United States v. Stevenscase in which the U.S. Supreme Court on April 20, 2010, ruled (8–1) that a federal law banning depictions of animal cruelty violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech. The law had been enacted primarily to prevent the production of so-called “crush” videos, in which a small animal is stomped or crushed to death, often by a woman wearing high heels.

The case arose in 2004 when Robert J. Stevens was indicted on charges of selling videos depicting animal cruelty, including two that recorded dogfights. The 1999 law under which he was eventually convicted in U.S. District Court criminalized the creation, sale, or possession of depictions of illegal acts of animal cruelty for commercial gain. Paragraph (c) of the law defined “depiction of animal cruelty” as

any visual or auditory depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film, video recording, electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing took place in the State.

The law made exceptions in paragraph (b) for depictions that have “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.” In 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found the law to be “facially unconstitutional” facially unconstitutional (unconstitutional on its face, as distinct from unconstitutional as applied to the case at hand). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and oral arguments were heard on Oct. 6, 2009.

In an 8–1 ruling issued on April 20, 2010, the court held that the law was substantially overbroad and therefore facially invalid. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts , Jr., first argued that depictions of animal cruelty should not be added to the list of constitutionally unprotected categories of speechbecause, unlike categories such as obscenity and speech integral to criminal conduct, , because “depictions of animal cruelty” is not well defined, and there is no tradition of excluding such depictions from First Amendment protection. The court criticized the government’s rationale for creating a new category as “a simple balancing test” in which the speech’s value of the speech is measured against its societal coststo society. Yet it also acknowledged—and rejected—the The court also rejected the government’s analogy with New York v. Ferber (1982), in which the Supreme Court recognized child pornography as a category of unprotected speech partly on the basis of its integral relation to an underlying crime (child sexual abuse) and its “de minimis” negligible societal value. The court held that the law was overbroad because it was unconstitutional in a substantial number of its applications. For example, because its definition of “depiction of animal cruelty” did not explicitly require that depicted acts of wounding or killing be cruel, the law extended to depictions of any illegal act of wounding or killing, even “the humane slaughter of a stolen cow.” Moreover , by means of the final clause of paragraph (c)—“regardless of whether the…wounding…or killing took place in the State”—the law applied to depictions of acts that were legal in the state in which they took place and to depictions of acts that were illegal in only a single jurisdiction. Thus, it applied to the sale of hunting videos in the District of Columbia (defined in the law as a state), where hunting is illegal. According to the majority, paragraph (b), the “exceptions clause,” The court also held that the “exceptions clause” did not sufficiently narrow the scope of the law, because most speech does not have “serious” value and much speech does not belong to any of the categories excluded by the clause. In his lone dissent, Samuel A. Alito argued that the unconstitutional applications envisaged by the majority were based on “fanciful hypotheticals” rather than on “real-world conduct.”