Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, ...
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Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. This book aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what the book calls the HOT-brain thesis. It defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. The book proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that the text calls the “wide intrinsicality view” and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. Thus it argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. The book’s integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make its argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers.Less

Rocco J. Gennaro

Published in print: 2011-11-18

Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. This book aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what the book calls the HOT-brain thesis. It defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. The book proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that the text calls the “wide intrinsicality view” and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. Thus it argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. The book’s integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make its argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers.

This chapter defends a modified version of the HOT theory referred to here as the wide intrinsicality view (WIV). In contrast to the HOT theory, The WIV states that although what makes mental states ...
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This chapter defends a modified version of the HOT theory referred to here as the wide intrinsicality view (WIV). In contrast to the HOT theory, The WIV states that although what makes mental states conscious is intrinsic to conscious states, an inner relational element is also present within the structure of such states. The chapter starts with an introduction to a seemingly false dilemma invoked by Rosenthal, followed by some initial rationale for favoring the WIV over his version of HOT theory. The three most serious objections to the standard HOT theory are addressed here, namely, the problem of misrepresentation, the problem of the rock, and the hard problem of consciousness. This chapter shows how the WIV can address these problems, specifically the problems of misrepresentation and of the rock. For the final problem, it is shown that either version of the HOT theory is a better solution.Less

From HOT Theory to the Wide Intrinsicality View

Rocco J. Gennaro

Published in print: 2011-11-18

This chapter defends a modified version of the HOT theory referred to here as the wide intrinsicality view (WIV). In contrast to the HOT theory, The WIV states that although what makes mental states conscious is intrinsic to conscious states, an inner relational element is also present within the structure of such states. The chapter starts with an introduction to a seemingly false dilemma invoked by Rosenthal, followed by some initial rationale for favoring the WIV over his version of HOT theory. The three most serious objections to the standard HOT theory are addressed here, namely, the problem of misrepresentation, the problem of the rock, and the hard problem of consciousness. This chapter shows how the WIV can address these problems, specifically the problems of misrepresentation and of the rock. For the final problem, it is shown that either version of the HOT theory is a better solution.