South Asia Analysis Group - Japanhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/japan
enJapan’s Naval Outreach to France and Britainhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2262
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6347 Dated 08-Feb-2018</strong></span></p>
<p>By Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p>Japan’s increasing strategic profile in 2018 now transcends the rapid buildup of its military muscle to forging strategic relationships especially in the maritime domain with France and Britain to offset China’s worrisome military adventurism in the South China Sea and East China Sea which in both cases endangers Japanese security.</p>
<p>Japan and France in end January 2018 signed agreements for joint Air Force and Navy exercises besides increasing cooperation in developing defence technologies.</p>
<p>More significantly, France agreed to join freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea and asserted that France stoutly maintains and would uphold the principles of free and unimpeded maritime navigation through international waters like the South China Sea and East China Sea.</p>
<p>France has made these assertions based on its belief that France has major stakes in Indo Pacific security having territorial dependencies both in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>Also signed in end January 2018 was a Defence Logistics Agreement between the Armed Forces of France and Japan.</p>
<p>Japan while attempting to cultivate friendly relations with China is at the same time embarking on forging defence cooperation agreements with countries like France and Britain to balance China’s aggressive designs in Indo Pacific.</p>
<p> France and Britain may not have large naval presence in the Far East but the very intent on the part of all the above three named countries to increase their naval cooperation is a big enough political and military signal to China that it is not going to have a free run in the Western Pacific against Japan</p>
<p> China would be very much disconcerted with Japan/s naval outreaches to France and Britain when it is kept in mind that both France and Britain are Permanent Members of the UN Security Council with veto powers.</p>
<p>Japan’s naval outreach to France and Japan must contextually be viewed with Japan’s naval partnerships with the United States and India. All these three nations are engaged in holding joint naval exercises both in the Western Pacific and also in the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>Japan and Britain share a long history of naval cooperation going back a century old. Japan and Britain had signed a Naval Treaty from 1902 to 1923 for enhanced naval cooperation. The Imperial Japanese Navy had modelled itself on the pattern of the Royal British Navy and the latter was responsible in the capacity building of the Imperial Japanese Navy.</p>
<p>So in 2018 Britain and Japan reviving their old historical naval relations should be a welcome step for all those committed to Indo Pacific security. The only difference being that in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century the Japan-Britain naval cooperation has been revived to countervail the new China Threat endangering Japan’s security and also that of the larger Indo Pacific.</p>
<p>Japan, Britain and the United States also established a Naval Trilateral in 2016 enmeshing the naval and maritime convergences of all these three nations.</p>
<p>Japan has thus been proactive in superimposing various templates of naval cooperation with like-minded countries that now are collectively conscious of the China Threat.</p>
<p>The China Threat perception in Asian capitals now transcends the Asian strategic space and extends to West European capitals. It is something which China in its military arrogance of new-found power cannot ignore.</p>
<p>China cannot afford to ignore the coalescing of naval powers from Asia to Europe rattled by China’s defiance of international Laws of the Seas and The Hague Tribunal Award declaring China’s claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea.</p>
<p>The United States with the highest stakes in Indo Pacific security and the security of the Western Pacific must proactively work towards enmeshing and solidifying Asian Navies coalescing against the China Threat with similar initiatives of West European countries like France and Britain joining hands with Japan.</p>
<p>In conclusion, it needs to be stressed that the China Threat in coming decades is going to emerge predominantly as a ‘Naval Threat” both in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. To pre-empt the Chinese Navy assuming monstrous proportions of posing a menace in both these Oceans, Indo Pacific Navies in particular must join Japan’s hands in forging a coalition of Navies to offset that eventuality.</p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-tags field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Tags:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/811" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China Threat</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1847" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan&#039;s Naval Outreach</a></div><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1848" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">France and Britain</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1351" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Indo-Pacific Security</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/china" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/india" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">India</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div></div></div>Thu, 08 Feb 2018 07:35:53 +0000asiaadmin22262 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2262#commentsJapan’s Geopolitical Assertiveness is an Asian Security Imperative in 2018http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2254
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6340 Dated 16-Jan-2018</strong></span></p>
<p>By Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p>Asian security environment plagued with volatility spawned by China’s hegemonistic impulses visible in 2018 places a special call on Japan’s geopolitical assertiveness. Japan is well positioned to do so with its established and credible strategic footings as compared to India which is still positioning itself in the global strategic calculus.</p>
<p>Japan’s established and credible strategic footings in the global strategic calculus arise from it’s a century-old strategic profile of political and military assertiveness beginning from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Japan’s defeat in World War II was only an interlude---a passing phase.</p>
<p>The United States soon after its victory over Japan facilitated only by use of atomic bombings soon realised that United States embedment in the Asia Pacific template then needed American co-option of Japan as a pivotal security partner in Asia.</p>
<p>The advent of the Korean War 1950-53 further reinforced United State conviction that the United States needed and could depend on Japan as an enduring security ally of the United States in the decades to come.</p>
<p>The United States owes immense gratitude for this visionary step of cementing United States embedment in Asia to General Douglass MacArthur through Japan in a pivotal role in post-World War II era.</p>
<p>Japan’s value as a security ally of the United States has never ever wavered after that in the last seven decades. Japan remained steadfast in its commitment despite United States varying the political nuances, if not the security nuances, to serve US political expedient ends of its China Hedging strategies.</p>
<p>In 2018, Japan still stands out as a pivotal security anchor not only of the United States security architecture in the Western Pacific but also as a co-anchor with India of the evolving Indo Pacific Security Coalition that seems to be taking shape potentially as a counterweight to China’s menacing rise endangering Asian security.</p>
<p>In 2018, an Indo Pacific Security Coalition is a trend already visible with all the portents to emerge as a Indo Pacific Treat Organisation recommended by me in an earlier SAAG Paper. A loose coalition already exists when the dots are added to the US-Japan Security Treaty with the Japan-India Global Special Strategic Partnership, the US-India Strategic Partnership, he US-Japan-India Trilateral and the US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral.</p>
<p> India in the years after 2014 with the Modi Government in place in New Delhi after decades of India’s obsessive fixations with Non Alignment as strategically meaningless policy precept has finally broken out of the Non Alignment straitjacket and adopted more assertive strategic policy formulations in keeping with prevailing geopolitical realities.</p>
<p>India’s strategic centre-pieces in the new policy formulation are United States, Japan, and Australia and followed by Vietnam and Israel. However in 2018 also, India’s dynamic moves towards propelling India into countervailing coalitions as counterweights to balance China and the China-Pakistan Axis are stymied by Indian opposition parties for narrow political gains in terms of domestic politics.</p>
<p>The above limitation sends wrong messages to India’s strategic partners in terms of lack of bipartisan support of Indian geopolitical and strategic formulations and India’s commitments towards Indian regional security , despite the Modi Government subtle moves in that direction. But then even the Modi Government has to recognise that in terms of balance of power strategies against military adventurism of revisionist powers like China, India needs to send out clear signals as to where India stands.</p>
<p>India under PM Modi has sent out clear signals of its intent but it needs to add more visible and vocal manifestations of its intent to be a proactive strategic partner of the groupings emerging for defending Indo Pacific security and stability. India needs to shed the shibboleths of “strategic autonomy” another euphemism for Non -Alignment. It has no place in balance of power political and strategic policy formulations that India must necessarily adopt in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.</p>
<p>In view of the above as India transcends its existing strategic coyness in a transitory period, hopefully short, it is Japan as the other leading Asian global power in contention with China that has to exhibit greater strategic assertiveness as an Asian security imperative.</p>
<p>Japan seems to be very much alive to China’s potential to endanger Japanese security both by direct action, coercive political and military brinkmanship and through proxy use of North Korea. Japan’s security postures have been realigned in relation to the China Threat. Japan has embarked on a graduated military buildup without giving the images of an arms race. PM Abe like PM Modi is very much cognizant of the China Threat is seeking to transform the provisions of the Japanese Constitution to position Japan to effectively counter both the China Threat and the North Korea Threat.</p>
<p>Japan is very much in a position to be the pivot for a North East Asia security grouping but is held back by South Korea’s clinging to historical mindsets against Japan, very much like China. Since the United States enjoys mutual security relationships with both Japan and South Korea, the United States needs to make special persistent pressures on South Korea and evolve a Japan-South Korea-United States Security Trilateral.</p>
<p>Japan has already initiated proactive moves towards putting in place a naval profile in the South China Sea under illegal occupation of China, by associating in Joint Naval Patrols with the United States. Australia is also ready to join-in in the same effort. Besides the preceding, Japan and Australia enjoy strong political and strategic bonds.</p>
<p>The South China Sea maritime expanse is one region where all the countries wishing to forestall China’s hegemonistic designs in the Indo Pacific can pool in their naval resources to affect an international naval presence in this vital global commons. Regionally, Japan is in a position both technologically and financially to build-up the military capacities of Vietnam and the Philippines subjected to Chinese illegal occupation of their islands in the South China Sea.</p>
<p>Noteworthy is the recent strategic understanding arrived at by Japan with Britain where British Navy would be exercising in the region. Japan needs to expand such strategic understandings with other major European countries like France and Germany. These moves would not go unnoticed in Beijing. With Chinese economy in a slow-down and thus with a lower attraction to European economies, China is in no position to dictate terms to European majors.</p>
<p>However, where Japan has to fast-rack its military capacities is in the areas of ballistic missiles interceptors, ballistic missiles shields, and cyberwarfare and space warfare capabilities. Japan has the requisite technological production capability indigenously available in Japan to make significant advances, even faster than India.</p>
<p>Short of war and in peacetime too, Japan should it achieve significant advances in the above mentioned fields, can significantly affect and narrow the gap that China has already achieved here. Japan should be well aware that it is in these fields that China is attempting to reduce its differentials with its asymmetries with the United States.</p>
<p>China while it may not admit openly does have serious fears and concerns on the Japanese Navy with battle-tested heritage against the most powerful Navies of the world. Japanese naval traditions coupled with Japan’s state of the art indigenous production of large Navy battleships, submarines and combat helicopter carriers ships. Japan has the most potent Navy in Asia.</p>
<p>Japan must also implement plans to materialise a greater naval profile in the Indian Ocean to checkmate China’s increasing intrusions in this vital Ocean so vital for Japan’s prosperity. Such a Japanese move could greatly supplement the Indian Navy presence in the Indian Ocean, with similar intentions. It is heartening to note that a Japanese task force on security has recommended to the Japanese Government that in the ultimate analysis, Japan’s security against the implicit China Threat would rest on the creation of significant oceanic naval profile</p>
<p>Rounding off the assertive role of Japan as an imperative for Asian security, what needs to be pointed out in this direction is that Japan has also to be more vocally assertive in Asian security affairs. Japan has nothing to be apologetic about in defending its own security against the China Threat and also partaking in regional and global security initiatives towards this end.</p>
<p>Concluding, the following observations would be in order in relation to the main theme of this Paper:</p>
<ul><li>
Asian security is definitely overshadowed and Indo Pacific security specifically threatened by China’s ongoing power tussle with the United States which so far has shouldered these responsibilities.</li>
<li>
Japan and India as the two leading Asian powers need to shoulder responsibilities of Indo Pacific security as indigenous Asian powers and recognised as global leading powers.</li>
<li>
Japan and India can together provide an existential counterweight to China’s unrestrained military and geopolitical moves without an overt arms race.</li>
<li>
Japan is more comprehensively well positioned in 2018 than India in this direction as India breaks out of its archaic strategic policy straitjacket to assume the joint responsibilities with Japan.</li>
</ul><p>In 2018, therefore, Japan’s geopolitical and strategic assertiveness emerges as a strong Asian imperative.</p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div></div></div>Tue, 16 Jan 2018 07:02:32 +0000asiaadmin22254 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2254#commentsJapan’s Imperatives to Break-Free from its Pacifist Constitutionhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2233
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6324 Dated 28-Nov-2017</strong></span></p>
<p>By Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p>Japan on the verge of 2018 is geopolitically a ‘Leading Power’ in Asia along with India, and both as important heavy counterweights to a militarily disruptive China need to fast-track their corresponding military build-ups. Japan needs to unshackle itself from its Pacifist Constitution to do so.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s overwhelming victory in October 2017 snap elections uniquely places him as Japan’s ‘Prime Minister of the Moment’ to lead Japan to break-free from the militarily debilitating Pacifist Constitution shackling Japan to confront threats increasingly emanating from China and North Korea.</p>
<p>Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s decision to call for snap elections was well-timed. Despite doubts expressed in some sections of the global media that an election victory was uncertain, PM Shinzo Abe rode into victory with a two-thirds majority. This itself should be taken as an indicator that the Japanese public despite their traditional dislike for a more assertive Japanese military role reposed faith in PM Abe’s leadership in the uncertain security environment imposed on the region by China and North Korea.</p>
<p>Following PM Abe’s landslide electoral victory, he stands lauded in Western media as not only Japan’s strongest and most successful leader but also the ‘West’s strongest leader’. Reputed for his personal inclination to amend Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution renouncing war and for Japan to maintain strong military forces commensurate with Japan’s enhanced geopolitical status, PM Abe can now be expected to strive for in this direction.</p>
<p>Japan on the verge of 2018 finds itself in the midst of a threatening and coercive security environment with no optimistic indicators on the horizon suggesting that China and North Korea would desist from their military brinkmanship directed at Japan.</p>
<p>Contextually, Japan is in the military crosshairs of China and North Korea chiefly because of Japan’s strong military alliance with the United States facilitating the Forward Military Presence of over 40,000 US Forces on the Japanese Mainland and on Okinawa. This imparts a significant forward military intervention capability intervention to the United States to swiftly respond to any crisis-situations that China or North Korea may be tempted to generate in the region. In addition the United States has a similar military presence in South Korea.</p>
<p>Galling for China is the fact that despite its concerted attempts to drive a wedge in US-Japan Strategic Partnership, the opposite stands generated. Responding to the intensifying China threat and the North Korea threat in recent times where North Korea has indulged in nuclear blackmail there is visible evidence that United States and Japan have embarked on increased levels of defence preparedness integration and solidification of their counter-responses to aggressive provocations.</p>
<p>China aside, even Russia has reacted sharply to strengthening of the US-Japan Strategic Partnership when in a recent meet of the Russian and Japanese Foreign Ministers, the former accused Japan of facilitating greater military presence of US military effort in Japan on the pretext of catering for the North Korea threat.</p>
<p>In such a hostile security environment it becomes pertinent for Japan to ponder whether it can continue with its self-renouncing pacifist Constitution shackling it against any substantial war-preparedness initiatives against the impending China threat and North Korea threat?</p>
<p> Japan and the Japanese public have to come to grips with the strategic reality that China and North Korea leave no space for Japan to continue as a pacifist nation secure under the security umbrella of the United States. While that continues as a given, Japan’s security imperatives and geopolitical imperatives too dictate that Japan shedding aside its pacifist impulses asserts itself by building up its both conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities too.</p>
<p>Breaking-free from the pacifist Japanese Constitution imposed by the United States in the immediate aftermath of American victory over Japan may have been an American imperative at that moment in history. But in end 2017, it is the United States, compelled by geopolitical compulsions now advocate a greater military role for Japan to complement the US Forward Military Presence in the Asia Pacific and more significantly Japanese participation in Joint Patrols in the South China Sea and naval exercises with US Navy off the coasts of North Korea.</p>
<p>Japan freed from Article Nine of the pacifist Constitution and other restrictive clauses would enable Japan to add muscle to its ‘leading Power’ status, sale of Japanese advanced military equipment in order to enable capacity building of Japanese strategic partners and friends and add musle to its diplomacy. It would also enable Japan to shed the appellation of ‘Self Defense Forces’ from its Land, Navy and Air Force military organisations and thereby build-up their capacities beyond the minimum levels of the present ‘Self Defence’. This would enable Japan to respond to crises farther away than her present capabilities. It would also enable Japan to build up her counterattack capabilities.</p>
<p>Within Japan certain powerful forces may object to change the status-quo but then such sections have to be asked as to what does Japan do if North Korea is foolish enough to launch strikes at the Japanese Mainland? Should Japan in possession of credible intelligence that North Korea is about to launch strikes against Japan not have the right to launch pre-emptive strikes against North Korea? Many such scenarios can be visualised in the coming times where Japan should not continue with the existing war-renouncing Constitution.</p>
<p>In Conclusion, it needs to be strongly emphasised that Japan as a Leading Power in Asia should have at its disposal instruments of State-Power that equips itself to withstand coercion from any quarter and also to intervene with force jointly with other nations to forestall threats to regional security and more importantly against the sovereignty, security and stability of the Japanese Nation.</p>
