LONGSTREET - JULY 2

From: Bob Lawrence
Subject: Longstreet-Reluctant Warrior?

One of the ongoing controversies in the years after the Battle
of Gettysburg has been Longstreet's actions on the second day.
The original accusations were along the lines that Longstreet
had been ordered to attack the Union line at dawn on July 2.
There isreally no support for this assertion(other than Early
trying to shift blame from his ineptness on day 1) and I
personally will not dignify this area of dispute by commenting on it.
However, there is much criticism and debate on Longstreets slowness in
deploying his troops once the order to attack was finally given. It is
this area that I would like to explore in this discussion.

Per Harry Pfanz in "Gettysburg-The Second Day" the definitive
order for Longstreet to attack the Union left came at around
11AM. there is some dispute as to whether Longstreet should
have taken the initiative and began moving his troops earlier
but there is little doubt that by 11:00 the movement had been
ordered. The question is why did it take Longstreet over 4
hours to get his troops in position?

Porter Alexander, in his book"Fighting for the Confederacy"
credits the slowness to "Longstreet did not want to take the
offensive" Per Alexander"His objection to it was not based at
all upon the particular strength of the enemies position for
that was not recognized, but solely on general principles" The
most damning example given by Alexander of this "reluctance'
to press the attack is Longstreets action at the "turning point". The
turning point is a rise on the road shortly after one passes the Black
Horse Tavern (and is today protected by a big, mean white
dog). Troops marching across this rise can be seen from Little
Round Top. When Alexander reached this point in the AM of July
2 he cut through the fields to the east of the rise and picked
up the road after it had dipped below the LRT line of sight.
When confronted with the same situation Longstreet turned the
troops around and found an alternative route-effectively
adding 1 1/2 to 2 hours to time it took to set up for the
attack. Alexander claims his route was quite visible since he
was dragging cannon with him.

In his autobiography ""From Manassas to Appomattox"
Longstreet's seems to blame his reconnoitring officer-"Under
the conduct of the reconnoitring officer our march seemed slow-
there were halts and countermarches" McClaws, in "Gettysburg"
seems to dispute this-laying the order to countermarch fully
on Longstreets shoulders. Per McClaws when he pointed out the
problem with the rise Longstreet replied"why, this won't do.
Is there no way to avoid it". McClaws then directs Longstreet
to an alternative route his scouts had found earlier in the day. Again no
mention of the canon tracks through the fields.

Harry Pfanz disputes that Longstreet and McClaws ignored Alexander's tracks.
Per Pfanz "It must be assumed that officers like Longstreet, McClaws and
Kershaw were practical men who must have noted the route of Alexanders
battalion and avoided it for good reason".

Others have also come to Longstreet's defense-most notable another General
noted for meticulous planning and flank attacks-Dwight D Eisenhower-per Ike
(commenting on the lateness of the attack)"He certainly could have not
done it with any strength" He cited a study by an officer of his
acquaintance that showed that the earliest Longstreet could have attacked
was 3 P.M.(Eisenhower comments taken from "Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg"
by Glen Tucker). As to the assertion that Longstreet deliberately dragged
his feet in mounting the attack Ike replied""...Longstreet was too good a
soldier to deliberately botch an attack".

So there we have it-should(or could) Longstreet have attacked earlier?
Did he drag his feet in hope Lee would call off the attack? Why did he not
follow Alexanders trail?

From: Bryan Meyer
Subject: Re: Turning Point

Excerpts from mail: 12-Jul-95 Turning Point by Robert W Lawrence
> So there we have it-should(or could) Longstreet have attacked
> earlier? Did he drag his feet in hope Lee would call off the
> attack? Why did he not follow Alexanders trail?

IMHO, I think Longstreet did have a few motives in his actions for
delaying the attack on July 2nd. However, his motives, IMO, were strictly
for the benefit of the Army of Northern Virginia.

First of all, we have to remember a few things about July 2nd, and
Longstreet's I Corps. Longstreet, when his corps was all concentrated,
had approximately 21,000 men. (Correct me if I'm wrong on that.) In the
early morning, when the attack was to commence, he did not have
Pickett's Division of some 5,000 men. So now, Longstreet's Corps has only
approximately 16,000 men. Take away from that 16,000 men, another 2,200
men or so of Brigadier General Evander M. Law's brigade (of Hood's Division)
, and Longstreet's Corps had a maximum strength of 13,800 men. Longstreet
was to attack the entire Union left (2-3 corps) and take LRT and the high
ground, with 13,800 men? He knew he couldn't do that, so he waited for
Law's brigade, and he waited as long as he possibly couldfor Pickett's
Division.

Well, he got Law's Brigade, and then attacked, and by this time, the soldiers
of Law's Brigade were tired and very thirsty...but yet, Longstreet hurried
them and the rest of his I Corps into the fight on the Union left, and
they almost captured LRT.

Longstreet could not have attacked earlier because of his corps' lack of
strength, until the late afternoon when Law's Brigade arrived. But as I
said, there could be other motives for his delay in attacking.

Perhaps Longstreet did want Lee to forget about attacking. Longstreet was
all-defense, and perhaps he thought that if he waited till the late
afternoon when most of the Army of the Potomac was concentrated, Lee would
decide the attack was too dangerous, and would put off the attack
until July 3rd. (Unfortunately, Lee made another attack which proved
damaging to the ANV on July 3rd.)

My question is...if Longstreet was so terrible in delaying his attack,
then why did he wait until Law's Brigade got there, and then rushed Law
into the attack along with the rest of the I Corps. And what was Ewell
doing during this whole time?

From: Marc73@aol.comSubject: Longstreet

It has been 132 years since the Battle of GB and much has been written
about the campaign. IMHO both Lee and Longstreet were excellant leaders of
men, but various persons since the battle have made Longstreet the
scapegoat for GB and the South's defeat of the CW in general. The contingent
of 'Lost Cause persons' mainly from Virginia have helped thru out time to
blame Longstreet for these failures, especially since he was not from VA.

Longstreet did not disobey orders at GB. Confussion existed as to
what was in front of the Confederate Army at the RTs and communications
being what they were, fast changing scenerios made following earlier
planned orders difficult.

I agree as in past posts, Longstreet was waiting for his various
divisions to come up and did delay until he felt enough troops were on hand.
IMHO Sickles movement to the Wheatfield and Peach Orchard in front of the
other Union troops may have swayed Longstreet to advance prior to being
completely ready. Volumes of material have been written on GB and various
opinions exist as to what or why something happened. I quess this is what
makes our discussion group so interesting.

I realize my thoughts are not as complete as other postings on this topic,
but I have not studied this particular aspect in detail yet.

Pvt Marc

From: Norman Levitt
Subject: LONGSTREET, JULY 2

For what it's worth, here's my two cents;

1) I agree that Krick is something of a mad dog when it comes to Longstreet.
He seems a throwback to the height of "Lost Cause" history.

2) The best source we have for how things were going between Lee and
Longstreet on the 2nd (so far as I know) is Fremantle, who stresses how
perfectly in accord they were. A grain or two of salt is in order, first
of all, because Fremantle was an outsider, and, secondly, because his book
was meant to show how strong, unified, and invincible the Confederacy was.
But it's probably more disinterested, in respect to the rivalries that
existed, than the postwar books.

3) My conjecture is that Longstreet was riled at Lee for his aggressive
attitude Gettysburg, contradicting the relative caution that Lee had
embraced in planning the Penna. campaign. He was also probably concerned,
as a professional, about commiting the bulk of his army in an unknown
situation. I believe that he was "surly" to the extent of being very
literal in carrying out Lee's direct orders (which may have been given
him with some heaat). In particular, I think he was cussed enough to
insist on concealing the movements of his people as he'd been explicitly
told to do. Hence, the countermarach. AS well, I think he probably
wanted to give Lee some time to think things over, and maybe to evolve a
more careful plan.

4) Longstreet's refusal to let od move around to the right of the Round
Tops and to adavance "up the Emmitsburg Road" may have been another
instance of taking Lee literally to spite him. But it was also, I think,
sound military judgment. The alternataive would have split Lonstreet's
Corps into two disconnected pieces. So far as Longstreet could tell, Hood
might well have run into 3 Federal Corps, dug in and loaded for bear,
east of the Round Tops. In fact, the Vth Corps was there, ready to engage,
and the VIth was coming up as the Confederate assault began. Hood's one
division might have had to take them on, whole McLaws would have faced II
Corps and parts of II Corps with no help on its right. Longstreet choose
to keep his spearhead united, and I think he was right.

4) Whatever you think of Longstreet's surliness and "insubordination", there
is no question that once the action started, he pressed it as hard as
possible and exposed himself to enemy fire with great personal bravery.
If Lee rebuked him for anything, it was for being where even a division
commander, let alone the senior corps commander, had no business
being--at the front of his advancing troops.

5) In the larger view, Longstreet is a puzzling and contradictory figure.
Away from Lee, he could be very erratic, as in Lookout Valley and
Knoxville. On the other hand, he came close to giving Lee the outright
victory in the Wilderness. Aside from Lee and Jackson, there
was no confederate general at the Corps level or above who performed as
well on average. Much of the hatred against him came about because of
his postwar friendliness towards the Reconstruction government, which has
nothing to do with his personal or professional qualities during the war.
He doesn't belong on anyone's villains list to any greater degree than
any other Rebel general. RIP.

Norm Levitt

From: mthcpa@ix.netcom.com (Mark T. Heath )
Subject: Longstreet

May I be so bold to offer the following on Pete Longstreet?
IMHO, Longstreet was Lee's best commander. However, Pete made one
serious mistake regarding his service to the Confederacy; he survived
his wounds from the Wilderness campaign. Had Pete died, most
uninformed "Lost Causers" would conveniently forget Day 2. Instead,
the focus would be on his knock out punch at Manassas, exploiting the
Union goof at Chickamauga and his own stonewall defense at
Fredricksburg. If he dies, he instantly achieves martyr status in the
Lost Cause. Ted's movie probably has done more to defend the honor of
Pete more than anyone. How can you not be sympathetic to Tom
Berenger's portrayal? We watch as he argues his point to go to the
right. History tell us Lee chose not to take this advice. Funny
thing, had Lee listend, some of us might be singing a different
national anthem today. Perhaps us Longstreet fans can take solace in
his much deserved monument to be erected at GB. May I recommmed
William Garrett Piston's "Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant" for some skewed
reading on the pro Pete side.

From: ADRIII@aol.com
Seems to me on the Longstreet deal that not only his post Civil War
activities did him in with the "faithful"...but....he didn't rush home to
write "his" version of the truth. Seems like quite a few of the lads
couldn't wait to get home to get their version of the TRUTH...down on paper.
.and like most of our politicians have learned...The FIRST liar in wins...

Longstreet did the best he could in a situation that he had feared would
come to pass. He had wanted to draw the Union army into attacking, not
attacking them first. He was told to attack a position that he had no
firm recon. on, he did not have his entire corps at his disposal, and
he had to try to position the attack without being observed. Under these
circumstances, any general would appear surly. Longstreet's attack on
the second actually succeeded in taking much of the prescribed ground that
Lee had pointed out. The failure is that the Union lines were actually
stronger than Lee knew, and Ewell never moved up to attack on the
right in strength until nearly seven o'clock. By then, Longstreet's
attack was dying out, and all Ewell succeeded in doing was getting more of
his men killed.

As for Longstreet's ties to the post war government, no one ever attacks
Lee for taking the oath. Longstreet is attacked for his friendship with
Grant, which preceeded the war.

Rascal

FROM BRYAN MEYER

On July 2nd, Longstreet did delay his attack for several number of
reasons, all of which would have benefitted the Army of Northern Virginia.
But yet even though Longstreet delayed his attack for the army's benefit,
it seems as though once again, blame is placed on him by
none other than the II Corps officers...Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell and Maj.
Gen. Jubal A. Early.

First of all, I am not trying to flame anyone here, I'm just simply
making a point in defense of Longstreet, and against the two II Corps
officers mentioned above. Longstreet delayed his attack because he was
waiting for the rest of Hood's Division and if possible and not too
late, Pickett's Division (which did not arrive until later that evening).
Longstreet had the artillery fire the one (or is it two?) initial shots to
alert General Ewell that he was commencing his attack on the Union left.
But, where was Ewell? Apparently, he said he didn't hear the shot. I
think that even from the distance from LRT to Culp's Hill, you would still
be able to hear an artillery shot. Ewell later started his attack when
Longstreet had already been pushed back on the Union left. Much good that
did...Meade already had reinforcements ready to send over to Culp's Hill
after the assault on his left ended, so Ewell's assualt was virtually
beaten, before it was started.

Years after the war, in his last years, Longstreet was forced to take
the blame from much of the South for the loss at Gettysburg because he was
from SC, not VA...Early was from VA. But, in essence, couldn't Ewell's
(and for that fact, Early's) delay in starting his motion on the
Union right proved fatal for Longstreet's assault on the Union left. If so,
then isn't Ewell and Early actually to blame for the defeat at Gettysburg
on July 2nd, 1863???

I was just looking for something in "Destruction & Reconstruction" by
Louisiana's favorite son, General Dick Taylor. I ran across his opinion on
Gburg. page 231

A recent article in the public press, signed by Genl Longstreet, ascribes
the failure at Gburg to Lee's mistakes, which he (Longstreet) in vain
pointed out and remonstrated against. That any subject involving the
possession and exercise of intellect should be clear to Longstreet and
concealed from Lee, is a startling proposition to those having knowledge of
the two men. We have Biblical authority for the story that the angel in
the path was visible to the ass, though unseen by the seer his master; but
suppose, instead of smiting the honest, stupid animal, Balaam had caressed
him and then been kicked by him, how would the story read? And thus much
concerning Gburg.

Ben Maryniak

From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: all we are saying is give Pete a chance

During 1888, an editorial in the Atlanta Constitution talked about
Longstreet.

Lee's lieutenant-general at Appomattox! Could man hold
worthier title to the affection and veneration of the southern people than
to wear that title? Many of us who admired Longstreet as a fighter have
not liked his course as a civilian since the war. But he has been more
sinned against than sinning . . . But Longstreet criticized Lee! Well, so
have others - notably President Davis. But, but, but! Away with your buts!
Remember how Longstreet suffered with us.

In the June 1990 issue of the Kent State quarterly "Civil War History,"
Gary Gallagher masterfully summarized Longstreet's post-Gburg activities -

"Sent west in the late summer of 1863, he hoped to find refuge from Lee's
persistent reliance on assaults under the command of Joe Johnston, the
Southern officer he most admired. Instead he recd a large dose of Braxton
Bragg, whose conduct in the aftermath of Chickamauga alienated Longstreet.
Eventually detached to East Tennessee to liberate Knoxville, Longstreet
conducted a remarkably ineffective campaign, quarreled with subordinates
Lafayette McLaws, Jerome B Robertson, and Evander M Law, and grew so
disenchanted that he seriously considered resigning from the army.

In 1867, Longstreet sent a letter to a newspaper that suggested
collaboration with the Republican Party and his suggestion (though not in
his actual words) eventually reached most southern papers. Coincidentally,
his 1865 request for federal pardon was granted soon after the surfacing
of this letter. Then he endorsed Grant for president in 1868. When
scapegoats were needed to explain the loss of Southern independence, Pete
was very convenient. His postwar actions, coupled with his wartime
episodes of brooding and his oft-stated desire for independent command
(away from Marble Robert's family circle), made him seem self-serving and
unfaithful.

Longstreet was unjustly pilloried after the war like many other soldiers -
it is part of the hostilities & loyalties of the military camraderie system.
For a great consideration of wartime rivalries & factionalism, I
recommend The Politics Of Command by Archer Jones & Thos L Connelly.

Going off on a complete tangent, I advise everyone to put aside $50 for
the purchase of "Don Troiani's Civil War" which is being published by
Stackpole. I got a look at a preliminary copy and, though I don't own a
single modern print, I was reminded how much I've admired Troiani's
renderings. The book includes all of his past prints and several I've
never seen, connected by Brian Pohanka's narrative. One of my favorites
is the one of Howard & Hancock at the Cemetery gate.

From: "James F. Epperson"
Subject: Longstreet/July 2nd

Folks who want to read about the events of July 2nd are encouraged to
read Glenn Tucker's book, LEE AND LONGSTREET AT GETTYSBURG. Although the
book was written in 1968, which means the research is pre-Krick, it does a
good job of demonstrating that Longstreet was not being sulky or dilatory,
but was trying to fulfill the orders he was given. Another good book which
sheds a lot of light on this whole matter is Connelly's THE MARBLE MAN,
which has an entire chapter discussing the way Lee's image was created and
protected by certain officers after the war.

From:Bill Cameron
Subject: Longstreet/July 2nd

For Jim Epperson:
Agree, LEE AND LONGSTREET... is a good book for anyone studying
Gettysburg. However, Tucker is such a Longstreet admirer that the work
lacks balance. Not to say that it is not a important work but he doesn't
do the best job of presenting both sides of the argument. Also, with
Tucker's style, you can have a hard time discerning the difference from
what Tucker thinks would have been a good idea and what Longstreet really
did. The chapter on Longstreet's flanking proposal is downright confusing.
Tucker speaks to the fact that a proposal ("generally discussed") was to
flank the Federals by occupying Meade's old Pipe Creek Line. He even
shows it on a map labled "Longstreet's Flanking Proposal" and as far as I
can figure, it is a hypothetical maneuver designed by Tucker or others
and I can't figure out how it is germane. I sure can't find any reference to the fact that
Longstreet was aware of the topography of the Pipe Creek area Compared to
Coddington and Pfanz, this work is a bit skewed. But again, it sure does a
good job of defending Longstreet. BTW, Tucker's HIGH TIDE ..." is a very
good first Gettysburg book. It is interesting and holds your attention.

From: MEllis3199@aol.com
Subject: LONGSTREET BASHING

I agree that Longstreets' conduct during the Gettysburg was
counter-productive but I also agree that much of his conduct was the
result of Lees' lack of caution and reliance on frontal assults
(ala Malvern Hill). I now realize that Lee was not a "great"commander in
the sense that he failed to observe what was happening around him and
placed too much on the frontal assault (a traditional tactic during those
times).

Lee should have known that the Federal army was on the move and
lacking sufficent intelligence of the Federal forces, should have
withdrawn to better ground continued the concentration of his army.

I am sure that Lee will continue to be regarded as a great commander
from the South and in some respects he was. Hindsight is always better
than foresight.

Some times I feel that if I were in Lees' shoes I would have taken a
nice trip to Europe in 1861. The war may well have been shortened and
saved thousands of lives-on both sides.

The question taken from the book "If the south won at gettysburg?"
Could the south have won the battle if general lee would have taken the
advice from longstreet. The advice was to use gettysburg as a defensive
strategy instead of an offensive one. In the book it gives a theory. Which
on the night of july 2 Lee orders the cavalry leaded by steurt and supporte
d by ewells corp. to move south to the extreme right around the two round
tops and come onto baltimore pike. Which this by seperating the federal
army from washington. By this strategy allowing steurt to attack washington
and lee and longstreet to damage meades army as much as possible. In the
book, this might have given lincoln a reason to call off grant out of
vicksburg. By ordering grant out of vicksburg to protect washington
from invasion. This is just hypothetical but could this have happened?
And what if steurt had attacked washington? Could the south have won the
war?

The "Afterword" to "The Killer Angels" indicates that after the war
Longstreet lost much of his image because of his politics and association
with Grant in efforts to rebuild the South. He drew further, and more
serious, criticism because of airing his opinion that Lee's actions lost
Gettysburg.

Certainly, an unemotional assessment of Lee's actions would conclude
serious mistakes and miscalculations were indeed made. As the years
passed, did the South reembrace Longstreet, and at least recognize Lee
was human?

>From what I have read and heard with talking with Southerners, and
admittedly, this is a limited survey, Longstreet has been "forgiven" in
some states. In Virginia, he is still seen as a turncoat.

IMHO, Longstreet's biggest problem was that he was not a Virginian.
ALL of the Virginia Generals who survived sided with the Lee camp
against Longstreet's assesment of Lee's performance at Gettysburg. This
is funny to me because in his memoirs, Longstreet used correspondence
with survivng officers from the AONV, as well as survivng official
reports and orders of battle to reconstruct the Pennsylvania campaign.
He interjects his own opinion occasionally, but for the most part, he
only writes what others could have. I feel that Longstreet was
victimized by Early, Ewell and Gordon, who were so interested in making
themselves look like the TRUE paladins of the COnfederacy that they
needed ot lay defeat at someones feet. Since Lee was untouchable, it
had to be Longstreet.

Of course, his friendship with Grant, joining the Republican party, and
receiving a political job from Grant didn't help, but he didn't rob the
people of the South in a lottery scam like Early, or start up a lynch
mob like Forrest.

Again, I am not asserting that any of this is historical fact, but my
opinion from what I have read so far.

The "Afterword" to The Killer Angels"indicates that after the war
Longstreet lost much of his image because of his politics and association
with Grant in efforts to rebuild the South. He drew further, and more
serious, criticism because of airing his opinion that Lee's actions lost
Gettysburg.

Certainly, an unemotional assessment of Lee's actions would conclude
serious mistakes and miscalculations were indeed made. As the years
passed, did the South reembrace Longstreet, and at least recognize Lee
was human?

Longstreet passed away on January 2 1904, having outlived most of those who
murdered his reputation, but murdered it remained. Fewer than five percent
of the United Confederate Veterans chapters passed resolutions honoring Old
Pete, and Savannah's Daughters of the Confederacy refused to send flowers
to the funeral because they blamed Longstreet for losing the South's
independence. Confederate Veteran magazine printed a kind obituary and
there were many many personal demonstrations of warmth toward the War
Horse. An unknown Confederate vet placed his tattered gray shell jacket
atop Pete's casket and asked that it be interred with his leader.

A comment was made that some blamed Longstreet for the defeat at
Gettysburg. Why would he be blamed? Was it because he didn't agree with
Lee? Or, that,technically, he ordered Pickett's charge? Or, was it his
politics and statements after the war? Maybe I should be asking who blamed
Longstreet, as well as why.

Tom

From: GaTechFan@aol.com

So I just spent a few days in the beloved home state of Georgia, visiting a
few relatives and friends. On the way back home to Maryville, Tn, I passed
through Gainesville in NE Georgia. Of course, since I was the only
representative of the Gettysburg Discussion Group in the area, I decided to
pay my respects to James Longstreet. I thought the Pete-o-philes among us
would be grateful, as would those of my ilk (who are a bit more neutral in
our feelings about the Warhorse).

The general is buried in Alta Vista Cemetery on Jesse Jewell Parkway in
Gainesville. One enters the gate, drives up a hill and sees a flagpole just
ahead on the right. His plot is beneath the flagpole (US flag if you're
interested). A few other family members are in the plot as well. Pete's
monument is quite appropriate. It's about five feet tall. The front side has
crossed USA and CSA flags(CSA is battle flag). The inscription mentions his
service in the USA and CSA armies. The right side of the monument says
"Manassas to Appomattox," while the left side says "Palo Alto to Chapultepec"
(Stanford had a war?). The back of the monument has one of those poems to the
Cause that brings tears to the eyes of we Johnnies, but probably gags you
Loyalists. A few small flags (GA, USA, CSA) had been placed on his grave. All
in all, an elegant, tasteful monument to a fine corps commander( most of the
time).

If any of you happen to be in Atlanta, a trip to Oakland Cemetery is
worthwhile. SEVEN CSA generals are entombed there: John Gordon, Alfred
Iverson, Clement Evans, Isaac Avery, Henry McCay, Lucius Gartrell, and
William Walker. Also buried there is Martha Mitchell and, completely
unrelated to the CW, the Great Bobby Jones(a golfer of some repute to the
non-knowers in our midst). It's also fun to try to trek over the battleground
of Peachtree Creek---hospital parking lots, 6-lane roads, a golf course and
numerous back yards. Ah well, progress.

Pat

From: Mark A. Fox
Subject: Re: Longstreet Forgiven?
As a new member, I just now got caught up on some of the past discussions
with particular interest to Longstreet. One post discussed aspects of whether
Longstreet has ever been "forgiven." I find the following document quite
amazing in that it does, indeed, absolve Longstreet of any wrong-doing at
Gettysburg and further, endorses the North Carolina efforts to erect a
memorial monument. But is it just talk?? This project is four years old and
the funds are still coming in too slowly. Worse yet, the SCV camps seem
completely oblivious to the project even though they passed this great
resolution. Is my view distorted through Yankee vision? It really seems
ironic that many of the biggest supporters of the fund are Northerners.
Longstreet forgiven?? I just don't know.

RESOLUTION TO SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS NATIONAL CONVENTION

Adopted by the National organization, SCV while in convention at
Wilmington, North Carolina, August 8, 1992

Whereas the purpose of the Sons of Confederate Veterans is to perpetuate the
honor, gallantry and chivalry of our ancestors and to pursue the truth in the
historical recordings of our Southern heritage. We strive to uphold the
Confederate cause and not let it be degraded by those who would rob us of our
heritage; and

Whereas an injustice begun in 1870, perpetuated not by revisionist
historians, nor by advocates of the enemies of our Southern way of life, but
by a group of misinformed individuals, who purposely initiated a campaign
against one of their own, who for long, arduous years led his troops
valiantly and courageously against the Northern invader; and

Whereas it has been proven over the last 120 years that no one general can be
blamed for the South's loss of the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on July
1-3, 1863. Mistakes were made not only by Stuart, Early, Ewell and
Longstreet, but by Lee himself; and

Whereas the conspiracy following Lee's death, to portray Lt. General
Longstreet as irresponsible by these same misinformed individuals resulted in
deliberate omission of a memorial anywhere in the South to General Lee's "Old
War Horse", until 1939; and

Whereas the North Carolina Division has accepted the challenge to appropriate
and erect a monument to Lt. General Longstreet at the Gettysburg Battlefield
(pending approval by the National Park Service).

Therefore be it resolved:

The National organization, Sons of Confederate Veterans, in convention do
hereby absolve Lt. General James Longstreet of the blame for the loss of the
Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on July 1-3, 1863.

This body, in convention, commend the North Carolina Division for assuming
the leadership in an effort to provide a monument for Lt. General Longstreet
at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (pending approval of the National Park Service).

This body, in convention, memorialize each division within the organization
to support the North Carolina Division effort with leadership and
cooperation.

Respectfully submitted,
Robert C. Thomas, Chairman
Lt. General James Longstreet
Memorial Committee of the
North Carolina Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans

This is not a pitch for funds. I'm genuinely confused at why the 25,000 SCV
members can't come up with 5 or 6 bucks a piece and get this thing done
tomorrow. Anyone out there understand more about the SCV organization than
this dull Yankee?
From: GaTechFan@aol.com
Subject: Pete, Bobby and Harv

One does not usually become a general officer without a magnificent ego. The
nature of the position, particularly in combat, requires self-confidence, to
say the least. It is natural, therefore, to tend toward self-preservation
when attempting to defend one's actions against the apparent attacks of one's
colleagues, whether these attacks are verbal or written, particularly when
your side lost.

While reading Hal Bridges' book "Lee's Maverick General: Daniel Harvey Hill",
I came across a couple of revealing quotes by Hill critical of both
Longstreet and Lee. As we know, Harvey Hill was an opinionated fellow,
difficult to get along with, and with a critical spirit. To his credit, he
was a skillful general and generally criticised his superiors publicly with
some restraint. But when it came down to getting credit or blame he opted to
speak out.

"Longstreet very early got control of his superior officers and worked things
to please himself. Thus at Seven Pines, he disregarded Johnston's order to
attack on Nine Mile Road and put my division first, came behind me, was not
on the field at all and got all the credit of the battle." (Bridges, p55).

"My impression of General Lee is not so enthusiastic as that of most men who
served under him." (Bridges, p276).

I think if we read in depth the thoughts and opinions of most military
leaders about their colleagues we could find evidence for incompetence and
buffoonery in them all. Part of the fun of researching for oneself is that I
can read all the "evidence" (verity and balderdash) and make up my own mind.
And never completely know the truth, but so what?

I just finished posting Buford's order of Battle - thanks, Steve. I
also linked to another discussion topic I titled "Little Round Top- No
Chaberlain." It is mostly about the signal corps activities. I was
rereading the posts, and it is pretty obvious the flag boys up there had
been watching the Confederate movement all morning.

How real was Lee/Longstreet's belief that they could move all of
those men and not be seen? The whole thing - in hindsight - seems ridiculous.

Hate to start this up again, but at least I'm off the shoes.

Dennis

What did we ever decide about the shoes, anyway?

From: Alexander Cameron

Dennis,
Here is a little ditty written by E.M. Law that I have always found
interesting. Obviously, in reflection, General Law thought he had been
observed.

"It was now past 4 o'clock in the afternoon and our troops were in
position for the attack. The flank movement by which they came into
position is referred to in the following dispatch from the Federal signal
station on Little Round Top: "To General Meade -4 o'clock P.M. The only
infantry of the enemy visible is on the extreme [Federal] left; it has been
moving toward Emmitsburg." It will thus be seen that the movement, in spite
of our precautions, was not unobserved." [E.M. Law, "The struggle for Little
Round Top, B&L III, p. 320]

In relation to the Signal Corps tales about Warren on LRT, Dennis wondered
how real was Lee/Longstreet's belief that they could move all of those men
and not be seen.

Lee/Longstreet did not want to hide their presence - they wanted to screen
their strength - and this was accomplished. If not for an officer of high
rank who managed to convince some brigadiers to disobey their orders, no
one would have been on hand to slam a door in the face of Oates et al.

I think the idea of a "hidden" force was part of the particular Gburg story
that made it easier to hiss Sickles and canonize Warren. If anything, it
was in the Confederate interest to be seen everywhere opposite the Yankee
line. This kept the Union from shifting reserves. The trick was to screen
your force - to keep the enemy ignorant of how many were behind the line.
To see Rebs in the woods opposite the US left was not to see an attack
massing. Sickles knew the ANV was on Seminary Ridge at least as far as a
point opposite the Peach Orchard because of the scrap between Cadmus Wilcox
and the sharpshooters/Mainers under Berdan. Moreover, Confederate batteries
were deployed all along Seminary/Warfield Ridge. From LRT, Warren saw that
Sickles had committed every blessed thing facing west and that his flank
was "hanging in the air." Short of a redeployment, there was nothing to
cover the southern approach except the section of Smith's Battery (the two
guns which wouldn't fit in the Devil's Den position) set up in Plum Run
Valley.

It was the CSA attack - the sight of CSA troops MOVING toward BRT - that
got units to defend LRT. Warren's rank got soldiers' attentions and the
report that the enemy WAS ON HIS WAY convinced Vincent and others to ignore
their prior orders and move to defend LRT.

PS - We decided that, because all the "real" reasons sounded incriminating
or otherwise lame when he composing his after-action report, Harry Heth
seized on shoes as an excuse for his whereabouts early on July 1 1863.

Ben wrote....
>Lee/Longstreet did not want to hide their presence - they wanted to screen
>their strength - and this was accomplished.

Ben, how about a source for this, or is it an opinion? Did Lee tell
Longstreet "I don't mind if they see you, just not all of you"? Longstreet
specifically ordered Alexander to avoid the signal station. He later
countermarched specifically to avoid it when McLaws saw the station as he
topped Herr ridge. Take a look in Coddington pp. 374-380. It goes into a
lot of detail on their desire not to be observed. As far as "screen their
strength", Hall signaled the movement of 10,000 troops (the countermarch),
and that was a pretty good clue that there was a significant movement of
personnel.

My opinion is that the problem with the signal corps' observation of
Longstreet's movement is that the messages sent from LRT to Meade's
headquarters appear to have been ignored. I think the culprit for that was
probably Dan Butterfield. His opinion of the signal corps was not high and
I suspect that he did not react to the numerous messages he received on the
afternoon of the 2nd concerning movement on the left.

Bell - When Dennis mentioned the Signal Corps stories, I thought he was
focusing on Warren & LRT in his question. If we are supposed to be talking
about Longstreet's movement from the Chambersburg Road to his eventual
point of attack on the CSA right, there's no doubt that Lee wanted the move
concealed. And I agree that the Signal Corps was ignored at Gburg.
Throughout the battle, there was a US Signal Corps post "behind" CSA lines
high atop one of the elevations in or near the South Mountain ridge, miles
west of Gburg. These 'scopes could actually see CSA movements behind the
woods of Seminary/Warfield Ridge, though none of this seems to have entered
into Meade's decision-making.

>Throughout the battle, there was a US Signal Corps post "behind" CSA lines
>high atop one of the elevations in or near the South Mountain ridge, miles
>west of Gburg. These 'scopes could actually see CSA movements behind the
>woods of Seminary/Warfield Ridge, though none of this seems to have entered
>into Meade's decision-making.

Ben,
Right you are. In fact, I have visited the site on Jack's Mountain and
have it included in a driving tour/staff ride I put together when I was a
student at Carlisle. I am trying to get permission to post at least part of
it to the web page. Also, the officers in charge of that site, Capt.
C.S.Kendall and Lieut. Louis Fortescue were captured by Stuart's cavalry on
July 4. Fortescue's diary is located at the Civil War Museum and Library in
Philadelphia and I am working on getting up there to see if I can edit it
for publication.

Bill

From: OldWarHors@aol.com
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 1995 07:49:02 -0500

In a message dated 95-11-26 21:48:49 EST, you write:

How real was Lee/Longstreet's belief that they could move all of
>those men and not be seen? The whole thing - in hindsight - seems
>ridiculous.
>
>Hate to start this up again, but at least I'm off the shoes.
>
>
The shoe thing is definately a myth. The Gettysburg guides have been trying
to dispel it for years.

I'm no scholar, but from the talks I've heard, I think Lee HOPED that
Longstreet could move unobserved, and Longstreet (given recent discussions
with Lee) was not about to make any movements that could be construed as
going against Lee's order. Kind of ironic that he got the heat for the whole
mess anyway, isn't it?

One other thing to remeber... Lee, of course, had no scouting reports of the
area without his cavalry.

Mark,
This is really not quite accurate. Lee did have a "scouting report". It
was provided by Captain R.S. Johnson. Johnson conducted a reconnaissance of
the area sometime shortly after Geary's two regiments left LRT (5 a.m.).
Johnson reported to Lee at the Seminary that LRT was unoccupied. Lee was
very surprised and elated at the depth that Johnson had penetrated the
Federal position. Johnson told Lee that he in fact had climbed LRT
personally. Lee assigned Johnson as the guide to take Longstreet around the
Union left. Now we know that Johnson's reconnaissance was inadequate for
the purpose Lee used it, however, the problem was Johnson and Lee's
interpretation of the intelligence, not the lack of cavalry. Reconnoitering
the terrain between Seminary Ridge and the Round Tops was not a mission that
required J.E.B. Stuart. In fact, McLaws wanted to personally reconnoiter
the terrain with Johnson and Longstreet refused to let him.

There are three levels of war; tactical, operational, and strategic.
Reconnoitering this ground was a tactical mission. Cavalry was used to
provide operational and strategic intelligence and Lee didn't need them to
gather intelligence for a strip of terrain that is less than 5 or 6 miles long.

Bill

From: Steve Clark
Subject: Re: screening not hiding

At 23:36 26/11/95 -0500,
Ben wrote:

>In relation to the Signal Corps tales about Warren on LRT, Dennis wondered
>how real was Lee/Longstreet's belief that they could move all of those men
>and not be seen.
>
>Lee/Longstreet did not want to hide their presence - they wanted to screen
>their strength - and this was accomplished. If not for an officer of high
>rank who managed to convince some brigadiers to disobey their orders, no
>one would have been on hand to slam a door in the face of Oates et al.
I agree; with your synopsis Ben. What I would like to hear about from others
are the demonstrations that should have been taking place on the right. I
have always assumed that the right was as convinced as the left that ANV was
preparing for an all out on that flank.

Again, I think that if you view the battle in "real time" (not
retrospectavely) Lee had every reason to expect a better outcome. Again I
submit that after the first day Longstreets suggestion of moving to a
defensive warfare, was not an option to Lee, if one takes into account the
"state of the Confederacy" as percieved at that particular moment.

As usual, Bill is right on! He wrote: (Longstreet) later countermarched specifically to avoid it when McLaws saw
the station...

If Longstreet's intention was to screen the intentions of the ANV,
countermarching two thirds of his corps a distance of 5 miles on an extremely
hot humid July day would seem to be a counterproductive way of doing it!
Especially, when he knew that these same men would be making an attack that
day, that time was of the essense, and that water was likely scarce. The
reactions of all of Alexander, McLaws and Longstreet all suggest that they
were under orders NOT to reveal their movements to the AOP if possible.
Nevertheless, Longstreet's uneasiness with Lee's order to "attack up the
Emmittsburg road" is shown in his petulance with Capt. Johnson, specifically
over the latters role in determining the route to the attack step off point.

Then, Bill wrote:My opinion is that the problem with the signal corps' observation of
Longstreet's movement is that the messages sent from LRT to Meade's
headquarters appear to have been ignored. I think the culprit for that was
probably Dan Butterfield. His opinion of the signal corps was not high and
I suspect that he did not react to the numerous messages he received on the
afternoon of the 2nd concerning movement on the left.

This is a very interesting point - so we are left with the question why would
Butterfield, or whoever in the Union high command was receiving Signal Corps
intelligence, be less than receptive to their reports. Maybe, because two
months earlier, signal corps reports of a "large body of rebles... retreating
along the Orange Plank Road" was followed about 6 hours later by a massive
Confederate attack on the Union right flank. Once bitten, twice shy, as they
say. I haven't done any research on the signal corps at Chancellorsville by
the way - it's just conjecture.

Finally, in a later post, Bill wrote:

I'm not convinced that Johnson was the right choice for this job. First of
all, he was in the Corps of Engineers. Maybe I'm wrong but I didn't think
engineers were generally used for reconn work. Secondly, throughout most of
the war the ANV had a recon advantage over the AOP, fighting mainly in
Virginia, where invariably somebody knew "the lay of the land". At
Gettysburg, that advantage was lost. Johnson may well have have found his way
down to LRT on his own, but leading a column of 10,000 men on what was the
most important deployment of the battle is different story. If you start
down the wrong lane, you can't backtrack the column "just like that". I
would suggest that the ANV's unfamiliarity with the terrain, and the
importance of this attack should have elevated the required level of recon
info to an operational one. If Stuart personally had been there, I think the
countermarch fiasco might have been avoided, IMHO. Not to mention that
Longstreet probably would have more comforable with Stuart directions rather
than a Captain of Engineers from Lee's staff. I'm sure Johnson did his best
- but I do have to question Lee's judgement in sending him to direct the
column. Of course, without Stuart there - who else could he have sent?

Grant,
I meant to answer this the other night but got off on something else. As
usual, you make lots of good points in your post. However, I would like to
respond to the Johnson/Stuart issue. First, I don't want to be
misunderstood, I am not defending Johnson's recon on the morning of the 1st.
Obviously there were problems. But it seems that you and at least one other
gentleman are blaming Longstreet's countermarch problems on Stuart's absence
and I'm not sure we want to hang that one on poor ole Stuart.

On the engineer issue, they were routinely used for this function. It was
one of there primary duties. Remember that Meade had his engineer, Warren,
doing exactly the same thing on the morning of the 2nd. Meade sent Warren
to the Union right to evaluate avenues of attack. Coddington is a lot
smarter than I, so let me quote from him:

"About daybreak he [Lee] sent for Captain Johnston and gave him
instruction to reconnoiter along the enemy's left and bring the information
back as soon as possible. Johnston knew from long service with Lee that in
carrying out his assignment the general expected him to consider every
contingency which might come up, including the need to have a route over
which troops could move unobserved by the enemy. He took Major J.J. Clarke
of Longstreet's engineers and two or three other men with him. Lee had
taught him, as a result of his own Mexican War experience, that a small
party was best for such work because there was less chance of detection..."

There is a couple of points in the above quote that impact on this
discussion. Note that Johnson got another Engineer from Longstreet's staff
to go with him. Coddington leads us to believe that Johnson had performed
this duty for Lee many times. Also note that this was a mission for a
"small party". My opinion is that if Stuart had been "personally"
available, Lee would not have sent his Cavalry Corps commander on a 5 man
recon party behind enemy pickets. On top of this, McLaws wanted to go with
Johnson on a second look at the approach route and Longstreet refused to let
him. As far as Lonstreet having more confidence in Stuart that a member of
Lee's staff, we need to remember that Longstreet had been feuding with
Stuart and Longstreet's own engineer had accompanied Johnson.

So, It is true that Stuart's absence was sorely missed by Lee, however,
reconning the route (5 or 6 miles) for a flank attack did not require
Stuart's Corps or Stuart himself. My opinion is that Longstreet should have
let his lead division commander (McLaws) go out with Johnson and look at the
route. McLaws had already selected one route (the one they ended up using
after the countermarch) and they could have easily compared notes. They
would not have had to go that far to do so.

I always enjoy your posts. Keep them coming!

Bill

From: Grant_Troop@fcgate1.osc.on.ca (Grant Troop)

Bill wrote:

Well obviously, I have to defer to you of this one. For some reason, when I
thought about engineers, I had an image of them building pontoon bridges and
deciding where the latrines should go. There is no doubt they were heavily
involved in tactical and operational recon - the best such officer of the war,
Jed Hotchkiss, was an engineer.

Bill also wrote:

Actually, I am not "blaming" Stuart at all - I am merely stating the fact that
he was absent at this critical stage of the battle. The discussion of where
Stuart was and why has been carried on ad-nauseum both by the GDG and
elsewhere, and I am not really offering an opinion on whether he was following
orders or not. However, I think you do agree that his absense was a critical
blow to Lee and the ANV at that time, as much for the man himself, as for his
command. He was, after all, Lee's second most trusted senior officer, after
Longstreet, notwithstanding the other two corps commanders, one of whom (Hill)
was ill and not fit to be commanding an infantry corps at the time, and the
other of whom (Ewell) had frozen. Remember, not two months before, Stuart had
personally directed Jackson's corps after the latter's wounding through the
tangles of the Wilderness, and was responsible for literally pounding Hooker
into submission. Whether Stuart and Longstreet were feuding or not before
Gettysburg, I can't believe that Pete would not have listened to Jeb's
military opinion, should it have been offered. They had been through too many
campaigns together already.

Bill also wrote:

Well..I didn't mean to imply in my previous post that Stuart should go
himself, nor that Jeb should lead 6,000 troopers on a recon mission. I admit
my post was not clear - one of the limitations of dashing off Email notes.
But, what I meant to say is that I think Stuart could have sent his most
trusted recon team to do the work - the men in Fitzhugh Lee's brigade composed
arguably the finest Cavalry unit in either army at the time, and they were
used to finding their way in complicated and unknown terrain. Again, this is
all conjecture - it didn't happen. But look at it in the context of what
outcomes Lee wanted from the recon:

find the most direct route to the
right;

ensure the route screens troop movements from LRT;

scout Union
troop positions on the right. In my opinion, these outcomes could be have
been more easily and efficiently handled by Stuart's men.
Nevertheless, I'd like to soften my position of Capt. Johnston at bit. Lee
chose him to go on the recon knowing the importance of this attack. I know
nothing of Johnston's previous service with the ANV, but Lee must have trusted
him enough to do this work. That's good enough for me to suggest that Johston
was an officer of high regard and capabilities. Would Lee have gone to Stuart
if he had been present? - this we can't know. Under the circumstances, we
must assume that Johnston did the best he could, although as you state, there
were serious problems with the intelligence he provided.

Finally Bill wrote:

I agree completely that Longstreet should have sent McLaws with Johnston - and
to do more than look at the route! What is interesting is that McLaws
requested permission of Pete not once but twice, and was denied. This is a
telling reaction by Pete to his resentment towards Lee and perhaps the
assignment of Johnston to the recon. My recollection of the situation is that
Pete told Maj. Clarke to accompany Johnston - rather than Johnston asking
Clarke to join him as you imply. And finally, I think McLaws concern in going
on the recon was not so much to check out the route, but rather to see the
ground over which he would deploy his division and make the attack. From a
tactical standpoint, this must surely have been McLaws priority. Obviously,
he had to "get" there first, but my interpretation of the situation is that
infantry commanders generally did not bear the immediate responsibility for
determining how to get there, although they did bear the ultimate
responsibility for getting there. It's a subtle point - I don't know if I'm
splitting hairs. Anyway, Longstreet's mulelishness at this critical time
compounded problems for the ANV later in the day.

Thanks for your well-thought out post Bill.
Regards,M
Grant Troop

From: "James F. Epperson"
I think part of the mis-conception over Johnson's fitness for the role
comes from thinking of "engineer" in the modern military sense, and not
in the context of the times and the experience of the officers
involved. Recall that RE Lee's highly-regarded Mexican War service was
as an Engineer officer doing recon work for General Scott. Recall also
the notion of a "topographical engineer," i.e., a map-maker. As Grant
Troop pointed out, Hotchkiss was one of the best recon men in the war,
and he is mostly known as Jackson's map-maker. The skills that would
make one a good military map-maker would also make one a good scout, in
terms of interpreting and understanding the lay of the land.

Lee's problem wasn't merely that he lacked clear ideas of where the
Federal line was on July 2; the point is that he hadn't much idea of
what the entire AoP order of battle might have been. He'd only fought
I and XI Corps on the First, probably had some sense that II Corps had
come up lat that after noon--but he didn't really know where four
Corps of the Federal Aramy was, whetehter it was on the scence or 20
miles back, where its reserves and fallback positions were, where its
trains were, and so forth. This is the kind of information that could
not have been scouted out by a few men on a morning ride, and this is
the kind of thing that a cavalry recon in force would have been useful
for. (In any case, Johston's information turned out to be inaccurate;
he reported the low area north of the roundtops free of Federals when,
in fact, III Corps was all over the place.

PS. On Engineers. Recall that in the pre-war army, the cream of West
Point graduates went into the Corps of Engineers; they weren't
technicians in the modern sense so much as the experts in the
advantages and disadvantages of terrain, fortified and otherwise.

I think we are talking about apples and oranges. This "thread" started
with Dennis wondered if Lee and Longstreet really thought they could move
Longstreet's Corps to the right unobserved. Then someone stated that Lee
had no scouting report, then it came up that Longstreet needed Stuart to do
the reconnaissance. We are talking about a specific reconnaissance to
prepare for Longstreet's flank attack. My opinion is that if Lee had wanted
to do an reconnaissance in Force, he would have ordered one. He didn't need
a cavalry corps to do that. Sickles did it with a handful of sharpshooters.
That is not a maneuver that was normally ordered if one wanted to conduct a
surprise flank attack. From the operational or strategic sense, I couldn't
possibly agree more that Stuart was sorely missed and that Lee had less
information than he needed. As the two armies were closing on each other,
if Stuart had been present he would have been able to give Lee the strategic
intelligence he needed. I just have a hard time marking up Stuart's absence
as the reason that the Confederate troops were observed as they marched to
the Union left and that is what this discussion is about. I would much
rather mention the fact that Longstreet would not let McLaws go with Johnson
after Johnson gave his initial report. As Grant Troop mentioned, he asked
twice.

Bill

From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Johnson on LRT

Jim,
You are exactly right. Johnson was up there between the time the 5th Ohio
and the 147th Pennsylvania left and when the first signal station (Arron
Jerome, Buford's Signal Officer) arrived. According to Freeman in "Lee's
Lieutenants", Johnson arrived on LRT at 5:30. Feeman got his information
from a manuscript by Johnson. Col. Patrick of the 5th Ohio stated that he
received orders at 5:00 a.m. to rejoin Candy's Brigade and most accounts
have him gone by 5:30. It would be over an hour later when Briney went into
position. Birney wrote in his report that he relieved Geary at 7:00 a.m.
I just finished an order of battle of LRT for Dennis and sent it to him
tonight. I made an attempt to do a time-line on all the units.

Bill

From: DPowell334@aol.com

In a message dated 95-12-08 09:14:15 EST, Steve Lieberum wrote:
>
> Wasn't it Longstreet that wanted to pull to a defensive position, and
> that it was HOOD that wanted to do the flanking movement.

>
> The whole time Longstreet wanted to let the AOP attach him and not the
> other way around.

>
Longstreet envisioned a larger flanking move around Meade's flank to
interpose between the AOP and Washington, and then let Meade attack. he
figured (probably correctly,) that political pressure would force Meade to
attack hastily.

Hood's idea was purely tactical, a move around BRT to attack astride the
Taneytown Road into Meade's rear. This idea was actually pretty flawed, in
that:

A

the move could not have been accomplished with enough daylight left to
actually fight, and Meade would have had ample time - and troops, namely 5th
and 6th corps - to counter this.

There is no way Lee could have streched his line enough to maintain
continuity and still mass enough men for a solid attack that far south and
east. Therefore, such a move would have exposed a large segment of the ANV to
piecemeal destruction. Certainly Hood's own flank would have been extremely
vulnerable during such an attack, and again, 5th or 6th corps would have been
well placed to take advantage of such an opportunity.

Dave Powell
From: Norman Levitt
To Dave P. re Hood:

Right on the money!! There's a continuing confusion between
Longstreet's strategic idea of making a flank march around theAoP and
forcing the battle elsewhere and Hood's idea of taking his division to
the east of BRT (which, I agree, was a dumb idea that invited
destruction in detail). Just rmember this is Hood we're talking
about--Atlanta, Franklin, Nashville. Eager, but not terribly bright.

Norm Levitt

From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Steve,
As Dave Powell said, the two are very different proposals. Occasionally,
Longstreet's flank march, ordered by Lee, gets confused with Longstreet's
strategic flanking proposal which Dave just described. So there were 3
proposals, two tactical and one strategic. For a good description of all
three, take a look at Chapter 4 "Longstreet's Flanking Proposal" in Glenn
Tucker's LEE AND LONGSTREET AT GETTYSBURG.

Bill

From: DPowell334@aol.com

Subject: Re: Flanking movements

In a message dated 95-12-08 21:55:10 EST, Bill wrote:
>Steve,
> As Dave Powell said, the two are very different proposals. Occasionally,
>Longstreet's flank march, ordered by Lee, gets confused with Longstreet's
>strategic flanking proposal which Dave just described. So there were 3
>proposals, two tactical and one strategic. For a good description of all
>three, take a look at Chapter 4 "Longstreet's Flanking Proposal" in Glenn
>Tucker's LEE AND LONGSTREET AT GETTYSBURG.p>
Longstreet was not above deliberately confusing the various proposals
himself. I think he tries to take credit from Hood in his memiors for a
tactical flanking march as well, but then portrays Lee as too rigid to allow
it. In effect, he claimed he told Hood that he (Longstreet) had that idea
first, and was denied. However, none of the more contemporary sources bear
this out.

Dave Powell

From: Alexander Cameron

Dave,
Good point. Agree. It also appears that Longstreet's unhappiness with
Lee influenced his actions during the execution of the flank march. It
seems as though he thought that Lee had placed the march under the control
of our man Johnston instead of simply providing him as a guide. In the B&L
article (340), Longstreet wrote that "he [Lee] ordered the march and put it
under the conduct of his engineer officers, so as to be assured that the
troops would move by the best route and encounter the least delay in
reaching the position designated by him for the attack...". Longstreet rode
well back in the column. Coddington interpreted this as Longstreet being
"more than punctilious in complying with army protocol. Since Lee had
ordered Johnston to lead and guide the head of the column, which was McLaws'
division, Longstreet decided to regard him as Lee's special representative
who during the march possessed greater authority over these troops than he".
Coddington continued, "Through this questionable interpretation of
Johnston's role Longstreet temporarily relinquished his position as
commander of the corps and rode behind with Hood's Division". Coddington
references Longstreet's article "Lee in Pennsylvania" in THE ANNALS OF THE
WAR..., Philadelphia, 1879, which I do not have. Coddington also believed
that Johnston felt that he had the more "modest" role of simply being a
guide. Again, it would be good to read exactly what Johnston did say.

Coddington may have been a little tough on Longstreet and easy on Johnston
here. Not sure. As we have discussed before, I always thought Longstreet
should have been able to scout around and take a similar route to
Alexander's once they saw the signal station. If he had sort of
"relinquished" control because of his unhappiness with Lee, that might help
explain it.

Bill

From: Dave Powell334@aol.com
Subject: Re: Flanking movements

Bill,
Actually, I have always been somewhat suspicious of claims that Longstreet
dragged his feet on the march. Consider this: That Longstreet's men marched
at a slightly faster rate than Jackson's at Chancellorsville - Longstreet's
men marched between 6-8 miles in about 2.5 hours (from 1-3:30 pm) while
Jackson's men covered 12 miles in about 8 hours. Longstreet took only about
1/2 hour to deploy for the attack - despite utterly changed tactical
conditions he found upon arrival. Jackson took almost three times as long to
deploy, from 3:30 to 5:00 p.m. Certainly Jackson had worse terrain to
confront, but the essential conditions of the Union exposed flank remained
the same.

I've always felt that if Jackson's march and attack were traditionally
considered brilliant, it was unreasonable to slam Longstreet for a
remarkably similar proformance.

So why the discrepancy? The post-war recriminations are too much at play
here, I think. Longstreet's claims are obviously rediculous. However, he
first made that claim about Johnson "commanding" the march in 1879, a
response to several years of constant attack on his reputation and skill by
Early, Fitz. Lee and Rev. Jones. Longstreet tried - rather foolishly - to
distance himself from any involvement in any of the attacks at Gettysburg,
trying to blame defeat on Lee.

In reality, the isssue is still somewhat confused. Lee did place Johnson in
charge of guiding the First Corps to it's jump-off point. McLaws supports
that, as do other sources. Johnson, however, claimed that he had "no idea"
where Longstreet was supposed to go, a rather odd claim given his morning
ride and report to Lee. Lee spent considerable time with Longstreet during
the march, and none of the relatively unbiased commanders (Mclaws, primarily)
saw any evidence of Lee urging Longstreet along,. In fact, McLaws confirmed
that Lee also told him to stay under concealment, indicating that Lee had a
direct hand in the countermarch decision.

I think that the rate of progress, the choice of route, and the deployment
all were accomplished with reasonable dispatch. Usually criticism of
Longstreet is vague, but I've never seen a specific charge (he deliberately
took the wrong route, etc.) that stood up to close scrutiny.

Dave Powell

From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
I have to disagree-although I am a big fan of Longstreet I think he did drag his
feet on July 3nd. you mentioned that he got his positioned in the 2.5 hours from
1:30 on. the problem is that he was given his orders no later than 11:00 AM-why
the 2 1/2 hour delay in starting?

I mostly fault Longsteet for the "countermarch" which added at least an 1 1/2 to
the deployment. Whether it was due to poor reconnaissance or a relucntant
Longsteet the fact is that Longsteet turned his topps around even though by most
accounts the path Alexander used to advance unobserved past the same position
was clearly visible.

Bob

<>
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Longstreet

Dave,
Good analysis. I don't think that the actual rate of march was slow.
Comparing Longstreet's rate of march with Jackson's is interesting, the
problem is that for part of the time they were going away from the enemy,
not toward them. The issue to me is how much faster Longstreet would have
gotten into position if he had followed a route similar to Alexander's once
he saw the signal station. From my perspective, he rode forward, deferred
to McLaws on a new route which caused them to countermarch, and lost a lot
of valuable time that could have been avoided. If he was unhappy with lee
and in a "petulant" mood, that might explain it, or it could have absolutely
nothing to do with it. It just seems like before he countermarched, he
would have taken a hard look at the alternatives (Alexander's route).

Clearly, Longstreet took a "bad rap" from his detractors after the war.
As you suggested, Longstreet didn't help himself, in some cases, by his post
war writings. However, from my point of view, some folks have ridden the
pendulum back a bit too far in the other direction. The truth is, I think
Coddington was a bit tough on him but I would suppose that I'm just a wee
bit more critical than yourself, based on previous conversations. That does
not mean that I think that Longstreet lost the battle for the ANV. There
were plenty of folks to share that responsibility.

On a related issue, I recently found out how to remotely search the
archives collection at the Military History Institute from the internet and
found that they have a collection of papers which include messages and
reports by Capt. James Hall, the signal officer on LRT at the time of the
flank march. The only signal officer's report that was published in the OR
for the 3 days of the battle was Capt. Lemuel Norton's. It appears that he
consolidated the reports of the other Signal officers and just submitted
his. However, for the part of the campaign that included the pursuit of Lee
toward Williamsport, all of the signal officer's reports were published and
there is a lot of detail. If Hall's Gettysburg report is there, we may have
some fresh material that has not been previously published. I can't find
the Hall papers referenced in any of the bibliographies of the major
studies. Lots of the messages that were published in the OR have been
referenced by writers to include Law and Longstreet. It would be great to
find additional messages that have not been previously considered. I'm
trying to get loose and get up there.

Dave wrote: >
>I think that the rate of progress, the choice of route, and the deployment
>all were accomplished with reasonable dispatch. Usually criticism of
>Longstreet is vague, but I've never seen a specific charge (he deliberately
>took the wrong route, etc.) that stood up to close scrutiny.
>
>Dave Powell

Longstreet was upset with the delay made necessary by
having his column exposed to the Federal signal station
on LRT, and the resulting counter-march. Far from dragging
his heels, Longstreet ordered the divisions of Hood and
McLaws to about-face and march abreast of each other, in
order to decrease the time required for the counter-march.

While it might have been better if Longstreet would have
been closer to the head of the column, in order to be in a
better position to direct the march of the I Corps -- is
another question. But, the results would have been the same.
Johnson would have lead the head of the I Corps column to the
same rise of ground beyond Black Horse Tavern, that would be
visible from the Yankee LRT signal station. Only a few extra
minutes would have been saved if Longstreet had have been at
the front of the line of march.

I think the point regarding JEB Stuart being unavailable for
recon service was missed in earlier discussions. Certainly the
entire cavalry force of Stuart would not have been sent out on a
sensitive recon, where stealth was important, as was required
for this mission. But, there would have been available more small
squads of cavalry experienced in recon work (the same size as
Johnson's party) that could have been sent out to find the best
concealed route to the step-off point for the assault. This would
have saved much time.

A lot can change, in the time a single scouting party takes to
return to report to headquarters. If squads of Stuart's horsemen had
remained out observing, the change in the dispositions of the AoP
could have been reported in time to change attack plans. The report
of Johnson was much too old to have been seriously regarded as still
valid. Stuart's squads could have provided Lee with hourly updates of
intelligence reports, that may have changed the final outcome of the
battle. If Stuart had been on the battlefield, there would have been
more opportunity to adapt to changing battlefield conditions.

It may never be known why Longstreet did not follow the tracks of
E.P. Alexander's guns during the counter-march, however that is beyond
this supporter of old Pete, ability to reason out. Would two divisions
of infantry be more observable than a few battalions of artillery (the
sun reflections off of thousands of musket barrels)?

Steven Cassel

From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron
Subject: Longstreet

Steve,
The issue here is indeed why he didn't follow Alexander. That's where he
lost the time. I pointed out that he was well back in the column is the
context that he seems to have deferred control of the movement to Johnston.
As far as ordering an "about-face", I'm not real sure where you are on that
one (I'm not trying to be cute, I just don't know). Longstreet asked McLaws
"is there no way to avoid it" and McLaws told him of his reconnaissance that
morning. Longstreet then asked "How can we get there" and McLaws replied
that they would have to countermarch. Longstreet then said, "Then all
right" [McLaws, "Gettysburg", S.H.S.P, VII, p. 69].

An "about face" and a countermarch are two different things. Longstreet
did comment to McLaws "...suppose you let him [Hood] countermarch first and
lead in the attack" but when McLaws resisted, Longstreet agreed to let
McLaws countermarch first by stating "Then go on" [McLaws, p.69]. They went
back in the same order they came. Kershaw was the lead brigade initially
and during the countermarch. I'm not sure where you are getting the "march
abreast" unless you are talking about Longstreet moving Hood forward and
"doubling" McLaws' column (nothing here about an "about face") after Mclaws
had made contact (this is much later) because he felt it no longer made
sense to worry about concealing it from the signal station. At this point,
let me quote Pfanz, "This made good sense, or so it seems today, but the
sophistry used in one of his [Longstreet] explanations for it does not.
Longstreet stated in one account that, since Captain Johnston was ordered by
General Lee to conduct the head of the column -McLaws' division - he,
Longstreet, could not interfere with it; but the order did not apply to
Hood's division, so he felt free to order Hood forward and did so" [Pfanz,
Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 122].

BTW, I'm a supporter of "old Pete" also, I just don't think his actions on
the 2nd are above criticism.

Bill

From: dmercado@BIX.com
Date: Sun, 10 Dec 1995 19:07:05 -0500 (EST)

> BTW, I'm a supporter of "old Pete" also, I just don't think his actions
>on the 2nd are above criticism.

>
Bill,
I am a big fan of Gen Longstreet, but arguably his biggest mistake was
to insist on waiting for his last brigade (Law's) before starting the attack.

While he waited for one brigade to come up, two full Corps came up for
the federals.

-Dave

From: DPowell334@aol.com
Dave,
Actually, he needed that brigade. The attack faltered for lack of support
anyway, even with Law. Without him, likely the attack at Devil's Den would
have been strictly a frontal assault, and much more easily repulsed.

As for fresh troops, all the Union troops that repulsed Longstreet were on
the field and in place by 10:00 a.m., an hour before Lee even gave Longstreet
his orders. The only deployment change after that was Sickles' advance, a
movement that clearly benefited the CSA attack. It might be said that waiting
for Law actually helped the attack, not hinder it.

Dave Powell

From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron
Dave Navarre wrote:

>Had Longstreet put his foot down, (booted or not) and had his Corps do
>an about-face rather than a countermarch, the Corps could have been in position
>much earlier and the attack started much sooner.

Dave,
Prepare thyself, you are fixing to get an incoming round from Dave Powell
about the fact that they had to be in the original order due to the fact
that Longstreet was going to do an "en echelon" attack and the units needed
to work in harmony.

Get the idea I've been down this road (no pun intended) before? :)
Want to get really confused? Go read Tucker's HIGH TIDE AT GETTYSBURG, p.
234. I knew Tucker was a little "fast and loose" but this is really messy.
First Tucker claims that Johnston told Longstreet that they could pass
around the shoulder of the hill and through a field, and that the column
would still be hidden from the enemy. Tucker said that Longstreet was
disgusted and peremptorily called off the entire movement. "He wanted
another route. He ordered an about-face and a return toward the Cashtown
road. This meant that Hood, who was in the rear of McLaws, now headed the
column..." I wonder where he got that. I also wonder if the Johnston
papers really say anything about him telling Longstreet to cut through the
fields. Only time I've ever hear it. First time I ever heard about an
"about face" at that point also. Obviously Tucker never read McLaws'
S.H.S.P. article. Tucker goes on to say that Longstreet was finding roads
south and following generally Herr Ridge and the bank of Willoughby Run.
Tucker also talks about the fact that the signal station never saw
Longstreet's columns. He is correct when he talks about the specific point
past Black Horse Tavern where they countermarched but clearly the messages
later were describing the countermarch and Law going into position (at least
Law thought so [B&L], and so do I).

>
>Dave,
> Prepare thyself, you are fixing to get an incoming round from Dave Powell
>about the fact that they had to be in the original order due to the fact
>that Longstreet was going to do an "en echelon" attack and the units needed
>to work in harmony.
Thanks, Bill for setting the stage:)
Actually, given Lee's order for an echelon attack, with the units keying off
each-other in order, I do believe that there was a valid military reason for
not reversing the order of march. At the very least, doing so would require
more time be spent making sure everyone understood the new order of advance.

Dave Mercado wrote:
"arguably his [Longstreet's] biggest mistake was to insist on waiting for his
last brigade (Law's) before starting the attack."

This falls directly in line with Longstreet's not wanting to go into battle
without Pickett, since it was like going in "with one boot off." I can
understand his reticence about not wanting to attack before he was ready, but
Dave makes a good point - it seems that Longstreet made several errors out of
petulance. (I still think he was an outstanding commander, but this sure wasn't
his greatest battle....)

Steve Cassel wrote:
"Far from dragging his heels, Longstreet ordered the divisions of Hood and
McLaws to about-face and march abreast of each other, in order to decrease the
time required for the counter-march."

My recollection is that McLaws remained the lead unit. This struck me as the
truly egregious error here, as the regiments in the van countermarched past Hood
and Law. Had Longstreet put his foot down, (booted or not) and had his Corps do
an about-face rather than a countermarch, the Corps could have been in position
much earlier and the attack started much sooner (it seems almost all of the
actions at Gettysburg got a late afternoon start despite the units being roused
at ungodly hours - was this typical of ACW actions?)

Bill wrote:
"during a terrain walk.... we won't be on horseback (big difference in how tall
you are!)"

>Dave,
> Good analysis. I don't think that the actual rate of march was slow.
>Comparing Longstreet's rate of march with Jackson's is interesting, the
>problem is that for part of the time they were going away from the enemy,
>not toward them. The issue to me is how much faster Longstreet would have
>gotten into position if he had followed a route similar to Alexander's once
>he saw the signal station. From my perspective, he rode forward, deferred
>to McLaws on a new route which caused them to countermarch, and lost a lot
>of valuable time that could have been avoided. If he was unhappy with lee
>and in a "petulant" mood, that might explain it, or it could have absolutely
>nothing to do with it. It just seems like before he countermarched, he
>would have taken a hard look at the alternatives (Alexander's route).
Bill,
I think Alexander's route is the most interesting of all these questions. Two
battalions of artillery took up a lot of road-space, and would have been as
easy to see as a marching Division any day, perhaps easier. Alexander's
column should have been almost as long as Hood's or McLaws' entire division,
given the latter were moving without trains. Clearly, Alexander could not
have gone anywhere that the infantry couldn't. Also, such a movement would
have made a clear track, it was unlikely to be missed (unless Johnson were
the only one looking, he seemed to miss everything.:))

However, I have some possible explanations (rationalisations?.)

First, I've noticed that none of the contemporary critics of Longstreet ever
raised this issue (Though I could be wrong here, I can't recall all the
sources. Any help?) I've only read about it in later historical works.
Alexander mentions the detour, but not why the infantry bypassed it.

It seems likely that McLaws had done some recon that a.m. as to the
approach route. He was the one Longstreet questioned about where to go next,
and the one who indicated the need to countermarch. Johnson - the designated
guide - was also available, and seems not to have made any suggestions beyond
countermarching. Lee was present, (or at least close by,) and aquiesced,
re-affirming his desire for the column to remain hidden. Hood was also
present.

Given all these qualified military men on the field, it seems odd that
none would have mentioned it after the fact if Longstreet were indeed being
"mulish" and unhelpful. Also, one wonders at the judgement of so many capable
officers ignoring that route. Why did not McLaws or Hood even suggest such a
move? Certianly they had other suggestions as to changing the order of march,
etc.

Since there is really no way of knowing what happened, I tend to defer
to the judgement of the collective group, here, and assume they had some
valid reason for not following Alexander. It is unfortunate that this charge
was never really leveled while the contemporaries were alive, perhaps then we
would have another entire body of conflicting liturature to deal with, but at
least we'd have a defense.

There is a likely explanation: The commanders were worried about traffic
problems. Passing all two divisions and the guns thru a single choke-point is
a good way to invite _real_ delay. They needed deployment space to get into
position, and that could be why they looked for alternate routes for the
infantry. I tend to view later historians' wonderment over how Longstreet
could have missed such an obvious alternative path as a clear exercise of
20/20 hindsight, based on information that it would be unreasonable to assume
that Longstreet should have had.

Pinning all this blame on Longstreet seems too convenient - as I
mentioned, what of Hood, Lee, McLaws, etc.? Why have a guide - in the form of
Johnson - if he's not to guide the column? If it wasn't simple oversight,
then likely there were good - if unkown today - reasons for not using that
route. If it were just an oversight, then they all missed it, which likely
indicates that it might not have been as easy to spot as we now think.

Dave Powell

From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Longstreet

Dave Powell wrote:
>First, I've noticed that none of the contemporary critics of Longstreet ever
>raised this issue (Though I could be wrong here, I can't recall all the
>sources. Any help?) I've only read about it in later historical works.
>Alexander mentions the detour, but not why the infantry bypassed it.

Dave, my guess on this one is the fact that Alexander's book was not
published until 1910. There were some earlier articles but I don't remember
the dates.

> It seems likely that McLaws had done some recon that a.m. as to the
>approach route. He was the one Longstreet questioned about where to go next,
>and the one who indicated the need to countermarch. Johnson - the designated
>guide - was also available, and seems not to have made any suggestions beyond
>countermarching. Lee was present, (or at least close by,) and aquiesced,
>re-affirming his desire for the column to remain hidden. Hood was also
>present.

No argument here as to McLaws "having done some recon that a.m." but I am
not sure he went down by Marsh Creek/Black Horse Tavern. He had reconned a
route by Willoughby Run. I do fault Longstreet for not allowing McLaws to
go back and recon with Johnson after he was asked by McLaws to do so. As I
indicated in my post the other day, Longstreet seems to have pretty much
deferred to McLaws. Nothing really wrong with that except to me it
indicates he wasn't in a "take charge" mood. That's the point I was raising
about being affected by his unhappiness with Lee. I am just guessing.
Let's look at "Johnson - the designated guide - was also available, and
seems not to have made any suggestions beyond countermarching". No way I'm
going to defend "wrongway" Johnston's guiding ability but a lot of secondary
sources have Johnston being "appalled" when he found that they were going to
be following his directions. He could have certainly reconned LRT without
going all the way down to Marsh Creek and Black Horse Tavern. He clearly
didn't know where he was going. However, did you see the part of my post
this afternoon about Tucker? Get your copy of High Tide and look at page
234. Now a lot of the stuff on this page is just wrong but I am really
interested in the part where Tucker says "By passing around the shoulder of
the hill and through a field, he [Johnston] told Longstreet, the column
would still be hidden from the enemy, if the enemy should , indeed, be
looking out from the Round Tops toward Black Horse Tavern". The passage has
no note. We really need to get a copy of the Johnston papers. Any luck on
having friends take a look at it for you?

> Given all these qualified military men on the field, it seems odd that
>none would have mentioned it after the fact if Longstreet were indeed being
>"mulish" and unhelpful. Also, one wonders at the judgement of so many capable
>officers ignoring that route. Why did not McLaws or Hood even suggest such a
>move? Certianly they had other suggestions as to changing the order of march,
>etc.

Again, we need to see if there is any validity to the Tucker statement
that Johnson told him to go across the fields. If that is true (or at least
in the Johnston papers), it is VERY significant. As to the rest of your
post, you make valid points in Longstreet's defense, as always. The common
problem in all of these discussions (Longstreet's flanking movement and
Where in the heck was Johnston) is our inability to critically analyze just
exactly what Johnston wrote. I would really love to do that. I think the
two of us could write a good piece centered on Johnston if we could just get
a hold of this material (I'm working on a piece on the 118th Penn. but I
have the same problem with resources. They are on the east coast.). I
don't remember if Bob Larwence has talked about it since you joined the
group but the discussion group is planning on meeting at Gettysburg in June.
Any chance you can make that? I plan on coming and am really looking
forward to meeting the rest of the group. I could take the souther route
out of east Texas and come up through North Carolina and Virginia and pick
up the Johnston material if we can't get hold of it before then.

Bill

From: "James F. Epperson"
Subject: Re: Longstreet

Concerning Johnson's role (or lack thereof) in guiding Longstreet's
column: Is it possible that he had scouted the enemy position, but not
how to get there with a column of troops? I know this is the position
that Shaara has him take in KILLER ANGELS, but that's a work of fiction
so I am not inclined to take it as ironclad truth. On the other hand, it
is a plausible explanation for why he was unable to help out when the
problem came up.

Actually, Alexander does profer an explanation of why the infantry bypassed
his route -at least partially (see Coddington, p.380). A lack of orders!
Alexander said, that upon returning along the same short cut he took to the
right earlier, he found the head of an infantry division stopped near the rise
on Herr Ridge visible from LRT. Surely, this must have been McLaws division-
Kershaw's Brigade. It stayed there for over an hour, according to Alexander,
despite his claim that he tried to get them to recognize the worth of his
route. Supposedly nobody present at that time had the authority to vary
orders. Where was Longstreet, McLaws, Kershaw, Johnson,etc. during this hour
plus period? Surely, Alexander would have mentioned them had they been
present. This does not provide an explanation of why Longsteet, McLaws etc.
didn't order the infantry to follow Alexander's route, but it certainly is a
bizarre story.

As far as McLaw's recon goes, he was forbidden from doing any by Longstreet
earlier that day, as we discussed in previous posts. However, McLaws would
have ridden the ground in question at least twice during his trips to and from
the Seminary that morning. The ground north of the Fairfield Road and east of
Herr Ridge is directly between the Seminary and Black Horse Tavern. He
probably picked up his "recon" during this time. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I was
under the impression that the head of McLaws division bivouaked at the Black
Horse Tavern, with the rest of the division stretched back out to the north
along Marsh Creek. If so, they were camped within less than 1/4 mile of where
the division halted and then began the countermarch. Nobody rode down the
road during that whole morning and noticed this? Again, bizarre.

As for Hood, I'm not sure he was present during the discussions of the
countermarch orders. Coddington (p.379) says Hood's division pushed into the
back of McLaws - presumably somewhere back north along Marsh Creek. Then
Longstreet ordered Hood ahead of McLaws, to the right "...by the most direct
route". It's not clear whether this order occurred before or after Longstreet
met McLaws and Johnson on the Black Horse Tavern Road. Anyway, I take
Longstreet's order to mean that Hood did not have to countermarch. I noted
that Coddington's map on p.332 actually shows two routes for the 1st Corps
march north of the Fairfield Road - one more direct, the other more
circuitous. I wonder if these are Hood's and McLaws' routes respectively -
at least in Coddington's interpretation, although there is no reference in the
text to this portion of the map. My understanding of the countermarch
principle would have kept McLaws (and specifically Kershaw) in the lead of the
column, as I have always thought. But I'm no longer sure this is the case.
Coddington (p.380) says "At Pitzer's School House, (McLaws) turned to the
left....,while Hood's division UP AHEAD continued south toward the Emmittsburg
Road." If Hood was "up ahead" as McLaws turned left to the Peach Orchard,
then Hood must have been leading the column - at least at this point.
Coddington uses a McLaws letter of July 7, 1863 as a source for this. At
least it was fresh in McLaws mind at this point.

Grant Troop

From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Longstreet

Grant,
This is very confusing isn't it. Here is my try at it. Correct me if I'm
wrong. Jim, Dave(s), Larwence brothers, feel free to pile on.
Mclaws is in the lead with Kershaw's Brigade up front. McLaws halts the
column and Longstreet rides up to see what is the matter. McLaws tell
Longstreet they need to countermarch and Longstreet agrees. Longstreet
suggests that Hood countermarch first (not "about face") but Mclaws protests
and Longstreet agrees to let McLaws go first. They go back the way they
came until they got to Herr ridge at that point they cut down a lane and
over land to Willoughby Run which they followed until they got to the road
that led to Pitzer's Schoolhouse. Hood is following McLaws. Hood was well
behind and Mclaws was very stretched out due to the fact that McLaws had
narrowed the company fronts because of the narrow lanes. Longstreet found
Hood's column halted and pulled Hood out to double McLaws columns. This was
because they could again see the Federal signal station on LRT and was
backed up behind McLaws. Longstreet wrote that if he could see the signal
station, they could see him and it was useless try to stay concealed. It is
not certain where his occurred but my guess is after they got on the road to
Pitzer's School House from the Willoughby Run lane but before they reached
the school house junction. Hood wrote that he sent out an advanced force to
tear down fences which indicates that he cut across fields. He was moved to
the right of Mclaws and went into position.
Now the problem is that many of the accounts do not agree. Pfanz (p. 122)
and Coddington (p. 379-80) have different interpretations (I like Pfanz's).
My interpretation is that Longstreet in B&L is talking about two separate
halts due to the signal station. At the second halt, he became impatient
and moved Hood around McLaws. This was after they had countermarched for a
long time. I have used Coddington, Pfanz, Hood (Advance and Retreat),
Longstreet (B&L), McLaws (SHSP), Law (B&L) ,Alexander (Military Memoirs) and
Kershaw's report in the OR. I do not have Longstreet's Lee in Penn.

For what it's worth, Jeff Wert in his biography of Longstreet supports
Tucker's unsubstantiated story concerning Johnston saying:"Johnston claimed
that he recommended to Longstreet that the troops skirt the hill by marching
across the fields, but the general "preferred the roads"." The phrase
"preferred the roads" is in quotes, inferring that it is Johnston's words.
Wert's source is the Johnston Papers at VHS. So, after this discussion, we're
to believe that all of Longstreet, McLaws and Johnson left the head of the
column for an hour or more to find "roads". One thing seems certain from
hindsight - they should have let Porter Alexander lead the column. After all,
he'd had his batteries in position for about an hour at this point.

And I think Jim Epperson's point about the focus of Johnston's recon is
potentially a good one. Lee had ordered Johnston to do three things - find a
route, make sure it was screened from LRT, and scout Union deployments on the
right. But perhaps, Johnston focused more particularly on the latter
(notwithstanding the results - let's be objective), and as a result, was less
well prepared in leading the 1st Corps down to Pitzer's Schoolhouse. I know
I've gotten lost and turned around on those roads - but then come to think of
it, the LRT area "looked" unoccupied as well. Maybe Johnston is a long lost
relative of mine.

Grant Troop

From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Lonstreet

Jim wrote:
> Then Longstreet ordered Hood ahead of McLaws, to the right "

Jim,
This is later, after McLaws had come in contact near the peach orchard.

Bill

From: Norman Levitt
Subject: Re: Longstreet

One questiion that seems to be getting lost in the general discussion
of Johnston's recon and Longstreet's countermarch is this: What
precisely did lee think he was sending Longstreet's two divisions
into? The usual answer is "the left flank of the Federal line". But
what, exactly, did Lee and his staff know, or think they knew, about
the Federal order of battle? Who did they think was on the field
facing them? They'd fought I and XI Corps on the 1st, of course, and
probably knew that elements of II and XII Corps were up. But just
what kind of thought was given to the dispositi of II, V, and VI
Corps? Why would Lee have ordered any kind of large-scale action
without at least some sense of where half the AoP might have been? Is
it possible that he thought Meade was holding half his Army in reserve
somewhere near the Maryland line? Do we have any sources at all on
any of this?

Itg all seems rrather puzzling, especially since, as has been
observed, Lee never ordered his available cavalry up to feel out the
Federal position.

Norm Levitt

From: Dave Powell
Good point, Norm.

Offhand, I don't remember what sources - if any - speak to this. My general
recollection is that Lee still hoped to find the Union force scattered, and
have to face only a portion of the Army of the Potomac. Certainly he was
surprised at the end of June at the rapidity of the AOP's arrival in Pa.

Tactically, of course, he thought he was placing Longstreet astride an
exposed Union flank on Emmittsburg Road.

One of the things that made the area such a poor position from the CSA point
of view is that Meade's deployments and reserves were almost entirely masked
by the fishhook.

This is why Hood's flank end-run proposal was flawed - they had no idea that
the 5th Corps was so close at hand.

I think Lee was banking on the Union forces living up to past lethargic
reputation. At Antietam, McClellan wasted a day on the 16th, just letting Lee
concentrate his army. Witness Burnside at Fredericksburg, where he also
wasted at least a day before nerving himself up to attack. Even Hooker at
Chancellorsville reinforced the idea. Just as the AOP was about to clear the
Wilderness and really put Lee's command in a vise, Hooker recalled the
leading elements and essentially adopted a defensive shell. Lee used the
ensuing time to shift men between fronts, recon and plan.

Meade did not hesitate. The army was essentially concentrated by noon on July
2nd, with only the 6th Corps not present, and even that command within a
couple hours of the field. I think Lee just worked off of past assumptions
that he only had part of the army to fight.

Dave Powell

From: STEVEN CASSEL
Subject: RE: Longstreet's Flanking Movement

I am a Beta Tester for the new Delphi Internet/ MCI/Newscorp Service.
I received an upgrade in the Beta-test software this week, and have not
been able to post a reply to the response regarding my earlier post on
Longstreet's flanking movement of 7/2/1863.

I must confess that my comment about Longstreet's column doing an
"about-face," to begin the counter march was made off the top of my
head without research. I beg everyone's pardon, I am not as a rule that
free and loose with history. It was late at night, when I grabbed
my keyboard, instead of some reference sources.

I fell back on a remembered reference from a miss-spent youth. I fell
victim to the memory of reading the infamous page 234 of Glenn Tucker's
_High Tide At Gettysburg_, with regard to the "about-face" reference.
In reading the footnotes listed by Tucker, I do not see where he might
have found a reference to any, about-face movement of Longstreet's column.
Tucker's notes included: SHSP Vol.IV, pp. 99-102; B & L Vol. III, pp. 320,
332, and 359. John B. Kershaw (McLaws Division) in his article: "Kershaw's
Brigade At Gettysburg" on page 332 from _Battles and Leaders_ states that --
his brigade counter marched past,(definitely not an about-face) Hood's
division, that had been following them [McLaws Division].

Could Tucker have confused a statement of E.M. Law (Hood's Division),
in his _Battles and Leaders_ article: "The Struggle For Round Top" on page
320, that referred to a later time period in the counter march? Law said:
"...At length, after many vexatious delays, Hood's division was pushed
forward until it uncovered McLaws, and soon reached the Emmitsburg road
in front of Round Top. Here our line of battle was formed at an acute
angle with the road, the right being in advance of it, between the road and
the mountain, and the left extending across and in rear of the road..." I
believe that Laws was discussing a point in time towards the end of the
counter march, not at the beginning of the movement. This is the only
possible reference from the notes cited by Tucker that I can see where
he might have got an idea about an "about-face." If this is the case, then
Tucker is very mistaken.

Harry Pfanz talks on page 121 in his _Gettysburg: the Second Day_ about
the incredible incident of Longstreet not pressing his suggestion that
Hood's Division lead the counter march over the objections of his subordinate
division commander McLaws. Longstreet should have issued an order that
would have turned the suggestion into a reality. After all old Pete was
being paid the "big bucks" as the I Corps commander, not McLaws.

Another place where I think Tucker confused later events in the counter-
march in his reference to the divisions of McLaws and Hood marching abreast
of each other, in order to speed-up their march. Pfanz on page 122 says:
"...Hood's division followed McLaws. Being far from the front of the
column, Hood's men felt the full effects of accordion action -- slow-moving,
starting, and stopping. There were vexatious delays caused in part by concern
that the column might be seen from Little Round Top. Longstreet became
impatient after a time and, considering it useless to worry any more about
concealment, ordered Hood to double with McLaw's column and go quickly into
position..." Longstreet later wrote a weak excuse that since General Lee
had ordered Captain Johnson to lead the column (with McLaws in the lead),
he could not intercede but, he could order Hood to double his division with
McLaws to speed-up the movement to the right.

So friends of the GDG, I will in the future research old references tucked
away in the cobwebs of my aging gray-matter before I reach for my keyboard.
And I will not quote anything written by Glenn Tucker again. I will not
regard Tucker, as one of the "grand old men" of Gettysburg historiography
anymore. After doing a little bit of checking, I see that he definitely is
not. After I finish David Martin's _Gettysburg: July 1_, I will finally
break-down and finally read Pfanz's _Gettysburg: the Second Day_.

From: Douglas M Macomber (macomb@cello.gina.calstate.edu)

Once again the great Longstreet debate, his actions on the second day are
still being debated today. I have heard both sides of the story and we all know
Jubal Early(who hated Longstreets guts) tried to make life miserable for
Longstreet every little chance he could get. In Longstreets memoirs, he blames
Lee for being to one-sided. Early using this fueled the south's anger on
Longstreet. Also just as a note:Longstreet was supposed to attack as soon as
heard Ewell's guns to the north.

Paul (Douglas) Macomber

From: Ethan Book (eb10996@www.cedarnet.org)

Jeffrey Zirkle wrote:

I just joined the group yesterday so I'm not up to speed on
past comments. I have read several entries relative to Longstreets suggested
tactics concerning this battle v/s Lees. As I understand it Longstreet suggested
a defensive position similar to the F'burg battles, wait and defend. I've
always been puzzled at this approach concerning the question of supply and the
fact that our forces were in hostile territory. Why wouldn't the Union just
wait us out. The only answer I can think of is possibly political pressure to
repel the invaders and the possibility that we might make a break for
Washington. I am certainly no expert on this battle, however it is my opinion
that Longstreets attitude throughout this battle might have very well cost us a
victory. His sluggish approach to follow orders (especially the second day)
cost us dearly. Our poorly executed artillery barrage on the third day, lack
of ammunition, the failure to bring the artillery in close support of "Picketts
Charge", battle smoke which caused needed reinforcements to breach the
breakthrough in the Union lines etc. etc. I'm not one of those history buffs
from Va. that thinks Lee just couldn't make a mistake, but he really almost
pulled it off. The fact that we were facing a determined force with leaders
like Chamberlain, I feel had the most to do with our defeat. Lets just say not
many of the Quote "victors" followed up the "victory" by
adequately pursuing our forces back to Virginia. I've said way to much for my
first time on. I'll try to keep it short, next time.

To my understanding I thought Longstreets idea of a defensive move was to
move around behind the Union army cutting them off from supplies, thus the ANV
could still be supplied from the south. And I also think Longstreet did as
much as he could with the number of men and amount of amunition he had, he was
greatly outnumbered by men and ground.

From: Douglas M Macomber (dmacomb@cello.gina.calstate.edu)

To Jeff and Ethan,

Both of you brought up some good points, yet Longstreets overall campaign
strategy was originally to march his corps and link up with the Army of the
Tennesee, and Pembertons army somewhere in Mississippi, Lee concluding Virginia
must be saved over Vicksburg, headed north. Ethan I do think I dropped you a
line earlier, so I was going to suggest a basic reading list, not just to you
but to all memebers: Coddington, Edwin B. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN, Longacre,
Edward THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG Also, a subcription to G'Burg magazine would
be a good idea. If you need any infor regarding these ISBNS, subscription info
just drop me a line.

Paul(Douglas)Macomber

From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg (wittenberg@qn.net)

You wrote:

To Jeff and Ethan,

Both of you brought up some good points, yet Longstreets overall
campaign strategy was originally to march his corps and link up with the Army of
the Tennesee, and Pembertons army somewhere in Mississippi, Lee concluding
Virginia must be saved over Vicksburg, headed north. Ethan I do think I
dropped you a line earlier, so I was going to suggest a basic reading list, not
just to you but to all memebers: Coddington, Edwin B. THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN
Longacre,Edward THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG Also, a subcription to G'Burg magazine
would be a good idea. If you need any infor regarding these ISBNS, subscription
info just drop me a line.
Paul(Douglas)Macomber

I have to disagree with Paul with respect to the Longacre book. He was
off-line for a while, and has missed a good bit of discussion about it. I am in
the middle of writing a biography of John Buford, and have spent years
researching cavalry operations in the G-burg Campaign. Longacre's book is chock
full of errors, inconsistencies, and lack of detail. You can do a lot better.
If you're interested, e-mail me privately, and I will go into further detail.
Sorry, Paul.

Eric Wittenberg

From: John Kelly (jkelly@argo.net)

You wrote:

Once again the great Longstreet debate, his actions on the
second day are still being debated toady. I have heard both sides of the story
and we all know Jubal Early(who hated Longstreets guts) tried to make life
miserable for Longstreet every little chance he could get. In Longstreets
memoirs, he blames Lee for being to one-sided. Early using this fueled the
south's anger on Longstreet. Also just as a note: Longstreet was supposed to
attack as soon as heard Ewell's guns to the north.

Paul (Douglas) Macomber

I have always been under the impression that it was Ewell who was to attack
when he heard Longstreet's guns.

Regards, Jack Kelly

From: Douglas M Macomber (dmacomb@cello.gina.calstate.edu)

Geez, I have been off-line so long I am mixing things up. Thanks for your
corrections Eric and John. Time to re-read Coddington and throw out Longacres
philosphy.

Paul(Douglas)Macomber

From: Bryan R Meyer (bm3p+@andrew.cmu.edu)

Comment reference Longs.. by John Kelly@argo.net

I have always been under the impression that it was Ewell
who was to attack when he heard Longstreet's guns.

Regards,

Jack Kelly

Jack,

That is what I thought too! Wasn't Ewell supposed to attack as soon as he
heard shots from Longstreet's guns? And also, wouldn't this put the blame of a
lack of coordination for attack on Ewell??

Bryan R. Meyer

From: Robin Hemperly (longstre@fig.leba.net)

Jeffrey,

Regarding Longstreet,,,,I am a firm believer in the idea, if the team fails,
fire the coach. You never fire the Asst. Coach! We need to stop trying to
blame Longstreet for the failure at Gettysburg. As pickett said, he thought the
Yanks had something to do with it.

Regards..

From: GaTechFan@aol.com

GDG:

Please enlighten me. I am relatively new to my CW study, and am not well
versed in my fellow-Georgian Longstreet's CW career. From what I have read,
however, it seems that Lee liked Pete because he was a good fighter, good field
tactician, obeyed orders, and could be talked to. But, other than at
Chickamauga, did Pete ever do anything of any significance when absent from
General Lee? I am not trying to trash him, I even like him somewhat. Am I
incorrect? But the Virginia interlude(I forget the place ...Suffolk?), and the
Knoxville debacle weren't exactly Pattonian. And weren't his pouty antics at
Gettysburg akin to Burnside's desultory actions(?) at Sharpsburg when he felt
slighted by the Young Napolean? I am not blaming the loss at G'burg on Pete (I
subscribe to the Captain of the Ship principle. But the captain expects the
mates to promptly obey). Any insights/opinions respectfully read. I sound like
Jubal Early...sheesh.

Pat Ellington

From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg (wittenberg@qn.net)

At 09:05 PM 1/28/96 -0500, you wrote:

GDG:

Please enlighten me. I am relatively new to my CW study, and am not well
versed in my fellow-Georgian Longstreet's CW career. From what I have read,
however, it seems that Lee liked Pete because he was a good fighter, good field
tactician, obeyed orders, and could be talked to. But, other than at
Chickamauga, did Pete ever do anything of any significance when absent from
General Lee? I am not trying to trash him, I even like him somewhat. Am I
incorrect? But the Virginia interlude(I forget the place...Suffolk?), and the
Knoxville debacle weren't exactly Pattonian. And weren't his pouty antics at
Gettysburg akin to Burnside's desultory actions(?) at Sharpsburg when he felt
slighted by the Young Napolean? I am not blaming the loss at G'burg on Pete (I
subscribe to the Captain of the Ship principle. But the captain expects the
mates to promptly obey). Any insights/opinions respectfully read. I sound like
Jubal Early...sheesh.

Pat Ellington

Pat:

Ol' Pete's best work was certainly done with Lee. He did rather badly, for
example, at Wauhatchie just before Lookout Mountain. At the same time, I can
think of no subordinate commander on either side who had three more grandly
successful assaults in the War than Old Pete. One need only read about his
sledgehammer flanking attack at Second Manassas and also his magnificent assault
at the Wilderness (where, by the way, he was badly wounded). Despite his
intriguing to succeed Braxton Bragg as commander of the Army of Tennessee, which
was so blatant that Bragg sent him away to Knoxville, he was not one capable of
independent command. Where he certainly did his best work was in a subordinate
role, where he was reliable, steady, and could be counted on the deliver
sledgehammer blows when called upon to do so.

Eric Wittenberg

From: SteveH7645@aol.com

You write:

did Pete ever do anything of any significance when absent
from General Lee? I am not trying to trash him, I even like him somewhat. Am I
incorrect? But the Virginia interlude(I forget the place...Suffolk?), and the
Knoxville debacle weren't exactly Pattonian.

Check out the battle of Chickamauga, in Georgia. Longstreet's attack
shattered the Federal line. It was one of the most perfect attacks in the entire
Civil War. Longstreet was a good, solid player, not flashy like Stonewall
Jackson. It can be compared to the quarterback who likes to pass for quick
yardage, who the fans really love, as opposed to the quarterback who makes
steady progress up the field with slow yardage. The first quarterback gets all
the glory, even though it is a very risky strategy. The second one is the one
the coaches really like...

Steve Haas

From: thumphri@nafis.fp.trw.com (Thad Humphries)

SteveH7645@aol.com says:

Check out the battle of Chickamauga, in Georgia.
Longstreet's attack shattered the Federal line. It was one of the most perfect
attacks in the entire Civil War.

Though a fan of Longsteet, he had a real stroke of luck here. The previous
day at that very spot, units eventually stood behind breastworks of their own
dead. Face to face fighting for several hours--I think easily twice as long as
the Battle of Brawner Farm/Groveton which openned 2d Manassas. Pete got lucky
the next day when an erroneous order moved a Federal unit out of positions
minutes before he attacked.

Thad Humphries

From: Robin Hemperly (longstre@fig.leba.net)

Dan,

I own nearly every book written about Longstreet, including the one written
by him. Overall, it is good, however, be ready for conflicting reports and
some anger. The book was only published the year he died, many of his original
notes and letters from comrades went up in smoke seven years earlier when his
home burned to the ground. It is not surprising to read some of the anger. If
you read reports that Longstreet wrote over the years on the battle you will
find glaring inconsistancy's, but I think that happened with many Generals who
lived a long time after the war......such as Fitz Lee and Early. When you
study his life you find how often he was over looked because he was not a
Virginian. Some misunderstand the fact that Lee enjoyed the company of the
General and his staff for slowness and proding needed by General Lee. I will
admit that the General was slow, however, this was not the reason Lee enjoyed
the friendship of his camp. Forgive me for going on. I also own the book
written by Helen Longstreet. If you are looking for insight into "Petes"
feelings you will not find it in this book. You will find much love and
respect for the General by Helen. I was hoping to find out how Longstreet
really felt about everything as he told her, however, this is really not
evident in the book. The books written by Moxley and T.J. are VERY good. Also
I would recommend Wert and Piston.

Not to open a huge can of worms but I have always personally
wondered what roads Longstreet would have used to move his corps
"around the Union left". Presumably, a corps of infantry, with its
attendant ammunition wagons, ambulances, and artillery (upwards of
70 horses per battery), would need a substantial road to move on.
Other than the small farm road several hundred yards south of BRT,
the road network doesn't look like it would support such a move.

This is an excellent sort of comment. So many times, we sit back and say
what should have been done, without ever bothering to look at the actual
time and place and examine HOW it could have been done -- and therefore
IF it could have been done. It's all well and good to say, "Well,
obviously, they should have flanked them." It's something else entirely
to actually do it. If Lee were here, he'd say, "Fine. Show me the road.
Show me how you'd do it. I'll wait." God, and truth, really is in the
details.

>>
>> No, Jackson's plan was outlandish. You will get a lot of reasons here
>> why Lee rejected it, but the most important reason why Lee wouldn't
>> even consider swinging around the Federal left flank has to do with
>> Lee's trains. All his supplies and ammunition were in Cashville. This
>> was only accessible by the Chambersburg Pike. For Lee to swing around
>> the Federal left would mean to abandon his trains to the Federal
>> cavalry. Even Lee was not that audacious. The alternative would have
>> been to send the trains south, around the back of South Mountain, and
>> hope to meet up with them someplace in Virginia. Lee would not have
>> taken that kind of gamble.

>
>I think you mean Longstreet's plan (do we all have Stonewall on the brain?)
>but otherwise this is an *excellent*, I say again, *excellent* post and
>a good reason why Lee stayed put.

>
Actually, on July 1 Lee's army trains were still at Chambersburg, with
Pickett. Had Lee and Longstreet settled on maneuver on the night of July 1st,
those trains would have stayed put or moved south towards Greencastle.
Also, such a maneuver would have required at least one corps to remain in
front of Gettysburg to pin Meade's attention and act as rear guard. This
would hardly have meant exposing the army's tail to destruction. Likely both
Ewell and Hill would remain between the bulk of the Union army and the
trains, at least until Meade was pulled south by Longstreet's movement.

With the main road from Chambersburg to Greencastle, Lee had a very good
lateral route, protected by South Mountain, behind which to screen his
trains. As his army's center of mass shifted southwards, so could the trains
without significant danger.

>I'm not claiming to know everything "let alone anything" ,but is
>Longstreet's plan that outlandish. Granted, Lee didn't like the idea of
>leaving what he thought was decent ground. One more thing, would anybody
>concede that Longstreet was maybe a little ahead of his time tactically.

Indeed. The man who, if not invented, advantageously used trenches and the
box barrage deserves some credit from taking us out of the Napoleonic era
of warfare.

Lee used trenches as readily as any officer in either army in the Civil War,
as did all the other commanders. West Point, with it's engineering emphasis,
tended to lay a strong defensive bias on it's graduates: even more so those
men, like Lee and McClellan, who were graduated directly into the engineer
branch. All of these men understood the value of defensive works, most of
them regarded defense as the inherently stronger form of warfare. All of
them, however, were struggling with the fact that it would require offensive
successes to win wars. Longstreet was no more defensive minded than the bulk
of his professional contemporaries.

As for "inventor of the box barrage," what is the proof of this claim?
Source? Longstreet took almost no active tactical role in artillery use,
that's why he gave Alexander such a free hand. Aside from that, the "box
barrage," as any artilleryman today would understand the term, was physically
impossible to create or control with ACW arty technology.

On the train into DC yesterday Scott clued me in to two more
points regarding the situation on July 2 and the ANV's ability to
sweep south.
1.) Merritt's brigade of cavalry was posted in that direction
precisely because of the danger of this eventuality.
2.) On the morning of July 2, with the exception of the 12th corps
and some other entrenched forces, the entire army was massed in
formation and ready to move in whatever direction Meade needed
them to go. Scott figures Meade was expecting some kind of move by
Lee and was ready for it.

I told you it wasn't my area of expertise... Scott easily trumps
me in just about every aspect of the battle.

Good points all, but not ones that could completely preclude an end run by
Lee"

1) Consider that Merritt not only had to screen the flank of the AOP but
protect the rear flotsam of the army scattered between Emmittsburg and
Taneytown. His position is exactly why I think that Lee would have needed
vastly better cavalry performance to make such a move than he had heretofore.
Merritt was an early warning tripwire, one that could be negated with
aggressive CSA cavalry action.

2) Meade still had his forces well in hand on the morning of July 2nd, but
nonetheless, had already made the choice to concentrate north. In doing so,
he shifted the AOP's center of gravity north of the PA state line, and was in
fact farther from the Waynesboro Turnpike than was Lee via the Fairfield
road. Unquestionably Meade would react, and react quickly, but the point is
that in forcing that reaction Lee would be well on his way to regaining that
initiative he'd lost the moment he was forced to turn and confront the Union
troops coming up in his rear. Given the position and the time lag bound to
incur as information made it's way to Meade's HQ, was digested, and new
orders reached the effected commands, Meade would have more ground to cover
than would Lee in moving back South.

"But I do know that he was ordered to
>start the attack at 9:00 AM. Lee came back to the southern end of the
>field around 11:00 AM and was incensed that the attack had not taken
>place. "
posted by Victor Vernon

Obviously Longstreet notes nothing about this in his book, from Manassas to
Appomattox. However, from various sources, I also begin to doubt this
piece of "history" as an "Earlyism" ( as in Jubal)

I would appreciate quotes from the GDG from any primary source that would
tell if:
1) the order was at 9 and not closer to 11 as Old Pete maintained;
2) that Lee felt Longstreet was stalling

Col. Fremantle had some observations about the morning of July 2, 1863:

"The firing ceased about dark[July 1], at which time I rode back with General
Longstreet and his Staff to his headquarters at Cashtown, a little village
eight miles from Gettysburg. At that time troops were pouring along the road,
and were being marched towards the position they are to occupy tomorrow...

2d July(Thursday)__ We all got up at 3:30AM...Col. Sorrell, the Austrian, and
I arrived at 5AM at the same commanding position we were on yesterday, and I
climbed up a tree in company with Captain Schreibert of the Prussian army.
Just below us were seated Generals Lee, Hill, Longstreet, and Hood, in
consultation...General Heth was also present...At 7AM I rode over part of the
ground with General Longstreet, and saw him disposing of McLaw's division for
today's fight...AS THE WHOLE MORNING WAS EVIDENTLY TO BE OCCUPIED IN
DISPOSING OF TROOPS FOR THE ATTACK, I rode to the extreme right with Col.
Manning and Maj. Walton...

At 2PM General Longstreet advised me, if I wished to have a good view of the
battle, to return to my tree of yesterday...But until 4:45PM all was
profoundly still...Longstreet suddenly commenced a heavy cannonade on the
right...So soon as the firing began, General Lee joined Hill just below our
tree...generally he sat quite alone on the stump of a tree...during the whole
time the firing continued, he only sent one message, and only received one
report."

Excuse the rather long quote, but Fremantle's account is important. He was a
great admirer of both Lee and Longstreet but really had no "dog in the
fight." His narrative of the morning of July 2 exhibits no sense of urgency
by any of the principals. Granted, he was not privy to all that was said,
but he had access to Longstreet and his staff, and it would seem he would be
aware of any contention between Bobby and Pete. The account proves nothing,
but indirectly seems to refute any theory that Longstreet was ordered to
attack at 9AM...they spent the previous night EIGHT miles away, and much of
the army was not yet deployed.

I have a few comments on Victor Vernon's "2 cents worth" on General
Longstreet's performance on 2 July.

1) I wouldn't call the Suffolk campaign a debacle, they accomplished what
they had been sent there to due, namely gather supplies; and Lee was
completely satisfied with the results.

2) Longstreet and A.P. Hill were never scheduled to fight a duel. In a
letter to the Houston Daily Post, T.J. Goree wrote:
" The statements contained in a publication in your paper a few days since
in regards to a misunderstanding between Generals Longstreet and A.P. Hill
during the war are not altogether correct, and especially is the statement
incorrect in regard to a challenge having been sent by General Hill and
declined by General Longstreet." A disagreement arose when Richmond papers
printed accounts of the Seven Days' Battle, giving most of the credit to
Hill's Light Division, and ignoring other divisions under Longstreet's
command(Hill was under Longstreet's command at that time). Colonel Sorrel
"felt called upon in behalf of the other portions of the command to correct
the reports published". This led to heated communications between Hill and
Sorrel, "and for a short time it was feared that a duel would result."

3) I wouldn't consider Longstreet an "outsider" at that point in history.
In fact, many sources remark on the close relationship he had with Lee.

4) I can't find anything in any of my sources that implies an order was
given to Longstreet at 9AM. From what I have read, Johnson and Clarke
returned between 7 and 8 am, Lee waited for Venable to return with a reply
from Gen'l Ewell until 9 am, at what time Lee went to see Ewell himself to
get his assessment of moving Ewell's Corp to the right. Lee then returned at
11 am, finalized his plan and gave Longstreet his orders. Whether Old Pete was too slow in moving his troops into position from that point is a subject open to debate.
William Garrett Piston writes that: Lee did not tell Ewell when the
battle would commence, but "report circulated that the attack of Longstreet
would be delivered at 4 o'clock." (The quote is denoted as being from
Freeman's Lee's Lieutenants)
The Austrian observer, Ross, wrote: "As evidently a long time would elapse
before Longstreet's corps, which would do the chief fighting that day, could
be placed in position, I determined meanwhile to ride into the town...."
Ross rejoined Longstreet at his attack position about 3 o'clock, which
suggests that someone told Ross when he should return if he wanted to view
the combat.

I quote from the 3/17/1877 letter of E.P. Alexander to
Rev. J. William Jones, as printed in the _Southern
Historical Society Papers._:

"...My command, with the greater portion of
Longstreet's corps, was in camp at Chambersburg from
Saturday, June 27th, to Tuesday, June 30th, and on the
latter date we moved in direction of Gettysburg, about
10 miles, and about 2 P.M. encamped at a small village
called Greenwood. General Lee was in camp very near
us during the same afternoon. On Wednesday, July
1st, we (the reserve artillery) remained in camp all day,
and heard nothing of the battle which was began at
Gettysburg until about dark, when orders were received
to march at 2 A.M. on the 2nd for Gettysburg. Pickett's
division of infantry had been left behind at
Chambersburg, Hood's and McLaws divisions had
marched before us, and when we took the road at 2 A.M
(my battalion, 26 guns, and the Washington Artillery,
10 guns, I think, forming the artillery reserve,) we had a
clear road and bright moonlight, and saw nothing of the
infantry. About 8 or 9 A.M., we reached the vicinity of
the field, and the guns were halted in a wood, and I
reported in person to Generals Lee and Longstreet,
who were together on a hill in rear of our lines... I
was especially cautioned in moving up the guns to
avoid exposing them to the view of a signal station
of the enemy's on Round Top Mountain. I do not
remember seeing or hearing anything at this time
of Longstreet's infantry, nor did I get the
impression that General Lee thought there was any
unnecessary delay going on. I had just arrived,
and knew nothing of the situation, and my
instructions were to reconnoiter the flank to be
attacked, and choose my own positions and means
of getting to them. This duty occupied me, according
to the best of my recollection, one or two hours,
when I rode back, and in person conducted my own
battalion to the school-house on Willoughby run..."

This does not sound like they Confederates were
even attempting a 9 A.M. step-off time for an attack
does it?

A great post on the Coddington/countermarch/never-ending story. Letting
the pendulum swing too far the other direction is a point well taken --
although as someone much more interested in what the Union did right at
GB than all the things the Rebs did wrong, I'm no particular fan of Old
Pete.

What I meant by "SOME" reason: McLaws and Johnson, as you said, had a
look at Alexander's route. Now, unless they're suddenly and inexplicably
thick-skulled, they had some -- by their judgment -- rational reason for
not taking the same route. Whether Longstreet should have then gone and
looked himself, etc., is another story, of course. But most descriptions
of the wretched march would have you believe that these soldiers -- not
exactly inexperienced in warfare -- simply suffered temporary insanity
by not following EPA. It's just not quite that simple, is it?

I said this in a post a month ago, but I'll say it again: Is there any
other afternoon of the war that has been examined as microscopically as
this one? If Old Peter had known what was to be made of his march, he'd
have called in sick that day.

>I certainly don't believe that he "lost" the Battle of Gettysburg
>because of it but I am still resisting what feels like a movement
>to the position where Longstreet is not culpable for any of the
>mistakes made on the field. The answer is usually in the middle.

Speaking as a "Longstreet-sensitive" person, I will freely admit that I
initially get huffy of ANY criticism of Old Pete; but I usually take the time
to consider the source and research behind the remark (unless Robert Krick is
involved) before I contradict it.
However, it is human nature to be biased; and you must understand why we
Longstreet fans are so quick to leap to the defense of our General's name.
We are fighting a negative historical image, based mostly on misinformation,
that has persisted for over a hundred years. For so long Longstreet has
either been the scapegoat, or his role has been ignored.
Even in some (not all) of today's history forums, things that new Civil
War enthusiasts turn to learn from, Longstreet is still presented
negatively, if mentioned at all; any compliments that are given to his
abilities are given with qualifications, as in the Jan issue of "America's
Civil War": "Regardless of other faults, Longstreet knew how to manage
troops in battle..." I feel no need to mention any printed opinions of
Robert Krick.
The above from "America's Civil War" is an entirely reasonable
statement, Longstreet had his faults, everyone does and did; however at the
same time we are still confronted by many images (new and old) of other
generals being touted as infallible and beyond blame. I don't believe that I
have ever seen a statement such as the one above, written about Stonewall
Jackson. I have encountered Lee & Jackson fans who are just as quick to jump
on anyone who makes a statement that hints that either of them had faults.
A serious student of history should always try to find a balance, that
should be closest to the "truth"; but it is very hard to be dispassionate
about your heroes. So, please bear with us, we are still trying to even the
scales. As long as there are people who believe that General Longstreet is
to blame for the loss at Gettysburg and therefore the loss of the war, or who
believe in the "dawn attack order", we will continue to defend.
Respectfully,
Sultron (Pete)

Hi Jeff,
I certainly didn't intend to be overly critical on the "SOME" reason
point, just trying to make a point. Having said that, I think I can shed a
little light on the issue. You wrote:

>What I meant by "SOME" reason: McLaws and Johnson, as you said, had a
>look at Alexander's route. Now, unless they're suddenly and inexplicably
>thick-skulled, they had some -- by their judgment -- rational reason for
>not taking the same route.

I never quite said that they "had a look at Alexander's route". What I said
was "McLaws and Johnson rode around and then McLaws told Longstreet that
they would have to go back by countermarching." Now the truth is, McLaws
kind of tells us why they didn't follow Alexander. McLaws said "I sent back
and halted my division and rode with Major Johnston rapidly around the
neighborhood to see if there was any road by which we could go into position
without being seen."[McLaws, "Gettysburg", S.H.S.P., VII, p. 69] Did you
catch it? He said "to see if there was any road". There's your answer.
They wanted to find a road but Alexander was willing to go off road into the
fields. We're not dealing with "temporary insanity" or thick skulls, we're
just dealing with a fixed notion that they needed to go by a road.
Alexander questioned why they didn't follow him and so do I.

Thanks to John A. Leo for an excellent posting.
It's curious to me just how powerful the ghost of Jubal Early is.
Longstreet's countermarch wasn't the most brilliant move of the war,
certainly, but by the standards of the time, it wasn't notably
horrendous either. Like everyone else on that field, Longstreet was
tired, confused, and uncertain as to just where he was and just where
the enemy was supposed to be. He was trying to keep 2/3 of a
Confederate Corps--close to 20,000 men--moving in the right direction
on a hot day through unknown country in order to carry out orders that
were too vague by half in the absence of decent intelligence reports.
In other words, he was the victim of the same muddle that governed
most movements of this size during most of the war. The idea that he
was either cowardly or hesitant on this occasion is belied by the way
in which he handled his divisions once the enemy was in sight. As we
all know, the delay in reaching the jump-off point didn't harm his
chances because, in the event, it allowed Sickles time to make his
fatal redeployment. Furthermore, you can't have it both ways!! If
you want to argue that the failure, e.g., of the 15th Ala. to take LRT
was the result of their exhausted condition after a forced march of 24
hours and a tremendous effort to reach the right flank of the Federal
line, then you are, in effect, accusing Longstreet of being too
impatient and driving his men too hard! If anyone gets the blame for
the overall failure of the Confederate assault on the Federal right
that day, it's AP Hill for failing to get his right into action
against in concert with Longstreet (and failing to get his left into
action in concert with Ewell). But then, that brings us back to Lee,
and his failure to issue precise instructions to his Corps commanders
and to communicate with them throughout the action. The most damning
statement about any high officer on July 2nd is that of Fremantle:
One message sent and one received by Lee during the most crucial
afternoon of his entire career. And that was meant to be a
compliment!!

Longstreet is a puzzling figure. He could be brilliant--2nd
Manasssas, Chickamauga, the Wilderness--or he could be lousy--Lookout
Valley, Knoxville. But he didn't deserve Early, and he doesn't
deserve Krick. In fact, to me, that's the most puzzling thing of all.
Why is a contemporary historian of considerable distinction so
determined to continue the rather silly vendettas of 125 years ago?

Thank you, Norm
At least you deal with Longstreet with an even hand. I think the one word
that describes him is "dependable." You need at least one Corps commander
with this attribute if you ever want to win a war. None of the commanders,
in my opinion were consistently "brilliant," but what human being is? Old
Pete gets a lot of criticism for his activities after the war, but in my
opinion, he did a great job for Lee, for his men, and for the cause during
the conflict. Because of his slight deafness, he probably wasn't a good
conversationalist, and because of his "steady" manner, he was not
charismatic and did not warrant a lot of press. And I'll grant you, he was
stubborn. But, from everything I've read, his men loved him and had
confidence in him. This is worth its weight in gold on the battlefield.

I think I can answer that, Norm - because he has a lot of fun doing
it. I've spent a lot of time around Bob Krick, enduring much ribbing
about being both a North Carolinian and a lawyer (the butts of Bob's
favorite jokes). He is a wonderful tour guide and an excellent writer,
but I think he genuinely enjoys getting the Longstreet people riled
up just for the sake of fun.

Don't get me wrong; I think Bob honestly believes a lot of the things
he says about Longstreet. It's the intensity of his criticism that I
often believe is done solely for effect. I think anyone who's ever
met Bob on a tour would understand what I mean; sometimes he seems to
be having too much fun to be completely serious...

Regarding Longstreet's personal material. Unfortunately, for all
historians and readers of history, his house burning down with all his
letters and papers within, is a real tragedy. I'm always hoping that
someone, digging through an old trunk somewhere, will uncover some
long-lost material that will help better define who Longstreet was as a
human being.

>
> Well, I snipped a bunch because this one seems to have generated a lot of comment.
> First, Bill's right about Birney's position - he was clearly east of the
>Trostle house and north of LRT. close enough to call it a foot. Second, by
>9:00 a.m. the lead elements of the 5th Corps are arriving in the immediate
>rear of 3rd Corps, ordered to act as army reserve. The backing of this corps,
> close at hand, is really the key to a strong defense of the area.

>
> At 9:00 a.m. 2nd Corps has just finished passing directly behind LRT
>on it's way to the middle of the line, and 12th Corps is essentially gone.
>However, the one unit that renders Longstreet's move tactically unworkable
>at 9:00 a.m. is Buford's 3000 Cavalrymen, directly across Longstreet's line
>of advance and more than capable of playing the same delaying role they did
>the day before, only this time with three Corps of infantry no more than a
>mile away to come help. (2nd, 3rd, 5th.)

>
> All of this activity means that the key area around the RTs was vastly
>better defended in the morning than it was at 4:00 p.m., after the departure
>of Buford and the advance of Sickles beyond immediate supporting range of
>the other troops.

>
> Also, I think some of us are getting hung up on semantics. The fact that
>Sickles did not have any troops on LRT at 9:00 a.m. does not mean it was
>ripe for capture. The critical element would have been Buford's command,
>which would act as a tripwire, forcing any CSA column to deploy prematurely,
>and giving Meade the luxury of time in sitting the main line as the battle
>developed. Even without this tripwire the Union did a pretty good job of
>deploying in that sector - I suspect that with it they'd have done right
>smartly.

>
> Dave Powell

Dave,

I think you've hit the nail on the head with Buford being the trump card in
the morning. I am by no means an expert on this part of the battle and your
post has left me with some hanging questions.

1. If the lead elements of the 5th corps were just arriving at 9:00AM would
they have been able to deploy quickly enough to reinforce a possible
Confederate victory in the AM?

2. If there had been a coordination in the attacks on the right and left and
Ewell had attacked when he heard Longstreet's guns as ordered would the
shuffling of troops from right to left still been possible?

3. With this same coordinated attack in mind would Longstreet's echelon
attack have drawn reserves from the center of the line instead of the right
flank weakening the center of the line. So that by the time Wilcox, Perry and
Wright hit they would have a better chance of breaking through and holding
onto what they attained?

All questions which I have no clue how to answer. Just trying to learn
something new here.

>>Regarding Longstreet's personal material. Unfortunately, for all
historians and readers of history, his house burning down with all his
letters and papers within, is a real tragedy. I'm always hoping that
someone, digging through an old trunk somewhere, will uncover some
long-lost material that will help better define who Longstreet was as a
human being.<<

Deb:

Yes I agree! I know that most of his personal papers were destroyed, I just
thought perhaps there would have been some info from others on his personal
life. The death of his children had to affect him deeply. He must have
discussed this with someone?????? I know it's mentioned in the book, but more
in the light that he became moody, etc.

I just think that understanding the personal side of the participants helps to
understand why they did the things that they did in battle. It makes it easier
to accept their flaws also.

I wasn't gonna get into this one again, but........
Longstreet's mistake a Gettysburg was not sending McLaws division into the
peach orchard and wheatfield until one and a half hours after Hoods attack on
Little Round Top. It was supposed to be an "echelon" attack which means
McLaws should have struck within minutes not hours. Oates was doing a
brilliant job on LRT considering his troops had marched 25 miles, climbed BRT,
and fought with no water, no rest and no support on a blistering hot July
day. McLaws attack at the peach orchard would probably have relieved some of
the brutal fighting on LRT. "Ole Pete" was between a rock and a hard place:
listening to his superior(Lee) to attack and his subordinate (Hood) to change
the plan. Tough call. Also Lee is guilty of listening to Ewell and Early on
the night of Jul 1. He should have insisted they move to support Longstreet's
attack of July 2, but he was sold a bill of goods by Early (but that's another
subject).
David Butchin

>I would appreciate it if you could e-mail me and explain why all
>Jackson fans seem so bent on degrading Longstreet's reputation. We
>Longstreet fans do not, in the main, make a habit of bashing Jackson.
>I am honestly curious.

Pete,

I think you made a gross generalization here on "Stonewall Fans". Few
have more respect than I for T.J. but to say that Longstreet was not on
the same plain I think is pure lunacy. They were both excellent
Generals with their little quirks and mannerisms. Longstreet was no less
a General than Stonewall. As I have said many times based on the lay of
the land etc. at the Burg I really don't think Stonewall would have made
a difference here. You don't realize what a change in position that is
for me. A defensive position was easier than an offensive one in 1863
and Longstreet did all he could under the circumstances.

To say Longstreet was the cause of the failure only perpetuates a myth
born from Early and passed on through the generations. We should not
barbecue the man over coulda, shoulda wouldas.

Now I feel better.

Mike VanHuss

From: DPowell334@aol.com
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 1996 18:08:06 -0500
Subject: Re: Longstreet (vic)
In a message dated 96-03-07 22:58:26 EST, you write:
>I'm speaking prior to Gettysburg. In all movements of the Army of
>Northern Va., Lee traveled WITH Longstreet. Some think this was because
>Longstreet was Lee's favorite. In actuality A.P. Hill probably claimed
>that distinction. Lee's Last words were of Hill. What is theory to some
>including me was that Lee could give "suggestions" to Jackson and rely
>on him to interpret them properly and carry out Lee's intentions.
>Longstreet on the other hand needed Lee's oversight on a somewhat
>constant basis. This is not a slight to Longstreet. Even he somewhat
>admitted this during his Suffolk "Shopping trip". He constantly wired
>Lee for advice. One can not say Jackson "Followed orders to the letter"
>because most of the time the "orders" were discretionary suggestions.
>Longstreet is not my favorite General. No newsflash there. But, he
>served the Army of N. Va. well. And can NEVER be faulted in his devotion
>to the cause during the war. Afterwards he understood what was necessary
>to reunite the country. Unfortunately most of his contemporaries failed to
>understand him in this. In any event he was a D--- sight better than
>Bragg.

>
>vic

Vic,

You really are managing to resurrect every one of the Early calumnies that
you can find, aren't you.:)

A better explanation of why Lee and Longstreet traveled together was the
extensive use Lee made of his subordinate's council. Lee constantly bounced
ideas off Longstreet, and relied heavily on him for another viewpoint. Prior
to the march north, for instance, Lee and Longstreet discussed tactical
options in PA almost every day.

As for A.P.Hill being Lee's favorite, I'd say that Hill's rather dismal
performance at Bristoe, and Lee's curt response to it, make that rather
implausible.

>
>Since you are a strong Longstreet supporter, I'd like to get your views
>on something. It has been often said that generals are always one war
>behind. That is they try to fight their war with their fathers tactics.
>I always felt that Longstreet was at least two wars ahead. His theories
>on defense were perhaps better suited to World War I. Ludendorf and
>Petain would have been well served if they could have read HIS memoirs.
>What do you think?

>
Vice,

Longstreet's strongest suit was clearly the tactical realm. However, perhaps
too much has been made of this 'defensive bent.' The prewar army was
dominated by Engineers, all of whom placed a strong emphasis on defensive
works. Hillock's essay on Napoleonic tactics - often hailed as a tribute to
the offense and responsible for the search for a decisive victory during the
first two years of war -was more than half devoted to the construction and
sitting of field works. McClellan, one of the rising stars of the pre-war
army, returned from his observation mission in the Crimea with the belief
that the defense had become pre-eminent, and was also a devoted follower of
fieldworks. Lee himself committed to entrenching right from the start,
constructing relatively massive works in front of Richmond, and especially at
Fredericksburg. The layout of the defense that was Burnside's undoing was
very much a Lee project. In short, the best minds of the Army were all
convinced that the defense was the stronger form: it was not simply a rogue
idea of Longstreet's.

Longstreet tactical thought was really a little more specific than usually
given - he thought that the proper war to conduct a battle was thru the
defensive-offensive. In other words, stand on the defensive until the enemy
has made sufficient mistakes in front of you so as to present a significant
opportunity - and then counterattack, swift and hard.

A few posts back you alluded to the anvil and the hammer - except tactically,
you had it backwards. Longstreet was the hammer, not the anvil, and his
attacks were amazingly powerful for the era. He commanded four of the largest
and most successful tactical offensives of the war - 2nd Manassas,
Gettysburg, Chickamauga, and Wilderness. In two of those, the enemy army was
driven from the field. In the other two, Longstreet attacked a superior foe
thru difficult ground and succeeded in seriously damaging his opponents. No
other officer of the war had such a record of tactical success, if measured
by the size of the attacking force (control in the 19th century was critical
to success - most large attacks fell apart into piecemeal attacks) and damage
inflicted on the enemy.

Simply to call him a defensive genius and thus dismiss him is only to see
half the picture, and misunderstand his ultimate goal.

Remember, while both sides viewed the defense as the stronger form, they also
viewed offense as the way to achieving long term success. Hence the quest for
decisive victory despite what all were convinced were long odds. Longstreet's
formula was - in my opinion - the likeliest form of achieving that offensive
success. Certainly it's the form Lee put to greatest use in his classic
victories - Chancellorsville and 2nd Manassas.

>
> According to his own orders, Jackson trained his men to march one mile
>in 25 minutes, 2 miles in 50 minutes, and then take a 10 minute break. The
>key to Jackson's ability to cover ground was not the speed of his men but their
>endurance. They could do 25 minute miles hour after hour. Please check the
>OR or the recent book on A.P. Hill to see the controversy which could arise
>when subordinates did not keep to this march discipline.

This is, BTW classic march discipline used since time immemorial. Virtually
every army of the Napoleonic wars used a similar scheme, and Jackson used
nothing original here.

Comparing rates of march over various times in the war, you find that units
under good commanders - no matter what the unit or army - easily matched
Jackson' performances, and often exceeded them, sometimes with significantly
larger bodies of troops. On the other hand, Jackson had his share of
bad-march days as well, and as often missed this mark as made it.

I'm not trying to pick on Jackson here, but simply point out that good
commanders - Jackson included, - tended to outmarch bad ones. Too much has
been made of this 'speed' as if it were a secret weapon.

>
>I have finally found the source of the "9:00 am" order.
>The first mention of this was on January 19,1872 by Maj. Gen Jubal Early
>it was also stated to be true by Rev William Nelson Pendleton, Lee's
>chief of artillery and John Gordon and Fitzhugh Lee.
>Since this was AFTER Lee's death he could not agree with it or deny it.
>Given the stature of these men, honorable men all, "so are they all
>honorable men" one could take it at face value as true. After all it was
>REV Pendleton. But at the time Longstreet was in disfavor in the South
>because of his views on reconstruction and re-union. His accusers were
>in the process of enshrining Lee's memory and in doing so attempted to
>expunge any blame for failures attributable to Lee. So there take it as
>you wish. I never trusted Early anyway. I guess they made a sucker out
>of me, but that's not the first time that happened. My apologies to
>James Longstreet.

>
>Deo Vindice

If it's any comfort, Vic, they made suckers out of virtually every historian
who wrote about the issue up thru the 1950's. The 9:00 version was a
variation on the sunrise attack theme, and is demonstrably false. For
instance, when Longstreet first contacted Lee's four closest aides (Taylor,
Long, Venable, and Marshall who comprised his immediate military family)
they all flatly denied that such orders were given.

I heartily recommend Garret Piston's excellent book - "Lee's Tarnished
Lieutenant," for more detail on this sordid affair.

Early-Pendleton-Jones' version of history, however is still fairly common,
especially among popular history. The worm turns but slowly.