Hearing Transcripts

591 Mr Davies on the following day. The suggestion, as2 your Lordship will recall from the evidence, was that3 the Government should accept the BBC's good faith in4 broadcasting the allegations while the BBC would5 acknowledge that it could no longer support them. The6 problem was that by the time this proposal was made it7 was too late. The Governors had stood up to be counted8 just as Mr Davies had asked them to.9 My Lord, I am coming to the position which arose10 when Dr Kelly came forward on 30th June. It is 5 to 1211 and I would like to suggest to your Lordship that it is12 probably more sensible I should take that in one bite at13 1.15 when your Lordship resumes.14 LORD HUTTON: That is certainly so, Mr Sumption. I will15 rise now and sit again at 1.15 pm.16 (11.55 am)17 (The short adjournment)18 (1.15 pm)19 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Sumption.20 MR SUMPTION: My Lord, on 30th June Dr Kelly wrote his21 letter to his line manager reporting on his exchanges22 with Mr Gilligan back in May. The chain of events then23 began which ended with Dr Kelly's death on 17th July.24 I want to pause at this point in order to invite25 your Lordship to take stock of the rather difficult

601 situation in which the Government found itself when2 Dr Kelly came forward.3 The first element of the situation was in fact the4 dominant one until after the second interview on5 7th July. It was not possible to be sure that Dr Kelly6 was, in fact, the source although, as time went on, it7 became increasingly probable that he was. Dr Kelly had8 admitted to saying some of the things attributed to the9 source by Mr Gilligan. He had denied saying other10 things.11 Mr Gilligan had said implicitly in his broadcasts,12 and explicitly to the Foreign Affairs Committee, that he13 had only one source. There were, therefore, a number of14 possibilities. The first was that Dr Kelly was the15 source but had said more than he had admitted to the16 Ministry of Defence. The second was that he was the17 source but Mr Gilligan had exaggerated what he had said18 to him. The third possibility was that someone else was19 the source and it was mere coincidence that Mr Gilligan20 had learnt some of the same things from Dr Kelly.21 Whatever other considerations may have entered into22 the matter, there could be no question of the Government23 disclosing Dr Kelly's name or even the fact that an24 unnamed official had come forward until it was25 reasonably satisfied that he was the right man. That

611 stage was reached on 8th July, after the second2 interview.3 Nobody suggested, even then, that it was certain4 that Dr Kelly was the right man, but Mr Howard had5 concluded that in spite of the evidential loose ends6 which remained, it was not only possible that Dr Kelly7 was the source but, as he put it, "very probable" that8 he was.9 Sir David Omand's view was that it was now pretty10 plain that Dr Kelly was the source. Their judgment was11 accepted by the Prime Minister at his meeting on this12 issue on the morning of 8th July. It was a judgment13 which was shared, as we know from their evidence, by14 everybody else who was present.15 As we also now know, they were right. The16 uncertainty, however, which persisted until after the17 second interview is the main reason why no decisions18 could be made until 8th July.19 The second element in the equation was the fact that20 the investigations of the Foreign Affairs Committee and21 the Intelligence and Security Committee were currently22 underway. The ISC had told the Government in May 200323 that it proposed to examine the general issue of the use24 of intelligence in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq.25 Mr Gilligan's broadcasts dealt with only part of

621 that broader issue, but it was undoubtedly an important2 part, which added a good deal of spice to the rest. The3 Foreign Affairs Committee's investigation was announced4 on 3rd June, five days after Mr Gilligan's broadcast.5 Its terms of reference are alone enough to show how6 seriously the points being made by Mr Gilligan were7 viewed outside as well as inside Government. The terms8 of reference to "investigate whether accurate9 information had been given to Parliament in the period10 leading up to the war and particularly whether accurate11 information had been given to Parliament about weapons12 of mass destruction".13 What all this meant was that whether the Government14 liked it or not, it was quite certain that there would15 be two major Parliamentary inquiries into the question16 whether the dossier had been sexed up and, if so, by17 whom.18 On 19th June, only a fortnight before Dr Kelly came19 forward, Mr Gilligan had given his evidence to the20 Foreign Affairs Committee in the course of which he had21 stoutly defended his broadcast; he had told the22 Committee that he had, to use his own words "invested23 strong credibility" in his source, who he described as24 a person of impeccable standing to make the particular25 allegations broadcast on 29th May. He also described

631 his source, yet again, as being in the Intelligence2 Services.3 There was a third element in the situation in4 early July which was also of some importance. Every5 witness with any experience of dealing with the press6 has agreed that sooner or later Dr Kelly's identity was7 going to become known whatever happened. Dr Kelly was8 renowned as an expert in this area, both among his9 fellow specialists and among journalists. Some of his10 most characteristic views, for example about the11 30 per cent probability of an active chemical warfare12 programme in Iraq, were aired by Mr Gilligan in his13 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee.14 Clearly, the likelihood of disclosure which existed15 even before he came forward was very much increased16 afterwards. He was, in fact, all but named in17 The Times' article of 5th July. Your Lordship has read18 a mass of newspaper reports, in which highly19 confidential matters are disclosed on the basis of what20 appear to have been unauthorised sources within the BBC21 or Government. These reports, I would suggest, are22 eloquent evidence of the sheer volume of indiscreet23 twittering which is heard whenever there is a story24 about which the press would dearly like to know more.25 That is, as more than one witness has told

641 your Lordship, the reality of our culture.2 The criticisms which have been made of the3 Government on behalf of Dr Kelly's family raise two main4 questions which your Lordship will have to consider.5 One is whether the Government should have allowed him to6 be named at all; the other is whether, if they did, they7 chose an insensitive way of doing it. The first of8 those questions is a question of principle. The second9 is essentially a question of personnel management,10 although nonetheless important for that.11 Let me deal with the question of principle first.12 It has been suggested to your Lordship that Dr Kelly13 felt that the Ministry of Defence press release on14 8th July was an act of betrayal because it would15 inevitably lead to his being identified. It has been16 suggested --17 LORD HUTTON: Was his feeling related just to the press18 release or was it related to the fact that his name had19 been confirmed?20 MR SUMPTION: He accepted that the press release was going21 to lead, in short order, to the disclosure of his name.22 Not only does the evidence of Dr Wells and Mr Hatfield23 demonstrate that, but so, in fact, as I shall point out24 in a moment, does the evidence of Mrs Kelly.25 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

651 MR SUMPTION: It has been suggested to a succession of2 witnesses that it was wrong in principle for Dr Kelly to3 be named by whatever method. The same point is implicit4 in the suggestion that there was some kind of plot or5 strategy to allow Dr Kelly's name to come out indirectly6 or by stealth. The implication of that, as we7 understand it, is that the Government were trying to do8 covertly what they knew they could not do openly.9 I have no desire and certainly those for whom10 I speak have no desire to criticise Dr Kelly's family11 for making these points. They are as much entitled as12 anyone here to raise issues for your Lordship to13 consider; but I have to say that these particular14 criticisms are completely unjustified.15 They take as their starting point the proposition16 that Dr Kelly was entitled to have his name withheld,17 and that proposition is wrong. There is no18 constitutional principle that civil servants are19 entitled to anonymity. The Government had no obligation20 to keep Dr Kelly's name secret; and Dr Kelly had no21 right to expect them to do so. The Government could22 not, in any event, have kept his identity secret23 consistently with its obligations to Parliament. The24 Government did not give Dr Kelly any assurance of25 anonymity; on the contrary, it told him that his

661 identity was likely to come out. What is more, that is2 what was bound to happen in practice, whatever the3 Government did. Against the background of a raging4 public controversy in the press and in Parliament, the5 Government neither could nor should have tried to keep6 this particular information indefinitely concealed.7 Once the Government was satisfied that Dr Kelly was8 likely to have been Mr Gilligan's source, the activities9 of the two Parliamentary Committees were, in practice,10 the drivers of events. The Foreign Affairs Committee11 reported on 7th July, the day of Dr Kelly's second12 interview. It exonerated Mr Campbell of the charge of13 sexing up the dossier but, as the BBC helpfully pointed14 out, the authority of that conclusion was gravely15 weakened by the fact that it had divided on party lines.16 Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Committee made an17 express recommendation that the identity of18 Mr Gilligan's source should be investigated. At the19 time of that report it had been known within the20 Government since 30th June that someone had come forward21 who might well be Mr Gilligan's source. There was22 serious and, I would suggest, justified concern that if23 it were to become known that they had sat on that24 information for a week before the FAC reported, they25 would be accused of trying to cover up something which

671 was of intense and current public concern.2 By 8th July, when the Government had satisfied3 itself of the facts, the FAC had to be told as soon as4 possible of the development which had occurred. The5 fact that the Committee had just reported was beside the6 point. The FAC is a standing committee of the House of7 Commons. The allegations remained a matter of8 continuing public controversy. The Government's view,9 after much discussion, was that the Committee would want10 to reopen their investigation when they learnt of this11 significant development; and the Committee was clearly12 entitled to do that.13 Mr Anderson showed that that judgment of those in14 Government was in fact correct; and the sequel bears out15 what he told your Lordship. The FAC did in fact reopen16 their inquiry and did want to take evidence from17 Dr Kelly.18 It inevitably followed that Dr Kelly's name would19 become known. It follows that unless we had concealed20 the fact that he had come forward from the FAC, it was21 bound to happen that his name would become known.22 Turning to the ISC's investigation, the position on23 7th July was that that was continuing. Most of their24 evidence on the use of intelligence in the compiling of25 the dossier had still to be taken.

681 It was fair to say that, in theory, the appearance2 of Dr Kelly before the ISC need not have led to his3 being identified because it sits in private; but that4 was not a realistic view of the situation.5 The Chairman of the ISC, Ann Taylor, had to be told6 about the development, for the same reason as7 Mr Anderson had to be told about it. It was originally8 proposed that she should receive a letter which would be9 copied to the Chairman of the FAC. In fact, Ann Taylor10 was understandably resistant to this suggestion. Her11 Committee is appointed by the Prime Minister and reports12 to him but its authority is very much dependent on its13 remaining at arm's length from No. 10.14 So if the matter was to be brought to the attention15 of the ISC, as it had to be, there would have to be16 a public announcement. Once that happened, and Dr Kelly17 went before the ISC, the practical possibilities of his18 remaining anonymous for much longer were really very19 slim indeed.20 The evidence is that there were some who considered21 that the appropriate committee to consider this matter22 was the ISC and not the FAC. The Prime Minister himself23 initially took that view. So, as we know, did24 Sir Kevin Tebbit. But everybody recognised that the FAC25 was almost certain to want to interview him as well and

691 that it would not be realistic to prevent them from2 doing so.3 Quite apart from that, to put important new evidence4 on an issue which had aroused public concern on this5 scale only to a Committee reporting to the6 Prime Minister and sitting in private was just not7 a realistic option.8 It was therefore an academic question which9 Committee the Government might have preferred. In the10 event, the nettle was grasped by the Secretary of State11 for Defence, who decided that both Committees would have12 to be offered an opportunity to hear the evidence of13 a witness whose evidence might plainly be central to the14 inquiries of both of them.15 At the same time, the Secretary of State sought, in16 agreement with the Chairman of the FAC, to limit the17 questioning of Dr Kelly to the matters which had given18 rise to his being called, ie to the Ministry of Defence19 statement, and to exclude matters on which Dr Kelly was20 not in a position to speak for Ministers because they21 went to policy.22 It has been suggested to a number of witnesses that23 the Government was delighted to be able to put Dr Kelly24 before the two Committees because it would further their25 case in their dispute with the BBC. It was even

701 suggested to Godric Smith, although oddly enough not to2 the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State, that that3 was why Dr Kelly was made available to the two4 Committees.5 Mr Campbell undoubtedly believed that it would be in6 the Government's interest to disclose the name as soon7 as possible, just as he also believed, in hindsight,8 that that would have been better for Dr Kelly as well.9 But Mr Campbell, at this stage, had been told by the10 Prime Minister to take a back seat on this issue. Apart11 from swearing at his diary, which must be the right of12 every free man, that is what he did. Others disagreed13 with the idea of naming Dr Kelly before they had to do14 so. Mr Smith, Mr Kelly and the Prime Minister all sat15 on the idea almost as soon as it was raised.16 A suggestion was made by Mr Gompertz this morning to17 the effect that the document which he brought up on18 screen -- I am not asking for it to be brought up but it19 is MoD/44/15 -- suggested there was a wider or more20 persistent desire to name him as soon as possible. If21 Mr Gompertz had read the whole of the document instead22 of part of it, he would have appreciated that e-mail was23 in fact about the letter which it had been agreed that24 Mr Hoon would write to Mr Gavyn Davies, the Chairman of25 the BBC. It referred to the naming of Dr Kelly in that

711 letter, which was a confidential letter, and not to2 a more public naming.3 LORD HUTTON: Were there not other persons who thought that4 it would be beneficial to the Government for Dr Kelly's5 name to be released?6 MR SUMPTION: They appreciated, of course, that7 a description of Dr Kelly's functions had to be given.8 They appreciated that it necessarily followed from that9 that his name would come out in short order thereafter.10 That is the reality of the position. The essential11 point, as far as they were concerned, was that they12 should be in a position to do two things: (1) to make it13 clear that an individual who had come forward who was14 likely to be the source but unlikely to have been able15 to say what Mr Gilligan had attributed to the source;16 and (2) enough had to be disclosed to put the two17 Parliamentary Committees in the picture.18 The suggestion was, in fact, implicit, as19 I understand it, in some of Mr Knox's questions that the20 idea was to use the Committees as a means of outing21 Dr Kelly. That was, I would suggest, quite unwarranted22 on the facts, but it also betrays a fairly fundamental23 misunderstanding of how Parliament and its Committees24 actually work. These Committees are not open to25 manipulation by the executive. If the Committees wanted

721 to interview the official who had come forward, they2 were going to do it. If not, not. The Government's3 views on the matter were neither here nor there unless4 the Government took the extreme step of refusing to let5 the witness appear. That would have been wholly6 inappropriate and would have provoked a major crisis of7 affairs.8 In fact, the evidence is that the Government had9 mixed feelings about the public impact of the appearance10 of Dr Kelly before the Committees. In the first place,11 the differences between Mr Gilligan's and Dr Kelly's12 accounts meant that the Committees would not necessarily13 accept that Dr Kelly was the source. The Foreign14 Affairs Committee, having heard from both Dr Kelly and15 Mr Gilligan, found, quite wrongly as we now know, that16 he was not the source. But secondly, in terms of public17 perceptions, Dr Kelly's evidence was clearly a mixed18 bag. His views about the dossier were not all in line19 with the Government's; and some of them were bound to be20 disclosed as part of his evidence, because he had shared21 them with Mr Gilligan. So that the view that putting22 Dr Kelly before the Committee was, in some ways, an23 unmixed boon for the Government is quite unrealistic.24 LORD HUTTON: Is it your submission that if the Government's25 primary concern is to avoid the charge of a cover-up and

731 for that reason it would have to be announced that2 a civil servant had come forward, and the FAC would have3 to learn of Dr Kelly's name --4 MR SUMPTION: Yes.5 LORD HUTTON: -- that that being so, the Government, No. 106 as a whole, still had no feeling that it might assist7 them in their dispute with Mr Gilligan?8 MR SUMPTION: If they had felt that it was desirable that9 the name should come out as early as possible, they10 would have included it in the press release of 8th July.11 They had been entitled to do that and it would have been12 easy enough to do. I am going to go into the mechanics13 of this, because it obviously goes to the sensitivity of14 the method, in a moment. That, in my submission, is the15 short answer to your Lordship's question.16 We cannot know, clearly, why Dr Kelly told some17 people in the last days of his life that he had received18 assurances that his name would remain confidential. It19 may be that under the pressures which he faced he20 persuaded himself that that was so. But it must be21 perfectly clear to those of us who have heard the22 evidence given in this room that it was not. Dr Kelly23 was told by Mr Hatfield on 4th July that there would24 probably have to be a public announcement. He was told25 that again on the 7th. He accepted it. We know that he

741 was shown an early draft of the press release on the2 7th. We know that he had read out to him on the3 telephone, paragraph by paragraph, the expanded draft4 which was ultimately issued in the early evening of the5 8th. Perhaps most important of all, we know that he6 recognised that his identity would become known in7 consequence. That is partly because Mr Hatfield told8 him, in terms, on 7th July, that that was not just9 possible but "likely".10 Dr Wells told your Lordship that Dr Kelly told him11 that it was likely. We also know that the point got12 home because Mrs Kelly herself has given evidence that13 he told her that he was bound to be identified as the14 two of them watched the announcement of the Ministry of15 Defence press release of the 8th together on the16 television news. In our submission, this is one area17 where there should be no room for controversy on the18 facts.19 The Ministry of Defence press release of 8th July in20 fact, I would suggest, reflected the openness of our21 governmental procedures as well as the strongly held22 view of all Ministers and officials concerned that these23 matters could not properly be withheld from the public24 or from Parliamentary scrutiny, and it was the 8th July25 press release which was the decisive event, as everyone

