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People
have asked me to write a Daily Blog.
They seem to want me to give them a thought
or two each day. About what? Well,
we'll just
have to wait and see. As, I see it, a blog is a
personal statement. I will try to make it enter-
taining and relate it mostly to the stock market.

I do promise not to belabor the
obvious. So,
I hope these thoughts, reflections and finds are
worth your time. I will give you my best.

Insiders
on Wall Street knew America
would not be able to escape World War II.

In this climate, looking back, we should certainly ask why was Pearl Harbor not more
prepared
for a potential attack. Despite this, I do think the narrative below shows FDR did
not purposely
invite such an attack, or know in advance that Pearl would be attacked,
as right-wing conspiracy
mongers are wont to suggest.

When the DJI rallies to the upper band and our Accumulation Index is negative or nearly
so,
we believe it shows insider selling and big money distribution. Such insider
big-money selling
xan be seen in Septembert, 1941. This is not said lightly. Insider selling, measured
like this, was
apparent at nearly every top since 1928, the first year for which we can get the necessary
data.
See how often significant market tops from 1929 on could have been called by our creation,
The Tiger Accumulation Index. Market Tops: 1929-1965Major Tops: 1966-2002
(bottom of page) 2006, 2007

FDR
and The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Another Conspiracy Theory To Dismiss Outright.

Sixty six years have passed since 8:00 AM Sunday morning
when Japan attacked Hawaii and the US and started
World
War II for the US. Three generations people are
still claiming
FDR left the deliberately US unprotected. Many
of the same
people who are willing to believe that the Bush
Administration
orchestrated 9/11, believe FDR knowing provoked Japan
into
attacking an unprotected Pearl Harbor.

Did Roosevelt Know in
Advance?

Did the President of
the United States actually know in
advance that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor
and yet say nothing to the American People and Let The
American Military Suffer Tragic Losses? Presumably,
he
wanted an unprovoked attack to switch American public
opinion away from its inter-war isolationism.

I'm not so cynical. I
distrust those who weave such
conspiracies. They want to believe the worst of their
political
enemies. From what I have seen, men make plenty of mistakes
of judgement. It is not necessary to claim that they
willfully
do these things. George Bush is certainly not very bright
and
and he has surrounded himself with some particularly venal
men, but I don't, for a minute, think he is so depraved to
cause 9/11. Likewise, LBJ most certainly was not behind
the assassination of JFK. Most conspiracy theories are bunk
served up to take advantage of the gullibly alienated.

The first
thing to notice is that this explanation
of events began as a campaign issue in 1944 used by Thomas
Dewey. The Republican Senators who took up this claim
because they knew that "certain Japanese codes" had
been
cracked.

Here's the most likely story.

1.) It's true that the US had
broken some Japanese
diplomatic codes, so that the US often knew what diplomatic
positions would be taken in advance by the Japanese.
The
US also knew from this that the Japanese were preparing for
a war. But the US had not cracked the codes that
protected
Japanese military communications. And the Japanese
did
not tell their diplomats where and when their military
would
attack the US.

2.) The US did know that the
Japanese were up to something.
The intercepted diplomatic communications told the US that
the Japanese diplomats were told to destroy their
cipher machines
and secret documents on December 7th. From
this, an attack
on the US should have
been deduced. Admiral Stark, the Chief
Naval Officer of the US at the time concluded that an
attack was
likely in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies or
Singapore.
Hawaii was apparently not considered. The fact
that US carriers
were out to sea on maneuvers proves nothing.
The significance
of carriers in naval warfare was not yet proven. The
battle ships
could just as easily have been sent on manouvers.
They were not,
because the attack was on Pearl Harbor was
unexpected.

3.) Anti-war sentiment in the US was waning by the
Fall of 1941,
partly because US ships were being sunk by German
sub-marines.
Congress had voted to extend draftees for more than
12 months.
Polls showed that more than two thirds of Americans
favored
risking war with Germany and Japan if they became
more
aggressive. There was no need to permit an attack on
Pearl
Harbor to get public support for US involvement.
The passive
of the Lend Lease program in March 1941 shows that
Congress
was already preparing for war, but like FDR wanted to
avoid it
as long as possible.

4.) What Japan did at Pearl Harbor was unthinkably
vile
and wicked. It would not have been easy for
even cynical
intelligence agents and politicians to foresee this
act of total
perfidy and murder. The conspiracy mongers
should give more
attention to and study the breakdown of Japanese
humanity.
Blaming FDR for what the Japanese Emperor, milirary
and
war-worshippers did seems wrong.

The crux of this conspiracy theory is:
1) that the US had intercepted and understoodthe radio messages
sent by Japan's Admiral Yamamoto to the Japanese war shipsheaded
for Hawaii. The November 25th message read:  the task force, keeping its movements strictly
secret
and maintaining close guard against submarines and
aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon
the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force
of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow This is the contention of Robert Stinnet in Days of Deceit
He claims this message
was sent "in the clear", unencrypted. Not true.
The problem with this is that
Admiral Yamoto's biographer makes it
clear that this message,
the famous "Climb Mt. Niitaka 1208, was was encrypted with a
special five number coding system, JN-25B, which was different than the
one Stinnet claims the US had broken. One critic, Lt. Philip H. Jacobsen, a Navy cryptologist for 27 years,
of Stinnet said: "The book misleads the uninitiated reader
by lumping the relatively simple
JN-25A code and cipher system that took 14 months to read with the much more
complicated JN-25B system together as "Code Book D." Thus, the final successes
of JN-25A are imputed to JN-25B even though the first significant reported decrypt of
the latter much more complicated code and cipher system was in early 1942."(http://www.amazon.com/review/product/0743201299/ref=dp_top_cm_cr_acr_txt/105-0932341-4166013?%5Fencoding=UTF8&showViewpoints=1)

As
for the charge that Roosevelt had settled on a strategy
of provoking a Japanese attack, I have
concluded simply that FDR saw as did the rest of the world,
that Japan was building an empire, as Germany was, and that their
military needed oil. The best way to oppose their military expansionism
was to deny them oil. The US properly demanded that Japan
withdraw from China and Indo-China in return for a lifting of the oil
embargo.

Cryptology

Japanese Purple Machine

"The PURPLE machine itself was first used by Japan in 1940, but US and British
cryptographers had broken some of its messages well before the attack
on Pearl Harbor. US cryptographers decrypted and translated the 14-part Japanese diplomatic
message breaking off relations (ominously) with the United States at 1PM Washington time
on 7 December 1941 before the Japanese Embassy in
Washington could do so. Difficulties at the Embassy were a major reason the note was
delivered late.

The US found no hint of the attack on Pearl Harbor in the PURPLE traffic at the time,
nor could they have as the Japanese
were very careful to not discuss the planned attack in Foreign Office communications. In
fact, no detailed information about the planned attack was even available to the Japanese Foreign Office;
it was regarded by the military, particularly the more nationalistic military, as
insufficiently 'reliable'. US access to private Japanese diplomatic
communications (even the most secret ones) was less useful than it might otherwise have
been because policy in Japan in the pre-War period was controlled largely by military
groups (eg, in China and Manchuria), not by the
Foreign Office. The Foreign Office itself deliberately kept from its embassies and
consulates much of the information it did have, so the ability to read PURPLE
transmissions was less than definitive regarding Japanese tactical or
strategic military intentions.

Handling of Magic prior to Pearl Harbor attacks

Even so, the diplomatic information discovered was of even more limited value to the US
because of its dissemination pattern within the US Government. "Magic" traffic
was distributed in such a way that many policy makers who should have access to it to do
their jobs knew nothing of it, and those to whom it actually was distributed (at least
before Pearl Harbor) saw each message only briefly, as the
courier stood by to take it back, and in isolation from all others (no copies or notes
were permitted). Before Pearl Harbor, in any case, they saw only those decrypts thought
"important enough" by the distributing Army or Navy officers. Nonetheless,
being able to read PURPLE messages gave the Allies a great advantage in the War; for instance, the Japanese ambassador to Germany produced long
reports for Tokyo which
were encrypted with the PURPLE machine. They included reports on personal discussions with
Hitler and a report on a
tour of the invasion defenses in Northern France (including the D-Day invasion beaches).( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography
)
German Machines: Lorenz

27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max
Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence
sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This
information was sent to the State Department and Naval Intelligence and to Admiral Kimmel
at Hawaii.

31 March 1941 - A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan
made war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft
from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had assumed that Japan, on the
outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet wherever it was. The fleet was the only
threat to Japan's plans. Logically, Japan couldn't engage in any major operation with the
American fleet on its flank. The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.

