The debate is over: By any definition, Iraq is in a state of civil war.
Indeed, the only thing standing between Iraq and a descent into total
Bosnia-like devastation is 135,000 U.S. troops -- and even they are
merely slowing the fall. The internecine conflict could easily spiral
into one that threatens not only Iraq but also its neighbors throughout
the oil-rich Persian Gulf region with instability, turmoil and war.

However, discussion of what to do next in Iraq and how to discuss new approaches and directions, an approach favored by Democrats, is being delayed by resistance from the Bush White House, who prefer to stay the course and not have Administration policy questioned. This facet of political reality was addressed in a fascinating op-ed written a few weeks ago in North Carolina's News & Observer.

The Bush administration's justification for continued operations in
Iraq -- that it has become the central front in the global war on
terrorism -- leaves almost no rhetorical space for an effective
counterargument (the opposition party has been labeled the
"Defeatocrats" and is said to be working on behalf of "al-Qaeda
types"). As long as the enterprise in Iraq is deemed central to
American national security, the only alternative to continued military
operations is to "let the terrorists win."

William A. Boettcher is an associate professor and Michael D. Cobb is
an assistant professor in the School of Public and International
Affairs at N.C. State University, and have a major interest in public opinion and public perception.

Attempts to reframe the American involvement in Iraq will inevitably
generate an aggressive rhetorical response. Accusations of abandoning
the Iraqi people, surrendering to the terrorists and enabling a
humanitarian catastrophe will be leveled from critics on the left and
the right. A successful reframing of the Iraq war must be combined with
a disengagement strategy that addresses these concerns, but
realistically acknowledges that public support for the war is waning
and the Bush administration does not appear inclined to commit the
resources needed to turn things around.

Note that a survey recently done by the professors on the American
public's perception of Iraq, the costs of war, and the likelihood of
future support is expected to be released next week (and we will cover
it here). I had the opportunity to discuss this with Professors Boettcher and Cobb. What follows comes from that discussion and subsequent emails.

Professors Boettcher and Cobb:

In an editorial we wrote several weeks ago in the Raleigh, NC News and Observer, we partially explained our belief that perceptions about the mission objectives in Iraq are fluid, and opponents of the war can make more persuasive withdrawal arguments by framing the goal of staying in Iraq as preventing a civil war. We said this because past experience shows that Americans’ casualty tolerance for largely humanitarian missions is substantially lower than for restraining a threatening adversary. DemFromCT read our editorial; we talked, and he was kind enough to give us the opportunity to answer some of his questions about casualties and framing effects on public opinion about Iraq.

Conventional wisdom holds that Americans get ‘weak in the knees’ and withdraw their support for military interventions as soon as casualties occur; or, at least as casualties increase, so too does American opposition to war. We think that the core of this argument is wrong for several reasons, but neither are we persuaded by recent research suggesting that Americans are tolerant of substantial casualties so long as they believe in the prospects for success.

First of all, we are skeptical about the argument that
cumulative casualties (i.e., total US military deaths to date) are the
best predictor of support for the President or an on-going war (full
disclosure: many scholars disagree with this claim, but there is no
consensus about why the claim is unpersuasive). Studies that find
casualty effects use aggregated (not surveys with individual-level)
data: actual combat deaths (over time) correlated with various
aggregate level measures of public opinion (over time).

One of the key problems with this approach is that the mechanism for
translating the effects of an individual’s awareness of casualties to
their attitudes about an on-going war is a black box. It is simply
assumed that this information about casualties is widely available so
that individuals accurately know about casualties and, other things
being equal, the higher the casualty count, the greater the opposition
to continuing to fight. Yet, we are unaware of any study showing that
Americans can accurately estimate casualties, and nobody has adequately
explained why perceiving more casualties (accurately or not) inevitably
produces greater opposition to war.

We’ve obtained data from eight nationally representative surveys about
respondents’ estimates of the cumulative casualties in Iraq, and with
few qualifications most people simply don’t know how many lives have
been lost. (Adam Berinsky at MIT conducted an experiment in one survey
where support for the war remained unchanged even after he told
respondents what the correct casualty information was.) Perhaps more
damaging to the original argument, there are only weak and sporadic
correlations between respondents’ perceptions of the number of total
casualties and their opinions about Iraq. In a recent survey we
conducted on Iraq, estimates of cumulative casualties are completely
uncorrelated with retrospective or prospective evaluations of Iraq
(i.e., was it the right thing to do; will we succeed in the end), and
marginally correlated with positions about troop withdrawal (.08).

Another serious problem lies in the logic behind the assumption that
cumulative casualties will always produce dissent. Why, for example,
would a Democrat and a Republican be expected to respond equally to the
same knowledge about actual combat deaths? Each person might know that
about 2,700 Americans have died since we invaded Iraq, but partisans
will vary in their tolerance for losing lives. Iraq is the most
partisan war on record. To illustrate, what if a typical Democrat is
willing to tolerate 1,000 casualties for a mission like Iraq while a
Republican has the stomach for 5,000? In this case, equally accurate
knowledge of 2,700 casualties will not have any systematic relationship
with support for the war. One person has surpassed their tipping point
for acceptable casualties while the other has yet to reach it. Even if
estimates of casualties are wildly off the mark and Democrats always
guess higher and Republicans always guess lower, the same principal
applies: the more important thing to know about any individual is their
tolerance for additional casualties.

Despite our skepticism that cumulative casualties directly affect
opinions about the war, we think casualties can affect war support.
Yet we also partly disagree with recent scholarship emphasizing the
importance of mission success (victory) for public tolerance of
casualties. The research on success that we’re referencing is being
conducted by political scientists affiliated with Duke University,
Peter Feaver and Chris Gelpi, and Jason Reifler at Loyola, Chicago
(from now on known as “FGR”) (Note: Feaver took leave from Duke to work
for President Bush on the National Security Council, and is believed to
be the principal actor behind the administrations’ “Plan for Victory”
PR campaign). In a nutshell, they argue that Americans will tolerate
substantial casualties so long as they believe the decision to go to
war was correct and that the mission in Iraq will succeed (and if you
believe both, you are especially tolerant of casualties). (We and
others have argued their model of public opinion is based on circular
logic in which tolerance for additional casualties both substitutes as
a measure of support for the war and predicts support for the war;
regardless of this specific flaw, it is probably impossible to
determine the direction of causality—perhaps support for war determines
casualty tolerance and not the other way around.)

According to FGR, the key to maintaining or building support for the
war in Iraq is to stress the likelihood of succeeding. It is not a
coincidence that the Bush administration’s rhetoric emphasizes
“winning”, “success”, and “victory”. We think their argument is
reasonable on its face but wrong for at least two reasons: Americans’
perceptions about the goal in Iraq is more important to know than
whether we will succeed in the abstract, and the Bush administration is
not trusted by a sizeable portion of the population to be credible when
making the case for inevitable success in Iraq.

We’ll only address the first part of our critique because the second
part has been discussed elsewhere and it is not our primary concern.
Past research demonstrates that the primary policy objective (PPO) of a
military intervention is crucial for predicting public support for the
mission. At the top of the PPO list we find missions to restrain an
aggressive and threatening adversary; in the middle are missions about
regime change and democracy building; and at the bottom are
humanitarian missions. This ranking reflects the kind of goals that
Americans are willing to bear greater burdens for achieving. Thus,
defeating terrorists who want to kill us is a goal worth paying the
costs, and success is indeed vital. When the Bush administration
frames Iraq as the central front in the war on terrorism, losing this
mission is inconceivable for most people and critics’ arguments to
withdraw from Iraq can be dismissed persuasively as surrendering to
terrorists.

Yet, there are multiple potential ways of viewing the mission in Iraq.
One can talk about Iraq as a war to remove Saddam and ensure that WMD
would not be used against us. Indeed, justly or unjustly, we agree that
we won that phase of the war, but we think that phase is over. Another
goal in Iraq is to fight insurgents who oppose our efforts to build a
stable democracy. A third potential goal is to prevent civil war.
This is the goal that we argue opponents of the war should highlight as
our current objective because Americans are less tolerant of casualties
for this kind of mission. While some conflicts, like WWII, are thought
to require paying substantial costs to win, victory in other conflicts
is not perceived to be essential. So long as the dominant frame of
Iraq is about fighting terrorists, the goal is paramount and the costs
will be tolerated. Changing the American frame of reference about Iraq
(to that of a country involved in a bloody civil war) changes
Americans’ tolerance for casualties and facilitates more reasoned
debate about how to extract ourselves from Iraq without being accused
of treason and siding with the enemy. This also highlights why success
by itself is somewhat beside the point—success at what? If the goal is
to prevent civil war, success (or failure) is not taken as seriously.

Our simple observation is that it will be easier for opponents of
staying the course to propose and consider alternative policy options,
like withdrawal, once a concerted effort is made to bury the terrorism
frame and replace it with that of preventing civil war. One reason
Americans have remained more ambivalent about withdrawing our troops is
because of the greater success of war supporters at framing the goal in
Iraq. Changing the frame to civil war will make it easier for citizens
who say the war was wrong (but don’t like the prospects of losing to
terrorists) to accept withdrawal as a valid option.

As for how Iraq affects the potential use of force against Iran, we are
skeptical that the administration has the institutional capacity to do
much right now. Regardless, they will have a much harder time
persuading Americans that it is right to attack Iran. One serious
problem in making shaky WMD claims about Iraq is that the
administration has now spent its earned trust on these kinds of
matters. Framing Iraq as an imminent nuclear threat will not be
effective this time around. On the other hand, the mainstream media
seem intent on repeating the mistakes in the run-up to Iraq, by placing
stories benefiting the administration’s claims about Iran on the front
page and burying challenges to those claims on page 17 (The Washington
Post is guilty of this, and it was noticed by Drum).

The above has major implications not just for what happens with Iraq
going forward, but what happens with Iran. To the extent that blogs
like this can highlight Iran challenges and get these stories discussed
in advance, and influence the media to do the same, we will have done this country a service, and one that the media didn't do pre-Iraq.

Comments

Thanks for providing us this excellent analysis, DemFromCT. People need to know how many have been killed and maimed, but the idea that a certain number is the tipping point depends, as the authors argue so very cogently, on what the perceived mission is. Self-defense against an implacable enemy - the Japanese, the Germans - is rightly perceived as an all-objections-be-damned affair: We have no choice. It's blood, sweat and tears until victory or obliteration.

As the authors note:

Thus, defeating terrorists who want to kill us is a goal worth paying the costs, and success is indeed vital.

This, of course, as the authors say, is the continuing problem we have with the Bush Regime's framing, not just with the rationale for the human casualties in the war/occupation, but also of more "intangible" casualties associated with dismantling the Constitution in the alleged effort to protect us from terrorists.

Our advantage, as DemFromCT has been saying now for more than a year(?) - based on a reading of the polls - is that Americans increasingly don't believe the regime. Hence the lack of any substantial polling bounce from the boatload of pre-9/11 anniversary speeches.

Still, I am not so sure Mister Bush and his mentors are quite so institutionally hamstrung in Iran because of Iraq. I don't think they will do anything militarily before November 7, but I'm guessing about this as much as anyone else. And, despite all the generals who have told Mister Bush NOT to move against Iran, despite everything that has happened in Iraq, I wouldn't bet my mortgage that he won't give the order for at least a smash-and-run attack on some critical infrastructure simply because of the fear that post-election this may be more difficult to accomplish.

Nice job, Dem! I really think the civil war is the issue that too many have overlooked. I suspect the Democrats could create more unity among themselves if they 1. talk about the civil war and 2.form a common policy that address one basic question: what can the US do to prevent a civil war in Iraq?

