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UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE

(USSID)

18

LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (FOUO)

LETTER OF PROMULGATION

(U) this USSID prescribes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities
to ensure that the missions and functions of the United States SIGINT System
(USSS) are conducted in a manner that safeguards the constitutional rights
of U.S. persons.

(U) This USSID has been completely rewritten to make it shorter and easier
to understand. It constitutes a summary of the laws and regulations directly
affecting USSS operations. All USSS personnel who collect, process, retain,
or disseminate information to, from, or about U.S. persons or persons in
the United States must be familiar with its contents.

(FOUO) This USSID supercedes USSID 18 and USSID 18, Annex
A (distributed separately to selected recipients), both of which are dated
20 October 1980, and must now be destroyed. Notify DIRNSA/CHSS (USSID Manager)
if this edition of USSID 18 is destroyed because of an emergency action;
otherwise, request approval from DIRNSA/CHSS before destroying this USSID.

(FOUO) Release or exposure of this document to contractors
and consultants without approval from the USSID Manager is prohibited.
Instructions applicable to release or exposure of USSID to contractors and
consultants may be found in USSID 19.

(FOUO) Questions and comments concerning this USSID should
be addressed to the Office of the General Counsel, NSA/CSS
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx NSTS 963-3121 or STU III 688-5015).

USSID 18

LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (U)

1.1 (U) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects all
U.S. persons anywhere in the world and all persons within the United States
from unreasonable searches and seizures by any person or agency acting on
behalf of the U.S. Government. The Supreme Court has ruled that the interception
of electronic communications is a search and seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. It is therefore mandatory that signals intelligence
(SIGINT) operations be conducted pursuant to procedures which meet the
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

1.2 (U) In determining whether United States SIGINT System (USSS) operations
are "reasonable," it is necessary to balance the U.S. Government's need for
foreign intelligence information and the privacy interests of persons protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Striking that balance has consumed much time and
effort by all branches of the United States government. The results of that
effort are reflected in the references listed in Section 2 below. Together,
these references require the minimization of U.S. person information collected,
processed, retained or disseminated by the USSS. The purpose of this document
is to implement these minimization requirements.

1.3 (U) Several themes run throughout this USSID. The most important is that
intelligence operations and the protection of constitutional rights are not
incompatible. It is not necessary to deny legitimate foreign intelligence
collection or suppress legitimate foreign intelligence information to protect
the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons.

1.4 (U) Finally, these minimization procedures implement the constitutional
principle of "reasonableness" by giving different categories of individuals
and entities different levels of protection. These levels range from the
stringent protection accorded U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens
in the United States to provisions relating to foreign diplomats in the U.S.
These differences reflect yet another main theme of these procedures, that
is, that the focus of all foreign intelligence operations is on foreign entities
and persons.

3.1 (U) The policy of the USSS is to TARGET or COLLECT only FOREIGN
COMMUNICATIONS.* The USSS will not intentionally COLLECT communications to,
from or about U.S. PERSONS or persons or entities in the U.S. except as set
forth in this USSID. If the USSS inadvertently COLLECTS such communications,
it will process, retain and disseminate them only in accordance with this
USSID.

4.1 (S-CCO) Communications which are known to be to, from or about U.S. PERSONS
oxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx not be intentionally intercepted. [1
line redacted.]

a. With the approval of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court under the conditions outlined in Annex A of this USSID.

b. With the approval of the Attorney General of the United States, if:

(1) The COLLECTION is directed against the following:

(a) Communications to or from U.S. PERSONS outside of the UNITED STATES,
or

(b) International communications to, from, [1 line redacted.]

(c) Communications which are not to or from but merely about U.S. PERSONS
(wherever located).

(2) The person is an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER, and

(3) The purpose of the COLLECTION is to acquire significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
information.

c. With the approval of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS), so long as the COLLECTION need not be approved
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Attorney General, and

(1) The person has CONSENTED to the COLLECTION by executing one of the CONSENT
forms contained in Annex H, or

(2) The person is reasonably believed to be held captive by a FOREIGN POWER
or group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or

(3) The TARGETED [3 lines redacted.]

(4) [3 lines redacted.]

(5) [5 lines redacted.]

(a) A non-U.S. PERSON located outside the UNITED STATES, or

(b) [1 line redacted.]

(6) Copies of approvals granted by DIRNSA/CHCSS under these provisions will
be retained in the Office of the General Counsel for review by the Attorney
General.

d. Emergency Situations

(1) In emergency situations, DIRNSA/CHCSS may authorize the COLLECTION of
information to, from or about a U.S. PERSON who is outside the UNITED STATES
when securing the prior approval of the Attorney General is not practical
because:

(a) The time required to obtain such approval would result in the loss of
significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE and would cause substantial harm to the
national security.

(b) A person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be in immediate
danger.

(c) The physical security of a defense installation or government property
is reasonably believed to be in immediate danger.

(2) In those cases where DIRNSA/CHCSS authorizes emergency COLLECTION, except
for actions taken under paragraph c.(1)(b) above, DIRNSA/CHCSS shall find
that there is probably cause that the TARGET meets one of the following criteria:

(a) A person who, for or on behalf of a FOREIGN POWER, is engaged in clandestine
intelligence activities (including covert activities intended to affect the
political or governmental process), sabotage, or INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
activities, or activities in preparation for INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM activities;
or who conspires with, or knowingly aids and abets a person engaging in such
activities.

(b) A person who is an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER.

(c) A person unlawfully acting for, or pursuant to the direction of, a FOREIGN
POWER. The mere fact that a person's activities may benefit or further the
aims of a FOREIGN POWER is not enough to bring that person under this subsection,
absent evidence that the person is taking direction from, or acting in knowing
concert with, the FOREIGN POWER.

(d) A CORPORATION or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by a FOREIGN POWER.

(e) A person in contact with, or acting in collaboration with, an intelligence
or security service of a foreign power for the purpose of providing access
to information or material classified by the United States to which such
person has access.

(3) In all cases where emergency collection is authorized, the following
steps shall be taken:

(a) The General Counsel will be notified immediately that the COLLECTION
has started.

(b) The General Counsel will initiate immediate efforts to obtain Attorney
General approval to continue the collection. If Attorney General approval
is not obtained within seventy two hours, the COLLECTION will be terminated.
If the Attorney General approves the COLLECTION, it may continue for the
period specified in the approval.

e. Annual reports to the Attorney General are required for COLLECTION conducted
under paragraphs 4.1.c.(3) and (4). Responsible analytic offices will provide
such reports through the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) and the General
Counsel to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for transmittal to the Attorney General by 31
January of each year.

4.2 (S-CCO) [2 lines redacted.]

[3 lines redacted.]

[2 lines redacted.]

4.3 (U) Incidental Acquisition of U.S. PERSON Information. Information to,
from or about U.S. PERSONS acquired incidentally as a result of COLLECTION
directed against appropriate FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE TARGETS may be retained
and processed in accordance with Section 5 and Section 6 of this USSID.

4.4 (S-CCO) [1 line redacted.]

a. [3 lines redacted.]

(1) [1 line redacted.]

(2) [2 lines redacted.]

b. [2 lines redacted.]

c. [2 lines redacted.]

d. [3 lines redacted.]

4.5 (C-CCO) [1 line redacted.]

a. [3 lines redacted.]

b. [2 lines redacted.]

4.6 (S-CCO) [3 lines redacted.]

4.7 (C-CCO) [6 lines redacted.]

4.8 (U) Distress Signals. Distress signals may be intentionally collected,
processed, retained, and disseminated without regard to the restrictions
contained in this USSID.

4.9 (U) COMSEC Monitoring and Security Testing of Automated Information Systems.
Monitoring for communications security purposes must be conducted with the
consent of the person being monitored and in accordance with the procedures
established in National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security
Directive 600, Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring, dated 10 April
1990. Monitoring for communications security purposes is not governed by
this USSID. Intrusive security testing to assess security vulnerabilities
in automated information systems likewise is not governed by this USSID.

c. A copy of the results of the review will be provided to the Inspector
General and the General Counsel.

5.3 (C-CCO) Forwarding of Intercepted Material. FOREIGN
COMMUNICATIONS collected by the USSS may be forwarded as intercepted to NSA,
intermediate processing facilities, and collaborating centers.

5.4 (S-CCO) Nonforeign Communications.

a. Communications between persons in the UNITED STATES. Private radio
communications solely between persons in the UNITED STATES inadvertently
intercepted during the COLLECTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be promptly
destroyed unless the Attorney General determines that the contents indicate
a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.

b. Communications between U.S. PERSONS. Communications solely between U.S.
PERSONS will be treated as follows:

(1) Communications solely between U.S. PERSONS inadvertently intercepted
during the COLLECTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS will be destroyed upon
recognition, if technically possible, except as provided in paragraph 5.4.d
below.

(2) Notwithstanding the preceding provision, cryptologic data (e.g., signal
and encipherment information) and technical communications (e.g., circuit
usage) may be extracted and retained from those communications if necessary
to:

(a) Establish or maintain intercept, or

(b) Minimize unwanted intercept, or

(c) Support cryptologic operations related to FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.

c. Communications involving an Office or Employee of the U.S. Government.
Communications to or from any officer or employee of the U.S. Government,
or any state or local government, will not be intentionally intercepted.
Inadvertent INTERCEPTIONS of such communications (including those between
foreign TARGETS and U.S. officials) will be treated as indicated in paragraphs
5.4.a. and b., above.

d. Exceptions: Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5.4.b. and c.,
the DIRNSA./CHCSS may waive the destruction requirement for international
communications containing, inter alia, the following types of information:

(1) Significant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, or

(2) Evidence of a crime or threat of death or serious bodily harm to any
person, or

(3) Anomalies that reveal a potential vulnerability to U.S. communications
security. Communications for which the Attorney General or DIRNSA/CHCSS's
waiver is sought should be forwarded to NSA/CSS, Attn: P05
P02.

5.5 (S-CCO) Radio Communications with a Terminal in the
UNITED STATES.

a. All radio communications that pass over channels with a terminal in the
UNITED STATES must be processed xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
unless those communications occur over channels used exclusively by a FOREIGN
POWER.

b. International common-access radio communications that pass over channels
with terminal in the UNITED STATES
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx may be processed
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx if necessary to determine
whether a channel contains communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest
which NSA may wish to collect. Such processing may not exceed two hours without
the specific prior written approval of the DDO and, in any event, shall be
limited to the minimum amount of time necessary to determine the nature of
communications on the channel and the amount of such communications that
include FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. Once it is determined that the channel contains
sufficient communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE interest to warrant COLLECTION
and exploitation to produce FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE [1 line redacted.]

c. Copies of all DDO written approvals made pursuant to 5.5.b. must be provided
to the General Counsel and the Inspector General.

6.1 (S-CCO) Retention of Communications to, from or About
U.S. PERSONS.

a. Except as otherwise provided in Annex A, Appendix 1, Section 4, communications
to, from or about U.S. PERSONS that are intercepted by the USSS may be retained
in their original or transcribed form only as follows:

(1) Unenciphered communications not thought to to contain secret meaning
may be retained for five years unless the DDO determines in writing that
retention for a longer period is required to respond to authorized FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE requirements.

(2) Communications necessary to maintain technical data bases for cryptanalytic
or traffic analytic purposes may be retained for a period sufficient to allow
a thorough exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably
believed likely to become, relevant to a current or future FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation
and may consist of any period of time during which the technical data base
is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis. If a U.S. PERSON's identity is
not necessary to maintaining technical data bases, it should be deleted or
replaced by a generic term when practicable.

b. Communications which could be disseminated under Section 7, below (i.e.,
without elimination of references to U.S. PERSONS) may be retained in their
original or transcribed form.

6.2 (S-CCO) Access. Access to raw traffic storage systems
which contain identities of U.S. PERSONS must be limited to SIGINT production
personnel.

7.1 (C-CCO) Focus of SIGINT Reports. All SIGINT reports
will be written so as to focus solely on the activities of foreign entities
and persons and their agents. Except as provided in Section 7.2., FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE information concerning U.S. PERSONS must be disseminated in
a manner which does not identify the U.S. PERSON. Generic or general terms
or phrases must be substituted for the identity (e.g., "U.S. firm" for the
specific name of a U.S. CORPORATION or "U.S. PERSON" for the specific name
of a U.S. PERSON). Files containing the identities of U.S. persons deleted
from SIGINT reports will be maintained for a maximum period of one year and
any requests from SIGINT customers for such identities should be referred
to P05 P02.

7.2 (C-CCO) Dissemination of U.S. PERSON Identities. SIGINT
reports may include the identification of a U.S. PERSON only if one of the
following conditions is met and a determination is made by the appropriate
approval authority that the recipient has a need for the identity for the
performance of official duties:

a. The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED to the dissemination of communications of,
or about, him or her and has executed the CONSENT form found in Annex H of
this USSID, or

b. The information is PUBLICLY AVAILABLE (i.e., the information is derived
from unclassified information available to the general public), or

c. The identity of the U.S. PERSON is necessary to understand FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE information or assess its importance. The following nonexclusive
list contains examples of the type of information that meet meet this standard:

(1) FOREIGN POWER or AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER. The information indicates
that the U.S. PERSON is a FOREIGN POWER or an AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER.

(2) Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information. The information indicates
that the U.S. PERSON may be engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.

(3) International Narcotics Activity. The information indicates that the
individual may be engaged in international narcotics trafficking activities.
(See Annex J of this USSID for further information concerning individuals
involved in international narcotics trafficking).

(4) Criminal Activity. The information is evidence that the individual may
be involved in a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed,
provided that the dissemination is for law enforcement purposes.

(5) Intelligence TARGET. The information indicates that the U.S. PERSON may
be the TARGET of hostile intelligence activities of a FOREIGN POWER.

(6) Threat to Safety. The information indicates that the identity of the
U.S. PERSON is pertinent to a possible threat to the safety of any person
or organization, including those who are TARGETS. victims or hostages of
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST organizations. Reporting units shall identify to
P05 P02 any report containing the identity of a U.S. PERSON
reported under this subsection (6). Field reporting to P05
P02 should be in the form of a CRITICOMM message (DDIxx) and include the
report date-time-group (DTG), product serial number and the reason for inclusion
of the U.S. PERSON's identity.

(7) Senior Executive Branch Officials. The identity is that of a senior official
of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. In this case only the official's
title will be disseminated. Domestic political or personal information on
such individuals will be neither disseminated nor retained.

7.3 (C-CCO) Approval Authorities. Approval authorities for
the release of identities of U.S. persons under Section 7 are as follows:

a. DIRNSA/CHCSS. DIRNSA/CHCSS must approve dissemination of:

(1) The identities of any senator, congressman, officer, or employee of the
Legislative Branch of the U.S. Government.

(2) The identity of any person for law enforcement purposes.

b. Field units and NSA Headquarters Elements. All SIGINT production organizations
are authorized to disseminate the identities of U.S. PERSONS when:

(1) The identity is pertinent to the safety of any person or organization.

(2) The identity is that of a senior official of the Executive Branch.

(3) The U.S. PERSON has CONSENTED under paragraph 7.2.a. above.

c. DDO and Designees.

(1) In all other cases, U.S. PERSON identities may be released only with
the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations, the Assistant Deputy
Director for Operations, the Chief, P05 P02, the Deputy
Chief, P05 P02, or, in their absence, the Senior Operations
Office of the National SIGINT Operations Center. The DDO or ADDO shall review
all U.S. identities released by these designees as soon as practicable after
the release is made.

(2) For law enforcement purposes involving narcotics-related information,
DIRNSA has granted to the DDO authority to disseminate U.S. identities. This
authority may not be further delegated.

7.4 (U) Privileged Communications and Criminal Activity. All proposed
disseminations of information constituting U.S. PERSON privileged communications
(e.g., attorney/client, doctor/patient) and all information concerning criminal
activities or criminal or judicial proceedings in the UNITED STATES must
be reviewed by the Office of General Counsel prior to dissemination.

7.5 (U) Improper Dissemination. If the name of a U.S. PERSON is improperly
disseminated, the incident should be reported to P05 P02
within 24 hours of discovery of the error.

a. Conduct regular inspections and perform general oversight of NSA/CSS
activities to ensure compliance with this USSID.

b. Establish procedures for reporting Key Component and Field Chiefs of their
activities and practices for oversight purposes.

c. Report to the DIRNSA/CHCSS, annually by 31 October, concerning NSA/CSS
compliance with this USSID.

d. Report quarterly with the DIRNSA/CHCSS and General Counsel to the President's
Intelligence Oversight Board through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence Oversight).

8.2 (U) General Counsel. The General Counsel shall:

a. Provide legal advice and assistance to all elements of the USSS regarding
SIGINT activities. Requests for legal advice on any aspect of these procedures
should be sent by CRITICOMM to DDIxx, or by NSA/CSS secure telephone 963-3121,
or STU III (301) 688-5015.

b. Prepare and process all applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court orders and requests for Attorney General approvals required by these
procedures.

c. Advise the Inspector General in inspections and oversight of USSS activities.

d. review and assess for legal implications as requested by the DIRNSA/CHCSS,
Deputy Director, Inspector General or Key Components Chiefs, all new major
requirements and internally generated USSS activities.

e. Advise USSS personnel of new legislation and case law that may affect
USSS missions, functions, operations, activities, or practices.

f. Report as required to the Attorney General and the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board and provide copies of such reports to the DIRNSA/CHCSS and
affected agency elements.

g. Process requests from any DoD intelligence component for authority to
use signals as described in Procedure 5, Part 5, of DoD 5240.1-R, for periods
in excess of 90 days in the development, test, or calibration of ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE equipment and other equipment that can intercept communications.

8.3 (U) Deputy Director for Operations (DDO). The DDO shall:

a. Ensure that all SIGINT production personnel understand and maintain a
high degree of awareness and sensitivity to the requirements of this USSID.

b. Apply the provisions of this USSID to all SIGINT production activities.
The DDO staff focal point for USSID matters is P05 P02 (use
CRITICOMM DDIxx).

c. Conduct necessary reviews of SIGINT production activities and practices
to ensure consistency with this USSID.

d. Ensure that all new major requirements levied on the USSS or internally
generated activities are considered for review by the General Counsel. All
activities that raise questions of law or the proper interpretation of this
USSID must be reviewed by the General Counsel prior to acceptance or execution.

8.4 (U) All Elements of the USSS. All elements of the USSS shall:

a. Implement this directive upon receipt.

b. Prepare new procedures or amend or supplement existing procedures as required
to ensure adherence to this USSID. A copy of such procedures shall be forwarded
to NSA/CSS, Attn: P05 P02.

c. Immediately inform the DDO of any tasking or instructions that appear
to require actions at variance with this USSID.

d. Promptly report to the NSA Inspector General and consult with the NSA
General Counsel on all activities that may raise a question of compliance
with this USSID.

(1) Acts in the UNITED STATES as an officer or employee of a FOREIGN POWER,
or as a member of a group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities
in preparation therefor;

(2) Acts for, or on behalf of, a FOREIGN POWER that engages in clandestine
intelligence activities in the UNITED STATES contrary to the interests of
the UNITED STATES, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the
UNITED STATES indicate that such person may engage in such activities in
the UNITED STATES, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person
in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person
to engage in such activities;

b. Any person, including a U.S. PERSON, who:

(1) Knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for,
or on behalf of, a FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve, or may involve
a violation of the criminal statutes of the UNITED STATES; or

(2) Pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a
FOREIGN POWER, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities
for, or on behalf of, such FOREIGN POWER, which activities involve or are
about to involve, a violation of the criminal statutes of the UNITED STATES;
or

(3) Knowingly engages in sabotage or INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or activities
that are in preparation therefor, for, or on behalf of, a FOREIGN POWER;
or

(4) Knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described
in paragraphs 9.1.b.(1) through (3) or knowingly conspires with any person
to engage in such activities.

c. For all purposes other than the conduct of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE as
defined by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance ACt (see Annex A), the phrase
"AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER" also means any person, including U.S. PERSONS
outside of the UNITED STATES, who are officers or employees of a FOREIGN
POWER, or who act unlawfully for or pursuant to the direction of a FOREIGN
POWER, or who are in contact with or acting in collaboration with an intelligence
or security service of a FOREIGN POWER for the purpose of providing access
to information or material classified by the UNITED STATES Government and
to which the person has or has had access. The mere fact that a person's
activities may benefit or further the aims of a FOREIGN POWER is not enough
to bring that person under this provision, absent evidence that the person
is taking direction from or acting in knowing concert with a FOREIGN POWER.

9.3 (U) COMMUNICANT means a sender or intended recipient of a communication.

9.4 (U) COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT A U.S. PERSON are those in which the U.S. PERSON
is identified in the communication. A U.S. PERSON is identified when the
person's name, unique title, address, or their personal identifier is revealed
in the communication in the context of activities conducted by that person
or activities conducted by others and related to that person. A mere reference
to a product by brand name or manufacturer's name, e.g., "Boeing 707" is
not an identification of a U.S. PERSON.

9.5 (U) CONSENT, for SIGINT purposes, means an agreement by a person or
organization to permit the USSS to take particular actions that affect the
person or organization. An agreement by an organization with the National
Security Agency to permit COLLECTION of information shall be deemed valid
CONSENT if given on behalf of such organization by an official or governing
body determined by the General Counsel, National Security Agency, to have
actual or apparent authority to make such an agreement.

9.6 (U) CORPORATIONS, for Purposes of this USSID, are entities legally recognized
as separate from the persons who formed, own, or run them. CORPORATIONS have
the nationality of the nation state under whose laws they were formed. Thus,
CORPORATIONS incorporated under UNITE STATES federal or state law are U.S.
PERSONS.

9.7 (U) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE means:

a. In the case of an electronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic
communication by electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is
a party to the communication.

b. In the case of a nonelectronic communication, the acquisition of a nonpublic
communication of electronic means without the CONSENT of a person who is
visibly present at the place of communication.

c. The term ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE does not include the use of radio direction
finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.

9.8. (C) FOREIGN COMMUNICATION means a communication that
has at least one COMMUNICANT outside of the UNITED STATES, or that is entirely
among FOREIGN POWERS or between a FOREIGN POWER and officials of a FOREIGN
POWER, but does not include communications intercepted by ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
directed at premises in the UNITED STATES predominantly for residential purposes.

9.9. (U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE means information relating to the capabilities,
intentions, and activities of FOREIGN POWERS, organizations, or persons,
and for purposes of this USSID includes both positive FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
and counterintelligence.

9.10. (U) FOREIGN POWER means:

a. A foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized
by the UNITED STATES,

b. A faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of
UNITED STATES PERSONS,

c. An entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments
to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments,

d. A group engaged in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM or activities in preparation
therefor,

e. A foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of
UNITED STATES PERSONS, or

f. An entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.

9.11. (U) INTERCEPTION means the acquisition by the USSS through electronic
means of a nonpublic communication to which it is not an intended party,
and the processing of the contents of that communication into an intelligible
form, but not including the display of signals on visual display devices
intended to permit the examination of the technical characteristics of the
signals without reference to the information content carried by the signal.

9.12. (U) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM means activities that:

a. Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the UNITED STATES or of any State, or that would
be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the UNITED
STATES or any State, and

b. Appear to be intended:

(1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,

(2) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion,
or

(3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping,
and

c. Occur totally outside the UNITED STATES, or transcend national boundaries
in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators
operate or seek asylum.

9.13. (U) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION means information that has been
published or broadcast for general public consumption, is available on request
to a member of the general public, has been seen or heard by a casual observer,
or is made available at a meeting open to the general public.

9.14. (C) [3 lines redacted.]

9.15. (C) [3 lines redacted.]

9.16. (U) TARGET, OR TARGETING: See COLLECTION.

9.17. (U) UNITED STATES, when used geographically, includes the 50 states
and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or
possession over which the UNITED STATES exercises sovereignty.

9.18. (C) UNITED STATES PERSON:

a. A citizen of the UNITED STATES,

b. An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the UNITED STATES,

c. Unincorporated groups and associations a substantial number of the members
of which constitute a. or b. above, or

d. CORPORATIONS incorporated in the UNITED STATES, including U.S. flag
nongovernmental aircraft or vessels, but not including those entities which
are openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed
and controlled by them.

e. The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person is a U.S.
PERSON:

(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as
a U.S. PERSON unless that person is reasonably identified as an alien who
has not been admitted for permanent residence or if the nature of the person's
communications or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such
communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a
U.S. PERSON.

(2) A person known to be currently outside the UNITED STATES, or whose location
is not known, will not be treated as a U.S. PERSON unless such person is
reasonably identified as such or the nature of the person's communications
or other indicia in the contents or circumstances of such communications
give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a U .S. person.

(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence may be
assumed to have lost status as a U.S. PERSON if the person leaves the UNITED
STATES and it is known that the person is not in compliance with the
administrative formalities provided by law (8 U.S.C. Section 1203)
that enable such person to reenter the UNITED STATES without regard to the
provisions of law that would otherwise restrict an alien's entry into the
UNITED STATES. The failure to follow the statutory procedures provides a
reasonable basis to conclude that such alien has abandoned any intention
of maintaining status as a permanent resident alien.

(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters are located outside
the UNITED STATES may be presumed not to be a U.S. PERSON unless the USSS
has information indicating that a substantial number of members are citizens
of the UNITED STATES or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

(5) CORPORATIONS have the nationality of the nation-state in which they are
incorporated. CORPORATIONS formed under U.S. federal or state law are thus
U.S. persons, even if the corporate stock is foreign-owned. The only exception
set forth above is CORPORATIONS which are openly acknowledged to be directed
and controlled by foreign governments. Conversely, CORPORATIONS incorporated
in foreign countries are not U.S. PERSONS even if that CORPORATION is a
subsidiary of a U.S. CORPORATION.

(6) Nongovernmental ships and aircraft are legal entities and have the
nationality of the country in which they are registered. Ships and aircraft
fly the flag and are subject to the law of their place of registration.

PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (U)

SECTION 1 - PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

1.1 (U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (the Act) governs the conduct
of certain electronic surveillance activities within the United States to
collect foreign intelligence information. A complete copy of the Act is found
at Annex B to NSA/CSS Directive 10-30. The Act covers the intentional collection
of the communications of a particular, known U.S. person who is in the United
States, all wiretaps in the United States, the acquisition of certain radio
communications where all parties to that communication are located in the
United States, and the monitoring of information in which there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The Act requires that all such surveillances be directed
only at foreign powers and their agents as defined by the Act and that all
such surveillances be authorized by the United States Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, or in certain limited circumstances, by the Attorney
General.

SECTION 2 - GENERAL

2.1 (u) Procedures and standards for securing Court or Attorney General
certifications to conduct electronic surveillances are set forth in the Act.
Requests for such orders or certifications should be forwarded by the appropriate
Key Component through the NSA General Counsel to the Director, NSA/Chief,
CSS and should be accompanied by a statement of the facts and circumstances
justifying a belief that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power and that each of the facilities or places at which surveillance will
be directed are being used, or are about to be used, by that foreign power
or agent. If the proposed surveillance meets the requirements of the Act
and the Director approves the proposal, attorneys in the Office of the General
Counsel will draw the necessary court application or request for Attorney
General certification.

SECTION 3 - MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES

3.1 (S-CCO) Surveillances authorized by the Act are required
to be carried out in accordance with the Act and pursuant to the court order
or Attorney General certification authorizing that particular surveillance.
In some cases, the court orders are tailored to address particular problems,
and in those instances the NSA attorney will advise the appropriate NSA offices
of the terms of the court's orders. In most cases, however, the court order
will incorporate without any changes the standardized minimization procedures
set forth in Appendix 1.

SECTION 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 (U) The General Counsel will review all requests to conduct electronic
surveillances as defined by the Act, prepare all applications and materials
required by the Act, and provide pertinent legal advice and assistance to
all elements of the United States SIGINT System.

4.2 (U) The Inspector General will conduct regular inspections and oversight
of all SIGINT activities to assure compliance with this Directive.

4.3 (U) All SIGINT managers and supervisors with responsibilities relating
to the Act will ensure that they and their personnel are thoroughly familiar
with the Act, its implementing procedures, and any court orders or Attorney
General certifications pertinent to their mission. Personnel with duties
related to the Act will consult the General Counsel's office for any required
legal advice and assistance or training of newly assigned personnel. Appropriate
records will be maintained demonstrating compliance with the terms of all
court orders and Attorney General certifications, and any discrepancies in
that regard will be promptly reported to the offices of the General Counsel
and Inspector General.

Pursuant to Section 101(h) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (hereinafter "the Act"), the following procedures have been adopted
by the Attorney General and shall be followed by the NSA in implementing
this electronic surveillance: (U)

SECTION 1 - APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE (U)

These procedures apply to the acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination
of non-publicly available information concerning unconsenting United States
persons that is collected in the course of electronic surveillance as ordered
by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under Section
102(b) or authorized by Attorney General Certification under Section 102(a)
of the Act. These procedures also apply to non-United States persons where
specifically indicated. (U)

SECTION 2 - DEFINITIONS (U)

In addition to the definitions in Section 101 of the Act, the following
definitions apply to these procedures:

(a) Acquisition means the collection by NSA through electronic means
of a non-public communication to which it is
not an intended part. (U)

(b) Communications concerning a United States person include all communications
in which a United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such
communications reveal only publicly available information about the person.
(U)

(c) Communications of a United States person include all communications to
which a United States person is a party. (U)

(d) Consent is the agreement by a person or organization to permit the NSA
to take particular actions that affect the person or organization. To be
effective, consent must be given by the affected person or organization with
sufficient knowledge to understand the action that may be taken and the possible
consequences of that action. Consent by an organization shall be deemed valid
if given on behalf of the organization by an official or governing body
determined by the General Counsel, NSA, to have actual or apparent authority
to make such an agreement. (U)

(e) Foreign communication means a communication that
has at least one communicant outside the United States, or that is entirely
among:

(1) foreign power;

(2) officers or employees of foreign powers; or

(3) a foreign power and officers or employees of a
foreign power.

All other communications are domestic
communications. (S-CCO)

(f) Identification of a United States person means the name, unique title,
address, or other personal identifier of a United States person in the context
of activities conducted by that person or activities conducted by others
that are related to that person. A reference to a product by brand name,
or manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a descriptive sense, e.g.,
"Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a United States person.
(S-CCO)

(g) [2 lines redacted.]

(h) Publicly available information means information that a member of the
public could obtain on request, by research of public sources, or by casual
observation. (U)

(j) United States person means a United States person as defined in the Act.
The following guidelines apply in determining whether a person who status
is unknown is a United States person: (U)

(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as
a United States person unless positively identified as an alien who has not
been admitted for permanent residence, or unless the nature or circumstances
of the person's communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such
person is not a United States person. (U)

(2) A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location
is unknown, will not be treated as a United States person unless such person
can be positively identified positively as such, or the nature or circumstances
of the person's communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such
person is a United States person.

(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence loses
status as a United States person if the person leaves the United States and
is not in compliance with Title 8, United States Code, Section 1203 enabling
re-entry into the United States. Failure to follow the statutory procedures
provides a reasonable basis to conclude that such alien has abandoned any
intention of maintaining his status as a permanent resident alien.

(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters or primary office is
located outside the United States is presumed not to be a United States person
unless there is information indicating that a substantial number of its members
are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.

SECTION 3 - ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING - GENERAL (U)

(a) Acquisition (U)

The acquisition of information by electronic surveillance shall be made in
accordance with the certification of the Attorney General or the court order
authorizing such surveillance and conducted in a manner designed to the greatest
extent reasonably feasible, to minimize the acquisition of information not
relevant to the authorized purpose of the surveillance.
(S-CCO)

(b) Verification (U)

At the initiation of the electronic surveillance, the NSA or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, if providing operational support, shall verify that
the communications lines or telephone numbers being targeted are the lines
or the numbers of the target authorized by court order or Attorney General
certification. Thereafter, collection personnel will monitor the acquisition
of raw data at regular intervals to verify that the surveillance is not avoidably
acquiring communications outside the authorized scope of the surveillance
or information concerning Unite States persons not related to the purpose
of the surveillance. (S-CCO)

(c) Monitoring, Recording, and Processing

(1) Electronic surveillance of the target may be monitored contemporaneously,
recorded automatically, or both. (U)

(2) Personnel who monitor the electronic surveillance shall exercise reasonable
judgment in determining whether particular information acquired must be minimized
and shall destroy inadvertently acquired communications of or concerning
a United States person at the earliest practicable point in the processing
cycle at which such communication can be identified as either clearly not
relevant to the authorized purpose of the surveillance (e.g., the communication
does not contain foreign intelligence information) or as containing evidence
of a crime which may be disseminated under these procedures.
(S-CCO)

