The problem is there no place where GOI has articulated strong ,measured and graduated response to terrorism.

For instance it took hell lot of time to put in place Nuclear Doctrine, since an articulation of doctrine compels the instrument to execute the doctrine to be in place, which in turn points to vision, which leads us to objective and goals...

If a doctrine on terrorism is in place then GOI has to act, that means tough decisions, which our current netas are completely inadequate to make them .. (the last one who could follow through was Mrs IG)

Rest all of them negotiated with terrorists and its too freah to recount them again...

So we are ill prepared to protect our citizenry is the 'Writing on the wall'

Ramana garuIf they use BD as a transit point and use BD for logistics should we forgive them?

RajGuru!I've actually mentioned BD (also KSA) beside TSP among the ones to be nuked. Any stupidity like nuking India by Jihadi hotheads will ensure rollback of Islamism from the sub-continent.

We are ending up nuking everyone. IROT,BD,China and India to start with are all a radioactive waste lands. That is really a tragedy. Half of mankind evaporated because of few mad men. ramana has a valid point. We cant make everyone our enemy and let our enemies join hands and destroy us. And all this because of the Islamic military in Pakistan.

I can safely conclude in this discussion that the best solution to avoid any future rogue nuke catastrophe is to completely destroy Pakistani Military pre-emptively and if enqyoob is wrong then we have a responsibility to prove him right.

I can safely conclude in this discussion that the best solution to avoid any future rogue nuke catastrophe is to completely destroy Pakistani Military pre-emptively

You would think so, but here is what the bozos in charge are spouting. This is the PM with the usual drivel on peace with pakistan and bus services to Nankana Saheb blah blah blah. And we are supposed to be "whining Indians" if we point out that the blatant incompetence in securing India's border with this kind of peace-and-love cr@p.

In my opening remarks, I mentioned that there are two dimensions to the problems of Jammu & Kashmir â€“ one being the relationship between Delhi and Srinagar and the other being the relationship between Delhi and Islamabad. I have said repeatedly to President Musharraf and the people of Pakistan that we are sincerely committed to peace and development in this region. Our government is committed to resolving all outstanding issues with Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. There is also realization that terrorism is an enemy of civilized societies. (Not in Pakistan, unless you are smoking some of their stuff)

In my speech while launching the Amritsar-Nankana Sahib bus service, I had said that the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan will open up enormous opportunities for an accelerated rate of economic growth. We must encourage people-to-people contacts between both sides. It is through such contacts that we can explore a vision for a cooperative common future for our two nations â€“ a future where peace prevails, where relations are friendly, where our citizens rejoice in the well-being of the other country. (Don't forget to pass the doobie around, Manmohan. Peace and love, man. )

This is the PM of the country and he seems to sincerely believe all the twaddle he spouts about loving pakistan till it hurts, and he is only repeating the drivel that the "analysts" and "think tanks" in India have presented to him.

I just wonder if one of the worst things that can happen to a JDAM is no response or a response that is far less than instantaneus disproportionate revenge?

After all - if you look at it from the Jihadi viewpoint - one may perhaps use the following reasoning:

We have bum and we explode it in an Indian city India reacts and puts bum on Pakistan and China. Someone else reacts and puts bum on India.

These are all lovely scenarios for the jihadi. If you live with the belief that any modernity, technology and the international economic order that helps the world to eat, travel and communicate is inportant - then the jihadi would love to se that come crashing down. The Islamist seen no need for all that and does not worry that Muslims may be affected or that he may die. He believes that Allah will prevail. But India may do nothing and declare that a tsunami caused the damage.

In a sense the cleverest Islamist will realise that nuking India may be a dead end option that cannot create an Islamist revolution. Only brownie points may come out to say that "They are afraid to react" or "They cannot react while we inflict cuts"

A nuke on the US or a target important to the US would be probably seem more productive because of the reaction it provokes from the US. But I am sure the intelligent jihadi will understand that the US is neither stupid nor weak. The US will not "destroy the world and its economic order" is a JDAM explodes in the US. The US is mre likely to wage a targeted war that, over the medium to long term takes out anything and everything related to Islamism. Again only bronie points for the jehadi - like 9-11 - and more damage that by attacking India.

Probably the most vulnerable and high value target is Israel because of its size and the support that the idea has among jihadis and the support they in turn get from the ummah - even if the latter do not support nuking Israel. That lack of support would not translate to condemnation if Israel gets JDAMned. And in any case once Israel is nuked - lip sympathy can come easily.

What would India's reaction be if the US or Israel got nuked? Would we say that this is fair and just because we support the Palestinian cause? Would we say that the US had it coming?

Wht about JDAM in Islamabad - decapitating Pakistan? Would that not help Islamism in Pakistan geta foothold. Nobody will blame islamists for such a JDAM. India or some other country would be blamed and Pakistan would get a lot of sympathy while Islamism could consolidate as the Army - the only pillar of Pakistan that pretends to be anti-Jihadi is sidelined further.

How about a JDAM in Vienna for symbolism? How would Berlinabad or Britainistan react?

What if jihadis think about all ths and merely blow upa US base in the Middle east or Pakistan with a JDAM?

Don't you folks think that what is important is not the "reaction" to a JDAM? No matter which way it goes - Islamism and Islam itself will take a severe beating especially if teh target is one of teh know targets of jihadis and jihad supporting nations. The idea is to prevent a JDAM from going off anywhere.

Shiv - If a Pakistani Nuke is slipped to Jihadi hands, Pakistan will do it for one reason to blow an Indian city and deny its role behind it. We all know that this Islamism thing is hollow for the IRoP generals and the only plausible reason to blow a non-Indian location would be money. The problem is places such as Israel and the US are heavily protected - many systems that have been put into place to detect such intrusions do work and the logistics to transport such a device are not trivial. Logistics with India are far easier. Also a deadly response from Israel or US or Europe is assured, while with India the Jingorampur scenario is a distinct possibility. The Indian establishment treats IRoP like an estranged brother, only if the brother has a knife on our throat do we react and protect ourselves. As soon as the brother retracts the knife - we melt like a chocolate in a tea pot.

Shiv - If a Pakistani Nuke is slipped to Jihadi hands, Pakistan will do it for one reason to blow an Indian city and deny its role behind it. We all know that this Islamism thing is hollow for the IRoP generals and the only plausible reason to blow a non-Indian location would be money. The problem is places such as Israel and the US are heavily protected - many systems that have been put into place to detect such intrusions do work and the logistics to transport such a device are not trivial. Logistics with India are far easier. Also a deadly response from Israel or US or Europe is assured, while with India the Jingorampur scenario is a distinct possibility. The Indian establishment treats IRoP like an estranged brother, only if the brother has a knife on our throat do we react and protect ourselves. As soon as the brother retracts the knife - we melt like a chocolate in a tea pot.

I am not arguing with the points you make.

I am trying to ask "Is this characteristic Indian behavior at least partially responsible for its long term survival?" The "natural and obvious" reaction would be to hit back and get into a fight.

Looking at it from another angle - the jihadi threat is causing certain standard reactiosn from members of this forum. The first reaction is "Hit back. Kill this. Destroy that". The second layer of reaction is "If we donlt hit back, then teh jihadis will take that as victory and claim that a)We won't react and b) we will eventually be killed by a thousand cuts.

From the civilizational viewpoint thousands of years of cuts has not kiled the civilization. The civilization won't die from these cuts. The only thing to do is to see how the civilization can be stopped from going underground or being subjugated as it has tended to do.

What would be more advantageous to us:

1) Hitting out at everyone and what ffect will that have on the cause
2) Hitting out a someone - if so who and what effect can it have on the cause
3) Not hitting out, and what effect will that have ob the cause

What would be more advantageous to te jihadi pan Islamist?

1)Provoking a wild destructive reaction
2)Provoking little or no response

< hint >What moves would make the cost highest for a jihadi who is concerned about teh spreead of Ilam and Islamism and is not concerned about pain or death on any scale. < /hint >

From the civilizational viewpoint thousands of years of cuts has not kiled the civilization. The civilization won't die from these cuts. The only thing to do is to see how the civilization can be stopped from going underground or being subjugated as it has tended to do.

Shiv: I am Hindu sindhi. Now to some Sindh might be in Pakistan a foreign land but to me it is my lost homeland. It was all part of Bharat. 60% of punjab and Bengal are lost maybe forever. The current population that live in them is a living symbol to me of India's defeats. The wound is fresh and the India of today is a severely wounded civilization. The very presence of IRoP and BD is a continual reminder of Bharat's failures. So my view is a firm NO that this characteristic response does not ensure our survival but does ensure another partition of India, if we do not shed the "characteristic".

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< hint >What moves would make the cost highest for a jihadi who is concerned about teh spreead of Ilam and Islamism and is not concerned about pain or death on any scale. < /hint >

There are many answers to this question but in this context it has to start with a clear, unambiguos understanding by IRoP that any such JDAM attack will be similar to that knife on the throat, where India is automatically compelled to act. The threat has to be targeted directly at the military establishment of IRoP. Then and only then, are there any hopes of averting such an attack, until then the possibilty and proability of a JDAM are high.

Shiv: I also think it is a mirage that the Jihadi fights for Islam alone. IRoP Jihadis are most motivated by their hate for India, Israel does not generate the same response in IRoP. For Hamas/Hezbollah it is Israel. OBL did not target Israel, but the US as in his eyes the US presence in KSA (his country) was a violition of his religion. So the Jihadist comes in all mixed hues and shades and seldom for the sake of Islam alone. The violence is a means to an end and not just for the sake of it. With this alone, I will have to conclude that an IRoP origin JDAM is destined for India alone.

But how real is this scenario in the light of developments since and as a consequence of what we know today. Consider:

Well, it is certainly real enough that Zbignew Brzezinski recognizes it, and assumes that the strategic community in DC would recognize it. In the linked article, Zbignew makes the following statement:

China is believed to now have 18 nuclear missiles aimed at the United States, a strategy of minimal deterrence -- just enough to discourage an American attack.

"Will the Chinese maintain the same position if India produces 50 nuclear weapons a year?" Brzezinski asked

Now: in what context could Brzezinski's expressed fear, that India arming itself might result in China arming itself with more than a minimal number of nuclear missiles aimed at the United States, make any sense whatsoever? More nuclear IRBMs aimed at India, sure. But why does Brzezinski obviously play on the fear of China increasing the number of strategic weapons it could aim at the US? Only because he knows that the Beg paradigm is not far from the minds of the US Strategic Community, and that they take it very seriously indeed.

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1. The Chinese have 20-30 missiles capable of reaching the US which are liquid fueled and the US has upto 6 hours of warning when those missiles are fuelled. The first thing the Chinese will have to start doing if India issues such an expliticit retaliatory threat will be to start expanding and modernizing those long range missiles besides having at least half a dozen SLBM boats. The US will undoubtedly start taking counter measures as soon as it tracks these developments.

First of all, there's no indication that the Chinese will not pursue the course of arming themselves with more US-capable nukes anyway. Especially given that the likes of Brzezinski are already all too happy to put the blame on India, whether we issue an explicit threat of retailation against China or not. If the US then takes countermeasures, why is that in any way a bad thing for India? Secondly, why does this in any way make it less likely that the Chinese will not pursue the Beg paradigm w.r.t. the US?

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2. There are strong indications in the recent Senate hearings on the India-US nuke deal that the Chinese may be having as few as 130 deployed warheads.

The jihadis may have as few as 1 Pakistan-supplied warhead, yet KS' reading of the Donnelly paper makes it clear that this alone is enough to put the fear of unacceptable costs into DC... the endless free passes and pandering to Musharraf being a primary consequence. China does not have to threaten the US with utter devastation in order to scare them with a Beg paradigm, in the event of an Indian retaliatory threat against Beijing. They simply have to have the capacity to impose unacceptable costs on the Americans... and they already have it.

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3. The recent India nuclear thread postulates that India has a fissile material production capacity of at least 260 warheads per year. Other estimates indicate that India could have material for in excess of 1000 warheads. These were unknown when that post was made on that thread. At that point of time best estimates were that India has 40-90 warheads.

Again, the Beg balance of terror was never about MAD in the Cold War sense. In the event of a nuclear exchange Pakistan could not annihilate India as India could Pakistan. India today may or may not be able to annihilate China-- what it could do for sure, is drag the Chinese back to the level of hapless third-world opium-eating coolies, which many Chinese would view as a fate worse than extinction for their glorious Han superpower in the making. In turn, the Chinese have only to threaten the US with a similarly painful, if not ultimately destructive fate, in order for the Beg paradigm to work.

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4. Even if India does not have the ability to target the US to deter a US first strike, India has the warheads and the delivery mechanisms to make the entire Middle East and most of Europe a wasteland besides ofcourse China.

When playing a game as dangerous as this, half-measures are never enough. The US would prefer to see the Middle East or Europe devastated, and vastly so, than one of their own cities. That possibility alters the strategic climate very fundamentally.

It is absolutely vital, given the existence of a Beg paradigm and the implied recognition of such by Washington's strategists, that India test, develop and deploy the Surya without any further ado. The *only* argument against doing so is that we might thereby jeopardize India's current relations with the US. Given the stakes, however, the obvious choice is to go ahead and test whatever we need to test, manufacture and deploy it... and then watch the US make whatever efforts necessary to improve their relations with us.

If Brzezinski thinks that the eight reactors that are going to remain on the military side will be used by India to make more than 50 weapons per year then what makes him think India is not producing atleast that number of weapons if not more with nearly double that number of reactors that it has at its disposal right now? And if India is not producing that many weapons now even though it has the reactors to do it with, then what makes him so sure that it will start doing so in the future when it will have fewer reactors to do it with? He is clutching at straws here.

Now: in what context could Brzezinski's expressed fear, that India arming itself might result in China arming itself with more than a minimal number of nuclear missiles aimed at the United States, make any sense whatsoever? More nuclear IRBMs aimed at India, sure. But why does Brzezinski obviously play on the fear of China increasing the number of strategic weapons it could aim at the US? Only because he knows that the Beg paradigm is not far from the minds of the US Strategic Community, and that they take it very seriously indeed.

Two responses. One, the whole issue of a Asian nuke balance was peripherally alluded to by John Kerry in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the nuke deal. From the US standpoint, any additional warheads with anyone else is bad whether mounted on IRBMs or ICBMs. Chinese IRBMs threaten in addition to India, US allies such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the ASEAN region. There is a certain global warhead/delivery mechanism equilibrium currently which satisfies the status quo powers. India striving for its security by increasing its warhead/delivery mechanism capabilities disturbs that equilibrium i.e. it is a domino effect. Whether specifically intended or not, a Chinese increase in warheads/missiles will threaten all other nuclear powers. I would not link it to the Beg paradigm specifically. As far as ZB himself, I think he is now on the fringes of the real power centers in the US and I will be surprised if he has any real input in policy even in a Democratic administration.

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Secondly, why does this in any way make it less likely that the Chinese will not pursue the Beg paradigm w.r.t. the US?

I think the whole Beg paradigm issue is overblown. I think in reality the US will be relieved if the two countries in the world with a population of 2.5 billion and competitors for all the increase in resource consumption in the world (especially oil) blow each other up and set themselves back by 500 years. A big bonus for the US is that the close to 1 trillion in dollars held by the Chinese as foreign exchange no longer have to be paid back by the UST. Towards that end, the US is not going to help India over China or vice versa. The US will respond only if it sees the Chinese missiles being fuelled up and will target those missiles.

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The jihadis may have as few as 1 Pakistan-supplied warhead, yet KS' reading of the Donnelly paper makes it clear that this alone is enough to put the fear of unacceptable costs into DC... the endless free passes and pandering to Musharraf being a primary consequence

As someone pointed out in an earlier post, you have different categories of jehadis. AQ if it posseses a JDAM will use it on the US, if it can transport the device physically into the US, not easy now with all the sensors/sniffers at US entry points as well as at various US highways/bridges etc. Similarly Hamas/Hezbollah if they have a JDAM will use it against Israel. The question is where will they get their hands on material to make even a dirty bomb. That is where Herr Musharaff's country comes in and the Pakistan Army's brazen blackmail wherein it essentially tells the US, "All bets are off if you threaten our existence". It is a completely different situation vis a vis China i.e. the US is not threatening China.

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In turn, the Chinese have only to threaten the US with a similarly painful, if not ultimately destructive fate, in order for the Beg paradigm to work.

The Chinese have always gone to war with the objective of attaining specific political objectives. Even if they have not *won certain wars*, they achieved the political objectives they set out with. Committing national suicide is not one of their political objectives, even for the sake of their pet rabies infected dog a.k.a. Pakistan. And based on their past behaviour of ultimately meeting rational objectives it will be inconsistent for them to want to commit national suicide by attacking the US. I am sure the Chinese know that by expending a fraction of its nucler arsenal, the US has the capacity to kill virtually all 1 billion plus Chinese.

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When playing a game as dangerous as this, half-measures are never enough. The US would prefer to see the Middle East or Europe devastated, and vastly so, than one of their own cities. That possibility alters the strategic climate very fundamentally.

It is absolutely vital, given the existence of a Beg paradigm and the implied recognition of such by Washington's strategists, that India test, develop and deploy the Surya without any further ado. The *only* argument against doing so is that we might thereby jeopardize India's current relations with the US. Given the stakes, however, the obvious choice is to go ahead and test whatever we need to test, manufacture and deploy it... and then watch the US make whatever efforts necessary to improve their relations with us.

I would say that unlike China, India's political leadership is not ruthless (and given India's political system cannot afford to be ruthless) enough in the pursuit of its national objectives. As such, testing a Surya IMO will be very counter productive from the viewpoint of India's overall interests. It will do India more harm than good at this point in time. If you look at the obvious holes in the logic of the Beg paradigm, especially Chinese behaviour in terms of their national political objectives, the subsequent logic for developing the Surya currently becomes superflous. A non country specific SLBM capability is far more credible and less threatening.

Ultimately the Chinese have to be made to realize that by directly threatening India's security by providing nukes to Pakistan, that they could end up paying the price for their reckless behaviour. That it is in their own interest to keep their rabid dog on a tight leash. Surely they do not want to have to pay the price of reverting as opium junkies for the misdeeds of Pakistan. They have to be made to understand that their reckless behaviour will have consequences on their own safety.

Anything else will reinforce the image of India as a pushover, however slick the rationalizations are and by whatever name they are called. India has built up its fissile material capacity for a reason i.e. to be able to talk to the Chinese mano a mano, not to rationalize away Indian inaction.

If Brzezinski thinks that the eight reactors that are going to remain on the military side will be used by India to make more than 50 weapons per year then what makes him think India is not producing atleast that number of weapons if not more with nearly double that number of reactors that it has at its disposal right now? And if India is not producing that many weapons now even though it has the reactors to do it with, then what makes him so sure that it will start doing so in the future when it will have fewer reactors to do it with? He is clutching at straws here.

Priyank,

I'm not saying that there is any merit to Brzezinski's arguments per se... they are the usual callow and hypocritical NPA-giri we can expect from him. That's not my point at all.

What's interesting is this tangent: Brzezinski has raised the spectre of China arming itself with more US-specific nukes as a response to India increasing her nuclear arsenal. Why would he even propose such a thing?

Under what circumstances, we may ask, does that make any sense? Why on earth would China develop more US-specific nukes in response to India building up her arsenal? The answer: it makes sense only if Brzezinski's intended audience, i.e. the US strategic community, is considering seriously the possibility that the Chinese might react to an Indian nuclear attack on them, by nuking the United States.

LDev:

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Two responses. One, the whole issue of a Asian nuke balance was peripherally alluded to by John Kerry in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the nuke deal. From the US standpoint, any additional warheads with anyone else is bad whether mounted on IRBMs or ICBMs. Chinese IRBMs threaten in addition to India, US allies such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the ASEAN region. There is a certain global warhead/delivery mechanism equilibrium currently which satisfies the status quo powers. India striving for its security by increasing its warhead/delivery mechanism capabilities disturbs that equilibrium i.e. it is a domino effect. Whether specifically intended or not, a Chinese increase in warheads/missiles will threaten all other nuclear powers. I would not link it to the Beg paradigm specifically. As far as ZB himself, I think he is now on the fringes of the real power centers in the US and I will be surprised if he has any real input in policy even in a Democratic administration.

This actually serves to illustrate my point. Zbignew could have easily made his argument by talking about an increase in the number of Chinese IRBMs that would threaten ROK, Japan etc. (though without question, the Chinese have a sufficiently large IRBM force to obliterate most of those nations already). Yet, he chooses to *specifically* put this in terms of the 18-20 ICBMs that China possesses which are capable of hitting the United States, as he clearly mentions. Why?

As for ZB himself, he may be in the twilight of his career but his legacy is very much around. The Clintonista establishment of Allbright and co. hold entirely with the Internationalist school of US Foreign Policy, on which Zbignew wrote the book. The Internationalists are *the* American foreign policy alternative to the rapidly-fading Neocons who currently hold the Pentagon and State Department... I would, in fact, bet on a resurgence of Zbignew-heads in the event of a Hillary adminstration.

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I think the whole Beg paradigm issue is overblown. I think in reality the US will be relieved if the two countries in the world with a population of 2.5 billion and competitors for all the increase in resource consumption in the world (especially oil) blow each other up and set themselves back by 500 years. A big bonus for the US is that the close to 1 trillion in dollars held by the Chinese as foreign exchange no longer have to be paid back by the UST. Towards that end, the US is not going to help India over China or vice versa. The US will respond only if it sees the Chinese missiles being fuelled up and will target those missiles.

Don't you see, that's exactly it. India would be very happy and relieved, if Al Qaeda jehadis exploded a nuke under Mush's tush (or say, Israel nuked Pakistan) and that was the end of the Pakstory. But it won't be. Pakistan will nuke India no matter who hits them...the original Beg paradigm.

