*1
The State of New Mexico appeals the district court's grant of Defendant's
motion to suppress evidence because Defendant was driving on a road within
the Mescalero Apache Indian Reservation and was stopped by a New Mexico
state police officer. The State argues that the district court erred in
concluding that there was no agreement between the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) and/or the Mescalero Apache Tribe and the New Mexico state police
authorizing the state police to patrol the Mescalero Reservation. In the
alternative, the State argues that even if there was no agreement authorizing
the state police to patrol the Mescalero Reservation, the state police
officer who arrested Defendant conducted a citizen's arrest. Because we
conclude that the officer was without authority to enforce Mescalero tribal
traffic ordinances and because the State did not preserve its remaining
argument, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

The facts are not in dispute. On August 31, 2002, New Mexico State Police
Officer Gerard Silva was patrolling Highway 70 in the Mescalero Apache
Indian Reservation. He observed Defendant driving 45 mph in a 35 mph zone
on Mescalero 6, which is not within a state right-of-way and is not maintained
by the state. Officer Silva
turned on his emergency lights and pursued Defendant, who pulled over
a short time later on Highway 244, a state road not located on the Mescalero
Reservation. Officer Silva observed Defendant "staggering" and
"swaying" as he emerged from his vehicle. The events following
the stop resulted in Defendant being charged with DWI, driving with a
suspended or revoked license, two counts of resisting, evading, or obstructing
an officer, and one count of speeding.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that Officer Silva's
initial traffic stop was unlawful because, as a New Mexico state police
officer, Officer Silva did not have authority to enforce Mescalero Apache
traffic ordinances. At the hearing on the motion, Officer Silva testified
that he believed he had "full, unfettered authority" to conduct
traffic stops within the reservation. Officer Silva also testified that
he patrolled the Mescalero Reservation at the request of the Mescalero
tribal police. Officer Silva stated that his captain had been asked by
the tribe to have state police officers patrol the reservation in order
to augment tribal police, who were shorthanded.

The State also called Chief Morgan Troy Bolen as a witness. Chief Bolen
testified that he was a BIA officer and additionally acted as Chief of
Police for the Mescalero Tribe. Chief Bolen stated that after he became
Chief of Police in 1999, he determined that he did not have a sufficient
number of officers to patrol the reservation. He therefore entered into
an informal verbal agreement
with the New Mexico state police and the Otero County Sheriff's Office.
According to Chief Bolen, the agreement was an "open invitation"
to the state and county officers to patrol highways on the Mescalero Reservation.
Under the agreement, when a state police officer makes a stop on the reservation,
the officer must determine whether the individual is a Native American.
If the person is Native American, the individual is cited to tribal court;
if not, the individual is cited to state court. Chief Bolen also testified
that the tribal council members and tribal courts were aware of, and did
not object to, the informal verbal agreement.

*2
On cross-examination, Chief Bolen acknowledged that as a BIA officer he
was an employee of the federal government, and, based on 25
U.S.C. §§ 2802 ,
2803 (1990) ,
the BIA had authority to patrol the reservation. Chief Bolen also acknowledged
that he was unaware of any authority authorizing the informal agreement
he described. At the conclusion of his testimony, the State argued that
Officer Silva had authority to stop Defendant on tribal land because (1)
the State has jurisdiction over victimless crimes by non-Indians, (2)
there was sufficient evidence of an informal agreement between the state
police and the Mescalero Tribe conveying authority to Officer Silva, and
(3) the agreement did not infringe on the authority of the tribe. Defendant
argued that evidence should be suppressed because neither Congress nor
the Mescalero Tribe expressly authorized state police officers to patrol
highways on reservation
land and because there was no legal authority for the informal agreement.

The district court took the issue under advisement and asked the parties
to brief the applicability of 25
U.S.C. § 2804 (2000)
and whether it authorized the informal agreement upon which the State
relies. Because the State indicated that there might possibly be a written
form of the agreement, the district court allowed the State two weeks
to produce the agreement in written form. The State never produced the
agreement and instead argued that no agreement was necessary because Defendant
was a non-Indian and New Mexico has exclusive jurisdiction over non-Indians
on the Mescalero Apache Reservation. The district court found that there
was no written agreement and that Officer Silva was not commissioned to
enforce ordinances of the Mescalero Tribe. As a result, the district court
concluded that Officer Silva "was without authority to stop"
Defendant and granted Defendant's motion to suppress.

Authority to Enforce Tribal Traffic Ordinances

The State argues that the district court erred in concluding that there
was no agreement between the BIA and/or the Mescalero Tribe and the New
Mexico state police authorizing the state police to patrol the reservation.
It contends that there was an actual verbal agreement made by Chief Bolen,
which was accepted implicitly by the Mescalero Tribe. Because the State
never produced a written agreement, the issue in this case is whether
a verbal agreement between
the BIA and/or the Mescalero tribal police and the New Mexico state police,
and a lack of objection to such an agreement on the part of the Mescalero
tribal leaders, is legally sufficient to confer upon the New Mexico state
police the authority to enforce tribal traffic ordinances on tribal land.

In reviewing the district court's grant of Defendant's motion to suppress,
"[w]e review the district court's ruling ... to determine whether
the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party." State
v. Cline, 1998-NMCA-154,
¶ 6, 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d 785 .
We review the legal issue of whether the district court correctly determined
that a verbal agreement is insufficient to confer authority upon the New
Mexico state police under a de novo standard of review. See
State v. Nieto,
2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 19,
129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442
(observing that application of law to facts is subject to de novo review).

*3
The State does not cite any authority generally giving the New Mexico
state police jurisdiction or authority to enforce tribal laws on tribal
lands. However, § 2804(a)
authorizes the BIA to
enter into agreements with state law enforcement personnel for the purpose
of aiding in enforcement of federal or tribal law within a reservation.
Similarly, the New Mexico Mutual Aid Act authorizes "mutual aid agreements"
for law enforcement purposes between state agencies and tribal governments
or the BIA. NMSA 1978,
§ 29-8-3 (1971)
(Mutual aid agreements).

Section 2804(a)
states in pertinent part:

The Secretary may enter into an agreement for the use ... of the personnel or facilities of a Federal, tribal, State, or other government agency to aid in the enforcement or carrying out in Indian country of a law of either the United States or an Indian tribe that has authorized the Secretary to enforce tribal laws.

We agree with the State
that Chief Bolen, as a BIA employee, ostensibly had the authority to enter
into an agreement contemplated by § 2804
. See
25 U.S.C. § 2803(8)
(2000) (stating that
the Secretary of Interior may authorize employees of the BIA to "when
requested, assist ... any Federal, tribal, State, or local law enforcement
agency in the enforcement or carrying out of [tribal law]"). The
question remains as to whether § 2804
authorizes verbal agreements.
We do not believe that it does.

Our duty, when interpreting federal
statutes, is to give effect to the intent of the legislative body.
State v. Cleve,
1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 15,
127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23 .
In this instance, we endeavor to give effect to the intent of Congress.
Great Am. Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 86 N.M.
336, 339, 524 P.2d 199, 202 (Ct.App.1974)
(Hendley, J., specially concurring). When doing so, we may find guidance
in federal case law interpreting federal statutes. See
id.
at 340, 524 P.2d at 203
(relying on "principle[s]
of federal statutory interpretation" to aid in construing a federal
statute which granted the
United States exclusive jurisdiction over Indians residing on Indian land).

There is no express language within § 2804
, and the State cites
to no authority, indicating that Congress intended to grant the BIA authority
to enter into verbal or implicit agreements. See
N.M. Cattle Growers
Ass'n v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
248 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir.2001)
(stating that an appellate court's primary task in construing statutes
is to determine congressional intent by using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation beginning with the plain language of the law);
United States v. Hess,
194 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th
Cir.1999) (stating that
when construing a federal statute, a court will "give effect to the
will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably
plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive"
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

*4 It
makes sense that Congress intended agreements entered into under
§ 2804
be written. Such agreements involve the law enforcement obligations and
relationships of federal, state, and tribal governmental entities. We
would not expect that Congress would intend that existing obligations
and relationships be modified without the formality of a writing for the
protection of each of the entities. We also would expect that Congress
would intend that issues of jurisdiction be formally set forth because
of the effect of jurisdictional boundaries on the rights of citizens subject
to the laws of the interested
government entities. Cf.
Chem. Weapons
Working Group, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Army,
111 F.3d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir.1997)
(stating that statutes are not to be construed in a manner that would
lead to an irrational result). Therefore, because of the parties involved
and the subject matter of an agreement under § 2804
, we cannot accept the
State's expansive interpretation of the statute without a clearer indication
of congressional intent. Cf.
DeVargas v. Mason
& Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,
911 F.2d 1377, 1388 (10th Cir.1990)
(declining to imply that Congress intended that a statute be applied retroactively
when Congress chose to remain silent on that issue).

Moreover, the State's
position is not supported under New Mexico law. The State characterizes
the verbal agreement between the New Mexico state police and the Mescalero
Tribe as an "implicit agreement." The Mutual Aid Act states:

Any state, county or municipal
agency having and maintaining peace officers may enter into mutual aid
agreements with any public agency as defined in the Mutual Aid Act [
29-8-1 NMSA
1978], with respect to law enforcement, provided any such agreement shall
be approved by the agency involved and the governor.

Section
29-8-3 . Similar to our
interpretation of § 2804
, we believe that because
the Mutual Aid Act addresses governmental agencies and their exercise
of law enforcement jurisdiction, the legislature intended that a mutual
aid agreement be written. Moreover, by adding the limiting language that
mutual aid agreements must be approved by both the agency involved and
the governor of the State of New Mexico, we believe that the legislature
contemplated a written agreement. Otherwise, there would be too much opportunity
for misconstruction. We must be mindful of our duty when interpreting
statutes to "find that interpretation which can most fairly be said
to be imbedded in the statute in the sense of being most harmonious with
its scheme and with the general purpose of the legislature."
Smith Mach. Corp. v. Hesston,
Inc., 102 N.M. 245,
247, 694 P.2d 501, 503 (1985)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The legislature's intent with regard to the validity of verbal mutual
aid agreements can also be discerned from looking to a statute similar
to the Mutual Aid Act. See
State v. Ogden
118 N.M. 234, 243, 880
P.2d 845, 854 (1994)
(stating that "[s]tatutes on the same general subject should be construed
by reference to each other, the theory being that the court can discern
legislative intent behind an unclear statute by reference to similar statutes
where legislative intent is more clear") (citation omitted).
NMSA 1978, § 29-1-11(B)
(2002) governs "cross
commissioning" of peace officers. The statute states in pertinent
part:

*5
The chief of the state police is granted authority to issue commissions
as New Mexico peace officers to members of the police or sheriff's department
of any New Mexico Indian
tribe or pueblo or a law enforcement officer employed by the bureau of
Indian affairs to implement the provisions of this section. The procedures
to be followed in the issuance and revocation of commissions and the respective
rights and responsibilities of the departments shall be set forth in a
written agreement to be executed between the chief of the state police
and the tribe or pueblo or the appropriate federal official.

Id.
It is inconsistent for
the legislature to require a written agreement for the issuance of a cross
commission under Section
29-1-11 between state
law enforcement and Indian tribal police officers and not require a written
agreement for mutual aid agreements under Section
29-8-3 . Cf.
State v. Herrera,
86 N.M. 224, 226, 522
P.2d 76, 78 (1974) ("We
will not construe statutes to achieve an absurd result.").

Officer Silva initially
stopped Defendant for speeding on the Mescalero Reservation. Because Officer
Silva did not have authority to enforce Mescalero tribal traffic ordinances,
the district court did not err in granting Defendant's motion to suppress.

Unpreserved Issue

The State argues for the
first time on appeal that even if there is no agreement authorizing the
state police to patrol the Mescalero Reservation, Officer Silva had authority
because he was conducting a citizen's arrest. Because the State did not
raise this issue below, it was not preserved and
we do not consider it. See
State v. Vandenburg,
2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 52,
134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19
("To preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling
or decision by the district court was fairly invoked." (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); State
v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030,
¶ 8, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1
(same).

Conclusion

The district court did not err in granting Defendant's motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision.