From The Transfer of
Power 1942-7, Volume IX The fixing of a time limit
and Volume X The Mountbatten Viceroyalty Formulation of a Plan, Eds.
Nicholas Mansergh and
Penderel Moon.

CommentIn the period 1946-early 1947, Punjab was ruled by a Coalition Ministry
of
Unionists, Sikhs and
Congress party members headed by Unionist leader Sir Khizr Hayat Khan
Tiwana. In the 1946 provincial elections, though the Muslim
League won the largest number of seats (77 out of 175), it had
been unable to form a majority coalition with other parties and
stake a claim to government.

In late-January 1947, the
Muslim League began an agitation against a ban imposed by the Coalition
Ministry
on the Muslim League National Guards. However, even after the ban on
the Guards was lifted a few days later, the Muslim League continued its
agitation, claiming that even without a legislative majority it
was entitled to use force to bring down the Khizr Hayat Ministry. The
League agitation which thus explicitly denied the legitimacy of a
Punjabi government with Hindus and Sikhs in it, hence, inevitably grew
increasingly communal in tone and more so in its later stages when
Hindu and
Sikh ripostes to it began.

On February 20, 1947, the British government announced that it
would withdraw from India by June 1948, that is, in approximately 16
months. This announcement greatly increased the political ferment
in Punjab. The Muslim League's efforts to wield power
over Punjab, the linchpin province of its envisioned future
Pakistan
became more urgent. The Unionist Party's proximity to and patronage
by the British Indian administration and the British Indian Army had
been the main sources of its power and legitimacy in
Punjab. The Unionist Party thus
immediately and swiftly lost prestige and position now that the British
had definitely decided to withdraw from the region and effectively
ditch their chief
subcontinental ally of many decades.

On 3rd March Sir Khizr Hayat finally decided to resign and in the
succeeding few days Punjab experienced widespread urban and rural
outbreaks of violence resulting in an estimated 3,500 (overwhelmingly
non-Muslim) deaths, widespread abductions of non-Muslim women and
forced conversions of non-Muslims, looting and arson and more
than
40,000 non-Muslim refugees. Within days the Congress demanded the
partition of the Punjab (this demand in
effect meant
that even if India as a whole remained united, the Congress position
was that Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs wanted the Punjab province
partitioned).

Ian Talbot writes in 'Khizr Tiwana,
the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India' :(quote)
The Punjab had been a powder keg for many months. It is nevertheless
significant, that within less than a week of Khizr's resignation,
communal violence had reached alarming proportions and the Congress had
demanded the partition of the province. For the first time, violence
spread from the cities to the countryside and took on the sinister
undertones of 'ethnic cleansing'. Whole villages in the Jhelum, Attock
and Rawalpindi districts were put to the sword. About 40,000 people,
mainly Sikhs had taken refuge in hurriedly established camps. The
outrage which many Sikh leaders felt at these assaults which were
orchestrated by Muslim National Guards and ex-servicemen[Jenkins to
Wavell, 17 March 1947] and condoned by Muslim League
politicians[Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947] fed a desire for
revenge which bred a civil war mentality..

The March violence destroyed any lingering hopes that the Punjab might
escape partition... The violence also destroyed the British system of
control in the countryside centred around such loyalist political
families as the Tiwanas. The collapse of Unionist influence created
political and administrative chaos.."
(end quotes)

Thus, in Punjab too as in other provinces, the failure
of top political leaders to reach agreement, and the intended use of
coercion
instead of compromise to advance political demands led to mass-level
communal polarization and chaos. This ground situation perversely
resulted in greatly reducing and constricting the options for
mutual settlement available to the British and political leaders,
Muslim, Sikh and Hindu to keep Punjab united. This turn of events in
Punjab had been foreseen
by the British governor, Sir Evan Jenkins who had warned the Punjab
Muslim League leadership about it well in advance.(end comment)

The following are
from The Transfer of
Power 1942-7, Volume IX The fixing of a time limit

Punjab situation. Continuation my telegram of 27th January. Reports of
the speeches made at meeting of January 27th which were
available on 28th January showed that Muslim League leaders were bent
on
defiance and that it would be useless for me to see Mamdot again.
Premier after full consultation with his colleagues issued statement
about 13-30 hours on 28th January withdrawing ban on R.S.S.S and
M.L.N.G. but indicating that general law and order position would be
held. During afternoon Muslim League leaders issued long statement and
made speeches alleging that by rights they should have been put in
office after general election and that they could no longer tolerate
denial by coalition Ministry of civil liberties. They intimated
that ban on M.L.N.G.. and its removal were of no (repeat no)
importance, that they had intended in any case to take direct action
against coalition Ministry and that direct action would be continued
until restrictions on processions and meetings were lifted and Ministry
resigned. I have so far seen only press summaries of statements and
speeches but Shaukat is reported to have said "Khizar Ministry must be
made to go no matter what cost to Muslim League. They would put out 15
million Muslims to break law".

2. Muslim League thus place themselves in constitutional position which
it is not easy to defend. They failed to form government after general
elections and have not yet defeated coalition Ministry in Assembly.
Budget
begins on 3rd March. Their argument is that because they are largest
single party they are entitled to dislodge coalition Ministry by show
of force. If this argument is accepted democratic government would
become impossible in the Punjab and Muslim League might ultimately
suffer more than any other party.

