Russia's foreign policy shall be purely pragmatic and match the country's
capabilities and national interests. The 2002 realities fully agreed with this
idea, contained in President Putin's message to the Federal Assembly. Realistic
evaluation of what the country is currently capable of has come to the
forefront.

Russia last year managed to enhance its influence somewhat in the priority
foreign policy area - the Commonwealth of Independent States. Although it has
failed to bring about any qualitative improvement of the CIS as an organization
- judging by the results of the latest summit in summit in Kishinev - Russia's
bilateral relations with individual CIS member-states were developing quite
well. Specific projects and agreements have been achieved with Ukraine
(strategic cooperation in the gas sphere), Armenia (economic cooperation and
mediation in efforts to settle the Karabakh dispute), Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
(settlement of the Caspian Sea status), and Kyrgyzstan (cooperation in the field
of security).

The Kremlin took the most resolute action in relations with Georgia and
Belarus.

Moscow's ultimatum forced Tbilisi to take measures against Chechen militants
in its territory, including the Pankisi gorge. It is noteworthy that U. S.
-hawk-like moves by Russia, coupled with clear argumentation, cut the ground
from under the feet of Eduard Shevardnadze's American supporters.

Relations with Minsk is another bright example. Analysts believe President
Putin has put an end to the "mild' policies of his predecessor to take a
harder line against Lukashenko by refusing to create a over-bureaucratized
supra-national structure, or giving Belarus the right of veto in a future union
state. Although further controversies are not ruled out in either case, the
Kremlin has scored additional points.

One cannot but take note of Russia's leading role in such associations as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization. In the context of the continuing counter-terrorist operation in
Afghanistan and Washington's claims to influence in Central Asia, as well as the
risk of a worsening of the situation around Iraq, a viable security mechanism in
the region will be a trump card in the Russian diplomats' hands.

As for progress in another priority area - European integrationRussia's
capabilities and achievements have proved far more moderate.

Firstly, this is seen in the problem of life support for the westernmost
exclave region of Kaliningrad. The Kremlin has been saying a compromise has been
found and the main task fulfilled - Russians will not have to apply for visas to
cross Lithuania to make trips to and from Kaliningrad. In reality transit
documents have remained in force, although they are not called visas.

Chechnya was another irritant in Russia-European Union relations. At a
certain moment it seemed that the European Union had eased its criticism and
most E. U. countries voiced support for the struggle against extremism. However,
another tide of criticism following the hostage-taking crisis at a Moscow
theater and some Western countries' duplicity in the Zakayev affair have
indicated quite clearly that having defended its right to take a hard line in
his own country in relations with the United States President Putin will now
have to do the same in Europe.

In general, Washington's support on a number of issues should be interpreted
as the Kremlin's success. The United States has begun to recognize Chechen
militant leader Aslan Maskhadov's connections with terrorists. The Department of
State is considering the question of blacklisting some Chechen groups as foreign
terrorist organizations. The international anti-terrorist coalition, in which
Moscow has taken an active part, has continued its efforts to start eliminating
- mostly through U. S. efforts - a hotbed of terrorism and drugs trafficking in
Afghanistan. For Russia, with its years-long tensions on the southern borders,
this is an indisputable benefit.

As for relations with the United States in general, Russia has been drifting
away from attempts to play the role of a counter-balance to the Western
super-power. Cooperation meets Russia's interests to a greater extent.

This allowed to secure the conclusion of a new legally binding agreement
after the United States' walkout from the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty and
to compensate for NATO's expansion with its own closer relations with the
alliance.

Now there is another major question on the agenda of the Russian-U. S.
dialogue - Iraq. Moscow has so far managed to keep Iraqi settlement efforts
within the United Nations. The United States, though, seems reluctant to stay
within the diplomatic framework for too long. In a situation like this Russia
has very little time to save face and to re-adjust its policy to the likely
march of events.

There are several other issues Russia will have to address in 2003. Admission
to the World Trade Organization is one. The clash over admission terms
acceptable to Russia is going to be tough. On the other hand, Moscow is
determined to settle foreign debts, which will let the country's leadership gain
a firmer foothold in negotiations with economically more advanced partners.

Stronger influence in Central Asia is an urgent need. Asia in general should
be high on the list of permanent priorities.

On the whole, a balanced policy matching the realistic capabilities looks the
soundest way of conducting the dialogue in the international scene. It remains
to be seen whether Russia's capabilities in twelve months' time will be greater
than they are today.