Submitted in part fulfilment for the requirements for
the Bachelor of Arts Degree in European Studies

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to all those who helped me write this project; in
particular Professors Peter Coogan and Joe Leedom, Hollins College,
Roanoke, Virginia. They gave me inspiration, direction and clarity.
My thanks to Professor Edward Moxon-Browne, Univerity of Limerick,
for organising the exchange programme between Hollins and the
University of Limerick. This project would not have been possible
without the resources of the Fishburn Library, Hollins College,
and the libraries of the University of Limerick and Trinity College,
Dublin. This project also owes a debt of gratitude to Joe Leedom's
Senior Thesis Class, Tiffany Seymour, the Hollins girls, my family,
Mark Sandblade, The Harvest House, Bad Brother Byron and
The O'Leary Family, and Le Rendezvous,Memphis,
Tennessee for the best ribs I have ever eaten. Finally, I would
like to thank my supervisor, Dr. John Logan, University of Limerick,
for his vital assistance in finishing this project.

Chapter 1 Introduction

During the American Civil War the diplomacy of the United States
reflected a better understanding of foreign affairs than that
exhibited by the Confederate States. The success and failure of
the diplomatic initiatives taken by the American parties depended
largely on two issues. First, the caliber of the agents employed
by the two sides had significant consequences for European responses
to the war. Did they have diplomatic experience? Did their backgrounds
suggest that they were useful as emissaries? Second, the circumstances
they found themselves in also obviously shaped their activities.
Were the orders they were given feasible considering the motives
of the European powers? Were their circumstances beyond their
control?

The Union appointed experienced and well mannered diplomats. The
South did not. Confederate diplomats supported slavery, which
was not popular in Britain or France, and they often had disagreeable
personal characteristics. However, the South could have sent the
best diplomats imaginable and possibly still not succeeded. Their
orders were to seek European recognition for the Confederacy;
first by promoting the idea that the secession of the Southern
states was not a revolution, and second, by pressing home the
serious consequences of a reduction in the supply of Southern
cotton to the European textile industry. Though the French Emperor,
Napoleon III, made it clear to the Confederacy that he would act
in their favor, he would only do so if Britain, the dominant European
power, would lead the way. But the political situation was too
fragile for Britain to recognize the new nation. The British Government
under Palmerston was a coalition with a small majority. The Tory
opposition was not putting forward a policy on the American situation
and Palmerston was not about to provoke them. Further, Britain
had over two years of cotton reserves and so could wait until
alternative sources became available. Lastly, intervention on
the side of the slave holding south would risk the support of
the working classes. On the other hand, Union diplomats often
had a difficult time keeping the peace. This was due to the actions
of the Union Secretary of State, William Seward, more than anything
else. Seward told the British that he would declare war on them
if they intervened. His diplomacy of intimidation was ultimately
successful but if others had not toned down much of what he said
then things could have turned out very differently.

Chapter 2 The diplomats

Confederate President Jefferson Davis's constitutional responsibilities
included the determination of "the scope of any diplomatic
function." However, he didn't care much for diplomacy. According
to James L. Orr, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the Confederate Congress, the Davis administration "never
had a foreign policy, nor did [it] ever consent to attempt a high
diplomacy with European powers." Further, the President
was not well qualified to direct the foreign relations of the
South. He made misjudgments in the understanding of foreign motives
and in the selection of diplomatic agents to represent the South.
He is described by Charles Francis Adams II as having "little
personal knowledge of countries other than his own, or, indeed,
of more than a section of his own country." Davis's only
experience abroad was as a colonel in the Mexican War of the late
1840s. He was born in Kentucky in 1808 and grew up on a small
farm. His older brother became a successful cotton planter and
sent Jefferson to West Point where he graduated in 1828. He married
the daughter of a wealthy planter and went into politics. Davis
served in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Democrat from
1845 to 1847, when he went to the Senate. On the election of President
Franklin W. Pierce, Davis was invited to enter the cabinet as
Secretary for War. He was an opponent of interference with slavery
and believed that States had the right to leave the Federal Union.
After the secession of Mississippi the provisional Confederate
Congress elected him president. Davis was one of the Southern
political élite who assumed the King Cotton philosophy,
that the global need for cotton would oblige foreign powers to
act favorably to the Confederacy. Robert Bunch, the British consul
at Charleston, described Davis as a "manifest destiny"
leader who believed that the Confederacy would end up despised
among nations for its maintenance of slavery.

The responsibility for realising the objectives of Confederate
foreign policy was delegated to the Secretary of State. This position
was occupied by many different men. Of consequence were the terms
of Robert A. Toombs, who occupied the position briefly, and Judah
P. Benjamin. Neither had traveled abroad or had prior foreign
policy experience. Toombs was from Georgia and had served in the
Senate. After secession he had sought the presidency but lost
it to Davis. The position of Secretary of State was poor consolation
and he took it under protest. He helped to shape the permanent
Confederate Constitution before resigning as a sign of contempt
for the President. Davis appointed Benjamin to Secretary of State
on March 24, 1862. Benjamin had been Confederate Secretary for
War though he had no military training. A congressional committee
reported his conduct in that office as incompetent and his administration
as negligent. However, Benjamin earned a reputation as "the
brains of the Confederacy." His parents were English Jews
who had settled in New Orleans where he studied law. Benjamin
made a successful reputation as a member of the law firm of Slidell,
Benjamin & Conrad with his friend John Slidell. He spent eight
years as a senator before becoming attorney-general in the provisional
Confederate Government.

On March 16, 1861, Davis had Toombs appoint three diplomatic agents
to represent him as 'commissioners' to the European governments:
William Lowndes Yancey, Pierre A. Rost and Ambrose Dudley Mann.
Yancey, though a great orator and capable politician, had never
been abroad. He was a known champion of slavery, which was not
supported by France or England. He was born on August 10, 1814,
in Georgia. His father died when he was young and, later, his
mother married a lawyer. Yancey studied law and, in 1834, was
admitted to the bar in Greenville, South Carolina, where he also
became editor of the Greenville Mountaineer. He then settled
in Alabama where he was elected to the state house and, in 1841,
the state Senate. Yancey believed with all his heart in the distinctive
institutions of the South. As a retired Congressman, he wrote
his "Scarlet Letter" of June 15, 1858, in which he urged
preparation for "prompt resistance to the next aggression
... throughout the cotton states." Yancey was the chief manager
of the Charleston Democratic convention of April, 1860, and "one
of its most brilliant and persuasive speakers." In his attempt
to make that party accept the demands of the South he accused
the anti-secessionist Northern members of "admitting slavery
to be wrong, and thus surrendering the very citadel of their argument."
However, useful as he was for the Southern cause, the idea of
sending a supporter of slavery to Europe was not judicious. For
this reason Yancey's brother, B.C., who had been on a diplomatic
mission in South America, was inclined to have William turn the
offer down. He advised that unless the Confederacy was prepared
to liberalize trade tariffs so as to "outweigh all other
considerations, no British government ... would in the end venture
to run counter the anti-slavery feeling." Pierre Adolphe
Rost was of French origin. He received his education at the École
Polytechnique, Paris, where men were recruited into the civil
service or military. As an artilleryman he was credited for brave
conduct in the defense of Paris on March 30, 1814. Rost applied
for a commission in Napoleon's army after the Emperor's escape
from Elba but was too late for Waterloo. Escaping from what he
thought to be an oppressive régime, he then emigrated to
the United States. He became a teacher in Natchez, Mississippi,
and studied law under Joseph Emory Davis, brother of Jefferson
Davis. In 1822 he was elected to the state senate before going
on to become one of the judges of the supreme court of Louisiana
in 1846. Frank L. Owsley describes him as having no real diplomatic
assets other than a poor knowledge of the French language. Ambrose
Dudley Mann was a Virginian, born on April 26, 1801. He studied
law in Greeney's County where he became involved in politics.
He was appointed U.S. consul to Bremen, Germany, in 1842, and
U.S. minister to Switzerland in 1850. From 1854 to 1856 he was
the assistant secretary of state. Though Mann was the only member
of the commission who had diplomatic experience, his usefulness
was hindered by his arrogance. Consul Bunch wrote that his personal
character was "not good". He is described by Owsley
as "credulous" and having a "great vanity".

Davis was not alone in lack of diplomatic savvy. Lincoln was hard
pressed to show even the slightest interest in foreign affairs
and Secretary of State Seward had views on foreign policy that
were dangerously naive. On the day of his appointment as Union
Minister to Britain, Charles Francis Adams was quite shocked by
Lincoln's casual attitude to foreign affairs. Lincoln's attention
was clearly on the other appointments of the day. The President
informed Adams that he was Seward's choice and not the President's
preferred man for the job. Lincoln's indifference and issues such
as the procrastination over withdrawal from Fort Sumter, the first
engagement of the war, added to an impression already held by
Adams that the President lacked judgment. In fact, it was generally
assumed that Seward would prove to be the virtual head of government.
Lincoln was not yet popularly recognized as a great man. Adams
II writes that at first Lincoln "filled with dismay those
brought in contact with him." Further, Charles Francis sensed
from him "an utter absence of lead in presence of a danger
at once great and imminent." However, it was Lincoln who
made the most important diplomatic move of the war.

Seward had a reputation for hostility to England and The Duke
of Argyle described him as "the very impersonation of all
that is most violent and arrogant in the American character."
The British Minister to the United States, Lyons, had written
that Seward was "a dangerous foreign minister" who would
even start a war with Europe if it would maintain the Union. Evidence
was sufficient for Lyons to write that the temptation for the
North would be "to endeavor to divert the public excitement
to a foreign quarrel." However Seward was very well qualified
for his position and with the exception of his temporary obsession
with the idea of a foreign war he did a very good job. He was
from New York and of Welsh and Irish ancestry. He graduated from
Union College in 1820 and was admitted to the bar in 1822. In
1828 he presided over the Utica convention, which favored the
election of John Quincy Adams to the presidency. He disliked secrecy
in politics and joined the anti-Masonic party in the same year.
In 1830 he was elected a senator. In 1833 he spent the summer
in Europe and sent home more than eighty letters from different
points which were published in a newspaper. He was elected governor
of New York in 1838 where his actions provoked controversy and
directed the course of his country's history. As governor he demonstrated
his contempt for slavery in passing an act giving fugitive slaves
a trial by jury and a defense paid for by the state. He was deservedly
considered a brilliant speaker. He delivered an oration on Daniel
O'Connell and a eulogy on the late John Quincy Adams. For Seward,
slavery was wrong according to a 'higher law'. In one of his great
speeches he declared that "Congress has no power to inhibit
any duty commanded by God on Mount Sinai, or by His son on the
Mount of Olives." Outside his active political life Seward
enjoyed travel. In 1857 he traveled through Canada and took a
trip on a fishing smack to Labrador, an account of which he published.
In 1859 he visited Europe again and went as far as Palestine and
Egypt.

Lyons telegraphed Russell regarding Adams's appointment, calling
it "very good." Adams was the son of John Quincy Adams,
fifth President of the United States, and was the grandson of
John Adams, the second President. J.Q. had been a diplomat when
Charles was young. He served as Minister to Russia, negotiator
of the treaty of Ghent, and Minister to Great Britain. Therefore
the young Adams was well traveled. He was also fluent in French
from an early age. Adams attended Harvard, studied law in Washington
and in 1828 he was admitted to the bar. At the peak of his political
career he presided at the first convention of a Whig splinter
party called the Free Soil Party. The party was an anti-slavery
alternative and, with Adams as vice-presidential nominee, it did
surprisingly well for a new organization in the 1848 election.
In 1854 the Free Soil Party was crippled by the surge in support
for a new Native American, or "Know-nothing" Party.
However, by this time Adams left the political arena and dedicated
two years to writing a biography of his grandfather. In 1858 Adams
became involved again in the Free Soil Party, now known as the
Republican party. He became a member of congress in the same year
on an anti-slavery ticket. The Secretary of State was an old friend
of the Adams family. Seward had originally thought Charles Francis
suitable for the cabinet. After all, he was a capable politician
having had an international education. Adams, in turn, had thought
Seward was the most capable of all the candidates for executive
office.

The Confederacy replaced two of their commissioners after a year.
The new men were John Slidell and James Murray Mason, the new
chief. Both were experienced in foreign relations but their personal
characteristics made them incompatible with the tasks to which
they were assigned. Slidell's family background was insurance
and banking. He studied law at Colombia College in 1810 and was
admitted to the New York bar. In New York he worked in the mercantile
business in New York until the embargo of the war of 1812. Following
a duel he was forced to move to New Orleans in 1819, where he
ran a successful commercial law practice with Judah P. Benjamin.
As a democrat he served in the Louisiana House from 1829 - 1833
and failed in three attempts for the U.S. Senate. He served as
a states' rights Democrat in the U.S. House of Representatives
from 1843 to 1845 and in the Senate from 1853 until his resignation
in 1861. He had some experience in diplomatic affairs and had
expertise in the workings of foreign markets. He was appointed
U.S. minister to Mexico in 1845 by President Polk but that republic
would not entertain any American representatives at that time.
In 1853 he sold bonds for railroads in London and was offered
a mission to Central America before his nomination to the Senate.
Slidell was rumored to be a drunkard, however, and would come
to be hated by practically all the Confederate agents in Europe.

James Mason was the son of George Mason, a famous Virginian patriot
and friend of George Washington. He graduated from the University
of Pennsylvania in 1818, and studied law at William and Mary College,
Virginia. After he was admitted to the bar in Virginia he was
repeatedly elected to the state legislature until 1831. From 1837
until 1839 he served as a Democrat in the U.S. House of Representatives.
As a U.S. Senator from 1847 to 1861, he chaired the Foreign Relations
Committee for ten years and drafted the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850. Mason also served as the United States Minister to France.
His fourteen years as a Senator earned him his reputation as a
hard working, pro-slavery activist. However, in England he did
much to undermine the British stereotype of the South as populated
by dignified, chivalrous gentlemen such as General Robert E. Lee
or those found in Sir Walter Scott novels. Historian Howard Jones
describes him as "rude and obnoxious". He recalls how
Mason chewed tobacco, which was anathema to the British. Moreover,
he spat the tobacco in Parliament and, more often than not, missed
the spittoon and left it in a heap on the red carpet.

However the Confederacy had many other operatives working in Europe.
Of note were those involved in the education of public opinion
and the buying of Naval vessels. Some of these men displayed amazing
ability in their field despite poor resources. One example was
the journalist Henry Hotze, who is described as one of the most
able agents who went abroad during the Civil War. Born in Zurich,
Switzerland, he was familiar with European attitudes and politics.
Hotze's father had been a captain in the French Royal Service.
Henry had been educated in a Jesuit college before moving to Alabama
in 1855. There he joined the editorial staff of the Mobile
Register. He was secretary of the U.S. diplomatic legation
to Brussels in 1858 - 1859 before becoming secretary for the Board
of Harbor Commissioners in Mobile. In April, 1861 Hotze entered
the Confederate Army. In August of that year he was sent to Europe
to purchase supplies. Then, in November he became a Confederate
commercial agent, instructed to educate the British public about
the Confederacy. On a small allowance he quickly got to work,
establishing a pro-Confederacy newspaper called Index in
May 1862. Another agent, James Dunwody Bulloch, arrived in Britain
the same time as the Yancey, Rost, and Mann Commission. Bulloch,
who was to become a controversially important figure in the diplomatic
war, proved a useful ally to the South. He was a man of wide experience
in naval affairs, merchant shipping, shipbuilding, and naval armament.
He was born in Savannah, Georgia in 1823. At sixteen he was a
midshipman in the United States Navy and spent ten years there,
slowly working his way up. He resigned in 1853 to go into private
shipping interests in New York. He gained such a reputation for
fair dealing in business that when war came, the Confederate government
trusted him with millions of dollars to buy ships and arm them.
The vessels which he put to sea were so effective that the United
States merchant marine lost millions of dollars worth of cargo
and contracts. The efforts he made provoked incidents which brought
England to the brink of recognition of the South and war with
the North.

The North had vastly superior diplomats. They were superior even
if only for the fact that those of the South were mostly unsuitable
for the positions to which they were assigned. The Southern diplomats
were not as experienced as those of the Union. Further, their
known support for slavery made them unsuitable in seeking recognition
from countries that were firmly anti-slavery. However, the Confederacy
did have an arsenal of qualified, intelligent agents working in
its interests. Though Southern diplomacy failed, these agents
were quite successful in helping the Southern cause.

Chapter 3 The diplomacy of the first years of the conflict

Year 1.

The first shots of the American Civil War were fired at Fort Sumter
by the Confederacy at 04:30 on April 12, 1861. The Times
wrote that by this action " the seceding states have
now constituted themselves a nation." However the British
Government did not recognize this. On May 2, in response to questions
in the House of Commons, Lord Russell announced the government's
intention to "avoid taking any part in the lamentable contest
now raging in the American States we have not been involved
in any way in that contest by any act or giving any advice in
the matter, and, for God's sake, let us if possible keep out of
it." British public opinion was confused by the signals coming
from America regarding the purpose of the war. Slavery prevented
the British public from immediately embracing the new nation.
Public opinion was sensitive to the harrowing descriptions of
slavery made by the Times foreign correspondent, W.H. Russell.
However, in his inaugural address, March 4, 1861, Lincoln had
announced:

I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere with the
institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe
I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to
do so.

Therefore it seemed that the war was not about slavery and this
offered an easy excuse for those who were inclined to support
the South. However, recognition was not forthcoming. The political
situation was too fragile for Britain to recognize the new nation.
The British Government under Palmerston was a coalition with a
small majority. Most attention of the day was on events in Europe.
The opposition was not putting forward a policy on the American
situation and Lord Russell was not about to provoke them. Russell
also wished to avoid conflict with Seward, one of the only known
figures in the American cabinet. In 1860, Seward is alleged to
have joked to the Duke of Newcastle that in case he became Secretary
of State it would then "become my duty to insult England,
and I mean to do so." There was a strategic advantage for
England in staying out of the war. On January 1, 1861, Baron de
Brunow, the Russian Ambassador to London, observed to St. Petersburg
that, "the English Government, at the bottom of his heart,
desires the separation of North America into two separate republics,
which will watch each other jealously and counterbalance one the
other." However, the correspondence of the British diplomats
does not reveal any proof of animus towards the American States.
Russell's instructions to Lyons and the British consuls were not
"to seem to favor one party rather than the other" but
only to advise against action which might lead to civil war.

The Confederate commissioners arrived on April 15 and 29, they
were met by William H. Gregory M.P., for Galway, who quickly
arranged an informal meeting with the head of the English foreign
office, Lord John Russell. Russell kept the meeting unofficial
so as not to provoke Seward. Russell wrote to Lyons that "if
it could possibly be helped Mr. Seward must not be allowed to
get us into a quarrel. I shall see the Southern Commissioners
when they come but not officially, and keep them at a proper distance."
The Confederates were instructed to promote the idea that the
secession of the Southern states was not a revolution but, as
Toombs put it, the "resumption of power delegated to the
federal government." This was legal justification to which
Toombs added that confederate states had been made subject to
unfair tariffs, like the Morrill Tariff Act of 1861, which made
European products more expensive and "extorted millions ...
from our people to foster Northern monopolies." Secession
was, as he put it, "separation from associates who recognize
no law but self-interests (sic) and the power of numerical superiority."
Second, there was the cotton bait. The commissioners' instructions
read "there is no extravagance in the assertion that the
gross amount of the annual yield of the manufacturies of Great
Britain from the cotton of the Confederate States reaches $600,000,000.
The British ministry will comprehend fully the condition to which
the British realm would be reduced if the supply ... should fail
or be diminished."

The meeting with Russell took place on May 3. He advised the commissioners
in advance that though "it would give pleasure to hear what
we had to communicate", he should, "under present circumstances,
have little to say." The diplomats stated their arguments
and concluded in expressing their hope that Great Britain would
find it beneficial to recognize the Confederacy. Mann reported
home that though England was hostile to slavery it was not hostile
to the disintegration of the Union. Therefore commissioners recognized
that slavery was an issue. They believed, however, that recognition
would come as soon as the South could gain a decisive military
victory to prove itself.

On May 11 news arrived of Lincoln's proclamation of a blockade
on all southern ports. That same week Russell issued a 'Proclamation
of Neutrality' which acknowledged the Confederates' belligerent
status without recognizing their independence. This move in favor
of the Confederacy owed nothing to the commissioners. Russell
was acting purely in Britain's interest. Neutrality would ensure
that Britain was not drawn into the war. Meanwhile trade could
continue with both the North and, assuming the blockade was compromisable,
the South. Jefferson Davis' response was to issue letters of marque
for privateering. He did this in an effort to bolster the Southern
Navy which was heavily outgunned by the Union. Lincoln, in turn,
announced that he intended to treat southern privateers as pirates
and expected all other countries to do the same as agreed by international
law. But the Union never previously subscribed to that law and
this put the Russell in a dilemma, for to treat the privateers
as pirates now would be the same as taking a side in the conflict.
Russell asked for legal advice and decided to grant neutrality.
This included a right for the belligerent parties to contract
with privateers. The proclamation was also justified by the argument
that the Northern blockade was exercising a right of 'war' in
also searching ships sailing under a neutral flag. This implied
the existence of two belligerent parties. Further, it directly
effected British trade. As early as March 20 Lyons had informed
Seward that the British Government would use all the means in
its power to keep the southern ports open if there was a blockade.
Lyons told Seward that the most likely course of action would
be to recognize the Southern Confederacy. However the proclamation
was a preferable alternative to such a direct challenge.

