"Increase professional expertise in defence acquisition else it will be imports as usual"

​​One example will bring home the morass we find ourselves in. While HAL struggles to get the delayed by decades final operational clearance for the Tejas, a sixth generation fighter concept was showcased at the recent Farnborough Airshow.

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Aug 02, 2018, 10.47 AM IST

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In this file picture from November 29, 2017, HAL Light combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas is seen being refueled at Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Airport at Nagpur.

By Manmohan Bahadur

“There is an urgent need for a culture of jointness to be developed in government institutions and decision making,” said S Jaishankar, the erudite former foreign secretary, while talking on national security at the Air Commodore Jasjit Singh Memorial Lecture in Delhi last month. It is surprising that such an elementary point had to be emphasised so long after India assumed control of its destiny – but it also highlighted the ‘siloisation’ that has marked decision making at apex levels.

This disturbing state of affairs is most visible in the area of defence R&D and manufacturing where India has the shameful tag of being the largest importer of arms. That an attempt is being made to get out of the compartmentalisation is evident in the creation of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC); being headed by the NSA it would, hopefully, bring an element of coherence and synergy in strategic decision making in matters defence. But is that the panacea?

Doctrine, strategy and technical creativity are not the preserve of people at the level of service chiefs, DRDO head, government secretaries and NSA who, amongst other bigwigs, constitute the DPC. These higher-ups fine tune the real work done earlier by lower functionaries, starting from director and joint secretary; so, the proverbial pudding can only be as good as the base it gets. The government needs to stoop to conquer, as it were, if it means business and wants the moribund defence R&D and manufacturing to start stirring.

One example will bring home the morass we find ourselves in. While HAL struggles to get the delayed by decades final operational clearance for the Tejas, a sixth generation fighter concept was showcased at the recent Farnborough Airshow – the cockpit of the British Tempest fighter would have no instruments, with the pilot operating through a virtual reality and augmented reality helmet system!

While the endeavour to bring in multi-ministerial cohesion at the highest echelons (DPC) is good, the kick-starting has also to happen at the mid policy formulation levels of the defence ministry; the exclusion of the MoD from the list of ministries where professional advisers from outside the IAS bureaucracy are being sought beats logic and common sense. Another quip from Jaishankar would be apt here: “We in India have an industry of policy making without one of policy analysis.” Policy making is a favourite pastime but the analysis of why earlier policies failed is missing. Are we alone in this predicament? No.

The US realised in the 1990s that their military acquisition programme was, in the words of their defence historian William Gregory, “managed and over-reformed into impotence with volumes of oversight regulations”. He added that the US Congress had been, “pursuing an impossible dream by trying to legislate perfection … when no regulation could create good management or top-notchpeople”. The US acted resolutely; the Defense Acquisition University was established, and it now runs postgraduate and doctorate programmes on defence procurements – basically, they resolved to acquire professional expertise (and not generalists) in the acquisition process.

If the DPC is to succeed in its endeavour of speeding up defence indigenisation while equipping the armed forces in a timely manner, it needs professionals of the armed forces to be positioned at executive positions (joint and additional secretary) in the MoD. The soldier, sailor and airman of today knows a thing or two about armament, technology, systems, doctrine, strategy and, of course, war fighting; and yes, they are also not novices at diplomacy and administration.

Inability to accept and include their expertise would only attest to what Gaius Petronius, a Roman courtier during Nero’s times, said: “We tend to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation.”

We must stop being spasmodically euphoric whenever the US ‘declares’ India to be a ‘major defence partner’ or as recently when accorded ‘Strategic Trade Authorisation Status STA1’. A feeling of satisfaction must flow from genuine self-sufficiency in our own abilities. But for that to happen, ‘jointness’ in thought and action has to permeate higher decision making levels of MoD with the inclusion of all stakeholders – bureaucracy, professionals from the services, scientists and industry working together to a purpose. Else, it would be imports as usual.

The writer is Additional Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views are personal.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of www.economictimes.com.)