Dr. Burroughs earned his
Bachelor of Arts degree from Pepperdine College, his Master of Science in
Education from the University of Southern California and his Doctor of Education
degree from the University of California at Los Angeles. He lived and worked in
the Middle East for some fifteen years, fourteen of those years in Iran.

While in Iran, Dr. Burroughs
served as Executive Director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Professor at
National University and Iran College for Women, Consultant in Protocol to the
Ministry of Court and Consultant to the Prime Minister and Minister of Health.
He also was Consultant to UNESCO and the Ford Foundation.

In the United States Dr.
Burroughs has held the following positions: Advisor to the U.S. Department of
Commerce; Visiting Scientist at the U.S. Department of Energy; President,
Armstrong University; Acting Dean, School of Business, Notre Dame de Namur
University; and, Lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley and Vista
College. Currently, he is serving as an English Language Officer on a contract
basis with the U.S. Department of Commerce and Professor at John F. Kennedy
University.

The United State has enjoyed one of the
world’s strongest economies and has greatly influenced international diplomacy
since World War II. As a nation, it has proved wrong numerous forecasts of its
imminent economic or military demise. Yet despite its economic, military and
diplomatic successes, its Middle East policy, particularly its policy toward
Iran, has in the past few decades proved to be its Achilles’ heel.

Iran’s policy toward the United States
has hardly been positive. The Government of Iran has sponsored or actively
supported groups engaged in terrorism or opposed to U.S. policy in the Middle
East. Almost any development having the imprimatur of the United States has
seemed to provoke Iran’s leaders to engage in opposition.

For the past thirty plus years,
diplomats from both the U.S. and Iran have continued to operate under outdated
world views and have failed to acknowledge or apply the changing realities of
diplomacy. Negativity has characterized the relations between the two countries.
This paper offers suggestions for transforming the negativity into positivity
for the mutual benefit of the two nations and the entire Middle East region.

U.S.-Iran Relations in Historical
Perspective

U.S.-Iran relations extend back at least
to the mid-nineteenth century and may be divided into three distinct periods:
the Golden Age or Period of Complete Trust; the Age of Greed; and, the Age of
Hostility or Confrontation. Although these designations do not represent
official historical titles, they do clearly show the differences among the three
periods, and their use is for that purpose.

The period of U.S.-Iran relations from
the mid-1800s to 1950s might be termed the Golden Age or the Period of Complete
Trust, on the part of both Iranian citizens and officials. American missionaries
established schools and hospitals and endeared themselves to the Iranians
despite the controversies that arose over conversions to Protestantism from
Islam and Orthodox Christianity. The Iranians felt the missionaries had Iran’s
best interests at heart.

Direct relations between the U.S. and
Iranian governments date from the 1840s. Based partially on the activities and
accomplishments of the American missionaries, Iranians originally considered the
U.S. Government an impartial entity interested in helping them protect their
natural resources and sovereignty against such imperialist countries as Britain
and Russia. They hoped that the U.S. would enable them to return to their former
greatness as a nation.

In the 1950s, Washington introduced an
era in U.S.-Iran relations which might be called the Age of Greed. The U.S.
Government focused on the containment of Communism rather than the preservation
of Iran’s natural resources and participated in a coup d’etat that overthrew
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and restored Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the
throne. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, the major U.S. focus in its
relations with Iran was on the containment of Communism and less on Iran as a
nation. Often U.S. administrations either dictated or strongly encouraged
reforms intended not just to benefit the Iranian people but also to make certain
the Soviet Union did not increase its influence in the country. As a result,
U.S.-Iran relations grew increasingly strong while encouraging an ever greater
dependence on the U.S. and its advice.

In the early 1960s, a religious leader
known as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khoemini began to proclaim his opposition to the
Shah and ultimately the U.S.-Iran alliance. The Government of Iran arrested
Khomeini in 1963 and exiled him one year later after a quiet meeting held in the
Tehran bazaar. Among those individuals in attendance at the meeting were the
following: the Shah; a popular Azarbaijani religious leader known as Ayatollah
Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari; and, a wealthy, now-deceased bazaari whose family
name was Eslami. This group could have imprisoned Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran but
chose to send him abroad, thinking that his absence from Iran would be
sufficient to quiet his proclamations and diminish his influence. Hindsight is
always better than foresight. The decision to exile Mr. Khomeini ultimately led
to a third and highly contentious phase in the U.S.-Iran relationship: the Age
of Hostility.

Unfortunately, the decision to exile
Ayatollah Khomeini proved to be hugely negative for the Shah as well as
Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Mr. Eslami. The Shah, of course, lost his throne
when the Islamic Revolution occurred and found it difficult to find a place to
settle with his family after his forced departure from Iran.

Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who was himself
a marja or a religious authority able to make legal decisions related to Islamic
law, declared Ayatollah Khomeini a marja following Khomeini’s arrest in the
1960s, thereby saving him from imminent prosecution and possible execution.
According to an online article enitled “A Brief History of ‘House Arrests’ and
Detentions in ‘Safe Houses’: What Will Be the Fate of Disappeared Leaders?”
issued by the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Ayatollah
Shariatmadari was put under house arrest following conflict between his
followers and those of Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after the revolution. An
accusation and supposed confession of complicity in a possible coup d’etat
against the Islamic Republic led to further restrictions. He died incommunicado
in the mid 1980s. (www.iranhumanrights.org/2011/03/history-of-house-arrests)

Interestingly, I personally witnessed an
attempt by the Iranian military in 1979 to convince Ayatollah Shariatmadari to
back a coup against the Islamic Republic. Mr. Eslami had introduced me to the
Ayatollah and several times accompanied me to Qom for private visits with him.
About 2:00 a.m. one morning in early October 1979, I was in the Ayatollah’s
bureau discussing possible business ventures with him when three Iranian
military officers entered the room escorted by a member of the Ayatollah’s
staff. When the Ayatollah inquired as to the purpose of their visit, they stated
in no uncertain terms that the military was ready to undertake a coup if he
would provide his support. I offered to dismiss myself but was asked by him to
remain in the room. After listening carefully to their proposal, the Ayatollah
asked me if I would convey the message brought by the officers to the U.S.
Embassy in an effort to determine what the U.S. might support. I did convey the
message, which, I understand, was forwarded to Washington, D.C. Washington’s
response was negative; the Ayatollah and I never discussed the possibility of a
coup again.

Mr. Eslami himself suffered both
psychologically and financially from the revolution even after his move to the
United States. He had been quite successful in Iran and maintained a rather
large garage near the Tehran bazaar. He kept several vans in the garage. When
planning Operation Eagle Claw, the attempt to free the fifty-two Americans held
captive at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1980, the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.)
approached Mr. Eslami about using his garage and some of the vans to temporarily
hide the hostages and transport them to the waiting helicopters. The mission
was, of course, ultimately aborted, but Mr. Eslami lost a considerable amount of
money when the Government of the Islamic Republic discovered his role in the
attempted rescue and seized his garage and vans. He asked me several times to
write letters to the C.I.A., seeking remuneration for his losses. Despite my
efforts, Mr. Eslami, to my knowledge, was never reimbursed for his losses.

The Age of Hostility or Confrontation
replaced the Age of Greed in 1979, when the Islamic Revolution shook the
foundations of Iranian civil society. Since the revolution, the governments of
both the United States and Iran have expressed mistrust and dislike for each
other. The U.S. paints Iran as part of “the axis of evil” while Iran regards the
U.S. as the “Great Satan.”

