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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000729
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017
TAGS: PRELPGOVUNFICYPCYTU
SUBJECT: LEADERS' MEETING BRINGS NO BREAKTHROUGHS
REF: A. NICOSIA 685
¶B. NICOSIA 583
¶C. 06 NICOSIA 1088
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Fourteen months after concluding a
framework arrangement to restart stalled Cyprus Problem
negotiations -- the July 8 or Gambari Agreement, which
envisioned regular tete-a-tetes of the island's community
leaders -- RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish
Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat conducted their first
follow-on meeting September 5 in the presence of UN Special
Representative Michael Moller. At the conclusion of the
three-hour gathering, Moller issued a terse statement
claiming the two men had conversed constructively, concurred
that "the process" needed to commence ASAP, and would reunite
"at an appropriate time" in the future. The leaders, too,
grabbed the microphones, with Papadopoulos first praising the
constructive tone of the meeting and assuring that further
contacts would occur. It was interlocutor Talat's insistence
in abandoning July 8 principles, the President argued, that
had prevented the leaders from reaching a real breakthrough,
however. Expectedly, Talat's comments differed dramatically.
The passage of time worked against a settlement, he
explained, and the sides' dithering had wasted fourteen
months. Talat had presented to Papadopoulos and Moller a
fast-track proposal in line with the spirit of July 8; Greek
Cypriots were not "psychologically prepared" for real
negotiations, he regretfully concluded.
¶2. (C) Media in both communities deemed the meeting a
substantive failure and expectedly placed blame on the other
sides' pigheadedness. Their arguments echoed those of key
political leaders on both sides: G/C editorials argued the
Turkish Cypriot leadership aimed to torpedo July 8 in hopes
of reviving the "undemocratic and doomed to fail" Annan Plan,
while T/C columnists disparaged Papadopoulos for seeking only
electoral gain, and not actual progress toward a settlement,
from the Gambari framework. We expect the President will
attempt to derive benefit from this meeting taking place, and
predict a Palace attempt to manage the timing and content of
future gatherings for maximum political bounce. As to Talat,
who so feared providing Papadopoulos that edge that he
seriously considered refusing the gathering, his proposal for
a time-limited preparations period leading to full-fledged
negotiations did not represent a complete abandonment of July
8, since he has been under significant international pressure
to live up to his earlier commitment to the agreement. He
still faces an uphill battle to convince the international
community, much less his counterparts across the Green Line,
of his seriousness toward the arrangement he and Papadopoulos
agreed to last year. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- --------
July 8 Agreement: One Step Up and...Three Steps Back
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶3. (C) For two years following the failed 2004 Annan Plan
referendum, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots engaged in a
unseemly blame game, and constructive engagement ground to a
halt. Few on either side expected much from the July 2006
visit of UN Political Under Secretary Ibrahim Gambari. The
UN official notched a notable victory, then, in brokering a
deal on July 8 that committed the communities to work toward
an eventual Cyprus solution by establishing working groups to
prepare the ground for settlement negotiations and technical
committees to tackle daily life issues (Ref C). Papadopoulos
and Talat also agreed to meet occasionally to review the work
of the bi-communal entities. Like much in Cyprus, however,
the devil was in the details -- and in the implementation.
For fourteen months after Gambari's departure, the impasse
continued and the blame game reached Olympic standards.
Despite each leader issuing invitations, for example, not a
single "summit" occurred, due mainly to Papadopoulos's
insistence that the groups and committees must first be up
and running. As to those bodies, despite dozens of meetings
of the tripartite coordination committee (Moller, plus
negotiators Tasos Tzionis and Rashit Pertev), the sides
failed to reach final agreement on their number, names,
composition, and terms of reference (Ref B).
¶4. (C) It soon became obvious the communities viewed the
July 8 agreement through different prisms, and sought to
implement it in varying degrees and speeds. To Papadopoulos,
the process represented an opportunity to bury the hated
Annan Plan, craft a solution "based on different principles,"
and shuck the "intransigent" label that neutral observers
believed he merited. Through Tzionis, the G/C side lobbied
NICOSIA 00000729 002 OF 004
to create a dozen working groups and committees whose agendas
were incredibly complex (one, "Governance," included nearly
sixty items, such as "study federal models currently used in
Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium"). Turkish Cypriots
immediately cried foul, claiming the tactics aimed to delay
the process indefinitely, a point shared by many in the
international community but ignored by most G/C media and
opinion leaders.
