Defendant(1) assigns error to that denial. In testing the evidence for sufficiency, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether any rational
trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den 514 US 1005 (1995); State v.
King, 307 Or 332, 339, 768 P2d 391 (1989).

Under ORS 475.992(4), "[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance." Here, the state presented no evidence
that defendant actually possessed the methamphetamine found in the dresser drawer. The
issue, therefore, is whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant
constructively possessed the controlled substance. To prove constructive possession, the
state must prove that a defendant knowingly exercised control over, or had the right to
control, the contraband. State v. Garcia, 120 Or App 485, 487-88, 852 P2d 946 (1993).
Evidence that contraband is found in quarters owned or occupied by a defendant can be
sufficient to allow the inference that he or she has a right to control that contraband.
State v. Bauer, 128 Or App 598, 601, 876 P2d 802 (1994).

The evidence here is meager. The state relies on: (1) the officer's
observation of jewelry, earrings, and similar items on top of the dresser in which the
methamphetamine was found; (2) the character of the clothing in the dresser where the
drugs were found; and (3) the envelope addressed to "Walter and Sandy Evans" at the
address searched that was found on the premises. According to the state, because there
was no evidence to suggest that anyone other than Walter and Sandy Evans lived at the
searched premises, a rational juror could conclude from the envelope and the contents of
the dresser that defendant was married to Walter Evans, that she lived with him at that
address, that she shared the master bedroom with him, that she shared joint possession
and control of the dresser where the methamphetamine was found, and that she knew
about the presence of the residue-covered plastic bag.

The evidence that the state points to simply will not bear the weight of the
inferences the state needs. The first two items that the state relies on are not even
accurately described by the state, at least not on the record before us. Although the state
characterizes the jewelry and similar items on top of the dresser as "feminine" in nature,
the officer who observed them did not describe them as such. Nor do the photographs of
the top of the dresser that were admitted into evidence and examined by the jury permit
that conclusion. Indeed, based on our review of the photographs, it is difficult to identify
the objects on the dresser as jewelry at all, let alone as a woman's jewelry.

Similarly, the state contends that the officer searching the dresser described
it as containing "clothing that was consistent with what a female would wear." That is an
overly generous description of the officer's testimony. What the officer actually said was
that the clothing was of a kind that either a male or female would wear. When asked if
the dresser contained "women's clothing," the officer specifically replied "I would not say
that." Instead, he recalled that the dresser contained sweatshirts and "clothing that
would be either sex, male, female, anyone could wear * * *."

In and of themselves, the nondescript items observed on and in the dresser
where the drugs were found support no particular inference about the gender or identity
of the person who used the dresser. They do not make it more likely than not that any
woman used that dresser; they certainly do not tend to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a particular woman--defendant Sandy Evans--had control over the area, joint or
otherwise.

The state's only other evidence was the envelope hand-addressed to "Walter
and Sandy Evans" at the address of the searched residence, postmarked six days before
the search, with a return address from Farmers Insurance. When police found it, the
envelope was empty; there was nothing inside to demonstrate that it was sent from
Farmers Insurance in a business capacity. That solitary envelope falls far short of
providing an adequate evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant
in fact resided at the searched residence and further had control over the area in which
the methamphetamine was found.

The indictment charged defendant with committing that crime by "knowingly remaining at a place while
knowingly permitting persons to use said place to keep controlled substances." For the
same reasons that a rational finder of fact, on this record, could not conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant occupied the premises and had constructive possession
of the drugs in it, a rational finder of fact could not conclude that defendant
stayed at the residence, had the authority to permit others to keep the drugs there, and
consented to their doing so. See generally State v. Pyritz, 90 Or App 601, 752 P2d 1310
(1988) (examining elements of frequenting a place where controlled substances are kept).

1. Because the only issue we discuss is the ruling on defendant Sandy Evans's
motion for judgment of acquittal, our references to "defendant" in the singular
throughout the remainder of the opinion refer to her.

"(1) A person commits the offense of frequenting a place where
controlled substances are used if the person keeps, maintains, frequents, or
remains at a place, while knowingly permitting persons to use controlled
substances in such place or to keep or sell them * * *.

"* * * * *

"(4) As used in this section, 'frequents' means repeatedly or
habitually visits, goes to or resorts to."