An Enquiry Concerning
Human
Understanding.

David Hume.

Sect.
VIII. Of
Liberty and Necessity

PART I.

62. It might
reasonably be
expected in questions which have beencanvassed and disputed with
great
eagerness, since the first origin ofscience and philosophy, that
the
meaning of all the terms, at least,should have been agreed upon
among
the disputants; and ourenquiries, in the course of
two
thousand years, been able to pass fromwords to the true and real
subject
of the controversy. For how easymay it seem to give exact
definitions
of the terms employed inreasoning, and make these
definitions,
not the mere sound of words,the object of future
scrutiny and
examination? But if we considerthe matter more narrowly, we
shall
be apt to draw a quite oppositeconclusion. From this
circumstance
alone, that a controversy hasbeen long kept on foot, and
remains
still undecided, we may presumethat there is some ambiguity
in
the expression, and that thedisputants affix different
ideas
to the terms employed in thecontroversy. For as the
faculties
of the mind are supposed to benaturally alike in every
individual;
otherwise nothing could be morefruitless than to reason or
dispute
together; it were impossible, ifmen affix the same ideas to
their
terms, that they could so longform different opinions of
the same
subject; especially when theycommunicate their views, and
each
party turn themselves on allsides, in search of
arguments which
may give them the victory overtheir antagonists. It is
true, if
men attempt the discussion ofquestions which lie entirely
beyond
the reach of human capacity,such as those concerning the
origin
of worlds, or the economy of theintellectual system or
region of
spirits, they may long beat the airin their fruitless contests,
and
never arrive at any determinateconclusion. But if the
question
regard any subject of common lifeand experience, nothing, one
would
think, could preserve the disputeso long undecided but some
ambiguous
expressions, which keep theantagonists still at a
distance,
and hinder them from grappling witheach other.

63. This has been
the case
in the long disputed questionconcerning liberty and
necessity;
and to so remarkable a degreethat, if I be not much
mistaken,
we shall find, that all mankind, bothlearned and ignorant, have
always
been of the same opinion with regardto this subject, and that a
few
intelligible definitions wouldimmediately have put an end
to the
whole controversy. I own thatthis dispute has been so
much canvassed
on all hands, and has ledphilosophers into such a
labyrinth
of obscure sophistry, that it is nowonder, if a sensible reader
indulge
his ease so far as to turn a deafear to the proposal of such
a question,
from which he can expectneither instruction or
entertainment.
But the state of the argumenthere proposed may, perhaps,
serve
to renew his attention; as it hasmore novelty, promises at
least
some decision of the controversy,and will not much disturb
his ease
by any intricate or obscurereasoning.

I hope, therefore,
to make
it appear that all men have ever agreedin the doctrine both of
necessity
and of liberty, according to anyreasonable sense, which can
be put
on these terms; and that thewhole controversy has
hitherto turned
merely upon words. We shallbegin with examining the
doctrine
of necessity.

64. It is
universally allowed
that matter, in all its operations, isactuated by a necessary
force, and
that every natural effect is soprecisely determined by the
energy
of its cause that no othereffect, in such particular
circumstances,
could possibly have resultedfrom it. The degree and
direction
of every motion is, by the laws ofnature, prescribed with such
exactness
that a living creature may assoon arise from the shock of
two
bodies in motion in any otherdegree or direction than
what is
actually produced by it. Would we,therefore, form a just and
precise
idea of necessity, we must considerwhence that idea arises when
we
apply it to the operation of bodies.

It seems evident
that, if
all the scenes of nature werecontinually shifted in such
a manner
that no two events bore anyresemblance to each other,
but every
object was entirely new,without any similitude to
whatever
had been seen before, we shouldnever, in that case, have
attained
the least idea of necessity, orof a connexion among these
objects.
We might say, upon such asupposition, that one object
or
event has followed another; not thatone was produced by the
other. The
relation of cause and effect mustbe utterly unknown to
mankind. Inference
and reasoning concerningthe operations of nature
would,
from that moment, be at an end; andthe memory and senses remain
the
only canals, by which the knowledgeof any real existence could
possibly
have access to the mind. Ouridea, therefore, of
necessity and
causation arises entirely from theuniformity observable in the
operations
of nature, where similarobjects are constantly
conjoined
together, and the mind isdetermined by custom to
infer the
one from the appearance of theother. These two
circumstances form
the whole of that necessity, whichwe ascribe to matter. Beyond
the
constant conjunction of similarobjects, and the consequent
inference
from one to the other, we haveno notion of any necessity
or connexion.

If it appear,
therefore, that
all mankind have ever allowed, withoutany doubt or hesitation,
that these
two circumstances take place inthe voluntary actions of
men, and
in the operations of mind; it mustfollow, that all mankind
have ever
agreed in the doctrine ofnecessity, and that they
have hitherto
disputed, merely for notunderstanding each other.