¶5. (C) Despite Talat signing his name last summer, he and
the other Turkish Cypriot leaders never knew quite how to
manage the July 8 process (on September 6, close advisor
Hasan Ercakica claimed the T/Cs had wanted something
different in July 2006 -- Papadopoulos to make public the
changes his side sought to the Annan Plan -- but they had
bowed to U.S., UK, and UN "pressure" and approved the
framework arrangement in a last-gasp attempt to spur movement
toward a final CyProb solution. A version closer to the
truth is that Talat made the July 8 agreement, then got
slapped by Ankara for reaching a deal that did not pay ritual
obeisance to the Annan Plan as the touchstone for all CyProb
diplomacy.) Frustrated by G/C go-slow tactics, the Turkish
Cypriots reacted with public statements and later, formal
letters, essentially seeking the abrogation of the process
and the immediate resumption of full-fledged negotiations.
In the arrangement they sought, the Annan Plan would provide
a basis for talks, which would feature international
arbitration and timetables. Greek Cypriots considered the
proposed changes complete non-starters.
-------------------------------------
Recent Events Bring Hope for Movement
-------------------------------------
¶6. (C) By late spring, few here believed any July 8 progress
was possible. Buoyed by his hard-line Cyprus Problem
strategy, Papadopoulos looked a shoo-in for reelection in
2008 and seemed unlikely to change tactics soon. North of
the Green Line, Talat, in the cross-hairs of the resident
Turkish military, facing a suddenly emboldened opposition,
and with his AKP supporters involved in their own battles at
home, was hamstrung from adopting a more flexible and/or
conciliatory position. Two developments portended a possible
unfreezing, however. Papadopoulos's governing coalition
ruptured in July, with one-time collaborator and AKEL General
Secretary Dimitris Christofias declaring his presidential
SIPDIS
candidacy. His re-election no longer assured, the President
suddenly faced the need to justify that his uncompromising
positions were bearing fruit. Talat derived benefit with
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's convincing win in July's Turkish
parliamentary elections. With the Turkish
nationalist/secularist parties' poor performance, his north
Cyprus opposition lost confidence and cohesion and the
military seemed to tone down its rhetoric, giving Talat some
room to maneuver. Talk around the water cooler changed to
the possibility the leaders might actually meet.
¶7. (C) Moller returned to Denmark for an August vacation,
but UNFICYP staff took advantage of the small opening and
pressed community representatives Tzionis and Pertev to
re-establish their coordination committee meetings. On
August 21, they gathered in Moller's offices. Evidently
under orders to say "yes," neither had an objection to the
leaders meeting September 5. Besides setting the date, the
two sides' representatives briefly discussed a broad agenda.
Tzionis reiterated points that Papadopoulos had made in his
July letter to Talat: the leaders must focus on
reinvigorating the barely-breathing July 8 process. Pertev
added "and focus as well on any/all other aspects of the
Cyprus Problem." UNFICYP sought to keep the gathering as
free-flowing as possible, deliberately avoiding mention of
any modality likely to cause either man to object or wrangle.
¶8. (C) A short burst of optimism quickly gave way to
reality, however, as the two communities voiced their aims
and redlines for the upcoming meeting. In the Turkish
Cypriot community, only Talat's CTP saw potential progress
stemming from the meeting, with General Secretary Omar
Kalyoncu telling us September 5 that "we always want to
negotiate, and never shy from a meeting. Let's see what this
one brings." Opposition figures adopted a more pessimistic,
even combative stance. Democratic Party (DP) Number 2
Ertugrul Hasipoglu the same day blasted Papadopoulos's
sincerity, claiming the President was unlikely to cede an
inch. "What will he want to discuss? Minority rights for
Turkish Cypriots? Osmosis? They'll never give up absolute
authority over the RoC, so what's the point?"
¶9. (U) Greek Cypriot media also downplayed the September 5
NICOSIA 00000729 003.2 OF 004
meeting's likelihood for success, focusing on "unreal"
Turkish Cypriot expectations. While Papadopoulos sought to
implement the July 8 agreement by establishing the envisaged
committees and working groups, Talat allegedly would seek
regular leaders' meeting regardless of progress at the
working level. In so doing, he would "downgrade the process
without burying it." Timetables and international
arbitration also topped Talat's wish list, G/C media claimed,
a recipe for further deadlock.
----------------------------------------
And They're Off...Sides Meet September 5
----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) UNFICYP had real fears that non-substantive
modalities, such as the order of arrival and flying of flags
on the leaders' limos, might derail the meeting. A flurry of
telephone diplomacy evidently resolved the tiffs, and the men
arrived at Moller's official residence the afternoon of
September 5. After three-plus hours, the SRSG emerged and
issued a short statement. "Constructive engagement" best
characterized the leaders' conversation, Moller claimed. The
two men had concurred that "the process" (not the July 8
process) must commence immediately, and had discussed other
topics related to a final CyProb settlement. Finally, Talat
and Papadopoulos had agreed to continue to meet under the
auspices of the United Nations, and would reunite at an
"appropriate time" to continue the talks.
¶11. (U) Upon returning to their respective HQs, the leaders
applied their spins. While the Greek Cypriot side had
insisted on a strict interpretation of the July 8 agreement
and its fundamental aim of "preparing the ground for future
negotiations," Papadopoulos asserted, Talat had proposed
deviations from the agreement that sought to minimize the
roles of the committees and working groups. Attempts by the
T/C side to speed the process would result only in reaching
dead-ends more quickly. The RoC President voiced his
intention, however, to continue meeting with Talat in hopes
of breaking the impasse, the end goal being a CyProb solution
"built on a different base." The passage of time reduced
hopes of finding a workable federal solution, Talat countered
publicly. Instead, he proposed "fast-track" preparations,
with a handful of committees deliberating key issues like
governance, security, and EU relations for a period of two
months. Afterward, the leaders would commence face-to-face
discussions aimed at a final solution. Explaining his
failure in winning Papadopoulos's buy-in for the re-worked
process, Talat claimed the G/C side was not psychologically
prepared to negotiate in earnest.
-----------------------------
Truth Somewhere in the Middle
-----------------------------
¶12. (C) UNFICYP Political Officer (and official notetaker)
Tim Alchin confirmed the leaders had behaved cordially and
professionally during the three-hour get-together, a positive
in itself. While expressing a common desire to move forward,
they had failed to agree on next steps, however. No
follow-up looked imminent, since Papadopoulos soon would
depart for New York and UNGA. Talat had focused on modifying
the process (his own words) by introducing the aforementioned
deadlines for the committee work. In his view, the fact that
14 months had passed without visible progress was proof the
"bottom-up" approach -- driven by the working-level groups --
could not successfully drive the negotiations. Talat also
sought Papadopoulos's commitment to aim for a solution by the
end of 2008.
¶13. (C) Conversely, Papadopoulos had lobbied for a stricter
following of the July 8 process and follow-on (November 2006)
Gambari bridging proposal. He rejected any and all fixed
timeframes, insisting that subsequent leaders' meetings
depended on progress at the working level. A 2008 solution
presented no problems to the President, but Papadopoulos
argued that Talat's two-month preparation period was
insufficient to tackle re-unification's numerous and complex
components. The minimalist statement Moller issued
characterized well the inability of the sides to reach any
real agreement, Alchin concluded.
----------------------------------------
Meeting to Prove Politically Beneficial?
----------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Embassy contacts within the G/C community were
unsure whether Papadopoulos would score electoral points from
the meeting. Polakis Sarris, who shepherded the President's
NICOSIA 00000729 004 OF 004
successful 2003 run and plays a similar part now, claimed it
was still too early to gauge its impact. If the public
perceived the process was leading nowhere, Papadopoulos might
even lose votes. He personally thought he could spin the
results positively, however. DIKO President Marios Karoyian,
a Papadopoulos protege who nonetheless has butted heads with
the President lately, called the September 5 gathering an
electoral non-event. If it led to progress in the
negotiations, Papadopoulos benefited, but if it failed, the
President would receive no blame. It was crystal-clear that
Talat deserved credit for the current impasse, Karoyian
reasoned, a "fact" the G/C electorate understood.
¶15. (C) "TRNC Spokesman" and Talat adviser Hasan Ercakica
confirmed that Talat had feared providing the hated
Papadopoulos an electoral boost by agreeing to the meeting.
Eventually, however, his "President" had determined that the
negatives of refusing the get-together outweighed the
negatives of boosting Papadopoulos's chances. While Turkish
Cypriots undoubtedly hoped Christofias or Ioannis Kasoulides
would unseat Papadopoulos in February, they saw a possible
backfire in attempting to influence the G/C elections, and
would "play our own game, not theirs" in the run-up.
Ercakica revealed Talat's unhappiness with the meeting's
outcome, and later argued that only a renewed U.S. or
"Western" push could dislodge the Greek Cypriots from their
hardened positions.
----------------
What Comes Next?
----------------
¶16. (C) COMMENT: While hesitant to rubbish the leaders'
meeting -- their first get-together in 14 months IS cause for
some rejoicing -- we're equally reluctant to claim it
represents much more than the first of a thousand steps. The
sides, after all, proved unable even to schedule a follow-on
meeting or issue a serious statement. In looking for
positives, we're left with Talat's latest plan for a handful
of working groups to tackle substantive issues over a
time-limited preparation phase. It would seem he received a
taste of reality, of what the Greek Cypriots, UN, and
international community might actually expect (in comparison,
his April 2007 letter to incoming UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon, in which
he sought immediate recommencement of full-fledged
negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan, complete with
strict timetables and international arbitration, won derision
from all parties.) We would hope Papadopoulos and company
give consideration to the proposal and seek changes that meet
their needs while also addressing Talat's.
¶17. (C) Much more likely is the President continuing to
insist on a stricter interpretation of the July 8 agreement,
seeking to control the negotiation's timing and progress for
maximum political gain. To that end, we expect Papadopoulos
to trumpet the leaders' meeting and "active political
process" at his UNGA speech in two weeks.
SCHLICHER