Whether the redeeming activity of God can be an intelligible and compelling reality in a postmodern society represents a profound challenge to the Christian church. By paying attention to evil as an abuse of power, the church may be able to present and embody a rehabilitated Christus Victor view of the atonement to a radically suspicious postmodern society.

Paul's reflections on the universal curse of death and its conquest by the resurrection of God's son who shared that curse in his own death on the cross help define the pastoral approach to those who suffer humanity's common anxiety in the face of death.

Even though just war theory is ostensibly intended to rule out some wars and some forms of warfare, CharlesBrown argues that, because of its basis in value-hierarachical dualism, just war theory ultimately props up warfare by justifying it. By its nature, just war theory defines warfare as waged against an evildoer, thereby shutting down avenues for dialog and peaceful prevention of warfare: "Just war theory has always been developed with the noblest of motives only to end as (...) part of the legitimation of war [...] The value-hierarchical and dualist set of assumptions informing traditional just war theory creates the perspective of a master self and with it a monological rationality that makes just war theory incapable of judging when the basic just war requirements for justice have been met. Just war theory must then be reconstructed in light of a new model of self-identity and a dialogical rationality.". (shrink)

This paper argues that the pluralist ethos of today’s world requires dialogue, i.e., the construction of shared meaning through a plurality of perspectives. This, in turn, requires that partners in dialogue overcome the perspective of the “master self” who claims universal legislative authority in its quest for epistemic closure. Dialogue requires the cultivation and development of a dialogical self-identity that reflects the ability to co-construct shared meaning without the erasure or suppression of differences.

A growing number of geologists, geophysicists, and other Earth scientists now claim that human caused changes in the chemistry of the atmosphere, oceans, and land are so pervasive as to constitute a new geological epoch characterized by humanity’s impact on the planet. They argue that these changes are so profound that future geologists will easily recognize a discernible boundary in the stratigraphy of rock separating this new epoch from the previous geological epoch, i.e., the Holocene. They propose to name this (...) new geological epoch the “Anthropocene,” a term meaning the age of man. Common to this view is the claim that humans are now the ecologically dominant force on Earth. This paper compares the understanding of human self-identity developed by the defenders of the Anthropocene discourse with the understanding of human self-identity developed by radical ecologists. It concludes by arguing that only an ecologically and dialogically informed conception of human self-identity can provide an adequate point of departure for an ecologically benign form of human dwelling on this planet. (shrink)

At the end of I.3, 319a29ff, Aristotle asks a series of questions. This difficult and condensed passage, whose translation is controversial at some points, raises two questions: what is what is not without qualification? and is the matter of earth and fire the same or different? In this essay, I shall focus on the second question.

In what sense can we not help thinking that every event has a cause? One answer is, that this begs the question: we can think of events as uncaused. Well, we can think of events in isolation from causes, and we can formulate the proposition that some events have no cause, or that no event needs a cause. But the first of these does not constitute thinking of an event as not caused , but thinking of an event not-as-caused ; (...) while the implications of the second, forming anti-causal propositions, are obscure. I can verbally formulate the proposition ‘some events are uncaused’; the question is, whether it makes sense to affirm it. Now I can verbally formulate the proposition ‘some triangles are quadrilateral’, and we must not say that this does not make sense ; for I know the criteria for being a triangle, and I know the criteria for being quadrilateral; and the proposition simply asserts that there are some figures which satisfy both sets of criteria. That this is logically impossible is true, but it is not unintelligible. It does not, however, make sense to affirm a logical impossibility, simply because I cannot meaningfully affirm what I do not understand and believe to be possible , and if I understand what it means to be both triangular and quadrilateral, I cannot also believe it to be possible, since to understand what it means for a plane figure to have three sides is to understand that this excludes its having any other number of sides, e.g. four. But ‘some events are not caused’ is not logically incoherent in this way, or not apparently so; for in thinking of an event I am by definition thinking of a happening in isolation from any cause; I am thinking of it not as caused . Thus ‘some events are uncaused’ is not incoherent ex vi terminorum. (shrink)