The Fall of Kabul, April 1992

Kabul ultimately fell to the mujahidin because the factions in its government
had finally pulled it apart. Until demoralized by the defections of its senior
officers, the army had achieved a level of performance it had never reached
under direct Soviet tutelage. It was a classic case of loss of morale. The
regime collapsed while it still possessed material superiority. Its stockpiles
of munitions and planes would provide the victorious mujahidin with the means of
waging years of highly destructive war. Kabul was short of fuel and food at the
end of winter in 1992, but its military units were supplied well enough to fight
indefinitely. They did not fight because their leaders were reduced to
scrambling for survival. Their aid had not only been cut off, the
Marxist-Leninist ideology that had provided the government its rationale for
existence been repudiated at its source.

A few days after it was clear that Najibullah had lost control, his army
commanders and governors arranged to turn over authority to resistance
commanders and local notables throughout the country. Joint councils or shuras
were immediately established for local government in which civil and military
officials of the former government were usually included. Reports indicate the
process was generally amicable. In many cases prior arrangements for
transferring regional and local authority had been made between foes.

Through mid-1995 these local arrangements have generally remained in place in
most of Afghanistan. Disruptions have occurred where local political
arrangements have been linked to been linked to the struggle that has developed
between the mujahidin parties. At the national level a political vacuum was
created and into it fell the expatriate parties in their rush to take control.
The enmities, ambitions, conceits and dogmas which had paralyzed their shadow
government proved to be even more disastrous in their struggle for power. The
traits they brought with them had been accentuated in the struggle for
preferment in Peshawar.

Collusions between military leaders quickly brought down the Kabul
government. In mid-January 1992, within three weeks of demise of the Soviet
Union, Ahmad Shah Massoud was aware of conflict within the government's northern
command. General Abdul Momim, in charge of the Hairatan border crossing at the
northern end of Kabul's supply highway, and other non-Pushtun generals based in
Mazari-i-Sharif feared removal by Najibullah and replacement by Pushtun
officers. The generals rebelled and the situation was taken over by Abdul Rashid
Dostam, who held general rank as head of the Jozjani militia, also based in
Mazar-i-Sharif. He and Massoud reached a political agreement, together with
another major militia leader, Sayyid Mansor, of the Ismaili community based in
Baghlan Province. These northern allies consolidated their position in
Mazar-i-Sharif on March 21. Their coalition covered nine provinces in the north
and northeast. As turmoil developed within the government in Kabul, there was no
government force standing between the northern allies and the major air force
base at Begram, some seventy kilometers north of Kabul. By mid-April the air
force command at Begram had capitulated to Massoud. Kabul was defenseless, its
army was no longer reliable.

Najibullah had lost internal control immediately after he announced his
willingness on March 18 to resign in order to make way for a neutral interim
government. As the government broke into several factions the issue had become
how to carry out a transfer of power. Najibullah attempted to fly out of Kabul
on April 17, but was stopped by Dostam's troops who controlled Kabul Airport
under the command of Karmal's brother, Mahmud Baryalai. Vengeance between
Parchami factions was reaped. Najibullah took sanctuary at the UN mission where
he remained in 1995. A group of Parchami generals and officials declared
themselves an interim government for the purpose of handing over power to the
mujahidin.

For more than a week Massoud remained poised to move his forces into the
capital. He was awaiting the arrival of political leadership from Peshawar. The
parties suddenly had sovereign power in their grasp, but no plan for executing
it. With his principal commander prepared to occupy Kabul, Rabbani was
positioned to prevail by default. Meanwhile UN mediators tried to find a
political solution that would assure a transfer of power acceptable to all
sides.