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U.S. Military & Iran — Part 4

What assets and weapons systems would the U.S. military likely
use in any strike against Iran’s nuclear program, and what targets
would it seek to use them against?

Historically, the military has used just two carrier groups for
actions in the Persian Gulf. That was the deployment before
Operation Desert Strike, a two-day bombing campaign in 1996, and
Operation Desert Fox, a three-day bombing campaign two years later
— both against targets in Iraq.

The capabilities of carrier groups are boosted by Tomahawk
cruise missiles, which can be carried by cruisers, destroyers and
submarines. With a range of up to 1,500 kilometers and the ability
to hit targets with precision, the missiles are likely to be part
of any attack.

But despite undeniable improvements in recent years,
carrier-based air power still has limitations. A carrier strike
group has far less actual attack planes than an Air Force air wing,
and the planes it does have are of shorter range.

Patriot air defense systems might be deployed to U.S. allies in
the gulf in an effort to offset any Iranian retaliation aimed at
them. And there may be deployment of some of the U.S.
European-based missile defense assets to Israel, just as there was
before Gulf II.

There would also likely be the deployment of mine sweepers to
keep sea lanes in the Persian Gulf, particularly the Strait of
Hormuz, open.

One would also likely see deployment of additional U.S. fighters
and fighter-bombers onto bases in Iraq, and maybe some into
Afghanistan.

But the best indicator of a forthcoming attack would be the
forward deployment of large numbers of KC-10 and KC-135 refueling
tankers. An attack using U.S.-based bombers would require lots of
tanker support, staging from places like Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean, Bulgaria and Romania.

The existence of bases in Iraq and Afghanistan capable of
handling the full range of U.S. fighter-bombers greatly expands
U.S. Air Force capabilities for such an attack. But the central
role is likely to played by the 22 B-2B “Spirit” bombers, which are
based at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri and can be hosted at
U.S. bases on Diego Garcia and Guam in the Pacific and at RAF
Fairford in Great Britain.

B1-B and B-52H bombers would likely make additional strikes.
Like the B-2 they have the range to launch attacks on Iran from
distant locations and great payload capabilities — the B-52H
carries up to 70,000 pounds of bombs and can launch cruise
missiles, which neither of the other aircraft can accommodate.

Supporting aircraft would likely include E-3 AWACS command and
control planes, and larger strikes might include the use of smaller
aircraft for precision strikes such as the F-15E Strike Eagle and
F/A-18 Hornet, both of which are equipped to carry special
penetrative munitions. Such a strike could witness the combat debut
of the F-22, currently based at Langley AFB in Virginia.

Pentagon officials have identified 1,500 “aim points” —
distinct targets — in Iran’s nuclear complex. Hitting them all, or
even most of them, would require at least hundreds, if not
thousands, of sorties.

Analysts like Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy have urged the destruction first and foremost of
facilities used to produce the components for the centrifuges that
Iran is using for uranium enrichment.

“It would be desirable to destroy workshops engaged in the
production of centrifuge components as soon as possible,” he wrote.
It might make sense to wait to strike some other facilities,
especially those still incomplete. “Striking facilities that are in
the early phases of construction now would yield little benefit; it
would make sense to wait until they are closer to completion,
although protective measures at these sites might well improve with
the passage of time.”

Still, by definition, any attack on Iran’s nuclear program could
not be a so-called surgical strike. The Iranians remember very well
from Israel’s 1981 lightning strike against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear
reactor. They have dispersed their nuclear facilities and buried
some of them deep underground. Satellite images suggest the
Iranians have constructed underground chambers, protecting their
equipment with as much as 45 feet of reinforced concrete and
dirt.

Osirak, on the other hand, was just one, easily identified,
above-ground site.

Moreover, Iran’s nuclear facilities are located near densely
populated towns, and those living or working nearby would be at
serious risk. For example, bombing the uranium conversion facility
at Esfahan is complicated by the uranium stockpile already there.
Destruction of the facility will certainly result in the release of
tons of uranium hexafluoride and other fluorine and uranium
products into the atmosphere.

In addition to the environmental contamination due to the
release of uranium, the presence of fluorine in the atmosphere will
almost certainly result in significant production of hydrofluoric
acid, an intensely corrosive substance that has the potential to
cause extensive damage. Adding to the potential for civilian
casualties is the proximity of the city of Esfahan, a metropolis of
close to 4.5 million people.

According to Anthony Cordesman, an analyst with the Center for
Strategic & International Studies in Washington, Iran has clustered
land-based air defense systems — U.S.-made Improved Hawks dating
from the 1970s and Soviet-era SA-2s — around some obvious targets,
such as the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, south of Tehran,
and the heavy-water reactor at Arak, southwest of Tehran.

Another obvious target is the Russian-designed reactor being
built at Bushehr, along the Persian Gulf coast. But it is a risky
target because of the several hundred Russian workers there who
might be killed.

David Isenberg is a U.S. Navy
veteran and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign
Policy. He is an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute, a
contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project, a research
fellow at the Independent Institute, and a correspondent for Asia
Times.