On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns

Abstract

This paper investigates the dimension requirements of informationally decentralized Pareto-satisfactory processes in production economies with increasing returns to scale or more general types of non-convexities. We show that the marginal cost pricing (MCP) mechanism is
informationally effcient over the class of non-convex production economies where MCP equilibrium allocations are Pareto effcient. We then discuss the informational requirements of
realizing Pareto effcient allocations for a general class of non-convex production economies.
We do so by examining the dimension of the message space of the marginal cost pricing
mechanism with transfers. Since the set of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations
with transfers contains Pareto effcient allocations as a subset for every economy under consideration, Pareto e±cient allocations can be realized through the MCP mechanism with
transfers, which is informationally decentralized and has a finite-dimensional message space.
This result is sharply contrasted to the impossibility result given in Calsamigla (1977).

Item Type:

MPRA Paper

Original Title:

On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns