Bobbie
Lee Monts appeals his conviction for felony battery and the
denial of his motion for a new trial. Monts raises two issues
for reversal. First, he argues that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence an email that he sent to his
girlfriend from the county jail as well as a videorecording
of a later meeting that he had with her, also at the jail.
Second, Monts contends that the court improperly precluded
him from cross-examining the victim about a deferred
prosecution agreement that she had entered into with the
State that was in effect at the time of his trial. As
explained below, we find no error on the first issue. We do,
however, agree with Monts that the court erred in its
limitation of his cross-examination of the victim, but we
hold that the error is harmless. Therefore, we affirm
Monts's conviction and sentence.

The
victim in this case is the mother of one of Monts's minor
children. She testified at trial that she and Monts had
gotten into an argument at her house that culminated in Monts
backhanding her across the face. As a result, the
victim's lip was cut, and she had bleeding in her mouth.
Monts left after the altercation, and the victim called her
father, who promptly telephoned 9-1-1. A law enforcement
officer arrived at the victim's home shortly thereafter
and would testify at trial to observing the victim with
redness on her face and that her lip was "busted on the
inside." Approximately one hour after the altercation,
Monts texted the victim, "Baby, I'm sorry."

While
in custody at the county jail subsequent to his arrest, Monts
emailed his girlfriend[1] stating that he was sorry for letting her
down, and essentially blamed his current predicament upon the
actions of "people who claim to love [him]." Monts
also requested of his girlfriend that she act as if he was
with her. This email was admitted into evidence over
objection. Monts subsequently met with his girlfriend at the
jail, and their conference was videorecorded. During their
conversation, Monts advised his girlfriend:

I told the lady I was home with you at the time, or whatever
this shit went on. I don't even know the date, but I told
her I was home with you, so if she calls you, be sure-I guess
she'll get in contact with you.

Over
objection, the videorecording of this conversation was
admitted into evidence at trial. Pertinent to the recorded
conversation, Monts's trial attorney was female.

We find
no merit to Monts's first argument that the trial court
erred in admitting the email and videorecording into
evidence. A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Cummings v. State, 715 So.2d 944, 949 (Fla. 1998)
(citing Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 684 (Fla.
1995)). The email and videorecording could reasonably be
interpreted as Monts attempting to fabricate an alibi by
having his girlfriend testify that she was with Monts at the
time of the battery. This evidence would be relevant to
Monts's consciousness of guilt. See Virgo v.
State, 931 So.2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
(recognizing that "[a]n attempt to fabricate or
fabrication of an alibi is relevant to the issue of
consciousness of guilt"). Monts, who neither testified
at trial nor presented any evidence, argues that this
evidence was "irrelevant, confusing, and highly
prejudicial" because it was unclear in these two
communications whether Monts was referring to the instant
battery case or to a separate case in which Monts was charged
with fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer
with lights and sirens activated with high speed or reckless
driving.[2] Based upon our review of the record, we
conclude that it was well within the trial court's
discretion to conclude that Monts's comments in the email
and videorecording were directed towards the present battery
case.

Monts
next argues that the trial court improperly limited his
cross-examination of the victim when it precluded him from
inquiring about the deferred prosecution agreement that she
had entered into with the State that was still in effect at
the time of Monts's trial. This agreement, which is part
of our record, showed that the victim had been charged with
battery in an unrelated matter, but that the State agreed to
defer prosecution against her on this charge for a period of
twelve months, provided that the victim fully abided by the
agreement's terms and conditions. If the victim was
successful in meeting the various conditions, the State would
not prosecute her on the battery charge; but the agreement
also required the victim to admit to the ultimate facts of
the battery as contained in the charging document or
information filed against her. The agreement further provided
that it could be used against the victim in court by the
State if it proceeded with the battery prosecution. Lastly,
the State Attorney, at its sole discretion, could shorten or
terminate the agreement, or, upon violation, could initiate
prosecution on the battery charge, whether or not the
violation was based upon sworn evidence.

Monts
contends that he was entitled to bring information about the
deferred prosecution agreement before the jury to attack the
victim's credibility by showing her potential bias in
favor of the State. He is correct. Section 90.608(2), Florida
Statutes (2017), provides that "[a]ny party, including
the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of
a witness by . . . [s]howing that the witness is
biased." Additionally, the Confrontation Clause
contained in Amendment VI of the United States Constitution
requires that a defendant be allowed to cross-examine a
witness regarding his or her credibility "if that
examination aims to reveal the motive, bias or prejudice of a
witness/accuser." Fajardo v. State, 193 So.3d
1019, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Carlisle v.
State, 137 So.3d 479, 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)). As our
court has recently explained:

Any relevant evidence tending to establish that a witness is
appearing for the prosecution for any reason other than to
tell the truth should not be kept from the jury. Defendants
may cross-examine a witness about the conditions of a plea
bargain entered into between the state and the witness. That
examination includes inquiry into the specific nature of the
pending charges against a cooperating state witness, and how
the pending criminal ...

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