Alfredo Roman-Roman, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, seeks to appeal the
district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence. The matter is before this court on Roman-Roman's request for a certificate of
appealability (COA). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a),
and,
because Roman-Roman has not made a "substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
483-84
(2000), we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.

Roman-Roman entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
841(b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and was sentenced to 135 months of imprisonment. We
affirmed on appeal. United States v. Roman-Roman, 116 Fed. Appx. 994 (10th Cir.
Dec.
6, 2004). The United States Supreme Court subsequently remanded for reconsideration
in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Roman-Roman v. United
States, 126 S. Ct. 410 (2005), and, upon remand, we again affirmed, United States v.
Roman-Roman, 172 Fed. Appx. 811 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2006). Roman-Roman then
filed his § 2255 petition, asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
district court denied the petition. Because the district court did not issue Roman-Roman
a COA or state why a certificate should not issue, we deem that Roman-Roman's
constructive request for a COA was denied. SeeUnited States v. Kennedy, 225
F.3d
1187, 1193 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a COA is deemed denied if the district
court does not address its issuance within thirty days). Roman-Roman now seeks a COA
and review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Our granting of a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to Roman-Roman's appeal
from the denial of his § 2255 petition. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003).
To be entitled to a COA, Roman-Roman must make "a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite showing,
Roman-Roman must demonstrate "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (internal quotations omitted).

To determine whether Roman-Roman has satisfied his burden, we undertake "a
preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal] framework" applicable to
each of his claims. Miller-El, 637 U.S. at 338. Although Roman-Roman need not
demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA, he must "prove something
more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith." Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Having undertaken a review of Roman-Roman's application for a
COA and appellate filings, the district court's order, and the entire record on appeal
pursuant to the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El, we conclude
Roman-Roman is not entitled to a COA. The district court's resolution of Roman-Roman's
§ 2255 motion is not reasonably subject to debate and the issues he seeks to
raise on appeal are not adequate to deserve further proceedings.

Specifically, the gravamen of Roman-Roman's claim is that because he was only a
drug courier, he was a minor or minimal participant in the drug conspiracy. His trial
counsel, Roman-Roman concludes, thus rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to seek a role reduction during sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and
Amendment 640, U.S.S.G. App. C, 264-65 (2002). Under the two-part test established
by the Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Roman-Roman must
prove that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"
and that "any deficiencies in counsel's performance [were] prejudicial to the defense."
Id. at 688, 692. Here, no reasonable jurist could conclude that Roman-Roman could
satisfy either element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

First, the mere fact that a defendant is a drug courier neither mandates nor
prohibits a role reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment., n. 3(A); see
alsoUnited
States v. Harfst, 168 F.3d 398, 402-03 (10th Cir. 1999) ("There is no per se rule in this
circuit that couriers are minor or minimal participants"). Instead, the decision of whether
to apply a role reduction under § 3B1.2 "is heavily dependent upon the facts of the
particular case." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment., n. 3(C). Significantly, "[a]s with any
other factual issue, the court, in weighing the totality of the circumstances, is not required
to find, based solely on the defendant's bare assertion, that such a role adjustment is
warranted." Id.; see alsoUnited States v. Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d
1271, 1278 (10th
Cir. 2004) ("A defendant's own testimony that others were more heavily involved in a
criminal scheme may not suffice to prove his minor or minimal participation, even if
uncontradicted by other evidence."). Instead, we consider "the defendant's knowledge or
lack thereof concerning the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of
others involved in the offense." Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d at 1277 (quoting
United
States v. Calderon-Porras, 911 F.2d 421, 423 (10th Cir. 1990)).

In light of this standard, no reasonable jurist could conclude that Roman-Roman's
trial counsel acted unreasonably by failing to seek a role reduction, because Roman-Roman's
vague and conclusory argument that he was merely a drug courier is, without
more, insufficient grounds to justify such a reduction. Bolstering our conclusion is
Roman-Roman's failure to meaningfully dispute the district court's finding that not
seeking a role reduction was sound trial strategy because (1) no objection was lodged to
the pre-sentence report or to the district court's tentative sentence during sentencing, (2)
counsel affirmed at sentencing that the proposed length of the sentence, which did not
include a role reduction, was anticipated by both counsel and Roman-Roman as a result
of the plea agreement, and (3) the statements Roman-Roman made to the police after
arrest failed to identify with particularity another more culpable individual.

Second, no reasonable jurist could conclude that Roman-Roman was prejudiced
by his trial counsel's failure to seek a role reduction. We reach this conclusion in light of
the above and given Roman-Roman's failure to dispute the district court's findings of
fact (1) that he purposefully and intentionally entered into employment as a drug courier,
(2) that he participated in the planning and carrying out of the charged crime, (3) that he
traveled a substantial distance with a significant amount (69 pounds) of
methamphetamine, and (4) that the unusually small payment he received suggests he was
to either receive profits from the distribution of methamphetamine or additional
compensation in the future.(2)

We therefore DENY Roman-Roman's application for a COA and DISMISS this
matter.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe

Circuit Judge

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*.This order is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel.

2. Roman-Roman's additional claim that the
district court erred by failing to apply
Amendment 640 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines also lacks merit because that
Amendment, since repealed, was only applicable when a district court granted a
defendant a role reduction. See U.S.S.G. App. C., Amendment 640, 264-65 (2002),
superseded by U.S.S.G. App. C, Amendment 668, 91-92 (2004).