Iraq – Global Politicshttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp
An International Affairs MagazineSat, 05 Aug 2017 07:38:12 +0000en-UShourly1Shaping Safety: How Architects Can Build a Stronger Peacehttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2016/03/10/shaping-safety-how-architects-can-build-a-stronger-peace/
Thu, 10 Mar 2016 19:35:10 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2234 I take my home for granted. There, I said it. Chances are you do, too, if your conception of home – like mine – does not include worrying about the daily dangers of a civil war playing out on your doorstep; the mortar shelling that has left your family homeless; or the stability of […]

I take my home for granted. There, I said it. Chances are you do, too, if your conception of home – like mine – does not include worrying about the daily dangers of a civil war playing out on your doorstep; the mortar shelling that has left your family homeless; or the stability of tent walls too thin too keep out winter’s frigid weather. As millions of refugees around the world lack a safe physical space, one crucial sector has remained both under-involved and underutilized in the scramble to provide such structures: architecture.

While places to live, meet, learn, etc., are still desperately needed in countries not in conflict (particularly for the estimated 100 million homeless worldwide), violence like that seen in Syria creates an acute lack of such space. Architects, engineers, and urban planners – those with the skill set to tend to the “built environment” – should be playing a larger role in aid and peace processes. Architecture can be vital not only for day-to-day survival, but also for advocacy and rebuilding efforts for refugees and post-conflict societies.

Refugees have been garnering attention this winter for the dangers they face in the migration process across Europe, but the challenges of refugees stalled in camps or unofficial dwellings are less likely to make headlines. Over half of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in insecure dwellings, and the situation is similar in Jordan. Aid groups’ small budgets can offer little more than stop-gap measures such as extra blankets, tarps, and heaters; for those with inadequate shelter – even official refugee tents are easily damaged by wind and snow – these may make little difference, if they receive anything at all. In the best of times, these shelters are often without electricity, toilets, and heating.

Certainly aid organizations need more funding to tackle these crises, but this is where architects have a chance to make an impact. Already, IKEA has started manufacturing easy-assemble, flatpack homes that arrive in a box, and a team headed by architect Cameron Sinclair created a shelter called RE:BUILD that can be constructed using gravel and sand. The best detail about these types of homes? They require no previous building experience or special training. Architect Alejandro Aravena suggests investing in permanent structures that residents can complete and use, claiming such buildings can alleviate housing shortages not just during crises, but permanently. Unfortunately, these ideas are expensive: an IKEA house costs three times more than a refugee tent, and while it lasts up to six times longer, the extra cost is hard to justify for agencies already facing budget deficits.

Refugee camps, with an expected duration of seven to seventeen years, also require schools, shops, and other everyday buildings. Their designers must juggle varying landscapes; limited space due to inhospitable host communities or land shortage; and the heightened possibility of rampant disease, violence, and sexual assaults in cramped spaces. New proposals include “alternative landscape frameworks” that encompass gardens, daycares and schools, and recycling mechanisms. One firm even created a movable playground for youth in Lebanese refugee camps when its employees realized the special difficulties of growing up in such an environment. While all of these efforts are laudable, aid groups, urban planners, and architects/engineers must increasingly work together to make affordable, practical solutions a reality.

Within Syria, 8 million displaced people are in overcrowded homes or squatting in abandoned buildings; hospitals have been destroyed; and schools are used as shelters, with little hope of remaining places of learning. When the war ends and society begins to heal, the lack of physical space to do so becomes a hindrance for rebuilding communities and nations. The need for hospitals, schools, and community centers is dire, though often overlooked. Again, those responsible for the built environment need a place at the negotiating table alongside the more common community leaders, aid workers, and military strategists. Creating an environment – literally – for peace may offer hope for sustaining it.

Architecture is not just another force imposed upon refugees and post-conflict communities by outsiders and agencies, but can act as an opportunity for empowerment and advocacy. A band of migrants denied asylum in Amsterdam used historic architecture as a launch pad for self-advocacy. Refugees occupied an iconic church in the city that became known as the “Vluchtkerk” or “flee-church,” prompting greater visibility for their plight. In Chile, the Villa Grimaldi, a former torture center of the Pinochet regime, is now a peace park dedicated to victims’ memories and human rights. Colombia is creating a National Museum of Memory for its citizens to grieve and remember victims of the ongoing conflict.

Architecture has the potential to lessen the dangers for refugees in unstable living conditions, rebuild safer communities after conflict, and even play a role in the healing process. The need for better and more creative solutions in conflict situations could not be more apparent than now, as over four million refugees have fled Syria and Europe faces an influx of migrants with nowhere to house them.

The built environment is not a magic solution that can feed hungry children and prevent violence – but it can act as a salve for neighborhoods too hurt to find a way to thrive and grow; offer hope to people too long denied a home or hospitals or schools; and allow those without a voice to create a space to band together. At the very least, the international community needs to reexamine architecture’s role in humanitarian pursuits.

]]>Understanding the Saudi-Iranian Cold War: A Road Maphttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2016/01/22/understanding-the-saudi-iranian-cold-war-a-road-map/
Fri, 22 Jan 2016 11:26:07 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2119The execution of a renowned Arab Shi’a cleric, Sheikh Nimr, just after the New Year has set long-standing rivals Iran and Saudi-Arabia on a new collision course. Radical elements in Iran attacked the Saudi diplomatic compound in the country prompting Riyadh to sever its relations with Tehran. While the Iranian government condemned the attacks, immediately dismissing some officials […]

The execution of a renowned Arab Shi’a cleric, Sheikh Nimr, just after the New Year has set long-standing rivals Iran and Saudi-Arabia on a new collision course. Radical elements in Iran attacked the Saudi diplomatic compound in the country prompting Riyadh to sever its relations with Tehran. While the Iranian government condemned the attacks, immediately dismissing some officials linked to the incident, it seems that Riyadh has decided on a course of escalation, urging its allies to downgrade relations with Tehran. At this point the much needed dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia to find a solution to the civil war in Syria seems more remote than ever. With the January 25th Syria peace-talks likely to be delayed, concrete measures need to be taken to get the two rivals to the negotiating table. Understanding the origins of the deep-seated Saudi-Iranian rivalry is essential, both to make sense of current developments and to recognize where a possible resolution to this conflict may come from.

Regional Rivalry: A Quest for Hegemony

In 1979 Iran became an Islamic Republic after the revolution, led by Imam Khomeini, who successfully overthrew the Western-oriented monarchy. During the reign of Shah Pahlavi, Iran and Saudi Arabia constituted the Nixon administration’s “Twin Pillar Policy” in the Middle East, promoting U.S. interests in the region and allowing both countries to acquire the latest military technologies. Khomeini’s Islamic ideology succeeded in creating a new type of government guided by a religious doctrine. He called for Muslims worldwide to follow in Iran’s footsteps and sought to export the revolution to countries near and far. Iran’s ideological transformation posed a serious threat to the region as Khomeini questioned the overall legitimacy of the Saudis’ mode of Islamic governance. In his view, the newly established Islamic Republic, ruled by a Vali-ye Faqih (Guardian Jurist), was the most appropriate model of an Islamic political system. Meanwhile, in the Eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia, the triumph of the Islamic Revolution had inspired the Shi’a minority to organize their first uprising demanding equal rights, further heightening the fears of the Saudi Arabian government.

Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980 provided Riyadh a means of militarily countering the Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies financially supported Baghdad, hoping that the Iran-Iraq war would eventually extinguish Iran’s ambition of becoming a regional hegemon. In 1981, with the war still in its early stages, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was founded by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies to further curb Iran’s power in the region. As the eight-year war progressed and the zeal for exporting the revolution started to wane, Khomeini urged Iranian pilgrims to maintain peace, especially during the Hajj in Mecca. This was contrary to Khomeini’s message at the beginning of the revolution, in which he specifically instructed his followers to spread the revolution. Nevertheless, the pilgrims’ protests during the Hajj continued, eventually leading to a deadly clash in 1987 when 450 Iranians were killed. Khomeini’s response was harsh accusing Saudi Arabia of heresy and simultaneously calling for the downfall of the House of Saud, even as angry mobs in Tehran attacked the Saudi embassy. It was at this point that Iran decided to formally support the Saudi Shi’a opposition group, Hezbollah al-Hijaz in which Sheikh Nimr played an important role. Saudi Arabia consequently cut off ties with Iran in 1988 and Iran boycotted the Hajj pilgrimage for a couple of years as Riyadh drastically reduced the number of visas issued for the pilgrims. The two nations only re-established ties in 1991 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which both countries saw as a threat, although Tehran remained neutral during Desert Storm.

