It got me wondering when we all started this absurd Americanised name calling. Wikipedia identifies its first use as in 1980, corroborating a google ngram viewer search which traced its published use back to 1980…
These searches are addictive by the way…

The next morning I was sitting on the train to work, reading John Grindrod’s Outskirts book (buy it) and turned the page to find this passage…

So the derogatory phrase was created by the PR department of a chemical company responsible for the Love Canal pollution scandal that practically singlehandedly led to modern US environmental law in relation to land contamination. Smell a rat?

When someone is objecting to or protesting about something happening in their area, how tempting is it to disregard the objection by labelling it as “nimby” but it’s an ugly blunderbuss of an expression. What if the objection or protest is justified? Who is going to stand up for an area if it isn’t those who live there? Was Jane Jacobs a nimby then? Why does the European Convention on Human Rights protect rights to property (paragraph 1 of the 1st protocol) and to private and family life (article 8)?
The answer is in the respective qualifications to those rights:
– nothing in the right to property “shall impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest”

– the right to private and family life is subject to such interference “as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Of course we know where the finger is being legitimately pointed when people are called out as nimbys – at those who are motivated by overly selfish motives – tranquility and wealth for the few, regardless of the wider public interest. However, are attitudes in fact changing when it comes to housing? A February 2017 report by the National Housing Federation, Demise of the NIMBY: changing attitudes to building new homes, would appear to suggest so.
Predictably, ministers have been on the bandwagon:

Gavin Barwell was more direct in his speech to the CPRE on 20 February 2017:
“…there are some people who claim the CPRE is merely a respectable front for nimbyism – that behind your public objectives is a private and unrelenting refusal to accept any kind of new development in rural areas.

Of course I know that’s nonsense.

You recognise that well-designed new settlements in sustainable locations can take the pressure off the green belt and you have an unparalleled legacy in influencing the planning system, particularly in the years after the war.

Your vision for garden cities, towns and villages has been adopted by the government. So has your preference for community-design, with extra power and resources for local areas to make this happen.

So now you have got the government behind your ideas I would challenge you to go a step further and prove your detractors wrong.

Support local communities in their quest for good design and actively seek out and champion the best-designed developments – so no one can say your words are not backed up by deeds.”

Is the CPRE a nimby organisation? Well it is certainly depressing to see that members have at their disposal on the CPRE website a copy-and-paste draft letter of objection.
Note the passage in the draft letter that suggests that the objector should draw where relevant on any relevant neighbourhood plan. The Government is of course anxious to distance neighbourhood plans from neighbourhood protectionism. For instance, this is John Howell MP speaking in a debate on neighbourhood planning on 3 July 2017 about those who promote neighbourhood plans:“I should say at this point that in the main we are not talking about communities who are anti-development; we are talking of communities who want to embrace new housing for the long-term sake of their communities and to ensure that facilities such as pubs and sports clubs do not fall into disuse. They also want new housing above all to cater for younger people and families. There is nothing for the Government to fear here about being in the world of the nimby; neighbourhood plans have allocated some 10% more housing than it was originally suggested they should provide by their district or borough councils. From that point of view, they have been a great success.”

This is an assertion which is difficult to square with experience. Time and again development is being delayed or thwarted by neighbourhood plans that have been made following the most light touch of examination procedures.

Yimbyism is of course the self-referential counter-balance to anti-housing development interests.

London YIMBY’s report “Yes In My Back Yard: How To End The Housing Crisis, Boost The Economy And Win More Votes was published by the Adam Smith Institute in August 2017. It is disappointing that their proposed solutions would entail further disruptive legislative change (not going to happen) and don’t to me at least (disclosure, I’m presumably part of the problem as one of the “armies of planning lawyers and consultants” on which “billions of pounds” are apparently spent, referred to in the report) seem to be practical in the sense of delivering a simpler, more effective, fairer system:
“We propose three policies that would hand power back to residents; ways of solving the housing crisis that will also win political parties votes. Each would make a huge difference alone; together they could have a transformative effect on the housing situation in Britain:

1. Allowing individual streets to vote on giving themselves permitted development rights, to build upwards to a maximum of six storeys and take up more of their plots.

2. Allowing local parishes to ‘green’ their green belts, by developing ugly or low amenity sections of green belt, and getting other benefits for the community in turn.

3. Devolving some planning laws to the new city-region mayors including the Mayor of London. Cities could then decide for themselves if they want to expand and grow and permit extra housing, or maintain their current size and character.”

It’s a new movement, originating a couple of years ago in San Francisco but gaining real traction. The New York Times reported in July on its second annual conference: California Today: A Spreading ‘Yimby’ Movement.
Yimbyism is good to see, as long it remains positive and is genuinely springing from communities rather than political activists. But we really need to avoid getting entrenched in “brexiteer”/”remoaner” style tribalism. As with Brexit, the underlying public policy issues are complex and often down to difficult political choices to be made against an impossibly complex economic, environmental and legal background. In a climate where simple messages, right or wrong, have greater potency to influence democracy than ever via social media and elements of the traditional media (and certainly greater potency than what the scorned “experts” may say) the message as to the need for housing and for essential infrastructure must be as clear and non-partisan as possible but at the same time we must treat those with opposing views with respect, winning the intellectual argument with the evidence. How to go about winning hearts and minds? There’s a lot of good sense in Shelter’s March 2015 report Addressing Our Housing Shortage: Engaging the Silent Majority. Labelling people as selfish and insular isn’t going to win any argument. QRED*

Topical issue: what are the legal constraints on the Government and local authorities in setting the fee rates and cost recovery regimes for administrative and court processes?
Claimant and applicant fee rates in particular are seen by the Government as a lever to seek to
– ensure that users of procedures make a fair contribution to the costs of providing them

– reduce the burden on the public purse and

– winnow out those who are seen as misusing the system.

This is however a dangerous game, if access to justice is to be maintained in accordance with domestic and international legal principles. How to get it right?
Dove J heard on 19 July the judicial review by RSPB, Friends of the Earth and ClientEarth of the Government’s changes to the cost capping regime regime that applies to JRs relating to environmental law matters. They take the position that the changes breach the Aarhus Convention’s requirement that access to environmental justice must be available, without prohibitive cost. I have previously blogged on the Government’s changes. ClientEarth issued this press release after the hearing but judgment has been reserved.

I would not be surprised if that set of proceedings did not end up in the Supreme Court. If so, it could be a worthy sequel to two interesting rulings from the Supreme Court in the last couple of weeks in relation to different subject areas but that same underlying theme.

R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor (Supreme Court, 26 July 2017) concerned a challenge by trade union Unison to the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013. The Supreme Court agreed with the claimant that the fee regime for claimants in employment tribunal proceedings and appellants in relation to appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was unlawful because of its effects on access to justice. The full judgment handed down by Lord Reed and supplementary judgment by Lady Hale in relation to discrimination issues are well worth reading. Here are some quotes, which you may care to read with our planning system in mind:
There is a “constitutional right of access to justice: that is to say, access to the courts (and tribunals: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Saleem [2001] 1 WLR 443).” (paragraph 65)
“At the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea that society is governed by law. Parliament exists primarily in order to make laws for society in this country. Democratic procedures exist primarily in order to ensure that the Parliament which makes those laws includes Members of Parliament who are chosen by the people of this country and are accountable to them. Courts exist in order to ensure that the laws made by Parliament, and the common law created by the courts themselves, are applied and enforced. That role includes ensuring that the executive branch of government carries out its functions in accordance with the law. In order for the courts to perform that role, people must in principle have unimpeded access to them. Without such access, laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless charade. That is why the courts do not merely provide a public service like any other.” (paragraph 68)“People and businesses need to know, on the one hand, that they will be able to enforce their rights if they have to do so, and, on the other hand, that if they fail to meet their obligations, there is likely to be a remedy against them. It is that knowledge which underpins everyday economic and social relations.” (paragraph 71)“There is however no dispute that the purposes which underlay the making of the Fees Order are legitimate. Fees paid by litigants can, in principle, reasonably be considered to be a justifiable way of making resources available for the justice system and so securing access to justice. Measures that deter the bringing of frivolous and vexatious cases can also increase the efficiency of the justice system and overall access to justice.” (paragraph 86)“The Lord Chancellor cannot, however, lawfully impose whatever fees he chooses in order to achieve those purposes. It follows from the authorities cited that the Fees Order will be ultra vires if there is a real risk that persons will effectively be prevented from having access to justice. That will be so because section 42 of the 2007 Act contains no words authorising the prevention of access to the relevant tribunals. That is indeed accepted by the Lord Chancellor. ” (paragraph 87)“In order for the fees to be lawful, they have to be set at a level that everyone can afford, taking into account the availability of full or partial remission. The evidence now before the court, considered realistically and as a whole, leads to the conclusion that that requirement is not met. In the first place, as the Review Report concludes, “it is clear that there has been a sharp, substantial and sustained fall in the volume of case receipts as a result of the introduction of fees”. While the Review Report fairly states that there is no conclusive evidence that the fees have prevented people from bringing claims, the court does not require conclusive evidence: as the Hillingdon case indicates, it is sufficient in this context if a real risk is demonstrated. The fall in the number of claims has in any event been so sharp, so substantial, and so sustained as to warrant the conclusion that a significant number of people who would otherwise have brought claims have found the fees to be unaffordable.” (paragraph 91)“The question whether fees effectively prevent access to justice must be decided according to the likely impact of the fees on behaviour in the real world. Fees must therefore be affordable not in a theoretical sense, but in the sense that they can reasonably be afforded. Where households on low to middle incomes can only afford fees by sacrificing the ordinary and reasonable expenditure required to maintain what would generally be regarded as an acceptable standard of living, the fees cannot be regarded as affordable.” (paragraph 93)“Given the conclusion that the fees imposed by the Fees Order are in practice unaffordable by some people, and that they are so high as in practice to prevent even people who can afford them from pursuing claims for small amounts and non- monetary claims, it follows that the Fees Order imposes limitations on the exercise of EU rights which are disproportionate, and that it is therefore unlawful under EU law.” (paragraph 117)
The previous week the Supreme Court had returned to the difficult and long-running saga of challenges to Westminster City Council’s fees regime for the licensing of sex shops. The case has been an unholy mess for the Council. It had been setting licensing fees at a rate that included its costs of enforcing the licensing scheme against unlicensed third parties running sex shops. The fee was made up of two parts. One part was payable regarding the administration of the application and was non-refundable. Another part (which was considerably larger – £29,435 in 2011/12) was for the management of the licensing regime and was refundable if the application was refused. Licensed shops brought a challenge, arguing that the second element of the fee was in breach of the Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2999) (which had been made to give effect domestically to EU Directive 2006/123/EC) and that the only fees that the Council could levy related to the administrative costs of processing the relevant applications and monitoring compliance with the terms of the licence by licence holder, rather than fund enforcement against those who didn’t seek or obtain licences.
Regulation 18 of the 2009 Regulations provides that:“(2) Authorisation procedures and formalities provided for by a competent authority under an authorisation scheme must not –

(a) be dissuasive, or

(b) unduly complicate or delay the provision of the service”

“(4) Any charges provided for by a competent authority which applicants may incur under an authorisation scheme must be reasonable and proportionate to the cost of the procedures and formalities under the scheme and must not exceed the cost of those procedures and formalities.”

