Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore

THOMAS GIBBINGS, DONALD HURLEY, and SCOTT MOORE

From Parameters, Winter 1998, pp. 99-112.

Few of the challenges facing America's expeditionary
forces match that posed by the US government's interagency process for
developing and conducting armed interventions. This is not to say that
we have lacked opportunities to improve our system for planning and conducting
military or military-supported contingency operations, both during the
Cold War and since. US armed forces twice intervened in Lebanon (1957,
early 1980s). In the Western Hemisphere they have been to the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, and Panama, and more recently to Haiti.
They have supported a variety of interventions in Africa since 1989, and
sustained the Kurds in Northern Iraq after ejecting the Iraqi army from
Kuwait through its defeat in 1991 by a US-led coalition. Our operations
in the Balkans will not end any time soon.

Recent US intervention operations have ranged in size and scope from
heavy force combat in 1990-91, to support for humanitarian relief in Rwanda
in 1994, to unfinished peace enforcement tasks in Bosnia under the terms
of the Dayton Accords.[1] The size of the force and the nature of the intervention
may change the degree of difficulty of each operation, but size is not
the issue here. Whenever the United States commits its armed forces to
an operation in any part of the world, the same elements of the US government
are energized to develop policies and guidance for the theater or operational
commander of those forces. They are also involved continuously during peace
operations, reacting to (if not anticipating) initiatives of coalition
partners or other participants in the operation as well as those of friendly
and hostile elements in the operational area.

This article briefly examines the US government's interagency culture,
looks at how the military anticipates or reacts to civil-military operational
requirements, and proposes a change to standard practices in such matters.
Our proposal involves establishing a full interagency team within the headquarters
of each US regional commander-in-chief. The teams eventually could be empowered
to have primary responsibility for planning, coordinating, prosecuting,
and sustaining US interagency responses in their regions. The goal would
be to improve reaction time to such requirements and to reduce, if not
eliminate, the effects of communication stovepipes that exist between civilian
agencies in Washington and their members operating abroad. This is more
than an exercise in communication technologies, however, for it could involve
devolution of a measure of authority from Washington to the representatives
of federal agencies assigned to the headquarters of the regional commanders-in-chief.
It suggests a permanent cultural change within the Washington bureaucracy.

The Challenge

America's National Security Strategy requires civil and military agencies
to work together to accomplish cross-agency tasks of unprecedented complexity,
and as a rule to do more with less.[2] Whether nation-building, providing
assistance to budding democracies, combating transnational crime, countering
asymmetrical threats to world order, or supporting humanitarian assistance
or peace operations, nearly every significant security undertaking demands
interagency teamwork. But no US national government civilian organization
currently is structured internally or empowered regionally to coordinate
interagency activities within US combatant commands in peacetime or in
a crisis.

Interagency planning and crisis responses are difficult under the best
of circumstances. They become especially so when they require government
civilian agencies to coordinate their activities with military hierarchies
and international volunteer organizations. Personalities, organizational
cultures,[3] and competition for scarce resources further complicate the
problem. As noted in a 1995 work titled Interagency Cooperation: A Regional
Model for Peace Operations, "Turf issues will continue as a dominating
factor in the quest for interagency cooperation and integration, but they
can be overcome by civilian and military leadership."[4] Members of
the large bureaucratic structures, private and government, frequently mistrust
one another for various historical reasons.[5] As a result, contemporary
ad hoc approaches to interagency coordination and policy development are
generally inadequate, if not sometimes detrimental to mission success.
The problem is that very few military or civilian agencies have established
the means and ways to conduct interagency coordination.[6] Instead, US
bureaucracies have often paid little more than lip service to interagency
coordinating bodies by forming on their own ad hoc boards, centers, "floating"
organizations,[7] and working groups.

Interagency requirements usually flow from an ad hoc, national-level
Interagency Working Group (IWG) to the departments and agencies tasked
to fulfill them. If the IWG reaches a consensus in Washington, each participating
agency passes guidance directly to its respective operators outside of
Washington, who must then meet in the region where the military is being
committed to organize and develop the basis for cooperation with representatives
of other US or international agencies.[8] Presently there is no regional
or operational-level body charged with supporting and coordinating the
various mandates generated in Washington and passed to the field for coordination
and execution.

The need for interagency solutions to national security policy issues
is well understood, and this discussion does not challenge civilian control
of the military. Rather, it seeks ways and means for increasing the prospects
for success in interventions and peace operations. Organizational publications
and lessons learned from recent operations indicate that without the right
people, structures, and emphasis, effective policy integration will not
take place within the affected region or the subordinate operational area.
At issue is whether it is more appropriate for the civilian agency representatives
on the scene or those of the military to coordinate and integrate into
executable policies and plans the many separate flows of guidance and advice
from Washington.

Whether it is the responsibility of the civilian agencies or of the
military to ensure that guidance from the center is complete, coherent,
coordinated, and executable, no organization would voluntarily attack such
murky issues, especially since the prescription for effective integration
might entail considerable cost.[9] But when stability is threatened, the
US military is invariably called upon to act and restore order. In these
cases, the problems of coordinating, integrating, and fielding a coherent
national effort fall squarely upon military leaders, specifically on each
regional military commander-in-chief (CINC).[10]

The military solution to the problem of managing interagency affairs
during an operational deployment has taken form as the civil-military operations
center (CMOC). The concept originated during Operation Provide Comfort,
the 1991 civil-military mission to feed the Kurds in Northern Iraq and
Southeastern Turkey.[11] From that beginning, regional commanders-in-chief
or the commanders of joint task forces have, based on mission requirements,
established one or more ad hoc operations centers to support humanitarian
assistance, contingency, or crisis response operations.[12] The decision
to use such centers is generally influenced by requirements for interaction
with allies, with the local civilian populace, and with other government
and nongovernmental agencies operating in the area.

Civil-military operations centers have come to be staffed with civil
affairs personnel and rely heavily upon reservists to conduct their business.
These "just-in-time" centers require considerable setup time
to be effective, particularly when interacting with governmental and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) already working in the area. Military personnel in
these centers do not command or control civilian interagency players, nor
can they use methods other than persuasion when dealing with nongovernmental
organizations of whatever national origin. The centers rely upon perceived
levels of trust, shared visions, common interests, and communication capabilities
to obtain the interagency coordination and international cooperation needed
to meet mission objectives. The myriad agencies involved will coordinate
their activities only if they feel it is in their best interest to do so.[13]

One source holds that the civil-military operations center concept may
reflect US culture: "There is still an unavoidable feeling that some
force commanders, particularly from NATO nations with a short-term war
fighting view of their role, tend to use the civil-military staff to sideline
rather than expand civil-military cooperation."[14] Each misuse of
the civil-military operations center coordinating capability can polarize
participating military and civilian agencies, and reduce the effectiveness
of interagency integration and international relief efforts.

The ad hoc approach to coordination and integration of diverse policies
in an operational deployment represented by the civil-military operations
center should give way to a full-time interagency operations center (IOC).[15]
The headquarters of the regional commander-in-chief is the most logical
permanent place to establish and support an empowered interagency operations
center. Its composition would be agile, professional, personality-dependent
(as are most civilian agencies), and sized to fulfill mission requirements.
The IOC's mission would be to train and incorporate all potential interagency
participants through routine planning and special exercises, and to provide
an initial coordinating cadre during crises. The cadre could be tailored
to accommodate regional and crisis-specific requirements, and representatives
would deploy to a crisis area having already established their bona fides
in day-to-day operations within the regional headquarters. Members of the
interagency operations center should eventually be empowered by the CINC
to obligate resources and involve interagency participants in exercises,
doctrine development, and conferences. This organization would work to
overcome civil-military prejudices, develop trust among participants, and
improve teamwork within the US crisis response team. It would be well-suited
to initiating coordination with representatives of other governments and
nongovernmental organizations upon deployment. The justification for establishing
a permanent regional entity is well supported by organization and interagency
theory,[16] military doctrine, and lessons learned from a wide range of
intervention operations.

Interagency Culture

It is reasonable to ask why it has been so hard for US government agencies
to work together. Organizational behavior studies help to answer these
questions by modeling general patterns of behavior and known organizational
characteristics that can facilitate or impede interagency coordination
and teamwork. Graham Allison developed three conceptual models (or viewpoints)
that help explain and predict organizational behavior:

Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III). Considers internal politics
and organizational behavior as a matter of perceptions, interests, stakes,
motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of principal players, from
which outcomes emerge. Leaders of these organizations cannot operate autonomously.
Organizational outputs result from bureaucratic bargaining and the pulling
and hauling of various players that define the give and take of politics.[17]

Allison's models help explain why agencies may at times appear to be
reluctant to pool their efforts and assets in support of a stated US policy.
From a Model II perspective, it is irrational for an agency to be altruistic
at the expense of turf, longevity, or power. Organizations tend to protect
themselves by distributing power and responsibility for making decisions
among various internal mini-bureaucracies. When standard procedures are
not followed and routines break down, bureaucracies are susceptible to
paralysis. Therefore, bureaucracies routinely avoid change and uncertainty.
According to Model III, adaptability to new and changing circumstances
rests with the people who constitute the organizations. Individuals breathe
life into the bureaucratic process. They may enable workarounds to meet
a common goal, to enhance their feelings of power, or to cope when they
conclude that the stakes warrant nonstandard behavior. This realization
highlights an area of interagency coordination worth developing: the pursuit
of vetted working relationships and frequent sharing of perspectives.

Knowing how each organization coordinates its activities is also important
to interagency operations. According to organizational theorist James Q.
Wilson, "An organization is not simply, or even principally, a set
of boxes, lines, and titles on an organizational chart."[18] If an
interagency coordinating body is to have any hope of succeeding in the
complicated and ever-changing game of intervention operations, then it
must dedicate itself to getting beyond organizations as they exist on paper.
The values and cultures of competing agencies need to be dissected, faces
and personalities identified, and personal relationships pursued and maintained.
James Colvard believes government organizations should learn from the better
parts of the private sector, namely "a bias toward action, small staffs,
and a high level of delegation which is based on trust."[19] Of course,
making changes to an existing bureaucratic structure comes at a cost, as
Wilson reminds us:

If the organization must perform a diverse set of tasks, those tasks
that are not part of the core mission will need special protection. This
requires giving autonomy to the subordinate tasks sub-unit (for example,
by providing for them a special organizational niche) and creating a career
track so that talented people performing non-mission tasks can rise to
high rank in the agency.[20]

The interagency operations center is well described by Wilson's summary.

The theory is interesting and probably applicable to parts of the problem
at hand. In the final analysis, however, it comes down to leadership, commitment,
and a capacity to adapt at least part of many federal agencies to new tasks
derived from the environment in which US military forces have been operating
for years. Particularly within the last decade, such operations have become
the norm.

Documenting the Interagency Process

Military operations are based upon doctrine, which is intended to serve
as a guide to conducting them. In contrast, private and other nongovernmental
relief agencies typically lack formal doctrine, though they may have some
written standard operating procedures. The lack of doctrine is not an impediment
to successful cooperation, but it does make anticipating requirements and
coordinating responses more difficult for military staffs.

Some civilian government agencies, such as the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), have established formal doctrinal
systems. Field agents of USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team use
a "Field Officer's Guide," for instance. Inasmuch as military
doctrine tells civilians how the military can be expected to operate, familiarity
with civilian "doctrine," whatever its form, can help to synchronize
and support interagency operations.

Although interagency integration problems are outlined in joint military
doctrine, most such documents leave it up to each regional commander-in-chief
to decide how best to focus interagency activities within his region. Joint
Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,
states that the Department of State will normally take the lead in coordinating
military operations other than war by working through an established country
team under the leadership of a US Ambassador or special Presidential Envoy.[21]
It also states that memoranda of agreement between civilian and military
organizations may improve coordination, as will the establishment of a
civil-military operations center. But the publication lacks definitive
guidance for handling interagency problems.

