It is
possible to feel sympathy for some, as well as respect for others, of
Nelson's opponents. With Pierre
Villeneuve, the most famous of the opponents, this is a harder task.
Unlike Gravina it is difficult to diagnose ability or courage.
Unlike Fischer we cannot say he was beaten by his own limitations nor
was he the victim of bad
luck as in the case of Cordova. Villeneuve and his pride were the main
reasons why Trafalgar was fought.

Pierre Charles Jean Baptiste Silvestre de Villeneuve was born into an
aristocratic family at Valensoles in Provence in 1763. He joined the
French navy at the age of
15 and served as a garde de pavilIon under Suffren during the latter's
campaign against the British in the Indian ocean between 1782-1783.
With the outbreak of the revolution in France, Villeneuve did not
follow the lead of many of his contemporaries and resign from the navy.
In fact he supported the revolution, dropped the aristocratic "de" from
his name and obtained his captaincy. In 1793 he met Napoleon for the
first time and in 1796 was promoted to
Rear Admiral. He commanded a squadron in the expedition in which it was
planned to invade Ireland and in 1798 was junior flag officer in
Brueys' fleet. There he served with colleagues with whom he wouldhave close connections later -Ganteaume (Brueys' chief of staff and commander at
Brest during the Trafalgar campaign) and Decres (later the Naval Minister).

At
the Battle of the Nile Villeneuve commanded the 80 gun "Le Guillaume
Tell" at the rear of the French line. He escaped from the battle with
his ship undamaged accompanied by another ship of the line and 2
frigates. Napoleon referred to him at this time as a "lucky man" but
Villeneuve was much criticised for failing to support the head of the
French line and for fleeing the scene of the action. In what was to be
characteristic he had perfectly plausible excuses. He blamed his dead
commander Brueys who "had foreseen the case where he could call the van
to the support of the centre or rear if these were attacked, but he had
put down no article which would take the ships of the rear to the help
of the
vanguard, because the thing was
impossible and he would have divided his squadron without being able to
take any advantage from it". In other words because he had no orders
specifically to do so Villeneuve did not attempt it. It is reckoned
however that the French rear if it had attacked would have captured the
"Culloden" and prevented other British ships entering the bay.

Villeneuve lived to fight another day and built up a reputation as an
able
tactician. However he might have never fought against Nelson if it had
not been due to two extraordinary pieces of bad luck for the French.
Firstly Admiral
Latouche-Treville the capable commander who had repulsed Nelson at
Boulogne died from a heart attack during his command of the Toulon
fleet on 14 August 1804. The question then arose of who would replace
him. The second piece of bad luck was that more capable admirals were
either appointed elsewhere or were out of favour. Vice Admiral
Ganteaume was appointed to
command of the Brest fleet following Napoleon's dismissal of Admiral
Trugeut in the summer of 1804. The commander of the invasion flotilla,
the very capable Admiral Eustace de Bruix was passed over, possibly
because he had dared to oppose Napoleon in public. So it was that
Villeneuve's friend Decres summoned Villeneuve to an interview and
offered him promotion to Vice Admiral, the ribbon of a Grand Officier
and explained the invasion plan to him provided he took command of the
Toulon fleet. We have Decres own account of what happened. "The risks
to be run did not of themselves seem to him insuperable; and in the end
his advancement to the rank of Grand Officier and Vice Admiral seemed
to make a new man of him. All thoughts of the difficulties attending
the scheme seemed to be laid aside, effaced by the hopes of glory. He
ended indeed by saying to me "I fall in with it entirely". On 19th
December 1804 Villeneuve arrived at Toulon where he raised his flag
over his new flagship the recently launched 80 gun "Bucentaure."
Waiting for him were sealed
orders which he duly promised "to execute to the letter".

At
first Villeneuve acted as his role demanded. He warned his captains
that the worst
consequences would befall them if they were not at their posts at the
heat of battle. But then, as one of his officers remarked, his fear of
Nelson got the better of him. Excuses were given to Paris as to why he
could not sail and in each of these reports his fear of Nelson is
apparent. Villeneuve seems to have been totally unhinged by Nelson's
actions at the Nile and feared that when they met there would be
another battle of annihilation. Following an
attempt to leave harbour on 18th January 1805, which failed due to his
ships suffering
storm damage, Villeneuve on 22nd January wrote a letter to Decres
resigning his commission
- slightly over a month after taking command! "You will be so good to
recall that I have not asked for command
of this squadron. What is more, to the contrary, I have always sought a
practical and useful career, as opposed to one filled with glory. I
should like to point out to you that about all one can expect from a
career in the French navy today is shame and confusion, and anyone who
denies this I declare to be presumptuous, utterly blind and incapable
of straight thinking".

If
this was bad more was to follow. "It is my most ardent wish that the
Emperor decide not to commit any of his squadrons to the hazard of
these events, for if he does the French flag will be seriously
compromised. In reality it is utterly impossible for us to defeat the
enemy when both sides are equal, indeed they will beat us when they are
a third weaker than we
are. Under no circumstances do I intend to become the laughing stock of
Europe by
being involved in further disasters". Villeneuve blamed the crews for
their lack of experience and the Naval Prefect at Toulon for the poor
quality of supplies. There is truth in this, the crews had been
blockaded in Toulon and could not practice naval exercises. Rear
Admiral Missiessy at Rochefort complained about the substandard quality
of ropes canvas and timber but neither untrained crews nor a lack of
good supplies prevented Missiessy from breaking out of the blockade at
Rochefort and sailing across the Atlantic. Villeneuve lacked the
determination of a fighting leader. Napoleon could be forgiven for
writing to the commander of the troops on board the fleet "I really
believe your Admiral does not know how to command. The separation of a
few vessels was nothing at all. We would have to renounce ever putting
to sea, even during the finest weather, if we were always worried about
losing a few ships".

Readers may wonder why Villeneuve was not replaced. The truth is that
Decres had no-one to replace him that had not offended Napoleon. Also,
it is important to remember
that
Villeneuve was not the most senior naval commander in the operation.
True his task was to escape from Toulon and with the Spanish fleet sail
to the island of Martinique in the Caribbean. There he would land his
troops but it was also here that his independence of command would end.
At Martinique he would be joined by the Rochefort squadron under Rear
Admiral Missiessy and by the stronger Brest fleet under Vice Admiral
Ganteaume and it was Ganteaume who would be in overall command. This
combined fleet of 40 ships would defeat the English vessels in the
Channel and shepherd the invasion flotilla over to invade England.
Consequently
Ganteaume, a much more fighting admiral than Villeneuve, had to remain
in command of the 20 ships of the line and 5 frigates at Brest and
Villeneuve in command of the
11ships of the line and 6 frigates at Toulon.

On
30th March having written a letter to Decres in which he said "I pray
that the future will treat me more kindly" (!!) Villeneuve escaped from
Toulon. On
10th April he left Cadiz and on 26th May the Spanish and French
squadrons joined each other at Martinique. Once there Villeneuve waited
for the arrival of the Brest fleet and waited and waited. Pleas from
the French commander at Martinique and orders from the Emperor for
Villeneuve to land troops to increase the garrisons at Martinique and
Gaudeloupe and then to capture nearby British possessions were ignored
although the 128 British sailors in possession of the islet of Diamond
Rock were forced to surrender! Eventually Villeneuve was forced by
the army commanders on board to begin offensive operations against the
British
islands Napoleon had ordered him to stay in the Caribbean until 22nd
June so there was still
time. However on 7th June having captured a British merchant convoy
Villeneuve learnt that Nelson had arrived at Barbados. The old phobia
returned. On
11th June Villeneuve gave order for his 20 strong fleet to return to
Europe and was in such a hurry to do so that he did not land the 12000
troops he had brought from Europe for the protection of the French
islands. Well could one of Napoleon's best generals,
Reille, write "It seems that we have some information about Nelson
having arrived in the Antilles with 10 or 12 ships and that the Admiral
intends to avoid any fight with them. Time will tell what the results
of this prudent planning will achieve. We have been masters of the sea
for three weeks but have only captured a single islet".

On
22nd July just over one hundred miles from El Ferrol the combined fleet
of 20 ships met Sir Robert Calder's fleet of 15 ships of the line and 2
frigates in battle. The battle was
fought in fog. Villeneuve manoeuvred his fleet well but the Spanish
took the brunt of the fight and lost two ships. Both Calder and
Villeneuve refused to renew the action on the next 3 days
blaming continuing fog and contrary winds. Some of Villeneuve's
officers, particularly Admiral
Magon, believed the action could have been continued and respect for
Villeneuve from both the French and Spanish officers reached new
depths. Villeneuve did not give full details in his
report to Napoleon of his failure in the West Indies or the events of
this battle. On Ist August Villeneuve arrive at La
Coruna. He received orders to proceed to Brest and Boulogne as planned.
However acting on a false report from a passing neutral merchantman
that an overpowering British force was close ahead, instead of
investigating Villeneuve turned round and sailed to safety in Cadiz
arriving on 21st August. By doing so he made any further attempt to
launch the invasion quite impossible. He also left an angry
Napoleon waiting for him on the cliffs at Boulogne

It has been stated
(Schom etc) that Villeneuve was by now suffering from the effects of a
nervous breakdown. As Decres himself wrote "This Villeneuve business is
heart breaking for me. I went on my first naval campaign with him, and
with him I share twenty five years of ties and friendship. I do not
believe it is a question of cowardice, but rather, simply of his having
lost his head". Napoleon was more forthright writing to Decres "I beg
of you not to mention a word to me about such an humiliating business,
nor remind me of the very existence of that miserable coward".

The
plans were now changed
- Napoleon now had to deal with a coalition raised against him of
England, Austria and Russia. On 16th September the combined fleet was
ordered to return to the Mediterranean to disembark the troops at
Naples and seize enemy shipping and now Napoleon ordered Villeneuve to
be replaced. On 2Oth September Decres wrote to Villeneuve that Admiral
Rosily would take command. Villeneuve was to return to Paris to account
for his actions. News of the new plan reached Villeneuve on 28th
September, long before news of his replacement which Decres ordered
Rosily to carry with him.

In
Cadiz meanwhile Gravina and Villeneuve made frantic efforts to get the
fleet ready for sea. Villeneuve called a Council of War and showed his
poor man management skills by insulting his Spanish allies claiming "it
is not the barometer but certain person's courage that is falling" when
objections against sailing were made due to bad weather conditions. He
had to be reproved by Gravina but got his own back by writing to Decres
that "the
Spaniards were quite incapable of meeting the enemy". A week of bad
weather then
intervened. Villeneuve took the opportunity of meeting with his
officers to explain how he felt Nelson would fight the battle and what
he proposed to do to counter it. His foretelling of Nelson's plan was
surprisingly accurate.

"The
enemy will not limit their tactics to forming the usual battle line
parallel to ours.. (rather) they will endeavour to surround our
rearguard, and cross through in order better to envelop and defeat us,
carrying away those of our vessels they will have isolated".

As for his plans, Villeneuve proposed the following:

1) The French and Spanish ships were to be intermingled. In this he was following the principle adopted by Admirals
D'Orvilliers and De Guichen who commanded combined French and Spanish fleets in the American War.2) The fleet to be divided into two. The main body of 21 sail
would form the main battle squadron. The remaining 12 ships would be a
"Squadron of Observation" under Gravina and
Magon. This separate squadron could act independently, or take post
with the main body of the fleet, as circumstances required. It would be
able to reinforce any part of the battle squadron line that might be
hard pressed; to parry a threatened blow, or to strike a counter
stroke. This was also not a new principle, having been used by
D'Orvilliers and De
Guichen. I suspect that Villeneuve calculated the number of ships in
this squadron on the basis this was the number he felt he had in excess
of Nelson's. In this he was mistaken and he jettisoned this concept
when he found out.3) Apart from the above, and adherence to the standard fleet
regulations, Villeneuve relied on his captains to win the battle by
their ships outperforming the British fleet. Given his own track
record and the captains' views of their crews there was little hope of
this! Still, commanders such as Magon and Lucas took measures to
further train their crews in boarding tactics. They did not have much
time to do this for on Friday 18th October Villeneuve gave the order to
sail.

Villeneuve's reasons for doing so were entirely personal - he had heard
that he was to be replaced but also that the actual order would not be
received from Admiral Rosily for a few
days. This was due to the Admiral's carriage needing to be repaired
which prevented
him from getting to Cadiz. In a last ditch attempt to save his career
Villeneuve determined
to sail before Rosily arrived. He justified his reasons to Gravina as
being an improvement in weather conditions and that Nelson had reduced
his force by sending ships to Gibraltar. What he did not know was that
other ships had joined Nelson.

Cadiz was not an easy port to clear for all these ships. Departure
started on 19th October. It was not until 3pm on 20th October that
Villeneuve had his fleet outside the harbour and arranged in the order
he wanted. At 11 pm he ordered the fleet to form a single battle line
for during the night and at about 6am on the 21st October to resume its
pre-night time formation. Villeneuve now received the news that the
British fleet was larger than expected. He now altered his instructions
and at 7am ordered the fleet to reform a single line of battle. With
experienced crews this might have been achieved. With inexperienced
crews it could not be easily executed. Gaps occurred in the line. These
were exacerbated by the order Villeneuve gave at
5am to wear together ie turn back to Cadiz. More confusion,
inexperienced crews and changeable winds resulted after 2 hours in a
crescent formation with gaps in the line and ships two or three deep.
The squadron of observation simply became the rear and the main plank
of Villeneuve's strategy was lost. The bunching up of various ships,
luckily for
Villeneuve, would help him in the battle ahead.

There has been much discussion why Villeneuve turned back. Was he
making a run for the safety of Cadiz or had he realised that because of
the light breeze it was impossible to reach the Straits of
Gibraltar without a battle and it might be better to have Cadiz harbour
under the lee for ships
crippled in actIon to find a ready shelter? We do not know.
Villeneuve's account does not help us.
At
11.30 Villeneuve ran up the general signal "Open Fire" and before the
smoke obscured the "Bucentaure" from view sent his last signal "Every
ship which is not in action is not at
its post, and must take station to bring herself as speedily as
possible under fire".
In
the battle which followed Nelson aimed to take out his opposite
number's ship and pass under the stern of the "Bucentaure." Despite the
efforts of
Magendie, captain of the flagship, and Lucas of the "Redoutable" the
"Victory" and "Neptune" broke the line. At
1 pm Hardy ordered one of the carronades mounted in the forecastle to
be fired through the "Bucentaure's" stern windows. Broadsides followed
and the "Bucentaure" was seen to heel. At 1.45pm the "Neptune" brought
down bother the "Bucentaure's" main and mizzen
masts. The "Leviathan" and
"Conqueror" poured broadsides into the flagship. By 4.15pm the
"Bucentaure's" position was quite hopeless. As Magendie wrote "All
rigging gone, entirely dismasted, having lost all the men on the upper
decks, the battery of 24 pounders left totally dismounted and unmanned
by the dead and wounded, the
starboard guns covered by the falling rigging, spars and timber, with
close to 450 casualties and no longer even being in a state to defend
ourselves...surrounded by 5 enemy ships, with no help in
sight...Admiral Villeneuve had no choice but to put an end to this, to
prevent the useless killing of any more brave people, which he then did
after three and a quarter hours of fighting, after first throwing the
debris of the Imperial eagle into the sea along with the ship's
signals".
It was ironical that the one officer on the
"Bucentaure" not injured was
Villeneuve! He had stayed on the quarterdeck throughout the engagement.
He had ordered, although
belatedly, Dumanoir to return to help the centre and, when all hope was
lost on the
'Bucentaure," had tried to transfer to another ship. Unfortunately the
"Bucentaure's" boats had been destroyed and no other ship responded to
his signals for assistance. His flag captain wrote that Villeneuve
complained bitterly that Fate had spared his life; that amid the
slaughter all round there seemed not to be one bullet for him. For what
was going to happen later it was indeed a pity.

After the battle Villeneuve was taken as a prisoner of war to England.
Fremantle found him "a very pleasant and gentlemanlike man" and
Collingwood wrote "He has nothing in his manners of the offensive
vapouring and boasting which we, perhaps too often, attribute to
Frenchmen". On 15th November aboard the "Euryalus" Villeneuve wrote his
despatch to
Decres. He attributed the British victory to having more powerful
ships, heavier armaments and better trained men. Surprisingly for him
he did not blame anyone. "So much courage and devotion merited a better
fate, but the moment has not yet come for France to celebrate successes
on seas as she has been able to do with regard to her victories on the
continent. As for myself
Monseigneur, overwhelmed by the extent of my misfortune and the
responsibility for so great a disaster, I desire only, and as soon as
possible, to offer at the feet of His Majesty either the justification
of my conduct, or a victim to be sacrificed, not to the honour of the
flag, which I venture to affirm has remained intact, but to the shades
of those who may have perished through my imprudence, want of caution,
or
forgetfulness of certain of my duties".Villeneuve
was released in April 1806 and stayed at the Hotel de Patrie in Rennes
awaiting orders. On 22nd April he was found dead in bed with 6 knife
wounds in his chest. Murder or suicide? The Prefect recorded a verdict
of "Death from self afflicted wounds" and the body of the ill fated
admiral was buried at night, without military
honours. For a man who had sacrificed the lives of 4,400 French and
Spanish sailors and the wounding of 2,500 others simply to avoid the
humiliation of being superseded in command such an obscure internment
might be deemed only fair..Sources
Fraser E, "The Enemy at Trafalgar"Howard D, "Trafalgar The Nelson Touch"Lyon D, "Sea Battles in Close up - the Age of Nelson"Schom A, "Trafalgar - Countdown to battle:Tracy N, "Nelson's battles - the art of victory in the age of sail"Tunstall B, "Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail"