Post-Revolution Libya’s Internal State-Building Challenges

February 27, 2019

“The 17 February 2011 Libyan revolution brought a sense of freedom to the Libyan people. Eight years later, the country has erupted into another war, with numerous internal state-building challenges. Many of these challenges are rooted in the Gaddafi regime.”

Libya
has become a deeply divided country in the eight years following the fall of
the Gaddafi regime in 2011. Facing many challenges, it has yet to stabilise as
warring factions, all interested in ruling, have made it difficult for Libya to
find peace, thereby plunging the country into a civil war. Libya is split
between the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the
Council of Deputies. Libya’s current issues, such as this divide, stem from
Gaddafi’s reign. In order to understand the challenges that the country faces,
we must first understand the foundations of fear, tyranny, and corruption it
was built on prior to the revolution.

Prior
to the Gaddafi era, Libya was a federal monarchy with three distinct provinces
between 1951-1963: Tripolitania to the northwest; Cyrenaica, also known as
Barqa, in the east; and Fezzan in the southwest.[1]
The federal form of governance was soon abolished, and with it the three
provinces were re-structured into baladiyat.
The 1969 coup d’état led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi brought with it a new way
of arranging the country, the latest version being the 22 shabiyat established in 2007.

As
a result of Gaddafi’s coup, the once stable and progressive monarchy
transformed into a dictatorship distinctly lacking infrastructure and
institutions.[2]Under
Gaddafi’s oppressive regime, there was a sense of powerlessness felt among the
Libyan people. This includes the torture, imprisonment, and murder of anyone
who opposed Gaddafi’s regime, including those living abroad.[3] When
Gaddafi’s security state finally collapsed in 2011, it left a ‘huge political
vacuum’ that multiple forces are competing to fill without any overall sense of
direction’.[4]

The
2011 revolution gave the Libyan people a sense of freedom but brought about
another set of problems, one of which is ethnic divisions. There was and
remains a strong sense of tribalism in Libya compared to its neighbouring
countries[5]. During
his reign, Gaddafi attempted to diminish tribal importance and influence by
pitting tribes against each other and adopting an ideology of pan-Arab
Nationalism[6].
Gaddafi then used these tribes to reassert his power. Nepotism was bountiful as
loyal tribes were given high ranking government jobs, while others were
sidelined.[7]
Furthermore, tribal loyalty to the regime was used to undermine the military.
In post-revolution Libya where ‘the state is traumatically absent’, tribes
offer a form of social protection that the state has failed to provide[8].

After
several attempts by the military to overthrow Gaddafi, a new security force was
created, the leaders of which were Gaddafi loyalists. They fought for Gaddafi
during the revolution, while many generals and soldiers defected.[9]The
tribal mindset and way of leading can still be found in post-revolution Libya.
This in turn led to the instability and chaos that Libya is facing today. In
contrast, neighbouring Tunisia has become relatively stable. This is due to the
strong military presence in the country, something which Gaddafi failed to
provide in order to strengthen his control. Had there been a strong and unified
military after the revolution, Libya may have become a united country without
militias and numerous parties vying for power. By segregating the populace,
Gaddafi played on his influence so he could remain in power. He exploited
tribal differences and pitted them against each other, thereby inadvertently
enabling these differences to exist even today.

The
rebel forces of the revolution were also divided, and militias were and remain
to be plentiful. Instead of establishing an army, the government has instead
hired these militias to enforce order.[10]
No job prospects or access to training may motivate some to join militias,[11]meaning
these militias are a hotbed of the unemployed. Libya has suffered from a high
unemployment rate both before and after the revolution, particularly among
youths.[12] While
different sources give different estimates for the unemployment rate in Libya,
the International Labour Organization estimates that the total unemployment
rate was 17.6% in 2010, 19.6% in 2011, and 17.3% in 2018.[13]
The lack of jobs, and prospects of a bleak future forces youths into a life of
militias and violence. In a society where there is low cash flow and no
unemployment benefits, some Libyans see this as their only option. There is a
societal expectation in Libya for men to be the primary breadwinners, thereby
creating a societal pressure to remain employed, even if it means joining a
militia. Those who are educated are also unemployed as many graduates lack the
necessary skills across different industries and sectors.

Libya’s
economy is heavily dependent on public sector employment, and hydrocarbons,
with the latter accounting for 95% of exports in 2013. However, oil exports
have decreased, and the economy has fluctuated greatly since 2011, some years
being the fastest growing economy in the world, while other years being the
slowest.[14]Without
the revenue it generates, the government cannot provide a sufficient number of
jobs in order to steer its citizens away from a life of militias. Ironically,
it is these militias, along with the Libyan National Army (LNA), who have
largely seized control of the oil production.[15]

Another
obstacle that Libya must overcome is the lack of a coherent government. The
National Transitional Council (NTC) of the revolution left Libyans unsatisfied,
and was ineffective in quashing the militia problem.[16]
Their successors, the General National Congress (GNC), also failed to govern
effectively yet have refused to step down.[17]
Neither have been successful in drawing up a constitution, disarming the
militias, and forming a unified army. Moreover, the GNC formed 99 new baladiyat after the revolution, which
later grew to 108. However, in 2012, the Cyrenaica Transitional Council (CTC)
was formed. Renamed in October 2013 to the Council of Cyrenaica in Libya (CCL),
the CCL declared Cyrenaica an autonomous province, bringing the old divisions
back to the forefront.[18]

Though the GNA and the Presidential Council (PC) to the west of Libya are recognised internationally as the legitimate government, they have not gained the support of the Council of Deputies and the House of Representatives (HoR) to the east.[19] The Council of Deputies does however back the LNA, headed by General Khalifa Haftar who had previously served in Gaddafi’s army but later tried to overthrow him, and who’s military has now expanded into southern Libya.[20] However, it is clear that both governments ‘may actually be in a worse position than that enjoyed by [Gaddafi, whose] militias and military forces were loyal to him; the militias in Libya today answer to themselves and secondarily to their paymaster government’.[21] Rather than coming together in order to rebuild the country, they have instead chosen to fight for power and control and, in the case of the militias, to push their Islamist agenda.

Eight years after the revolution, Libya remains in conflict, with many of the challenges largely stemming from its past. After 42 years of living under a dictatorship, the Libyan people are once again living in a time of oppression and fear. The mindset of the Gaddafi era is still present throughout Libya; the struggle for dominance and power can still be found between warring factions looking to control the country and its resources. Post-revolution Libya has seen the rise of federalism as the citizens are fearful that if one government rules, the country will revert to old ways.[22] While the country has been liberated from Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime, it has been plunged into a never-ending conflict. It is clear that there is more to do in order to obtain peace and security in such a turbulent nation.