U.S. PLANNED IN '84 FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO HELP CONTRAS

Senior Reagan Administration officials approved a plan in early 1984, under which the Nicaraguan rebels would receive training and equipment that would ultimately have been paid for by South Africa, Government officials said today.

Those approving the plan were said to include Secretary of State George P. Shultz and William J. Casey, then Director of Central Intelligence.

Government officials, explaining declassified documents made public today by the Congressional select committees on the Iran-contra affair, said the proposal was dropped several months later after a controversy erupted in Congress over the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors. Indicates Commitment to Contras

The disclosure is significant because it illustrates the depth of the Administration's commitment to the contras. Because of South Africa's policy of apartheid and its human rights record, such a deal could have embarrassed the United States had it become publicly known.

When the Administration sought aid for the contras from third countries in 1985, it explicitly ruled out any countries with human rights problems or those dependent on American aid out of fears of adverse publicity.

A State Department spokeswoman said tonight she would have no comment on the South Africa issue.

It has been previously disclosed that the Reagan Administration asked or accepted offers from several countries to provide military assistance or money for the Nicaraguan rebels. Those disclosed previously have included Brunei, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Singapore. The talks with the South Africans came before Congress cut off aid to the contras and do not appear to have violated any law. Testimony by Clarridge

The documents, with the name of the country blanked out, were made public along with testimony on the issue by Duane (Dewey) R. Clarridge, a Central Intelligence Agency official who in 1984 was directing the agency's covert support for the Nicaraguan rebels. He testified before the panels in closed session two weeks ago, and declassified transcripts were made public today. [ Excerpts, page A12. ] The Aug. 4 session was Mr. Clarridge's second before the panel. In his first sworn deposition, he was asked whether he was aware ''of any discussions in the agency about soliciting aid from third countries.'' Mr. Clarridge answered ''No.'' He was later in that same session asked ''were there any discussions in the C.I.A. about soliciting aid from third countries,'' and again replied ''no.''

On Aug. 4, he was asked whether he would like to change his response. Mr. Clarridge said: ''Yes, I would. Based on a review of the cable traffic prior to my going out - but I think that cable traffic also needs to be clarified - because I'm not so sure the answer was soliciting. My reading of that cable traffic is that at least the agency thought something was being offered.'' Called Complex Negotiation

One former Government official said today that the talks with South Africa were part of a complex negotiation in which the C.I.A. was preparing to send intelligence to South Africa that could be used by the Angolan rebels. At the time, American law barred the Government from assisting the Angolan rebels. But there was nothing to prevent South Africa from passing sensitive military information to the Angolans on its own.

This issue was not raised in the questioning of Mr. Clarridge, officials familiar with the Iran-contra investigation said, According to an intelligence report dated February 1985, the C.I.A. learned that Eden Pastora, one of the Nicaraguan rebel leaders, had received 200,000 pounds of equipment from the South Africans. The name of the country involved was omitted from the transcripts released today, but was disclosed by Government officials. It was not clear how this shipment was arranged, although the C.I.A. has told the Iran-contra committees it had no role in it.

According to the C.I.A. documents, the idea of using the South Africans was widely discussed within the Administration and was eventually approved by Secretary of State Shultz. One C.I.A. cable, in April 1984, said, ''SecState has been briefed on the initiative and approved.'' Refers to Misunderstanding

Mr. Clarridge insisted in his testimony that the cables and discussion of a South African offer were based on a misunderstanding by the C.I.A. He said that when he eventually traveled to South Africa to discuss the matter, his conversations with officials led him to conclude there had never been an offer.

One cable, written by a C.I.A. official in South Africa to Mr. Casey said: ''Spoke to [ delete ] a few days ago about Central American/Nicaraguan situation. [ Delete ] believes some independent help from the military here is possible both in training and equipment.''

The cable went on to say that the C.I.A. would be ''offering behind the scenes advice of where to plug in and what assisance would be truly useful. However [ delete ] remains open to other suggestions and approaches.'' Dealings Began in 1984

As traced in the documents and Mr. Clarridge's testimony, the dealings with South Africa had their beginnings in January 1984, when Mr. Casey met in his office with a South African official whose name was blacked out from the text. Mr. Clarridge said he was brought to Mr. Casey's office to brief this official on Central America.

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Mr. Clarridge said of the purported offer that ''I cannot say whether the Director of the C.I.A. solicited that'' or ''whether he offered it.''

In March 1984, Mr. Casey wrote in a memo to Robert C. McFarlane, then the national security adviser, that listed the South Africans as a possible source of equipment and material. ''The director, at least believed'' that the South Africans ''were prepared to offer some assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance.''

Within a month, however, the Administration began to have second thoughts. An April cable quotes John McMahon, then the deputy director of Central Intelligence, as saying ''there are some second thoughts around town as to the wisdom'' of involving South Africa ''in the already complicated Central American equation.'' Traveled to South Africa

Nonetheless, Mr. Clarridge traveled to South Africa between April 9 and 13, documents show. But he insisted that he did not solict any aid for the contras, and that he had been instructed to reject any such offer, were one made. He said this decision was made after Mr. Casey consulted with Mr. Shultz.

Uys Viljoen, the minister-counselor of the South African Embassy, tonight said the Pretoria Government would have no comment for the time being. Part of the Deposition

The committees have not released the full deposition of Mr. McMahon, but a portion of it was made public today.

Mr. McMahon appears to support Mr. Clarridge's version of events. He said that when Mr. Clarridge traveled to South Africa, he had been told not to raise the issue.

In questioning Mr. McMahon, however, a committee officer quoted a cable after Mr. Clarridge's visit that suggests the deal was still alive. A C.I.A. official in South Africa asked headquarters what he should tell the South Africans about the contra program and said: ''If no decision yet reached, will temporize accordingly.''

In his testimony to the committees, Mr. Clarridge repeatedly contradicted the sworn statements and notebook of his friend and colleague, Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North. Reviewed the Operation

He told the committees that Colonel North had asserted that Mr. Clarridge had reviewed aspects of the Iran operation, even when this was untrue.

Colonel North's notes about the November shipment of arms say Mr. Clarridge called after midnight to say he had been summoned by senior C.I.A. officials to explain the arms shipment. Clair George, the C.I.A. director of operations, and Mr. McMahon, who was then the agency's Deputy Director, apparently told Mr. Clarridge, ''This is criminal,'' according to the notes. 'Don't Remember Phone Call'

''I specifically don't remember this phone call,'' Mr. Clarridge told the committees when asked about the notebook entry. ''It is inaccurate.'' He also said he was not summoned to a meeting of senior agency officials about the November shipment and suggested that since the date of the note was incorrect, its contents may be untrue as well.

The November arms shipment had caused great anxiety within the agency because it was carried out without specific Presidential authorization. After learning of it, Mr. McMahon immediately demanded that a Presidential document, called a finding, be drafted retroactively to approve the agency's actions.

Mr. Clarridge frequently said during his testimony that he could not recall key events in the Iran affair. His lapses of memory were so frequent that members of the committee expressed frustration with his inability to remember key events.

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A version of this article appears in print on August 20, 1987, on Page A00001 of the National edition with the headline: U.S. PLANNED IN '84 FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO HELP CONTRAS. Order Reprints|Today's Paper|Subscribe