<p><span style="font-size:10px;"><em>(Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations &amp; Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at <a href="mailto:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com">drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com</a>)</em></span></p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-tags field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Tags:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1800" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">US Forward Military Presence</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1801" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan-US Relations</a></div><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1802" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China-N.Korea-Japan Relations</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/united-states" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">United States</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/china" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div></div></div>Tue, 28 Nov 2017 05:34:56 +0000asiaadmin22233 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2233#commentsSouth Korea’s Strategic Imperatives to Shed Historical Mind sets on Japanhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2231
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6322 Dated 20-Nov-2017</strong></span></p>
<p>By Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p>Contextual North East Asia security imperatives dictate in 2017 for South Korea to opt for a ‘Nixonian Moment’ of a serious and sustained political and strategic reachout to Japan and shed its historical mindsets on Japan and not follow China’s footsteps of an eternal damnation of Japan.</p>
<p>China can afford to continue with its strategically and imperious, unimaginative hatred of Japan but comparatively South Korea can ill-afford to ignore the strategic reality that its greatest military threat for over seven decades has been the Communist dictatorship of North Korea now emerging as a regional nuclear weapons and missiles monster. Further, South Korea needs to recognise that North Korea is only a proxy puppet in the hands of China. China is the puppeteer which pulls all the strings of North Korea including its nuclear brinkmanship.</p>
<p>North Korea is militarily overbearing on South Korea simply because it enjoys China’s full weight of geopolitical and military backing. This is what South Korea has to recognise as a strategic reality and factor in its policy formulations when considering future options</p>
<p>Having been posted some decades ago as a military diplomat in Japan for nearly four years with concurrent accreditation to South Korea I stand convinced that the security and stability of South Korea and Japan is strategically interdependent. This reality is more than ever stark in 2017 when the intended target of China and North Korea is the United States which by virtue of its bilateral mutual security treaties with Japan and South Korea underwrites their security and hat of this turbulent region.</p>
<p>In other words, China and its nuclear weapons proxy, both aim to render Japan and South Korea ‘defenceless’ by diluting United States’ predominance in this critical region where China has displayed hegemonistic tendencies.</p>
<p>Japan and South Korea are the two main pillars on which rest the credibility of the United States security architecture in the Asia Pacific. While Japan has had a credible record of an enduring and firmly loyal ally of the United States without any wavering, South Korea comparatively under different Presidents perceptionaly wavered and nearly fell to the inducements of China, and thereby embarrassing the security templates of both the United States and Japan. The present President also has sent out conflicting signals to United States and Japan which not only endanger South Korean security but also the power balance in North East Asia or the Western Pacific.</p>
<p>In 2017, more than ever, a strong case exists for the United States to convert its bilateral mutual security treaties with Japan and South Korea into a ‘Triangular Multilateral Security Alliance’ to effectively combat the combined onslaughts of North Korea egged on by China in a great power tussle, with an integrated security mechanism.</p>
<p>In the materialisation of the above strategic imperative one does not foresee any opposition emanating from the United States and Japan. The main opposition seemingly will arise from South Korea which still clings to its historical mindsets of Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula of over a century ago.</p>
<p>It is pertinent to question South Korea as to when they make political and economic outreaches to China, do they forget that China militarily over-ran South Korea in the 1950s and the tide was reversed by the United States military intervention made effective by the territories of Japan as being used as the military base for supporting the US military intervention.</p>
<p>In 2017, the China Threat directly or through proxy use of North Korea is even more pronounced with China with its burgeoning military power having emerged as a ‘Superpower Pretender’ challenging the United States and North Korea built up as nuclear weapons and ICBM missiles potential capable of striking Mainland United States.</p>
<p>With the above contextual background it becomes pertinent to ask South Korea as to how it can tackle the dual military threats to their nation on their own? The stark logical answer is strongly in the negative. Even if South korea emerges as a nuclear weapons power its capability to effectively withstand China and North Koreas’ political and military coercion is debatable.</p>
<p>South Korea is extremely vulnerable to North Korea’s military attacks both by conventional firepower and missiles. South Korean capital city of Seoul is virtually within long range artillery fire from across the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and North Korean fighter jets could take hardly five minutes to hit Seoul.</p>
<p>If North Korea has held its hand so far it is only because of the US Forward Military Presence in South Korea. Minus this US Shield, South Korea is absolutely defenceless despite South Korea’s military machine being strong and professional.</p>
<p>South Korea if it decides to dilute the US Shield would be forced to divert billions of dollars to a military buildup to develop a self-reliant South Korean military power to deter North Korea. This would besides other complications impose a heavy strain on the South Korean economy which today is vibrant but could backslide due to massive increases in defence spending reducing its competitiveness in the global markets.</p>
<p>China which could restrain North Korean military adventurism has been diffident in not restraining North Korea. It is axiomatic therefore as to how South Korea can seriously hope that by a political outreach to China it can swing China to neutralise the North Korean threat to South Korean security?</p>
<p>Further, the problem for South Korea gets more complicated as its Mutual Security Treaty with US is strictly bilateral but not having any stipulations that South Korea too is obliged to retaliate against North Korea, should it in its misplaced bravado launches strikes the US Mainland. This is a reality that has emerged in 2017.</p>
<p> Either way South Korea cannot rule itself out of not getting involved in any military conflict escalation in North East Asia, even though it may not be of its own making. So also any military conflict arising in North East Asia resulting from the China-North Korea nexus would automatically draw-in the United States, Japan and South Korea, even if unwilling.</p>
<p>It is inconceivable for South Korea to remain neutral and uninvolved in any conflict escalation in the Asia Pacific. Even during the Vietnam War of the decades of the 1960s, South Korea contributed two Infantry Divisions fighting alongside the United States. In the remainder of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, South Korea may be compelled by its security environment to do likewise, much that it may dislike.</p>
<p>In Conclusion, therefore, two main observations come to the fore, namely:</p>
<ul><li>
South Korea’s geographical location and its military history since the 1950s of Chinese and North Korean military offensives deep into South Korea leave no scope for South Korea to strike strategic postures independent of the United States. South Korea will always need the countervailing power of the United States as a credible deterrence against the China-North Korea nexus.</li>
<li>
In 2017, the security and stability of South Korea are more than ever interdependently interwoven with those of the United States and Japan—both similarly under threat from the China-North Kora nexus. Further, both the United States and Japan in 2017 without explicitly saying so are engaged in evolving postures to cater for the China Threat threatening Asia Pacific security and which could singe South Korea also, even if it stays neutral.</li>
</ul><p>Therefore the moment has come for South Korea to shed its historical mindsets on Japan and grasp the opportunity for a political and strategic outreach to Japan so that it facilitates a Triangular Military Alliance of the United States, Japan and South Korea for dissuasion of possible threats in the making and maintaining credible regional security.</p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-tags field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Tags:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1797" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">South Korea-Japan Relations</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1740" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China-North Korea</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/east-asia" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">East Asia</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div></div></div>Mon, 20 Nov 2017 07:13:57 +0000asiaadmin22231 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2231#commentsUS President Trump’s Asia Pacific Tour November 2017- An Estimative Analysishttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2228
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6319 Dated 13-Nov-2017</strong></span></p>
<p>By Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p>US President Trump’s first tour of the Asia Pacific in November 2017, nearly a year after assuming office, raises two questions in terms of estimative analysis--- whether it was a strategic foray to a highly volatile region critical for US security or was it merely a diplomatic necessity, particularly in relation to China?</p>
<p>In November 2017, the United States cannot be oblivious to the reality that China’s ultimate strategic aim is to dethrone the United States initially from its Asia Pacific strategic predominance and ultimately exploit the ensuing decline of US power to emerge as the global co-equal of the United States. United States must therefore restrain itself from any deferential display towards China which increasingly has been positioning itself to fill the vacuum of a perceived decline of US power.</p>
<p>On the face of it, it seems to be a mix of both the above named components with the strategic foray imperatives predominating. Nowhere in the world is the United States’ global stature as the world leader and the predominant power in Asia Pacific more challenged than in this region by China.</p>
<p>The United States is under strategic siege in the Asia Pacific and militarily challenged by an aggressive and brinkmanship-prone China. China additionally besieges the United States through its wayward proxy protégé that is North Korea.</p>
<p>China has built up its proxy North Korea satellite into a nuclear weapons and missiles monster to levels where North Korea not only is a serious menace to US Allies in the region but also capable of striking Mainland USA.</p>
<p>President Trump’s Asia Pacific tour was to commence from China but better sense prevailed and this tour started with visits to Japan and South Korea before heading for China. Japan and South Korea have been enduring military Allies of the United States.</p>
<p>Japan significantly is the sheet anchor of the United States security architecture in the Asia Pacific. Japan has been an enduring ally of the United States and deserves more deferential acknowledgement from the United States. China has constantly worked to undermine US national security and is a powerful threat that the US has now to manage----and nothing beyond that.</p>
<p>By doing so, President Trump validated Japan and South Korea as steadfast security Allies of the United States and this should have been so when contextually viewing China as the root cause of United States’ security and trade concerns in the Asia Pacific.</p>
<p>The United States needs the unstinted strategic, diplomatic and military support of both Japan and South Korea if it has to effectively counter North Korea’s unrestrained nuclear menace and so also to have in place a regional security counterweight system to balance a similar unrestrained military rise of China.</p>
<p>Analytically, therefore, President Trump’s Asia Pacific tour in November 2017 can be estimated as a ‘strategic foray’ to reassure its traditional Allies in the region that the United States stands committed to maintaining security and stability in the region.</p>
<p> President Trump enjoys a strong personal rapport with Japanese PM Abe and there are no doubts here. But in the case of South Korea, the new South Korean President Moon raised US concerns with his initial opposition to US THADD deployment in South Korea and also his efforts for a political outreach to North Korea.</p>
<p>Continuing the thread of strategic foray in the region, President Trump’s visits to Vietnam and Philippines can be estimated to have been an attempt to reinforce the growing US-Vietnam strategic proximity. In case of the Philippines, it can be estimated that the US President aimed the visit as a serious attempt to “reclaim” the Philippines as a firm strategic Ally of the United States. This was an imperative as the mercurial Philippines President went overboard in a political outreach to China soon after his inauguration. This has turned out to be disappointing for the Philippines President.</p>
<p>In view of the foregoing President Trump’s Asia Pacific tour covering Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines can be estimated not only as a strategic imperative but also strategically useful for the United States.</p>
<p>The China visit of US President Trump cannot be estimated as a strategic foray as in the preceding months the Chinese President did not honour the US President’s eff orts to enlist him to restrain North Korea’s nuclear belligerence and the threatening rhetoric against the United States. Chinese President Xi with his emphasis on using Chinese ‘Hard Power’ as a policy instrument was not and will not oblige the United States on the North Korean count.</p>
<p>US President could not have realistically hoped to dent the Chinese President’s obduracy on not restraining North Korea belligerence despite having emerged as even more stronger after the 19<sup>th</sup> NPC last month. Therefore, the strategic component would have been missing in the Beijing parleys.</p>
<p>Estimatively, one could conclude that US President Trump would have indulged in some plain-speaking with the Chinese President behind closed doors on North Korea. If it was otherwise then surely, United States image would take a strategic hit not only in relation to China but also in Asian capitals which do not view China through rosy prisms as the US pro-China Lobby in Washington.</p>
<p>Trade and investments issues are a sore point in US-China relations and here again, despite the rhetorical flourishes in Beijing and his personal effusive praises for the Chinese President cannot cover-up China’s manipulations on trade relations with the US and also currency manipulation.</p>
<p>China however seems to have attempted to silence United States pressures on trade issues by obliging the United States with billions of dollars contracts. Can the United States continue to be permissive on China buying US silence on its aggression in the South China Sea and the East China Sea and other strategic and military turbulences that it creates in Asia?</p>
<p>The above can be estimated as short term transactional financial gains for the United States but unlikely to transform the overall adversarial tenor of US-China relations. What needs to be noted is that while President Trump was more than effusive in personal praise of Chinese President Xi, no matching responses ensued from the Chinese President.</p>
<p>The China visit of US President Trump can be estimated merely as a diplomatic exercise in the overall attempt of the United States to” Manage China” on an aggressive trajectory in the Asia Pacific, while the United States undertakes other steps to contain China. In this connection, it needs to be mentioned that while US President was on the penultimate leg of his tour in the Philippines, the US Navy had commenced a major exercise off the coast of North Korea concentrating three Aircraft Carrier Groups---for the first time in this decade. Significantly, Japan also sent its Helicopter Carrier to join the US Navy exercise.</p>
<p>The message of the above to China by the United States should be seen as signalling that should China not restrain North Korea with its tremendous leverages, the United States and Japan have the military option on the table.</p>
<p>At this stage of this estimative analysis it becomes imperative as to what personal impressions US President Trump has formed over and above the professional briefs provided to him, after his 12 day tour of Asia Pacific including attending the AOPEC and East Asia Summit.</p>
<p> It would be fair to say that one over-riding strategic concern in Asia Pacific capitals other than Beijing would be the fear of an aggressive China moreso reinforced after Chinese President’s ascent to emerging as China’s 21<sup>st</sup> Century Emperor and the pursuit of his grandiose ‘Great China Dream’.</p>
<p>Strategic concerns in Asian capitals would be two-fold. Firstly, how far the United States would descend to kow-tow to China in the pursuit of US national security interests? Secondly, would the United States have the will to use military power to tame North Korea’s nuclear blackmailing? On both counts, the image of the United States takes a hit unless President Trump carries ot a mid-term course correction to allay Asian fears of China.</p>
<p>The oft-repeated theme in my SAAG Papers of the last fifteen years is that Asian capitals are not willing to accept two things from the United States cantering on China. Firstly, Asian capitals would not countenance United States having a conciliatory and differential approach to China while at the same time egging Asian Nations to confront China. Secondly, Asian capitals would oppose any United States efforts to co-opt China into a G-2 Condominium to manage Asian security and stability. The Obama Administration disabused its mind of this initiative well in his first term.</p>
<p>Concluding this estimative analysis one would like to assert that if the United States wishes to sustain its global and Asia Pacific predominance it can only do so by an unreserved commitment from Asian capitals and not by a US-China G2 Condominium. Can the United States or its Presidents be oblivious to the strategic reality that China’s avowed aim is to dethrone the United States from both these pedestals? That should be the fulcrum around which United States policy formulations on China should revolve.</p>
<p><span style="font-size:10px;"><em>(Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations &amp; Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at <a href="mailto:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com">drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com</a>)</em></span></p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-tags field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Tags:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1633" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">President Trump</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1791" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">US-Japan-S. Korea relations</a></div><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1257" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Asia Pacific Region</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/united-states" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">United States</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div></div></div>Mon, 13 Nov 2017 07:04:35 +0000asiaadmin22228 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2228#commentsUS-Japan-India Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue September 2017 Analysedhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2214
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6308 Dated 26-Sept-2017</strong></span></p>
<p>By Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p> Geopolitically, in the context of a threatening Asian security environment, the Second US-Japan-India Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue of the Foreign Ministers of the three nations was held in New York on September 18 2017 on the side-lines of the UNGA Session acquires added significance.</p>
<p>Sticking to diplomatic niceties and avoiding overt references to the Chan Threat to Indo Pacific stability, the communiques issued by the three nations on conclusion of the Second Trilateral Dialogue when analysed leaves no doubt that each point of emphasis in the strategic convergences highlighted on the discussions in the Trilateral Dialogue alluded to China without any ambiguity.</p>
<p>For sake of analysis and to highlight India’s policy formulations on Asian security which coincide strategically with those of the United States and Japan, the contents of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs note covering the Trilateral Dialogue posted on its web-site is taken as the bench-mark for analysis in this Paper.</p>
<p>The Indian Foreign Ministry in its Communique emphasised that all three nations laid great emphasis on the following foreign policy formulations, when summarised as follows: (1) Freedom of navigation and overflights needed to be ensured in the Indo Pacific Region (2) Respect for international laws, and (3) Peaceful resolution of disputes. India also emphasised and the others concurred that on Connectivity Issues, these should be based on international laws and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.</p>
<p>On nuclear and missile challenges to regional security posed by North Korea, India was quite forthcoming in (1) Deploring North Korea’s recent actions (2) North Korea’s proliferation linkages must be explored, and that (3) Those involved be held accountable. India’s unequivocal support would have gladdened the US and Japanese foreign policy makers by standing with them on a security challenge which is live for both the United States and Japan.</p>
<p>India’s additional call for investigating North Korea’s linkages in building-up its nuclear weapons and ICBM arsenal on accountability of those involved alludes directly to the China-Pakistan linkages and their WMD assistance to North Korea.</p>
<p>Similarly, the main points of emphasis stated above regarding freedom of navigation and overflights and respect for international laws and sovereignty are undoubtedly has China in the crosshairs. After all, what China has brazenly done in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea is a gross violation of such norms and challenge to international rules-based order. Here China’s open defiance of The Hague Tribunals award against China on the South China Sea disputes needs to be recalled.</p>
<p>The United States and Japan sharing India’s concerns on China’s Connectivity Initiatives challenge which affect India’s national security interests with particular reference to China’s CPEC traversing Indian territory under illegal occupation of Pakistan, namely the Northern reaches of CPEC, should be a welcome step of support. The CPEC does violate India’s sovereignty and China emerges as a Pakistan-accomplice in putting down India strategically.</p>
<p>Interestingly, in Japan, the coverage of the Trilateral Dialogue besides covering the above aspects further highlights two notable aspects in the maritime security domain and these were (1) Develop strategically important ports and infrastructure in the Indo Pacific Region, and (2) Boost Trilateral Maritime Security and maritime security cooperation.</p>
<p>On the above, one already finds movement in this direction in terms of Japan being formally accepted as the third participant in the Annual Malabar Naval Exercises hithertofore being held bilaterally between the United States and India. One could now expect greater increased Trilateral Naval Cooperation in terms of the Indian Ocean. Joint India-Japan Connectivity Initiatives linking Indo Pacific with Africa as a counter to China’s OBOR are already visible.</p>
<p>This analysis would be incomplete without a comparative review of the First Inaugural Trilateral Dialogue held in New York on September 29 2015. The Communique then listed on India’s Foreign Ministry website list all the major points that are listed in the Second Trilateral Dialogue 2017, but there were two additional points that were highlighted. These two points emphasised in 2015 were as follows: (1) Centrality of ASEAN in multilateral political and security architecture of the region, and (2) Importance of East Asia Summit as a premiers-level forum for discussion of key political and security issues.</p>
<p>The above omissions may be inadvertent this year but I am led to believe that reservations on ASEAN –centrality in regional political and security architecture may be arising from ASEAN having been open to division by China on the South China Sea issue and not unitedly confronting China on territorial dispute foisted by China on some ASEAN countries.</p>
<p>China’s reactions on the Trilateral Dialogue as articulated by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson was on expected lines, especially on points critical of China, though only alluded. In keeping with China’s current policy trends, China has been trying to drive a wedge between India and Japan by referring to India positively and negatively on Japan. In other terms China is alluding that India stands to lose greatly if it continues to reinforce its strategic partnership with Japan.</p>
<p>The Trilateral Dialogues between the United States, Japan and India commenced during US President Bush Jr tenure though at the bureaucrats’ level. However, the initiative lost much of its steam in later years and until 2015. This presumably arose from the ‘hedging strategies’ of both the United States and India in the last decade or so.</p>
<p>The revival of the US-Japan-India Trilateral Dialogue in 2015 and that too reinforced by its elevation to Foreign Ministers-level has coincided with the emergence of two strong and assertive leaders in Japan and India in the persona of PM Abe and PM Modi. It also coincides with the gradual fading away of both United States and India’s ‘China Hedging Strategies.”</p>
<p>Concluding, it needs to be strongly emphasised that geopolitical imperatives foisted by China’s not so peaceful military rise and its aggressive nationalism under current Chinese President Xi Jinping destabilising the Indo Pacific Region places a current higher call on the United States, Japan and India to strengthen their Strategic Partnerships to a level which dissuades China from actively endangering regional and global security directly or through its proxy nuclear states creations like North Korea and Pakistan.</p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-tags field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Tags:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/968" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">India-US Relations</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/828" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">India-Japan Relations</a></div><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/329" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">South China Sea</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/united-states" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">United States</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/india" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">India</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div></div></div>Tue, 26 Sep 2017 04:57:12 +0000asiaadmin22214 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2214#commentsJapan’s Imperatives for Nuclear Weapons Arsenal (SAAG Paper No. 487 Dated 05.072002) contextually Reviewed 2017http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2211
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6305 Dated 18-Sept-2017</strong></span></p>
<p>Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p>Japan’s geopolitical and strategic imperatives for nuclear weapons were strongly existent in 2002 and highlighted by me then and when contextually reviewed in 2017 against the backdrop of China-generated North Korea nuclear flashpoint makes a Japanese nuclear weapons arsenal “Inescapable” for Japan’s survival as an Emerged Power.</p>
<p> Commencing with my first SAAG Paper of 2002 (Reproduced as Annexure to this Paper) this Author has been periodically pleading that a strong case exists for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. Besides repeating Japan’s nuclear weapons imperative in all my writings thereafter reviewing Japan’s security challenges, this Author again wrote a detailed SAAG Paper No.1947 dated 12.09.2006 titled “Japan’s Renewed Imperatives for Nuclear Weapons: An Analysis.”</p>
<p>Japan’s imperatives in 2017 to go in for a nuclear weapons arsenal arise from multiple pressing imperatives, not only geopolitical and strategic but also from Japan’s inherent compulsions and status as an Emerged Power in Asia along with India for balance of power reasons when China’s threatening military rise in Asia is taken into account.</p>
<p>While India as an Asian Emerged Power has stood upto China’s provocative military brinkmanship on the strength of her nuclear weapons and ICBM arsenal capable of hitting Beijing, it the lack of a nuclear weapons arsenal in Japan’s armoury limits Japan’s stature in Chinese perceptions as an Emerged Power, otherwise equal to China.</p>
<p>In 2017, Japan needs no lessons on the imperatives of a nuclear weapons arsenal than to learn from North Korea. The United States is temporising with China and North Korea only because in 2017 North Korea with Chinese comprehensive technological and financial assistance has added nuclear weapons and ICBMs arsenal neutralising United States ‘compellance capabilities’ against North Korea.</p>
<p>In similar fashion, Japan which ever since the early 1980s has been only a ‘screw driver ‘turn away from possession of a nuclear weapons arsenal, should now operationalise her nuclear weapons arsenal and missiles arsenal to achieve ‘dissuasion’ of China’s political and military coercion against it.</p>
<p>Japan in recent years since the ascension to power of President Xi Jinping in Beijing has been subjected to political and military coercion by China—notably, over the Senkaku Islands and China’s unilateral declaration of a Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea maritime expanse contiguous to Japan.</p>
<p>In 2017, Japan faces daunting odds wherein North Korea without any restraint imposed on it by China as its nuclear weapons patron and supplier and Russia having some leverage on North Korea joins China in similar fashion, just to extract geopolitical leverages against the United States. China is using its nuclear proxy North Korea to inveigle the United States into a serious armed conflict in North East Asia without the onus of having to shoulder the responsibility of triggering a nuclear conflict.</p>
<p>Foreseen in my Papers in the last decade is the inevitability of a serious US-China Military Conflict wherein a non-nuclear weapons Japan gets automatically draw-in with devastating consequences. The geopolitical tussle between United States and China is also examined in my book ‘China-India Military Confrontation: 21<sup>st</sup> Century Perspectives”.</p>
<p>In the past I have questioned the credibility of the United States “Nuclear Umbrella” assured to Japan. In 2017, the credibility of the same is under strain where US President Trump despite strong warnings to North Korea and China has been unable to restrain North Korea or China.</p>
<p>On the contrary, US President Trump has clubbed his November 2017 visit to US Allies Japan and North Korea with a visit to China. Perceptively, in my assessment this decision of President Trump perceptively indicates that the United States is willing to kow-tow to the Chinese President. In the past too US Presidents have bowed to China’s sensitivities going much against the national security interests of Japan.</p>
<p>With such political indicators what is the guarantee that the United States would have the WILL TO USE US POWER when the chips are actually down against a provocative North Korea or a coercive China? Will the United States stand with Japan when North Korea and China pose nuclear-tipped ICBMs to the American East Coast?</p>
<p>This eventuality prompted me to conclude the 2002 Paper with the following observations: “No nation can afford to mortgage its national security interests to the defence policies of another nation, however powerful that may be. Japan’s strategic vulnerabilities and its volatile security environment provide adequate justification to acquire nuclear weapons capability to safeguard its existence. Japan should not worry about international reactions in this regard. The maximum outcry could come from China. For China and other major powers, Japan has a very simple answer, ‘Gommen Nasai’ (Sorry) and ‘Sumimassen; (but excuse me). You too have nuclear weapons for your security, why not Japan?</p>
<p>Japanese public opinion needs to be educated against the very potent China Threat against Japan with the force-multiplier effect of China nuclear proxy of China. Senior politicians in Japan have foreseen this imperative and articulated opinions accordingly.</p>
<p>In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that can the Japanese people overlook China’s propensity for demanding endless humiliating Japanese apologies for Second War so-called war crimes. It is that impulse which in 2017 will impel China to humiliate Japan militarily to ‘avenge wrongs historically committed against China’</p>
<p>. Japan’s urgent materialisation of a nuclear weapons arsenal will not only ensure the protection of Japan’s sovereignty and ‘National Honour’ against the China Threat but also ensure Asian peace and security.</p>
<p><span style="font-size:10px;"><em>(Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations &amp; Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at <a href="mailto:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com">drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com</a>)</em></span></p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong>Annexure</strong></p>
<p>Paper no. 487 05. 07. 2002 </p>
<p>JAPAN`S IMPERATIVES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL: An Analysis</p>
<p>by Dr. Subhash Kapila </p>
<p> Japan is the only country in the world to have been subjected to a nuclear weapons holocaust, not once but twice, in the closing stages of the Second World War. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are painful reminders of the American nuclear attacks in 1945. It is but natural that Japan as a nation has a strong aversion to nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Japan’s imperatives to possess a nuclear weapons capability or arsenal came briefly into focus in June 2002, when a high Japanese official articulated the need. However, it was promptly denied within the next two three days that there were no changes in Japan’s defence policies.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding the above, two questions arise in this context. First, would Japan have ever been subjected to nuclear weapons bombing, had it also possessed nuclear weapons i.e. nuclear deterrence? Second, is it strategically wise for Japan to continue renunciation of nuclear weapons capability in the context of its security environment?</p>
<p>Arising from the above, this paper attempts to analyze the strategic and political imperatives for Japan to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.</p>
<p>Japan’s Strategic Imperatives for a Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: Japan’s imperatives for a nuclear weapon’s capability were born the day it was subjected to nuclear weapons attacks in 1945. The volatility of its security environment emerged soon after the United States Occupation of Japan when the Korean War erupted as a result of the Cold War super-power clash of interests in the region. The Korean War was on the brink of a nuclear conflagration.</p>
<p>Japan’s imperatives for a nuclear weapons capability became latent due to the ‘nuclear umbrella’ assured by the United States during the Cold War. But, it is my belief that while the imperatives may not have been in public focus or debate, the question stood reviewed periodically. Japan’s strategic imperatives for a nuclear weapons capability are best concluded by answers to the following questions:</p>
<p>* Does Japan’s historical strategic experience justify non-possession of nuclear weapons? </p>
<p>* Is the United States` nuclear umbrella’ to Japan leak proof? </p>
<p> * Has the North East Asian security environment acquired peaceful contours that encourage Japan to justify non-possession of nuclear weapons?</p>
<p>Japan’s historical strategic experience, irrespective of any other factor suggesting non-possession of nuclear weapons should promote it to recognize the strategic imperatives for possession of a credible nuclear deterrent. Japan would never have been subjected to a nuclear holocaust, had it possessed a nuclear deterrence. For Japan to argue that it is a peaceful country and therefore unlikely to be drawn into nuclear conflict or nuclear blackmail is strategically untenable. It is peaceful nations that invite aggression. Peaceful nations need deterrence too, especially in a hostile neighbourhood.</p>
<p>The United States` nuclear umbrella’ for Japan is not leak-proof. It can develop many leaks as a result of: </p>
<p>* Changes in United States strategic postures in Asia-Pacific region </p>
<p>* United States’ policies towards China</p>
<p>* United States` domestic constraints </p>
<p>* Prevailing global security environment</p>
<p>Japan therefore has an imperative requirement to provide it’s own ‘nuclear umbrella` for it’s national security. </p>
<p>The post-Cold War era has not brought any peace dividends to North East Asia. On the contrary, Japan’s security environment has become more threatening and complex due to: </p>
<p>* China’s upgradation of its nuclear and conventional military capabilities </p>
<p>* China’s predilection to challenge American military pre-dominance in the Asia Pacific </p>
<p>* North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities build-up as China’s proxy </p>
<p>* Russia’s strategic devaluation and consequently its counter vailing capability in the region. </p>
<p> All these suggest that not only Japan’s security environment has become more threatening, but Japan is the only major power in Asia Pacific which does not possess nuclear weapons, essential for its security. </p>
<p>Strategic imperatives therefore exist to justify Japan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. A Japanese independent nuclear weapons capability would provide both strategic and political stability in Asia Pacific. </p>
<p>Japan’s Political Imperatives for a Nuclear Weapon’s Capability: The currency of power for both global and regional power status today is nuclear weapons capability. Japan is not only a major regional power but also an economic superpower. Yet all this means nothing if Japan cannot add the muscle of power to the content of its foreign policies.</p>
<p>Japan also seeks to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, rightly so. Yet, Japan, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, would be the only member without nuclear weapons capability. A permanent member of the UN Security Council carries with it a ‘ power connotation’, which Japan can only acquire with a nuclear weapons capability.</p>
<p>Japan’s political and economic status and its attendant considerations provide additional imperatives to Japan’s strategic imperatives for a nuclear weapons capability. </p>
<p>Conclusion: No nation can afford to mortgage its national security interests to the defence policies of another nation, however powerful that may be. Japan’s strategic vulnerabilities and it’s volatile security environment provide adequate justification to acquire nuclear weapons capability to safeguard it’s existence. Japan should not worry about international reactions in this regard. The maximum outcry could come from China. For China, and the other major powers, Japan has a very simple answer: ‘Gommen Nasai’ (sorry) and ‘ Sumimasen’ (but excuse me), you too have nuclear weapons for your security, so why not Japan? </p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-tags field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Tags:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1764" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan-Nuclear</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1765" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China-US</a></div><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1766" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">North Korea-Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/united-states" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">United States</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/china" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China</a></div><div class="field-item even"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/wmd" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">WMD</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div></div></div>Mon, 18 Sep 2017 05:44:51 +0000asiaadmin22211 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2211#commentsJapanese PM Abe’s Visit to India September 2017 Geopolitically Significanthttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2209
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><strong><span style="font-size:14px;">Paper No. 6303 Dated 12-Sept-2017</span></strong></p>
<p>By Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p>Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s visit to India on September13-14 2017 though officially as part of the Annual Summits between the Prime Ministers of Japan and India emerges as geopolitically significant against the contextual Asian security environment muddied by China itself and its nuclear proxies in East Asia and South Asia.</p>
<p>Japan holds India in great geopolitical and strategic esteem as a potential Superpower and India under PM Modi needs to live upto this expectation and inherent in this esteem is Japan’s sincere desire to assist India in this direction. In a book released virtually coinciding with the Japanese PM’s visit, a former distinguished Japanese Ambassador to India, Amb. Hiroshi Hirabayashi has titled it as “The Last Superpower”. A sincere tribute from an Emerged Power itself</p>
<p>The explosiveness added by China to the Asian security environment in 2017 and in which Japan and India finds themselves enmeshed in China’s strategic and military crosshairs enjoins the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers as they meet in the Ahmedabad Summit on September13-14 2017 to give a new substantive direction to their “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” so as to offset the China Threat to themselves and Asian security.</p>
<p>In fact the political and economic dimensions of this Partnership need to be subsumed into the over-riding and larger matrix of security and defence cooperation. What is at issue for Japan and India currently is national security and reinforcing of their absorptive capacities to take on the China Threat.</p>
<p>The Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers as they meet at the Ahmedabad Summit would hopefully be aware of the prevailing strategic reality that what stands between Chinese hegemony over Asia and Asian security is the Japan and India’s “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”. The connotation of “Global Partnership” to the earlier “Strategic Partnership” itself is a pointer that Japan and India as Emerged Powers have to jointly transcend the Asian dimensions and ascend the global stage. The outcome of the Ahmedabad Summit would be measured therefore on this scale.</p>
<p>The enormity of the challenges that face Japan and India today from China and its nuclear weapons proxies need a brief recall to set the contextual stage in to enable the two Prime Ministers of Japan and India to address the challenges appropriately.</p>
<p>East Asia security environment in which Japan is situated in September 2017 presents dangers of an explosive flashpoint generated by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ICMs tests unrestrained by China as North Korea’s strategic patron and benefactor. China is using its North Korea nuclear weapons proxy not only to threaten Japan and South Korea as US Allies in the region but also targeting the United Sates as well. North Korea dare not challenge the United States and its Allies which host sizeable US Forward Military Presence hemming China but for a wink and permissive nod from China.</p>
<p>China also for some years, more notably since President Xi Jinping assumed charge of China has not only escalated tensions in the South China Sea but also nearer home to Japan in the East China Sea and Senkaku Islands. Chinese submarines prowl in Sea of Japan, besides Chinese Air Force overflights.</p>
<p>South Asia wherein India is situated has witnessed intense military brinkmanship by China on the Dokalam Plateau which could have ignited militarily. Dokalam Standoff between China and India was temporarily defused by China so as not to endanger the BRICS Summit in early September 2017 by Indian PM refusing to attend due to Chinese military escalation. Chinese intrusions into Indian Territory continue.</p>
<p>Like North Korea as China’s proxy indulging in conflict brinkmanship against Japan, in South Asia one witnesses China’s other nuclear weapons proxy, that is, Pakistan indulging in attempting to ignite Kashmir Valley in name of Islamic Jihad against India besides border clashes on the LOC. Pakistan too like North Korea has a wink and a permissive nod from its born again paramour—China.</p>
<p>Japan and India therefore contextually in September 2017 stand poised at dangerous crossroads geopolitically and strategically in relation to China’s not so benign, rather threatening, military rise, endangering Asian security. The position becomes more dangerous as China geopolitically challenges the United States, both directly and indirectly, with Japan and India as initial targets.</p>
<p>The Japan -India Summit in 2017 being held at Ahmadabad and therefore better termed as the Ahmedabad Summit 2017 acquires a a geopolitical and strategic significance unlike the earlier Japan-India Summits in view of the China-induced Asian security turbulence and China’s grab for global dominance in the garb of globalisation and global connectivity through its deceptive OBOR and CPEC both opposed by India.</p>
<p>Obviously a lot of groundwork has already been done by Indian Defence Minister’s visit to Tokyo last week for the Annual Defence Ministers Dialogue. Also accompanying him was a large delegation of top Indian industrialists participating in PM Mod’s ‘Make in India’ defence production projects.</p>
<p>China’s prime challenges today which both Japan and India would be faced with is in the maritime dimensions, missiles warfare, space warfare and cyber warfare. Chines air power too is also a force multiplier for China. Japan is a technologically advanced nation with advanced R&amp;D and defence production infrastructure. With changes in Japan’s constitutional provisions in arms exports, Japan is well placed to assist India in collaboration in these fields in which India too has good leads.</p>
<p>The maritime dimensions of China’s naval threats in the Seas of East Asia and its recent drive for sizeable presence in Indian Ocean is an area of prime cooperation between Japan and India, both operationally and also in capacity- building of the Indian Navy. In terms of global convergence of interest in Indian Ocean, Japan and India are fortunate in that their concerns of Chinese naval presence in Indian Ocean are shared by USA, Britain, France and Australia. India should be more forthcoming in terms of enlarging participation in the Malabar Series of Naval Exercises. There is no reason why Japan and India should not indulge in Joint Maritime Surveillance of the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>Moving to Joint Military Exercises between Japan and India which are presently limited to the Navy only, should now be enlarged to include the Japanese Army and the Japanese Air Force. Special Forces techniques including counter-terrorism operations should be shared.</p>
<p>Defence production collaborations between Japan and India are the most promising dimensions that need to be exploited by India. My knowledge of Japanese defence production superiorities gained as a military diplomat in Japan for nearly four years, makes me assert that they are the best in the world.</p>
<p>Defence technology being a great force multiplier and an area in which India has been backward due to archaic bureaucratic DDO and MOD, is an area in which India can profitably gain with Japanese expertise. PM Modi’s priority for indigenous defence production offers great scope for Japanese defence majors. However, Japanese defence majors should avoid the Indian MOD route and engage in joint projects directly with Indian private sector defence enterprises. It is also for consideration as to why the Indian Government cannot enter into direct FMS contracts with Japanese Government on the pattern of the US.</p>
<p>Now moving to the higher plane of geopolitical domains, the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers should at this Summit need to work out procedures and mechanisms for coordinated responses by Japan and India at the United Nations on critical issues and also to the Asian flashpoints situations.</p>
<p>Japan significantly supported India on the Dokalam Standoff and India must not shirk from doing likewise on the South China Sea issues and the North Korean Threat.</p>
<p>In the field of civil nuclear energy cooperation enabling India to acquire technologies from Japan, steady progress is visible. Recently, both countries had an “Exchange of Diplomatic Notes for Entry into Force of Japan-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.</p>
<p>Significantly, India made a big leap in strategic trust of Japan in which an Agreement has been signed allowing entry of Japanese participation of Development of India’s North East Region and also the Andaman &amp; Nicobar Islands. No other country has been allowed this.</p>
<p>Concluding, one would like to emphasise that with Japan and India both headed by bold and assertive Prime Ministers in the persona of PM Abe and PM Modi, the Ahmedabad Summit would delineate a more assertive and bold direction for the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”. In terms of Asian security and global stability this is the need of the hour.</p>
<p><span style="font-size:10px;"><em>(Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations &amp; Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at <a href="mailto:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com">drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com</a>)</em></span></p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-tags field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Tags:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/11" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">japan</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/9" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">india</a></div><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1760" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">PM Abe</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/india" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">India</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/political" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Political</a></div></div></div>Tue, 12 Sep 2017 06:43:28 +0000asiaadmin22209 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2209#commentsChina: Signs of an Expansionist Nationhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2151
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6249 Dated 25-Apr-2017</strong></span></p>
<p>By Bhaskar Roy</p>
<p>Over the decades the People’s Republic of China has sold to the world the narrative that it is a self-contained power and has no ambition of coveting territories of other nations. This is far from the truth. China in the past had tried to expand colonialism over other countries like Vietnam and Indonesia. The only problem was they were unable to hold on to the territories that they tried to colonise. </p>
<p>In their incursion into Vietnam in 1978 to teach Hanoi a lesson, they had to withdraw with a bloody nose. In their military excursion against India in 1962, they withdrew unilaterally behind the MacMahon Line, not in goodwill but in strategic calculations they would not succeed in holding on to those territories in Arunachal Pradesh, then NEFA, for long. They, however, projected it as a virtue.</p>
<p>At that time, defence was the lowest priority for the Indian government, which was upholding China’s cause universally and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was shocked at this great betrayal. Nehru was so decimated psychologically that he died soon after in 1964.</p>
<p>At that time China was not a powerful military state, but its army was battle tested with revolutionary zeal. It invaded Tibet, a quasi-independent country at least, in 1951.</p>
<p>The other narrative that China created was that unequal treaties were imposed on a weak China, and this was expanded to gradually claim historical Chinese territories, expanding deep into Soviet territories in Central Asia. China creates its own history. It had no locus standi in the demarcation of territories between Tibet and India in the 1914 Simla Accord because Tibet was not Chinese territory at that time. China had only an Amban, an ambassador in modern parlance, in Lhasa.</p>
<p>By its shrill and bellicose opposition to the 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang and the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, and connecting this whole issue to the India-China border talks, China may have scored some negative points. It has affirmed that the Dalai Lama remains central to China’s Tibet policy, and that Tibetans do not endorse Beijing’s position on Tawang and the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh.</p>
<p>By renaming six Arunachal Pradesh towns in Chinese on the pretext of standardisation of Chinese names, Beijing has exposed its real game plan on the border issue and tried to make it a territorial issue. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said the renaming “supported” China’s territorial claims – “These names reflect from another side that China’s territorial claim over South Tibet is supported by clear evidence in terms of history, culture and administration”.</p>
<p>This is a bizarre argument, bereft of any logic. Mompas living on both sides of the border do not prove anything for China’s arguments. It can be turned over on its head that Mompas are historically Indians and the Mompa inhabited areas held by China should be returned to India. Neither side should indulge in such type of arguments.</p>
<p>In ancient times tribes moved across places and regions and settled down where suitable. This does not mean that entire tribes moved. China was once ruled by the Mongols. Using twisted logic can it be argued that China belongs to Mongolia? There are numerous such examples.</p>
<p>The Indian foreign ministry spokesman gave a suitable reply. Changing of names in another country does not translate into ownership.</p>
<p>China’s extra-territorial ambitions are no longer growing – they are galloping! The official Chinese daily, the <em>Global Times</em> (April 20) revealed this in an article. It quoted Xu Guangyu, a senior advisor to the China Arms Control and Disarmament, saying the following: <strong>“China will build ten more bases for six aircraft carriers”, adding that they can be built around countries friendly to China, like Pakistan.</strong></p>
<p>Xu’s comments are significant and demands attention. He was not talking in the air and reflected the government’s plan. One aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is already operational and taking part in exercises. A second is expected to be launched sometime this year, may be around the 19<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party. Each carrier will have a battle group, and will be placed in strategic areas where China has friendly relations. Chinese marine force is to be expanded from the current 20 thousand to 100 thousand.</p>
<p>The mention of “Pakistan” is an important pointer. The Gwadar deep sea port constructed by China is on 40 years management lease to a Chinese company. The company will also control other projects, Chinese aided, in Gwadar city. Gwadar is a declared defense establishment by the company. Pakistan has also set up a special naval task force for Gwadar port and strategic sea lanes where China is the main contributor of naval assets. This is also where the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) enters the sea. Naturally, this would be the first Chinese overseas base where its carrier task force will be placed. The entire project will be controlled by China. In other words, it will be China controlled territory.</p>
<p>Djibouti has agreed to a base for China. Beijing is also exploring similar bases in the Seychelles and Maldives. They have an eye on Myanmar and Bangladesh.</p>
<p>How is China viewing countries like India which are averse to such agreements? The approach will be increasingly adversarial, and pressure will be exerted in different ways, as we are witnessing on the Tawang/ Arunachal Pradesh issue.</p>
<p>It appears Beijing is heading towards remodelling the border issue with India into a territorial grab like they have done in the South China Sea. In course of time Beijing is likely to turn relations with India into the framework of relations with Japan (over the Senkaku islands) and other claimants to the South China Sea islands. The mantra is” keep diplomatic relations intact; trade and economic relations should continue, but also use the levers of power periodically; massive propaganda.</p>
<p>Where India is concerned, China’s “Three Warfare” strategy is unfolding. This encapsulates</p>
<p style="margin-left:1.0cm;">(i) <strong>Media Warfare</strong>: which is reflected in official media articles and official statements</p>
<p style="margin-left:1.0cm;">(ii) <strong>Psychological Warfare</strong>: not in full force yet but can be a double edged sword. Some of the PLA’s incursions are examples, but has been kept within limits.</p>
<p style="margin-left:1.0cm;">(iii) <strong>Legal Warfare</strong>: Naming Arunachal Pradesh towns in Chinese as discussed above. This kind of warfare is still being formed, but may go up intermixed with media warfare and psychological warfare.</p>
<p>These are the makings of an unhappy situation – things are going to unfold gradually.</p>
<p><span style="font-size:10px;"><em>(The writer is a New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail<span style="color:#000000;"> </span><a href="mailto:grouchohart@yahoo.com"><span style="color:#000000;">grouchohart@yahoo.com</span></a><span style="color:#000000;">)</span></em></span></p>
<p> </p>
</div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-tags field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Tags:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1666" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China-Tibet</a></div><div class="field-item odd" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/826" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Arunachal Pradesh</a></div><div class="field-item even" rel="dc:subject"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1667" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan-Senkaku</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-category field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Category:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/papers" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Papers</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-countries field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Countries:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/china" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">China</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/japan" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Japan</a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-field-topics field-type-taxonomy-term-reference field-label-above"><div class="field-label">Topics:&nbsp;</div><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="/strategic-affairs-and-security" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Strategic Affairs &amp; Security</a></div><div class="field-item odd"><a href="/political" typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Political</a></div></div></div>Tue, 25 Apr 2017 09:37:24 +0000asiaadmin22151 at http://www.southasiaanalysis.orghttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2151#commentsAsian Security’s Complex Strategic Quadrilateralhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2089
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even" property="content:encoded"><p><span style="font-size:14px;"><strong>Paper No. 6199 Dated 23-Nov-2016</strong></span></p>
<p>By Dr Subhash Kapila</p>
<p>Asian security in 2016 stands dominated by the geopolitical dynamics that are at play in the complex ‘Strategic Quadrilateral’ comprising the United States, China, Japan and India.</p>
<p>Of the above named countries, the United States is undoubtedly the sole Superpower with complex global predominance in all domains. This predominance has virtually remained intact when the global unipolar moment emerged in 1991 with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Many today would like to contest that the United States power and predominance is on the decline. This position is not debatable as none of the major powers enumerated above neither are within closing distance to US predominance nor do they have global power-projection capabilities to carve out their respective spheres of influence at the expense of the United States.</p>
<p>China exhibits the pretensions of emerging as the rival Superpower to the United States, a burning Chinese national aspiration. China no doubt has made exponential progress economically and militarily to reduce the strategic asymmetries in power in relation to the United States. But this is far from done and that makes China a dissatisfied ‘revisionist power’ out to challenge United States predominance. Regrettably for China, repeated by me for over a decade now, is that China has no ‘Natural Allies’ with national aspirations synchronous with China in dethroning the United States. Nor even Russia would fully subscribe to the Chinese aim and in any case Russia is not considered included in the Asian Strategic Quadrilateral as in Asian power dynamics Russia has yet to assert itself independently of China.</p>
<p>Japan has in the 20th Century dominated the Asian geopolitical dynamics for the first half of the Century. Japan was the first Asian country to be considered as a Major Power by the colonial powers of the day. Japan today can still be considered as a major power with a significant bearing on Asian geopolitical dynamics and since 1945 fully aligned with the United States in a military alliance to ensure security and stability in the Asia Pacific.</p>
<p>In terms of Asian geopolitical dynamics, Japan significantly is a contending Asian power against China. China has spared no space and efforts to politically and militarily coerce Japan at every stage.</p>
<p>In the Asian Strategic Quadrilateral, India is the new entrant after decades of wasteful self-inflicted isolation from Asian geopolitical dynamics. With national attributes of power closely comparable somewhat to that of China, the global major powers have conceded to India the status of an ‘Emerged Power’ by virtue of its ascendant economic and military power trajectories.</p>
<p>India not only in the context of the Asian Strategic Quadrilateral but also in the context of the global strategic calculus can be said to enjoy the unique distinction of the reigning ‘Swing State’ especially in relation to offset China. The United States and Japan are strategically investing in India for it to emerge as an ‘Existential Strategic Counterweight’ against a military threatening China.</p>
<p>India more specifically under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has opted to cast and put its weight behind the United States and Japan to balance China’s not so benign military rise. All available indicators point to the fact that in the Asian Strategic Quadrilateral, India would continue with the course adopted in strengthening its strategic partnerships with the United States and Japan.</p>
<p>The above conviction stands reinforced by the sheer irreversibility of China’s military confrontation against India along the China Occupied Tibet border and further complicated by China’s strategic nexus with Pakistan similarly and implacably hostile to India.</p>
<p>The pertinent issue that comes to the fore in the above context is that whether the China-Pakistan Axis can imbalance the USA-Japan-India Trinity. Obviously not, simply because Pakistan despite its nuclear weapons arsenal does not have the strength to be a game-changer. Pakistan at best can continue to be a military irritant to India but not enough to distract India from its pivotal role in the US-Japan-India Trinity.</p>
<p>One was not dismissive in not considering Russia as an important player in Asian geopolitics. Russia was being discounted primarily because in 2016 Russia does not enjoy any strategic proximity with United States or Japan or India in their implicit agenda of countering or managing the China threat.</p>
<p>Asian geopolitical dynamics could change should US-Russia relations ‘normalise’ under the incoming Trump Administration. Russia had in the recent past had indulged in a strategic reach-out to Japan but recessed under Chinese pressure. Russia is once again attempting to recover lost ground with India after an ill-advised pivot to Pakistan.</p>
<p>But despite the above moves, Russia would have to prove a lot to regain credibility with USA, Japan and India that it has moved out of the shadow of being a Chinese satellite. Till the above materialises, the US-Japan-India Trinity has to weld itself more strongly to ensure that this trio is in position of maintaining their position of strength in the Asian Geopolitical Quadrilateral.</p>
<p>The above analysis however presupposes that the United States under the incoming Trump Administration like all incoming US Administrations in their first term does not flip for China, notwithstanding the strong electoral rhetoric against China that President-elect Trump resorted to. Piously, one can fervently hope that the Washington security establishment does not let this deviation take place. Significantly should the incoming US Admiration flips for China, it is welcome to do so at its own cost. As reflected in one of my recent SAAG Papers, Japan and India in such an eventuality have other options.</p>
<p>In conclusion, it needs to be stressed that no game-changers can be expected from China in terms of China emerging as a responsible stakeholder in Asian security and stability in its present strategic arrogance trance. China simply cannot stomach Japan and India as rival contenders for Asian strategic space as Asian powers perceived widely as responsible stakeholders in contrast to China and whose ascendancy to power is perceived as benign.</p>
<p> </p>
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