After Khomeini’s death in 1989, Iranian president Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani initiated a strategy of rapprochement and reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. Rafsanjani also attempted to restore relations with the United States during his presidency but the Clinton administration responded by sanctioning Iran through the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996. Tehran was more successful in rebuilding its ties in the Middle East, making way for the first direct talks in 1997 between Prince Abdullah and Rafsanjani in Islamabad. In the same year, Prince Abdullah attended the eighth Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Tehran, meeting with the then newly elected Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami on the side. Abdullah was the highest ranking Saudi official to visit Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Khatami, for his part, introduced various reforms, and advocated the ‘good neighbour policy’ aimed at strengthening the ties with the Gulf monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the reformist president proposed a dialogue among civilizations at the UN in 1998, which was welcomed more enthusiastically by Washington. This prompted Madeleine Albright to make an apology in March 2000 admitting U.S. involvement in the 1953 coup that overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh.[1]

By 2001, Iran had made significant headway, with Tehran and Riyadh reaching agreement in various areas such as security, terrorism and immigration. However, the consequences of the disclosure of Iran’s nuclear program, followed by the country’s inclusion in George W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ in 2002, and the fall of Saddam in 2003, undermined the efforts to establish a trusting relationship between Tehran and Riyadh. Iran’s influence in Baghdad grew as Shiites rose to power in Iraq, while Iran’s support of the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon increased. When King Abdullah ascended the throne and Ahmadinejad became president in 2006, the relationship became more cordial, despite both the rising popularity of the Iranian president in the Arab world for championing the Arab cause in Palestine, and his fiery rhetoric against the United States. Ahmadinejad’s visit to Riyadh in 2007, when he sat next to the King in welcoming the delegations for the 2012 OIC summit which was being held there, was a distinct high point in relations between the two nations.

However, the Arab uprisings which followed Iran’s Green Revolution in 2009, negatively impacted the blossoming relations as political uncertainty mounted in many of the Arab countries that Riyadh counted as its allies. Further complicating matters, several internal Shi’a protests were held in 2011 and 2012 within the Kingdom, once again threatening the legitimacy of the ruling Saudi monarchy. It was the developing civil war in Syria, however, which was to bring relations between the regional titans to their current low ebb. As the Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, continued their efforts in backing the opposition with the aim of eliminating the Assad regime, Iran has fought relentlessly to turn the tide in Assad’s favour.

Two key developments in 2015 were to cause a further worsening of relations between the two states. The first was King Salman’s creation of an alliance to contain Iran, one strand of which is the establishment of a purely Arab coalition against DAESH in Syria. King Salman’s approach to Iran has been very different from the previous King as he regards Iran to be a menace and a hindrance to Saudi interests. The second development was Iran’s agreement with the West in July over its nuclear program aimed at ending the sanctions and Iran’s isolation. Further intensifying the situation was the death of 464 Iranian pilgrims during a stampede at the Hajj in September, prompting the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei to issue harsh statements against Saudi Arabia.

However, it was the attacks on the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran and the consulate in Mashhad a few months later that drove Riyadh to recall its ambassador from Iran. The attacks were carried out by the radical elements in Iran as a response to the execution of Sheikh Nimr. Nevertheless, the Iranian government has condemned the attacks on the Saudi diplomatic sites and dismissed officials that were thought to be involved in an effort to de-escalate the situation. The Saudis, however, do not seem convinced by Iranian motives. Saudi Arabia’s allies in the region such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have followed Riyadh in downgrading their diplomatic ties with Iran. While the current situation seems to be a repetition of the events in 1987-1988, (with Iran again apparently considering a boycott of the Hajj pilgrimage), this time around the stakes in the Saudi Iranian rivalry are much higher for both countries.

Leading the Ummah (Islamic Community)

Religious sectarianism is perhaps the most prominent feature of the rivalry between Shi’a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. Iran’s official state religion since the 16th century, Shi’ism, is a sect of Islam that has been at odds with the Sunnism that predominates in most of the Muslim world. Traditionally Shi’ism has been apolitical but Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 changed that, giving this branch of Islam a distinctly political orientation, and making it a contender for the ideal Islamic political system. This strategy, initiated by Imam Khomeini, made Iran a viable candidate to lead the Ummah in the contest of pan-Islamism while also bringing the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy to do likewise into question. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran claim that their respective governments act in accordance with God’s will, placing sovereignty in the hands of God, effectively turning the sectarian strife into a competition about the right form of Islamic governance and political system. The establishment of the Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government), led by the Vali-ye Faqih (Guardian Jurist) in Iran, which replaced the Shah, was promoted as the proper alternative to the monarchical system of the Gulf States, effectively threatening their legitimacy.[2] Facing a serious challenge, it is logical for Riyadh to perceive Iran’s hegemonic ambition to be driven by Shi’a expansion as it is often expected that ‘birds of the same feather flock together’.[3] Thus, scholars and political leaders across the Gulf have expressed the threat of a ‘Shi’a revival’ or a ‘Shi’a crescent’ as Iran has bolstered its influence in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.[4]

The Black Gold

Although oil prices have dropped sharply since last year, the fact that oil resources are dwindling remains a reality. As rentier states, Saudi Arabia and Iran heavily rely on oil sales to run their economies and access to this precious natural resource is essential for their interests until an alternative source of income is established. The religious sectarian tension has a significant impact on this aspect of the rivalry as most of the fossil fuel is located in areas dominated by a Shi’a population in the Middle East such as Iran, Iraq and Bahrain. Even in Saudi Arabia, the oil lies beneath the Eastern provinces, which are also predominantly populated by Shi’a Saudi’s. This is likely an aspect in the calculation of Riyadh in militarily supporting the Sunni government in Bahrain during the uprising in 2011 as the country’s population largely consists of Shi’a Muslims. If the Sunni government is overthrown, it is very likely that a Shi’a government will take its place – a scenario that the House of Saud clearly wants to avoid after witnessing what had happened in post-Saddam Iraq. If such a scenario were to unfold, the Shi’a minority in the Gulf will control the lion’s share of the oil reserves.

US patronage

The role of the United States in the region is perhaps the single most significant feature of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry. Much to the delight of Riyadh, Iran severed its relations with the United States in 1979, which, coupled with the hostage-taking at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, and generally bellicose rhetoric from the regime, was to have an adverse impact on U.S.-Iranian relations for years. These developments further strengthened Washington’s relationship with the Saudis, and in the years since, the United States had stood squarely behind its Arab ally, providing Riyadh with a certain amount of security in the region. However, the rapprochement between Iran and the United States, signified by the July 2015 agreement, together with the U.S. mismanagement of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have conspired to dent U.S. credibility in the eyes of Riyadh. Therefore, it is only logical for the Saudis to be worried about the long-term developments of this rapprochement, given their long-standing assessment of Iran’s ambitions.

Saudi Arabia was well aware that the execution of Sheikh Nimr was going to upset Iran’s hardliners. The question, then, is whether the House of Saud has been so overwhelmed by Iran’s diplomatic success with the nuclear agreement that they deliberately proceeded with the execution as a means of polarizing the region in the Saudis’ favour? Is the idea of an Iran that is open to the West so frightening? From the perspective of Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, Riyadh ‘is panicking’ and, seeking to reassure the Saudis, noted that ‘there is no reason to panic our friends’ and that Iran is ready to talk. One thing is certain though: since King Salman and the Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, took office, Riyadh’s stance towards Iran had been much harsher. It won’t be an easy task for the moderate President Rouhani to maintain peaceful relations with Riyadh while keeping the radical elements in Iran at bay. If there is to be a reversal of the current breakdown in relations, it is most likely to come through a diplomatic intervention by the U.S. and other Western countries. Nevertheless, as long as Saudi Arabia perceives Iran as a mischief-maker in the region, re-instilling trust into Saudi-Iranian relations will be difficult.

[1] Abright stated in her speech: “In 1953 the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Massadegh. The Eisenhower Administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons; but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development.” Albright 2000, available from: http://fas.org/news/iran/2000/000317.htm

[2] The position of the Vali-ye Faqih is conceived to be quite similar to that of the Pope in the Roman Catholic tradition.

[3] Stephen Walt discusses this phenomenon in his article “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power” in International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985), pp. 3-43

[4] An example is Vali Nasr book ‘The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future’ (2006).

]]>Kurdistan: the Next Epicentre of Regional Instabilityhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/08/30/kurdistan-the-next-epicentre-of-regional-instability/
Sun, 30 Aug 2015 23:19:09 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1775Kurdistan is a nation that encompasses parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, but it is not a state. In post-Saddam Iraq the Kurds have had success in forming a new autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) with their own military. In July last year, KRG President Masoud Barzani asked his parliament to prepare for an independence referendum. The Kurds have a […]

Kurdistan is a nation that encompasses parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, but it is not a state. In post-Saddam Iraq the Kurds have had success in forming a new autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) with their own military. In July last year, KRG President Masoud Barzani asked his parliament to prepare for an independence referendum. The Kurds have a rich heritage of rebellion, having fought with Iraq, Iran, Syria,Turkey and, of course, Islamic State, all within a 25 year time frame. Yet it is this recent role as an effective ally against ISIS that has increasingly come to define the Kurds in the eyes of the West.

Frustrated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Western states understandably have little appetite for more messy ground wars. Hence the emphasis on air power against ISIS with the U.S. and several other states providing close air support for ground forces. But on the ground, utilising other people’s armies (OPA) facilitates the pursuit of military objectives by outsourcing the blood intensive combat roles to the armed forces of other countries. The Kurds have become especially important since the Iraqi army melted away en masse. The Iraqi army has, by some estimates, lost enough hardware to arm in excess of 150,000 combatants. American built Humvees, artillery, small arms, even tanks, have all been lost to ISIS and in significant numbers. As a result, Kurdish Peshmerga forces now receive most Western military support, and yield results. ISIS’s ideology of violence has made a peaceful settlement impossible and their eventual fragmentation into obscurity is the most likely option. Sadly, the future of the Middle East after ISIS is unlikely to be a peaceful one, and Kurdistan could be instrumental in any future conflict.

Peshmerga fighters seem to be the only force capable of effectively countering ISIS. Consequently, they are pressuring the US and other states for both funds and modern weaponry. Germany has so far pledged anti-tank systems, 16,000 rifles, 8,000 pistols, 6 Million rounds of ammunition, and more than 100 military vehicles. Equally substantial arms shipments have also been sent by Albania, Australia, Croatia, The Czech Republic, France, The United States and others. Arming the Kurds is proving effective in combatting ISIS. But while this may be the solution to today’s problem, this ‘solution’ could well become tomorrow’s problem.

The KRG has found itself in control of 40% more territory than it administered before the war with ISIS began. Crucially, the KRG now controls Kirkuk, commonly acknowledged to be the Kurdish cultural capital, and its accompanying oil field, which is responsible for almost half of Iraqi oil production.

It is entirely conceivable that the KRG could emerge from the war with ISIS richer, better equipped and better organised than the rest of Iraq, a position that would virtually make Kurdish independence a reality. Strategic evaluations of Kurdish assistance based only on its value to Western foreign policy objectives neglect potentially significant risks in the years ahead. Arming the Kurds makes short term sense, but it may prove harmful to regional stability.

There needs to be a serious re-evaluation of the logic behind arming the military of an aspiring state with huge stockpiles of weaponry. If creating peace is the ambition for Western policy in the Middle East then the Kurdish policy appears to be a dangerous panic reaction as opposed to a solution. Such short-term thinking is the hallmark of what has been worryingly described a‘whack-a-mole’ Middle Eastern foreign policy where the pressure to ‘do something’ takes priority over more considered strategic calculations.

Internally, a future Kurdistan would face problems with racial politics and with respect to which peoples it seeks to represent. Kurds are one of the largest ethnic groups in the world without their own state. The foundation of a country along broadly ethnic lines has proved to be extremely problematic in the past. The Yugoslav wars are a vivid lesson about the horrors of ethnic nationalism in practice.

Following a Kurdish declaration of independence what remains of Iraq could descend into further Sunni and Shiite sectarian violence as happened from 2006-2007. Thus, an independent Kurdistan might not only be bad for Iraq, but also dangerous to neighbouring states, especially when we consider the ethnic Kurds who reside outside the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey has faced an armed insurrection from Kurdish nationalists since the mid 1980s, a conflict that would surely be exacerbated by a formal declaration of Kurdish independence.

The ethics behind politics and the use of violence become completely distorted when ethnic nationalism is the foundational principle of a state. By gifting the KRG weapons, hardware and training, a precarious situation has become even more dangerous and the conditions for a new phase of Middle Eastern violence have been created.

]]>After Authoritarianism: State Development and National Identity in the Middle Easthttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/04/18/after-authoritarianism-state-development-and-national-identity-in-the-middle-east/
Sat, 18 Apr 2015 14:07:08 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1489The Arab Uprisings have resulted in an increase in the expression of both sectarian and trans-state identities, making the process of reunification and the prospects for a peaceful coexistence somewhat dependent on the new leaderships’ ability to unite, make amends and, possibly for the first time in the region, craft a territorial nationalism that complements rather […]

The Arab Uprisings have resulted in an increase in the expression of both sectarian and trans-state identities, making the process of reunification and the prospects for a peaceful coexistence somewhat dependent on the new leaderships’ ability to unite, make amends and, possibly for the first time in the region, craft a territorial nationalism that complements rather than conflicts with sub-state and supra-state identities. But what is it about the nature and history of Middle Eastern states that has created such a fragile balance between territorial nationalism and extraterritorial nationalism? And why is it that the collapse of authoritarianism in the region has lead to an increase in sectarian identity? Finally, how has the Islamic State (ISIL) picked up the pieces of these fractured identities and reconstituted them into a “state”?

Identification, as Hall (1996) argues, “turns out to be one of the least well-understood concepts…it is drawing meanings from both the discursive and the psychoanalytic repertoire, without being limited to either.”[ref]Hall, S. & Du Gay, P. Questions of cultural identity. London: Sage, 1996, p. 2[/ref]Identification relies on the recognition and belief in a ‘common origin’[ref]Ibid.[/ref] or, for Benedict Anderson, a belief in the of the nation.[ref]Anderson, B. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London:Verso, 1983[/ref] For Anderson, it is the construction of these imagined communities that has provided nations with the cohesive materials necessary to form a state. In contrast, Anthony Smith argues that these nations are not simply a product of a constructed or imagined cohesion, but rather are a product of much older ethnic origins, rooted firmly in a continuous and distant past. [ref]Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986[/ref]

Despite the differences between these two theories, both would agree that the logical end result or by-product of nationalism should be the realization of a sovereign state. However, history has shown this hasn’t always been the case. In fact, the consolidation of states in the Middle East runs contrary to Smith and Anderson’s assumptions in numerous ways. As Hinnebusch argues, the consolidation of nation-states in the Middle East has been “obstructed by the profound flaws originating in its largely external imposition: the resulting often arbitrary borders and ill fit between states and national identities means that loyalty to the individual states is contested by sub-state and supra-state identities.”[ref]Hinnebusch, R. and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. London: Lynne Rienner, 2002, p. 7[/ref] This was due, in large part, to the colonial processes by which the former Ottoman territories were divided, which in some cases reflected certain pre-existing entities, but for the most part involved either the restructuring of former Ottoman provinces, as in the case of Trans-Jordan, or combining several provinces as in Syria and Iraq.[ref]Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 9[/ref] As a result, the states took on a rather artificial shape, “with their new names, their new capitals, their lack of ethnic homogeneity and their dead-straight boundaries.”[ref]Ibid., p. 9[/ref] The immediate effect of this fracture was that these new ‘states’ and their citizens had no real nationalistic attachment to the state, and often times only a flimsy attachment to its territorial boundaries. As a consequence, common colonial practices like the census and the issuing of identity cards were used to re-categorize and re-identify populations, whilst central governments issued laws by which the relationship between citizen and state, as well as the principals of the newly defined nationalism were established. In the case of the Arab states, this redefined nationalism was determined, as Owen argues, by a combination of territorial attachment, with citizens proving nationality based on historical connections to territory within the newly defined borders, as well as proof of a family member having lived in the territory before a certain date.[ref] Ibid., p. 9[/ref] Therefore, both the ethno-nationalism of Smith and the imagined community of Anderson, while useful up to a point, fall short in that territorial sovereignty, and its implied territorial nationalism, assume a certain measure of particularity. Implicit in this particularity is the presumption that nationalism is limited to the boundaries of the state, whereas the development of states and nationalism in the Middle East has acted, as Noble argues, more as “a set of interconnected organisms separated only by porous membranes”, rather than the kind of mechanical determinism of Smith and Anderson.[ref]Hinnebusch, p. 7[/ref]

As a result of national identity’s extraterritorial character and lack of any real democratization processes within the majority of Arab states, which would have helped secure state-centric national support from the masses (Turkey), Arab political elites have attempted to secure their legitimacy through a number of populist strategies aimed at creating a singular identity for their citizens and whilst attempting to absorb traditional and localized power structures on the periphery. As Zubaida agues, elites attempted to curb cross-border relationships through what he terms the ‘national political field’, in which all political activities were focused inward towards the capital city and all assertions of localized power were centralized.[ref]Zubaida, Sami. Islam, the people and the state: essays on political ideas and movements in the Middle East. London: Tauris, 1993, p. 145[/ref]

This was the case with the early 20th century expression of Pharaonism, a territorial nationalist movement in 1920s and 30s Egypt. The development of nationalism in Egypt is unique to the Middle East in that Egypt’s historic territory has, more or less, remained constant throughout history (with a few exceptions). Meaning that, unlike other former Ottoman provinces, the Egyptian state was never in a position to “convince” its citizens of their territory. There was, however, an attempt to convince Egyptian citizens of their cultural uniqueness amongst the Arab states. As Charles C. Smith argues, Pharaonism attempted to both undermine the traditional authority of the ulama (religious elite), by focusing on the period prior to the introduction of Islam, and to sever extraterritorial connections by focusing on the pre-Arab ethnic character of Egypt.[ref]Smith, Charles C., “Imagined identities, Imagined Nationalisms: Print Culture and Egyptian Nationalism in Light of Recent Scholarship” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 (1997): 612[/ref] To what extent the Egyptian state succeeded in this is debatable, however, as C. Smith argues, even when supra-Egyptian nationalism spread and began to supplant Pharaonism in the 1930s, “Egyptians…continued to assume ‘hegemony’ over their Arab neighbours, indicating a continued feeling of being Egyptian vis-à-vis their counterparts from other Arab regions”, while continuing to feeling connected to them through Islamic and pan-Arab nationalism. [ref]Ibid., p. 612[/ref] Regardless of the fleeting success of these territorial nationalist movements, what became clear to Arab leaders in their state’s nascent period was that any attempt to legitimize their authority must include what had become populist issues: namely, anti-colonial pan-Arabism, the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict and Islamism.

Therefore, during the period between the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 1967 War, Arab leaders sought legitimisation through what Hinnebush and other have termed ‘symbolic politics’, with the Arab leadership co-opting issues more broadly central or symbolically relevant to the Arab world.[ref]Hinnebusch, p. 8[/ref]However, after the failure of the 1967 and Yum Kippur Wars with Israel, it became clear that anti-Zionist posturing was nothing more than rhetoric and that the pan-Arabism of Nasser had failed to counter western and Zionist imperialism in the region.

This period of soul searching lead many of the Arab states to abandon pan-Arabism in favour of an inward consolidation of power made possible, in part, by new investment from the USSR in the Levant and Egypt, and the United States in the Gulf. These regimes and monarchies were able to redistribute wealth to the middle and lower classes, thus pacifying to a certain degree internal opposition to the ruling elites, whilst securing their grip on power through the development of pervasive security apparatuses. The failure of the Arab States to curb Israeli aggression in Palestine and beyond also had the effect of increasing the popularity of Islamist movements, which was furthered by the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by the forces of Saddam Hussein and subsequent American military intervention, the unforeseen consequence of which was the strengthening of anti-western sentiment in the Islamic world, as well as a general shift in attitude away from the pan-Arabism of the 1950s, 60s and 70s towards pan-Islamism. If we fast forward to the Arab Uprisings we were then left with several types of states in the Middle East: the oil rich and western-backed monarchies of the Arabian peninsula and Gulf, the authoritarian regimes of Syria, Iraq, Egypt and beyond, and the stateless nations of Palestine and Kurdistan.

The Islamic State and National Belonging

When this article was first published in 2013, it explored how the breakdown of authoritarianism in the region would ultimately lead to a collapse of nationalisms – a ‘post-authoritarian identity crisis’. It also suggested that new political actors would seek popular legitimacy through the reconstitution or co-opting of traditional identities not necessarily bound to contemporary international borders. Now, some four years after the Arab Uprisings began, the emergence of the Islamic State seems to suggest that this new paradigm now exists in the Middle East. But it also leads to the question of how national belonging has evolved in response to and within ISIL – particularly as ISIL attempts to carry out many of the functions of a state – administrative, military, etc. – whilst lacking fixed borders, a shared culture, language or ethnic background and other basic elements of national identity. What then provides a sense of national cohesion for a population that has very little in common – apart from a shared experience of Sunni Islam? Indeed, is a form of pious-nationalism cohesive enough to constitute a “state” in the contemporary context?

Within the Andersonian model of national identity, a move towards secularism within nation-states is implied because the state gradually replaced the church in areas of politics, education, and social welfare. As a consequence, the public role of the church declined. Simultaneously other allegiances and identifications, which, ‘in a pre-modern age or in more traditional societies, were given to tribe, people, religion and region, came gradually in western societies to be transferred to the national culture.’[ref]Hall, Modernity–an Introduction to Modern Societies / Edited by Stuart Hall … [Et Al.}.[/ref] However, grounding the analysis of national identity within the secularism model is problematic, not only because, since the 1970s it has become outmoded, but also because it seems to apply only to a western experience, and even then only marginally.

In the context of the Middle East, Wedeen, Kartveit, Zeberi and others have discussed the role of pious-nationalism within Arab states, where religion has continued to play a significant role in the public discourse and politics. In essence this model largely forgoes territoriality in the place of membership in the global religious community. While the long-term goal might be unification of the religious community in a single territory, national aspirations may take priority. However, pious-nationalism can take on several different forms. Two obvious examples are Hamas and ISIL. Whilst Hamas views Palestine as an Islamic waqf, its political ideology and goals are largely based upon a territorial nationalism, which prioritises the liberation of Palestine over the establishment of a global Muslim Caliphate. In other words its national identity is simultaneously Palestinian and Islamic. In contrast, ISIL views itself as the “authentic” Caliphate representing the entire global Muslim community – whether they like it or not. Its goals are therefore not based upon any one national project, in the sense of Iraqi or Syrian nationalism, but rather the establishment of a global Islamic hegemony. “Nation” in this context can be equated with the Islamic umma or global community of Muslims, and is less orientated towards “state”.

Within a typical nation-state, modes of national attachment and public displays of nationalism might include the celebration of national days, wearing of national costumes, traditional dances, etc. These are, in essence, a form of secular ritual with the focus on the citizen and state rather than the believer and God. Expressions of pious-nationalism in the Islamic context place emphasis on the umma – expressed through hajj, the observance of religious holidays, public morality, and other areas of social conduct. In this way, the global Muslim community can relate to other Muslims regardless of their national, ethnic or other backgrounds. Loyalty to ISIL in relation to other Islamist or national groups is proven through the adherence to a specific brand of Islamic interpretation. This brand is reinforced through shari’a schools attended by both children and new immigrants to the state, but also through the very public enforcement of ISIL branded Islamic morals. One then proves one’s loyalty to the state by adhering to these principles, which distinguish the Islamic State not only from the surrounding Arab states, but also crucially between a correct and incorrect interpretation of Islam. In a roundabout way, this actually mirrors the construction of national identity within nation-states in that the practice of national identity necessarily distinguishes itself from the other.

Authoritarian Arab states utilised their monopoly on violence to curb the plethora of trans-state and other traditional identifications. Their collapse and, ultimately, the disintegration of state borders has allowed the Islamic State to play upon traditional identities in order to secure a stronger sense of legitimacy for itself. Whilst these terms “traditional” and “modern” conjure up a rather orientalist interpretation of Middle Eastern society, they do highlight certain factors that undoubtedly influence the construction of identity within the Middle Eastern context; namely that political actors will often frame their own ideologies and understandings of the nation within traditional cultural, religious or tribal frameworks. In other words, political actors may attempt to merge, reconstitute or repurpose traditional affiliations in order to both consolidate power (through identification with a cultural or demographic majority), and to unify otherwise heterogeneous populations (as the state seeks to secure its position as the primary authority).

As discussed above, this is accomplished primarily through ‘recurrent social practices’ like ceremony, tradition and religious ritual. [ref]Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity / Anthony Giddens (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1990., 1990)., cited in Hall, Modernity–an Introduction to Modern Societies / Edited by Stuart Hall … [Et Al.}., 599.[/ref] By placing these social actions within a continuous narrative of past, present and future, traditional societies can make use of symbols and histories that represent the collective experience of previous generations.[ref]Ibid., 599. [/ref] In other words, the use of traditional symbols may actually serve to create a stronger sense of legitimacy for ISIL vis-à-vis the past Arab regimes because it can present itself as representing a time prior to the end of Islamic hegemony and western colonialism in the region. Whereas the Arab regimes represented the last vestiges of a past corrupted by colonialism, the Islamic State presents itself as being rooted in a period and worldview before this occurred. This is obviously a perspective shared by numerous Islamist groups, but the difference is that ISIL has succeeded in establishing itself as a “state”, where other groups remain isolated within larger national contexts.

]]>Was ISIS Inevitable?http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/04/04/was-isis-inevitable/
Sat, 04 Apr 2015 21:15:57 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1458ISIS’ exploits dominate headlines, horrifying witnesses around the world. As a history graduate who specialised in researching the rise of Islam, its culture, and its creation of a complex and inspiring civilisation, the recent destruction of millennia old artefacts have almost reduced me to tears. As we now watch and condemn the destruction of priceless […]

ISIS’ exploits dominate headlines, horrifying witnesses around the world. As a history graduate who specialised in researching the rise of Islam, its culture, and its creation of a complex and inspiring civilisation, the recent destruction of millennia old artefacts have almost reduced me to tears. As we now watch and condemn the destruction of priceless heritage, how far can we truly be shocked at the rise of ISIS?

The resurgence of the ‘caliphate’ should not come as a surprise. I have dedicated considerable research into the development of Islam as first a religion, then as a rapidly evolving political and cultural entity. Islam’s power entrenched the use of a caliphate from the time of the Rashidun Caliphate in 632AD to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s. When the caliphate collapsed at this time it was naïve to assume that the caliphate as a fully established institution (although fluctuating in importance and power) would disappear forever. It is a system of government that was respected and successful enough to exist for approximately 1,291 years in various forms; it is only logical, therefore, to assume that the concept would resurface.

The form that it took, however, has not been pleasing to most. It is interesting to note the specific way in which ISIS has chosen to re-establish what they believe to be the epitome of power within the Islamic world. This article will argue that this form is ultimately detrimental to ISIS, in their fight to re-establish a monopoly of power following a series of destructive events for the region.

Crucially, we must begin with the creation of Iraq following the carving up of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The Treaty of Sevres in August 1920 established the British Mandate of Iraq defining the terms of a decades-long conflict across the region. This came about as a result of the division of ethnicities, including dividing the Kurds between four sovereign states, as well as inserting divisions between different Shia and Sunni sects predominantly in Iraq. In this way, a country was artificially created that would suffer from the treaty’s repercussions until the current day.

The clear trichotomy of the country was evident and further entrenched during Saddam’s time, with Shiism in the south, Sunnism in the centre, and the Kurds in the North. Each seemed to determine their own course for existence, with the Kurds fighting for independence from the moment of the country’s creation, to Shi’ites in the South establishing Shi’a holy sites that stand protected even today. The Iraq war, however, is when the trouble began to bubble dangerously close to destroying the country itself. Study of this conflict enables us to begin to see how ISIS exploited a perfect opportunity.

Saddam’s Sunni dominated government, although by no means advantageous to Sunnis, concentrated the focus of power away from close-knit Kurdish and Shi’a groups respectively. Following the collapse of Saddam’s regime during the Iraq war, this in effect diverged power away from the Sunni population and left a power vacuum that was filled by groups opposed to Saddam, many of which were Kurdish. The Iraq war was, thus, not just an opportunity for the West to move into an oil rich plateau. It also provided an opportunity for the Shi’a south to strengthen ties with their natural allies in Iran, and enabled Kurdish movements to rekindle independence efforts. This inevitably left the Sunni centre at the mercy of a new Shi’a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and a Kurdish President Jalal Talabani.

The situation was exacerbated by US policy-makers’ botched understanding of the political make-up of a government in transition, an army whose loyalty was uncertain, and an obvious three-way split in loyalties across the country in general. The disbanding of the army was the first decisive factor in the rise of ISIS. The army was fully functioning, armed, and trained, and their loyalty was yet to be decided. Yet the decision to leave a military jobless within a destroyed and impoverished environment no doubt allowed ISIS to ‘employ’ Baathist members easily.

It is unfair to assume that the central government should have prevented the rise of ISIS. How many governments have we seen successfully overcome deeply entrenched divisions for decades, tackle the repression of a ruthless dictator, and transition easily from two separate wars, one of which left an undecided outcome and was widely acknowledged as illegal? It is therefore unfair to argue that the Iraqi government should have quelled the rise of ISIS when it was so fragile.

However, the government was by no means devoid of blame. Nouri al-Maliki’s attitude towards the Sunni centre accelerated the need for ISIS to mount opposition to an undermined Sunni identity following the war. Maliki’s policies exacerbated the situation intensely. While butting heads with the Kurdish north, Maliki also heavily favoured Shi’a authority at the expense of the Sunnis. By disbanding the Sunni militias, Maliki effectively (although perhaps inadvertently) ordered the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis with the use of Shi’a militias. The number of Sunnis fell from 45% to 25% in the space of four years. Sectarian violence became a heavy feature of Maliki’s Iraq, driven by his hopes to ensure Shi’a dominance across the region.

Heavy corruption within the government and the fear of a new autocratic system of government under Maliki which would significantly disadvantage the Sunnis, aided the realisation of a need to act by Sunni insurgents. With growing resentment accumulated amongst ex-Baathist militia forces and the Sunni centre, it is inevitable that ISIS (or a similar fighting force) would have emerged from the rubble of a war-torn artificial country.

I have outlined the opportunistic spread of ISIS across Iraq. The situation has been similar in Syria whose ongoing civil war has left a wide vacuum of power which has been expertly exploited by ISIS. Similarly the sudden rise of ISIS in Libya is a reflection of the power vacuum of a country in transition.

]]>ISIS, Islam and Credulity: More Irreverence Needed in the Fight Against Extremismhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/03/15/isis-islam-and-credulity-the-need-for-greater-irreverence-in-the-fight-against-extremism/
Sun, 15 Mar 2015 00:46:45 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1304This week, King Abdullah of Jordan appealed to European parliamentarians to help root out both terrorism and ‘Islamophobia’. Setting aside this interesting conflation, the wholesale failure of Arab and majority Muslim countries to embody either mutual respect or inclusivity towards many of their ethno-religious minorities bespeaks of an imbalance in critical attention to how those […]

This week, King Abdullah of Jordan appealed to European parliamentarians to help root out both terrorism and ‘Islamophobia’. Setting aside this interesting conflation, the wholesale failure of Arab and majority Muslim countries to embody either mutual respect or inclusivity towards many of their ethno-religious minorities bespeaks of an imbalance in critical attention to how those states embody such attributes. We will never finally root out terrorism while we continue to indulge the basis of it in ideologies derived ultimately from religious beliefs with eschatological narratives. While xenophobia is undoubtedly a problem, ‘Islamophobia’ has now been reduced to a self-serving defence mechanism to ring-fence one major religion from legitimate mockery. Needless to say, criticism of ideas does not equate to racism. The unwillingness to have an honest conversation about this, without fear of being labeled a bigot by ideologues on both the Islamic right and the (supposedly) secular left, has permitted xenophobia to fester. For elements on the left it is almost as if Islam alone among the major faith traditions is bereft of any problematic dogmas. Quite a number of western citizens are not buying this. Until we re-create (yes, we actually need to re-create it now, as it has effectively been conceded through Islamist intimidation) a legitimate space for criticism and satire of religion as part of a wider exchange of views the basis of apocalyptic terrorist narratives will remain fundamentally intact. The failure to be honest in relation to this will also continue to swell the ranks of the far right.

In the aftermath of the sadistic burning alive of a Jordanian serviceman by a group of seemingly educated (Jihadi John is apparently a computer programmer) social misfits and conspiracy theorists bent on establishing an Islamic dystopia in Syria and Iraq, a series of statements emerged from mainstream political and religious leaders from the Middle East. These statements from both spiritual and temporal leaders must have chimed well with the emotional mood among western publics as they viewed spliced and pixelated images of IS militants gleefully enacting Surah 8:12 and Surah 47:4 of the Qur’an. However, no one appeared to notice, still less comment on, the inherently troubling tone and rhetoric being used by this Arab mainstream.

Political leaders like the aforementioned King Abdullah of Jordan duly pledged to fight ISIS until they ran out of bullets. Abdullah himself even went so far as to ‘suit up’ (on Twitter only), emulating the flight suit wearing antics of George W Bush, as Jordanian forces participated in the Arab version of ‘shock and awe’ in ISIS held territory. Not to be outdone, Islamic scholars of repute, such as Al Azhar University’s Grand Imam Al Tayeb, declared the violent extremists ‘un-Islamic’ and then ironically issued some unambiguously violent phraseology of his own, including punitive amputations, crucifixions and death sentences.

The problem is that most public and supposedly informed political, media and academic discussion of this has skirted and evaded, and spoken lazy platitudes about tolerance and ‘dialogue’ between faiths. But some of these faiths have at their core some unsavoury beliefs that never enter the conversation. One must seriously question the point of having a mutually respectful and inclusive dialogue with people who adhere to a religion (and not just Islam) that holds straight-faced belief in winged horses, hellfire, voices from the nether world, resurrection of the dead and scenes that would not look out of place in a Peter Jackson movie. It is perhaps time to take the gloves off and finally confront the dangerous ridiculousness of missionary religion’s eschatological dimension. We can talk all we like about ‘deviance’, ‘twisted’ or ‘warped’ religious beliefs, but these versions of belief emanate from the persistence of one unfortunate human characteristic.

At the heart of twenty-first century debate around ISIS, terrorism and the role of religious belief is the undiscussed question of human credulity. Credulity, the human tendency to believe in the improbable in the face of evidence to the contrary, has hampered our political response to religious extremism. We can monitor, track and bug all we want; if the ideas are not discredited with some hard talking, then we won’t get much further forward. Credulity is something that all religions depends on to survive. It also sustains many of the conspiracy theories thrown into the mix by Islamist and sub-cultural ideologues, whether about 9/11, Jewish plots to rule the world, the CIA or MH370. Remarkably, credulity has had an inexplicably easy pass thus far and tends to be overlooked as an important variable in understanding the most fundamental challenge to contemporary global security. It is credulity, matched with a dose of gullibility and naïveté, which prompts fifteen year old British schoolgirls to pack their bags under their parents noses, leave their comfortable British lives complete with healthcare and education, and enter the black hole of Islamic State. The emergence of ISIS, indeed of radical Islam generally, has failed to be understood on its own terms. Wood’s important recent article in The Atlantic isolated the issue well. However, what is really missing from the ‘dialogue’ is the question of why the human belief in fairy stories and the supernatural continues to be indulged by those who should really know better.

It is time to end the emerging taboo against criticizing and mocking people’s beliefs. It is about calling such beliefs exactly what they are: ludicrous. The sensitivity is perhaps understandable, but too much is at stake now. This is about more than satirizing people’s ‘deeply held beliefs’ simply for the sake of it. No one is satirizing Jainism or animism. They don’t pose a threat to international security. This is about satirizing beliefs in order to punch a hole in the bubble of indulgence and conformist ‘respect’ that has sustained these beliefs in the contemporary world of email, YouTube and nuclear weapons. When these beliefs form part of a narrative that is political as well as religious then they are fair game for mockery.

