“Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government.” Shemaya, in the Thalmud

“A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one’s attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced.” Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev’d Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

“The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.”Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

“There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

“It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

“A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. … But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Governments purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

Libertythe freedom from unwarranted intrusion by governmentis as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark. United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

“You can’t always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need.” Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

“In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Catholic. Then they came for meand by that time there was nobody left to speak up.” Martin Niemller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!—Pep Le Pew

Fourth Amendment, amendment (1791) to the Constitution of the United States, part of the Bill of Rights, that forbids unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals and property. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see below.

Introduced in 1789, what became the Fourth Amendment struck at the heart of a matter central to the early American experience: the principle that, within reason, Every mans house is his castle, and that any citizen may fall into the category of the criminally accused and ought to be provided protections accordingly. In U.S. constitutional law, the Fourth Amendment is the foundation of criminal law jurisprudence, articulating both the rights of persons and the responsibilities of law-enforcement officials. The balance between these two forces has undergone considerable public, political, and judicial debate. Are the amendments two clauses meant to be applied independently or taken as a whole? Is the expectation of privacy diminished depending on where and what is suspected, sought, and seized? What constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure?

The protections contained in the amendment have been determined less on the basis of what the Constitution says than according to what it has been interpreted to mean, and, as such, its constitutional meaning has inherently been fluid. The protections granted by the U.S. Supreme Court have expanded during periods when the court was dominated by liberals (e.g., during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren [195369]), beginning particularly with Mapp v. Ohio (1961), in which the court extended the exclusionary rule to all criminal proceedings; by contrast, during the tenure of the conservative William Rehnquist (19862005) as chief justice, the court contracted the rights afforded to the criminally accused, allowing law-enforcement officials latitude to search in instances when they reasonably believed that the property in question harboured presumably dangerous persons.

The full text of the amendment is:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Whether a particular type of search is considered reasonablein the eyes of the law,is determined by balancing two important interests. On one side of the scale is the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. On the other side of the scale are legitimate government interests, such as public safety.

The extent to which an individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment depends, in part, on the location of the search or seizure.Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).

Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

However, there are some exceptions. A warrantless search may be lawful:

If an officer is given consent to search;Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)If the search is incident to a lawful arrest;United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)If there is probable cause to search and exigent circumstances;Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)If the items are in plain view;Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).

When an officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)

School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority; rather, a search of a student need only be reasonable under all the circumstances.New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

Where there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a criminal activity, an officer may lawfully search any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009),

An officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or that criminal activity is afoot.Berekmer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984),United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).

An officer may conduct a pat-down of the driver and passengers during a lawful traffic stop; the police need not believe that any occupant of the vehicle is involved in a criminal activity.Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).

The use of a narcotics detection dog to walk around the exterior of a car subject to a valid traffic stop does not require reasonable, explainable suspicion.Illinois v. Cabales, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).

Special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without any individualized suspicion.Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

An officer at an international border may conduct routine stops and searches.United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).

A state may use highway sobriety checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving.Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

A state may set up highway checkpoints where the stops are brief and seek voluntary cooperation in the investigation of a recent crime that has occurred on that highway.Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

However, a state may not use a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics.City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).

Fourth Amendment, amendment (1791) to the Constitution of the United States, part of the Bill of Rights, that forbids unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals and property. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see below.

Introduced in 1789, what became the Fourth Amendment struck at the heart of a matter central to the early American experience: the principle that, within reason, Every mans house is his castle, and that any citizen may fall into the category of the criminally accused and ought to be provided protections accordingly. In U.S. constitutional law, the Fourth Amendment is the foundation of criminal law jurisprudence, articulating both the rights of persons and the responsibilities of law-enforcement officials. The balance between these two forces has undergone considerable public, political, and judicial debate. Are the amendments two clauses meant to be applied independently or taken as a whole? Is the expectation of privacy diminished depending on where and what is suspected, sought, and seized? What constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure?

The protections contained in the amendment have been determined less on the basis of what the Constitution says than according to what it has been interpreted to mean, and, as such, its constitutional meaning has inherently been fluid. The protections granted by the U.S. Supreme Court have expanded during periods when the court was dominated by liberals (e.g., during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren [195369]), beginning particularly with Mapp v. Ohio (1961), in which the court extended the exclusionary rule to all criminal proceedings; by contrast, during the tenure of the conservative William Rehnquist (19862005) as chief justice, the court contracted the rights afforded to the criminally accused, allowing law-enforcement officials latitude to search in instances when they reasonably believed that the property in question harboured presumably dangerous persons.

The full text of the amendment is:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”Fourth Amendment, U.S. Constitution

Whether a particular type of search is considered reasonablein the eyes of the law,is determined by balancing two important interests. On one side of the scale is the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. On the other side of the scale are legitimate government interests, such as public safety.

The extent to which an individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment depends, in part, on the location of the search or seizure.Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).

Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

However, there are some exceptions. A warrantless search may be lawful:

If an officer is given consent to search;Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)If the search is incident to a lawful arrest;United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)If there is probable cause to search and exigent circumstances;Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)If the items are in plain view;Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).

When an officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)

School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority; rather, a search of a student need only be reasonable under all the circumstances.New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

Where there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a criminal activity, an officer may lawfully search any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009),

An officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or that criminal activity is afoot.Berekmer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984),United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).

An officer may conduct a pat-down of the driver and passengers during a lawful traffic stop; the police need not believe that any occupant of the vehicle is involved in a criminal activity.Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).

The use of a narcotics detection dog to walk around the exterior of a car subject to a valid traffic stop does not require reasonable, explainable suspicion.Illinois v. Cabales, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).

Special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without any individualized suspicion.Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

An officer at an international border may conduct routine stops and searches.United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).

A state may use highway sobriety checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving.Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

A state may set up highway checkpoints where the stops are brief and seek voluntary cooperation in the investigation of a recent crime that has occurred on that highway.Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

However, a state may not use a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics.City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).

Whether a particular type of search is considered reasonablein the eyes of the law,is determined by balancing two important interests. On one side of the scale is the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. On the other side of the scale are legitimate government interests, such as public safety.

The extent to which an individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment depends, in part, on the location of the search or seizure.Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).

Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

However, there are some exceptions. A warrantless search may be lawful:

If an officer is given consent to search;Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)If the search is incident to a lawful arrest;United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)If there is probable cause to search and exigent circumstances;Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)If the items are in plain view;Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).

When an officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)

School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority; rather, a search of a student need only be reasonable under all the circumstances.New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

Where there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a criminal activity, an officer may lawfully search any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009),

An officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or that criminal activity is afoot.Berekmer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984),United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).

An officer may conduct a pat-down of the driver and passengers during a lawful traffic stop; the police need not believe that any occupant of the vehicle is involved in a criminal activity.Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).

The use of a narcotics detection dog to walk around the exterior of a car subject to a valid traffic stop does not require reasonable, explainable suspicion.Illinois v. Cabales, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).

Special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without any individualized suspicion.Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

An officer at an international border may conduct routine stops and searches.United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).

A state may use highway sobriety checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving.Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

A state may set up highway checkpoints where the stops are brief and seek voluntary cooperation in the investigation of a recent crime that has occurred on that highway.Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

However, a state may not use a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics.City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).

“Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government.” Shemaya, in the Thalmud

“A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one’s attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced.” Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev’d Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

“The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.”Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

“There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

“It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

“A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. … But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Governments purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

Libertythe freedom from unwarranted intrusion by governmentis as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark. United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

“You can’t always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need.” Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

“In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Catholic. Then they came for meand by that time there was nobody left to speak up.” Martin Niemller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!—Pep Le Pew

Fourth Amendment, amendment (1791) to the Constitution of the United States, part of the Bill of Rights, that forbids unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals and property. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see below.

Introduced in 1789, what became the Fourth Amendment struck at the heart of a matter central to the early American experience: the principle that, within reason, Every mans house is his castle, and that any citizen may fall into the category of the criminally accused and ought to be provided protections accordingly. In U.S. constitutional law, the Fourth Amendment is the foundation of criminal law jurisprudence, articulating both the rights of persons and the responsibilities of law-enforcement officials. The balance between these two forces has undergone considerable public, political, and judicial debate. Are the amendments two clauses meant to be applied independently or taken as a whole? Is the expectation of privacy diminished depending on where and what is suspected, sought, and seized? What constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure?

The protections contained in the amendment have been determined less on the basis of what the Constitution says than according to what it has been interpreted to mean, and, as such, its constitutional meaning has inherently been fluid. The protections granted by the U.S. Supreme Court have expanded during periods when the court was dominated by liberals (e.g., during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren [195369]), beginning particularly with Mapp v. Ohio (1961), in which the court extended the exclusionary rule to all criminal proceedings; by contrast, during the tenure of the conservative William Rehnquist (19862005) as chief justice, the court contracted the rights afforded to the criminally accused, allowing law-enforcement officials latitude to search in instances when they reasonably believed that the property in question harboured presumably dangerous persons.

The full text of the amendment is:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Thirty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution of IrelandTo permit marriage to be contracted by two persons without distinction as to their sexLocation IrelandDate22May2015(2015-05-22)ResultsVotes% Yes1,201,607700162070000000000062.07% No734,300700137930000000000037.93%Valid votes1,935,907700199290000000000099.29%Invalid or blank votes13,81869997100000000000000.71%Total votes1,949,725100.00%Registered voters/turnout3,221,681700160520000000000060.52%Results by constituencyHow the electorate voted, by constituency. Proportion of the valid poll voting yes:

72.5%75%

70%72.49%

67.5%69.99%

65%67.49%

62.5%64.99%

60%62.49%

57.5%59.99%

55%57.49%

52.5%54.99%

50%52.49%

48.58%

The Thirty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Act 2015 (previously bill no. 5 of 2015) amended the Constitution of Ireland to permit marriage to be contracted by two persons without distinction as to their sex.[2] Prior to the enactment, the Constitution was assumed to contain an implicit prohibition on same-sex marriage in the Republic of Ireland.[3] It was approved at a referendum on 22 May 2015 by 62% of voters on a turnout of 61%.[1][4] This was the first time that a state legalised same-sex marriage through a popular vote.[5][6] Two legal challenges regarding the conduct of the referendum were dismissed on 30 July by the Court of Appeal,[7] and the bill was signed into law by the President of Ireland on 29 August.[8] The Marriage Act 2015 then amended marriage law to give effect to the constitutional amendment, which came into force on 16 November 2015, with the first same-sex marriage ceremony being held on 17 November 2015.[9]

The amendment inserted a new section 4 to Article 41 of the Constitution. The English text reads:

4. Marriage may be contracted in accordance with law by two persons without distinction as to their sex.

Journalist Bruce Arnold argued against the bill in two articles in The Irish Times, one of which focused on alleged issues with the Irish text.[10][13] Arnold argued that the Irish text describes only same-sex couples, thus rendering opposite-sex marriage illegal.[10] Government sources pointed out the words impugned by Arnold (“beirt” and “cib acu is fir n mn”) are already used with similar intent elsewhere in the constitution.[14] Counterpoints from legal academics were that Arnold’s strict constructionist interpretation would be trumped by the doctrine of absurdity, and that failure to mention opposite-sex marriage would not make it illegal.[14] Some argued that the Irish text should nevertheless be changed to remove all doubts.[14] Enda Kenny announced on 10 March 2015 that such a change would be made.[15] Frances Fitzgerald moved the amendment in the Dil the following day.[16]

Katherine Zappone and Ann Louise Gilligan lost a case in the High Court in 2006 for the recognition by Ireland of their Canadian same-sex marriage.[17] The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 instituted civil partnership in Irish law. After the 2011 general election, the Fine Gael and Labour parties formed a coalition government, whose programme included the establishment of a Constitutional Convention to examine potential changes on specified issues, including “Provision for the legalisation of same-sex marriage”. The Convention considered the issue in May 2013 and voted to recommend that the state should be required, rather than merely permitted, to allow for same-sex marriage.[18] Its report was formally submitted in July and the government formally responded in December, when Taoiseach Enda Kenny said a referendum would be held “no later than mid-2015”.[19] All amendments to the Irish constitution must be approved by the people in a referendum before becoming law.

Some legal academics claimed that extending marriage to same-sex couples did not require a constitutional amendment and could have been accomplished by an ordinary Act of the Oireachtas.[20][21] Then-minister Shatter disagreed in November 2013, stating that there was “ample case law” to the effect that “marriage is understood as being between one man and one woman”.[3]

In January 2015, the wording of the proposed amendment was agreed at a special cabinet meeting and published in the press, and the bill was formally introduced in the Dil by the Minister for Justice and Equality, Frances Fitzgerald.[22][23]

A separate Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 was passed in April 2015. This included adoption rights for same-sex couples prior to the passing of the Act, single gay or lesbian people, or one of the partners in a same-sex couple could adopt, but joint adoption by both partners was not possible.[24] The general scheme of this bill was published for consultation in January 2014,[25] and in 2015 it was passed by the Dil on 12 March and the Seanad on 30 March, and signed into law on 6 April.[26][27] As of May 2018[update] the legislation has only partially been commenced.[28]

Two referendums were held on 22 May 2015, on the marriage bill and another constitutional amendment, to reduce the age of candidacy for the presidency.[29][30] Referendums need a simple majority of the votes cast to pass. A Dil by-election in CarlowKilkenny was held on the same day.[29]

According to the Referendum Commission, if the referendum is passed:[31]

The Thirty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Bill 2015 was debated in the Dil on 10 and 11 March 2015. Several deputies from different parties spoke in favour. The only speaker to oppose it was independent TD Mattie McGrath; it was passed without a division (i.e., by voice vote). It was then debated in the Seanad on 25 and 27 March. Votes were held on a number of proposed amendments, all of which were defeated, and the Bill was finally passed by 29 votes to three. Among those speaking in favour was Katherine Zappone, who was a Senator at the time. Those who voted against were Senators Rnn Mullen, Jim Walsh and Feargal Quinn; the opposition amendments were also supported by Senator Fidelma Healy Eames.[33]

All four main parties in the Dil supported the bill: the governing Fine Gael and Labour, and the opposition Fianna Fil and Sinn Fin. Members of the Green Party, Anti-Austerity Alliance, People Before Profit Alliance, Workers’ Party of Ireland and independents are also on record in support of the amendment.[34] “Yes Equality” was an umbrella campaign by Gay and Lesbian Equality Network (GLEN), the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and Marriage Equality.[35]

Religious bodies in Ireland officially adopted stances that were either neutral or opposed to the referendum. The Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference is opposed to same-sex marriage, and has distributed a booklet to all parishes.[36][37] In February 2015, the Methodist Church in Ireland issued a statement supporting the traditional view of marriage as being between a man and woman.[38] In April 2015, a cross-denominational group issued a leaflet urging a No vote. Two bishops (one Roman Catholic and one Church of Ireland), and ministers and lay members of the Methodist, Presbyterian various Pentecostal churches signed and distributed the leaflet.[39] On 22 April 2015, the leaders of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland issued a statement advocating a no vote, saying “the change proposed in the same-sex marriage referendum denies the rights of children and the natural responsibilities of a father and a mother in nurturing them”.[40] The Iona Institute, a mainly-Catholic religious think tank, also opposed the amendment.[41]

However, in February 2015, the Church of Ireland announced that it was not taking a stance on the referendum, but was urging its members to vote according to their conscience.[42][43] Two Church of Ireland bishops called for a Yes vote. As early as May 2014, the Church of Ireland Bishop of Cork, Dr Paul Colton had signalled his support for a yes vote.[44] Similarly, the Islamic Centre in Ireland issued a statement on 17 April stating that “As Muslims we must believe in equality and inclusiveness. People should not be discriminated for any reason. It is important to humanise people and not to de humanise. The Islamic tradition teaches to hate the sin but not the sinner. The attitude of some Muslims towards homosexuals is incompatible with the spirit of mercy and kindness in Islam. The Irish constitution guarantees all Irish citizens the freedom of conscience and Muslims must exercise this right when voting on 22nd May 2015.”[45]

A petition initiated by a number of religious groups including the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland, the Irish Council of Imams, and the Galway branch of the Reformed Presbyterian Church on 15 April called for a “conscience clause”, which would allow individuals and businesses to discriminate against same-sex couples in the provision of goods and services. In response, Taoiseach Enda Kenny said: “The Government has made its decision very clear here in respect to the question that the people will be asked on the 22nd of May. That question of course is to give their approval, if they see fit and I hope they do, to allow for marriage in civil law irrespective of sexual orientation.” Brendan Howlin said “The one issue at the core of this referendum is equality under the Constitution and anything else is extraneous.”[46]

However, some religious-affiliated groups were in favour of the referendum. In January 2015, the Church of Ireland LGBT group Changing Attitude Ireland welcomed the publication of the wording of the Marriage Equality Referendum. Dr Richard OLeary, the organisation’s chair, said that marriage should be “available to couples without distinction as to their sex”, just as civil marriage “may be contracted by two persons without distinction as to their race or religion”.[42] On 7 May, at a Changing Attitude Ireland event, former Archdeacon of Dublin, Gordon Linney said “We are being given an opportunity on May 22 finally to show the gay community that we value them for who they are. We welcome them as they are fully into society and so give them the recognition they are entitled to and that those who are in stable relationships and wish to marry should be allowed to do so. Marriage is a civil contract. No church will be forced to solemnise any union it does not approve of.”[47]

Many business groups advocated for the passing of the referendum. On 16 April, Business for Yes Equality launched, with high-profile companies such as Twitter, eBay, PayPal and 150 Irish-based international and local companies joining.[48][49] Stephen McIntyre, MD of Twitter in Ireland, said “As I see it, this case has three key elements. First, people perform better in the long run when they can be themselves. Second, talent is attracted to organisations which demonstrate an appreciation for diversity, inclusiveness and equality. Finally, Irelands international reputation as a good place to do business will be enhanced by a Yes vote.”[50] Martin Shanahan, the head of IDA Ireland, the Industrial Development Authority, called for a Yes vote on 1 May, saying “A Yes vote on May 22 would tell the business world that Ireland is open, inclusive and welcomes diversity and that would be a very positive message to be sending internationally.”[51] He also said he believed that a No vote would send a negative signal to international businesses.[52]

Also on 1 May, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions announced its support for the Yes campaign with the launch of its “Trade unions for civil marriage equality” campaign.[53] Other trade unions and staff representative associations supporting a Yes vote included the Garda Representative Association, Mandate, and Ireland’s largest trade union SIPTU.[54][55][56]

On 7 May, eBay CEO John Donahoe announced that the company was backing a Yes vote. Donahoe said that its position on equality issues such as same-sex marriage, in addition to being “the right thing to do”, also helps the company attract, retain and develop the right people.[57]

Other prominent groups to support the referendum included a coalition of Ireland’s main children’s charities called “BeLonG To Yes”. Constituent organisations include the ISPCC, Barnardo’s, Forige, Youth Work Ireland, the Migrant Rights Centre, Headstrong, Yes Equality, the Children’s Rights Alliance, Pavee Point, EPIC and the National Youth Council of Ireland. Speaking at the launch, Fergus Finlay said they had come together to call for a Yes vote in part because groups within the No campaign were “using children as pawns” and that every time he saw a poster calling for a No vote because “every child deserves a mother and father”, he saw “a sickening insult to the thousands of lone parents and children who love and care for each other in Ireland. The message is exploitative, hurtful and dishonest. What every child deserves is love, respect, safety. That can come from two parents of either sex, two parents of the same-sex, or a single parent.”[58][59] The Union of Students in Ireland, then led by Laura Harmon, launched its “Students for Marriage Equality” campaign in January together with its dedicated website, voteforlove.ie.[60]

Amnesty International launched their “Let’s Make History”[61] campaign for marriage equality on 22 March 2015 to thousands of people outside the historic General Post Office, Dublin.[62] Speakers included Colm O’Gorman, Pat Carey, Sabina Brennan, Gavin Brennan and Grace Dyas.

On 5 May, the “Yes for Health” campaign was launched by Liam Doran, general secretary of the Irish Nurses and Midwives Organisation and Kieran Ryan, CEO of the Irish College of General Practitioners. Speaking at the launch, Minister for Health Leo Varadkar said that a No vote would be a “big step backwards” for the country, and that it would have an adverse effect on the mental health of members of the LGBT community.[63] The following day, the National Women’s Council of Ireland and launched their ‘Yes’ campaign. The launch was attended by representatives of various groups, including the Irish Feminist Network, Digi Women and the Association of Childcare Professionals.[64] On 7 May, the Law Society of Ireland announced its support for a Yes vote. Ken Murphy, the society’s Director General, said that the society was taking a public stance because marriage equality was an issue of fundamental human rights. The decision followed a report from the society’s human rights committee, which found that there were 160 ways in which civil partnership, compared to civil marriage, was the lesser of the two unions.[65]

Some groups were also formed in opposition to the referendum. On 18 April, Mothers and Fathers Matter, formed in 2014 to oppose the Children and Family Relationships Bill, launched its No campaign.[66][67] First Families First, a group of three people headed by children’s and disabilities campaigner Kathy Sinnott, and fathers rights campaigner John Waters launched its campaign for a No vote on 1 May.[68] On 7 May, a group called StandUp4Marriage launched. Its founder, Senator Jim Walsh said the launch was sparsely attended because people who want to vote no are afraid to speak out.[47]