(3) Communications of or concerning United States persons that may be related
to the authorized purpose of the surveillance may be forwarded to analytic
personnel responsible for producing intelligence information from the collected
data. Such communications or information may be retained and disseminated
only in accordance with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of these procedures.
(C)

(4) Magnetic tapes or other storage media that contain acquired communications
may be processed. (S-CCO)

(5) Each communication shall be reviewed to determine whether it is a domestic
or foreign communication to or from the targeted premises and is reasonably
believed to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime.
Only such communications may be processed. All other communications may be
retained or disseminated only in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of these
procedures. (S-CCO)

(7) Further processing, retention and dissemination of foreign communications
shall be made in accordance with Sections 4, 6, and 7, as applicable, below.
Further processing, storage or dissemination of inadvertently acquired domestic
communications shall be made in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 below.
(S-CCO)

(d) U.S. Persons Employed by the Foreign Power (C)

Communications of or concerning United States persons employed by a foreign
power may be used and retained as otherwise provided in these procedures
except that:

(1) Such United States persons shall not be identified in connection with
any communication that the person places or receives on behalf of another
unless the identification is permitted under Section 6 of these procedures;
and

(2) Personal communications of United States persons that could not be foreign
intelligence may only be retained, used, or disseminated in accordance with
Section 5 of these procedures. (S-CCO)

(e) Destruction of Raw Data (C)

Communications and other information including that
reduced to[2 lines redacted] shall be reviewed for retention
in accordance with the standards set forth in these procedures. Communications
and other information, in any form, that do not meet such retention standards
and that are known to contain communications of or concerning United States
persons shall be promptly destroyed. (S-CCO)

(f) Non-pertinent Communications (U)

(1) Communications determined to fall within established categories of
non-pertinent communications, such as those set forth in subparagraph (6)
of this section, should not be retained unless they contain information that
may be disseminated under Sections 5, 6, or 7 below. (U)

(2) Monitors may listen to all communications, including those that initially
appear to fall within established categories until they can reasonably determine
that the communication cannot be disseminated under Sections 5, 6, or 7 below.
(S-CCO)

(3) Communications of United States persons will be analyzed to establish
categories of communications that are not pertinent to the authorized purpose
of the surveillance.

(4) these categories should be established after a reasonable period of
monitoring the communications of targets. (U)

(5) Information that appears to be foreign intelligence may be retained even
if it is acquired as a part of a communication falling within a category
that is generally non-pertinent. (S-CCO)

(6) Categories of non-pertinent communications which may be applied in these
surveillance include:

(i) Calls to and from United States Government officials;

(ii) Calls to and from children;

(iii) Calls to and from students for information to aid them in academic
endeavors;

(1) During periods of known extended absence by a targeted agent of a foreign
power from premises under surveillance, only communications to which the
target is a party may be retained and disseminated. (S-CCO)

(2) When there is reason to believe that the target of an electronic surveillance
is no longer a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, or no longer
occupies the premises authorized for surveillance, that electronic surveillance
shall be immediately terminated, and shall not resume unless subsequently
approved under the Act. When any person involved in collection or processing
of an electronic surveillance being conducted pursuant to the Act becomes
aware of information tending to indicate a material change in the status
or location of a target, the person shall immediately ensure that the NSA's
Office of General Counsel is also made aware of such information.
(S-CCO)

SECTION 4 - ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING - SPECIAL PROCEDURES (U)

(a) Collection Against Residential Premises (S-CCO)

(1) An electronic surveillance directed against premises located in the United
States and used for residential purposes shall be conducted by technical
mean designed to limit the information acquire to communications that have
one communicant outside the United States, [1 line redacted]. The
technical means employed shall consist of [2 lines redacted] known
to be used by the targeted foreign power and its agents. Communications to
or from the target residential premises that are processed [2 lines
redacted] located in a foreign country, or on the foreign country or
foreign city telephone direct dialing codes (area codes) for the areas in
which such foreign powers or agents are located. (S-CCO)

(2) [6 lines redacted.]

(3) Domestic communications that are incidentally acquired during collection
against residential premises shall be handled under Section 5 of these
procedures. (S-CCO)

(b) Attorney-Client Communications (C)

As soon as it becomes apparent that a communication is between a person who
is known to be under criminal indictment and an attorney who represents that
individual in the matter under indictment (or someone acting on behalf of
the attorney), monitoring of that communication will cease and the communication
shall be identified as an attorney-client communication in a log maintained
for that purpose. The relevant portion of the tape containing that conversation
will be placed under seal and the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review, shall be notified so that appropriate procedures may be
established to protect such communications from review or use in any criminal
prosecution, while preserving foreign intelligence information contained
therein. (S-CCO)

(1) domestic communications that are reasonably believed to contain foreign
intelligence information shall be disseminated to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (including United States person identities) for possible further
dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with its
minimization procedures;

(2) domestic communications that do not contain foreign intelligence information,
but that are reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has
been, is being, or is about to be committed, shall be disseminated (including
United States person identities) to appropriate Federal law enforcement
authorities, in accordance with Section 106(b) of the Act and crimes reporting
procedures approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
and

(3) domestic communications that are reasonably believed to contain technical
data base information, as defined in Section 2(i), may be disseminated to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to other elements of the U.S. SIGINT
system. (S-CCO)

(b) Retention (U)

(1) Domestic communications disseminated to Federal law enforcement agencies
may be retained by NSA for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed six
months (or any shorter period set by court order), to permit law enforcement
agencies to determine whether access to original recordings of such
communications is required for law enforcement purposes.
(S-CCO)

(2) Domestic communications reasonably believed to contain technical data
base information may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough
exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed
likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence
requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation.
(S-CCO)

a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data
bases requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably
believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of
any period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use
in, cryptanalysis. (S-CCO)

b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought
to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one year unless the Deputy
Director for Operations, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a
longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence requirements. (S-CCO)

SECTION 6 - FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS OR OR CONCERNING
UNITED STATES PERSONS (U)

(a) Retention (U)

Foreign communications of or concerning United States persons acquired by
the NSA in the course of electronic surveillance subject to these procedures
may be retained only:

(1) if necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for
this purpose is permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough
exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed
likely to become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence
requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation.

a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data
bases requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably
believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of
any period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use
in, cryptanalysis.

b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought
to contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is one year unless the Deputy
Director for Operations, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a
longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence requirements.

(2) if dissemination of such communications with reference to such United
States persons would be permitted under subsection (b) below; or

(3) if the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or
is about to be committed and is provided to appropriate federal law enforcement
authorities. (S-CCO)

(b) Dissemination (U)

A report based on based on communications of or concerning a United States
person may be disseminated in accordance with Section 7 if the identity of
the United States person is deleted and a generic term or symbol substituted
so that the information cannot reasonably be connected with an identifiable
United States person. Otherwise dissemination of intelligence reports based
on communications of or concerning a United States person may only be made
to a recipient requiring the identity of such a person for the performance
of official duties but only if at least one of the following criteria is
also met:

(1) the United States person has consented to the dissemination or the
information of or concerning the United States person is available publicly;

(2) the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign
intelligence information or assess its important, e.g., the identity of a
senior official in the Executive Branch;

(3) the communication or information indicates that the United States person
may be:

(A) an agent of a foreign power;

(B) a foreign power as defined in Section 101(a)(4) or (6) of the Act;

(C) residing outside the United States and holding an official position in
the government or military forces of a foreign power;

(D) a corporation or entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly
by a foreign power; or

(E) acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a
foreign power and the United States person has, or has had, access to classified
national security information or material.

(4) the communication or information indicates that the United States person
may be a target of intelligence activities of a foreign power;

(5) the communication or information indicates that the United States person
is engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security
information; but only after the agency that originated the information certifies
that it is properly classified;

(6) the communication or information indicates that the United States person
maybe engaging in international terrorist activities;

(7) the acquisition of the United States person's communication was authorized
by a court order issued pursuant to Section 105 of the Act and the communication
may relate to the foreign intelligence purpose of the surveillance;

(8) the communication or information is reasonably believed to contain evident
that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that
dissemination is for law enforcement purposes and is made in accordance with
Section 106(b) of the Act and crimes reporting procedures approved by the
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General. (U)

SECTION 7 - OTHER FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS (U)

Foreign communications of or concerning a non-United States person may be
retained, used, and disseminated in any form in accordance with other applicable
law, regulation, and policy. (U)

1.1. (U) In accordance with the provisions of Section 2.6 of E.O. 12333,
and the NSA/FBI Memorandum of Understanding of 25 November 1980, the National
Security Agency may provide specialized equipment and technical knowledge
to the FBI to assist the FBI in the conduct of its lawful functions. When
requesting such assistance, the FBI shall certify to the General Counsel
of NSA that such equipment or technical knowledge is necessary to the
accomplishment of one or more of the FBI's lawful functions.

1.2 (U) NSA may also provide expert personnel to assist FBI personnel in
the operation or installation of specialized equipment when that equipment
is to be employed to collect foreign intelligence. When requesting the assistance
of expert personnel, the FBI will certify to the General Counsel that such
assistance is necessary to collect foreign intelligence and that the approval
of the Attorney General (and, when necessary, a warrant from a court of competent
jurisdiction) has been obtained.

SECTION 2 - CONTROL

2.1 (U) No operational assistance as discussed in Section 1 shall be provided
without the express permission of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, Deputy Director,
NSA, the Deputy Director for Operations, or the Deputy Director for Technology
and Systems. the Deputy Director for Operations and the Deputy director for
Technology and Systems may approve requests for such assistance only with
the concurrence of the General Counsel.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

B/1

[Pages C/1 and C/2.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY
EXERCISE COMMAND AUTHORITIES (U)

SECTION 1 - POLICY

1.1. (C) Signals intelligence support to U.S. and Allied
military exercise command authorities is provided for in USSID 56 and DoD
Directive 5200.17 (M-2). Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum MJCS111-88, 18
August 1988, and USSID 4, 16 December 1988, established doctrine and procedures
for providing signals intelligence support to military commanders. The procedures
in this Annex provide policy guidelines for safeguarding the rights of U.S.
persons in the conduct of exercise SIGINT support activities.

SECTION 2 - DEFINITIONS

2.1. (U) The term "Military Tactical Communications" mean United States and
Allied military exercise communications, within the United States and abroad,
that are necessary for the production of simulated foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence or to permit an analysis of communications security.

SECTION 3 - PROCEDURES

3.1. (C-CCO)(C) The USSS may collect, process,
store, and disseminate military tactical communications that are also
communications of, or concerning, U.S persons.

a. Collection efforts will be conducted in such a manner as to avoid, to
the extent feasible, the intercept of non-exercise-related communications.

b. Military tactical communications may be stored and processed without deletion
of references to U.S. persons if the names and communications of the U.S.
persons who are exercise participants, whether military, government, or
contractor, are contained in, or such communications constitute, exercise-related
communications or fictitious communications or information prepared for the
exercise.

c. Communications of U.S. persons not participating in the exercise that
are inadvertently intercepted during the exercise shall be destroyed a soon
as feasible, provided that a record describing the signal or frequency user
in technical and generic terms may be retained for signal identification
and Collection-avoidance purposes. Inadvertently intercepted communications
that contain anomalies in enciphered communications that reveal a potential
vulnerability to United States communications security should be forwarded
to the NSA Deputy Director for Information Systems Security.

d. Dissemination of military exercise communications, exercise reports, or
information files derived from such communications shall be limited to those
authorities and persons participating in, or conducting, reviews and critiques
thereof.

[Pages D/1 and D/2.]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1.1. (U) This annex applies to the testing of electronic equipment that has
the capability to intercept communications and other non-public information.
Testing includes development, calibration, and evaluation of such equipment,
and will be conducted, to the maximum extent that is practical, without
interception or monitoring of U.S. persons.

SECTION 2 - PROCEDURES

2.1. (U) The USSS may test electronic equipment that has the capability to
intercept communications and other information subject to the following
limitations:

a. To the maximum extent that is practical, the following should be used:

(1) Laboratory-generated signals;

(2) Communications transmitted between terminals located outside the United
States not used by any known U.S. persons.

(3) Official government agency communications with the consent of an appropriate
official of that agency, or an individual's communications with the consent
of that individual;

(4) Public broadcast signals, or

(5) Other communications in which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
(as approved in each instance by the NSA General Counsel).

b. Where it is not practical to test electronic equipment solely against
signals described in paragraph 2.1.a, above, testing may be conducted, provided:

(1) the proposed test is coordinated with the NSA General Counsel;

(2) the test is limited in scope and duration to that necessary to determine
the capability of the equipment;

(3) no particular person is targeted without consent and it is not reasonable
to obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance;
and

(4) The test does not exceed 90 calendar days.

c. Where the test involves communications other than those identified in
2.1.a and a test period longer than 90 days is required, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act requires that the test be approved by the Attorney General.
Such proposals and plans shall be submitted by USSS elements through the
General Counsel, NSA, to the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS for transmission to
the Attorney General. The test proposal shall state the requirement for an
extended test involving such communications, the nature of the test, the
organization that will conduct the test, and the proposed disposition of
any signals or communications acquired during the test.

2.2. (U) The content of any communication other than communications between
non-U.S. persons outside the United States, which are acquired during a test
and evaluation shall be:

a. retained only for the purpose of determining the capability of the electronic
equipment;

b. disclosed only to persons conducting or evaluating the test; and

c. destroyed before or immediately upon completion of the testing.

2.3. (U) The technical parameters of a communication, such as frequency,
modulation, and time of activity of acquired electronic signals, may be retained
and used for test reporting or collection-avoidance purposes. Such parameters
may be disseminated to other DoD intelligence components and other entities
authorized to conduct electronic surveillance, provided such dissemination
and use are limited to testing, evaluation, or collection-avoidance purposes.

SECRET

1.1. (U) This annex provides the procedures for safeguarding the rights of
U.S. persons when conducting SIGINT search and development activities.

1.2 (S-CCO) The USSS may conduct search and development
activities with respect to signals throughout the radio spectrum under the
following limitations:

a. Signals may be collected only for the purpose of identifying those signals
that:

(1) may contain information related to the production of foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence;

(2) are enciphered or appear to contain secret meaning;

(3) are necessary to assure efficient signals intelligence collection or
to avoid the collection of unwanted signals; or,

(4) reveal vulnerabilities of United States communications security.

b. Communications originated or intended for receipt in the United States
or originated or intended for receipt by U.S. persons shall be processed
in accordance with Section 5 of USSID 18, provided that information necessary
for cataloguing constituent elements of the signal environment may be processed
and retained. If such information does not identify a U.S. person, information
revealing a United States communications security vulnerability may be retained.

c. Information necessary for cataloging the constituent elements of the signal
environment may be disseminated to the extent such information does not identify
U.S. persons. Communications equipment nomenclature may be disseminated.
Information that reveals a vulnerability to United States communications
security may be disseminated to the appropriate communications security
authorities.

d. All information obtained in the process of search and development that
appears to be of foreign intelligence value may be forwarded to the proper
analytic office within NSA for processing and dissemination in accordance
with relevant portions of USSID 18.

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OPERATION AND USE OF SIGINT COLLECTION AND OTHER
SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (U)

SECTION 1 - APPLICABILITY

1.1. (U) This annex applies to all USSS use of SIGINT collection and other
surveillance equipment for training purposes.

SECTION 2 - POLICY

2.1. (U) Training of USSS personnel in the operation and use of SIGINT collection
equipment shall be conducted, to the maximum extent that is practicable,
without interception of the communications of U.S. persons in the United
States who have not given consent to such interception. Communications and
information protected by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
(see Annex A) will not be collected for training purposes.

SECTION 3 - PROCEDURES

3.1. (U) The training of USSS personnel in the operation and use of SIGINT
collection and other surveillance equipment shall include guidance concerning
the requirements and restrictions of the FISA, Executive Order 12333, and
USSID 18.

3.2. (U) The use of SIGINT collection and other surveillance equipment for
training purposes is subject to the following limitations:

a. To the maximum extent that is practical, use of such equipment for training
purposes shall be directed against otherwise authorized intelligence targets;

b. The contents of private communications of nonconsenting U.S. persons may
not be acquired aurally unless the person is an authorized target of electronic
surveillance; and

c. The electronic surveillance will be limited in extent and duration to
that necessary to train personnel in the use of the equipment.

3.3. (U) The limitations in paragraph 3.2 do not apply in the following
instances:

a. Public broadcasts, distress signals, or official United States Government
communications may be monitored, provided that, where government agency
communications are monitored, the consent of an appropriate official is obtained;
and

b. Minimal acquisition of information is permitted as required for calibration
Purposes.

3.4. (U) Information collected during training that involves authorized
intelligence targets may be stored in accordance with Section 6 of USSID
18 and disseminated in accordance with Section 7 of USSID 18. Information
other than distress signals collected during training that does not involve
authorized intelligence targets or that is acquired inadvertently shall be
destroyed as soon as practical or upon completion of the training and may
not be disseminated outside the USSS for any purpose. Distress signals should
be referred to the DDO.

1.1. (U) The forms set forth in this Annex are for use in recording consent
by U.s. persons for USSS elements to collect and disseminate foreign
communications concerning that person. The first form is consent to collect
and disseminate a U.S. person's communications and references to that person
in foreign communications. The second form is consent to collect and disseminate
only references to the U.S. person and does not include communications to
or from that person.

1.2 (U) Section 4.1.c. of USSID 18 states that the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
has authority to approve consensual collection of communications to, from
or about U.S. persons. Elements of the USSS proposing to conduct consensual
collection should forward a copy of the executed consent form and any pertinent
information to the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS for approval.

1.3 (U) The forms provided on the following pages may be reproduced, provided
the security classifications (top and bottom) are removed. It is the
responsibility of the user to properly reclassify the document in accordance
with requisite security guidelines.

___________________________________

SECRET

USSID 18 ANNEX H
27 July 1993

CONSENT AGREEMENT

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE

I, ______________________________________, hereby consent to the National
Security Agency undertaking to seek and disseminate communications to or
from or referencing me in foreign communications for the purpose of
________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________.

This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the
United States Signals Intelligence System to this consent, as well as to
any signals intelligence reports that may relate to the purpose stated above.

Except as otherwise provided by Executive Order 12333 procedures, this consent
covers only information that relates to the purpose stated above and is effective
for the period ________ to ________.

Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications
to or from me may only be disseminated to me and to
___________________________________. Signals intelligence reports containing
information derived from communications referencing me may only be disseminated
to me and to _________________________________________________ except as
otherwise permitted by procedures under Executive Order 12333

______________________
(SIGNATURE)

______________________
(TITLE)

______________________
(DATE)

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

SECRET

________________________________

SECRET

USSID 18, ANNEX H
27 July 1993

CONSENT AGREEMENT

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE

I, _________________________________________, hereby consent to the National
Security Agency undertaking to seek and disseminate references to me in foreign
communications for the purpose of
________________________________________________________________.

This consent applies to administrative messages alerting elements of the
United States Signals Intelligence System to this consent, as well as to
any signals intelligence reports that may relate to the purpose stated above.

Except as otherwise provided by Executive Order 12333 procedures, this consent
covers only references to me in foreign communications and information derived
therefrom that relate to the purpose stated above. This consent is effective
for the period ________ to ________.

Signals intelligence reports containing information derived from communications
referencing me and related to the purpose stated above may only be disseminated
to me and to __________________________________ except as otherwise permitted
by procedures under Executive Order 12333.