Judging
from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are
well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th
(message #1189 [b]) showed a great disparity between the demands of both
parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within
the time limit you set.

Although
we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands
made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the
same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this
scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been
able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not
expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there
would be "no last words." If we do not cause any stop in the present
negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set---

Army 25444Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[a] Part 2 not available.

[b] S.I.S. #25441.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1190. (Part 2 of 2)[a]

To
be handled in Government Code.

The
United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the
various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize
that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for
our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations,
deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that
the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There
have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing
conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we,
without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and
suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may
use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider
doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless,
such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret;
consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on
the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and
irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in
Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like,
if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore,
in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do
with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would
want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

Army 25480Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

[a] S.I.S. #25444. (Part 1 of 2).

(EXHIBITS
OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)