I write separately to express
certain concerns that the majority's opinion either fails to address or that
are in need of further clarification. When possible, this Court clearly prefers
that legal matters be determined on their merits. See McDaniel v. Romano,
155 W.Va. 875, 879, 190 S.E.2d 8, 11 (1972). At the same time, however, this
Court fully recognizes the validity of and supports the enforceability of
a default judgment that is properly obtained. In light of the finality of
such judgments, barring successful Rule 60(b) motions, this Court has a duty
to ensure that the requirements necessary for the issuance of default judgments
are properly applied.

Lack of Defendant's Appearance

In discussing the distinction
between default judgments that are obtained under the provisions of Rule 55(b)(1),
as compared to those that result via the procedures of Rule 55(b)(2), the majority
singularly focuses on the presence of a sum certain as the crucial
requisite for proceeding under the former provision of the rule. While a sum
certain is necessary to proceed under Rule 55(b)(1), the distinction that determines
whether a clerk can enter the judgment or whether the court must enter the judgment
is the issue of whether there has been an appearance by the defendant for purposes of this rule. In tailoring
its discussion to the narrow issue of a sum certain, the majority
overlooks the significance of the absence of an appearance by the defendant
as a critical component of a default judgment that is entered pursuant to
Rule 55(b)(1).

Thus, in establishing as
a new point of law that [g]enerally, under Rule 55(b)(1) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, when the damages sought by a plaintiff
involve a sum certain or a sum which can by computation be made certain, a
judgment by default may be entered against a party who has defaulted as to
liability without prior notice to that party, the majority appears to
gloss over the essential distinction between default judgments obtained under
Rule 55(b)(1) and (b)(2). Only where no appearance has been made by the defendant,
can a default judgment be entered under Rule 55(b)(1). (See footnote 1)See 10A Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil § 2683 at 24-25 (3rd ed. 1998) (stating that Rule
55(b)(1) applies only to parties who have never appeared in the action;
it does not apply when a party appears and then merely fails to participate
in some subsequent stage of the proceedings).

In attempting to distinguish
those instances that properly fall under Rule 55(b)(1) from those required to
proceed under Rule 55(b)(2), the majority should have followed the distinction
used in the rule itself. Rule 55(b)(1) is labeled to apply only to those limited
instances when a clerk is authorized to enter the default judgment, while Rule
55(b)(2) covers all the remaining instances, which require the active involvement
of the circuit court judge in the process of entering judgment. See generally,
Wright, supra at § 2684 (noting limited instances when default judgment
can be entered under Rule 55(b)(1) and recognizing that in all other instances,
including those in which defendant is in default for a reason other than
a failure to appear, application for judgment must proceed under Rule
55(b)(2)).

Oral Communication Constituting an Appearance

In establishing what constitutes
an appearance for purposes of the notice requirement that attaches
under the provisions of Rule 55(b)(2), the majority states that any communication,
be it oral or written, suffices to constitute an appearance, provided
that such communication demonstrates either an interest in the pending
litigation, or actual notice of the litigation. In formulating this new
law, the majority leaves unanswered several related concerns. I am concerned
that when this law is applied, the practicing lawyers may find themselves without
the necessary guidance to proceed. This is because, in elevating to a syllabus
point the concept of oral communications being sufficient to constitute an appearance under Rule 55, (See footnote 2) the majority has failed to
properly instruct the practitioner as to the parameters of oral communications
that can properly be viewed as an appearance for purposes of the
Rule 55.

Other courts that have considered
this issue have made clear that not just any oral communication will suffice
to constitute an appearance for purposes of invoking the notice requirement
of Rule 55(b)(2). As the court made clear in Alliance Group, Inc. v. Rosenfield,
685 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio App. 1996), [a] telephone call between parties
would not constitute an appearance unless circumstances give the call some
legal effect. Id. at 577. Generally, an affirmative act is required
that manifests an intention to defend the action. See id.; accord
Miamisburg Motel v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 623 N.E.2d 163, 170 (Ohio App.
1993) (recognizing that telephone call that indicates to moving party clear
purpose to defend the suit is sufficient to constitute appearance and trigger
notice requirements under Rule 55); see generally Scott K. Zesch, What
Constitutes Appearance under Rule 55(b)(2) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Providing that if Party Against Whom Default Judgment is
Sought has Appeared in Action, that Party must be Served with
Notice of Application for Judgment, 139 A.L.R. Fed. 603, § 9[a],
[b] (1997). Not all conversations, however, will be sufficient to amount to
an appearance under the rule. See, e.g., Ryan v. Collins, 481 S.W.2d

85, 88 (Ky. 1972) (holding that defendant had not voluntarily taken
a step in the main action that showed or from which it might be inferred that
he had the intention of making some defense where defendant had conversation
with plaintiff's attorney regarding pending action and plaintiff's counsel
merely instructed defendant to take summonses to insurance company).

While the issue of whether
an appearance results from an oral communication will necessarily
be a factual determination based on the nature of the conversation, as a general
rule an appearance will result from a communication that conveys
a clear intent to defend against the lawsuit at issue and may also be implied
by language that indicates the defendant has taken or intends to take some
steps related to the pending action that are either beneficial to the defendant
or detrimental to the plaintiff's interests. See Heleasco Seventeen, Inc.
v. Drake, 102 F.R.D. 909, 912 (D. Del. 1984). Missing from the majority's
adoption of this new point of law permitting an oral communication to constitute
an appearance is the clarification that the communication must
involve an indication on the defendant's part to take some action relative
to the lawsuit. Absent such an affirmative indication, an oral communication
is unlikely to rise to the level of the appearance necessary to
trigger the notice requirements of Rule 55(b)(2).

Practitioner Pointers

Despite the fact that Rule 55(b)(1)
clearly allows default judgments to be taken in instances where no appearance
has been made by the defendant and there is a sum certain, I respectfully
suggest to practitioners that it is by far the better practice to send notice
of a default judgment application whenever counsel has sufficient information
from which to serve such notice upon the defendant or defendant's counsel. Notice
should be given to all parties who, despite the non-filing of formal pleadings,
have nonetheless indicated a clear purpose to defend the suit by means of communication
with the moving party.
(See footnote 3) Thus, if notice can be sent to an opposing
party, it would appear prudent to dispatch such notice and hopefully foreclose
unnecessary litigation that may result from the failure to advise a party of
a default judgment application.

Based on the foregoing,
I respectfully concur with the majority's decision.

While perhaps the majority intended
to implicitly refer to the lack of an appearance in referencing the entry of
a default as to liability, this is not accurate because the default as to liability
may have been entered on a basis other than the lack of an appearance.
Footnote: 2

See Miamisburg, 623 N.E.2d at 170.
By applying Rule 55 in this fashion, the court in Miamisburg observed that informal,
honest communication between the parties to a lawsuit [will be fostered] . .
. [and] may lead to the resolution of disputes without resort to the legal process.
Id.; see also Zesch, supra, at § 2[b] (recognizing that most federal
courts appear to be primarily concerned with the good faith of the moving party
and fairness to the defaulting party and that [c]onsequently, courts
may take into account whether the moving party attempted to obtain a default
judgment by stealth).