Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century

Sebastian Balfour + Paul Preston (editors)

Since the loss of her empire in 1898, Spain has been outside the ranks of
the great powers. But the Spanish Civil War brought Spain to the centre
of the international stage and during the Second World War "there was
a brief critical period when Spain's sovereign foreign-policy choices
again commanded the rapt attention once automatically accorded the grand
strategic decisions of Philip II".

Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century focuses on that
period, with six essays on the period from 1936 to 1945 and events
immediately preceding and following it, but the remaining five essays
cover the first third and second half of the century.

Sebastian Balfour describes Spanish foreign policy from 1898 to 1914,
most importantly her involvement in Morocco and resulting relations
with France, Britain and Germany; this was closely linked to domestic
politics. Francisco Romero covers the First World War and the crisis
of neutrality, which ended the party system that had dominated Spain
since the Restoration. And Ismael Saz contributes two essays, one on
foreign policy under the dictator Primo de Rivera and one on the foreign
policy of the Second Republic.

Enrique Moradiellos describes the international context of the Spanish
Civil War, the origin and effects of Britain and France's policy of
non-intervention, and the contrasting Soviet involvement, which reflected
preference for a policy of collective security over one of appeasement.

Christian Leitz describes relations between Nazi Germany and Spain
— and between Hitler and Franco — from 1936 to 1945. Though Germany
began in a vastly stronger position, Hitler failed to get Franco to join
the war and Spanish support was limited to economic links (the supply
of wolfram was particularly important), the contribution of the Blue
Division to the Russian front, and tolerance of clandestine military
activity inside Spain.

Looking at Italian relations with Spain from 1936 to 1943, Paul Preston
argues that the Spanish Civil War helped to push Italy closer to Germany.
But Mussolini went ahead without matching German involvement and once
committed could not back down. "The real beneficiaries of Italian
intervention were Hitler and Franco, certainly not the Duce."

During the war Spain was economically dependent on the Allies, most
notably for oil, but aggravated them by contributing to the German war
effort. Denis Smyth concentrates, however, on Spain's geostrategic
importance. In 1940-41, fearing Spanish entry into the war, the British
had a standing plan to seize a naval base as a replacement for Gibraltar,
either in the Portuguese Azores or Cape Verdes or the Spanish Canaries
— an operation that came within a hair's-breadth of being launched
preemptively. And in 1942 Spain lay astride Anglo-American supply lines
for Operation Torch.

Florentino Portero describes how Britain stopped sanctions being
imposed on Spain in the immediate post-war years, or any attempt to
unseat Franco, but also prevented normalisation of Spain's international
status, working to deny it Marshall Plan money or membership of NATO.
The issue divided the victorious Allies, the British government, and
the British Labor party.

As Boris Liedtke explains, early antipathy by the United States towards
Franco soon gave way to tacit support, motivated by anti-communism;
relations revolved around the concession of military bases and their
renegotiation, but no fundamental change was possible while Franco was
alive. And Angel Vinas covers post-Franco Spain, describing the role
of international forces and politics in the transition to democracy,
the controversy over joining NATO, and Spain's attempts to chart an
independent course.

These last two essays are useful background to understanding recent
events, in particular Spain's deployment and then withdrawal of troops
from Iraq. The collection as a whole offers an unusual perspective on
the history of Spain itself, as well as on key events in European history.