The Union's newly appointed Minister to England, Charles Francis
Adams, arrived with his family in Liverpool on May 13, 1861. He
was given a good welcome by Russell who, despite pressing personal
problems, quickly arranged an interview between the two and a
formal presentation to Queen Victoria. Adams wrote that Britain
was "unfriendly to the Union." In his first report back
to Seward on May 14 he claimed that he was politically "ready
for business" but that public opinion was "not exactly
what we would wish for." For the Northern position horrified
some and encouraged support for the Confederacy. Henry Adams,
Adams' son and secretary for the mission, later wrote of that
time in England noting that "even the friends of America
shrank for a moment from the realization that a million lives
might have to pay the price of Union." On May 9 the Times
ran an editorial stating the proclamation was a reflection of
the fact that Great Britain was now coming to see the conflict
in a new light - as a conflict where there were in fact no such
ideals involved as had been earlier attributed to it. Southern
rights were now clearly understood, and now that war was at hand,
it was England's business to keep out of it. Before departure
Adams had received scant orders from Secretary of State Seward
in Washington. Essentially he was to consider any recognition
of the "rebels" an unfriendly act to be countered by
an immediate break in diplomatic communication between the two
countries. It was well known that Seward had a theory that the
fighting would end if a foreign power were to be engaged in a
war with the Union. However, Adams wrote in his diary "My
duty here is, so far as I can do it honestly, to prevent the mutual
irritation from coming to a downright quarrel. It seems to me
like throwing the game into the hands of the enemy ... If a conflict
with a handful of slaveholding States is to bring us to [our present
pass] what are we to do when we throw down the glove to Europe?"

On May 18 Adams had his appointment with Russell and he explained
his disappointment with the recent proclamation of belligerency.
He asked whether Russell was planning to "adopt a policy
which would have the effect to widen, if not make irreparable,
a breach [between North and South] which we believed yet to be
entirely manageable by ourselves." To this Russell replied
that the recognition of Confederate independence was not an issue
at the moment. Adams protested the basis of the proclamation.
First, the South was had not "shown their capacity to maintain
any kind of warfare whatever." Second, the proclamation considered
the South a maritime power even though the South had no navy.
Should not England have considered that the privateers which they
were recognizing would probably be pirates as Lincoln suggested?
Furthermore, so far the South had not produced a single privateer
on the water. If England was acting before the facts were clear
then the North must presume a point of predisposition to the South.

Adams suspected that his time in England would not last very long
and he decided to rent his house by the month. Henry wrote that
during the year 1861 the London legation "stood in an attitude
of anxiety not easy to realize." Yet the Minister was not
convinced that the Queen's proclamation or Russell's talk should
be taken as a sign of English support for the Confederacy. His
meeting with the Queen went well. Russell publicly criticized
those in parliament who spoke out against the United States, and
W.H. Gregory's motion to recognize the Confederacy was postponed.
He wrote to Washington that he believed that the government was
not "animated by a desire to favor the rebellion" but
suffered a "division of opinion, consequent upon the pressure
of the commercial classes." The Minister was also making
a favorable personal impression to the British. The London government
seemed to openly welcome Adams and in the three weeks following
his arrival five cabinet members invited him to dinner. In October
Russell wrote in a letter to Lyons that there was "every
reason to be satisfied with the language and conduct of Mr. Adams
since he arrived in this country." Yancey, Rost and Mann
meanwhile worked to increase the support for the Confederacy,
gaining aid from such people as William S. Lindsay, a radical
member of Parliament and largest shipowner in England. Mann's
Reuters News Agency connections promised to broadcast all the
news he supplied them throughout Europe. According to secret agent
William M. Walker, U.S.N., Confederate agents and "southern
gentlemen" were swarming through the impressionable upper
echelons of English and French society. The commissioners reported
that the Northern representatives were ruining their own cause
with too much obstreperousness and that the anti-slavery element
was becoming less active. They knew the United States was strongly
supported by the anti-slavery movement in England but, as reunion
became the clear objective of the war and not emancipation of
the slaves, the South's support from those who supported free
trade increased. Adams observed this too. "Tragically few"
of the English, he wrote, understood that the preservation of
the Union was necessary for the progress of free institutions
all over the world.

During the summer of 1861, Secretary Seward was angry at foreign
interference in American affairs and was still keen to provoke
a foreign war. A dispatch bearer bound for the British Consulate
in Charleston was arrested by Union agents. This prompted Seward
to issue an aggressive complaint at yet another example of British
meddling. Palmerston replied by recommending the sending of troops
to Canada. The American politician was "so wild", he
said, "that any act of intemperance may be expected."
Then, in May, he declared in a dinner table talk that "the
Southern Commissioners could not be received by any power, officially
or otherwise." On May 21, Seward's dispatch No.10 to Adams
arrived. It was made private and confidential by a shrewd Lincoln.
The dispatch informed Adams that any further diplomatic contact
between England and the South would have to be countered by a
break in the diplomatic relations between England and the North.
It contained language that would be offensive to the British government.
It threatened war "not unlike ... at the close of the last
century." Of the dispatch Adams wrote "the government
seems ready to declare war with all the powers of Europe ... I
scarcely know how to understand Mr. Seward. The rest of the government
may be demented for all that I know but surely he is calm and
wise." Adams decided to resolve his dilemma by relating only
a general idea of the dispatch to Russell. He explained that any
further contact with the commissioners "could scarcely fail
to be viewed by us as hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding
action accordingly." Seward had earlier explained his motives
for these actions in a confidential paper to Lincoln entitled
"Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration" he
urged Lincoln to "change the question before the [American]
public from one upon slavery ... for a question upon union or
disunion." To this end he recommended engineering a war against
Spain or France or Great Britain. The previous December Seward
had explained his idea at the dinner of the New England Society
in New York. In the event of a foreign attack on New York, he
said, "all the hills of South Carolina would pour fourth
their population to the rescue."

A change in public and government sympathy towards the South occurred
that summer as the Times and others started to write in
favor of the Rebels. This was precipitated by a Confederate victory
at Bull Run on the July 21. Yancey, Rost and Mann wrote to the
temporary Confederate Secretary of State, R.M.T. Hunter, on June
10. They told him that the only thing hindering recognition was
the lack of a major military victory. They had also reported that
relations between Adams and the British government were "not
entirely amicable and satisfactory to either." The commissioners
had been snubbed in the past by the London foreign office in obtaining
official meetings and now, on the heels of Bull Run, they expected
a formal interview. However, they did not interpret the situation
in correctly. Russell would only take communication in writing.
This is an indication that he took Adams' warning seriously. The
commission wrote and reviewed the arguments presented previously.
They added that there were now four more states in the confederacy.
They argued that the war was not about slavery but only waged
in order to preserve the Union. However, Russell would not pass
judgment on the issue. Britain would maintain neutrality and wait.
This frustrated Yancey to the extent that he submitted his resignation.

That summer Seward ordered Adams to represent America in the conclusion
of the Declaration of Paris, a definition of the practices of
maritime war. In April 1856, after the Crimean War, Great Britain,
France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Turkey agreed to respect
neutral commerce, whether under its own flag or under the flag
of an enemy. In April 1856, four articles were adopted at the
Congress of Paris:

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of
contraband of war.

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are
not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.

4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that
is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent
access to the coast of the enemy.

The signatories pledged to invite all states not represented at
the congress to accede to it. In 1856 the U.S. Secretary Marcy
notified the French government that he could not give up his right
to use privateers unless there was an assurance of the protection
of all noncontraband private property. Negotiations on this issue
were never completed. However, on April 24, 1861, Seward issued
a circular to his ministers overseas to the effect that they should
"enter into negotiations for the accession of the government
of the United States to the Declaration of Paris." Adams
was to accede to the declaration with the understanding that the
Marcy amendment was unacceptable. Russell delayed in accepting
the application replying eventually that Her Majesty did not intend
to interfere with internal U.S. issues. For the policy was not
to be reversed regarding the proclamation which made Confederate
privateers safe in English harbors. Russell wrote to Adams that
any "European power signing a convention with the United
States declaring that privateering was and remains abolished,
would be bound to treat the privateers of the so-called Confederate
States as pirates." Frustrated, Adams then closed the negotiation.
He wrote of it in his diary that it was "difficult to suppress
indignation at the shuffling practiced throughout." He argued
that with Russell's amendment Articles 2 and 3 were very beneficial
to the English merchant marine and would lead to the destruction
of the U.S. merchant marine, their primary competitors. The Confederate
ships carried no cargo and, under these conditions, U.S. cargo
would have to be carried under a neutral, quite likely British,
flag. Adams had made an assumption of the friendliness of Earl
Russell to the United States. He now believed that he could not
rely on the Palmerston-Russell government.

Unease continued that autumn as British blockade runners continued
to compromise the validity of the U.S. blockade. The English were
angry at the ease at which ships could slip through the net and
at the 'paper obstruction' which it presented to the hungry cotton
mills. There was distress in the cotton districts as the U.S.
consul in Manchester, Henry Lord, observed in a letter to Seward
that September. Public opinion in that town, he said, was "almost
unanimously adverse" to the North. On October 5 the commission
wrote Hunter that prospects for recognition were the best ever.
But they were wrong. When the French ambassador to the Court of
St. James, Charles de Flahault, and the French minister to the
United States, Henri Mercier, approached Russell, suggesting action,
they were told that the situation did not warrant war. This opinion
was widely held in cabinet and Palmerston wrote Russell on October
18 that it would not do to intervene just to obtain cotton. Parts
of the press also seemed to support Russell. On October 30 the
Times argued that the South had not yet proved itself capable
of maintaining independence. The labor press was opposed though.
One editorial commented that if the North was not fighting to
free the slaves then England was "relieved from any moral
consideration in their favor".

In November the two replacement Confederate diplomats, Mason and
Slidell, were removed by the commander of the U.S.S. San Jacinto
from a British ship called the Trent which was carrying
them to England. The commander of the San Jacinto, Charles
Wilkes, was a famous naval scientist and explorer. He learned
that Mason and Slidell were abroad and determined, without waiting
for orders, to legally seize them as "the embodiment of despatches
(sic)"or political contraband. This he did on
November 8, off the coast of Cuba. Wilkes's arrest of the two
men was celebrated as a major victory in New York. But when news
arrived in Britain, Palmerston exclaimed to the cabinet, "You
may stand for this but damned if I will." He already knew
that the Commissioners were abroad and predicted that an event
like Trent could happen. On the basis of British precedent,
dispatches could be contraband. The attorney-general advised Palmerston
on November 12 that the ship "and all and everything in her"
could be seized and brought to a prize court. However, based on
the American practice with regard to right of search and impressment,
the actual removal of the diplomats was illegal. Illegal or not,
though, on November 11 Palmerston advised Adams that it would
be unwise to "create irritations in this country merely for
the sake of preventing the landing of Mr. Slidell, whose presence
here would have no more effect on the policy of [her] Majesty
with regard to America than the presence of the three other Southern
deputies who have been here many months." Further, he warned,
British public opinion could not but be offended.

Of all the ministers in Lincoln's cabinet, only the Postmaster-General,
Montgomery Blair, denounced Wilkes' act. Seward was noncommittal.
He believed that England would not go to war over a "couple
of slave envoys." He kept Adams in the dark for weeks while
the Government decided how to handle the affair. As he delayed
it seemed a war was inevitable. At a cabinet meeting on November
29 Palmerston spoke of an arms embargo and moving the fleet to
American waters. The government demanded the prisoners back with
an apology and the defenses of Canada were augmented. However
war was not a practical option for Britain at that time. Reinforcing
Canada during the late winter months created logistical difficulties
due to frozen waterways and Union naval technology put the British
fleet at risk. Similarly, the Union made no arrangements for a
war with England. Lincoln explained to the Canadian financial
minister, Galt, that the token preparations arranged along the
Canadian border were merely to "satisfy the people."
If England issued an ultimatum, the Union did not seem to have
secured an alternative to capitulation. On December 16 news arrived
from Seward that the removal of Slidell and Mason had not been
policy. Adams let Russell know this immediately. Lincoln's cabinet
moved to surrender the prisoners on Christmas Day. It was, as
Lincoln recalled "the bitterest pill."

Though the Trent affair had been resolved peacefully, it damaged
the Union reputation. Richard Cobden, a supporter of the Union,
wrote that "three fourths of the House [of commons] will
be glad to find an excuse for voting for the dismemberment of
the Great Republic." Northern policy was full of irony. Justification
of policy during the Trent affair relied upon a wartime
right of search, yet it denied the basis upon which that right
rested. Similar ironies were present in the fact that the blockade
was only legal in a time of war and that the North expected the
full application of the principles of the Paris agreement to apply
to what was argued to be a nonexistent entity. The British public
learned that the war was not about slavery, as was previously
assumed, and the Union Secretary of State seemed eager for a war
with England. After the contents of Seward's dispatches became
public at the end of the year, the New York Times observed
that "the London journals persist in ascribing to the administration
of President Lincoln [a] wanton craving for a foreign war".
Seward figured in the British mind as "a Giant Blunderbore,
thirsting day and night for the blood of Englishmen."

Year Two

In early spring Lord Lyons wrote to Russell predicting that a
dangerous stalemate was developing. If North could not achieve
a great victory before this 'sickly season' set in then popular
discontent with the war would force the North to concede. This
posed a problem for Britain. Republican moderate elements, he
observed, would combine with the already hostile radicals to provoke
a war with Britain. The former to restore the Union, the later
to remain in power. He suggested that, as the Union elections
were looming, intervention would strengthen the Republican peace
elements and help end the war. In Britain, prices were up on the
surplus cotton stocks, and there was a hope that finally the monopoly
of U.S. cotton was broken. This led Adams to try to promote a
retraction of recognition of belligerency. In conversation with
Union Minister to France, William L. Dayton, Adams learned that
Napoleon III was pro-retraction if only the English would agree.
Russell gave his regrets but declined. Also, a ship of war, The
Alabama, manufactured in Liverpool, received arms and crew
from Britain while at sea. Neutral obligations in this respect
had been defined in the Foreign Enlistment act of 1819, which
stated that "No British subject ... could engage in equipping
any ship or vessel, with intent or in order that such ship
or vessel shall be employed in the service of a belligerent."
It was, however, too difficult for Adams to prove who the intended
owners were and so it escaped.

The subject of mediation arose several times in parliament during
the summer of 1862. On March 7, to the approval of many, William
Gregory demonstrated in the Commons that the blockade was ineffective.
The Cabinet did not support him however. But by June there was
more interest in recognition. Though Russell warned in Parliament
that "the present time would be most inopportune for such
an attempt at mediation", on June 20 another motion for recognition
was presented to the Commons. It was unsuccessful and on June
30 Palmerston stated that the Cabinet would act only when it appeared
"that such a step would be attended with success". When
passion cooled on either side "and a fair opening appear[ed]
for any step which might be likely to meet with the acquiescence
of the two parties", the Cabinet would act. On July 1 William
Stuart, British chargé d'affairs in Washington, wrote that
the Union general, McClellan, was now retreating from Richmond.
He wrote that the continuing poor military performance would lower
northern confidence and that French minister Mercier believed
that by October northern public opinion would welcome mediation.

During the autumn of 1862 Great Britain seriously considered intervening
in the American Civil War. In September General Lee's troops invaded
Maryland after Stonewall Jackson repelled the Union army at the
second battle of Bull Run. While the Europeans did not believe
the South had the ability to conquer the North, French Foreign
Minister Thouvenel observed that no leader on the continent thought
that the Union could win. A stalemate had been reached. Russell
and Palmerston now believed the time to act was almost at hand.
Public opinion leaned towards action of some sort. The Morning
Herald pleaded "Let us do something ... arbitration,
intervention, diplomatic action, recognition ... let us do something
to stop this carnage." Secretly the British Cabinet was discussing
some form of urgent intervention. On September 13 Russell ordered
Lord Cowley, ambassador to France, to sound out informally Édouard
Thouvenel, the French foreign minister, regarding a joint recommendation
of armistice accompanied by a threat that the Confederacy "might"
be recognized. There were clear ideas about how the conflict could
be settled. On September 14 Palmerston wrote Russell that "The
federals ... got a very complete thrashing". "Would
it not be time for us to consider," he asked, "[to]
address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon
the basis of separation?" Russell agreed and suggested "One
Republic to be constituted on the principle of freedom and personal
liberty - the other on the principle of slavery and the mutual
surrender of fugitives." Further, he noted that "whether
the Federal Army is destroyed or not it is clear that it is driven
back to Washington, and has made no progress in subduing the Insurgent
States." Many urged caution however. Lyons, who was now in
England, protested that the time was not yet right for an intervention.
On September 22 Palmerston advised Russell that Britain should
await the outcome of the coming battle before making any decisions.
He argued that "if the Federals sustain a great Defeat they
may be once ready for Mediation and the Iron should be struck
while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best
of it we may wait awhile and see what may follow." Palmerston
concluded that "whichever way Victory now inclines, I cannot
think the South can now be conquered." Russell agreed that
in such a case the Union might realize the futility of the war
and he suggested a Cabinet meeting for October to discuss the
whole matter. The Confederate commissioners got news of these
developments and believed that recognition would come soon. On
September 23, the son-in-law of Lady Palmerston, the Earl of Shaftesbury,
visited Paris. He was widely known as an associate of the prime
minister and was described by Adams as a "good key"
to understanding British policy. In Paris he assured Slidell that
British recognition was no more than a few weeks away. Palmerston
wrote Gladstone on September 24 that if the Federals lost the
battle for Maryland their cause would become "manifestly
hopeless."

On September 30 news arrived in England that Lee had been defeated
at Antietam. Palmerston wrote Russell that the situation was now
confused; the North would not consider mediation until it had
"had a good deal more pummelling (sic) from the South."
Owsley describes this event as the death-blow of Confederate hopes
for recognition. However, it rather reinforced the idea that neither
side would win. On September 30, Shaftesbury assured Slidell that
the British attitude with regard to intervention had not changed.
He was right. The truth is that these events actually heightened
British interest in intervention. 24, 000 men had been wounded
or killed at Antietam. Within a week of the battle, Stuart sent
a dispatch explaining that Lyons and Mercier wanted to jointly
declare their desire for an armistice to end the terrible war.
But Cowley reported to Russell on October 4 that Napoleon III
favored recognition of the Confederacy. This encouraged Russell
who then proposed to Palmerston that Britain immediately adopt
a joint mediation plan based upon achieving separation. He recommended,
as per Mercier's suggestion, that Lyons should return to America
immediately with a suggestion of an armistice and a joint offer
of "good offices."

The news of Antietam was followed on September 22 by Lincoln's
proclamation that on January 1 all the slaves in all the rebelling
states would be free. The motivation was clear. Lincoln had recently
told an anti-slavery group in Washington that no other step "would
be so potent to prevent foreign intervention." The Chicago
Tribune agreed, describing the proclamation as "a practical
war measure ... to be decided upon according to the advantages
or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion."
Most British observers did not believe that the proclamation was
a moral or humanitarian measure. It was more an attempt to bring
down King Cotton from within. Russell and Gladstone feared that
emancipation would incite a slave revolution which would grow
into a race war. In January of 1862 Lyons had alerted Russell
that the war was "rapidly tending towards the issue either
of peace and a recognition of the separation or a Proclamation
of Emancipation and the raising of a servile insurrection."
Russell knew then that Lincoln might promote a revolution of the
slaves if the Union could not be restored by other means. Stuart
wrote that the proclamation demonstrated no "pretext of humanity"
and offered "direct encouragement to servile reactions."
The British government feared that a terrible slave revolution
would ensue. This would upset the entire commercial relationship
with the American States and, as a result, it would pull England
into the conflict too. Russell asked the chargé in Washington
to make the point to Seward that a race war would "only make
other nations more desirous to see an end to this desolating and
destructive conflict."

Seward was infuriated with the British reaction. He said Union
victory "does not satisfy our enemies abroad. Defeats in
their eyes prove our national incapacity". "At first,"
said he, "the [Union] government was considered as unfaithful
to humanity in not proclaiming the emancipation, and when it appeared
that slavery, by being thus forced into the contest, must suffer,
and perhaps perish in the conflict, then the war had become an
intolerable propagandism of emancipation by the sword." Seward
promised that British intervention would turn the conflict into
"a war of the world." His threat posed an obstacle which
was not fully evident until October, when a cabinet meeting was
to discuss the issue of intervention. Attention was drawn to it
inadvertently by Gladstone. On October 7, he had made a speech
at Newcastle saying "Davis was making a nation". He
left the impression that the ministry was on the verge of recognizing
the South. This proved embarrassing and was promptly disavowed
in the Evening Globe and by Russell in a meeting with Adams.

Russell believed the war had to stop. Emancipation, he argued,
had authorized the Union armies to commit acts of revenge which
would tear America apart. But how could Britain step between the
antagonists without recognition? There was little support for
Russell's proposal from cabinet members. The Duke of Newcastle,
secretary for the colonies, thought that the proposal was premature
and would obstruct a tendency towards peace already present in
the Republican party. There were elections in November; perhaps
the balance of power would shift away from the radical elements.
Lord Clarendon wrote Palmerston that Lord Derby, the Tory leader,
also opposed intervention. Unwilling to compromise the delicate
balance of power, Palmerston stated that "we must continue
merely to be lookers-on til the war shall have taken a more decided
turn". Talking peace to the Americans, he wrote, would be
as useless as "asking the winds to let the waters
remain calm." Secretary for War, George Cornwall Lewis, insisted
that intervention meant war. Further, England had no terms to
offer. If any terms sanctioned slavery then the British government
would alienate the Union and much of its own public. If the terms
suggested abolition the South would reject them. In the cabinet
Lewis's ideas were popular. By October 20 Russell postponed the
Cabinet meeting. He learned that Russia was not prepared to support
the Anglo-French scheme. "Less than the whole five [of the
major powers]," he wrote, "would not do."

Then, in France, Thouvenel was replaced by Édouard Drouyn
de Lhuys. He informed Cowley that the Emperor desired an Anglo-French-Russian
mediated six-month truce and a suspension of the blockade. Secretly,
Napoleon III was hoping to create a diversion which would allow
him to operate freely in his Mexican ventures. The Emperor suggested
that if Lincoln were to reject the offer then peaceful elements
in the North would be strengthened and would overthrow the Lincoln
government. In America the evidence seemed clear of a swelling
tide of disgust with Republican mismanagement of the war. Napoleon
III contended that foreign interposition would accelerate this
and force a compromise between the two parties. The Emperor told
Slidell, on the other hand, that rejection of his proposal by
the Union would provide "good reason for recognition and
perhaps more active intervention." The French proposal gave
Russell new hope and he decided to present the proposal to the
Cabinet on November 11. However, the Cabinet clearly feared the
opposite to Napoleon's idea. Interference would unite the States
and prove Seward's foreign war theory. Lewis took up a campaign
against this proposal in the newspapers. Under the pseudonym "Historicus"
he repeated his arguments. He admitted that international law
made provision for the armed intervention of neutral nations but
this was not rational in this case. How were they to transport
their armies across the Atlantic? How were their wooden warships
to engage the Union ironclads? Finally, even if the parties could
be brought to the table, the distance involved was too great for
European powers to coordinate any mediation effectively. Lewis
also wrote a 15,000 word memorandum to the cabinet explaining
his ideas in detail. On November 11 -12, the cabinet met. The
proposal was supported by Gladstone, Russell, and Palmerston.
However, when Russell revealed that Russia was no longer a willing
party to mediation the Cabinet overwhelmingly rejected Napoleon's
offer. The Times approved; it commented that history would
judge any "untimely meddling" as having "forced
the nation once more under the power of a faction which must have
fallen without our aid."

Year Three

The confederate agents in Europe looked upon their recent failure
as a 'trifling' incident and expected better luck in the coming
year. On December 11, 1862, Mason wrote to Benjamin that "...
events are coming to pass which must lead to some change in the
attitude of England." Though postponed by private contribution,
the commissioners believed that soon there would be starvation
in the districts hit by the cotton famine. The Parliament was
due to meet in February and some form of government action was
anticipated. However, the Confederates could not seek intervention
again without some solid military victory to back up their arguments.

Were the confederate agent's views naive? Certainly they were
painting a rosier picture than events suggested. There had been
some cynical reaction to the emancipation proclamation from those
who were hostile to the Union, as it seemed like an attempt to
gain foreign sympathy. But generally it was welcomed. Speeches
by Lord Russell at the opening of Parliament indicated that the
cabinet still seemed to have no plans for recognition. The British
lower and middle classes were delighted with the proclamation
as the attendance at a mass emancipation meeting in Exeter Hall
on 29 January proved. It was so crowded that traffic outside
was held up for two hours. Adams was besieged with letters, petitions,
and resolutions from worker's groups and emancipation societies,
all supporting the proclamation. Also, as the demand for manufactured
goods from the Lancashire textile manufactories was high, the
conditions and temperaments of the workers hit by the cotton famine
were improving. Further, Lyons had now returned to Washington
and reported that after the American election radical elements
in both Republican and Democratic parties were now more powerful
and still committed to the conflict. Therefore mediation was impossible.

News arrived that the Confederates had won the battle of Fredricksburg
and had been advancing northwards ever since. This prompted more
requests to Napoleon III from Southern sympathizers to take action.
France was suffering from the reduced supply of cotton and Napoleon
publicly condemned the war which had exhausted "one of the
most fruitful of [French] industries." Mercier was instructed
to approach Seward to arrange some form of mediation to resolve
the conflict. But Seward was in no mood to entertain a stalemate
in the war, and refused Mercier's request. By then it seems that
Russell had given up entirely on the idea of a mediation and wrote
on February 14th that there was no point in further action until
"both parties are heartily sick and tired of the business."
However, some believed that the Union would never be sick and
tired of the business and that reunion was impossible. Sympathizers
on both sides saw separation asthe only solution. "The
North and the South are virtually separated," commented the
pro-Northern novelist Anthony Trollope, "and the day will
come in which the west also will secede". The historian E.
Freeman concurred with Trollope in his History of Federal Government,
published in 1863. If this was the fate of the United States then
why not act to end the conflict as soon as possible? With this
idea popular and being published, the Confederates hoped that
there was still a chance for recognition. The problem was that
the Whig ministry seemed unshakable. Mason's friend, Spence, suggested
that as the Tories should be approached. This idea was not popular
as it was seen that the Tories were not pro-Confederacy but it
would resurface later.

Meanwhile Union patience was running out with Britain since, despite
her words, Britain's continuing dereliction of neutral responsibilities
implied favor to the South. English vessels continued to compromise
the blockade and confederate warships were being built in England.
Yet, the British government made no moves to condemn these actions
on the part of her subjects. Neutral obligations with respect
to the warships had been defined in the Foreign Enlistment Act
of 1819. This stated that "No British subject ... could engage
in equipping any ship or vessel, with intent or in order
that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of a
belligerent." As early as November 1862 Adams had asked for
redress from Russell for damages from these ships. Now he wrote
to Seward that the issue, for fear of ill-will, should not be
pursued as a matter of critical importance. He was mistaken. In
spring it came to light that two more ships, the Laird rams, were
under construction. Adams looked for legal means to prevent their
launch but it was left up to the United States to prove the malicious
intent of the vessels. However, evidence of this would only be
interpreted as such after the offense. The South had already received
legal advice that the Act would continue to be interpreted this
way as long as the ships were not armed and equipped inside the
country. When news of the vessels reached the Union in late February
it was met by a "Privateering Bill", engineered by Seward,
for the issuance of letters of marque to hunt down the Alabama
and others like her. This caused immediate reaction in Britain
and, the day after Adams informed Russell of the Bill, a debate
on neutral policy took place in Commons. During this debate, though
Russell privately advised action to the contrary, both Palmerston
and Laird defended British conduct in the matter. This prompted
Adams to comment that Palmerston was a "rancorous hater of
America and bent on depressing it." Regardless, on 5 April,
with the Prime Minister's approval, Russell gave orders for the
seizure of another vessel, the Alexandra.

No decision could be expected from the Alexandra proceedings
until June. In the meantime Adams provoked a controversy. A vessel
carrying goods to the Confederacy, The Peterhoff, en route
to the Mexican port of Matamoras, was intercepted by the blockade.
Although the British argued that the seizure was illegal as goods
were bound for Mexico when on the ship, the incident resulted
in a decision by Lloyd's of London to stop underwriting such trips.
Then, in April, Adams was approached by two Americans who smuggled
guns to Mexico. They could not get insurance for their next venture
because Lloyd's needed evidence that the guns were not intended
for the South. So, Adams gave them an affidavit stating that they
could be insured without fear of trouble from the blockade. He
also gave them a letter for Admiral Dupont of the blockade so
that he would let them pass. In the body of this note Adams referred
to a "multitude of fraudulent and dishonest enterprises"
which had come from Britain putting honest trade "under suspicion".
An underwriter at Lloyd's leaked this information to the Times
and the next day Adams was universally denounced. Newspapers
condemned his attempt to "constitute himself an authority
for 'licensing' certain ships as opposed to others." Adams
immediately tried to apologize for any misunderstanding as he
had not intended to interfere in British trade. The incident was
formally protested in Parliament and in letters to Washington.
In the end Seward officially disavowed the letter.

The previous year it had become difficult to raise funds for Confederate
operatives in Europe. The absence of confidence in southern currency
meant that the Confederacy had to experiment with various alternative
ways of obtaining money. Cotton liabilities, for example, were
issued by an agency belonging to Mason's friend, Spence, raising
a million dollars in December 1862. Following this, a 'cotton
loan' was floated by the Emile Erlanger & Company of Paris
for £3,000,000 ($15,000,000). This was not so much for profit
as for the "strong influences" that would accompany
the loan, as Slidell wrote "it is a financial recognition
of our independence." Erlanger issued bonds against this
loan at 90 percent face value on March 15th. The bonds were measured
in sterling, bore an annual interest of 7 percent, and were convertible
into certificates representing cotton at a price of six pence
per pound. Investors would pay for bonds over a period of seven
months and Erlanger & Co. would pay the proceeds of the loan
to the Confederate government after taking a commission. The discount
rose by up to 5 percent in the first five days then, on March
23, it dropped below par. At this stage only 15 percent had been
paid in by investors so Erlanger feared that they would have forfeited
their payment rather than throw good money after bad. Apart from
being a financial loss for the Confederacy, it would have been
a demonstration of a lack of faith in the South. The intermediary
had to intervene but by April 5 they could afford this no more.
On April 4 Russell ordered the detonation of the Alexandria
in her dock. Confidence trembled and the bonds fell to 87. The
Southern agents then agreed to allow the use of Confederate loan
money from the 15 percent already paid to further support the
price. This improved the position of the loan and the next settlement
date, May 1, passed without any problems. Then, on June 13, the
intermediary agreed to accept the whole issue in exchange for
bonds worth 13 percent of the face value. From then the bonds
fluctuated freely.

Professor Judith Gentry has argued that the loan was quite successful.
By the end of the war, after payment of debts and disposal of
as many bonds as they could (nearly two-thirds), the Confederacy
received £1,760,989 or $8,535,486 from the loan. Considering
Erlanger's commission, the maximum net income possible of 90 percent
of the loan was £2,153,629. Gentry argues that next to this
the net income sum does not seem "quite so small." Gentry
further argues that the Erlanger loan could not have performed
any better. A comparison with the terms of other proposals made
to Confederacy showed no significant differences. This was the
best contract available to the Confederate agents as any risk
adverse intermediary needed a high commission. In comparison with
domestic Union bond sales (which were paid for in depreciated
currency), the Erlanger loan was almost as successful in terms
'productive purchasing power'. Ultimately, it produced £1,759,894
for use in Europe when Confederate needs were great. More importantly,
however, the Confederates achieved their goal of 'financial recognition'.
They established good credit and prevented the failure of their
loan at a critical time when they still had hope for an intermediation.
Thus the loan was a success.

That May news of a break in the Vicksburg campaign was accompanied
by news of a greater victory by Lee at Chancellorsville in Virginia.
If Lee could capitalize on this he could invade the North. With
all the newspapers excited by this, William Roebuck M.P. proposed
a motion to recognize the Confederacy. Russell reacted skeptically,
"Lord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I should think
no great number of the liberal party." But Confederate recognition
was now clearly against Whig policy. A victory for this motion
would dislodge the government and replace them with a Tory government.
Since January Hotze's newspaper, Index, ran highly
critical articles of the Palmerston administration to attract
Tory support. There was an excellent chance for recognition. However,
the motion was withdrawn due to a ridiculous controversy. Roebuck
communicated with Napoleon III to determine if he was still willing
to intervene on behalf of the Confederacy. This was beyond his
jurisdiction. He was accused of misrepresenting parliament and
of dealing in an official capacity with a foreign power. The parliament
did not even have an opportunity to discuss recognition.

On July 16 news arrived of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg. This, combined
with Grant's victories in the West, enabled the Union to commence
planning offensively. The Confederacy was never again able to
mount a full-scale invasion of the North. Observers at Gettysburg
noted that much of the equipment left on the battlefield was homemade
or makeshift. Thereafter the South's material resources declined
further. The news of the battle undermined public confidence in
the ability of the Confederacy. It ensured that neither recognition
or mediation was ever again proposed in Parliament. The diplomatic
tide turned and the Union now confidently pursued its objectives.
On September 5 Adams resolved the last serious contentious issue
between Britain and the Union; the Laird rams. In reference to
the impending launch of the ships he gave Russell an ultimatum
and explained clearly that if they put to sea: "It is superfluous
to point out to your Lordship that this is war".

Chapter 4 Conclusion

The priority of the Confederate diplomats was British recognition
and intervention. However, at the start of the war, this was not
in Britain's interest. First, the delicate coalition of the Palmerston
administration could not survive in controversy and slavery was
a controversial issue. Second, Britain had two years worth of
cotton reserves. The reduced supply of cotton from the Confederacy
had pushed prices up so British industry was thriving. It hoped
that finally the American monopoly on cotton production was broken.
Third, the Union Secretary of State, William Seward, made it clear
that there would be violent consequences in the event of Southern
recognition. In fact it seems probable that war could have started
over far less. Charles Francis Adams had to tone down Seward's
threatening rhetoric when he spoke to Russell. However, Britain's
actions were not entirely impartial to the South. The consequences
of the Proclamation of Neutrality seemed to indicate a bias. The
Confederacy did not yet have any privateers. Therefore England
was acting before the facts were clear and so the North justifiably
presumed favor to the South.

The Union diplomats' priority was to avert Britain from intervening
on behalf of the Confederacy. This posed a problem. Southern rights
were clearly understood after Lincoln let it be known that the
war was not about slavery. The Confederate agents believed that
their cause was more popular and that military success would prove
that the South had truly established itself. However, even after
news of Bull Run arrived there was no sign that recognition was
forthcoming. The poorly qualified Southern agents were frustrated
by this; Yancey resigned thinking his mission impossible. However,
the British government in no way excluded itself from future recognition.
Seward's dispatch No. 10 only effectively averted Russell from
dealing with the Confederacy in an official capacity. The following
imply that, despite Seward's strong words, British policy was
not greatly altered by Union efforts. First, Adams negotiations
regarding the Declaration of Paris failed as Russell was still
not prepared to reconsider the South's belligerent status. Second,
at the time when Britain and the Union were closest to war, during
the Trent affair, the British government made no serious
efforts to back up their ultimatum for the return of Mason and
Slidell. Third, Adams was still unable to obtain a retraction
of the Proclamation of Neutrality. Fourth, Russell did nothing
to prevent the launch of the Alabama.

The British government's tendency towards recognition was most
evident during the autumn of 1862. The American Civil War seemed
to have reached an impasse and appalled British public opinion.
Within a week of the arrival of the news of bloody Battle of Antietam,
Russell was willing to make an offer of 'good offices' to both
parties. At this time Lincoln made the most important diplomatic
move of the war. The Proclamation of Emancipation was, by his
own words, a practical measure to avoid the Confederacy of foreign
recognition. Russell feared, however, that the proclamation was
an effort to revolt the slaves. He believed this would tear America
apart and force Britain to intervene in defense of economic interests.
Regardless, the proclamation found massive support from the British
working classes and the Tories now had definite policy against
intervention. Further, due to Lewis's campaign and the strengthening
of radical Republican elements in the Union election, the Cabinet
now seemed to believe that intervention would make Seward's theory
a reality, as the prompt disavowal of Gladstone's Newcastle speech
proved. The new Confederate agents naively did not appreciate
these facts. Nevertheless, there was more than enough reason for
the Southern commissioners to remain hopeful. Books were published
suggesting an American tendency towards disintegration, the Erlanger
loan proved that the British commercial classes supported their
cause, and it was generally agreed that the Union would not reunify
with the rebel states by force. There remained then a strong reason
for mediation. However, the opportunity presented by this was
lost. Then news of General Lee's terrible defeat at Gettysburg
undermined confidence in the ability of the Confederacy. The Southern
agents had blundered and it only remained for Adams to make his
ultimatum.

In the end, it was the poor management of the Confederate diplomatic
effort which created the controversy surrounding Roebuck's motion.
The last opportunity of the Confederacy was lost leaving the commissioners
with a poor record. The only Confederate diplomatic success was
in the field where Slidell was best qualified; foreign markets.
Adams, on the other hand, made only one mistake; the phrasing
of the affidavit he gave to the gun smugglers. The Union Minister
was maverick but this was good. There would have been a war if
Adams had followed the letter of his orders. Seward's toned down
threats did not cause the war that was intended, instead they
ensured that the Southern commissioners were never acknowledged
by the British government. This, followed by Lincoln's proclamation,
made the Confederate mission quite difficult. So, there were circumstances
beyond the control of the Southern agents. However, their ultimate
failure can not be attributed to these. Their orders were feasible.