On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state public defender of Madison.

Respondent

ATTORNEYS:

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Maura FJ Whelan, assistant attorney general, and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney
general.

2012 WI App 15

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

January 4, 2012

A. John Voelker

Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to
further editing.If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.

A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals.SeeWis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.

Appeal No.

2010AP2808-CR

Cir. Ct. No.2008CF562

STATE OF WISCONSIN

IN COURT OF
APPEALS

State of Wisconsin,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Anrietta M. Geske,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Brown County:SUE E.
BISCHEL, Judge.Affirmed.

Before
Hoover, P.J., Peterson, J., and Thomas Cane, Reserve Judge.

¶1HOOVER, P.J. Anrietta Geske appeals a
judgment of conviction for recklessly endangering safety and two counts of
first-degree reckless homicide, and an order denying her motion for
postconviction relief.Geske argues
there was insufficient evidence supporting the utter disregard for human life
element of the homicide charges.She
further argues that computer simulated accident reconstruction evidence was
erroneously admitted for multiple reasons, and that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its sentencing discretion.We
reject Geske’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2Geske consumed prescription medication, had drinks at a bar,
and then drove her Porsche into the side of a rusty Buick at a high speed,
killing the Buick’s two occupants.Moments earlier, sixteen-year-old Tyler Hampton was operating his vehicle
on South Oneida Street in Green Bay, a well-traveled commercial strip. Hampton was in the left lane, stopped at a red
light at Cormier Road. He noticed a
Porsche convertible in the right lane. When
the light turned green, Hampton “[took] off … kind of fast,” leaving the
Porsche behind.

¶3The speed limit was thirty miles per hour.Hampton was driving between forty and
forty-five miles per hour when, in the middle of the next block, he started to slow
down for a red light at Willard Drive.Then,
he “heard the Porsche’s engine get really loud. So I had figured she downshifted, and I saw
her basically just zoom past me.”Hampton
estimated the Porsche was going “[a]round 80, 85 miles an hour.” It went through the red light at Willard, and Hampton
“didn’t see any brake lights go on.” Hampton
saw a dark-colored sedan drive from Willard onto Oneida.The Porsche swerved left, but struck the
sedan.

¶4Fifteen-year-old Elizabeth Sadowsky was a passenger in
Hampton’s car. She also recalled encountering
the Porsche at the Cormier Road intersection. In the middle of the next block, Sadowsky saw

her coming out of the corner of my eye and just like flying
past us really fast like I have never really seen a car go that fast on that
road or any road in general past me, and … I was like holy cow, and then Tyler noticed
that the light in front of us was red, and he was like, “Liz, that’s a red
light,” and I was like she’s not stopping at all ….

Sadowsky could see the driver
as the Porsche passed by. “[S]he was
very like set back in her car, and her hair was just like flying all over
because … the top was down ....”Sadowsky
thought the Porsche was going at least eighty miles per hour. She could not remember whether the driver braked,
but she did see the swerve.

¶5Geske’s blood alcohol content was .072
about two hours after the crash. Additionally, she had consumed prescription
medication carrying recommendations against also consuming alcohol.Geske testified that as she reached for her
small dog, which had become loose in the vehicle, she took her attention from
the road and inadvertently accelerated and ran the red light.

¶6Police officer Thomas Kraus explained that the Porsche “was
protruded so far into [the Buick], that it caused the back tires to come up …. It was—in my 20 years’ experience … the most
damage done to a vehicle that I’ve ever seen.”Lieutenant Scott Schermitzler testified, “The wreckage … was devastating”
and “significantly more severe than normal.”Other public safety professionals similarly testified that the wreckage
was the worst they had seen in their decades of experience.

¶7The State presented two experts who analyzed the crash scene
and reconstructed the crash.Deputy
Kevin Pawlak explained that after colliding, the joined cars traveled 127 feet.He opined that distance was inconsistent with
a fifty or sixty mile per hour crash.Rather, he concluded the Porsche was traveling between seventy-nine and
ninety-six miles per hour at the time of impact, with the most probable speed
being around eighty-seven miles per hour.State patrol sergeant Duane Meyers estimated
that Geske was traveling eighty to eighty-six miles per hour at the time of impact.He believed the “extensive damage” was
inconsistent with the Porsche traveling at fifty or sixty miles per hour.

¶8Geske presented one expert, engineer John DeRosia.DeRosia prepared an accident reconstruction and
concluded Geske was going between fifty-two and fifty-seven miles per hour.DeRosia also explained why he felt the State’s
experts were mistaken.He stressed
that the rusty condition of the Buick significantly compromised its structural
integrity and that the extensive damage was therefore consistent with a lower
speed crash.He also disagreed with
Pawlak’s drag factor or “friction rates” for the vehicles as they moved after
the collision.

¶9The jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of
second-degree reckless homicide and negligent homicide. It found Geske guilty of two counts of
first-degree reckless homicide and of recklessly endangering safety.[1]Following the denial of her postconviction motion,
Geske appeals.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency
of the evidence

¶10Geske argues the State failed to prove the first-degree
reckless homicide element that she acted with utter disregard for human
life.When reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless
the evidence, viewed most favorably to the conviction, is so lacking in
probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).However, the determination of whether the evidence
satisfies the legal elements of the charge constitutes a question of law that we
review independently.State v.
Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 151-54, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997).

Utter disregard requires more than a high degree of
negligence or recklessness. To evince
utter disregard, the mind must not only disregard the safety of another but be
devoid of regard for the life of another. A depraved mind lacks a moral sense, an
appreciation of life, is unreasonable and lacks judgment.A person acting with utter disregard must
possess a state of mind which has no regard for the moral or social duties of a
human being.

¶12Geske argues that because she swerved to avoid the collision,
the State could not prove utter disregard for human life.She relies on two prior cases where our
supreme court held that swerving one’s vehicle to avoid a collision precluded a
finding of utter disregard.SeeBalistreri v. State,
83 Wis. 2d 440, 458, 265 N.W.2d 290 (1978); Wagner, 76 Wis. 2d at
47.

¶13In Wagner, the defendant was taking pain and
sleeping pills following a surgery.Wagner,
76 Wis. 2d at 31.Wagner went out
drinking at several bars in Marshfield, leaving around 11:00 p.m.Id. at 32.However, he blacked out and did not recall
anything after the first bar.Id.Wagner’s car was stopped in the right lane at
a traffic light when another vehicle stopped in the left lane.Id. at 32-33.Wagner then engaged in a “drag race” with the
other car on the main city street. Id.
at 31, 33.He struck and killed a
pedestrian who had exited a bar and was crossing the street to his parked car. Id. at 31-32, 35.

¶14The two eyewitnesses to the incident testified they saw the
racing cars “suddenly swerve to the left approximately one-half of a traffic
lane” immediately before striking the victim. Id. at 33.Wagner continued driving, even though his
windshield had shattered.Id.
at 33, 35.Wagner was later found at a
home unconscious; his blood alcohol content was .178 about two hours after the
incident.Id. at 35.The front right portion of his car was
extensively damaged.Id.
Wagner’s speed was never established; however, a witness estimated the vehicle
was traveling about fifty miles per hour as it passed by him a few blocks away
from the incident on another street.Id.
at 34, 39-40.The supreme court vacated
Wagner’s conviction because “his attempt to avoid striking the victim by
swerving to the left indicates some regard for the life of the victim.” Id. at 47.

¶15Balistreri involved a police chase through
downtown Milwaukee during rush hour, weekday traffic. Balistreri, 83 Wis. 2d at 444-45.
Balistreri, who was being pursued by a
police car, drove the wrong way down at least two one-way streets. Id. at 452. He swerved to avoid an oncoming police vehicle,
thereby forcing three pedestrians in a crosswalk to jump to the curb for
safety. Id. During the course of the chase, Balistreri
was sometimes going over fifty miles per hour, at one point even exceeding sixty
miles per hour. Id.He also proceeded through at least five
red lights. Id. at 453. Although traffic was at times intense, during
the last stretch of the chase, it was fair to light.Id. at 452-53.The chase ended when Balistreri struck an automobile
at an intersection.Id. at
444, 453.

¶16The supreme court reversed Balistreri’s conviction. The court noted the undisputed evidence that
the defendant turned on his car’s headlights, swerved to avoid the squad car on
one of the one-way streets, and sounded his horn and braked in an attempt to
avoid the collision with the other vehicle. Id. at 457. The court concluded the evidence was
insufficient because “[t]hese actions show some regard for the life of others.”
Id. Following Wagner, the
court held that “[t]he uncontroverted evidence that the defendant attempted to avoid
a collision precludes a finding that his conduct was devoid of concern for
others or indifferent to the life of others.” Id. at 458.

¶17While swerving was held to show regard for life in prior cases,
we must consider the defendant’s conduct in context, that is, in light of the
totality of the circumstances.Our
supreme court recently reiterated this principle in Burris:“[W]e have ‘carefully avoided per se
rules in this area and instead [have] consistently applied a totality of the
circumstances approach to the cases.’ We continue along that path today.”Burris, 333 Wis. 2d 87,¶38 n.9 (quoting Miller, 320 Wis. 2d 724, ¶37).

¶18We agree with Geske that her case is similar in many respects
to Wagner,
in particular, as well as Balistreri.It is not, however, the same.Geske was driving over eighty miles per hour
on a major, well-traveled city street after consuming alcohol and prescription
pills.She never braked or slowed down
before running the red light, even though her view to the right—where the
victims’ car came from—was obscured by a large sign.These factors demonstrate an utter disregard
for human life, regardless of whether Geske attempted a last-moment swerve.[2]A legally intoxicated person[3]
driving over eighty miles per hour through the city could not reasonably expect
to avoid any collision by swerving at the last moment.[4]Given the totality of the situation here,
Geske’s ineffectual swerve failed to demonstrate a regard for human life.

¶19This case is distinguishable from Wagner because Geske had
ample notice that her victims might cross her path:a red light at an intersection.In Wagner, the victim had unexpectedly
appeared in Wagner’s path.Wagner,
76 Wis. 2d at 43.The court
distinguished that circumstance from a prior case where a driver “knew or
should have known of [the victims’] presence.”Id. (citingMontgomery v. State, 178 Wis. 461,
190 N.W. 105 (1922)).The court
explained:

In the instant case, neither the defendant, nor the
occupants of his vehicle, saw the victim in the road prior to striking him. In fact, the evidence is unclear as to whether
the victim was standing in the road while the vehicle bore down on him, or
whether the victim suddenly stepped in front of the vehicle. In any event, there was no testimony that the
defendant was forewarned of the victim’s presence in the street.

Id. at 43-44.Additionally, the witness who was blocks away
from the drag race testified he “heard the squealing of tires and loud roar of
mufflers on” the street where the drag race occurred.Id. at 33-34. Thus, Wagner could have reasonably expected
that others would be aware of the drag-racing cars’ approach that July night,
thereby reducing the potential that somebody would enter the racing vehicles’
path.Geske, on the other hand, should
have reasonably expected her victims to cross her path—they had a green light
and their view in Geske’s direction was obscured.[5]

¶20Wagner is further distinguishable because of the extreme speed
involved in this case.There was no
evidence in Wagner that the defendant was driving nearly as fast as Geske
was.As speeds increase, the probability
of avoiding a collision by swerving, of course, decreases.

¶21Balistreri, which is less similar factually to the present
case, is also distinguishable.There,
Balistreri’s reckless driving was more extensive in time and distance.Thus, during the course of his conduct, he
took numerous actions to avoid collisions.Significantly, according to the pursuing officer, Balistreri’s “brake
lights went on and off ‘all through the chase.’”Balistreri, 83 Wis. 2d at
453.Additionally, while Balistreri did
reach excessive speeds, he never drove as fast as Geske did here.Nor was Balistreri intoxicated.In fact, Balistreri’s lower speeds, sobriety,
and evasive maneuvers combined to avoid the catastrophic type of collision that
occurred here.Balistreri honked and
braked before his collision, resulting in a five to ten mile-per-hour
collision.Id.The victim “scratched his finger slightly and
bumped his head, but sustained no other personal injuries.”Id.

Accident
reconstruction computer simulation

¶22Geske next argues the circuit court erroneously allowed the
State to introduce an “EDSMAC” computer simulation because (1) it was not
disclosed as required by Wis. Stat. § 971.23,
and (2) it lacked foundation and probative value.The simulation at issue was prepared during
the course of trial by Meyers, the State’s expert, utilizing data from the
expected testimony of DeRosia, Geske’s expert.The State introduced the simulation in
rebuttal, after DeRosia testified that a computer simulation should have been
run, and that he probably would have used the EDSMAC program.If accepted by the jury, the EDSMAC
simulation undermined DeRosia’s speed estimate.

¶23A district attorney is required to disclose and make available
for inspection:

(d) A list of all witnesses and their
addresses whom the district attorney intends to call at the trial. This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal
witnesses or those called for impeachment only.

(e) Any relevant written or recorded
statements of a witness named on a list under par. (d), including any
audiovisual recording of an oral statement of a child ..., any reports or
statements of experts made in connection with the case or, if an expert does
not prepare a report or statement, a written summary of the expert’s findings
or the subject matter of his or her testimony, and the results of any physical
or mental examination, scientific test, experiment or comparison that the
district attorney intends to offer in evidence at trial.

Wisconsin
Stat. § 971.23(1)(d), (1)(e).Geske argues that because Meyers was listed as a witness under para.
(1)(d), the State was obligated under para. (1)(e) to disclose the results of
the computer simulation without exception.

¶24We disagree.Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(e) is
comprised of two distinct components.While para. (1)(e) requires disclosure of all “relevant” statements of a
named witness, including summaries of expert testimony, it only requires the
disclosure of medical examinations, scientific tests, or experiments if the
State “intends to offer” that evidence.In other words, even if otherwise “relevant,” the district attorney need
not disclose scientific test or experiment results if he or she does not intend
to use them.Interpreting the statute as
Geske suggests would render surplusage the language “that the district attorney
intends to offer in evidence at trial.”Thus, it is irrelevant whether the person who conducted the experiment
is named as a witness.The case that
Geske relies on did not involve evidence subject to para. (1)(e)’s
intent-to-offer provision. See State
v. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, 248 Wis. 2d 409, 636 N.W.2d 488.

¶26Moriarty dealt with a provision of a prior version of the
discovery statute that is substantially equivalent to the one at issue
here.There, the statute provided for
disclosure of “reports or results of any scientific tests or experiments made
by any party relating to evidence intended to be introduced at the trial.”Wis.
Stat. § 971.23(5) (1981-82); Moriarty, 107 Wis. 2d at
626-27.The facts in Moriarty
were as follows:

The district attorney ... stated that he did not intend
to use the medical records in the presentation of his case-in-chief. The transcript shows that [the victim’s]
injuries were not at issue during the prosecution’s presentation of its case or
during cross-examination of [the victim] by the defense. The injuries only became an issue during the
defense portion of the trial, when [the] defendant ... testified and implied
that [the] injuries were caused by a sudden stop of the vehicle. The trial court found that the evidence was
being offered to rebut [that] testimony about the cause of [the victim’s]
injuries.

Moriarty, 107
Wis. 2d at 627.We held that the
evidence was not subject to the statute’s disclosure requirement because:

First of all, the prosecution did not intend to use
medical evidence of [the victim’s] injuries at trial. As the trial court found, the question of the
source of [the] injuries was raised for the first time by the defense, and the
records were offered only to impeach [the defendant’s] testimony in that
regard.

Id. at 627-28.

¶27Here, the prosecutor represented during trial and
postconviction proceedings that the State did not intend to offer the
simulation in evidence at trial until DeRosia referred to EDSMAC during
cross-examination.The circuit court
apparently accepted the State’s representation.Therefore, in accordance with Moriarty, the State was not required
to disclose the EDSMAC simulation prior to DeRosia’s testimony.

