Even after we had heard from our relatives in Kalibo, Aklan, which, though not as badly ravaged as other places, has certainly seen its share of death and destruction, I continue to feel weighed down by elemental helplessness, and it has been tempting to yield to the impulse to contribute to the rapidly rising tide of recriminations that I have observed among my colleagues, friends, and other contacts. There can, after all, be no denying that the response to Yolanda so far signals immense, perhaps criminal, failures on the part of the government, both at the local and national levels, in terms of disaster risk reduction, mitigation, and management, and therefore scrutiny and censure are more than called for. (In line with this, I would particularly like to know whether charges of treason would prosper against local officials who, despite being safe and sound, chose not to reach out to their constituents, but to ensconce themselves in Manila and issue statements to the press.)

The problem with social media, however, is that it can perpetuate a vicious cycle of validation rather than allow for catharsis: when we vent in Twitter, Facebook, or similar platforms, there is a distinct possibility that our fury and despondency may not drain away to create a space for clear, intelligent thought, or convert itself into energy for deliberate, effective action. Instead, it may simply go round and round and round, accumulating intensity and power while destroying our ability to ask ourselves what has so provoked our emotions and to consider if our reactions are still commensurate to the matter at hand. I do not wish to suggest that indignation cannot be productive—a cursory survey of our history as a people would prove otherwise quite easily—but any expression of such ought, I believe, to be accompanied by a strong sense of proportion, of responsibility: the best instances of criticism contain within them not only an invitation to dialogue, but also a commitment to it. Engaging in vituperation helps nothing and no one, as this reduces us to mere cogs in a mindless machine of rage.

If we are to converse on Yolanda and its aftermath in a manner that is meaningful and can lead to vastly improved disaster response in the future, I suggest that we begin with the following considerations:

First: Yolanda was one of the most powerful typhoons in the recorded history of the world—the fourth strongest, in fact, according to the Joint Typhoon Warning Center in Hawaii. While the Philippines is battered by about 15 to 20 typhoons each year, it does not seem reasonable to suggest that this has given us sufficient experience to face a monstrous weather event like Yolanda, which had one-minute sustained winds of 315 km/h, a speed that would enable one to traverse a traffic-free EDSA from end to end in less than five minutes. Prior to November 8, when it first made landfall in Guiuan, Eastern Samar, it is difficult to imagine any individual or institution being able to extrapolate from available data and set a baseline for preparations that would be good enough. How does one prepare a nation for a natural disaster of this magnitude?

The initial plans that had been made—and it must be acknowledged that plans were in place—were based on assumptions that Yolanda, precisely because it was so unprecedented, easily blasted, ripped apart, and destroyed. The excruciatingly sluggish pace of the response is not necessarily a function of ineptitude, but it is definitely a function of lack of information: how can one plan when one does not know the reality on the ground? And how can one know what is out there when communication lines, roads, bridges, seaports, and airports are out of commission, wrecked, or otherwise unusable owing to safety and security concerns? Such situation has begun to be addressed, but repair and recovery work takes time. Anecdotal information may come in from several sources, but these reports still need to be collated, arranged, and made sense of from a broader perspective to facilitate the conduct of aid that is as efficient as can be, in light of prevailing constraints.

Second: Much of the rage that I have seen (hardly representative, admittedly) appears to be based on the heavily sensationalized—or, to use John Crowley‘s term, “catastrophized“—stories and images of agony that the media, especially parachute journalists like CNN celebrity anchor Anderson Cooper, can capture: as of this writing, various news entities have collectively served up seven days of post-apocalyptic poverty porn for the combination of the 24-hour news cycle and Web 2.0 that has proven so menacing to journalism and so soporific to the general public. The latter was something that cultural critic Neil Postman had warned about as early as 1985, in his book against television, Amusing Ourselves to Death:

In both oral and typographic cultures, information derives its importance from the possibilities of action. Of course, in any communication environment, input (what one is informed about) always exceeds output (the possibilities of action based on information). But the situation created by telegraphy, then exacerbated by later technologies, made the relationship between information and action both abstract and remote. For the first time in human history, people were faced with the problem of information glut, which means that simultaneously they were faced with the problem of a diminished social and political potency.

Cooper et al. may not be malicious—a contentious point that I will leave on the table for now—but that does not mean they are not guilty of imperial and imperious condescension: a number of commentaries, academic and popular, have underscored the problematic, even racist, rhetoric of Western media when their reporters cover Third World events, as in the case of the 2010 earthquake that struck the Carribean nation of Haiti. Here, for instance, is Rebecca Solnit on the coverage of that specific tragedy:

The belief that people in disaster (particularly poor and nonwhite people) are cattle or animals or just crazy and untrustworthy regularly justifies spending far too much energy and far too many resources on control — the American military calls it “security” — rather than relief. A British-accented voiceover on CNN calls people sprinting to where supplies are being dumped from a helicopter a “stampede” and adds that this delivery “risks sparking chaos.” The chaos already exists, and you can’t blame it on these people desperate for food and water. Or you can, and in doing so help convince your audience that they’re unworthy and untrustworthy.

As well, it may be useful to remember that no less than the United States of America hardly seemed like the global superpower it styles itself to be following Hurricane Katrina, as evidenced by this timeline, or by this clip, in which Cooper interviews Louisiana Senator Mary Landrieu:

(None of the foregoing, by the way, should not be understood as a tacit defense of broadcaster Korina Sanchez, who I understand has been pitted against Cooper in many discussions given her reaction to the coverage of CNN. As far as I am concerned, Sanchez, given that she is the wife of Department of Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas, should not be associated with any outfit that purports to report news.)

Third: Whenever we are moved to slam the government, we must remind ourselves that “government” is not a faceless, monolithic entity or an arena populated entirely by corrupt, greedy, and incompetent officials who are hell-bent on looking after their interests, preserving their prerogatives, and perpetuating their political careers at the expense of lives.

The government is also made up of the tired, hungry, overworked, and utterly courageous police officers, soldiers, doctors, nurses, drivers, pilots, clerks, technicians, engineers, and aid workers who are contributing to the relief effort. The government is also made made up of people who have lost their possessions, their homes, their relatives, and their friends to Yolanda, and yet they are out there in Eastern Visayas, sifting through the ruins of various cities, towns, and barangays, to save who and what they can. The government is also made up of people who need to know that we completely support what they are doing, and that our appreciation and gratitude for their vital work are boundless.

Finally, the government is also made up of us—we who are, in ways large and small, inextricably bound to and complicit with the system as it exists, and if said system needs to be renovated, refurbished, or razed to the ground so as to establish a better one, then this could be the moment to seize and to shape, not by way of ire-driven status updates, but by sustained, collaborative action beyond the screen, in the real world for which the digital one, for all its attractions, will always be a poor substitute.

This is a continuation of my post, “Crunching the DSWD numbers“, in which I examined two of the records that the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) had made available on its web site. While I discovered several disturbing discrepancies, I was unable to get to the heart of the issue that had been brought up by blogger Ella: the inefficiency of the DSWD.

Many donors have still not been issued official receipts, but that is somewhat understandable—for those who have yet to be identified, at any rate. Exponentially less understandable is the reason that varying entities were issued the same receipts. Take a look at the transactions on October 22, for instance: the Ateneo Grade School Community Association, the Department of Public Works and Highways Regional Office XI, Estrella Brigole and Erlinda Daycan, Editha Tugap, the Department of Natural Resouces Regional Office XI, PHRMO Davao del Norte, and the Deparment of Education Davao del Norte were all given Official Receipt Number 1921132. What is that supposed to mean?

Seeing that the total based on Actual Monetary Value (PhP54,563,321.50) would seem to be the most accurate—it is closest to the Reported Grand Total of PhP59,426,418.75, if nothing else—the total combined value of donations that the DSWD has received, excluding unmonetized donations, is PhP169,786,306.22. How has that value been utilized? Below is a comparative analysis of donations received and donations released. I have also indicated the cumulative value of donations that remain unutilized.

It is true that the warehouse is still filled with relief goods and that is thanks to the generous hearts of individuals and organizations both here and abroad…Just because the warehouse is full does not mean there is hoarding. We have to have calibrated release. When we receive requests from the regional office or evacuation center or local government unit, then we release goods to them. Every day we release goods and every day we receive donations.

Relief response is not just emergency assistance. There will come a time when we have to do recovery work and rehabilitation work and when that time comes there will not be many volunteers left. There will be large NGOs that we usually work with but mostly it will be the government that will provide relief to these people who are starting to recover and who need to be rehabilitated. We need to keep some resources for them because when that time comes, there will be no more donations coming in.

Some [of the goods] will be reserved. It depends on whether we’ve fulfilled the emergency needs. If those goods are required for emergency release, then it will all be released for emergency relief. If some goods are left behind, then they will be used for recovery and rehabilitation.

Does an average non-utilization rate of 74.63% constitute a “calibrated release”? How was such a calibration arrived at, and how effective has it proven to be? Consider also that on October 25, the utilization rate was the same as the day before, because there was no release of donations whatsoever.

In view of what I have found, it seems fair to say that transparency and ineptitude are not mutually exclusive. While the DSWD is to be lauded for undertaking relief operations in what seems to be as honest a manner as possible, that does not excuse what is clearly incompetent documentation—and which could be symptomatic of graver problems. At the very least, DSWD should strive to make its records accurate and easily “cross-referentiable”, as this is the easiest way to earn the trust of the general public. If the DSWD cannot be relied upon to produce correct documents, what can it be relied upon to do?

I have raised several important questions in this entry, but let me reiterate and expound upon them here:

How does the request-based release system work? While security is certainly a valid concern, is it worth giving up rapid relief delivery? How much time elapses between the filing of a request and the correspondent release of relief goods, anyway? Does the DSWD do need-matching between victims and available donations? If so, how long does that take?

How long does it take to identify a donor and issue a receipt to said donor? Why are different donors being issued the same receipt? How have the cash donations been used?

What does “calibrated release” mean, exactly? What is the rationale behind the low utilization rate of donations? Is this based on historical data or projections for future needs? Where can such data or such projections be found?

Much has already been made, both in cyberspace and in meatspace, of the entry entitled, “Aanhin pa ang damo kung patay na ang kabayo? (A special report from a volunteer)” by blogger Ella. If the controversial entry, which questions the efficiency of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in conducting relief operations, is more strident and more provocative than absolutely necessary, especially toward the end, when Ella speculates that the goods thus far unreleased might magically surface during campaign season or in flea markets, the fact that many people assumed the worst—and behaved at their worst, should the comments that I have read on the issue be any indication—is a clear demonstration of at least two things: first, the despair and outrage at the devastation caused by typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng, which have not found an outlet for sufficient expression and catharsis; and second, the low regard in which the government in general, and the present dispensation in particular, is held.

One of the more notable signs of the commitment of the DSWD to transparency and accountability is to allow the public access to its records of donations received and released via its official web site, a list of which follows below:

That DSWD made these records available apparently without prompting or pressure is a move worth recognizing. Cabral, in the same letter to Magsanoc quoted above, made a good point when she said, “We could have very well kept the information to ourselves and you will likely be none the wiser.”

That said, there is certainly plenty of room for improvement. On the question of rapid action, for instance, which was the main bone of contention for Ella, Manolo Quezon remarked in his column that:

The blunt answer is, the DSWD could be moving faster, and it took the public outcry caused by the blog for the government to start sounding a call for more volunteers, which sidesteps the question of whether it’s a wise or even necessary policy to rely on volunteers for a line agency to fulfill its functions. The DSWD has done a lot, as it is; so the public interest lies in figuring out how it could do better—which it can’t do, without the public participating by means of criticism and helping in problem-solving.

He also stated in his supplement to the column that, while the records as such appear to indicate that the DSWD is indeed being a responsible steward of the donations, they are rife with inconsistencies. It is therefore difficult to make any firm conclusions, though it is not from a lack of trying: one need merely take a look at the number of ways that he and a few online volunteers were able to present and re-present the data.

What follow below are my own attempts at crunching the DSWD numbers. Obviously, my findings are in no way definitive or exhaustive.

Considering that the DSWD records are Google Documents, which are meant to be easily changed and updated, I uploaded the records on which I based my study to my Scribd account: the tally of in-kind donations received here, and the tally of released donations here. The inclusive dates are September 27 to October 27.

Findings on Donations Received

(Note: The yellow columns in the spreadsheet are ones that I added to the record. Everything else either appeared as is or was rearranged for clarity.)

With regard to donations received, the DSWD was tracking five basic variables: (a) date received; (b) donor; (c) goods/services donated; (d) quantity of units donated; and (e) monetized unit value. Upon multiplying the latter two, a sixth variable, (f) the total monetized value of the donation, would result. Producing (f) is easy enough; with a spreadsheet program, all one has to do is copy the formula to the relevant cells. As can be seen toward the bottom of the first page, which reflects all the donations received on September 27, 2009, there are significant differences between the figures in the Reported Monetized Value (RMV) column, which appeared as is on the DSWD record, and the figures in the Actual Monetized Value (AMV) column, which were generated simply by multiplying quantity of units donated with the monetized value per unit. The DSWD received goods from the UNICEF which had monetized unit values, but were nevertheless marked “For monetization”, leading to a discrepancy of PhP396,550.00.

Another discrepancy lies with the Reported Total of the Day (RTD), which also appeared as is on the DSWD record. The RTD for September 27 is PhP2,369,440.00, but the figures that contributed to this specific total cannot be found. In truth, this RTD conflicts both with the Total RMV and the Total AMV. Inexplicably, there are three different totals for the same set of donations received.

The record for the next day, September 28, shows no difference between the Total RMV and the Total AMV, but the RTD is smaller than either by PhP804,900.00. It is only on the third day, September 29, that the RTD, the Total RMV, and the Total AMV are finally the same figure. From September 30 onwards, however, the RTD is no longer recorded.

On October 5, the World Food Program donated 50 kilograms of National Food Authority (NFA) rice, but the value of the donation was recorded as Php0.00.

On October 13, General Santos (care of Aboitiz) donated 26 boxes of noodles. Each box contained 72 packages of noodles. The unit value per package is recorded as PhP540.00. Then, the RMV for the entire donation is recorded as PhP5,400.00. Evidently, both values are suspect, but if the unit value is accepted for what it is, then the AMV of the entire donation is PhP1,010,880.00.

Added on October 31: Note that the immediately succeeding entry, which is also a donation of 900 packages of noodles from General Santos, has no reported value. Is this second set of noodles different from the first?

At the very end of the record, the Reported Grand Total of donations is PhP59,426,418.75. This figure does not seem to be based on any of the totals that could be derived from the available data.

Here is a summary that shows the discrepancies between and among the various totals:

Findings on Donations Released

Unlike the previous record, there seem to be no discrepancies as far as computing the value of the donations is concerned.

One strange thing that I did observe was that, on October 7 and 8, assorted donations were released without being monetized.

As the donations are also tracked by area, it might be useful to compare this record of releases to situation maps, such as the Typhoon Ondoy Situation Map, in order to determine how strategic the DSWD is in its relief operations.

As the first column of the above document indicates, I tried to come up with a broad classification system for the recipients of the donations so as to be able to get a rough picture of how the distribution went. (I assumed that “VIBES Inc.” is a charity of some kind, but I could not find any information about it.) This is the resulting chart:

A significant majority (80.89%) of the released donations went from the NROC to the various field offices of the DSWD, which should be reassuring. I do not know, however, why PhP774,528.00 worth of noodles was released to an unnamed entity—is this a clerical error?

To say that the government, as specifically embodied in the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), missed the boat as far as the Typhoon Ondoy (also known as Ketsana) disaster is concerned would be an understatement—if popular consensus is any indication, it missed many, many important boats. The tide of recriminations, then, has only begun to build, as it should. Philippine Daily Inquirer points out in its October 4 editorial that:

If in recent weeks the nation has been united in remembrance, it is now united in grief and – we do not think it’s an exaggeration to say – anger. All of officialdom, on whichever side of the aisle, in whatever office, is in the dock. As the public demands accountability, we won’t be surprised if officials react by finger-pointing, dodging the issues, or fudging the facts. The public needs to know who did their duty, did it well, or did it badly; and what can be done, institutionally and operationally, to improve disaster response and rehabilitation efforts.

This entry represents my own attempt to think through the manner in which Ondoy was handled, particularly within the first 48 hours, which I believe was the critical period for action.

My primary sources of information have been the situation reports of the NDCC, which I have cross-referenced with other material when I thought it necessary. I focus on Situation Report Nos. 1 to 9.

Although I obviously assume that these situation reports are more or less accurate, it should be said at the outset that they fail to inspire confidence. At absolute best, they were incompetently executed. Updates in one report are still recorded as updates in succeeding reports, which means that the newer a report is, the greater the amount of padding. One possible implication of such a practice is that there was little progress worth recording.

I do not know if revisions have since been made to the documents, but I have uploaded copies of the reports I used for writing this entry to my Scribd account.

Timeline

In constructing this timeline, I have only taken the highlights from the situation reports, excluding redundant information.

As much as possible, I have quoted the reports verbatim et literatim. Occasional editorial changes are enclosed between brackets.

September 26 (Sat)

1000H

NDCC Advisory was disseminated to regions concerned through SMS and facsimile for further dissemination to their respective local disaster coordinating councils from the provincial down to the municipal levels.

OCD Regional Centers concerned have been continuously disseminating weather advisories/bulletins to the Local Disaster Coordinating Councils and monitoring of possible effects in their respective areas of responsibilities.

1800H

The Secretary of National Defense and Chairman, NDCC in a Press Briefing this afternoon, declared a State of National Calamity in the following areas in view of the extensive effects of Tropical Storm “Ondoy”:

No data on persons affected/evacuated are available. A total of 5 persons are reported dead.

Later in the evening, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issues a brief message on Ondoy, exhorting everyone to “pull together and look out for each other in the finest Filipino tradition of caring and sharing”:

September 27 (Sun)

0100H

Secretary of Department of National Defense and Chairman, NDCC issued an NDCC Circular to Chairmen of RDCCs I, II, III and CAR directing them to undertake necessary response measures to avoid loss of lives and destruction of properties.

PCG, KN, SOG and CGETC teams rescued 200 residents in Brgy Hagonoy, Taguig near Laguna Lake. At St. Peter, MH Amoranto, Quezon City, more than 20 persons have been rescued from rooftops. Afterward, some teams proceeded to Araneta and Del Monte, Quezon City.

One (1) SOG team on board MRT with rubber boat and another SOG team which just finished operations in Parañaque now en route to Marikina.

Six (6) more teams with rubber boats and trucks formed with PBRC to proceed Marikina shortly after logistical fill-up and four (4) more rubber boats are expected to arrive from Subic early tomorrow morning for dispatch to other flooded areas to be assigned by NDCC.

As of this report, the partial total of people affected in Metro Manila, Bulacan, and Pampanga is 21,896 families (106,180 persons), while the partial total of evacuees is 624 families (3,114 persons) in 12 evacuation centers. There are also 15 casualties, 21 missing, and 3 injured.

0500H

DSWD’s on-going interventions are activation of the Quick Response and Social Welfare and Disaster (QR/SWAD) teams to provide technical assistance to the disaster-affected local government units (LGUs) on disaster operations; provided PhP635,056.00 worth of relief goods consisting of food and non-food commodities to the affected families; and prepositioned stand-by funds, family food packs and stockpile of relief commodities composed of food and non-food amounting to PhP19,981,158.35 by the field offices concerned along the typhoon path, ready for additional augmentation/assistance whenever necessary

As of this report, the partial total of people affected in Metro Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Batangas, Laguna, Rizal, and Camarines Sur is 54,891 families (279,763 persons), while the partial total of evacuees is 8,388 families (41,205 persons) in 92 evacuation centers. There are also 51 casualties, 21 missing, and 3 injured.

1200H

The NDCC Technical Working Group met on September 26, 2009 to map out available resources for rescue operations and to prioritize the heavily flooded areas for rescue operations.

Another meeting was held at the NDMC Conference Room to determine the immediate needs and requirements in the flood-stricken areas in terms of Water, Sanitation, and Health (WASH), medicines and medical supplies, food and non-food items.

In Region IV-A, no power in the following Districts of Quezon: 4th District except Gumaca and 3rd District except Unisan, Agdangan, and Padre Burgos both due to Quezelco 1 problem, 1st District except Lucban and Infanta breaker 51FY4 Famy Infanta 69kV line under patrol and Tayabas, Sampaloc and Pagbilao Meco portion lateral Line cut-out still open, subject for patrol by MECO and 2nd District has power except in the municipalitis of Tiaong and San Antonio but MECO portion lateral Line cut-out still open, subject for patrol by MECO.

Globe Telecom temporarily lent four (4) hotlines at NDCC OPCEN to augment the communication capability of NDCC in providing emergency calls in the calamity areas during the entire TS “Ondoy” Operations, with the following hotline numbers: 0917334193, 0917334256, 0917334263, and 09155316719.

As of this report, the partial total of people affected in Metro Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Batangas, Laguna, Rizal, and Camarines Sur is 59,241 families (294,555 persons), while the partial total of evacuees is 9,601 families (47,261 persons) in 101 evacuation centers. There are also 52 casualties, 23 missing, and 4 injured.

DepEd reported that 15 schools were damaged: 7 elementary schools 1 high school and 8 secondary schools were damaged in Regions CAR, NCR Regions III and IV-A amounting to PhP6,520,000.00. There are 36 school buildings used as evacuation centers occupying 1,650 families and 1,366 individuals.

The NDCC facilitated the release of 4,400 sacks of rice to the following:

The US Contingent: 1 Officer and 17 EPs, with night capability equipment, 2 rubber boats and 1 chopper (Bell 214) arrived this afternoon at NDCC OpCen to support SAR operations. Six persons have been rescued from Ever Gotesco, Cainta and two hundred packs of assorted goods (five kilos each) were distributed to the affected families.

Donations Received

The Manila and Subic Yacht Clubs lent rubber boats to the NDCC for use of response teams in the conduct rescue operations.

San Miguel Corporation and Petron Corporation donated 20 pieces 2.7 kg cylinder with gasoline lamps for use in the evacuation areas.

As of this report, the partial total of people affected is 69,513 families (337,216 persons), while the the partial total of evacuees is 11,967 families (59,521 persons) in 118 evacuation centers. There are also 73 casualties, 23 missing, and 4 injured.

DSWD had distributed the following items at the Rosario Sports Complex: 5 big boxes of doughnuts, 146 small boxes of doughnuts, 52 bags of hotmeal, 4 boxes of bottled water, 12 bags of used clothes, and 2 bags of blankets.

As of this report, the partial total of people affected is 86,313 families (435,646 persons), while the partial total of evacuees is 23,126 families (115,898 persons) in 204 evacuation centers. There are also 86 casualties, 32 missing, and 5 injured.

0639H

U.S. Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, along with representatives from the U.S. contingent that arrived yesterday, appears on Unang Hirit. Kenney says she sees no need to duplicate relief efforts already underway. Instead, she plans to divert resources already in the Philippines to hard-hit areas. She is also coordinating with the U.S. Marines to move up a military exercise slated for next month in Clark. Ideally, the troops and the equipment should arrive by the night of September 30 (Wednesday).

When asked how many Marines would be arriving, Kenney dodges the question, saying that the medical team will consist of 30 persons, who will then team up with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

1200H

NDCC on-site coordination has been established at the Incident Command Post in Ever Gotesco, Ortigas to support relief efforts.

DOH activated all DOH CHD’s operations center 24 hours/7days with continuous coordination with theLGUs concerned and prepositioned drugs and medicines in all affected areas; has provided 150 pieces of cadaver bags and six (6) boxes of assorted drugs and medicines. DOH-HEMS augmented 350 boxes of bottled water (8,400 bottles) for NCR and same quantity for CHD IV-A.

National Grid Corporation of the Philippines conducted power restoration in various damaged sub-stations (S/S). All lines are on normal operation except San Jose, Bulacan and CND-San Miguel (Bacnotan, San Miguel, La Union).

