The ACRI Command and Control Challenge

SCOTT E. BROWER and ANNA SIMONS

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was
launched in 1996. Its aim has been to help develop African countries' capabilities
to keep the peace on the continent. Having grown out of the international
community's reluctance to intervene in the genocide and fighting in Rwanda
in 1994, ACRI's existence tacitly acknowledges that the United States is
unable and unlikely to intervene everywhere. However, this does not mean
the United States will not support such efforts undertaken by others. Indeed,
US funding of ACRI is proof that the United States is willing to offer
certain incentives and assistance to African countries to step into the
breach. This has been most recently demonstrated by the deployment of US
Special Forces to Nigeria to train Nigerian peacekeepers for deployment
in Sierra Leone.

Currently, ACRI is funded only through Fiscal Year 2001. What happens
beyond that time will depend on several factors. One is the US presidential
election (which has not yet taken place at this writing). Depending on
who assumes office in 2001, there may be a shift in American foreign policy.
Another issue which is likely to affect future support for ACRI is the
performance of the African countries that have already received US training
(Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire). For instance,
the Cote d'Ivoire military recently staged a coup. Will the US Congress
continue to look favorably upon an initiative whose participants have engaged
in such anti-democratic behavior? Or, if the countries which have received
training do not step up to the plate and volunteer for peacekeeping and
humanitarian relief operations, will American taxpayers continue to support
the idea that this is a worthwhile program? Why train countries to a capability
they are then unwilling to use or, worse, too willing to misuse?

Why Support ACRI?

Despite questions such as these--and this article will raise more--the
reasons to continue to support ACRI are compelling. In an ideal world,
the desire to provide humanitarian assistance should be reason enough.
But the United States also has a self-interest in promoting regional stability
efforts in Africa. More than 16 percent of the oil used in the United States
comes from Africa, with some experts predicting that "oil imports
from Africa could surpass those from the Persian Gulf by 2010."[1]
Plenty of other strategic minerals also stream out of Africa, as do a range
of profitable raw materials, from diamonds to timber and gold to rubber.
In fact, fighting over control of these natural assets is the reason for
most of the continent's conflicts. To put it even more bluntly, if there
were no corporate buyers fewer battles would be fought.

Without question, transnational syndicates of all kinds manage to profit
despite (and arguably because of) rampant corruption and instability in
Africa. US citizens, in stark contrast, do not. Narco-traffickers and terrorists
have increasingly found safe havens in countries like Nigeria and Sudan.
Diseases that no one had heard of two decades ago now threaten people just
a plane ride away. Americans can try to bury their heads in the sand and
presume that their modernity offers sufficient protection from such dangers.
But family members of the victims of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy
bombings would rightfully argue otherwise. And just the name "West
Nile fever" should serve as a wake-up call.

Yet those committed to bettering conditions in Africa have tried to
prick the consciences and scare sense into the American public by sounding
similar alarms for years. Theirs remains a Sisyphean task.[2] Whatever
American goodwill there was toward Africans in the aggregate dissipated
in Somalia. Also, truth be told, there isn't enough of a political constituency
in the United States to support expansive peacekeeping efforts in Africa--which
also explains the development of ACRI.[3] In many regards, ACRI represents
the living, breathing embodiment of the American national ambivalence.
Standing it up is an admission that the United States is unlikely to commit
forces to Africa in the face of future unrest--US forces are already stretched
too thin, Africa has too much unrest. Yet because the United States is
the world's sole remaining superpower, US leaders feel a responsibility
to do something to help Africa relieve its many conflicts and problems.
Thus ACRI embodies the US desire to train Africans to keep the peace among
themselves.

As a consequence of the US ambivalence toward Africa, however, not even
ACRI's future is secure. Critics of the program can correctly point to
a number of shortcomings. Also, the sudden decision to train Nigerian soldiers
outside the scope of ACRI will no doubt raise a number of questions among
those who have signed on for what has been touted as a multilateral effort.
The real problem ACRI's existence presents, however, is that not just the
United States has committed to it. Numerous African countries have put
their faith and trust in the United States to support this initiative over
the long haul. It is hard to imagine how it can now be bypassed or discontinued
without repercussions.

