Book Review: Out of the Ashes, an oral history of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement

By Robert W. White

Published by Merrion Press, 2017.

Reviewer: John Dorney

Robert White is an American sociologist, who over 30 years conducted a series of interviews with members of Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA.

There are some interesting things in this book; the interviews with the veterans of the IRA campaigns of the 1940s and 50s are illuminating. There is interesting material on the 1975 IRA ceasefire and on the 1990s peace process. The Republican movement’s various splits are analysed in terms of generation, geography and experience as well as ideology, which is an interesting and informative approach.

The final chapter provides some detail on the splintering into micro-groups of those Republicans who attempted to maintain the ‘armed struggle’ in the 21st century.

And yet, overall, this book is a disappointment. The first problem is perhaps not entirely of the author’s making. This work purports to be an ‘oral history of the Provisional Republican Movement’ but the inside access this would require simply is not there. The author conducted a series of interviews in 1985, 1995 and 2005 with Republican activists, a category that included Sinn Fein members, former IRA prisoners and others .

The problem is that, unlike the remarkably rich sources we now have for the revolutionary period of the 1920s, such as the Bureau of Military History and the Military Pension collection, his respondents were not willing to talk about the central tenet of Provisional Republicanism, that is the use of the force or ‘armed struggle’. Publication of such information in the 1980s would of course have been extremely dangerous for respondents.

What is more, the fiasco of the Boston College tapes, where interviews with paramilitaries that were collected by journalist Ed Moloney were later subpoenaed by the Police Service of Northern Ireland for investigations into unsolved murders, has meant that no one is likely to open up to researchers again for the foreseeable future.

So instead of an inside look into the Provisional IRA, which waged a nearly thirty-year long campaign of political violence in Northern Ireland, what we get instead is a rather vague collection of attitudes from a medley of activists from both sides of the border, mostly Sinn Fein or anti-H Block activists with a few ex-prisoners who talk a little about their times in the IRA in the early 1970s.

Provisional IRA members in Belfast, 1980s.

The author appears not to appreciate the vast gulf separating the experiences of southern Republicans from those inside the ‘war zone’ in Northern Ireland or the drastically different experiences of serving as a Sinn Fein councillor and serving in a Provisional IRA active service unit. Rather, all of these categories of activist tend to be lumped in together as representatives of the ‘Republican Movement’.

Furthermore, there are simply not enough of them to make this a really coherent oral history of the Provisional movement. So instead, much of the text is actually a fairly conventional narrative history of the Troubles from a Republican point of view. There is nothing wrong with this, but not much new either.

While it is understandable that the author could not get respondents to talk about illegal activities, it is frustrating that he did not mine those first hand sources we do have a bit more thoroughly. Eamon Collins’ memoir for instance, ‘Killing Rage’ explains exactly how a P.IRA active service unit worked in the early 1980s but also how Collins, at one time a hardline militarist, grappled with his frustration at the leadership’s increasingly political strategy, before eventually breaking under interrogation and becoming an informer.

Similarly Rogelio Alonso’s admittedly antagonistic ‘The IRA and Armed Struggle’ was able to get IRA members to discuss much more openly the debates within the movement over the use of force in the 1980s and 1990s. Neither of these sources or other comparable ones appear to have been used here.

If access to inside information is one problem, then the author’s apparent closeness to some of his respondents is another. A particularly sympathetic hearing is given to Ruairi O Bradaigh and other founders of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein in 1970, who later split again from the Provisional movement in 1985 and later opposed the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

Regarding the initial split in the IRA and Sinn Fein in 1969-70, when the Provisional movement was formed, White basically gives unchallenged the Provisionals’ version that the existing IRA leadership failed to protect the Catholic nationalist community from a loyalist pogrom and the Provisional IRA arose ‘out of the ashes’ of burned-out Bombay Street. The IRA, in this version were being called ‘I Ran Away’ in Catholic neighbourhoods of Belfast before the Provisionals restored their reputation in the Catholic ghettos.

The problem is that, as Brian Hanley for one has shown, the existing leadership, pre-1969, of what became known as the Official IRA did in fact mount an armed defence of Catholic neighbourhoods as best they could in the rioting of August 1969. Hanley has been at pains to point out that there is actually no evidence of ‘I Ran Away’ being scrawled on Belfast walls at the time.

On top of that, there is a wider point that is central to the whole history of the Provisionals. White writes that it was not Republicans or the Catholic Civil Rights movement that sparked off the Northern Ireland conflict but British mismanagement of the crisis. Now clearly this is true to an extent, British Army incursions onto the Falls Road, the introduction of one-sided internment in 1971 and Bloody Sunday in Derry in 1972 all conspired to create mass support for armed struggle among Northern Catholics.

What this narrative fails to acknowledge though is that the Provisional IRA was itself partly driving these events by its insistence that the only strategy could be armed struggle against British forces until Britain left Northern Ireland. The book never once seems to consider whether this was in fact the right strategy of whether it was actually a blind alley.

What if no amount of force would change the status of Northern Ireland while the majority there was unionist? What if more political violence actually drove the conflict, provoking greater state and loyalist violence and creating a vicious circle of attack and retaliation? What if Northern Catholics’ very real grievances could be remedied without a united Ireland in the short term?

These hard questions never seem to be raised with the author’s interviewees. Nor is due weight given to the Republicans’ attitudes towards loyalist and unionism.

The Official Republicans, who later became the Workers Party, argued that Northern Ireland must first be ‘democratised’ and the sectarian barrier overcome by class politics before Irish unity could be achieved. The moderate SDLP argued that what was needed was a reconciliation between nationalists and unionists within Northern Ireland. Both of these points of view are blithely dismissed here and there seems to be a degree of sympathy for those Republicans who feel betrayed by the Provisional leadership of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness who eventually came to much the same conclusion.

Provisional Sinn Fein in the pre-ceasefire world was a marginalised political group south of the border and even north of it, pulled in only a fraction of its current vote. The so-called ‘dissidents’ today cannot even get a councillor elected anywhere in Ireland. So either the electorate are completely wrong or the policy of indefinite armed struggle was a political dead end.

Certainly the peace process involved a degree of manipulation and deceit of its own fighters, activists and supporters on behalf of the Provisionals’ leadership. And certainly some of these people have a right to feel used. But if the alternative to the peace process was a permanent continuation of an interminable campaign of low level political violence, that in any case was never going to budge the unionist and loyalist community from their loyalty to Britain, it is rather difficult to feel sympathy for the so-called ‘purist’ Republicans.

Finally I felt the book was lacking an element of realism in its discussion of the lives of Republican veterans of the conflict. White writes that like activists in the American Civil Rights movement, many of them are to be found in the ‘caring professions’ and ‘progressive politics’.

Again, there may be some truth in this, but again, it appears to miss stark difference between what the two movements were involved in. Brendan Hughes, a Provisional IRA legend who is actually quoted at length here, for instance, ended up dying alone in Belfast flat, addicted to alcohol and apparently tortured by regret. Anecdotal evidence suggests that among those who passed through Provisional IRA service, this story is not uncommon; a sad experience more akin to a war veteran – family breakdown, addiction, depression – than a ‘progressive’ activist.

If this review had been harsh on this book it is not intended as an admonition not to buy it. It is well worth reading, and will be a valuable reference point. But one cannot shake the feeling that it could have been better.

24 Responses to "Book Review: Out of the Ashes, an oral history of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement"

White basically gives unchallenged […] What this narrative fails to acknowledge […] The book never once seems to consider whether this was in fact the right strategy of whether it was actually a blind alley

I do have a question – is this book allowed to stand on its own feet as what it claims to be, an oral history, or is it a club requirement of southern academic historians, now and forever, that the Provisionals must be singled out for condemnation at every opportunity and in a highly partisan fashion? Where is the supposedly holy academic impartiality?

I note that by contrast the British Army and other crown forces are routinely treated by the very same sources (not John Dorney, that I know of) in a remarkably benevolent and respectful fashion, with the mantra that we must have ‘reconciliation’, ‘inclusiveness’ and all the other meaningless palaver which no doubt brings a smile to Cruise O’Brien’s ghost.

This review is my opinion, pure and simple. I’m not responsible for southern academia. I remember the tail end of the Troubles quite well and I make no pretence about being able to be impartial about it.

Regarding an oral history, my main problem with the book is that it really doesn’t achieve that. Have you read it yourself?

I remember the tail end of the Troubles quite well and I make no pretence about being able to be impartial about it.

That you don’t at all see where this politically-motivated crusade, overriding even the pretence of objectivity, causes a problem for Irish historical academia (who, like it or not, are the gatekeepers for publication and people’s careers in this country) proves my point here.

This is how we end up with charlatans like Peter Hart, who is still being lauded to this day by people who should (and do) know better, because they approve of the ’cause’ behind his discredited work.

It is interesting to note, surely, that the two significant and sustained attempts to record the recollections of republican activists during the Troubles were both based and funded a) outside the island of Ireland and b) in particular, outside the 26 county world of historical academia. Bob White is a sociologist based at Indiana University and our effort was funded by Boston College. Neither myself nor Anthony McIntyre were academics. Both colleges are in the USA. Unfortunately we were misled and ultimately let down by BC but at least, for a while, the people there had the courage and foresight to take on such a project. When we began the search for a sponsor for the project we were soon made aware of the realities of revisionist Irish academe, at least in the world of historical research. Amazingly, given the importance of the Northern conflict, no-one in the South was interested in taking up our project and not only were none willing to give the necessary confidentiality assurances but we became aware that the likelihood of material being made available to the security forces, as it had already been done in Belfast, without prompting or the threat of legal action was too high to risk. Add on all this the work of Rogelio Alonso, a Spanish researcher who you acknowledge as having interviewed IRA members as well, and it becomes clear that all the serious efforts to get inside the heads of republican activists in Ireland originated or were funded/made possible outside the island of Ireland. What an indictment of Irish history scholars! Yet John Dorney critiques Bob White’s work without acknowledging any of this; those who live and work in glasshouses should be careful at whom they throw stones. Bob took on this task when Irish historians would not, at a time when it was dangerous to do so and when to do so risked the accusation of being ‘a fellow traveler’ or ‘a sneaking regarder’. John is perhaps too young to know what it was like when Ireland was McCarthyite. The first IRA ceasefire was in 1994, twenty-three years ago; the Good Friday Agreement was signed nearly two decades ago; IRA decommissioning was completed over a decade ago. It has become incrementally safer for Irish academics to conduct this sort of research, yet still it has not been done. John Dorney cites the Boston College experience as a factor deterring academic research but we know now, courtesy of former Irish Justice Minister, Michael McDowell that the Irish government took a decision a decade or so ago to draw a line under the past. There is now no legal impediment on conducting such research in the 26 counties. Yet it still does not happen. When it does start, then you can write your critical review. Enough said.

I’m sent a book to review, I give my opinion in the review. That is the purpose of the exercise. The failings or otherwise of southern Irish historians of the Troubles are nothing to do with me. If you don’t like my opinion, that is your right. But I don’t need your permission to write reviews, critical or otherwise.

But once you do publish a review you must expect anything to happen by way of a response, even if you don’t like it. You happen to be a southern historian and the failings and cowardice of southern historians is very much part of this story……

Acually, the very first ceasefire called by the Provos was in 1972 not 1974 (that was their 2nd), when a delegation was flown to Cheney Walk for talks with Whitelaw. The reference to the ‘first ceasefire’ in my comment above was clearly in relation to the peace process.

John,
Thanks for that – useful reference piece – I am reasonably familiar with the period even though i left Ireland in 1972 – hence that particular year leaves gaps in my recollections – as I was intending to refer specially to the first cease fire’ I deliberately referred to 1974 – i.e. Cain: Sunday 22 December 1974 Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ceasefire
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) observed a ceasefire between midnight on 22 December 1974 to midnight on 2 January 1975. The ceasefire was called to allow the British government to respond to proposals put by the IRA to Protestant clergymen on 10 December 1974.

On reflection, i am at a complete loss to see how you can construe your remark as being in relation to the 1994 ceasefire as the operative term ibeing: “The first IRA ceasefire” – to wit: “‘too young to know what it was like when Ireland was McCarthyite.The first IRA ceasefire was in 1994, twenty-three years ago; the Good Friday Agreement was signed nearly two decades ago; IRA decommissioning was completed over a decade ago”

Think you’re being a bit disenguous there Ed
I do agree with you that there’s been an appalling reluctance on the past of southern
academic historians to address the north. In relation to the War of Independence period, outside Fearghall McGarry’s biography of O’Duffy, no-one has been willing to write on the pogrom period of 1920-22. It’s a footnote, at best. This carries through to the more recent era.
That being said, there may be no legal impediment on conducting such research from a southern base, but neither is there any impediment on the PSNI and/or British government seeking access to the fruits of that research, published or otherwise. “Voices From The Grave” was compelling reading, especially to someone like me who grew up in Belfast in the 70s, but it did let the cat out of the bag. “Publish and be damned”, indeed.
The fallout from the BC has put a huge obstacle in the way of anyone conducting such research, whether in Ireland or elsewhere. The only credible commitment that can be given in terms of non-disclosure is non-publication, in which case, what’s the point? You’re back to a BMH-style keeping everything sealed until everyone’s dead, which will be great for 22nd Century historians, but not much use to anyone alive now.
BC has taught us that letters of comfort may or may not be worth the paper they’re written on. What researcher or interviewee is gonna take the chance?

Hi Kiernan,
Living in Australia now (although born in the North and grew up in the South) I am generally ignorant of individual authors origins – my perspective has always been 32 county one – not from a particular political motivation but because that’s the way I grew up – or maybe that’s living politics – who knows!

Hi Kieran – dont forget this southerner wrote a chapter on Belfast in his last book on the War of Independence and is planning to do more on the North. I have a PhD – but don’t work in a university and publish with a popular rather than academic publisher … so I’m not sure I could be considered an ” academic” but generally yes you are write most Southerners think solely in terms of Cork, Tipperary and Dublin in terms of the War of Independence and forget that it was a 32 county event.

Apologies, Padraig, that was an oversight on my part, though you and The Irish Story are the exceptions that prove the rule.
And don’t worry, I have huge respect for so-called “popular” publishers! ;-)

John,
I enjoyed your review and, in the main, agree withyou. I happen to have a hand-written account in my possession (somewhere) of the events of 12–17 August 1969 written by Art McMillen (brother of Liam) which details the Official IRA involvement.
Despite your final caveat I’ll forego the (to me,dubious) pleasure of reading this work..

Hi John, interesting review. Im reading the book at the moment. One point of information Id correct you on though “The so-called ‘dissidents’ today cannot even get a councillor elected anywhere in Ireland.” That is not entirely correct, I think Galway County Cllr. Tomás Ó Corrain is a member of Republican Sinn Féin, but because RSF don’t recognise the “Free State” RSF aren’t registered as a political party with Leicester House so he appears on the ballot as an independent/ non party. Also I think Éirigi have had a few Cllrs elected – but overall I think your general point is correct that modern Militant Republicans have had little or no electoral success.