65. As to the
first circumstance,
the constant and regularconjunction of similar
events, we
may possibly satisfy ourselves bythe following
considerations. It
is universally acknowledged thatthere is a great uniformity
among
the actions of men, in all nationsand ages, and that human
nature
remains still the same, in itsprinciples and operations.
The same
motives always produce the sameactions: The same events
follow
from the same causes. Ambition,avarice, self-love, vanity,
friendship,
generosity, public spirit:these passions, mixed in
various
degrees, and distributed throughsociety, have been, from the
beginning
of the world, and still are,the source of all the
actions and
enterprises, which have ever beenobserved among mankind.
Would you
know the sentiments, inclinations,and course of life of the
Greeks
and Romans? Study well the temper andactions of the French and
English:
You cannot be much mistaken intransferring to the former
most
of the observations which you havemade with regard to the
latter.
Mankind are so much the same, in alltimes and places, that
history informs
us of nothing new or strange inthis particular. Its chief
use is
only to discover the constant anduniversal principles of
human nature,
by showing men in allvarieties of circumstances
and situations,
and furnishing us withmaterials from which we may
form
our observations and becomeacquainted with the regular
springs
of human action and behaviour.These records of wars,
intrigues,
factions, and revolutions, are somany collections of
experiments,
by which the politician or moralphilosopher fixes the
principles
of his science, in the same manner asthe physician or natural
philosopher
becomes acquainted with thenature of plants, minerals,
and
other external objects, by theexperiments which he forms
concerning
them. Nor are the earth,water, and other elements,
examined
by Aristotle, and Hippocrates,more like to those which at
present
lie under our observation than themen described by Polybius
and Tacitus
are to those who now governthe world.

Should a
traveller, returning
from a far country, bring us anaccount of men, wholly
different
from any with whom we were everacquainted; men, who were
entirely
divested of avarice, ambition, orrevenge; who knew no
pleasure but
friendship, generosity, and publicspirit; we should
immediately, from
these circumstances, detect thefalsehood, and prove him a
liar,
with the same certainty as if hehad stuffed his narration
with stories
of centaurs and dragons,miracles and prodigies. And
if we
would explode any forgery inhistory, we cannot make use
of a
more convincing argument, than toprove, that the actions
ascribed
to any person are directly contraryto the course of nature, and
that
no human motives, in suchcircumstances, could ever
induce
him to such a conduct. The veracityof Quintus Curtius is as
much to
be suspected when he describes thesupernatural courage of
Alexander,
by which he was hurried on singlyto attack multitudes, as
when he
describes his supernatural forceand activity, by which he
was able
to resist them. So readily anduniversally do we
acknowledge a
uniformity in human motives andactions as well as in the
operations
of body.

Hence likewise the
benefit
of that experience, acquired by long lifeand a variety of business
and company,
in order to instruct us inthe principles of human
nature,
and regulate our future conduct, aswell as speculation. By
means of
this guide, we mount up to theknowledge of men's
inclinations
and motives, from their actions,expressions, and even
gestures;
and again descend to theinterpretation of their
actions
from our knowledge of their motivesand inclinations. The
general observations
treasured up by a course ofexperience, give us the clue
of
human nature, and teach us tounravel all its intricacies.
Pretexts
and appearances no longerdeceive us. Public
declarations
pass for the specious colouring of acause. And though virtue and
honour
be allowed their proper weight andauthority, that perfect
disinterestedness,
so often pretended to, isnever expected in multitudes
and
parties; seldom in their leaders; andscarcely even in individuals
of
any rank or station. But were there nouniformity in human actions,
and
were every experiment which wecould form of this kind
irregular
and anomalous, it were impossible tocollect any general
observations
concerning mankind; and noexperience, however
accurately digested
by reflection, would everserve to any purpose. Why is
the
aged husband-man more skilful inhis calling than the young
beginner
but because there is a certainuniformity in the operation
of the
sun, rain, and earth towards theproduction of vegetables;
and experience
teaches the oldpractitioner the rules by
which
this operation is governed anddirected.

66. We must not,
however,
expect that this uniformity of humanactions should be carried to
such
a length as that all men, in thesame circumstances, will
always
act precisely in the same manner,without making any allowance
for
the diversity of characters,prejudices, and opinions.
Such a
uniformity in every particular, isfound in no part of nature.
On the
contrary, from observing thevariety of conduct in
different
men, we are enabled to form agreater variety of maxims,
which
still suppose a degree ofuniformity and regularity.

Are the manners of
men different
in different ages and countries? Welearn thence the great force
of
custom and education, which mouldthe human mind from its
infancy
and form it into a fixed andestablished character. Is
the behaviour
and conduct of the one sexvery unlike that of the
other? Is
it thence we become acquaintedwith the different
characters which
nature has impressed upon thesexes, and which she
preserves with
constancy and regularity? Arethe actions of the same
person much
diversified in the differentperiods of his life, from
infancy
to old age? This affords room formany general observations
concerning
the gradual change of oursentiments and inclinations,
and
the different maxims which prevail inthe different ages of human
creatures.
Even the characters, whichare peculiar to each
individual,
have a uniformity in their influence;otherwise our acquaintance
with
the persons and our observation oftheir conduct could never
teach
us their dispositions, or serve todirect our behaviour with
regard
to them.

67. I grant it
possible to
find some actions, which seem to haveno regular connexion with
any known
motives, and are exceptions to allthe measures of conduct
which have
ever been established for thegovernment of men. But if we
would
willingly know what judgementshould be formed of such
irregular
and extraordinary actions, we mayconsider the sentiments
commonly
entertained with regard to thoseirregular events which
appear in
the course of nature, and theoperations of external
objects.
All causes are not conjoined totheir usual effects with
like uniformity.
An artificer, who handlesonly dead matter, may be
disappointed
of his aim, as well as thepolitician, who directs the
conduct
of sensible and intelligentagents.

The vulgar, who
take things
according to their first appearance,attribute the uncertainty of
events
to such an uncertainty in thecauses as makes the latter
often
fail of their usual influence; thoughthey meet with no impediment
in
their operation. But philosophers,observing that, almost in
every
part of nature, there is contained avast variety of springs and
principles,
which are hid, by reason oftheir minuteness or
remoteness,
find, that it is at least possible thecontrariety of events may
not proceed
from any contingency in thecause, but from the secret
operation
of contrary causes. Thispossibility is converted
into certainty
by farther observation, whenthey remark that, upon an
exact
scrutiny, a contrariety of effectsalways betrays a contrariety
of
causes, and proceeds from their mutualopposition. A peasant can
give no
better reason for the stopping ofany clock or watch than to
say that
it does not commonly go right: Butan artist easily perceives
that
the same force in the spring orpendulum has always the same
influence
on the wheels; but fails of itsusual effect, perhaps by
reason
of a grain of dust, which puts astop to the whole movement.
From
the observation of several parallelinstances, philosophers form
a maxim
that the connexion between allcauses and effects is
equally necessary,
and that its seeminguncertainty in some
instances proceeds
from the secret opposition ofcontrary causes.

Thus, for
instance, in the
human body, when the usual symptoms ofhealth or sickness
disappoint our
expectation; when medicinesoperate not with their
wonted powers;
when irregular events followfrom any particular cause;
the philosopher
and physician are notsurprised at the matter, nor
are
ever tempted to deny, in general, thenecessity and uniformity of
those
principles by which the animaleconomy is conducted. They
know
that a human body is a mightycomplicated machine: That
many secret
powers lurk in it, which arealtogether beyond our
comprehension:
That to us it must often appearvery uncertain in its
operations:
And that therefore the irregularevents, which outwardly
discover
themselves, can be no proof thatthe laws of nature are not
observed
with the greatest regularity inits internal operations and
government.

68. The
philosopher, if he
be consistent, must apply the samereasoning to the actions and
volitions
of intelligent agents. The mostirregular and unexpected
resolutions
of men may frequently beaccounted for by those who
know
every particular circumstance of theircharacter and situation. A
person
of an obliging disposition gives apeevish answer: But he has
the toothache,
or has not dined. A stupidfellow discovers an uncommon
alacrity
in his carriage: But he hasmet with a sudden piece of
good
fortune. Or even when an action, assometimes happens, cannot be
particularly
accounted for, either by theperson himself or by others;
we
know, in general, that thecharacters of men are, to a
certain
degree, inconstant andirregular. This is, in a
manner,
the constant character of humannature; though it be
applicable,
in a more particular manner, tosome persons who have no
fixed rule
for their conduct, but proceedin a continued course of
caprice
and inconstancy. The internalprinciples and motives may
operate
in a uniform manner,notwithstanding these
seeming irregularities;
in the same manner asthe winds, rain, clouds, and
other
variations of the weather aresupposed to be governed by
steady
principles; though not easilydiscoverable by human
sagacity and
enquiry.

69. Thus it
appears, not only
that the conjunction between motivesand voluntary actions is as
regular
and uniform as that between thecause and effect in any part
of
nature; but also that this regularconjunction has been
universally
acknowledged among mankind, and hasnever been the subject of
dispute,
either in philosophy or commonlife. Now, as it is from
past experience
that we draw all inferencesconcerning the future, and
as we
conclude that objects will alwaysbe conjoined together which
we find
to have always been conjoined;it may seem superfluous to
prove
that this experienced uniformity inhuman actions is a source
whence
we draw inferences concerning them.But in order to throw the
argument
into a greater variety of lights weshall also insist, though
briefly,
on this latter topic.

The mutual
dependence of men
is so great in all societies thatscarce any human action is
entirely
complete in itself, or isperformed without some
reference
to the actions of others, which arerequisite to make it answer
fully
the intention of the agent. Thepoorest artificer, who
labours alone,
expects at least theprotection of the
magistrate, to
ensure him the enjoyment of thefruits of his labour. He
also expects
that, when he carries hisgoods to market, and offers
them
at a reasonable price, he shallfind purchasers, and shall
be able,
by the money he acquires, toengage others to supply him
with
those commodities which are requisitefor his subsistence. In
proportion
as men extend their dealings, andrender their intercourse
with others
more complicated, they alwayscomprehend, in their schemes
of
life, a greater variety of voluntaryactions, which they expect,
from
the proper motives, to co-operatewith their own. In all these
conclusions
they take their measures frompast experience, in the same
manner
as in their reasoningsconcerning external objects;
and
firmly believe that men, as well asall the elements, are to
continue,
in their operations, the samethat they have ever found
them.
A manufacturer reckons upon the labourof his servants for the
execution
of any work as much as upon thetools which he employs, and
would
be equally surprised were hisexpectations disappointed.
In short,
this experimental inference andreasoning concerning the
actions
of others enters so much into humanlife that no man, while
awake, is
ever a moment without employingit. Have we not reason,
therefore,
to affirm that all mankind havealways agreed in the
doctrine of
necessity according to theforegoing definition and
explication
of it?

70. Nor have
philosophers
ever entertained a different opinionfrom the people in this
particular.
For, not to mention that almostevery action of their life
supposes
that opinion, there are even fewof the speculative parts of
learning
to which it is not essential.What would become of
history, had
we not a dependence on theveracity of the historian
according
to the experience which we havehad of mankind? How could
politics
be a science, if laws and formsof government had not a
uniform
influence upon society? Where would bethe foundation of morals, if
particular
characters had no certain ordeterminate power to produce
particular
sentiments, and if thesesentiments had no constant
operation
on actions? And with whatpretence could we employ our
criticism
upon any poet or polite author,if we could not pronounce
the conduct
and sentiments of his actorseither natural or unnatural
to such
characters, and in suchcircumstances? It seems
almost impossible,
therefore, to engage eitherin science or action of any
kind
without acknowledging the doctrine ofnecessity, and this
inference from
motive to voluntary actions, fromcharacters to conduct.

And indeed, when
we consider
how aptly natural and moral evidencelink together, and form only
one
chain of argument, we shall make noscruple to allow that they
are of
the same nature, and derived fromthe same principles. A
prisoner
who has neither money nor interest,discovers the impossibility
of his
escape, as well when he considersthe obstinacy of the gaoler,
as
the walls and bars with which he issurrounded; and, in all
attempts
for his freedom, chooses rather towork upon the stone and iron
of
the one, than upon the inflexiblenature of the other. The
same prisoner,
when conducted to thescaffold, foresees his death
as
certainly from the constancy andfidelity of his guards, as
from
the operation of the axe or wheel. Hismind runs along a certain
train
of ideas: The refusal of thesoldiers to consent to his
escape;
the action of the executioner;the separation of the head
and body;
bleeding, convulsive motions, anddeath. Here is a connected
chain
of natural causes and voluntaryactions; but the mind feels
no difference
between them in passing fromone link to another: Nor is
less
certain of the future event than ifit were connected with the
objects
present to the memory or senses, bya train of causes, cemented
together
by what we are pleased to calla physical necessity. The
same experienced
union has the same effecton the mind, whether the
united
objects be motives, volition, andactions; or figure and
motion. We
may change the name of things; buttheir nature and their
operation
on the understanding never change.

Were a man, whom I
know to
be honest and opulent, and with whom Ilive in intimate friendship,
to
come into my house, where I amsurrounded with my servants,
I rest
assured that he is not to stabme before he leaves it in
order
to rob me of my silver standish; and Ino more suspect this event
than
the falling of the house itself, whichis new, and solidly built
and founded.-
But he may have been seizedwith a sudden and unknown
frenzy.-
So may a sudden earthquake arise,and shake and tumble my
house about
my ears. I shall thereforechange the suppositions. I
shall
say that I know with certainty thathe is not to put his hand
into the
fire and hold it there till it beconsumed: And this event, I
think
I can foretell with the sameassurance, as that, if he
throw
himself out at the window, and meetwith no obstruction, he will
not
remain a moment suspended in the air.No suspicion of an unknown
frenzy
can give the least possibility tothe former event, which is
so contrary
to all the known principlesof human nature. A man who
at noon
leaves his purse full of gold onthe pavement at Charing
Cross, may
as well expect that it will flyaway like a feather, as that
he
will find it untouched an hourafter. Above one half of
human reasonings
contain inferences of asimilar nature, attended
with more
or less degrees of certaintyproportioned to our
experience of
the usual conduct of mankind in suchparticular situations.

71. I have
frequently considered,
what could possibly be thereason why all mankind,
though they
have ever, without hesitation,acknowledged the doctrine of
necessity
in their whole practice andreasoning, have yet
discovered such
a reluctance to acknowledge itin words, and have rather
shown
a propensity, in all ages, toprofess the contrary
opinion. The
matter, I think, may be accountedfor after the following
manner.
If we examine the operations ofbody, and the production of
effects
from their causes, we shall findthat all our faculties can
never
carry us farther in our knowledgeof this relation than barely
to
observe that particular objects areconstantly conjoined
together, and
that the mind is carried, by acustomary transition, from
the appearance
of one to the belief ofthe other. But though this
conclusion
concerning human ignorance bethe result of the strictest
scrutiny
of this subject, men stillentertain a strong
propensity to
believe that they penetrate fartherinto the powers of nature,
and perceive
something like a necessaryconnexion between the cause
and
the effect. When again they turn theirreflections towards the
operations
of their own minds, and feel nosuch connexion of the motive
and
the action; they are thence apt tosuppose, that there is a
difference
between the effects which resultfrom material force, and
those which
arise from thought andintelligence. But being once
convinced
that we know nothing farther ofcausation of any kind than
merely
the constant conjunction of objects,and the consequent inference
of
the mind from one to another, andfinding that these two
circumstances
are universally allowed to haveplace in voluntary actions;
we may
be more easily led to own thesame necessity common to all
causes.
And though this reasoning maycontradict the systems of
many philosophers,
in ascribing necessity tothe determinations of the
will,
we shall find, upon reflection, thatthey dissent from it in
words only,
not in their real sentiment.Necessity, according to the
sense
in which it is here taken, has neveryet been rejected, nor can
ever,
I think, be rejected by anyphilosopher. It may only,
perhaps,
be pretended that the mind canperceive, in the operations
of matter,
some farther connexionbetween the cause and
effect; and
connexion that has not place involuntary actions of
intelligent
beings. Now whether it be so ornot, can only appear upon
examination;
and it is incumbent on thesephilosophers to make good
their
assertion, by defining or describingthat necessity, and pointing
it
out to us in the operations ofmaterial causes.

72. It would seem,
indeed,
that men begin at the wrong end of thisquestion concerning liberty
and
necessity, when they enter upon itby examining the faculties
of the
soul, the influence of theunderstanding, and the
operations
of the will. Let them firstdiscuss a more simple
question,
namely, the operations of body andof brute unintelligent
matter; and
try whether they can there form anyidea of causation and
necessity,
except that of a constant conjunctionof objects, and subsequent
inference
of the mind from one toanother. If these
circumstances
form, in reality, the whole of thatnecessity, which we conceive
in
matter, and if these circumstancesbe also universally
acknowledged
to take place in the operations ofthe mind, the dispute is at
an end;
at least, must be owned to bethenceforth merely verbal.
But as
long as we will rashly suppose, thatwe have some farther idea of
necessity
and causation in the operationsof external objects; at the
same
time, that we can find nothingfarther in the voluntary
actions
of the mind; there is nopossibility of bringing the
question
to any determinate issue, whilewe proceed upon so erroneous
a supposition.
The only method ofundeceiving us is to mount
up higher;
to examine the narrow extentof science when applied to
material
causes; and to convinceourselves that all we know
of them
is the constant conjunction andinference above mentioned.
We may,
perhaps, find that it is withdifficulty we are induced to
fix
such narrow limits to humanunderstanding: But we can
afterwards
find no difficulty when we cometo apply this doctrine to
the actions
of the will. For as it isevident that these have a
regular
conjunction with motives andcircumstances and
characters, and
as we always draw inferences fromone to the other, we must be
obliged
to acknowledge in words thatnecessity, which we have
already
avowed, in every deliberation ofour lives, and in every step
of
our conduct and behaviour.*

* The prevalence
of the doctrine
of liberty may be accounted for,from another cause, viz. a
false
sensation or seeming experience whichwe have, or may have, of
liberty
or indifference, in many of ouractions. The necessity of
any action,
whether of matter or of mind, isnot, properly speaking, a
quality
in the agent, but in any thinking orintelligent being, who may
consider
the action; and it consistschiefly in the determination
of
his thoughts to infer the existence ofthat action from some
preceding
objects; as liberty, when opposed tonecessity, is nothing but
the want
of that determination, and acertain looseness or
indifference,
which we feel, in passing, or notpassing, from the idea of
one object
to that of any succeeding one.Now we may observe, that,
though,
in reflecting on human actions, weseldom feel such a
looseness, or
indifference, but are commonly ableto infer them with
considerable
certainty from their motives, and fromthe dispositions of the
agent; yet
it frequently happens, that, inperforming the actions
themselves,
we are sensible of something likeit: And as all resembling
objects
are readily taken for each other,this has been employed as a
demonstrative
and even intuitive proofof human liberty. We feel,
that
our actions are subject to our will,on most occasions; and
imagine we
feel, that the will itself issubject to nothing, because,
when
by a denial of it we are provoked totry, we feel, that it moves
easily
every way, and produces an image ofitself (or a Velleity, as it
is
called in the schools) even on thatside, on which it did not
settle.
This image, or faint motion, wepersuade ourselves, could,
at that
time, have been compleated into thething itself; because,
should that
be denied, we find, upon a secondtrial, that, at present, it
can.
We consider not, that the fantasticaldesire of shewing liberty,
is here
the motive of our actions. And itseems certain, that, however
we
may imagine we feel a liberty withinourselves, a spectator can
commonly
infer our actions from our motivesand character; and even
where he
cannot, he concludes in general, thathe might, were he perfectly
acquainted
with every circumstance ofour situation and temper,
and the
most secret springs of ourcomplexion and disposition.
Now
this is the very essence of necessity,according to the foregoing
doctrine.

73. But to proceed
in this
reconciling project with regard to thequestion of liberty and
necessity;
the most contentious question ofmetaphysics, the most
contentious
science; it will not require manywords to prove, that all
mankind
have ever agreed in the doctrine ofliberty as well as in that
of necessity,
and that the whole dispute,in this respect also, has
been hitherto
merely verbal. For what ismeant by liberty, when
applied to
voluntary actions? We cannotsurely mean that actions
have so
little connexion with motives,inclinations, and
circumstances,
that one does not follow with acertain degree of uniformity
from
the other, and that one affords noinference by which we can
conclude
the existence of the other. Forthese are plain and
acknowledged
matters of fact. By liberty, then, wecan only mean a power of
acting
or not acting, according to thedeterminations of the will;
that
is, if we choose to remain at rest,we may; if we choose to
move, we
also may. Now this hypotheticalliberty is universally
allowed to
belong to every one who is not aprisoner and in chains.
Here, then,
is no subject of dispute.

74. Whatever
definition we
may give of liberty, we should be carefulto observe two requisite
circumstances;
first, that it be consistentwith plain matter of fact;
secondly,
that it be consistent withitself. If we observe these
circumstances,
and render our definitionintelligible, I am persuaded
that
all mankind will be found of oneopinion with regard to it.

It is universally
allowed
that nothing exists without a cause of itsexistence, and that chance,
when
strictly examined, is a mere negativeword, and means not any real
power
which has anywhere a being innature. But it is pretended
that
some causes are necessary, some notnecessary. Here then is the
advantage
of definitions. Let any onedefine a cause, without
comprehending,
as a part of the definition,a necessary connexion with
its effect;
and let him show distinctly theorigin of the idea,
expressed by
the definition; and I shall readilygive up the whole
controversy. But
if the foregoing explication of thematter be received, this
must be
absolutely impracticable. Had notobjects a regular
conjunction with
each other, we should never haveentertained any notion of
cause
and effect; and this regularconjunction produces that
inference
of the understanding, which is theonly connexion, that we can
have
any comprehension of. Whoeverattempts a definition of
cause,
exclusive of these circumstances, willbe obliged either to employ
unintelligible
terms or such as aresynonymous to the term which
he
endeavours to define.* And if thedefinition above mentioned
be admitted;
liberty, when opposed tonecessity, not to
constraint, is
the same thing with chance; whichis universally allowed to
have no
existence.

* Thus, if a cause
be defined,
that which produces any thing; itis easy to observe, that
producing
is synonimous to causing. In likemanner, if a cause be
defined, that
by which any thing exists; this isliable to the same
objection. For
what is meant by these words, bywhich? Had it been said,
that a
cause is that after which any thingconstantly exists; we should
have
understood the terms. For this is,indeed, all we know of the
matter.
And this constancy forms the veryessence of necessity, nor
have we
any other idea of it.

PART II.

75. There is no
method of
reasoning more common, and yet none moreblameable, than, in
philosophical
disputes, to endeavour therefutation of any
hypothesis, by
a pretence of its dangerousconsequences to religion and
morality.
When any opinion leads toabsurdities, it is certainly
false;
but it is not certain that anopinion is false, because it
is
of dangerous consequence. Such topics,therefore, ought entirely to
be
forborne; as serving nothing to thediscovery of truth, but only
to
make the person of an antagonistodious. This I observe in
general,
without pretending to draw anyadvantage from it. I frankly
submit
to an examination of this kind,and shall venture to affirm
that
the doctrines, both of necessityand of liberty, as above
explained,
are not only consistent withmorality, but are absolutely
essential
to its support.

Necessity may be
defined two
ways, conformably to the twodefinitions of cause, of
which it
makes an essential part. It consistseither in the constant
conjunction
of like objects or in the inferenceof the understanding from
one object
to another. Now necessity, inboth these senses, (which,
indeed,
are at bottom the same) hasuniversally, though tacitly,
in
the schools, in the pulpit, and incommon life, been allowed to
belong
to the will of man; and no one hasever pretended to deny that
we can
draw inferences concerning humanactions, and that those
inferences
are founded on the experiencedunion of like actions, with
like
motives, inclinations, andcircumstances. The only
particular
in which any one can differ, is,that either, perhaps, he
will refuse
to give the name of necessityto this property of human
actions:
But as long as the meaning isunderstood, I hope the word
can
do no harm: Or that he will maintainit possible to discover
something
farther in the operations of matter.But this, it must be
acknowledged,
can be of no consequence tomorality or religion,
whatever it
may be to natural philosophy ormetaphysics. We may here be
mistaken
in asserting that there is noidea of any other necessity
or connexion
in the actions of body: Butsurely we ascribe nothing to
the
actions of the mind, but whateveryone does, and must
readily
allow of. We change no circumstance inthe received orthodox system
with
regard to the will, but only in thatwith regard to material
objects
and causes. Nothing, therefore, can bemore innocent, at least,
than this
doctrine.