3. Premier had foreseen that [this] constitutional issue and after
uneasy day of demonstrations on 28th delivered premeditated
counter-attack on night of 28th-29th. All important League Leaders in
Lahore including Mamdot, Iftikaruddin, Firoz, Daultana were arrested
under Ordinance and sent for detention to places outside Lahore. Press
stoppage was put on all news of agitation other than government
communiques. Lahore still disturbed today and there have been further
disturbances in other districts. No loss of life yet reported and
situation generally in hand. Repeated to Viceroy.

3. On 1st February I had a long talk with General Messervy, who looked
in on me on his return journey from Delhi to Rawalpindi. I also had a
talk with Khizar, and suggested that he should now begin to consider
his long term position. I pointed out that he could neither keep the
Muslim League leaders in detention indefinitely, nor let them out
unconditionally in order that they might continue the agitation. Khizar
said that he would think the matter over, but until he was clear about
the attitude of the Muslim League High Command and probable
developments at the Centre, he could make no plans.
...
8. The resolution by the Muslim League High Command on the Punjab
situation was published in the newspapers this morning[n.b.], and does not strike me as
very impressive. The Muslim League have certain grievances, but the
Punjab Public Safety Ordinance, 1946, was certainly not directed
against the League and was not used against them before this agitation
began. In fact not a single Muslim League M.L.A. had been arrested or
interfered with in any way - the Ordinance was my doing, and I was able
to see that it was not abused. The statement does not mention at all
the threats of the Punjab leaders to oust the coalition Ministry by a
show of force, which is Khizar's real casus
belli.

I fear that the League have made it very difficult for themselves to
form a Government and have greatly advanced the case for the partition
of the Punjab. The agitation cannot fail to be communal, since the
Congress and the Sikhs are involved in the attack on the Premier.
However, it is possible that the League will in the end be more
conciliatory to the other communities, though as a party they are very
sadly lacking in brains and political sense.

[n.b.] The resolution on the
Punjab situation passed by the League Working Committee at Karachi on 1
February 1947 'noted with grave concern' the serious situation which
was developing in the Province. It strongly condemned the order
declaring the Muslim National Guards as an unlawful association 'which
amounted to a biggest and most high-handed attempt to suppress the
activities of the Muslim League in the Punjab.' After commenting on the
'fundamentally unrepresentative and unpopular character' of the
Punjab Ministry, the Committee stated that it was its 'considered
opinion and earnest advice to Muslims that they should maintain a
perfectly non-violent, disciplined firm and dignified attitude in their
protest against repression..."

Muslim League agitation has so far taken normal course of all Indian
passive resistance movements. Methods employed are hartals to ensure
mass idleness, organisation of processions and meetings in
contravention of law and dissemination of exaggerated false stories
about roughness of police, heroism of demonstrators and so on...

2. Agitation has sympathy of almost all Muslims official and
non-official. But police have been staunch and good humoured.
Participants are mainly politicians and their womenfolk and Muslims of
poorer classes. Villagers have joined demonstrations in some districts.
The objects of agitation are not generally understood and apart from
abuse of Khizar and Ministry slogans refer to Pakistan.

3. There has been little violence. One demonstrator died of injuries
received in lathi charge in Simla. No other fatal casualty reported.
..

5. Immediate situation is not alarming. But it might be worsened at any
minute by a clash between communities or between demonstrators and
police. Former danger is real but communal trouble seldom occurs during
a conflict between one community and the Government.
...
6. Agitation can end only in one of the following four ways. First. By
communal outbreak so violent that agitation is swamped by it. Second.
By outright defeat of League. Third. By straight defeat of Ministry.
Fourth. By a compromise.

7. First is possible but not in my judgment very likely for reason
given in paragraph 5. Ministry would probably attempt to remain in
office and control situation. Second is most improbable. Like first it
would leave Ministry in office. Third is possible but Muslim League
would not (repeat not) be able to form stable Ministry. Agitation has
convinced Hindus and Sikhs that League want undiluted Muslim Raj.
League ministry would therefore not materialise, or if formed with
venal support would be overthrown in turn by non-Muslim direct action.
Sikhs are of course incalculable and might co-operate with League but I
think not. Fourth is most likely ending but much depends on outcome of
present controversy at Centre. Compromise would need most skillful
handling if split between Premier and non-Muslims is to be avoided. It
might take form of abandonment of agitation in return for offer to
review working of Ordinance and to enlarge Cabinet. Majority of Muslim
League are against settlement but some are in favour.

..
8. It is quite impossible for one community to rule the Punjab with its
present boundaries. Long-term alternatives are therefore reversion to
Unionist principles with Muslim domination or partition which would
create intolerable minority problems. Effect of agitation is to force
second alternative on non-Muslims and to impair seriously long-term
prospects of Muslim League and Muslims generally. Muslim League are in
fact wantonly throwing away certainty of Muslim Leadership in a United
Punjab for uncertain advantages of a partition which Sikhs will
gradually now demand. But nobody has brains to understand this.

..
It is clear that the Muslim League could not run a stable Government in
the Punjab without support from some other party, even if they could
win over all the Unionist Muslims. The party strength as on the 11th
December was as follows:-

It is unlikely that the Muslim League would secure any firm support
from another party for a policy which was based on Pakistan, and I
agree with Jenkins' view expressed in his telegram of 8th February that
one community cannot possibly govern the Punjab with its present
boundaries. It will perhaps only be when the Muslim League have the
opportunity of forming a government that they will realise the full
facts of the situation.
..