¶28Moreover, even if we were to apply an objective standard, that
is, whether a reasonable prosecutor would have intended to use the simulation
at trial, Geske’s argument still fails.The simulation could not be used to confirm the State’s experts’
testimony, because their conclusions required numerical inputs that the
simulation program could not accept.Thus, the EDSMAC program was irrelevant to the State’s case.It only became relevant when DeRosia
testified that an EDSMAC simulation should have been run, and testified
regarding what data inputs should have been used.The State then rebutted DeRosia’s testimony
by introducing such a simulation.That
simulation, however, could not validate the State’s experts’ conclusions.No reasonable prosecutor would have intended
to offer irrelevant evidence.

¶29Geske next argues that, nonetheless, the State violated the Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7) continuing
duty to disclose, because the State did not immediately disclose its EDSMAC
simulation at the time DeRosia testified about the subject, or at least when
cross-examination was finished.Subsection 971.23(7) provides that if a party “discovers additional
material ... subject to discovery, ... the party shall promptly notify the
other party of the existence of the additional material[.]”

¶30Geske stresses that the State waited approximately four hours
after DeRosia referred to EDSMAC, including lunch and other breaks.We disagree that four hours is an
unreasonable delay in disclosure by the State after learning that it might wish
to introduce its EDSMAC simulation.This
is especially true given that the disclosure was made only two and one-half
hours after the State completed its cross-examination of DeRosia.

¶31Geske next argues the
EDSMAC simulation was erroneously introduced because it lacked a foundation and
probative value.Specifically, Geske
takes issue with the stiffness factor Meyers entered into the program.Meyers inputted forty-five pounds per square
inch for the Buick, whereas a new Buick would have a factor of about
ninety-five.Meyers acknowledged the
stiffness factor was an estimate, and that the true number could not be
determined.However, he opined that it
would be “unreasonable” to use an even lower number.Additionally, his number was consistent with
DeRosia’s testimony that “much less rusty vehicles” are “half as stiff or less
than comparable new vehicles.”

¶32We reject Geske’s argument that the EDSMAC simulation lacked
foundation and probative value.The
simulation did not need to precisely reflect all the conditions of the crash to
be admissible.Rather, Meyers only
needed to enter data that was “sufficiently similar to [the actual conditions]
to give the jury a view of what occur[red].”See Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 125 Wis. 2d 145,
166, 370 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985).Any
faults in the variables entered into Meyers’ simulation were adequately
presented to the jury on cross-examination.See id. at 165.Further, the
simulation was not introduced to precisely re-create the accident.Rather, it was introduced to demonstrate that
DeRosia’s recommended validation tool failed to validate his conclusions.The fact that the simulation could not demonstrate
whether the Porsche was going eighty-five miles per hour has no bearing on its
ability to demonstrate that the Porsche was not going fifty-five miles per
hour.

¶33Finally, we conclude that even if the court erred by allowing
the EDSMAC simulation, it was harmless error.As to delay in disclosing the simulation, Geske thoroughly pursued her
current criticisms of the simulation during cross-examination.Also, a postconviction letter from DeRosia
indicating that EDSMAC was not useful in this case merely confirms Meyers’
opinion that DeRosia’s own recommended validation tool was inapplicable because
the crash was too severe.[7]Regardless, as set forth in the State’s brief
and the circuit court’s analysis, the evidence supporting the verdicts against
Geske was so strong that there is no reasonable doubt that the verdicts would
have been the same with or without the rebuttal evidence.

Exercise of sentencing
discretion

¶34Lastly, Geske argues the circuit court erroneously exercised
its sentencing discretion by placing excessive weight on her demeanor and
candor at trial, as compared to her otherwise clean criminal record over
forty-six years.The court sentenced
Geske to the maximum on the two homicide charges, totaling eighty years’
confinement and forty years’ extended supervision.[8]

¶35The primary factors to be considered at sentencing are the
gravity of the offense, the character of the offender, and the need to protect
the public. State v. Santana, 220 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 584 N.W.2d 151 (Ct.
App. 1998). The weight given to each
factor is a matter of trial court discretion. Id.The
court may consider the defendant’s lack of remorse. SeeState v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 441, 456-59, 304 N.W.2d 742
(1981).“[I]t is impermissible for a
trial judge to add to a convicted defendant’s sentence an additional term for
the crime of perjury. If perjury has occurred, it should be the subject of a
separate charge and conviction.” Lange
v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 569, 575, 196 N.W.2d 680 (1972). “We have, however, frequently pointed out that
the trial judge’s appraisal of a defendant’s attitude, including the evidence of
his [or her] veracity at trial is highly relevant to the exercise of sentencing
discretion.” Id.We give
deference to the sentencing court because it is in a “superior position to
observe the demeanor of the defendant, weigh the evidence available and
consider the relevant factors.”State v. Bizzle, 222 Wis. 2d
100, 105, 107, 585 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1998).

¶36The court here properly considered the three primary sentencing
factors.We have reviewed the court’s
sentencing comments and observe no error in discretion.The court acknowledged it was aware of
Geske’s bipolar disorder and that it may have had an effect on the court’s
perception of Geske’s demeanor.The
court was therefore entitled to place the weight on Geske’s demeanor it saw
fit.As to Geske’s truthfulness, the
court could properly consider that factor as it related to Geske’s
remorse.The court considered Geske’s “perjured,”
“ridiculous,” “selfish,” “laughable,” not “remotely believable,”
“manufacture[d]” testimony to be “direct proof of lack of remorse and
repentance.”It was not unreasonable to
conclude Geske falsely testified that she inadvertently accelerated through the
red light because she was reaching for her little dog.

By the Court.—Judgment and order
affirmed.

[1] The
jury also found Geske guilty of two counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a
vehicle, and not guilty of homicide by operation of a vehicle with a prohibited
blood alcohol content.At sentencing,
the court dismissed the two additional homicide counts as multiplicitous under Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the
2009-10 version unless otherwise noted.

[3] As
noted previously, the jury found Geske guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of
a vehicle.

[4] Indeed,
it appears possible that the swerve here could have increased the harm.Geske was traveling in the right lane of the
road before she swerved.Yet, the
collision occurred in the left lane.Geske “impaled” the center of the victims’ car, which had been moving to
Geske’s left.Had she instead stayed in
her lane or swerved slightly to the right, perhaps the collision would have
been less severe or even avoided.

[5] The
State argues Wagner should be distinguished because swerving to avoid a
pedestrian shows regard for others, while swerving to avoid another vehicle is
merely a selfish act to protect oneself.SeeWagner v. State,
76 Wis. 2d 30, 250 N.W.2d 331 (1977).This notion, however, is inconsistent with Balistreri, where the
avoidance maneuvers were all taken relative to other vehicles.SeeBalistreri v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 440, 458, 265 N.W.2d 290 (1978).Additionally, as evidenced by the substantial
damage to Wagner’s vehicle, a collision with a pedestrian at high speed also
poses a significant potential of injury to the driver.See Wagner, 76 Wis. 2d at 33, 35.

[6] In
Moriarty,
we held that medical records were not subject to mandatory disclosure because
they “were not ‘reports or results of any scientific tests or experiments made
by any party relating to evidence intended to be introduced at the trial.’” State
v. Moriarty, 107 Wis. 2d 622, 627, 321 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1982)
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 971.23(5)
(1981-82)).This conclusion was based in
part on the lack of any scientific tests or experiments within the medical
records.Id. at 628.The current discovery statute, however, now
requires disclosure of “the results of any physical or mental examination,” in
addition to scientific tests or experiments.SeeWis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(e).

[7] Specifically,
the program could not reconstruct the actual crash because the Porsche impaled
the Buick with sufficient force to intrude beyond the Buick’s center of
gravity.

[8] On
the reckless endangerment count, the court sentenced Geske to a total of twelve
and one-half years, to be served concurrently with the homicide sentences.