July - The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese
were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl
Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to
positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.

10 August 1941, the top British agent, code named "Tricycle", Dusko
Popov, told the FBI of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The
FBI told him that his information was "too precise, too complete to be believed. The
questionnaire plus the other information you brought spell out in detail exactly where,
when, how, and by whom we are to be attacked. If anything, it sounds like a trap." He
also reported that a senior Japanese naval person had gone to Taranto to collect all
secret data on the attack there and that it was of utmost importance to them. The info was
given to Naval IQ.

Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan, an agent for the Sino-Korean People's League,
told Eric Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea and Japan had positive
proof that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among other
things, one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late October, Haan finally convinced US
Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were planning to attack in December or January.
Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence and FDR personally.

24 September 1941, the " bomb plot" message in J-19 code from Japan
Naval Intelligence to Japan' s consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of exact
locations of ships pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was
deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT location of ships in harbor, unless to
attack them - it was a dead giveaway. Chief of War Plans Turner and Chief of Naval
Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and warnings based on it prepared by Safford and
others from being passed to Hawaii. The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was
replaced because he insisted on warning HI. It was lack of information like this that lead
to the exoneration of the Hawaii commanders and the blaming of Washington for
unpreparedness for the attack by the Army Board and Navy Court. At no time did the
Japanese ever ask for a similar bomb plot for any other American military installation.
Why the Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese spying on PH has never been
explained, but they blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall of 1941 to allow it
to continue. The bomb plots were addressed to "Chief of 3rd Bureau, Naval General
Staff", marked Secret Intelligence message, and given special serial numbers,
so their significance couldn't be missed. There were about 95 ships in port. The text was:

"Strictly secret.
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible:
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you
like.)
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"

Simple traffic analysis of the accelerated frequency of messages from various Japanese
consuls gave a another identification of war preparations, from Aug-Dec there were 6
messages from Seattle, 18 from Panama, 55 from Manila and 68 from Hawaii.

Oct. - Soviet top spy Richard Sorge, the greatest spy in history, informed
Kremlin that Pearl Harbor would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him that this
was passed to the US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in the War
Department's copy of Sorge's 32,000 word confession to the Japanese were deleted. NY Daily
News, 17 May 1951.

16 Oct. - FDR grossly humiliated Japan's Ambassador and refused to meet with
Premier Konoye to engineer the war party, lead by General Tojo, into power in Japan.

1 Nov. - JN-25 Order to continue drills against anchored capital ships to prepare
to "ambush and completely destroy the US enemy." The message included references
to armor-piercing bombs and 'near surface torpedoes.'

13 Nov. - The German Ambassador to US, Dr. Thomsen an anti-Nazi, told US IQ that
Pearl Harbor would be attacked.

14 Nov. - Japanese Merchant Marine was alerted that wartime recognition signals
would be in effect Dec 1.

22 Nov. - Tokyo said to Ambassador Nomura in Washington about extending the
deadline for negotiations to November 29: "...this time we mean it, that the deadline
absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."

CIA Director Allen Dulles told people that US was warned in mid-November that the
Japanese Fleet had sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was going to attack Pearl Harbor. CIA
FOIA

23 Nov. - JN25 order - "The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on
X-day." (Tokyo time or 8 A.M. Honolulu time)

25 Nov. - British decrypted the Winds setup message sent Nov. 19. The US decoded
it Nov. 28. It was a J-19 Code message that there would be an attack and that the signal
would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report - rain meaning war, east (Higashi) meaning
US.

25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary "FDR stated that we
were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked: "the
question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot
without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting
the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of
the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this
so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."

25 Nov. - Navy Department ordered all US trans-Pacific shipping to take the
southern route. PHH 12:317 (PHH = 1946 Congressional Report, vol. 12, page 317) ADM Turner
testified "We sent the traffic down to the Torres Straight, so that the track of the
Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic." PHH 4:1942

25 Nov. - Yamamoto radioed this order in JN-25: " (a) The task force,
keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and
aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities,
shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal
blow. The raid is planned for dawn on X-day -- exact date to be given by later order. (b)
Should the negotiations with the US prove successful, the task force shall hold itself in
readiness forthwith to return and reassemble. (c) The task force will move out of
Hitokappu Wan on the morning of 26 November and advance to the standing-by position on the
afternoon of 4 December and speedily complete refueling." ( Order
to sail - scan from the PHA Congressional Hearings Report, vol 1 p 180, transcript p
437-8) This was decoded by the British on November 25 and the Dutch on November 27. When
it was decoded by the US is a national secret, however, on November 26 Naval Intelligence
reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for
offensive action.