Likewise. China would be very happy and relieved if India and Pakistan just nuked each other. Stripped of all moralpolitik implications, when we on BRF discuss retaliating against China for a Pakistani/Jehadi WMD attack, what are we *really* talking about? Beg paradigm again.

Maybe we shouldn't really call it the "Beg paradigm", because honestly it has been around longer than Beg's brag. That's just a convenient shorthand for non-bilateral nuclear retaliation, which the Israelis refer to as the Sampson option. South Africa had a somewhat similar doctrine which Graham Greene alludes to in "The Human Factor" as "Uncle Remus"...but probably went by a different name in reality. But "Beg paradigm" will have to do for now, as a matter of convenience.

China threatening the US with nuclear retaliation if India nukes China, is nothing but a further extension of the same logic. It is *precisely* this which will not allow the US to remain securely relieved if India and China nuke each other, depriving the US of its resource competitors, evaporating their $1T debt to Beijing, etc. That is exactly why the Chinese will not allow it to stop with an Indo-Chinese nukefest. The logic of it is, you will feel our pain too. Sheer nuclear blackmail... but it has replaced cold war notions of MAD in a hurry.

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As someone pointed out in an earlier post, you have different categories of jehadis. AQ if it posseses a JDAM will use it on the US, if it can transport the device physically into the US, not easy now with all the sensors/sniffers at US entry points as well as at various US highways/bridges etc. Similarly Hamas/Hezbollah if they have a JDAM will use it against Israel. The question is where will they get their hands on material to make even a dirty bomb. That is where Herr Musharaff's country comes in and the Pakistan Army's brazen blackmail wherein it essentially tells the US, "All bets are off if you threaten our existence". It is a completely different situation vis a vis China i.e. the US is not threatening China.

Jehadis threatening the US or Israel with nukes are not really India's concern. It is the ones who threaten India that we're worried about, and the discussion on this thread has to do with the scope of our retaliation to a JDAM. In the same way as the US is not threatening China, China is not the one threatening India with a JDAM... Pakistan is. Yet we talk about extending retaliation to China as well, because of Chinese proliferation to Pakistan in the first place.

But why should we imagine that China will allow themselves to be set back 500 years from Indian nuclear attacks if India is determined to extend such retaliation to them? Why will the Chinese let the US get away unscathed in the event of such an impending threat to themselves? I'm sure they wouldn't like the US to go laughing happily to the bank with $1T worth of debt forgiven while they find their own superpower aspirations dashed back to the stone age.

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The Chinese have always gone to war with the objective of attaining specific political objectives. Even if they have not *won certain wars*, they achieved the political objectives they set out with. Committing national suicide is not one of their political objectives, even for the sake of their pet rabies infected dog a.k.a. Pakistan. And based on their past behaviour of ultimately meeting rational objectives it will be inconsistent for them to want to commit national suicide by attacking the US.

I think you might be confusing some fundamentally different political concepts here. Deterrence is not about suicide-- it's about imposing the threat of unacceptable costs. Convincing the enemy that you are ready and willing to impose those costs even at the risk of your own annihilation , a.k.a. brinkmanship, has always been a part of deterrence mechanisms. The political objective is not something you achieve by fighting a nuclear war... the political objective IS never having to fight the nuclear war.

Hence, as KG has explained, the Chinese will achieve a very important political objective by threatening the US with retaliation in case of an Indian nuke attack on themselves. They will leave the US with only one relatively safe option... an agreement along with China to nuke India immediately following a Pakistani or Jihadi nuclear attack on India, terminating the Beg chain of events at that stage.

The Chinese will say, if the Indians make an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange into an India-Pakistan-China nuclear exchange, we will take it further into an India-Pakistan-China-US nuclear exchange. You, the Americans, have only one choice... you collaborate with us to ensure that it *stays* an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange, by nuking India along with us, and ending the whole story right there on the subcontinent.

This is a safe option for the US because, as I said before, China *has* the ability to stage a nuclear attack on the United States, while India *does not*.

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I would say that unlike China, India's political leadership is not ruthless (and given India's political system cannot afford to be ruthless) enough in the pursuit of its national objectives. As such, testing a Surya IMO will be very counter productive from the viewpoint of India's overall interests. It will do India more harm than good at this point in time. If you look at the obvious holes in the logic of the Beg paradigm, especially Chinese behaviour in terms of their national political objectives, the subsequent logic for developing the Surya currently becomes superflous. A non country specific SLBM capability is far more credible and less threatening.

If we say that India should predicate its geopolitical strategies on the assumption that our leadership is incapable of being ruthless, we've lost already.

I honestly do not see any holes in the Beg paradigm. An observation of Chinese behaviour in terms of their objectives thus far, cannot be extended to cover this eventuality... Indian nuclear retaliation against them because of irrational Pakistani/Jehadi nuclear attack against us... because it is an entirely unique situation driven by an irrational actor (who may or may not be within Beijing's power to keep on a tight leash at this point).

Thus far all nuclear threats to them have come from the USSR (later Russia) or the United States, both of whom understood and played by the rules of cold-war deterrence. *If* India explicitly or implicitly threatens the Chinese with such retaliation... that is the basis on which all of this discussion is predicated... the Chinese can either face the prospect of such retaliation by themselves ,or they can threaten to involve the United States to gain more leverage. I don't think there's any doubt which way they will go.

As for SLBMs, "long-range sub-orbital bombers" and so on... Johann has offered such pacifiers to BR jingos before. I don't believe they have any credible deterrence value vis-a-vis the United States. Think about it... we don't even have an indigenous nuclear-*powered* submarine, quite necessary if we're going to base missiles in the ocean for long periods of time... nor any tested means of launching anything from our submarine fleet. In that technological realm we're not even at square one, and it could be years if not decades before we even approximate that capability. The US, meanwhile, already has decades of experience tracking and hunting SLBM boats, which would prove a distinct advantage. Also, there is little doubt in my mind that as we came closer to actually having an SLBM capability, the US would suddenly decide to find that quite as threatening and country-specific as the Surya. Talking of SLBMs , IMO, is nothing but a way of postponing the inevitable.

On the other hand we already have the GSLV, and a well-funded, concerted effort could possibly yield a fully functional Surya in a year or less. Hadn't this best be done before we enter into any sort of ill-advised deal with the US whereby we'd be dependent on their noblesse oblige for nuclear fuel?

Adding to the urgency, of course, is the fact that the jehadis will not operate on a convenient or predictable time schedule. They might have a JDAM in Bangalore or Hyderabad next month; they might have one assembled right now. They will not wait for us to develop SLBMs or sub-orbital-whatsits. It is all very well to say "Hunooz Dilli Door Asth" today, but if we suddenly find ourselves facing KGoan's scenario... we had better have the ability to deter the US from going along with any Chinese plan to confine the resulting nuclear conflagration to the Indian subcontinent.

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Ultimately the Chinese have to be made to realize that by directly threatening India's security by providing nukes to Pakistan, that they could end up paying the price for their reckless behaviour. That it is in their own interest to keep their rabid dog on a tight leash. Surely they do not want to have to pay the price of reverting as opium junkies for the misdeeds of Pakistan. They have to be made to understand that their reckless behaviour will have consequences on their own safety.

Anything else will reinforce the image of India as a pushover, however slick the rationalizations are and by whatever name they are called. India has built up its fissile material capacity for a reason i.e. to be able to talk to the Chinese mano a mano, not to rationalize away Indian inaction.

Absolutely, I agree with you there. The only ingredient missing is the level of deterrence which will prevent the US and Chinese from colluding to restrict an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange to the Indian subcontinent by collaboratively nuking India. The stakes being what they are, this is not a risk we can allow ourselves to take.

With a reported 18 Chinese missiles aimed at the US what kind of threat is that? For even a minimum credible threat I would expect a LOT more missiles with Multiple nukes. "Lot" = at least saturate a defence system in 2025.

I feel that the US is trying to maintain the current status to prevent just that.

So, even more than Agni 3, it is the ATV and like that will determine Indian capabilities in the future.

Also, all nations that shelved anything threatening to the US have always been told that they will be provided with a reward. The fact that India never has been (I do NOT see the nuke deal to be a reward) leads me to believe that India has been told to shelf techs on a needs basis. Or at least that is what India seems to have bargained for.

BTW, the language of threat is all Chicom and TSP and Jihadis understand - I am not saying that they will agree and do what we say, but any other language such as CBMs, etc is utter nonsense.

If Indian policy planners believed in the "Beg paradigm", the following would have happened:

India would have kept its nuke arsenal Pak specific i.e. 40-50 warheads and Agni 1 at most. But what is the reality? Anywhere upwards of 200 to may be 1000 plus warheads and drawing aside the curtain on Agni 3 which is very China specific. What it means is that India is in the process of deterring China. Per the Beg paradigm India should just GUBO to China and give up. Obviously Indian policy planners do not believe that to be the case.

If Chinese policy planners believed in the "Beg paradigm", the following would have happened:

Much faster expansion and modernization of Chinese land based ICBMs. The fact is that the Chinese even now, show no signs of an acceleration in their long range missile capability and are in the low 2 digit range inspite of all that India is doing to modernize its arsenal is an indication that they do not believe in the Beg paradigm. They have been at that "18" number for the last 10 years if I recall, maybe longer. The move to the more modern solid fuelled DF-31 ICBMs is taking 10 years and more. For the Chinese to convince the US that they subscribe to the Beg paradim, they should have a few hundred ICBMs targetting the US and inspite of India modernizing its forces and deploying Agni 2 and now unveiling Agni 3, the Chinese are not responding in terms of their US targetting.

If both India and China by their actions do not believe in the Beg paradigm, what does that tell you about its credibility? ZB's remarks could be construed to mean lots of things, not necessarily the Beg paradigm and even if did mean the Beg paradigm, he is a "has been" who does not have input into US policy. His own pet theories are part of what the now banned Sanjay M calls the "Atlantists", who have been in retreat on the US policy planning circuit for some time.

< hint >What moves would make the cost highest for a jihadi who is concerned about the spread of Islam and Islamism and is not concerned about pain or death on any scale. < /hint >

Enough hard power to keep the people who control the jihadis in check - this includes sufficient Indian power to safeguard its trade routes. The whole medieval Islamic/later European colonial domination had to do with their control over trade routes to India. I should say, the economic basis of empire over India was this control of trade routes.

Secondly, growing soft power to turn back nasty ideologies. This soft power can grow much faster than the economy, but is underpinned by a healthy economy.

As a gardener, I see two approaches to controlling weeds. E.g., in flower beds, one has to physically exterminate weeds, otherwise weeds will dominate. The mental model is that of delicate plants that need protection from invaders by ruthless action.

In the lawn, a second strategy is available - healthy grass doesn't let weeds get established. Only problems because of drought or miswatering, wrong application of fertilizer, soil compaction because of excessive foot traffic, etc., creates weak spots where weeds can gain a foothold. The mental image here is that grass is tough, only where we handicap it does it lose out.

I believe in the second version of India - only where we artificially handicap India is it vulnerable to cr*p. Indian civilization is not a delicate hot house thing that needs coddling.

If both India and China by their actions do not believe in the Beg paradigm, what does that tell you about its credibility? ZB's remarks could be construed to mean lots of things, not necessarily the Beg paradigm and even if did mean the Beg paradigm, he is a "has been" who does not have input into US policy. His own pet theories are part of what the now banned Sanjay M calls the "Atlantists", who have been in retreat on the US policy planning circuit for some time.

ldev, India's ability to target China is irrelevant in the whole pak-China-US-India scenario. Also, Rudradev's post was more about US's reaction rather than China's reaction. The US has no intention of reining in Paki nukes as it is an interesting foil to destabilize the region, which is in the US's interests, if they end up at the losing end of the game in central Asia.

Also, the halfbright clones/atlanticists in the state dept. are not gone by any means -- they just don't have any influence in the current administration --- they will certainly rear their ugly heads once the current dispensation loses control over policy making.

A_Gupta wrote:

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I believe in the second version of India - only where we artificially handicap India is it vulnerable to cr*p. Indian civilization is not a delicate hot house thing that needs coddling.

The phrase "Indian Civilization" keeps getting thrown about with great abandon out here on BRF, but really the GOI, including the current peon in charge, and the quasi-communist elements like Nehru (who studied the quaint natives of India in his books), do not believe in the "Indian Civilization". The above statement is along the lines of "Fluffy pink elephants will never become extinct".

Besides,everything that is valued by us needs to be protected, including whatever we have that comes under the banner of "Indian civilization" -- there is no force field around such stuff, and the local populace can be easily manipulated by external forces to eschew their origins (for example, via aggressive proselytization, which is again supported by the peon in charge), and when the local populace no memory of its roots, or has nothing but contempt for its roots, there will be no such thing as an Indian civilization.

If India had 20-40 nukes it is conceivable that the US would be tempted to strike to stop the escalation at the India level because of the probability that it could take out all/most of the Indian capability. But if India has 1000 nukes, can the US be certain that it can take out all 1000 warheads? Completely unlikely. Therefore, even with a US first strike, India will strike China and the so called "Beg paradigm" will result in escalation. Without having a Surya, India has already neutralized the Beg paradigm because neither the US nor China are now certain that they can defang India. The proof? The current India-US nuclear dialogue.

Shiv: I also think it is a mirage that the Jihadi fights for Islam alone. IRoP Jihadis are most motivated by their hate for India, Israel does not generate the same response in IRoP. For Hamas/Hezbollah it is Israel. OBL did not target Israel, but the US as in his eyes the US presence in KSA (his country) was a violition of his religion. So the Jihadist comes in all mixed hues and shades and seldom for the sake of Islam alone. The violence is a means to an end and not just for the sake of it. With this alone, I will have to conclude that an IRoP origin JDAM is destined for India alone.

I tend to see it as follows.

What is the difference between an Islamist madman and just any madman? For example what is the difference between say Lex Luthor and an Islamist madman with a nuke?

The difference is Islamism. No matter how small and insignificant Islamist madmen take at least a small degree of support from Islam and Islamic causes. In doing that they get support and recruits from sections of the ummah.

I see that as a way of getting them by the balls.

Let me explain.

What does Pakistan say about a nuke attack or an attack on their nukes? They say no matter who attacks we will nuke India.

That is an easy example to follow and must be followed.

No matter who or what the jihadis target it - we blame Islam. Islam and Muslims are at fault.

The advantage in this attitude is that you don't even have to wait for an attack. The threat of a jihadi using a nuke is enough to reach that conclusion.

If that conclusion and actions based on that conclusion are to be reversed - the onus has to be put on the ummah as well - to check jihadis. The jihadis nuke wielder is NOT Lex Luthor. Lex Luthor had his aims and has his support system. But it is NOT Islam.

This is a diffcult choice to talk about or say out loud, but the subject is a serious one and needs drastic solutions. Let the Ummah reject Jihdis. Let Pakistanis and Saudis (people on the ground - aam junta) start condemning Jihadis and not supporting the same causes as Jihadis. That would start making people think "Hey maybe its not islamism - its Lex Luthor"

Jihadis need to lose even the support they get from the ummah. Why allow them that? This is not cricket. If that support does not go - then the supporters are allies of the jihadis.

No matter who or what the jihadis target it - we blame Islam. Islam and Muslims are at fault.

The advantage in this attitude is that you don't even have to wait for an attack. The threat of a jihadi using a nuke is enough to reach that conclusion.

Commendable. Problem as I see it is how do you lump all the IMs, sections of who may well support jehadi nukes on desi soil, as responsible for TSP-jehadi actions. Hey, if it indeed is civilizational war as you say (and lemme hurry to clarify, I totally agree with that assessment), what about IM reaction? You're saying we'll do a response nuke strike while tackling civil war within our borders?

There are no easy ways out. And all the while it seems, our owen deceny and humanism and ideals of fairplay tie our hands down in a one sided fight with jehadis who seem to care for nothing. Somehow, in terms of spiritual and idological darwinism, I fear the jihadis may have the stronger genes (or memes) ...

In continuation of my post above. India has to incentivize the US to continue to cooperate with India on all the economic/technology issues which India needs. A very strong incentive is for India not to have a weapon capable of striking the US. An Indian nuclear capability which is survivable via numbers as well as SLBMs to target Pakistan and China will ensure that the US and the Chinese are incentivized to believe that the only option to prevent an escaltion is that there is no start to proceedings via a JDAM attack. Since the most likely source of material for a JDAM is the Pakistan military, the US and China will be incentivized to believe that their own security is dependent on very tight control and/or total nuke defanging of the Pakistan military. I think current Indian policy is geared to achieve precisely these objectives.

Added later:
It was an act of Chinese commission and US omission which resulted in Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons. The responsibility is on those two countries to restore their own security. India I am sure will help them in whatever way it can so that they achieve that objective.

If Indian policy planners believed in the "Beg paradigm", the following would have happened:

India would have kept its nuke arsenal Pak specific i.e. 40-50 warheads and Agni 1 at most. But what is the reality? Anywhere upwards of 200 to may be 1000 plus warheads and drawing aside the curtain on Agni 3 which is very China specific. What it means is that India is in the process of deterring China. Per the Beg paradigm India should just GUBO to China and give up. Obviously Indian policy planners do not believe that to be the case.

Umm, not. For one thing, India has always intended to possess a nuclear deterrent that was China specific, long before talk of the Beg paradigm was heard... so relating the observation that we have a China-specific deterrent to the conclusion that we must not believe in the possibility of a Beg chain of events is facile. Secondly, if Indian planners take the contingency of a Beg chain of events under consideration now that such a contingency *has* surfaced, they are not left with the sole option of scrapping their already existing China-specific nukes and cowering in fear. There is the far better option of acquiring deterrence against the US AND China. So... the mere fact that we don't restrict ourselves to a Pakistan-specific deterrent by no means indicates that we do not consider a Beg chain of events as a contingency.

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If Chinese policy planners believed in the "Beg paradigm", the following would have happened:

Much faster expansion and modernization of Chinese land based ICBMs. The fact is that the Chinese even now, show no signs of an acceleration in their long range missile capability and are in the low 2 digit range inspite of all that India is doing to modernize its arsenal is an indication that they do not believe in the Beg paradigm. They have been at that "18" number for the last 10 years if I recall, maybe longer. The move to the more modern solid fuelled DF-31 ICBMs is taking 10 years and more. For the Chinese to convince the US that they subscribe to the Beg paradim, they should have a few hundred ICBMs targetting the US and inspite of India modernizing its forces and deploying Agni 2 and now unveiling Agni 3, the Chinese are not responding in terms of their US targetting.

Again, as I've said so many times, Beg paradigm isn't about MAD. The Chinese do not need to hurry up and establish an arsenal capable of entirely destroying the US, in order to blackmail them in the Beg fashion. Pakistan, where it all originates, doesn't have the capacity to utterly destroy India in the first place.

In all cases... the Pakis, ourselves and the Chinese have the capacity to impose unacceptable costs on the next step up the ladder. Secondly, the Chinese and the Americans have the capacity to utterly destroy India with nukes if acting in concert. Thirdly, India has the capacity to impose unacceptable costs on China but *not* the United States. That's all it takes for a Beg balance of terror to be established... one that is very, very detrimental to India's security.

To say that because the Chinese haven't spent all their money and effort on developing a nuclear arsenal that could completely destroy the United States, or raced ahead and built hundreds of US-specific ICBMs in response to an Agni III test that has yet to occur, and therefore the Chinese have ruled out the Beg option for themselves is, likewise, facile. It ignores the myriad other geopolitical and economic compulsions on the Chinese that are extremely important outside of the contingency of an Indian nuclear attack in response to a Pakistani nuclear strike on India... but which would become quite meaningless if the Chinese were actually faced with such a situation.

Threatening a Beg chain of events is not something you plan your entire long-term nuclear security on. It is an option that becomes available when you have the capacity to inflict nuclear strikes on a party that has not itself attacked you with nuclear weapons, and blackmail them with involvement in a nuclear exchange between yourself and some third party. It is a poor man's form of deterrence, and doesn't require the sort of arsenal buildups that cold-war type deterrence did in order to effect. Guarding *against* it, however, for India in particular, will compel India to go in for deterrence against *all* nuclear arsenals anywhere in the world.

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If both India and China by their actions do not believe in the Beg paradigm, what does that tell you about its credibility? ZB's remarks could be construed to mean lots of things, not necessarily the Beg paradigm and even if did mean the Beg paradigm, he is a "has been" who does not have input into US policy. His own pet theories are part of what the now banned Sanjay M calls the "Atlantists", who have been in retreat on the US policy planning circuit for some time.

Again, I would question the observation that India and China's actions necessarily or sufficiently indicate that they do not "believe in the Beg paradigm", or consider the possibility in their strategic thinking. As for the Atlanticists, or Internationalists...as Rye says, they are the alternative school of thought to the Neocons, whose credibility is swiftly being eroded. All it will take is a democratic administration to bring the ideological children of ZB back into the corridors of power in DC.

But even that hardly matters. The realization that collaborating with China to nuke India after a Pakistani nuke attack on India, is the best solution to terminate a Beg chain of events at the level of India does not require one to be an Atlanticist or Neocon in order to develop. Particularly when India's retaliatory capability is restricted to China and cannot cover the US.

Here's why.
A nuke going off is simply too HUGE an event for common janta not to get roused. Satell. photos, int'l media, the internet, rumours etc will ensure that GOI isn't anywhere near likely to succeed in whitewashing a nuke strike on our soil.

