以往談及公司治理，研究主軸多傾向公司績效，本研究意圖將公司治理與財務危機連結以探討1、當企業有效執行公司治理規範時，是否得以降低財務危機發生的機率。2、公司治理對於財務危機是否具有預測效果。本研究擬排除特殊金融證劵業後，以所有上市（櫃）公司為研究對象且研究期間為2003-2010年。實證結果發現，一、獨立董監事占董事會席次比例愈低、董事會規模愈高、董監事股權質押比率愈高、董監事股權質押權責偏離程度愈大、資訊揭露程度愈為薄弱、會計師選任愈不嚴謹，企業在未來三年內落入財務危機的機率愈高。二、董事長兼任總經理與否對財務危機的影響會受到總經理持股比率所干擾。三、本研究後續分析中發現：1、董事會愈活絡，愈不容易落入財務危機；但當董事會過於活絡將愈容易落入財務危機。2、在董事長兼任總經理狀況下，隨著總經理持股比率增加會因利益共存而降低公司發生財務危機。3、如以公司治理指標為基礎，觀察財務危機發生的機率（單一年度觀察，即指後一年、後兩年、後三年），本研究擬出這三項單一年度的共同指標，如獨立董監事比率愈低、董監事股權質押權責偏離程度愈高與會計師選任嚴謹度愈差，企業落入財務危機的機率愈高。Studies usually focus on the mechanism of corporate governance and its effect on corporate performance. This study intends to link corporate governance and its effect on financial crisis, we discuss: 1. Will the probability of financial crisis reduced by performing effective corporate governance? 2. Whether corporate governance can be a predicting factor of financial crisis? The sample includes all listed (OTC) companies but excludes financial / securities industry due to their characteristic. The empirical evidence is collected from 2003 to 2010, showing that: First, low proportion of independent directors and supervisors, large board size, high ratio of directors and supervisors'' pledging shares, high right diverges from duty of pledging directors and supervisors'' shares, low extent of information disclosure, less rigorous of the electing of external auditor, may increase the probability for corporation to fall into financial crisis within three years. Second, the general manager''s shareholding ratio has intervention effect in the relationship between the duality identities of general manager/director to financial crisis. Third, through sensitivity analysis, we found: 1. There is an inverted U-shaped relation between board''s activity and financial crisis. 2. If the duality identities of general manager/director exit, the probability of financial crisis will be reduced through increasing shareholding rate of the general manager. 3. This research identified three common corporate governance variables, such as the low proportion of independent directors and supervisors, high right diverges from duty of pledging directors and supervisors'' shares, and less rigorous of the electing of external auditor can be signals of corporate financial crises.