The Tao of Anarchy: There is no God. There is no State. They are all superstitions that are established by the power-hunger psychopaths to divide, rule, and enslave us. It's only you and me, we are all true and real existence though in one short life. That is, We all are capable to freely interact with one another without coercion from anyone. We all are capable to take self-responsibility to find ways to live with one another in liberty, equality, harmony, and happiness before leaving this world forever. We all were born free and equal among all beings on this planet. We are not imprisoned in and by a place with a political name just because we were born there by chance. We are not chained to a set of indoctrinated beliefs that have been imposed upon us by so-called traditions. This Planet is home to all of us. No one owns it. We share the benefits from and responsibility to this Earth. We pledge no oath, no allegiance to no one; submit to no authority. We are all free and equal. The only obligation we all must undertake constantly with consistency is to respect the same freedoms and rights of others.

E. Michael Jones and yours truly at the 2013 Hollywoodism conference in Tehran, “the capital of the free world.”

The Justice (sic) Department just charged US military whistleblower Monica Witt with spying for Iran—and sanctioned the Iranian NGO New Horizons. The charges against Witt allege that Press TV news anchor Marzieh Hashemi
is in the business of recruiting spies, and was somehow responsible for
Monica Witt’s decision to move to Iran. Yet not a single shred of
evidence supporting these allegations has been made public. And Marzieh Hashemi
has not been charged with any crime—even though the FBI kidnapped her
and held her for ten days as a “material witness” in the Witt case. It
looks like Ms. Hashemi has a slam-dunk libel case against whoever wrote
up the charges against Witt. (Oh, I forgot—the government can commit
libel with impunity.)

First hour: US military whistleblower Scott Bennett,
like Monica Witt, witnessed horrific crimes committed by the US
government—and its ultra-corrupt contractor Booz Allen. And Scott
Bennett, like Monica Witt, first visited Iran to participate in a
conference sponsored by the New Horizons NGO. (Witt attended the Feb.
2013 Hollywoodism Conference, where I met her, while Bennett attended
last May’s Palestine conference in Mashhad.) So let’s ask Scott Bennett
what he thinks about the Witt case, New Horizons, and Iran. (Obviously
if New Horizons were really a front for recruiting spies, they would
have tried to “turn” Scott, who was in the thick of US military
antiterrorism efforts before he blew the whistle on his Booz Allen boss
Dov Zakheim’s financing of ISIS and al Qaeda.) We’ll also discuss the
likely real reason for the whole Witt/New Horizons witch hunt: the
initiative launched at the Mashhad conference by Scott and
ex-US-military-intel folks to convince Iran to take the fight for 9/11 truth into an American federal courtroom.

Second hour: E. Michael Jones, editor of Culture Wars,
participated in the 2013 New Horizons sponsored Hollywoodism Conference
in Tehran where I met Monica Witt. Did he meet her too? What does he
think of the US government’s claim that New Horizons is a front for
recruiting spies? And how about its evidence-free calumnies directed at
Marzieh Hashemi?

Spoiler: E. Michael Jones was so impressed by the New Horizons Hollywoodism conference that he started calling Tehran “the capital of the free world.” Why would a leading conservative Catholic intellectual be so impressed by Iran’s atmosphere of intellectual freedom in general, and the New Horizons NGO in particular? Could it be that the people leading the witch-hunt against New Horizons are terrified that Americans like E. Michael Jones will change their views of Iran after interacting with the Iranian NGO? Is the intellectual freedom available in Tehran a threat to the censorship-ridden American police state?

U.S. Air Force Intel Vet Monica Witt Is Accused of Being Iran’s Dumbest Spy

Monica Witt allegedly helped Iranian hackers set up honeypots. But she left a lot of breadcrumbs.

Spencer Ackerman,

Kevin Poulsen

02.13.19 1:41 PM ET

If
there’s a silver lining to be found in Wednesday’s blockbuster
indictment of a former U.S. Air Force intelligence officer who allegedly
spied for Iran, it’s that the court papers detail how astonishingly bad
Monica Witt was at espionage.

Witt allegedly visited Tehran in 2012 and 2013 for a conference sufficiently high-profile for the Anti-Defamation League to take note of its anti-semitism.
She permitted herself to be broadcast on Iran’s propagandistic Press TV
network and identified herself as a U.S. military veteran. She
allegedly communicated with an Iranian who exhibited behavior the
indictment calls “consistent with serving as a spotter and assessor on
behalf of the Iranian intelligence services” over interceptable means
like emails and texts. She was even warned by an FBI agent before her
alleged 2013 defection that she was a “target for recruitment” by Iran.

For
a trained counterintelligence specialist with the Air Force’s Office of
Special Investigation, it’s notably sloppy work. And it had
consequences. The indictment indicates that Witt’s digital fingerprints
led to the exposure of a broader spy network “which operated in many
ways like a typical business or organization” on behalf of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The spying effort is something the
U.S. government has clearly monitored for some time. The Iranian spying
outreach occurred in the first half of 2015. A grand jury has been
empaneled on this case since July and the FBI put out a wanted poster
for her on Wednesday.

The
case borders on the bizarre, featuring honeypot enticements to U.S.
government agents and references to Russia, Edward Snowden, and
WikiLeaks.

But however poor or inexplicable Witt’s tradecraft may
have been, the charges she faces are highly serious. Federal prosecutors
in Washington, D.C., allege that Witt disclosed a code-named
intelligence program to Iranian government officials, one that contained
“details of ongoing counterintelligence operations, true names of
sources, and the identities of U.S. agents involved in the recruitment
of those sources.”

In one case, the indictment charges Witt with
providing Iran with the “true name” of someone working on that
code-named intelligence program. This colleague conducted
“counterintelligence activities against a specific target,” the
indictment alleges, likely something of interest to Iran. Several more
of these sources fell for honeypot accounts that gave the Iranians
greater access to their social network of American contacts.

All
that represents a trove of information for an adversarial government.
And it wasn’t all of what Witt is accused of providing. The indictment
also alleges that shortly after her August 2013 defection to Iran, Witt
gave the Iranians profile information on U.S. agents, including
counterintelligence officers in the U.S. spy agencies–the sort of
information can be used to suborn or pressure them into becoming witting
or unwitting assets for Iranian intelligence, or to put their lives in
jeopardy.

And around late 2014, the indictment alleges, Witt
worked with four Iranian “cyber conspirators” ordered to infiltrate the
social networks and computer systems of Witt’s former intelligence
colleagues.

Witt
is charged with conspiracy and two counts of delivering national
defense information to representatives of a foreign government. The
federal court docket does not indicate that Witt has legal
representation in the U.S., and efforts to reach her family in Florida
were unsuccessful.

The unsealing of the indictment against Witt
comes weeks after federal agents detained an American-born PressTV
anchor, Marzieh Hashemi, as a grand jury witness in an unnamed case in
the same courthouse. It’s not clear if the two cases are related. An
attorney for the Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which advocated for
the release of Hashemi, said he did not handle those legal proceedings
and could not comment. According to the Tehran Times,
Hashemi organized a conference on African-Americans for New Horizon,
the same group that put on the Hollywoodism conference that Witt
attended.

It’s not clear from the indictment how useful Witt was
to Iran’s cyber espionage. Witt allegedly guided Iranian hackers to her
former colleagues. One of the targets, deployed to Kabul for a Central
Command intelligence activity, accepted a Facebook request from a
honeypot account set up by the IRGC. Another target unwittingly added an
Iranian-controlled account to a Facebook group of fellow American
government employees. But there’s no allegation that Iran learned any
secrets through either ploy.

The same goes for Iran’s attempt to
get malware onto an intelligence worker’s computer through the “Bella
Wood” persona. “Bella” communicated over email with the target after the
Facebook connection was made, and “she”–actually four men–did her best
to entice the officer with unspecified “photos” and a “pretty card.” But
the effort was about as sophisticated as a fake Nigerian prince with a
lucrative business offer. “The effort was about as sophisticated as a fake Nigerian prince with a lucrative business offer.”

“I’ll
send you a file including my photos but u should deactivate your anti
virus to open it because i designed my photos with a photo album
software, I hope you enjoy the photos i designed for the new year,” the
Iranian men allegedly wrote to their American target on Jan. 9, 2015.
Then came a specification that ought to go into the hall of fame of spy
thirst: “They should be opened in your computer honey.”

The
Iranians may have had more success with another ploy: outright
impersonating an intelligence agent on Facebook. The hackers allegedly
created a fake profile by copying the agent’s real one, then started
making friend requests to other intelligence agents. One target of this
social engineering attack, identified as “USG Agent 5,” was a former
co-worker of Witt’s. The agent not only accepted a friend request from
the fake account, but “vouch[ed] for the Imposter Account” later when
adding it to “a private Facebook group composed primarily of USG [U.S.
government] agents.” That, the indictment says, gave the four Iranian
hackers “greater access to information regarding USG agents.”

Two
months after that, in May 2015, the four Iranians created an email
address using the real name of someone the indictment identifies as
having a “leadership role” during Witt’s Air Force tenure. This outreach
was more sophisticated than Bella was. It faked a real Air Force
domain, “@ogn.af.mil,” to send out malware. They also attempted another
spearphish, this one masquerading as a Facebook email with a
password-reset prompt. It’s unclear whether anyone was taken in by these
efforts, or what might have been compromised as a result.

The
four Iranians–Mojtaba Masoumpour, Behzad Mesri, Hossein Parvar and
Mohamad Paryar–set up shop as a hacking organization, allegedly “on
behalf of the IRGC,” barely two weeks before Bella Wood went to work.

Parvar
is the accused ringleader. He set up a cutout business that seemed to
operate as a typical business, as it “disbursed regular salaries,
established work hours, issued assignments and employed supervisors and
managers.” Behind that front, they “develop[ed] and obtain[ed]” malware,
including keyloggers, software to hijack a web camera, and other tools
to lurk in a “persistent manner” on the U.S. government agents’ devices
and networks.

All these people involved in Parvar’s fake business
are “known to the United States,” the indictment says–another
indication that Witt, despite her training as a U.S. military
counterintelligence specialist, may have inadvertently compromised her
own operation for Iran.

Witt joined the Air Force as a
Cryptologic Linguist in 1997 before moving over to the Air Force’s
Office of Special Investigations in 2003, and she served as an
intelligence specialist and special agent for over 10 years. In that
time she was deployed to a number of unspecified “overseas locations”
for secret missions intercepting electronic communications, among the
most sensitive roles in intelligence work. She had a top secret
clearance and access to compartmentalized projects.

As
laid out in the indictment, Witt began drifting toward betrayal in
February 2012 when she made a trip to Iran to participate in an
anti-American propaganda event called “Hollywoodism.” Witt allegedly
converted to Islam on Iranian television and made statements on video
“that were critical of the U.S. government, knowing these videos would
be broadcast by Iranian media outlets,” the indictment charges.

Three
months later FBI agents warned Witt that Iran had targeted her for
recruitment as an intelligence asset, and she assured them that if she
returned to Iran, she would keep her mouth shut about her work for the
Air Force, according to the indictment. But the next month Witt took a
paid job helping shoot another Iranian propaganda video, and in February
2013 she met with officials in the IRGC and formally declared that she
wanted to move to Iran, according to the indictment.

Though not mentioned in the indictment, the International Affairs Review journal at George Washington University
published a commentary by Witt in April 2012 in which she criticized
the U.S. call for Iran’s neighbors to sever ties with Tehran, writing
that “in enacting a policy of severe sanctions against Iran, the U.S.
should address the potential affects (sic) on other countries and not
inadvertently alienate friends by making them choose between Iran and
the U.S.”

A Feb 2013 article on the International Quran News Agency website
quoted Witt discussing her conversion—and blasting the U.S. military.
“As someone who served in the US army for years, I expected that after
embracing Islam, my right to choose a religion and my beliefs would be
respected. However, a US army member becoming Muslim was not something
they could stand. They are afraid of such individuals.”

Iran was
initially suspicious of Witt and slow-walked her defection, according to
the indictment. But she kicked the process into high gear by
threatening to “do like Snowden” and go public with U.S. intelligence
secrets from the safety of Russia.

“I think I can slip into Russia
quietly if they help me and then I can contact wikileaks from there
without disclosing my location,” she allegedly wrote in a June 2013
email to an Iranian contact.

The threat evidently worked. Her
contact, the Iranian propaganda filmmaker for whom she worked, arranged a
meeting between Witt and the Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan, and
plans were drawn up to get her safely to Iran. “They are so kind,” Witt
allegedly wrote, “even taking me to the airport.”