At best one might say we Americans have a spotty record when it comes
to long-term commitments to those who regard themselves as US allies. Yet
increasingly the United States relies on international coalitions whenever
and wherever it seeks to intervene abroad. Making the most of ACRI can
help the United States prove it will uphold its end of such bargains, and
could even help in striking more of them. Or, consider: if the United States
could empower others so that they not only want to, but can, achieve regional
stabilization in the face of state collapse and ethnic strife, the United
States and its allies could realize tremendous benefits at minimal cost
from such a contribution to the "shaping" strategy. Achieving
stability is, after all, a pressing need, and not just in Africa. At the
moment, one could argue (as did many world leaders at the UN's Millennium
summit) that this goal represents the greatest challenge of the 21st century.
Certainly, if unaddressed, that is what it is likely to become.

The Command and Control Challenge

To nip destabilization in the bud, then, would seem to require programs
like ACRI. However, even with the initial training iterations having been
completed at the battalion level, ACRI as a whole has yet to be put together.
As a capability it remains incomplete. Intended as it is to be multinational
in nature, major questions still loom: How will battalions be called up?
Who will call them up? How will they be supplied? Who will command them?
It seems vital that answers be found to these and other unresolved issues
before there can be a first deployment. Each one of these issues, meanwhile,
is thorny. Take, for instance, the business of command and control (the
subject of the bulk of this article). For ACRI to have a fighting chance,
this aspect had better be addressed sooner rather than later.

Timing is itself a critical factor. Current responses to crises in Africa
are reactive rather than proactive. Rwanda demonstrated just how quickly
800,000 people can be murdered--in less than four months. Too often it
takes longer than that to even agree to, let alone deploy, peacekeeping
forces. Many factors can be cited to explain away the lack of effective
responsiveness on the part of the UN and other actors, but the real lesson
to be drawn is that if nations are unwilling to provide troops, money,
and timely logistical help, no multinational force can be constituted,
let alone committed. As Secretary General Kofi Annan has acknowledged,
this is the principal stumbling block for the UN.[4]

That is why additional steps need to be taken to promote the maturation
of the kind of peacekeeping mechanism which ACRI, at least conceptually,
promises. We might accept NATO as the exemplar of a well-established international
organization, with an elaborate command and control structure already in
place, but even NATO requires considerable time to decide whether and how
to act and react. This is in part because a consensus must be built prior
to action, and consensus-building always takes time. Europe is also fortunate,
however, in that NATO is institutionalized. Africa has nothing remotely
comparable. While the Organization of African Unity (OAU) does have a Crisis
Management Center, this body has proven to be largely ineffective in solving
the types of disputes that would call for peacekeepers. Not designed to
undertake such operations, the OAU nonetheless now finds itself in a situation
where it may be asked to do so. In large measure this is because the OAU
is the only overarching organization on the continent with a presence in
all member states.

One question worth pondering, then, is whether an effective command
and control (C2) node for peacekeeping should be established under OAU
auspices, assuming one should be established at all. If the United States
is truly serious about helping African countries develop their peacekeeping
capabilities, a C2 node must be established somewhere. Otherwise, the likelihood
that a multinational coalition could gather itself quickly is doubtful.

Why C2 Matters

As poor as communications are within most African countries, they are
even less reliable between them. For instance, in 1996 the Botswana Defence
Force (BDF) invited contingents from Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi, and Lesotho
to participate in training as part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Flintlock
exercise series. The BDF received confirmation from Namibia, Malawi, and
Lesotho. But as the exercise began, the Lesotho group still had not appeared,
while the Mozambicans showed up at the border unannounced.[5] Once under
way, the training proceeded relatively smoothly, but getting it started
turned out to be difficult, and this is just one example of the kind of
trouble that often can't be avoided at the sub-regional level during a
training exercise. There is no reason to believe that the situation would
improve at the regional level during a crisis.

Compounding communications difficulties are transportation nightmares.
In many parts of the continent road and rail networks may exist. But they
also might be in disrepair. This means some areas will be isolated and
unreachable by vehicle or train. Even if locations can be reached, the
length of time required to get there can be prohibitive. In such cases,
when time is of the essence or the area is simply too difficult to traverse
on the ground, the mission may require airlift, a capability which will
likely have to come from the United States or Europe. Again, this will
require time, especially if none of the arrangements are in place and nothing
has been institutionalized--or even considered--prior to a crisis.

Having a C2 node up and functioning could, at the very least, mitigate
some of these problems by ensuring that certain basic contingencies would
be planned for. Timely decisions could be made more easily at the outset
since critical personnel would already be together. Additionally, participating
in an established C2 cell would mean that members from different countries
would become more familiar with each other, reducing the likelihood of
potential misunderstandings and miscommunications. This would certainly
assist in the consensus-building process. It would also reduce the ability
of one hegemonic power to take unilateral action or domineer.

A Permanent C2 Cell

With a centrally located C2 cell established on a permanent or semipermanent
basis, data could be centrally stored and updated. Pertinent data might
include the location of units available for peacekeeping duty; a record
of their prior peacekeeping experience; contact information; and lists
of potential commanders, liaisons, and interpreters.

One critical area that a permanent C2 body would be better suited to
address than any other entity would be in determining which countries should
constitute the peacekeeping or humanitarian relief force, depending on
such variables as where the crisis occurs and who is deployed elsewhere.
Often, every country that volunteers for service is needed. But heads of
state seldom act selflessly. Political leaders are likely to commit forces
only if they feel they have something to gain. This is to be expected.
But what isn't acceptable is intervention in order to interfere in a dispute.
US, UN, and other officials who are not steeped in local and regional politics
may not be able to adequately screen potential participants for their ulterior
motives. Ideally, a professional C2 node would have its own stake in ensuring
that an operation be well-conceived from the outset.

Although early on in the discussion phase of ACRI it was determined
that a standing force not be established, this does not preclude the need
for a standing C2 element. In fact, the lack of a ready force only accentuates
the need for a permanent coordinating body. Again, where such a node should
be located is a matter for debate. Founded in 1963, the OAU has long-established
credibility as an international organization, with regional offices in
Maputo, Lusaka, and Luanda, along with headquarters in Addis Ababa and
an office near the UN headquarters in New York. Unfortunately, the OAU
has yet to live up to what many regard as its potential. Instead, as William
Thom recently noted, its inaction encourages the development of subregional
groupings.[6]

Subregional groups themselves pose a challenge for ACRI. Almost by definition,
subregional economic unions like the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), which then generate military branches (like the Economic
Community's Monitoring Group, ECOMOG), are interested in unrest within
their areas. Whether or not they start off as neutral or impartial participants,
soldiers sent in by subregional organizations rarely have the training
or wherewithal to stop a conflict in short order, while the longer they
are involved the more embroiled they become in the political, social, and
economic nuances. Subregional organizations also tend to be dominated by
subregional powers, as has been the case with Nigeria in ECOMOG, or South
Africa in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). ACRI offers
an antidote since, in theory, units from one part of the continent could
be sent to keep the peace in a region where they have no local interests.
This would presumably alter the incentives for all involved. It would also,
though, require considerable logistical coordination--requiring, again,
a permanent C2 node.

The Institutionalization Challenge

How to institutionalize a C2 cell is not the only aspect of ACRI's command
and control structure which requires further consideration. Several levels
of what is still an inchoate structure merit attention if ACRI is to ever
prove to be more than the sum of a series of disparate parts. These levels
range from the tactical to the strategic, and while it is vital to ensure
that a workable command and control structure exists at all levels, each
presents its own particular set of challenges.

At the battalion level, command and control should be relatively easy
to structure. In most instances, countries will deploy and operate as organic
elements. This allows each military to use its own command and control
techniques and procedures. The ACRI training program currently addresses
leadership and staff training at this level. Where training lags is at
the next level--that of the brigade--where, not surprisingly, real coordination
dilemmas are bound to occur.

Several different models for command and control structures at the brigade
level are possible, any of which might prove suitable depending on the
particular nature of the mission. Because of such uncertainties it makes
little sense to lock in a set structure ahead of time. Instead, decisions
about which specific brigade command and control structure to adopt should
probably be deferred until the mission has been approved, units committed,
and a commander designated. Even so, certain factors can be taken into
account in the training of C2 elements, and should be presented as factors
worthy of leadership consideration.

For instance, the current ACRI brigade training plan of instruction
places emphasis on staff responsibilities and interactions with nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). This is
important since there is bound to be a humanitarian concern in any peacekeeping
mission. But other vital areas for ensuring harmony across the operational
landscape often receive short shrift. Five factors in particular are discussed
below. Not each of these factors is likely to surface in every deployment,
but all will likely appear over the course of numerous deployments, and
any one could undo a mission. In light of many of the challenges that have
plagued peacekeeping operations in the past, brigade-level leaders must
learn to take each of these into account and make the right assessments
before the first battalion deploys.

• Composition of forces. The brigade commander
may have little choice about the forces provided to him, but he must still
take into account their composition. He must determine whether units assigned
to him have ethnic or cultural ties to any of the warring factions. He
must also know whether existing animosities are present among the peacekeeping
forces themselves.

