Messengers
of Death
Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Through
July and August 2011, war-ravaged Afghanistan witnessed
a succession of gruesome suicide bombings, and the trend
demonstrates every sign of continuing. In the latest of
such attacks, on September 4, 2011, at least two security
guards of a private security company were killed and 21
civilians were wounded, after a suicide bomber detonated
explosives inside the company’s compound in southern Kandahar
Province. On August 28, 2011, three civilians (a woman
and her two children) were injured when Taliban
suicide bombers struck at a US-led North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) reconstruction team in Qalat, the
capital of Zabul Province. The intended targets remained
unharmed. On August 27, in three separate suicide attacks,
two in Kandahar City and one in Lashkar Gah, the capital
of Helmand Province, seven people were killed and another
43 were injured. On August 19, 12 people were killed in
a suicide attack on the British Council building in Kabul.
On August 13, six suicide bombers targeting the Parwan
Province Governor Abdul Basir Salangi, in an attack at
Charikan, the provincial capital, killed 22 and injured
34, including 16 Government employees. The Governor, however,
escaped unhurt. On August 2, four people were killed and
10 were injured in a suicide attack in the Northern Province
of Kunduz.

On July
27, 2011 the Mayor of Kandahar City, Ghulam Haider Hamidi
was killed by a suicide bomber, along with one civilian,
while another civilian and a security guard were injured
in the attack. On July 17, Jan Mohammad Khan, top aide
of Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai was killed in Kabul.
Member of Parliament (MP) Mohammad Hashim Watanwal and
a member of the Afghan Police anti-terrorism unit also
died in the attack. On July 13, a suicide bomber blew
himself up inside Sara Mosque in Kandahar City, killing
Mawlawi Hektmatullah Hekmat, the head of religious council
of Kandahar and four others.

Significantly,
despite 30 years of warfare, Afghanistan had never experienced
a suicide attack until September 9, 2001, when the Northern
Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masood was assassinated
at Khwaja Bahauddin in Takhar Province, by two Arab al
Qaeda
suicide bombers. With this event, Afghanistan was thrust
into a new chapter of armed conflict, though suicide bombing
came into prominence only after mid-2005. Since 2005,
Afghanistan has experienced a steady escalation in suicide
bombing fatalities, as recruits from poor, under-educated
or uneducated backgrounds, often recruited from madrassas
(religious seminaries), are recruited and trained
by a multiplicity of terrorist organisations, many at
bases in Pakistan. The principal architect of the initial
upsurge was senior Taliban ‘commander’ Mullah Dadullah
alias Dadullah Akhund, who targeted Afghan and
Western troops in Southern Afghanistan. Though Dadullah
was killed in a raid by International Security Assistance
Force troops in Kandahar City on May 12, 2007, the trend
of suicide bombings continues to terrorise Afghanistan.

According
to partial data collected by the Institute for Conflict
Management from open sources, there have been 735
suicide attacks since September 9, 2001, killing at least
3,753 people.

Out of
the total of 735 suicide strikes, 34 have been ‘major’,
resulting in three or more fatalities, over a period of
11 years. The most significant of these incidents include:

June 25,
2011: 35 people were killed and 13 injured due to a suicide
blast in a hospital in the Azra District of Logar Province.

March 14,
2011: A suicide bomber attacked an Army base in Kunduz
Province, killing at least 37 people and injuring 40.

February
21, 2011: 33 people were killed and 41 were injured in
a suicide attack at the Central Census Department of Imam
Sahib District of Kunduz Province.

June 9,
2010: 40 people were killed and 72 were injured in a suicide
attack by an 18 year old boy in Arghandab District of
Kandahar Province.

August
25, 2009: 46 people were killed and 60 injured in a Vehicle
Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) suicide blast
in the commercial and residential area of Kandahar City.

February
11, 2009: A number of Taliban fighters, including suicide
bombers, storm two Government buildings, including the
Justice Ministry, across the Presidential Palace at Kabul
City, killing more than 20 and injuring nearly 50 people.

February
2, 2009: A suicide bomber killed 21 Afghan Police personnel
and injured seven inside a training center for Police
reservists in the town of Tarin Kot in Uruzgan Province.

July 7,
2008: 58 people were killed in a suicide car bomb attack
outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

February
17, 2008: 67 people were killed in the Arghandab District
of Kandahar, in a suicide attack. The dead included Abdul
Hakim Jan, a prominent leader of the Alokozai tribe and
the commander of the Arghandab District’s contingent of
the [now discontinued] Afghan National Auxiliary Police
(ANAP).

November
6, 2007: A bomber blew himself up when a Parliamentary
delegation visited a sugar factory in Northern Baghlan
Province, killing 74 people. Six Parliamentarians, including
Mustafa Kazimi, who headed the Parliament's Economics
Committee and was a former Government Commerce Minister,
were killed.

September
29, 2006: A suicide bomber blew himself up inside a bus
packed with Afghan Army officers, killing 30 people, including
six civilians.

Suicide
missions in Afghanistan have targeted the ISAF and Afghan
Military, the Afghan Police, as well as softer targets
such as Government leaders, politicians, Government workers
and community leaders. Civilian casualties have also risen
dramatically. According to United Nations Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA) data, in the year 2011, 49 per
cent of a total of 1,462 civilian fatalities were a result
of suicide attacks. Out of the country’s 34 Provinces,
the worst affected were Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and Khost
in the South, and Kabul, Paktika, Nangarhar and Kunar
in the East. The Central Province of Uruzgan, the Northern
Provinces of Takhar and Kunduz, and the western Provinces
of Farah and Herat, bordering Iran, have also been affected
by suicide attacks.

The numerous
armed opposition groups operating in Afghanistan, collectively
referred to as Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) have been
involved in these suicide attacks. AGEs include the Taliban
under the leadership of Mullah Omar; Hezb-i-Islami or
the Haqqani Network, headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; and
al Qaeda affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM).
The cadres executing the suicide strikes have included
Afghan and Pakistani nationals, Afghan refugees settled
in Pakistan, as well as Uzbeks, Tajiks and some elements
from a number of Arab countries. The principal modus
operandi has been the use of Body-Borne Improvised
Explosive Devices (BBIED), Remote Controlled Improvised
Explosive Devices (RCIED) and VBIEDs.

Pakistan’s
menacing proximity and strategic overreach into Afghanistan
underpins the trend of suicide attacks (as, indeed, the
wider insurgency and terrorism) in Afghanistan. UNAMA’s
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Mid-Year Report,
2011, mentions that, on May 7, 2011, the National
Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan arrested
five boys between the ages of 13 and 14, who confessed
that they had undergone training in Peshawar, the Provincial
capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, to carry out
suicide attacks. An earlier UNAMA Report, Suicide Attacks
in Afghanistan (2001-2007), observed that,
without dedicated efforts to eradicate the recruitment
drive in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt, it would be difficult
to reduce the supply of suicide attackers, or to deter
the groups who deploy them. Pakistan’s tribal areas, especially
the North and South Waziristan Agencies, remain the crucial
arena where recruitment and training for suicide attackers,
as well as the furnishing of explosives and equipment,
are concentrated. Significantly, on August 30, 2011, Afghan
President Hamid Karzai released eight children groomed
by Taliban insurgents to become suicide bombers, the youngest
of them just seven years old.

On August
25, 2011, US Army Major General Daniel Allyn, Commanding
General of the Regional Command, East (Afghanistan), thus
expressed serious concern over the continued smuggling
of ammonium nitrate, a key ingredient in bomb making,
from Pakistan, into its strife-torn neighbour. Allyn stated,
"In fact, Afghan Uniform Police (the principal civil
law enforcement agency in the country) this past week
conducted two independent operations responding to intelligence
from their own sources, and captured two different shipments
totaling over 5,750 kilograms of ammonium nitrate”. Along
with ethnic bonding between Pashtuns on both sides of
the AfPak border, innumerable Pakistani madrassas,
thriving on Islamist propaganda and ‘hate literature’,
and covert support from Pakistani state agencies, act
as catalysts to violence and suicide bombings in Afghanistan.

Surprisingly,
the Taliban’s 2010 ‘Code of Conduct’, in paragraph 57
on suicide attacks, imposes a requirement to avoid civilian
casualties. Earlier, in July 2009, Mullah Omar had issued
a previous ‘code of conduct’, “The Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan Rules for Mujahideen”, for Afghan Taliban
in the form of a book with 13 chapters and 67 articles
for distribution to Taliban forces. The earlier code also
called on Taliban fighters to win over the civilian population
and avoid civilian casualties, and included exhortations
to limit the use of suicide attacks to important targets
and set down guidelines for abductions.

