As the war on Iraq ends its second week, Baghdad is not yet under siege. But, according to The Chronicle, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is ("Rumsfeld's strategy under attack," March 31). The results of the first two weeks of the second Persian Gulf War came as a surprise to many observers, especially in Washington after months of planning and preparation.

Like everything in Washington, this unexpected turn of events became an instant debate along partisan lines. The two sides of the debate were quick to take to the airwaves and print media to state their position and to settle multiple scores. But away from the political and technical aspects of the matter, the question remains: What went wrong?

There is no easy answer to this question. Experts on Middle East affairs point to a few salient elements that led to miscalculations in the master plan of the war:

Outdated impressions: Most of the people in the decision-making ranks are veterans of the first Persian Gulf War (1991), but they were away from power for the duration of President Bill Clinton's two terms. When faced with a new situation in Iraq they employed their left-over impressions of the first war.

As a result of this gap, leaders (civilians and uniformed alike), thought Iraq would be a much weaker enemy compared to 1991, having suffered a defeat and years of sanctions. What they didn't consider was the fact that Saddam Hussein in 1991 was willing to surrender and leave Kuwait in order to stay in power. In the current conflict he is not willing to leave power to become a political refugee somewhere in Europe. Hussein has ruled a wealthy country for a quarter of a century with an iron fist, and with all the privileges of absolute power. He won't give this up to write his memoirs or to build a presidential library or to give lectures. He is in a region where there is only one way out of power -- the next world.

False comparisons to Afghanistan: In the post-Sept. 11 atmosphere that was augmented by a quick (yet unfinished) victory in Afghanistan, the decision to invade Iraq was based on a euphoric assumption of sheer power ("shock and awe"). What the plan failed to notice was that the Afghanistan war was against a militia-type regime, easy to defeat but difficult to finish off. In Iraq there is structure, a central government and a certain order. These elements make it difficult to defeat but easy to finish off.

Miscalculating the Iraqi street: Even though one of the stated goals of the war is to liberate the Iraqi people, there was little consideration given to the attitudes of the Iraqis toward the campaign. One major component of the plan was based on the assumption that the Iraqi people would welcome the day that Hussein is toppled. This is an accurate assumption. But what the plan overlooked is that the American call to revolt is not new to the Iraqi people. They responded to this call in 1991 and they were left by President George H. W. Bush's administration to face their fate on their own. Those who revolted were brutally crushed. Some estimates put the total casualties of that uprising at 200,000 deaths.

This was not the only result of the uprising's defeat. Hundreds of thousands of people, mostly opposing the Iraqi regime, were forced out of the country in exile, and Hussein was able to reconsolidate his grip of power.

In the simplistic view used to promote the war, Iraq is described as a country of three different groups: Shiites in the south, Kurds in the north, and Sunnis in the middle. We are told that two of the three groups support the U.S. invasion. This turned out not to be true. Being against a regime does not necessarily translate to supporting a foreign invasion.

The Iraqi opposition representatives in exile here in the United States predicted an early collapse of the regime, but they were suffering from the same gap in understanding that afflicts the first war veterans. These Iraqis left their government and army in 1991 and assumed that they were replaced by similar people who are also eager to defect, as if the Hussein regime did not learn a lesson. In a region where survival is the name of the game, regimes are quick to learn and adapt to ways of survival. Hussein is no exception.

All this does not mean that the United States is in danger of losing the war, or even sinking into another Vietnam. But it is going to make Washington and London deal with it as a war, not as a cakewalk.

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