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BY MARK POMERLEAU
Military deterrence e orts are
as old as battle tactics. From
troop build-ups to increased
armaments to robust strategies on highly
advanced warfare such as nuclear arms,
military strategists and commanders have
intently studied the art of deterring adver-
saries.
But deterrence in cyberspace is a di er-
ent game. With the proliferation of tech-
nology, the Internet and greater connec-
tivity, malicious actors in cyberspace are
able to operate much more freely than in
the physical world. e number of cyber-
attacks on both government and commer-
cial networks is growing, and established
practices for protecting those networks
could be falling short. Former director of
the National Security Agency Keith Al-
exander, in a keynote address earlier this
year at the American Enterprise Institute
said atly, "I'd say our defense isn't work-
ing." Citing cyberattacks from Iran, China,
Russia and North Korea, Alexander told
the audience that "if everybody's getting
hacked... industry and government... the
strategy that we're working on is awed."
So is deterrence an option? Can the type
of military deterrence policies that have
worked in the physical world be applied
to cyberspace? It's an issue military leaders
are starting to focus on.
As Scott Jasper, retired Navy captain and
a lecturer at the Center for Civil-Military
Relations and the National Security A airs
Department at the Naval Postgraduate
School, wrote in a recent essay for Strate-
gic Studies Quarterly (PDF), " e aim of
deterrence is to create disincentives for
hostile action and normally involves two
components: deterrence by punishment
(the threat of retaliation) and deterrence
by denial (the ability to prevent bene t).
Some notable scholars have suggested a
complementary third component: deter-
rence by entanglement (mutual interests)
that encourages responsible behavior of
actors based on economic and political
relationships."
In an attempt to outline the Defense
Department's framework and strategic
interests in cyber deterrence at a Senate
Armed Services Subcommittee hearing,
Eric Rosenbach, principal cyber advisor to
the Secretary of Defense, described deter-
rence policy as a "[w]hole-of-government
cyber strategy to deter attacks. is strat-
egy depends on the totality of U.S. actions
to include declared deterrent policy, over-
all defensive posture, e ective response
procedures, indication and warning capa-
bilities, and the resilience of U.S. networks
and systems."
In addition to DOD's three missions for
cyberspace---defending DOD networks,
defending U.S. networks overall against
signi cant attacks and providing full-
spectrum cyber support for military op-
erations---Rosenbach outlined three roles
the Defense Department can play within
14 JULY/AUGUST 2015 | DefenseSystems.com
CYBER WAR:
As breaches mount, the military debates the
merits of a Cold War defense
Can
deterrence
work?
"The U.S. is a glass
house when
it comes to cyber."
--- ERIC ROSENBACH, DOD CYBER
ADVISOR