You — And Only You — Can Fly the Airplane

Recent fatal accidents involving GA aircraft after either an equipment failure or a non-instrument-rated pilot's encounter with poor weather led the NTSB last week to make several recommendations to the FAA concerning controller training. All that is well and good — and should be implemented — but, as AVweb's Scott Puddy writes, only the pilot can fly the airplane.

By R. Scott Puddy
| July 10, 2002

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About the Author ...

R. Scott Puddy was an ATP, CFI, CFI-I, MEI who taught out of the
Buchanan Field Airport (CCR) in Concord, California. Scott was type-rated
in the Beech/Raytheon King Air 300 series but regularly flew a V35 Bonanza
and practices law in San Francisco.

On the morning of June 18, 2002, Scott perished doing what he
loved: practicing aerobatics in a Yak-52, in the mountains of Brentwood,
California.

He contributed many articles about flying to AVweb in recent
years and also worked as our features editor. His enthusiasm for
aviation and his intensity in pursuing it were simply extraordinary.
Even more extraordinary was his dedication to sharing his passion for
flying with others, by teaching and writing. He touched a lot of lives,
undoubtedly saved many, and his legacy of written words will continue
to do both for many years to come. Scott's warmth, wit, and keen
intelligence will be missed by all who knew him and worked with him.

As AVweb
recently reported, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
issued
a Safety Recommendation to FAA Administrator Jane Garvey on September 24
suggesting that action be taken to address inadequate responses by air traffic
controllers to emergencies relating to VFR flight into IMC and instrument or
vacuum system failures. Although it is clear from the report that some housecleaning is in order at the FAA, it is apparent that we pilots need to clean
up our acts as well. The only person in a position to fly the airplane is the
PIC. Reliance upon ATC to assume those responsibilities has, and will have,
deadly consequences.

Below are summaries of several accidents that, according to the NTSB,
illustrate the need for additional training of air traffic controllers. They
also evidence a need for additional pilot training to dispel some lethal
misconceptions about the division of responsibilities between the PIC and ATC.

An all-too-common accident scenario involves a VFR-rated pilot in a high-performance, autopilot-equipped aircraft, under VFR flight following in IMC on
a "present position direct granite intersection" flight plan.
Although the pilots have been unavailable for post-accident interviews, their
thought processes seem obvious. "I don't need instrument training to fly
in IMC because the autopilot can fly the airplane. The controller has me on
radar. He'll warn me before I run into anything."

The NTSB's Safety Recommendation references one such accident that occurred
on June 8, 1998, near Bangor, Calif. The non-instrument-rated pilot had
advised the preflight weather briefer that he was planning an IFR flight from
Lincoln, Calif., to Sun River, Ore. The pilot departed Lincoln VFR and
obtained VFR flight following from Sacramento Approach. Within minutes, the
pilot advised Sacramento Approach that he had passed through some clouds. The
controller instructed the pilot to remain VFR.

About 15 minutes into the flight, the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center picked up VFR flight
following and instructed the pilot to remain VFR. The pilot responded,
"I'm ah not VFR I'm in the clouds I'm on autopilot." Indeed, the
pilot was in solid IMC at altitudes varying from 1,700 to 2,400 feet MSL in an
area where the minimum instrument altitude was 5,000 feet MSL. The controller
provided current weather for Chico and Marysville and issued the pilot a
vector to Marysville. However, the controller never issued a safety or terrain
alert. Within five minutes of the handoff to Oakland Center, the flight
terminated abruptly and the pilot and his passenger were killed.

The NTSB was critical of the controller for not attempting to use nearby
maps to determine the airplane's proximity to terrain, for not attempting to
determine whether the pilot was capable and qualified for IFR flight, and for
the controller's deficient understanding of the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
(MSAW) system.

Pilots need to understand that a functioning autopilot and radar flight
following are not adequate substitutes for instrument flying skills. According
to FAA Order
7110.65, if a pilot is flying VFR and requests radar assistance upon
encountering IFR conditions, controllers are supposed to ask the pilot if
he/she is qualified for and capable of conducting IFR flight, inform the pilot
of airports where VFR conditions are reported, inform the pilot of the
appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude, and furnish a heading
or radial on which the aircraft should climb to reach the appropriate minimum
altitude.

However, we cannot count on receiving even that level of assistance. To
begin with, the provisioning of VFR flight following is on a workload-permitting basis at the controller's discretion. The purpose for the service
is to provide traffic information, not terrain avoidance. The controller's
radar screen does not show terrain (except for prominent landmarks used for
position reporting). In order to determine the locations of higher and lower
terrain, the controller has to retrieve terrain maps and correlate the
aircraft's position on the radar screen with a location on the map.

Depending on the type of facility, the controller will have access to
either the MSAW system or the (less-sophisticated)
Low Altitude Alert System (LAAS). However, both systems are disabled for
participating VFR traffic unless the pilot specifically requests MSAW or LAAS
monitoring. Therefore, the Aeronautical Information Manual (paragraph
4-1-15) specifies that the issuance of a Safety Alert "cannot be
mandated, but it can be expected on a reasonable, though intermittent
basis." In other words, don't count on it.

MISCONCEPTION #2: ATC Will Recognize The Existence Of An
Emergency If You Speak In Urgent Tones

On November 26, 1999, a Beechcraft S35 Bonanza crashed out of control into
a New Jersey residential area following a failure of the turn coordinator and
the horizontal situation indicator. During the four-minute flight, the pilot
exhibited a complete inability to control altitude or turn to or hold assigned
headings and told the controller at least twice, "I have a problem."
The controller never realized that an emergency existed and ineffectually
continued to assign headings and altitudes to the pilot. Sometimes the pilot
responded. Sometimes the pilot did not. Oblivious to what was transpiring in
the cockpit, the controller's last transmission before the plane impacted the
ground at a vertical descent rate of 10,000 FPM was, "niner two mike, I
need to be acknowledged please."

A similar incident occurred on August 13, 1999, after
a Cessna 210
continued VFR flight into IMC conditions and crashed near Mount Pocono, Penn. The pilot was receiving radar traffic advisories from
Wilkes-Barre approach and had been asked to report Mount Pocono airport in
sight. As the airplane passed the airport, the controller asked whether the
airport was in sight. The pilot responded, "No not yet as a matter
<unintelligible> I am in the soup right now." The controller
instructed the pilot to remain VFR and issued a vector back to the airport.
About a minute later, while at 700 feet AGL within 3/4 mile of the airport, the
pilot again stated that he was "in the soup" and asked for the
reported ceiling at the airport. The controller issued another vector to the
airport, but the pilot did not respond and the target disappeared from radar.
When interviewed later, the controller stated that he did not realize that
"in the soup" meant "in the clouds."

Neither of the controllers realized that an emergency existed. In the first
case, the controller failed to recognize the severity of the pilot's
difficulty in controlling the airplane. In the second case, the controller did
not recognize that the VFR pilot had entered instrument conditions. The NTSB
was critical of both controllers for those deficiencies.

The blame doesn't stop there, however. The 3 C's are: Communicate, Confess,
Comply. An in-flight emergency is no time for colloquial speech. It's crunch
time and it should be all business. "I have a problem," should read,
"I have an emergency; I am unable to control the airplane."
"I'm in the soup," should read, "I have an emergency; I am in
the clouds and am not instrument-rated."

Once a controller hears the "E" word, several requirements are
triggered. In the event of a VFR into IMC emergency, the controller is
required to provide "Radar
Assistance" to a pilot not qualified to operate in IFR conditions.
"Radar Assistance" means:

The controller must also inform the pilot of the appropriate
terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude. If the aircraft is below
appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude and the controller is
able to establish the aircraft's location with sufficient accuracy, the
controller is to furnish a heading or radial for the aircraft's climb to the
appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude. (FAA
Order 7110.65, paragraphs 10-2-8,
10-2-9)

The NTSB noted that the same procedures are applicable to instrument
failures in IMC. Unqualified pilots (or qualified pilots with broken
equipment) who find themselves in instrument conditions are entitled to all
that assistance. To receive it, they need only state clearly and unequivocally
the existence and nature of their emergency.

MISCONCEPTION #3: ATC Will Give You The Assistance You
Require If You Make An Obscure Remark and Wink Twice

A number of articles have been written concerning how to get what you want
from ATC, including ways to get what you are not really entitled to without
really asking for it. You're IFR and want to navigate direct to a distant
point using your handheld GPS? Just advise ATC that you have a handheld on
board, ask for a vector to "Remote" intersection, and wink twice.
"Roger Dodger, fly heading two-three-zero, direct "Remote" when
able (in about 100 nm)." Unfortunately, these "tips" for the
devious may lead some pilots to believe that controllers are always "in
the know." They understand what assistance you want or need even if you
don't ask for it straight out. Again, the consequences can be fatal.

A short while later the pilot asked, "what's the bottom of the cloud
layer; we're IFR at this time." Responding to the pilot's oblique request
for a lower altitude, the controller cleared the pilot to descend from FL 230 to 14,000
feet MSL. The controller then handed the pilot off to
another sector and instructed him to advise the new controller if he required
any further assistance. After failing to respond for some time, the pilot
advised, "We're having trouble; I think we're in a spin." Fifteen seconds
later, the pilot stated, "we're back with you" and requested vectors
to Albuquerque.

In his initial communications with Albuquerque Approach, the pilot advised
"we've lost both our vacuum pumps and uh I think we just went through ...
a roll; ...we've got electric driven backup systems uh electric horizon
electric uh compass and they're not uh agreeing with each other at this time
so we're gonna need some help." The controller asked if the pilot could
accept standard right turns for the vectors, and the pilot replied,
"we're gonna need some help." The controller asked the pilot to
start a right standard rate turn and the pilot replied with his final
transmission, indicating that he had lost control of the airplane.

The NTSB was critical of the controllers for failing to understand the
significance of a vacuum pump loss in IMC and for failing to initiate steps to
minimize the pilot's workload under the emergency circumstances. The steps the
controllers should have taken included avoiding assigning turns and frequency
changes, locating areas where VFR conditions existed, assisting the pilot in
establishing the airplane in stable flight, and initiating a surveillance
approach.

The NTSB laid blame upon inadequate training of controllers, specifically
in the areas of aircraft operations and navigation and the possible
consequences of aircraft system and instrument failures. The NTSB also called
upon the FAA to maintain a list of pilot-qualified employees who might provide
valuable assistance to a controller without pilot experience who is handling
an in-flight emergency.

Although the NTSB's call for improvement in the training of controllers is
laudable, the fact is that the responsibility for flying the airplane, even in
the midst of an emergency, rests with the PIC. In the movies there is always
someone on the ground who is more qualified and knowledgeable about the
specific airplane and its systems who can talk the pilot down. In real life,
chances are that there will be no one better situated to address the emergency
than the pilot.

Fly The Airplane — ATC Cannot Fly It For You

It is incumbent upon the PIC to know and understand the airplane's systems,
their failure modes, and the appropriate emergency procedures to follow in the
event of a failure.

It is incumbent upon the PIC to have a general understanding of the weather
all along and adjacent to the route of flight. If a vector to VFR conditions
is an appropriate response to the emergency, the PIC should make that request
and, perhaps, even suggest where VFR conditions may be found.

It is incumbent upon the PIC to understand the various services that
controllers can provide to pilots in the event of an emergency. If a
surveillance approach is an appropriate response to the emergency, the PIC
should make that specific request. It may be that the pilot in this particular
case was truly over his head and unable to further assist himself in
addressing this emergency. However, as pilots, we should strive to do better
than advise ATC that "we're gonna need some help."

As pilots in command, we must also understand that, even if the FAA
augments training procedures as the NTSB has recommended, the controller may
not be up to the task. The PIC must assess the situation, advise ATC of the
emergency nature of the situation, and instruct ATC concerning the steps
necessary to address the situation. You, and only you, can fly the airplane.
ATC cannot do it for you.

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