Policy Regimes and Governance: Constructing Homeland Security

Transcription

1 Policy Regimes and Governance: Constructing Homeland Security Peter J. May, Ashley E. Jochim, and Joshua Sapotichne Center for American Politics and Public Policy University of Washington Prepared for the 10 th Public Management Research Association Conference at the Ohio State University, October 1-3, 2009 Corresponding Author: Professor Peter J. May Center for American Politics and Public Policy Department of Political Science 101 Gowen Hall, Campus Box University of Washington Seattle, WA USA (206) fax (206)

2 Acknowledgements Research assistance with the collection and coding of the data for this research was provided by Steve Baxter, Kyle Dunning, Darrell Kelly, Jami Larson, and Sophia Le. Valuable comments on earlier versions have been provided by Betsi Beem, John Griswold, Barry Pump, Hank Jenkins- Smith, and John Wilkerson. This research benefited from presentations at the Messy Policy Areas panel of the 2008 Annual Research Meeting of the Association for Policy Analysis and Management, at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Hong Kong in March 2009, and the Workshop on Multidisciplinary Approaches to Governance as part of the Fifth Trans-Atlantic Dialogue Conference held in Washington DC, June We also thank Samuel Workman and Bryan D. Jones for their participation in the broader research project. Financial support for this research was provided by National Science Foundation grant numbers SES and CMMI Neither the NSF nor those who have offered insights are responsible for the content of this manuscript.

3 Policy Regimes and Governance: Constructing Homeland Security Abstract Widespread crises that spill over into multiple policy areas and different levels of government provoke demands for greater policy cohesion. Policy regimes that crosscut elements of different policy subsystems and induce players within them to pursue similar ends what we label boundary-spanning policy regimes hold the prospect for fostering the desired cohesion. Stronger regimes accomplish this by reinforcing a shared purpose, mobilizing efforts of key players and supporters, and focusing the attention and authority of multiple subsystems in support of a common goal. We develop these notions and illustrate them in analyzing attempts in the United States to construct a unified approach to homeland security. The homeland security case is instructive because all the ingredients for fashioning a powerful regime were evident. For a variety of reasons that we discuss, the results are far from cohesive. The lessons we draw from our study of the homeland security regime are more general ones regarding the evolution of boundary-spanning policy regimes and the challenges of governing across policy subsystems.

4 Policy Regimes and Governance: Constructing Homeland Security One of the central challenges for governance is the unification of governmental efforts to achieve public purposes across a variety of policy areas and levels of government. This challenge is particularly acute in the aftermath of crises that highlight disarray in existing governmental efforts. Problems posed by crime, drugs, deteriorating infrastructure, energy disruptions, poverty, and terrorism have each at one time or another reached crisis status in recent history in the United States with ensuing calls for governmental action. The responses have entailed multi-pronged initiatives often invoking a war metaphor that sought cohesion at both national and subnational levels of government. 1 These initiatives call for actions across multiple policy sectors, within and across different levels of government, and among private and public entities. Efforts to fashion policy responses to messy problems like these confront the basic fact that the requisite responses do not fit within traditional boundaries for organizing policy solutions. This is typically portrayed as a consequence of fragmented structures that necessitate governmental reorganization or reliance on other coordination mechanisms like policy czars. 2 These organizational reforms seek to overcome long-standing ways of doing business built into the governmental machinery that tend to pull in different directions. This type of solution makes sense when the problem is viewed as a structural one. But the diagnosis of balkanized governmental structures misses the larger political dynamics associated with fragmented policy subsystems in American politics and policymaking. Policy process scholars have long observed the consequences of this fragmentation in producing disjunctive policymaking and fostering disjointed policy implementation. 3 In terms of policy processes, a central issue for achieving more unified governmental efforts is overcoming the inertia that is embedded in different subsystems for policymaking. Each provides a different lens about the problem and the solution that fits the distinctive history and perspectives of the subsystem. These forces pull in different directions and thwart 1

