Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's has claimed that his country has enriched
uranium to a sufficient quality for use in a nuclear reactor, but he reiterated
his insistence that Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

LINDSEY HILSUM: Waiting for what they had been told would be good
news about the nuclear program, Iranian dignitaries and foreign ambassadors
summoned to the town of Mashad for an important announcement. President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived. This, for him, was a triumphal moment.

MAHMOUD
AHMADINEJAD, Iranian President: At this historical juncture, I announce,
in shadow of the Mahdi, the lord of time -- may we hasten his return
-- through the sacrifices of our scientists and our devoted youth and
the prayers of our brave people, we have mastered the nuclear fuel cycle
on a laboratory scale. And we have enriched uranium to the necessary
level for nuclear power generation.

LINDSEY HILSUM: "Allah Akbar," they responded. It was, said
the president, a day in history. According to the Iranian calendar,
the 22nd of Farvardin, 1385.

No mention of nuclear weapons or bombs. He went on to say that Iran
planned to continue enriching uranium, until it reached an industrial
scale, enough to fuel its nuclear power plants and provide electricity
for the nation.

Before the president spoke, the head of Iran's atomic energy organization
made a video presentation, showing Iran's nuclear facilities. He said
that, with their 164 centrifuges, they had enriched uranium to a level
which can be used for nuclear power. But, by the end of the year, he
said, they hope to have a plant which could output 3,000 tons of enriched
uranium every year. This technology is dual-use. The Iranians might
stop at nuclear power. But now they have the know-how, the breakout
capacity. They could work on a bomb, if they chose.

Iran's
nuclear program is thought to be spread over at least 50 sites. If the
164 centrifuges at Natanz are enriching uranium to 3.5 percent, it is
enough for nuclear power. And now they have mastered the process, they
could, at least in theory, enrich uranium to 90 percent, weapons-grade,
requiring some 2,000 centrifuges spinning to supersonic speeds.

The president was mobbed by the audience after his speech. But the
good news, as the Iranians had put it, did not go down well in London
and Washington. The British Foreign Office said, his comments were not
helpful. President Bush's spokesman said, Iran was moving in the wrong
direction and the matter would have to go back to the UN Security Council.

But President Ahmadinejad said, the West must respect Iran's right
to peaceful nuclear technology.

A
moment of triumph for Iran

MARGARET WARNER: And for more now on the significance of Iran's announcement,
we turn to two nuclear experts: Paul Leventhal, founder of the Nuclear
Control Institute, an independent research and advocacy group in Washington
that promotes nuclear non-proliferation; and David Albright, president
of the Institute For Science and International Security, which studies
nuclear programs worldwide. He worked with the U.N.'s nuclear agency,
the IAEA, monitoring nuclear programs in Iraq.

And welcome to you both.

Paul Leventhal, how big a milestone is this, in terms of the technology
required to produce nuclear weapons?

PAUL
LEVENTHAL, Founder, Nuclear Control Institute: Well, this is a moment
of triumph for the Iranian regime.

They are now claiming -- and this should soon be confirmed by the
international inspectors -- that they have enriched uranium. The quantity
was not specified, but they have enriched it to the low level needed
to -- to run nuclear power plants.

And this will be seen by some as a crossing of the line, because,
with that capability scaled up, they will have the ability to enrich
to weapons-grade. And another ominous aspect of this is that, by producing
low-enriched uranium, they are potentially producing feed for centrifuge
plants that will require far less number of centrifuges and a far small
quantity of uranium to reach weapons-grade, because, when you start
with 3.5 percent enriched, you can achieve weapons-grade with much less
effort than if you started with natural uranium, which is less than
1 percent of the fissionable isotope.

So, it -- it's -- it's an ominous moment, I think.

MARGARET WARNER: Do you find it ominous? Do you agree that they have
really crossed a line here on the way to weapons development, if they
chose to do it?

DAVID
ALBRIGHT, Institute For Science & International Security: It's significant
development, but it's -- it was not unexpected. I mean, they -- they
started this -- started working on this experiment on cascade in January.

MARGARET WARNER: The cascade is the number of...

DAVID ALBRIGHT: This -- where the 164...

MARGARET WARNER: ... the series of centrifuges.

DAVID ALBRIGHT: And, so, it's not -- it's it was expected that they
would start about now.

And -- and it's -- whatever they enriched -- and I believe them when
they say 3.5 percent -- it was a minuscule amount, far, far below anything
they would need for a power reactor. And they're a long way from mastering
gas centrifuges. They -- they really are just starting the process of
learning to operate this cascade.

(CROSSTALK)

DAVID ALBRIGHT: And, so, I think we shouldn't exaggerate the significance
of the event.

Defying
the international community

MARGARET
WARNER: Now, just for our viewers, without getting too technical, the
centrifuges are machines that separate out different materials by spinning
them at very high speed, correct?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: Right. Yes.

MARGARET WARNER: And the cascade is the series that -- it -- it takes
a series of them to do this?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: That's right, yes.

So, they're connected together in parallel and in series. And, so,
you, in series, enrich consecutively, and then raise the enrichment
level in -- in -- in parallel, so you can increase the amount. And this
is a very small cascade. But the significance is, if Iran learns to
really operate this cascade reliably, then it can duplicate it.

And, so, we would estimate they still need many months to do that.
But, once they do master the operations cascade, then they're ready
to go and -- and put together a -- a gas centrifuge plant, which could
then produce enough material for nuclear weapons or produce some low-enriched
uranium for some research purposes.

MARGARET WARNER: So, bottom line, on a -- in a -- in a technological
sense, do you think this is a big deal?

DAVID
ALBRIGHT: I think, politically, it's a very big deal.

I mean, this is the answer to the UN Security Council resolution that
called on Iran to stop. I mean, this is a very dramatic and -- and blustering
response to that, that we're not going to stop and we're going to, you
know, try to declare victory, in a sense, and exaggerate what they have
accomplished.

And now it's up to the international community to come up with a response.

MARGARET WARNER: Let's go back, though to the -- how significant this
is, in terms of getting them to weapons, if they choose to do it.

How long do you think it would take, Mr. Leventhal, to move from this
stage, of -- of 3.5 percent purity, to the 90 percent it takes for weapons?

PAUL LEVENTHAL: That depends on what else is going on in Iran that
we may not and probably do not know about.

Iran has acknowledged moving scientists and equipment to unknown locations,
in order to escape a possible bombardment by the United States or Israel.
That, in itself, is a violation of IAEA safeguards, because you are
not supposed to have secret facilities where fissile material can be
or is being produced. And I think the...

Could
Iran make a nuclear weapon?

MARGARET WARNER: But let's just say -- could we say, for the purpose
of argument, though -- let's say this is all they had.

PAUL
LEVENTHAL: But we can't say that.

MARGARET WARNER: How long would it take?

PAUL LEVENTHAL: And I -- and I would argue that it's very likely it's
not all that they have.

I would argue that they have a parallel program of some size. And
I would also caution against a grand deception by Iran to play into
Western perceptions of Iran as being technologically and industrially
backward, and apparently having problems in facilities that they're
letting the IAEA into, while, at unknown locations, they are proceeding
with all the technological help and technology that money can buy.

And I -- I think that the problem is the IAEA is being given the run-around
in Iran, and Director General ElBaradei has not been altogether forthcoming
in describing the full extent of just how extensive the concealment
and deception program is.

MARGARET WARNER: Do you think that's possible, that, in fact, they're
actually further along than this?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: Well, anything is possible. But -- but Paul is speculating.

I mean, if you -- if you listen to what the U.S. intelligence community
says, they say that Iran is -- is within 10 years of getting nuclear
weapons, which is generally interpreted as they're going to need five
to 10 years. And -- and we think that that process can be sped up by
Iran, but it's still -- they're several years away.

And people have been looking for these -- these parallel programs,
the secret sites. I mean, the IAEA has been looking very intensely,
intelligence agencies. And the evidence isn't there. But the concern
remains. And -- and -- and that's part of the reason why the international
community wants Iran to stop all uranium-enrichment activities.

MARGARET WARNER: Now, if this is the first time they have gotten this
far, just for the sake of argument, does that advance the date? Does
that shorten that five-to-10-year estimate?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: No, not -- not unless the IAEA inspectors come back
with new information, where Iran revealed something that they didn't
expect to find.

I mean, it's -- this -- this plant was -- is starting to enrich uranium,
more or less, on an expected schedule. And it's -- and -- and we will
-- you know, all these things need to be tested. And it's very important
the inspectors remain in there. And it's also very important that the
international community start to increase the pressure on Iran, that,
in a sense, now is the time when sanctions have to be considered against
Iran.

MARGARET WARNER: So, that raises the question, Mr. Leventhal.

You know, the Israelis, who have been very concerned about Iran's
program, have always talked about the point of no return, a point to
which Iran would get it, and -- and no longer need the outside world
to help. In other words, they would have both the know-how and the material
they needed to just proceed.

Do you think this says they're at that point, or do they still need
international assistance or sales to proceed; i.e., in other words,
would sanctions -- if they could really choke off supplies to Iran --
could it still stop or retard the program? Long question.

The
international response

PAUL LEVENTHAL: Again, it depends on what may be going on that we
don't know about.

And -- and I think you have to listen carefully to what the former
director of safeguards, Pierre Goldschmidt, had to say about the extent
to which the Iranians made life extremely difficult for the inspectors,
and the fact that inspectors are not free to go into military facilities
that have been -- that have been identified by the Iranian opposition
as places where material had been removed from other nuclear facilities
that -- that were torn down and -- and leveled.

And I would just want to make the point that, as important as
sanctions are, it's also important for the Security Council to empower
the IAEA to have the same kind of intrusive authority that it had in
Iraq, because that's what it is going to take if we are to find out
whether or not there is a parallel program.

And, short of that, diplomacy has its limitations, because Iran can
be expected not to voluntarily disclose the facilities where they may
indeed have secret weapons development, secret fissile material production
facilities.

And there has been any number of disclosures, information provided
by the Iranian opposition, that the IAEA has chosen not to pursue, primarily
because there's no supporting evidence. And every time they raise evidence
or information coming from the opposition to the Iranian authorities,
the Iranian authorities go ballistic.

MARGARET WARNER: David Albright, you said earlier that they still
haven't demonstrated that they really can get this up and running, this
whole cascade. What do you mean by that? And do they still need the
rest of the world to sell them things to do it?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: Yes.

The -- the -- they need to learn how to operate a cascade. It's a
very sophisticated device. And they -- and it's hard to get them to
work together without breaking. And, so, they need to...

MARGARET WARNER: You once used an analogy of a race car.

DAVID ALBRIGHT: That's right.

It's like, if you -- if you had a brand-new engine in a -- in a
race car and you turn on that engine, that doesn't mean you're ready
to go out and race with it. And, so, you just need to test it out, and
make sure it works, it's not going to break down unexpectedly. And,
so, they -- they need to go through a process with this cascade.

Now, the Israeli red line is when they go through that process and
succeed. And it could be as early as six months or a year. And, so,
that's -- for the Israelis, that's the big issue.

In terms of foreign procurement, I mean, we don't think they need
any more for -- if they wanted to build 1,500 centrifuges. But, at some
point, they do need more from the international community. They're actually
out now purchasing items, or trying to purchase items, around the world.

And -- and there's a great effort to try to stop them, that it --
and if it's successful, it will inhibit their ability to build thousands
of centrifuges. But it's not going to -- we don't think it's going to
stop them from building enough centrifuges to make, let's say, one bomb
a year.