The NDCC facilitated the release of 3,900 sacks of rice to the following:

28 September 2009, donation of three (3) motorized rubber boats to NDCC, [courtesy of PGMA Sagip-Tulong].

As of this report, the partial total of people affected is 89,953 families (451,683 persons), while the partial total of evacuees is 23,147 families (115,990 persons) in 205 evacuation centers. There are also 100 casualties, 32 missing, and 5 injured.

NDCC Assets Deployed

Each NDCC situation report came with a table showing the assets that had been deployed for rescue operations. As previously stated, however, the reports tended to be padded, and thus confusing to read. In seeking to understand what the movements of the NDCC were, therefore, I decided to put together the following table, which I hope clarifies matters:

The units deployed came from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) Fire Department and SWAT. There was also a small contingent of U.S. troops.

Where details were not given, I placed a question mark in between parentheses. Otherwise, the data is practically unchanged.

A caveat regarding the PCG: As of SR No. 3, the PCG had deployed four units, while as of SR No. 4, the PCG had deployed six units. Of the six units in SR No. 4, however, four are deployed to exactly the same areas as the four units in SR No. 3. Also, it is only the latter six units that are recorded in succeeding reports. Therefore, it is possible that the PCG only deployed an additional two units, rather than six. I have decided to give the PCG the benefit of the doubt.

Preliminary Findings

While I have yet to come to any conclusions, these findings may serve as starting points for further dialogue or investigation.

Reportorial errors

Personal finickiness could well be the informing spirit here, but the following errors are significant if the reports served to drive actions and decisions:

The Globe hotlines in SR No. 6 are mistyped, and thus could have exacerbated communication problems. The first three numbers each lack one digit, while the last number should be 09175366719, at least starting from SR No. 8. A total 18 hours may have elapsed before corrections were made to the report.

A discrepancy of 500 sacks of rice becomes apparent upon comparing SR Nos. 7 and 8. Per SR No. 7, a total of 1,100 sacks were released to Region III, with 100 going to the first district of Bulacan, and the rest going to the Bulacan Provincial Disaster Coordinating Council. Per SR No. 8, however, only a total of 600 sacks were released to Region III.

Time mismanagement

There appears to be a significant gap—up to 17 hours—between the establishment of the first Advance Command Post (ACP) in Marikina (see SR No. 4) and the establishment of the other ACPs in Pasig, Cainta, and Quezon City (see SR No. 7).

Per SR No. 6, a meeting was held to “determine the immediate needs and requirements in the flood-stricken areas in terms of Water, Sanitation, and Health (WASH), medicines and medical supplies, food and non-food items”. If this objective is taken at face value, should it be inferred that the NDCC is not aware of what flood victims need? Or, if the allocation of supplies was the purpose of the meeting, what does it say about the actual state of coordination when data regarding evacuees was available as early as 0100H?

Questionable moves

About an hour and half before Ondoy made landfall, all the NDCC had done was monitor developments and send advisories.

There is little evidence that the NDCC and its member agencies were communicating or coordinating with each other efficiently.

While the DSWD had begun accepting donations as of SR No. 6, it is only in SR No. 7 that specific persons are identified and made accountable for any donations that come in. How donations that arrived in the interim were handled cannot be determined from the reports.

The deployment of assets over the critical 48-hour period seems merely sporadic rather than strategic. There are entire blocks of time in which there was very little deployment or, per SR No. 9, no deployment at all.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) was recorded as having mobilized significantly only on September 28. Why was it not able to do so earlier, despite its apparently significant resources? Consider, for instance, that the Special Action Force (SAF) of the PNP was scheduled to move to a 368-hectare camp in Baras, Rizal from Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig to the tune of PhP100 million. And whether the SAF has moved or not, that it was recorded as having arrived on the scene only on the morning of September 28, per SR No.8, is curious.

My fellow Filipinos, thank you very much for your generosity and good will toward the victims of Typhoon Ondoy.

In order to ensure the continuous and orderly flow of aid to those in need, please be informed that your government is taking the following steps:

First, a price control task force has been set up to prevent and penalize the overpricing of medicines. This exploitative practice is strictly prohibited.

Second, those involved in anomalous or fraudulent transactions for donations coursed through banks will be caught and punished.

Third, donations of food and other goods from abroad will not be taxed or confiscated by the Bureau of Customs, provided these are consigned to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).

Fourth, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has instructed all embassies and consulates to expedite the processing of documents required for donations coming from abroad, provided these are consigned to the DSWD.

Fifth, remittance service providers are requested to waive transaction fees for cash donations that are coursed to the DSWD through them.

It is only fitting that the government facilitate the delivery of aid to those in need, as well as ensure that they suffer no further. Anyone who seeks to impede such actions will be subject to severe punishment, including imprisonment.

Sahana Disaster Management System is in need of IT volunteers. The system will be extremely helpful in case of future disasters. Send a message to sahana@kahelos.org.

Courtesy of ABS-CBN News Online, assorted updates and advisories may be found here, and a list of class suspensions and cancelled events may be found here.

The succeeding information has been compiled from various sources, and I am particularly indebted to Manolo Quezon, Charo Limaco, Bryan Ong, and Dementia, among many others on Twitter, Plurk, and the general blogosphere.

Unless otherwise specified, all landline numbers are for Metro Manila and therefore require no dialing prefix if you are in that area. If you are outside Metro Manila, add 02 before the number, e.g., 02 XXX XXXX. If you are outside the Philippines, add 632 before the number, e.g., 632 XXX XXXX.

Or you can donate to Ayala Foundation USA via credit card by visiting this link.

In “choosing organization to receive the donation”, please choose “Gawad Kalinga-Community Infrastructure Program” for now. By September 29, (Tuesday), you will be able to choose “Gawad Kalinga-Relief”.

Kabataan Partylist

Manila Broadcasting Company (MBC)

670 0666

832 6117

MBC radio stations DZRH, 101.1 Yes! FM, and 90.7 Love Radio are accepting donations, such as bread, canned goods, clothes, and water. The drop-off point is at the MBC Building, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City (beside Star City).

Marika Bouncers Cooperative

The c-op will accept donations starting September 28 (Monday), at 10 AM. Its office is located at 95 Malaya St., Malanday, Marikina.

Move for Chiz

Volunteers are asked to report to Bay Park Tent along Roxas Blvd in Manila. It is beside Max’s Restaurant and Diamond Hotel. They may also proceed to Gilas Minipark on Unang Hakbang St., Gilas, Quezon City.

Philippine Daily Inquirer

These may be brought to the Inquirer office at 1098 Chino Roces Ave. corner Mascardo and Yague Streets, Makati City, or to any of its classified ads branches, or to any McDonald’s branch within Metro Manila.

Fantastik! Manila

Jollibee

Luca

Donations can be sent via Luca branches in The Powerplant Mall, Shangri-La Mall, or Eastwood City.

Mail and More

Donations for the victims of Typhoon Ondoy are accepted at all Mail and More outlets. The complete list of all outlets nationwide is available here.

Manor Superclub

Relief items will be accepted starting September 27 (Sunday) at 10AM. Manor Superclub is located in Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City.

Ministop (Ibarra branch)

Food (non-perishable goods only), clothing, medicines, beds, pillows, blankets, and other emergency supplies can be dropped off at the Ministop store located on España cor. Blumentritt, Sampaloc, Manila.

Moonshine

Donations for victims in Marikina and Cainta can be sent to Moonshine in The Powerplant Mall, Rockwell Center, Makati.

Myron’s Place

Myron’s Place in Greenbelt 5, Makati City, will accept relief goods.

Papemelroti

You may drop off relief goods, such as canned goods, milk, bottled water, and used clothes at any of the following Papemelroti branches:

91 Roces Avenue

Ali Mall Cubao

SM City North EDSA

SM Fairview

SM Megamall

Glorietta 3

SM Centerpoint

SM Southmall

No cash will be accepted.

Petron

All Petron gas stations will serve as collection points for relief goods.

The Powerplant Mall

Donations will be forwarded to the ABS-CBN Foundation. Please drop them off at the adminstration office, P1 level.

Redkimono

Redkimono will accept canned goods, bottled water, clothing for all ages, basic household items. You may find the contact information for the branch nearest you here.