The SALi fluid behaves like a type of material that does not exist in nature. You can envisage it as either a compressible liquid, or a remarkably stiff gas.

SALi based cushions offer four damage mitigation mechanisms:

The capsules absorb energy when they suffer bulk compression during an impact.

Viscous damping converts impact energy into heat when the matrix fluid swirls round the compressing capsules. This reduces the “kickback” when the capsules spring back into shape in the milliseconds following the impact.

The hydraulic characteristics of the matrix fluid distribute impact loading over the surface being protected.

Shock waves are scattered at the capsule-fluid interfaces.

The compressive stiffness of the device depends on the type of capsules used. Published research papers [2, 3, 4.] describe the use of air capsules made from bubble packing to produce very soft cushions, with stiffer expanded polystyrene beads being the most versatile for use in protective clothing. For very violent crash impacts, expanded metal foam beads can be used. Open ended hollow tube capsules are also described in Courtney's patent literature.

Thick liquids having a viscosity similar to treacle offer good viscous damping, but silicone gel is usually preferred because this eliminates the problem of liquid leakage if the packaging is ruptured.

Shear thickening SALi The use of shear thickening (dilatant) liquids that stiffen up during impact is described in our patent literature and recorded research. [1, 4, 6, 9.]

Packaging The packaging used for the published research varies from stout cotton bags to piston and cylinder arrangements. [1, 2,3, 4, 5.] A key feature of the SALi concept is that stretching of the packaging must be minimised in order to maximise the capsule compression and viscous damping processes.

Graphene looks like becoming the SALi packaging material for the future, for sportswear and other body armour applications because of its strength, flexibility, good thermal conductivity and antibacterial properties.

In principle, the shear thickening gel versions of SALi that lock up under impact don't require a low stretch packaging. But unpackaged gel SALi is less effective than the original packaged version.

Q. Why is the SALi concept referred to as a "technology"?

A. We want to emphasise that a broad collection of materials and ways of blending and packaging is involved. The global idea is to create a composite material that shares the impact protection characteristics of solids, liquids and gasses. But, to absorb useful amounts of impact energy, some form of low stretch, variable volume packaging is required.

Prior to the invention of SALi, engineers had developed a range of useful impact and virbration energy absorbing devices by combinig any two of the three basic states of matter,( solids, liquids and gases) . These emergent properties are summarised along the sides of the triangle below. SALi is the next logical step, combining all three basic states of matter.

Contents

1 The basic SALi mechanism

2 The load spreading benefits of SALi cushions

3 Reducing the weight of SALi cushions

4 Illustrative proposed applications

5 Barriers to product development

6 Some milestones in the “development” of SALi Technology

References

1 The basic SALi mechanism

Figure 2. During an impact the capsules shrink in size as they are compressed on all sides by the matrix fluid. The capsules, lubricated by the fluid, re-arrange themselves inside the package, so that the front face of the package takes up the shape of the impacting body.

The matrix fluid In principle any liquid or gel which allows the hydraulic transfer of pressure can be used as the matrix fluid. In experiments[1-4] silicone oil, glycol anti-freeze, wall-paper paste, Vaseline, mastic sealant and a range of engineering greases have been used as the matrix fluid. In order to maximise viscous damping very thick liquids having a viscosity similar to treacle are preferred. Gooey mastics or silicone gels are good because there are no leakage problems if the packaging is damaged.

Shear thickening fluids allow the package to change shape easily when deformed slowly, but stiffen up during violent impacts. This feature is appealing in protective clothing, for example in pads to protect the spinal column of motorbike or equestrian riders.

The capsules Elastomeric capsules tested in the published research[1-5] include hollow rubber balls, expanded polystyrene beads, polymeric microspheres, bubbles cut from bubble packing and narrow diameter, open ended, hollow tubes, with filaments of air trapped inside them. The inclusion of hollow glass microspheres has been proposed as a mechanism for adding shear thickening.[9]

The packaging If the packaging stretches significantly during an impact then some impact energy is absorbed but overall, energy absorbing efficiency is reduced because the capsules suffer less compression and the matrix fluid provides less viscous damping.

Figure 3. The correct packaging is a vital part of SALi Technology.

2 The load spreading benefits of SALi cushions

Figure 3. Early experiments to demonstrate the load spreading advantages of SALi used very simple equipment.[1] Impact patterns produced in the surface of soft clay slabs were compared, when the slabs were protected by different types of cushion.

Three types of cushion were tested: (i) Sorbothane (a visco-elastic rubber), (ii) elastomeric foam and (iii) SALi filled bags. The Sorbothane and foam cushions both produced distinct impact craters under the impact zone. In contrast, the SALi cushion produced a very shallow indentation over most of the clay slab.

Figure 4. The steel sphere produced a clear impact crater in the Sorbothane. In contrast, the SALi based cushion produced a broad shallow impact pattern. Similar impact craters to those made by Sorbothane were produced when elastomeric foams were tested.

Load spreading occurs throughout the interior of a SALi cushion. Consequently, elastomeric foam based SALi capsules suffer bulk compression. In contrast, if a similar foam is used as the basis of a conventional cushion, the individual air cells are flattened under the impact zone, but cells to the sides of the impact zone are unaffected.

Figure 5. The hydraulic nature of SALi cushions produces a load spreading effect throughout the interior of the cushion. The cell walls inside a SALi beads are subjected to axial compression, making the foam stiffer than the same material in block form.

[Thought experiment Compressing foam is similar to squashing a squash or tennis ball between your finger and thumb; distorting the shape is fairly easy. But if you try to mimic uniform bulk compression of SALi beads by compressing the same ball between cupped hands, changing the volume of the ball is very difficult.]

3 Reducing the weight of SALi cushions

The matrix fluid is responsible for most of the weight of SALi based devices. So the key to weight reduction is to minimise the fluid fraction by close packing the capsules.

3.1 Spherical elastomeric capsules The basic SALi formulation as illustrated in Figure 1 has a single size range of low density capsules, with the matrix fluid occupying about 34% of the volume. The fluid fraction can be reduced by using two size ranges of capsules, with small capsules occupying part of the void spaces between the larger capsules. This reduces the matrix fluid to about 12% of the volume.

The larger capsules could be expanded polystyrene beads and the smaller ones, polymeric microspheres. The matrix fluid fraction can be further reduced by introducing hollow nano-particles between microspheres.

If the smallest size of capsules are fairly rigid, compared with the larger ones, the smaller capsules will tend to bunch up during impact, producing a shear thickening effect.[9]

3.2 Use cube shaped capsules

Cubes have the most efficient shape for filling a volume.

Figure 7. Close packed cube SALi. The density of the matrix fluid between the cubes is reduced by adding polymeric microspheres. Polystyrene nano-spheres can be added to create a shear thickening matrix fluid.

During impact the compressed cubes lose their neat packing structure. But during the recovery phase they realign themselves in order to minimise the potential energy stored inside the package.

Research tip: Cube shaped capsules can be made by dicing up a sheet of closed cell camping mat foam. At least four faces of each cube should be slightly corrugated to create small pockets for the matrix fluid to settle into. Alternatively, if cutting the cubes using a sharp blade, deliberately make the cuts a few degrees away from true right angles so that the jumbled up "cubes" cannot mate together without leaving small wedge shaped gaps for the matrix fluid.

3.3 Maximising the viscous damping for a given mass of SALi

In order to maximise viscous damping during an impact the shear movements between adjacent elements of matrix liquid should be maximised. The general rule for doing this is:

The larger the elastomeric capsule, the lower the bulk compressive stiffness should be.

For example, in the case of 2-3 centimetre sided cube based SALi, with the pure liquid mass minimised by adding polystyrene beads and polymeric microspheres, the bulk stiffness should be graded as follows:

Elastomeric capsule type

20-30 mm sided "cubes"

2-3 mm diameter expanded polystyrene beads

Polymeric microspheres

Relative bulk stiffness

Low stiffness

Medium

High stiffness

4 Some proposed applications

This is a short review. Please follow the links for more detailed information.

4.1 Body armour

Depending on the market requirements, design issues that can be solved by SALi based designs include low weight, soft feel, flexibility for articulated parts of the body, penetration resistance and temperature control.

Where flexibility is important packaging based on strong poly-cotton, Kevlar or Cuban fibre can be used.

Weight reduction using SALi plus foam If the body armour includes a stiff outer shell, then SALi cushions can be used to protect the most vulnerable body parts with lighter compressible foam protecting other parts.

Figure 9. This prototype footballer’s shin pad incorporates SALi cushioning to protect the tibia (shin bone), but reduces weight by using compressible foam to the sides of the tibia.[1]

The following diagram represents a cross section through a shin bone receiving a kick.

Figure 10. The load spreading characteristics of SALi work in harmony with the load transmitting characteristics of the human bodies own soft tissue.

Hip protection for older people and other osteoporosis sufferers

In 2003, the market leading product was a plastic Hip Shield. This was inserted into the underwear and covered the hip bone area. It looked similar to a footballer's shin pad but included a cushioning layer of elastomeric foam. A Manchester undergraduate student carried out tests in which he replaced the foam with SALi. The reduction in maximum force experienced during impact was significant.

Figure 11. The impact test results using a basic SALi formulation were encouraging. (Paul Featherstone, The University of Manchester, 2003.)

Untested but patented improvements [9] include the incorporation of nano-particles to create shear thickening during a fall.

Based on Featherstone's results, plans were made to bid for funding to design a superior form of hip protection pad that incorporated shear thickening and dispensed wit the plastic hip shield.

Soft shell hip protection for elderly people

Dynamic comfort tests 2003.

Figure 12. The Shear thickening hip protection pad was sufficiently light and flexible that it did not interfere when playing an energetic game of squash.

(The match ended in a draw.)

Unfortunately academic jealousy problems at Manchester University resulted in the funding bid being abandoned in late 2003.

Keeping cool To reduce heating problems, the use of a phase change wax as the matrix fluid has been proposed. [1, 6.]

Graphene would be an ideal packaging material because of its combination of flexibility, strength and outstanding thermal conduction properties.

Several SALi based designs have been proposed.[1, 5, 6, 7, 10] A common characteristic is that the elastomeric capsules stiffen up as they are compressed. This allows the suspension unit to offer a soft ride when travelling over smooth roads, then automatically stiffening up when moving over rough ground. Here is one of the proposed designs:

Figure 14. The matrix liquid transmits pressure, offering energy adsorption by compression inside the whole length of the box section. To minimize the liquid weight, three sizes of compressible capsule can be used: 1 large aluminium foam balls fill most of the volume. 2 Expanded polystyrene beads fit into the spaces between the Al balls. 3 Polymeric micro-spheres fit in the spaces between the polystyrene beads.

Using this nested bead system only about 4% of the space inside the box sections is occupied by liquid.

Keeping repair costs down The front and rear crumple sections can be telescopic, moving into the rigid section during a collision. Following minor bumps, the gas filled capsules will make a full recovery. If necessary, additional SALi fluid can be injected into the cavity, to expand the box section to its full length.

Converting SALi filled box sections into vehicle batteries

The compressible capsules can be coated with a thin layer of lead and dilute sulphuric acid used as the matrix fluid.

Figure 15. A short horizontal cross section through a SALi filled vehicle box section that also doubles up as a lead-acid battery. The battery is packaged, allowing it to be removed for replacement during the life of the vehicle. In common with existing lead-acid batteries, the lead coating is preferably in the form of a grid, with voids in the grid lattice being filled with lead paste.

4.5 Acoustic vibration (sound) reduction

Work by Valentin LeRoy at Paris Diderot University, France suggests that SALi type materials may employ a process known as Minnaert scattering to reduce sound transmission through walls. [15, 16]

4.6 Blast mitigation

LeRoy's work is in line with earlier unpublished SALi research carried out at Cranfield University Royal Military College of Science. Researchers under the supervision of Professor Horsfall have verified that SALi type materials have good blast wave mitigation properties.

Figure 16. The blast mitigation properties of SALi being tested at Cranfield University RMCS. The SALi filled bag was ruptured by debris thrown up during the explosion. If the bag is covered by a floating steel under plate, it remains intact during the explosion.

Impact tests can be very expensive, with the test piece commonly being destroyed during the impact. To minimise costs, engineers need to have a good idea of the outcome before an impact test take place. In recent years the key to cost reduction has been to carry out a range of computer simulated impact tests, before carrying out a live test on the most promising design.

Computer predictions are only as good as the data fed into the computer model. SALi poses particularly difficult simulation problems because it’s a system of interacting materials. There are almost too many choices of capsules, matrix fluids and packaging designs. A more serious challenge is that the energy absorbing characteristics of the SALi material change rapidly, and in a complex manner, as the viscous fluid swirls round the shrinking capsules.

A third problem is that the “text book” techniques used for measuring the core characteristic properties of solid and foam based impact absorbers cannot be applied to SALi because of its novel, visco-elastic fluid nature. The limited number of SALi characteristics that have been published to date cannot be used in computer simulations because they fail to reflect SALi’s complexity.[11, 14]. Techniques for producing valid SALi characteristics are discussed on our SALi Core Characteristics web page.

Other early investigations in Britain failed because they used inappropriate materials, such as elastic packaging and corrosive fluids which damaged the packaging.[12, 13] Consequently, in spite of £300,000 research funding by the British Government, commercial interest declined after 2003. [We will explain why these "careless" mistakes were made in the next section.]

More recent work in China[5] and Britain[4] has been far more successful. For example, after completing their study of a SALi based vibration isolator, researchers at Nanjing University concluded that it, “offers outstanding performance and a good prospect in engineering practice.” [5]

Bill Courtney regularly receives letters from optimistic inventors who are prepared to take huge financial risks because they believe in their inventions. He also receives distressing letters from inventors whose family relationships were destroyed when the money ran out.

If you are thinking of taking a gamble on your great idea, please read this section before you splash out your cash. – It could save your marriage or other family ties.

Bill was lucky; his partner Jill stood by him during the long difficult years. But you may not be so fortunate.

July1986 In 1986 Bill Courtney decided to celebrate his fortieth birthday by riding one of the recently invented mountain bikes from Lands End to John O’Groats. The bulk of the journey was off-road. His cycling mitts offered limited protection against the vibrations caused by riding over rough ground and he suffered several injuries because he was not wearing a helmet any protective clothing. – In those days, there was very little protective cycling gear on the market.

While recovering from cracked ribs and other minor injuries back home, his mind turned to the problem of developing lightweight protective gear for off-road cycling and other sports. He invented SALi, a composite material + packaging that combined the strengths of the two types of cycling mitt that he used during his ride.

Figure 19. This photograph shows the test rig that Bill built in 1986 to test different formulations of SALi. (As labelled for BBC and Sky television programmes a decade later.)

A range of SALi formulations were investigated. The most important finding was that the correct packaging is vital. Elastic packages such as rubber balloons, plastic bags and condoms are inadequate, but low stretch packages made from Ventile cotton or Cordura nylon are effective. (See Figure 3 above.)

Ironically, the theme of the BBC program, (“The Money Programme”, 27 October 1996) was “Why can’t we exploit our British inventive talent?” The short history of SALi Technology on this web page shows that twenty nine years after SALi was invented, we still don’t (want to) know the answer.

In those 1986 paper based information days, Manchester Central Library had an excellent collection of patent literature. From 1986 to 1996 Bill spent many of his Saturdays studying the patent documents. He concluded that the SALi concept was novel. He also realised that it has a massive life saving potential. So he lived frugally for ten years, building up funds to enable him to exploit his invention.

His companion Jill was tolerant and supportive. Thank you Jill XX 1987 Bill buys a sewing machine, learns to sew and develops a number of prototype SALi products. He also investigates different types of fabric containment bags. Low stretch polycotton is excellent, but stretchy Lycra is ineffective.

Below, some early SALi concept designs from the 1980's.

Figure 20. Soft protective headwear for boxing, other contact sports, visually impaired people and others at excessive risk of injury when wild country walking.

Figure 21. A wide range of mittens and gloves was envisaged for both humans and robot "hands."

Figure 22. Passive impact protection for vehicle interiors could vary from improved head restraints to baby carriers and cushioning for roof support pillars.

1993

Bill Courtney’s original business plan was to use SALi as a cash cow invention to fund his green energy inventions.

After 10 years of secrecy a patent was filed. Then following a Patent Office investigation, a patent was granted [6]. The SALi products developed during the 1980's went on display at an international inventions fair and received a good reception.

Figure 23. This is the only surviving photograph of SALi's launch day. The rest were thrown out during a "tidy-up" at Manchester University.

The worst

Bill sought advice from Manchester Business Link and was introduced to Dr Wilson a mathematician at Manchester University. Dr Wilson was researching gaseous volcanic lavas that are mathematically similar to SALi.

As result, Bill Courtney enrolled as a mature engineering student at the University. He hoped to publish research papers on SALi and gain a PhD to enhance his academic credibility.

He was jointly supervised by an engineer, Dr Oyadiji and the mathematician, Dr Wilson.

Following media interest Dr Oyadiji became unhappy and started to stymie Bill’s work. He insisted on a test rig being built that Wilson and Courtney are very uneasy about.

The rig was so insensitive that massive impact forces had to be applied for any load sensor signal to be generated. As a consequence two expensive accelerometers were damaged.

Dr Wilson advised on an alternative rig design. This worked, but again Bill was stymied because he had to use a damaged accelerometer. This produced inexplicable signals that Wilson could not analyse, but which Oyadiji insisted were correct.

Figure 24. This display of hubris delayed the SALi research by another two years.

Dr Wilson abandoned his role in frustration. Bill tried to find an alternative second supervisor, but nobody was willing to take on the work.

After two years of painfully slow progress using damaged equipment Bill finally gained an MPhil and abandoned his PhD plans.

1997

A two page article in Eureka magazine describes Bill's proposals for using SALi in car bumpers. It attracts interest from the BBC, but annoys his supervisor.

It leads to a wide range of commercial proposals including protective motor cycle and horse riding clothing, rugby helmets for children, car interiors, crash barriers, engine mounts and protection for works of art in transit. Several company representatives visit Manchester University and offer to invest in the research. But when they realise the difficulties Courtney is facing, they lose interest.

Figure 25. Bill changed the name of his invention to "Manchester Material" in an attempt to appease his Manchester University research supervisor. But it had the opposite effect, so he reverted to its original name, Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi).

1998

22nd October, BBC Radio 4 broadcast a documentary programme, "Science in the Attic" exclusively featuring Bill Courtney as an inventor. As a result of the programme, Bill is invited to discuss SALi Technology with engineers at the Motor Industry Research Association (MIRA) laboratories in the Midlands.

Bill ignores instructions from his supervisor not to attend because MIRA "cannot be trusted with intellectual property." It was here that he learned that the “conflict of stiffness” problem was baffling engineers. [Engineers needed a car bumper that was both soft for pedestrian accidents and stiff for other types of collisions. ]

He managed to acquire a working accelerometer and applied to continue his University work a Research Fellow. But his supervisor, Dr Oyadiji, blocked approval. It takes Bill another four years to achieve Fellow status. (Fellowship awarded June 25th, 2002.)

Using results obtained with his new accelerometer, Bill wrote three research papers, referenced as 18, 19 and 20 below. They were never published because submission was blocked by his supervisor.

The blocking of papers 18 and 19 was particularly unethical because they provided the best evidence to date, that a correctly packaged, SALi filled car bumpercould solve the "conflict of stiffness problem." That is, create a "smart" car bumper that is soft for pedestrian lower leg impacts, but stiff for other bodywork damaging impacts. Later, in 2003, the absence of this evidence allowed the European automobile manufacturers to persuade the EU to abandon its soft, pedestrian friendly bumper requirements. Since then, many thousands of European pedestrians have been killed or permanently crippled by accidents involving stiff car bumpers.

Seven years later, when a Formal Enquiry Panel at Manchester University delivered its report in 2010, it made no reference to Courtney's complaint about publication of his research being blocked.

1999

A Dow Chemicals (Auto Division) employee read about Bill’s SALi filled car bumper proposals in Auto express. He contacted Bill and a senior Dow executive flew over from America to meet Bill and his research supervisor. When the executive referred to the possibility of multi-million dollar royalties being earned, Dr Oyadiji became agitated.

Thanks to the intervention of MIL, the business arm of the University, the agitation is calmed and a legally binding collaboration agreement is signed between Dow, Manchester University and Cheshire Innovation (Bill’s trading name.)

The collaboration received EPSRC funding for the University and Foresight Vehicle funding for Bill. Dr Oyadiji’s line manager, Professor Wright was the joint applicant for the EPSRC funding, so there was some hope that with a professor in charge, the University work would run smoothly.

Unfortunately Professor Wright is a mild mannered man who finds it difficult to tackle Dr Oyadiji when problems emerge later.

As a result of the brooding hostility over royalties, there is an eighteen month delay before the project begins.

Following an international telephone interview, a Chinese research assistant is appointed. Courtney and Wright say that they cannot understand what the interviewee is saying, but Oyadiji claims he can. Dow and Bill only agree to his appointment because Oyadiji and Wright propose using PedSALi funding to pay for him to go on a crash technical English learning course.

Patents written for Manchester University 1999 - 2001 Bill invented a wide range of variations of SALi Technology. At his own cost, he wrote six patent applications on behalf of MIL, the business arm of the University. He was primarily concerned with the humanitarian benefits of SALi and was happy at the prospect of Manchester University earning royalties from his creativity. He signed a legally binding royalty sharing agreement covering all of his SALi inventions. In accordance with custom, his supervisor Dr Oyadiji was named as the second author. Bill hoped that this would appease his supervisor.

The Chinese research assistant is met by Bill when he flies into Manchester Airport minutes before the skies are closed down by the terrorist attacks on America. He is a delightful person and clearly very intelligent. But his spoken English is poor.

The research assistant is instructed to build a 3 metre high drop rig. This is intended to allow a steel bar, representing a human lower leg, to fall on to a prototype car bumper at 11.1 m/s (40 km/h), to meet pending EU pedestrian safely requirements. Bill argues that Dr Oyadiji, the research supervisor has miscalculated the height. Dr Oyadiji disagrees and Professor Wright refuses to speak. The research assistant is unable to intervene because Dr Oyadiji has withheld his English language course funding and he is reluctant to speak in very poor English.

[If you have a basic knowledge of mechanics, you can verify that that a fall of h = 3.0 m cannot deliver an impact velocity, v = 11.1 m/s, by using the equation v2 = 2gh, where g= 9.8 m/s/s is the acceleration due to gravity.]

Dr Oyadiji got his revenge three years later when Oyadiji et. al. publish a paper claiming that the catapult improvement is their invention. (You can see the plagiarism on this linked web page. You will need to scroll down about sixteen screens to see a diagram of the catapult.)

The later 2010 Formal Enquiry Report, written by Professor Helen Gleeson, Professor Peter Duck and Dr Pablo Fernandez will not make any reference to the plagiarism, but will reprimand "Mr Courtney" for "interfering" in the "Dr" and "Professor" led PedSALi research.

Dr Oyadiji goes on to instruct the research assistant to use an experimental design for the core characteristic work that ignores Newton's laws of motion and the laws of conservation of energy and conservation of momentum. Again, Bill objects. But the futile work went ahead because Professor Wright was reluctant to intervene in an argument between a "Dr" and a "Mr".

Again, the research assistant is unable to intervene because of his English language problems.

In 2010, the Formal Enquiry Panel will refuse to examine this embarrassing evidence that Manchester University researchers have ignored the laws of physics.

2001, October onwards

The new SALi inventions that were the subject of Bill's patent applications donated to the University included anti-terrorist SALi applications.

A joint collaboration agreement with Cranfield Royal College of Military Science wasnegotiated by MIL, the business arm of Manchster University. Professor Horsfall from Cranfield flew to Washington to find out how we Brits could use SALi to help in the defence of the west.

On his return a meeting was arranged at Cranfield. Dr Oyadiji holds up the journey to Cranfield for two hours and the collaboration gets off to a bad start.

Both MIL and Bill are extremely frustrated by the blocking tactics used by Dr Oyadiji. The problem was he held the purse strings for the PedSALi project and in line with University working practice, he has the final say on Bill’s input to University research.

Dr Oyadiji’s behaviour became more disruptive and MIL decided not to invite him to future SALi business meetings. MIL suggested that Bill applied for non-academic (SMART) research money. This wouldl allow him, supported by MIL, to control some of the SALi research funding. This strategy would deplete Bill’s remaining retirement funds, because, in accordance with SMART rules, he had to contribute £10,000. However, sixteen years after inventing SALi, there is no obvious alternative, if the SALi research is to succeed.

The MIL theory, which Bill agreed with, was that an independent, good English speaking SALi researcher of PhD status would add authority in future debates on experimental design. A second SALi project would also provide healthy competition for the PedSALi project.

SMART funding was applied for using the project name CrashSALi.

At that time an amalgamation between Manchester University and its sister university, UMIST was being planned. The MIL/Courtney thinking is that, even if PedSALi fails, there will be a legacy of some good SALi research for the new University to build on. [Bill is a guest lecturer at UMIST and the CrashSALi work focuses on topics where UMIST engineers are internationally noted for their expertise.]

SMART funding for CrashSALi was won and a second research assistant, George Georgiades appointed. With the benefit of hindsight, the appointment of Georgiades was an unfortunate one because he was writing up his PhD under Dr Oyadiji’s supervision. However Bill and MIL feel they are in control because they can veto SMART funding payments if the CrashSALi work is not done correctly.

March 2002 onwards Bill becomes increasingly concerned about the Chinese research assistant.(i) Telephone and cable television lines outside the research assistants temporary Manchester home close to the University are cut on ten occasions. [BT and the cable TV supplier should be able to verify this.] (ii) Large boxes of his research materials supplied by Dow mysteriously disappear. Bill fears that somebody is trying to intimidate the research assistant or sabotage the PedSALi project. But Dr Oyadiji and Professor Wright refuse to call in the police. They also veto Bill's request for Dow to be informed.

December 2002 The EPSRC become increasingly worried that the PedSALi project is falling way behind schedule. Meanwhile, the car makers are presurising the EU to abandon its soft bumper Directive. The EPSRC requests that a vehicle engineering conference paper be presented to demonstrate progress. But there are no valid results available for publication.

January 2003 The badly treated Chinese research assistant for the PedSALi project decides to hand in his resignation. Dr Oyadiji and Professor Wright keep his resignation secret from Dow Chemicals and Bill until he has almost worked his notice.

March 2003 The truth about the research assistant's resignation emerges when Bill discovers him booking his flight back home to China.

Following complaints from Dow, a copy of the resignation letter is released. This makes specific reference to the ten attacks on the research assistant's home.

Dow Chemicals demand rapid action by Dr Oyadiji to try and salvage the PedSALi project. He responds by secretly appointing the CrashSALi research assistant, Georgiades to the PedSALi work.

This outfoxes Bill and MIL because half of the CrashSALi funding has already been paid and the researcher they hoped would act and think independently has been stolen from under their noses. Bill has also lost £5,000 of his retirement savings for no useful purpose.

Following written complaints from Bill and Dow, the University appoints Dr Turner to act as an intermediary between the disputing parties.

Dr Turner invites Bill to a private meeting where Bill explains why CrashSALi is vital to the success of the PedSALi project. He also points out that he has paid £5,000 to no useful effect.

The work will be done by another student, Himi, as part of his PhD research. This will proceed at a slower, PhD rate of progress, so the competitive aspect of CrashSALi will be lost. But Bill has little choice and verbally accepts

Following discussions with UMIST engineers and the funding agency, Bill accepts this offer because the 50% SMART funding saved (plus another £5,00 from Bill) will be spent on additional PedSALi research at Manchester’s sister University UMIST.

Crucially, UMIST will use their expertise to do the core characteristic work correctly. This will allow Dow to make a belated start on its computer modeling and leave Manchester University free to move on to the next research stage: simulated car bumper tests.

Dr Turner arranges a meeting with Bill, a UMIST representative and Dr Oyadiji. Towards the end of the meeting, the UMIST man is escorted from the room and Bill is left to face Oyadiji and Turner.

Dr Turner eyeballs Bill, thumps his fist on the table and chastises him for his “stupidity” in not understanding that "no additional cost" simply means that Bill will not be personally liable for the University administrative costs triggered by the resignation of the PedSALi research assistant.

[Dr Turner later publicly boasts that he has let Bill off lightly because, when he "gives somebody a real bollocking, they don't know what has hit them for two days." Witnesses of this boast are listed in document AC2.]

Bill argues that "letting him off " paying costs that he has no liability for, as "compensation" for his £5,000 personal loss, is equivalent to the type of “protection” offered to small businesses by criminal gangs.

In spite of written protests from Bill, the CrashSALi work goes ahead under the supervision of Oyadiji and Turner.

Dr Turner uses his power most destructively when Dr Oyadiji instructs the new research assistant to abandon car bumper tests on correctly packaged SALi and only perform tests where the SALi is stored in elastic bags.

Instead of accepting Bill's 1986 findings, Dr Turner overrules Bill’s research and supports Dr Oyadiji. This condemns PedSALi to failure because for the last seventeen years it has been known that elastic packages for SALi are ineffective. [See Figure 3 above for an explanation of why the SALi packaging must not stretch significantly under impact.]

The misleading car bumper impact tests are a convenient foil for the earlier nonsensical core characteristic tests because they will provide (false) evidence that SALi filled bumpers cannot provide pedestrian protection. This will act as a distraction, with automobile engineers and EPSRC funding referees unlikely to look at the implausible core characteristic work too closely.

The fraudulent elastic packaging research was published as references 12 and 13 below. These papers were later submitted to the EPSRC as proof that the University had done its work, and full payment was made.

The deception of the EPSRC and the cheating of the international engineering research community is discussed in greater detail on the PedSALi page.

UMIST and Manchester University are now close to amalgamation. A widely respected UMIST engineer, Professor Reid, who has acted as an unpaid consultant for the CrashSALi project becomes worried about the problems he and his UMIST colleagues are going to walk into. He offers to take over supervision of the PedSALi project so that all the research can be done correctly. Dow and Bill agree, but Professor Reid’s rescue plan is vetoed by Dr Turner.

Dow Chemicals cannot use the nonsense core characteristic data produced by Manchester University. It is disillusioned and stops sending representatives to the PedSALi meetings.

* Bill Courtney calls for Dr Turner to step down because he is not acting as an independent chairman. But he is outvoted by Dr Oyadiji and Professor Wright.

* Total control over the PedSALi and CrashSALi research shifts to Dr Turner, Dr Oyadiji and Professor Wright.

* Bill is ostracised by his Manchester University engineering colleagues and his health declines.

* The Cranfield collaboration collapses.

* Professor Reid leaves the University shortly after amalgamation.

* Dr Cooper, the highly professional person at MIL that Bill had closest links with also leaves.

With the benefit of hindsight, the biased appointment of Dr Turner as an intermediary between the disputing parties was the real mischief that that prevented the exposure of the SALi research fraud. From the date of his disastrous appointment, the University had a stronger vested interest in hiding bad senior management decision making that may have cost pedestrian lives, compared with exposing research fraud by junior staff.

February 2004 When the CrashSALi research report is finally delivered it is useless because the wrong materials have been used and the wrong type of tests carried out. Crucial details of the early good work done by Georgiades are also missing.

Bill annotates the report and makes a summary of its deficiencies. He sends these documents to the University Vice-Chancellor. Bill insists that the work must be corrected before he will approve transfer of the 50% balance of SMART funds or pay his outstanding £5,000.

Bill is worried that Turner et. al. will mislead the V-C, so he names Professor Reid and Dr Cooper as people the V-C should speak to, for a rounded view of the research problems.

This advice is not taken and the flawed CrashSALi research is not corrected.

Nevertheless, Bill still receives intimidating demands from Manchester University, for him to pay his £5,000 and approve the handing over of public funds for the CrashSALi project.

An example of the bad research that Bill insisted had to be done correctly before his contribution and public funds for the CrashSALi project could be handed over.

MRPRA = Malaysian Rubber Producers Research Association.

The deficiencies of the bad research remained hidden in the report, because the work was restricted to a single impact, instead of a long series of oscillating impacts, as experienced by car suspension units.

March 2004 Bill receives a tipoff that representatives of a local company LighTex Ltd, have met with Dr Oyadiji and made commercial enquiries, in the mistaken belief that he is the joint inventor of SALi Technology. Bill contacts the company who confirm the tipoff. Bill later discovers that two more Lancashire based companies have also been misled. He writes to the University Vice-Chancellor about the matter, but the V-C's response is evasive.

Four years later Bill submits this information to a Formal Enquiry Panel, but it is not referred to in their report.

January 2005

Bill appeals to his Member of Parliament for help. The MP asks the University to withhold its financial demands on Bill while he investigates.

The University responds by increasing its pressure on Bill. It employs the internationally respected (and very expansive) solicitors, Eversheds, to pursue Bill personally for the payment for the flawed CrashSALi research.

The employment of Eversheds acts as effective smokescreen, bringing the MPs attempts to deal with the University to a close.

Bill finds it hard to believe that Eversheds would wittingly become involved in intimidating and fraudulent behaviour. He tries to obtain copies of the correspondence between the University and Eversheds using the Freedom of Information Act.

The University refuses to release the documents, citing public interest immunity. Bill appeals to the Information Commission who respond that they are unable to force the University to reveal legal correspondence. To this day, Bill does not know what creditworthiness damage this secret correspondence has done to him.

Further evidence of a cavalier attitude to the Freedom of Information Act

Bill was a Fellow of the University and had been appointed lead partner for the PedSALi project. In spite of this, the University correspondence with the EPSRC who funded the University research was withheld from him. He tries to obtain this information from the University using the FoI Act, but again he is foiled and it is withheld. [See Figure 4 on this linked page for details.]

Bill confronts a painful truth about his battle to expose fraud: So many academics have been drawn into the Manchester SALi research cover-up, he can only uphold the good name of his invention at the risk of shaming British science.

Around this time his eyesight deteriorates rapidly and he is warned that he may go blind. Fortunately, the medical team who treat him at the Manchester Eye Hospital, a Manchester University teaching hospital are superb. He has to give up driving and cycling and struggles to read without electronic aids. But the highly skilled medical team manages to save a significant amount of his vision.

This traumatic experience has a surprisingly reassuring effect on Bill’s faith in humanity, science and Manchester University.

After his vision deteriorated he was knocked down while crossing a road. The fight for softer car bumpers becomes personal.

April 2005 Bill received a tipoff that public funds may have been used to disseminate false information about SALi Technology. Trips to Virginia Beach USA and San Diego, California have been made to present the fraudulent PedSALi research results. [The papers presented are listed as references 11, 12 and 13 below.]

(ii) Since the 1960’s Bill has argued that it should be possible to significantly reduce power generating costs by building a new type of turbine that mimics hurricanes. He forms a small company to develop the concept with a chartered engineer, Dick West. They approach Manchester University, suggesting a research collaboration. Bill hopes that by working with the University on another project that attracts research funding, the penny will finally drop:

He is fighting research fraud at Manchester University because he believes in research integrity and wishes his local University well. Sadly this overture fails and the research is done at Lancaster University.

April 2008 Bill receives a phone call from a distressed undergraduate student at Manchester University. He claims that he has been set a SALi research project by his supervisor, Dr Oyadiji that defies the laws of conservation of energy. He asks for advice.

This project breaches Bill’s intellectual property rights and does indeed “defy” the law of conservation of energy.

Bill writes a letter of complaint to the University Registrar.

Professor Colin Bailey, the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences makes an anonymous reply. (His identity only emerged later.) This includes false evidence that Bill’s IP rights have not been violated. There is no reference to the student being set a physically impossible project.

September 2008 onwards Undergraduate engineering students at Cardiff University begin a series of SALi Technology projects. Two students carry out impact tests on correctly packaged SALi beams, mimicking half size SALi filled car bumpers. Their results are far superior to the fraudulent PedSALi car bumper research at Manchester University. With Bill's agreement, a paper is presented at an international automobile engineering conference in Germany [4].

The contrast between Manchester and Cardiff Well supervised undergraduate students at Cardiff University, working on shoestring budgets, have produced better results in six months of work than badly supervised post- doctorate researchers in four man-years at Manchester University.

October 2008 The post amalgamation University of Manchester establishes an Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation. Bill submits his evidence of fraud to the two leaders of the Institute, resulting in a formal enquiry being held.

It has taken four years and sixteen letters to the University to win a formal enquiry. Here is a list of them:

July 2009 A student at Cardiff University discovers that SALi Technology is being investigated at Nanjing University, China, and that two papers have been published. These papers include a diagram from Bill's unpublished Degree thesis. Further investigations reveal that Dr Oyadiji has visited Nanjing and that he has collaborated in writing research papers with one of the Nanjing authors. This information is submitted to the Formal Enquiry Panel, but is not referred to in their Report. [For details see Section Two on the CrashSALi web page.]

August 2009 Sadly, the enquiry process itself becomes a corrupt farce. Here are some of the reasons why:

(i) There are three people whose behaviour should be investigated; Dr Oyadiji, Dr Turner and Professor Wright. But Dr Oyadiji is selected for investigation as a scapegoat, with Turner and Wright appearing as independent witnesses who can testify on his behalf.

(ii) Professor Reid and Dr Cooper, the witnesses that Bill recommended to the Vic-Chancellor are not called.

(iii) Bill gives permission for all of the University personnel involved to see his evidence, but there is no reciprocity. During the course of the formal investigation Bill does not receive a single document submitted by the University party.

(iv) Bill submits evidence of good SALi research being done at Nanjing and Cardiff Universities that highlight the Manchester research fraud. The Panel does not follow up this valid peer research. This is particularly disturbing because repeatability of research by peers is the most fundamental research quality control tool.

(v) Bill is placed in an unfair position when he is invited to appear before the Panel. He is competing with secret evidence from “independent witnesses” who have a vested interest in protecting the scapegoat.

Given the huge number of documents involved and his partial sight problems he asks for an outline of the questions he is likely to be asked, so that he can get his documents in order.

The Panel refuse Bill’s request and he declines to appear because he fears that his unsubstantiated verbal statements will be twisted against him.

The Panel reprimands Bill for his “unprofessional” behaviour in seeking research advice from Professor Reid. They make recommendations to prevent future Research Fellows causing similar problems for the University.

The Report, which has been overseen by the Manchester University Research Integrity Office, contains many false and damaging statements about Bill’s professional behaviour. He spends three months assembling the evidence of Formal Enquiry fraud and submits this to The Information Commission, claiming that Manchester University is creating and holding false records about him.

The Commission refuses to examine the evidence explaining that the case is too complex for them to investigate.

The Research Integrity Office refuses to examine the evidence that its own staff had misbehaved on the grounds that it was not submitted within ten days of the report being sent to Bill.

March 2010 Dr Huw Davies who has supervised the highly professional SALi research at Cardiff University requests EPSRC funding to do the SALi core characteristics research correctly. His bid is rejected on the grounds that the research lacks novelty. It is not known if the anonymous EPSRC referees who rejected the Cardiff bid had any association with the earlier fraudulent Manchester work. Or, if the fraudulent Formal Enquiry Report had any influence on their decision.

August 2010 Bill becomes increasingly worried about the damage the fraudulent Report may be doing. He sends a detailed testimony of the misbehavior at Manchester University to all listed members of its Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation. He hopes that he will be able to shame them into acting ethically.

Nobody responds.

July 2011

Fresh evidence relating to the fraud emerges so Bill submits a revised version of his testimony to the ‘Ethics Institute. This testimony bounces back from all the twenty Institute email addresses. He manages to get round this by changing his email identity to “SaveBritishScience”. This time all of the copies of the testimony appear to get through.

(ii) A member of the public makes a Freedom of Information request for copies of the two testimonies, as sent to the Institute. The FoI request comes to nothing because the ‘Ethics Institute denies all knowledge of the testimony.

May 2013 The EPSRC is informed that details of the financial, research and Formal Enquiry Panel fraud have been published online. Tracey Moulsley, the EPSRC Corporate Information Manager acknowledges receipt. But she does not respond to Bill's request for the EPSRC to investigate the evidence.

Twenty nine years after inventing SALi Technology, Bill Courtney is left £140,000 worse off, in poorer health and his good professional name has been tarnished.

£250,000 of public funds for SALi research has been squandered by Manchester University. In contrast, Dr Huw Davies and his students at Cardiff University, who have acted in a highly professional manner have been denied public funding.

But the real losers may be some of the victims of car crashes and other impact accidents who have been denied the benefits of SALi Technology.

This history is more of a Greek tragedy than a tale of British research corruption. Each person who intervened probably started off gently bending the truth in the belief that this would protect the good name of British science and Manchester University in particular. Unfortunately, having made their slightly bent contribution and discovering that Bill Courtney was not going to concede defeat, they had to bend the truth ever more to protect their own professional names.

Initially Professor Wright loyally protected Dr Oyadiji. And then Dr Turner dropped his brief of independence to protect Professor Wright and Dr Oyadiji. And then senior management tried to use Eversheds solicitors to protect Oyadiji, Wright and Turner.

With the passage of time over the years, more basically decent Manchester University academics have been drawn in and their careers placed under threat.

By the time Bill went public and started appealing for outside intervention, the fraud had become too hot for anyone to touch. Fraud creep had set in.

When Courtney complained that the fraud was hampering the development of his green energy inventions, the sunken cost of exposing the fraud for the establishment only increased. Only time will tell if the fight against global warming has suffered as a consequence.

Its not just Bill’s SALi and green energy inventions that have suffered during the long wasted years. Stress related health problems plus his financial difficulties mean that virtually all of his inventions described on this website have been adversely affected.

Bill remains committed to playing his part in rebuilding Britain as a modern science based economy. He offers a number of suggestions incorporating what he has learned from hi dealings with Manchester University on the following web pages:

Bill believes that compared with the size of our population, British universities are the best in the world. But we are at grave risk of losing this status if we rank academic protectionism higher than research integrity.

See Section 10 on this linked webpage for our proposal for countering the protectionism of British science.

References

1 Courtney, W. A. Preliminary investigations into the mechanical properties and potential applications of a novel shock absorbing liquid, MPhil Thesis, Manchester School of Engineering, University of Manchester (1998).

18 W. A. Courtney and S. O. Oyadiji, University of Manchester, A Novel shock absorbing solid-liquid Composite with potential for automobile engineering applications, 1: Basic concepts and properties of SALi, Journal of Automotive Engineering. Courtney handed this paper to Oyadiji for final checking in July 2000, but it was not taken forward to publication.

19 W. A. Courtney and S. O. Oyadiji, University of Manchester, A Novel shock absorbing solid-liquid Composite with potential for automobile engineering applications, 2: Variable stiffness car bumpers, Journal of Automotive Engineering. Courtney handed this paper to Oyadiji for final checking in January 2002, but it was not taken forward to publication.

Failure to publish papers 18 and 19. In February 2002, Courtney complained in writing to Professor Wood, the head of the engineering department about Dr Oyadiji’s actions in blocking the publication of these papers. He requested an interview to discuss this obstruction and other matters. But his request was ignored.

20 Courtney W, Oyadiji S O. A Novel Impact Absorbing Device Based on a Shock Absorbing Liquid. Journal of Materials Processing Technology. This is a ghost paper. Courtney handed the paper to Oyadiji for final checking and submission, 8th April 2002. According to the Manchester University web site (2007) The paper was “In press.” But when Courtney checked with the publisher, Elsevier, they could find no evidence of this paper being submitted.

Q. Would Bill Courtney be willing to work with Manchester University at a future date?

A. Bill describes himself as “a proud Manchester Man.” The vast majority of staff at the University had nothing to do with the SALi research fraud. Their professional conduct should not be judged by any of the evidence presented on this website. In order to demonstrate his belief in this statement, Bill would be happy and willing to work with the University developing any of his inventions.

BUT

(i) He does not tolerate research fraud and believes that the fraud problems described on this website need to be openly and fully investigated by a totally independent third party.

The PedSALi project was a collaboration between Dow Chemicals, Cheshire Innovation and Manchester University. The University work was funded by the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC).

The project ended in failure because, in spite of protests from Dow and Cheshire Innovation, the University researchers willfuly did the wrong experiments. But the EPSRC paid the University in full, rating the research as "Tending to internationally leading."

This suggested that the University had deceived the EPSRC when it submitted its PedSALi project report.

Bill Courtney (who traded as Cheshire Innovation) tried to get hold of a copy of the University report for the EPSRC, using the Freedom of Information (FoI Act.

But the University withheld the document.

He had a reasonable entitlement to see this report because he owned the intellectual property behind the PedSALi project and had been appointed as lead partner for the PedSALi project by The Department for Transport.

After making several FoI requests to th University, Bill eventualy overcame the secrecy at Manchester University by getting a copy of the report directl from the EPSRC.

What you see below is a copy of one one of the report pages as annotated by Bill.

As he had suspected, the EPSRC had been decived.

This annotated report page formed part of the evidence he submitted to the Formal Enquiry Panel.

The named applicants for the University share of the PedSALi research funding were Dr Sunday Oyadiji and Professor Jan Wright.

Motor vehicle suspension units provide passengers with a smooth, stable ride and make the steering easier to handle. Each unit has two components: a spring and a damper.

Figure 1. A simple car suspension unit.

The springs are compressed as the wheels travel over bumps. Then, as the springs expand, the dampers absorb energy, to prevent the vehicle bobbing up and down.

This damper action produces waste heat that has to be dissipated into the environment. Up to 5% of the vehicle fuel is used up by damper action, with the percentage increasing with vehicle size.

Our SALi suspension design is different. It converts energy mopped up by the dampers into electricity instead of wasting it. The electricity can be fed back into the battery, increasing the range of battery powered vehicles.

Figure 2. A SALi based suspension system that can generate electricity.

Modest savings on battery power create cumulative benefits: For the same travel range, battery weight, recharge times and battery purchase costs are all reduced.

If widely adapted in lithium-ion battery powered vehicles, this would lead to a useful drop in the market price of lithium and reduced demands on the power grid, when the batteries are being recharged.

We will describe our conventional SALi suspension designs, and then explain how they can be modified to produce electricity.

The elastomeric capsules (for example foam rubber or hollow rubber balls) can be compressed like springs. As the capsules change in size internal friction produces some damping. Additional damping is produced as the hydraulic fluid swirls round the shrinking/expanding capsules.

Adding extra damping on the expansion stroke (Conventional design.)

Figure 4. The empty suspension unit. The viscous damping grid can move up and down to act as a valve.

Figure 5. Hydraulic fluid can pass round the rim of the damping grid on the compression stroke, but is forced through holes in the grid on the expansion stroke.

Benefits of the conventional SALi suspension design:

Ø It does not require any precision made parts to be manufactured, so production costs are low.

Ø Low weight.

Ø The simple design reduces recycling costs at the end of the products working life.

Figure 9. The designer has considerable freedom to choose the position and shape of the rigid walled chamber because the capsules are compressed indirectly by hydraulic pressure.

For example, the rigid chamber can be shaped around the axle, allowing virtually the whole height of the suspension unit above the axle to be compressed.

For the rear suspension, this creates extra space inside the boot or passenger compartment. At the front end, it creates extra space under the bonnet. Indirectly, this can improve pedestrian safety because it allows extra space for the bonnet to deform during a pedestrian impact.

Improving the elastomeric capsule design

When cross sections through elastomeric foam capsules are examined using an electron microscope, a complex layer structure is revealed.

This structure can be used to advantage in SALi based suspension units because the stiffness of the capsules increases as they are compressed. Consequently, the unit gives a soft ride when travelling over moderate sized bumps, but stiffens up to cope with larger bumps.

The diagram below explains why stiffness increases with compression.

Figure 11. Compression increases elastomeric foam capsule stiffness because the gas inside the cells is compressible, but the solid elastomer (for practical purposes) is not. Consequently, the relative volume of the elastomer increases.

The project aim was to demonstrate that a simple SALi based suspension unit could work effectively.

Figure 12. The design investigated.

Figure 13. The prototype SALi suspension unit.

Figure14. Thin walled capsules consisting of individual cells cut from a sheet of polythene bubble packing were used. The capsules were uniformly stressed by the surrounding hydraulic fluid, so there was no risk of them popping.

(i) The prototype unit produces repeatable performance over a number of oscillations. (ii) Damping is produced as the rubber bellows is deformed and the hydraulic fluid swirls around the elastomeric capsules. The amount of damping can be calculated from the area of the closed loops.

Traditional "woolly hat "design

Kids don't have to look different because they are wearing protective headwear.

Engineering features that make SALi based head protection unique

This photograph shows the type of SALi padding used in the prototype hats. The capsules are expanded polystyrene beads in a thick viscous fluid.. The beads can be quite stiff, similar to the foam used in hard shelled helmets, but the fit is far more comfortable, because the pads mould to the shape of the wearers head. Weight reduction: We can mix the liquid with polymeric microspheres, to reduce the liquid weight. Cool heads for active sports: phase change waxes that soften just below body temperature can be used as the matrix fluid. Further softening and eventual melting will occur as the wax absorbs body heat during vigorous activity.

The risk of brain damage to cyclists involved in traffic accidents is high. The risk is reduced, but not eliminated by wearing a helmet. Sassy Hats may be superior to conventional hard helmets for some types of accidents, but research must be done, to verify this.

The logjam preventing development:

The Sassy Hats concept is simple, but extensive research into the impact energy absorbing characteristics of different SALi formulations is required before a commercial product is launched. Unfortunately the inventor Bill Courtney is currently unable to win research funding because rogue researchers at Manchester University have published fraudulent research suggesting that SALi is ineffective. This fraud needs to be exposed before the Sassy Hats project can move on. [See this linked webpage for details.]

If you have a professional interest in this project please contact us.

First, we explain how soft bumpers work, and then we show how the public was tricked into losing their protection.

Finally, we provide six appendices so that you can follow the clues and check the evidence of fraud for yourself. The appendices include extracts from the dodgy Formal Enquiry Report that "cleared" the University of fraud. We also provide evidence that the Formal Enquiry Report was itself fraudulent.

Why was the PedSALi research done so badly?

Bill Courtney invented the smart bumper concept in the 1980's. After saving up for 10 years to fund his work, he carried out basic tests as supervised research at Manchester University.But he encountered an unforeseen problem with his supervisor.

Dow estimated that Bill would earn about £30 million in royalties from car bumper sales in Europe by 2015. This would rise to about £90 million if smart bumpers became mandatory in all markets. He would also achieve international fame as a life saving inventor. Bill’s research supervisor who led the PedSALi research at Manchester University found these prospects very distressing and sabotaged the project.[Academic supervisor jealousy is a well documented phenomenon. For example see https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/oxford-tutor-accused-of-professional-jealousy/406012.article]

Why did Manchester University take secondary action to hide the sabotage?

A clue can be found in the ambitious Manchester University strategic vision published at

Motor vehicles have become far safer for occupants over the last century.

Unfortunately, reductions in pedestrian casualties have not kept pace. In some respects the problem is getting worse.

The combination of increasing numbers of quiet electric cars and the addiction to pedestrian texting is creating a new pedestrian hazard on our roads.

But this problem could have been tackled before it became serious.

In the 1990’s, the European Commission tried to improve pedestrian safelty by drafting legislation that would require all new cars to be fitted with soft, pedestrian friendly bumpers.

Vehicle manufacturers were unhappy with this proposal, because soft bumpers would be less effective in low speed impacts with other vehicles and street furniture. And this in turn would cause insurance premiums to rise.

Creating a car bumper that would keep insurance costs down and protect pedestrians is not beyond human ingenuity. In fact Bill Courtney had invented the answer way back in 1986, but it had no commercial importance at the time.

By 1997 Bill recognised that the time for his SALi filled bumper had come because it met pending EU requirements for pedestrian friendly car bumpers while also keeping the car makers happy. That is, it could be a “smart bumper”; soft for pedestrian leg impacts, but stiff for other impacts.

His early research findings were described in several research journals and magazines during the following three years.

Figure 1. In 1997, an article was published in the engineering magazine Eureka. This gave the first public hint that a “smart” bumper was feasible. (Unfortunately it upset Bill's research supervisor, even though he tried to pacify him by changing the SALi brand name to "Manchester Material.")

Here is a short extract from the article:

Eureka, Engineering Materials and Design, December 997, pages 24-25.

It is important to note the use of the term “tough, flexible membrane” in this extract.

Six years later mischievous researchers at Manchester University would publish deceitful research using a weak elastic packaging membrane. They would then use their fraudulent test results to claim that Courtney’s invention was ineffective. ~ All Courtney’s years of work were destroyed in a single lie. But the real victims are probably the poor unfortunate pedestrians who continue to be hit by stiff car bumpers.

As you will see from the evidence, many more lies were told during the following years, but their primary purpose was to hide the blatant falsehood of the very first lie.

In March 2000, the PedSALi consortium consisting of Dow Chemicals, Bill Courtney (under his trading name of Cheshire Innovation) and the University of Manchester won £250,000 of UK government funding to build and test a prototype bumper according to Bill’s designs.

How it works: a soft bumper for pedestrians

(If you have come straight to this web page a more basic discussion of SALi Technology is available on our "What is SALi Technology? page.)

The following sketch represents a horizontal cross section through a SALi filled car bumper during a lower leg impact.

You are looking down on the bumper.

Figure 2. The bumper is soft for pedestrian impact.

The visco-elastic SALi fluid flows to the sides of the impact zone. This reduces the stresses on the leg by allowing it to travel the full front to back distance of the bumper before coming to a halt.

The viscous nature of SALi permanently absorbs some of the impact energy and slightly increases the bumper recovery time compared with a conventional foam filling. This reduces the secondary injuries caused by the pedestrian bouncing off the bumper.

Additional smart feature: A child’s leg has a smaller horizontal cross section than an adult leg, allowing the bumper to appear softer in accidents involving children.

Supporting research evidence (1997)

By increasing the width of a SALi cushion it softens. In contrast, changing the width of a block of bumper infill foam does not change its properties. The graphs below show maximum accelerations during impact; maximum forces on the simulated leg increase proportionately.

This graph is extracted from [3].

The foam material tested was supplied by the UK Motor Industry Research Association (MIRA)

Figure 18. Impact energy absorbing performance of a block of expanded polypropylene foam, compared with SALi pads constructed using grease + granules of the same foam. The length of the block of foam did not affect the impact performance, provided that the length exceeded the diameter of the impact head, so the results for one length only are shown. In contrast, the maximum acceleration for the SALi pad declines as the length of the pad increases.

Now we will explain how the same SALi filled bumper stiffens up for impacts with concrete pillars and other hard objects

Again, this is a plan view looking down on a cross section through the bumper during an impact.

Figure 3, non-pedestrian impact. The SALi cushions compressed by the concrete pillar act like a very stiff foam. [See Section 7 on our car suspension page for a detailed explanation of why SALi beads offer exceptional stiffness as they are compressed.]

Consequently the bumper is stiff for non-pedestrian impacts. Bonus smart feature: Viscous damping increases with compression rate, so the bumper stiffness and energy absorbing capacity increases with impact speed. The faster the car is travelling, the greater the impact protection.

SALi filled bumpers offered car manufacturers two new selling points.

(i) Unlike conventional bumpers, a SALi filled bumper would recover after low speed crashes, helping to keep insurance costs down. (Foam bumpers can spring back rapidly for leg impacts, but are damaged by impacts with more massive objects.)

(ii) A SALi filled bumper would be stiffer and offer extra occupant/bodywork protection to vehicles in medium speed crashes.

Supporting evidence 1997 [3]

The simulated leg impact tests are copied from above and the results for a simulated bumper-bumper impact added. These results show that SALi filled bumpers are “smart”. That is, they can be soft or stiff, depending on the type of impact

The broad conclusion suggested by the simulated bumper impact data, shown in Figure 19, is that a front bumper filled with a suitable formulation of SALi would behave like a soft foam filled bumper, for lower leg impacts, but like a stiff foam bumper, for bumper-to-bumper impacts. This difference in uniaxial stiffness behaviour, for different types of impact, could also be useful in solving the other conflict of stiffness problems identified by Clemo [3] and summarised in the introduction.

It is important to note that Courtney’s early experiments demonstrated that car bumpers would only exhibit soft/stiff “smart” behaviour if the car bumper outer face deformed but did not stretch significantly during impact.

So, how come most people don’t know about soft bumpers?

The university research was mismanaged and the EU legislation was abandoned.

(ii) There was an eighteen month gap between the PedSALi project being approved and the University research starting.

(iii) No usable research results were ever delivered to the industrial partner for the project, Dow Chemicals Automotive Division. Following a progress review in June 2004 a decision was made to wind up the PedSALi project. Thirty three months after the delayed start of the University research, Dow had still not received any data for use in its computer modeling of different types of bumper impacts.. Consequently Dow had no evidence to encourage the rest of the automobile industry. Time had passed and its “window for commercial opportunity” had closed.

Here is an extract from the end of project review. The chart shows the original work plan as submitted to the funding bodies. The comments in red show what actually happened.

The University was offered public funding to carry out two types of experiment:

(i) SALi core characteristic work. The aim of this research was to obtain data about the impact energy absorbing properties of different SALi formulations. Dow would use this data to carry out computer simulations of pedestrian leg and bumper-to-bumper impacts on a SALi filled bumpers.

(ii) Impact tests on a basic design of SALi filled car bumper to check that Dow's computer simulations were giving the correct answers. An important feature of these tests was that the packaging for the SALi had to mimic the low stretch properties of the outer plastic cover that can be seen on any car bumper.

As for Courtney's small scale 1997 research described above; In order to demonstrate the "smart" features of PedSALi bumpers, two types of impact tests were required: (a) to simulate pedestrian lower leg impacts, and (b) to simulate bumper-to-bumper/ street furniture impacts.

But the following is what happened in reality:

(i) The core characteristic research was so badly done that Dow was unable to use it. The work was an embarrassing nonsense that violated basic physics laws that GCE A level physics students would understand. This is why Dow was trapped at the beginning of its contribution to the project. For more information about how the University researchers failure to grasp GCE A level physics click here.

(ii) Under protest from Dow and the SALi inventor Courtney, the University researchers willfully carried out invalid bumper simulation tests using elastic packaging. These tests did not reflect the true properties of a car bumper during a pedestrian accident and gave the research funding body a false impression that SALi filled bumpers were ineffective. This false evidence of design failure created a smokescreen hiding the embarrassingly bad core characteristic research that had prevented Dow from making progress.

(iii) The University researchers failed to carry out the bumper-to-bumper/ street furniture impact tests. This meant that the EU policy makers and the car manufacturers were deceived by the published PedSALi research [12, 13] because the unique feature of the PedSALi bumper, that it could solve the “conflict of stiffness” problem by being soft for pedestrian impacts but stiff for non-pedestrian impacts was never revealed.

[This "smart" feature demonstrated by Courtney's earlier work was the key to the PedSALi project receiving Engineering and Physical Science Research Council support. But even though the University researchers deceived the EU policy makers and car manufacturers by publishing fraudulent work and failing to do the bumper-to-bumper impact tests, the EPSRC paid for the work and the person in charge of the University research was promoted.]

SummaryHow hiding bad research cost Britain the chance to lead the world in road safety

In the first half of the PedSALi project, embarrassingly bad research that ignored the laws of physics was done.

In the second half of the project, tests using the wrong type of car bumper shell (i.e., SALi packaging) were deliberately done. This diverted attention from the embarrassing earlier research by creating false evidence that the PedSALi bumper design was ineffective.

The University researchers hid evidence that a British invention could have met both the humanitarian need for a soft bumper for pedestrian impacts and a stiff bumper for other types of collisions by the simple expedient of not doing the agreed comparative tests.

Why did the EU abandon its legislation? Apart from SALi, there was no technology available to solve the “conflict of stiffness” problem Two months before the delayed start to the University research, the car makers began lobbying the European Commission, claiming that solving the problem was impossible. The lobbying was successful because the PedSALi partners had no substantive evidence to show the Commission. The Directive was withdrawn in February 2003.

(i) The published research was invalid and carried out under protest from Dow and the inventor, Bill Courtney.

(ii) The false research was published in breach of a confidentiality agreement signed with Dow and Courtney.

(iii) News of the misleading publications and the trips to America only reached Bill after a confidential tip off from within the University.

Why was the published research invalid?

There were many flaws in the published papers. Here are a few of them: (i) The research was limited to cylinder shaped “bumpers” which nobody in the automobile industry uses. (ii) Early tests by Courtney had shown that cylinders were less effective than “D” shaped bumpers when filled with SALi. But this evidence was ignored by the Manchester researchers. [Take a look at the titles of their fraudulent papers 12 and 13 below. - They both refer to cylinder shaped devices.]

(iii) the impact tests were done using elastic packaging. [12, 13.] Elastic packing prevents the SALi from doing its job. Instead of the SALi being compressed and absorbing a significant amount of impact energy, the package expands and absorbs a small amount of energy. The innocent reader of the research papers is tricked into thinking that SALi is ineffective.

(iv) The impact tests did not include the vitally important bumper-to-bumper impact simulations that would have verified SALi's unique "smart" properties.

(v) The nonsense research paper referred to above falsely misquoted Courtney's own published research, claiming that SALi filled bumpers were unable to make a good recovery after an impact.

CommentBritish based researchers should not be going to America to trick their international colleagues in this way. British taxpayers should not be subsidising these trips and research trickery.

"Researchers lie and pedestrians die"

The hidden good research The first PedSALi research assistant resigned after his research materials mysteriously disappeared from the Manchester engineering labs and there were ten unexplained attacks on his temporary family home close to the University.

(Bill was concerned that the research assistant was being intimidated. He requested that the police were called in. But Dr. Oyadiji and Professor Wright, the University recipients for the PedSALi research funding overruled him.)

A week before leaving, the long suffering research assistant produced valid research results using low stretch “D” shaped packaging. This good research, which showed a fivefold improvement in performance compared with the elastic packaging results, was withheld from publication. Consequently the EPSRC and the automobile industry were misled. The good and bad research results are compared in Appendix 2 below.

Unfortunately the researcher was unable to test the lighter, more efficient SALi formulations described in Section 3 of the "What is SALi?" page because his irritated line manager, Doctor Oyadiji, banned him from using the laboratory after two days of good work.

The good experiments were repeated at Cardiff University six years later. The original good results were confirmed and published. [4]. The Cardiff experiments were only small scale but they did include research similar to the banned Manchester work. To lighten their SALi formulations the Cardiff workers had to use soft Expancel microspheres. These are not as efficient as the calcium carbonate coated Dualite microspheres that were available and should have been tested at Manchester.

Figure 4 The selective publication of misleading results suggested that a SALi filled car bumper would be unacceptable to the automobile industry. This fraudulent research "Proving" that the bumpers do not work “absolved” the academic researchers of any responsibility for the failure of the PedSALi project.

In total, four misleading papers [11, 12, 13 and 14] were published in breach of the confidentiality clauses of the PedSALi collaboration agreement. Please see point 2 of “Checking our claims”, below, for advice on gaining access to these papers.

Here is a timeline showing how the PedSALi project let down Europe's pedestrians

Figure 5. The PedSALi project failed to deliver, but Manchester University received full funding.

(i) This project failure could have been avoided if an early warning to the Head of Engineering at Manchester University that the project was about to go "horribly wrong“ had been acted on. Click here to see the warning.

Fighting the fraud Bill Courtney was appointed lead partner for the PedSALi project by the Department for Transport. He suspected financial fraud had been committed and that the EPSRC had been deceived. He requested copies of the relevant documents from the University. But the University withheld financial information from the lead partner

Some months later he obtained the financial documents indirectly from the EPSRC.

What was the most blatant financial fraud?

A. The University claimed funding for a fictional event where the results of the PedSALi project were supposedly presented to the automobile industry. They also claimed funding for trips to Dow Chemicals UK headquarters, to present research results to Dow engineers. These visits were never made.

For the record Bill Courtney was also offered public funding to cooperate in these activities. Collusion with his University colleagues would have allowed him to pocket £10,000. He did not claim. (You can use the Freedom of Information Act to verify Bill's honesty. We explain how to do this below.)

Bill complained to the University after discovering the financial fraud. His evidence of fraud was dismissed by the University on the grounds that the research was acceptable to the EPSRC, so any discrepancies in the funding claims were also acceptable under EPSRC rules. (See Appendix Three for a detailed discussion.)

The wider consequences of management level collusion with research and financial fraud

(i) A publicly recorded failure affecting Manchester's research rankings was avoided.

(ii) Any suspicion that Manchester University researchers cannot be trusted was avoided. Bill Courtney acknowledges that this is a genuine problem because the misconduct is restricted to one small research group and it would have taken great moral courage to confront it.

(iii) This failure of moral courage gained increasing importance after two brilliant Manchester University researchers were quite rightly tipped to win the Nobel Prize for Physics, for their honest and highly original work on graphene.

But the Manchester University cover-up cannot be condoned because crippling and mortal injuries continue to blight pedestrian lives.

9/11, A dark day in history

It’s a bitter irony, but the delayed University research started on the same day as the 9/11 attacks on America.

History may record that in the long run, the University mismanagement of the PedSALi project caused more pointless deaths than all of the terrorist attacks on America, Madrid, Mumbai, Bali, London, Nairobi, Norway, Paris and Tunisia.

Data to support this claimAccording to the Department for Transport, 5,605 pedestrians were killed or seriously injured in 2010, on the UK roads alone. If we consider the death toll for all of Europe's roads since 2005 when pedestrian friendly cars should have been introduced, the total numbers are frightening.

If smart car bumpers had been introduced in 2005, then the financial savings for the Eurozone countries alone would probably have been sufficient to pay for the third Greek bailout.

Historians may also be tempted to draw comparisons between the PedSALi fiasco and “the worst industrial accident in history." This happened at Bhopal in India, in 1984. At the very least, 4,000 people died as a result of a chemical plant gas leak. This site is now owned by Dow Chemicals. (But in the PedSALi case, Dow was a victim, not a perpetrator. )

But the Bhopal victims did not die completely in vain because lessons were learned and the risk of similar industrial accidents reduced thereafter. In contrast, Manchester University aided by the UKRIO has hidden the research mischief and no lessons have been learned.

We cannot have one standard of ethics for industry, and another for academia.

Please check our claims

1 The University held a Formal Enquiry that was supposed to reveal the truth. Instead it added a second layer of fraud that buried it deeper. Bill responded by trying to shame members of Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation into speaking up for truth within the University. He did this by sending all listed members a testimony and inviting them to respond.The tactic failed, but the testimony contains evidence that you or any member of the Institute can check online. So, if you are serious about investigating research fraud, it's worth reading. Use the Freedom of Information Act to obtain a copy from the University. [The Records Management Office, Risk and Compliance, The University of Manchester, G 011, John Owens Building, M13 9PL, Email: foi@manchester.ac.uk ].

2 Nullius in verba "Trust no one" In order to gain a balanced picture, consider asking the University of Manchester for their version of events, including details of the unpublished PedSALi research and the June 2004 review quoted above.

3 In contrast to PedSALi, workers at Cardiff University, operating on a shoestring budget have produced impressive results. [Huw Davies et. al., Cardiff University School of Engineering, Pedestrian Protection using a Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) based Bumper System, ESV Conference, Stuttgart, June 2009, Paper Number 09-002.]

What is the current position?

On the assumption that the Formal Enquiry Panel would deliver an honest report, Cardiff University applied for EPSRC research funding to do the PedSALi research correctly. Unfortunately, the enquiry process was not honest and the original fraudulent Manchester research was allowed to stand. This undermined the Cardiff case for funding and its EPSRC funding request was declined.

Research paper references

These references are a sub-set of those on our What is Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) Technology? web page. There are gaps in the numbering because the same reference numbers are used.

1 Courtney, W. A. Preliminary investigations into the mechanical properties and potential applications of a novel shock absorbing liquid, MPhil Thesis, Manchester School of Engineering, University of Manchester (1998)1

11 S O. Oyadiji et. al., University of Manchester, Core property characterization for a shock absorbing composite, SAVIAC 75th Symposium, 17-22 October 2004. False research published in breach of agreement and under protest from Courtney.

12 S O. Oyadiji et. al., University of Manchester, Characteristics of deformable cylindrical beams filled with a shock absorbing composite, SAVIAC 75th Symposium, 17-22 October 2004. False research published in breach of agreement and under protest from Courtney.

13 G. Georgiades et. al., Impact response of flexible cylindrical tubes filled with a shock absorbing composite, University of Manchester, SPIE Conference 7-10 March 2005. False research published in breach of agreement and under protest from Courtney.

18 W. A. Courtney and S. O. Oyadiji, University of Manchester, A Novel shock absorbing solid-liquid Composite with potential for automobile engineering applications, 1: Basic concepts and properties of SALi, Journal of Automotive Engineering. Courtney handed this paper to Oyadiji for final checking in July 2000, but it was not taken forward to publication.

19 W. A. Courtney and S. O. Oyadiji, University of Manchester, A Novel shock absorbing solid-liquid Composite with potential for automobile engineering applications, 2: Variable stiffness car bumpers, Journal of Automotive Engineering. Courtney handed this paper to Oyadiji for final checking in January 2002, but it was not taken forward to publication.

20 Courtney W, Oyadiji S O. A Novel Impact Absorbing Device Based on a Shock Absorbing Liquid. Journal of Materials Processing Technology. This is a ghost paper. Courtney handed the paper to Oyadiji for final checking and submission, 8th April 2002. According to the Manchester University web site (2007) The paper was “In press.” But when Courtney checked with the publisher, Elsevier, they could find no evidence of this paper being submitted.

Courtney comments The ghost paper was a threat to the fraudulent SALi research published by Oyadiji et. al., because it emphasised the importance of correct, low stretch packaging. The ghost paper is not referred to in the Formal Enquiry Report.

As listed in Section 6 of the "What is SALi?" page, further complaints about the suppression of these papers were made to senior University management at later dates. Inn 2009 the Formal Enquiry Panel had access to all these documents. But this suppression of papers is not referred to in their Report.

Suppression of papers 18 and 19 may have cost lives because their publication would have neutralized arguments from the car manufacturers that the conflict of stiffness problem could not be solved.

What should Manchester University have done?

Instead of denying the research fraud and then burying it under successive layers of management fraud, it should have acted in the moral manner of Tilburg University in the Netherlands and practiced complete openness.

Consumers have mixed opinions about driverless cars. Some are excited for the changes they’re supposed to bring, including the elimination of reckless driving and the benefit of convenience. Others are concerned that they will cause more accidents than they stop. The biggest controversy has been the risk of driverless cars hitting pedestrians.

Provided the fraudulent PedSALi research results and claims of poor performance are retracted and the smart bumper research is done correctly, SALi Technology could make driverless cars safer and reduce this fear.

Bill Courtney would be happy to work with a collaboration including Manchester University engineers, proved they are not tainted by the PedSALi fraud.

Manchester would be an excellent location for this work because a combination of graphene based SALi packaging and a graphene based outer bumper facia would offer the ideal combination of high strength and low weight. As a bonus, the superb thermal conduction properties of graphene would allow the front bumper to replace the conventional car radiator in vehicles powered by an internal combustion engine.

Appendix 1

Proof that the bumpers required low stretch SALi packaging

1.1 The research proof

Courtney objected to the publication of papers [12] and [13] above because they described impacts on elastic packages filled with SALi.

His own research described in his M Phil thesis [1] and the suppressed papers [18] and [20] had demonstrated that elastic packages were ineffective and could not solve the conflict of stiffness problem.

DfT Research Database

Objectives

At the end of the project it is anticipated that, using Finite Element techniques, it will be possible to predict the performance characteristics of a SALi based shock-absorbing component. Physical testing be will used to confirm the predicted results and validate the model. The chosen materials will be assessed using FMEA techniques to ensure that any adverse effects, such as toxicity and corrosive properties, are recognised and evaluated.

Description

This highly innovative project is researching a new composite, impact energy absorbing material that can in effect, automatically alter its stiffness, to cope with different types of impact. At present it is being evaluated with respect to the reduction of serious and fatal pedestrian casualties as the result of road accidents, in line with DTLR targets.

The patented material being investigated is a Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) which consists of lots of small resilient elastomeric capsules immersed in a matrix liquid and stored in a strong flexible package. Upon impact, all of the capsules are compressed by the matrix liquid and the front face of the package deforms to the shape of the applied load. The compressive stiffness of SALi filled packages increases as the area of applied load is increased. Consequently, a suitable sized package would be soft for a small child’s head impact, but stiff for an adult head impact. If SALi filled packages are integrated into car bumper systems, then the bumpers will be soft for lower leg impacts, but stiff for low speed bumper-to-bumper impacts. This will help to make vehicles safer for pedestrian accidents, while keeping vehicle repair costs low.

The unusual cushioning properties of SALi can be illustrated by comparing its impact absorbing performance with that of a block of elastomeric closed cell foam.

The project is investigating the three parameters that influence the physical characteristics of a SALi filled impact absorber: the matrix liquid, the size and nature of the elastomeric capsules and packaging design.

The matrix liquid acts as a lubricant to facilitate the movement of the capsules and to transmit the hydraulic pressure changes when a load is applied. Additionally the liquid provides viscous damping when the steady state condition is disturbed due to its shear viscosity and bulk viscosity properties.

The capsules can vary from expanded polystyrene beads to bubble packing. The size distribution of the capsules need to be optimised in order minimise the total weight of the impact absorber, without compromising on impact absorbing performance.

The packaging provides a flexible leak-proof envelope to contain the liquid and capsules but, importantly, it must not stretch significantly during load application. Also, the package must not burst open and eject its contents during a violent impact. The size and shape of the package will affect impact energy absorbing performance.

The following comparison between the unpublished good research and the published bad research was sent to The Records Officer at the University of Manchester (7th March 2007). Duplicate copies were subsequently sent to The Research Integrity Office and The Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation at the same University.

You can obtain a copy of the letter from the University, under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act. This letter includes references to the primary source, where the good research was written up for the PedSALi partners.

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Figure 6.Originally Figure 4 in Exhibit 11. Compact car bumpers require good energy absorption during the early stages of indentation. The published results falsely suggest that SALi only offers a small braking force and is ineffective during the early stages of impact.

Figure 7.Originally Figure 5 in Exhibit 11 for the Formal Enquiry.The published results give a false impression that a long braking distance is required. In practical terms this means that a ridiculously large bumper would be required. See Figure 4 above.

The published results are even more misleading because the good results were obtained using a smaller sample.

If results for similar sized samples had been compared, the magnitude of the deceit would have been even more obvious.

Originally Figure 6 in Exhibit 11 for the Formal Enquiry.

Figure 8. The first research assistant carried out tests on valid samples having a circumference of 220 mm. These results were not published.

The second research assistant carried out research using incorrectly packaged samples having a cross sectional circumference of 300 mm.

Why did the EPSRC pay Manchester University for doing misleading research in spite of Bill Courtney's fraud warnings?

Using the The Freedom of Information (FoI) Act the reasons become clear.

(i) A fictional Technical Review of the research results by Dow Chemicals in 2004 was created by the University for the EPSRC.

This misled the EPSRC into believing that a foam alternative to SALi was available and that having reviewed the University research, Dow concluded that by comparison, “SALi bumpers were too heavy, too expensive and too complex”.

In reality there was no valid research data for Dow to review and no such foam was available.

Proof of this deceit lies in the hospitals and mortuaries; pedestrians are still being crippled and killed by stiff bumpers. (Document IC 12 presented to the Formal Enquiry Panel verifies that the EPSRC was deceived by the University.)

Dow played no part in this deceit and were unaware that the EPSRC had been fooled.

(iii) This careless behaviour by the EPSRC might be explained by the additional University trickery used to deceive them.

The Department for Transport appointed Bill as lead partner for the PedSALi project, so his fraud warnings should have been taken seriously. But he discovered that his name, contact details and key role was airbrushed out of the initial submission and financial claim documents submitted to the EPSRC. Click to view the evidence. Bill's role was also airbrushed out of all the PedSALi research papers submitted to the referees because he was not named as being a participant in the project. [You can check this for yourself by reading references 11, 12, 13 and 14 listed above.]

(iv) The University breached its FoI Act obligations by failing to release the incriminating documents to Bill. He eventually obtained them from the EPSRC. (Evidence that the University was aware that it had broken the law is presented in Figure 4, Document C1.)

After discovering the evidence that the EPSRC had been deceived, what did Bill Courtney do about this?

At about this time the University set up an Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, so Bill sent his evidence of fraud to the Institute. (Hard copy letter plus supporting documents on a CD ROM.) This resulted in the University carrying out a Formal Enquiry. The EPSRC agreed to accept its findings

Q. What were the Formal Enquiry findings?

The Enquiry employed some neat tricks that allowed the Panel to dismiss all of Bill's fraud claims. Dr. Oyadiji was selected as a scapegoat for investigation. Dr. Turner and Professor Wright who should also have been investigated were then allowed to present evidence as as "independent" witnesses. This enabled them to testify on behalf of the scapegoat and against Courtney. During the period of the Enquiry Bill made two written protests about the use of this scapegoat "trick", but his protests were ignored. (You can use the Freedom of Information Act to verify this.)

The Enquiry succeeded in further discrediting the reputation of SALi Technology by suggesting that SALi filled bumpers were a foolish invention that could not work.

For the innocent reader, this part of the Report seems to make sense. It records that Bill marketed SALi believing that it had a single Goldilocks stiffness that was just right for all types of pedestrian impacts and car crashes. The Report also implies that Bill considered this Goldilocks stiffness was just right for use in car suspension systems.

A single stiffness material that meets all these different engineering needs is physically impossible. But recording that Bill believed this nonsense makes him look incompetent by University and EPSRC engineering standards.

How did the Panel support this nonsensical statement about Bill's "beliefs"?

The Report claimed that the results of the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects were scrutinized by a "Technical Committee of 6 engineers, of more than 120 man-years of engineering experience" and that the Committee found the evidence did not back up Courtney's "beliefs".

But this was a GHOST COMMITTEE - it never existed

(i) One named member of the committee resigned from his Manchester University post in despair and returned home to China two years before the committee is supposed to have met. (His temporary Manchester home close to the University was attacked on ten occasions and his PedSALi research materials mysteriously disappeared, presumed stolen. But Dr. Oyadiji and Professor Wright refused Bill's request for the police to be called in.)

(ii) Another named member, supposedly representing Dow Chemicals, has made a written statement denying his membership. (Document IC 12 on the CD ROM, as sent to the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation)

(iii) Bill has not met anyone who has ever heard of this committee.

(iv) Multiple Freedom of Information requests have failed to produce any documents that refer to its existence. (You can check this for yourself by making an FoI request to the University.)

(v) Even if the Committee had existed, its findings would have been wrong because the research on the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects was invalid and carried out under protest from Courtney. (For evidence that the CrashSALi research was invalid see Figure 2 on the CrashSALi web page.)

We discuss this ghost committee again in Appendix 3.

Implications for British science

(i) Prior to the Formal Enquiry, PedSALi was a "local" ethics problem restricted to crash research. But the Report presented a fictional expert peer review in order to hide research fraud. This creates a wider ethics problem by undermining trust in the peer review process across the whole of science.

(ii) These are difficult financial times for Universities. If a University gains competitive advantage by violating peer review and the formal enquiry process it will be tempted to repeat the exercise.

Could the Panel have made an innocent mistake?

The Panel had no excuse for undermining Bill's good name by making false claims about him. PedSALi had only won public funding because Bill's published research demonstrated that that SALi was a "smart" material that provided different levels of stiffness for different types of impact.

You can check the evidence presented to the Panel for yourself. [Figures 2, 3 and the supporting evidence above. Also, see the Department for Transport description of SALi filled bumpers in Appendix 1 above.]

Was this the only "mistake"?

The Formal Enquiry Report included a number of demonstrably false statements that damaged Bill's professional name. For example, it recorded false evidence that his dealings with the good UMIST researchers referred to in Appendix 4 below had been unethical because they breached his commercial confidentiality agreement with Manchester University. (The honest Business Manager at Manchester University, Dr. M... C..... who advised Bill on his dealings with UMIST could have punctured this libel in a sentence. But, in spite of Bill's written recommendation to the University Vice Chancellor, she was not interviewed by the Enquiry Panel.)

The Report also falsified dates. The most serious falsifications allowed the Report to hide: (i) The truth about the critical delays in the University research start date. (ii) The truth about the trips to America and presentation of fake research results in breach of the commercial confidentiality agreement.

How was all this misinformation hidden?

The format of the Report lacked academic rigour. It had no accessible indexing, referencing or footnotes. Consequently comparing statements recorded as "facts" with the primary source evidence was very difficult.

What did Bill do next?

(i) The report was an assembly of false facts about Bill's professional reputation and his invention. So he complained to the Information Commission about the University holding such a record. But the Commission declined to intervene because it had limited funds and the issues were too complex. (ii) Bill also tried to clear his name by sending evidence that the Panel's findings were corrupt to the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation. He is partially sighted, so the delays caused by writing to the Information Commission and then collating evidence for the Institute were a very time consuming tasks. The University refused to consider Bill's evidence because it was not received within 10 (ten) days of the Report being sent. This is discriminatory because the Report itself was delivered a year later than recommended by University of Manchester guidelines. (Meanwhile Bill ran out of funds and had to abandon his international patents relating to SALi.) Since then Bill's emails to anyone at the University "Ethics Institute" have bounced back as "undeliverable".

Q. Who polices the Universities when this type of situation arises?

At an early stage in the problems, Bill Courtney's MP Graham Brady sought an answer to this question. The then Science Minister, Lord Sainsbury, ruled that he was unable to intervene and that it was for Mr Courtney to resolve the problem himself. [The Sainsbury letter is reproduced as Appendix 6 below.]

There appears to be no mechanism for dealing with Universities that refuse to address research fraud. So with great reluctance and after a game changing event, Bill has taken the only option left; publishing the evidence in detail on the web.

What was the "game changer" that made Bill go public?

His health deteriorated over the years of his dispute with Manchester University. In particular, his eyes started hemorrhaging and the process was irreversible. He was registered as partially sighted and had had difficulty crossing busy roads. He was knocked down by a car and the pedestrian safety issue became personal.

You are challenged to check the facts The bulk of the evidence has now been published on this web site. If you have a professional interest in defending the integrity of science or the public purse, Bill Courtney will send you a CD ROM copy of all the residual evidence submitted to the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation.

You can then contact Manchester University and the EPSRC to cros check Bill's claims. The Freedom of Information Act is a very powerful tool that will enable you to do this.

If you do go to the trouble of carrying out a rigorous investigation, you should compare the quality of the evidence you receive from both sides.

1 THE WHISTLEBLOWER'S SIDE

Bill Courtney’s submissions to the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation / Formal Enquiry Panel were supported by very detailed references, with a total of about 110 (one hundred and ten) documents being supplied in all.

2 THE UNIVERSITY SIDE

In contrast, the Formal Enquiry Report findings have to be taken on blind trust. The Report does not include primary copies of any of the evidence taken, any list of evidence, or other form of referencing. (Assuming that you receive the same Report as sent to Bill Courtney.)

YOUR DETECTIVE CHECKLIST

Omissions from the Report relating to research and financial fraud that you can check

(i) The PedSALi research was fraudulent because, by using elastic packaging, a false impression that SALi does not work work was created. The Report provides no justification for this fraudulent work being done at public expense.

(ii) The Enquiry Panel was presented with evidence that the University researchers had created a libelous document implying that the false research was only done because Dow Chemicals had demanded it. [Document 37.] The University sent document 37 to the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council and also the Department for Transport. The Formal Enquiry Report makes no reference to document 37.

(iii) As explained at the beginning of this article, the PedSALi bumper offered a unique solution to the conflict of stiffness problem. It was a "smart" bumper, being soft for pedestrian impacts and stiff for other potentially expensive bodywork damaging impacts. But the comparative PedSALi impact tests that should have verified this property were never done. Consequently the car makers argument that the conflict of stiffness problem could not be resolved remained in force. There is no reference to this key research omission in the Formal Enquiry Report.

(iv) Two trips were made to America, to present the fraudulent research to the international research community. [Papers 11 and 12 at Virginia Beach, USA and paper 13 in San Diego, California.] Bill Courtney only discovered this after a confidential tip-off from inside the University. The Report offers no explanation for British taxpayer funds being used to fund these foreign trips.

(v) The CrashSALi researchers used ineffective materials that breached the publicly funded contract. Consequently, Bill Courtney, who held stewardship over the funds wrote to the (then) University Vice Chancellor insisting on the work being done correctly. The University responded by using its solicitors Eversheds to intimidate Courtney into approving payment without the contract being fulfilled. This intimidation had a serious effect on Bill's health. (He was treated for depression, his blood pressure shot up and blood vessels in both of his eyes hemorrhaged.) The Report offers no explanation for this bullying. (You can see medical evidence that Bill's health was affected on the CD ROM.)

(vi) One of the great strengths of science is (supposed to be) that fraudulent researchers are eventually found out when other researchers do the work correctly. The Formal Enquiry Panel was presented with evidence that good PedSALi and CrashSALi topic research had been published by Cardiff [4] and Nanjing University [5] researchers. Neither of these papers are mentioned in the Report.

An example of how the scientific method should work

Fraudulent research into an AIDS vaccine at Iowa State University was exposed when the "impressive" findings of Dr. Dong-Pyou Han were contradicted by the work of other researchers.

In 2013 DoctorHan resigned and his work was discredited. This episode was a serious setback for AIDS research because Han’s fellow scientists wasted valuable time and research funds following a false research trail. But at least the fraud was exposed and science can move forward again.

In contrast, The Formal Enquiry Panel at Manchester University has ignored the evidence of SALi fraud highlighted by the good SALi research at Nanjing & Cardiff Universities. This

If you have a serious professional interest in fighting academic fraud you should go back to the primary source, obtaining your documents from Manchester University, using The Freedom of Information Act,

(i) Exhibit 37is a copy of the document that the University researchers sent to the public funding providers. The section where they falsely blame Dow Chemicals for demanding the fraudulent research is highlighted.

(ii) Exhibit 39 is an email from a Dow representative after he discovers that one of the university researchers had repeated the claim that Dow insisted on the fraudulent research being done. He writes, “Eugenio did in fact mention to me that in my absence the finger was pointed at me concerning a number of issues. I am afraid this typifies the characters (or should I say character) we are dealing with at Manchester.”

(iii) Figure 6 in Document C1 reveals a “careless mistake” made by the academics in fooling the funding providers. This allowed the Dow representative to discover that he was falsely being accused of demanding bad research.

How did the Formal Enquiry Report avoid discussing the evidence that Dow was falsely blamed for the fraudulent research?

By creating a new layer of false evidence that made Courtney look stupid and unreliable by academic standards!. This allowed the Panel to ignore his evidence in support of Dow. It also allowed the Panel to dismiss all of his evidence relating to research fraud. The documentation on the CD ROM provides six examples of Courtney's good professional name being tarnished by false evidence.

This is an extract from the Formal Enquiry Report, followed by an annotated version.

(i) The original

“Mr Courtney had promoted SALi technology as showing a stress/strain curve of an “Ideal Shock Absorbing Material” and stated that there were indications that SALi behaves like that. Prior to PedSALi and CrashSALi, no tests had been carried out using displacement sensors, so stress strain characteristics could not have been obtained. The results that were generated by the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects did not back up the Complainants beliefs about the ideal behaviour of SALi. The results were scrutinized by the Technical Committee of 6 engineers (Professor Jan Wright, Dr John Turner, Dr Eugenio Toccalino, Dr Xinqun Zhu, Dr George Georgiades and Dr Oyadiji) of more than 120 man-years of engineering experience.”

[Gleeson, Duck and Fernandez, Formal Enquiry Report, University of Manchester, January 2010.]

To the innocent eye, this extract looks plausible and damming to Courtney's professional competence.

(ii) The annotated version

This tells an entirely different story, because the whole section has been fabricated. And you, the reader, are invited to check these fabrications.

You should also note that the Report refers to "a stress/strain curve". This is false and misleading because SALi based impact absorbers present different shapes of stress/strain curves for different types of impact. Courtney would have been academically stupid to believe that a single curve was involved. A more serious criticism is that it contradicted his published [2, 3, 4] and unpublished [1,18, 19, 20] research.

1984 thinking

In order to believe this section of the Report any reader familiar with the PedSALi project has to abandon logic and use doublethink.

The whole purpose of the PedSALi project was to develop a "smart" SALi filled car bumper that offered a soft material type stress/strain curve for pedestrian leg impacts but a stiff material type stress/strain curve for other impacts. Courtney’s early research had shown this was possible [See the graphs near the top of this page.] But according to the Report, the inventor was throwing away all of the advantages of his own invention by promoting SALi as a physically impossible “Goldilocks” material having a single stress/strain curve that was just right for many types of impacts. These ranged from the two types of bumper impacts to the far wider range of impacts and vibrations that should have been investigated in the CrashSALi project.

Courtney's true beliefs about how SALi worked were supported by independent research evidence from Cardiff [4] and Nanjing [5] Universities. The Panel were sent copies of these papers, but failed to mention them in their report.

This censorship of good research adds yet another layer of deception to the panels report because they wrote,

"Prior to PedSALi and CrashSALi, no tests had been carried out using displacement sensors, so stress strain characteristics could not have been obtained. "

Yes this was strictly true, but its use to support doublethink was deception. Both the Cardiff University research [4] and the Nanjing University research [5] that the Panel ignored included tests using displacement sensors.

It is also worth noting that it would have been physically impossible for the fictional "Technical Committee" to have tested Mr Courtney's true belief that a SALi filled bumper offered different types of stiffness depending on the type of impact because the University research [12, 13] failed to include bumper-to-bumper impact simulation tests.

Quality control underpins trust in British science. We must not allow a Formal Enquiry Panel to lower our standards by getting away with creating false evidence to hide research fraud.

Summary of this section

The Formal Enquiry Panel dodged an investigation into the original research fraud by writing a story about a “Technical Committee” that never existed.

There is clear evidence that the Technical Committee could not have existed.(i) One purported member has provided a written statement denying that he was a member.(ii) A second purported member resigned from his post and returned to China two years before the committee was supposed to have met.(iii) Freedom of Information requests submitted to Manchester University have failed to unearth any evidence of the existence of this committee.

In order to make their case, the Panel had to create a false set of beliefs that they attributed to Courtney. These “beliefs” were bizarre and made Courtney look stupid by academic standards.

The false beliefs attributed to Courtney were the polar opposite of his true evidence based beliefs.

Courtney’s true beliefs, along with supporting evidence had been published in a journal paper [3]. The Panel had access to this paper and made indirect reference to it in their report.

It was Courtney’s true beliefs that attracted the interest of Dow and later won EPSRC funding for the PedSALi project. They were referred to explicitly in the Manchester University funding proposal to the EPSRC.

The committee is supposed to have tested Courtney’s beliefs against the PedSALi research evidence. But this research was flawed and contradicted the laws of physics.

Courtney’s true beliefs about the “smart” variable stiffness behaviour of a SALi filled car bumper could not have been tested because the Manchester University researchers failed to carry out the necessary experiments. (But they claimed EPSRC funding for the work!)

Cardiff University subsequently carried out the required experiments and published their results. They were in line with Courtney’s predictions. A copy of the Cardiff research paper [4] was presented to the Panel, but is not referred to in their report.

The Formal Enquiry Panel that created this secondary fraud consisted of the Heads of Physics and Maths at Manchester University and a representative of the UK Research Integrity Office.

For shear chutzpah, can any other research fraud in history trump this?

Refusal to face up to painful evidence about criminal activity

Exhibit 44 and Document C1 (Section 6.5), 19 and 44 provide proof that the Formal Enquiry Panel was aware of Dr Zhu’s Manchester home being attacked on ten occasions They also provide proof that the Panel were aware of research materials supplied by Dow Chemicals being "stolen" from Dr Zhu’s work place. You will also read that the Panel were aware that Dr Oyadiji and Professor Wright had blocked Courtney's demand for the police to be called in. Instead, Dow was accused of not supplying the University with sufficient research materials.

Document C1 (Section 6.6), 7 and 19 provide proof that the University withheld information from Dow and Courtney that Dr Zhu wished to resign following the attacks on his home until his resignation had been accepted and he had booked his flight back to China.

If you use The Freedom of Information Act to obtain a copy of The Formal Enquiry Report from the University, you should note that the Report containsnoreferences to any of the following criminal law issues:

(i) The theft of Dr Zhu’s research materials from the University,

(iii) The ten attacks on Dr Zhu’s Manchester home,

(ii) Courtney’s concerns that Dr Zhu was being intimidated but the University refused to call in the police to investigate (Document C1 (Section 6.5) and Exhibit 19),

(iv) Dow’s hard copy letter of complaint to the University that they had been kept in the dark about Dr Zhu’s crime victim problems and resignation until it was too late to help him. (Exhibit 7)

The related financial fraud

Was the Formal Enquiry Panel presented with any hard evidence of financial fraud?

Bill Courtney presented three strands of argument to support his assertions of financial fraud:

(i) As discussed on this web page, the PedSALi research was fraudulent. Consequently, any claim for full expenses must also be fraudulent.

(ii) In breach of the terms of the collaboration agreement, two trips were made to America to promote the fraudulent research findings. These trips to Virginia Beach and San Diego, California were made at the British taxpayers expense. [Evidence of this foreign trip fraud was clear from several documents submitted to the Formal Enquiry. See for example Document C1 (11th Challenge.)]

(iii) Claims were made for (a) trips to Dow Chemicals UK Headquarters to present the Manchester University research findings and (b) for hosting an event where the findings would be presented to the European automobile industry. These were supposed to be key milestones in the successful completion of the project.None of these activities took place, but by claiming for them, the University gave the EPSRC the false impression that the milestones had been passed. [Detailed evidence was presented to the Panel in Document A1.]

How did the Panel respond?

Their Report claims, "The Panel could find no evidence of misuse of research funding."

In response to the testable evidence of financial fraud presented in Document A1 it stated, " The Panel did not uphold this allegation."

[Gleeson, Duck and Fernandez, Formal Enquiry Report, University of Manchester, January 2010.]

Here is an illustrative example of the tricks used in the Formal Enquiry Report to create a smokescreen around the financial fraud:

As the lead partner, Cheshire Innovation kept the Department for Transport (DfT) regularly informed about the problems that the project was facing.

By April 2004 the University had failed to deliver any results to Dow, so Dow were unable to start their agreed work programme.

The DfT proposed a meeting of the project partners in London on April 27th 2004, to try and get the project back on course.

The Formal Enquiry Panel was presented with several documents that made this position clear. But, instead of recording the truth, the Report includes a blatant lie that damages Courtney's professional reputation,

"An arbitration meeting was scheduled for 27 April 2004: this was cancelled because Mr Courtney refused to attend."

[Gleeson, Duck and Fernandez, Formal Enquiry Report, University of Manchester, January 2010.]

The British taxpayer funding for the PedSALi project came mainly from the EPSRC. As lead partner for the PedSALi project, Bill Courtney had complained to the EPSRC about the Manchester research fraud. Initially the EPSRC planed to hold its own enquiry, but subsequently agreed to accept the findings of the Manchester University investigation.

What did the EPSRC learn from the Report about the theft of Dr Zhu's PedSALi research materials, the ten attacks on his home close to the University and the University's refusal to call in the police?

The EPSRC remained ignorant of the personal nature of the criminal damage suffered by Zhu's family because the Formal Enquiry Report merely explains Dr Zhu's resignation by referring to "the crime situation in Manchester that had affected his family." [Gleeson, Duck and Fernandez, Formal Enquiry Report, University of Manchester, January 2010.]

To verify the truth about the ten attacks on his family home, you will need to obtain a copy of Dr. Zhu's resignation letter from Manchester University.

The links between PedSALi and CrashSALi

Why was the CrashSALi project launched at a time when PedSALi was already causing so many difficulties?

Manchester University had an excellent business arm, Manchester Innovation Ltd (MIL). MIL was extremely supportive to Bill Courtney and Dow. It was very frustrated at the massive delay in starting the PedSALi project (see the timeline above) but could do nothing to help because Dr “Tunde” Oyadiji was sitting on the EPSRC funds and nobody within the Engineering Department was prepared to challenge him.

MIL suggested that a second project (CrashSALi) with Courtney holding the purse strings might put pressure on Oyadiji and stimulate PedSALi progress. This was a last option for saving PedSALi, so Courtney readily agreed.

You can get an insight into this strategy from an MIL email presented to the Enquiry as Document 5. Here is an extract, “It would be good when we get the money to sit down with Tunde and try and make it blatantly clear what the University’s obligations in this project are!”

Unfortunately, as can be seen from Document C1 (4th Challenge), the strategy backfired in the chaos following the theft of research materials, attacks on Dr Zhu’s home, and his subsequent resignation.

In spite of Courtney's recommendation in Exhibit 14 that the key person from MIL be interviewed, the Panel failed to do so. Their Report fails to make it clear that CrashSALi was a last desperate effort to save the PedSALi project. Yet again, as readers of the Report, the EPSRC was misled.

The Formal Enquiry Report Conclusions & Recommendations

The Report ends,

The Panel found no evidence of research misconduct on the part of Dr Oyadiji and did not uphold any of the allegations related to this contained within Mr Courtney’s complaint. The Panel make the following recommendations to the Deputy President:

That the University should look carefully at the role of honorary staff and ensure that their rights and responsibilities are clearly stated in a contractual agreement.

2. That the University should seek to restore Dr Oyadiji’s reputation if it has been damaged by the complaints that Mr Courtney has made against him over the years.

3. That the University should seek to ensure that the papers blocked by Mr Courtney are duly submitted for publication and any unpublished results are allowed to be published without such blockages in the future. “

[Gleeson, Duck and Fernandez, Formal Enquiry Report, University of Manchester, January 2010.]

Bill Courtney comments

There are many reasons why the Panel's conclusions are corrupt. Here are the main ones for fraud busters to investigate.

1 Courtney presented detailed evidence to the Panel that Dow was unable to start its work on the PedSALi project because the Manchester University work was invalid and worthless.But the Panel made a self contradicting excuse for not examining this evidence. click here to see their excuse.

2 He presented detailed evidence to the Panel that the EPSRC and others had been misled because the researchers only published fraudulent data relating to ineffective elastic SALi packaging.But, instead of examining the evidence, the Panel created a ghost committee that is supposed to have examined Courtney's evidence at an earlier date and concluded that he was wrong.

3 The CrashSALi project Courtney presented the Panel with evidence verifying that the University researchers had tested the wrong materials. Also, that instead of fulfilling their contractual obligations and doing the work correctly, Manchester University used their solicitors, Eversheds, to intimidate Courtney. But the Panel did not address either of these issues.

4 The investigation failed to meet two internationally recognised standards of justice:

4.1 Failure to reveal evidence During and after the Enquiry, Courtney was kept completely ignorant of any of the evidence submitted to the Enquiry by the University party. On reading the Panel’s report is was clear that many false statements had been made, both about him and Dow Chemicals.

4.2 Failure to use witness evidence in a balanced manner

Honest witnesses not calledAccording to the Report, two key witnesses that Courtney had named to the VUM Vice-Chancellor, were not interviewed. These were Dr Michelle Cooper (pre amalgamation, at MIL, the business arm of the University) and Professor Steve Reid (Engineering, UMIST).

Valid testimony not citedIn an e-mail to Courtney, a Dow representative claims to have submitted written evidence to the Enquiry. But the Report states that the Panel received no evidence from Dow. Based on past behaviour, Courtney trusts the Dow representative to be the honest party.

A biased witness was presented as "independent"In 2003, the University had provided Dr Turner as an “independent” chairman with referee powers to help resolve the research disputes between Dr Oyadiji and Professor Wright on one side and Dow Chemicals and Cheshire Innovation (CI) on the other. But Dow and CI subsequently discovered that he was a one of Dr Oyadiji’s closest research colleagues. No Dow representative attended meetings after this discovery. Courtney called for Turners resignation as Chairman but he remained because he was outvoted by Oyadiji and Wright.

"I should become involved as an independent person in an attempt to assist and resolve the difficulties."

“I see my job as essentially similar to that of a referee, ensuring ‘fair play’ between the different parties, issuing ‘yellow and red cards’ should these be appropriate, and keeping the project on course to a successful outcome.”

In reality, this meant that Dr Turner overruled Courtney's objections about bad research being tolerated.

The bad research came in three forms:

(A) The University researchers interpreted their results using muddled thinking that contradicted the laws of physics. This meant that the results looked superficially plausible but were meaningless and could not be used by Dow.Even though Dr Turner had been appointed by Manchester University he did not have the power to wave red cards and "send off" the laws of physics.

If you are familiar with Newton's laws of motion and the laws of conservation of energy and momentum, you can check this hubris for yourself.

(B) The University researchers willfully used elastic packaging the rendered the SALi impact energy absorbing mechanism ineffective. As you can see from this linked web page, Dr Turner shifted the blame for the bad research on to Dow by falsely claiming that they insisted on the bad research being done.

(C) There was also bad research by omission because in spite of reminders from Courtney during Dr Turners time as an intermediary, the University researchers failed to carry bumper-to-bumper simulation tests that would confirm the PedSALi bumpers "smart" properties.

4.3 Intimidation by the "referee" Examples of Dr. Turner’s intimidating behaviour were presented to the Panel in Document C1.

To read about the most serious case of intimidation Scroll down to “4th challenge to the right of the University to pursue CI for debt recovery”.

Summary of what you will find The “referee” starts his work in a very encouraging manner by offering Courtney compensation for the University mismanagement of SALi research. This will take the form of a rebate on the research fees for the CrashSALi project that is 75% public/25% Courtney funded. But Dr Turner changes his mind when he learns that the rebate savings will be used to fund good SALi research for Dow at sister university, UMIST. A short meeting with the Manchester researchers plus an engineer from UMIST is held. At the end of the meeting, the UMIST man is escorted from the room by Dr Turner but Courtney is instructed to stay seated. On his return the "referee" chastises Courtney for his "stupidity" in failing to understand "plain English". "Compensation" simply means that Courtney is excused from paying the University costs incurred in finding a replacement for the PedSALi research assistant who has resigned. (Following the attacks on his home and other problems.)

The "referee" rules that he is right and Courtney has to accept it.

The UMIST research is not done and Dow is left with nothing but the physics defying Manchester research.

Courtney is concerned because Turner is blocking research that, even at this late stage, may save the PedSALi project. As explained in Document C1, this ruling will blossom into legal intimidation by the University solicitors. [CrashSALi page.]

Courtney protests to the University,

"This form of “compensation” is equivalent to the form of “protection” offered to small businesses by criminal gangs." (Document C1.)

Courtney also protests at the next meeting with the funding bodies. See Footnote 8, towards the end of Document C1

Courtney describes Dr Turner's intimidating behaviour at the earlier meeting and calls for him to step down because he has failed to declare a research interest and has demonstrated bias.

Turner refuses to step down, claiming to have let Courtney off lightly on the earlier occasion.

He boasts,

“I was not intimidating. When I give people a real bollocking, they don’t know what’s hit them for two days.”

Six members of the University and three representatives of the Department for Transport / Foresight Link witness this complaint and boast but say nothing. Nobody from Dow or UMIST is present. (Dow did not send a representative to any subsequent meetings.) Dr Turner continued in his "referee" work until the project eventually failed.

The Panel’s response Instead of Courtney’s complaints about Dr. Turner’s intimidating (and possibly criminal) behaviour being investigated, Dr. Oyadiji was selected as a scapegoat, with Turner appearing as an "independent" witness.

The Report records,

" In June 2003 Dr John Turner of the University of Manchester was appointed as an independent person to assist to resolve the difficulties between the University of Manchester and the industrial partners."

[Gleeson, Duck and Fernandez, Formal Enquiry Report, University of Manchester, January 2010.]

Did Courtney attempt to get the Report retracted?

Yes, but he faced a problem; who should he appeal to? The Formal Enquiry had been managed by the University Research Governance Office so it could not provide an independent "appeals court.". Instead, Courtney appealed to The University of Manchester Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation for their honest intervention. Click here to see a copy of the letter he sent.

The Institute ducked the problem by passing his appeal on to the University Research Governance Office.

This Office refused to examine Courtney's evidence that the Panel had committed secondary fraud.

Comment Bill Courtney is "A Manchester man" by birth and long association with the University. He recognises that the vast majority of University staff are doing good honest work and has enjoyed working with many of them. Appendix Four provides evidence that he "put his money where his mouth is."

But Bill's pride in his local University does not extend to tolerating fraud.

A final effort to fight fraud from inside Manchester University

Bill tried to embarrass members of the Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation into speaking up for truth within the University.

He did thus by sending all listed members a testimony and inviting them to respond.The tactic failed. So, with a heavy heart, he has gone public.

Was Manchester University warned that comprehensive details of the Formal Enquiry fraud had been published online?

Research into SALi Technology has been done at six British Universities, in China, the USA and Ireland. In the UK, only the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects have received direct public funding.

Prior to amalgamation in 2004, the Victoria University of Manchester (VUMAN) and the University of Manchester Institute for Science and Technology (UMIST) were separate institutions. SALi research was carried out at both.

The publicly funded research at VUMAN was fraudulent. (See above and also the CrashSALi page.)

In contrast, low budget SALi research at nearby UMIST, was excellent. [The good work at UMIST was done by Professor Steve Reid, Dr John Harrigan and their Masters Degree students.]

Bill Courtney hoped that post amalgamation the good researchers would prevail and that this embryonic SALi research hub would expand.

To generate funding for the hub, he handed over commercial negotiating powers to VUMAN, and agreed to it to taking 50% of all future royalties.

Dow Chemicals estimated that the PedSALi project alone would bring about $(US) 1 million/ year to the new University.

What happened in reality Sadly, covering up fraud proved to be more tempting than developing a research hub.

When Bill Courtney's MP asked for time to investigate the matter, the new University created a smokescreen by falsely pursuing Bill for debt recovery. (See CrashSALi page)

The good researchers and the honest Business Manager that Bill trusted with his intellectual property all left the new University. Bill wrote to the University Vice Chancellor urging him to contact them, to hear their side of the story, but his suggestion was not taken up.

The legal threats affected Bill's health. He was treated for depression, became partially sighted and he ran out of funds. [For proof see Exhibits 9, 42 and Minutes, PedSALi Formal Meeting 9, 27 June 2003] The SALi patents had to be abandoned and Bill's dedication to developing SALi Technology since 1986 came to nothing. In attempting to make Europe's roads safer, he lost his £140,000 retirement savings.

Here is the key clause from the profit sharing agreement between Cheshire Innovation (Bill's trading name) and MIL, the University business arm.

Bill was locked into a legally binding agreement that gave Manchester University the sole authority to negotiate with industry on his behalf. Meanwhile, the University was hiding fraud by generating "evidence" that SALi was ineffective and that Bill himself was professionally incompetent.

The Formal Enquiry Panel were given proof of this Agreement, but it is not referred to in their Report.

Appendix 6

A letter from Lord Sainsbury to Graham Brady MP

Bill Courtney comments It is important for the reader to recognise that (i) The University received its funding from the public purse.

(ii) The Department for Transport had appointed Cheshire Innovation (Bill's trading name) as the lead partner for the PedSALi project.

(iii) In keeping with his contractual obligations Bill had warned the EPSRC and the Department for Transport of the research fraud.

(iv) As a private person with very limited funds, the government should not have left him alone to police the spending of public money.

Implications for British science

1 Un-policed academic freedom encourages Meta-fraud

When University managers commit secondary or meta-fraud to hide research fraud the University system has no “Higher Court” to correct it. At a time when funding is tight, Universities that tolerate meta-fraud gain at the the expense of their honest peers.

Since its birth in ancient Greece, science has been our most successful human endeavour. This success is based on a unique set of quality control systems. The whole edifice of science will collapse if we abuse these systems to hide embarrassing research failures.

British science will be reduced to junk bond status if we abuse our science heritage.

If you have links to Manchester University or value science, don't just sit back and say "Oh dear."

To paraphrase Edmund Burke,

“For British science to fall from grace, it is only necessary that good scientists do nothing.”

Would Bill Courtney be willing to work with Manchester University at a future date?

Bill describes himself as “a proud Manchester Man.” The vast majority of staff at the University had nothing to do with the SALi research fraud. Their professional conduct should not be judged by any of the evidence presented on this website. In order to demonstrate his belief in this statement, Bill would be happy and willing to work with the University developing any of his inventions.

BUT

He does not tolerate research fraud and believes that the fraud problems described on this website need to be openly and fully investigated by a totally independent third party.

SALi and global warming

Unfortunately SALi research fraud at Manchester University undermined this plan and the green energy work has ground to a halt. As a result Britain may have lost a world leading position in fighting climate change. And as a consequence, your energy bills may be far higher than necessary.

Article summary

SALi based suspension units were invented in Britain by Bill Courtney. But while bad research using the wrong material and doing the wrong experiments was being done at Manchester University, excellent research, using the right materials and doing the right experiments was being done in China.

Britain The taxpayer funded CrashSALi Project (2002-3) should have investigated SALi based suspension units in the UK, but the University research was fraudulent and did not deliver any sensible results. When Bill Courtney's MP asked awkward questions about the failed research, the University bluffed its way out of the problem.

It ignored the MP's questions and created an illusion that the work had been done correctly by using legal threats to try and force Bill to pay for the fraudulent work.

China Somehow Bill's suspension unit designs have ended up in China. Engineers at Nanjing University have published papers which suggest that SALi based suspension units are a Chinese invention. They have refused to sign a research licensing agreement with Cheshire Innovation or take up a proposal to collaborate with Cardiff University on development.

To be fair to the Chinese

(i) Unlike Manchester University, the quality of their research work is excellent.

(ii) Following warning letters from Bill Courtney and a complaint to the publishing house Elsevier, publication of papers has ceased. It is possible that the Chinese were duped into plagiarizing Courtney's work by a rogue employee at Manchester University. We present the evidence below.

Britain vs. China

British taxpayer funded research into SALi suspension systems at Manchester University

Chinese government funded research using designs copied from an unpublished Manchester University thesis

APPARENTLY WILFULLY BOTCHED, but the University still claimed funding for the work.

Legal action was threatened when the inventor refused to approve transfer of public funds and his MP tried to intervene.

Manchester University has created false evidence that hides any suspicion that one of its employees has leaked British IP to the Chinese. (The cover-up by senior management at Manchester University is exposed on our PedSALi page.)

Researchers at Cardiff University working on SALi projects discovered the Chinese work during their literature search

The Chinese work was EXCELLENT, but they refused to cooperate with the British inventor or Cardiff University.

There is verifiable evidence that a Manchester University based researcher leaked the inventor's IP to the Chinese.

What Britain is losing: (i) About 45 million road vehicles are manufactured world-wide each year. Suspension manufacturing is a Multi-Million Pound segment of this industry. As we seek new export markets post Brexit, an opportunity to create world beating manufacturing jobs is being lost.

The last coalition government deserves credit for investing heavily in university research. For example, on the strength of its" excellent materials science publications record", it awarded Manchester University £235 million to establish a national materials science research centre.

In order to explain their fraudulent results, the Manchester University authors had to include three violations of the laws of physics in their paper. Anyone who is familiar with Newton's laws of motion and the law of conservation of energy will be able to understand why the "physics" in this paper is nonsense.

That's the outline. Now here are the details.

1. The SALi suspension unit concept

The diagram below illustrates the prototype suspension unit specified in the CrashSALi research contract.

Unlike the SALi filled car bumpers described on the PedSALi page, suspension units must be made from high quality elastic materials that can be subjected to many millions of compression cycles without degrading.

Recommended materials The research laboratories of the Malaysian Rubber Producers Research Association (MRPRA) advised on the materials to be used. They provided sample materials for testing.

Here is the design

*

Figure 1. The British prototype suspension unit

This lightweight unit does not require any precision made parts, so manufacturing costs should be low. The design could be used for a wide range of vibration isolation applications in mechanical and civil engineering. [

2. CrashSALi

The CrashSALi Project (2002-3) was a 65% British taxpayer funded feasibility study into crash protection and vehicle suspension applications of SALi. Cheshire Innovation paid the balance. The project was suggested to Bill by honest people working for the business arm of Manchester University. Their thinking was that if Bill held stewardship for the CrashSALi funds he would be in a stronger position to exert influence over the management of the PedSALi project that was heading towards failure.

The people working for the business arm at that time acted in good faith and are in no way responsible for the subsequent disgraceful behavior of their research colleagues.

CrashSALi was a profit sharing partnership, because Bill Courtney, (trading name Cheshire Innovation) was contractually bound to give 50% of his royalties from all applications of SALi Technology to the University [For proof of the profit sharing contract see Appendix 2 below.]

Copies of the research contract are held by The Small Business Service and Manchester University.

How Britain lost a fourteen year technology lead

For some reason that has never been explained, the contractually agreed materials were not used for the Manchester University research. One thing is certain. Bill's research supervisor at the University was uneasy about the media attention he was receiving and the prospect of the fortune he was likely to earn from successful SALi based products. He had been throwing spanners into the SALi development works since Bill first started at the University in 1996.

Figure 2. The materials specified in the contract were not investigated. For innocent eyes, the researchers managed to hide the effects of using bad materials by carrying out a single drop impact test on the unit. A valid multiple cycle test would have exposed the fraud.

In contrast, the Chinese researchers used the correct materials, carried out the correct tests and obtained excellent results.

The Manchester University research results were an embarrassing nonsense. They could not be used to attract commercial interest in Britain.

The contractual cover-up

This was pretty shocking at the time. But it looks even worse in the light of the government's recent decision to make Manchester the national centre for materials research.

Bill Courtney, a research fellow of the University, refused to approve payment of taxpayer funds for the Manchester University research until the work had been done correctly. But the University was reluctant to admit to bad research. It attempted to shift the blame by claiming that the contract had been completed and pursuing Bill for debt recovery. This is a very disturbing precedent, because British science should learn from its mistakes, not resort to legal intimidation, to hide its research failings. Also, small businesses such as Cheshire Innovation must be able to trust universities who handle their intellectual property. It is unethical to bully a contractually binding profit and risk sharing partner, to take all the losses when a joint project fails. What is even more worrying is that the well intended business arm of the University had suggested the CrashSALi project to Bill. But when things went wrong, it was Bill, not the fraudulent researchers that the University management went after.

Bill Courtney's MP took these problems up to the (then) Minister for Science, Lord Sainsbury. The minister ruled that Courtney must resolve the dispute with Manchester University himself. (See Appendix 1 below.)Fifteen years have been frittered away on this dispute because Bill Courtney cannot afford to employ a solicitor, for a prolonged dispute with Britain's largest University.

Meanwhile, the Chinese are stealing SALi Technology prospects from under out noses. Bill lost his £140,000 retirement savings working with Manchester University trying to develop SALi Technology. After spending many thousands of Pounds on British, French, German and American patents he ran out of funds and the patents were abandoned. This means that the Chinese can now develop SALi Technology without breaching patent law.

[But to be fair to the Chinese, they appear to have halted their research since Bill complained to them.]

3. The valid Chinese research on SALi suspension units

In July 2009, a diligent Cardiff University student who was working with Bill Courtney made a disturbing discovery: state funded research into SALi based vibration isolators is making rapid progress in China. Unlike the Manchester research, the Chinese work is enviably good! Two papers have been published by engineers at Nanjing University:

Bill subsequently discovered that The Chinese State Laboratory of Electrical Insulation and Power Equipment had also published research on SALi. [”Study on an Audible Noise Reduction Measure for Filter Capacitors Based on Compressible Space Absorber Wu Peng et al, State Key Lab. of Electr. Insulation & Power Equip., Xi'an Jiaotong Univ., Xi'an, China, Power Delivery, IEEE Transactions, vol. 26, Issue 1, pages 438- 445.”]

Bill wrote to the Nanjing University authors, but they were not interested in a British-Chinese collaboration. They have also refused to sign a licensing agreement to legitimise their work. However the Chinese researchers have acknowledged Bill's unpublished 1998 MPhil research thesis in their references.

Here’s the header from one of the Nanjing University papers. Note that Bill's brand name for SALi has been subtly changed from SALiTM to SALiM.

The authors published high quality research, similar to what should have been done at Manchester University.

For example, their multiple compression tests, showed no tailing off in performance. Here is the evidence:

Figure 3. This Chinese graph, (originally published as Figure 10 in [1] above.) demonstrates that if the right materials are used, a SALi based suspension system makes a full recovery after each vibration.

A reminder about the bad Manchester research

Instead of subjecting the SALi suspension system to a series of vibrations they simply dropped a heavy weight onto the suspension unit so that it was compressed once. Consequently the deterioration in performance caused by using poor materials did not show up.

After doing the correct research, the Chinese authors were impressed by SALi's car suspension potential. They conclude:

Reference 2 above, page 4.

This promise of “outstanding performance and a good prospect in engineering practice” should be a wakeup call to a sleepy Britain. China may be developing know-how that could take engineering jobs from Britain as we move away from Europe.

The embarrassing questions about Chinese acquisition of British intellectual property must be answered before more British taxpayers funds are handed over to Manchester University for materials research.

The Nanjing papers include plagiarised material from Bill's 1998 MPhil research thesis. This material is very difficult to get hold of, because the thesis remains unpublished.

Here’s an example of the plagiarism:

Figure 4. This is a reproduction of Figure 1 in Teng and. Chen, reference 1 above.

For comparison, Bill's thesis diagram is reproduced below.

Figure 5. This is a reproduction of Figure 6.4 from "Courtney, W. A., Preliminary investigations into the mechanical properties and potential applications of a novel shock absorbing liquid, MPhil Thesis, Manchester School of Engineering, University of Manchester (1998)"

Figure 6. A second example of plagiarism by Teng and Chen. But, the "curious facts" below cast doubt on their culpability.

Some curious facts linking Manchester with Nanjing University

# In 2002, when the botched CrashSALi research was starting at Manchester University, the Manchester research team leader co-authored four conference papers presented at Nanjing University, China.

# Two years later he co-authored a paper written with one of the authors for the excellent Chinese SALi research.

Here are the joint paper reference details:

# In the same year (2004) Manchester University tricked Bill's MP and tried to force the inventor to pay for the botched Manchester research by threatening him with legal action.

# The fact that the Chinese authors cited Bill's unpublished thesis in their papers suggests that his intellectual property was mischievously handed over to them, rather than being illicitly acquired.

# Following a complaint by Bill to the publishing house Elsevier, no further Chinese papers on SALi were published.

# This evidence of criminal disregard for British business interests was submitted to the Manchester University formal enquiry discussed on our PedSALi page. But the enquiry Report makes no reference to it.

# At the time of the formal enquiry, two Manchester University physicists were favorites to win that years Nobel Prize. The chair of the formal enquiry panel was also their head of department. (And quite understandably boasts of publishing joint papers with them.)Was the truth about misbehaviour at Manchester University hidden for fear that it would damage the chances of Manchester academics winning the Nobel Physics Prize?

4 Confronting some painful truths

Bill Courtney proudly describes himself as "A Manchester man." He is particularly proud of its science, technology and manufacturing heritage. He acknowledges that the majority of researchers at Manchester University are doing excellent work and fully supports the government decision to establish a national materials science research institute in Manchester. But he strives for a better Manchester future based on honesty, not unsustainable research fraud.

If Britain wants to learn lessons, to protect our manufacturing sector, the following questions require answers:

Q. How did an unpublished British materials science thesis end up in Chinese hands?

Q. Why did the Formal Enquiry at Manchester University ignore the evidence? (We discuss this in detail in Appendix Four below.)

Q. Why did the 2005 UK government remain passive when presented with evidence that publicly funded research into a British invention was botched and then covered up? (For proof of government indifference, see Appendix 1 below.)

A note of caution about the Chinese authors, Teng and ChenThere is clear evidence that Teng and Chen had claimed Bill's suspension unit design as their own. But given the massive amount of evidence of unprofessional behaviour by Bill's supervisor, they should be treated as "innocents led astray", rather than mischievous plagiarists out for personal gain.

5. A second example of wasted British research on SALi Technology

Manchester University also failed to use the correct materials for the PedSALi project. As a result, Britain lost the opportunity to take the lead in developing soft, pedestrian friendly car bumpers.

For their bad bumper research the Manchester workers used the right filling, but the wrong packaging material.! Instead of using low stretch packaging that allowed the SALi capsules to compress, they used elastic packaging that prevented them from working. This was no accident, but was done under protest from Courtney and Dow Chemicals employees who were also involved in the PedSALi project. Please see figure 3 on our "What is SALi?" page for an explanation of why elastic packaging is ineffective.

Excellent work on SALi Technology has been done at Cardiff University.

Here are two examples of good SALi research at Cardiff University

ONE Suspension units: Figure 17 on our Battery charging car suspension page shows an encouraging set of results using a valid test and appropriatematerials. Unfortunately, this belated British work has to be done on a shoestring budget in the form of short undergraduate projects. The research management is very professional, but we are continuing to fall behind the competition because progress is inevitably slow.

TWO Soft, pedestrian friendly car bumpers: Based on undergraduate project work, Cardiff University has presented an excellent conference paper on SALi Technology.

A. The published Cardiff research was limited in scope because it was done without the support of public funding. The University applied for EPSRC funding to continue the soft bumper research, to meet a revised EU pedestrian friendly vehicle deadline of 2912. However the government had already provided generous public funding for bad SALi research related to soft car bumpers at Manchester, to meet an earlier 2005 deadline. As you can see from the PedSALi page, Manchester University has taken the money and managed to bury their bad research by smearing Bill Courtney's professional name.

He needs to clear his name against the false accusations made in a Manchester University formal enquiry report before asking for more public funds for SALi research.

7. A timeline showing the key events as Britain lost its technology lead to China

SALi Technology was invented in Britain in 1986. Since then the inventor has lived frugally and received generous British taxpayer funding to help him develop it. But thanks to the shameful behavior at Manchester University, the Chinese are now in the best position to commercially develop it.

Bill Courtney comments, "This letter provides clear evidence that the 2005 government failed to exercise due diligence, to protect British taxpayer funds. Bill courtney cannot do its policing work for it."

But during better times, the government was happy to be associated with promising SALi research

So, When Courtney provided Lord Sainsbury with evidence that the project had collapsed due to fraud and that the University of Manchester refused to take action, Sainsbury's assertion that, "I am unable to comment or intervene in this matter" amounted to misconduct. When lives were at stake, it was Sainsbury, not Courtney who had the primary responsibility for defending the public purse against fraud.

The British system of governance would collapse in criminal chaos if government ministers really were unable to comment or act act when presented with evidence of public finance fraud.

Lord Sainsbury has long retired from political office but pedestrians continue to be crippled and killed on European roads. In terms of consequences, Sainsbury's act of short term political expediency is far more serious than the highly publicized parliamentary expenses scandal.

Fraudulently claiming for duck houses and second homes does not kill people. But willfully corrupting car safety research does. Manchester University should not have been paid for its PedSALi "research".

Appendix 2

Extract from the profit sharing agreement with Manchester University

Why this is important

Bill Courtney is "A proud Manchester man" by birth and long association with the University. He recognises that the vast majority of Manchester University employees are honorable, trustworthy people. He has enjoyed working with many of them.

This contract shows that his pride is no idle boast.

When the chance came, he was keen to share potential royalties from SALi Technology inventions with the University. His hope was that this would provide pimp priming finance for a post-amalgamation Manchester to become a SALi materials research hub.

In contrast with the bad SALi research at The Victoria University of Manchester, excellent but unfunded SALi research was being done on a smaller scale at its pre-amalgamation sister university, UMIST. Courtney worked with the good UMIST researchers to win additional SALi research funding for the post-amalgamation University. [Project theme: Reduced cost bullet and stab proof clothing incorporating SALi, for UK civilian services.]

But the Victoria University of Manchester SALi researchers driven by rivalry and self interest trumped over the good UMIST researchers.

Here is an extract from the royalty sharing agreement that should have allowed Cheshire Innovation to make a generous contribution towards the post-amalgamation University:

MIL was the business arm of the Victoria University of Manchester.

The MIL officers Bill dealt with played no part in the subsequent intimidating acts or cover-up.

Unfortunately the good UMIST researchers and the good MIL staff left the University shortly after amalgamation. But the people who had caused all the problems stayed behind.

Manchester University honored or breached this contract, depending on what suited them best. In contrast Bill, who operated on very limited finances and could not afford legal representation, was at their mercy.

Bill lost his £140,000 retirement savings working on SALi. A large fraction of this was was spent on international patent protection. The new University would have shared in the royalty benefits. But when a tiny number of its employees misbehaved, it tried to shift all the costs and blame onto him. That is, Bill was treated and recorded as a dodgy contract breaching client who owed the University money. Not an honest profit sharing partner.

This was convenient for building a new corporate identity in the delicate months after amalgamation. But it could prove disastrous in the long term because a false reputation based on lies and fraud requires the continual addition of more lies to fight Bill's attempts to expose them.

After the royalty sharing agreement ran out the University maintained its grip on Bill's intellectual property by creating false patent evidence that "proved" that SALi Technology was not his invention anyway.

We might expect an aggressive foreign competitor to get up to this sort of illegal trickery, but not a British University. Click to see the evidence.

Why Bill as a proud Manchester man and supporter of his local University has gone public in exposing the unethical Manchester University behaviour

Primarily Bill is motivated by a quest for justice and a desire to clear his name. But he also has a strong financial incentive. (As explained on the "What is SALi?" page, he has lived frugally since 1986 to build up funds to develop SALi Technology. As a result, repairs to his home have been badly neglected. (Witty friends refer to his home as "The favela.")

He found himself locked into a legal agreement where control of his intellectual property shifted to a University where:

(i) The remaining researchers were willfully publishing misleading research that suggested SALi Technology was ineffective.

(ii) There is evidence that his IP was secretly being handed over to the Chinese

(iii) Senior management was prepared to abuse the good name of the highly respected solicitors Eversheds, to create a false claim for payment, to mislead Bill's MP, when he got too close to the truth.

(iv) A later formal enquiry report misled readers by failing to mention the royalty sharing agreement. It also failed to cite the good SALi research at Cardiff University which showed what financial opportunities Manchester had thrown away. Instead, as we explain on the PedSALi page, it created false evidence to suggest that Bill was professionally incompetent and untrustworthy. This allowed the University to sidestep the injustice about Bill being locked into an unfair legal agreement.

If the senior management at Manchester University, Lord Sainsbury or the formal enquiry panel had possessed the moral courage required to confront the Manchester fraud, Cardiff University may have received its funding. As a result, many pedestrian deaths and painful injuries on European roads since 2012 might have been avoided.

Secondary consequences

Bill works as an inventor. So the high financial, health and time wasting cost cost of misbehavour at Manchester University has had serious knock-on effects.

Here is an example of how his work has been slowed down:

Bill has received £180,000 public funding to help Latent Power Turbines Ltd develop a new type of power generator. This work is making good progress and details are published on a linked page. If successful, Latent Power Turbines will reduce UK energy bills and make a significant contribution to reducing carbon emissions.

Bill has been working on his power generator designs since he studied thermodynamics at university in the 1960’s and filed his first related patent application 22 years ago. Back in 1996 when he went to Manchester University as a mature student his hope was that he would gain academic credibility by earning a PhD, commercial credibility by bringing SALi products to market and earn money for investment in LP Turbine research from SALi product royalties. However, the problems at Manchester University have delayed LP Turbine development by up to ten years.

If these results scale up as predicted, there will be a backlash against academic science when this “ten year” delay in reducing energy bills and defeating climate change becomes public knowledge.

Appendix 3

Bill Courtney refused to approve the transfer of public funds to Manchester University until the CrashSALi work was done correctly.

When Graham Brady MP started asking awkward questions about the SALi research at Manchester University, the University tried to discredit Courtney by using Eversheds Solicitors to pursue him for debt recovery.

Comments (i) Using legal threats to hide bad research, deceive a member of parliament and intimidate a whistle blower is wrong.

(ii) Manchester University was a profit and loss sharing partner with Cheshire Innovation. The contract extract in Appendix 2 proves this. The University has no legal right to unilaterally ignore this contract and treat him as a bad debtor client, just to deceive an MP and hide its contractual failings.

(iii) Courtney was acting as a trustee of public money when he refused to hand over public funds until the CrashSALi work was done correctly. Lord Sainsbury should also have acted in the public interest, not for short term political convenience.

Q. Was Eversheds deceived by Manchester University?

A. When Bill pointed out to Eversheds that he was a profit and risk sharing partner of the University who was trying to defend the public purse, not a defaulting debtor, their intimidating letters ceased. Aftermath The University has refused to release its correspondence with Eversheds, so Bill's "bad debtor" status remains unclear. For proof of this refusal, please click.

The Manchester University Formal Enquiry Panel should have investigated this complaint.

Legal notes

1. Bill Courtney would have been committing criminal fraud if he agreed to sign public funds over to Manchester University for the CrashSALi project, when he had written proof that the work had been done wrong and in breach of contract.

2.Harassing a person to commit criminal fraud in order to obtain a financial gain is classified as "blackmail" or “demanding money with menaces.”

Unfortunate coincidence? Bill Courtney is a sole trader. This means that by standing up to the University he was putting all of his financial assets in jeopardy. A couple of days after receiving the first intimidating letter from Eversheds, his left eye started hemorrhaging. Shortly after receiving their second intimidating letter his right eye started hemorrhaging. He is now registered partially sighted.

in 2010, as a result of his eyesight problems, he was knocked down by a car while crossing the road. Until that time he had preferred to clear his name discretely, to protect the University reputation. After his accident the issue of pedestrian injuries became personal and he decided to publish his evidence in detail on this web site.

As discussed on the PedSALi page, the University held a Formal Enquiry into Courtney’s complaints about the failings of the CrashSALi and PedSALi projects.

Courtney submitted evidence to the Enquiry about the intimidating use of Eversheds, but there is no reference to Courtney's evidence in the Report. This is surprising because the Panel was supplied with sixteen (16) very detailed arguments opposing the use of Eversheds by Manchester University. Click here to view the arguments.

Q. How did the Report explain the failure to carry out research into suspension units using the materials laid down in the contract?

A. The Formal Enquiry Report foes does not offer an explanation or make any reference to the materials used. Instead, as we explain on the PedSALi page, it created false evidence against Courtney, implying that he was an unreliable person who could not be trusted.

Q. Traditionally bad research is exposed when other researchers subsequently do the correct work. In the present case, good CrashSALi type research was done in China. Were the good Chinese research findings submitted to the Enquiry for comparative examination?

A. Yes the good research was submitted for examination but it is not mentioned in the Formal Enquiry Report. This failure to compare the research evidence is one of the reasons why Courtney claims that the Manchester University Formal Enquiry process was corrupt.

Updates December 2014

Two innocent parties have been drawn into the SALi research scandals that threaten to undermine the international reputation of British science. Others are at risk of being drawn in during the coming months.

(i) The chair of the corrupt Manchester University formal enquiry panel has been appointed as Head of the Physics and Astronomy Department at Leeds University. She will be bringing a specialist team of materials researchers from Manchester University with her.

(ii) The present government has awarded £235 million to Manchester University for it to become the hub for UK materials research. Leeds and other North of England Universities will be linked by electronic spokes to the hub.In principle this is good because Manchester hosts many world standard materials researchers. But, because of the huge sums of money involved and the dark secret at the heart of Manchester University, there is a danger that other Northern Universities will find themselves being drawn slowly into the cover-up and corruption.

Bill has written to his MP requesting that the relevant government departments investigate the anti-British and anti-science behavior of a tiny number of Manchester University employees before the funds are handed over. (9 December 2014.)

Trust nobody!

Visit the PedSALi page for details about how you can check the University side of this story.

Q. Would Bill Courtney be willing to work with Manchester University at a future date?

A. Bill describes himself as “a proud Manchester Man.” The vast majority of staff at the University had nothing to do with the SALi research fraud. Their professional conduct should not be judged by any of the evidence presented on this website. In order to demonstrate his belief in this statement, Bill would be happy and willing to work with the University developing any of his inventions.

BUT

(i) He does not tolerate research fraud and believes that the fraud problems described on this website need to be openly and fully investigated by a totally independent third party.

SALi and global warming

Unfortunately SALi research fraud at Manchester University undermined this plan and the green energy work has ground to a halt. As a result Britain may have lost a world leading position in fighting climate change. And as a consequence, your energy bills may be far higher than necessary.

Essentially, the idea is to create a giant buffer behind the dam, to absorb surge wave energy.

Surge waves travelling towards the dam wall would compress the SALi filled bags providing two forms of protection: (1) The bags would absorb wave energy reducing the stresses on the dam wall, (2) The space behind the dam, created by compressing the bags, would provide a "hole" for the wave peaks to fall into, reducing the volume of water that sloshes over the dam wall.

NEUTRAL BUOYANCY SALI BAGS

The SALi bag which is just floating in this jar of water is filled with expanded polystyrene beads and a matrix fluid consisting of water mixed with sand, to counter the buoyancy of the beads and Bentonite clay, to provide viscous damping.

SALi based protective system could be retro-fitted to existing reservoirs, without requiring modifications to the existing structure. The level of protection could be gradually increased over time, at modest cost, by adding SALi filled bags on an incremental basis.

Settlements close to the water line of large reservoirs could be protected by SALi based pontoons. These would double up as harbours or embankments for public gatherings. At times of the year, when the risk of landslips is low, the pontoons could be strung out, to provide pontoon bridges, linking settlements on opposite banks of the reservoir. In order to allow the intermittent passage of marine traffic, the central sections of the pontoon bridges could include air bladders, which are deflated, so that the section temporarily sinks below the depth of the ships keels.

If you are an engineer with a professional interest in dam protection please contact us.

Obtaining these core characteristics is a challenge for engineers

Each SALi formulation has its own unique set of core characteristics, depending on the type of capsule and matrix fluid used.

For example, cheap expanded polystyrene beads can be used in SALi for car bumpers, but good quality rubber beads are required for vehicle suspension systems.

| SALi formulations offer more viscous damping than foam pads made from the same material as the SALi capsules. For the end user this means improved impact protection. But for the product designer, viscosity adds complexity because viscous damping increases with the rare at which the capsules are compressed. (i.e., viscous damping increases with bulk strain rate.)

So, to assist product designers, each SALi formulation requires a family of core characteristics relating to different strain rates.

The following notes are written for anyone wishing to work with Bill Courtenay, developing SALi Technology.

An “obvious” way of determining core characteristics is to carry out impact tests on samples of SALi trapped inside a piston and cylinder container. However, this type of test is not quite as simple as it looks.

Here’s why:

Figure 2. The three important variables change simultaneously during each test. Ideally, to produce usable characteristics, the bulk strain rate should remain fixed, while the relationship between stress and strain is investigated.

Here are two proposals for keeping the strain rate constant

Method 1.

The sample is compressed very rapidly, to simulate an impact, but the piston moves down at a steady rate. This requires a complicated and expensive test rig.

Method 2

Accept that impact experiments involve three simultaneously changing variables and include instrumentation to measure them. Then process the data from a series of tests to generate a family of constant strain rate curves.

The modified piston and cylinder for this method is shown below.

Figure 3. A piston and cylinder arrangement suitable for the measurement of stress, strain and strain rates.

Design notes: (i) The three variables, dynamic stress, bulk strain and bulk strain rate are recorded during each impact.

(ii) The pressure transducer attached to the piston crown provides data about the stresses on the front face of a SALi based impact absorber. This is required for example, for designing soft car bumpers that minimise damage to pedestrians in lower leg impacts.

(iii) The pressure transducer attached to the base of the cylinder provides data about the stresses on the back face of a SALi based impact absorber. In the car bumper example, this relates to protection offered to the body of the vehicle and its occupants in any front bumper collision.

(iv) Ringing vibrations produced as the drop mass hits the anvil can be overcome by placing a rubber buffer on top of the anvil.

(v) The drop mass will ricochet off the anvil, so the impact velocity of the drop mass does not provide any useful information about piston movement.

(vi) Fluid stresses are measured inside the cell, so friction between the piston rings and the side walls does not introduce an error.

(vii) A similar argument applies to the rubber buffer: because the stresses are measured inside the cell, the characteristics of the rubber buffer are irrelevant.

(viii) The piston and anvil should have a low mass to minimise the zero loading error.

(ix) The different SALi formulations will need to be subjected to a wide range of impact velocities and energies.

(x) This primary impact data will then have to be cross referenced to produce families of secondary data, showing dynamic stress-strain relationships at different strain rates.

Figure 4. These sketch graphs indicate how the primary data can be cross referenced to produce stress-strain curves at different strain rates.

Conclusion A single SALi formulation will produce a whole family of dynamic stress-strain curves depending on the impact conditions.

To date, only one attempt to measure SALi core characteristics has been published. [11, 14.] Unfortunately the authors failed to recognise the importance of separating out the three key variables. The results were limited to the primary data, as in sketch graph (a) above. As a substitute for different strain rates, the results were presented for different drop mass impact velocities. (Which are meaningless; see point (v) above.) The authors were also distracted by trying to take into account the characteristics of the rubber buffer. Again, this is irrelevant if the experimental design is correct and all stress measurements are made inside the test cell.

These published results have no scientific value. The SALi Technology inventor, Bill Courtney, refused to add his name to the papers. He also objected to their publication because they wilfully misled the international research community. For details of this misleading research please click.

Alternative apparatus: Split Hopkinson pressure bar

In 2003, Dr John Harrigan, then at the University of Manchester Institute for Science and Technology suggested the construction of a small SALi retention cell inserted into a Split Hopkinson pressure bar. He also suggested that the bar should be made from polycarbonate plastic, to match with the high compressibility of SALi. Harrigan’s suggestions look promising and are worth pursuing. There could be a PhD thesis in this for somebody!

In1986 Bill Courtney invented an elastic fluid for absorbing the energy of violent impacts and vibration. He referred to his invention as Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) Technology.

After saving up for ten years he patented his invention and enrolled as a mature mechanical engineering student at Manchester University. He handed over SALi marketing to the University and signed a 50:50 royalty sharing agreement with it.

His University status rose rapidly when he gained media attention and attracted £300,000 of public funding for University research into SALi. The bulk of the money went towards developing a new type of pedestrian friendly car bumper to meet pending EU legislative requirements.

Unfortunately, Bill’s research supervisor resented being overshadowed by Bill. So he created false evidence “proving” that SALi inventions were ineffective. This fraud squandered the public funding plus Bill’s personal investment of £140,000. It may also have cost European pedestrian lives. Eventually, the SALi patents ran out, development ceased and the EU legislation was withdrawn.

After five years of lobbying and winning the support of a Nobel Prize winner, a Formal Enquiry into Bill’s complaints about research fraud was finally held. The Enquiry Panel consisted of two Manchester University Professors and a representative of the UK Research Integrity Office.

Their report cleared Bill’s supervisor of any wrongdoing, but castigated Bill for making a groundless complaint.

In order to reach this conclusion the Enquiry Panel had to ignore the evidence as submitted via the Nobel Laureate and replace it with false evidence that in some cases was so bizarre that it defied the basic laws of physics.

You can judge this case for yourself by reading the article below.

Contents

1 Background - Shock Absorbing Liquid

2 Smart car bumpers - how they work

3 The research fraud begins at Manchester University

4 How valid research exposed the Manchester research fraud

5 The fraudulent collusion between Manchester University and the UK Research Integrity Office

In 1986 Bill Courtney discovered a new method for cushioning the energy of violent impacts and vibrations. Eventually he gained five patents to protect different versions of this in invention [References 6-10 below.]

He refers to this invention using the trade name Shock Absorbing Liquid (SALi) TechnologyTM.

These are the essential components of any SALi based impact absorber

Figure 1. The essential features of a SALi based impact energy absorber.

Early research verified that for effective impact protection, stretching of the packaging during an impact must be minimal. This evidence was presented in a journal paper written by Courtney and his research supervisor, Dr Oyadiji, in 2001 [2].

SALi based impact absorbers can described as ‘smart’ devices because they can vary their stiffness to maximise their protection for different types of impact.

For example, a hollow car bumper filled with packages of SALi could solve the “conflict of stiffness problem”. That is, it would be stiff for impacts with other vehicles, but soft for collisions with humans. This variable stiffness would keep minor crash repair costs down while minimising pedestrian accident injuries.

2 Smart car bumpers - how they work

The following diagrams represent horizontal cross sections through a SALi filled bumper under different types of impact. The SALi is held in overlapping low stretch bags.

Figure 2. A variable stiffness car bumper. The bumper is extra-soft for collisions with children’s legs, because they have narrower tibia bones. Supporting experimental evidence was published by Courtney and his research supervisor, Dr Oyadiji in 2001 [2].

After saving up for ten years, Bill Courtney enrolled as a mature mechanical engineering research student at Manchester University. Later he went on to become a self funding University Research Fellow.

Bill’s smart bumper designs received several write-ups in the engineering press, arousing the interest of the Auto Division of Dow Chemicals (which made car bumpers).The reason for Dow’s interest was that the EU had published a draft directive requiring all new cars sold into European markets from 2005 onwards to have soft pedestrian friendly front bumpers. But the manufacturers wanted to retain stiff bumpers because they feared that car sales would suffer if the cost of repairing minor impact damage increased. Bill’s variable stiffness bumper design had the potential to keep everyone happy. So Dow teamed up with Bill’s company, Cheshire Innovation, and Manchester University to create the PedSALi Project to build a demonstration smart bumper. The University was awarded £212,000 to pay for their PedSALi research.

3 The research fraud begins at Manchester University

Bill seemed to be on the verge of becoming a millionaire as a result of this collaboration.

However, as an inventor, he was more interested in developing inventions that benefited humanity than becoming rich. In spite of this, Bill’s university research supervisor (Dr Sunday Oyadiji) became unhappy about Bill’s pending fame and fortune. This resentment deepened after Bill voluntarily signed a 50:50 royalty sharing agreement with the university.

Eventually Dr Michele Cooper, the team leader for the SALi marketing group at the university, banned Dr Oyadiji from her marketing meetings because of his disruptive behaviour.

Shortly after his ban, Dr Oyadiji steered the car bumper research in a false direction by using elastic packaging that rendered the SALi material ineffective. In spite of protests from both the Dow representative and Bill, he went on to present these false results at two engineering conferences in the USA [11, 12, 13]. The University research results were completely useless to Dow and the collaboration collapsed.

The University was paid in full for its corrupt research and Dr Oyadiji was promoted from Lecturer to Reader in the following years.

There was no other solution to the conflict of stiffness problem. So the EU abandoned its draft directive in February 2003. However, it did not abandon its pedestrian interests completely, planning to implement the soft bumper requirements in 2012, if the technical problems could be solved.

The business arm of the University had seen this collapse coming. As a backup, it proposed developing other commercial applications of SALi that could earn a royalty income.

But experimental evidence was needed to support the marketing drive. So Bill agreed to Dr Cooper’s suggestion that additional research should be done using DTI SMART funding, with Bill holding the purse strings, instead of his supervisor. The planned CrashSALi research was broad based, varying from vehicle crash protection to SALi based car suspension units.

The funding bid was successful. But the research achieved nothing because once again, fraudulent research work was done. For example, the wrong materials were used and the wrong tests were done for the car suspension experiments. [See this linked CrashSALi page for details.]

Bill became ill after spending years battling against the fraud committed by Dr Oyadiji and ignored by his line manager, Professor Wright. Then he was effectively hounded out of the University for ‘not playing the system’. (The University was on the verge of amalgamation with its sister university, UMIST. So in the power struggle for management posts, exposing bad behaviour was seen as disloyalty.)

Although he owned the SALi patents and had spent his £140,000 retirement savings on them, he lost control of them because he had handed over royalty negotiating rights to the University.

Fig 4. Extract from the royalty sharing agreement signed with MIL, the business arm of Manchester University. As part of the agreement, MIL took control of the royalty negotiating rights.

4 How valid research exposed the Manchester research fraud

In 2008, Dr H Davies, an enterprising academic engineer at Cardiff University took an interest in the SALi concept. An incidental benefit of the Cardiff University interest was the production of valid SALi research results that could be compared with the fraudulent research done at Manchester University.

(i) CrashSALi fraud exposed: Under Dr Davies supervision, Cardiff University, students carried out the basic CrashSALi research correctly. Their work was good but very limited because it was unfunded. During their background literature search, the students also made a surprise discovery. Somebody had leaked Bill’s unpublished CrashSALi car suspension designs to Nanjing University in China. The Chinese research paper dates indicated that at the same time as Manchester was using the wrong materials and doing the wrong tests, the Chinese were produceing excellent results using the correct materials and doing the correct tests. This was a classic case of research replication exposing research fraud. [See our CrashSALi page for details.]

(ii) PedSALi fraud exposed: Dr Dr Davies’s students also produced replication evidence that exposed the Manchester PedSALi research fraud. His students also carried out good basic research into SALi based variable stiffness car bumpers. This work was published at an engineering conference in 2009 [4]. Likewise, the good Cardiff research exposed the Manchester PedSALi research fraud.

In order to do more detailed work Dr Davies needed to win EPSRC funding. This would require the fraudulent Manchester University SALi research to be retracted and the dishonestly earned PedSALi grant repaid.

5 The fraudulent collusion between Manchester University and the UK Research Integrity Office

After five years of lobbying and winning the support of a Nobel Prize winner, Professor Sir John Sulston, Manchester University finally agreed to investigate Bill’s complaints. This Inquiry took place in line with procedures laid down by the UKRIO.

Following a preliminary investigation carried out by two Manchester University academics and Professor Farthing, a UKRIO trustee, the inquiry moved to the Formal Investigation stage. This is where the corruption began.

The report was written by Professors Helen Gleeson and Peter Duck of Manchester University and Dr Pablo Fernandez of the UKRIO Advisory Board.

The following extract reveals how the report was worded so that the reader would be fooled into thinking that Bill Courtney was an incompetent inventor and Manchester University was the victim of his foolishness.

“Mr Courtney had promoted SALi technology as showing a stress/strain curve of an “Ideal Shock Absorbing Material” and stated that there were indications that SALi behaves like that. Prior to PedSALi and CrashSALi, no tests had been carried out using displacement sensors, so stress strain characteristics could not have been obtained. The results that were generated by the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects did not back up the Complainants beliefs about the ideal behaviour of SALi. The results were scrutinized by the Technical Committee of 6 engineers (Professor Jan Wright, Dr John Turner, Dr Eugenio Toccalino, Dr Xinqun Zhu, Dr George Georgiades and Dr Oyadiji) of more than 120 man-years of engineering experience.”

[Gleeson, Duck and Fernandez, Formal Enquiry Report, University of Manchester, January 2010.]

To the innocent eye, this extract appears to provide clear evidence that Bill Courtney was incompetent and that a panel of expert engineers had exposed him. We will now consider this statement a phrase at a time, to show how the reader has been deceived.

“Mr Courtney had promoted SALi technology as showing a stress/strain curve of an “Ideal Shock Absorbing Material” This claim is false and makes Mr Courtney look stupid by research engineering standards because such a material would defy the basic laws of physics. This lie is the polar opposite of the promotional claims agreed by both Courtney and the business arm of Manchester University in their agreed marketing literature. There is no such thing as an ideal shock absorbing material stress/stain curve. For example, a SALi filled car bumper can exhibit a range of diferent stress/strain curves depending on what the bumper is hitting.

For car bumper impacts with other vehicles, a very steep stress/stain curve indicating a stiff material is required.

For adult leg impacts, a gentle curve indicating a soft material is required.

For child leg impacts, an even gentler curve indicating a very soft material is required.

Furthermore, the promotion of SALi Technology was being led by a four strong University marketing team, not Mr Courtney. This inconvenient truth was buried by failing to mention the royalty sharing agreement in the report and ignoring Mr Courtney’s recommendation that Dr Michele Cooper, the marketing team leader, should be interviewed.

“Mr Courtney …………stated that there were indications that SALi behaves like that.

Mr Courtney had stated no such thing. In fact his experimental evidence [reproduced on the PedSALi page] demonstrated the variable stiffness properties of SALi based impact absorbers. This is what had attracted Dow Chemicals interest and won public funding for the PedSALi project.

Furthermore, (i) One of the members of the supposed Technical Committee, Dr Oyadiji, was a aware that this ‘statement by Courtney’ was false because it contradicted what Courtney and Oyadiji had written in a joint journal paper [2].

(ii) A second member of the supposed Technical Committee, Professor Wright was also aware that that this ‘statement by Courtney’ was false because it contradicted statements made in the joint bid for PedSALi research funding made by Oyadiji, Wright and Courtney.

“Prior to PedSALi and CrashSALi, no tests had been carried out using displacement sensors, so stress strain characteristics could not have been obtained.” This statement seriously misleads the reader because the research carried out at both Cardiff and Nanjing Universities had used displacement sensors. Copies of relevant papers published by both Cardiff and Nanjing Universities was submitted to the Inquiry [4, 5]. But the valid SALi research done at Cardiff and Nanjing Universities is not referred to in the Formal Enquiry Report. This omission of key evidence sidesteps one of the basic tests for scientific integrity: good quality research can be replicated.

“The results that were generated by the PedSALi and CrashSALi projects did not back up the Complainants beliefs about the ideal behaviour of SALi.” This is a double deception of the reader because the statement about Courtney’s beliefs was a lie and both the PedSALi and CrashSALi research results were fraudulent. [As discussed on the PedSALi and CrashSALi web pages.]

(i) In spite of several requests to Manchester University using the Freedom of Information Act, no traces of this Technical Committee can be found. There are no meeting minutes, no recorded meeting dates and no email references to such a Committee.

(ii) As explained on the PedSALi page, three of the named members, Professor Wright, Dr John Turner and Dr Oyadiji were heavily involved in the earlier publication of the corrupt SALi research.

(iii) Dr Xinqun Zhu was the first research assistant for the PedSALi project. He had resigned and gone home to China almost two years earlier following lack of University support during some very unsettling experiences.

Since the publication of the Formal Enquiry Report [17], Courtney has been fighting to have it retracted and to clear his name. But, to date this fight has failed because the UKRIO holds a monopoly over research integrity authority in the UK that it has been impossible to break. [This abuse of power by the UKRIO is discussed in a journal paper, 15.]

Manchester University and the UKRIO are conveniently hiding behind each other in a manner that shows contempt for genuine research integerity.

Professor Luke Georgiou, the Vice President for Research and Innovation at Manchester University, has refused to examine Courtney’s evidence of Enquiry Panel fraud. He claims that the Panel’s Report is quality control guaranteed because the Panel included a UKRIO member.

On the other hand, James Parry, the Director of the UKRIO has said that it will investigate Courtney’s complaints, but only if Manchester University requests it to do so.

The UKRIO is funded by British Universities. So it has a vested interest in humoring them.

Each page of the formal inquiry report that Courtney received was marked “Private and Confidential”. The UKRIO should not be participating in secret investigations where its operations are beyond public accountability. (Try getting a copy of the report for yourself!) Nor should its trustees be willing to collude in refusing to investigate allegations of false information within the report.Courtney has not been able to gain access to the thinking of the trustees on hiding fraud because the UKRIO is exempt from the Freedom of Information Act.

In an age when fake news is destroying trust in public life British science needs to set an example by offering higher standards of openness and integrity.

Bill’s original business plan when he signed the royalty sharing agreement was that his share of the royalties would be used to develop a radically new type of power generator to fight climate change. In the event, he was able to partly prove his power generator design with the help of Innovation UK funding. But he needs specialist engineering expertise in turbine design to complete the research. [We explain the design and the outstanding problem on this linked webpage.]

Several universities in the UK possess the required turbine design skills and when approached, each initially agreed to work with him. This has resulted in visits to the universities for detailed discussions. But for some reason, after a few weeks of planning joint work, communications are cut off. The most likely explanation for this abrupt cooling of interest is unease at Bill’s activities as a research fraud whistleblower.

Bill and his Latent Power Turbines Ltd business partner are patriotic Brits, but they have now been driven to seeking a partnership with an overseas university.

References

1 Courtney, W. A. Preliminary investigations into the mechanical properties and potential applications of a novel shock absorbing liquid, MPhil Thesis, Manchester School of Engineering, University of Manchester (1998).