751 recognised. I say that because everybody, including2 Dr Kelly himself, knew that that was going to be the3 trigger for his being identified in fairly short order.4 The only question was how long it would take.5 That is also, I would suggest, at least part of the6 answer to the second criticism which the family has made7 of the Government, namely that if the name had come out8 this was not the way to do it.9 LORD HUTTON: Just before you move to that, Mr Sumption,10 what is your submission on the point that when the11 Secretary of State wrote to Mr Anderson as to the scope12 of the questioning of Dr Kelly that that was designed to13 prevent the Committee asking questions that might give14 rise to answers which would be detrimental to15 Government?16 MR SUMPTION: My Lord, I reject that suggestion. I do so17 for two reasons. First of all, it is fundamental that18 civil servants appearing before Parliamentary Committees19 in principal do so on behalf of the Government. They20 speak for Ministers, they do not give their own21 evidence. In dealing with questions of policy,22 witnesses before Parliamentary Committees accordingly23 speak for the Government in their particular area. That24 is a convention that made it completely inappropriate25 for Dr Kelly to speak about policy, nor is there any

761 indication that he had any desire to do so or was in2 a position, in a broader sense, to do so.3 That was one consideration.4 The second consideration was the welfare of Dr Kelly5 himself. The Secretary of State for Defence gave6 evidence about this to your Lordship. His evidence,7 which in my submission is both creditable to him and8 entirely appropriate against the background in which9 these things happened, his evidence was that he was10 concerned about Dr Kelly having to give evidence before11 two Committees on the same day which was, at that stage,12 how matters were scheduled. He appreciated that the13 Foreign Affairs Committee had only reconvened in order14 to deal with matters supplementary to their previous15 inquiries which arose out of the Ministry of Defence16 statement. He, therefore, arranged with the Chairman of17 the FAC that Dr Kelly's questioning would be limited to18 that. The ISC had suggested three quarters of an hour19 was enough; the same suggestion was made to the FAC.20 But what is striking is that if this was designed21 to, as it were, gag Dr Kelly from giving relevant22 evidence to a Parliamentary Committee, surely the first23 person to appreciate that would be Mr Anderson himself.24 Parliamentary Committees are extremely sensitive about25 their independence of the executive. The truth is that

771 Mr Anderson gave evidence to your Lordship that he2 agreed with the line that was being proposed by the3 Secretary of State for Defence. Moreover, the letter4 which your Lordship refers to in fact refers to5 a discussion that had already occurred between the two6 men in which that understanding had been established.7 My Lord, turning to the second criticism, that is8 that if the name had to come out this was not the way to9 do it. Realistically, there are only two ways in which10 the Government could have handled this matter. It could11 have identified Dr Kelly in the same press release in12 which they announced the fact he had come forward.13 Given the need to make an announcement as soon as the14 Government had satisfied itself that Dr Kelly was likely15 to be the source, that would have meant on 8th July16 itself or possibly first thing on the following day.17 Alternatively, it could have taken the course which18 it actually did take, announcing that someone had come19 forward, thereby giving Dr Kelly at least a day or two20 before his name followed that information into the21 public domain.22 Even in hindsight, it is a difficult question, which23 would have been the better course. I have pointed out24 Alastair Campbell's view, in hindsight, that it would25 probably have been better for Dr Kelly to retain control

781 of the process by naming Dr Kelly in the original press2 release. It has to be said, however, that that would3 probably have meant bringing his naming forward. The4 timetable would therefore have been even more abrupt and5 that would not necessarily have made matters any easier6 for Dr Kelly.7 LORD HUTTON: Would it have been possible to have informed8 Dr Kelly that his name would appear in a press statement9 and then to delay the press statement for 24 hours to10 give Dr Kelly time to make other arrangements and11 perhaps to be advised as to what he should do?12 MR SUMPTION: It would have been possible to do that13 provided the Government was confident that the news14 would not break anyway in the intervening period, with15 the allegations of cover up that would inevitably have16 followed. Of course, the Government could not be17 confident of that. Their mindset was very much18 influenced by the disclosures in The Times article on19 5th July. As your Lordship will recall, the press20 office at the Ministry of Defence were somewhat21 surprised that the information had not already broken22 and prepared provisional Q and A in case it broke before23 the Government was in a position to form a firm view on24 the matter over that weekend. So one thing is clear:25 that while there was no doubt some leeway, that there

791 was really very little leeway indeed. The Government2 could not assume that 24 hours would not, in fact,3 result in the news breaking from other directions first.4 Others have said that it was right to put the moment5 off when Dr Kelly was identified by name for as long as6 possible, even if that was not likely to be very long.7 I would accept that there is something to be said for8 both views. But it is frankly impossible to say that9 this would have made any real difference. It is far too10 easy, simply because we know about the tragedy which11 happened on 17th July, to say that something else,12 anything else, would have been better than what was13 actually done. The instinct to say that, of course,14 does credit to the humanity of those involved. All of15 those who have given evidence to your Lordship's Inquiry16 have obviously had to ask themselves whether things17 might have turned out differently if they had acted18 differently themselves. But the truth is that we cannot19 know.20 Apart from anything else, there were so many other21 sources of potential pressure on Dr Kelly which no-one22 has even suggested were attributable to the acts of the23 Government. The very fact that Dr Kelly had felt24 obliged to come forward at all was plainly one source of25 considerable tension. So, also, was the strong

801 possibility that he may in fact have said more to2 Mr Gilligan than he admitted to the Ministry of Defence3 or to the two Parliamentary Committees.4 There are other factors also. The rudeness of at5 least one member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The6 very unfortunate incident in which Dr Kelly was7 effectively taxed by one member of the Committee with8 something that he had said to Susan Watts, something9 which we know from other evidence took him aback. There10 were also his concerns about his pension. Those11 concerns were entirely without foundation, it was never12 in fact in jeopardy, but they may still have been very13 real concerns as far as he was concerned.14 Against this background, it is not only a crude15 oversimplification of a complex problem but also16 exceptionally unfair to lay the blame for what happened17 at the door of Dr Kelly's colleagues and superiors at18 the Ministry of Defence or indeed elsewhere in19 Government. Even with the assistance of the highly20 qualified psychiatric evidence which your Lordship has21 heard, it is difficult to look into the mind of a man22 who has reached the state that Dr Kelly must have been23 in when he resolved to take his own life.24 Professor Hawton's evidence was that none of those25 dealing with Dr Kelly in the last days of his life could

811 have foreseen that he might kill himself. Indeed, it2 seems likely that his decision to do so was only made3 very shortly before he acted on it.4 My Lord, it is one thing to say that in hindsight5 one might have chosen another way of doing things or6 even that with foresight one ought to have done. It is7 quite a different thing to suggest that there was some8 underhand strategy in which at least eight individuals9 in different Government offices participated to expose10 Dr Kelly by subterfuge, yet that appears to be what11 Mr Gompertz has suggested.12 Your Lordship will, in due course, examine the13 evidence in its entirety, including the reasoned14 rejection of that charge which every one of those15 witnesses offered when it was put to them.16 What I will do, if I may, is simply to make some of17 the more important points about it.18 LORD HUTTON: Yes.19 MR SUMPTION: First of all, whenever someone is accused of20 bad faith, the first question that has to arise is21 motive and one is bound to ask what possible motive all22 of these people, at different levels of seniority, could23 have had for doing in an underhand way something that24 they were fully entitled to do openly. One suggestion25 that we have heard is that they did it in order to

821 further the Government's war of words with the BBC.2 Another suggestion is that the Government wanted the3 name to get into the public domain without itself being4 identified as the party which had put it there.5 The problem is that none of these suggestions really6 answer the question.7 If the Government wanted Dr Kelly's name to be in8 the public domain, they did not need to be devious in9 order to get it there. Since all of them believed that10 it would inevitably come out anyway, they only had to11 wait on events. If they wanted it out straightaway,12 they would have been absolutely entitled to announce the13 name in an immediate press release.14 The suggestion, therefore, that there was a plot to15 do something they wanted to do in the most16 time-consuming and indirect way lacks even the starting17 plausibility that one would expect of a theory which is18 intended to discredit the individuals in question.19 The actual mechanism by which this supposed plot is20 said to have been put into effect consisted, according21 to Mr Gompertz, of the details included in the press22 release, the Q and A material and the afternoon Lobby23 briefing of 9th July, to some extent the morning one but24 mainly the afternoon.25 None of these suggestions will, in my submission,

831 bear examination. I say to your Lordship that the2 information about Dr Kelly which was included in the3 press release reflected a perfectly legitimate4 objective. An announcement had to be made. It had to5 contain enough information to explain why it was being6 made. It had to say enough to justify the Government's7 belief that the unnamed individual was Mr Gilligan's8 source. It had to say enough about the official's9 functions to explain why he was not in a position to say10 all of the things that Mr Gilligan had attributed to11 him. That was no more, after all, than Dr Kelly had12 himself told the MoD in his letter of 30th June and in13 his two interviews.14 Of course, these things were said in the press15 release in order to make the point that the 29th May16 broadcast was likely to be wrong. I make absolutely no17 bones about that, yet many witnesses have been addressed18 by counsel as if it was in some way shameful or wrong19 for a Government to defend itself against a scandalous20 allegation by disclosing these facts, even though they21 were true.22 I am at a loss to know where that idea comes from.23 A Government is as much entitled to defend itself24 against falsehoods as anyone else. If that means25 disclosing the truth, then it not only can do it but

841 ought to.2 My Lord, exactly the same --3 LORD HUTTON: You will appreciate, Mr Sumption, as I am sure4 the press will, that when I raise points with you or5 other counsel it is not in any way intending to indicate6 any view I form, it is simply to inform myself of the7 submissions of counsel.8 MR SUMPTION: I entirely understand that, my Lord.9 LORD HUTTON: I would like to ask you this: the view might10 be taken or it might be suggested that even if the11 Government were entitled to seek to show that12 Mr Gilligan's broadcast was wrong by Dr Kelly's name13 eventually becoming public, that, in itself, would14 impose a considerable strain on Dr Kelly, not with any15 foresight that he might take his own life but simply16 that for a civil servant who was an expert on weapons,17 to have to give evidence before the FAC would impose18 a burden and strain.19 MR SUMPTION: My Lord, it has been accepted by a number of20 witnesses, and I certainly accept, that appearing before21 Parliamentary Committees is an ordeal. There is no22 doubt about that. It is not usually an ordeal which23 leads to the appalling consequences that followed, not24 I suggest entirely from the Committee but that may have25 been part of it. It is not necessarily an ordeal which

851 would lead to suicide but it is a disagreeable2 experience. It is just as disagreeable for other3 witnesses who appear before Parliamentary Committees in4 controversial matters as it was for Dr Kelly.5 One has to consider what the alternative was. Is6 a responsible Government responsible to Parliamentary7 institutions to say: because it is not agreeable for8 a civil servant to appear before a Committee, we are9 going to withhold from the Committee the fact that10 a person has come forward who we think that they will11 want to interview? Because that is the necessary12 consequence of taking the line implied by the hypothesis13 that your Lordship puts to me.14 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. Thank you.15 MR SUMPTION: My Lord, the same point, I would suggest, can16 be made about the Q and A.17 The essential point about the Q and A is that the18 final approved version reflected the Government's19 decision that they would confirm Dr Kelly's name if it20 was put to them. If the name was not included in21 a press release, and it was not, then the press office22 had to have an answer to questions about him if they23 were put to a press officer by a journalist.24 Was it so irresponsible to adopt a policy of telling25 the truth instead of putting up a wall of lies or

861 transparent evasions? And to what end? To postpone by2 a few hours or days the inevitable moment of disclosure.3 In my submission it is problems like these that press4 officers working at the sharp end have to face day in,5 day out which makes it so unrealistic to suggest that6 the Q and A were part of some underhand plot or scheme7 to expose Dr Kelly in the most indirect possible way.8 Even that, however, is not, I would suggest, as9 unrealistic as the suggestion made to Kate Wilson and10 Pam Teare that some inferences might be drawn from11 earlier drafts in different terms. This mistake comes12 of treating an internal draft, which had never been13 submitted to anyone, as if it were a provisional14 statement of policy which must have been changed in the15 next draft for some different reason of policy.16 The drafts were, as Kate Wilson and Pam Teare told17 your Lordship, successive stages of their incomplete18 work in progress. Only the final draft was ever19 submitted for approval to a policy official.20 My Lord, the Lobby briefings of 9th July have been21 dealt with in the evidence of Tom Kelly. Once again, it22 is necessary to point out that the criticisms of this23 briefing underestimate the difficulties of press24 officers operating in a relatively open system of25 Government in which honesty is absolutely paramount and

871 silence is not usually an option.2 The atmosphere of a Lobby briefing has been3 graphically described by Tom Kelly. It is worse than an4 appeal committee in the House of Lords. The PMOS5 clearly did not set out to expose Dr Kelly on that6 occasion. The truth is that he was placed in an7 extremely difficult position by the disingenuous press8 release which the BBC had issued in response to the9 MoD's announcement.10 Now, I do not wish to criticise, more than I need11 to, this particular conduct of the BBC because we now12 know that the form of this remarkable document was owed13 entirely to Mr Gilligan, who was the only person14 involved in drafting it who actually knew the facts. He15 knew that his source worked for the Ministry of Defence16 but he authorised the BBC to say that he did not work in17 the Ministry of Defence. And that, in our submission,18 was pure mischief making.19 My concern, however, is not with Mr Gilligan's20 semantic conjuring tricks but with the actual21 consequences this document had on 9th July. It led to22 a situation in which Tom Kelly was forced to explain to23 a room of insistent journalists how the source and the24 Ministry of Defence unnamed official could possibly be25 the same person, when the official worked in the

881 Ministry of Defence but the source apparently did not.2 Why should the Prime Minister's Official Spokesmen3 have left journalists with the impression that the4 Ministry of Defence press release was a misleading5 document when it was in fact entirely justified?6 Because that would have been the consequence of failing7 to answer those questions. Since there was in fact8 a perfectly good explanation of the discrepancies, on9 what basis is it to be said that Tom Kelly should not10 have given that explanation when he was asked for it?11 Following upon the suggestion of a cynical scheme12 comes the allegation that the Ministry of Defence's13 officials did not give Dr Kelly the support to which he14 was entitled when, in due course, he was identified.15 LORD HUTTON: Just before we move to that, I think the point16 was also made by Mr Gompertz that according to17 Mr Baldwin of the Times he had received briefings from18 Whitehall officials on both the 7th and the 8th July19 before the name came out.20 MR SUMPTION: I cannot help your Lordship on that. A number21 of witnesses were asked about it. The position is that22 all of the witnesses who were responsible for this23 particular matter have told your Lordship that they had24 nothing to do with that.25 LORD HUTTON: Hmm.

891 MR SUMPTION: I cannot rule out the possibility that2 somebody without any authority, somewhere in Whitehall,3 who had got wind of this was indiscreet, although it is4 fair to make the point also that Mr Baldwin's article is5 also based, as it expressly says, on sources within the6 BBC. It is a very unfortunate fact that matters which7 ought not to be disclosed and which those who disclose8 them know ought not to be disclosed nevertheless are9 repeatedly disclosed to journalists. That happens. It10 is unfortunate it did happen. It certainly is not11 evidence, on the material that your Lordship has heard,12 of some broader underlying plot.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes.14 MR SUMPTION: My Lord, one comes, therefore, to the15 suggestion that there was insufficient support of16 Dr Kelly after he was identified in due course. It is17 fair to say, my Lord, at the outset, that Dr Kelly was18 an extremely self-contained person, he kept his feelings19 to himself; and that very fact meant that he was not an20 easy person to help.21 The facts are actually perfectly clear. Dr Kelly22 was interviewed with scrupulous fairness by Mr Hatfield,23 who made it clear at an early stage that there would be24 no disciplinary proceedings against him. Dr Kelly was25 not told that the Ministry of Defence would confirm his

901 name if it was put to their press office, but there is2 no reason to suppose that it would have made any3 difference if he had been. I say that because he had4 been warned of the likelihood that his identity would5 become known once the press release came out. He was6 given an opportunity to comment on the terms of the7 press release. He was also telephoned by Kate Wilson on8 the evening of the 8th with contact numbers and advice9 to consider alternative accommodation. He decided not10 to avail himself of either of those.11 He was telephoned by Dr Wells when the name12 eventually was confirmed; not, as some of the papers13 have this morning suggested, in one conversation of14 46 seconds but in three conversations over a period of15 an hour amounting to nearly four times that.16 A press officer was standing by to go to Dr Kelly's17 home if he wanted it. He was phoned almost daily by18 Dr Wells, who then cancelled his trip to New York to19 support him at the Committee hearings.20 My Lord, these individuals are as much entitled to21 have their own feelings considered as Dr Kelly was.22 We should not underestimate the effect on them of23 having to meet these accusations, one after another,24 under the glare of intense press publicity and in some25 cases hostility which has attended this Inquiry.

911 People like Richard Hatfield, Kate Wilson and2 Bryan Wells are entitled to feel saddened that their3 very real efforts to support Dr Kelly have only served4 to bring down accusations of incompetence and bad faith5 upon their heads; and for my part I would wholly endorse6 the description which Mr Hatfield gave of the support7 that Dr Kelly received as "outstanding".8 I have reminded your Lordship of the expert evidence9 that none of these individuals could have foreseen10 Dr Kelly's suicide, yet if Dr Kelly had not died it11 could not have been argued even faintly that by12 providing support on the scale they did, the Ministry of13 Defence was in breach of its obligations as an employer.14 LORD HUTTON: I fully appreciate one has to guard against15 the dangers of hindsight, but the point has been made16 that a brief phone call to Dr Kelly when he pulled in17 off the motorway was really insufficient for him to18 consider the implications of the press statement. Do19 you have any submission on that point?20 MR SUMPTION: My Lord, I do not accept that. First of all,21 there is a tendency, simply looking at the crude length22 of phone calls, to assume that it was not enough to23 communicate very much. That depends on how chatty the24 individuals are, on what the subject matter is and on25 how much irrelevance they intersperse with it. It does

921 not take long to get the essential facts over.2 Moreover, your Lordship needs to bear in mind that3 this was not a telephone call that occurred, as it were,4 out of the blue. It is not as if Dr Kelly had never5 heard there was going to be a press release. He had6 known for 24 hours there was going to be a press7 release. He had seen a much shorter version of it.8 Moreover, before the telephone call in which he pulled9 over and took the details, the longer of the telephone10 calls, he had been told that the new statement was11 longer and that it was going to say more about him. In12 my submission, the time required for those phone calls13 was perfectly good enough to enable the essential14 information to be communicated and Dr Kelly, who was15 already familiar with the issues, to respond to them.16 I would accept that it was not long enough to17 accommodate a more general social chat; but there is18 absolutely no evidence to suggest that that is what19 Dr Kelly wanted. Everything that we know about his20 personality suggests otherwise. Moreover, in looking at21 the general question of support one needs to ask oneself22 not: is this phone call on its own enough? But to ask23 oneself about the totality of the support he received.24 One needs to look at the telephone calls, day after day,25 some of which did not get through but some of which did,

931 from Dr Wells. The support he had on the telephone from2 Kate Wilson. The support that your Lordship heard about3 yesterday from Mr Lamb, which was clearly a friendly4 support between colleagues. There was a limit, as5 Mr Lamb made clear, to the extent to which Dr Kelly6 wanted support; but that he was offered it is, I would7 submit, absolutely beyond question.8 My Lord, this perhaps brings one to Mr Gompertz's9 point this morning about learning lessons.10 Looking at the whole of this issue we are,11 I suggest, in danger of trying to learn general lessons12 from appalling but wholly exceptional and unpredictable13 events. What is much worse than that is we are in14 danger of learning the wrong lessons. Dr Kelly's death15 is undoubtedly a tragedy for his family. It is also16 a great loss for the service for which he worked but it17 is perfectly possible to recognise those facts and to18 express genuine sympathy to his family, as we do,19 without at once turning aside in order to hunt for other20 people to blame.21 My Lord, unless I can assist your Lordship any22 further, that is what I have to say.23 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much Mr Sumption.24 I think this will be a convenient time to rise to25 give the stenographers a break. I will sit again in

941 five minutes.2 (2.05 pm)3 (Short Break)4 (2.10 pm)5 CLOSING STATEMENT by MR CALDECOTT6 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Caldecott.7 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, there can be few subjects of greater8 public interest than reasons presented by a Government9 to its own people as possible grounds for war. That --10 let there be no doubt about it -- was the purpose of11 the September dossier. It was an assessment of the12 threat posed by a foreign power against whom hostilities13 were in serious contemplation.14 It was advertised by a label which is almost unique15 in British political history. The Prime Minister was to16 share with the people the gist of the formal17 intelligence assessments he had received from the Joint18 Intelligence Committee. The invitation was to share the19 Prime Minister's conclusion, having shared the20 intelligence.21 The dossier, as the Prime Minister himself made22 clear to the House of Commons on the day of publication,23 was necessarily a matter of trust.24 On unemployment figures or exam results or crime25 statistics there is always available data to unravel any

951 spin but not so here. This was a voice from a closed2 world not obviously open to scrutiny.3 But in time whispers of dissent were heard.4 I mention two examples not as evidence of their truth5 but as material published by reputable newspapers and6 left unchallenged by No. 10 -- and therefore as7 important background to the BBC's decision to broadcast.8 The Observer on 9th March 2003 spoke of "rows"9 between the Intelligence Services and Downing Street.10 The bone of contention was said to be that "intelligence11 material should be presented straight rather than spiced12 up to make a political point". Mr Campbell was13 expressly named as having had fairly serious rows with14 at least one member of the Joint Intelligence Committee.15 The Independent on 27th April referred to one16 aggrieved intelligence officer as stating that "You17 cannot just cherry pick evidence that suits your case18 and ignore the rest".19 What these articles, and others, did not do was20 identify any specific issue in the dossier as provoking21 this alleged disquiet.22 In the month following The Independent on Sunday23 article Dr Kelly spoke of his concern that the September24 dossier had been subject of political interference. He25 cited the 45 minute claim as the classic example of that

961 interference and he chose to express his concerns to the2 BBC and, with differing emphasis, to three separate3 journalists at the BBC. He clearly did so for broadcast4 on an unattributable basis.5 Each of these three experienced journalists6 independently judged that Dr Kelly's criticisms should7 be heard by the public. They did not know them to be8 true. How could they? The intelligence world is closed9 and the BBC did not have a key. They therefore did not10 present them as true, but they did present them as11 credible.12 That broad judgment the BBC defends as entirely13 right.14 I have already referred to the obvious public15 interest in the subject matter of Dr Kelly's concerns,16 but there were other factors in play.17 He combined two crucial areas of expertise. He was18 an expert on inspections in Iraq, and therefore on their19 chemical and biological weapon capabilities in the20 recent past, and he was a scientific expert on the21 weapons themselves. He was also an interpreter for the22 intelligence agencies of the scientific aspects of23 intelligence, especially in the context of Iraq. He had24 clearance at the highest level. His suggestion that he25 was closely involved in the preparation of the dossier

971 was intrinsically credible.2 Mr Sumption says that Dr Kelly knew little about3 assessing the reliability of agents, but on chemical and4 biological warfare issues he was uniquely well placed to5 judge the viability and sense of what they said.6 There are other points to note. Dr Kelly had been7 talking to the press about weapons of mass destruction8 on a largely authorised basis for many years. The mere9 fact that someone of Dr Kelly's background voiced his10 criticisms as forcibly as he did speaks to the depth of11 his concern. It is also most unlikely that he would12 have spoken of many others in intelligence sharing his13 view unless he believed that they did. The validity of14 Dr Kelly's concerns about the dossier I shall explore15 later.16 Dr Kelly was not, as such, against war. He was not17 against the dossier in principle. He was no peace18 campaigner.19 His view appears to have been that Saddam Hussein's20 programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction in21 the future posed a true threat. His quarrel was the22 dossier's emphasis on a current threat posed by his23 actual weapons and with Government interference, where24 he cited the 45 minutes claim as the classic example.25 There was and is no reason whatever to suppose that

981 these views were distorted by any private agenda of his2 own.3 Why did Dr Kelly feel so strongly? We suggest4 three reasons.5 First, he knew Iraq. To know a country is to care6 the more about it. Off and on he had spent seven hard7 and exacting years in Iraq, studying their WMD capacity.8 He had conducted 37 inspections. He was a scientist.9 He knew his Iraqi counterparts, scientists and military.10 There are hints in the evidence that he thought he knew11 more than many of the deskbound in Whitehall. If he did12 think that, he was most likely right. In Iraq of all13 places, intelligence was difficult to gather, and new14 intelligence had always to be measured against the15 position in 1998 when the inspectors were withdrawn.16 Secondly, if the dossier exaggerated the position as17 to current chemical and biological weapons, it could18 directly affect those, such as Dr Kelly, who could19 expect to be subsequently charged with finding them20 after any war. From Dr Kelly's ISC evidence we know21 that the UNMOVIC inspectors discussed the 45 minutes22 claim in this very context. He said to the Committee:23 "In terms of the 45 minutes, yes that was very24 seriously discussed -- particularly people in the UN --25 in UNMOVIC -- who were desperately trying to think about

991 what systems is it they should be looking for when they2 get back into Iraq, because it doesn't fit any of the3 known Iraqi systems, so yes, that was talked about and4 discussed very seriously."5 This was a highly topical subject to Dr Kelly in May6 when the Iraq Survey Group was about to return to the7 country.8 Thirdly, he worked in a world of formal inspection9 and report, where accuracy of language was paramount.10 Professor Hawton described him as extremely meticulous11 and a person who believed intensely in what he was12 doing. He was clearly a principled man. If he thought13 in an area where his two special subjects converged,14 Iraq and WMD, that the public were being misled, he15 would most likely have deeply resented it.16 For these various reasons Dr Kelly was and appeared17 to be an important and credible source.18 Anonymous sources should, of course, be used with19 great care. But voices speaking from within the system20 can rarely declare themselves, especially if they are in21 or close to the intelligence community.22 Mr Gilligan, having had his interview with Dr Kelly23 on 22nd May, did set out to test the apparent24 credibility of what he understood Dr Kelly had said.25 He studied other coverage. He was himself aware of

1001 apparent disquiet within the intelligence community over2 the Government's treatment of intelligence on Iraq.3 Unsurprisingly, the fiasco of the February dossier, for4 which Mr Campbell was driven to apologise, gave some5 credence to the case by Dr Kelly on the dossier that6 preceded it.7 Mr Gilligan identified some striking inconsistencies8 of language within the September dossier as published.9 He noted that the 45 minutes claim, after hitting the10 headlines on 25th September, retired meekly into the11 shadows. He also observed that in the American case for12 war, it did not even make the stage. Nor had weapons of13 mass destruction, on a 45 minute fuse or any other, ever14 been found. The day before the first broadcast15 Mr Rumsfeld, the United States Defence Secretary,16 conceded that Iraq might have destroyed its WMD before17 the war even began. This was the first such indication18 by any member of the coalition.19 There were some 20 broadcasts by Mr Gilligan between20 29th May and 5th June on BBC radio and television21 programmes on the subject of Dr Kelly's concerns. One22 broadcast, his first, at 7 minutes past 6 on the morning23 of 29th May, has attracted particular criticism. It was24 unscripted, which with hindsight it should not have25 been, and was live. It did not sufficiently distinguish

1011 between what Dr Kelly had said and Mr Gilligan's2 interpretation of what he had said in two respects.3 Dr Kelly did not say, as this broadcast suggested,4 that the Government had put in the 45 minutes claim when5 they probably knew it was wrong. Nor did Dr Kelly say6 that Downing Street had ordered more facts to be7 discovered. The BBC regret the inclusion of these8 statements.9 However, Dr Kelly did say that the dossier was sexed10 up by Mr Campbell, that the classic example of this11 transformation was the 45 minutes claim, that most12 people in intelligence were not happy with the13 45 minutes claim because it did not reflect the14 considered view they were putting forward. These15 charges were serious enough and dominated the rest of16 Mr Gilligan's reports, save that he did not name17 Mr Campbell in the early broadcasts.18 The BBC also accept that Downing Street should have19 been notified before broadcast. This was the instant20 reaction of Mr Sambrook, Director of News, when he21 looked at the matter, and was also the publicly stated22 view of the Governors when it came before them in July.23 LORD HUTTON: When you say "accept that Downing Street24 should have been notified". Do you mean by that25 notified on the evening before, Mr Caldecott?

1021 MR CALDECOTT: I mean notified on the evening before,2 my Lord, yes.3 These areas we accept. There is a modern mantra:4 never apologise, never explain. Because you invite the5 taunt: you admit it now, why not earlier? That approach6 is to ignore one simple point, that those who do not7 admit mistakes are unlikely ever to learn from them.8 On 2nd June, Newsnight, acting quite independently9 from the Today Programme, also broadcast Dr Kelly's10 concerns as relayed to another BBC journalist,11 Susan Watts. She had the advantage of a tape recording.12 It is highly informative as to what Dr Kelly's13 misgivings were. He told Newsnight that the Government14 was obsessed with finding intelligence on immediate15 Iraqi threats, and that the Government's insistence that16 the Iraqi threat was imminent was a Downing Street17 interpretation of intelligence conclusions. He said18 that the 45 minutes claim got out of all proportion19 after Downing Street's intervention. If true, it was20 a grave indictment of the integrity of the dossier.21 There was not a whisper of challenge from the Government22 to this programme.23 There followed an exchange of correspondence between24 the Government and the BBC directed at Mr Gilligan's25 broadcasts. The complaint at this stage was primarily

1031 focused on the BBC's reliance on an anonymous source.2 Mr Campbell's second letter was written on3 12th June. On the same day Mr Sambrook attended a lunch4 at No. 10 but no effort was made by Mr Campbell to open5 any dialogue. He had other options. He could have6 pursued a complaint with the BBC through the Programme7 Complaints Unit, as the BBC invited him to do on8 16th June. In this particular case a request to9 fast-track the complaint would have been sympathetically10 received. He could equally have pursued the matter with11 the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the independent12 regulatory body. In the event, the BBC heard nothing13 more from Mr Campbell until he gave evidence to the14 Foreign Affairs Committee almost two weeks later.15 Before the Foreign Affairs Committee Mr Campbell16 used more than battlefield munitions. He went17 strategic. He said that "large parts of the BBC" had an18 anti-war agenda and that the BBC's allegations against19 the Government were lies. Mr Campbell and Mr Sumption20 focus the regret on the Channel 4 interview, but that is21 not where the escalation lay. It was this charge of22 institutional political bias within large parts of the23 BBC, coupled with an allegation of lying against the24 organisation (not, I stress, merely against25 Mr Gilligan).

1041 LORD HUTTON: But was Mr Campbell's charge before the FAC2 that the BBC were lying, was that not directed to the3 broadcast, that the BBC probably knew that the 45 claim4 was wrong? My recollection is, having read the5 evidence, that it was when he was concentrating on that6 point that he emphasised that the BBC were lying.7 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, that is certainly true. I am not8 suggesting it was a general allegation of dishonesty, in9 contrast to the other charge he made about large parts10 of the BBC having an anti-war agenda. That is correct.11 But he never specified precisely where the dishonesty12 lay and it was left as a general charge of dishonesty13 albeit infecting that specific programme. It was very14 unspecific about why it was a lie but it was a very15 strong term to use and it plainly escalated the debate,16 we would have said.17 LORD HUTTON: Yes.18 MR CALDECOTT: There has, I should add, been no withdrawal19 or expression of regret for the allegation of20 institutional political bias in the BBC from21 Mr Campbell, who would have been seen by many as22 speaking on behalf of the Government. Unsurprisingly,23 in his diary he said he had opened a flank on the BBC.24 Hot foot from the Committee, Mr Campbell wrote25 a private letter to the Director General of the BBC, in

1051 which he described the story, not limited to the 6.072 broadcast, as 100 per cent wrong. He also wrote3 a letter to Mr Sambrook, Director of News. This letter4 could not be described as private since Mr Campbell5 leaked its gist to the press before the letter was even6 received. It set a deadline for reply of close of7 business that day, the letter having arrived at8 4 o'clock pm. It demanded answers to a raft of9 questions which had never been asked before, although10 the PMOS was briefing that the BBC had been repeatedly11 asked the same questions and failed to answer. This12 stampeding tactic was not a dignified way for13 a Government to behave, nor was it the action of someone14 with any interest in compromise or a considered response15 from the BBC.16 There is an important point to make about this new17 letter from Mr Campbell. It implicitly complained of18 the suggestion that the case for war had been19 exaggerated and that the dossier had been sexed up to20 make it appear that Saddam was a greater threat to the21 West than the intelligence justified. This reflected22 the wider charge of Dr Kelly's statements as generally23 reported by Mr Gilligan, a charge the BBC maintains it24 was fully entitled to broadcast.25 LORD HUTTON: The letter did specifically ask, did it not:

1061 "Does it [the BBC] still stand by the allegation2 made on that day that both we and the intelligence3 agencies knew the 45 minutes claim to be wrong and4 inserted it despite knowing that?"5 MR CALDECOTT: Without doubt, my Lord. I am not suggesting6 for one moment it did not include a specific question7 and probably more than one question directed at the 6.078 broadcast. The second paragraph of the letter before9 those questions I think on the second page sets out10 a quotation in far more general terms without the11 "probably wrong" or anything equivalent to it.12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.13 MR CALDECOTT: What should also be remembered, my Lord, is14 in his very first letter Mr Campbell asserted that one15 of the programme's central charges was that the16 45 minutes intelligence in the dossier was based on17 a single source and that this statement by the BBC was18 false. That was in fact 100 per cent true.19 The BBC, faced with sustained calls from the media,20 replied to Mr Campbell's letter the following day. The21 letter ran to 12 pages and was firm but courteous. Some22 mistakes were made in the rush. In hindsight the BBC23 accepts that Mr Gilligan's notes should have been24 examined. However, it will be borne in mind that25 Mr Campbell's public attack on the BBC now went well

1071 beyond the 6.07 broadcast and into wider matters.2 As I have said, this allegation of institutional3 bias against the BBC, coupled with an allegation of4 lying, was as grave a charge as could be made against5 a public service broadcaster by the Government's6 Director of Communications; and it had the effect of7 bringing the BBC Governors into play. They had no8 obligation to meet, having received no formal complaint9 from the Government or Mr Campbell personally, but they10 held a special meeting on 6th July. In a private letter11 to them, in stark contrast to what he had just said in12 televised evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee,13 Mr Campbell said he was not attacking the BBC's14 independence. This was a choice example of having your15 cake and eating it.16 The Governors examined both the general and specific17 attacks on the BBC. They could not determine the18 accuracy of what the source had said, since they lacked19 the necessary intelligence materials to do so.20 As to the rest, they did not uncritically endorse21 management. They criticised the lack of notice to22 Downing Street. They made it clear that the BBC was23 only reporting the source and not adopting his views as24 true. They stated, in terms, that the BBC was not25 accusing the Government or the Prime Minister of lying.

1081 They accepted the assurance of management that the notes2 had been reviewed and Mr Gilligan's recollection3 checked, as indeed was the case.4 LORD HUTTON: I recognise, Mr Caldecott, that there is5 a distinction between the BBC making a direct charge and6 the BBC reporting a criticism made by a source, but7 there is the point that can be made against that view8 that as regards the person who is the object of the9 criticism it matters little to him, whether he be10 a person or whether it be the Government, that the11 report does not directly allege the misconduct on his or12 its part.13 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, can I analyse that a little?14 LORD HUTTON: If you could assist me on that.15 MR CALDECOTT: First of all, I think I accept the broad16 premise put to me that to the person criticised it will17 still remain a serious charge even if it is not adopted18 as true. And it is for that reason that the law of19 defamation has a doctrine called the repetition rule,20 that the mere fact you have quoted someone as saying21 something does not provide a defence. You have to show22 that the underlying charge was true. That, I think,23 reflects the concern that your Lordship is putting to me24 that a hearsay charge can still be very serious in its25 consequences.

1091 But that is to look at it entirely from the2 perspective of the individual criticised. In the3 context of public interest issues there is a quite4 separate consideration as to the value of the material5 in the public interest. In that context it is very6 important that publishers make clear whether it is their7 conclusion after thorough investigation or whether it is8 merely the conclusion of the source which they are9 reporting.10 We would also suggest that in the context of11 intelligence stories of this kind, the public do not12 live in an ivory tower, and make obvious allowances for13 the fact that this is only a single source, as the BBC14 made clear, there is no corroboration and a degree of15 scepticism must be brought to bear. Of course, they no16 doubt make allowances for such matters as the17 Prime Minister's denial, the reported denial of the18 Chairman of the JIC and indeed the acceptance by the BBC19 that they were not accusing any of those persons of20 lying.21 LORD HUTTON: Yes.22 MR CALDECOTT: But I accept your Lordship's premise that it23 is still a serious matter for the person criticised.24 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.25 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, the Governors and BBC declined to

1101 accede to a Government request on 8th July to disclose2 the identity of their source to the Government in3 confidence. It was, of course, a strange kind of4 confidentiality, since almost at that exact time the5 naming of Dr Kelly was in close consideration in high6 Government circles. The BBC stood firm on protecting7 its source's identity and says it was entirely right to8 do so.9 My Lord, what followed thereafter is really ground10 covered by Mr Gompertz and Mr Sumption, and appearing11 for the BBC I doubt it would assist if I were to comment12 as, in a sense, a stranger to those matters.13 LORD HUTTON: Quite, yes.14 MR CALDECOTT: Can I now turn to Dr Kelly's perception of15 the dossier and the extent to which it appears to be16 valid.17 One has to judge his state of knowledge by reference18 not just to the documents, of which there are19 surprisingly few, but by reference to the realities of20 his working life.21 He was the expert of choice across several22 independents. He had a desk at the Ministry of Defence,23 the Foreign Office and with the Defence Intelligence24 Staff. He was consulted by the JIC assessment staff,25 and so valuable was his advice to the DIS that they

1111 provided him with a pass for unaccompanied access. If2 DIS personnel trusted him with raw intelligence and3 respected his professional judgments, they would have4 doubtless trusted him with their private views.5 We know that persons close to the process did so and6 your Lordship will recall the e-mail from Mr A to7 Dr Kelly:8 "Another example supporting our view that you and9 I should have been more involved in this than the spin10 merchants of this administration ... let's hope it [that11 is the dossier] turns into tomorrow's chip papers."12 It seems that some of these persons in the13 assessment world, including Dr Kelly, felt14 professionally excluded. We know that Mr A also had15 misgivings about the 45 minutes claim being included in16 the dossier as a certainty. He thought it begged more17 questions than it answered. As a view, it is hardly18 surprising. Nobody knew what weapons system it referred19 to or what journey the 45 minutes was in fact20 describing. And these were, after all, weapons experts.21 Dr Kelly described the claim to Tom Mangold as22 "risible".23 This view unconditionally reflects the terms of24 a formal letter sent to the Deputy Chief of Defence25 Intelligence by Dr Jones, a branch head within the DIS

1121 on 19th September.2 We do not accept the attempt to diminish the3 importance of Dr Jones, who described himself as4 "probably the most senior and experienced intelligence5 community official working on weapons of mass6 destruction".7 Mr A told the Inquiry that the perception was that8 the dossier had been round the houses several times to9 try to find a form of words which would strengthen10 certain political objectives. Dr Kelly told Susan Watts11 that the Government were desperate for information, they12 were pushing hard for information which could be13 released. He also said that it was very difficult to14 get comments in because people at the top of the ladder15 did not want to hear some of the things.16 My Lord, it is beyond the scope of these oral17 submissions to explore the evolution of the 45 minute18 claim from a mere possibility to a certain judgment.19 And I have to say that a study of JIC vocabulary would20 not be a volume to bring out for the Christmas rush.21 But you do not need to be a student of obscure phrases22 to know that a statement that Iraq may be able to launch23 WMD within 45 minutes is very different from a statement24 that they are able to.25 In JIC speak if you want to suggest it is only

1131 possible that Iraq can launch WMD in 45 minutes you say2 intelligence "indicates" or "suggests" that position.3 This was the effect of the only JIC assessment which4 addressed the point and is exactly how it was put in the5 first draft of the dossier. As I have said, there6 appear to have been some good reasons for that7 qualification.8 The 9th September JIC paper, as I say, reads as9 a possibility; and in the absence of any new10 intelligence on the point, and there was none, it is11 perhaps hardly surprising that those in DIS close to12 Dr Kelly could see no sound reason for hardening the13 language to a certainty.14 We know that the gear change followed a minute from15 Mr Campbell to Mr Scarlett, observing that the main text16 was weaker than the executive summary. Dr Kelly told17 Susan Watts that the 45 minutes claim "just got out of18 all proportion", a statement that was broadcast on19 Newsnight without complaint.20 It must be remembered that Dr Kelly cited the21 45 minutes claim as merely an example; and we know that22 he and Dr Jones went through the dossier on23 19th September, line by line. It is inconceivable that24 Dr Kelly, with his special interest in Iraq and his25 involvement in the dossier's preparation, did not read

1141 the final version with care.2 At 3.45 pm on 19th September, after the time for3 last essential comments by JIC members had expired,4 Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff at Downing Street,5 launched a further bid for change. This was not6 cosmetic. It was substance. The whole purpose of the7 dossier was an assessment of the threat posed by8 Saddam Hussein. In the drafts of 11th, 16th and9 19th September, all considered and approved by JIC10 members, the dossier was careful to stress that11 Saddam Hussein was prepared to use chemical and12 biological weapons if his regime was under threat,13 including in the event of an uprising by his own Shia14 population.15 These drafts did not suggest that Saddam Hussein16 would be so stupid as to use such weapons offensively17 and unprovoked, inviting defeat by Western forces far18 stronger than his own.19 Mr Powell realised that this wording advanced20 a powerful argument against war. As he put it in his21 e-mail to Mr Scarlett and Mr Campbell, "It backs up the22 argument that there is no chemical and biological23 weapons threat" and "we will only create one if we24 attack him".25 "So", says Mr Powell, "I think you should redraft

1151 the paragraph". That is what Mr Scarlett duly did.2 Mr Scarlett says there was intelligence to support3 this change. If there was, it is nowhere apparent in4 the ISC report published on 9th September of this year.5 The ISC operate within what is called the ring of6 secrecy and see significant amounts of classified7 material. Moreover, the final JIC assessment on Iraq of8 9th September is consistent with the presentation of9 Saddam Hussein as a defensive rather than an offensive10 threat. It states:11 "... that if Saddam were to be faced with the12 likelihood of military defeat and removal from power, he13 would be unlikely to be deterred from using chemical and14 biological weapons by any diplomatic or military means."15 Was this new intelligence of which Mr Scarlett16 speaks ever assessed in final form? If so, when? It17 appears to conflict with a later JIC assessment18 of November 2002, to which the ISC also refers, which19 seems to emphasise the defensive nature of20 Saddam Hussein's threat. It is an assessment hedged21 around with a regiment of "ifs". It states:22 "It was assessed that Saddam was prepared to order23 missile strikes against Israel with chemical and24 biological warheads, in order to widen the war should25 hostilities begin."

1161 It then referred to some other targets and goes on:2 "The update also contained recent intelligence that3 Saddam would use chemical or biological weapons if4 allied forces approached Baghdad, if Basra, Kirkuk and5 Mosul fell to allied control or if Iraqi military units6 rebelled."7 Mr Sumption said, I think this morning, that this8 had nothing to do with the 45 minutes claim. I query9 whether that is right. The 45 minutes claim is not only10 in the same paragraph, it is in the very next sentence.11 Dr Kelly could hardly have missed it.12 These are not questions the BBC can conclusively13 answer. The final covering note to JIC members from14 Mr Scarlett says nothing about any new intelligence and15 makes no effort to draw attention to this change,16 despite its evident importance.17 There was one other late final change. The title.18 On 16th September and 19th September drafts, also19 approved by the JIC, being those which Dr Kelly appears20 to have seen, the dossier's title was "Iraq's Programme21 for Weapons of Mass Destruction", the emphasis being on22 what Saddam Hussein was seeking to develop rather than23 the weapons he had. At the last minute the word24 "Programme" disappears, leaving the impression that the25 threat is posed by the weapons he has now. This appears

1171 to have been the work of Mr Scarlett. Titles do colour2 contents. This was again a transforming change and3 Dr Kelly could hardly have missed it. Indeed, there is4 more than a hint that Dr Kelly, with his close interest5 in the specific nature of Iraq's current threat, took6 on-board this very change and viewed it with dismay. In7 his taped telephone call with Susan Watts, Dr Kelly said8 this:9 "I think that was the real concern that everybody10 had, it was not so much what they have now [meaning11 Iraq] but what they would have in the future. But that12 unfortunately wasn't expressed strongly in the dossier,13 because that takes away the case for war."14 It is unclear to what extent Dr Kelly and others15 within the DIS were aware on the grapevine of16 Downing Street's contribution to the drafting process.17 They certainly knew that Downing Street was pressing for18 more intelligence. They also are likely to have known19 that the very important first planning meeting for the20 dossier on 9th September was chaired by Mr Campbell with21 Mr Scarlett in attendance, rather than vice versa.22 It has not been easy to piece together who learned23 what at which meeting, since it appears that in24 Government note-taking is a forgotten art. This is25 a serious point. Accountability anywhere requires

1181 a record to be kept of important meetings. Parish2 councils keep minutes, but not apparently the Government3 when planning the unprecedented presentation of4 intelligence to the public. There are, however, some5 flashes of insight to be gained from the e-mail traffic.6 To take but one example, the reaction of Mr Campbell's7 special adviser to the first draft of the dossier was8 "we're in a lot of trouble now". Why, one asks, should9 an accurate and fair summary of the JIC assessment spell10 any trouble for anyone? It is exactly what the dossier11 was meant to be doing.12 The answer, of course, is that Mr Bassett meant13 political trouble. Mr Scarlett said in his first round14 of evidence that he was aware of the input that was15 coming to him on the back of these e-mails and that16 members of the intelligence agencies were also aware.17 He said that no worries of any kind were expressed to18 him, but others may have thought that politics had19 started to enter the bloodstream of the dossier.20 To what extent was Dr Kelly in fact right? It is21 beyond the scope of this speech to address the fine22 detail of the case for political interference with23 a dossier and the Government's response to it. There24 are, however, some short points which may shed light as25 to why at least suspicions remain about the process

1191 whereby the dossier was produced. These points share2 a simple theme: there is no reason not to be open if you3 have nothing to hide.4 The Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on5 4th June, declared that this was indeed the Government's6 position. In response to a call for a Public Inquiry7 the Prime Minister said this:8 "Furthermore, the allegation that the 45 minute9 claim provoked disquiet among the intelligence10 community, which disagreed with its inclusion in the11 dossier -- I have discussed it, as I said, with the12 Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- is also13 completely and totally untrue. Instead of hearing from14 one of many anonymous sources, I suggest that if people15 have evidence, they actually produce it."16 But when the evidence did become available,17 a strangely coy approach prevailed. That coyness goes18 to three matters: the history of the drafts on the19 45 minutes claim; the extent of disquiet with the20 dossier, including as to the 45 minutes claim; and21 thirdly, acknowledging that the 45 minutes claim had22 been seriously misunderstood by both the public and the23 media, so unclear was its terms.24 There are four matters to consider in this context.25 Firstly, Mr Straw had given evidence to the Foreign

1201 Affairs Committee of the House of Commons that to his2 knowledge there had been no formal complaint from the3 Intelligence Services about the dossier. In acquitting4 the Government of any political meddling, the Foreign5 Affairs Committee expressly attached importance to the6 absence of any evidence of any intelligence personnel7 complaining about or seeking to distance themselves from8 the content of the dossier. In fact, Dr Jones, a branch9 head in DIS, had written a strong formal letter of10 protest about the dossier on 19th September, not only on11 his own behalf but on behalf of his branch as well; and12 not only to his immediate line manager but to the Deputy13 Chief of Defence Intelligence, Mr Cragg, expressing14 reservations about the dossier. Mr Cragg stated to15 the Inquiry that he was surprised by its strength of16 language.17 A similar letter was written by a colleague on18 20th September, after the dossier had been finalised.19 These letters were only disclosed to the ISC as20 a consequence of this Inquiry and were apparently never21 drawn to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee22 or Mr Straw. The speaking note, approved by Mr Howard23 and Mr Scarlett, portrayed the documents as customary24 debate between analysts and a mere expression of concern25 to immediate line managers. They were, in fact,

1211 neither. Dr Jones was sent a letter which gave the2 false impression that the record had been corrected.3 I turn to the second matter. Mr Campbell prepared4 a memorandum for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the5 changes he had suggested to the dossier. Those changes6 were entirely based on an exchange of documents between7 him and Mr Scarlett. He had those documents in front of8 him when the memo was prepared. He also had the benefit9 of Mr Scarlett's help. No points outside these10 documents were mentioned in his memo to the Foreign11 Affairs Committee, but several points within the12 documents were omitted. Most strikingly, Mr Campbell13 made no mention of his comment that the 45 minutes claim14 was weaker in the text than in the executive summary,15 despite the fact that this was the very issue the16 Foreign Affairs Committee were concerned to examine.17 The memo reads as if it is a product of recollection18 rather than drawn from documents, so that documents were19 never asked for and the omission never emerged. It was,20 in context, a quite extraordinary oversight.21 The third example concerns the oral evidence given22 to the Foreign Affairs Committee by Mr Campbell, who23 stated that he looked at all the drafts of the dossier24 and left no doubt that on the 45 minute claim they had25 stayed the same. This was demonstrably wrong.

1221 Mr Campbell was asked to relay a request to the JIC2 for these drafts. If Mr Campbell's evidence was3 accurate, there could be no possible reason for not4 producing them, since on his account they were all5 identical on the 45 minutes claim, and the annual report6 of the ISC had stated the obvious in saying that the7 published intelligence was now declassified.8 The truth is that if the drafts on the 45 minutes9 claim had been produced, Mr Campbell's evidence on the10 point would have been wholly undermined. And the11 uncomfortable questions would have followed: who made12 the changes, and why?13 Even in phase 1 of this Inquiry Mr Campbell did not14 refer to the fact that he had made a comment on the15 45 minutes claim. It also begs the question: who in16 Government was following Mr Campbell's evidence with an17 awareness of the fact that the drafts had consistently18 changed on the 45 minutes claim?19 The last point relates to what the public were told.20 Several mass circulation newspapers understandably21 interpreted the 45 minutes claim as referring to22 strategic missiles or bombs. It seems to have been23 common knowledge within Government that the intelligence24 referred to battlefield munitions only, though this was25 never made clear in the dossier.

1231 Only Sir Richard Dearlove, in evidence to this2 Inquiry, acknowledged real dismay on the point. The3 reaction of Mr Hoon and Mr Scarlett borders on cynical4 indifference. The Government's failure to correct is5 wholly indefensible. It is hard to put it down to6 anything other than political expedience. The Inquiry7 has seen pages and pages of Q and A material, core8 scripts and lines to take devoted to getting across9 a media message when the Government wants it. The best10 governing minds of the country closely considered the11 outing of Dr Kelly, but on this fundamental12 misrepresentation to the public and in this wholly13 unprecedented context there was nothing. Humble pie, it14 seems, is never on the menu.15 Had the Government been candid on these points,16 especially those concerning the Foreign Affairs17 Committee, the public focus may have shifted from18 Dr Kelly to a more substantive and informed debate on19 the dossier.20 I conclude with two short observations.21 First, while some people saw or perhaps should have22 seen some of the pressures Dr Kelly was under, it was23 always going to be a very partial view. The BBC, for24 its part, accepts that nobody in Government or the BBC25 or the Civil Service had an inkling of all the pressures

1241 he was under, still less could or should anyone have2 foreseen their tragic outcome.3 Second, the BBC anticipates criticism of the 6.074 broadcast in particular and its treatment thereafter,5 but they do ask the Inquiry to have in mind the public6 interest in the remainder of its extensive coverage of7 Dr Kelly's concerns about the dossier, which the BBC8 believes the public had a right to know.9 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Caldecott.10 CLOSING STATEMENT by MS ROGERS11 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Ms Rogers.12 MS ROGERS: My Lord, I have been given 15 minutes to make13 submissions on behalf of Andrew Gilligan. It is14 obviously not possible in that time to deal with all the15 detail and that will be done in writing.16 LORD HUTTON: If you feel you would like to extend that time17 to some extent, please feel free to do so. I do not18 want you to feel you are restricted or under pressure.19 MS ROGERS: I will try to stay within it. Within that time20 what I will seek to do is to address you from the21 perspective of Andrew Gilligan, which is that of the22 working journalist, the working journalist who has an23 essential job to do in a democracy.24 Andrew Gilligan has accepted that he made mistakes.25 They were inadvertent. But it is important to

1251 acknowledge that it was right for Andrew Gilligan to2 talk to David Kelly. It was right for Andrew Gilligan3 to ask him about the September dossier. It was right to4 report what Dr Kelly said about it. In short, it was5 right for Andrew Gilligan to tell the public.6 I want to start at 22nd May 2003, with7 Andrew Gilligan's meeting with Dr David Kelly at the8 Charing Cross Hotel. That meeting has to be put into9 its context: the war in Iraq. The decision whether the10 UK should go to war had been hotly debated, with very11 strong passions aroused about whether that decision was12 right or wrong. This was not an arid debate taking13 place only in the inner circles of Government, it was14 central to political debate in this country. And the15 country was divided. Parliament was divided. Even the16 Government was divided. Cabinet Ministers resigned.17 The debate was continuing on 22nd May 2003. One18 reason was that by that date no weapons of mass19 destruction had been found in Iraq. The central20 justification from Washington and London for the war was21 to rid the country of weapons of mass destruction, WMD.22 The failure to find WMD had fuelled the ongoing debate.23 Some people thought that the Government had misled24 them. Before 22nd May there had been reports in the25 media, the responsible media, that some Labour

1261 backbenchers thought they had been duped into backing2 the war on the basis of questionable intelligence.3 There was a great deal of media reporting on the issue4 of what the Government had told Parliament and the5 public, and whether it was right. It was a persistent6 issue. It was a problem for the Government. Some7 people just did not believe what they had said about the8 need to go to war. And of course the problem was9 compounded by the Government's February dossier, which10 was, as the Government itself acknowledged, a mistake.11 It was a mistake that severely damaged the Government's12 case.13 All this formed part of the context in which14 Andrew Gilligan, the Today reporter, met Dr David Kelly,15 the experts' expert on Iraqi WMD. Was it right for16 Andrew Gilligan to meet David Kelly? We say: yes, it17 was.18 David Kelly had vast experience on Iraq and WMD. We19 have heard in this Inquiry about David Kelly's knowledge20 and experience, how he was valued and respected by his21 colleagues. He was a very credible and authoritative22 source. We know that David Kelly spoke regularly to23 journalists. He was comfortable dealing with them. We24 have seen some of David Kelly's e-mails; we have seen25 some journalists' notes, we have heard a tape recording

1271 of one of David Kelly's conversations.2 The big issues, the war in Iraq and the Government's3 justification for it, were issues of incontestable4 public interest and importance. As defence5 correspondent on Today it was Andrew Gilligan's job to6 go out and ask questions about those matters; to7 interview good sources and to report to the public.8 Andrew Gilligan, a working journalist, had met9 David Kelly before and knew his expertise. It is10 through sources like David Kelly that working11 journalists obtain information and report it as part of12 healthy political debate. David Kelly agreed to meet13 Andrew Gilligan when he called. It was right for them14 to meet. Was it right for Andrew Gilligan to ask15 David Kelly about the September dossier? We say: yes,16 it was.17 Meeting when they did, it was inevitable that18 Andrew Gilligan would ask David Kelly about the failure19 to find WMD in Iraq and about what the Government had20 said in its September dossier about WMD. He would have21 been failing in his job had he not done so. We have22 heard what David Kelly said, in short summary: the23 dossier had been transformed in the week before24 publication to make it sexier; the classic example of25 the transformation was the statement that some WMD were

1281 ready for use in 45 minutes. That had not been in the2 original dossier. David Kelly and others thought it was3 wrong; that the intelligence was unreliable; that it had4 been misinterpreted. The statement had been included in5 the dossier against the wishes of David Kelly and6 others. Most people in intelligence were unhappy with7 the dossier because it did not reflect the considered8 view that they were putting forward.9 And who, according to David Kelly, was responsible10 for the transformation of the dossier? Campbell.11 LORD HUTTON: Are you suggesting that Dr Kelly told12 Mr Gilligan that most people in intelligence were13 dissatisfied with the dossier?14 MS ROGERS: Yes.15 LORD HUTTON: Yes.16 MS ROGERS: This information coming from David Kelly was17 important and valuable. David Kelly was not someone who18 was opposed to taking action against Iraq. He was19 a hawk. He believed, as he emphasised to20 Andrew Gilligan, that Iraq had WMD programmes. What21 David Kelly said about the September dossier in his22 answers shows that Andrew Gilligan was right to ask him23 questions.24 Was it right for Andrew Gilligan to report what25 David Kelly told him? We say: yes, it was.

1291 David Kelly was, on 22nd May 2003, as he had been2 for many years, a trusted public servant. He had the3 highest security clearance. The fact is that he4 volunteered information to Andrew Gilligan, a reporter,5 knowing that it was likely to be used and intending that6 it should be published.7 That David Kelly should volunteer this information8 to Andrew Gilligan shows that David Kelly thought it was9 information that should be put into the public domain.10 What did Andrew Gilligan do before reporting this11 issue? Of course there is a limit to what you can do12 when you are dealing with a confidential source from13 a closed world like the intelligence community.14 Andrew Gilligan has explained in his evidence to this15 Inquiry the steps that he took to check the information.16 He did what he could.17 Meanwhile, the debate about the big issue for the18 Government, for all of us, continued. In America19 Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of State for Defence,20 went on record with a suggestion that Iraq might have21 destroyed its WMD before the war began. This was22 a significant development. The morning headlines for23 the newspapers, broadsheet and tabloid, on 29th May 200324 were summarised in the Government's own 6 am daily25 briefing service which has been produced to this

1301 Inquiry. It includes reporting of claims that the2 Government had misled Parliament and the people.3 When Andrew Gilligan took his story to the editors4 of the Today Programme, he did not know what the5 newspapers would be saying next day. It was on6 28th May 2003 that three experienced journalists --7 Andrew Gilligan, the day editor and the programme editor8 of Today -- decided they should report what David Kelly9 had said on the Today Programme on 29th May.10 What about the fact that David Kelly's identity had11 to be protected? There was no prospect of naming12 David Kelly in the broadcast. His position meant that13 it was not possible for him to go on the record as the14 source. He had spoken on an unattributable basis and15 Andrew Gilligan had a duty to protect his source. That16 duty to protect sources is a fundamental principle for17 journalists.18 Andrew Gilligan and David Kelly agreed a form of19 words to describe David Kelly that would not reveal him20 as the source. The fact is that David Kelly was a good21 source, a very good source. He was not a member of the22 Intelligence Services, but he was a member of the23 intelligence community, an intelligence insider,24 a source on intelligence.25 What about the record of what David Kelly had said

1311 at the meeting? Of course, Andrew Gilligan did not have2 a verbatim note of the conversation. He is not a court3 transcriber who records every word. He is a journalist,4 and like most journalists he made notes. He made and5 revised them on his personal organiser at the meeting.6 Next day he wrote out a longer account of the7 conversation; and on 28th May he produced from that note8 the summary of what David Kelly had said for the editors9 on the Today Programme.10 As for how the story was reported, the Inquiry knows11 from Mr Gilligan's evidence that he has examined and12 re-examined in the cold, clear light of hindsight every13 aspect of his reporting in the light of what has14 happened since 29th May. His journalism has been15 subjected to an unprecedented level of scrutiny. He has16 acknowledged his mistakes. They were made inadvertently17 and in good faith.18 One question that has been raised is whether19 Andrew Gilligan should have gone back to David Kelly20 before reporting his words on Today. David Kelly was21 familiar with dealing with journalists and he knew that22 when he met Andrew Gilligan he was meeting a working23 journalist who would want to use what he said.24 When Andrew Gilligan checked key points and25 quotations at the end of the conversation, David Kelly

1321 asked Andrew Gilligan not to use some of the technical2 information he had mentioned. But apart from that he3 was happy for what he said to be reported. That is why4 he said it.5 Of course, David Kelly was saying similar things to6 other journalists at this time. We can take two7 examples from the BBC, Susan Watts and Gavin Hewitt.8 As for Susan Watts, on 7th May David Kelly had9 raised the question of Alastair Campbell's involvement10 in the September dossier with her. She did not report11 it at that time but there is no doubt that David Kelly12 raised his name with her. When she asked him about that13 conversation later, Dr Kelly remembered what he had14 said. He went on to say that he regarded15 Alastair Campbell as synonymous with the No. 10 press16 office because he was responsible for it.17 On Newsnight on 2nd June 2003, Susan Watts' report,18 based on what David Kelly had said, included that the19 Government had been desperate for information, that it20 had seized on the 45 minutes claim, which had21 unfortunately got out of proportion.22 As for Gavin Hewitt, he too gave evidence to23 the Inquiry. He was sure, relying on his notes, about24 what David Kelly had said to him about the dossier.25 This included that No. 10 spin had come into play and

1331 that there had been unease of some substance amongst2 intelligence people.3 As for Dr Kelly's views on the 45 minutes claim,4 well we know that he confirmed to Tom Mangold that it5 was "risible".6 We may never know for sure why Dr Kelly was giving7 this information to journalists, but the fact that he8 was doing so is clear. He gave it to Andrew Gilligan;9 and what Andrew Gilligan set out to do, in good faith,10 was to report fairly and accurately what David Kelly had11 told him. What Dr Kelly had told him was of interest to12 the public and Andrew Gilligan was right to do his best13 to report the story.14 Was it right for Andrew Gilligan to bring these15 matters to the public's attention? We say that it was.16 By 29th May the September dossier was eight months17 old. Why did it still matter? It mattered because what18 Dr Kelly had said was concerned with issues of real19 substance. The decision to go to war is one of the most20 important political decisions that can be made. We are21 here in this Inquiry because David Kelly died. His22 death is a tragedy, the loss for his family, his friends23 his colleagues is immense. This Inquiry is concerned24 with the circumstances that led to his death. In25 a narrowest sense that could be said to focus on the

1341 events of a single day, but the issues under2 consideration here have been much wider and in that3 wider context we remember that as a result of a decision4 to go to war many other lives have been lost, many other5 lives have been changed by the loss of a husband,6 a father, a brother, a friend.7 The decision to go to war, the Government's8 justification for it, deserves the closest possible9 scrutiny. A defence correspondent who failed to raise10 these matters in the continuing public debate would be11 failing in his duty.12 It is the role of the journalist to investigate and13 report upon matters of legitimate public interest. This14 journalism was not an unwarranted intrusion into15 someone's private life, it was not celebrity gossip. It16 was a classic example of working journalism reporting on17 a matter of public interest.18 Freedom of expression is a fundamental right. It is19 a right to receive as well as a right to communicate20 information. The media play a vital role in a democracy21 as the eyes and ears of the public. The law protects22 freedom of expression not just as a lofty principle, not23 just as a matter of theory, but as a matter of practical24 reality. It was this Government that gave us the Human25 Rights Act, promising that it would bring rights home.

1351 The law allows --2 LORD HUTTON: These are all very valid principles that you3 are stating, but as I understand it you are stating them4 against the background that Mr Gilligan accepts that5 there were errors in his reporting.6 MS ROGERS: My Lord, yes.7 LORD HUTTON: In the way in which he reported what he8 believed Dr Kelly had said to him. Am I right in that9 understanding?10 MS ROGERS: My Lord, that is right. My very next sentence11 was to be, my Lord: the law allows, as it must, a margin12 for error. It does not require perfection from those13 who practice the trade of journalism in the media, as in14 real life nobody is perfect.15 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes.16 MS ROGERS: Free and open political debate is so important17 that the law requires politicians and others who engage18 in the public arena to show a higher degree of tolerance19 for criticism of their actions and their motives. Such20 criticism should be understood, if not welcomed, by21 a Government in a healthy democracy like ours.22 LORD HUTTON: Is that so if a very grave charge is made23 which has really no basis for its underlying gravity?24 MS ROGERS: Well, my Lord, that --25 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate we have been discussing these

1361 matters really for a number of days, but the real2 criticism of Mr Gilligan is that he had a discussion3 with Dr Kelly. You are submitting that Dr Kelly made4 certain observations to him. But Mr Gilligan then made5 a very serious charge, which was that the Government6 probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong; and7 as I understand it Mr Gilligan has accepted that in8 reporting that he gave a wrong impression, which he did9 not intend to give.10 I mean, are you suggesting that there is some11 justification for that particular charge? I appreciate12 also that Mr Gilligan says that he gave other broadcasts13 and he suggests, and I have to consider this carefully,14 of course, that there was some basis for these other15 suggestions. But the Government's main complaint was in16 relation to that charge, which the Government says was17 a very grave charge for which there was no basis.18 MS ROGERS: My Lord, that is the Government's complaint now,19 that that is a serious charge.20 LORD HUTTON: Yes.21 MS ROGERS: What I was going to go on to do was to look at22 the charge at the beginning, which essentially was23 a wholesale attack on the story.24 LORD HUTTON: Yes I see, yes.25 MS ROGERS: It depends what the starting point is. I was

1371 seeking to start from the starting point that2 Mr Gilligan had, which was the conversation with3 Dr Kelly and the reporting about that.4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Please do develop that.5 MS ROGERS: If I do not answer your Lordship's question in6 my submissions then please come back to it and I will.7 I do not want to duck the question.8 LORD HUTTON: No, quite.9 MS ROGERS: Today we do not take the word of public figures10 automatically at face value. We question what we are11 told. It is right that we should. It is healthy for12 society that we do. It is by public debate, vigorous13 open debate, that we are all better informed.14 The issues raised in this reporting were big issues,15 serious issues of substance. The reporting of claims16 and responses to claims is the common currency of17 political debate. The Government, doing its job,18 responded to Andrew Gilligan's story swiftly and as19 fully as it wanted. The Government has a vast dedicated20 and sophisticated communications machinery. It had no21 difficulty in getting what it wanted to say reported in22 the media, both on 29th May and after it made press23 statements, statements in Parliament, and what it said24 was reported just as widely as what Dr Kelly had said.25 The problem for the Government was that

1381 Andrew Gilligan's story, based expressly on a single2 anonymous source, did not go away. Dr Kelly was not the3 only person giving information to the media. Other4 journalists and publications followed up the story,5 including their own sources, including sources in the6 Intelligence Services who were making similar7 statements.8 The problem for the Government was that the burden9 of Andrew Gilligan's story fitted with other evidence,10 other information from other sources. In this Inquiry11 and before it the Government has focused its attack on12 Andrew Gilligan, but Andrew Gilligan was just one13 working reporter doing his job. His contribution to the14 ongoing political debate was to report what David Kelly15 had said.16 Andrew Gilligan's report did not put the issue of17 what the Government had said about WMD on to the18 political agenda. The Intelligence and Security19 Committee, for example, had decided at the beginning of20 May 2003, before Andrew Gilligan's report, to examine21 the intelligence and assessments on Iraq and their use22 by the Government. That is what the ISC said in its23 annual report and what its chair, Ann Taylor, said in24 evidence to this Inquiry.25 The Foreign Affairs Select Committee had decided it

1391 would seek to establish whether the Foreign and2 Commonwealth Office within the Government as a whole had3 presented accurate and complete information to4 Parliament in the period leading up to military action5 in Iraq, particularly in respect of WMD.6 As to whether what David Kelly said about the7 dossier was right, on behalf of Mr Gilligan we adopt8 what Mr Caldecott has said earlier today, and of course9 further submissions will be made in writing it and about10 the changes in wording we have seen on the drafts11 disclosed to this Inquiry.12 We must remember that while the Government's denials13 of Andrew Gilligan's story amounted to a wholesale14 refutation of what he had reported, now, the Government15 focuses its attack on Andrew Gilligan's reporting by16 subjecting a small part of one broadcast, the unscripted17 6.07 item, to elaborate forensic analysis where lawyers18 pick over a few words that were used once and were not19 repeated. This process is artificial and it is unreal.20 It diverts attention from the real issues of substance.21 When David Kelly came forward to reveal he had22 spoken to Andrew Gilligan you might have expected the23 Government's concern to be to find out what David Kelly24 had said not only to Andrew Gilligan but also to other25 journalists with whom he had admitted contact. We know,

1401 because witnesses have told us, that they focused on2 what he said to Andrew Gilligan on 22nd May.3 We do not know what steps they took to find out4 whether David Kelly was the source who had leaked the5 top secret document. I should make clear that6 David Kelly was not that source.7 We now know, because we have seen8 Alastair Campbell's diary extracts, that he and9 Geoff Hoon agreed, when they learned that the source had10 come forward, that this was an opportunity to get11 Gilligan. Of course, "get" is not exactly the word12 Mr Campbell used in his diary.13 The response is like that of a playground bully.14 They do not like what Andrew Gilligan has said and they15 want to get him. But this is not a playground, they are16 senior officials in the Government. Their priority17 should not have been to get Gilligan, he was the18 messenger. They should have acknowledged that as19 a working journalist he was doing his job by reporting20 on a legitimate public debate. They subjected him and21 his journalism to an unprecedented attack.22 What Andrew Gilligan reported has to be put into its23 proper context: the big picture of the issues of24 legitimate public concern which form the background to25 his meeting with David Kelly. His reports on Today need

1411 to be listened to as they would have been on the day.2 Radio reports are not subject to close textual analysis3 by listeners. They are heard by people as they go about4 their daily routine, in the car, over the breakfast5 table, on the bedside radio. His reports have to be6 considered in the context of the wider reporting as7 a whole.8 Andrew Gilligan was not writing a legal document.9 He was not preparing a court transcript. He was10 reporting what he had been told. He, and the other11 experienced journalists on the Today team, viewed the12 report as a valuable contribution to a continuing13 political debate.14 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate that point, Ms Rogers, but when15 you refer to precise textual analysis, if this report16 that someone probably knew that something was wrong, it17 does not require a precise textual analysis for the18 listener to understand what that means, does it?19 MS ROGERS: It does. Those words do have to be considered20 in the context of how they would have been heard by21 a listener at the time.22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.23 MS ROGERS: What the burden of the report was concerned24 with, and in the context of what the debate was which25 had preceded it, was in essence whether the intelligence

1421 was right, whether the intelligence had been exaggerated2 by the Government in the course of putting forward its3 case for war. And that, in a sense, was the debate4 which people were familiar with and in the context5 against which this would have been received.6 Now, the words --7 LORD HUTTON: I want to make clear to you, I entirely8 understand the point you are making about the general9 debate. But I just want to ask you about the precise10 point you were making that those words have to be11 understood against the burden of the general debate.12 The listener who heard that broadcast at 6.07 would13 certainly be aware of the general debate about the14 Government's dossier, but they had not heard the rest of15 what Mr Gilligan was going to say. I do have some16 difficulty in understanding your point that those words17 would not convey to the average listener that the18 Government was acting dishonestly, just listening to19 those precise words as they came over the air.20 I am not seeking to challenge you. I have to21 consider all these matters. I am not seeking to22 challenge your general submissions, it is just on that23 particular point, which in itself is an important one.24 MS ROGERS: Of course, what the journalist intended to25 convey, speaking in a defamation context, is not

1431 relevant. But of course a charge of dishonesty was not2 one that Andrew Gilligan was seeking to make and it was3 not one that his fellow members of the editorial team on4 the Today Programme thought that they were making at the5 time.6 LORD HUTTON: Yes.7 MS ROGERS: Of course, when one looks at the complaints that8 were made at the time, the letter of 29th May, where9 part of the complaint was that Adam Ingram, who was the10 designated Minister responding for the Government on the11 issue, had not been I think invited on the World at One,12 that did not say: you have made a serious charge of13 dishonesty against us. Nor did Mr Campbell's letter of14 5th or 6th June. It is quite right, it was brought up15 in the course of evidence, that that letter does refer16 specifically to the 6.07 broadcast, but it is important17 to look at what points are then made about the 6.0718 broadcast, and they are essentially three points19 concerned with possible breach of the BBC's own producer20 guidelines.21 LORD HUTTON: Yes.22 MS ROGERS: So if it was a serious attack on the integrity23 of the Government, on the honesty of the Government,24 then one might have expected that if not made25 immediately on 29th May, that it might have been made in

1441 a letter of complaint on 5th June. And it is much later2 that that is how the complaints are brought forward.3 LORD HUTTON: You make that point very clearly. I have that4 point clearly.5 MS ROGERS: If I could just add this: we have heard from6 Mrs Wilson -- there are a number of witnesses, of7 course, who did not hear the broadcast.8 LORD HUTTON: Quite.9 MS ROGERS: Mrs Wilson was one of those who did. Her10 initial reaction was to consider making a complaint, but11 the complaint she had in mind was one about, I think,12 the hostile tone, as she put it, of Mr Humphrys'13 engagement and debate with Adam Ingram.14 LORD HUTTON: Yes.15 MS ROGERS: So essentially we say it certainly was not16 intended to be that allegation, it was not perceived by17 three experienced journalists as making such an18 allegation. Again, of course, as Mr Gilligan explained,19 had it been seen as that kind of allegation there are20 well established procedures, if you are making21 essentially allegations of dishonesty, criminality and22 so on, of referring the matter to lawyers so they get23 involved with exact wording and scripting and so on.24 LORD HUTTON: I think the point was put to Mr Sambrook that25 the important thing is: what is the impression of the

1451 listener? I think that is the important matter.2 I think Mr Sambrook was disposed to accept that,3 although I appreciate he was speaking for himself.4 MS ROGERS: That of course is right. That is why we say5 that it is important to step away from -- it is6 difficult, because we are here in the Inquiry, we are7 going over the documents, and we are all lawyers8 subjecting it to analysis. But we must try to be9 listeners. Your Lordship has a tape and I invite you to10 listen to it and to bear in mind that that was not the11 attack that the Government made at the time.12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.13 MS ROGERS: In conclusion I want simply to say this, unless14 your Lordship has any more questions for me: that15 Andrew Gilligan has conceded that his reporting was not16 perfect, that mistakes were made, but lessons have been17 learned. Andrew Gilligan will ask this Inquiry to18 recognise that he was right to talk to David Kelly and19 that he was right to ask him about the September20 dossier, and that he was right to regard what21 David Kelly said as worth reporting and right to report22 it. And this is because the public, all of us, had23 a right to know what David Kelly had to say.24 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Ms Rogers.25 I think now I will give the stenographers another

1461 short break and then we will have your submissions2 Mr Dingemans.3 (3.30 pm)4 (Short Break)5 (3.35 pm)6 CLOSING STATEMENT by MR DINGEMANS7 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Dingemans.8 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, in my short opening statement on9 15th September I identified some 15 issues which10 your Lordship might want to consider. I do not intend11 to repeat the list. May I, in the time available to me,12 concentrate on some of those issues, and to identify13 some competing conclusions in respect of those issues14 which it is open for your Lordship to draw.15 As your Lordship knows, I have no case to put, no16 client to represent and my only aim in these submissions17 is to attempt to assist your Lordship in determining the18 truth relating to the circumstances surrounding the19 death of Dr Kelly.20 I intend, my Lord, to start at the end. All the21 submissions before you so far have assumed that Dr Kelly22 killed himself. It is first of all necessary to23 determine whether those assumptions are well founded.24 The evidence shows that after increasingly frantic25 family searches Dr Kelly was reported missing shortly

1471 before midnight on 17th July. A risk assessment was2 carried out, and because of the high risk nature of the3 disappearance matters were reported up the police line4 to Assistant Chief Constable Page by 3.09 am in the5 early hours of the morning of 18th July. A police6 helicopter was deployed, searchers were brought in and7 two specialists in identifying missing persons were8 brought in to assist.9 At 9.20 am searchers found his body, early in the10 morning. The scene was sealed and preserved. Extensive11 investigations were undertaken by search teams, forensic12 biologists and pathologists. At the scene was located13 a knife, subsequently identified as one which Mrs Kelly14 knew Dr Kelly had, empty Coproxamol blister packets,15 a bloodstained bottle of water, Dr Kelly's watch and his16 cap.17 There was a wound on his left wrist and an artery18 had been severed. Dr Kelly was declared dead at the19 scene. Notwithstanding the cut to the wrist, the20 ambulance personnel when they came to give evidence21 reported not seeing much blood, though they accepted22 they were not looking in detail.23 The forensic biologist has assisted in this respect.24 He identified the blood, the stains on the clothing and25 the blood on the leaves, which had acted in part as

1481 blotting paper.2 Fingertip searching of the scene did not yield any3 signs of struggle.4 Extensive investigations were undertaken after death5 by the pathologist and by the toxicologist. There was6 evidence of some residue of Coproxamol in the stomach7 contents but the majority had been absorbed. The8 presence was confirmed by the toxicologist.9 The pathologist noted the absence of defensive10 wounds, the tentative cutting marks and the absence of11 any other bruising at significant sites. The12 toxicologist reported the absence of any chemical13 substances. Visual identification of the body and DNA14 tests have confirmed that it was Dr Kelly.15 The evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that16 Dr Kelly had taken his own life and there was no17 involvement of third parties.18 The police made extensive investigations in an19 attempt to determine whether or not there was any20 criminal activity, for example blackmail, leading up to21 Dr Kelly's actions. These very extensive investigations22 have not revealed any such activity. The computer and23 e-mails have been checked; and your Lordship has seen24 relevant e-mails. The phone and mobile records have25 been checked. Some 500 persons have been contacted and

1491 over 300 statements taken. No evidence of criminal2 involvement in the decision leading up to Dr Kelly's3 death has been located. So why did he take his own4 life?5 I will return to Professor Hawton at the end, but6 I now need to go back to 2002. In the meantime perhaps7 I can note this: there are two phrases which have been8 used throughout this Inquiry which are certainly capable9 of more than one interpretation. One is "weapons of10 mass destruction", and the other is "sexing up".11 Let us deal with weapons of mass destruction first.12 The dossier of September 2002 was prepared and published13 on 24th September. We have now heard evidence in detail14 about the history of the dossier. The decision not to15 publish in March 2002. The ongoing work16 until June 2002. Dr Kelly's involvement in drafting the17 paper on the history of Iraq's weapons and concealment18 programmes. And it seems from the evidence published of19 Dr Kelly's views that this remained, for him, the most20 convincing part of the dossier and any case for war.21 Dr Kelly was also engaged at this time in work for22 the IISS report and dossier, and revised the chemical23 warfare chapter.24 As far as the United Kingdom Government dossier was25 concerned, there was a slight hiatus over the summer

1501 until early September 2002, when the Prime Minister2 announced on 3rd September the decision to publish the3 dossier.4 The stages through which the dossier went have, so5 far as possible, now been proved. Some things are6 clear. The intelligence on which the 45 minutes claim7 was based came in late, at the end of August 2002. It8 was intelligence evidence and it was assessed on the 5th9 and 9th September 2002 by the Joint Intelligence10 Committee. The final assessment read:11 "Iraq has probably dispersed its special weapons12 including its CBW weapons. Intelligence also indicates13 that chemical and biological munitions could be with14 military units and ready for firing within 20 to15 45 minutes."16 Drafts of the dossier were revised. Ownership of17 the dossier was expressly said, in a memorandum of18 9th September, to be with Mr Scarlett, Chairman of the19 Joint Intelligence Committee. The evidence suggests20 that Mr Scarlett approved all of the changes that were21 made to the dossier. Mr Scarlett's evidence is that he22 was happy with all of the proposed changes. His23 evidence is that there was no case being made or24 presented in the dossier.25 Mr Campbell, in evidence earlier this week, when

1511 asked what case was being made, said:2 "The explanation as to why the Prime Minister and3 the Government were growing more and more concerned4 about the issue of Iraqi WMD."5 There is some evidence that in order to make this6 case Downing Street wanted the dossier to be as strong7 as possible. The e-mail of 11th September 2003 at8 CAB/23/15 records that the dossier was wanted to be as9 strong as possible, but before that there were experts10 who were picking up on the word "spin".11 The e-mail of 10th September at CAB/3/21, in which12 Dr Kelly's comments on growth media were communicated,13 concluded with these words:14 "The existing wording is not wrong -- but it has15 a lot of spin on it!"16 It is also interesting to compare the fate of17 comments made by Defence Intelligence Staff on the18 45 minutes point on 17th September with those made by19 Mr Campbell. The Defence Intelligence Staff comments20 dated 17th September can be contrasted with the fate of21 Mr Campbell's comments in detailed written submissions22 which have been made.23 Mr Scarlett asserted that this was because the24 intelligence supported the assessment, and also asserted25 that this was because a prior meeting had come to that

1521 conclusion.2 The actual wording in the dossier relating to the3 45 minutes claim can be set next to the wording of the4 Joint Intelligence Committee assessment.5 Whatever the rights and wrongs of those matters,6 which are for your Lordship, it is plain that Dr Kelly7 was involved in the final stages of the dossier. He had8 made the comment on 10th September. He attended a final9 meeting at the Defence Intelligence Staff in Dr Jones'10 branch on 19th September. It seems plain from the11 evidence that there was unhappiness expressed with parts12 of the dossier within that branch alone, including the13 wording of the 45 minute claim.14 The Defence Intelligence Staff final letter at15 CAB/3/79 coordinated all the comments but also included16 comments from Dr Jones' section. It seems at this stage17 that Dr Jones was not happy. He wrote, at MoD/22/1,18 a memorandum of 19th September 2002. Another memorandum19 was sent by another person in his section on20 20th September 2002.21 Mr A, who your Lordship heard give evidence, was22 brought along to assist Dr Kelly, and he was unhappy23 about the wording relating to a plant at al-Qa'qa',24 although, as my learned friend Mr Sumption rightly25 points out, that criticism was not picked up in the

1531 Defence Intelligence Staff letter.2 The impression created is of a particular branch of3 experts in their field who, albeit without access to4 some later intelligence which we were told in evidence5 related to continued production of chemical warfare6 weapons but not the 45 minutes point, believed that the7 intelligence had been, to use Dr Jones' words,8 "over-egged".9 How far Dr Kelly shared the view at the time is not10 known. He was reported by Dr Jones to think the dossier11 was good. However, he did come to report some of these12 concerns to Mr Gilligan.13 Set against that unhappiness, which the BBC have14 emphasised in their oral submissions, is the clear15 evidence that at JIC level Mr Scarlett and the other16 members of the Joint Intelligence Committee gave final17 assent, by silence procedures -- effectively "come back18 if you are unhappy" -- and were happy with the drafts.19 There was evidence from the then DCDI, Mr Cragg, and20 Air Marshall Sir Joe French, then Chief of Defence21 Intelligence, and Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6,22 there had been a meeting within the Defence Intelligence23 Staff to discuss Dr Jones' unhappiness, and the Chief of24 the Defence Intelligence Staff was content with the25 final claims made.

1541 Perhaps part of the problem, that a case was being2 made in the dossier, whether or not Mr Scarlett was3 aware of it and Dame Pauline Neville-Jones a former4 Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and5 a current governor of the BBC was recorded by the6 Foreign Affairs Committee as saying this, is that there7 was a fine line between showing the evidence and making8 a case.9 Mr Sumption says it is constitutionally appropriate10 for Mr Powell and Mr Campbell to be involved with the11 drafting of the dossier. But if the gist of the12 comments made was to make a case, that may or may not,13 it is a matter for your Lordship, be the other side of14 the line. Even a judge, even your Lordship, hearing one15 side of an argument, may get it wrong. A matter for16 your Lordship to consider will be whether Mr Scarlett17 was hearing from Downing Street only one side of the18 argument.19 However it came about, the 45 minutes claim was20 picked up by the media and, as we now know,21 misinterpreted when set against the original22 intelligence. The Evening Standard, BBC/4/90, was23 followed by others, including the Daily Star, in24 identifying the 45 minutes claim as an important25 allegation.

1551 The Intelligence and Security Committee, at2 ISC/0/36, whilst explicitly rejecting the allegations of3 sexing up made against Mr Campbell, has commented on the4 confusion surrounding the 45 minutes claim and regretted5 the fact the intelligence was taken apart from its6 original context.7 It might be thought unfortunate that if Government8 communications experts were involved, because of the9 lack of experience of JIC members at public10 presentation, such confusion was allowed to occur.11 The BBC has made the point that the record was not12 corrected, which brings us forward to the meeting on13 22nd May.14 It seems that there was a wide-ranging discussion15 about Iraq between Mr Gilligan and Dr Kelly and that16 there was also discussion about the dossier.17 Mr Gilligan has produced his notes, at BBC/1/54; and18 further analysis by experts has been carried out on his19 Palm Pilot. The principal difference reported by those20 experts between the first set of notes and the second21 set of notes is that the word "Campbell", set alone, is22 missing from the first set of notes. There is no doubt23 that the word "Campbell", meaning Mr Campbell, was24 raised. Dr Kelly confirmed as much when he was alive.25 However, Dr Kelly's account was that Mr Gilligan had

1561 raised Mr Campbell's name, and he is reported by2 Olivia Bosch as having said something like "maybe" to3 avoid the question.4 Mr Gilligan claims that Dr Kelly first raised it.5 There is no doubt that Dr Kelly did raise Mr Campbell's6 name with Susan Watts in earlier discussions; and7 your Lordship has heard tape recordings of those.8 On the other hand, the absence of Mr Campbell's name9 in the first set of notes may suggest that it was more10 likely to be Mr Gilligan's question than Dr Kelly's11 answer.12 It is plain, however, from Mr Gilligan's evidence13 that Dr Kelly did not say that the Government probably14 knew that the 45 minutes claim was false before it was15 put in the dossier. Indeed, in his evidence on the16 second day of the Inquiry, as long ago as 12th August,17 Mr Gilligan said:18 "I think in hindsight as I say, particularly that19 6.07, quite unwittingly and unintentionally but I did20 give people the wrong impression about whether this was21 real intelligence or whether it was made up or not; and22 I never intended to give anyone the impression that it23 was not real intelligence or that it had been24 fabricated, but I think I must have done..."25 The fact that Dr Kelly did not support the more

1571 sensational aspects of Mr Gilligan's broadcast is part2 supported by the proposed running order of the Today3 Programme; cluster bombs were first and Mr Gilligan's4 story was second. The billing was "chatter in the air".5 And now late, in your Lordship's view perhaps6 significantly, you have BBC/31/2, the draft cues which7 make it clear that the proposed wording was:8 "Doubts about the reliability of Tony Blair's9 assertion last September that Iraq could deploy WMD10 within 45 minutes have been confirmed by this programme.11 "What do they say:12 "Evidence that experts felt their work was being13 misrepresented to justify an attack on Iraq to fit in14 with the US led timetable..."15 Of course, we now know that Dr Kelly was reporting16 concerns specifically within Dr Jones' branch, who are17 rightly identified as experts. But it is also right to18 record that they are not the Joint Intelligence19 Committee and do not have complete access to all the20 intelligence that the Joint Intelligence Committee had.21 It has been said that it is artificial to pick up22 words from a broadcast. Your Lordship will have to23 consider whether or not if making a very serious charge24 against the Government is a form of words, how one is to25 pick up and deal with those allegations unless you

1581 identify the wording.2 Your Lordship will also have to consider whether or3 not the meeting and what was said by Dr Kelly was4 authorised or unauthorised, so far as he was concerned.5 It is plain that he had a unique position within the6 Government. He worked, we heard, for the Foreign and7 Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, DSTL and8 the United Nations, all running together and in9 overlapping areas dealing with weapons of mass10 destruction in Iraq.11 On the other hand, we have also heard that there was12 a system of practical effect that worked well, which was13 clearing conversations with Mr Lamb, who would report to14 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. There is also15 little doubt that there were elements of discretion16 involved in the system, and Mr Lamb confirmed as much17 both in his first and second evidence before18 your Lordship.19 Your Lordship will have to consider what Dr Kelly20 himself said about whether or not this meeting was21 authorised. In interviews with the Ministry of Defence22 he did not seek to suggest that he was entitled to meet23 with Mr Gilligan. He is also reported by Olivia Bosch,24 a friend, as having said that the meeting was25 unauthorised. And, finally, if one looks at SJW/1/39,

1591 which are extracts from Susan Watts' tape recording of2 a conversation with Dr Kelly, he said this about halfway3 down the page, when asked whether or not he was in4 trouble:5 "I mean they wouldn't think it was me, I don't6 think."7 Your Lordship may or may not conclude that that8 suggests that Dr Kelly realised the meeting was9 unauthorised.10 Was then Mr Gilligan's broadcast at 6.07 am and his11 article in The Mail on Sunday supported either by his12 notes or what he had been told? There are the13 concessions which Mr Gilligan has already made, recorded14 above, and the concessions made by my learned friends15 Mr Caldecott and Ms Rogers.16 On the other hand, it is right to record that parts17 of Mr Gilligan's broadcast were supported by18 Ms Susan Watts' broadcast on Newsnight. As has now been19 acknowledged, there were critical differences.20 A question for your Lordship to consider is the21 question of notice of intention to broadcast. It is22 plain that on 28th May there was a telephone23 conversation between Mr Gilligan and Mrs Kate Wilson of24 the MoD press office lasting some 7 and a half minutes.25 There is a conflict of evidence between them about what

1601 was said. Mr Gilligan's recollection was not clear but2 he asserted that notice of the story was given.3 Mrs Wilson's recollection was that the conversation had4 related to cluster bombs and that there was a mention of5 the dodgy dossier, as she took it meaning the February6 dossier.7 Mr Gilligan makes the point that he is unlikely to8 have discussed someone else's story for 7 and a half9 minutes. Kate Wilson makes the point that Mr Gilligan10 had always been interested in cluster bombs and notes11 she did not report any story about the September dossier12 and asked for briefing material on it. Perhaps it is13 clear at the least that there was confusion.14 It is established that no notice of intention to15 broadcast the more serious allegation against the16 Government was given, because Mr Gilligan had no17 intention to make such a broadcast. It is also clear18 that no notice of intention to broadcast was given to19 Downing Street.20 Finally, your Lordship will need to consider the21 question of controls when the programme was broadcast.22 In an e-mail of 27th June the story's flaws were said to23 be the result of the loose and in some ways distant24 relationship that Mr Gilligan had had with the Today25 Programme, and the BBC accepted some failings.

1611 The response of the Government to the BBC's2 broadcast.3 It is plain that there was acute concern within the4 Government. Sir David Manning's evidence was to this5 effect: that it was the most serious charge that could6 be made against a Government. Sir David Omand,7 Mr Scarlett and the Prime Minister all gave evidence to8 the same effect.9 On the other hand, it is also fair to note that the10 BBC say that political debates before 29th May had11 already raised issues of lies, both from backbenchers12 and in newspapers, particularly after Mr Rumsfeld's13 comments, widely reported, in the United States.14 A supreme irony of all this is that one man,15 Dr Kelly, who was very skilled at finding weapons of16 mass destruction, is no longer able to assist. There is17 no doubt that the story did continue to dominate the18 headlines. It was, in part, given legs by The Mail on19 Sunday article written by Mr Gilligan; in part by the20 fact that the allegations had been reported by the BBC;21 and in part by the fact that the Government was22 determined to put the record straight.23 Your Lordship will have to consider whether all24 those matters were properly done.25 Mr Campbell's role was downplayed by Mr Sumption,

1621 but it is at least fair to record that the2 Prime Minister himself said in evidence that The Mail on3 Sunday article which named Mr Campbell gave "booster4 rockets" to the story.5 The BBC's reactions to the complaints.6 The original complaints were all rejected. There7 was a lunch on 12th June at which the matter was not8 discussed; but on 25th June Mr Campbell came to give9 evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee. He made10 plain his intention to secure an apology. He said this:11 "And I tell you until the BBC acknowledge that it is12 a lie, I will keep banging on. That correspondence file13 will get thicker and thicker until they issue an apology14 pretty quick."15 On 26th June Mr Campbell wrote a specific letter16 identifying a number of questions for the BBC, and there17 was a response on 27th June. Mr Campbell had called for18 a response the same day and had publicised his letter.19 The BBC's view, and your Lordship has heard further20 evidence about it this week, was that their whole21 independence was under attack and that it was22 appropriate to respond as strongly as possible. They23 also note that Mr Gilligan was supporting the whole of24 his story.25 On the other hand, if Mr Gilligan's evidence to the

1631 Foreign Affairs Committee had been critically examined2 on 19th June, it was at least clear that he was not3 reporting to them that the critical charge had been made4 to him by Dr Kelly.5 The letter of 27th June by the BBC.6 Whatever had been said in the original broadcast,7 whatever had been repeated or not repeated after, the8 original broadcast asserted that the claim that the9 Government probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was10 wrong was reporting the source. Parts of the letter are11 now admitted to be wrong.12 On the same day that the letter was written, an13 internal e-mail, not seen by Mr Sambrook nor by Mr Dyke,14 reported that Mr Gilligan's broadcast had been marred by15 flawed reporting and loose use of language.16 Mr Campbell's response to the letter of 27th June17 was, as he himself accepted, not measured. He appeared18 on Channel 4 News and he accepted that he was too angry.19 It was perfectly apparent that perspective had been20 lost. Your Lordship will have to consider whether or21 not that loss of perspective was restricted to either22 side.23 Mr Campbell was recording, in his diaries, albeit24 later on, that he wanted a clear win. The BBC were25 intent on reaffirming their original allegations.

1641 Into this maelstrom steps Dr Kelly. Part of the2 reason he came forward was because Olivia Bosch, at3 COM/4/64, had e-mailed him:4 "You might want to read Gilligan's evidence."5 That referred to Mr Gilligan's evidence to the6 Foreign Affairs Committee. It led Dr Kelly to write his7 letter of 30th June in which he accepted that he had met8 Mr Gilligan, accepted that he had spoken with9 Mr Gilligan and accepted that Mr Gilligan might have10 reported some of the things that he had said. He11 disputed that he was the source of the whole broadcast.12 On 3rd July Sir Kevin Tebbit, of the Ministry of13 Defence, and Mr Hoon discussed matters and there was14 a discussion about whether there should be15 a disciplinary process or some sort of management16 process to correct the public record.17 Again on 3rd July Mr Hoon reported the matter, the18 development, to Mr Powell at Downing Street.19 On 4th July Dr Kelly was going to be interviewed by20 Dr Wells. Matters were overtaken and Mr Hatfield21 conducted the interview. Within a very short period of22 time disciplinary measures were ruled out. The23 interview was devoted to an analysis of what Mr Gilligan24 had said and what Dr Kelly had said.25 "It might well become necessary to make a public

1651 statement to correct the public record" was all that was2 recorded as having been said about press statements.3 After the interview Sir Kevin Tebbit had written to4 Sir David Omand and he had said this:5 "I do not think that we should use this man to6 correct the public record", or words to that effect:7 "I do not recommend that we use him to correct the8 public record."9 Mr Campbell noted, on 4th July, a discussion in10 which the words "plea bargain" had been mentioned11 between him and Mr Hoon. It will be for your Lordship12 to determine what, if anything, was said that might have13 given rise to that word.14 Dr Kelly was asked, in interview, about the15 45 minutes claim which he was reported, if he was the16 single source, as having said had come in late and was17 single sourced; and he said this:18 "I did not see the intelligence involved."19 Well, that much was true; but it seems plain, from20 Mr Gilligan's evidence and from what he said to21 Ms Watts, that he did report that the 45 minutes claim22 was late and single sourced.23 On 5th July the Times published an article said to24 have all but named him. That was written by Mr Baldwin25 and relied on BBC sources.

1661 Mr Sambrook has made it plain that he was not the2 BBC source for part of those allegations; and obviously3 it has not been possible to take the other matters4 further.5 Over the weekend there was extensive discussion,6 involving the Prime Minister, about what to do with7 Dr Kelly and the fact he had come forward.8 On 7th July Mr Scarlett produced a note in which he9 noted perceptively that Dr Kelly could not have told the10 whole story if he was indeed the single source for11 Mr Gilligan's broadcast. That was because Mr Gilligan12 had put into the public domain two facts which we know13 to be true. First, that the 45 minutes claim had been14 added late, because the intelligence had been late; and15 second, that it was based on a single source.16 Curiously, that particular fact never appears to17 have been chased down.18 Dr Kelly was at RAF Honnington on 7th July,19 attending a two day course pre-deployment to Iraq. He20 was called back to London and underwent a second21 interview.22 The main purpose of the second interview appears to23 have been to analyse his account, in detail, against24 what Mr Gilligan said.25 A secondary purpose of the interview was to raise

1671 the question of publicity. A draft press statement was2 shown to Dr Kelly. It was a short statement,3 your Lordship has seen it. Mr Hatfield, in his letter4 of 8th July, said this:5 "I said [to Dr Kelly] I did not think it would be6 necessary to reveal his name or to go into detail, at7 least initially."8 Dr Wells in his note said this:9 "His identity may become public in due course."10 To which Dr Kelly is recorded as replying:11 "Of course, my friend [Olivia Bosch, though he did12 not name her] thought it might be me."13 A contrast to the way in which matters were left on14 7th July might be made with the Government evidence and15 indeed Government submissions that it was completely16 inevitable that Dr Kelly's name would come out, and17 sooner rather than later.18 If that was the view that had been formed by19 Mr Hatfield and Dr Wells, it is not plain, on the notes,20 that it was shared with Dr Kelly.21 On 8th July the matter returned to Downing Street.22 After the Prime Minister's appearance before the23 Liaison Committee, there was extensive discussion about24 giving Dr Kelly's name to the Intelligence and Security25 Committee, in confidence, and publicising a letter that

1681 a person had come forward to the FAC. The ISC reported2 that they were not interested in such an approach. And3 it was therefore proposed to issue a press statement.4 The press statement which had been presented to5 Dr Kelly on 7th July was extensively amended. It, on6 the evidence, took some 30 minutes to 1 hour, with7 Godric Smith, the Downing Street press officer,8 Sir Kevin Tebbit, John Scarlett, Alastair Campbell and9 Jonathan Powell all in Godric Smith's office drafting10 the press statement.11 Meantime, the question and answer material was going12 through a number of drafts. On 4th July the proposed13 first draft, as a working paper, had said that it was14 not appropriate or necessary to name Dr Kelly as the15 person who had come forward.16 The second draft, produced on 7th July, said that no17 name would be given unless consent had been obtained18 from the person who was the subject of the report.19 And the third draft, and the draft which was20 actually used, said that the Ministry of Defence would21 confirm Dr Kelly's name if the correct name was put to22 them.23 On 8th July Mr Hatfield rang Dr Kelly and cleared24 the press statement with him. There is no doubt, on the25 evidence, that the conversation took place. There is

1691 also no doubt, on the evidence, that it was not2 a particularly long conversation.3 Dr Kelly was told, by Mr Hatfield, that the main4 difference was the main difference he had first noted5 when it had been read over the phone to him, namely that6 more detail had been given about his meeting with7 Mr Gilligan.8 There was another, your Lordship might think,9 critical difference, which was that more detail was10 given about Dr Kelly.11 The press statement was issued. By 7 pm Dr Kelly12 was watching the news with Mrs Kelly, the Channel 413 News, and having watched the news item relating to the14 Ministry of Defence press statement he is reported by15 Mrs Kelly as saying this:16 "The press will soon put 2 and 2 together."17 There was a call later that night, when Dr Kelly was18 out on a walk, in which Mrs Wilson had said that19 Dr Kelly ought to consider arranging alternative20 accommodation; but it is plain from the evidence that21 Dr Kelly was not aware of the media maelstrom which was22 about to descend upon him. That is part proved by the23 e-mail which he sent at 3.30 pm in which he confirmed24 that he was free to see Dr Scott, his personnel manager25 from DSTL, tomorrow. If he had had any sensible idea of

1701 the intense media coverage that he was likely to be2 subjected to, it seems inconceivable that he would have3 sent such an e-mail.4 Your Lordship will have to consider whether he was5 adequately warned of the media interest or whether or6 not Dr Kelly was, in some respects, attempting to avoid7 the issue.8 On 9th July, shortly after the 3.30 pm e-mail, the9 Prime Minister's Official Spokesman gave out further10 details in response to questioning by journalists11 By 5.45 pm or shortly around 6 pm Dr Kelly's name12 was confirmed to the press. Dr Wells called Dr Kelly at13 7 pm from his train in a very short telephone14 conversation, because he was on the train and at risk of15 being overheard. He said his name had been confirmed to16 the press. It seems, still, Dr Kelly had not taken on17 the full import of what was to happen because at 7.30 pm18 Mr Rufford, who had believed that Dr Kelly might be but19 was not sure was the source, had turned up at his house.20 Between 7.30 and 7.45 pm that night Dr Kelly spoke21 with Mr Rufford and Mr Rufford was the person who22 expressly raised, again, the question of alternative23 accommodation and, according to Mrs Kelly, told them24 that they really would have to move.25 Dr and Mrs Kelly packed within 10 minutes and left

1711 to stay the night at a hotel, travelling down towards2 Cornwall.3 Whatever the precise motivation of Downing Street4 and the Ministry of Defence, Dr Kelly was not informed5 about the additional information which was contained in6 the question and answer material which would have been7 deployed if the press had asked the right questions.8 A question for your Lordship will be whether or not9 he was given full information about the media handling10 strategy. Your Lordship will also need to consider11 whether or not the failure to provide the further12 information to Dr Kelly was part, as the family have it,13 of a deliberate strategy or, as the Government have it,14 something that the Government was fully entitled to do.15 The family stress the difference between the drafts16 of the question and answer material. Mr Sumption17 answers and says: these were only working drafts. That18 much is plain. On the other hand, as working drafts19 they had anticipated in the first draft the right20 question, namely: will you give the name? And had21 provided a completely different answer from that which22 was finally provided.23 The family rely on Mr Campbell's diaries.24 Mr Godric Smith, in his evidence, pointed out that there25 is the world of difference between desiring a result and

1721 actually going out and securing it.2 The family rely on the e-mail, MoD/44/15.3 Mr Sumption says Mr Gompertz has not read the whole4 e-mail. Part of the difficulty may be that this e-mail5 only came to light the day before yesterday and,6 therefore, neither Mr Gompertz nor indeed the Inquiry7 were able to question Mr Powell and Mr Hoon about it.8 Reading the whole e-mail it says this:9 "We spoke. Herewith draft letter to Gavyn Davies.10 Is this consistent with the Campbell suggestion this11 morning? Jonathan Powell has separately suggested to12 [Secretary of State] that we should simply name our man,13 but left the decision to Mr Hoon who has not yet reached14 a final view.15 "Grateful for comments soonest."16 One possible reading of the e-mail is that it17 referred to naming Dr Kelly in the letter, and indeed18 the original letter sent by Mr Hoon did not name19 Dr Kelly, it just said: we would be prepared to confirm20 the name, if they gave the name back.21 On the other hand, another possible reading -- and22 it is impossible on the evidence, with this having been23 produced at this late stage, to chase it down -- is that24 it was discussing naming the man, because that would25 pick up comments made in Mr Campbell's diaries that "we

1731 wanted the source out".2 There is also the question of contact with the3 media. It is plain that there were media reports4 suggesting that Whitehall officials, both before and5 after Dr Kelly's name had been confirmed and before and6 after the Ministry of Defence press statement had been7 issued, had contacted newspapers and had provided8 details.9 Against the family's case your Lordship will have to10 consider this: the Government, there is no doubt, were11 concerned to avoid allegations of a cover-up. There was12 evidence, from Mr Anderson and Mr Mackinlay of the13 Foreign Affairs Committee, who expressly said that they14 wanted to know why the name had not been confirmed even15 earlier than it had been on 8th July.16 Your Lordship will also have to take into account17 the denials made by all the witnesses to whom this18 allegation was put.19 A further matter that the Government can rely on is20 this: that they wanted to put the record straight; and21 they wanted to emphasise Dr Kelly's status as a person22 not within the Intelligence Services, and indeed he was23 not in the Intelligence Services, and a person who is24 not on the Joint Intelligence Committee.25 Of course, to do that effectively they had to

1741 provide further information. And indeed they did2 provide further information. They provided further3 information in the press statement; they provided4 further information in the question and answer material;5 and they provided further information in the6 Prime Minister's Official Spokesmen Lobby briefings.7 But if there was no deliberate strategy to name8 Dr Kelly, should Dr Kelly nevertheless have been9 informed about what was going to happen?10 Mr Hatfield asserted that Dr Kelly would have known11 that his name was bound to come out. I have already12 referred your Lordship to some evidence which suggests13 that Dr Kelly had certainly not taken those warnings14 on-board.15 Mr Sumption also submitted this: he said that the16 Government was entitled to name any civil servant if it17 involved putting the record straight. Well, that raises18 a proposition of law; and I do not propose now to19 develop legal submissions, your Lordship might be20 relieved to hear.21 On the other hand, there is authority for the22 proposition that Crown servants have, at least since23 1992, enjoyed proper legal protection equivalent to24 a contract of employment and, indeed, since the25 implementation of the Human Rights Act enjoyed

1751 privileges and rights afforded to them against public2 bodies, namely their employers.3 My Lord, that takes us to the end of the 9th July.4 We know that Dr Kelly then travelled with his family,5 with Mrs Kelly, down to Cornwall and returned on the6 Sunday.7 On Monday 14th July he returned to London.8 In the early morning of 14th July Rachel, his9 daughter, said that he seemed quiet, nervous, but10 composed.11 There was a morning meeting between Mr Smith,12 Mr Dowse and Mr Howard, and Mr Howard was recorded as13 saying at the meeting that Dr Kelly was "not handling14 the pressure well".15 That afternoon there was a briefing session at the16 Ministry of Defence relating to Dr Kelly's proposed17 evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee and the18 Intelligence and Security Committee.19 The question of whether or not anyone should sit20 with Dr Kelly was discussed, as indeed were various21 lines; and Mr Howard admitted that in his evidence when22 he first appeared before your Lordship. Suggested23 answers were: this is a matter for Ministry of Defence24 on certain issues and these are matters for Ministers on25 certain issues. Perfectly proper answers.

1761 Your Lordship may have to consider this: if there2 are going to be questions which were matters for the3 Ministry of Defence it would, one might think, have been4 perfectly possible to put someone to sit beside Dr Kelly5 to deal with those matters which were for the Ministry6 of Defence.7 Dr Kelly returned home to Rachel's house in Oxford8 that evening.9 On Tuesday 15th July he travelled down to the10 Foreign Affairs Committee.11 One point that Mr Sumption has made in respect of12 a question Mr Knox had asked of Godric Smith suggesting13 that the Government wanted Committees to get Dr Kelly14 out to the public, he suggested was without foundation.15 Well, there is some evidence suggesting that the16 Government were interested in using Committees to get17 Dr Kelly's name out into the public. Indeed, there is18 a particularly interesting e-mail, which I had not19 planned to refer to but as Mr Sumption has made the20 suggestions about Mr Knox's questioning I have to, at21 CAB/1/87 which repays reading.22 To avoid being selective I will read it all:23 "I have confirmed that you will appear from 8.30 to24 9.45 am ... [this is Clare Sumner to Alastair Campbell]25 and will have to leave promptly.

1771 "I asked where they were with other interviews."2 This relates to Mr Campbell's evidence before the3 Intelligence and Security Committee on 17th July:4 "The ISC Clerk told me that Committee were not5 interested in interviewing Andrew G [Gilligan] as he6 could not say anything more to them than the FAC.7 "He said on that on the source they were waiting for8 David O [Omand] to write to them with the9 correspondence. He implied that he did not believe it10 was the source so could not see the point of the ISC11 seeing him and said they were not interested in the12 BBC/AC row. The fact he rested this on was the fact13 that AG said that he had known his source for years14 whereas the MoD said months. I think this point could15 be clarified in the letter from DO to the ISC, I pointed16 out that the BBC had not denied he was the source."17 And the response:18 "I think one of us should speak to Ann on this."19 The evidence plainly establishes no-one did speak to20 Ann Taylor on this because the Committee revised its21 decision perfectly independently. But it plainly22 suggests that there was at least the possibility that23 Committees might be contacted.24 A further justification for Mr Knox's questions was25 the curious terms of the e-mail which appears at

1781 CAB/25/5, which Godric Smith in his evidence accepted2 read in an unusual manner and appears, if read at first3 blush, to be a press statement issued by the Foreign4 Affairs Committee.5 Godric Smith has explained to your Lordship how that6 came to be written. But the question, in my submission,7 was perfectly appropriately asked.8 At the Foreign Affairs Committee it was hot. There9 had been a bomb scare. Dr Kelly was not accompanied by10 anyone to assist him in answering. Dr Wells and11 Kate Wilson assisted him by sitting behind.12 There is also no doubt that Dr Kelly -- from13 responses that he reported to Wing Commander Clark, who14 had also accompanied him, afterwards -- was thrown by15 questioning about Susan Watts. There is also no doubt16 that Mr Gilligan, in an e-mail which he has accepted was17 inappropriate, referred the Committee to Dr Kelly as the18 source for Ms Watts' story.19 Dr Kelly returned to Oxford that night, he ate20 a good meal, and he returned to London on 16th July to21 give evidence before the Intelligence and Security22 Committee.23 In the very early hours of the morning he was24 e-mailed by Judy Miller from New York:25 "David, I heard from another member of your fan club

1791 that things went well for you today, hope it is true."2 Dr Kelly was still at this stage unable to access3 his computer.4 He gave evidence to the ISC and returned again to5 Oxford. Mrs Kelly had travelled up from Cornwall and6 they all had supper together, which brings us to7 Thursday 17th July.8 At about the time that Mr Campbell is giving9 evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee,10 Dr Kelly is dealing with his e-mails and with11 Parliamentary Questions that he has been asked to draft.12 He received, at 9.28 am, four further Parliamentary13 Questions, perfectly appropriately asked, which raised,14 amongst other things, questions of rules and regulations15 which might have been infringed by Dr Kelly and16 disciplinary measures his Department might take against17 him. It seems, from the evidence, that he did not18 discuss those with anyone.19 At 11.18 am Dr Kelly sent a series of e-mails:20 "I have been keeping low on the MoD advice. If all21 blows over by the beginning of next week I will get to22 Baghdad soon."23 He thanked one person for his support. He sent an24 e-mail to New York saying this:25 "Many dark actors playing games. Thanks for your

1801 support."2 Whether or not this was a reference to the3 questioning at the Foreign Affairs Committee and indeed4 the suggestion that he was the source for Ms Watts'5 story, we will never know.6 A further e-mail:7 "If all blows over I will be in Baghdad next Friday.8 Hope to see you shortly after that."9 Professor Hawton has given evidence that so far as10 he can judge, at the time that Dr Kelly was sending11 these e-mails he had not yet formed the intention to12 kill himself.13 Mrs Kelly's evidence was that Dr Kelly "shrunk14 within himself" and her evidence related their lunch15 together. In the early afternoon Dr Kelly decided to16 take his walk. Your Lordship has heard the further17 evidence in that respect.18 Professor Hawton has dealt with, so far as he can,19 the question of the factors that led Dr Kelly to make20 his final decisions.21 He said that a major factor that is likely to have22 contributed to Dr Kelly's decision to commit suicide is23 the severe loss of self esteem resulting, as he saw it,24 from his feeling that his employers had lost their trust25 in him and his dismay at his exposure in the media.

1811 It is also plain and should be recorded that, as2 Professor Hawton made plain, Dr Kelly's actions were not3 foreseeable to any party, whether family, Ministry of4 Defence, No. 10 or the BBC.5 It will be for your Lordship to attempt to decide6 what are the proper answers to these issues.7 Whatever I have submitted above, and whatever8 actions and failings may or may not have been exposed,9 it is right to record that notwithstanding the legal10 powers to compel the attendance of witnesses or the11 production of documents, your Lordship and the Inquiry12 team and I have been provided with unprecedented13 cooperation by witnesses and access to documents,14 whether late or early.15 The aim of the Inquiry is to urgently conduct an16 investigation into the circumstances surrounding the17 death of Dr Kelly.18 The material that has been adduced has inevitably19 raised issues beyond your terms of reference.20 Your Lordship is restricted to the terms of reference.21 As a matter of constitutional law and practice there are22 other institutions who have powers to examine matters23 beyond your Lordship's terms of reference.24 My Lord, subject to the evidence of25 Sir Kevin Tebbit, who is still recovering from an

1821 emergency eye operation, and depending on medical advice2 it is hoped his evidence will be heard on Tuesday3 30th September, together with any short supplementary4 submissions that are to be made, my submissions and5 your Lordship's remarks will conclude the oral stages of6 your Inquiry.7 The parties are being given the opportunity to put8 in any further written submissions and given the9 opportunity to correct any factual errors they say have10 been made in any written submissions. I am sorry if11 I have been slightly obsessive and sad about the12 timetable in this Inquiry.13 LORD HUTTON: You have been very successful, Mr Dingemans.14 We are all very grateful to you for it.15 MR DINGEMANS: I hope at the least there has been presented16 to your Lordship and shared with the public and the17 media, as the eyes and ears of the public, evidence18 which will enable your Lordship, so far as possible, to19 determine the circumstances surrounding the death of20 Dr Kelly.21 Stage 1 of the Inquiry commenced in early August.22 Stage 2, subject to Sir Kevin's Tebbit's evidence,23 concludes today. Somewhere along the way we lost a24 summer. I hope we exchange it for understanding.25 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Dingemans.

1831 At the close of the statement by counsel it is right2 that I should express my thanks to a number of people.3 That we have completed the hearings, save for the4 evidence of Sir Kevin Tebbit who we hope to hear next5 week, we have completed the hearings within the time6 allotted in the timetable, and that fact is due to very7 hard work by a considerable number of people.8 I am most grateful to the Inquiry team for their9 very hard work in making all the arrangements and for10 handling a very large volume of documents most11 efficiently.12 I am almost most grateful to the ushers and to all13 the court staff for their help.14 I know we have all greatly admired the remarkable15 skills of the stenographers in producing such an16 excellent and accurate LiveNote, which has been such17 a help in the conduct of the Inquiry, and I am most18 grateful to them.19 The screens for the LiveNote and for displaying the20 documents and also the website and the videolinks have21 worked with great efficiency and I am very grateful to22 the experts in technology who set up and maintained23 those systems and to those who operated them.24 The Inquiry has heard evidence from a large number25 of witnesses and I am most grateful to them, some of

1841 whom who came on more than one occasion, for coming to2 give that evidence.3 I would also like to thank the officials in the4 Government and the BBC who worked very hard to produce5 a large quantity of relevant documents, and I am6 conscious that the hearings in August disrupted the7 holidays of a number of people, which I regret.8 In my opening statement on 1st August I stressed the9 importance of the public having full knowledge of what10 took place at the Inquiry and I said that the press11 would be able to report to the public everything which12 took place, every word which was spoken by a witness,13 every question put to a witness by counsel and the14 contents of every document which was referred to in15 evidence. I am most grateful to the press and the radio16 and television programmes for their very detailed and17 accurate reporting of the proceedings, which has meant18 that the public have been fully informed of the evidence19 given.20 Finally, I am most grateful to counsel and solicitor21 to the Inquiry and to the counsel and solicitors for the22 interested parties who have mastered a great volume of23 materials in a relatively short time and in a very24 thorough and fair manner have examined and25 cross-examined the witnesses within the allotted time.

1851 I would also wish to say that the solicitor to2 the Inquiry, Mr Martin Smith, has done splendid work in3 arranging for the attendance for the very large number4 of witnesses at very short notice.5 I will write and deliver my report as quickly as6 I can. However, I am unable to be specific as to a7 precise time when the report will be completed because8 experience teaches that the writing of a report usually9 takes longer than one expects. But I hope that the10 report will be delivered in December and it is possible11 that it may be delivered in November.12 So, ladies and gentlemen, I will rise now and I hope13 to sit again on Tuesday of next week at 10.30 am.14 I will hope to hear Sir Kevin Tebbit and hope he has15 recovered from his operation by that time. Thank you16 very much.17 (4.36 pm)18 (Hearing adjourned until 10.15 am on Tuesday19 30th September 2003)202122232425