Tuesday, September 9, 2014

RETIRED
SEATTLE POLICE CHIEF CONNECTS FERGUSON TO DRUG WAR IN SENATE HEARINGS ON SAME
DAY THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY CALLS FOR END TO DRUG WAR

Police
Chief at Time of WTO Protests’ Written Testimony to Senate Below

Panel
of Dignitaries, Including Kofi Annan, George P. Shultz and Eight Former Heads
of State Calls for Decriminalization Approach to Drugs

WASHINGTON DC–In the wake of tragic events in
Ferguson, Missouri that focused the public’s attention on the increasing
militarization of police, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs is holding a hearing on police militarization today at
10:30am ET. Retired
Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper, who oversaw and now
regrets his role in the militaristic response to the Seattle WTO protests in
1999 has been in consultation with the Committee and has submitted written testimony
which appears in its entirety below.

Meanwhile, in New York City, a group of dignitaries
including former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz, former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the former presidents or prime ministers of
Brazil, Switzerland, Colombia, Chile, Portugal, Poland, Greece and Mexico and a
long list of other top leaders are meeting this morning to release a new
report calling for putting public health and safety first
through the decriminalization of drug use and possession and the institution of
legalized regulation of drug markets.

“The drug war is inextricably linked to most major
issues of our time, from immigration to police militarization. It’s the cause
of much of the violence on our streets and in communities worldwide. We are
increasingly seeing smart leaders recognize that and become determined to do
something about it,” said Major
Neill Franklin (Ret.), executive director for Law Enforcement Against
Prohibition, a group of law enforcement officers
opposed to the war on drugs.

Hearing on Oversight of Federal Programs for
Equipping State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies:
Statement of Norm Stamper, Seattle Chief of Police (Ret.), advisory board
member of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition, and Author of Breaking Rank: A Top Cop’s Exposé of the
Dark Side of American Policing

Introduction. Something has gone
terribly wrong with American policing. Never wholeheartedly embraced by a
freedom-loving people, the institution recently has suffered a major blow to
its image, and to community-police relations. Thanks in part to the federal
government’s 1033 Program, which furnishes Department of Defense military
surplus to city and county law enforcement, we have seen a rapid and massive
expansion in the militarization of local policing exemplified by, but not
limited to, the tragedy that occurred in Ferguson, Missouri this August. This
trend is disturbing in the extreme, and must be reversed in the interests of
public safety and community support for law enforcement.

As a former police chief who has made
these mistakes myself (during the 1999 WTO protests in which I authorized
military gear as well as the use of tear gas against nonviolent demonstrators),
and who has spent the past 15 years working to atone for these past
transgressions, I urge a top-to-bottom overhaul of the 1033 program. This is a
task best reserved, I think, for multidisciplinary experts (tactical, legal,
ethical) combined with a cross-section of the American people and subject to
congressional oversight. I do not mean to suggest, however, that tightened
regulations, to include inspections, must await a more comprehensive
examination of the 1033 program. On the contrary, the current situation demands
immediate remedial attention.

I also urge consideration of the role of
the federal government in mandating or encouraging additional law enforcement
reforms implicit in this paper and along the lines of those developed during
previous generations of national inquiries into local police practices.

Community policing. Throughout the ’90s
many cities began adopting the policies and practices of community policing.
The essence of community policing is deceptively simple: the citizenry and the
police working together, in full partnership, to identify, analyze, and solve
crime and other neighborhood problems—including, as necessary, the
community-police relationship itself. The goal? Safe streets, healthy
communities, and a strong community-police bond.

Of course, such a relationship demands a
high level of trust between police officers and the people they serve. But even
in the most advanced versions of community policing (i.e., those that embrace
systematic, joint community-police problem-solving, and reject a cosmetic or
“PR” approach), this trust has been elusive. I believe there are two
fundamental reasons for this.

America’s War on Drugs. First, the drug war,
as the expression implies, has served as the impetus for many departments to
“militarize” key aspects of the work, by which I mean procurement of military
vehicles and weapons, adoption of military garb, use of military and
quasi-military tactics, even the vocabulary of war as local agencies carry out missions
to target and defeat the enemy—defined overwhelmingly as
drug offenders, be they users or dealers.

From the onset of the drug war in the
early ’70s, this “enemy” has been disproportionately young, poor, and nonwhite.
Many agencies argue that this is merely a statistical outcome, not an intended
consequence.

But since President Nixon famously
proclaimed drugs “Public Enemy Number One” and prioritized their eradication,
an impossible goal, what has transpired is less a war on drugs than a war on
the American people. We have incarcerated tens of millions of young, poor,
black and Latino Americans for low-level, nonviolent drug offenses. The
devastating effects of the drug war on inner-city residents, in particular,
cannot be overstated. Families have been fractured and individual lives damaged
if not lost. Entire neighborhoods have been turned into war zones, resulting in
plummeting property values and a deeply diminished quality of life for millions
of Americans. Across the country, residents have been forced to change the way
they live and how they raise their children as a result of fear—of both drug
trafficking and of law enforcement’s aggressive, militaristic response to it.

Which brings us to the second barrier
standing in the way of mutual trust between the police and the people they
serve.

