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~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
nearly thirty years ago.

The
difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.

In September 2007, UK
Weekly Worker published an article of mine. Several months later Jack
Conrad of the CPGB published a
reply. I then posted a response
to it at my
site.

Now, I regularly check
the internet for ill-informed comments about my work (these are rarely addressed
directly to me), and in a recent trawl I came across the following Kangaroo
Court, where some of my ideas were tried and found guilty, in my
absence, of course:

The length is daunting, and it really should be read -- if at all --
consecutively, as the author points out. How lengthy is this anti-dialectical
analysis-cum-tirade? We get the following admission by Lichtenstein:

"This week sees a 'devastating' reply to the 1.3 million words published at my
site in just over 3000, from Jack Conrad, resident Dialectical Magus of the
CPGB."

I haven't read it yet, but I'm hoping the
Conrad/Lichtenstein exchange provides an entry point to understanding
Lichtenstein's claims, if not the implied one that her words are sufficiently
valuable that someone would wish to read 1.3 million of them.

While Lichtenstein's politics shouldn't prejudice assessment her philosophical
analysis's assessment, we are entitled to our curiosity. Her politics are those
one should expect of an anti-dialectician. She is a former member of the SWP
(GB), who resigned to pursue her "university project." She is now critical of
the SWP from the right. Above all, she "hates sectarians."

She writes in an irritating tone, which I mention because in addition to her
prolixity, it makes her difficult to read. Consider her ad hominem remark about
Conrad's reply in my preceding post, which continued by lamenting Conrad's
theoretical level. Her message is not 'Conrad transparently fails to answer my
arguments' but 'I'm the superior philosopher.'" srd [Taken from
here.]

A
couple of points:

(1) I
did not leave the SWP "to
pursue [my] 'university project'". The quotation marks around "university
project" suggest that this comrade is quoting me, but these aren't my words,
they are his. I have not been enrolled in, or employed by, a University for well over
25 years. I am a full-time worker, and, until recently, a trade union rep. (unpaid),
which role I occupied for 17 years. Moreover, I
left the SWP for personal reasons (circa 1990/91), but began this project in
1998. I have absolutely no political differences with the SWP. [This was
written before the SWP became embroiled in accusations that it had
white-washed a leading member over accusations of rape. If I were still a
member of the SWP, I would have resigned over this scandal alone.] It seems
this comrade is quite happy to make things up where he lacks information. And
this tactic carries over into his criticisms of my work (that is, what little of
it he has read). In addition, the comment
that I "hate sectarians" is also in quotation marks, but that phrase is nowhere
to be found in my Essays, either. Once more, the comrade prefers invention over
fact.

(2) I
am not criticising the UK-SWP "from the right" since I am not criticising the
SWP at all. My argument is solely with this mystical theory [DM]. Again, this
comrade prefers fantasy to fact.

(3)
The acerbic tone of my Essays is deliberate; had this comrade bothered to read the
Introductory Essay, he
would have found out why:

Several other features of these Essays will
strike the reader as rather odd: (1) Their almost exclusively
negative, if not unremittingly
hostile tone;
(2) Their quasi-dialectical structure (where the word
"dialectical" is to be understood in its older, classical sense);
(3) The
total absence of any alternative philosophical theses; (4)
Their extraordinary length; and finally, (5) Their analytic, if not
relentless, style.

The first two of the above points aren't unrelated.
Although I have endeavoured to construct as comprehensive a case against DM as I
am capable of producing, I have also sought to
raise objections to my own criticisms at nearly every stage. While this
strategy has been adopted to test my ideas to the limit, it has also been of
some use in trying to render DM a little clearer and/or more comprehensible.

To that end, the reader will find that many
issues have been raised here for the very first time -- ever. Core DM-theses have
been examined in unprecedented detail, most of them from a completely novel
direction. It is a sad reflection on the mental paralysis induced in those who -- in
Max
Eastman's words -- "suffer from dialectics", that these ideas have
escaped detailed attention for over a hundred years, but it is nonetheless accurate for
all that.

Even if it should turn out that this project
is misconceived in some way, it succeeds in breaking entirely new ground, as
readers will soon discover. In fact, should DM-supporters engage fairly with the
content of this site -- even if they remain of the same opinion by the end --,
they will find that their own ideas will emerge clarified and strengthened because of the
entirely novel set of challenges advanced in this work.

As alleged earlier, it is the opinion of
the present author that DM has contributed in its own not insignificant way to
the spectacular lack of
success 'enjoyed' by
Dialectical Marxism. It is an alarming fact that of all the major political ideologies
and/or movements in history,
Dialectical Marxism is among theleast successful.
The role that DM has played in helping to engineer this disastrous state of
affairs partly accounts for the persistently negative, if not openly
hostile, tone adopted in these Essays.

If revolutionaries genuinely wish to change
the world by assisting in a successful working-class revolution (and I certainly
count myself among those who do), then the sooner this
alien-class ideology (DM) is excised the better.

In that case, if the ideas presented
here are correct, then it is clear that DM has helped cripple the
revolutionary movement almost from the beginning. Because of that, those who
insist on clinging to this regressive doctrine (for whatever reason) risk
extending this abysmal record of failure into this new century.

Unfortunately, it is far from clear whether
either the planet or humanity can take another hundred years of Capitalism.
Indeed, one more protracted cycle of
DM-induced failures could mean that even fewer workers will take Marxism
seriously --, or, what amounts roughly to the same thing, live to tell the tale
in anything remotely resembling a civilised society.

In
that case, if this comrade finds me irritating, that just means I am doing my
job properly.

(4)
The point of the exercise isn't, as this comrade says, to prove who is the
"superior philosopher", since the point of my work is to show that Traditional Philosophy (including the fourth-rate version found in 'materialist dialectics')
is just self-important hot air, and expresses a ruling-class view of the world.

[Why I
say this is explained in detail here,
and is summarised here and
here.]

(5) If
this comrade genuinely wanted an "entry point" to my work, then why did he not
go to my site and read the many Introductory Essays I have posted there for
readers like him?

[Here
is the most comprehensive of them;
here is one of the
shortest.]

Another poster asks:

Lots of people have been 'opposed to dialectics' since the time of Marx and
Engels. However, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky all saw dialectical
materialism as central to their world outlook. So why is just another
anti-dialectician worth reading? Roger [From
here.]

The
simple answer is that my demolition of this mystical theory is by far and away
the most comprehensive ever written by a revolutionary (or, indeed, by anyone) --
and by several orders of magnitude, too. Moreover, much of it is
completely
original to me.

"So what?" dialecticians might be
tempted to ask. Well, "So nothing!" if they want to remain locked in
their dogmatic slumber, wedded to a theory that has presided over
150 years of almost total failure --
a theory which history has thus already
refuted. On the other hand, if they are interested in the scientific
development of Historical Materialism [HM], then my Essays are at least one place to
begin. We have to clear the ground of weeds before we can cultivate a new and
healthier version of Marxism.

But,
now to specifics:

Yes she's irritating alright. Remember her attack is on the dialectics of nature
not on Engels per se. Taking a cursory look (a tiny sample without reading
Conrad's reply -- I would say it's pretty predictable) of the Rosa
Lichtenstein/Conrad (Weekly Worker) "entry level" debate we have her say
this:

"Engels asserted the following:

"'[Q]ualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction
of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the
quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e.
without quantitative alteration of the body concerned.

"'Such changes are neither smooth nor gradual:

"'...[Q]uantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of
quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in
gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts….'

"And yet, there are many things in nature that undergo smooth qualitative change
-- for example, melting metal, glass, plastic, butter, toffee and chocolate.
Sure, some things change 'nodally', but many do not. So, the 'nodal' aspect of
this Law is defective.

"Unfortunately, this implies that it cannot be used to argue that the
transformation from capitalism to socialism must be nodal too, for we have no
idea whether this transformation is one of these exceptions. Plainly, we could
only use this Law if it had no exceptions whatsoever.

"This means that the whole point of adopting this Law in the first place has now
vanished."

Her remarks are of such inaccuracy and triteness that they makes one wonder how
she musters up the hide to write hundreds of thousands of words presumably in
the same vein -- as this is the simplest stuff ("entry point dialectics") to
deal with (almost sub-Hegelian).

In spite of what she says, all these things "metal, glass, plastic, butter,
toffee and chocolate" do at some point undergo "nodal" changes at a certain
point. Metal (presumably an element) vaporises, glass (a compound) no doubt
vaporises and if it is cooled undergoes an apparent solidification, butter (a
mixture) caramelises, toffee (a mixture) carbonizes, chocolate (a mixture)
undergoes complex degradation. And even if there were an exception -- an
infinite range of melting without an qualitative change this would prove NOTHING
at all against Engels' point.

And further she says:

"What about 'quantity into quality'? Undeniably, many material things change
qualitatively as a result of the addition or subtraction of matter or energy.

"But this is not true of all qualitative difference. The order in which events
take place can affect quality, too. For example, try crossing a busy main road
first and looking second -- now, try it the other way round! And anyone who
tries pouring half a litre of water slowly into a litre of concentrated
sulphuric acid will face a long and painful stay in hospital, whereas the
reverse action is perfectly safe."

Who says that the order of events is of no importance? Does she think Engels was
a stupid as she is?

Conrad, though some of what he writes has a satisfying historical sweep, doesn't
pick up these errors. But he too goes on -- and on as if undergoing multiple
orgasm.

Is this the amateur hour?

A Marxist philosopher of the calibre of John Hoffman (Marxism and the Theory of
Praxis) -- gives scholarly and comprehensive answer to the deniers of the
dialectic in nature. "dusty" [From
here.]

Her remarks are of such inaccuracy and triteness that they makes one wonder how
she musters up the hide to write hundreds of thousands of words presumably in
the same vein -- as this is the simplest stuff ("entry point dialectics") to
deal with (almost sub-Hegelian).

Of
course, in my 'debate' with Jack Conrad, I had to keep things relatively simple, but
that is no more reason to judge the detailed work at my site as "simple" than it
is to judge Das Kapital as "simple" on the sole basis of having read
Wages, Price and Profit.

However, if this comrade is so easily put off my Essays, then he deserves to
remain in the stygian gloom in which we found him. I have no desire to relieve
him of his self-inflicted ignorance.

In
spite of what she says, all these things "metal, glass, plastic, butter, toffee
and chocolate" do at some point undergo "nodal" changes at a certain point.
Metal (presumably an element) vaporises, glass (a compound) no doubt vaporises
and if it is cooled undergoes an apparent solidification, butter (a mixture)
caramelises, toffee (a mixture) carbonizes, chocolate (a mixture) undergoes
complex degradation. And even if there were an exception -- an infinite range of
melting without an qualitative change this would prove NOTHING at all against
Engels' point.

This comrade misses the point. Metals slowly soften when heated; there is no
"nodal" point in the "qualitative" transition from solid to liquid metal. Maybe
there is a "nodal" transition later on if the metal is heated until it
vaporises. But that doesn't affect the point that there is no such "node" when metals melt.
Human beings have known this for thousands of years -- this is what makes metals
malleable, and formable. So, the "qualitative" transition of metals from solid
to liquid is slow, not rapid. The same is true of the other examples I gave. Who
doesn't know that glass and
plastic melt slowly?

Moreover, the above
'reply' runs contrary to what both Hegel and Engels said:

It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state.
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis
added.]

With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring. [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83.I have used the
online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages
edition. Bold emphasis added.]

We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water. [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]

From this it is quite
clear that for both of the above, "nodes"/"leaps" are sudden.
Indeed, for Engels, this fact applies right across the sciences. Once more, both
are wrong -- not all qualitative change is "nodal" (even if we knew what
dialecticians meant by "quality").

For
Lenin, this is what distinguishes 'dialectical' from non-dialectical change:

"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]

In that
case, this critic perhaps needs to enrol himself in a crash course in "entry
level" dialectics, even beforebravely venturing on to Dialectics
101.