You will recall that some time ago I wrote to you regarding the
impropriety of Muslim League Members of the Central Government issuing
public statements criticising the conduct of the Punjab Government in
grossly disparaging terms. You then replied to me that things
would improve but instead I notice in today's Dawn that the Finance Member
himself has issued a statement which not only offends in the above
mentioned respect, but seeks to draw, from the happening in the
Punjab, portent of what might be achieved on an all-India scale[n.b.1]. Things have been made worse
by a clear hint that matters [might] take a violent turn.

2. I also enclose a cutting from the
Free Press Journal (dated 7th February 1947) of Mr. Ghazanfar
Ali Khan's speech in Lahore. I would particularly invite attention to
the following passage:

"Mohammed Bin Kassim and Mahommed of Ghazni invaded India with armies
composed of only a few thousands and yet were able to overpower lakhs
of Hindus; God willing, a few lakhs of Muslims will yet overwhelm
crores of Hindus."

The parallel drawn significant, particularly in regard to Ghazni's
invasion, which consisted of repeated raids on India in which Hindus
were killed in thousands and temples were destroyed.

3. I am sure you will not regard with equanimity such utterances of
your two colleagues of the Cabinet. A more flagrant breach of the rules
of responsibility incumbent on Members of the Central Government would
be difficult to find. Instances like this only serve to strengthen our
conviction that a corporate body like the Central Government has ceased
to exist and that the sooner the present state of affairs is put an end
to, the better.

[n.b.1] Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan
was reported to have stated that he expected the Punjab Ministry to
fall as a result of the League's campaign. He added that the Punjab
demonstrations were an indication of what the League could do on an
all-India scale if it became necessary although 'I couldn't guarantee
that it would remain always non-violent.'

2. It is now possible to get the agitation into rather better
perspective. To understand it properly one must go back to the Census
tables, the essential figures in which are approximately as follows:-

Divisions.

Population 1941
(Round Millions)

Muslims

Others.

1. Rawalpindi

9

2

2. Multan

3. Lahore

4

3

4. Jullunder

3

7

5. Ambala

16

12

28

It is obvious on these figures that no one community can rule the
Punjab with its present boundaries, except by conquest. The peaceful
alternatives are a united Punjab under a Government representing
Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, or a partition into two or possibly three
separate States.

3.
...
After Sir Sikander's death the Muslim wing of the Unionist Party
disintegrated in circumstances which Your Excellency knows, and since
then the Muslim League have been determined- so far as their published
policy is concerned- to establish undiluted Muslim rule all over the
Punjab. This can certainly not be done by consent, and I am very
doubtful whether it could be done by conquest. Members of the Muslim
League are in fact much more liberal in private conversation that they
are in public, and some of them realise the difficulties inherent in
their official policy. But the fact remains that they fought the
General Election of 1946 on the extreme demand for Pakistan, and have
not since said a word to reassure the Hindus or the Sikhs. Even among
the more liberal of them the line seems to be that having established
undiluted Muslim rule they will be generous to the minorities.

4. The failure of the Muslim League to take office after the General
Election was due more to their uncompromising communal outlook than to
any other cause. I believe that the local Congress broke with them on
the old question of the inclusion of a nationalist Muslim in the
Cabinet, but the underlying suspicion was there. A Sikh, who says he
was present in the negotiations between the League and the
Akalis, has told me that the immediate terms offered by the
League were acceptable, but that the League leaders bluntly refused to
discuss the future of the Sikhs or to give any assurances to them. The
Sikhs felt that they could hardly maintain in power a party whose
avowed policy was to treat them as inferiors in a Muslim country.

5. Having failed to form a Ministry the Muslim League were inevitably
sore...

2. Position has been radically changed by His Majesty's Government's
statement of 20th February. Premier is now not prepared to go through
with repression, exercise of which could be successfully undertaken but
which would not facilitate peaceful transfer of power in 16 months'
time.
...
4. Premier's idea is to endeavour before, during and if necessary after
budget session to promote formation of All-Parties Ministry or
League-Sikh Coalition. It is clear that in new conditions Ministry
cannot carry on for long and that if chaos amounting possibly to civil
war is to be avoided there must be a Ministry representing the bulk of
Muslims and Sikhs.

5. I do not wish to be alarmist but during next few days and possibly
weeks the situation has most dangerous possibilities. Unless Muslim
League change their tone completely which seems most improbable there
may be an abandonment of present constitution and attempts to establish
Muslim or Sikh rule by force. I intend to avoid a Section 93 situation
if I possibly can but prospect of independence in 16 months' time is
not conducive to moderation and Muslim League will act under
instructions from Jinnah who knows little and cares less about the real
interests of the Punjab.

I reported last night to the Secretary of State and Your
Excellency by telegram that Khizar had resigned. The following is
a rather fuller account of what has happened.
..
3. Khizar's anxiety about his position was increased by the Muslim
League agitation, and increased still further by His Majesty's
Government's announcement of 20th February. As I reported in an earlier
letter, the announcement shook Khizar severely on 20th February, and
after an attempt to "laugh it off" on 21st (which I thought imprudent
to encourage) he became increasingly gloomy. (Sir E. Jenkins
[had] reported that 'on 20th
February, when I showed him the text of
the announcement, Khizar remarked that it was "the work of lunatics".
On 21st February he was in a more complacent mood, and said he took it
to be nothing more than "a threat"."). In all our discussions up to 2nd
March, however, Khizar agreed to see the Budget Session through.
..
4. On the morning of 2nd March Khizar telephoned asking if he and
Qizilbash could see me in the early afternoon, as he had to address a
meeting of the members of the coalition parties at 3 p.m. I duly saw
him and Qizilbash at 2.15 p.m. when Khizar made it clear that he was
not really interested in his meeting of Assembly members, but wished to
ascertain my reactions to his immediate resignation.

