North Korea’s Fast-Track Missile Development: How Far It’s Come and Why It Has the U.S. on Edge by Gregory Elich from Counter Punch.

Since Donald Trump became president, North Korea has conducted a
flurry of missile tests, triggering a wave of condemnation by U.S. media
and political figures. The reaction contains more than an element of
fear-mongering, and it is sometimes implied that armed with an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), North Korea is liable to
launch an unprovoked attack on the U.S. mainland.
What tends to be lacking in such reports is any sense of sober
reflection, and much confusion is sown concerning the actual state of
North Korea’s program. This article takes a closer look at North Korea’s
recent missile launches and argues that they pose a threat–not to the
safety of the U.S. population, as the corporate media claim, but to the
United States’ strategic calculus in the region.Pukguksong-2
First tested on February 11, the Pukguksong-2 is a medium-range
ballistic missile based on the design of the submarine-launched
Pukguksong -1. The main advantage the Pukguksong-2 has over North
Korea’s other land-based ballistic missiles is that it relies on solid
fuel. For that reason, the Pukguksong-2 is far more mobile and
survivable than North Korea’s other medium-range missiles that
outperform it. The other missiles are liquid-fueled and therefore
hampered by the need to be accompanied by tanker trucks while on the
move. Their necessity of a lengthy fueling process before launch makes
them vulnerable to attack. [1]
Flying on a nearly vertical trajectory, the Pukguksong-2 travelled
500 kilometers and soared to an apogee of 550 kilometers. That
translates into a range of 1,200 kilometers, were the missile to be
fired at a regular trajectory using the same payload. [2]
One of the reasons for the unusually steep trajectory of the test was
so that technicians would be within technical monitoring range to
gather data on performance. [3]
The unusual flight path may have also been undertaken, as North Korea
indicates, to avoid the political sensitivities of overflying Japan.
The missile was again tested on May 21 and followed a trajectory
similar to the first. Despite North Korea’s claim that the missile
should go into mass production, more testing is needed to solidify
reliability and accuracy. It does not appear that the reentry vehicle
was tested on this occasion, as it lacked the fins or thrusters
necessary for terminal guidance capability. According to missile expert
John Schilling, it “will likely take at least five years” for the
Pukguksong-2 to become “the mainstay of North Korea’s strategic missile
force, and even then, only in a first-generation version with a
non-maneuvering warhead.” [4]
The differing performance of the two tests indicates that there are
unmet challenges in the engine manufacturing process so that it can
produce consistent results.Hwasong-12
After three failed launches in April of this year, the
intermediate-range Hwasong-12 finally achieved success on May 14. Unlike
the Pukguksong-2, this missile is liquid fueled. By all accounts, the
performance of the Hwasong-12 demonstrated a significant technological
advance over any of North Korea’s other missiles. In the last test, the
missile flew at a steep 85-degree angle and achieved a height of 2,111
kilometers. It is calculated that a normal trajectory would give the
missile a range of 4,500 kilometers, making it capable of striking the
U.S. strategic bomber force in Guam. [5]
More importantly, this marked North Korea’s first successful test of a
reentry vehicle. A nuclear warhead must be able to withstand the
enormous heat generated from reentering the earth’s atmosphere for it to
reach its target. Without that capability, North Korea would not have
an effective nuclear deterrent. South Korean monitoring equipment picked
up data communications between the descending warhead and North Korean
ground control, confirming the success of the test. [6]Anti-Ship Missiles
On May 29, North Korea tested an upgraded version of the Hwasong-7.
Among the improvements were fins to improve stability during the boost
phase, an engine in the middle section for speed control, and terminal
guidance technology to provide greater accuracy. The missile is said to
have a range of 1,000 kilometers and is intended to strike targets at
sea. [7]
Little more than a week later, North Korea launched several anti-ship
cruise missiles, which demonstrated excellent maneuverability and
precision. According to North Korean media, the missiles “accurately
detected and hit the floating targets on the East Sea of Korea after
making circular flights.” [8]
The flight distance was estimated at 200 kilometers, and like North
Korea’s other missiles tested this year, the cruise missiles are newly
designed. [9]
The cruise missiles were fired from tracked transport vehicles that
are capable of travelling across rough terrain, thus allowing them to go
where they would be harder to spot and destroy. [10]Hwasong-14
On July 4, North Korea launched what it claimed was an ICBM, the
two-stage Hwasong-14. Analysts are split on whether or not the launch
actually demonstrated the ability to achieve the minimum range of 5,500
kilometers needed to qualify as an ICBM. U.S. officials call the launch
an ICBM, while Russian analysts place the missile’s performance in the
intermediate range category.
