Thursday, May 31, 2012

Too many money shots that decorum prohibs sharing yet here's a wicked tease to whet appetites subtle and more bigger

Since 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to pursue a coordinated soft-powerstrategy throughout its sphere of influence, using political, economic, and military tools topromote its agenda. Unlike the period of the early 2000s, however, Iran’s payoff for thatstrategy is in doubt. The Arab Spring has presented Tehran with new opportunities but alsonew challenges in the Middle East. In general, it has brought a growing Sunni-Shi’a sectariantinge to regional conflict, and Iran finds itself on the wrong side of that fight in most countriesin the region. As that sectarian conflict spreads, Iran will have more difficulty presenting itselfas a pan-Islamist regional leader—and Saudi Arabia, and possibly Turkey, likely will emerge asthe obvious and natural Sunni Arab resistance to the Persian Shi’a.As long as Bashar al Assad remains in Damascus, the Syrian alliance with Tehran is likely toremain strong. Should the predominantly Sunni insurgency oust Assad and take power in someform, however, the Iran-Syria relationship would very likely fracture. However, the depth ofthat relationship would make unwinding it no easy matter for Syria and those states that supportits new rulers. Understanding the full scope and scale of the Tehran-Damascus alliance will beessential for policymakers regardless of the outcome of the current Syrian insurgency.The ascension of Hezbollah to a position of dominance in Lebanese politics in 2011 hasallowed Tehran to establish much more direct relationships in Beirut without the mediation ofSyria. This development could not have come at a better time for Iran, as it suggests that Iran’sinterests in the Levant can be protected and advanced even with a greatly weakened Syrianregime.Of all Iran’s proxy relationships in the region, its entente with Hamas is likely to be the mostdifficult to retain in the face of growing sectarianism in Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf. Aformal split with Iran and the loss of Hamas headquarters in Damascus in early 2012 promisesmore turmoil for both Hamas and the Palestinians it governs. Overall, Iranian support toregional allied and proxy militaries, however, has remained very strong and quite possibly hasincreased.The revolution in Egypt has thus far delivered little by way of practical results for Tehran.Cairo, likely under some additional pressure from the Persian Gulf states and from Washington,DC, has made only miniscule steps in the direction of renewed relations with Iran.In Iraq, Tehran’s policies have been largely successful, giving Iran an unprecedented degreeof influence there at the expense of the United States and of Baghdad’s Arab neighbors. Afriendly Iraq is not only an important part of the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” but also servesas an opportunity for Iran to evade the increasingly harsh international sanctions regime and tocontinue financing regional groups.Iranian influence in the levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan

Iranian efforts to influence events in Afghanistan have been largely unsuccessful, as Afghanpresident Hamid Karzai pursues a strategic partnership with the United States and North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) despite Iranian pressure not to do so. Although ideologicallyopposed to the Taliban, Tehran continues to provide calculated support to the radical Sunnimovement as a way to accelerate the withdrawal of US forces from its eastern neighbor.We began our study of Iran’s regional influence in 2007 because we saw an emerging Iranianstrategy to apply both hard- and soft-power tools to improve and consolidate Tehran’s positionin the region.

The pattern of Iranian economic, social, political, and diplomatic activity seemedto possess a unity that US policy—stove-piped into separate US concerns such as the war inIraq, the Israel-Palestinian peace process, the Iranian nuclear program, and, subsequently, theArab Spring—often seemed to miss. This study makes clear that Iran does, indeed, pursue sucha coherent smart-power approach to the region, although not always with success.Nothing about the ongoing struggle in the region is inevitable. The most important conclusionthis study can offer is the growing importance of evaluating Iranian strategy in any one areawithin the context of Iranian strategy as a whole. One of the greatest mistakes the UnitedStates can make is to imagine that Iranian activities in a given arena—the nuclear program, forexample—are isolated from Iranian undertakings in another.The United States and its allies and partners in the region and beyond must not only understandIran’s regional strategy and influence but also develop a coherent strategy of their own withwhich to confront them. Considering the relative economic, political, and diplomatic power ofthe two sides, it is simply unacceptable for the United States and its allies to allow Iran evensuch progress as it has made in these realms. To the extent that soft power can substitute for orenhance and support the effectiveness of hard power, developing a coherent influence strategyfor the Middle East is imperative for US national security.

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