Wednesday, 30 December 2015

In a giant capability boost for the Indian
Navy, a naval warship today test-fired a new missile that can shoot down
incoming aerial threats --- such as aircraft and missiles --- whilst they are
still 70 kilometres away.

A defence ministry press release today
stated: “Adding a quantum jump in its air defence capability, INS Kolkata,
Indian Navy’s state of art, indigenous stealth destroyer, successfully test
fired the Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LR-SAM). Two missiles
were fired on 29th and 30th of December on high-speed targets, during
naval exercises being undertaken in the Arabian Sea.”

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and
India’s Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) have jointly developed the LR-SAM.
The Israelis call this cutting-edge missile system the Barak-8, while India
calls it the LR-SAM.

In earlier days, ship-to-ship battles were
fought with heavy-calibre guns, requiring warships to come within gun range of
each other. Once a shell was fired from a gun, there was no way of intercepting
it in mid-flight.

Guns have now been replaced with long-range,
anti-ship missiles, which are fired from submarines, ships or aircraft up to
150 kilometres away. Many of these, such as the US-made Harpoon II, are
extremely accurate, with sensors on the missile homing it unerringly onto its
target. They have a key vulnerability, though. Since a missile is bigger and
much slower that a gun shell, it can be detected at long ranges with radar, and
then shot down in mid-flight with another missile.

The LR-SAM detects and shoots down incoming
missiles and aircraft with a reliability that is said to exceed 95 per cent. DRDO
sources say there will be further tests to verify that the missile has been
integrated properly onto INS Kolkata.

Mechanics
of engagement

To engage an incoming missile or aircraft
at the maximum possible range, INS Kolkata’s on-board radar --- called the MF-STAR
(multi-function surveillance, tracking and acquisition radar) --- can detect it
while it is still 200 kilometres away.

After detecting the target in the recent
tests, the MF-STAR began tracking it, communicating its key parameters --- distance,
altitude, direction and velocity --- to INS Kolkata’s command centre in real
time.

Meanwhile the LR-SAM interceptor, located in
a vertical canister on the warship’s deck, began its pre-launch checks. Simultaneously,
the LR-SAM’s command system was generating engagement scenarios, calculating
the exact point where the outgoing missile would impact and destroy the
incoming target.

As INS Kolkata’s weapons officer gave the launch
command, the interceptor roared out of its canister, engulfing the deck in a
ball of fire. At the designated height, it switched to level flight, gained
supersonic speed, and streaked towards the incoming target, guided by the
MF-STAR over a data link.

About five-to-seven kilometres short of the
target, a seeker on the interceptor’s nose switched on, locking it onto the
target. To accelerate the interceptor, which was by now merely coasting, the
dual-pulse motor fired for a second time. This increased the interceptor’s
velocity up to Mach 5-7, enabling it to manoeuvre sharply in tandem with the
target’s evasive zigzags.

A few metres from the target, the
interceptor’s proximity fuse detonated its 23-kilo high-explosive warhead,
disrupting it and preventing it from reaching the Kolkata.

The DRDO termed the test a success,
although the “high-speed targets” that the LR-SAM shot down were significantly
slower than the actual threats it must counter. Simulated targets travel at
500-550 kilometres per hour (kmph), while the Harpoon anti-ship missile comes
in at about 865 kmph; and the Exocet missile at 1,150 kmph.

LR-SAM
origins

During the Kargil conflict of 1999, when
the navy was preparing for war, the admirals realised to their dismay that they
had no counter to the Pakistan Navy’s Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The bigger
and more sophisticated Indian warships, some costing half a billion dollars,
were vulnerable to being sunk by the Harpoon, which costs less than $2 million.
New Delhi approached Tel Aviv for an emergency procurement of the Barak
anti-missile missile, which tided over that crisis.

Pleased with the Barak, New Delhi and Tel
Aviv agreed in January 2006 to develop a 70-kilometre version of the Barak to counter
anti-ship missiles of the future. Given the navy’s “blue water” ambition to control
wide swathes of the Indian Ocean, a destroyer or frigate equipped with the LR-SAM
would not just protect itself; but also create a protected “air defence bubble”
for smaller warships in the flotilla.

India allocated Rs 2,606 crore to this
project, which includes Rs 1,700 crore for fitting three Kolkata-class
destroyers with the LR-SAM. The Israeli Navy made an equal commitment,
undertaking to fit the Barak-8 on its three Sa’ar corvettes.

The work share was divided, with 30 per
cent going to the DRDO, which was charged with developing the LR-SAM’s solid-fuel,
two-pulse propulsion motors. Israeli company, Rafael, has developed the rest of the interceptor missile. IAI has built the rest of the systems, including the sophisticated MF-STAR radar.

The delay in the LR-SAM of three-to-four
years has been caused mainly by the DRDO’s difficulties in building the
sophisticated two-pulse motor. Eventually, it succeeded in developing a stable
propellant for this purpose.

The
way ahead

After the LR-SAM is integrated on all three
Kolkata-class destroyers (Project 15-A); it will be built for another four
Project 15-B destroyers being constructed in Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai (MDL);
and seven frigates that will begin construction in MDL and Garden Reach
Shipbuilders & Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE). The LR-SAM will also be installed
on INS Vikrant, the indigenous aircraft carrier being built in Kochi. It is
almost certain that several more warships would be equipped with the LR-SAM.

The manufacturing supply chain that is now
emerging includes several private sector companies, such as Godrej & Boyce,
and SEC. The LR-SAM system will be integrated at state-owned Bharat Dynamics
Ltd. DRDO officials say that indigenising numerous sub-systems will bring down
the cost of the system.

The authoritative Congressional Research
Service (CRS), which provides data and analysis to the US Congress, finds that
India no longer features in the world’s three biggest arms importers.

A new CRS report, according to The New York
Times, finds that of the world’s total arms trade of $71.8 billion in 2014, the
three biggest importers were South Korea ($7.8 billion in contracts signed),
Iraq ($7.3 billion) and Brazil with $6.5 billion.

In March, the equally authoritative Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) had declared, in its annual weapons
trade report for 2014, that Saudi Arabia had surpassed India as the world’s
biggest arms importer. According to that report, Saudi Arabia imported $6.46
billion worth of arms, compared to India’s $5.57 billion.

This is not the only divergence in public
figures relating to defence procurement, particularly that of India.

On December 8, the defence ministry told
parliament that India had bought Rs 24,992 crore ($3.78 billion) worth of
foreign weaponry in 2014-15. Ten days later, the same defence ministry told the
same parliament that India had spent Rs 29,222 crore ($4.42 billion) on foreign
arms in that same period.

There are several reasons for such
divergent figures in tracking the weapons trade. First, some institutions track
the signature of defence contracts in a particular year. On the other hand, others
track the actual delivery of defence systems during that year.

For example, India signed a $2.1 billion
contract with Boeing for eight P8-I multi-mission maritime aircraft in 2009-10.
Agencies tracking arms contracts would have put that entire amount in India’s
arms trade ledger for that year. Others, who track delivery, would spread the
$2.1 billion across the six years till 2015, when the last P8-I was delivered.

There is also a reason for divergence in
the defence ministry’s own figures. The figure placed before parliament on
December 8 represents actual orders placed on foreign vendors during the year,
and assumes orders placed on Indian vendors to be 100 per cent indigenous. The
higher figure placed before parliament on December 18 tracks foreign components
in “Indian” weapon systems, treating them as imports.

For example, the warship INS Kochi was built
by Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai (MDL) and is, technically, an indigenous system.
But it contains numerous foreign systems, such as the Israeli MF-STAR radar.
According to the Defence Procurement Procedure of 2013 (DPP-2013), the cost of
foreign systems, sub-systems and components in “indigenous” platforms are
treated as imports, along with the freight, insurance, service costs, license
fees, royalties and duties relating to their import.

Calculating according to DPP-2013, the
“indigenous content in defence procurements for the year 2014-15 is
approximately 40 per cent”, the defence ministry informed parliament on
December 18. Based on the total procurement outgo of Rs 78,754 crore ($11.9
billion) for 2014-15, an imported component of 60 per cent adds up to Rs 47,252
crore ($7.14 billion).

That outgo is only from the capital budget.
In addition, a significant portion of imported spares and components comes from
the revenue budget, which, after deducting salaries, amounts to Rs 46,905 for
the three services. Conservatively assuming a foreign outgo of 20 per cent from
that component of the revenue budget, another Rs 9,381 crore ($1.4 billion) is
added to India’s defence imports.

India’s total defence imports, arrived at
by adding Rs 47,252 crore ($ 7.14 billion) of imports from the capital account
to Rs 9,381 crore ($1.4 billion) of imports from the revenue account, amounts
to $8.54 billion for 2014-15.

This means going by either CRS’s
calculations, or those of SIPRI, India remains for now the world’s biggest arms
importer.

On the export side, the CRS report notes
that America is handily the world’s biggest arms exporter. From $26.7 billion
in 2013, the sale of US arms rose in 2014 by almost $10 billion (35 per cent)
to $36.3 billion, more than half of the global $71.8 billion arms export market.

Russia is a distant second, logging $10.2
billion in arms sales in 2014. Sweden is in third position ($5.5 billion);
France is fourth ($4.4 billion) and China is fifth ($2.2 billion).

Saturday, 26 December 2015

On a busy Christmas Day for him, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi redefined the rules of Indo-Pak diplomacy with an unscheduled
visit to Lahore to personally greet his counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, on his
birthday.

The brief stopover at Lahore came on Modi’s
journey home to Delhi from Kabul, where he inaugurated Afghanistan’s new
parliament building --- a Rs 710 crore gift from India to the people of
Afghanistan.

Foreign ministry sources in Delhi discount
the official version of the story, in which Modi made an impromptu request to
stop over at Lahore, during the course of a birthday telephone call to Nawaz
Sharif. In fact, this stopover had been carefully considered in Delhi, as a way
to galvanise the peace process further.

Careful planning, not least for adequate
security at Lahore, preceded Modi’s tweet this morning that contained the
bombshell: “Looking forward to meeting PM Nawaz Sharif in Lahore today
afternoon, where I will drop by on my way back to Delhi.”

With Pakistan TV covering the visit live, Sharif
greeted Modi with a hug at Lahore airport, and then accompanied him on a
helicopter him for talks at the Sharif’s ancestral residence in Raiwind, 40
kilometres from Lahore.

In an intriguing aside, businessman Sajjan
Jindal, who apparently set up a meeting between the two prime ministers in
Kathmandu last year, was present in Lahore as Modi arrived. On Friday
afternoon, he tweeted a photograph of himself with the message, “In Lahore to
greet PM Navaz (sic) Sharif on his birthday.” It is not known whether Jindal
played any role in mediating this meeting.

While it is not known what the two leaders
discussed, the resumption of dialogue would surely have featured on the agenda.
On Thursday, Sharif’s Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz had told Pakistan’s
National Assembly that the two foreign secretaries would meet soon to discuss a
comprehensive bilateral dialogue. Both foreign secretaries accompanied their
respective PMs.

There has been predictable criticism of
Modi’s initiative from India’s opposition, less the Left parties. However, Modi
has drawn wide praise on social media for seizing the initiative in shaping
Pakistan policy.

Earlier on Friday, while inaugurating the
Afghan parliament, Modi addressed a full sitting, and urged a regional approach
to restoring peace. “All of us in the region – India, Pakistan, Iran and others
– must unite, in trust and cooperation, behind this common purpose and in
recognition of our common destiny”, he said.

Modi’s advocacy of regionalism comes as
Islamabad spearheads a “four party” approach to restarting dialogue with the
Taliban, featuring the US, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. India has been
conspicuously left out.

Highlighting Pakistan’s growing role in
bringing the Taliban to the table, Pakistan’s army chief, General Raheel
Sharif, will visit Kabul on Sunday to coordinate a second round of talks with
the Taliban. After a first round of talks at Murree last year, Kabul called off
the dialogue when it emerged that Mullah Omar had been dead two years and it
was unclear who the government of Afghanistan was negotiating with.

Sharif will have his task cut out with a
growing succession struggle within the Taliban. On Friday, The New York Times
reported that the chiefs of several Taliban factions had written to Mullah
Mohammad Mansour, Mullah Omar’s successor, rebuking him for a recent bloody
crackdown on dissent within the Taliban.

Modi, however, made it clear that India
supported the reconciliation dialogue. He told Afghan parliamentarians: “Those
waging war from outside must seek a path to this building and this hall. Those
seeking territory through gun must seek power through ballot. Those who have
destroyed homes must now rebuild their nation.”

MoU between "GLONASS” and Centre for Development of Advance Computing (C-DAC) for cooperating in commercial applications through integration of Russian and Indian satellite navigation systems.

* * * * *

By Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 25th December 15

Visiting
Moscow at a time of trouble, when international sanctions over Ukraine are
compounding the blow to Russia’s economy from plummeting oil prices, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi signalled clearly that, notwithstanding India’s warming
relations with the United States, Russia remains a privileged partner.

“We have
stood together in bad times and good”, Modi reminded businessmen and officials
at the CEO’s Forum in Moscow.

Defence,
space and nuclear and hydrocarbon energy remain the four key pillars of the
Indo-Russian partnership, but Modi placed an unusual focus on business and
commerce. He talked up India as an investment destination, stating that its 7.4
per cent GDP growth is the highest amongst large countries.

“I have
come to invite Russia to be a partner in India’s economic development”, said
Modi. “We want to make India into a global manufacturing hub.”

Modi
specially mentioned Russia’s interest in participating in the Delhi-Mumbai
Infrastructure corridor. “I see Russia as a partner in India’s economic transformation”,
said the prime minister.

While
bilateral annual trade languishes at $10 billion, the two countries have set an
ambitious target of tripling that over the coming decade.

The body
language between the two leaders lacked the effusiveness of Modi’s earlier engagements
with the leaders of the US, Japan, UK and France. However, Modi personally
credited Putin for resurrecting the Indo-Russian strategic dialogue.

“You are
the architect of the India-Russia Strategic Partnership… I have always had great
respect and appreciation for (it)”, said Modi.

Defence was
expected to be the highlight of the dialogue, but the joint statement only
mentioned the signing of an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for
manufacturing the Kamov-226 light helicopter in India.

“The
(agreement) on manufacture of the Kamov 226 helicopter is the first big project
under the ‘Make in India’ initiative. It is rightly with our most important
defence partner”, said Modi.

There was
no indication whether the Indian partner for this project would be Hindustan
Aeronatics Ltd, or Reliance Defence, both of which are keen on this project.

It is
noteworthy that there was no official mention of the S-400 air defence missile
system, or the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), all projects that were
discussed during the visit. The joint statement after the talks has only a
cursory mention of defence.

Energy
cooperation was an expected highlight, with the two sides talking about
building 12 Russian nuclear reactors, in two different locations. While four
reactors already have the green light in Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu, and another
two are being discussed; the next six reactors will come up at another
location, probably Andhra Pradesh.

“Cooperation
in nuclear energy (will eventually involve) twelve Russian nuclear reactors in
two sites. The Indian manufacturing content has been increased in these. I
thank President Putin for his support”, said Modi.

The Indian
prime minister also talked up Indo-Russian cooperation in hydrocarbons, stating:
“Russia can be a critical source of energy security for India. We are enlarging
investment in Russia hydrocarbon sector.”

In
September, ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), the overseas arm of Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation (ONGC), had signed an agreement to buy a 15 per cent stake i
Russia's second-largest oil and gas field, Vankor.

The joint
statement put out by New Delhi and Moscow “welcomed the signing of Agreement
between Rosneft and ONGC Videsh Limited for acquiring 15% stakes by OVL in
Rosneft’s Vankorneft Oil fields and discussions for further stakes in future.”

The joint
statement also “welcomed the first meeting of the Joint Study Group for
studying the possibility of hydrocarbon pipeline system connecting Russia and
India held in Moscow on November 6, 2015 as part of the Programme on Enhanced
Cooperation in the Oil and Gas sphere signed in New Delhi in December 2014.”

Modi
flagged cooperation between India and Russia on Afghanistan and Central Asia, specifically
mentioning the road-cum-rail transportation corridor being built, with Indian
support, through Iran’s Chabahar Port to those regions.

Significantly,
the Indian prime minister backed Russia’s role in Syria, which has been sharply
criticised by western powers for being supportive of Basher Assad’s regime. The
joint statement notes: “Russia and India voiced their strong support to
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. Both sides expressed a
common understanding that the internal armed conflict in Syria cannot be solved
by the use of force, but rather through political and diplomatic means –
through a substantiveintra-Syrian
dialogue without preconditions or external interference…”

This
constitutes vital diplomatic support for Moscow. Putin told the media after the
bilateral dialogue: “It is important Russia and India make similar approaches
to key international problems. Our countries are for a political settlement of
the conflict in Syria and promotion of national reconciliation in Afghanistan.”

He also lauded
the “high degree of (Indo-Russian) convergence on global issues”, terming
Indo-Russian cooperation on the United Nations, BRICS, East Asia Summit, G-20
and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as “a partnership of global character”.

Thursday, 24 December 2015

The Russian S-400 air defence missile that could feature in Modi's agreements with Putin in Russia today

By Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 24th Nov 15

Why is Prime Minister Narendra Modi
visiting Russia on what much of the world considers Christmas Eve? Because it
will not be Christmas in Russia until January 7, according to the Gregorian
calendar, when Orthodox Christians --- Russia’s majority --- celebrate
Christmas.

Nor will Modi be mistaken for Santa Claus
with a stocking filled with defence orders. India is no longer handing Moscow
the meaty contracts that, from 1970-2000, met 70 per cent of India’s military
equipment requirements.

Even so, there could be significant announcements
about India’s purchase of Kamov-226T helicopters, S-400 air defence missile
systems, and the long-delayed contract for joint development of the Fifth
Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA).

“Russia does things with us; [and] we do
things with Russia, which we don’t do with any other country, said Foreign
Secretary S Jaishankar, briefing the media on Modi’s visit on Tuesday. While
Jaishanker declined to predict what announcements could be made, here are some
of the balls in play.

FGFA
and Multi-role Transport Aircraft (MTA)

Once the flagship of Indo-Russian defence
cooperation, the FGFA project illustrates the downswing in defence relations.
For two-and-a-half-years, the two sides have bickered over a research &
development contract (R&D Contract), under which India would commit about
$4 billion (Rs 26,464 crore) for Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) to work with
Sukhoi to evolve the Russian T-50 stealth fighter (already flying) into an FGFA
that incorporated India’s requirements.

Business Standard learns that, last month, discussions
were concluded on the R&D contract. While this clears the way for a
positive announcement in Moscow, the Indian Air Force (IAF) continues to block
the FGFA. Its criticism is intended to reinforce the impression of an aircraft
shortfall, thus increasing pressure on New Delhi to buy more Rafale fighters,
beyond the 36 already contracted with Dassault.

New Delhi will now decide whether to restrict
the FGFA project to buying 60-70 T-50 fighters off-the-shelf from Russia, or to
go ahead, as earlier planned, with joint development and the manufacture of
larger numbers of a customised fighter.

The FGFA project kicked off in October 2007
with an Inter Governmental Agreement (IGA) between New Delhi and Moscow. In
December 2008, a General Contract stipulated work share and cost, and
conditions under which the FGFA could be sold to other countries.

In December 2010, under a Preliminary Design
Contract, each side paid $295 million (Rs 1,952 crore) to finalise the FGFA’s
configuration and systems. Since June 2013, when this was concluded,
negotiations have dragged on over the R&D contract.

Standing in the way is the IAF, which
announced in October 2012 that it would buy only 144 FGFAs, instead of the 214
originally planned. On December 24, 2013, as reported by Business Standard
(January 21, 2014, Russia can’t deliver
on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF) the IAF told the defence
ministry the FGFA’s performance was below par. On January 15, 2014, at a MoD review
meeting, the IAF said the FGFA’s engine was unreliable, its radar inadequate,
its stealth features badly engineered, India’s work share too low, and the
fighter’s price too high.

While the FGFA’s future hangs in the
balance, that of another Indo-Russian joint development project --- the
Multi-role Transport Aircraft (MTA) --- is almost certainly dead. For three
years negotiations have remained deadlocked and there is little likelihood of
change soon.

Speaking to Russian new agency, TASS, on
October 29, prior to a visit to Russia, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar
stated: “(W)ith the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft, there are serious issues
needing clarification, let me be frank. There are some serious observations
which need to be clarified and reviewed properly.”

