to kill Wang.[67] The credibility of these reports has been questioned.[66]

After Wang died, Zhou married Jia Xiaoye (贾晓烨, also been written as 贾晓晔), a former reporter and television producer at CCTV-2, who is 28 years his junior. According to the autobiography of Shen Bing,[N 7] Zhou and Jia wed at a small, tense private ceremony; no photos were allowed to be taken.[65] Jia continued to maintain a low profile following their wedding; she did not appear at any official functions with Zhou.[68] Indeed, the first official mention of Jia Xiaoye in her capacity as Zhou's wife was during the latter's sentencing announcement in June 2015.[65]

Zhou's son, Zhou Bin, born in 1972, was a prominent oil and gas executive who ostensibly used his father's connections to further his own business interests. The younger Zhou was the primary shareholder and Chairman of Beijing Zhongxu Yangguang Energy Technology Holdings Ltd.[N 8] Zhou Bin was investigated, tried, and sentenced to 18 years in prison.[69] The younger Zhou is married to Chinese-American Huang Wan (黄婉), whom he met while studying oil and gas exploration in Texas.[70] Huang's mother, Zhan Minli (詹敏利), held a stake in a number of companies with business dealings with China National Petroleum and lives in southern California.[71] Zhou's younger son, Zhou Han, maintains a comparatively lower profile, and was not close to his father.[65]

^The event was noted for being a gathering of Sichuan's political and business elite at the time. Those on the guest list included Deng Hong, Li Chongxi, Ji Wenlin, Guo Yongxiang, He Huazhang, Tan Li, and Li Chuncheng. All were detained for investigation or charged with corruption related crimes fourteen years later.

^Due to the opaqueness of machinations of China's political elites, numerous conspiracy theories emerged on what really happened in Beijing on the night of March 19 in what became known as the "March 19 Beijing coup". A widely circulated theory from Chinese-language news portal Boxun alleged that Zhou dispatched paramilitary troops in an attempt to free former Dalian Shide executive chairman Xu Ming, and ally of Bo Xilai, from custody, so as to prevent Xu from testifying at Bo's trial. Another more elaborate theory by New York-based Mingjing News stated that Zhou Yongkang planned to launch a coup on the night of March 19, and that Hu Jintao dispatched the 38th Army into Beijing in order to protect the Zhongnanhai compound from incursions by Zhou's "coup militia". This theory posits that paramilitary forces stormed Xinhua Gate and were repelled by the 38th Army in a stand off during which gunshots were fired into the air. Thereafter Hu Jintao received a phone call from former leader Jiang Zemin, who told Hu that Zhou had no intentions of launching a coup, which de-escalated the situation. None of these theories have been independently verified, nor reported on by mainstream English-language news sources.

^The spokesman was referring to the unspoken rule that the authorities cannot confirm or deny any facts related to any party investigation before an official announcement was made. Indeed, in his response, he did not even utter Zhou's name. The phrase ni dongde (你懂的) became so popular after its use by the spokesman that it was regularly used on social media websites as a placeholder for Zhou Yongkang himself, whose name was still routinely censored at the time. To evade censorship, other names used for Zhou included "Master Kang" (康师傅), from the instant noodles brand which shares the Chinese character "Kang", "Big Tiger" (大老虎), "Old Tiger" (老老虎), and "Zhou Tiger" (周老虎).

^The last Politburo Standing Committee members expelled from the Communist Party of China were members of the Gang of Four, Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen, following their trials in 1980. It is worth noting that Zhao Ziyang, PSC member at the time of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 who opposed martial law, and the last PSC member before Zhou to have fallen out of political favour, was never expelled from the party.

^According to He, Zhou had formed a "New Gang of Four" with Bo Xilai, disgraced general Xu Caihou, and former General Office chief Ling Jihua, a modern incarnation of the so-called "counter-revolutionary clique" whose real crime was deviating from the party line and "standing on the wrong side". He compared Zhou to losers of historical power struggles in the party, including Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, the Gang of Four, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang, and asserted that out of these cases only Zhou had truly engaged in forming a political clique to commit a conspiracy against the party's leaders. These assertions have not been independently verified.

^Shen Bing (born 1976), is also a former television host with CCTV. It has been suggested by overseas Chinese media that Shen was a favourite of Zhou, though this has not been confirmed by any authoritative sources. Her autobiography was published in Hong Kong and its authenticity has been questioned.

^The Chinese name of the company was "北京中旭阳光能源科技股份有限公司". Abbreviated Zhongxu)

1.
Charles Djou
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Charles Kong Djou is an American politician who served for 7 months as U. S. Representative for Hawaiis 1st congressional district in 2010–11, in June 2016, Djou entered the race for Mayor of Honolulu, which he lost to Democratic incumbent Kirk Caldwell. Born in Los Angeles, California, to a Chinese American father and he earned his law degree at the USC Gould School of Law at the University of Southern California. Djou is a major in the United States Army Reserve and he has taught as an adjunct professor of law at the University of Hawaii and as an adjunct professor of political science at Hawaii Pacific University. Djou served as the Vice Chairman of the Hawaii Republican Party from 1998 to 1999 and he was named legislator of the year by Small Business Hawaii in 2002,2004, and 2006. In 2006 he was selected as one of the 40 most promising leaders in Hawaii under age 40 by Pacific Business News, in 1998, Djou ran as a Republican for the Hawaii State House of Representatives District 47 seat. He was unopposed in the election, but lost to Iris Ikeda Catalani in the general election by a margin of 190 votes. In 2000, he ran for the Hawaii State House of Representatives District 47 seat. Unopposed in the primary, he faced incumbent Democrat Iris Ikeda Catalani in the general election, Catalani faced controversy in the campaign, with allegations that she broke a promise to the Outdoor Circle by posting yard signs. Djou won the race, gaining 52.5 percent of the vote to Catalanis 44.2 percent, as a member of the State House of Representatives, Djou served one term in the Hawaii House of Representatives from 2000 to 2002 and was the Minority Floor Leader. The documents detail the budget for state departments and agencies. He opposed the state van cam program launched in 2002 to catch speeders using automated cameras instead of police officers, in 2002, Djou announced he would run for the Honolulu City Council. He also announced he would move to East Honolulu from Kaneohe to avoid running against fellow Republican Stan Koki, Honolulu City and County elections are officially non-partisan, and any candidate who wins a majority of the votes in the primary election can win outright. Djou won with 51.3 percent of the vote, to Fishmans 39.2 percent, Djou ran for reelection to the Honolulu City Council. He was unopposed and won the seat by default, Djou subsequently served as the Hawaii co-chair of former New York Mayor Rudy Giulianis campaign for President in 2008. In 2002, Djou was elected to the Honolulu City Council and he was re-elected in 2006 and served until his election to Congress. On the City Council he was the Chairman of the Zoning Committee, Vice Chair of the Planning Committee and as a member of the Transportation and Public Safety & Services committees. In March 2008, Djou announced well ahead of time that he would run for U. S. Congress in the 2010 cycle, the seat became vacant on Feb.28,2010, when incumbent Neil Abercrombie resigned to focus on his run for Governor of Hawaii

2.
Chinese name
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Chinese personal names are names used by those from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora overseas. Prior to the 20th century, educated Chinese also utilized a courtesy name or style name called zi by which they were known among those outside of their family and closest friends. From at least the time of the Shang dynasty, the Han Chinese observed a number of naming taboos regulating who may or may not use a given name. In general, using the given name connoted the speakers authority, peers and younger relatives were barred from speaking it. Owing to this, many historical Chinese figures – particularly emperors – used a half-dozen or more different names in different contexts and those possessing names identical to the emperors were frequently forced to change them. Although some terms in the ancient Chinese naming system, such as xìng and míng, are used today, they were used in different. Commoners possessed only a name, and the modern concept of a surname or family name did not yet exist at any level of society.3 billion citizens. In fact, just the top three – Wang, Li, and Zhang – cover more than 20% of the population. This homogeneity results from the majority of Han family names having only one character. Chinese surnames arose from two separate traditions, the xìng and the shì. The original xìng were clans of royalty at the Shang court, the shì did not originate from families, but denoted fiefs, states, and titles granted or recognized by the Shang court. Apart from the Jiang and Yao families, the original xìng have nearly disappeared, xìng is now used to describe the shì surnames which replaced them, while shì is used to refer to maiden names. The enormous modern clans sometimes share ancestral halls with one another, nonetheless, however tenuous these bonds sometimes are, it remains a minor taboo to marry someone with the same family name. In modern mainland China, it is the norm that a woman keeps her name unchanged. A child usually inherits his/her fathers surname, though the law explicitly states that a child may use either parents or the grandparents. It is also possible, though far less common, for a child to both parents surnames. In the older generations, it was common for a married woman to prepend her husbands surname to her own. This practice is now almost extinct in mainland China, though there are a few such as the name change of Gu Kailai, but survives in some Hong Kong, Macau

3.
Chinese surname
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Chinese surnames are used by Han Chinese and Sinicized ethnic groups in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Malaysia, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and among overseas Chinese communities. In ancient times two types of surnames existed, namely xing or lineage names, and shi or clan names, Chinese family names are patrilineal, passed from father to children. Women do not normally change their surnames upon marriage, except in places with more Western influences such as Hong Kong, traditionally Chinese surnames have been exogamous. The colloquial expressions laobaixing and bǎixìng are used in Chinese to mean ordinary folks, prior to the Warring States period, only the ruling families and the aristocratic elite had surnames. Historically there was also a difference between clan names or xing and lineages names or shi, Xing were surnames held by the noble clans. They generally are composed of a nü radical which has taken by some as evidence they originated from matriarchal societies based on maternal lineages. Another hypothesis has been proposed by sinologist Léon Vandermeersch upon observation of the evolution of characters in oracular scripture from the Shang dynasty through the Zhou, the female radical seems to appear at the Zhou period next to Shang sinograms indicating an ethnic group or a tribe. This combination seems to designate specifically a female and could mean lady of such or such clan, prior to the Qin Dynasty China was largely a fengjian society. In this way, a nobleman would hold a shi and a xing, after the states of China were unified by Qin Shi Huang in 221 BC, surnames gradually spread to the lower classes and the difference between xing and shi blurred. Many shi surnames survive to the present day, according to Kiang Kang-Hu, there are 18 sources from which Chinese surnames may be derived, while others suggested at least 24. The following are some of the sources, Xing, These were usually reserved for the central lineage of the royal family. Of these xings, only Jiang and Yao have survived in their form to modern days as frequently occurring surnames. Royal decree by the Emperor, such as Kuang, state name, Many nobles and commoners took the name of their state, either to show their continuing allegiance or as a matter of national and ethnic identity. These are some of the most common Chinese surnames, name of a fief or place of origin, Fiefdoms were often granted to collateral branches of the aristocracy and it was natural as part of the process of sub-surnaming for their names to be used. An example is Di, Marquis of Ouyangting, whose descendants took the surname Ouyang, there are some two hundred examples of this identified, often of two-character surnames, but few have survived to the present. Names of an ancestor, Like the previous example, this was also a common origin with close to 500 or 600 examples,200 of which are two-character surnames, often an ancestors courtesy name would be used. For example, Yuan Taotu took the character of his grandfathers courtesy name Boyuan as his surname. Sometimes titles granted to ancestors could also be taken as surnames, seniority within the family, In ancient usage, the characters of meng, zhong, shu and ji were used to denote the first, second, third and fourth eldest sons in a family

4.
Zhou (surname)
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Zhōu is the Hanyu Pinyin transliteration of the Chinese family name 周, which now ranks as the 10th most common surname in Mainland China, and 71st in South Korea. It has been one of the ten most common surnames in China since the Yuan Dynasty. In places which use the Wade-Giles romanization such as Taiwan, Zhou is usually spelled as Chou, zhōu can also stand for another, rare Chinese family name, 洲. The Korean equivalent is Joo or Ju, in addition, the Vietnamese equivalent is Châu or Chu. O. Zhou Xiaoyan, soprano and voice teacher Zhou Xuan, actress Zhou Xun, actress Zhou Yi Zhou Zuoren, writer, brother of Lu Xun Jimmy Choo Yeang Keat, world famous Malaysian born London shoe designer. Chow Yun-fat, famous Hong Kong actor Stephen Chow, famous Hong Kong actor and director Jay Chou, Taiwanese singer Emmanuel Zhou, Zimbabwean Alphabetized by surname, then by given name

5.
Communist Party of China
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The Communist Party of China is the founding and ruling political party of the Peoples Republic of China. It was founded in 1921, chiefly by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, the CPC is currently the worlds second largest political party with a membership of 88.76 million as of 2016. It also controls the worlds largest armed force, the Peoples Liberation Army, the highest body of the CPC is the National Congress, convened every fifth year. The partys leader holds the offices of General Secretary, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, through these posts the party leader is the countrys paramount leader. The current party leader is Xi Jinping, elected at the 18th National Congress, the CPC is still committed to communist thought and continues to participate in the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties each year. The official explanation for Chinas economic reforms is that the country is in the stage of socialism. The planned economy established under Mao Zedong was replaced by the socialist market economy, the CPC has its origins in the May Fourth Movement of 1919, during which radical ideologies like Marxism and anarchism gained traction among Chinese intellectuals. Other influences stemming from the Bolshevik revolution and Marxist theory inspired the Communist Party of China, Li Dazhao was the first leading Chinese intellectual who publicly supported Leninism and world revolution. In contrast to Chen Duxiu, Li did not renounce participation in the affairs of the Republic of China, both of them regarded the October Revolution in Russia as groundbreaking, believing it to herald a new era for oppressed countries everywhere. The CPC was modeled on Vladimir Lenins theory of a vanguard party, Study circles were, according to Cai Hesen, the rudiments. Several study circles were established during the New Culture Movement, the founding National Congress of the CPC was held on 23–31 July 1921. With only 50 members in the beginning of 1921, the CPC organization, while it was originally planned to be held in Shanghai French Concession, police officers interrupted the meeting on 3 July. Because of that, the congress was moved to a tourist boat on South Lake in Jiaxing, Zhejiang province, only 12 delegates attended the congress, with neither Li nor Chen being able to attend. Chen sent a representative to attend the congress. The resolutions of the called for the establishment of a communist party. The communists dominated the left wing of the KMT, a party organized on Leninist lines, when KMT leader Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, he was succeeded by a rightist, Chiang Kai-shek, who initiated moves to marginalize the position of the communists. Fresh from the success of the Northern Expedition to overthrow the warlords, Chiang Kai-shek turned on the communists, ignoring the orders of the Wuhan-based KMT government, he marched on Shanghai, a city controlled by communist militias. Although the communists welcomed Chiangs arrival, he turned on them, Chiangs army then marched on Wuhan, but was prevented from taking the city by CPC General Ye Ting and his troops

6.
Wang Lequan
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Wang Lequan is a retired Chinese politician, most notable for being the Communist Party Secretary in Xinjiang, the autonomous regions top political office, between 1994 and 2010. From 2004 to 2012 Wang was also a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, from 2010 to 2012 he was a Deputy Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission. He retired from politics in 2012, and became President of the China Law Society in 2013. Wang Lequan was born in Shouguang, Shandong in December 1944 and he joined the Communist Party of China in 1966. He was a post-graduate at the Central Party School of the CPC Central Committee, Wang ran the Communist Youth League in Shandong Province in the mid-1980s and became vice governor of Shandong in 1989. Wang was the Secretary of the CPC Xinjiang Committee from 1994 until 2010, as Secretary, he was responsible for implementing modernization programs in Xinjiang. He encouraged industrialization, development of commerce, and investments in roads and he furthered the development of the oil and gas fields in the region, link-up of pipelines from Kazakhstan to eastern China. Wang was a member of the 16th and the 17th Politburos of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and he is known for his hardline approach to ethnic minorities. He acquired the nickname the stability secretary for his ability to enter into a chaotic situation, Wang was widely criticized by Uighurs and foreign scholars of Xinjiang for his hard-liner policies. After the 2009 July riot in Ürümqi, Han Chinese also became frustrated with his leadership because of the progress in restoring social order. As a result, many began to call for his resignation in public demonstrations. He was removed from the post in April 2010, and transferred to work on the Central Committees Political and Legal Affairs Committee as a Deputy Secretary under Zhou Yongkang and he was replaced by Zhang Chunxian. Wang remained in the Political and Legal Affairs Committee until the 18th Party Congress when he retired from active politics, in November 2013 Wang became the president of the China Law Society. Biography of Wang Lequan, Peoples Daily Online

7.
Meng Jianzhu
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Meng Jianzhu is a Chinese politician and a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China since 2012. He is currently the Secretary of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China and he also heads the Central Public Security Comprehensive Management Commission. Meng began his career in a cooperative based in rural Shanghai. He made his way up the ranks in the city, serving as mayor in charge of agriculture. Prior to his tenure as Zhengfawei chief, he served as the Minister of Public Security. Meng was born in July 1947 in Wu County, an urban district of Suzhou. In the 1960s, he headed to Changxing Island in Shanghai to become a tractor operator, for the next 13 years he worked on the rural agricultural cooperative. He graduated from the Shanghai Mechanical College and he joined the Communist Party of China in 1971. He became head of the cooperative in 1981. He spent much of his political career in Shanghai. He served in leading roles in Chuansha County and Jiading County and his portfolio included was agriculture and rural development. In 1996 he was promoted to become the deputy Communist Party secretary of Shanghai and he held the position until 2001. While in Shanghai Meng was low-key and camera-shy, but was popular with city residents. In 2001, Meng was appointed the Communist Party secretary of Jiangxi Province, some say Meng was transferred out of Shanghai because he had lost out on a struggle to Chen Liangyu become the citys party boss. Meng and Chen were polar opposites in many ways - Chen preferred to be in the limelight while Meng preferred doing work behind the scenes, Meng was also known for paying regular respects for retired municipal politicians. When Meng arrived in Jiangxi, most residents were optimistic, a common refrain amongst Jiangxi residents at the time was if Jiangxi wants to be rich, keep Meng Jianzhu. While Meng was often regarded by observers as a soft leader, for example, once during a provincial conference of officials at county level and above, some county leaders did not show up and instead sent their assistants to attend. Meng responded to this by postponing the entire conference until all the required attendees arrived as a means to reprimand those who failed to show, Meng became a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China in November 2012, following the 18th Party Congress

