Masters Of War

Come you masters of war You that build all the guns You that build the death planes You that build all the bombs You that hide behind walls You that hide behind desks I just want you to know I can see through your masks. You that never done nothin' But build to destroy You play with my world Like it's your little toy You put a gun in my hand And you hide from my eyes And you turn and run farther When the fast bullets fly. Like Judas of old You lie and deceive A world war can be won You want me to believe But I see through your eyes And I see through your brain Like I see through the water That runs down my drain. You fasten all the triggers For the others to fire Then you set back and watch When the death count gets higher You hide in your mansion' As young people's blood Flows out of their bodies And is buried in the mud. You've thrown the worst fear That can ever be hurled Fear to bring children Into the world For threatening my baby Unborn and unnamed You ain't worth the blood That runs in your veins. How much do I know To talk out of turn You might say that I'm young You might say I'm unlearned But there's one thing I know Though I'm younger than you That even Jesus would never Forgive what you do. Let me ask you one question Is your money that good Will it buy you forgiveness Do you think that it could I think you will find When your death takes its toll All the money you made Will never buy back your soul. And I hope that you die And your death'll come soon I will follow your casket In the pale afternoon And I'll watch while you're lowered Down to your deathbed And I'll stand over your grave 'Til I'm sure that you're dead.------- Bob Dylan 1963

(from left to right) Tom Ricks of Foreign Policy magazine and The Washington Post, along with fellow FP editors Joshua Keating and Blake Hounshell all rushed to discredit Hersh and the contents of his January 17th, 2011 speech.

(from left to right) James Jesus Angleton, chief of the CIA's counter-intelligence staff from 1954-1975, and Reagan-era CIA Director William Casey were both members of the Knights of Malta.

TEL AVIV - When Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas directed harsh accusations against United States President Barack Obama and his team in what looked like a carefully prepared public relations stunt (letting "Newsweek into his personal space" for five days, as the magazine put it), the writing was already on the wall.

"It was Obama who suggested a full settlement freeze," Abbas told Newsweek's Dan Ephron. "I said OK, I accept. We both went up the tree. After that, he came down with a ladder and he removed the ladder and said to me, jump. Three times he did it." Among other criticism, Abbas complained about the "impolite" way in which Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was pushed out, and about the recent American veto on a United Nation Security

Council resolution draft which would have condemned Israeli settlement construction. [1]

There were indications for over a month that something big was brewing (see my article Jerusalem bomb seeds gathering conflict, Asia Times Online March 24, 2011). Few, however, expected Wednesday's announcement that a Palestinian reconciliation agreement had been forged with Egyptian mediation between rival factions Fatah and Hamas, and a national unity government was to be announced soon. Those taken by surprise reportedly included the Israelis, the Americans, the Turks, and indeed most of the international community.

While the announcement of a vague Palestinian unity deal falls far short of speculations that the Palestinian Authority would rush a declaration of independence (the meeting of the Quartet for the Middle East scheduled for mid-April was in fact postponed), it is certainly a big step in the direction of independence. According Israeli analyst Ron Ben-Yishai:

The Palestinian president has been granted renewed political legitimacy for his rule in the Palestinian street, because formally his term as president ended a while ago. Now, Abbas is the president in every why, until the next elections are held. This also enables him to appear at the United Nations as a legitimate representative of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank and demand recognition of a Palestinian state ... The unity deal take away an important bargaining chip from Israel, which has consistently told UN members that Abbas only represents the West Bank.

To expand on these observations, the reconciliation move signals also that Abbas made a very specific choice of his path to Palestinian independence, most likely forsaking his relationship with the United States. While the White House issued a muted response, supporting Palestinian reconciliation but expressing concern that Hamas "is a terrorist organization which targets civilians", members of the US Congress bluntly threatened to cut aid to the Palestinian Authority if the deal is implemented. [2]

Hamas, meanwhile, appeared set on keeping up with its hardline image. "Our program does not include negotiations with Israel or recognizing it," commented one of its leaders, Mahmud az-Zahar. "It will not be possible for the interim national government to participate or bet on or work on the peace process with Israel." These comments throw a shadow on Abbas' assertion that he would continue to be in charge of the peace talks.

One compelling interpretation of Abbas' actions, in line with the Newsweek interviews, is that he finally lost faith in Washington. Up until now the possibility remained open that he would choose to isolate and disregard Hamas as he pushed for a recognition of Palestinian statehood at the UN in September; the campaign has already started, and so far it was conducted without the militant rulers of the Gaza Strip.

This option had its allures, not least since the Palestinian Authority, dominated by Abbas' Fatah party, has a lot more international legitimacy than does Hamas; the latter's failure to accept the Quartet Principles and use of terrorist tactics could undermine the PA's case that it is offering peace.

However, the American administration's refusal to abandon Israel at the UN Security Council, coupled with pressure from Egypt, seems to have tipped the scales and pushed him into a more confrontational stance. Abbas apparently calculated that his legitimacy with the rest of the international community - specifically at the General Assembly of the UN - would be improved by the move, and that he had less to lose than to gain.

What appears odd, however, is that he does stand to lose quite a bit - not least in financial assistance from the United States. It is hard to imagine that Abbas would embark on such an adventure without having secured alternative sources of funding to make up for the loss. European and Persian Gulf donors top the list of suspects, and it is important to watch the behavior of Saudi Arabia, which is rumored to be quite active throughout the Middle East recently.

The precise parameters of the agreement are unclear - and possibly are not finalized yet. Different sources have written about "a government of experts" that would rule both the West Bank and Gaza, about integration of security services, about the release of prisoners, and general elections within a year. How exactly any of these stipulations is to be achieved is another matter; not only is the devil in the details, but these details have managed to derail repeated attempts at reconciliation for at least two years now.

The basic outlines of the deal are nothing new - Egypt had drafted them in 2009. What is new is that Egypt was able to apply pressure efficiently on both sides. This is partly a result of the Arab uprisings - in the face of Hosni Mubarak, Abbas lost an ally, while Hamas' main base in Syria is endangered due to the escalating unrest there. Both were weakened, making them more amenable to compromise.

In addition, Egypt applied some carrots - for example, it promised to open "permanently" its border crossing with Gaza at the town of Rafah, effectively ending the blockade on the strip. It is unclear what Abbas received, but some analysts speculate that he would retain the greater share of power in the new government.

For the Palestinian president, a major risk is that the deal might collapse, as previous agreements with Hamas have collapsed - many Palestinians [3] and Israeli observers [4] are reportedly skeptical that it will last long. This would leave Abbas once again without full legitimacy but further isolated from both the United States and Israel. Hamas will beyond doubt reap enormous benefits from the opening of the Rafah crossing; once the border opens, Egypt is unlikely to close it again due to domestic pressure.

The militant organization could also use the reconciliation to strengthen its position on the West Bank and eventually to try to take it over, as it did in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority and Israel have worked together to prevent such a scenario over the past years, arresting numerous Hamas activists.

In light of all the uncertainties surrounding the deal, it is hard to completely rule out the possibility that it is an elaborate bluff of some sort (perhaps in order to extract concessions from the United States and Israel or to suit the needs of an external power). Even in this case, however, it will have a profound effect on the regional relationships.

Israel's reaction will be particularly important. Israeli politicians across the board ruled out the possibility of talks with Hamas, unless the latter "undergoes a deep and fundamental change". The greatest fear of the Jewish state is that Hamas will re-establish terror bases in the West Bank, from where it could strike at the Israeli heartland. A secondary problem is that if a Palestinian unity government gains international legitimacy, this would come at Israel's expense. Thus, Israel cannot be expected to stand by passively for long.

A number of apocalyptic scenarios circulate. If the agreement is implemented and Hamas forces are integrated into the security apparatus in the West Bank, this would mean the end of security cooperation with Israel (and also the United States). While some analysts have spoken about a third intifada (Palestinian uprising), however, and the peace process is buried for the near future, violence is not necessarily imminent.

