I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where annual elections end, tyranny
begins." If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally
founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which
the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the
reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of
pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within
which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this
respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for
all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. The
election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient....

Federalist No. 55

The Total Number of the House of Representatives

Wednesday, February 13, 1788 [James Madison] (excerpt)

To the People of the State of New York:

THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another and a very interesting
point of view, under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article,
indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of
character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited
against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public
interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their
numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize
least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the
few on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it
will be more and more disproportionate....

Federalist No. 54

Apportionment of Members of the House of Representatives Among the States

Tuesday, February 12, 1788 [James Madison] (excerpt)

To the People of the State of New York:

THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its
members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.
It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the
proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for
the appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this case, is by no
means founded on the same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal
rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to
the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit
one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of
the States....

Federalist No. 56

The Total Number of the House of Representatives (continued)

Saturday, February 16, 1788 [James Madison] (excerpt)

To the People of the State of New York

THE second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due
knowledge of the interests of its constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with
the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests,
without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from
other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these
peculiarities.
It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and
circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and
interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate....