106. It is sometimes claimed that part of Turkey's
importance is the role that it can play as a bridge between Europe
and the Islamic world. The Foreign Secretary has spoken of Turkey's
"pivotal role".[120]
In fact, by taking a conscious decision to look westward since
the foundation of the Turkish republic, Turkey has in many ways
turned its back on the Middle East. Dr Philip Robins was dismissive
in his evidence to us of the notion that Turkey could act as a
bridge between Europe and the Middle East in more than a geographical
sense, telling us:

"personally I would tend to see the European
Union as a bridge for better relations between Turkey and Iran.
Turkey has always looked west, is very much oriented towards the
West, it has tried to keep out of Middle Eastern politics for
many years ... It does not particularly understand Middle Eastern
politics or Middle Eastern dynamics ... It is not comfortable
operating in those circumstances. I would say that the European
Union, or some European Union countries, have better relations
with Iran than Turkey has with Iran."[121]

107. Dr Robins was also dismissive of another frequently
raised idea, that Turkey is a model of democratic governance for
the region.[122] It
is certainly true, as the Foreign Secretary has said, that "Turkey
has been able to show ... that it is possible for there to be
a secular country, which represents 98% Muslims in its population".[123]
It was the view of David Barchard that "the difference between
Turkey and Syria, or the difference between Turkey and Iraq, or
even the difference between Turkey and Iran, is rather like the
difference between day and night."[124]

108. Dr Robins, on the other hand, has told us that
"Turkey is insufficiently democratic to parade a democratic
platform which fuses Islam and democracy, but on the other hand
... insufficiently inclusive in terms of the moderate Islamist
forces inside Turkey to have a credibility in the wider Muslim
world."[125] However
successful the Turkish model may have been in Turkey, other countries
in the region have so far shown no signs of interest in adopting
it themselves, and there are a number of indigenous factors which
make a transfer of Turkish experience unlikely.

109. Following the events of September 11 2001, and
the beginning of the global campaign against terrorism, in February
of this year the Turkish Government held a conference in Istanbul
of Foreign Ministers from the countries of the European Union
and of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), with
the aim of bringing together leaders from the Western and Islamic
worlds. This is precisely the sort of event that Turkey is ideally
placed to organise. What the Conference itself achieved is open
to question. The Foreign Secretary has said, perhaps sensing scepticism
in the air, that "not all conferences are useful, but I think
this one is",[126]
while an article in the Wall Street Journal on the conference
trailed with the by-line "A Muslim-European summit is short
on honesty and long on clichés".[127]
It seems that a number of bilateral meetings in the margins of
the conference were more productive. Providing a forum for impromptu
bilateral meetings is often the clearest benefit of such conferences.
The strong British delegation, led by the Foreign Secretary, which
attended the OIC, was commented on with much approval by those
we met in Turkey. We conclude that there is probably only a
limited extent to which Turkey can bring together Europe and the
Islamic world, but that it is well worth the effort of it trying
to do so.

110. According to Dr Malcolm Cooper, Turkey "appears
to switch erratically from the pursuit of European integration
to attempts to become a regional Asian power".[128]
Whether or not Turkey is well-placed to bridge the divide between
Europe and the Islamic world, it is certainly the case that Turks
have day-to-day personal and trading contacts with their eastern
and southern neighboursSyria, Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgiato
a much greater extent than Europeans do. Turkey also has a special
relationship with the new republics of the Caucasus and Central
Asia, in many of which languages are spoken which are closely
related to Turkish. The one neighbour with which Turkey seems
to have truly negative relations is Armenia, mainly because of
a long-running dispute over whether a genocide of ethnic Armenians
was committed by Ottoman Turks in 1915.[129]
We experienced during our visit the extreme emotion that this
dispute arouses within Turkey, emotion which is quite incomprehensible
to us as outsiders, given how long ago these events took place.
We recommend that the Government should encourage Turkey to build
good relations with all its neighbours, and to view improved partnerships
with both the European Union and Asia as two mutually complementary

111. Most of the heroin used in the United Kingdom
passes through Turkey.[130]
This does not appear to be due to laxity on the part of the Turkish
authorities. To a great extent it "is simply the map",
a factor of Turkey's geographical position.[131]
Dr Philip Robins told us that until recently the British Government
was very critical of the Turkish authorities' failure to act effectively
against the illegal drugs trade, but that over the last two years
there has been a great improvement.[132]
Certainly, in its evidence to us, the FCO makes much of British-Turkish
counter-drugs co-operation.[133]

112. Since 1994, the British Government has spent
more than £1 million on bilateral counter-drugs assistance
to Turkey.[134] If
this has made it more difficult for heroin to reach Europe, it
is hard to think of money that has been better spent. We recommend
that the Government continue to place a very high priority on
counter-drugs co-operation with Turkey.

113. There is a danger that if Turkey's hopes of
EU accession fade, its programme to take action against illegal
drugs may lose urgency. Because there is very little use of hard
drugs within Turkey, preventing such drugs from entering the country
is not a high domestic priority.[135]
Philip Robins has told us that Turkish officials are under the
impression that successful co-operation against hard drugs may
offset shortcomings in other respects as far as Turkey's EU candidacy
is concerned,[136]
and that there might therefore be a cost in terms of this co-operation
if Turkey's candidacy stalls.[137]
We conclude that while Turkey's efforts to combat the illegal
drugs trade should certainly be taken into account when assessing
progress on Turkey's EU candidacy, linking the two too closely
could mean that if Turkey's EU candidacy stalls, so might co-operation
against illegal drugs. We therefore recommend that the Government
should look for incentives which are unconnected to Turkey's prospects
for EU accession which could be used to encourage the Turkish
authorities to maintain their vigour in acting against the illegal
drugs trade.

114. Much of the heroin that passes through Turkey
is brought from Iran. Philip Robins has drawn to our attention
the low level of co-operation between Turkey and Iran in combatting
the hard drugs trade. According to Dr Robins, this is because
the Iranian anti-drugs effort is directed at combatting the high
levels of heroin abuse in Iran, and therefore at limiting the
flow of heroin into Iran, not out of it. We agree with
Dr Robins that "there is a lot of potential ... for trying
to bring about closer co-operation between the Turkish and Iranian
governments to the benefit of both parties and of course ultimately
to the benefit of all of us."[138]
We recommend that the Government should use its good relations
with both the Turkish and Iranian authorities in the fight against
illegal drugs to encourage the two countries to co-operate in
this field. We further recommend that the Government should consider
making funds available to assist in such co-operation.

115. It is often, as Dr William Hale recognises,
hard to distinguish the United Kingdom's bilateral relations with
Turkey from the two countries' multilateral relations within NATO
and through the EU.[139]
There are some individual areas of bilateral significance on which
we have recommendations to make, relating to visas, encouraging
Turkish students to the United Kingdom and ministerial visits.
But there is also a more general point. The United Kingdom is
well placed to assist Turkey's EU candidacy. Many of the concerns
that Turkey has about joining the EU are shared or have been shared
by the United Kingdom. Turkey is by no means the only country
to have had doubts about whether full membership of every aspect
of the EU is compatible with its sovereignty and with the sort
of country that it aspires to be. Moreover, the United Kingdom,
like Turkey, has suffered an indigenous terrorist threat. Both
countries have been shaped by this ordeal, and both have experiences
that they can share. We conclude that the United Kingdom, as
a committed but not uncritical member of the European Union, is
in a particularly good position not only to show understanding
for Turkey where it has concerns about the potential impact of
the EU accession process, but also to play an important part in
allaying these concerns, where this is possible.

117. We discussed the visa operation with the British
Consul-General in Istanbul, and we have sought further information
from the FCO.[142]
The FCO has identified a serious problem with visa applications
requiring a second interview and with applications for settlement.
The majorityabout 78 per centof visa applications
are straightforward, and of these 99 per cent are processed within
24 hours of receipt. More complicated applications require a second
interview. In December 2001 the average waiting time for a second
interview was 104 days, as against a best practice target of 10
days. We assume that applications in this category have been the
main cause of complaint. Many people apply for a visa to visit
the United Kingdom for a specific event within a specific timeframe.
Even if they are granted a visa after 104 days have passed, this
will often simply be too late for them to use it.

118. A review in January 2002 of the visa operation
in Istanbul by the Joint Entry Clearance Unit made a number of
recommendations for reform, most of which have now been implemented.
In March 2002, the waiting time for a second interview stood at
76 days, a definite improvement on the figure of three months
earlier, but still far too long, as the FCO accepts.[143]
There also seems to have been an improvement in management of
the visa operation, and consequently in staff morale, which we
hope will have a positive effect on customer relations.

119. We take very seriously our remit, which includes
not only the policy, but also the administration and expenditure
of the FCO. Entry clearance officers carry out highly pressured
and important work which receives little recognition. One of the
reasons why it is so important is that it can effect, for good
or for ill, the United Kingdom's image abroad, particularly among
the population at large. We conclude that work by the FCO to
improve service delivery at the visa operation in Istanbul appears
slowly to be having positive results, but that there is still
some way to go before targets for second interviews will be met.
We intend to keep this situation under review, and we recommend
that the Government in its response to this report keep us updated
on progress towards meeting these targets.

121. We heard during our visit to Turkey that the
poor reputation of the British visa-issuing service in Istanbul
was discouraging Turkish students from applying to study in the
United Kingdom. Hopefully, as the visa operation improves it will
leave this reputation behind it. The actual percentage of student
applications refused, at 16 per cent in 2001, while considerably
higher than the global refusal rate, also indicates that a very
large proportion of student visa applications are accepted.[146]
The delay at second interview stage is evidently as much a barrier
as rejection for Turks hoping to attend English-language courses
in the United Kingdom at relatively short notice.

122. Chevening scholarships are awarded by the FCO
to outstanding overseas graduates for post-graduate study in the
United Kingdom. The amount of money available to fund Turkish
graduates has been almost halved in recent years, from £854,360
in 1999-2000 to £450,291 in 2001-02. This is largely a result
of the reallocation of funds within the Wider Europe command to
Russia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo).
While we understand the point made by a witness from the FCO that
"this is simply a hard choice we are having to make in straitened
budgetary times between a variety of very worthy countries",[147]
we regard it as extremely unfortunate that Turkey should have
lost out to such an extent just as it became a candidate for membership
of the EU. Chevening scholarships help to build personal links
between high-flying young Turkish peoplepossibly the leaders
of the futureand the United Kingdom. Given the importance
of Turkey, and given that every encouragement of pro-British and
pro-European sentiment in that country must be welcome, we believe
that shifting Chevening allocations from Turkey to eastern Europe
was very much a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul. We recommend
that the Government find a means of raising Chevening allocations
to Turkey to their former level, either by the redistribution
of available funds or by applying to the Treasury for an increased
total allocation in the next public expenditure round.

123. Turkey will shortly begin participation in the
European Union's SOCRATES programme, which will give Turkish students
far easier access to higher education in other EU member states.
This makes it all the more important, if the United Kingdom is
to attract the best and brightest Turkish students, that the barriers
to such students coming to the United Kingdom are no greater than
they are for other EU member states. We are pleased to see the
reassurance from the Foreign Secretary that the Government works
in close partnership with the European Commission, and that they
aim to have "coherent and mutually reinforcing" programmes.[148]

124. The other side of this coin is of course British
interest, or lack of it, in Turkey. David Barchard has written
of the "striking poverty of Turkish studies in the UK and
paucity of well-informed work about the country".[149]
Professor Clement Dodd notes that "six of the ten or so specialists
in this field are either well into retirement or on the point
of retiring".[150]
Dr Philip Robins has suggested "greater funding for Turkish
studies in the UK and more money for research on Turkey and for
joint projects with Turkish institutions".[151]
We are not in a position to judge the extent of this problem,
but there does seem to be a startlingly limited understanding
of Turkey in the United Kingdom. We recommend that the Government
examine ways of encouraging an increased interest in Turkey in
the United Kingdom, and of building links between British and
Turkish educational institutions to promote mutual understanding.

125. There are about 250,000 people of Turkish origin
living in the United Kingdom. They have, as David Barchard notes,
"strikingly failed to develop notable spokesmen". [152]
Nonetheless, they constitute a resource which should not be ignored
in promoting personal, business, cultural and other bilateral
contacts. We recommend that the Government consider ways of
involving the Turkish population in the United Kingdom in projects
to enhance British-Turkish relations at the level of civic society.

"if we can get our presentation in order
... it will certainly provide a much better context in which we
can go at some of these problems together in a low-key and businesslike
sort of way. I think a regular stream of high level visitors really
did serve the United States extremely well here and that is precisely
the sort of thing that has never really happened with the European
Union. Jacques Delors never visited Turkey, for instance. I think
Robin Cook spent four hours in Turkey during his term as Foreign
Secretary. Tony Blair has not visited Turkey even though I think
he is interested in Turkey ... High level visits of this kind,
even if they are only vacations with a little bit of official
business tagged on at the end, would mean an awful lot and would
certainly play very well."[155]

127. We are pleased that the Foreign Secretary has
visited Turkey, and that he attaches so much importance to the
personal relationships that he has forged there.[156]
Given the quantity of foreign travel undertaken by the Prime Minister
in recent months, much of it connected with the campaign against
terrorism, we are somewhat surprised that he has not visited Turkey.
Given Turkey's size and importance both as a strategic ally and
as a trading partner, given its EU candidacy and its role in the
campaign against terrorism, we believe that such a visit is overdue.

128. Committees often recommend that a Government
minister should visit a country which they have recently visited
themselves, and this can devalue the currency of such recommendations.
Turkey, however, is a country in which presentation and personal
relationships mean much. The simple fact of a visit by the Prime
Minister to Turkey could in our view achieve a great dealmuch
more than would be possible by a visit to most other parts of
the world. We conclude that a visit by the Prime Minister would
be well received in Turkey and could be of much benefit not only
to the United Kingdom's bilateral relations with Turkey, but also
to the multilateral relations which the British Government is
keen for Turkey to foster.