26 Nov. 3 A.M. - Churchill sent an urgent secret message to FDR, probably
containing above message. This message caused the greatest agitation in DC. Of Churchill's
voluminous correspondence with FDR, this is the only message that has not been released
(on the grounds that it would damage national security). Stark testified that "On
November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intention to wage
offensive war against Great Britain and the United States." C.I.A. Director William
Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941, in his book THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER, p 7, wrote
"The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward
Hawaii." Washington, in an order of Nov 26 as a result of the "first shot"
meeting the day before, ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the
Lexington out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as practicable." This order included
stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection.
In response to Churchill's message, FDR secretly cabled him that afternoon -
"Negotiations off. Services expect action within two weeks." Note that the only
way FDR could have linked negotiations with service action, let alone have known the
timing of the action, was if he had the message to sail. In other words, the only service
action contingent on negotiations was Pearl Harbor.

26 Nov. - the "most fateful document " was Hull's
ultimatum that Japan must withdraw from Indochina and all China. FDR's Ambassador to
Japan called this "The document that touched the button that started the war."

27 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson sent a confused and confusing hostile
action possible or DO-DON'T warning. The Navy Court found this message directed
attention away from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward it. One purpose of the message was to
mislead HI into believing negotiations were continuing. The Army which could not do
reconnaissance was ordered to and the Navy which could was ordered not to. The Army was
ordered on sabotage alert, which specifically precluded attention to outside threat. Navy
attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC repeated, no less than three times as a
direct instruction of the President, "The US desires that Japan commit the first
overt act Period." It was unusual that FDR directed this warning, a routine matter,
to Hawaii which is proof that he knew other warnings were not sent. A simple
question--what Japanese "overt act" was FDR expecting at Pearl Harbor? He
ordered sabotage prevented and subs couldn't enter, that leaves air attack. The words
"overt act" disclose FDR's intent - not just that Japan be allowed to attack but
that they inflict damage on the fleet. This FDR order to allow a Japanese attack was aid
to the enemy - explicit treason.

29 Nov.- Hull sat in Layfayette Park across from the White House with ace United
Press reporter Joe Leib and showed him a message stating that Pearl Harbor would be
attacked on December 7. This could well have been the Nov. 26 message from Churchill. The
New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH report on page 13 under the headline "Attack Was
Expected" stated the US had known that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked the week
before. Perhaps Leib wasn't the only reporter Hull told.

29 Nov. - The FBI embassy tap made an intercept of an uncoded plain-text Japanese
telephone conversation in which an Embassy functionary (Kurusu) asked 'Tell me, what zero
hour is. Otherwise, I won't be able to carry on diplomacy.' The voice from Tokyo (K.
Yamamoto) said softly, 'Well then, I will tell you. Zero hour is December 8 (Tokyo time,
ie, December 7 US time) at Pearl Harbor.' (US Navy translation 29 Nov)

30 Nov. US Time (or 1 Dec. Tokyo time) - The Japanese fleet was radioed this
Imperial Naval Order (JN-25): "JAPAN, UNDER THE NECESSITY OF HER SELF-PRESERVATION
AND SELF-DEFENSE, HAS REACHED A POSITION TO DECLARE WAR ON THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." (Congress
Appendix D, p 415). US ally China also recovered it in plain text from a shot-down
Japanese Army plane near Canton that evening. This caused an emergency Imperial Conference
because they knew the Chinese would give the information to GB and US. In a related J-19
message the next day, the US translated elaborate instructions from Japan dealing in
precise detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia
"on the outbreak of war with England and the United States"

1 Dec. - Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI, Twelfth Naval District in San
Francisco found the missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports from the four wireless
news services and several shipping companies that they were getting strange signals west
of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew the exact location of the Japanese fleet because
they asked the Japanese in advance to let one of their ships pass (Layton p 261). This
info was most likely given to them by US because Sorge's spy ring was rolled up November
14. All long-range PBY patrols from the Aleutians were ordered stopped on Dec 6 to prevent
contact.

