Tom Waterhouse

Failing to win the Eastleigh by-election is a huge
disappointment to the Conservative Party, but was perhaps not surprising. The
entrenched position of the Liberal Democrats in Eastleigh
– holding every single council ward in the constituency with some handsome
majorities – meant it was always going to be an uphill struggle.

However, as has been reported
elsewhere, problems with the Conservatives’ campaign technology, Merlin, hindered
the campaign. Most activists who have been involved in a recent election could
tell you of the problems they’ve encountered with Merlin, but the problems have
been around for so long that local parties have learned to use Merlin for what
it can do, and work around what it can’t. Poor performing campaign technology
is not the main reason the Conservatives lost in
Eastleigh. But there’s a case to say that poor performing technology cost
Republican candidate Mitt Romney the US Presidency in November, and that it
should serve as a lesson to UK Conservatives on how tiny margins can make a
massive difference.

Romney lost the Electoral College vote to President Barack
Obama 206 to 332. That 126 vote gap may seem wide until you consider that the
Democrat campaign took the four key states of Florida, Ohio, Virginia and
Colorado by a total of just 405,679 votes. That’s a very small margin when you
consider that 30 million people voted in those four states. It’s even smaller
when you consider it’s just 0.3% of the total 123 million people who voted in
the Presidential election. Those four states have a combined total of 69
Electoral College votes. So if Romney had been able to turn out an extra
406,000 Republican voters across those four states – where 10.3 million
eligible voters did not vote – he would have secured 275 Electoral College
votes to Obama’s 263. Tiny margins can make a massive difference.

The most important election result we’ll see between the last general election and the next saw Boris Johnson returned as Mayor of London. Throughout the count on 4th May, the bar charts on the live screens showed that this two-horse race was going to be won by a nose. The result was closer than most opinion polls had been suggesting in the run up to polling day. Boris edged it by just 3% in the end, but in elections it doesn’t matter if you win by 10 votes or 10,000, so long as you win.

The Boris campaign victory was more remarkable than people have given it credit for. This is understandable given that it was mainly viewed as a Boris vs Ken bout, with the latter seeming to punch himself in the face again and again and again. Indeed, the most significant moment in the campaign was the exposure of Ken’s hypocrisy on his tax affairs, something I understand was worked on for over a year.

Having such a disastrous candidate meant Labour lost the “air war”. But on the ground things were much more even. Two years ago Labour had strengthened its grip on the capital, with the Conservatives’ net gain in parliamentary seats in London masking a more significant development. Having the general election on the same day as local elections meant much higher turnouts. Labour enjoyed a net gain of 191 councillors. The Conservatives had a net loss of 68 councillors. Further to this, Labour gained control of 10 more councils, while the Tories lost control of three. Despite enjoying a net gain of seven parliamentary seats, the Conservatives still trail Labour 38 to 28. This is the stark reality in London – have a look at the difference in political control of councils between May 2006, and May 2010 above it. From this you can see why the Boris campaign was at a disadvantage on the ground, especially as Labour could also tap into the 670,000 trade union members in the capital.