In this splendid section
from his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume's first
concern is our ordinary belief that the natural world -- the world
leaving our own
conscious existence aside -- is a world of determinism, all cause and
effect.
He gives his account of what this ordinary belief can come to, the fact
of
the matter. Turning to our own conscious existence, he finds the same
fact
of the matter. Hence our world too is a world of determinism, all cause
and
effect. That is the story with the man who comes to dinner and does not
rob
Hume of his silver standish. The story of Indeterminism, and in
particular
of the kind of freedom that is origination, must be a mistake.

-----------------------------------------------

It is universally allowed that matter, in all
its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every
natural
effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no
other
effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted
from
it. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature,
prescribed with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise
from the shock of two bodies as motion in any other degree or direction
than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just
and precise idea of necessity; we must consider whence that
idea arises when we apply it to the
operation of bodies.

It seems evident that, if all the scenes of
nature were continually shifted in such a manner that no two events
bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new,
without any similitude to
whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have
attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connection among these
objects. We might
say, upon such a supposition, that one object or event has followed
another;
not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and
effect
must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reasoning concerning
the
operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the
memory
and senses remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real
existence
could possibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of
necessity
and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the
operations
of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and
the
mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of
the
other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which
we
ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar
objects,
and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no
notion
of any necessity or connection.

If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have
ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these two
circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the
operations of mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever agreed
in the doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed,
merely for not understanding each other.

As to the first circumstance, the constant and
regular conjunction of similar events, we may possibly satisfy
ourselves
by the following considerations. It is universally acknowledged that
there
is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and
ages,
and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and
operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: The same
events follow from
the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship,
generosity,
public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and
distributed
through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still
are,
the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have ever been
observed
among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course
of
life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the
French
and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former
most of the observations which you have made with regard to the
latter.
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history
intorms
us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only
to
discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by
showing
men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us
with
materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted
with
the regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records or
wars,
intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of
experiments,
by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of
his
science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher
becomes
acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external
objects,
by the experiments which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth,
water,
and other elements, examined by Aristotle, and Hippocrates, more like
to
those which at present lie under our observation than the men described
by
Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world.

Should a traveller, returning from a far
country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any with
whom we were ever
acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or
revenge;
who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we
should
immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove
him
a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with
stories
of centaurs and dragons, mirades and prodigies. And if we would explode
any
forgery in history, we cannot make use of a more convincing argument,
than
to prove, that the actions ascribed to any person are directly contrary
to
the course of nature, and that no human motives, in such circumstances,
could.
ever induce him to such a conduct. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is
as
much to be suspected, when he describes the supernatural courage of
Alexander,
by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes, as when he
describes
his supernatural force and activity, by which he was able to resist
them.
So readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human
motives
and actions as well as in the operations of body.

Hence likewise the benefit of that experience,
acquired by long life and a variety of business and company, in order
to
instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future
conduct, as well as speculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to
the knowledge of men’s inclinations and motives, from their actions,
expressions,
and, even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of their
actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The
general observations treasured up by a course of experience, give us
the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies.
Pretexts and appearances no longer
deceive us. Public declarations pass for the specious colouring of a
cause.
And though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and
authority,
that perfect disinterestedness, so often pretended to, is never
expected
in multitudes and parties; seldom in their leaders; and scarcely even
in
individuals of any rank or station. But were there no uniformity in
human
actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind
irregular
and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations
concerning
mankind; and no experience, however accurately digested by reflection,
would
ever serve to any purpose. Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in
his
calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain
uniformity
in the operation of the sun, rain, and earth towards the production of
vegetables;
and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which this
operation
is governed and directed.

We must not, however, expect that this
uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that
all men, in the
same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner,
without making any allowance for the diversity of characters,
prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular, is
found in no part of nature. On the
contrary, from observing the variety of conduct in different men, we
are
enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a
degree
of uniformity and regularity.

Are the manners of men different in different
ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and
education, which mould the human mind from its infancy and form it into
a fixed and established
character. Is the behiviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that
of
the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different
characters
which nature has impressed upon the sexes, and which she preserves with
constancy
and regularity? Are the actions of the same person much diversified in
the
different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? This affords
room
for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our
sentiments
and inclinations, and the different maxims which prevail in the
different
ages of human creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar to
each
individual, have a uniformity in their influence; otherwise our
acquaintance
with the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach
us
their dispositions, or serve to direct our behaviour with regard to
them.

I grant it possible to find some actions,
which
seem to have no regular connection with any known motives, and are
exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever been
established for the government
of men. But if we would willingly know what judgement should be formed
of
such irregular and extraordinary action; we may consider the sentiments
commonly
entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the
course
of nature, and the operations of external objects. All causes are not
conjoined
to their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles
only
dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician,
who
directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents.

The vulgar, who take things according to theft
first appeannce, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an
uncertainty
in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence;
though they meet with no impediment in their operation. But
philosophers, observing that, almost in every part of nature, there is
contained a vast variety of
springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or
remoteness,
find, that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not
proceed
from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of
contrary
causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther
observation,
when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects
always
betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual
opposition.
A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or
watch
than to say that it does not commonly go right: But an artist easily
perceives
that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same
influence
on the wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a
grain
of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation
of
several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the
connection
between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its
seeming
uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of
contrary
causes.

Thus, for instance, in the human body, when
the
usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation; when
medicines operate not with their wonted powers; when inegular events
follow from any
particular cause; the philosopher and physician are not surprised at
the
matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the necessity and
uniformity
of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted. They know
that
a human body is a mighty complicated machine: That many secret powers
lurk
in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehension: That to us it
must
often appear very uncertain in its operations: And that therefore the
irregular
events, which outwardly discover themselves, can be no proof that the
laws
of nature are not observed with the greatest regularity in its internal
onerations
and government

The philosopher, if he be consistent, must
appiy the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent
agents. The
most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be
accounted
for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character
and
situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer:
But
he has the toothache, or has not dined. A stupid fellow discove an
uncommon
alacrity in his carriage: But he has met with a sudden piece of good
fortune.
Or even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly
accounted
for either by the person himself or by others; we know, general, that
the
characters of men are, to a certain degree inconstant and irregular.
This
is, in a manner, the constant character of human nature; though it be
applicable,
a more particular manner, to some persons who have fixed rule for their
conduct,
but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy. The
internal
principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding
these
seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain, clouds,
and
other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady
principles;
though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and enquiry.

Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction
between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that
between the cause and effect in any part of nature but also that this
regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind,
and has never been the subject
of dispute, either in philosophy or common life. Now, as it is from
past
experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future, and as we
conclude
that objects will always be conjoined together which we find to have
always
been conjoined; it may seem superfluous to prove that this experienced
uniformity
in human actions is a source whence we draw inferences concerning
them. But in order to thrc the argument into a greater variety of
lights
we shall also insist, though briefly, on this latter topic.

The mutual dependence of men is so great in
all
societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself,
or
is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are
requisite
to make it answer fully the intention of the agent. The poorest
artificer, who labours alone, expects at least the protection of the
magistrate, to ensure
him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour. He also expects that,
when
he carries his goods to market, and offers them at a reasonable price,
he
shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to
engage
others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his
subsistence.
In proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their
intercourse
with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes
of
life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from
the
proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclusions
they
take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as in
their
reasonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe that men, as
well
as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the same
that
they have ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour of
his
servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools which
he
employs, and would be equally surprised were his expectations
disappointed.
In short, this experimental inference and reasoning concerning the
actions
of others enters so much into human life that no man, while awake, is
ever
a moment without employing it. Have we not reason, therefore, to affirm
that
all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity according
to
the foregoing definition and explication of it?

Nor have philosophers ever entertained a
different opinion from the people in this particular. For, not to
mention that almost every action of their life supposes that opinion,
there are even few of the
speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential. What would
become
of history, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the
historian
according to the experience which we have had of mankind? How could politics
be a science, if laws and forms of goverment had not a
uniform
influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of morals, if
particular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce
particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant
operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our criticism
upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the
conduct and sentiments of
his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters, and in such
circumstances?
It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or
action
of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this
inference from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to
conduct.

And indeed, when we consider how aptly natural
and moral evidence link together, and form only one
chain
of argument, we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the
same
nature, and derived from the same principles. A prisoner who has
neither
money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well
when
he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with
which
he is surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather
to
work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible
nature
of the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold,
foresees
his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards,
as
from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain
train
of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape; the
action
of the executioner; the separation of the head and body; bleeding,
convulsive
motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and
voluntary
actions; but the mind feels no difference between them In passing from
one
link to another: Nor is less certain of the future event than if it
were
connected with the objects present to the memory or senses, by a train
of
causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical
necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind,
whether
the united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and
motion. We may change the name of things; but their nature and their
operation on
the understanding never change.

Were a man, whom I know to be honest and
opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friendship, to come into my
house, where I am surrounded with my servants, I rest assured that he
is not to stab me
before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish; and I no
more
suspect this event than the falling of the house itself, which is new,
and
solidly built and founded.—But he may have been seized with a
sudden
and unhnown frenzy.— So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake
and tumble my house about my ears. I shall therefore change the
suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to
put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed: And
this event, I think I
can foretell with the same assurance, as that, if he throw himself out
at
the window, and meet with no obstruction, he will not remain a moment
suspended
in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least
possibility
to the former event, which is so contrary to all the known principles
of
human nature. A man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the
pavement
at Charing Cross, may as well expect that it will fly away like a
feather,
as that he will find it untouched an hour after. Above one half of
human
reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature, attended with more
or
less degrees of certainty proportioned to our expenence of the usual
conduct
of mankind in such particular situations.

I have frequently considered, what could
possibly be the reason why all mankind, though they have ever, without
hesitation, acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole
practice and reasoning, have yet discovered such a reluctance to
acknowledge it in words, and have rather shown a propensity, in all
ages, to profess the contrary opinion. The
matter, I think, may be accounted for after the following manner. If we
examine
the operations of body, and the production of effects from their
causes,
we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our
knowledge
of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly
conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary
transition, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other.
But though
this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the
strictest
scrutiny of this subject, men still entertain a strong propensity to
believe
that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive
something
like a necessary connection between the cause and the effect. When
again
they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds,
and
feel no such connection of the motive and the action; they are thence
apt
to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which result
from
material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence.
But
being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any
kind
than merely the constant conjunction of objects, and the
consequent inference of the mind from one to another, and
finding that
these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in
voluntary
actions; we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to
all
causes. And though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many
philosophers,
in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall
find,
upon reflection, that they dissent from it in words only, not in their
real
sentiment. Necessity, according to the sense in which it is here taken,
has
never yet been rejected nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any
philosopher.
It may only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the
operations
of matter, some farther connection between the cause and effect; and
connection
that has no place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now
whether
it be so or not, can only appear upon examination and it is incumbent
on
these philosophers to make good their assertion, by defining or
describing
that necessity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of material
causes.

It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the
wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity, when they
enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of
the understanding, and the operations the will. Let them first discuss
a more simple question, namely, the operations of body and of brute
unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea
causation and necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of
objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from or to another. If
these circumstances form, in reality, the whole of
that necessity, which we conceive in matter, and if these circumstances
be
also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the
mind,
the dispute is an end; at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely
verbal.
But as long as we will rashly suppose, that we have some farther idea
of
necessity and causation in the operation of external objects; at the
same
time, that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the
mind;
there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate
issue,
while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition. The only method of
undeceiving
us is to mount up higher; to examine the narrow extent of science when
applied
to material causes; and to convince ourselves that all we know of them
is
the constant conjunction or inference above mentioned. We may, perhaps,
find
that is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to
human
understanding: But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to
apply
this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as it is evident that
these
have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and
characters,
and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we must be
obliged
to acknowledge in words that necessity, which we have already avowed,
in
every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of our conduct and
behaviour 1.

-------------------------------

Footnote 1: The prevalence of the doctrine of
liberty may be accounted for, from another cause, viz, a false
sensation
or seeming experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or
indifference,
in many of our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter
or
of mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any
thinking or mtelligent being, who may consider the action; and It
consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the
existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, when
opposed to necessity, is nothing
but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness or
indifference,
which we feel, in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object
to
that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe, that, though, in reflecting
on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness, or
indifference,
but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from
their
motives, and from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently
happens,
that, in performing the actions themselves, we are sensible of
something
like it: And as all resembling objects are readily taken for each
other,
this has been employed as a demonstrative sad even intuitive proof of
human
liberty. We feel, that our actions are subject to our will, on most
occasions;
and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing,
because,
when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it moves
easily
every way, and produces an image of itself (or a Velleity, as
it is
called in the schools) even on that side, on which it did not settle.
This
image, or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could, at that time,
have
been completed into the thing itself; because, should that be denied,
we
find, upon a second trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not,
that
the fantastical desire of showing liberty, is here the motive of our
actions.
And it seems certain, that, however we may imagine we feel a liberty
within
ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives
and
character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he
might,
were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation
and
temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition.
Now
this Is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing
doctrine.

---------------------------------------------------------

Well, Hume goes a long way towards convincing
me. He didn't convince Kant, to whom
you
might turn. Or you could turn to a view of 2002 by a philosopher of
science
as to the bearing of old and new physics on the truth of determinism --
John Earman.