That said, Jehadi nukes are likely to be used in conjunction with a buildup of ISI inspired and aggravated sedition, tension and communal flaming. All these temple, civilian, mosque attacks were mere lab tests. When the big one comes, a few orchestrated "attacks" on muzlims (pig carcasses across mosques, women raped and killed and left in public etc) will ensure a combustible mix.
What does all that add to? Combine that with your assertion of what the GOI *should* do:

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No matter who or what the jihadis target it - we blame Islam. Islam and Muslims are at fault.

I'd find it hard to believe that when you "blame islam" as in you're not going to get a cornered-animal response from the more excitable elements among the IMs, with broad support from the rest of the IMs.
Which is where the (quasi-?) civil war scenario comes into play.
Responding to a nuke strike on our soil while IMs all over the country go on the boil? Every ISI agent, every criminal, every corrupt politico, every sabouteur worth his/her/its salt will know this is the time to maximize mayhem and no other.
Heck, desperate times call for desperate measures. Chances are we'll o what it takes, even if the toll is in 10s of 1000s to get the internal situtaion under a tight lid while steelily taking out the external threat with a nuke response.
But hey, I'm not entirely confident we're upto THAT order of ruthlessness.

At the risk of repeating myself - India has broken out of the constraints imposed by the "Beg paradigm", by virtue of the sheer number of nukes which it has led the US and China to believe it possesses. All the calculations which demonstrate India's fissile material production capacity and the unveiling of the Agni 3 are designed to convey just such a message. India was possibily vulnerable to the Beg paradigm 5-7 years ago and that post 2 years ago was based on that information. But times have changed. And as it secures a SLBM capability, India will be secure from any vestiges of the Beg paradigm. As things stand today because neither the US nor China is confident that a first strike will not leave India with sufficient reserve capability to seriously damage China, the Beg paradigm is no longer a credible proposition vis a vis India. India does not have to threaten the US directly for it to achieve deterrence from the Beg paradigm. India only needs the Chinese to believe that notwithstanding a US/Chinese first strike, India will still be able to inflict unacceptable damage to China to make the Chinese escalation to the US redundant. IMO, India has already achieved that. Otherwise the US would not be talking to India on nuclear matters.

If India had 20-40 nukes it is conceivable that the US would be tempted to strike to stop the escalation at the India level because of the probability that it could take out all/most of the Indian capability. But if India has 1000 nukes, can the US be certain that it can take out all 1000 warheads? Completely unlikely. Therefore, even with a US first strike, India will strike China and the so called "Beg paradigm" will result in escalation. Without having a Surya, India has already neutralized the Beg paradigm because neither the US nor China are now certain that they can defang India. The proof? The current India-US nuclear dialogue.

For one thing, where is this 1000 nukes coming from? Secondly, how does 1000 or 5000 nukes make us any safer from a US nuclear attack when we don't have Surya, SLBMs or anything else to deliver them with? Thirdly, how does the current India-Nuclear dialogue in any way indicate that India has neutralized the Beg paradigm, when in fact it is all about opening up our nuclear program, being pressured to sign an FMCT, being pressured not to test Agni 3 let alone Surya by threatening congressional disapproval? Every one of those measures can be viewed as calculated to ensure, that the US *will* be able to stop the Beg escalation at the level of India without any risk to itself.

At the risk of repeating myself - India has broken out of the constraints imposed by the "Beg paradigm", by virtue of the sheer number of nukes which it has led the US and China to believe it possesses. All the calculations which demonstrate India's fissile material production capacity and the unveiling of the Agni 3 are designed to convey just such a message. India was possibily vulnerable to the Beg paradigm 5-7 years ago and that post 2 years ago was based on that information. But times have changed. And as it secures a SLBM capability, India will be secure from any vestiges of the Beg paradigm. As things stand today because neither the US nor China is confident that a first strike will not leave India with sufficient reserve capability to seriously damage China, the Beg paradigm is no longer a credible proposition vis a vis India. India does not have to threaten the US directly for it to achieve deterrence from the Beg paradigm. India only needs the Chinese to believe that notwithstanding a US/Chinese first strike, India will still be able to inflict unacceptable damage to China to make the Chinese escalation to the US redundant. IMO, India has already achieved that. Otherwise the US would not be talking to India on nuclear matters.

With some real stretching of the imagination, it's possible to conceive that China alone might not be able to completely neutralize India's nuclear arsenal (of 1000 warheads if that is even accurate) with a first strike. All the more incentive for the Chinese to take the Beg paradigm one further step and involve the US. But a combined US-China strike? Come on. They could pretty well wipe India out if they did that together. And worse come to worst, if they did not... the US still would not stand to lose as much as China.

For one thing, where is this 1000 nukes coming from? Secondly, how does 1000 or 5000 nukes make us any safer from a US nuclear attack when we don't have Surya, SLBMs or anything else to deliver them with? Thirdly, how does the current India-Nuclear dialogue in any way indicate that India has neutralized the Beg paradigm, when in fact it is all about opening up our nuclear program, being pressured to sign an FMCT, being pressured not to test Agni 3 let alone Surya by threatening congressional disapproval? Every one of those measures can be viewed as calculated to ensure, that the US *will* be able to stop the Beg escalation at the level of India without any risk to itself.

If the India-US nuclear dialogue is about the US finding out more information about Indian capability, it offers India an opportunity to convey to the US that Indian capability can withstand the Beg paradigm.

As far as the 1000 nukes is concerned, refer to certain references in the Nuclear thread ala Arun S. Its not a black and white issue but something designed to cause uncertainty i.e. India could have a 1000 warheads. That ambiguity will ensure that the Beg paradigm is not exercised.

India today needs US technology and economic cooperation to grow at the 10% pa economic growth rate. It also needs deterrence via a survivable nuclear deterent. It also needs to deter a JDAM attack. The present Indian posture ensures that all these requirements are met. Your prescription of testing the Surya willl immediately negate technology and economic cooperation without which the very foundation of India's ability to grow at 8-10% per annum and fund a modern military will be jeopardized. Obviously GOI is aware of this and hence their current strategy. And that is why I stated that testing the Surya will do India more harm than good unless India believes that India faces an immediate unprovoked nuclear threat from the US (not related to the Beg paradigm). That IMO is a laughable proposition.

US technology in the areas of missile defence is moving to be able to neutralize a handful of missiles not a blanket salvo consisting of hundreds of missiles launched at the US. Testing and deploying Surya will not buy India deterrence from the US unless India develops enough missiles to overwhelm any potential US missile defence i.e India will need Surya's on the same scale as the Russians have ICBMs. The reason the US is not really paranoid about Chinese missiles is precisely because they are a handful in number and the US can neutralize them. But testing the first Surya will invite US economic strangulation of India such that the Indian economy will not be able to support the funding for those hundreds of Surya's and maintain its conventional forces. Pretty much like the mess the Russian military is in i.e. trying to maintain a superpower military on a non superpower economy.

India today needs US technology and economic cooperation to grow at the 10% pa economic growth rate. It also needs deterrence via a survivable nuclear deterent. It also needs to deter a JDAM attack. The present Indian posture ensures that all these requirements are met.

What is the present Indian posture? "no first use". I would like to state NO ONE with any understanding of realpolitik would consider NFU stances as worth the paper it is written on. Why? Let me show you how easy it is for a state to move from this stance to the opposite...there, now we are no longer NFU...there, now we are back to NFU again

Seriously, in a domain where a trust deficit between all the actors is not just a given -- it is one of the fundamental axioms -- proclaiming that a NFU stance somehow makes us a non-threatening nation is laughable. This is why the TSJ's of the world talk about India aiming missiles at the US -- they do not give any credibility to NFU and neither should we.

This stance makes absolutely no difference when it comes to a JDAM attack on India by the pakjihadis, with the willing collusion of the US and China -- the NFU is absolutely and thoroughly worthless in countering this threat.

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Your prescription of testing the Surya willl immediately negate technology and economic cooperation without which the very foundation of India's ability to grow at 8-10% per annum and fund a modern military will be jeopardized.

"Testing" a Surya is a political decision, and it must be done after ensuring that the alignments of the moon and the stars are all well and good, and the wind is blowing in the right direction, etc. But developing such a capability is a strategic decision, and one can only hope that the overt peacenik cr@p emanating from the PM's mouth and from those of the leftist establishment in control is just a front, and that behind the scenes, we are moving in the right direction.

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\ Obviously GOI is aware of this and hence their current strategy. And that is why I stated that testing the Surya will do India more harm than good unless India believes that India faces an immediate unprovoked nuclear threat from the US (not related to the Beg paradigm). That IMO is a laughable proposition.

At some point down the line, all three parties US, China, and Pakistan need to be deterred from joining hands against India, as it is their collusion that is an existentialist threat to India.... maybe it is not wise to make such noises at this point in time, not least because there is no such thing as a Surya yet.

If the India-US nuclear dialogue is about the US finding out more information about Indian capability, it offers India an opportunity to convey to the US that Indian capability can withstand the Beg paradigm.

As far as the 1000 nukes is concerned, refer to certain references in the Nuclear thread ala Arun S. Its not a black and white issue but something designed to cause uncertainty i.e. India could have a 1000 warheads. That ambiguity will ensure that the Beg paradigm is not exercised.

The Beg paradigm begins with Pakistan's arsenal. They certainly don't have the arsenal necessary to utterly destroy India as India's could utterly destroy them. However, they have made their intentions clear in this matter. One nuclear warhead of Pakistani origin exploding in India is all it takes. If we make our intent known, explicitly or implicitly, that we would retaliate against China in that situation... the Beg paradigm is already exercised, no matter how much ambiguity exists about the size of our arsenal. In fact, the more ambiguous the size of our arsenal, the greater the threat perception the Chinese would have to consider to themselves in that situation, hence the greater the incentive for the Chinese to extend the Beg paradiagm one step further... with the results KGoan has described.

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India today needs US technology and economic cooperation to grow at the 10% pa economic growth rate. It also needs deterrence via a survivable nuclear deterent. It also needs to deter a JDAM attack. The present Indian posture ensures that all these requirements are met. Your prescription of testing the Surya willl immediately negate technology and economic cooperation without which the very foundation of India's ability to grow at 8-10% per annum and fund a modern military will be jeopardized. Obviously GOI is aware of this and hence their current strategy.

As for India's economic growth... the process began, and continued unhindered, through all the years the US had imposed sanctions on us post Pokhran-II. Today there is a far greater degree of economic engagement with the US (something I have always supported increasing). You observe that the US is willing to live with, and not be paranoid about 18 Chinese ICBMs pointed at them... and continues economic cooperation with the Chinese anyway. So why are we so fearful that the US will economically strangle us (or that they COULD economically strangle us without losing out themselves), in the event of a Surya test? If they would actually do such a thing... then they must really, really fear the Beg paradigm... which makes it all the more critical for us to establish that deterrence.

We certainly need economic cooperation with the US, and technological cooperation would be most welcome, but it must never come at the cost of our security which is most certainly threatened given our current state of deterrence. Before we sell ourselves short yet again, let us remind ourselves that the US has much to gain by technological and economic cooperation with India also. If they are confident in their ability to handle small numbers of ICBMs, why would they deprive their corporations of the world's largest emerging market on the basis of a Surya test? Surely India has more to offer the US, than the US would like to throw out of the window for that reason.

I'm also far from convinced of the importance of the India-US nuclear deal for India's continuing economic growth. The Hobson's choice it presents is that either India meet too small a degree of her energy needs from US-built N-plants for it to really have a significant impact, or India make itself dependent on the whims of the US Congress and future US administrations for an assured supply of nuclear fuel to drive her economy... both of which are very bad ways to go. Still, that is a matter for another thread.

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And that is why I stated that testing the Surya will do India more harm than good unless India believes that India faces an immediate unprovoked nuclear threat from the US (not related to the Beg paradigm). That IMO is a laughable proposition.

I agree that it is an extremely unlikely proposition-- but I don't know that I would go so far as to say it is laughable. 1971 may be unimaginable today, but its shadow has rather taken the humor out of that proposition for the Indian strategic community.

However, it is important to realize that there are many different forms the Beg paradigm can take. It does not have to involve China at all. Today, we know that the Pakistanis are enjoying the fruits of having successfully imposed nuclear blackmail on the United States. India cannot retaliate against terrorist attacks militarily, nor seek to solve the Kashmir problem on its own terms, without fear of the US stopping us for exactly this reason: the Pakistanis can impose nuclear threats of unacceptable cost on the US, via the spectre of a jehadi JDAM... while we cannot even deter the US from attacking us, should that ever become necessary. Now that is an equation I would find laughable, if I were a Pakistani.

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US technology in the areas of missile defence is moving to be able to neutralize a handful of missiles not a blanket salvo consisting of hundreds of missiles launched at the US. Testing and deploying Surya will not buy India deterrence from the US unless India develops enough missiles to overwhelm any potential US missile defence i.e India will need Surya's on the same scale as the Russians have ICBMs. The reason the US is not really paranoid about Chinese missiles is precisely because they are a handful in number and the US can neutralize them. But testing the first Surya will invite US economic strangulation of India such that the Indian economy will not be able to support the funding for those hundreds of Surya's and maintain its conventional forces. Pretty much like the mess the Russian military is in i.e. trying to maintain a superpower military on a non superpower economy.

India may not be a superpower economy yet, but we're certainly no Soviet economy either. I am sure any buildup of forces, conventional or nuclear, will be calibrated to our economy's ability to sustain it (1000 warheads, being the figure you cite, cannot exactly be cheap to maintain either).

We have not prevented Pakistani or Chinese-by-proxy nuclear blackmail from advancing our own efforts at accelerated economic growth. Likewise, we cannot allow the spectre of US economic blackmail to prevent us from establishing the deterrence we need to ensure our own security. If the US goes ahead and imposes sanctions (at no small cost to itself), other nations will still be willing to trade with us, if the post-Pokhran-II situation is any indication. The world is not exactly keen to follow the US' lead at cost to themselves, as events over the last five years have amply demonstrated. If it means that our economic growth is somewhat slowed from 10% p.a. until the US decides to cut their own losses and be mature about dealing with us once again, so be it... not all the liberalization and prosperity in the world is worth the risk of nuclear devastation.

Sooner or latter, the wisdom of having 2k bums will dawn on smart folks (my rant of last few years).
Can USA afford to have spread of ISlamic BUms along with Chinese bums? Chinese and Islamist have both shown their co-ordinated antagonism toward Uncle.
The weakest and the stoopidest link in this supooooosed Beg's Ladder is the existense of IROTLAND.Pre -empting PUKEs with NUKEs is still the best and safe option for all. Next month wind will start blowing to West from Indian side:The goodluck of this auspicious Muhurat should no go missing for long.