Better interagency doctrine is contained in Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency
Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I.[22] Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright opines: "By melding the capabilities of the
military and the NGOs and PVOs [private voluntary organizations] you have
developed a force multiplier."[23] Few will dispute the importance
of civil-military "melding," yet Joint Pub 3-08 concedes, "The
connectivity between NGOs, PVOs, and the Department of Defense is currently
ad hoc, with no statutory linkage. But while their focus remains grassroots
and their connections informal, NGOs and PVOs are major players at the
interagency table."[24] The goal of interagency coordination should
be to enable and bolster the capabilities of all nonmilitary agencies,
whether private or governmental, rather than have the military perform
their tasks. In the end, all agencies will be better served by such integration.

Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) is the latest document advocating
improved planning and coordination practices among US government agencies
and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations.[25]
In particular, the directive emphasizes the need to create "coordination
mechanisms at the operational level."[26] The scope of PDD-56 is limited,
however, by defining complex contingency operations as "peace operations,"
such as the peace accord implementation in Bosnia; "humanitarian interventions,"
such as Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq; and "foreign humanitarian
assistance operations," such as Operation Support Hope in Somalia.[27]
This directive has the potential to influence future US government interagency
procedures and joint military doctrine. Once it is fully implemented, however,
it seems reasonable to expect that interagency coordination procedures
described in PDD-56 would be applied to contingency operations beyond those
presently specified in the document.[28] There is no clear and compelling
reason to limit application of the concepts in PDD-56 to those kinds of
operations.

Military doctrine is largely developed from the collection and analysis
of lessons learned. Three recent (and diverse) interagency experiences
involving civil-military operations centers (or comparable organizations)
occurred in Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda.

Somalia

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia proved to be one of the most diverse
humanitarian operations undertaken by US military forces; it quickly highlighted
the need for better interagency coordination. According to Kenneth Allard,
in Somalia the military was challenged to coordinate the activities of
"49 different UN and humanitarian relief agencies--none of which were
obligated to follow military directives."[29] As expected, relief
agency personnel tended to be suspicious of the military peacekeepers.
The military commander formed a civil-military operations center to coordinate
military support for convoys of relief supplies and to allocate port and
pier space in Mogadishu harbor to the humanitarian relief organizations
that were bringing in the food needed to prevent starvation in the country.
The center worked closely with the UN Humanitarian Operations Center to
coordinate and exchange information with the humanitarian relief organizations.

The Somalia CMOC was kept small so its participants would not be tempted
to take on more than they could handle. In fact, for the first time, several
"mini-CMOCs" were set up throughout the country where international
organizations, NGOs, government organizations, and PVOs could coordinate
their activities.[30] Ambassador Robert Oakley, the President's Special
Envoy for Somalia, was sold on the tactical contributions of civil-military
operations centers during that intervention:

The center [CMOC] was an effective innovative mechanism, not for operational-level
coordination, but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian
perceptions. By developing good personal relationships, the staffs were
able to alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief community.[31]

Haiti

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti provided additional evidence of
the importance of interagency integration and coordination. Strategic-level
interagency coordination and planning for the operation were deemed more
successful than during any previous operation, but for several reasons
deficiencies at the operational and tactical levels produced complications
after the military arrived in Haiti.[32] Most significantly, the links
between the strategic and operational levels were deficient.[33] Early
in the process, compartmentalized military planning effectively precluded
interagency coordination.[34] Once security concerns allowed, United States
Atlantic Command attempted some operational-level interagency coordination
by holding two meetings during the summer of 1994.[35] However, participants
essentially briefed only what their respective agencies were doing, which
produced little of value by way of coordination--a case of too little,
too late.[36] Consequently, according to one source, the coordination required
during the interagency process to achieve the goals of both the civil and
military aspects of this operation never emerged as part of a comprehensive,
integrated civil-military plan.[37]

Mutual ignorance of organizational cultures and capabilities also contributed
to interagency problems.[38] Non-DOD agencies did not have the same robust
planning and expeditionary capabilities that the military possesses, a
condition that probably will always characterize such operations.[39] Another
key factor affecting interagency coordination was that not all agencies
reacted to agreed fundamental goals with the same sense of urgency. This
led military planners to make some incorrect assumptions about mutual progress
toward those goals.[40] Military planners envisioned a scenario in which
objectives would be met, missions completed, and military forces subsequently
withdrawn. Some agencies did not share that vision; others lacked performance
standards by which to measure progress.[41] Personnel from several agencies
arrived in Haiti expecting the military to provide them a full range of
support, such as food, shelter, transportation, and communications. In
many cases the military eventually was able to meet some of these needs,
but the lack of interagency understanding as well as poor planning and
coordination produced delays.[42] In the end, as usual, the absence of
detailed operational coordination and planning was in many respects offset
on the ground by the drive and initiative of operators working in harm's
way.[43]

Rwanda

In the final case to be considered, Operation Support Hope in Rwanda,
the combined joint task force established several ad hoc civil-military
operations centers, each different in its structure and mission. One served
as the joint task force's focal point for assessing and supporting relief
agencies, while another was responsible for the airlift function of the
operation. These CMOCs served as the key coordination elements for interagency
participants, including USAID's Disaster Assistance Relief Teams, UN agencies,
international organizations, private voluntary organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations in the operational area as well as for host nation agencies.[44]
Unfortunately, firm rapport was never established among those agencies,
a situation that was aggravated by their proliferation (more than 100 by
the end of the operation).[45] Lack of effective working relations among
the many participants complicated the mission.[46] Although the commander
of the combined joint task force, Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder,
recognized the importance of integrating these organizations into the operation,
he observed that the coordination process took valuable time from the JTF's
other tasks.[47]

Learning from Experience

There is a clearly defined need for an efficient, reliable, civil-military
integrating agency in each geographic combatant command, with the mission
of actively pursuing interagency coordination at the operational level.
Experience with ad hoc civil-military operations centers suggests why this
need is urgent.

Whenever established, the centers have quickly become the focal point
for humanitarian assistance operations. Conversely, in most instances the
permanent joint task force staff has had little experience and less knowledge
of the purpose and capabilities of a civil-military operations center.
Those staffs generally are not trained to appreciate the magnitude of the
interagency process and the challenges inherent in dealing with dozens
of other organizations in the operational area. At the same time, some
US government civilians involved in the operation have seemed to not understand
the benefits of coordinating their activities with the military. Since
most civil-military interagency participants met for the first time on
the ground in the crisis area under pressure to perform, they too often
did not trust each other, did not know what to expect, nor even knew what
questions they could ask to find out. They did not have previously established
working relationships such as would develop in the daily activities of
a permanent interagency operations center under the command of the regional
commander-in-chief or the commander of a combined joint task force.

There is an obvious lack of input from US government civilian agencies
during the initial planning phase of an operation, which tends to complicate
the efforts of military planners and commanders to coordinate interagency
matters late in the planning process. The situation can be aggravated when
civil-military operations centers do not deploy with the first military
units, and when they lack the communication systems required to support
the center's austere structure and staffing. This results from customary
ad hoc approaches to forming, staffing, and employing CMOCs. A permanent,
mature interagency operations center in each US regional headquarters--one
that has been organized for some time, whose personnel have trained together,
and which has been equipped with appropriate communications means--could
overcome such obstacles. These kinds of operations tend to become so logistically
intensive that a logistics expert often has had to be added after the fact.
A permanent interagency operations center could better anticipate such
requirements, would institutionalize lessons from previous deployments,
and could train participants to prepare for probable interagency scenarios.

All of these recurring complications support the recommendation in Joint
Pub 3-08 that there needs to be long-standing and deliberate interagency
coordination at the level of the regional commander-in-chief:

The geographic combatant commander and combatant command staff should
be continuously engaged in interagency coordination and establishing working
relationships with interagency players long before crisis action planning
is required. In many cases, the combatant commander's organization for
crisis is well established and functioning far in advance of such an occurrence,
with preexisting and long-standing relationships formed among engaged agencies,
departments, and organizations at the national and theater levels.[48]

This is the ideal. Until the US government decides to change its practices
in this aspect of interagency coordination and cooperation, reality will
remain quite different.

Conclusion

US regional commanders-in-chief should answer the need for deliberate
operational-level interagency planning by establishing a robust interagency
operations center on their staffs. It is up to each regional commander
to establish the requirement for the personnel and equipment needed for
full-time operation of such a center in his region. The CINC must take
the first deliberate steps for operational-level interagency coordination,
training, and oversight, for once a crisis develops, that commander's military
forces will ultimately have to deal with the complicated interagency issues
on the ground.

Forming a permanent interagency operations center is the necessary first
step toward improving civil-military responses to contingencies. The center
will improve responses in Washington, in the different regional commanders'
headquarters, and in the field where unity of effort matters most. An IOC
can help lay the foundation for quicker and more effective problem-solving
and consensus-building when lives may depend upon effectiveness and efficiency
in responding to a crisis. The establishment of a permanent coordinating
agency such as an IOC can ensure that the organization is functioning and
engaged in ways that can anticipate, shape, and respond to crises better
than the current ad hoc response has permitted.

It hardly needs to be said that the interagency operations center must
be staffed with high-quality people who are trained and empowered by civilian
and military authorities to get the job done. Positions allocated to the
State Department and other civilian departments and agencies should be
staffed and supported by their communities. Regrettably, such is not always
the case today. The State Department's priority for filling positions at
each CINC's headquarters is low, which can leave the key post of political
advisor unfilled.

The IOC's military staff should work to put themselves out of a job,
since post-conflict resolution tasks will ultimately be conducted by civilian
agencies. IOC staffs will need to understand that it is neither necessary
nor desirable for the military to be in charge of interagency peace or
humanitarian support operations; the military should be engaged and integrated
into the planning and execution of policy decisions. With enough experience,
IOC responsibilities could someday be handled by civilian agencies with
little military involvement.

Organizational behavior theory details the characteristics and pitfalls
of different types of bureaucracies; center personnel would benefit from
being educated to identify those characteristics, peculiarities, and mechanisms
that could hamper coordination in the field. Empowered by the CINC, they
would become expert planners, consensus builders, and ultimately the means
to implement and then transfer interagency affairs to an appropriate lead
agency.

Interagency coordination is important, and organizational structure
matters. Organization theory and lessons learned during recent operations
have repeatedly shown that ad hoc organizations are inherently inefficient.
For a variety of reasons the interagency coordination mechanism is strategically
and operationally flawed. Sweeping organizational changes are needed, but
until they occur, an interagency operations center could provide a measure
of operational-level coordination and support for civil-military solutions
to complex problems that presently is available only through the ad hoc
structures of civil-military operations centers.

The composition and resourcing of those centers warrants further study;
in addition to common characteristics, each will reflect the unique needs
of its regional commander-in-chief. Some might start out as a cell with
a few experts. In others, the nature of the theater may demand a large
coordinating body that serves as the focus of humanitarian, post-conflict,
or other civil-military operations. The IOC should not be regarded as just
another attempt to improve interagency coordination. The success or failure
of any interagency operations center will depend upon each CINC's support
of the interagency process and the dedicated investment of resources--time,
money, equipment, and personnel--to the IOC concept. Failing that, as greater
numbers of agencies can be expected on the scene in future contingency
operations, some other concept will have to be developed to solve an interagency
coordination problem that can only get worse with time.

NOTES

1. US armed forces are routinely deployed all over the globe to conduct
military operations other than war. For example, US special operations
forces are engaged overseas in 45-60 countries at any one time and over
140 countries a year.

2. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century
(Washington: The White House, May 1997), p. 6. The US National Security
Strategy justifies this need for integrated approaches by explaining: "Our
response to these threats is not limited exclusively to any one agency.
. . . National security preparedness--particularly in this era when domestic
and foreign policies are increasingly blurred--crosses agency lines; thus,
our approach places a premium on integrated interagency efforts to enhance
U.S. security."

3. "The cultural bias . . . often isolates the military from the
other instruments of power . . . force is regarded as a separate instrument
that is somehow incompatible with other means. This perception of military
power undermines efforts to achieve a synergistic application of national
power." George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the
Interagency Process," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995),
8-9.

5. Some distrust is deliberate as a matter of checks and balances, some
is rooted in history and passed on from generation to generation as a matter
of organizational culture, and some is drawn from misleading labels or
exaggerated stories.

8. Ibid., pp. 1-8. "NGOs and the American military will have to
work together toward a common goal. Theirs is not a natural relationship
. . . . Even assuming sustained and correct attention from the highest
policy-making circles, a shared vision is extremely difficult to develop
. . . . [D]ecisions of the `on-the-ground' operators carry a good deal
of weight; like it or not, they will be collectively creating policy."

9. The costs can include relinquishing hard-earned turf, institutional
change, trust in unknown and uncontrollable entities, unplanned budget
outlays, and sharing of personnel and resources. Doing the "right"
thing might lead to a loss of influence for one's parent organization and
ultimately bureaucratic insecurity close to home.

10. Mendel and Bradford, pp. 1-2. "But not all government organizations
sense the need for (or see a problem) integrating interagency capabilities,
. . . having little need to operate beyond the reach of an ambassador's
country team in a host nation . . . . Although it is not within the Department
of Defense charter to pull together US interagency actions regionally,
the unified commander can assist State Department and other government
officials in that effort."

15. The name change from CMOC to IOC deemphasizes civil-military issues,
prejudices, and fears and portrays the image of all agencies as equal participants
on an interagency team. It is important to note that the military does
not have to be (and if possible, should not be) in charge. The sooner that
nonmilitary agencies can handle the crisis on their own, the better.

16. Mendel and Bradford, p. 2. "The existing [interagency] literature
discusses the National Security Council (NSC) staff system and possibilities
for improving government from that level. Yet, the NSC facilitates policy
and strategy development; it does not [help] execute policy in the field.
The Joint Staff publications and the service doctrine do not provide specific
guidelines or techniques for building interagency teamwork and integrating
capabilities."

22. Volume II describes the key US government departments and agencies,
NGOs, and international organizations that typically interact with the
US military. It explains their core competencies, basic organizational
structures, and relationship with the US armed forces.

45. NGO proliferation can be a major factor that creates confusion in
the early stages of a humanitarian emergency. According to a 1996 Guide
to Peace Support Operations: "There are now over 4000 development
NGOs . . . whose main mission is to work overseas . . . [and] an estimated
20,000 other NGOs that often work as the operational partners of International
NGOs or international development donors and UN agencies." MacKinlay,
pp. 96-97. Inter Action is the largest coalition of US-based development,
relief, and refugee organizations with 160 agencies operating in 185 countries.
USAID has registered another 350 NGOs. New volunteer organizations are
being formed each day. The worldwide proliferation of such agencies is
unavoidable; US government departments and agencies, including the military,
must rise to the challenge.

46. USEUCOM, Operation Support Hope, p. 17.

47. Ibid., p. 3.

48. Joint Pub 3-08, p. III-6.

Major Thomas Gibbings, USA, is the Adjutant for the 650th Military Intelligence
(CI) Group, SHAPE, Belgium. He received a B.S. from Radford University
and an M.B.A. from Marshall University. A graduate of the Armed Forces
Staff College and US Army Command and General Staff College, he commanded
a tank company in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson,
Colorado. He also served as an armor battalion S3 and XO and was the Secretary
of the General Staff for the US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Lieutenant Commander Donald Hurley, USN, is a naval intelligence officer
assigned to the joint intelligence staff at the Defense Intelligence Agency
in Washington, D.C. He is a 1985 graduate of the US Naval Academy, holds
an M.A. degree in Military Art and Science from the US Army Command and
General Staff College, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

Major Scott Moore, USAF, is an Air Force special operator assigned to
the Future Concepts Branch of the US Special Operations Command in Tampa,
Fla. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and holds an M.S.
in Defense Analysis (Irregular Warfare) from the Naval Postgraduate School.
An experienced MC-130 navigator with over 3000 flying hours, he has planned
and flown a variety of special operations missions in the Pacific and Europe.