In any case, there are technological challenges involved in
developing an ICBM that will be much harder for North Korea to overcome
than was the case with the Hwasong-12. This was only a single test, and
The longer the range of a ballistic missile, the higher the amount of
total heat a reentry vehicle must be able to withstand. The rate of
heat associated with range – and therefore speed – increases so rapidly
that a successful test of an intermediate ballistic missile’s reentry
vehicle says nothing about how it would fare in an ICBM. A reentry
vehicle launched by an ICBM must absorb far more punishment than is the
case with shorter-range missiles, and survive temperatures of 7000˚C. It
took the United States several years to master the challenge of
designing a survivable ICBM reentry vehicle, [11] and we have no solid information on the Hwasong-14’s reentry performance.
A nuclear warhead must be miniaturized to reduce the weight enough
for it to be deliverable in a missile. As military technology
specialists Markus Schiller and Theodore Postol point out, “It is
unlikely that North Korea now has a nuclear weapon that weighs as little
as 1000 kg. It is also unlikely that such a first-generation nuclear
weapon would be capable of surviving the unavoidable 50 G deceleration
during warhead reentry from a range of nearly 10,000 kilometers.” [12]
It appears that the Hwasong-12 provided the basis for the Hwasong-14,
but a significant amount of work remains to be done to perfect
associated technology, such as the guidance system and reentry vehicle.
Moreover, before a missile can be considered operationally ready, it
must undergo multiple tests to ensure that it meets performance and
reliability standards. The Hwasong-12, which provided the likely base,
was only successful in one of its four tests.
A missile needs to be thoroughly tested to establish its reliability
before it is ready to accommodate a nuclear warhead. No nation is going
to risk having a missile blow up on the launch pad with a nuclear
warhead on top.
It may take years for North Korea to develop a fully operational ICBM
capability. “If a vague threat is enough for them, they could wait for
another successful launch and declare operational deployment after that,
and half the world will believe them,” Schiller points out. “But if
they take it seriously, as the U.S. or Russia do, it would take at least
a dozen more launches and perhaps ten years. Mind you, this is their
first ICBM.” [13]Threats and Provocations
It is an article of faith in the West that each missile test by North
Korea is a “threat” or “provocation.” But is it true? Over the last
several months, India tested its Agni-2 medium-range and Agni-3
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as an Agni-5 ICBM,
producing only yawns of indifference. Pakistan fired an Ababeel
medium-range ballistic missile, capable of delivering multiple warheads,
while China and Russia both tested ICBMs. The United States, as it was
roundly condemning North Korea for its tests, launched Minuteman 3 and
Trident missiles. None of these tests by nuclear powers were deemed
provocative. Nor was note taken of the hypocrisy of the Trump
administration in expressing outrage over North Korea doing what it was
doing.
Objectively speaking, there is no difference between North Korea’s
missile tests and the others, although it should be pointed out that the
U.S. arsenal of nearly 7,000 nuclear warheads dwarfs that of North
Korea.
As the North Korean foreign ministry observed, “Not a single article
or provision in the UN Charter and other international laws stipulates
that nuclear test or ballistic rocket launch poses a threat to
international peace and security.” [14]
The political and economic might of the United States gave it the means
to prod other members of the UN Security Council to agree to its demand
to impose sanctions on North Korea. As a result, North Korea is the
only nation singled out by UN sanctions that forbid it from testing the
same types of missiles as other countries are free to do. There is no
legal basis for this double standard, which is primarily a product of
U.S. influence.
From the North Korean perspective, the large-scale military exercises
that the United States regularly conducts in tandem with South Korea
are threatening. These drills rehearse the invasion of North Korea,
including decapitation operations to kill North Korean leaders.
Recently, American B-1B bomber planes executed a series of flights over
South Korea, simulating the carpet bombing of North Korea. [15]
Originally designed to deliver nuclear weapons, the B-1B underwent
conversion to a conventional weapons only role ten years ago. [16] The plane is still a formidable weapon, however, and can carry three times the payload of a B-52. [17]
In the Western mindset, none of these actions can be construed as
being “provocative” or a “threat” to North Korea. But it is easy enough
to imagine the hysterical reaction if Russia were to conduct joint
military exercises in Cuba, practicing the bombing and invasion of the
United States, along with the assassination of U.S. political leaders.Refusal to Recognize North Korea as a Nuclear State
Trump’s policy of “maximum pressure and engagement” is based on the
principle that the United States will not recognize North Korea as a
nuclear state. But what does this mean? North Korea, as everyone knows,
is a nuclear state.
What the U.S. means is that it won’t recognize North Korea’s right to be a nuclear state. Why is this important?
According to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), only the five
countries that already had nuclear weapons when the treaty went into
force in 1970—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia,
China—are internationally recognized as nuclear weapon states. The
treaty requires them to reduce their nuclear arsenal towards eventual
elimination and prohibits all other signatories from possessing nuclear
weapons.
Never mind that the five nuclear weapon states are far from achieving
their commitment to disarmament and that the United States is spending
$1 trillion to modernize its nuclear arsenal. The United States’ primary
concern is the second half of the NPT’s stated goal—that no one else
besides the five officially-recognized nuclear weapon states should have
nuclear weapons. As such, North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, in
the U.S.’ view, is an affront to this doctrine and the country should
be punished accordingly.
But what about India, Pakistan and Israel—also countries with nuclear
weapons that are not parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), you might ask. Does the United States refuse to recognize them as
nuclear states?
Therein lies the greatest hypocrisy behind U.S. condemnation of North
Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. Because the U.S. has no problem with
India, Pakistan and Israel possessing nuclear weapons, it has seen no
need to make such a pronouncement.North Korea’s Accelerating Missile Development: Threat to U.S. Hegemony
It has not gone unnoticed that the pace of North Korea’s missile
testing has accelerated in recent months. When the year began, North
Korea found itself in a somewhat vulnerable position, given the Trump
administration’s aggressive rhetoric. North Korea had a nuclear weapons
program but no tested reentry vehicle–which meant that it had no means
of delivery. The north’s conventional arms are sufficient to inflict
heavy damage on South Korea. But in a conflict, harm to U.S. forces
would be relatively mild, especially if the U.S. launched a first strike
to eliminate much of North Korea’s military capability. The window of
opportunity for attacking North Korea would permanently close once it
could demonstrate an effective means of delivering a nuclear weapon and
the ability to strike U.S. warplanes stationed in Guam and aircraft
carriers off the coast of the Korean Peninsula. Thus for North Korea,
the race was on.
The North Koreans have taken note of the experience of Yugoslavia,
Iraq, and Libya, and arrived at the conclusion that a small nation
relying on conventional arms alone has no chance of deterring attack by
the United States. North Korea says its nuclear program “is a legitimate
and righteous measure for self-defense to protect the sovereignty and
the right to existence” of the nation. [18]
That is a conclusion the U.S. is keen to discourage. For the United
States, it is a fundamental principle of its foreign policy that it
should be able to attack any nation of its choosing, and that no country
ought to have the means of defending itself. And therein lies the
source of U.S. concern. The reason why stopping North Korea’s nuclear
and long-range missile program is a priority for the Trump
administration is not because it truly believes North Korea will launch
an ICBM at the United States. Rather, it’s that if North Korea succeeds
in establishing an effective nuclear deterrent, then this could have
serious geopolitical implications for U.S. policy, as other targeted
nations may follow North Korea’s example to ensure their survival.
For this reason, the United States has branded North Korea a pariah
state and sponsored harsh UN sanctions. North Korea faces a dichotomy
between policy objectives. If it does not denuclearize, then it risks
succumbing to the economic strangulation imposed by the United States.
But if it abandons its nuclear program, it becomes far more vulnerable
to military strikes by a hostile U.S. The lesson of Libya’s fate after
it abandoned its nuclear weapons program is not forgotten. Moreover, it
is exceedingly unlikely that the U.S. would lift sanctions on North
Korea even after full denuclearization.
The United States declares that it will not engage in talks with
North Korea unless it denuclearizes as a precondition while receiving
nothing in return. [19]
That position shuts down any possibility of diplomacy, and it is hard
to visualize any way out of the current impasse as long as Washington
clings to that attitude.
The launch of the Hwasong-14 has set U.S. officials and media into a
frenzied reaction, and there are mounting calls for harsh, reckless, and
even dangerous measures. The more belligerent Washington becomes, the
more convinced North Korea is that it needs a nuclear deterrent. For its
part, North Korea has recently reiterated its position that unless the
United States drops its hostility, it will not give up its nuclear
program. [20]
South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s deferential attitude when
meeting Trump was a deep disappointment. Nothing good can come from
supporting Trump’s aim of ramping up pressure and threats against North
Korea and China. It is to be hoped that Moon can shift course and
demonstrate more independence. The time has come for South Korea to take
the lead in finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear dispute.Gregory Elich is on the Board of Directors of
the Jasenovac Research Institute and the Advisory Board of the Korea
Policy Institute. He is a member of the Solidarity Committee for
Democracy and Peace in Korea, a columnist for Voice of the People, and one of the co-authors of Killing Democracy: CIA and Pentagon Operations in the Post-Soviet Period,
published in the Russian language. He is also a member of the Task
Force to Stop THAAD in Korea and Militarism in Asia and the Pacific.His website is https://gregoryelich.orgNotes.[1] John Schilling, “The Pukguksong-2: A Higher Degree of Mobility, Survivability and Responsiveness,” 38 North, February 13, 2017.[2] David Wright, “North Korea’s February 12 Missile Launch,” Union of Concerned Scientists, February 12, 2017.
John Schilling, “The Pukguksong-2: A Higher Degree of Mobility, Survivability and Responsiveness,” 38 North, February 13, 2017.[3]
Li Bin, “The Logic Behind North Korea’s Recent Pukguksong Missile
Test,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 15, 2017.[4] John Schilling, “The Pukguksong-2 Approaches Initial Operating Capability,” 38 North, May 24, 2017.[5] Tamir Eshel, “Pyongyang Tested its Longest Arm Yet – Hwasong 12 Ballistic Missile,” Defense Update, May 15, 2017.[6] Lee Chul-jae, “North Korea Acquires Re-entry Technology,” JoongAng Ilbo, May 17, 2017.[7] Tamir Eshel, “How Capable are North Korean Scud-Based ‘Carrier-Killers’?”, Defense Update, May 30, 2017.
Lee Chi-dong, “N. Korea Seeks ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missile Amid Technical Hurdle,” Yonhap, May 30, 2017.[8] “Kim Jong Un Guides Test Fire of New Ground-to-Sea Cruise Rocket,” KCNA, June 9m, 2017.[9] Ankit Panda, “North Korea Launches Multiple Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles into Sea of Japan,” The Diplomat, June 8, 2017.[10]
Ankit Panda, “North Korea Introduces a New Coastal Defense Cruise
Missile Launcher: First Takeaways,” The Diplomat, June 9, 2017.[11] David Wright, “North Korea’s Missile in New Test Would Have 4,500 km Range,” Union of Concerned Scientists, May 13, 2017.[12] Theodore A. Postol, Markus Schiller, “The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program,” Korea Observer, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 2016.[13] Eric Talmadge, “Analysis: Despite Test, N. Korean ICBM Likely Years Away,” Associated Press, July 6, 2017.[14] “Press Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” KCNA, June 16, 2017.[15] “B-1B Bombers Fly Training Missions Near Korean Peninsula,” DOD Buzz, May 1, 2017.
Ju-min Park and Jack Kim, “South Korea Says Conducted Joint Drills with U.S. B-1B Strategic Bomber,” Reuters, May 29, 2017.
Lee Chi-dong, “Two B-1B Bombers to Train over Korea,” Yonhap, June 20, 2017.[16] “B-1B Lancer,” U.S. Air Force, December 16, 2015.[17] Joe Pappalardo, “Learn to Love the B-1 Lancer,” Popular Mechanics, Apr 9, 2012.
“B-1B Lancer Long-Range Strategic Bomber, United States of America,” Air Force Technology, undated.[18] “Press Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” KCNA, June 16, 2017.[19] Heather Nauert, Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, June 15, 2017.[20] “ICBM Test-Launch is Demonstration of Juche Korea’s Invincible Might: KCNA Commentary,” KCNA, July 5, 2017.