76. All laws being
founded
on rewards and punishments, it issupposed as a fundamental
principle,
that these motives have a regularand uniform influence on the
mind,
and both produce the good andprevent the evil actions. We
may
give to this influence what name weplease; but as it is usually
conjoined
with the action, it must beesteemed a cause, and be
looked
upon as an instance of that necessity,which we would here
establish.

The only proper
object of
hatred or vengeance is a person orcreature, endowed with
thought and
consciousness; and when anycriminal or injurious
actions excite
that passion, it is only by theirrelation to the person, or
connexion
with him. Actions are, by theirvery nature, temporary and
perishing;
and where they proceed notfrom some cause in the
character
and disposition of the person whoperformed them, they can
neither
redound to his honour, if good; norinfamy if evil. The actions
themselves
may be blameable; they may becontrary to all the rules of
morality
and religion: But the personis not answerable for them;
and
as they proceeded from nothing inhim that is durable and
constant,
and leave nothing of that naturebehind them, it is
impossible he
can, upon their account, become theobject of punishment or
vengeance.
According to the principle,therefore, which denies
necessity,
and consequently causes, a man isas pure and untainted, after
having
committed the most horrid crime,as at the first moment of
his birth,
nor is his character anywiseconcerned in his actions,
since
they are not derived from it, andthe wickedness of the one
can never
be used as a proof of thedepravity of the other.

Men are not blamed
for such
actions as they perform ignorantly andcasually, whatever may be
the consequences.
Why? but because theprinciples of these actions
are
only momentary, and terminate inthem alone. Men are less
blamed
for such actions as they performhastily and unpremeditately
than
for such as proceed fromdeliberation. For what
reason? but
because a hasty temper, though aconstant cause or principle
in the
mind, operates only by intervals,and infects not the whole
character.
Again, repentance wipes off everycrime, if attended with a
reformation
of life and manners. How is thisto be accounted for? but by
asserting
that actions render a personcriminal merely as they are
proofs
of criminal principles in the mind;and when, by an alteration
of these
principles, they cease to bejust proofs, they likewise
cease
to be criminal. But, except uponthe doctrine of necessity,
they
never were just proofs, andconsequently never were
criminal.

77. It will be
equally easy
to prove, and from the same arguments,that liberty, according to
that
definition above mentioned, in whichall men agree is also
essential
to morality, and that no humanactions, where it is
wanting, are
susceptible of any moralqualities, or can be the
objects
either of approbation or dislike. Foras actions are objects of
our moral
sentiment, so far only as they areindications of the internal
character,
passions, and affections; it isimpossible that they can
give rise
either to praise or blame, wherethey proceed not from these
principles,
but are derived altogetherfrom external violence.

78. I pretend not
to have
obviated or removed all objections to thistheory, with regard to
necessity
and liberty. I can foresee otherobjections, derived from
topics
which have not here been treated of.It may be said, for
instance, that,
if voluntary actions besubjected to the same laws
of necessity
with the operations of matter,there is a continued chain
of necessary
causes, preordained andpre-determined, reaching
from the
original cause of all to everysingle volition of every
human creature.
No contingency anywhere inthe universe; no
indifference; no
liberty. While we act, we are, atthe same time, acted upon.
The ultimate
Author of all our volitions isthe Creator of the world,
who first
bestowed motion on this immensemachine, and placed all
beings in
that particular position, whenceevery subsequent event, by
an inevitable
necessity, must result. Humanactions, therefore, either
can have
no moral turpitude at all, asproceeding from so good a
cause;
or if they have any turpitude, theymust involve our Creator in
the
same guilt, while he is acknowledgedto be their ultimate cause
and author.
For as a man, who fired a mine,is answerable for all the
consequences
whether the train he employedbe long or short; so
wherever a
continued chain of necessary causes isfixed, that Being, either
finite
or infinite, who produces thefirst, is likewise the
author of
all the rest, and must both bearthe blame and acquire the
praise
which belong to them. Our clear andunalterable ideas of
morality establish
this rule, upon unquestionablereasons, when we examine the
consequences
of any human action; andthese reasons must still
have greater
force when applied to thevolitions and intentions of
a Being
infinitely wise and powerful.Ignorance or importence may
be pleaded
for so limited a creature asman; but those imperfections
have
no place in our Creator. He foresaw,he ordained, he intended all
those
actions of men, which we sorashly pronounce criminal.
And we
must therefore conclude, either thatthey are not criminal, or
that the
Deity, not man, is accountablefor them. But as either of
these
positions is absurd and impious, itfollows, that the doctrine
from
which they are deduced cannot possiblybe true, as being liable to
all
the same objections. An absurdconsequence, if necessary,
proves
the original doctrine to beabsurd; in the same manner
as criminal
actions render criminal theoriginal cause, if the
connexion
between them be necessary andevitable.

