Knowledge is the building block of Judaism. Love of God is contingent on what one knows about Him.
ועל פי הדעה--על פי האהבה--אם מעט מעט, ואם הרבה הרבה
I am planning to post from time to time some of the ideas that I develop as I read and think about issues that catch my attention. Usually they relate to Machshava or Halacha especially how they affect our daily life. I am looking forward to learn from all commenters.

Monday, October 23, 2006

Empirical Proofs and Beliefs: The Truth is the correct approach.

One of the problems that cause immense damage to our belief system is when claims that cannot be substantiated are made. Those range from claims that the fact that God created the world from nothingness is empirically provable to Ma’amad Har Sinai being empirical proof for the divinity of the Torah, Prophecy and so on. Any logical person when presented with these proofs immediately sees through them and as the flaws in the arguments are exposed doubts are triggered about the veracity of everything else we are asked to believe in. It is therefore very important that we understand upfront what can be proven empirically, what we believe in because it is most likely to be true, what we believe in until proven wrong and so on. It is quite a broad subject and it would be impossible to address more than one or two examples in a single post so I will focus on one Rambam addresses extensively. We can learn, from his approach in this specific case, how other areas should be treated.

When discussing proofs for the existence of God, Rambam prefaces the discussion in MN 1:71. He addresses the way other religious thinkers approached the issue, who argue that there must be an intelligent Creator of the Universe, being it was created in time, an argument that is still used nowadays by the proselytizers of all religions.

“They set forth the propositions which I shall describe to you, and demonstrated by their peculiar mode of arguing that the Universe had a beginning. The theory of the creation ex nihilo being thus established, they asserted, as a logical consequence, that undoubtedly there must be a Maker who created the Universe. Next they showed that this Maker is One, and from the Unity of the Creator they deduced His Incorporeality. This method was adopted by every Mohammedan Mutakillimun in the discussion of this subject, and by those of our co-religionists who imitated them and walked in their footsteps… I have examined this method, and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because all the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be considered as convincing except by those who do not know the difference between a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Those who understand the force of the different methods will clearly see that all the proofs for the creation are questionable, because propositions have been employed which have never been proved… For it is well known to all clear and correct thinkers who do not wish to deceive themselves, that this question, namely, whether the Universe has been created or is eternal, cannot be answered with mathematical certainty; here human intellect must pause… Such being the nature of this theory, how can we employ it as an axiom and establish on it the existence of the Creator? In that case the existence of God would be uncertain: if the universe had a beginning, God does exist: if it be eternal, God does not exist; the existence of God would therefore remain either an open question, or we should have to declare that the creation had been proved, and compel others by mere force to accept this doctrine, in order thus to be enabled to declare that we have proved the existence of God. Such a process is utterly inadmissible.”

If I were to tell a religious Jew that we cannot prove empirically that God created the world in time, Yesh Me’ayin, from nothingness, most contemporary orthodox circles would consider me heretic. Rambam did not accept that as to him truth was paramount. Though he believed that God created the universe in time, he was honest in acknowledging that it is not empirically provable. The argument for creation in time is rather ontological as Rambam shows in the first half of the second part of the Moreh. It is therefore wrong to base the proof for the existence of God as the First Cause, which he proves empirically, on an unproven belief. As Rambam says to “compel others by mere force to accept this doctrine” is not a viable option.There are very few things that we empirically prove when it comes to religious beliefs. It is important to distinguish what is an accepted belief and what is provable. Only then do we have a leg to stand on if we want to be truthful.

38 comments:

It is important to clarify that "empirical proof" is an elusive concept in general, not just when it comes to religious matters.

Technically speaking, empirical proof is proof based on evidence that can be perceived with the senses. Examples of this are controlled experiments that confirm or disconfirm hypotheses (even then, confirmation is usually tentative, and only contradiction is interpreted as absolute.)

Logical proof is proof based on logical demonstration that can be considered reliable even if we don't have experimental results to verify it. Although most frequently encountered in mathematics, this kind of proof has application to the material world as well, inasmuch as the material world is "logical".

In day-to-day life, we rarely have logical or empirical proof for anything we rely upon as "true". Most of what we believe in is based upon some kind of tradition or hearsay. As the Navi states so famously, "Halo Yadata Im Lo Shamata", if you don't know it firsthand, then you've certainly heard about it from tradition.

As my Rosh Yeshiva once said, secular people and naive religious people all base themselves on "faith". The Torah, by contrast, encourages us to live reasonably and rationally, which also entails understanding the standards of proof and evidence appropriate to each field of inquiry.

