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Editor: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman September 25, 2007
Saudi Arabia and the United States:
Reluctant Bedfellows in a Strategic Embrace
Joshua Teitelbaum
For several years, the relationship between the
United States and Saudi Arabia has been
especially difficult. During the first Gulf War
(1990-1991), relations had reached an all-time
high, marked by intensive cooperation to liberate
Kuwait and protect the Saudi kingdom from Saddam
Husayn. Yet little remains today of those halcyon
days of photo-ops with Generals Norman
Schwarzkopf and Khalid bin Sultan. Seventeen
years ago, the countries strode confidently
forward to confront a common enemy. Today, they
retain common adversaries, but different ones:
radical jihadi terrorism and a rival state
bidding for regional hegemony – the Shi`ite
Islamic Republic of Iran. The geopolitical
changes unleashed by America’s overthrow of
Saddam Husayn’s regime in Iraq have resulted in a
significant measure of mistrust creeping into the
Saudi-American relationship. As a result, a
mutual lack of confidence intrudes on what should
otherwise be an air-tight alliance.
Over the past 40 years, marked by the decline of
British power and its replacement by the US in
the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has consistently
turned to the United States to assure its
security. A close military and political
relationship developed, as the Saudis became firm
US allies in the Cold War. The US trained Saudi
troops and built military facilities for Saudi
use, ostensibly, but which could be easily used
for American operations, as they were, in fact,
in the 1991 Gulf War. The two countries did not
share much in the way of values, but they did
share much in the way of common interests, from
combating communism to keeping oil flowing.
The recent downward spiral began with the 9/11
terrorist attacks. From Washington’s perspective,
the involvement of so many Saudi citizens in the
attacks combined with initial Saudi government
denials and the ideological and financial support
for terrorism emanating from the kingdom to
seriously sour the relationship. “If I could
somehow snap my fingers and cut off the funding
from one country, it would be Saudi Arabia,”
Stuart Levey, the Undersecretary of the Treasury
in charge of tracking terror financing told ABC
News on the sixth anniversary of the attacks.
In Washington, there was hope that the Saudis
would play a more constructive role in Iraq, but
instead the long US occupation has encumbered the
relationship. While initially supportive of
Saddam’s removal, the end result of the US
occupation has been the strengthening of the
Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi`ites and of Iran itself,
Saudi Arabia’s traditional rival across the Gulf.
The Saudi government either looked the other way
or gave tacit approval to Saudis jihadis who
flocked to Iraq, choosing to kill two birds with
one stone: the “martyring” of home-grown Wahhabi
extremists while supporting Sunni co-religionists against Shi`ite domination.
The US considers the Saudi role to be
counterproductive. US officials have said that
the Saudis are funding the Sunni tribal
opposition and seeking to enlist other Gulf
countries in the effort, since they consider the
current regime of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
to be in the pocket of Iran. The US Ambassador to
the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, stated that
“Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries are
not doing all they can to help us in Iraq. At
times, some of them are not only not helping…they
are doing things that [are] undermining the
effort to make progress.” Adding fuel to the
fire, Crown Prince Abdallah referred to the US
presence in Iraq as an “illegal foreign
occupation” at the Arab summit hosted by Riyadh
in March. (The US had been given a preview of
Abdallah’s ire a week earlier when the Saudi king
refused to attend a White House dinner in his honor planned for April.)
It is to Iran that one must look for an
explanation of Saudi behavior. The success of
Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza, the
deepening of the Syrian-Iranian relationship
(creating an unprecedented level of tension
between Riyadh and Damascus), and the threat of a
nuclear-armed Iran have significantly altered the
balance of power between these two regional
rivals. Although both the US and Saudi Arabia
want to block the expansion of Iranian power, the
US appears indecisive and is not exhibiting the
kind of leadership necessary to assuage Saudi fears.
In a kind of Catch-22 situation, the US wishes to
engage the Saudis as a leading force in a
US-allied coalition of Middle Eastern “moderates”
to confront Iran, but the Saudis appear reluctant
to follow an America that might leave the
Shi`ites in power in Iraq and fail to act
decisively when the Iranian situation reaches a
critical point. In Riyadh’s eyes, the US is no
longer a confident and reliable superpower
willing and able to pursue its vital interests in the region.
It appears likely that in the near future (at
least until a new President enters the White
House), Riyadh will be moving its relationship
with Washington on a new trajectory that
emphasizes its independence from a weakened
United States. For instance, President Bush’s
July 16 call for an “international meeting” this
fall on Arab-Israeli elicited mixed signals from
Saudi Arabia. A visit by Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert
Gates in early August resulted in a statement by
Saudi Foreign Minister Sa‘ud Al Faysal that the
Saudis “would look very closely and very hard at
attending” the meeting – a response that was
interpreted, perhaps charitably, by a senior
State Department official as “an interesting and
forward-leaning answer.” But in mid-September,
Sa‘ud lowered expectations of Saudi attendance
when he stated that “the kingdom’s participation
is doubtful” if substantive issues were not to be addressed.
Yet despite tactical differences over Iran and
the Arab-Israeli issue, all indications are that
long-term interests dictate that strategic
relations remain intimate. Both sides realize
this, and indeed are stepping back from the
brink. In late July, US officials announced that
Washington would propose an arms sale –
reportedly valued at $20b. – to Saudi Arabia.
Commitment to protecting Saudi oil fields was
indicated by a report in late August that the US
defense company Lockheed Martin would provide
training for a special force tasked with
protecting those fields. Such deals further lock
the two countries into a long-term defense relationship.
While the degree of US-Saudi intimacy will
fluctuate, the US needs Saudi Arabia for its oil
and contribution to regional stability, and the
Saudi royal family needs the US to keep it in
power and Iran at bay. This is what keeps these
very different countries, reluctant bedfellows
they may be, locked in a strategic embrace.
TEL AVIV NOTES is published with the support of the V. Sorell Foundation
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