This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsicvalue of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a (...) view about value-suppression that is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsicvalue within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsicvalue to the value of that world. (shrink)

According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsicvalue must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsicvalue may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsicvalue may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this (...) is right, of course, then the traditional contrast between intrinsicvalue and instrumental value is mistaken. (shrink)

What is the most general common set ofattributes that characterises something asintrinsically valuableand hence as subject to some moral respect, andwithout which something would rightly beconsidered intrinsically worthless or even positivelyunworthy and therefore rightly to bedisrespected in itself? Thispaper develops and supports the thesis that theminimal condition of possibility of an entity'sleast intrinsicvalue is to be identified with itsontological status as an information object.All entities, even when interpreted as only clusters ofinformation, still have a minimal moral worthqua (...) information objects and so may deserve to be respected. Thepaper is organised into four main sections.Section 1 models moral action as an information systemusing the object-oriented programmingmethodology (OOP). Section 2 addresses the question of whatrole the several components constituting themoral system can have in an ethical analysis. If theycan play only an instrumental role, thenComputer Ethics (CE) is probably bound to remain at most apractical, field-dependent, applied orprofessional ethics. However, Computer Ethics can give rise to amacroethical approach, namely InformationEthics (IE), if one can show that ethical concern should beextended to include not only human, animal orbiological entities, but also information objects. Thefollowing two sections show how this minimalistlevel of analysis can be achieved. Section 3 provides anaxiological analysis of information objects. Itcriticises the Kantian approach to the concept ofintrinsic value and shows that it can beimproved by using the methodology introduced in the first section.The solution of the Kantian problem prompts thereformulation of the key question concerningthe moral worth of an entity: what is theintrinsic value of x qua an object constituted by itsinherited attributes? In answering thisquestion, it is argued that entitiescan share different observable propertiesdepending on the level of abstraction adopted,and that it is still possible to speak of moral value even at thehighest level of ontological abstractionrepresented by the informational analysis. Section 4 develops aminimalist axiology based on the concept ofinformation object. It further supports IE's position byaddressing five objections that may undermineits acceptability. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsicvalue. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsicvalue was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge (...) of inconsistency that Moore levels at the qualitative hedonism outlined by J. S. Mill in Utilitarianism. Along the way I suggest that there are a number of ways in which Moore was unfair in rejecting qualitative hedonism as inconsistent. I close by relating the issues that arise in discussion of Moore to contemporary debates on value and reasons. (shrink)

Recent literature on intrinsicvalue contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsicvalue (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic (...) class='Hi'>value about which Mooreans and Kantians have disagreed, but rather two distinct concepts. I state a number of principles about intrinsicvalue that have typically (though not universally) been held by Mooreans, all of which are typically denied by Kantians. I show that there are distinct theoretical roles for a concept of intrinsicvalue to play in a moral framework. When we notice these distinct theoretical roles, we should realize that there is room for two distinct concepts of intrinsicvalue within a single moral framework: one that accords with some or all of the Moorean principles, and one that does not. (shrink)

An important constraint on the nature of intrinsicvalue---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ 's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsicvalue can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, (...) in explaining value. (shrink)

The position of some environmental ethicists that some non-humans have intrinsicvalue as a mind-independent property is seriously flawed. This is because human beings lack any evidence for this position and hence are unjustified in holding it. For any possible world that is alleged to have this kind of intrinsicvalue, it is possible to conceive an observationally identical world that lacks intrinsicvalue. Hence, one is not justified in inferring the intrinsic (...) class='Hi'>value of some non-human from any set of observable properties, since that same set of properties could just as well exist in a world that lacks intrinsicvalue. However, since human beings do not have a faculty of intuition that would allow them to .. (shrink)

I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsicvalue also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsicvalue, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on (...) the supposition that obligation supervenes on goodness? Third, if the truth of judgments of intrinsicvalue and those of moral obligation do presuppose our having access to alternatives, what should be said about whether determinism imperils the truth of such judgments? I defend an affirmative answer to the first question, a more guarded answer to the second, and a yet more restrained answer to the third. (shrink)

The creation of transgenic animals by means of modern techniques of genetic manipulation is evaluated in the light of different interpretations of the concept of intrinsicvalue. The zoocentric interpretation, emphasizing the suffering of individual, sentient animals, is described as an extension of the anthropocentric interpretation. In a biocentric or ecocentric approach the concept of intrinsicvalue first of all denotes independence of humans and a non-instrumental relation to animals. In the zoocentric approach of Bernard Rollin, (...) genetic engineering is seen as a morally neutral tool, as long as the animal does not suffer as a result of it. Robert Colwell who defends an ecocentric ethic, makes a sharp distinction between wild animals and domesticated animals. Genetic manipulation of wild species is a serious moral issue, in contrast to genetic manipulation of domesticated species which is no problem at all for Colwell. Both authors do not take the species-specific nature (or telos) of domesticated animals seriously. When domestication is seen as a process between the two poles of the wild animal and the human construct (which can be patented), the technique of genetic manipulation can only be seen as a further encroachment upon the intrinsicvalue of animals. At the level of molecular biology, the concept of an animal's telos loses its meaning. (shrink)

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsicvalue of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to (...) analyse what exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

In their article “Is There a Prima Facie Duty to Preserve Genetic Integrity in Conservation Biology?” Yasha Rower and Emma Harris argue that there is no underived prima facie obligation to preserve genetic integrity. In particular, it is argued that there is no such obligation because genetic integrity has no intrinsicvalue. In this commentary I raise doubts about this part of the authors’ argument. I argue that there might well be at least prima facie value in (...) genetic integrity, that the Moorean isolation test the authors use might not work in their favour, and that connecting genetic integrity to the idea of identity might work against the authors’ argument. (shrink)

Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm have suggested marks or criteria of intrinsic goodness. I distinguish among eight of these. I focus in this paper on four: (a) unimprovability, (b) unqualifiedness, (c) dependence upon intrinsic natures, and (d) incorruptibility. I try to show that each of these is problematic in some way. I also try to show that they are not equivalent – they point toward distinct conceptions of intrinsic goodness. In the end it appears that (...) none of them is fully satisfactory. Insofar as none of these succeeds, a fundamental problem remains for those who make use of the concept of intrinsicvalue. Precisely what do we have in mind when we say that some sort of value is intrinsic? (shrink)

This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato's Symposium (199d-212a). According to this interpretation, the term "καλóν", as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call "intrinsicvalue"; and "love" (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation , which for Plato consists in the desire to "possess" intrinsically valuable things - that is, according to Plato, to be happy - for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes (...) that "possessing" intrinsically valuable things, at least for mortals like us, consists in actively creating instantiations of the intrinsic values, both in oneself and in the external world, and in knowing and loving these intrinsic values and their instantiations. Finally, it is argued that this interpretation reveals that Plato's "eudaemonism" is a different and more defensible doctrine than many commentators believe. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is only one intrinsicvalue. I start by examining three aspects of values that are often taken to count against this suggestion: that values seem heterogeneous, that values are sometimes incommensurable, and that we sometimes experience so-called “rational regret” after having forsaken a smaller value for a greater one. These aspects, I argue, are in fact compatible with both monism and pluralism about intrinsicvalue. I then examine a (...) fourth aspect: That a very large amount of any one value can always outweigh a very small amount of any other. I argue that this aspect, which I call the nominal notable-commensuration principle, is compatible only with monism. (shrink)

Proponents of the argument from regress maintain that the existence of Instrumental Value is sufficient to establish the existence of IntrinsicValue. It is argued that the chain of instrumentally valuable things has to end somewhere. Namely with intrinsicvalue. In this paper, I shall argue something a little more modest than this. I do not want to argue that the regress argument proves that there is intrinsicvalue but rather that it proves (...) that the idea of intrinsicvalue is a necessary part of our thinking about moral value. (shrink)

Whether or not intrinsicvalue is additively measurable is often thought to depend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. I argue that the truth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additive measurement. However, there are other very plausible evaluative claims that are more difficult to combine with the additivity of intrinsicvalue. A plausible theory of the good should allow that there are certain kinds of (...) states of affairs whose intrinsicvalue cannot be outweighed by any number of states of certain other, less valuable, kinds. Such``non-trade-off'' cannot reasonably be explained in terms of organic unities, and it can be reconciled with the additivity thesis only if we are prepared to give up some traditional claims about the nature of intrinsicvalue. (shrink)

This paper examines the debate as to whether something can have final value in virtue of its relational (i.e., non-intrinsic) properties, or, more briefly put, whether final value must be intrinsic. The paper adopts the perspective of the fitting-attitude analysis (FA analysis) of value, and argues that from this perspective, there is no ground for the requirement that things may have final value only in virtue of their intrinsic properties, but that there might (...) be some grounds for the alternate requirement that final value be grounded only in the essential properties of their bearers. First, the paper introduces the key elements of the FA analysis, and sets aside an obvious but unimportant way in which this analysis makes all final values relational. Second, it discusses some classical counterexamples to the view that final value must be intrinsic. Third, it discusses the relation between final, contributive, and signatory value. Fourth, it examines Zimmerman’s defense of the requirement that final value must be intrinsic on the grounds that final value cannot be derivative. And finally, it explores the alternative requirement that something may have final value in virtue of its essential properties. (shrink)

In recent metaethical debate over ways to justify the notion of intrinsic natural value, some neopragmatists have challenged realist conceptions of scientific and moral truth. Holmes Rolston defends a critical-realist epistemology as the basis for a metaphysics of "projective nature" and a cosmological narrative--both of which set up a historical ontology of objective natural value. Pure ecological science informs the wilderness experience of Rolston's ideal epistemic subject, the "sensitive naturalist." The author argues that Rolston's account of the (...) relation between knowing and valuing can be clarified and strengthened by appropriating Bernard Lonergan's transcendental method. Conversely, Lonergan's view of moral self-transcendence can be developed further in light of Rolston's virtue epistemology, which is embodied in the figure of the sensitive naturalist. (shrink)

The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsicvalue of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. (...) The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, care, cherishing, etc. (shrink)

Abstract: Every sentient organism needs constantly to re-assess its environment in order to adjust to any changes in it and to ascertain which aspects are, or become, salient for its current purposes. Such adaptation is of basic evolutionary importance, but for human beings it can be difficult to achieve in the face of radical novelty or when different frames of reference are in conflict. Art by virtue of its integrated structure presents examples of how a partial unification of experience may (...) be envisaged. Art thus helps to meet our constant need for orientation and re-orientation, though its operation in this respect is invariably outside consciousness. So art can be said to have intrinsicvalue only within a strictly subjective, phenomenological perspective; more broadly considered from a third-person viewpoint, the value of art is instrumental. Questions then arise concerning our motivation for seeking or producing art, about the relation of art to other cultural activities, and about the role of pleasure in connection with aesthetic experience; these are briefly discussed. (shrink)

At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsicvalue that (...) other types of value may be understood, and hence that we can begin to come to terms with questions of virtue and vice, right and wrong, and so on. This book investigates the nature of intrinsicvalue: just what it is for something to be valuable for its own sake, just what sort of thing can have such value, just how such a value is to be computed. In the final chapter, the fruits of this investigation are applied to a discussion of pleasure, pain, and displeasure and also of moral virtue and vice, in order to determine just what value lies within these phenomena. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a theological account of intrinsicvalue drawn from some passages in Robert Merrihew Adams’ book Finite and Infinite Goods. First I explain why Adams’ work on this topic is interesting, situate his theory within the broader literature on intrinsicvalue, and draw attention to some of its revisionist features. Next I state the theory, raise some problems for it, and refine it in light of those problems. Then I illustrate how the (...) refined theory works by showing that it has the resources to deal with some seemingly formidable objections. (shrink)

Franz Brentano developed an original theory of intrinsicvalue which he attempted to base on his philosophical psychology. Roderick Chisholm presents here a critical exposition of this theory and its place in Brentano's general philosophical system. He gives a detailed account of Brentano's ontology, showing how Brentano tried to secure objectivity for ethics not through a theory of practical reason, but through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. Professor Chisholm goes on to develop certain (...) suggestions about intrinsicvalue made by Brentano and his students, and discusses their relevance to theodicy and the problem of evil. Brentano, as the teacher of Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski, and others, stands at the origin of the phenomenological tradition and of the Polish school of philosophy that developed after World War I. He has also had considerable influence on Anglo-American philosophy. This book will interest those concerned with the origins of phenomenological value theory and more generally with the connections between ethics and philosophical psychology. (shrink)

Recent critics (Andrew Light, Bryan Norton, Anthony Weston, and Bruce Morito, among others) have argued that we should give up talk of intrinsicvalue in general and that of nature in particular. While earlier theorists might have overestimated the importance of intrinsicvalue, these recent critics underestimate its importance. Claims about a thing’s intrinsicvalue are claims about the distinctive way in which we have reason to care about that thing. If we understand (...) class='Hi'>intrinsicvalue in this manner, we can capture the core claims that environmentalists want to make about nature while avoiding the worries raised by contemporary critics. Since the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value plays a critical role in our understanding of the different ways that we do and should care about things, moral psychology, ethical theory in general, and environmental ethics in particular shouldn’t give up on the concept of intrinsicvalue. (shrink)

Establishing that nature has intrinsicvalue has been the primary goal of environmental philosophers. This goal has generated tremendous confusion. Part of the confusion stems from a conflation of two quite distinct concerns. The first concern is with establishing the moral considerability of the natural world which is captured by what I call "intrinsicvalue p ." The second concern attempts to address a perceived problem with the way nature has traditionally been valued, or as many (...) environmentalists would suggest, undervalued, what I call "intrinsicvalue v ." In this paper I argue against further development of both types of theories of the intrinsicvalue of nature. There are, I believe, intermediate valuations that have been almost entirely overlooked in discussions of value. Much of the confusion currently plaguing environmental ethics can be avoided by abandoning intrinsicvalue and refocusing environmental ethics. (shrink)

Recent Work on IntrinsicValue brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsicvalue to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsicvalue has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such (...) a way that all of the fundamental questions concerning the nature of intrinsicvalue are treated in depth and from a variety of viewpoints. These questions include how to understand the concept of intrinsicvalue, what sorts of things can have intrinsicvalue, and how to compute intrinsicvalue. The editors have added an introduction that ties these questions together and places the contributions in context, and they have also provided an extensive bibliography. The result is a comprehensive, balanced, and detailed picture of current thinking about intrinsicvalue, one that provides an indispensable backdrop against which future writings on the topic may be assessed. (shrink)

Even if you were the last person on Earth, you should not cut down all the trees—or so goes the Last Man thought experiment, which has been taken to show that nature has intrinsicvalue. But ‘Last Man’ is caught on a dilemma. If Last Man is too far inside the anthropocentric circle, so to speak, his actions cannot be indicative of intrinsicvalue. If Last Man is cast too far outside the anthropocentric circle, though, then (...)value terms lose their cogency. The experiment must satisfy conditions in a seemingly impossible ‘goldilocks’ zone. To this end I propose a new version, the Ultramodal Last Man, which appeals to Routley's work in metaphysics and non-classical logic. With this ‘Last Last Man’, I argue that the Local/Global dilemma is resolved: impossible equations balance in ultramodal space. For defenders and critics alike, this helps to clarify the demands of intrinsicvalue, and renews a role for non-standard logics in value theory. (shrink)

According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsicvalue must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsicvalue may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object's intrinsicvalue may sometimes depend on its instrumental value. If this is right, (...) of course, then the traditional contrast between intrinsicvalue and instrumental value is mistaken. (shrink)

Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsicvalue. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.

In the Netherlands, the policy of supporting the efforts of ethnic-cultural minorities to express and preserve their cultural distinctiveness, is nowadays considered as problematic because it might interfere with their integration into the wider society. The primary aim is now to reduce these groups' unemployment rate and to stimulate their participation in the wider society. In this article I consider how the notion of the intrinsicvalue of cultures, if sensible, might affect the policy regarding ethnic-cultural minorities. I (...) develop a theory of intrinsicvalue of culture, as an analogy of the theory of intrinsicvalue of non-human natural entities. My conclusion is that the dominant cultural group in the Netherlands should preserve clearly deviant minority cultures which have considerable intrinsicvalue. (shrink)

This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsicvalue found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsicvalue as traditionally conceived, but that this is (...) of little consequence with regard to the role of sport as a moral laboratory. (shrink)

In this final chapter, Moore rebuts egoism and upholds the view that it is always our duty to perform that action, of the various ones open to us, the total consequences of which will have the greatest intrinsicvalue. He criticizes the hedonistic doctrine that one whole is intrinsically better than another when, and only when, it contains more pleasure. He rejects not only the idea that intrinsicvalue is proportional to pleasure, but also that it (...) is proportional to any other single factor. He concludes by distinguishing different senses in which a thing can be good or bad. (shrink)

In this paper I examine what I will call "the standard account" of intrinsicvalue as it appears in recent textbooks written by John Hospers, William Frankena, and Richard B. Brandt. I argue: (a) it is not clear whether a theory of intrinsicvalue can be developed along the lines of the standard account; (b) if one is to develop such a theory, one will need to introduce a notion of "basic intrinsicvalue" in (...) addition to the notion of "intrinsicvalue"; and (c) several different theories of intrinsicvalue may account for the same judgments concerning desirability, and it will be arbitrary to choose one of these theories over another. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental pragmatists balk at the mere mention of intrinsicvalue. Indeed, the leading expositor of the pragmatic position in environmental philosophy, Bryan Norton, has delivered withering criticisms of the concept as it has been employed by nonanthropocentrists in the field. Nevertheless, I believe that Norton has left an opening for a recognition of intrinsicvalue in his arguments, albeit a version that bears little resemblance to most of its traditional incarnations. Drawing from (...) John Dewey’s contextual approach toward moral inquiry, I offer a reconstructed notion of intrinsicvalue that avoids the metaphysical pitfalls identified by Norton. I argue that this contextual understanding of noninstrumental claims has the advantage of turning our attention toward, and not away from, the critical realm of practice and policy, and that it is especially compatible with the norms of democratic deliberation. By way of example and in defense of my position, I conclude with a rejoinder to Holmes Rolston’s claims about the role of foundational intrinsicvalue commitments in settling the human-nature dilemma at Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal. (shrink)

In this essay I propose an environmental ethic in the pragmatic vein. I begin by suggesting that the contemporary debate in environmental ethics is forced into a familiar but highly restrictive set of distinctions and problems by the traditional notion of intrinsicvalue, particularly by its demands that intrinsic values be self-sufficient, abstract, and justified in special ways. I criticize this notion and develop an alternativewhich stresses the interdependent structure of values, a structure which at once roots (...) them deeply in our selves and at the same time opens them to critical challenge and change. Finally, I apply this alternative view back to environmental ethics. It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms and concern for the natural environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only become stronger, once the demand to establish intrinsic values is removed. (shrink)

Many philosophers apparently still accept the proposition that there is such a thing as intrinsicvalue, i.e., that some part of the value of some things (objects, events, or states of affairs) is intrinsicvalue. John Dewey's attack seems not to have dislodged this proposition, for today it is seldom questioned. I propose to press the attack again, in terms that owe a great deal to Dewey, as I understand him.

Leon Culbertson's recent contribution, 'Does Sport Have IntrinsicValue?' objects to the account of the value of sport as intrinsicvalue I had developed in my Sport, Rules and Values ; in particular, as this occurs in my argument that the value of some sports resided in the possibility of their functioning as a moral laboratory. He identifies two accounts of intrinsicvalue; and shows that neither would fit my purposes seamlessly. He (...) urges that my account of the place of normative reasons cannot generate intrinsicvalue: rather, the person whose reasons they are somehow imports that value. Yet he has misunderstood my particularist conception of values; and the place occupied by my contextualism - these, rather than a residual commitment to essentialism, are what generates an apparent inconsistency he identifies. But they also explain it away. As a result, much of his concern to find some exact account of the term 'intrinsic' is misplaced: we need to look contextually. Further, the project of my discussion was limited to showing, first, how the moral laboratory idea might explain the value of some sport (on the assumption that sport had intrinsicvalue); and, second, how failures of realisation of that intrinsicvalue might be traced to the distinction between motivating reasons and normative ones. (shrink)

In the literature of environmental philosophy, the single most potent argument that has been made against the claim that nature may possess intrinsicvalue in any objective sense is the Humean thesis of projectivism and its associated view that human consciousness is the source of all values. Theorists, in one way or another, have to face up to this challenge. For instance, J. Baird Callicott upholds this Humean foundation to modern Western philosophy. However, by distinguishing between the source (...) and locus of value, he makes it possible to argue that nature is the locus of intrinsicvalue without at the same time compromising the thesis that human consciousness is the source of all values. On the other hand, Holmses Rolston, III, another eminent environmental philosopher, criticizes the distinction as well as challenges the Humean foundation itself. In this article, I attempt to resolve the disagreement between Callicott and Rolston over this particular distinction, thereby doing justice to the insights which each theorist, undoubtedly, has brought to bear on the issue of intrinsicvalue, at least as far as individual organisms is concerned. However, I am also critical of both for having failed to draw out the full implications behind certain crucial distinctions that should be made about the notion of intrinsicvalue itself. (shrink)

Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsicvalue for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsicvalue in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsicvalue flies in the (...) face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of the metaphysical foundations of modem science—a problem Rolston never directly confronts. The modern scientific world view is obsolete. A post-modem scientific world view provides for a range of potential values in nature actualizable upon interaction with consciousness. The bestthat a modem scientific world view can provide are subject-generated—though not necessarily subject-centered—values in nature. (shrink)

The central and most recalcitrant problem for environmental ethics is the problem of constructing an adequate theory of intrinsicvalue for nonhuman natural entities and for nature as a whole. In part one, I retrospectively survey the problem, review certain classical approaches to it, and recommend one as an adequate, albeit only partial, solution. In part two, I show that the classical theory of inherent value for nonhuman entities and nature as a whole outlined in part one (...) is inconsistent with a contemporary scientific world view because it assumes the validity of the classical Cartesian partition between subject and object which has been overturned by quantum theory. Based upon the minimalistic Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory, I then develop a theory of inherent value which does not repose upon the obsolete subject/object and ancillary fact/value dichotomies. In part three, I suggest that a more speculative metaphysical interpretation of quantum theory--one involving the notion ofreal internal relations anda holistic picture of nature-permits a principle of “axiological complementary,” a theory of “intrinsic”-as opposed to “inherent”-value in nature as a simple extension of ego. (shrink)

Many environmental, humane and character educators try to foster a belief in the intrinsicvalue of nature and a respect for non-human life among students. Marangudakis argues that Christianity advocates anthropocentrism and opposes belief in the intrinsicvalue of nature. If Marangudakis is correct, then a goal of many environmental and humane educators may conflict with some of their students' religious beliefs and training. Fears of conflicting students' religious beliefs may deter environmental and humane educators from (...) teaching students to respect non-human life and nature. In this study, the relationships between anthropocentrism, belief in the intrinsicvalue of nature and Christian religiosity were explored. The results fail to support Marangudakis' argument; Christian students are no more or less likely to believe in the intrinsicvalue of nature or advocate anthropocentrism than non-religious students. Humane and environmental educators should continue to instruct their students to respect life and nature. (shrink)

This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating theories of the good. It proposes evaluating these theories on the basis of their compatibility with the most plausible ways of calculating overall intrinsicvalue of a world. The paper evaluates the plausibility of egalitarianism using this approach, arguing that egalitarianism runs afoul of the more plausible ways of calculating the overall intrinsicvalue of a world. Egalitarianism conflicts with the general motivation for totalism and critical-level totalism, which (...) is that independent contributions of each individual’s life should be counted separately. It conflicts with the most plausible version of averagism because only the highly implausible simultaneous life-segment version of egalitarianism can make sense of inequality being disvaluable at a time. Egalitarianism combined with a diminishing marginal value theory also fails because it holds that, other things equal, the world is a better place when we reduce inequality by adding many people whose lives go very badly but whose sheer numbers lessen inequality. The discussion moves the debate about egalitarianism forward by circumventing the oft-discussed, but intractable, debate concerning the leveling down objection. It also reveals a promising new approach to critiquing theories of the good. (shrink)

This paper argues that Moore's principle of organic unities is false. Advocates of the principle have failed to take note of the distinction between actual intrinsicvalue and virtual intrinsicvalue. Purported cases of organic unities, where the actual intrinsicvalue of a part of a whole is allegedly defeated by the actual intrinsicvalue of the whole itself, are more plausibly seen as cases where the part in question has no actual (...)intrinsicvalue but instead a plurality of merely virtual intrinsic values. (shrink)

In the literature of environmental philosophy, the single most potent argument that has been made against the claim that nature may possess intrinsicvalue in any objective sense is the Humean thesis of projectivism and its associated view that human consciousness is the source of all values. Theorists, in one way or another, have to face up to this challenge. For instance, J. Baird Callicott upholds this Humean foundation to modern Western philosophy. However, by distinguishing between the source (...) and locus of value, he makes it possible to argue that nature is the locus of intrinsicvalue without at the same time compromising the thesis that human consciousness is the source of all values. On the other hand, Holmses Rolston, III, another eminent environmental philosopher, criticizes the distinction as well as challenges the Humean foundation itself. In this article, I attempt to resolve the disagreement between Callicott and Rolston over this particular distinction, thereby doing justice to the insights which each theorist, undoubtedly, has brought to bear on the issue of intrinsicvalue, at least as far as individual organisms is concerned. However, I am also critical of both for having failed to draw out the full implications behind certain crucial distinctions that should be made about the notion of intrinsicvalue itself. (shrink)

This article poses the hypothesis that the problem of the intrinsicvalue of nature that stems from the work of G. E. Moore and is widely discussed in environmental philosophy, bas a parallel in a contemporary discussion in semiotics on the existence of semiosis in nature. From a semiotic point of view. value can be defined as an intentional dimension of sign. This is concordant with a biological interpretation of value that relates to biological needs. Thus. (...) a semiotic approach in biology may provide a useful tool for further analysis of the intrinsicvalue problem in the biological realm. From an ecosemiotic point of view, the problem is also related to the concepts of bioart and ecoart. Ecoart viz environmental art is that which encompasses the human ambience, e.g., landscape or its components. Bioart call be defined as the art whose material ("clay") is a living body, living matter or communication of organisms (which may include, e.g., genetic engineering). It is concluded that the acceptance of biosemiotic view has implications for a large area of ecological philosophy. (shrink)

Environmental philosophers often conflate the concepts of intrinsicvalue and moral standing. As a result, individualists needlessly deny intrinsicvalue to species, while holists falsely attribute moral standing to species. Conceived either as classes or as historical individuals, at least some species possess intrinsicvalue. Nevertheless, even if a species has interests or a good of its own, it cannot have moral standing because species lack sentience. Although there is a basis for duties toward (...) some species (in terms of their intrinsicvalue), it is not the one that the holists claim. (shrink)

This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsicvalue: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsicvalue can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs (...) about intrinsicvalue, including coherence theories and the idea that some value beliefs are warranted on the basis of emotional experience. Professor Lemos defends the view that some value beliefs enjoy 'modest' a priori justification. The book is intended primarily for professional philosophers and their graduate students working in ethics, value theory and epistemology. (shrink)