The West, as Obama rightly noted recently, is not at war with Islam. The fact that ISIS perpetuates this nonsense as they are bombed by Arab jets is neither here nor there. Obama is probably right to keep the US largely out of it and deny the End Timers their final battle. Where the cleavage really lies, however, is in the distinction between those who believe in eschatological fantasies and those who do not. And therein rests a major problem. The non-believers, the incredulous, are a minority of the world’s population. Most of the world’s citizens do in fact buy some version of this, whether Christian, Muslim or not. There is, at the very least, a reluctance to tamper with the idea of an afterlife. In the two main missionary faiths this eschatological dimension is linked very explicitly to personal salvation and redemption. The grip that ‘End of Days’ fantasies has over so many is remarkable given the age we live in. It is not coincidental that there are so many Christian leaders lining up to defend mainstream Islam from mockery. Would that they could intimidate cartoonists so effectively themselves. This is ultimately a self-interested move by Christian clerics and apologists. The premises of the critique of eschatalogical religion applies to Christianity as well as Islam. The appetite for self-criticism among believers is simply not there. Even US President Obama made use of tactical platitudes in a recent conference on counter terrorism:

All of us have a responsibility to refute the notion that groups like Isil somehow represent Islam, because that is a falsehood that embraces the terrorists’ narrative – US President Obama

It’s well meaning, but it is plainly nonsense. Most believers are happy enough to compartmentalize these aspects of their beliefs and reconcile them with day to day reality. Most are prepared to countenance such apocalyptic eventualities as occurring well beyond their individual lifetimes. Our current problem emanates from the fact that some do not consider the End Times a distant reality. They are divining ‘signs’ in the geopolitical landscape and acting on their own narratives. They are attempting to externalize their beliefs and have them incorporated and reified in real world politics. The worldview embodied by Islamic (and Christian) doctrine fully supports this narrative of End Times. The Islamic Hadith even makes clear where it will happen, hence ISIS’s formation in Syria. The result is obvious and disturbing.

We have been fed the mantra, at least since 9/11, that those who perpetrate atrocity and violence in the name of religion – and in the name of Islam specifically – are not ‘true’ Muslims. As any halfhearted constructivist would point out – there is no ‘true’ Islam. What we have are medieval texts and commentaries that have been definitively detached from orthodox religious authority and opened to individual interpretation. Add in vastly contradictory attitudes to violence in the principal texts, selective quotation and the inerrancy of divine word, and we have all the ideological structures in place for entities like Al Qaeda and ISIS. ‘True’ Islam is now that Islam that largely conforms to modern international norms. Perhaps that is the best we can hope for in the long run. This was the Islam of King Abdullah’s speech, his war stance notwithstanding. But it can never be the only Islam given the sizeable corpus of contradictory core doctrines, sayings, epithets and the obvious variable of there being 1.6 billion believers on all continents.

The Islamist and leftist efforts to prevent those who try to burst these delusional notions from being heard should be faced down. If the narratives of believers are deeply held, then satire will hardly shake their personal convictions. The trenchant reaction by mainstream Muslims, Islamists and leftists to the Charlie Hebdo controversy (and before that the Danish Cartoons controversy) seemed to indicate an unwillingness to accept that perhaps there is something within the Islamic tradition to worry about. A more honest and frank conversation is required in order to begin the process of overcoming the root cause of ISIS’s continuing appeal and success in recruitment, as well as the stubborn persistence of radical and extremist Islam. Alas, the jury is out on whether that will ever occur while writers and artists find themselves under threat of violent death. A real ‘dialogue’ is about believers being confronted by those prepared to say that the premises of what they believe in is fantastical nonsense. There needs to be a little less reverence. Satirists and critics should not be pilloried by the self-appointed guardians of political correctness. As Kenan Malik highlighted, too many assert that ‘I believe in freedom of speech. But…’.

The End of Days, the Apocalypse, Armageddon, the Final Battle, Rapture, The Resurrection of the Dead, The Second Coming. These narratives, associated conspiracy theories, and the continued indulgence of them by commentators who accuse the satirists of racism or ‘Islamophobia’, are perpetuating a mystic and allure that should long ago have been undermined. It is not only right but absolutely essential to point out their absurdity.

]]>ISIS and The Illusion of Powerhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/03/05/isis-and-the-illusion-of-power/
Thu, 05 Mar 2015 00:06:51 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1230It can be difficult to stay optimistic about peace while an atmosphere of gloom permeates the contemporary Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Syria. It is nearly impossible to watch the news without being inundated by provocative visuals of ISIS’s atavistic executions of U.S. journalists and perplexed by ISIS’s seemingly uncanny ability to recruit Westerners. […]

It can be difficult to stay optimistic about peace while an atmosphere of gloom permeates the contemporary Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Syria. It is nearly impossible to watch the news without being inundated by provocative visuals of ISIS’s atavistic executions of U.S. journalists and perplexed by ISIS’s seemingly uncanny ability to recruit Westerners.

Nevertheless, ISIS has paradoxically but effectively managed to harness the power of modern technology while using antiquated acts of barbarity and terrorism to provoke emotional thinking. That is, after all, exactly the point of terrorism: to project false strength and prompt irrational miscalculations based on emotion.

ISIS is selling fear; the media has been doing much of their marketing, and it is working. A recent CBS poll showed that 65% of Americans view ISIS as a threat, and 57% were in favor of sending U.S. ground troops to combat them. This is a significant increase from back in September when only 39% supported possible intervention.

Recognizing the manipulative quality and intent of the social media influence of ISIS is vital. All citizens must understand the context in which ISIS is attempting to influence them. It is in the face of terrorism when it is more important than ever to prevent emotion from triumphing over reason. There is a telling dichotomy regarding ISIS’s actual power and their propaganda-induced illusion of power. The truth is that – especially in Iraq – ISIS is losing.

ISIS is certainly not on the brink of defeat, and they still hold some significant territories, but they have been losing these territories at an escalated pace as the opposition ranged against them grows exponentially. The tide has turned against them, and their inability to gain state allies makes a reversal of fortunes highly unlikely. The U.S. is also planning a major operation that could hugely curtail ISIS’s influence.

The U.S. has recently announced plans to assist Iraqi troops in seizing the city of Mosul from ISIS in April or May – possibly later. The importance of this operation cannot be overstated; a successful campaign could play a pivotal role in the battle against ISIS. Vox’s world correspondent Zack Beauchamp recently explained the significance of Mosul:

Mosul is a center of Sunni life in the country. Over one million people are thought to live there, making it potentially a sixth of the total population under ISIS control. It’s also at a critical location in northern Iraq, providing ISIS a base from which to threaten both Iraqi Kurds to the north and other Iraqi cities, such as Tikrit, Samarra, and even Baghdad south along the Tigris River.

Taking back Mosul, then, would remove ISIS from its core base in northern Iraq, making it very hard for it to hold territory further south. It would no longer be able to fundraise by running extortion rackets in the populous city. Without Mosul, ISIS likely could not accomplish its core objective of building a real state on Iraqi land.

So, what we have here is an opportunity for the Shia Iraqi government to not only deliver a crushing blow to ISIS, but to also assuage sectarian tensions with Mosul’s Sunni population by alleviating the conditions that previously made them susceptible to ISIS recruitment.

This operation elicits profound comparisons – though not synonymous – with Operation Enduring Freedom back in 2001 when the U.S. assisted Afghans in seizing back Mazar-i-Shariff from the Taliban.

I recently sat down with scholar of Islamic History and author Brian Glynn Williams to get his thoughts on the situation. Williams, who has received unparalleled access to General Dostum, said, “It is a very valid comparison.” “It is much better to follow the Afghan model instead of launching Operation Iraqi Freedom 2.” He went on to emphasize how some people have “short memories” when it comes to the Iraq invasion, especially regarding “the full-blown civil war in 2006 that proved how disastrous things had become.” While Williams would not go as far as saying ISIS is losing, he did confidently assert that “they are definitely not winning.”

Like Mosul in Iraq, Mazar-i-Shariff had strategic significance in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s loss of Mazar-i-Shariff precipitated a series of losses that eventually forced them to flee the country.

There are some important differences between ISIS and the Taliban, however, that are worth mentioning. The Taliban was able to retreat to the FATA areas on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which allowed them to regroup and establish a revolt years later. The Taliban is essentially a nationalist Pashtun group whose goals do not extend beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan. ISIS is a transnational jihadist group with global aspirations that requires an ideology which appeals to a much larger audience. ISIS views the concept of nationalism as anathema to their goals, and has shaped their ideological appeal within an apocalyptic, cosmic framework.

ISIS’s apocalyptic aspirations and fierce commitment to the establishment of a caliphate may ultimately result in its downfall. “To be the caliph, one must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law,” Graeme Wood explains in his cogent, thought-provoking piece in The Atlantic. Wood explains how it is the duty of the caliph to “expand the caliphate.” ISIS’s ideological outreach and appeal requires them not only to hold territory, but to continue gaining territory. Simply put, ISIS cannot retreat and regroup the same way the Taliban did without it being hugely detrimental to their image – which is paramount for their necessary recruitment.

ISIS in Iraq would likely retreat to Syria. Syria, of course, is a different story than Iraq: the seemingly never-ending civil war complicates matters. Still, ISIS has failed to make any kind of significant gains since U.S. airstrikes began there in September. ISIS can no longer launch large offensives without becoming an easy target for coalition airstrikes. Momentum was key to their success, and they no longer have momentum.

ISIS is essentially fighting a losing battle behind an illusion of power. They are pursuing completely irrational, impossible goals and their resources are insufficient. Overall, their business model is unsustainable, since their allies are nonexistent and their opposition is growing. Although ISIS’s rise was unprecedented, their success will be transient. It may take time, but ISIS’s defeat is inevitable. It has already begun.

]]>Mediterranean Migration Reveals Flaws in Dublin Conventionhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/02/21/mediterranean-migration-needs-collective-european-action-down-with-the-dublin-regulation/
Sat, 21 Feb 2015 15:56:43 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1126John Donne famously reminded us that ‘no man is an island’. Likewise in today’s polycentric, ever-globalized, and interconnected world, no state can remain untouched by social, economic, or political influences from neighbouring states. As terrible as Islamic State has been for people living in Syria, Iraq and Libya, its effects on Europe are also increasingly being felt. […]

John Donne famously reminded us that ‘no man is an island’. Likewise in today’s polycentric, ever-globalized, and interconnected world, no state can remain untouched by social, economic, or political influences from neighbouring states. As terrible as Islamic State has been for people living in Syria, Iraq and Libya, its effects on Europe are also increasingly being felt.

The rise of migration from North Africa and the Middle East to Southern Europe has resulted in a tragic increase in human suffering. The great exodus began last June as ISIS moved through Iraq, expelling Christians and other religious groups from cities such as Mosul. The United Nations Refugee Agency reported that in 2014 Europe saw a 25% increase of asylum applications, with urgent European action required to stop rising refugee and migrant deaths at sea. Furthermore, mounting pressure has fallen on neighbouring nations, as the UNHCR attempts to cooperate and interact with volatile governments in Syria, Sudan, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt in hopes of dealing with the ever-growing numbers of refugees.

Unsurprisingly, there has been increasing demand for the services provided by illegal transport cartels offering to take refugees from North Africa to Europe (namely Spain, Malta, Greece and Italy). These modes of travel are highly dangerous, as highlighted recently when over 300 migrants drowned after attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Tripoli in rough seas.

Desperate refugees are herded like cattle into overcrowded fishing boats and inflatable rafts, which are turned onto ‘auto pilot mode’ (as the well-paid smuggler jumps off), leaving the illegal immigrants to face their fate at the mercy of the elements. The BBC reported that the average value of a boat of migrants to traffickers can be more than $1m, which these human trafficking “businesses” receive, regardless of whether their human cargo survive the journey.

Under the current legislation of the 2003 Dublin Regulation, if the boat is picked up by a European naval or coast guard service, or is fortunate enough to dock on dry land, the first European country to offer assistance is responsible for the adequate protection and provision of the illegals. The purpose of this convention is firstly, to allocate the responsibility for asylum applications to one member state to prevent situations where an asylum seeker is passed from one country to another without anyone prepared to examine the merits of the claim, and secondly, to deal with ‘asylum-shopping'[ref]Sandgren, P.(2001). The Dublin Convention, The University of Lund p.1[/ref], when an asylum seeker lodges applications in several different countries at the same time.

Article 8 of the Dublin Convention establishes that if the asylum seeker has never been in contact with any state within the EU, the asylum seeker is not allowed to freely choose in which state he or she wishes to lodge an application; instead, the state whose territory he or she enters is responsible[ref]Sandgren, P.(2001). The Dublin Convention, The University of Lund, p.18[/ref].

Unfortunately, the instrument has not functioned as intended, partly due to subjective determinations of whether a country is ‘safe’. For example, a refugee from Iraq who traveled through Egypt to get to Italy may have their asylum claim refused if the authorities deem Egypt to be the first safe state traveled through.

Europe’s Schengen Acquis adds further strain to these major immigrant receiving countries. Both the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Agreement deal with the allocation of responsibility for processing asylum claims. The existence of borderless travel among European States can result in further complications, such as an asylum seeker refused refuge in France being deported back to the original state he or she initially came through.

Even those who make it across the Mediterranean to the continent are not guaranteed safety or comfort. The UNHCR highlighted that some governments are more concerned about keeping people out than treating them as individuals who may be fleeing war or persecution. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, noted that “Security and immigration management are concerns for any country, but policies must be designed in a way that human lives do not end up becoming collateral damage,”.

The strain is also greatly felt by the Greek and Italian economies. The Economist estimates that these naval and humanitarian operations cost Italy €9.5 million a month. Neither Greece nor Italy is in a position to begin to look after up to 5000 immigrants per weekend. Angelino Alfano – Italy’s Interior Minister, has repeatedly insisted the European Union must relieve the pressure on Italy’s services. Instead, the UN has had to step in and provide assistance for the 350,000 people stranded on Europe’s shores. These figures are three times higher than in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring revolts in Libya, which saw a previous annual high of 70,000 people.

Frontex, the EU agency that manages the cooperation between national border controls, and help prevent illegal immigration, human trafficking and terrorist infiltration, has a budget of €89.1 million. Frontex is able to coordinate border surveillance operations, but its role is not to replace border control of national authorities, but rather to provide ‘those EU countries that face an increased migratory pressure’ with additional assistance. This assistance and extra funding has not been enough, though, to cope with the demand for search and rescue operations, as illustrated by the thousands of deaths that have occurred in the past year alone.

The EU currently runs a border control operation called Triton to help these vulnerable European states. However, it cannot pre-empt problems occurring in international waters and is limited in remit and legal capacity, as it can only act when lives are immediately at risk. Deborah Haynes of The Times notes that with the recruitment of 6,000 extremists to ISIS since October, this North African and Middle Eastern migration is set to grow. For a number of geographically “peripheral” and often vulnerable states, the Dublin Convention is unsustainable. Its enactment preserves landlocked countries such as Austria and Hungary, along with more remote countries like the UK and Ireland from the brunt of this humanitarian crisis, while Italy’s exposed peninsula must deal with almost everything that fate and circumstance throws at it.

With IS having recently incited Egypt, Jordan, Japan, and Australia through provocative terror and publicity videos, the consequences of the fear spreading from the Middle East has already resulted in increased military action, which will continue to play a pivotal role in shaping events for the foreseeable future. With President Obama having just asked Congress to formally authorize military force against the Islamic State group, there seems little sign of stability just yet.

No man is an island, but neither is any nation. For now, the International community must view the IS threat and Libyan migration within the context of International Security. Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, is doing admirable work but other European States also need to take responsibility and send aid. In 2012, Germany was the third highest recipient and host of refugees in the world, supporting 589,700 refugees. However, there is great disparity across Europe, with the UK hosting just shy of 150,000 individuals and Ireland accepting an embarrassing total of just 6000.

There has to be a full-scale and collective effort to deal with the thousands of people who are drowning in the Mediterranean, especially in the coming months when the seas become calmer and the migration season begins again.

]]>Responsibility To Protect at Tenhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/01/27/responsibility-to-protect-at-ten/
Tue, 27 Jan 2015 23:35:31 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=858The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was agreed by UN member states in the 2005 World Outcome document. As we near the tenth anniversary of its adoption, how successful has it been? R2P replaces humanitarian intervention as a way in which the UN has justified state intervention. Implementation of R2P has come in 3 forms: i) […]

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was agreed by UN member states in the 2005 World Outcome document. As we near the tenth anniversary of its adoption, how successful has it been?

R2P replaces humanitarian intervention as a way in which the UN has justified state intervention. Implementation of R2P has come in 3 forms: i) institutional, ii) cases and application, and iii) international norms.

(i) Institutional refers to the way in which R2P has been driven by the UN, states, NGOs and regional actors resulting in the establishment of new institutional structures such as the creation of a Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on R2P.
(ii) Cases and application refers to R2P’s use in countries such as Kenya in 2008, and Libya in 2011.
(iii) International norms refers to how R2P has become a new institutional norm, and is also linked to how it has been implemented culturally, and particularly wider public awareness of it.

A further dimension in which R2P’s implementation ought to be analysed is through the three pillars. I will argue that the success of R2P’s implementation varies depending on the element of R2P in question. It also seems evident that R2P’s implementation is undergoing transition.

Other points to consider regarding R2P’s implementation

i) Looking at the number of resolutions in which R2P features is a poor guide to assessing its implementation.

ii) One ought not write off R2P based on operational or military failures in some of the instances in which R2P has been used; for example, R2P should not be judged solely on the basis of the supposed civilian deaths in Operation OdysseyDawn.

Pillar one of R2P (responsibility to prevent) is the protection responsibilities that the state has towards its own citizens. This evolves from already existing laws concerning the conduct of states. If this pillar were fully implemented and adhered to by states, then the other pillars would cease to be necessary. Although there seems to be a growing awareness on the part of states in terms of their responsibilities regarding their own citizens, recent examples of atrocities such as those committed by the Anti-Balaka militia in the current Central African Republic conflict point to a limitation to this pillar. States are said to have responsibility over their citizens, but what about non-state actors, such as rebel groups who commit atrocities?

This is where the other pillars set in, or when governments should request international assistance, as is currently the case with the Iraqi government requesting assistance in their operations to curtail ISIS, which has committed atrocities against those of the Shi’ite branch of Islam and other religious minorities such as the Yazidi Kurds. Implementing R2P over the long term and making states aware of their responsibilities will require continued efforts. Raising global public awareness of R2P might go some way to ensuring that states become aware of their pillar one responsibilities.

Pillar two (responsibility to rebuild) involves the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting their pillar one responsibilities. This includes providing material resources and ensuring coordination between the state in question, the UN system, regional, and other actors.[1] The current assistance being provided to Iraq in the fight against ISIS arguably falls within the pillar 2 criteria.

Pillar three (responsibility to act) is the most controversial aspect of the R2P doctrine. It is not restricted to military means; economic, diplomatic and political methods may also be used. The operations of the various pillars should not be thought of as acting in complete isolation from one another. For example the 2007-2008 Kenyan crisis indicates how pillar 2 and 3 diplomatic pressures can ensure that states are made aware of their pillar 1 responsibilities.

The first explicit reference to R2P in a UNSCR was in Resolution 1970 concerning the 2011 conflict in Libya. The resolution clearly reiterates pillar one of R2P when it restates “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population”.[2] Resolution 1973 extended R2P into the realm of pillar 3 when it committed the international community to implement an NFZ (no-fly zone) above Libya. The fact that NATO states went further than this resolution does not remove the fact that R2P was used for the first time in a Chapter VII context.[3]

R2P’s implementation into the international structure has been fairly straightforward. A Global Centre for R2P has been established which monitors international crises and makes recommendations to the UN and governments on the applicability of R2P. Additionally, the UN Secretary General appointed a Special Adviser on R2P to oversee its implementation. There has also been the creation of a new academic journal Global Responsibility to Protect.

As I have mentioned, R2P seems to have been implemented quite successfully institutionally with the establishment of new organisations and the fact that R2P is now an option that the UNSC can consider in responding to crises. In terms of its status as being an international norm, the process is incomplete, although it has been partially successful given the large number of states that support it. In terms of its implementation in real cases, R2P was clearly successful in the case of Libya.

It is hard to draw conclusions about R2P’s true impact because of uncertainty regarding the ‘behind the scenes effect’, meaning it is difficult to determine at this point the extent to which R2P has actually affected the decisions of diplomats. The reality is that R2P has huge potential as a doctrine of decision-making in international relations. However, its future ultimately hinges on China’s rejection of its legitimacy as an international criterion of policy making. Although we are in R2P’s early stages, we can see that it is being implemented successfully within the UN framework, and it may well become the principal motivation for action in international relations over the next decade.

]]>Why Are Humanitarian Workers Targeted?http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/01/25/why-are-humanitarian-workers-targeted/
Sun, 25 Jan 2015 12:29:34 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=829Why are humanitarian workers targeted? On World Humanitarian Day this year the United Nations reported that in various conflict zones in 2013, 155 aid workers were killed, 171 were injured and 134 were taken as captives. We have to ask, what is the justification for such acts? Let us begin with the illegal occupation of […]

On World Humanitarian Day this year the United Nations reported that in various conflict zones in 2013, 155 aid workers were killed, 171 were injured and 134 were taken as captives. We have to ask, what is the justification for such acts?

Let us begin with the illegal occupation of Iraq by the United States. On August 19, 2003, a truck laden with explosives rammed into the Canal Hotel, Baghdad, housing United Nations (UN) headquarters, killing Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Secretary General’s Special Representative in Iraq along with 20 members of his staff. The same day, the head of UNDP, Mark Malloch Brown, said: “We do this [humanitarian relief] out of vocation. We are apolitical. We were here to help the people of Iraq and help them return to self-government. Why us?”

Almost a year later, on June 2, 2004, five Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) personnel were killed in western Afghanistan. The Taliban claimed responsibility, claiming that MSF was working for US interests. MSF announced the closure of its operations in Afghanistan, raising objections to the US civil military intervention in aid as well as US social and developmental projects.

MSF said it worked hard to maintain its independence and a distance from the coalition forces, and opposed attempts to link military objectives with the provision of humanitarian assistance by the US military in Afghanistan. Adam Ereli, a US State Department deputy spokesman, said: “We strongly reject any allegation that our actions have made it more dangerous for humanitarian workers.”

In the aftermath of the UN bombing in Baghdad, individuals within the NGO community quietly acknowledged that they were targeted because of the UN’s failure to stop the war, or to at least reject the US invasion in clear terms.

The perspective of the attackers

From the perspective of the attackers, the answer to the question raised by Mark Malloch Brown in Baghdad, when he asked “Why us?” was clear. The UN had failed to stop the illegal invasion of Iraq and it was now there to calm the situation, giving respite for the occupier which would allow it to establish roots and entrench its version of peace in Iraq.

Analysing the situation from across the Muslim and non-Muslim civilizational divide, collectively, the UN and NGO groups are not neutral or impartial about the nature of future peace. They all work towards a peace that reflects Western values and that is what the war is about – it is a war about the nature of peace.

In 2001, Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, proclaimed:

“Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom… NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.”

Although his comments were rejected by many NGOs, looking at this issue with a wider lens it is a legitimate question to ask, was he wrong?

In today’s world, peace and security is only accepted in the image of western liberal democracies, dictated by state liberalism. There has been a drive to make the world into a single ideology state – liberal democracy. However, the majority of Muslims are not convinced that liberal democracy is any good; what they want is to be able to choose those that would govern them according to Islamic law. In other words, they want a ‘Muslimcracy’.

When the UN or Western liberal-democracies prop up a government in Muslim majority societies, many Muslims see it as suspect or illegitimate. And when these puppet governments are supported in the name of ‘humanitarianism’, especially through civil-military coordination (CIMIC) the civil relief work becomes questionable. NGOs working in partnership with the military will be seen as a “force multiplier” for the puppet government and in an active conflict zone, a legitimate target.

“Human security” or “Modernist global order”

A new phrase is on the tongue of the ‘humanitarian relief workers’ and modernist policy makers; they call it ‘human security’. The term was first coined by the UNDP, Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security in 1994. The report defined seven interconnected elements of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. It is an all-encompassing theory of intervention in an attempt to create a specific global ‘order’ of Modernism.

The term was coined in search of a new system of control in the aftermath of a bipolar world. It is an attempt to shift the focus of security from state security to the security of the people allowing the uni-ruler of the world to intervene whenever and wherever under the pretext of securing the people. It appears that in a unipolar world or more precisely Western/modernist-polar world, the western concept of ‘Developmentalism’ is being repackaged under a new term ‘human security’. One of the criticisms of development agencies has been that they are the tools of modernity and westernization imposing itself on the world in the name of progress.

Now it appears that the same thing – development – take two, is served under the banner of ‘human security’, but this time in coordination with the military, in the name of humanitarian aid but keeping a ‘civilian’ face!

Humanitarianism in context

American NGOs coordinating and cooperating with US military in delivering relief to a US friendly secular liberal society is one thing, but doing the same in a US occupied Muslim country is quite another.

“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”

NATO uses the word “coordination” and “cooperation” side by side. The first means organisation, management and direction while the second is synonymous with collaboration, teamwork and help.

When NGOs cooperate with military commands in meeting shared objectives, then it can be argued that they have taken sides. The question is at what point in its “cooperation” with the military can an NGO differentiate between military, political, and ‘humanitarian’ objectives? In a liberal democratic context, the military and NGOs are extensions of society. For this reason, Colin Powell is right to say: “…NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team”. Here the mere act of coordination is not in question, but the whole philosophy behind what is to be achieved is very much in question. Conflicts are not always seen in the light of the immediate war on resources alone but also in the light of the overarching theories of life and civilizational paradigms. Wars are fought to control the agenda of hegemonic states and at times this agenda manifests itself through the soft and hard powers of the warring sides.

From a purely Islamic perspective, the entire foundation of the military and social doctrine that is based on modernity is illegitimate. In Islam, God is sovereign not man.

Civil-military coordination and cooperation in the current global setting is an inward modernist discussion. The debate needs to be widened at the philosophical level. The concerns of other theories of social order must be considered. Otherwise, NGOs operating in a purely modernist paradigm continue to be at risk of being perceived as the soft power arm of the occupying civilization and will remain at risk of being targeted

Many humanitarian organizations work very hard to remain impartial and are, in fact, saving lives, reaching out to millions of disadvantaged people across the world, which must not be forgotten. I pay my respect to all the humanitarian workers who have lost their lives, their freedom and put themselves in harm’s way to help others.

Hashmat Moslih is a political analyst and commentator on Afghanistan. He has an MA in International Urban and Environment Management and served as an advisor to the former president of Afghanistan Burhanuddin Rabbani.