Excerpt: criminal procedure code, section 145 - dispute as to possession of immovable property--compromise--suit for determination of title--estoppel. - - fail......mas purchased by parsotam, so that the ownership of the grove was in parsotam. on that finding the suit of madho lal was entitled to succeed because he had stepped into the shoes of parsotam. gopi das claimed to be the chela of one chhotu das, and he says that the grove was waqf property and that ohfiotu das was the manager of it, and, after his death, his widow was the manager and that after her death he, as chela of chhotu das, succeeded to it. this has been found against him. it has been found that he was not the chela of chhotu das.2. on these findings the courts below have decreed madho lal's suit and dismissed the suit of gopi das. gopi das has preferred these appeals and the question to be considered is what is the effect of the compromises referred to above. the learned judge.....

Judgment:

Pramada Charan Banerji and Gokul Prasad, JJ.

1. This and the connected Second Appeal No. 1425 of 1921 relate to a grove situate in the suburbs of Benares. In execution of a decree obtained against one Parsotam, this grove was sold by auction on the 10th of February, 1919, and was purchased by Madho Lal. Madho Lal brought a suit for recovery of possession of the grove by virtue of this auction purchase. A counter suit was brought by the appellant, Gopi Das, in which he claimed possession of the grove, at least in respect of one half of it. It appears that some disputes arose between Parsotam and Gopi Das before the auction sale, and a case was instituted in the Criminal Court under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That case was compromised on the 28th of May, 1918, and in that compromise it was stated that Parsotam Das was to remain in possession of a part of this grove and Gopi Das was to remain in possession of another part. The Criminal Court decided the case under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in accordance with this petition of compromise, and declared that possession should be in the respective parties in the manner mentioned in the document until the question of title was settled in due course of law. After the auction sale of Parsotam's rights, disputes arose between Madho Lal and Gopi Das and two cases were instituted in the Criminal Court, one under section. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the other under Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code. In the case under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a compromise was filed on the 8th of December, 1919, and in that compromise it was agreed that possession should be maintained in the manner mentioned in the earlier compromise of 1918. After this Madho Lal brought his suit. The court of first instance found, and this finding was confirmed by the learned Judge, that the grove originally belonged to one Raja Ram, that he sold half of it to Parsotam and the other half to Ratan Singh and that Ratan Singh's half Mas purchased by Parsotam, so that the ownership of the grove was in Parsotam. On that finding the suit of Madho Lal was entitled to succeed because he had stepped into the shoes of Parsotam. Gopi Das claimed to be the chela of one Chhotu Das, and he says that the grove was waqf property and that Ohfiotu Das was the manager of it, and, after his death, his widow was the manager and that after her death he, as chela of Chhotu Das, succeeded to it. This has been found against him. It has been found that he was not the chela of Chhotu Das.

2. On these findings the courts below have decreed Madho Lal's suit and dismissed the suit of Gopi Das. Gopi Das has preferred these appeals and the question to be considered is what is the effect of the compromises referred to above. The learned Judge held that the two compromises did not operate to create any title in Gopi Das. The compromises were filed for the purposes of the cases under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and in proceedings under that section the question was only one of possession and it was the question of possession that was settled by those compromises. So far as the question of title is concerned, the two documents, upon which reliance has been placed, cannot be treated as documents conveying title. If it had been intended that Parsotam wished to convey a part of the property to Gopi Das, he would have executed a duly stamped and registered document, but this was not done, and, even if the intention had been to convey the property, that intention, was not carried out by a duly executed and registered document. The compromises, therefore, could not give the effect of conveying proprietary right to Gopi Das who, upon the findings of the court below, has no title to the property.

3. Gopi Das claimed adverse possession, but it has been rightly held that, since his possession began only in 1912, it was not for such a length of time as would confer any proprietary right on him by reason of his possession. The compromises could, at the outside, amount to an admission of title but they could not be deemed to have the effect of estoppel. Therefore it was open to Madho Lal to prove that title to the property was in Parsotam and that he by purchasing the rights of Parsotam had acquired the property.

4. It was next urged that Madho Lal or Parsotam had not been in possession within 12 years preceding the date of Madho Lal's suit and that, therefore, any right which Parsotam had, had become extinct when the suit was instituted. That contention has no foundation because it has not been found that Chhotu Das was in adverse proprietary possession. The court of first instance did not hold that his possession was adverse or of proprietary character and the lower appellate court only says that, 'it is possible that Chhotu Das maintained the worship of the idol of Hanumanji' which exists on the land in question. The learned Judge did not find that Chhotu Dau was in adverse proprietary possession; therefore there is no finding on the basis of which it can be contended that Parsotam or his predecessors were deprived of possession by reason of the adverse possession of some one else.

5. We think that in view of the above circumstances the claim of Madho Lal has been rightly decreed and these appeals mtu;f. fail. We dismiss both appeals with costs.