The Court of Appeal had upheld the claim in 2013 and as a result made repayments totalling £1,189,466 to the licence holders, together with a further £227,779.15 which it paid, it turned out, by mistake.
However, the Supreme Court overturned that ruling in 2015, finding that the fees regime was basically lawful. There was one aspect which the court referred to the European Court of Justice, namely the way in which the part of the fee which covered wider enforcement costs was paid upfront when the application was made but only repaid if the application was unsuccessful. The European Court confirmed in November 2016 that this aspect of the regime was indeed unlawful.
The case came back to the Supreme Court with the Council arguing that it was entitled to be paid or repaid the sums it repaid to licence holders in 2013 and the licence holders in turn contending that they are entitled to retain the repayment made to them in full, because it was charged in a way which in part at least had been unlawful. In its judgment dated 19 July 2017 the court basically agreed with the Council that it is entitled to be reimbursed to the extent that it has raised fees lawfully, but it has remitted the case to the Administrative Court to resolve a whole host of complexities that arise from the whole mess, including a number of accounting issues, complications arising where licensees have ceased to exist and the recovery of the monies that the Council had paid by mistake. Implications for planning
It may be thought that our planning system currently has the opposite problem: many applicants would be willing to pay higher application fees if the fees enabled authorities to staff up and offer a faster, better, service. The Government went less far than many would have wished when it announced in its February 2017 housing white paper that:“We will increase nationally set planning fees. Local authorities will be able to increase fees by 20% from July 2017 if they commit to invest the additional fee income in their planning department. We are also minded to allow an increase of a further 20% for those authorities who are delivering the homes their communities need and we will consult further on the detail. Alongside we will keep the resourcing of local authority planning departments, and where fees can be charged, under review.” (para 2.15)
But even that relatively weak and overdue measure has not yet been brought into effect.
More controversially the white paper indicated that the Government would consult on introducing a fee for applicants submitting planning appeals: “We are interested in views on this approach and in particular whether it is possible to design a fee in such a way that it does not discourage developers, particularly SMEs, from bringing forward legitimate appeals. One option would be for the fee to be capped, for example at a maximum of £2000 for the most expensive route (full inquiry). All fees could be refunded in certain circumstances, such as when an appeal is successful, and there could be lower fees for less complex cases.”

The white paper consultation sought views on: “a) how the fee could be designed in such a way that it did not discourage developers, particularly smaller and medium sized firms, from bringing forward legitimate appeals;

b) the level of the fee and whether it could be refunded in certain circumstances, such as when an appeal is successful; and

c) whether there could be lower fees for less complex cases.”

This is another area where we await an indication of whether the new ministerial team will take a different approach. Careful note will need to be taken of the Supreme Court’s rulings in Unison and in Heming.
Finally, court fees continue to increase, most recently, from 26 July 2016, by way of the Civil Proceedings, Family Proceedings and Upper Tribunal Fees (Amendment) Order 2016 . The Order’s explanatory memorandum puts it like this:“The majority of fees affected by this instrument will be increased by a rate which is above the level of inflation. The Government has decided, in view of the financial circumstances and given the reductions to public spending, that such an increase is necessary in order to make sure that the courts and tribunals are adequately funded and access to justice is protected, in the long term.”
In relation to judicial review, the fee levels are still relatively modest compared to some other court procedures but are still significant sums for some claimants to find, particularly at short notice:
– application for permission to apply £154 (previously £140)

– request to reconsider at a renewal hearing £385 (previously £350)

– to proceed to a full hearing if permission is granted £770, or £385 if reconsideration fee already paid (previously £700 and £350)

There is that tired saying about justice in England being open to all, like the Ritz Hotel. It’s true, save that the Ritz doesn’t close its doors for months on end. The court term ends on Monday 31 July (with the next term starting on 1 October).
The end of this term marks the end of an era for the Supreme Court: Lords Neuberger and Clarke are retiring (there is an amusing Legalcheek account of their 28 July valedictory speeches) and Lady Hale will become president (only of the Supreme Court unfortunately rather than of the western world). If only we were to see more blogging from the retired judiciary such as that of Sir Henry Brooke. Do read his recent blog post on a truly surreal Tribunal case.
Simon Ricketts, 29 July 2017
Personal views, et cetera

To what extent might the state choose to tax land owners, through reducing their compensation entitlement, in order to facilitate the provision of housing or infrastructure, rather than subsidise that provision through more general tax raising? How can the state capture land value gains created by its own infrastructure provision, or due to its own strategic planning for development?
These questions are central to a number of current areas of public policy thinking, including:
– Using compulsory purchase
– Land auctions and land value capture charges
– Benchmark land values in viability appraisal
– CIL reform
There are some confluences arising in this area between current Conservative party thinking, other political parties, Transport for London and Shelter to name but a few. I’m not sure that land owner interests have yet joined all the dots. Developers may wish to partner more closely and regularly with local authorities with compulsory purchase powers, but in other situations should also be aware of the risks ahead for their businesses if additional costs are not sufficiently predictable as to come off the land price or if they cause land owners simply to hold rather than sell. Using compulsory purchase

Compulsory purchase is already a practical mechanism for securing land where there is a compelling case in the public interest for interfering with private property rights. Of course it isn’t easy, and will never be. The power is draconian. The necessary procedural safeguards to protect against its abuse make for a slow, procedurally technical process and for uncertain outcomes.

Another disincentive for local authorities can be the significant compensation costs payable, given the fundamental principle that the land owner is entitled to what the value of his interest would have been were it not for the compulsory acquisition (the ‘equivalence’ principle). Even where compensation liability is being underwritten by a developer partner, the extent of compensation is:
– likely to affect whether the project is viable after all; and
– not ascertainable until all parties are too far in to back out due to the leisurely pace at which a compensation figure is determined (both pre- and post-reference to the Lands Tribunal, aka Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal).
The Conservative manifesto, published on 17 May 2017, refers to compulsory purchase in this one paragraph:“We will enter into new Council Housing Deals with ambitious, pro-development, local authorities to help them build more social housing. We will work with them to improve their capability and capacity to develop more good homes, as well as providing them with significant low-cost capital funding. In doing so, we will build new fix-term social houses, which will be sold privately after ten to fifteen years with an automatic Right to Buy for tenants, the proceeds of which will be recycled into further homes. We will reform Compulsory Purchase Orders to make them easier and less expensive for councils to use and to make it easier to determine the true market value of sites”.

I am guessing that what is planned goes further than making the current system work better. Changes are being considered which would enable in some circumstances greater use of compulsory purchase and, in some circumstances, acquisition at lower values than the equivalence principle would suggest.
The February 2017 Housing White Paper says this:“2.43 Compulsory purchase law gives local authorities extensive powers to assemble land for development. Through the Housing and Planning Act 2016 and the Neighbourhood Planning Bill currently in Parliament we are reforming compulsory purchase to make the process clearer, fairer, and faster, while retaining proper protections for landowners. Local planning authorities should now think about how they can use these powers to promote development, which is particularly important in areas of high housing need.

2.44 We propose to encourage more active use of compulsory purchase powers to promote development on stalled sites for housing. The Government will prepare new guidance to local planning authorities following separate consultation, encouraging the use of their compulsory purchase powers to support the build out of stalled sites. We will investigate whether auctions, following possession of the land, are sufficient to establish an unambiguous value for the purposes of compensation payable to the claimant, where the local authority has used their compulsory purchase powers to acquire the land.

2.45 [ ]

2.46 We will keep compulsory purchase under review and welcome any representations for how it can be reformed further to support development.”
Note the references to encouraging the use of compulsory purchase where development has stalled, and investigating the use of auctions to establish land value (more on that later in this blog post).
Revealingly, in the week before the publication of the manifesto there was a press release with this passage in its “notes to editors”:“To further incentivise councils to build, the Conservatives also intend to reform compulsory purchase rules to allow councils to buy brownfield land and pocket sites more cheaply. At the moment, councils must purchase land at “market value”, which includes the price with planning permission, irrespective of whether it has it or not. As a result, there has been a more than 100% increase in the price of land relative to GDP over the last 20 years and the price of land for housing has diverged considerably from agricultural land in the last fifty years. Between 1959 and 2017, agricultural land has doubled in value in real terms from £4,300 per acre to £8,900 per acre, while land for planning permission has increased by 1,200%, from £107,000 to just over £1,450,000. Local authorities therefore very rarely use their CPO powers for social housing, leaving derelict buildings in town centres, unused pocket sites and industrial sites remain undeveloped.”
I’m guessing at the following policy strands for a future Conservative government from these various statements:
1. Further encouragement for use of CPO powers in the right circumstances, including particular encouragement where a “Council Housing Deal” is in place (guaranteeing social housing with a fixed-term right to buy for tenants) and possibly where private sector development is shown to have stalled (link this and the “delivery” elements of the Housing White Paper and this could be quite a stick to wield).
2. Further process reform likely.
3. Reform likely of the process for determining the compensation price to be paid, so that (1) figures are known earlier on, (2) the land auctions model is followed (see later in this blog post) to determine values in appropriate circumstances and (if those ‘notes to editors’ are to believed) (3) in some circumstances authorities will be able to acquire land for less than it is worth (possibly ruling out hope value unless planning permission or a certificate of appropriate alternative development under section 17 of the Land Compensation Act 1961, has actually been obtained).
The last point (still speculation) has caused consternation and excitement in equal measure. The principle of equivalence is at stake, but equally this opens up the prospect of securing land for development at an undervalue so as to achieve affordable housing at no cost to the state. Money for nothing (unless you are the land owner). Shelter for example have been lobbying for a similar approach. Their May 2017 paper Financing the infrastructure and new homes of the future: the case for enabling acquiring authorities to purchase land for strategic development under a special CPO compensation code May 2017 lobbies for Government to:

“enable acquiring authorities to purchase land for strategic development under a special CPO compensation code. This would involve three changes:

1) An amendment to the National Planning Policy Framework to allow planning authorities to designate land for strategic development;

2) An amendment to Section 14 of the 1961 Land Compensation Act to disregard prospective planning permissions on land designated for strategic development;

3) An amendment to Section 17 of the 1961 Land Compensation Act to restrict the use of certificates of alternative development on land designated for strategic development.”

Shelter’s delight at the references in the Conservatives’ recent policy announcements is plain to see from their subsequent 16 May 2017 blog post Compulsory purchase and council homes – a new direction for housing policy?
Do the Conservatives really intend such a radical market intervention, or do they misunderstand how the compensation system currently works? The reference in the press release’s “notes to editors” that “councils must purchase land at “market value”, which includes the price with planning permission, irrespective of whether it has it or not” is of course wrong. The prospect of planning permission for development in the “no scheme world” is taken into account in arriving at a valuation but the existence of a planning permission is never assumed.

However logically necessary the concept is, the “no scheme world” (or “Pointe Gourde”) rule been much criticised for being difficult to apply in practice. Its complexities were most recently explored by the Supreme Court in Homes & Communities Agency v JS Bloor (Wilmslow) Ltd (22 February 2017), where Lord Carnwath said this:
“The rule has given rise to substantial controversy and difficulty in practice. In Waters v Welsh Development Agency [2004] 1 WLR 1304; [2004] UKHL 19, para 2 (“Waters”), Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead spoke of the law as “fraught with complexity and obscurity”. In a report in 2003 the Law Commission conducted a detailed review of the history of the rule and the relevant jurisprudence, and made recommendations for the replacement of the existing rules by a comprehensive statutory code…”

Lord Carnwath had himself of course chaired that review. Too late for the litigants in Bloor, now finally, by virtue of section 32 of the Neighbourhood Planning Act 2017 (which introduces new sections 6A to E into the Land Compensation Act 1961) we have a codified version of the “no scheme world” rule. (The compulsory purchase provisions within the 2017 Act are well summarised by David Elvin QC in a paper to the 2017 PEBA conference).

New section 6E has refined the rule so that it is now more difficult for claimants to rely on increases in value of their land created by the transport project for which the land has been acquired, where regeneration or redevelopment was part of the justification for the transport project.
The big question is whether a more radical manipulation of the “no scheme world” rule might be possible, even if it parted from the principle of equivalence. After all, if land for development could be secured at little more than agricultural value…?
It would be mightily difficult, indeed controversial to the extent of potentially being counter-productive, if land is to be acquired without prolonged legal wrangling. If in the real world your land has hope value for another form of development, why should that be ignored? However, in fact it’s not legally impossible.
Article 1 of the protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights states as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

(Incidentally, the Conservative manifesto confirms: “We will not repeal or replace the Human Rights Act while the process of Brexit is underway but we will consider our human rights legal framework when the process of leaving the EU concludes. We will remain signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights for the duration of the next parliament.“)
The European Court of Human Rights interprets Article 1 of the protocol so as to require compensation to be paid in relation to the confiscation of property. In Lithgow v UK (European Court of Human Rights, 8 July 1986), a case arising from Labour’s nationalisation of various industries under the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977, the court said:“The Court further accepts the Commission’s conclusion as to the standard of compensation: the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would normally constitute a disproportionate interference which could not be considered justifiable under Article 1 (P1-1). Article 1 (P1-1) does not, however, guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives of “public interest”, such as pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value”.

Whilst a distinction was drawn in the case between state nationalisation of industries and the compulsory purchase of property, the same basic principles apply. It is clear from this and other cases that individual states are given a margin of appreciation to determine what is in the public interest. For example:
– Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (22 September 1982) (a case about longterm blight caused by ‘zonal expropriation permits’) “…the Court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights…”
– James v UK (21 February 1986) (a challenge brought by the trustees of the estate of the Duke of Westminster to leasehold enfranchisement under Leasehold Reform Act 1967):“Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is “in the public interest”. Under the system of protection established by the Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment both of the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of deprivation of property and of the remedial action to be taken… Here as in other fields to which the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy a certain margin of appreciation.” The Court went on to find that the aim of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967, namely greater social justice in the sphere of housing, was a legitimate aim in the public interest.

Similarly, in theory a mechanism might be arrived at which in some way disentitled land owners in some circumstances from achieving a full market value for their land. But the circumstances would need to be carefully circumscribed and the reaction of most land owners would be to fight rather than one of flight.
It is not as if compulsory purchase compensation is presently particularly generous, even with the additional loss payments (capped, even for owner-occupiers, at the lesser of 10% of the compensation payable and £100,000) that were introduced by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 specifically to sweeten the pill for land owners and make compulsory purchase less contentious! Do we really want more uncertain situations such has arisen at the Aylesbury Estate, with the Secretary of State rejecting a CPO made by the London Borough of Southwark, on the basis of the prejudice that would be caused to leaseholders by the inadequate level of compensation payable to them, and now reportedly having consented to judgment following a challenge by the council, such that all concerned now face a re-opened inquiry?
Furthermore, if these amended compensation principles are only to apply to, for example, Council Housing Deals, how will dispossessed owners be able to recover their property, or further compensation, if the land ends up not being used for the restricted purposes for which the land was taken?
Lastly, that manifesto reference to making it “easier to determine the true market value of sites”. Does this suggest a simplification of compensation principles? Or an overhaul of the timescales for determining compensation liability? Transport for London have recently suggested (in the paper referred to in the next section of this blog post) that the Government might make “the process of acquiring land through compulsory acquisition more transparent by:

* Introducing an independent valuation panel to determine the market value of the land based on the ‘no scheme’ principle set out in the Neighbourhood Planning Bill 2016

* Establishing (early in the land acquisition process) an objective and transparent evidence base on alternative development potential in the absence of the scheme, for such a panel to determine ‘no scheme’ market values, for instance through the use of a modified section 17 certificate”.Land auctions, land value capture charges

The passage quoted earlier from the Housing White Paper refers to “auctions”. Academic Tim Leunig has been promoting the idea of “community land auctions” for a long time and indeed the idea was toyed with in the early years of the coalition government, whilst to a number of us it seemed naive in its assumption as to how planning actually works:“The council first asks all landowners to name the price at which they are willing to sell their land. By naming a price, the landowner gives the council the right to buy the land for 18 months at that price. The council then writes a development plan. As now, they will take into account the suitability of the land offered for development, but will also consider the price of the land, and the likely financial return to the council.”
Transport for London has more recently been promoting a more sophisticated “development rights auction model” as a method of capturing land value increases created by transport infrastructure improvements. Their 20 February 2017 land value capture report , summarises it as follows:“For zones with high development potential (particularly for housing) with multiple landowners, the Government, TfL and the GLA should consider the development rights auction model (DRAM), a new land value capture mechanism.

The key features of the development rights auction model are:

* The integrated planning and consenting of land use and density in a defined zone around a major new transport facility, in parallel with the planning of the transport scheme * The introduction of a periodic development rights auction, in which development rights over land put forward (voluntarily) by landowners are auctioned in assembled packages to a competitive field of developers. Gains above a reserve price are shared between the participating landowners and the planning/auctioning authority. No development taxes (such as CILs or s106 payments) are payable under this scheme. All non-operational but developable public sector-owned land within the zone is entered into the auction as part of a standard public sector land pooling arrangement

* The introduction of a high zonal CIL for those landowners who wish to self- develop rather than participate in the auction

* The use of reformed compulsory purchase order (CPO) powers (following successful passage of the Neighbourhood Planning Bill 2016) to deal with holdout problems that threaten to stall development, together with further consideration of other options as discussed in the report”.
The Government’s 8 March 2017 budget announcements included a memorandum of understanding entered into with the GLA, that says this:“At Budget 2016, the government invited Transport for London (TfL) to bring forward proposals for financing infrastructure projects from land value uplift.

The government has agreed to establish a joint taskforce bringing together the GLA, TfL, London Councils, HM Treasury, Department for Transport (DfT) and Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) to explore the options for piloting a Development Rights Auction Model (DRAM) on a major infrastructure project in London.

Should a pilot of DRAM be agreed, it will be jointly evaluated by London and the government to review its effectiveness and determine whether a similar model could be applied to other infrastructure projects.”

I can’t presently relate the DRAM initiative to the reference in the Housing White Paper (quoted above) to establishing land value via auctions in CPO situations, following possession. What on earth is that a reference to?
TfL’s February 2017 paper has various other more radical policy suggestions to capture infrastructure-related land value increases, including changes to SDLT, to retention of business rates and a new “land value capture charge” This would “capture a proportion of the premium paid to landowners by new purchasers or tenants of residential property for access to new transport facilities“. (Shall we call a tax a tax though, folks?).
There is also a current RTPI research project The Use of Alternative Land Value Capture Mechanisms to Deliver Housing in England and Wales.Benchmark land values in viability appraisal

One of the most contentious issues in relation to developers’ project viability appraisals (carried out for the purposes of seeking to agree reductions in the scale of section 106 affordable housing and other obligations) is the benchmark land value that should be applied as a cost input. Clearly it should not be the actual market value (which would lead to circularity) but equally it should not be just the existing use value (EUV), which would not reflect reality and would result in schemes being assumed to be viable when in reality they would not be because the land would not be made available at the assumed benchmark value.
The 2012 RICS guidance, Financial Viability In Planning , advises that it is appropriate to take into account alternative use value (AUV):“Site Value should equate to the market value subject to the following assumption: that thevalue has regard to development plan polices and all other material planning considerations and disregards that which is contrary to the development plan.”
As summarised in my 1.12.16 blog post , the London Mayor is seeking to move away from accepting AUV, preferring an “EUV+” approach, ie existing use value “plus premium”, with the methodology for calculating the premium left undefined, and therefore a recipe for continuing debate.
In practice, surely any attempt to pitch EUV+ at less than AUV is equivalent to restricting the application of the “no scheme world” rule – a policy intervention to apply that shortfall for public purposes. Except that with viability negotiations, it could of course lead to development simply not proceeding. Is there then a stalled scheme and grounds for compulsory purchase? The extent to which this sort of economic intervention is acceptable needs to be carefully limited and defined. CIL reform

There have been rumours that the reason why the Government parked in February any response to the CIL review team’s report was that the new ministerial team had started to think about whether in fact any replacement for CIL should encapsulate land value concepts (memories of the planning gain supplement anyone?). There is certainly no mention of CIL in the Conservative manifesto. Certainly the policy priorities as between CIL and affordable housing need to be reconsidered.

If we weren’t in such dire straits, we could of course go back to a position where the state invested in social housing and funded public services without weighing the costs so heavily on land owners and developers. In the meantime, over the next five years we’ll definitely see answers emerge to those questions I posed back at the beginning of this overlong post.
Simon Ricketts 20.5.17