In diesem Artikel stellt Paul De Grauwe abschliessend fest: “The ECB has been unduly influenced by the theory that inflation should be the only concern of a central bank. It is becoming increasingly clear that financial stability should also be on the radar screen of a central bank. In fact, most central banks have been created to solve an endemic problem of instability of financial systems. With their unlimited firing power, central banks are the only institutions capable of stabilising the financial system in times of crisis.

In order for the ECB to be successful in stabilising the sovereign bond markets of the Eurozone, it will have to make it clear that it is fully committed to exert its function of lender of last resort. By creating confidence, such a commitment will ensure that the ECB does not have to intervene in the government bond markets most of the time, very much like the commitment to be a lender of last resort in the banking system ensures that the central bank only rarely has to provide lender of last resort support.

While the ECB’s lender of last resort support in the sovereign bond markets is a necessary feature of the governance of the Eurozone it is not sufficient. In order to prevent future crises in the Eurozone, significant steps towards further political unification will be necessary. Some steps in that direction were taken recently when the European Council decided to strengthen the control on national budgetary processes and on national macroeconomic policies. These decisions, however, are insufficient and more fundamental changes in the governance of the Eurozone are called for. These should be such that the central bank can trust that its lender of last resort responsibilities in the government bond markets will not lead to a never-ending dynamic of debt creation”.

Krugman: First of all, give the green light to the ECB and say: Price stability is the mandate, but it’s not defined. So the reality is we’re going to need to see 3-plus percent inflation over the next five years. No more tightening, no more raising interest rates at the first hint of inflation, even if it’s obviously a commodity blip. If anything, cut interest rates. Open-ended lending to governments and banks.

SPIEGEL: And Berlin …

Krugman: … should not be doing austerity in Germany. I’m tempted to add that I wish for all of that and a pony as long as we’re wishing for things we don’t expect to get.

SPIEGEL: And maybe that’s a good thing. Because 4 or 5 percent inflation may be fine for a short while, but how do you make sure that it doesn’t rise to 7 and 8 percent or more once the expectation is there?

Krugman: It’s not actually hard. Just raise interest rates once it’s creeping up to the level you don’t like. I mean, people have the notion that inflation just explodes out of nowhere. It just isn’t true. It just hasn’t happened. If you actually look at the histories of the inflations that we’ve had, hyperinflations come from a very different story. They come from governments that can’t raise revenue and just rely on the printing press.

SPIEGEL: But if inflation really isn’t that big of a problem, why is everybody so afraid of it?

Krugman: For one, it’s that central-banker culture. Central bankers almost define themselves that way. Their job is to take away the punchbowl just as the party really gets going. And, in the current circumstance, they seem to be eager to take away the punchbowl even though there isn’t any party to begin with. Plus, in Germany, you have this weirdly lopsided historical memory where everyone remembers 1923, everybody remembers Weimar. And nobody remembers Chancellor Brüning (Germany’s chancellor from 1930 to 1932, who pushed austerity measures)”.