Moreover,
the Afghanistan National Ulema Shurah issued a fatwa
in March 2011, condemning the killing of civilians in
both air strikes by the ISAF and in suicide attacks by
AGEs. Nevertheless, deaths from suicide attacks continue
to rise. In 2011 (till September 2), suicide attacks have
already resulted in at least 1019 civilian casualties,
including 329 fatalities. In addition, IEDs caused another
1,272 civilian casualties, including 450 deaths. In addition,
421 ISAF, 101 Afghan National Army (ANA) and 189 Afghan
National and Local Police personnel have already been
killed in 2011 – a large proportion of them in suicide
attacks.

Evidently,
the implementation of the various codes, edicts and fatwas
is far from stringent.

The impact
of suicide bombings on the civilian population extends
far beyond the sepcific victims of these attacks, creating
a lasting climate of fear throughout affected and unaffected
communities alike. Suicide attacks have emerged as one
of the most devastating terrorist tactics in Afghanistan,
distorting public perceptions about the Government’s and
the international community’s capacities to protect Afghans.
These incidents have also attracted widespread international
media attention, even when the attacker manages to kill
only himself. As the supply lines of Ishtihadis
(persons with a strong desire to attain bahisht,
paradise, through martyrdom) are sustained by the perverse
cocktail of religious fanaticism, extremist politics and
regional strategic intent, Afghanistan can only look to
bloodier times in the foreseeable future.

The good
news is that Nepal has a new Prime Minister; the bad,
that the intrinsic and entrenched political instability
that has marred the country since the Constituent Assembly
(CA) Elections of April 2008 and the end of the Monarchy
in May that year, shows no signs of receding.

On August
28, 2011, the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal elected
Unified Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (UCPN-M)
Vice Chairman Baburam Bhattarai, as its fourth Prime Minister
(PM) since the CA Elections. The previous incumbent, Jhala
Nath Khanal of the Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist
Leninist (CPI-UML), had resigned on August 14, 2011, to
pave the way for a National Consensus Government (NCG).
He had, in turn, taken over as Prime Minister just in
February 2011, after a seven month deadlock over the election
of the Prime Minister.

Bhattarai’s
elevation to the PM’s post, however, represented a failure
to establish a NCG, and came after another contentious
election process, and an uncertain last minute deal between
the UCPN-M and the United Democratic Madheshi Front (UDMF),
a grouping of five Madhesh-based parties.

In the
latest electoral process,Bhattarai received 340
votes while Ram Chandra Poudel, the Nepali Congress (NC)
Parliamentary Party leader, who stood against Bhattarai,
received 235. 575 lawmakers, out of a total of 594, participated
in the voting. The UCPN-M has 229 members and the NC,
115, in the CA. The UDMF, with 65 lawmakers, and few fringe
parties, supported Bhattarai, Poudel was backed by the
CPN-UML, which has 108 members, and some small political
formations.

In the
morning ofAugust 28, just before the commencement
of voting, UCPN-M Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka
Prachanda had signed a four-point agreement with leaders
of the UDMF. The UDMF pushed a hard bargain, which reportedly
included up to eleven cabinet and eleven state ministries
in the new Government, including the crucial Home and
Defence portfolios, as well as an assurance of the inclusion
of the Madhesis in the Nepal Army and in public office.

The election
followed the May 29, 2011, 5-point agreement between the
three largest political parties in the CA – UCPN-M, NC
and CPN-UML, to pass the Ninth Amendment to the Interim
Constitution, to extend the CA by another three months.
On August 29, 2011, the CA’s term was once again extended
for another three month, by the Tenth Amendment to the
Interim Constitution.

The failure
to constitute a NCG, and the potential for continuing
instability was clearly recognized by Bhattarai, even
before he was voted to power, as he noted, “It is very
unfortunate that we were not able to form a consensus
government... The country is also caught in a cycle of
frustration and uncertainty.”

That the
country will not quickly find its way out of this cycle
was confirmed by the NC and UML, with both parties openly
declaring that they had no reasons to trust the Maoists.
NC leader Ram Chandra Poudel thus declared, “The Maoists
have constantly breached past agreements and continue
to retain their military apparatus.” Similarly, the UML
noted that they had not yet received any “credible and
acceptable peace process proposals” from the Maoists.
For any significant progress on the fractious issues of
the absorption of Maoist armed cadres into the Nepal Army
(NA) and agreement on a number of divisive clauses in
the Draft Constitution, some agreement between the present
ruling Coalition and these two major political formations
would be necessary – and seems entirely unlikely in the
proximate future.

The stability
of the present arrangement is also enormously jeopardized
from within. Bhattarai’s installation as Prime Minister
represents, at best, a transient victory in an inner-party
factional feud. Despite the fact that Bhattarai’s candidature
was proposed by Party Chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka
Prachanda, the rivalry between the two leaders is legendary.
Worse, Bhattarai’s commitments on the transfer of control
of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) weaponry
to a Special Committee, and to complete the process of
integration with the Nepali Army, have rankled with hardliners,
who insist, on the one hand, that the decision to hand
over keys of the Arms Containers was ‘suicidal’, and that
Bhattarai was exceeding the mandate of the Party’s Central
Committee. The hardliners insist that decisions on the
weapons’ handover issue should have been left to the Party’s
CC meeting , scheduled for September 18, 2011, though
Party Chairman Dahal has strongly criticised the rhetoric
emanating from this faction. Significantly, the keys of
the weapon containers were handed over to the Special
Committee, on September 1, 2011. In protest, the hardline
Mohan Baidya faction refused to send its candidates to
the Cabinet, despite a directive from the Party leadership
to ensure that they were part of the Cabinet expansion
of September 4, 2011.

Bhattarai
has also come under direct personal attack by proxies,
denounced as “a Nepalese face with an Indian mind”, even
as connections with India’s external intelligence agency,
the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) are hinted at.

Acknowledging
the factionalism in his party, Prime Minister Bhattarai,
nevertheless, insists that this was both natural and entirely
manageable. “In a communist party,” Bhattarai argues,
“two-line struggles are natural and we have successfully
managed it so far and we will manage it in the future.”
He insists, further, that, in the Special Committee, “both
PLA and Nepal Army are there. It is not a question of
surrendering to the state, but handing over to the Special
Committee, which is a joint committee.” Nevertheless,
the dangers of factionalism and a possible split in the
party are recognized: “Even if some leaders and cadre
may oppose or some splinter groups may move out, even
then it won’t make much impact on the political line followed
by the party.” An astonishing deadline of 45 days has
been imposed by Bhattarai to complete the weapons transfer
and Army integration processes – and this commitment is
likely to become the anvil on which his political future
will be tested.

Bhattarai
also insists that his ‘majority government’ is only a
prelude to the promised ‘consensus government’ to which
all parties had committed themselves: “unfortunately since
that (a consensus government) could not happen, the second
choice was to start with a majoritarian and work for a
consensus government. Even though I was elected by a majority,
my efforts are directed towards forging consensus.”

The UCPN-M
– UDMF agreement of August 28, 2011, has been preceded
by at least a dozen
earlier agreements between major political
formations in Nepal, since the 12-Point Agreement between
the Seven Political Parties and the Maoists in November
2005, which initiated the peace process and laid the groundwork
for an end to a decade of armed violence. These agreements
have sought to impose and maintain political equilibrium,
to advance the peace process, to establish an effective
structure of Governance, and to take the Constitution
drafting process to a conclusion. These various agreements
have, however, been riven with contradictions and a failure
by various parties to adhere to their terms. Factionalism
in the Madhesi parties is already threatening the survival
of the latest agreement, and this is expected to intensify
once the process of allocation of ministries is completed,
with leaders who are left out potentially resorting to
brinkmanship to press their own case, failing which, they
at least some would attempt to chart out their own course.

Nevertheless,
some sort of a democratic framework has survived in Nepal,
and all major political formations have restricted their
confrontations and contradictions below the threshold
of armed violence. It is abundantly clear that national
consensus on a wide range of issues, including the formation
of a NCG, Army integration, the structure of the Federation,
the form of Government, and a number of other divisive
issues, will remain tantalizingly elusive. Bhattarai has
already admitted that the three month extension of the
CAs tenure will be inadequate to complete the drafting
process, and a nine-month timeframe is likely more realistic.
The gains of the past years, however, are not insignificant.
The absence of sustained armed violence – despite the
persistence of intimidation and sporadic incidents of
bloodshed – has itself transformed both politics and the
character of political parties in Nepal, including, most
significantly, the Maoists. Despite intra- and inter-party
friction, there is no reason to believe that this process
will not deepen, or that there will be an abrupt regression
to the more atavistic politics of the past.