A Look at Societal Realities

Both the U.S. and Iran have experienced
complex challenges during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
the dominant one being globalization, the growing application of technology and
a conflict of world views. Globalization involves the integration of national
economies into a developing international economy through the reduction of trade
barriers, foreign direct investment, capital flows, migration and the
dissemination of technology. It has contributed to the transnational diffusion
of ideas, languages and cultural practices and has resulted in the need to
reconstruct the concept of diplomacy from an exterior or global perspective
rather than strictly Eurocentric/ North America and Iran perspectives.

In an article entitled “Globalization
Genie is Out of the Bottle in Iran and There’s No Putting it Back” published in
the Jakarta Globe on May 21, 2010, Jamsheed K. Choksey wrote: “Globalization has
reached Iran and is here to stay.” Mr. Choksey goes on to explain how Iranian
women in cities, including the religious stronghold of Qom, adorn their heads
with Chanel scarves rather than simply covering them. All types of Western music
are popular, and such activities as online dating, internet chat groups and even
sexual relationships threaten to upset the “clergy-dictated” pattern of life in
private settings. Drug and alcohol use has increased significantly despite the
religious leaders’ efforts to enforce an Islamic code of conduct. (www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/globalization-genie-is-out-of-the-bottle-in-Iran....)

Further, opportunities presented by
globalization as well as perceptions of social injustice have, over the last few
decades, encouraged the migration of Iran’s intellectual elite to other
countries and the emergence of the bazaari class with its emphasis on financial
gain without the appropriate reference to business ethics and/or the national
welfare. According to Davood Salmani, Gholamreza Taleghani and Ali Taatian of
the University of Tehran, the brain drain has been serious. These authors, who
wrote a paper entitled “Impacts of Social Justice Perception on Elite
Migration,” contend that the departure of the elite from Iran represents a
serious social problem that needs to be corrected. Iran requires, so the authors
say, educated manpower to realize its twenty-year national vision: becoming a
developed country. (Iranian Journal of Management Studies, Volume 4, Number 1,
March 2011, pages 43-62)

Even though Iranians have long
integrated elements of Western cultures into their social fabric, globalization
seems to have intensified the influence of the West on Iran. This
intensification has resulted in a social conflict between the more Westernized
and the more religious-minded, traditional members of Iranian society.

According to Washington Post Staff
Writers Jon Cohen and Peyton M. Craighill, an increasing number of Americans
have a negative view of the acceleration of globalization. Some sixty percent of
Americans looked positively on the economic interconnectedness in 2001, but the
percentage has fallen to thirty-six in 2011. Many feel the U.S. cannot compete
globally as it once did and thirty-three percent of the American public put the
fragility of the international economy at the top of their fear list.
Approximately sixty percent of the individuals polled felt the U.S. was on the
wrong track while more than eighty percent rated the U.S. economy negatively.
(“More in U.S. grow wary of globalization,” Washington Post Staff Writers,
Saturday, January 29, 2011) www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/28/AR2011012806137html}

On June 30, 2011, Rick Newman made the
following pronouncement in his introduction to an online article entitled “Why
U.S. Companies Aren’t So American Anymore”: “’Globalization’ has become a dirty
word.” He acknowledges that Americans most often associate globalization with
the shipment of jobs overseas, a reduction in wages and living standards and the
rise of China as a global power. He also lists fifteen major U.S. firms that
derive a major portion of their revenue from overseas operations. Those include
Wal-Mart, Exxon-Mobil, Bank of America, Ford, IBM and Intel. The article
indirectly points out the conflict over globalization. Americans look at their
personal, often less-than-satisfactory situations resulting from the
globalization of business while the companies view the trend of globalization as
a means of improving their corporate earnings.
(http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2011/06/30/why-us-companies...)

Undoubtedly, globalization is
influencing world economies positively in some ways, but it appears the
phenomenon is resulting in internal conflict in both Iran and the United States.
The components of the conflict may differ in the two countries, but the ongoing
battle between and among the groups with opposing points of view in each country
will eventually need to be addressed and a solution or compromise worked out.
The application of technology encompasses business and commerce, education,
biology and a variety of cultural fields and includes such diverse endeavors as
video conferencing, game-based learning, marketing and digital storytelling. The
stories told digitally can conflict with the national culture. Certainly, the
sexually- oriented films that one knowledgeable Iranian recently disclosed are
being beamed into Iran from Western countries, including the United States, do
not comply with the social and religious principles espoused by the Iranian
regime. According to this source, even very young children are being exposed to
the sensual materials. The result, according to a piece appearing in the August
20th 2011 issue of The Economist, is a “secular malaise:” an increased murder
rate, a breakdown in family relations and burgeoning personal debt. (The
Economist, August 20th 2011, page 45)

Technology has, in all probability, also
increased inequality in Iran. It tends to emphasize the development and use of
technological skills and reduce considerably the need for unskilled labor,
resulting in important wage differences. Traditional interpersonal communication
can be greatly diminished.

In the United States, the application of
technology has had both negative and positive effects. Among the positive
influences is the reported increase in student learning. The journal Learning
and Leading with Technology reported as early as 2002 in an article written by
John Cradler, Mary McNabb, Molly Freeman and Richard Burchett and entitled “How
Does Technology Influence Student learning?” that studies showed that
computer-assisted instructional applications significantly aided students in the
comprehension of content areas, the development of problem-solving skills and
preparation for entering the workforce. (www.iste.org/learn/publication/learning-and-leading.aspx)
Technology has, in many instances, streamlined business operations. Technology
has, however, increased the number of patent lawsuits in the United States,
resulting in the withdrawal of many products from the U.S. versions of Apple’s
App Store and Google’s Android Market. (Charles Arthur, Guardian’s technology
editor, guardian.co.uk) The application of technology led the U.S. to create
nuclear technology in 1945 and use the nuclear bomb on Japan in World War II.
Now the U.S. has to worry about other countries, including Iran, developing and
using nuclear weapons. Finally, technology application has had an increasing
tendency to isolate individuals.

An article appearing in the Article
Online Directory of May 12, 2009, summed up the dilemma presented by the
application of technology in this way:

Technology has its benefits, but when
you take a look at how it has affected society in general and how people
interact with one another, you will quickly see that it has a negative impact.
Modern technology has allowed people to communicate with just about anyone they
want to at any given time and although this may sound like a good thing, the
fact remains that people do not interact personally with one another as often as
they used to. (“The Negative Effects of Advancing Technology on Society” by
Aydan Corkern) This quotation can be applied not only to the average Iranian and
American but also to the diplomats of both countries. Advanced technology
enables the latter to talk indirectly at rather than directly to their
counterparts. It can discourage face-to-face communication and create barriers
to understanding. It can also prevent a real and authentic search for solutions
to country-to-country problems.

Currently, one worldview that seems
prominent in both Iran and the United States is traditionalism. Traditionalists
in the United States emphasize church, family and principles based on Biblical
teachings; in Iran, they give priority to the Quran and Islamic traditions. U.S
traditionalists or conservatives lean toward the Republican and Tea Parties;
Iranian traditionalists can be religious stalwarts, individuals steeped in
Iran’s rich and ancient culture, or traditional businessmen or bazaaris. U.S.
traditionalists or conservatives stress a balanced approach to relations with
other countries and national self interest over ambitions to promote particular
ideologies. They are basically opposed to interfering in the politics of other
countries.

