1. That part of c. 378, § 2, of the Public Laws of New
Hampshire which forbids under penalty that any person shall address
"any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is
lawfully in any street or other public place," or "call him by any
offensive or derisive name," was construed by the Supreme Court of
the State, in this case and before this case arose, as limited to the
use in a public place of words directly tending to cause a breach of
the peace by provoking the person addressed to acts of violence.

Held:

(1) That, so construed, it is sufficiently definite and
specific to comply with requirements of due process of law. P.
573.

(2) That as applied to a person who, on a public street,
addressed another as a "damned Fascist" and a "damned racketeer,"
it does not substantially or unreasonably impinge upon freedom of
speech. P. 574.

(3) The refusal of the state court to admit evidence offered by
the defendant tending to prove provocation and evidence bearing on
the truth or falsity of the utterances charged is open to no
constitutional objection. P. 574.

2. The Court notices judicially that the appellations "damned
racketeer" and "damned Fascist" are epithets likely to provoke the
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace. P. 574.

91 N. H. 310, 18 A. 2d 754, affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Appellant, a member of the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses, was
convicted in the municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire, for
violation of Chapter 378, § 2, of the Public Laws of New
Hampshire:

"No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word
to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public
place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any
noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to
deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his
lawful business or occupation."

The complaint charged that appellant, "with force and arms, in a
certain public place in said city of Rochester, to wit, on the public
sidewalk on the easterly side of Wakefield Street, near unto the
entrance of the City Hall, did unlawfully repeat, the words
following, addressed to the complainant, that is to say, 'You are a
God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist and the whole government
of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists,' the same being
offensive, derisive and annoying words and names."

Upon appeal there was a trial de novo of appellant before a jury
in the Superior Court. He was found guilty and the judgment of
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 91 N.H.
310, 18 A. 2d 754.

By motions and exceptions, appellant raised the questions that the
statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, in that it placed an unreasonable
restraint on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of
worship, and because it was vague and indefinite. These contentions
were overruled and the case comes here on appeal.

There is no substantial dispute over the facts. Chaplinsky was
distributing the literature of his sect on the streets [570]
of Rochester on a busy Saturday afternoon. Members of the local
citizenry complained to the City Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky
was denouncing all religion as a "racket." Bowering told them that
Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, and then warned Chaplinsky that the
crowd was getting restless. Some time later, a disturbance occurred
and the traffic officer on duty at the busy intersection started with
Chaplinsky for the police station, but did not inform him that he was
under arrest or that he was going to be arrested. On the way, they
encountered Marshal Bowering, who had been advised that a riot was
under way and was therefore hurrying to the scene. Bowering repeated
his earlier warning to Chaplinsky, who then addressed to Bowering the
words set forth in the complaint.

Chaplinsky's version of the affair was slightly different. He
testified that, when he met Bowering, he asked him to arrest the ones
responsible for the disturbance. In reply, Bowering cursed him and
told him to come along. Appellant admitted that he said the words
charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name of the
Deity.

Over appellant's objection the trial court excluded, as
immaterial, testimony relating to appellant's mission "to preach the
true facts of the Bible," his treatment at the hands of the crowd,
and the alleged neglect of duty on the part of the police. This
action was approved by the court below, which held that neither
provocation nor the truth of the utterance would constitute a defense
to the charge.

It is now clear that "Freedom of speech and freedom of the press,
which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by
Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties
which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by
state [571] action." Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450.[note 1] Freedom of worship is similarly sheltered.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303.

Appellant assails the statute as a violation of all three
freedoms, speech, press and worship, but only an attack on the basis
of free speech is warranted. The spoken, not the written, word is
involved. And we cannot conceive that cursing a public officer is the
exercise of religion in any sense of the term. But even if the
activities of the appellant which preceded the incident could be
viewed as religious in character, and therefore entitled to the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would not cloak him with
immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed
in violation of a valid criminal statute. We turn, therefore, to an
examination of the statute itself.

Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances.[note 2] There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention [572] and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.[note 3] These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.[note 4] It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.[note
5] "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 309-310.

The state statute here challenged comes to us authoritatively
construed by the highest court of New Hampshire. It has two
provisions--the first relates to words or names addressed to another
in a public place; the second refers to noises and exclamations. The
court said: "The two provisions are distinct. One may stand
separately from the other. Assuming, without holding, that the second
were unconstitutional, the first could stand if constitutional." We
accept that construction of severability and limit our consideration
to the first provision of the statute.[note 6]

[573] On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state
court declared that the statute's purpose was to preserve the public
peace, no words being "forbidden except such as have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom,
individually, the remark is addressed." [note 7] It was
further said: "The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of
what a particular addressee thinks. . . . The test is what men of
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause
an average addressee to fight. . . . The English language has a
number of words and expressions which by general consent are
'fighting words' when said without a disarming smile. . . . Such
words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are
threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying
words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as
heretofore interpreted only when they have this characteristic of
plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. . .
. The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the
face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by
the addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace
by the speaker--including 'classical fighting words', words in
current use less 'classical' but equally likely to cause violence,
and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and
threats."

We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus
construed contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression. It
is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific
conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public
place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace. Cf. Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311; Thornhill v. Alabama,
[574] 310 U.S. 88, 105. This conclusion necessarily disposes
of appellant's contention that the statute is so vague and indefinite
as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process. A
statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not unduly to
impair liberty of expression, is not too vague for a criminal law.
Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277.[note 8]

Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts
disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon
the privilege of free speech. Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate
that the appellations "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist" are
epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace.

The refusal of the state court to admit evidence of provocation
and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances, is
open to no Constitutional objection. Whether the facts sought to be
proved by such evidence constitute a defense to the charge, or may be
shown in mitigation, are questions for the state court to determine.
Our function is fulfilled by a determination that the challenged
statute, on its face and as applied, does not contravene the
Fourteenth Amendment.

3. The protection of the First Amendment, mirrored
in the Fourteenth, is not limited to the Blackstonian idea that
freedom of the press means only freedom from restraint prior to
publication. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
714-715.

4. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States
(1941), 149.

5. Chafee, op. cit., 150.

6. Since the complaint charged appellant only with
violating the first provision of the statute, the problem of
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, is not
present.

8. We do not have here the problem of Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451. Even if the interpretative gloss
placed on the statute by the court below be disregarded, the statute
had been previously construed as intended to preserve the public
peace by punishing conduct, the direct tendency of which was to
provoke the person against whom it was directed to acts of violence.
State v. Brown, 68 N. H. 200, 38 A. 731 (1894).

Appellant need not therefore have been a prophet
to understand what the statute condemned. Cf. Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.
373, 377.