The battle's done, and we kind of won, so we sound our victory cheer: where do we go from here?
... a blog by Marc Lynch

July 06, 2008

Military Review: "Partnering with the Iraqi media"

The current issue of Military Review (via SWJ) contains a quite fascinating article written by Lt Col Frank DeCarvalho, Major Spring Kivett, and Captain Matthew Lindsey entitled "Reaching Out: Partnering with Iraq Media." The article enthusiastically details the efforts of Task Force Marne to use Iraqi media as a more credible source for pro-coalition stories. An Iraqi face on the coalition's stories, they argue, offers a more effective way of influencing Iraqi attitudes than traditional PSYOP techniques: "using native news reporters will increase chances of acceptance by the Iraqi population by relaying credible stories of progress that can resonate favorably through communities." It's worth a look.

The authors explain that traditional PSYOP methods such leaflets, posters, handbills and radio broadcasts are inadequate to the task of influencing Iraqi attitudes: "Iraqi citizens know the information's origin and often question its legitimacy, credibility, and intent." After a while, they point out, "the inherently manipulative PSYOP process... reaches a point of diminishing returns. Inducement requires not just a persuasive message but also a credible source." Backing away from the "inherently manipulative PSYOP process" does not seem to be an option, given that "influencing Iraqis is central to managing a favorable outcome in this war". Instead, this led to an effort to find a more credible source: the Iraqi media.

They found such a credible source in the Iraqi media, they explain, as Task Force Marne "established an Iraqi media section (IMS) to capitalize on Iraqi media capabilities and the advantages of using them." The IMS began with media monitoring functions, and then "expanded its
mission to include developing, translating, and disseminating
coalition-related stories to Iraqi media outlets." As of today, it has
"contacts with 11 television stations, 27 newspaper outlets, and a host
of media websites." IMS also has an exclusive contract with Iraqi government's newspaper al-Sabah, and the article offers a lengthy vignette of a program it orchestrated for the government TV station al-Iraqiya. All told, IMS has "conducted 38 battlefield circulations with Iraqi media crews, and it has translated over 300 'good news' stories into Arabic and disseminated them."

While the authors stress repeatedly that their efforts are exclusively public affairs, they acknowledge that the IMS does not work for the Public Affairs office, with its mandate of informing: "instead, it falls under the direction and oversight of the effects coordinator" (i.e. the unit which handles PSYOP and influence operations). The authors insist that this is not significant and that the IMS plays only a public affairs "informational" role - which would be odd, given everything else claimed for the program, but is duly noted. Nevertheless, the stories and their placement are carefully coordinated with the "effects" officers, tightly interwoven with the strategic communications plan, and then their distribution used in part to improve the feedback loop on PSYOP development.

The benefit of this, as they write repeatedly, is "putting an Iraqi face on the story; an Iraqi reporter talking to fellow Iraqis has a much greater effect on the Iraqi psyche than if a coalition reporter told the story." This has worked so well that "the IMS is currently considering hiring independent Iraqi correspondents and developing a sustainable network of informed journalists." Overall, the authors urge that the coalition develop more ways to "support and use the Iraqi media."

Quite interesting. Some might remember the scandal which erupted back in late 2005 when the Lincoln Group's efforts to pay Iraqi newspapers to run pro-US stories was exposed. This isn't quite that, in that the essay claims that the articles
are published with full Task Force Marne attribution - though I'd like to know whether that "produced by Task Force Marne" disclaimer is used as universally as claimed. But it is a sustained effort to place US military-produced "good news stories" in the Iraqi media, which falls under the jurisdiction of "effects" and not "public affairs", and which is explicitly cultivating the Iraqi media as a more credible face for its strategic communication efforts.

This should not surprise anyone who follows the information war dimensions of counter-insurgency doctrine, or read various published accounts of specific IO operations in Iraq, but it might provoke some useful discussion. There always seems to be a deep tension between strategic
communications and traditional public diplomacy on questions like this,
which will likely shape reactions to the Military Review story. Some might respond that since the insurgency uses the media as a "force multiplier", so must the counter-insurgents. Others might argue that there is something inherently objectionable about this kind of use of "independent media" for strategic ends, no matter how overt. Yet others might note similarities to the administration's efforts to shape coverage in the American media.

Some specific questions about this case come to mind. Did the architects of these efforts consider that their efforts might discredit the Iraqi media over time, or that using the media to strategic effect might somehow compromise the independence and freedom of the Iraqi media? Does the disclosure that the IMS has translated and disseminated more than 300 'good news stories' force us to re-evaluate the credibility of "good news stories" published over the last few years in the Iraqi media?

Finally, there's the issue of 'blowback' (when propaganda produced for foreign audiences is recirculated inside the United States). Maj Gen Rick Lynch explains that "targeting the American
audience is a PA responsibility, and targeting the Iraqi audience is an
effects responsibility." What happens when the disseminated good news report is picked up out of the Iraqi media source, tranlated - perhaps without that "produced by TFM" label - and then becomes the basis for American reporting?

Comments

Marc, I'm not sure what you're trying to say here but it does sound something like this (...please correct me if I'm mistaken): When it comes to Iraq (as opposed to Qatar) all news, except bad news, is to be suspected.

There's always the possibility that you'd go to Iraq and double-check with your own eyes, though.

On a related note: can you imagine how different your knowledge of Jordan would have been had you never been there? Would you acknowledge that your understanding of what's going on in Iraq is similarly influenced (...in a deficient way) by never have seen the place with your own eyes?

Oh, and I know that I've asked you for this many times now (...gone unacknowledged, though), but just let me know if you're ever going to retract that post of yours concerning Kimmage's work. I don't want to get my hopes up for nothing.

What are you going to do if the GoI should actually end up winning in Iraq, Marc? Or you going to retract this whole blog? Or are you going to pretend that you were right all along and that somehow the traitorous Iraqi puppets managed to defeat the heroic resistance anyway, somehow? I've been following this blog for years, and you have consistently been proven wrong in almost everything you say, but instead of admitting you were in error you just show up saying the same (wrong) things, over and over again (but in a different way). Remember a year and a half ago when you were implying the US military was outright lying about how quiet Anbar province had become? And instead of admitting that you were the one who was in the wrong on that, you made a series of posts suggesting the obvious successes (that you denied had been achieved in the first place) in Anbar would be short lived? Well, what say you now? More BS or will there come a day when you'll call it like you see it?

Time, perhaps, to rethink the IO-PAO chinese wall? Can you really segment an audience between domestic US and foreign? Aren't the most persuasive messages grounded in facts?

Granted, of course, that facts are not probative without being part of a narrative -- the key for IO staffs is to disseminate factual narratives that are compelling.

All products of IO, whether PSYOP or PAO are edited narratives - and that process of editing means they are a snapshot, a take, on reality. Then provided they are grounded in truth/fact (the best type of propaganda, as Robert Thompson noted), Messrs Smith and Mundt can rest easy.

can you imagine how different your knowledge of Jordan would have been had you never been there? Would you acknowledge that your understanding of what's going on in Iraq is similarly influenced (...in a deficient way) by never have seen the place with your own eyes?

By way of humor, Nibras Kazimi, who has been to Iraq, wrote this:

Iraq is succeeding because the Iraqi state has weathered the worst of the insurgent storm and survived, and because the Sunni insurgency is fatigued.

...in October 2006. I don't know if he's every apologized for this.

But I suppose we should all listen to him now, because, you know, he used to fetch Ahmad Chalabi's coffee or something.

Speaking of Kaz's former boss, he didn't see Iraq with his own eyes for decades and yet for some reason he was supposedly a reliable source of information on the place, and not just a master embezzler.

You wrote: "What happens when the disseminated good news report is picked up out of the Iraqi media source, tranlated - perhaps without that "produced by TFM" label - and then becomes the basis for American reporting? ". Some is going say/write "mission accomplished" because the primary target of the PSYOP is, and has been, the American public.

I think here's the problem with the way the US military is dealing with the media (and perhaps even in the way it deals with the armed opponents, too--if the latter is true, God save us....): it's ignoring Sun Tzu's famous dictum about knowing your adversaries. Even in strictly "military" matters, too many US military types forget that a battle is a game where their enemy is a player, too. Thus, they are too eager to play up how tough and powerful they and their weapons are--and how they'll obliterate their enemies. Having sufficient military power might absolve these folks of that strategic error--and in conventional combat, US has enjoyed that luxury for so long. The option of physically crushing the enemy, in strategic terms, of course, is equivalent to totally imposing your own terms regardless of what the other player thinks or wants. This tendency seems to dominate thinking too much both among military and civilian policymakers (and incidentally, in game theory classes in US poli sci depts). The consequence of this is that many in the US military rarely had to worry about situations--beyond mere theorizing--where you lack the wherewithal to obliterate the opposition to smithereens and have to worry about situations where "destroy the enemy" is ruled out as an option.

We have seen the consequence of this strategic myopia on the part of the US military in the conduct of various insurgency campaigns, where the option of physically obliterating the opposition is typically unavailable. Dealing with the media and public relations, of course, compounds the problem even further. The other players in that game are the public, or publics, in various countries and the media organizations. These aren't "enemies," although many both in and out of military seem to think them as such, although they may have goals and interests different from the military. The option of totally forcing military's agenda on them is impossible. How the other players would react to the military's choices must, then, ought to be taken into consideration of the strategy.

I don't think this sort of PR strategizing is beyond the capability of the US military: after all, they have actually done very well when lobbying Congress and the US public for their procurement budgets, etc. Nor, do I think such attempt at media dissemination is categorically beyond the pale as a part of military strategy. Still, the attempts seem, almost disturbingly, amateurish and clumsy.