8.
Hu Jintao
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Hu Jintao is a Chinese politician who was the paramount leader of China from 2002 to 2012. He was a member of the 14th to 17th CPC Politburo Standing Committee, Hu is the first leader of the Communist Party without any significant revolutionary credentials. As such, his rise to the leadership represented Chinas transition of leadership from establishment communists to younger, during his term in office, Hu reintroduced state control in some sectors of the economy that were relaxed by the previous administration, and was conservative with political reforms. Along with his colleague Premier Wen Jiabao, Hu presided over nearly a decade of consistent economic growth, meanwhile, Hu followed conservative policies on China politically, cracking down on social disturbances, ethnic minority protests, and dissident figures. On foreign policy, Hu advocated for Chinas peaceful development, pursuing soft power in international relations, throughout Hus tenure, Chinas influence in Africa, Latin America, and other developing regions increased. Hu possessed a low-key and reserved leadership style and his tenure was characterized by collective leadership and consensus-based rule. These traits made Hu a rather unknown figure in the public eye, Hu retired in 2013 and was succeeded by Xi Jinping. Hu Jintao was born on 21 December 1942 in Taizhou, Jiangsu province and his branch of the family migrated from Jixi County, Anhui to Taizhou during his grandfathers generation. Though his father owned a tea trading business in Taizhou. His mother was a teacher and died when he was 7, Hus father was denounced during the Cultural Revolution, an event that apparently had a deep effect upon Hu, who diligently tried to clear his fathers name. During his time at Tsinghua, he met his wife Liu Yongqing, from 1969 to 1974, he worked for Sinohydro Engineering Bureau as an engineer. In 1973, Hu was transferred to the Construction Department of Gansu as a secretary, the next year he was promoted to vice senior chief. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping implemented the Four Transformations program, which aimed to produce communist leaders who were more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable, another protégé of Song, Wen Jiabao, also became prominent at the same time. In 1982, Hu was promoted to the position of Communist Youth League Gansu Branch Secretary and was appointed as the director of the All-China Youth Federation. His mentor Song Ping was transferred to Beijing as Minister of Organization of the Communist Party of China, with the support of Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping, Hu was assured of a bright future in the party. At Song Pings suggestion, in 1982 central CPC authorities invited Hu to Beijing to study at the Central Party School, soon after, he was transferred to Beijing and appointed as secretariat of the Communist Youth League Central Committee. Two years later Hu was promoted to First Secretary of CY Central, during his term in the Youth League, Hu escorted Hu Yaobang, who was CPC General Secretary then, in visits around the country. Hu Yaobang, himself a veteran coming from the Youth League, in 1985, then-Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang pushed for Hu Jintao to be transferred to Guizhou as the provincial Committee Secretary of Communist Party of China

9.
Ministry of Public Security (China)
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It currently has 1.9 million officers. It is headed by the Minister of Public Security, prior to 1954, it was known as the Ministry of Public Security of the Central Peoples Government. The Ministry operates the system of Public Security Bureaus, which are broadly the equivalent of police forces or police stations in other countries, the candidate for the minister of the MPS is nominated by the Premier of the Peoples Republic of China and approved by the National Peoples Congress. As the main security agency in the Peoples Republic of China. Hong Kong and Macau have their own security bureaus/agencies and police forces, as of 2012, the Minister of Public Security is Guo Shengkun. The Ministry of Public Security was among the very first government organs of the PRC, the ministry began operations on 1 November 1949, at the end of a two-week-long National Conference of Senior Public Security Cadres. Most of its staff of less than 500 cadres came from the regional CCP North China Department of Social Affairs. At the national level, its creation signaled the formal abolition of the CDSA, the ministry moved to its present location, in the heart of the one-time foreign legation quarters in Beijing, in the spring of 1950. The MPS is organized into functional departments, subordinate to the MPS are the provincial- and municipal-level PSB and sub-bureaus at the county and urban district levels. At the grassroots level, finally, there are stations which serve as the direct point of contact between police and ordinary citizens. The organization of public security stations may be inferred from the tasks with which the police are charged. Generally, each station has sections assigned to cover census and household registration matters, pretrial investigations, welfare, traffic control. Each also has a detention center, railway, navigation, civil aviation, forestry and anti-smuggling public security departments are under the dual leadership of their superior administration and the MPS. In the 1980s the public security station—the police element in closest contact with the people—was supervised by the public security subbureau as well as by local governments and procuratorates. A great deal of coordination occurred among the security organs, the procuratorates. The public security station generally had considerably broader responsibilities than a station in the West. In a rural area a station typically has a chief, a deputy chief, an administrative staff. In an urban area it usually has a number of administrative staff members

10.
Wen Jiabao
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Wen Jiabao was the sixth Premier of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, serving as Chinas head of government for a decade between 2003 and 2013. In his capacity as Premier, Wen was regarded as the figure behind Beijings economic policy. From 2002 to 2012, he held membership in the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, the de facto top power organ. He worked as the chief of the Party General Office between 1986 and 1993, and accompanied Party general secretary Zhao Ziyang to Tiananmen Square during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. In 1998, he was promoted to the post of Vice Premier under Premier Zhu Rongji, his mentor, Wen was dubbed the peoples premier by both domestic and foreign media. Instead of concentrating on GDP growth in cities and rich coastal areas, Wen advocated for advancing policies considered more favourable towards farmers. Wens government reduced taxes and pursued ambitious infrastructure projects. Following the global crisis of 2008, Wens government injected four trillion yuan as part of a stimulus program. He left office in 2013 and was succeeded by Li Keqiang, a native of Beichen District, Tianjin, Wen Jiabao went to the Nankai High School from which his predecessor premier Zhou Enlai graduated. He joined the Communist Party of China in April 1965 and entered the force in September 1967. Wen has a background in engineering and holds a degree from the Beijing Institute of Geology. He studied geomechanics in Beijing and began his career in the bureau of Gansu province. From 1968–1978, he presided over the Geomechanics Survey Team under the Gansu Provincial Geological Bureau, Wen succeeded in office, rising as chief of the Gansu Provincial Geological Bureau and later as Vice-minister of Geology and Mineral Resources. Wen was discovered by then-general secretary Hu Yaobang, and joined the ranks of the Central Committee, after Wen was promoted to work in Beijing, he served as Chief of the Partys General Affairs Office, an organ that oversaw day-to-day operations of the partys leaders. He remained in the post for eight years, Wen has built a network of patronage during his career. Throughout this period Wen was said to be an administrator and technocrat, having earned a reputation for meticulousness, competence. Wen served as Secretary of the Central Financial Work Commission from 1998 to 2002, Wens most significant political recovery occurred after accompanying Zhao on his visit to students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Wen Jiabao is the only Chief of the Partys General Affairs Office to have served under three General Secretaries, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin

11.
Sichuan
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In antiquity, Sichuan was the home of the ancient states of Ba and Shu. Their conquest by Qin strengthened it and paved the way for the First Emperors unification of China under the Qin Dynasty, during the Three Kingdoms era, Liu Beis Shu was based in Sichuan. The area was devastated in the 17th century by Zhang Xianzhongs rebellion and the areas subsequent Manchu conquest, during the Second World War, Chongqing served as the temporary capital of the Republic of China, making it the focus of Japanese bombing. It was one of the last mainland areas to fall to the Communists during the Chinese Civil War and was divided into four parts from 1949 to 1952, with Chongqing restored two years later. It suffered gravely during the Great Chinese Famine of 1959–61 but remained Chinas most populous province until Chongqing Municipality was again separated from it in 1997, the people of Sichuan speak a unique form of Mandarin, which took shape during the areas repopulation under the Ming. The family of dialects is now spoken by about 120 million people, in Modern Chinese, the name Sichuan has the meaning four rivers and this folk etymology is usually extended to list the provinces four major rivers, the Jialing, Jinsha, Min, and Tuo. In addition to its map and Wade-Giles forms, the name has also been irregularly romanized as Szű-chuan and Szechuan. In antiquity, the area of modern Sichuan was known to the Chinese as Ba and Shu, in reference to the ancient states of Ba and it was the refuge of the Tang court during the An Lushan Rebellion of the mid-8th century. The region had its own religious beliefs and worldview. The most important native states were those of Ba and Shu, Ba stretched into Sichuan from the Han Valley in Shaanxi and Hubei down the Jialing River as far as its confluence with the Yangtze at Chongqing. Shu occupied the valley of the Min, including Chengdu and other areas of western Sichuan, the existence of the early state of Shu was poorly recorded in the main historical records of China. It was, however, referred to in the Book of Documents as an ally of the Zhou and this site, believed to be an ancient city of Shu, was initially discovered by a local farmer in 1929 who found jade and stone artefacts. The Sichuan basin is surrounded by the Himalayas to the west, the Qin Mountains to the north, Qin armies finished their conquest of the kingdoms of Shu and Ba by 316 BC. Any written records and civil achievements of earlier kingdoms were destroyed, Qin administrators introduced improved agricultural technology. Li Bing, engineered the Dujiangyan irrigation system to control the Min River and this innovative hydraulic system was composed of movable weirs which could be adjusted for high or low water flow according to the season, to either provide irrigation or prevent floods. The increased agricultural output and taxes made the area a source of provisions, Sichuan was subjected to the autonomous control of kings named by the imperial family of Han Dynasty. Shu-Han claimed to be the successor to the Han Dynasty, in 263, the Jin dynasty of North China, conquered the Kingdom of Shu-Han as its first step on the path to unify China again, under their rule. Salt production becomes a business in Ziliujing District

12.
Zhu Rongji
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A tough administrator, his time in office saw the continued double-digit growth of the Chinese economy and Chinas increased assertiveness in international affairs. His opponents, however, charge that Zhus tough and pragmatic stance on policy was unrealistic and unnecessary, Zhu retired in 2003 and has not been a public figure since. Premier Zhu was also known for his charisma and tasteful humour. Zhu Rongji was born in Changsha, Hunan, to a family of intellectuals, according to family tradition, his family was descended from Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of the Ming dynasty. His father died when he was born, and his mother died when he was nine, Zhu was subsequently raised by his uncle, Zhu Xuefang, who continued to support Zhus education. Zhu was educated locally, and after graduation from school he attended the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing. While attending Tsinghua he became a student leader and took part in activities that were organized by the Communist Party, in 1951 he became the chairman of the Tsinghua Student Union. Following his graduation, Zhu began his career as a civil servant and he began his career in the Northeast China Ministry of Industries, where he was appointed the deputy head of its production planning office. From 1952-1958 he worked in the State Planning Commission, where he worked as head, deputy director. In 1957, during the Hundred Flowers Campaign, he criticized Mao Zedongs economic policies and his comments led to him being subsequently identified as a rightist in 1958, for which he was persecuted, demoted, disgraced, and thrown out of the Communist Party. In the late 1950s his family was persecuted for their pre-revolutionary status as wealthy landowners. After his persecution as a rightist, Zhu was sent to work at a cadre school. During the Cultural Revolution Zhu was purged again, from 1970-1975 he was sent for re-education to the May Seventh Cadre School, a special farm for disgraced government workers and former Party members. During his exile in the countryside Zhu worked as a laborer, raising pigs and cattle, carrying human waste. Shortly after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 Deng Xiaoping initiated economic and political reforms led to Zhus rehabilitation. From 1976 to 1979 he worked as an engineer in the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, in 1978 he was formally rehabilitated and allowed to rejoin the Communist Party. He had few connections in the army, the Party, or the bureaucracy, in 1979 he was reassigned to the State Economic Commission, in which he served as vice-minister from 1983-1987. After being politically rehabilitated and re-entering the civil service, Zhu resumed connections with his alma mater, in 1984 he was named the founding dean of the Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management

13.
Wuxi
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Wuxi is an old city in southern Jiangsu province, China. The city borders two other cities, Changzhou to the west and Suzhou to the east, and borders Zhejiang Province as well in the south. It also covers a coastline of the Yangtze River in the north, the modern name consists of the Chinese characters 无锡, literally translated no tin. According to a myth, at the time of the Warring States, while burying a pot to prepare food, a soldier found a stone plaque engraved with the words If there is tin there is an army, there will be conflict under heaven. If there is no tin, there will be peace under heaven, however, some scholars believe the name may have been originated from 吳墟, meaning the Ruins of Wu, due to Meicuns role as the original capital of the region. Another interesting theory suggests the name comes from a Chinese transcription of an indigenous Baiyue name honoring a bird deity. Others believe that the name could be derived from an ancient pronunciation of the name Fu Xi, Former translations to English include Wu-shi, Wushi and Wu-hsi. According to traditional Chinese historians, two Zhou princes, Taibo and Zhongyong, founded the first Chinese state in the area of Wuxi around the 11th century BC and this state of Wu had its first capital at Meili, generally thought to be the village of Meicun in Wuxi. Taibo and Zhongyong helped develop Wus agriculture and waterways and the area soon flourished, Taibo died without an heir, and Zhongyong succeeded him as King of Wu. His descendants were later officially enfeoffed by the Zhou court as vassals before declaring themselves full kings again during the Spring, a shrine to Taibo was set up in todays Meicun. Although the original structure was eventually destroyed in war, it has been rebuilt several times. A stone carved with sayings by Confucius can still be seen at the modern Taibo Shrine, the State of Wu became one of the strongest kingdoms during the Spring and Autumn period. Sunzi, who wrote the famous the Art of War came to Wu, Wu was considered one of the seven strongest kingdoms during this period. Some of Sunzis descendants still live in Sunxiang in Wuxi near the Plum Garden, however, Wu was later defeated by the State of Yue, todays Zhejiang and Fujian, which in turn was overthrown by the State of Chu and incorporated into Chu during the Warring States period. The cultural and economic center of the Wu area shifted to Suzhou after the reign of the first Qin dynasty emperor, Qin Shi Huang, during the Han dynasty, Wuxi was set up as a county by emperor Han Wudi. Historic records show that tin was discovered during the early Han era, soon, however, the tin was depleted. This was once believed to be the origin of the name Wuxi, the name was changed to Youxi, meaning having tin, during the Wang Mang conflicts period because Wang wanted to change the name. Agriculture and the industry flourished in Wuxi and the town became a transportation center under the early Tang Dynasty after the construction of the Grand Canal

14.
Jiangsu
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Jiangsu, formerly romanized as Kiangsu, is an eastern-central coastal province of the Peoples Republic of China. It is one of the provinces in manufacturing electronics and apparel items. Jiangsu is the third smallest, but the fifth most populous, Jiangsu has the second-highest GDP of Chinese provinces, after Guangdong. Jiangsu borders Shandong in the north, Anhui to the west, Jiangsu has a coastline of over 1,000 kilometres along the Yellow Sea, and the Yangtze River passes through the southern part of the province. Since the Sui and Tang dynasties, Jiangsu has been an economic and commercial center. Cities such as Yangzhou, Nanjing, Wuxi, Suzhou and Shanghai are all major Chinese economic hubs, since the initiation of economic reforms in 1990, Jiangsu has become a focal point for economic development. It is widely regarded as Chinas most developed province measured by its Human Development Index, Jiangsu is home to many of the worlds leading exporters of electronic equipment, chemicals and textiles. It has also been Chinas largest recipient of foreign investment since 2006. Its 2014 nominal GDP was more than 1 trillion US dollars and its name is a compound of the first elements of the names of the two cities of Jiangning and Suzhou. The abbreviation for this province is 苏, the character of its name. The state of Wu was subjugated in 473 BC by the state of Yue, Yue was in turn subjugated by the powerful state of Chu from the west in 333 BC. Eventually the state of Qin swept away all the other states, during the Three Kingdoms period, southern Jiangsu became the base of the Eastern Wu whose capital, Jiankang, is modern Nanjing. When nomadic invasions overran northern China in the 4th century, the court of the Jin Dynasty moved to Jiankang. Cities in southern and central Jiangsu swelled with the influx of migrants from the north, Jiankang remained as the capital for four successive Southern Dynasties and became the largest commercial and cultural center in China. The Tang Dynasty relied on southern Jiangsu for annual deliveries of grain and it was during the Song Dynasty, which saw the development of a wealthy mercantile class and emergent market economy in China, that south Jiangsu emerged as a center of trade. From then onwards, south Jiangsu, especially cities like Suzhou or Yangzhou, would be synonymous with opulence. Today south Jiangsu remains one of the richest parts of China, the Mongols took control of China in the thirteenth century. The Ming Dynasty, which was established in 1368 after driving out the Mongols who had occupied China, following a coup by Zhu Di, however, the capital was moved to Beijing, far to the north

15.
Alma mater
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Alma mater is an allegorical Latin phrase for a university or college. In modern usage, it is a school or university which an individual has attended, the phrase is variously translated as nourishing mother, nursing mother, or fostering mother, suggesting that a school provides intellectual nourishment to its students. Before its modern usage, Alma mater was a title in Latin for various mother goddesses, especially Ceres or Cybele. The source of its current use is the motto, Alma Mater Studiorum, of the oldest university in continuous operation in the Western world and it is related to the term alumnus, denoting a university graduate, which literally means a nursling or one who is nourished. The phrase can also denote a song or hymn associated with a school, although alma was a common epithet for Ceres, Cybele, Venus, and other mother goddesses, it was not frequently used in conjunction with mater in classical Latin. Alma Redemptoris Mater is a well-known 11th century antiphon devoted to Mary, the earliest documented English use of the term to refer to a university is in 1600, when University of Cambridge printer John Legate began using an emblem for the universitys press. In English etymological reference works, the first university-related usage is often cited in 1710, many historic European universities have adopted Alma Mater as part of the Latin translation of their official name. The University of Bologna Latin name, Alma Mater Studiorum, refers to its status as the oldest continuously operating university in the world. At least one, the Alma Mater Europaea in Salzburg, Austria, the College of William & Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia, has been called the Alma Mater of the Nation because of its ties to the founding of the United States. At Queens University in Kingston, Ontario, and the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British Columbia, the ancient Roman world had many statues of the Alma Mater, some still extant. Modern sculptures are found in prominent locations on several American university campuses, outside the United States, there is an Alma Mater sculpture on the steps of the monumental entrance to the Universidad de La Habana, in Havana, Cuba. Media related to Alma mater at Wikimedia Commons The dictionary definition of alma mater at Wiktionary Alma Mater Europaea website

16.
Suzhou High School
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Soochow Academy, officially the Suzhou High School of Jiangsu Province, is a Chinese public high school of one-millennium rich history, located in Suzhou, Jiangsu. In AD1035, the Northern Song politician and writer Fan Zhongyan founded the predecessor of Soochow Academy, during the Qing Dynasty, Zhang Boxing established the Ziyang College inside the Suzhou Prefecture School. It was one of the most prestigious colleges in the nation, in the 1900s, the imperial examination was abandoned, and consequently Duan Fang, the governor of Jiangsu, transformed the school into a modern school. He also invited sinology masters Wang Guowei and Luo Zhenyu to join the faculty of the school, in addition, during the Republic of China period, Zhang Taiyan and Qian Mu taught sinology here. It is widely regarded as one of the four most famous school in Jiangnan. In 1997, Soochow Academy became the first batch of national high school in Jiangsu Province. After the key concept was abolished, it became four-starred high school in 2004. The same year, Fan Zhongyan donated a house, and began the construction of quasi-government school after the approval of the Emperor Ren Zong, then he employed the educator Hu Yuan, the implementor of sub-Studio teaching style. Since then, with the school in Suzhou, Soochow Academy began the Millennium Prefecture School of history, during the Qing Dynasty, Zhang Boxing established the Ziyang College in the Suzhou Prefecture School. At that time, most of the schools are examination-oriented while the Ziyang College focused on Neo-Confucianism. Zhang also engaged famous teachers from all over the country and the college attracted students nationwide, in 1860, Suzhou Prefecture School was seriously damaged in the catastrophe of Taiping Rebellion. Fourteen years later, governor Zhang Shusheng arranged a huge budget in its reconstruction, in 1902, Ziyang College was renamed to Xiaoshiguan. Two years later, Duan Fang, the governor of Jiangsu. He invited sinology great masters Luo Zhenyu and Wang Guowei to the school, serving as principal, after that, the renowned elite college in Jiangnan became a public high school. In 1911, the school was renamed to Jiangsu Provincial No.1 Normal School, during May Fourth Movement, students in the school established a student council with some universities to protest the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. In mid-May, the strike finally affected the governments decision. After that, he modified the English name of school to Soochow Academy. He invited some famous scholars, including Qian Mu, Zhang Taiyan, after Wang resigned in 1931, Jiangsu Province Department of Education let geographer Hu Huanyong at National Central University to take this position temporarily

17.
China University of Petroleum (Beijing)
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The China University of Petroleum - Beijing is a Chinese university with campuses in Beijing and Karamay. It is part of the China University of Petroleum, China University of Petroleum-Beijing has two campuses, one in Changping, Beijing and the other in Karamay, Xinjiang. It also has its own school under the administration of Ministry of Education. In 1997, it became of member of the first “Project 211” universities, Beijing campus is situated in Changping, Beijing, covers an area of 0.331 km2. There are 9 professors received the title of Changjiang Distinguished Professor for Changjiang Scholars Program, Beijing campus currently has 7,714 undergraduate students,5,538 Master students,1,142 PhDs and approximately 800 overseas students from 52 countries. The Secretary of the Party Committee of China University of Petroleum - Beijing is Shan Honghong who is the president of China University of Petroleum. The President of Beijing Campus is Zhang Laibin, Karamay campus is located in Karamay, Xinjiang and covers an area of 4.8 km2. The Principal of Karamay campus is Zhang Shicheng who is the Vice President in Beijing campus as well and it teaches engineering, economics, finance, business, management, computer science, information technology, TCFL. E. In the fall semester of 2016, it enrolled the first batch of 461 undergraduate students from 16 nationwide

18.
Chinese language
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Chinese is a group of related, but in many cases mutually unintelligible, language varieties, forming a branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. Chinese is spoken by the Han majority and many ethnic groups in China. Nearly 1.2 billion people speak some form of Chinese as their first language, the varieties of Chinese are usually described by native speakers as dialects of a single Chinese language, but linguists note that they are as diverse as a language family. The internal diversity of Chinese has been likened to that of the Romance languages, There are between 7 and 13 main regional groups of Chinese, of which the most spoken by far is Mandarin, followed by Wu, Min, and Yue. Most of these groups are mutually unintelligible, although some, like Xiang and certain Southwest Mandarin dialects, may share common terms, all varieties of Chinese are tonal and analytic. Standard Chinese is a form of spoken Chinese based on the Beijing dialect of Mandarin. It is the language of China and Taiwan, as well as one of four official languages of Singapore. It is one of the six languages of the United Nations. The written form of the language, based on the logograms known as Chinese characters, is shared by literate speakers of otherwise unintelligible dialects. Of the other varieties of Chinese, Cantonese is the spoken language and official in Hong Kong and Macau. It is also influential in Guangdong province and much of Guangxi, dialects of Southern Min, part of the Min group, are widely spoken in southern Fujian, with notable variants also spoken in neighboring Taiwan and in Southeast Asia. Hakka also has a diaspora in Taiwan and southeast Asia. Shanghainese and other Wu varieties are prominent in the lower Yangtze region of eastern China, Chinese can be traced back to a hypothetical Sino-Tibetan proto-language. The first written records appeared over 3,000 years ago during the Shang dynasty, as the language evolved over this period, the various local varieties became mutually unintelligible. In reaction, central governments have sought to promulgate a unified standard. Difficulties have included the great diversity of the languages, the lack of inflection in many of them, in addition, many of the smaller languages are spoken in mountainous areas that are difficult to reach, and are often also sensitive border zones. Without a secure reconstruction of proto-Sino-Tibetan, the structure of the family remains unclear. A top-level branching into Chinese and Tibeto-Burman languages is often assumed, the earliest examples of Chinese are divinatory inscriptions on oracle bones from around 1250 BCE in the late Shang dynasty

19.
Standard Chinese
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Its pronunciation is based on the Beijing dialect, its vocabulary on the Mandarin dialects, and its grammar is based on written vernacular Chinese. Like other varieties of Chinese, Standard Chinese is a language with topic-prominent organization. It has more initial consonants but fewer vowels, final consonants, Standard Chinese is an analytic language, though with many compound words. There exist two standardised forms of the language, namely Putonghua in Mainland China and Guoyu in Taiwan, aside from a number of differences in pronunciation and vocabulary, Putonghua is written using simplified Chinese characters, while Guoyu is written using traditional Chinese characters. There are many characters that are identical between the two systems, in English, the governments of China and Hong Kong use Putonghua, Putonghua Chinese, Mandarin Chinese, and Mandarin, while those of Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia, use Mandarin. The name Putonghua also has a long, albeit unofficial, history and it was used as early as 1906 in writings by Zhu Wenxiong to differentiate a modern, standard Chinese from classical Chinese and other varieties of Chinese. For some linguists of the early 20th century, the Putonghua, or common tongue/speech, was different from the Guoyu. The former was a prestige variety, while the latter was the legal standard. Based on common understandings of the time, the two were, in fact, different, Guoyu was understood as formal vernacular Chinese, which is close to classical Chinese. By contrast, Putonghua was called the speech of the modern man. The use of the term Putonghua by left-leaning intellectuals such as Qu Qiubai, prior to this, the government used both terms interchangeably. In Taiwan, Guoyu continues to be the term for Standard Chinese. The term Putonghua, on the contrary, implies nothing more than the notion of a lingua franca, Huayu, or language of the Chinese nation, originally simply meant Chinese language, and was used in overseas communities to contrast Chinese with foreign languages. Over time, the desire to standardise the variety of Chinese spoken in these communities led to the adoption of the name Huayu to refer to Mandarin and it also incorporates the notion that Mandarin is usually not the national or common language of the areas in which overseas Chinese live. The term Mandarin is a translation of Guānhuà, which referred to the lingua franca of the late Chinese empire, in English, Mandarin may refer to the standard language, the dialect group as a whole, or to historic forms such as the late Imperial lingua franca. The name Modern Standard Mandarin is sometimes used by linguists who wish to distinguish the current state of the language from other northern. Chinese has long had considerable variation, hence prestige dialects have always existed. Confucius, for example, used yǎyán rather than colloquial regional dialects, rime books, which were written since the Northern and Southern dynasties, may also have reflected one or more systems of standard pronunciation during those times

20.
Pinyin
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Pinyin, or Hànyǔ Pīnyīn, is the official romanization system for Standard Chinese in mainland China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. It is often used to teach Standard Chinese, which is written using Chinese characters. The system includes four diacritics denoting tones, Pinyin without tone marks is used to spell Chinese names and words in languages written with the Latin alphabet, and also in certain computer input methods to enter Chinese characters. The pinyin system was developed in the 1950s by many linguists, including Zhou Youguang and it was published by the Chinese government in 1958 and revised several times. The International Organization for Standardization adopted pinyin as a standard in 1982. The system was adopted as the standard in Taiwan in 2009. The word Hànyǔ means the language of the Han people. In 1605, the Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci published Xizi Qiji in Beijing and this was the first book to use the Roman alphabet to write the Chinese language. Twenty years later, another Jesuit in China, Nicolas Trigault, neither book had much immediate impact on the way in which Chinese thought about their writing system, and the romanizations they described were intended more for Westerners than for the Chinese. One of the earliest Chinese thinkers to relate Western alphabets to Chinese was late Ming to early Qing Dynasty scholar-official, the first late Qing reformer to propose that China adopt a system of spelling was Song Shu. A student of the great scholars Yu Yue and Zhang Taiyan, Song had been to Japan and observed the effect of the kana syllabaries. This galvanized him into activity on a number of fronts, one of the most important being reform of the script, while Song did not himself actually create a system for spelling Sinitic languages, his discussion proved fertile and led to a proliferation of schemes for phonetic scripts. The Wade–Giles system was produced by Thomas Wade in 1859, and it was popular and used in English-language publications outside China until 1979. This Sin Wenz or New Writing was much more sophisticated than earlier alphabets. In 1940, several members attended a Border Region Sin Wenz Society convention. Mao Zedong and Zhu De, head of the army, both contributed their calligraphy for the masthead of the Sin Wenz Societys new journal. Outside the CCP, other prominent supporters included Sun Yat-sens son, Sun Fo, Cai Yuanpei, the countrys most prestigious educator, Tao Xingzhi, an educational reformer. Over thirty journals soon appeared written in Sin Wenz, plus large numbers of translations, biographies, some contemporary Chinese literature, and a spectrum of textbooks

