SKOPJE, Macedonia, Feb. 13 (UPI) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin warned
on Tuesday, in an interview he granted to the French television channel TF1,
that unilateral U.S.-British military action against Iraq would be a "grave
mistake" and an "unreasonable use of force." Russia might veto it
in the Security Council, he averred. In a joint declaration with France and
Germany, issued the same day, he called to enhance the number of arms inspectors
in Iraq as an alternative to war.

Only weeks ago Russia was written off, not least by myself, as a satellite of
the United States. This newfound assertiveness has confounded analysts and
experts everywhere. Yet, appearances aside, it does not signal a fundamental
shift in Russian policy or worldview.

Russia could not resist the temptation of playing once more the Leninist game
of "inter-imperialist contradictions." It has long masterfully
exploited chinks in NATO's armor to further its own economic, if not
geopolitical, goals. Its convenient geographic sprawl -- part Europe, part Asia
-- allows it to pose as both a continental power and a global one with interests
akin to those of the United States. Hence the verve with which it delved into
the war against terrorism, recasting internal oppression and meddling abroad as
its elements.

As Vladimir Lukin, deputy speaker of the Duma observed recently, with Britain
having swerved too far toward America, Russia may yet become an intermediary
between a bitterly disenchanted United States and an irked Europe and between
the rich, industrialized West and developing countries in Asia. Publicly, the
United States has only mildly disagreed with Russia's reluctance to countenance
a military endgame in Iraq -- while showering France and Germany with vitriol
for saying, essentially, the same things.

The United States knows that Russia will not jeopardize the relevance of the
Security Council -- one of the few remaining hallmarks of past Soviet grandeur
-- by vetoing an U.S.-sponsored resolution. But Russia cannot be seen to be
abandoning a traditional ally and a major customer (Iraq) and newfound friends
(France and Germany) too expediently.

Nor can Putin risk further antagonizing Moscow hardliners who already regard
his perceived "Gorbachev-like" obsequiousness and far reaching
concessions to the United States as treasonous. The scrapping of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the expansion of NATO to Russia's borders, the
U.S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia's "near abroad"
-- are traumatic reversals of fortune.

An agreed consultative procedure with the crumbling NATO hardly qualifies as
ample compensation. There are troubling rumblings of discontent in the army. A
few weeks ago, a Russian general in Chechnya refused Putin's orders publicly,
and with impunity. Additionally, according to numerous opinion polls, the vast
majority of Russians oppose an Iraqi campaign.

By aligning itself with the fickle France and the brooding and somnolent
Germany, Russia is warning the United States that it should not be taken for
granted and that there is a price to pay for its allegiance and good services.
But Putin is not Boris Yeltsin, his inebriated predecessor who over-played his
hand in opposing NATO's operation in Kosovo in 1999, only to be sidelined,
ignored and humiliated in the postwar arrangements.

Russia wants a free hand in Chechnya and to be heard on international issues.
It aspires to secure its oil contracts in Iraq -- worth tens of billions of
dollars -- and the repayment of $9 billion in old debts by the post-bellum
government. It seeks pledges that the oil market will not be flooded by a
penurious Iraq. It desires a free hand in Ukraine, Armenia and Uzbekistan, among
others. Russia wants to continue to sell $4 billion a year in arms to China,
India, Iran, Syria and other pariahs unhindered.

Only the United States, the sole superpower, can guarantee that these demands
are met. Moreover, with a major oil producer such as Iraq as a U.S.
protectorate, Russia becomes a hostage to American goodwill. Yet, hitherto, all
Russia received were expression of sympathy, claimed Valeri Fyodorov, director
of Political Friends, an independent Russian think-tank, in an interview in the
Canadian daily National Post.

These are not trivial concerns. Russia's is a primitive economy, based on
commodities -- especially energy products -- and an over-developed weapons
industry. Its fortunes fluctuate with the price of oil, of agricultural produce
and with the need for arms, driven by regional conflicts.

Should the price of oil collapse, Russia may again be forced to resort to
multilateral financing, a virtual monopoly of the long arms of U.S. foreign
policy, such as the International Monetary Fund. The United States also has a
decisive voice in the World Trade Organization, membership thereof being a
Russian strategic goal.

It was the United States that sponsored Russia's seat at table of the G8 --
the Group of Eight industrialized states -- a much-coveted reassertion of the
Russian Federation's global weight. According to Rossiiskaya Gazeta, a Russian
paper, the United States already announced a week ago that it is considering
cutting Russia off U.S. financial aid -- probably to remind the former empire
who is holding the purse strings.

But siding with the United States risks alienating the all-important core of
Europe: Germany and France. Europe -- especially Germany -- is Russia's largest
export destination and foreign investor. Russia is not oblivious to that. It
would like to be compensated generously by the United States for assuming such a
hazard.

Still, Europe is a captive of geography and history. It has few feasible
alternatives to Russian gas, for instance. As the recent $7 billion investment
by British Petroleum proves, Russia -- and, by extension, Central and East
Europe -- is Europe's growth zone and natural economic hinterland.

Yet, it is the United States that captures the imagination of Russian
oligarchs and lesser businesses.

Russia aims to become the world's largest oil producer within the decade.
With this in mind, it is retooling its infrastructure and investing in new
pipelines and ports. The United States is aggressively courted by Russian
officials and "oiligarchs" -- the energy tycoons. With the Gulf states
cast in the role of anti-American Islamic militants, Russia emerges as a sane
and safe -- i.e., rationally driven by self-interest -- alternative supplier and
a useful counterweight to an increasingly assertive and federated Europe.