The temptation of “Option C”

Marc Lynch has interesting post up on the Foreign Policy Magazine blog. It’s called “Shopping Option C for Syria.” I won’t address the substance of Lynch’s piece — which argues against the United States arming Syrian rebels — though I am sympathetic to it. I would like, instead, to discuss his general idea of “Plan C.” Here’s Lynch:

“The failure of American diplomacy to end Syria’s parade of horrors has rightfully driven the policy community to search for a useful alternative. But arming the rebels was always a classic “Option C.” Every bureaucrat knows the trick of offering three options — one to do nothing, one so outlandish that it is easily rejected, and then one that takes the seemingly sensible middle ground, allowing the decision-maker the illusion that they are resolving the problem.”

There is truth to this observation. I saw a lot of so-called “option papers” when I worked in the State Department and many — if not most — of them conformed to Lynch’s description. At one level, this is not surprising. If a bureaucrat’s objective is to advance his or her career, there is a strong incentive to give superiors what they want, not what they need. And what senior policymakers often want — when dealing with pressure “to do something” from the Congress, interest groups, the general public or other parts of government — is a policy that gives the appearance of decisiveness while deferring difficult choices. Hence the popularity of “Option C,” whatever the matter at hand.

Sometimes “Option” C works. This can be because the policy it proposes actually succeeds; or because events on the ground make the whole issue moot; or because, for whatever reason, the pressure to act subsides. There is no shame — and often wisdom — in putting off hard choices, particularly if they bear high potential costs.

But, as Lynch points out, choosing “Option C” can create a dynamic of its own:

“In Syria, the most likely effect of arming the rebels is simply to set up the president for another decision point six months later as the battle rages and the rebels seem unable to close the deal. And at that point, the president would face an even starker decision: Option A, give up and be tarred forever for cutting and running; Option B, full-scale military intervention, which of course would be rejected; and Option C, escalation through some combination of no-fly zones, a bombing campaign, and safe areas.”

Picking “Option C,” in other words, can shift the universe of choices available to decision-makers and lead, inexorably, toward escalation. It can also lead, in instances where the United States is already deeply involved, to a “stay the course” approach that splits the difference on policy but lacks any strategic rationale. The “surge” in Afghanistan, as Lynch notes, is a case in point, though to President Obama’s credit, he finally appears ready to “declare victory” and get the United States out of our Central Asian quagmire.

Although Lynch does not discuss it in his post, our sanctions policy toward Iran is a classic “Option C.” It allows us to appear to “do something” while avoiding, at least for the time being, the risky alternative of a military assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But what if sanctions continue to fail in forcing Iranian concessions? We can already imagine the options: a) admitting failure, going back to the drawing board, and accepting the inevitable avalanche of criticism; b) launching a full-scale invasion of Iran that neither the U.S. military nor the American public wants; or c) undertaking air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even to list the options is to know which one will be prevail.

Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.