An ongoing analysis of southwest border violence issues by an experienced intelligence professional.

I am a consultant and analyst with eight years of military law enforcement experience, six years of analytical experience covering Latin America, and over seven years of analytical experience covering Mexican TCOs and border violence issues. This blog is designed to inform readers about current border violence issues and provide analysis on those issues, as well as detailed focus on specific border topics. By applying my knowledge and experience through this blog, I hope to separate the wheat from the chaff...that is, dispel rumors propagated by sensationalist media reporting, explain in layman's terms what is going on with Mexican TCOs, and most importantly, WHY violence is happening along the US-Mexico border.

With over a dozen years of combined experience in military law enforcement, force protection analysis, and writing a variety of professional products for the US Air Force, state government in California, and the general public, Ms. Longmire has the expertise to create a superior product for you or your agency to further your understanding of Mexico’s drug war. Longmire Consulting is dedicated to being on the cusp of the latest developments in Mexico in order to bring you the best possible analysis of threats posed by the drug violence south of the border.

December 31, 2011

There's no doubt 2011 has been an eventful year in Mexico, but sadly, that's been largely due to escalating drug-related violence in certain parts of the country. The December 2010 split between La Familia Michoacana and the Knights Templar, as well as the internal split in the Gulf cartel between the Metros and Rojos factions, have added to the chaos and conflict. Ciudad Juárez continued to be the epicenter of violence, the Casino Royale attack in Monterrey shocked the region, and Veracruz garnered the narco spotlight with the dumping of dozens of Zetas corpses.

So what can drug war observers expect to see in the coming year? The security situation in Mexico is extremely fluid, and the landscape of territorial conflicts and epicenters of violence could look very different in as little as six months. The Mexican government has either arrested or killed several high-ranking cartel leaders in the last 18 months, and hopefully this trend will continue as cooperation and information sharing between Mexican and US authorities increases. However, this “kingpin strategy” has not really resulted in any significant decreases in violence. Since most cartels operate like corporations, they have plans for leadership succession when someone at the top of the organizational chart is taken out. Other options are for the cartels to split into rival factions, which is what is occurred with LFM ans the CDG.

Cartel control of territory is anything but static, and Los Zetas is currently the most aggressive group when it comes to expansion. They’ve engaged in violent activity in areas traditionally considered strongholds of the Sinaloa Federation. This means 2012 could see a polarization of the drug war, where the smaller and weaker cartels pick sides and align with either the Federation or Los Zetas. While such an arrangement would significantly reduce violence levels in areas where the smaller cartels are competing with each other or one of the “big two,” there could potentially be huge outbreaks on the future front lines of Federation-Zetas conflicts.

One of the most important events of 2012 will be Mexico’s presidential election in July, and subsequent inauguration in December. While a major strategy change in the drug war isn’t feasible for several reasons, many Mexican citizens are tired of the carnage and desperate for some kind of change from their new president. Everything from legalization to a pact with the cartels has been thrown around as ways to stem the violence, and it will be interesting to see what strategies the various candidates put forth leading into the election. It’s important to note that who sits in Los Pinos doesn’t matter nearly as much to the TCOs as who sits in the chairs of the local mayors, police chiefs, and governors. Changes in these appointments—whether initiated by Mexican lawmakers or TCO threats—are more significant to the drug war landscape, and merit closer observation in 2012 than the presidential election. You can read more about my thoughts on the election HERE.

I'm hoping to see more outreach by grassroots movements like Javier Sicilia's in an attempt to go more mainstream during an election year. Many supporters think international media attention or the number of people present at marches are not that relevant, but for the US to take notice - and for Americans to care enough to change their drug use habits - requires massive mobilization and the media attention that comes with it. Actually, I hope the media pays more attention to Mexico and the drug war in general in 2012. The American public is thankfully a bit more clued in to what's happening south of the border, but I'm still coming across stunned audiences on a regular basis who are shocked by news that those of us who regularly follow this stuff consider "duh" material.

I wouldn't be surprised to see a slight increase in US military involvement in the drug war if conditions on the ground continue to worsen. By that, I mean more drone overflights in Mexico, more "boomerang" operations originating in southwest border states, and an increase in police training and exercises. If the new president decides to demilitarize the drug war by pulling the army out of many of their deployments (a platform I think Andrés Manuel López Obrador will be running on), then expect US cooperation to focus almost exclusively on helping primarily municipal and state police - the source of most of Mexico's law enforcement corruption.

I wish I could honestly say I envision things getting better in Mexico in 2012, but I really don't. This is a "lame duck" year for Calderón, so don't expect any changes at all in the current drug war strategy. Mexico's economy is faring a bit better, and I'm hoping the government can focus more on domestic programs that offer more educational and employment opportunities for adolescents and teenagers. The presidential candidates would be VERY wise to make that one of their major platforms, in my opinion.

The most we can do from the US end of things is to hope and pray that things do get better, but to be prepared for things to continue to get worse.

December 20, 2011

Hello all! I just wanted to let you know that I appeared on The History Channel's "Brad Meltzer's Decoded" on December 21st! The episode was called "Mafia: Alive?" Here's the description:

"What if I told you that the Mafia and organized crime have taken on a brand new look that most people would never recognize? Today's mob has evolved into something more powerful, sophisticated and deadly than ever. Starting with Al Capone's notorious Chicago Outfit, Decoded traces the progression of the mob from Whitey Bulger's fearsome Irish Mafia, to today's Mexican cartels who are bringing their violent operations onto American soil, and the Cyber Mafia--online gangsters who can steal your money and identity without leaving their home. So what exactly does the new Mafia look like today, and what can we do to protect ourselves?"

December 17, 2011

Here is an excerpt from this Associated Press article as reported by FOX News Latino:

"The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) gave Enrique Peña Nieto a document declaring him the party's candidate Saturday. All other hopefuls had already dropped out. Legal candidate registration takes place in February and the campaign starts in March. The former Mexico State governor has a strong lead in most polls. His party ran Mexico from 1929 to 2000, when it lost to the National Action Party that still governs. National Action is still choosing its candidate but the third major force has picked its contender. Andrés Manuel López Obrador will run for the leftist Democratic Revolution Party... Growing disenchantment in Calderón's policies and the widespread violence related to the country's drug war has allowed the PRI to make a resurgence in the country's political scene. Local elections in 2011 saw the party gain back a number of political spots." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Since it's likely that many of my readers haven't closely followed Mexico's electoral politics - particularly prior to 2000 - I thought this would be a good time to provide some context on this candidate selection by the PRI, and what his potential victory next summer might mean for the drug war.

From 1929 until 2000, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) ruled over Mexico with more or less an iron fist. It wasn't considered a "real" democracy, elections notwithstanding. The PRI was also extremely corrupt, but the real issue that Mexicans today take with the PRI is that for decades, they had an implicit agreement with the drug lords who had emerged and flourished under PRI rule - drug lords like Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, Juan Ábrego, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, and the Arellano Félix family, just to name a few. The government agreed to look the other way while the drug traffickers went about their business - as long as they behaved. Back then, the PRI ran that show; if the traffickers got out of line, the Mexican government made some arrests, conducted some disappearances, and the capos got their people back in line.

The year 2000 saw the ouster of the PRI and the entrance of the National Action Party (PAN) with the election of Vicente Fox, and the subsequent election of PAN member Felipe Cálderon in 2006. Many people don't realize that the political turning point that started today's drug war brewing was the PRI's ouster in 2000; because when the PRI got tossed, so did that implicit arrangement between the government and the cartels, and so did the pax mafiosa. Vicente Fox didn't fight the traffickers as hard as Calderón is doing now, but he made a half-hearted effort. Calderón clearly made the point when he entered office that he wasn't playing games, and the cartels started fighting back even harder.

Now the evolution has made clear that, for the most part, the now-TCOs run the show, and not the government. If the government steps out of line - meaning they and their proxies, the police - don't do the TCOs' bidding, there will be killings, kidnappings, disappearances, etc.

Many people in Mexico and observers outside the country will be watching the 2012 election with much interest because the PRI, via Enrique Peña Nieto, is poised to retake Los Pinos - the Mexican version of the White House. Peña Nieto is very popular and well-liked, and he had a good record while in Mexico City. It appears he's relatively clean, or at least as clean as any Mexican politician can be. The real question is, what will his campaign platform consist of, and if he wins, how will his drug war strategy evolve from that? Much of Mexico is pinning its hopes for peace on the next president, although it's hard to see how drastically any new president could change the current strategy. Some are hoping for a return to the "old days" of an arrangement with the TCOs - even former president Vicente Fox has called for negotiations - but I don't think this is the answer, or even possible, seeing as the TCOs have little to gain from an agreement, and much to concede.

If he wins, Peña Nieto will be under a LOT of pressure to do things differently than Calderón, from the both the Mexican people and members of his party who have repeatedly criticized Calderón's militarized strategy. But he'll also be pulled in other directions; by the United States, who - despite Mexico's extreme reluctance to admit it - wields considerable influence over Mexico's counterdrug strategy, and by the international community, which expects to see an effort by the PRI to prove it's changed its corrupt and underhanded ways of old.

Looking at the election from the other side of things, I don't know if the TCOs even care who becomes president. Their source of power is derived from control of the state and municipal police, as well as the influence they wield over city mayors through threatened and actual violence. The president dictates the overall strategy, of course, but the state governors - who are elected independently - have a bit more say/control over what goes on at that level. No matter which party controls Los Pinos, I believe that the way the TCOs do business at the local level won't change that much. Unfortunately, that means that levels of violence and the conduct of the drug war is, in my opinion, unlikely to change that much, either.

This is definitely one case where I hope I'm really wrong. Who knows? Maybe Peña Nieto will, if elected, bring some fresh ideas into office with him, and be able to invigorate the Mexican congress to pass strong legislation intended to strengthen anti-money laundering laws and reform the justice system in a meaningful way. The PRI made a lot of headway in the last mid-term election, so it would be easier for Peña Nieto to pass legislation with this congress than it has been for Calderón. It's another case of stay tuned, and we'll see next year.

December 06, 2011

"For years, if not decades, Mexican drug lords and various upper-level members of Mexico’s transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have resided in the United States. But because the savage drug war in Mexico has become so dangerous for them, they now prefer to spend more and more time at their “vacation” homes in the relative safety of US cities and communities. Knowing that violent TCO members are living among us is disturbing on many levels, and has begged the question of whether the United States can be equated to Pakistan as a country that allows itself to be a “safe haven” for violent criminals and narco-terrorists?"

November 29, 2011

It’s the phone call every Mexican immigrant in America dreads—the anonymous, vulgar, and threatening voice demanding ransom for a family member’s release. Such an event can throw an entire family into distress, calling distant relatives, friends, friends of friends, and anyone else who might be able to lend money. And even if a ransom can be gathered together, that’s no guarantee a kidnapping victim in Mexico will be released.

But why should Americans care? Because this horror, this distress, fear, and chaos could be happening to a Mexican family you know, you live next to, or you come across every day.

The drug war in Mexico is like cancer; everyone there either knows someone who has survived it, or knows someone who has died from it. Most Americans don’t understand the connection that’s maintained between Mexican immigrants in the US and their friends and family in Mexico. Word of mouth is very powerful, and often when a Mexican national gets deported, people in Mexico usually their friend or family member is on the way home. Especially in smaller communities, it’s easy to discover most people’s whereabouts, which is why it’s typical for a kidnapper to be able to contact a kidnap victim’s relatives in the US relatively quickly.

The nature of the Mexico’s drug war has changed quite a bit in the last seven years. It used to be that only the “bad guys”—people directly involved in the drug business—were killing or getting killed themselves. But as drug trafficking revenue shrinks due to enforcement efforts and competition between TCOs, criminals have had to turn to other methods of generating profits. As kidnapping for ransom has grown in popularity in Mexico, so has the targeting of innocent people—namely, Mexican and Central American migrants headed north, or Mexican citizens with family members already living in the U.S.

The problem is, Mexican TCOs view immigrants—legal or otherwise—as a potential source of easy cash. Many migrants pay a smuggler, known as a coyote, several thousand dollars to ensure safe passage to, then across, the US-Mexico border. TCO thugs and border bandits know these migrants had a source of cash to pay the coyotes, and assume there must be more where that came from.

They also know migrants usually have friends and/or family members already living in the US. Under duress, kidnapped migrants can provide cartel kidnappers with information about their family members in the US who hopefully can round up enough cash to ensure their release. Often enough, migrants can’t come up with the ransom and are executed on the spot, their bodies buried in mass graves along some deserted stretch of a Mexican road, or left to bake in the desert sun.

Even if these migrants arrive safely in the US, this doesn’t mean they’re in the clear. Chances are they left some family members behind in Mexico. They may find work, and save enough money to start living a decent life and send some money back home. Then a year or two later, they may be the ones on the receiving end of that dreaded phone call.

No matter where in the US you live, chances are there’s at least a small Mexican community there, or in the city closest to you. It’s likely you cross paths with someone from Mexico on a regular basis—at a restaurant, a hotel, the supermarket, or any number of stores and businesses. The next time you talk to someone from Mexico, ask him or her what part of the country he or she is from (and commit it to memory so you can do a Google News search on it when you get home). Next, ask if he or she still has family there; the answer will almost always be yes.

Finally, ask if any of them have been affected by the ongoing violence. Again, the answer will almost always be yes. A friend or relative who has been kidnapped, threatened, forced to go into the drug trade, received threatening phone calls, witnessed a murder or shootout…be prepared. The answer may surprise you. As Americans, we need to understand that Mexico is not fighting this war alone. We are inextricably tied to Mexico’s economy, its drug war, and its people. Thus, it’s not just Mexico’s drug war; it’s our war, too.

November 25, 2011

What if it wasn’t a “Fast and Furious” gun that was used to kill US Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry near Rio Rico, Arizona that fateful day in December 2010?

It’s the question no one is asking, and the concept that everyone is ignoring. In the meantime, members of Congress, federal and local law enforcement, pro-gun and anti-ATF activists, and much of the American public is focused on skewering the ATF and Department of Justice—in many cases, rightfully so—for a botched operation designed to identify Mexican arms smugglers.

Operation Fast and Furious was initiated by the ATF in mid-2009 as a sort of sting operation. It was designed as an attempt to identify the people at the highest levels of Mexican weapons smuggling organizations by knowingly allowing their hired hands to buy guns in the US, then smuggle them into Mexico. The ATF intended to track these guns to their final destinations and hopefully make some arrests.

But many things went horribly wrong. The ATF started to lose track of hundreds of guns they allowed law-abiding gun shops to sell. Fast and Furious guns started showing up at crime scenes across Mexico, and were also being seized in the US. What really brought the operation into the public eye was the fact that two Fast and Furious guns were found at the scene where Agent Terry was killed.

However, the tiny—and crucial—fact that all these people fail to remember is that the gun that was actually used to kill Agent Terry was never found, and as such, no one knows if that gun was part of the Fast and Furious program, or if it came from a different gun shop in the US that was never part of the program, or if it came from a non-US source altogether.

When Mexican cartels want to purchase weapons in the US, they hire US citizens with clean records and no criminal history—called straw men—to buy those guns for them. They go to gun stores, pawn shops, and gun shows with a cartel laundry list and buy these guns legally, more or less. They only thing they do wrong is lie on an ATF form where it asks if the guns they’re purchasing are for personal use; obviously, they’re not. Once they have the guns in hand, they pass them off to a middle man, and their part in the deal is done.

This was the critical part in the Fast and Furious operation that is coming under fire. The vast majority of American gun sellers will immediately call the ATF when they detect a suspicious transaction by a possible straw buyer. Under Fast and Furious, for at least a year the ATF directed these gun sellers to allow the transactions to take place—called letting the guns “walk”—and often with much protest by the seller.

After the guns are handed off, the middleman distributed the guns to multiple couriers, who then spread out along the various ports of entry on our southwest border with Mexico. Since Mexican authorities don’t inspect inbound traffic and our Customs and Border Protection agents are charged with inspecting only ten percent of outbound traffic, the couriers’ odds of success in smuggling the guns into Mexico is very high.

Once the guns arrive at their final destinations in Mexico, they’re usually stored at stash houses or warehouses for later use by cartel assassins or smugglers. This is another crucial point to understand: it’s highly likely that Fast and Furious guns were mixed in with non-Fast and Furious guns in various storage locations across Mexico. When the smugglers in the group that confronted Agent Terry and his partners picked (or were provided) the guns they had with them that December day, they received them randomly from probably a large selection of mixed firearms.

In other words, had Fast and Furious never existed, those bandits still would have had guns that day, and they still would have killed Agent Terry.

It’s easy to suggest that Fast and Furious was directly responsible for his murder, and to indict all of ATF and the Department of Justice for it. We’re a nation that holds people accountable for their negligent actions, and people want to be able to point the finger at someone identifiable for his tragic death. The ATF and many in the DOJ certainly engaged in abysmally poor decision-making, and there’s no doubt that high-level heads will - and should - roll. Despite being well intentioned, Fast and Furious was poorly conceived and should have been halted long ago.

But the real murderer of Agent Terry is a Mexican smuggler. He will likely never be identified, and the gun he used to kill Terry will likely never be found and traced. This fact is unacceptable to many because people in the accountability business hate not having an answer, or a real person to point their fingers at. The people ultimately associated with Fast and Furious will hopefully be held accountable for their negligence.

But Congress and our law enforcement agencies absolutely cannot lose sight of the fact that we are fighting a war with Mexico against savage cartels who will stop at nothing—including the murder of American agents—to continue raking in billions of dollars in drug profits. They’re the real enemy, and some anger and energy needs to be spared so Congress and US law enforcement agencies can truly focus on stopping them.

November 22, 2011

"Citizens of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico were stunned to see two beheaded and disemboweled corpses hanging from a highway overpass in early September. It wasn’t because they’d never been exposed to this level of brutality by Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), but rather it was because of the message that was left with the bodies signed by Los Zetas. The note implied the two unidentified males were savagely killed for using social media against them. Later that month, the beheaded body of Elizabeth Macias, an employee of a Mexican news organization, was found in the same location. And on November 10, Mexican police found a fourth body in a wealthy Nuevo Laredo neighborhood with a note that read: “This happened to me for not understanding that I shouldn't report on the social networks.” While US media have reported these incidents and the impact they have had on social media users in Mexico, few have examined how drug war bloggers and tweeters in the United States feel about this new TCO tactic. As it turns out, their level of concern varies."

November 08, 2011

"Brownsville, Texas is what most people would call a working-class town. It has an industrial feel and there are areas of the community that have seen better days. One of the city’s mainstays is its large port and its connection via three international bridges to Matamoros in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas. Driving around town, you find plenty of taquerias along with typical chain restaurants, warehouses, car dealerships, schools and other places typical for a south Texas town or Gulf Coast port city. But there is something else that makes Brownsville - as well as the neighboring cities of Harlingen and McAllen - different from the average, small port community. And that is it is located a few hundred yards from the US-Mexico border and one of the most violent areas in Mexico. As a result, many members of Mexico’s transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) spend a considerable amount of time in south Texas. Some even own homes, property and small businesses here... Several recent incidents have brought to light the fact that TCO members—some very high-ranking and some violent—are living among us in the United States, and definitely in much higher numbers along the southwest border."

November 02, 2011

Here is an excerpt from this Associated Press story, published in The Houston Chronicle:

"A shooting that injured a sheriff's deputy was the first indisputable case of spillover violence from the Mexican drug wars in Hidalgo County, the local sheriff said Monday. Sheriff Lupe Trevino, who previously said there was no direct spillover violence in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, said the Sunday shootout erupted while one of his deputies investigated a reported kidnapping and drug deal. 'I have to say that with this particular incident, the way the witnesses and the information that we have gotten particularly in the federal system, this is the first recorded spillover violence event that we have experienced — and unfortunately got one of our deputies shot,' Trevino said. One suspect was killed and two were wounded. In all, six people were taken into custody, including the alleged kidnapping victim, and are awaiting charges, the sheriff said... Trevino said the reported kidnapping was a bid to recover marijuana stolen when the Gulf cartel's reputed second-in-command, Samuel Flores Borrego, was killed in September...'Now, there are more cartel members living in Texas, in the Valley, in the United States. I'll guarantee you there's a ton of them,' he said." Link to Full Story

Analysis: That something like this has happened along the Texas-Mexico border should come as a surprise to no one. But this is what I really don't understand. Why isn't this story getting more national attention? I did a search of news stories on this particular incident, and just about everything was local in the RGV or Texas - KRGV, KGBT, The Monitor, The Houston Chronicle, etc. Although I will say, The Boston Herald did print a story on it. But why aren't the "big guys" like CNN, FOX News, and MSNBC splattering this report all over the screen?

This really shouldn't surprise me too much, either. Just last year, the first drug war-related beheading occurred in the US, specifically in Chandler, Arizona. Yep, a beheading on US soil in an apartment complex. When I tell people about that story, they look at me in awe, as if to say, why haven't I heard about this before? Then there are the five men who were electrocuted, tortured, and had their throats slit in a northern Alabama safe house in 2009. Again, only local coverage about that.

But this story in Hidalgo County is different. Most reports about possible spillover violence almost always involve bad guys killing bad guys - like the Gulf cartel members who got into a firefight on a McAllen highway a couple of weeks ago. Perhaps that's why people are disinterested; criminals killing criminals makes the work easier for law enforcement, right? But these were TCO members who shot and severely wounded an American law enforcement officer on US soil. The activities they were engaged in before the confrontation were directly related to the drug war in Mexico. Why is it that only news outlets in Texas are noticing?

The cynic in me tells me that these types of incidents are very bad PR for DHS. Everyone along the border - and particularly in south Texas - knows that cartel members are everywhere down there, but generally keep to themselves. But many border residents also knew it was a matter of time before something like this happened. This is the main reason for the subtitle of my book: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars. The TCOs are getting squeezed tighter and tighter by authorities on both sides of the border. However, they still need to keep the drug profits coming in. That means taking on more risk, i.e. engaging with US law enforcement and engaging in violent behavior in public on US soil.

This is not the first time that TCO members or armed drug smugglers have fired shots at US law enforcement (e.g. USBP Agent Brian Terry), and it certainly won't be the last. My question is, how many of these incidents have to happen before the US government starts rethinking its statement that the border is the safest it's ever been? And what's it going to take to move border security up the totem pole of national concerns? Hopefully, not another injured sheriff's deputy.

October 12, 2011

OK...whew! I'm doing FIVE live radio interviews tomorrow (Thursday, Oct. 13) to help promote National Geographic Channel's "Border Wars," with a sprinkling of Cartel thrown in. Here's the schedule, in case you live in any of these listening areas (all times are local):

October 11, 2011

Here is an excerpt from J. David Goodman's article in The New York Times:

"Federal authorities foiled a plot by men linked to the Iranian government to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States and to bomb the embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said in a news conference on Tuesday. Mr. Holder said the plot began with a meeting in Mexico in May, “the first of a series that would result in an international conspiracy by elements of the Iranian government” to pay $1.5 million to murder the ambassador on United States soil. The men accused of plotting the attacks were Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri, according to court documents filed in federal court in Manhattan. The Justice Department said the men were originally from Iran. He said the men were connected to the secretive Quds Force, a division of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps that has carried out operations in other countries... According to the complaint, other conspirators based in Iran were aware of and approved the plan, which involved hiring men connected to a Mexican drug cartel to carry out the killing... The complaint says that the men hired by the two accused plotters were in fact confidential sources of the Drug Enforcement Agency. The men were later asked by the accused plotters whether they were knowledgeable in bomb-making, the complaint said, adding that Mr. Arbabsiar 'was interested in, among other things, attacking an embassy of Saudi Arabia.'" Link to Full Article

To read the full criminal complaint issued by the US Department of Justice, CLICK HERE.

Analysis: Much is being made at this moment about the connection between Iran and the unnamed Mexican TCO referred to in the complain, and rightfully so. But there is also much need for context and perspective in this story.

First, I highly recommend that if you're interested in this story, you read the full complaint. It gets bogged down in legalese in several places, but there's important factual information that people (i.e. the media) need to be aware of before jumping to dangerous conclusions.

I'd like to point out that no TCO is specifically named in the complaint. The government describes the TCO that the Iranians believe they're working with as follows:

"Drug Cartel #1 is a large, sophisticated, and violent drug-trafficking cartel. It is well known throughout North America, and its principal places of operation are Mexico and the United States. According to published reports, Drug Cartel #1 has access to military-grade weaponry and explosives, and has engaged in numerous acts of violence, including assassinations and murders."

Anyone who follows the drug war with any sort of regularity can make the assumption that we're talking about Los Zetas here. But just know for the record that Drug Cartel #1 is never named in the official complaint.

Moving on to the most important part of the story...the informant. Many media reports about this story are making the erroneous connection that the Iranians successfully hired Los Zetas, who agreed to murder the Saudi ambassador. What actually happened was that the Iranians thought they had hired someone who works for Drug Cartel #1 (we're reasonably assuming it was a Zeta), and who was actually a paid informant for the DEA. Here's how the complaint describes the informant:

"CS-1 is a paid confidential source. Previously, CS-1 was charged in connection with a narcotics offense by authorities of a certain US state. In exchange for CS-1's cooperation in various narcotics investigations, the State charges were dismissed..."

There's some more info, but that's the basic picture. We can assume he was arrested in Texas, since the meetings between the Iranians and the informant occurred in Reynosa, right across the border from McAllen. But again, this is an assumption. There's also no indication of what Mexican TCO he may have been connected with "in real life." For all we know, he may have been a local gang member of Mexican nationality.

Here's the most important aspect of this story: We have NO IDEA if Los Zetas, or the Gulf cartel, or whichever TCO the Iranians thought they were working with would actually have agreed to help them. Yes, it's always a possibility. But think about the ramifications of a TCO getting caught in the Washington DC area involved in this kind of plot. And for what, $1.5 million? That's chump change for a major TCO - one lost load of cocaine or meth. To risk the kind of US government and law enforcement scrutiny - essentially the Hammer of God - being brought down on them for participating in such a plot would hurt their business, and very existence, in a way that Mexican government action never has. Why would they take such a risk for (relative) pennies?

The problem is, there's no way to just call "El Lazca" or "El Coss" and ask, um, would you guys actually do this if they offered? I've already written several times in several places that I thought it would be unlikely for TCOs to willingly and knowingly smuggle terrorist operatives into the US across the southwest border because the risk to their business of getting caught was too high for whatever money they'd get for it. But this kind of plot is a completely different animal - engaging in the assassination of a foreign dignitary for a country that's a state sponsor of terrorism in the US capital...it just seems too risky.

But this should not take away from the fact that the Iranians - and God knows who else - was interested in using a TCO for this purpose. Who knows how many times TCOs have been approached by foreign governments or terrorist groups for this purpose? And if this has happened, what transpired during the negotiations? Have they all been turned down outright, or is there some negotiation like this ongoing for future murderous action on US soil?

Maybe Los Zetas are crazy enough to do it, but for $1.5 million dollars? Add a couple of zeros to that figure, and maybe it's a better possibility.

I'd like to congratulate Mike Blakesley, Jose De Avila, and David Fielding for being randomly selected to receive a signed copy of my new book, Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars!

I've emailed the three of you with instructions for claiming your prize, but in case you don't receive it, please contact Adam Pendergraph of 1105 Media (sponsors of the giveawar for the GovSec West conference) at apendergraph@1105media.com with your contact/mailing information.

October 08, 2011

Here is an excerpt from Tim Johnson's article for McClatchy Newspapers:

"The gruesome discovery of 32 bodies scattered in houses in the port city of Veracruz this week is the latest sign that Mexico's drug-fueled violence is entering a new phase in which murky paramilitary-style squads are carrying out mass exterminations... It was the latest ghastly event to send shudders through Veracruz. Two weeks ago, gunmen dumped 35 semi-nude, mutilated bodies along a freeway underpass in Veracruz in broad daylight. Authorities said at least some of the victims in both instances were members of Los Zetas, a violent crime group whose reach now stretches beyond Mexico's borders... The Zeta Killers group, which also calls itself New Generation, first came to light in a YouTube video in late July... The manner in which four vehicles maneuvered along the highway, blocked traffic and dumped the bodies led some experts to see a unique style to the recent killing spree... 'These were people who had military training,' said Alberto Islas, a security analyst and chief of Risk Evaluation Ltd... A public security specialist at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Eric L. Olson, said too little evidence exists to draw conclusions that the killings are anything but violence between rival gangs." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Just the mere speculation that paramilitary groups may exist inside Mexico is exasperating. It makes me wonder what some people define as a paramilitary group, and how much knowledge those people have of paramilitary groups in another drug trafficking capital, Colombia.

Back in the 1980s when Pablo Escobar ruled Colombia, he started seeing a threat being posed to his territory and operations by leftist guerrilla groups - the FARC and the ELN. He formed a personal army, called MAS for Muerte a Secuestradores, or "death to the kidnappers." Soon, other drug lords started doing the same thing. In 1997, three men - brothers Carlos, Fidel, and Vicente Castaño - started an umbrella group to sort of unite these various paramilitaries, under the name Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia ("United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia"). Over the next decade, the AUC racked up more murders than the FARC and ELN combined, and displaced hundreds of thousands of Colombian citizens in an effort to thwart their support to the FARC and ELN.

There is no doubt that many members of the Colombian government secretly supported the AUC's efforts because they had a shared goal - the elimination of FARC and ELN terrorists. But where things got complicated was when the United States designated the AUC a foreign terrorist organization in 2001, despite the fact that the AUC had no political or religious ideology; they existed solely as the private armies for Colombian drug lords. Well, technically they did try to straighten out in the mid 1980s before becoming the AUC and formed a political party called the Union Patriotica. But after several of their members were killed or kidnapped by the guerrillas, they gave up and went back to paramilitary action - that is, defending their employers' turf and operations, and getting into the drug trade themselves. This is actually what led to several cracks in the AUC before they started to disintegrate - and partially disarm - in 2003; the fact that some groups were getting into the drug trade, and some were opposed to that.

Now let's move over to Los Zetas. They were recruited and created by Gulf cartel capo Osiel Cárdenas Guillen in the late 1990s to defend his turf and operations from the Mexican authorities and rival cartels. They soon started racking up an impressive body count, and introduced beheadings and dismemberment as the new drug war norm in 2003-2004 during the battle with the Sinaloa Federation over Nuevo Laredo, and the battle over control of Acapulco. Just like the AUC, Los Zetas come from former military stock (many some members of the AUC were also former Colombian police officers). Also like the AUC, Los Zetas have no ideology to speak of. While they were still working for the Gulf cartel, they existed to fulfill Cárdenas Guillen's wishes. Now, they exist to serve their own.

Moving to the present day, I'm speechless when the Mexican government says no paramilitaries exist in Mexico, and when the media even speculates as to their existence; especially since Los Zetas weren't the only private army working for the TCOs. The Sinaloa Federation has Los Pelones and Los Negros, run by Edgar "La Barbie" Valdez Villarreal before his arrest, and the Beltrán Leyva Organzation has La Linea, made up almost exclusively of former police officers. What does the Mexican government and the media think these groups are?

Here are a couple of definitions of paramilitary groups: "A group of personnel with military structure functioning either as a civil force or in support of military forces," and "A force with military structure conducting armed operations against a ruling or occupying power." I think a strong argument can be made that Los Zetas (in their former iteration under the Gulf), Los Pelones, Los Negros, La Linea, and the latest version of the Mata Zetas are operating with a military structure and conducting armed operations against an occupying power - their rivals that are occupying a desired piece of territory. The Mata Zetas aren't some vigilante group; they're working for the Jalisco Cartel/New Generation, so they're no different than the other private armies.

And who knows how they Mexican government feels about these groups? Los Zetas are a different animal now because they're their own TCO, and fighting the Mexican army and police like everyone else. But the other groups are primarily killing rival TCO members; something that inadvertently helps the Mexican government's cause.

So let's move beyond the silly question of whether or not paramilitaries exist inside Mexico; we need to move more towards the question of what the Mexican government wants to do about their growth and expanding activities.

October 06, 2011

I was very excited to speak with Dr Sabet this morning for my latest podcast because, personally, I've been going back and forth regarding my stance regarding the legalization of drugs. In my last podcast, I spoke with the Director of Texas NORML, who is clearly in favor of legalizing marijuana. There are also many well-respected authorities on drugs and drug policy, like Dr Sanho Tree, who feel that ending drug prohibition makes sense if done properly, and would put an end to the violence in Mexico.

However, Dr Sabet makes a compelling case for why drugs like marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin should remain illegal, why increasing treatment and prevention programs is not an easy, nor inexpensive, answer, and why current drug policies - although not perfect by any means - are keeping illegal drug use in America down in a way that ending drug prohibition could not.

To listen to this really informative and eye-opening conversation, just click on the audio link below!

October 05, 2011

I just finished an interview for the BBC World Service's radio program, "Newshour," during which we discussed the premise of the Mexican government making a deal or arrangement with the TCOs, and on the impact of potentially designating the TCOs as foreign terrorist groups.

Although the number of reports about the drug war south of the border has increased in the last few years, it’s still miniscule compared to the volume of news about Afghanistan, the economy, and the 2012 US presidential election. As such, the bits of information the American public gets exposed to can often be skewed, and present a haphazard impression of the drug war and the impact it has on US national security.

To help clarify some of the major issues surrounding the drug war and border security, here is a “Top Ten” list of myths associated with those issues:

1. The drug war is Mexico’s problem, and we shouldn’t get involved. Unfortunately, it’s very much our problem. The American demand for illegal drugs is higher than ever, and because of that demand (and the fact that certain drugs are illegal), our two countries are inextricably entwined in this mess. The very nature of the drug trafficking business has resulted in people either working directly for or on behalf of Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) having a presence in over 1,000 US cities. Essentially, anywhere in the United States where there’s a demand for illegal drugs, you’re going to find a connection to Mexican TCOs.

2. It’s just criminals attacking other criminals; let them kill each other off. Perhaps several years ago, that used to be the case. But TCOs like Los Zetas are increasingly targeting innocent civilians for kidnapping and ransom operations, executing Mexican and Central American migrants if they don’t agree to work for them, or just not really caring if bystanders die in one of their attacks. The age, professionalism, and level of expertise of TCO hitmen have decreased dramatically, meaning the likelihood of non-criminals being injured or killed in a TCO shootout or grenade attack has increased significantly.

3. We know where most of the guns being used illegally in Mexico are coming from.This is easily the most polarized argument related to the drug war. One side claims that anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of firearms being used by the TCOs come from US points of sale, based on ATF trace data. The other side claims that only a small number of TCO guns comes from the United States, and the vast majority come from either Central America, Asia, former Eastern Bloc countries, or Mexican military and law enforcement stock. The hard truth is that no one knows exactly how many guns the TCOs have, how many of those guns come from what sources, and what proportion of their weapons are military-grade and what proportion are handguns and rifles.

4. Our borders are being overrun with gun-toting criminals, and the entire southwest border is a war zone. There are several major cities along the southwest border that have extremely low violent crime rates. In fact, the city of El Paso, Texas was ranked by CQ Press as the safest city in the United States in 2010, and it’s directly across the border from Ciudad Juárez, the deadliest city in the Western Hemisphere. There are no shootouts going on in downtown Nogales, or San Diego, or Houston. People on the US side of the border can still safely go to work, go to the supermarket, take their children to school, etc. However, it's also untrue to say that...

5. Our southwest border is as safe as it’s ever been. This statement has been uttered repeatedly by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, and has been viewed skeptically by many (with good reason). She cites FBI crime statistics to validate this statement, but those statistics don’t take into account violent incidents that occur in more rural areas of the border. Also, many drug war-related incidents on the US side of the border are never reported because they’re committed against illegal immigrants or other criminals, who either don’t want to get deported or go to jail. Moreover, Mexican nationals who are arrested and whose crimes are entered into these police databases rarely self-identify as members of a TCO, so capturing that data is next to impossible. The first beheading related to the drug war occurred in Chandler, Arizona last year, and cross-border kidnappings continue in San Diego, Phoenix, and several other smaller US border towns and cities. Only a few days ago, there was a shootout on a McAllen, Texas expressway between associates of the Gulf cartel. Ranchers' homes in rural parts of Texas and Arizona are routinely being burglarized and their lands trespassed on by migrants and armed smugglers. Portions of US national parks along the border are closed to the public directly because of violent smuggling activity in those areas. And drug smugglers are more willing to engage US law enforcement in the process of getting their drug loads across the border.

6. I live in a state pretty far away from the southwest border, so I don’t really need to be concerned about drug-related violence happening so far away. As mentioned above, Mexican TCOs have a presence in over 1,000 US cities. Take St. Louis, for example—a typical Midwest city roughly 1,000 miles northeast of the border. The city’s use of black tar heroin—and subsequently heroin overdoses by young people—has exploded in the last two years, and that heroin is coming from Mexico. Seattle has a huge crystal methamphetamine problem, and again, that meth is being supplied by Mexican TCOs. Denver, Detroit, Atlanta, Chicago, Miami, and other major US cities not along the border serve as hub cities for TCO drug distribution within the United States. And of the top ten US states with marijuana plantations being run by armed men working for the TCOs, only one (California) is located on the southwest border.

7. We should just send in a few thousand troops or some Special Forces guys to get rid of those drug lords for good. A US military presence in Mexico is the last thing the Mexican government or the Mexican people want. The United States has a negative history of intervention in Latin America going back over 150 years, and as bad as things are in Mexico right now, they’re not bad enough to even put that option on the table for consideration. US Northern Command is taking great pains to ensure that both the American public and the Mexican people understand that any US military assistance provided to the Mexican government is by request only, and with their full consent.

8. Sealing (or fencing off) the entire border will take care of the problem. The border fence is one of the more controversial subjects related to border security these days. Our southwest border with Mexico is about 2,000 miles long, and current US law mandates the construction and maintenance of only about 735 miles of fence. Many Americans advocate a fence running the entire length of the border to keep everybody out. That is both unnecessary and impractical. There are many parts of the border where lack of foot traffic and harsh environment don’t require the expenditure of millions of taxpayer dollars to build a fence. Also, experience has taught border agencies that smugglers and migrants will always find a way over, under, or through. Finally, the sheer volume of cross-border traffic and business that occurs on a daily basis between the United States and Mexico makes shutting down the border an impossible task.

9. Kicking out all illegal immigrants will take care of the problem. People who aren’t familiar with the intricacies of the drug war and border security issues sometimes have a tendency to confuse border violence with immigration problems. It’s true that both drug smugglers and illegal immigrants often cross the southwest border in similar ways. More TCOs are becoming involved in the human smuggling business, and migrants are increasingly being targeted by some TCOs for kidnapping, or are being forced to transport illegal drugs in exchange for their safety. However, the main difference is that there are hundreds of thousands of migrants who just want to come here to make better lives for themselves, and have no criminal history. There are thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—of drug smugglers and criminals who come here to smuggle illegal drugs and engage in other criminal behavior. Current border policy of border crosser interdiction does not differentiate between the two, or prioritize one over the other. This can lead to a misallocation of limited resources; i.e. Border Patrol agents spending many hours going after non-criminal migrants when that time could be better spent going after violent drug smugglers.

10. Legalizing marijuana will take out a huge chunk of TCO profits and hit them hard in their wallets. Perhaps a few years ago, this would have been more true. However, most TCOs have expanded their operations well beyond drug trafficking to make up for any shortfalls in drug income. Some experts believe drug income accounts for only 50 percent of TCO profits, with the other 50 percent coming from kidnapping for ransom, extortion, fuel theft, media piracy, and other illegal activities. Of their drug income, it used to be that the US government thought 60 percent of TCO drug income came from marijuana sales in the United States. New studies show that marijuana actually may only account for as low as 15-26 percent of drug income, with the rest coming from methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. TCOs are very smart, flexible, and adaptable organizations. The legalization of marijuana may hit them financially in the short term, but they’d manage to get around it and keep going. This isn't to say marijuana shouldn't be legalized; I firmly believe it should for several logical reasons, and any little bit we can do to hurt the TCOs' profits is better than nothing; I just don't think it's the silver-bullet solution some people think it is.

While there are several other myths and misconceptions about the drug war, I feel these are the most common—at least in the United States. Feel free to insert your own in the comments section. And if you want to read more about the basics of the drug war and what it all really means, pick up a copy of my new book, Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars, at your nearest bookstore or on Amazon.com!

October 03, 2011

Here is an excerpt from my recently published opinion piece in The Houston Chronicle:

"Although a late entry into the 2012 presidential race, Texas Gov. Rick Perry is already considered a front-runner. In the Sept. 22 GOP debate, he engaged in a spirited back-and- forth with several of the other candidates - Mitt Romney in particular - over Social Security, immigration and foreign policy, and is definitely in the media spotlight for many of his responses - for better or for worse. It's true that Perry isn't well-known among many Americans for his expertise in Middle Eastern affairs, his opinion on China's status as a most-favored nation or his stance on a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. What he is best known for, however, is his experience with - and sometimes controversial measures toward - border security... Regardless of Perry's opinions on the various issues related to border security, the fact is that he's bringing national attention to a topic that most Americans are vaguely aware of, but don't place at the top of their priority lists."

GovSec West is a security conference taking place in Phoenix, AZ on November 14-16, 2011. It provides relevant and timely insights, tools and tactics to anticipate, prepare, prevent and respond to terrorism, accidental and natural disasters, and attacks on critical infrastructure. I will be both a participant and a presenter, providing a session on the impact of the debate over border violence spillover. I'll also be doing a joint book signing with keynote speaker and good friend Nicholas Stein, series producer of National Geographic Channel's "Border Wars."

