Hillary Clinton’s Impressive Legacy in Foggy Bottom

Hillary Clinton’s record as U.S. secretary of state is under fire. Like all secretaries, she faces controversies over specific incidents and decisions, from what she did or didn’t do in Benghazi to where she stood on controversial questions like whether to arm the Syrian rebels, how best to combat Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants and what kind of deals—if any—to make with the Taliban.

She addresses many of these questions in her new book, Hard Choices, though her partisan adversaries are unlikely to pay much heed. But the larger critique is potentially more damaging. The Washington Post’s David Ignatius summed up what is quickly becoming the conventional wisdom. Clinton, Ignatius said, “can say, ‘I was a solid secretary,’ but compared to what Kerry’s attempted she just wasn’t really at that level.”

Story Continued Below

Clinton has not helped herself as she struggled to assess her own record. Asked at a recent conference in New York to name her proudest moment as secretary of state, she replied, “I really see my role as secretary, and, in fact, leadership in general in a democracy, as a relay race. I mean, you run the best race you can run, you hand off the baton.”

The media and political debate on Clinton’s time as secretary has been particularly shallow because it lacks historical context and an appreciation for what success in diplomacy really means. So what does make a great secretary of state? And how does Clinton stack up?

Let’s start by asking the question is a different way. When was the last time any U.S. secretary of state notched any truly historic accomplishments? Certainly not recently. One would have to go back to James Baker, who served under George H. W. Bush, to find them. Baker built an impressive international coalition to liberate Kuwait and, with President Bush and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, managed the reunification of Germany as the Cold War came to an end. Yes, he and his boss made mistakes and left nettlesome problems, like Yugoslavia, to their successors. But Baker’s successes were enduring.

George Shultz was likely the best secretary of state in contemporary times. He may have been the only member of President Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy team to correctly read his boss. Reagan wanted a tough-minded foreign policy focused on ending the Cold War once and for all. That meant a very hard line against the Soviets in the first half of his presidency, followed by a more conciliatory approach once the Soviets realized that they could not compete with the United States. Shultz helped Reagan refine his thinking and both men correctly judged when to soften the competition. By the end of the Reagan-Shultz years the Cold War was basically over, the threat of nuclear war largely dissipated and Europe on its way to becoming whole and free.

Henry Kissinger may be the most famous secretary of state. Many do not agree with some of his policies—for good reason—but he does measure up well by the criteria that should define success. As national security adviser he was initially against President Richard Nixon’s opening to China, but once he understood that his boss was serious, he got on board and devoted his impressive intellectual prowess and energy to help make the opening happen. He and Nixon became true partners, exchanging ideas and visions about how to achieve the opening, and when Nixon resigned Kissinger saw the policy through as Gerald Ford’s secretary of state. Kissinger rightfully remains a highly controversial figure in the annals of U.S. diplomacy, but there is no doubting his influence and impact.

Dean Acheson was arguably America’s greatest-ever secretary of state. Even more than George Kennan, the author of the famous “Long Telegram,” he was the architect of the strategy of containment that served the United States so well throughout the Cold War. He was tough-minded and hawkish, in lockstep with his boss Harry Truman and highly effective. The organizing principle of Acheson’s foreign policy was to build “situations of strength” in Europe and Asia. He rejected bilateral negotiations with the Soviets before strengthening America’s global position as they would simply have served to appease Stalin further. As part of the positions of strength strategy, he created the U.S. alliance system and Western institutions, which have served as the linchpin of U.S. strategy ever since. In the case of NATO, this was negotiated over Kennan’s objections.

Before Acheson there was George Marshall, the general who led the Allies to victory in World War II, sowed the seeds of the containment strategy and authored the Marshall Plan to rebuild a shattered Europe. Marshall became secretary after James Byrnes, who had a difficult relationship with President Truman, and at a time when the American people wanted to reduce their engagement in European affairs—economic aid to Europe was highly unpopular. Truman trusted Marshall, who quickly recognized that economic collapse in Europe posed a strategic threat to the United States. He reversed the tide of retrenchment and carefully constructed a plan that not only rebuilt Europe but also tied the United States to European affairs for the decades that followed.

These five stand above all others. Why no one else has since come close is worthy of a dissertation.

***

Of the 16 remaining postwar secretaries of state, where does Clinton rank? To answer the question, it is necessary to define success.

It’s certainly not simply shooting for the moon. Trying, even if you might fail, may be good advice in life but it is not necessarily a sound basis for a foreign policy. A deal that goes bad is often worse than never having tried for it in the first place. Just look at John Kerry, who has received plaudits for his determination to restart the Middle East peace talks. They are now “paused,” and their collapse could lead to the resumption of conflict, just as the failure of Camp David did in 2000.

Diplomatic success depends upon recognizing when a problem is ripe for a solution and when it is not. Ripeness is not just a matter of political will. Take the Cold War as an example. A negotiated compromise with the Soviet Union was a terrible idea in the late 1940s, as Acheson and Truman recognized; it was a risky but worthwhile proposition in the late 1960s, and it was an absolute necessity in the mid-1980s, when the Soviet economy was teetering on the edge of collapse and the Kremlin was run by a reformer.

Above all, success in diplomacy is not just about solving problems or negotiating peace treaties. It is about strengthening America’s position and influence in the world, which will in turn contribute to the solving of intractable problems when they are ripe for it.

Since 1945, successful secretaries have been tough-minded and understood the unique leadership role the United States must play internationally. They combined vision with practical judgment and effective execution. They knew what their bosses wanted and they helped shape their thinking, whether that is Shultz with Reagan or Madeleine Albright persuading President Bill Clinton to intervene in Kosovo.

The great top diplomats also engage in what Acheson termed gardening. It would be a poor gardener, he wrote, who tore up his plants every morning to see how much they grew overnight. In other words, the successful diplomat will plant the seeds of future success. To do this they need to properly understand how the world works and where it is headed.