The postings of a customs lawyer in Chicago on the state of customs law and international trade law. Important Disclaimer: None of this is legal advice, don't act on it. Don't ascribe these statements to my law firm, its partners or clients. Don't steal from my blog. I wrote it, I own it. But, feel free to link to me. Also, under the rules regulating speech by attorneys, this blog may be construed as lawyer advertising. I am the sole party responsible for the content.

Monday, December 26, 2016

In real life, I represent importers and exporters who need to maintain compliance with U.S. laws and regulations concerning international trade. For the most part, that means customs law and export controls. As Bryan Garner once said at a seminar I attended, "hence the title" [of my blog].

One of the more complicated and potentially troublesome areas of compliance for importers involves antidumping and countervailing duty orders. The financial consequences of such an order can be dire for companies that entered into purchase contracts prior to the order or without knowing that an order applied to the goods. Often, the latter happens when suppliers assure the buyer that merchandise is either outside the scope of the order or from a source other than the subject country. Unfortunately, suppliers may be uninformed on the scope of the order, too happy to falsely state the origin of the product, or willing to misrepresent that it is otherwise outside the scope of an order. An unwary importer who ends up receiving a rate advance of 200%, for example, may be in for a world of financial and legal trouble.

Moreover, the scope of orders is becoming increasingly complex. The cases involving aluminum extrusions, tires, and solar products are good examples of complicated case scopes.

As a result, I am spending increasing time on scope and related questions for importer clients. My assumption is that readers of this blog are also seeing more of these issues arise. Consequently, I plan to address more of these cases here. I will not be getting into the weeds of determining subsidy and margin rates. But, to the extent the application of an antidumping or duty order impacts import compliance, I will make more of an effort to note it here.

The problem for Kyocera in this case is that the Commerce Department defined the scope of the investigation as covering cells and modules produced in Taiwan and modules "completed or partially manufactured" in other countries from cells produced in Taiwan. Kyocera was importing solar modules from Mexico that incorporate solar cells from Taiwan.

Separate and apart from this case, Kyocera is challenging the scope of the order as it applies to its imports from Mexico. Leave that aside for now. In this case, Kyocera raises the more interesting question of whether the International Trade Commission was required to treat the source of these products as Mexico or as Taiwan for purposes of its investigation of possible injury to the domestic industry.

The root of this question is 19 USC 1671d(b) (for countervailing duties) and 1673d(b) (for antidumping duties), which require that the ITC terminate an investigation if it determines that "imports of the subject merchandise are negligible . . . ." Negligible is defined in 19 USC 1677(24) as follows (with exceptions and details omitted here):

imports from a country of merchandise corresponding to a domestic like product identified by the Commission are “negligible” if such imports account for less than 3 percent of the volume of all such merchandise imported into the United States . . . .

The issue here is the meaning of "a country." According to Kyocera, Mexico is "a country" and is, therefore, entitled to its own negligibility test. Presumably, its exports would be less than the 3% threshold and, therefore, excluded from the order.

The International Trade Commission and the Court of International Trade both rejected that argument. Now, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has upheld the CIT. According to the Court of Appeals, the negligibility test is applied to the subject merchandise. Here, the order defines the scope as including cells from Taiwan finished into modules in other countries. Accordingly, the Kyocera products that include cells from Taiwan are still products of Taiwan even though finished in Mexico. Consequently, products finished in Mexico are not entitled to a separate negligibility analysis.

What is the lesson for importers? First and foremost, understand that scope is more than just the title of the Federal Register Notice. The scope of the order may, as it did here, encompass downstream or upstream products including products finished in other countries. When that is the case, it is not enough to just move finishing operations to another country. That will not necessarily remove the product from scope and might end up causing additional issues if the effort is seen as either evasion or circumvention.

Finally, as long as I am thinking about these things, keep in mind that HTSUS classification is not a reliable test for whether or not a product is in scope. Every order states that classification is provided for convenience, and that the description of the merchandise controls. The fact that an item is not flagged in ACE or elsewhere as within the scope of an order does not mean it cannot actually be within the scope of the order.

Tuesday, December 20, 2016

Note: I am writing this post while on vacation at an undisclosed location. The Internet here is lousy. I am paying a fair amount of money for "high speed access." Despite that, I feel like I am working on a vintage 3600 baud dial-up modem. Consequently, you will have to make do with two links. I might go back and fill in more when I have a decent connection.

We just talked about a Customs and Border Protection ruling
in which I complained about CBP straying from the traditional substantial
transformation test of looking for a change in name, character, or use to
determine country of origin. Now we run up against Energizer Battery, Inc. v.United States, in which the Court of International Trade addressed essentially
the same question. The CIT started out strong and raised my expectations that we
would see a very detailed analysis of the test. We did get a thorough and
logical opinion. But, I still have some concerns. So, let’s walk through this.

Under the Buy America portion of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 19 USC §§ 2511-2518, the U.S. government can procure material from countries
covered by the Act. Those are countries that have signed on to the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement and U.S.-free trade agreement partners. China
is not an eligible country.

The case involves a flashlight assembled in Vermont.
Virtually all of the approximately 50 components, including the light-emitting
LED’s, the lens assembly, and wires that are pre-cut to size, come from China.
After importation, the assembly process involves workers at two stations and
takes approximately 7 minutes and 10 seconds. The value of imported materials
is $12.96 and the finished cost of the flashlight is $23.55.

The only way to make these flashlights eligible for
government procurement is to determined that they are products of the United
States by virtue of the assembly operation in Vermont. That requires a
substantial transformation. The test for a substantial transformation under the
Trade Agreements Act is that the product is “a new and different article of
commerce with a name, character, or use distinct from that of the article or
articles from which it was transformed.” While there have been few cases
applying this test in the context of the procurement agreement, this is the
well-established test used for non-NAFTA country of origin marking, some
drawback, and for other purposes.

Energizer sought a final ruling from Customs on whether the
assembly of the flashlights in the U.S. resulted in a substantial
transformation. Customs found that after assembly in the U.S., the LED’s continue
to perform their intended function of emitting light and that the assembly
process was not complex or time-consuming. Customs also noted the traditional
name, character, or use test. Based on its analysis, Customs found no
substantial transformation.

The first issue the plaintiff raised is that Customs’ focus
on the LED’s and “essential character” is not part of the test for substantial
transformation. That is manifestly true. The statute does not reference
essential character. The Court, however, noted that it must decide the origin
of the flashlight on its own, based on the evidence presented to it. The
original analysis CBP performed is, therefore, of limited importance.

Given my most recent post on this question, I was very happy
to see the Court of International Trade focus its attention on the name,
character, or use test. The Court went so far as to say the “’essential
character’ is not an established factor in the substantial transformation
analysis, although some courts have looked to the ‘essence’ of a finished
article in order to evaluation whether there has been a change in character as
a result of post-importation processing.” Essential character is a useful
concept for tariff classification. Separately, “essential identity” comes up in
the context of U.S. goods returned. Neither is traditionally part of the
substantial transformation test. So far, I am happy.

The Court then reviewed the history of the substantial
transformation test from its roots in the 1908 Supreme Court decision Anheuser
Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States. Since that time, the test has become
“flexible” and the outcome depends on the facts of each case.

The Court noted that a change in name is generally the least
compelling evidence of a substantial transformation. That said, let’s keep in
mind that the imported components were not called “flashlights.” They were
LED’s, wires, screws, switches, and other components all with their own name.

Regarding name, the Court followed the lead of a prior CIT
decision in a case called National Hand Tool v. United States. That case
involved hand tools that were partially finished prior to importation and
machined, etc. after importation. In all cases, the name of the article as
imported remained the same as that article in the completed tool. From
this, the CIT held that the question is whether the imported components retain
their names after assembly into the flashlight. The switch, for example,
remains the switch even when it is fully incorporated into the flashlight.

Moving on to character, the Court looked for a substantial
alternation in the characteristics of the components. That requires more than a
cosmetic change. Rather, the end-use of the imported product must not be the
same as (or “interchangeable with”) the end-use of the product after
post-importation processing. Here, the Court found that the shape and material
composition of the components was unchanged, meaning there was (according to
the Court) no change in character.

The Court also noted that that prior cases have found a
substantial transformation less likely where the imported item has an intended
end-use and the post-importation processing is consistent with that end-use. This
is where I start to get concerned. Here, the parts were all imported for the
purpose of manufacturing flashlights. The lens assembly, in particular, had no
other apparent use. This does not bode well for Energizer.

Regarding use, Plaintiff argued that none of the imported
components are useful as flashlights. The Court rejected that approach and held
that the correct inquiry is whether the imported parts have a predetermined
end-use at the time of importation. Here, the lens head is partially assembled at
the time of importation, with four of the five LED’s attached and pre-cut wires
soldered to the circuit board. This, and other components, have pre-determined
end-uses as parts of the flashlight. Based on this, the Court found no change
in use.

To my way of thinking, the unassembled components of a
flashlight do not constitute a flashlight and cannot be used as such. As
imported, they mostly have functions that are distinct from the function of a
flashlight. A switch makes and breaks an electrical circuit. Wires conduct
electricity.

The problem for Energizer is that LED’s emit light and the
lens assembly directs light. Those are pretty close to the functions of a
flashlight, although they are not sufficient to form a flashlight. Keep that in
mind as we go forward.

Next, the Court looked at several subsidiary tests for
substantial transformation. The most important of these tests is the nature of
the assembly process. When assembly is simple, the question is whether it is
“minor manufacturing and combining” as opposed to extensive operations
resulting in the loss of identity of the imported component, which becomes an integral
part of a new article. Summarizing, the Court stated, “However, when assembly
operations were manual and required some ‘skill and dexterity to put components
together with a screw driver’ but the names of each article and the form and
character of each component remained unchanged, and the use of the imported
articles was predetermined at the time of importation, the court did not find
that substantial transformation had occurred.” The Court found that the
production process constituted simply attaching one component to another. It is
not a complex process.

Having found no change in name, character, or use and that
the assembly process was not complex, the Court of International Trade held
that the flashlight components from China were not substantially transformed by
assembly in Vermont. Thus, the Court affirmed the final determination from
Customs and Border Protection.

I’m not entirely comfortable with this for a few reasons.
First, I need to say that this is a well-reasoned opinion and it is clearly
following the lead of National Hand Tools. I think that is admirable for
purposes of providing predictability and business certainty.

The problem is that as an advocate, largely for importers, I
don’t like the result. It is very hard to apply in practice. It seems to me that
this decision makes a substantial transformation in the context of assembly very
difficult to establish. Most assembly can be reversed by disassembly. That
means a switch will always be a switch and an LED will always be an LED even
after assembly. This ignores the name changes from switch and LED to flashlight.
Furthermore, the use of components will almost never be the use of the finished
article, even when the components are imported specifically for incorporation
into that finished product. Under the Court’s analysis, an engine assembled
into a car remains an engine and does not change its character because it was
intended for use as a car engine. Nor does it change its intended end use. But,
an engine is not a car. I cannot drive an engine.

By focusing on the components before and after assembly, I
fear the Court has set the bar too high. It seems that substantial transformation
will occur when the imported part is subject to further fabrication prior to final
assembly. The murkier question is when assembly is sufficiently complex to
produce a substantial transformation. That will depend on the facts of the case.
Unfortunately, it appears to me that under this analysis the complexity of the
assembly process—which is not name, character, or use—is firmly part of the
name, character, or use test. That seems to go beyond what was required under
the 1979 Trade Agreements Act and similar CBP applications of the test.

Thursday, December 15, 2016

You may recall that the Court of International awarded attorneys fees to the plaintiff in International Custom Products v. United States. This case has a very complicated litigation history. I will not review that here. You should go back and read the original post about the CIT decision on fees. Now, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has affirmed the CIT's decision. That is a substantial victory for the plaintiff.

What you need to know is that Customs and Border Protection issued a binding ruling to ICP on the classification of its "white sauce." Customs subsequent issued a Notice of Action reclassifying unliquidated entries under a different provision. CBP did not take steps to revoke or modify the prior ruling before taking this action. As a result of the reclassification, and the resulting application of dairy quota, the duty payable on this merchandise increased by 2400%. The subsequent litigation resulted in five judicial opinions including two prior decision of the Court of Appeals.

