How would Prime Minister Miliband perform on the world stage?

Unlike Cameron in opposition, the Labour leader has international experience, and a clear sense of where he stands

Ed Miliband: 'He has a clearer sense of where he stands on the major international issues than Tony Blair did at the same point in his leadership.' Photograph: Felix Clay for the Guardian

Ed Miliband: 'He has a clearer sense of where he stands on the major international issues than Tony Blair did at the same point in his leadership.' Photograph: Felix Clay for the Guardian

Published on Fri 28 Jun 2013 11.00 EDT

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d Miliband's guest appearance at this week's meeting of the National Security Council raises an interesting question: what kind of foreign policy could we expect if he becomes prime minister? The Labour leader has said relatively little about international affairs so far: a few comments made during his leadership campaign, a handful of responses to government statements in the House of Commons, but not yet a set-piece speech or major policy intervention.

Of course, prioritising domestic politics is a golden rule of opposition. Tony Blair, whose legacy was ultimately defined by foreign policy, didn't make his first major speech on the subject until the start of the 1997 election campaign. If anything, Miliband has a clearer sense of where he stands on the major international issues than Blair did at the same point in his leadership. He also has more experience. As a former environment secretary, Miliband has already handled major international negotiations on behalf of Britain. That's something very few leaders of the opposition can claim: not Blair, not Cameron, not even Thatcher.

Inevitably, much of Labour's thinking about foreign policy is framed by the experience of Iraq. When Miliband used his first leader's speech to say that Labour had been "wrong" to take Britain to war in 2003, he wasn't just referring to its illegitimacy. He was also making an important point about the purpose and utility of military force. As he wrote a few months later: "the neocons were wrong to think we could impose democracy at the point of a gun".

Miliband certainly isn't opposed to military intervention as a matter of principle – he supported the use of airpower in Libya, for example. But he is clear-minded about the conditions that ought to apply. Force should be a last resort. There should be clear multilateral authority and achievable military goals And the purpose should be to save lives and alleviate suffering, not further the geopolitical interests of the intervening powers. He dismisses the enthusiasm of neoconservatives and liberal imperialists for using western military power to "remake" the world as dangerously utopian.

This has obvious implications for the transatlantic relationship. Miliband admires America, but not blindly so. He has often said, with reference to Iraq, that our alliances should be shaped by our values, not the other way round. This poses little difficulty as long as Barack Obama is in the White House. But the issue could easily become a live one if a Republican with neocon leanings succeeded him in 2017. Would Miliband be willing to stand firm, as Harold Wilson did when he refused to send British troops to Vietnam, or would he follow Tony Blair's strategy of blank-cheque loyalty? He has already shown a willingness to take a different line from Washington by advocating recognition of a Palestinian state, so I expect that Miliband would choose to be a Wilson rather than a Blair.

As well a signalling a more prudent and realistic approach to the use of military power, Miliband has also referred to the importance of strengthening Britain's soft power attributes. These are the commercial, cultural and educational linkages that complement traditional instruments of diplomacy and military power and generate prestige, influence and goodwill. The BBC, our great universities, the British Council, the creative industries, globally minded companies and even the armed forces in their non-combat functions all play their part in this.

This matters because the rise of China, India and Brazil isn't just about greater financial muscle and military power; it's also about their cultural self-confidence and their success in turning themselves into poles of attraction for other countries. This means that soft power isn't the soft option anymore. It's the new realpolitik. There is now a global competition in ideas and cultural influence, and Britain and other western countries cannot take their traditional advantage in these areas for granted any more. After the financial crash, the west is no longer seen to provide the single sustainable model of success.

Miliband's project to reform democratic capitalism has an important external dimension in another sense as well. Its success will require significant changes to the structure of globalisation as we have come to know it. New rules are needed to stamp out tax havens and other abuses that have allowed multinational companies to shift tax burdens from the rich to the rest. The division of the global economy into an east that produces and a west that consumes isn't compatible with the kind of economic strategy Miliband has in mind. If he wants to re-industrialise the economy and create the sort of jobs that will allow Britain to "grow from the middle out", there will need to be more action to tackle global imbalances in finance and trade. This calls for a new focus on economic diplomacy.

Finally, the significance Miliband attaches to reaching agreement on issues such as climate change, energy security and global economic reform means that he will retain a strong preference for multilateral diplomacy over narrow bilateralism. He is, for example, dismissive of the idea that a foreign policy based on striking separate deals with China, India and Brazil can ever be a substitute to being at the heart of Europe. Although pro-European by instinct, the case he makes will be pragmatic rather than idealistic. The EU will continue to have a huge impact on our interests whether we are in it or not, so walking away isn't an option. The British interest is to engage.

Miliband may not have set out his big international vision yet, but it's already possible to see the building blocks of what his foreign policy is likely to consist of: judicious and realistic in the use of military power; Atlanticist without being subservient to the US; values-based and strong on human rights; multilaterally engaged in the pursuit of common solutions to global problems; and pragmatically pro-European. It will certainly be distinctive in reflecting his outlook and experience.