Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26213

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DC Field

Value

Language

dc.contributor.author

Matsen, Egil

en_US

dc.contributor.author

Thøgersen, Øystein

en_US

dc.date.accessioned

2008-02-07

en_US

dc.date.accessioned

2009-07-28T08:29:07Z

-

dc.date.available

2009-07-28T08:29:07Z

-

dc.date.issued

2007

en_US

dc.identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26213

-

dc.description.abstract

We suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters' preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of re-election. Comparing to a benchmark case of a certain re-election, we demonstrate that the incumbent's optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias.