Turbulent Times: The Last Years of Santeri Nuorteva in America, 1918-1920

Auvo Kostiainen

In 1918 Santeri Nuorteva was the representative of "Red Finland" in
the United States, struggling to get the United States to recognize the
revolutionary government in Finland. Simultaneously he promoted the cause of the
Russian Bolsheviks and later became the information director of the Soviet
Russian Information Bureau in America.1 Nuorteva came to Duluth,
Minnesota, in the spring of 1918 to give a talk. The mayor of the city, however,
refused to give him permission to speak. Kalle Rissanen, a well-known Finnish
American newspaperman, relates how Nuorteva went personally to see the mayor. At
first the secretary said the mayor did not wish to see Mr. Nuorteva. But after
an earnest entreaty, Nuorteva was permitted into the mayor's office. After a
long and apparently intensive discussion, the mayor and Mr. Nuorteva came out of
the office arm in arm and bid each other a friendly farewell. Then the mayor
said: "If Mr. Nuorteva needs protection in case of a hooligan's attack, I
will send police officers to the meeting place." When Nuorteva left,
according to Rissanen, the mayor mumbled "What a wonderful man, a wonderful
man." Santeri Nuorteva was indeed appreciated by Finnish American
socialists like Rissanen.2 But this particular story also reflects
Nuorteva's political abilities.

Many similar reminiscences could be told about Santeri Nuorteva and the
turbulent period when he was in the United States. We must also remember the
circumstances under which Nuorteva operated here. The period immediately
following World War I was a time of intensive political and social tension in
the United States - a reason for the sharp focus given the period by subsequent
historians. Santeri Nuorteva's name appears in many kinds of historical sources.
The purpose of this article is to examine one group of materials preserved, the
papers of the Military Intelligence Office. Through them we can learn of Santeri
Nuorteva's stay in the United States and the conditions under which he worked.
We can also learn much about the Finnish American community out of which he
worked.3

Santeri Nuorteva's original name was Alexander Nyberg. He had been born in
Viipuri, the son of a Finnish Swedish telegraph officer and Russian Jewish
mother. The city of Viipuri and his disparate background must have been good for
the linguist he became. He could speak at least Finnish, Swedish, English,
Russian and perhaps some German. After his family moved to Helsinki, and Santeri
enrolled at the University, he moved to Forssa, a small industrial town between
Helsinki and Turku, to become a language teacher in the local secondary school.
Gradually he became more interested in the political and social questions which
were sweeping Finland. While still in Forssa, he became editor of the local
newspaper. After its failure, he edited a new working class paper and served as
a member of the Finnish Diet, 1907-1910, as a Social Democrat. After troubles
with Czarist bureacrats, and the threat of prison for citicizing the imperial
government, he was forced to leave for the United States with his family in
1911.

His first job was as editor of Toveri (Comrade) in Astoria, Oregon.
Later he became a speaker and organizer for the Finnish Socialist Federation,
established in Hibbing, Minnesota in 1906, and also editor of Raivaaja
(Pioneer) and Säkeniä (Sparks) in Fitchburg, Massachusetts. During the
teens he became one of the best known Finnish American socialists and was often
seen as a delegate to Federation conventions and meetings of the Socialist Party
of America.

While in Fitchburg he became nominated as the "ambassador" of the
revolutionary government in Finland in the United States in early 1918. The
Civil War had broken out after Finland had gained independence in the fall of
1917, and the tension between the "White" and "Red" elements
had gradually grown until the outbreak of Civil War in late January, 1918. The
revolutionaries in Finland were, however, defeated during the spring. Nuorteva
had to find another job in America. Soon he was a member of the Soviet Russian
Information Bureau under the leadership of Ludvig C. A. K. Martens.

To understand the nature of the materials of the Military Intelligence on
Santeri Nuorteva and the Finns, it is important to remember that after the
United States joined the World War in 1917 anti-alien and anti-radical feelings
in the country began to increase. Everything foreign was seen as a threat to the
country's existence. Particularly, after the Russian October Revolution of 1917,
the Eastern European element in the United States (which included Finns) was
seen as especially dangerous. A reason for this was that a good deal of the
leadership of the American radical movement was in the hands of Russian Jews.
The peak was reached in the Palmer Red Raids under the leadership of Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer in 1919-1920. Thousands of suspected radicals and
aliens were arrested and many deported.4

The Military Intelligence papers show that in the crucial years 1918-20 the
activities of Finnish-American radicals were strictly watched. Agents reported
on "Bolshevik meetings" in different parts of the country. Santeri
Nuorteva was a common speaker both in Finnish and English at such affairs,
particularly after he became employed by the Soviet Russian Bureau. Thus there
is a detailed report by sergeant G. L. Ryder of the celebration of the first
anniversary of the Russian Revolution on November 17, 1918. At the meeting, held
in Boston's Grand Opera House, there were prominent radical speakers such as
Eaikmonn McAlpine, editor of the New York Call, Gregory Weinstein, editor
of Novi Mir, Louis C. Frainia, editor of Revolutionary Age, and
Santeri Nuorteva, "Ambassador of the Finnish Soviet Republic".
Nuorteva gave a long talk in the English language about the situation in Finland
and Russia at the meeting.5 Naturally there were also other
Finnish-American radicals who drew the attention of government agencies, such as
Raivaaja's editor-in-chief, F. J. Syrjala and Elis Sulkanen, another
known socialist journalist. Also the Finnish-American supporters of the
Industrial Workers of the World was seen as especially dangerous because of its
syndicalist and sometimes anarchist-oriented ideas and practices. There even
appear to have been some MI agents who believed that Nuorteva was an
IWW-supporter, but after more investigation such notions were dropped.6

The materials also include several copies of the letters and writings
Nuorteva sent to American officials (including the Military Intelligence) and
newspapers. These reveal his active role as a Finnish-American social leader and
also his work to secure the results of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

The agents' reports are both positive and negative about the role of Nuorteva
as a "dangerous Bolshevik". Several agents see him as a very
intelligent man, as a socialist, but not as an anti-American or seditious
person,7 as do such agents who will be discussed in the later pages
of this article. An example of the positive reports by the Military Intellegence
agents is one by Julius Wulbert from August 30, 1918. He attended a Socialist
Party meeting in Chicago, where Nuorteva appears to have spoken in English.
Wulbert describes in detail Nuorteva's speech and states among other things:

...while there was nothing anti-American in his speech, his care in choosing
his words was noticeable and several questions propounded to him on American
diplomacy or government he refused to answer or give an opinion....Subject is a
socialist propagandist and a shrewd diplomat. He has called on Mr. Miles of the
State Department in in Washington, and asked for the assistance of this
Government, pledging an anti-German policy on behalf of the Red Guard of whom he
claims to be accredited agent....

The report also includes a description of how Nuorteva gave detailed
suggestions to arrange America's relations with Soviet Russia, what kind of help
should be sent there and that Americans should take certain diplomatic measures
in international politics to help the Soviet Russian government. According to
Wulbert, Nuorteva also assisted the "Chicago Bolsheviks" financially.

While it appears that agents followed Nuorteva in America, and watched other
suspicious activities of labor Finns, it is also clear that the so-called loyal
Finns were as interested as the government in the radical Finnish-American
workers. As it is generally known, the Finnish community in America was divided
into conflicting groups along religious or ideological lines. The conflict
between the church goers and the socialists is particularly visible in the early
decades of this century. The antipathy of the socialists against the church has
to be understood largely from immigrant experiences in Finland, where the state
church was very conservative and supported the existing order.8 In
America many Finns thought that church was unnecessary and only limited a
person's activities, while others felt secure to be active in the Suomi Synod or
other Finnish-American church groups.

The conflict within the Finnish-American community culminated in the early
1900's after Finnish socialists had been active in several great strikes and
caused many to consider all Finns radicals. It was more difficult now for all
Finns to find work. Proclamations by "non-radicals" were given to
re-establish the Finns as good workers. Suomalainen Anti-sosialisti-Liitto
(The Finnish Anti-Socialist League) was founded in 1914. During the war the
conflict again intensified and the same kind of development occurred as
described above. Again it was understood by Americans that all the Finns in
America were radicals because of the activities of only a section of the Finnish
immigrant community.

"Loyalist meetings" were held and one result of the conservative
Finns' reactions was the founding of the Lincoln Loyalty League in 1918, the
purpose of which was to make known to Americans that not every Finn was
"seditious and dangerous", but they were good potential American
citizens. In the leadership of the League were conservatives, many of whom were
closely linked to the church.9 A well-known Finnish-American
businessman, J. H. Jasberg, was the secretary of the League in 1919 and informed
government officials of "dangerous propaganda" by Finns after having
received information from other loyalists.10 Also, Hon. Oscar J.
Larson, chairman of the League:

felt humiliated to have to acknowledge that most, if not all, of the
class-conscious international Socialist Finns in the United States are not loyal
to the government. In fact they have never been loyal. But they aren't
pro-German. Neither are they pro-American. On the contrary, they are
anti-American in that they are doing nothing especially to help the United
States win the war.11

Mr. Larson was definitely right when he said that the socialist Finns were
internationalist, and he was also right when he said they were not pro-American,
since the socialists were willing to be Americans, but only in a different
America, a socialist one. However, the claims by Larson that the socialists were
pro-German were without any grounds. This was only an effort to blackball them
in the eyes of the government and to further the conservative Finns' cause. This
is clear from historical facts, and, for example, Santeri Nuorteva in his
propaganda strongly attacked Germans while representing the unsuccessful Finnish
revolutionary government in America. At that time everybody had to acknowledge
that the defeat of the Finnish revolution was partly a consequence of the
landing of the German troops in Finland which helped the Finnish "White
government" to re-establish its power.

In its activities the Lincoln Loyalty League thus saw it necessary to inform
the government about the activities of the "dangerous Finns", either
basing their information on the materials they had collected themselves or
received from other Finnish informants like Emil Saastamoinen, one of the
leading Finnish-American conservatives. The United States government offices
also hired Finnish-speaking persons to translate information from Finnish
newspapers. Similar persons were hired from other language groups to keep the
government informed of the situation among each one of them. Also, there were
associations which were closely connected with the government and promoted
Americanism, such as the American Legion and the North American Civic League for
Immigrants, whose office in Boston in early 1920 noted that Santeri Nuorteva
appeared to be "a man of very great ability". The president of the
Civic League also claimed that Nuorteva was the man who "practically steers
the Bolshevik course".12

Military Intelligence officers appear to accord to Nuorteva a great deal of
"honor" for importing communism to America. Thus, it was stated that
Nuorteva and Martens had spent a great deal of money to capture the leadership
of the American labor movement. Their records also claim that Nuorteva was
appointed the American Communist Labor Party's honorary member at large along
with certain other eminent American radicals like Eugene V. Debs.13

Even if the accuracy of these reports is questionable, the reputation of
Nuorteva as one of the top radicals in America is undoubted. His reputation was
based on his active role in the Finnish information Bureau, the papers of which
were confiscated in 1920 and are now preserved in the New York State Library in
Albany. Later, when working in the Soviet Russian Bureau with Martens, he was in
charge of its foreign and information affairs. Because of all these activities
he became widely known in America, and not only among the Finnish immigrant
groups. The press, for example, was in frequent contact with him. It is also
possible that Nuorteva's work in the Russian Bureau somehow was actually
connected with the creation of both American communist parties in the fall of
1919.

Nuorteva's name is also connected with the infamous Sandburg case and the
import of large amounts of money from Russia to the United States. Also, when
Finnish-American socialists collected money, the Million Mark Fund (Miljoonan
markan rahasto), to help in rebuilding the Finnish labor movement from the
strains of the Civil War of 1918, misunderstandings and suspicions arose. When
marking Nuorteva's activities for 1918, the Synopsis of the case against Santeri
Nuorteva of the Military Intelligence notes:

He made a big collection in the United States, principally among the Finns,
with the ostensible purpose of helping the Finnish women and children, supposed
to be on the verge of starvation, with food. The real object of collecting the
gigantic funds, $14,500,000 on deposit in a New York Bank, was alleged to start
a nation-wide revolution in the United States. The disposition of this fund has
not been traced.

Here the Military Intelligence apparently confused the Million Mark Fund
collection, and the efforts of the Finns to buy foodstuffs from America. The
fact is that the Finnish official ("White") government had deposited
the above-mentioned sum of money in the White government's bank in New York for
that purpose. And when Nuorteva acted as the White government's opponent in
America, he managed to prohibit the use of the money by the representatives of
that government in the United States. However, he was not able to use the money
for purchase of foodstuffs for the revolutionary government in Finland.14

A revealing example of the tension and suspicion prevailing in America about
the possible seditious activities of Finnish-American radicals is the attention
directed to Finnish socialist newspapers and their publishing houses, such as Raivaaja
of Fitchburg, Massachusetts, where Nuorteva worked before being nominated the
representative of "Red Finland" in the United States in 1918. There is
a report by First Lieutenant Hannibal L. Hamlin of Worcester, Massachusetts, to
the Intelligence Office, Northeastern Department in Boston, from July 10, 1918,
where attention is directed particularly to the sixty-eight page book Aakkosia
sosialistien lapsille (A Socialist Primer).15 A short article
titled Sotamies (Soldier) is translated completely because of its
anti-war attitude, but it is either not mentioned, or no one knew, that the
original was written by Jack London! The contents of the primer in general is
analyzed in detail.

Such portions as the Socialists' ten commandments are commented on.
Commandment one undoubtedly raised some eyebrows. It reads: "Ajattele
itse, tutki itse. Ei Kannata uskoa porvarien jaarituksia. He eivät tiedä
tulevaisista eikä salaisista asiosta enempää kuin sinäkään - (Think
for yourself. Examine things yourself. It doesn't pay to believe in the nonsense
of the capitalists. They don't know any more about future events than you).16

It is most difficult to get this book, as the Finn socialists guard it most
jealously, although it probably is in every socialistic home. Mr. Samuel E. M.
Crocker, who has co-operated in this investigation, said he would undertake to
get a copy of this book last night. With the assistance of a loyal Finnish
Minister and another patriotic Finn, the copy was secured at midnight at the
foot of Wauchusett Mountain in the thick woods. It would probably cost this man
his life if it were known that he assisted in this matter.

The report also tells dramatically how the mailing of these
"dangerous" primers was supervised. It is not, however, told that the
first printing of the primer was made as early as 1912, but only now after six
years' serious attention was directed to it. There was also another children's
book by Hilja Liinamaa-Parssinen, Lasten laulukirja (Children's Songbook,
1st printing in Astoria, Ore., in 1914), to which another report paid attention,
and especially to its "seditious and anti-military" song, "March
for Peace."17

The report by Hamlin also pointed to the rich and active Finnish socialists
functioning in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, and to their publishing house,
cooperatives, and workers' credit union. A totally incorrect claim was also
presented by Hamlin when he said that Nuorteva had organized all these
"some years ago,", since Raivaaja was established in 1905 and
the cooperative in 1910, or before Nuorteva even came to America. The workers'
credit union was established in 1914, but Nuorteva does not appear to have
played any major role in its establishment.18 In addition Hamlin said
that "it is believed that this man is an agitator of the extreme type and
is in no way a friend to the best interests of the country."

The socialist primer and children's songbook coincidence might have had
larger importance to the investigation of the socialist Finns, since those
reports are among the oldest ones in the files of the Military Intelligence, and
apparently increased the government's attention to the Finns' activities. Later,
in July 1918, the Raivaaja house in Fitchburg was actually raided and F.
J. Syrjälä and Santeri Nuorteva were taken before the Intelligence
authorities.19Raivaaja, however, did not run into major
difficulties, since its second-class mailing permit was not cancelled and no law
suit was filed.20 The radical Finns were also under surveillance in
other parts of the country as well as in Canada, and some of them were arrested,
put in jail and even deported from the United States.21

The above facts reveal that the information the government agencies received
was not always even close to the truth. Apparently one reason for the
difficulties of the agents was the language barrier. They had to rely greatly on
information from "loyal Finns" which was biased in favor of their
ideology and aims. Examples of wrong or biased information are found frequently
in the Military Intelligence files, as are the reports of a special agent, Jacob
Spolansky, from a Finnish socialist meeting from Chicago. The Intelligence
synopsis of the case of Nuorteva is based on its information, however.22
Good examples of confusing and mixed information are the different versions of
Nuorteva's biography in the files, which are all incorrect. The synopsis of the
Military Intelligence wrongly states that Nuorteva was born in Petrograd,
Russia, and that he learned the Finnish language only after becoming twenty-one
years of age. The report appears to believe the information from
"conservative" Finns when it states that Nuorteva's friend, Wilho
Boman, was a bank robber in Finland, which is incorrect. Also the timing of
Nuorteva's activites in Finland and America are very much confused in the
Synopsis. Then there is the report by the Department of Justice agent, V. J.
Valjovec, of July 29, 1918, which also mixes the timing of important events in
Nuorteva's life and asserts some curious things:

Subject (Nuorteva) is a pure and simple Bolshevist, and was associated with
the work of Trotsky, Le-nine and Koltenay [Kollontay?] and other Bolshevists as
far back as 1906 when they were living in Switzerland and other countries and
perhaps acting as German agents.

The connection with leading Russian revolutionaries has never been proved in
the case of Nuorteva, but perhaps this was only one of the rumors connected with
the suspicions about his activities in America. Another possibility is that in
his younger days Nuorteva actually visited Petrograd and was active in the
General Strike of 1905-06 in Finland. At that time, and between 1907 and 1911
when Nuorteva was active in the Finnish Social Democratic movement and one of
its leaders, Russian revolutionaries often went to Petrograd through Finland,
and the country was one of the bases for anti-Czarist activities.

Further examples of wrong data were also reports that Santeri Nuorteva was
kicked out of the Finnish Socialist Federation. This erroneous information,
however, was corrected by other agents. All this leads one to think about the
function of the Military Intelligence: how could they steer their way in the
chaos of different types of information on the same things; how were they able
to find at least a partial truth? And, obviously, MI offered a good place for
politically biased persons to do harm to their opponents by misusing a
government agency.

Still, we must remember that the Nuorteva case for the years 1918-1920, and
through him the case of the Finnish-American radicals, has to be understood as a
reflection of the crisis being endured in America. The period was painful
because of the participation in the war and its aftermath, when the country
tried to recover from the strains connected with war. At the time the government
tried to assimilate different immigrant groups into one homogenous unit to be
able to respond better to any outer threat. The Military Intelligence materials
give a hint of the factions into which the Finnish immigrant community was
divided because of ideologies, and of the conflicts between them, which drove
them into different relations with the American government.

The central Finnish-American figure in these years, Santeri Nuorteva, saw it
necessary to leave the United States in 1920. Otherwise he apparently would have
been deported. The phases of his life thereafter continue just as colorfully. He
went through Canada to England, where he was jailed. The English government
transported him by a warship to Soviet Russia. There he was soon appointed to a
high administrative position in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, seemingly
because of his international experiences and linguistic skills. However,
suspicions rose about his possible role as a double agent and he was jailed for
almost one year. After being released he again gained an important position in
the government and particularly in the administration of the Soviet Karelian
Republic.

The life of this socialist, who started as a school teacher and newspaperman
in Finland and rose to a member of the Finnish Diet, who became a
"revolutionary ambassador" in America and a political figure in Soviet
Russia, was ended in a Leningrad hospital in 1929. His lifespan reflects in its
way the crucial years of these three countries. Through his experiences we may
see the course of autonomous Finland toward independence under the Czarist
pressure, the postwar crisis of the United States and the state of the
Finnish-American community. Through his biography we can also trace the attempts
of Soviet Russia to gain diplomatic status and the efforts to form a new type of
government in Russia.

Footnotes

The author of this article is preparing a major biographical study of Santeri
Nuorteva. The article here covers only a small section of the research being
done.

See Kalle Rissanen, "Feidias veistää henkilokuvia"
a type-written manuscript at the Emigration History Research Archives at the
Department of History, University of Turku, p. 112, original at Immigration
History Research Center, University of Minnesota.

For studies about this period, see William Preston, Jr., Aliens
and Dissenters. Federal Suppression of Radicals 1903-1933 (New York 1963),
esp. pp. 88-237; and John Highham, Strangers in the Land. Patterns of
American Nativism 1860-1925, rev. edition (New York, 1973), pp. 194-263.