America’s civil war provides lessons for Syria

The civil war in Syria weighs on the American conscience. Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham press for military intervention in the hope that one good shove will topple President Bashar Al-Assad. The ghost of Abraham Lincoln might disagree.

The Egyptian and Libyan governments fell quickly during the Arab Spring. In Libya, NATO jets provided air cover for rebels. Proponents of intervention argue that similar results might be achieved in Syria, too, and we have a duty to try.

But the chemistry of civil war in one country typically cannot be replicated in another. Foreign intervention is an unstable compound when added to the volatile mix. Meddling in domestic disputes has been taboo since the Peace of Westphalia ended the wars of the Reformation, for good reason. Outsiders rarely understand the complexities as participants do, and can make matters worse.

Two 19th-century cases illustrate the point. In 1860 and 1861, Europeans looked aghast upon two miserable brawls, unsure if they had a moral obligation to get involved. In the first instance, they sent troops to tamp down the killing that produced 10,000 deaths. When foreign soldiers eventually withdrew, internal factions were more embittered than ever.

How Europe responded to the humanitarian crises presented by the Syrian Civil War of 1860 and the American Civil War of 1861 offers important lessons. As compelling as arguments may be for taking sides, history shows that – like with forest fires – onlookers sometimes help best by allowing local blazes to burn themselves out.

Maronite Christians initiated the Syrian violence of 1860, which had religious, political and economic roots. Druzes hit back hard. France announced a duty to protect civilians, and led an intervention by five foreign powers. Britain pressed for withdrawal within six months. As foreign minister John Russell cautioned, “If Syria is not tranquilized in that time, it will be clear that no period, however long, will suffice.”

European intervention prompted the Ottoman Empire to police its Syrian province more effectively. But no solution was found to the larger problem of how to share power and land in the Levant.

Those rivalries are still visible. Syria today is comprised of Sunni Arabs, Alawi Arabs, Sunni Kurds, Maronite Christians, Druzes, and Salafi Islamists. The Free Syrian Army is an amorphous coalition with no central command or political platform. Only a common enemy unites it.

Bashar Al-Assad announced limited democratic reforms early on, but the opposition claimed he offered too little, too late. Meanwhile, Assad continues to brutally suppress an uprising that has claimed 70,000 lives. The violence is clearly terrible, but how it might end and what kind of regime would replace Assad is not clear at all.

The American Civil War caused more deaths than any other internecine conflict in the 19th century, outside China’s Taiping Rebellion. Critics in Europe condemned Abraham Lincoln’s “invasion” of the South, and many clamored for intervention.

“I think we must allow the president to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason,” Russell told Prime Minister Palmerston.

The U.N. voted in 2005 that the world has a “responsibility to protect” civilians from mass atrocities. The rub comes in deciding what constitutes “mass atrocities,” and who should lead the “collective” action to protect civilians from themselves or their governments.

McCain and Graham are ready to call out the Marines, but duty is related to proximity. If foreign intervention is required, neighboring countries have greater familiarity and a greater obligation. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the European Union are thousands of miles closer than we are. Fulfilling their responsibilities for them depletes the American treasury and perpetuates a local power vacuum.

Vladimir Putin’s call for peace talks between Assad and the opposition promises a better approach, though not if Russia continues supplying arms.

Staying out of Syria is America’s best choice – not because we don’t want to help, but because we do. And if our government does contemplate force, it’s worth examining how we felt about foreign meddling in our own Civil War and what it might have wrought.

Cobbs Hoffman is the author of “American Umpire,” recently released by Harvard Press. She holds the Dwight E. Stanford Chair in U.S. foreign relations at San Diego State University and is a national fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.