News Comment/COMENTARI AL DIA

Europe on Scot and Catalan Independence

by Graham Avery

Europe is a red herring. Switzerland and Norway, the top European economies, are not in the EU. Better for Catalonia to devalue the pesseta from 166 to 250 to the euro and let the Eurozone, not Catalans, subsidise failed state Spain. Below: Graham Avery pours cold water on imperial Spanish and English scaremongering. European citizens have rights and cannot be expelled.

The UK Parliament has commissioned European expert professor Graham Avery of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, on the EU position on independence. No wonder Spain wants to avoid a referendum at all costs and has already refused an EU invitation to report on Catalan independence.

“The object is to clarify the procedure by which, following a referendum in which the Scottish people vote in favour of independence, Scotland could become a member of the EU. In the debate on Scottish independence it is natural that opponents tend to exaggerate the difficulties of EU membership, while proponents tend to minimise them. Scotland’s 5 million people, having been members of the EU for 40 years, have acquired rights as European citizens. For practical and political reasons they could not be asked to leave the EU and apply for readmission. The EU would adopt a simplified procedure for the negotiations, not the traditional procedure followed for the accession of non-member countries. The following cases are relevant: Greenland joined the EU in 1973 as part of Denmark. Later it obtained home rule and voted to leave the EU. In 1990 the GDR joined the GFR and its 16 million people became members of the EU. As a result of Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce the Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent states and they both became members in 2004. German reunification represents in some ways the opposite of Scottish independence: it was enlargement without accession, whereas Scottish independence would be accession without enlargement. The EU adopted a simplified procedure for negotiation. No EU intergovernmental conference was necessary because there was no modification of the EU Treaties. However, for Scotland a modification of the EU Treaties would be necessary, if only to provide for Scottish representation in the EU institutions (number of members of European Parliament, number of votes in Council of Ministers, etc.). For practical and political reasons the idea of Scotland leaving the EU, and subsequently applying to join it, is not feasible. From the practical point of view, it would require complicated temporary arrangements including the possibility of controls at the frontier with England. The EU would not have an interest in creating such an anomaly. From the political point of view, Scotland has been in the EU for 40 years; and its people have acquired rights as European citizens. If they wish to remain in the EU, they could hardly be asked to leave and then reapply for membership in the same way as the people of a non-member country such as Turkey. If a break-up of Belgium were agreed between Wallonia and Flanders, it is inconceivable that other EU members would require 11 million people to leave the EU and then reapply for membership. A protracted accession procedure of that type, with detailed scrutiny of 35 chapters of the EU’s acquis, would not be necessary in the case of Scotland, which has applied the EU’s policies and legislation for 40 years. The changes in the basic Treaties for institutional reasons should not be problematic: for Scotland they could easily be calculated by reference to member states of comparable size (Denmark, Finland & Slovakia have populations of 5-6 million). Although a large number of technical adaptations would be needed in order for Scotland to implement EU law, the vast majority of these would be uncontroversial since they would be based on the existing situation. Scotland’s citizens have a legitimate expectation of the maintenance of the status quo. until the relevant EU rules come up for revision, for example the renegotiation of fishing quotas, or the multi-annual budgetary framework. Such solutions would, in fact, be in Scotland’s interest since it could expect to obtain a better deal as a member state with a full voice and vote.”

(“The foreign policy implications of and for a separate Scotland,” by Graham Avery, UK Parliament HC 643, 17 October 2012)