On May 6, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture
of the United States issued its final report at the United States
Institute of Peace.[1]

Unfortunately, press reports are emphasizing the fact that the
commission failed to reach an agreement on U.S. ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[2] This emphasis obscures the
fact that the commissioners did achieve consensus on a wide variety
of issues regarding the overall strategic posture of the U.S.
Therefore, Congress would do well to pay attention to the
commission's areas of agreement while exercising caution regarding
CTBT ratification due to the lack on consensus on that issue.

Toward a More Defensive Strategic
Posture

The Strategic Posture Commission is careful to broadly define
the terms "strategic deterrence" and "strategic posture." At the
outset, it refers to protection capabilities as a part of these
terms.

The commission specifically focuses on ballistic missile
defense--the most visible element of the transition from a
strategic posture based on retaliation to a more defensive one. The
report states that missile defenses are "an integral part of the
strategic posture of the United States after the Cold War." It goes
on to state that such capabilities "can play a useful role in
support of the basic objectives of deterrence, broadly defined, and
damage limitation against limited threats."

The commission, however, does not limit its recommendations in
favor of a broadly defined policy of deterrence to ballistic
missile defense. Additional defensive measures--such as homeland
defense measures and protection against the effects of an attack
with electromagnetic pulse weapons--are cited as important.
Finally, the commission's report appropriately makes a strong
statement that this broad definition of deterrence includes
extended deterrence and assurance measures for the benefit of U.S.
allies around the world.

Preserving the U.S. Nuclear
Posture

The commission is unequivocal about the need to maintain a
nuclear deterrent force as a part of the broader strategic posture
of the U.S.--a force that is effective in meeting America's
security needs and those of its allies for as long as nuclear
weapons exist. In accordance with its recommendation for a broad
definition of strategic deterrence, the commission recognizes the
contributions that nuclear forces can make to deterrence by
retaining "damage-limitation capabilities." Separately, the
commission's report recommends that the U.S. declare that it would
consider using nuclear weapons only under extreme circumstances. On
the other hand, it counsels against issuing a "no first use"
declaration.

Accordingly, the report recommends the retention of the nuclear
triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, and bombers. Further, it recognizes that
preserving the triad will require selective modernization. The
report also recommends that the U.S. retain the ability to deliver
non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Regarding the nuclear stockpile, the commission recommends that
the U.S. retain "a stockpile of nuclear weapons that is safe,
secure, and reliable, and whose threatened use in military conflict
would be credible." It also expresses concern about the current
state of the nuclear weapons complex that manages the stockpile.
While it points out that the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has a plan to transform the complex, the
commission also urges Congress to increase support to the
complex.

Finally, the commission chose not to provide a specific
recommendation regarding the overall size of the nuclear force.
Rather, the commission recommends that the size of the force be
determined by a careful and deliberate process, starting with the
presidential-level direction.

Arms Control and Nonproliferation and
Nuclear Disarmament

The commission recognizes that arms control can play an
important role in lessening nuclear dangers and enhancing
deterrence. In the case of nonproliferation, the commission
stresses that the proliferation threat cannot be overstated. In
this context, it sees both U.S. extended deterrence guarantees to
its allies and support for the applicable treaty regime as
necessary to preventing the rise of new and potentially dangerous
nuclear powers.

The commission's report states that the most effective means of
arms control must begin with Russia. The commission also demands
that any reductions be pursued in tandem with Russia and not on the
basis of unilateral U.S. reductions that Russia may not match.
Finally, it recommends that negotiations with Russia proceed in
accordance with a step-by-step approach.

According to the report, the nonproliferation effort needs a
multifaceted diplomatic approach. Specifically, the commission
believes that the U.S. should:

Strengthen the international nuclear watchdog agency, called
the International Atomic Energy Agency;

Develop a stronger working relationship with Russia on
nonproliferation issues;

Negotiate a treaty to end the production of fissile
material;

Expand threat reduction activities; and

Adopt new approaches for ensuring that nuclear energy
cooperation does not lead to weapons proliferation.

Finally, the report expresses regret that the U.S. has not
effectively publicized the steps it has taken to meet its
disarmament obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Regarding President Obama's clearly stated goal of achieving a
world without nuclear weapons, the commission essentially adheres
to the position spelled out in its interim report that nuclear
disarmament requires "a fundamental transformation of the world
political order."[3] Accordingly, the commission states that the
U.S. must be prepared to retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite
future.

CTBT Ratification

The CTBT, which the Senate rejected in 1999, is a treaty that
would prohibit nuclear testing. While the Strategic Posture
Commission did not reach agreement on the matter of whether the
Senate should heed President Obama's demand that it consent to the
ratification of the CTBT now, it did agree that before the Senate
considers the matter, the Obama Administration should conduct a net
assessment of the treaty's costs, risks, and benefits. It also
recommends that the definition of what the treaty permits and
prohibits in the way of test activities be clarified among the five
recognized nuclear weapons states (China, France, Great Britain,
and Russia, as well as the U.S.).

These agreed-upon CTBT recommendations, when coupled with the
failure to reach a consensus regarding ratification, make it clear
that the Senate should, at a minimum, exercise extreme caution
before taking up the treaty. In fact, it is not clear whether
President Obama has the relationship between CTBT ratification and
his goal of nuclear disarmament reversed: He sees CTBT ratification
as a necessary step for bringing about the transformation in the
world political order that the Strategic Posture Commission
believes is necessary for nuclear disarmament. In reality, CTBT
ratification may benefit from being postponed until the required
change in the global political order has put the world on the path
to nuclear disarmament.

Adjusting the strategic posture of the United States to meet the
current and emerging security needs of the United States and its
allies, by necessity, is a long and difficult process. Ultimately,
such an adjustment requires defining deterrence both
differently and more broadly than during the Cold War confrontation
with the Soviet Union:

It must include defensive options; and

It must permit a careful balancing of nuclear, defensive, and
conventional forces with arms control, nonproliferation, and
disarmament efforts.

The report of the Strategic Posture Commission should mark the
beginning of the end of the adjustment process. This is why
Congress should follow its guidance.

Baker
Spring is F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security
Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation.

[1]William J. Perry et al., "America's
Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission
on the Strategic Posture of the United States" Washington, D.C.
United States Institute of Peace, 2009), advance copy.