Senator BIDEN. The hearing will please come to order.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. It is delightful to have you back before
the committee. From my perspective, it is particularly delightful to
have you back discussing what I think is a very, very valuable contribution you and the President have made to this country and presented to the Senate for our consideration, the subject matter of
our hearing this morning.

The Foreign Relations Committee today begins hearings on the
CFE Treaty governing conventional forces in Europe. Chairman
Pell had intended to be here, Mr. Secretary, but he is engaged elsewhere and sends his apologies to you.

The CFE Treaty marks a watershed in the 20th century world history. It was
signed by 22 signatories. This treaty will eliminate a fundamental cause of
tension in Europe since the end of World War II, which has been the huge numerical
advantage of Soviet conventional forces. This superiority threatened the security
and prosperity of the West for many years and was integral to the Soviet domination
of Eastern Europe.

This superiority also fueled a nuclear arms race. In every strategic doctrine adopted by NATO for 40 years, from massive retaliation to flexible response, nuclear weapons were intended to compensate for the Soviet edge in conventional arms.

The CFE Treaty has been widely described as historic, but few
accounts have underscored just how favorable this treaty and its
terms are for the United States of America. This treaty will not
only end the Soviet conventional superiority in the European theater, it will reverse it. I repeat, this treaty will not only end Soviet
conventional superiority in the European theater, it will reverse it
by limiting Soviet forces in the theater to a level well below the
combined forces of NATO.

This treaty is, as they might say in certain circles, a real good
deal for the United States of America and for its allies.

An overarching question which I hope to explore in these hearings is how the new and unfamiliar reality of this treaty will affect
our defense posture in Europe and our overall approach to American national security. Clearly, by eliminating the shadow of Soviet
military supremacy in Europe, the CFE Treaty chips away a final
foundation stone of the cold war.

But can the treaty also lay a new foundation stone for a cooperative international order that transcends the intense and relentless
arms competition of the past half-century?

While I hope the CFE Treaty can help us build a new security
order, and I will be asking you, Mr. Secretary, several questions
about that and the treaty's significance for U.S. defense policy, I
note that this treaty's immediate effect will be far less than some
had originally anticipated.

With regard to the Soviet reductions it requires, the treaty has been largely
overtaken by events in the last 18 months. Even before the treaty was signed
the Soviet Union had withdrawn some 75,000 tanks and artillery pieces and armored
combat vehicles to storage sites east of the Ural Mountains. For this reason
the treaty will not require the nations of the Warsaw Pact to destroy 130,000
pieces of equipment as the administration had predicted to this committee last
year.

In remarking on this phenomenon, I am not in any way assigning blame. The only practical alternative would have been to accelerate the negotiations so that less equipment would have been
transferred prior to the treaty signing. Whether this acceleration
could have been accomplished by bolder action on our part or more
cooperation on the part of the Soviets remains a matter for historians to debate. But it may be true that if there are flaws in the
treaty, this is the biggest.

To dwell on this fact, the fact that we were unable to require the full destruction
of the Soviet forces retreating from Eastern Europe and from the cold war itself,
would truly be an act of morbid self-flagellation in my view.

Instead, I believe we should focus on the welcome development
that has given rise to this problem. If it is bad news that we did
not achieve wholesale destruction of Soviet forces during their
hasty retreat, surely it is good news that this is the kind of bad
news that we must now cope with.

Moreover, a partial solution to this problem is contained in the Soviet government's
unilateral pledge made last month to destroy 25 percent of the equipment moved
east of the Urals and with regard to the remaining 75 percent of such equipment,
not to position it in operational units or in any other way use it as part of
a strategic reserve force.

This political commitment is necessary to ameliorate the potential, even if
unlikely, threat posed by such forces. But as the Soviet pledge stands legally,
it may be insufficient. I intend to discuss with you, Mr. Secretary 'y, a possible
remedy in the form of a Senate condition that would not require the treaty to
be renegotiated.

Another major issue requiring the Senate's attention is the Soviet effort
to reinterpret article 3 of the treaty so as to exempt more than 3,000 pieces
of equipment they assigned to naval forces. In last month's accord, the Soviets
formally agreed to act as if that equipment is covered by the treaty. But again,
while this was necessary, it may be insufficient, for the agreement took the
form of a U.S. Soviet bilateral agreement that is fully separate from the treaty
itself.

Again, Mr. Secretary, I would like to discuss with you the possibility of a second Senate condition that, again, would require no renegotiations, but could nonetheless render this bilateral agreement
functionally equivalent to being an integral part of the treaty.

As we commence these hearings, I think it is fair to say, without
intending any insult to our able negotiators, that the CFE Treaty is
a nitpicker's paradise. As a result of the immensely complicated
nature of the subject matter and the fact that no less than 22 nations were involved in the negotiations, the final product is not a
model of clarity. Nor do I think it could possibly be.

This committee could easily attach numerous conditions clarifying the meaning
of different sentences in the treaty text. Instead, "assuming we receive certain
assurances from you, Mr. Secretary, it is my belief that we should place our
discussion of these ambiguities in report language rather than formal Senate
understandings or reservations.

In closing, Mr. Secretary, let me say that I expect this treaty to
receive overwhelming bipartisan support. And I intend to work
closely with the Ranking Member of this committee, Senator
Helms, and with the administration on any language we add to the
resolution of ratification and on any other issues that may arise
throughout this process.

And again, Mr. Secretary, I welcome you and I am delighted we
are here discussing this issue.

I yield to the senior member of this committee, Senator Helms. Senator HELMS.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, I do not want to be a party-pooper, but I am obliged
to suggest that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is scarcely a landmark
in the history of arms control.

I agree with much of what Senator Biden has said. In fact, the main question,
it seems to me today, is whether the CFE Treaty is not totally irrelevant. It
is a treaty that long ago was overtaken by events beyond its scope and its terms.
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, the fall of Communist
regimes in Central Europe, and the great cracks that are appearing in the surface
of the Soviet empire have already established the withdrawal of Soviet troops
at rates exceeding the provisions of this treaty.

Moreover, the treaty is deficient in my judgment in that it does
not contemplate a more rapid removal of U.S. military forces from
Europe. I just about decided that NATO is dead and should be
given a decent burial.

In any case, it is true that there may be some marginal utility of
the treaty. It does establish guidelines for withdrawal of Soviet
troops. And it does set limits on the number of conventional arms
and military vehicles that each group of the state party to the
treaty may keep west of the Ural Mountains.

Moreover, and I especially want to complement the distinguished Chairman,
Mr. Joe Biden, for his excellent work on this. It does seem to imply that the
Brezhnev doctrine is dead even though the Soviet Union, in its grand tradition
of bad faith, has spirited away east of the Ural and beyond the reach of the
treaty thousands of armored vehicles and other weapons supposedly controlled
by the treaty. The Soviets will be all set if Brezhnev rises again.

But of course the former members of the Warsaw Pact are no longer in the camp
of the Soviet Union even though socialism has not been driven out completely
in some areas. The Soviet Union remains the prime military threat in Eastern
Europe. And insofar as the treaty has any impact at all on Soviet military deployments,
it may have a smidgen of utility. At least it provides benchmarks to tell us
if the Soviets are cheating.

But even that is faint praise, Mr. Chairman. The fact is there are
procedures for monitoring in the treaty, but the confidence of verification is extremely low. The U.S. negotiators have strained
mightily, but they have come up with, not a mouse, but with a
goose egg. It is so meaningless that there is no point in opposing it.

However, there is one lesson to be learned for future arms control exercises. And that is that the Soviets regard arms control as a
joke. A joke largely at our expense. Their record of negotiations is
full of deceit, circumvention, data falsification, fraud, attempted
violations, and reneging on the plain terms of the agreements. To
put it as politely as possible, the Soviets are cheats and liars and
scoundrels. They have proven that through the years.

I would get angry about this treaty if it meant anything in my judgment. But
it does mean something for START. And that is the point I want to emphasize.
My critique of the INF Treaty in 1988 was based upon my assessment that the
Soviets had engaged in negotiating deception to preserve covert INF forces,
that they had falsified their declared data on the numbers of their INF missiles,
and, that they had illegally retained banned INF missiles as covert forces.

In April of 1990 the Soviets finally admitted that they did covertly provide SS-23 missiles banned by the INF Treaty to three East
European nations. In March 1990, I would say to my distinguished
chairman, the former chief U.S. INF negotiator, Ambassador Maynard Glickman, termed this Soviet action, quote, "deceit and mendacity." And he added that this deceit and mendacity had characterized Soviet private and public behavior before, during, and after the INF Treaty negotiations.

I might say parenthetically that I wish Maynard had mentioned
this deceit and mendacity when we, were conducting the INF hearings, but he did not.

President Bush in his 1991 report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with
arms control treaties called the Soviet covert deployment an act of, quote,
"bad faith." If that was not the understatement of the year, I cannot think
of one.

Now the administration has new evidence relating to the SS-23 deployment,
but they will not release it to the public. I asked that it be made public in
March, but so far nothing has happened.

Now Ambassador James Woolsey, the U.S. CFE negotiator has
accused the Soviets of, quote, "fraud" in the CFE negotations. And
Russian President Boris Yeltsin told us last month when he came
to this Senate that Soviet negotiators had engaged in falsification
and deception in arms control negotiations. So what else is new?

What else is new? START, unlike CFE, is a treaty that matters.
START needs full scrutiny even though it may not be possible to
ratify in time to save Mr. Gorbachev.

But in any case, Mr. Secretary, I welcome you here this morning.
And the distinguished chairman and I are going to have a little colloquy with you a little later on. But we welcome you as we do
always.

Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman, before we begin, may I make
one statement?

Senator BIDEN. Let me say this, it has been the practice of this
committee to only have the Chair and the ranking member make
opening statements. I was about to say that I do not do that in the
judiciary committee.

But why do you not go ahead?

Senator MOYNIHAN. I simply wanted to acknowledge the presence in the room of our most distinguished negotiator of this
treaty, Ambassador Woolsey, who serve this country so well and so
diligently.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Some of my colleagues apparently do
want to make a statement. If we could all agree to limit it to a
couple of minutes, anyone who has an opening statement, go
ahead, and I will probably be dethroned for this by the full chairman when we get back. But why do we not recognize Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Senator, you may be enthroned, not dethroned.

I will be very quick. Having listened to Senator Helms, I am somewhat reluctant
to assert that this treaty does mean something since it may raise his level
of opposition to the treat . But I in fact think it is significant, and I want
to commend the Secretary and the administration and Mr. Woolsey for having achieved
this result and brought it to the committee.

Now I think Chairman Biden is correct, this treaty is not perfect.
Obviously we are going to have to go over it very carefully, and
conceivably there are ways that we could strengthen it, while allowing the process to move forward.

But I believe that if new security arrangements are to be developed in Europe,
they require virtually as a precondition the approval of a CFE treaty. This
treaty would lock in many of the changes that have taken,place which otherwise
would not have such a guarantee. It provides that no party to the treaty can
station forces in the territory of another country without its express consent.
It thus reinforces the arrangements for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed
in Eastern Europe.

As I recall, when President Havel spoke to the Congress last
year, he said that the CFE process not only helped to get the troops
out of his country, but enabled Czechoslovakia to cut back on its
own forces.

This, of course, raises the further point that approval of the
treaty is important to creating new economic arrangements in
Europe and indeed in the United States and the Soviet Union.
That is one of the great benefits we have always sought from these
arms limitation agreements.

I also think that the verification provisions contained in this
treaty are very important. In fact, we will be getting a degree of
verification that we have never heretofore had, and that in itself is
an important breakthrough not only with respect to this treaty,
but also as a precedent for arms control in general.

So, Mr. Secretary, I, for one, want to indicate to you, I do think
this treaty represents an important accomplishment, and I very
much hope that in the coming days and weeks we will be able to
move forward with its consideration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a
longer statement be placed in the record at this point.

Senator BIDEN. Without objection.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the Secretary's views
on the CFE treaty. I congratulate him, the President, our negotiators and the rest of the administration on the truly remarkable
achievement.

This treaty is so favorable to the interests of the United States
that I predict it must pass the Senate by a large margin. The
treaty virtually eliminates any threat of a short-notice, Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe.

It is significant again that the Soviet Union will no longer be
able to dominate Europe militarily. The combined conventional
forces of NATO will be greater than, as well as technologically superior to, those of the U.S.S.R. in the area from the Atlantic Ocean
to the Urals.

The treaty locks in the voluntary withdrawals of Soviet forces
from Europe and requires significant additional reductions and provides insurance against the reconstitution of Soviet military forces
in Europe if Soviet hardliners were to come to power.

The treaty complements the INF treaty by eliminating the
Soviet conventional advantage that many of my colleagues were
concerned should be rectified before we eliminated INF missiles.

The treaty's verification provisions provide additional warning
time of a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe. It
will deter Soviet cheating and permit us to read the Soviet military
books for the area west of the Urals during an unstable and unpredictable period of change in the U.S.S.R.

But there are three major areas that I believe will become the
subject of Senatorial questioning. Let me take a moment to explain
what they are and why they are of concern. First of all, verification; second, the complex issues that arose after signature of the
treaty and delayed its submission to the Senate; and third, senatorial prerogatives.

With respect to the first area, we are dealing with a new and different standard of verification. Unlike arms control treaties dealing with nuclear weapons, which are much more destructive,
weapon-for-weapon, than tanks and artillery, our verification
standard for the CFE treaty is "militarily significant Soviet cheating." We cannot verify most small scale Soviet cheating.

With respect to the second area of concern, the issues that have delayed submission
of the treaty to the Senate-Article III. Soviet movement of equipment east of
the Urals, and the data discrepancy-have captured my colleagues' attention since
last November.

I especially commend the President for the creative, practical,
but tough compromise he has crafted on article III. But I do believe
the Senate will wish to devote considerable attention to the data
discrepancy issue which raises important questions about our monitoring capability and possible Soviet cheating.

With respect to the third concern, one of the reasons why the Senate takes
its consent responsibility so seriously is that treaties entail legal obligations
under international law, and we must be certain that they are consistent with
domestic law.

But while it is clear that treaties are the law of the land, it is not
clear that ancillary agreements containing binding commitments
are part of the law of the land. And the Senate will need clarification of this issue.

But I believe that all of these problems can be overcome with respect to the CFE treaty if high administration officials consult
closely with and pay careful attention to the concerns of members
of the Senate during the deliberations.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for a chance to make this statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

I welcome Secretary Baker's appearance before this committee to provide the
administration's views on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
It gives me an opportunity warmly to congratulate him, the President, the administration,
and the negotiators on their remarkable achievement. It also provides an opportunity
to review the major advantages of the Treat and the most important problems
that are likely to arise during its consideration to the Senate.

As a Cochairman of the Senate Arms Control Observers Group, I have followed
the progress of the negotiations with interest, and I have carefully studied the
major issues in preparation for the important constitutional role the Senate will
now play in providing its advice and consent with respect to the Treaty.

Militarily, the CFE Treaty is overwhelmingly in the interest of the United States
and NATO. In my judgment, this is the key point-a point to which I will return. It
is the main reason why I believe the Senate will give its overwhelming approval to
the treaty.

But my Senate colleagues. and I take our constitutional responsibility very seriously. The Senate will go over this Treaty quite properly, with a fine tooth comb. It
may even give greater consideration to some issues than the administration. I hope
that my colleagues will be satisfied that no major Treaty revisions will be necessary,
but that is not a foregone conclusion. Careful attention by the administration to the
concerns of this committee and the Senate as a whole, and close consultation with
high administration officials, such as that represented by the Secretary,s appearance today, are critical if we are to reach a successful conclusion to our deliberations.