One of the problems that cause immense damage to our belief system is when claims that cannot be substantiated are made. Those range from claims that the fact that God created the world from nothingness is empirically provable to Ma’amad Har Sinai being empirical proof for the divinity of the Torah, Prophecy and so on. Any logical person when presented with these proofs immediately sees through them and as the flaws in the arguments are exposed doubts are triggered about the veracity of everything else we are asked to believe in.

Any logical person when presented with these proofs immediately sees through them and as the flaws in the arguments are exposed doubts are triggered about the veracity of everything else we are asked to believe in.

I agree with much of what you're saying, but I should note that it isn't merely an issue of logic. Many religious "proofs" are a testament to the follies of formal logic. The reasoning of an argument can be completely sound while basing itself on shaky premises.

Take the Kuzari "proof" of the Torah. The logic of the argument is pretty compelling, in my opinion. It's the assumptions being made that reveal the argument's weakness. For example, the argument starts from the premise that, basically, either the Torah is completely true or completely a hoax. To audiences in the Middle Ages, that premise probably sounded so plausible as to be virtually self-evident, which is why the Kuzari spent no time elaborating on it. To modern audiences, however, the premise sounds blindingly naive, since we know today that myths aren't created overnight. True stories can be embellished and mixed with fantasy. Even fictional stories can come to be accepted as true. Therefore, the whole argument collapses right there.

What I find particularly maddening is when I personally find an argument compelling (the First Cause argument, for example) yet other intelligent people do not. Debates over the issue just seem to go in circles. The skeptic inquires "Who created God?" and those who defend the argument think the skeptic is just not getting it. R. Norman Lamm's essay on faith and doubt seems to concede that the traditional proofs are generally not compelling to those not already convinced. But does that fact in itself prove the arguments false?

Rabbi Maroof, i agree that there are different type of proofs. One has to clarify though what method is used. Not all methods have the same validity and some require what we call 'Shikul Hada'at". Unless one sets out upfront what type of proof we are dealing with we end up with egg in our face. unfortunately as anonymous points out that is not the accepted method in the kiruv business.

Kylopod, i find the same things frustrating. I cannot see where the flaw is in the First Cause proof. I read Bertrand Russel's argument and I don't find them compelling. Must be a defect in my logic!

the Kuzari approach is not at all compelling to me. I prefer to live with the argument of acceptance, reliance on Moshe's nevuah and a system of "Ky'emu Vekiblu" rather than "proof". If that is not the case why all the exhortation of Moshe to accept the Torah, how do you explain the egel immediately following this undeniable experience and all the Drashot of Chazal.

>I've written a critique of Bertrand Russell's arguments for moral subjectivism

Prof. Yeshayahu Lebowitz argued that morality does not make sense without religion. I tend to agree although I am still not 100% sure. rambam is equivocal on this. YL claims that he bases his position on Rambam I am not sure he is not forcing it.

Re Ky'emu Vekiblu I have touched on it iin earlier posts but have not gone in depth into it. i felt I needed to deal with Nevuah first, then hashgacha and only then can I deal with Ta'amei hamitzvot where this belongs. BTW though I have learned many of the rambam's and ramban's on the subject over the years, everytime I write a post I learn new things. The readers comments are excellent and usually bring out a lot of new thoughts. So I thank you and all commenters.

"Prof. Yeshayahu Lebowitz argued that morality does not make sense without religion."

What is meant by "does not make sense"? If he means that atheists don't have any basis for their own morality, then I disagree. I understand that rabbis through the ages have recognized a natural morality in all societies. What Jewish theism contributes, and what an atheistic perspective lacks, is a strong basis for working to improve the world for future generations.

The classic argument Leibowitz makes is that the same act can be moral or immoral depending on a viewpoint. E.g. killing is immoral, killing Hitler is moral to his victims and ennemies immoral to his supporters. One act various judgements by various people.

Just because there are different viewpoints doesn't render the issue meaningless. One viewpoint may be better supported than another, based on rational consideration of the evidence. I dealt with this in the post I linked to.

I understand but what is rational when it comes to morality? Ramabm in MN 1:1 says that Adam at first knew only true and false and morality which is right and wrong came only after his imaginative faculty came to play a role. In other words pure intellect does not value right and wrong only true and false.

Marvin Fox in his Understanding Maimonides struggles with this to diasgree with lebowitz. this si a lengthy subject.

I saw your post and it is on target . One can disagree however. As I said I am not resolved on the issue at this time.

Gemara argues that one learns morality from a cat etc... thus natural morality exists according to this position. There is a lkengthy discussion that deals with related matters in Shemona Perakim chapter 6.

The philosopher Mortimer J. Adler argued that the idea that "right and wrong" cannot possibly emerge from "true and false" is an error first introduced by the empiricists.

The question Hume raised was - how can a prescriptive norm emerge from a descriptive, factual statement?

Adler answers that there is one prescriptive statement which, although in need of definition and refinement, is necessarily "true":

"One should pursue that which is truly good for oneself."

Although the term "truly good" requires further analysis, it seems that Adler is correct here. It is logically necessary to admit the statement he formulates, because it is unthinkable to assert "one should choose that which is not good", by definition.

Thus, we can place this in the form of a syllogism:

All things that are truly good should be desired/chosen/pursued.

X is truly good.

Therefore, X should be pursued...

All that is left to be determined is human nature, from which we could establish what is "truly good" and then choose it.

With regard to Adam and Chava, before the chet there is no question that they would have chosen properly when faced with moral dilemmas.

What happened there was that they began to experience conflict between two conceptions of "good" - the humanly generated one and the divinely established one. Think of "you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil" versus "and the L-RD saw that it was good." Adam and Chava strayed after an artificial standard of goodness that wasn't true.

Gemara argues that one learns morality from a cat etc... thus natural morality exists according to this position

This is what Louis Jacobs argues in his article "The Relationship Between Religion and Ethics in Jewish Thought" (Religion and Morality, 155-72, Anchor books 1973)

He is taken to task for this position by Dr. Shnayer Leiman in "Jewish Ethics 1970-1975: Retrospect and Prospect". This is what Dr. Leiman has to say:

"..Turning to the rabbinic evidence, Jacobs conveniently makes no mention of passages such as Mishnah Berakhoth 5:3 and its explanation in the Babylonian Talmud (Berahkoth 33b) to the effect that God's commandments are to be obeyed precisely because they are devine fiat, and not because they are ehically charged. (Cf. Rashi, ad loc., for a medieval elaboration of this view.) As proof of ethical autonomy in rabbinic literature, Jacobs cites a teaching ascribed to a third-century Palestinian teacher, which reads: "If the Torah had not been given we could have learned modesty from the cat, honesty from the ant, chastity from the dove, and good manners from the cock who first coaxes and then mates." But what does this passage really prove? How many Jews (or Gentiles, for that matter) have learned modesty from a cat, why not promiscuity from a dog? In short, it does not sufice merely to marshal evidence for a moral realm seperate and distinct from God's commandments as prescribed in the Torah. The vitality of that realm needs to be examined, and specifically, its potency when in conflict with God's commandments. Jacobs does not discuss moral obligation or accountability outside of God's commandments, a crucial oversight in any discussion of the relationship between religion and ethics. Indeed, the distinctions he introduces between religion and ethics (in the Jewish tradition) appear to be artificial. At one point (p. 161), Jacobs remarks that "the nearest ... Judaism comes to a complete seperation between religion and ethics is in the following remarkable Talmudic comment ..." - and then proceeds to cite from the Talmud an exegetical midrash on Isaiah 3:10-11!

In sum, the Jewish tradition speaks in many more voices than Jacobs is willing to concede. William of Ockham's "God the Commander" is as prominently displayed in Judaism as Aquinas' "God of Virtue." Jacobs' rationalist bent colors his view of traditional Judaism, rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the descriptive from the normative in his writings..."

In sum, the Jewish tradition speaks in many more voices than Jacobs is willing to concede. William of Ockham's "God the Commander" is as prominently displayed in Judaism as Aquinas' "God of Virtue." Jacobs' rationalist bent colors his view of traditional Judaism, rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the descriptive from the normative in his writings...

That seems a pretty weak rebuttal. Basically, he's saying that Jacobs' interpretation is valid but that there are other possible interpretations. So what?

Your comments confirm my lack of conviction how to treat morality. Going through rambam I can marshall both point of view as i can in many other Rishonim. As we see the debate is still ongoing and probably will for a long time.

Re morality without G-d: Are there not two distinct issues here?1. Whether there is such a thing as morality2 What that morality might be.

I always understood the gemora regarding modesty from a cat as something one might learn were the Torah (i.e. a moral guide) not given, but certainly only AFTER one had accepted the existence of G-d and hence the concept of morality.

Going through rambam I can marshall both point of view as i can in many other Rishonim.

Since we all seem to agree that our tradition can support either point of view, why don't we examine the issue directly and decide from there? It's the same with science. There are those who think that, say, the age of the universe can only be decided by studying the relevant Torah sources. But that approach isn't satisfying to someone who is already thoroughly convinced by the scientific evidence. Similarly, I have already concluded based on philosophical reasoning that morality can be meaningful without a belief in God. Therefore, I'm inclined to look to Torah sources which support my view on this matter, rather than basing my opinion on those sources.

I suspect, however, that the "no morality without God" thesis (which, by the way, I once accepted) is more of a revisionist view. I see it expressed mostly in modern-day religious apologetics. I think it arises from the beating that religion has taken from science over the past two centuries. The apologists are looking for a safer ground from which to make their case for religion, and the moral realm is ideal, since it's been all but abandoned by the skeptics.

Kylopod, If i was convinced like you are about morality without religion or some other such system i would be with you and as rambam says I would find a way of dealing with the sources. I am not convinced by pure objective analysis. The Nazi thought he was moral as did every human monster in history from Napoleon to Genghis Khan, Cesar, Pompei etc...The Indian who was thrown out of his tribe into the wilderness in old age felt it was justified without the concept of prohibition of suicide which according to us was one of the first Mitzvot.

That seems a pretty weak rebuttal. Basically, he's saying that Jacobs' interpretation is valid but that there are other possible interpretations. So what?

He is not saying its valid but rather that it is forced and that his rationalist tendencies are causing him to force his views onto hazal.

It is, IMO, a silly midrash to use to try and prove the point for it presupposes that virtuous traits have already been defined and that after they have been defined, that they can now be identified in nature.

Everything I have studied in History and all of my personal experience has demonstrated that man without God can not achieve any degree of moral greatness. The most you can hope for is moral neutrality (which in the western world is often confused with moral greatness (eg. 'oh, that guy is good - he doesn't hurt anyone'). Of course, the yardstick I use is a religious one and therefore the whole discussion is circular and somewhat pointless. It is like saying that "the only way to achieve worthwhile morality which is given by God is by having a revelation from God." That is a lovely and true religious sentiment but it is only relevant to my own self. The same is true for any other religion out there.

The criticism of Jacobs is that he presents the approach of natural morality as if it is the primary Jewish one (which it is not). He does not say, 'I can prove that morality can exist without Torah and then find sources for it', rather, he purports to give an overview of the Jewish position on this topic and ignores the most mainstream approach and replaces it with one which is forced and untenable.

Everything I have studied in History and all of my personal experience has demonstrated that man without God can not achieve any degree of moral greatness.

As I said before, I believe that atheism provides a weak basis for working to perfect the world, even though some atheists like Richard Dawkins see themselves as on a personal mission. But basic moral principles (don't kill, don't steal, even virtues like kindness and integrity) do not depend on a theistic worldview.

It is like saying that "the only way to achieve worthwhile morality which is given by God is by having a revelation from God."

Yes, that's a fallacy that some religious people stumble into. They often do so indirectly, by attacking the immorality of society for doing things only they view as immoral (e.g. gay marriage). It's a pretty uninspiring message if just about the only moral teachings religion has to contribute consist of restrictive sexual norms.

ignores the most mainstream approach and replaces it with one which is forced and untenable.

From the excerpt, I didn't take Dr. Leiman to be saying that Jacobs' view is untenable.

dg: I suppose that's fair. But if you take this reasoning to extremes, you end up rejecting the concept of objective truth altogether. People have believed, and continue to believe, many different things about reality. Some people genuinely think the world is less than 10,000 years old. There is even still a Flat Earth Society, or so I'm told. To people who hold such beliefs, you could say that is their reality. Of course, even Bertrand Russell would never accept such extreme relativism. When it comes to tangible, physical things, we consider it self-evident that the truth is "out there," regardless of what humans believe or know. The problem arises from thinking that abstractions such as moral principles can have any basis in objective reality. The point I'm trying to make is that, while morality starts at the abstract level, its actual application to the world is very strongly connected with what is objectively true or false. That's why the most evil people, such as the Nazis, almost invariably have a distorted picture of reality, and their immorality arises from that distorted picture.

>you end up rejecting the concept of objective truth altogether >The problem arises from thinking that abstractions such as moral principles can have any basis in objective reality.

I am not sure if you are talking at each other rather than to. Morality is in the realm of "good and Bad" while objective reality in the realm of "true and False". In Judaism trying to understand God's ways and emulating them, which is ultimately Jewish morality, ties together those two realms. It gives an objective basis for a subjective matter. But this is a method. (This is based on MN 1:2 not 1:1 that I referred to yesterday).I don't know if there could be other methods out there that would create a similar system without religion. I don't know enough about Cofucianism, hiduism and other such systems .

Can we perhaps take a step back here and clarify what we mean by "ethics without God"? Or even what we mean by "ethics"?

I understand ethics as principles of living that are based upon some concept of goodness or rightness that we strive to realize in the world. We must begin with a value system, and from there we derive norms of behavior.

We all feel comfortable in asserting that murder, for example, is evil. But the reason why murder is condemned may differ from value system to value system.

One person may say that murder should be forbidden because it destroys the structure of society and leads to chaos.

Another might argue that murder is wrong because a person's life belongs to God and therefore cannot be "taken" by anyone else.

A third person may argue that murder is wrong because God rules the world and has legislated as such.

My point here is that our sense of "ethics" derives from our value system. A God-based value system, in which knowledge of, closeness to or obedience to God is viewed as the ultimate aim, would yield a different system of ethical principles than an atheistic one.

However, a materialist can formulate a consistent set of principles for life, centered around some vision of "goodness" for the individual or society, and may stick to it tenaciously. We may view some of the principles he subscribes to as "unethical", but this demonstrates the extent to which our intuitions about ethics depend upon our core values.

So the real question is not whether ethics can exist without God, but whether there is an objective set of values for mankind and to what extent they involve God.

I believe, following the Rambam, that the very idea of Yichud Hashem - the fact that Hashem is the only true existence - dictates that our highest objective must be to draw close to Him and imitate Him to the extent of our abilities.

In this way, I consider my essential value system to be objective.

All ethical decisions I make must be evaluated in terms of this framework, which is of course concretized and formalized in the 613 mitsvot.

>We all feel comfortable in asserting that murder, for example, is evil.

Not really ask a Jihadist.

Ultimately you are saying that emulating God is an objective system. That is rambam's understanding that I quoted. Understanding how He runs the world creates a criteria that can be understood as objective.

The question is again, can other systems create an objective set of criteria? I dont know.

The Jihadist example is a little unfair. He wouldn't say that there is no prohibition of murder, just that there are special exceptions. This is akin to what we might say about wartime casualties, the conquering of Canaan, etc.

I am not sure what the question is that you are grappling with. Why shouldn't a secular system be able to formulate consistent, objective (although artificial) criteria for behavior?

Morality is in the realm of "good and Bad" while objective reality in the realm of "true and False".

But the two realms are often connected. The Nazi plan of genocide, for example, was inextricably linked to their racial understanding of reality.

In Judaism trying to understand God's ways and emulating them, which is ultimately Jewish morality, ties together those two realms.

Yes, but what Judaism says about ethics isn't always provable. An atheist wouldn't accept all the teachings of Judaism, but that doesn't mean his own ethics wouldn't be connected to his views on truth.

I don't know enough about Cofucianism, hiduism and other such systems .

I don't know enough either, but I have gotten the impression that Eastern cultures tend to be more relativistic--not just about morality, but about "truth" in general.

We all feel comfortable in asserting that murder, for example, is evil. But the reason why murder is condemned may differ from value system to value system.

I still think it is possible to look at the shared principle (in this case, a law against murder) and formulate a reason that might go beyond what individual societies believe. I think all morality stems from some form of the Golden Rule, whether this is accepted explicitly or not.

One person may say that murder should be forbidden because it destroys the structure of society and leads to chaos.

That is a good reason to a point, but it isn't the most compelling motive for individuals.

Another might argue that murder is wrong because a person's life belongs to God and therefore cannot be "taken" by anyone else.

That may be valid, but it isn't provable.

A third person may argue that murder is wrong because God rules the world and has legislated as such.

Again, unprovable. And certainly not something atheists would accept.

My point here is that our sense of "ethics" derives from our value system. A God-based value system, in which knowledge of, closeness to or obedience to God is viewed as the ultimate aim, would yield a different system of ethical principles than an atheistic one.

Probably, but this only goes to reinforce my point that it's rooted in one's view of ultimate truth. You cannot separate "truth" from morality.

Kylopod, we are in agreement about this issue, i.e., the connection of truth and morality. That was exactly my point. You are reading my comment as if I am asserting that there is a separation between truth and goodness, when in fact I am trying to argue the opposite.

Incidentally, none of the reasons I offered for a prohibition of murder were meant to be exhaustive or anything more than simplistic "examples" to emphasize a principle. So, while your critique may be valid, these were just hypotheticals from off the top of my head and didn't really deserve too much scrutiny.

As for your statement "unprovable", I'm not sure of the relevance of that to this discussion. Provable or not, these are concepts, aspects of a view of reality/ultimate truth, that a hypothetical person/society might use as a basis for ethical norms.

In summary, I do believe an atheist can abide by a coherent system of ethics that will be rooted in his/her perception of basic truths or realities.

The question is whether that perception is valid and, by extension, whether that ethical system is correct in the ultimate sense.

I do think that the Torah's prohibition of murder is based upon a metaphysical, rather than "golden rule", principle. It is rooted in the idea that man is created in God's image, as communicated to Noah in this week's parasha.

I do think that the Torah's prohibition of murder is based upon a metaphysical, rather than "golden rule", principle.

I don't think the two are mutually exclusive. I believe that the Golden Rule is more than just a rule. It is perhaps the most fundamental principle of human behavior. It is rooted in the idea that I am aware of other people's feelings, consciousness, and desires, and therefore for me to work purely for my own self-interest would not make sense. I do not want to be killed, and I infer that other people feel the same way about themselves. Therefore, if I respect my own desire to live, it is logical for me to respect other people's desire to live as well.

Obviously, the inclination to follow the Golden Rule is not universal. But the recognition that other people possess wants and needs comparable to my own is a feature of the higher consciousness of human beings. I can choose not to act based on this knowledge, but I can't help being aware of it. That, to me, is the natural basis of morality. Not surprisingly, numerous religions and societies have formulated some form of the Golden Rule. But even those societies that haven't done so probably still accept the idea indirectly.

Of course, it does make a difference if you're an atheist, or even a pantheist. If you hold that the universe wasn't created for the sake of human beings, then morality can have no cosmic significance, and is simply a human invention. Thus, I understand your point that secular morality is to some extent artificial. But that's a far cry from calling it subjective and arbitrary.

To say that morality comes from God isn't an alternative to the natural morality I've described; it simply adds a new dimension to what's already there, giving it a deeper meaning.

By the way, my brother yesterday started telling me about an article he read in Moment Mag in which several rabbis from different denominations gave their views about the halachic status of Halloween. It wasn't until later that day that I scrolled down your blog and discovered that one of those rabbis was you!

I don't consider the natural morality I have described either self-serving or relative. But it is manmade, and it doesn't necessarily have any cosmic significance. We as religious Jews need not reject this basic level of morality. Our tradition expands on this basic level rather than replacing it with something different.

By the way, I'm interested in getting an answer to the question I posed to you on RJM's blog.

The Rambam's statements regarding the 7 mitsvot of Bnei Noah are relevant to this discussion.

He distinguishes between Hachmei Ummot Haolam, who observe these rules because they are rational and sensible, vs. Hasidei Ummot Haolam, who follow the 7 laws out of a sense of obligation and submission to the Creator.

Of course, the law against Avoda Zara precludes atheism as an option - and the Rambam would not have considered an atheist a wise person anyway - but otherwise, the Rambam certainly suggests that "secular" scholars can recognize and adhere to universal moral principles without recourse to divine revelation.

(BTW, this distinction is only valid according to the manuscript editions of the Mishneh Torah. According to the classic printed version - which is seemingly incorrect - the Rambam says that one who observes the 7 laws without acknowledging their divine source is not a wise person either.)

>(BTW, this distinction is only valid according to the manuscript editions of the Mishneh Torah. According to the classic printed version - which is seemingly incorrect - the Rambam says that one who observes the 7 laws without acknowledging their divine source is not a wise person either.)

Hmm. See Matvin Fox and shinuyei Nuschaot in Frankel's Rambam. ( I agree with your reading but ....)

Disclaimer

About Me

I am a businessman living in Brooklyn. I spent time at Slabodka in Bnei Brak and Beth Medrosh Elyon in Monsey during the Sixties. Altough I have to thank the Yeshivos for giving me the basic tools to learn and think, I have found that they have not prepared me to be a thoughtful and practicing Jew once I was confronted with reality. Most of my real learning and personal growth was attained on my own while being active in the real world.