1.Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to
the State. 2.It is a matter of life and death, a road either to
safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can
on no account be neglected. 3.The art of war, then, is governed
by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's
deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions
obtaining in the field. 4.These are:

5.The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord
with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of
their lives, undismayed by any danger. 6. 7.Heaven signifies
night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. 8.Earth
comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open
ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. 9.The
Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely,
benevolence, courage and strictness. 10.By method and
discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in
its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the
officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach
the army, and the control of military expenditure. 11.These
five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows
them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
12.Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine
the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a
comparison, in this wise:-- 13.

1.Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral
law? 2.Which of the two generals has most ability? 3.With whom
lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? 4.On which
side is discipline most rigorously enforced? 5.Which army is
stronger? 6.On which side are officers and men more highly
trained? 7.In which army is there the greater constancy both in
reward and punishment?

14.By means of these seven considerations I can forecast
victory or defeat. 15.The general that hearkens to my counsel
and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in
command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts
upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!
16.While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also
of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary
rules. 17.According as circumstances are favorable, one should
modify one's plans. 18.All warfare is based on deception.
19.Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using
our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must
make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must
make him believe we are near. 20.Hold out baits to entice the
enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. 21.If he is secure at all
points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength,
evade him. 22.If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
23.If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces
are united, separate them. 24.Attack him where he is
unprepared, appear where you are not expected. 25.These
military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged
beforehand. 26.Now the general who wins a battle makes many
calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The
general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few
calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It
is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely
to win or lose.

II. WAGING WAR

1.Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are
in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots,
and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions
enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and
at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items
such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,
will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.
Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 2.When you
engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then
men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If
you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
3.Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the
State will not be equal to the strain. 4.Now, when your weapons
are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your
treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take
advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be
able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 5.Thus, though
we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been
seen associated with long delays. 6.There is no instance of a
country having benefited from prolonged warfare. 7.It is only
one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can
thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
8.The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither
are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. 9.Bring war
material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the
army will have food enough for its needs. 10.Poverty of the
State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by
contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army
at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. 11.On the
other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up;
and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained
away. 12.When their substance is drained away, the peasantry
will be afflicted by heavy exactions. 13.With this loss of
substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people
will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be
dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots,
worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,
spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy
wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. 14.
15.Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy.
One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty
of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is
equivalent to twenty from one's own store. 16.Now in order to
kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may
be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their
rewards. 17.Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more
chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the
first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the
enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with
ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
18.This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own
strength. 19.In war, then, let your great object be victory,
not lengthy campaigns. 20.Thus it may be known that the leader
of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom
it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

1.Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best
thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;
to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better
to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a
regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy
them. 2.Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not
supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the
enemy's resistance without fighting. 3.Thus the highest form of
generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to
prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order
is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst
policy of all is to besiege walled cities. 4.The rule is, not
to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The
preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the
piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three
months more. 5.The general, unable to control his irritation,
will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the
result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town
still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a
siege. 6.Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's
troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without
laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without
lengthy operations in the field. 7.With his forces intact he
will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without
losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method
of attacking by stratagem. 8.It is the rule in war, if our
forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to
one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army
into two. 9.If equally matched, we can offer battle; if
slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite
unequal in every way, we can flee from him. 10.Hence, though an
obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it
must be captured by the larger force. 11.Now the general is the
bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points;
the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the
State will be weak. 12.There are three ways in which a ruler
can bring misfortune upon his army:-- 13.(1) By commanding the
army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that
it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. 14.(2) By
attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers
a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an
army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. 15.(3)
By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
16.But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is
sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply
bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
17.Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:

1.He will win who knows when to fight and when not to
fight. 2.He will win who knows how to handle both superior and
inferior forces. 3.He will win whose army is animated by the
same spirit throughout all its ranks. 4.He will win who,
prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. 5.He will
win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the
sovereign.

18.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If
you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained
you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

1.Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put
themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited
for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. 2.To secure
ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy
himself. 3.Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself
against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4.Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being
able to do it. 5.Security against defeat implies defensive
tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the
offensive. 6.Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. 7.The
general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret
recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes
forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand
we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory
that is complete. 8.To see victory only when it is within the
ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. 9.Neither
is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the
whole Empire says, "Well done!" 10.To lift an autumn hair is no
sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of
sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick
ear. 11.What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who
not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. 12.Hence his
victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit
for courage. 13.He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of
victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already
defeated. 14.Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a
position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the
moment for defeating the enemy. 15.Thus it is that in war the
victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has
been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and
afterwards looks for victory. 16.The consummate leader
cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and
discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. 17.In
respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement;
secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation;
fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18.Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of
quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity;
Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing
of chances. 19.A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as
a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
20.The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of
pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

V. ENERGY

1.Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same
principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question
of dividing up their numbers. 2.Fighting with a large army
under your command is nowise different from fighting with a
small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and
signals. 3.To ensure that your whole host may withstand the
brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is
effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. 4.That the impact of
your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this
is effected by the science of weak points and strong. 5.In all
fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but
indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
6.Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as
Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the
four seasons, they pass away to return once more. 7.There are
not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these
five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. 8.There
are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red,
white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues
than can ever been seen. 9.There are not more than five
cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet
combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be
tasted. 10.In battle, there are not more than two methods of
attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in
combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. 11.The
direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is
like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. Who can
exhaust the possibilities of their combination? 12.The onset of
troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll
stones along in its course. 13.The quality of decision is like
the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and
destroy its victim. 14.Therefore the good fighter will be
terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision. 15.Energy
may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the
releasing of a trigger. 16.Amid the turmoil and tumult of
battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder
at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without
head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. 17.Simulated
disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear
postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
18.Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a
question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of
timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength
with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.
19.Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move
maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy
will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at
it. 20.By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then
with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. 21.The
clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and
does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability
to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. 22.When
he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were
like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log
or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when
on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
round-shaped, to go rolling down. 23.Thus the energy developed
by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled
down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the
subject of energy.

VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG

1.Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits
the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever
is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive
exhausted. 2.Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on
him. 3.By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can
make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. 4.If the enemy
is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with
food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force
him to move. 5.Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to
defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
6.An army may march great distances without distress, if it
marches through country where the enemy is not. 7.You can be
sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places
which are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense
if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked. 8.Hence
that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know
what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent
does not know what to attack. 9.O divine art of subtlety and
secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you
inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
10.You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make
for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from
pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the
enemy. 11.If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an
engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart
and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place
that he will be obliged to relieve. 12.If we do not wish to
fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though
the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.
All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in
his way. 13.By discovering the enemy's dispositions and
remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces
concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. 14.We can form
a single united body, while the enemy must split up into
fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate
parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the
enemy's few. 15.And if we are able thus to attack an inferior
force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire
straits. 16.The spot where we intend to fight must not be made
known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a
possible attack at several different points; and his forces
being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall
have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
17.For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his
rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van;
should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should
he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends
reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
18.Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against
possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our
adversary to make these preparations against us. 19.Knowing the
place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate
from the greatest distances in order to fight. 20.But if
neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be
impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to
succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the
rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest
portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and
even the nearest are separated by several LI! 21.Though
according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in
number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of
victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. 22.Though the
enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.
Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their
success. 23.Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity
or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out
his vulnerable spots. 24.Carefully compare the opposing army
with your own, so that you may know where strength is
superabundant and where it is deficient. 25.In making tactical
dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal
them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the
prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the
wisest brains. 26.How victory may be produced for them out of
the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot
comprehend. 27.All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is
evolved. 28.Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one
victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite
variety of circumstances. 29.Military tactics are like unto
water; for water in its natural course runs away from high
places and hastens downwards. 30.So in war, the way is to avoid
what is strong and to strike at what is weak. 31.Water shapes
its course according to the nature of the ground over which it
flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe
whom he is facing. 32.Therefore, just as water retains no
constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
33.He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent
and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born
captain. 34.The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way
for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon
has its periods of waning and waxing.

VII. MANEUVERING

1.Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands
from the sovereign. 2.Having collected an army and concentrated
his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements
thereof before pitching his camp. 3.After that, comes tactical
maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The
difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the
devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. 4.Thus, to
take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out
of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach
the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of
DEVIATION. 5.Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an
undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. 6.If you set a fully
equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the
chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to
detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice
of its baggage and stores. 7.Thus, if you order your men to
roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without
halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a
stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the
leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of
the enemy. 8.The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones
will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army
will reach its destination. 9.If you march fifty LI in order to
outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first
division, and only half your force will reach the goal. 10.If
you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your
army will arrive. 11.We may take it then that an army without
its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
without bases of supply it is lost. 12.We cannot enter into
alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our
neighbors. 13.We are not fit to lead an army on the march
unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes
and swamps. 14.We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to
account unless we make use of local guides. 15.In war, practice
dissimulation, and you will succeed. 16.Whether to concentrate
or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
17.Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that
of the forest. 18.In raiding and plundering be like fire, is
immovability like a mountain. 19.Let your plans be dark and
impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a
thunderbolt. 20.When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil
be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,
cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
21.Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. 22.He will
conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the
art of maneuvering. 23.The Book of Army Management says: On the
field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough:
hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary
objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of
banners and flags. 24.Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are
means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on
one particular point. 25.The host thus forming a single united
body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone,
or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of
handling large masses of men. 26.In night-fighting, then, make
much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of
flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes
of your army. 27.A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a
commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
28.Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday
it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only
on returning to camp. 29.A clever general, therefore, avoids an
army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is
sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying
moods. 30.Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of
disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of
retaining self-possession. 31.To be near the goal while the
enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is
toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is
famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength. 32.To
refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect
order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and
confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.
33.It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the
enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. 34.Do not
pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers
whose temper is keen. 35.Do not swallow bait offered by the
enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
36.When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not
press a desperate foe too hard. 37.Such is the art of warfare.

VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS

1.Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands
from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his
forces 2.When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country
where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not
linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in
situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate
position, you must fight. 3.There are roads which must not be
followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must
be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of
the sovereign which must not be obeyed. 4.The general who
thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation
of tactics knows how to handle his troops. 5.The general who
does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the
configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn
his knowledge to practical account. 6.So, the student of war
who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even
though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to
make the best use of his men. 7.Hence in the wise leader's
plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be
blended together. 8.If our expectation of advantage be tempered
in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part
of our schemes. 9.If, on the other hand, in the midst of
difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may
extricate ourselves from misfortune. 10.Reduce the hostile
chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them,
and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious
allurements, and make them rush to any given point. 11.The art
of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's
not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the
chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we
have made our position unassailable. 12.There are five
dangerous faults which may affect a general:

1.Recklessness, which leads to destruction; 2.cowardice,
which leads to capture; 3.a hasty temper, which can be provoked
by insults; 4.a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
5.over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and
trouble.

13.These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous
to the conduct of war. 14.When an army is overthrown and its
leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five
dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH

1.Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping
the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over
mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. 2.Camp in
high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to
fight. So much for mountain warfare. 3.After crossing a river,
you should get far away from it. 4.When an invading force
crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it
in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across,
and then deliver your attack. 5.If you are anxious to fight,
you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has
to cross. 6.Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and
facing the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. So
much for river warfare. 7.In crossing salt-marshes, your sole
concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
8.If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and
grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. So much
for operations in salt-marches. 9.In dry, level country, take
up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your
right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in front, and
safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.
10.These are the four useful branches of military knowledge
which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several
sovereigns. 11.All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny
places to dark. 12.If you are careful of your men, and camp on
hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,
and this will spell victory. 13.When you come to a hill or a
bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear.
Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and
utilize the natural advantages of the ground. 14.When, in
consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish
to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until
it subsides. 15.Country in which there are precipitous cliffs
with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined
places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be
left with all possible speed and not approached. 16.While we
keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach
them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on
his rear. 17.If in the neighborhood of your camp there should
be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow
basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they
must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places
where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be
lurking. 18.When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet,
he is relying on the natural strength of his position. 19.When
he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for
the other side to advance. 20.If his place of encampment is
easy of access, he is tendering a bait. 21.Movement amongst the
trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. The
appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass
means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. 22.The rising
of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. Startled
beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. 23.When there
is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots
advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area,
it betokens the approach of infantry. When it branches out in
different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to
collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro
signify that the army is encamping. 24.Humble words and
increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to
advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the
attack are signs that he will retreat. 25.When the light
chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it
is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. 26.Peace
proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
27.When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into
rank, it means that the critical moment has come. 28.When some
are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. 29.When
the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from
want of food. 30.If those who are sent to draw water begin by
drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. 31.If
the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to
secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. 32.If birds gather on
any spot, it is unoccupied. Clamor by night betokens
nervousness. 33.If there is disturbance in the camp, the
general's authority is weak. If the banners and flags are
shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it
means that the men are weary. 34.When an army feeds its horses
with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the men do
not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that
they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are
determined to fight to the death. 35.The sight of men
whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones
points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. 36.Too
frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his
resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire
distress. 37.To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright
at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
38.When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is
a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. 39.If the enemy's
troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time
without either joining battle or taking themselves off again,
the situation is one that demands great vigilance and
circumspection. 40.If our troops are no more in number than the
enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct
attack can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all
our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and
obtain reinforcements. 41.He who exercises no forethought but
makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
42.If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to
you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive,
then will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have
become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will
still be unless. 43.Therefore soldiers must be treated in the
first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means
of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. 44.If in
training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army
will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
45.If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists
on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.

2.Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is
called accessible. 3.With regard to ground of this nature, be
before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and
carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you will be able to
fight with advantage. 4.Ground which can be abandoned but is
hard to re-occupy is called entangling. 5.From a position of
this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and
defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and
you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster
will ensue. 6.When the position is such that neither side will
gain by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground.
7.In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should
offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir
forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his
turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver
our attack with advantage. 8.With regard to narrow passes, if
you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and
await the advent of the enemy. 9.Should the army forestall you
in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully
garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. 10.With regard
to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your
adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and
there wait for him to come up. 11.If the enemy has occupied
them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to
entice him away. 12.If you are situated at a great distance
from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it
is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be to your
disadvantage. 13.These six are the principles connected with
Earth. The general who has attained a responsible post must be
careful to study them. 14.Now an army is exposed to six several
calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults
for which the general is responsible. These are:

15.Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled
against another ten times its size, the result will be the
flight of the former. 16.When the common soldiers are too
strong and their officers too weak, the result is
insubordination. When the officers are too strong and the
common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse. 17.When the
higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the
enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of
resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or
no he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin. 18.When
the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are
not clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned
to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly
haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization. 19.When
a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an
inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak
detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked
soldiers in the front rank, the result must be rout. 20.These
are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted
by the general who has attained a responsible post. 21.The
natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally;
but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the
forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties,
dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.
22.He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his
knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows
them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. 23.If
fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight,
even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in
victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.
24.The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats
without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his
country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of
the kingdom. 25.Regard your soldiers as your children, and they
will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as
your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto
death. 26.If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make
your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your
commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then
your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are
useless for any practical purpose. 27.If we know that our own
men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the
enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards
victory. 28.If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but
are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack,
we have gone only halfway towards victory. 29.If we know that
the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in
a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the
ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only
halfway towards victory. 30.Hence the experienced soldier, once
in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is
never at a loss. 31.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you
know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.

2.When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is
dispersive ground. 3.When he has penetrated into hostile
territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.
4.Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to
either side, is contentious ground. 5.Ground on which each side
has liberty of movement is open ground. 6.Ground which forms
the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it
first has most of the Empire at his command, is a ground of
intersecting highways. 7.When an army has penetrated into the
heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified
cities in its rear, it is serious ground. 8.Mountain forests,
rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is hard to
traverse: this is difficult ground. 9.Ground which is reached
through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by
tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would
suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in
ground. 10.Ground on which we can only be saved from
destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.
11.On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile
ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not. 12.On open
ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. On the ground of
intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. 13.On
serious ground, gather in plunder. In difficult ground, keep
steadily on the march. 14.On hemmed-in ground, resort to
stratagem. On desperate ground, fight. 15.Those who were called
skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the
enemy's front and rear; to prevent co-operation between his
large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from
rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. 16.When
the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep them in
disorder. 17.When it was to their advantage, they made a
forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still. 18.If asked
how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and
on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by
seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will
be amenable to your will." 19.Rapidity is the essence of war:
take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by
unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. 20.The following
are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The
further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the
solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not
prevail against you. 21.Make forays in fertile country in order
to supply your army with food. 22.Carefully study the
well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate
your energy and hoard your strength. Keep your army continually
on the move, and devise unfathomable plans. 23.Throw your
soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they
will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is
nothing they may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put
forth their uttermost strength. 24.Soldiers when in desperate
straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge,
they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will
show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will
fight hard. 25.Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the
soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to
be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, they
will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted.
26.Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious
doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be
feared. 27.If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it
is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives
are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to
longevity. 28.On the day they are ordered out to battle, your
soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing their garments,
and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the
courage of a Chu or a Kuei. 29.The skillful tactician may be
likened to the shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is
found in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you will
be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be
attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be
attacked by head and tail both. 30.Asked if an army can be made
to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer, Yes. For the men of
Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a
river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will
come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the
right. 31.Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the
tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the
ground 32.The principle on which to manage an army is to set up
one standard of courage which all must reach. 33.How to make
the best of both strong and weak--that is a question involving
the proper use of ground. 34.Thus the skillful general conducts
his army just as though he were leading a single man,
willy-nilly, by the hand. 35.It is the business of a general to
be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus
maintain order. 36.He must be able to mystify his officers and
men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in
total ignorance. 37.By altering his arrangements and changing
his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. By
shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the
enemy from anticipating his purpose. 38.At the critical moment,
the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height
and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men
deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. 39.He
burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd
driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that,
and nothing knows whither he is going. 40.To muster his host
and bring it into danger:--this may be termed the business of
the general. 41.The different measures suited to the nine
varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or defensive
tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are
things that must most certainly be studied. 42.When invading
hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating
deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means
dispersion. 43.When you leave your own country behind, and take
your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on
critical ground. When there are means of communication on all
four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. 44.When
you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When
you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. 45.When
you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and narrow
passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place
of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. 46.Therefore, on
dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of
purpose. On facile ground, I would see that there is close
connection between all parts of my army. 47.On contentious
ground, I would hurry up my rear. 48.On open ground, I would
keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground of intersecting
highways, I would consolidate my alliances. 49.On serious
ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies.
On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.
50.On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. On
desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the
hopelessness of saving their lives. 51.For it is the soldier's
disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded,
to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly
when he has fallen into danger. 52.We cannot enter into
alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with
their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march
unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes
and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to
account unless we make use of local guides. 53.To be ignored of
any one of the following four or five principles does not befit
a warlike prince. 54.When a warlike prince attacks a powerful
state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the
concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents,
and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
55.Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and
sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He
carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in
awe. Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow
their kingdoms. 56.Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue
orders without regard to previous arrangements; and you will be
able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a
single man. 57.Confront your soldiers with the deed itself;
never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright,
bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the
situation is gloomy. 58.Place your army in deadly peril, and it
will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will
come off in safety. 59.For it is precisely when a force has
fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for
victory. 60.Success in warfare is gained by carefully
accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose. 61.By
persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall succeed in
the long run in killing the commander-in-chief. 62.This is
called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. 63.On
the day that you take up your command, block the frontier
passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of
all emissaries. 64.Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you
may control the situation. 65.If the enemy leaves a door open,
you must rush in. 66.Forestall your opponent by seizing what he
holds dear, and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the
ground. 67.Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate
yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
68.At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the
enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of
a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose
you.

XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE

1.Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with
fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second
is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage trains; the
fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl
dropping fire amongst the enemy. 2.In order to carry out an
attack, we must have means available. The material for raising
fire should always be kept in readiness. 3.There is a proper
season for making attacks with fire, and special days for
starting a conflagration. 4.The proper season is when the
weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon
is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or
the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind. 5.In
attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five
possible developments: 6.(1) When fire breaks out inside to
enemy's camp, respond at once with an attack from without.
7.(2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's soldiers
remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack. 8.(3) When the
force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with
an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.
9.(4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from
without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver
your attack at a favorable moment. 10.(5) When you start a
fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.
11.A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night
breeze soon falls. 12.In every army, the five developments
connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars
calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. 13.Hence
those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;
those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession
of strength. 14.By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted,
but not robbed of all his belongings. 15.Unhappy is the fate of
one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks
without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is
waste of time and general stagnation. 16.Hence the saying: The
enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general
cultivates his resources. 17.Move not unless you see an
advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be
gained; fight not unless the position is critical. 18.No ruler
should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own
spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.
19.If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not,
stay where you are. 20.Anger may in time change to gladness;
vexation may be succeeded by content. 21.But a kingdom that has
once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can
the dead ever be brought back to life. 22.Hence the enlightened
ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is
the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.

XIII. THE USE OF SPIES

1.Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men
and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the
people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily
expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There
will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down
exhausted on the highways. As many as seven hundred thousand
families will be impeded in their labor. 2.Hostile armies may
face each other for years, striving for the victory which is
decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance
of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay
of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the
height of inhumanity. 3.One who acts thus is no leader of men,
no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. 4.Thus,
what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike
and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary
men, is foreknowledge. 5.Now this foreknowledge cannot be
elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from
experience, nor by any deductive calculation. 6.Knowledge of
the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.
7.Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes:

8.When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can
discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation
of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.
9.Having local spies means employing the services of the
inhabitants of a district. 10.Having inward spies, making use
of officials of the enemy. 11.Having converted spies, getting
hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.
12.Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for
purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them
and report them to the enemy. 13.Surviving spies, finally, are
those who bring back news from the enemy's camp. 14.Hence it is
that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations
to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally
rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be
preserved. 15.Spies cannot be usefully employed without a
certain intuitive sagacity. 16.They cannot be properly managed
without benevolence and straightforwardness. 17.Without subtle
ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of
their reports. 18.Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for
every kind of business. 19.If a secret piece of news is
divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to
death together with the man to whom the secret was told.
20.Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or
to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin
by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp,
and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our
spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. 21.The enemy's
spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted
with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will
become converted spies and available for our service. 22.It is
through the information brought by the converted spy that we
are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. 23.It is
owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed
spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. 24.Lastly, it is by
his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed
occasions. 25.The end and aim of spying in all its five
varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can
only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.
Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with
the utmost liberality. 26.Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty
was due to I Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the
rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served under
the Yin. 27.Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise
general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for
purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.
Spies are a most important element in water, because on them
depends an army's ability to move.