Brazil Under Lula: Off the Yellow BRIC Road

Abstract

Covers President Lula's challenges to reduce "Brazil cost" and grow like other BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Experts agreed that for Brazil to grow like other BRIC countries, the Brazilian government would have to reduce the cost of doing business in the country ("Brazil cost"). At the same time, President Lula's challenge is to develop programs that accelerate growth without undermining the progress achieved in reducing inequality and poverty. Can the Brazilian government reverse inequality and grow at the same time? What development strategy should Lula follow in his second term? Does Brazil belong in BRIC? What do these countries have in common?

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