Under federal law, a court shall award attorneys fees to the non-governmental prevailing party unless the position of the United States "was substantially justified" or there are special circumstances making an award unjust. A position is substantially justified if it could satisfy a reasonable person. Stated in the positive, what that means is that a prevailing party in a case against the United States can be awarded fees where the government took an unreasonable position in the litigation or the administrative process.

The CIT held that Customs' use of the Notice of Action was rooted in its desire to avoid the more complicated, but required, process of revoking the ruling. That, according to the CIT, was not reasonable.

On appeal the United States raised several technical arguments. The most interesting of these is that because the Court of International Trade ruled in favor of the United States on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, thereby letting the case go to trial, the government's position was necessarily reasonably. The Federal Circuit had not previously addressed this question and, therefore, looked to guidance in the decisions of other circuits. The Seventh Circuit has held that surviving a motion for summary judgment creates a presumption that the position is reasonable; but that presumption can be rebutted. The Federal Circuit did not go so far as to find a presumption. Rather, it held that it must review the record as a whole to find reasonableness.

That probably brings this part of the case to an end. For those of us who litigate customs issues, this serves as a good reminder that it is possible to get fee awards when the U.S. has taken an unreasonable position. That is an unusual circumstance, but it is good to know the law.

This is one of those posts in which I tell you that there are many cases and rulings sitting on my desk, all of which I plan to use as the basis for upcoming blog posts. It is also the end of the year and the time when I contemplate the state of this blog. [Note: Shaking my fist at the ABA Journal] This has been a good blog year, despite having fallen behind on my coverage of rulings. My personal view is that the content remains of acceptably high quality combined with it usually being timely. So that's good. I did earn recognition from the Expert Institute; fifth place out of a large field is not too bad. Thanks for your votes.

I'll continue to plug along here and hope you stay with me in an 2017. As always, I sincerely appreciate my readers. At the recent Court of International Trade Judicial Conference and at a trade meeting in Chicago, folks introduced themselves as readers. That always makes me happy. I hope to see more of you at upcoming events. Feel free to comment on my posts, I would love to see more reader engagement.

That all sets the stage for me to say to you and your families, "Happy Seasonal Holiday of Your Personal Choosing" and a very Happy New Year to you all.

Tuesday, December 06, 2016

I watch competitive cooking the way a stereotypical American male might watch baseball. I don't care if it is Top Chef or Chopped at the high end or the dreck that is Cupcake Wars and The Great American Food Truck Race. I don't watch kids compete, that's where I draw the line. I also like to eat. As a result, I am familiar with a lot of strange food items.

Customs and Border Protection classified these seeds as "Other nuts, fresh or dried, whether or not shelled or peeled: Other: Other: Shelled: Other" in HTSUS item 0802.90.97. The plaintiff believes they are best classified in 0802.90.25 as "Pignolia: Shelled." Clearly, the question is whether the seed of the Koreas pine, from China, is a "Pignolia" for purposes of tariff classification. Note that both classifications are in subheading 0802.90. This question is all about the last two digits.

While it may seem that a pine nut is a pine nut, that is not the case. The Explanatory Notes to the Harmonized System, which are not binding on U.S. Customs and Border Protection but are authoritative interpretations of the international parts of the tariff, state that the nuts of Heading 0802 include "pignolia nuts (seeds of the Pinus pinea)." It turns out that Pinus pinea is the Italian Stone Pine, which is native to Europe, north Africa and the Mediterranean, which would exclude both China and Korea and is in contrast to the Pinus koraiensis.

Seeds of Pinus koraiensis via Wikipedia

What this comes down to is whether the seeds of the Pinus koraiensis are within the common and commercial meaning of "pignola nuts," giving due weight to the Explanatory Notes additional notation of "Pinus pinea."

This case is a good read for anyone interested in learning how customs lawyers muster lexicographical evidence of common and commercial meaning. Plaintiff put forward a number of definitions broad enough to encompass edible pine nuts of any source. These were taken from dictionaries, trade publications, government sources, and various websites. The government put forward a similar collection of more restrictive definitions taken from other sources and challenged the plaintiff's interpretation of some of its sources. None of this competing reference material was sufficient to resolve the matter.

The plaintiff also pointed to prior CBP rulings as evidence that Customs has established the meaning of "pignolia." These rulings, however, relate to infused oils and do not directly address the classification of the pine seeds.

The Court next looked to the historical treatment of pine seeds in U.S. tariff acts. This is something we don't often see. Prior tariffs are only relevant today when the language is similar to the current law, which is often the case when an item is called out by name (or eo nomine). In this case, the Court looked at the 1921 Summaries of Trade and Tariff Information and the Tariff Act of 1922. The government, however, pointed out that neither the subsequent Tariff Act of 1930 nor the 1946 revision use the word "pignolia." This is meaningful because during that time, all pine nuts appear to have been classified as "other" and the seeds of Pinus pinea only subsequently specified as pignolia. Furthermore, a 1968 tariff report indicates that the pignolia nut is gathered in Italy, Portugal and Spain, presumably excluding similar products from China and Korea.

That took the Court back to where we started: the Explanatory Notes. In 1986, the Explanatory Notes used the phrase "pignolia nuts (Seeds of the Pinus pinea)." That language remained in subsequent editions.

This does not resolve the issue because there is no disagreement as to the proper heading and subheading (i.e., to sixth digit), which is as far as the Explanatory Notes go. Nevertheless, the Notes clearly limit pignolia to the European variety. The U.S. drafters of the HTSUS presumably knew that and were also aware of the 1968 report. Taken together, that indicates to the Court of International Trade, that these particular pine nuts are not pignolia for classification purposes.

This is the point where I usually find something in the decision to pick at. Initially, my concern was that the Explanatory Notes insert a limitation to pignolia that is not in the HTSUS and should, therefore, be ignored. That would broaden the meaning beyond seeds of Pinus pinea. But, the Court addressed this saying that there was not sufficient evidence of a common and commercial meaning to establish a conflict with the Explanatory Notes. Touché.

Now, I will go home, open my basket, and make dinner from pine nuts, squid ink, elk loin, and a Boston cream pie. If my entre does not cut it, I will be Chopped.

Sunday, December 04, 2016

We don't talk enough about customs value here. It is important, complicated, and interesting. It deserves more attention. There are, however, also fewer rulings and cases on valuation questions. Happily, this one (HQ H233376, Sep. 19, 2016) caught my eye. The issue is whether a royalty paid to a U.S. patent holder who is unrelated to the importer is dutiable when the royalty is paid not by the importer but by the importer's parent company.

The patents at issue are all utility patents, meaning that they relate to new and useful inventions rather than to the design aesthetics of the item. A utility patent generally involves the critical technology that defines or empowers the invention. The license grants to the importer (via a predecessor company, just to complicate matters) "to make, have made, use, sell, offer for sale and import Licensed Devices" worldwide. The license also authorizes the licensee to disclose to the manufacturer, who is in Malaysia, the information that is necessary to manufacture the products. Similarly, the manufacturer is authorized to use the patented technology to makes the item and to apply related trademarks.

When goods are imported pursuant to a sale, the customs valuation is usually the "transaction value." That is defined at 19 USC 1401a(b) as the price actually paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for exportation to the United States, plus specified statutory additions including "any royalty or license fee related to the imported merchandise that the buyer is required to pay, directly or indirectly, as a condition of the sale of the imported merchandise for exportation to the United States."

In 1993, Customs published an official notice detailing how it will analyze royalties for dutiability. We discussed that here. To summarize from my earlier post, under the test, Customs and Border Protection analyzes each royalty agreement on a case-by-case basis and asks three questions:

1. Was the importer merchandise manufactured under patent? If the answer is yes, then the payment is more closely tied to the production of the merchandise and is, therefore, more likely dutiable.

2. Was the payment involved in the production or sale of the imported merchandise? This question goes more deeply into the purpose of the payment. If the importer can show that the payment is for something other than the manufacture, production, or purchase of the imported goods, the payment may not be dutiable. Customs gave two examples in which the Court found that the putative royalty was for the use of the product in the United States, not for the patent rights related to the production or importation of the product. A positive answer to this question, therefore, leans toward dutiablity while a negative answer leans against.

3. Could the importer buy the product without paying the fee? If the fee is not optional and goes to the seller, it is more likely to be a dutiable part of the value of the merchandise. According to Customs, this question "goes to the heart" of whether the payment is a condition of sale. That means a negative answer to this question indicates dutiability.

In this ruling, Customs gave the short answer that the royalty is dutiable. The merchandise was manufactured under a patent and the patented technology is related to the production or sale of the imported item. Furthermore, Customs found that the importer could not buy the merchandise without paying the fee. Nevertheless, counsel for the importer (who was not me) argued against suitability of the royalty in this case.

Counsel first noted that the royalty is not paid to or for the benefit of the seller. This is a common argument and merits attention. How is a royalty part of the "price paid or payable" for the merchandise if it not paid to the seller? The answer is that the statute does not require that the royalty be paid to the seller to be dutiable. Rather, the statute requires that royalties be added to the dutiable value when they are "related to the imported merchandise" and when "the buyer is required to pay [the royalty], directly or indirectly, as a condition of the sale of the imported merchandise for exportation to the United States." Note that the statute does not say to whom the royalty must be paid to be dutiable.

The question is not how much did the seller receive in exchange for the goods. The question is what is the total cost to the buyer to acquire the merchandise. This is entirely consistent with other parts of the statute which, for example, add assists, selling commissions, and packing materials to the entered value for duty. If the buyer did not pay this patent royalty, the seller would have to do so to acquire the legal right to manufacture the item. Because the buyer's parent paid it, the cost to the seller is reduced below what it would otherwise have been. This is exactly why the value of buttons provided by the buyer to the manufacturer for use in the production of shirts must be added to the entered value of the shirts. If the seller had to go buy the buttons, it would increase the price to cover the additional expense. This, therefore, is a losing argument, even when the patent holder is in the U.S.

To stick to this conclusion, Customs had to distinguish several prior rulings that appear to have conflicting results. I'm going to spare you the details. It should suffice to say that a patent royalty might not be dutiable if it is not a condition of the sale to the United States or is not fundamental to the manufacturer of the item. For example, a patent license relating only to the use of some item, as opposed to the manufacturer of it, is less likely to result in a dutiable royalty. Similarly, a design patent is less likely to be dutiable than is a utility patent.

The other question is whether a royalty paid to a U.S. patent holder can be a condition of the sale for export from the foreign manufacturer. After all, what does the manufacturer care if the buyer fails to pay the royalty? That is not its problem. Customs' analysis is more nuanced than that. It held that a condition of the sale exists where the right to use the patent "must be secured, either by the buyer or the manufacturer because the patent is necessary to produce the merchandise to be sold for export to the United States. i.e., [sic] the imported merchandise would not exist it the rights to the patent were not obtained." This gives the requirement that the royalty be a condition of the sale a broad and flexible interpretation that can be interpreted practically as well as under the terms of an individual contract.

All of that led Customs and Border Protection to hold the royalty in this case to be dutiable.

I have a question. The ruling clearly says, "the royalty payments at issue are made to the licensor, [Company A] (a U.S. patent holder who is not related to the company or to the manufacturer of the imported merchandise_, by [Company B], the parent of the company's parent." [Emphasis added.] So am I correct that the buyer did not actually pay this royalty? It was paid not by the parent company but by the grandparent company. This should be discussed in the ruling. The company, presumably the importer, is not responsible for the payment of the royalty. It seems possible that the company did not even know about it.

The statute covers "any royalty or license fee related to the imported merchandise that the buyer is required to pay, directly or indirectly, as a condition of the sale . . . ." [Emphasis added.] It appears that Customs treated the royalty as indirectly paid, without stating so. Is that right?

I would read "indirectly" as relating to the method of payment to the seller, not to the party making the payment, which seems to be limited to the buyer. How do we know from this ruling that the buyer is required to make this payment, whether directly or indirectly? It seems clear that a related but legally separate entity is required to make that payment. I can see CBP's implied conclusion that this is an indirect payment by the buyer, but I think there needs to be some facts stated to support that conclusion. Otherwise Customs has effectively ignored the separate legal status of the companies and pierced a corporate veil without comment.

Saturday, December 03, 2016

I like bikes. Lately, that is more in theory than in actual usage, but that is my fault. In reality, bikes are a transformative technology. They give kids their first sense of independence. They give everyone a means of transportation with zero carbon emissions. In some cases, the availability of that transportation may be lifesaving.

Thus, when I see something at work that involves bicycles, I usually take note. Such is the case with the September 21, 2016 Customs Bulleting and Decisions in which Customs and Border Protection revoked a ruling, N269994 (Nov. 20, 2015), on the country of origin of bicycles.

The bicycle in question is assembled in the United States from imported components, including frames. Customs had previously ruled that assembling components to a U.S.-origin frame produces a bike with the U.S. as the country of origin. In N269994, it apparently misapplied that same analysis to find the U.S. to be the country of origin of bicycles with imported frames.

In this new ruling, which is HQ H273304 (Aug. 11, 2016), Customs finds that the country of origin of the frame is the country of origin of the finished bike.

The starting point is the law, which requires that all articles of foreign origin be marked in a manner that will indicate to the ultimate purchaser the name of the country of origin. Note that the analysis is different for goods of a NAFTA country, that is not what we have here.

When the item is imported to be further processed, the question is whether the further processing is sufficient to make the item a product of the U.S. when sold to the ultimate purchaser. According to 19 CFR § 134.1(b), "Further work or material added to an article in another country must effect a substantial transformation in order to render such other country the 'country of origin' within the meaning of this part . . . ." A substantial transformation occurs when the article that emerges from a process has a new name, character, or use different from that possessed by the imported article. When that happens, the processor is considered to be the ultimate purchaser and the imported item is exempt from marking.

Here, Customs ruled that the imported frames were not substantially transformed. Customs reasoned that the frame is the most costly and essential component of the finished bicycle. Furthermore, Customs held that the frame provides the overall shape, size and character of the bicycle. "Because the bicycle is assembled in the United States and is one of the bicycle's essential components, the frame, is made outside of the United States, [Customs and Border Protection found] that the country of origin of the bicycle would be imparted by the frame." Accordingly, the country of origin of the bike is the country of origin of the frame.

I hate this decision. For some reason, Customs and Border Protection did a great job of setting up the issue and explaining the legal test for substantial transformation. Then it whiffed at trying to apply that test. The question is whether the finished bicycle has a new name, character, or use different from the imported frame. The question Customs answered is whether the frame is an expensive and important component. Those questions will not always produce the same answer. Furthermore, it seems likely that the "essential component" test Customs applied is less likely to result in substantial transformations than is the actual legal test.

From Manchester Triathlon Club http://www.man-tri-club.org.uk/

Let's try it here:

The imported item is a "frame" at the time of importation. No one would call it a bicycle. True, it is an essential component of the assembled bike. It also dictates many aspects of the nature and use of the bike. But, it is a frame. It just is. That is what it is called. Customs has stated many times that a change in name is the least probative of the three elements of name, character, or use. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that there is a name change here.

What about "character?" This test is hard to define. We know a few things for certain. The frame is not a completely assembled vehicle as is a bicycle. It has no moving part and is generally uniform in construction (i.e., it is most likely a collection of metal tubes welded together). If you want to move it, you need to pick it up or drag it along the ground. The finished bike, on the other hand, is an assembled, mechanical vehicle. It has moving parts of gears connected by a chain, it has brakes connected by cables to hand controls. It has wheels that rotate about their axle and a front steering mechanism that works with handlebars connected to the fork through the head tube. If you want to move a bicycle, you can roll it or ride it.

So, as you might be able to tell. I don't buy it. I think an imported frame--in all its carbon, titanium, steel, or aluminum glory--is a static component of a bicycle. Assembling the finished machine, in my view, substantially transforms the frame into a useful bicycle. Customs and Border Protection might not agree. But, if it is going to disagree, it should apply the proper analysis to get there.