A SELECTION OF WORKS BY KOTARBINSKI

N.B. Works avalaible only in Polish are not enclosed.

Kotarbinski, Tadeusz. 1931. "Le Réalisme Radical." In Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, Held at Oxford, England, September 1-6, 1930, edited
by Ryle, Gilbert, 488-500. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1935. "The Development of the Main Problem in the Methodology of Francis Bacon." Studia Philosophica no. 1:107-117.

"This monograph answers the question concerning the philosophical outlook and the intellectual heritage of the Polish thinker Tadeusz Kotarbinski.Kotarbinski called his own system
praxiology. This book has also a wider aim, namely, to describe the "phenomenon of Tadeusz Kotarbinski in the Polish philosophy of the twentieth century". The reader can see how the whole
intellectual period full of new methodological and philosophical ideas emerges and changes due to the influence of Kotarbinski during those eighty years that have passed since the publication of his
first, seminal essays. The Polish methodology of science has been wonderfully fruitful and the same can be said of the methodology of practical endeavors, as Professor Gasparski shows in this
book."

"Kotarbinski developed a general theory of action. It abstracts from moral, esthetic and other qualities of action and studies only the efficacity. He provides an analysis of what
it means to do something, to be an agent, a perpetrator. It means that his voluntary act is a necessary condition for something to occur. An analysis of negligence, refraining from doing something,
collective action and a variety of the methods of efficacity is given."

"Tadeusz Kotarbinski is widely recognized as a major philosopher of the Lvov-Warsaw school. His reism, which is a contribution to semantics and ontology, is still discussed and
debated, and his most original creation, praxiology, has grown into an entire research field. However, Kotarbinski's philosophy of science has not received much attention by later commentators. This
paper attempts to correct this situation by considering the hypothesis that Kotarbinski succeeded already in 1929 in formulating a position that can be regarded as an early version of scientific
realism. Unlike most other "scientific philosophers'' before the mid-thirties, he was able to combine ontological realism (by defending a form of physicalism and nominalism) and semantical realism
(by defending the classical correspondence theory of truth). He was also a critical epistemological realist. Further, in spite of the instrumentalist flavour of his reductionist programme in
eliminating terms apparently referring to abstract entities, Kotarbinski accepted theories as statements with truth values and theoretical entities as long as they can be understood as physical
bodies."

"Kotarbinski's ontology (called reism) maintains that there are only things. According to this theory, all genuine names refer to things and all the terms that refer to non-things
(properties, qualities, events, etc.) are pseudo-names or onomatoids. After the criticisms of Ajdukiewicz, reism turned into a semantic theory stating that onomatoids should be used only in
paraphrasable by other expressions containing only terms. I shall try to restate the ontological reading of reism resorting to the theory of substance and accident advanced by Brentano in his last
philosophical analysis."

"The principal defenders of nominalism in Poland were Lesniewski and Kotarbinski. Several senses of nominalism' are distinguished. Lesniewski attacked Twardowski's theory of general
objects, rejected set theory, and proposed an ontologically neutral, nominalistically acceptable logic. I examine how this neutrality is to be attained despite higher-order quantificationKotarbinski
denied that there is anything except bodies (reism) and attempted to eliminate statements apparently about other things, but reism is inadequate for explaining true predications. Their student Tarski
was also a nominalist, but he did not argue for his views in print."

"This is a brief appreciation of the philosophical ideas of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, written on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday. The discussion is limited to his doctrine of
Reism, asserting the existence of things only. The evolution of Reism is sketched and some difficulties concerning its tenets are pointed out. Finally, the author stresses the role of Kotarbinski's
teaching in the development of philosophy in Poland."

"This paper examines relations between Reism, the metaphysical theory invented by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and Lesniewski's calculus of names. It is shown that Kotarbinski's
interpretation of common nouns as genuine names, i.e., names of things is essentially based on Lesniewski's logical ideas. It is pointed out that Lesniewskian semantics offers better prospects for
Nominalism than does semantics of the standard first-order predicate calculus."

"This paper is intended to show the place of Kotarbinski's philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School and his influence on the development of this movement in Polish philosophy. The
author describes links of Kotarbinski's views with ideas developed by other outstanding members of the Lvov-Warsaw School, particularly Twardowski and Lesniewski. Moreover, Kotarbinski's conception
of so called small philosophy was a typical exposition of general metaphilosophical views of the Lvov-Warsaw School."

———. 1996. "Reism in the Brentanist Tradition." In The School of Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 357-376. Dordrecht:
Kluwer.