NEWS
BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in
South AsiaAugust 29-September 4,
2011

Civilians

Security
Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

2

0

0

2

Jammu &
Kashmir

0

1

4

5

Left-wing
Extremism

Bihar

1

0

0

1

Jharkhand

0

0

2

2

Odisha

1

0

0

1

Total (INDIA)

4

1

6

11

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

14

0

1

15

FATA

7

0

0

7

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

5

0

1

6

Sindh

17

1

0

18

Total (PAKISTAN)

43

1

2

46

Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.

INDIA

ISI
bankrolled and locals carried
out 13/7 blasts, says Maharashtra
ATS:The Maharashtra Anti-Terrorist
Squad (ATS) believes that
the July 13, 2011 Mumbai serial
blasts (also known as 13/7)
was funded by the Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) through
the Saudi Arabian route and
executed with the help of
local city youth. According
to Government sources, the
Maharashtra ATS got information
that the blasts were planned,
coordinated and executed with
the help of one General Murad
of the ISI with the help of
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and
Indian Mujahideen (IM) modules
in the State. Hindustan
Times,
September 3, 2011.

US
in 1997 knew that ISI funded
terrorists in Kashmir Valley,
says Wikileaks:
US intelligence agencies knew
as early as 1997 that terror
groups conducting attacks
in Kashmir as well as the
rest of India were being run
and funded by the Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI), latest
cables released by WikiLeaks
reveal. A secret cable sent
in July 1997 details the role
of the Pakistani establishment
in funding and running Kashmir
terror groups that conducted
a series of attacks in India.
Indian
Express,
September 3, 2011.

Militants
operating in Tripura have
14 camps in Bangladesh, says
Tripura Chief Minister:
Chief Minister Manik Sarkar
on September 1 said that at
present there are about 14
camps in Bangladesh of the
militants operating in Tripura.
Taking advantage of the hilly
terrain, thick forests and
unfenced border, Northeast
militants trained in Bangladesh
camps cross over into Indian
Territory, he added. Sentinel,
September 2, 2011.

Maoists
in eastern Bihar and neighbouring
parts of Jharkhand initiate
large-scale recruitment of
young village boys and girls:
The Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist) has initiated
large-scale recruitment of
young village boys and girls
and training camps for the
new cadres in inaccessible
terrains of eastern Bihar
Districts and neighbouring
parts of Jharkhand. The intelligence
reports claimed that the camps
have been providing training
to members of Marak Dasta
(armed squad). Telegraph,
September 1, 2011.

FICN
on the rise in the country,
says RBI: The Reserve
Bank of India warned that
Fake Indian Currency Notes
(FICNs) are steadily making
their presence felt in the
Indian monetary system. The
number of FICNs in India grew
by 9% to 435,607 in 2010-11
from 401,476 in 2009-10, according
to data by the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI). During the
same period, total banknotes
in circulation grew by 14%
to 64,577 million from 56,549.
Times
of India,
August 31, 2011.

BSF
enforces water wing for safeguarding
borders: In order to thwart
any intrusion bid through
the river water, the Border
Security Force (BSF) has enforced
its water wing to keep round-the-clock
patrolling in the river running
along the border in Fazilka
sector in Punjab. The water
wing consists of fiber motor
boats loaded with floodlights
installed on them, weapons
and other necessary equipment
needed for patrolling. Times
of India,
September 3, 2011.

Centre
and Assam sign tripartite
agreement with ULFA: A
tripartite agreement for Suspension
of Operations (SoO) was signed
on September 3 among the Centre,
the Assam Government and the
United Liberation Front of
Asom (ULFA). Shahdhar Chaudhuri,
Chtraban Hazarika and Raju
Barua, three key ULFA functionaries,
represented the organisation.
The
Hindu,
September 4, 2011.

NEPAL

UCPN-M hands over keys
of arms containers to AISC:
The Unified Communist
Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M)
on September 1-2 handed over
keys of the weapons containers
to Army Integration Special
Committee (AISC) as per the
party's earlier decision.
Handover of the keys of the
containers, which is also
mentioned in the agreement
signed between UCPN -M and
United Democratic Madheshi
Front (UDMF) before Prime
Ministerial election on August
28, is one of the key components
of the peace process. Nepal
News,
September 2, 2011.

PAKISTAN

JuD collecting donations
by changing its name, says
report: The Jama'at-ud-Da'wah
under has created an offshoot,
Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation
(FIF), to circumvent the ban
on collection of donations
in Pakistan and are collecting
aid with Police doing nothing
to stop them. Moreover, the
outfit's chief Hafiz Saeed
and his son Hafiz Talha Saeed
made speeches and collected
donations at mosques in various
parts of Lahore all during
Ramazan. Times
of India,
September 4, 2011.

Government
must end enforced disappearances,
says Amnesty International:
Amnesty International on August
30 slammed the Pakistan Government
for its failure to resolve
hundreds of cases of alleged
disappearance in the country.
"The Pakistan government has
made little progress in resolving
hundreds of cases of alleged
disappearance, while new incidents
are being reported around
the country," said Sam Zarifi,
Amnesty International's (AI)
Asia-Pacific Director. Times
of India,
August 31, 2011.

Pakistani
courts let three out of every
four terror suspects go, says
US State Department: A
US State Department report
published last week said that
Pakistan was incapable of
prosecuting terror suspects
as three in four defendants
are acquitted. According to
a report in The Telegraph,
the US State Department's
2010 report said that Pakistan's
acquittal rate of prosecuting
suspected terrorists was approximately
75%. Tribune,
September 1, 2011.

A
joint team of SFs to check
the movement of terrorists
and smuggling of arms into
Karachi: A joint force
of the Federal Investigation
Agency (FIA), the Coast Guards
and the Frontier Constabulary
will be established on the
Sindh-Balochistan border to
check movement of terrorists
and smuggling of arms into
Karachi. This was decided
in a meeting on September
3 chaired by Interior Minister
Rehman Malik. Daily
Times,
September 4, 2011.

Peace
bodies of Peshawar and FATA
meet for joint fight against
TTP: The volunteers of
various peace bodies in Peshawar
and tribal and semi-tribal
regions of Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) on September
3 decided to extend cooperation
to each other in their fight
against Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP). The meeting
of the heads of various peace
bodies was held at Bazid Khel
of Peshawar wherein different
issues were discussed. Dawn,
September 4, 2011.

Afghan-trained
youths indulging in terror
activities in Pakistan:
Afghan-trained militants and
returnees from the prisons
from Afghanistan have surfaced
in Punjab and are indulging
in terrorist activities, Pakistani
intelligence reports said
on August 30. According to
a report by the Counter Terrorism
Department (CTD) Punjab, 2,487
militants trained in Afghanistan
and 566 returnees from Afghan
prisons have been identified.
Indian
Express,
August 31, 2011.

SRI LANKA

Government
to bring in new laws to deal
with LTTE: Sri Lanka is
considering enacting new laws
under the Prevention of Terrorism
Act (PTA) to handle possible
future and past terrorist
activities by the defunct
terror group Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as the
emergency regulations that
were imposed on and off for
the past 30 years cease to
be in operation from August
31. Sri Lanka's Attorney General
Mohan Peiris told the media
that President Mahinda Rajapaksa
was to declare four regulations
under section 27 of PTA to
handle matters related to
the terrorist organization
in the absence of the emergency
law. Colombo
Page,
September 1, 2011.

1,200
ex-cadres of LTTE to be freed:
About 1,200 cadres of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka
will be released with the
end of emergency rule. The
media quoted Justice Minister
Rauf Hakeem as saying that
the end of emergency rule
announced by President Mahinda
Rajapakse last week would
lead to the immediate release
of suspects detained under
the regulations. Daily
News,
September 1, 2011.

Over
270,000 of IDPs resettled,
claims Government: The
Sri Lankan Government claimed
to have either resettled or
released over 270,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and
that only 7,422 were remaining
in the camps as of August
29. The remaining IDPs include
3,319 in Kadirgamar Zone-0
and 4,103 in Anandakumaraswami
Zone-1 in Menik Farm Relief
Village in Vavuniya. Colombo
Page,
August 30, 2011.

The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.