On
September 28, 2016, Plaintiff Thomas D. Burns, Sr. filed two
lawsuits in this Court using the same Complaint in each. He
also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis in
each case.

Turning
first to the Motions, based on the information Burns
provides, he appears to be indigent. The motions shall
therefore be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing courts to allow indigent
parties to proceed “without prepayment of fees”).

28
U.S.C. § 1915 instructs district courts that they
“shall dismiss [a] case” filed by a plaintiff
proceeding in forma pauperis if the court determines
that the action “is frivolous or malicious, ”
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,
” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Here, because Burns is proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, the Court
must screen the Complaints to determine if the cases must be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A
self-represented party's complaint must be construed
liberally. Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). However, a pro se plaintiff must still carry
“the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a
recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v.
Bellmon,935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

Here,
Burns seeks custody of his children, who appear to have been
removed from his care by the Montgomery County Child
Protective Services (“MCCPS”), which he names as
the defendant in the first of his lawsuits. In support of
this request, Burns alleges that Leslie Henriquez, a MCCPS
case worker who is named as the defendant in the second
lawsuit, committed perjury when testifying in the state court
custody proceedings and that she tampered with evidence used
in those proceedings. He also alleges that the judge
presiding over that case ignored evidence favorable to Burns
and was unfairly biased, so much so that the proceedings
amounted, in his estimation, to a “kangaroo
court.” Compl. at 9, ECF No. 1. Based on these
allegations, Burns asks that all of Henriquez's testimony
and evidence be stricken, that the state court proceedings be
“dismissed as a mistrial, ” and that the state
court judge be required to recuse herself from presiding over
his case. Id. at 5-6. He also asks to be awarded
custody of his children and for $6, 000, 000, 000 in damages.

Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained
to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of
the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal
statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147
F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Because questions of subject
matter jurisdiction concern the court's power to hear the
case, they must be resolved before the court can turn to the
sufficiency or merits of a claim. Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment,523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)
(“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a
threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the
judicial power of the United States and is inflexible without
exception.” (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)). Federal courts have original jurisdiction over
civil cases, with some exceptions not relevant here, only in
two instances: (1) under federal question jurisdiction,
meaning that the case involves an issue of federal law,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) under diversity
jurisdiction, meaning, as relevant here, that the parties in
the case are citizens of different states and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75, 000, see 28 U.S.C. §
1332.

Burns
indicates that his causes of action are fraud claims that
fall under federal question jurisdiction. However, to the
extent that Burns asserts that the state court child custody
proceedings were tainted by fraud and thus seeks to have this
Court revisit or rehear that case, this Court cannot do so
for two reasons. First, the “domestic relations
exception” to federal jurisdiction “divests the
federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 703 (1992) This Court does not have the power to
provide Burns the primary remedy he seeks, namely, custody of
his children.

Second,
“[u]nder the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a
‘party losing in state court is barred from seeking
what in substance would be appellate review of the state
judgment in a United States district court.'”
American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d
311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. De
Grandy,512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). This doctrine
applies both to final and interlocutory orders of state
courts. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211
F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000). The doctrine bars “lower
federal courts from considering not only issues raised and
decided in the state courts, but also issues that are
‘inextricably intertwined' with the issues that
were before the state court.” Washington v.
Wilmore,407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 486 (1983)). An issue is “inextricably
intertwined” when it “was not actually decided by
the state court but where success on the ... claim depends
upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the
issues before it.” Brown & Root, Inc., 211
F.3d at 198. Because the doctrine is jurisdictional, courts
“are obliged to address it before proceeding” to
the merits of a given case. Friedman's, Inc. v.
Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 2002).

Although
it is unclear whether Burns expressly raised in the state
court proceedings his present allegations that
Henriquez's testimony was perjured and her evidence was
tainted, because Henriquez was the MCCPS case worker involved
in the child custody determination, the question of the
admissibility and credibility of her evidence was necessarily
before the state court during the child custody proceedings.
Burns's present allegations against Henriquez, and the
claims of fraud to which they give rise, are therefore
inextricably intertwined with the state court's child
custody determination. Further, although Burns names
Henriquez and MCCPS as defendants, the core premise of his
claims in both suits is that the state child custody
proceedings were a sham. He seeks to have this Court revisit
the state court child custody proceedings, as evidenced by
the fact that he expressly asks this Court to grant him
custody of his children, a remedy that would essentially
overturn the determination of the state court.
Rooker-Feldman bars this Court from doing so.
See American Reliable Ins. Co., 336 F.3d at 316
(“A litigant may not circumvent the[] jurisdictional
mandates [of Rooker-Feldman] by instituting a
federal action which, although not styled as an appeal,
amounts to nothing more than an attempt to seek review of the
state court's decision by a lower federal court.”)
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear Burns's
claims.

Accordingly,
it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis in TDC-16-3273,
ECF No. 2, is GRANTED;

2. The
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis in TDC-16-3275,
ECF No. 2, is GRANTED; and

3. Both
cases, TDC-16-3273 and ...

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