In the post-Cold War era, reform efforts must restructure and empower the IC to
address the new and changing needs of the United States. The key issue in reform is
prioritizing the correct set of IC missions given the needs of the country and the limited
resources at hand. The Clinton administration has issued a set of general guidelines for the
community, but much remains to be clarified. The growing need for support to military
operations (SMO) and the increasing pressure on the IC to expand into new areas such as the
environment and health are stretching resources beyond their limit and endangering the IC's
ability to adequately perform its duties.

2.1 The Existing Framework

Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-35), a still-secret document, defines the
existing missions framework. It declares support to military operations (SMO) as the most
important mission of the intelligence community,(1)

but also specifies nuclear proliferation,
narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and global crime as other important concerns. In accordance
with the existing framework, a sizable portion (83%) of the current IC budget goes to the
Department of Defense (DoD), appropriated for SMO.(2)

Unfortunately, the breadth of missions given to the IC has stretched its resources to
the breaking point and beyond, and budget and personnel reductions have made this problem
even more acute. The existing framework does not properly address these concerns and
must therefore be modified to fit the current international situation.

2.2 Diplomacy and Defense: Balancing Support to Policy-makers (SPO)

and Support to the Military (SMO)

The Snyder Commission holds the following principle as the basis for all its
intelligence reform work:

While the existing framework adequately protects the needs of the battlefield
commander, it neglects to address the equally important needs of the diplomat and the
high-level official who will be the first line of defense for America's national interests.
The needs of such policy-makers are met by what is termed national intelligence, whose
scope is broader than the tactical military intelligence required in SMO. The military is
essentially deployed only as a means of achieving an end that cannot be achieved by normal
diplomatic means (or at least this is the reasoning of those who order the military into
action). In this light, SMO and support to senior policy officials who make US foreign
policy (SPO) are inextricably linked, and both must be addressed with equal vigor to have a
successful and efficient IC.(3)

The National Security Act of 1947 created the IC to provide
the President and other national consumers with the information that they need to make
informed decisions about world events and to warn them of impending crises. These basic
roles must not be forgotten, and therefore SPO must stand on equal ground with SMO.
Subordinating one to the other would dangerously hamper the ability of our country to
protect its interests.

2.3 America's National Interests

Although today's international environment is still rapidly changing, several basic
trends in US foreign policy reveal a clear definition of American objectives in the coming
years. The most important of America's long-term national interests is:

In order to secure the balance of SPO and SMO required in Section 2.2 and to better
protect the national interests outlined in Section 2.3, the IC needs a new, post-Cold War
(PCW) missions framework. This PCW framework is divided into three tiers and has two
main pillars. The two main pillars are:

Pillar I: Support to Policy Officials (SPO), which includes support to all high-level policy-makers up to and including the President.

Pillar II: Support to Military Operations (SMO), which includes tactical support
to the battlefield commander.

These two pillars are fixed because of their inherent importance to America's
national interests. The IC performs its most critical missions within these two broad pillars,
so changing them or the relative balance between the two would endanger our vital interests.

The three tiers help prioritize specific missions of the IC. Although the specific
missions presented below are not an exhaustive list of IC missions, they are given as
examples of the primary threats found in each tier.

Tier A (High Priority): Nonproliferation, Counterterrorism, and Global Crime
and Counternarcotics. Tier A missions are critical and imminent dangers to
national security. Notably, they are all transnational in nature.

Tier C (Low Priority): Environmental Intelligence, and Health and
Humanitarian Operations Intelligence. Tier C missions do not pose immediate
dangers to the United States, and under normal circumstances can be adequately
supported through open-source collection.

Each of the three tiers should receive resource allocations according to its place in
the hierarchy. When national security demands additional funding for higher priority or
"higher-tiered" missions, funding for lower priority missions should be reduced or
eliminated as needed. In addition, the missions themselves can be reassigned to higher or
lower tiers as their importance emerges or diminishes with time or world events.

The PCW framework allows the IC to adequately protect current national interests
while simultaneously maintaining the flexibility to redirect resources if the IC needs to be
retasked to counter new threats. It gives policy-makers in particular (and consumers in
general) great discretion as to how the community uses its limited resources to provide
relevant intelligence. Using this PCW framework as a basis, the Snyder Commission has
derived appropriate recommendations which, if implemented, will support a cohesive and
integrated IC.

Recommendations

Even if the PCW framework is adopted, successful implementation will require
certain reforms. These reforms will ensure that the PCW framework's objectives are met
and that intelligence remains timely and relevant to its consumers.

Maintain the necessary balance between the two pillars, SPO and SMO, through a
two part strategy.

Change current budgetary and organizational trends

The current trend of transferring civilian intelligence activities and
responsibilities (funds and personnel) to the Department of Defense (DoD)
dangerously subordinates the intelligence needs of senior policy-makers. The growth
of SMO funding should be checked and the transfer of functions to the Defense
Department halted and even reversed if possible.

Increase cooperation between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF)

Balance between SPO and SMO can only be achieved with seamless
coordination between the DCI, the SECDEF, and their respective institutions.
Although it is impossible to legislate personal cooperation, new efforts to improve
institutional ties between the two offices have been devised by the Snyder
Commission and will be discussed throughout this report.

Task the Priorities Inter-agency Working Group (IWG) created by PDD-35 with
continuously reviewing the implementation of the PCW
framework.

To address changing intelligence needs, the IWG should periodically review
the PCW framework and recommend necessary changes. For example, it could
recommend reductions in Tier C mission resource allocations if those resources
(funds, personnel, or facilities) were needed by higher-priority missions.

The IWG should be placed under the auspices of the National Security
Council, and its staff should be selected from the different IC agencies on a rotational
basis as part of recommendations in Section 4.4. To ensure that resources are
redirected objectively and properly, non-traditional and "lower-tiered" intelligence
missions should always have representation on the IWG.

Establish an Office of the Consumer Advocate (ConAd) within the Community
Management Staff (CMS).

In order for the PCW framework to properly function, the IC must be fully
and continually aware of the needs of its consumers: policy-makers and the military.
Towards this goal, the DCI should establish an Office of the Consumer Advocate
(ConAd) in the Community Management Staff (CMS) to poll consumers, hear their
feedback, and where possible supplement the work of the Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production (ADCI/A&P), whose position is
created by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997 (IAA97). (Chapter 5
elaborates on the proposed duties of the ADCI/A&P and the other ADCI offices
created by the IAA97.)

The ConAd office should have no more than four staffers, and one of the four
should serve as a liaison to both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees,
compiling a database of consumer complaints, suggestions, and recommendations
brought up during Congressional hearings in both chambers. The oversight
committees have access to a tremendous amount of feedback from various groups of
intelligence customers, and a liaison will enable the ConAd office to tap into that
valuable resource.

Modify the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Process and Format.

As an integral part of the important SPO pillar, National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) provide senior policy-makers with informed and objective
assessments and predictions of world events. But too often, the extensive duration
and the consensus-driven nature of the compilation process undermine the NIEs'
potential utility.

The NIE process and format should be redesigned to reflect greater
timeliness in delivery and competitive analysis. For instance, the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) could institute a six-month time limit on production and
prominently feature alternative scenarios submitted for its review in the finished
product. By making intelligence more relevant and useful to policy-makers, the
new NIE format will help to maintain an emphasis on SPO.

Also, the use of special estimates (SNIEs) which fulfill more urgent
requirements should be encouraged. Additional use of SNIEs not only bolsters SPO
and SMO, but also facilitates the dynamics of the PCW framework by allowing the
IC to react promptly and appropriately.

NOTES

2.
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown
Commission), Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence, Washington DC, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 72.