1 Dec. - The tanker Shiriya, which had been added to the Striking Force in
an order intercepted Nov 14, radioed "proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E.
Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December." (near HI) The fact that this message
is in the National Archives destroys the myth that the attack fleet maintained radio
silence. They were not ordered to (Order 820). Serial numbers prove that the Striking
Force sent over 663 radio messages between Nov 16 and Dec 7 or about 1 per hour. The NSA
has not released any raw intercepts because the headers would prove that the Striking
Force did not maintain radio silence. On Nov 29 the Hiyei sent one message to the
Commander of the 3rd fleet; on Nov 30 the Akagi sent several messages to its tankers - see
page 474 of the Hewitt
Report. Stinnett in DAY OF DECEIT (p 209) found over 100 messages from the Striking
Force in the National Archives. All Direction Finding reports from HI have been crudely
cut out. Reports from Dec 5 show messages sent from the Striking Force picked up by
Station Cast, P.I.

From traffic analysis, HI reported that the carrier force was
at sea and in the North. THE MOST AMAZING FACT is that in reply to that report,
MacArthur's command sent a series of three messages, Nov 26, 29, Dec 2, to HI lying about
the location of the carrier fleet - saying it was in the South China Sea. This false
information, which the NSA calls inexplicable, was the true reason that HI was caught
unawares. Duane Whitlock, who is still alive in Iowa, sent those messages.

There were a large number of other messages that gave the location of the Striking Force
by alluding to the Aleutians, the North Pacific and various weather systems near HI.

1 Dec. - FDR cut short his scheduled ten day vacation after 1 day to meet with
Hull and Stark. The result of this meeting was reported on 2 Dec. by the Washington Post:
"President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and military
moves relating to Japan." This politically damaging move was necessary to prevent the
mutiny of conspirators.

1 Dec. 3:30 P.M. FDR read Foreign Minister Togo's message to his ambassador to
Germany: "Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger between Japan &
Anglo-Saxon nations through some clash of arms, add that the time of this war may come
quicker than anyone dreams." This was in response to extreme German pressure on
November 29 for Japan to strike the US and promises to join with Japan in war against the
US. The second of its three parts has never been released. The message says it contains
the plan of campaign. This is 1 of only 3 known DIPLOMATIC intercepts that specified PH as
target. It was so interesting, FDR kept a copy.

2 Dec. - Commander of the Combined Imperial Fleet Yamamoto radioed the attack
fleet in plain (uncoded) Japanese Climb
Niitakayama 1208 (Dec 8 Japanese time, Dec 7 our time). Thus the US knew EXACTLY when
the war would start. Mount Niitaka was the highest mountain in the Japanese Empire -
13,113 feet.

2 Dec. - General Hein Ter Poorten, the commander of the Netherlands East Indies
Army gave the Winds setup message to the US War Department. The Australians had a center
in Melbourne and the Chinese also broke JN-25. A Dutch sub had visually tracked the attack
fleet to the Kurile Islands in early November and this info was passed to DC, but DC did
not give it to HI. The intercepts the Dutch gave the US are still classified in RG 38, Box
792.

2 Dec - Japanese order No. 902 specified that old JN-25 additive tables version 7
would continue to be used alongside version 8 when the latter was introduced on December
4. This means the US read all messages to the Striking Force through the attack.

4 Dec. - In the early hours, Ralph Briggs at the Navy's East Coast Intercept
station, received the "East Winds, Rain" message, the Winds Execute, which meant
war. He put it on the TWX circuit immediately and called his commander. This message was
deleted from the files. One of the main coverups of Pearl Harbor was to make this message
disappear. Japanese Dispatch # 7001. In response to the Winds Execute, the Office of US
Naval IQ had all Far Eastern stations (Hawaii not informed) destroy their codes and
classified documents including the Tokyo Embassy.

4 Dec. - The Dutch invoked the ADB joint defense agreement when the Japanese
crossed the magic line of 100 East and 10 North. The U.S. was at war with Japan 3 days
before they were at war with us.

4 Dec. - General Ter Poorten sent all the details of the Winds Execute command to
Colonel Weijerman, the Dutch military attache' in Washington to pass on to the highest
military circles. Weijerman personally gave it to Marshall, Chief of Staff of the War
Department.

4 Dec - US General Thorpe at Java sent four messages warning of the PH attack. DC
ordered him to stop sending warnings.

5 Dec. - All Japanese international shipping had returned to home port.

5 December - In the morning FDR dictated a letter to Wendell Wilkie for the Australian
Prime Minister, "There is always the Japanese to consider. The situation is
definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment...Perhaps the next four
or five days will decide the matters."

5 Dec. - At a Cabinet meeting, Secretary of the Navy Knox said, "Well, you
know Mr. President, we know where the Japanese fleet is?" "Yes, I know"
said FDR. " I think we ought to tell everybody just how ticklish the situation is. We
have information as Knox just mentioned...Well, you tell them what it is, Frank."
Knox became very excited and said, "Well, we have very secret information that the
Japanese fleet is out at sea. Our information is..." and then a scowling FDR cut him
off. (Infamy, Toland, 1982, ch 14 sec 5)

5 Dec. - Washington Star reporter Constantine Brown quotes a friend in his book The
Coming of the Whirlwind p 291, "This is it! The Japs are ready to attack. We've
broken their code, and we've read their ORDERS."

5 Dec. - Lt. Howard Brown of Station Cast in the Philippines received urgent
request from Washington to listen for a short message from Tokyo which ended with the
English word "stop". He heard the message at 11:30 PM Hawaiian time Dec 6. This
is the Hidden Word Code set up in a message of November 27 (e.g. in code, Roosevelt=Miss
Kimiko). The message was: "Relations between Japan and the following countries are on
the brink of catastrophe: Britain and the United States."

6 December - This 18 November J19 message was translated by the Army:
"1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my No.219
on that day. Area A -- A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left
port. Area C -- 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in harbor. The carrier Enterprise, or some other
vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class
were tied up at docks 'KS'. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D.
3. At 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the
Harbor..." Of course this information was not passed to HI.

6 Dec. - A Dec 2 request from Tokyo to HI for information about the absence of
barrage balloons, anti-torpedo nets and air recon was translated by the Army.

6 Dec. - at 9:30 P.M FDR read the first 13 parts of the decoded Japanese
diplomatic declaration of war and said "This means war." What kind of President
would do nothing? When he returned to his 34 dinner guests he said, "The war starts
tomorrow."

6 Dec. - the war cabinet: FDR, top advisor Hopkins, Stimson, Marshall, Secretary
of the Navy Knox, with aides John McCrea and Frank Beatty "deliberately sat through
the night of 6 December 1941 waiting for the Japs to strike." (Infamy ch 16
sec 2)

7 December - A message from the Japanese Consul in Budapest to Tokyo:
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a
British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the
7th." The communique was the Dec 5th War Alert from the British Admiralty. It
has disappeared. This triple priority alert was delivered to FDR personally. The Mid-East
British Air Marshall told Col. Bonner Fellers on Saturday that he had received a secret
signal that America was coming into the war in 24 hours. Churchill summarized the message
in GRAND ALLIANCE page 601 as listing the two fleets attacking British targets and
"Other Japanese fleets...also at sea on other tasks." There only were three
other fleets- for Guam, the Philippines and HI. 2 paragraphs of the alert, British targets
only, are printed in AT DAWN WE SLEPT, Prange, p 464. There is no innocent purpose for our
government to hide this document.

7 December 1941 very early Washington time, there were two Marines, an emergency
special detail, stationed outside the Japanese Naval Attache's door. 9:30 AM Aides begged
Stark to send a warning to Hawaii. He did not. 10 AM FDR read the 14th part, 11 A.M. FDR
read the 15th part setting the time for the declaration of war to be delivered to the
State Department at 1 PM, about dawn Pearl Harbor time, and did nothing. Navy Secretary
Knox was given the 15th part at 11:15 A.M. with this note from the Office of Naval IQ:
"This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." Naval IQ also transmitted
this prediction to Hull and about 8 others, including the White House (PHH 36:532). At
10:30 AM Bratton informed Marshall that he had a most important message (the 15th part)
and would bring it to Marshall's quarters but Marshall said he would take it at his
office. At 11:25 Marshall reached his office according to Bratton. Marshall testified that
he had been riding horses that morning but he was contradicted by Harrison, McCollum, and
Deane. Marshall who had read the first 13 parts by 10 PM the prior night, perjured himself
by denying that he had even received them. Marshall, in the face of his aides' urgent
supplications that he warn Hawaii, made strange delays including reading and re-reading
all of the 10 minute long 14
Part Message (and some parts several times) which took an hour and refused to use the
scrambler phone on his desk, refused to send a warning by the fast, more secure Navy
system but sent Bratton three times to inquire how long it would take to send his watered
down warning - when informed it would take 30 or 40 minutes by Army radio, he was
satisfied (that meant he had delayed enough so the warning wouldn't reach Pearl Harbor
until after the 1 PM Washington time deadline). The warning was in fact sent commercial
without priority identification and arrived 6 hours late. This message reached all other
addressees, like the Philippines and Canal Zone, in a timely manner.

7 December - 7:55 A.M. Hawaii time AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL.

7 December - 1:50 P.M. Washington time. Harry Hopkins, who was the only person
with FDR when he received the news of the attack by telephone from Knox, wrote that FDR
was unsurprised and expressed "great relief." Eleanor Roosevelt wrote about
December 7th in This I Remember p 233, that FDR became "in a way more
serene." In the NY Times Magazine of October 8, 1944 she wrote: "December 7
was...far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of
the sort for a long time."

7 December - 3:00 PM "The (war cabinet) conference met in not too tense an
atmosphere because I think that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was
Hitler...and that Japan had given us an opportunity." Harry Hopkins (top KGB agent
and FDR's alter ego), Dec. 7 Memo (Roosevelt and Hopkins R Sherwood, p. 431)

7 December - 9 hours later, MacArthur's entire air force was caught by surprise
and wiped out in the Philippines. His reaction to the news of Pearl Harbor was quite
unusual - he locked himself in his room all morning and refused to meet with his air
commander General Brereton, and refused to attack Japanese forces on Formosa even under
orders from the War Department. MacArthur gave three conflicting orders that ensured the
planes were on the ground most of the morning. MacArthur used radar tracking of the
Japanese planes at 140, 100, 80, 60, down to 20 miles to time his final order and ensure
his planes were on the ground. Strategically, the destruction of half of all US heavy
bombers in the world was more important than naval damage in Pearl Harbor. Either
MacArthur had committed the greatest blunder in military history or he was under orders to
allow his forces to be destroyed. If it were the greatest blunder in history, it is
remarkable how he escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his fourth star and
Congressional Medal of Honor shortly later. Prange argued, "How could the President
ensure a successful Japanese attack unless he confided in the commanders and persuaded
them to allow the enemy to proceed unhindered?"

7 December - 8:30 PM, FDR said to his cabinet, "We have reason to believe
that the Germans have told the Japanese that if Japan declares war, they will too. In
other words, a declaration of war by Japan automatically brings..." at which point he
was interrupted, but his expectation and focus is clear. Mrs. Frances Perkins, Secretary
of Labor, observed later about FDR: "I had a deep emotional feeling that something
was wrong, that this situation was not all it appeared to be." Mrs. Perkins was
obsessed by Roosevelt's strange reactions that night and remarked particularly on the
expression he had:" In other words, there have been times when I associated that
expression with a kind of evasiveness."

FDR met with CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow at midnight. Murrow, who had seen many
statesmen in crises, was surprised at FDR's calm reaction. After chatting about London,
they reviewed the latest news from PH and then FDR tested Murrow's news instincts with
these 2 bizarre giveaway questions: "Did this surprise you?" Murrow said yes.
FDR: "Maybe you think it didn't surprise us?" FDR gave the impression that the
attack itself was not unwelcome. This is the same high-strung FDR that got polio when
convicted of perjury; the same FDR that was bedridden for a month when he learned Russia
was to be attacked; the same FDR who couldn't eat or drink when he got the Japanese order
to sail.

8 December - In a conversation with his speech writer Rosenman, FDR
"emphasized that Hitler was still the first target, but he feared that a great many
Americans would insist that we make the war in the Pacific at least equally important with
the war against Hitler."

Later, Jonathan Daniels, administrative assistant and press secretary to FDR said,
"The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be...But the risks paid
off; even the loss was worth the price..."

FDR reminisced with Stalin at Tehran on November 30, 1943, saying "if the Japanese
had not attacked the US he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send any
American forces to Europe." Compare this statement with what FDR said at the Atlantic
Conference 4 months before Pearl: "Everything was to be done to force an 'incident'
to justify hostilities." Given that a Japanese attack was the only possible incident,
then FDR had said he would do it.