In January 1993, Africa Watch conducted
a fact-finding mission to Somalia, in order to inquire about the new situation
created by the deployment of a large contingent of foreign troops to secure
relief operations. The Africa Watch delegation consisted of consultant
Ahmed H. Esa, Africa Watch associate Ben Penglase and Juan E. Méndez,
Executive Director of Americas Watch, another division of Human Rights
Watch. The object of the mission was to look into the extent to which the
new military situation was promoting or hampering the development of a
genuine civil society; to observe the behavior of all parties to the military
conflict with respect to their obligations under the laws of war; and to
assess the prospects of a political settlement founded on respect for human
rights. This report is the product of that mission. It was written by Ben
Penglase and Juan Méndez, and edited by Kenneth Roth. The authors
acknowledge the comments offered by Dr. Esa, who is at the Institut Pasteur
in Paris, and by Holly Burkhalter and Kenneth Roth, Washington Director
and Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch respectively. Africa Watch would
also like to extend its thanks and admiration to the international relief
organizations and Somali organizations and individuals that assisted us
with our visit to Somalia, especially the International Medical Corps and
the International Committee of the Red Cross.

I. Introduction

The deployment of a large international
military force in Somalia, led by the United States, has produced a dramatic
improvement in the ability of relief agencies to reverse the terrible famine
that was causing massive death among innocent civilians. In this sense,
the international community should be proud of the results achieved through
an impressive coordination ofmilitary and civilian efforts. This application
of an emerging international law principle of humanitarian intervention
that allows for limited use of force even in the absence of consent by
the local sovereign bodes well for future reactions by the international
community to man-made disasters.

The task is far from accomplished, however,
and already it is possible to note important shortcomings. The current
effort does not adequately address the underlying causes of the destruction
of Somalia's social fabric that ultimately led to the famine. In sponsoring
a peace process, the United Nations is acting as if the cause of the disaster
was simply war. The U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley,
has limited his diplomatic efforts to ensuring that the factions avoid
attacking the international forces and observe a shaky cease-fire. In fact,
it was not war alone that created this disaster, but rather the massive,
persistent, deliberate violations of human rights committed by all the
factions in the course of that war. The longer this important distinction
is ignored, the harder it will be to achieve a lasting solution to the
Somali conflict. The present gains against the famine may well be short-lived
if the warlords are allowed to reenact the devastation they have brought
upon Somalia.

Before 1991, dictator Mohamed Siad Barre
tried to divide the rising opposition to his rule by exacerbating clan
rivalries. After his ouster in January 1991, the clan-based factions vying
for power fought a civil war with total disregard for the safety of the
civilian population. Indeed, members of rival clans and sub-clans were
targeted for murder solely on the basis of that affiliation, whether or
not they engaged in combat. Young men were tortured and even mutilated
to ensure that they would not join rival forces. Women and girls were raped.
In rural areas, crops and livestock were looted to feed the troops. Farmers
and herders were then prevented from resuming their labor, so as to deprive
the enemy and their potential civilian supporters of food and sustenance.
Once in control of territory, most of the various factional leaders made
no attempt to provide for the welfare of the people in their areas or create
any sort of meaningful public administrations, and demonstrated no care
or remorse for the starvation and suffering that their actions created.

All factions recruited their troops,
not only on the basis of clan membership, but also on the implied promise
of a lucrative reward: fighters shared in the loot stolen or extorted from
rival clans, and their leaders did nothing to discourage them. The looting
and extortion was later directed against the expatriate relief agencies,
until the international forces were deployed; for months while the world
decided whether to act, intimidation of the nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) interfered with the urgent task of feeding the hungry, and prolonged
the agony of the innocent. It is misleading, therefore, to see the lawlessness
and anarchy as the result simply of war and breakdown of authority. Rather
it is the direct result of a particularly abusive way of waging war. The
warlords are self-serving, disingenuous and cynical when they pretend that
"uncontrolled elements" are responsible for the acts of violence and intimidation
that they themselves have directed and fomented.

The current peace process hosted by Ethiopia
and sponsored by the United Nations ignores this crucial fact. It simply
brings together some of the warlords and expects them to agree on a cease-fire
and on some future agenda for the distribution of power. Similarly, the
military and relief effort on the ground in Somalia does little to reduce
the power of the warlords and their factions. Rather, it engages their
henchmen in local dialogues in a hasty attempt to rectify problems and
satisfy international demands for some Somali participation. Entering into
adialogue with these thuggish leaders may well prevent attacks on American
troops, but in the process unsavory and murderous characters are given
a legitimacy they do not deserve. Neither the Addis Ababa-based peace process,
nor the political diplomacy on the ground, includes any discussion of human
rights issues, and that is precisely what is wrong with the present direction
of the effort.

Human rights must be placed squarely
on the agenda of the peace negotiations, and must become the centerpiece
of localized strategies to bring Somali civilians into the relief effort.
The peace talks in Addis Ababa must include an agreement, effective immediately,
to respect universally-accepted standards of human rights and the laws
of war, and that agreement should be backed by an aggressive United Nations
presence throughout the land to monitor compliance. The peace talks must
also include discussion of an effective procedure to ensure accountability
for the many crimes of the recent past. The victims of Somalia's war must
be reassured that their suffering will not be forgotten for the sake of
a false and treacherous "national reconciliation." Because the only participants
at the Addis Ababa talks are the warlords, who are guilty of atrocities,
it is imperative to enlarge the composition of the talks so that representatives
of Somali civil society without blood on their hands participate.

At the local and regional level, the
U.N. Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM) must also help to make possible a system
for holding accountable those who are responsible for gross human rights
abuses. Clan and village elders, as well as members of organizations of
civil society must be given the opportunity to participate, without fear
of retaliation, in open and honest discussions about responsibility for
the crimes committed against the innocent. Victims must be allowed a forum
to come forward with their testimony, in the expectation that their stories
will contribute to the establishment of truth and justice. Such a process
will make it possible to sort out the victims from the perpetrators, and
will prevent the thugs-some of whom are now posing as self-appointed "relief
committee" members-from achieving power and legitimacy under the new security
conditions created by the international forces.

In addition to the search for truth and
justice, the relief effort must proceed in a way that encourages the development
of genuine organizations of civil society. Somali non-combatants, especially
women and young people, have struggled against overwhelming odds to maintain
and nurture such organizations; they have provided relief in cooperation
with international nongovernmental organizations, and they have kept orphanages,
hospitals and feeding centers running despite intimidation and danger.
To be sure, the warlords have their own front organizations that pose as
public interest groups. But many effective-and often unheralded-organizations
of civil society try to cut across clan affiliations and invite their fellow
citizens to participate as Somalis. These organizations, and others that
could be promoted, are not given enough opportunities to join actively
in the current effort to feed the hungry and cure the sick. Indeed, U.S.
and U.N. representatives, as well as some foreign NGOs now working in the
country, have largely ignored these Somali civilian organizations. Their
future role in reconstruction is at this point uncertain.

The clan system that is embedded in Somali
culture is not in itself responsible for the destruction of Somalia: the
deliberate policy of exacerbating clan rivalries is. Siad Barre initiated
the policy, but the warlords bent on replacing him replicated his tactics.
Most Somalis took refuge in their clans as the only protection against
the rigors of this unusually dirty, cruel war. There are clan elders and
structures of collective moral leadership that are not only innocentof
atrocities but have in fact played a courageous role in protecting people
and correcting wrongs. They must be given an opportunity to emerge as an
alternative leadership for Somalia, in keeping with the best traditions
of the culture, with the hope that they can rid it of the current divisiveness
and intolerance.

Key to the emergence of this alternative
leadership is a process of truth and justice, and the active promotion
of organizations of civil society. These steps are also essential to the
success of the current relief effort, and the parallel effort to establish
a secure environment. It will be a tragic mistake if the mission is declared
accomplished, and the troops and NGOs leave, without establishing an official
process for accountability for the egregious crimes of the warring factions,
and without laying the foundation for the reemergence of civil society.
Such a premature end to the international involvement in Somalia would
only ensure a resumption of the cycle of human rights violations, devastation
and famine. This means, of course, that the international community must
be committed to long-term goals in Somalia; but those goals will be achieved
sooner if accountability and promotion of civil society are given a high
priority now.

II. Background to the
Current Situation

Siad Barre's Divide-and-Rule Tactics

With no appreciable religious, linguistic,
cultural or other divisions within Somalia, clan and sub-clan loyalty have
emerged as the most important political factors in Somali politics. The
reliance on clan identity and competition among clans and sub-clans, while
long a part of Somali culture, was exacerbated by the divide-and-rule tactics
of Siad Barre. The warfare that has racked Somalia since Siad Barre's ouster
has also been based upon the manipulation of clan and sub-clan allegiances.

During his 21-year rule, Barre manipulated
clan loyalties and rivalries, favored members of his own clan, and undermined
independent sources of authority. In what was to be a recurring pattern,
following an April 1978 coup attempt led mainly by army officers from the
Majerten clan, Siad's forces singled out Majerten civilians for reprisals.
After the creation in 1981 of the Somali National Movement (SNM), a guerilla
force that drew its support from the Isaaq clan, the government unleashed
a reign of terror against Isaaq civilians, killing 50,000 to 60,000 between
May 1988 and January 1990.1

From the outset of his rule, Siad also
favored members of his own clan, the Marehan, who were recruited in large
numbers into the army and favored within the civil service. Despite this
favoritism, Siad purported to outlaw "tribalism" by banning clan gatherings,
such as engagement and wedding ceremonies, and co-opting elders by making
them paid "peacekeepers." Independent institutions capable of challenging
the government's power were destroyed, leading civilian politicians were
arrested, independent civic organizations and political parties were outlawed,
and any form of political dissent was prohibited. Thus, in seeking to maintain
himself in power, Siad Barre fanned the flames of clan animosity while
systematically destroying anyinstitution that could cut across clan lines
or act as an authentic mediator in disputes between clans.

Siad Barre was also responsible for introducing
the strategy of banditry into the civil war, particularly during the 1988
war against the SNM. During this brutal campaign, Siad's troops, many of
whom later joined clan factions after the collapse of the central government,
were allowed openly to loot and sell the spoils of the war in the markets
of Mogadishu, with no fear of punishment.2 This
practice broke with traditional Somali customs governing competition between
clans, and changed the character of the civil war. After Barre's ouster,
other clan factions continued these tactics.

The Fall of Siad Barre and the Ensuing
War

In January 1991, Siad Barre was forced
from the capital by the United Somali Congress (USC), a rebel group created
in January 1989 that drew its support from the Hawiye clan. The USC is
only one of several rebel groups that control different regions of Somalia,
each drawing its support from different clans or sub-clans. Other groups
include: the Somali National Movement (SNM), which is dominant in the north
and is supported largely by the Issaq clan; the Somali Salvation Democratic
Front (SSDF), which is active in the northeast and central regions and
represents the Majerten sub-clan of the Darod clan; the Somali Patriotic
Movement (SPM) in the south, whose support comes mainly from the Ogaden
sub-clan of the Darod; and the Somali National Front (SNF), which draws
its support from members of the Marehan, a sub-clan of the Darod, and from
some former supporters of Siad Barre.

With the flight of Siad Barre from Mogadishu,
fighting soon broke out between two rival factions of the USC, one led
by General Mohamed Farah Aideed, the USC's main military commander, and
the other by Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a wealthy Mogadishu hotelier. The fighting
between the rival USC factions soon became a war between two sub-clans
of the Hawiye: Aideed relied upon the Habr Gedir sub-clan while Ali Mahdi's
forces were based largely upon the Abgal sub-clan. The fighting was motivated
almost exclusively by concerns over personal profit and clan allegiance,
and the warring parties showed no restraint in targeting civilians of the
opposite clan or in firing weapons indiscriminately without regard for
the safety of civilians.

A mere three days after the ouster of
Barre's forces from Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi declared himself Interim President
of Somalia, to the immediate objection of General Aideed. Ali Mahdi also
claimed that a conference attended by several of Somalia's armed factions
in Djibouti in July 1992 had legitimized his claim to be Interim President.
Various attempts to mediate the conflict between the two men failed, and
on November 17, 1991, General Aideed's forces launched a large-scale attack
on Ali Mahdi's forces, who occupied the northern part of Mogadishu. The
capital soon became the scene of widespread and flagrant abuses, as both
sides used artillery and anti-tank missiles, as well as automatic weapons,
indiscriminately. Africa Watch estimates that in Mogadishu alone, 14,000
people were killed and 27,000 wounded between November 17, 1991, and February
29, 1992.3 A cease-fire was agreed upon in earlyMarch,
and despite frequent but short-lived breaches, a fitful peace in Mogadishu
has been in effect for almost one year.

In January 1991, as forces loyal to Siad
Barre fled Mogadishu, they moved through the Bay and Juba regions, Somalia's
richest farming areas. Aideed-led forces pursued them and, for months,
this fertile area was the scene of repeated sweeps and occupations by both
forces. The sequence took a heavy toll on civilians as the warring factions
looted food stored in underground silos, stole or killed livestock, ruined
wells, raped women of various clans, and killed men of opposing clans to
prevent them from taking up arms. These attacks on civilians so thoroughly
disrupted production and distribution of food that, far more than the drought,
they are responsible for the famine in Somalia.

In 1992, as alliances between clans-particularly
in Mogadishu-began to collapse and warfare became more and more factionalized,
a general situation of anarchy and lawlessness prevailed, and many of the
clan fighters turned their attention more exclusively to looting and theft.
Africa Watch believes that the looting and banditry prevalent in Somalia
is not solely due to individual looters and bandits, but is a direct result
of the manner in which the armed factions chose to recruit their forces
and wage war. In fact, many observers argue that without the implied promise
of fruitful looting, few factions would be able to summon any sizable military
support. Because it is a direct outcome of this strategy to wage war that
their "soldiers" become looters and thieves, senior commanders must be
held responsible for the actions of those under their command.

All of the warring factions are responsible
for attacks on civilians who were targeted solely on the basis of their
clan identity. Particularly egregious was the scorched earth campaign waged
by Siad Barre's forces as they fled from Mogadishu to their home area of
Gedo region, traveling through regions inhabited largely by the Hawiye
and the agricultural Rahanweyn and Digil clans. These abuses were repeated
in March 1992, as the Somali National Front, a movement formed by some
of the remnants of Siad Barre's army and members of the Marehan clan, took
advantage of the fighting between the USC factions to mount an assault
on Mogadishu. The SNF slaughtered non-Darod civilians, largely members
of the Rahanweyn and Hawiye clans, who were perceived as supporters of
the USC. Similarly, in April 1992, General Aideed's USC forces counter-attacked
and entered traditional regions of support for the SNF (areas inhabited
by the Marehan sub-clan), committing atrocities against Marehan and Darod
civilians and staging raids across the Kenyan border.

The pattern was once again repeated as
the SNF was reconstituted under the military leadership of General Mohamed
Said Hersi "Morgan," Siad Barre's son-in-law and the former commander of
the Somali army who destroyed the city of Hargeisa during the Siad Barre
government's brutal war against the SNM in northern Somalia. With the assistance
of the Kenyan military (in violation of a United Nations Security Council
arms embargo), the SNF retook the Gedo region. In October 1992, the SNF
captured the town of Bardera, committing atrocities against civilians who
were thought to have supported the USC, and greatly disrupting relief efforts.

In early March 1992, Ali Mahdi and General
Aideed signed a cease-fire, which ended most of the heavy artillery shelling
in Mogadishu. In a later meeting in December 1992, coordinated by Ambassador
Robert Oakley, the U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Aideed and Ali Mahdi
agreed to cease hostilities and negative propaganda, to begin to remove
checkpoints along the so-called "green line" dividing the city, and to
restrict their weapons and combatants to designated compounds on the outskirts
of the city. While these negotiations may have stopped organized clashes
between the two factions, sporadic fighting continued in Mogadishu.

On January 1, 1993, serious fighting
once again broke out, this time between the USC-Aideed forces and those
of the Murusade clan, who were attempting to recapture territory that Aideed
controlled. The Murusade forces shelled a troop cantonment of USC forces
but were unsuccessful in taking control of the area. In late January 1993,
there were clashes between the SNF under the command of General Morgan
and SPM forces under the control of Col. Omar Jess in areas to the northwest
of the southern port of Kismayu. On January 25, after warning Morgan's
troops to retreat, U.S. Army helicopter gunships and Belgian ground forces
attacked, destroying several of Morgan's heavy weapons and forcing him
to retreat.4 U.S. forces attacked the SNF again
on February 1, 1993.

In contrast to the fighting that devastated
the southern areas of Somalia, the northeastern area has seen relative
peace in the past year. Sporadic conflicts have occurred between Aideed's
USC and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, but generally this area
has been spared the devastation of southern Somalia.

Similarly, in the self-declared Republic
of Somaliland, despite clashes between two sub-clans of the dominant Isaaq
clan in late 1991 and early 1992, peace has generally prevailed. This region,
which is under the control of the Somali National Movement (SNM), declared
its independence in May 1991. A peace conference in October 1992 reportedly
established a committee of elders to mediate disputes between the sub-clans.
In January 1993, a follow-up to this peace conference was independently
organized by clan elders in the town of Borama. Despite the generally peaceful
situation, Africa Watch has received disturbing reports that in mid-January
in the city of Hargeisa six women were accused of prostitution and were
stoned and lynched by Islamic fundamentalists. Five of the women subsequently
died. The Somaliland authorities have reportedly issued a press release
decrying the murders and announcing the arrest of 16 people.

Attacks on Civil Society

Along with indiscriminate attacks on
the civilian population, the warring factions also targeted elements of
civil society that they perceived as potential rivals. These attacks on
civil society decimated local authority that was independent of the armed
factions.

A dramatic example of these attacks is
the killing that occurred in Kismayu prior to the arrival of foreign troops.

From December 8 to 10, 1992, prominent
civilians of the Harti clan were killed by forces under the command of
Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess and his Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).It is thought
that Jess, who is a member of the Ogaden, viewed Harti elders as a potential
political threat once the foreign troops had arrived.5

According to various press reports, Col.
Jess ordered his militia to conduct house-to-house searches to eliminate
prominent members of the Harti clan. One of those killed was Dr. Mohamed
Musa Sugule. According to information received by Africa Watch, on December
9, Dr. Sugule was forcibly taken from his home by armed men and, in front
of his family, shot in the head. According to another account of the killings
reported in The New York Times, a survivor described how SPM fighters
broke into his house on December 9, beating the women in the house and
taking the men to a nearby beach where the Harti men were killed.6
Doctors working in Kismayu while the killings were occurring reported that
the wounded showed signs of having been shot deliberately and at close
range, in the head or abdomen, and not in combat or cross-fire.

Africa Watch received a list of 126 Harti
individuals-including intellectuals, clan elders and religious leaders
as well as women and children-thought to have been killed by SPM forces
during this episode. Somali refugees in Kenya allege that these names are
only a portion of the 600 who were killed in Kismayu. Other reports have
put the number of deaths between 100 and 200. Africa Watch cannot confirm
any of these figures, but the fact that Omar Jess conducted a systematic
campaign of execution of defenseless victims is, we believe, well established.

Another example of attacks on organizations
perceived as threats to the warlords' powers is the harassment of the United
Somali Salvation Youth (USSY), a Somali youth organization founded in September
1991 with the aim of educating and providing safety and protection for
the youth of Mogadishu. The organization opened a school in South Mogadishu
in August 1992, with the motto: "Put [down] the gun, take the pen, seek
the knowledge."

In September 1992, the USSY decided to
organize a peace march and fast, appealing to the two USC factions to end
the fighting and calling upon the two USC leaders to resign. During the
demonstration, troops loyal to Ali Mahdi opened fire on the marchers, killing
Abdullahi Farah Aideed and wounding a young woman known as Shena.

According to the USSY, the USC-Aideed
constantly threatens the organization, trying to force it to withdraw from
the building it occupies, which is the otherwise abandoned site of the
former Ministry of Education. The USC-Aideed claims control of the building
and some of Aideed's cronies occupy some rooms. Although members of the
organization have not been physically attacked, they have received several
letters from the USC calling upon them to evacuate the building, and fear
for the safety of their staff and students.

The Famine

As Africa Watch has noted previously,
war and famine in Somalia feed on each other, creating a cycle of suffering
and violence. As the war disrupted commerce and prevented people from feeding
themselves, internationally donated food became a valuable commodity and
thetarget of theft and extortion. This in turn provoked more hunger, and
more violence. This cycle combined with the utter devastation of the war
and the complete destruction of a viable economy to ensure that the control
of food became the key to power and profit.

However, this cycle was not inevitable
and does not excuse the warring factions from their responsibility in the
creation of a horrendous humanitarian disaster. In particular, the devastation
inflicted upon the Rahanweyn and other farming communities by the different
armed factions-the looting of their harvests and the theft of their livestock-ensured
that these communities would starve or remain at the mercy of internationally
donated food. The further disruption of relief deliveries kept these communities
suffering and, far more than drought, is the factor responsible for the
300,000 people estimated by the U.N. to have died.7

After the fall of Siad Barre there were
early signs that the clan-based fighting would lead to famine, disease
and loss of life of extraordinary proportions. Between June and November
1991, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted a thorough
survey of the incidence of malnutrition in the southern part of the country.
The results were astounding: elsewhere in the world, the ICRC considers
a situation alarming when it finds a small percentage of the population
severely malnourished, and 10 to 20 percent "moderately malnourished."
In southern Somalia, in late 1991, the ICRC found 40 percent severely malnourished,
and 50 percent moderately malnourished. In 1991 and 1992, the central region
lost 70 percent of its livestock, while the south lost 50 percent. This
shows that the combination of the fighting and the drought had so quickly
created a disaster that the international community was unprepared, and
generally unwilling, to take drastic action to cope with the new situation.
The ICRC assessment came at a time when the fighting intensified, particularly
in Mogadishu, as described above.

III. The Response of
the International Community

The Response of Relief Organizations

Throughout 1992, the ICRC and other relief
organizations struggled desperately to meet Somalia's massive humanitarian
needs, while increasing insecurity impeded their operations. On January
5, 1992, Dr. Martinka Pumpalova, a Bulgarian doctor working with UNICEF
in the northeastern city of Bosaso, was murdered. Some organizations pulled
out temporarily as a result. For those that stayed, security conditions
deteriorated to the point that they took the unprecedented step of hiring
security guards to protect the delivery of their services. The following
case exemplifies both the dangers to relief operations and the impunity
enjoyed by thugs under the command of warlords.

In August 1992, eleven men-including
two Somali staff of the ICRC and three members of the Somali Red Crescent
Society (SRCS)-were killed in the southern port of Kismayu. The eleven
men, along with their families, were attempting to board a flight and leave
Kismayu under ICRC protection, when a truck that they were in was diverted
from the airport by forces loyal to General Aideed.

The victims were members of the Majerten
and Dulbahante sub-clans of the Darod clan. Despite animosity between the
Darod and the Habr Gedir, these people had elected to stay in the Kismayu
area to continue assisting the foreign staff of the ICRC after Habr Gedir
forces under General Aideed's command took control of Kismayu in May 1992.

However, by August 1992, the ICRC and
SRCS staff members along with their families-a total of 45 people-asked
the ICRC to help them leave Kismayu. The group planned to travel to Garoe,
a city in the northeast where the Darod predominate and where they felt
they would be safer. As the ICRC had transferred two other people several
days earlier, they did not expect any difficulties at the airport. Nevertheless,
the ICRC spoke in advance with the leaders of the various factions in Kismayu
about the transfer and obtained signed promises guaranteeing safe passage.

On August 19, a truck bearing ICRC and
Somali Red Crescent symbols, accompanied by a car carrying a pregnant woman
and escorted by two technicals (four-wheel drive vehicles mounted with
heavy weapons), drove the group of 45 people to the airport, 20 miles outside
of central Kismayu. The ICRC had scheduled a flight to arrive from Mombasa,
Kenya, with 10 tons of food, and then planned to transport the people from
Kismayu to Garoe. When the vehicles approached the airport, the men guarding
the airport did not allow them on the tarmac. The airport guards were new
men who had replaced those that the ICRC had dealt with just several days
before. The guards informed the ICRC staff that they had to wait outside
the tarmac until the plane landed and that no one was allowed to leave
the airport. They also refused to recognize the papers signed by the SNA
authorizing the departure of the 45 people, even after the ICRC staff went
to the city and brought the SNA official who had signed them. The guards
stated that the official who signed the papers was not their commander,
and became upset when the ICRC officer asked them who their commanders
were. After the plane arrived, the guards surrounded it with their technicals
and threatened to blow it up.

While the ICRC expatriate staff was attempting
to defuse the situation and ensure the safety of the plane, another group
of guards told the driver of the ICRC truck that was carrying the people
to turn around and return to the ICRC's offices in town. The driver complied
with the orders and began to return to town, escorted by a technical carrying
airport guards. On the way back to town, the men in the technical prevented
the truck driver from returning to the airport after ICRC staff-who encountered
the truck on the road-had ordered him to take the families back to airport.

Shortly thereafter, the armed men in
the technical told the truck driver to stop and ordered the passengers
to get out. Armed men appeared from the surrounding bush and encircled
the truck, and the male passengers were separated from the women. The armed
men then marched the eleven male passengers into the bush. Several minutes
later gunshots were heard. After the shooting, the truck driver walked
back from the bush to where the truck was parked and told the guards to
release the women and children, as the men had been killed. The women and
children were released, and the truck was ransacked, apparently to make
the incident look like the truck had been ambushed and looted.

The following day, a sister of one of
the men who was killed went to the area, where she found 7 or 8 bodies,
one of them her brother, who had been shot in the leg and mouth. The families
of those killed and the woman who identified the bodies were later evacuated
from Kismayu.

Two days after the killings, ICRC representatives
met with General Aideed and other factional leaders who were in Kismayu
to establish the local office of the Somali National Alliance. (At this
time the factions in Kismayu were the Somali Patriotic Movement, the USC-Aideed,
and the SNA-an alliance between the SPM, the USC-Aideed, and two smaller
factions, the SDM and SSNM). General Aideed reportedly stated that he knew
nothing about the incident. According to a statement later issued by the
SNA Leadership Council, the SNA "expressed shock and abhorrence" and "apologized
to the ICRC for this unfortunate and intolerable incident." The SNA also
promised to form a committee to investigate the incident and determine
who was responsible. Several weeks later the ICRC was informed by Aideed's
faction of the USC that the eleven men were actually still alive and had
been abducted by "uncontrolled elements."

Despite the SNA's insistence that it
knew nothing about the killing, witnesses in Kismayu noted that one of
the technicals involved in the diversion of the truck remained in Kismayu
and continued to patrol the airport. The testimonies given to Africa Watch
indicate that the killings, due to the planned and coordinated way in which
they occurred, could not have happened without at least the knowledge,
if not the expressed orders, of the leaders of the local factions. It appears,
that the killings occurred either because one of the SNA factions wanted
to assert its control over the airport or because the SNA saw the ICRC's
transfer activities as a challenge to its authority.

On August 1992, the situation in Somalia
had deteriorated to such an extent that television screens the world over
showed tragic images of Somalis of all ages dying of hunger. Until then
the media had largely ignored Somalia, so there was little public pressure
to respond. International public opinion began to change after a well-publicized
July visit to Somalia by U.S. Senator Nancy L. Kassebaum and her public
call on the Bush Administration to support U.N. efforts there.8
Around the same time, as the fall campaign for the presidential elections
in the United States got started, then candidate Bill Clinton stressed
the humanitarian disaster in Somalia as evidence of the Bush administration's
inept foreign policy, thereby contributing to heightened media attention.
The pressure of public opinion forced President Bush to act. On the eve
of the Republican Convention in August, he announced a unilateral decision
to organize an air lift of emergency food supplies to Mogadishu, dramatically
increasing the levels of material support that the international community
was providing to Somalia. Several nongovernmental organizations with extensive
experience in other disaster situations joined the effort, while the ICRC
and other organizations that had been working in Somalia for many months
substantially increased their own contributions.

All observers agree that the August air
lift, and its effect on the actions of other countries, U.N. agencies and
NGOs, began to turn the tide of famine. It did not, however, immediately
produce satisfactory results, precisely because it evaded the issue of
providing armed protection to the humanitarian relief services. Relief
supplies were abundant, but the famine continued because of the inability
to deliver them.

The looting and extortion, including
far-reaching protection rackets, continued after the air lifts began, and
even intensified. The relief organizations did the best they could under
the circumstances. They hired armed security guards, a method virtually
unheard of in other disaster situations. In some cases, such protection
had to be bought from the same sources that had created the intimidation
and insecurity, as the following case makes clear.

Dr. Mohamed Ali Warsame, a gynecologist
and one of the best-known doctors in Somalia, went missing and was probably
murdered in Mogadishu in November 1992. It is believed that Dr. Warsame
was killed because he was a Darod, and as a prominent doctor aroused the
envy and anger of Hawiye doctors affiliated with General Aideed's wing
of the USC.

Dr. Warsame had originally fled Somalia
after the fall of Siad Barre and lived temporarily in exile in Kenya. While
in Kenya, Dr. Warsame contacted S.O.S. Kinderdorf, an Austrian non-profit
organization that since 1985 has run a school, maternity clinic and orphanage
in Mogadishu. (He had been a consulting physician with SOS-Kinderdorf before
going into exile.) In November 1992, Dr. Warsame agreed to move back to
Mogadishu and assist SOS Kinderdorf with their maternity hospital, despite
some hesitation about his personal safety because Dr. Warsame was a Darod
and the clinic was located in a part of Mogadishu controlled by General
Aideed's Habr Gedir troops. Prior to his departure, SOS Kinderdorf consulted
with their medical team in Mogadishu to ensure that Dr. Warsame would be
safe.

On November 11, 1992, Dr. Warsame flew
into Mogadishu and was driven to the SOS compound. He was given a tour
of the hospital and shown his room. At 6:00 that evening, Dr. Warsame came
to the main office and then walked out of the building with a Catholic
nun who worked for the organization. An eyewitness to the abduction told
Africa Watch that soon after this, a white car was seen inside the SOS
compound, the gate of which was open, and a man pushed Dr. Warsame into
the car. Guards who were supporters of Aideed's USC and who had been hired
by SOS under pressure from Aideed's men, were responsible for the abduction.
One of them was the one who pushed Dr. Warsame into the car.

Staff from SOS immediately went to General
Aideed's headquarters to inquire about Dr. Warsame's whereabouts. A USC
official told them that they did not need to look for Dr. Warsame any longer
because he was being taken to see Aideed. However, Dr. Warsame never reappeared
and his body was never found. Although there has been no confirmation,
his family believes that he was killed several days after his abduction.
Several other SOS staff were threatened and had to leave Somalia.

Despite this and other examples, it is
also true that some NGOs have been able, over time, to hire legitimate
security guards who have proven themselves loyal to their employers. Still,
the relief organizations had to acquiesce in the payment of fees-in cash
or in kind-for "services" provided in warehouses, ports and airports by
armed Somali groups. Some nongovernmental organizations decided to restrict
their operations to delivery of products like sorghum, which is insufficient
to provide a balanced diet to famine victims but is unattractive to looters
because it carries a low market value.

At the same time, the relief organizations
decided that the way to respond to the many obstacles to the effective
delivery of aid was to flood the market with food, in the belief that even
looted food helps to solve the famine, since it eventually makes its way
to the markets. By November, that tactic seemed to be yielding some results:
in Mogadishu, food was relatively abundant in the markets and prices were
dropping. However, market prices are not in themselves a reliable indicator
of the severity of a famine, since those without income or resources may
still go hungry. Moreover, ordinary distribution channels are in such chaotic
state that food may be cheap in Mogadishu while unavailable only miles
away.

All of the NGOs consulted by Africa Watch
agreed that, by November, the famine was by no means under control; in
fact, even as of February 1993 there remained pockets of malnutrition and
hunger in some rural areas. A recent survey by Medecins sans Frontieres
inthe Baidoa and Hoddur region found that the daily mortality rate from
December 15 to January 14 was 15.8 per 10,000 people, increasing to 46.9
per 10,000 for children under the age of five. The organization stated
that these numbers were seven times higher than in similar situations involving
displaced persons.9

The United Nations

After the fall of Siad Barre, the United
Nations left the country on grounds of insecurity. For one year, different
U.N. agencies alternated short and timid presences in Somalia with prolonged
absences. Meanwhile, the world body seemed oblivious to the gathering tragedy.
On January 23, 1992, the United Nations finally acknowledged its responsibility
to act. By Resolution 733, the Security Council declared itself "gravely
alarmed at the ... heavy loss of human life ...." Earlier in January, James
Jonah, a high-ranking U.N. official who had been appointed Special Envoy,
visited the country. His visit did more harm than good. Bypassing neutral
Somalis who had offered to facilitate his mission, Jonah allowed his visit
to be manipulated by General Aideed and then issued a hasty statement on
the prospects for a cease-fire which only exacerbated tensions.10
Because of his refusal to hear other factions, the airport was shelled
heavily during his visit and was later closed for ten days, enormously
complicating relief operations.

On March 17, 1992, the Security Council
issued Resolution 746, calling for the dispatch of a U.N. technical team
to Somalia. In its first two resolutions, the U.N. simply called on the
warring factions to respect the lives of relief workers, and to allow them
to fulfill their humanitarian duties. In the third (No. 751 of April 24,
1992), it agreed in principle to deploy a U.N. security force.11
But it still took another four months for the U.S. to begin an airlift
to Somalia. Then, on August 28, 1992, the Security Council issued Resolution
775, welcoming "the material and logistical support from a number of States
and [urging] that the airlift operation be effectively coordinated by the
United Nations...."

In addition to bungling the Jonah mission
in January, the U.N. continued through the year to dither on Somalia. For
months, the Security Council resolutions were not implemented. Officials
and agencies delayed the establishment of a presence on the ground, or
stationed themselves in neighboring countries. As a result, the U.N. provided
no leadership or coordination to the courageous efforts of the ICRC and
other nongovernmental agencies, which were forced to take on responsibilities
that the U.N. was skirting. The only bright spot in this dismal picture
was the April 28 appointment of Mahmoud Sahnoun, an experienced Algeriandiplomat,
as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Somalia. Mr. Sahnoun displayed
active diplomacy on the ground, including painstaking negotiations with
the warring factions. He promoted the work of neutral Somali clan elders,
women and organizations of civil society, and encouraged them to participate
in relief operations as well as in the peace process. For months, Mr. Sahnoun
pleaded with the U.N. agencies to send permanent representatives to Mogadishu
and to establish programs. His efforts went unheeded because the U.N. personnel-including
many who would have volunteered to go to Somalia-were barred from moving
there by a general directive declaring the country dangerous. In October
1992, after Mr. Sahnoun repeatedly and publicly criticized this inaction,
U.N. headquarters forced him to resign.

The U.N. continued to call on the warring
factions to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid (Resolution 767 of July
27, 1992), but only on August 28, 1992 did it authorize the deployment
of 3,000 peace-keeping troops. Even then, however, no such levels of international
armed presence were achieved until December 1992. The U.N. had sent a lightly-armed
force of 500 Pakistani troops in late September, pursuant to the April
24 resolution, but never increased that presence in accordance with the
August resolution.12 Even the 500 Pakistani troops
did not actually take up protective positions at Mogadishu airport until
mid-November, because the USC-Aideed forces would not lend their consent.

The failure to act decisively to implement
resolutions adopted by the international community was disastrous. Armed
militias and so-called uncontrolled elements took advantage of the situation
and increased their extortion of nongovernmental organizations attempting
to deliver emergency assistance; they also increased the looting of those
supplies by force of arms. In November, during the Thanksgiving holiday
and after his defeat in the Presidential election, President Bush decided
to send a division of American troops to Somalia. On December 3, the Security
Council issued Resolution 794, taking action under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations "to establish a secure environment for humanitarian
relief operations...."

IV. The Situation after
December 1992

On December 9, 1992, a large international
force led by the U.S. Marines began its deployment in Somalia to protect
the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance. As of February 1, 1993,
there were some 24,000 American troops and about 13,000 troops of other
nationalities deployed throughout Somalia. Twenty-two nations are participating
in the military effort, the majority of them with financial support or
with small military contingents.

All the NGO officials interviewed by
Africa Watch in Somalia agreed that, given the situation at the end of
the year, the deployment of troops was necessary to protect the delivery
of services. They also agree that it has made an enormous difference in
their ability to stem the famine.

Although precise figures are only now
being collected, it is abundantly clear that the more secure environment
provided by the international military presence has produced an immediate,dramatic
improvement for most Somalis. To be sure, some improvement had started
earlier, after the air lifts, thanks to the courageous efforts of the leading
NGOs working under extremely dangerous conditions. The death rate was also
declining because, by December, many of the weakest and most vulnerable
had already died. Nonetheless, the deployment of foreign troops has had
an almost instantaneous beneficial effect on the ability of NGOs to deliver
food and services. As of early January, meals and supplemental food were
being delivered to virtually all parts of southern and central Somalia,
without interference from thugs or bandits. Severely malnourished children
were on their way to recovery. At the orphanage in Baidoa, newly arrived
children were still bearing the heart-breaking marks of malnutrition; but
their care providers told our delegation that virtually all of them would
be saved. Before the deployment, each new arrival had a 50-50 chance of
survival.

Still, in some parts of Somalia the task
of delivering relief supplies remains very dangerous, as the following
case illustrates:

On January 2, 1993, Sean Devereux, a
28-year-old British UNICEF worker, was shot and killed in Kismayu. He was
the first foreign relief worker to have been killed since the military
intervention began on December 9.13 According
to UNICEF sources quoted in the press, Devereux was shot three times in
the back of the head and in the middle and lower spine by a lone gunman.14
He was shot at approximately 7:00 p.m. as he was walking from an NGO meeting
to the UNICEF house with two Somali office staff, who were not hurt. Shortly
before the shooting, unknown Somali men had asked about Devereux at the
UNICEF compound.

Initial reports from U.S. military sources
stated that Devereux was killed as a result of a wage dispute with his
guards. However, Col. Fred Peck, the U.S. military spokesman, later stated
that this explanation was incorrect, and UNICEF denied that their guards
were responsible. A UNICEF press release stated that all of their security
guards were in the compound when Devereux was shot. UNICEF also denied
that any wage dispute existed.

Although the motives for Devereux's killing
are not certain, Africa Watch believes that it is likely that he was killed
as a result of statements that he had made to the international press regarding
the killings carried out by Col. Jess's forces against Harti civilians.
Devereux was, in fact, one of the main sources for an article that appeared
in The New York Times detailing the killings, and he had been quoted
in The Washington Post and on British Broadcasting Corporation radio
condemning the violence in Kismayu. Devereux had previously been threatened
in Kismayu but, after spending the Christmas holidays in Nairobi, Kenya,
had chosen to return to Somalia.

In the aftermath of the killing, UNICEF
evacuated its foreign staff from Kismayu. The U.S. military also began
an investigation into Devereux's death and the earlier killings of Harti
civilians. Officials of Col. Jess's SPM also promised to investigate.

There have been few signs of resistance
to the presence of foreign troops, and only a very limited number of armed
encounters between them and armed Somalis. The delivery of food to ports
and airports, its transportation within Somalia, and the provision of meals
and other services to needy persons has been generally free of interference
due to the protective cover of the international forces. In addition to
guarding entry points and routes, the international forces escort convoys
of food wherever needed, displaying an impressive ability to coordinate
their actions with the needs of the NGOs.

It is our impression that the drought
is indeed over, but that the famine is not. UNICEF officials told us that
the Gedo region (south and west of Bardera, toward the borders with Ethiopia
and Kenya) was still insufficiently served, and there may be pockets of
starvation that have not yet been reached. Elsewhere, there are thousands
of displaced persons who may be safely out of danger of starvation, but
whose nutritional needs have not been completely met. The same is true
for many more thousands who are being fed in their own villages. It must
be understood that a very high percentage of the population in the south-central
region is now wholly or partially dependent on relief assistance for their
food. Unemployment is rampant, as what little industry existed in Somalia
has been destroyed, and the war has left farming families without seeds
and tools so that they will not be able any time soon to fend for themselves.

Economic activity, including market-oriented
production and normal distribution channels, has been deeply disrupted
by the fighting and dislocation. For that reason, the encouraging but slow
recovery of some crops, the assistance provided by some NGOs in the form
of seeds, tools and veterinarian services to rehabilitate agriculture and
livestock, and the economic activity generated by the foreign presence
remain completely insufficient at this time to cover the needs of the population.
It is important, of course, to implement relief programs that reduce the
dependence on imported, donated food, because Somalis need to recover not
only health and nutrition, but also self-reliance. But it would be a serious
mistake to declare victory against famine and leave Somalia before it is
certain that the secure environment needed to overcome famine can be maintained.

Paradoxically, the increased security
for those delivering humanitarian services has resulted in more insecurity
for others in Somalia. With relief supplies no longer easy picking, thugs
and looters, be they under the control of organized forces or acting on
their own, have turned to other targets for theft and extortion. Foreign
journalists have been victimized repeatedly. The insecurity for Somalis
is probably greater, although it is rarely makes the international press.
This transferred insecurity is a particular problem in Mogadishu, because
the city is large and it is not possible to secure most of its quarters.
Adding to that problem is that the conflict between rival factions of the
USC remains unresolved, and the cease-fire that such forces observe is
at best precarious. In Kismayu and Bardera, where there is a strong international
presence, the insecurity is even more closely related to the unsettled
political violence.

In the first few days, it is quite clear
that armed thugs acting on their own did withdraw and adopt a "wait-and-see"
attitude. But they soon realized that the foreign forces would concentrate
on protecting the humanitarian services and would not guard the general
population. As a result, large urban and rural areas were left where it
was safe to assume that there would beno presence of foreign troops. As
thugs moved to unprotected areas looking for new victims, these areas became
more dangerous than before the foreign troops arrived.15

A similar effect has been created with
respect to organized forces. Arriving ahead of the deployment of troops,
U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley immediately engaged in talks with some of
the warlords, to warn them against any attempt to attack the foreign troops.
This diplomacy was very successful in ensuring a smooth landing for the
international military contingents, as well as swift achievement of the
goal of protecting relief services. Military spokesmen have frequently
pronounced the accomplishment of objectives "ahead of schedule." One key
element of these negotiations is that the warlords agreed to take their
"technicals," artillery pieces and troops out of the areas where the international
troops would operate. In some cases, they placed that materiel in encampments
that were easy to supervise, or they hid some of their weapons. In other
instances, however, many of these troops, and weapons were simply removed
from the sight of the international troops, and sent to regions in which
inter-clan fighting is still taking place. The result is additional instability
and insecurity in those areas.

Those in charge of the international
military operation have countered calls to increase disarmament and policing
efforts by responding that the forces have no authority to disarm, citing
the narrow scope of the U.N. mandate, which speaks of "establish[ing] a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia..." (items
7 and 10). They also point out that to disarm, all Somalis would have to
be told that owning and displaying weapons is illegal, which it currently
is not. Some authority would have to legislate that possessing a gun is
a punishable offense, and another authority would have to take responsibility
for applying appropriate sanctions. For the U.N. forces to do all or part
of this, it is argued, would make them in fact the government of Somalia,
in the form of an occupation force-a responsibility that they are reluctant
to assume.

Although Africa Watch takes no position
on the issue of expanding the mandate of the foreign troops, we note here
that their limited mandate has created or at least exacerbated a legal
vacuum on the ground. A limited international military mandate makes sense
if there is some other authority that is responsible for maintaining law
and order. Even if that authority is derelict in the discharge of its duties,
or too weak to perform them adequately, there at least would be an authority
to go to in demand of protection. In Somalia, however, such authority simply
does not exist, as the United Nations has explicitly recognized in its
resolutions.16 Under such circumstances, the
unintended result of a limited mandate is the generation of more insecurity
everywhere except in the delivery of emergency assistance.

In fact, the U.N. forces have not applied
such a strict interpretation of their mandate. The rules of engagement
have been adapted over time. For example, while the small peace-keeping
force deployed in mid-1992 adopted a policy of not shooting at all, not
even in self-defense,17the massive forces deployed
in December (known as the United Nations Task Force, or UNITAF) were authorized
from the start to shoot in self-defense or when they perceived any danger
to themselves or to the relief operation. Because weapons pointed at them
were understood to constitute such a danger, UNITAF forces were authorized
to open fire. In the first days of the December deployment, these rules
resulted in a passive attitude by the international forces in the presence
of weapons on the streets of Mogadishu. At the same time, some NGOs complained
that their hired guards were disarmed, which placed the NGOs again in danger
of being looted or extorted by those who retained their weapons. Soon thereafter,
the rules were changed: the foreign troops began to confiscate weapons
when they were displayed in public, since that was said to create a public
danger. If rifles, assault rifles and handguns were carried in cars, but
concealed, their owners were allowed to keep them. By agreement with the
organized factions, artillery pieces, "technicals" and all other crew-served
weapons were placed in cantonment areas, and if any of them were found
in the streets they were subject to confiscation.

Even while maintaining the rules of engagement
as described above, the international forces in January abandoned their
passivity in a few significant ways. On January 8, U.S. forces attacked
and destroyed an encampment in South Mogadishu, which was under the control
of General Aideed. U.S. military commanders justified the action as legitimate
under the rules of engagement, because they claimed that individuals in
the camp had previously fired on U.S. forces. The following week, U.S.
Marines conducted a highly publicized raid of the Bakara market in Mogadishu,
where they found and confiscated caches of weapons. On January 25, U.S.
forces attacked a contingent under the command of General Morgan as his
troops were closing in on the southern port of Kismayu. U.S. forces have
also begun to patrol certain neighborhoods of Mogadishu, unrelated to the
delivery of emergency relief assistance, to provide a degree of protection
to the city.

At times, this stepped-up protective
presence has seemed to backfire. On January 15, near Buur Leego, a town
on the road between Mogadishu and Baidoa, a serious incident resulted in
tragic loss of life. U.S. Marines approached a truck at night just as the
truck, with many civilians on board, was being held up by gunmen. The Marines
were fired upon and they returned fire. The shooting left one assailant
and five civilians dead; the other assailants escaped, and at least six
Somalis were wounded. A few days earlier, near Wanlaweyn, on the same road,
looters held up a vehicle of an international relief organization that
carried wounded men, and shot the driver in the leg. It was reported that
a short time earlier, U.S. Marines had confiscated the weapons borne by
the relief agency's guards, for lack of registration documents.18

The international forces deployed in
December have generally made a consistent effort to treat civilians with
respect and to avoid useless confrontation. Relief workers and independentobservers
told Africa Watch that, for the most part, foreign troops on patrol or
providing escort to food deliveries were judicious in limiting their use
of force.

However, there have been several troubling
exceptions to this restraint. Most recently, on February 4, 1993, U.S.
Marines shot and killed a 13-year-old boy, who they stated was running
behind a military truck and appeared to be about to throw a grenade at
them. According to Somali eye-witnesses, though, the boy was merely pointing
at the soldiers, with empty hands, and had a box, probably a military ration
package, in his pocket.19 In another notable
exception to the restrained use of force, the French troops during the
first few days of the intervention were reportedly unnecessarily hostile
and harsh to the civilian population, sometimes coming close to provoking
dangerous incidents. On December 11, a French Foreign Legion contingent
had set up a checkpoint in Mogadishu. A beat-up old van overloaded with
civilian passengers failed to stop, apparently due to brake failure, and
the French troops opened fire, killing two person and wounding seven others.
U.S. Marines who were present also opened fire.20
At first, French and U.S. military authorities claimed that the troops
had been fired upon, but later they admitted that they had never been under
attack. As a result of this incident, the French troops have been moved
out of Mogadishu, to Hoddur, where there have apparently been no new problems.
In another incident, a U.S. Marine is reported to have entered a private
home in Mogadishu and opened fire on a Somali who happened to have a gun
in his possession.

At the incident in Buur Leego, described
above, we believe the U.S. Marines may have acted in violation of their
obligations under the laws of war. They were operating at night, using
night-vision goggles, as they approached a civilian vehicle. For that reason,
they presumably were aware that there were women and children in the truck.
We do not dispute the legality of their decision to open fire to put down
an attack on them. Under those circumstances, however, a soldier is still
under an obligation to use means that will minimize potential harm to civilians
that may be caught in the cross-fire. In addition, under the rule of proportionality,
soldiers must refrain from causing incidental loss of civilian life that
is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.21
In this instance, a legitimate question arises as to whether the troops
could not have protected themselves from attack by means that exacted a
lesser cost in innocent lives. Similarly, in the incident involving the
shooting of the 13-year-old boy, it appears, at the very least, that the
use of lethal force was disproportionate to the potential threat, and should
not have been used.

To issue a more definitive judgment,
we would need to have more information on the details of these episodes.
Our point, however, is that their tragic consequences should have led to
a detailed, honest examination of the circumstances, and eventually to
disciplinary action if appropriate. Instead, we are dismayed to see that
U.S. military spokesmen have hurried topronounce their actions legitimate,
without the benefit of serious inquiries. This is particularly disturbing
because it repeats a pattern established by the command of U.S. forces
in Panama and in the Gulf War, where there has been a complete refusal
to investigate acts of war by U.S. forces that caused serious civilian
casualties.22

Military law specialists stationed with
the troops in Somalia have sought the expertise of the ICRC in developing
guidelines for the behavior of troops in case of combat. There is a program
to provide compensation for innocent victims, although so far it appears
to have benefitted only the victims of traffic accidents involving the
American troops. In addition, press reports suggest that the families of
those shot by U.S. troops are sometimes treated in an unnecessarily callous
fashion.23 As during the Gulf War, military spokesmen
consistently refuse to provide any information on the identity or number
of Somali casualties inflicted in the course of the few encounters that
have taken place. It is known that some Somali militias and others wounded
in attacks by the foreign troops have been taken to military hospitals,
but public information about them has so far been unavailable.24

The Geneva Conventions place a clear
obligation on forces participating in any military action to collect the
enemy dead, to identify them, to provide information to relatives if possible,
and to bury them as appropriate.25 We are told
that the Office of the Judge Advocate General assigned to the American
force deployed in Somalia has advised that such actions must be undertaken.
However, the press has been repeatedly frustrated in its effort to obtain
any such information from the military. In reporting shooting incidents,
the military press officers have consistently responded to inquiries about
Somali casualties that such information is unavailable because the troops
did not attempt to verify whether there had been Somali casualties.26
This response suggests that important humanitarian obligations imposed
by the Geneva Conventions are not being properly discharged, as indeed
it was not in Panama and in the Gulf War.

The Status of Civil Society since
the Deployment of International Troops

Throughout the worst moments of the famine,
the NGOs that stayed in Somalia to confront it (ICRC, Medecins Sans Frontieres,
Save the Children-UK, International Medical Corps) obtained invaluable
help from persons and groups that have received scant credit and attention:
their Somali employees, the clan elders and civic leaders who helped to
coordinate their efforts, and Somali doctors and other health professionals
who labored selflessly for months without reward. Even under the most dangerous
conditions, Somalis have created their own organizations of civil society
to provide some educational and health services, as well as employment
and development opportunities. These unsung heros of the Somali catastrophehave
also struggled courageously to keep those organizations alive against overwhelming
odds. All experts agree that any serious plan to address the famine, and
to reconstruct Somalia after it, must build upon this invaluable foundation.
And yet since December their voices have not been appropriately heard and
their counsel has not been assiduously sought.

In Mogadishu, a group of women started
a women's development organization called IIDA in 1991. IIDA states that
in the last two years it has maintained its independence from the factions
in the capital, and that its membership cuts across clan lines. With assistance
from German NGOs and the ICRC, IIDA provides a variety of services, including:
running an elementary coeducational school and a cooperative that employs
women in weaving and other crafts; providing food and other support to
the staff of hospitals; and assisting the ICRC with a program to employ
Somalis in sweeping and cleaning up the streets of Mogadishu.

IIDA leaders told us that they had fruitful
discussions with Mr. Sahnoun until his dismissal in October 1992. Since
then, they have had no contact with local officials of the United Nations,
who they consider unresponsive. IIDA did participate in meetings of relief
organizations in the Seychelles and in Addis Ababa, the latter held in
December 1992. They asked to attend the Addis Ababa peace conference that
began on January 4, 1993, but were told that the meeting was restricted
to the fighting factions. IIDA insists that it is ready to discuss the
future of Somalia, and that the peace negotiations should include them
and other independent groups.

IIDA leaders reported that many of the
international NGOs were equally unresponsive to their suggestions and requests
for assistance, although UNITAF had, from time to time, provided IIDA with
armed escort to relief operations as requested. They told Africa Watch
that they had requested a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley, which
took place on January 14. Expressing a "need to pay more attention to them
in the future," Oakley reportedly donated $5,000 for IIDA's school, and
advised them to link up with foreign aid agencies.27

A group of young residents of the capital
formed the Union for Somali Salvation Youth (USSY) in 1991, with the purpose
of mediating disputes through discussion with the leadership of the warring
factions. In September 1992, they organized a peaceful demonstration and
a fast to appeal to the factions led by Ali Mahdi and Aideed to stop fighting.
(As described earlier in this report, that demonstration was attacked by
Ali Mahdi supporters.) In August 1992, USSY occupied the battered building
of the Ministry of Education, where it offers elementary and intermediate
education to thousands of children.

The USSY leaders told us that the foreign
NGOs and UNOSOM officials have been generally unresponsive to the organization's
appeals for assistance, on the grounds that the object of the foreign presence
is to provide food, not education. At times, USSY has been told that it
must bring a letter from General Aideed, because the NGOs do not wish to
be seen as supporting groups that oppose the established warlords.

Other Somali NGOs have long been active
in other parts of Somalia. In the north, for example, organizations like
the Somali Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SORRA) and theSomali
Relief Association (SOMRA) have run clinics, schools and sanitation projects;
mediated clan disputes, and provided valuable assistance to international
NGOs working there. These organizations and others have often been a means
for Somali intellectuals and activists not involved in waging war to do
useful work for their communities. However, they have been able to raise
meager if any resources and do not generally receive assistance from the
U.N., international NGOs or outside sources.

United States officials repeatedly told
us that the immediate effect of Operation Restore Hope was a noticeable
replacement of war lord cronies with a newly emerging Somali leadership
with clean hands, and that organizations of Somali civil society and other
grass roots leaders were being empowered by their role in coordinating
the delivery of aid. From our on-site observations, we believe that such
may be the intent of the relief and security policies currently being implemented,
but we do not share the far-too-optimistic view that this important objective
is already being accomplished. The dissatisfaction expressed to us by IIDA
and USSY are illustrations of our point.

U.S. officials told us that Mogadishu
is especially complicated in this regard because the capital is not completely
secured. In the interior of the country, they said, the story is different:
in Baidoa the foreign troops have secured the town and the displacement
of the warlords in favor of to a new leadership is already visible. Indeed,
Baidoa was repeatedly touted as the "model" of what is being accomplished
in the political realm through Operation Restore Hope.

In Baidoa, however, we found a very different
picture. The town is definitely secure, and the humanitarian assistance
proceeds quite smoothly, but there is still a long way to go before an
alternative Somali leadership emerges. We talked to many NGO workers, and
invariably they told us that the same people who for months had held them
hostage are now in charge of coordinating relief services with them and
the UNITAF troops. The thugs who used to control relief operations with
their guns have simply redefined themselves as members of "relief committees."
As late as January 2, 1993, CARE was looted of fifty tons of food. Irish
Concern decided to invest in education, and began rebuilding a school in
December, after the Marines had secured Baidoa. The same night, all of
the construction materials were looted; they reportedly showed up in the
local market a few days later.

UNOSOM and United States diplomats actively
encourage the formation of "regional relief committees" as a means to bring
Somalis into the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It appears that,
in some places, the idea works. Wajit, a town northwest of Baidoa where
Irish Concern is present, seems to have succeeded in creating an effective
local structure under the protective umbrella of UNITAF. In contrast, in
Buur Akaba, midway between Mogadishu and Baidoa, the local relief committee,
still dominated by allies of General Aideed, seems itself to be the source
of insecurity for relief operations. An American NGO that works in the
town reportedly experienced serious threats because it refused to recruit
workers through the committee.

In Baidoa, the NGOs openly refuse to
work with the Regional Relief Committee; nine of the eleven foreign NGOs
active in the area boycott a periodic meeting between the relief committee,
the NGOs and the UNITAF civilian-military operations command. Some clan
elders apparently are beginning to join local efforts at relief coordination
and reconstruction, but the official committee that enjoys the support
of UNOSOM and UNITAF is dominated by the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM),
a Rahanweyn-based militia that was allied with General Aideed.Our delegation
did come in contact with Somalis who have played no part in the destruction
of Baidoa and who are struggling to provide sorely needed services in cooperation
with international NGOs. Impressive examples are the citizens group that
runs the Baidoa orphanage and the Somali women who daily feed and care
for dozens of children there. However, when the Africa Watch delegation
was in Baidoa, however, these valuable citizens were not represented in
the Regional Relief Committee, and they were far from exerting influence
in the community beyond their own humanitarian efforts.

During our visit to Baidoa, we noticed
that insistent talk about the imminent departure of the U.S. Marine Corps
contingent deployed there was creating some anxiety about security after
the troops left, and probably prevented well-meaning Somalis from stepping
forward into positions of leadership. The Marines did leave on January
23, 1993, to return to the United States, and they were replaced by 900
Australian troops. According to subsequent press reports, the transfer
of military duties went smoothly and conditions in Baidoa have continued
to improve.

V. The Present Needs
and Some Recommendations for Action

Civil Society

For a lasting peace in Somalia, a legitimate
government, accountable to its citizenry and sensitive to their needs,
must be helped to emerge. It is hard to envision such a government arising
from any combination of the presently warring factions. Africa Watch believes
that this authority has to be built from the ground up, and that it is
primarily the responsibility of the United Nations to generate conditions
for such a process to take place. Representatives of local communities
must be encouraged to participate in the decisions that affect their lives,
free of interference from the armed factions. That participation must begin
as soon as possible where it is not now occurring and it must be strengthened
and solidified where it has already started. Discussions with these local
representatives should lead to the identification of the most urgent community
problems and their solutions: how to establish security and basic services,
including education and health, and most important, how to make those who
are entrusted with those tasks accountable to the community.

For legitimate local authorities to begin
to assert themselves, several steps must be taken. First, local leaders
who are independent of the armed factions will have little incentive to
assert themselves unless their long-term safety can be guaranteed. For
the reasons stated earlier, the international forces can be a protective
umbrella, but they are no substitute for Somali law enforcement bodies
that are urgently needed. As UNOSOM has begun to perceive, an integral
part of creating a safe environment is the creation of a responsible and
lawful local police force. Second, active on-the-ground diplomacy by the
U.N. must assist communities in establishing the conditions to permit the
free selection of local leaders who are accountable to their constituencies.
UNOSOM representatives should help to empower these leaders by encouraging
their participation in relief and rehabilitation efforts. Third, the national-level
peace talks currently taking place in Addis Ababa must be broadened to
include the participation of elements of civil society other than the warlords.
If it appears, as it now does, that the Addis peace conference will include
only the warring factions and result in their future assumption of leadership
roles in Somalia, local figures of authority who are independent of the
warlords will be discouraged from participating in local governance.

1. The Creation of a Safe Environment

The continuing insecurity in Somalia
has brought into sharp focus the question of whether the international
forces should proceed to disarm the country. An overwhelming majority of
Somalis openly call for disarmament and many argue that, without it, the
gains made in defeating starvation will be ephemeral. There are so many
guns in the streets and roads, and they are in the hands of so many disparate
and irresponsible elements of society, that it is not enough to ensure
that the warlords refrain in the short term from using the weapons they
control. It is further argued that if there is no disarmament, banditry
will accelerate as farmers return to their lands to harvest crops and those
crops once again become valuable commodities.

Moreover, it is sometimes argued that
a concerted, consistent policy of disarmament is a natural and necessary
extension of the mandate conferred by the Security Council on the international
forces to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In that light,
disarmament is simply another method-and perhaps a more efficient one-of
achieving a secure environment for the aid and development programs. In
addition, humanitarian activity is not limited to hot food kitchens; it
also includes support for the reconstruction of agriculture and livestock
breeding, as well as for the rehabilitation of market mechanisms for the
distribution of food and health care to needy people. These activities
cannot be adequately protected while the country is awash in weapons.

Africa Watch takes no position on whether
the mandate of the U.N. forces should be extended to include disarmament.28
However, we continue to stand by our call, issued in early 1992, for military
protection of humanitarian relief efforts, and we believe that the December
3, 1992 Security Council Resolution was an important response to the urgent
need to save lives. We simply state here that the problem of disarmament
remains a stumbling block to long-term efforts to build a secure environment
and that this broader goal must be addressed, by the United Nations in
its role as mediator in the armed conflict, by the organized factions that
are collectively responsible for the insecurity they have created, and
by organizations of Somali civil society that can attest to the pressing
need to establish the rule of law.

A noticeable increase in patrolling and
occasional disarmament activity, in our view, are not enough to address
the problem of insecurity and its potential effect on humanitarian assistance.
These actions constitute gestures and not a concerted, consistent policy.
They send a signal of uncertainty which serves as a disincentive for Somalis
of good will to step forward and assume leadership roles.

If disarmament does proceed-and especially
if the effort is led by UNITAF-we believe the following principles should
apply. To generate confidence, a policy of disarmament must be even-handed
and avoid any perception of playing favorites. It cannot start with those
who are easier to disarm, such as hired armed guards, because it would
once again leave relief NGOs, Somali families, legitimate businesses and
foreign visitors at the mercy of the more-difficult-to-disarm thugs and
warlords. In addition, most hired guards use their weapons only for defensivepurposes
and are loyal to their employers; for the most part, they are not contributing
to the climate of insecurity. With respect to the armed factions, disarmament
must proceed simultaneously so as to avoid creating unfair advantages,
and it has to be carefully supervised to avoid concealment of weapons.
It must be accompanied by some form of receivership in neutral hands, with
full public disclosure and verified destruction of weapons and munitions.
There must also be a concerted plan to prevent importation of new weapons.29

The U.N.-sponsored conference in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, held between January 4 and January 15, produced an important
agreement on disarmament, even if little other progress was achieved. Participants
agreed to disarm by March 1. There are reasons to be skeptical about this
agreement. One is that not all military factions were present or fully
participating, so that the disarmament agreement does not bind all fighting
forces, let alone the countless Somalis with guns who at any time can be
considered "uncontrolled." Another reason is that the agreement contains
precious little detail on implementation and verification. Finally, the
past behavior of the forces that now pledge to disarm does not inspire
confidence in their good faith. In fact, on February 4, U.S. General Robert
Johnston, the commander of the UNITAF forces, called upon the armed factions
to begin the disarmament process and inform the U.N. by February 15 of
the location and composition of their troops and weapons.30
The deadline went unheeded and was extended until February 23.31

Nevertheless, the Addis Ababa agreement
to disarm could be an important step in that direction. In the first place,
it could provide a clear mandate for the U.N. forces to proceed to take
weapons out of circulation. For this, the agreement may have to be complemented
with a specific request from all parties to the U.N. to implement the agreement
and verify compliance. Even if the warlords' commitments are heeded, long-term
security will depend on the creation of a responsible police force, backed
by an independent judicial system.

We are encouraged by the announcement
that detailed arrangements have been made for an orderly transfer of the
military command of UNITAF to the United Nations, because it provides assurances
to Somalis that the international community is committed to a long-term
strategy of ensuring security in Somalia. In our view, some degree of certainty
about the immediate future will go a long way toward encouraging Somalis
to come forward and provide an alternative leadership to that of the warlords.

2. The Creation of a Somali Police
Force

Creation of a Somali police force has
been unanimously pronounced as urgent, and yet for more than one month
after the deployment of foreign troops very little was done. We have heard
that in Wajit a successful effort is under way to create a local police
force, complete with uniforms donated by European sources. In Mogadishu,
U.S. troops recently began patrolling in the company of some armed Somalis
who the U.S. hopes will form a police force for the city. In early February,
the U.N. Development Program announced a project to fund the training of
6,000 policemen.32 Some European countries have
reportedly offered technical assistance and training to a future Somali
police force.

It is encouraging to note that the international
community is taking concerted steps in this direction. Without more information
on the details of these plans, it is hard to comment on them. Nevertheless,
Africa Watch believes that some basic principles should guide the development
of these projects. First, it is important not to wait for a comprehensive
political settlement, because a possible result could be that the ranks
of the future police would be filled by the demobilized combatants of the
factional militias, a terrifying prospect. Second, at the outset it is
best not to envision a national police force but local and regional bodies.
Recruitment of the right people would be easier to control, and from the
start small local forces can be made accountable to the community. Legitimate
Somali leaders should be encouraged to devise mechanisms that would ensure
citizen-based review of police actions. Third, communities that have attained
a small amount of order (in the north and northeast, for example) should
be immediately assisted with the creation of police forces. This may provide
models to follow elsewhere.

3. Diplomacy on the Ground and Participation
in Relief Efforts

Involvement of Somalis in the immediate
tasks of humanitarian assistance, and in decisions about security, is an
explicit goal of UNOSOM and UNITAF. Africa Watch supports that idea, but
insists that much more needs to be done in practice to achieve it. In Mogadishu
and Baidoa, we were allowed to sit in at daily meetings between NGO representatives,
UNOSOM humanitarian coordinators, and officers of UNITAF assigned to civilian-military
operations. No Somali citizens attend those meetings. Those daily sessions
are very effective in achieving an impressive degree of coordination between
the military and the foreign relief side of the operation. We understand
that their narrow purpose is to coordinate security for relief efforts
and to report any security problems. Even so, we register our concern that
the daily insecurity suffered by Somali communities does not merit anything
remotely resembling that level of attention, and that the opinion of legitimate
organizations of Somali civil society in matters affecting their vital
interest is not more actively sought.

To bolster independent authority, the
U.N. must begin active, on-the-ground diplomacy, to make the concept of
regional relief committees work. In particular, the U.N. should work with
local communities to ensure that the regional relief committees are independent
of factional control, are accountable to local citizens, and do not replace
existing private Somali NGOs.

In Baidoa, this active diplomacy is precisely
what is lacking. Technically, UNOSOM has representatives in each of the
seven centers (outside Mogadishu) where the military and relief operations
are coordinated. In practice, the UNOSOM official in Baidoa had spent little
time there as of early January. In general, we observed that UNOSOM's presence
throughout Somalia was passive and almost unnoticed. Relief workers complain
that, in the absence of civilian UNOSOM officials, they and U.S. military
officers are forced to engage in complex negotiations with local and regional
officials of the warring factions.

We believe that an expanded civilian
U.N. presence would encourage genuine organizations of civil society and
other Somalis with clean hands to displace the warlords from positions
of authority. Currently, there is no serious effort to conduct U.N. diplomacy
on the ground in Somalia, and without it, there is little hope that Somalis
who are not responsible for the crimes of the recent past will come forward
and participate in recreating a Somali state. The absence of the U.N. is
troublesome because, without active on-the-ground diplomacy, the structures
conceived by UNOSOM such as the regional relief committees are an easy
prey for the local powers that be, meaning the organized thugs of the political
factions.

4. Broaden the Peace Process

The efforts by Ambassador Oakley on the
ground in Somalia have been directed at securing from the warlords their
cooperation in not attacking the international forces. But in reaching
out very publicly to the warlords, he has conferred a measure of legitimacy
on them. This is especially problematic because in fact distinctions are
made between the warlords. Oakley openly refuses to talk to some warlords
while seeking out Aideed and Ali Mahdi. While we do not believe that the
intent is to sanction any warlord's rise to power, this clearly different
treatment is exploited by the favored ones as a certificate of legitimacy.
Africa Watch believes that no distinctions should be made among murderers,
so that there can be no perception that the international community plays
favorites.

Ambassador Oakley has made a point of
refusing to meet with General Morgan, and has called him a "cold-blooded
murderer."33Africa Watch agrees that Oakley should
not meet with Morgan precisely because of that reason, but we are at a
loss to understand the logic of meeting with other warlords whose hands
are equally full of the blood of innocent Somalis. During our visit to
Mogadishu we raised this question with Ambassador Oakley's closest aides,
and we were told that the U.S. Special Envoy saw no political future for
General Morgan in Somalia. The implication of this answer is that political
considerations, not their human rights records, account for the difference
in the way each warlord is dealt with. In our view, none of the warlords
should have a political future in a reconstituted Somalia, and it is crucial
that the current efforts by the international community are carefully designed
to avoid giving any of them preferential treatment.

Somali public opinion, with good reason
given the international community's attitudes during the Siad Barre dictatorship,
is skeptical about the impartial nature of the current involvement. For
that reason, it is important to convey unequivocal signals that the international
community recognizes no better or worse warlords and certainly does not
legitimize any of them. To the degree that the international community
must deal with the warlords, such a factshould be recognized as a necessary
evil, and talks should take place at a low level and not as public photo
opportunities.

This is especially needed now, as the
U.S. Special Envoy prepares to yield a large measure of responsibility
to the United Nations. Mr. Oakley should take public steps to avoid the
unwanted effect of legitimizing any of the warring factions. And, as the
United Nations assumes a larger role in the command of a reconstituted
UNITAF and enters into a new phase of the relief and peace-making operation,
it is incumbent upon its appointed representatives on the ground to make
similar pronouncements. In particular, due to a widespread perception among
Somalis that the United Nations is biased in favor of one of the factions,
its representatives must firmly establish their impartiality by clearly
emphasizing that there are no particular friends or pre-arranged scenarios
for the distribution of power.

The peace conference in Addis Ababa is,
up to now, a conversation among warlords. As stated earlier, we object
to the exclusion of organizations of civil society from these talks: if
the talks are to achieve any beneficial result, they cannot be conversations
among mass murderers. Though the imperative of talking to the warring factions
to obtain assurances on security arrangements must be acknowledged, a broader
political discussion should not rely exclusively on these factions. The
U.N. and the government of Ethiopia, as sponsors of the Addis Ababa peace
process, need urgently to expand the representation of Somali society at
the talks, and specifically to break through the factional-and to a large
degree fictional-representation of clans and sub-clans and achieve a fair
representation of different sectors through traditional as well as emerging
leadership.34

5. A Proper Role for Clan and Sub-clan
Participation

Representatives of all regions of Somalia
must be encouraged to discuss whether they want a national government or
an appropriate regimen of autonomy and federation. Somali individuals,
families and groups must be allowed to decide where they want to live.
All emerging local, regional or factional authorities must be asked to
pledge that in each territory they will respect the rights of minorities
to live there, to work, to worship, to associate peacefully, to express
themselves and to participate in the affairs of the community. This must
include those Somalis who are not identified with any clan or sub-clan.

Accountability

There must be an effort to make those
responsible for egregious crimes accountable to the Somali people and to
the international community. On at least two occasions the Security Council
has warned that there will be a price to pay for the violations committed
against human decency, and it is time to propose and implement a plan for
that purpose.

1. Accountability Must Be Included
on the Agenda of the Peace Talks

There needs to be a more aggressive mediation
role by the United Nations. Up to now, the U.N. has allowed the warlords
to set the agenda for the talks. That may have been a necessaryfirst step
to set the process in motion and achieve some momentum, and indeed, some
early results are encouraging. But a precarious cease-fire and a pledge
to disarm in the future are not enough. In particular, the U.N. needs to
force the parties to agree to respect human rights and to allow their behavior
to be monitored, as well as a process to achieve accountability for the
crimes of the past.

2. The U.N. Should Document Past and
Ongoing Human Rights Violations

As it has done in other countries, the
United Nations should deploy specialized personnel to investigate and document
violations of human rights that have been committed in recent years, in
order to preserve the memory of those abuses and to offer the victims and
their relatives an appropriate forum to tell their stories. At some point,
the courts and civilian authorities of a reconstituted Somali state must
decide whether there will be prosecutions and punishment. In the meantime,
as they select their future leaders, Somalis will be able to make informed
judgments as to the responsibility borne by each warlord and faction for
the crimes perpetrated against the Somali population. This investigation
and truth-telling must be a credible, long-term effort, conducted under
rigorous research standards with guarantees of impartiality, balance and
reliability.

The U.N. will need to commit resources
to the verification and truth-telling efforts we propose, as it does to
its military, relief and diplomatic tasks. For these equally important
exercises for bringing human rights into sharper focus, governments must
be willing to provide the U.N. with adequate funding and in-kind assistance,
and to allow their own officials to be assigned temporarily to U.N. duties.
In Central America, in the Balkans, in Cambodia and in Namibia, the United
Nations has amassed a body of experience in such human rights monitoring.
Although there will be a need to avoid errors committed in those experiments,
Somalia presents a challenge that the United Nations must face with creativity
and vision.

A new Security Council meeting is expected
on Somalia as this report goes to press (February 1993). We are encouraged
to learn that the United States Mission to the United Nations has submitted
a draft resolution that includes language calling upon the U.N. to "receive,
collect, and preserve information relating to serious violations of international
humanitarian law in Somalia." We firmly support the idea, and encourage
the Clinton Administration to find ways to support its passage and implementation,
by providing the necessary resources. We believe that the effort must be
thorough and broad; it will be necessary to assign experienced human rights
monitors and investigators to many areas. We call on the United States
and other governments to fund this effort generously so that the U.N. can
hire capable monitors, and wherever possible to assign their own experienced
investigators to work under the U.N.'s direction.

Once the evidence of atrocities has been
compiled, we believe it will show that several warlords and military leaders
have been responsible for massive violations that can rightly be called
crimes against humanity. At that point, the courts of a reconstituted Somali
state will bear the burden of prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators.
If they are unable or unwilling to live up to this obligation, then the
United Nations should create an international tribunal to bring to justice
those who may be guilty of crimes against humanity.

3. Verifying the Peace Accords

The United Nations must offer its services
to the parties to the negotiations, not only as a mediator of the talks,
but in verification of compliance with the agreements reached. To this
end, in addition to troops of different nationalities, the United Nations
must be prepared to deploy civilian agents in sufficient number to monitor
the behavior of all factions, to verify implementation of the cease-fire
and other specific accords, and to witness a peaceful transition to a new
Somali state. In particular, civilian monitors-backed where necessary by
foreign troops-are needed to monitor compliance with human rights standards
by those entrusted with governmental functions, and compliance with the
laws of war and the truce by armed factions until they disarm.

***

Africa Watch is a non-governmental organization
which was established in May 1988 to monitor human rights practices in
Africa and to promote respect for internationally recognized standards.
Its Chair is William Carmichael; its Vice-Chair is Alice Brown. Its research
associates are Janet Fleischman and Karen Sorensen; Bronwen Manby is a
Schell Fellow; Abdelsalam Hassan is a consultant and Anthony Levintow,
Ben Penglase and Urmi Shah are Associates.

Africa Watch is a division of Human Rights
Watch, which also includes Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch,
Middle East Watch and Fund For Free Expression. The Chair of Human Rights
Watch is Robert L Bernstein and the Vice-Chair is Adrian W DeWind. Aryeh
Neier is Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, the Deputy Director
is Kenneth Roth; Holly J. Burkhalter is Washington Director; Gara LaMarche
is Associate Director and Susan Osnos is Press Director.

For further information contact:

Juan E. Méndez tel: 202-371-6592

Susan Osnos tel: 212-972-8400

1 See Africa Watch, Somalia: A Government
at War with Its Own People, (January 1990), for details on this conflict.

2 See, for further examples, the chapter on
"Unfair Economic Practices," in Africa Watch, Somalia: A Government
at War with Its Own People, pp. 83-86.

3 Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Rights,
Somalia: No Mercy in Mogadishu, New York and Boston,March 1992,
p. 5.

10 For further details, see, Africa Watch,
Somalia: A Fight to the Death, February 13, 1992, Vol. IV, Number
2, pp. 7-10.

11 It is important to note that, due largely
to the influence of the Bush Administration, these resolutions were watered
down and became ineffective. Although high-ranking officials at the State
Department made public calls for emergency humanitarian action in Somalia,
the White House did not want to raise the profile of foreign policy issues
during an election year. At hearings before Congress in April, U.S. diplomats
confirmed that their position at the Security Council had been to soften
the language of the resolutions, out of concern for the security of an
international peace-keeping operation. See Human Rights Watch, World
Report 1993, New York, December 1992, pp. 44-45.

12 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General,
Letter to the President of the Security Council, 29 November 1992 (U.N.
document S/24868).

13 Since Devereux's death, Kurt Lustenberger,
a 32-year-old Swiss man working with the ICRC, was killed on January 14,
in Bardera, and Valerie Place, a 23-year-old nurse with Irish Concern was
killed near Afgoi on February 22. Two U.S. Marines, Pfc. Domingo Arroyo
and Lance Cpl. Anthony Botello; and a civilian employee of the U.S. Army,
Lawrence Freedman, have also been killed. Army Pvt. David J. Connor died
in an truck accident.

14 "Unicef quits town after British aid man
killed," The Independent (London), January 4, 1993.

15 In January 1993, the international troops
began wider patrolling efforts, somewhat alleviating this problem. Still,
large areas of Somalia remain where there is no international military
presence.

16 See below for efforts currently under way
to reconstitute a police body in several Somali cities.

17 The commander of the U.N. force, Brig. Gen.
Imtiaz Shaheen, has said that the troops were allowed to fire any time
that they perceived a threat, but that Shaheen had chosen to be very cautious
about theexercise of this power because his force was so small. Also, U.N.
troop deployment was contingent upon acceptance by the warring factions,
which was never fully granted. Keith Richburg, "Top U.N. Officer In Somalia
Says Tactic Were Apt: Pakistani Defends His Troops But Says They Were Too
Few," The Washington Post, January 23, 1993.

19 Diana Jean Schemo, "Boy's Death in Somalia
Tests Uneasy U.S. Role," The New York Times, February 20, 1993.

20 Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon Says Killing
of 2 Somalis May Have Been Accidental," The New York Times, December
12, 1992.

21 Despite the humanitarian mandate of the
international forces, Somalia has become an international armed conflict
and, consequently, all forces operating there are bound by the laws of
war, or international humanitarian law. The principles cited above have
achieved the status of customary law.

22 See Americas Watch, The Laws of War and
the Conduct of the Panama Invasion, May 1990; Middle East Watch, Needless
Deaths in the Gulf War, November 1991.

28 In keeping with our mandate as an organization
that concerns itself exclusively with the international law of human rights,
and not with other aspects of international law and policy, Africa Watch
(a division of Human Rights Watch) takes no position on the matter of the
possible expansion of the current U.N. mandate for military forces in Somalia.

29 The Security Council has established and
reiterated an arms embargo for Somalia (United Nations Security Council
Resolution 733, adopted on January 23, 1992). Yet, nothing has been done
to control weapons importation or to make violators pay a political price,
as when materiel and personnel belonging to the Kenyan armed forces were
captured. In Nairobi and in Mogadishu, we met with NGO and U.S. government
relief officials who thought no arms embargo was in place. U.N. officials
have reportedly said that an embargo is impossible to enforce. Even admitting
those serious difficulties, it seems to us that the U.N. must do something
to take its own decisions seriously if it expects them to have any positive
effect.

33 Molly Moore, "Deep in the Desert With a
Somali Militia," The Washington Post, February 23, 1993.

34 In this regard, we note that large numbers
of Somalis currently in exile across the country's borders support mass
murderers such as General Morgan, solely because they believe their sub-clan's
survival depends on him. In our view, it is urgent to find ways in which
all sectors of Somali society -- including those now living abroad -- can
feel adequately represented at the peace talks.