The initial Israeli response, at least, was non-violent. On Friday morning, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported that Israel planned to "launch a diplomatic campaign, with particular emphasis on the European Union, to thwart international recognition of the unified Fatah-Hamas government".

It is important to note that aside from dangers, the reconciliation deal also carries some important benefits for the Benjamin Netanyahu government, and strengthens its security-related arguments both domestically and internationally. According to Israeli journalist Aluf Benn:

The Palestinian reconciliation deal, if realized, heralds the takeover of the Palestinian national movement by Hamas, providing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with an escape from the rut he has fallen into because of the deadlock in the peace process. This is just what Netanyahu needed to unite the Israeli public behind him and thwart international pressure to withdraw from the West Bank. ... From here on, the pressure will mount on [leader of the opposition Kadima party] Tzipi Livni to join an Israeli unity government to stand against the Palestinians and international community. When Mahmoud Abbas joins Hamas, Kadima cannot say it has a peace partner and cannot propose an alternative policy. Why should Kadima stay in opposition now? ... The reconciliation has also saved Netanyahu's trip to Washington to speak at the AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee] convention and in Congress. He no longer has to line the trip with concessions to the Palestinians. The pressure is off.

Indeed, Netanyahu's relationship with Washington might just have taken a turn for the better. If Obama wants to be re-elected as president, and he does, he cannot afford to be seen supporting Hamas against Israel. The European Union, as the Palestinian news agency Ma'an observes, is "more open than [the] US on [the] unity deal", but even there Netanyahu could gain some traction. Alternatively - though unlikely - Hamas could mitigate its stance and renounce violence, which would grant it international legitimacy, but would also serve the Jewish state well.

In addition, now that the Rafah crossing is about to open, Israel will face a greater danger from smuggled weapons into the Strip, but will also have another option open to deal with Hamas. It could seek to disengage from Gaza fully, cutting off electricity, food and fuel supplies, and leave Egypt to deal with the situation. A number of Israeli politicians and analysts have advocated this course of action, and it is important to note that it would also allow the Jewish state greater military freedom there, since it would no longer have the status of an occupying power according to international law.

Overall, the Palestinian reconciliation deal is a major gambit, especially for Abbas. If implemented, it would have a profound and complex impact on the basic relationships in the Levant, and in the Middle East in general. Even before it has been signed, it is sending shockwaves throughout the region.

To follow Pepe's articles on the Great Arab Revolt, please click here.

Once again this week the Arab Gas Pipeline had to be shut down - with no gas flowing to Israel and Jordan. An "unknown armed gang" bombed the al-Sabil gas terminal near the coastal city of el-Arish, less than 350 kilometers northeast of Cairo in the Sinai Peninsula.

On March 27, an "unknown armed gang" tried to blow up the terminal but failed. On February 5, they did succeed - the flow of gas to Israel and Jordan was interrupted.

The Sinai Peninsula is a de facto red zone. Local Bedouins rule. Security is spotty. Weapons smuggled to Gaza and other parts of

he Middle East flow through the Sinai - that is, within striking distance of the Arab Gas Pipeline.

The Arab Gas Pipeline is the star of Arab Pipelineistan - linking Egyptian gas to the north to Israel and to the south towards the Gulf of Aqaba and from there across Jordan to Syria and via Damascus towards Lebanon.

The Arab Gas Pipeline has the potential to grow east and west - turbulent politics and economic allowing. From Damascus it could go to southern Turkey, and then connect to the perennially troubled, still in the making, Nabucco project exporting gas to Europe. The other possibility is an extension towards Italy and Spain including Libyan and Algerian gas.

In strategic el-Arish, the Arab Gas Pipeline breaks in two; one of the arms goes northeast, to the Israeli city of Ashkelon. The el-Arish-Ashkelon pipeline has been supplying Israel since 2008. For the moment, Israel gets 1.7 billion cubic meters a year; before Tahrir Square there were plans to increase it to 2.1 billion. As it stands, Egypt supplies about 10% of Israel's energy mix, and is responsible for over 30% of Israel's electricity. Over half of the total natural gas consumed in Israel comes from Egypt.

Few may know that Egypt - with 63 billion cubic meters a year - is one of the largest producers of natural gas in the Maghreb. In Africa, it's only behind Algeria (80 billion). While Egypt is increasing production, Algeria is decreasing. Cairo and Algiers are fierce competitors in the natural gas market. At the same time, Egypt is also investing heavily in liquefied natural gas (LNG) - to be transported by sea - so it may offset its dangerous dependency on Middle Eastern Pipelineistan.

Egyptian gas exports are regionally strategic - but especially to Israel. Sabotage may hurt the Israeli economy and its military/energy security. Bit it also hurts Egypt's regional and international credibility as a gas hub; the Hosni Mubarak regime was very keen to cultivate this image.

Because president Anwar Sadat and then Mubarak killed any attempts to diversify the Egyptian economy, the country has to rely on tourism; remittances from Egyptian workers abroad; tolls in the Suez Canal; payment for dodgy privatizations; and their oil and especially gas exports. A hefty chunk of all these proceeds ended up in Mubarak's Swiss banks accounts.

No wonder Israel defended Mubarak until the last minute. Mubarak's sons Gamal and Alaa pocketed hundreds of millions of dollars in "commissions" from the sale of Egyptian gas to Israel. As much as Tel Aviv paid these "commissions" to get gas at a ridiculously low rate, average Egyptians could not even dream of enjoying at least some financial benefit for working in the gas fields. No wonder in mid-April new Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf ordered a serious review of the pricing deals with Israel.

The new gas rush
Now there's another huge game at play in Arab Pipelineistan. Texas-based Nobel Energy has found massive natural gas deposits - trillions of cubic meters - in the eastern Mediterranean. The waters encompass all number of key regional players; Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, Gaza, Egypt and Turkey. No treaties demarcate these territorial waters. What everyone may eventually enjoy is no less than over 300 years of assured energy; at least in theory, that would mean the end of a regional energy war.

Turkey is at the moment involved in a complex push to develop regional Pipelineistan not only along an east-west axis but north-south as well; this means it must cultivate a complex web of relations with no less than nine countries - Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Before Tahrir Square, serious negotiations were already ongoing regarding an extended Arab Pipelineistan that could link Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad. This would certainly do more to unify and develop the Middle East than any "peace process".

The same applies to the newfound eastern Mediterranean gas. An ideal world would point to multi-nation corporation in charge of exploiting these new gas finds, maybe located in Cyprus, which is neutral and a member of the European Union (EU) to boot. That would simplify the sale of much of this gas to energy-hungry Europe, thus alleviating its dependency on Russian gas.

Russia's energy giant Gazprom anyway won't fail to be part of the action. It has already offered Lebanon its prospection services. China is already on the spot, ready to buy from anyone. For the moment, the heart of the action in this New Gas Rush is Cyprus airport. The Delek corporation - which controls the second-largest quota, after Noble Energy, of the extraction rights in Israel - wants to install a LNG refinery in Cyprus, on a site strategically located between two American naval bases.

So reality will be messy - especially with Israeli/US interests trying to get the upper hand while Arab governments think they could use this new gas bonanza as a way to pierce the economic/military hegemony of Israel.

At least one front of the great 2011 Arab revolt might seem to be spelling a rosy future, as in "natural gas"; commodity, capital and infrastructure leading to development for all. Or maybe not; and this will turn out to be yet another lethal chapter of ongoing energy wars.

Wednesday, April 27, 2011

WASHINGTON, Apr 26, 2011 (IPS) - Starting in late 2005, U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan began turning detainees over to the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), despite its well-known reputation for torture.

Interviews with former U.S. and NATO diplomats and other evidence now available show that United States and other NATO governments become complicit in NDS torture of detainees for two distinctly different reasons.

For the European members of NATO - especially the British and Dutch - the political driver was the need to distance themselves from a U.S. detainee policy already tainted by accounts of U.S. torture.

The U.S. and Canada supported such transfers, however, in the belief that NDS interrogators could get better intelligence from the detainees.

The transfers to the NDS were a direct violation of the United Nations Convention against Torture, which forbids the transfer of any person by a State Party to "another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."

The first official shift in policy was the adoption by NATO in December 2005 of a "96-hour rule" requiring transfer of Afghan detainees to the Afghan government within four days.

The British and Dutch unwillingness to continue turning their detainees over to the United States was in response to published reports of U.S. torture of detainees at a secret detention facility at Bagram airbase.

Ronald Neumann, then U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, told IPS the "initial impetus" for the 96-hour rule came from the "discomfort" of the British and Dutch about "being associated with U.S. handling of detainees".

A former NATO diplomat who served in Afghanistan at the time confirmed Neumann's recollection. "The British and Dutch privately expressed their concerns that perceptions of U.S. detainee policy could damage the mission," he said.

But under the new 96-hour rule, the detainees were turned over the NDS, which had long had a reputation for torturing suspected enemies of the state, starting when it was the secret police and intelligence agency during the Soviet occupation. That reputation had continued under the government of President Hamid Karzai.

The impetus for the U.S. and Canadian forces in Afghanistan to transfer detainees to the NDS, however, was the desperate need for intelligence on the Taliban.

By the time U.S. and Canadian military commanders began large-unit sweeps in areas where the Taliban had been operating in 2004-2005, the George W. Bush administration had already decided to consider all Afghans in detention as "unlawful combatants".

But most of the Afghans picked up in those sweeps were not Taliban fighters. After U.S. and NATO forces began turning over detainees to the NDS, the intelligence agency's chief Amrullah Saleh told NATO officials that the agency had to release two-thirds of the detainees who had been transferred to it, according to the NATO diplomat.

Matt Waxman, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defence for detainee affairs until the end of 2005, recalled in an interview with IPS that there had been "a lot of concern both in the Pentagon and in the field" about "over-broad detention" in Afghanistan, but also "counter-pressures" for "more aggressive detention operations".

U.S. Ambassador Neumann told IPS that the U.S. military turned detainees over to the NDS because of "the intelligence benefit and so we didn't have a revolving door" – a reference to the fact that many detainees who had been turned over to local authorities had been set free.

In an interview with the Ottawa Citizen published May 16, 2007, Canadian Brig. Gen. Jim Ferron, then the intelligence chief for NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command in Afghanistan, referred to the intelligence motive for both detention and transferring detainees to NDF.

"The detainees are detained for a reason," said Ferron. "They have information we need."

But he complained that much of the information provided by detainees was "not truthful and is aimed at deceiving military forces". Ferron explained that detainees went through "basic questioning" by NATO interrogators about "why they joined the insurgency" and the information was then turned over to NDS.

Ferron clearly implied that the NDS interrogators could do a better job of getting the truth out of the detainees than NATO interrogators. The "best information" was what was being gleaned by the NDS, he said, and ISAF "would like to make it more a part of our daily intelligence".

Ferron said senior NDS officials had assured him that "detainees are treated humanely." But only three weeks earlier, the Toronto Globe and Mail had published a series of investigative articles based on interviews with detainees turned over by the Canadians who had been tortured by NDS.

Even though they had just initiated the 96-hour rule under which detainees were turned over to NDS, British and Dutch diplomats were very concerned about the NDS reputation for torture, according to the NATO diplomat. "They knew if they turned their detainees over to the Afghans, they would be tortured," recalled the diplomat.

Largely because of their awareness of the risk of NDS torture, the British and Dutch turned over relatively few detainees, according to the NATO diplomat.

The British and Dutch also joined with U.S. officials in trying to get the Afghan government to shift responsibility for detainees from NDS to the Afghan Ministry of Defence, the NATO diplomat recalled.

But there were two problems: under Afghan law, there was no provision for long-term legal internment, and a 1987 Afghan law gave NDS the responsibility for handling security cases through its own "security courts".

The U.S. and its two European NATO allies wanted President Hamid Karzai to remove those legal obstacles to long-term detention by the Defence Ministry. "The idea was that Karzai would declare a state of emergency, so the government could hold people for the length of the conflict," the diplomat said.

The plan also envisioned the renovation of the Pul-I Charkhi prison to add a new wing for security detainees, for which the Ministry of Defence would be responsible.

But Karzai refused to declare a state of emergency, according to the NATO diplomat, because he didn't want to make concessions to the Afghan parliament to get it. Meanwhile, Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak "wanted nothing to do with detainee policy", said the NATO diplomat.

In early November 2007, a detainee turned over to the NDS by Canadian forces told Canadian diplomats in an NDS jail in Kandahar in early November 2007 that he had been beaten with an electrical cable and a rubber hose, and the Canadians found the torture instruments nearby.

The Canadian government then halted its transfers of detainees to the NDS. And in February 2008, Amnesty International called on NATO defence ministers to suspend all transfers of detainees from ISAF to Afghan authorities, given the substantial risk of torture and ill- treatment.

Despite that appeal, however, the United States continued to transfer its detainees to NDS.

During 2009, ISAF transferred a total of 350 detainees to NDS, according to official data provided to IPS by a knowledgeable U.S. source. An even more detainees were transferred to NDS by U.S. troops operating separately from the NATO command, according to the source.

*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.

WarI abhor,And yet how sweetThe sound along the marching streetOf drum and fife, and I forgetWet eyes of widows, and forgetBroken old mothers, and the wholeDark butchery without a soul.

Without a soul – save this bright drinkOf heady music, sweet as hell;And even my peace-abiding feetGo marching with the marching street,For yonder, yonder goes the fife,And what care I for human life!The tears fill my astonished eyesAnd my full heart is like to break,And yet ’tis all embannered lies,A dream those little drummers make.

O it is wickedness to clotheYon hideous grinning thing that stalksHidden in music, like a queenThat in a garden of glory walks,Till good men love the thing they loathe.Art, thou hast many infamies,But not an infamy like this;O snap the fife and still the drum,And show the monster as she is.

The struggle for the future of the Arab nations has just begun. The best thing that can be said about their uprising is that it was truly 'made in the Arab lands by the Arab youth.' The West including the US can influence events but they learnt from the war on Iraq to do so quietly, behind the scenes. The West especially the US cannot be a reliable supporter of democracy unless its interests are served.

The US overturned the democracies of 1953 Muhammad Mossadegh in Iran, 1954 Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, 1973 Salvador Allende in Chile, the 1984-89 Sandinistas government in Nicaragua and most recently 2006 Hamas government in the West Bank and Gaza. Whatever the merits of these regimes, there was no protest or criticism by the US public. The US may use its old tricks to abort or dilute democracy in the Arab states to ensure small impassioned groups (moderates according to the US) to dominate the politics of the Middle East rather than the nationalists or the Islamists who are perceived to have near monopoly on passion (extremists according to the US).

From the moment the Tunisian demonstrators succeeded in overthrowing Ibn-Ali, optimism has dominated reporting and commentaries on what are called the “Arab democratic renaissance”. There is hope for a future of equal rights and justice in constitutional liberal democratic pluralist societies especially in Egypt.

The resignation of President Husni Mubarak was an astonishing victory for the young Egyptian revolutionaries. But the struggle for the future of Egypt is just beginning. The constitution and the election laws must be rewritten, the shaken liberal economy that lacks a system of checks and balances has to be rebuilt, the grinding poverty, massive unemployment, housing shortages, injustice and inequality must be addressed and stability restored.

Many past revolutions that overthrew tyrannical or corrupt regimes replaced them with more of the same. The 1789 French Revolution that called for democracy was terminated with the establishment of an emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte. The American Revolution of 1775-83 created a slavery system that took a civil war to abolish. The fledgling democratic constitutions in the US excluded women and slaves from voting, and in France, the poor, women and servants were excluded in most elections. The movement that drew on broad ideas of addressing social injustice in late-nineteenth-century coalesced into the tyrannical Bolshevik movement in Russia.

Eastern European countries revolution of 1989 that overthrew Soviet style communism invalidate this rule; perhaps because the dictatorships were imposed by outsiders, the Soviet Union, democracy prospered after overthrowing the communist dictatorship.

There are questions about the US democracy even today: candidates with most money to spend are most likely to win elections; the election structural rules in the US national presidential elections may not allow the candidate preferred by the majority of voters to become president. And when more than two candidates run for the office of president, the winning candidate may have a plurality but not a majority. In twelve cases since the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, “the winning candidate has not been the first choice of a majority of voters.” This makes the system even less democratic since the president’s power has been growing at the expense of the legislative branch.

It may take years for liberal democracy to succeed in the Arab world including Egypt because liberty and political tolerance has seldom been practiced in generations. Egypt’s 1952 military coup by Nasser created a template of the strong leader cult (dictatorship) that has been emulated by Sadat and Mubarak and most regimes in the Middle East. It inhibited the development of formal political opposition that might have challenged the regime by demanding political reform. The new Egyptian generation that overthrew Mubarak should avoid replacing a tyranny system with another.

The electoral process is central to democratic legitimation, but democracy cannot be reduced to elections even if they were fair. Elections in Iraq and even Afghanistan were hailed by the US politicians and some commentators as success stories of democracy, but Iraq and Afghanistan can only be accurately described after the elections as failed states.

The constitutions of Egypt under Mubarak and Tunis under Ben-Ali did not call for running the country by repressive corrupt dictators, but their system of governing became dysfunctional when the so called elected leaders maintained control through unfair elections, corruption, banning of opposition political parties, persecution of critics and declaring emergency laws. There are reasons for worrying about the future of democracy in Egypt even if I believe that the Egyptian youth yearning for freedom is too powerful to settle for less than real democracy.

The historical events raise long-standing question of whether the new democracies can manage the daunting economic crises. Viewed at this time of the Arab youth revolution, once the democratic government institutions are reformed, under what economic and institutional conditions is democracy going to be consolidated to meet the needs and aspirations of the masses in each state?

Arab people in the Middle East have been trained to consider the government as the provider of subsidized food stuff, employment, health care and education. If given the choice between the market-driven economy and Scandinavian welfare model, Arab masses would approve the welfare model. But choosing the type of economy has international dimension that may limit the reformers’ options. The World Bank, the International Money Fund and foreign aid donors are known for supporting only free market economy even if it leads to economic dislocation.

There was a popular uprising in Egypt when the price of subsidized food items in Egypt was raised in 1977 by Sadat. For two days, January 17-18, order broke down in Cairo, rioters attacked police stations and foreign interests, the regime was traumatized by the violence and Sadat called it “the thieves’ uprising.”

The entrenched bureaucracies, that issue regulations and administer policies, will be a major challenge to the democratic process. The voice of the people may be heard on the election-day, but it may not be heard by the bureaucrats. Professional bureaucrats, whose careers do not depend on their political fortunes, are known for violating the will of the electorates. The core of their discipline is based on their acquired experiences and receiving bribes. Carl Friedrich argues in his book, ”Constitutional Government and Democracy” that whether a government is responsible to the people depends on “a responsible bureaucracy.”

Politicizing religion by imposing a religious doctrine as the sole official faith, as some Egyptians demand, will be a serious setback to the political liberalism and the constitutional democratic state which is a major objective of the Egyptian uprising. Imposing a religious doctrine, even if it is the faith of the majority, opens conflicts and arouses sectarian hostilities. Liberal democracy does not dismiss spiritual questions as unimportant, but because of its importance, it should be left for each citizen to decide for himself or herself.

Despite optimism, the future of democracy in the Arab World is hardly secure because it carries within it the problems of the present moment and the legacy of the past.

- Hasan Afif El-Hasan is a political analyst. His latest book, Is The Two-State Solution Already Dead? (Algora Publishing, New York), now available on Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com.

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