Eleven days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the
Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act (hereinafter “Act” or “Stabilization
Act”)1 to protect air carriers from tort lawsuits that threatened to cripple air travel in
America. The Act capped tort lawsuits against the airlines at their pre-existing liability
insurance limits and limited jurisdiction for tort claims to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. Moreover, the Act established the September 11th
Compensation Fund of 2001 (hereinafter “Fund” or “9/11 Fund”), in which victims of the
attacks could opt to waive all federal and state tort claims and receive administrative
relief through a predetermined formula, under the discretion of the Fund administrator.
That the airlines were so concerned about their liability exposure, and the
Congress so willing to act promptly upon that concern, is a testament to the mess our
modern civil justice system has become.2 This paper will: (1) outline the contours of the
“litigation explosion” in the United States, and the problems it creates; (2) examine
briefly the historical precedents for administrative remedies designed to replace common
law tort actions; (3) expand this analysis to survey the 9/11 Fund experience; and (4)
discuss the implications of this experience for possible policy solutions to the liability
crisis.

For a Criminal Investigation
of the Events of
September 11th, 2001
The worst single criminal act ever committed on US
soil, the attacks of September 11th, 2001 have served as
justiﬁcation for: US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq;
a new doctrine of preventive war; the USA PATRIOT
Act and Department of Homeland Security; torture and
indeﬁnite detention of “enemy combatants”; surveillance
of citizens without a court warrant; and shifting trillions
of dollars in public spending priorities.
Surveys by Zogby and Scripps-Howard found that signiﬁcant proportions of US citizens believe their own government had “actionable
foreknowledge” of the attacks and “consciously failed to act” (Zogby
2004), or even that elements of the state were involved in orchestrating the attacks. The widespread disbelief in the ofﬁcial story indicates
a deep crisis of trust in government, one that only an exhaustive and
fearless criminal investigation can address.
We ﬁrmly believe there is probable cause for such an investigation.
The case for investigation is based on three pillars:
1) evidence of cover-up and a lack of serious investigation
after the fact;
2) evidence of misconduct on the day of 9/11
3) evidence of foreknowledge and preparation before
September 11th.
Undertaking a full-scale, truly independent investigation is imperative,
not only because there must be justice for the victims, but also because
of the role 9/11 has played in justifying policies of aggression supposedly justifed by 9/11 must be halted, and a shattered public trust must
be repaired.
The 9/11 Cover-up 1
• During their 2002 inquiry, the Congressional joint intelligence committees (who redacted 1/4 of their report) were scrutinized by an FBI
counter-investigation, which invaded the Senate in search of an alleged
leak. It was widely believed that the FBI investigation may have been
intended to have a chilling effect on the conduct of the Congressional
Joint Inquiry.
• The Congressional investigation failed to pursue solid evidence of a
money trail to the alleged hijackers from the US-allied Pakistani intelligence agency (ISI). The ISI chief was removed from his post when
strong evidence of his connection to the plot surfaced in early October
2001, but no serious punitive action was taken against him.
• Evidence was destroyed or withheld, including suppression of the
discovery of black boxes from the two ﬂights at Ground Zero and the
destruction of tapes made by the air trafﬁc controllers who handled
the same ﬂights.2
• Whistleblowers such as FBI translator Sibel Edmonds and Anthony
Shaffer of “Able Danger” were disciplined or ﬁred, even as FBI, CIA,
and military ofﬁcials who were blamed for failures received promotions and medals.
• The September 11th relatives who lobbied for the 9/11 Commission
(after 14 months of White House resistance) submitted 400 questions
that Commissioners accepted as a “roadmap.” 70 percent of the questions were fully ignored in The 9/11 Commission Report. Many of
the relatives later declared the Report a whitewash.3
• 9/11 Commissioner Max Cleland resigned in late 2003, calling the
panel a whitewash and saying, “Bush is scamming America.” There
• Philip Zelikow, the 9/11 Commission executive director who
oversaw the panel’s activities, refused to step down after the September 11th families called for his resignation due to grave conﬂicts of
interest (close association with Condoleezza Rice, member of White
House national security staff both before 9/11 and in 2002, member
of Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board).
• Rice may have committed perjury in her April 2004 Commission
testimony that an August 2001 Presidential Daily Brieﬁng to Bush
was only of “historical signiﬁcance,” when in fact it detailed current
intelligence.
• The 9/11 Commission Report claimed the ﬁnancial background of
the attacks was unknown, but dismissed the question as being of “little
practical signiﬁcance” (page 172). Since when doesn’t an investigation
“follow the money”?
• Large sections of the report are based on the confessions of “enemy
combatants” such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, as provided in the
form of transcripts by the government. The 9/11 Commission staff
was not allowed to see or interview any of these “enemy combatants.”
• Over a period of several years, NORAD, FAA, White House and
military ofﬁcials gave widely divergent and conﬂicting accounts of the
air defense response to 9/11, but no one was ever held accountable
for upholding falsehoods. The 9/11 Commission chairs later admitted
they considered a criminal investigation of NORAD’s statements, but
preferred instead to present a unanimous report.
• The focus of the Commission will be on the future. We’re not
interested in trying to assess blame. We do not consider that part of
the Commission’s responsibility. – Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission
vice-chairman.

Welcome to the COMPASS Sample Mathematics Test!
You are about to look at some sample test questions as you
prepare to take the actual COMPASS test. The examples in this
booklet are similar to the kinds of test questions you are likely to
see when you take the actual COMPASS test. Since this is a
practice exercise, you will answer just a few questions and you
won’t receive a real test score. The answer key follows
the sample questions.
Once you are ready to take the actual COMPASS test, you
need to know that the test is computer delivered and untimed—
that is, you may work at your own pace. After you complete the
test, you can get a score report to help you make good choices
when you register for college classes.
We hope you benefit from these sample questions, and we
wish you success as you pursue your education and career goals!
Note to Parents
The test questions in this sample set are similar to the kinds of
test questions your son or daughter will encounter when they take
the actual COMPASS test. Since these questions are only for
practice, they do not produce a test score; students answer more
questions on the actual test. The aim of this booklet is to give a
sense of the kinds of questions examinees will face and their level
of difficulty. There is an answer key at the end.
COMPASS Mathematics Tests
The COMPASS Mathematics Tests are organized around five principal content domains:
numerical skills/prealgebra, algebra, college algebra, geometry, and trigonometry. To ensure
variety in the content and complexity of items within each domain, COMPASS includes
mathematics items of three general levels of cognitive complexity: basic skills, application, and
analysis. A basic skills item can be solved by performing a sequence of basic operations. An
application item involves applying sequences of basic operations to novel settings or in complex
ways. An analysis item requires students to demonstrate a conceptual understanding of the
principles and relationships relevant to particular mathematical operations. Items in each of the
content domains sample extensively from these three cognitive levels.
Students are permitted to use calculators on all current Windows® and Internet versions of
COMPASS Mathematics Tests. Calculators must, however, meet ACT’s specifications,
which are the same for COMPASS and the ACT Assessment. These specifications are
updated periodically and can be found at ACT’s website at
http://www.act.org/aap/taking/calculator.html