The
following case analysis is part of a regular series we publish to help you
broaden your knowledge of rulings of Georgia’s appellate courts that may
affect your practice. Remember: mediators should not give legal advice
or opinions.

When Does a
Child “Attend” Secondary School ?
The case of Draughn v. Draughn
highlights the ever-increasing influence of the Internet on the lives of
divorcing parties and their children. And it is an important ruling that
will assist you in helping custodial parents receive child support when
their children drop out of a conventional high school.

In Draughn, the child support order
obligated the father to support his son financially until the
son:

“reaches the age of eighteen … provided that if the child becomes 18
years old while enrolled in and attending a secondary school on a full
time basis, then the child support shall continue for said child until
he has graduated from secondary school or reaches the age of twenty,
whichever comes first.”

At trial, the father
asserted that his child support obligation had terminated because his
18-year-old son was taking online classes and thus no longer actually
“attending” school. Moreover, the father argued, even if his son had been
“attending” school, he wasn’t attending “full time” because he stopped
attending between June and August 2009. One question for the trial court
was whether the son could “attend” online classes for the purposes of
determining if child support was due. The trial court agreed with the
father, finding that it “does not find that an online class satisfies the
requirement of attend as per the agreed upon language in the child support
modification clause.” The court based its ruling in the case, however, on
its finding that even if the son was attending school, he was not
attending “full time,” as required by the child support order. Therefore,
the court ruled, the father should be released from his obligation to pay
child support for his son.

The Georgia Virtual School Of course, the mother appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, which
took up the trial court’s findings on the father’s two arguments. On the
issue of whether a child could “attend” school by taking online courses,
the Georgia Supreme Court made a critical finding – that O.C.G.A. §
20-1-319.1 authorized the Georgia State Board of Education to establish
the Georgia Virtual School, whereby students (age 21 or younger) may
enroll in state-funded courses via the Internet or in any other manner not
involving on-site interaction with a teacher.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled in Draughn that once a child
enrolls in approved online courses in an effort to graduate from secondary
school, his online participation constitutes “attending” school for the
purposes of extending child support beyond the child’s attainment of the
age of majority. The trial court had erred by finding otherwise, the
justices decided.

“Full-Time” School Attendance The Supreme Court then addressed the correctness of the trial court’s
finding that the son was not attending school “full time” because he
stopped taking online courses from June through August 2009.
As mediators, we know words affect meaning. Note that the phrase “full
time basis”in the Draughn child support agreement. One has
to wonder whose idea it was to use that language, because it cannot be
found in O.C.G.A.
§ 19-6-15 (e), the child support statute:

(e) Duration of child support responsibility. The duty
to provide support for a minor child shall continue until the child
reaches the age of majority, dies, marries, or becomes emancipated,
whichever first occurs; provided, however, that ... the court, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may direct either or both parents to provide
financial assistance to a child who has not previously married or become
emancipated, who is enrolled in and attending a secondary school, and who
has attained the age of majority before completing his or her secondary
school education, provided that such financial assistance shall not be
required after a child attains 20 years of age.

The Supreme Court found that neither the statute nor the Draughn
agreement required the son’s continuous attendance during the summer
months, but rather only his “full time” attendance in school. The court
cited one of its prior rulings to support its finding; In Bullard v.
Swafford, 279 Ga. 577, decided in 2005, the court defined “full time
student” as requiring “continuous attendance during the normal school
year.” In that case, the requirement that a child be a full-time student
did not entail his attendance in school during the summer months of a
normal school year.

Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the Draughn trial
court erred as a matter of law when it determined that the father’s child
support obligation ended simply because the child was not attending school
between June 2009 and August 2009 – the summer months of a normal school
year.

One cannot help but question what the decisions would have been if the son
had stopped “attending” during the winter, rather the summer months. And
there seems little doubt the justices were basing their ruling on the
law’s public policy of enforcing child support payments. In their
opinion, they discuss at length the General Assembly’s recognition of the
importance of a child completing a secondary education and the parental
responsibility to help a child reach that goal.

This case recognizes an expanding area that mediators should talk with
parties about, particularly in light of the fact that the Georgia Virtual
School has been authorized by the Georgia State Board of Education, and in
light of the Court’s ruling on public policy in Draughn, which
supports online education as a qualifying event for the continuation of
child support.

Also, make sure that the parties know that “secondary education” means
high school, not college. This seems to be a common point of confusion
for many parties.

Mary Ellen Cates is an attorney and registered mediator
in Avondale Estates, Ga. She has practiced domestic law exclusively
since 1985. A divorce mediator since 1998, she is also a domestic
arbitrator, and she has been appointed as special master for DeKalb
County Superior Court.