5 policy integration. Though organizational reforms may be part of the solution, we argue that these alone are insufficient for addressing the disintegrative forces. Our contribution builds on this understanding of politics and policymaking in further developing notions about policy regimes and their prospects for inducing policy cohesion. We consider policy regimes that crosscut elements of different policy subsystems and induce players within them to pursue similar ends. Policymakers establish governing arrangements and undertake implementing actions that allow these regimes to take form and to gain strength. We consider the role of four forces in this equation that are commonly identified in the broader literature about regimes. One is an issue of concern that calls into question existing governing arrangements and motivates a search for new approaches. A second element is a central idea that serves as a motivating purpose or goal. Ideas are the engine of coordination without which efforts across multiple areas of policymaking will often work at cross-purposes. A third element is supportive interests that provide the energy and political power behind the regime. A fourth element is an institutional force to meld purpose and policy implementation. In order to ground our discussion of boundary-spanning policy regimes we address the experience in the United States with what we label the homeland security policy regime. The homeland security case is compelling for study for a number of reasons. It illustrates the role of crises in highlighting the disarray that is endemic to our American political system. We identify elements of eight different subsystems that are important components of different aspects of homeland security. The distinctive histories among these subsystems well illustrate the challenges of messy problems for which regime solutions are appropriate. Though some scholars question the agenda for the Bush administration s homeland security efforts, 4 there is little doubt that policymakers sought to bring about greater cohesion and stronger policy integration for these efforts at all levels of government. The prominence of homeland security issues makes this topic especially appropriate for analysis by political scientists. 2

6 There is no shortage of scholarly accounts of homeland security issues and challenges in the United States. Donald Kettl s insightful depiction of the events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina as disruptive forces that challenge governing arrangements in the United States a system under stress encapsulates the broader political and policy context for our study of the homeland security policy regime. 5 A variety of accounts of the challenges posed by the organizational design of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) underscore the difficulties of bringing about institutional cohesion. The relevant point for our purposes is the limits of reorganization as a coordination mechanism for messy problems like homeland security given the vast array of organizations and variety of public and private entities that need to be brought on board. 6 These complexities carry over into the intergovernmental arena as highlighted by various discussions of the intergovernmental challenges for homeland security. Of particular relevance are the intergovernmental tensions that undermine the ability to mobilize subnational governmental efforts around common goals. 7 Clarke and Chenoweth suggest these intergovernmental challenges entail more than a matter of coordination for which a marshalling of shared goals and mobilization of local governmental resources around them is required. 8 These accounts underscore the complexities of many facets of fashioning cohesive approaches to homeland security. Unlike many of these analyses, we do not seek to provide policy prescriptions. Rather, we take advantage of the research opportunity that we had in studying homeland security to ground our discussion of boundary-spanning policy regimes. The lessons we draw are more general ones concerning the potential for and limits to governing across policy subsystems. Some may see this as simply introducing more terms into an already complicated governance terminology. As we discuss, the regime concept is widely employed in international relations, comparative politics, American political development, and urban politics. Moreover, it is not a new term for policy process and implementation scholars that we have conjured up from whole cloth. 3

7 Conceptual Underpinnings The unique characteristics of messy policy problems provide the conceptual underpinnings for our discussion. We consider problems that span multiple policymaking subsystems and situations for which widespread crises introduce opportunities to reshuffle existing ways of doing business. This leads to consideration of boundary-spanning policy regimes as governing arrangements that put pressure on players in different subsystems to pursue similar ends. The features that give formation and strength to this type of policy regime are suggested in the broader literature about regimes as discussed by scholars of international relations, comparative politics, American political development, and urban politics. It is also useful to distinguish what we mean by boundary-spanning policy regime from other uses of the policy regime terminology. Messy Policy Problems Many contemporary problems crosscut multiple areas of policy. Rittel and Webber first highlighted the complexity of social problems in coining the phrase wicked problems to refer to their inherent messiness. 9 But, only in recent years have boundary-spanning aspects been highlighted as illustrated by Duit and Galaz s discussion of a range of complex biophysical and human problems. 10 Arjen Boin discusses how transboundary crises can jump functional boundaries from a financial system into an industrial system; from private to public; from one sector of industry to another. 11 The challenges of such boundary-spanning problems are especially acute in the face of widespread crises. For these in particular, there often is a strong push for reform to address disarray in existing governmental efforts. The nature of fragmented policy subsystems in American politics and policymaking is central to our discussion. A key precept of the policy process literature is the existence of fairly distinctive subsystems for policymaking comprised of relatively stable sets of actors, more or less common problems and approaches to addressing them, and institutional ties that govern the decision-making context. The terminology differs in referring to variations of the subsystem 4

8 concept that include subgovernments, 12 policy monopolies, 13 and policy domains. 14 Notwithstanding these distinctions, there is broad consensus in the literature that policy subsystems help to establish boundaries for policymaking 15 and function to bring stability to the otherwise volatile process of policymaking. 16 Most policymaking and the solutions that policymakers develop fit within more-or-less distinctive subsystems. Boundary-spanning policy problems do not. The fact that these crosscut multiple subsystems creates a fundamental problem that is far more than a structural one of fragmented governmental institutions. The myopic nature of policymaking among policy subsystems is the culprit. Each of the relevant subsystems provides a separate lens through which to view problems. Each also has different ways of addressing problems given that they have separate policymaking histories and serve different interests. The threat of terrorism looks very different to players in the domestic preparedness subsystem that is concerned with responses to weapons of mass destruction and other catastrophic attacks than it is to players in the subsystem that is concerned with food safety. It might be different if the 9/11 events involved mass poisoning of the food supply. Because of the distinctive perspectives of different subsystems, achieving the desired unification among elements of diverse policy subsystems for any given boundary-spanning issue is the Achilles heel of governing. Widespread crises like those at different points in American history surrounding crime, drugs, energy shortages, poverty, and terrorism have been highly destabilizing for the normal functioning of multiple subsystems. Three aspects of this instability are particularly relevant. One is the uncertainty that policy disruptions foster about the dimensions of the problem at hand and available solutions. 17 This provides noteworthy challenges as policymakers attempt to reduce these uncertainties and prevent further system failure or breakdown. A second aspect of the destabilizing influence is jurisdictional ambiguity among key policymaking committees in Congress due to the disruptions to multiple subsystems. This fosters cross-subsystem competition as policymakers from different subsystems seek to gain policymaking authority and 5

9 define issues to fit their purview. 18 A third aspect is the desire of presidents to centralize authority in the time of crisis and eschew Congressional action, which further complicates the jurisdictional ambiguities and increases policy instability. 19 Regimes and Paradigmatic Change Destabilizing influences open a variety of possibilities for policy entrepreneurs to redefine fundamental directions of policy. This entails the type of change that Peter Hall labels paradigmatic policy change. 20 Adam Sheingate theorizes that the institutional and other ambiguities created under such circumstances open up new possibilities for speculative acts of creativity as part a process of entrepreneurial innovation and institutional change. 21 In a similar vein, Baumgartner and Jones suggest the potential for uncontrollable spillovers across areas of policymaking for which a large-scale issue redefinition can determine the fundamental direction of public policy for decades. 22 This is consistent with Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith s argument that significant perturbations external to the system have the potential to alter the alignments of long-standing coalitions within and among affected policy areas. 23 Stated differently, the destabilizing forces of widespread policy disruptions set the conditions for the introduction of new, boundary-spanning policy regimes. In order to conceptualize these further, it is useful to consider notions about regimes that have been developed in scholarship concerning international relations, comparative politics, American political development, and urban politics. Each of these traditions has considered variants of the regime concept while proceeding relatively independently. More recent contributions by policy scholars develop notions of regimes of relevance to specific policy reforms. Taken together, these literatures highlight the roles of four key attributes issues, ideas, interests, and institutions in regime formation and change. Perhaps the most developed notions about regimes come from international relations scholars who have utilized the concept to understand patterns of activity in and around internationalized policy areas. Stephen Krasner describes an international regime as sets of 6

10 implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 24 International regimes are fundamentally about crafting institutions in the international sphere for governing responses to particular policy problems such as hazardous waste and food, or to promote particular ends such as trade. 25 Policy problems that demand coordination within the international sphere create conditions that are ripe for the development of international regimes. The discussion of regimes by these and other scholars of international relations underscores the point that institutional arrangements alone do not constitute a regime. Institutions are only meaningful insofar as they embody and reinforce shared understandings and beliefs regarding the problem at hand. For example, treaties governing climate change by regulating carbon emissions do not signify the existence of a climate change regime; a regime requires the coupling of an ideational component, signified by shared principles, beliefs, and goals with an institutional component. As discussed by Martin and Simmons, regimes foster the desired convergence among actors in diverse settings only when the international institutions that are created advance agreement about shared principles, beliefs, and goals. 26 Scholars working with the regime concept in other traditions have more explicitly highlighted the centrality of power and interest groups in regime formation and change. Foremost among these is the work of Clarence Stone and his colleagues, who apply the regime concept to the study of power arrangements in urban politics. 27 According to Stone, the challenges of urban governance are coalition building, resource mobilization, and devising schemes of cooperation. 28 This framework suggests that interest groups lend strength to governing arrangements but, unlike international regimes, cooperation does not necessarily signal shared values or beliefs. A similar progression of ideas developed in comparative politics where scholars have brought attention to structural power relationships between the state and society. Kitschelt defines political regimes as the rules and basic political resource allocation according to which 7

11 actors exercise authority. 29 In this tradition, Esping-Anderson considers the role of labor in shaping different welfare state regimes. 30 From this perspective, coalitions of political actors shape the direction and capacity of the regime to act as buttressed by the power of ideas and the formation of supporting institutions. Those writing within the traditions of historical institutionalism with the American political development literature adopt a similar stance in arguing that new regimes are made possible by the embracement of organizing ideas by new coalitions of political actors. As characterized by Orren and Skowronek: As [political] regimes transform new ideas about the purposes of government into governing routines, they carry on the reformer s central contention as the political common sense of a new era, a set of base assumptions shared (or at least accepted) by all the major actors in the period. 31 These literatures suggest that while ideas and institutions are important components for developing governing regimes, the alignment of political power is central to their strength and durability. Different Types of Policy Regimes Scholars working in the policy process tradition have employed regime concepts in examining particular policy reforms or classes of reforms. Particular reforms involving new policy-specific regimes have been characterized by Carter Wilson as containing a policy paradigm, an institutional basis that structures policymaking and implementation, and a set of interests that provide political support. 32 A variety of considerations of this type of policy regime can be found in the recent policy process literature along with extensive use of policy regime terminology in various scholarly accounts of different policies. Consider some examples. Susan Clarke develops notions about performance regimes in analyzing workforce development policy in Denver. 33 Patrick McGuinn discusses regime change in federal education policy that shifted focus from equity to accountability, transformed K-12 institutions, and involved new coalitions of actors around the accountability regime. 34 Gila Menahem addresses the transformation of higher education regimes in Israel since the 1990s. 35 Rogers, Beamer, and Payne discuss differences among American states in their welfare and income support regimes following reforms at the 8

12 national level. 36 Williams discusses the creation of a new financial services regime in Canada in response to the credit crisis. 37 A subset of the policy regime literature concerns implementation regimes as the arrangements for carrying out policies. Robert Stoker introduced this terminology when considering the challenges of intergovernmental implementation. He defines an implementation regime as an arrangement among implementation participants that identifies the values to be served during the implementation process and provides and organizational framework to promote those values. 38 For example, Clarke and Chenoweth discuss the potential for local performance regimes aimed at enhancing the resilience and responsiveness of local governments to terrorist attacks and other extreme events. 39 More generally, one can think of implementation regimes as comprised of a set of arrangements, inducements, and signals that both structure and facilitate implementation. Regime terminology has also been employed by policy scholars in talking about classes of reforms. Emphasizing the relevance of paradigm change, scholars studying regulatory reforms have used regime terminology to describe the adoption of new regulatory approaches. For example, Marc Eisner suggests [o]ne can recognize the emergence of a new regime when regulatory policy initiatives and institutional innovations introduced across a number of areas reveal similar goals, patterns of state-economy relations, and administrative models. 40 In a related vein, Eric Patashnik considers different examples of policy regimes in discussing the durability of what he labels general interest reforms that eliminate or curb special-interest benefits. 41 Our focus is a particular type of policy regime a boundary-spanning policy regime that crosscuts elements of different policy subsystems and induces players within them to pursue similar ends. This focus has three important implications. It eliminates conflation of the concept of a policy regime with the notion of a policy subsystem. It distinguishes our perspective from that of those who study policy regime formation for particular policy areas that comprise single 9

13 subsystems of policymaking. And, it draws attention to the cross-subsystem dynamics of regimes in overcoming the inertia that is built into the individual policy subsystems that are addressed by a given regime. We choose the case of homeland security in the United States in order to ground our discussion of boundary-spanning policy regimes. A variety of other examples of this type of policy regime are discussed by Jochim and May. 42 These include: the community empowerment regime of the late 1960s and early 1970s that embraced urban renewal through decentralized planning; the pollution abatement regime of the early 1970s that emphasized endof-pipe pollution control; the drug criminalization regime of the 1980s that embraced zero tolerance for illegal drug use; the disability rights regime of the 1990s to the present that seeks to ensure socio-economic independence of disabled individuals; and, the welfare responsibility regime that transformed the approach to welfare and employment in the mid-1990s. Each of these examples spans elements of multiple subsystems and instilled some degree of cohesion among them through the interplay of the forces we discuss below. The contours of a given policy regime can be difficult to identify given the range of possibilities and the status of the viability of the regime. Policymakers establish governing arrangements and undertake implementing actions that allow boundary-spanning regimes to take form and to gain strength. The emergence or collapse of a policy regime is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon but an evolutionary process that can play out over a period of time. Jochim and May provide examples of widespread crises that have not led as yet to viable boundary-spanning policy regimes. 43 Deficiencies in infrastructure, the obesity epidemic, the depletion of oceans, and the persistence of poverty each constitute messy policy problems that demand solutions that crosscut elements of multiple policy subsystems. Each has a more or less identifiable set of issues. But to varying degrees, at present they lack a common focus upon which to base governing activities. Without a core idea to provide focus to policymaking, institutional capacity and interest support remain fragmented for these messy problems. 10

14 Studying the Homeland Security Policy Regime Elements of a variety of policy subsystems that for decades have surrounded different aspects of protecting society from widespread harms are potentially relevant to homeland security. The federal role has evolved since the 1950s when the Civil Defense Act of 1950 (P.L ) authorized a federal domestic preparedness program that grew into a powerful subsystem. 44 Since that time, a variety of different preparedness-related subsystems have evolved to address risks associated with food safety, natural disasters, public health emergencies, wayward technology, information security, transportation safety, and other public risks. Each of these has historically involved distinctive political and policy responses to different catastrophes. Melding elements of these with attention to their terrorism-related concerns into a more cohesive effort broadly constitute what today can be considered as the homeland security agenda. 45 Table 1 shows eight subsystems with elements that comprise what we label the homeland security regime. Each has a fairly distinctive public risk at the core, a lead or a few lead federal agencies, a history of legislative action surrounding the risk, and a distinctive terrorism-related issue focus after 9/11. We recognize some of the subsystems that we identify can be characterized as part of larger subsystems. Border protection, for example, is part of both immigration and drug policy subsystems. Rather than addressing the larger subsystems in these instances, we choose to work with the component subsystems that are most relevant to the homeland security focus. 11

16 subsystems. 46 Our primary data source is the content of congressional hearings for each policy subsystem for the post-9/11 period from September 2001 through The frame for identifying relevant hearings for our research is the congressional hearings dataset composed of a comprehensive archive of hearings coded by substantive topic and available for electronic access at the Policy Agendas Project. 47 We had research assistants examine 1,281 hearings that we identified from this archive in order to assess whether each hearing in fact addressed a homelandsecurity related topic. Many did not as they pertained to other topics that were incorporated in the same Policy Agendas Project subtopic. 48 This review narrowed our dataset to 459 hearings that pertained to elements of the eight policy subsystems we study for the post-9/11 period. Our tracing of interest involvement and endorsement of key regime concepts is based on a coding of witnesses who appeared at the various hearings. We identified a total of 2,844 witness appearances. We also analyzed testimony of key witnesses in order to identify the degree to which the ideas that undergird the concept of homeland security were embraced. The relevant measures are described in the following paragraphs. Terrorism Issue Focus. This is a measure of issue attention. For each hearing, coders identified by looking at the title and summary of the hearing whether or not the hearing explicitly addressed terrorism (terror, terrorists, or related terms) or terrorist events (such as 9/11) as a subject. This yielded an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if terror or the terroristevents were a subject and a value of zero otherwise. 49 Aggregating these by year as a proportion of all hearings in a given subsystem provides a measure of the degree to which each subsystem focused on an aspect of terrorism post-9/11 and after the creation of the DHS. Ideational Uptake. This concerns the extent to which the organizing principles of homeland security and all-hazards preparedness are embraced by witnesses in different subsystems. To measure these, we collected and analyzed testimony of 575 witnesses appearances of federal officials who held senior policymaking roles (i.e., cabinet secretaries, agency administrators, and their deputies) or had key line operating functions (i.e., bureau heads) 13

17 along with the testimony of 97 witness appearances for individuals who represented key intergovernmental organizations (e.g., International Association of Fire Chiefs, National Emergency Management Association, National Governors Association, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors). 50 Using the content analysis package QSR NUD*IST Version 4, we searched these testimonies in order to identify the degree to which the ideas that undergird the concept of homeland security were mentioned by these witnesses. Interest Involvement. We trace the composition of interests within each of the component policy subsystems and overall. We measure this as the percentage distribution of interests among seven categories of different types of interests business interests, federal agency personnel, local government administrators and officials, professional and governmental associations, research experts, state and regional government administrators and officials, and outside interests (consumer, environmental, labor, good government, and other interests). We analyze various combinations of these categories with particular attention to the intergovernmental aspects of interest involvement in the homeland security policy regime. Federal Agency Involvement. We further categorized federal agency witnesses as coming from one of 74 federal bureaus and offices that have homeland-security related functions. 51 This resulted in the identification of 944 witness appearances for the post-9/11 period for personnel from federal agencies, including both top-ranking and other personnel. By mapping the relevant subsystem and the agency that the witness represented for a given hearing, we are able to trace the composition of federal agency involvement in policymaking for different subsystems. The Dynamics of Policy Regimes: Constructing Homeland Security Our discussion of the homeland security regime illustrates the role of crises in the emergence of policy regimes and the difficulties of fashioning strong boundary-spanning regimes. In what follows, we first discuss the emergence of the homeland security regime. We then turn to a more extended discussion of the four forces that help shape the strength and viability of policy 14

18 regimes issues, ideas, interests, and institutions for which we assess the role of each for the homeland security regime. Homeland Security Regime Emergence Widespread crises can be highly destabilizing for the normal functioning of multiple subsystems. The instability is a result of uncertainties that policy disruptions foster about the dimensions of the problem at hand and available solutions, the jurisdictional ambiguity that is created for policymaking within Congress, and the tension created by presidential desires to centralize authority in times of crisis. The policy responses to the terrorism attacks of September 11 th 2001 led to dramatic shifts in media attention, legislation, and symbolic undertakings. More than 450 bills and resolutions relating to these events were introduced in the 107 th Congress. 52 The presidential choice to create the Office of Homeland Security on October 8 th 2001 provided a visible response that centralized control through a White House coordinating entity. 53 The limitations of the Office of Homeland Security and the politics of the situation soon led to renewed calls for the creation of a cabinet-level agency. Though originally opposed out of a disdain for large bureaucracy and creation of a new government department, the Bush administration responded to the shifting political environment and worked with Congress to fashion a super-agency. In announcing his plan for the Department, Bush cited a need to unite essential agencies that must work closely together in providing the best opportunity to succeed by organizing our resources in a way that is thorough and unified. 54 Both the Bush administration and Congress were seeking fundamental institutional change with the creation of the DHS. From the outset there was recognition that the requisite tasks, however defined, were beyond the scope of the federal government alone. As such, the DHS can be viewed as an institutional force for advancing homeland security efforts across the federal government, at other levels of government, and within the private sector. This is embodied in the DHS strategic plan in stating: We will continue to work cooperatively [with other federal, state, local, and tribal 15

19 institutions; and the private and non-profit sectors] to ensure that all the instruments of national power are brought to bear on the challenges we face in a coordinated and unified manner. 55 The creation of the DHS, a series of presidential executive orders, a variety of legislation, and numerous speeches by the President and DHS officials established governing arrangements and reinforced actions that allowed the homeland security regime to take form. Rather than recounting the details of these actions, the important point for our purpose of illustrating regime dynamics is that each of the four unifying forces that undergird boundary-spanning policy regimes was present: (1) a widespread problem threats posed by terrorism and other extreme events; (2) a common purpose homeland security; (3) engaged stakeholders federal agencies, state and local governments, experts, and business interests; and, (4) institutional redesign the creation of the DHS. In what follows we discuss each unifying force and assess the role of each in affecting the strength of the homeland security regime. Fragmented Issue Attention As discussed by Jones and Baumgartner, a key hurdle for policy action is gaining the attention to particular dimensions of a problem. 56 Widespread crises, problems, or other disruptions by definition garner attention of relevant actors in affected policy subsystems. But as shown by May, Sapotichne, and Workman the timing and duration of shifts in attention to new dimensions of a problem differ according to the degree that affected subsystems were previously attending to aspects of the relevant problems. 57 We get at these disjunctions for homeland security by considering the degree of attention to terrorism as an issue for each of the subsystems under study. Table 2 shows the distribution of hearing activity post-9/11 and the degree to which terrorism issues were considered at different points in the post-9/11 period. More than two-thirds of the hearing activity took place within subsystems that were directly impacted by the events of 9/11 domestic security, transportation safety, public heath emergencies, and border security in comparison to the more limited attention to the issue in the remaining homeland security subsystems that were not as directly impacted. 58 The former 16

20 subsystems were in the game while the latter were sitting on the sidelines. This makes sense given the nature of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax scare. Table 2. Terrorism Issue Attention Hearing Distribution a Terrorism Focus b Subsystem Post 9/11 c d Domestic Security 39% 91% 72% Transportation Safety 17% 56% 48% Public Health Emergencies 13% 88% 58% Border Security 10% 73% 38% Information Security 9% 50% 27% Technological Hazards 5% 45% 7% Natural Disaster Preparedness 5% 27% 8% Food Safety 3% 0% 20% All subsystems 73% 49% Number hearings Statistics - chi-square e p <.01 Notes: a Cell entries are percentages of total number of hearing in each category for the designated period. Totals do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. b Cell entries are the percentage of total number of hearing in each category for the designated period. Totals do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. c Hearings held from September 2001 through December d Hearings held from September 2001 through December 2002 e Chi-square comparison of the distribution of the percentage of hearings preversus post-dhs that were terrorism-related for the eight subsystems. As can be seen in the two right-hand columns of Table 2, there was a 35 percent reduction in the number of hearings that were concerned with terrorism for the timeframe in comparison to the earlier period. With the exception of the food safety subsystem involving only two terrorism-related hearings, the percentage of hearings in concerning terrorism was substantially lower in each subsystem. This suggests that the disruptions associated with the terrorism events of 9/11 had been absorbed within each subsystem by 2003 with most policymaking within these subsystems returning more or less to business as usual. Although still prominent in some subsystems, the attention to terrorism by 2003 could no longer be considered a galvanizing issue across the board. 17

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