He said that he
had consulted Zafrullah Khan who had been staying in Lahore for the
last few days, and had come to the conclusion that the Muslim League
must be brought up against reality without delay. In his opinion they
had no idea of the strength of Hindu and Sikh feeling against them and
as long as he and his Muslim Unionist colleagues acted as a buffer,
they would not change their fantastic and arrogant ideas. He did not
feel that the unnatural Coalition Ministry could continue for very long
and he was not disposed to lead the Congress and the Panthic Sikhs
during the Budget Session only to make it clear to them immediately
afterwards that he intended to break the Ministry. He felt that if he
attempted to act as a "bridge", he could do nothing effective, and in
the meantime communal relations would inevitably worsen. He had not
consulted his colleagues, but intended to do so later in the afternoon,
and might wish to see me again in the evening.

5. I replied that given his views..
I believed that the Muslim League were bent on forming a Muslim
Ministry with the support of a few Scheduled Caste Members whom they
expected to buy. If they adhered to this idea, they could not maintain
themselves in office for more than a few weeks. The Sikhs would
immediately start a most formidable movement, and the Muslim League had
already established "direct action" as a legitimate means of attack on
a constitutional Government with a technical majority in the Assembly.
It was evidently to me that the only Government which could keep the
Punjab steady until June 1948 was one representing a large section of
all communities or at least the vast majority of the Muslims and the
Sikhs.

Khizar admitted that the outlook for Mamdot was very bleak, and said
that if he failed to secure adequate support from the Hindus or the
Sikhs or both, it would be my duty to go into Section 93. I expressed
no opinion on this- provisionally I think that if Mamdot can form a
Government of any kind, he must be allowed to go ahead, though the
consequences may be very serious and may include an early Section 93
situation.
...
7. The Budget Session was due to begin at 12 noon on 3rd March with the
presentation of the Budget by the Finance Minister. On the morning of
the 3rd March I got into touch with the Speaker, canceled my orders
fixing dates for business connected with the Budget and the
Supplementary Estimates, and arranged for the adjournment of the
Assembly. My own idea was an adjournment for a week-that is up to 10th
March; but I understand that the Speaker prefers an adjournment sine
die, and the House will have to decide what to do. [The Assembly
adjourned to a date to be intimated later by the Speaker].
...
8. I saw Bhim Sen Sachar at about 11 a.m. on the 3rd. He was tired,
having been up all night. The Premier's decision had come as a surprise
to him and he thought it injudicious; but he spoke without heat, and
like other members of the Cabinet has, I think, a genuine regard for
Khizar. I told him I was sending for Mamdot and asked him what the
attitude of the Congress would be to co-operation with the Muslim
League. I am not clear whether he had consulted the Congress leaders in
Delhi; but he said that the Congress could not co-operate with the
Muslim League unless it was clear that the minorities would be treated
as equals and not as inferiors. The arrogance of the Muslim League had
created a very bad impression upon the Hindus, and they were not going
to submit to undiluted Muslim rule.

Whether the Punjab remained as it was not or were partitioned a stable
Government was most necessary and could not be achieved by one
community alone.
...
9. Swaran Singh saw me immediately after Bhim Sen Sachar at about 11-25
a.m. on 3rd March. He also was surprised at Khizar's decision. His
views about co-operation with the Muslim League were similar to
Sachar's but stiffer. He said that Sikhs would no longer be satisfied
with immediate concessions and assurances, which might be repudiated
later.

They must have a clear account of the Muslim League's plan for the
future of the Punjab and of the position of the Sikhs within this plan.
The Sikhs had no intention of being treated as serfs under Muslim
masters, and felt that they were strong enough to defend themselves. I
told him, as I had told Sachar, that I might later want his help,
and asked, and asked him to prevent the Sikh leaders from making any
rash commitments in the immediate future.

Swaran Singh said that he would certainly co-operate with me; but the
attitude of the Sikhs towards the Muslim League is not
encouraging. In particular Swaran Singh observed in the course of our
conversation that if Mamdot succeeded in forming a Muslim Ministry with
Scheduled Caste and miscellaneous support, it would be my clear duty to
go immediately into Section 93.

10. Finally, I saw Mamdot at 11-40 a.m. I said that I was charging him
with the duty of forming a Ministry. I had no doubt that he was aware
of the very heavy responsibility that rested on him and need only say
that in my judgment no Ministry formed by one community, with support
from miscellaneous elements in the Assembly such as the Scheduled Caste
Members, could last for more than a few weeks. He would find the Hindus
and the Sikhs, particularly the latter, indignant and hostile, but in
my opinion he must do his utmost to come to terms with them. I hoped he
would be able to report progress by Saturday, 8th March, at latest- I
realised that he would want some time, since the Sikhs would certainly
ask for a complete statement of long-term policy on the future of
Punjab and the Sikh community; and unless the Muslim League leaders
could deal with the minorities as Punjabis negotiating with Punjabis,
they would make little progress. I gave him an absolutely free hand and
said that I would not interfere at all unless he asked for my help.
..

Punjab situation. Multan rioting is reported serious with 20 dead, many
injured and many fires. Rioting has broken out at Amritsar many(?group
omitted) one dead and five seriously injured. There have been incidents
in Rawalpindi likely to lead to rioting. Position in Lahore has
deteriorated with many dead and widespread incendiarism. We shall be
lucky if we escape communal rioting throughout Punjab on unprecedented
scale.

2. Mamdot failed to keep appointment at 16-30 hours and asked for time
at
18-00 hours. He again failed to come and after denying that
appointments were made sent me letter demanding immediate appointment
with support of ninety members of Assembly including Muslim League 80,
other Muslims 3, Scheduled Castes 4, Indian Christians 2 and European
1.
No names were given and I was simply asked to accept assertion that
League would in fact command majority. Private information suggests
that Mamdot commands only 3 votes outside the League including 1 Muslim
and 2 Scheduled Castes.

3. Risk of installing League Ministry of this kind even with assumed
Parliamentary majority is enormous. Without such majority installation
of Ministry would in my judgment be fraud on constitution and
Instrument of Instructions. I should simply be inviting one of Parties
to present communal conflict to assume charge of it without even
satisfying myself of its Parliamentary competence to do so.
...

7. His Majesty's Government must be quite clear as to realities. During
the next sixteen months order can be maintained in Punjab whether under
communal Ministry or Section 93 only by use of force. Under communal
ministry British officers and Indian Army will be used to conquer
Punjab for the community in power. Under Section 93 administration
would
have limited tenure and would hand over to chaos.
...

3. Major disturbances in the cities and towns have been confined to
Lahore, Amritsar, Rawalpindi and Jullunder. Lesser disturbances have
occurred at Ludhiana, Sialkot, Kamoke in the Gujranwala district,
Hoshiarpur, and Khushab in the Shahpur district.

In Lahore the rioting differed little in kind from communal rioting of
the past. Casualties were fairly heavy, but there was no extraordinary
destruction of property.

In Amritsar the main feature of the rioting was incendiarism. Several
important streets look as though they had had a heavy raid, with many
houses and shops completely down and the road and pavement heaped high
with rubble.

The electric transmission lines were broken, and for some time the
greater part of the city was in darkness. Casualties were heavy; the
Muslims suffered worse than the other communities.

At Multan the trouble was started on 5th March by a sudden procession
of non-Muslim students shouting "Qaid-i-Azam murda-bad". Between 12
noon and 3.15 p.m. it is estimated that about 150 people-nearly all
Hindus-lost their lives. There was much incendiarism, but the damage as
compared with that in Amritsar is small.

At Rawalpindi, as in Lahore, the rioting seems to have followed the
pattern of earlier communal riots. I have not been through Rawalpindi
City, but from the air it does not appear that many buildings have been
burnt. Casualties were fairly heavy.

There is nothing special to note about the other cities and towns.
Jullunder had the worst of the lesser outbreaks, and Ludhiana probably
came next.

The urban disturbances were brought under control pretty quickly with
the aid of troops.

3. The rural disturbances have been far more serious. The major
outbreaks are so far confined to the Rawalpindi and Attock districts,
the part of the Jhelum district around Chakwal, and the Multan
district.

Trains have been attacked in Mianwali, and there is a report in this
morning about the looting of an entire train on the Khushab-Kundian
line somewhere near the Mianwali borders.

4. In the rural areas gravely affected there has been extreme savagery.
In the triangle Taxile-Murree-Gujar Khan there was a regular butchery
of non-Muslims particularly Sikhs. Cruelty and treachery seem to have
been common. General Messervy told me that he had seen in hospital a
child whose hands have been cut off; there are at least two
well-authenticated stories of non-Muslims being lured into "peace
committees" and then murdered; and in one village, a party of Sikhs,
who surrendered to the Muslim attackers on the promise that their lives
would be spared, were murdered out of hand. The most brutal killings
seem to have been in the triangle to which I have referred, but there
has been frightful brutality outside it, and everywhere in the district
looting and arson have been common.

In Attock the Chauntra area, which is very close to Rawalpindi, was
affected in much the same way. In the rest of the district there seem
to
have been fewer killings than in Rawalpindi, but quite as much burning
and looting. A common method of attack has been for the Muslims in a
village to put white flags on their houses and to invite the Muslims of
the neighbouring villages to come in and deal with property not so
marked.

In the Chakwal neighbourhood of the Jhelum district a large village,
Dhudial, was sacked, but the Police and troops were able to inflict
fairly heavy casualties on the attackers.

In Multan murder, arson and looting were very much the same as in the
districts of the Rawalpindi Division, but the area affected (the Sadar
Police Station and part of the Shujabad tahsil) is flat and relatively
easy to control. The troops seem to have inflicted fairly heavy
casualties on a mob at an early stage, and though the loss of life and
property must have been heavy, it is certainly less than that in the
Rawalpindi district.
...

7. It is very difficult to account for this extraordinarily
violent rural movement. General Messervy thinks that there are some
signs of organisation and conspiracy- in parts of Rawalpindi outbreaks
seem to have occurred almost simultaneously, and the raid at Murree to
which I referred in my letter of 9th appears to have been carefully
planned and carried out. All Muslims in the affected districts seem to
be involved in or sympathetic to the movement. The
Commander 7th Division told me when I saw him yesterday that attacks on
non-Muslims had been led in some cases by retired Army officers-some of
them pensioners with honorary Commissioned rank. The Muslim section of
the local notables, to whom I spoke at Campbellpur yesterday, were
extremely sulky, and though some of them are
beginning to be frightened, there is little doubt that they believe
that the movement was inevitable and are not prepared to oppose it.

The
most probable theory is that the growth of the Pakistan idea from 1943
onwards, the extreme communalism of the election campaign of 1945-46,
the frustration which followed it, the propaganda against the Coalition
Ministry, the Muslim League agitation, H.M.G's statement of 20th
February, and Khizar's resignation combined to touch off an explosive
mixture which had been forming for some time. The Muslims say that they
were influenced by rumors of a large Sikh Army marching on the north;
also that the movement is a spontaneous outburst against
black-marketing by non-Muslims. It is more likely that they believe
that by exterminating non-Muslims now they will make their districts a
safe base for operations against the other communities in due course.
No educated man could reasonably believe the story about the Sikh army,
and though opportunity had been take to wipe out economic scores,
resentment at the controls and the way in which non-Muslims make money
out of them was not in my judgment the immediate cause of the trouble.

8. The disturbances have produced a crop of special problems:-
..
(5) When I was at Rawalpindi yesterday, the total number of refugees
was estimated at nearly 30,000, and we must be prepared to receive at
least 35,000 and perhaps more from the Rawalpindi Division. The
refugees are at present held at various places including a large camp
managed by the Army in Rawalpindi Cantonment. We shall probably take
over the Military Camp at Wah, which is now vacant, and the old M.T.
Centre at Kala near Jhelum.
...

555 page 996
(excerpts)Note by Sir E. Jenkins
20 March 1947

Raja Ghazanfar Ali came to see me at 4 p.m. today. He opened in
rather a complacent way about the riots in the Rawalpindi and Attock
districts and in the Chakwal Sub-Division. He took great credit for
having kept Gujrat and the greater part of Jhelum quiet. He scouted the
idea that the outbreak was organised or that the League had anything to
do with it.

He worked up gradually to the suggestion that I might now put a Muslim
League Ministry into power. He
suggested a general election and said that this would give the
electorate an opportunity of deciding whether the Punjab should be
partitioned or not.

...
I was exasperated by Ghazanfar Ali's complacency and dealt with him
rather roughly. I said he did not appear to realise that what had
occurred in Rawalpindi, Attock and the Chakwal Sub-Division was a
general massacre of a most beastly kind. He could suggest, as he had
suggested, in dealing with the conspiracy theory that the non-Muslims
had been provocative, but the provocation was certainly not such as to
justify the slaughter and savagery that had occurred.

As regards a Muslim League Government, I said I would resign sooner
than see one in office at this juncture, and I thought practically
every British officer would do the same. The massacre had been
conducted in the name of the Muslim League, and senior Military
Officers thought that it had been carefully planned and organised.
Non-Muslims with some justice now regarded the Muslims has little
better than animals, and for my own part I thought that British
officers would find it difficult to work with or under such people.

I could see no object whatever in a a general election. It would
not alter the basic position that no single community could rule the
Punjab except by actual conquest. If a Muslim League Government took
office, there would be immediate fighting, and the Government would
find it impossible to hold even a single session of the Assembly. I
considered Raja Ghazanfar Ali's political views so irresponsible as to
be hardly worth discussing.

...
I said that the troubles of the Muslim League were due to folly and
bad leadership. The League had given the impression that the Muslims
were a kind of ruling race in the Punjab and would be good enough to
treat with generosity their fellow Punjabis, such as the Sikhs, when
their rule was established. They could not explain what they meant by
"Pakistan", and unless they were prepared to deal with other Punjabis
as equals, they would make no progress at all. It was a ludicrous
position in which the so-called League leaders had to take orders from
Bombay from a person entirely ignorant of Punjab conditions. If Raja
Ghazanfar Ali argued, as he did, that the Central picture must be
complete before any picture of the Punjab could even be sketched, my
reply was that his whole conception of the future of India was topsy
turvy. A Punjab divided into two or three States or in a condition of
chaos and civil war could not possibly fit into any conceivable
all-India picture. Surely the right course was to determine the future
of the units in a way acceptable to their inhabitants and then to
sketch the all-India picture. (Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that he thought
there was something to this.).

At the end of the interview Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that I
had distorted and misrepresented the League's views and that he would
send me a number of statements by Mr. Jinnah showing that he had never
intended to treat the minorities and particularly the Sikhs, in the way
I suggested.

I said that the first task now was to restore order. I could not
prevent the League from making further blunders. They had already
fooled away a kingdom, and it would in my judgment be futile now to
attempt any final solution of the Punjab problem until feelings had
settled down. The League did not seem to realise that the non-Muslims
regarded the Muslims of Rawalpindi and Attock as little better than
beasts and hated the League profoundly. It was futile to suggest, as he
had suggested, that the League agitation was noncommunal. It was
manifestly communal from the first, and could not have been anything
else.

My dear Abell,
I enclose an account by General Messervy, GOC-in-C Northern Command,
giving his personal opinions on the recent communal outbreak in the
Punjab.
I think H.E. may like to see this.
...
I would like to add that I am in entire agreement with the opinion
expressed by General Messervy in para. 9 of the note. Unless effective
action is taken by the leaders to compose their differences and restore
mutual confidence between the two main communities in the Punjab, I
fear that a large part of the Army which is drawn from the Punjab may
become infected with communalism. This is a contingency which no one
can contemplate with equanimity at this juncture.
..
Yours sincerely,
C.J. AUCHINLECK

Enclosure
to No. 560

Note by General Messervy

SOME REMARKS ON THE
DISTURBANCES IN THE NORTHERN PUNJAB

1. Causes

The first cause was politico-religious. The Muslim League,
though a political party, has been framing its main propaganda on
religious lines for some time. This has undoubtedly had a great effect
on all Muslims in the Punjab. Pakistan and Islam together provide an
almost irresistible force on the minds of the mass of comparatively
uneducated Muslims. When the intensive Muslim League campaign succeeded
in forcing the resignation of the Unionist Punjab Government and was
followed by militant anti-Pakistan statements by Master Tara Singh and
other Sikh leaders, Muslim feelings were roused to a pitch of
fanaticism. It only needed a spark to set alight the raging fires of
religious passion. This was provided by anti-Pakistan meetings and
processions in such places as Lahore, Amritsar, Multan and Rawalpindi.
In Multan the Hindu-Sikh processionists were even so madly unwise as to
raise the cry of 'Qaid-e-Azam Murdabad'. In the predominantly Muslim
areas of Rawalpindi and Multan divisions the fires spread rapidly to
the rural areas.

There have been also two minor causes. The first is the economic
element. Scarcity of cloth and some items of food, such as sugar, has
undoubtedly been taken advantage of by the Hindu-Sikh bania community
to profiteer and indulge in black-market operations. The Govt. controls
were also mostly in the hands of Sikh or Hindu agents and clerks. The
Muslim peasant and labourer was only too ready to get some of his own
back when he got the chance. The second is the 'goonda' element in
every community, which is always ready to take full advantage of such
disturbances to practise arson, loot and dacoity.

2. The Course of the Disturbances

In the cities events followed the usual course, well known
to us for many years, but attacks were fiercer, more sudden, and more
savage than ever. In the rural areas attacks were launched by large
mobs of Muslim peasants who banded together from several hamlets and
villages to destroy and loot Sikhs and Hindu shops and houses in their
area. In some areas arson and loot were the main objects, and
casualties inflicted on the Hindu-Sikh community were not great. In
others savagery was carried out to an extreme degree and men, women and
children were hacked or beaten to death, if not burned in their houses.
There were also a number of cases of forcible conversion of males and
abduction of females. Having served for 34 years, mostly in the Punjab
and with Punjab troops I would never have believed that agitation could
have aroused the normally chivalrous and decent P.M. peasant to such
frenzied savagery as was widely prevalent. Much of this savagery was
undoubtedly deliberately intensified by the wildest rumours, the
commonest of which was an impending attack by a large Sikh Army.
It is interesting that on no occasion as far as is known has a second
major attack been made on any village or area in a village. The passion
of the mob burns itself out and the survivors are generally left
unmolested. There has also been a widespread desire to rid many areas
of all Sikhs and Hindus, entirely for ever. Some former sites of
houses have even already been ploughed up....

8. Refugees in the Rawalpindi Division

Refugees in the Rawalpindi Division are likely to amount
to some 40,000 homeless and largely destitute persons. This is a big
problem. We are planning eventually to form camps to take the whole
number at Wah and Kala (near Jhelum). Other refugees, who may amount to
about an equal number will either be persuaded to return to their homes
or be absorbed in other Sikh-Hindu communities in towns or large
villages. Some 4,000 have already been absorbed in Rawalpindi City.

9. Prevention of Outbreaks in Other
Districts of the Punjab

I have concentrated all available troops in the Punjab.
Flag marches
and patrols are being carried out widely wherever tension is greatest.
But it must be clearly understood that such preventive action is only a
palliative. We are dealing with the symptoms of disease and cannot
eradicate the disease by military action. The disease comes from the
political leaders of all parties. The only complete cure is for them to
come to some agreement. An agreement now between the Sikh and Muslim
leaders would result in immediate peace in the Punjab. Failing this
unlikely contingency the avoidance of provocative statements and the
impressing on their followers of the necessity of avoiding bloodshed
and protecting minorities is the only hope.
F.W.
MESSERVY
Lieut-General
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Northern
Command

The following are from The Transfer of
Power 1942-7, Volume X The Mountbatten Viceroyalty
Formulation of a Plan.

Lord Ismay suggested that each Governor should begin by giving his
views on the general proposition which they had just read (i.e., Plan
Balkan).

Sir Evan Jenkins said that as he understood it, there was to be
complete
partition, with separate Constituent Assemblies, and a boundary
commission to settle boundaries where necessary. He then gave details
and figures of Muslim and non-Muslim majorities in the Province,
showing that no demarcation could prevent there being serious minority
problems in each of the provinces. The Muslim aim, vehemently pursued,
was to
dominate the whole Punjab within its present boundaries. The Sikh aim,
even more vehemently pursued, was to frustrate the Muslims. The Jats
wished to separate and join with the U.P., but their claim was not
being very strongly voiced. He doubted whether there was any
possibility of an announcement of partition without it being followed
up
by an immediate blow-up. There was therefore a military problem
of considerable magnitude. His military commander had told him that he
would need four operational divisions with an army headquarters to deal
with the situation; Punjab troops would not carry out the task.
...
Sir Eric Mieville asked what were the alternatives to plan of
partition. Sir Evan Jenkins replied that there were three alternatives,
namely : (a) reversion to unionism (b) partition (c) civil war. If we
were unable to get (a) or (b) then there was little option but to
withdraw and leave both sides to fight it out. He had no doubt that the
Sikhs would fight at some stage, but would rather wait until we were
out of the way.

