Paperback Book, 392 pages

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In this Second Edition of Inside the Iranian Revolution, first published in 1981, author John Stempel describes his experience and insight as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer in Tehran from 1975-1979. He then continues with an updated chapters to describe what we can draw from the experiences of three decades ago and apply to the current diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Iran. "John Stempel is a Foreign Service offi cer who was stationed in Tehran through the early stages of the Iranian revolution; he left four months before the hostages were taken. Mr. Stempel explains the strength and weaknesses that accumulated through the Shah's reign. Among the latt er, he says, was the Shah's alternating between att empts to build genuine political support for his regime and reliance on the repressive tactics of his secret police. Mr. Stempel's concluding chapters are effective. He suggests that the Shah might have survived by being simultaneously more liberal and more ruthless-by offering more than a token of political participation to opposition groups, but then punishing those who would not support the liberalized regime. On the American side,Mr. Stempel points out the slowness to develop intelligence sources among opposition groups and the contradictory signals sent to the Shah. Mr. Stempel also implies that, once the hostage situation reached deadlock, the United States should have come more quickly to the recognition that military force was necessary." New York Times Book Review

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In this Second Edition of Inside the Iranian Revolution, first published in 1981, author John Stempel describes his experience and insight as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer in Tehran from 1975-1979. He then continues with an updated chapters to describe what we can draw from the experiences of three decades ago and apply to the current diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Iran. "John Stempel is a Foreign Service offi cer who was stationed in Tehran through the early stages of the Iranian revolution; he left four months before the hostages were taken. Mr. Stempel explains the strength and weaknesses that accumulated through the Shah's reign. Among the latt er, he says, was the Shah's alternating between att empts to build genuine political support for his regime and reliance on the repressive tactics of his secret police. Mr. Stempel's concluding chapters are effective. He suggests that the Shah might have survived by being simultaneously more liberal and more ruthless-by offering more than a token of political participation to opposition groups, but then punishing those who would not support the liberalized regime. On the American side,Mr. Stempel points out the slowness to develop intelligence sources among opposition groups and the contradictory signals sent to the Shah. Mr. Stempel also implies that, once the hostage situation reached deadlock, the United States should have come more quickly to the recognition that military force was necessary." New York Times Book Review