Maybe so, but the
transition from solid butter to liquid butter is nonetheless "node"-free; the
same is the case with toffee and chocolate. In addition there are many other
examples of such "node"-less "qualitative" changes (some of which
have been listed
here).

And even if there were an exception -- an infinite range of melting without an
qualitative change this would prove NOTHING at all against Engels' point.

Well,
of course, the capital letters settle it, don't they? If my original
article had been written in capitals these critics would surely have had no
answer.

Some might want to appeal to the exact melting
points of solids as clear examples of dialectical "leaps"; however, this is what we read about the so-called "amorphous
solids" (such as glasses, gels, and plastics):

Amorphous solids do not have a sharp
melting point; they are softened in a range of temperature. [Quoted from
here; accessed 03/05/2015. Bold added.]

Amorphous
solids tend to soften slowly over a wide temperature range rather than having a
well-defined melting point like a crystalline solid. [Quoted from
here; accessed 08/04/2015. Bold added.]

Moreover:

Almost any substance can solidify in
amorphous form if the liquid phase is cooled rapidly enough.... [Ibid.]

This must mean that "almost any substance" will lack
a melting point if it has been cooled in the above way. In turn, this implies that there are
countless non-'nodal' (non-"leap"-like) changes in nature.

But,
the comrade is wrong, anyway; these examples show that Engels's 'Law' is
defective just here: there are many qualitative changes in nature and society
that are smooth, and do not progress in "leaps".

Notice: I amnot arguing that
there are no sudden changes, only that not everything behaves this way

What
of this, though?

Who says that the order of events is of no importance? Does she think Engels was
a stupid as she is?

Well,
Engels, actually, "says" so:

"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Dialectics of Nature,
p.63. Emphasis
added.]

Notice
that? "Qualitative" changes can "only" occur by the "quantitative addition or
subtraction of matter or motion", and that it is "impossible" to effect these
changes in any other way. So, for Engels, that rules out the order in which
events occur causing such changes.

So,
yes, perhaps Engels was "stupid" -- but, plainly, far less so than this critic, who
needs to learn to read what Engels actually said before he accuses me of
"inaccuracy" and "triteness".

A
Marxist philosopher of the calibre of John Hoffman (Marxism and the Theory of
Praxis) -- gives scholarly and comprehensive answer to the deniers of the
dialectic in nature.

No he
doesn't; Hoffman makes all the usual mistakes in his haste to defend this
Hermetic 'theory'.

There
are several more points worthy of comment on the same page; such as this:

As
far as I can tell without taking significant time, this is the basic error
involved in Rosa Lichtenstein's critique. The ultimate thrust of dialectics is
to deny the existence of a "point in time." Trotsky goes into this in "In
Defense of Marxism." This is a logical rather than empirical matter. Thus the
lack of relevant direct evidence. srd [From
here.]

But,
dialecticians use this phrase all the time, whereas I only use it to help
sink their theory.

For
example, here is Engels:

[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change,
their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in
contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change
of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in
another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the
same place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous
solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is. [Engels (1976),
Anti-Dühring, p.152. Bold emphasis added.]

"Point
in time" and "moment in time" are indistinguishable, as we can see from
Trotsky's use of the latter:

A sophist will respond that
a pound of sugar is equal to itself at 'any given moment'…. How should we really
conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a
pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that 'moment' to inevitable
changes. Or is the 'moment' a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero
of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted
process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of
existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to
itself if it does not change, that is if it does not exist. [Trotsky
(1971),
In Defence of Marxism, p.64. Bold emphasis added.]

And,
of course, I make the same point as the comrade above, but in this case
against Trotsky, who gets himself into an awful tangle here. [More
on that in Essay Six.]

Be this as it may, if Trotsky were
correct, then Engels can't be correct, for then there would be no such thing as
the "same moment" in which a moving object could be in two places at once (on
that, see Essay Five).
On the other hand, if Engels were right, then Trotsky can't be right, for in that case at
least one of these "same moments" would have to exist if a moving object is to
be in two places in that "same moment".