Lord Ismay said that it was not much use talking about 'four divisions
of troops', since they did not exist. We should have to do the best we
could with whatever troops were available.
...
There followed some discussion on means of bringing about any form
of agreement between Muslims and Sikhs, in which Sir Evan said that the
Muslim policy was one of 'daring us to leave' by threatening us with
the bogy of the conditions which would be the result of our departure:
and that the Sikhs were almost certain to ask for partition on their
own terms and would be content to have the Hindus in with them.
...

160 page 281
(excerpts)Note by Sir E. Jenkins
16 April 1947

This letter from Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to H.E. tells only part of the
story and that inaccurately. ..

(1) On 24th January the Muslim League started an intensive agitation
against the Coalition Ministry. The casus
belli was the imposition of a ban on the Muslim League National
Guards simultaneously with a similar ban on the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak
Sangh. On 26th January the Premier decided to withdraw the bans,
and it at once became apparent that the Muslim League intended to
continue their agitation. On 27th morning I sent for Mamdot, the League
leader, and warned him that if the agitation continued, he would
probably reduce the Punjab to chaos and might even force the Ministry
out of office. I knew that the agitation could not be kept
non-communal. If the Ministry resigned, it would be my duty to
call upon him to form a Government, and I thought it most unlikely that
he would be able to do so.
...

On the night of 3rd March a very large non-Muslim meeting was
held at Lahore, at which violent speeches were made. At this point the
non-Muslims were undoubtedly to blame; but they had put up with 34 days
of League agitation and were in a hysterical state.

On 4th March rioting broke out in Lahore. On that evening the Coalition
Ministers, who had been asked to carry on pending the formation of a
new Ministry, told me that they must resign at once, as they could take
no further responsibility for the situation. On 5th and 6th March
rioting broke out in Multan, Rawalpindi, Amritsar and Jullunder. The
non-Muslims were not specially armed at any of these places, with
the possible exception of Rawalpindi, though they undoubtedly gave
considerable provocation. At Multan the trouble was started
by a procession of students, and within three hours the Muslims killed
about 120 Hindus. Casualties were heavy in the other cities
also, and except in
Amritsar the non-Muslims suffered much more heavily than the Muslims.

By 6th-7th March the trouble was spreading to the rural areas of
the Rawalpindi Division and the Multan district. In the Rawalpindi and
Attock districts and later in part of the Jhelum district there was an
absolute butchery of non-Muslims. In many villages they were herded
into houses and burnt alive. Many Sikhs had their hair and beards cut,
and there were cases of forcible circumcision. Many Sikh women who
escaped slaughter were abducted.

The Muslim League made no efforts to maintain peace and Mamdot made
no serious attempt at forming a Ministry. At the time he had no
majority and he gave me the impression that he was not anxious to take
responsibility for quelling a very serious outbreak of violence.

(2) The total number of dead is not yet known. The latest figure
is just under 3,000 and I believe that the final figure may be 3,500.
The communal proportions have not been accurately recorded, but I
should say that among the dead there are 6 non-Muslims for every
Muslim. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan can hardly realise the terrible nature of
the rural massacre. One of my troubles has been the extreme complacency
of the League leaders in the Punjab, who say in effect that "boys will
be boys". I have no doubt that the non-Muslims were provocative in the
cities, but the Muslims had been equally provocative during their
agitation and had in particular murdered a Sikh constable in Amritsar.

(3) I was forced into Section 93 in circumstances which were fully
reported at the time, and my reasons for getting into this extremely
unsatisfactory position were known to Lord Wavell and the Secretary of
State. Mamdot had failed to produce a majority, and it was obvious that
he could not begin to control the situation.

(4) We are dealing with the aftermath of very serious disturbances. In
one Police Station alone of the Rawalpindi district the Police tell me
that they are investigating 500 murders. It is quite impossible for me
to declare an amnesty, nor can I permit people to retain looted
property, abducted women, and so on. In one village of the Attock
district the Police found 30 lorry loads of loot.

...

(9) For what object the British officials in the Punjab, including
myself, are "fostering chaos" I do not know. Every British official in
the I.C.S and I.P. in the Punjab, including myself, would be very glad
to leave it tomorrow. With two or three possible exceptions no British
official intends to remain in the Punjab after the transfer of power.
Six months ago the position was quite different; but we feel now that
we are dealing with people who are out to destroy themselves, and that
in the absence of some reasonable agreement between them the average
official will have to spend his life in a communal civil war.

(10) The Punjab is not now in a constitutional, but in a
revolutionary situation. If a Muslim League Government were formed
tomorrow, it would be attacked by the non-Muslims, and particularly the
Sikhs, with a violence which might be uncontrollable and would
certainly involve frightful slaughter by Police and troops. If Mr.
Liaquat Ali Khan means to start an agitation against authority in the
Punjab, he will produce very much the same result. He might be reminded
that it was the Muslim League, and not the non-Muslims, who first
attempted to dislodge a Ministry by force.