21.
Wu Chinese
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Wu is a group of linguistically similar and historically related varieties of Chinese primarily spoken in the whole city of Shanghai, Zhejiang province, southern Jiangsu province and bordering areas. Major Wu varieties include those of Shanghai, Suzhou, Ningbo, Wuxi, Wenzhou/Oujiang, Hangzhou, Shaoxing, Jinhua, Wu speakers, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Lu Xun and Cai Yuanpei, occupied positions of great importance in modern Chinese culture and politics. Wu can also be found being used in Shaoxing opera, which is only in national popularity to Peking opera, as well as in the performances of the popular entertainer. Wu is also spoken in a number of diaspora communities, with significant centers of immigration originating from Shanghai, Qingtian. Suzhou has traditionally been the center of Wu and was likely the first place the distinct variety of Sinitic known as Wu developed. Suzhou dialect is considered to be the most linguistically representative of the family. Due to the influence of Shanghainese, Wu as a whole is incorrectly labelled in English as simply, Shanghainese, among speakers of other Sinitic languages, Wu is often subjectively judged to be soft, light, and flowing. There is an idiom in Mandarin that specifically describes these qualities of Wu speech, Ngu nung nioe ngiu, Wu varieties have the largest vowel quality inventories in the world. The Jinhui dialect spoken in Shanghais Fengxian District has 20 vowel qualities, Wu Chinese, along with Min, is also of great significance to historical linguists due to their retention of many ancient features. These two languages have proven pivotal in determining the history of the Chinese languages. More pressing concerns of the present are those of language preservation, however, many analysts believe that a stable state of diglossia will endure for at least several generations if not indefinitely. Saying one speaks Wu is akin to saying one speaks a Romance language and it is not a particularly defined entity like Standard Mandarin or Hochdeutsch. They do this by affixing 話 Wo to their locations endonym, for example, 溫州話 Wēnzhōuhuà is used for Wenzhounese. Affixing 閒話 xiánhuà is also common and more typical of the Taihu division, Wu, the formal name and standard reference in dialectology literature. Northern Wu, Wu typically spoken in the north of Zhejiang and it by default includes the Xuanzhou division in Anhui as well, however this division is often neglected in Northern Wu discussions. Southern Wu, Wu spoken in southern Zhejiang and periphery, comprising the Oujiang, Wuzhou, Western Wu, A term gaining in usage as a synonym for the Xuanzhou division and modeled after the previous two terms since the Xuanzhou division is less representative of Northern Wu. Shanghainese, is also a common name, used because Shanghai is the most well-known city in the Wu-speaking region. The term Shanghainese is never used by linguists to refer to anything

22.
Law enforcement
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Most law enforcement is conducted by some type of law enforcement agency, with the most typical agency fulfilling this role being the police. Law enforcement agencies tend to be limited to operating within a specified jurisdiction, various specialized segments of society may have their own internal law enforcement arrangements. For example, military organizations may have military police, outline of law enforcement – structured list of topics related to law enforcement, organized by subject area Criminal law Biosecurity Commons

23.
Cultural Revolution
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The Cultural Revolution, formally the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was a sociopolitical movement that took place in China from 1966 until 1976. The Revolution marked the return of Mao Zedong to a position of power after the Great Leap Forward, the movement paralyzed China politically and negatively affected the countrys economy and society to a significant degree. The Revolution was launched in May 1966, after Mao alleged that bourgeois elements had infiltrated the government and society at large, to eliminate his rivals within the Communist Party of China, Mao insisted that these revisionists be removed through violent class struggle. Chinas youth responded to Maos appeal by forming Red Guard groups around the country, the movement spread into the military, urban workers, and the Communist Party leadership itself. It resulted in factional struggles in all walks of life. In the top leadership, it led to a purge of senior officials, most notably Liu Shaoqi. During the same period Maos personality cult grew to immense proportions, a large segment of the population was forcibly displaced, most notably the transfer of urban youth to rural regions during the Down to the Countryside Movement. Historical relics and artifacts were destroyed, Cultural and religious sites were ransacked. Mao officially declared the Cultural Revolution to have ended in 1969, after Maos death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, reformers led by Deng Xiaoping gradually began to dismantle the Maoist policies associated with the Cultural Revolution. In 1958, after Chinas first Five-Year Plan, Mao called for grassroots socialism in order to accelerate his plans for turning China into an industrialized state. In this spirit, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, established Peoples Communes in the countryside, many communities were assigned production of a single commodity—steel. Mao vowed to increase production to twice 1957 levels. The Great Leap was an economic failure, uneducated farmers attempted to produce steel on a massive scale, partially relying on backyard furnaces to achieve the production targets set by local cadres. The steel produced was low quality and largely useless, the Great Leap reduced harvest sizes and led to a decline in the production of most goods except substandard pig iron and steel. Furthermore, local authorities frequently exaggerated production numbers, hiding and intensifying the problem for several years, in the meantime, chaos in the collectives, bad weather, and exports of food necessary to secure hard currency resulted in the Great Chinese Famine. Food was in shortage, and production fell dramatically. The famine caused the deaths of millions of people, particularly in poorer inland regions, the Great Leaps failure reduced Maos prestige within the Party. Forced to take responsibility, in 1959, Mao resigned as the President of the Peoples Republic of China, Chinas de jure head of state

24.
China National Petroleum Corporation
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China National Petroleum Corporation is a Chinese state-owned oil and gas corporation and the largest integrated energy company in China. Its headquarters are in Dongcheng District, Beijing, CNPC was ranked the third in 2016 Fortune Global 500. CNPC is the parent of PetroChina, CNPC is the government-owned parent company of publicly listed PetroChina, which was created on November 5,1999 as part of the restructuring of CNPC. CNPC and PetroChina develop overseas assets through a joint venture, CNPC Exploration & Development Company, in March 2014, CNPC chairman Zhou Jiping announced that CNPC would be opening six business units to private investors. In 1949, the Chinese government formed a Fuel Industry Ministry dedicated to the management of fuel, in January 1952 a division of the fuel ministry was formed to manage petroleum exploration and mining, called the Chief Petroleum Administration Bureau. In July 1955 a new ministry was created to replace the Fuel Industry Ministry, from 1955 to 1969, approximately 4 oil fields were found in 4 areas in Qinghai, Heilongjiang, Bohai Bay and Songliao basin. CNPC was created on 17 September 1988, when the government decided to create a company to handle all Petroleum activities in China. CNPCs international operations began in 1993, the CNPC subsidiary SAPET signed a service contract with the government of Peru to operate Block VII in the Talara Province basin. This was followed by an oil contract with the government of Sudan to manage Block 1/2/4 in the Muglad oilfield, in August 2005 it was announced that CNPC agreed to buy the Alberta-based PetroKazakhstan for US$4.18 billion, then the largest overseas acquisition by a Chinese company. The acquisition went through on 26 October 2005 after a Canadian court turned down an attempt by LUKoil to block the sale, in July 1998, the government restructured the company in accordance with the upstream and downstream principle of the oil industry. And CNPC spun off most of its assets into a separate company. On 5 November 2007, HK listed PetroChina was listed as an A share in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, in July 2013, CNPC and Eni signed a $4.2 billion deal to acquire a 20% stake in a Mozambique offshore natural gas block. In June 2014, the head of a key China National Petroleum subsidiary was recalled to Beijing, replacement of China National Petroleums top representative in Canada was announced in July. CNPC holds proven reserves of 3.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent, in 2007, CNPC produced 54 billion cubic metres of natural gas. CNPC has 30 international exploration and production projects with operations in Azerbaijan, Canada, Iran, Indonesia, Myanmar, Oman, Peru, Sudan, Niger, Thailand, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. The exploration projects, both domestic and overseas, are run by a wholly owned subsidiary, the Great Wall Drilling Company. In March 2009, CNPC began development of Ahdab, an oil field in Wasit Governorate holding a modest one billion barrels, the project progressed despite security problems with local farmers. Dozens of farmers complained of damage to property because of work on the site and Iraqi oil officials claimed thievery from the oil site by local farmers

25.
State councillor (China)
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The state councillor is a powerful position within the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, i. e. the executive organ of Chinas central government. It ranks immediately below the Vice-Premiers and above the Ministers of various departments, the position was created during the May 1982 restructuring of the State Council, when eleven state councillors were appointed, ten of whom were vice premiers until then. In theory, state councillors are to assist the Premier and Vice-Premiers to oversee various government portfolios and they can also represent the State Council on foreign visits. State councillors are part of a Standing Committee of the State Council, alongside the Premier, Vice-Premiers, in practice, a state councillors portfolios can be very wide-ranging. State councillors often accompany Chinas higher dignitaries on trips abroad - as was the case with State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan from 2003–08, and Dai Bingguo from 2008–present. Dai also became Chinas representative at the 2009 G8 Summit in Italy when President Hu Jintao decided to cut short his attendance to return to China in order to deal with the July 2009 Urumqi riots, the position was created during the May 1982 restructuring of the State Council. Eleven state councillors were appointed, ten of whom were vice premiers until then, the only exception being Zhang Jingfu

26.
State Council of the People's Republic of China
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The State Council, constitutionally synonymous with the Central Peoples Government since 1954, is the chief administrative authority of the Peoples Republic of China. It is chaired by the Premier and includes the heads of each governmental department, currently, the council has 35 members, the premier, one executive vice premier, three other vice premiers, five state councilors, and 25 additional ministers and chairs of major agencies. The State Council directly oversees the various subordinate Peoples Governments in the provinces, the State Council meets once every six months. Between meetings it is guided by a Standing Committee that meets weekly, the standing committee includes the premier, one executive vice premier, three vice premiers, and five other state councilors. The vice-premiers and state councilors are nominated by the premier, incumbents may serve two successive five-year terms. Each vice premier oversees certain areas of administration, each State Councilor performs duties as designated by the Premier. The secretary-general heads the General Office which handles the work of the State Council. The secretary-general has relatively little power and should not be confused with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, commissions outrank ministries and set policies for and coordinate the related activities of different administrative organs. Offices deal with matters of ongoing concern, bureaus and administrations rank below ministries. In addition to the 25 ministries, there are 38 centrally administered government organizations that directly to the state council. The heads of these organizations attend full meetings of the committee on an irregular basis. The State Council and the Communist Party of China are also tightly interlocked, with rare exceptions, State Councilors are high-ranking members of the CPC. Although, as Party members, they are supposed to follow Party instructions and this results in a system which is unlike the Soviet practice in which the Party effectively controlled the State. Rather, the Party and State are fused at this level of government, the State Council is the functional center of state power and clearinghouse for government initiatives at all levels. With the governments emphasis on modernization, the State Council clearly acquired additional importance and influence. The State Council controls the Ministry for National Defense but does not control the Peoples Liberation Army, which is instead controlled by the Central Military Commission. e

27.
Secretariat of the Communist Party of China
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The Secretariat of the Communist Party of China Central Committee is a body serving the Politburo of the Communist Party of China and its Standing Committee. The Secretariat is mainly responsible for carrying out routine operations of the Politburo and it is empowered by the Politburo to make routine day-to-day decisions on issues of concern in accordance to the decisions of the Politburo, but it must consult the Politburo on substantive matters. The Secretariat was set up in January 1934 and it is nominally headed by General Secretary, though the position of General Secretary was not always one and the same as the top party leader. Secretaries of the Secretariat are considered some of the most important political positions in the Communist Party, by protocol, its members are ranked above the Vice Chairmen of the National Peoples Congress as well as State Councilors. The General Secretary presides over the work of the Secretariat, the Secretariat of the Central Committee was formed in January 1934 at the 5th Plenary Session of the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which was held in Shanghai. In 1956, the party created the position of the General Secretary to head its Secretariat, the position is not that of the foremost leader in the party, which at the time was the Chairman of the Central Committee. Rather, the General Secretary was in charge of carrying out the work of the Communist Partys Politburo. Its inaugural General Secretary was Deng Xiaoping, with prominent political figures such as Peng Zhen, during the Cultural Revolution, the post of General Secretary as well as the Secretariat itself completely ceased to function. Beginning at the 9th Party Congress, party documents made no mention of the Secretariat, since its reinstatement, the composition of the Secretariat has varied between 6 and 12 members. Wan Li, Hu Qili, Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong, Xi Jinping, the Secretaries of the Secretariat are ranked highly in the order of precedence among party and state leaders. The Secretaries rank under the Politburo, but ranks above the Vice-Chairpersons of the National Peoples Congress

28.
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
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The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is a political body that comprises the top leaders of the Communist Party of China. It is currently composed of 205 full members and 171 alternate members, members are elected once every five years by the National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The Central Committee is, formally, the partys highest organ of authority when the National Congress is not in session and it also oversees work of various powerful national organs of the party. The Committee convenes at least once a year at a plenary session, the Committee operates, however, on the principle of democratic centralism, i. e. once a decision is made, the entire body speaks with one voice. The role of the Central Committee has varied throughout history, nonetheless, Central Committee plenums function as venues whereby policy is discussed, fine-tuned, and publicly released in the form of resolutions or decisions. The Central Committee is therefore technically the partys highest organ of authority when the National Congress is not in session. The Central Committee must also be convened to prepare for a National Congress, for example, to determine its dates, delegate selection, agenda. The Central Committee has the power to elect the General Secretary and the members of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the Central Military Commission. These elections take place in the form of votes, i. e. there is only one candidate. In some instances write-in candidates may also be allowed, the Central Committee also confirms membership of the Secretariat, the organ in charge of executing party policy, whose membership is determined through nomination by the Politburo. The Central Committees role has varied throughout history and it was founded in 1927 as a successor organization to the Central Executive Committee, a group of party leaders charged with executing party work during the pre-revolutionary days of the CPC. Over the next decades it served to confirm the party leadership lineup and legitimize military, strategic. In practice, power was concentrated in a group of military and political leaders. Although the Central Committee was required to convene at least once a year, it did not convene at all in 1951–53,1960, 1963–65, and 1967. Mao did not hold power over the Central Committee, as evidenced by the debates surrounding the policies of the Great Leap Forward. Mao faced some opposition at the 11th Plenum but ultimately most delegates were goaded into ratifying Maos decisions, many members were politically disgraced or purged thereafter. The Committee was then convened again in October 1968 to ratify the decision to then head of state Liu Shaoqi from the Party. At the 12th plenum, less than half the members actually attended, in a letter to Mao evaluating the members of the Central Committee at the time, Kang Sheng wrote that some 70% of CC members were considered traitors, spies, or otherwise politically unreliable

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18th Party Congress
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The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China began on November 8,2012 in Beijing, China, at the Great Hall of the People. The Congress elected the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the seven PSC members elected during the Congress were Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli. Only Li Keqiang and Liu Yunshan are considered to be members of the tuanpai, some 2,270 delegates selected from 40 constituencies attended the Congress. This represented an increase of 57 delegates and two constituencies from the 17th Congress,31 of these constituencies represent Chinas province-level jurisdictions. The remaining three delegations are the subject of conflicting accounts, hong Kong and Macau may represent two delegations or one delegation or they may be treated as part of the Guangdong delegation. No more than 68% of the delegates may hold positions within the party. The remaining 32% will be grassroots party members who hold jobs outside of the party apparatus, the number of females increased from the previous congress. Each delegation will be selected in an election in which there are at least 15% more candidates than there are delegates to be selected, the candidates in these elections are heavily vetted by multiple party organs. In addition to these 2,270 delegates, a number of additional delegates, primarily retired veteran Communist leaders. At the 17th National Congress there were 57 such delegates, the Congress ratified changes to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China. The Scientific Outlook on Development was said to be the latest product Marxism being adopted in the Chinese context, the affirmation of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as a system was written into the party constitution for the first time. Since 2002, all Standing Committee members had retired if they were 68 or older at the time of a party congress. As a result of this largely unspoken convention, it was expected that all members of the outgoing standing committee would have to retire at the 18th Congress. The Congress marked the most significant leadership transition in decades, thus ultimately the paramount leader was not expected to have the same amount of power accorded to it during the era of Mao and Deng. The practice of governing through consensus within the Politburo Standing Committee became the following the 16th Party Congress in 2002. However, these two factors led to inefficiencies in the decision-making process, in order to improve the efficacy of the Standing Committee, the 18th Party Congress was expected to end in a return to a smaller, seven-member committee. The propaganda and public security portfolios were expected to be downgraded to the level of the Politburo, apart from the largely pre-ordained selection of Xi and Li for its top two positions, intense speculation mounted over who else might join the standing committee. Two unexpected events upset the carefully balanced political equilibrium in the lead up to the Congress, initial speculation placed Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Dejiang, Li Yuanchao, Wang Qishan, and Wang Yang on the new standing committee

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Corruption in China
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Like other socialist economies that have undertaken economic reforms, such as post-Soviet Eastern Europe and Central Asia, reform-era China has experienced increasing levels of corruption. Despite this high-profile anti-graft drive, in 2014 China was ranked No.100 in Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index, which is 20 places lower than 2013, according to 2016 results of Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, China ranks 79th place out of 176 countries. This puts China on par with Algeria and Suriname, and comparable to Armenia, Colombia, Egypt, Gabon, Liberia, Panama, Bolivia, Mexico, Moldova, means of corruption include graft, bribery, embezzlement, backdoor deals, nepotism, patronage, and statistical falsification. Public surveys on the mainland since the late 1980s have shown that it is among the top concerns of the general public, Corruption undermines the legitimacy of the CPC, adds to economic inequality, undermines the environment, and fuels social unrest. Since then, corruption has not slowed down as a result of economic freedom. Business deals often involve participation in corruption, in popular perception, there are more dishonest CPC officials than honest ones, a reversal of the views held in the first decade of reform of the 1980s. China specialist Minxin Pei argues that failure to contain widespread corruption is among the most serious threats to Chinas future economic, Bribery, kickbacks, theft, and misspending of public funds costs at least three percent of GDP. China, though not a member of the OECD has participated as an observer in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, the spread of corruption in traditional China is often connected to the Confucian concept of renzhi as opposed to the legalist rule of law. Profit was despised as preoccupation of the people, while the true Confucians were supposed to be guided in their actions by the moral principle of justice. Thus, all relations were based solely on mutual trust and propriety, as a matter of course, this kind of moral uprightness could be developed only among a minority. The famous attempt of Wang Anshi to institutionalize the monetary relations of the state, as a result, corruption continued to be widespread both in the court and among the local elites, and became one of the targets for criticism in the novel Jin Ping Mei. Another kind of came about in Tang China, developed in connection with the imperial examination system. The widespread corruption of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, is credited as being an important component in the defeat of the KMT by the Communist Peoples Liberation Army. Getting high quality, reliable, and standardised survey data on the severity of corruption in the PRC is enormously difficult, however, a variety of sources can still be tapped, which present a sobering picture, according to Minxin Pei, an academic with expertise on Chinese affairs. Official deviance and corruption have taken place at both the individual and unit level since the founding of the PRC, initially the practices had much to do with the danwei system, an outgrowth of communist wartime organs. In the PRC the reforms of Deng Xiaoping were much criticized for making corruption the price of economic development, Corruption during Maos reign also existed, however. For this, the CPC has been called the princelings party, attacking corruption in the Party was one of the forces behind the Tiananmen protests of 1989. Both structural and non-structural corruption has been prevalent in China, structural corruption arises from particular economic and political structures, this form is difficult to root out without a change of the broader system

31.
Tianjin
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Tianjin, formerly known in English as Tientsin, is a metropolis in northern coastal Mainland China and one of the five national central cities of the country, with a total population of 15,469,500. It is governed as one of the four direct-controlled municipalities of the PRC and is thus under direct administration of the central government, Tianjin borders Hebei Province and Beijing Municipality, bounded to the east by the Bohai Gulf portion of the Yellow Sea. Part of the Bohai Economic Rim, it is the largest coastal city in northern China, in terms of urban population, Tianjin is the fourth largest in China, after Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou. In terms of area population, Tianjin ranks fifth in Mainland China. The walled city of Tianjin was built in 1404, as a treaty port since 1860, Tianjin has been a major seaport and gateway to Beijing. During the Boxer Rebellion the city was the seat of the Tianjin Provisional Government, under the Ta-tsing Empire, and the Republic of China, Tianjin became one of the largest cities in the region. At that time, numerous European-style buildings and mansions were constructed in concessions, after the founding of the Peoples Republic of China, Tianjin suffered a depression due to the policy of the central government and Tangshan earthquake, but recovered from 1990s. As of the end of 2010, around 285 Fortune 500 companies have set up base in Binhai, Tianjin is the pinyin romanization of the Chinese characters 天津, which mean Heavenly Ford or Ford of Heaven. The origin of the name is obscure, one folk etymology is that it was an homage to the patriotic Chu poet Qu Yuan, whose Li Sao includes the verse. departing from the Ford of Heaven at dawn. Another is that it honors a former name of the Girl, a third is that it derives from a place name noted in the River Record of the History of Jin. The most common are that it was bestowed by the Yongle Emperor of the Ming, before this time, it was open sea. The opening of the Grand Canal during the Sui dynasty prompted the development of Tianjin into a trading center, during the Qing dynasty Tianjin was promoted to a prefecture or Zhou in 1725 with Tianjin County established under the prefecture in 1731. Later it was to upgraded to a prefecture or Fu before becoming a relay station under the command of the Viceroy of Zhili. In 1856, Chinese soldiers boarded The Arrow, a Chinese-owned ship registered in Hong Kong flying the British flag and suspected of piracy, smuggling and they captured 12 men and imprisoned them. In response, the British and French sent gunboats under the command of Admiral Sir Michael Seymour to capture the Taku forts near Tianjin in May 1858. At the end of the first part of the Second Opium War in June of the year, the British and French prevailed, and the Treaties of Tianjin were signed. The treaties were ratified by the Emperor of China in 1860, and Tianjin was formally opened to Great Britain and France and these nations left many architectural reminders of their rule, notably churches and thousands of villas. Today those villas provide a flavour to Tianjin

32.
Asian swamp eel
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The Asian swamp eel, swamp eel, rice eel, or white ricefield eel is a commercially important, air-breathing species of fish in the Synbranchidae family. Originating in the waters of East and Southeast Asia, it has identified as an invasive species in the North American Everglades. The Asian swamp eel is a freshwater fish belonging to the family Synbranchidae. This family is native to the fresh, brackish, tropical, and subtropical waters of Asia, but is now present in West Africa and North, Central, Monopterus albus is placed in the class or subclass Actinopterygii. It arose from the Osteichthyes, the first bony fish, whose fossil record back to the Triassic period. In turn, the fish came from the Acanthodii class of bony. The common name of M. albus is somewhat of a misnomer, as the Asian swamp eel is not an eel, eels are of the order Anguilliformes, while M. albus is of the order Synbranchiformes. The Asian swamp eel has a scaleless, anguilliform body that grows to a meter or less, as a swamp eel, it has a tapering tail and blunt snout, and lacks pectoral and pelvic fins. The dorsal, anal, and caudal fins are rudimentary, with the caudal fin often absent and these fins serve to protect the swamp eel against rolling, and assist in sudden turns and stops. Its gill membranes are fused, but one v-shaped gill is located beneath the head, such a shape prevents reverse flow. Its body and head are dark, with olive or brown dorsal coloring. This coloration camouflages the aquatic predator, however, some are colored with yellow, black. The mouth is large and protractile, and both upper and lower jaws have tiny teeth for eating fishes, worms, crustaceans, M. albus is an evasive nocturnal animal. Its diet includes fish, shrimp, crayfish, frogs, turtle eggs, aquatic invertebrates such as worms and insects. This results in an increase in the population of the species without adequate time for population control methods. The Asian swamp eel has versatile motility and is capable of moving over dry land for short distances. This behavior is used for relocation according to resource availability, in the absence of water and food, the Asian swamp eel is able to survive long periods of drought by burrowing in moist earth. If its home becomes unsuitable, M. albus simply crawls ashore and these characteristics enhance its ability to disperse widely

33.
Jiangnan
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Jiangnan or Jiang Nan is a geographic area in China referring to lands immediately to the south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, including the southern part of the Yangtze Delta. The most important cities in the area are Anqing, Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Shaoxing. Jiangnan has long regarded as one of the most prosperous regions in China due to its wealth in natural resources. Many of the people of the region speak Wu Chinese in addition to the national dialect Mandarin, the word Jiangnan is based on the Chinese name for the Yangtze, Cháng Jiāng, and nán meaning south. In the 19th century, English speakers also called it Keang-nan, the earliest archaeological evidences were of the Majiabang and of the Hemudu cultures. The later Liangzhu culture, from around 2600-2000 BC, created complex and their economy was based on rice cultivation, fishing and constructed houses on stilts over rivers or lakes. During the Zhou dynasty, the Wu and Baiyue peoples inhabited the area with heavy aquaculture and stilt houses and they adopted the Chinese writing system and created excellent bronze swords. The Chu state from the west expanded into this area and defeated the Yue state, after Chu was conquered by the Qin state, China was unified. It was not until the fall of the Western Jin dynasty during the early 4th century AD that northern Chinese moved to Jiangnan in significant numbers, the Yellow River valley was becoming barren due to flooding and constant harassment and invasion by the Wu Hu nomads. Many people settled in South China, where the Jiangnan areas warm and wet climate were ideal for supporting agriculture, as early as the Eastern Han dynasty, Jiangnan areas became one of the more economically prominent areas of China. Other than rice, Jiangnan produced highly profitable trade products such as tea, silk, several Chinese dynasties were based in Jiangnan. After the Qin Dynasty fell, the insurgent state of Chu took control and its ruler, Xiang Yu, was born here. During the Three Kingdoms period, Jianye was the capital of Eastern Wu, in the 3rd century, many northern Chinese moved here after nomadic groups controlled the north. In the 10th century, Wuyue was a coastal kingdom founded by Qian Liu who made a lasting cultural impact on Jiangnan. During the last years of the Yuan dynasty, Jiangnan was fought for by two major states, Zhu Yuanzhangs Ming faction, based in Nanjing, and the Suzhou-centered Wu faction led by Zhang Shicheng. Nanjing remained the capital of the Ming dynasty until the early 15th century, when the third Ming ruler, when the Qing dynasty first took over China, Jiangnans gentry offered resistance in the form of denying the ability to deal with taxes to the government. The Qianlong Emperor of the Qing dynasty made many visits to Jiangnan, earlier, the Kangxi Emperor visited the region as well. During the 19th century Taiping Rebellion, the established by the Taiping rebels occupied much of Jiangnan

34.
National Higher Education Entrance Examination
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The National Higher Education Entrance Examination, commonly known as Gaokao, is an academic examination held annually in the Peoples Republic of China. This examination is a prerequisite for entrance into almost all education institutions at the undergraduate level. It is usually taken by students in their last year of high school. The exams last about nine hours over a period of two days, depending on the province, Chinese literature, Mathematics, and English language are required for all students. In addition, students have to choose between two streams, social-science-oriented area and natural-science-oriented area, Students who choose the former take an additional paper on history, politics and geography, while those who choose the latter take an additional paper on physics, chemistry and biology. In 2006, a high of 9.5 million people applied for tertiary education entry in China. Of these,8.8 million took the entrance exam and 27,600 were exempted due to exceptional or special talent. Everyone else took other standardized entrance exams, such as those designed for education students. The overall mark received by the student is generally a weighted sum of their subject marks, the maximum possible mark varies widely from year to year and also varies from province to province. The National Higher Education Entrance Examination, commonly known as the gaokao was created in 1952, the unified national tertiary entrance examination in 1952 marked the start of reform of National Matriculation Tests Policies in the newly established PRC. With the implementation of the first Five Year Plan in 1953, after repeated discussions and experiments, the NMTP was eventually set as a fundamental policy system in 1959. From 1958, the entrance examination system was affected by the Great Leap Forward Movement. Soon, unified recruitment was replaced by separate recruitment by individual or allied tertiary education institutions, meanwhile, political censorship on candidate students was enhanced. Since 1962, criticism of the NMTP system had even harsher. On July 1966, the NMTP was officially canceled and substituted by a new policy of recommending workers, farmers and soldiers to college. Against the backdrop of world revolution, millions of young people, some full of religious-like fervor, joined the ranks of farmers. However, they were disillusioned by the reality of hard conditions in the countryside. In the early 1970s, Mao Zedong realized that political struggle had taken too big a toll on him as well as the nation

35.
China University of Petroleum
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The China University of Petroleum is a university system in China. It consists of two universities, China University of Petroleum, located in Qingdao and Dongying, and China University of Petroleum, both are regarded as the best universities in the field of petroleum related subjects in China. They are placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, the university, founded in 1953, was known then as Beijing Petroleum Institute. In 1988, it was renamed The University of Petroleum consisting of one part in Dongying as the college, each gradually developed into universities with both undergraduate and graduate students. In January 2005, its changed to China University of Petroleum. In 2004, China University of Petroleum began to move to Qingdao, Dongying campus currently serves as the base for continuing education, remote education, research laboratories, and industry collaboration. China University of Petroleum specializes in upstream, midstream and downstream petroleum science and engineering, China University of Petroleum - East China is located in Qingdao. It also manages its old campus in Dongying, the alumni of CUP include the top officials of China, CEOs of major oil companies, members of Chinese Academy of Sciences, and members of Chinese Academy of Engineering, etc