Advantages of the Treaty

What are the advantages of the Treaty? As I mentioned, it is overwhelmingly
in our interest.

First, it virtually eliminates any threat of a short-notice Soviet conventional
invasion of Western Europe.

Second, the Soviet Union will no longer be able to dominate Europe militarily.
The combined conventional forces of NATO will be greater than, as well as technologically superior to, those of the USSR in Europe.

Third, the Treaty locks in the voluntary withdrawals of Soviet forces from
Europe, requires significant additional reductions, and provides insurance against
the reconstitution of Soviet military forces in Europe should a new Soviet leadership
harboring hegemonic designs come to power.

The Soviets will have to destroy or convert about 38,000 pieces of equipment--over
20,000 more than NATO.

The United States will have to reduce only about 2,000 pieces of equipment, which can be transferred to the allies in a "cabcade" process that ensures that only older, less efficient equipment actually will be destroyed.

Soviet voluntary withdrawals from Europe since January 1989 amount to
54 percent of their traditional holdings. CFE, combined with voluntary
Soviet withdrawals, will reduce the USSR's traditional holdings from the
Atlantic to the Urals by a whopping total of at least 70 percent.

Fourth, the Treaty complements the INF treaty by eliminating the Soviet conventional advantage, one that many Senators thought should be rectified before eliminating INF missiles.

Fifth, the CFE Treaty's verification provisions provide additional warning time of
a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe, and deter Soviet cheating.

Sixth, the verification provisions also impose a Western management tool on the
Soviet. military during an unstable and unpredictable period of change in the USSR.
We will be able to read the Soviet military's books for the area west of the Urals.

Questions Likely to Arise

The military advantages of this Treaty are clear to even the most vocal skeptics of
arms control. But we can expect questions to be raised about the Treaty.

Verification: Questions are likely to be raised about the Treaty's
verification regime. It is fundamentally different from those of the INF and
pending START Treaties. Nuclear weapons are so destructive that we need to monitor
Soviet activities down to the last missile and warhead. Politically, it would
be nice to be able to detect any possible instance of Soviet cheating on CFE.
But from a military standpoint, it is not absolutely essential to be able to
detect the illegal presence of a small number of tanks or artillery pieces in
the zone of application.

Instead, the security of Western Europe depends on our ability to detect militarily
significant levels of change in Soviet conventional arms in the zone. Under this new
and different standard, I am confident that we can effectively verify militarily significant Soviet cheating. A verification regime is a balancing act. We have to have
enough verification to protect ourselves, but must not impose debilitating constraints and unnecessary burdens on our allies and on our own military.

Role of the Allies: Questions are also likely to be asked about the role of the
allies, particularly on verification. All negotiations involve compromise, and we had
to compromise with 21 other parties to the Treaty-including our own allies. The
United States led the process and, in general, exercised more influence than any
other Western country over the shape of the Treaty. In addition, there was considerable underlying allied agreement and cooperation. The final product shows that we
got a good document.

The United States withdrew some of its most intrusive verification proposals in
the face of strong allied opposition. But the allies have a key voice on CFE verification because Soviet inspectors will be running around their territory, not ours. We
cannot impose our will on our partners in a democratic alliance.

We must also bear in mind that the Treaty is a complex of interrelated compromises.
Almost any issue that we reopen here could open a Pandora's box involving the
other 21 signatories. Yet failure by the Senate to ratify the Treaty would be
comparable in its impact on our foreign policy to the Senate's failure to ratify
the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I.

Post-November 1990 Issues: Questions will undoubtedly be raised about the three
controversial issues that arose after signature of the Treaty-the Article III issue,
Soviet movement of huge amounts of equipment beyond the Urals, and the data discrepancy issue.

Article III: The Soviets violated Article III by claiming that Treaty-limited equipment subordinated to naval infantry units, newly created coastal defense units, and
the Strategic Rocket Forces was exempt from Treaty ceilings. The president is to be
congratulated for his creative, practical, but tough approach to resolving this problem.

We forced the Soviets to comply with their significant obligations under the
Treaty, without forcing them to admit that they had violated it. We did not
concede on principle on significant Soviet obligations, and we got compensation
for Treaty-limited equipment subordinated to coastal defense and naval infantry
units. We also closed the open-ended loophole created by the Article III violation
by getting the Soviets to agree not to increase their ancillary forces and to
maintain their equipment at CFE-required levels.

The administration acceded to the Soviet claim that equipment resubordinated to
the Strategic Rocket Forces was really for internal security, to protect missiles from ethnic minorities or rebellious republics. But the type of equipment armored combat
vehicles-are not the most threatening to Europe.

As a result of the Article III settlement, the Soviets will have to destroy twice as
much equipment as they thought when they signed the Treaty.

The Article III settlement also achieved some Soviet concessions east of the Urals
for the first time, including a commitment to destroy or convert, by 1995, 14,500
pieces of equipment over and above what the Treaty itself required.

Movement of Equipment Beyond the Urals: The second controversial issue
that arose after Treaty signature was the movement of Soviet equipment east
of the Urals. Soviet removal of huge amounts or equipment out of the zone of
reduction before Treaty signature, in order to avoid destroying most or it,
was not a Treaty violation. But the Soviets appeared to be trying to defeat
the object and purpose of the Treaty.

We have sought and received assurances that the equipment moved beyond the
Urals will not be used as a strategic reserve, that it will not be stored in sets for
military formations, and that the number of military units will not be increased,
raising the level of the threat.

We have also received a Soviet commitment to destroy or convert the equivalent
of at least 36 percent of the tanks, 28 percent of the artillery, and 9 percent
of the armored combat vehicles moved east of the Urals. To facilitate monitoring,
the Soviets have provided assurances that they will inform us of the disposition
of everything withdrawn from the zone after January 1, 1989, and that destruction
or conversion will be done in a visible way.

The Soviets have declared that most of the remaining equipment removed from
the zone will be used to augment equipment in existing units, or to replace
equipment in existing units as it becomes obsolete or its useful life runs out.
Soviet production lines for conventional arms are being cut and the economy
is in a shambles.

There is some danger that the Soviets could move the equipment back into the
zone illegally and marry it up with skeletal units left behind. But the equipment
does not pose any military threat without trained personnel, unit cohesiveness,
and a lot of au port equipment. Training personnel in achieving cohesiveness
take time, and the movement of support equipment would make it easier to detect
the illegal movement of Treaty-limited equipment. These factors increase warning
time. In addition, the Soviets have given assurances that the unit structure
in the zone would preclude absorption of removed equipment if it were brought
back into the zone-which implies that the skeletal units will be restructured.

The United States also transferred equipment out of the zone prior to Treaty signature. But it was on a much smaller scale, and we either transferred the equipment to nonsignatory countries or gave assurances that it would continue to count against the Treaty ceilings.

Data Discrepancy: Questions will almost certainly arise about the discrepancies
between the Soviet data declaration and our estimates of Soviet equipment in the
zone at Treaty signature. This is a very technical, difficult, and potentially controversial issue, and in my judgment, the administration has not devoted sufficient attention to it. It raises questions about our ability to monitor the Treaty and perhaps
about a serious Soviet attempt at deception.

Last fall, the Intelligence Community experienced great difficulty in estimating
accurately how much Soviet equipment was in the zone. The Soviets declared much
less equipment to be there than we expected. The discrepancy has been narrowed
significantly since Treaty signature. It can be accounted for largely by the huge
quantities of equipment moved legally by the Soviets out of the zone prior to Treaty
signature.

But there may have been thousands of pieces of equipment that the Soviets
did not declare and left in the zone illegally. If so, most of it was of a type
that was least significant militarily, and much@ of it has been withdrawn from
the zone or is being destroyed. Though there are a number of "smoking guns"
we have raised with the Soviets, we have little meaningful evidence to back
up the bulk of our suspicions. For this reason, the problem resists total solution.

When the Treaty is implemented, the Intelligence Community can use the tools
provided by the Treaty to get a better grip on the question of equipment illegally in
the zone. But since so much of the equipment has been removed from the zone or is
being destroyed, we may never get a true picture of Soviet holdings in the zone
prior to Treaty signature.

I am confident that the intelligence problem behind this issue was unique. The
Intelligence Community has learned from its errors, and the Treaty will improve
the monitoring ability of the Intelligence Community through on-site inspection and
notifications. We will also be primarily monitoring militarily significant change, which focuses on righting force, not on equipment alone. Fighting force is easier to
monitor and its generation gives us more warning time than the simple movement
of equipment.

Negotiating Record: Another area in which questions may arise involves
the negotiating record. There may be in expectation that the Senate should have
access to the negotiating record, as it did during its consideration of the
INF Treaty, so that it will have complete knowledge of what it is being asked
to consent to, so that it will be able to make informed judgments, and so that
there is agreement between the executive and legislative branches on the legal
meaning of Treaty provisions.

The problem is that a complete negotiating record does not exist. In fact,
it would be very surprising if a complete negotiating record existed. Since
there were originally 23, and later 22 parties to the negotiations, much of
the negotiating process did not involve the United States at all. In addition,
the negotiating process became so intricate that it was impossible for the negotiators
to keep a complete record of all that was discussed.

A record of the negotiations leading up to signature of the Treaty in November
1990 would be of little help to the Senate. However, since much of the Senate debate
will likely concern the compromises negotiated after Treaty signature, I would find
it useful if the administration would provide for the record a chronological and substantive account of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United
States regarding the three issues that arose subsequent to November 1990-Article
III, Soviet movement of equipment east of the Urals, and the data discrepancy issue.

Political Commitments: The final area in which questions may arise is that of
political commitments. There are some assurances that the Soviets have given, or
commitments that they have made, that are not legally binding. In general, the Soviets were not willing to agree to undertake legal obligations on issues they did not
consider to be within the mandate of the negotiations. For example, we were able to
get limitations on land-based naval aircraft only as a political commitment, and the
provisions of the Article III settlement that do not remote to the zone of application
are not legally binding.

If the Senate attempts now to force the administration to renegotiate the Treaty
or its associated documents to make these political commitments legally binding, or
seeks to make the Soviet political commitments part of the Treaty legislatively, the
Soviets will not agree, our relations with our European allies will suffer substantial
harm, and the Treaty itself could be threatened.

If any Member of the Senate believes that the Soviet political commitments
cannot be given significant weight in evaluating the value of the Treaty and should
be dismissed, then that Member may have to make his or her overall judgment
about the consequences of the Treaty for the security of the United States based on
Soviet legal obligations alone. Even on this basis, however, I believe that the Treaty
is in our national interest.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, let me repeat that no Treaty is perfect from the standpoint of each
of its signatories. Negotiation involves give and take.

But on balance, the CFE Treaty is so overwhelmingly in the interest of the
United States and the Alliance that any perceived shortcoming in its text and
packaging should be put in proper context.

I would like to congratulate the President, the Secretary and his colleagues and
staff again on what they have achieved. The Treaty is an important element of a
new European order and I am pleased to support it.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure, as always to welcome you, particularly in light of the fact that you come to us with such a fine
treaty that you and others have worked out.

The creation of few diplomatic instruments have spanned as
much history in as short a time as have the CFE negotiations. The
walls of oppression and fear in Eastern Europe have given way to
new expressions of democratic faith-all the way to the Urals, and
beyond. These changes, the new context in which they have taken
place, make this treaty as relevant today as the old order, in its
time, made such an effort imperative.

I have seen a figure that I think illustrates in a rather unique
way the enormous progress that this treaty will enshrine. If one includes the arms reductions that have taken place in East Germany,
then the conventional weapons that will eventually be destroyed or
rendered useless in Eastern Europe, under the terms of this treaty,
are the equivalent of all the conventional weapons held by NATO,
and that is a pretty remarkable accomplishment.

The changed atmosphere amongst those who were once our enemies and our technical national means and onsite inspect capabilities, make this treaty a very wise investment, politically and diplomatically, for the United States.

You, Mr. Secretary, and other members of the administration deserve high praise for this achievement, and so does President Gorbachev -- a fact, I am sure you will remember, as you consider what
help the United States might offer to Soviet reformers in the upcoming G-7 talks and thereafter.

This treaty is a tribute to the pragmatism and goodwill of President Gorbachev and the reformers, inside and outside the Kremlin,
who have helped sustain these important gains even in very difficult times for them. This treat is not just in our interest. It is in
the Soviet interest as well.

I look forward, Mr. Secretary, to working closely with you on
closing this excellent deal for American foreign policy and security
interests.

I hope you will soon be back with us with a START treaty in your hands. I
look forward beyond that to even more post CFE accords in the conventional area
and elsewhere, as we work to bring new ideas of peaceful coexistence to the
old continent.

I look forward to those days ahead.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to congratulate the Secretary on this fine piece of work. I
know the process of negotiation has been long and hard, and I
know that Jim Woolsey and others have done a great job.

To summarize, I hope that the ratification of this treaty will
start us down the road, which it will, to significantly reducing our
troop levels in Europe. I recall that several years ago, Congressional Quarterly picked one of my amendments as one of the 10 key
Senate votes of the year. That amendment was an effort to reduce
our troop levels in Europe.

I know that this has been a controversial subject, but it seems as
though the weight of the bureaucracy in Washington is to keep our
troop levels very high or as high as possible in Europe. The European countries are very wealthy.

They have reached a point where Europe can defend Europe in
my judgment, and I mention this only to underscore the fact that I
have been a strong supporter of reducing U.S.-European troop commitments. This CFE effort today, and the ones to follow, should
help us get to the point where our wealthy European allies do a
better job of defending themselves. With the base closure commission, we are closing bases in the United State, but that commission
does not cover overseas bases.

And a lot of taxpayers are asking, if we must have those troops,
why not relocate them to our own country, where they would stimulate our economy or be ready if we need them.

So I thank the Secretary and I look forward to this hearing.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join in commending you, Mr. Secretary as well as the
President and Ambassador Woolsey and everyone involved. It is
hard to realize, just a few years ago, we were worried about a confrontation that might literally destroy civilization and how dramatically we have moved away from that.

And what this entails is not only a lot of detail, some of which I
do not begin to understand in terms of equipment, but it also is a
general message to the nations of the world: let us solve problems
in a nonmilitary way, and that seems to be to be a very, very sound
message, and I hope it is a message that is heard in Yugoslavia
today and elsewhere where the question people are asking is
whether we are going to solve the problems in a military way.

I would add that I hope that beyond this and beyond START,
that we would also seriously take up the question of whether or not
we should not take up an earlier Soviet offer to stop all nuclear
warhead testing. I think the time has arrived when we can not
only safely do it, but increase the safety of the world by moving in
that direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Senator McConnell.

Senator MCCONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I too want to congratulate
the Secretary, but I am anxious to hear from him. So consequently,
I will insert my statement in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator McConnell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL

I am pleased we have the opportunity to hear from Secretary Baker on a significant
treaty to the United States, the Soviet Union and all of Europe. The Treaty
on Conventional bed Forces in Europe (CFE) comes amidst momentous change in
that region.

It was only thirty years ago when the "Iron Curtain" assumed physical form with
the construction of the Berlin Wall, and tensions between the U.S. and Soviets were
at an all tic high during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Today, the Wall has crumbled
and there is one Germany. East European nations are embracing democratic ideals
and free market economies. The "winds of change" have forever altered the course
or communism.

While the geopolitical fog has not lifted from Eastern Europe or the Soviet
Union, the importance of the CPE Treaty cannot be underestimated. NATO and former
Warsaw Pact countries are placed in parity with respect to limits on conventional
arms, namely: battle tanks; armored combat vehicles; artillery; combat helicopters;
and combat aircraft. By committing themselves to military stability, and through
mechanisms of verification which diminish the element of surprise attacks, the
22 CFE nations have provided additional guarantees for peace and security in
that region.

I think two contentious issues within the Soviet's negotiating position are worth
noting. First, prior to signing the Treaty in November 1990, the Soviets moved over
70,000 tanks and artillery to locations outside of negotiated zones. Second, the Soviets declared shortly after signing the Treaty that certain military hardware used by
naval infantry and coastal defense forces would not be covered by the arms limitation.

With the end of the cold war, the CFE Treaty limits the possibility of a world
theater of combat in Europe. It enjoys broad bipartisan support in the Senate,
and I look forward to hearing Secretary Baker's testimony.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I would like once more to acknowledge and
welcome the presence of our genuinely distinguished negotiator,
Ambassador Woolsey.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Woolsey, would you please stand? [Laughter.]

Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would simply like to note that the very distinguished Secretary of State
that is before us today has participated in a historic change in public policy.
This Nation in the 1960's and 1970's thought the way to deal with the Soviets,
at least at times, would involve unilateral concessions and at times, not standing
behind the brave men and women that represent this country in times of combat.

And so we went through a painful period of experimenting with
unilateral disarmament or aspects of it and a period of backing our
and not supporting the people who put their very lives on the line
to represent this country.

The Secretary has played a critical role and an important role in
a change of policies in the 1980's and now the 1990's, that suggest
that the way to deal with the world is to insist that disarmament
should be mutual, not unilateral, and that the men and women
who represent this country deserve to have the Nation stand
behind them when they are in combat.

The results speak louder than any political rhetoric ever could.
What has come is a historic and landmark disarmament that is
mutual and a resolution on the battlefield that has renewed America's pride in itself and in the men and women who represent it.

Mr. Secretary, I salute you not only for this great achievement
that is before us today but the integral role you played in changing
American policy from a policy of unilateral disarmament to one
that insisted it had to be mutual, from a policy change that instead
of bringing defeat and disgrace to this Nation, has brought it, I
think, a very advantageous disarmament that reduces tensions in
the world.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Wofford.

Senator WOFFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have played a significant part in the new
process that must take us all the way to peace and the nuclear
strategy for peace.

You walk in the shoes of a secretary of state from the State I
originally came from, Tennessee, who led us, Cordell Hull, into the
process of reciprocal trade. This is a process of reciprocal peace. It
will be a long journey.

This is a very important step, and to all of those who have been
part of this process here with you and those have joined with you
from other countries, to proceed on that long journey to the next
step: test bans and strategy for nuclear peace, that makes full use
of this opportunity that we have in the world today.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator. We have almost
ended our long journeys, Mr. Secretary. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. I would ask unanimous consent my full statement be placed in the record.

Let, me just very quickly say, as I am sure my colleagues have
said, Mr. Secretary, you and the President and the administration
deserve gratitude and the respect of people all over the face of this
planet for this accomplishment, and I think that for a long time,
ever since World War II, we have spent trillions upon trillions of
tax dollars in both blocs to build ever more sophisticated weapons,
and for a long time we just dreamt about the possibility of even
putting a cap on it, let alone reducing it.

I think the fact that we are now in an extraordinary moment
when there is such a significant reduction-asymmetrical reductions, where NATO will be effectively in a stronger position, I
think-and you have accomplished this, is really a remarkable accomplishment. It is a first step. I think we all recognize that. There
is more to be done.

I am sure colleagues will have questions, as we all will, on the
verification issue, as well as oh the questions that arose regarding
data and transfers and the difficulties before you, but I also congratulate you and the President for the tough stand you took with
respect to those difficulties, and I think that we are better off for
it.

So, Mr. Secretary, I think this is obviously an historic moment of
huge import, and the world looks to see how we can take advantage of this and further codify the extraordinary changes that have
taken place in Europe as well as the rest of the world, and I congratulate you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

We are here today to consider a document -- and the culmination of a process
-- that is of historical proportions and dimensions.

Virtually since the days of world War II, the armies of Western Europe, Canada,
and the United States stood ready to confront those of the Soviet Union and its East
European clients. The threat that a disagreement or misperception could erupt into
a globe-shattering cataclysm hung heavily for nearly half a century. Even if nuclear
war could be avoided, both sides greatly feared a conventional conflict that would
reduce the continent to rubble and kill millions. The nations in both blocs spent trillions of tax dollars to purchase and field ever-more-sophisticated weapons, as the
natural law of a spiraling arms race proceeded without restraint.

For many years, the idea of reaching agreement on a sweeping treaty that would
significantly reduce the level of such weaponry-or even just cap it-was little more
than a dream. But the dreamers persisted. And the inexorable and sometimes unpredictable march of history continued. Suddenly, the idea of achieving such a
treaty shifted from the inconceivable to the possible.

The task was never easy. The topic was so complex, the history so real and recent.
But Herculean effort on the part of thousands of people representing dozens of nations prevailed.

Is the CFE Treaty the manifestation of everything for which we had hoped and
dreamed? It is not. However, in light of the fundamental changes that have taken
place in Europe during the last 2 years, it is easy to lose sight of the CFE
Treaty's significance. The Treaty does provide for the staged reduction of the
huge military forces of both sides. It lacks in many long-awaited changes that
have row occurred in the European security environment. It requires the Soviet
Union to make large, asymmetric cuts in its conventional arsenal and establishes
a comprehensive, intrusive monitoring regime. Most important, the CFE Treaty
lays the groundwork for further arms reductions and stability-enhancing measures
throughout the region. While it does not go as far as many of us would like
in reducing the level of arms in Europe, it is still an historic agreement that
enhances our security and that of our friends and allies there in important
respects.

Therefore, although the world is a very different place than it was when the CFE
negotiations began just over two years ago, the Treaty remains not just valid but
vital.

It is important, however, to view the Treaty, rather than its an end in itself, as a
first step toward a fundamental restructuring of the European political and security
order. There is a great deal more to accomplish. But every journey must begin with
a first step.

I am confident that this committee, and the entire Senate, can move expeditiously
on the CFE Treaty so that the nations of Europe, along with the United States and
Canada, can proceed to establish a new era.

The development of the Treaty was not without its trials. Some were expected;
others were not. Some problems-and quite serious ones-surfaced after the Treaty
was signed. But due to diligent effort and diplomacy, agreement has been reached
on these matters. I commend you, Mr. Secretary, for your persistence in striving
toward this point-as I commend all who, on behalf of the United States and the
other signatory nations, labored to produce this Treaty.

I look forward to the committee's consideration, to the Senate's action, and to the
ratification of this very significant and welcome step toward a safer world.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator. Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. BAKER, III. SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I should start by thanking you
and the members of the committee for those very generous comments and tell you that I am really honored to appear before you
today to present the case for ratification of this treaty. Your constitutionally mandated role in the ratification process is critical, of
course, to the protection of the interests of America all around the
world, and so the administration asks that you weigh the merits of
this treaty carefully with due regard for our long-term strategic political and economic interests.

Having said that, let me interject here that we think this is a
darn good treaty, and we think, as many of you have already pointed out, that it very well serves our strategic political and economic
interests, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, when you and the members of
the committee have finished questioning all of us in the administration, not just the Secretary of State but our legal and technical
experts as well, that you will find this treaty worthy of ratification.

It is a legally-binding commitment entered into by Europe's
major military and political powers, and as such it can help protect
America's national security and help protect it for decades to come.

It marks, in my view, Mr. Chairman, a fundamental shift away
from the cold war to a Europe which is whole and free. Not only is
it an essential foundation for the new Europe, but I think it will
serve as a bulwark against a return to cold war dangers and to cold
war animosities.

Not only does this treaty alter the shape of military confrontation in Europe and I think one of you alluded to this-it does,
indeed, lock in more stable and predictable security relations in
Europe and thereby fosters a political and military environment
that is essential to healing old divisions and to safeguarding the
new democracies of Europe.

To understand the importance of this treaty, I think we might
step back to the world before 1989. I think Senator Simon, among
others, alluded to this, to the cold war world that a ratified and
fully implemented CFE treaty can help us lock away for ever.

If you remember, the concerns we had then included the massive
preponderance of Soviet offensive forces which were capable of an
overwhelming attack on Western Europe, the danger of a short-warning blitzkrieg-type offensive that was created by military secrecy, and was enhanced by the closed societies of the Central and
Eastern European States, the political weight of Soviet occupation
forces in Central and Eastern Europe which burdened the prospects for reform, and the economic cost of defending against the
threat.

We worked very long and hard for a long period of time to deal
with these concerns through the mutual and balanced force reduction talks. You will all remember that those talks led to a complete
stalemate for over 15 years. Even relatively modest reductions of
forces in Central Europe eluded our negotiators.

Then in December 1988, just months before the CFE negotiations
were scheduled to begin, President Gorbachev announced what
were then viewed as very dramatic unilateral force cuts, yet these
cuts, even when implemented, would have left the Warsaw Pact
with a 2 to 1 advantage in key capabilities, and the main point, I
think, is that these cuts were far from irreversible.

Gorbachev's announcement, however, did serve as a catalyst to
the CFE negotiations, setting a more hopeful environment for those
negotiations. NATO moved forward promptly with proposals that
would allow everyone in Europe to be more secure, including, I
would submit, the Soviet Union.

We and our allies were determined to reduce sharply the massive
forward deployments of Soviet forces, it being our hope that this
would diminish the Warsaw Pact's potential to launch a short-warning attack. It would foster the prospects for political change in
Central and Eastern Europe, and it would lessen the burden of defense through stability at lower levels of forces.

The CFE treaty helps turn what were those fond hopes into realities, and let me briefly explain that. Strategically, the treaty codifies a radically new European security environment. It provides a
strong foundation for future European security negotiations.

The CFE requires the destruction and the limitation of key offensive weapons, thereby locking in a new basis for strategic stability
in Europe. It also introduces what is the most extensive and intrusive verification regime ever adopted by an arms control treaty,
locking in increased openness and increased predictability.

The treaty will codify stability by eliminating many thousands of
pieces of military equipment, primarily through destruction, subject to notification and to observation. It will codify stability by reducing and limiting five categories of armaments-tanks, artillery,
armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft -- those being the most suited to the conduct of offensive military operations.

It limits any one State from possessing more than roughly one-third of the
total treaty-limited equipment in the area, thereby restricting the potential
for any one State to achieve military and political hegemony on the continent
of Europe. It limits equipment in active units and requires that other ground
forces equipment under the overall ceilings be held in certain designated storage
areas.

It creates an interlocking system of geographical limitations on
the size of military forces, thereby constraining force concentrations and ensuring balances not only in Central Europe but on the
flanks of Central Europe as well.

The treaty will also codify predictability and openness, and they
will do so by the extremely intrusive verification regime that I just
mentioned. In conjunction with our national intelligence means,
this will virtually eliminate the possibility of militarily significant
clandestine build-ups.

This regime includes exchanges of detailed information it includes openness requirements, and several forms of onsite inspections to complement national technical means. Military installations of all 22 signatory States in the Atlantic to the Urals zone
will be subject to mandatory inspections, and challenge inspections
will be possible at any suspect site.

In addition, the treaty provides for the establishment of a joint
consultative group designed to address any questions relating to
compliance or interpretation and to consider measures to enhance
the effectiveness and the viability of the treaty.

Politically, the treaty helps lock in the removal of Soviet forces
from Eastern Europe. The treaty reinforces the sovereignty of
those emerging democracies. It provides that no State party to CFE
may station forces on the territory of another State party without
the express consent of that State.

Reinforcing the bilateral accords that called for the elimination
of all stationed Soviet troops, the treaty assures that any Soviet
military deployments in Europe without the consent of the host
country would also violate the treaty, and President Havel said in
his address to Congress last year, as one of you has already alluded
to, the CFE process not only facilitated the removal of Soviet forces
from his country, but it also created the conditions for the reduction of Czechoslovakia's own national armed forces.

In each of these ways, Mr. Chairman, CFE helps to safeguard the
security and independence of the new democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe.

Economically, CFE allows us to maintain deterrence at much
lower levels of forces-Senator Pressler has already mentioned
this-allowing for reductions in the resources that we devote to Europe's defense.

It also allows the Soviets to turn new thinking into new policy,
and to convert their defense resources to civilian uses, something
we have been talking to the Soviets about-specifically, something
we will be talking to them about in London at the economic
summit there this weekend and early next week-and it will
permit them to convert defense resources to civilian use by defining security through a negotiated and legally binding regime
rather than through the threat of a massive use of force.

Above all, legally, Mr. Chairman, CFE locks in these unprecedented strategic
political and economic facts through a treaty that we submit to you is legally
binding, and one that has been agreed to by all of the major military powers
in Europe.

It is true, some of these facts could have come about-Senator Helms has made
this point-through unilateral steps taken by various States, and some, indeed,
have already come about through unnatural steps. But any unilateral action,
Mr. Chairman-and this is the key to this criticism of this treaty-can be unilaterally
reversed, and that is why we worked so hard to get a multilateral, legally binding
and effectively verifiable agreement.

Given the continuing uncertainties that we see in the Soviet
Union, this treaty's contribution as a bulwark against any return
to cold war military confrontation I hope will weigh very heavily in
your considerations. As the President has made abundantly clear,
we support perestroika and the new thinking, and we are actively
working toward their success.

But as I said in San Francisco almost 2 years ago:

Any uncertainty about the fate of reform in the Soviet Union is all the more
reason, not less, for us to seize the opportunities presented at the present. For the
works of our labor-a diminished Soviet threat and effectively verifiable agreements-can endure even if perestroika does not endure.

If the Soviets have already destroyed weapons, it will be difficult, it will be costly,
and it will be time consuming for any future Kremlin leadership to reverse the
process and try to assert military superiority, and with agreements in place, any
attempt to break out of treaties will serve as an indicator of an outbreak of the old
thinking.

Those words from 2 years ago, Mr. Chairman, I would submit to
you, are just as true today, and that is why we ask you to give your
consent to the ratification of this treaty.

Many of you have mentioned your concern about resolution of
the so-called article III question, so let me devote a brief bit of time
to that before we get to the questions and answers.

Shortly after the treaty was signed last November, the Soviets
came to us with an assertion of the right to apply treaty counting
rules in a way that we felt was at odds with the text, was at odds
with the negotiating record, and was at odds with the views of the
other 21 participants to this negotiation.

Most importantly, the Soviets claimed that equipment and units
subordinate to the Navy were not accountable under various CFE
limitations, despite the fact that this equipment fell within the
treaty's scope of coverage. By that, I mean it met the definition for
treaty-limited equipment and was permanently based on land
within the CFE area of application.

The President made clear that this problem would have to be
rectified before we would even send the treaty up here to the
Senate for advice and consent, and you will recall, Mr. Chairman,
we had an exchange on that during the course of one of my recent
appearances before the committee.

There were other treaty-related problems as well. During the
final months of the negotiations, it became clear that the Soviets
had moved tens of thousands of pieces of equipment East of the
Urals, where they are not subject to the treaty's provisions, and
sever al of you in your opening statements have referred to this
matter as well.

Last, there were questions about the accuracy of Soviet data on their holdings
of equipment in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone of coverage, and Senator Lugar
has referred to that. After months-many months of bilateral United States-Soviet
discussions and high-level communications, after activities in the Joint Consultative
Group and a number of bilateral exchanges between Moscow and several other participants,
we produced a package that we would submit to you, Mr. Chairman, preserves the
integrity the inviolability of this treaty.

In a separate, legally-binding statement, the Soviet Government
committed itself to a number of undertakings to reduce and limit
naval infantry and coastal defense forces that will effectively bring
them into compliance with treaty ceilings and other key provisions.
While separate from the treaty, the preamble of the Soviet statement explicitly notes these undertakings are designed to promote
implementation of the treaty.

This statement also affirms the comprehensive nature of the
CFX counting rules. That is, that all equipment in treaty-limited
categories in the zone of application is covered by the limitations of
the treaty except as provided for in the treaty and associated documents. We think that this solution will reduce the likelihood of
similar disputes in the future.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, this statement resolves another area of dispute by
specifying that armored personnel carriers in strategic rocket forces, as with
similar vehicles involved in analogous internal security functions, do not count
against treaty ceilings. The Soviets are proscribed from increasing their holdings
of such vehicles in the strategic rocket forces and from providing any other
types of treaty-limited equipment to these forces.

In addition, the Soviets undertook several political commitments
concerning equipment East of the Urals. They will destroy or convert by 1995 at least 14,500 pieces in an open and observable fashion. They also pledged not to use the withdrawn equipment to
create a strategic reserve force. These assurances satisfy our major
concerns about the disposition and possible future use of this equipment.

The information to be provided by the Soviets and the actions
they have pledged to undertake will facilitate effective monitoring
by national technical means of that equipment, that is, the equipment East of the Urals.

Discrepancies between our estimates and the Soviet data provided at signature have been narrowed considerably as a result of further analysis and information, including data which has been provided to us by the Soviets.

Remaining questions are going to be fully explored, Mr. Chairman, in the Joint Consultative Group, or through other channels.
In our view, none of these data issues warrant any delay in acting
on this treaty.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me simply say this. In 1989, Europe
underwent a political earthquake. We saw there an eruption of
democratic values that changed the political map of the continent.
Now we are working with the new democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe and with a reforming Soviet Union to ensure that
democracy continues to flourish from the Atlantic to the Urals.

One of the surest ways, in our view, to do that, is to ratify this
treaty and then move forward with its implementation, because,
Mr. Chairman, this treaty can be an enduring pact of mutual advantage. It can be a treaty in which all Europeans and Americans
find their interests advanced, and in so doing CFE can reduce the
uncertainties of the future by helping make certain that the military map of Europe reflects our fundamental interest.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am honored to appear before you
today to present the case for ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE). Your constitutionally-mandated role in the ratification
process is critical to the protection of America's interests around the world. And go I
ask you to weigh the merits of this Treaty carefully with due regard for its impact
on our long-term strategic, political, and economic interests.

I believe when you review this Treaty in all its provisions, Mr. Chairman, you will
rind it worthy of ratification. For as a legally-binding commitment, entered into by
Europe's major military and political powers, it can help protect America's national
security for decades to come.

The CFE Treaty marks a fundamental shift away from the cold war to a Europe
whole and free. Not only is it an essential foundation for the new Europe, but it will
be a bulwark against a return to cold war dangers and animosities. CFE does not
simply alter the shape of military confrontation in Europe. It locks-in more stable
and predictable security relations in Europe, fostering a political and military environment that is essential to healing old divisions and safeguarding the new democracies of Europe.

CFE and the New Europe

To understand the importance of this Treaty, we need to step back to the world
before 1989, to the cold war world that a ratified and fully implemented CFE Treaty
can help lock away forever. The concerns we had then included:

The massive preponderance or Soviet offensive forces, capable of attacking
Western Europe;

The danger of short-warning blitzkrieg created by military secrecy and
closed societies in the East;

The political weight of Soviet occupation forces in Central and Eastern
Europe, burdening the prospects for reform; and

The economic costs of defending against the threat.

Our efforts to deal with these concerns through the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions (MBFR) talks led to stalemate. For fifteen years, even relatively modest
reductions of forces in Central Europe eluded us. Then, in December 1988, just
months before the CFE negotiations began, President Gorbachev announced what
were then viewed as dramatic unilateral force cuts. Yet these cuts would have left
the Warsaw Pact with a two-to-one advantage in key capabilities, and these cuts
were fir from irreversible.

Gorbachev's announcement, however, did serve as a catalyst to the CFE negotiations, setting a more hopeful environment for the negotiations. NATO moved forward with proposals that would allow everyone in Europe to be more secure, including the Soviet Union. We and our Allies were determined to reduce sharply the
massive forward deployments of Soviet forces. It was our hope that this would diminish the Warsaw Pact's potential to launch a short-warning attack, foster the
prospects for political change in Central and Eastern Europe, and lessen the burden
of defense through stability at lower levels of forces.

The CFE Treaty helps turn these hopes into realities. Let me explain.

Strategically, the Treaty codifies a radically new European security environment
and provides a strong foundation for future European security negotiations. CFE requires the destruction and limitation of key offensive weapons, locking-in a new
basis for strategic stability in Europe. CFE also introduces the most extensive and
intrusive verification regime ever, locking-in increased openness and predictability.

The Treaty will codify stability by:

Eliminating many thousands of pieces of military equipment, primarily rough
destruction, subject to notification and observation;

Reducing and limiting five categories of armaments tanks, artillery, armored
combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft-most suited to the
conduct of offensive military operations;

Limiting any one state from possessing more than roughly one-third of the
total Treaty-limited equipment in the area, thereby restricting the potential
for any state to achieve military and political hegemony on the Continent;

Limiting equipment in active units,and requiring that other ground forces
equipment under the overall ceilings be held in designated storage sites;
and

Creating an interlocking system of geographical limitations on the size
of military forces, thereby constraining force concentrations and ensuring
balances not only in Central Europe but on the flanks as well.

The Treaty will also codify predictability and openness by an extremely intrusive
verification regime. In conjunction with our national intelligence means, this will
virtually eliminate the possibility of militarily significant clandestine buildups.

This regime includes exchanges of detailed information, openness requirements,
and several forms of onsite inspections to complement national technical means.
Military installations of all 22 signatory states in the Atlantic to the Urals
zone will be subject to mandatory inspections, and challenge inspections will
be possible at any suspect site. In addition, the Treaty provides for the establishment
of a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) to address any questions relating to compliance
or interpretation and to consider measures to enhance the effectiveness and
viability of the Treaty.

Politically, the Treaty helps lock-in the removal of Soviet forces
from Eastern Europe. The Treaty reinforces the sovereignty of the emerging democracies.
It provides that no state party to CFE may station forces on the territory of
another without the express consent of that state. Reinforcing the bilateral
accords that call for the elimination of all stationed Soviet troops, the Treaty
assures that any Soviet military deployments in Europe without the consent of
the host country would also violate the Treaty. And as President Havel said
in his address to Congress last year, the CFE process not only facilitated the
removal of Soviet forces from his country, but it also created the conditions
for the reduction of Czechoslovakia's own national armed forces. In each of
these ways, CFE helps to safeguard the independence, security, and political
development of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Economically, CFE allows us to maintain deterrence at lower levels of forces, allowing for reductions in the resources we devote to Europe's defense. It also allows
the Soviets to turn new thinking into new policy and convert their defense resources to civilian use by defining security through a negotiated, legally-binding
regime rather than through the threat of a massive use or force.

Above all, legally, CFE locks-in these unprecedented strategic, political, and economic facts through a legally-binding Treaty, one agreed to by the major military
powers in Europe. It is true some of these facts could have come about through unilateral steps taken by various states. But any unilateral action can be unilaterally
reversed. That's why we've worked so hard to get a multilateral, legally-binding,
and effectively verifiable agreement.

Given the continuing uncertainties we see in the Soviet Union, this Treaty's contribution as a bulwark against any return to cold war military confrontation should
weigh heavily in your considerations. As the President has made abundantly clear,
we support perestroika and the new thinking and are actively working toward their
success. But, as I said in San Francisco almost two years ago, "Any uncertainty
about the fate of reform in the Soviet Union, however, is all the more reason, not
less, for us to seize the present opportunity. For the works of our labor-a diminished Soviet threat and effectively verifiable agreements-can endure even if perestroika does not. If the Soviets have already destroyed weapons, it will be difficult,
costly, and time-consuming for any future Kremlin leadership to reverse the process
and to assert military superiority. And with agreements in place, any attempt to
break out of treaties will serve as an indicator of an outbreak of old thinking."
Those words from two years ago are just as true today.

And that's why we ask you to give your consent to ratification of this Treaty.

Article III and Resolution of Outstanding Issues

I know many of you are concerned about resolution of the so-called Article III
question, so let me devote some time to that issue.

Shortly after the Treaty was signed last November, the Soviets asserted the right
to apply Treaty counting rules in a way that was at odds with the text, the negotiating record, and the views of all other 21 participants. Most importantly, the Soviets
claimed that equipment in units subordinate to the Navy were not accountable
under various CFE limitations, despite the fact that this equipment fell within the
Treaty's scope of coverage. By that, I mean it met the definition for treaty-limited
equipment and was permanently based on land within the CFE area of application.
The President made clear that this problem would have to be rectified before the
Treaty could be presented to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

There were other Treaty-related problems as well. During the final months of tile
negotiations, it became clear that the Soviets had moved tens of thousands of pieces
of equipment east of the Urals, where they are not subject to the Treaty's provisions. Finally, there were questions about the accuracy of Soviet data on their holdings of equipment in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone of coverage.

After months of bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions and high-level communications,
activities in the Joint Consultative Group, and a number or bilateral exchanges between Moscow and several other participants, we produced a package that preserves
the integrity and inviolability of the Treaty.

In a separate legally-binding Statement, the Soviet Government committed itself
to a number of undertakings to reduce and limit naval infantry and coastal defense
forces that will effectively bring them into compliance with Treaty ceilings
and other key provisions. While separate from the Treaty, the preamble or the
Soviet Statement explicitly notes these undertakings are designed to promote
implementation of the Treaty. This Statement also affirms the comprehensive
nature of the CFE counting rules (that is, all equipment in Treaty-limited categories
in the zone of application is covered by the limitations of the Treaty, except
as provided for in the Treaty and associated documents). This will reduce the
likelihood of similar disputes in the future. Finally, this statement resolves
another area of dispute by specifying that armored personnel carriers in Strategic
Rocket Forces, as with similar vehicles involved in analogous internal security
functions, do not count against Treaty ceilings. The Soviets are proscribed
from increasing their holdings of such vehicles in the Strategic Rocket Forces
and from providing any other types of Treaty-limited equipment to these forces.

In addition, the Soviets undertook several political commitments concerning
equipment East of the Urals. They will destroy or convert by 1995 at least 14,500
pieces in an open and observable fashion. They also pledged not to use the withdrawn
equipment to create a strategic reserve force. These assurances satisfy our
major concerns about the disposition and possible future use of this equipment.
The information to be provided by the Soviets and the actions they have pledged
to undertake will facilitate effective monitoring by national technical means
or equipment east of the Urals.

Discrepancies between our estimates and the Soviet data provided at signature
have been narrowed considerably as a result of further analysis and information,
including data provided by the Soviets. Remaining questions will be fully explored
in the Joint Consultative Group or through other channels. In our view, none of
these data issues warrant delay in acting on the Treaty.

CONCLUSION

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say this: In 1989, Europe underwent a political
earthquake, an eruption of democratic values that changed the political map or the
Continent. Now, we are working with the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe and a reforming Soviet Union to ensure democracy continues to flourish
from the Atlantic to the Urals.

One of the surest ways to do that is to ratify the CFE Treaty and then move
forward with its implementation. For CFE can be an enduring pact of mutual advantage,
a Treaty in which all Europeans and Americans rind their interests advanced.
And in doing so, CFE can reduce the uncertainties of the future by helping make
certain,in that the military map of Europe reflects our fundamental interests.

Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I should note for everyone that although you are a most important witness, we will give Ambassador
Woolsey an opportunity to testify before us and the Joint Chiefs as
well, and the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence community.
So although we have many, many questions, we will not attempt to
direct all of them to you, nor do we need to direct all of them to
you today.

I would also indicate, particularly for those who may be watching this on television, that we have said all these nice things about
the treaty and your efforts and I suspect what you are going to
hear now are a number of questions on areas where we have concerns about the treaty. This may be confusing to people. If you dwelled on what was good about the treaty, we could spend
view, the next several days alone talking about it.

It is, in my opinion, overwhelmingly favorable to the United
States and clearly and overwhelmingly in U.S. interest to ratify.
But there are, and I suspect most of us will be focusing on, those
portions of the treaty where there are ambiguities or where we
think there may be some difficulty. I know you are aware of that.

But I know there are a number of people in here who are watching this proceeding and who may wonder what it is we're talking
about. We just said all those nice things about that treaty and now
we are going to spend all our time asking questions that seem in
conflict with that notion.

But before we begin the questioning, there are two housekeeping
matters that Senator Helms and I are obliged to take care of. And
I would like, Mr. Secretary, to ask your cooperation on both of
these.

The first item concerns the significance this committee and the
Senate at large should attach to the testimony of administration officials. In that regard I would like to ask you several simple questions.

When you and other key officials, such as Secretary Cheney, testify before this committee on the CFE Treaty, can we assume that
you are speaking for the executive branch?

Secretary BAKER. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. And when you and other authoritative officials
testify on this treaty and explain it to us, do you believe that your
testimony is contributing to, to use the term of art, a shared understanding between the executive and the Senate as to the meaning
of the treaty and the way the United States will interpret that
treaty?

Secretary BAKER. Mr. Chairman, let me, having said that it is my
view that the testimony of Cabinet officials is testimony for and on
behalf of the administration, let me say that I do not think I ought
to pronounce on specific legal questions. We are going to provide
you with legal witnesses. But I think maybe I can help you by
elaborating on my yes answer to you.

First of all, let me say that obviously my testimony and that of
the Cabinet officials you mentioned, and for that matter I think
other executive branch witnesses, within their authorized scope, I
should say perhaps within the authorized scope of each of us, is authoritative. And you can and should treat it as authoritative. The
testimony and materials that we submit for the record here can, I
think, be considered as authoritative by you without any need for
you to incorporate them in your resolution of advice and consent, if
that is what you are asking me.

The administration does not intend to depart from the interpretations of the CFE Treaty that we are presenting to the Senate. I
hope that answers your question.

Senator BIDEN. It does.

And so this does not seem cryptic to those who may be listening,
we have met with a mild dilemma here. This is an extremely complicated treaty. By definition it is complicated when 23 nations get
together and try to deal with such a complicated subject.

And what Senator Helms and I want to ensure, or as I should
speak only for myself, what I want to make sure of is that we do
not, as a consequence of not going through every single line in this
treaty with you, leave the Senate open to the assertion at a later
date that, notwithstanding the fact that we accepted the assertions
made by the administration officials as to what the treaty provisions meant, have a situation whereby the Senate consented to
something different than it thought it did because we should have
gone back and taken every line where there was any possible ambiguity and attached a Senate understanding to that line.

And so, as you know, the phrase shared understanding is a term
of art which is used for the purpose of us being able to rely on the
interpretation given by you and other authoritative administration
officials that the treaty means what you say it does so that when
we consent, we are consenting to the treaty according to the administration's definition of it.

And that is the purpose of this. I just want to make sure that
you would agree with the opening premise that if you speak and
the committee does not take issue with your statement, then the
statement contributes substantively to our shared understanding.

Secretary BAKER. Let me say with respect to the question of the
term of art that was embraced in your second question, Mr. Chairman, shared understanding, it would be my hope that my testimony and the testimony of other executive branch witnesses will contribute to a shared understanding. Whether or not the committee
chooses to comment on any particular point or not, is up to the
committee.

On the other hand, as I indicated earlier, I would prefer not to
attempt to pronounce on the legal affect of complicated hypothetical scenarios because I cannot.

I will say that we will be up here giving you our best understanding of the meaning of treaty provisions, taking into account the negotiating history of those provisions.

Our testimony can be accepted by the Senate as authoritative.
And I would hope that it would contribute to a shared understanding, as I have just mentioned. I hope that answers your question.

Senator BIDEN. It almost does.

Let me just say that possibly before this process is over we would
have to hear from the legal office of the Secretary of State because
otherwise we find ourselves in the position that it might be necessary for this committee to have the entire negotiating record and
for us to examine the negotiating record in detail prior to any
movement on the part of the Senate to agree to ratification of this
treaty.

And I would hope that is not what is necessary and that we are
able to constitutionally and technically rely upon your assertions
as to what the treaty means unless it is apparent on the face of the
treaty that it does not mean what you have previously asserted.

Secretary BAKER. Let me try one more time and see if this
pushes the envelope a little further, Mr. Chairman.

It would be our hope that the Senate will act on the assumption
that it can rely on administration witnesses to interpret the treaty
and it will rely upon the administration to interpret the treaty in accordance with the testimony of the administration witnesses.

That is certainly our intention.

I cannot pass on the legal consequences of certain hypothetical
scenarios as I think would have been required in a fuller response
to your second question.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you.

I yield to my colleague, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. You use the word best understanding. I am sure
that is correct.

But can we rely on all of you from now on to give us full answers? We ran into this on the INF hearings. And now it is coming
to light and has been coming to light that we were not told any
falsehoods, but we were not told all of the story. I mentioned a
couple of those examples in my opening statement.

Let me try to summarize my understanding of what has been
said here. If the treaty text and your presentation of the treaty's
meaning are clear and mutually consistent, then can we expect the
executive branch to act in accordance with that interpretation even
if the Senate does not explicitly state in the resolution of ratification that we are relying upon you to do so?

Secretary BAKER. I would rather answer that question for the
record, Senator Helms. Let me take it and confer with the lawyers,
I will be happy to answer that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Yes. The administration will in no way depart from the interpretations of the
CFE Treaty that we are presenting to the Senate.

Senator HELMS. I understand why you want to do that because it
is a heavy question.

Now let us turn to the second housekeeping question which relates to the relationship between this committee and the administration on the matter of information sharing and consultation as
we head into a period of considerable arms control activity.

With the CFE Treaty now before us and Soviet and U.S. negotiators working
even as we speak to try to finalize the START Treaty, there is a great deal
on the agenda. In my view, and I know Senator Biden shares it, it is simply
imperative, Mr. Secretary, if this administration expects to work closely with
the committee of jurisdiction on arms control matters that the administration
share with this committee the same information that is being conveyed on a routine
basis to other entities in the Senate.

Let me be specific. I am referring to information being transmitted to the Senate on a regular basis by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but not to the Foreign Relations Committee.
Perhaps you are not even aware of this anomaly.

But I am confident, Mr. Secretary, that Senator Biden and I
speak for this entire committee in saying to you quite firmly that
this anomaly should be corrected without any delay if there is to be
a sound basis for a constructive interaction on this and forthcoming treaties.

Before I ask for your response, Senator Biden indicated that he
might wish to comment.

Senator BIDEN. I would concur with Senator Helms both in his
suggestion that this is an unacceptable situation and in his supposition that you may not even know about it, Mr. Secretary.

But may we have your assurance that this committee will receive, under all the same strictures regarding the handling of classified information, the same data and reports being supplied to others in the Senate?

Secretary BAKER. Let me answer both of you by saying that our
job and particularly my job is to keep this committee informed of
arms control developments. That is and should be a priority for us.
I am not familiar with exactly what you are referring to.

But if you let me know what it is that you are talking about and you are lacking
some material, I am sure we can try and work something out. Let me see what
it is, see what the problem is. I cannot answer this in a vacuum.

Is this something that has gone to the Arms Control Observer
Group?

Senator BIDEN. That is right, the Arms Control Observer Group
has staff to go and get information that this committee is not able
to get through the same means.

Secretary BAKER. And they will not share it with you?

Senator BIDEN. We are not looking to be shared with, we are the
outfit that decides whether or not we recommend that the treaty
be ratified.

As we go into the negotiation on the START Treaty we are going
to have to wait in line and determine whether or not we think we
have all of the information.

It is real simple. I am supposed to dance around that subject, Mr.
Secretary, but I am not a very good dancer. And so that is it,
straight and simple.

Secretary BAKER. Let me reflect, Senator, as I know you are
aware and the thrust of your question even, I think presupposes
this, that it is not material that has come to the Arms Control Observer Group from the Department of State. And so let us look at it
and take my statement that I made about supplying this committee of jurisdiction with information as a priority at face, if you will.
And let me see what the situation is or what the problem is.

[The information referred to follows:]

I will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the
anomaly will be corrected and that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as
the committee of jurisdiction over these treaties, receives on a regular basis
all information relative to these treaties that the executive branch is sharing
with any other entities. I understand that Ambassador Lehman has already taken
steps to satisfy the committee.

Senator BIDEN. It will be very helpful. And I assure you we will both follow-up
with you on both of those issues.

Now I know the time is short and I apologize to my colleagues for going through
what I characterize as housekeeping, but quite frankly, unless we know the ground
rules upon which we are beginning these discussions on this significant arms
control agreement, as well as the one that hopefully will be coming our way
soon, I think we may otherwise have wasted a lot of time.

Let me begin the questioning and shorten my questions to give
my colleagues some more time.

Mr. Secretary, as I said, obviously part of the focus here is going
to be on the things we are more skeptical about and not the things
we think are great about the treaty.

I mentioned to you earlier the issue of the withdrawal of 75,000
pieces of equipment, artillery, tanks, armored combat vehicles that
are east of the Ural Mountains. And we all know this occurred. It
is not a violation in the sense that it occurred for a whole range of
reasons, partly as a result of unilateral reductions, partly due to
bilateral agreements with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Germany and with also, apparently, and partly by the defense establishment of the Soviet Union wanting to get these pieces of
equipment out of harm's way. But for whatever reason, they sit
there.

And you have negotiated a political understanding with the Soviets that says that they must destroy 25 percent of them and the
remaining 75 percent they cannot put in any position that would
be of any threat to us, to oversimplify the situation.

My question is, would their inability to keep this political pledge
constitute a circumvention of the treaty as proscribed by article 14?
And could it thereby warrant withdrawal from the treaty on the
part of the United States?

I said 14, I meant 19. I had better start wearing these glasses all
the time.

Secretary BAKER. Say it again, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Could Soviet actions in violation of this solemn
political pledge that they made, could it constitute a circumvention
of the treaty as proscribed by article XIX and could it thereby warrant U.S. withdrawal the treaty?

Secretary BAKER. I think that we have withdrawal rights that
are perhaps a bit broader than just for reasons of circumvention of
the treaty. We attach a great deal of importance to this political
statement and we expect when we take a political statement, that
it will be complied with.

And you are asking though the specific legal question, and I am
not absolutely certain. [Pause.]

I was right, Senator. We would have the right under our national
security withdrawal rights. If it was a substantial violation of a
major political commitment, we could pull out.

Senator BIDEN. Maybe I was not clear enough. I understand that.
The question is would you? I mean, you clearly could.

Secretary BAKER. That is very Hypothetical. I would have to
know, before we recommend to the President that we withdraw
from a treaty that is so favorable to us as this one, the exact scope
and extent of the failure to observe the political commitment.

Suppose they did not destroy 1 APC, would we pull out? No.

Senator BIDEN. If there was a gross disregard?

Secretary BAKER. Where do you draw the line, Senator? Is that 52 tanks? Is
that 70 artillery pieces?

Senator BIDEN. I assumed that would be your answer, and that is why I have
drafted a condition that would formalize to a greater extent that political
condition. I will not introduce it prior to going into some great detail with
you and your people privately.

I will not take your time with that now, but I would just ask you
whether or not you would be willing, I would hope you would be willing to spend some time, to determine whether or not you would
accept consent on a condition that would not require renegotiation,
that would more clearly formalize the political commitment made
by the Soviet Union on this issue.

Secretary BAKER. It is very difficult to answer that question. It is
purely hypothetical because. you really have to look at the situation
prevailing at the time. You have to know the degree and extent to
which the political commitment had not been carried through on.

Let me just say, generally speaking, with respect to conditions-whether it
is a category one or otherwise-I would hope we could move forward with the ratification
of this treaty without the imposition of conditions, because I really think
it is a good treaty.

It is very favorable to the United States and we do not think that
conditions are prudent or necessary. But get through the hearing
process, talk to the experts, both the experts on substance and the
legal experts and if you still have a problem, we are prepared to sit
down and try and work through it with you.

I just think it will be very difficult to draw an arbitrary line, and
we may be better served by not trying to draw an arbitrary line.
We do have this national security grounds provision for termination any treaty.

Senator BIDEN. That is correct, we do. I have drafted two such
conditions, one pertaining to the article III issue as well, and I will
be giving you copies of that and asking you to speak about it, because quite frankly, I think you are going to find that you will be
confronted with that issue one way or another, and I would hope
that we could do it in a way that the administration would find to
be consistent with and supportive of its intentions.

Now, Mr. Secretary, there are a whole range of additional questions I have. Your time is limited at this point, and I am going to
have an opportunity to spent a lot of time with your colleagues in
the administration.

But let me just ask one broad question relating to American defense policy overall. What is the likelihood of there being a CFE 2
treaty?

Secretary BAKER. In the future--

Senator BIDEN. Cuts in equipment?

Secretary BAKER. I think probably not, Senator, because the pace and scope
of political events are such that I think they might outstrip CFE 2 by the time
you got to it. But you will see a CFE-1A, which will be devoted to questions
involving manpower in Europe and will be devoted to the development of an aerial
inspection regime. Both of these things are called for in the CFE Treat.

So there will be a follow-on negotiation. It will not be CFE 2, in
the sense that it will be limiting and eliminating equipment. It will
deal with manpower and it will deal with an aerial inspection
regime.

Senator BIDEN. Well, as I said, I have many questions. I am
taking too much of my colleagues' time, but let me just conclude by
saying that I would hope the administration, at some point in the
near future, would be willing to share with. us the impact this
treaty has on its judgment as to how many forces, an issue our
friend from South Dakota has raised, how many U.S. forces are required in Western Europe?

And what impact this has on our strategic requirements, beyond
what is being negotiated in the START agreement now, including
what impact it has on the SIOP, but, we will have plenty of time to
talk about that.

Secretary BAKER. Yes, sir. Let me say only, that this-particularly with respect to CFE-lA-that these are matters that we are
looking at and are engaged in, and there will be a follow-on negotiation, characterized as CFE-1A dealing with manpower and aerial
inspection.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The yellow light is on and I yield to my colleague from North
Carolina.

Senator HELMS. Let me try to be brief too because others want to
ask questions and I will file some in writing.

I was particularly intrigued with your very brief statement regarding the
Soviet's armored personnel carriers and strategic rocket forces. This was a
sticking point right at the end of the negotiations, is that not right?

Secretary BAKER. Well, both of those were part of the article III
controversy, yes, Sir.

Senator HELMS. The Soviets, did they not, demanded to be authorized to deploy
500 extra personnel carriers in the Baltics? That is right, is it not?

Secretary BAKER. Demand the right to deploy 500 extra personnel carriers in the Baltics? I do not think so. Let me ask the negotiator. [Pause.]

Ambassador Woolsey tells me that there was during the course
of the negotiations a request from them to this effect, to which we
did not accede, and they did not insist, so that was not agreed to.
Senator HELMS. Now, my understanding, and I hope my understanding is incorrect, that a "compromise" was accepted, namely
that the Soviets could have an extra 1,500, not 500, 1,500 personnel
carriers for deployment all around their strategic rocket forces.
Now, some of the strategic rocket forces are deployed in the Baltics. Do you see what I am getting at? They want to use this weaponry and these weapon carriers to suppress the people we ought to be supporting.

Does this mean that the Soviets got more than their original request for 500 personnel carriers, to suppress freedom in the Baltics?

Secretary BAKER. I do not think that is the proper interpretation,
Senator. Let me say that under the solution that we worked out to
the article III problem, first of all, none of the treaty ceilings are
going to be exceeded, including those for armored personnel carriers.

In the statement of June 14 which laid out the solution to the
article III problem, that is, the Soviet statement, they pledged to
reduce another 1,725 armored combat vehicles which brought them
down to the treaty permitted level.

But we agreed that they could do this through a combination of
destruction, conversion for nonmilitary use, and the internal modification of a certain type of armored personnel carrier, called the
MTLB, in a manner specified in the treaty, to reduce its troop-carrying capacity.

But that method of eliminating armored personnel carriers from
the accounting requirements of the treaty was already in the
treaty and it was not a part of the article III dispute.

We also agreed that the Soviets would not have to count against
the treaty ceilings the armored personnel carriers in their strategic
rocket forces, and we did that because these APC's are used for security at their missile installations.

So that is the best way I know to answer your question: to lay
out here what was actually agreed to.

Senator HELMS. I want to know about the Baltics. Did anybody
think about the use of the personnel carriers and other things to
put down these people yearning for freedom in the Baltics? That is
my question, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BAKER. Well, I think that there was a lot of thought
given throughout the negotiation of this treaty, Senator Helms, to
getting this equipment removed from the zone, whether it was
through removal or destruction. We wanted to reduce the size of
the Soviet armed forces that represented a threat to Western
Europe.

The goal and purpose of CFE was, as I stated in my opening remarks, to eliminate the threat of conventional, overwhelming conventional forces, directed against Western Europe.

It was not intended to deal with what they would consider, and
we would not, internal security matters within the Soviet Union.
That is the best way I know to answer your question.

Senator HELMS. I hope that there is a little more to it than that,
Mr. Secretary, because I believe most Members of the Senate are
concerned about what is going on in the Baltics. But I will leave it
there.

Secretary BAKER. Well, let me say to you that we in the administration are concerned about what is going on in the Baltics, and we
do not pass up any opportunity to raise this.

Senator HELMS. Well, I just did not want you to do it inadvertently. That is what I am talking about.

Now, is it fair to say that this treaty repudiates the Brezhnev
doctrine under which the Soviet Union claimed the right to invade
any socialist state in order to suppress counterrevolution?

Secretary BAKER. Senator, before I answer that question, let me just put,
into the record a note that Ambassador Woolsey has passed me saying that very
few, if any, of the strategic rocket force, APC's of the Soviet Union are deployed
in the Baltics.

However, we would be pleased to get into the exact numbers
with you in closed hearings. This is some information that the negotiators would have and we would be delighted to make available

Now would you repeat the question?

Senator HELMS. Yes, Sir. It is fair for me to conclude that your
reading of this treaty repudiates the Brezhnev doctrine under
which the Soviet Union claimed the right to invade any socialist
state in order to suppress counterrevolution?

Secretary BAKER. I am not sure the treaty represents the first renunciation of that doctrine. I think that when the Soviet Union
agreed to the unification of Germany as a member of the NATO
alliance, when the Soviet administration and President Gorbachev
and others agreed to the removal of all of their forces from Eastern and Central Europe, that these actions perhaps taken together
with this treaty, clearly amount to a renunciation of that doctrine.

Senator HELMS. Very well. One final question, not really related
to the treaty, but I am obliged to ask it. I am informed that on
June 20, the American intelligence community issued a report accusing Communist China of engaging in a massive nuclear proliferation program with a country of concern in the Middle East. Are
you aware of that?

Secretary BAKER. If I was, I would not talk about it at this hearing.

Senator HELMS That means you are not aware of it.

Secretary BAKER. That does not mean anything. That just means
that this is not the place for us to discuss that subject.

Senator HELMS. Well, I might have staff pass you an envelope.

Secretary BAKER. If it relates to intelligence matters, you know I
cannot discuss them in an open hearing.

Senator HELMS. The report number, Mr. Secretary, notwithstanding your feeling about it, is contained in that envelope that is being
handed to you, and I hope you will look at it and we can get on a
secure telephone or whatever. I would like to have your opinion
about it.

Secretary BAKER. Since it obviously has to do with an intelligence matter, I would be delighted to discuss it with you under
secure conditions, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, we are both cleared.

Secretary BAKER. I am not so sure our entire television audience
and the audience behind us here are.

Senator HELMS. I said on a secure telephone, did I not?

Secretary BAKER. After you asked me the question, you said we will talk about
it. After I gave you a non-answer you said we will talk about it on a secure
telephone, that is right, and I am happy to do that with you, but I cannot talk
about it here and I think you know that.

Senator HELMS. I did not ask you to talk about it. I asked you if
you were aware of it.

Secretary BAKER. That would entail my talking about it, and you
know it.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, who will monitor this treaty?

Secretary BAKER. Are you referring, Senator Sarbanes, to the
Joint Consultative Group?

Senator SARBANES. No. Who will ascertain that the equipment is
being destroyed and that the numbers are being reduced in conformity with the timetable in the treaty, and so forth and so on?

Secretary BAKER. You are not talking about compliance disputes,
you are simply talking about--

Senator SARBANES. No.

Secretary BAKER. Hang on. [Pause.]

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to intervene in
the State Department's business, but I think that if Ambassador
Woolsey would come sit in the front row it would eliminate the
concern of some of us that the Ambassador is going to fall over.
[Laughter.]

Secretary BAKER. It is the On-Site Inspection Agency, Senator Sarbanes, that
is located under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

Senator SARBANES. So that is a NATO operation, I take it?

Secretary BAKER. This was a 22-nation treaty.

Senator SARBANES. But the inspections will be done through a
NATO structure?

Secretary BAKER. Ambassador Woolsey tells me that this is a U.S. Agency, that
we will do our inspections through this agency, the On-Site Inspection Agency,
and other nations will be responsible for theirs.

Senator SARBANES. What happens if one of the Eastern European
countries which was part of the Warsaw Pact during the negotiation of this treaty and during the arms reductions it mandates,
later becomes a part of NATO? What happens then with these arrangements, or what conceivably could happen?

And further, does the monitoring of this treaty address the prospect of having to construct new security arrangements for Europe,
one of whose principal functions will be arms control monitoring?

In other words, you have a treaty essentially concluded between
the members of NATO and the member of the Warsaw Pact. You
are bringing the numbers down. You have a political dynamic
going on in Europe which may, in fact, lead to the dissipation of
the old alliance structures. Actually, I would regard it as an advance if the monitoring of this treaty could lead toward evolving
new security arrangements that were more inclusive and less related to the old confrontational approach between the two pacts.

Secretary BAKER. Senator Sarbanes, that might well happen at some point, and
as you know we have had a lot of discussions about the political adaptation
of the NATO alliance, and one of the things that has been discussed is a verification
activity, or responsibility, but under this treaty if a question such as that
arose, any country could call a conference under one of the articles of the
treaty. We do not have new structures in place now, and we have to verify this
agreement on the basis of the structures we now have in place.

Senator SARBANES. Is there any kind of deadline for completing
ratification of this treaty, with respect to how quickly other parties
will act on it, as you see it?

Secretary BAKER. Not that I am aware of. I think we are starting
the process ahead of many others. For instance, I feel certain the
Soviet Union has not begun the process in the full Supreme Soviet.
Senator SARBANES. Does the treaty limit the ability of countries
affected by it to send their arms outside of the treaty area? The
treaty limits how the arms are distributed within the treaty zone.
How about outside the treaty zone?

Secretary BAKER. No, there is no restriction that I am aware of
with respect to, for instance, our transferring arms to an area outside the zone covered by this treaty, or any of the other nations
doing the same, [Pause.]

That is correct. There are no restrictions on transfer. Ambassador Woolsey makes the point that transfers from now on will not
reduce reduction obligations that the various parties to this treaty
have undertaken.

Senator SARBANES. So things like the Czech sale of modern
tanks, say, to Syria, are not affected by this treaty?

Secretary BAKER. That one does decrease the Czechoslovak obligation, because they declared it as of November 19, but there are
no restrictions-generally speaking, there are no restrictions on
any of these countries transferring weaponry of a nature covered
by this agreement to areas outside the zone.

For instance, when we send weapons to other areas of the world,
or even other areas close to the zone, it is not limited or circumscribed by this treaty.

Senator SARBANES. Could you tell us a bit about your anticipated timetable,
if there is such a possibility of telling us, on the CFE-1A?

Secretary BAKER. As I mentioned in answer to the chairman, we
have begun work on these follow-on negotiations, and there is no
deadline for the completion of those discussions, Senator Sarbanes.

As I mentioned, we do have a commitment in this treaty to undertake these
discussions-particularly since actions were taken in an agreement between the
Soviet Union and Germany that make it important, particularly to Germany, that
CFE-1A proceed with respect to manpower limitations. As you know, manpower is
not covered by this treaty. There is no deadline, but I think that there is
a view on the part of the parties that they want to conclude this as soon as
they responsibly can.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that Foreign Minister Besmertnykh is in town.

Secretary BAKER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. I take it that you are trying to work out the balance of
the START differences so that you might be able to move on that matter by a
summit at the end of the month, is that correct?

Secretary BAKER. Well, we continue to work toward that end,
Senator Sarbanes. We just had some recent high-level exchanges in
Geneva where our START negotiators made some specific proposals, and we are hoping that we will receive answers to those this
afternoon or tomorrow from the Soviet Union. We are hoping those
answers will move us forward.

It always gets tougher as you get to the end game-I think you
know that-and while these issues that we are now dealing with
are technical issues, they are very important issues, particularly
the one dealing with telemetry encryption or data denial, which
has major verification consequences.

Our hope is that we will be able to resolve these in order for
President Gorbachev and President Bush to conclude a summit
before the August break. That is what they both want to do, but we
are not going to rush it, and we are not going to push it beyond
what we think is reasonable and prudent, because it is too important.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I have a question that has four parts and that is
technical, and you may wish to respond but you may wish to
submit an answer in writing.

What is the legal relationship between the treaty as signed, the signed agreement
on land-based naval aviation, and the documents containing legal obligations
and political commitments associated with the article III settlement hammered
out after treaty signature?

In particular, what would the administration's view be of a
Senate effort to incorporate all ancillary agreements and Soviet
statements into the treaty proper, and if these ancillary agreements are not incorporated into the treaty, what is the status of
each of these documents under international and domestic law?

More concretely, could a material breach of the legal obligations
contained in the side agreements on article III constitute a material breach of the treaty?

Secretary BAKER. Those are very technical questions Senator
Lugar, and I will give you a full answer for the record. I could
mention a few things here-and maybe I should do that-but let
me preface what I am going to say by saying I will give you a complete answer for the record.

The land-based naval air declaration is one of four political documents that are associated with the treaty. The other three are the
22 signatories declaration on personnel, the German declaration on
personnel, and the Soviet statement on East of the Urals of June
14, about which we have already spoken.

The Soviets' other statement of June 14, which was the mechanism that was used to resolve the big dispute that held up the
sending of this treaty to the Senate for ratification, is a separate
but legally-binding international obligation that is associated with
but not a part of this treaty.

It does not formally amend the treaty. It does diverge from the
treaty provisions in one respect, and that is in permitting the Soviets to withdraw some equipment from the zone rather than destroying it or converting it in the zone.

This statement, taken alone, does not, we think, require ratification because it does not limit U.S. armed forces or armaments but
only Soviet armaments. But, as a document that is very relevant to
the treaty, we are transmitting it for the information of the
Senate.

There will be a continuing difference on principle. We have worked out a solution
to this problem that will permit the Soviets to take a position on principle
that will differ from the position on principle that we will take. Havink said
that, I want to reiterate that all the limits established by this treaty are
going to be respected, but the Soviet Union would argue that the obligations
that they undertake in this June 14 statement are in addition to those they
undertook under the treaty.

They will argue, in fact, that their coastal defense and naval infantry forces are limited only by that statement and not by the
treaty. The United States and the other 20 signatories will maintain that these forces are also limited under the treaty.

In our view, Senator Lugar, we can agree to disagree on this
point of principle, since the practical results are effectively the
same. Moreover, the Soviet statement reaffirms the comprehensiveness of the treaty's counting rules and it makes therefore a similar
dispute much less likely in the future.

But I will submit a full answer to your question for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Question. What is the legal relationship between the treaty as signed, the signed
agreement on land-based naval aviation, and the documents containing legal obligations and political commitments associated with the article III settlement hammered out after treaty signature?

--In particular, what would the Administration's view be of a Senate effort to
incorporate all ancillary agreements and Soviet statements into the treaty proper,
and if these ancillary agreements are not incorporated into the treaty, what is the
status of each of these documents under international and domestic law?

--More concretely, could a material breach of the legal obligations contained in
the side agreements on article III constitute a material breach or the treaty?

Answer. There are several documents associated with the CFE Treaty: the Soviet
statement of June 14, 1991, and the 21 responses to it by the other Signatories;
the Soviet East-of-the-Urals statement, also of June 14; the Declaration by
the 22 States Parties with respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft (LBNA); the
Declaration by the 22 States Parties with respect to Personnel; and the Declaration
by Germany with respect to Personnel.

The Soviet statement of June 14, along with the 21 responses to it by the other
Signatories to the CFE Treaty, constitutes a separate, legally binding international
agreement that is associated with, but not part of, the treaty. While the statement,
which resolved the article III counting rule dispute, does not formally amend the
treaty, it does diverge from the treaty provisions in permitting the Soviet Union to
withdraw some conventional armaments and equipment from the area of application of the treaty rather than reduce them there. The statement taken alone does
not require ratification because it does not limit United States armed forces or armaments, only Soviet forces and armaments. However, as a document relevant to
the treaty, it was transmitted for the information of the Senate in accordance with
past practice.

The Soviet East-of-the-Urals statement, also of June 14, constitutes a unilateral
Soviet political commitment with respect to certain armaments and equipment located east of the Urals. The statement is neither part of the treaty nor legally binding; rather, it is a political commitment in written form associated with the treaty.

The LBNA Declaration is not a unilateral statement; rather, it is a joint document of all 22 Signatories of the treaty. The LBNA Declaration is not legally part of
the treaty, nor is it a legally binding document in and of itself. Instead, it represents
a political commitment in written form that is associated with the treaty. However,
since the LBNA Declaration was negotiated in parallel with the treaty, it may be
used to provide interpretative guidance with respect to the treaty. In particular, it
may be used as evidence to show that land-based naval aircraft-and only land-based naval aircraft-are not covered by the principal counting rule set forth in article III of the treaty.

The Declaration by the 22 States Parties with respect to Personnel has the
same legal status as the LBNA Declaration, except that it does not provide any particular interpretative guidance with respect to the treaty.

The German Declaration with respect to personnel is a unilateral political undertaking made by Germany that is associated with the treaty and that was acknowledged by the other 21 Signatories to the CFE Treaty.

B. The Administration would oppose any binding requirement to incorporate legally all ancillary agreements, including the Soviet binding agreement, into the
treaty proper. As noted above, all of the ancillary documents were agreed to outside
of the treaty framework, and four of them represent political commitments that
were never intended or understood by the Signatories to be either part of the treaty
proper or legally-binding international agreements. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to consider them to be part of the treaty, which is an international agreement. Moreover, such a move would constitute, in effect, an amendment to the
treaty. It would undoubtedly provoke other Signatories to propose additional
changes to the structure and meaning of the treaty. In turn, this would create
major-perhaps fatal-stumbling blocks to entry into force of the treaty.

Since the four political documents
are not legally binding, they do not constitute international agreements under
either international low or U.S. domestic law. On the other hand the Soviet
legally binding statement ;constitutes an international agreement under international
law (in accordance with Article 31(3)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties) and an executive agreement under domestic law.

C. A particular action by the Soviet Union in violation of its obligations under the
legally binding statement would not necessarily violate the treaty. In some cases,
there would be a violation only of the statement; in others there could be a violation
of both the treaty and the statement. In those cases in which a violation of the
statement also constituted a violation or the treaty, the violation might, depending
on the circumstances, constitute a material breach of the statement and treaty as
well. Whether the violation constituted a material breach would be context dependent and, in particular, would depend on the severity of the violation and whether
the obligation violated was essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose
of both the Soviet statement and the treaty.

An example of an action that violated only the statement would be a failure to
provide "sufficient visible evidence" of destruction of the 50 percent equivalent of
the transferred TLE (transferred outside the area as an offset to holdings in Naval
Infantry and Coastal Defense) that are to be destroyed or converted outside the area
of application, pursuant to the statement. This would be a violation only of the
statement, not of the treaty, since the treaty contains no such obligation for out-of-area verification of destruction and conversion. On the other hand, the other 50 percent to be destroyed or converted within the area of application pursuant to the
statement must be destroyed or converted pursuant to treaty procedures. A violation of such procedures would violate both the statement and the treaty procedures
and the statement includes a specific obligation in this regard.

Furthermore, in the U.S. view,
Coastal Defense and Naval Infantry count for purposes of meeting treaty ceilings.
Thus, an increase in equipment held by Coastal Defense or Naval Infantry that
caused the treaty's ceilings to be exceeded would, in our view (and, we believe,
in the view or 20 other treaty Signatories as well), violate both the treaty
and the statement. Moreover, such violations-depending on their severity-might
very well also constitute material breaches of both the statement and the treaty.
On the other hand, the Soviet view is that only the statement limits equipment
held by Coastal Defense and Naval Infantry. However, both documents lire equally
legally binding. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that a violation
of the statement alone would give rise to a compliance issue in the Joint Consultative
Group and it could, depending in its seriousness, create a right of withdrawal
from the treaty under article XIX.

A more specific example would be if the Soviets were at the level of 13,150 tanks
(their maximum level under article VII), and then assigned 100 battle tanks to a
Naval Infantry unit. In such a case, they clearly would have violated the statement.
But would they have also violated the treaty? In the U.S. view (and, as noted, in the
view of 20 other treaty Signatories as well), they would have violated the treaty as
well because we believe that Naval Infantry is not exempt from the treaty. The Soviets would probably claim that there was no treaty violation because their position
is that Naval Infantry equipment is not covered by the treaty. However, both sides
would agree that there is a violation of the legally binding statement.

Senator SARBANES. Would you yield?

Do the Soviets regard that agreement as a treaty in their terms?

Secretary BAKER. They regard it as a legally-binding statement
by them that was accepted by the other parties to the treaty, and
they will say that with respect to coastal defense forces and naval
infantry-they are bound by that legally-binding statement but not
by the treaty, and they will continue to be able to insist on this
position of principle.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that answer, and
likewise the response that you will be preparing with your lawyers.
I raise the question because I foresee that this is a question that is
going to come to the fore at some point, and Senators will suddenly
rise up with surprise that there is an agreement here that is not a
treaty. Even though it supposedly has legally binding effect, it is of
a different order, and so I wanted to raise that problem initially.

I concur with you that I do not believe it is fatal to the successful consideration
of the treaty, but it clearly is something different.

Secretary BAKER. It is, Senator Lugar. It is, I think, a very creative way in which to resolve what were some very difficult issues, and we were able to do so in a way that respected all of the treaty limits, save the one minor point that I just made, and it was, we
felt, the only way that we could work this issue out and be in a
position to submit to the Senate for ratification an agreement that
I think we all agree is very, very much in the national interest of
the United States.

Senator LUGAR. Let me follow-on a point that Senator Sarbanes
was making with regard to Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Defense
News has reported on June 3 that Czechoslovakia alone plans to
export 1,578 tanks, 1970 armored combat vehicles and 1,900 artillery pieces.

I think these account for more than 75 percent of the equipment Czechoslovakia
would otherwise have had to destroy under the terms of the treaty. Clearly in
the case of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria they would appear to have the intent
to sell much higher numbers of treaty-limited equipment than they had normally
exported and, thus, some would say, would be in violation of the CFE treaty.

I raise this point because I suspect that some thought needs to be
given to this problem, so that we are not accused, in the case of the
Czechs, of excusing acts by governments that we find friendly that
we would not find so friendly if done by the Soviets.

I wonder if you have any overall comment on the Czech and Bulgarian problem with respect to CFE compliance.

Secretary BAKER. We have discussed it with them, Senator
Lugar. We are continuing to discuss it with them. The question revolves to some extent around whether or not the equipment was
declared for export as of November 19.

But it is something we intend to continue to discuss with them,
and would be pleased to continue to discuss in more detail with the
Senate.

These countries have a difficult problem, and without trying in any way to
come down on one side or the other of what is a difficult issue, I think we
should all recognize that we want these emerging democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe to succeed in their efforts to reform.

Unfortunately, one of the major export items that these countries were involved in-one of the major things they made for
export-were armaments, and it is not easy for them, now that
they have lost all their markets in the Soviet Union, to make this
very difficult economic transformation.

And in fact, it has created, as you know, some tension between
the Slovaks and the Czechs because many of these armament industries in Czechoslovakia are in Slovakia and many of these weapons were made or at least ordered to be made and put on the production line in advance of the revolutions for freedom and democracy.

So we have to be conscious of all of these things when we deal
with this very difficult problem.

Senator LUGAR. I thank you, and I raised the question, not as an
unfair attack on the treaty, but rather as something that we are
going to have to rationalize.

Secretary BAKER. Well, I think the question is what happens in the future-that
is where we should be focusing our attention, helping them with defense conversion,
conversion of defense plants to civilian production and uses, and helping these
countries find markets for the civilian products that they will produce, and
frankly, opening our markets to them and seeing Western Europe open its markets.

They have lost all their markets and both Western Europe and
the United States need to do more for these countries. It is really
important that the experiments in democracy and freedom and
free market economics in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungry, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania all succeed.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I imagine people listening to this do not quite
understand why it would not be very much in our interest to economically aid
them rather than have them sell arms to the Middle East, requiring us to spend
tens of billions of dollars potentially again to go knock them--

Secretary BAKER. But, Senator, unfortunately, 95 percent of the
weapons that go to the Middle East, come from the permanent five
members of the United Nations' Security Council, which includes
none of those Central and Eastern European countries.

Senator BIDEN. I absolutely agree with you, that is why, if you
recall, I proposed before you even set up your organizational effort,
that we should have those five nations agree to an arms supplier
cartel, whereby we would control the selling of those weapons.

But I now yield to the real chairman of the committee.

Senator SARBANES. Actually, Senator Biden has a provision
which would try to move us down the path of restraining arms
sales by the five permanent members and thereby significantly
transform this international situation.

Secretary BAKER. Before we go to you, Mr. Chairman, let me just
mention, since we are on a very important subject, really that is
not CFE, but that we just concluded a very, very successful and important meeting of the permanent five in Paris. Our arms control
experts and the arms control experts of the Soviet Union, China,
Britain, and France, met and agreed to support the President's proposal to increase transparency on conventional weapons now, to set
up a registry of sales to the Middle East and that sort of thing.

So we were very pleased that that meeting reached the degree of
consensus that it did. We frankly did not expect that there would
be that much consensus. So I am optimistic that we may be able to
do some things.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, you made a valiant effort, but essentially what you agreed to was everybody make a list to let everybody else know what they are selling.

Secretary BAKER. You have to crawl before you walk, Senator,
and walk before you run, and for us to get the permanent five to
agree to these things, I think is significant. I mean, it may not go
as far as some would like, but let us get the process started.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Senator Pell.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I apologize for not
being here earlier. I was presiding over a joint session with the
House on another matter. Not having been here, I will limit myself
to one or maybe two questions, out of deference to my colleagues
who have been here right along.

What sort of signals are we issuing or giving to potential miscreants, for
example, the Iraqis, vis-à-vis, their attacks on the Kurds, or the Serbians,
regarding their attacks on the Albanians? I am just curious if there is not
a parallel here, on putting them on notice that they can go just too far and
no further in the abuse of human rights in those two areas.

Secretary BAKER. Well, we have put down some very strong
markers in Yugoslavia, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the use of
force by central authorities.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, I think it is now being used in
Kosovo in Albania.

Secretary BAKER. It is being used in Kosovo, against the Albanian population
there. This is something we have been concerned about and something that we
have strongly protested with the Yugoslav Government for a long, long time,
but we have also done so recently.

With respect to Iraq, I think that the situation is perhaps somewhat different because we have shown what we think are violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions, and you have
heard the President, you have heard me and others in the administration over the course of recent weeks talking about the importance of observing United Nations' Security Council resolutions,
and pointing to what the consequences of nonobservance have been
previously.

Now the concerns I'm talking about there relate primarily to the
refusal of the Iraqi Government to comply with Security Council
resolutions having to do with nuclear, the possibility of nuclear
weapons development.

We have also, Senator Pell, made known our views very, very
clearly and directly with respect to questions involving persecution
of the Kurds by the Government of Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think committee is very glad
indeed at the prospects of CFE and Senator Biden is doing an excellent job of pushing us down that road.

When do you expect to finish START, if things work out in these
discussions today and tomorrow? Do you see START being sent up
to us on the hill by the August recess?

Secretary BAKER. I do not think we ought to assume that we are
going to have a START treaty agreed to before the August recess,
Senator Pell.

I said earlier that it is the fervent wish of both President Gorbachev and President Bush that we conclude START so that the delayed Soviet-U.S. summit can be held.

Both of them have said that they do not want to hold that
summit in Moscow until a START treaty has been concluded. We
are down to the end game. It gets tougher as you get closer to the
end, and we will be meeting this afternoon beginning at 3 p.m. We
will also meet tomorrow. The full Soviet arms control delegation is
in town.

We hope they are here prepared to make decisions and we will
just have to see how those discussions go.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Also in connection with the CFE, has
there been any effort to figure out what the savings will be to the
U.S. Government if we pass it? Will there be a peace dividend from
CFE?

Secretary BAKER. Well, there will be a savings, and we talked
about the fact that CFE is important politically, structurally, strategically, but also important economically because it will allow a
lot of countries, including the United States to reduce the resources
that we devote to European defense, and it will allow us indeed to
reduce the number of troops that we maintain in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you hazard a guess in dollar terms?

Secretary BAKER. I do not want to do that because we have not
gone through the mathematics. A lot depends on where we come
out with respect to force presence and that is a part of the CFE-1A
negotiation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. No further questions.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue the CFE-1A question a little bit
more. I know that we started out with the MBFR negotiations to
reduce troop levels in Europe and those bogged down. They were
replaced by the CFE negotiations to actually reduce troop levels.
This troop reduction idea is something I think our country is becoming much more interested in, especially as it regards Europe.

As you know, even some very conservative columnists are starting to advocate the reduction of troops in Europe at a faster rate,
although there is some disagreement on this. I go to some of these
parliamentarian meetings in Europe and it seems like the European parliamentarians always want to keep our troops there. They
have very much a sweetheart deal in terms of our taxpayers
paying for their defense, not only our troop commitments but other
expenses, too

The base closure effort in the United States, which I supported,
has caused some to question why our overseas bases continue to be
necessary. I did not lose any bases, but increasingly, our people--

Secretary BAKER. That accounts for the strength of your support.
[Laughter.]

Senator PRESSLER. We could have lost a base but we did not. The point is,
when this sinks in, our people are going to be asking even more-if we are reducing
bases in the United Sates, why can we not relocate some of our troops from Europe
to the United States or apply some of the same closure principles to European
bases.

That being said, it is possible some U.S. troops could be withdrawn from NATO as a result of CFE. What will that number be?

Secretary BAKER. Well, that number is a part of our CFE-1A discussions, Senator Pressler, and it really would not be prudent for
me to put a number on it out here right now.

Let me simply say in light of the reduced threat in Europe that we will be
able to make substantial force reductions, and in fact, I think you saw an announcement
here not long ago that we were changing the nature of the military structures
in NATO, going to more of a mobile rapid reaction type of force, a smaller force
and a more flexible force.

But it is really important that we not lose sight of what the presence of American forces in Europe has meant politically, not just
militarily, but politically over the course of the past 45 years.

And it is important that we not lose sight of the fact that during
the discussions on the questions of unification of Germany and freedom for Central and Eastern Europe, that everyone, everyone
including the Soviet Union, came to us and said, we think American forces in Europe are a force for stability and we hope you will
maintain some forces in Europe.

They will be significantly reduced, the number of approximately
150,000 following implementation of the CFE Treaty.

Senator PRESSLER. As I understand it, they have been reduced
some because of the Gulf war and some of those are moving back.

Secretary BAKER. There will be substantial reductions, Senator
Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I hear these arguments from European parliamentarians, and I agree, NATO is probably the most successful
military alliance in history, or one of the most successful. I hear
these same arguments from European parliamentarians, that
American troops must be kept in Germany and elsewhere for political stability.

Now what is the logic behind that? That is the same thing you
just said. Going into the 1990's and beyond the year 2000, why do
we need to keep American troops in Europe for political stability?

Secretary BAKER. Why does the rest of the world want the
United States to lead? That is the reason.

Senator PRESSLER. I want that very much too, but how will
having troops in wealthy Europe, how do we lead from that? I am
trying to understand that.

Secretary BAKER. The United States security presence in Europe
is very, very important, Senator Pressler, to our political influence
in Europe. Our ticket to this game in the past has been the NATO
alliance.

I think we both agree that NATO has been the most successful
military alliance, perhaps in history, and to remove U.S. forces
from Europe would remove the backbone of that alliance. To dissolve NATO, as I heard suggested in the opening remarks here,
would remove the raison d'etre for an American presence.

And NATO, let us remember, is not just a military alliance. It is
also a political alliance, and it is very important that the United
States remain politically engaged with our friends and allies in
Europe, particularly now with everything going in our direction,
with all of Europe moving toward freedom, toward democracy and
toward free markets.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes, I want us very much to remain politically
engaged and economically engaged. I am trying to envisage our
policy. Indeed, you are the most influential man in the administration, other than the President, and what you lay out in terms of
policy is going to be with us for 20 and 30 years.

But is it not possible for us to be politically and economically engaged with Europe with a substantially reduced number of troops?
Who are the troops, what threat are they protecting against or
what role do they play?

Secretary BAKER. Without suggesting that there would be any
out-of-area expansion of the duties of the NATO alliance, let me
suggest, Senator, that we would not have been able to respond in
the manner that we responded in the gulf had we not had those
forces in Europe.

We would not perhaps even have been able to win the political
support of our allies for our actions in the gulf in the way that we
were able to do, culminating in United Nations Security Council
resolutions, had we not been the major force presence in NATO
militarily.

There is a direct correlation between our security role in Europe
and our political influence in Europe.

Senator PRESSLER. Certainly, I can see it, having some troops in
different parts of the world, to move quickly and so forth is a
strong argument, but in terms of maintaining the large numbers
that we--

Secretary BAKER. I think you and I agree that the numbers are going to come
down, I have said, come down substantially. I am just not in a position at this
time, while we are in the midst of developing our bottom line for negotiations
on CFE-1A, I am just not at liberty to put a number down. But I have said substantial
reductions.

Senator PRESSLER. I am not in an argument with you. I am just
trying to get what you envisage the future will be in terms of the
role of U.S. troops in Europe.

Earlier, in response to one of Senator Helms' questions on Soviet
armored personnel carriers in the Baltic states, as I understood it,
you stated the goal of the CFE is to reduce the Soviet threat to
Western Europe. You stated that the CFE treaty was not meant to
deal with internal security matters of the Soviet Union.

Now exactly how do you resolve that with the Baltic states?

Secretary BAKER. I am not sure I understand your question. The
treaty in no way alters or undercuts our position that we do not
recognize the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union.
And we expressly negate any such suggestion.

Senator PRESSLER. So you are saying that we will treat the Baltic
states as part of the Soviet Union for purposes of this treaty?

Secretary BAKER. But not in terms of constituting any recognition on our part that their forcible incorporation was in any way
legal, because we do not agree with that.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions on
Yugoslavia and other matters which I want to put in for the
record. But my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BAKER. Senator Pressler, let me say that I think you
will be having Defense Department witnesses before you and I
think when they are here you will be able to get into further detail
with them regarding these questions of the estimates on U.S. troop
strength after CFE implementation.

But that is not really what you are seeking. What you are seeking, I think, is what happens in the medium term in terms of a
U.S. force presence.

Senator PRESSLER. I know we will have members of the Defense
Department here, but you probably will do more to influence what
the administration and the country does in the big picture here,
and I was trying to get your picture of our troop levels in Europe
throughout the 1990's and beyond and what their role will be
there. I know we need some there so we can have a mobile capability.

Secretary BAKER. Throughout the 1990's, Senator Pressler, our
forces will be substantially reduced. In the immediate aftermath of
implementation of CFE, the number of U.S. troops will be approximately 150,000. That of course, in and of itself, is substantially
down from what we have had there.

Senator PRESSLER. I think everybody agrees, we need a mobile capability. But we have greatly increased our mobility and I do not
think that that should be an argument for keeping so many there.

Also, I have heard so many European parliamentarians say to
me, we need you to stay for political stability. What they are really
saying is we want you to pay the bills, and that is what bothers
me. So that is just one Senator giving his opinion.

Secretary BAKER. Well, the best I can do for you is 150,000 in the
aftermath of implementation of this treaty, but I interpreted your
question, and I think correctly, to be asking, what about during the
1990's?

And all I can say is, it will be substantially down from today's
levels.

Senator PRESSLER. When do you expect CFE 2 to be--

Secretary BAKER. CFE-1A. I just said, we do not have a definite
timetable, although I do not anticipate that it will take a lot of
time, Senator Pressler.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.
Secretary.

Let me just take a section at the outset since I was not here
when the committee hearings began to compliment you and Ambassador Woolsey for your very fine job in negotiating this agreement, and we are pleased that you are before us today.

I have just a couple of notes to pick up on Senator Lugar's suggestions raised about Czechoslovakia and the sales to Syria and
other such issues, and your point about encouraging conversion.

I would just ask you to take note, as this is not directly within
your purview, that some thought be given to how we might also
treat what some have called the veterans of the cold war, that is
the people who work in our plants and facilities across this country, who will be losing jobs not because they are producing a bad
product or being beaten in some sort of competition, but rather because the numbers are coming down.

And as we start talking about what we do for Central Europe
and other nations in that area, the question of what we do for the
American worker who in no small measure made it possible for us
to achieve the results we have been able to see in the last couple of
years, need to be brought into that equation.

I think we will have an easier time convincing the American taxpayer, maybe do something about countries that need to do that
conversion, if we can convince them we are also concerned about
what happens to them.

That is just merely a statement. I realize it not something you
directly have purview over, but nonetheless, can have some influence on.

Second, the Baltics have been mentioned by several here and I
intended to raise that issue as well. I had prepared at least a rough
draft of a declaration to be added as possibly an article II, but conceivably an article III provision which would state that nothing in
this agreement should be deemed to confer either recognition or acceptance of Soviet efforts to exercise sovereignty or maintain control over the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by
this agreement.

Would you have any problem with incorporating something like
that in this agreement, to make clear what I thought was your response to Senator Pressler's concern that because there will be
Soviet weapons in the Baltic states, that in no way should this
agreement be interpreted as anything less than what you stated in
response to the questions.

Secretary BAKER. I do not have any problem whatsoever, Senator, in saying that, because that is the policy of the United States
and that is exactly the way we look at it. I do not know whether
that is what you are asking me.

If you are asking me to get the Soviet Union to agree to that, I
obviously will not be able to do that.

Senator DODD. But it may fall in the article II kind of situation,
where you incorporate it, communicate it to them rather than requiring their agreement on it, although you may find some disagreement whether or not that would be too mild.

Secretary BAKER. Ambassador Woolsey points out that, you are
talking I think, about categories of reservations, not articles.

Senator DODD. Yes, categories--

Secretary BAKER. Yes. Well, I do not know that I can answer you any further
that I already have. We are pleased to make the statement, but if you deal with
it in a manner that requires going back, obviously we are not going to get agreement
on that. This treaty, the negotiation of this treaty-just like the negotiation
of other agreements in the past with officials of the central government in
Moscow-does not represent any change in our long-standing policy of nonrecognition
of the forcible incorporation of the Baltics.

This is not the first agreement that we have negotiated and have
made that very clear.

Senator DODD. I do not have any difficulty. I understand where
you are coming from and I am not going to try to nail you down to
any wording, but to let you know that I certainly would like to
maybe see some sort of a declaration included.

I understand that raises some concerns, but nonetheless, I would
like to raise it, and incorporating it as a declaration, understanding
how you just responded.

Secretary BAKER. We felt it was important to make darn sure
that the treaty limits applied comprehensively to all Soviet forces.
There are Soviet forces in the Baltic military districts.

Senator DODD. Which raises a second question, we began this
process, of course, as you watched a politically evolving situation.
We began the negotiation with one entity in sense and we are
ending up with something entirely different in the sense that the
Warsaw Pact does not exist any longer.

And it seems to me, it gets a little confusing as to who we really
deal with in all of this, what happens as we watch a continuing
erosion of that and how do you, how does data get shared, for instance?

We are dealing with these separate entities now.

Secretary BAKER. Senator Dodd, I engaged a little bit with Senator Sarbanes on that. I think the best thing for you to do would be
to get into that detail with the technical experts.

But there will be ways in which the data will be shared. The fact
remains that the political situation has evolved quite rapidly. That
is not an argument for our not picking up on this really good
treaty.

Senator DODD. Not at all. I think it is just a question of down the
road, as you try and implement, you deal with the consultative
groups, the verification, all of these matters that will be raised, getting your fingers around it is, is kind of like trying to nail jello to a tree.

How do you get a hold of who you want to deal with those specific issues?

Secretary BAKER. Well, as we go about the political adaptation of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we now have former
Warsaw Pact countries that have established liaison offices to
NATO.

Senator DODD. Which raises my next question and that is the
other side of the equation, what is NATO's role going to be in this
with emerging and changing organizations in Europe, what in your
opinion will NATO's role be?

Do you see it as a static role? Are you satisfied that it is pretty
firm or is there a possibility that we going to see some evolution
occur with regard to NATO specifically as an organization in a
changing structure?

Secretary BAKER. I think there will be an evolution of NATO,
Senator Dodd, and it was premiered or forecast at the London
NATO summit last year. There a very forthcoming and far-reaching declaration was issued by the heads of state which addressed
this very issue and said here is what we intend to do.

We are going to see this organization evolve politically. There is
going to be more of an emphasis on its political character, although
it will remain the primary security alliance for Europe.

We are going to do a lot of things. One of the things was the liaison offices with the Warsaw Pact and there were other things.
NATO is going to be involved in verification, and will deal with
proliferation perhaps. It will exercise some interests and activities
in these areas.

So it will be an evolution of NATO and its military character will change.
Indeed, it already has: the force is going to be more flexible and more mobile
and smaller. It will still have its major security role and that is something
we want and should want, unless you just really want to say, it is going to
be the policy of the United States that we are going to pull out of Europe.
I think that would be a fundamental mistake.

Senator DODD. I agree with you. I do not hear that. I guess it is
just a question, as these structures change, and the fluidity of it, in
terms of how this kind of treaty is applied.

Let me ask you if I can to address some of the economic issues
broadly here. What was the economic impact of this on the Soviet
Union? I do not mean to put it down to dollars and cents, but give
us some concept here if you can about what this means to them
economically.

Secretary BAKER. I think initially the Soviets will not gain a lot
economically because they have got some destruction obligations.
They have to do some things that are going to cost them some
money.

Thus, in the near-term, I do not think the treaty will improve the Soviet
Union's economic prospects. And those prospects are not bright. We know what
has happened to the Soviet economy during 1991 and the prognosis for the balance
of this year is not bright.

But I think with respect to other countries, there will be some
economic benefit, because the destruction obligations are nowhere
near as great-which resulted from the imbalance in forces in
favor of the Soviet Union. So they are having to destroy and to convert or move, or store, much more equipment than other parties to
the treaty.

We will, as a consequence of this agreement and the political
changes that have taken place in Europe, be able to reduce substantially the number of our forces in Europe and that will effect
some political saving. I cannot tell you how much right now. but
there will be some economic saving.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I want to express that in the spirit of détente
we start with the discussion of this treaty and I noticed that from the Secretary's
viewpoint you have moved from a position to the left of the chairman, to a position
to the right of the chairman.

Your immediate contact with Senator Helms, I think is going to
be a very positive influence in the future.

Senator BIDEN. I hope so, but I hope no one believes that my sitting to the right of Senator Helms means anything at all. [Laughter.]

Senator BROWN. Mr. Secretary, I am particularly cheered by the potential-and
I suppose we should emphasize this-the potential of significant troop reductions
in Europe. I think that is good news for the American taxpayer, and while I
fully understand and appreciate your concerns that we not be viewed as withdrawing
from our commitments to be a positive force in the world, it seems to me that
that may be one of the more positive aspects of this treaty in the United States.
A reduction potentially in half-the elimination of half of our forces in Europe
could have, I believe, an enormous impact in terms of budgetary implications.

Secretary BAKER. Senator Brown, as I mentioned to Senator Pressler, in the
aftermath of implementation of this treaty, we anticipate the number of U.S.
troops in Europe will be in the neighborhood of a 150,000. That would be down
from 300,000. What I cannot answer is what the rest of the 1990's will hold.

Senator BROWN. In viewing this treaty, I think virtually everyone I have talked to shares what I believe is your view that it is an
enormous plus for the United States. Clearly, the dramatic reductions are on the other side.

But in thinking about long-term implications, I would hope you
would share with the committee your view of the comparative burdens of moving troops and manpower from East of the Urals to a
point on the German border, the Soviet potential, to the United States' burden of moving troops and material from the United
States to the eastern border of Germany.

Are we in a circumstance here where the U.S. would-it would
be much more costly and time consuming for us to move troops?

Secretary BAKER. Absolutely, Senator Brown. Of course, you have
to remember, I think, that the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe will no longer be particularly amenable to the transport of
those forces across their territory. That will make a significant difference.

Senator BROWN. That is a valid concern. I was cheered by your
focus on cooperation with Eastern Europe in an effort to work with
there in bringing free enterprise to their economies. I would be interested in whether you would think it wise, or would be willing to
consider developing a free trade agreement with some of the Eastern European countries. Is that something that you think is worth
exploring?

Secretary BAKER. Our plate right now is fairly full on negotiation
of free trade agreements, Senator Brown, and that is one that I
would want to take a look at.

There is a lot of interest, of course, on the part of those countries
in some sort of a relationship with the European Community, and
there are negotiations or discussions now ongoing with respect to
some sort of a relationship. It is certainly not something that I
would exclude, and I think that if any country wants to talk to the
United States about a GATT-legal free trade agreement, we ought
to be at least willing to sit down and talk.

Having said that, I think it is very important that we get a successful Uruguay
Round concluded, and that is going to be one of the things we are going to be
dealing with at the London summit this weekend and early next week, because
if we do not conclude a satisfactory Uruguay Round, I fear that protectionism
all around the world is going to increase. We are going to lose the world's
free trading system as we have known it, and you are going to see the entire
world break up into trading blocs, and I think that would be very unfortunate.

In talking about a free trade agreement, you are not talking
about trading blocs, and neither am I. We are talking about agreements that are specifically approved by and contemplated by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Senator BROWN. Well, frankly, my bringing the subject up is
prompted by concern over trading blocs. As I view our past agreement with Europe, it was one sponsored by, at least in part, America's interest in seeing Europe revive, and in that regard we helped
to provide defense forces that we have talked about, and we also
helped-I believe we helped the Europeans substantially, not only
wit the Marshall Plan but with a trading policy that allowed
them to be somewhat protectionist. At the same time, we offered a
relatively open market in the United States, and I bring it up with
the thought that this country's expressing interest in developing a
free trade agreement in Eastern Europe could well be an incentive
for Western Europe to integrate Eastern Europe more quickly.

I guess, put a different way, a fellow seems to take more interest
in a girl if he knows other people are interested in her as well.

Secretary BAKER. That is true.

You know, we have had some discussions recently, again leading
up to the economic summit, about the importance-and I have
spoken to this earlier today-of these countries succeeding in their
reform efforts.

They are only going to succeed if they can find markets for their
products, and therefore we have asked the Europeans to do what
they can about opening their markets a little wider to these countries so that the experiment in democracy and free markets can
succeed. We should be opening our markets a little wider to these
countries as well, Senator Brown, and a free trade agreement
would open those markets a little wider.

But having said all of that, can you guess what the major products are that they would like to export to the United States? Do
you want me to give you those, or would you just rather leave it at
that?

Senator BROWN. Well, I think you make a very valid point, but let me forego
subtlety here, and let me just say frankly that part of the ability of the Common
Market to face the real world in agricultural production is going to be either
working out arrangements through the current round of GATT negotiations or integrating
some of the Eastern European countries into that Common Market. At least, the
way I see it, if they integrate them into their Common Market they are going
to be forced to change the policy with regard to high-priced farm products.

Secretary BAKER. I am not sure they will, Senator. In my view,
that does not necessarily follow.

But I know one thing for sure, they ought to open their markets
to the agricultural products of these emerging democracies and
they ought to open their markets to their other products, which are
textiles and steel and dairy, just as we should.

But those all have certain political costs and considerations. But
if these countries are going to succeed, America and Europe together-and we both have a big stake in their succeeding-both of us
ought to be willing to do more.

Senator BROWN. Well, I think you hit the nail on the head. I
guess my concern is one that you voiced earlier about the future,
where this agreement helps lead us. At least in my view the real
challenge we face may be ensuring that the United States and
Western Europe do not emerge into the next century as competing
economic blocs.

Senator BIDEN. We have said a number of encouraging things
here today, but the last thing you said, Mr. Secretary, I am delighted to hear, and I would hope that would mean that we would be
even more ambitious in our SEED II efforts so that we do something more than we have done. I am confident you mean that. I
hope we can sweep away some of the bureaucratic inertia that has
made it difficult to do even SEED I and SEED II as they came
along.

But Mr. Secretary, let me conclude by stating that as I read the article-by-article
analysis, about a 500-Page document which you all submitted, in which you repeatedly
make it clear that the fact that equipment is able to remain in the Baltics
and that the Baltics are part of this agreement in no way is meant to, or is
designed to, or does it contravene U.S. policy relative to the Baltics and the
autonomy of the Baltics.

Secretary BAKER. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. You have done that repeatedly, as I understand
it, and it leads me to the very last question to be asked, and that is,
you have contemplated and you have supported the independence
and the autonomy of the Baltics-you the administration, we the
United States.

Obviously, none of us know what is going to happen in the Soviet
Union, and whether or not there will be Soviet disunion and
whether or not there will evolve from the 15 republics, independent nations, a confederation, whatever the changed relationship
will be, but we all know something may happen.

We are all, in this country, saying we want the Baltics to be able
to claim independence and move out of the Soviet Union. If our
desire to see that happen becomes reality as a consequence of what
is going on in the Soviet Union now, what does this mean for the
treaty?

What does it mean for the treaty when you have staging areas
now where, under the treaty, the Soviets are still able to maintain
limited amounts of equipment as a consequence of this treaty, and
later the area that is covered by the treaty. Would that staging
area no longer be a part of the Soviet Union? What happens then?
Am I being clear?

Secretary BAKER. Yes.

I think that once that happens, and we do indeed hope that it
happens. Let me digress for 1 minute and say that there have been
some talks. You know, in the aftermath of what happened in Vilnius on January 13, we had some very serious discussions with the
Soviets about the importance of engaging with the Baltic leaders in
a dialog and negotiation in an effort to find a way to resolve those
differences. There have been some talks. They have not progressed
to the degree that we would like.

My own personal view is those talks are on hold pending completion of the union treaty. That is what I think is happening, but
there has been some reduction in the incidence of violence and that
sort of thing, and we are pleased to see that.

Senator BIDEN. Let me make it perfectly clear, I am not in any
way being critical of your policy. I am just trying to get at a mechanical response as to what happens, and I could have picked
Georgia, or I could have picked Armenia, assuming Armenia ends
up an independent nation after this is all over. What happens?

Secretary BAKER. The first thing that would happen is that there
would be a conference called under article XXI of the treaty to deal
with the issue, and I think what would happen is that the agreements that were entered into would either be ratified by those new
States or they would not be. If they were not, there would be no
right to station anything there, and if there were, there would be a
right on the part of those countries to do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Question. What would happen in terms of the CFE Treaty if one or more of the
Baltic States became independent?

Answer. First, it should be emphasized that inclusion or the Baltic military
district within the area of application of the treaty ensures that the treaty's
limits apply comprehensively to all Soviet forces within the area. This does
not represent any changes in the long-standing U.S. policy of nonrecognition
of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

Second, the possible effect of regained Baltic independence on the CFE Treaty
raises a number of complex legal issues. As a result, it is premature to make any
definitive statements as to how the CFE Treaty regime would be affected by regained independence, of the Baltic States.

Senator BIDEN. I assumed that would be the answer, but I think
it is important that it be raised, because it is a question that will
be raised, I think repeatedly, although not in any way in my view
to impact on anything other than the continued value of this treaty
for us.

But anyway, I thank you very much. I realize we took you over
the allotted time. I feel very, very flattered that you would stay
beyond your usual 12:00 hour with us, and I want to thank you
very, very much.

Secretary BAKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m.,
July 16, 1991.]