First paragraph:
Modern representative democracies face serious challenges,
particularly when it comes to reinvesting public money. An
almost inevitable consequence is the neglect of certain
interests while others, more widespread or better organized,
reap greater benefits (Dahl, 1956; Madison, 1787). Political
tensions are both managed and fostered through interaction
between partisan interests, parties themselves and rigid
institutional rules. Frictions inevitably emerge.

Figures and
Tables:

Table 1. Dickey-Fuller unit-root test
(t-statistic).

Figure 1. Change in the fraction of total budget
(percent).

Table 2. ARIMA estimates -- predictors of change in
spending ratio.

Table 3. Party effects in five policy domains.

Last Paragraph:
Do parties make a difference in budgetary policy? The answer
in Canada is a definite yes. If there are constraints
imposed by federalism and the incremental nature of
developed states' policy-making, these seem to be at least
partly overcome by a combination of a majoritarian system of
elections and an executive-centred decision-making process.
For sure, there is a good amount of friction in certain
policy domains that limits the role of parties in budgetary
policy. But governing parties are still able to influence
public spending. The magnitude of partisan effects appears
to be rather subtle. But small effects add up over time. The
systematic influence of parties on budgetary decisions, even
at the margins, has a considerable effect over the long
term. This finding provides fresh insights into the study of
budgetary policy in Canada, but also provides a method to
test similar hypotheses in other parliamentary systems. This
new approach will hopefully clarify our understanding of the
role of governing parties in policy.