Reconsidering Turkish military culture and secularism after the coup attempt

How did Turkish military culture transform under the rule of AKP? And what will be the impact of the failed coup attempt on the results of the upcoming referendum in Turkey?

People gather at Konak Square against military coup attempt, in Izmir, Turkey, July 20, 2016. Picture by Depo Photos/ABACA/PA Images. All rights reserved. Military culture refers
to a combination of specific ethoi that
shape the military’s institutional behaviour toward
inside and outside stimulants including politics. These ethoi
can be norms, values, beliefs, ideals and
political ideologies that are shaped by historical experiences,
geopolitical vulnerabilities, religious as well as national concerns
that show themselves through martial rituals, symbols, discourse,
formal statements and eventually actions. In the civil-military
literature, military culture has recently increased its importance as
an effective variable to explain civil-military relations.

In this regard, it is generally accepted that Turkish military culture is deeply embedded in the secularism
principle of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founder
of the Turkish state). Although the modern Turkey, as the successor
of theocratic Ottoman monarchy, was founded as a western-orientated
secular state by Atatürk, religion and religious class still
maintained their influential position, especially in rural areas and
villages. This provided a major advantage to the right wing parties
which traditionally present themselves as more sensitive to religious
values. Indeed, starting from the Democrat Party (1950-1960), the
right wing parties began to tolerate Islamist movements and created
suitable conditions for Islamists to institutionalize themselves
under religious brotherhoods. Over the years, the anti-secular groups
became more effective by actively getting involved in politics under
political Islam.

At this point, the Turkish military, which
formally considered secularism a vital tool for the survival of the
Turkish Republic, appeared as the main deterrent and coercive force
against political Islam. This deterrence, indeed, caused the military
to topple elected governments four times in 1960, 1971, 1980 and
1997, by claiming responsibility for preserving the secular nature of
the regime. Additionally, by creating the necessary legal mechanisms
to supervise politics, the military got directly involved in the
decision making process. The National
Security Council which was founded by the
military during the 1960 junta, became a military dominated supreme
body that reviews whether governmental decisions are against
secularism or not.

In this regard, the Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi
(AKP) came to rule in 2002, as the last
representative of political Islam. Nevertheless, unlike its
predecessors, the party offered a highly liberal programme by
promising liberties to religious people and minorities. The party and
its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also
stated their commitment to secularism and desire for EU membership by
portraying themselves as a typical conservative democratic party
which is closer to the Christian Democrats in Europe. This liberal
discourse enabled the AKP to have a growing support from businessmen,
intellectuals and media. In addition to this, the western states
welcomed the AKP’s efforts seeing them as a democratic compromise
between seculars and religious that can save the Turkish state from
further military interventions.

Accordingly, in parallel with the EU goals, the
AKP implemented various reforms in several fields. These had to do
with civil-military relations by making the National Security Council
a civil institution, removing the military’s inspection on media
and universities, and bringing the security expenditures under
civilian control. Therefore, by the second term of AKP (2007-2011),
most of the military’s political powers had already been removed.
Yet, the military was still influential enough to give specific
briefings about politics, arguably, by trusting in its image as
‘ultimate decision-maker’ in the eyes of people. At this point,
the main developments that ended military influence came during the
Ergenekon-Balyoz indictments (2008-2010).
According to these indictments, the Chief of the General Staff, the
Head Commanders of First Army, Navy and Air as well as a number of
active and retired senior officers had prepared a coup plan to
overthrow the AKP and Erdoğan. Indeed, the process created three
important repercussions for the military: first, the accusations,
trials and arrests during the indictments, did serious harm to the
military’s image; second, the arrests provoked a major change in
the commanding elite; third, the military has never been the same
reactive army regarding secularism.

The above-mentioned changes in the commanding
elite prepared the suitable conditions for removing the military
tutelage. The newly appointed commanders were known with their
‘moderate personalities’ unlike their secular predecessors.
Accordingly, they appeared in harmony with the government and avoided
making comments about secularism and political Islam. However, this
trend was finally broken by a coup attempt on 15 July 2016
allegedly by the Islamist Gülen
Brotherhood which was
claimed to have secretly infiltrated the military. This organisation
had been founded by the religious leader Fethullah
Gülen whose disciples
had already been known for their ambitious attempts to obtain key
positions in the state. Due to this fact, the military authorities
had previously warned the AKP government against the Gülen
infiltration. Yet arguably, the AKP ignored these
warnings, because the Islamic line of the Gülen followers,
at those days, were increasing the AKP’s popularity within the
media, state departments, security forces and the military. However,
since 2013, the Gülenists and the AKP have
been involved in a noticeable
conflict given their
clashing interests. Erdoğan and Gülen
began to speak to one another in a highly
accusatory tone. In the meantime, the Ergenekon
and Balyoz cases were
dismissed by the Turkish courts. Ironically, the AKP's earlier
tolerance of these allegedly Gülenist
prosecutors had enabled the arrest of
many innocent secular commanders.

More interestingly, the elimination of secular
commanders and the recent wave of AKP authoritarianism came almost
simultaneously. Erdoğan intensified
his Islamic rhetoric stating that he
wants a “religious generation”. Also, the AKP were
limiting fundamental freedoms
by cracking down on internet use, alcohol,
and protests. During the
massive Gezi protests in Istanbul, the police used
excessive violence against protestors.
Nevertheless, despite all of these developments, the military
remained silent which would not have been the case in the
previous decades.

At this point, can we talk about a possible desecularisation in
the main ethoi of military culture? If we look at the developments
from the Ergenekon case to the 15 July attempted coup, the answer
would be yes. Arguably, the AKP tolerated the Ergenekon-Balyoz by
considering it an opportunity to undermine the military’s
secularist culture. Then, after removing the main obstacle, the AKP
began to increase its Islamic-orientated authoritarianism. Yet, after
Erdoğan and Gülen began to disagree with one another, Erdoğan lost
his popularity among the Gülenist officers who allegedly attempted a coup d’etat to overthrow Erdoğan but failed.
In this regard, the aforementioned tolerance of the AKP to the
Gülenist movement, had enabled the latter to infiltrate the military
and, ironically, had opened the path for this alleged juntaist
establishment.

Following the unsuccessful coup attempt, the
AKP started a big operation to remove Gülenists from
the military and state departments. Nevertheless, there is still not
a remarkable decrease in the AKP’s Islamic-oriented
authoritarianism. In contrast, by demanding a presidential system,
Erdoğan, now, wants to collect most parliamentary powers into his
hands. At this point, what may be the military’s take on this? The
military today is definitely not the Atatürkist military
that presents itself as the guardian of secularism especially in
light of the aforementioned developments. Will Erdoğan win
the referendum for the presidential system? Will the AKP’s Islamic
discourse continue? If so, what will be the military’s reaction?
Silence, reaction or obedience? The answers to these questions may
give us clear clues about the current status of military culture and
the destiny of a secular Turkish democracy.

About the author

Hakki Goker Onen completed his PHD at the Humanities department of the University of Bath in December 2016. He continues his investigations in Turkish Studies focusing on Turkish domestic and foreign policy, Turkish political history and contemporary political thought.

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