SPEECH BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR DOUGLAS HURD,
TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW AND EXTENSION
CONFERENCE, NEW YORK, 18 APRIL 1995
'NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW'
INTRODUCTION:
Mr President,
A thread of remembrance runs through 1995. Fifty years ago, many
of the events which shape the world we now know took place. Their
anniversaries prompt us to look forward as well as back. As we
remember the end of the war in Europe we look ahead to completing
the new structure of European security. As we remember the birth
of the United Nations we look forward to ways in which we can make
the UN work more effectively in a world still torn with strife.
We no longer live in the deep shadow of confrontation between the
superpowers. The nightmare of total devastation has gone. But not
all bad dreams have faded. The risks posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction are still with us.
That is why we are here. The Non-Proliferation Treaty lies at the
heart of our efforts to deal with those risks. We need it to rest
on solid, permanent foundations. The Treaty has its imperfections.
But none of them is a fatal flaw. None is a reason to doubt that
we will best serve our hopes of a world without fear of nuclear war
by deciding to extend the Treaty unconditionally and indefinitely.
In short, this is a Treaty for all seasons, devised in one set of
circumstances, but equally essential now that the world has
changed. I cannot see a time when it won't be essential.
But mere exhortation is no good to us here. We need to look the
imperfections of the Treaty - perceived and real - squarely in the
face.
CRITICISMS OF THE TREATY
Many parties to the Treaty believe it is discriminatory because it
appears to divide the world into first and second class citizens;
nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Some are
unimpressed by the progress of the nuclear weapon states towards
nuclear disarmament. Some are disappointed by the benefits of the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many are concerned that the
Treaty has not yet secured the adherence of all states. I
understand these concerns and frustrations. They must be
addressed, not smothered.
DISCRIMINATION
The Treaty recognises five states as nuclear weapon states while
others can become parties to it only as non-nuclear weapon states.
This may seem discriminatory. But the Treaty had to recognise the
real position 25 years ago, if it was to prevent further nuclear
proliferation. Then proliferation appeared unstoppable. Well over
twenty states were thought eager to acquire nuclear weapons. It is
largely because the Treaty drew a firm distinction between nuclear
and non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear proliferation has been
contained. By reflecting the reality at the time, the Treaty made
possible the creation of a regime effective enough to keep at bay
what has been and remains a formidable danger.
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
We all endorse the concept of nuclear disarmament. But the
continuing existence of nuclear weapons must not blind us to the
progress we have made. We have seen enormous strides forward: the
INF Treaty and the two START treaties have consigned thousands of
nuclear warheads to redundancy and elimination. Hundreds more have
gone from their silos and launchers in unilateral decisions to
reduce nuclear stockpiles. Britain has not folded its arms and
decided that nuclear disarmament is only for others. We have got
on steadily with our own reductions. We have given up our surface
maritime tactical weapons and are phasing out our free-fall bombs.
Our nuclear forces will soon be limited to a single system deployed
on submarines. No British weapons will be deployed elsewhere. The
total number of our warheads at the end of this decade will be 21%
less than in the 1970s, and their explosive power 59% lower: a
reduction of three-fifths. If the world had seen cuts of this
order in other types of weapon, it would be a safer and more stable
place.
But we understand the fears of others. To meet them we have - with
other nuclear states - offered strengthened security assurances.
We are committed to negotiating measures which will impose severe
constraints on nuclear weapons on the future. We want to see the
early conclusion of an effective and verifiable CTB. To that end
we have now accepted that there should be no exemption for 'tests
in exceptional circumstances', the so-called 'safety tests'. We
want to see an early start to negotiations on a Cut-Off Convention.
To remove any doubts about our commitment to this process I can
announce today that the United Kingdom has ceased the production of
fissile material for explosive purposes.
The reductions in our nuclear forces which I have described mean
that even when START II is implemented, British nuclear forces will
be considerably less than 10% of the total nuclear forces available
to the US or Russia. But there is no doubt that a world in which
US and Russian nuclear forces were counted in hundred, rather than
thousands, would be one in which Britain would respond to the
challenge of multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear
arms.
The reductions I have described could only have taken place in a
framework of stability and predictability. By preventing
widespread proliferation the Treaty has contributed substantially
to that framework. If we are to build further on the momentum
created by recent disarmament successes, by the negotiations in
prospect or in progress, we must ensure that the essential
framework provided by the Treaty is made permanent.
PEACEFUL USES
The peaceful uses of nuclear energy have not developed as fast or
as far as was once expected. I remember it being said in Britain
during the fifties that nuclear energy would produce electricity
'too cheap to meter'. That has not happened in either developed or
developing countries. But nuclear power has spread widely around
the world. Nuclear energy has also found extensive application in
fields of particular interest to developing countries, such as
medicine and agriculture. All this would not have been possible
without the NPT and the safeguards of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. It takes many decades to secure a return on
investment in major civil nuclear projects. A predictable and
certain Non-Proliferation Treaty is fundamental to increasing
international cooperation in these peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Some are concerned about export controls. But making certain items
subject to controls does not mean they cannot be exported at all.
Such controls are necessary if suppliers are to be confident that
their exports will not be misused. They bite only on countries,
like Iran, about whose ultimate intentions there are widespread
doubts. Suppliers must be careful about their exports. They would
be rightly criticised if they were not.
UNIVERSALITY
Britain constantly urges all states not party to the Treaty to
allay suspicions about their nuclear activities and to accede to
the Treaty at the earliest opportunity. Progress has been made.
Among others, we have recently welcomed Algeria, Argentina, South
Africa and all the successor states to the Soviet Union as new
parties.
It is not impossible that Israel, India and Pakistan may one day
accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. The Berlin Wall
and the Iron Curtain have fallen. Some who once condemned the
Treaty are now parties to it. Unrelenting pressure and persuasion
can achieve the same result with others. But we will not succeed
if our decisions at this Conference display a lack of commitment to
the Treaty.
COMPLIANCE
As important as securing universal adherence to the Treaty is
ensuring compliance with its terms among those states which have
adhered to it. The scale of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons
programme has been a salutary shock for all of us. North Korea has
presented us with a problem. Many of us are anxious about Iran.
But these dangers are a reason for strengthening not despairing of
the control system which stems from the Treaty. The UN Special
Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency are dealing
with the Iraqi problem. The Agreed Framework signed in October
1994 offers a way of resolving the North Korean problem within the
framework of the Treaty.
The international community has also recognised the wider need both
to strengthen the safeguards system of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and to provide it with all the support it needs from
the UN Security Council. We welcome the Agency's latest proposals
for strengthening safeguards and look forward to early agreement on
their implementation. The statement by the President of the
Security Council Summit in January 1992 that the Members of the
Security Council will take fitting measures in the case of any
violations of safeguards agreements was another important step
reinforcing confidence in the Treaty.
In reviewing the Treaty after its first 25 years, we must raise our
eyes above the technicalities - however important these may be.
The Treaty has endured. The majority of UN member states are now
party to it. It has its imperfections. But these should not
district us from its benefits. The threats to peace and stability
in the world are legion. But few today lie uneasy in bed because
of the chance of nuclear war. That is in large measure to the
credit of the Treaty. When it was signed the risk of uncontrolled
nuclear proliferation seemed huge. The successful management of
that risk reflects credit on those who drafted the Treaty. I
believe we owe it to them, and to the people of the world today and
in the future, to preserve what the Treaty has achieved by making
it a permanent feature of the international scene.
Indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty is the right
decision because:
- it will much reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, with all
its destabilising consequences;
- it will reinforce the momentum towards nuclear disarmament;
- it will provide the continuing framework essential to
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy;
- it will send a clear signal to those few remaining non-parties
that the international community expects them to adhere to the
Treaty.
Perhaps most important of all, it will underline to all - including
those tempted to go down the route of proliferation - that the
world community remains determined to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and the horrors which this threatens. The Treaty deserves
the biggest vote of confidence which we can give it. It will repay
us well.
ENDS