Reflections on American politics from one who thinks the republic needs constant attention.

Friday, May 6, 2016

Daniel J. Mahoney on Love, Seriously

Daniel J. Mahoney and the Progressive Apocalypse

P. Schultz

Below you
will find a link to an article written by Daniel J. Mahoney, once a colleague
of mine at Assumption College, in which he argues that, yes, we should “love”
democracy but only “moderately” so. And it is essential to our own well-being
that we so “love” democracy because only in that way can our democracy be
consistent with our “famil[ies], churches, the armed
forces, and … universities,” institutions that “should not be endlessly democratized
or subjected to social engineering. Democracy needs ‘extra-democratic’
institutions to flourish.”

This is the crux of
Mahoneyism, as some call it, “that the ‘conservative foundations of the liberal
order,’. . .[namely], healthy family life, a moral code rooted in religion and
natural law, prudent and far-seeing statesmanship, the rule of law, a
respect for legitimate institutions, love of truth” are essential if we
are to avoid a kind of “hubris” that makes we democrats think we are like the
gods.

It is difficult to wonder
why anyone would want to dispute Mahoney given that doing so seems to put one
on the side of those who want to do away with a “healthy family life, a moral
code rooted in religion and natural law, prudent and far-seeing statesmanship,
the rule of law, a respect for legitimate institutions, love of truth. . .
.” But, apparently, at least as Mahoney
understands them, this is precisely what the progressives want to do. As he
summarizes progressive thought: “True democracy must move to the
left, becoming ever more inclusive, tolerant, egalitarian, and
relativistic. To realize the democratic ideal, we must
reject antiquated truths and insist on extreme equality and
unlimited personal choice (think “the right to choose” or the self-reinvention
central to “gender theory”). In this view, there is no such thing as loving
democracy (or liberty and equality) too much.”

But while I find Mahoney’s
formulation of this debate humorous, even frivolous, and therefore not worth
much attention, I have to ask two questions. First, where are these values,
composing an “authoritative traditional framework,” to come from? From
tradition? Well, that seems to be quite a weak link on which to hang the worth
of our democracy. As Mahoney notices, the “Founders” themselves merely
“presupposed” – that is, did nothing to provide for – such a “framework.” But
what Mahoney apparently does not notice is that this “oversight” by the
“Framers” was a result of their distrust of tradition as reflected by
Hamilton’s rejection of ancient political thought and practice early on in the Federalist. The “Founders” claimed to
embrace “a new science of politics,” one that made, I am convinced, traditional
kinds of virtues, such as religious piety, seem unnecessary. And as Madison
noted in a letter to Jefferson, defending the proposed Constitution, this was
all to the good because religion had never, in Madison’s telling, proved to be
a deterrent to tyranny, majority or otherwise.

The second question
is this: Supposing we find a source for these values that makes them real, who
in our pantheon of politicians will embrace them? Mahoney suggests that those
who support “the millennial-old institution of marriage” will embrace them. But
aren’t these the same politicians who are embracing American hegemony, and an
hegemony based upon the idea that we can construct a military that can see
everywhere, defend everywhere, and kill everywhere so that we can impose our
will on the world? That is, Mahoney’s only example of the hubris he claims to
be concerned with is those who would “rewrite the millennial-old institution of
marriage by judicial fiat, ignoring nature, tradition, and biology, not to
mention the sacred traditions of the West….” He ignores, completely, the
hubris of those who, like our two Bush presidents, thought they could, by means
of an overwhelmingly powerful military, create “a new world order.” He also
ignores those who, like Dick Cheney, who said we would have to go to “the dark
side” in order to create this new world order. But then perhaps “going to the
dark side” is part of that “authoritative traditional framework” Mahoney is so
enamored with.

Generally speaking,
Mahoney doesn’t mention here – or elsewhere that I am aware of – a view of his
hero Tocqueville according to which modern democracy is condemned, that it is
the wave of the future, a virtual tsunami that will wipe away, gradually but
certainly, the best of our humanity. This is Tocqueville “going to the dark
side.” We can hope that if this is the best interpretation of Tocqueville, that
he, Tocqueville, was wrong. But however that might be, it is certain that a
debate about these “two Tocquevilles” and about their different takes on modern
democracy would be far more worthwhile than “the debate” Mahoney would have us
engage in.