Wilsonian Veneer of US Foreign Policy

When Bill Clinton was in charge of US foreign policy, he was often accused
of "Wilsonianism" by his conservative critics. The phrase was drawn
from President Woodrow Wilson's promotion of democracy, self-determination and
international law during and after the first world war.

For these critics, it became a synonym for the alleged humanitarian idealism
of the Clinton administration - particularly its naive confidence in America's
ability to transform other societies. They argued that this philosophy resulted
in costly and unnecessary overseas interventions, and the subjugation of US
national interests to those of foreign states.

Since George W. Bush's speech last month calling for, among other things, the
democratic reform of the Palestinian Authority and the democratisation of Iraq,
some of these same commentators have lined up to praise his new "Wilsonianism".
They have tried to elevate his remarks into a "Bush Doctrine" and
to use the language of liberal international idealism in the service of their
various goals.

As an intellectual, political and propaganda manoeuvre, this tactic is something
of a tour de force. After all, it is hard to argue against democracy as a good
in itself. The new approach wrong-foots liberal opponents of the administration's
policies in the Middle East and elsewhere, and provides cover to Tony Blair
and any other western leaders who could be persuaded to support a war against
Iraq.

The approach also reflects some truths about conditions in both the Palestinian
territories and Iraq. Many Palestinians have long been unhappy with the corruption
and lack of democracy in the Palestinian Authority, while the horrors of Saddam
Hussein's tyranny are notorious.

But there are many reasons to be wary. For one thing, the credibility of Mr
Bush's "Wilsonianism" is undermined by the hostility of many in the
administration to nation-building. This hostility has been reflected in relative
political, military and financial indifference to Afghanistan now the Taliban
and al-Qaeda's forces in the country have been defeated. The suspicion is that,
once the Bush administration has used the pretext of creating democracy to smash
a regime it dislikes, it will be uninterested in the future of that democracy.

As far as the Palestinians are concerned, Mr Bush's approach looks at best
like an attempt to create the impression of an active US peace policy until
Mr Hussein can be defeated, after which the US administration may perhaps take
a genuine look at the peace process. At worst, the lack of a Palestinian democracy
will be used as an excuse by the US and Israel for delaying indefinitely an
end to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the creation of a Palestinian
state within legitimate and viable borders. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
will simply be allowed to continue.

This is certainly the intention of at least some advocates of the "Bush
Doctrine". Among the first to argue that a Palestinian democracy is essential
for a peace settlement was Natan Sharansky, Israel's deputy prime minister and
housing minister. Mr Sharansky's party opposes the creation of the most basic
conditions for a Palestinian state, and indeed contains advocates of the transfer
of Palestinians from the West Bank - a policy that would amount to ethnic cleansing.
How are the Palestinians supposed to make progress towards an exacting standard
of democratic statehood under such conditions of military occupation and prolonged
curfew, with the borders of the future state wholly undefined?

In the case of Iraq, the Wilsonian case for US intervention would appear much
stronger. With some massaging of history, a few of the same arguments that justified
western interventions in the Balkans and Sierra Leone can be applied to Iraq.

But a unilateral US war with Iraq would actually be a travesty of Wilsonian
principles. While Wilson was certainly prepared to use US armed force in pursuit
of his aims, the core of his internationalist philosophy was a commitment to
the development of international institutions and international law. This is
something for which the US nationalists who now misuse his name have open contempt.

In this regard, it is revealing to compare the cases of Kosovo and Iraq. While
Nato acted in Kosovo without the approval of the United Nations, it at least
had the approval of the great majority of states on Kosovo's own continent of
Europe. Exactly the reverse would be the case with a US war against Mr Hussein
- which is opposed by almost all Middle Eastern states except Israel.

Scepticism about the Bush administration's true commitment to the spread of
democracy is strengthened by the tendency of the US right to support ruthless
dictatorships when these are seen to serve US interests. American and Israeli
hardliners speak of dictatorships (usually with specific reference to the Muslim
world) as inherently treacherous and aggressive. But this is less a reflection
of political philosophy than an accusation that Arab political culture is so
low that no genuine compromise with Arab states or movements is possible.

This approach by the hardliners illustrates a fundamental flaw even in true
Wilsonian thinking. The liberal belief that western democracy can be easily
planted in every society has an unfortunate side-effect with echoes of the western
imperial past. For if certain nations persistently fail to develop democracy
- or what our ancestors would have called "western civilisation" -
the assumption is that they must be somehow inherently inferior. They can therefore
be legitimately conquered and reformed by superior civilisations.

In the past, such interventions were supposedly "for their own good";
but all too often, they turned out to be for the good only of their conquerors.
They also produced repeated cycles of human tragedy. In recognising that the
record of post-colonial states across the world has often been a frightful one,
we should not forget that western imperialism too was often a deeply malignant
force.

The writer is a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace

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