A history of paramilitarization. The drug war and
post-9/11 considerations aside, policing has, from its early moments, been
organized as a paramilitary bureaucracy. How a law enforcement agency is
organized—not just the work it does on the streets—gives rise to and shapes an
imposing workplace culture. The “cop culture,” whether in compliance or in
defiance of department policies and community expectations, pretty much
determines the performance and conduct of our police officers.

Much has been written on the powerful
influence of this culture, its positives and its negatives. At the heart of
current controversies, however, one negative stands out: the tendency of our
police officers to isolate themselves, to distance themselves from the
residents they have been hired to serve and in the process to form an in-group
solidarity that is all but impenetrable. The militarization movement has
dramatically exacerbated this tendency.

Starting in the early ’90s, even as some agencies embraced the language of
community policing, most were moving incrementally toward an increased military
presence in the communities they serve. SWAT accounted for the bulk of these
martial actions, and upwards of 80 percent of all SWAT operations were, and
remain, dedicated to low-level drug targets.

The “9/11 Effect.” In the aftermath of
9/11, with new and legitimate concerns about homeland security, we saw a major
escalation in the militarization of our police forces. Given the federal
government’s generosity in distributing military equipment, vehicles, and
weaponry—with virtually no strings attached (no demonstration of need, no
training, no maintenance)—we have seen even tiny, rural police departments
transformed into small armies, their peace officers converted into soldiers.
With no real homeland security challenge, many of the 18,000 local police departments
in the U.S. have too often employed their new military materiel and weaponry
against essentially nonviolent, nonthreatening citizens.

In light of what we witnessed last month
on the streets of Ferguson—city and county police officers clad in “camis,”
combat boots, ballistic helmets, and carrying semi-automatic military
rifles—even an officer poised prominently atop a tall MRAP (mine-resistant
ambush-protected vehicle), tripod-mounted sniper rifle at the ready—it is no
wonder that so many Americans believe their local cops have become an occupying
force, military in appearance, military in demeanor, military in tactics.

If my understanding of the pre-existing
relationship between the largely black population of Ferguson, Missouri and its
largely white police force is accurate, what happened in the hours after the
controversial August 9 shooting death of an African-American teenager was
depressingly predictable. Simmering fear, resentment, and tension exploded when
at a peaceful vigil the police showed up looking and acting like storm
troopers.

Imagine a pre-existing relationship in
which the police of Ferguson had instead reached out to their community, had
already forged a genuine partnership with its citizens who want nothing more
than safe streets and an effective, respectful police force.

Collateral damage. A single
unnecessary or unwise militaristic action can destroy any hope of a
constructive community-police relationship: the wrong house hit in a predawn
raid of the family home; an elderly, unarmed resident caught in the crossfire;
a toddler severely burned by a SWAT “flashbang” grenade; the family pet shot to
death in the midst of a “shock and awe” invasion; a police officer killed by a
disoriented, bewildered homeowner. Any one of these is enough to create a
permanent rift in the way a community views its police force.

In the years prior to 9/11 there were roughly 3,000 recorded SWAT missions
annually in the entire country. After 9/11—and notably, with the proliferation
of the 1033 military surplus program—SWAT operations have mushroomed to more
than of 50,000 separate missions per year. Many of these operations have been
carried out by enthusiastic but undertrained and undisciplined police officers.
The “collateral damage” has been staggering.

The difference between cops and soldiers. The purpose of our
military in wartime is to kill or capture the enemy. By contrast, the purpose
of our domestic police agencies is (1) to prevent crime (murder, sexual
assault, burglary, domestic violence, grand theft, child abuse, arson, etc.)
(2) to detect and apprehend those who commit these criminal offenses (and to
assist in their successful prosecution), and (3) to provide other public safety
services, ideally in seamless partnership with the residents who benefit from
these services. Soldiers follow orders for a living; police officers make
decisions for a living.

There will always be times, places, and
circumstances that demand a military-like approach with military-like
discipline, decisiveness, tactical precision and teamwork. Active shooter
incidents, armed and barricaded hostage-takers, and school and workplace
shootings come to mind.

The challenge, then, is as obvious as it
is difficult to meet. How do we build a police force of honest and honorable
men and women who treat one another and the communities they serve with dignity
and respect and who have the physical strength, psychological hardiness and
resilience, self-confidence and self-discipline required to handle the full
range of duties they are called upon to perform when these activities range
from a bank robbery in progress to a crib death; from a school shooting to a nonviolent crowd of protestors?

The answer is complicated but within our grasp. It involves, at a minimum, a
careful selection process for choosing new police officers, rigorous training,
diligent supervision, effective discipline, and competent and courageous
leadership—from elected officials, civic leaders, community activists, and, of
course, the police chief and the police union.

It also demands a willingness to tackle
the complex structural and cultural barriers to reasoned and responsible police
work. Daunting though it may be, we can and must reverse the militarization
trend of American law enforcement.

I believe it all starts with a decision.
We must decide to view America’s cities as DMZs—demilitarized zones. And to
treat our police officers as mature, respected partners of the community, even
as we demand they act as such. I’ve written extensively on these and related
subjects and invite readers to peruse selected chapters of my book, relevant, I
believe, to the issues arising out of Ferguson: “Why White Cops Kill Black
Men,” “Racism in the Ranks,” “Staying Alive in a World of Sudden, Violent
Death,” and “Demilitarizing the Police.”