This objection
consists of
two parts, which we shall examineseparately; First, that, if
human
actions can be traced up, by anecessary chain, to the
Deity, they
can never be criminal; onaccount of the infinite
perfection
of that Being from whom they arederived, and who can intend
nothing
but what is altogether good andlaudable. Or, Secondly, if
they
be criminal, we must retract theattribute of perfection,
which we
ascribe to the Deity, and mustacknowledge him to be the
ultimate
author of guilt and moral turpitudein all his creatures.

79. The answer to
the first
objection seems obvious andconvincing. There are many
philosophers
who, after an exact scrutinyof all the phenomena of
nature,
conclude, that the WHOLE, consideredas one system, is, in every
period
of its existence, ordered withperfect benevolence; and
that the
utmost possible happiness will, inthe end, result to all
created beings,
without any mixture of positiveor absolute ill or misery.
Every
physical ill, say they, makes anessential part of this
benevolent
system, and could not possibly beremoved, even by the Deity
himself,
considered as a wise agent,without giving entrance to
greater
ill, or excluding greater good,which will result from it.
From
this theory, some philosophers, andthe ancient Stoics among the
rest,
derived a topic of consolationunder all afflictions, while
they
taught their pupils that thoseills under which they
laboured were,
in reality, goods to theuniverse; and that to an
enlarged
view, which could comprehend thewhole system of nature,
every event
became an object of joy andexultation. But though this
topic
be specious and sublime, it was soonfound in practice weak and
ineffectual.
You would surely more irritatethan appease a man lying
under the
racking pains of the gout bypreaching up to him the
rectitude
of those general laws, whichproduced the malignant
humours in
his body, and led them through theproper canals, to the sinews
and
nerves, where they now excite suchacute torments. These
enlarged views
may, for a moment, please theimagination of a speculative
man,
who is placed in ease andsecurity; but neither can
they dwell
with constancy on his mind,even though undisturbed by
the emotions
of pain or passion; muchless can they maintain their
ground
when attacked by such powerfulantagonists. The affections
take
a narrower and more natural survey oftheir object; and by an
economy,
more suitable to the infirmity ofhuman minds, regard alone
the beings
around us, and are actuated bysuch events as appear good
or ill
to the private system.

80. The case is
the same with
moral as with physical ill. Itcannot reasonably be
supposed, that
those remote considerations, whichare found of so little
efficacy
with regard to one, will have a morepowerful influence with
regard to
the other. The mind of man is soformed by nature that, upon
the
appearance of certain characters,dispositions, and actions,
it immediately
feels the sentiment ofapprobation or blame; nor
are there
any emotions more essential to itsframe and constitution. The
characters
which engage our approbationare chiefly such as
contribute to
the peace and security of humansociety; as the characters
which
excite blame are chiefly such as tendto public detriment and
disturbance:
Whence it may reasonably bepresumed, that the moral
sentiments
arise, either mediately orimmediately, from a
reflection of
these opposite interests. Whatthough philosophical
meditations
establish a different opinion orconjecture; that everything
is right
with regard to the WHOLE, andthat the qualities, which
disturb
society, are, in the main, asbeneficial, and are as
suitable
to the primary intention of natureas those which more directly
promote
its happiness and welfare? Aresuch remote and uncertain
speculations
able to counterbalance thesentiments which arise from
the
natural and immediate view of theobjects? A man who is robbed
of
a considerable sum; does he find hisvexation for the loss
anywise diminished
by these sublime reflections?Why then should his moral
resentment
against the crime be supposedincompatible with them? Or
why should
not the acknowledgement of areal distinction between
vice and
virtue be reconcileable to allspeculative systems of
philosophy,
as well as that of a realdistinction between personal
beauty
and deformity? Both thesedistinctions are founded in
the
natural sentiments of the humanmind: And these sentiments
are not
to be controuled or altered byany philosophical theory or
speculation
whatsoever.

81. The second
objection admits
not of so easy and satisfactory ananswer; nor is it possible
to explain
distinctly, how the Deity can bethe mediate cause of all the
actions
of men, without being theauthor of sin and moral
turpitude.
These are mysteries, which merenatural and unassisted
reason is
very unfit to handle; and whateversystem she embraces, she
must find
herself involved in inextricabledifficulties, and even
contradictions,
at every step which she takeswith regard to such
subjects. To
reconcile the indifference andcontingency of human actions
with
prescience; or to defend absolutedecrees, and yet free the
Deity
from being the author of sin, has beenfound hitherto to exceed all
the
power of philosophy. Happy, if she bethence sensible of her
temerity,
when she pries into these sublimemysteries; and leaving a
scene so
full of obscurities andperplexities, return, with
suitable
modesty, to her true and properprovince, the examination of
common
life; where she will finddifficulties enough to
employ her
enquiries, without launching into soboundless an ocean of doubt,
uncertainty,
and contradiction!