Yes there is an insurgency.
It is directed toward the US.
It is directed toward Democracy.
It is directed toward a Shia led government.
It is directed toward anything on a particular day.

Yes there is a Civil war as Sunni's and Shia kill and revenge kill for grievances for present and past.
The war is cleric, and the war is secular.

And there are criminals, and opportunists, and even businessmen competing ruthlessly.

You in this forum as in many forums both Liberal and Conservative are splitting hairs. Counting the militant angels on dancing on the heads of pins. Over intellectualizing.
You are out of touch with those that will and might vote Republican. And likewise will and might vote Democratic. And really out of touch with those that may not vote at all.

My own family is a case in point in conflict about this war.
My oldest brother was in Afghanistan, but out of the active military now. He railes against losing the momentum there.
My next brother has been in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and is now going back to Iraq. He says we have to have more troops to have a chance to make it worthwhile. He is tired of taking the same ground over and over.
My father is depressed over the wounded. He extended to take care of them.
My mother is on medication trying to live through all this.

I worry about what comes next.

That is what you must address. Fighting a war, but not being on a war footing. Having you cake and eating it too. Losing men near 3000 dead, near 30,000 wounded, untold others scarred by what they have seen and had to do. Not all this Philosophy. Or you are wasting time and words and deserve to win no more than the Republicans.

Where are your leaders. Where are the Democrats. Whether they are for and against the war they should be counted. Instead they are no better than the Republicans trying to finely judge what the points in a poll might do for any one actions.

Jodi, when you get down to it, you are not taking responsibility for who and what got us there. Trying to understand that is part of the process of getting us out. It's called planning, and this WH did none of it.

Here are the facts: what you agonize over is real, yet we didn't have to be in iraq and could have and should have finished the job in Afghanistan. There's only one party responsible for that. And those decisions are the ones made by the CiC; the rest follows. This is an accountability election. You're running away from that. Bush and the GOP are failing your family and other Americans, just like they did during Katrina.

"Where are the Dems?" Only the WH sets foreign policy. The Dems are in the minority in both houses and don't run the WH. If you want them front and center, you'll have to elect them.

you might remember I said I voted for Bush 2000, and for Kerry 2004. Don't think I like either. I don't paint the best of a rotten barrel of apples as "great."

The problem I see is that the Democrats aren't saying that they want to do a better job because then the liberal/left bloggers would say they are warmongers because they are saying get out immediately.
So the Dems are sitting on their hands with their heads bent back beneath the apple tree waiting for a "fresh" fruit [office] to fall in their mouths.

Leadership isn't reading the polls, it is taking the initiative and stepping up. Dean, perhaps misguided, showed leadership. And some you lose and some you win, but if you are too careful, you are never in the game.

Dem, you're quite right about the civil war, I meant "full scale civil war." The story about the attempted coup is disturbing because it's quie plausible. And Juan Cole says the curfew caught some US officials by surprise.

You might remember I said I voted for Bush 2000, and for Kerry 2004. Don't think I like either.

I do remember! And I don't fault those who dislike Kerry (he's not Clinton re leadership) for dithering. Sometimes you vote for the least worst alternative. And Senators don't always make great leaders, which is why Governors tend to win the WH.

I do think you've got to feel guilty for 2000, though. The better man was not declared the winner.

But now, this is beyond 2000. Bush and republicans in congress now have responsibility for the Iraq mess. Giving the keys to the driver that put us in the ditch is just dumb. But the dynamic of an off-year is that there's no opposition standard bearer who acts as leader for the oppo party. Therefore, you get to harbor whatever prejudices the ad campaign from the last election suggests.

I would say to you that what you've seen is not "no plan" but "many plans" from Dems, as well as a willingness to relook at everything without insisting on old assumptions (clearly not something the WH is capable of). That is sufficient to make a choice.

The Bush administration has allowed the terrorists to win. They quit Afghanistan and allowed OBL to survive. They then destroyed Iraq to create a new training ground for him. GWB is handing the middle East to terrorists. That's the frame.