In partnership with GovSec West, I'm doing a giveaway this week for a signed copy of my new book, Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars! All you have to do to enter for your chance to win is one of two things:

1. Make a comment on this blog post that you're interested in entering the contest

2. Click on this link and tweet the text there through your Twitter account: http://ow.ly/6ESBx

Five people will be randomly chosen from everyone who either posts a comment on this blog post or tweets the above message between now and Friday, October 7th. Those five people will win a signed copy of Cartel. Thanks for your participation, and good luck!

September 27, 2011

Earlier today, I had the distinct pleasure of being interviewed by NFL sideline reporter Michele Tafoya for her Minneapolis-based radio show! We talked about my book, the New York Times op-ed I wrote on legalization, and the impact of the drug war in general.

If you'd like to listen to the audio clip (it's about 10 minutes long), here it is:

September 24, 2011

I've really been looking forward to reading this relatively short and new contribution to the growing body of published work on the drug war. Many of my colleagues have read it and said it was great, so my expectations going into it were pretty high...just so you know.

Gibler starts the book off a la Saving Private Ryan, with lots of back-to-back stories of gruesome narco deaths and explanations about the silences that follow them. I particularly like how he details the story of a photographer who snapped shots of a man in police, then Navy, custody one day, only to be taking photos of his body on the side of the road the next day.

But then the first chapter started to meander, and I picked up on a couple of things that bugged me. First, Gibler touches upon how the illegality of drugs fuels the violence - true enough. He says, "Legalization would put the traffickers as they exist today out of business." However, he then spends several pages describing how cartels have branched out into kidnapping, extortion, oil theft, etc., which somewhat contradicts his stance on legalization. He even acknowledges that statistics regarding the estimated values of cartel drug profits are only guesses, and sometimes wild ones, so it's tough to see how he reconciles these things.

I was happy that he touched upon the extent of cartel money laundering and how much money gets injected into the Mexican economy by the drug trade. However, Gibler drops a bomb here; he quoted a reporter from London's The Observer who said, "Drug money worth billions of dollars kept the financial system afloat at the height of the global crisis." The reporter got this info from a man at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and Gibler ticks off some theoretical statistics about how this is possible. But he stops the discussion after only a couple of paragraphs. I mean, if true, this is huge news! Why would he not lend more space towards expanding on something that explosive?

In his discussion about cartels' expansion into other trades, I was disturbed that Gibler used the term "human trafficking" instead of "human smuggling." I'm used to amateurs getting the two confused and using the terms interchangeably, but I would never expect someone with Gibler's experience to make this error. As a reminder, human trafficking is when people are involuntarily taken from one country to another to work as sex slaves or essentially indentured servants. Human smuggling is when people voluntarily pay someone to get them to, then safely across, a border into another country. Mexican cartels, contrary to the verbiage Gibler uses, are involved in human smuggling, and to varying extents of involvement depending on the cartel.

All that being said, Gibler does a fabulous job of explaining how the cartels operate with such impunity. He also beautifully illustrates the myth the Mexican government keeps trying to feed its people like castor oil: that almost everyone killed in the drug war must have been involved or deserved it somehow. I love this passage:

"And this is what they tell us: if you are found dead, shot through the face, wrapped in a soiled blanket, and left on some desolate roadside, then you are somehow to blame. You must have been into something bad to end up like that. Surely you were a drug dealer, a drug trafficker, or an official on the take. The very fact of your execution is the judgment against you, the determination of your guilt."

Still, To Die in Mexico is an uneven read for me. Gibler provides some good background information on the drug war that's invaluable for context. But these sections are interspersed with politically charged statements and opinions that could be a turn-off for many readers. For example, he supports Michelle Alexander's statement, "Reagan's drug war consolidated the racist underpinnings of prohibition into a new racial caste system." Later, he writes, "Thirty years later mass incarceration through drug laws has become the new Jim Crow caste system of racial discrimination in the United States." I understand what he means, but I totally disagree with his approach; the last time I checked, illegal drug use in the US was still voluntary, and heroin will kill a black man as easily as a white man. He provides no compelling evidence that the US government is willfully using prohibition as a means of "social control" (he brings up that term) to propagate racism, although that's what he implies. Hey, I just wanted to learn more about Mexico's drug war from a different perspective, not get hammered with a social agenda!

The unevenness continues with a solid mention of La Santa Muerte and a conversation with renowned anthropologist Claudio Lomnitz. But then Gibler casually throws in that Los Zetas studied counterinsurgency strategies in the US and adopted al-Qa'ida's tactics of recording beheadings and posting them on YouTube. First, the US Army has run all the names of known Zetas through their student databases, and there have been no matches; the "fact" that Zetas trained at Ft Bragg or Ft Benning is only a (false) rumor. Also, there has never been any confirmation that Los Zetas are intentionally imitating al-Qa'ida's techniques; this has always been pure speculation, but Gibler presents both as facts. This bugs me.

Fortunately, the second chapter flows into a familiar rhythm of solid journalistic narrative. I enjoyed reading about his visits with Mexican journalists and ride-alongs with photographers to various crime scenes. Gibler is able to give the reader an "I was there" feeling without actually having to personally live through the horror like he did. But even in the midst of this great flow, the reader can find errors of fact that lead Gibler to make some bad conclusions. For example, he mentions the expansive arrests of dozens mayors, police and other officials that President Felipe Calderon initiated in May 2009. Gibler writes every single person arrested belonged to the PRD, one of the opposition parties to Calderon's own PAN. He then says the arrests took place six weeks before the Mexican mid-term elections, implying the arrests were a political ploy by Calderon. The problem is that the people arrested came from all different political parties: the PRI, the PRD, and Calderon's PAN (as reported by Reuters, the Associated Press, etc.)

The narratives in the third chapter are pretty thrilling, especially one of a confrontation between journalists and cartel members in Reynosa. Much of the rest of the book focuses repeatedly on two main themes: the lives of and threats to journalists working in Mexico, and the general agreement by Mexican citizens that the cartels run the show across the country. Over and over, the reporters Gibler talks to say the same thing: they can't report the war accurately, and there are unspoken rules to follow and lines not to cross if they want to stay alive. Gibler delves into Ciudad Juarez and the hundreds of maquiladoras on the city's outskirts in the fourth chapter, and how it all interconnects in the drug war.

Unfortunately, as Gibler wraps up the book in the final chapter, he goes political again. It's one thing to propose solutions to decreasing the violence and making the situation more manageable. But Gibler aggressivly stands on his soapbox to say "the drug war is a proxy for racism, militarization, social control, and access to the truckloads of cash that illegality makes possible." These are strong statements, and he has every right to say them. I disagree with him on several counts, which makes these sections so difficult to read, but there are many people out there who'd tell Gibler he was preaching to the choir.

All in all, for me, To Die in Mexico was a mixed bag. I loved the narratives and all the stories of people he interviewed. He's a good writer, and has a knack for bringing to life these conversations and situations for the reader. However, I was really bothered by the factual inaccuracies in several places, and those were just the ones I caught, having written my own book on this subject. This, of course, leads me to wonder what else in the book I'm accepting as face value that might not be accurate because I'm not personally familiar with the incident or topic. I also didn't like that he injected so much political vitriol in the first chapter; I was honestly tempted to just stop reading right there. The only thing that kept me going was knowing there was some great writing on the other side of that. Gibler might have been better served by saving all of it for the end so that readers have a chance to fully ingest all the information he provides before getting an earful of his opinion, and potentially getting turned off by it. I'd say, 3 1/2 out of 5 stars for being solidly written, but diverging too many times into too many directions, several factual inaccuracies, and breaking up good narrative with political invective at the wrong moments.

September 15, 2011

Here is an excerpt from Dudley Althaus' article in The Houston Chronicle:

"Placards left with the tortured bodies of two people hanging from a Nuevo Laredo overpass warn that the same fate awaits social media devotees who keep information flowing by text, Twitter, blogs and other means as gangsters muzzle the news media in much of Mexico. 'This is going to happen to all the internet busybodies,' said one of the notes signed with a Z, presumably for the Zetas gang that controls Nuevo Laredo. 'Listen up, I'm on to you'... The messages found in Nuevo Laredo on Tuesday, with the bodies of a man and a woman in their 20s, directly threatened two popular blogs that specialize in reporting gang-related violence." Link to Full Article

"More than 48 hours after two mangled bodies appeared hanging by ropes from a pedestrian bridge in a Mexican border city, authorities had yet to identify the victims... The woman was hogtied and disemboweled. Attackers left her topless, dangling by her feet and hands from a bridge in the border city of Nuevo Laredo. A bloodied man next to her was hanging by his hands, his right shoulder severed so deeply the bone was visible.Posters found with the bodies contained messages mentioning two blogs and threatening users of social media, demanding they stop reporting drug-related crimes in the city, located across the border from Laredo, Texas. Mexico's notoriously ruthless drug gangs regularly hang victims from bridges and highway overpasses. And bloggers who specialize in sharing news about trafficking have been threatened in the past. But this could be the first time users of such social networks have been targeted... CNN tried unsuccessfully to get information about the grisly slayings at the local, state, and federal level. Officials were either unavailable or unwilling to release any information about the killings. Local media reported that the male victim was 25 years old and the female 28, without citing any sources." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This latest incident has caused a global uproar, with even huge European news outlets like BBC wanting to find out more about the murdered social media users in Nuevo Laredo. The thing is, how do we really know who these people were, or what they did?

Essentially, every media outlet is basing their story on the content of the messages posted with the bodies - presumably from Los Zetas, by their signature "Z." That means that Los Zetas - the bloodthirsty criminals and killers that they are - are being taken at their word, that these two people posted in some social media outlet some sort of detailed information about TCO activity in the area. The problem is, the authorities aren't talking - probably because they don't know anything, and/or are afraid to ask any questions.

So the media and Twitter are going nuts, telling the world that freedom of the press and freedom of speech (which were already being severely hampered in Mexico by the narcos) are taking the biggest historical hit because of this incident, and no one really even knows what happened. Who were these two victims? What social media outlet (Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, a blog...) did they use? What did they say, and about which TCO did they say it? Did they even do what Los Zetas say they did? Did they post anonymously somewhere, or were they foolish enough to identify themselves somehow? And if they were indeed anonymous social media users, how did Los Zetas identify them?

There are two things that could have happened here. If what Los Zetas say happened is true, then this is one of the bigger salvos the TCO has launched against "civilians." But perhaps even that needs to be caveated. Were the victims members of a rival TCO and posting information that would hurt Zetas operations? Or were they innocents, warning others to get away from a potentially violent area due to Zetas activity?

The other scenario is that these two victims are rivals, fall guys, or random people Los Zetas killed and wanted to use to make threats and spread fear. Obviously, this incident has had that effect and more. In the grand scheme of things, it doesn't matter who these people were (regarding TCO affiliation) or what they did or didn't do. Los Zetas are being taken at their word, and everyone is assuming the two victims did what Los Zetas are accusing them of. As a result, many social media users in Mexico are freaking out, and lots of people who provide useful information about drug war activity have probably just been silenced.

This is another one of those terrorist tactics Los Zetas have chosen to engage in. It doesn't matter whether or not you carry out what you threaten to do; the threat is often enough to persuade enough people to modify their behavior to suit your needs. Also, there's the well-worn adage that perception is reality. Whether or not these victims did what Los Zetas say they did, people are believing the message Los Zetas are putting out there. It's a perfect example of a successful psychological operation, and we'll have to chalk one up in the L column for the Mexican authorities - and a good number of media outlets.

"Over the last year-and-a-half, the Mexican government arrested and killed more top Mexican drug lords than it has in at least the last decade. For an administration that is constantly under fire for a drug war strategy that has failed to significantly reduce violence along the US-Mexico border and beyond, these high-profile arrests are hard-won victories against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). But are they really?"

September 13, 2011

In my latest podcast, I had a greatly informative and eye-opening conversation with Josh Schimberg, the Executive Director of Texas NORML (which stands for the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws), about the legalization of marijuana. We talked about what Texas NORML advocates, how marijuana compares to tobacco and alcohol, and the general attitude in America about marijuana use.

More importantly, we talked about how legalizing marijuana would potentially impact Mexico's drug war - the violence across the country, and the huge drug profits being raked in by the Mexican TCOs who produce it, smuggle it, and sell it in the US. The most surprising/shocking thing I learned? Members of NORML are not only aware of the impact illegal marijuana use has on the drug war - they make a conscious effort to not contribute to the bloodshed by "buying American" and supporting local growers.

This is a can't-miss podcast for those of you who want to learn more about the legalization debate, find out if marijuana really is or isn't that bad for you, how it stacks up to cigarettes and beer, and if you want to hear some (good) surprises along the way.

September 06, 2011

"Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are no strangers to cyberspace. For the last few years, they’ve been posting videos of their kidnap victims and rivals being tortured on YouTube. They push propaganda on Facebook and MySpace. They’ve even learned how to communicate with each other through Twitter to evade the watchful eyes of Mexican authorities. But now they’re taking their presence on the Internet to new levels: fraud, piracy and information theft, hacking and sabotage. This only adds to their electronic expansion of existing crimes, like extortion, intimidation and money laundering. The question is, are they targeting American individuals or businesses, and what impact are they having on US cybersecurity?"

September 03, 2011

A couple of weeks ago, I contacted a colleague of mine who's a producer in Los Angeles. She has some contacts at the Discovery Channel, and my initial idea while talking to her was to ask for help with pitching the TV rights to my book to some TV channels. What ended up happening was that she put me in touch with the executive producer of "Brad Meltzer's Decoded" because she knew they were working on something that might involve Mexican cartels. Before I knew it, I was being flown out of town by The History Channel for a whirlwind trip to be filmed for an upcoming episode!

I arrived on site around 1pm. I honestly had no idea what to expect because I'd never seen a TV show being filmed, although I'd seen several episodes of "Decoded" and knew how the scene would probably go. After a few minutes, the crew arrived and started unloading all the gear. I couldn't believe how much equipment and how many people it takes to film what ends up being a five-minute conversation on TV! While the gear was being brought in, I met Buddy Levy, one of the "Decoders," i.e. my interviewer. I liked him right away; he was very nice, genuine, and originally from New Orleans!

We then moved to the very warm room where the scene would be filmed. It took about an hour to set everything up. During this time, I chatted at length with the producer about the subject of organized crime in Mexico. This helped him form the questions that Buddy and Christine McKinley (she goes by her last name), the other Decoder, would ask me during our conversation on film.

After the scene was set, McKinley came in, and I also really liked her right away! Both she and Buddy were so friendly, laid back, and very easy to talk to. They were also genuinely interested in the subject of the drug war, and just loved learning new things in general - the biggest reason why my husband and I love watching the show so much! The crew then spent the next hour just setting up the shot - getting the lighting right, the camera angles right, switching up where we were sitting, etc. There was a lot of work getting done before they even started rolling any film! And we were all sweating pretty profusely; it was a hot day, and there wasn't much A/C going on in that room.

We finally started to film. McKinley and Buddy came into the room, shook my hand and sat down, and they would start asking me questions about Mexican mobsters. They filmed the same questions multiple times to make sure we talked about all the issues relevant to the subject they were trying to decode - in this case, organized crime. We did this for about an hour, then broke for "lunch" at 4pm. I sat next to Buddy and McKinley and some crew members, which was super cool because we got to know each other a bit better, and talk about different things. I loved being able to ask about their experiences with the show, how they fell into the work, where they were from, etc.

After lunch, we really put our noses to the grindstone. They filmed a few parts many more times, again to make sure we covered the relevant topics. A funny thing: My hair, which started out looking great at 1pm (thanks to my awesome stylist at Beauty Brands in Shiloh), was really starting to frizz out by 5pm in all that heat and humidity (!!!). The director kept coming over to smooth it out to make sure it looked as much like it did in the first few takes, which I imagine was a challenge! It was just funny to see this guy making sure my hair was "just so." They really pay attention to the little details! Finally they got everything they wanted, and we "wrapped" around 7pm.

There were several things I was particularly proud of. First, the producer said he was extremely happy with the interview, and that he got exactly what he wanted. It was my job to do that for him, and I'm glad I was able to do that. Second, he said they normally have to work with their experts to make sure they know what to do, what to expect, and I guess some they've worked with have been more difficult than others. Everyone said they wished all their experts could be like me, and that made me feel amazing! Third, my experience in front of the cameras for the news paid off; he loved what I was wearing (solid bright color), and said I looked great on camera. That made me feel REALLY amazing!

Overall, it was a truly incredible experience. But let me tell you, it was work, and all I was doing was sitting on a stool and talking! The crew was on their feet most of the time - especially the camera guys, who are holding heavy equipment while standing for hours - and it was really hot in that room. Everyone was so nice to me, making sure I had water, a comfortable place to sit, etc. I spoke with pretty much everyone there, and met some really interesting people - including a crew member from Ecuador! It was cool speaking in Spanish with him and learning about his roots there. Talking with Buddy and McKinley is definitely at the top of my "Cool Things I've Done in My Life" list! They're funny, smart, and very interesting people. McKinley and I are already FB friends, so fortunately I'll be keeping in touch with them.

The new season of "Brad Meltzer's Decoded" starts on October 4th on The History Channel. Check it out because it's a really neat show! The episode I'm in will air later in the season, either in December or January. I will be sure to let you all know when it's going to air so you can tune in. As always, thanks for your unending support in my professional endeavors!

September 01, 2011

"One of the worst mass killings in Mexico’s drug war history occurred on August 25 in the violence-plagued city of Monterrey. Around 3:00 PM, a dozen men in four cars pulled up in front of the Casino Royale casino lugging several gas cans with them. In less than three minutes, they doused the small casino with gasoline and set the building on fire, killing 52 people in the ensuing blaze. Some witnesses said the attackers - allegedly members of the brutal Los Zetas transnational criminal organization (TCO) - yelled at casino patrons to get out of the building. Sadly, though, most were unable to do so. Instead of heading for the casino’s exits, most patrons fled deeper into the casino and into bathrooms, where they died of smoke inhalation. Conflicting reports claimed the emergency exits were blocked. However, one report by CNN said several vetted witnesses heard grenades exploding in the casino and saw victims - including pregnant women - intentionally being gunned down by the attackers. One woman who escaped the fire told CNN one of the attackers told the patrons, “we’re going to kill all of you.” In the wake of the tragedy, Mexican President Felipe Calderón wasted no time publicly condemning the attack. But what especially perked the ears of many of the nation’s drug war observers - and likely not just a few members of the US government - was the wording he used. Calderón called the attack an “aberrant act of terror and barbarity.” His National Security spokesman, Alejandro Poiré, bluntly stated that “an act of terrorism has been committed.” But was the Casino Royale attack a true “act of terror”? If the Mexican government believes TCOs are committing acts of terrorism, what does that imply for its drug war strategy - and that of the US government?"

August 26, 2011

Twitter was on fire last night with various reports of an attack on the Casino Royale in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, that killed over 50 people and injured many more. Here's a recent report in The Wall Street Journal:

"In what Mexican officials have called an "act of terror," a half dozen gunmen burst into a casino in Mexico's industrial capital of Monterrey Thursday, sprayed the place with gasoline, and started a fire in the bingo section, killing at least 53 people. Speaking to Monterrey's leading newspaper El Norte, Nuevo León Gov. Rodrigo Medina said that at least 53 people had been killed in the attack... Officials said they expected the death toll to continue to climb in what appeared to be an attack linked to warring drug cartels, although there was no immediate information linking the massacre to drug traffickers. Up to 80 people were in the casino when it was attacked.'Six hooded gunmen came in, shouting obscenities and firing their guns,' said a person at the scene who asked not to be named. 'They drenched the place with gasoline. People were running as the place went up in flames. Those who stayed behind burned to death.'... 'An act of terrorism has been committed," said Alejandro Poiré, the federal government's spokesman for security affairs. "This act of terror will not remain unpunished.' The mention of 'terror' has been a controversial one in Mexico's drug wars, where officials have argued hard against terminology suggesting an insurgency." Link to Full Article

However, this wasn't the only casino attack this week. The Caliente casino in Saltillo, owned by controversial former Tijuana mayor Jorge Hank Rhon, was attacked on Wednesday. A grenade attack near a Reynosa, Tamaulipas casino also occurred on Wednesday, and the Sun City casino in Saltillo) was attacked on August 15th. These other attacks involved mostly gunment (with the exception of the Reynosa incident), and few lives were lost - especially in comparison to the Casino Royale attack.

Analysis: I'm very concerned about the references Calderon and Poire are making to the Casino Royal attack as an "act of terror." I've always written/said that TCOs often behave like terrorists, and engage in terrorist-type activity. However, this doesn't necessarily make them terrorists, and to label them as such would open up a huge diplomatic and political Pandora's Box. Many of my readers and Twitter followers have already commented that the box was opened when he came into office.

The problem with that is that we don't fully understand yet the motivation behind the Casino Royal attack. But because of the string of other casino attacks (and other factors), we can start doing some intelligent speculation. Casinos are frequently owned by TCOs, or allies of TCOs who do extensive money laundering for them. Monterrey, Saltillo, and Reynosa are currently battlegrounds for the war between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel. These attacks could be rival hits. Or, the owners of the casinos may not be following up on their end of a bargain with one of the two TCOs, and now they're paying the price. I'm more inclined to go with the first explanation; it would be too much of a coincidence that four casino owners would all be screwing their bosses over at the same time. Don't forget; according to the news reports, we don't even know if TCOs were involved, although it's a reasonable assumption.

Taking a look specifically at the Casino Royale attack, spreading gasoline around and starting a fire is a poor way to carry out a true terrorist attack. There are multiple factors here that led to the death of so many people. First, it sounds like it was a small place; only 80 people were in it at the time of the attack, and there are definitely more than 80 people in any Vegas casino in the middle of a Thursday. Second, something was wrong with the emergency exits; either there weren't enough of them, they were poorly lit/indicated, or they weren't opening. Third, many people fled to the bathrooms to escape the attackers, and they subsequently got trapped - and killed - in there by the smoke and flames.

Initial reports claimed this was a robbery attempt, and the attackers were yelling at people to get out of the casino after they started the fire. This is looking less and less like a robbery and more like a simple attempt to burn the place down. Honestly, I don't believe the attackers' intent was to kill everyone inside the casino. This is incredibly important when major political figures are throwing around sound bytes like "act of terror." Were the people in the casino terrorized? Absolutely. Are the Mexican people throughout the country terrorized by the news of what happened yesterday in Monterrey? I have no doubt. But people living in certain parts of Los Angeles and Detroit and Washington, DC (and many other US cities) are terrorized every day by gang violence that rips their children away in drive-by shootings. Does this make gang members terrorists? No.

The bottom line is, unless those men wanted to and planned to kill innocent people in the casino in order to send a message to Calderon's government, the attack wasn't a true act of terrorism.

Yesterday's attack on the Casino Royale was one of the biggest tragedies we've seen in Mexico's drug war. Whenever innocent people are caught in the crossfire of TCO violence, it has a huge impact on the morale of the Mexican people, and the viability of Calderon's strategy. How will the Mexican people choose to view this attack? As a true "act of terror" and an indiscriminate killing? As a severely botched attempt by a TCO to send a message to a rival, or uncooperative casino owner? Or yet another example of a failed drug war strategy?

Sadly, it's unlikely this will be the last tragedy of its kind in Mexico. The question is, how will Calderon's administration play future incidents in the press? By calling the Casino Royale attack an "act of terror," he and Poire may be trying to open an avenue for increased US or international assistance that would help save the face of Mexican sovereignty. He may also be pursuing a political agenda that includes pushing for passage of legislation allowing the government expanded powers to monitor TCO activity.

I'm sure more information will roll in over the next few days and weeks regarding who was responsible for the attack, and why it was committed. However, we're going to see the political fall out from this for many months - perhaps years - to come.

August 25, 2011

"On August 18, the El Cajon, California Police Department set off alarms with a press release that mentioned an association between the Sinaloa Federation and an organized crime group run by Iraqi Chaldeans. But while the knee-jerk reaction by some might be that this roundup of Iraqi criminals by multiple law enforcement agencies in San Diego County finally provided solid evidence that Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are working with terrorists, it didn't. Far from it. Yet, there are some very interesting aspects of this story regarding how certain TCOs are behaving in southern California and why they are reaching out to groups like the Iraqis in San Diego County."

To read the full article on the HSToday.us website, please CLICK HERE!

August 19, 2011

Here is an excerpt from a press release issued yesterday by the El Cajon Police Department:

"Our officers had noticed increased narcotics trafficking and violent crime in certain neighborhoods of El Cajon. These crimes have been attributed primarily to Iraqi organized crime elements, and as this investigation has discovered, the Sinaloa Cartel, a Mexico- based drug trafficking organization (DTO) which supplies them... The targets of this investigation are members of an Iraqi DTO which has suspected affiliation with the Chaldean Organized Crime Syndicate. This syndicate began in the early 80’s in Detroit, Michigan. Crimes associated with the syndicate include murder, arson, weapons and narcotics trafficking, money laundering, fraud, theft, counterfeiting, racketeering, alien smuggling, assault, kidnapping, and armed robbery. Chaldean organized crime has historical ties to the Sinaloa Cartel, and the Mexican Mafia... During the course of 'Operation Shadowbox,' from January 2011 to present, DEA/MET and El Cajon Police have purchased large amounts of narcotics, pharmaceuticals, firearms, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from [Iraqi] subjects at 811 E. Main... In April 2011, a DEA undercover operative was shown a hand grenade at 811 East Main and was told additional grenades were available, being obtained from a Mexican military source of supply... As the investigation continues, additional members of the Iraqi DTO are expected to be identified and arrested." Link to Full Press Release

Analysis: First I want to give you a little bit of background about these Iraqis. Chaldeans are Iraqi Christians who were persecuted after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and thus sought asylum here in the US. A large percentage of them have come, and continue to come, through the port of San Ysidro to join the vast community of Iraqi Chaldeans in San Diego County. These Iraqis are heavily scrutinized when they declare themselves because Iraq is considered a "special interest country" by DHS; i.e. a country with ties to terrorism. Therefore, Iraqis attempting to enter the US are considered "special interest aliens," or SIAs.

I really need to emphasize here that there is no evidence that operational terrorists from Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East have entered the US in this manner. Of course, it's a huge concern for DHS that a member of Hizballah or al-Qa'ida might try to infiltrate a group of emigrating Chaldeans and sneak in with fraudulent documents. I'm not saying that this has never happened; however, if it has, no one in our government knows about it. Besides, the Chaldean community is pretty tight-knit, as are the groups of them that travel halfway across the world to Mexico in order to cross the border from Tijuana. They would be wary of an outsider trying to join their group. Again, while this scenario is always a possibility, it's less likely than you might think.

Moving onto the more interesting issue...the association between Chaldean TCOs and the Sinaloa Federation. I saw this and was immediately concerned that some media outlets would start screaming about the association between Mexican TCOs and terrorists. Trust me, that is NOT what is going on here. In fact, it's no different than all the other drug trafficking arrangements Mexican TCOs have with gangs and other criminal groups here in the US.

The association between the Chaldeans and the Federation makes a lot of business sense. Given the criminal activities the Chaldeans are allegedly involved in, according to the press release, they definitely need a big drug supplier. Who better to fit that bill than the Federation? What's even more interesting is that it's the Federation doing the supplying and not the AFO/FSO. Based on some government and on-the-ground sources, I was under the impression that the AFO/FSO still had control over the Tijuana plaza, but under an arrangement with the Federation (which has control of the Mexico border along California east to Mexicali). With these Chaldeans being right across from purportedly AFO/FSO territory, you'd think that's who they'd be dealing with. It's likely the Chaldeans have had this trafficking arrangement with the TCOs for many years, and with all the chaos in northern Baja California in the past five years, it's tough to say how that's affected supply lines to this group.

Back to the main point, this is NOT representative of an alliance between Middle Eastern terrorists and Mexican TCOs. This particular Chaldean organized crime group is involved in a lot of nasty things, but they're all typical for organized crime. The main role the TCOs are playing here is that of illegal drug supplier, and possibily military arms supplier. Nothing more profound - at least not at this point - should be drawn from this investigation.

August 10, 2011

Here is an excerpt from Diana Washington Valdez's article in The El Paso Times:

"U.S. federal agents allegedly allowed the Sinaloa drug cartel to traffic several tons of cocaine into the United States in exchange for information about rival cartels, according to court documents filed in a U.S. federal court. The allegations are part of the defense of Vicente Zambada-Niebla, who was extradited to the United States to face drug-trafficking charges in Chicago. He is also a top lieutenant of drug kingpin Joaquin "Chapo" Guzman and the son of Ismael "Mayo" Zambada-Garcia, believed to be the brains behind the Sinaloa cartel... Zambada-Niebla claims he was permitted to smuggle drugs from 2004 until his arrest in 2009... According to the court documents, Mexican lawyer Humberto Loya-Castro, another high-level Sinaloa cartel leader, had his 1995 U.S. drug-trafficking case dismissed in 2008 after serving as an informant for 10 years for the U.S. government. Guzman and the Zambadas allegedly provided agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement with information about other Mexican drug traffickers through Loya-Castro... The court documents also allege that the U.S. government is using a 'divide and conquer' strategy, 'using one drug organization to help against others.'" Link to Full Article

Analysis: This case is both interesting and strange. One of the interesting parts is the bait-and-switch the DEA pulled on Zambada-Niebla, making him think he was being sourced and then arresting him five hours later. If their intent was to get more information from him about rival cartels, maybe the DEA felt they'd have a better chance doing so by extraditing him and threatening him with decades of solitary confinement. Or perhaps enough cocaine had been allowed across the border through the arrangement with Loya-Castro, and the DEA had to wrap things up. We'll probably never know.

The divide-and-conquer strategy actually makes a lot of sense, and I've written before that Calderón may be secretly pursuing one - go after and dismantle the smaller guys so that they're left with only one or two big fish to deal with. Now, this relationship with Zambada-Niebla and Loya-Castro goes back before Calderón's administration, so we can't say the DEA was trying to follow a parallel strategy. However, the alleged arrangement with Zambada-Niebla started at the same time the drug war truly began to heat up - in 2004, when Nuevo Laredo was on fire and Los Zetas were starting to tear things up.

Ms. Valdez says this case could be a bombshell on par with the ATF Fast & Furious scandal. I can certainly see why she believes that. The report doesn't say exactly what volume of drugs Zambada-Niebla was permitted to smuggle across the border, but considering who he was working for, and the fact he was doing it for five years, it probably wasn't just a few baggies here and there.

Here's the other problem I have with this. Just how good was the information he was providing? The biggest catches in the drug war have occurred in the last 18 months, and Zambada-Niebla was arrested in 2009. Were any of those arrests - mostly VIPs in TCOs who were rivals to the Federation - linked to information provided by Zambada-Niebla either during his time as an informant, or while in custody after his arrest? That information would be helpful, but unlikely to be publicized. Given how the drug war has worsened and drug trafficking volume has not lessened significantly since 2004, did it really take five years for the DEA to realize that their arrangement wasn't working too well?

Again, I understand the likely intention. Zambada-Niebla and Loya-Castro were high up enough in the Federation food chain to be able to provide good intelligence. It was both in their and the DEA's interests (not to mention the Mexican government's) to take down Federation rivals. Speaking of the Mexican government, I haven't seen much about their thoughts - or knowledge of - this arrangement. Regardless, how many American lives were affected by the illegal drugs that were allowed to enter as a result of this operation? Maybe it doesn't really matter. Remember this: drug users hurt themselves voluntarily, so if they didn't buy their drugs from a Zambada-Niebla shipment facilitated by the DEA, they would have gotten them elsewhere.

Bottom line, it doesn't look like the DEA got their money or time's worth in that arrangement. And now Zambada-Niebla is squealing like a pig to anyone who'll listen, probably in an attempt to either get his case thrown out, get returned to Mexico for trial, or get a reduced sentence. I've always said these guys aren't stupid - far from it - and Zambada-Niebla's tactics are a prime example of that.

UPDATE: I wanted to share this snippet of conversation I had with a colleague via email this morning. He (who shall remain nameless, but he's VERY good at what he does) has great contacts, and isn't buying Zambada-Niebla's story...or his lawyer's story, anyway. Here's what my colleague had to say:

"The folks I've spoken to say [Zambada-Niebla's story] is BS, and I tend to believe them. The claims made are pretty wild, and not really consistent with how [confidential informants] (CIs) are normally worked. I know that DEA agents can sometimes be cowboys, but I worked a number of joint investigations with them and these claims seem over the top based on my experience. I can see making the offer to make him a CI used as a ruse to interview him and arrest him, but no way they let dope flow for that long."

I find his point of view to be realistic, and I trust his assessments. Let's see in the next few weeks if this angle that Zambada-Niebla's lawyer is going for manages to pay any dividends.

If any of you plan to be in the St Louis area on September 29th, then I hope to see you at the launch party for my first book, Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars! It's being held at The Jive and Wail Dueling Piano Bar, so I'll be combining a VERY short book intro and traditional book sale/signing with old-fashioned fun! For every book puchased, that person will get an entry into a drawing to win some cool Cartel-themed prizes.

I've also partnered up with the local Gateway Chapter of the National Multiple Sclerosis Society to donate a portion of that night's book proceeds to the chapter. Jive & Wail will be creating a special drink called the "Cartel Cocktail" just for the party, and there's a good chance a portion of the proceeds from those sales will also go to the chapter.

If you think you might be able to swing it, follow the link below to the official invitation and click on your RSVP. Hope to see you there!

August 04, 2011

"In a remote stretch of desert between Calexico, California and Yuma, Arizona, there’s not much to be seen but sand and a scorching sun. And, of course, the incongruous dark brown border fence that stands out against the bland terrain like a miles-long stitch. The fence that straddles the US-Mexico border has been the source of endless controversy... The controversy over the border fence has been going on for years, and has several aspects. One is the potentially dangerous impact it has on illegal immigrants because the fence is incomplete. Consequently, migrants travel to areas where the fence end and cross the border there. Unfortunately, these areas tend to be situated in some of the most inhospitable regions for migrants traveling on foot... Despite these criticisms, there is significant demand for even more border fencing. On July 20, an Arizona law went into effect that permitted the use of private donations to complete border fence construction in that state. Supporters created a website where donations could be made, and in its first day, the program raised over $58,000 from nearly 1,300 donors... However, the project will run into many challenges."

August 01, 2011

Here is an excerpt from Daniel Borunda, Alex Hinojosa and Marty Schladen's article in the El Paso Times:

"Mexican authorities captured the reputed leader of La Linea, a vicious group of thugs that carried out murders and terrorized Juárez for a drug cartel. José Antonio Acosta Hernández, also known as 'El Diego,' one of the highest-ranking bosses of the Juárez drug cartel, was reportedly arrested Friday after a shootout with authorities in a Chihuahua City neighborhood. Acosta was indicted this year in the killings of three people connected to the U.S. Consulate in Juárez... His arrest, according to one expert, may signal the end of the Juárez drug cartel and a downturn in the violence that has gripped Juárez and the state of Chihuahua. Acosta, who was reportedly flown to Mexico City after his capture, is believed to run operations for La Linea in Chihuahua City and Juárez and was arguably the most-wanted man in the state of Chihuahua... In recent weeks, narco-graffiti threatening the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Consulate employees appeared on public walls in Juárez and Chihuahua City. The messages telling the "gringos of the DEA" to quit meddling were signed 'Diego'... Many of the public threats from La Linea made frequent references to 'El Diego'... The capture of Acosta may be a new beginning for Juárez residents and a decrease in violence, said University of Texas at El Paso political science professor Tony Payan." Link to Full Article

Analysis: Chalk up another victory for the Calderón administration, as this is a nice one. There's no doubt that Acosta's arrest will have a detrimental impact on La Linea, and perhaps on the VCFO (Juárez cartel) as a whole. The big question is, of course, how much?

Acosta has been indicted in the US for alleged involvement in the attack on the three US Consulate employees, which makes him eligible for extradition. The only thing any narco fears is extradition. Dr Payan mentioned in the article something about Acosta providing good, useful intelligence about his organization and perhaps rivals. That's the key here, both to either preventing Acosta's extradition, reducing his sentence if he is sent to the US for trial (and assuming a conviction, of course), and bringing down the remnants of the VCFO. But will he talk?

No one can really say. Edgar "La Barbie" Valdez Villareal did, and so did Osiel Cárdenas Guillen. If the VCFO really is crumbling, Acosta may believe there's not much left to save - except his own rear end. La Linea has been a force to be reckoned with in Chihuahua for many years, and the VCFO is not a TCO to go quietly into the night - it's been fighting for its life against the Federation for quite some time now, and still maintains a presence in Juárez. However, there is a chance that Acosta could drive some pretty big nails into the VCFO's coffin; we'll see how that develops over the next few weeks and months.

But there's still the other question - how will the assumed demise of La Linea, and perhaps later on the VCFO - affect levels of violence in Juárez? Many people believe that if the VCFO were to concede or be destroyed, the Federation would win control of the Juárez plaza and peace would ensue. Unfortunately, that probably wouldn't be the case.

In past years, the violence in Ciudad Juárez has been a result of the turf battle between the VCFO and the Federation. But something happened in the last couple of years to change to rules - throw them out the window actually...the local drug trade exploded. There are something like 500 colonias, or neighborhoods, in Juárez, and each one has its own gang defending its turf - and dealing drugs. These gangs have joined in the bloodshed, and it's gotten to the point that no one in Juárez really knows who is killing whom. The Federation and the VCFO don't have their top people mixed up in that mess; they hire out lower level thugs to do the grunt work for them in that chaos. The cops are afraid of going in and asking too many questions, let alone thoroughly investigating any murders that occur in Juárez, so it's too simplistic to say that once the VCFO is out, everything will get better. Juárez still has a few hundred gangs to deal with.

That being said, if the Federation ends up being top dog in Juárez as a result of Acosta's arrest (whether that's in a few weeks or months), they have the power to rein in all the disparate factions in the city and establish some order. Whether or not they want to is a good question. With all the killing and chaos, less authority is scrutinizing the movement of drugs across the border into El Paso. However, all those gang members already in the drug business and possibly looking for work...this could result in the largest narco recruiting drive the drug war has ever seen.

At this early point in the game, post-Acosta arrest, it's too soon to tell what impact him being out of the game will have. Of course, it's always interesting to speculate, and imagine positive outcomes. As always, more to come...

July 29, 2011

I'm sitting in LAX waiting for my flight back home after a whirlwind four days with National Geographic at the TCA summer press tour in Beverly Hills. I got to meet the most incredible, kind, and genuine people with the Channel, and was privileged to meet the people involved in all of NatGeo's new shows coming up this fall.

The presentation for "Border Wars" was brief (each show only had 20 minutes to answer questions from the press), but it was a huge success. There were six of us on the panel (which is larger than average), including Nick Stein (series producer) and Natalia Baldwin (his field producer), USBP Agent Justin De La Torre, CBP media liaison Bill Anthony, and BELO-TV border reporter Angela Kocherga. We all got a chance to speak, and the press asked some good questions. Here's a photo of our panel:

In addition to prepping and doing our own thing, we got to support (and be supported by) producers and cast of really cool upcoming NatGeo shows like "Rocket City Rednecks," "Mad Scientist," and "Men of WILD." Where else would I get to hang with people who have multiple PhDs and do crazy experiments to advance scientific understanding, crocodile wranglers, and deadly animal experts? Here's a photo of me with some of the "Men of WILD" you'll see on NatGeo in the fall:

On a personal note, my publisher had 100 advance copies of Cartel printed out exclusively for this event, and I'm thrilled to say that not a single copy remained on the table when the journalists were done picking up their NatGeo freebies. I also gave out dozens of book promo cards to people who told me they really wanted the book, which was exciting! The TV star sightings were pretty cool, and I was able to get photos with actors from "Entourage," "Friday Night Lights," "True Blood," and a few others.

Bottom line, this trip has made me into a die-hard NatGeo supporter, and I'm super excited about the upcoming season of "Border Wars"! Please check it out when the third season premieres in September...I promise you won't be disappointed.

July 26, 2011

Just a heads up, I may not be posting for a few days or approving comments. I'm currently in Los Angeles (technically Beverly Hills, I suppose) to help the National Geographic Channel promote the falls season of "Border Wars" for the television press. I'm very honored that they would ask me to help them, and I'm super excited to make it as successful session for them as possible. I'll be spending a lot of time over the next few days with NatGeo executives and the other panelists - including series producer Nicholas Stein and reporter Angela Kocherga - and I look forward to writing a blog post about my experience when I get back!

July 21, 2011

Here is an excerpt from Alia Beard Rau's article in The Arizona Republic:

"Supporters of increased border enforcement now can help Arizona build its own fence along the Mexico border. new law went into effect today that allows the state to build the fence, as long as it can raise enough private donations and persuade public and private landowners to let it be done on their property. A new website for the effort, www.buildtheborderfence.com, was set to go online at midnight... State lawmakers who supported the law have said they want a consistent fence along the entire border that is solid, has multiple layers and is tall enough to keep out pedestrians... The Sierra Club opposes the law. It says Arizona already has more border walls than any other state and that the walls have caused flooding in some areas and have blocked wildlife in other areas." Link to Full Article

Analysis: This is one of the more interesting ideas I've seen regarding border security in a while, although I'm sure it won't be without controversy. I have mixed feelings about the concept of a border fence, and have generally agreed with DHS Secretary Napolitano's statement, "Show me a 50-foot fence and I'll show you a 51-foot ladder." Or something to that effect.

On my recent trip to San Diego, I saw the newest iteration of border fence in the San Ysidro area separating the US from Tijuana, and it certainly looked high-tech. It definitely dwarfed the primary fence, which was a ten-foot rusted-out relic that could serve only as a five-minute deterrent. The new fence, bathed in stadium lighting and topped with razor wire, looked at first sight as impossibly tall and quite imposing. Then I saw the dozens of holes that had been patched up, and it no longer looked so impenetrable.

But in southwest California, like in Arizona, the secondary fence isn't consistent in size or construction. The have another type of fence that consists of tall, tightly-spaced metal columns with a top that angles out over the Mexican side to discourage climbers. Yes, it does allow for free water flow and the passage of small critters back and forth. However, any migratory animal bigger than a cocker spaniel would have a hard time getting back and forth. Still, for the purpose of preventing "pedestrian and vehicle traffic," the polite way of referring to drug and human smugglers, it looked very effective.

But even if private donations are raised in sufficient quantities to finish the Arizona fence, is it a good idea? I will say, of all the southwest border states to implement such a law, the home of SB 1070 is the place to do it with success. There are enough angry ranchers and border residents who are tired of having their land traipsed on and their homes burglarized by smugglers to make this happen. Also, Arizona is one of the most dangerous human smuggling corridors, claiming the lives of hundreds - if not thousands - of migrants every year. Perhaps if word of a contiguous border fence in Arizona got out, migrants would be forced to use a different, and perhaps safer, route of passage.

That in and of itself, however, might pose a greater danger. There are still several stretches of unfenced border in California and Texas that are dangerous, due to both environmental factors and bandits who prey on migrants. The cost to migrants who have to pay coyotes would probably go up due to having to go around the Arizona fence. But isn't this the point? To deter illegal immigration and drug smuggling into Arizona? Admittedly, those are nice benefits, but there are human costs to be considered.

I can't deny that, after having seen it myself and listening to a Border Patrol agent tell me about it, a border fence acts as a significant deterrent. It doesn't completely stop illegal immigrants or drug smugglers, but it slows them down enough to allow USBP to respond more effectively. The agency is also receiving more funding to pave border roads and acquire all-terrain vehicles, which greatly improves their response time. This, combined with better fencing, does improve border security. Thus, another question is raised. Can USBP in Arizona take advantage of a privately funded border fence with a corresponding reduction in response time?

There are a few problems I see with that. First, the fence is going to have to sit on some private land, go through tribal reservations, federal lands, and probably go around some environmentally protected areas. What kind of hoops will the Border Patrol have to go through in order to access these areas, especially if they're between the fence and the actual US-Mexico border?

Well, let's not put the cart before the horse. First, the donations have to come in, then a fence builder has to be found, a contract written, etc., before anything can be built. Considering how these things go - and how many years it took to build the scant few hundred miles of border fence we currently have - I don't see a huge rush to have these questions addressed. Just some points to ponder.

July 19, 2011

"Not too long ago, organized crime groups in Mexico—commonly (and inaccurately) known as cartels, were referred to as drug trafficking organizations, or DTOs. In the last couple of years, US government agencies have stopped using this moniker and switched to using transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to refer to the narcos because their portfolio of illegal activities has significantly expanded in scope and geographic area. It’s widely accepted that Mexican TCOs make most of their vast sums of money from the drug trade. But is that really the case anymore? Some drug war observers believe it may not be. Edgardo Buscaglia, a renowned expert on organized crime in Mexico, believes as little as half of the TCOs’ profits are currently derived from drug trafficking. In the past several years, as enforcement and interdiction efforts have improved, many major TCOs have seen a drop in drug income. To cover their losses, they’ve expanded into kidnapping for ransom, human smuggling, extortion and media piracy. Bloodthirsty and heartless killers are selling bootleg copies of “Toy Story 3” on the street to make money? Believe it."

To read the rest of my article on the HSToday website, please CLICK HERE!

July 18, 2011

While I was on vacation with my husband in San Diego, we were fortunate enough to be able to arrange a brief driving tour of the US-Mexico border between San Ysidro and Otay Mesa. I was offered the chance to observe operations at the port of entry, but due to my occasional reliance on a cane to walk (thanks to my MS) and the requirement to be on my feet most of the time, I regrettably had to decline.

Regardless, our brief tour was fascinating, and we had awesome tour guides in the form of a US Border Patrol Agent and Public Affairs representative from San Diego sector. First we started out driving for a while between the two border fences - the low brown one (on the left) called the primary fence, and the tall mesh one topped with razor wire (on the right) called the secondary fence.

There were a number of spots in the mesh secondary fence that had been patched up because holes had been cut into it by migrants. You'll also notice the towering lights running in between the two fences that can light the place up like a Yankees game. There are also cameras and sensors located at intervals along the fence.

While we were driving along, we saw several areas on the Tijuana side of the primary fence were people were living...literally along the fence. Sometimes they had tents, but more often it was just a flimsy tarp stretched between the fence and some rocks. There was a lot of garbage being dumped over that low fence.

They also have to run across some incredibly varied terrain. Here's an image of Smugglers' Gulch, a popular transit area for drug and human smugglers:

There are several areas in the rockiest parts of these hills and mountains where the fence just can't go, but the Border Patrol knows they need to have a physical presence in those areas. One such area is the very end of the primary fence, which extends a few yards into the Pacific Ocean. As easy as it looks to just wander into the water and hook around it into US territory, the looks are deceiving. The currents are nasty, and there's always a Border Patrol presence there. Off in the distance you can see the Coronado Islands, which are used as a stopping point by drug and human smugglers before coming into US costal waters and picking a spot to drop their cargo. I've been to the southern-most point in the US in Key West, so it was pretty cool to see the southwestern-most point in the US:

Speaking of trash, I remember when I worked as an analyst in California that the Governor's Office had a joint program with the Mexican government to address all the trash and tires (many of them burning) accumulating along the border. The trash accumulation I could understand, but thousands of tires, and many of them being burned? Why? Well, the Border Patrol doesn't really know why either, and it was an odd sight to see so many tires just randomly scattered along the landscape. Many of them are salvaged, but others are burned for no apparent reason, causing noxious dark fumes (some of which we saw). It's quite a mess.

As many who live or have traveled to El Paso know, it's a strange juxtaposition to see bustling San Ysidro on one side of the fence and the slums of Tijuana on the other. Some of the worst and most violent neighborhoods in Tijuana are literally a stone's throw away, and they have the tactical advantage (if narcos ever decided to use it) of being on higher ground. The Border Patrol has actually built up quite a bit of the paved border road to raise it up and minimize this elevation discrepancy, and also reduce response time to incidents to just a matter of minutes.

The tour was too short, but as I was often reminded by my husband, we were there on vacation and wanted to squeeze in only a little bit of time for work-related things. I'm hoping to do another tour maybe in Brownsville or McAllen during my book tour in October because every stretch of border has its own challenges and nuances. My many thanks to USBP and CBP in San Diego for taking the time to give us a peek into your work!

July 09, 2011

Good evening everyone! I just wanted to let my readers know I will be on vacation until July 17th, and NOT (by some weird miracle) taking my laptop with me. Yes, I am purposely trying to stay away from all news about the drug war because, after all...it's a vacation! So, I won't be posting anything over the next week, and won't be able to approve any comments on existing posts, either. No worries, that will all get taken care of when I get back.

July 07, 2011

I just wanted to let my readers know that Kirkus Reviews, a trade publication and company that describes itself as "The World's Toughest Book Critics," gave my forthcoming book a thumbs up! Here's the review they posted:

Overview of the war on drugs being fought without relief in Mexico and the United States.

In her debut, Longmire is a longtime analyst of drug trafficking, advising government agencies on the realities and solutions that might mean a few victories along the porous, violence-ridden U.S.-Mexican border. The author covers a lot of material in a relatively brief book, sometimes giving the text the feel of linked encyclopedia entries. Still, the prevalence of breadth over depth is no major shortcoming, since Longmire offers fresh insights into almost every facet of the war on drugs. She makes a convincing case that within the United States, the violence stemming from illegal substances has caused more injuries and deaths than generally acknowledged by law-enforcement agencies. Those casualties are in addition to the dangers of ingesting contaminated narcotics sold and purchased illegally. Mexican drug organizations have established sizable marijuana growing fields within national parks and forests throughout the United States. When law-enforcement officers or unsuspecting civilians enter the fields, their lives might be endangered by trigger-happy Mexican criminals determined to protect their lucrative cash crops from detection. The most frequent danger from infiltrated marijuana fields seems to be concentrated in California. Longmire demonstrates, however, that potential free-fire zones have cropped up in North Carolina, West Virginia, Tennessee and other states far from the Mexican border. Switching aspects of the drug war chapter by chapter, Longmire explains why law-enforcement agents have been mostly unable to halt the flow of weapons from the United States into Mexico. Legalization of currently illegal substances will never serve as a panacea, writes the author, but strategic legalization might alleviate some of the violence.

July 04, 2011

After my panel interview on KNPR last week to discuss the pros and cons of legalizing marijuana, I was left with a lot of food for thought. There were some great points made by everyone involved, and I haven't thought about the issue - or the practical domestic ramifications - of such a dramatic shift in US drug policy as deeply and extensively as I have in the last week.

Then I read an intriguing Twitter post a few days ago, and my brain has been spinning ever since. Essentially, it pointed out that the United Nations requires member states to enact prohibitionist policies. So I asked myself, if this is true, why doesn't anyone mention it during debates over legalization, and how do countries like Portugal and the Netherlands get away with their liberal drug policies?

It turns out that those countries - and a few others with similar policies - have never truly legalized drugs; they have decriminalized their use. And this is where the huge amount of public misinformation and misunderstanding begins.

Many people don't understand the subtle - but distinct - legal difference between legalization and decriminalization. Legalization of a drug or several drugs means that anything associated with it - its use, possession, production, distribution, etc. - is completely legal and not subject to any criminal or civil penalty. Of course, laws can be enacted to regulate all of those things, and the breaking of those laws can draw penalties. In the example of alcohol, you can buy and consume it if you're over the age of 21, you can sell it if you have a license, and you can get arrested if you drink too much of it in public. Contrary to public perception, not one country (at least, none of the 180 signatories to the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs) has fully legalized drugs.

However, there are several countries that have decriminalized the use and possession of various drugs. This means that people caught using or possessing them are either given a simple fine, the drugs are confiscated, or they're mandated to seek some sort of counseling or treatment (sometimes only after the third violation). Drug use is treated pretty much in the same way as a speeding violation. Those involved in the manufacture or distribution of drugs, however, can be prosecuted as criminals. Some of these countries include Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, Argentina, Germany, Ecuador, Belgium, and Mexico. Yes, Mexico.

Before I get into the decriminalization loophole, I want to bring to your attention a document I just mentioned - the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This is an international treaty that was created in 1961 to essentially serve as an umbrella for several different anti-drug conventions that were created several decades earlier, and was able to take into account new synthetic drugs and opioids that had come into vogue during that window. In 1972, it was supplemented by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which controls LSD, Ecstasy, and other psychoactive pharmaceuticals.

Knowing about the Convention is critical to understanding some of the complexities of international drug policy - specifically, why certain countries do or don't do certain things with their drug policies. The Convention prohibits the production and supply of specific (nominally narcotic) drugs and of drugs with similar effects except under license for specific purposes, such as medical treatment and research. Article 36 requires treaty parties to criminalize "cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention." It also identified/created the four schedules that we're familiar with for categorizing drugs based on their potential for addiction and medical uses.

Understanding the Convention is also important because it turns out it's the foundation for our own drug policies. Our Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and the United Kingdom's Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 were actually designed to fulfill treaty obligations. Both Acts include analogous schemes of drug scheduling, along with similar procedures for adding, removing, and transferring drugs among the schedules. The Controlled Substances Act also includes a provision mandating that federal authorities control all drugs of abuse at least as strictly as required by the Single Convention.

So how do those countries that have decriminalized drug use and possession get away with it on the international stage? Well, the Convention has a lot of loopholes. And, after all, it's the United Nations we're talking about - not exactly an authority with teeth. There has been considerable legal debate over whether or not the Convention's reference to criminalization of possession means or includes possession for personal use, or just for intent to distribute. The wording that mentions penalties and exceptions for certain countries' constitutions is necessarily vague, and treaty parties can easily find a way to decriminalize drugs - much to the UN's chagrin - through their interpretation of the Convention.

On the flip side, countries with conservative drug policies can point to the Convention as a major reason for maintaining a prohibitionist stance. After all, the US designed its own drug policy after the Convention. How would it look to the international community if the US government decided to blatantly defy the Convention by decriminalizing marijuana? I ask that rhetorically, as I've just laid out how it's not really that blatant of a rebuke. But the US is held to a different international standard than many other countries, and the UN pointing out an American refusal to stick to the Convention's principles and guidelines would go over very differently than if, say, Ghana decided to do the same thing.

So, taking all of this into account, I wonder why the drug policy reform movement isn't pursuing a decriminalization agenda rather than one for legalization. Given the legal distinction between the two, and the fact that no country has truly legalized drugs (only decriminalized them to varying extents), surely they have to know that legalization just isn't a practical goal. Decriminalization, however, is a different story. Maybe it's just easier to use the term legalization, or maybe no one wants to explain over and over the difference between the two.

I strongly suspect that the drug reform movement isn't concerned about the practicalities, given the passion of those in the movement I've come into contact with. However, I wonder why they're so vehemently pushing for all-out legalization - given the Convention's requirements for treaty parties against it - instead of the more doable decriminalization. I'll be the first to admit I don't know a ton about NORML or the drug reform movement in general, so perhaps it's a matter of principle or the group's mission not to take baby steps.

Just a few final points I want to make here. First, those of us involved in one way or another in the debate over drug policy need to be better about describing it more accurately. Drug reform advocates can't point to countries like Portugal and the Netherlands as good examples of countries that have legalized drugs, when in fact they've only decriminalized them to varying extents. Second, I think it's smarter for drug reform advocates to pursue a decriminalization agenda rather than a legalization one, if only because it's more practical and realistic in light of restrictions imposed by the Convention; not super-enforceable perhaps, but ones which the US government will likely always stick to. At least with decriminalization, there's are viable loopholes our government can exploit. And no matter how much legalization advocates may disagree with or despise the Convention, it's a UN treaty with 180 signatory nations, and it does mean something.

Third, the American public has been warming up to the concept of legalization over the last two decades, but how many of them know about the complexities of international drug policy and how that impacts what we can do to change our own policies? The American public isn't stupid. However, it's very easy to misinform people, especially on issues they may not closely follow or not feel too strongly about one way or another. A big push to educate Americans - and our own government, perhaps - about the relative ease of decriminalization compared to full legalization might make some big inroads for the drug reform movement, as well as our own understanding of how we view drug use.

June 30, 2011

Later this morning (specifically, at noon EST/9am PST), I'll be doing a live panel interview on State of Nevada Public Radio (KNPR) to discuss the pros and cons of drug legalization. The other panel guests will be Jude Joffe-Block, reporter for Nevada Public Radio, Keith Humphries, Prof of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University (and White House policy advisor), and Allen St. Pierre, Exec Director of NORML. I'm sure this will be a lively and informative discussion!

June 29, 2011

Every so often in this business of following Mexico's drug war, I come across an analyst or writer who really gets it. Don't get me wrong; there are dozens of academics, journalists, analysts, politicians, law enforcement agents, etc. who have a really good handle on the situation in Mexico. But many times, because of what their job entails, they have a limited view of the big picture, or some of the more in-depth, nuanced issues. I've been reading Ioan Grillo's work for some time, and he really gets it; a fact made obvious in his first book, El Narco.

The first several chapters are dedicated to the rise of today's major cartels. It's a fascinating history lesson, interspersed with some really cool stories about different big personalities involved in the development of cocaine smuggling in Mexico, and why certain cartels started fighting each other in the first place. I definitely learned quite a bit; like the fact that opium poppies were first introduced into Mexico by the Chinese in the late 1800s, and the first man to orchestrate cocaine smuggling in Mexico was Honduran, not Mexican.

Politics in Mexico isn't an easy river to navigate, but Grillo does an admirable job explaining the role the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) played in negotiating and playing along with the cartels, and how the transition to real democracy in 2000 dramatically altered that delicate balance. My only criticism of this first section of El Narco is that it switches back and forth between political history and narco history - ostensibly to follow a chronological path - and sometimes there aren't adequate transitions between the two. This sometimes leaves the subject material in conflict with what the reader might think the theme of the chapter is (based on the chapter title), which can be a bit disconcerting. If you can disregard that, there's no way you can avoid learning something really neat about the drug war's history here.

Most people who write about the modern drug war in Mexico point to 2006 as its start. Grillo points out that it's a convenient historical marker because that's when Calderón took office, and as such, began his aggressive anti-narco campaign that supposedly let all hell break loose. Grillo proposes that the modern drug war actually began towards the end of former President Vicente Fox's term in 2004, when the first major battle over Nuevo Laredo broke out between the Sinaloa Federation and then-Gulf enforcers Los Zetas. He contends that Los Zetas were engaging in brutal paramilitary tactics, like beheadings, dismemberments, and grenade attacks, that had not traditionally been used by other TCOs. When the rest of the drug lords and their subordinates started seeing what Los Zetas were doing to intimidate others, they started to do the same, and the war went downhill from there. Of course, Calderón's all-out war didn't help matters, but it was more of the transition from PRI rule to "normal" democracy in 2000 that dumped out the gas can. Los Zetas threw the match, and Calderón added some kindling.

Since the book is written in a past-present-future format, the second section is an overview of the activities TCOs are involved in. He covers the details of drug movements across the border, different methods the TCOs use to murder and intimidate their rivals and various other victims, and also delves into some of the cultural aspects of the drug war - Santa Muerte, Jesus Malverde, and narcocorridos.

In the final section, Grillo delves into drug war policies on both sides of the border, and how TCOs are morphing and expanding in order to keep drug profits coming in. He also tackles the controversies of drug legalization, the use of the term "insurgency," and the current extent (and potential) of US military involvement in Mexico. His recommendations are brief and in no particular order, but they're logical, and he clearly explains why he thinks each change is necessary.

One of the things I like the best in El Narco is the way Grillo brings to life (if in a macabre fashion) the business-like cruelty and psychosis of so many narcos. For example, in one passage, he's talking to an assassin about how new recruits are trained. The assassin explains that the "newbies" often take more than ten minutes to cut off a hand or arm, and make a mess in the process; the pros can do it cleanly in 3-4 minutes, largely because many of them used to be butchers. In another passage, he describes a video he saw of a blindfolded 13 year-old hostage, naked and trembling, begging his parents to pay the narcos the ransom they were demanding for his release.

I can't lie about my bias here; I'm a fan of El Narco and thus Ioan Grillo because I agree with about 99% of what he says. It's hard to give huge props to a book that is considered direct competition to Cartel, but I can't help it. Actually, I prefer to consider it a companion book, rather than competition. Remember, Grillo is a seasoned journalist and I'm an analyst. While the general content and message of our books is similar, our approaches and the way we lay out the information is different.

This is what I love about the community of writers who follow the drug war; we're just happy to get good information out to people who really need to know what's happening south of the border. Grillo is good at relating stories and the personal experiences of people he interviews, and this makes El Narco immensely readable. There's no jargon or charts or tons of statistics to wade through. However, one of my few criticisms (and I may have brought this up earlier) is that I'm not a huge fan of the way the information flows in the chapters themselves. While the book follows a chronological format, the information in the chapters themselves could be organized better to make it flow even more smoothly.

Bottom line, this is a book you really need to read when it comes out in late October (available now for pre-order on Amazon). I had a hard time putting it down; like I said, it's immensely readable, with some great stories and fascinating history and factual tidbits about the drug war. If you're even remotely a fan of my work or viewpoints on the drug war, you'll quickly become a fan of Grillo's and El Narco - I certainly did.

June 26, 2011

Last week, I did a lengthy interview for The Jaco Report, a news program on the local St Louis FOX2 station. We talked about the heroin trade in St Louis, as well as the overall drug war and its impact on the US. It aired this morning, and if you'd like to watch, please follow the link by clicking on the image below:

June 24, 2011

Here is an excerpt from Guy Taylor's article in World Politics Review (in which I'm heavily quoted):

"The capture this week of La Familia Michoacana drug cartel boss José de Jesús Méndez, aka El Chango or the Monkey, represents a shiny notch on the belt of Mexican President Felipe Calderón, whose five-year-old presidency has been defined by its war against drug kingpins. But the arrest is unlikely to stem the ongoing violence that has caused frustrations to mount among Mexican voters ahead of the nation's 2012 presidential election. In fact, it's likely to have the opposite effect, says Sylvia Longmire... The government campaign against La Familia over the past several years had already resulted in a split within the cartel's ranks, Longmire added. With El Chango now in custody, she explained, a power vacuum has opened, with the Los Zetas and Sinoloa cartels angling to take over La Familia's territory in the Michoacan and Guerrero states along Mexico's southwestern Pacific coastline." Link to Full Article

Analysis: You can read my take on the arrest in a small nutshell in the rest of the article, but I wanted to go a little more in depth here.

At the time of El Chango's arrest, the original LFM was split in two. This occurred after the cult-like TCO's original leader, Nazario "El Mas Loco" Moreno Gonzalez was killed back in December. Those in LFM remaining loyal to him, led by Servando "La Tuta" Gómez Martínez, renamed themselves the Knights Templar. Oddly enough, they're considered in some places as the breakaway faction. Those under El Chango kept the LFM name, and almost immediately started battling with the Knights Templar over the original LFM's territory and drug routes.

Shortly before El Chango was arrested, he realized that LFM was almost out of money, and running out of options. What's a narco to do? Form an alliance! And that he did, albeit a strange one. Roughly a year to 18 months ago, the original LFM formed an alliance with the Sinaloa Federation and the Gulf cartel to do battle against Los Zetas. So why join them now? Well, because La Tuta and his Knights Templar are the loyalists, El Chango may have been viewed by La Tuta's allies - the Federation and the Gulf cartel - as an enemy. His best bet for survival would have been to seek out help from Los Zetas.

This bears relevance to what might happen to the remnants of LFM in the days and weeks to come. The Mexican government is convinced that LFM is done for, and that may be true - in their previous incarnation. There are, in my opinion, three major possibilities. First, the Knights Templar could make peace with the LFM remnants and reunite. I think this is the least likely option; too much blood has spilled between the two factions in the last six months. Next is the possibility of the Federation absorbing LFM.Their territories butt up against each other, and it probably wouldn't be too difficult for the Federation to muscle in on that. However, that would anger the Knights Templar, and as far as I know, the Federation and the Knights Templar want to stay in each other's good graces to keep fighting Los Zetas.

That leaves us with the most likely option, which is that Los Zetas will absorb what's left of LFM. They were already in talks to form an alliance, and Los Zetas are just inching to work their way westward into LFM and Knights Templar territory. There have already been reports of a Zetas presence in Guanajuato and Nayarit, so expansion is definitely one of their top goals. Unless LFM reunites - which, again, is unlikely - then there will probably be some increased narco activity in and around LFM's territory, which means more violence to come.

June 23, 2011

This morning, I had the pleasure of being interviewed by Tim Sullivan for KURV 710's "The Valley's Morning News." We talked a bit about my background, about Cartel, and about the lack of a definition of border violence spillover. If you'd like to listen (it's about 5 min long), please click below!

"Here is a public challenge to both the National Rifle Association and the Obama administration. I challenge you to prove that either of you has any idea what you’re talking about when it comes to southbound weapons trafficking to Mexico. The issue at hand is not whether guns sold in the United States are making their way into Mexican cartel hands; that’s indisputable. It’s trying to figure out exactly how many of those guns come from the U.S. and how many come from elsewhere... Here’s the problem: No one – not the NRA, not the Obama administration, not the Mexican government – knows what proportion of cartel guns comes from the north and from the south. But each will tell you otherwise."

June 22, 2011

Most of my regular readers know my professional background, and why I write about the drug war in Mexico the way that I do. But for those of you who would like to know more about how I reach my conclusions, I want to use this post to talk a bit about intelligence analysis and the process I used to write Cartel.

For eight years, I was a Special Agent for the Air Force. I worked criminal investigations, counterintelligence, and counterespionage operations for most of that time. But during the last two and a half years of my time on active duty, I worked as a force protection, or counterterrorism, analyst. This is where I first learned how to take hundreds of bits of information, throw out the garbage and keep the useful nuggets, and make sense of those in a written product. Some of the people who read my work were experts on Latin America, and others were high-ranking commanders who needed to know just the most basic information in a concise fashion. More importantly, they all needed to know what everything meant.

When I went to work for the State of California and started focusing on Mexico and the drug war, it was almost an identical situation. Middle- to executive-level management in the then-Office of Homeland Security and Governor's Office wanted up-to-date, key information about the border situation, and what it meant for California's overall security. I did this by pulling, over the course of four years, hundreds - if not thousands - of federal government reports, law enforcement reports, and open source/media reports. I had to take all this information - some of which was contradictory - and try to figure out ultimately what it meant for California.

There are generally two types of intelligence analysis - tactical and strategic. Tactical intelligence is short-term, on-the-ground information that is used and digested within a very short period of time. Typically, it's used by law enforcement agencies in operations that go after the bad guys. An example of tactical intelligence is where suspected drug traffickers are going to be making a deal at a particular time. That information is acquired on-the-ground from confidential sources, and used within a short period of time by police who want to plan a raid. It's what many in the intelligence community refer to as the view from 1,000 feet.

Strategic intelligence is the "big picture" stuff - the view from 30,000 feet. Information is collected about a subject over a longer period of time, and deeper meaning is extracted from it. More importantly, analysts use the information to detect trends and try to predict what's going to happen in the short term and the long term. We use words like probably, likely and unlikely, and could and would a lot; sometimes that drives people nuts, but it's not an exact science and involves a lot of informed speculation. This is what I've done over the past six years, and what I continue to do now.

Typical intelligence analysts who do this type of work are employed by the military, the CIA, the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, DHS, and almost any other major US government agency with a stake in national security. They're also employed by state fusion centers and local law enforcement agencies. Strategic analysts normally don't spend much time in the field outside from occasional familiarization trips. The analysts who work for those agencies I just mentioned and look at Mexico, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, China, etc. usually work from the Washington DC area. There are definitely analysts who work in-country, but in many instances, that's not feasible for diplomatic or security reasons - like Syria or Iran.

It also isn't typically part of a strategic analyst's job description. For this blog and for Cartel, I rely(ied) heavily on information from hundreds of sources who are on the ground: journalists in Mexico and along the border; academics at both US and Mexican universities; law enforcement officers and agents in every type of agency there is along the border and beyond; press reports from outlets of every political bias imaginable; and personal accounts from Mexicans living on both sides of the border. I then sort out all those reports, pick the ones I feel are the most solid, reliable, and significant, and explain to you what I believe the latest narco arrest means, or why violence is increasing in certain parts of Mexico.

There are some really amazing books out there written by journalists who have spent a considerable amount of time in Mexico and on the border. I've certainly enjoyed reading them, as well as more academic works by professors and researchers who have been examining Mexican history and politics for decades. I didn't write Cartel from either perspective, which is why I think it's unique. After spending over six years watching and studying almost every major move made by the TCOs, the Mexican government, and US agencies in Washington DC and along the border, I have a good idea of what it all means at the strategic level, and what it's going to mean a year (or five) down the road. Better yet, I have a conduit for sharing my ideas about the drug war with you, and with future readers of Cartel.

This has always been my goal for this blog, and is my goal with Cartel - to use my experience as an analyst and the methodology of strategic intelligence analysis to make sense of the drug war for people who only hear bits and pieces, and don't know what it all means. Of course, not everyone agrees with my conclusions or methods. But that's the beauty of a community of analysts and journalists and academics who follow the drug war! Most of us have at least heard of each other, and many of us regularly share information back and forth to maximize analytical possibilities. I've had some of the best learning experiences through exchanges with people who disagree 100% with what I write. The ultimate benefit is that more people are exposed to the complex tragedy that is the drug war in Mexico.