Now,
it is all the same to me which one of these two it is that the other has sunk
because of their sloppy use of language.

Alas,
there is more (on the same page):

The question for me is what background do any of these characters have that
makes them experts on physics and the philosophy of science? advanced degrees in
physics, chemistry or biology? peer reviewed articles? etc. etc. It just seems
that they are spouting forth their own lay, albeit somewhat educated opinions in
the manner of creation science experts. As far as "In Defense of Marxism", I
recall that excellent work which to my recollection dealt with the nature of the
Soviet Union, not vulgar expositions of philosophy. It seems to me that as is
sometimes said about the law, these individuals "know just enough to be
dangerous" meaning to give a scientific rationalization to their views that can
sound somewhat convincing-and mystical-to the uninitiated.

Engels and Trotsky were great political leaders, not scientists, although they,
particularly the latter, were influenced by Darwin and developments in science
which they sought to popularize and defend, drawing certain inferences to social
history from these conclusions.

The comparison with creation science is inapt, because
dialectics does not pretend to provide a testable scientific theory. On
philosophical matters at the periphery of science, an educated layman can
accomplish much. But to me the untestability of dialectics, the fact that its
laws are permissive rather than prohibitive like scientific laws, suggests that
the notion that matter itself is dialectical isn't quite right. Trotsky gives
the best description of what dialectics is for here (the essay can also be found
at
http://www.themilitant.com/1997/6120/6120_32.html):

"Dialectical thinking is related to vulgar thinking in the same way that a
motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not
outlaw the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws
of motion. Dialectics does not deny the syllogism, but teaches us to combine
syllogisms in such a way as to bring our understanding closer to the eternally
changing reality.

"Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into
quality, development through contradictions, conflict of content and form,
interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc.,
which are just as important for theoretical thought as is the simple syllogism
for more elementary tasks... The fundamental flaw of vulgar thought lies in the
fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of reality, which
consists of eternal motion. Dialectical thinking gives to concepts, by means of
closer approximations, corrections, concretizations, a richness of content and
flexibility, I would even say a succulence, which to a certain extent brings
them close to living phenomena."

I
see "vulgar thought," perhaps to reductively, as the innate starting point of al
cognition. We cognize reality as static and then correct our picture to bring in
motion. Dialectics systematizes the corrective steps we must take to have a
dynamic view. It generates an open-ended catalogue of false assumptions that
must be questioned when starting from the static picture we are innately cursed
with as finite beings and moving toward a truer account. One assumption holds,
for instance, that any trend can be extrapolated indefinitely. The denial of
vulgar evolutionary extrapolation one expression of the interpenetration of
opposites, or more narrowly, the transformation of things into their opposites.

Dialectics demands some ontology's underpinning, but that isn't necessarily
simply (undialectically) asserting that the laws of dialectics apply to matter
itself. One underpinning is the truistic existence of change. But there's little
reason why or even as easy way how the path toward augmenting a static view, to
the extent it is augmentable, would match the laws governing the actual movement
of the universe. srd [From
here.]

Taking
one section at a time:

The question for me is what background do any of these characters have that
makes them experts on physics and the philosophy of science? advanced degrees in
physics, chemistry or biology? peer reviewed articles? etc. etc. It just seems
that they are spouting forth their own lay, albeit somewhat educated opinions in
the manner of creation science experts. As far as "In Defense of Marxism", I
recall that excellent work which to my recollection dealt with the nature of the
Soviet Union, not vulgar expositions of philosophy. It seems to me that as is
sometimes said about the law, these individuals "know just enough to be
dangerous" meaning to give a scientific rationalization to their views that can
sound somewhat convincing-and mystical-to the uninitiated.

Engels and Trotsky were great political leaders, not scientists, although they,
particularly the latter, were influenced by Darwin and developments in science
which they sought to popularize and defend, drawing certain inferences to social
history from these conclusions.

If
this comrade had bothered to read the Introductory
Essay before putting his non-dialectical foot in his Hermetic mouth, he'd
have seen only too well what my 'qualifications' are. But, even if I had none
whatsoever, Engels wasn't a scientist and neither was Hegel (as this comrade
acknowledges). Not one page of Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin or Trotsky's work was
peer reviewed, either, and yet this comrade is quite happy to accept the
untested Mickey Mouse Science found in
the DM-classics.

Apparently then, it is only the critics of dialectics who need to be
qualified. Any idiot can, it seems, write on dialectics. And they do, all the
time, as we can see.

Moreover, it is quite clear that this comrade knows no logic, otherwise he
wouldn't have been quite so impressed with Trotsky's 'defence' of dialectics.

[Trotsky's incompetence in this area (and with it that of the vast majority of
dialecticians, including
Hegel)
has been exposed in Essays Four and
Six.]

In
that case, these words are more applicable to this comrade than they are to me:

It
seems to me that as is sometimes said about the law, these individuals "know
just enough to be dangerous" meaning to give a scientific rationalization to
their views that can sound somewhat convincing-and mystical-to the uninitiated.

What
of this, though?

The comparison with creation science is inapt, because
dialectics does not pretend to provide a testable scientific theory. On
philosophical matters at the periphery of science, an educated layman can
accomplish much. But to me the untestability of dialectics, the fact that its
laws are permissive rather than prohibitive like scientific laws, suggests that
the notion that matter itself is dialectical isn't quite right. Trotsky gives
the best description of what dialectics is for....

But,
Lenin said:

From living perception to abstract thought,
and from this to practice, -- such is the dialectical path of the cognition
of truth, of the cognition of objective reality. [Lenin (1961),
Philosophical Notebooks,
p.171.]

The
correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be tested by the
history of science. This aspect of dialectics (e.g. in Plekhanov) usually
receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the
sum-total of examples [“for example, a seed,” “for
example, primitive communism.” The same is true of
Engels. But it is “in the
interests of popularisation...”] and not as a law of
cognition (and as a law of the objective world). [Ibid.,
p.357. Bold
emphasis alone added.]

Marx
added:

The
question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a
question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth --
i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.
The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from
practice is a purely scholastic question. [Theses on Feuerbach,
quoted from
here. Bold added.]

The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active
in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations.
Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and
without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and
political structure with production. [p.46.
The German Ideology. Bold added.]

And
Engels argued as follows:

Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it. [Engels (1976),
Anti-Dühring,
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]

We all agree that in every field of science, in natural
and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in
natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter;
that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are
not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered
to be verified as far as possible by experiment.

Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the
dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin
Hegelians of the older and younger line. [Ibid.,
p.47. Bold emphasis alone
added.]

These comrades were pretty clear; if
Marxism isn't testable it is either an idealist
theory, or false. Indeed, this is precisely the point George Novack made:

A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice....
[Novack (1965), The Origins Of Materialism, p.17. Bold emphases added.]

Perhaps the comrade here needs to be "initiated" in the entry-level esoteric
rites associated with dialectics a little more. He will never make the level of
Magus at
this rate.

Of
course, the real point about practice is that this is where dialectics comes
unstuck, for practice has refuted it.

Now, I won't comment on Trotsky's
lamentably poor attempt to respond to Burnham (I have already done that in detail in several Essays, for instance
here and
here), but this deserves a few
words:

I
see "vulgar thought," perhaps to reductively, as the innate starting point of al
cognition. We cognize reality as static and then correct our picture to bring in
motion. Dialectics systematizes the corrective steps we must take to have a
dynamic view. It generates an open-ended catalogue of false assumptions that
must be questioned when starting from the static picture we are innately cursed
with as finite beings and moving toward a truer account. One assumption holds,
for instance, that any trend can be extrapolated indefinitely. The denial of
vulgar evolutionary extrapolation one expression of the interpenetration of
opposites, or more narrowly, the transformation of things into their opposites.

Dialectics demands some ontology's underpinning, but that isn't necessarily
simply (undialectically) asserting that the laws of dialectics apply to matter
itself. One underpinning is the truistic existence of change. But there's little
reason why or even as easy way how the path toward augmenting a static view, to
the extent it is augmentable, would match the laws governing the actual movement
of the universe.

It is
not true that we "cognize reality as static"; this is a myth put about by
dialecticians (following on Hegel's lead). Practically every verb and adverb (and
more words besides) in ordinary language testify to the fact that in the
vernacular we have a far more sophisticated handle on change than is allowed for
by the wooden and incomprehensible jargon Hegel invented in order to fix
something that wasn't broken. Here is a greatly truncated list:

[In
each case, where there is a noun form of the word listed, its verb form
is intended. So, where you see "ring", for example, think of the verb "to ring"
and its cognates -- like "ringing", for instance.]

Naturally, it wouldn't be difficult to extend
this list until it contained literally tens of thousands of words all
capable of depicting countless changes in limitless detail (especially if it is
augmented with words drawn from
mathematics and
HM).

In fact, and ironically, dialectics
itself can't account for change; or, to state
this in another form: if DM were true, change would be impossible.

Whilst Engels and Trotsky were not scientists they were well educated in
philosophy something most scientists are not. The major problem for natural
scientists in drawing philosophical conclusions from their work is that the
logic they use is quite formal and little changed since the philosophers of the
middle ages. Now this leaves natural science in a somewhat 'aimless' position
which can do a lot of valuable empirical research and create the conditions for
the rapid development of technology but is socially very backward and
conservative. Roger [From
here.]

Dialecticians say this sort of thing all the time, but in every case they fail to
substantiate it, happy merely to copy it off one another from one generation to the
next, without bothering to check. The fact is, as any history of logic would have
informed them, 99% of logic is less than 150 years old. Burnham tried to tell
Trotsky, but he might as well have been talking to the cat for all the good that
did.

Indeed, at first sight, it would seem obvious that a
logical system based on a static view of the world -- as it is alleged of
Formal Logic [FL] -- would have few if any practical
consequences. On the other hand, it would appear equally clear that a different logical
system based on the opposite view of reality -- as is also claimed of
Dialectical Logic [DL]
--
should have countless practical applications in science and technology.

Oddly enough, the
exact opposite is the case: DL has no discernible practical or scientific
applications, and has featured in none of the advances in the
natural or physical sciences (and arguably none even in the social
sciences) -- ever. Worse still: DL has made no contribution to technological
innovation.

In stark contrast to this, FL has played an invaluable
role on
the development of science and mathematics, and has featured in countless
applications in technology and the applied sciences.

Indeed, one excellent example (among many) of the impact FL on technology is worthy of
note: the
development of computers. Their origin goes back many centuries,
but advances in mathematical logic (post 1850) proved to be decisive. The
invention of Boolean and
Fregean Logic, the mathematical logic of
Russell,
Whitehead,
Hilbert,
Peano,
von Neumann and
Church (etc.) -- along with the
logico-mathematical work of
Alan Turing -- all helped make the development
of computers possible. FL has not only contributed to the evolution of software and of
computer languages, the principles of
Propositional Calculus govern the
operation of all standard processors (etc.).

In addition, there are
numerous other examples of the practical applications of FL, ranging from
Cybernetics to
Code Theory and from Linguistics to
Game Theory and
Discrete
Mathematics. The question is:
Can DM-theorists point to a single successful application of DL in
technology, or in the natural and physical sciences? The answer is reasonably
plain; they can't. But this glaring failure becomes all the more revealing when it is
remembered that dialecticians repeatedly claim that their 'logic' is superior to
FL when it is applied to the material world.

This is perhaps one paradoxical mismatch between DM
and recalcitrant reality that cannot be solved by the simple expedient of
"grasping" it. [More on that,
here.]

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

So, this Kangaroo Court was convened and has decided in my absence
that my work is "trite", "inaccurate", and amateurish. However, we can see from
the superficial and error-strewn comments of this cabal of self-appointed judges,
prosecuting counsels and jury members that it is this court that is at fault, not the
accused.