Kamov-226T
helicopters

The proposal to build 197 Kamov-226T light utility
helicopters in India has moved quickly after Modi committed to Putin, during
their last annual summit in January, that India would give Russia the contract.

Parrikar told TASS in October: “[Regarding]
the project for joint production of Kamov Ka-226 helicopters. I hope to use my
visit to have it inked on paper when the prime minister arrives. Also the
purchase of S-400 missile systems. We anticipate these projects to be
coordinated by next month.”

What remains to be decided is whether
Russian Helicopters’ Indian partner will be Reliance Defence, or HAL. Both
firms have lobbied hard, but the decision will be a political one.

The Kamov-226T is a 3.5 tonne, two-pilot,
light helicopter that is specially modified with a new engine for India’s
high-altitude operations along the Himalayan borders.

S-400
air defence missiles

As promised by Parrikar above, the vaunted
S-400 missile system --- a long-range, mobile, surface-to-air missile system
(M-SAM) that can shoot down incoming aircraft and several types of ballistic
missiles --- could see a high profile announcement on Thursday.

On December 17, the defence ministry
cleared the purchase of five S-400 units, which could be used to protect
high-value targets from nuclear-tipped missiles --- like New Delhi or our
strike formations attacking across the border. While the contract value would
be negotiated, Reuters has placed it at $4.5 billion.

The S-400 Triumf (NATO designation: SA-21
Growler) can shoot down aircraft and missiles at ranges of 40-400 kilometres.

Submarine
and frigates

India and Russia have negotiated since 2012
for leasing a second nuclear attack submarine (SSN), to supplement INS Chakra,
the Akula II class SSN that the navy has leased for ten years for some $900
million (Rs 5,954 crore).

Navy sources say this negotiation is
entangled in a larger package of naval systems, including the sale of three
Krivak-III frigates of the Grigorivich-class (Project 1135.6) to India. The
navy, which already operates six such frigates, is keen for three more, which
are lying part-built by Yantar Shipyard in Russia.

Russia wants the frigates to be completed
in Yantar Shipyard, but the defence ministry wants to build them under “Make in
India”. The navy, aware that India’s frigate-building shipyards are already
full to capacity, is keen on building in Russia.

Complicating this further is Russia’s wish
to be awarded, without competitive bidding, India’s Project 75I contract to
build six conventional submarines with air-independent propulsion (AIP). The
defence ministry wants competitive tendering, and is also apprehensive that
Russia has not yet mastered AIP technology.

Bruce Riedel is a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) veteran, who has advised the last four US presidents on South and
West Asia. His riveting new book, JFK’s
Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and Sino-Indian War, addresses America’s
role, and that of President John F Kennedy, in Tibet’s resistance to China’s subjugation
and the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Numerous books and articles have earlier
recounted America’s support to the Tibetan uprising against China in the 1950s,
and its full-hearted response to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s SOS as
Chinese troops advanced through the North East Frontier Province (NEFA) towards
the Assam plains. However Riedel is the first to weave together these multiple
strands in the context of US Cold War policies, telling the story from
Washington’s perspective.

This is the detailed story of how Kennedy
and Nehru, despite the lack of chemistry between them, were induced by their
democratic values and principles to come together in the face of China’s
aggression. More than any author before him, Riedel marshals logic and evidence
of Kennedy’s support to India in 1962 to convincingly argue that, had Beijing
not decided to withdraw its forces from Indian territory in December 1962,
Kennedy would have accepted Nehru’s request for the US Air Force to send
fighter aircraft to defend Indian airspace, freeing the Indian Air Force to strike
targets in Chinese territory. In so doing, Riedel presents an alternative
answer to an oft-asked question: “Why did China withdraw from captured Indian
territory in 1962?”

Riedel provides context and colour to what
is already documented about that sombre period. It is known that on November
19, 1962, India’s darkest hour of the war, Kennedy decided to despatch Averell
Harriman and a team of crisis managers to India to assess what help was needed.
Riedel reminds us of the significance of sending Harriman, who he describes as
“an icon of American diplomacy”. In a striking parallel, President Franklin
Roosevelt had despatched Harriman to an embattled London in 1941, at the height
of the Battle of Britain, to implement the lend-lease programme, which provided
Britain the resources to continue fighting Germany. Harriman also coordinated
the war effort with Stalin; and, in 1975, was chief negotiator with the North
Vietnamese at the Paris peace talks. Riedel convinces with his conclusion:
“Sending such a high-level diplomat as Harriman was an important expression of
American resolve. So large was Harriman’s team that the US envoy in Delhi, John
K Galbraith, lamented the “mission is so large that there doesn’t seem to be
any way of arranging conferences with the Indians short of hiring a church.”

The bold argument that Kennedy, and other
US allies, would have fought China alongside India is given credence by plans,
formulated during Harriman’s visit, for an air defence exercise in India in
1963, which would see US, British, Canadian and Australian fighter and bomber
pilots rehearsing the defence of Indian airspace. This exercise was actually
conducted, just weeks before Kennedy’s tragic death.

Riedel details a fascinating account of how
close Washington and New Delhi came close to what might even have developed
into a military alliance. But fate conspired to stall that rapprochement. A
five-year, $500 million (big bucks in those days!) military aid programme that
Kennedy’s administration drew up was to be sealed at a National Security
Council meeting in Washington on November 26, 1963. Four days before that
meeting, Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. His successor, Lyndon B Johnson,
was more susceptible to pressure from Pakistan against military aid to India.
President Ayub Khan threatened to cut off US access to Peshawar air base, from
where U-2 spy planes mounted missions over China. Even so, a meeting was
scheduled in the White House on May 28, 1964 to approve the aid. A day before
that, Nehru suddenly died. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, continued
negotiations, but then, in August 1964, signed a larger deal with the Soviet
Union. US Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, described that as “a lost
opportunity” in Indo-American relations.

The 35-year slump in relations that
followed has not prevented Washington and New Delhi from coming together again
in the face of China’s rise. The author highlights the irony in the fact that
Mao’s paranoia about US-India collusion in supporting the Tibetan rebels ---
quite contrary to the facts --- brought the two closer together in 1962 than
anyone would have believed possible.

Enlivening Riedel’s book are numerous
insider tidbits about personalities and events. The briefing notes for Nehru’s
visit to the US during Dwight D Eisenhower’s presidency mentioned that the
Indian prime minister “liked filet mignon and enjoyed an occasional Scotch as
long as it was all in private.” Indira Gandhi, it was noted, shared his
culinary tastes. Allen Dulles --- Eisenhower and Kennedy’s CIA chief --- drew
his fascination for the Great Game from Rudyard Kipling’s “Kim”, which was by
his bedside when he died. Roosevelt House, the New Delhi residence of the US
ambassador, was designed by Edward Durell Stone --- the US architect who also
designed the main building of PINSTECH (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science
and Technology), which catalysed that country’s nuclear arsenal.

Riedel is on sure ground whilst recounting
the diplomatic dance between Washington, New Delhi and Karachi (then Pakistan’s
capital). But he is disappointingly misinformed on the historical backdrop of
the Sino-India border dispute. Nor have the editors of the book spotted an
annoying series of factual errors, which badly erode the author’s credibility.
For example, he writes that China’s October 1962 attack “resulted in China’s
occupation of 14,500 square miles of territory claimed by India in Kashmir
called Aksai Chin…” In fact China was in possession of Aksai Chin even before
the war, and had even built a highway through it. Like in the statement quoted
above, Riedel repeatedly ignores the fact that Ladakh is quite separate from
Kashmir, with both forming separate parts of the state of Jammu & Kashmir.
That leads to jarring errors like his statement: “All of the territory that
China acquired in the Sino-Indian War in 1962 was a part of Kashmir.”

Even more disconcerting is Riedel’s
apparent belief that the boundary between Tibet and Jammu & Kashmir ---
which he calls the Johnson Line --- was drawn in 1914, along with the McMahon
Line in the east. In fact the Johnson Line (never a formal boundary) has its
origins in 1865, almost half a century before the Simla Conference, where the
McMahon Line was drawn. These would be embarrassing mistakes even for a novice.
That a thirty-year Central Intelligence Agency official could make such glaring
errors, and that editors could let them pass through to publication, are
nothing short of astonishing. It is to be hoped that subsequent editions of
this otherwise very readable book are free of these errors.