Broadcasters are legally required to cover referendum campaigns in a balanced manner. Several complaints were made to the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (BAI) that programmes and presenters had unfairly favoured the Yes side. The BAI rejected these in its October 2015 report.[72][73]

A 2014 poll showed that support was strongest among younger voters, and that Sinn Fin and Labour voters were somewhat more in favour than Fine Gael and Fianna Fil.[91][84][89]

Counting began at 09:00 IST on 23 May (08:00 UTC). Early tallies quickly began to indicate a victory for the Yes campaign, with Minister of State Aodhn Rordin declaring a “landslide” victory across Dublin only 8 minutes into counting.[95] Key figures in the No campaign, including David Quinn began conceding defeat as early as 10:00, long ahead of any constituencies declaring their final count.[96]

Urban regions generally recorded higher approval ratings for the change. The highest Yes percentages were recorded in the Dublin Region with the all of the top ten by Yes vote percentage being in the region (with a total yes vote of 71% for the region), and all of the top 15 located in the Greater Dublin Area. Cork’s urban constituencies also ranked above the national average, as did Limerick city. Although the Donegal constituencies had been expected to return a No vote,[97] and indeed, of all constituencies reporting a majority Yes vote, the lowest margin was recorded in Donegal South-West where a Yes vote was carried by a margin of only 33 votes RoscommonSouth Leitrim was the only constituency to return a majority No vote.

The national results were as follows:[98]

Dublin Castle, where the result of referendum was officially announced, was opened to the public for the duration of the count, with numbers limited to 2,000 at any one time. A carnival atmosphere prevailed all day after early count tallies indicated that the result would be a Yes. Celebrations and street parties took place at many venues in cities around Ireland, with Dublin celebrations centred between gay venues Pantibar and The George, and Dublin Castle.[101]

Taoiseach Enda Kenny said “With today’s Yes vote we have disclosed who we are a generous, compassionate, bold and joyful people. The referendum was about inclusiveness and equality, about love and commitment being enshrined in the constitution. The people have spoken. They have said yes. Ireland thank you.”[102]

Tnaiste Joan Burton described Ireland as a “rainbow nation” and said “In Ireland, we are known as a nation of storytellers and today, the people have told quite some story. Together, the people of Ireland have struck a massive blow against discrimination as we extend the right of marriage to all our citizens.” Leo Varadkar, Minister for Health and Ireland’s first openly gay cabinet minister, said “It is a historic day for Ireland. We are the first country in the world to enshrine marriage equality in our constitution and to do it through popular mandate. That makes us a beacon of equality and liberty to the rest of the world, so it’s a very proud day for the Irish people.”[102]

Michel Martin, Fianna Fil leader and Leader of the Opposition, who supported the amendment, said “there is something in the DNA of Irish people that reacts to inequality”, adding “It is something that Irish people do not accept historically and I believe this ballot is a vote in favour of a more inclusive, equal and just society.”[103] However, Senator Averil Power resigned from Fianna Fil after the referendum, alleging that many of its TDs and Senators had refused to canvass or leaflet for a Yes vote, and that its low profile in the Yes campaign was “cynical and cowardly”.[104][105]

The leader of Sinn Fin, Gerry Adams, said “We have a new era of equality and that is a good day for Ireland.”[102]

Veteran gay and civil rights campaigner, Senator David Norris, who was one of the key figures in having homosexuality decriminalised, said “I think it’s wonderful. It’s a little bit late for me. As I said the other day, Ive spent so much time pushing the boat out that I forgot to jump on and now it’s out beyond the harbour on the high seas, but it’s very nice to look at.”[106]

Katherine Zappone, the first openly lesbian member of the Oireachtas, proposed remarrying her wife on air.[107]

Diarmuid Martin, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin told RT that the church needed a “reality check.” He said “I appreciate how gay and lesbian men and women feel on this day. That they feel this is something that is enriching the way they live. I think it is a social revolution.” He added “I ask myself, most of these young people who voted yes are products of our Catholic school system for 12 years. I’m saying there’s a big challenge there to see how we get across the message of the Church”.[108]

The Church of Ireland issued a statement indicating that it “defines marriage as between a man and a woman, and the result of this referendum does not alter this.” The Archbishops and bishops also called for “a spirit of public generosity, both from those for whom the result of the referendum represents triumph, and from those for whom it signifies disaster”.[109][110]

The Presbyterian Church in Ireland said it was “deeply disappointed and saddened that the Constitution will no longer reflect the historic and Christian view of marriage that it is exclusively between one man and one woman.”[111]

Under the Referendum Act 1994, the returning officer issued a provisional certificate of the referendum result to the Master of the High Court and published a notice in Iris Oifigiil, the official gazette.[1][128][129] Citizens have seven days in which to lodge a petition challenging the result.[130][129] If no petition is upheld, the provisional certificate is certified as final by the Master of the High Court and the bill is sent to the President of Ireland to be signed into law, thereby amending the constitution.[131][129] Two petitions against the marriage referendum were rejected in the High Court in June and the Court of Appeal in July, after which the bill was signed by President Michael D. Higgins on 29 August 2015.[8][132]

The provisional referendum certificate was issued on 25 May 2015 and published the following day in Iris Oifigiil.[1] Two separate petitions challenging the certificate were lodged within the time limit and considered in the High Court on 5 June 2015.[133] The petitioners, Gerry Walshe and Maurice J. Lyons, were lay litigants.[134] Walsh argued that political parties receiving state funding should have been prohibited from campaigning; that copies of the amendment should have been available at post offices; and that the secrecy of the ballot was compromised by serial numbers on ballot papers and CCTV cameras in some polling stations.[134][135] Lyons argued that the amendment is too vaguely worded and incompatible with the constitution’s Christian ethos and reference to “woman … in the home”; and also that non-voters should have been counted as no-voters.[136][137] Nicholas Kearns, President of the High Court, dismissed both applications and awarded costs against the petitioners.[138][136][139] Walshe and Lyons appealed the decisions, and on 29 June the Court of Appeal scheduled hearings for 30 July.[140][141][142][143] On 30 July the court upheld the dismissals and the costs awards against both petitioners.[7][144] The remaining steps were as prescribed by the Referendum Act 1994: on 24 August the High Court’s Master formally notified the referendum returning officer Rona N Fhlanghaile that it had not accepted any petition;[145] on 28 August N Fhlanghaile sent the final referendum certificate to the Taoiseach and President;[146] on 29 August the President signing the amendment into law.[147][148][132][149]

Meanwhile, on 27 August, both Walshe and Lyons applied to the Supreme Court to overturn the Court of Appeal decision, although neither sought a stay on the Master or returning officer’s actions, and their applications did not prevent the bill being signed into law.[147][150] On 16 September, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, stating neither applicant had raised any points of substance.[151][152] The Supreme Court criticised the decision to finalise the referendum certificate before it had made its decision;[153] however, the High Court on 23 September rejected a claim by Walshe that the certificate was therefore invalid.[148][154] The President’s office and the Department of the Environment also stated they had acted in accordance with the law.[132][155] The Master of the High Court said the problem arose because the Referendum Act 1994 did not take account of the Court of Appeal, created in 2014 under the Thirty-third Amendment of the Constitution.[147][155] Lecturer Conor O’Mahony suggested the Master, though not obliged to wait for a Supreme Court appeal, might better have chosen to do so.[155] The Supreme Court suggested that the applicants’ failure to request a stay on the Court of Appeal decision pending request for a Supreme Court Appeal was a consequence of their being lay litigants, and that a professional lawyer would not have made such an omission.[156]

In March 2015, the Department of Justice published the general scheme of the Marriage Bill 2015, setting out the changes to be made to marriage law if the proposed amendment was enacted. These include removing the current legislative bar on same-sex couples marrying,[157] allowing foreign same-sex marriages to be registered in Ireland as marriages rather than as civil partnerships,[158] and dissolving a civil partnership if the partners marry each other.[159] Authorised solemnisers of marriage from religious groups would be allowed to refuse to officiate at same-sex ceremonies.[160][161] Lawyer Benedict Floinn felt the bill’s drafting should have been completed before the referendum, to minimise the lacuna during which statute law is out of step with the constitution.[162] The Gender Recognition Act 2015 requires a transgender person to be unmarried to recognise a change of legal sex;[163] the Marriage Bill intends to remove this restriction.[164][165]

The government hoped to have the Marriage Bill enacted before the Oireachtas’ summer adjournment, but the referendum petition hearings in the Court of Appeal delayed this.[140][141][166] The government intended to enact the Marriage Bill “as early as possible” after the Dil’s resumption on 22 September 2015.[167] The bill provides that applications for civil partnership pending when it comes into force can be converted into applications for marriage.[168][167][169] The Minister for Justice stated that marriages under this provision should take place by November.[169][170] The bill was approved at a cabinet meeting on 16 September for publication the following day.[171] It passed its final stage in the legislature on 22 October 2015[172] and (in the absence of the President, who was out of the country) was signed into law on 29 October 2015 by the Presidential Commission.[173]

The Marriage Act 2015 came into force on 16 November 2015.[174] The first same-sex marriage ceremony was the next day in Clonmel, County Tipperary.[175]

Fourth Amendment, amendment (1791) to the Constitution of the United States, part of the Bill of Rights, that forbids unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals and property. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see below.

Introduced in 1789, what became the Fourth Amendment struck at the heart of a matter central to the early American experience: the principle that, within reason, Every mans house is his castle, and that any citizen may fall into the category of the criminally accused and ought to be provided protections accordingly. In U.S. constitutional law, the Fourth Amendment is the foundation of criminal law jurisprudence, articulating both the rights of persons and the responsibilities of law-enforcement officials. The balance between these two forces has undergone considerable public, political, and judicial debate. Are the amendments two clauses meant to be applied independently or taken as a whole? Is the expectation of privacy diminished depending on where and what is suspected, sought, and seized? What constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure?

The protections contained in the amendment have been determined less on the basis of what the Constitution says than according to what it has been interpreted to mean, and, as such, its constitutional meaning has inherently been fluid. The protections granted by the U.S. Supreme Court have expanded during periods when the court was dominated by liberals (e.g., during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren [195369]), beginning particularly with Mapp v. Ohio (1961), in which the court extended the exclusionary rule to all criminal proceedings; by contrast, during the tenure of the conservative William Rehnquist (19862005) as chief justice, the court contracted the rights afforded to the criminally accused, allowing law-enforcement officials latitude to search in instances when they reasonably believed that the property in question harboured presumably dangerous persons.

The full text of the amendment is:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”Fourth Amendment, U.S. Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment Defined:

Like the majority of fields within American law, the Fourth Amendment is heavily rooted in the English legal doctrine. In a general sense, the Fourth Amendment was created to limit the power of the government and their ability to enforce legal actions on individuals. The Fourth Amendment was adopted as a direct response to the abuse of the writ of assistance, which was a type of general search warrant used by the government during the American Revolution. The Amendment was created to limit the powers of the law enforcement agency who is conducting a search of an individuals personal property.

The Fourth Amendment is a part of the Bill of Rights, which are the first 10 Amendments to the United States Constitution and the framework to elucidate upon the freedoms of the individual. The Bill of Rights were proposed and sent to the states by the first session of the First Congress. They were later ratified on December 15, 1791.

The first 10 Amendments to the United States Constitution were introduced by James Madison as a series of legislative articles and came into effect as Constitutional Amendments following the process of ratification by three-fourths of the States on December 15, 1791.

Stipulations of the 4th Amendment

The Fourth Amendment guards against the governments ability to conduct unreasonable search and seizures when the individual party being searched has a reasonable exception of privacy.

The Fourth Amendment specifically requires a law enforcement agency to possess judicially sanctioned search and arrest warrants, which are supported by probable clause, to be administered before a persons property can be inspected.

The Fourth Amendment ties in numerous limitations whereby an individual may be searched without a warrant given the presence of certain circumstances. The individuals property may be searched and seized if: The individual is on parole or in a tax hearing, faces deportation, the evidence is seized from a common carrier, the evidence is collected by U.S. customs agents, the evidence is seized by probation officers, the evidence is seized outside of the United States, or probable cause is evident.

Court Cases tied into the 4th Amendment

In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment is enforceable and should be applied to all states in the Union by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that certain searches and seizures were in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment even when a warrant was properly issued to the coordinating law enforcement agencies.

The Fourth Amendment, or Amendment IV of the United States Constitution is the section of the Bill of Rights that protects people from being searched or having their things taken away from them without any good reason. If the government or any law enforcement official wants to do that, he or she must have a very good reason to do that and must get permission to perform the search from a judge. The fourth amendment was introduced into the Constitution of the United States as a part of the Bill of Rights on September 5, 1789 and was ratified or voted four by three fourths of the states on December 15, 1791.

The Text of the Fourth Amendment

The text of the Fourth Amendment which is found in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights is the following:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

History of the Third Amendment

In Colonial America, laws were written in order to help the English earn money on customs. The justices of the peace would do this by writing general warrants, which allowed general search and seizure to happen. Massachusetts wrote a law in 1756 that banned these warrants, because tax collectors were abusing their powers by searching the colonists homes for illegal goods. These general warrants allowed any messenger or officer to search a suspected place without any evidence. It also allowed them to seize people without even saying what they did wrong or showing evidence of their wrongdoings. Virginia also banned the use of general warrants later due to other fears. These actions later led to the addition of the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.

The Fourth Amendment Today

Today, the Fourth Amendment means that in order for a police officer to search and arrest someone, he or she will need to get permission or a warrant to do so from a judge. In order to get a warrant, the police officer must have evidence or probable cause that supports it. The police officer, or whoever has the evidence, must swear that it is true to his or her knowledge.

Facts About the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment applies to the government, but not any searches done by organizations or people who are not doing it for the government.

Some searches can be done without a warrant without breaking the law, like when there is a good reason to think that a crime is happening.

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

Reasons for the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment came about because of the actions of British tax collectors before the Revolutionary War. They would use general warrants to enter and search any house they wanted without needing evidence of wrongdoing. The Founding Fathers wanted to protect people from this sort of invasion of privacy from the government.

What is “searches and seizures”?

A “search” under the Fourth Amendment is when a public employee (like a police officer) looks at something that is considered “private”. It typically takes two things in order for something to be considered “private”:

1) the citizen thought it was private and it would not be able to be viewed by the public (For example, something inside a house would be private, something on the driveway could be viewed by anyone).

2) these expectations of privacy are realistic (It wouldn’t be realistic to expect something on your driveway to be private).

When someone is “seized” they are not free to leave (like being arrested and placed in jail). When something is “seized” it cannot be taken back (like the police taking your wallet and not giving it back).

In order to conduct a legal “search” or “seizure” the police must have a warrant written by a judge. To get this warrant they must present evidence to the judge that some criminal activity has taken place. This assures that the police can’t enter a person’s home or arrest a person without evidence that has been reviewed by a judge.

The Fourth Amendment also states that there must be “probable cause.” This means that there is enough evidence to show that a crime has likely been committed. The police must have this evidence before any arrest or search. Any evidence found during the search does not count as probable cause.

The requirements for search and seizure are slightly different in the public schools. The Supreme Court has said that school officials and police officers can search a student if they have “reasonable suspicion” that a crime has occurred. This is less of a requirement than “probable cause.”

There are certain places and situations where people are searched or stopped without a warrant. Consider the airport where everyone who flies is searched. When you agree to fly, you give up some of your Fourth Amendment rights. Another example is a roadblock that tests for drunk drivers. When you drive on public roads you give up some of your Fourth Amendment rights. These searches are generally accepted by the citizens for their own safety and protection.

Whether a particular type of search is considered reasonablein the eyes of the law,is determined by balancing two important interests. On one side of the scale is the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. On the other side of the scale are legitimate government interests, such as public safety.

The extent to which an individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment depends, in part, on the location of the search or seizure.Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).

Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

However, there are some exceptions. A warrantless search may be lawful:

If an officer is given consent to search;Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)If the search is incident to a lawful arrest;United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)If there is probable cause to search and exigent circumstances;Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)If the items are in plain view;Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).

When an officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)

School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority; rather, a search of a student need only be reasonable under all the circumstances.New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

Where there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a criminal activity, an officer may lawfully search any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009),

An officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or that criminal activity is afoot.Berekmer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984),United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).

An officer may conduct a pat-down of the driver and passengers during a lawful traffic stop; the police need not believe that any occupant of the vehicle is involved in a criminal activity.Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).

The use of a narcotics detection dog to walk around the exterior of a car subject to a valid traffic stop does not require reasonable, explainable suspicion.Illinois v. Cabales, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).

Special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without any individualized suspicion.Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

An officer at an international border may conduct routine stops and searches.United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).

A state may use highway sobriety checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving.Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

A state may set up highway checkpoints where the stops are brief and seek voluntary cooperation in the investigation of a recent crime that has occurred on that highway.Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

However, a state may not use a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics.City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).

A police officer witnessed three men pacing in front of a jewelry store and suspected that a robbery was being planned. He approached the men and identified himself, then performed frisks of defendants Chilton and Terry and discovered illegal concealed weapons. Defendants were convicted and appealed, claiming that the frisk violated their Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches and seizures.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that when a law enforcement officer has “reasonable grounds” for suspecting that a criminal suspect may be armed, he may pat down the outer layer of the suspect’s clothing for weapons. The ruling held that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a pat down is performed based on reasonable suspicion for the purpose of ensuring officer safety.

The Court’s ruling in Terry v. Ohio has been understood to validate the practice of frisking (or patting down) suspects for weapons under diverse circumstances. Generally, law enforcement officers will perform frisks at their discretion, regardless of the “reasonable suspicion” standard established by the ruling in Terry. Thus, it is not uncommon for frisks to be conducted for investigatory purposes where no actual evidence of a threat to officer safety exists.

Due to the prevalence of police frisks, it is important for citizens to understand the rationale behind police authority to pat down suspects and the limitations the Court has placed on that authority:

For more on this, check out our podcast on police pat downs and the ‘plain feel’ doctrine.

Defendant Bostick boarded a bus from Miami to Atlanta. At a stopover in Ft. Lauderdale, the bus was boarded by two uniformed narcotics officers who were performing a routine inspection of the bus. Without reasonable suspicion, the officers approached Bostick in his seat and requested to see his ticket and identification. Finding nothing out of the ordinary, the officers proceeded to request consent to search his luggage. Bostick reportedly consented, at which point the officers performed a search and discovered cocaine. Bostick was subsequently convicted, and appealed claiming that due to his apparent inability to leave the bus, the encounter constituted an unlawful seizure, the evidence obtained must be suppressed. The Supreme Court upheld Bostick’s conviction, finding that the practice of contacting citizens on buses in this fashion did not constitute an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s ruling rejected Bostick’s claim that because the officers were armed and positioned such that he could not leave his seat or the bus, the encounter was a seizure. Since it was never directly communicated to the defendant that he was not free to leave, the Court concluded that the police officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. So long as nature of the officers’ contact with the defendant is held constitutionally valid, his consent to be searched and the evidence that resulted are held valid as well.

Florida v. Bostick is a clear example of law enforcement officers’ systematic reliance on the tendency of citizens to overestimate police authority. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case indicates a willingness to accommodate manipulative law enforcement practices in order to prevent the Constitution’s provisions from interfering with the arrest of drug suspects. So long as the police and the courts cooperate in using the ignorance of suspects as a tool through which to obtain convictions, it is extremely important for all citizens to know their rights.

In the context of investigatory stops and detentions, here are a few important principles that should be remembered:

For more on this, check out our podcast on the 3 levels of police-citizen encounters.

An investigatory stop is a particularly difficult encounter for the citizen because police officers are experienced at controlling the situation. It is important to note, however, that it is actually the citizen who controls all police encounters unless and until there exists such evidence to justify police intrusion into the citizen’s privacy or freedom of movement.

Remember that your refusal to be searched cannot be legally interpreted as evidence that you may be involved in a crime. Police cannot detain you merely because you refused consent to a search.

Officer James Rand stopped a car with six occupants and received consent from the driver to search the vehicle. It was determined that the officer did not pressure the driver into consenting. In the back seat he found three checks which had been stolen from a car wash. Defendant Robert Bustamonte challenged his arrest, arguing that while he had consented voluntarily, he had not been informed of his right not to consent to the search.

In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court ruled that consent is valid as long as it is voluntarily given. The ruling held that police may not use threats or coercion to obtain consent, but that they need not inform suspects of their right not to consent to a search. In reaching this decision, the Court overturned the more strict “waiver test”, which required that suspects be fully informed of their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures before they can give valid consent.

As demonstrated by the Court in the Schneckloth ruling, the police are under no obligation to inform citizens of their Fourth Amendment rights when requesting to perform a search. This means that it is up to the individual to understand and exercise their right not to be searched. Some states require that police obtain the citizen’s signature on a waiver form before conducting the search, however, in most places, police merely need to obtain the citizen’s permission verbally. This can be a tricky situation because police will sometimes interpret a broad range of statements or actions as implied consent. Here’s what you should remember about police search requests:

Cooperating with someone who is trying to arrest you just might get you arrested!

Police officers forcibly entered Mapp’s home in search of a bombing suspect. In the course of the search, officers failed to produce a valid search warrant and denied Mapp contact with her attorney, who was present at the scene. While the suspect was not found, officers did discover illegal pornography in Mapp’s home, for which she was charged and convicted. Mapp appealed her conviction claiming that the evidence against her should not be admissible in court because it was illegally obtained.

In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that illegally obtained evidence is not admissible in State courts. The Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures could not be properly enforced as long as illegally obtained evidence continued to be presented in court. The ruling argued that there was no other effective means of deterring widespread Fourth Amendment violations by police. The ruling acknowledged that sometimes a criminal could go free due to improper police conduct, but argued that the interest in promoting professionalism among police outweighed this concern.

The policy established in Mapp v. Ohio is known as the “exclusionary rule”. This rule holds that if police violate your constitutional rights in order to obtain evidence, they cannot use that evidence against you. If you have been charged with a crime and you feel that the evidence was illegally obtained, your lawyer can make a “motion to suppress” that evidence. The judge will then consider the manner in which the evidence was obtained and make a decision as to whether or not it can be presented during the trial. In many instances, the evidence is central to the prosecution’s case, and if the judge grants a motion to suppress, it is not uncommon for all charges to be dropped.

The exclusionary rule is a critical remedy against improper searches, and can be used as an effective protection by citizens who know their rights. The reality is that police officers on the street consider it their primary duty to identify and arrest criminals, and often consider the procedural guidelines which restrict their authority as a secondary concern or even a hindrance. In this context, it is understandable that police sometimes perform searches when they shouldn’t. Here’s what you should know about illegally seized evidence:

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Herring v. United States further weakened the exclusionary rule by expanding the so-called “good faith” exception. Listen to our podcast on this, “Herring v. U.S. (and why it sucks!)”.

The Fourth Amendment includes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.11 min read

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, detention must be ‘reasonable.’ See:

In the context of a criminal arrest, a detention of longer than 48 hours without a probable cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law in the absence of a demonstrated emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 670 (’91). However, the Supreme Court arrived at this rule by considering the time it takes to complete administrative steps typically incident to arrest.

Even in the law enforcement context, the State may interfere with an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests with less than probable cause and without a warrant if the intrusion is only minimal and is justified by law enforcement purposes. For example,

The gathering of fingerprint evidence from ‘free persons’ constitutes a sufficiently significant interference with individual expectations of privacy that law enforcement officials are required to demonstrate that they have probable cause, or at least an articulable suspicion, to believe that the person committed a criminal offense and that the fingerprinting will establish or negate the person’s connection to the offense. For example:

Thus, in the fingerprinting context, there exists a constitutionally significant distinction between the gathering of fingerprints from free persons to determine their guilt of an unsolved criminal offense and the gathering of fingerprints for identification purposes from persons within the lawful custody of the state.

The drawing of blood from free persons generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a person has committed a criminal offense and that his blood will reveal evidence relevant to that offense. See: Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-71; U.S. v. Chapel, ___ F.3d ___, slip op. at 5753-54 (9th Cir.’95) (en banc), but the absence of such a warrant does not a fortiori establish a violation of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that the drawing of blood constitutes only a minimally intrusive search, as in the following cases:

“An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 421-2 (holding that a warrant was not required in part because “in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate”).

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed and expanded the principle first enunciated in Skinner, stating that, in some contexts, “testing based on ‘suspicion’ of [wrongful activity] would not be better, but worse than suspicionless testing.” Acton, 1995 WL 373274, at *8. In Acton, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a school district’s practice of conducting random, suspicionless urine testing of school athletes for drug use. The Court rejected the proposition that the school district could “conduct such testing only if school officials had suspicion that a specific athlete was using drugs, holding that this alternative ‘entails substantial difficulties — if it is indeed practicable at all.” Id. Accusatory drug testing would “transform[] the process into a badge of shame” and would increase the risk that school officials would impose testing arbitrarily upon disfavored, but not drug-using, students. Id.

Except in certain narrowly limited cases, the Court repeatedly has stated its “insist[ence] upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution.” Chambers v. Moreny, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (’70). Because “[t]he integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value in our society,” searches that invade bodily integrity cannot be executed as mere fishing expeditions to acquire useful evidence: “The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 769-70.

Only when law enforcement faces an exigent circumstance, such as a need to preserve evanescent blood alcohol evidence, and has probable cause to link the sought-after information to a crime under investigation is it constitutional to conduct nonconsensual blood testing without a warrant. Id. at 770-71. Therefore, forced extraction of blood not only ‘implicates the Fourth Amendment,’ as the majority notes, but also falls squarely within the area of privacy interests for which the traditional probable cause requirement determines reasonableness in the law enforcement context. Forced blood extraction intrudes on the private personal sphere and infringes upon an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’ Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 60 (’85).

In answering the first question, the Court recognized that it was ‘writ[ing] on a clean slate’ regarding the treatment of searches that involve intrusions into the human body. Id. at 767-8. It concluded that such searches require probable cause. Id. at 770-1.

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (’85), recognized that Schmerber’s threshold standard was a requirement of probable cause “where intrusions into the human body are concerned,” which implicate “deep-rooted expectations of privacy.” Id. at 761, 760. The Winston Court then acknowledged “other factors” [b]eyond these standards that must be considered in determining whether a particular intrusion is reasonable. For instance, whether “the procedure threatens the safety or health of the individual” and “the extent of the intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary interests.” Id. at 761 (emphasis added).

In regard to the additional ‘dignitary’ factor (beyond the threshold inquiry of invasion of bodily integrity), the Winston Court noted Schmerber’s recognition that blood extraction is not ‘an unduly extensive imposition.’ Id. at 762. The Court contrasted this lesser bodily invasion, which the Schmerber Court had upheld upon demonstration of probable cause, with the more drastic measure of dangerous surgery to recoup criminal evidence, which the Winston Court concluded would violate the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights even when supported by probable cause.

Thus again, the context of the quotation demonstrates that the Court places blood extraction squarely within the probable cause requirement because it is an invasion of bodily integrity, while at the same time acknowledging that it is a less extensive imposition on dignitary interests than surgical removal of a bullet.

The unique situation in which the Supreme Court has approved suspicionless searches in the traditional law enforcement context includes the practice of stopping motorists at sobriety checkpoints. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (’90). The Sitz Court relied on well-settled law that motorists have a lessened expectation of privacy regarding stops and visual searches of automobiles on the nation’s roadways. Id. at 450 (explaining the importance of the context of ‘police stops of motorists on public highways’). At these sobriety checkpoints, which motorists may choose to avoid, only the initial brief stop and preliminary questioning may take place without individualized suspicion: “more extensive field sobriety testing” requires justification. Id. at 450-2.

Like the highway sobriety checkpoints, the ‘special needs beyond normal law enforcement’ rationale supports searches on lesser grounds than probable cause only in a very few, carefully tailored regulatory contexts that do not involve apprehension of criminal perpetrators. See, for example, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 65-66 (’89) (applying the special needs exception to suspicionless quasi-consensual drug testing of Customs Service employees seeking transfer to positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction).

The special needs exception covers testing which “is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement [because] . . . results may not be used in criminal prosecution.” Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (emphases added). Even so, a search in the special needs context almost always requires individualized suspicion. See the following cases:

Nonetheless, routine searches that intrude into prisoners’ bodies without probable cause may be upheld only when the search is undertaken pursuant to a valid prison regulation that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective. For instance:

Individuals have a categorically different and lesser expectation of privacy in their fingerprints, visual images, or voice prints.

The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what ‘a person knowingly exposes to the public’. Like a man’s facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.

Blanket searches are unreasonable, however “even-handed” they may be, in the traditional criminal law enforcement context. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-2, 92 n.4 (’79) (invalidating a blanket pat-down search of all patrons in a tavern, even though there was probable cause to search the bartender and the premises). The ill that the Fourth Amendment prevents is not merely the arbitrariness of police discretion to single out individuals for attention, but also the unwarranted domination and control of the citizenry through fear of baseless but “even-handed” general police searches.

In Zurcher, the Supreme Court held that a search of the offices of a university newspaper, which was not involved in any criminal activity, for photographs of demonstrators who had assaulted police officers did not offend the Fourth Amendment’s ban against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court concluded: “[T]he Amendment has not been a barrier to warrants to search property on which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located, whether or not the owner or possessor of the premises to be searched is himself reasonably suspected of complicity in the crime being investigated.” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (’78) 436 U.S. 547, 549-50.

Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The essence of that protection is a prohibition against some modes of law enforcement because the cost of police intrusion into personal liberty is too high, even though the intrusion undoubtedly would result in an enormous boon to the public if the efficient apprehension of criminals were the sole criterion to be considered. “The easiest course for [law enforcement] officials is not always one that our Constitution allows them to take.” Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, dissenting).

A permanent resident alien is entitled to constitutional protection. For example:

Imagine youre driving a car, and a police officer spots you and pulls you over for speeding. He orders you out of the car. Maybe he wants to place you under arrest. Or maybe he wants to search your car for evidence of a crime. Can the officer do that?

The Fourth Amendment is the part of the Constitution that gives the answer. According to the Fourth Amendment, the people have a right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right limits the power of the police to seize and search people, their property, and their homes.

The Fourth Amendment has been debated frequently during the last several years, as police and intelligence agencies in the United States have engaged in a number of controversial activities. The federal government has conducted bulk collection of Americans telephone and Internet connections as part of the War on Terror. Many municipal police forces have engaged in aggressive use of stop and frisk. There have been a number of highly-publicized police-citizen encounters in which the police ended up shooting a civilian. There is also concern about the use of aerial surveillance, whether by piloted aircraft or drones.

The application of the Fourth Amendment to all these activities would have surprised those who drafted it, and not only because they could not imagine the modern technologies like the Internet and drones. They also were not familiar with organized police forces like we have today. Policing in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a responsibility of the citizenry, which participated in night watches. Other than that, there was only a loose collection of sheriffs and constables, who lacked the tools to maintain order as the police do today.

The primary concerns of the generation that ratified the Fourth Amendment were general warrants and writs of assistance. Famous incidents on both sides of the Atlantic gave rise to placing the Fourth Amendment in the Constitution. In Britain, the Crown employed general warrants to go after political enemies, leading to the famous decisions in Wilkes v. Wood (1763) and Entick v. Carrington (1765). General warrants allowed the Crowns messengers to search without any cause to believe someone had committed an offense. In those cases the judges decided that such warrants violated English common law. In the colonies the Crown used the writs of assistancelike general warrants, but often unbounded by time restraintsto search for goods on which taxes had not been paid. James Otis challenged the writs in a Boston court; though he lost, some such as John Adams attribute this legal battle as the spark that led to the Revolution. Both controversies led to the famous notion that a persons home is their castle, not easily invaded by the government.

Today the Fourth Amendment is understood as placing restraints on the government any time it detains (seizes) or searches a person or property. The Fourth Amendment also provides that no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The idea is that to avoid the evils of general warrants, each search or seizure should be cleared in advance by a judge, and that to get a warrant the government must show probable causea certain level of suspicion of criminal activityto justify the search or seizure.

To the extent that a warrant is required in theory before police can search, there are so many exceptions that in practice warrants rarely are obtained. Police can search automobiles without warrants, they can detain people on the street without them, and they can always search or seize in an emergency without going to a judge.

The way that the Fourth Amendment most commonly is put into practice is in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court decided in the mid-twentieth century that if the police seize evidence as part of an illegal search, the evidence cannot be admitted into court. This is called the exclusionary rule. It is controversial because in most cases evidence is being tossed out even though it shows the person is guilty and, as a result of the police conduct, they might avoid conviction. The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered, declared Benjamin Cardozo (a famous judge and ultimately Supreme Court justice). But, responded another Supreme Court justice, Louis Brandeis, If the government becomes the lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law.

One of the difficult questions today is what constitutes a search? If the police standing in Times Square in New York watched a person planting a bomb in plain daylight, we would not think they needed a warrant or any cause. But what about installing closed circuit TV cameras on poles, or flying drones over backyards, or gathering evidence that you have given to a third party such as an Internet provider or a banker?

Another hard question is when a search is acceptable when the government has no suspicion that a person has done something wrong. Lest the answer seem to be never, think of airport security. Surely it is okay for the government to screen people getting on airplanes, yet the idea is as much to deter people from bringing weapons as it is to catch themthere is no cause, probable or otherwise, to think anyone has done anything wrong. This is the same sort of issue with bulk data collection, and possibly with gathering biometric information.

What should be clear by now is that advancing technology and the many threats that face society add up to a brew in which the Fourth Amendment will continue to play a central role.

Twenty-fourth Amendment, amendment (1964) to the Constitution of the United States that prohibited the federal and state governments from imposing poll taxes before a citizen can participate in a federal election. It was proposed by the U.S. Congress on August 27, 1962, and was ratified by the states on January 23, 1964.

In 1870, following the American Civil War, the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing the right to vote to former slaves, was adopted. The Twenty-fourth Amendment was adopted as a response to policies adopted in various Southern states after the ending of post-Civil War Reconstruction (186577) to limit the political participation of African Americans. Such policies were bolstered by the 1937 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Breedlove v. Suttles, which upheld a Georgia poll tax. The Supreme Court reasoned that voting rights are conferred by the states and that the states may determine voter eligibility as they see fit, save for conflicts with the Fifteenth Amendment (respecting race) and the Nineteenth Amendment (respecting sex). It further ruled that a tax on voting did not amount to a violation of privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, because the tax applied to all votersrather than just certain classes of votersit did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

During the civil rights era of the 1950s, particularly following the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, such policies increasingly were seen as barriers to voting rights, particularly for African Americans and the poor. Thus, the Twenty-fourth Amendment was proposed (by Sen. Spessard Lindsey Holland of Florida) and ratified to eliminate an economic instrument that was used to limit voter participation. Two years after its ratification in 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court, invoking the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection clause, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors, extended the prohibition of poll taxes to state elections.

The full text of the amendment is:

Section 1The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

Section 2The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.