This petition for
special leave to appeal arises from an eviction proceeding. The 2nd Additional
Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, held that the eviction petition (HRC No.422/99)
filed against respondent no. 1 was not maintainable under the Karnataka Rent
Act, 1999 because the proceeding was instituted within the period of 15 years
2 since the suit house was subjected to substantial renovation and additional
construction as provided under Section 2(3) (f) of the Act.

In revision, the High
Court affirmed the view taken by the trial court vide order dated 22 June, 2006
in House Rent Revision Petition No.554 of 2005. The petitioner seeks leave to
file appeal against the High Court order.

The facts of the case
are brief and may be stated thus. The suit premises belonged to one Shankar
Narayan Rao (now deceased). He inducted respondent No.1 as a tenant in the
house in the year 1976. At that time it was a single storey house without any
garage as an appurtenance. In the year 1988, on the request of the tenant,
another storey was added and a garage was also constructed on the ground floor.
Respondent No.1 then came to occupy as tenant, the entire premises, that is to
say, the ground floor and the newly added first floor and the garage on a
monthly rental of Rs.2500/-.

In 1999, Shankar
Narayan Rao filed a petition under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 seeking
the eviction of respondent No.1 on a number of grounds. Respondent no.1
resisted the eviction proceeding and filed his written statement, inter alia,
stating that additional construction/renovation of the house in the year 1988
was 3 done at his expense and in that connection he had incurred the cost of
Rs.6,50,000/-.

The Karnataka Rent
Control Act was repealed and it was replaced by the Karnataka Rent Control Act,
1999 with effect from December 2001. At that time the proceeding was pending
before the trial court.

In the same year
Shankar Narayan Rao died and the present petitioner and respondent No.2 got themselves
substituted in his place to prosecute the eviction proceeding. Respondent No.2
is the widow of Shankar Narayan Rao and the petitioner claims to be his adopted
son.

In course of the
proceeding before it the trial court seems to have noticed the plea taken by
respondent No.1 that the additional construction/renovation of the house was
done in the year 1988 at a cost of Rs.6,50,000/-. On the basis of the evidences
already on record he further found that the aforesaid amount was in excess of
75% of the valuation of the house and hence, the suit premises had undergone
substantial renovation/construction within the meaning of Section 2 (3) (f) of
the Act that stipulated that to such a premises no provision of the Rent
Control Act, 1999 would apply for a period of 15 years 4 from the date of
completion of construction or substantial renovation.

The eviction petition
in question, was filed in 1999, i.e., clearly within the period of 15 years
from the date of completion of additional construction/substantial renovation
of the suit premises and was, therefore, not maintainable under the Act.

The petitioner
challenged the order of the trial court in revision before the High Court. At
this stage, the dispute which was till then only bipartite, being between the
tenant on the one side and the petitioner and the second respondent on the
other assumed a tripartite dimension. The widow of Shankar Narayan Rao who
after the death of her husband had initially joined the petitioner in
prosecuting the eviction proceeding changed her stand. A petition was filed on
her behalf in the trial court stating that she came to know about a will
allegedly created in favour of the petitioner, which according to her was a
fake. She also disputed the petitioner's claim of adoption by Shankar Narayan
Rao and prayed for dismissing the eviction proceeding. It was in those
circumstances that in the revision filed by the petitioner before the High
Court she was impleaded as the second respondent along with the tenant being
the first respondent. The High 5 Court, as noticed above, dismissed the
revision and affirmed the order passed by the trial court.

Learned counsel
appearing in support of the Leave Petition submitted that the question of
maintainability of the proceeding was not even raised by respondent No.1, the
tenant, and there bring no such plea the trial court was in error in dismissing
the petition as not maintainable. He further submitted that the suit house
could not be said to have undergone construction/substantial renovation within
the meaning of the explanation to Section 2(3)(f) of the Act. Learned counsel
also submitted that at any rate on 21 November, 2005, the date on which the
trial court dismissed the eviction petition, the 15 years period was already
over. The bar of Section 2(3)(f) was thus lifted in connection with the suit
house and there was no legal impediment before the court to proceed in the
matter. In support of the last submission, he relied upon a decision of this
Court in Sudhir G.Angur & Ors. V. M. Sanjeev & others, 2005 (8) Scale
762.

We are not impressed
by any of these submissions. What was the cost of construction or the value of
the single storey house that was originally let out to respondent No.1 and what
was the cost of construction of the first floor and the garage and whether or
not the suit house had undergone substantial renovation/additional 6
construction within the meaning of Section 2(3)(f) of the Act are pure
questions of fact. On the basis of the evidences led before it, the trial court
found and held that the cost incurred in the additional construction/renovation
was in excess of 75% of the value of the original single storey house. The
finding of the trial court has been affirmed by the High Court. The finding is
based on evidence brought before the court and it, therefore, does not warrant
any interference by us. Further, once it was established that the suit house
had undergone additional construction/substantial renovation within the meaning
of Section 2(3)(f) of the Act the question of maintainability of the proceeding
became a jurisdictional issue and the court was legally bound to address it
regardless of whether or not any objection was raised by the other side. The
trial court was, therefore, perfectly justified in considering whether or not
it had the jurisdiction and the competence to proceed in the matter. The Trial
Court did so and found that the proceeding was not maintainable before it.

We are also unable to
accept the contention that the date on which the order was passed the 15 years
period was over and the proceeding had thus became maintainable. We are of the
view that the decision in Sudhir G.Angur has no application to the facts of the
case.

7 The
maintainability of the proceeding was to be decided with reference to the date
on which the Rent Control Act, 1999 came into force and not the date on which
the order was passed by the trial court. A proceeding that was incompetent on
the date the Act came into force would not revive merely because it remained
pending before the court.

Counsel for the
petitioner lastly submitted that the intent of section 3(2)(f) was to give some
benefit to the landlord and further that the proceeding would not abate under
Section 70(2)(c) of the Act. We find no force in the submission. It is indeed
true that Section 2(3) (f) is beneficial to the landlord but then it was for
the land lord, Narayan Shankar Rao to withdraw the proceeding on coming into
force on the 1999 Act in terms of Section 2(3)(f) and to proceed against the
tenant under the general law governing the landlord and tenant relationship.
That course having not been adopted the proceeding under the Rent Control Act
was clearly not maintainable and was rightly dismissed by the trial court.

We thus find no merit
in this special leave petition and it is dismissed accordingly.

We may note here that
the High Court has left it open to the petitioner or the 2nd respondent (the
widow of Narayan Shankar Rao) 8 to file a fresh eviction petition on the
ground that by the end of December 2003 the 15 years period was over. The
direction of the High Court in that regard would remain undisturbed by the
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition.