Aristotle is the earliest known proponent of 'Ethical Egoism'.

ADVANTAGES

Psychological egoism claims that each person has but one ultimateaim: her own welfare. This allows for action that fails to maximizeperceived self-interest, but rules out the sort of behaviorpsychological egoists like to target — such as altruistic behavior ormotivation by thoughts of duty alone. It allows for weakness of will,since in weakness of will cases I am still aiming at my own welfare; Iam weak in that I do not act as I aim. And it allows for aiming atthings other than one's welfare, such as helping others, where thesethings are a means to one's welfare.

Please note that any orders related to theses or dissertations, as well as their parts or chapters, are only available for third or fourth year academic levels or higher.

Total price:
$12.00

To compare psychological egoism vs.

Photo provided by Flickr
You have probably also heard this saying. ‘If you love something set it free. If it comes back it’s yours. If not, it was never meant to be.’ Suppose that you did let someone that you loved go, knowing that they probably would not come back to you. Why? If all that you cared about was your own interests then I am not sure why it would matter to you whether the other person in the relationship was happy as long as you were. Maybe it would make you unhappy to know that the other person is unhappy, but if that is the case then obviously you must care about the other person’s interests as well as your own, which is the opposite of egoism. You would be sacrificing your own perceived best interests (since you want to stay in the relationship and believe that is what would be best for you) so that the person you love can pursue their perceived best interests. Either egoistic behavior must be much broader and more complex than previously supposed, or it would not be correct to classify an act like this as egoism.

An 'egoist' practices ethical egoism.

Photo provided by Flickr
Another problem is that conversion can be costly. I might berequired by my non-egoist morality to make a sacrifice for which Icannot be compensated (or pass up a gain so large that passing it upwill not be compensated for). Since I have converted from egoism, I canno longer reject making the sacrifice or passing up the gain on theground that it will not pay. It is safer, and seemingly feasible, toremain an egoist while cooperating in most cases. If so, ethical egoismand standard moralities will diverge in some cases. (For discussion ofthe cooperation argument, see Frank 1988; Gauthier 1986 ch. 6; Kavka1984 and 1986 Part II; Sidgwick 1907 II.V.)

1991 "Egoism" in a Companion to Ethics. (ed.

Photo provided by Flickr
There is another recent argument against rational egoism (Rachels andAlter 2005, Tersman 2008, and especially de Lazari-Radek and Singer2014). (1) Believing that rational egoism is true increases myreproductive fitness, whether or not rational egoism is true. (2)Therefore my belief that rational egoism is true (or, better, thatrational egoism appears to me true upon reflection) does not help tojustify rational egoism, since I would have that belief whether or notrational egoism is true. (3) For some other normative beliefs (such asbelief in utilitarianism), having the belief does not increasereproductive fitness. (4) Therefore my belief that (say)utilitarianism is true can help justify utilitarianism. (Without (3)and (4), there is no argument against rational egoism inparticular.)

Remember that egoism is different from Psychological Egoism.

First, one could challenge rational egoism, not only with theinstrumental theory, but also with the “present-aim”theory of rationality. According to the present-aim theory, I havemost reason to do what maximizes the satisfaction of my presentdesires. Even if all of these desires are self-regarding, thepresent-aim theory need not coincide with rational egoism. Suppose Iknow that in the future I will desire a good pension, but I do not nowdesire a good pension for myself in the future; I have differentself-regarding desires. Suppose also that, looking back from the endof my life, I will have maximized my welfare by contributing now tothe pension. Rational egoism requires that I contribute now. Thepresent-aim theory does not. It claims that my reasons are relativenot only to who has a desire — me rather than someone else — butalso to when the desire is held — now rather than in the past orfuture. The obvious justification an egoist could offer for notcaring about time — that one should care only about the of good produced — is suicidal, since that should lead one not tocare about who receives the good. One reason the present-aim theoryis important is that it shows there is a coherent, more minimalalternative to rational egoism. The rational egoist cannot argue thategoism is the most minimal theory, and that standard moral theories,by requiring more of people, require special, additionaljustification. (For a very different argument to show again that analternative to morality is less minimal than expected — directed moreat the instrumental theory than rational egoism — see Korsgaard2005.)

We know that psychological egoism exists because we have the concept.

Second, if psychological egoism is false, I might lack a preferencefor my own welfare. It would follow that for me, a distinction betweenmy welfare and that of others would be arbitrary, and the rationalegoist claim that each ought to maximize his own welfare would beunjustified when applied to me. The proposal that preferences establishnon-arbitrary distinctions supports the instrumental theory better thanrational egoism.