Traditionalism or conservatism should
not be confused with “neo-conservatism”. Originally, the latter term embodied a
criticism of American modern liberalism. Adherents to this world view advocate
the use of U.S. economic and military power to overthrow the enemies of the U.S.
and promote liberal democracy. Neo-conservatives had considerable influence in
the George W. Bush Administration. The behavior of Iranian government officials
often suggests that they hold not only the neo-conservative world view but also
the postmodernist view that the Western world is an outdated lifestyle operating
under impersonal and faceless government bureaucracies. They declare that the
freedom and prosperity claimed by the West represent nothing more than empty
promises. They emphasize the flawed nature of democratic institutions. They
continue to defy entreaties from Western powers to cease their pursuit of the
atomic bomb and quietly help groups considered terrorists by the West. Their
proclamations indicate that they view Western powers, particularly the United
States, as neo-conservative entities. Despite their neo-conservative and
postmodernist views, Iranian officials display a great deal of political
practicality. They offer a monthly stipend to a large number of uneducated
Iranian citizens and subsidize food purchases to help counteract the high level
of inflation. The recipients of this largesse regard the regime positively and
express satisfaction with the political conditions in the country despite the
lack of human rights. Members of the educated elite and government officials
continue to benefit substantially from the regime and its policies. The number
of millionaires has grown substantially during the last few years. Both the less
well educated and those with considerable formal training are benefitting either
directly or indirectly from the policies of the current Iranian regime and do
not appear eager to push for change. Even though many Iranians would apparently
like to see improved relations with the U.S., they do not seem ready to forego
their advantages for formal U.S. recognition. This reality must be incorporated
into the U.S. policy toward Iran. The behavior of U.S. government officials
implies that Iranian culture is passй, that the
Government of Iran has no credibility whatsoever. They impose sanctions on Iran
that greatly hinder or totally prevent the creation of prosperity on a broader
scale than is now possible.. They continue to define democracy in Western terms
and decry any institutions that appear unacceptable to the West. The behavior of
diplomats from both countries reflects a lack of awareness of a move away from
postmodernism toward a new era of interaction and diplomacy: trans-modernism.
This new era involves a large number of independent social variables interacting
with each other in a variety of ways. The trans-modern world of today presents
sometimes unthinkable contradictions as its most profound reality. Political and
ethical theories appear somewhat outdated since they can no longer churn out
neatly packaged concepts appropriate to today’s world and/or the world that is
emerging. Trans-modernism suggests the realization that culture can no longer be
used as the matrix to settle differences; no one culture is superior to another.
Success in trans-modern diplomacy is defined in terms of transmissibility and
interaction rather than irrecoverability and the lack of interaction. This
approach to diplomacy does not permit representatives of Western cultures to
position traditional cultures as primitive or underdeveloped, nor does it allow
the more traditional cultures to view Western cultures as unworthy.
Trans-modernism encourages intercultural dialogue and the mutual liberation of
cultures. It encourages interaction within a global framework. It embraces
plurality and thinks in terms of “beyond” the current situation or dialogue. It
must involve more than a mere dialogue between learned experts or seasoned
diplomats. It requires the negation of any negativity and the affirmation of
national and international legacies.

A Glimpse at U.S. and Iranian Foreign
Policy Initiatives

To date, the diplomatic initiatives
undertaken by both the United States and Iran to date have proved ineffective.
The United States imposed sanctions on Iran after the Islamic Revolution and
added further sanctions after the discovery of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
The embargo on Iran includes sanctions against companies that do business with
Iran, a ban on practically all imports from Iran, sanctions on Iranian financial
institutions and nearly a total ban on the sale of aircraft or repair parts to
Iranian aviation companies. The U.S. Treasury Department can grant exceptions
and does so, for example, in the case of pharmaceuticals.

Laicie Olson, Senior Policy Analyst at
the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, D.C., contended
in a short article published in the “East Texas Review” on January 7, 2011, that
the legislation approved by the U.S. House of Representatives to introduce
sanctions against foreign companies that provide Iran with gasoline would not be
effective. She stated that Iran had increased its refining capacity and had
adopted an effective rationing program, reducing the possibility of inflicting
hardship on the Government of Iran while amplifying the hardship on the majority
of Iranians. She also felt that sanctions would take away Iranian government
attention from Iran’s “real” problems: freedom of speech and other rights. In
her opinion, sanctions should be confined to groups like the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran) so that Iranians interested in dialoguing
with the U.S. would not get the impression that the U.S. was no longer
interested in participating in a dialogue. (“Iran Sanctions are
Counterproductive,” East Texas Review , January 7, 2010 and put online by The
Center for Arms Control and Non Proliferation) (http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/iran/articles/iran_sanctions_are_counterproductive)

Ms Olson’s recommendation that sanctions
be restricted to groups like the Pasdaran or guards appears naпve
since the Pasdaran wields influence in almost every sphere of Iranian political
life. The group controls media outlets, provides training programs that
encourage loyalty to the regime and makes every effort to ensure its own
institutional credibility. Any sanctions against the Pasdaran would be
considered sanctions against the government itself.

President George W. Bush pronounced Iran
a part of the “axis of evil” but sought Iran’s support when forming the first
provisional Karzai government in Afghanistan as well as when he wanted to calm
the aggressive Iraqi mullah Moqtada al-Sadr and his militia. He also threatened
occasionally to bomb Iran’s nuclear installations and designated Britain, France
and Germany to negotiate with Iran on behalf of the United States in its effort
to convince Iran to stop enriching uranium. None of his moves, however, seemed
to deter Iran in the pursuit of its nuclear and missile programs. As pointed out
by Edward N. Luttwak in an article published in “The Wall Street Journal” on
August 12, 2009 and entitled “Why U.S. Diplomacy Will Fail With Iran”, the
Iranian regime halted its nuclear weapons program temporarily when it thought
the U.S. might attack Iran after the destruction of the Saddam Hussein
government but resumed the program when it saw the U.S. was totally occupied in
Iraq and no longer feared a U.S. invasion. (www.irannewsdigest.com/2009/08/12/page/2)

During the 2008 presidential campaign
President Obama promised to talk with Iranian officials without pre-conditions.
His offer has essentially been rejected. In his Cairo speech, he appeared to be
apologetic for the past behavior of the U.S., an approach which Iranian
officials could perceive as a weakness or an attempt to play on their emotions.
Neither approach is likely to be effective. Iranians are masters at detecting
policy weaknesses and ways of manipulating their opponents. Iran’s diplomatic
initiatives related to the United States appear to have been few and relatively
unorganized over the past decades. One such attempt occurred in New York in
2010. Diplomats from both the U.S. and Iran met secretly at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York to pursue the possibility of establishing “covert
communication” between the two countries. Perhaps the secret talks continue, but
formal diplomatic relations have still not been established.

Recent U.S. Foreign-Policy
Initiatives Toward Iran

Despite the failures of previous U.S.
policy initiatives toward Iran, additional diplomatic attempts reflective of
essentially the same world views and assumptions continue to be formulated. A
number of these attempts have merit, but too often, they appear to be mere
extensions of what has already been tried without success.

To illustrate, in 2008 the Council on
Foreign Relations issued a volume titled Restoring the Balance: A Middle East
Strategy for the Next President. In chapter 3 of that volume, Suzanne Maloney
and Ray Takeyh focused on Iran. The chapter was entitled “Pathway to
Coexistence: A New U.S. Policy toward Iran” and proposed a reevaluation of U.S.
policy toward Iran and a strong effort to engage the U.S.’s “most enduring
Middle East foe”. It contained the following suggestions:

1. Multi-track, delinked negotiations on
these important issues: the restoration of diplomatic relationships; the nuclear
issue; security in the Persian Gulf and Iraq; and, broader regional issues;

2. The appointment of a coordinator for
Iran policy within the Department of State;

3. The normalization of low-level
diplomatic relations;

4. The treatment of the Iranian state as
a unitary actor . (www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/12_iran_maloney.aspx)

The suggestions fail to take into
account the neo-conservative philosophy currently dominant in Iran and
concentrate on structure and procedure rather than the transmodern concepts of
integration and positivism. They do not take into account Iran’s multi-faceted
culture. If implemented, this initiative with its various suggestions would be
destined for the same failure as previous attempts at establishing even a basic
relationship with Iran.

In 2009, the Brookings Institution in
Washington, D.C. published a book entitled Which Path To Persia? Options For A
New American Strategy Toward Iran. The authors considered several U.S. options
related to Iran and discussed those options in chapters entitled: Dissuading
Tehran: The Diplomatic Options; Disarming Tehran: The Military Options; Toppling
Tehran: Regime Change; and, Deterring Tehran: Containment. After presenting the
various options, the group of scholars/authors makes this statement: None of the
policy options toward Iran have a high likelihood of succeeding, even as their
proponents would define success. None is likely to protect all of America’s
national interests at low cost and with minimal risks. As should be apparent by
this point, all of them are less than ideal solutions to the problems Iran
poses. Indeed, one of the reasons that the Iran debate is so contentious and
intractable is that there is no obviously right course of action. Instead,
policymakers must choose the least bad from among a range of unpalatable
alternatives. (Page 201, Conclusion, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at
the Bookings Institution, Analysis Paper Number 20, June 2009)

Once again, the group of theoreticians
failed to base its considerations and conclusions on the emerging trans-modern
approach with its emphasis on integration, positive outlook and adaptability.
The attitude toward Iran and the possible establishment of a relationship was
negative. The diplomatic option suggested was “the least bad from among”
negative alternatives.

President Obama has several times since
his election expressed a willingness to enter into a direct dialogue with Iran,
but the substance of any possible dialogue remains a mystery. Threats of
continued sanctions can be heard simultaneously with offers to engage in
discussions. Even what would initially appear to be a willingness to enter into
positive interaction is accompanied with negativity and threats.

A Possible New Approach to Iran

The Government of Iran continues not
only to rail against the “Great Satan” but also to work diligently to defeat it
wherever and whenever possible. Despite the vitriol consistently voiced by Iran
against the United States, the Iranian people remain quite pro-American. If only
that cordial attitude of many Iranians toward the United States could be
translated into a formal country-to-country relationship, the Islamic Republic
could possibly be encouraged to reduce the rhetoric and begin the process of
integrating with the United States to the benefit of both countries. Perhaps a
trans-modern diplomatic approach by the United States to Iran could ease the
tension and begin the process of establishing a much-needed relationship between
the two countries.

The establishment of a U.S. trans-modern
policy toward Iran initially requires U.S. diplomats to embrace international
diversity. In the United States, dealing with ethnic and cultural diversity has
long been a challenge, but slowly the principles of diversity and equality
appear to be gaining ground throughout the fifty states. U.S. officials and even
average citizens who interact with representatives of other cultures
successfully make diversity a part of their personae.

To avoid national and global chaos, both
U.S. and Iranian leaders must believe in a positive future and exercise their
belief in innovative and positive approaches to diplomacy. They should not
disengage when presented with cultural differences and should easily tolerate a
high level of ambiguity. In thought and action they must become what Paul H. Ray
might refer to as “transmodernists”. They must attempt to create, if not an
“integral culture,” at least a global or trans-modern approach to culture,
emphasize personal, interactive diplomacy. Electronic approaches to diplomacy do
not encourage or even permit interpersonal communication and interaction. The
use of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can prove helpful in negotiations.
The alternative to an open and active approach to diplomacy will produce the
“Great Divide”. (Paul H. Ray, “The Rise of Integral Culture”, July 5, 2010.
(http://charlesstirton.posterous.com/?tag=transmodernism) U.S. diplomats should
become acquainted with and attempt to accept what is known as the “chaos
theory”. This theory acknowledges that nature and diplomacy are highly complex,
and the only prediction that can be made about a negotiating session is that the
session is unpredictable. The theory suggests that complex systems or series of
negotiations can spontaneously create order out of chaos when the systems
reaches a balancing point between stability and total deterioration; the
resulting cultural form depends somewhat on the quality of the image of the
future that national leaders have and the efforts resulting from that image.

Further, U.S. diplomats must, as Marc
Luyckx stated as early as 1999, combine intuition, spirituality and brainwork in
their thinking. Iranians thrive on all three, but Americans tend to concentrate
on the brainwork, particularly when dealing with other cultures. The use of such
a combination of thought ingredients helps in analysis of conflicts and areas of
potential disagreement as well as the formulation of potential solutions.

The trans-modern diplomat must possess
his/her own convictions but not necessarily to the exclusion of the beliefs and
practices of representatives of other cultures. Too often, U.S. diplomats feign
a strong confidence in nation building and democracy, while their diplomacy
hints at what Iranians might tend to view as cultural and/or political
imperialism. The trans-modern diplomat must engage the future as well as the
past positively and make every effort toward cultural and diplomatic integration
with the Iranians and representatives of other cultures with whom they interact.

Finally, U.S. diplomats should be able
to critique their own traditions with the resources and concepts of their own
cultural backgrounds. They must be aware of the assumptions common to their
culture and use those assumptions in their critique. Self-criticism is important
to the critiquing process and allows subsumed ideas about a culture to
beidentified and dealt with in a logical fashion. In an article that appeared in
the August 8, 2011 “Time”, Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign
Affairs, suggests that the foreign-policy doctrine that should prove quite
beneficial to the United States is that of “restoration”. The doctrine does not
permit isolationism but does encourage the regaining of U.S. strength and the
replenishment of economic, human and physical resources. It discourages entry
into wars of choice such as the conflict in Afghanistan, but dictates an active
foreign policy. Wars of necessity would be permitted. Bringing diplomacy home
could greatly help the United States get its own house in order while pursuing a
new, more positive Iran policy. The doctrine of “restoration” remains quite
compatible with trans-modern diplomacy.

Specific recommendations for a
successful trans-modern-restorative diplomatic approach to Iran include the
following:

1. Become thoroughly familiar with the
theory of trans-modern diplomacy and adopt its concepts for use in policy
sessions.

2. Do not confuse the concept of
“restoration” with imperialism.

3. Do not be surprised at the
development of chaos, realizing that out of chaos often comes a positive
development.

4. Be forthright in U.S. beliefs and
principles while acknowledging the ideas and views of representatives of the
Iranian government.

5. Enter negotiations with the
anticipation of establishing diplomatic relations or at least making progress
toward the establishment of relations.

6. Include intuition, spirituality and
brainwork in the negotiations.

7. Look backward as well as forward.
(Iranians often look back to their ancient culture for answers in negotiation
dilemmas, etc.)

8. Do not be in a hurry. Let things take
their course.

9. Make clear that the United States is
not for isolationism and wishes to engage any and all nations in dialogue.

10. Emphasize that the United States is
not an imperialist country.

11. Make every effort to integrate the
points of view present at the negotiating table and use that integration for
diplomatic persuasion.

12. Accept and incorporate the dichotomy
of pro-U.S.- pro-Iranian government sentiment within the Iranian community and
incorporate such into the U.S. policy toward Iran.

Conclusion

Iran is remains one of the most
significant and potentially influential countries in the Middle East region. The
United States cannot continue to ignore the country for a long period of time
and must ultimately make every effort to engage the Government of Iran as well
as the Iranian people in a positive and integrative manner. U.S. diplomats must
ultimately acknowledge that the U.S. and Iran are interconnected, and only
through that acknowledgement can diplomacy work to the mutual advantage of the
two countries. The diplomats need to permit the Iranians to reinvent themselves
as the diplomats attempt to change them-selves.

The trans-modern approach to Iran
encourages teamwork, acceptance of differences and encouragement toward greater
human rights and social justice without defining precisely what the rights and
justice will mean in Iranian terms.

Acceptance of the restoration doctrine,
acknowledgement of the intervention of the chaos theory and the application of
the trans-modern diplomatic approach to Iran should enable the U.S. to view
interaction with Iran realistically while providing guidelines for a positive
approach to the reestablishment of formal relations.