Given the population dislocations generated throughout Africa by conflict,
famine, and urbanization, as well as deep-seated patterns of labor migration,
soldiers might well carry different passports or wear different uniforms
but practice the same customs and possess the ability to speak the same
language as people from a different country. This can present a commander
with distinct advantages, but it also can cause potential problems in terms
of maintaining unit integrity.

In the best of circumstances, successful peacekeeping requires a great
deal of finesse. A commander needs to be able to read people and not just
terrain. Presuming that he is honest about his own attitudes, it is vital
that he make every effort to discern those of his subordinates in order
to achieve harmony within his organization. This is not only the arena
in which he had better be able to exert control, of course, but the more
controlled, responsible, and professional he can keep the actions of the
peacekeepers, the likelier it is that locals will respond in kind. To achieve
and thus project harmony, a commander might separate forces he suspects
will not get along by segregating them geographically or by assigning them
different, non-overlapping missions. Alternatively, he may find himself
better off emphasizing commonalities or interpersonal ties in order to
forge stronger inter-battalion or even civil-military bonds.

In other words, the significance of recognizing ethnic and cultural
fault lines, and the degree to which these may cross national boundaries,
cannot be overstated. To be able to prevent detrimental enmities from surfacing,
a commander needs prior knowledge not just about the country from which
a peacekeeping battalion hails, but more detailed, sociological information
about the soldiers comprising his constituent battalions.

•Composition of staff. The ability of a
commander to make correct judgments will depend largely on the composition
of his staff. Since it is unlikely for him to have detailed personal knowledge
regarding the capabilities and limitations of the various contingents available
to him, he will have to rely on his staff for their assessments. It is
therefore crucial, both for his sake and for the sake of the contingents,
that each of the contingents is well represented at the brigade level.

Yet, as important as it is that a staff be composite (and sometimes
transparently so), this in and of itself creates a new set of challenges.
It will inevitably take some time for the various staff members to learn
to work together cohesively. Also, from the contingents' point of view,
a composite staff will be expected to act in a more representative manner
than would a staff dominated by the commander's own people. As a result,
there will be a greater need for consensus-building rather than unilateral
decisionmaking if the expectations of all of the constituent units are
to be fulfilled. In the long run this should prove beneficial, since each
contingent will feel that its point of view has been taken into consideration.
But initially this could generate the kinds of difficulties which a sensitized
commander would be well-positioned to preempt.

•Filling all staff positions. In building
such a staff, all positions should be filled. This includes positions such
as that of the Public Affairs Officer, for example. The Public Affairs
Officer may well prove to be one of the staff's most important members,
since he or she is often perfectly positioned to help foster goodwill and
support at home. Yet few African countries have a well-trained public affairs
element. ACRI should consider ways to redress this shortcoming.

•Civil-military relations. In the realm
of civil-military relations more generally, the ACRI training plan has
devoted considerable attention to the need for peacekeepers to be able
to work with external agencies such as humanitarian relief organizations,
NGOs, and PVOs, as well as with civilians from the sponsoring body who
are responsible for financial oversight of the mission. However, thus far
there has been no consideration for the role of civilian police, even though
this is one asset that time and again has proven absolutely critical to
success in peacekeeping.

There are several reasons why this aspect of keeping the peace has been
neglected. One has to do with the legal ramifications of US military personnel
training civilian police forces. But even if local civilian police are
restricted from participating in the training, there may be other ways
to bridge this gap. For instance, key members of various police agencies
could be invited to attend ACRI training as observers. At the same time,
ACRI training should, at a minimum, include information about the historical
use of civilian police units in peacekeeping operations. This would assist
the military force commander to better understand how he should properly
engage with (or engage) civilian police. As with NGOs and PVOs, civilian
police forces are bound to appear on the scene if they are not already
present.

•Liaisons. Another lesson learned from
previous peacekeeping operations concerns the indispensability of liaisons.
US doctrine considers the use of liaisons critical in multinational operations.
A peacekeeping operation that employs ACRI-trained battalions could well
wind up with troops from countries as far removed as Senegal and Botswana,
with all of their attendant linguistic, ethnic, religious, and other differences
compounding those inherited from two very different sets of military traditions.
It should not be assumed that just because all of the forces deployed are
African, battalions will have anything more in common than the supplies
and training that ACRI has provided. Thus, liaisons are important. Their
selection and positioning should be addressed at the highest levels of
command for each mission.

While commanders are invariably hesitant about allowing their best people
to be pulled away, it is vital that every liaison be someone who has his
commander's full confidence and the authority to speak on his behalf. Liaisons
must also have sufficient rank to ensure that wherever they are positioned
they will be listened to. US doctrine states that the senior liaison should
be equal in rank to the gaining element's operations officer.[7] This grants
the liaison the ability to keep his commander informed of all actions that
pertain to, or could possibly affect, his unit, along with assisting the
gaining commander and his staff in learning as much as possible about the
capabilities and limitations of the unit the liaison represents.[8] The
fact that there is no set rule for where liaisons should be located offers
commanders considerable flexibility in assigning them where they are most
needed. In multinational operations, usual locations are with other contingents,
various government agencies, NGOs and PVOs, and international organizations.[9]

Although the topic of liaisons is addressed in the ACRI battalion level
plan of instruction, the focus is (again) on conducting liaison operations
with NGOs and PVOs. There is no mention of liaison operations between various
headquarters or contingents. There would be immeasurable benefits, however,
in their inclusion at all levels.[10]

Conclusions

Ensuring that liaisons are more effectively incorporated is suggestive
of the approach those steering ACRI should now take if the program is to
have any chance of success. At the moment, ACRI remains an initiative.
Its aim is to provide battalions with a capability. The United States is
not helping Africa form a peacekeeping body or field a peacekeeping force
per se. Even if it were, Americans could not unilaterally configure a command
and control node. Nor could the United States dictate which international
body should oversee a credible, permanent command and control cell. However,
without a plan for how to establish such an element, the efforts of all
military units, no matter how well trained, are likely to prove worthless.
Given the fact that battalions comprising a multinational force will be
drawn from different (and not necessarily compatible) militaries, a controlling
element must be in place to ensure mutual cooperation. Without some preconceived,
easy-to-adopt method of coordination, even the best-intentioned forces
are all too likely to go astray.

ACRI provides the United States a perfect opportunity to nudge participants
(and others) toward this next phase of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief
management. Although a popular current view is that Africans must solve
Africa's problems, any assumption that Africans would have a better understanding
than Americans of the coordination issues raised by multinational peacekeeping
operations in Africa is mistaken. Africa contains more than 50 countries
stretching over a land mass that is more than three times the size of the
continental United States. Africa is unbelievably diverse. This diversity
itself will likely render peacekeeping efforts contentious, if not touch
and go. Thus there is a need to build up those elements that will foster
cross-cultural, multinational, and inter-battalion cooperation.

The US military has substantial experience with combined operations.
We should share that expertise, just as our expertise in peacekeeping techniques
and procedures, with those African countries that are willing to commit
a portion of their forces to train to keep the peace. This would be particularly
helpful since it is often a lack of trust, cooperation, and a shared sense
of responsibility that leads to conflict in the first place.

Working to make cooperative operations a reality in Africa also would
help allay the concerns of critics of ACRI who worry that "security
assistance and training provided by the United States will strengthen the
government's resolve to use military solutions and thereby influence domestic
political outcomes."[11] While the United States can never guarantee
that the forces it trains won't be misused, the more collective ACRI can
be made to be and the more integrated and professional its command and
control structure, the greater will be the commitment of its constituent
battalions to peacekeeping. This, ultimately, is what ACRI should be shooting
for, both so Americans don't have to deploy to an African hot zone, and
so Africans can but perhaps one day will no longer need to.

2. See, for instance, Jeffrey Goldberg's 2 March 1997 New York Times
Magazine article, "Our Africa," in which he strives to appeal
to American self-interest regarding narco-trafficking, terrorism, and what
he calls "biological national-security issues: environmental destruction,
explosive population growth, the rapid spread of disease and the emergence
of entirely new diseases" (p. 35).

3. Although, as Mora McLean recently pointed out in an op-ed piece in
The Washington Post (27 August 2000), "Fully 13 percent of
Americans trace their lineage to Africa and derive an important part of
their personal identity from this association" which could be taken
to represent a political constituency, a strong, coherent lobbying effort
has yet to materialize. See also George B. N. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Major Scott E. Brower is a student in the Command and General Staff
Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a Special Forces officer
who served in the 3d Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
He is a 1989 graduate of the US Military Academy and a 1999 graduate of
the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict program at the Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California.

Dr. Anna Simons is an associate professor in the Special Operations
Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School. She also has been an associate
professor of anthropology at the University of California, Los Angeles.
She is a previous contributor to Parameters and is the author of,
most recently, The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special
Forces, as well as Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone.