“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” U.S. v. Olmstead – Justice Brandeis

Impeach Judge Kathleen Pantle

Judges should be impeached when their conduct so intentionally impeads justice and so intentionally violates the Bill of Rights that they bring great disgrace upon the courts and cause great injustice. These impeachable acts are not just a mistake of law, or a judicial error, but rise to the level of intentional, disgraceful, illegal, unconstitutional, acts of harassment, retaliation, bullying, obstruction of justice, and aiding and abetting felony misconduct of prosecutors. These acts have caused great harm to their victims.

I propose that articles of impeachment should be brought against the following judge for the following reasons:

Dishonorable Judge Kathleen Pantle:

Dishon. Judge Pantle purposely violates the Constitution and the laws of both the United States and the country:

1. She issues excessive and unconstitutional bail orders out of spite, animosity, arrogance, narcissism, and deceit, even without a formal charge or due process.

On June 15, 2005 she raised my bail on a fraudulent Medicaid vendor fraud charge, upon a motion from the State for violation of bail, from a $10,000 personal recognizance bail to a $100,000 D-Bond (requires 10% payment) despite the fact she had declared me indigent, I am disabled, I had no criminal record, and I care for an elderly disabled father. I had been jailed wrongfully by Pantle for contempt because I told her she was violating the law and had no jurisdiction in this void case, then politely attempted to walk out of the courtroom to preserve this issue for appeal, particularly because she had sue sponte removed me as pro se counsel and then denied me appointment of a public defender. During incarceration I was attacked by Sgt. Anthony Salemi, who falsified his record and said I attacked him from my wheelchair.

On December 14, 2005 in the same case Dishon. Judge Pantle arrested me executing her arrest warrant illegally issued on December 8, 2005, despite me informing her in writing on December 7, 2005 that I could not come to a court hearing on December 8, 2005 because Federal Judge Filip had scheduled my Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on this criminal contempt case to be heard on that morning, and even told me prior to the hearing informally through his courtroom deputy that another judge would not arrest someone for not appearing as long as they were given notice there was another court hearing. Judge Filip denied my petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. This Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus has now been refiled and is pending before Federal Judge Coar. I had been illegally removed as pro se counsel (self-representation), although declared indigent denied a public defender for 7 months, denied a due process hearing on her statement that she was jailing me because I failed to show up for hearing on December 8, 2005 and because I refused to answer questions at a fitness exam she had ordered although I showed up. It is actually a statutory right for me to refuse to answer questions. I did so in exercising this right because I am adamant that her orders are illegal and without jurisdiction – void ab initio. I refuse to bow to despots. The statute, 725 ILCS 5/104-13, even states that bail may NOT BE REVOKED to accomplish a fitness exam. Her order for a fitness exam was without legal basis – she only said my behavior in court (vigorously defending myself pro se by questioning her lack of jurisdiction) and my copious pleadings (soon to be posted on the web motions to dismiss the case for lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction) suggested a mental unfitness. This statement is NOT a legally sufficient allegation in open court that would justify a fitness exam.

On January 6, 2006 after the Illinois Appellate Court freed me on December 30, 2005 and reduced bail from “no bail” to $10,000 personal recognizance bail, Dishon. Judge Pantle falsely stated on the record, without me in the courtroom and without benefit of counsel that I had lied to the IL Appellate Court to obtain release and then she raised the bail from $10,000 personal recognizance bail to $500,000 D-Bond (10$ cash required to get out). The IL Appellate Court again freed me 2 weeks later, overturning her order.

2. She committed felony conspiracy to violate rights under color of law in conspiring with Bill Bradley, IL State Police Investigator William Reibel, Patrick Keenan, Nicholas Cozzolino, John Fearon, Patrick Murphy, and Judges Kathleen Pantle, Jorge Alonso, and Lon Schultz, as well as other unnamed or unknown individuals to intentionally retaliating against those who are whistle blowers against government corruption in Illinois and Cook County in that she conspired to illegally prosecute providers of mental health services to those on Medicaid so as to deny care for mental health services to those on Medicaid – this is a gross violation of her oath of office in that prosecutions without personal or subject-matter jurisdiction are forbidden;

3. She committed felony violation of civil rights under color of law as above;

4. She committed the act of aiding and abetting felony subornation of perjury by the employees of the IL Attorney General’s Office by failing to hold hearings on my motion to dismiss for fraud upon the grand jury, including the acts by State Police Inv. Reibel in making false statements to the grand juries that indicted Dr. Shelton and Mr. Glass, including false statements about the law and about evidence;

5. She violating her oath of office in allowing the void prosecution of Dr. Shelton and Mr. Glass for Medicaid Vendor Fraud without jurisdiction and in violation of the United States Federal Medicaid Code and the Constitution’s Supremecy Clause, as well as prosecuting these persons when she had evidence they were not guilty of the alleged acts;

6. She committed malicious prosecution against Dr. Shelton and Mr. Glass in that all these persons were whistle blowers against corruption in Illinois government and these fraudulent and malicious prosecutions amounted to retaliation for exposing the criminal conduct of members of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, as well as officials in the City of Chicago, County of Cook, and State of Illinois;

7. She was aiding and abetting the felony violaton of civil rights under color of law by AAGs Fearon, Murray who were and are still grossly violating due process in not only prosecuting these persons without subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but also in doing so in a process indicative of gross prosecutorial misconduct in violating many rights required by due process under the Constitution;

8. She committed the felony federal crime of slavery concerning Dr. Shelton in jailing her without legal process in violation of the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution;

9. She violated her oath of office and snubbed her nose at the Constitution in stating in open court in answer to my concerns about her lack of jurisdiction, “I don’t care,” in open defiance of the rules of law;

10. She gave false information to Judge Alonso , who had taken over the case against me when Judge Pantle was transferred out of the criminal court to the Chancery Division, while in the judge’s chambers behind the bench on April 13, 2007, so that Judge Alonso would again illegally hold me in contempt and summarily jail me – Judge Pantle was “visiting” the courtroom to finish up a few cases and hid herself in Judge Alonso’s chambers during one of my void pre-trial hearings – Judge Alonso, falsely thinking that Judge Pantle understood pro se and contempt issues BLINDLY followed her suggestions and procedures thereby also illegally finding me in contempt in an act of not just judicial stupidity, but also in an unconstitutional act;

11. She committed court ordered elder neglect, in a heartless and unethical act, by not considering my father’s situation and not allowing me to arrange for the care of my disabled father whenever she took me into custody- during May to June 2005 he lost 20 lbs and I found him at home dehydrated and depressed;

12. She ignored the well being and health of a defendant, as well as denied due process, by continuing hearings when I was substantially impaired by an asthma attack and/or dehydration and medical neglect – Cook County Jail staff had withheld my heart and lung medication;

***further details to be added to this post – work in preparation***

I call upon the Illinois House to investigate this matter and consider articles of impeachment. I call upon Chief Judge Evans to remove this incompetent, arrogant, dangerous, witch from the bench before others are harmed.

It is criminal in my opinion that she is now a bond judge in the main criminal court building concerning the most serious felonies in Cook County. Presiding Criminal Court Judge Biebel should be ashamed that he has appointed her to such an important task.

12 Responses to “Impeach Judge Kathleen Pantle”

I’m in front of judge pantle twice a week in my commercial litigation practice. I have always found her to be courteous, respectful, and well reasoned in her opinions and rulings. Additionally, she has the very best clerk in daley center.

George Ryan was also very good at a few things. It didn’t excuse his corruption. Judge Pantle stated when I read her law she was violating “I don’t care”. She was arrogant, intolerant, ignorant of the law, and unethical. She violated her oath of office. She will be held accountable. Probably criminal courts were just not her thing. She had the attitude that the defendant was guilty before they even spoke. She violated the constitution repeatedly including putting my subpoenas on hold for three years until the evidence needed for defense was destroyed. She illegally jailed me repeatedly for contempt and was repeatedly over-ruled by the Appellate Court. She let the case proceed despite a clearly insufficient indictment, supremacy clause violations, and lack of authority of the Attorney General to prosecute the alleged crime. So many of the criminal court judges have these bad attitudes. They essentially refuse to hear the pro se defendant. They are so intolerant and rude to pro se defendants the most, and all defendants in general. Judges should be required to go to school for a year before they take the bench. Most criminal court judges are ignorant of fitness laws. Pantle held up my case for nine months saying she though I was unfit because I defended myself with appropriate legal arguments about lack of jurisdiction! She kept ordering fitness exams 6 times when the psychiatrist’s report said he could not determine fitness because I would not answer his questions. The statutes say she even has to tell the defendant that they have a legal right to refuse to answer questions. The law said she MUST hold a fitness hearing within 45 days of the psychiatrist’s report. You can’t keep ordering fitness exams because you don’t like what the psychiatrist says. The judge during a trial, not the psychiatrist determines fitness. Pantle kept the case going for years without jurisdiction. She should have dismissed the case after listening to my arguments and confirming the case law. Now she must bring a defense attorney to federal court. I sued her. Judges who totally lack jurisdiction in a case lose judicial immunity.

The Illinois MFCU, through the Director of the Illinois State Police, wrote yearly applications to the U.S. DHHS Office of Inspector general for certification (and funding) as a MFCU, which state that the Illinois Attorney General has NO authority or jurisdiction to prosecute Medicaid Fraud and that any evidence of fraud they send to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution. Illinois is one of six states where the State Attorney General has NO jurisdiction or authority to prosecute Medicaid fraud. Only the County States attorney or U.S. Attorney may bring an indictment or prosecute. They admit this in their own words in their application. I asked for the yearly MFCU applications for recertification written by the Illinois MFCU, a section in the IL State Police, from U.S. DHHS and from the Illinois State Police in 2006. The IL State Police refused to give them to me. In Illinois, since the AG cannot prosecute, the MFCU is NOT in the AGs office. IT is in a division in the State Police Department. State police cannot indict or prosecute. They can only investigate. Pres. Bush had instructed departments not to answer FOIA requests. When Pres. Obama came into office, he issued an executive order that departments MUST answer freely FOIA requests. So – in 2010 I received the applications from U.S. DHHS in response to my 2006 FOIA.. You can read the pertinent pages here: http://www.scribd.com/Dr%20Linda%20Shelton/d/54453666-Evidence-Treason-by-Illinois-Attorney-General-Madigan-Illinois-State-Police You can find all the federal codes and state statutes pertaining to all this here: http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6601086736248200894#editor/target=post;postID=625232546894240854

All the case law regarding lack of jurisdiciton of Illinois Attorney General to prosecute Medicaid Fraud is as follows:

ATTORNEY GENERAL WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION TO
INDEPENDENTLY PROSECUTE VENDOR FRAUD

Statutes and case law regarding constitutional and statutory authority of Illinois Attorney General do not allow the Illinois Attorney General to prosecute Medicaid Vendor Fraud without the invitation, consent, or participation of the Cook County State’s Attorney.
The Illinois Constitution, Article V, Section 15 states: “The Attorney General shall be the legal officer of the State, and shall have the duties and powers that may be prescribed by law.”

15 ILCS 205/4 (from Ch. 14, par. 4) states:

“The duties of the Attorney General shall be:
…
Fourth – To consult with and advise the several State’s Attorneys in matters relating to the duties of their office; and when, in his judgment, the interest of the people of the State requires it, he shall attend the trial of any party accused of crime, and assist in the prosecution…
Fifth – To investigate alleged violations of the statutes which the Attorney General has a duty to enforce and to conduct other investigations in connection with assisting in the prosecution of a criminal offense at the request of a State’s Attorney…”

People v. Massarella, 53 Ill. App. 3d 774 (1977)” states:

“Although a court may request that the Attorney General act in place of the State’s Attorney if he is sick, absent, uninterested, or unable to attend, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 14, para. 6 (1973), in the absence of such circumstances, even the court may not substitute one official for the other. Moreover, since the State’s Attorney has the duty to take charge and prosecute all criminal offenses in his county, the attorney general has no power to interfere while that duty is being honestly, intelligently, and carefully discharged.

Nowhere in the Illinois Statutes does it state that an Attorney General may initiate
and pursue a prosecution, independent of the State’s attorney, in a category of crimes not specifically assigned to the Attorney General by Statute, but which falls under the duties of the State’s attorney according to the following Statute:
55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a) states:

“The duty of each State’s attorney shall be: (1) To commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county…”

The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Massarella, 72 Ill.2d 531, 382 N.E.2d 262 (1978), held that the Illinois Attorney General has authority to prosecute any crime with acquiescence of and absent of objection by State’s Attorney. The key is that the state’s attorney had knowledge of the case and actively acquiesced or failed to make an objection. It also held that the Illinois Attorney General has authority to appear before the grand jury without prior approval of the State’s Attorney.
In People v. Buffalo Confectionery Co., 78 Ill.2d 447, 36 Ill.Dec. 705, 401 N.E.2d

546 (1980) the Illinois Supreme Court, under common law, found that “duties of the Attorney General…include the initiation and prosecution of litigation on behalf of the people.” They state that this power “may be exercised concurrently with the power of the State’s Attorney to initiate and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments, and prosecutions in his county as conferred by statute.”
However, they also ruled that the State’s Attorney is the only official whom by statute can initiate and prosecute criminal charges in that county (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 14, § 5) and that the Illinois Constitution gives the Attorney General only the “duties and powers that may be prescribed by law.” They also ruled that the statutes prescribe the Attorney General’s duties to include to “attend…and assist in the prosecution.” (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 14 § 4). Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that:
As we have previously stated, the aforementioned duties and powers of the two officers are concurrent. Thus, the Attorney General lacks the power to take exclusive charge of the prosecution of those cases over which the State’s Attorney shares authority. (People v. Flynn (1941), 375 Ill. 366, 368, 31 N.E.2d 591.) However, where the statute so provides, the Attorney General has exclusive authority to institute and prosecute. See, e.g., Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 120 par. 453.16 (Cigarette Tax Act prosecution); Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch 38, par. 60-6 (Illinois Antitrust Act prosecution). [They explained that since Illinois Revenue Laws do NOT give the Illinois Attorney General exclusive authority to prosecute violation of revenue laws, the Illinois Attorney General may NOT prosecute these violations without the acquiescence of the State’s Attorney – in the revenue violation case in Buffalo Confectionery Co., the State’s Attorney was deemed to have acquiesced because he had been named to the grand jury, he had signed the indictments, he had attended the arraignments and he had filed certain pretrial discovery motions.)

They also found that an indictment is not invalidated because the Illinois Attorney General appears before the grand jury without approval of the State’s Attorney.
The court then stated that there was no statute prescribing the duties of the Attorney General to include prosecuting revenue claims to the exclusion of the State’s Attorney. (People v. Buffalo Confectionery, Co., Ibid at page 549 [4].) Analogously, in the above captioned case, there is no state statute that grants the Attorney General exclusive authority to prosecute cases of CRIMINAL vendor fraud. The statutes do however, proscribe the duties of the Attorney General to include exclusive prosecution of CIVIL vendor fraud. (305 ILCS 5/8A-7I.)
In Buffalo Confectionery, Co. (Ibid at page 548) the court noted that in that case the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) told the grand jury that he had obtained permission of a named Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) to prosecute the case. The named ASA was present at the arraignment and filed a motion for pretrial discovery. The signature of the Cook County State’s Attorney appeared on the indictment. In the case at bar the AAG told the grand jury he had permission of the State’s Attorney, but does not name any such person. The ASA has not appeared at any hearing or before the grand jury in this case and has filed no motions. A signature stamp for SA Richard Divine on the indictment is the only documentation of involvement of the state’s attorney. This signature stamp does not verify that ANY person from the State’s Attorney’s office ever was consulted about this case, was shown evidence about this case, decided what charges should be filed, and consented to the prosecution of this case by the Attorney General with exclusion of ANY involvement of the State’s Attorney in this case.
In Buffalo Confectionery, Co. (Ibid at page 548 and 550) the court noted that there was an “obvious acquiescence by the State’s Attorney”, who was present at the arraignment and made a motion for pretrial discovery. In that case, it was clear that the State’s Attorney had considered the case and had decided to allow the AAG to proceed with prosecution without the ASA.
In, Shelton v. Brown, 126 S.Ct. 51, 163 L.Ed.2d 472, certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed with Cook County State’s Attorney Dick Devine stated in his Illinois Appellate Court response brief page 12,
“It is clear that in Illinois, even the Attorney General, a constitutionally created prosecuting office, cannot invade the exclusive jurisdiction of the State’s Attorney to bring charges absent some evidence of abuse by the state’s attorney, or a conflict of interest.

This issue in this case was whether or not citizens can file criminal complaints with the court clerk, without the approval or signature of police or the state’s attorney. The clerk had refused to accept criminal complaints by Shelton against corrupt State and County officials, including the State’s Attorney and police. The Appellate Court ruled that this refusal was proper and that citizens had no standing to file such complaints. The reasoning agreed with Cook County State’s Attorney Richard Divine who opined that the Attorney General has no statutory authority to indict and prosecute a person absent consent and participation of the State’s Attorney. This is binding precedent, so much so that any criminal prosecution of vendor fraud by the AG is null and void if the AG did not have the invitation, consent, and participation or acquiescence of the SA.
This position was later re-iterated in People v Dosaky, 303 Ill.App.3d 986, 709 N.E.2d 635 Ill.App. 1 Dist., 1999, where the court ruled:
Attorney General lacks the power to take exclusive charge of the prosecution of those cases over which the State’s Attorney shares authority, but is authorized to consult with and advise the several State’s Attorneys and attend the trial of any party accused of a crime and assist in the prosecution.

Illinois statutes and case law are explicit in that an Attorney General, in Illinois, can only initiate and prosecute a criminal offense if they are invited to do so by the states attorney and the states attorney participates at hearings and at trial, if the State’s Attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, taken some initial steps towards prosecution and acquiesces to the Illinois Attorney General prosecuting without the State’s Attorney’s participation, or if statutory authority is granted, as it is in CIVIL prosecution of vendor fraud (after approval by OIG-DHHS), in certain environmental crimes or in certain cases involving drug crimes and other statutorily specified crimes.
Medicaid vendor fraud is not such a special statutory category subject to independent and exclusive prosecution by the Attorney General and cannot be criminally prosecuted by the Illinois Attorney General without the written approval of the OIG-DHHS and the request, and at least initial participation of the States Attorney, after the State’s Attorney has evaluated the evidence and determined which offense with which offender should be charged.
More recently, in People v. Knippenberg, 325 Ill.App.3d 251, 757 N.E.2d 667 Ill. App. 3 Dist., 2001, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the “Attorney General has exclusive authority to initiate and prosecute cases only when a statute so provides.”
The court in People v. Mitchell, 1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 347, 268 N.E.2d 232 states:
It is the responsibility of State’s attorney of county to appraise evidence against accused and determine offense with which he should be charged.

State’s attorney as a representative of the people has responsibility of evaluating evidence and other pertinent factors and determining what offense can properly and should properly be charged.

Therefore, without a specific statute giving the Illinois Attorney General authority to exclusively prosecute criminal Medicaid vendor fraud, the Illinois Attorney General may not prosecute anyone including Defendant in case at bar if there has been no review of evidence by the State’s Attorney, no determination of the charges by the State’s Attorney, no initial participation by the State’s Attorney, and no acquiescence by the State’s Attorney.
Without the authority of the Attorney General to prosecute the charges, the charges were not properly before the court and the case was void ab initio.

She may do all right on commercial litigation, but she committed criminal acts regarding fraudulent prosecution of Medicaid fraud, aiding and abetting federal felony funding fraud by the IL MFCU and IL Attorney General, she violated her oath of office, and her acts amount to what the U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshal defined as felony treason punishable by 20 yrs to life. She should be held accountable.

A state appeals panel on Tuesday upheld the firing of two Chicago police officers who assaulted a man inside a Northwest Side restaurant more than 10 years ago while off-duty.

But the 1st District Appellate Court took the extra step of criticizing Cook County Circuit Judge Kathleen M. Pantle, who ruled in favor of officers Jason Orsa and Brian Murphy, finding their version of events credible despite contrary video evidence.

“Not only does the circuit court disregard the board’s determination that the testimony of the two witnesses was particularly credible and the testimony of the police officers was not worthy of belief, but it also interprets what occurs on the surveillance video in ways that twist the facts and defy reason,” Justice Michael B. Hyman wrote.

“Our careful and close review of the video leaves us dumbfounded by the circuit court’s rejection of the [b]oard’s prima facie true and correct findings,” Hyman added.

The 1st District panel agreed with the Chicago Police Board that Orsa and Murphy — along with their compatriots, Daniel McNamara and Louis Danielson, who are not a party to this case — were not prejudiced by the amount of time it took for police Superintendent Garry McCarthy to bring charges against them.

Additionally, the panel found that the officers’ version of events were not credible in light of witness statements and a videotape of the incident. The video does not feature audio.

But the panel also accused the officers of “stirring prejudices” with their false depiction of Obed DeLeon, the victim of their assault, as flashing gang signs and saying he wants to kill the police.

“Misconduct and manipulation of the sort that occurred here leaves a stain on the good honor of the vast majority of police officers in the department who comport themselves with integrity, dignity, decency and discipline,” Hyman wrote.

The events that occurred at Taco Burrito King during the early morning hours of March 24, 2006, are disputed by DeLeon, witnesses and the videotape, on one hand, and the police officers on the other.

The three police officers were eating their meal with a friend, Matthew Walsh. DeLeon entered the restaurant, asking who had parked a late model Chevrolet Camero in the restaurant’s parking lot in a way that prevented people from entering or leaving the lot.

DeLeon spoke with Shawn Nelson and Joseph Mularczyk, two men whom he didn’t know and were waiting in line for food. DeLeon at one point said, “Yeah, that guy’s an a–hole for parking like that.”

Orsa, Murphy and McNamara were sitting at a table near the counter and near the three other men. Overhearing DeLeon’s comment, DeLeon testified that Orsa replied, “What if I’m that a–hole?” DeLeon and Orsa exchanged words with DeLeon saying, “You need to quit acting like an a–hole and go move your car.”

According to DeLeon and the two other men, Murphy pulled out his gun and aimed it at DeLeon. Orsa, McNamara and Walsh surrounded DeLeon and began beating him while Nelson and Mularczyk took refuge in the restaurant’s kitchen, where they watched the encounter.

Witnesses said that at no point did the officers identify themselves as police officers.

When other on-duty police officers arrived, they arrested DeLeon. Nelson and Mularczyk testified that they tried to tell the officers what happened, but Danielson ordered the men arrested, saying “[A]rrest these two for being in the wrong place at the wrong time.”

Nelson and Mularczyk were charged with assaulting Walsh, even though the video shows the two men were not involved in the fight. Those charges were dropped when Walsh did not appear in court for Nelson and Mularczyk.

Orsa, Murphy and McNamara left the restaurant that night without giving a statement to their fellow officers and never filed a report about the incident, a violation of department policy. The only interaction that occurred was a brief conversation between the group and one of the responding officers.

The police officers alleged that DeLeon walked in the restaurant, flashing gang signs, saying he was a gangster and talked about wanting to kill police officers.

DeLeon threatened the officers, who described themselves as jumping into action to restrain DeLeon and prevent him from attacking others.

DeLeon filed a complaint a few days later; the Independent Police Review Authority completed its investigation in 2009. In July 2010, the superintendent recommended the firing of Murphy and Orsa to the police board.

Murphy and Orsa were charged with violating a host of rules, including discrediting the department, maltreating a person while off duty and failing to report improper conduct.

The panel mentioned that charges were also brought against McNamara and Danielson, but it does not go into detail what happened with their cases. Although not a police officer, Walsh participated in the proceedings.

Before the police board, Murphy and Orsa argued the superintendent’s filing of charges were time-barred, and they were prejudiced by the late filing.

The board weighed the testimony of the officers versus the testimony of DeLeon, Nelson and Mularczyk. Reinforcing DeLeon’s version of events was a restaurant security guard who said DeLeon never threatened the police officers as well as a video that showed the officers assaulting DeLeon.

In January 2011, the board found Murphy and Orsa guilty of breaking department rules and fired them. They determined DeLeon and the other witnesses were more credible than the officers, whose testimony they described as “false and unbelievable.”

In particular, the board found the decision of the officers to not report what had happened to the department or give a statement as “ ‘seriously undermin[ing] the credibility of their testimony.’ ”

The board also described Walsh as an “incredible” witness; he testified that he was attacked by Nelson Mularczyk when in fact the video showed no one touched him.

In March 2011, Murphy and Orsa sought an administrative review in Cook County Circuit Court.

Pantle in March 2012 reversed the board’s decision, finding that they were prejudiced by the superintendent’s delayed finding.

She also credited the officers’ testimony over the others — she noted that DeLeon was a four-time convicted felon. Pantle also found that the video corroborated the officers’ testimony.

Pantle ordered the officers be reinstated. Up until the 1st District panel’s ruling, Orsa and Murphy were still with the Chicago Police Department.

The 1st District panel reversed Pantle. The justices noted there is nothing in municipal and state law that time-barred the superintendent’s filings.

In particular, the panel found, that despite their claim, Murphy and Orsa did not prove how they were prejudiced by the delayed filing of the charges.

Murphy and Orsa claimed that Nelson’s and Mularczyk’s testimony was biased because they were upset over their arrest, but the panel found that the video and the testimony of the security verified Nelson and Mularczyk’s version of events.

The panel also agreed with all of the police board’s findings. In particular, the panel pointed to the videotape; if DeLeon was really making these threats out loud, no one in the restaurant heard it.

“The officers’ reactions and the reactions of other patrons are inconsistent with their contention that DeLeon threatened them or they feared he might have a gun and harm them,” Hyman wrote.

The panel found that, based on the rule violations, the board had the authority to fire Murphy and Orsa.

Orsa was represented by James P. Nally of James P. Nally P.C. He declined to comment.

Murphy was represented by Terence P. Gillespie and Michael P. Gillespie of Gillespie & Gillespie. They did not return a request for comment.

They were also represented by Ruth F. Masters, of the Oak Park-based Masters Law. She was appointed special assistant corporation counsel for this case. Masters declined to comment, deferring any questions to a city Law Department spokesman.

A city Law Department spokesman did not return a request for comment on the current employment status of Orsa and Murphy.

Justices P. Scott Neville Jr. and John B. Simon concurred with the opinion.

The case is Jason Orsa, et al. v. The Police Board of the City of Chicago, et al., 2016 IL App (1st) 121709